YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
III II Jill I IN

3 9002 06126 5717

A.

EXPOSITION

CAUSES AND THE

UK

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE

SUBSEQUENT! Y T& THEIR

Adjustment by ARBiTRATlOjNf.

LIVERPOOL:
MITCHEU, HEATON..AND MITCHELL, PRINTERS, DUKE. STREET.
:''r?V ' ,a ' 1839;' ." * "

EXPOSITION

THE CAUSES AND THE CONSEQUENCES

BOUNDARY DIFFERENCES,

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES,

SUBSEQUENTLY TO THEIR ADJUSTMENT BY ARBITRATION.

> I -

" THE TRANQUILLITY OF THE PEOPLE, THE SAFETY OF STATES, THE HAPPINESS OF THE HUMAN RACE, DO NOT
ALLOW THAT THE RIGHTS, FRONTIERS, SOVEREIGNTY, AND OTHER POSSESSIONS OF NATIONS, SHOULD
REMAIN UNCERTAIN, SUBJECT TO DISPUTE, AND EVER READY TO OCCASION BLOODY WARS. "— V attel't Law of Nations.
" MAY WE GIVE THEM AS LITTLE CAUSE AS POSSIBLE TO RECOLLECT THAT THEY ARE NOT BRITISH SUBJECTS."—
Townsend— 1783.

ADDKESSED TO
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SHEFFIELD,
12th APRIL, 1839.

NOT PUBLISHED.

LIVERPOOL:
PRINTED BY MITCHELL, HEATON, AND MITCHELL, DUKE STREET.

Copy of a Resolution passed at a Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, held at the
Cutler's Hall.

Sheffield, March 26th, 1839.
Resolved,
That this Meeting regards the settlement of the question of the North-east
Boundary Line, still pending between this Country and the United States, as of vital
importance to the commercial interest of both Countries ; and that the Secretary be
requested to write to David Urquhart, Esq., soliciting his views upon this interesting
and important subject ; especially with reference to the rights of Great Britain, and the
effect which the non-settlement of this question may have upon our Trade.

Sheffield, March Vlth, 1839.
Sir, Annexed I hand you copy of a Resolution passed unanimously at a
Meeting of our Chamber of Commerce. The importance which the North-east Boundary
Line has now assumed, and the great difficulty of forming a correct opinion upon it in
the present state of the case, has impelled us to seek at your hands, that information
by which we can the better understand its bearings.
Knowing as we do, the amplitude of your" information on all diplomatic questions
and international affairs, we hope you will pardon this trespass upon your time. The
great willingness with which you entered into many subjects of deep interest in a com
mercial and national point of view, when we had the pleasure of seeing you here, em
boldens us to take this step.
Hoping that your health is sufficiently restored as to enable you, without the liability
of further injury, to comply with our request,
I beg to subscribe myself,
Sib,
Your very faithful and obedient servant,
CHARLES CONGREVE,
Secretory.
To David Urquhart, Esq.

Speke Hall, April 12th, 1839.
Sir, My delay in acknowledging the receipt of the Resolution of the Chamber
of Commerce of March the 26th, and in replying to your letter of the 27th, has been
occasioned by my immediate and entire application to the task you have assigned me.
The Papers presented to Parliament, have been so arranged, the Diplomatic trans
actions so adjusted, and the Documents so worded, that it has been a task of no
ordinary difficulty to arrive at the simple facts ; and still more difficult to render them
intelligible, to make them clear, and to prove them true.
The best consideration which I have been enabled to give to the subject, has brought
me to the conclusion, that the complications and dangers of this question spring solely
from the non-execution of the Award pronounced by the King of. Holland ; to accept
which, both Nations were, and are, bound; — no international, act having abrogated its
authority. It appears to me that I have satisfactorily established, the following points : —
That there has been a settled purpose on the part of the British Minister to set aside
the Award ; and, consequently, to disguise the truth, and to falsify the facts : —
That not to have exacted and enforced the execution of the Award, after its adoption
by the British Crown, was a dereliction of duty, — a violation of the nation's rights ; it
was to degrade the dignity of the Crown, and to involve this Empire in difficulty and
danger : —
That this neglect has resulted, not from culpable negligence, but from criminal
intention, exhibited in a variety of circumstances, extending over a series of years : —
That the enforcement of the Award is now the only admissible ground of
adjustment : —
That to abandon the Award, is to sacrifice our public rights and national honour ;
and to fulfil and accomplish the scheme of foreign hostility, of which the Secretary
for Foreign Affairs has been the agent.
If the Award of the King of Holland is binding on Great Britain and the United
States ; if its fulfilment (were it not binding,) is the only practicable settlement : then
it is imperative on the nation to arrest any attempt at a new arbitration.
The convictions which I state now, when collision is imminent, I' have already
stated at Sheffield. Long before the occurrence of the events which have directed
your attention so intently and painfully to 'Boundary " differences," I have pointed out
that question as the most alarming, and that transaction as the most disgraceful, in the
wide range of our dangers and our dishonour.
That it required an armed assault by one of the States of the American Union, to
call any attention to such a subject in the Parliament or the Nation, is the amplest
proof of the negligence that prevails — of the disasters which that negligence may pro
duce, and the ruin it must ultimately entail.
By the disregard of the mercantile class for all that nations have hitherto deemed
prudent and considered just, the public service of this constitutional . state has been
reduced to a position, in which a negligent or a criminal Minister has only to sacrifice a
British interest, to secure the support of every foreign influence hostile to Great Britain.

He secures also the support of the party to which he belongs, by committing it to a
false line: — he is secure of the silence of the party to which he is opposed, from igno
rance of facts and consciousness of error.
In regard to this question, the party in power is committed through the Foreign
Minister; — the party in opposition is committed through the misconception of the
question when in office in 1835 ; — the third party has expressed in both Houses the
doctrine, that the claims of Great Britain are unjust. No one, in either House, was
found to contradict this assertion, except the Minister by whom the facts had been
misrepresented. The rights secured to Great t Britain by treaty, the result of triumphs on land
and sea, bought by British blood, and purchased by two thousand millions of
treasure, are an inalienable portion of our national and individual property. They are
beyond all other rights ; they are our existence as a nation and a name. The abandon
ment of any one of these, touches the honour and the welfare, the poHtical independence,
and the individual possessions, of each member of the State ; it is treason to the Nation,
the Constitution, and the Throne.
The integrity of our national rights is the source of prosperity — the basis of
security — the bond of Government — the condition of allegiance. Bankruptcy, war,
convulsion, and disloyalty, are the results of the infraction of treaties, — of the dishonour
to that which is the personification of our unity, the expression of our rights, the
emblem of our power, the record of our fathers, and the promise to our sons, — our
National Flag.
The recollection of the interesting days I spent at Sheffield, and of the zealous and
enthusiastic adoption there by the leading men of all parties — of British and National
interests, leads me to feel no small gratification in addressing to the Chamber of Com
merce of that Town, this exposition of a Question, which I conceive dangerous, only
because misrepresented, and a correct comprehension of which is a duty in every Briton
— a duty to America as well as to England — to mankind as well as to his country.
I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your obedient, humble servant,
D. URQUHART.
To CHARLES CONGREVE, Esq.
Secretary to ihe Chamber of Commerce, Sheffield.
P. S. Applications on the same subject' having reached me from other quarters, I
have thought it better (as well as from its length) to send you my Analysis in a printed
form. The shortness of time, my seclusion here, and consequent inability to refer to
authorities, have been serious obstacles to the elucidation of this subject; and I
have from the first cause also to apprehend repetitions and omissions.

CONTENTS.
PART I.
STATE OF THE QUESTION, BEFORE REFERENCE TO THE KING OF HOLLAND  5
PART II.
THE RECEPTION OF THE AWARD OF THE KING OF HOLLAND IN ENGLAND AND IN AMERICA, AND
THE MEASURES THEREUPON ADOPTED BT THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
UNITED STATES  15
PART III.
OUTRAGES COMMITTED BT SUBJECTS AND SUBORDINATE AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES
AGAINST THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH CROWN  35
PART IV.
DOUBLE INSTRUCTIONS OF LORD PALMERSTON, AND CONSEQUENT REJECTION OF THE AWARD BY
• THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES  '. 43
PART V.
COURSE OF NEGOCIATIONS SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE REJECTION OF THE AWARD BY THE UNITED
STATES  57
Objections to the Award of the Ring of Holland  72
Project of a New Commission  74
PART VI.
RECAPITULATION— VIOLATION OF NATIONAL COMPACT— BETRAYAL BY THE FOREIGN SECRETART OF
THE PUBLIC INTERESTS— HIS ASSUMPTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL POWER— ONLT REMEDY,
IMPEACHMENT  75
PART VII.
CONSEQUENCES, TO EUROPE AND AMERICA, OF THE ABANDONMENT OF THE AWARD  79
APPENDIX; (PART I.):—
Extract from the Fourth Article of the Treaty of Ghent, (1814.)  i.
Extracts from a Convention between His Britannick Majesty and the United States of America,
relative to the reference to arbitration of the disputed points under the fifth arti
CLE of the Treatt of Ghent. Signed at London, September 29, 1827  i.
Extracts from the Award of the King of Holland  ii.
APPENDIX; (PART IV.):—
Correspondence between Lord Palmerston and Charles Bankhead, Esq  i ii .—vi.
Debates in the House of Commons on the North-East Boundary, from 1831 to 1837. — (Extracted
from the Mirror of Parliament)  vi .-x.
Merits of the Boundary Question. — (Extracted from the Albion New York Paper, March, 1839  xi.
Extracts from Channing's Letter on the Annexation of the Texas  xiv.

ERRATUM.
Page 19, Line 13,  For " concluding " — read " contending ".

PART I.

STATE OF THE QUESTION BEFORE REFERENCE TO THE
KING OF HOLLAND.

" The American Commissioners have enriched the English Dictionary with new terms and phrases — reciprocal
advantage, for instance, means the advantage of one of the parties ;— and a regulation of boundaries, — accession of
territory."— Lord Stormont, 1783.

By the treaty signed in Paris, in 1783, between Great Britain SSS"* SL
and the United States, by which the independence of these States
and their sovereignty were recognized, a Boundary Line was fixed,
separating from the United States the possessions still remaining
to Great Britain in North America. In the adjustment of this
frontier, between the Atlantic Ocean and the Connecticut River,
the physical features of the country were so vaguely and erroneously
laid down, that it was found impracticable to trace a frontier
that should coincide with the constructive line of the Treaty, and
the (assumed) natural features of the country, constituting points in
that line. This region, however, being at the time uninhabited, little in
terest was excited with regard to the territory in dispute, or the
claims in abeyance. The astute and resolute representatives of
America, who, in the framing and interpreting of treaties, in assert
ing or in infringing rights, have so invariably profited by the loss of
this country, had succeeded it would appear in introducing into the ggy**
original treaty an intentionally faulty definition of localities,* con- stall'
* " Language cannot be found too condensed and severe to characterize the terms of the
first Provisional Treaty of Peace in 1783. Mr. Oswald, our Plenipotentiary, who adjusted it
with Franklin and Jay, after his return to England, and when waited upon by the Merchants of
London, that they might inform him of the concessions and sacrifices he had made, both confessed
his ignorance, and wept, it is said, over his own simplicity." — Young's " North American
Colonies," page 29.
" Mr. Oswald — that extraordinary Geographer." — Lord Stormont.
B

part of the United

vinced that all ambiguity would be resolved in their favour, and that
every shock would tend to weaken the fabric of Britain's remaining
power in America, to the benefit of the young and ambitious Union.
With such expectations, — such confidence in their own powers, and
justifiable contempt for the diplomatists opposed to them, ambiguity
and incorrectness in the wording of the Treaty, became a primary
and a paramount object to the United States, presenting as it did
the means of realising, cautiously and systematically, results which
successful war could scarcely have secured.
puteTTfrrUo^ The region, throughout which was pretended to be found, or
sought to be established, by either party, the limits of their territory,
as defined by 'the treaty of 1783, extended over no less a space
than five degrees of latitude, and four of longitude : an amount
of no less than twenty millions of acres of rich and fertile soil, well
watered and admirably situated, was claimed by each of the parties;
the claim of the British being at one time carried as far as the
Kenebec, and that of the United States to within ten miles of St.
Lawrence on the north-west, and to the St. John's on the east.
Between the peace of 1783, and 1812, negociations had been carried
on between the two governments; and a gradual retrocession of
the claims of Great Britain took place, until they were confined
within their present limit. The United States, on the other hand,
abandoned its pretensions to the St. John's ; but maintained, to their
fullest extent, its claims to the north and west. There was thus
left in dispute, a territory amounting to eleven millions of acres,
but cutting deeply into the English possessions, and intercepting
the communication between Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton.
SrSnoyer Over this territory, which had now become partially occupied bv
the whole. . . ",..,.. „ „. . J r J
British subjects, the jurisdiction of Great Britain was established —
it had never been questioned, nor ceased to be exercised.
During the war between England and America, the Americans
did not take possession of this territory ; and it remained at the
peace as it formerly did, — in occupation of Great Britain, (so far as
occupation extended), and under her jurisdiction.
At the peace between the two countries, England— having then
triumphed in Europe, and having the full power of her naval and
military resources available for the contest with America, if she had
chosen to prolong it — generdusly proffered peace; and heedlessly

tri-
the Uni
ted' States at the

made it upon conditions, which, in every instance, seemed only
intelligible by the triumph of America, and the defeat of England.
America had declared war against England, in consequence of ^J^ra
a disputed right of search, to recover her seamen, and of other no vL^fisu.
less grave subjects of difference, arising, not out of counter pre
tensions, or hostile interests, on the part of the two countries, but
being merely consequences of the exercise of England's belliger
ent rights. Peace was signed, without the settlement of any one icearopennhewar
of those questions, which induced the United States to declare
war against this country — and which, therefore, must revive, when
England has again recourse to the same measures. The conse
quence of leaving these questions unsettled was the certainty of a
war between England and America, on an occurrence of a war
between England and any other power. Thus, hostility of inten
tions and interests, came to be introduced into the relations of these
powers, by the existence of cause for future collision. And as,
under these circumstances, the certainty of rupture with the United
States, in case of England being involved in any European war,
was a heavy drawback on England, and a serious blow to her
consideration, — so it was, in a proportionate degree, a national gain
and a diplomatic triumph for the United States.
The United States further acquired the right of free traffic with **?**¦ st?-*^ «-
1 O quire the freedom
our eastern possessions, whilst she obtained from England the formal oreaSain^
surrender on her part of all right to traffic with the Indian tribes ^AnS^in-
throughout those regions designated as being under the "jurisdic
tion of the United States " !
The United States further obtained from England those rights united states ob-
O O tain relaxation of
of navigation, subsequently known under the designation of reci- NaTigation Laws-
procity treaties ; and it is singular, that whilst England withheld
such rights from all other powers, she yielded them to the United
States without an effort. When she did subsequently grant them to
the Northern Powers, .it was as it were by compulsion, — and the
concession gave rise to great and not yet quieted exasperation and
opposition. These concessions made to America passed in perfect
silence. Another triumph for America was secured in negociation, in obtain indemnity
J- O ' for slaves.
an enormous sum paid by Great Britain, as an Indemnification for

8
runaway Slaves, in consequence of the ambiguous wording of the
Treaty*
obtain rights to ln the treaty of 1783, England had made to America, on the
Fisheries, injuri- J 7 O
Zander ct subject of fisheries, concessions the most unwarrantable and the
most unjust;— it was expected, alike in England and in the
Colonies, that at a peace signed under circumstances apparently
so favourable to England, these obnoxious concessions should be
set aside, and that the right of fishing on their own coasts should
be granted to the North American subjects of Great Britain,
so as to put them on a footing with the inhabitants of all the other
shores of the ocean, and the subjects of every other crown. But
interests and rights were alike disregarded; and a negociation,
conducted in secret, ended in the Convention of 1818, by which
still larger concessions were made to the Americans, and greater
sacrifices imposed on the Colonies of Great Britain: — nor was it
enough that stipulations so disadvantageous should have been
mSlpriviie^ signed; even the remaining restrictions imposed upon the Americans
^aTimphun1trte have been broken and infringed, with the most perfect impunity,
from the signing the treaty, up to the present hour.-f
Such being the superiority of the American diplomatists
over those of Great Britain ; in proportion to the ambiguity and the
difficulty of a question, would be the chances of American triumph
and British discomfiture. At a period when England had the
power (physical I mean, of course, for England seems incapable of
using or comprehending any other) of enforcing on the United

* England and the United States having agreed to refer the differences arising, as to the true
meaning of the 1st Article of the Treaty of Ghent, to the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, a
Convention between Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, was signed on the 12th July,
1822, at St. Petersburgh, whereby a Joint Commission was established for settling the value of
slaves, and for carrying into effect the Award. The Convention was signed — Charles Bagot,
Nesselrode, Capo-d'Istrias, Henry Middleton.
The amount fixed was, I believe, about £500,000. England instantly submitted to the
Award. The Emperor Alexander employs less formal expressions than those used by the King
of the Netherlands. He says, " Invite par la Grande Bretagne et les Etats Unis d'emettre une
opinion comme Arbitre dans les differends, &c. L'Empereur considerant, &c. est d'avis."
f A Committee of the House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, appointed in 1837, to inquire
into the Fisheries, in commencing their Report, state that it " exhibits a melancholy picture of
the evil consequences flowing from the indiscreet negociation between Great Britain and the
United States of America; and the flagrant violations of subsisting Treaties by the citizens of
the latter, and the necessity of promptly repelling suck invasion of our inherent rights."

sue.
all

biter.

¦9
States her own conditions, and compelling submission to any terms,
the United States extorted from and bound England to concessions Sf8^
and terms which no other nation would have yielded, . save to a SS"StSS'of
J * the Boundary.
conqueror. In regard to the disputed territory, what did the United
States seek — what did they extort ? They sought for nothing more
than the terms of the Treaty q/*1783. These terms were sufficiently
ambiguous and incorrect: they had nothing further to desire.
A limit however was placed to the indefinite prolongation of ^Uf^f:
the dispute, by a stipulation that, in the event of differences arising
between the Commissioners appointed on both sides for the purpose
of laying down the Boundary, such differences should be sub
mitted to an Arbiter, whose decision should be final and conclusive.
In settling the Western Boundary, the two Governments com
pletely overlooked the natural features of the country. The words
of the treaty of 1783, " by a line to be drawn from thence to the
" River Mississipi," are not admitted as requiring that the Mississipi
should be a point in the frontier ; yet the Mississipi is not a doubt
ful geographical fact ; — whereas, in that part of the Boundary
which was kept open to dispute, the terms of the treaty of 1783,
"the north-west angle of Nova Scotia," which is not a natural
feature, and not an ascertained point in geography, is again re
asserted, and re-committed to treaty stipulation, as the only ground
of settlement. That is, the Treaty, where clear,* is at once set
aside ; where confused and impracticable, insisted upon as if a
people's existence were at stake.
I refer to these, to shew that in every stage of the proceed
ings, and on every point where the interests of the two countries
were at variance, the American diplomatists gained the advan
tage; that in fact they proceeded in a systematic and consecu
tive course of aggression — but proceeded with as much caution
as determination : decided, when seeing their antagonist waver ;
cautious and reserved, whenever the suspicion of England became
awakened. No less patient in waiting their time, than dexterous
in seizing their opportunity, we find them, throughout fifty years,
re-appearing with new forms, and speaking in altered tones,
but returning always to the point where they had left off, and
* The adoption of the Mississipi would have greatly extended the British possessions.
C

Convention of
Sept. 29, 1827.

10
resuming the thread where it appeare.d to be broken. Such their
confidence in their own superiority, that it seems to them a triumph
to create grounds of difference !
The treaty of Ghent, in 1814, having thus sent England and
America back to their old disputes of thirty years, new negociations
were opened, and commissioners were again appointed ; — the result
of which was the same confusion as before, and both parties found
themselves as far as ever from any hope or chance of settlement.
But the extension of occupation throughout the disputed district,
and the consequent prospect of inevitable collision between the
two nations, induced the Cabinet of Great Britain to look more
seriously upon this matter; and, armed as it was, by the treaty of
Ghent, with the power of referring the matter, in case of sub
sequent differences, to the final decision of a Sovereign Arbitrator,
it required from the American Government the execution of that
stipulation. To prevent the possibility of further misintelligence,
difference, delay, or negociation, a formal Convention was entered
into by the two parties, on the 29th September, 1827, establishing
with forethought, and defining with minuteness, the conditions
according to which the litigation before the Sovereign Arbitrator
was to be carried on, and solemnly binding both nations to
adopt, " as final and conclusive," the decision of the Arbiter,
and to carry it " without reserve into immediate effect."
S^ttJcori Under this Convention new commissioners were appointed by
both Governments, and the whole of the facts and arguments were
resumed on both sides ; these statements, with a single rejoinder
from either party, were to constitute the documents to be laid
before the Arbiter. The statesmen in England more particularly
interested in bringing about this settlement, were Mr. Canning,
Lord Aberdeen, and Mr. Charles Grant (now Lord Glenelg); while
the reclassification of the documents, and the preparation of the case
to be submitted to the Arbiter, were confided to the zeal and
ability of three of the most distinguished (or rather the three most
distinguished) names in British diplomacy.*
On the 10th January, 1829, the documents were presented
»
* Mr. Addington drew up the first document : Sir Stratford Canning the second, Sir C,
Vaughan was Minister at Washington. #

vention.

11

to the King of Holland, the selected Arbiter, and on the 10th llnfc?™
^~^ as .Arbiter ^^ His
January, 1831, the King of Holland communicated to the Pleni- *>***>**•
potentiaries of both the contending parties, at the Hague, his
final Award.
The only point secured by England in 1814 against the un
bounded concessions made to the United States, was, the stipulation
to refer the Boundary differences to arbitration. Thirteen years,
however, were suffered to elapse before any steps were taken in ful
filment of that stipulation. I am inclined to attribute the fact of
the Reference to arbitration to the new and powerful position
assumed by Great Britain, when she possessed a man of genius for
a Minister. From a people so grasping as those of the United
States, to obtain a right, seems to be the gaining of a victory : for a
nation so heedless as Great Britain not to sacrifice a contested
point, is" a thing requiring explanation, and only to be accounted
for by the extraordinary circumstance of a British Minister direct
ing his attention to interests, unconnected with Party.
Thus was settled a question, which in importance is second to I^S™* ofthe
none as affecting the interests or the destiny of this country. Thus
was settled a question, which, in difficulty and complication — in the
extent of time over which the negotiations had extended — in the
natural and artificial obstacles attending its adjusting — exceeds that
of any negotiation upon record of ancient or modern times. Thus
was concluded a negotiation, in which the diplomatic ability of
Great Britain was exhibited in a light no less novel than brilliant ;
and no less advantageous to the Public, than creditable to the men
by whom it had been effected.
The practical results of this decision were as follows : two- **&*<«>¦ of ae
J. Territory,
thirds of the disputed Territory were awarded to America, and
one-third to Great Britain : that is to say, that of the Territory
originally in dispute, and of the Treaty of 1783, little more than
one-seventh fell to the share of Great Britain.
It might therefore be supposed that England had no grounds
of congratulation upon the amount of soil which fell to her share.
But it is to be observed, that the obi eet of the United States was to consequences of
. . ,. this adjustment
keep the question open, and, by keeping it open, to have the power
of constant action upon our North American Colonies, and of
diplomatic communion and concert with every European power in

12
any degree unfriendly to Great Britain; that thence accrued a
continuous source of irritation in America against Great Britain—
of agitation in the North American possessions of Great Britain—
and combinations of an unfriendly nature, and a secret character, in
the Cabinets of Europe : that America, pressing, in her gradual
growth, at once upon the disputed territory, and upon the Colonies
of Great Britain ;— menacing, from her position,— and intent, through
her spirit of acquisitiveness; — became from year to year more capable
of injuring, and more disposed to injure ; and, consequently, that,
collision being the ultimate point to which this progression could only
tend, the question of collision between Great Britain and America
was one which it became the duty of every European Cabinet to
examine : and, being satisfied thereof, that conclusion remained an
element of their own calculations, and a condition of their policy.
The whole of these complications and dangers were at once
swept away by the decision of the King of Holland ; and that
decision, opening a prospect of harmony and good-will between
the cognate races of the United States and Great Britain, placed
England immediately in a new attitude, and a new position, as re
gards the Powers of Europe, and, by assuring the concord, in peace
and harmony, of the maritime Powers of the two hemispheres, the
aggressive projects of the territorial empires of the North and West
received such a check, and so great a discouragement, as to promise
a long continuance of peace in Europe.
By the award of the King of Holland, England obtained that
northernmost portion of the disputed territory which was necessary
to secure her position in the Canadas, and to connect her various
possessions in North America ; while America, obtaining the largest
share of that which she coveted, — Land, had every reason to remain
satisfied with the decision. By the fact of the settlement, and by the
strengthening of the British frontier, the temptations were removed
for those projects of aggression, which, at that period, the majority
of her people, and the most enlightened of her statesmen, depre
cated and disavowed ; and which endangered her own prosperity,
and her political existence, in the chances of future collision with
Great Britain.
ofTil'S'pSd! This award of the King of Holland is now a matter of treaty
^gon io par- s^pU]ati0Ilj ^y. which England is bound. Although during eight

13
years the British Minister for Foreign Affairs has in his communica
tions with the United States characterized that obligation as not
binding — although he declares it in his dispatches to be set aside by
the British Government — yet, as no formal international act has
abrogated the convention of 1827, by which the decision of the
Arbiter is established as finally and unreservedly binding on both
parties, I conceive that the Award of the King of Holland is so
binding, and that it constitutes at this hour one of the treaty
obligations and rights of Great Britain.

PART II.

RECEPTION OF THE AWARD OF THE KING OF HOLLAND IN
AMERICA, AND MEASURES THEREUPON ADOPTED BY THE
GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES.

" I HOPE, SIR, WHEN THOSE PAPERS ARE PRODUCED, THAT THEIR CONTENTS WILL NOT BE PARTIAL,
MEAGRE, AND UNSATISFACTORY— THAT THEY WILL NOT BE CONFINED MERELY TO THE CORRESPONDENCE
OF THE NEGOCIATING PARTIES, BUT THAT THEY WILL INDICATE THE VIEWS AND POLICY OF GOVERN
MENT, DURING THE WHOLE OF THAT LONG AND IMPORTANT TRANSACTION.— Lord Palmerston, Feb. bth, 1830.

On the 10th January 1831, the King of Holland declared his
Award, and officially communicated it to both governments through
their representatives at the Hague. It is impossible to speak of ^7™/'
this document without saying that the King of Holland, by the
labour he had bestowed on the investigation of this involved and
intricate question, and by the ability and judgment he displayed in his
subdivision of the question, and his decision upon it, is entitled to
the gratitude of the interested parties. Never was award delivered
in so explicit and detailed a form — never was an award so fortified
by the statement of grounds of decision against the doubts of
ambiguity or the suspicion of partiality;— and, in taking this
unusual line, of detailing his grounds of decision, he probably was
influenced by the apprehension that, being at the' moment threatened
by the fleets of one of the parties, he might have been suspected of
vindictiveness against that party, and partiality towards the other.
It appears by the official papers lately published, that the ASSentofEngiand
A A •> A 1 J ± ' communicated i .
adhesion of Great Britain to this Award was finally expressed to King
the King of Holland so soon as it reached this country; but the
first public »notice of this event, so important to Great Britain,
occurred in the House of Commons on the 14th of February of the
same year. It had become public that this question had been finally
settled, and that the Award of the King of Holland had been

communicated to
of Holland.

16
rendered. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was questioned
HoSse "f^com- on tne subject, and the decision was asked for. The Foreign Minister,
however, refused to give any information, or to produce any papers.
This first step will perhaps be considered, by men of business,
conclusive, as to the character of the whole transaction. An arbi
tration is concluded, and being formally accepted by one of the
parties, is binding on both; it is a compact settled, a contract
signed. The refusal to state the fact — to produce the decision — is,
on the part of the Secretary of State, a contradiction of the final
character of the transaction, and is an invitation to the adverse
party to refuse its assent, if so disposed. It is further fearfully
compromising the dignity of the country, by refusing to produce,
on the score of unconcluded negociation, the decision which the
Crown had already declared to be final. It reveals, from the earliest
period of this transaction, (which indeed takes its origin from the
settlement of the question), that the real views of the Foreign Se
cretary were at variance with the ostensible policy and objects
avowed by the State.
AssentofEngiand The second consideration that presents itself is, that his Britannic
notcommumcated -I
state!?6 United Majesty officially announces to the King of Holland his acceptance
of the Award ; but makes no such communication to the President
of the United States. It was however not less essential to make such
a communication to the latter, than to the former ; — indeed, much
more so, — and the neglect of such a step was in fact a virtual con
tradiction of the communication made to the King of Holland : for
negligence could not be admitted as an explanation, nor " pressure of
other business" as a pretext, for the omission of so important a duty.
From the relative geographical positions of the Hague, London, and
Washington, it became, on that ground alone, the part of the British
Minister to take the initiative ; and the American Government must
have expected to receive the formal communication from the British
Government, together with the decision itself. Moreover, the
whole course of the proceedings of the United States having been
directed to keep this question undecided, and that of Great Britain,
to bring about a decision, — silence on its part at this moment could
not fail to be interpreted as a proof that some secret influence in
England paralyzed the action of its government, and favoured the
hostile views and pretensions* of the United States.

17
We must now turn to the steps taken by the American Go- ^z^wL
vernment. It is probably known to the reader that the State of Maine was Dispositions and
J. ¦/ ^ ^ interests of the
more particularly interested in this matter, — that it had pronounced state of Main&
the most decided opinion respecting it, — that the value of the pro
perty it aimed at acquiring was then estimated at .£3,000,000, — that
grants of this land had been made, and that many individuals, and
some of the most influential in the United States, were deeply in
terested, in a pecuniary point of view, in the acquisition of this #
property, — that the State of Maine had already attempted to ex
ercise jurisdiction and to locate townships, and that the central
Government had already connived at the assumption of unconsti
tutional powers by the State of Maine, as appearing to lead to the
further embarrassment of the negociations, and the advancement of
the American pretensions.
It is further to be remarked that, during the negociations at M^f^l*
the Hague, the individual selected by the United States as its re- SfMiSttefat'
o -7 the Hague.
presentative belonged to the state of Maine, — was an influential
member of that state, and was believed to have pecuniary interests
in its settlement. He was moreover one of the Commissioners ap
pointed to draw up the case to be submitted to the Arbiter. The
representative of England was not one of the diplomatists employed
in the same capacity by Great Britain.
On the 12th of January, 1831, two days after the Award is ren- His Protest
J * * J i against the Award
dered, the United States' Minister at the Hague, protests against
what he terms " a document purporting to be an expression of His
" Majesty's opinion on the several points submitted to him as
" Arbiter" !
The Award reaches the United States in the beginning of March, %fff£j£z£i\
— is communicated to the State of Maine, who hold a secret sitting, Sg^ta'
the result of which is communicated at Washington on or before
the 12th of March ; but the United States' Government inform
the British Minister that the Award reached Washington on the
16th of March ! It is then ostensibly communicated to the State
of Maine, who transmit to the President a declaration that they
will not submit to it, and immediately proceed to pass regulations
for the purpose of extending the State and Sovereign jurisdiction
throughout the disputed Territory, subject to the jurisdiction qf
E

18
Results conned Great Britain. The British Minister, informed of these proceedings
§££? ""* by the press, states in a despatch to his Chief, that he had requested
from the United. States' Government copies of the documents, and
was told that " the Government had not yet received any account
" of them ;" copies of the whole documents having, as it subsequently
appears, been transmitted to the President twelve days before-
shewing in this earliest stage the deception practised with complete
success on the British Minister. Up to this period the British
« Minister had remained without any communication whatever from
his own Government !
The President, in communicating the Award, ostensibly, to
Maine, carefully avoids any the slightest expression of opinion, —
transmits the protest of Mr. Preble, equally without the slightest in
dication of censure or approbation of the extraordinary step he had
taken, but stating that step to be without instructions. The message
concludes thus, " under these circumstances the President will rely
" with confidence on the candour and liberality of your Excellency,
" and the other constituted authorities of Maine, in appreciating
" the motives which may influence that course on his part, and in
" a correspondent interpretation of them to your constituents, in
" whose patriotism and discretion he has equal confidence."
Thus, on the threshold of this subject, we have satisfactorily
defined the position of the United States Government ; that of tacit
acquiescence in the Award, but a resolution to wait, and watch
the tone and attitude of England, in the hope of setting it aside.
The Governor of the State of Maine, on March 25th, 1831, com
municates to the Senate and House of Representatives of that
State, the message of the President, with the documents : and
responds to the request of the President for a candid and liberal
interpretation of his motives in the future course he might adopt,
by declaring that the State of Maine relies with confidence on the
central Government "for the enforcement of its claims against the
power of Great Britain."
These earliest proceedings of Maine may however merit a
more special notice, as they contain the germ of the ensuing
discussions and events.
lutfof Mam!? -^ joult Committee of the two Houses of the State is appointed
to deliberate, and on the 31st 6f March they make a long report to

19
their several houses. It is by them unanimously adopted, accepted by
the Governor, and transmitted to the President of the United States.
This report commences with references to the anterior de
scriptions, memorials, and negociations ; and re-asserts the claims
and pretensions overruled or referred to arbitration by the Con
vention of September, 1827. It denies the authority of that
Convention : objects to the Award of the King of Holland,
because of the diminution of his territory and power during the
interval between his acceptance of the office of Arbitrator and that
of pronouncing his decision. The motive of such objection being,
that that Sovereign became dependent on England, and therefore
favoured British interests. It also denies that the Arbiter has
decided according to the conditions proposed by the condb.ding "7^^
parties : — further, denies that the Arbiter has decided at all ! " The
" Arbiter," they say, " did not pretend to decide, and declared
" he could not- decide the point in controversy between the parties,
" but only intended to suggest a mode by which, in his opinion,
" it might be det/ led. The Arbiter seems to have been impressed
" with the limits' ion of his powers, and that he had no authority to
"decide contra; y to the question submitted; and that he was
" bound to decide, if he decided at all, in favour of one of the two
" lines claimed by the parties." They maintain, then, that the
United States' Government not having asked for " advice," are not
bound to accept it. " The Government of the United States cannot Resolution
*¦ J hostile to th
" feel themselves bound to adopt or be governed by the advice of the
" Arbiter, particularly when his advice was not sought or asked by
" them." They then enquire whether " the Arbiter has decided in
" pursuance of the authority given him," and after a statement of the
case, in the same spirit as the above, they conclude that he has not.
The report terminates as follows : " In conclusion, your Committee Grounds of the
" deem it to be their duty to the Legislature and to the State, to
" declare that, in their opinion, in whatever light the document which
" emanated from the Arbiter may be considered, — whether as eman-
" ating from an Individual, and not from that friendly Sovereign,
" Power, or State, &c. — the ' United States will not consider them-
" selves bound, on any principle whatever, to adopt it. And
" further, should the United States adopt the document as a de-
" cision, it will be a violation of the constitutional rights of the
" State of Maine, to which she cannot yield."

hostile to the
Award.

Resolution.

20

Their falsehood.

It may perhaps be superfluous to observe, that if any objection
could be raised to the decision of the King of Holland, because he
had lost Belgium, such objection should have been urged before
the declaration of the Award ; but the objection, inadmissible,
subsequently, if valid, is itself too contemptible to merit observation.
If the King of Holland had given advice instead of a decision,
the course of the United States to adopt was to put that question
to the Sovereign Arbiter himself; this plea, therefore, like the
former, is wholly inadmissible. The objection, however, is an utter
falsehood. The award is rendered with all due solemnity, and
couched in the usual and formal terms of arbitration : to the map,
marked according to the Award, the Royal Signet is appended,
countersigned by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ; and
the terms of the Convention of September, 1827, are explicit and
imperative : — " The decision of the Arbiter, when given, shall be
"final and conclusive, and it shall be carried, without reserve, into
" immediate effect."
This document is transmitted to the President, and we have no
information regarding its reception — no copy of the reply.
These proceedings having appeared in the public prints, they
were of course brought to the knowledge of the British Minister ;
so that it became impossible for him to avoid pronouncing an
opinion — against these proceedings, by formal communication, or
in favour of them, as it would necessarily be understood, by silence.
The British Minister is silent.
The communications sent home by the British Minister at
Washington, before the arrival of any instructions from England,
may appear at first worthy of little notice ; but, on examination,
they will be found (even such extracts as have been given) to
contain food for deep reflection, and to throw valuable light on
the dispositions of the parties, and . the position of the British
Mission at Washington. On the 12th March. Mr. Yaughan
writes : —
ilters^Det^atehet " ^b nas keen lon§ known at Washington, that His Majesty the King of the
Netherlands delivered, on the 10th January, to Mr. Preble, the Minister from the United
States, his decision upon the question of boundary referred to arbitration.
" / am assured, however, by Mr. Van Buren, that this Government has not yet
received the official communication of His Majesty's decision ; though it appears that some
communication of the import of it has been made by Mr. Preble to the State of Maine,

Received and
admitted by the
United States'
Government.

The British Min
ister is silent.

21
to which he belongs ; as it is stated in the newspapers, that the Legislature of that State T^BrfflshjiKii-
immediately took it into consideration, in a secret Session: and it is reported that
general dissatisfaction was expressed with the decision of the Arbiter."
That the British Minister should learn from the newspapers
so important a fact as the Secret Session, reveals his perfect help
lessness ; hence his admission of the extravagant supposition that
Mr. Preble should have communicated with Maine, Avithout com-
municatino; with his Government. It is curious to observe the
words " to which he belongs," inserted as justification of the Ame
rican Secretary of State. " Washington, March 20th, 1831.
" The decision of the King of the Netherlands upon the question of Boundary,
submitted to His Majesty's Arbitration, was received, by way of Havre, by the Govern
ment of the United States on the 15th instant.
" On the 18th instant, a messenger was despatched with an official communication
of it to the Government of the State of Maine.
" I understand from Mr. Van Buren that the Award of the King of the Netherlands
has called forth a protest against it from Mr. Preble, the American Minister at the
Hague, which I have not seen, — but I understand that a copy of it was delivered to
Sir Charles Bagot ; and I presume, therefore, that His Majesty's Government is already
in possession of it.
" This Government has resolved to abstain from any expression of an opinion until
they are in possession of the answer to their official communication of the Award to the
State of Maine."
That the despatches should have been received " by way of
Havre," accounts neither for the delay of two months and five days,
in a matter of such urgent importance, nor for the strange assertion
that the Government had not received the intelligence through some
of those channels through which the Minister at the Hague had
communicated with Maine, or which had conveyed the decision to
Washington, where Mr. Vaughan, eight days before, stated it had then
been "long known." It serves to shew however that the most frivolous
reason was considered sufficient by the American Government to
offer to an English diplomatist for circumstances the most suspicious
and inexplicable ; the statement of the route selected for the arrival
of the intelligence, when the American Government thought proper
to avow the reception of it, is remarkable, and suggests the idea of
a previous communication with the French Government.
The reference to the State of Maine of a matter of Treaty

Represents the
American view.

represents American views,

22
represshenMi™fr stipulation between States is the clearest proof of the hostility of the
Government to a settlement of the question, and the suspending of
a reply till they receive the decision of Maine, as if the power re
sided in that State, or as if the opinion of that State were doubtful,
exhibits a settled plan of misrepresentation and deception, of course
not without an end and object, which, to avow, would be to frus
trate, and which to attain, required deception.
On the 12th of April, Mr. Vaughan writes : — ¦
" We are at length in possession of the manner in which the Governor and
Legislature of Maine have received the Award of the King of the Netherlands, — as, on
the 5th instant, a newspaper published at Portland, the seat of Government of that
State, commenced the publication of documents which had been officially communicated
by the President, when the Award of the King of the Netherlands was transmitted to
the Governor. " The first part only of these documents, published in Maine, has yet reached
Washington, and I have the honour to enclose a copy, extracted from a newspaper.
" I have endeavoured to procure from the Secretary of State, a copy of the pro
ceedings of the Legislature of Maine, which will in time appear in the newspapers ; but
the Government has not yet received any account of them."
These enclosures, exhibiting the violence and excitement of the
State of Maine, are published in the second series of papers, marked
(B), which appeared several months after those we are examining ;*
consequently the reader is left in total ignorance of these events,
and it is thus utterly impossible for him to comprehend the bearings,
even of the fragments of evidence that are placed before him.
On Mr. Vaughan's application for information regarding the
transactions in Maine, he receives a refusal, to which he evidently
submits, without murmur and without suspicion. In his unreserved
communications with his chief, he does not even say — I am told that
" the Government has not received the documents." He savs, in
justification, self-volunteered, of the American Government, " but
" the Government has not yet received," &c.
isaecdvedbyae By the resolution of Maine, already quoted, the Government
of Maine had, on the 31st, communicated all the documents to the
* Not only is an interval of several months allowed to elapse between the publication of the
papers thus separated, and thereby rendered unintelligible; but publication of the second is
reserved until the Session is closed ! They bear no date but 1838 ; consequently, on subsequent
reference to them, the fact of this separation is concealed. There is no reason assigned for the
interval, or the separation ; and none, certainly, in the matter or the circumstances.

AmericanGovern-ment.

more
than three months
remains inactive.

American Go
vernment.

23
President. This then furnishes the proof, if that were wanting, of
the deception practised on the British Minister, and of the concert
between the General Government and the State of Maine.
It is remarkable here, as throughout the whole of these pro
ceedings, that there is no single statement of the American Govern
ment borne out — no promised hope realised ; — and yet on no sin
gle occasion is a statement made by it, not implicitly admitted by
England — not a hope expressed that is not immediately taken up
and repeated by the British Agent or Minister.
It had now exceeded three months from the period of the de- England, for
¦ •!¦ than t.hrep m
cision of the King of Holland, and no intimation had been received
at Washington of the views or intentions of the British Cabinet — no
step had been taken on the part* of England in any sense whatever
— no step more hostile could have been taken than inaction.
Meanwhile, the activity and calmness, the decision and repose of
the Government of the United States were truly remarkable. Two Activity of the
" Avnprip.fin fin-
days after the rendering of the Award were not suffered to elapse,
without a Protest being entered against it by the Minister at the
Hague. The United States' Government protest immediately to us
that that Protest is unauthorized, while the Protest is significantly
conveyed by a message to the State of Maine. The American
Government had secured the means of a double communication of
the Award of the King of Hdlland ; two separate constitutional steps
take place on the part of the State of Maine — the one secret, the
other public, with an interval between them admitting of interme
diate reference to the supreme Government. The first announce
ment of the Award is made to the American people with circum
stances calculated to divest it of all authority ; this announcement
is so made by the Government without any formal or informal act
or word, on the part of Great Britain, expressive of any interest,
intention, or opinion, regarding this matter.
But to whatever expectation the negligence of the British
Government might have given rise, still there was one ground upon
which her representative might rest. To the assertions "that the
" King of Holland had exceeded his powers," — " that he had not
" decided the question," — " that the State of Maine would not
" consent," — " that the Central Government could not enforce the
" Award," — the British Minister might have answered : — " To such

24
frivolities it is superfluous to reply. To Maine and its Resolves
England has nothing to say. This is a question of grave and
solemn treaty stipulation between Nations. I have riot yet received
instructions, but when I do— it will be to call upon the United States
to proceed to the execution of the Award, delivered in conformity
with the Convention of 1827, and the Treaty of Ghent." His
strength, so far, would lie in his having no instructions.
If the British Minister did not use this language, it was how
ever that which he must have felt. It is what every American
must have felt. The non-arrival, therefore, of despatches from
England, however unaccountable, must still have served to excuse
or to weaken the effect of the silence and inaction of the British
Minister.
o?tord Mm! However, on the 19th April, 1831, the British Minister was re-
-TprifSS.' lieved from his anxiety by the arrival of despatches from Downing
Street. The despatch referring to the award of the King of Holland
was not a long one, as indeed it required not to be. But, together
with the Award in question, strange to say, it contained another do
cument, which was no other than the disavowed protest against it of the
American Minister at the Hague. Short as is the despatch to which
the signature " Palmerston" is affixed, it contains subjects of deep
aMconseluenies, reflection, and is the commencement of a long series of ter-
giversation and falsehood, of which the calculated consequences
necessarily are — even in case of the triumph of Britain — mutual
bloodshed, and common disaster.
" Viscount Palmerston to the Right Honorable C. R. Vaughan.
" Foreign Office, February 9, 1831.
" Sir,
" I have now to transmit to you a copy of the decision which his Majesty the King
of .the Netherlands has communicated in duplicate to the representatives of Great
Britain and the United States at the Hague, upon the question of disputed boundary
submitted by the two Governments to His Netherland Majesty's arbitration.
" I am compelled by the pressure of other business to delay until a future opportunity
whatever observations I may have to make to you upon the terms of this decision ; against
which you will perceive, by the enclosed copy of a paper communicated by the American
Envoy at the Hague to His Majesty's Ambassador at that Court, Mr. Preble has thought
fit to protest in the name of his Government.
" I can only acquaint you by this opportunity, that whatever might be the sentiments
or wishes of His Majesty upon some of the points embraced in the decision of His
Netherland Majesty, His Majesty has not hesitated to acquiesce in that decision, in fulfil-.

of that Despatch.

25
ment of the obligations which His Majesty considers himself to have contracted by the Ld. raimerstons
terms of the Convention of arbitration of the 29th of September, 1827; and His Majesty
is persuaded that such will be the course adopted by the Government of the United
States. " If, however, contrary to this expectation, the American Government should
determine upon taking any step of the nature of that which has been adopted by Mr.
Preble, and should make to you any communication to that effect, before you shall
have received any further instructions from me on that point ; you will inform the
American Minister, that you are not prepared to enter into any discussion upon such a
subject, and that you can only transmit the communication to your Government for its
consideration.
" I am, &c, " PALMERSTON."
" Right Hon. C. R. Vaughan,
fyc. fyc. fyc.
What may be supposed to be the stunning effect of such a des
patch upon the British Envoy ! Having for week after week ex
pected the announcement of a decision, which was to terminate a
difference of half a century, he is at length told in a public despatch
— that the Minister of England has no time to enter into the sub- it sacrifices the
• . . ... . Award.
ject: — but what need he enter into it at all? — That his instructions
would be communicated at some future day; — but what instructions
could avail, if not communicated then ? Not to exact the fulfilment
of the contract upon the judgment given, was the mockery of all
that is held sacred among men — binding among nations. It was
to set at nought forms of law — -principles of office — habits of busi
ness. The concealment of such abandonment, from the Parliament
and the nation, leaves this act referable to other causes than
ignorance or negligence.
The negociations of half a century had proved the national
purpose of the United States to keep open this boundary discussion
— had also proved the ability with which that purpose had been
pursued, and the success with which it had been attended. De
cision was therefore called for, on the part of Great Britain, at
the moment of the notification of the award. But so effectual had
been the forethought evinced by the Minister of Great Britain
in 1827, and so stringent the language of the Convention, that
it seems a mystery how it ever could enter into any man's mind that
such a compact could be broken. The individual who possessed
the power of speaking in the name of England, and of withholding
G

26
the truth from England, could alone have dared to conceive the
project. No American could have aimed at such a triumph : No
other Englishman contemplated such a crime.
its contradictions The only means of accounting for negligence in a British Secre
tary of State, on such an occasion, or for the excuse of " pressure
" of other business" — is, that it could not have entered into that
individual's mind to suppose that the Award could be resisted. But
the despatch itself does suppose resistance; — it encloses the very
protest of the American Minister at the Hague (which his Govern
ment had taken care to proclaim unauthorized), as the only docu
ment to guide the views or reflections,* of the British Minister : —
it limits the duties of a Minister to the functions of a post-master,
and prepares him to exhibit and announce the longing of the British
Government for the re-echo from Washington of the (to all but
Lord Palmerston) perfectly insignificant, unnoticed, unanswered,
pseudo-protest of the American Minister at the Hague. The pre
text, therefore, of " pressure of business" for leaving the Minister
uninstructed, I take to be as destitute of truth, as, if true, it would
be repugnant to reason.
If the despatch had concluded with "You are not prepared
" to enter into any discussion on such a subject," the effect on the
British Minister, and through him on the American Government,
would have been that England considered the matter finally
adjusted ; — but the words that follow, " You can only transmit the
" communication, &c." sheAV that the English Government had not
made up their mind. Thus this despatch did convey the most
positive instructions ; therefore the pretext of " pressure of business"
is no less inapplicable to the circumstance than unreasonable and
untrue, and reveals a process of perplexing what is simple and
confusing what is plain, which must have been, even to a man of
talent and dexterity, a heavy pressure on his legitimate avocations.
BrffiffiJer -^et any one place himself in the position of the British
Minister, on receiving this despatch, and he will at once feel all the
doubt and bewilderment which such a communication must have
* It is singular that whilst Lord Palmerston encloses the protest of Mr. Preble, he does not
enclose the reply of Sir Charles Bagot to that protest; nor is this reply at all given in the pub
lished documents :— although that reply was communicated by the President to the State of Maine,

27
produced. By being relieved from responsibility, he became a cipher.
It being enjoined him not to act; he would receive the impressions
made upon him, — be, the channel of these to England, and the
echo of them, as English, to Washington.
This despatch is placed at the head of the communicated papers, tub despatch
J- J- J. J- made to appear
as if it were the commencement of bona fide negociations. The ^^f^^
document that follows it is the protest of Mr. Preble ; so that the *
reader's mind is at once impressed with the idea that he is about to
commence the negociations ; whereas, in the very first document, he
has arrived at the conclusion, — and, if he reads it aright, has dis
covered the whole truth. And what is this truth ? The frustration of
the Award, and the sacrifice of all the anterior negociations and con
tracts, through the studied vagueness and the calculated contradictions
of a single despatch of twenty-three lines ! The papers, as already
observed, are separated into parts, and the documents necessary to
their mutual elucidation are kept apart, and published with the
interval of months : — the separation, the transposition, and the selec
tion, so calculated to bewilder the reader, that no member of
either House of Parliament has ventured to deal with the subject;
and so completely has the question been rendered unintelligible,
that no individual in this country seems to be aware, that the setting
aside of the Award of the King of Holland is the enigma that is
to be solved ; and is the sole and unique cause of past, present, or
future complication or collision.
Though I am arguing this question on its intrinsic merits, Transaction un-
and judging it according to evidence furnished solely by the func- *teelf-
tionary whose conduct is arraigned — evidence, diluted, prepared,
and presented by himself — yet there is a consideration which the
inquirer ought to weigh, and of which he must not for a moment lose
sight, if he deems it of value. In investigations of a legal character,
the motive of the acts, and therefore the truth, lies within the
subject-matter, and is contained in the statement of the facts ; but,
in diplomatic transactions, the motives may lie without, as well as
within; and the truth may therefore have to be sought in external
circumstances. In the present case, the course of the British Mi
nister, judging of it by the facts before us, is incomprehensible. It
is a simple case of the implementing of a contract, presenting no
difficulty in the performance, — admitting no ambiguity in the po-

28
licy of the State, the obligations of the Crown, or the duties of
the Minister. These are all on one line, and concentrated in a
single point. A requisition addressed to .the adverse party to
proceed to execution was all that had to be done — was that which
Moave of Lord could not be omitted. Refusal on its part, if refusal there had been,
Palmerston must _ _ _ . ,
^looked for else- would nave regarded the Parliament and the JNation, not her
Minister and Cabinet ; for what Cabinet would bear such responsi
bility as submission to, and concealment of, the violation of a national
compact ? This step not having been taken, the subject itself fur
nishes no clue to the act of the Minister ; — supplies us with no
intelligible motive for departing from routine forms, duties, and
interests. In this dilemma it becomes necessary to inquire into the
character of the Minister, and into the position and motives of other
powers, who may have an interest in the non-adjustment of this
question, and be able to exercise any influence over the British
Minister, to obtain such a result.
rnolt'hl^ioolel The United States, in rejecting the Award, either expected the
BritaufnstGreat concurrence or the opposition of England. In the first case the
guilt of the Foreign Minister of England is clear, and we need not
pursue the subject.
If it anticipated the opposition of England, it became the duty of
that Government to consider the question of collision with England.
It must therefore, (unless through a short-sightedness or negligence
with which it never yet has been chargeable or charged), have
sought to fathom the views of such great powers as must, by their
opposition or concurrence, render negociation or an appeal to phy
sical force fruitless, or successful. Russia and France are these
powers. I therefore assume that the United States could not have entered
upon this line, without the assurance of the concurrence of Russia and
France against England, or of the Foreign Minister of England
against herself — which in fact was much more than the support of
the other two, carrying as it did along with it the support of these
two powers.
eEngagedminF™r But Russia and France were at the time actively eno-ao-ed in
jects hostile to -. p . ...
g^ Britain, general projects of aggression — in opposition, if not to the policy, at
least to the interests, feelings, and rights, of Great Britain. They
could not therefore have looked with indifference on a settlement

Russia & France

29
which would lose them the United States as an eventual ally — re
lieve England from an embarrassment and a danger which would
diminish her power, if ever exerted against themselves — and would
open up to her the prospect and the means of uniting with America
to resist their aggressions. In the fulfilment of their duties, the
Ministers of these States must have been prepared to take such ^l^^hF
measures as were within their reach, both with the United States que5s'aon0.mitiary
and with England, with a view to averting from themselves the
catastrophe of a settlement of the North-east Boundary question.
These two Powers were at that time engaged in various They succeed.-
o o through the co-
projects, the fruits of which have since appeared, and which leave no aSTiinUer.
doubt as to their concert and their objects. I will instance only
the three European questions directed by conferences held in Down-
ing-street: — First, the affairs of Greece; secondly, the affairs of the
East; thirdly, the affairs of Belgium. In regard to the first, their
concurrence to sacrifice the rights of England has been established.*
In regard to the second, their common dismemberment of the
Ottoman Empire is before the eyes of all men. — As regards the
third, (Belgium), the results have not yet appeared, and no exposi
tion of the question has been made, but the best attention which I
have been able to give to the subject, leads me to conclude that the
objects of both have not been less hostile, nor the policy of Russia
less successful, in this matter than in the other two.
But, in all these, Russia — (France is but the half-instructed
and paralytic coadjutor) — Russia has succeeded, solely by the co
operation of the Minister of Enyland, — who has placed the
diplomatic functionaries and naval commanders of Great Britain in
the monstrous position of receiving orders signed by the represen
tatives of these two powers,"j" and has accustomed England, Europe,
* See Diplomatic History of Greece, by H. H. Parish, Esq.
f Not only are commands thus given to representatives of England ; but they are ordered to
make their representations to their own Government, conform with those of their colleagues (of
Russia and France). . Not only are they thus ordered and instructed, but disgraced and re-called
by foreign functionaries. For instance : the Dutch Government brings a charge against the Minister
of England at Brussels ; it is of course addressed, not to the Conference, but to Lord Palmerston.
The British Minister receives an order instantly to quit Brussels, signed by the Ambassadors at
London of Russia and France. The diplomatist whose person is so selected to vilify and degrade
the British name is then sent Ambassador to — Constantinople.
H

30

Lord Palmerston
co-operates with
them in setting
aside the Award,

Heply of Mr.
Vaughan to
Ld. Palmerston's
first despatch. •

and the world, to be governed by secret conclaves of Russian
diplomatists. What then must have been the position of Lord Palmerston
with regard to the North-east Boundary question ? Must not the
motives, which prompted his previous conduct, have prompted him
here— must not the fact of subserviency to Russian views in one
instance, have compelled him to follow her dictates in all ? —
Without a knowledge of these external influences, the inquirer is
lost and confused in coming to proofs of the hostility of a British
Minister to the interests of Great Britain. He consequently perverts
what he sees, to escape from a conclusion at which he revolts ; besides,
few men have been in a position to comprehend how the Minister of a
country neglecting its interests can be reduced to subserviency to a
foreign power : unable to comprehend the motives of the man, they
resist the evidence of their senses and the conclusions of their reason,
as regards the acts of the Minister.
Having explained the character of Lord Palmerston's despatch
of February, I now come to the effect which it produced. Mr.
Vaughan' s reply displays, as its prominent feature,— as the first
object of his attention, — the Protest ! But he again repeats to Lord
Palmerston, that the American Secretary (notwithstanding Lord
Palmerston's assumption, that it was " in the name of his Govern-
" ment " ) " expressly stated that it had been made by Mr.
" Preble, without instructions from his Government.". Mr.
Vaughan communicates then, from the Newspaper, the proceedings
of Maine,— enumerates the whole of the arguments and obstacles
that had been industriously put forward, and which threatened,
unresisted as they were, to set aside the decision of the King of
Holland. •
But, with all these documents in his possession, — documents
which proved the deception practised upon him, eight days before,
by the United States' Government, does Mr. Vaughan yield to the
impressions made upon him by Lord Palmerston's despatch of
February 9th, enjoining him to stand with folded arms and
compressed lips, the unmoved spectator of proceedings at once
so extravagant and alarming. With the phantom of the Protest
incessantly before his eyes, he says, " should the American
•" Government make . any communication to me of the nature

31
" of Mr. Preble's Protest, I shall be prepared to conform
" strictly to what your Lordship suggests" : — the service is not one
which would commonly be supposed to require preparation, or to
admit of doubt as to strictness of performance ; but, in this case, the
terms are happily selected, and show the importance which the Mi
nister felt to be attached to the performance of — nothing. But Mr.
Vaughan was too able a man to be long entrusted with so delicate
a charge. Notwithstanding the advantages which the Anti-English and pSn'ofttT
, . . , . -. , . , American people
war party was thus allowed so rapidly to gam, the great ma- t£effij^°dp'ionof
jority of the American people, the whole of the Southern States, and
her senators and politicians of the highest distinction, were still
all in favour of the adoption of the Award. Although, I say, the
Award had been virtually sacrificed by Lord Palmerston ; although
formal measures had been taken against it, not only by a state,
but by the general Government;* although the idea of a second
reference to the Senate had been extensively spread, and had been
generally adopted, still it was clear that the Senate, left to its
natural impulses, would, by the same motives that led it to adopt
the Convention of 1827, now adopt the Award rendered according
to the terms of that Convention.
Let us now suppose for a moment that Lord Palmerston had an Means that could
object, in preventing the adoption by America of the Award, but yet t0
that, from particular circumstances, he could not commit himself to
the English Minister'at Washington, by openly instructing him to
oppose its adoption : — what would be the course which he would be
likely to pursue ? . He would relieve America from all apprehension
as to England's insisting upon the fulfilment of the contract. If
remonstrances were made by any party against the Award, he would
be careful to give' them importance. If violation of Territory took
place, or of the rights of the British Crown, he would sedulously
aAToid noticing the occurrence. He would impose upon the Minister
at Washington silence and reserve. He would place in that post
no man of commanding talents or of practical acquaintance with

* The Protest of Mr. Preble, though formally disowned, yet, having been subsequently pub.
lished as a State paper, and having been received as such by Great Britain, became in reality the
Protest of the Government.

have been devised
frustrate it.

32
the subject matter, — or, finding sudh a man in that office, he would
remove him. Above all, at any critical moment, he would lower
the authority of the British Mission, by removing the titular re
presentative, and by supplying his place with a diplomatic officer,
charged ad interim, and accredited, not to the Government or the
adopted"^™' State, but merely to the Foreign Secretary. These suppositions
Lord Palmerston. ' J O «/ ± ±
constitute a simple narrative of that which has occurred. The cri
tical moment when the American Government had to decide as to
whether or not it should submit the Award to the Senate, and when
BriUshMeinfster! the Senate, if referred to, had to decide upon it, — arrives ; and, as
usual, the British Minister — -departs.*
This intermission of the representation of Great Britain at
Washington, is not for a short interval, for an interval important
only by accident, or. of an importance unexpected and unforeseen.
absent1 t^Te'ars -^he British Minister is absent during two years, and that absence
dates from the aggression of the subjects of the United States against
the jurisdiction of the British Crown, and from the avowed forma
tion of a party to defeat the decision of the King of Holland. It
it takes eighteen was not till more than eighteen months had elapsed, that the American
tt?Awardfjeot Government refused its assent to the Award !
To return now to the chain of evidence, at the point where it
was last interrupted.
The last communication from Mr. Vaughan, the British Repre
sentative, on the 20th of April, stated that he was " prepared to
" conform strictly" to Lord Palmerston's instructions to do
nothing ; and during three months that instruction is strictly con
formed to. On the 21st of July, Mr. Bankhead, the Charge"
Thecharg6d'- d'affaires, writes, " the same reserve as has been manifested bv
Affaires does no- ~ J
befcinanad- " the United States Government to my predecessor, has been con
tinued to me by Mr. Livingston." He communicates the arrival in
America of Mr. Preble, the energetic protester at the Hague, and
the approaching departure of Mr. Van Buren for England, the
* At the recent critical events in Europe and America, the British Ambassador and Minister
has almost always been absent at the important moment— for instance, the occupation of Con
stantinople by Russia— the capture of St. John d'Ulloa, by the French. There might per
haps have been some motive for the absence of Mr. Vaughan ; but there were two dis
tinguished English diplomatists, to whose zeal had been entrusted, and by whose abilities
had been secured, the settlement of this question.

justment.

33
principal opponent of the Award in America. The state of his own The charge a-.
¦¦- x J. x Affaires uses the
mind maybe gathered from what follows: "I am not altogether oTaelSof
" without hopes that the pretensions of the State of Maine will be'
" much softened, and that an acquiescence will at last be given to
"the opinion of the Royal Arbitrator." In a substitution of the
word " opinion" for " Award" in the mouth of the British Char g 6
d'affaires, is the evidence of the success of Lord Palmerston in
rendering the British Representative the coadjutor of the preten
sions of the State of Maine.
But it is only a month after the date of this last despatch, that ?&i%Saat
the project is admitted, of referring the matter to the Senate. feli7efi^st
On the 23rd of August, Mr. Bankhead writes, " I learn from
" an authority which I have no reason to doubt, that before the
" President can consent to the provision contained in the Royal
" Award, it will be necessary to receive the approbation of the
" Senate, as the President has no power in himself to alienate any
" part of the territory of an individual state."
To all these despatches, — to these sundry communications,
extending from the month of March (when commenced the first
secret Session of the State of Maine), down to that of the 4th of
October (which we shall shortly touch upon), communicating the
aggression of the State of Maine upon the disputea Territory and
the jurisdiction of the British Crown, — no reply whatever proceeds
from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
With this momentous question suspended by a thread, shivering 'E^ef!^-iIX.
in the wind, the Minister,— a man of recognized ability, conversant tlshMmisteI:
with the anterior details of the negociation, and influential from his
character, and the general estimation in which he was held, — is
suffered to abandon his post. No Extraordinary Mission is on
its way to meet and confer, on some neutral island. Nothing of
the kind. The Minister withdraws — his post is left vacant — the
Secretary of Legation is left in charge, and without instructions.
The year rolls on; his despatches are unre plied to. The Session of the secretary
* ¦*¦ *¦ t of Legation beinj:
of Congress approaches, the members flock to Washington, — he ISm"^!*™'
turns his eyes in vain to the rising sun, but no counsel comes to him
from the East. The question is to be referred to the Senate — he
has no protest ready. The message of the President is to be pre-
i

34
pared; the day for its delivery arrives ; and not a single syllable
dare the Representative of Great Britain articulate on any one point,
— no fallacies can he refute — no truth assert — no enemy confute — no
friend confirm or secure. Washington, the President, the North-east
Boundary, the Award, and the British Charge" d'affaires, are as
completely forgotten in Downing Street, as if Columbus or Canning
had never lived, — as if another hemisphere had never been discovered;
nor a New World called into existence.

PART III.

OUTRAGES COMMITTED BY SUBJECTS AND SUBORDINATE
AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE
RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH CROWN.

" AN ENGLISH MINISTER WOULD BE UNWORTHY OF HIS OFFICE, WHO SHOULD SEE ANOTHER STATE
SWALLOWING UP TERRITORIES IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF BRITISH COLONIES, AND NOT STRIVE BY
ALL JUST MEANS TO AVERT THE DANGER."— Charming ore the Texas.

The dispositions of the State of Maine being well known ; the k„0TO1 aisposi-
violence of its population having been already experienced ; it
was to be expected that a decision of the question would lead to
commotion and aggression, and that outrages would be resorted
to, as a means of preventing its adjustment. In this view, too
clear not to have been taken ; with these consequences, too evident
not to have been anticipated ; the hands of the Colonial Govern
ment of Great Britain ought to have been fortified by increased
military means, and a firm and announced determination to resist
all attempts at disturbance.
But, as the English Government had not called upon the
United States to proceed to the execution of the Award, — the hopes
of Maine may be imagined, and its acts anticipated. We pass
therefore, naturally, (as from cause to effect), to the announcement:
— "Attempt of the Authorities of the State of Maine Tooutragescom.
, , T « T"\ m mitted by its au-
" TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION* WITHIN THE DISPUTED lERRITORY, thority.
" October and November, 1831."
Sir A. Campbell to Charles Bankhead, Esq.
"Sir, " Fredericton, New Brunswick, September 13, 1831.
" I have the honour to inclose, for your information, some documents from Lieut.
Maclauchlan, at present in charge of the boundary line between the United States and
*
* The words " exercise jurisdiction" are not applicable to the fact. The attempt made
was to annex the territory to Maine. Jurisdiction has reference to the administration of justice,
which was in no case attempted. It was attempted to institute State Government, and to
seduce British subjects from their allegiance.

36
this province, by which you will perceive that the authorities of the State of Maine have
actually taken possession of part of the territory now in dispute between the British
and American Governments.
" I cannot believe for a moment that these proceedings, so lamentably calculated to
interrupt and destroy the peace and harmony existing between the two countries, can be
sanctioned or approved of by the American Government ; and I am sure you will there
fore feel it to be your duty to call at once upon the American Government to put a
stop to measures of so dangerous a tendency ; measures, which, if persevered in, must
infallibly lead to consequences the most prejudicial and injurious to both countries.
" I have the honour to be, &c.
" Charles Bankhead, Esq. "(Signed) "ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,
fyc. £fc. $$c. " Lieut.-Governor."
The argumentative character of this letter is remarkable. All
the agents and authorities of Great Britain seem to be individuals
left to reflect, to act, and to shift for themselves.
Mr. Bankhead, in addressing Lord Palmerston on this subject,
makes the following observations : —
" As this proceeding was so much at variance with the spirit of forbearance inculcated
by the President in his despatch to the Governor of Maine, at the period of the receipt of
the decision of the King of the Netherlands, in this country, and one so likely to produce
unfriendly feelings between the respective parties, I lost no time in submitting the com
plaint of General Campbell to the Government of the United States ; and I trust that
such a communication will be made to the Authorities of Maine, as shall prevent the recur-
ence of such irregularities until the question of disputed Territory shall be finally settled.
"The General Government is most anxious to avoid the slightest collision between
the State of Maine and His Majesty's provincial officers; and Mr. Livingston expressed
his regret that any occasion had been afforded by the State of Maine, to embarrass the
harmony and good-will subsisting between the two countries."
Mr. Livingston's regret was superfluous— not the slightest
embarrassment disturbed the harmony — not the faintest shadow
overcast the good-will subsisting between the two countries,
through this or any other " occasion" furnished by the State of
Maine.
e^cS^bfthe6 In reply to a timid remonstrance from Mr. Bankhead, the
General Govern- '
American Secretary writes as follows : —
" The Honorable Edward Livingston to Charles Bankhead, Esq.
" (Extract.) "Department of State, Washington, October 17, 1831.
" Immediately after receiving your note of the 1st instant, I wrote to the Governor
of the State of Maine for information on the subject of it. I have just received his
answer, of which I have the honour to inclose two extracts. By the first you will per
ceive that the election of town officers in the settlement of Madawaska, of which com

ment

37
plaint was made in the papers inclosed in your letter, were made under colour of a
general law, which was not intended by either the executive or Jegislative authority af
that State to be executed in that settlement; and that the whole was the work of
inconsiderate individuals."
It is in proof, that they were authorised by .the State.
" It is therefore of no avail, and can have no more effect than if the same number
of men had met at Madawaska, and declared themselves duly elected members of the
British Parliament. The Act interferes with no right, it comes in actual collision with no
established power: — not so the punishment of the individuals concerned. This is at
once a practical decision of the question, may lead to retaliatory legal measures, or what
is worse, to illegal violence; for if the Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick feels
himself obliged, as he says he does, to enforce the authority of the laws within what he
thinks the boundaries of his province, will not the same feeling excite the Governor of
Maine, under the same sense of duty, to pursue the hke measures? And thus the fruits
of moderation and mutual forbearance during so long a period, will be lost for the want
of a perseverance in them, for the sfert time that is now wanting to bring the contro
versy to an amicable close. It is therefore, Sir, that I invite your interposition with His
Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of New Brunswick to induce him to set at liberty the
persons arrested, on their engagement to make no change in the state of things until the
business shall be finally decided between the two Governments."
This is treating the British Minister as a child. The delibe- outrages advoca-
rate and official act of the State of Maine is asserted not to have statf «^
ment.
been intended: the violation of the British jurisdiction is asserted
not to be sanctioned ; and thence the double inference is drawn, that
the violators are innocent, and that punishment inflicted upon them
would legalize retaliatory measures. The United States' Govern
ment do not, however, conceive their imprisonment to be illegal,
but, out of a kindly regard to both parties, request their release
as a favour; and counsel the British Crown to obtain from the
prisoners a guarantee for its future security, before releasing them
from gaol. Extract of Sub-Inclosure.
" The measure (says the Governor of Maine) that is said to have been adopted by
the inhabitants of that territory, of voluntarily organizing themselves into a corporation,
was unexpected by me, and done without my knowledge."
A falsehood, as may be seen by Mr. Livingston's own note.
The public acts of the State of Maine, authorizing and ordering
the proceedings, are to be found, Papers (B) page 10.
(Second Extract.)
" A copy of this letter from Messrs. Wheelock and Savage is herewith transmitted,
by which it further appears that they, together with several other citizens of this State,
K

38
have been arrested by the British authorities, and transported towards Fredericton for the
purpose of being there imprisoned. They were arrested within the territory of this
State and of the United States, and, as citizens of the United States, now claim the aid
and protection of their Government and country."
" The territory of this State and of the United States," refers
to the disputed Territory.
On receiving this note from the American Secretary, putting
the remaining absurdities out of the question, the British Minister
had but one course to pursue in regard to this inclosure ; which was
to refuse to hold any diplomatic intercourse with the American
Government, while it used, or suffered officially to be used, the
designation of " territory of Maine," or " territory of the United
States," as "applied to the territory in dispute: by suffering this
falsification of language, all that was contended for, was given
away. On this, Mr. Bankhead writes to Lord Palmerston : —
" Washington, October 21, 1831.
" l'have great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that the language held by
the General Government, upon this subject, has been of the most friendly nature."
And further : —
Advocacy admit- " I have ventured to submit to his (Sir Archibald Campbell's) early consideration,
Minister? nbsh the motives which the American Secretary of State brings forward in favour of the release
of the persons at present in custody at Fredericton.
" I venture to hope that my conduct upon this occasion will not be disapproved of
by His Majesty's Government."
But, before the arrival at Fredericton of these satisfactory
assurances, and conclusive " motives," — new events had occurred/
Sir A. Campbell to Charles Bankhead, Esq.
" (Extract.) "Fredericton, October 4, 1831.
New outrages. " Since I had the honour of addressing you on the 13th ult., relative to the extra
ordinary proceedings of certain agents of the State of Maine in that part of the disputed
territory called Madawaska, further and more serious aggressions than those therein
mentioned have taken place, for the avowed purpose of usurping the sovereignty of a
large portion of His Majesty's dominions on ' both' sides of the River St. John.
violators cap. " The enclosed documents will clearly shew the alarming extent of these aggressions
on our territory by the presumed agents of the neighbouring State; together with the
legal measures which we have, in consequence, been compelled to adopt, in order to make
the jurisdiction of our laws be respecte'd by all classes throughout this province."

tured.

39
C. T. Peters, Esq. to Sir A. Campbell.
" (Inclosure.) " Madawaska, September 24, 1831.
" I have the honour to lay before your Excellency copies of statements, under oath,
which I have been enabled to collect, of the proceedings of a number of the inhabitants
of this settlement, tending to disturb the peace of the place, calculated to estrange the
French inhabitants from their allegiance, induce them to acknowledge themselves citizens
and subjects of the United States of America, and transfer the possession of this district
of the province to that Government, and constituting a high and serious offence against
the law, in open contempt of the King and his Government."
" The conduct of the persons who have been concerned in these transactions is the
more aggravating, as they evidently appear to be the instruments and agents of the State
of Maine ; with a view entertained by that Government, through their instrumentality,
to obtain possession of the tract of country at present in dispute between Great Britain
and the United States, which both those Governments have solemnly pledged themselves
by the Convention entered into between them, that nothing shall be done by the one or
the other, pending the proceedings for settling the dispute, which may alter the relative
situations of either party.
" The proceedings of these persons, aided by the conduct of certain other agents from
the Government of Maine, who, by the papers which I now have the honour to lay
before your Excellency, will appear to have been secretly passing through the settlement
and intermixing with the French inhabitants (of which the great majority consists), has,
I regret to say, evidently had an effect of unsettling the minds of a great number, if not
almost seduce them from their allegiance to His Majesty's person and Government."
The depositions follow, — -mentioning also the administration to
British subjects of an oath of allegiance to the United States.
The United States' Government, it will be observed, disavowed a£g£n^tes'
the acts of these subordinate agents, but yet claimed for them
immunity. The British Minister does not even attempt to deal
with the question ; but, with great satisfaction, admits the argu
ments of the American Secretary of State, and makes himself the
channel of the request to the Governor of New Brunswick, for the surrendered i,r
T- ' Great Britain.
liberation of the prisoners.
The Americans, having; secured this position, hesitate not to capture of prison-
' O J. 7 ers now sought to
advance (the State of Maine taking the initiative) to the justification inv^n^t^
n i re 1 1 •¦ 1 / 1 1 r> part of Great Bri-
ot the offenders : — thus constituting the caption (the release from tain-
which was obtained as a favour), an act of violence and aggression
on the. part of Great Britain.
No. 5. — Charles Bankhead, Esq. to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received December Vj.)
" (Extract.) " Washington, November 20, 1831.
"The Council of the State of Maine, in their late extraordinary sitting, have
forwarded to Washington a report,^couched in very strong language ; and orders have
been given to the different brigades of militia on the frontier, to hold themselves in
readiness to support the views of the State, with reference to the neighbouring pro
vince. Notwithstanding this threatening proceeding, / am happy to find, fyc."

claimed the pri-

40
State op Maine.
" (Inclosure.) "In Council, November 7, 1831.
SKwooiaiL016 " The Committee of the whole Council, to which was referred the subject of the
recent transactions at Madawaska, ask leave to report : That, in common with their
fellow citizens, they view with feelings of just indignation, the unwarrantable and
oppressive acts of the authorities of the British Province of New Brunswick, in invading
the territory of this State with a military force, and arresting a number of our peaceable
citizens, compelling others to conceal themselves in the wilderness, and abandon their
homes, in order to escape the violence with which they were threatened.
" In this violation of the sovereignty of the State, we perceive the continuation of
that system of encroachment, which, by our forbearance, the Provincial Government
have long been enabled to practise for the purpose of extending their possession, and
afterwards relying on that possession, as the only foundation of the extraordinary claim
they still persevere in making to a considerable portion of the State. * * *
" On the 12th day of September last, they (the inhabitants of Madawaska) held a Town
Meeting for the purpose of electing a Representative, as required by the laws and consti
tution of this State.
" For these acts, four of the citizens have been arrested by the authorities of New
Brunswick, carried out of the State, and are now confined in jail at Frederickton, in
execution of a sentence pronounced against them, after the form of a trial in a Court of
that province." It concludes with a statement that the Governor had addressed
to the General Government —
" An urgent request that the proper measures might be adopted, to procure the
release of our Citizens, and protect our Territory from invasion."
united states' .The President was thus appealed to by Maine to protect them
Government con- J- J- * A
0f Milne.6™"3 from invasion ! He was appealed to — to obtain the release of agents
whom, with the slightest sense of honour, he ought to have been the
first to punish ; and whom the Government, with any sense of its
dignity abroad — any regard to its supremacy or power at home,
ought to have sought to abandon to the justice they had outraged.
And what does the President do? — He seeks to obtain their release.
so does the Bri- What does England do ?— Grant their release ! That is not enough:
tish Minister. O O
the British Agent pens, as if to insult the English tongue, the follow
ing words: — " Washington, November 28, 1831.
" The President, upon the receipt of this intelligence, having completely disavowed
the proceedings of Maine, and at the same time called upon the Governor of that State
to discountenance any attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the disputed territory, until
the question of boundary, as decided by the King of the Netherlands, should be formally
brought before the Senate of the United States, I thought it my duty so far to give

41
effect to the pacific intentions of the President, as to solicit the early attention of Sir
Archibald Campbell to the wishes of this Government, with respect to the persons who
had been guilty of these irregularities, and who were in jail at Fredericton.
" I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that General Campbell has
deemed it proper to exercise his prerogative in favour of the prisoners, and they have ac
cordingly been released from confinement, and their fines have been remitted.
" I have great pleasure in thus being enabled to communicate to your Lordship the
satisfaction which has been evinced by the President of the United States, in consequence
of the very conciliatory spirit in which Sir Archibald Campbell has acceded to the wishes
of the American Government in this transaction."
These outrages took place in the months of August and Sep
tember, not in October and November, as headed in the documents
presented to Parliament. There appears to have been no notice These facts e»
± x x eluded from
of them whatever taken by Lord Palmerston. The reader of the SiSS!64
diplomatic correspondence, as published during the Session of 1838,
would remain in perfect ignorance of the occurrence of such facts ;
all the papers referring to them having been collected together
and reserved until the Session had ended, and until the minds
of Members of Parliament had been made up on the unintelligible
fragments, — or their interest and patience exhausted, by the inex
tricable confusion in which this simple transaction had become
involved. The objects, however, of the opponents of the Award, were
now attained; outrages committed, — jurisdiction attempted — and
discussed in terms that falsified the position of England. Agitation
and irritation spread through the Union. The Boundary question
elevated in importance; and insult and aggression — inflicted with
impunity on England by a single member of the American Union
— accepted by her with extreme submission.
From this period, no further aggressions occurred for a space of
more than two years.
We must now revert to the diplomatic intercourse of the two
Governments.

PART IV.

DOUBLE INSTRUCTIONS OF LORD PALMERSTON, AND CON
SEQUENT REJECTION OF THE AWARD BY THE GOVERN
MENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

" HE SEEMS TO HAVE NOTHING AT HEAET, BUT THE GOOD OF MANKIND, AND THE PUTTING A STOP
TO MISCHIEF."— Franklin on the British Negotiator of the Treaty of 1783.

As Lord Palmerston, before making his first vague intimation Extraordinarydelay, of dat- —
transmissionDespatches.

to the British Minister at Washington, of the fact of the decision of E^LiSa'™
o * Despatches,

the King of Holland, and of the acquiescence of England in that
decision, had waited until time was allowed for the circulation of
Mr. Preble's Protest — until the prolonged silence of England had
awakened in America the hope of setting aside the Award — and
until the State of Maine had time to come to a formal decision
against it ; so now he delayed making the official communication to
the American Government, which he could not possibly avoid, until
he had intimation of the practical aggressions and outrages of the
subjects of the United States against the British Authorities, arous
ing feelings of hostility throughout the union, calculated to frustrate
any effect which might have been produced by England's ostensible
demand to proceed to the execution of the Award.
But as the Despatch of February 9th, dated as it is, thirty days Delay of Despatch
after the rendering of the Award by the King of Holland, did not
arrive at its destination until the 19th of April — that is, until ninety
days had elapsed ; so, in the present instance, does a delay occur
scarcely less calculated to awaken suspicion of systematically-
practised deception.
The memorable Despatches, dated 14th October, 1831, which we oroou4,M3».
have now to consider, were not received till the 18th of December,
being a delay of two months and four days. But without any irre-

ofFeb.9, 1831.

44
gularity, accidental or intentional, in this respect—no one who has
perused the preceding account of the outrages committed against
Great Britain under the authority (of the state of Maine— and there
fore) of the United States, can fail to inquire what steps were taken
by Lord Palmerston on so grave and alarming an event ? In what
strain had he remonstrated ? In what terms required the instan
taneous execution of the Award of the Sovereign Arbiter? The
Reader naturally looks to the next despatch from Lord Palmerston.
He finds in it no allusion at all to the subject. Its date is the 14th
Date of outrages. 0f October. He turns then to Papers (B) for the date of these
— October substi- *¦
tuted for August outrages# — The date, as given in the Index and the Heading, is
October, 1831 ; of course he will infer, that when the despatch
of 14th October was penned, Lord Palmerston could have had no
knowledge of the outrages committed.
It is true, that whoever read these documents when they
appeared, had no means of making such reference ; because the
papers connected with the transactions of Maine were withheld
until after the close of the Session. But there is evidence that
they were both printed at the same time j because there is reference
made in Papers (A) to the paging of Papers (B). An examination
of these will show that the outrages, indexed in October, occurred
on the 19th of August; consequently the intelligence had six
weeks to reach London (by other channels than Washington),
before the transmission of Lord Palmerston's instructions, supposing
the despatches of October 14th to have been transmitted on the
day they .were dated. A violation of the jurisdiction of the British
Crown, by authority, and with the declared intention of taikng
possession of the land, the subject of arbitration, is committed
on the 19th of August; despatches from the British Minister,
received at Washington four months after, take no notice of the
fact ; in the presentation of the papers to Parliament, the statement
of these outrages is not presented together with the diplomatic
correspondence ; when presented, the date of October ( in the
Index and heading) is given, instead of August.
Siv^pSriot'iy There is another circumstance, worthy of consideration in con-
congreSS?ssage '° nection with the period of the arrival of this despatch at
Washington. The Session of Congress was to open in the be
ginning of December; the1* President's Message to both Houses

45
became now a most important event in this discussion, which was
beginning to assume' the character of a new negociation. It was
therefore absolutely necessary that any step of the English Govern
ment towards realizing the objects it assumed to desire, should be
taken previously to the presidential Message to Congress — a Mes
sage wherein that very question would assume a paramount impor
tance; — a Message, which, in consequence of its expression of
opinion on that subject, was looked for with the greatest interest,
not only throughout the Union, but throughout the North American
possessions of Great Britain.
Nor is this all: the assemblage of the Members of both
Houses in Washington, was a period for which the British
Minister ought to have been armed and prepared with the utmost
solicitude. I omit the past; I take the negociation (if that word
can be so prostituted) as it stood at the time : — a measure, in which
Great Britain had a deep interest, was to be referred to the decision
of the American Senate. The majority, indeed, of the Senate was
known to be in favour of it ; but there was a number of individuals,
active, able, and energetic, using every means which interest or
ambition could prompt, ability, and ingenuity suggest, or duplicity
sanction, to impose upon the remainder of their compatriots, through
a false representation, not only of the facts, but of the intentions of
the British Government. These means being employed to lead the
American Senate into a decision hostile to Great Britain, what is
the diplomatic position of Great Britain at Washington? No official
step taken, or communication made ; — the Representee — the atf-
thorative and titular representative of Great Britain removed, and British charge
the Charge" d Affaires, ad interim, not merely left without in- strutted to do 'no-
structions, but having positive instructions to do nothing!
Looking upon this state of things, no less unwonted than un- Demand of fc
11. s* ai * "l i il' • 1 execution of the
accountable, it cannot fail to strike and to startle the inquirer, that ^ShiateTntiL
there is recorded in the Foreign Office, as dated, and therefore Foreign 0ffice-
despatched, on the 14th of October, (and therefore one month and
twenty-two days before the opening of the Session), a despatch
calling upon the American Government to accept the Award ; and
at the same time, dealing in a most conclusive and authoritative
manner with the objections raised against it by the State of Maine.
But this despatch does not arrive at Washington until after the
M

46
Message is delivered.* When it does arrive, it is accompanied with
a secret instruction, in an opposite sense !
Message to con- The Message of the President to the Congress of the 6th
gress of Dec. 0,0 "
December, 1831, is however any thing but unfavourable to the
Award, although abstaining from pronouncing an opinion. In
reference to the Treaty of Ghent, to the Convention of 1827, he
says, " The King of the Netherlands having, by the advice of the
" late President and His Britannic Majesty, been designated as
" such friendly Sovereign (who should be invited to investigate
" and make a decision upon the points of difference), it became my
" duty to carry with good faith the agreement so made into effect."
&5'tDes^ton°ofs On tne 18th December, Lord Palmerston's despatch of the
arrive"*11' ' 14th October arrived at Washington ; and as this document is ihe
most important of those that have been made public, and is the key
to the ensuing transactions, I have transferred it in extenso to
the Appendix, and request to it the reader's most serious atten
tion. It commences with instructing the Charge d Affaires to ad
dress, for the first time, an official communication to the American
Secretary of State, stating the King of Great Britain's assent to
the Award of the King of Holland, and requiring the American
* It is singular, that, during the course of this negociation, Lord Palmerston has written not
quite one despatch a year; which has arrived subsequently to the meeting of the Session, —
and, of course, to the delivery of the President's Message.
Date of Date of Date of
Lord Palmerston's Despatch. the President's Message. Arrival at Washington.
In 1831  .October 14th. December 6th. December 18th
1832  (See note* below.)
1833  December 21st, December 5th. :.. February 10th, 1834.
1834  October 30th. December 2nd, December 8th.
1835  October 30th. December 8th. December 27th.
1836  (No Communication.)
1837  November 19th. December 5th. January .10th, 1838.
There are five annual despatches, independent of the first despatch of February 9th, 1831,
" and that of February 25th, 1833. The time occupied in the transmission of these seven de
spatches (which constitute the negociations of seven years) is 390 days. The despatch of February
9th occupied in its passage 72 days ; those of the 14th Oetober, 1831, 66 days; and the mean
time of transmission, during the whole period of negociation, that is to say, between the date
(assumed to be the date at Downing Street) and the arrival at Washington, is 55 days and 18
hours. The average time occupied in the passage of common commercial letters has been, from
the year 1831 up to the establishment of steam communication, twenty-nine days.
* Despatch of February 25th, 1833, is in reply to a note of 21st July, 1832 ; aud therefore ought to be the
despatch of 1832. ' ' • '

effect.

47
Government to proceed to the execution of that Award. It then jd- rameMton-a
1 first Despatch of
recalls to notice and importance the protest of Mr. Preble, and °t^dti^3lLi
proceeds to say that, notwithstanding that protest, His Britannic
Majesty is persuaded " that the Government of the United States
" will not hesitate" to accept the Award of His Netherland Majesty :
— thus neutralizing the effect of the first communication, by a selec
tion of terms which shewed that the English Government considered
the future decision of the United States as optional, and not imperr
ative. Lord Palmerston then proceeds to argue the question. The
introduction of argument in this stage of the proceedings is a setting
aside of the question of right and treaty stipulation, upon which it
it now rested ; but the arguments themselves are conclusive. Lord
Palmerston effectually disproves, from their own mouths, the
frivolous- — (were the subject less grave, I should say — ludicrous)
objections, put forth by the opponents of this measure. These
arguments, employed at an earlier date, would have left no room
for discussion; and, had Lord Palmerston left the Minister at
Washington free to use his own judgment, his Lordship never
would have penned them, because they would not have failed to
have been used by the Minister himself, — and urged at the moment
when they were called for, and would have been of use. By delaying
to instruct, and by forbidding to discuss, Lord Palmerston allowed
the opposition to get root, and to gain head ; reserving to himself
the opportunity of appearing to advocate British rights, when that
advocacy would be of no avail, — and of overthrowing, triumphantly,
the American fallacies, after these fallacies had produced their effect.
This despatch, remaining in the Foreign office, or produced to Par
liament, becomes proof of his ability ; it stands a record of his zeal
for British interests, — " the polar star — the leading principle of his
"¦ policy," and tends further to the complication of this, the simplest
of all possible questions, as it stood on the 10th of January :-^an
arbitration, sealed, signed, and delivered to parties mutually bound
to abide by it.
Nearly twelve months had been allowed, as we have seen, to
elapse, before the British Minister had been permitted to receive any
instructions on the subject of the Award. On the 18th December
the instructions just referred to had been received ; and feeble, con
tradictory, and untimely as they are, not a month— a week-1— a day—

Brst.

48
or even an hour, are they suffered to remain without subsidiary
id. paimersws instructions, by which, whatever effect they could produce was
second Despatch J " / f\ 1 A \9t
conteadiets the entireiy effaced !— Another despatch, of the same date, (Oct. 14,)*
and of course contained in the same bag, prepares the British Charge"
d Affaires, to look to a new negotiation as being the "ulterior",
and therefore real views of His Majesty's Government. This
despatch will also be found, in extenso, in the Appendix.-}- Lord
Palmerston commences by stating that, in reference to the other
despatch of the same date, the simple and unconditional acceptance
of the Award is " the only course to be pursued consistently with the
" respective obligations of the two Governments." He continues, " You
" are nevertheless authorized to intimate privately, upon any suitable
" occasion, a modification of the Award by a reciprocal exchange or
" concession." " You will, however," he adds, " be particularly
" cautious in making any communication of this nature, to guard
" against the possibility of being misunderstood as inviting negoci-
" ation as a substitute for the adoption of the Award."
Bewilders the ' From such instructions, what would any man comprehend, save
mind of the . ."'....
charged' Affaires, ^at he was to obtain — without appearing to mvite — negotiation as
a substitute for adoption. The instructions in themselves are contra
dictory and self-destructive ; but as the contradiction destroyed in
the British Agent's mind all idea of a determination of England
that the stipulation should be fulfilled, it rendered him incapable of
doing that which his duty required, viz. — the enforcement, by every
means, of the adoption of the Award, and the energetic expression
of the determination of England, that it should be so accepted ;
furthermore, it placed that Agent in a position of dilemma, so that,
whatever line he took, Lord Palmerston had reserved to himself the
faculty of disavowing his act, and disgracing him, — a position, if
calculated for nothing else, eminently calculated to render him
timid and inefficient.
Mr. Bankhead, in the first instance, communicates to the
American Government only the first despatch of Oct. 14th, and the
* It is singular that the office-number of none of the Despatches is given. There is, on
one occasion, a reference by number to a Despatch, containing the opinion of the President
expressed to the British Minister, which I am unable to find, and which is certainly not to
be found, by its reference, in the published documents.
¦j- See Appendix, part 4, No. 2, page v.

49
American Secretary of State declines answering (a new authority
having now intervened) until the decision of the Senate had taken
place. For more than three months the question then remains in S!1^^
suspense ; but, on the 29th March, 1832, Mr. Bankhead discovers S*Sili
through the newspapers, that Maine had agreed, under certain con
ditions, to subscribe to the Award, and that the United States Go
vernment had taken steps to adjust the difference to the satisfaction
of Maine.* It thus appears that, after all the temptations held out by
Lord Palmerston, the general integrity of the Senate, as that of the
Executive, was still unprepared for this flagrant violation of Na
tional compact; but the British Charge" d Affaires, after waiting; six ™e. ^ d/
J. J *s Jii 7 O Affaires suspects
months from the period of his communication of the first despatch of tt^TTfl
r\ i a t • • i i-i i • 14th' does not re"
Oct. 14th, receiving no reply to his despatches — -no communication stftajiS
from the Foreign Office — has commenced to become alarmed lest
he should not be fulfilling the real and " ulterior views " of his
chief, as communicated by his second, and secret, Despatch of
October 14th; and, consequently, on the eve# of the decision of the Makes use 0f the
question by the Senate, he intimates to the American Secretary
of State the substance of that second despatch. In reporting
this step to Lord Palmerston, he commences with excusing himself
for having reserved, up to that period, this second despatch. " I did
so," says he, " because the Senate had shewn no disposition to
take up the question, and I thought that the slightest intimation
" on my part as to the possibility of future negociation, would
" perhaps endanger its favourable decision." Is not this reason
most clear and imperative for not making the communication at all ?
Used, as it is, as an excuse for not having done so before, it
proves the conviction impressed upon his mind, that the Ostensible
views, conveyed in the first despatch of October 14th, were not the
real views of his chief.
If one moment could have been selected more favourable than
another for endangering the decision, it was that moment, when
the Senate was about to come to its decision: consequently, "I Justifies htosdf
" thought," says Mr. Bankhead, " that this was the proper moment
" informally to intimate to the Secretary of State that "His
* See Appendix, Part 4, No. 3, page vi.
N

a

for not doing so
before.

50
" Majesty's Government might not be indisposed to enter into
" negociation with this Government, with a view to effect some
" modification by a reciprocal exchange and concession." The con-
SS3£a5& sequence of this step, as may be expected, immediately appears :—
the next despatch, given in extract,* commences " It is with great
" regret, that I announce to your Lordship, that the Senate has
" refused to sanction the acquiescence, &c."
We have thus arrived at the conclusion of the first phase of
this negociation : — viz. the rejection, by the Senate of the United
States, of the Award of the King of Holland, brought about, as I
conceive no impartial man who will study even these documents,
(selected, separated, and misplaced as they are,) can hesitate to admit,
by the acts, positive and negative, of the British Minister. During
the eighteen months of suspense and indecision, no step was taken
by Great Britain, in any way calculated to bring about an adjust
ment of the difference : every imaginable step was taken to pre
vent it. There is a continuous chain of evidence proving the
favourable disposition, .during seventeen months, (until the commu
nication of the second despatch of October 14th), of the majority
of the Congress and Senate, and of the President, towards the
adoption of the Award.
Before leaving this part of the question, I will refer to and
establish three collateral points, — as confirmatory of these con
clusions.
collateral proofs First, the absence of all censure of Mr. Bankhead for the
of an intention on
Mmerston S communication of the second despatch of October 14th; even after
the result of that communication had appeared, in the rejection of
the Award. Secondly, the indisposition of the Senate to reject
the Award, up to the period of Mr. Bankhead's communication.
Thirdly, the language of Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons,
as entirely corroborative of the views here given of his intentions
in this matter.
ist.-Mr. Bank- First. — Mr. Bankhead, in his despatch of June the 13th, as in
his previous despatches, has expressed his conviction that the de
cision of the Senate would be favourable to the adoption of the Award.
It is upon this ground that he justifies, it is this fact that he assigns as
the motive for, his communication of what he terms " the ulterior
* As each despatch refers exclusively to one subject, the presentation of extracts from
despatches, instead of entire despatches, requires explanation.

aside the Award.

head not cen
sured.

51
" views of His Majesty's Government." The subsequent rejection
of the Award proves, either that his opinion of the disposition of the
Senate had been erroneous, or that his communication had been the
means of altering the favourable disposition which previously had
existed. In the one case, he showed himself perfectly incompetent
to fulfil the duties of his office ; in the other, he had acted in direct
violation of the interests of Great Britain, and had consequently
become liable to the extremest penalty of diplomatic delinquency, —
and [Lord Palmerston had no alternative between censure of that
servant, and dereliction of his own duty. But, as Lord Palmerston,
in confiding to him the secret proposal of negociation, had, by the
peculiar construction of the language he had used, thrown upon him
the entire responsibility of its employment, and directed him to be
particularly cautious, in making any communication of this nature,
to guard against the possibility of being (mis)understood as inviting
negociation as a substitute for the adoption of the Award; — and as
Mr. Bankhead himself had stated " that the slightest intimation on
" his part as to the possibility of future negociation might endanger
" the favourable decision of the Senate" : — it is clear that he had
contravened the positive instructions of his chief, and had acted in
opposition to his own emphatically expressed conviction . of his duty.
If therefore Lord Palmerston, with the whole facts before him, with
the rejection of the Award coming after the dangerous intimation of
negociation as a substitute for adoption, did not visit with his
severest censure, the functionary by whom that intimation had ]^en
so unfortunately made, — it follows, that he had placed him in that
position of embarrassment with a purpose — and that the unfortunate
step so taken, was that which Lord Palmerston desired.
Second. — On the return of Sir Charles Vaughan to Washington, 24.-3^ 0fa«.
a o United States fa-
it was impossible he should not in some degree reconsider what had 1™$%'?° *«
taken place during his absence, and in the despatch of his, dated f^^fl
July, 1833, (of which only an extract is given), he makes an obser
vation upon the authority of the Senate, to the effect that it was
limited to advising and consenting to ratify, or advising the instruc
tions to be given previously to opening a negociation ; adding, that
when in the month of July it advised the rejection of the Award of
the King of the Netherlands, it took the initiative in the process of
negociation which it directed the President to open at Washington,
Sir C. Vaughan was therefore of opinion that they had not

52
authority constitutionally to interfere, and that in this instance they
had departed from their constitutional practice. There was indeed
no use in alluding to the subject at that time, or in speaking at all in
that sense to Lord Palmerston; but this indication alone, from Sir C.
Vaughan, is sufficient to shew that unless he had been removed from
Washington, even the despatch of Feb. 9th would not have sufficed
to keep him silent and indifferent, when intrigues and misrepresen
tations such as these were employed to obstruct a measure of which
his ostensible instructions required the adoption.
Sir C. Vaughan, in addressing the American Secretary of
State, bursts out more indignantly against the decision of the
Senate ; " When the undersigned finds so important a measure
" defeated by a bare majority — when the majority of only one
" decides the Senate to open a new negociation, &c." This was in
March, 1834, consequently two years after the rejection of the
Award. It is the first time that any allusion has been made on the
part of England ; and slight and fleeting, timid and inoffensive, as is
the remark, it calls forth a long and complicated reply from the
American Secretary of State. And I refer to the correspondence,
for the purpose of obtaining the Evidence of Mr. M'Lean-, the
American Secretary of State, as to the disposition of the Senate —
" The Committee," says Mr. M'Lean, under date, March 31st, 1834,
" to whom the President's Message was referred, and to whose Report
" Sir Charles has alluded, expressed the opinion that in this case
" (agquestion referring to the practice of the Senate), the United
" States were not bound by the decision of the Award, as such ;
Fawnrahiedispo- " though, on grounds of expediency, a mai'ority of the Committee
sition of the Se- ° *1 . n . . , n
Awardto™anited " were favourable to its adoption, and therefore they recommended
iLrttor^ofStete! " a positive and affirmative resolution, &c." As the note from
which this is an extract is an attempt to prove (and proceeds on
the assumption that it does establish), that a considerable majority
in the Senate were unfavourable to the Award, this admission is
valuable ; and not less so, on account of the grounds assumed for
their adherence to the Award, — not the conviction that the Award
was binding, but that — it was expedient ! thus shewing (whatever
the truth of the previous assertion,) the desire then prevalent in
the breasts of the Senators of America, to concede even what
(the American Secretary asserts) they deemed a right, or to make

5|
what they considered a sacrifice, to maintain harmony and good
will with Great Britain.
But Mr. Bankhead, in communicating; the reiection of the Modeofobtaining
~ J the rejection of
Award, speaks of the Senate in the following terms :— " This sub- shena£ardl5ytlie
' ject was submitted to that body early in the Session, and accom-
' panied by the earnest wish of the President, that the Award should
' be agreed to. The message was referred to the Committee on
' Foreign Relations, who reported their opinion that the President's
' views should be acceded to. A motion was then made, that the
' votes of two-thirds of the Senate should be considered necessary to
' pronounce a final opinion. This enabled the opponents of the mea-
' sure to defeat the views of Government ; and finally, the Senate
' withheld their assent to the Award of His Netherland Majesty, and
' recommended to the President to enter into farther negociations
' respecting the Territory in dispute." Again, Mr. Bankhead, on
the 28th of July, says, " I take the liberty of transmitting to your
' Lordship an account of the proceedings which took place in the
' Senate, in their executive capacity, during the discussion upon
' the Award of the King of the Netherlands. Your Lordship will
' observe by the perusal of this paper* that the Senate was divided
' into three parties : the first composed of those who desired the
' acceptance of the Award ; among them was Mr. Tazewell, the
' Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations ; the second was
' composed of those who thought that the question did not come
' under the cognizance of the Senate ; and the third party included
' those who were opposed to the acceptance of the Award. The
' unfortunate wording of that Instrument, which might imply
' mediation as well as decision, has given a strong hold to those
' who were opposed to that measure."
Here then, on the testimony of the American functionaries,
that is, of the adverse party ; and of the British functionaries, that
is, of the over-reached parties ; there is proof of the favourable
disposition of the Senate to whom the decision was referred ; so
that the rejection by that body can be attributed only to the impres
sion produced upon them, that England would not take unkindly
their decision against herself, or even, that the English Ministry
* This important inclosure is not given.
0

desired that the Boundary question should not be settled. These
facts being before Lord Palmerston, he has no censure to convey to
the Agent through whose means these dispositions were sacrificed,
and re-entrusts him with the representation of Great Britain at
Washington.
nolurS'tcu'on In entering into this point, it must not be for a moment forgotten,
1^! sSo'n- that the Senate had nothing to do with the question ; that the
ed the Convention ° 1
ofl827- Senate had already considered the Convention of 1827, as absolute
and final ; and whatever had been the decision of the Senate, or
whatever the steps of the American Government, no course was left
open to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, except
to require the immediate execution of the decision of the Arbiter.
Had the United States resisted, it remained but for him to make his
report to the Government, and for the Government to go to
Parliament, and to transfer to Parliament the responsibility — too
grave for any administration to assume; — that of the admission of a
declaration by a foreign power, that the obligations by which it had
become bound to this country should not be fulfilled.'
3d._M. Mmer- j now come to the third point : viz. Lord Palmerston's conduct
ston s conduct in 1
the House of Com* • .1 tt n r^\ „
mons. in the House ot Commons.
Immediately upon the reception of the Award of the King of
p^uSLS Holland, the natural, the necessary course for the Foreign Minister,
was to declare that decision to Parliament and the country ; and,
thereby support the action of the British Minister at Washington,
fortify himself at home by the national support, and exhibit to the
United States the decision of Great Britain to carry it into effect.
The negociations were terminated — the affairs wound up — the
decision given — the assent of His Majesty notified to the Sovereign
Arbiter ; and consequently there was nothing further to do. There
were no negociations to be embarrassed by publicity — there was
no honest or then intelligible motive for secresy or reserve — there
was every motive for instantaneous publication. There was indeed
a necessity — from regard to the feelings and interests of our North
American Colonies, not less than with a view to any possible
resistance on the part of the United States — at once to proclaim
the conclusion of the negociations and the decision of the Go-
p^iislSdi9not vernment. No such step however is taken by Lord Palmerston;
and these extraordinary transactions exhibit no step more extra-

55
ordinary than this concealment, where every public motive and
every private feeling of the Minister combined to call for the pub
lication of a fortunate event — of the only diplomatic success which
perhaps England ever obtained.
On the 14th February* a Member of the House of Commons, ^ord Paimerston
interested in the North American Colonies, puts a question to the MfbjecT
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and requires to know whether
the negociation has been completed, and whether there is any
objection to the production of the decision. Lord Palmerston, *
with that peculiar adaptation of phraseology, and that facility of
perverting the sense of the question to which he replies, which
characterize each of the well-weighed periods that escape from his
lips, answers in the following terms : — ¦" I am not aware of any f^,* giTB
" circumstances which would render it incumbent on His Majesty's
" Ministers to lay that decision before the House: if the honourable
" gentleman, or any other Member, have a specific motion to make
" on the subject, it is of course in his power to do so."
Upon this, Mr. Robinson gave notice of a specific motion ^j"^™3^ *£
upon the subject, and when it comes in this shape before the House, f^tr^^Lt,
Lord Palmerston resists the production of the document ; refuses
to assign any reason for so doing ; " appeals to the House for
" sufficient reliance on the declaration which he makes in his
" Ministerial capacity," to resist the production of the document.
He will make no statement upon the subject ; he will assign no
reason for his silence: but " he trusts that the House will not
" consider the circumstances of the case to have been such as have
" been stated by the honourable gentleman, in consequence of his
" not answering him."-f

* The first despatch of February 9th, as has already been stated, did not reach its destination
until two months and ten days after the day when it is assumed to be dated. There were, con
nected with the substance of that despatch, reasons for supposing that this delay had not been
accidental, and that the despatch had been post-dated, or that its transmission had been postponed.
It is not unlikely that the interest which had been manifested, even by one Member of the House
of Commons, was a motive for hastening this first communication.
fThe discussion in the House of Commons on the 14th March, appears to me to be so
important, that I have given it in the Appendix. I have also added two subsequent discussions,
including all that transpired in the House of Commons during this prolonged negociation.— See
Appendix, pp. vii-x.

of the case. Mo
tives of such
statement.

56
False statement His assumption, that the (correct) statement of the case was
of the case. Mo- J- * \ '
false — his throwing himself upon the confidence of the House, in
his Ministerial capacity, to avert the expression of that decision
which the English Government had in reality taken — can leave no
doubt as to his having then deliberately formed the plan of setting
aside that decision; and of his having, from the earliest hour,
commenced a systematic suppression of the truth, and falsification
of the facts; thereby to be enabled to carry this purpose into
% execution, and bewilder and mislead opinion after it was effected.
The conception of such a scheme might be considered heroic,
were it not that the perfect ease with which it has been executed,
and the complete delusion with which it has been followed, shows
that facilities so great must have been calculated upon. In a
degraded age, not even crimes can have the character of grandeur.
The effect upon the United States, of language like that used
in the House of Commons, by a British Minister, — language
repeated again with an interval of five years, — it is needless to
point out or to comment upon. The purpose for which it was
intended, was realized ; and into the official documents themselves,
strange to say, has slipped the evidence of its effects.
Sir John Harvey thus writes to Lord Glenelg : — (1837.)
laigu^in'Se3 " I will take care to keep your Lordship and Her Majesty's
House leads to -m/r' * vrr • J J
sSfsMainte " Minister at Washington, promptly informed of all that may occur
" connected with, these vexatious proceedings ; to which I have
" been assured that some (doubtless wilful) misconception on the
" part of the people of Maine, of a declaration imputed to Lord
" Palmerston, in his place in the House of Commons, some months
" ago, if it did not actually give rise, yet is believed to have given
" an increased degree of confidence on their part."

PART V .

COURSE OF NEGOCIATIONS SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE RE
JECTION OF THE AWARD BY THE UNITED STATES.

"BESTIB THYSELF IN ANT THING, EATHEB THAN. STAND IDLE."
Hesiod (at quoted by Socrates, and reported by Zenophon.)

The Award is thus at length rejected by the United States! Award rejected.
— What was now to be done ? — The question could not solve itself.
Events could not occur, to alter or to modify circumstances
thus intractable : time could not change interests thus opposed.
Stipulations, conventions, commissioners, negotiations, — had, over
and over, been tried in vain. Judgment itself had been discarded
with indignity and contempt. Still, it was impossible to discard
that judgment, and yet to appear to do nothing. We will now trace
the course of the subsequent interchange of proposals, which, it is
to be assumed, were honestly entertained by the proposers, and
believed capable of effecting a more advantageous settlement than
the Award which they had rejected.
On the 21st July, 1832, the United States announce to Great American ProPo-
C sal of 1832.
Britain, in the most summary manner, the rejection of the Award,
and propose a new negotiation. This is the first communication of
the United States. Sir C. Vaughan is then sent back. He is sir c. vaughan
instructed to assent to the rejection of the Award — to assert the gj™*^^'
conviction of the British Government, " that it is utterly hopeless to S^S^rther
. , -i hopeless : —
" attempt to settle the question by a new negotiation — and to assure
the American Minister, " that upon receiving satisfactory expla- to assert the
x . . . , readiness of tl
"nations, they will enter upon the new negotiation in the most E ¦
" friendly spirit and the most sincere desire, &c. " An interchange
p

the
n-
ment to negociate.

1833.

58
then ensues of long, involved, and fruitless notes. Sir C. Vaughan
is now allowed to discuss ; he is suffered to exhibit the valuelessness
of the propositions, and the groundlessness of the hopes of ad
justment. Mr. Vail, (in the mean time), in London, on the
invitation of Lord Palmerston, advancing the very points that Sir
Charles Vaughan, at Washington, is left to contradict.
tus negociation The first discussion of the American proposal, occupies the
occupies the year n t i i
year 1833, and eighteen folio pages of the produced papers. —
The third annual Presidential Message comes round, without
any notice of them being deigned by Lord Palmerston, and, as
usual, his despatch arrives after the Session has opened. The
American Government, with the most perfect coolness, assert : —
" These difficulties arise from a denial of the power of the General
" Government, under the constitution of the United, States, to
" dispose of any portion of territory belonging to either of the States
" composing the Union." Hence all negotiation was vain ; and this
single statement must instantly have put an end to all discussion,
had there been any real object in debate.
To this Sir Charles Vaughan replies : —
" The undersigned "will lose no time in submitting the proposition made by the
Government of the United States to His Majesty's Government ; as the President, it
appears from Mr. M'Lean's letter, is not authorized, after the recent proceedings in the
Senate, to agree upon a conventional line of boundary, without the consent of the State
of Maine ; which it is not probable would be given, while there remains a reasonable
prospect of discovering the line of the Treaty of 1783."
Sir Charles Vaughan however remonstrates thus with his chief,
• in transmitting the American note —
" To admit the pretensions of Maine, would be to allow the effects of the Treaty to
be construed entirely to the advantage of the United States." " It is surely therefore
for the two Governments to remedy any defects in the original contract, and to carry it
into complete execution, without reference to the pretensions of any particular State."
" It is utterly impossible to establish a division of the disputed Territory according to
that Treaty, and yet we are assured that certain insurmountable constitutional difficulties
must restrict the Government of the United States to treat only upon that basis.
" At the time when His Majesty's Government is called upon to deliberate upon
the only deviation from his restrictions which the President feels himself authorized to
make, 1 cannot refrain from submitting to your Lordship these observations, upon the
pretensions of Maine which have imposed restrictions upon, the powers of the executive
directed to settle this question, and upon the hopelessness of arriving at any satisfactory
result, if we are to adher to the letter of the Treaty."

59
And all this takes place in the face of the prescriptive jurisdic
tion of Great Britain, over the disputed Territory ! Sir Charles
Vaughan says —
" The rejection of Mr. Livingston's proposition, and the impossibility of engaging Negociation
the Government of the United States to treat for a conventional line, must have the
effect, I presume, of leaving the disputed territory in the possession of His Majesty,
unless it should still be left at the option of this Government to acquiesce in the
boundary suggested by the King of the Netherlands."

Observe, in the term " suggested," the departure from the Adoption by ot.
7 . . . . ~° . x Britain of the lan-
term decision, — hitherto employed by Great Britain. !mEnsdb5,the
The new proposal brought out by this process is — a project of
negociation without a prospect of a settlement — only as a means of
overcoming supposed " constitutional difficulties." The rights of
Great Britain are thus made to depend on 'the option of the United
States : — the Minister of England, who sanctions the existence of
a fleet -of fifty pennants within ten days' sail of London, on the
ground of a Russian review, prepares to justify the aggressions of
America on our North American Colonies, by the " constitutional
" difficulties" of the United States.
The new proposal is, that Commissioners be appointed to
settle " a line, deviating only from the defective description in the
Treaty of 1783, by 'permitting a search for highlands, in any direc
tion westward of the line due north from the St. Croix laid down
in that Treaty."
To deviate from a treaty in one point, is to invalidate it in all ;
for it cannot be deviated from, in any respect, excepting by an
authority that extends to all. The pretence for rejecting the Award
of the King of Holland was, that it had departed from (it was
assumed) the terms (as were assumed) of the Treaty of 1783.
This is met by a counter proposal on the part of Great Britain,
conveyed in two despatches, dated December 21st, 1833 ; wherein
Lord Palmerston proposes the adoption of seven of the grounds of
decision contained in the Award of the King of Holland, while
agreeing to reject the conclusions to which they lead. Not content
with this, he now reasons against the Award he had before adopted,
and proposes a new negociation ; — after having declared any new
negociation "'utterly hopeless."

60

Proposals and
refusals of 1B34.1

Proposals and
refusals of 1835,

Specimens of the
Negociations.

In his second Despatch of the same date, he virtually admits
the pretended " constitutional obstacles" on the part of the United
States, by entering into a discussion on the subject.
The arguing of these propositions occupies another year; and
then comes the periodical despatch of Lord Palmerston for the
year 1834. It is dated October 30, and concludes thus : — " His
" Majesty's Government having once submitted this point," — [the
question of the Atlantic and St. Lawrence rivers,] — " in common
" with others, to the judgment of an impartial arbitrator, by whose
"award they have declared themselves ready to abide, they cannot now
" consent to refer it to any other arbitration."
Of what use is saying that he will not refer to another arbitra
tion, when he never has exacted the execution of the decision
which resulted from the first ?
The notes continue to be exchanged ; and on April 28th, 1835,
the American Secretary of State proposes another new Commission,
which is replied to by Lord Palmerston on the same day in 1835 as
his despatch of the previous year. .The following are specimens of
the communications, and of the negociators : —
" The President has derived a satisfaction proportionate to his deep sense of its
importance, from the success which has attended the past efforts of the two Govern
ments, in removing existing, and preventing the recurrence of new, obstacles, to the
most liberal and friendly intercourse between them."
Lord Palmerston, on the 30th October, 1835, says, —
" His Majesty's Government have observed with the greatest pleasure, during the ,
whole of the communications which of late have taken place on this question, the
friendly and conciliatory spirit which has been manifested by the President of the United
States ; and they are themselves equally animated by the sincerest desire to settle this
matter by an arrangement just and honourable for both parties.
"His Majesty's. Government are fully convinced that if the repeated attempts
which they have made to come to an understanding on this subject with the Government
of the United States, have not been attended with success, the failure of their endeavours
has been owing to no want of a corresponding disposition on the part of the President,
but has arisen from difficulties on his side over which he has had no control.
" The time seems, however, now to be arrived, when it has become expedient to
take a review of the position in which the discussion between the two Governments
stands ; and by separating those plans of arrangement which have failed, from those
which are yet susceptible of being adopted, to disencumber our future communications of
all useless matter, and to confine them to such suggestions only as may by possibility
lead to a practical result.

61
" His Majesty's Government, on receiving the Award of the King of the Nether
lands, announced, without any hesitation, their willingness to abide by that Award, if it
should be equally accepted by the United States."
The acceptance, or the non-acceptance, of the American
Government, formed no part of the decision of England. The de
cision of England was absolute — it was never stated in any way to
be contingent on any view or measure, policy or act, of America.
Who ever heard of the acquiescence of both parties, after judgments
being required to make it binding ? They bound themselves before
judgment, solely with the view of over-ruling resistance. If the
adoption of an Award were optional, who would submit differences to
an arbiter — who would arbitrate ? The proposition is so preposterous,
that it requires but to be pointed out, to display the character of the
whole transaction; and this passage alone, if it was the only one pub
lished, could leave no doubt as to the intentions of the principal actor.
But the statement is moreover false : Lord Palmerston, in October,
1835, dares — what he did not dare in 1831 ; and, confident of the in
capacity of the men with whom he has to deal, he asserts in 1835, that
the monstrous proposition he gives utterance to then, had been already
uttered in 1831. The opposition having been some months in office,
and become committed, he could now proceed with greater decision.
The terms, explanatory of the proceedings, have been vused by
Lord Palmerston himself. The communications were " all useless
" matter," and contrived so as not to lead by any " possibility
" to a practical result." He continues : —
"But their expectations were not realized. The Senate of the United States
refuseo", in July, 1832, to subscribe to the Award; and during the three years which
have elapsed since that time, although the British Government has more than once
declared that it was still ready to abide by its offer to accept the Award, the Government
of the United States has as often replied that on its part that Award could not be
agreed to.
"The British Government must now, in its turn, declare, that it considers itself, by
this refusal of the United States, fully and entirely released from the conditional offer
which it had made, and you are instructed distinctly to announce to the President, that
the British Government withdraws its consent to accept the territorial compromise
recommended by the King of the Netherlands."
Then comes a refusal to accede to the proposal of the President ; Britisn pi.opo„a]
after that, Lord Palmerston makes a counter proposal : — he suggests isss?"
Q

62

British proposal
rejected by the
United States.—
Counter proposal
rejected by Eng
land.

treating for a new conventional or partition line, which " His
" Majesty's Government conceive that the natural features of the
disputed Territory would afford peculiar facilities for drawing."
The King of the Netherlands gave to England one-third, and
to America two-thirds. The division would have taken one-fourth
from the American share, and added one-half to that of Great
Britain: if the United States refused to accept so favourable a
proposition, Lord Palmerston was perfectly safe in proposing a
partition. This proposal is rejected by the United States, who re-propose
the River St. John as boundary. This in turn is rejected by
England. The United States require to be put in possession of
the specific mode of appointing Commissioners according to the
previous proposition of Great Britain ; promising, when put in
possession of such information, — " a reply" I
A new Minister then arrives. — He is left without any commu
nication from Lord Palmerston for eighteen months. Twenty-five
months after his former despatch, Lord Palmerston writes : —

Negociations of
1837.

Sir,

" Viscount Palmerston to Henry S. Fox, Esq.
"Foreign Office, November 19, 1837-

" Various circumstances have hitherto prevented Her Majesty's Government from
giving you instructions with reference to the negotiation with the United States, upon
the subject of the North-eastern Boundary. Those instructions it is now my duty to
convey to you.
" I have accordingly to request that you will express to the Government of the
United States the sincere regret of that of Great Britain, that the long continued
endeavours of both parties to come to a settlement of this important matter, have hitherto
been unavailing ; but you will assure Mr. Forsyth, that the British Government feel an
undiminished desire to co-operate with the Cabinet of Washington, for the attainment
of this object of mutual interest ; and that they have learned, with great satisfaction,
that their sentiments on this point are fully shared by the existing President.
" The communications which, during the last few years, have taken place upon this
subject, between the two Governments, if they have not led to a solution of the questions
at issue, have at least narrowed the field of future discussion.
" Both Governments have agreed to consider the Award of the King of the Nether
lands as binding upon neither party ; and the two Governments therefore are as free in
this respect as they were before the reference to that Sovereign was made."
Before this composition has traversed one-half of the Atlantic,
the President (the agitation in Canada having commenced), ex-
presses himself to Congress in the following strain : —

63
" It is with unfeigned regret that the people of the United States must look back
upon the abortive efforts made by the Executive, for a period of more than half a century,
to determine, what no nation should suffer long to remain in dispute, the true line which
divides its possessions from those of other Powers. It is not to be disguised that, with
full confidence often expressed in .the desire of the British Government to terminate it,
we are apparently as far from its adjustment as we were at the time of signing the Treaty
of Peace in 1783."
During the .course of these anomalous negociations, not less
anomalous were the practical relations of the two Powers.— The Excited state of
JT the Provinces lo-
neighbouring American states, invited to aggression by the con- Jn^hSS
duct of the English Government, the language of Lord Palmerston ^°e^seS on
in the House of Commons, and the bearing of the British Minister
at Washington: while the tone of the Colonial Minister maintained
confidence among the British Colonists, and the Military Governors
of these Provinces " asserted and maintained " at all hazards* the
prescriptive rights of jurisdiction of the British Crown. It is need
less to dwell upon the effect of this excitement upon the public
mind of America ; and the evidence afforded even by the parlia
mentary papers suffices to show that this excitement had its imme
diate cause in the language used by Lord Palmerston in the House
of Commons. While the Foreign Office carefully abstains from any de
cision, or from any act, in connection with these outrages, a very
considerable amount of importance is given to them, in the ap
parent negociation between the two States, to which they give
rise. The aggressions of Maine, which are detailed in Part III,
and which were made so powerfully to tell upon the rejection
of the Award, never called forth any expression of opinion what
ever upon the part of Lord Palmerston. These outrages, (with a
dispute about the cutting of timber, two years afterwards), were,
however, the only positive measures of aggression resorted to by
the United States, until the approach of the troubles in Canada.
In regard to these aggressions on the disputed Territory, there is a
singular exhibition of unavailing activity and idle business ; giving
rise, for the time, to an appearance of zeal for the public service,
and leaving behind a mass of utterly useless matter, well calculated
to repel any inquirer. Between the 4th of October, 1831, and the
* Sir Archibald Campbell.—January 20, 1834.

M Ml

64
4th of March, 1834, seven communications were addressed by the
Governor of New Brunswick to the British Minister at Washington ;
to these, there are three replies. There are seven communications
from the Minister at Washington to the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs. There are twelve notes exchanged between the British
Minister at Washington and the American Secretary of State.
Besides these twenty-nine diplomatic papers, there are a host of
documents, — statements, declarations, affidavits, and public acts, —
occupying in all twenty-six folio pages ; and of which Lord Palmer
ston takes not the slightest, notice, and from which no result of
any kind appears.
caS?1"^™ I cannot help adding another specimen of this diplomatic
tiomSreu^on8" intercourse. Mr. Bankhead transmits to the Foreign Office, on
February 21st, 1836, an account of an assault, committed by the
inhabitants of the State of Maine, in the territory of Lower Canada,
in October of the previous year ; " the scene of which," says Lord
Gosford, " was not in the disputed territory." In this despatch there
are nineteen inclosures, and they occupy twenty-four folio pages.
Neither Lord Palmerston nor the American Secretary seem to take
any notice of the communication. However, on the 12th of January
of the following year, the American Secretary replies by a few lines,
enclosing thirty-three documents, in contradiction and reply !
These occupy twenty-six folios. This correspondence occupies fifty
folio pages, and ends with a despatch from Lord Palmerston, who,
after twenty-two months' delay, writes thus to Mr. Fox, on the 22nd
of July, 1837.
" With reference to your despatch of the 25th of January last, relative to the
outrage that was committed in October, 1835, within the Canadian Frontier, by certain
citizens of the State of New Hampshire, — 1 have to instruct you to point out to
the American Secretary of State, the unjustifiable violation of territory indisputably
British, which was committed on the occasion referred to ; to express a conviction that
such an act must incur the disapprobation of the President ; and to say that, if it has
not been punished, its impunity must have arisen from some insurmountable difficulties of
constitutional action."
It is a novel procedure in diplomacy, to suggest an excuse for
an injury as the means by which redress is to be obtained ! To
advance an hypothesis in an irrelevant matter, and to cast an impu
tation on the constitutional character of. an independent State, has,

65
I believe, been hitherto unheard of in international correspondence.
So complete a displacement of the question at issue — so entire a
departure from the forms of the subject and the style of the office —
so artful a leading away of the mind of the reader from the inten
tion of the writer, and from the effect of the communication — could
not have fortuitously presented themselves to the writer's mind ; nor
could ideas so disjointed, and propositions so unnatural, have been
brought together in a single phrase, except by an ominous concert
of ability and design.
It will have been observed that throughout these negociations, Jurisdiction m
._ , o o the disputed terri-
England practically held the whole question in her hands ; that £giS?d ta
the prescriptive and recognized jurisdiction over the disputed
territory was vested in her, and formally established. One of the
principal objects of the outrages that were committed on the
northern frontier, and of the specific and public acts of the
Representatives of the State of Maine, appears to have been the
confusing and invalidating of this right and of this jurisdiction on
the part of Great Britain. It is upon this point that the warlike
proceedings, the intelligence of which has recently reached this
country, entirely hinge. Until the Award of the King of Holland
is carried into effect, this is the only point upon which any difference
can by possibility arise. This question is of the deepest importance,
therefore, as being the end to which (if design there be), all these
complications are directed ; and to which, at all events, they tend.
Unless this right is confused, it cannot be set aside ; and if not set
aside, the non-settlement of the question leaves the disputed territory
in the hands of Great Britain.
The first attempt against the jurisdiction of the British Crown Attempt of Maine
„ , . rP,-, in I837. t° exer-
took place in 1831, for the purpose which we have seen, lhat be- ^SefwIS1'
ing accomplished, no further movements were attempted until the caST'8
end of 1837 ; when, (according to the opinion of the Governor of
New Brunswick,) the State of Maine proceeded to violent measures
with a view to fomenting the troubles in Canada.
In a report of the Committee of the House of Representatives
of the State of Maine, 2nd February, 1837, we have the following : —
" We come now to the recent transactions of the British
" Colonial authorities, sanctioned, as it appears, by the Government
" at home ; and we regret to perceive in them also those strong
R

66
"indications of continual and rapid encroachment, which have
" characterised that Government in the whole of this controversy.
" Mr. Livingston, in his letter of July 21, 1832, proposes that ' until
" ' the matter be brought to a final conclusion, both parties should
" ' refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction,' and Mr. Vaughan, in
"reply, (of April 14, 1833,) on behalf of his Government, 'entirely
" ' concurs.'— Here then the faith of the two Governments is pledged
" to abstain from acts of jurisdiction until all is settled."
Sfafpftedtert- The passages referred to are as follows : — " Until this matter,"
u>tj discussed. gayS Mr> Livingston, " shall be brought to a final conclusion, the
" necessity of refraining, on both sides, from any exercise of juris-
" diction, beyond the boundaries now actually possessed, must be
" apparent, and will no doubt be acquiesced in on the part of the
" authorities of His Britannic Majesty's provinces, as it will be by
" the United States."
Sir Charles Vaughan replies : — " His Majesty's Government
" entirely concur with that of the United States, in the principle of
" continuing to abstain, during the progress of the negociation,
" from extending the exercise of jurisdiction within the disputed
" territory, beyond the limits within which it has hitherto been
" usually exercised by the authorities of either party."
Here, first, is to be observed, the flagrant perversion of truth,
even in quoting public documents, by the representative of a (so
styled) Sovereign State ; and this with perfect unanimity, leaving
no ambiguity as to the character of the men or their proceedings.
The exhibition of such lawlessness and rapacity — of such cunning
and dishonesty, pervading the whole mass of a neighbouring
Province, is a melancholy and alarming prospect for England. But
are not these dispositions, and this immorality, the result of her
own pusillanimity and misconduct ?
We have further to observe, in the extracts from the diplomatic
correspondence, the art with which Mr. Livingston displaces the
question. To propose to refrain from extension of jurisdiction
beyond the boundaries actually possessed, was to propose that
which was absolute nonsense. To extend jurisdiction, beyond the
bounds possessed (put for established) would be aggression — crime
— hostility. The object of the passage is, to convey the existence
of coequal rights of jurisdiction ; but, protecting himself at once

67
against detection of the aim, and the recoil, in its failure, of this
insidious attempt, the American Secretary carefully avoids any
designation of the district wherein it is proposed that such co-ordi
nate forbearance should be exercised.
After nine months, the English Minister replies, in the words of
Lord Palmerston's despatch of February 25, 1833, " The English
" Government entirely concurs in the principle of abstaining from
" extending the exercise of jurisdiction"; — that is, from violence and
hostility, the region of which he allows no longer to remain indefinite
and indistinct; he boldly sets down the words — "within the
"disputed territory"! He thus crowns with success the furtive
phrase of Mr. Livingston, and raises the United States into coequal
rights of jurisdiction in that territory with Great Britain ; as if,
indeed, he had " nothing at all at heart, but the good of mankind,
" and the putting a stop to mischief." But even eight years of
falsehood and deception have not sufficed to efface all evidences of
the truth, nor have all the public servants of the Crown, connected
with these transactions, received the impression which the Foreign
Secretary has so laboured to stamp upon them.
In 1835, Lord Palmerston having been for a while re
moved from the Foreign Office, Sir C. Vaughan* addresses to
Downing Street a clear and distinct statement upon the subject : —
" As no part of the disputed territory has ever been withdrawn
" from the sovereignty of Great Britain, in consequence of the
" defective description of the line of boundary in the Treaty of
" 1783, American citizens cannot have acquired, justly, a title to
" any lands, from the State of Maine, or of Massachusetts, as
" asserted by Mr. Lincoln ; and there cannot be any pretence for
" disputing the uninterrupted exercise of jurisdiction over that
" territory by the British authorities of New Brunswick."
* The Diplomatists and the Statesmen, conversant with this subject, — are : —
The two gentlemen who prepared the Case; — Me. Addington, Sir Stbatfokd Canning. — Disgraced.
The Minister, acquainted in detail with previous negociations at Washington ; — Sin C. Vaughan. — Unemployed — quasi
Disgraced.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, when the Convention of 1827 was proposed ; — Lord Aberdeen. — In Opposition; 
therefore — "An Enemy."
The Negociator of that Convention. — -Lord Glenelg ; — . . — Removed, in time, from the Cabinet.
Whatever light these individuals may possess, — and I do not know that any one of them has
suspected Lord Palmerston's motives, — they are thus put out of the way : — their opinions treated
as those of public or " personal enemies."

68
Sir Archibald Campbell, on the 20th of January, 1834, says :,
" I am most happy, however, to find that it is not contemplated [by
" the Americans] to make any further attempts to exercise the
" rights of sovereignty within the conventional frontier. Our
" provisional rights of jurisdiction and of occupancy have been
" too frequently, and at all hazards [sic], asserted and maintained, to
"leave any doubt as to the course we must again pursue, if the.
" construction of this road be persevered in, or other encroachments
" made upon the lands in question."
British jnrisdic In November, 1837, the British Minister at Washington,
tion in disputed m ^
iy&ZIric^^ speaking of the opinions of the American Secretary of State, uses
these words : — " Acquiescing, to a certain extent, — reluctantly and
" doubtingly, — in the claim of Great Britain to exercise jurisdiction
" within the disputed territory until the Boundary question shall
"be adjusted; and conceding this point only so far as to recognize
" the British jurisdiction as resting upon an ' arrangement,' and an
" ' understanding,' and not upon a right."
Having no instructions, and guided only by the above-quoted
opinion of Lord Palmerston, in his despatch of February 25, 1833,
(which was an admission of the first step of the American Govern
ment in this matter) — what could Mr. Fox do, save, like his
predecessors, assent to whatever was stated, yield whatever was
contested, and learn whatever he was taught !
aofunfKaf ^ne °iuestion °f jurisdiction in the disputed territory, was as
distinct and clear a point as the Sovereignty of the Crown in the
British dominions. It could admit of no doubt — of no equivocation.
That Mr. Fox should be left in the predicament of not knowing
what to reply — that he should have suffered the equivocations of the
American Secretary — would seem to show that the diplomatic
service is incapable of transacting any business, however trivial, or
settling any point, however clear. If so, it had better be done away
with. Power uncontrolled — authority unchecked—cannot long
exist without destructive effects on the interests of those who
entrust, and on the character of those who are entrusted.
In the question of jurisdiction, then, as in each other branch
of the subject, Lord Palmerston has done nothing to refute unsound
arguments, or to resist unjust claims; on the contrary, he has
invited the advancement of claims, in opposition to the rights he

69
was commissioned to defend, — he has suggested arguments destruc
tive of the views he pretended to advocate.
In summing up the negbciations from the year 1831 to 1837, I 4s to me naviga-
have reserved the important question of the navigation of the St. John J^"^-'
for separate notice. When, in October 14th, 1831, Lord Palmer
ston hinted at negociation, and at a system of compensation as a
substitute for the adoption of the Award, he must have had in view
the certainty of an instantaneous demand from the Americans, of
the navigation of the St. John. The navigation of the St. John,
and that river as a frontier, was the original claim of the United
States ; the abandonment of that claim on their part, was the only
occasion on which a point advanced by America had not been
secured, or a pretension put forward had been withdrawn. To
whisper, therefore to the United States, the word " negociation,"
was to say : — " Re-assert your claim to the St. John." No sooner
does Mr. Bankhead, in fulfilment of his instructions, whisper nego
ciation, than the claim to the St. John is re-asserted ! That such was
the necessary result of Lord Palmerston's proposal, is too clear to
admit of any object in proposing it, save that which was obtained
by its proposal : but that such was his object, is established by the
terms in which he replies to the proposal. He pretends to reject it; Jj^0^ °LJ£'
but in such terms as in reality to adopt it, and establish it as a ^^0^0-
-. . /— , -r» • • ciation by Great
claim against Great Britain : — Britain-
" It will be impossible for His Majesty lo admit the principle upon which it is
attempted to treat these two questions as necessarily connected with each other. Whatever
might be the eventual decision of His Majesty upon the latter question, if treated
separately, and whatever may be His Majesty's disposition to promote the harmony so
happily subsisting between the two countries, by any arrangements which might tend to
the convenience of the citizens of the United States, without being prejudicial to the
essential interests of his own subjects, His Majesty cannot admit any claim of right on
the part of the citizens of Maine to the navigation of the St. John, nor can he consider
a negociation on that point, as necessarily growing out of the question of Boundary. —
February 23, 1833.
By refusing to admit this claim as necessarily connected with
the Award, he does admit it, as standing alone. He does admit it,
therefore, not in a relative, but in an absolute manner; he does
admit it— not as a contingency, a consequence of negociation
already undertaken, of principles already in dispute ; he admits it
as a thing distinct— as a new original — as springing from a sepa-
s

70
rate source — as flowing from a one-sided faculty, to exact, and
not to bargain, and involving therefore, if it means anything at all,
superiority of right or of power, — resting the right to exact on
inability to resist.
But, it may be asked, what were the Colonial interests about,
all this while ? If the House of Commons and House of Lords
were negligent in such matters, if the Colonial Legislatures had no
representative in England, if public opinion was dead to every ques
tion beyond those which touched the selfishness of its local passions,
— could the commercial community remain ignorant of such
proceedings, or indifferent to them ? The commercial community
is divided, unorganized, possesses no attributes, performs no func
tions, has no distinct existence in the State. But the Corporation
of the great Metropolis of the Empire ? It has nothing to do with
national questions. Then, at all events, the Chamber of Commerce
of London ? No such body exists ! There was no associate body
in the country, conceiving itself to be at all interested or to have
any right to interfere *in the matter of the North-East Boundary,
excepting the North American Association, who having heard some
thing of the right of navigation of the St. John being drawn into the
Lord palmerston negociation, became alarmed. Thev sought an interview with a
denies, through _ •/ O
^tteeSstenc; Minister of the Crown upon this diplomatic question. The interview
of negociation as 1 ' 1 l utt' ' 11 1
kto? st- Johns was not, however, with the Minister who alone was the manager of
these matters. They expressed their apprehensions to Mr. Stanley,
then Secretary to the Colonies, and received from him the emphatic
assurance that the claim to the navigation of the St. John had been
" peremptorily negatived " by His Majesty's Ministers.*
Thus had Lord Palmerston practised a deception on the Colonial
Minister, and rendered the colonial department effectively subser
vient to the prosecution of his views.
™adtheaunTtedon And what is all this negociation about? Nothing, — absolutely
meantscombSent'o nothing;; ! That America aimed at gaining; advantages is clear • but
disguise and per- •— " ~ ~
pie* the question. t}ie diSpOSition to do so was prompted by the occasion. It did not
appear in the early stage of the proceedings. When she did articulate
pretensions, so groundless were they, so inadequate her means,
that it would be futile to imagine that the end she sought, or the
•
* See Beport of the North American Association for the year 1833.

71
advantages she gained, had their origin elsewhere save in the sup
port of the British Minister. The Americans, when dealing with
an honest Minister, have shown sufficient dexterity in perplexing
and confusing questions; but what must not be the results in
confusion, of concert between them and a dishonest and dexterous
man, whose power and ability, from the hour of his committal to
this fatal line, must have been exerted to disguise every step, how
ever simple, and to confuse every question, however insignificant,—
in order to make himself necessary, and thus secure that tenure of
office which was requisite to prevent detection. What have been
the results of their joint labours ? The complete bewilderment of
the House of Commons ; the complete perversion of the public
mind. One man— an English Minister, at once the tool and the
strength of foreign ambition, holds in his hands the parliamentary Control of fte
majority of his party, the subserviency of his opponents, the apathy S£% JSibE
of the nation, and the support of every foreign power that has aught lifS\™l£l
to dread in England's strength, or any thing to covet in her weak- TowZt*0™*0
ness. His colleagues are his dupes : the various departments of the
State, his instruments; the Colonial Minister speaks at his bid
ding ; the Horse Guards disposes of the military — the Admiralty,
of the naval force, at his command ; his words in the House of
Commons lull the nation into indifference, and at the same time
arouse the border population of America to aggression. The firm
bearing of the Colonial Governors prepares for the collision, which
their weakness in military force invites ; while he himself, in his
own immediate department, can put falsehoods into the mouth of
England —sanction hostility — inspire the spirit, and suggest the
pretext, of aggression.
These may be strange sounds, and startling thoughts, but they
are facts : and you have the proofs before you.
But why refer to these minor things. Has not this man spoken
falsely in the. name of the Sovereign of England? Has he not
abrogated a national Treaty, and cast to the winds a solemn Award,
after its adoption by the Crown ? Has he not done this of his own
will, for his own purposes; by his own act, for his own behoof?
The Crown and the Parliament have submitted, in silence and Porei^ j*™***
7 assumes the pre-
in ignorance, to his assumption of their prerogatives, and to the &oa™.eofthe
exercise of them for the violation of the Sovereign's faith, and
the prostration of the Nation's power.

72

Objections to the Award of the King of Holland.
First Objection. — That the Award was not pronounced according
to the Authority given.
Reply. — The Award is in strict conformity to the authority given.
n The Arbiter was authorised to decide on all and every sub
ject of Boundary which had arisen, or could arise. And the
Award, when rendered, was to be carried, without reserve,
into immediate effect.*
Second Objection. — That the decision was not in conformity to the
Treaty of 1783.
Reply.— The " differences" had reference to the interpretation of
the Treaty (of 1783). If the parties had agreed in the inter
pretation of that Treaty, — no reference would have taken
place. The terms of the Treaty of 1783 contain a description
of localities.,-}- admitted by both parties to be incorrect.
The Treaty of Ghent, and the Convention of 1827, in stipu
lating a reference to arbitration, did so to remedy recognized
defects : that they existed, was the ground of the arbitration :
that the arbitration should be final, was the object of the
compact. The terms of the Treaty of 1783 have been infringed.
The frontier of the Mississipi, secured by it to England, has
not been given to England : — that Treaty is therefore invalid,
and binding in no part.
* Terms of Submission. — The two Powers request of the King of Holland, " that he would
please to take upon himself the arbitration of their differences." See also Convention of 1827,
Treaty of Ghent, (Appendix.)
t Probably the difficulties in regard to the Treaty of 1783, have arisen from the substitution
of the word " North," for the word West, from the source of the St. Croix. That is the com
mon sense direction of the Boundary ; and it would avoid the difficulties of intermediate waters
between the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic. An indicative, but unlettered line, in Mitchell's Map,
seems to confirm this idea.
In the same Article of the same Treaty, a line is directed to he drawn due West from the
North-west point of Lake Superior, to the Mississipi, — the Mississipi lying South of that point-
The men employed by America in the negociating of that Treaty, were Franklin and Jay. —
The negociator on the part of Great Britain was Mr. Oswald, — a man utterly ignorant of the
subject, and wholly unfitted for the undertaking.

73

The American Government has proposed, since the
rendering of the Award, a new negociation, on the basis of
departure from that Treaty.
Therefore, objection to the Award of the King of Holland
on the pretext of inconformity with the Treaty of 1783, is
unfounded, — is the reverse of the truth, — is frivolous, — is not
acted on or believed by the Government of the United States.
Both objections are utterly contemptible ; and the admission
of either for a moment, would render the diplomatists on the British
side (on the supposition of integrity) so obnoxious to reproach and
contempt, as to be committed to America, and against this country,
through the dread of exposure.
These pretexts were originally put forward by a single State,
and by a few interested individuals. Repeated, year after year,
without contradiction, — they came to be admitted and acted upon
by the American legislature. By the very dishonesty of the grounds
assumed — by the very absurdity of the arguments advanced — has
the determination to enforce their pretensions on England's weak
ness become fixed and resolute. Thus, the perversion of language
(the source of all human disaster), has equally degraded and
disgraced the American State, and British diplomacy.
The negociations, in the parliamentary papers, extend over six
years. They commence from the receipt of the Award of the King
of Holland, and its adoption by England ; that is to say, from the
settlement of the Boundary Question : and they are directed to un
settling that Question, — by violating the Award, and reversing the
decision of Great Britain.
The communications from Downing Street may be summed up
as follows : —
In 1831, the Award was, by Lord Palmerston, \ announced.

In 1832,
In 1833,
In 1834,
In 1835,
In 1836,
In 1837,

—forgotten.— relinquished.
freproposed —
¦i superseded —
{re-asserted.
— abandoned.
—forgotten.
—cast away.

74

The Project of a New Commission.
The project of a new commission is the accomplishment of the
transactions which have been exposed. But this project will now
no longer be the secret deed of a Minister — with this, at least, to say
— that he staked his head upon the die. Now, it will be the act of
the Nation. No "Ministerial capacity" (responsibility) stands any
longer between these transactions and the light of day. On the
nation' therefore, and its representatives, will now lie the responsi
bility of this new and public violation of national faith — this outrage
on common sense, — a new commission — to find, what is known not
to exist — to interpret, what is recognized to be void of sense — and
to execute, what is admitted to be impracticable.
The object of the new proposal is of course the same as that to
which the previous negociations have been directed. By it the Par
liament will be formally committed. Suspicion in the nation, and
interest on the subject, will be laid at rest ; while the warlike dispo
sition of the United States will be kept up and increased. Thus will
measures be matured with equal progression in the East and in the
West: and, when India is ripe for insurrection, Persia prepared for
assault, Alexandria for revolt, Constantinople for occupation, —
(and with frightful rapidity do those fates approach),- — then will be
determined at St. Petersburg the mode and the moment of our war
with America.*
* On the occurrence of the events in Maine, which have directed the attention of England,
for the first time, to this subject, the eyes of every one at Washington were turned to
the Russian Mission. The American newspapers in which I read the account of the proceedings
in Congress at the close of the Session, had given a full half of their columns to the details
of the festivities at the Russian Embassy — and to the mutual hospitalities of the Burghers
of New York, and the officers of the French Steam Frigate Veloce — who received the
honour of American citizenship. Meanwhile, the Governor of New Brunswick speaks as a
soldier ought; — the Minister at Washington as, — alas! — British diplomatists are now taught to
speak. The first declares his determination and obligations, " at all hazards," to resist aggres
sion : — the second, begs the American Government to yield — implores the Governor of New
Brunswick to withdraw — declares England to be wholly unprepared for War with any one, far less
with the United States. And, in character with the remainder of these proceedings, the
Secretary of Legation is publicly stated in the newspapers to have asserted that the Governor
of a British province had exceeded his instructions ; and that he would be recalled.

PART VI.

RECAPITULATION — VIOLATION OF NATIONAL COMPACT-
BETRAYAL BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OF THE PUBLIC
INTERESTS — HIS ASSUMPTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
POWER— ONLY REMEDY, IMPEACHMENT.

1 SUCH A MAN IS A PUBLIC ENEMY, WHO SAPS THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE PEACE AND COMMON SAFETY
OF NATIONS."— YaUel, Book ii. Chap. xv.

Great Britain and the United States are bound, by the Treaty
of Ghent, to submit differences respecting the Boundary to an
Arbiter, and to be bound by his decision. The peace of those States
reposes on that Treaty. To violate it, on any one point, is to abro
gate it in all. The violation of the stipulation which renders arbi
tration final, would be abrogation of all international ties subsisting
between those States.
The two Governments have signed a convention, on the 29th
September, 1827, executory of the stipulation of the Treaty of Ghent,
and binding themselves to accept, as final and conclusive, the
Award which the Arbiter should pronounce; and to carry it,
without reserve, into immediate execution. This international
compact had solely reference to, and was to be fulfilled in, the
single act of the adoption of the Award, when rendered.
In conformity with this public deed, and on the faith of these
obligations, the King of Holland was requested by the High Parties
" to be pleased to take upon himself the arbitration of their differ-
" ences ;" and that prince did so undertake that office.
On the 10th of January, 1831, the King of Holland pro
nounced his decision.
The King of Great Britain immediately expressed to the King
of Holland, his acquiescence in that decision.

76
The King of Great Britain did not so express to the United
States, his acquiescence in that decision.
The United States made no communication on the subject,
either to the King of Holland or to the British Government.
In December, 1831, the British Government communicated to
the United States the acceptance of the Award by Great Britain,
and requested to know what the United States proposed to do. ,
The United States gave no answer.
In the month of July, 1832, the Senate of the United States
advised the President not to accept the Award ; and also advised
him to open a new negociation with Great Britain.
Communication to that effect was made in July 21st, 1832.
On April 14th, 1833, after an interval of nine months from
the period of the American communication, and two years and three
months after the rendering of the Award, the receipt of this com.
munication is acknowledged by the British Government ; — the
setting aside of the Award, by America, acquiesced in ; and
a proposal for new negociations adopted.
On the 29th December, 1835, the English Government signi
fied to the American Government, that it distinctly withdrew its
assent to the Award of the King of Holland, which it then
designates as a " territorial compromise, recommended."
From April 1833, to January 1838, sixteen notes are ex
changed between the British Minister at Washington, and the
American Secretary of State, containing proposals for negociation —
counter-proposals — refusals — and counter-refusals.
On the 10th of January, 1838, the British Minister at
Washington receives, from the principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, a despatch containing these words :— " Both Go-
" vernments have agreed to consider the Award of the King of
" Holland as binding on neither party ; and the two Governments
" therefore are in this, respect as free as they were before the
" reference to that Sovereign was made."
Thus — The British Minister had accepted the Award in the name
of the Crown ; had applied to that Award the anterior treaty
stipulations; had signified to the King of Holland his acceptance
of it ; had signified to the American Government his acceptance

77
of it. He had not produced it to the House of Commons ; he
had resisted in his ministerial capacity the production of it in
the House of Commons ; he had refused to assign any reason
for the withholding of it. He had obtained the rejection of
it by the American Senates— by an intimation that England
was not indisposed to open new negociations ; he had sub
mitted to that rejection : he had acceded to a proposition of
a new negociation ; he had himself offered projects of negocia
tion : he then withdrew the assent of the British Government
from the Award altogether, and finally instructed the Envoy at
Washington, that both Governments were entirely absolved
from all obligations imposed upon them by the Award, and
consequently imposed upon them by the Convention of 1827
and the Treaty of 1814.
Further — He had suffered a long series of aggressions against the
rights of Great Britain, and the prerogative and authority of
the Crown, to be perpetrated without obtaining satisfaction, or
demanding it; without making remonstrance, or even commu
nication, to the Government by whose subjects these crimes
were committed, until he had encouraged, sanctioned, and fully
established, a determined spirit of hostility to the fulfilment of
the common obligations of the two States, and until he had
diplomatically set aside the rights of Great Britain in that
question. He had, moreover, by his positive declarations in
the House of Commons, excited the American people and
Government to resist the Award, had fomented a spirit of
hostility, and encouraged the outrages of the population border
ing on the disputed Boundary.
But — The Award of the King of Holland, founded as it is on
international compact, remains binding upon this country, and
upon the United States, so long as both are not absolved from
such obligations by the same authority as that by which they
were contracted.
Until such compact is entered into, the proposal of a new
negociation on the part of a British Minister, being an attempt
to set aside an act, the fulfilment of a convention, is an assump
tion of the prerogatives of the Crown. It is therefore illegal,
and is not binding on Great Britain.
ix

78
The public safety requires an immediate inquiry into the con
duct of the principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in regard
to this question ; and if it appears that by his acts, or his negligence,
or even his ignorance, these alarming and unfortuate results have
been brought about, then are the means furnished, by which to
restore our national position, and to transfer, from the Parliament
and the Crown, to the guilty Minister, the responsibility of such
acts, by his impeachment and condemnation.

PART VII.

CONSEQUENCES TO EUROPE AND AMERICA, OF THE ABAN
DONMENT OF THE AWARD.

" THE FAITH OF TREATIES IS INTERESTING, NOT ONLY TO THE CONTRACTING PARTIES, BUT LIKEWISE
TO ALL NATIONS, AND TO THE UNIVERSAL SOCIETY OF MANKIND."— Vattel.

If the previous conclusions are correctly drawn from the facts
stated in the papers presented to Parliament, — the setting aside of
the Award involves the national disgrace and dishonour of Great
Britain, and is an act of state treason.
Are the Government and people of the United States desirous to
take advantage of, and prepared to profit by, such an act ? Are they
prepared to ally themselves to the diplomatic scheme of which it is
a part ? — to associate themselves with treason and dishonour ; to
become the tools of Russian ambition ; and so labour to effect the
downfall of Great Britain ?
Is England prepared to violate, before the eyes of mankind,
her national honour ; to sacrifice her rights ; to adopt the guilt of a
dishonest servant; and, by the prostitution of her power, to confirm
those gigantic projects of ambition, which tend to place in common
jeopardy, her own power, and the liberties of mankind ?
Is America in this matter the originator of a policy which she
has grasped, — or the instrument of an ambition by which she is
used ?
Is England a party to the proceedings in which she is involved,
— or the sufferer from a compact of which she is ignorant ?
Have either of the Nations deliberately examined and tho
roughly comprehended the subject in debate ; the proceedings of
their Governments, or , their respective rights and obligations?

80
Does either comprehend the steps they are now taking — the point
to which they are now tending — the policy by which they are now
influenced — the objects for which that influence is now exerted ?
These points are more particularly deserving of the attention
of America, seeing that she is the aggressive party, — and, though
the disasters may be equal to each, the principal guilt of this
unnatural alliance will rest with her.
But " no American Statesman," it will be said, " has contemplated
such results ; there is no desire in the American people for such a
catastrophe ; their minds are absorbed in the pursuits of gain — their
horizon does not extend to the politics of Europe. The general
feeling of the Union was in favour of the adoption of the Award,
even if it had not been a matter of treaty. It has been set aside
by a process of which the nation knows nothing, and in which it
was not interested ; and therefore there is no ground whatever for
the supposition that War between the two countries must ensue, —
still less for the assumption that union of ends, or concert of means,
should be introduced or established between our republican institu
tions and federal union, and the despotic autocrat of a military
empire." It is precisely because the American nation has not understood
the politics of Europe — it is precisely because the American States
men have not grappled with this question in its larger diplomatic
bearings, nor have penetrated to its individual and moral source —
that the United States find themselves at this moment committed, —
as they are committed, to a career of which they no more compre
hend the conclusion, than they can account for the progress they
have made.
But, it is because they have gone so far, without calculation, and
without defined object, that the obligation is imposed upon them, as
responsible agents, as members of a free State, as originators of a new
national type and destiny, — to examine with solemnity the position
in which they stand; to scrutinize the motives by which they are
actuated ; to compare boldly the temptations with which they
are surrounded, with the consequences with which they are threat
ened ; and, at once, to make the election between a futurity of justice
and of peace, or an existence of injustice and convulsion.

81
The steps by which America has advanced to the present posi
tion of antagonism with Great Britain, have been already traced : —
they have not been taken as the result of a fixed resolve — they seem
rather unpremeditated, and almost involuntary; so that her guilt
of aggression — as that of England in submission — has been brought
about by the art of a British Minister, the enemy no less of his
country than of the United States : by the disavowal of whose acts,
England and America may at once be restored to amity and good
will ; the honour of the one, as of the other, retrieved, and the
misfortunes threatening both, — averted.
In thus encroaching upon the undefended and unsupported
rights of Great Britain, the American diplomatists have followed
the natural course of business — the common laws of nature. As
the able and the active gain upon the weak and the inert ; as
the weight of the solid mass presses upon the slight and yielding
substance : so have the American diplomatists gained from their
antagonists, and pressed upon their neighbours ; occupied the posi
tions she has abandoned, and disregarded the power of which she
was unconscious.
To proceed in this line, required neither concert nor plan ; and
the range of their political vision probably never extended beyond
personal satisfaction in a supposed trial of strength ; or, at the
furthest, an ultimate incorporation of some British provinces, which
England might appear to be more disposed to relinquish, than
America to acquire.
A larger view, however, of these subjects, presents other
elements of calculation, and other results. These are, the inability
to resist an impulse given ; — to disguise the fact, or to counteract the
effect, of unjust advantages gained on one side, and dishonourable
sacrifices incurred on the other : hence the growth of national
hatred between the two people ; the advancement of the one to a
position which the other will not be able to endure, — by which its
patience will be exhausted, and its vengeance aroused ; the conse
quent collision of the two States, and the employment of the whole
resources of the one, for the destruction of the other. Besides,
there is the action of the policy of other States upon these animosi
ties, and the prospects of ambition opened to the Great Nations of
Europe, in the lowering of the consideration, in the weakening of
x

82
the power, in the diminution of the commerce, in the prostration
of the maritime strength, of one or other of the Anglo-Saxon
Nations ; and above all, in their mutual animosities and reciprocal
destruction. To these calamities both parties are led by the setting aside of
the decision of the Boundary question ; which cannot be set aside
except by a violation of our honour ; which, if set aside, would
only be so, through the betrayal by a British Minister, of British
rights — and through design on the part of the American Govern
ment to do what is dishonest, and to gain what is unjust. On this
point, let us not deceive ourselves : there is no interval between the
adoption of that Award, and the plunging of both nations into a
career of animosity and injustice, involving reciprocal disasters, and
ending in the certainty of the destruction of one, and probably
in the ruin of both.
I therefore now come to the question, — What, to the United
States, will be the consequences of entering upon this career ?
As, however, they may not feel, in regard to England, the
impossibility of her adopting in this matter a middle course ; as,
by the proposition of Lord Palmerston for a new commission, they
may be deceived even now into the idea that England will yield to
them the territory in dispute ; it may be advantageous to state the
grounds upon which I conceive that the submission of England
to the progress of the United States northward, must lead to
collision with the United States, or to the downfall of the British
power, — the greatest possible disaster, as I conceive, that could
befall the United States.
These complications have arisen solely from the secresy in which
the question has been involved, from the total ignorance of the
subject in the House of Commons, and from the general apathy of
the Nation in all questions of foreign policy. There has existed,
throughout the British nation, a great regard and profound at
tachment for the American people ; a disinclination to construe
any doubtful fact unfavourably to them ; an earnest desire to
preserve the closest union of political interests, of commercial in
terchange, and national sympathy.
These elements are now all changed : and whoever has watched
the tendency of opinion in England, must have perceived a turn

83
in its direction,— must be prepared for the setting of a strong tide in
a counter sense, and for a re-action, strong, perhaps heedless, in
proportion to the tameness and the extent of past endurance.
This, I say, is the feeling arising in this country with regard to
its general position ; but its recovered energies will be directed most
immediately, and with most effect, against the United States' per
severance in its present career. That is the question most immediate,
most sensibly touching us; redoubled hate will spring from outraged
affections : and retaliation was never yet slow to follow insults cast
upon a powerful people in its mother tongue. England will not be
more astounded herself at the energy which she will put forth, than
America, at the vengeance she will have so heedlessly aroused.
The language of the Provincial Senate of Nova Scotia, and
its decision, regardless and careless of the opinions of England,
furnish the proof of what I say, and are the earnest of what I
prognosticate. But there is another consideration which will tend in no slight
degree to unchain the slumbering energies of England, when we
begin to examine our position, and to inquire into the objects,
views, and means of the United States : and it is this, — that, while
daring our power, and defying our vengeance, she lies completely
at our mercy. — But it can admit of no question, and of no doubt,
that, if England is aroused to action, the settlement of the North-
East Boundary Question remains the only means by which the
United States can ward off a storm which must overwhelm her.
But it may be said, the restoration of England to energy, is a
mere supposition : England has endured so long, and lost so much,
that she has no spirit or mind remaining for the assertion of right or
the resistance to wrong. Let us concede that point for a moment,
and examine its consequences.
The submission to the abrogation of the Award of the King of
Holland is the carrying out of the policy of the present Foreign
Minister : it is the accomplishment of the designs of Russia. Now,
if, as already stated, the restoration of England depends upon
the overthrow of the present fatal system of diplomacy, and the
consequent arrestation of the designs of Russia, — it is clear, without
going a step further, that to set aside that Award establishes that
fatal policy, supports a traitor in the Councils of Great Britain, gives
Russia a triumph over England, enabling her thereby to continue

84
with impunity her aggressions on the British dominions in the East
and in the West, of establishing her supremacy over France, the
United States, Persia, &c. compromising them separately against
Great Britain, and rendering their (henceforward necessary)
concert, practicable only through herself. In fact, it is the triumph
of her delegate in London, — combining the representation of the
two antagonist systems that divide the world.
The setting aside of the Award of the King of Holland increases
and prolongs the irritation between the tWo people ; the sacrifice of
right and territory brings the United States into an attitude of
menace, and a position of aggression : — they reach the St. Lawrence
— they cut off the North American possessions of Great Britain
from each other — shut it out from Canada, — they blow the spirit of
discord and faction throughout the whole of these provinces — they
become strong, in the degradation of British power, in the indig
nation of the loyal subjects of the British Crown. Our attached and
intelligent fellow citizens across the Atlantic, will vainly proffer that
aid, in our cause as in theirs, which we shall have shewn ourselves
unable to receive, and unworthy to use.
Will not this position of the United States, co-operating with
Russia's eastern and southern allies, insure and hasten the downfall
of the fabric of British dominion ? Can such motives exist, or such
objects be in project, without alliance and without concert between
the United States and Russia ? Are not these the consequences
that flow from the abrogation of the Boundary Award ? Was not the
setting aside of that Award the work of Russia's agent ? Were
not these the consequences to which she looked in requiring that
service ? I therefore assume that to set aside the Award of the
King of Holland is to bring about collision between America and
England, or to be the accomplishment and the seal of a scheme for
the dismemberment of the British Empire.
There is, therefore, no middle course for America, between ac
ceptance of the Award, and single or conjoint collision with England.
It is not by accumulation of wealth, or extension of dominion —
it is not by the possession of armies or of navies, that greatness is at
tained or tranquillity secured. These things, important and valuable
as they are, yet are not the sources of power. There is a possession
beyond these: by which these are created; without which they are

85
useless, — national character. A Nation's destinies are in its mind ;
its circumstances flow from its qualities : its strength lies not in
its political institutions, but in its individual character. Wherever
Men are just and prudent, the Nation will live and prosper. It will,
above all things, revere and preserve the moral attributes which
alone ennoble the human race. It will not be unjust to others : it will
endure insult or injustice from none. We read in history of the
fall of nations through the decay of their institutions : but if history
really were the handmaid of philosophy, weshould learn that the decay
of institutions is an effect, and not a cause ; —that things which
men's opinions create, interpret, and apply, have no existence
— whatever the form they wear, whatever the name by which they
are known — save in the spirit of the age. Whatever produces
unworthy desires or ignoble subserviency in the people of a country,
exposes to hazard the politic body— because the parts have been
corrupted ; renders feeble and valueless its forms of Government —
because principles of honour and a sense of dignity are wanting in
the men. Implant in a people an object of policy which is not just,
— cause it to submit to an act which is dishonourable, — and you
instantly sink the value of each individual of which it is composed,
and lower at once institutions, power, and character ; diminish the
value of possessions, and of existence, — for whatever detracts from
the morality of a people, diminishes its happiness.
For three hundred years has Europe been kept in a state of
agony and convulsion, by the desire of France to secure the Rhine
for a frontier ; and France has not yet extended to the Rhine which
she has so frequently overpast. Each succeeding century has found
her with mature designs, and confident expectations, relying on the
heedlessness of the other powers, and on the depth and penetration
of her own diplomacy : each struggle has left her discomfited and
overpowered, and unpossessed of the Rhine. On each of these oc
casions the attempt of France was only practicable by having lulled
or deceived England, or by having bought with money the Ministers
of the British Crown.* What have been the moral consequences to
* Indeed, the Sovereign of England has himself been a pensioner of France; but France was not
then forming designs immediately injurious or necessarily hostile to Great Britain. She only
bought inaction from the British Cabinet, so as to separate England from the policy of the Con
tinent, and to leave the Netherlands at her mercy. Happy had it been for herself, as for Europe
Y

86
France ? What the fate of the dynasty — what the end of the in
stitutions, under which those unjust projects were formed and exe
cuted ?
The New World was to read a political lesson to us of the
old. May the moral of the old not be cast away on its young am
bition — and, tainted already with crimes from which the oldest civi
lization recoils, let it not suppose that the experience of the past is
not available for it, nor that retributive justice is to slumber over
violence, because it is disguised as free, or excused as new.
An apostle of national justice, worthy of better ages and of
nobler times, has arisen among our descendants in the West.
In the seclusion of remoteness — under the shade of privacy-
engaged in the holy ministry of the altar — this extraordinary man
has grasped the political relations of the old and the new world, with
a precision, and exposed them with a power, — which the land of
his birth, as that of his ancestry, has hailed with cold and fruitless
admiration. To attempt to exhibit to America the ruin of its character —
the destruction of its institutions — the downfall of its political ex
istence — as the inevitable consequences of a career of aggression; —
the deluging of Europe and America in blood, as the result of an
insane purpose of greatness and dominion ; — would but be to follow
the argument exhausted by Dr. Channing.* I refer to his letter on
the Texas, to Mr. Clay; — from which, extensive as has been its cir
culation, I have extracted some passages — confident that those who
have already read them will re-peruse them with increased interest
and advantage.
and mankind, if she had been less successful in these attempts, or if the institutions of England
had been less unhappily formed for the management of Foreign interests. It is curious to observe
a nation, exerting all the energy of a free people to resist a shadow of undue prerogative, and
placing it in the power of a foreign intriguer, or the mistress of a Sovereign or a Minister, to
plunge it in war, or to cause it to violate its most sacred rights and duties. — E. g:  See Sir Wm.
Temple — On the Treaty of Nimeguen.
* See Appendix, page xiv.
I cannot omit stating that the question of the Texas, so far back as the year 1833, had
engaged my most serious attention, and has been to me, looking to it from the shores of the
Euxine, as the key to' the events of the world.
The perusal of Dr. Channing's letter produced on me an electrical effect. — That such thoughts
should in this age exist any where ! That such views should proceed from America !

87
The attempt of Dr. Channing to arrest the spirit of violence,
or the lust of plunder, amongst his countrymen, was made during
the first aggressions upon a large scale against the Province of
Mexico. He justly considered that event, not as an accident, but
as the result of inherent national immorality, and as the com
mencement of a long series of future violence, wars, and disasters.
His arguments bore on considerations of a moral kind; and on the mis
fortune which the United States, as a nation, was preparing for it
self. These are his strong — his unassailable positions : having how
ever established these, he proceeds to unrol before his countrymen
another aspect of futurity ; — he points out to them the certainty of
collision with England, (although at that time, designs against the
Canadas, nor aggressions upon the disputed territory, appeared in
the distance, but as incidentally among a hundred other results of a
purpose of aggression), and he pointed out the impossibility on the
part of England, of submission to the assaults of the United States
on any people whatever : the imperative obligation resting on the
British Cabinet, not merely to prevent an extension of ber dominions,
alarming to the peaceful relations of the world, but also to curb and
repress, in the people of the United States, the spirit of aggression.
— That spirit, easily arrested at its source, would be irresistible in
the full current of its accumulated streams, and accelerated course.
The responsible guardian of the interests and destinies of a neigh
bouring people, could not contemplate, without dismay, the deve
lopment of such a spirit in America; nor avoid, without criminality,
to use every just and honourable means to repress its growth, and
resist its progress.
England has falsified the prognostics, and disproved the con
clusions, of Dr. Channing. England has been heedless of the
alarms which he entertained, — she has been blind to the motives he
has exposed ; — felt, or seemed to feel, no interest in the present or
the future, to entertain no sense of duty, or instinct of preservation.
England has thus abandoned Dr. Channing, with the friends, in
America, of England and of peace, to the contempt of their com
patriots. Those who, with him, respected alike England's power and
her intelligence, and who had raised their voices to say to their
countrymen, " Venture not there — it is unjust — it is moreover, in
jurious to England, and she will not suffer it," have learnt to

88
disbelieve reason, or to despise England;— have learnt that nothing
was too unjust for England to approve, and nothing too injurious for
her to suffer.
America has commenced to speak of war — to threaten England.
Is this a result of the perversion of its own reason, or a justifiable
conviction of the degradation of that of Great Britain ? It is a
natural result of long endurance of injustice, that they should
threaten violence : but new enquiries will not fail to be made, and
conclusions, startling to America, may be the result.
With a Government, weak in its central authority, disjointed
in its constitutional power; — with a People, destitute of national
patriotism, sacrificing every feeling to gain, and bending every faculty
on acquisition, — disunited in popular sympathies, divided in imme
diate interests, distinct in ulterior aims, — haughty in the exaction
of submission, suspicious in the yielding of authority, — untrained to
war, unbroken to discipline ; — with a Country, extended, unoccupied,
exposed, — undefended by frontiers of difficulty, unprotected by
fortresses of strength ; — with every neighbour a foe — a servile in
surrection threatening within, — and the Indian prowling around,
maddened by injustice and desperate in revenge ; — to enter into a
war, except a war of necessity, and a war of justice, would be an
act of madness, not a measure of policy.
Let us suppose however, that collision takes place — let us sup
pose the United States re-enacting the tragedy of 1812, and march
ing her armies to the St. Lawrence. In the last war, when England
was in arms against France (then mistress of Europe,) and could
not send a single soldier to Canada, did not the United States incur
defeat after defeat ? Was not army after army captured ? And did
that power not reckon then on a bloodless triumph : and was not the
result all but fatal to her political existence ?
No elements of strength have grown up since then ; no fortify
ing of popular judgment — no strengthening of executive authority :
— the United States are, now, as weak as then : no better fitted
to judge, and more liable to err, — to be carried away by popular
passion, and to be acted on by foreign intrigue. The American
Union is now more likely to plunge into war, because England
ceases to steady its judgment, by imposing respect for justice ; and
less likely either to muster strength for the struggle, or to exhibit

89
judgment in its conduct. What could America do against England? —
Invade Canada? Does she conceive that the conquest of Canada can
be effected7 except with the destruction of the power of Great Bri
tain : or that England, recalling her energies, as she has always done
in war, will not bring them all to bear on a contest for existence ; —
strike the Union at all points at once, and by the weapons the most
dreadful — legalized by necessity.
A struggle arising between the two, either the United States
or England must perish. America being overpowered, it requires
no argument to show that England must exact conditions, and
that the rival portions of the Union would assert pretensions
incompatible with its existence. If England be overpowered,
success will scarcely be less fatal to the United States, than
discomfiture. The name, character, industry, and commerce of
Great Britain, constitute a large portion of the national existence
of the American Union, by exciting its emulation, and preserving
its feelings of nationality. Great Britain gives strength to its
Government at home, by competition of character, and rivalry
of dominion in America; and maintains its independence in the
world, by controlling the ambition and neutralizing the power of
the old Governments. England's power and position, are the real
band of the Union : remove these, and it will be found that there
is none within. The annexation of the British possessions to the
United States, would lead to a separation of sovereignty, to trans
atlantic complications and collisions ; blasting all the anticipations
and the hopes with which the patriotic of the United States, and
the philanthropists of the world, have contemplated its future growth
and greatness. The genius of the old world would re-assert its
influence over the new, and exercise that influence, as it has ever
done, in each distant region it has reached, to the destruction of
individual worth, and national strength — of patriotism, and of peace.
If the United States have so essential and so paramount an in
terest in the preservation of Great Britain — England has, no less, a
vital interest in maintaining the independence and promoting the
well-being of the United States. England has, in this, a moral as
well as a political interest : — she is led to it by compunction for
the past, no less than by the hopes of the future.

90
If England has to lament the overreaching policy, the ambitious
aims, and immoral acts, of the American Government,— she has also
to reproach herself with having inspired her transatlantic progeny
with contempt for justice — alike by her conduct towards them, and
by her conduct to herself.
It was the violation, not less impolitic than criminal, by Eng
land, of the rights which she had conferred on her Colonies, and of
the principles she had established in the breasts of her subjects,
that drove the United Colonies into the dire necessity of rending
asunder every tie that belonged to nationality; — of extinguishing
the associations of race — the aspirations of loyalty. Could a people
behold crimes committed by the authority they had been taught from
their earliest hour to revere, — violence and folly enacted by the
fatherland which it was their pride to vindicate, and their happiness
to love, — without revulsion in all their moral being, disturbance of
every settled principle, without disregard for the supremacy of
justice and honour, — the swaddling bands of infant nations, without
the corruption of those sympathies and affections, which bind men
into societies, and societies into States ?
The Anglo-Americans, commencing with a triumph over their
best feelings, proceeded in their revolution to triumph over consti
tuted authority ; — but, not having taken up arms to defend their
hearths and homes, their patriotism lay not in associations of local
interests of race or of country, — but in a point of honour — an
abstraction, dignified by the defeat of England. They spoke not of
their country, but of their institutions: — the political disputations
that arise in the decrepitude of decayed nationalities, had per
verted the simplicity of their early affections. In preserving to
the letter the forms of their colonial government, they thought
themselves the imitators, the equals — of Athens and of Rome. The
nervelessness of the new creation was displayed in designating, and
causing to be regarded, their achieved existence and triumphant
sovereignty, as a political experiment ! — Such men the descendants
of Anglo-Saxon fathers !
Thus demoralized, their first step was to re-enact on the
Indian, the lessons of injustice they had learnt from their parental
state. Each district brought into cultivation — each successive
extension of territory and dominion, was extorted by violence, or

91
abstracted by fraud, from the "lords of the soil;" and each successive
wave of population, as it spread in a widened circle around, marked
its flow with blood. The settlement of the new race upon the
virgin soil, was effected by the extirpation of the charities of nature,
and the outrage of the rights of man.
Among the chief sources of American weakness, — glaring
amidst the proofs of constitutional fallacy and of human injustice,
is the state of the Negro, and the condition of the coloured race.
But here, too, has not England with humiliation to remember, that
that system, was her system, — that the crime of which she has ceased
to be guilty, had been by her transmitted to her American progeny,
as a principle of law, and an hereditary possession.
A popular opinion arose in the southern portion of the Union,
in favour of invading the neighbouring country ; and that mea
sure was announced, adopted, and carried into effect, in the manner
of a proposal touching some municipal or parochial regulation.
Public opinion justified it; a free press advocated it; and a
people proud of their institutions carried it into effect : exhibiting a
departure from those ordinary feelings of integrity and honour
which had hitherto been admitted in common by all men, — and, at
the same time, a disregard for the existing authority of the State,
which I believe has never before occurred in the history of man ;
for even rebellion in the old world has been united by a principle or
controlled by a leader. Dr. Channing asks whether they are pre
pared to take the new position in the world of a " robber state :" —
but robbers have never yet been known destitute of authority among
themselves. What prospect does such an event present to the
neighbours of the United States ? What prospect for itself? Eng
land,— whose interests in the independence of Mexico were not less
than her interests in the independence of this Island, — extends no
protecting shield before that State ; articulates no word to save it
from this disaster — the American people from this guilt — the Ame
rican Government from this degradation. Yet, one word would
have sufficed. England — whose most anxious efforts ought to
have been directed, and whose whole power, if necessary, ought
to have been exerted, to arrest the progress of a spirit of aggression
in the United States, — carefully avoids the indication of any interest
or of any opinion on that subject ; when an expression of her inten-

92
tion and her determination would have effectually overawed and
repressed that spirit. She is indeed the first to hail, and first to con
firm, the triumph of this injustice.*
The United States, thus mentally constituted, thus morally
instructed, next turned the lawlessness of their ambition, directed
with the cunning of the Indian, against Great Britain herself. And
here again, has Great Britain to bear the disgrace of their attempts,
and the penalty of their success. Her contemptible submission
was the cause of their boldness, the justification of their injustice,
by yielding up every contested right, and sanctioning each advanced
pretension. Commotions take place in Canada : the people of the North,
emulating those of the South, look on Canada as a new Texas,
on England as another Mexico. Armed bands proceed to carry
war into the provinces of a friendly power; and constituted
authorities applaud, support, and co-operate. England, differing
in this respect from Mexico, find excuses for such acts in " the
constitutional difficulties" of the Government of the United States ;
— the perpetrators, when discomfited, withdraw in peace to their
homes, experiencing, and fearing, no retribution from the power
they have offended, or from the state to which they belong : and,
instructed by the " harmony prevailing between the two Govern-
" ments," consider such acts as honourable enterprizes. — Then fol
lows, — the new assault on the disputed territory.
It is because England has been false to herself, that the United
States have not been true to their own interests. It is because
England is allied to her foes, that the United States have been false
to her. The interests of both are then identical. England, by the
assertion of her own rights and the performance of her own duties,
can still preserve both.
Thus much as to the relations and interests of the two States,
in connection with each other : but the question pending between
them is, unfortunately, now contingent upon foreign influences and
combinations.

* Witness the Commercial Treaty between England, and the Sovereign State of Texas,
of 65,000 inhabitants.

93 '
In assuming a position of hostility to Great Britain, is America
not influenced by the idea of support from Russia and from France ?
Is she not influenced by the knowledge of the hostility of these powers
to England ? It cannot be that America should have ventured upon
her present line, without confidence in such support : and it is
precisely this which casts the darkest shade over her national
tendencies. Let us therefore examine this position : — Russia, France, and
the United States, leagued against England in an unjust cause ; in
opposition to all that is honest in these countries themselves : and
constituting every independent people throughout the world, the
allies of Great Britain. What would be the consequence ?
England must either triumph or sink. If she triumphs, France
and Russia return to their natural position — America is ruined.
If England sinks, the United States acquire, for the moment,
extended frontiers ; but no share of England's power. In that very
extension lies the certainty of dissolution. The separation of the
parts of a cognate race, of an unjust and acquisitive character, can
present but the prospect of incessant rivalry, and unnatural
hatred : of a futurity realizing the fable of a soil sown with
dragon's teeth.
But what would be the action of the policy of Europe, under
such circumstances, on the United States ? We are supposing the
power of England overthrown ; consequently, there would be no
further balance in Europe, to the combined aggression of France
and Russia. But it is not only that there would be no balance to
these powers; — they would have absorbed into themselves the ele
ments of the strength of England and Turkey. If Russia and France
have, since 1815, been concerting views of ambition on America; —
if they have both exhibited, already, a determination to extend their
dominions, and to secure influence in that region ; to promote quar
rels between the states, and disaffection among the people, of the
transatlantic world ; is it not to be anticipated, that their triumph
over England would be followed by their domination in America,
North and South ? Will she look for respite in the subsequent
collision of France and Russia? But France and Russia will not
come into collision while they are kept in check by any respectable
power in America. It is to be supposed that Russia will preserve
2 A

• 94
her supremacy in intellect and diplomacy ; if so, she will use France
for her ends : and when Russia is in possession of the Dardanelles,
she will command France and Europe. — The high-way of the sea,
and the roads to a hundred people, will be in her hands ; the •
materials for war secured in her arsenals : in her granaries, will be
locked the bread of Europe — in her store-houses, the commerce of
the world. I trust, however, that for such anticipations the time is not
yet come. I trust it is not yet too late to rest the question on the
basis of justice; to appeal to Anglo-saxon sympathies, not yet
effaced. A semi-barbarous race, the subjects of different crowns,
with their language separated into distinct dialects — yet impelled
by the memory of a common origin, and attracted by the instinct of
future glory and supremacy in their union, — exhibits to those who
speak the English tongue, a subject of humiliation in its mutual
sympathies, — an object of dread in its growing power. Can the
Sclavonian subjects of the Russian sceptre glory in mutual affections
to which the sons of Britain are dead ? Can the Sclavonian sub
jects of the three North-east powers of Europe, look with the
kindness of fraternity on each other, and sigh for the day of their
union. — whilst no such impulses are known or felt throughout the
forty millions of educated and polished inhabitants of the British
Isles and of the American Union ? The children of a common
ancestry, the co-inheritors of political freedom, the joint masters
of the seas, the common explorers of the remote regions of the
earth, the favoured children of science, the subduers of time,
distance, difficulty, and nature itself — do they own no honourable
and honest pride associated with their common name ? Throughout
such a population— so distinguished, and so blessed — are no frater
nal yearnings spread, linking their hearts ? Is it possible that one or
both of them, forgetful of the past, and heedless of the future, —
deaf to the promptings of charity, to the dictates of religion, to
the voice of honour, and the suggestions of policy, should rush
into mutual destruction ? Is it possible that, with infirmity of mind
equal to such extravagance of passion, they should so rush without
an intention ? Will they tear down, labouring for their own destruc
tion, the large prospects of their future fortunes ; — raise the Sclavonic

95
above the English tongue ; and place, by the crimes of freedom, the
sceptre of the world in a despot's hands ?
But it is a vain and useless concession to make, that England
must perish, because America is unjust : England, the mother of
Nations, the parent of Freedom, and the wielder of the Trident,
has her destinies within her own breast.
True it is, that, for a season, she has been forgetful of herself.
In the benumbing confidence of security, in the lethargic shadow
of repose, she has become heedless of those common interests that
sanctify the name of country, and which are wisely given as the
spur to individual energy, in the pride of national glory and renown.
Thus has confidence in her power been lost, not only in the
estimation of mankind, but in her own. Let however visible danger
threaten from without, — let some great disaster fall on this land, — she
would arise again, but with a power far beyond that which
heretofore she has ever wielded: for her assailants have aroused
against themselves, the fears or the vengeance of every race of the
old world and the new. Break but the spell that binds England to
an ally stained with every crime, and she will no longer credit the
lie of her own weakness — that sole strength and confidence of
her foes.

APPENDIX.

PART I.

No. 1.
Extract from the Fourth Article of the Treaty of Ghent,* 1814.
" It is further agreed that in the event of the two Commissioners differing upon all
or any of the matters so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of the said
Commissioners refusing or declining, or wilfully omitting to act as such, they shall make,
jointly or separately, report or reports, as well to the Government of His Britannic
Majesty as to that of the United States, stating in detail the points on which they differ,
and the grounds upon which their respective opinions have been formed, or the grounds
upon which they, or either of them, have so refused, declined, or omitted to act. And
His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States hereby agree to refer
the Report or Reports of the said Commissioners to some friendly Sovereign or State, to
be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differences
which may be stated in the said Report or Reports, or upon the Report of one Com
missioner, together with the grounds upon which the other Commissioner shall have
refused, declined, or omitted to act, as the case may be. And if the Commissioner so
refusing, declining, or omitting to act, shall also wilfully omit to state the grounds upon
which he has so done, in such manner that the said statement may be referred to such
friendly Sovereign or State, together with the Report of such other Commissioner, that
such Sovereign or State shall decide, exparte, upon the said Report alone; and His
Britannic Majesty and the Government of the. United States engage to consider the decision
of such friendly Sovereign or Slate as final and conclusive on all the matters so referred.

No. 2.
Extracts from a Convention between His Britannick Majesty and the
United States of America, relative to the reference to Arbitration
of the disputed points under the flfth article of the treaty of
Ghent. Signed at London, September 29, 1827.
Article I.
" It is agreed that the points of difference which have arisen in the settlement of
the boundary between the British and American dominions, as described in the Fifth
Article of the Treaty of Ghent, shall be referred, as therein provided, to some friendly
Sovereign or State, who shall be invited to investigate, and make a decision upon such
points of difference.
" The two contracting powers engage to proceed in concert to the choice of such
friendly Sovereign or State, as soon as the ratifications of this Convention shall have
been exchanged, and to use their best endeavours to obtain a decision, if practicable,
within two years after the arbiter shall have signified his consent to act as such."
* In the Papers presented to Parliament there is the Fifth Article of the Treaty of Ghent, which has reference to
the disputed Boundary between New Brunswick and the State of Maine ; but the Fifih Article of the Treaty of Ghent,
in as far as the subsequent negociations are concerned, does no more than refer to the Fourth Article, wherein the
conditions of the reference to arbitration are stipulated. The omission of this important act is here supplied ; and that
omission is the more remarkable, seeing that the ground assumed by the United States, and by Lord Palmerston, for
setting aside the award of the King of Holland, is, that he, instead of selecting one of the two lines proposed by the
parties, had laid down another line. Now, the Treaty of Ghent, as clearly as words can express, determines that the
differences which might arise, of whatever kind, were to be settled by the award of the arbiter.
 (a)

ii APPENDIX. Article VII.
" The decision of the arbiter, when given, shall be taken as final and conclusive ;
and it shall be carried, without reserve, into immediate effect, by Commissioners
appointed for that purpose by the contracting parties."

No. 3.
Extracts from the award of the King of Holland.
"Anime du desir sincere de repondre par une decision scrupuleuse et impartiale, a la
confiance qu'elle Nous ont temoignee, et de leur donner ainsi un nouveau gage du haut
prix que nous y attachons : —
"Ayant a eet effet diiinent examine et murement pese le contenu du premier expose
ainsi que de l'expose definitif du dit differend, que nous ont respectivement remis, le
1 Avril de l'annee 1830, l'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste
Britannique, et l'Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire des Etats Unis
d'Amerique, avec toutes les pieces qui y ont ete jointes a l'appui :
" Voulant accomplir aujourd'hui les obligations que nous venons de contracter par
I'acceptation des fonotions d'Arbitrateur dans le susdit differend, en portant a la
connaissance des deux Hautes Parties interessees le resultat de Notre examen et Notre
opinion sur les trois points dans lesquels se divise de leur commun accord la contestation."
"Declarons que, —
"Quant au premier point, savoir, la question, Quel est l'endroit designe dans les
Traites comme Tangle nord-ouest de la Nouvelle Ecosse, et quels sont les Highlands
separant les Rivieres qui se dechargent dans le Fleuve St Laurent, de celles tombantdans
I'Ocean Atlantique, le long desquels doit etre tiree la Ligne de Limites depuis eet angle
jusqu'a la source nord-ouest de la Riviere Connecticut?"
[After enumerating twenty-eight grounds of his award on this first point, the
Document proceeds :]
"Nous sommes d'avis, —
"Qu'il conviendra d'adopter pour limite des deux etats une ligne tiree droit au nord
depuis la source de hi Riviere St. Croix jusqu'au point ouelle coupe le milieu du thalweg
de la Riviere St. John ; de-la le milieu du thalweg de cette riviere, en la remontant
jusqu'au point oii la Riviere St. Francis se decharge dans la Riviere St. John ; de-la le
milieu du thalweg de la Riviere St. Francis, en la remontant jusqu'a la source de sa
branche la plus sud-ouest, laquelle source nous indiquons sur la Carte (A) par la lettre
(X) authentiquee par la signature de Notre Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres ; de-la une
ligne tiree droit a l'ouest jusqu'au point ou elle se re-unit a la ligne reclamee par les Etats
Unis d'Amerique, et tracee sur la Carte (A) ; de-la, cette ligne jusqu'au point ou, d'apres
cette carte, elle coincide avec celle demandee par la Grande Bretagne; et de-la ligne
indiquee sur la dite carte par les deux Puissances, jusqu'a la source la plus nord-ouest
de la Riviere Connecticut :
"Quant au second point, savoir, la question, quelle est la source la plus nord-ouest
(north-westernmost head) de la Riviere Connecticut ?"
[Five Grounds enumerated] —
"Nous sommes d'avis, —
"Que le ruisseau situe le plus au nord-ouest de ceux quicoulent dans le plus septen
trional des trois lacs, dont le dernier porte le nom de Connecticut Lake, doit etre
considere comme la source la plus nord-ouest (north-westernmost head) du Connecticut.
"Et quant au troisieme point, savoir, la question, Quelle est la limite a tracer depuis
la Riviere Connecticut le long du parallele du quarante-cinq degre de latitude septen-
trionale jusqu'au Fleuve St. Laurent, nomine dans les Traites Iroquoi ou Cataraguy?"
[Three Grounds enumerated] —
"Nous sommes d'avis, — *
* The second ground of objection taken to the award by the State of Maine and Lord Palmerston, is that the King of
Holland had not decided, but only recommended a line, and that if he had decided at all, he had only decided on two out
of three poins submitted to him. It will be setn from these extracts that the award was as formal as possible, and that
the same forms and teims are equally applied to the three'points.

APPENDIX. iii
K Qu'il conviendra de proceder a de nouvelles operations pour mesurer la latitude
observee, afin de tracer la limite depuis la Riviere Connecticut, le long du parallele du
quarante-cinq degre de latitude septentrionale, jusqu'au Fleuve St. Laurent, nomme dans
les Traites Iroquois ou Cataraguy ; de maniere cependant, qu'en tout cas, a I'endroit dit
Rouse's Point, le territoire des Etats Unis d'Amerique s'etendra jusqu'au fort qui s'y
trouve etabli, et comprendra ce Fort et son rayon kilometiique.
"Ainsi fait et donnesous Notre Sceau Royal, a la Haye, ce Dix Janvier, del'an de Grace
Mil Huit Cent Trente-un, et de Notre Regne de Dix-huitieme.
" (Signe) GUILLAUME.
" Le Ministre des Affaires Etrnngeres,
" (Signe) VERSTOLK DE SOELEN."

PART IV.

No. 1.
Viscount Palmerston to Charles Bankhead, Esq.
"Foreign Office, October 14, 1831.
« Sir,
" With reference to my despatch of February 9, of this year, to Mr. Vaughan, on
the subject of the award of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, upon the question
of the disputed boundary, submitted by Great Britain and the United States of America
to the arbitration of that Sovereign, I am commanded by the King to instruct you to
address a note to the American Secretary of State, to the following effect.
" Mr. Livingston is doubtless aware that his predecessor in office was informed,
verbally, by Mr. Vaughan, that the King, our Master, upon the receipt of the instrument
by which the award of the King of the Netherlands was communicated to the British
Government, had considered himself bound, in fulfilment of the obligations which he
had contracted by the terms of the Convention of arbitration of the 29th September,
1827, to express to His Netherland Majesty, His Majesty's assent to that award.
" It appears to his Majesty's Government, that the time is now arrived, when a final
understanding between the British and American Governments, on the subject of that
award, and on the measures necessary to be taken for carrying it into effect, ought no
longer to be delayed: and I am accordingly to direct that, in making to the American
Secretary of State, the present more formal communication of the assent of His Majesty
to the decision of His Netherland Majesty, you enquire of Mr. Livingston whether his
Government are now ready to proceed, conjointly with that of Great Britain, to the
nomination of Commissioners for marking out the boundary between the possessions of
His Majesty in North America, and those of the United States, agreeably to His
Netherland Majesty's award.
"His Majesty's Government are not ignorant that the Minister of the United
States of America residing at the Hague, immediately upon the receipt of the award of
His Netherland Majesty, protested against that award, on the ground that the arbitrator
had therein exceeded the powers conferred upon him by the parties to the arbitration.
But that protest was avowedly made without instructions from Washington, and His
Majesty is persuaded that the Government of the United States, influenced, like His
Majesty, by a sincere determination to give a fair and full effect to the spirit and inten
tion of their engagements, no less than by an anxious desire to settle this long pending
difference between the two Governments, in the only way which the experience of so
many years has shewn to be practicable, will not hesitate to accept the award of His
Netherland Majesty.
" In deciding to give his own assent to this award, for the reasons above stated, His
Majesty was not insensible to the sacrifice which he was thus making of a most impor
tant portion of those claims, of the justice of which, in their full extent, His Majesty
continues to be, as he has always been, entirely satisfied.
" It was impossible for His Majesty to see without deep regret, that, on one branch

v APPENDIX.
of the British claims, the award deprived the British Crown of a large tract of country,
to which it had long been held to be entitled ; while, on another branch of the claims, that
award, at the same time that it pronounced in favour of the principle of demarcation for
which Great Britain contended, introduced a special modification of that principle for the
convenience and advantage of the United States, without offering to Great Britain any
compensation for the loss thus occasioned to her.
"But these were not considerations by which His Majesty thought himself at
liberty to be influenced, in deciding the question of his acceptance or rejection of the
decision of His Netherland Majesty. In whatever degree His Majesty's wishes or ex
pectations may have been disappointed by that decision, His Majesty did not hesitate to
act upon the stipulation contained in the VI lth Article of the Convention of Arbitration,
that ' the decision of the arbiter, when given, shall be taken to be final and conclusive;'
and His Majesty fulfilled this duty with tbe greater cheerfulness, from the confident
hope that in thus completing the engagement which he had contracted, he was finally
setting at rest a dispute which had been so long and so hopelessly agitated between the
two Governments, to the interruption of that perfect agreement and harmony on all
points, which it is His Majesty's sincere desire to see permanently established between
Great Britain and the United States of America.
"His Majesty would indeed be deeply grieved, if he could suppose that the
Government of the United States could hesitate to adopt the same course which His
Majesty has pursued on this occasion. For what other prospect of an adjustment of
this long pending difference would then remain? Commissioners, since the Treaty of
1783, have found it impossible to reconcile the description of the boundary contained in
that Treaty, with the real features of the country ascertained by actual survey; and the
hopelessness of establishing absolutely, in favour of either party, the point which has
thus, since the year 1783, been the subject of controversy between them, has now
received a new confirmation, by the solemn decision of an arbitrator, chosen by both
parties, who has pronounced it to be incapable of being established in accordance with
the terms of the original Treaty, that Treaty having been drawn up in ignorance of the
real features of the country, which it professed to describe.
" Seeing that there cannot be a settlement of the claims of either party in strict
accordance with the Treaty of 1783, what course would remain, even if the choice were
now to be made, but that which was agreed upon by the negotiators of the Treaty of
Ghent; viz. the adjustment of the differences between the two Governments by means
of an Arbitrator? And how unreasonable would it be to object to such an adjustment,
because it aimed at settling by compromise, differences pronounced to be otherwise
irreconcileable. That such an adjustment, and not a rigid adoption of one of the two
claims to the exclusion of all compromise, was the object of the IV th Article of the
Treaty of Ghent, will be manifest upon referring to that Article, in which provision is
made for a decision of the arbiter which should be final and conclusive, even although
the arbiter, owing to the neglect or refusal of one of the parties, should have had before
him only one of the two claims which it would be his province to adjust. Even the
official correspondence of the United States furnishes proofs that such was the under
standing in that country, and among parties most interested in the subject, as to what
would be the effect of the reference of this question to arbitration. ' By arbitration,'
(says the Governor of the State of Maine, in a letter to the President of the United
States, dated May 19th, 1827, and previously, of course, to the conclusion of the Con
vention), ' I understand a submission to some Foreign Sovereign or State, who will
decide at pleasure on the whole subject, who will be under no absolute obligations or
effectual restraint, by virtue of the Treaty of 1783.' And it appears, by a letter from
the same functionary, dated the 18 th of April in the same year, that Mr. Gallatin had
used the following words, in a despatch to his Government on the same subject: 'An
umpire, whether a king or a farmer, rarely decides on strict principles of law ; he has
always a bias to try, if possible, to split the difference:' and the Secretary of State of
the United States, in a letter to the Governor of Maine, written after the conclusion of
the Treaty of Arbitration (viz. on the 27th of November, 1827), adverting to the above-
mentioned exposition, by Mr. Gallatin, of the usual practice of umpires, and to the

APPENDIX. v
objection which the Governor of Maine had thereupon stated to the mode of settlement
by arbitration, while he defends the Convention in spite of the objection of the Governor
of Maine, admits that it is an objection to which the Convention is liable.
"These passages will be found in the printed paper, No. 171, 30th Congress, 1st
Session, at pages 80, 85, and 99.
" On every ground therefore, His Majesty feels confident that if the Government of
the United States have not already, before your receipt of this despatch, announced their
assent to the award of the King of the Netherlands, they will not hesitate to enable you
to apprize His Majesty's Government of their acquiescence in that decision. The
grounds on which His Majesty's acceptance of it was founded, have been fully explained
to you in this despatch, and among the motives which influenced His Majesty on that
occasion, there was none more powerful than the anxious desire which His Majesty feels
to improve and confirm the harmony which so happily exists on other subjects, between
Great Britain and the United States of America, by thus settling, once for all, a question
of great difficulty, and for which His Majesty is unable to see any other satisfactory
solution. " I am, &c.
" (Signed) PALMERSTON."
" C. Bankhead, Esq.
Sfc. cj-c. eye.

No. 2.
Viscount Palmerston to Charles Bankhead, Esq.
" Sir, "Foreign Office, October 14, 1831.
"You will learn from the instructions contained in my other despatch of this date,
on the subject of the north-eastern boundary, that the communication which you are to
make, in the name of His Majesty, to the Government of the United States, extends no
farther than to propose a simple and unconditional acceptance of the award of the King
of the Netherlands by the United States, and the consequent appointment of commis
sioners to carry that award into effect ; such being, in the opinion of His Majesty's Go
vernment, the only course to be pursued at the present stage of the boundary question,
consistently with the respective interests and obligations of the two Governments.
"You are nevertheless authorized to intimate privately to the American Minister,
upon any suitable occasion, that His Majesty's Government would not consider the
formal acceptance of the award by Great Britain and the United States, as necessarily
precluding the two Governments from any future modification of the terms of the
arrangement prescribed in that instrument, provided it should appear that any par
ticular parts of the boundary line, thus established, were capable of being improved to
the mutual convenience and advantage of both countries ; and you will state, that, after
the award shall have been formally acceded to by both Governments, His Majesty's
Government will be ready to enter, with the Government of the United States, into the
consideration of the best means of effecting any such modification by reciprocal exchange
and concession. " You will however be particularly cautious, in making any communication of this
nature, to guard against the possibility of being misunderstood as inviting negotiation as
a substitute for the adoption of the award.
" Until the award is mutually adopted, any such concert between the two Govern
ments would be impossible, because, each party claiming the whole of the territory in
dispute, there is no boundary line between the two, with respect to which modifications
could be proposed by either party ; but when the award is acquiesced in by both sides,
and a boundary line is thus established to which both Governments shall have assented,
there will then be a basis upon which exchanges or modifications might reciprocally be
effected " I am &c»
" " Charles Bankhead, Esq. " (Signed) PALMERSTON."
c^C. SfC. ijc.
(b)

vi APPENDIX. No. 3.
Charles Bankhead, Esq. to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received April 23.,/
(Extract.) " Washington, March 29, 1832.
" The proceedings of the Secret Session of the Council and House of Represent
atives of Maine have lately been disclosed to the public, and it appears that an agree
ment has taken place, subscribing, under certain conditions, to the decision of the King
of the Netherlands. Those conditions, as given in the Maine newspapers, are, that
Commissioners, on the part of the United States, and on the part of the State of Maine,
are to be appointed in order to negotiate as to an indemnity to be given by the former to
the latter, for the loss which she alleges that she would suffer by her acceptance of the
Netherland arbitration. That the result of this commission is to be laid before the legis
lature for their ultimate acceptance or rejection."

No. 4.
Charles Bankhead, Esq. to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 1S.J
"My Lord, " Washington, June 13, 1832.
" I have heretofore delayed the fulfilment of the instructions which I had the honour
of receiving from your Lordship, in your despatch of October 14, of last year, respecting
the ulterior views which His Majesty's Government might entertain, when the question
of boundary, as awarded by the King of the Netherlands, should have been fully acqui
esced in by the United States.
" I did so, because the Senate in its executive capacity had shewn no disposition to
take up the question, and I thought that the slightest intimation on my part, as to the
possibility of future negotiation, would, perhaps, endanger the favourable decision of the
Senate upon the original question, which decision, fully and unconditionally declared,
was to precede any other step which might be taken thereupon. However, during the
last two days, I learnt that the whole boundary question has been under the consider
ation of the Senate ; and Mr. Livingston informed me, that he hoped very soon to be
able to communicate to His Majesty's Government the decision of the United States
upon it. I thought that this was a proper moment, informally, to intimate to the Secre
tary of State that His Majesty's Government might not be indisposed to enter into
explanations with this Government with a view to effect some modifications by reciprocal
exchange and concession, but that the full and unconditional acceptance of the award
by this country must precede any such intention on the part of Great Britain.
" Mr. Livingston asked me (and he did so informally) whether I was authorized to
make or to receive any overture before the President had signified his assent to the
award ; I replied, of course, in the negative.
" I hope that your Lordship will not consider that I have exceeded the discretionary
power with which you invested me in bringing forward, at this moment, the possibility
of a future arrangement being effected relative to the north-east boundary.
" I have the honour to be, &c.
" Viscount Palmerston, " (Signed) CHARLES BANKHEAD."
fyc. tyc. fyc.

No. 5.

Debates in the House of Commons on the North-East Boundary,
From 1831 to 183 7- — (Extracted from the Mirror of Parliament.)
MARCH 14, 1831.
Mr. Robinson. — "I rise, in pursuance of the notice that I have given, to move
that an Address be presented to His Majesty, for a copy of the decision of the King of

APPENDIX. vii
Holland on the question of the boundary line of the North-west Coast of America. I
shall not occupy much time in addressing the House ; but it is necessaiy that I should
make a short explanation of the nature of my motion. In one of the articles in the
Treaty of Peace between this Country and the United States, it was stipulated that
Commissioners should be appointed with a view to decide the important question
regarding the Boundary line between the provinces of New Brunswick and Lower
Canada, and the United States of America; and that, in case of difference arising
between them, the subject should be referred to the decision of a friendly power, agreed
to by both parties. As the Commissioners did not come to a satisfactory conclusion,
the matter was referred, in 1827, to the decision of the King of the Netherlands. I
understand the decision of that Sovereign has recently been given; and that the
Minister of the United States refuses to abide by it.
" In the agreement between the two Countries, it is stated, that ' in the event of
the Commissioners differing upon all or any of the points so referred to them, or in the
event of both or either of the Commissioners refusing or declining or wilfully omitting
to act as such, they shall report, jointly or severally, to their respective Governments ;
and His Britannic Majesty, and the Government of the United States, hereby agree to
refer the report or reports of the said Commissioners to some friendly Sovereign or State
to be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differ
ences which may be stated in the report or reports.' And further : — 'And His Britannic
Majesty, and the Government of the United States, engage to consider the decision
of such friendly Sovereign or State to be final and conclusive on all the matters
so referred.' "After a period of three years, the Monarch to whom the question was referred
has decided. The King of Holland was the party to whose judgment the matter was
left ; and he, I understand, has declared in favour of the claim of this Country. The
House, I think, has a right to know the particulars of this case, and why the matter has
not yet been set at rest. This is a most important consideration, as regards some of our
most valuable Colonies ; and the particulars ought to be made public, without delay.
The decision, whatever it may be, will be attended with important results both to this
Country and the Colonies, as well as to the United States. I am not able to speak
positively — but probably the Noble Lord will be able to give some information — as to
a rumour afloat on this subject. It has been very generally reported, that when the
American Minister heard that the decision of the King of the Netherlands was against
his Government, he protested against this decision, and appealed to his own Country
from it. But, at any rate, this House ought to be informed whether any decision has
been given by the King of Holland, — and what that is, whether it is favorable or not to
this country. If the American Government has now thought fit to refuse to abide by
this decision, or to protest against it, surely it is of sufficient importance that the House
should be acquainted with the particulars of it.
" The territory which is the ground of dispute is of great extent and value, and is of
great importance in a military point of view. It remains to be seen whether this country
is tamely to yield to these demands of the American Government, or whether that terri
tory is to remain in the possession of this country as it is at present. The people in the
North American provinces ought to know immediately what they are to expect, and
whether this Government intends to abide by the decision given by the King of Holland.
" I trust that there is sufficient firmness in the English Ministry not to abandon the
advantages which they may have obtained by this decision. I feel assured that if the
King of Holland had declared against the claim of this country, there would have been
too high a feeling of honour, on our part, to hesitate for one moment as to the course
which ought to be pursued. The Americans however will again attempt to gain time by
negotiation, for the chance of something arising in their favor. They generally have got,
and I fear, unless some great improvement takes place in our diplomacy, they will con
tinue to get, the better of us in negotiation.
" It will be in the recollection of the House that it is now nearly seventeen years
since the treaty of Ghent, when this question was referred to the Commissioners for their

viii APPENDIX.
decision. I could urge many reasons why the information I now move for should be
granted ; and unless the Noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, is prepared to
say, that granting it would be attended with detriment to the public service, I shall
press for it.
" I beg leave to move, ' Tbat an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, pray
ing, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this
House, a copy of the decision of His Majesty the King of Holland, on the Boundary
line of the North- West Coast of America.' "
Viscount Palmerston. — " I think that I have a right to complain of the
course pursued by the Honourable Member, who, in his eagerness, has assumed the ob
jections that may be urged against his motion. The Honourable Member has no right
to assume Avhether or no any decision has been given on this question, and still less,
whether or no it is in favor of, or adverse to, the claims of this country. I feel it my
duty to oppose the motion, because the transaction to which the Honourable Member
alludes is as yet an incomplete transaction, and negotiations connected with it are still
pending. He has no right to make the gratuitous assumption that he has entertained
respecting it. 1 shall not attempt to answer the observations of the Honourable Mem
ber, as 1 think that by doing so I should necessarily be drawn into explanations which
I feel I ought not to enter into.
"With respect to the present motion, I feel bound to declare, that, as a Minister of
the Crown, I do not feel myself justified in assenting to it. It remains for the House to
determine whether or no it will place sufficient reliance on the declaration I have now
made in my Ministerial capacity — that the motion of the Honourable Member cannot
with safety be assented to ; and this because the matter in question is not yet finally
closed. I do trust, however, that the time is not far distant at which I shall feel myself
at liberty to give all the information now applied for, and that that information will prove
satisfactory to the Honourable Member and the House — meanwhile I shall certainly give
my negative to the present motion."
Mr. Robinson. — " I have no doubt that the House will agree with the Noble
Lord, after the declaration he has just made, as a Minister of the Crown. I, however,
do contend, that whenever two Governments, — our own and another, — have been
negotiating for thirteen years on any given point, afterwards submit the question for the
decision of a neutral power, and at the expiration of that period find that a settlement
of the matter takes place, this House should know what has been done in the business
in that interval; so that whatever impediments may exist, or have existed, may be
removed. I complain of the singular procrastination which has attended this nego
tiation, and I must express my astonishment that hitherto, in any negotiation in which
we have been engaged with the United States, they should have got the better of us.
If the decision of the umpire selected had been in favour of the United States, our
Government, actuated by those honourable motives which influence them in all their
negotiations, would have immediately yielded. The American Minister, however,
finding that the award was likely to be unfavourable to the pretensions of his Govern
ment, protested. I feel assured that if an Enghsh Ambassador had acted in this way,
his conduct would not have been approved of by this house, or by his country. I
lament that the matter has not been settled, as the protracting of the negotiations in
this way is productive of singular annoyance to the inhabitants of our North American
Colonies. " I assure the Noble Lord that I did not suppose that the production of the
documents I now apply for would be attended with inconvenience, for I should be loath
to do any thing calculated to embarrass His Majesty's Government. I shall not press
my motion ; but I must consider that the United States have had an advantage over this
country which ought not to have been allowed in this affair, and which has arisen from
the weakness of our own Government in allowing the matter to be referred back to the
United States."
Viscount Palmerston. — " I trust that the House will not suppose the cir
cumstances of the case to be such as tbjey have been stated by the honourable gentle-

APPENDIX. , ix
man, in consequence of my not answering him. I repeat, that I do not feel justified in
assenting to the motion." — The motion for the address was then put, and negatived.
MARCH 3, 1835.
Mr. Robinson. — " Seeing the Right Honorable Baronet in his place, I wish to ask
him whether any, and what progress has been made in the negociations with the United
States, respecting the settlement of the Boundary line between them and our Colonies?"
The Chancellor of the Exchequer. — " I am afraid that I shall not be able to
give the Hon. Member an answer to his question regarding the boundaries in as brief
terms as those he has employed for his question. It is one of the most important topics
with which the British Government can have to deal. The difficulty seems to be to set
tle the precise boundaries of the province of Maine on the part of the United States, and
of New Brunswick on the part of his Britannic Majesty. The dispute arises out of
some vagueness in the terms of the Treaty of 1783. According to that Treaty, the
boundary was to depend upon certain high Lands, as they were called, extending to the
River St. Lawrence. Now, those high Lands have never yet been discovered — and,
indeed, I believe they are not to be found. The question was, by the consent of both
parties, referred to the King of the Netherlands ; and three points were to be settled by
his Arbitration. On two of them the King of the Netherlands gave a decided opinion,
but the third remains undetermined, because it was physically impossible to fix upon the
position of the high lands, as laid down in the Treaty of 1783. The King of the
Netherlands, therefore, proposed that the matter in dispute should be amicably com
promised, and the British Government was willing to abide by the terms of compromise he
should point out ;* but the Government of the United States would not give its consent."
" A new Survey was suggested by the United States ; and we expressed our willing
ness to concur, if a preliminary understanding were come to upon certain points. One
of them was, that the Bay of Fundy should be taken to be part of the Atlantic Ocean.f
A despatch was sent out on the subject in the course of last autumn, but sufficient time
has not yet elapsed for us to receive an answer. Negociations are, therefore, still pend
ing ; and the President of the United States has refused to produce certain papers, lest
he should compromise any of the interests he is bound to protect. I believe that there
is an earnest desire, on both sides, to come to an amicable adjustment of the only remain-
in^ question of litigation. A proposition was made by this Government in the month of
October last, and it is impossible for us yet to know whether the preliminary arrange
ments will or will not be accepted."
* [These mis-statements, or rather this complete falsification of the facts and the truth,
made by Sir Robert Peel, shows how Lord Palmerston had adjusted his records}
measures, and men, before leaving office, to impose upon his successor. — After this,
of course, the other party is committed to the measures of Lord Palmerston.
[There are two points worthy of attention. First, Sir Robert Peel does not conceive
that there was any ground for suppressing what he knew (or what he heard) to be
the state of the case. Secondly, there was no member in the House of Commons
able to expose the falsehood of the statements, or the fallacy of the arguments put in
his mouth. One might suspect that the English language had ceased to be an avail
able vehicle for any national purpose.— It is, however, the language used in America.]
¦j- [By reference to the article from the New York Albion, pp. xi, xii, it will be seen that
the arguments of Maine are adopted by Sir Robert Peel.]
APRIL 24th, 1837.
Sir Robert Peel.—" I will avail myself of this opportunity to ask the Noble
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in what position our differences are with the United States,
as to the Northern Frontier ? I wish to know whether they are adjusted, or whether
any progress has been made towards their adjustment ? "
(c)

x APPENDIX.
Viscount Palmerston. — " There have been a great many communications upon the
subject, between the Governments of the two countries; and I can assure the Right
Hon. Bart, that the Government of each is animated by a sincere desire to come to an
amicable arrangement. I must do this justice to the Government of the United States,
and to the late President especially, to say that the Central Government has laboured
under great difficulty with regard to the negociation, from the circumstance of its discre
tion being limited by certain independent actions on the part of the Government of Maine.
There have not, lately, been any written communications upon the subject ; but many
verbal communications have taken place between the Government of this Country and
the American Minister here, as well as between the British Minister in America and the
Government of the United States. The whole correspondence on the subject has been
published, by order of the Congress, in the United States; and, when it reaches this
Country, the Right Hon. Bart, will see all the official communications .that have taken
place upon the subject. I am sorry, however, to say, that there does not seem to be any
prospect of an immediate settlement of the question."
Mr. Hume. — "Would there be any objection to lay before the British Parliament
the papers that have been published upon the subject in America ?"
Sir Robert Peel. — " I beg to ask the Noble Lord whether the state of Maine is
in the occupation of any portion of the disputed territory ?"
Viscount Palmerston. — " The whole of the Territory is, / believe, at present in
our possession ; with a clear understanding however, that neither party is to exercise
within the limits any rights that belong to a permanent sovereignty."
Sir Robert Peel. — " I do not exactly see how that arrangement can have been
made. The land must be occupied by one party or the other. Am I to understand that
it is at present occupied by British subjects ?"
Viscount Palmerston. — " The district is not inhabited. The Territoiy is chiefly
covered with forests ; and it has been agreed that neither party shall cut wood in it until
the question is finally settled. As regards the question put to me by the Honourable
Member for Middlesex, I beg to state that there can be no objection to produce all the
correspondence that has taken place" upon the subject, except that it would be a departure
from a very wholesome rule generally acted upon in this country, of not producing any
papers relating to negociations still pending. As the papers in question, however, have
been published by order of Congress, I do not see that there can be any objection in
placing them before the House."
Mr. Roebuck. — " The Noble Lord cannot be aware that the government of Maine
has passed some regulations which operate severely upon the neglected and destitute
condition of the inhabitants of the disputed Territory. The Noble Lord says, that Great
Britain is in occupation of the Territory, but that she cannot enforce the rights of occu
pation. The truth is, that at this time there are a great number of persons who are
cutting down trees, who are peopling the land, and who are called — a large portion of
them — citizens of the United States. The population consists, indeed, of refugees from
both sides the territory — rogues and vagabonds — who find there a safe asylum from the
laws of either country."
Viscount Palmerston. — " The Honourable and Learned Gentleman must refer
to another part of the country, and not in the territory in dispute."

[Such are the words dropped, in the Imperial Senate of this mighty Nation, — during
six years, — on the subject, of a disputed Frontier and a National Treaty !
[In tracing the debates on Foreign Policy, during the course of the Peace, I find that
information is constantly refused, on the plea that it might endanger the success of
the matter under negociation ; — but I also find that, though information has been
invariably with-held, failure has been as invariable.]

APPENDIX. xi

MERITS OF THE BOUNDARY QUESTION.
From the Albion New York Paper, March, 1839.
[As the inquiry to which these pages have been devoted commences with the Award of
*the King of Holland, it would have been beside the question to enter at all into the
negociations preceding that act, and the merits of the dispute which was brought to a
close by that decision,— indeed, to refer to the anterior question would only serve
to perplex the reader, to confuse the argument, and to cut away the grounds on
which the matter rests. However, a plain and simple exposition of the state of the
case, independently of the arbitration, may not be without interest ; the more so as
that which follows is an American statement, and one which, as it carefully avoids
all reference to the Award, is clearly not the production of a man who sees the
question in a British point of view.]
"The subject of the North-eastern Boundary so fully absorbs public attention, that
we may be pardoned for occupying a large portion of our paper with it. We are the more
anxious to do so, because the opinion so generally prevails that nothing can be said in
behalf of the British claim. It is indeed affirmed, and generally believed, that England
is claiming what she knows is not her own, and that her designs are altogether dis
honourable and even fraudulent ; but she is never dishonourable, and it is therefore but
fair after we have heard so much in favor of Maine, that something should be said on the
other side. We shall endeavour to do this as briefly as possible, and then refer our
readers to the Award of the King of the Netherlands— a document, we may remark,
drawn up with great clearness and impartiality — which will be found in the preceding
columns. " We must take it for granted, that all our readers who feel any interest in the
matter, understand the preliminary fact of the case, viz. that the difficulty has arisen
from a misconstruction of the 2nd article of the treaty of 1783, made at Paris between
Great Britain and the United States at the close of the revolutionary war. This article
we insert above, as it may be necessary to refer to it in the course of the few observations
we are about to make. It will be observed, that, in tracing the boundaries, it is declared
that the line shall commence at the ' North-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz. that angle
which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix river to the
Highlands, along the said Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves
into the River St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic ocean, to the North-
westernmost head of the Connecticut river/ &c. Under the Treaty of Ghent a Com
mission was appointed to run this line, and to ascertain the true position of those High
lands, but unfortunately the British and American Commissioners disagreed, and the
matter remains unsettled to this hour. The British Commissioners asserted that the
Highlands commenced at Mars Hill, while the American contended for a range of hills
one hundred miles further to the north. These points will be found designated upon the
map now before the reader.
" The gist of the case lies in a nut-shell. It is clear that the north-west angle of
Nova Scotia of the Treaty, must be sought for at those Highlands which separate waters
flowing into the River St. Lawrence and into the Atlantic Ocean. Now do the High
lands contended for by Maine at the north of the River St. John, separate such waters ?
Certainly not. They separate waters flowing into the St. Lawrence, but not into the
Atlantic, and consequently a main requisition of the treaty is unprovided for. By a •
reference to the map it will be seen, that the rivers which flow to the south of these
Highlands are the Restigouche, which falls into the Bay of Chaleur; and the St. John, '

xii APPENDIX.
which empties itself into the Bay of Fundy. No river in that part of the line flows into
the Atlantic, and therefore those that do exist, cannot be regarded as the true streams, or
those required by the treaty. But, say the Maine claimants, this is immaterial ; for as
the Bays of Chaleur and Fundy ultimately reach the Atlantic, they must be considered
as the Atlantic itself.* This is geographically incorrect ; the Bay of, Fundy is the Bay of
Fundy, and nothing more ; so is the Chesapeake. As well might we call the Baltic and
the Mediterranean the Atlantic Ocean ; but if we did so, what schoolboy would not cor
rect us ? Besides, the terms of such an important instrument as a treaty cannot be so
loosely construed ; every word must bear its true and precise meaning, and nothing
more. No expounder of law can possibly say that the general term ' Atlantic Ocean,'
means and comprehends every bay, inlet, and gulf that may ultimately flow into it>. If
so, where is the utility of giving such bays, inlets, and gulfs, distinctive names at all ? —
But the treaty itself settles this point, for it makes a clear and broad distinction between
the ' Atlantic' and the ' Bay of Fundy.' This is visible to any one who will peruse the
2nd article inserted above. The east line, it says, shall be drawn ' along the middle of the
Saint Croix from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy ;' and that all islands shall be compre
hended and given to the United States lying within twenty leagues of the coast, where
the aforesaid boundaries, between Nova Scotia on the one part and East Florida on the
other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy AND the Atlantic Ocean.' Now here
the negotiators of 1783 have drawn a clear distinction between the Bay of Fundy and
the Atlantic Ocean, which is immediately fatal to the claim of the State of Maine, for the
Highlands designated by her do not separate rivers, falling into the St. Lawrence and
into the Atlantic Ocean, as prescribed by the treaty, but rivers emptying into the St.
Lawrence, and into the Bay of Chaleur, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the Bay of
Fundy. A treaty must be construed like an Act of Parliament or an Act of Congress,
and no such latitude of construction could be given as claimed by the State of Maine to
any legislative act whatever.
" But the American diplomatists fortify their position by citing the boundaries of
the Province of Quebec, as set forth in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and other British
documents. Such citations would certainly be useful if it were apparent that the nego
tiators of the treaty of 1783 intended to make the southern boundary of the province of
Quebec form one part of the north-west angle of Nova Scotia : but no such evidence
appears — on the contrary the strongest presumption exists that neither party intended
to carry the line north of the St. John. If it had been the intention to carry the north
line to the southern extremity of the Quebec Province, why was it not so specified ? The
Royal Proclamation above mentioned was then extant, and perfectly well known to Dr.
Franklin, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jay, and it is inconceivable that they should have been
silent on such an important point, had it been their intention to carry the line into that
vicinity. But, say the jurists of Maine, behold the similarity in the words of the Treaty
and of the Proclamation. The latter says ' the line shall cross the River St. Lawrence and
Lake Champlain in 45 degrees north latitude, pass along the Highlands which divide the
rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the sea,
and along the north coast to the Bay of Chaleur.' Here the single word sea makes an
important difference, and clearly indicates the distinction to be drawn between that com
prehensive monosyllable in the Proclamation and the more limited term ' Atlantic Ocean,'
employed in the treaty. The 'sea' means the ocean in general; the 'Atlantic,' the At
lantic in particular — the one is comprehensive, the other distinct and limited, and upon
this point the whole question turns.
" A vast number of collateral arguments are brought forward on the British side
which our limits do not allow us to quote ; we shall however mention a few of the more
prominent. " If we are to be governed by the treaty, it is impossible to depart from its strict
letter ; and if it be found that the words of the instrument are incompatible with the
geographical delineations of the country, and that neither party can satisfactorily
establish its line — it follows that a new one should be adopted by mutual and friendly
«
* See page ix, ante. — Sir Robert Peel's Statement in the House of Commons, Nqte (t).

APPENDIX. xiii
agreement. It was with this view of the case that the King of the Netherlands-
recommended a compromise, and designated the St. John and the St. Francis as the
basis of that compromise. It was also in accordance with the same friendly spirit that
the British Government, only a few months since, offered to make an equal and exact
division of the whole territory, and take one half — an offer, in our opinion, most just,
most rational, and in the highest degree expedient.
" The north-west angle of Nova Scotia of the treaty was conventional, rather than
geographical, and the treaty prescribed the mode of finding and fixing that angle. The
American Commissioners of 1783 first proposed as a boundary the river St. John, from
its source to its mouth, and if this had been agreed to, where would the north-west angle
of Nova Scotia have been then ? Of what utility would have been the southern boundary
of Quebec in that case ? Surely, if it had been the settled purpose of the negotiators
to fix irrevocably the north-west angle where the western line of Nova Scotia intersects
the southern limits of Quebec, the treaty could not have been silent upon a point of
such moment. The King of the Netherlands pointedly alludes to this defect.
" The British Commissioners refused to surrender the whole territory washed by
the river St. John, because the demand was exorbitant, and the American Commissioners
abandoned it for the same reason. Now, can it be supposed, as the Award remarks,
that England would consent to give up more land to the north of the St. John "than at
the south, especially when such surrender cut off her communication with Canada?
Such an arrangement never could have been meant or intended by either party.
" In the Preliminaries of Peace, entered into in 1782, we find the following: —
" ' It is agreed to form the Articles of the proposed Treaty on such principles of
liberal equity and reciprocity, as that, partial advantages (those seeds, of discord) being
excluded, such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse between the two countries may
be established, as to promise and secure to both, perpetual peace and harmony.'
" Now look at the map, and see if the boundary as claimed by the United States
corresponds with this injunction. Does this line yield no partial advantages to Maine, —
those ' seeds of discord?'
" Let any candid person draw a line from the city of St. John to the city of
Quebec, and see if it describes a good and sufficient boundary to Great Britain. The
American Commissioners of 1783 would not have asked for such a line, nor would those
of England have yielded it, and, consequently, it cannot be in conformity to the true
intent and meaning of the Treaty of that date.
" The whole question has been submitted to an impartial arbiter — the King of the
Netherlands; that monarch has investigated it, and given his award, which will be
found in this day's impression. This award the State of Maine refused to be bound by,
although England, notwithstanding it gave her the smallest portion, expressed her
willingness to accede to it.
" There was no reason to suppose that His Majesty of the Netherlands was unduly
favourable to England, for at that period a hostile English fleet was at his door,
endeavouring to dissever his kingdom ; which was ultimately done, and Belgium wrested
from him.
" We have made these remarks for the purpose of showing that England has some
justice on her side, and is not acting the fraudulent part that is represented. The
position assumed by the State of Maine, and in part by Congress, places England in a
painful situation. The whole territory is insisted on, and if Great Britain yields it, she
cuts herself off from Canada, and renders herself incapable of sending succours during
, the winter to her loyal population in those provinces, and thus place in imminent
jeopardy their safety. Are the United States, then, prepared to force on England the
dire alternatives of war or the loss of Canada ? We hope not, most ferwently, especially
when the matter in dispute is comparatively of little value, and of doubtful title. We
trust that the sober good sense of the American people will calmly examine this matter,
and enable the President and his Cabinet to present to England some less obnoxious
alternative. Let the case be once more referred to a third power — let moderation and
justice guide the councils of both nations ; but never let two kindred people again imbue
their hands in each other's blood."
(d)

APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS FROM CHANNING'S LETTER ON THE ANNEXATION OF
THE TEXAS.
[Though addressed to America, these words are no less ominous to England. The crimes
of nations affect not the perpetrators or the victims alone. It was in England's
power to prevent the disasters here described and prognosticated : it was her duty
to have'done so. The perusal of these lines, besides awakening Englishmen to a sense
of their position in the actual crisis, may lead them to reflect on the duties associated
with their great fortune, and on the prospect of bloodshed and misery, of violence
and injustice, in every quarter of the Globe, resulting from their unfitness for the
station they occupy. I pray God that it may lead them to think on their children's
fate : and on the execration that may yet be heaped on their name, where it has
hitherto been revered.]
" Some crimes, by their magnitude, have a touch of the sublime ; and to this
dignity the seizure of Texas by our citizens is entitled. Modern times furnish no exam
ple of individual rapine on so- grand a scale. It is nothing less than the robbery of a
realm. The pirate seizes a ship. The colonists and their coadjutors can satisfy them
selves with nothing short of an empire. They have left their Anglo-Saxon ancestors
behind them. Those barbarians conformed to the maxims of their age, to the rude code
of nations in time of thickest heathen darkness. They invaded England under their
sovereigns, and with the sanction of the gloomy religion of the North. But it is in a
civiUzed age, and amidst refinements of manners ; — it is amidst the lights of science and
the teaching of Christianity, amidst expositions of the law of nations and enforcements
of the law of universal love, amidst institutions of religion, learning, and humanity; —
that the robbery of Texas has found its instruments. It is from a free, well-ordered,
enlightened Christian country, that hordes have gone forth, in open day, to perpetrate
this mighty wrong."
" We boast of our rapid growth, forgetting that, throughout nature, noble growths
are slow. Our people throw themselves beyond the bounds of civilization, and expose
themselves to relapses into a semi-barbarous state, under the impulse of wild imagination,
and for the name of great possessions. Perhaps there is no people on earth, on whom
the ties of local attachment sit so loosely. Even the wandering tribes of Scythia are
bound to one spot, the graves of their fathers ; but the homes and graves of our fathers
detain us feebly. The known and familiar is often abandoned for the distant and
untrodden ; and sometimes the untrodden is not the less eagerly desired because
belonging to others. To this spirit Ave have sacrificed justice and humanity ; and through
its ascendancy, the records of this young nation are stained with atrocities, at which
communities grown grey in corruption might blush."
" Texas is a country conquered by our citizens ; and the annexation of it to our
Union will be the beginning of conquests, which, unless arrested and beaten back by a
just and kind providence, will stop only at the Isthmus of Darien. Henceforth we must
cease to cry, Peace, peace. Our Eagle will whet, not gorge its appetite on its first vic
tim ; and will snuff a more tempting quarry, more alluring blood, in every new region
which opens southward. To annex Texas is to declare perpetual war with Mexico.
That word, Mexico, associated in men's minds with boundless wealth, has already
awakened rapacity. Already it has been proclaimed, that the Anglo-Saxon race is
destined to the sway of this magnificent* realm, — that the rude form of society, which
Spain established there, is to yield and vanish before a higher civilization."

APPENDIX. xv
" A deadly hatred burns in Mexico towards this country. No stronger' national
sentiment now binds her scattered provinces together, than dread and detestation of
Republican America. She is ready to attach herself to Europe for defence from the
United States. All the moral power which we might have gained over Mexico, -we have
thrown away ; and suspicion, dread, and abhorrence, have supplanted respect and trust."
" I am aware that these remarks are met by a vicious reasoning which discredits a
people among whom it finds favour. It is sometimes said, that nations are swayed by
laws, as unfailing as those which govern matter ; that they have their destinies ; that
their character and position carry them forward irresistibly to their gaol: that the
stationary Turk must sink under the progressive civilization of Russia, as inevitably as
the crumbling edifice falls to the earth ; that, by ahke necessity, the Indians have melted
before theVhite man, and the mixed, degraded race of Mexico must melt before the
Anglo-Saxon. Away with this vile sophistry ! There is no necessity for crime. There
is no Fate to justify rapacious nations, any more than to justify gamblers and robbers,
in plunder." " Hitherto, -I have spoken of the annexation of Texas as embroiling us with
Mexico ; but it will not stop here. It will bring us into collision with other states. It
will, almost of necessity, involve us in hostility with European powers. Such are now
the connexions of nations, that Europe must look with jealousy on a country, whose
ambition, seconded by vast resources, will seem to place within her grasp the empire of
the new world. And not only general considerations of this nature, but the particular
relatipn of certain foreign states to this continent, must te,nd to destroy the peace now
happily subsisting between us and the kingdoms of Europe. England, in particular,
must watch us with suspicion, and cannot but resist our appropriation of Texas to our-
selves._ She has at once a moral and political interest in this question, which demands
and will justify interference."
. " England has a political as well as moral interest in this question. By the
annexation of Texas we shall approach her liberated colonies ; we shall build up a power
in her neighbourhood, to which no limits can be prescribed. By adding Texas to our
acquisition of Florida, we shall do much toward girdling the Gulf of Mexico ; and I
doubt not that some of our politicians will feel as if our mastery in that sea were sure.
The West Indian Archipelago, in which the European is regarded as an intruder, will,
of course, be embraced in our over-growing scheme of empire. In truth, collision with
the West Indies will be the most certain effect of the extension of our power in that
quarter. The example, which they exhibit, of African freedom, of the elevation of the
. coloured race to the rights of men, is, of all influences, most menacing to slavery at the
South. It must grow continually more perilous. These islands, unless interfered with
from abroad, seem destined to be nurseries of civilization and freedom to the African
race." " Will a slaveholding people, spreading along the shores of the Mexican Gulf, cul
tivate friendly sentiments towards communities, whose whole history will be a bitter
reproach to their institutions, a witness against their wrongs, and whose ardent sympa
thies will be enlisted in the cause of the slave ? Cruel, ferocious conflicts, must grow
from this neighbourhood of hostile principles, of communities regarding one another
with unextinguishable hatred. All the islands of the Archipelago will have cause to
dread our power; but none so much as the emancipated. Is it not more than possible,
that wars, having for an object the subjugation of the coloured race, the destruction of
this tempting example of freedom, should spring from the proposed extension of our
dominion along the Mexican Gulf? Can England view our encroachments without alarm?"
" An English Minister would be unworthy of his office, who should see another
state greedily swallow up territories in the neighbourhood of British colonies, and not
strive, by all just means, to avert the danger."
" By encroaching on Mexico, we shall throw her into the arms of European states,
shall compel her to seek defence in transatlantic alliance. How plain is it, that alliance
with Mexico will be hostility to the United States, that her defenders will repay them
selves by making her subservient to their views, that they will thus strike root in her
soil, monopolize her trade, and control her resources. And with what face can we resist

xvi APPENDIX. $ %
the aggressions of others on our neighbour, if we give an example of aggression ? Still
more, if, by our advances, we put the colonies of England in new peril, with what face
can we oppose her occupation of Cuba? Suppose her, with that magnificent island in •
her hands, to command the Mexican Gulf and the mouths of the Mississipi?; will the
Western States find compensation for this formidable neighbourhood, in the privilege of.
flooding Texas with slaves ?"
" Thus, wars with Europe and Mexico are to be entailed on us by the annexation
of Texas. And is war the policy by which this country is to flourish? Was it for inter
minable conflicts that we formed our Union ? Is it blood, shed for plunder, which is to
consolidate our institutions ? Is it by collision with the greatest maritime power, that
our commerce is to gain strength? Is it by arming against ourselves the moral sentiments
of the world, that we are to build up national honour ? Must we of the North buckle on
our armour, to fight the battles of slavery ; to fight for a possession, which our moral
principles and just jealousy forbid us to incorporate with our confederacy? la attaching
Texas to ourselves, we provoke hostilities, and at the same time expose new points of
attack to our foes.* Vulnerable at so many points, we shall need a vast military force.
Great armies will require great revenues, and raise up great chieftains. Are we tired bf
freedom, that we are prepared to place it under such guardians ? Is the republic bent on
dying by its own hands ? Does not every man feel, that, with war for our habit, our
institutions cannot be preserved ? If ever a country were bound to peace, it is this.
Peace is our great interest. In peace our resources are to be developed, the true inter
pretation of the constitution to be established, and the interfering claims of liberty and
order to be adjusted. In peace we are to discharge our great debt to the human race,
and to diffuse freedom by manifesting its fruits. A country has no right to adopt a
policy, however gainful, which, as it may foresee, will determine it to a career of war. ' A
nation, like an individual, is bound to seek, even by sacrifices, a position, which will
favour peace, justice, and the exercise of a beneficent influence on the world. A nation,
provoking war by cupidity, by encroachment, and, above all, by efforts to propagate the
curse of slavery, is alike false to itself, to God, and to the human race."
" This possession will involve us in new Indian wars. Texas, besides b,eing open
to the irruption of the tribes within our territories, has a tribe of its own, the Camanches,
which is described as more formidable than any in North America. Such foes are not
to be coveted. The Indians ! that ominous word, which ought to pierce the conscience
of this nation, more than the savage war-cry pierces the ear. The Indians ! Have we
not inflicted and endured evil enough in our intercourse with this wretched people, to
abstain from new wars with them ? Is the tragedy of Florida to be acted again and
again in our own day, and in our children's?"
" But one thing does move me. It is a sore evil, that freedom should be
blasphemed, that republican institutions should forfeit the confidence of mankind,
through the unfaithfulness of this people to their trust."
* If these consequences have not fallen as yet on the United States, it is that France encouraged the outrages,
as committing that people against England ; and a Minister of England, — false to his country, did not repress the wrong,
and did suppress the truth.

THE END.

MITCHELL, HEATON, AND MITCHELL, HUNTERS, DUKE STEEET, LIVERPOOL.