!k*>;*; 4 ¦ • : §& s Vv- !H#'^. **¦ / |l^i:f 'f ^jk.* "^^^^ *W' « :^^*."W* iJr« ^rf1 V* ^ 5^ff5k* CLARK'S FOKEIGN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY. NEW SEEIES. VOL. X. 39orner'0 Sgstem of Cfcuatian ©octrois. YOL. IY. EDINBURGH: T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET 18 82. PEINTHD BT MOEBISON AND GIBB, FOE T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH. LONDON, . . . IIAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO. DUBLIN, .... GEOEQE HEBBEET. NEW TORK, . . SCRIBNEE AND WELFOED. A SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. BY DR. I. A. pORNER, OBERCONSISTORIALRATH AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY, BERLIN. TRANSLATED BT REV. ALFRED CAVE, B.A., PRINCIPAL AND PEOFESSOB OF THEOLOGY, HACKNEY COLLEGE, LONDON AND REV. J. S. BANKS, PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY, WESLEYAN COLLEGE, LEEDS. VOL. IV. TRANSLATED BY PROFESSOR BANKS. EDINBURGH: T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET. 188 2. [This Translation is Copyright, by arrangement with the Author.} r\ tmS4f '07S5" CONTENTS. PART II.— Continued. FIRST MAIN DIVISION— Continued. B. — Ecclesiastical Development. SECT. 114. Permanent and Variable Elements, . 115. History of the Doctrine to the Reformation, 116. Evangelical Doctrine, 117. Subjectivist Theories of Atonement to 1800, 118. Reaction from Subjectivist Theories, PAGE 1 203847 C— Dogmatic Investigation. First Article. 119. Need of Atonement, and God's Eternal Purpose of Atonement, . 79 Second Article : The Idea of Substitution and Satisfaction in general. 120. Substitution, ........ 89 121. Satisfaction, ........ 99 Third Article : Substitutionary Satisfaction of Jesus Christ. 122. Subjective Aspect, ....... 107 1226. Objective Aspect, ....... 116 123. Transition to Third Division : Christ's Post-Existence or Exaltation, 125 THIRD DIVISION. EXALTATION OF CHRIST. 124. First Point : The Descent into Hades, . . . .127 125. Second Point : The Resurrection of Christ, .... 132 126. Third Point : The Ascension and Session at the Right Hand of the Father, ....... 138 VI CONTENTS. SECOND SUBDIVISION (see vol. iii. p. 392). SECT. PAGE 127. The Transfiguring of the Earthly into the Heavenly Ofiice, . . 142 128. Transition to the Doctrine of the Church, . . . .154 SECOND MAIN DIVISION. THE CHURCH, OR THE KINGDOM OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. 129. The Work of the Holy Spirit in general, . . . .159 FIRST DIVISION. THE ORIGIN OF THE CHURCH THROUGH FAITH AND REGENERATION. 130. Relation of the Holy Spirit in the "Work of Grace to Human Activity, ........ 164 Biblical Doctrine, . . . . . . .165 Ecclesiastical Development of Doctrine, .... 168 Dogmatic Investigation, . . . ... . 177 131. First Point : Repentance or Change of Mind, . . . 187 132. Second Point : Regeneration, or the Faith that appropriates Justifi cation, . . . . , . . . . 192 Biblical Doctrine, . . . . . . .194 Ecclesiastical Doctrine, ...... 198 1326. Dogmatic Doctrine of Faith and Justification, . . . 209 133. Third Point : Sanctification, . . . . .238 SECOND DIVISION. THE EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. FIRST SUBDIVISION. ESSENTIAL AND UNCHANGEABLE BASES, OR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHURCH. 134. Summary. — Distinction between the Continuation of Christ's Official Activity through the Organ of the Church and the Reflecting of the same, ........ 243 First Point : Continuation and Reflecting of Christ's Prophetic Office. 135. A. — Continuation of same, or the Doctrine of God's Word, . . 247 CONTENTS. Vll SECT. PAGE 136. B. — Reflecting of same, or the Ministry of the Word, . . 263 137. Transition to Second Point : Relation of Word and Sacrament, . 270 Second Point. A. — Continuation of Christ's Priestly Activity. — Baptism. 138. Biblical Doctrine, ....... 277 139. Ecclesiastical Forming of Doctrine, ..... 280 140. Dogmatic Exposition of the Doctrine of Baptism in general, . 285 141. Infant Baptism, ....... 293 B. — The Church as a Reflection of Christ's Priestly Love. 142. The Confirming Church, ...... 302 Third Point. A. — The Continuation of Christ's Kingly Office through the Organ of the Church, or the Holy Supper. 143. Biblical Doctrine, ....... 307 144. Ecclesiastical Development of Doctrine, .... 314 145. Dogmatic Exposition, ...... 322 B. — The Reflecting of Christ's Kingly Office through the Church, or the Power of the Keys. 146. Biblical Doctrine. — Ecclesiastical Doctrine, .... 334 1466. Dogmatic Investigation, ...... 338 SECOND SUBDIVISION. THE CHURCH ORGANIZING ITSELF IN AND OUT OF THE WORLD. 147. Organization in reference to Christ's continuing Activity, . 1476. Organization in reference to the Reflection of Christ's Activity, 148. Invisibility and Visibility of the Church, . Biblical Doctrine, ..•••• Ecclesiastical Doctrine, . 149. Dogmatic Investigation, . 340 340345 345 347 357 THIRD SUBDIVISION. 150. The Militant Church, ...-•¦ 367 Vlll CONTENTS. THIRD DIVISION. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAST THINGS, OR OF THE CONSUMMATION OF THE CHURCH AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD. SECT. PAGE 151. Summary. — Characteristics of Christian Eschatology, . . 373 First Point. 152. Christ's Second Advent, with its Preparation in the History of the World, ........ 383 Second Point. 153. Intermediate State of Departed Souls and Resurrection, . . 401 Third Point. 154. The Last Judgment, and End of the World, . . .415 155. Eternal Blessedness and Consummation of the World, . . 428 PART II— (Continued.) FIRST IAIN 1)1118107$— (Continued) THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIS T -(Continued.) B. — Development of the Ecclesiastical Doctrine. §114. On one hand, the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Reconciliation x of mankind with God through Christ has in all ages remained immoveably the same, namely, in respect of the consciousness of the Christian Church that the com munion between God and mankind, disturbed by sin, has been restored through the mediatorial Person of Christ, who, as the Representative of the personal unity of God and man, accomplishes His work through His substitutionary love without violating the divine justice, nay, in harmony therewith. On the other hand, the development of this dogma contains a variable element through its dependence on the current development of Christology, Ponerology, and in the last resort of the Doctrine of God. Liteeatuee. — Cotta's Treatise in his edit, of J. Gerhard, 1 [Reconciliation and atonement represent the same word in the original, Versohnung. Atonement is used wherever English idiom permits. At the same time, the substantial equivalence of the two terms must constantly be borne in mind in the following discussions.] Dorner. — Christ. Doct. iv. A 2 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. Loci Th. t. iv. Ziegler, Hist, dogmatis de redemtione, ed. Velthusen, 1791. Bahr, die Lehre vom Tode Jesu in den drei ersten Jahrh., 1832. Baur, die Lehre von der Versohnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung, 1838. Cf. Tholuck's Liter. Anzeiger, 1839, No. 79. Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte, p. 370 ff. Ritscbl die chr. Lehre von der Rechtf. u. Versohnung, i. 1870. Hasse, Anselm v. Canterb., 2 vols. 1849, 1852. Other discus sions of the Anselmic theory by Bornemann, Franck, Sib- macher, Ziinen (Anselmi et Calvini placita de hominum per Christum apeccato redemptione, 1852). Aemil. Hohne, Anselmi Cant, philosophia — ejusdem de satisfactione doctrina dijudicatur, 1867. As to Luther's doctrine of Atonement, cf. the works of J. Ktistlin, 1863, andTh. Harnack, 1862, on Luther's Theology, also Held, De qpere Jesu Christi salutari, 1860, and Chr. H. Weisse, Martinus Lutherus quid de consilio mortis et resur- rectionis Jesu Christi senserit, 1846. Socinus, Prcelectiones Theol. ; Christ, religionis brevissima Jnstitutio, Biblioth. Fr. Polon. i., Cat. Racov. qu. 377. Hugo Grotius, Defensio Fidei Cath. de satisfactione Christi, 1617. As to C. Vorstius, cf. Baur's theol. Jahrbucher, 1856. Against the Socinians, L. Hiitter's Loci Comm. xxii. Fr. Turretin, De Satisfactione. J. G. Tollner, Ueber den thatigen Gehorsam Christi, 1768. FA. Philippi, der thatige Gehorsam Christi, ein Beitrag zur Recht- fertigungslehre, 184l. Thomasius, De Obedientia Christi activa, 1846. Von Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, ed. 2, 1857-59, i. 577. Against his doctrine arose : Philippi, LTerr v. Hofmann, gegenuber der luth. Versohnungs- und Rechtfertigungslehre, 1856. Thomasius, das Bekenntniss der luth. Kirche von der Versohnung und die Versohnungslehre Chr. v. Hofmanns, mil einem Nachwort von Harnack, 1857 ; cf. also Thomasius, Lehre von Christi Person und Werk, iii. 1, pp. 157-315, ed. 2, 1862. Ebrard, die Lehre von der stellvertretenden Genugthuung in der H. Schr. begrundet — mit besonderer Rucksicht auf v. Hofmann's Versohnungslehre, 1857. Weizsacker, Jahrbucher f. deutsche Theol. 1858, p. 154 ff. Gess, Jahrbucher f. d. Theol. 1859, p. 467 ff. Von Hofmann, Schutzschriften fur eine neue Weise, alte Wahrheit zu lehren, 4 Stlicke, 1856-59. Sartorius, Lehre von Christi Person und Werk, ed. 7, 1860. Schipberlein, Grundlehren des Heils, etc., 1848. The same, Art. " Versohnung " in Herzog's theol. Real-Encycl., and his work, Die Geheimnisse des Glaubens. Kahnis, Luth. Dogm. iii. 371. A. Schweizer, Centraldogm. ii. ; Reform. Dogm. ii. 331, 377, 388, ii. 164 ff.. Schenkel, i. 650. Edw. Park, The Atonement; Discourses and Treatises of Edwards, Smalley, Maxcy, Emmons, etc., 1860. (Collection of the more important advocates of the older New England theology.) DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE. 3 1. The variable element in the dogma does not consist in the Church ever having doubted whether we owe to Christ alone the restoration of divine communion and redemption, and whether His work is all-sufficient and complete. From the first it was with His name that Christendom connected the forgiveness of sins — that blessing which must appear and does appear to every one, who knows aught of himself and God, the first and most urgent requisite in order to the attain ment of divine communion ; for the good man is conscious that atonement for his sin, not a positively holy and virtuous walk, is the fundamental and most sacred problem. This reli* gious is again the first moral problem, without the solution of which man's entire existence would be destitute of foundation and assured worth, because an existence without God. In Christ, then, was beheld the God-given, personalized, universal principle of Redemption. But it was only by degrees that reflection advanced from the experienced fact of redemption1. through Christ to the work of demonstrating the necessity of I this special form of redemption, or from the that to the why, and how. And to this question belonged again the dogmatic?: knowledge of — 1. The Person adapted to be the Mediator; 2. That which makes salvation necessary ; 3. The Character of God, in order that the Redemption or Reconciliation may harmonize with His nature. Certainly many, abstaining from closer dogmatic investigation, prefer to stop at the totality of Christ's Person. In it they behold the realized, personal reconciliation between God and mankind, between heaven and earth. In this mystical doctrine Christ's essential Person and His vitality or manifestation are not distinguished from each other in thought ; by His very existence the Person sanctifies the race, rendering it acceptable to God. But if atonement is viewed as accomplished in Christ's mere exist ence or birth, then 'the ethical meaning and ethical form of Christ's work, as well as sin and what Christ did and suffered for sin, remain obscure and in the background. Real possi bility is still not actuality. To regard all humanity as reconciled and sanctified as matter of course, because the Incarnation took place in a certain spot of humanity, leads to physical and false sacramental theories of redemption. The Church was therefore compelled, not merely in the interest of 4 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. Gnosis, but also in order to secure its faith against falsifica tion, to advance from the general, from th6 totality of the principle, to the special, because to stop at the principle would be to falsify the principle itself. But to do this was to initiate movement in reference to the dogma. 2. But despite all the variability exhibited by the history of the dogma in the Church, it is not without an identical and fixed element. This was the case not merely because man's need of redemption in presence of a holy God was always acknowledged, and both the mission and work of Christ — the Sinless One — among sinners were always re garded as a gift of God's paternal love, but also because the way in which Christ carried out His mission to mankind, under every aspect in which it is^ viewed, bears a twofold character. It bears, on one side, the character of substitu tionary love, which makes our misery its own, in order that we may make what belongs to it ours. And again, while justice is very unequally treated as regards clearness and em phasis, the presupposition remains, that Christ accomplished redemption, not in opposition to but in unison with the divine justice, in unison not merely with legislative justice, but also with the justice that denounces punishment against sin. He represents neither Love without Justice, nor Justice without Love. 3. As relates, then, to the dogmatic development of this doctrine or the variable side of the dogma, it will be helpful both to the understanding of its history and to its thetic con struction, if we consider preliminarily to what extent the shaping of the doctrine of Atonement depends on these three dogmas — Christology, Ponerology, Theology. First. The more completely both sides in the Person of Christ are defined, — the divine and the human, — and the more correctly their relations are apprehended, the greater must, be the importance attributed to the work of Christ. For nothing but the divine side in this Person gives us that sharp contrast between His suffering and His dignity which suggests a mysterious depth in His love and a divine import in His sufferings. On the other side, nothing but His humanity secures the reality of the historical revelation in Him and the verity of His suffering and acts, while nothing DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTEINE. 5 but His uniqueness secures the possibility of His being a substitute for us. Hence it is clear that the Christian doctrine of Atonement depends on the rejection of Ebionism and Docetism. But even after both sides were acknowledged completely in thesi (as was done at Chalcedon), the unity of the Person might be so conceived that the divine side pre ponderated in a one-sided way. The consequence of this was, that the humanity became a mere selfless organ of the Divinity. But in this case the humanity contributes nothing essential towards procuring the forgiveness of sins. Rather is the atonement then only revealed through Christ in the sense that it is exhibited in Him or by Him, — whether the meaning be that God is essentially and eternally propitiated for sin, or that we are told how we are to make atonement to God, — this exhibition taking place through His teaching, or sym bolically through His sacrificial death. But the humanity of Christ then retains a merely accidental import. In order to the enlightenment of men on this subject, or to the office of teacher, no divine Incarnation was necessary. But the doctrine of Atonement is no less affected by a false pre ponderance of the human side in Christ's Person, such as prevailed after 1750 ; for then Christ is little more in what He did and suffered than a martyr for truth and pattern of inorality.( A principal part of the truth, it is said, for which Christ died, is that God forgives sin in virtue of His love, and is essentially and eternally propitiated for it, pro vided only it comes to an end in the future. Thus the two extremes are again at one in the doctrine, that reconciliation was not first procured through Christ's historical Person, but that God, instead of standing in essential opposition to evil in virtue of His holy Justice, is eternally reconciled with the world's sinful reality on account of the possibility of good still dwelling in it. The aim of the Reformation, as shown before, is to secure both to the divine and human sides in Christ's Person their full rights, thus rendering possible a satisfactory doctrine of Christ's atoning work. No less, secondly, must the idea of Atonement be different according to the condition of Ponerology, i.e. according as that from which deliverance is necessary is found mainly in some- thing objective, in physical ill, perhaps as a punishment (whether 6 THE DOCTEINE OF ATONEMENT. the ill be 0dvaTo$, or' the bondage of sin, or the mastery of Satan) ; or according as this is discovered mainly in something subjective, whether in the consciousness of discord, or in ungodly volition, in evil acts or states; or, finally, according as the objective and subjective are united, as was done at the Refor mation. The one-sided objective theory of Atonement places the process altogether outside man ; it is, e.g., a process merely between God or Christ and Satan. Just so, when death or the guilt merely of another — Adam's — is regarded as the enemy, the process of its conquest or abolition may take place in a purely objective way, without man being compelled to take an essential part therein. Conversely, when that which has to be vanquished is found simply in subjective moral character, the process of reconciliation is placed solely in man, as is done by the purely subjective theories, and nothing is left for Christ to do and merit. The Reformation, on the contrary, goes back from what is external, from physical HI and objective punishment to the culpa, which is no mere debitum inherited from another's guilt, and finds the ground of the objective punishment in guilt. The physical ill is punish ment through its connection with sin and through the divine justice. Punishment and sin, the objective and subjective sides, while different, are also connected by the intermediate idea of guilt,1 which is the main idea in relation to the doctrine of Atonement, and that not as mere debitum ex aliena culpa contracture. Thirdly. Both the purely objective and the purely sub jective theories of Atonement may assume different forms according to the concept formed of God, with whom the reconciliation is necessary (although, as already said, every Christian theory of Atonement at least includes justice in a negative aspect and love in a positive). Still, the concept formed of man and sin on one side and of Christology on the other, depends in the last resort on the definition of the doctrine of God. Now, as we know, God may be conceived either in a merely physical way, or in an aesthetic way as the Principle of Harmony, or in a logical way as supreme Truth and supreme Knowledge and Wisdom, or in a juridical way as Justice, or in a moral (i.e. in the sense that His sole concern 1 Form. Cone. 799. 818. Apologia, I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE. 7 is for amendment and obedience to His law), or in a religious; as Love. These views determine at the same time the Pone rology and Christology, and therefore the doctrine of Atone ment ; and we are justified in hoping to be able under this division to include a survey of all the more important theories of Atonement possible. The theory of Atonement may there fore take either a physical, or aesthetic, or logical, or juridical, or moral, or one-sided religious form, according as it is deter-! mined, either really or in pretence, by a doctrine of God; and all this both on the one-sided objective and subjective mode of considering the question. At the same time, such a review will suggest important dogmatic hints towards a suitable con struction of the doctrine. The idea of God, rightly conceived, is adapted to guard against the one-sided objective and subjec tive theories of Atonement, requiring as it does the union of the objective and subjective elements ; for in God lies the reason that He willed men to be not impersonal instruments, nor deistically independent, but images of Himself. For this very reason, by the divine will they are on the one hand capable of personal culpability, and on the other destined to blessedness in divine communion, but without violence to justice or indifference to wrong. And thus the main question is : How, despite sin and guilt, which in virtue of the divine justice expose men to punishment and separate them from God,1 a combined revelation of divine justice and love may take place in the world, as they are eternally combined in God, whereas through sin and guilt the two seem necessarily at variance in the world. Since, further, all possible aberra tions in the doctrine of Atonement — the objective and the subjective — correspond to a true element in the idea of God and of man made in God's image, the true Christian theory of Atonement must combine the elements of truth scattered in those theories. It will include, therefore, the abolition of physical ill, the restoration of harmony, the return to wisdom, to true self-consciousness and moral amendment, but all in due moral order. In the same way, it can neither obscure justice by love, nor love by justice, but will reveal both in their divine harmony. 1 §§ 87-89. 8 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. 1. History of the Doctrine up to the Period of the Reformation. § 115. The ancient Church - teachers, in proceeding to lay down the rudiments of a dogmatic theory, as well as the Middle Ages, predominantly favour objective theories of Atonement; whereas the period of the Reformation began to blend the subjective with the objective side. 1. Although the fact of deliverance through Christ's self- sacrificing love was always certain to the Christian conscious ness, the common Christian faith did not include as matter of course an immediate certainty of the mode in which He brought about salvation, and therefore did not include an immediate certainty of a definite theory of Atonement, or of the necessity of the mode realized historically. Nevertheless, one thing may be said : the idea of substitution is common to all the Fathers. Thus Irenseus says: "Christ must needs become what we are, that we may become what He is ; what He did and suffered held good, therefore, for us. Longam hominum expositionem in se ipso recapitulavit." 1 Athanasius teaches : " Men were created for eternal life, but fell a prey to death as a punishment for their sin. Thus the Logos, the aino^mri, became mortal, in order as a vicarious sacrifice to vanquish death through suffering death." 2 We may say that the idea of the substitution of Christ forms the common germ- point or ground-thought in all attempts at dogmatic theories, however different, whether the chief idea is sacrifice, or Christ is described as a means of exchange or a ransom-price to God or to Satan, or whether, finally, the matter is presented more after the Pauline manner, in an abstract way apart from figure. But, as concerns the mode in which the work of redemption is carried out, the Church in all ages is united on 1 Adv. Hareses, v. 23. 2, iii. 17, 1. 18, 7. Cf. too, Ep. ad Diognet. c. 9. 2 De Incarnatione, c. 6-10, c. Ar. ii. 68. Similarly Eusebius of Csesarea, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, Leo the Great, Cyril of Alexandria, c. Nest. iii. 2. John of Damascus, de Fide orthod. iii. 27. Cf. Nitzsch, Doamenaesch. t> 370 ff. > » v I HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE REFORMATION. 9 two points r that redemption must not be effected by sheer might or in the way of violence, but in the way of suffering and dying love; and, indeed, the necessity of mortal suffering is always brought in some way, directly or indirectly, into con nection with the divine justice. Especially for the sake of the latter point, or in order to prove that the relation of Atone ment to the divine justice, which is so often placed in the background in modern days, formed an essential part of the faith of Christendom in all ages, and was by no means foisted into theology by Anselm (as may seem to be the case, when the history of the doctrine is dated only from him and Abe- lard), we will review the beginnings of the different theories before Anselm, which certainly for the most part leave room in their breadth for various dogmatic interpretations of a higher and lower kind. Here come specially into view the ideas of sacrifice, of ransoming from Satan and of ransom to God, or satisfaction to His justice. Almost all without distinction call Christ a Sacrifice} Cer tainly this common word, however well-grounded its liturgical position, expresses of itself no definite theory. Were Christ compared with the peace-offering, were He simply well-pleas ing to God (oa-fir) ei/coStas) because of His love for God and for sinners, the relation of His Person to the removal of sin and procurement of forgiveness would become secondary. The same would be the case were He only called a Sacrifice on the ground that He presented Himself in His purity to God, giving us a pattern of surrender to God and self-con secration, or, finally, on the ground that by the sacrifice of His death He was the cause, so to speak, of the world's repentance, on account of which God then forgives sin. And, in fact, all these conceptions are found in the Fathers.2 But they by no means stop there, but at the same time consider Christ's sufferings in relation to our sins, not merely in so far as His spontaneous surrender to death is said to be a pattern 1 Cf. e.g. the passages in Hase, ut supra, p. 236 f. 2 The first class, which leaves out of sight Christ's mortal sufferings, occurs most of all in that mystic theory, according to which in Christ a humanity well- pleasing in God's sight is presented to God, who accepts this gift and beholds us in Him. So Irenseus, Justin, who regards Christ as the Paschal Lamb, Dial. e. Tryph. a. iii. Cf. Semisch, Justin d. te. 1840, pp. 413-418. Origen, cont. Cels. iii. 28, and others. 10 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. of self-consecration to God,1 etc., but also in such a way that Christ is viewed as a sacrifice for the general good, or as an expiatory sacrifice for sin. So by Origen, Athanasius, Hilary, Augustine, and John of Damascus.2 It is true the question still remains : Is He an expiatory sacrifice merely as a symbol of forgiveness to us, given by God as a pledge of His love, which love is no mere fictitious creation,3 or did Christ bring about some real and objective result, which without Him had not existed ? But still, despite ambiguity of figurative phraseology, it remains certain that wherever Christ is regarded as an expiatory sacrifice, a relation between His suffering love and divine justice is supposed. The expiatory sacrifice forms a transition to the second figure, that of Ransoming. For if Christ's death is an ex piatory sacrifice, this at once suggests that we are bought at great cost, that He is the means by which we are purchased for Christ's kingdom, or the ransom by which we are delivered from ruin. But to the figure of purchase or ransom a series of various theories might attach themselves, always, however, implying that a grave hindrance to the salvation of mankind could only be removed at the price of Christ's death or blood. The ruin from which deliverance is necessary might then be found either in the power of Satan over man kind, or in death, or in the guilt inherited from Adam, or in sin and personal guilt, or, finally, in God's just displeasure. All these various phases, again, are closely interconnected. For it is only sin and guilt, personal or inherited, which justly incurs God's displeasure. Further, it is only through God's just displeasure that Satan possesses power over men, while this power again is displayed in death, which is inflicted by Satan, as well as in the dominion of sin. But this connection was by no means clearly perceived at once. The conscious ness of penal desert gave the impulse first of all to seek and find in Christ deliverance from a penal state. The predominant view up to the Middle Ages of the evils from which redemption 1 And according to Clement of Rome, ad Cor. i. 7. 2 Origen, cont. Cels. i. 81, vii. 17, in Num. Horn. xxiv. 1, ad Rom. t. iii. 7. 8 ; Athanasius, ed. Col. 1686, i. 73, 426, 366-69 ; Augustine, cont. Faust. Man. xiv. 2. 3, de Trin. xiii. 14 ; John of Damascus, de Fide Orth. iii. 27. ^ 3 Thus Gregory of Naz. Or. 42, says : " God accepted the ransom by way of HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE REFORMATION. 11 is necessary was merely objective, and the view taken of the nature of redemption harmonized therewith. The hostile power which threatened man's welfare, and from which Christ rescued us at the cost of suffering and death, was predomi nantly conceived as a power external to man ; and since mankind was viewed as subject to the dominion of Satan and death through Satan in virtue of the guilt inherited from Adam, it was natural that the power of Satan, who is the ruler of death, should be regarded as the central-point of the ruin from which deliverance is necessary, and that Christ should be pri marily regarded in His suffering and death as engaged in conflict with Satan, — ideas favoured by passages in the New Testament. 2. The most elaborate theories adhered for a long time to this line. The doctrine of the vanquishing of Satan by Christ was advanced by Church-teachers with a variety of application, only that the conviction always recurs therein, that redemp tion or atonement could not be effected by means of violence, or in the way of mere caprice or power, but in that of justice.1 Men were subject to Satan's dominion by God's righteous judgment,2 and ought not to be wrested from him by violence, or in such a way as to give him cause to complain of violence done to his rights. On the ground of these as sumptions, the victory over the devil was achieved, according to some, by legal means. After the manner of justitia com- mutativa, the person of Christ, on which Satan worked his pleasure, is the ransom-price, for the sake of which the devil had to release men. Christ's soul was offered in the way of exchange to the devil, and for its sake he was to set men free ; for that soul was the noblest possession, by reason of its perfection surpassing the whole of mankind in value. The devil agreed to the exchange. But he was unable to retain this pure soul, it was torture to his hand, and thus Christ became the conqueror of the devil and death.3 On Satan's 1 According to Irenseus, man must not be redeemed from death and perfected fiia or by caprice. According to Augustine, Christ must overcome Satan lege justitiae, not violenter. In the same way speaks Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Cat. c. 15-27. a E.g. according to Augustine, Diabolus jure cequissimo ornnem prolem primi hominis vindicabat. Iniquum enim erat, ut ei quern ceperat non dommaretur. Cf. de Trin. xiii. c. 12. 3 So Origen, Comm. in Matth. xvi. § 8, Exhort, ad Mart. 12. Similarly Theodoret and Augustine. 1 2 • THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. part, accordingly, there was self-deception. As the deception was intended by God, this view led to the formal theory of a deception of Satan by God1 This application, although starting from the idea of justice, makes the divine majesty and power, not justice, finally decide the victory of Christ ; and the deceptive craft, although represented as military strategy, fails to harmonize with the divine holiness. Although the ransom to Satan is never, of course, represented as a sacrifice to him, he is still, with a touch of Manichseisni, viewed as a sovereign Power, co-equal with God, a Power with which God treats, or which He outwits and thus strips of its rights. Better, therefore, are the theories which place the deliverance from Satan's power and right on such a basis, that Satan is put in the wrong, and a just conflict with him ensues. Gregory of Nazianzum and John of Damascus expressly reject the notion of a ransom to Satan.2 They say: Christ was slain by Satan, and Satan was deceived as to Christ's divinity by His birth of a virgin and humble condition, so that he did not know Him ; but Satan thus sinned against the Holy One; for God had only conceded to him power over sinners. As a punishment, he lost his right in mankind by sentence of God's just law. It is true that even thus a dualistic element re mained, the reason of which perhaps lies in the following considerations. The Christian consciousness, in seeking to regard Christ as a Substitute for guilty humanity, does not venture directly to subject Christ to the divine justice and punishment, and make Him without further ado the object of the displeasure of the just God. For this reason Satan is interposed, God's punitive justice is placed in Satan, nay, in mythological phraseology is hypostatized as it were in him, of course on the basis cf God's cosmical government. On one 1 According to Gregory of Nyssa, the divine wisdom led the devil to the exchange mentioned. In his view, the divine Incarnation is an artifice of the wisdom of divine love, since it seemed to render accessible to the devil the essentially inaccessible, Or. Cat. I.e. Gregory the Great describes Christ's flesh as the bait held before the Leviathan by the divine stratagem of the Incarnation, in order that he might try to swallow the hook of Christ's divinity, and thus come to shame. Similarly, according to Origen, the cross is the net, according to Peter Lombard, the muscipula in which Satan was caught. In like manner Augustine, Ep. 130, 134, 263. Ct. Philippi, iv. 2, p. 65. 2 Gregory of Naz. Or. 42 ; John of Damascus, iii. 27. Many Fathers who include Satan, regard Christ again as an expiatory offering to God. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE REFORMATION. 13 side it seemed necessary to assume punitive justice as an active factor in the redemptive process ; on the other side, were Christ directly subjected to it, there was danger of a conflict both with Qod's love and with the dignity of the Son of His love. But when punitive justice was placed in Satan, outside God, it was made to appear as if justice were not an objective determination of the divine essence, as if God might be recon ciled with sinners without further ado, provided Satan's right and power were out of the way, whereas this right can still only flow every moment from God. Moreover, the theories which, without attributing importance to Satan, go back to the Adamic debitum as a debt contracted by Adam and to be paid by his posterity, or to death as the just punishment of God, from which redemption is necessary, do so in such a way as to imply that it would be well with the world and everything would be in harmony, provided these hostile powers, standing outside the personality, were out of the way. For this reason opposition to these theories was never quite suppressed, and traces were not wanting of a representation more in harmony with facts ; e.g., according to Gregory of Nazianzus, the devil cannot be the recipient of a ransom, but the Father received it. According to John of Damascus, Christ presents Himself as a sacrifice and ransom to the Father, whom we have offended — not to the usurper was the blood of the lawful Lord offered,1 recourse being thus had again to the idea of an expiatory sacrifice under the figure of a ransom to God. Nay, long before Anselm there was mention in a non-figurative, abstract way of a satisfaction offered by Christ to God. So by Ambrose, Cyril of Alex andria, Hilary, Augustine, John of Damascus.2 The exposition given above shows, indeed, how the Patristic doctrine applied all the divine attributes in regular order to Christ's work of atonement, — Love and Mercy, Power, Vera- 1 Cf. Nitzsch, ut supra, p. 374 ff. 2 According to Origen, Christ rendered the necessary propitiatio. Ambrose, de Fuga, 7 ¦ "Christ died, ut satisfieret judicato ;" Gregory of Nazianzus and John of Damascus, ut supra ; Cyril of Alex. c. Nest. iii. 2 : " Only the Logos, because &*tk%h>s ™» S'Xmv, could die for all, and thus take away the punishment of our disobedience ; " according to Eusebius of Caesarea also, Christ vicariously assumed our penal suffering — death ; His death is equivalent to the infliction of the punishment on all. Cf. Nitzsch, p. 373 ff. 14 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. city and Immutability (both in reference to the threatening of sin with death and to the promise of salvation), further, the Divine Wisdom, and finally, Justice. But still it is, above all, the latter upon which, although so inadequately, the necessity of the saving process through Christ's death is made to depend ; and, moreover, Justice is regarded not as the divine consistency in manifesting His Love, but as that which acts as a bar to the communication of His love until a way is found in which the divine love is able to realize its thoughts of salvation without violence to justice. The defectiveness of ' the theories before Anselm consists, therefore, in the following points. It is wrong to find that which renders redemption necessary in something merely external to man. It is wrong so to distribute the several parts as to make Satan represent the energy of justice, and God with Christ the pure forgiving love, which only evinces its justice in refusing to infringe on Satan's right. It is wrong, finally, to make the process of reconciliation only issue, as it were, from God. On the contrary, we must have the courage to bring God's justice and Christ into mutual relation. 3. But the idea of justice first receives independent and systematic notice in the juridical theories, of which that of Anselm is by far the most profound.1 Anselm endeavours to demonstrate the necessity both of atonement by Christ, and of divine incarnation in order to atonement. He starts from the honor Dei as an inviolable good. God's honour is the preva lence of justitia in the world ; by obedience to God's will the creature pays the honour due to God. God's care for His honour is not egoistic, justice being the universal law inviol able even to the divine volition. It would be inconceivable, as well as unworthy of God, that He should will anything opposed to justice. In this way God's power and plenary authority are placed beneath, not above, His justice. In His character of justice He must require righteousness or obedience to His righteous will from rational beings. This is the solus et toius honor which they can offer to God. Hunc honorem debitum qui Deo non reddit, aufert Deo quod suum est Deumque exhonorat, et hoc est peccare. Sin is a contumelia Deo illata. To it God cannot and ought not to be indifferent. He must 1 Anselm Cantuar. Cur Deus Iwmo ? HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE REFORMATION. 15 demand satisfaction for it ; and this requires plus reddere quam ablatum erat, in order to efface the wrong to His honour and atone for the injuria. Baumgarten-Crusius here strikingly calls attention to the Old German expiation or penance, and to that conception of sin as an outrage to honour which was in keeping with the chivalrous spirit of the age. Notwith standing, the divine honour is not regarded as a mere private good, so that God might, like a private person, in virtue of His free plenary authority, renounce claim to satisfaction or not. On the contrary, it would be against God's honour to forgive sin without satisfaction ; for otherwise evil would be freer than good. In the absence of satisfaction, poena must follow. Now, man cannot render satisfaction for the past ; for what he has and can do he owes as a rational creature to God. Punishment, therefore, would be necessary ; and how grievous this must be is evident from the consideration that the violated good — the honour of God — is of greater value than the whole world, and therefore the violation of this honour is of infinite import. But, on the other hand, the infliction of the punishment must entail destruction on the world. This would be the destruction of the fair world-order, the overthrow of the fair world-plan, which willed along with the angels the perfection and happiness of the race of human beings.1 Thus, in order to render punishment unnecessary, God must give to humanity the means of rendering the satis faction which it cannot render out of its own resources. Humanity must render it. It cannot do so as mere humanity, but it can as divine humanity (Gottmenschheit). Now, Christ is the God-man. He can render it, because He is the eternal Son as well as man, His person and His work thus possessing infinite value. As man, indeed, His active obedience is due to God ; and by it, therefore, He cannot acquire merit capable of transference to us. But it is otherwise with His spontan eous suffering, which was not matter of obligation. Accord ing to Anselm, this suffering is not penal suffering in virtue of the jus talionis; but Christ creates meritum by His love, which yields not even to deatL This is a good plus amabile than sin is hateful. Not merely, therefore, does God regard 1 The race of human beings is not merely designed to supply the place of the fallen angels. It has also to Anselm a worth of its own. 1 6 THE DOCTEINE OF ATONEMENT. this suffering as an action, a plus reddere quam ablatum erat, and thus an adequate satisfaction ; 1 but Christ's suffering begets an overplus of meritum, a reward being conferred on Him. This reward He cannot receive on His own account, for He is already in possession of divine majesty. But in His love for us He counts it a reward to Himself to be permitted to impart the reward due to Himself to those who follow His word and example, and whom He calls His kins men. His satisfaction holds good objectively for all ; His reward secures the happiness of believers. The fact of Christ's work not merely being a legal satisfaction, but being also regarded by God as transferable merit, involves a convenientia, although not a strict legal arrangement. It deserves unceasing acknowledgment that Anselm employs the idea of justice not merely in the disguised and impure form peculiar to the theories which refer to Satan, nor simply in the manner of mere civil law, which requires the payment of the debt contracted by Adam after the fashion, as it were, of a money debt. In the place of mere debitum appears in Anselm the culpa, possessing infinite significance ; and in place of the payment of a debt and the defeat of Satan, the satis faction, which God must require in virtue of His nature, of the justice which is not subject to His will. The satisfaction is brought into direct relation to God and to His justice ; Christ, who renders the satisfaction, stands directly face to face with justice. Although Anselm at the same time treats sin as injury, which according to Old German law requires along with an equivalent for the insult or damage a tribute of honour, still he does not regard it as a mere private matter, but as an absolutely culpable offence, directed against the absolutely good order in heaven and on earth, and thus against the honour of God. ¦ In law, injury forms a sort of inter mediate sphere between civil and criminal law. And since, according to Anselm, God cannot in His plenary authority dispose at pleasure of the gravity belonging to the injuria to His honour, as a private man may decide what importance he will attribute to an attack upon his honour, his theory leans to a conception of sin allied with criminal justice. But, as 1 He regards the divine justice as God's maintenance of Himself in His moral glory, similar to the use in the 0. T. of the idea of 1133. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE REFORMATION. 17 relates to satisfactio, in excluding therefrom Christ's active obedience, Anselm has indeed properly nothing but a satis- passio, while attributing to the spontaneous (according to him, non-obligatory) suffering (in harmony with the mode of view met with elsewhere in mediasval theology) the character of a good work, meritorious, because non-obligatory. Instead of the rendering of the obedience or good works due from men, appears a spontaneous, non - obligatory, supererogatory suf fering on the part of Christ ; instead of the idem, He thereby rendered a tantundem, the divine estimation assigning to the sufferings the value of positive good acts. This confounding of the worth of suffering with positive acts plainly implies something of an arbitrary nature, and to a certain extent reintroduces the notion of private right. Moreover, the idea, appropriate to Roman Catholicism, that there are actions at once good and non-obligatory, and that such actions acquire merit ; and further, the opinion that sufferings, because involv ing renunciation, are in themselves pleasing to God, and to be set on a par with good actions, are both faulty. Add to this, that Anselm, because viewing Christ's humanity as impersonal, cannot properly say that humanity has satisfied God in the way justice requires. Besides, scarcely any but physical suf ferings come into view in this theory. For, had he regarded the spiritual sufferings, which are the consequence of Christ's high-priestly love for men, he could not have said of these that they were not obligatory on Christ, i.e. not included in His office. Had Anselm seen that what is spontaneous and what is done in virtue of office — the officially obligatory — are not mutually exclusive, he might have conceded importance also to Christ's active obedience in relation to the work of redemp tion. Nay, the way in which He bore His sufferings must have its ground in His positive moral power. Supposing, finally, that sin demands an infinite satisfaction on account of the infinite wrong to God, sin might indeed be covered by Christ's spontaneous suffering, so far as it possesses infinite value, and therefore by the suffering merit of Christ, but without overplus or reward for Christ capable of being transferred to us.1 1 An altogether similar theory of reconciliation was advanced by Nicholas of Methone in the Greek Church about the same time. Cf. Ullmann, "die Dogmatik in der griech. Kirche, sc. xii.," Stud. u. Krit, 1833. Dornbr.— Christ. Doct. iv. B 18 THE DOCTEINE OF ATONEMENT. Scholasticism, after Anselm, only partially preserved his thoughts. The reference to Satan indeed, still maintained by Peter Lombard, is more and more generally given up, and Thomas Aquinas holds fast the satisfaction (satisfactio). The spontaneous, non-obligatory humiliation and sufferings assumed by Christ as Head, are said, by reason of the love for us which they reveal, to be an acceptable sacrifice to God, a meritorious ground, for the sake of which He forgives us, so that they may be called a ransom paid to God. But the satisfaction of Christ was on this theory as little necessary as the Incarnation. It is true the satisfaction by Christ's sufferings was fitting (modus conveniens) ; for as the suffering of the God-man corresponds with the gravity of the guilt, so it corresponds also with the divine mercy and justice. But this modus was not neces sary in itself. Although simple, immutable Being, considered as knowing and willing, forms the basis of Thomas Aquinas' concept of God ; although, further, the world, to which that knowledge and consciousness refer, is conceived as in deterministic dependence on God, — still no special place is left by Aquinas in God's eternal essence for the justice of God in particular. Justice, as a special determination of God's essence, is not in keeping with his view of the abstract identity of God with Himself. On the contrary, God's absolute plenitude of authority now gains most essential influence. But in this case God might just as well accept (acceptare) a mere finite worth as satisfaction as that infinite worth which dwells in Christ, and which transcends the amount required by justice.1 But He chooses the modus convenientior, that of satisfaction by suffering. Duns Scotus differs still more widely from Anselm.2 The necessity of atonement by Christ is to him altogether immaterial, because to him God in His innermost essence is nothing but free plenary authority. In addition, he not merely denies the infinity of the wrong done to God by sin on account of the finitude of man, but also asserts the finitude of the merit 1 Cf. the Art. "Thomas v. Aq." by Landerer in Herzog's Realencyc. vol. xvi. 5 ; Ritschl, " Studien uber Genugthuung u. Verdienst," Jdhrb. f. deutsche Tlieol. 1860, 4. In his view, Christ's work becomes efficacious by awakening love ; but love is awakened by Christ's love for this very reason, that what it does and suffers is a ransom to God. 2 Respecting Duns Scotus, cf. the Art. by A. Dorner in Herzog, ed. 2. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE REFORMATION. 19 of Christ, which he derives wholly from Christ's strongly emphasized humanity. Thus the argument for the necessity of a satisfaction by the God-man, deduced from the idea of God as well as from the nature of evil, is entirely given up. In place of this necessity he puts the meritum, the value of which is determined by God's free plenary authority. That authority permits an acceptatio of the merit of Christ to avail for the circle of believers. Thus, as relates to the demon stration of the necessity of Christ's work, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus fall behind Anselm, while not denying the fitness (convenientia) of the divinely-appointed economy of salvation, and endeavouring to give more scope than Anselm to the manifestation of God's spontaneous love. Thus is their theory, although unelaborated, a transition to the one which recurs to the wisdom of divine love and freedom. Observation. — The theory of Abelard cannot be regarded as worked out with precision, nor has it exercised any influence worth mentioning on the subsequent development of the dogma. On the one side, he seems to diverge from the usual path of Church-teaching, and to look for reconciliation to righteousness of life, to the love implanted in us by God through Christ. The love of God, displayed in Christ's Incarnation, suffering, and death, awakens responsive love in us, by which we are justified and saved. On the other side, in allusion to Gal. iii. 13, he emphasizes the expiation of the divine justice by Christ, who on the cross became a curse for us (cf. Reuter, Geschichte der Aufkl'drung im Mittelalter, L 320) ; an aspect which Ritschl, who has selected Abelard as a testis veritatis, ought not to have passed by in silence. But Abelard cannot claim the high scientific importance in relation to the present dogma which Ritschl attributes to him. For how he combines both conceptions — the more moral and the juridical — is not apparent, because he says nothing expressly on the point. It is conceivable that he held both without reconciling them, and without conscious ness of any contradiction. But it is also possible that Abelard did not intend to advance the former theory, which is the more modern ' in; tone, and specially commended by Ritschl, in opposition to the other one, which recurs to the expiation of the divine justice, but still presupposes the latter. In favour of this is the fact that he would have our imperfect righteousness supplemented by Christ's. intercession, which accompanies the life of believers, and by Christ's 20 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. righteousness, after the manner of the mystic theory, which sees in Christ's objective righteousness our expiatory sub stitute. But further, when he specially finds in Christ's sufferings and death a manifestation of God's love powerful enough to kindle responsive love in us, the question is reasonable, how far a manifestation of love ought to be found in Christ's sufferings and death if no expiatory and sub stitutionary meaning belongs to them (a question doubly warranted in relation to Ritschl's own theory, since he neither favours the mystic view nor regards an expiation as necessary). Thus Abelard's moral theory only seems to gain intrinsic strength and consistency on the supposition that he has not framed it in opposition to the expiation offered to justice, but presupposes the latter. In this way, certainly, the form of Abelard's theory becomes essentially different from Ritschl's account of it, since it is then similar to the views held by many Church-teachers before him, who ascribe to. Christ's sufferings and death, along with the expiation of justice, the awakening of responsive love. 2. The Evangelical Doctrine of Atonement. §116. In this dogma also the Reformation proves itself to be the conclusion of an old and the beginning of a new age. Its advances in Ponerology and Christology contributed to this result, but especially the Evangelical principle of faith, which strove to realize to itself in Christ's work the objective foundation of the peace of conscience it had gained. That from which deliverance is necessary is no longer considered as something merely external to man and objective, as the dominion of Satan and the power of death, or as an alien inheritance, but as personal guilt which subjects to desert of punishment.1 On this account it is not merely freedom from punishment or moral amend ment, but above all the abolition of guilt and the pacifying of divine justice, which is recognised as the first requisite to man's redemption, in order that filial relationship to God and righteousness of life may be added to the state 1 Cf. above, § 75. THE EVANGELICAL DOCTRINE. 21 of peace with God., To this end the Evangelical doctrine bases the work of salvation on both sides of Christ's Person in their unity,1 while Christ Himself is brought into direct relation with divine justice, which He perfectly and vicariously satisfies by means of His righteousness in active and passive obedience. Thus, in the objective reconciliation of God by Christ the basis is laid in respect of God for the application of His grace to us, while in respect of man the possibility is opened of elevation from consciousness of guilt and punishment into peace of conscience and filial relationship to God, or into consciousness of justification through faith. Literature. — The Evang. Symbols : Conf. Aug. iii. iv. xv. ; Apol. 92 ; Form. Cone. 684, 696, 894 ; Heidelb. Cat. Qu. 38 ff. ; Conf. Helv. c. 11 ; Dordr. Syn. pp. 213-218, ed. Augusti ; Colloq. Lips. 400; Form. Consens. Helv. 450; Gallic, xvii.; Scot. ix. ; Cat. Genev. 526 ; Westmonast. (in Niemeyer's appendix to the Reform. Symbols, 1840) c. 8, p. 12 ff. Observation. — The notion that the Reformation doctrine is simply a repetition of that of Anselm, is as erroneous as it is common. It is true that the former holds by the necessity of that mode of reconciliation which was realized historically, as firmly as Anselm ; but in place of God's injured honour, which demands satisfaction, — a view still retaining somewhat of the spirit of civil law, — the Evangelical doctrine, and especially Calvin and Melanchthon, put punitive justice, with which Christ is placed as Atoner in direct relation, which Anselm had not done. For Anselm said: Either punishment or the substitution of satisfaction for punish ment. But the Evangelical doctrine finds the satisfaction in the pacifying of the justice which demands punishment from man. According to the Evangelical Church, the satisfaction consists not primarily in the offering of good works as a tribute of honour, nor, as in the case of Anselm, in the innocent sufferings endured by Christ, not at the hands of God and His justice, but simply at the hands of men, those sufferings being merely treated by God as good works, which are of benefit to us ; but according to Evangelical doctrine, Christ enters into direct relation with the just punishment due to us. Moreover, whereas Anselm leaves out of sight 1 Cf. § 94. 22 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. Christ's active obedience, because as man Jesus was bound to render it, the Evangelical doctrine brings Christ's active obedience into direct relation with, the work of atonement and with divine justice. The active obedience is necessary, like the passive, to the pacifying of divine justice. Instead of the civil or political conception of justice, we have here the absolute view and a correspondent theory of punishment to place in contrast with the violation of an infinite good — the divine will — by the doing of wrong and the omission of obligatory good. — As concerns Luther in particular, in him the old theories, as Weisse, v. Hofmann, and Held rightly remark, revive and enter upon a new course. It is thus with the reconciliation of heaven and earth through the Incarna tion, or through the meritorious life by which Christ presents Himself in His proved righteousness as a perfect sacrifice to God; and again with the theory of the vanquishing of Satan and death. But this is not all, for he also takes God's justice into account, as Thomasius proves in detail.1 Again, . he treats Satan in a different way from that in which all the old theories treat him, bringing him into close connection with the law. Through Satan's temptation, the law provokes the sinner to rebellion and disbelief of God. Through sin, the law became Satan's handle to effect man's destruction. Now Christ's triumph over Satan is complete, because He raises above the sole authority of the law, above the legal standpoint. But since, in Luther's view, the law in its commands and ordinances, its threats and penalties, is of divine origin, and has its roots in the divine justice, his teaching rightly takes the ground, that Christ led beyond the legal stage by satisfying the law in every respect, and therewith triumphed over Satan, death, the world, and sin. But certainly it was Melanchthon who worked out the relation of atonement to the divine justice, and in this Calvin is essentially one with him. 1. The Evangelical principle — the experience of Justifica tion through faith in Christ — necessarily reacted on the doctrine of Atonement ; and here, indeed, the fruitfulness of the advance made by the Reformation in Ponerology specially shows itself. For Justification is the disburdening of the personality from guilt at the tribunal of God's punitive justice, and therefore from punishment ; but this in such a way that 1 Cf. Kostlin, Luther's Theol. ii. 404 ff. ; Harnack, ut supra, i. 557 f. ; cf. " The New Year's Sermon " in Luther's Kirchenpostille ; Hauspostille, Erlang'. ed! iii. 137, 305 ; Thomasius, ut supra, 260 ; Philippi, iv. 2, p. 114 ff. THE EVANGELICAL DOCTRINE. 23 the believer has the consciousness that divine justice itself has been satisfied by Christ ; that no exception has been made at the cost of justice ; that his is not simply the experience of divine long-suffering, including neither definitive forgiveness nor satisfaction made to justice. On the contrary, the believer knows that, despite his own unrighteousness, harmony with the law and with justice has been restored by Christ. In this knowledge is rooted his assured peace of conscience, his elevation above those doubts as to the Christian economy of salvation which conscience would always suggest, in case forgiveness came to the sinner in the way, so to speak, of a partial act of exception, through a breach with justice and violation of the eternal law. But by this means, since it is only faith in Christ which knows itself justified, Christ's acts and sufferings enter into direct relation with the penal law and with our guilt which has to be blotted out, Christ being thus the Atoner, to whom the consciousness of justification attaches itself. The Reformers and Evangelical Confessions state the matter thus : Christ's sufferings are penal sufferings, to which He submitted,1 not an opus super erogatorium, but having relation to our liability to punishment. He bore the maledictio, the jus legis contra nos. God's law is absolutely immutable, and therefore brooks no exception. Lex divina est immota, ergo legi satisfieri debet; obligat vel ad obedientiam, vel ad poenam. Peccato, malo infinito, debetur poena infinita, abjectio, mors ceterna. Puniendo Deus justitice suae satisfacit, non remittit peccata ex levitate, vel futilitate. For this reason has God provided a means of reconciliation, temperamentum, copulatio justitias et misericordice. In poena quce debet esse placaiio, oportet punienti tribui laudem justitice. As innocens, Christ does this.2 Thus is the jus legis observed, and indeed satisfied on our behalf ; for Christ has satisfied the claim of the law or satisfied justice, in order that the law may not condemn us.3 As He has spontaneously, so He has innocently suffered for men (or at least for the elect, see below), and thereby averted punishment, because He has caused guilt not 1 Apologia, 92, 93. 2 Cf. Melanchthon, Corp. Ref. xxiii. 338, 549, xxi. 1042, 1077. 3 Conf. Aug. iii. iv. ; Apol. 92, 195 ; Form. Cone. 696, 57 ; Heidelb. Cat. 38 f. Without this imputation even sins of omission could not be forgiven. 24 s THE DOCTEINE OF ATONEMENT. to be imputed to us. Nay, in order that we may not merely escape punishment and the imputation of guilt, but that God may regard us as righteous and holy in Christ, and so His whole paternal grace may become ours, Christ's own righteous ness — as well that of His active as of His passive obedience — is imputed to us.1 Only a portion of the Evangelical Theologians (among the Reformed Piseator, among the Lutherans Karg, among moderns Tollner) have declined to include Christ's active obedience. Even the Reformed Theology on the whole holds by this view, which is again linked to the doctrine held in the ancient Church of the merit of Christ's life. Schweizer, Schneckenburger, Schenkel go so far as to assert that the chief stress of the Reformed Theology rests on Christ's active obedience.2 But in doing so, they confound Christ's active obedience with the communication of new life, and forget how decisively Calvin, Wolleb, Maresius, and others emphasize the expiation of just punish ment rendered by Christ. 2. The fruit or benefit of Christ's Atonement is, above all, found in this, that God placatus est, homo expiatus. This implies a change brought about in God's relation to' sinful humanity through Christ's historic work. The change relates to the remission in the heart of God, rendered possible and actual by Christ. Above all, Christ procures the forgiveness of sins, i.e. the cancelling of guilt. This is opposed to the eudsemonistic, servile view, which puts the chief stress on freedom from physical ill, from punishment, not on the just claims of the law being satisfied and the conscience relieved from the burden of guilt. In opposition to this view the Apology says: Remissio pcence frustra quceritur, nisi cor antea qucesiverit remissionem peccatorum. Moreover, the Evangelical doctrine is opposed to the notion that sanctification, the obliteration of sin, is first in importance, and that forgiveness of sins takes place on its account, although of course for giveness is, with Augustine, referred to grace (as justitia infusa, or inhmrens, hdbitualis). Still, the benefit of Christ's 1 Form. Cone. 684, 696. ' 3 Schweizer, Olaubl. d. Ref. Kir. ii. 399 f., and die chr. Olaubensl. nach prot Grundsatzen, ii. 171 f. ; Schneckenburger, Verglekfiende Darstellung d. luth u ref. Lehre, i. 124. THE EVANGELICAL DOCTEINE. 25 merit is not exhausted in the negative blessing — the removal of guilt, remission of punishment, and abolition of the con sciousness of guilt and punishment. On the contrary, Christ's purpose is also to impart to those whom He represents the divine favour, which brings us salvation and sheds peace abroad in the heart of believers, — a result completing the revelation of the reconciliation of God effected by Christ. Thus Christ's entire obedience secures for us, that for Christ's sake God does not merely not impute our sins to us, but also regards us as righteous and holy in virtue of Christ's whole righteousness — the obedientia activa also — being imputed to us. Again, the extent to which the atonement by Christ refers is of importance in deciding its value. Christ's entire obedience is viewed as of infinite value, sufficient to cancel infinite guilt and punishment, and to present eveiy believer holy and righteous before God. According to both Evangelical Confessions, therefore, this value is all-embracing, i.e. refers to all sins, — original and actual, — sins not merely before but also after baptism,1 whereas the Catholic Church limits the efficacy of the atonement to original sin and sins before baptism. As relates to persons, the Lutheran Church ascribes universal value to Christ's atonement more definitely than the Reformed. But even the Reformed theologians teach that Christ's merit, because infinite, would be sufficient for all in itself, only the application of this universal power is rendered particular by the twofold decretum. Along with this idea the doctrine occurs in the Form. Consensus Helv. (which was not adopted as a Symbol), that it was neither the will of God nor of Christ that Christ should taste death for all, but only for the elect. But, in order to atone even for these, a piaculum of infinite value, sufficient in itself for all, was necessary on account of the infinity of guilt. Both Confessions teach that neither human penance nor good works can supplement the merit of Christ and the value of that merit.2 Christ's atone ment possesses this value through the character of His person. He is Mediator between God and men, because of His standing in the most intimate relation to both through the Unio in 1 P. II. Conf. Aug. iii. de Missa, .p. 25, § 21 ff. 2 Conf. Aug. xv. § 3, p. 13 ; Apol. 193, 51 ; A. S. 305 ; Cat. Heidelb. ed. Niemeyer, pp. 431, 443, qu. 60 ff. 26 THE DOCTEINE OF ATONEMENT. Him. The Form. Cone, says: The divinity and humanity must not here be separated, else the work loses its value. On this account Stancarus was condemned, because he wished to regard only the human side as mediatorial, and for this reason to ascribe finite value to Christ's obedience, enhancing it by means of acceptilatio.^ On the other hand, Andr. Osiander was condemned, because he treated redemption as secondary, and regarded justification as effected only by the divine nature of Christ dwelling in us, while severing it from the atonement, which to him was something external and subordinate, "the payment of our debts 1500 years ago." The doctrine of the Church seeks to secure the historic truth and reality of Christ's entire obedience by His humanity, and its infinite value by His divinity ; and in this way the Christological advance made in the age of the Reformation in respect of a more living conception of the unity of Christ's person, has its influence on the dogma now under consideration. 3. From what has been said, it is clear how definitely the Evangelical Church advances beyond mere convenientia, or adaptation in Christ's work, to the necessity of this mode, and how by the consciousness of God's immutable justice it avoids everything arbitrary or capricious, even where arbitrariness shelters itself behind God's free plenary authority. On the other hand, it firmly lays down the ethical idea of God. And it is worthy of note that here the Reformed theology does not, as in the doctrine of the decretum Electionis and Reproba- tionis, go back to God's supreme authority, but to the divine justice, which it reckons a part of God's essence, and there fore does not subordinate to God's supremum arbitrium. But from this it also follows that Christ's atoning action procured a blessing of a moral nature most precious to God Himself, a blessing which did not previously exist even for God, and that consequently a change was made by Christ's work, in accordance with the decretum, not merely in the relation of men to God, but in the relation of God to men. Thus has the Evangelical Church, in asserting the necessity of Satis faction, afforded proof that, advancing beyond the mere le^al stage, and for this reason visited with the reproach of Antinomianism, it pays greater honour to the inflexible honour of God's law than those theories which assign to that law the THE EVANGELICAL DOCTEINE. 27 precarious position of a positivity which might be other than it is, and which therefore do not regard atonement by Christ as the essential mode of salvation. When the Formula of Concord says : Gratia Dei, Meritum Christi, Fides belong to Justificatio, this triad shows how, according to Evangelical teaching, the process of Atonement, starting from the depths of the Divine Essence, proceeds onward to the historic Mediator, until it reaches its goal in fides, with its joyous assurance of the divine forgiveness. The decisive factor is the terminus medius, Christus per quem Deus placatur ; but still the process is not concluded with the objective trans action through Christ outside us. It first comes to rest in fides, because by faith the peace, which exists through Christ in God's heart, is received into our heart. Mere objective atonement, on the other hand, however important and funda mental, would avail us nothing. 4. The advance made in the Evangelical doctrine of Atone ment, and continued by the theology of the Church, cor responds to the advance made by the Reformation in Ponerology, Christology, and Theology. But the defects also, which, as formerly indicated,1 were not overcome in these doctrines, exercised their influence, giving rise to a number of points needing explanation or more satisfactory verification. We shall consider these defects, as they appear in part in the Symbols and old Evangelical theologians of both Confessions, following as closely as possible the defects, previously discussed and still remaining, in Ponerology, Christology, and the doctrine of God. First. We saw previously that the old Evangelical theology made too little distinction in the doctrine of sin between generic and personal sin, especially that of definitive unbebef, which is inevitably followed by damnation. The consequence of this on the present dogma is, that the statement : Christ died for all the sins of the world, as to form gives the im pression that His atoning work avails even for the sin of definitive rejection of Christ,2 which neither was nor could be the meaning. On the other hand, it gives the impression 1 § 75, 6 ; § %. Cf. §§ 94. 95. 2 Certainly Quenstedt does not seem to shrink even from this. P. ii. p. 163. ell. iii. 324. 28 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. that Christ, in order to make satisfaction for sin at all, must endure the punishments of hell for us, those punishments being due by divine justice to all sin, not merely to that of definitive unbelief. This defect in dogmatic precision acquires greater importance from the fact that the idea of punishment was not investigated with sufficient thoroughness. The usual supposition was, that the satisfaction of divine justice con sisted in the same amount of suffering befalling Christ which would have befallen those destined to obtain forgiveness, on which view the amount of Christ's sufferings would neces sarily have been greater if the number of sinners had been greater, and smaller if smaller. When this quantitative , conception of sin and of Christ's sufferings is carried farther, : those sufferings appear as a numerical amount, which Christ ; was bound to discharge for all without distinction, in order to I create for them the possibility of deliverance, since those for \ whom He did not pay the amount would be those excluded a priori from election. A further consequence would be, that if the numerical sum due had been paid on behalf of those remaining in unbelief, punishment for their sins, which had been expiated, could no longer be demanded of them, because Christ had made satisfaction for them, and a double satisfac tion would be unjust. But even if the sin, to which Christ's atoning work could not refer, were separated from that capable of forgiveness, and it were said that Christ had only to do with the latter, the old theology is still inclined to maintain that it was necessary for Christ to endure the pains of hell, because the infinite significance of sin demands infinite punishment.1 But in opposition to this view the question was early asked, Whether the comparatively brief duration of Christ's sufferings could come into comparison with the punishments 1 The Reformed theologians in part teach that on the cross Christ suffered the pangs of hell. The Lutheran Confessions, while not excluding this view (Frank, d. Theologie der Concordienformel, ii. 32, 1861), do not teach it, as is often done by theologians on both sides. But the impotence of rebellion and despair form a part of those pangs, and these cannot be thought of in Christ without dissolving the Unio. It is true, the Lutheran Confessions speak of the eternal death to which we should be exposed apart from Christ's suffering for us. But it is not said that Christ endured this eternal death. For this reason, moderns like Kahnis (iii. 397), Frank (Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit, ii. 181 ff.), and Gess, reject this Theologoumenon of the old Protestant theologians. It is otherwise with Philippi, iv. 2. 136. THE EVANGELICAL DOCTRINE. 29 of hell, and as relates, for example, to those dying before maturity, whether original sin alone could be an adcequata causa damnationis to the punishments of hell 1 The disposi tion to externalize the idea of punishment, in order to seek a quantum of suffering in Christ answering to the amount of sin, followed naturally from the assumption, that the satisfy ing of divine justice by Christ's suffering for men's sins rests on the jus talionis of the compensation-theory, which was confounded with the absolute theory of punishment formerly discussed ; 1 and then the question was asked, What sufferings of Christ in particular make expiation for definite, particular kinds of sin ? But therewith it is overlooked that suffering as suffering is no good in God's sight, and divine justice is not revenge ; the only good is the revelation of justice. Such a' treatment of the matter is repugnant to the Evangelical view of sin, that view being averse to such piecemeal division, and rather drawing attention away from the endless diversity of sin's manifestations to its single source. Thus the revelation of the divine justice demanded is not to be of a kind implying punishments as various as the manifestations of sin. Nor can it be shown that retributive punishments, various in kind and corresponding to all human sins, were borne by Christ. Generally speaking, this tendency to a quantitative equivalent in Christ's sufferings for human sins must lead to undue, one sided stress being laid on Christ's physical sufferings, whereas the suffering of His soul alone exceeded the delight and joy felt by any sinner in sin. On the supposition of the sum of general guilt and punishment on the part of the world having to be cancelled or paid by a mathematically equal quantum of suffering on Christ's part, we should have before us in the cross a sum in arithmetic instead of a wondrous mystery of love. From the quantitative we must advance to the in trinsic view of the matter, to an intensive estimate of the work of Christ. Further, were Christ's work considered in the light of a calculation and counter-calculation, Christ being made the payer of a money debt, this evil consequence would follow, that Christians might demand remission of punishment and justification from God as their strict right ; and if the satisfaction were of this nature, gracious forgiveness would be 1 § 24, 6 ; 32, 4. Cf. § 88. 30 THE DOCTEINE OF ATONEMENT. out of the question. But, on the contrary, Christians are conscious that not merely Christ's mission, but also the imputation of His righteousness, is not indeed an act of arbitrary favour, but of grace, so that they would of necessity look on it as impious to ask forgiveness as a legal due from God, on the ground that God, after the debt has been paid by Christ, cannot again require its payment from the debtors. Instead of this, the Christian consciousness only requires that forgiveness clash not with divine justice, Christ having satisfied that justice. Evil with its culpability, like Christ's merit, must be conceived dynamically or intensively. Christ's merit is not to be measured by weight and number, because it is a potency intensively infinite, equal to the guilt incurred by the violation and rejection of an infinite good. But Christ's sufferings owe their intensive import to the fact that they are not merely physical, but spiritual sufferings, sufferings of His divine-human person. By God's just ordinance sin draws upon itself His wrath and displeasure — that intensive power (Gi'dsse). As the divine displeasure is the source, so it is the innermost core of punishment, the sting in every other punish ment. Wherever a sinner, though the subject of outward ill, regards it not as a sign of the divine displeasure, he is still superficially blind to his penal state. On the contrary, although the ills, which were punishments, still continue, if that in tensive element in punishment — the divine displeasure — ho longer rules, but the enjoyment of the peace and favour of God, then that which was punishment is no longer punish ment, but the remaining ills are, as it were, swallowed up by the sense of infinite good, of the divine favour, which trans forms even ill into a proof of love. Thus under every aspect we are directed from the mere quantitative, arithmetical view of sin and guilt, of the divine grace and divine punishment, as well as of Christ's merit, to a higher mode of view, from an extensive to an intensive power (Grbsse). But that which is intrinsically infinite in worth or demerit refuses to be measured by weight and number. Observation. — Another common defect in the Church theo logians, is in making the satisfaction contained in Christ's sufferings the chief matter to such an extent, that they regard the mere execution of punishment as identical with the THE EVANGELICAL DOCTRINE. 31 restoration of divine grace. But that the mere objective execution of punishment, even when tending to the benefit of the sinner, could not suffice, is easily apparent. Even in the State, when a criminal has expiated his punishment, he is not on this account so restored to citizenship and confi dence that all is forgotten, and honour and cordial confidence are completely regained by him ; for he might submit to the punishment reluctantly. Restitutio in integrum, the return of full confidence, is only possible when the sufferer acknow ledges the justice of the punishment, thus doing honour to justice. Then only is atonement made to justice. For these reasons, in the case of Christ an objective execution of punishment is by no means sufficient ; i.e. it is not sufficient for the ills and sufferings, even the death, ordained as a punishment to men, to be inflicted on and endured by Christ for men's good. In order to the restoration of God's spon taneous communion with sinners, and to the fresh bestowal of His favour, besides suffering, this is necessary, that Christ, in the suffering coming to Him as Mediator through the injustice of men, honour and acknowledge God's justice in His judicial displeasure at sin, and submit to the feeling of that just displeasure ; and this is a new and broader act, in cluding not merely willingness to endure outward sufferings, but to descend for the sake of a sinful world to the feeling of just subjection to punishment. Second. As relates to Christology, a firm, intimate connec tion must certainly be maintained between Christ's physical sufferings and those of His soul, the conscious sense of life and suffering on its physical side having its roots in the ^Jrv^rj of Jesus. But however important, according to the N. T., those physical sufferings of Christ, by which He entered into most real fellowship with sinners, the reasons just advanced show that His spiritual sufferings should receive more con sideration than is commonly the case.1 Sin, as the infringe ment of an infinite good, and guilt, are only comprehensible in relation to the soul ; only the soul can have the sense of God's just displeasure. But the reality of Christ's human soul must also influence the doctrine of atonement, inasmuch as the really human will is most important in relation to His 1Matt. xxvi. 36 ff., xxvii. 46. Cf. Isa. liii. 7, 8, 11; John xii. 27; Mark x. 39 ; Luke xii. 50. It is especially the Catholic theologians who are disposed to dwell unduly on the physical sufferings and the sense of them. Cf. Cotta's Dissert, on Gerhard's Loci Th, t. iv. 75. 3 2 ' THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. obedience, in order both that His suffering may be voluntary, and that He may do honour to the divine justice, feel the divine displeasure, and confess its justice. But we pointed out as a leading defect in the old Lutheran Christology, that it confounded the States of Humiliation and Exaltation by the Communicatio idiomatum, supposed to be absolute from the beginning, and inconsistent with the admitted reality of the humanity.1 This has. critical consequences for the present dogma. For, according to this Christological theory, Christ was necessarily after the Unio, even as man, in possession, not to say exercise, of every divine prerogative, and in undisturbed divine blessedness. But this would be inconsis tent with the reality of His suffering. And if Christ's humanity, as this theory must properly assume, even before the Exaltation entered into fellowship with the Godhead, then the Godhead is so preponderant in Him, especially if Christ's humanity is supposed to be impersonal, that only God the Son, or the Logos, as it were, stands over against God the Father, and therefore God over against God, or over against Himself. But if in this work it is God who at once pays and receives, and therefore pays to Himself, atonement is in danger of becoming a mere internal calculation of God, and the history of atonement a mere epideictic or symbolic trans action, a sign of that which God possessed eternally in Him self even apart from Christ. Then would Christ by His historical work procure nothing new, nothing which did not really exist for God before. Lutheran theology, it is true, did not intend this. On the contrary, even the old Kryptists endeavour here most of all to treat Christ's humiliation as real, and regard Christ not as God merely, but as true man.2 But this proves that, where those Christological propositions ought to have evinced their truth, they had to be given up as unpractical and useless, and that, on the other hand, where a practical application of the doctrine of Christ's Person was in question, recourse was had to the propositions of another Christology, lying in the line of the one sketched by us. But 1 See §§ 94, 95. 2 According to Luther's postulate : Here must Christ be regarded as man pure and simple (Walch, xiii. 547, xii. 1677-85. My Geschichte der Christol. ii. 555), a view which certainly goes too far, because it would dissolve the Unk. THE EVANGELICAL DOCTRINE. 33 the Reformed doctrine also was not free from the danger of Docetism in the form of apprehending Christ's historical work, nor does it adequately secure the procurement of an infinite blessing by Christ's historic work. For if the divine Predes tination and Election alone, and therefore God's will, are viewed as the ultimate, all-conditioning and decisive cause both of Christ's work and of faith, while Christ's work and man's faith are not viewed, in accordance with the demand of the; divine essence, as conditioning the attainment of God's counsel, of salvation to historical realization, then again the history and work of Christ are in danger of being viewed in a mere docetic light, whereas the strict Reformed doctrine of God's justice and of Christ as the causa meritoria salutis repudiates- everything docetic. There must be added, in the third place, the defect, for merly indicated in the Doctrine of God held by the old Church theologians, namely, the false conception of God's immutability and elevation above the world In order to exclude temporal change from God's knowledge and volition, that doctrine would make God's relation to the world eternally the same, and assign all change to the world. But the consequence of this must be, that neither could evil produce an alteration in God's relation and disposition towards the world, nor for this very reason would the atonement of Christ influence the way in which He is disposed towards men. But if Christ's atonement does not remove real divine displeasure; and again render possible a favourable disposition on God's part, His atoning work cannot be understood in its entire earnestness and depth. Then no place remains for objective discord between God and the sinful world, nor for the removal of such discord. The only question could be of a discord on the part of men with God, and of a change in their attitude to God. 5. Again, the greatest importance belongs to the question respecting the Transferdbleness of our guilt to Christ, and of, Christ's righteousness to us, — a point upon which the opposition to the Evangelical doctrine of atonement, especially on the part of the Socinians, first of all and early fastened. Against the transferableness of our guilt to Christ is the consideration, that it seems to run out into caprice, and only to be possible at the cost of the immutable, law, because the guilty one is, Dorner. — Christ. Doct. iv. C 34 THE DOCTEINE OF ATONEMENT. exempted from punitive justice, while the innocent one is punished. The earnest emphasizing of justice seems thus to pass into crying injustice. Justice — that guardian of distinc tions, and therefore of the rights of the personality — seems necessarily regarded as mutable, whereas it is part of God's essence. Now, as regards, first of all, the transference of our guilt and penalty to Christ, the Symbols certainly remind us, as an argument in favour of its possibility, of Christ's position as the /cetjxikij, a position forming the ground of a substitution. But the way in which this substitution is to be conceived was not settled more precisely. Many theologians speak as if it implied a sort of commutatio personarum, and as if in consequence of this Christ were directly subject to God's wrath, an object of the divine displeasure and punishment, whereas others' opposed both notions. And as concerns the transferableness of Christ's righteousness to us, the commutatio personarum seemed to be avoided by the person of Christ being distinguished from His work or merits, and an attempt being made to show that there is objectively in Christ some thing over and above, which is available for transference to us. This the Form. Cone, seeks to establish in the following manner.1 As Son of God, Christ was not personally subject to the law, but Lord of the law, even as to His humanity, in virtue of the communicatio idiomatum. Since, nevertheless, by an obedience well-pleasing to God He submitted to the law, merit was the consequence, which He needed not for Himself, and which was therefore available for others. This theory, reminding us of Anselm, cannot be approved even in its confirmatory aspect (in which aspect it is put forward), to say nothing of its intrinsic merits.2 It has much in common with the Romish doctrine of supererogatory good works avail- 1 684, 15 ; 697, 58. 2 When Philippi, I.e. (as also iv. 2, pp. 146 ff., 134), and also Harless (Zeitschr. f. Prot. 1839, No. 7), defend these propositions of the Form. Cone., whereas Frank gives them up (die Theol. der Ooncordienformel, ii. 38, 1861), and when Harless reminds us that Christ's appearance in the world, as well as His servant- form, was not His duty but voluntary, it is overlooked that what is voluntary is not therefore arbitrary (i.e. must n6t be handed over to caprice), but may be official duty, and what is done officially and therefore as matter of duty is not unfree or necessitated ; and it is overlooked that the law or the imxi is the efflux of the divine essence, and not a matter of mere free plenary authority. It is true that men have no right to demand the Incarnation or THE EVANGELICAL DOCTEINE. 35 able for others. The law — that efflux of God's holy essence — is here directly made no part of the essence of God (and therefore of Christ's also, as the Son), but is treated as the efflux merely of supreme authority, and therefore derived from the physical category of power. But Christ is not exlex, but evvouoi. He is certainly free even as man, but free in gladly and spontaneously realizing the will of the Father, the ethically good and necessary. It would be contrary both to His Deity and humanity, were He able to deal with the law by arbitrary will. What He did in obedience to the law or the ivroXri of the Father is an official, and certainly unique, fulfilment of the law of love binding on all men. In this fulfilment, therefore, and not in anything material, not in any work or merit divorced from His person, must the grounds of the legitimacy and force of His substitution be sought. For the rest, in order to secure the benefits of this substitution and intercession of Christ to us, the Confessions rightly refer to the correlate of Christ's love — faith in man. His merit avails for fides, inasmuch as faith respicit in personam Christi, quatenus Hie pro nobis legi sese subjecit, peccata nostra pertulit} The transference of the merit of Christ to us is mediated on His side by His intercession with the Father, on our side by that believing surrender to Him which loses itself in 'Him. sacrifice of Christ. But this does not abolish the official character of Christ's free action. Philippi supposes (ut supra, pp. 23-42), that were Christ under obligation to holy action, and were only His holy death vicarious, this would be equivalent to saying that by His active obedience He procured eternal life for Himself and by His passive obedience for us. Here, withal, a false idea of substitution betrays itself, as if the same love, which by action and suffering manifests the vicarious spirit, could not at the same time be the means of attesting and glorifying one's own person. The converse of suoh a view would be, that what has really vicarious force would exclude the personal ethical conduct of him for whom the substitution avails, and therefore would be without productive power. When he says further, that, were Christ under obligation, He would not be One Person, since the Logos oannot be under obligation, but is Lord of the law, apart from the error of supposing that there may be caprice in God in relation to the law, the counter-question is necessary, whether the humanity of Christ can be real, if He is as little under obligation as man as He is as Logos, whether Docetism or Monophysitism would not be the conse quence ? It is certainly unbecoming to assert obligation of God, since He is Himself the ethically necessary. But the ethical necessity, according to which God acts, even as the Incarnate Son, coheres very well with the official action, in which the ethically necessary expresses itself for men. 1 Form. Cone. 684, 13 ; 697, 58. 36 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. The consequence is, that our injustitia is not imputed to us, but His justitia. Thus, in laying hold of Christ we lay hold of our righteousness.1 But this teaching rather indicates the factum of the transference and the way thereto, than shows how the transferableness harmonizes with personal responsibility. 6. That Christ's merit did not consist, as Anselm supposed, merely in passive, but also in active obedience, was distinctly acknowledged by the Evangelical doctrine.2 But the right way of combining and applying the two was not as readily found, while the wrong one gave rise to early attacks on the whole doctrine. The supposition, certainly, that personal obedience is no longer due from us, because Christ's vicarious righteousness dispenses with it, was utterly rejected on Evan gelical soil, obviously as it seemed to be suggested when the idea of substitution was not rightly laid down. But the demon stration of the obedientia activa was vacillating from the first. Some said: We not merely need the cancelling of past guilt in order to please God, but, if the law is to be satisfied, we must also appear righteous and holy before God, so that even our past may no longer disturb the world's harmony, but appear in God's sight as normal and as positive obedience. Christ's suffering, then, cancels the guilt of disobedience ; His obedientia activa, on the other hand, presents us holy before God. But this division of the One complete obedience is insufficient. For if the obedientia Christi activa by itself has the effect of presenting us holy and obedient before God even in reference to our past, liability to punishment is thereby. excluded, and Christ's vicarious suffering is needless as penal suffering. Conversely, if His passive obedience has atoned for all guilt, substitution through the obedientia activa seems superfluous, for then even the guilt of omitted good is can celled, so that the non-existence of righteousness no longer' forms a punishable gap. Quenstedt refers the obedientia passiva to the poena, the activa to the culpa? But when the culpa is cancelled, the penalty is no longer penalty ; and the 1 Form. Cone. 584, 5 ; 696, 55 f. ; 685, 15. 2 Form. Cone. 685. 686. 696. The obedientia. activa resulted from the fact that Christ sine peccato peccati pcenam subiit, Apol. 118. s Cf. Thomasius, De obed. Christi activa, on the historical development. Quenstedt, I.e. sec. ii. qu. 3. THE EVANGELICAL DOCTRINE. 37 abrogation of the penalty is impossible, unless the guilt is first abrogated. Just as little is it admissible to refer the obedientia passiva to our sinful past, the activa to our im perfect present and future, which are covered by it. For Christ's obedientia passiva cannot be referred merely to the sinful past before faith, the subsequent operation of pre- Christian sin in the believer still needing Christ's atoning efficacy. Further, the obedientia Christi passiva would not really be atoning in character unless it were also an act of active obedience — both an act of love and an act done in acknowledgment of the divine justice. It thus appears that it is wrong to cut in two the one complete merit of Christ, seeing that Christ's obedience under both aspects must always co-operate. The relation of the obedientia passiva and activa to each other cannot be such as to allow the supposition that either of the two without the other effected a special part of the expiation or covered a special defect. But as they did not exist apart in time, and doing and suffering were always combined in Christ's Person, so, although rela tively opposed, they must be treated dogmatically on the basis of their interdependence and mutual interpenetration. Mere physical sufferings would halve no atoning import ; but', as the sufferings are sufferings of the soul, they necessarily imply action, because love. Thus, His obedientia passiva, because a free volition to suffer in the interest of justice, is also an action, and His action included the will to satisfy God by suffering Jforne in virtue of office. Observation. — When Schleiermacher apprehends the obedi entia activa, so far as it is vicarious in nature, as a communi cation of life and the principle of sanctification, we are led at once into an altogether different sphere (see above, p. 24). For the whole old Evangelical theology places the obedientia activa and passiva in relation with the justification of the sinner before God, but not with sanctification. It would be more in keeping with the spirit of the Evangelical doctrine to regard the obedientia Christi activa as the ground on which man obtains not merely remission of guilt and punishment, but also a new bestowal of the divine favour, and thus, for the first time, full justification. So Philippi, who remarks, however, that even this may be derived from Christ's penal suffering, so far as it is an act of obedience. 38 , THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. 3. Subjectivistic Theories of Atonement. § 117. The transition to theories of atonement of a one-sided sub jective kind was made by Socinianism and Arminianism. In these systems, justice and law, like punishment, have no necessary importance in themselves, but only in rela tion to the consciousness of man, whose welfare is to Arminianism the highest end. The eudsemonism of the popular philosophy denies punishment altogether, as it denies the absolute worth of the moral. And the subjective theories of Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, while teaching a self-redemption on the part of man in the way of volition, knowledge, feeling, do not rise above the self-forgiveness of sin and guilt — the pseudo-Protestant counterpart of Romish Indulgence. 1. Hugo Grotius, with whom the Arminians are here essentially in sympathy,1 does not wish indeed quite to give up the idea of divine justice and punishment ; but, according to him, both these have no inner necessity of an absolute kind (as little as the divine law), but only a relative one, namely, in reference to the wellbeing of men, which is the supreme end. The world, as now constituted, can only be made happy by obedience to God's will and to the law given by Him. That regard for the welfare of the creature, which is decisive for God, is also the reason of the penal sanction with which God's positive law was invested in relation to sin. But the same regard also forbids the simple forgiveness of sin ; for such relaxation of the law would beget recklessness and corrupt the world, although in the abstract God might bestow free forgiveness, as, too, in the abstract no necessity having its ground in God compelled the giving of this particular law. But since the original purpose of the law, to secure the welfare 1 Defensio Fidel Cath. de Satisfactione Christi adv. F. Socinum de J. Chr. Sera. 1617. In opposition to him, J. Crell, Reap, ad libr. GrotU de Satisf., £lbl. Fr. Pol. iv. 1623. SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 39 of mankind through fulfilment of the law, was frustrated by- sin, another economy recommended , itself. In order still to maintain this ultimate purpose, which would of necessity be injured by the infliction of punishment on mankind, God's administrative wisdom hit upon a scheme,- which does honour to the law and its penal sanction without involving the sinner's ruin.1 The expedient used is, to set forth Christ as a penal example with a view to terrify, and as a sign of God's abhorrence of sin, notwithstanding His forgiveness of it. Christ is the Head ; like a king He answers for His people, presenting to God in symbolic penal suffering the acknowledg ment that grace ought not to be extended to the presumptuous. But after this act of Christ men may think of God as for giving upon condition of amendment ; what their virtue lacks, grace supplies in the case of the upright. Here, therefore, we have indeed a divine arrangement, but its sole purpose is to beget in the subjective consciousness of men the idea that Christ satisfied the divine justice — even penal justice — for us ; whereas, according to Grotius, the truth is that justice threatened with punishment, not for its own sake, but solely on account of man's welfare. Thus, justice takes here but a precarious, subordinate position, the highest position being due to the divine wisdom, into which justice resolves itself. The latter is supposed to be directed solely to the welfare of men, even amendment or obedience being simply a means of happiness. This theory involves a, strong eudse- monistic spirit, making God a means to the good of the individual subject ; for both the divine justice and the law — the divine action in general — have here no absolute signi ficance, no worth in themselves, but only outside themselves, in relation to the wellbeing of men. Absolute plenary authority is regarded as the innermost thing in God ; and this authority settles by its beneplacitum — according to the teaching of Duns Scotus and some of the defenders of absolute pre- destinationism — what the law shall be and whether punish ment shall follow, while at the same time acting according to the rule of wisdom, of harmony with the welfare of the world 1 Leibnitz also views justice as a species of wisdom. Administrative wisdom is also the basis of the " Governmental theory " widely current in the theology of New England. 40 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. (convenientid). This no doubt implies a certain goodness, which aims at the eudaemonism of the creature, but not holy love blended with justice; for otherwise the morally good could not be kept in the position of a mere means in order to wellbeing. 2. Even before Hugo Grotius, the Socinians had relaxed the ideas of law and justice — in the same way as Duns Scotus —by regarding them both, not as necessarily grounded in God's essence, but merely as necessary in relation to men, whereas in the abstract God might have given another law. For this reason, the conflict waged by Grotius with the So cinians of necessity remained without result. The Socinians, however, attacked both the ecclesiastical doctrine and Armini anism with keen weapons.1 Forgiveness and satisfaction, they said, are mutually exclusive ideas. Where the satisfaction is complete no debt is left to pay, and there is nothing to forgive. Conversely, where a real forgiveness obtains, no place is left for demanding a satisfaction, for this would be to demand what has been already settled by gift No forgiveness is possible on the theory of the ecclesiastical doctrine, but merely a commutation between our punishment and the suffering or acts of Christ. This objection rests upon an external con ception of the guilt to be cancelled, which very conception is again described by Socinianism as inadequate, when it teaches that money-penalties may be paid by another than the debtor ; but (and thereby it passes to a more weighty objection) the essentially personal penalty of eternal death cannot be trans ferred from the guilty party to another, and least of all to an innocent one. Moreover, it is said, the idea of Head avails nothing, because Christ has only been Head since His resur rection. He therefore did not suffer as Head, but was Himself bound to fulfil the law. Hence there is no real merit capable of transference to others. Satisfaction on the part of Christ by means of His obedientia activa is impossible, because a virtuous life is the duty of every individual. This, it is alleged, is indirectly acknowledged by the fact of the Church doctrine requiring an imputatio meriti Christi to fid,es; for, were the satisfaction by Christ complete in itself, its efficacy lCf. Fock, Der Socinianismus, 1847, ii. 610 ff. Cat. Racov. qu 61 ff 379 ff. SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 41 could no longer depend on the individual's faith. But even Christ's suffering and death, it was said, were insufficient for a satisfaction ; for Christ did not taste eternal death and was but an individual, whereas, according to the ecclesiastical doctrine, eternal death had to be endured by each individual. We see that these objections fasten on defects and unsolved difficulties in the working out of the ecclesiastical doctrine, the idea of substitution especially being exposed to various misinterpreta tions. Against the doctrine of Christ as a penal example, the Socinians object that Christ would then be unjustly made a mere, means.1 Adopted by Rationalism in the 18th century, the Socinian objections were scarcely carried much farther. The theory of the Socinians themselves is to the following effect. It would be a contradiction to the divine omnipotence or free dom for God to be unable to forgive freely, without demanding penalty or expiation. In order to forgiveness, God merely requires amendment and sanctification in man. No change in God's relation to men is necessary, but merely a moral change in man. Those in the way of self-amendment God can freely forgive. But Christ contributes to that amendment by His example and His obedience unto death, His death sealing His doctrine, the doctrine of forgiveness among others. And the objective sealing of His doctrine lies in the Resurrection and Exaltation of Christ. Socinianism transforms religion into morality, and fails to transcend the legal stage. 3. The Eudcemonism of the pre-Kantian popular philosophy, after lurking in the Arminian system, goes still farther in dissolving the ideas of punishment and penal justice, and in subordinating even the moral law to physical categories of power, caprice, or pleasure. According to Steinbart, God is merely to be conceived as absolute goodness, which overlooks the mistakes of its children. The God of the Old Testament is cruel, bloodthirsty, vengeful. God's justice is rather merely wise, symmetrical goodness. At the same time, men are certainly supposed to be permanently undeveloped, scarcely responsible beings. Loffler and Eberhard deny the remissible- ness of punishments, because, according to them, the only possible punishments are benefits, salutary chastisements, not 1 Notwithstanding, Tollner, Doderlein, and Reinhard adopt this idea. Cf. Philippi, iv. 2, p. 181. 42 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. real punishments. Thus remission of punishment is super fluous, nay, impossible. To this must be added the exaggerated representations of the natural excellence of man. In this case there can be no question of criminality as a violation of absolute good ; all that is injured by evil is our own happiness, which even now is inconsistent with evil. But the issue of this presumption in the subject of making his happiness the end of the world and the world-order, and God a means in order thereto, is that man is robbed of all share in absolute worth, and degraded into a mere finite being with ends of mere finite wellbeing. The Eudaemonists may serve to teach us, that we can only give up the idea of punishment by abolishing the absolute worth of good in itself, and the absoluteness of our destiny. Christ's death under its sacrificial aspect appears to these Eudsemonists an impossible horror, or on Christ's side idealistic fanaticism. It is spoken of indeed in the New Testament, but only by accommodation to notions of the age — what notions, forsooth it is hard to say, seeing that the cross of Christ was to the Jews a stumbling-block, to the Gentiles foolishness. 4. The Subjective Theories of Atonement from Kant onward relate to Will, or Knowledge, or Feeling. First, Theories of the Will. Kant successfully opposed Eudaemonism, and consigned it to the contempt it deserved. Not happiness, but morality is the good of absolute worth and the ultimate end. Hence the punitive justice which guards the absolute right of the moral element is well- founded; a proportion between moral worth and wellbeing is a demand of the practical reason. From these premisses some Kantians (e.g. Flatt the Elder 2) deduced the following conclusions : — Forgiveness of sin is an impossibility, nor is it necessary in order to amendment, — a view which Flatt strove to vindicate by Scripture. Punishment must necessarily follow ; the opposite supposition would be moral laxity, and would involve morality in self-contradictions. Nevertheless, moral effort must be honestly carried on in reliance upon divine help, even without hope of remission of punishment. But to require such effort is to require the impossible ; for 1 C. Christ. Flatt, Philosophisch-exegetische Untersuchungen uber die Lehre von der Versohnung des Menschen mit Gott, 1797, 98. SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 43 how can confidence and love blend with consciousness of punishment and fear, especially when no mere external punishment is in question, but also self-condemnation and the sense of condemnation before God? Others, like Siiskind, insist that execution of the punishment may have injurious moral effects, and in this case remission is possible ; God may communicate the reality of forgiveness by revelation. But Tieftrunk assumes an a priori cognizable practical necessity for the remission of punishment, at least of the heaviest, sharpest punishment. According to him, no true amendment is possible without inner joyousness and cheerfulness in moral effort, in order to which the assurance of reception into the divine favour is necessary ; for what is required is no mere legal obedience, but love for the law, while love for an absolutely implacable law is impossible.1 The inference from this seems to be that remission of punishment, forgiveness, must take place before real amendment, in order for the latter to be possible. But the moral standpoint must not be untrue to itself in working out its theory; the command and the penalty proceed from one and the same moral law. Were God without further ado to regard with complacency the man who stands morally condemned before Him, He must of necessity be indifferent to the distinction of good and evil. It thus becomes necessary to acknowledge that the commands of the moral law which aim at realization and its penalties, do not contradict, but agree with each other, and that there fore the infliction of punishment is reconcilable with such realization. Kant2 sought to escape this difficulty in the following way. He knows nothing of divine displeasure, or of discord in man with God, in the strict sense, but only of discord in man with himself. As legislation is to him only self-legislation, so chastisement is only self-chastisement, inner unhappiness. External punishments would be tolerable, and no injury to goodness; but self-condemnation and self- contempt would of course disturb inner progress in goodness, 1 Siiskind in Flatt's Magaz. St. i. 1796. Tieftrunk, Censur des prot. Lehr- begr. vols. ii. iii. Cf. Flatt, ut supra, i. 127 ff., 143 ff. 2 Religion .within the Limits of mere Reason, Pt. 2, 1793, vol. x. ed. by Rosenkranz. Respecting the personified idea of the good principle, p. 69. Respecting guilt and punishment, p. 83 ff. 44 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. and paralyze cheerfulness and moral energy. There is especially radical moral evil within us, which is a constant source of such discord This discord to him is no mere subjective notion, but rests on an objective basis. The guilt of sin exposes to punishment (and on account of radical evil such guilt pertains to every one). Even the reformed man, who after his change of heart contracts no fresh guilt, cannot regard this change for the better as paying the old debt. Any overplus in a life well-conducted subsequently is out of the question. From this antinomy, according to which punish ment is morally necessary and yet morally injurious, Kant seeks the following way of escape. Despite all this, he con tinues, man may carry within himself a better element, — better will, good disposition, — which may still of course be far removed from completeness of moral strength. It answers to the idea of humanity well-pleasing in God's sight, called by the Church " the Son of God." Although now every one is only in a course of endless approximation to the goal, we may still conceive to ourselves that " One who knows the heart by pure intellectual intuition judges our ceaseless progress, on account of the supersensuous pure disposition from which it springs, to be virtually a completed whole."1 In his new disposition, man is morally a different man from what he is empirically. He has received into himself the disposition of true humanity, which may be called "the Son of God." Or, personifying this idea, we may say: As a Substitute this Son of God bears the guilt of sin for him and for all who virtually believe in Him, as Redeemer satisfies supreme justice by suffering and death, and as Advocate secures to them the hope of being able to appear just before their Judge. The suffering, of necessity progressively assumed in life by the new man in dying to the old man, is represented by the Church as a death assumed by the Representative of humanity once for all.2 In any case, whoever has adopted the volition of the good as the supreme principle of his will, is warranted in regarding himself as born again and just before God. Thus we are reconciled through the idea of man, or of God-pleasing humanity, of " the Son of God," which renders us well-pleasing to God, so far as we are one 1 Ut supra, pp. 87, 88. s p. 86 f. SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 45 with it in the good ground of our disposition. There is here, therefore, a representation of our actuality by our idea, a sort of substitution, without which it is impossible for us rightly to know ourselves reconciled and free from unhappiness. In addition, the new man, to whom as such no punishment is due, has still to suffer for the sins of the old man. He really bears these sufferings, which may be called vicarious sufferings on the part of the new moral personality for the physical, sinful personality, and which again help to free the conscious ness from guilt and the sense of .penal desert. This Kantian theory is exceedingly instructive. It con fesses that the unhappiness and condemnation of conscience, so injurious to moral progress, must be abolished, if it is ever to be better with us ; further, that in order thereto, our actuality must be left out of sight, and replaced by a substitute better than itself; and that God must look upon us through our idea, instead of judging us according to our works. This implies that the mere legal standpoint must give place and be transcended in order that the law may be fulfilled. More over, Kant's principles imply that if this idea is mere law and in no sense reality, it cannot be a substitute for our empirical reality. But to what reality does he appeal ? To our good disposition. But therewith he suddenly assumes, as much against expectation as without warrant, a realization of the idea of the perfect man in ourselves, without our' being able to see how this is to be arrived at, if radical evil has poisoned the inmost ground and highest principles, and if the actuality, in which disposition constantly shows its impotence and vacillates between good and evil, needs atonement, and no immediate certainty of moral progress, such as is necessary in order to hopefulness in a better moral walk, exists before the end, and therefore no right to comfort oneself with the idea of substitution through the ideal man. He therefore confounds what is to be a substitute with what needs substitution, the idea of man with its realization, the ideal righteousness which man ought to have with its reality, and instead of solving the problem, assumes its solution. Thus, precisely at the point where he deviates from Christianity and wishes to evade Christ's substitution, he falls away from himself and evades his own principles. How can the resolve on a better life 46 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. guarantee or represent the reality of goodness, seeing that it is merely a desire after goodness, not goodness itself, as Kant himself acknowledges in holding only the possibility of an endless approximation to moral perfection ? Such approxi mation is a wretched comfort, seeing that, while it affirms a constant growth, it affirms also a never-ending distance from the goal. Before, therefore, it is satisfactorily proved that our ideal really exists in some form for God, and is put to our account in God's esteem, according to Kant himself (and therein he is right) there can be no claim to a consciousness of Reconciliation. Observation. — It deserves notice, that in his Criticism of the Faculty of Judgment (p. 329 f., ed. by Rosenkranz), Kant describes the moral community, not individuals per se, as the aim of the world, and at still greater length in Religion within, etc. (p. 114 ff). But whereas Kant teaches self- redemption through the moral votition of the subject in the moral community, many with more external proclivities expect a harmonious existence, free from all trouble and discord, as the result of the best State, or of the best con stituted society, or of the rule of man over nature. On this view the religious and moral needs of the personality and conscience come under consideration at best indirectly. In the second place, others seek Reconciliation in the way of Knowledge or Intelligence. Right knowledge brings every thing into order and harmony, because it has power to determine the will ; instruction, culture, brings the world redemption from every ill. Or, according to the scheme of absolute Idealism : The possessor of knowledge comprehends his true Ego ; the Ego is free and pure, and in comparison with it everything empirical is mere semblance, even sin. Evil is a mere nonentity, or at least the non-being of good, lethargy, or defect. But, alas ! the true Ego is no actuality, but bare possibility. But in the moral sphere the very first requisite is a better actuality, for in the actuality sin and guilt do not remain bare possibilities. Finally, some of the Romanticists seek Reconciliation in Feeling, in part in connection with Kantian criticism.1 The Romanticists proper seek the reconciling harmony in the 1 So Fries, H. Schmid, de "Wette, together with F. H. Jacobi. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 47 aesthetic, in Art and artistic enjoyment, especially Music. With more show of refinement, the literati of the Weltschmerz (World-Agony) find Reconciliation in a blending of pleasure and pain, chiefly in a proud sorrow for the low, poor, pitiful world, to which they feel themselves far superior. They seek their pleasure in the self-complacent suffering of an utterly empty self-consciousness, in which there is as little of divine sorrow as of divine joy. For the pleasure is here nothing but vapid superiority or irony over the joys and sorrows of men, a negative, blighting pleasure without even the power to make itself the object of irony. An offshoot of this school is the modern Pessimism of a Scliopenhauer and a von Hartmann, who, at least in theory, treat the misery in the world with seriousness, and to whom nonentity is the only object of hope.1 Far higher stands the school of Jacobi. According to it, Reconciliation consists in elevating the subject into the ideal, divine sphere, through the inner consciousness of God and of the ideal, noble Ego. The Ego, it is true, is not free from the dualism of idea and reality, and fails to rise above alternation between the sense of happiness and unhappiness on account of unabolished dissonances, not merely in the moral, but also in the intellectual life. From the historic Christ and His work the school of Jacobi and Fries is able to derive little more than a symbolic meaning.2 4. Reaction against Subjectivistic Theories of Atonement. (From 1800 to the present time.) § 118. After one-sided subjectivity had again inclined to acknow ledge the necessity of attaining unity, not merely with self but also with God, the theories of Atonement current 1 His latest writings in part approximate more to the Hegelian theory of reconciliation. Cf. A. Dorner, Stud. u. Krit. 1881, 1. 2 According to de Wette, Christ's death is the symbol of divine reconciliation, and shows God's earnestness in forgiving. Staudlin and Tieftrunk also speak of a symbolic meaning in Christ's death. 48 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. in the ancient Church revived, only that now the Reformation-principle of penitent faith so far asserted itself, as, along with the objective provision gained in Christ, to make the requisite room for the subjective side of the atoning process. But so long as evil of a physical or logical nature, or sin, is regarded as the only thing which has to be overcome, and not guilt in relation to the divine justice, so long is the development in the Reformation - doctrine required by Christian faith and Holy Scripture impossible (§§ 113-116). 1. Were the question at issue merely man's reconciliation with himself, or with his surroundings, instead of with God, atonement would not be a religious question at all. Subjec tive Idealism in various ways denies the need of objective communion with God, at most with the partial exception of Jacobi, who after all rather recognises the need for man to become conscious of God, than the need for enjoying those acts of God which are the basis of communion. The reaction from subjective Idealism to desire after real objectivity, which, on the whole, characterized the beginning of the present century, again caused God to be recognised as true Being and the supreme Good, the consequence of which for the present dogma was, that an atonement of a merely subjective nature was seen to be inadequate, the chief stress being laid upon the restoration of unity with God, on which everything else must depend. Thus Schelling and Hegel form a turning-point to a spiritual tendency more favourable to the present dogma. But certainly this change was only a preliminary condition; the cause was not yet won. The Pantheistic systems of modern days speak (it is true, on the surface only) of a sort of reconciliation in the process of the divine life. That life steps forth from its eternal unity and self-identity into its antithesis, into other^being (Anderssein), in order to the creation of the world, which is Nature and Spirit ; but the third stage is its return from the antithesis into itself through the Spirit, which apprehends itself in its other-being and again coalesces with itself. Since these systems directly postulated God as the essence or the REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 49 reality of man, they made this process permanent in the divine life even as to its subjective side, and proceeded to investigate how the consciousness of reconciliation may be reached in us.1 It is then affirmed : In himself man is one with God, being divine by his essence, only he knows it not at first ; his con sciousness is at variance with his essence, and thus he is estranged from himself. But when he reaches the knowledge of his essential unity with God, the variance is done away, reconciliation becomes his, he knows God as his Father, and himself as God's son. The position belonging to Christ is, that He is the first self-conscious man, free and certain of His divine essence. And this consciousness of God's Fatherhood and man's sonship is the good news which He proclaims.2 According to this view, Christ has kindled the consciousness of reconciliation in mankind by teaching that God is eternally reconciled. Thus, no procuring of reconciliation by Christ' is necessary. The unity of God and man is here thought as substantial, indestructible : all that is necessary to reconcilia tion is to know it. But seeing that tbe mere appeal to the substantial unity with God ignores ethical and religious requirements as well as the consciousness of sin, such a theory can give no peace to the consciousness of sin and guilt, when once awakened, but only stifle the need for the true atone ment. Simply to refer us from the evil actuality to the essence, which in the best case is mere possibility, such as can never satisfy God's holy law, implies indifference to the distinction of good and e*ril. Further, this theory depends for reconciliation on a mere change in the consciousness, not in the being of the entire personality in a moral and religious respect.3 1 Hegel, Relig. Philos. ii. 191, 218. God is a process ; He (1) exists in His eternity in and for Himself ; (2) He passes over into His other-being in order to the creation of the world, which is Nature and Spirit. To the diremption (3) the return into itself — the reconciliation — joins on. The Spirit distinguishes itself from itself, and again coalesces with itself. This theory claims to be at once a doctrine of the Trinity, a Cosmogony, a Ponerogony, and a Soteriology. The process is part of the divine life. The philosopher knows and passes through the process. 2 So, for example, Marheinecke, Grundlehren d. chr. Dogma, 1827, p. 227 ff. ; Biedermann, ut supra, pp. 675-688 ; Baur, Gnosis, 1835, p. 700 ff. 8 Biedermann would make this process ethical and religious, not merely intellectual (cf. § 866) ; but since he treats the human side not as receptive Dorner. — Christ. Doct. iv. D 50 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. 2. The majority of modern writers lay stress on the necessity of sin being overcome, and seek to establish the importance of Christ's intervention therein. But they do this in very different ways. Some1 think of sin as an objective power, hypostatized in the " flesh." This power Christ was obliged to assume with human nature, in order, by the sacrifice of the sinful flesh, to give a new birth to human nature, to render that nature sinless through His Person, and present it pure and holy. According to Menken, human nature is corrupted, physically and psychically, by the for bidden fruit of the poisonous tree. This poison is the principle of sin, inhering in us without fault of ours. Christ has again removed it from human nature by His death, which became a second birth of the human flesh, after Christ had resisted all Satan's temptations to acquiesce in the propensity to evil. Whoever receives Christ in faith, receives the principle of cleansing and sanctification. Thus Christ's death benefits us in virtue of His mystical community of life with us (through faith). But on this theory Christ had first of all to die in order to His own cleansing from sin and His own sanctification,2 while the fruit of His sanctification by His death would be, that He also became to us the principle of sanctification mediated by an act of death, and thus the principle of atonement. But the idea of sin obtaining here is a physical one, as if sin would die through physical death, as if the flesh were essentially sin; and this view leads to a physical theory of redemption, as if a holy corporeity, instead of the Pneuma imparted to the conscious volitional person, were able to cleanse and sanctify us. Guilt and penalty are here ignored to such an extent that it is accepted as self- evident, that to one who is sanctified in principle God is able of divine communication, but as immediately divine, he is again led to a theory of self-redemption. And in this process the intellectual element— the vanquish ing of the stage of presentation by the concept or the true consciousness— plays again the chief part. See below. 1 So Menken, Rud. Stier, Ed. Irving, Stroh : God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, pp. 48-51. In reference to the Pauline doctrine, Holsten reaches from the exegetical side a similar result. 2 Stroh, ut supra, p. 51 : Christ's death on the cross is a destruction of sin to its roots and in its seat, therefore not a suffering of the penalty of sin, not a payment of the debt of sin, not the death of a sinner or of a suffering, dying Just One, who stands by imputation in the sinner's place. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 51 and willing to give reconciliation and justification ; and that real sanctification may exist before sin is forgiven. The case would not be different if, as others wish, we were to go back to those theories (§ 115) which discover the evil needing to be removed by atonement in the power of Satan.1 The first thing requisite cannot be the overthrow of Satan as an external power, but the undoing of the bond by which men are connected with Satan ; and that is guilt. Christ's atoning purpose must refer to this guilt directly, not merely indirectly, or in the sense that Christ subjected Himself to the just penalty of guilt incurred by the guilt of men, i.e. to death, over which Satan had acquired power in virtue of the divine ordinance (Heb. ii. 14). Even were Satan annihilated, or his right to inflict death on sinful humanity abolished, yet if sin remains unexpiated there can be no atonement ; God could not for Christ's sake regard the humanity, which He patiently bore with, as reconciled. For God's relation to every man is direct ; the relation of His justice to sin and guilt is direct, and not merely through Satan. The divine work of atone ment is able so to undo the bond, knit by guilt between us and God's penal justice, that this very bond is transformed into a bond of communion in love. 3. Schleiermacher struck out a new path in respect to the present doctrine also. His fundamental conception has become the most influential in modern times, although it almost entirely ignores the divine justice in relation to the work of atonement, and in consequence of his Doctrine of God strictly excludes all influence upon God !2 Since the con sciousness of God grew in Christ into God's perfect being, not merely is there in Him personal holiness, and therefore untroubled blessedness, but He has also the power and the vocation to draw men into the communion of His. holiness 1 To this view Frank (like v. Hofmann, see below, p. 54) approximates (Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit, ii. 153, and Theol. der Concordienformel, ii. 45), when, according to him, the chief stress in the work of atonement falls on Satan being stripped of his power. "The only way," Frank says in the latter passage, "in which the penalty of the sin of the world could be laid on a sinless man is by the tyranny of Satan being laid on him,, that tyranny including all the woe and all the suffering of the world." Philippi justly censures this view, iv. 2, 136 f. 2 Der Christi. Glaube, §§ 100-104. ii. pp. 94 ff, 102 ff, 128 148. 52 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. and blessedness, and by this means to redeem and reconcile them. Nor is this done in a magical way by a purely objective transaction. On the contrary, faith is necessary in order to our partaking of His holiness and blessedness. And just as little is it a satisfactory course to reduce Christ's redeeming work to the prophetic office, to His teaching and example. This he calls the empirical heresy, corresponding to the Ebionite conception of the person of Christ, because it is forced to lay the chief stress on self-redemption. How then does Schleiermacher, after excluding these errors, conceive of Christ's atoning office itself? The way, first of all, in which he presents Christ's high-priestly communion with men, is most excellent and suggestive. If Christ really desired to participate in the life of men, the sufferings, ordained to every member of a sinful race as afflictions, must necessarily light upon Him.1 Nay, the deeper He saw into the nature of sin, and the more earnestly He contended against it, the more must the power of evil have pressed upon Him ; and thus He suffered through the sin of men not merely in His last days, but during His whole life. But it was in His last days that the depth of suffering disclosed itself to Him, when the two representatives of the world's sin — the heathen and Jewish — turned, and, as it were, conspired against Him. But it was not so much His personal suffering, due to the sin of the world, which He felt so keenly. This suffering is only understood aright when it is recognised as His act; and here Schleiermacher gives a place to Christ's active obedi ence. For His suffering proper consisted in this, that His outer suffering, caused by sinners, presented to Him as in a mirror the depth and extent of sin, and stirred His sympathy in the most powerful way. This sympathy, spring ing from the energy of His love, leads Him into unhappy communion with us in order to transform it into a holy and blessed communion. This sympathy constitutes Christ's proper high-priestly action in distinction from His prophetic and kingly office. It has the power of drawing us into the communion of Christ's holiness and blessedness, after He, by His sympathy, had let Himself be drawn into communion with us. The Teacher and Prophet remains outside the scholar as •P. 136 f. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 53 his example ; but Christ, as High Priest, draws us into His communion by His sympathy with us, — that sympathy by which He feels our sin and its wretchedness, while allowing its power to burst on Himself. This high-priestly love of His, endowed with such power of attraction, is matter of delight to God ; and since God now beholds us in this union with Christ, which is established by faith on our part, Christ's person renders us objects of the divine delight, and presents us pure before God. God has determined to let all salvation flow to us through Christ's mediation, and looks upon us in Christ, who is therefore our substitute. According to Schleiermacher, the kingly office also is distinct from the high-priestly one. From it proceed our personal sanctification and the founding of the community. But although, according to Schleiermacher, participation in Christ's blessedness is objectively conditioned by participation in Christ's holiness, still, according to him, we have not the consciousness of atonement through knowing ourselves to be already holy, even in a merely initial sense ; for, should the consciousness of our reconciliation merely result from the consciousness of our holiness, which is always imperfect, the former must always remain imperfect and vacillating. On the contrary, the atonement and the consciousness of it have their security in the fact of Christ standing in communion with us, and our standing in communion with Him.1 For Christ's sake, faith is warranted in treating present sin as non-existent and future, completed sanctification as already present. According to this view, Christ's high-priestly sympathy, which finds its most perfect expression in His suffering, is the climax of His redeeming work, by which we are freed from punish ment and the sense of it ; for that sympathy has the power of drawing us into His fellowship. Only in the fellowship of His sufferings can His blessedness be felt, because the consciousness of how God was in Him, and therefore of His holiness and blessedness, .chiefly arises in us from absorption of the spirit in His sufferings ; and by this very means the communication of holiness and blessedness to us may become fact. Unquestionably, the view here given of Christ's high- priestly office is spiritual and forceful, compared not merely 1 P. 133. 54 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. with the Rationalism, but with the Supernaturalism of those days. By the Biblical doctrine of Christ's sympathy and living communion with us, He seeks to impart movement to that which had become rigid in the Christian dogma. Nitzsch developed this still farther in representing Christ's suffering and death as the principle of repentance to the world, as judgment upon sin, which is forced to reveal its innermost essence by killing the Holy One, who, however, by the purity of His person, stands security to God for this, that those receiving forgiveness of sins through communion with Christ shall also become partakers of His holiness. The defects of Schleiermacher's theory are in the closest connection with his \ Doctrine of God. While Omnipotence preponderates over S justice in God, no adequate place remains, either for guilt or ¦ punitive justice. The reason given by Schleiermacher for prefixing Christ's redeeming to His atoning work, is, that otherwise the first regard would be paid not to evil as such, but to evil so far as it is a source of suffering, and that deliverance from suffering would be sought first. But the desire for atonement is not eudaemonistic. It is desire for deliverance from guilt ; and this is something eminently moral. Further, according to Christi. Glaube, ii. 107, those conceptions of the atoning work, which make the communication of Christ's blessedness independent of reception into living communion with Him, are magical in character. But magical it cannot be, if Christ as Atoner enters into communion with us by anticipation, without our returning the communion at once. On the contrary, it would be magical if we enjoyed communion with Christ before guilt was blotted out. For the sake of Christ's communion with us, God is able to look on us with com placency, just as Christ's high-priestly function has a value for God in itself, and not merely through our faith. Hofmann' s theory is partially akin to Schleiermacher's.1 He calls the ecclesiastical theory an artificial mystery. Christ is an Atoner to him, because of His having proved Himself righteous despite the uttermost that sin and Satan could do against Him. By this self-attestation Christ vanquished Satan, and established a relation no longer dominated by the sin of 1 Schriftbeweis, i. Schidzschriflcn. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 55 Adam, but by the righteousness of the Son, i.e. a state of life holy and well-pleasing to God. This holy righteousness, which was also passive obedience, does not effect expiation as penal suffering, but because He fulfilled the demand of the divine law, — holiness, — thus rendering a service well-pleasing to God, and making reparation for sin. So far as by faith in Him we receive into ourselves the same principle of holiness which He exhibited in His attestation of Himself as righteous, we have the right to regard ourselves as well-pleasing to God and reconciled. Therefore we have atonement by at least initial sanctification. That Christ's personal self-attestation exhibits Him as righteous and holy is true, but this belongs to His prophetic office ; but thereby nothing is affirmed in relation to the high-priestly office. Thus von Hofmann is behind Schleiermacher. He does not once take into account Christ's high-priestly sympathy. The only point he has in common with Schleiermacher is the mystical union with Christ through faith, and that he makes Christ a substitute in God's view in relation to our holiness. But to him Christ's substitution is in no sense an act of Christ, or a means impelling us to convert Christ for us into Christ in us.The controversy which arose against him1 was of no essential benefit to theology, because his opponents almost entirely maintained the ecclesiastical doctrine without remov ing the difficulties which it left. They especially omit a searching examination of the ideas : Justice, Punishment, Expiation. Philippi and Thomasius place justice and love, even in God Himself, in opposition instead of in distinction, thus losing a supreme unity. Philippi frankly connects there with the other proposition, that the divine attributes are not objectively distinguished, but merely in relation to our finite thought.2 He would also have Christ's sufferings regarded as penal sufferings in the strictest sense, vicarious in nature it is true, but in such a sense that we have a right to demand forgiveness for their sake. He comes very near to placing Christ's sufferings under the jus talionis (see below), and to i On the part of Philippi, Thomasius, Harnack, and others. See Literature above. 2 Philippi, iv. 2, p. 44. See above, vol. i. p. 191. 56 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. simply identifying Christ's person with those to be punished:1 Others, like Schoberlein, start from love as the supreme unity, but because in that unity they fail to distinguish between self-affirmation and self-communication, they gain no secure position for justice. 4. Two Jurists have given closer attention to these ideas, Goschel and Stahl? Goschel's leading thought is: Justice and Love in no sense form an antithesis. Punishment is an outflow of paternal love, certainly a necessary counterstroke to law-opposing volition, in order to effect its conversion. But even in the act of punishing, the judge cannot be with out love to the offender ; he cannot but sympathetically feel his guilt and sin. The more pure and unreserved such sympathy is, the greater its power to subdue and amend the heart of the sinner, and by this very means to render the fullest satisfaction to justice. The fact of the judge bearing the punishment in poignant sympathy constitutes a satisfac tion to the righteous government of the world. Christ had this sympathy in the purest and profoundest degree ; we are reconciled when, following in His steps, we feel His sorrow by penitent faith. These are the sufferings left by Christ (Col. i. 24) to believers as a remnant, which they bear. His feeling of our punishment must pass over to us. Forgiveness is not the abolishing, but the perfecting of punishment ; for real penal suffering — such as satisfies God — carries forgive ness in itself, because it is the expiatory feeling of the justice of the punishment, without which no forgiveness is possible. But here it is the consciousness of guilt which is conceived to be the punishment of men, this consciousness being identical with dying to sin, and therefore with initial sanctification. 1 IV. 2, pp. 38, 41. According to p. 28 ff., sin is the attempt absolutely to annihilate God the Infinite One Himself — Deicidium. It is consequently an infinite offence, which can only be absolutely expiated by the same infinite penal suffering of absolute death with which the Infinite One is Himself threatened. Thomasius, who accepts a vicarious, expiatory, penal suffering, is censured by Philippi (p. 234) because he merely regards a passive obedience as necessary to atonement, without including active obedience. Respecting Sartorius Gess Weber, cf. Philippi, p. 238 ff. 2 Goschel, Zerstreute Blatter aus den Hand- und Hulfsacten eines Juristen, 1832, Th. L pp. 468-494 : Das Strafrecht und die christi. Lehre von der Satisfaction. Stahl, Fundamente einer christi. Philosophic, 1846, Abschn. ii. cap. 6 : Die Gerechtigheit und die Strafe. Cap. 7 : die Suhne. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 57 And Christ is here represented as Judge, which contradicts the N. T.,1 although the Judge is at the same time credited with sympathy. But, according to Goschel, Christ's suffering is merely the principle of repentance. Stahl's view is different. While rightly refusing to separate justice and love in God, he desires the two to be separately revealed in the world in opposition to sin. The function of justice, he says, is by guarding the divinely-established moral government of the world, and by retribution to maintain the validity of that government, and therewith God's glory or supremacy. Now the sinner is a rebel, virtually denying God's supremacy. In- opposition to this, God must reveal Himself as the Lord, and this is done by using His Omni potence, which reveals to the sinner such power as nullifies his physical strength, and thus reveals his nothingness. This retributive justice restores the glory of the moral government of the world, but only by physical means, by force and ex ternally, not by transforming the law-opposing volition. But the justice of the world's moral government, he continues, may also be satisfied by internal means, the glory of God may be restored by expiation. The first form of satisfaction — punishment — can certainly only be undertaken by the guilty one. But expiation may be undertaken by an innocent person, in order by this means to bring the sinner to repent ance and inner acknowledgment of the glory of God and His moral government. Now Christ's suffering was not penal suffering, but an expiation to the world's government, an expiation which can be offered best by an innocent person. It was an expiatory suffering of love undertaken for our good. This theory has much in common with that of Anselm, as Philippi rightly perceives. On one hand, punishment for the past is supposed to be necessary, and the blotting out of past guilt to be demanded by the law, like repentance and acknow ledgment of the majesty of the law for the future. On the other hand, expiation is not placed in relation to punitive justice, but the atoning element is supposed to lie in the new acknowledgment of the moral government of the world for 1 John iii. 17, xii. 47. The Redeemer has not come primarily for judgment. The Judge would only here come into question, if merely the divine side in Christ's person came under consideration in reference to atonement. 58 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. the future, and expiation is supposed to be substituted for punishment. Akin to Goschel's are the ideas advanced by Dr. W. Simon of England1 Atonement is not to be conceived as self- redemption, but exclusively as God's work in us, for in 2 Cor. v. 18 it is said: "God reconciled the world to Himself." It is with this reconciliation as with command. When from a feeling of inward helplessness we ask God for help, He gives strength for the fulfilment of His command. Thus He Himself gives that which He requires. Through us He fulfils that which is our duty towards Him, thus taking our place. But there is a command of God not merely to do, but also to suffer, for it is normal and God's will that we suffer for sin (punishment). But we could not bear the sufferings, which are just according to divine appointment. Now, as God's Spirit works vicariously in us in order to satisfy God's command, so is it also with suffering. God can suffer in us, bear the punishment which we cannot bear. All help to a sufferer, especially to one whose sufferings are moral, is only possible through co-suffering. If we are acquainted with a co-suffering and yet strong heart, able to show us how to suffer, then the disposition and courage are awakened in us to suffer in a way well-pleasing to God. This we have in God, and thus God is security for the right method of suffering. While we can suffer for one another, we can only bear outward sufferings for others, not the inner burden. On the other hand, it is God's prerogative to relieve us of spiritual burdens also. Nevertheless it is a moral law, even for God, that He can only help sinners at the price of atonement, that He suffer with us, that He take on Him our burden, share our anxiety and sorrow ; but since He is God, He is able also to turn them to our good (Rom. viii. 25). He can bear our punishment, regard and impute it as ours, nay, He effects that we bear it in Him. He is bound by Himself, by the ethical necessity in Him, to characterize spiritual pain as righteous pain. Forgiveness, which abolishes the; exacting or condemning law, would be frivolous, nay, no forgiveness. Dr. Simon would make not merely the man Jesus suffer, but also the Logos. How this is possible without objectionable 1 In the treatise, " Atonement and Prayer," Expositor, Nov. 1877. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 59 anthropopathism, he does not inquire more closely, while not allowing any loss to the Godhead through the origination of Christ's Person, or any confounding of His Ego with man.1 Co-suffering, so far as it is a demonstration of the strength of love, cannot be described as unworthy of God, — a view which Frank rightly developes.2 On the other hand, another objec tion lies near at hand. This theory gives us only a suffering of God in us in order to expiation, but not the necessity of a divine-human suffering. The historic Christ brings us here merely the knowledge of God's co-suffering and yet strong heart. Bushnell, in saying : We can only forgive and forget entirely when we have also done good to an enemy, transgresses the limits of the admissible in reference to divine suffering. It is said to be thus with God. Only after He has suffered for us is there full forgiveness in His heart, is His heart, so to speak, free. — To say that only the divine beneficence perfectly reconciles God with us (not merely shows Him to be perfectly reconciled), is an inner contradiction ; for a love that does good to an enemy is more than pardon, and must therefore certainly have been already forgiving love. Without doubt, beneficence towards foes acts like coals of fire on the head, and is more adapted than anything else to change the disposition of a foe and incline him to acknowledge his fault, and therefore (to apply the matter to the present dogma) to reconcile man with God. But this refers to the ethical sphere, belonging to the appli cation or use of prevenient love for our sanctification; and therewith no explanation is given, how God can both forgive and do good to sinners without prejudice to the divine penal justice. This is certain, — and therewith we return to the theory of Goschel and Simon, — that God regards sin with abhorrence, and cannot forgive it offhand ; nay, that He ought not to allow His love to prevail, unless it acknowledge the justice of the punishment, and therefore affirm soixow for 1 This line of thought recalls the words of Sartorius (die heilige Liebe, i. Abschn. iii. cap. 2) : " God can only forgive sin by forgiving nothing to Himself, by Himself bearing what He forgives, and Himself performing what He com mands, as is done by Jesus in His servant-form, who by fulfilling the law makes possible the forgiveness of its unfulfilment." 2 Syst. d. chr. Wdhr. ii. § 35. 60 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. sin to be just, and participate therein. But here, if any where, Christ's humanity is to be taken into account. For if His entrance into our unhappy condition is left out of sight, the chief matter in the process of atonement was a transaction within the divine nature. But in this case the whole would wear a Docetic look; for, since God even as Logos is true God, it follows that God would then demand homage to His justice alongside or in His love from Himself alone, and would therefore receive satisfaction from Himself simply. But this would render Christ's humanity useless or needless in order to atonement. That humanity would then at most help to exhibit the inner, super-historical process of atonement in God Himself, while contributing nothing to the realization of atonement. This would be opposed to the mediatorship of the God-man. Ritschl also occupied himself at length, though in quite a different way, with the idea of justice. To state and examine his theory on this point is of as great importance for understanding as for criticizing his doctrine of atonement. In this criticism the thetic exposition given previously (vol. i. § 24) must be brought to bear. According to Ritschl, God is to be conceived absolutely and exclusively as love, the one concern of which is to realize the divine world-plan (i.e. the kingdom of God), which consists in the freedom of men, i.e. in their dominion over nature, and in the mutual improvement of the members of that kingdom. The justice of God is simply the con sistency with which God's love provides for the welfare of members of the kingdom. Of retributive, especially punitive justice, there ought to be no mention in the moral and religious sphere. The sense in which theology usually employs the word justice only has its place in public or civil right,1 and is alien and inapplicable to the moral and religious sphere ; a position which Ritschl tries to prove by a series of reasons,2 which can by no means be regarded as relevant, and in great measure refute Ritschl himseff. With the Socinians, he censures the ordinary doctrine, that justice and the necessity of punishment are grounded in God's essence. If justice belonged to the essence of God, God's 1 Cf. ut supra, iii. 211 ff. s jjj 211-225. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 61 will, he says, would be subject to this justice as to a physical necessity. But, on the contrary, everything must be under the divine will, even as character itself is only shown in permanent volition and action.1 Ritschl does not see that for the same reason, if it held good, there ought to be no mention of the divine love, in which he yet would discover God's essence; and he overlooks the fact, that a free will not determined by the ethical essence of God would be simple caprice, and therefore unethical in nature, a mere physical force. In relation to God and God's kingdom, — the moral sphere, — he continues, only the moral law comes into account, not legal right (das Recht). For legal right refers merely to the outward order, the system of actions, which subserve the ends of a particular State ; it is nothing but a human, civil arrangement for finite ends. On the other hand, the moral law or the divine will refers to inward dis position, and is comprised in the demand for love, but not as a legal injunction. It refers to the system of dispositions, aims, and actions, which follow of necessity from the all- comprising end of the kingdom of God, and from the sub jective motive of universal love of man. In view, therefore, of this opposition between the moral law and public right, it is a contradiction to conceive the moral law in the form of public right. It would certainly be a mistake to regard love as that which the State has to create by the means at its command, of which force is a part; or so to lay it down as a prin ciple of State-action, that the State, instead of employing its own means which operate after the fashion of physical necessity, should leave everything to the freedom of love in individuals. It must work with the instruments of retri butive justice, to which reward and punishment belong. But, nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to affirm on this account that the State, Right, and Justice have nothing to do with the moral sphere. Right and Justice are them selves moral ideas, in no sense of mere finite, transient significance; as negative pre-conditions, they themselves belong to the complete notion of the moral. If the State would be corrupted in its essence by identifying legal right 1 Cf. iii. 213 f. 62 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. with love, still more would the moral sphere be shattered to its foundation by severing right and justice from the moral sphere. A love that did . not embody justice would result in the distinction of good and evil being made a matter of indifference, and become weak, blind goodness ; and whilst it fancied itself moving in divine heights above everything natural and finite, it would fall back to the eudaemonistic and therefore physical stage. The principles of Ritschl would result in emptying human, civil right of moral import, and in leaving it without basis. Certainly the ideas of right and justice stand in need of supplement ; they do not represent the all of morality. But , still the State has no such ignoble origin, that its sole concern is about finite interests. In administering justice, it represents on its part a divine idea. The hard, narrow framework of the State, representing what is compulsory and morally necessary for the commonwealth, is the indispensable guard as well as school of moral freedom. For the rest, the State does not embrace the entire sphere of justice, but merely the public sphere of human society ; so that, supposing it demonstrable that civil right has nothing to do with morality, it could not be concluded from this that morality has nothing to do with right and justice in general. And yet Ritschl permits himself to draw this false inference, in supposing that an idea of justice, involving reward and punishment, has no place in the moral sphere, the kingdom of God, but merely in the State. The special reasons he gives for this conclusion are the following. If we may speak of punishment in the moral sphere, reward may be spoken of with no less right. But the bestowal of eternal life cannot be treated as a " return ing " (rewarding) of the observance of the moral law. Moreover, the consequence of admitting the notion of reward into the kingdom of God or the moral sphere would be that the law of love would be fulfilled for the sake of reward, instead of from love, which asks for no reward.1 There would then necessarily be a possibility of speaking of a legal claim, and Pharisaic mercenary virtue would be justifiable. But if for such reasons the idea of reward in the moral sphere is objectionable, the corresponding idea of punishment 1 iii. pp. 214-219. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 63 must be given up. In addition, experience shows that the idea of punitive justice involves contradictions ; for just men suffer, unjust flourish. Finally, no outward evil can be named which ought to be described as punishment ; for all may be regarded as good, e.g. as chastisement, and can only become punishment (namely, to the sense of the sub ject concerned) through the consciousness of guilt — a sub jective power, whereas in itself or objectively nothing is punishment It is correct to say that love neither ought to desire nor does desire reward ; but it would be a mistake to deny that, in the same degree in which the desire is wanting, it is the more worthy of and actually partaker in reward. The demand for reward would not merely offend against humility and gratitude, which are conscious of owing everything to God, but would also betray an egoistic, eudaemonistic spirit, which has its reward below, a disposition to which goodness would not itself be the highest thing and its own end, but a mere means to something else in reality of a subordinate kind. But certain as it is that love, as the sphere of the positively good, is higher than the sphere of mere legal right, still retributive justice is in no sense incompatible therewith. Although the virtuous man ought not to aim at -reward, — for the essential test of pure virtue, such as alone renders worthy of reward, is precisely that we give from love, not expecting to receive again, — still reward, inward or even outward, follows virtue as certainly and necessarily as the shadow the body, provided only that virtue is first present, i.e. provided the reward is not sought or made the end to which love is the means.1 This follows from the harmonious, creative co-ordination of the moral and the physical, a co-ordination which stamps the ethically good as the supreme reality possessed of power to unite everything in harmony with itself. It is a sort of ethical Docetism (Spiritualism) for any one so completely to sever nature from the spiritual and moral sphere as to undertake to be in different to everything physical.2 And not merely has retri- 1 Matt. vi. 33. 2 Ritschl not merely makes the relation of God's retributive justice to nature as loose as possible, but denies such a relation, and tries to frame his doctrine 64 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. bution in its rewarding aspect its necessary place in God's government of the world, thus proving the co-ordination of everything natural with the moral, and the use of that co-ordination as a means in order to the moral ; but we also should act immorally, if in our intercourse with men we did not return (of course we do not repay) love, and in general refused to be guided by the law of justice. But certainly the more important point for us here is to maintain the right and reality of & punitive justice in God. The objection, that experience presents to view the opposite of such justice, has been already treated above (§ 88, 3. 4), and, moreover, is refuted by the other objection of Ritschl, " that all external evils may be regarded as chastisements," for this implies that no good man has to complain of wrong in God. But although to Christians external evils are no longer punishment (which is to be proved later on), it does not follow from this that they were not so originally, or that these evils would have had a place among mankind if sin, which makes punishment and chastisement necessary, did not prevail among them of God in general on this basis. According to him, it is indifferent to Theology whether God is thought as Creator (consequently as Almighty), Theology having to do only with the causa finalis, not the causa efficiens ; inquiry as to the cause of the world, and in the same way knowledge of the world, is indifferent to it. The sense of absolute dependence on God as the causa efficiens is rejected by him as the independent basis of religion. Faith in God is supposed to be first derived from the consciousness of moral freedom, and thus to be a merely secondary thing, i.e. to indicate a source of help, where with we are able to preserve the consciousness of being worth more than the whole world, as well as a courageous heart for the discharge of our calling (see above, § 98, 3). It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the contradictions in which he hereby involves himself. Nevertheless, the only security given him by the conception of God for that harmony between nature and the moral in which it is morally necessary to believe, is that God is the one sole (einheitliche) causality (causa efficiens) of the world. Whereas, further, he treats nature so churlishly ; almost the only definition he is able to give of freedom, and therefore of the morality of the Christian, where he endeavours to describe it, is as dominion over the world. And the only position of religion in his esteem is that of a means in order to such freedom. That it is also, and indeed primarily, an end in itself, is a view which he does not reach. In his contention against the punitive justice, which employs even nature as a means for its own purposes, Ritschl proceeds as if we had not one world, in which even the natural is subordinate to the supreme law which holds together the natural and spiritual, but as if we had two worlds independent of each other, which would be flatly to deny that the ethical is the supreme power in the world, the principle determinative of worth and fate. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 65 When the divine reason, clothed with omnipotence, has created morally free beings, the right of punitive justice cannot be refused to it without exposing the moral world to the danger of falling a prey to chaos. The very prerogative of God as the "World-ruler," unless omnipbtence be wanting to Him, is not to treat evil and good, guilt and innocence, with love unalterably the same, and by this means to throw doubt on the distinction between good and evil themselves.1 On these premisses it may be surmised by anticipation that Ritschl is unable to lay down a special theory respecting the divine work of atonement. Rather, the gist of his great work is the doctrine, that no Expiation or Satisfaction is necessary, because there is no punitive justice in God, just as in experi ence there is said to be no punishment (except in the State). Nay, the question suggests itself, whether in his eyes even the ideas of guilt and penal desert do not resolve themselves into mere subjective representations (Vorstellung), and whether, above all, he does not deny even moral freedom of will ; for certainly his contention against a punitive justice would only be conclusively demonstrated on the supposition that there is no capacity in man to contract moral guilt. As matter of fact, Ritschl has been so understood. Let us then test his doctrine on this point in order. While he calls the problem of moral freedom a crucial question in theology (iii. 251), he does not venture to give, but avoids giving, a straight answer of his own in respect to it. Rather, he again evades it by turning aside to real or 1 Schweizer expresses himself far more to the point (Chr. Glaubenslehre, ii. 187) : To us the moral attribute stands without any doubt above the natural ; next, the fatherly attribute above the universal moral; and therewith the sphere of love, grace, and fatherly wisdom above holy goodness, justice, and the wisdom of universal Ruler ; only the higher revelation of God cannot contradict the lower. The kindly attributes of the Father are an enhancement of the moral attributes of the Ruler (i.e. the latter are not set aside, not dissolved, but fulfilled in the Fatlter), and especially is this true of wise justice, which is ever united with kindly disposition, because it becomes an element absorbed and involved in the fatherly love, which takes the form of grace towards sinful children. (But to show grace is to affirm, not to deny, guilt and penal desert.) He rightly censures (p. 184) the opinion of the Socinians, that God can forgive apart from all condition and expiation. Certainly his doctrine of absolute predestination prevents his conceding to Christ's historical work a real causality in reference to the reconciliation of God, and impels him to accept forced inter pretations by Calvin, Maresius, etc., see pp. 173 f., 177 f. Dornee.— Christ. Doct. iv. E 66 THE DOCTRLNE OF ATONEMENT. theological freedom so called. That he denies moral freedom and objective guilt seems confirmed by the fact, that he would have all sin proveable by experience regarded as sin flowing from the ignorance with which human development universally begins, and that he speaks much indeed of consciousness of guilt, but not of objective, actual guilt occurring in experience ; that, on the contrary (iii. 43, 67), he only concedes validity to the idea of guilt in so far as sin is associated with consciousness of guilt. Nay, because empirical human sin is sin in ignorance, it is said not to need expiation. But, on the other hand, he would still regard the will as partici pating in moral evil, even if only in consequence of human ignorance (pp. 40, 44). He even says that the definite rejection of Christianity, were it to occur (which, however, cannot be established by experience), would be real guilt of a gravity not admitting of expiation (pp. 332-338). Certainly, expressions of the latter kind do not confirm beyond doubt the supposition of actual moral freedom ; for even if volition is present in sins of ignorance, it is not on this account free volition. Further, the supposition of an actually occurring definite rejection of Christianity, which becomes the object of divine wrath and punitive judgment, would involve him in difficulties and self-contradictions, for a capacity would thereby be conceded to man of incurring punishment and guilt in the most real objective sense, and of offering resistance to God. But when such a capacity of incurring guilt (which, however, Ritschl cannot wish to be described as merely the gift of Christianity) is once conceded to man, the right is entirely lost to ignore this capacity in pre-Christian days, and to say : Man can indeed freely incur the highest, inexpiable guilt, but not slighter guilt, such as is pardonable though still requiring atonement. Further, were the necessity of a punitive justice in God (although at first, and until the final sin is present, of " quiescent " justice) seriously acknowledged in relation to the sin of definitive unbelief, it would be no less an illogical course to say: God's retributive justice can indeed punish the highest guilt with eternal death, but cannot visit any other guilt, at least with milder punishment. Considering, further, that his entire investigation respecting atonement is built upon the contention against a punitive justice in God REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 67 and its supposed incompatibility with His fatherly love, it is strange that no clear, connected doctrine respecting punish ment, God's punitive justice, moral freedom, and guilt is to be found in Ritschl. Nor is this improved by the summary words: "The Christian view of the world 'judges' sin, which is universally diffused both in act and inclination, to be the antithesis of God's kingdom, without necessitating cause either in God's government of the world or man's gift of freedom ;" for the remark is only too obvious, that these words recall the circumstance that Ritschl also goes back to a twofold judg ment in respect of the Person of Christ. The scientific, historic judgment regards Him as mere man, the religious "judges" Him to be the Son of God, and ascribes divinity to Him. The same dualism between the religious and the intellectual or scientific mode of view seems also to be the last word that Ritschl has to say respecting the ideas of freedom, guilt, penal desert, and God's retributive justice. That word is no doubt again capable of a twofold interpretation. His indefinitely ordered language may either signify : The mode of considera tion belonging to the Christian religion presupposes indeed a true, actual guilt, but in truth and according to the divine con sideration there is no such guilt. But in this way the Christian mode of consideration would be convicted of an essential error. For this reason it is probably more correct to reckon him among the maintainers, in these days not rare, of two-faced opposite truths, both equally justified from their respective standpoints, — the religious and the scientific,— but both just as certainly to be renounced from the other stand point, so that, finally, nothing would be left but a sceptical agnosticism, a renunciation of objective truth. Thus the question still remains : Is not the very idea of sin itself drawn into the vortex of such uncertainty, of such opposite streams, and thereby all need of even mere subjective reconciliation of man cut off by anticipation? This consequence, indeed, is ascribed to Ritschl's doctrine, but the objection is without justification. Even supposing retributive justice to be denied, the giving of the law or the divine will, which wills a kingdom of the good, is not thereby directly abolished, although shaken. Further, even were not merely the idea of divine punishment, but still more that of objective guilt, 68 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. denied, sin, i.e. moral imperfection, might still be spoken of, if only a definite moral aim, which he has not yet reached in the beginning of his existence, remains prescribed to man. If this duty occurs to his consciousness before his discharge of it, and if he compares what he is with what he ought to be, he will see himself to be in antagonism to that good aim ; and this all the more if, while still at a lower stage, he perceives how his desires seek something else than that aim, and there fore are relatively averse to it. No doubt, the idea of sin and guilt cannot escape deterioration, nay, corruption, if moral freedom is not definitely taken into account and emphasized. For the rest, what Ritschl retains of all these ideas he applies to his statements respecting the doctrine of atonement as follows. Humanity, it is true, only stands in God's presence as still imperfeet. Its perfection is the fixed goal towards which He is leading it. Nor is God On His side alienated from humanity, or far from it. As already said, there is no punitive justice or penal desert in man, and in so far no objective guilt which could expose to punishment before Christianity came. Rather, all sin is mere sin of ignorance, which rather challenges helpful, saving love than punishment. There is no removing of God to a distance, which would be a withdrawal of His fellowship on God's part, an anger of God M7ith sinners. It would there fore be an error to suppose the necessity of an expiation or satisfaction. But, on the other hand, he continues, we all — individuals and the entire race — stand in antagonism to God through the initial non-fulfilment of the law or of the divine will. We are destined for divine communion, and so long as we fail to 'find this, and, on the contrary, remain for our part at a dis tance from God, we miss our destination. The consciousness that man is not what _h_e should be, is reflected in religious contemplation as guilt. But this notion of guilt or subjective " consciousness of guilt " fills man with discontent to such a degree that he feels as if in a penal state, and imagines God to be far off, nay, his enemy, from which springs again a mistrust of God which renders man worse.1 By this means he falls into a misery and dread, which makes him shrink from God 1 iii. 44, 49. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 69 and keeps his soul at a distance from God, whereas the con sciousness of fellowship with God is the indispensable means to enable him to apply himself to his moral work with courage and inner security. This condition of distance from God cannot be described as mere misfortune, for there is human (although unfree) volition (see above) in those very things to which the consciousness of guilt refers. Nor is that condition divine punishment ; for in virtue of His immutability God ever remains in paternal, loving communion with man, and never withdraws to a distance from him. But the '"conscious ness of guilt " is the expression of a defect in religious communion with God, and is the primary manifestation of punishment or of the abatement of the " religious " privilege cf communion with God, i.e. consciousness of guilt is associated with distance from God ; and then from this consciousness follows the consciousness of penal desert and the notion of punishment. For, generally speaking, only those evils possess the character of divine punishment which every one imputes to himself as punishment through his consciousness of guilt.1 How, then, would Ritschl conceive of redemption or atone ment, which certainly even on his view seems necessary to human consciousness ? It must be confessed that he does not require first the fulfilment of the divine law, and does not seek to derive the consciousness of divine communion or of the divine fatherly love from the at least initial realization of the law. He sees that, as the Evangelical Church teaches, distance from God, dread of God as Judge, must be first transformed into consciousness of communion with God, be cause this, as already said, is the indispensable means to enable man to apply himself with success to his moral work.2 1 iii. 339. So far as the consciousness of guilt is supposed to be forced on us by the constitution of our nature, it has for Ritschl a certain objective — more precisely, psychological — backgrounds On the other hand, the opinion that distance from God is at once guilt and punishment, in this indefiniteness which confounds the two, is a part of the error criticized above (§ 88. 1), that evil, the contraction of guilt, is itself also punishment. 2 He expresses this thus : " Justification is a synthetic, not an analytic judg ment" (iii. 68 ff.); but does not mean this in the sense that justification is a fruit of Christ's atonement or a divine act, but to him it is the consciousness of one who belongs to the Church of God's eternal, and therefore anticipatory, love, which with unchangeable fidelity conducts the Church to its consummation ; and atonement is the reconciled subjective consciousness given in Justification. 70 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. Of course the question at issue, according to Ritschl, is not merely that God hold fellowship with humanity, for this is true even under the dominion of sin, since God is unchange able love even in presence of sin, however much His image is obscured by the consciousness of guilt as if He were hostile to man. The question at issue must be, that man also on his part quit his distance from God and acquire trust in God's fatherly love, which is eternally the same. How, then, is this reached ? Not by seeking an expiation or satisfaction. This, according to Ritschl, would only be a new error, a confirmation of the first one, which paints God as displeased with us, and through our consciousness of guilt awakens in us the feeling of unhappiness, penal desert, and the notion of God's punitive justice. Christianity proceeds differently, and by this means becomes the redeeming religion. It reveals God as Father instead of as Lawgiver and Judge, as unchangeable Love, which knows nothing of anger and punishment, since, on the contrary, as Ruler of the world, God, with unmoved security and " necessary sequence," realizes the world-aim consisting in the founding of the kingdom of God, hay, in eternal fashion (in vision sub specie ceternitatis) sees the imperfect beginnings covered by the consummation. This revelation is given through Christ. Christ lived in constant communion with God, prov ing this in all He did and suffered ; this is the meaning of the conception of His divine Sonship and divinity.1 He was always conscious of God's fatherly love (which, moreover, is said to be a truth of reason), and made it known by His teaching, besides in His walk and whole personal manifestation setting the divine patience and love before our eyes 2 (thus accelerat ing the process of knowledge among mankind). But Christ's love may also be regarded as a proof of the love of God. It is love on God's part, that He brought this man into existence, who reveals God to us as fatherly love, and thus scatters those gloomy errors of an angry God and a punitive justice. As concerns Christ's suffering and death, indeed, Ritschl gets so far as to affirm that Christ attested therein His undisturbed communion with God. But how the fact of Christ's being given over to such sufferings is supposed to be a proof of the Father's love, this he is unable to show. At most, 1 iii. 396 f. See above, vol. iii. § 98. 3. a iii. 395, 472 f., 490. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 71 Christ is here a martyr for the truth of His doctrine. Abelard's position in this respect was better, because he saw in Christ not only a teacher or pattern, but also an expiatory sacrifice (see above, p. 19). In addition to the teaching and pattern, through which Christ worked, there remains for Ritschl the founding of a Church, whose members carry in themselves the consciousness of God's universal love every where the same and unchangeable, and therefore not the consciousness that God forgives and frees from guilt and punishment for Christ's sake, but that God knows nothing of anger and punishment, that therefore the dread of punish ment, nay, the idea of being worthy of punishment in God's eyes, and therefore the consciousness of an objective guilt in virtue of the supreme, decisive judgment of God, rests upon an error which Christianity dispels. For, according to Ritschl, punishment only could and ought to emerge, supposing some one definitely rejected this doctrine of God's unpunishing fatherly love, a thing not occurring in experience. The founding of the Church or kingdom of God is the proper divine act which God had in view from the beginning ; and every one who is reckoned in the Church, by his connection with it has security for the love of God applying also to him, and therewith deliverance from those erroneous notions of God's retributive, and especially punitive justice, which inter fere with divine communion. But whoever, Ritschl believes, has this communion with God, of which the Church is the pledge, in the background of his consciousness, may give him self with comfort and success to the regular exercise .of his love in the kingdom of God, and in this calling may even attain such perfection as carries with it the subjective cer tainty of reconciliation (iii. 573-588). For the personal assurance of salvation through the Holy Spirit, with which his teaching ends or culminates, Ritschl would therefore substitute the fact of belonging to the Christian Church as a faithful member ; and hence by this Catholicizing doctrine which relegates us to some human authority he combats not only Pietism, but also the Reformation in its central point, alleging that " the testimony of the Holy Spirit is a piece of mediaeval piety," whereas the very characteristic of mediaeval piety is the denial of a divine assurance of salvation in the heart of the 72 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. Christian. If the certainty of God's love towards us is sup posed to be based upon nothing else than, on one side, the successful prosecution of our moral life-calling in harmony with God's will (i.e. on our sanctification), and, on the other > side, upon our connection with the Church of God, it is hard to say which of these two foundations is the weakest. A certainty of reconciliation, resting on such foundations, is in keeping with mediaeval, but not with Evangelical, piety. Accordingly, it is certain that Ritschl does not retain a theory of atonement in the proper sense, but with all decisive ness assigns the Christian doctrine of punitive justice in God, and the necessity of an expiation, to a subordinate, erring religious standpoint. Hdring 1 is therefore right in desiring a more comprehensive appreciation of the divine justice, and in endeavouring to assure to the idea of expiation its right as an independent correlate of justification. The point in question, he says, is not merely the cancelling of the subjective con sciousness of guilt or amendment for the future, but also the cancelling of the divine claim, which demands the penitent acknowledgment of the inviolableness of God's law and infinite abhorrence of its violation. To him the divine for giveness is not already self-evidently involved in God's love. On the contrary, it follows from that very love itself, that God only forgives upon condition of an infinite feeling of contrition and abhorrence of eviL But rhan cannot render this of himself, not even the believer, and consequently cannot reckon upon forgiveness. On the other hand, Christ has rendered both ; He supplements our consciousness of guilt before God (Weizsacker 2). He is not merely the Revealer of God, but also our priestly Representative with God, who permits Him to bear this character, because He furnishes security that all who believe in Him will also realize the normal relation to God. What thus, according to Haring, is supposed to be the condition of pardon, is plainly an act belonging to sanctification. But in his opinion the complacency 1 Haring, das Sleibende in dem Glauben an Christus, 1880, a work showing an uncommon talent for theology, but too dependent on Ritschl ; e.g. he approves even the subjectivistic doctrine of Ritschl, that there is no punishment where there is no consciousness of guilt. 2 Jahrb. f. deutsche Thiol, iii. 183 ff., according to his excellent historical REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 73 of God rests not directly upon the human act or faith, but upon Christ — the security of our normal relation to God. According to Haring, God can and does freely forgive, in so far as our future sanctification is secured. The expiation to be demanded is in his view, therefore, a satisfaction to the divine holiness, not to justice, and does not refer to our desert and remission of punishment. He says indeed : Christ knows and experiences perfectly, and with the keenest poignancy, the entire guilt and power of sin in which humanity lay ; but near as he comes to the truth, even here the reference to God's displeasure and punitive justice, in the proper sense, is wanting, for guilt has to him the meaning of obligation to render repentance and abhorrence of evil, but not of obligation to suffer punishment, which is something different from repentance and abhorrence of sin. Observation. — Ritschl's theory is in sympathy with Kant, first, by the position which he assigns to religion in relation to morality. For Ritschl treats it as little more than a means in order to the latter, scarcely leaving to fellowship with God the position of an end in itself. He is also akin to Kant in this, that he endeavours to obtain the certainty of God from a moral idea exclusively. Like Kant, he would allow scientific validity to the causa finalis only, and thinks that the causa efficiens, together with God's creative activity, might be excluded from theology, by which means it certainly becomes more than doubtful whether he is able to suppose God the active and efficient cause of a new creation like Christianity, or, in general, to assign God any other position in reference to salvation than that assigned to God by Aristotle, namely, that of the attractive ideal, i.e. the deistic position. On the other hand, Kant excels him in his high regard for the idea of justice, as well as for the idea of the individual personality and its certainty. It forms a point of superiority to Kant, that Ritschl has transcended the stand point of rigid legal right by the doctrine of the divine love, as well as that he would make forgiveness and reconciliation (more precisely, the consciousness that God is reconciled) precede holiness even in its rudiments. But neither Chris tianity nor the Church teaches an inert lax love, incapable of anger, such as would strip the divine forgiveness of value, and make the need of expiation an error. The unsophis ticated conscience is unable to recognise itself in such a 74 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. doctrine, and therefore in this way, instead of reconciliation, the inner unrest is perpetuated. Whereas, finally, Kant, while speaking of a twofold treat ment of the Christian tenets, — a rational or scientific and a symbolic, which accommodates itself to a lower standpoint, — decidedly finds truth in the former only, Ritschl, on the other hand, if we have rightly apprehended him, keeps in the suspense of a Dualism, which ventures to take neither of the two alternatives in full earnest, nor even attempts rationally to combine the truth in the two standpoints, the religious and the scientific. Lipsius also, by the unsolved contradiction between the religious and scientific modes of consideration, remains entangled in a similar Dualism to Ritschl, a Dualism leading to the standpoint of a two-faced truth. He is unwilling to sacrifice the former to the latter; but, separated too much from thoughts in which science and religion should find their unity,1 the religious mode is too impotent to be able to restore harmony in the nature of man. Although in Biedermann also the thoroughgoing antithesis between " conception and idea " may seem to threaten us with a similar Dualism, he is still in advance of Lipsius in a formal respect, because he does not co-ordinate conception and 1 Cf. my treatise on the Dogmatic of Lipsius, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1877, xxii. 177 ff. On one side he adopts literally in his investigation (§§ 589-655) the thoughts of Biedermann (§ 581), that the fundamental mistake of the Church doctrine is the identification of the eternal principle of Christianity with the person of Jesus Christ ; on the other side, however, he would suppose not merely a casual and transient, but intrinsic and abiding, relation between the two (§ 624). According to him, principle and person have an " inseparableness, a unity as matter of fact," in relation to the immediate religious "conception" of believers. From Ritschl he takes in addition (§ 621) the importance of Christ as a religious founder, the founder of the Christian Church. God's purpose of atonement is not efficacious apart from His revelation in Christ as the objective basis of the Christian community. For the Christian Church the historic Christ (§§ 620, 621) has typical, nay, creative religious significance, and Lipsius hopes by including the founding of the Church to advance beyond the merely "ideal Christ" (§ 624), for a merely ideal Christ would also be an ideal founder of the kingdom of God, — a view which, in presence of such an historic phenomenon as the kingdom of God, already realized in the Christian Church, gives au utterly impracticable idea (p. 545). But this is only relevant on the supposition that the Christ who has founded the Christian Church is not a mere man, a teacher and pattern of divine sonship, over whom the Christian principle hovers, i.e. on the supposition that this principle has become identified with the historic Christ not merely in religious " conception," but actually. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 75 idea, but views them as different stages, of which the latter only is supposed to contain irrefragable truth. But certainly he also fails to reach the Christian doctrine of atonement, because, firstly, he considers sin and discord as a necessary transition on man's part in the religious process, and the natural universally as evil; nevertheless, secondly, he holds in every man not merely capacity of redemption, but an immanent potentiality of reconciliation, consisting in his essential unity with God ; and because, thirdly, while regarding the actualization of this (divine-human) potentiality as a new element necessary to the perfecting of man (an element which must also be regarded as a work of God, or as grace ; in brief, as the Christian principle of God's fatherly love, to which the divine sonship or sonship of man corresponds), he repudiates most expressly the identification of the Christian principle with the person of Jesus Christ, because in the latter the Christian principle merely found its historically primitive realization, which is now the spring of the efficacy of this principle in history.1 If we cast a glance back at the different theories of atone ment of an objective and subjective kind, it appears that in their entirety they correspond to the various possible theories of the world, which depend in the last resort on the idea of God, as we found to be true also in Ponerology and Christology. Atonement also may be apprehended from the viewpoint of divine love in a one-sided physical, or aesthetical, or logical, or abstractly juridical, or moral, or, finally, in a one-sided religious way. As a rule, over against the one-sided objective theory of atonement of the one kind belonging to antiquity, there stands a more subjective theory of the same kind belonging to modern days ; so that, upon the whole, we see the cycle of the leading possibilities of an objective and subjective kind exhausted in this review.2 1 Biedermann, ut supra, pp. 527-553. 675 ff. 689. 691 : "The statement of the historical gospel respecting Jesus Christ is the fundamental vehicle of all Christian preaching of salvation." On the premisses mentioned, Biedermann cannot even maintain the typical perfection and sinlessness of Christ. But if Christ has Himself to be redeemed, He can only, in a very improper sense, be called Redeemer ; God only is Redeemer, Christ being merely the precursor in the consciousness of redemption. 2 In the same teacher are often found rudiments of several theories, of which, 76 • THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. The physical and cesthetic theories of atonement of an objective kind find atonement in the vanquishing of an objective foe of man, who is an evil to man — the devil or death. The vanquishing of the foe takes place here through the divine might and intelligence superior to death and Satan. If the evil, from which deliverance is necessary, is regarded as inherited debt transmitted by physical means, it is the riches of Christ that pays for us. The physical theories of a subjective kind find the evil, from which redemption is neces sary, in inner discord, in the disturbance of wellbeing, and seek the restoration of the feeling of harmony in Eudaemonism, or by aesthetic means. Whereas the theory of the divine polity makes the Eudae monism or wellbeing of the world the highest end, to which the ethical serves as a means (the Mediator out of love assuming the death, which is supposed to be the symbol of the reality both of divine justice and divine love), other theories of this species address themselves to plans for the improvement of the world, in order to overcome evils and disturbances in the harmony of the world. But here only a precarious position is left to the Mediator. The objective theory of atonement through knowledge is the supposition, that, men being disquieted by the fear of divine punishment and by consciousness of guilt, God, eternally reconciled in Himself, has communicated to them through divine revelation the knowledge of His forgiveness, or rather of His being eternally propitiated for sin. The subjective form of this theory is self-redemption by true self-consciousness and the knowledge of God, who is in essential, indestructible unity with man, or knowledge of the natural, essential nobility of man. The one-sided juridical theory of the objective form is the civil-law theory of Augustine, according to which Christ pays the debitum contracted by us (in Adam), as well as the theory of Satisfaction for our injuria in Anselm ; the subjective form of the same is Satisfaction by the complete suffering of the merited penalties due to the old man, on the part of the new man, according to Kant and the stricter Kantians. .usually, none are worked out consistently. The elements of justice and love, •especially, are seldom altogether wanting. See above, p. 6. REACTION AGAINST SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. 77 The moral theory finds its atonement in the sanctification of man. Its objective form makes sanctification to be effected through grace, and through sanctification, if it exists in prin ciple at least, atonement. Its subjective counterpart is the doctrine, that atonement is brought about through earnestness of resolve to live a better life, by which a new man is con stituted in principle, who, as well-pleasing to God, represents to the true (even the divine) point of view the still imperfect empirical man. An attempt is even made to turn to account the historic mediatorship by those who say :, Atonement, it is true, is the fruit of our amendment or sanctification; but the latter is brought about for the benefit of those who amend by Christ's example, and in virtue of the doctrine, confirmed by His authority, of God's readiness to forgive sins. The one-sided emphasizing of a divine love apart from justice is essentially Antinomian in nature, and in all its possible forms, however lofty they seem, sinks back to an unethical and, in so far, essentially physical ground. Of the same class on the objective side are not merely all magical theories (whether after the manner of a Marcion, or whether counten ance is given to an absorptive idea of the substitution of Christ as the personal atonement through His mere existence), but in general all, which represent the divine love as active indeed, but because destitute of an inner law of justice, as benevolent caprice. The subjective form of the theory of .atonement, which rests in a one-sided way on the divine love, assumes again various forms. From the viewpoint of will it may be said, as in the moral theory, that both moral defec tiveness and guilt are cancelled and covered in the eye of God's love, provided only a better will is present. On the side of knowledge it may be asserted : The need of an expia tion arises for the human consciousness from erroneous con ceptions of a justice in God that demands, and a guilt that needs, expiation; whereas God's eternally unchanging, unchiding, fatherly love dispels these erroneous conceptions, because it invites us to make the divine mode of view ours, and to enjoy reconciliation in the consciousness of that divine love which freely, without condition and expiation, with a confidence in the realization of the world-aim that 78 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. never wavers, joyously sees temporal imperfection (at least in faithful members of the kingdom) covered by viewing it sub specie ceternitaiis. Finally, on the side of feeling, it may be desired to find the atonement in elevation to the ideal feeling of God. But a Dualism remains in all these three forms, because morally satisfactory means for bridging over the distance between the empirical condition and the ideal world are wanting. This Dualism is the reason why all theories whatsoever of this latter kind must perforce halt, if not at a two-faced, contradictory truth, still at an unreconciled, two- faced mode of view — an ideal and an empirical. The solution of the problem cannot, therefore, lie in all these theories, which, however, by the uncertainty and the profound discord in which they plunge the spirit which has attained the summit of the pre-Christian consciousness, convert the neces sity of a solution, such as Christianity promises, into the most urgent need, in order that the spirit may be delivered from its conscious or unconscious discord. C. — Dogmatic Investigation. Literature. — Cf. § 114, p. 1 f. Schleiermacher, Der christi. Glaube, §§ 104. 105. Nitzsch's System, ed. 6. Marheinecke, Die Grundlehren der chr. Dogm. als Wissenschaft, 1827 ;. and his Syst. d. Dogm. 1847, p. 360. Lange, Positive Dogmatik, 1851, § 76 f. pp. 813-908. Martensen, Die chr. Dogm. §§ 156-169, pp. 280-293 (Eng. Trans., T. & T. Clark). Goschel and Stahl, see above, p. 56. Sartorius, Die lieilige Liebe, 2 Abth. 1855. Gess, Die Nothwendigkeit des Suhnens Christi, Jdhrb. f. d. Theol. vol. iii. p. 713 ff. Ibid., Weizsacker, Der Streit uber die Versohnungslehre, p. 154 ff. Weber, Vom Zorne Gottes, 1862 (with Introduction by Delitzsch). Delitzsch, Comm. zum Heb- raerbrief, Anhang, 1857. Philippi, Kirchl. Glaubenslehre, iv. 2 ; Die Lehre von Christi Werk, 1863, pp. 24-345. V. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, 1857 ff, i. 577. Thomasius, Lehre von Christi Person und Werk, iii. 1, p. 15 ff. Dietzsch, Adam und Christus, Bonn 1871. Al. Schweizer, Christi. Glaubenslehre, i. 537, ed. 1, ii. 164 ff. Hase, Evang. Dogm. 1826, ed. 3, 1842. Schenkel, i. 650 ff. Lipsius, Lehrbuch der evang.-prot. Dogm. 1876, see above. Biedermann, Dogm. § 815 ff. Ritschl, ut supra, iii. Kahnis, Syst. d. luth. Dogm. iii. 371 ff. 1868. Fr. Reiff, Die christi. Glaubenslehre als Grundlage der christi. Weltanschauung, DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 79 2 vols. ed. 2, 1876, ii. 214 ff. § 85 ff, p. 229, §§ 88-98. F. Fr. Bula, Die Versohnung des Menschen mit Gott durch Christum oder die Genugthuung, Basel 1874. G. Kreibig, Die Ver sohnungslehre auf Grund des christlichen Bewusstseins, 1878. Fr. Frank, Syst. der christi. Wahrheit, ii. 1880, § 35, p. 153 ff. Foreign Works. — E. de Pressensd, le dogme de la Redemp tion, 1867. Maurice, The Doctrine of Sacrifice (both in opposi tion to the notion of equivalence). Jowett, Comm. on the Epistles of St. Paul, 1855. MacDonnell, The Doctrine of the Atonement (against Maurice and Jowett). The English and American theology of the last decennia has busied itself much with this dogma. Dr. Park's work, The Atonement, Boston 1860, — a collection of treatises by Edwards, Smalley, Maxcy, Emmons, Griffin, Rurge, Weeks, with an introductory treatise, — gives a review of the history of New England theology on the subject. His own view on pp. x. xi. The doctrine of atonement has been treated, further, by Magee, J. Gilbert, The Christian Atonement, 1836 (in opposition to Wright's Antisatisfactionist) ; Horace Bushnell, Monsell (The Religion of Redemption, London 1867, pp. 51-153), Hodge, father and son. G. W. Samson, The Atonement, viewed as assumed Divine Responsibility, 1878. (Substitution is said to rest on these grounds: as Creator, Preserver, Ruler of a world of free beings, God has assumed a responsibility ; by the redemption in Christ He is answerable for its past sins and future sanctification, whereby He Himself submits to the law which He gave, p. 37 ff) John Miley, The Atonement and Christ, 1879. iPresby. Review, 1880, April.) FIRST ARTICLE : THE NEED OF ATONEMENT, AND GOD S ETERNAL PURPOSE OF ATONEMENT. § 119. The divine justice demands expiation, and without it humanity, unable to make it out of its own resources, is exposed to God's retributive displeasure, or to punish ment, which does not better but clouots the higher con sciousness, and fills with dread of destruction and death. The sin and guilt of the world, which call forth retri butive justice, stand therefore as a barrier in the way of God's loving purpose, which created the world for 80 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. perfection in holiness and blessedness. But as Justice and Love exist eternally in God in harmonious inter- penetration, so God wills the world to be the scene of the combined revelation of the two so long and so far as the world is still capable of redemption. This is His eternal purpose of atonement, i.e. His purpose to give humanity the possibility of atonement. This possibility is implanted in humanity by the divine incarnation in Christ. 1. A frequent, but not on this account less objectionable, theory is this, that we only need to be reconciled with God, but no need exists for God to be reconciled with us, or, what is the same, no need exists of an expiation for us. Against the conceivableness of God wishing to be reconciled, or being reconciled, it is urged that this would assume a change in God. For He would cease to be angry and begin to be propitious ; as reconciled He would therefore become what He was not before, and this would conflict with His immutability, nay, imply an influence upon Him from without, so that it would not even be He who changes Himself, but He would be changed, — a view unworthy of God. In order, therefore, to preserve God's immutability, the change which the idea of atonement certainly implies must be placed entirely on the side of the world or in man, either in his consciousness or will. Man, therefore, is reconciled by being delivered from the thought of anger in God, or by His will being changed for the better. On the other hand, it is out of the question to say that God must first be reconciled with man, in order that man may enjoy reconciliation, for God is raised above the possibility of being variously affected by the distinction of good and evil. But we have previously1 proved that God's immutability cannot be of a lifeless, deistic kind, and that the distinctions in the world and its history are not indifferent to God, and therefore valueless in themselves, that rather God is, above all, immutable in ethicalr vitality. But for this very reason His relation is not the same towards evil and good, nor can His disposition, whether of favour or 1 Vol. i. p. 244 ff. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 81 displeasure, towards the ethical mutability of men be always the same.1 And indeed the supposition that God, in harmony with His ethical immutability, accompanies the history of men with His sympathy, which modifies itself, moment by moment, according to the actual character of men, implies no passive dependence of God on the world ; but it is His own essence, abiding eternally the same, and His own volition, by which He allows Himself to be determined to modify His sympathy with the world. 2. But it must now, further, be definitely laid down, that a reconciliation of God, and not merely of men with God, is necessary, whether the matter be considered in reference to man or to the idea of God. Sin and guilt have interrupted the loving communion which God desires to have with the creature, and it lies not in man's power to renew this communion of God with him. To this a prevenient act of God is necessary. The only source of misery is not, that man is at variance or enmity with God, and does not accept or respond to God!s ever unchanging love. Even the desire for amendment could not truly exist in one who did not, above all, affirm his guilt and desert of punishment, and acknowledge the necessity to concede its rights to the divine justice demanding punishment or expiation. His conscience condemns the sinner, so that by his own means he cannot have peace in himself and with God. Nor is the love of God, although unchangeable in itself, necessarily unvarying in its exercise, somewhat as a physical force is always unvarying in its . operation. This leads to the second point : The idea of God requires a reconciliation of God in order to the restoration of communion with Him. Against this it might be objected : Even granting a change in the relation of God to be necessary in order to reconciliation, no special arrangement, such as Christianity teaches, is needed in order thereto. For there is nothing to prevent God restoring His relation to the world to harmony, if it has been disturbed by sin, and forgiving without satisfaction and expiation, in virtue of His absolute freedom, without further ado. And in 1 Martensen, p. 282 (Eng. ed. p. 204) : That it is not merely man, but God Himself, who is to be reconciled, contradicts only a dead, not a living idea of God's unchangeableness. Cf. too, Rothe, Ethilc, ii. § 567, p. 305. Dornbr.— Christ. Doct. iv. F 82 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. point of fact, various reasons are alleged in favour of a so-called free divine forgiveness. It would be a denial (e.g. according to Duns Scotus and Socinus) of Omnipotence, of God's free plenary authority, and therefore an inadmissible limit to God's action, if He could not forgive off-hand. On the contrary, it is said, the love which seeks not its own and seeks not its own honour, must be inclined to such a free forgiveness of sin ; and Christ Himself seems to acknowledge this to be the mode of conduct befitting God, in so frequently requiring placability and readiness to forgive from man, in accordance with God's example and on the ground of the divine forgiveness. • This is even required by the policy of the divine government (so Grotius and the Arminians continue), because unforgiven sin preys upon itself, while forgiveness restores moral courage, and pardon, like an amnesty at times in the political sphere, ministers to the common good and preserves the commonweal from growing disorganization. To these reasons the following answer may be given. In God there is no Omnipotence severed from His ethical essence, just as little as there is in Him caprice or the physical necessity to will what He is able to do by free power. Rather, His holy essence is in God the living law for the exercise of His power. Unconditional forgiveness of private injuries, where no judicial function is in question, may be required of the love by virtue of which man seeks not his own. But as the guardian of universal, public moral order, even government cannot forgive violations of the law off-hand or treat them with indifference and impunity, — this would be the dissolution and subversion of moral order. Civil amnesty is only permissible by way of exception, where it may be supposed that crimes in themselves punishable are sub stantially caused by corrupt states of the commonweal, which are characterized by a common guilt, and by life in parties, which have all something to forgive to each other. Moreover, acts of grace, whatever the motives from which they spring, are no denial of culpability, and therefore of the right of punitive justice, but a ratification of it. Besides, God cannot regard evil as mere private injury, seeing that good also cannot be a mere private matter to Him. For good is the rationally necessary in itself, the alone absolutely precious thing, which cannot be sacrificed to finite good, to regard for supposed claims DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 83 of the wellbeing of individuals or the public welfare, without subverting all right order in the world. Without ethical worth and ethical distinction, only physical beings would be willed by God. There can therefore be no policy even of divine government which would prefer the physical wellbeing of the creature to what is ethical, and to the condition required by the ethical. An apparently exuberant, profuse love of such a kind, since it would outsoar itself, and in ecstasy, so to speak, emancipate itself from the fundamental laws of the world, from sacred justice, would directly fall back to the mere physical level of finite eudaemonism, while losing and extin guishing the character of the infinitely precious. Despite their mutual relative independence, the natural and the moral are so co-ordinated in creation (not arbitrarily, but in virtue of God's ethical essence, which is the power above even Omnipotence and its works), that true and enduring physical wellbeing at the cost of the ethical and its claim to dominion is impossible. On the contrary, suffering is the physically and ethically necessary consequence, the fruit and wages of sin. For these reasons the policy of divine government cannot leave evil unnoticed, first, because universal impunity would be a charter to sin, a giving the reins to moral licence, and therefore assuredly opposed to the common weal ; and also because such impunity would contradict the innate law even of the physical world, and therefore contradict wise policy.1 To this must be added, that God's holy essence cannot look otherwise than with disfavour and holy displeasure at sinners as such, and at the evil present in them and done by them. In Himself He cannot be eternally reconciled to evil ; in Him is neither moral indifference nor caprice. Even in the world the energy of God's holy and righteous essence remains unchangeable.2 The satisfaction of justice is the negative pre-condition of the revelation of love as self-communication. God must therefore perforce make the maintenance of His ethical glory and unchangeableness, the satisfaction of His justice which is necessarily angry and displeased with sin, the indispensable 1 The truth of this is shown by the fact that, even where guilt is forgiven, the evils originally springing from God's punitive justice may continue, although no longer as punishments, and yet cannot deny their connection with sin. 2 §§ 24. 25. 87. 88. 84 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. condition of His loving fellowship and favour. For this very reason, the conscientious man could have no confidence in a re conciliation that warped the rights of justice,and was indifferent, although not to evil generally, yet to guilt actually contracted.1 Thus the unsophisticated conscience, like the true conscious ness of God, knows that the divine displeasure is no mere subjective conception, but objective truth ; else the subject would only need to divest himself of this conception in order to enjoy impunity. But, on the contrary, the divine displeasure rests objectively on sinners, whether they are at once conscious of this or not ; and it has its consequences. It is the source of all evils to men. When displeasure emerges, the state of peace between God and man is abolished, loving communication limited or interrupted. And from this withdrawal of favour and grace follows also diminution of life. Since all life has its abiding source in God, according to the profound view of the Old Testament, this diminution of life is in principle a dying ; and the extremest issue — actual death in the spiritual and physical sense — must have followed, if sin had maintained its unchecked progress and uninterrupted increase. In fact, the revelation of retributive justice was already in course of development before Christ.2 1 Even Weizsaeker (ut supra, p. 183 f.) rightly says : A more independent and natural meaning must be assigned to the idea of expiation than is usually done at present. Biblical teaching is too decisively in favour of this view, as well as the whole of the older theology and the moral experience of the sense of guilt, which seems to him too powerful, to permit him to believe that that idea is satisfied by any manifestation of grace or of divine-human love. " I believe," he continues, ' ' that Christ's sufferings should be considered under this point of view, that He therewith actually did something in our place, that He suffered what we ought to suffer and could not, and thereby remove this indebtedness from us. Pure moral feeling, when it awakens, is always in its guilt conscious that its penitence ought to be an infinite sorrow, and that penitence is a gnawing worm for the very reason that it never reaches this point. But in his penitence the Christian participates in the infinite sorrow of Christ." 8 Rom. i. 18. Cf. with the above th« excellent exposition of Martensen, Christi. Ethilc, spec. Theil, Abth. i. p. 155 ff., in the section : " Imputation and Guilt ; Punitive Justice," p. 156 [Eng. Trans, pp. 130-132] : The idea of guilt implies that sin is the product of man's will, and that the man who by sin has made a rent in God's holy world-order, is thereby liable to an expiatory punish ment, of which not amendment, but primarily retribution must be regarded as the aim, that right may remain right. P. 157 : What is imputed to a man is not merely the particular action, but the entire moral condition in which he is found. For it is by his own will that every one makes himself what he is. Even that DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 85 3. Accordingly, the question of sin and guilt is so serious a thing, that it occasions a change even in God's disposition towards man. For this reason, reconciliation apart from satis- -faction of the divine justice is out of the question. Uncon ditional forgiveness, as shown, is inadmissible. To renew the disturbed communion of God with man, as said before, lies not in man's power ; and yet the discord of man with God is so opposed to His true nature and destiny, that, unless it is removed, disorganization and ruin must be the consequence. The condition on which reconciliation and restoration of communion would alone be possible even to God, is in general expiation. But the rendering of expiation to God is utterly out of our power. There can be no overplus of merit ; consequently no release from the bondage of guilt already contracted, besides what we normally owe, can be found. Man is bound to do all the good that he can do. There can therefore be no question of making good what has been neglected; the only result would be a new instance of neglect. Just as little could the resolve to amend be a sufficient expiation. The resolve is no security for amendment. It merely furnishes the possibility of future obedience to the divine will. But such possibility does not, as an adequate equivalent, correspond to that violation of the divine will which has not remained possibility, but become actuality. Moreover, indubitable universal experience shows that even those earnestly desirous of amendment are obliged ever to confess to manifold defects. Just as little, finally, is the satisfaction, which our action cannot furnish, to be found in our suffering, or in our willing ness to bear as just punishment the divine displeasure with all the effects that may flow from it. For even the full knowledge of the gravity and extent of sin, the feeling of God's just displeasure, and the will to bear these, presuppose which we call fate has an aspect under which it belongs entirely to personal imputation — so far as the man has himself appropriated and voluntarily continues transmitted evil. On p. 158 ff. he strikingly explains, that not merely conscious, voluntary transgression is sin, as held by the Jesuits, but that even sin of ignorance so called is imputable and punishable (however it may furnish a ground of palliation), Luke xxiii. 34, cf. Luke xii. 47 f. For the binding nature of the law depends not upon an accidental knowledge of the same, but it is the law of my being, by which every estimate of worth must proceed. 86 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. a measure of moral strength such as would only be possible, in realized communion with God, and is not found in a state of unreconciled estrangement from God. How could the natural man, whose better resolves even are enfeebled by discord within, be in a position fully to acknowledge his own unworthiness in presence of the divine holiness, and in thought, feeling, and will to do honour to the divine justice, not merely in acknowledging the holiness of the law and the duty of obedience for the future, but in the sense of guilt and contrition, and in the righteous disposition which bears as just even the divine displeasure with its effects ? To do all this by way of expiation, remains to us an impossibility. As certainly, therefore, as the possibility of true reconciliation both of God with man and of man with God is inconceivable without expiation, so certainly this expiation cannot be rendered by sinful man. All theories of self-redemption are false, morally lax and inadequate to the need of the conscience, whether their tendency be to expel the consciousness of sin and guilt, and of a Deity angry with sin, as gloomy and essentially futile conceptions, or whether they require us to seek rest and peace in resolves- on a better life, or in resigna tion and willingness to suffer; or even to ascribe meritorious, expiatory force to repentance and the unhappy sense of punishment. It thus remains certain that the capacity of redemption still existing in humanity has for its converse the incapacity itself to furnish the potency of reconcilia tion. What it still has is merely the possibility of becoming reconciled. 4. God's Purpose of Reconciliation. — Where human strength and wisdom come to an end, there is the divine beginning. God's creative wisdom, animated by the impulse of love both for the world, for whose sake goodness is meant to exist, and for goodness, for whose sake the world is meant to exist, not merely requires expiation, such as is due to its holiness and justice, but also by the eternal counsel of its mercy gives humanity the possibility of reconciliation by sending His Son ; and the antinomy— insoluble without grace, — to the effect that humanity cannot live without reconcilia tion, and therefore without satisfaction to the divine justice, and yet cannot be the originator of its own reconciliation, is dogmatic investigation. 87 solved by the miracle of divine love in such a way, that humanity is enabled to present the atonement by a God- given potency. In these powers of atonement belonging to humanity, and reckoned among its possessions, humanity finds a substitute for its impotence to make atonement. Thus God's eternal purpose of atonement proves itself just and yet rich in love, and restores the combined revelation of the two attributes disjoined by sin, nay, perfects the world in this way, that the world gains the possibility, not indeed immediately, but through the divinely-given Mediator, of reconciling God, and on the ground of this of becoming holy and happy. It must, of course, be impossible to an abstract idea of the simplicity of God, such as obtains with many inconsistencies in the old Theology, but especially in Schleiermacher, to regard Justice and Love as objectively different definitions of God, the revelation of which may be divergent by reason of the character of the world. On this point enough was said pre viously.1 But even those who do not assign a merely sub jective import to the attributes go astray when, in order to combine the divine attributes into unity, they regard objec tively conceived love not merely as the highest, but as the exclusive definition of the divine essence, and therefore in various methods consider justice as a mere form or kind of love, even though at the same time zeal or hatred to its opposite is ascribed to love, this hatred being identified with justice. The correct element in this view is, that even justice is love for goodness, zeal for its honour, maintenance of the divine honour or self-love ; but still it is not love for persons, for sinners, in the form of communicative benevolence. Rather is justice in its punitive aspect the assertion of the dignity of the holy and good which God Himself is, even in opposition and antagonism to man whose desire is wellbeing. On the other hand, to conceive of punishment as mere communicative love, would in the best case lead back to the theory of amendment.2 But, on the other side, Love and Justice are indeed not seldom distinguished, but are so conceived that they no longer blend harmoniously in the unity of the divine idea. This is the case when they are viewed as mutually limiting or tempering 1 § 19. 2 §§ 24. 32. vol. i. pp. 300, 456. 88 THE doctrine of atonement. each other. At the basis of this theory lies the opinion, that in God's essence they form two different wills, each of which lays claim to sole authority, and is therefore involuntarily restrained by the other. It might therewith be supposed that this opposition remains mere possibility so long as sin does not actually exist, but with sin the two come into conflict with each other. Thus, were the revelation of divine Justice contrary to the will of Love, and the revelation of Love contrary to the will of Justice, both, instead of carrying their measure within themselves, would be limited by each other, since a third power — the ingenuity of wisdom — would temper both, and restore peace among the divine attributes. The Christian doctrine permits no such, even merely possible, inner conflict. For us such conflict is entirely excluded, because, while firmly maintaining the objective distinctiveness of both, we had to regard them as so constituted that an inner mutual relation and indissoluble interconnection are again cognizable in them. This is rendered specially obvious by the consideration that God is not merely the Father of His children, but also the Ruler of the world, who maintains unhurt the world's moral aim. In God is no unjust Love, no Love even merely detached, emancipated from Justice. His Love carries the law of justice within itself, it keeps in view and honours the distinction between good and evil, because it loves and wills the holy as such. Even in communication God is holy self-love, i.e. He loves and wills the good which He is Himself, guarding it from violation. Thus His love with its tendency to communicate cannot come into conflict with justice, but throughout wills only what is in harmony therewith. Further, Justice as the guardian of distinctions, maintains the distinc tion between physical good, which would be communication without moral self-affirmation, and holy or ethical love, and in so far is also a safeguard against the self-exhaustion of self-communicating love. Accordingly, they are both essential factors of " holy Love." That holy Love is secured by their distinctiveness and mutual inner relationship. In it they are united, and it is the supreme governing principle of the divine attributes in general, and of their revelation. There with also an answer is given to the question: How can God be conceived as demanding expiation, and therefore angry, if DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 89 still He is and must be the One who bestows on humanity the possibility of expiation ? Neither is there in God a love capable of being indiscriminately communicative, and of dispensing with expiation for guilt, nor can Justice prevent Love creating the possibility of expiation; for the aim of the world, of which expiation is the means, is itself also a revela tion of Justice. SECOND AETICLE : THE IDEA OF SUBSTITUTION AND SATISFACTION IN GENERAL. Substitution. § 120. Atonement is only possible through the fact that there are substitutionary forces at work for the good of humanity, and receptiveness in humanity for those forces. As the second Adam, or Representative of humanity before God, Christ is the Substitute for humanity outside Him, so far as humanity is defective in religious personality. Literature. — Cf. Gess, ut supra. Bersier, la Solidarite, 1870, pp. 68, 70 ff., 83. Mohsell, The Religion of Redemption. 1. There are substitutionary Forces, and a Receptive ness FOR them in Humanity. — >As concerns the first proposi tion, the preceding century, with its predominantly subjective tendency, the influence of which we still feel, maintained the most unfriendly attitude to the idea of substitution ; and the subjective moralism, which severs the personal from the generic consciousness, and views communities simply as products of the individual will of the subjects, has given sufficient evidence of its power in the idea of the Church and of the State current in these days (to say nothing of marriage).1 But certainly on the other side a false idea of substitution, and one hostile to personality, is possible, which we might call magical. The Church, for example, may be conceived as a corpus mysticum of such a kind, that the independence which every person 1 Cf. Rousseau, Contrdt social. 90 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. should gain in Christ, and the personal participation of man in his moral and religious edification, are abridged thereby. After what has been established above,1 we must maintain that neither the personal nor the generic consciousness is rightly conceived if one excludes the other, because each can only obtain its true form in connection with the other. The individual and the universal do not exclude, but include each other. Whoever wishes to sever himself from the genus is in a false state. 2. Let us then survey the circle in which Substitution obtains. First, Substitution has an extensive application in the material and outwardly legal sphere. It is so in virtue of justitia commutativa in barter and commerce, where one class of goods passes and is exchanged for another. One also may pay debts for, i.e. instead of another, nay, even a money-penalty may possibly be settled vicariously. In legal affairs also, substitution obtains in the widest extent. No wonder that the ecclesiastical doctrine fondly attached itself to the figure of a vicarious payment of debt, which must retain its place as a figure, e.g. in catechetical instruction, provided that the intensive moral and reKgious character of the debt, which is a violation of an infinite good, is not obscured thereby, nor the relation of man to God transformed into one of co-ordinate compact. But further, there is substitution in the sphere of the living. Even organic nature supplies analogies of this. A noble branch is grafted on a wild stock, and takes the place of the branch removed, not merely with the result of the partially alien branch becoming native to the stock, but also with the result of this substitution ennobling the entire tree and changing its sap. And conversely, by engrafting in a noble stock a wild branch may be ennobled.2 The case is similar in animal life. When one organ suffers, net seldom another, having capacity for such a purpose, assumes the functions belonging to the first ; and this is one condition of the power of the organism for self-preservation. Thus, one sense may become a substitute for another, e.g. hearing or taste for sight in the blind, or the eye for the ear in the deaf, and even in the case of those with all their senses, the written for the spoken word. But especially, before the development of the 1 §§ 82. 83. , Cf. Rom. xi. 17. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 91 particular organs in an organism, the function assigned to them is not necessarily passive, but the whole assumes, so to speak, the place of the particular organ or part, not in order that its germ may be atrophied or dispensed with, but that what is lacking may be developed by means of real, i.e. productive, not absorbing, substitution. Thus the child, before it sees the light of the world, lives as yet no independent life, either physically or psychically; but the life vicariously lived by the mother for the child developes it to independence and maturity. As in the vegetable and animal, so in the spiritual sphere. Here also all culture is conditioned by substitution ; and not merely in relation to culture, it is also the neces sary postulate of moral independence and freedom. What the child receives from its parents is not of necessity merely such instruction as it understands as fully as they do ; and in reference to morality, not merely ought that to be expected from the child of which it sees the grounds, and which it produces of its own strength, and therefore imposes on itself. On the contrary, its productive power in reference to know ledge and volition must first be educated by the objective reason of its parents, whose maxims, deposited in the mind of the child and accepted on trust by it, train it to inde pendence. Thus the reason of the parents lives a vicarious life in the child until it is ripe for independence. This is the benefit of authority in its place.1 And if, in order not to interfere with the child's freedom, it were left without . the benefit of this spiritual authority operating vicariously, i.e. if each generation were left to make a purely new beginning, the gain of such a course would accrue not to personality and freedom, but directly to the spirit of wild-growing nature and caprice hostile to them. The reason, clothing itself in the form of vicarious authority (for which in its ripe state it has the power), is the true seed of freedom. The true divine contents of reason, although not produced or spontaneously appropriated by the child, stand in secret, friendly elective affinity with the yet undeveloped reason of the child. Conse quently, those contents, deposited in the region of the receptive generic attitude, of the memoria, of good habit and obedience, in a word, in that yet impersonal intermediate region belonging 1 Vol. i. § 6, p. 79 ff. 92 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. to the generic life, which may be called the ante-chamber of personality, possess force to summon forth the true personality, and conduct it to freedom through the life of the individual spirit in knowledge, volition, and feeling being seized by and filled with the spirit of the rational and universal. No one will say that anything unethical is involved in free personality being thus developed by the operation of the vicarious reason. On the contrary, it is an admirable, divinely-instituted arrange ment, characterizing us as an inter-connected race, that in all points — physical, legal, intellectual, moral, and religious — we must have guardians, tutors, and advocates, until the time determined beforehand by the Father;1 and that the moral form peculiar to a certain epoch of life is this, that the youth ful reason, instead of being self-willed, render itself dependent and behave obediently to the objective reason co-ordinated with it, so far as that reason has still a divine and human right to live a vicarious life in it. This is nothing but the right childlike attitude, the postulate of true, free personality. But as the childlike disposition involves both the possibility of going back to the true generic nature and the capacity of allowing its powers to operate upon itself, so conversely in the vigorous, personalized reason, and especially in love, there is not merely the capacity, but the inner desire and necessity, to descend to the position of an instrument, in order to open the needy, subjective reason to itself, to enter into it, and in sympathy communicate itself to it. This is the happiness of ethical i personality, and also the test of its ripeness, that it is able to transform itself into a seed-corn, so to speak, for the good of the developing reason, i.e. into a form in which all egoistic, absorptive substitution is excluded, and self-surrender ing self-forgetfulness desires to retain but one thing — the power of being an instrument for the victory of the good, for the powers of the universal.2 Thus in its very highest stage personality has the power, most certainly of all, of becoming through substitution a seed of freedom. 3. But, of course, receptiveness for substitutionary forces within humanity differs at different stages of life. Whereas the first period of human existence is absorbed in the generic 1 Gal. iv. 2. 2 Cf. John xii. 24. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 93 connection, in the second a distinction of the subjectivity from the generic life emerges, which in the case of sinful develop ment may lead to variance, severance, and repulsion. On the other hand, at the last stage that existence coalesces anew, and in a higher manner, with the generic consciousness. Now, the right of substitution is disputed not in reference to the first stage, but in reference to the second, where the subject desires to be self-concentrated and self-enclosed. There a jealousy for freedom on the part of the subject may even oppose itself to God, until the subject recognises his need of God, and sees that determination by divine powers, representa tion of our empirical life by a divine life, harmonizes well with freedom, since freedom may be determined to let itself be determined by God,- and since God's aim is, that His powers, operating at first vicariously as an impulse from without, should become natural to the subject ; for God is a lover of freedom. But at the stage of subjectivity it seems to be otherwise with receptiveness for a vicarious life of the genus. The genus operates on the subject in the form of particular indi viduals. Were, then, these individuals to live a vicarious life in us, the only possible result seems to be the injury or destruction of our individuality. This is even the case in an abnormal course, where the stronger individuality seeks to make the others at most selfless copies of itself. But this is not necessary. For example, in the case of parents, what is one-sided and abnormal in their individuality need not be the element operating vicariously in the life of the children, instead of what is rational and universal in their individuality. Moreover, Christ is no abnormal or one-sided individuality. He is the centre and reality of our genus.1 Consequently, His personality cannot absorb our individual peculiarity and freedom ; but if we have natural receptiveness for God, we have in a special degree receptiveness for Him in whom both true humanity and the absolute revelation of God are given. Since, therefore, the receptiveness is directed to Him, both the receptiveness for the genus with its substitutionary forces and the receptiveness for God find their satisfaction in Him. Receptiveness for the genus and its substitutionary forces, J § 103, 5. 94 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. directing itself to Christ, is in an eminent sense well-pleasing to God, because it is also receptiveness for God. This is the meaning of believing in Him, the only way in which an evil subjective life-tendency can be plunged, so to speak, into the sacred depths of vital powers possessed of creative force, into the love of One who, belonging to the human genus and con centrating its powers in Himself, is mighty to save us and to originate a new life in us. But what has hitherto been advanced is less doubted; substitution and receptiveness thereto are conceded in the sense, that in place of the old man the holy principle that was in Christ must be imparted to us, in order that His life may take the place of the old man. But all this lias reference merely to the life of sanctification, not of reconciliation. And thus the main question is left : Is not the operation of substitution excluded where the matter in question is the guilt of the subject ? It seems as if every one must answer himself for his free acts, and there were no room therefore for substitution. The answer to this has been prepared for in what precedes, on the subjective side by the doctrine of sin and guilt, on the objective by the doctrine of the divine penal justice.1 It must be frankly confessed, that a substitutionary work of Christ is not possible for every possible sin and guilt, namely, not for the sin of rejecting Him, for the finale repudium salutis, and therefore not for the sin, which cannot "be regarded at all as the effect of generic sin, because, on the contrary, it is purely personal in kind. Guilt exclusively, and in the full sense personal, God cannot do otherwise than visit on the sinner himself. It has no interest in the words : " They know not what they do." 2 The sin of definitive unbelief is the sin incapable of forgiveness. It is the sin against the Holy Ghost, and carries with it a character indelebilis of evil, because it rejects the good itself or as such. The person has therefore surrendered himself without reserve to the evil principle. On the other hand, all other sin and guilt, however great and penal it may otherwise be, is not personal in the full sense ; it does not impart this character indelebilis ; the general state has an ambiguity in it which does not exclude hope.3 To it, therefore, the divine justice stands in a different attitude, and 1 §§ 82. 83. vol. i. §§ 24. 25. p. 297 f. 2 Luke xxiii. 34. 3 § 83, 2 C. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 95 not merely is long-suffering compatible therewith, but also the admission of substitutionary powers. Before Christ, sin and guilt were not yet consummated, although present in different degrees ; then a provisory state yet existed, because the good itself was not rejected in its clearest revelation, and hence the capacity of redemption was not yet extinguished. Thus it was possible for God before Christ's days to regard all the sin and guilt of humanity as the common sin and guilt of the race, and the punishment due to it as common punishment, for which a corresponding expiation must be required. Despite the different degrees of guilt, which the subjects may contract at the second stage, to the divine eye humanity is like one homogeneous sinful life in common. The whole of humanity is treated by God in conformity with this view, and so are individuals. No doubt an essential distinction here presents itself between the divine procedure and human justice, although even the latter has to administer the divine objective idea of right as far as it is able. Human judicial administration is unable to see deeper into the heart, so as to estimate the degree of energy in the law-opposing will. It does not comprehend the entire state of man, nor to what extent outward influences were decisive in the acts of sin. It must consequently limit itself strictly to the visible outward act of the legal personality, although it also makes a distinc tion between dolus and culpa, thereby acknowledging that knowledge of the entire inner worth of the person is necessary to a just judgment. Human justice, accordingly, stops for the most part at the act of the individual person and at the judgment of the act, in order not to strike the innocent and let the guilty go free. For it, therefore, a final principle must be, that every one has to answer for >his own guilt ; guilt can in no wise be imputed vicariously to an innocent person. And were the divine action necessarily analogous to the pro cedure pertaining to human justice even in reference to the second stage, there could then be no question of a divinely- given substitution. But the fact of human judicial admini stration having to limit itself altogether to those particular evil acts of the subjective evil will, which appear on the surface, is not its perfection, but its imperfection and limit ; and it knows well that its function is not to pronounce the definitive 96 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. judgment on a man, but merely to regulate and judge the provisory state according to the idea of justice and its best knowledge. The imperfection of human justice, which is no searcher of hearts, is based on the fact that the particular act is not the person, but only one of the manifestations of the subject, whereas the punishment falls on the entire person, which yet did not necessarily participate in the act, even as it is not exhausted in the particular act. Those equally punished may be very unequal in their entire moral worth or demerit. The entire worth of the person, which is essential to an absolutely just judgment, may elude the eye of the human judge, because he knows not how much of the fault is due in the particular case to education, evil example, etc., and how much to the law-resisting will. But God's administra tion of justice must regard the entire man, his total worth or demerit. The first consequence of this is a far stricter and more deeply penetrating judgment of God on the evil in the world, to wit, the view that, on account of the universality of sin and its power, a common guilt exists, and that even judges, nay, the society that demands the execution of law and justice, are implicated in the common guilt, which in God's sight is not appearance, but reality. The consequence of this from the divine standpoint is a universal KaraKpifia extending to the whole of humanity, a condemnatory judgment on their state.1 In presence of this condemnation all stand in absolute need of redemption and atonement, and the distinctions of greater or less personal guilt in the subjects make no difference therein, because no one can acquit himself of joint responsi bility for the common sin. Consequently, before the divine judgment-seat, antecedently to the rejection of Christ, all sinners are equal in so far as this, that the difference in the degree of their guilt is not finally decisive, but to the divine view vanishes again in essential equality as to the universal need of atonement and redemption. First, because all are infected by the sin of the race, which does not remain inopera tive, and are laden with the common guilt, which neither in its origin nor growth springs from God, but from the subjective freedom and guilt, in which we are implicated as members of one family and by our own act ; secondly, because all sins 1 Rom. iji. 19, v. 18 ff. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 9 7 prior to Christ may spring from the common evil root— evil bias, and may thus be regarded as specific continuations of the generic sin. But the same fact which aggravates the depth of sinfulness and the extent of guilt, both in the eyes of God, who looks not merely at the particular outward acts, but at their deeper source and the general state of man, and in the eyes of the truly penitent man, the same fact which makes sin and guilt appear in their true light, and is the cause of a KaraKpty-a upon all,1 causes a ray of hope to shine forth. For, on the other side, all sins prior to Christ, as formerly shown,2 have also the character of essential equality in this, that so long as Christ has not been rejected, the capacity of redemption still continues. Receptiveness for the substitu tionary forces of the genus belongs indeed to the, age of child hood as by nature. But even a higher stage of life may return to the childlike nature, namely, by moral means. On this ground Christ requires us to be converted and become as children.3 Where a man has not become a personality hardened in evil,4 there withdrawal of the evil, subjective ten dency of life is still possible. There, accordingly, substitution still has its place and fruit for those who maintain a generic attitude, or an attitude of childlike trust to the forces of atonement, supposing such to exist in humanity. We affirm, therefore : Substitution still has its place where and in so far as evil is either the result of the inherited evil bias of the race, or may be still included under the common guilt in which we are all implicated, where, therefore, the subject has not yet incurred the guilt, which can no longer be reckoned at all part of the generic guilt, because it is purely personal in kind, derivable neither from a corrupt nature nor from temptation by the common spirit of evil, but altogether from free decision. In all cases outside that species of guilt, the sin of the subject may spring just as well from the cor rupt generic life as from his subjectivity, and may therefore be reckoned part of the common sin and guilt of the genus. 1 Rom. v. 16, 18. !§83. 8 Matt, xviii. 1-6 ; John iii. 5. He describes conversion and becoming a child again as possible even to the full-grown, and therefore a spiritual return from the abnormity of the second stage to the better receptiveness of the first. 4 Matt. xii. 31 ff. Dorner.— Christ Doct. iv. G 98 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. But then the same generic side, peculiar to every one, which was the occasion of his sinfulness, and which made him part of an organism, in which he could not without falsehood exempt himself from the common guilt, is also the medium by which redemption and atonement are still possible, — pro vided that substitutionary saving forces are not lacking to the genus. Thus man's capacity for redemption is now defined as receptiveness for the substitutionary forces of atone ment. But just so we saw above 1 that the eternal unity of Justice and Love in God in presence of man's capacity for redemption is more precisely defined as the divine purpose of atonement, and the latter as the supplying of the possibility for humanity to make satisfaction to God through substitu tionary forces in it. The possibility of salvation is restored by this, that humanity in some way carries within itself a saving, personal force of universal significance side by side with its common sin and guilt, whose effect is a common punishment. This saving force is able to answer for the whole, because God Himself hives in it, as conversely every individual has receptiveness for it. And this power to make satisfaction in the name of the genus to God's punitive justice, which has reference to the genus, is conferred on the genus by the Son whom God's love vouchsafes to it. He through the act of divine Incarnation has divine power to answer for humanity, while He also became a true scion of humanity as the Son of Man, having universal relation to humanity. The fact that humanity in Him. transformed this possibility of substitution into reality, thus not merely rendering the divine forgiveness possible, but actually reconciling God with the world, — this is the meaning of His office, which represents at once His ability and His right, i.e. His iljovcria. The means by which He discharges His office is, that He is able to effect and does effect the substitution, which is the law of His life as the Centre and Representative of humanity. But, before considering this, we have to inquire what the task of His substitution was, or wherein the Satisfaction, which it is essential to make, consists. ¦ l § 119, 4. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 99 Satisfaction. § 121. The Satisfaction which is requisite in order that God may be reconciled with the sinful world, and His communion with it restored, consists in expiation to be made to God. This expiation consists not primarily in righteousness of life, but in voluntary subjection to that law of the divine justice which imposes just sufferings on sin and guilt, the centre of which is the divine displeasure. 1. It is true that, so long as the capacity for redemption is not altogether extinguished, there is no necessity in God to require such satisfaction to His justice by punishment as would leave no place for the revelation of His love and mercy.1 There is no justice in God to which the preservation of the possibility of perfecting the world, and therefore of realizing the end of the world, is a matter of indifference. Such justice would be at variance with God's thoughts in creation, and with His love. On the contrary, God is long-suffering, so long as the possibility of salvation is not yet excluded. But, of course, the divine long-suffering does not abolish the discord and dissonance engendered by sin between God and the world, and that on both sides. The time of long-suffering, as we know, merely denotes an incomplete state, which must be carried on to the point of crisis. But the remedial crisis cannot be initiated by violating the divine justice, or ignoring its rights. A manifestation of the divine favour and grace, such as maintains the divine goal of the world, cannot take place immediately in an unreconciled world, in a world standing in unappeased conflict with God's justice. Unless the divine justice is to prove untrue to itself, it must require the rendering of a sufficient expiation.2 But the question now is, wherein must the satisfaction or expiation consist, in order to be sufficient ? 2. Simple as the common answer sounds: "The amend ment of the sinner is the best satisfaction," still it cannot content us.3 Not merely on the grounds previously laid down, i § 89. 2 § 119. 3 Ibid. 100 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. according to which the power of faultless virtue is wanting to us by nature, and there can be no question of a superfluity of good, by which we "might cover our sinful past (on the contrary, our old guilt is increased by new faults of omission or commission1), but even if a germ of virtue at least were implanted in us by divine providence from without, or by God's Spirit from within, the goal of atonement would not be reached thereby, nor the requisite satisfaction to God effected. For even if it be said that revelation awakens confidence and hope to begin a new and better life, by giving the assurance that divine forgiveness will be imparted to a pure moral life in the future, still good conduct in the future is not on this account an expiation for the past, to say nothing of the defectiveness of the moral life, which, by the testimony of experience, never ceases in this life, — a defectiveness which itself ever needs forgiveness, instead of having power to expiate past guilt. Were it said : Still a better beginning may be made in principle, and although the new good principle has still to . develope itself in time, yet God, who stands above time, embraces in His view the consummation with the beginning, and sees the empirical moral life covered by the former, — or to speak with Kant : The idea of humanity well-pleasing to God, with which man becomes one in the resolve upon a better life, is to the divine view a substitute for the defective actuality of man,2 — there is no doubt in this a presentiment of the truth, that substitution, through a perfection above us, is necessary in order that God may by anticipation behold us as righteous, so far as we stand in real contact with such perfection. But a better beginning in order to moral unity is no security for future sanctification, since the better principle does not progress after the fashion of a physical necessity; so that, even then, both moral perfection and forgiveness must remain immeasurably uncertain, whereas peace of heart and renewed fellowship with God form the condition for attaining a harmonious moral life, while again having the reconciliation of God with man and His forgiveness as their postulate. Further, the idea of humanity well- pleasing to God, as a mere idea remote from actuality, would exercise no essential influence on man's moral transformation. 1 § 119. ! Religion innerhalb der Gi-enzen, etc. See above, p. 44. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 101 But the chief point is and remains, that the cancelling of the guilt of the past and present is of prime necessity, if we are to attain rest of conscience and peace with God, i.e. to know God reconciled with us. The effect of unatoned guilt is to diminish the moral strength. It can only be better with man when God's wonder-working power transforms forgiven sin and guilt itself into an impulse to moral enthusiasm by this very means, that liability to punishment is acknowledged as true and real, while none the less a divinely-given true, real, and effectual satisfaction is obtained through the Mediator, whom the gospel announces as the purport of its glad tidings. 3. Again, the expiatory satisfaction, which we cannot make of ourselves, or the atonement, cannot be accomplished by the divinely-given Mediator as Prophet. First, not by mere teaching. For, since the purport of this teaching could not be a paternal goodness that is neither holy nor just, it must, in any case, propose a pure moral ideal that addresses its elevating demands to us, and would therefore result in accusation rather than atonement. But were it said : " The God-pleasing, and therefore expiating and satisfying nature of Christ's mediatorship lies in His personal, typical manifestation, so far as the contemplation of it originates a new life in us," this would presuppose that a stimulating of our moral strength suffices for our reconciliation, whereas what is needed is not merely and primarily amendment for the future, but, as shown, the purifying of our present from the guilt of our past. Nor, for the same reason, can the Kingly power of the Mediator, which imparts strength in order to sanctification, . by itself alone do what is requisite. The Priestly intervention of the Mediator with the Father is necessary for us and our guilt. Can we, then, say with some distinguished teachers, that He is the medium of God's forgiving grace, by becoming the principle of repentance to the world, inasmuch as in His suffering innocently at the hands of the world, the sin of the world has revealed itself in its horror-striking criminality? But, in this case, the properly atoning element would be the act of our repentance. As certainly as the latter ever remains imperfect, so certainly also would atonement ever remain defective, nay, mere possibility. Nor would the case be essentially changed if Christ came into view as supplementing 102 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. our imperfect abhorrence of evil and defective repentance (see above, p. 72). Even then the Mediator would be merely the principle of sanctification, which still, as often remarked, needs atonement as its presupposition. On these terms we could never rejoice in atonement as accomplished and availing for us. Nor, for the same reason, can it suffice to find the atonement in this, that through all sufferings and assaults the Mediator stands approved before God in purity and fidelity, both re presenting pure humanity before God, and becoming also the efficient beginning of a new humanity, so that His existence forms a security to God that He may forgive without danger of thereby multiplying sin. For even this would lead back to the position, that God forgives for the sake of the possibly future sanctification, which yet remains insecure and uncertain on account of moral freedom. Forgiveness, consequently, must of necessity remain in uncertainty. The proved fidelity of the Mediator in His calling can only come into considera tion here, provided His calling is not merely His own personal sanctification and fidelity, but provided that calling brings Him into the closest, and only by this means mediatorial, fellowship of doing and suffering with the race. The Mediator must be able, by force of vicarious love, to regard and treat our sin and guilt as affecting Him. Not indeed in the sense that He knows and feels it as His personal guilt, for this would either be contrary to truth, or, instead of being Mediator, He would be one of those needing redemption. Just as little, certainly, can He wish to stand to our sin and guilt in the relation of Judge. But His satisfac tion, in order to be expiatory, must have a definite reference to our sin, guilt, and penal desert. The question is, wherein this reference consists, in order that it may be able to make expiation for us ? In the first place, it must be conceded that the guilt cannot be treated on the footing of civil law like a debitum which Christ pays for the believer (either to Satan or God), not because too much importance would thereby be attributed to the work of Christ or to sin, but too little, and because too mean an idea of both, as well as of God's justice, would in this case be held. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 103 The theory of injuria also, and of a tribute of homage to be paid to God, is insufficient, inasmuch as it proceeds on the supposition that nothing is in question but a private matter, a personal pacifying of God, to say nothing of the, universal necessity of justice as an essential aspect of the ethical generally.1 Moreover, just as little can compensation in accordance with the jus talionis, which runs : " Eye for eye, tooth for tooth," be put in the place of the absolute theory of punishment so called, which was established in the Doctrine of God.2 This most rudimentary, nay, most barbarous form of administering justice, was transcended even by Anselm in his supposition, certainly in an unsatisfactory way, of a divine exchange by way of satisfaction, this exchange raising Christ's voluntary sufferings, which were not due from Him, to the dignity of a good work that makes satisfaction to God. Instead of identity between the punishment and the ruin incurred, the only requisite is, that the imperial rights of the divine justice be not infringed. The divine justice has no pleasure in the suf fering of the creature as such, it is no thirst for revenge ; suffer ing is no end in itself to God, but justice ; and nothing is sought primarily by divine punishment but the good of the satisfaction of justice. In the previous historico-critical investigation, we have already alluded to the untenableness of this com pensation-theory. On the one hand, in reference to Christ's high-priesthood, it asserts too much of His suffering in seeking to point out a distinct suffering of Christ by way of penal compensation for eveiy kind of evil human acts. He did not endure all possible, especially physical, sufferings which men have inflicted on one another, and thus endure compensatory punishment corresponding to the different sins of men. Especially was it impossible for Him to endure the actual torments of hell, for eternity is part of the punishment of hell, and the misery of despair because of its unalterableness. Further, eternal damnation is no part of the common punish- 1 The counterpart to this is the truth in the so-called Governmental theory, which goes back to the moral government of the world. Only the moral govern ment of the world must be conceived as the divine government, and be grounded in God's essence, which as the primary ethical is also the universal ethical principle, which must assert itself and guard its own honour. * Vol. i. p. 300 f. 104 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. ment, because before the preaching of the gospel God does not visit sins with damnation, while for the sin of definitive unbelief Christ could not intend to intervene with a view to atonement. Speaking generally, no individual person would be 'able in a limited measure of time to ex perience all possible outward sufferings by way of expiatory compensation. But, on the other hand — and this is still more important — this theory affirms too little of Christ's suffering. In placing the physical sufferings as the chief matter in the centre of view, whereas others have endured similar physical sufferings, it pays too little regard to Christ's spiritual sufferings, which alone were incomparably severe. Further, the application of the jus talionis or of compensation would give encouragement to a piecemeal way of considering sin, guilt, and punishment, as well as the sufferings of Christ. Moreover, this mode of consideration would involve the danger that forgiveness might be asserted by man as a legal claim, after the penalty had been paid for him in the way of compensation (see above, p. 29), so that the atonement would conclude with the objective fact of the payment of the debt, instead of proving the fruitful commencement of a subjective process. But in this way Christ's work of atonement would not set in motion a moral and religious process, but introduce a mechanical, lifeless, essentially negative settlement. Moreover, mere com pensation would by no means give what is requisite to the cancelling of guilt and punishment. A criminal who has paid the penalty to the State, is not thereby restored to the full integrity of his personal honour. Public confidence remains still withheld. Even in respect of the Mediator, it is not merely requisite that He submit to suffering, as if some expiatory power lay in this material element. The special requisite must refer to the righteous disposition in which He bears the suffering. That suffering must be related to God's just displeasure with its effects. It must be assumed with a righteous disposition and an absolute, voluntary surrender to suffering, which prefers even to sacrifice life rather than leave the guilt of humanity on the one hand, and the divine justice on the other, without expiation. The sacrifice of life has its significance as a palpable proof of unreserved surrender both DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 105 to the humanity which has to be reconciled, and to God's inviolable, sacred justice. This surrender has as its conse quence the restoration of communion on God's part. On the other hand, an external atonement for guilt by a correspon dent, external, substitutionary penal suffering would not imply a new and positive relation of God to mankind in communion and life, or the converse. The measurement of the sufferings pertaining to the Mediator by the quantum of debts and merited penalties, and therefore the application of the cate gory of quantum to establish the idea of satisfaction or ex piation, is for these reasons unsatisfactory. An arithmetical calculation and counter- calculation are inadequate to the matter here treated of (see above, p. 29). Instead of the external, extensive mode of consideration, the internal inten sive mode must be applied, both in reference to guilt and punishment, and to Christ's merit. Christ's merit is not measurable by weight and number, because it is of infinite worth, and a potency intensively infinite by reason of the high dignity of the divine -human Person — the Head of humanity, and by reason of the depth of His spontaneous descent into our condition, and the purity of His life and pas sion. Conversely, the common sin and guilt have their gravity in this, that they are directed against an infinite good, although not with the energy of a will absolutely opposed to law, and therefore not with absolute depravity; for otherwise even the capacity of redemption would ' be gone. Just so we have a right, nay, are under an inner necessity, to advance in refer ence to punishment also from the external quantitative to the intensive mode of consideration. We have seen that the pith and centre of the divine punishment, as well as the source of all further penal evils, is the divine displeasure hanging over the sinner as such. Were that displeasure the last word, it would beget in the man conscious of it a misery with which no external suffering, measurable by quantity, would bear com parison ; for the true feeling of this displeasure is the feeling of impending perdition, of exclusion from the source of sal vation and life, the feeling of abandonment by God. When really awakened, it is the real and terrible feeling of death, with which nothing else can be compared. Of what nature, then, must the satisfaction or expiation be, 106 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. in order to effect a reconciliation down to the depths of the conscience, and restore living, unfettered, paternal communion ? The Mediator will not merely know the sin of the world in its culpability, and with an incorruptible sense of truth con demn it as a dishonouring of God, but in virtue of substitu tionary love will feel with intensest pain the guilt of the world as affecting Him. In loving sympathy for us He will feel and bear the penal desert of sin, in a word, feel and bear its curse that lies upon us, and the justice of the divine displeasure with us. To this displeasure, He will give the honour due to it in everything which it does and will do, in order by what he does and suffers to vindicate its eternal truth and sacred majesty. Wherever the divine displeasure is not merely known, but its earnestness and justice are also sincerely acknowledged, accompanied with a sense of misery and the feeling that this displeasure is the just source of all other possible evils ; wher ever, finally, unconditional and willing submission to the divine judgment is found, there God's just displeasure is propitiated, there God may forgive and again impart His favour to man ; for therewith the inviolable holiness of the divine justice is again established in its rights among men, and the unreserved submission to its judgment in thought, feeling, and will is an expiatory satisfaction to it. But all this is impossible to humanity before Christ. Even supposing it to have at least an imperfect knowledge of the divine displeasure, it is still without the power to submit to this judgment with the full sense of culpability. Instead of doing this, it flees from an angry God as from a gloomy, hostile, unjust power, either by diminishing its guilt by thoughts of self-righteousness, or by despondency and despair when the accusation of conscience waxes loud, and therefore by disbelieving the divine love, which in its character of holiness requires unreserved self- surrender and submission to justice. But what is impossible to man is achieved by the divine- human Mediator, because He sympathizingly takes our place, and by His person and work represents to God the expiatory power of humanity. Observation.— Having considered, on the one hand, the idea of substitution and its sphere in general, and investigated DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 107 next what is requisite for an expiation in order to divine justice being pacified and satisfaction made in respect of the sin and guilt of humanity, we come now to the THIRD ARTICLE : THE SUBSTITUTIONARY SATISFACTION OF JESUS CHRIST. 1. Subjective Aspect. § 122a. Christ makes God's eternal purpose of atonement (§ 119) His own in suffering obedience, in order to give effect to that purpose in the world, and therewith to the divine inter- blending of Justice and Love. The means by which Christ carries out this His subjective purpose of atone ment is, that His divine love or substitutionary dispo sition transfers itself into the place of humanity, in order with absolute surrender and acquiescence in suffering to bear in His own sense of suffering the divine displeasure against the sin and guilt of humanity, in order to manifest His saving love even in face of God's punitive justice. . 1. We stand here before the sacred shrine of humanity — the Atonement. Hence it behoves us in a quite special sense to bear in mind, that here are depths which no thoughts and words of man can exhaust, depths of holy sorrow in the Redeemer, and also treasures of divine blessing and peace, which, springing from the cross, continually move and animate the heart of Christendom. Every epoch of the Church has had glimpses of or beheld rays or aspects of these depths and this wealth ; and glowing discourse and hymnology, as well as contemplation and theology, have from the Church's beginning, with the understanding of the heart, lost themselves in the rela tions which here crowd and intertwine together. But our age has above others the gift for apprehending the natural connec tion of what otherwise lies dispersed or apparently in hostile relations, and for uniting in one image those elements of truth 108 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. which have so far developed themselves. Having considered God's eternal purpose of atonement, and next the idea of Sub stitution and of the requisite Satisfaction in general, the possi bility of substitutionary forces and their need, principally in reference to the divine displeasure against the common sin and guilt of the race, the effect of which is common punishment, we proceed now to Christ's historical work of Atonement. Here, above all, the uniqueness of His personality comes into consideration, in which the possibility is given of that per sonality sacrificing itself for the race in the unique way which the race needs. Everywhere, it is true, the innermost heart of love must be defined to be the substitutionary disposition and the desire to transfer itself by sympathy and communicativeness into the place of another, to identify another as an end with itself, in order to make itself a means for his sake. In accordance with this we see substitutionary forces in different spheres, in the case of parents, teachers, husbands and wives, kinsmen, fellow-countrymen. But Christ's substitutionary disposition must be determined by the uniqueness of His person, thus distinguishing itself from all others. True, the equality with us, without which that disposition would be im possible, exists completely in Him. He is true man, belong ing integrally to our genus. But, in addition, by the indwelling of the Logos or God as the Son, He has absolutely universal significance.1 In Him dwells the perfect knowledge,2 which comprehends both the depths of the divine holiness and justice, and also the common sin and guilt of humanity, and its just penal subjection to the divine displeasure. This universal knowledge in Him is based on His perfect holiness and absolute unity with God, which stood its ground in the fiercest attacks of the powers of darkness in His conflict of soul in Gethsemane and in the dark hours on Golgotha. But His undisturbed unity with God was also the source of His love for humanity. This love, as universal as that 1 Cf. Rothe's Nachgelassene Pred. vol. ii. p. 137. Jahrb. f. deut. Theol. 1858, p. 754, 770 f. Marheinecke, Dogm. p. 369 ff. Martensen, p. 285 ff. 2 Martensen says aptly, p. 277 : Although Christ's knowledge is not all- knowledge, it is nevertheless perfect knowledge. This antithesis between the unlimited and limited in His knowledge is only solved by the idea of central knowledge. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 109 knowledge, with absolute purity and strength embraces entire humanity and every burden lying on it. He is to humanity like a central conscience, the heart, so to speak, in its organism, the sensorium commune for all its suffering, especially for its spiritual wretchedness. Although an individual, He still suffered and lived what He was, suffered and lived as an individual in the spirit of the Whole and for the Whole. Through His calling, which was not arbitrarily assumed, but involved in the uniqueness of His Person, He has not merely a relation to a particular circle of life, but within humanity is that member who has a primary relation to all, as all have to Him. But this relation points, above all, to the centre of all true, human life — divine communion. Thus His sympathy, which is not merely natural, but moral, was able to penetrate to the inmost depths of human need and suffering, embracing all persons and their needs. Let us see, then, how this substitutionary position of Christ is carried out in reality. Observation. — The old controversy, whether the active or merely the passive obedience of Christ is to be included in His high-priestly office, is not settled by our saying, with J. Gerhard : omnis Actio Christi fuit passiva et omnis Passio fuit activa. In reference to the atonement of sin and guilt, — sins of commission and omission, — Christ's suffering comes first into consideration as a special act indispensable to expiation, although, in order to making satisfaction, it must be grounded in the strength of the positive, holy disposition that enters into God's will.1 2. Love seeks not its own ; the stronger it is, the greater its impulse to make another's case, especially another's burden, its own. To a mother's love the child's suffering is more painful than its own would be ; she would gladly bear the pain for her child. Now in Christ such love lived in unique fashion, stronger than death. In contrast with Him, all humanity stood laden with guilt. He consciously dis tinguishes Himself from the world of sinners, but not in 1 Similarly Frank, System d. chr. Wahrh. ii. § 35. The same lies at the basis of Anselm's theory. But it is very well consistent therewith, that Christ's active obedience also, apart from Christ's suffering, is of the highest importance, chiefly as security for the sanctification of believers. 110 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. order to exalt Himself in the act of judgment and condemna tion above it, but in order in love to identify Himself with it in its need of Him. His love shrinks not from the seemingly impossible ; He Himself desires, at the cost of participating in the unhappiness of the race, to sacrifice Him self for it, and, infinitely more than this, Himself to feel the divine displeasure and the unhappiness answering to it. Christ bears this feeling of unhappiness, not in order to spare mankind the sense of God's just displeasure in general, but in order to deprive the penitent sorrow, which cannot and ought not to be spared, of the character of hopelessness and despair as well as of imaginary meritOriousness, and to impart to it an evangelical instead of a legal character, because, instead of shrinking from God, that sorrow has to take its stand on the ground of atonement already accom plished. Many expositors have taken offence at the question, how Paul could wish 1 to be an avdOejia for his brethren after the flesh ; and yet this is a mere spark of the spirit of that substitutionary love which springs from the altar of the cross, from the fire of love which kindled holy flames in the martyrs.2 But the following objection is made to the Evangelical doctrine: It is not satisfied with Christ's substitutionary disposition, His sympathy with us, but places Him in relation to the divine penal justice (opytf). But this, it is alleged, is something abrupt, and implies a super-historical, purely mysterious transaction, — a compact between Christ and the Father, which is neither mediated historically nor con firmed exegetically. The pragmatic, historical mediation of Christ's passion and death, and its necessity, is clearly apparent, but it has no direct relation to God's punitive justice and atonement. The ecclesiastical doctrine would imply an artificial enigma or mystery in arraigning Christ before the throne of the Father in order to let Him — the Son of His love — be judged and punished by the Father, whereas the Gospels tell us indeed of Christ's suffering through sinners, but not of a God-reconciling suffering for sinners. To all this it must be answered: Certainly, as already seen, the Son could not be the personal object of the 1 Rom. ix. 1 ff. * Col. i. 24. Cf. Luke xii. 49 ; Gal. iii. 13. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 1 ] 1 Father's wrath or displeasure. He was and remained well- pleasing to God even in His act of substitution, nay, on account of it. Moreover, in His unselfish surrender, no givin« up of His moral personality is to be seen, no confounding of His person with that of men, for even His feeling could contain nothing untrue. The substitution for us can be no commutatio personarum. He does not Himself become the sinful personality. But as concerns the Scripture statements, it is undeniable that Christ attributed to His passion and death a divine necessity, a connection with the forgiveness of sin.1 In the next place, it is certainly necessary to place the pragmatic or historical necessity of His passion and death in more intimate connection than is commonly done with its divine necessity in order to atonement,2 to exhibit the transition from His outer and inner sufferings through men to His sufferings for them, and, finally, to recognise how the holy relation to humanity coincides in His heart with His living relation to the holy, just, and loving God, and how His relation to God is more closely defined by His sympathy with men. But it is also possible to show all this approxi mately. In any case, this task is incumbent on Theology. Let us then attempt to reconcile these claims, and that in such a way as to exclude everything magical and abrupt. 3. Christ's atoning passion is not something arbitrary and abrupt, which came upon Him by surprise, and placed Him, in opposition to the Father and His judgment, altogether outside and apart from the action of historical causes. He came into these sufferings on the one hand by historical necessity, on the other by divine necessity, combining both in His historical, divinely-given calling. His passion was an official act, to which He gave a relation to divine justice not arbitrarily, but of necessity, by recognising in that which befell Him a connection with God's punitive justice or displeasure with humanity, while presenting an expiation to God by the manner in which He bore His sufferings. Even by the Incarnation Jesus entered in a general sense into the fellowship of physical and social evils, which inflicted 1 John iii. 14 ff., vi. 51, xvii. 19 ; Mark x. 45 ; Matt. xx. 28, xxvi. 28 ; Luke xii. 50, cf. xxii. 20. 2 Kreibig's discussions on this point are good (pp. 207-248). 112 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. sufferings on Him which He willingly endured. He became poor for our sakes, and took a servant's form, whilst He might have possessed glory.1 He did not so regard these sufferings of humanity, in which He took part, as if they included the real evil from which humanity needed first to be delivered. His gaze is directed above all to the sin and guilt, which are the greatest of evils. He sees in the entire sum of the world's suffering its connection with the sin which by divine appointment brings in its train evils and punishment upon sinners. Whoever commits sin is the servant of sin. Thus He sees in these evils a revelation already of the divine justice, effects of the divine displeasure ; and, entering without guilt into the fellowship of sinners, with willing and loving mind He allows this common punish ment to trouble and smite Him. Out of the heavy sufferings and afflictions besetting Him, the outer and inner degeneracy of the people without a shepherd, out of the power of death among mankind, the consciousness grew upon Him that humanity is in a state of bondage, that harmful powers hold sway over it,2 in a word, that it is in a state of punishment from which it needs to be redeemed. But although His sympathy with humanity and His suffering through fellowship with sinners ran through His whole life, still His atoning passion was not spread uniformly over His whole life. Rather, through the pragmatic, historical de velopment of His life it came to pass, that at the close of His life He came into such relation with the sin of the world as became to Him the point of transition to. a high- priestly suffering in the stricter sense, a suffering for the sin of the world. That participation in the common evil or dained by God to sin was for Him the condition of entrance into our fellowship. His love and patience are therein revealed. But it was a new thing, that at the close of His life the sin of the Gentile and Jewish world conspired against Him, consigning Him to a transgressor's shameful death, a new thing that by His manifestation sin was com pelled to disclose its innermost nature — falsehood and hate, murderous spite against the Just One, whilst He repaid this hate with the power of propitiatory love. By His word and 1 2 Cor. viii. 9 ; Heb. xii. 2. * John xi. 33-38, xiv. 30. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION. 113 His holy, pure manifestation He bore witness to the sin of the world, He discovered to it the falsehood in which it seeks to hide itself, in order as the Physician to heal its sickness. But the world sought to get rid of the Physician in order to assert itself. Because He was pure amid the impure, and had no part in sin, therefore the world grew more and more averse and hostile to Him, and treated His existence as a personal accusation, against which it fortified itself by arrogance leagued with falsehood. For no one could long remain indifferent in presence of such a manifestation. Whoever refused to be for Him, must of necessity be against Him. The necessary consequence of His manifestation was to initiate a crisis for those with whom He came into con tact. The catastrophe which the crisis must also bring upon Him He early foresaw, and prepared His disciples for the persecution and hatred of the world,1 neither promising them easy victory nor glory. In the same way, too, the thought of the divine judgments hanging over the nation, especially in the last days, filled His consciousness.2 In the blindness with which His foes turned against the health-bringing Physician He sees a consequence of their sin, which shut itself up in self-contentment and pride against Him. He foresees that, if the nation refuses to awake and be warned, a terrible judgment awaits Jerusalem, and weeps over the city, for which He is distressed even on the way to Golgotha. Nor could He be other than conscious of the condemnation it incurred by the fact that, instead of letting itself be saved, it raised its presumptuous hand against its Redeemer. The sin that rejected Him must continue ever to bring forth new sins till the fatal point is reached.3 But He had first of all to pass through the catastrophe, which was to befall Him, in His inner consciousness. For this end He won by hard struggles the high-priestly attitude of soul in the spiritual conflict in Gethsemane.4 He must also learn in actual ex perience how humanity strove to fling Him away from it, and on its part in sinful blindness to sever every bond of fellowship with Him. For, however conflicting and divided the world of sinners otherwise is, here Herod and Pilate — 1 Matt. v. 10-12, x. 16. 2 Matt, xxiii. -xxv. ; Luke xxiii. 31. 3 Matt, xxiii. 35. • Matt. xxvi. 36 ff. Dorner. — Christ. Doct. iv. H 114 THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT. the Gentile and Jewish worlds — united to persecute. Him who stood in contrast with them — alone and forsaken in His holiness. The sin of the Gentile and Jewish worlds — and therefore the sin of the world — here revealed itself in its fundamental forms, confronting Him in typical shape. How does He behave in its presence ? All the sufferings in flicted on Him personally — physical and spiritual — stir in Him no thought of retaliation,1 no movement of desire for God's power and judgment to interfere and revenge Him by punishing the evil-doers. On the contrary, although what He suffers at the hands of men brings home to Him the depth and extent of the sin and guilt of the world, which He views in connection with the Prince of the world, He is far from yielding to bitterness, or wishing to assume the attitude of Judge towards sinners. He regards them as exposed to the divine condemnation, and even their rebellious hatred against Him who is conscious of being their king, is to Him, in virtue of the purity of His love, a challenge to His sympathy, a motive to redouble the ties of fellowship on His part and to constitute Himself their intercessor.2 " Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do ! " In such deep compassion and sympathy He feels their sin and guilt more than His own suffering. Nay, sorrow for them, this sympathy not merely with their wretchedness, but their guilt and penal desert, is through His self-forgetting devotion His deepest suffering, the heart of that suffering. He knows their wretchedness better than they. He knows what they know not in their conduct, that they stand under God's displeasure and condemnation3 for hating and reproach ing Him. He enters into this condemnation of theirs in feeling, sorrowfully acknowledging it to be just in His deepest soul, and so far therefore subjecting Himself to the divine con demnation, which He recognises.4 Whilst His body and soul 1 1 Pet. ii. 23 ; Heb. xii. 3. 2 Luke xxiii. 28, 34. a Luke xxii. 53. * When we speak, with the Epistle to the Hebrews, of His sympathy (/ca set up, and man is restored to his freedom. This freedom is now able to make the decisive resolve of life, and in filial surrender to perform the act of faith which affirms the design of pre venient grace presenting itself, first of all, in the form of forgiveness. Thus is it possible without violence or magical working to restore freedom in the natural man, who lacked DIVINE GRACE AND HUMAN ACTIVITY. 183 it in spiritualibus, of course by divine action, and therefore in a supernatural way; and thereby Manichasism and absolute Predestinationism, whether in a particular or uni versal form, as well as Pelagianism, Semi-Pelagianism, and Synergism, are excluded. Accordingly, the relation between divine and human activity in the work of salvation is in general terms as fobows : — The beginning starts from the divine, but in such a way that human activity is set in action by God, partly stimulated, partly evoked anew. The divine activity is also continuous, not effective in the beginning merely. In the sphere of gratia prceparans God brings about the awakening of better move ments in man himself in feebng, knowledge, and volition. In doing this all divine action is originative of action. StiU more is this true in the sphere of precursory grace, where the soul is brought into relation to Christ. There grace, or Christ, is able more and more by the Holy Spirit to reveal itself, and draw near step by step to man, always in such a way that the talent already given to man has to operate in order to restore susceptibibty for higher gifts.1 Every new step is taken with a good conscience; every rejection of the new enlightening, awakening, and stimulating influence takes place against con science. But finally, grace wib and must lead to a decisive turning-point. If grace has wrought hitherto through single rays, these must at last converge to a living focus in the will. The soul must become a mirror, in which the complete image of Christ as the Mediator is received. There Christ acquires a higher significance than that of a Teacher and Pattern, namely a rebgious significance demanding the full surrender of the soul. He must then either become more to man than He was before, or less, because that which He claims is not conceded to Him. This turning-point is called into existence by the setting forth of Christ as the Atoner, or by the preaching of the forgiveness of sins for Christ's sake. This is the culminating-point of Christ's prevenient, intervenient action upon man prior to the faith, that God's favour and forgiveness are offered to him for Christ's sake. 3. Calling and Election. — Calling (vocatio) is universal, for the divine purpose of redemption is just as universal as the 1 Matt. xiii. 12. 184 ORIGIN OF CHURCH. need and capacity of redemption, so that the notion of a divine decree to pass by a portion of mankind, and to restore freedom of decision only to the rest, is out of the question. Christianity can only put everything in the way of decision, and introduce the Judgment on condition that sooner or later this goal at least is certainly and inevitably reached in the case of all, that they know what they are doing in rejecting Christianity, and that the wrong decision is not forced upon them by outward influences or by the power of inherited evil The restoration of the possibility of a free decision for Christianity is required by the ethical character of the process introduced by Christianity, and by the personal responsibibty, without which least of all could the ultimate worth of any one be determined. But if in this way freedom of decision is again established by Christianity and incorporated with the saving process itself, the question arises, whether this gain is not bought too dearly, whether with the admission of freedom a permanent insecurity as to salvation is not estab lished. Such insecurity would leave no place for an abiding state of grace, and a settled assurance of salvation. Both would be constantly 'threatened by the vacillations of human freedom. Such a doctrine of permanent insecurity as to salvation would be in contradiction to the N. T. as well as to the Christian's need. According to John, they who fall away did not really belong to Christ and His people.1 Paul knows that the crown of righteousness is reserved for him.2 The Apocalypse speaks of a Book of Life, in which bebevers are entered, and of their new name.8 Christians are said to be sealed to the day of redemption, i.e. of Christ's second coming.4 None can pluck the sheep from the Good Shepherd's hand.5 A Paul, a John, the Reformers, knew from experience what strength, what source of confidence lay in knowing themselves eternally saved, what a motive to gratitude and guarding of self. Hence they were unwilling to give up the certainty of election. But how does this agree with the restoration of freedom by Christianity? Does not this freedom form an express contradiction to the idea of election altogether, so that the idea must be dropped and merely a divine foreknowledge 1 1 John ii. 19. » 2 Tim. iv. 8. 3 Rev. ii. 17, iii. 8, xvii. 8, xxi. 27. • Eph. iv. 30, i. 13 ; 2 Cor. i. 22. 6 John x. 28. Similarly Rom. viii. 29-39. DIVINE GRACE AND HUMAN ACTIVITY. 185 of the final fidelity of the one class be put in its place ? Frequently, as in later days in the Lutheran Church, the divine foreknowledge, in opposition to the Form. Cone, has been put in the place of election, and the assurance of sal vation limited more and more simply to a certainty of the present state of grace; still it is inadmissible according to Scrip ture, as web as according to the assertion of the Christian consciousness, to deny the idea of election altogether, or to suppose the insecurity of the state of grace perpetuated by freedom. Election in the broader sense is already involved in calling generaby. For although the call to salvation, and the power to decide in its favour, must come to all in due course, still all are not called at the same time. Rather the order of succession is determined by a divine election, which extends to nations and individuals. And the caUed are all cabed to salvation ; not merely the beginning, but also the completion of salvation is designed for all by divine faithfulness. As called, they are set apart or elected to believe and be saved But of course this election does not secure to man an actual share in the salvation offered to him in caUing. There is no election ex cluding freedom of acceptance or rejection, and replacing it by an almighty volition. But it does not fobow from this, that assurance of salvation must be imperilled by freedom, or still less that uncertainty as to the state of grace must be perpetu ated. Rather, according to Scripture, there is an election in the stricter sense.1 Holy Scripture teaches the eternal election of believers before the foundation of the world.2 The restoration of freedom by no means implies that the trust of the Christian is placed in this freedom. The Christian puts his trust not in the strength and stability of his personal faith of itself, but in God's unchangeable fidebty, which will not leave unfinished the good work begun, but will guard and conduct it right through the human weakness, of whose continued influence His foreknowledge took account even in the act of forgiving. But in the next place, it is a false conception of the nature of the freedom restored, to suppose that it can always just as 1 John xiii. 18 ; Matt. xxii. 14, xxiv. 22, 24 ; 1 John v. 4 ; 2 Pet. i. 10 ; Rom. xi. 28. J Eph. i. 4-11. 186 ORIGIN OF CHURCH. easily fab away from Christ as remain in fellowship with Him. The regenerate man cannot abuse his freedom eternaby. There is no such thing indeed even for him as a fatalistic necessity, a compulsion to goodness ; sin is still possible to him. But regeneration produces a real change in his heart and its inclinations. It does not leave his freedom as a vacillating power of choice, equaUy open to opposite possi bilities always and for ever (liberum arbitrium indifferentice). Such formal freedom is perhaps a point of transition, but not the goal. The result of the moral process is real freedom. Such freedom is coeval as to principle with regeneration, which implants a divine 0-irkpy.a ; and so far as it exists, such freedom works for good. Even where a momentary subjection to the remains of sin is found, there is connected therewith an inner resistance to sin, so that sin in the regenerate man remains distinct in nature from sin in the unregenerate, even if this fact should be hidden from consciousness. This resist ance makes itself felt again in regret and penitent self-renewal. That the saved in the next world can no longer fall from grace, is universally believed ; and yet no one wiU say on this account that they have lost then- freedom. But Paul and John know and extol £w^ almvioi in this world also, although in weakness. But he who fabs entirely was never truly regenerate. The new creature is a being immortal in nature. It is true, indeed, that the believer is conscious in the first instance of his present state of grace. But his future does not for this reason be in an uncertain, anxious obscurity. A mere hope of future blessedness, unaccompanied by any con fident certainty as to the future state of salvation, would not be Christian hope at ab. The assurance is immanent in the consciousness of reconcbiation, that according to God's gracious purpose the reconciliation and justification of man are final, that nothing, " neither things present nor things to come, can separate us from the love of God in Christ." Among these "things to come" must be the frailty, which continues to operate in the believer against his will. It belongs to the very nature of faith to commit itself with courage and full confidence to God's power and love. On the other hand, the torment of uncertainty would be perpetuated and be a hin drance to spiritual growth, if we were forced to rely only upon REPENTANCE. 187 our own freedom and its faithfid use for the assurance of our salvation in the future. Man's chief concern no doubt should be, by fidelity and resistance to unbelief to remain perpetually in the present state of grace. Bebef in a fate-bke decretum electionis might easby betray him into indolence, presumption, self-exaltation. The divine election rather impbes, that the state of grace, like everything living, is preserved by means of an active secondary causality — by means of perpetual self- renewal. But the divine purpose of grace need not for this reason be vacillating, nor the divine election uncertain. On all these grounds a union of the apparently clashing interests — of human freedom and stability of divine grace and gracious election — is possible. We are able to leave the necessary place to freedom, and yet speak of a certainty as to the state of grace by God's help, of an election of believers. The regenerate are the elect also in the stricter sense, although not without the medium of their free decision. The election of bebevers to eternal life does not resolve itself into a mere foreknowledge of the stabbity of their faith, and of their per sonal fidelity ; but as they have really performed the decisive act of faith, so is it always in the last resort the grace laid hold of by them, its strength and fidebty, by which they are guarded and preserved from an entire apostasy from grace. Observation. — The doctrine of the appropriation of salvation divides into the three points : Repentance or Change of Mind, Regeneration through the faith that appropriates Justification, and Sanctification. FIRST POINT : REPENTANCE OR CHANGE OF MIND. § 131. The Christian method of salvation requires a state of prepara tion, for regeneration (§ 130). That preparation consists on the divine side in the Calling (vocatio externa et interna) or Invitation to salvation, which refers indeed to all spiritual blessings, but has for its primary contents the justification of the sinner before God by grace. The effect of this calling on man's side is Illumination 188 ORIGIN OF CHURCH. respecting law and sin (i.e. the need of justification), as web as respecting the righteousness offered in Christ; the Feeling of personal guilt and penal desert ; and the Awakening of the will to seek righteousness before God. These elements constitute together the nature of the penitent mind, which however in its maturity is simply receptiveness for salvation in the form of longing after a divinely-given righteousness. Observation. — In this threefold v Illumination, Sense of Gubt, Awakening," is produced subjective receptiveness for Christ in that threefold office of His, which averts the three fold evil, from which redemption is necessary, — error, guilt, sin.1 1. The New Testament in unison with the Old Testament requires first of all fierdvota, reconsideration, inner turning of the disposition from the abnormal direction to the normal commencing- or starting-point. Hence with this conversion is connected the becoming a chbd again.2 Right self-knowledge, united with sincerity, produces 3 acknowledgment of gubt and penal desert, sorrow and mourning, and this is associated with confession of sin.4 2. The terminology in use before the Reformation under stood by pcenitentia both the sacrament of penance, and, in harmony with this, the whole of conversion, penitence, con fession, and satisfaction by works, including justification While the Reformation repudiated the necessity of confession to the priest and satisfaction by works, it left for a time the name of pcenitentia to the entire work of conversion, including repentance and faith.6 The modern terminology fobowed by us distinguishes repentance and faith as two elements, understanding by repentance regret or change of mind. Now 1 § 61, vol. ii. p. 202. 2 Matt, xviii. 3 ; Acts iii. 19, 26, xx. 21, xxvi. 18. Wifrfifi,,, trTpipiTi,t •iarefyiZfrxi. Cf. Vol. i. § 11. 6 Penance as a making satisfaction pushed faith into the background, reducing it to mere notitia, perhaps along with assensus. 6 Cf. Conf. Aug. xii., Apol vi. de Pcenitentia. REPENTANCE. 189 this is brought about on the objective side by ab that which is included in calling.1 But calling is the arrangement by which the gospel approaches man from without through the means of grace, and also brings influence to bear on him inwardly that he may believe (vocatio externa et interna). Faith comes by preaching.2 A false universalism speaks of reconciliation and regeneration, of a share in that which forms the contents of Christianity, even outside Christendom apart from connection with the word of Christ. But as there can be no knowledge of the historic by purely inward, but only by historical means, this would be to depreciate the historic manifestation of Christ. Hence the Reformation rejects Enthusiasm or Fanaticism so called, which seeks salvation extra verbum by a sort of inner magic, and denies the necessity of the external mediation of Christian grace (vocatio externa)? But no less does the Evangelical Church reject also the notion of an outer magic, e.g. of magical force, of means of grace administered by the priesthood, which are supposed to act ex opere operato. The power of spiritual efficiency does not belong dnectly to the outward and sensuous.4 Faith does not come by preaching directly through the power and influence of the outward sound. The heart of man must first be set to work and excited to activity. The Word has its effect on feebng and will only when it is received into the perceptive spirit, and the understanding is opened by the Holy Spirit. We avoid the errors both of outward and inward magic by acknowledging the necessity just as much of inward as of outward calling. 3. But as to contents, the gospel must first work as the objective preaching of repentance, and this involves the ac knowledgment of the law and its rights on the part of the gospel. But, at the same time, the preaching of repentance must not lead away from Christ by legality and a severity that induces despair, or by a superficiality which cares only for immunity from punishment, and not for the removal of gubt and the claims of justice on the guilty. Even the 1 Rom. viii. 30, xkws. 2 Rom. x. 14-17. 3 Cf. Conf. Aug. v., Art. Sm. 331, Apol. 153. 268 ; Form. Cone. 672. 4 Even Word and Sacrament do not act blindly as of themselves, but ubi et quando visum est Deo, Conf. Aug. v., and therefore by an act of divine volition. 190 ORIGIN OF CHURCH. preaching of repentance must wear a Christian character, of which prophecy in the 0. T. was already a beginning. To preach repentance is to take the right path, because Christ is a preacher of repentance. This is possible, for Christianity, as the absolute religion, includes also the law in its contents, and is able out of these contents to evolve the law. But such preaching becomes vocatio (invitation), from the fact that Christ — the personal law, the personal holiness and love — on the one hand intensifies the consciousness of sin by His typical perfection, and by ab that He suffered through sin, and on the other hand causes Himself to be announced as the Saviour, who answers for sin, and through His atoning action and suffering has become the security for the Father's forgiving love. The perfect union of justice and love . given in Christ' leads in the true path of repentance, that through reconciba tion and sanctification man may become a transcript of His justice and love. The crowning-point of the preaching of evangelical repentance and its overwhelming power lie in the proclamation of God's prevenient, humbling grace for Christ's sake, i.e. in this, that it is also the preaching of the reconciliation of the unbebeving world effected by Christ, that the world may believe. 4. This proclamation of the gospel as a salutary preaching of repentance, whbst guarding against Pelagian and Manichsean aberrations of pride, or presumption and despair, works through the Holy Spirit a change in the mind of man. First, illumination respecting sin, gubt, God's hobness and justice — briefly, respecting the need of redemption, especially in the mirror of Christ's image. Secondly, the feeling of unhappiness on account of separa tion from God by guilt and penal desert, "and also the feebng of abhorrence for sin, and of longing to be set free from guilt and sin, i.e. the feeling of penitence. The purer this penitent feeling is, — the more, therefore, that it is not mere sorrow for the consequences of sin — evb, but for sin itself and its guilt in the sight of a just and holy God, the more, In the third place, is the will excited against evb, and the awakening brought about, in which the desire to cast off evil and the resolve to live a better life are formed. The purer the enlightenment and penitence, the less does the awakening REPENTANCE. 191 take the direction of attempts at self-redemption or self- reconciliation. On the contrary, the evangelical preaching of repentance shows, on the one hand, the depth and inveteracy of sin, and therefore the impotence of such attempts, and on the other tells of Christ, the divinely-given means of propitiation — of a forgiveness which is not deserved or inherited by us, but must become our possession by free grace, and which at the same time appears as a law of faith, and demands that we desire the divine help, and submit to be led by the divine grace with the whole strength of our wib. When, then, as the result of this preaching, man fervently desires to make experience of what the gospel makes known, the inwardly- working cab draws to Christ, and the restored freedom has a counterpoise to doubt and unbelief in the inner need on the one hand, and the promises of the evangebcal proclamation on the other. In this way, willingness may pass into the obedi ence of faith, or issue in desire after propitiation and redemption from sin becoming an actual turning to the Redeemer. Observation. — Methodism would bring the occurrence of the elements described, and their order of succession, under a definite rule and uniform method. It seeks to do this by making the sensible experience of sin and grace the centre of the saving process, and using definite methods for evoking that experience. But no such technical method can be prescribed either to the terrores conscientice or to the consolationes evangelii. The one divine grace, sufficient for the totality of the spirit, — understanding, feeling, and will, — lays hold in its working of those sides of the soul which are most open to it, save that of course the same unity must lead in some way to a co-operation of the three sides. It is wrong to require a definite amount of penitent sorrow — a real penitent struggle in every case, although no one can lack it without heavy loss. The amount of sorrow depends on the vitality of the emotional bfe, which differs with the individual, as well as on the degree in which sin has previ ously been manifested in particular acts, which is essentially conditioned by outward circumstances. Deadness of feeling is certainly one form, and a dangerous form, of sinful ab normity, which has to be resisted ; but one person may have come earber into more vital communion with Christ, especially in a Church practising infant baptism, before sin had developed itself in him in a worse form, and therefore 192 ORIGIN OF CHURCH. before it had come to consciousness. For Christ has not a relation to sin merely ; He calls forth a delight, a devoted affection, not merely because He takes away our gubt from us, but also through what He is in Himself, or through the image of His person. Hence a certain faith, a certain love to Christ, is possible even in a child from which real repent ance first springs. Where, then, the image of Christ in His benignity and love has been early imprinted on the heart, or where the rays of His grace so shine upon life's early- dawn that only mitigated forms of sin spring up, there it may happen that the vital communion with Him is never quite broken off; and this will not allow terror at God's justice and holiness to arise, without also His love manifested in Christ in some way reveabng itself to the soul. But certainly, whatever a fortunate youth and education may do, it remains true that birth and regeneration never combine into one element. None is exempted from regeneration; and although there is no necessity for every one to pass first through a period under the exclusive dominion of sin or alienation from God, which would then be precisely marked off from the time when grace attains the dominion, stib no one can be exempted from sorrowfuby gazing down more and more into the might and the ramifications of his own sin, in order that he may consciously and of set purpose die to it. No conscious estabbshed personabty, however, exists, unless it has laid hold of the Atoner in Christ, and obtained, therefore, justification before God through grace, for Christ's sake, as the real basis of its state of grace. The bebef that there is a faith from which true repentance first springs, which the Lutheran Church owes to infant baptism, Calvin, who in general makes pcenitentia, follow fides, owes to the fact that, in the interest of the prevenient character of grace, and in harmony with the doctrine of Predestination, he seeks to derive faith, not from repentance, but simply from the power of God. SECOND POINT : REGENERATION, OR THE FAITH THAT APPROPRIATES JUSTIFICATION. § 132a. When prepared, living receptiveness in man for salvation takes the form of trustful surrender to Christ, or becomes the faith of acceptance (Spyavov X^tttikov^, which is FAITH AND JUSTIFICATION. 193 willing to be determined by Christ's righteousness as the vicarious Mediator, the result is not merely a gracious relation of the reconciled Father to us, or the mere substitution of Christ for us, but a twofold bond between the believer on the one hand, and God the Father and Christ on the other. On the part of man, there is appropriation of Christ and His righteousness, primarily of propitiating grace or justification, in virtue of which our sin is not reckoned to us by God, but forgiven, and the righteousness of Christ is imputed ; and on the part of Christ, real appropriation of man, union of the divine bfe with the human by the power of the Holy Spirit. Since Christ's substitution is productive in nature (§§120, 127), the result of this union through the Holy Spirit is a new, living phenomenon, namely a personabty after the image of God, which is a reflection of the union of the divine and human in Christ. The child of man has thus become the chbd of God. He now has the satisfaction of Christ (§§ 120—122) as his own, and is consequently in real possession of the justification, which before was merely a declaratory offer. The fact of being justified by faith is fobowed, in due course, normaby by the knowledge of justification, or the assurance of salvation. But the communion instituted by faith between Christ and the soul, does not end in participation in reconcilia tion ; but, on the permanent basis of justification in virtue of the same communion, the sanctification, which is the end and fruit of reconcbiation, is developed through the Holy Spirit. Literature (Exegetical).— Wieseler, Comm. z. Galaterbrief, on ii. 16 ff. Meyer, Comm. z. Galaterbrief, 6th ed., by Sieffert. Lipsius, die paulin. Rechffertigungslehre, 1853 (retracted later). Weiss, die bibl. Theol, ed. 3. (Hist, of Dogma) — Literature respecting Andr. Osiander ; Baur, Ritschl, Preger. Schnecken burger, Symbolik der reform. Kirche. (Dogmatic) — MelanctL Loci Th. Corp. Ref. xxi. M. Chemnitius, Loci Th. De Justifica- tione. J. Gerhard, Loci Th. vii. H. Hopfner, De Justificatione Doenek.— Christ. Doot. iv. N 194 origin of church. hominis peccatoris coram Deo, Diss. xii. 1653. Jo. Musaei, Tract. theol. de Conversione hominis peccatoris ad Deum, 1661. A. Calov, Systema, To. x. David Hollaz, Evang. Gnadenordnung in vier Gesprachen, newly edited, Basel 1866. Fresenius, Abh. iiber die Rechtfertigung eines armen Silnders vor Gott, V74!7, 1766, newly edited by A. F. C. Vilmar, 1857. Ph. Dav. Burk, Rechtfertigung und Versicherung, newly edited in an orderly abridgment by E. Kern, 1854. My Address on Justification in Kiel, 1868. V. Zezschwitz, die Rechtfertigung des Silnders vor Gott in ihrem Verhdltniss zur Gnadenwirkung und zur ewigen Erwdhlung (Address at the Luth. Conference in Hanover, 1868, cf. Ritschl, iii. 102). Preuss, die Rechtfertigung des Silnders vor Gott, 1868. The Way of Life made Plain, John Kirk, 16th thousand, 1849, Lect. 3-7, 11. Gloag, A Treatise on Justifica tion by Faith, 1856 (see older English literature, especially by Owen and Davenant, Barlow and Rennet, in Gloag, p. vi.). Gloag, Assurance of Salvation. (Buchanan, The Doctrine of Justification, 1867. O'Brien, The Nature and Effects of Faith.) The Groundwork of a System of Evang. Luth. Theology, by S. Sprechen, Prof, in Wittenberg College, Ohio, 1879, T. i. c. 7, T. ii. c. 10. A. — Biblical Doctrine. The N. T. doctrine is, that we do not obtain forgiveness of sins for the sake of our amendment or sanctification, but conversely, that love grows out of the prevenient, pardoning love of God to the unworthy.1 Even the lost son receives forgiveness before he is approved. The same thought lies in a narrative, which is often regarded as proving the contrary,2 for the parable of the free remission of debt would have no sense, no applicabdity to the case of the sinfid woman, if the meaning were, that her sins were forgiven because of her manifestation of love. Rather, her anointing of the Lord is her thanks for forgiveness received.3 Further, entrance into Christianity takes place not through sanctification, but through baptism for the forgiveness of sins, which is treated in the N. T. as the certain and first fruit of Christian baptism. If 1 1 John iv. 10 ; Rom. v. 8. s Luke vii. 37-50. 3 Ver. 47 must be understood thus : He that loves little shows by this that he has not yet had his sins forgiven, as, conversely, the greatness of a man's love evinces that his many sins are forgiven him. The woman must therefore have received forgiveness from Christ before the meal, for which now she returns thanks as well as she is able. FAITH AND JUSTIFICATION. 195 James derived justification from good works J performed by man before faith in forgiveness, and therefore before baptism, the whole N. T. economy would be abolished and useless. Such an epistle would therefore be without canonicity. But, on the contrary, the epistle assumes that the readers are already Christians,2 — have, therefore, been baptized and re ceived forgiveness, and have opened their hearts to the gospel8 Certainly, according to it, a faith that remains without fruits is merely a pretence.4 But it is Paul who distinguishes justification and sanctification most clearly. He makes holi ness first spring from the peace of reconciliation.8 Unprejudiced exposition now universally acknowledges the Reformation understanding of Pauline doctrine to be correct, whether agreeing with it or not. This very admission implies that the teaching of the Romish and Greek Churches, to the effect that Paul derives forgiveness from faith and works, is a misinterpretation of Pauline doctrine. But what, then, does Holy Scripture understand by the faith on which, as with one voice, it lays the chief stress in reference to the appropria tion of forgiveness ? In the Biblical sense, it is no mere knowledge, stib less a mere opinion in which doubt may exist.6 Further, it has for its object no mere historic fact as such, but God and divine things, to which, although invisible, faith ascends above everything visible.7 More definitely, the object or content of Christian faith is Christ, the Crucified and Risen One.8 Regarded psychologically or formally, faith is related in a positive aspect to man as a unity; it is a matter of the heart.9 On the side of intebigence, it is the positive antithesis to doubt, a receiving and recognizing of 1 Jas. ii. 14-26. 2 Jas. i. 18. a Jas. i. 21. * Jas. ii. 14. But since the epistle has to do with Christians who have been made partakers of forgiveness through faith, it rightly requires that this faith continue operative in the soul, and prove itself permanent, which can only be shown in fruits, in which persevering faith attains to completeness (ver. 22).. At the same time, this fruitfulness of faith has a value in God's eyes, who calls it good and approves it, which is more than mere pardon. Even to James, the gospel, received in faith, remains God's power for good works (i. 18, 21) ; but there is a difference in diligence and sincerity of holiness among believer's, and in correspondence with this the positive divine complacency in man has its stages. 5 Rom. v. 1-11, cf. with vi. HI. 6 Jas. ii. 19, i. 3 ft ' Heb. xi. 1 ; Rom. iv. 17-21. 8 Rom. iv. 25. * Rom. x. 10. • . 196 ORIGIN OF CHURCH. truth as such j1 on the side of will, it is obedience,2 trust* associated with confident security and certainty. The way, then, in which forgiveness is imparted to man, is this : negatively, God does not impute sin to man, so that he no longer stands under condemnation;4 positively, faith is reckoned as righteousness, or righteousness comes by the medium of faith or from it.5 But the meaning is not, that, considered as a subjective virtue, faith is regarded as some thing meritorious because of its excellence, but it has this importance because of its contents — Christ. We are righteous in Christ, as united with Him, which is the same as saying that Christ's righteousness, His substitution, is imputed to us.6 Because, then, the whole Christian salvation is enclosed in Christ's person, faith also has a comprehensive significance, extending to the renewal of the whole man, although the part of this salvation which, in the first instance, blesses man and gives him contentment is Christ's atonement, which has our justification for its effect. But the dominating importance of atonement and justification in Paul might seem to be threatened, if not excluded, by all the passages of the N. T, which place faith in most intimate connection rather with regeneration and adoption, not merely with atonement and justification. For example, according to John, every one who believes is born of God, begotten of divine seed ;7 and Peter and James teach the like.8 But this forms no contradiction, for regeneration is related to the consciousness also. The consciousness in possession of reconciliation and peace is precisely regeneration on the side of consciousness. Paul also places regeneration in the closest connection with faith.9 But his more dialectical manner makes the particular ele ments stand forth more distinctly, and in their inner relations. The Pauline vloOeola has, indeed, been referred to a mere legal relation, adoption into the place of a child, without a second birth taking place in man himself. But although 1 Rom. iv. 20 ff. ; John viii. 32. * Rom. i. 5. 3 Tixoifatris, T>.npo Eph. ii. 8-10. faith and justification. 237 faith receives God's purpose of reconcbiation. But we saw again that repentance and conversion must precede the pos session of justification. And both have already a moral character. Penitence acknowledges sin and guilt as web as the law, faith seeks a satisfaction to the rights of divine justice. In addition, experience of debverance from gubt and penalty revives the despairing conscience, inspires the man rejoicing in salvation with new bfe and new impulses, snatches him from the common sinful bfe of the world, and transplants him into the kingdom of the new humanity, in a word, makes him in germ a new creature born of God. To such a creature it is natural to love. It is not merely grati tude to God, who first loved us, by which responsive love is begotten ; 1 it is also a law of bfe in the new creature, blood- affinity as it were, that he who is born of God also love his brethren, either those who already are or are destined to be such. Although the new bfe shows itself at first in single light-glimpses, the Spirit's workings gradually converge nearer and nearer untd they form a connected series, and a new, unbroken being and consciousness is able to rise, in which, whbe the consciousness of sin and guilt is not absent, the abolition of the discord is implanted by justification. The consciousness or conscious possession of justification forms then the decisive standpoint dividing the old existence from the new bfe, although the old existence was pierced or illumi nated by scattered rays of grace. It is from this consciousness of being personally justified, which must needs arise in a normal course just as definitely as the consciousness of sin and guilt, that the conscious love must flow in the form of grati tude, which transforms the heart and creates the incbnation to present the whole life an offering to God. For ab these reasons, the transition from justification and faith to sanctifica tion is not a sudden leap or departure from surrender to God, nor casual or arbitrary, but is founded on inner necessity, whether the matter be considered on the side of God's action and its aim, or on the side of man and the inner concatenation of the stages of the subjective process of salvation. The state of justification — the primary result of the process — is again itself an infinite, life-pregnant beginning of a process stretch- 1 1 John iv. 10 ; Col. i. 13. 238 ORIGIN OF CHURCH. ing into eternity, in which that which is already gained under goes development, and man is shaped into a new personality belonging to and resembling Christ. Observation. — The aim of the exposition given has been, on the one hand, to distinguish the reconcibation or forgiveness of God from that which Evangelical theology calls justificar tion, but on the other again to connect the two in the closest way, namely, in the way in which the living, abiding basis (potentiality) coheres with its historical exercise, by which the believer is placed in possession and enjoyment of God's pardoning favour. The solution of the problem depends, again, on the right apprehension of the relation of God to time ' and history, on which the First Part dwelt at large.1 The essential point is to combine on the one hand God's purpose of reconciliation and abiding reconciliation through Christ, and on the other the reality and necessity of a history, and, indeed, of a not merely human, but divine-human process.2 And this must not be done in such a way as to imply that the prime fundamental on God's side is merely the redemp tive idea, and the realization of atonement a purely divine act, nor conversely, that atonement or forgiveness indeed was perfect and actual before the faith of man, and for this very reason the divine activity had no more to do, but the rest of the process was merely human. Oh the contrary, actual participation in the supra-temporal atonement procured by Christ's historic work (i.e. justification) must be imparted to the believer by God in the way of temporal history. — The fruitfulness of the dogmatic positions gained in this section will manifest itself in various ways hereafter^ chiefly in the doctrine of the Means of Grace, especiaby of Baptism and Infant-Baptism. THIRD POINT: SANCTIFICATION. §133. The new man is created for a bfe reflective of Christ in His unsullied holiness, wisdom, and blessedness, and also for living membership in His body or the Church. 'Vol. i.p. 244 f. 8 Here again the question turns on the right distinction and connection of the divine Transcendence and Immanence. SANCTIFICATION. 239 Observation. — The state of sanctification relates not merely to growth in holiness of will, but embraces the whole man and the development of his entire personality, and there fore the preservation and growth of sonship to God in the regenerate. 1. The first necessary function of the new man is the pre serving of the salvation in possession.1 As Conservation joins on to Creation, as everything living co-operates in its own preservation and seeks food as the means of its preservation, so the first evidence of existing life is that it avoids or repels what is hostbe, and seeks after what is helpful to it. Thus faith (77-40-7-49) in its self-affirming aspect becomes fidelity (vironovrj), or the virtue of stedfastness, which so holds man in check that he remains self-collected in communion with Christ, instead of giving way to distraction and doubt. If up to the point of justification man's activity consisted merely in spontaneity of living receptiveness, and the divine activity so predominated that the man is justified, now that the new personality is present, co-operation begins. 2. Hand in hand with seK-preservation by persistent putting away of the old man, and by daby effort in the renewal of repentance and faith, goes positive growth. The Spirit of God cannot be satisfied with the death of the old man. His wib is a new and holy life, putting forth effort on ab sides. And on man's side, if man desired after receiving reconciliation to remain inactive, repentance and faith would not be ethical, not real delight in good, but debght merely in freedom from evil, in the blessing of freedom from punish ment. They would not then exist at ab in genuine form. Nor would there be a new focus of bfe. The Holy Spirit, when He takes up His dwebing in a man, seeks to be a fountain of living water also to others, that their bfe too may issue in eternal life. If the blossoms fall without bearing fruit, they were dead blossoms from the first, no products of a union of the divine and human bfe really carried out by faith. Sanctification is the living test of regeneration (principium cognoscendi) to itself and others. Where the process of sanctification stands stib, the cause must be a sickliness of faith ; and if that is wanting which cannot be wanting where 1 1 John v. 18, Titpiiv ixurit. 240 ORIGIN OF CHURCH. actual regeneration is present, its existence may rightly be questioned. It is true, even the regenerate man stbl sins ; but however great the similarity in appearance between his sin and that of the unregenerate, internally the distinction always remains, that a resistance is always bound up with the sin of the former (see above, p. 186), which makes itself known by retractation of the sin in sorrow or penitence, and that he no longer puts his whole strength of will into evb. As a new personabty the man "cannot sin,"1 he delights in God's will, and knows what is good. As such he no longer needs an outward law, but is a law to himself by the Holy Spirit.2 But the believer is not merely a new personality, but the old man with his habits belongs stib to the unity of his person. That person has consequently an imperfect disordered appear ance, although in principle the old man is broken. Thus rises the duty of restoring perfect unity, which can only be done by increasing the strength of the new man by growing appropriation of the gospel ; and this is effected by conquer ing ab the powers for the new man,3 by unlearning evil habits and propensities, or by cleansing and animating (Beseelung). But this is nothing else than the growing, the unfolding of the new man in ab functions, as to which Christ as lex viva is the example. Thus Christ's prophetic office, to which His exemplary character pertains, acquires a position in reference to sanctification, just as prior to personal faith it had to operate as the principle of repentance. This is the meaning of the tertius usus legis so called, the didacticus or normativus. The first usus of the law, the usus civilis or politieus, serves justitia civilis; the second is the usus elencticus or pcedagogicus, leading to repentance* Holiness is the final aim of redemption;6 the crown of the Pauline Epistles is Ethics based on faith.6 This sanctification, starting from the KapBta of man, transforms all his powers into powers of virtue, his knowledge as web as his volition, as is more fuby set forth in Christian Ethics. 3. The Holy Spirit does not extinguish individuality, but educes charisms therefrom. The persons remain distinct ; the 1 1 John iii. 6-9. ! 1 Tim. i. 9. « Rom. vi. 11 ff. 4 F. C. 584. 717. 722, 18 ; John xvi. 8. » Eph. i. 4 ; CoL i 22. « Rom. xii. ff. ; Gal. v. ff. ; Eph. iv. ft, i. i, ii. 10 ; Col. iii. ff. SANCTIFICATION. 241 nearer they approach perfection, the more purely is their distinctive, independent core elaborated, the more is their character disciplined by the Holy Spirit, who thus ratifies distinctions. It might thus seem as K He only created an atom,-world of spirits, who all stand indeed in connection with their invisible centre, but not with each other. But in the first place, if the Holy Spirit is one and the same in all, and thus abare already one in themselves, and this only needs to be recognized, then even with the consciousness of unity an intimate communion is established in the form of a common spirit. Further, this potentiaby existing unity becomes an object of wib and an actual unity; for, just by every individuabty being perfected in itself is it conducted to its inner essence, its divinely conceived idea. But personal consciousness is perfected in true generic consciousness, in love, just as the world-aim — the divine idea of humanity — is directed to a bving, indivisible spirit-kingdom, a real communion of love with God in Christ, and with the brethren. Since, then, in the new personality even the generic conscious ness is ennobled and attains its reabty, the antithesis of the individual and identical is brought to unity in the bving communion, the organism of which is the supreme end. The ab-embracing and imperishable organism is the Kingdom of God. This perfecting of the personal consciousness by the generic consciousness, and the converse, is secured to Christen dom through Christ as its Head. To glorify Him is its duty, which at the same time includes the perfecting of the individual and the whole, one through the other, each one standing to the other in the relation both of end and means. 4. The aim of regenerating grace, which is necessarily directed first of all to individuals, as web as the result of the saving process fobowing of course in the individual, is the communion of love primarily as religious, i.e. as a Church. As rebgion is the heart in the spiritual bfe of humanity, so the church is the heart of all other moral communities. In it must be the focus of the flanie of love that glorifies the world and a reflex of the divine life, for God is love. Separatism refuses to advance to communion in love, although it desires faith and hope, and perhaps only finds salvation in communion with Christ in love. If it refuses all communion Dokner. — Christ. Doct. iv. Q 242 ORIGIN OF CHURCH. of love on earth, shutting itseK up in inner or even outward lonebness, in order professedly to care only for its own soul and enjoy undisturbed saving communion with God, it is egoistic, loveless faith, to which even knowledge of sin and faith are wanting. Christ's wib is not to be a private . pos session, but the common possession of humanity. It more frequently happens, however, that Separatism does not reject communion of love altogether, but desires to hold communioD merely with the pure or like-minded, with the good of the same temper or colour, while refusing to join the existing religious communities as they are on account of their defects. But in acting thus, it fobows a course contrary to that of Christ and the apostles. It acts as if the communion of love only existed for declarative action, or for enjoyment in de claring what is common. But Christian action is also purify ing and diffusive or expansive; religious communion is the instrument and school of the life of love, in giving and taking. And every one needs such a school ; but its special instructiveness and influence rest on the fact that not merely those of kindred spirit or friends are to be loved. Personal faith, therefore, as soon as it has come into existence, naturally tends towards religious communion or a church, which it has certainly no longer to found or form, for now faith arises through its agency. Seeing that, considered in the historical process, the church is the end of the process of salvation, it may be said that the church — that end of Christ — has its genesis in faith and holds its ground by means of faith, whether as in the beginning, when the church was enclosed in Christ only, and no actual church as yet co-operated with Him, or as now, when the realized church co-operates in its self-preservation or self-reproduction ; for even in relation to it the law must apply, that what is bving co-operates in its own permanence. But this seK-reproduction of the church is always effected by the reproduction of faith and the rise of bebevers, who are not merely impersonal passive means in order to the church as the end, but who in the normal course carry the church in themselves. For the tendency to communion and the impulse to exercise the spirit of communion are not first given when sanctification is complete, but in its beginning, in regeneration. — As the church arises through EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. 243 Christ's fruitful love, the individual standing to it in the relation of means, so, conversely, the community (and only thus is it a church) makes itself in love and service a means to individuals, to their genesis and growth ; and only in such a cycle, where the individual serves the whole and the whole the individual, has the life of love in humanity its movement in giving and taking, but in such a way that its limits are ever growing wider and wider. SECOND DIVISION. THE EXISTENCE OF THE CHUECH. The Division, falls into three Subdivisions, of which the first sketches " The Essential and Unchangeable Characteristics of the Church ; " the second, " The Church organizing itself in and out of the World;" while the third treats of "The Militant Church." FIRST SUBDIVISION. THE ESSENTIAL AND UNCHANGEABLE BASES, OR THE DOGMATIC AND ETHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHURCH. § 134.—,%?, The Church, building itself up out of individual persons (Div. i.), always has its existence indeed as engaged in a process of reproduction or rejuvenescence (§ 133), but stbl retains its self-identity by means of the un changeable basis on which it is renewed and rises higher and higher. This bving basis is Christ and the Holy Spiritr who takes of the things of Christ. Now Christ continues actively at work in His state of exaltation (§§ 127, 128), or in the church He has a permanent continuation of His office, but for this end, that the world may become partaker in His life. Hence two things are to be distinguished in the church : I. The Continuation of His official activity. II. The Reflecting of the same. 244 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. The Continuation takes place in the church by Christ appropriating the church as His organ, in order to exercise His influence through its ministry. This con tinuation of His office through the church, which, how ever, is not a deputing of His activity to it, He Himself ordained as certainly as the church was founded by Him in order to be preserved. In accordance with His threefold office, the doctrine of its continuation takes a threefold form : The doctrine of the Continuation of the Prophetic Office of Christ in the Church is the doctrine of the Word of God. The doctrine of the Continuation of the High- priestly Office is the doctrine of Holy Baptism. The doctrine of the Continuation of the Kingly Office is the doctrine of the Holy Supper. But since Christ not merely continues to work in the church as His organ, but also desires to have in it a living ethical Reflection of Himself, Christ's entire life must be mirrored in the bfe of the church. The Reflecting of the prophetic office takes place in the ecclesiastical ministry of the Word ; the reflecting of the high-priestly is seen in the priestly spbit and action of the church in worship, in vicarious, educating and instructing love, in care for souls and for the poor; ' finally, the reflecting of the kingly office is represented in the power of the keys, or in the power of establishing and administering church ordinances resting on the joint-lordship of bebevers with Christ, which has its centre in prayer in the name of Jesus. In these two combined — the continuation and reflect ing of the office of Christ in the church — the unchange able dogmatic and ethical characteristics of the church are described. Accordingly, six points emerge in reference to the CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHURCH. 245 characteristics of the church, each two of which — one dogmatic and one ethical — combine in a pair, and are related to each other as the continuation and reflecting of Christ's office. 1. The body of disciples surrounding Christ before His exaltation was merely a becoming (werdende), not yet a self- declarative (sich darstellende) church, a seminarium credentium, a paedagogy unto faith. The perfected church is no longer a seminarium, but merely declarative. Since Pentecost the church exists in earthly historical reality, and is declarative and a seminarium at the same time. In the course of the world's history, in the fluctuation of generations and the still limited extent of the church, both forms — that of being or existence, and that of extensive and intensive becomings — must always be conjoined,— a circle of becoming Christians around a circle of existent Christians not outwardly distinguishable, who have just to show that they are Christians by their ministry to those designed to become such. It is thus clear that the two forms are essentially related to each other, and that it would be unnatural to try to sever them. 2. The teaching of the above paragraph and its division are in affinity with Schleiermacher's celebrated exposition of the essential characteristics of the church, which he also refers in part to Christ's office.1 His three pairs are : (1.) Holy Scripture and the Ministry of the Word (where the principle of division is the distinction between continua tion and reflecting as above). (2.) Baptism and the Supper, which are related to each other as the estabbshing or founding and the preserving of communion of love with Christ. (3.) The Power of the Keys and Prayer in the name of Jesus, where the principle of division is the distinction of the relation of the whole to the individual, and of the indi vidual to the whole. Our division is based on one thorough going principle of division, and for this end aims at showing (1) the continuation of Christ's threefold office in the church, which is the dogmatic side of its characteristics; (2) the reflecting of the same by the church, which is the ethical side, 1 Clir. Ql. ii 127. 246 •;¦ EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. ' a division not thoroughly carried out in Schleiermacher, who also omits the reference to Christ's threefold office, which, however, is given us by § 127. Therewith is connected a further difference. Whdst Schleiermacher indeed groups the first pair as our text does, but combines Baptism and the Supper in the second, we place the confirming beside the baptizing church. And since the kingly office is related to the community as the kingdom of Christ, while the Holy Supper is the meal of communion, and chiefly of the exalted Lord and Head with His church, in the meal of His founding we have the continuation of His kingly activity in order to preserve and increase His kingdom ; whereas the reflecting of the same takes place in the power of the keys belonging to the church, which through prayer in the name of Jesus is a participation in His government 3. On its reflective side the church is in course of growth, still burdened with imperfection in inward and outward respects, and hence fallible, although the duty of reflection is proved to be divine. In those of its characteristics, in which Christ's activity is continued, it possesses an unchangeable governing base-type and an ever-sufficient corrective. Even the first, dogmatic side — Word and Sacrament — has a change able element in its form. Word and Sacrament had at first a different form from the later one, but the change does not affect the essence and contents. Christ's oral word preceded the written one, which we now have. The disciples were not baptized by Christ Himself,1 the electing and educating influence exercised by Christ immediately on the disciples being a perfect substitute for baptism in their case until Pentecost crowned His work.2 In the same way, finally, the Holy Supper was not the same in every respect at its in stitution as since His glorification. But the only conclusion to be drawn is, that we must recognize an accidental element in all three, and search for the essential, which remains the same in the changing forms. 1 1 John iv. 2. 2 Granted, it may be said, that they all received John's baptism. In the first place, this is not historically established ; secondly, they were baptized with fire and the Holy Spirit first at Pentecost, therefore in the baptism of John they still had not Christian baptism. • THE WORD OF GOD. 247 FIRST POINT: THE CONTINUATION AND REFLECTING OF THE PROPHETIC OFFICE OF CHRIST. A. — The Continuation of the same, or the Doctrine of the Word of God. §135. As certainly as Christ, in whom the Eternal Word became man, was given to the world in order to be permanently preserved to it, so certainly is it part of the founding of Christianity itself as a vital historic power (Grosse), that the objective presentation of Christ was permanently preserved to humanity in primitive purity, and an inde structible, immoveable manner. An authentic represen tation of His person and words was created in His disciples by Christ and the Holy Spirit, so that in their mutually supplementary entirety a pure and trustworthy image of Him remained in the world after His ascension, which was not merely transmitted in their oral preaching but fixed in writing, and recorded by the aid of the spiritual comprehension of their faith with authentic fidelity. Thus the apostles and the apostobc men appointed and acknowledged by them are true witnesses of Christ, and that not merely for their age, but for aU generations and nations, and through their testimony Christ continued His testimony to Himself. In refer ence to primitive Christianity as historic, they are the decisive source in a thoroughly sufficient manner (suffi- cientia Scriptures sacrce), and a norm and corrective for the doctrine of all ages, both because the several sacred writings have a unique authority (autoritas normativa) resting on the direct relation of this first body of disciples to Christ and on their apostobc blumination, and also because their collection into the Canon was carried out by the criticism of faith under the leading of the Holy Ghost dwebing in the church. But since the authentic testimony of Christ in the historical books "248 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. which is preserved to us in their writings, as well as the testimony of their personal Christian piety in the epistolary portion of the New Testament, is the specific means for generating faith (efficacia Scriptures sacrce), their word, so far as it has God's Word or the revelation completed in Christ for its contents, is not merely the authentic and thus normative source of knowledge of Christianity to the church, but also a specific means of grace to individuals. But Holy Scripture does all this because it has the power of passing over into the understanding (Perspicuitas, semet ipsam interpretandi facultas). The Old Testament derives its highest attes tation from Christ, for whom it prepares and whom it predicts. Cf. vol. i. 3, § 7, p. 47 ff; § 11, pp. 146-150; vol. ii. § 59, pp. 189-199 ; § 63, pp. 221-231 ; § 70, p. 284 ff. Literature.— Cf. vol. ii. p. 183. Phdippi, Kirchl. Glaubens lehre, L Voigt, Fundamentaldogmatik, 1874. J. Muber, das Verhdltniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heiligen Geistes und den Gnadenmittel des gottlichen Wortes. In dem dogmat. Abhandlungen, 1870, pp. 127-277. Frank, System der christi. Wahrheit, ii. 235-250 (The Word of God in distinction from Holy Scripture), and pp. 393-417 (the Written Word). Hase, Dogmatik, §§ 198-204. Cf. John xiv. 25, 26, xv. 27, xvi. 7, 12, 13, xx. 21-23 ; Luke xxiv. 46-49 ; 1 Cor. vb. 10, 40. Respect ing the O. T, Matt. v. 17 ff. ; John v. 39 ; 2 Tim. iii. 16 ; 1 Pet. i. 10-12 ; 2 Pet. i. 20, 21. For the Church doctrine cf. Art. Smalk. 308; Form Cone. 572, 7, 8. 638, 10, 13 ; Conf. Aug. v.; Conf. Helv. 1536, §§ 1-5; Helv. 1566, c. 1, 2; Scot. xix. The four: Conf. Belg. \\.-y\L; Anglic, vi. vii.; Gallic, of 1561, b.-v.; and Conf. Fid. Westmonast. cap. i. enumerate the canonical writings separately. Observation. — The Word of God occurred before under different points of view, first in the Introduction in the doctrine of the Genesis of Christian Faith (vol. i. §§ 7, 8, 11, p. 144 ff), again in the doctrine of the Conservation 'of' the' Historic Revelation (§ 63). In both cases the Word of God is considered with reference to the decisive importance of securing harmony of faith with historic primitive Christianity. THE WORD OF GOD. 249 In Specific Dogmatics, again, the Word of God came under consideration in the doctrine of cabing especially as a means of grace, and as such it has a much freer and wider sphere than when it is considered in its fixing in Holy Scripture as the source or record of revelation. But both points of view are united here, where the proper sedes of the dogmatic doctrine of the Word of God is found, and where we have to assign it its place in the system, in relation to Christ, to the Holy Spirit, and to the Church. The relation of the Word of God to Christ comes especiaby under consideration, so far as the point in hand is the continuation or preserva tion of the revelation given in Him in its purity for the consciousness of humanity, and therefore the securing of the identity of the faith of the church with itself. Further, the origin of the Word of God, which satisfies this need, points back already to the Holy Spirit. But the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Word of God comes especiaby into view in considering the efficacy (Efficacia) of the latter. 1. The Word of God in the Wider and Stricter Sense. — We are rightly reminded x that the activity of the Holy Spirit in reference to the self-communication of the Redeemer is carried on primarily through the Word as a means of grace (not through the Sacraments). We have formerly shown the necessity there is2 that revelation (i.e. the Word of God) should not merely remain and work internally, but that it should also enter into the sensuous finite world, and stand in contrast with the human spirit as God's external Word, partly that consciousness may more clearly distinguish what springs from God's revelation from its own ideas, partly that, by such contrasting of the divine, freedom of appropriation may be preserved, but finally, and above ab, that the divine may embody itself in finite form, and thus be the more readby apprehended by us.3 Fundamental importance is also attributed in Holy Scripture to the Word of God in the wider sense, in relation to the founding of God's kingdom. The Word is the principal means by which revelation is introduced and 1 Frank, ii. 235 f. Cf. Luther's Werke, by Walch, xviii 1796. 2 Vol. ii. § 52, p. 142 ff. Cf. § 38. 3 This certainly involves the presupposition, founded for us in the doctrine of Creation, and confirmed by Christology, that the outward and sensuous is able to receive the inward and spiritual, and either to express it symbolically or to subserve its objective realization. But this presupposition follows already from the unity of the world ; the opposite supposition of Spiritualism is dualistic. 250 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. , communicated. The kingdom of heaven grows from an in significant germ or seed : that seed is the Word of God.1 And as it forms the beginning, so the Word of God is preserved and transmitted through .the Kerugma, the glad tidings.2 It initiates krisis for individuals and the world. When the gospel shab be preached to the whole world, then follows the end.8 To this word of Christ the power is ascribed to purify, to enbghten, and to make free through knowledge of the truth* For the contents of the Word of God are Christ Himself, who, thus continues His presence with His people through the same Word. Hence abiding in His sayings, the keeping of His word in the heart, is regarded as identical with abiding with and in Him.5 And not merely is the word of Christ Himself, or the word of the apostles of Christ, described as the means of transmitting the gospel blessing of salvation, and the vehicle, so to speak, for communicating the treasure of the Christian salvation. On the other hand, such influence is not affirmed exclusively of the written Word. A believing church existed long before the writings of the New Testament. And even after the formation of the Canon, the Word of God assumes various forms within the church, in pious converse, in preaching and sacred song, in science and Christian art. The word of the believing church has its divine force, not merely in so far as the words of Holy Writ are repeated in it; every believer is to partake in original fashion in the truth and the certainty thereof, nay, to be a relatively independent spring of living water.6 The living word proceeding from Christ begets living personalities] who do not depend on foreign, even apostolic, authority, but themselves know and possess the truth as truth. 2. But of course the Church is only able to be assured of its Christian character through its being in a position every moment to become cognizant of the identity of its faith with the primitive church, of its agreement with the faithfully transmitted Word of Christ. Nay, even the individual believer, despite his subjective certainty of what he believes, 1 Matt. xiii. 3, 19, 24, 37, and 1 Pet. i. 23. 8 Rom. x. 17 ; Matt, xxviii. 19, x. 7 ; Luke x. 5 ; Acts i 8, x. 41. 3 Matt. xxiv. 14. * John xv. 3, viii. 32. 4 John xiv. 23, xv. 7, 10. 6 John iv. 14, vii. 38. See vol. ii. p. 221. THE WORD OF GOD. 251 can only be certain of his Christian character through his knowing himself one with objective historic Christianity, either with the fixed written form of the same in the New Testament, or at least with the church ; the latter, however, can only satisfy him so long as he retains his undoubting conviction of the agreement of the church with primitive Christianity. The need of the church and of individuals finds its satisfaction in Holy Scripture as the historic record of Christianity, which alone is the sufficient norm of the church's faith and bfe for ab ages. According to what has been said, the necessity of a fixed written form of the Word of God, i.e. the need of an authentic statement of the revelation completed in Christ, is grounded partly in the character of Christianity, in which the historic is so essential an element — (even the faith of later generations must have in it power to come into firm, conscious relation with that historic element, while certain knowledge of the historic is only possible through testimonies of a documentary kind), — partly in the uncertainty of oral tradition.1 In view of the power of sin and error in the world, in which the church must have its place, in order to maintain beneficial intercourse with it, and of the after-workings of sin even in believers, it was inevitable that the still unrenewed world should cast its shadows into the very heart of the -church. By the preservation of the authentic form of Christianity, and only by it, are recurrence to the original, and . comparison of the church with the primitive norm, possible to every age. Without Holy Scripture the Reformation would have been impossible. As freedom is secured by it to the individual in relation to the erring church, as well as independence of human authority in matters of salvation, so through the record of revelation the church and the faith of individuals are preserved from subjective caprice and fanaticism.2 That the perfected revelation should receive its documentary fixing, was therefore an essential moment in the divine purpose to preserve it. As concerns the manner of its realization, it did' not take place abruptly, as if revelation had to begin afresh with Holy Scripture ; but it took place according to the law lying at the basis of all preservation — the essential co-opera- 1 Cf. vol. ii pp. 222-225. ' * Vol. ii. pp. 224, 225. 252 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. tion of secondary causabties. The record of revelation is not indeed to be confounded with the revelation itself. But revelation must needs itself provide for its secure transmission. This is involved in the founding of Christianity itseK as a historic power destined to live. As such, the power of self- preservation must be innate in Christianity. Else it would not have been adequately equipped for really passing over to humanity as a spiritual possession, as bebeved and known truth; for, provided humanity had Christianity as an actual possession, and as an element (Bestimmtheit) of its being, it could testify to and diffuse it, from which it clearly appears that the actual transition of Christianity to humanity is identical with its capacity of propagation1 But certain as it is that this possession (i.e. faith) is an essential factor in the preservation of Christianity to humanity, still through it alone the church would not be secured against intermixing anomalies and fal sities ; and the divine purpose to preserve original Christianity in its purity and entirety to humanity for ab ages found its secure reabzation only through the plan that the written recording took place on the part and with the guiding co-operation of those who had enjoyed the company of Christ, were His eye- and ear- witnesses, and were trained by Him for the office of bearing witness to Him, and finally were par takers in a special degree of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from Christ, and were charismaticaby endowed for their vocation — all which it is only necessary to mention here after what has been said before.2 The spirit of the natural man is not the spirit of Christ. Hence the organs of the true authentic transmission of Christianity had not to work with purely human means, but needed to be seized and inspired by the Spirit of Christ in order to be able to do what was essential. Through this inspiration the authors of these books are not simply passive machines, but independent Spirit-fibed per sonalities. Their productions, therefore, are of the same character ; and it cannot be said : Their believing personalities indeed were inspired, but not their writings. Rather, the 1 Vol. ii. pp. 191, 221. Still it is not enough to call Holy Scripture merely a product of the Christian church. In this case the intervenient prescient working of-the Divine Spirit is left out of consideration. s Vol. ii. pp. 193-195, 226-229. THE WORD OF GOD. 253 latter breathe the Divine Spirit, the gift of the Holy Spirit, who became the possession of the sacred authors through their faith.1 3. Formation of the Canon. — The gospel being recorded in an authentic and written form, these writings necessarily found acknowledgment with those who had enjoyed the oral instruction of apostobc men, who recognized their faith therein, and placed a high value on the fixing of oral tradition in the same ; and upon this naturally fobowed zeal to preserve and collect these writings. But this zeal was employed by the presciently working, self-preserving power of Christianity for the purpose of transmitting and securing at the right time to the church of the succeeding centuries the memory of the Christian fore-time. The Holy Spirit must needs have impelled to this work, that these authentic writings might remain to the church for its guidance. And just so He must have directed this work,2 which was rendered easy to the ancient church by historic accounts respecting the authors, 1 But certain as it is that it is a scientific advance to go back from the inspiration of sacred books to inspired personalities, we ought not to make the degree of their life of faith the measure of the trustworthiness of that which they give us as primitive Christian tradition. Their testimony to Christ is not the mere product of their piety. Through the Hving recollection of Christ's image they had more than what their piety had appropriated ; and so little is what they say of Christ a simple reflex of their religious spirit, that, on the contrary, through the objective beholding of Christ, their knowledge was in advance of their Volition and being ; cf. vol. ii. p. 194. True, only their historical position, not their participation in the Holy Spirit, is specifically different from that of other believers ; and as they are not on a level with the infallibility of Christ, so also Christ must be believed in on the ground of His redeeming power, not on the ground of their authority : cf. vol. ii. 226 ff. ; GaL i. 8. Nevertheless, through the Spirit of truth they were equal to their mission. Despite their personal faUibility, they were neither under necessity nor wishful to give forth errors and false principles as truth. Their wish was to impart truth. Untruth has not the power to give inner certainty of itself, like truth. They were well able to distinguish what they were authorized to invest with the authority of Christ, and what not (1 Cor. vii. 10 ; Rom. xi. 25, xv. 18). Hence it is very well consistent with the imperfections of their exposition in secondary points, to affirm that their writings form the God-given, trustworthy, undeceptivo record of the revelation of God in Christ, sufficient until faith passes into sight. 8 Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl ii § 130, pp. 331, 338 : "The faithful preservation of the apostolic writings is the work of the Divine Spirit acknowledging His own products. He distinguishes that which is to remain unchanged from that which assumes various forms in the further development of Christian doctrine, and on the other hand partly repels the Apocryphal directly it arises, and partly causes this kind of productivity, and the taste for such products, gradually to disappear from the church." 254 EXISTENCE of the church. the place, time, and circumstances of the composition. But however important this historic element, a second factor must needs have co-operated at least as a negative active principle, in order to guard against possible errors in historic tradition. Since Christian faith is a work of the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit cannot contradict Himself, no writing can lay claim to canonicity which offends against Christian faith, or " does not treat of Christ." By this canon-forming activity, the church in no sense makes itself a judge of apostles. On the contrary, it submits to the universal laws of scientific historic criticism. It has to deduce its judgment from the facts of the case, and is subject thereto. It confers canonical authority on no writing, but only asserts the facts of the case as seen from the historic and dogmatic point of view, but independently of the wishes of the subject. Since faith just as little permits what is not God's Word to pass for it, because some human authority counts it such, as it permits what is God's Word to pass without recognition, the work of criticism or canon-forming cannot be regarded as concluded once for all. Every generation which aims at clearness and certainty of Christian consciousness, must reproduce to itself the conviction of the canonicity of the Holy Scriptures, and has a right itself to form a judgment thereupon In this process the rule holds good, that no writing can be canonical which is in contradiction to faith. Christian faith must therefore be brought into use in the work of criticising the Canon. Since faith is not founded by mere external human authority, even apostobc,1 but is a relatively independent power2 (Grbsse), co-operation in the work of criticism cannot be refused to it,' at least in so far as that it ought not to regard a writing as canonical, which contradicts that which forms the primal certainty of Christian faith. If, on the , other hand, a writing does not contradict this postulate, and is at the same time attested by credible historic witnesses as belonging to the circle of apostolic men, normative authority is due to it. It has such authority precisely for faith, not for others. But the church has to make this authority effective 1 This constitutes the relative independence of the so-called material principle in contrast with the formal, see vol. i. § 7. 2 Cf. Schleiermacher, ii. § 128, p. 323. the word, of god: i 255 with its adherents. This, as already said, is not done on the footing that any one should believe merely because of human authority, but on the footing that by the normative authority of the Holy Scriptures that matter is secured for preaching which carries with it the power of self- attestation. Therewith a distinction between Proto-canonical and Deutero-canonical always has its place in the sense that, the authority of the latter is conditioned by that of the former. But faith itself sees more and more the depth and inexhaustible wealth of Holy Scripture, and especiaby of Christ's words ; and thus Scripture is not to it a mere external norm and law of faith, but an ever-gushing spring of light and bfe. From what has been said, fobows the right of the science of criticism on the sob of the Evangebcal Church. To desire to exclude the science of criticism in opposition to the Reformation, which unanimously excluded the Apocrypha from the canon, and to Luther, who also questioned the canonicity of particular writings of the Old and New Testaments, would not tend to the advantage of the authority of Holy Scripture as a unity, which, on the contrary, is so confident of itself that it desires the grounds of its claims to be known. In that case we remain absolutely bound to the authority of tradition, and therefore to the judgment of the church of a particular age, in reference to what is to be regarded as the Christian norm, and this radicaby coincides with the Roman Catholic principle. Hence Evangelical theology cannot cease to regard . the formal criticism of the Canon (formale Kanonik), i.e. criticism of the Holy Scriptures, as one of its essential parts, of course not separated from the science of material criticism of the Canon, i.e, of Biblical Theology. Extravagances, which are disturb ing to faith, are certainly possible in such a course, but abusus non tollit usum; faith is an unceasing stimulus to the correction of aberrations. The independence of the existence of saving faith in respect of the results of critical research and its sense of truth assure to it the equanimity belonging to the pursuit of scientific investigation ; and such investigation may with all the greater confidence bebeve that criticism can never destroy that which belongs to the vital conditions of faith and the church, since all historical criticism is subject to the law, that it has to work with historical sources, not 256 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. with subjective, a priori hypotheses, which implies that of the sources belonging to the original age a portion must always be acknowledged credible and genuine,1 and therefore that it can only operate against certain portions of the Canon from an acknowledged historic datum, and seek to show that they are not consistent therewith. But as regards this end the task of theology is simply this. To unwarranted attempts to separate the portions of the canon it has, so far as is consistent with truth, to oppose the scientific proof of their harmony or homogeneity, and to show how the contents of one writing confirm those of the rest. And thus it may be said : Scientific historic criticism is a work carried on by the Canon itself through the medium of the impartial critic, who has not to invent but to find his judgments in subordination to the facts of the case. And thus the science of criticism of the Canon — formal and material — serves to bring up afresh before the consciousness of Christendom the historic connection with the founding of Christianity, as well as the inner organic connec tion of the parts of Holy Scripture belonging to the Canon — • a work which is itself a Ministry of the Word. 4. To the whole of Scripture, then, as the Canon, the dis tinctive predicates specified in the text belong. After the previous exposition, nothing more need be said as to its normative authority. Only this may be added, that it can only have authority in the fub sense for one who bebeves. This involves the postulate, that what of the contents of the Christian Scriptures is not definitely and vitaby appro priated by faith, is not satisfied with standing over against man as an external law unknown in its contents or at least in its truth, but that it desires such a union with the spirit as attests it to man as truth. This holds good especially of ab that which has been transmitted on credible historic grounds as the acts and words of the Lord. Moreover, speaking generally, the canonical character of the rest of the N. T. has on good grounds the presumption in its favour, that it sets forth a higher, more mature stage of the Christian life.2 The normal way for appropriating the rest wbl be, 1 As e.g. even the Baurian school proves ; cf. my Hist. qfProt. Theology, ii. 410. 2 Schleiermacher rightly suggests (§ 130. 4), "that we may conceive to our selves the Holy Spirit ruling freely in the thought-world of the entire Christian THE WORD OF GOD. 357 that the already existing faith, which is a germinal unity, wbl grow into that which has to be stbl appropriated, recognizing and acting upon the inner necessity of its de velopment on this side. Christianity itself, which faith has accepted, is a firmly compacted whole; the divine acts form an organic system, and are only perfectly intebigible through it. But from this it also fobows, that this organism or system of truth must be laid down, although not in systematic form, in Holy Scripture, K Scripture is to do what it exists for. Holy Scripture is in its contents a presenta tion of the organism of Christian truth; and through this system each one of its parts with its special contents receives new significance. The truth organized in Holy Scripture is sufficient for ab ages (Sufficientia Ser. sacrce). Hereto belongs also its Perspicuity (Perspicuitas). To those thirsting for salvation it is intebigible in itself, at least in things necessary to salvation, which implies the right and the duty of believers to read Holy Scripture. Especially has Evangebcal piety to strive after a sharply-defined conscious ness of primitive historic Christianity, with which the believer must know . himself in accord, in order to be sure of his Christian character. This perspicuity implies that Holy Scripture does not first need the help of the interpreting church in order to be understood to the extent mentioned. Else a human authority would take the place of Holy Scrip ture as the norma et judex, e.g. human learning and science, or the interpreting church. On the other hand, this predicare of Holy Scripture does not mean to deny the necessity of the ibuminating agency of the Holy Spirit, of which Holy Scripture is the channel. For the Word of God has not so naturabzed or incorporated itseK in Holy Writ as to be equally accessible and intebigible to every one, to the crude and stupid as to the receptive.1 The proposition of the Perspicuity of Holy Scripture is not merely directed against all false ecclesiasticism and disparaging of simple, childlike sphere, in the same way as every individual in his own world of thought. For every one can distinguish his best thoughts, and so treasure them up as to secure their re-presentation, while he rejects the rest," etc. 1 This implies, therefore, that Perspicuitas belongs to Holy Scripture by its, being also a means of grace (see below). Dokner.— Chkist. Doct. iv. R 258 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. faith,1 but is also of importance for distinguishing the- funda mental from the non-fundamental. On the other hand, it demands an interpretation in accordance with the universal laws of human language, to which, however, along with grammatical and historic research, the homogeneity of the interpreter with Scripture, his bving in its atmosphere, or at least in a state of earnest spiritual desire for salvation, is necessary. Since human participation in the Holy Spirit co-operates and opens Scripture, it may be said that Holy Scripture has the power of seK-interpretation through the interpreter as an organ (semet ipsam interpretandi faeultas). Finaby, the Holy Scriptures possess Efficacy (Eflicacia) corresponding to the origin ascribed to them. This leads to the second main aspect of the matter. 5. The Word of God, especiaby in Holy Scripture, as a Means of Grace, and its relation to the Holy Spirit.— Whoever calls Holy Scripture a mere dead letter, is either the victim of an optical delusion in transferring out of him- seK the dead sense which is within himself, whereas the seeker of salvation, bke the bebever, has a very different experience, or he is unable to coalesce with Scripture, because his piety wears a spiritualistic character averse from history, and he fancies himself, in his efforts after false freedom, to have outgrown the teaching of the objective Word of God That the Holy Spirit is the author of our conversion and renewal, is certainly often asserted in Holy Writ.2 But no less is this effect ascribed also to the Word of God ; and when Holy Scripture speaks of the power of God's Word or of the gospel to beget bfe and be the means of salvation (Rom. i. 16 ; 1 Cor. i. 18, iv. 15 ; 2 Cor. ib. 8), this does not mean the oral word of preaching merely, but must also hold good of the Word of God in Holy Scripture. As certainly as Christianity is a historic power, and history an essential factor in it, so certainly is not merely internal spiritual working necessary in order to Christian faith, but also the working of the objective word of God, which, as we saw, must always in the last resort test and legitimate itseK as such by the 1 Matt, xi 25. 2 Tit. iii. 5 ; 1 Cor. xii. 3 ; Rom. viii. 9-17 ; John xiv.-xvi, vii. 39. See above, pp. 160, 182. the word of god. 259 record of revelation, i.e. by the Word of God in Holy Scripture. But again, unless God Himself as the Holy Spirit wrought directly and immediately with and in the Word, immediate communion with <3»d would be denied us, and we should be stbl standing in the pre- Christian age. But what conception must be formed of the relation between the agency of the Word and that of the Holy Spirit ? * One possibility, to which Lutheran Dogmatists of the 17th century suspiciously approximated,2 is the fobowing. In order thoroughly to exclude all fanaticism andi objective caprice, which may at first have a pious or mystic' tone, but sooner or later readily passes into Rationalism or Ideabsm, a kind of incarnation of the Holy Spirit in Scripture may be supposed ; and it may be said : The Holy Spirit has fastened Himself, so to speak, to Scripture, so that He- has no. longer any special activity outside it, but His activity coincides with that of Holy Scripture ; and since the Scripture came- inta existence, the divine power which dwelt originally in theHoly Spirit dwells in it alone ; through His, embodiment in Holy Scripture, His divine power is. delegated,, so to speak, to Scrip~ ture, which is even extra usum an embodied divine power, as to substance the Holy Spirit. But, Scripture is something material, which the Holy Spirit cannot be ; and if we could come into connection only with this divine substance^ Holy Scripture — immediacy of communion with God would be denied us, Holy Scripture would become a separating mediator. And this would be stbl more the case, if the activity of the Holy Spirit were limited to His having inspired Holy Scripture, and deposited in it supernatural doc trines, which now operate purely of themselves, in a natural way by logical and moral niean& analogously with other writings.3 The second possibibty would be to conceive the 1 Cf. the excellent treatise of J. Muller : Das VerltMtniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heiligen Geistes und dem Qnadenmittel des gSttlichen,. Wortes. Dogm. Abh. pp. 127-277. 2 Especially in consequence of the controversy- with. Rathmann, cf. my Hist, of Prot. Theology, vol. ii. p. 129. 3 With Episcopius, Claude Pajon, and others, especiaUy Supematuralists of the last century, cf. J. Muller, pp. 215-224. The notion of an, incarnation of the Holy Spirit in Scripture is a Pantheistic paroxysm, wliich,, when, it yields. 260 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. bond between Word and Spirit more loosely, the working of the Spirit in the Word as accidental and external — " parastatic," dependent on a divine purpose (e.g. twofold Predestination), on which view therefore the Holy Spirit would only work intermittently in the elect, or only by accident co-operate with Scripture. But the universality of God's purpose of grace excludes such a separation of the activity of the two. Thus, the third possibibty remains, namely, to ascribe to the two — inspired Holy Scripture and the Holy Spirit — a relative inde pendence of existence and operation, whbe thinking of thenr as co-operative. On this view, the activity of the Holy Spirit is not exhausted in that of Holy Scripture, whbe at the same time secondary causality is not denied, or a mere logical and moral causabty left, to Holy Scripture, as if it were nothing taken alone. The Word of God in Scripture is stbl a real manifestation of spiritual power, of divine truth in a finite form. But the co-operation of the two must not be viewed as if Holy Scripture did one part of the saving work, and the Holy Spirit the other. Instead of such a distribution, we must affirm that the two embrace the whole work of salvation, but in a different manner. Holy Scripture gives faith its object, it puts Christianity in its purity and attractive force objectively before our eyes, as a challenge and induce ment to enter into union with it by faith. The agency of the Holy Spirit opens the heart and understanding to the objective Word of God, implants that Word in the heart of man, and endows it with power to transform and renew man. The Word of God in Holy Scripture can and ought more and more to become "an inner Bible."1 It has a mediating o influence, placing us in connection with the Christ of his tory, for without the Word we should know nothing of Him, without the primitive Word in Holy Writ nothing historicaby trustworthy. But " this mediating position of the Word is not meant to dispense with or exclude the immediate working of the Holy Spirit in man's spirit. The working of the Holy Spirit penetrates, embraces, and rules the working of its own to sobriety, transfers the Holy Spirit, after His founding of Scripture, into a state of Deistic seclusion in order to contemplate Him in permanent inde pendence. ' Cf Harms' Sermons on the Bible. THE WORD OF GOD. 261 instrument." a The Holy Spirit perpetually glorifies Christ as He is set forth in Scripture, makes Him emerge, so to speak, from the letter and Stand in living form before us. He thus brings us, through the medium of Holy Scripture, into com munion with the bving Christ, from which it is specially clear, how the exalted Lord of the church continues through the Word of God His prophetic office among humanity and in the church. The before-mentioned predicates also first gain their fub meaning through the activity of Holy Scripture constituting it a specific means of grace. For in this way, instead of being a mere outward rule or critical principle, it becomes a productive power (Grosse), even as a norm and authority ; in this way also its true understanding and sufficiency are first really secured to it, so that through its use the Holy Spbit can just as well lead us into all truth as the apostles themselves, and all those who enjoyed Christ's immediate instruction.2 Although, further, the Holy Spirit does not cease even now and perpetuaby to beget thoughts in a direct and original way, it may still be said, since the gospel is contained in authentic totabty in Holy Writ, and is in itself a bving whole concentrated in Christ's person, that all the riches of the Christian world of thought are merely the unfolding and applying of the contents given in Holy Writ — contents, however, to which increasing motive power belongs by virtue of its essential relation to the continued working of the Holy Spirit. Thus it may be said in a certain sense, that ab knowledge of the Church is interpretation of Scripture. 6. The Old Testament. — It is indeed a Jewish error to require in the church direct faith in the 0. T., i.e. faith not mediated by the authority of Christ; it cannot be necessary to become first a Jew, then a Christian. The economy of the 0. T. does not so much attest Christ, as it receives its attestation from Him ; and the value of the 0. T. as a whole and in detail, as web as the degree of its enduring normative force, depends in the last resort on Christianity. However, an indirect authority, guaranteed by Christ, certainly belongs to the Old Testament.3 Christ sees in the Q. T. the 1 Miiller, pp. 236, 244. 2 Schleiermacher, ii. 344. 3 John v. 34 ff., 45-47, vii. 23 ; Matt. v. 17 ; Luke xxiv. 46. Cf. 2 Tim. iii. 15 f. 262 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. revelation or Word of God. True, much in the 0. T. is temporary, especially the theocratic and Jewish national ele ment. Stbl it is merely the form of the eternal divine thoughts, which in the 0. T. gives an imperfect expression to them. Further, the doctrines of universal rebgion are contained in purest fulness in the 0. T., such as the idea of the Personal, Almighty, Wise, Holy, and Just as well as MercKul God, the doctrine of Creation, Conservation, Pro vidence, and others, — doctrines which, when uttered, commend themselves naturally to the rebgious consciousness as true, and upon which .the N. T. budds as its presuppositions, without repeating them systematicaby and in full. Again, as law the 0. T. points to Christ, and prepares the way for His appearance. And this preparation stbl has its place in the heart even in Christian days, as the Church intimates by fixing Advent-season before Christmas. Finally, prophecy contains ideally, as the history of the 0. T. and the ceremonial law contain typicaby, what is to be realized in Christianity. In this, certainly more limited sense, the saying has its truth : N. T. in vetere latet, V. T. in novo patet. The knowledge of a coherent system of revelation in its organism and stages is only possible through the 0. T. together with the New Testa ment. For this very reason the 0. T. sheds bght in many ways on the N. T. Especiaby can no conception of the latter be true, which is inconsistent with the connection of the two, or according to which Christianity is made to bring something absolutely new, not even ideally prepared for — an important canon at least negatively. Even in these days the 0. T. renders a paedagogic service to Christianity, in placing us in the bne which conducts to true knowledge of Christ. But inasmuch' as law and prophecy ab obtain theb? fub. clearness and certainty in the fulfilment, it is only Christendom, which possesses the key to the 0. T. in its self-consciousness (i.e. in the Christianity not dependent on the 0. T.), not unbebeving Judaism. Here too the saying holds good : Christendom is the true Israel. THE MINISTRY OF THE WORD. 263 B. — The Ministry of the Word. §136. Since the written Word cannot preserve itseK and reach individuals without human intervention, there is an activity perpetuated in the church under the guidance of Christian knowledge — the ministry of the Word — which not merely transmits the Scriptures with fidebty, by critical aids restores their integrity, multipbes them, and seeks to conduct to completion the forming of the Canon, but also by interpretation disengages their meaning from its veb and applies it to each age, in order thus to reproduce amid the humanity of ab ages the preaching of the apostles with the greatest possible fidebty and force, — all in harmony with the properties of Holy Scripture specified in § 135. This Ministry of the Word is in part informal, in part strictly organized, and rejoices in being able to trace itself back to Christ's wbl. The duty and right (i.e. the office) of teaching is committed to the Church indeed in the first instance as its main function. But it is necessary on ethical, although not on dogmatic grounds, to secure this function by transferring it to definite persons. In this way a standing or regular and strictly organized office of teaching arises through the Church, which rightly affirms the harmony of such a result with Christ's wbl. But this office is bound to the gospel, and, apart from the preaching of the same, which is the source of its independence, has as a special office only the authority transferred to it by the Church. Literature. — Spener, 70 Fragen und Antworten vom geist- lichen Priesterthum. Petersen, Die Idee der christlichen Kirche, 3 vols. 1839 ff. Honing, Grundsatze der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirchenverfassung, ed. 2, 1851. Harless, Kirche und Amt nach lutherischen Lehre, 1853. Etliche Gewissensfragen hinsichtlich 264 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. der Lehre von der Kirche, Kirchenamt und Kirchenregiment, 1862. Harnack, Die Kirche, ihr Amt, ihr Regiment, Grund- legende Sdtze mit durchgehender Bezugnahme auf die symb. BB. d. luth. K, 1862. Kostbn, Luther's Lehre von der Kirche, 1853. Ibid., Das Wesen der Kirche, beleuchtet nach Lehre und Gesch. des N. T, 1854. Luther's Theologie, 2 vols. 1863. Preger, Die Geschichte der Lehre vom geistlichen Amte auf Grund der Geschichte der Rechtfertigungslehre, 1857. G. Pfisterer, Luther's Lehre von der Beichte, 1857. K. Lechler, Die N. T. Lehre vom heiligen Amt in ihr en Grundzugen und auf die bestehenden Rechtsverhaltnisse der evangelisch-luther- ischen Kirche in Deutschland angewendet, 1857. Walther, Die Stimme unserer Kirche in der Frage von Kirche und Amt ; eine Sammlung von Zeugnissen uber diese Frage aus den Bekennt- nisschriften der ev.-luth. Kirche und aus den Privatschriften rechtglaubiger Lehrer derselben, von der deutschen ev.-luth. Synode von' Missouri, Ohio, etc., als ein Zeugniss ihres Glaubens vorgelegt, 1852. Miinchmeyer, Das Amt des neuen Testaments nach Lehre der Schrift und der lutherischen Bekenntnisse. Ibid., Neun Thesen abermals erkldrt und gegen Herm Hofling gerechtfertigt, 1853. Kliefoth, Acht Biicher von der Kirche, vol. i. 1854. Liturg. Abh. 2. Die Beichte und Absolution, 1856. Debtzsch, Vier Biicher von der Kirche, 1847. Lohe, Drei Biicher von der Kirche, den Freunden der lutherischen Kirche dargeboten, 1845 ; Aphorismen iiber die N. T. Aemter und ihr Verhdltniss zur Gemeinde, 1849 ; Kirche und Amt, neue Aphorismen, 1853. 1. The Biblical Doctrine of the Ministry of the Word. — To the church, which existed first of all in the apostles, is committed as a duty and right the function of preaching the gospel to all the world.1 Through the apostles, as the original faithful witnesses, the preaching of Christ is continued ;2 they are to judge the tribes of the new Israel, i.e. to govern by then- word.3 But on the basis of the apostobc Word, and under its constant governance, preaching gives birth to faith,4 which cannot but speak out of the fulness of the heart. Christ has not provided for a continuous supplementing of the apostolate, nor yet for the founding of a distinct teaching, or stbl less priestly, order. The apostles indeed, as already shown, had a unique position through their immediate relation to Christ. 1 Matt, xxviii 19 ff. ; Mark xvi. 15 ff. ; John xxi 17, xx. 23, xv. 27 ; cf. Rom. x. 17. 2 Luke x. 16 : Whoever hears you hears me, 3 Luke xxii. 30 ; Matt. xix. 28. * Rom. x. 17. THE MINISTRY OF THE WORD. 265 But this position of theirs is unrepeatable, and the apostolate in this sense continues only in the writings of the N. T. (§ 135). For example, in the church of Corinth, and simi larly stib in the days of Origen, bebevers in general could speak with a view to edification in worship, without all the speakers having the office of teaching for their life-vocation. Each church had leaders, but the worship was not of necessity conducted exclusively by them. On the other hand, a teaching office was never wanting, i.e. the right or authority and the duty of preaching. That faith, where it is planted, should propagate itseK by further preaching or testimony, i.e. that there should be a continuous teaching function in the Church, is the wbl and command of Christ. This rests on dogmatic necessity. Through faith He has implanted in His Church, wherever it exists, the preaching of the gospel as its inmost impulse. Not individuals, not an order, but the Church (Art. Smalk. 353), is the original bearer of the office, bound as well as warranted to preach the gospel. It is responsible for seeing that the function of teaching is never wanting ; and thus the teaching office, considered as a permanent, established teach ing function, has divme authorization. The form, on the other hand, in which it has to make provision for this, is not divinely prescribed. Hence it is not necessarily the same in ab ages, save that the Church must ever make as good pro vision as possible for the continuance of this function, which may be done in a freer or stricter form. For the rest, the primitive Christian Church submitted itself to the universal ethical laws, according to which the objective call or "mission" must be added to the inner subjective impulse and cab by way of confirmation and acknowledgment.1 It must be the right of the Christian Church, on which the duty of preaching is laid, to transfer the right of speaking in its name, and therefore of acknowledging or not the teaching of one who discourses from free impulse, and of passing a corrective judgment.2 With this limitation, the Trpotyrrrevetv is conceded by Paul to ab believers who have the impulse.3 But although a free Ministry of the Word had its place in the primitive days of the Church alongside the teaching office in the apostles and 1 Rom. x. 15. 2 1 Cor. xiv. 29. 8 1 Cor. xiv. ; 1 Thess. v. 19-21 ; cf. Jas. iii. 1. 266 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. attached by them to fixed persons,1 Paul would stib have provision made for due order (evraijta) in this free movement or exercise of the teaching function on the part of bebevers at the impulse of the Spirit. The Pastoral Epistles exhibit already an advanced pobty.2 A setting apart to teaching on the ground of evident charisms obtained, not merely for missionary purposes,3 but also for the edKying of churches. But in the age to which we owe the writings of the N. T, the administration of Baptism and the Holy Supper, Church discipbne and government, which includes the election of persons according to their gifts, were not committed to a special order, nor necessarily to persons, to whom the teach ing function had been transferred by the Church ; but in the earliest church ab these pubbc functions were distributed in the most various ways, but so that what was to be done in the name of the Church should only be done on the basis of the transference of its office to the individuals, or at least stood in need of recognition by the church. 2. The Ecclesiastical Doctrine.4 — In harmony with the N. T., the Augsburg Confession requires first of all the Ministry of the Word in general (Ministerium Verbi divini), whatever the form of its constitution, save that a regular call (the rite vocari) is necessary to pubbc teaching (publice docere et administrare sacramenta), by which the right of speaking and acting in the name of the Church is transferred. Vocatio or ordinatio (see below) is to be regarded as an act of the Church, not as a sacrament, nor is a sacerdotium supposed to be established by the transference of authority.6 The selection may fab on the unworthy, and is so far falbble, not a directly divine act ; but the duty is imposed on the church of setting apart persons for the Ministry of the Word to the best of its knowledge, not as if the Word preached by the regular official teacher were alone sure of effect.6 Such a Cathobcising error would again interpose a priestly order, " an official means of grace," between the believer and Christ. On 1 Tit. i. 5, 9. 2 1 Tim. iv. 14 ; Tit. i. 5 ff. » Acts xiii 1-4. , 4 Conf. Aug. v. xiv. ; AH. Sm. 352. 353 ; Apol. 201. 204. Of the Reformed Confessions, ed. Augusti, Conf. Helv. p. 55 ; Gall. 121 f. ; Angl. 134. 140 ; Belg. 190 ff. 192 ; Bohem. 295 ff. ; Cat. Gen. 518. J. Gerhard, to. xii. 6 Apol. 201. 204. 6 As Kliefoth supposes, in opposition to the Art. Sm. the ministry of the word. 267 the contrary, the Confessions preserve to all bebevers their priestly right, expressly reserving to them the right of com forting or teaching by pious private converse. Thus, the Reformation doctrine of the Office or Ministry of the Word holds its ground against a twofold opposition, that of the hierarchical and that of the anarchical extreme, which latter would leave the function of Evangebcal preaching to chance or supposed inner divine impulse, as the Anabaptists and later the Quakers. To Evangebcal bebevers ordination is no sacra ment, but according to John Gerhard and others merely solennis et publica testificatio vocationis. The vocatio is therefore the chief thing, and great weight is rightly laid upon the regular cab, or " ordination to the Ministry of the Word." It is not necessary de fide, but a praiseworthy custom, for the vocatio by the Church to take place in solemn manner with prayer on the part of the Church and imposition of hands. Nor need this accidens be done by bishops.1 Nay, the right of ordination, in which the vocatio is the chief thing, according to the old Evangelical teaching does not even rest exclusively with the clerus, but, like ab Church power originally, with the Church (see above), in which laymen also may co-operate.2 3. Dogmatic Investigation. — The church is to be a reflex of the prophetic office of Christ. It becomes this by appropriating Christ's word, giving it the widest circulation and increasing extension. But although the saying, "I believe, therefore do I speak," holds good of every Christian, the duty of the church' is not discharged with this informal testifying or ministry of the Word. Everything informal is imperfect, subject to caprice or chance, without stabibty, exposed to aberrations without any certain antidote. Hence, although the Ministry of the Word is committed to the Church as a unity, and not to a special order, although the right of testing, selecting, and appointing the ministers of the Word is conferred on the Church (in which mistakes on its side are just as possible as unfaith fulness in those called to office), stib it is not left to it whether it wbl or wbl not have a regular, i.e. a reaby fixed, Ministry of the Word as an essential part of its organization, 1 J. Gerhardi Loci, to. xii loc. 24, § 159. a This follows also from the idea of ordination as testificatio vocationis. Hence even Evangelical magistrates ordained at first. 268 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. nay, as a fundamental institution of its existence, but this is a divine necessity of a moral order, having the example of Christ and the apostles on its side.1 And in harmony with this duty is the fact that the Holy Spirit never abows the church to want those who present themselves to it, equipped with special charisms in keeping with this end, charisms of didaskaba and gnosis, exhortation and consolation, gifts of inspired holy discourse in speech or writing, or hermeneutic and historic as web as rubng talent.2 In continually calbng forth such talents, which seek a place for their constant exercise, the Holy Spirit virtually or creatively reveals the wbl of the Lord of the Church, that it should give scope and place for the ordered ministry of the Word in its manifold branches, even as, conversely, just as manifold and expbcit a need of such talents is always arising. Fitted into their place, the. charisms thus obtain a field of constant and abiding exercise, so that the giving and receiving members are able to rejoice together. But, to say nothing of the difference of gifts and the corresponding need of the Church, the necessity of this ordinance lies also in the successive series of generations, by which a younger generation is always associated with an older. To the teaching office proper naturaby joins on the care of souls in applying the Word to individual persons and their needs, for the right administration of the Word requires also the right distribution of the Word of truth.3 But however necessary this strict organization of the ministry of the Word, that ministry should never forget, that it has indeed to reflect but not to continue Christ or to take His place. No divine authority or infabibbity pertains to the ministers of the Word or to the teaching order, considered even as a whole, but it has perpetuaby to grow intensively by living itself more and. more comprehensively into the Word of Christ. Nor has the fixed ministry of the Word the privbege of being the sole deposi tory of Christian truth ; but as even in the 0. T. the prophets had their place alongside the established offices, because the Spirit blows where He wibs, so must the Church also set itself 1 Matt. x. ; Luke x. ; Tit. i 8 1 Cor. xii. 1-11, 28-30 ; Eph. iv. 11 ff. 3 So far, certainly, as the care of souls demands also a loving transference of self into the position of others, it has its place in the reflecting of the high-priestly spirit of Christ (see below). THE MINISTRY OF THE WORD. 269 to allow air and free movement to the free ministry of the Word, especially to look upon the free investigation of science, which has to do with the truth, and not merely sacred traditions, with joyous confidence in the victorious strength of Christian truth. This victory is only achieved by the mutual supple menting of the free and the fixed, by living wrestle and strain of the faculties, not by mere lordship of the fixed The good conscience of the Church in its traditional teaching is not shown in imposing sbence within its borders on opposi tion to that teaching, so far as opposition does not break loose from Christ's Word, and suppressing it, but in being always ready to give reply, and far from relying on mechanical means, in letting itself be roused by opposition to bring to light new aspects of Christian truth, as each age needs, by deeper digging into the mines of the Divine Word, to solve the problems stib left to every age, and therefore to acknowledge the truth lying hidden in the opposition to its tradition. 4. Independent as are the ministers of the Word, in the stricter sense, of the wib of the several empirical churches in reference to the matter to be preached, they have this inde pendence only as ministers of the Word. Since with the Church they are dependent on the latter, in such common subordination to a higher power they both have due freedom and independence in relation to each other. For independence of judgment belongs to the churches also, Holy Scripture being equally accessible to them, and the right of scriptural knowledge being equaby their duty. They are not, therefore, bound or even warranted to acknowledge dependence on the minister of the Word, where he is not dependent on God's Word, but have in this case to prove their independence and stedfastness in the faith.1 We must not, in opposition to God's Word, practise idolatry from regard to ecclesiastical order. 5. The conferring of other powers (e.g. the administration of Baptism and the Holy Supper, Church discipline, govern ment, etc.), which rest originaby in the bosom of the Church, on the same persons to whom the ministry of the Word is committed by regular cab, rests on no dogmatic necessity, save that it is obligatory on the Church to call into existence 1 1 Tim. vi 5. 270 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. an organized activity for these duties, and in general for every thing done in the name of the Church. The more precise character of such arrangements depends on time and circum stances, and is therefore a question partly of Ethics and Practical Theology, partly of Church law. TRANSITION TO THE SECOND PODNT : RELATION OF WORD AND SACRAMENT, §137. The Sacraments are sacred actions, instituted by Christ and connected with the Word of God, in which, under out ward signs, invisible grace is not merely preached, but dispensed to the individual receptive thereto by Christ Himself, to whom the Church is merely an organ (§ 134). The benefit of this offered grace is personally appropriated by faith. Literature. — Ad. Wuttke, De ratione quce interest inter Ver- bum et Sacramenta, 1842. Hoffmann, Das Gnadenmittel des gottlichen Wortes; Jubelschrift fur D. Strauss, 1859. J. Muller, Das Verhdltniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heiligen Geistes und dem Gnadenmittel des Wortes. Sudhoff, De Convenientia, quce inter utrumque Gratice Instrumentum, Verbum Dei et Sacra- mentum, intercedat, Comment, dogm. theologica, 1852. Harless and Harnack, Die kirchlich-religiose Bedeutung der reinen Lehre von den Gnadenmitteln, 1869. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, ib. 2, 112-135. Phibppi, v. 2. Of the Confessions, cf. Conf. Aug., v. xbi. x. ; Apol. 98, 86. 203, 18. 252, 11-13. 265, 59 ; Heidelb. Cat. qu. 65. 69. 75 ; Scot. 18. 1. The word sacramentum has received by convention, not by etymology, the stricter meaning indicated in the text. The idea of the sacraments held in common by Evangelical teachers is, that they are sacred actions instituted by Christ Himself, which, under visible signs, offer the invisible grace promised in the word of institution. This idea decides as to the number of the sacraments. Accordingly, of the Cathobc number, seven, which were accepted also by the later Greek RELATION OF WORD AND SACRAMENT. 271 Church under the influence of the Latin, there are left only two, Baptism and the Supper, because each of the others lacks either the divine institution and promise (bke the sacraments of Confirmation, Ordination, and Extreme Unction), or the outer sign, like Penance and Matrimony. Other sacred actions in the ethical sphere, bke prayer, instabation of authorities, or anointing of kings, might as sacred actions be called sacraments in the wider sense with as good right as the last-named. Here we have to do with dogmatic, not ethical, sacraments, because the point in hand is agencies, by which Christ accord ing to promise continues His work upon individuals (§§ 127, 134), and in which the Church is simply the organ of His action, so that its act is to be regarded as His act, because done in His name and by His command. But since we see in them the act of Christ Himself offering salvation, their being or validity is independent of the faith or worthiness of the administrator; and in the same way faith does not make them sacraments, but receives their benefit. Moreover, the Evan gebcal view, in its opposition to the number seven, apprehends Christianity as a unity, not spbt up into fragments, although human receptiveness for the entire undivided salvation given in Christ may be of different degrees. This weighty principle is also the deepest reason of the fact, that Evangebcal teachers of the Reformation age refuse to concede a different grace in the sacraments from that in the Word, in which, as in the sacrament, the bving Christ works and invites to Himself, that He may impart HimseK to us. Hence, with Augustine, the Symbols cab the sacraments a pictura Verbi.1 The second characteristic trait of Evangebcal teaching is, that the sacraments work not ex opere operato, but that faith is requisite to then- efficacy.2 Stbl the meaning is not, that the sacraments only have significance for those who bring faith thereto, but simply that then* benefit first reaby comes to man by means of faith, for the Conf. Aug. says that 1 Apol. 200, 5. 2 Conf. Aug. 25, 22. 28. 29. Apol. 98, 86. 252, 11 ff. 203, 18. 265, 59. Conf. Aug. xiii., damnant illos qui docent, quod Sacramenta ex opere operato justifi- cent, nee docent fidem requiri in usu sacramentorum quae credat, remitti peccata. Apol. 213, 18, rejects the notion, quod Sacramenta non ponenti obicem con- ferant gratiam ex opere operato sine bono motu cordis, hoc est sine fide. This is impia, perniciosa doctrina, simpliciter Judaica. 272 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. the Holy Spirit works, excites, and confirms faith by Word and Sacrament.1 2. Relation of Word and Sacrament. — The saying of Augustine, according to which the sacraments are to the eye what the Word is to the ear, is true in so far as faith has to see in both a divine self-mamfestation, which may be cabed God's Word in the wider sense ; and in so far as they ought not to be distinguished in such a way as to exalt one at the cost of the other. But stbl they are not identical The differ ence expresses itself historically thus : The Reformed in general lay stress rather on the Word, which is nearer to the spirit ; the Cathobcs, on the sacrament with its sensuous symbolism. The dogmatic problem wib be to show, that in their difference they are mutuaby related. In doing this, the starting-point wbl be the unity of Christian grace, which does not permit the difference between Sacrament and Word generally to be sought in their contents, hut in the diversity oiform, in which the one grace is offered according to the variety of need in the subject. Now the affinity of the Word and the Sacrament is evident from this, that the Word — the continuation of Christ's prophetic work — must prepare the way for all further mani festation of grace, since without the Word the latter could only influence man by magic, outward or inward. The Word addresses itseK to the intebigence, that intebigence may arouse the wib, thus giving rise to Christian faith, which could not exist without knowledge of Christ, because it would lack its object, which cannot be given by purely inward spiritual influence, but only by the preaching of the Word.2 Again, without the Word of divine institution and founding, the sacrament were no sacrament. It is itseK nothing but the carrying out of the word of institution and promise, brought within the actual present. Were we to imagine the sacred action cut off from the Word, it would lack the definite mean ing which interprets and gives effect to it. The Word, then —and this leads to the other aspect — has indeed Christ for its ' Conf. Aug. xiii. Apol. 265, 59, as the right usus sacramenti it is indicated, ut fides aceedat (not antecedat), or ut fides concipiatur. This must especially apply to Baptism, for in a normal way faith must be already assumed at the Holy Supper. 2 § 127, 3. RELATION OF WORD AND SACRAMENT. 273 contents, nay, since it is preached in His name, it involves also an action of Christ ; and since the Word of the gospel embraces in its way the whole field, there is no difference between Word and Sacrament in reference to contents.1 Oil this is based the old Evangelical doctrine, that as to contents the spiritualis manducatio supplies the same as the oralis. But although the Word is a clothing of spiritual truth in sensuous garb, in order that faith may preserve the conscious ness of an objectivity in its contents independent of its own act, and know itself one with the historic Christ in externally historic fashion through the Word, which is a continuation of Christ's act, stbl the Word does not satisfy the need. Although in it in its own way the one and entire gospel finds expression, the Word is largely dependent on the skill and gifts of the ministers of the Word for debvery and effect, as web as for the living representation of Christ. Further, by its nature it is first of all a communicating of doctrine or truth to the intelbgence, which it addresses ; and this is necessarby done in a multipbcity of sentences of human discourse, into which the unity and entirety of Christian truth is divided in its manifestation. The presentation of the gospel in its unity and entirety, such as was given in the living Person of Christ and the contemplation of that Person, is very unequaby accom plished by the Word preached according to the gifts of the speaker, and never perfectly. Moreover, in this its divided manifestation the Word extends equally to ab the hearers of preaching, whereas one and the same aspect of the Word is not that which suits ab at one time ; for preaching gives special distinctness to particular aspects of the — in itself thoroughly united — Word, the rebuking and condemning, as web as the comforting and encouraging aspects. It is thus impossible for the individual to know what part of the Word, which mentions none by name, applies to him as he is at the present moment, whether for example he must apply to himself words of grace (which application has its time and hour) or words of rebuke. And yet the estabbshing of a secure state of grace depends on his not appropriating grace arbitrarby, but on good objective grounds. For these defects of the Word taken * As Harless rightly insists, after the example of Augustine and the Refor mation. Dorneb. — Christ. Doot. rv. S 274 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. alone, the Sacrament brings the supply. As an unquestionable institution of Christ, the Sacrament is an invitation on His part. This invitation in historical process He causes to come to individuals in such a way, that along with the outward action He is wbbng to communicate His grace, nay HimseK, accord ing to promise. It is meant to bring the individual into union with His person, in whom the unity and entirety of the gospel is enclosed; and thus, as an action in whieh Christ continues His work of receiving men, to restore to the spiritual vision of faith that which was given by Christ's outward manifestation during His earthly ministry. Thus the Sacra ment combines apparently opposite but equally necessary elements. First. Whereas the one Word divides in its manifesta tion into words and sentences, grace thus fabing asunder through Holy Scripture and preaching into a multipbcity of rays, which yet only have their true effect when they again combine for consciousness into a unity, it is the Sacrament which presents grace in its ab-embracing complete ness and makes it visible to the eye of faith. It gives therefore not a mere ray of grace, but the whole Christ; and how rich its blessing shall be, depends simply on the degree of receptiveness. On the other side, the Sacrament specializes grace, not in itself, but in reference to individuals. It appbes the one and complete grace to individuals in historical progress. It does not, as the Word unavoidably does, exhibit one single aspect of Christianity, and that in such a way that the same aspect presents itself equally to all, however different they may be, and without the individual knowing what he ought to apply to himseK. On the contrary, the Sacrament addresses itseK, by Christ's commission and as His action, to particular individuals by name, who thereby, provided they bebeve in the divine institution and promise of the Sacrament, come into relation with Christ in His unity and entirety, enter into gracious covenant with Him, and thus rejoice in Christ's redeeming purpose as referring to their own personality, and that at the present moment, without putting subjective wishes in the place of objective truth. Thus, through the sacraments instituted by Christ, and dispensed in His name as though He Himself RELATION OF WORD AND SACRAMENT. 275 administered them, Christ's work of cabing and receiving men into communion with Him is just as directly applied to men as once to His disciples, so that they may be as confi dent of His loving wib as those disciples. Hence too it is clear, that when some suppose the significance of justification by faith must be limited, if the sacraments are to receive their due honour and their objectivity is to be acknowledged, this is a gross misunderstanding of the meaning both of the Sacra ment and of faith. So bttle is one a hindrance to the other, that faith itseK longs for the Sacrament, because faith longa after personal assurance of communion with Christ, and that not a seK-made, subjective, but subjective-objective assur ance; and conversely, the Sacrament on its side looks for bebeving partakers of it, because only to such can it impart its benefit. Here, therefore, Evangelical doctrine also steers between two errors — the Romish, which injures faith by its opus operatum, from fear lest the sacraments and their objective significance should suffer loss through the Evangelical doctrine of faith; and the Anabaptist and Quakerish, which thinks faith should be set against the Sacrament, as if faith did not need the Sacrament, but would be placed by it in false dependence on the external. The Protestant Fides, in which Fiducia and assurance of salvation — Fides specialis — are the chief matter, agrees best with the exhibitio gratice specialis by the Sacrament, which most perfectly meets the need of faith. For the sacra ments are personal acts of Christ to persons, as is recognized in the Form. Concordia;.1 Observation. — Thomasius prefers another distinction be tween Word and Sacrament.2 In the sacraments, he says, grace operates through physical means directly on the nature of man, on his entire psychico-physical, essential being (there fore without intervention of knowing and volition); they transplant us into Christ's holy human nature, and into the organism of the Church ; they are the church-forming powers which the Church administers. The Word, on the other 1 F. C. 807, 37 : et quidem cam ipsam ob causam (re de revelata erga nos Dei voluntati dubitemus) promissionem Evangelii Christus non tantum generaliter proponi curat, sed etiam Sacramenta promissioni annectere voluit, quibus tanquam sigillis ad promissionem appensis unicuique credenti promissionis Evangelicae certitndinem confirmat. 2 Ut supra, iii. 2, p. 113 f. 276 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. hand, operates on the self-conscious personality, on the in telligence and the successive unfolding of the personality, whereas the Sacrament establishes a new relation by one drastic stroke, in one act and moment. — It is true, that in the Sacrament the undivided, concentrated grace is offered, and this grace also requires a concentration of the entire man, i.e. a cobected bving receptiveness ; but it would neither be Scriptural nor commendable to ascribe to the sacraments in distinction from the Word an influence on the nature in a physical way, i.e. not through the medium of the spirit, so that only the nature of man, as determined by the sacrament or Christ's holy human nature, could influence his spirit. This would lead back to a physical process of salva tion, to the opus operatwm. It is also strangely wrong to exclude the Word of God from the church-forming powers. This is in keeping with the overlooking of the fact, that the Church has its constantly self-renewing genesis in germinant faith, not in impersonal nature. Finaby, this mode of con ception contradicts the fundamental principle of the New Testament, according to which the gospel first of ab aims at the spirit, and only through it at transforming also the physical side of man in conformity with Christ's holy human nature. On the other hand it has been already premised, that it is certainly of value for faith to come into relation with the historic Christ through the medium of institutions of His which also touch the senses, only it is overlooked by Thomasius that even the Word of God comes to man in sensuous form. SECOND POINT. A. — The Continuation of the High-priestly Activity of Christ. § 138. — Holy Baptism. Holy Baptism is the sacred action instituted by Christ, by means of which the individual is received by Christ's substitutionary, high-priestly love into His communion, that the old life may die and a new reconcbed one begin — a bfe of sonship to God. Literature. — Matthies, Baptismi Expositio biblico-historico- doymatim, 1831. W.Hoffmann, Taufeund Wiedertaufe, 1840. BAPTISM. 277 Oster, P. J., Brief e uber die Lehre der H. Schr. von der Taufe, 1840. Brauns, J. F., zur Verstdndigung uber den Anabaptismus, 1844. Nagelsbach, Luth. Zeitschr. 1849, 4. Schoberlein, Stud. u. Krit. 1847, 4. p. 1024.1 Honing, Das Sacrament der Taufe, 2 vols. 1846, 1848; cf. especiaby II. 132, 105, 106, § 22. Martensen, die christi. Taufe und die baptistische Frage, 1847, ed. 2, 1860. Culmann, Welche Bewandtniss hat es mit der Taufe in der christlichen Kirche ? 1847. Steinmeyer, Vortrag auf dem Kirchen-Tag zu Frankfurt, 1854 (cf. the records of this Kirchen- tag and Ev. Kz. 1854, 55). R. Stier, Taufe und Kindertaufe (from the "Words of the Lord Jesus," vb.), 1855. Hase, Polemik, ed. 2. Leiner, Das Sacrament der heiligen Taufe; Ausleg. des IV. Hauptstucks des kleinen lutherischen Katechismus, 1857. Wblms, Beleuchtung und Widerlegung der Schrift von Leiner, 1862. Ribbeck, F., Aus der Landeskirche in die Baptisten- gemeinde, 1854. (In opposition to him write : Esch, C. W., Die evangelische Landeskirche, etc., and J. L. Muller, 1854. Sub sequently Ribbeck again renounced the Baptist doctrine.) Miinchmeyer, Das Dogma von der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kirche. Ein historischer und kritischer Ver such, 1854. (For the definition of the Church as Societas fidei in Conf. Aug. VIII., he would substitute the definition of it as a community of baptized persons.) In English Literature: Pusey, Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism, 1836. Rob. Wilberforce, The Doctrine of Holy Baptism, ed. 3, 1850 (in opposition to Goode's Effects of Infant Baptism). Wardlaw, Dis. on Infant Baptism, ed. 3, 1846 (in opposition to Dr. Habey's work: The Sacraments). Haldane and Birt, Strictures on Infant Baptism? write on the Baptist side, in opposition to Wardlaw. I. — Biblical Doctrine. Baptism was instituted by the Risen Lord, after pre vious intimations,3 in accordance with John's baptism, which, although not a mere baptism of repentance, but also a promise of the approach of the kingdom of heaven, only finds its fulfilment in the Christian baptism with the 1 J. Miiller (das gottliche Recht der Union, p. 203) declares against the notion of Nagelsbach and Schoberlein, that Holy Baptism relates also to the nature of man, and imparts the prima stamina of a heavenly corporeity for the forming of the new personality. Cf. Thomasius, iii. 2. 1-47. 140. 2 Biit says of Infant baptism : It is a cause without effect, means without end, cloud without rain, tree without fruit. 3 Matt, xxviii. 19 f. ; Mark Xvi. 15. Cf. John iii. 5 ; 1 John v. 6-8. 278 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. Holy Spirit.1 The Johannine baptism in its turn joins on to passages in the law and prophets of the Old Testament respecting sacred washings.2 But Christian Baptism is first a rite of symbolic cleansing, and then of consecration and reception into the community of Christian confessors. It takes the place of the Old Testament circumcision,3 and from the beginning is the New Testament covenant-sign.4 The nature of circumcision was chiefly to impose obligation,6 namely, to obey the wbl of God as it is and will be revealed. Still even the Old Testament covenant is also a covenant of promise. In the New Testament, in harmony with the cha racter of the prevenient grace of Christianity, baptism is not primarily obligation or service, but a promise and communication of divine grace. But forgiveness of sins appears everywhere as the fundamental factor in Christian grace ; in many passages it is regarded as the first and surest fruit of baptism. In Peter, baptism is called the inquiry after a good conscience.6 But the benefit of baptism is not exhausted in this negative factor — forgiveness. The gift of the Holy Ghost, implanting a new bfe, the germ or seed of a new man, is essential to Christian baptism. Hence baptism is called a laver of regeneration.7 Paul combines the Johannine and Christian baptism, but so as to give repentance a Christian character, and uses the outward action as a symbol, seeing in the submersion the dying of the old man with Christ, the being planted into His death which procured the forgiveness of sins, and in the rising again from the grave of the water the resurrection of the new man into Christ's fellowship.8 The intimate connection with Christ, into which baptism brings, is already expressed in the words of institution, according to which it is a being baptized into the name, i.e. into the revealed nature, of God as Father, Son, 1 Acts i. 5. 2 Ex. xix. 10, xxix. 4, xxx. 18 f. ; Num. xix. 7 ff., and Zech. xiii. 1, xiv. 8 ; Ezek. xxxvi 25. 3 Col. ii. 12, 13. * Cf. on this point Ecce Homo (by Seeley), ed. 4, 1866, p. 83 ff. J Gal. v. 3. 6 1 Pet. iii. 21 : ewiiSwtas ayxlris Impwrtiftx. The answer to the inquiry is sought and found in baptism. Cf. Acts ii. 38. 7 Tit. iii. 5. Cf. John iii. 5 ; Gal. iii. 27. 8 Rom. vi. 3 ff. The relation of baptism to His death was already declared by Christ, Mark x. 38 ; Luke xii. 50. BAPTISM. 279 and Holy Spirit. If baptism unto Christ only, or unto His death, is often spoken of,1 the conclusion must not be drawn that ancient Christendom baptized unto Christ only. The opposite is clear from the fact that even the Ebionites used the Trinitarian formula. Rather, baptism is often cabed baptism unto Christ, because the revelation in Him is the centre, which points in a mediatory character on one side to God as Father, on the other to the Holy Spirit. The New Testament indicates nothing more definite respecting the re lation of the outward element in the act to the inner spiritual meaning, apart from the symbolic use of that outward element, save that the gift of the Holy Spirit is viewed as connected with baptism in a normal way. In the beginning the baptism of adults was customary, a new and blessed consciousness of filial relationship being usually expected as its fruit. In harmony with this view, regeneration is especiaby described as its result, but in order thereto it is necessary to become as chbdren ; and so much is the receiving, and not any human observance, any human action whatever, the chief point in baptism, that Paul brings it into the most intimate association with Christ's substitution and high-priestly love. Baptism is symbobcaby the death and grave of the old man, but only as union with Christ's death, which His substitutionary love endured for us, thus acquiring the power so to draw us into the spiritual fellowship of His death that His death is effectual for our benefit.2 For, dying with Christ, we also rise again with Him as men, whose old life, permeated with the generic sin of Adam, is as it were swabowed up by His substitution appbed to us. Hence Paul even says, that by baptism we have put on Christ, the righteousness of Christ, as a white garment, so that we stand in God's sight as parts of His manifestation.3 For these reasons the baptized are called sons of God, God looks upon them in Christ. Accordingly it is proved by scriptural evidence, that Christ's heavenly, high-priestly love continues its activity through baptism in His name, which takes place indeed but once,4 but in which Christ's high-priestly love unites with man and pledges itself 1 Acts ii 38, viii. 16, x. 48 ; Rom. vi. 3 ; Gal. iii. 27. 2 Col. ii. 12, 13. 3 GaL iii. 27. Cf. Rev. iv. 4, iii. 4, vii. 9, 13 f. 4 Acts viii. xvi. xvii 280 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. to continued operation. But through Christ's mediation the baptized one enters also into relation to the Triune God in general. Observation. — Holy Scripture says nothing of an effect of Holy Baptism on the nature, of another heavenly gift (materia ccelestis) than the Holy Spirit; but this does not preclude the divine power, which the new personality receives, conversely exercising also an influence on the physical side belonging to the personabty. § 139. — Continuation. II. — Forming of the Ecclesiastical Doctrine. Literature.— Conf. Aug. IX. ; Apol. 156, p. 329 ; Cat. 379. 401. 534; Heidelb. Cat. qu. 69 ff. 1. The common Evangelical doctrine is, that Holy Baptism is necessary for ab, because it is the form ordained by Christ HimseK for bringing the individual person into communion with Christ's person and salvation, and because without participation in His redemption man remains in the natural corruption which, apart from counteraction, must result in eternal death. Hence both Evangebcal Confessions, however earnestly the Reformation maintains the cause of the conscious religious personabty, are at one in rejecting not merely Anabaptism, but late baptism in general, and in retaining infant-baptism. As in respect of the sacrament generally, so here also they have fixed two limits, which must not be transgressed. On one side, according to them, the Sacrament without faith is a signum inefficax1 for the benefit of baptism — the Holy Spirit — cannot be imparted ex opere operato. On the other side it is not faith which makes the sacrament a sacrament, but Christ's institution and fidelity to His promise.2 Thereby the objectivity of the Sacrament is rendered secure, even as by the, first condition all magical influence of the out ward act is excluded. A consequence of the objectivity of the sacrament is, that baptism remains vabd, and is not to be repeated, although in the .baptismal act itself faith was not 1 Cat. Maj. 549, 73. * Ibid. 545. 546. BAPTISM. 281 exercised, and therefore the benefit of baptism was not effectual. A distinction must be made between validitas and efficacia. Repetition would involve the erroneous conception, maintained by Romish teaching, that the significance of baptism is but momentary, namely, valid so long as the baptized one does not again fab into sin. But, on the contrary, according to Evangebcal teaching the revelation of something eternal, of God's faithful purpose of grace, is contained in the temporal moment. Baptism is on God's part a covenant with man, which only definitive unbebef can dissolve. Hence, even after the fall of the baptized one, a return to baptismal grace is possible through repentance without a new sacrament (Confirmation, or the sacrament of Penance, or Extreme Unction). " He who did not actually believe at his baptism, let him now believe" in the gracious promise revealed con cerning him in his baptism, which is stib in force.1 The complete grace is wrapped up and made sure to man in this promise on God's part ; he has only to appropriate it by faith. Thus, the wealth of the baptismal benefit is so great, that he can only completely make it a personal possession when his entire bfe is a " continuous baptism " by union in dying and rising again with Christ.2 Hereby also the chief point is given in respect to infant baptism. The Conf. Aug. speaks of a twofold oblation.3 Through baptism offertur Gratia Dei to the baptized one, and the children are offeruntur Deo et recipiuntur in gratiam Dei. No mention is here made of regeneration in the fact of infant baptism ; but the meaning of the Conf. Aug. implies,4 that regeneration, on its emergence with faith, is the carrying out or realization of the promise connected with baptism. 2. But the relation of baptism to faith and regeneration was variously defined, and in the case of infant-baptism problems of pecubar difficulty arose as to that relation. The Cathobc Church could assume a substitutionary faith in the Church, or a magical effect of baptism, and consequently a faith before baptism (conferred as it were), as well as an effect of baptism on the person in the moment of the outward act apart from his own faith. This the Reformation was forced to reject; i Cat. Maj. 546, 56. s Ibid. 548, 65. 543, 41. 3 Conf. Aug. ix. « Cf. Art. II. 282 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. and Luther, in order to leave no place for the opus operatum, assumed, although not with fub certainty, the personal faith of the child in order to baptism (Cat. Maj. 544, 47 ff, 546). The ancient formularies, indeed, had the confession of faith recited in the name of the chbd before baptism, upon which the baptism followed.1 Luther assumed that God gives the child faith for baptism in answer to the intercession of the Church before baptism. But there is no exegetical authority for ascribing a consciousness of God and Christ, or Christian faith, to infants who as yet have not even self- consciousness. And if a general, mere receptiveness for Chris tianity were called faith, then ab men would be believers by nature. But faith comes by preaching, not by nature. Granted that we are right in ascribing the effect of the production of faith to the bebeving intercession of the Church, such intercession may be wanting in the baptismal act ; and since it is uncertain, the authority of such baptism would be doubtful, so far as it is supposed to depend on the existence of faith in the child before baptism. To assign to the intercession such potency as would command with certainty individuals and the origination of faith in them, would only transfer the magical element of the Romish doctrine to the spiritual sphere and the act of the Church, instead of to the outward act of the priest. The outward opus operatum would then, it is true, be averted from infant-baptism, in so far as the baptismal blessing itself would not pass to the chbd by magical means, but only through its faith ; but it would be otherwise with the origination of the faith itself. Moreover, the supposition of a faith before baptism includes yet another danger. Since, according to the common Evan gelical doctrine, regeneration is originated by faith, it would fobow that regeneration as web as faith comes before baptism, and therefore could not be thought as its effect. If faith and regeneration are already brought to baptism, the only meaning left to the latter is that of seabng what has been done, i.e. !Cf. Honing, II. 1-20: "The ancient and also the later Catholic Church gave no marked expression in a liturgical respect to the difference between adult Christian children and proselytes ; they transferred the entire liturgical treatment of the Catechumenate and of proselyte baptism more or less to the baptism of children, thus paving the way for the importance which they attribute to the aponsorial institute.'' BAPTISM. 283 the prefixing of faith to baptism leads to the Baptist theory. No wonder that Luther again betrays uncertainty whether faith in the proper sense is to be ascribed to children, although he cherishes the hope that they believe.1 In the Large Catechism he says, whether chbdren have faith, let the learned decide;2 and on the occasion of the Wittenberg Concord, 1536, he conceded, that because children have as yet no intelligence, they can only have an analogon of faith, namely, a natural bias of the soul to God, just as Calvin also spoke of fides seminalis in chbdren. In the Large Catechism, Luther finaby contented himself with saying : " The matter does not depend on whether chbdren have faith ; baptism is valid, even when faith is wanting in the act of baptism, and brings its blessing through the faith that emerges later." 3 The Lutheran theology of the 17th century abandoned the standpoint, that faith must be required before baptism, con sidering it rather, in opposition to Baptist teaching, as the effect of baptism, bke regeneration. But this effect of baptism was considered as directly involved in the outward act ; and thus the result was a faith produced by the baptismal act, and a regeneration apart from personal self-consciousness, apart from all knowledge of sin or of Christ, and therefore apart from all spiritual intervention on man's side, and the reproach of the opus operatum lay again only too close at hand. Certainly the same was not understood by faith and regeneration, which we with Holy Scripture understand thereby; rather a mere resting of the soul in God, connected with a miraculous restoration of free will, by which in due time the child is able personaby to appropriate grace and justification. But this is too much for the moment of baptism in the case of children, and too little for the entire significance of baptism. It is too bare a view of the contents of the blessing conveyed to man in baptism, to suppose it merely to give the possi bility of personal faith and conscious regeneration (which was then usually called conversion). See above, p. 204 f. 1 Cat. Maj. 546, § 57. * Ibid. Ui, 47 ff. 3 Ibid. 545, 52 : hoc quoque dicimus, nobis non summam vim in hoc sitam esse, num ille, qui baptizatur credat, necne : per hoc enim baptismo nihil detrahitur. § 55 : quamquam pueri non crederent . . . tamen baptismus verus esset. 546, § 56 : Propterea dico, si non recte credidisti prius, tamen adhuc crede. 284 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. For these reasons, Pietism, with its stricter idea of faith and regeneration, opposed this view. It insisted on the necessity of personal faith in order to salvation and to regeneration, and left no place for a faith which is mere passivity or unconscious receptiveness. Only, the teaching of Pietism was such as to make regeneration begin too sub jectively from the conscious person. It wished, indeed, to retain infant-baptism, but was unable to weave the fact of baptism as an efficient factor into the process of regeneration, and to apply the fact of its consummation to the conscious life. The logical result of such inabibty must necessarily be the giving up of infant-baptism. In very recent days a reaction has again set in against these views. The Puseyites maintain " baptismal regenera tion." They indeed understand thereby justification especially, but obscure and minimize the idea of faith and regeneration, describing regeneration as already effected by baptism. In Germany of late the opus operatum has been again openly adopted by many in the interest of infant-baptism, and even the Catholic consequences of the theory with respect to the idea of the Church are not shunned, but drawn.1 The church- idea was transformed by them to this effect: the sacrament, and not faith, decides as to belonging to the true Church ; even hypocrites, blasphemers, if baptized, are members of the body of Christ ;2 the Church is not to be defined as a societas Fidei et Spiritus Sancti, but as a community of the baptized. More moderate writers say, regeneration in baptism, and the faith which baptism straightway produces, are certainly stbl imperfect. As birth must fobow generation, so must conversion follow baptism and the regeneration (i.e. the genera tion of the new man) in it. But in this case it is a mystery how a regeneration worthy of the name is possible before conversion, or how after regeneration man can still be unconverted.3 Nor can the restoration of liberum arbitrium be called regeneration. This review shows very plainly, that a clear and definite 1 E.g. by the Volkblattfur Stadt und Land; the latter by Miinchmeyer. 4 On the other hand, the Apology describes them as membra Satanai. — Apol., de Ecclesia,. p. 147, 16. More fully below, § 148. 3 See above, § 131. For the rest, in the notion of a relation to Christ, even BAPTISM. 285 form of doctrine is stbl to be framed, at least in respect to infant-baptism. The essential points are — first, that baptism must not find the best work already done, as the Baptist theory supposes, but that faith and regeneration are the fruit of baptismal grace ; secondly, that no place be left here for opus operatum, or the magic of grace, to serve as a centre of doctrinal corruption on other points ; thirdly, that the idea of faith and regeneration be not here suddenly diluted in an unevangelical sense, whereas elsewhere it is to be maintained in full energy against Cathobcism. In the case of the baptism of adults, when it reaches its consummation in a normal way, the union of these three postulates wib be secured without great difficulty, and that union and its right dogmatic settle ment wib shed bght on the difficulties of the doctrine of Infant-Baptism. § 140. — Continuation. III. — Dogmatic Statement of the Doctrine of Baptism in general. 1. The eternal redemption accomplished objectively still needs accomplishment in the subjects. The salvation given in Christ must stib be applied to each individual. No one can produce it or seize it as a prey, and on the other hand it cannot be forced on any one by violence. The gift of God is free ; its acceptance must also be free. Midway between a grace lying absolutely at the disposal of man and a passively-conceived human personabty, bes a bvingly-conceived relation between God and man, according to which free grace is offered preveniently, whilst there is a free receiving on man's side. That offer rests on a choice or election, for one nation being invited before another to salvation, and one individual before another, implies a preference.1 And the offer leaves room for the rejection of Christian grace, for its nature is to require free appropriation. From these main bnes apart from conversion, perhaps the truth finds unconscious expression, that we are united with Christ by a bond reaching farther back than sin. Only, this natural relation should neither be called faith nor regeneration. 1 See above, pp. 167. 185. 286 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. sketched above (§ 130) we must not now deviate. But there was further shown already (§ 137) the necessity of a sacred act having reference to the person, by which the person may be consciously placed, as by a divinely-given objective pledge, in historic connection with Christ, and be assured of being received into His communion in accordance with His wbl. This sacred act is baptism, instituted by Christ for all ages. By this means, firstly, the individual is saved from the great uncertainty, whether he is warranted to regard himself as called and received by Christ into His communion, notwith standing that redemption advances only by degrees. Whoever is in earnest about his salvation cannot rest satisfied with the universal proclamation of the gospel, or with reception into the communion of the Church of any place or country. Nor can he base the certainty of salvation on what is purely inward alone. For what he seeks is reception into the com munion of Christ, the historic, objective, but still actively working Mediator. But Christ's act of reception in reference to the person finds no certain expression in the purely inward sphere, apart from connection with Christ's historically revealed and continuously working purpose of grace. Even reliance on the signs of regeneration could of itself never be exempt from the suspicion of self-deception. Now this defect is suppbed and this need satisfied by Holy Baptism in Christ's name, which, since it is done by His command, and is without doubt merely a continuation of His institution, is to be regarded as His act, in reference to which the Church simply presents itself as Christ's organ. But in the same way, secondly, the Church also is saved by this institution from uncertainty as to whom it must regard and treat as belonging to it. The church can despise no one whom the government of the world, which is subservient to the gospel, brings to it in such circumstances, that duty compels it to offer to him the salvation designed for mankind; and as it can refuse itself to no one whom Christ wishes to be received among His disciples, so also it can recognize no one whom Christ does not acknowledge. Since, then, knowledge of man's heart is denied to the Church, it would be in constant danger of doing too much or too little, of excluding those whom Christ wishes to see received, and of receiving those whom He does BAPTISM. 287 not approve, unless Christ had instituted Holy Baptism, by which He HimseK declares to the Church — provided it is wilbng to administer the sacred act simply as His faithful organ, i.e. according to His commission — that He on His part wishes the chbd to be regarded as belonging to His com munion, and to impart to it the benefits of His substitution. If the Church is so attentive to His gracious wib as to perform baptism, wherever the offer of it cannot be refused without coining into cobision with Christ's loving will, it is also certain that every baptized one, who does not openly reject its blessmg subsequently, is to be regarded as received by Christ, and therefore is also to be acknowledged by the church. Living membership in it is not grounded in the wib of the church, and just as little in the wbl of the indi vidual himself; but reception by Christ is the fundamental, the first condition. But His purpose of reception is revealed out of the depths of eternity in time through the baptism of His institution, in reference to which His church is merely the organ. This act is irrevocable on the part of God and Christ until man's unbelief definitively rejects baptismal grace. God remains true to the baptismal covenant. If the baptized one fabs into sin, which is not sin against the Holy Ghost, the way of return to baptismal grace stands open to him in repentance. He needs no second baptism — which would be a declaration af the invabdity of the first — or a second supplementary sacrament. Reception into Christ's communion, and reception into the Church, therefore, ought not to be separated. 2. But then all depends on knowing the way in which the Church ought to administer . Christ's commission, in order that no human caprice may insinuate itself, but the Church may be simply an organ of His will in this act. Since Christian grace is universal by intrinsic tendency, all men are certainly designed for baptism, and mistake on this point might thus seem impossible. This view is true in the sense that Christ wbl let no baptized one suffer for the mistake of the Church, nor is a second baptism required, or the baptism performed to be declared invalid. But the Church must seek to be as far as possible the executant of His wbl ; and the universal tendency of grace decides nothing as to the 288 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. time when the individual shall be baptized, for here election has its place (§ 130). Here it must first of ab be laid down, that the Church ought not to baptize every one on whom it can lay hands — the unwilling, or chbdren of unwilling parents ; for by divine ordinance the access of the Church to the chbdren bes through the parents as God's representatives. Here also, according to the Evangelical view, the ordinances of the first creation are not ahobshed by the second. It is unseemly to unite Holy Baptism with an act of resistance on man's part. Enforced baptism would be an object of contempt instead of a blessing. Only a magical theory could recommend such arbitrariness and violence. Precisely because baptism con tains a blessing which claims for itself the whole bfe, its dis-' tribution ought not to be conjoined with a violence injurious or possibly fatal to the first germs of the blessing.1 In the case of adults, not merely must wibingness to submit to the outward action be required, but also a preparation by which they may learn the meaning of the action, and be led to conscious desire for it. On the other hand, it is just as erroneous to require antecedent regeneration and the signs of it in the candidate for baptism. If regeneration already exists, the only meaning left to baptism itself is to confirm what has been done. If it is only right to administer it, provided regeneration is certainly present, it would not be valid if it took place before regeneration. But since the presence of regeneration is not discernible with absolute cer tainty, neither could the Church ever baptize with absolute certainty, nor the baptized one bubd upon it as a divine seal of his reception into Christ's communion. And supposing the regenerate one afterwards to fall into temptation, it would be only too natural for him to regard himseK as baptized illegally; and baptism, instead of being a firm anchor of faith, as it was to Luther, would rather be a memorial of heavier sin. Add to this, what is already implied, that all faith, which is unable to base itself on the objective attesta tion of God's prevenient grace, remains exposed to temptations, from which it is most certainly saved by remembering the 1 On the ground of the inseparableness of baptism from Stidrxuv and the Word as a means of grace, Hbfling rightly condemns its administration where there is no prospect of the necessary consequence — the $ieWxs/» following BAPTISM. 289 certain fact (Facticitdt) of baptism having taken place. Finally, it is objectionable with Schleiermacher to make the coincidence of regeneration and baptism the ideal of baptism. Since the church ought to come as near to the ideal as possible, the infer ence from this theory would be, that it should delay baptism untb the probabibty of this coincidence is present. It would also mean, that regeneration is not the effect of baptism, else baptism would precede it, but only takes place parallel with baptism, although not under its influence. Further, such maturity would in this case be required for baptism, that every one baptized must forthwith be a fub-grown member of the church ; but to such fub-grown maturity long prepara tion is necessary, in which the blessing of antecedent bap tism itseK may take the chief share. Therefore, to make the coincidence spoken of the ideal of the church, were to deny that Christian grace, in virtue of its prevenient character (§§129,130), originates even the preparations for regeneration ; whereas it was formerly shown, that Christianity is also the perfect law and principle of repentance (§ 130, c. 2, § 131), and need not calculate on a pre-Christian truth proceeding and working alongside itseK, since it is itself the all-com prehending truth. The specificaby Christian truth must co-operate to saving repentance. The Christian grace embraces also a sphere of Christian psedagogy. Christ would not have the mature alone reckoned among His disciples, and therefore not in the kingdom in which He rules,1 although ab are to become mature, which wbl be realized best K Christ prpvides for their training and growth from the beginning. From this it also fobows, that Holy Baptism finds more complete expression as the cause of regeneration precisely where regeneration and baptism do not coincide ; but where the former fobows the latter, in such a way, however, that baptism constantly enters as a living factor into the process of regeneration as well as intro duces it. Certamly if a human performance were the point at issue in baptism, i.e. were confession of sin and faith this performance, which must precede baptism by its very idea, then would the reception of the man only be justified after confession and faith, and baptism would be a sort of vow. But in this case baptism would fab primarily into the sphere 1 Matt, xviii. 6 ff. ; cf. xi. 25, 28 ff. ; Acts ii. 38. Dorner.— Christ. Doct, iv. T 290 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. of requirement or performance ; it would not be primarily a gift, but a law bke the baptism of John. But on this view the prevenient character of the gospel would be obscured at the very moment of entrance into Christianity. It would seem as if God's grace were unable to offer itself to man as he is, i.e. as a stbl unconverted, unregenerate sinner, and declare to him, that God is reconciled with him in Christ. Rather we should thereby affirm, that a transformation or perform ance of man is necessary before the offer of salvation, whereas this transformation wbl be effected by the offer, which not merely demands but has the power to produce faith. Faith cannot arise without the object which it has to lay hold of ; but the object is the offered salvation, the earnest and sufficient offer of which in God's sight is made precisely in baptism. If, therefore, as already stated, the church ought only to baptize in the case of adults, e.g. on mission-ground, when it perceives the conscious desire for baptism, the reason of this must not be sought in the fact that the Christian grace, before it can offer itseK, presupposes subjective dispositions or performances (such as Romish teaching requires for the sacrament of Penance, which is supposed to form a substitute for the sacrament of Baptism abeged to have been rendered inoperative), but only that the baptizing church may be assured that it is not baptizing men against their wbl, the inwardly unreceptive or hypocritical. Therefore, in saying that in Holy Baptism according to its strict idea we have to do not primarily with an antecedent perform ance of the candidate, or with an already existing mutual relation between Christ and man, but with the estabbshing of a relation of Christ to man, we simply remain in harmony with the conclusions reached in the doctrine of Justification (§ 132). In baptism Christ gives expression on His part to His prevenient purpose of love ; He estabbshes communion, and that in the substitutionary spirit which desires to repre sent the sinner before God for the purpose of making him a personal partaker in God's favour. Since no human perform ance is the essential element in baptism, it fobows that the church may and ought to baptize wherever baptism is legaby sought at its hands, and where, instead of resistance, recep tiveness for the Christian salvation is to be presupposed ; and BAPTISM. 291 in taking such a course, it is assured of being in conformity with Christ's declared wbl. But receptiveness for salvation is already part of human nature universally (because it is designed for Christ as well as needs Him), provided no sinful resistance has developed itseK subsequently, with which of course baptism cannot coalesce. Hence the apos tolic practice was not to delay baptism until regeneration or its approach was discernible, but regeneration was expected as the effect of baptism. No one, it is true, can become a living, personal member of the kingdom of heaven without regeneration ; but for this reason Christ can on His part by way of anticipation, and therefore at first on one side only, begin the fellowship by His regenerating grace, by His blessed greeting of love, as He did once,1 and give expression to its beginning in order that it may become mutual. 3. Effects of Baptism. — Holy Baptism is a dogma only because it is a manifestation of something eternal, although in the individuality of space and time, a manifestation of eternal grace in individual appbcation, of the love of the Triune God to the person of the candidate, who is made partaker not merely of reconcibation, but also of sonship to God. Baptism cannot be understood by a dead deistic lin^ of thought, which severs God from the world and Christ from humanity. Its meaning only discloses itseK to one who sees Christ stbl bvingly present and rubng in due order in His house. The divine purpose of love, which finds expression in baptism, embraces not merely communion with God in Christ, but the infinitude of blessings destined for man ; and every thing which grace lavishes on man must be regarded as an outcome of the grace imparted or promised to man in baptism or of baptismal grace. Consequently, the effect of baptismal grace is not to be limited to that for which receptiveness exists at the moment of the act, but it includes also the faithfulness of God to His promises for the future ; and the unfolding of grace in the subsequent bfe is part of the baptismal blessing, the performance on God's part of the baptismal covenant. Baptism lays the foundation, which must continue active and vital for the whole bfe. Through the impartation and promise of the complete grace being given and prefixed 1 Mark x. 13 ff. 292 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. in the baptism of the child, in order that its blessing may be appropriated moment by moment, it is possible for the entire development of men to proceed from the first on a uniform plan, for the entire conscious life to be passed in the light of Christianity. That baptism cannot reveal all its powers at the temporal moment of the outward act, is not its weakness, but its wealth, by which the whole life must be adorned, which Luther meant when he said : " The whole bfe of the Christian is meant to be a continuous baptism." x From this it fobows, that the genesis of conscious faith and regeneration is brought about in the most normal and happy manner under the influence of the baptismal blessing, and therefore under the consciousness of having been received preveniently by Christ's love. But further, we stand in need of the substi tution of Christ in respect of the after-workings of the old man, for by baptism deliverance is given indeed from guilt and punishment, but not from sin. But, in accordance with the baptismal covenant, Christ's substitution and intercession, and the wib of God to regard us as justified, stbl continue in respect of these after-workings of sin; and there is no need of the sacraments of Confirmation, of Penance with priestly absolution, and Extreme Unction, interpolated by the Cathobc Church without scriptural ground as a substitute for the nominal baptismal grace which was at once forfeited. All these give no security, and what they promise is contained more fuby and richly in the sacrament of Baptism than in that which the Cathobc Church obtains by those supple mentary means. After every new fab, the Christian may and ought to recur to the grace of baptism or to the baptismal covenant, assured of the abiding significance of baptism on the part of a faithful God. 4. Absolutely necessary to salvation certainly outward baptism is not. The disciples of the Lord scarcely received it from Christ, and the baptism of John was not Christian baptism. Hence also the church, distinguishing essence and form, teaches that the baptismus flaminis or sanguinis (the outpouring of the Holy Spirit or a martyr's death) may be a substitute for the baptismus fluminis. Further, the Evan gelical Church rightly teaches, that not the want but the 1 Cat. Maj. 548, BAPTISM. 293 despismg of baptism is damnable, from which it follows that the non-baptized children of non-Christians are not (as the Synod of Carthage in the year 418 supposed in a critically suspected canon) to be regarded as condemned. But still it must be held that every one must receive that which con stitutes the essence of baptism, either in this world or the next. This essential element may be given in very different ways, but it consists in the outward reception into Christ's communion realized through an historic act. In the case of the disciples this act took place through their invitation by Christ Himself to follow Him and their reception into His communion with the promise of the Holy Spirit. Thus they are to be regarded as reaby baptized. A simbar judgment perhaps must be held respecting the children (Mark x. 13 ff.) whom Jesus took into His arms and blessed. How God will impart that essential element to man depends on His free choice, not on our caprice. And for this reason the so-called baptism in extremis may be justified,1 although not so as to imply that those dying unbaptized must on this account be lost. Necessitas baptismi non est absoluta, sed ordinata. But we must adhere to the ordinance instituted by Christ, the necessity and blessing of which we now see. Observation. — The later theology of the 17th century distinguished in baptism, after the analogy of the Holy Supper, the materia terrestris, the water, and the materia ccelestis, which was thought to be now the Trinity, now the Spirit, and the sanguis Christi as web, which were united by Gerhard (ix. c. v. p. 133 f.) and Quenstedt (iv. 110). The latter cannot be proved on biblical grounds, and is therefore objected to by others. But, in general, the theory of a materia ccelestis in the water of baptism comes near the theory of Thomas and the Dominicans contested by Luther : " Deum spiritualem virtutem aquas contubsse et indidisse, quae peccatum per aquam abluat," Art. Sm. v. p. 329. § 141. — Infant-Baptism. Infant-baptism is not merely permitted in the case of those born within the Christian church, but corresponds more 1 J. Gerhard, Loci Th. torn. ix. p. 198 ff.; cf. Hbfling, ii. 296 ff. 294 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH: completely than late baptism to the idea of baptism (§ 140), and is therefore the right mode of adminis tering baptism for a church that has gained such insight, apart from the field of missions. 1. The church ought not to be satisfied with regarding infant-baptism as something merely permitted. The merely permitted is an intermediate region, . which vanishes before full knowledge, either falling back into the region of the forbidden or advancing to the divinely wbled. It sprang first of ab from the need of regarding the children of Christian parents as belonging to Christ, not merely on the ground of the wib of the church but of Christ Himself, and of regarding the age of chbdhood as consecrated and hallowed by Christ, who bved through and hallowed all the periods of our bfe.1 The natural bonds between parents and chbdren are not reduced to msignificance in Christianity, but acknowledged in their importance, as was done even in the 0. T. by circum cision.2 These bonds are not simply left by Christian parents to their quiet unconscious influence, but contain a definite hint to them, that they should present their chbdren to Christ, nay, that through them God wishes their children brought into the number of Christ's disciples, a sign of His grace directed towards chbdren.3 This natural connection involves the duty, and therefore the right, of parents to present their chbdren to Christ. To say in objection, that consecra tion in reference to children is already implied in the natural connection, and that baptism is therefore needless for them,4 would be to attach more importance to the bond of nature connecting children with Christian parents, and thus indirectly with Christ, than to a direct bond of union with Christ. But the former view would only be sufficient on the supposition of parents ascribing the power of consecration to themselves. On the other hand, the more that parents and the church are conscious of their needy condition and dependence on 1 According to the speculative thought of Irenseus. See Martensen, § 255. 2 Acts ii. 39 ; 1 Cor. vii. 14. 3 This may be gathered from 1 Cor. vii. 14, and 0. T. circumcision. 4 The appeal to 1 Cor. vii. 14 is not relevant, because there the mixed marriage might hinder the baptism. BAPTISM. 295 Christ, the more must they go back in behalf of their children, not to their own substitutionary consecration, but to Christ's alone sufficient substitution, seek His blessing, and cling to its expression in the baptism of the Lord's own institution, which of itself points to Christ's substitutionary death and life. Ab the more have Christian parents the right to seek Christ's blessing and consecration, as the pre senting of their chbdren accords with His mind ; for He did not reject the parents who presented their children to Him, that He might touch them, lay His hands on them and pray for them, as if He could do nothing with them, or they had nothing to do with Him, but He said : " Suffer the bttle chbdren to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of God," and He had compassion on them, laid His hands upon them and blessed them.1 This blessing and reception into His love might take the place of baptism to them. Thus, then, the church in conformity with His insti tution offers itself to Him as an organ for the continuance of His purpose, that through its hands He may baptize the little ones and take them into His arms as His possession. The church cannot be poorer than the synagogue ; the new covenant cannot express less love than the covenant of circumcision, whose benefits appbed also to chbdren. The first sermon of Peter abuded to this.2 At the same time, the natural febowship of the parents renders this service, that their recobection of the chbd's baptism is a substitute for the chbd's own knowledge, and in due time this knowledge is communicated to the child after self-consciousness is awakened. But the knowledge of Christ's prevenient love is effective and fruitful in bringing about desire fpr communion with the Redeemer, and therefore regeneration, through faith. Observation. — Since the infant-baptizing church offers itself to Christ in accordance with His wib as an organ in bringing children into His kingdom, and desires to see its own faith reproduced through intercession in them, it may even be said in a certain sense, that Christ desires to regard their faith as substitutionary, i.e. as security for their chbdren until the time of maturity. For this is the nature of childhood, that 1 Mark x. 13-16. Cf. Matt. xix. 13-15. s Acts ii. 38, 39. Cf. Luke xix. 9 ; Acts xvi. 15, 81, 33. 296 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. the religion of the parents is in the first instance transmitted to the children with a sort of physical certainty, of course in an impersonal manner as to rebgious meaning. But, this inheritance has already a value and co-operates in the origina tion of fides specialis, belonging to the region of impersonal and unconscious, although salutary workings of grace.1 2. That the church has a good conscience in baptizing infants, and rightly regards itself as in unity with the divme wib, is readby evident, whether the matter be considered on the side of Christ or the church or the child. First, of Christ. If late baptism is required, it is required because preparations are deemed necessary before Christian: grace itself can have a place. But to deny to Christianity that it is meant to cover the entire life, is to deny its absoluteness, and implies that we must first belong to a religion preparatory to Chris tianity. That Christianity is the absolute religion, embracing within itself ab religious . truth and power, finds its most perfect expression in infant-baptism. In the same way, in it the nature of prevenient grace is set in the clearest bght. In infant-baptism the church opposes the notion that Christian grace does not hold good for chbdhood. Chbdren are indeed but imperfect Christians, but stbl they are Christians, because Christ has received them. As to the Church, in refusing baptism to chbdren, it would not do sufficient honour to its own mission and to Christ's right in chbdren If it supposed that it deprived them of nothing because of its desire to give them a Christian educa tion, it would place reliance on its own influences without basing itself on Christ's grace, and incur the danger of putting itseK in Christ's place. The child taken into His arms, and consecrated by Christ Himself, forms also quite another obliga tion to the work of Christian education than mere human bonds can do. Finally, in virtue of Christ's ab-embracing purpose of grace, the individual within Christendom has a right to claim that no 1 This security of the church, in the entire absence of which baptism would be out of the question, is embodied in the form of an institution in the spon- sorial relation, cf. Hbfling, ii. 230. §§ 132, 133. An obligation for the child is contained in the sponsio of the sponsors only in so far as faith in Christ is to be regarded as a universal human duty. BAPTISM. 297 portion of his bfe shall be outside Christianity. This is secured to him by mfant-baptism. Loving education, along with the refusal of baptism, would be no compensation. Withal, the consciousness of having been the object of Christ's prevenient love is the effectual means for begetting faith, and for respond ing to the febowship established by Christ. 3. The history of infant-baptism (§ 139) has certainly shown us the difficulty of preserving a Christian doctrine of infant-baptism free from opposite errors ; and this difficulty is specially emphasized on the Baptist side. Nevertheless, the reasons urged by Baptists against infant-baptism are not con clusive, but to some extent prove the opposite. They are partly Biblical, partly dogmatic and ethical. First of ab, the exegetical reasons in favour of late baptism are not conclusive. If, as must be conceded, the baptism of adults was the custom in the apostobc age, the reason was the same as holds good at present in the mission field. Since the way to the chbdren bes through the parents, Christianity first of all necessarby addressed itseK to adults. But even adults had again to become children in order to receive the blessing of baptism, and the willingness or the desire to be baptized was sufficient. Or was it possible for the apostles at Pentecost to preface the baptism of the 3000 candidates by an examination of theb" faith I1 In instituting baptism,2 Christ does not set up as a universal rule: "Teach first and then baptize," but : " Make disciples " (fiaOrjTevo-aTe) ; and how this is to be done, is said in the fobowing words which connect for this end the two means of grace, Word and Sacrament : "Baptizing and teaching" (ab nations) — two requirements, respecting the necessary order of which the passage is meant to decide nothing, for that adults are first taught is grounded in the nature of the case. On the other hand, the necessity of teaching always coming first can ab the less be inferred from the passage, as it puts baptism first. A disciple is one received into training by Christian grace ; chbdren also belong to nations. The passage thus intimates that Christianity not 1 Cf. Acts ii 41. The words (viii. 37), "If thou believest with thy whole heart, thou mayest be baptized," etc., received in the Elzevir editions, are most probably to be regarded as spurious. 2 Matt, xxviii. 19. Cf. Mark xvi 15. 298 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. merely seeks existence in adult, individual persons, but seeks also to have a national form. Moreover, the passage in Mark describes ab humanity (the icoo-fios, the ktI, i/i£> xixpvxTxi rit rip Xpitrru l» rS tt£. 6 Eph. v. 27, iv. 16. 348 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. ance of the Church in its oppressed and still restricted actuality. But both — idea and actuality — were kept together by Christian hope, which, when it went astray in Ebionite and Judaistic paths, only placed so little value on the salvation abeady existing in the earthly Church as no sort of identity seemed to exist between the earthly Church and that which is to be expected. The reason why distinction was made in the first ages between the visible and invisible Church lay undoubtedly in the fact, that in those ages the Church enjoyed an essential unity and purity, to which not the least contributor was the sifting power of persecutions. The want of outward advantages in the confession of Christianity, nay its dangers, exercised a most effective Church discipbne. But when, after the 4th century, the heathen masses suddenly streamed into the Church, the contrast between the Church as it should be and its actuabty, especiaby the character of its leaders, was so obvious that men like Tichonius, Vigbantius, and Jovinian put the true Church, Christ's unspotted bride — the object of their faith, of their love and hope — in glaring contrast with the empirical Church as a different Church. But the Catholic Church withstood such a distinction with the utmost earnest ness, permitted only the distinction between the mibtant and triumphant Church, and found more and more a substitute for that deficiency of holiness in all persons in the Church, which it did not deny, in the holiness of its institutions, which were supposed to give a guarantee for the unity and cathobcity, the apostobcity and infalbbility of the Church. Then obedience to the hierarchically-constituted Church was made de fide, and the bmits of the Romish Church became the bmits of Chris tianity, extra ecclesiam (Romanam) nulla salus. Attempts at drawing a distinction between the visible and invisible Church are seen in opposition to the outward, increasingly emphasized, unity of the Cathobc Church, in the distinction between prcedestinati or electi and the non-elect or prcesciti advanced in different forms by Augustine, Wycbffe, Huss. But the nature of the distinction is such that its application is postponed to the final judgment, and the conception of the earthly Church is not essentially affected thereby. 2. But the question assumed a different phase in the age of the Reformation. The Evangelical idea of faith with its VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE CHURCH. 349 inwardness contained, instead of mere communion with men and equality in outward rites or ordinances, immediate, personal communion with God, participation in justification through the Atoner and by the Holy Spirit. Therewith was connected the certainty, that this faith must also be the principle and regulator of the community deserving the name of a Christian Church. But in this way the Evangebcal teachers came into profound opposition to the Cathobc idea of the Church, which found the Church in unity of cultus and ceremonies, but especiaby in a legal constitution of Christian confessors on the model of the State, and in the subjection of Christians to the hierarchy, to which obedience is due in God's name. On the ground of its idea of the Church, Roman Catho licism denied that the Evangelicals belonged to the Christian Church, unless they submitted to the hierarchical decrees and the Catholic cultus. But the same perception of the nature of faith and its importance to the Church which had led to the severance of the Evangelicals from Roman Catholicism, supplied them with the means both for defending then? own standpoint and criticising that of their, opponents. And the working out of the apologetic and polemical significance of their positive con ception of faith led to the distinction of the ecclesia as visibilis, in relation to which they maintained their Evangelical freedom, from the invisibilis. They refused to concede, that they did not belong to the latter. On the contrary, they held them selves the more justified in reckoning themselves a part of it, the more they sought to keep themselves pure from the corruptions of the reigning visible Church, and laid the chief stress on the inwardness of the faith that united them with Christ, and thus with their brethren. This distinction was early advanced in various forms as to substance, although at first without fixed expression ; and it was an essential part of the common Evangebcal consciousness. But the expression ecclesia visibilis et invisibilis graduaby became current among ab Reformers. Although Zwingle was the first to use it (1531), it forced itself on Luther as on Calvin and Melanchthon, although they did not understand two separate churches thereby.1 Their aim in taking such a bne is not to create indifference to the visible Church, or to absolve from duties 1 See note at end of section. , 350 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. towards it, but to secure the pure, spiritual character of Christ's Church, its holiness through faith. The pure idea of the Church gained was adapted to form a keen weapon of assault on the secularizing as well as the spirituabzing of the Church, and no less served also as a defence against the reproach brought against the Evangebcals, that in separating from the Pope they separated from the Church of Christ, and as a means of strengthening the confidence, that the Church, although seem ingly overwhelmed by hostile powers, stib exists and wbl not perish.1 This doctrine of the Reformers was next fixed in Symbols.2 3. The Evangelical Confessions teach : He is not a member of the Church in the proper sense, who stands in the outward communion of Church usages and ceremonies, or in the same politia (under the same Church government), but only he who has faith ; for the Church is principaliter a communion of faith, and the Holy Spirit, the assembly of the saints scattered over the entire circle of the earth.3 Since then faith, bke the Holy Spirit, is not perceptible to sense, under this aspect invisibility pertains to the Church. But on these terms, it may be asked, is even the existence of the Church on earth secured ? If it is invisible, can the name of a communion or congregation apply to it? In reference to the Conf. Aug., what the fifth article had said comes into consideration here. It treats of the connection of Word and Sacrament on one hand with faith, on the other with the Holy Spirit. It is accordingly laid down with logical strictness : " Where faith is, there also are Word and Sacrament," and believers gathered around the two are therewith gathered around Christ as their common invisible Head, who is the bond of communion through the Holy Spirit. And since Word and Sacrament are visible, we 1 Apol. 146. 2 Cf. Conf. Aug. v. vi. vii. ; Apol. iv. ; Art. Sm. 335. 342 ff. The Reformed Confessions also have in part the formula, Ecclesia invisibilis et visibilis; cf. Helv. 1566. c. 17, Scot. c. 16 ; cf. Westmonast., ed. Niemeyer, c. 25, p. 36. The Lutheran Confessions have not the phrase Ecclesia invisibilis, but have the thing almost more than the Reformed Church, which insists more than the former on the phenomenal side and the exhibition of the essence of the Church by organi zation and Church discipline, nay, to some extent makes a dogma of the first. . 3 "Ecclesia principaliter" or "proprie est societas fidei et Spiritus Sancti, cbmmunio, congregatio sanctorum et credentium, sparsorum per totum orbem," Conf. Aug. v. viii. ; Apol. 144, 5. 146. VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE CHURCH. 351 may go on to say : Although as to its essence the Church is not perceptible to sense (for Word and Sacrament of themselves are not the Church, and stbl less is the communion of Church- government the Church, which is first given in faith and the Holy Spirit), stib it has outward marks, by which its exist ence is known,1 not however by sense, but only by faith, as the apostobc symbol already says : " I believe in one holy Cathobc Church."2 To faith the existence of the Church is present where Word and Sacrament are, certainly because the two are not without power and effect.3 Accordingly we must say, where faith is, there too are Word and Sacrament as its birthplace; but also conversely, where Word and Sacrament are, there it must be assumed that the Holy Spirit works faith through them and has His work-place, however little the eye of man is able certainly to single out those who possess living faith, and bttle as the outward communion in Word and Sacra ment can be identified with the Church in the proper sense. The outward communion, in which men are joined together for the common hearing of God's Word and partaking of the Sacraments, is merely the Church in the wider sense4 (ecclesia large dicta). But even this Church has at least a connection with the Church in the proper sense (hence it also bears the name) ; for even communion in the use of the means of grace would cease were faith altogether to cease on the earth.5 In its outer circle, therefore, faith must always be assumed. It is bebevers who perpetuate both means, and thus have real communion with each other. In the same way, moreover, an enduring connection between the Church in the wider and the Church in the stricter sense obtains, because new believers are always born of Word and Sacrament. Hence the Apology can say on one hand : We dream of no Platonic state ;6 and on the other : Unbebevers, profligates, and hypocrites are no members of the Church proper (ecclesia proprie dicta), which is Christ's body, but are membra regni diaboli? Although, accordingly, that which decides the question of belonging to the Church in the proper sense is not communion with men and community of cultus and confession, but communion with the Head of 1 C. A. vii. ; Apol. 145, 5-7. s Apol. 145. 7. 3 Ibid. 148, 19. 20. - Ibid. 146, 11. 28. i Ibid. 147, 16. 17. " Ibid. 148, 20. ' Ibid. 147, 16. 17. 148, 19. 352 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. the Church — Christ, still it is quite consistent therewith, that, where true faith exists, establishing of communion with men is not wanting, above all communion in Word and Sacrament as web with actual believers as with those who wib believe, who are both contained in the Church in the wider sense, without a separation of the former from the latter being possible to human eyes and permitted to human wbl.1 A place indeed is left for Church discipbne in opposition to public offences ; but the Donatist spirit, and the purism which would fain exhibit a visible church of saints, are repudiated,2 whether it assume the form of the separation of believers from the rest, or the form of the excision of non-bebevers from the Church. The latter would involve the denial that the Church upon earth has not merely a visibihty (i.e. cognizableness), but no less also an invisibdity, i.e. incognizableness in respect of what persons belong to the church in the proper sense. This doctrine is next carried forward by the Evangebcal theologians. Even the expression ecclesia visibilis et invisi bilis is retained in Hiitter, Gerhard, Baier, etc.3 But its meaning is not, that these are two churches (gemince ecclesice), but the one Church has both predicates. Were the invisible side altogether wanting, either faith also would be altogether wanting, and thus it would no longer be a Church, but illusion, or it would be assumed that the Church has rendered itself completely visible, -which is never true of the earthly, develop ing Church. Conversely, were the visibility (i.e. cognizableness) altogether wanting, there would no longer be a Church upon earth, for then not merely would persons be wanting whose faith makes itself known, although not certainly, but also the continuance of the outward signs of the Church with its means of grace. The relative incognizableness of the persons actually belonging to the Church in the proper sense is, in the view of the theologians, by no means incognizableness of the Church itself. 4. In the most recent days the idea of the ecclesia invisibilis has encountered evident dislike in many forms, especially with those who lay preponderant stress on the legal side of the church, or think themselves compelled specially to emphasize 1 Apol. 150, 28. 2 Ibid. 156, 49. 3 Gerhard, torn. xi. 82 ; Hollaz, ii. 798 ; Calov, viii 262. VISIBLE AND IN VISIBLE CHURCH. 353 its manifested form.1 They object against it, that it endangers the unity of the Church, easily leading to a duality of churches, or to a Donatist and spiritualistic conception of the Church. Stahl thinks with Mohler, that the visible Church is the first, the invisible the second. Rothe, Delitzsch, and others, insist that the invisible Church cannot even be thought by itself; for if the Church is to be a community it is not invisible, if it is to be invisible it cannot be a community. Community presupposes an issuing forth of what is within, intercourse. An invisible Church is therefore a contradictio in adjecto? Thiersch thinks that the strong emphasizing of the invisible Church has worked injuriously, having given rise to false con tentment respecting the contradiction between the idea and actuabty of the Church. On logical grounds it is objected to the distinction, that in it both the visible and invisible Church have the name of Church, whereas the visible is no Church in that which distinguishes it from the invisible, namely unbe bevers. The Church as a dogmatic idea, it is said, is an object of faith, and there essentiaby belong to it Word and Sacrament, from which faith arose and continuaby arises. But unbelievers or the godless are no object of faith ; therefore, strictly speak ing, they are non-existent to the dogmatic Church-idea. Rather, in relation to the Church-idea they must be left out of sight, and the right to do this is just based on the ground that faith knows Christ as the Substitute, who covers ab imperfection in the empirical Church by His holiness. In the dogmatic idea of the Church, therefore, no attention need be paid to hypocrites or impii. Accordingly, to distinguish between ecclesia proprie dicta and ecclesia large dicta would be without justification.3 We connect the examination of these objections with the dog matic investigation. Note (see p. 349). Zwingbi, Expositio Christiance Fidei (composed shortly before his death for Francis I.), ed. Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum in rCf. J. Muller, p. 282 ff. 2 Cf. especially Hothe, Anfange der chr. Kirche, p. 99 ff, and Theol. Ethik. 3 So especially Ritschl in the Studien, ut supra, and in his treatise on the Foundation of Church Rights, p. 15 ff. For the rest, he defends the Evangelical doctrine that the Church is an object of faith, and in so far invisible. Doenek.— Cheist. Doct. iv. Z 354 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. Ecclesia Reformata publicatarum, p. 53, 1840. Zwinglii Opera, ed. Schuler et Schulthess, iv. 58 : Credimus et unam sanctam esse Cathobcam, h.e. universalem ecclesiam. Earn autem esse aut visibilem aut invisibilem. Invisibihs est, quae— Spiritu s. blus- trante Deum cognoscit et amplectitur. To it belong ab believers on the face of the earth. It is not cabed invisible, as _ though believers were invisible, but because who really believes is known only to God and himself, not to human eyes. Visibbis autem ecclesia non est Pontifex Romanus, etc., sed quotquot per universum orbem Christo nomen dederunt. Among them there are some who are called Christians wrongly, because they believe not; and in the visible Church there are some who are not members of the elect, invisible Church. Accordingly the ecclesia invisibilis is a narrower circle than the visible. On the other hand, if the Romish Church is understood by the visible, there are members of the true Church outside this visible one. He does not say in the passage, that the elect form the ecclesia invisibibs, to him the invisible Church is no civitas Platonica ; he rather ascribes an organization (pastores, magistratus) to the Church in general. Calvin (in the dedication of his Institutio to Francis I., Corp. Ref. xxx. 22 f. Inst. Rel. Chr., ed. Tholuck, i. 15, of the year 1536): In his cardinibus controversia nostra vertitur: primum, quod ecclesiae formam semper apparere et spectdbilem esse contendunt, deinde quod formam ipsam in sede Romanae ecclesiae et praesulum suorum ordine constituunt. Nos contra asserimus : et ecclesiam nulla apparente forma stare posse, nee formam externo bid splendore — sed longe aba nota contineri, nempe pura Verbi Dei praedicatione et legitima sacramentorum administratione (iv. 12. 1, the disciplina is also described as maxime necessaria to the Church), iv. 1. 7. Ed. Thol. ii. 193 : De ecclesia visibili et quae sub cognitionem nostram cadit, quale judicium facere conveniat, — bquere existimo. Diximus enim bifariam de ecclesia sacros bbros loqui. Interdum — earn intelb- gunt, quae revera est coram Deo, in quam nubi recipiuntur, nisi qui et adoptionis gratia filii Dei sunt et Spiritus sanctificatione vera Christi membra. In this case the Church embraces all the elect from the beginning of the world. Saepe autem ecclesiae nomine universam — multitudinem in orbe dispersam designat (S. Ser.), quae unum se Deum et Christum colere profitetur, Baptismo initiatur in ejus fidem, Ccenae participatione unitatem in vera doctrina et caritatem testatur, consensionem habet in Verbo Domini ad ejus prasdicationem, ministerium conservat a Christo institutum. In hac autem plurimi sunt permixti hypo- critae, sinners also of various classes, who are not reached by church discipbne. Quemadmodum ergo nobis invisibilem, solius Dei oculis conspicuam ecclesiam credere necesse est, ita hanc, note. 355 quae respectu hominum ecclesia dicitur, observare ejusque com- munionem colere jubemur. As relates to individuals, God knows His own, and He alone (§ 8).' But He permits us by the judicium caritatis to regard as brethren those who show by confession of faith, exemplary walk, and partaking of the Sacra ments, that they adhere to the same God and Christ with us. On the other hand, God has provided for the body of the Church being known by visible signs. These are Word and Sacraments. For it must certainly be bebeved, that they are not fruitless (§§ 9, 10). Luther in the (second) commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (Walch. vib. 2745, Erlang. ed. iii. 38) : Recti igitur fatemur in symbolo, nos credere ecclesiam sanctam. Est emminvisibilis, habitans in spiritu, in loco inaccessibib, ideo non potest videri ejus sanctitas. Deus enim ita abscondit et obruit earn infirmitatibus, peccatis et erroribus varus formis crucis et scandabs ut secundum sensum nusquam appareat. Qui hoc ignorant — -statim offenduntur. Others, on the contrary, in- vertunt articulum fidei : credo ecclesiam sanctam, et pro credo ponunt: video. Against Jerome Emser (Walch, xvib. 1654): I therefore conclude that the Christian Church is not tied to any one place, person, or time (nor to the counterfeit Church of the Roman Pope). Ab Christians in the world pray thus: I believe in the Holy Ghost, one holy Christian Church, the communion of saints. If the article is true, it fobows that no one can see or feel the holy Christian Church, nor may it be said : Lo, it is here or there. For what is believed is not seen or felt. — Against Ambrose Catharinus (xvbi. 1792): But you may perhaps say: If the Church is altogether in the spirit and a purely spiritual thing, no one ean know where any part of it is in the whole world. But (1793 f.):- There are not wanting signs by which the Church is known — Baptism, the Bread, and most of all the Gospel. P. 1796 : Of a truth the Go,spel is the only surest and noblest sign of the Church, far surer than Baptism or the Bread. I speak not of the written Gospel, but of that proclaimed with bodby voice, nor of every sermon debvered from the pulpit in the Church, but of the Word of the right sort, which teaches the true faith of Christ. — Simbariy (iv. 1813 on Ps. xxii. 25, xviii. 1221) against Augustine von Alveld: No one says: "I believe in the Holy Ghost, one holy Roman Church, a communion of Romanists." We see, we do not bebeve in the Roman Church. Hence it is not the Church of the Creed. The true Church, which is believed in, is a Church of the sanctified by faith. And no one sees who is bebeving or holy. — On the other hand, the signs, by which we may know where that Church is in the world, are : 356 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. Baptism, the Sacrament, and" the Gospel. For where Baptism and the Gospel are, there, no one can doubt, saints are found, and should be like mere chbdren in the cradle. P. 1214 f. he regrets that it has become customary to call the outward insti tution of the Church, and especially the ministerial order, the Church. Spiritual rights and human laws indeed call such a matter the Church or Christendom. But there is not a letter in Scripture to show that such a Church, if it exists apart, was ordained by God. For the sake, therefore, of better under standing and brevity, we would call the two Churches by different names. The first, which is natural, fundamental, essential, and real, we would cab the spiritual, internal Chris tendom. The second, which is artificial and external, we would call a material, external Christendom, not that we desire to separate them from each other, but as the apostle usuaby speaks of an inward and outward man. The former is not without the latter. Simdarly in Walch, v. 450. Why he wishes to know nothing of a division into two Churches, he says with special energy (Walch, vii. 303, 304), where he appbes the parable of the tares. The Lord's forbidding the servants to tear up the tares is " a comfort against fanatical spirits, Cathari, Anabaptists, who, because they see the Church mixed with the godless, shriek all together : The Church is no Church. This also troubles many people. But if we refused to tolerate tares, there would be no Church. For, seeing that the Church cannot exist without tares, to desire to root up the tares would be to desire to root up the Church. The fanatics, who refuse to harbour any tares among them, only succeed in leaving no wheat among them ; i.e., in their desire to be wheat pure and simple, they end in making themselves with their great holiness, forsooth, no Church at ab, but a pure and simple sect of the devb. For the arrogant and those puffed up with vain conceit of hobness are at the farthest remove from the Church, which spontaneously confesses that she is a sinner and bears with the intermixed tares, i.e. heretics, sinners, godless." Melanchthon also agrees therewith, as is shown by the Conf. Aug. viii. and especially the Apology. From 1535 he began in his Loci to strongly accentuate the visible side of the Church in opposition to Anabaptism, and in order to give greater security to the Church as a historic power, nevertheless not in such a way as to identify the external mamfestation of the Church with the ecclesia proprie dicta. To him the Church still remains an object of faith. Cf, Herrlinger, ut supra, pp. 252-268. VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE CHURCH. 357 C. — Dogmatic Investigation. § 149. 1. The distinction of the Church as Visibilis and Invisibilis has decisive dogmatic value, but is capable of being wrongly conceived in various ways. Hence, first of ab, the right meaning must be fixed. As two churches are not to be understood thereby, so also the distinction must not be con founded with the antithesis of reality and idea. The invisible aspect of the Church is real in an eminent sense, no figment of thought nowhere existing, merely .something that ought to exist. Christ, the Holy Spirit, faith, are thoroughly real powers. Nor is the distinction the same as that between the true and false ChurcL This would issue in two churches, one of which would be altogether undeserving of the name of Church. Further, the invisible ChurcH is not identical with the triumphant Church ; for although the perfected righteous belong to the ecclesia invisibilis, the seat of the latter is not merely heaven. The ecclesia invisibilis is found also on earth in the militant, visible Church, else the earthly Church would be no longer a Church. Many em phasize the invisible Church in a sense which shows only too plainly that invisibility signifies to them at most an ideal that ought to be and is essentially identical with the non existence of an actual Church. Atomistic and separatist thinkers often conceal their feeble sense of communion by appealing to the invisible Church, of which they wish to be regarded members, whbe utterly indifferent to the visible Church. Many of the educated understand by the invisible Church, in which they reckon themselves, a sort of aristocracy of nobler, loftier natures, for whom the historic reabty of the Church is too bad to allow them to share its responsibilities, tobs, and sufferings. They seem to themselves to walk on the heights of humanity, whereas they are entangled in an egoism as lacking in humibty as in love. This is the pseudo-Protestant error, that exaggerates the just critical element, which impels to a distinction between visibibty and invisibility in the Church, to such a degree as to mean that reality and idea are divorced from each other. 358 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. But then certainly the opposition to the emphasis laid on the invisibility of the Church must not be pushed so far as with Stahl, Miinchmeyer, and others to lay the chief stress on the visibility of the Church, from a fear lest the idea of invisibility should beget a spiritualistic undervaluing of the outward Church, or an indifference to the interval between it and the divine idea of the Church. The priority of the visible to the invisible Church is dogmaticaby untenable. No doubt, faith might originate through the Word alone, and therefore through a co-operating outward element. But the Word, which of course comes first, is stib no Church. That faith originates now through the ministry of the empirical Church, and therefore now the Church in so far precedes the faith of individuals, is not called in question by the present distinction ; but it is quite consistent therewith that a Church only exists when faith exists.1 Nay, even the outward element, which ministers to the origination of faith — above all, the Word — had, first of all an inner existence in the spirit of the speaker. The visible and outward, whether Creed or God's Word, is no certain proof of the existence of faith in the individual speaker. On the other hand, faith only is the end, to which everything external ministers, so that the chief stress must stbl fab on that which is invisible in the Church. Further, it is correct to say that a distinction must be drawn between the dogmatic and ethical (and stbl further the legal) idea of the Church. But it cannot be said, that because the dogmatic idea has to do with that which is essential to the idea of the Church, whilst unbelievers belong not to the essential but to the accidental aspect, they must be ignored in reference to the dogmatic idea, and especially that their subsumption under the same idea of the Church, which includes the divine work of gathering together saints, involves a logical self-contradiction. Even the need of redemption, and therefore sin, has a side related to Dogmatics, and is no merely ethical idea. Sin is not to be regarded as a vanishing quantity, a nonentity or defect, which for the sake of Christ's advocacy does not come into consideration when contemplated sub specie cetemitatis. Rather, time and development have a meaning even for God.2 And as concerns the divine idea 1 Cf. § 128, p. 155. » See vol. i 244 f. 328 f. VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE CHURCH. 359 of the Church, God has wibed no Church but one which advances to its consummation through development, through holding febowship with non-believers, nay, with such as are unbebevers at least for the moment. But the idea of the Church is of course modified by, the mingling which thus arises ; not indeed in the sense that unbelievers belong just as essentiaby to the idea of the Church in their own right, so to speak, as believers, for they are only connected with the Church as an element to be vanquished or to be cut off in due time, but in the sense that the Church would not answer to its divine idea K it desired to separate from all non- bebevers and ceased to be a seminarium credentium. And thus the idea of the Ecclesia large dicta is justified. How the Church has to accomplish the vanquishing of unbelievers is an ethical question. But it is part of its dogmatic idea, that it is instituted by God in order more and more to reach its completeness and perfection by development, by historical progress and conflict with unbebef. It is indeed correct to say, that through Christ, who pertains to the Church as its Head, the Church may rightly be called holy, despite its stains, despite the commingling of hypocrites or unbelievers deforming its historic nianKestation ; and such a theory is in keeping with faith. But this wbl not justify the Church in being indifferent, in rebance on Christ's vicarious hobness, to the duty of its own actual holiness, and to the unhobness existing in its circle, and therefore in regarding its dogmatic idea as always equaby reabzed. Rather, the object of the expectant faith of the Church are stbl future acts of God, who wib perfect His work in it and present it pure and spotless, a state not as yet existing even to the eye of faith ; for it is by no means a matter of divinely-wrought faith to. regard in a docetic spirit development and history as something indifferent and valueless in reference to the idea. And now, after disposing of false conceptions, and repebing attacks upon the distinction between the " visible and invisible Church," we can settle and verify the right meaning of that distinction. 2. The Church is cabed invisible first, because its spiritual essence, as well as the work of the Holy Spirit generaby, is not perceptible to sense ; secondly, because it is neither per- 360 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. ceivable by sense nor cognizable with certainty, who are among the true believers and the sanctified by faith ; nay, those belong to it who are no longer corporeaby upon earth. On the other hand, the meaning is not that.the Church is incognizable; for, on the contrary, it has been constantly repeated, that it has marks" by which we may know that it is and where it is. But these marks must of necessity be outward things — Word and Sacrament — although1 faith is requisite to judge of their value and recognize them as marks of the Church. Consequently the Church is cabed visible, although by its nature incognizr able to sense, first, so far as the invisible Church stbl has outward signs belonging to the sensible world, which give to faith, not to the senses, a guarantee for the existence of the Church ; for faith is assured that, where Word and Sacrament are observed, there is the Church, for the. means of grace are not ineffectual. Secondly, the invisible Church is called visible, because believers or the sanctified by the Holy Spirit, its members upon earth, are visible persons perceivable by sense. Thirdly and finally, visibdity is also ascribed to the Church, which is holy by nature, and consists of saints, in the sense that it is part of its idea to hold communion also with those not yet believers in order to lead them to faith. Since it receives such into its outward communion, or tolerates them therein (especially because they are baptized), the mamfestation of its community-life includes such as belong to it simply as objects of its culture ; for without this it could no longer be cabed a seed-plot of faith. In this way, without being forced to deny its' inner holy essence, it condescends, in keeping with its divine vocation, to become the Ecclesia large dicta, which, whbe perceptible to sense as a community of men, is again as a Church cognizable only to faith. For only faith is aware, that a kernel of men sanctified by faith must be sought in the outward ccetus vocatorum, nay, that a Church must be sought only within that ccetus, not outside it, where neither Word nor Sacraments are dispensed. On all these grounds it is certain, that the Church as Ecclesia proprie dicta is an object of credo, not of sensuous perception, although it pertains to the idea of the Church to extend its influences into the world of visibility, and also that we must distinguish from sensible perceptibleness. the cognizableness (i.e. to faith), VISIBLE AND DIVISIBLE CHURCH. 361 which of course pertains to the Church both in itself and in its manifestation, or as the Ecclesia large dicta? 3. It thus remains to verify the right, nay the dogmatic necessity of the distinction between the visible and invisible Church, but in the sense now settled, that, strictly taken, we can only speak of the invisibility and visibility of one and the same Church, not of a visible and invisible Church, as if there were two, which implies that visibbity must not be taken as identical with absolute cognizableness, nor invisi-> bibty with absolute incognizableness. The necessity of acknowledging both sides fobows from the fobowing considerations. That no Church at all would exist, if by this were understood merely a community cognizable by sense, needs no further exposition after what has been said. Even the Romish Church holds that no Church would, exist without faith and real connection with the Triune God. But, further, nothing outward, however holy and essential, such as God's Word and Sacrament, would be a Church. Everything visible in and by the Church must have for its end and aim the supplementing and nourishing of faith, which is something invisible, like God with whom faith is in communion, and only with this invisible element is the bving foundation of an existing Church given. But, conversely, the inner or invisible side of the Church is inseparable from the outward or visible ; for this its inner aspect existed already, continually springing into existence through the medium of an outward instrument — the Word of God and the Sacraments, which have to be administered by the existing Church. But again, faith and through faith communion with God in Christ being estabbshed, it is impossible for the Church to remain mere invisible com munion. Bebevers would not be a Church, unless they also had communion with each other. Communion is the inner element objectivized, and thus making itself cognizable. Without love, faith would be dead, a bfeless potency. But love shows itself in the intercourse of giving and taking, in which process again the Word of God and the Sacraments form the most important means of intercourse for the com munion of believers. So far the inner connection between the visible and invisible 1 Although not in reference to persons. 362 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. Church is evident. Both predicates are therewith demon strated to be in mutual and friendly relation, and both essential to the idea of the Church. But the visibility gains a further significance through the entrance of non-believers into the outer circle of the Church, a contradiction being thus seemingly introduced into the idea of the Church, so far as in some way it includes non-believers and yet is said to remain one Church. In other words : The Ecclesia large dicta involves difficulty, and yet this is the actual historic Church of all ages, whereas it seems to aim at combining utterly con tradictory elements. But the matter assumes another aspect, when it is considered that the Ecclesia proprie dicta with its invisible* essence has to organize and reabze itself in and out of the world of the first creation, in which sin has gained the mastery, and in pursuance of its vocation to enter into febow ship of living intercourse with that world. The empirical manifestation of the Church is thus clouded, the certain cog nizableness of true bebevers is especially lacking, nay, even in believers sin is still a power by which the good principle is fettered and vebed, instead of attaining free and bright revelation. And this gives occasion to the reproach, that the complete Evangelical idea of the Church on one side as a societas fidei et Spiritus Sancti, and on the other as Ecclesia large dicta, in which the wicked and unbebevers also are found, is self- contradictory, and in any case the empirical Church, which carries such a contradiction in its bosom, must renounce the claim to be reaby a Church by the Evangebcal standard.1 The Evangebcal idea of the Church, say others, is only tenable, provided it is permitted altogether to ignore non- believers or impii even in reference to the empirical Church, and to regard them as vanishing before the true point of view or as non-existent, because the real Church is covered by Christ its Head. The insufficiency of the latter expedient has been shown. To the former reproach we reply : Bebevers and unbebevers are certainly a contradiction, but a Church community, containing a mixture of both, does not 1 Or the being sanctified by faith must be excluded from the idea of the Church as an essential nota, and the Church must rather be defined as ecclesia vocatormn, and therefore exclusively by objective signs, such as Baptism and God's Word. VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE CHURCH. 363 for that reason form a contradiction destroying its character as a Church, just as little as a State must needs become a non ens, K ab its members are not animated by the State-idea, and if, on the contrary, a number of them are hostile to the S bate-principle. Even in such a mixture the empirical Church is stbl reaby a Church, so far as the difference between its essence and those in contradiction thereto is not forgotten, but remains in bving consciousness ; nay, this consciousness influences the wib to testify and act against error and sin, — in other words, so long as the Church, which is principaliter societas fidei et Spiritus Sancti, in fulfilment of its calling (not merely passively, still less decbning from itself), becomes the Ecclesia large dicta. Certainly the reason why unbelievers have a place in the Ecclesia large dicta, and in communion with bebevers, is not that they are unbebevers. But because they are able and bound to become believers, they have in them another side, which brings them into febowship with believers ; and it is precisely the strength and essence of the Ecclesia proprie dicta which is cherished and fostered by communion with them. They are capable of redemption and committed to the Church as an object of its culture, especially where the regular administration of baptism takes the form of infant-baptism. Believers have no right to declare the season of grace of non- believers expired, discontinue their culture, and anticipate the Judgment. On the contrary, the Church must hold com munion with them. Whbe notoriously antichristian elements may be excluded by Church discipbne, and offences in walk and doctrine expebed, this gives no sanction to a Donatist course. The tares, so bke the wheat as to be undistinguish- able from it before harvest, would not thereby be extirpated. Nay, the effect of a premature excision must be to expel those from the Church who ought to be won over by right treatment. Not merely are the true believers, who properly constitute the Church, not certainly recognizable because of hypocrites, but also the knowledge is denied us in what persons the better features suggestive of hope exist, despite appearances to the contrary. For the same reason also Donatism fails in pre senting a holy and pure Church in visibbity. It cannot avoid including in the Church those who only seem to be pure, and excluding those to whom it owes Christian fellow- 364 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. ship and culture, whbe it forgets also the sin still remaining even in believers. Accordingly in the earthly world-period neither is a separating judgment possible in reference to everything impure in doctrine or in persons, nor a gather ing together of the saints of the Church; nor is this even enjoined. The eagerness for premature presentation is common to the Donatist idea of the Church with Catholicism, save that the latter places its confidence in the institutions of its Church,1 and in its material hobness,soto speak; while Donatism, on the other hand, seeks to bring about a Church composed of thoroughly holy persons. By these means, on one side the Church is narrowed in a separatist spirit, and on the other divorced from its world-historical duty towards what is without, in opposition to the fact that, according to Christ's Word, it is itself the BatriXela t&v ovpav&v, the idea of which requires a tolerating of the tares and a union of believers and unbelievers during its earthly world-period. Thus the idea of the Ecclesia large dicta is sanctioned by Christ HimseK. But of course this mixed community, if it is to be rightly called a Church, must have a cohesive bond in the common blessing of God's Word, although in very different degrees of appropriation, and in the use of the Sacraments ; for, were these wanting, the essential signs of the Church, even in the wider sense, would be wanting, and thus there would be no Church. The reaction of the Church, where it exists, against error and sin has its firm and invincible support in these its immutable characteristics — Word and Sacrament. It cannot be in that state of contradiction between essence and manifesta tion wibingly, but only reluctantly. But just as little can it solve the contradiction arbitrarily or violently. It can neither palhate the contradiction and accelerate the harmony between the two by pronouncing the world holy, by weakening the antithesis between nature and grace, or by a superficial doctrine of repentance, nor by laying stress upon outward forms, works, and usages, apart from the life-giving Spirit ; finaby, neither by violent excision of everything in it of a worldly nature, nor, which would be essentiaby the same, by withdrawing from the 1 In a similar spirit the degenerate orthodoxy of the seventeenth century thinks the fiorentissimus status ecclesia! has come, where there is purity and unity in public teaching; VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE CHURCH. 365 world, in order to present in the like-minded a community of the pure and believing alone. Rather, what is enjoined on it is spiritual conflict with the world within and without it. The salt, the leaven, exists for the mass, and ought not to remain isolated. The fulness of love seeks what is empty in order to fill it. The Church must not avoid communication and participation from fear of pollution. But in doing both, it must reflect Christ in maintaining itself in righteousness. Instead of losing itself in the world, and making itself like it, it has to assimbate, and thus to conquer the world. It thus remains the one true Church, even in the sullied manifestation of its actuality. Invisible in essence, it is constantly in process of becoming visible, by virtue of its immortal inner nature. But it humbly submits to suffer at the hands of the world within and without it, and to exist in servant-form, not in holy, glorious manifestation, untb the coming of the. Lord, to whom alone the final judgment pertains. 4. Finaby, the distinction of the Church as visible and invisible has great value in its right confessional statement, and its acknowledgment is a. test of the purity of Evangelical teaching. The value is defensive, critico-polemical, and finally eirenical. In reference to the defensive aspect, or as a bul wark of pure Reformation doctrine, the distinction has value, because for its sake it is important, in distinction from Cathobcism, to maintain faith — that internal, not sensibly cognizable, and therefore invisible element — and the union with Christ estabbshed by faith, as the primitive factor through which the Church is constituted. That union with Christ is the principle and regulator of communion with men (bebevers and non-believers). It is true, Word and Sacrament precede faith, and at present also the Church which administers them. But as those means of grace are not the Church, because the Church first exists with believers, so also the Church is not the faith-estabbshing power. Rather, faith is generated by the Holy Spirit through Word and Sacrament, and the Church is not the power over both. No idea of the Church is evangebcal, which no longer makes the faith of the members an essential constituent factor of the Church, but, in order to get rid of the predicate of the invisibility (i.e. of the relative incognizableness) of its true members, makes 3o6 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. institutions of any kind the chief thing in the idea of the Church, call it episcopacy or clergy, forms of Confession or1 the hare fact of being baptized. Especiaby, as Harnack truly remarks,2 the Church must not be defined as the entire body of the baptized.3 That would be, since he who advances not to faith, or he who again fabs away, remains baptized, im- pbcitly to treat faith as non-essential to the idea of the Church. It would be an externalizing of the Church, a retrogression to the Cathobc mode of view, an offence against the material principle. The divinely-ordained con nection between Word and Spirit, between baptism and faith, would be dissolved. Baptized non-bebevers, because true members of the Church, would also be members of Christ. That a magical notion of baptism as an opus operatum would at the same time follow, has been previously shown. But the distinction has also its indispensable critical and polemical importance, not merely with an external reference — especially against Donatism and Romanism4 — but also with internal reference. For it keeps the consciousness awake to the difference or contradiction between the essence of the Church and its empirical manifestation. And this summons to the work of Church purification. Finally, this distinction includes eirenical breadth of sym pathy, a Christian oecumenical character. Where this dis tinction is neglected, and the empirical Church made identical with the essence of the Church, there haughty, stagnant self- contentment appears in the Church in question, wliich in a repebent and fault-finding spirit loves in its narrowness and short-sightedness to sit in judgment on other Confessions, whbe overlooking its own imperfection. But in virtue of the fact that we Evangelicals do not make the question of belonging to the true Church dependent on frail, professedly infabible human institutions bable to corruption and on connec tion with them, but on communion with Christ by faith, it is possible for us to regard, as true partners in faith, ab those 1 As Munchmeyer would have. 2 Ut supra, p. 20. 3 Such a definition would not keep to that which makes the Church the Church. * Donatism refuses to know anything of an Ecclesia large dicta ; Roman Catholicism emphasizes the visibility in such a degree as to leave but an incidental place to faith and personal holiness. MILITANT CHURCH. 367 in other churches, beyond the outward limits of the Evangelical Church, who are in communion with the living Head — Christ, ¦ who has His people in all of them. Christ is not so poor, George Calixtus used to say, as to have His Church only in Sardinia. THIRD SUBDIVISION. THE MDLITANT CHURCH. §150. The Church, assimilating the world to itself, and organizing itseK therein (§§ 147-149), on one side stands in con trast with the non-Christian world as a historic spiritual power, exerting influence on the world in a regular, systematic way, and thus acquiring a potent manifested aspect. But, on the other side, coming in contact with the world, it experiences therefrom counter- influences, which not merely limit or clog its mani festation, but also disturb it internally. The unity and holiness of the Church in its outward and inward reality are injured by violation of the common spirit of love ; the truth implanted in it is disturbed by errors. These disturbances, when not mere momentary phenomena, are schism and heresy. But stbl the Spirit of God departs not from the Church, hut arouses in it, where it stbl exists, purifying and cementing, reforming and con forming activity by way of counteraction ; and thus as a militant Church (Ecclesia militans) it stib remains Christ's true Church. 1. Although in the earthly world-period the Church is not an object of sight, but of faith (§ 140), it stib reaby exists upon earth. There is always a seed of believers, although they may at times be only sparsi per totum orbem, i.e. without regular communion with each other, but exist for the most part merely as a communion of individual members with each other and with their Head. Did believers no longer exist, 368 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. and had all Christendom faben away, Word and Sacrament would also no longer be preserved ; it would be as if Christ had never come : He must appear once more to initiate His historic work, for the purpose of taking up again its broken threads. But as Word and Sacrament are never without effect, so believers, where they exist, are animated with the impulse to realize the communion of faith as widely as possible, to preserve and extend Word and Sacrament. But a stbl un- vanquished world remains in the Church, because sin and error are still a power in every believer, and because the Church — the salt of the world — must not or cannot outwardly separate from the world.1 To do this, as has been shown, would be contrary to its vocation and to love. It preserves itself, however, as a true Church, because purifying forces are at its command in the possession of Word and Sacrament. The Holy Spirit is a spirit of discipline, and from Him pro ceeds the Church discipline, for the sake of which, as formerly shown, the Church has to organize itself. Now Church discipline certainly nowhere seems able to attain a certain and complete result, because the absolute excommunication from its communion, which might secure such a result, is interdicted to the Church by the educating and loving activity which it owes to all who are baptized. But it can stib re main a true Church, according to what was proved above respecting the nature of Church discipline, and the stages of belonging to the Church.2 The objects of Church discipbne who have caused notorious scandal, necessarily lose the right of influencing the Church by election or by official functions, that the scandal may be weakened and deprived of its con tagious power. They may also be debarred from the Holy Supper, if they lack the capacity profitably to receive it. By this means they are relegated to the first stages of belonging to the Church, and are now to be treated as under instruction, and as Christian minors. If they refuse to submit to this, they exclude themselves from the Church. But the Church, although compelled 3 for a time on its part to limit or suspend communion, must never exclude from the hearing of God's Word, and must always hold itself ready to receive the penitent again into 1 John xvii 15 ; § 149. 2 § 1475, 1. § 1466. 3 According to Matt. vii. 6 ff. MILITANT CHURCH. 369 full communion. By purifying action, the chief force of which consists in employment of God's Word, the Church can thus maintain itself as a true Church, despite the sin and error in its bosom. It is not in the world for a mere show, but to be in spiritual intercourse therewith, in order that through its word the world may come to believe ; but it is not of the world.1 It would destroy itself by conformity to the world. But it would also destroy itself by absolute, and therefore unloving separation from the world. Instead of this, it remains in the world in the character of the salt of the world that loses not its savour, or in its character of a militant Church contending with the weapons of faith, of holy love and hope. 2. In its mbitant character the Church might have re mained a unity even upon earth, and thus been all the more successful in its struggle with the world. But, as we know, in the course of its history it has suffered from various divisions or schisms. Like ab disturbances, this also must be derived from error and sin2 If error were only in an indivi dual, without disturbing the community, it would be transient ; and if there were no error, but primarily mere sin, deficiency of love in an individual, a merely momentary weakening of the common spirit might arise. But sin and error stand also in intrinsic connection, they strengthen and fertilize each other, and thus nothing is more natural than their seeking and finding each other. Want of love and selfishness may seek their legitimation in errors, thus acquiring contagious force. Errors may beget strife, abenate the mutually friendly, and cause love to wax cold. Where sin is, there also is the seed of discord ; and since sin is everywhere, we may say, discord is everywhere and always on the point of bursting forth ; and peace is nowhere save where it is again and again newly won by keeping down the elements of discord. Holy Scripture exhorts : " Pursue peace," because peace is always fleeing away. But sin also begets error, by preventing mutual understanding and agreement. When the powers of error and sin, the powers that mar love and truth, gather and accu mulate in masses through the predominance of the world in 1 1 Cor. v. 10, 11, vii. 31. 2 Not from difference of national individualities, which on the contrary ought to be moulded charismatically, and to form a bond of communion. Doenbe. — Christ. Doct. iv. 2 A 370 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. the Church, a Church-division is the consequence, usually — at least in great Church-divisions — attaching itself to different national individuabties (effects, so to speak, of unmastered earthly matter), binocent in themselves, but overlooking their need of mutual supplement, or attaching itseK to difference of degree in apprehending and appropriating Christianity. Observation. — If the visible unity of the institutional Church-organism constituted that in which the reality of the Church resides, the man who breaks with that organism and its authorities would always be gubty of schism, and would secede from the true Church. But since obedience to such authorities can only be conditional,1 because the out ward organism of the Church does not represent the con tinuation, but merely the reflection, of Christ's office, and that possibly in a very distorted form, and since the organism has not the promise of always being sustained by God's word and faith, but may fall away from both, there may be a disobedience to antichristian, Christ-denying ordinances, which is obedience to Christ, as web as an obedience to such ordinances, that would be a participation in the sin of rebebion against Christ. Although in such a case obedience to Christ seems to be the cause of the division, just because the organism only remains what it was before the division, in reality the organism, setting itself in opposition to the call to obedience to Christ, is the cause of the schism, and excludes itself from the true Church inasmuch as it sets itself in opposition to the truth crossing its path. 3. Nothing but sin, and indeed accumulated sin, can spbt the one Church in its manifestation into a multiplicity of churches, which surrender positive communion with each other, Church divisions being always a grievous judgment on the visible Church. But still the unity can never be utterly abobshed. Even the divided churches in their character as Christendom stand in contrast with the world ; and the circle where the light of Christianity stbl shines, be it ever so dimly, is never quite identical with the circle where it is extinguished or does not shine. Where the visible Christian Church stbl exists through. preservation of Word and Sacrament, there also is something of Christian spirit and life, and therefore something to counteract the want of love, or discord and error. Ab particular churches 1 § 136, 4. MILITANT CHURCH. 371 have a claim to be regarded as Christian so long as they have not lost, but stib exercise, the essential characteristics or signs of the Church — Word and Sacrament. For, so long as these endure, even with many perversions, the presupposition of faith must be maintained, namely, that despite heresy and schism the true Church still contains members, and the healing force of the higher nature is not yet extinct. In each of the Church-parties deserving the name, the Holy Spirit is at work as a Reforming spirit, and accomplishes His end by setting in motion purifying and cementing forces. Moreover, every particular Church needs such action at all times both for its own sake and in relation to others. The conflict of the militant Church must be directed against the principles that would dissolve the true Church — sin and error, — above ab, against impurity within itself.1 It must never so frame its organization or government as to interdict or exclude effort to purify its life or teaching. But as relates to conduct towards other particular churches, it is wrong to fix the gaze on their faults alone, and, forgetful of our own defects or faults, to wrap ourselves up in self-admiration and security, and by want of sympathy to lessen our influence upon them, instead of righteously acknowledging the excebences or the good bestowed also on them, and regarding that good as a common blessing intended for the whole of the Church, and to be sought by it. Just as blameworthy of course is an attempt at union, whose only aim is to promote an external unity. Such unity is no absolute good alone. The absolute good even for the visible Church is, not indeed a particular form of dogma, but the truth embodied in the dogma and contained in Word and Sacrament. Ghrist is the true treasure of the Church. Thus truth and unity, faith and love, seem to be limited, but only in appearance, because love is not Christian, unless it takes its law of bfe from Christ. It is the function of Symbobcs to determine the nearness or distance of particu lar Church-parties from each other, and thus to fix the limit and direction of efforts after unity among them. Towards par ties, with whom union is inadmissible as Church communities, like the Roman Cathobc Church, ecclesiastical hospitality is at least to be exercised, and, what is of greater import, the 1 1 Pet. iv. 17 372 EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH. consciousness of mutual relationship must be shown at least by conflict in love, i.e. by rendering help to what is true among them, in criticising what is false, for which a keener eye always dwebs in others. And this is the dogmatic principle of Confessional Polemics. Since each individual Church has to do with the others at least in controversy, and each one desires thus to render loving service to the others, nay, ac knowledges the good presented by them in distinctive expres sion, in this way also they are a unity, although divided, or a Christian family ; and in this sense all churches, which are stib parts of the one true Church, are a mibtant Church in the spirit of truth and love within and without. 4. Although, therefore, error may be strong, and the bond of communion within or without feeble from different causes, so long as a particular Church is still really mbitant in out- ' ward respects, and stib more inwardly or with itself, it is a Christian Church, not forsaken by the heabng forces of grace. Both in the toil of conflict outwardly, and in the zeal for constant inward purifying, the believing kernel in different Church-parties forms the true Christendom, strong through faith in the might of Him whom it knows to be with it, and who is able to convert even the storm and tempest of the Church into blessing.1 The believers in the Church are at all times the preserving, quickening, hallowing salt in relation to those destined and on their way to faith. Without being outwardly separate, they form the inner circle and real centre of the empirical Church. Without being outwardly cognizable, they are also the upholders of particular churches, in whom and for whose sake these churches form a part of the actual Church. This invisible Church in the earthly Church has and is aware of the promise even as to its earthly history, that the gates of hell shab not prevab against it. It forms the Militant Church contending in the certainty of victory. 1 Matt. xvi. 18 ff., xviii. 18 ff. CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY IN GENERAL. 373 THIED DIVISION. THE DOCTEINE OF THE LAST THINGS, OR OF THE CONSUMMATION OF THE CHURCH AND THE WORLD. § 151. There is a consummation of individuals and of the whole, especiaby of the Church, which, however, is realized not through a purely immanent, uninterrupted process, but through crises and Christ's Second Advent. Literature.— Ph. Nicolai, Theoria Vitce AEternce, 1620. G. Cabxtus, Dissert, de immortalitate, de purgatorio, de statu ani- marum separatarum, de extremo judicio, de beatitudine ceterna. Meyfart, Das himmlische Jerusalem, 1627 ; Das hollische Sodom, 1630 ; Das jilngste GericM, 1632, each 2 vols. J. Gesenius, Die vier letzten Dinge. Fbigge, Geschichte des Glaubens an Unsterb- lichkeit, Auferstehung, etc., 1794 to 1800. Heppe, Dogmatik des deutschen Proiestantismus im 16 Jahrhundert, iii. 413 ff., 1857. Cf. Halm, Dogmatik, ed. 1, 636 f. (especiaby gives the bterature of Rationalism and Supernaturalism). Schleiermacher, Der chr. Glaube, II. § 157 ff. Nitzsch, System, etc., ed. 6, p. 398 ff. Rothe, Ethik, ed. 1, vol. 2, § 801 ff. Kern, Die christliche Eschatologie u. Pradestinationslehre, 1840. Weisse, Philosophische Bedeutung der christlichen Eschatologie, Stud. u. Kr. 1835, I., and Philos. Dogmatik, § 952-972. Weitzel, Die christliche Unsterblichkeits- lehre (exegetical treatise), Stud. u. Kr. 1836, IV. Miiber, J., Stud. u. Kr. 1835, II. Lange, ibid., 1836, see Positive Dogmatik, 1851, p. 1227 ff. His Vermisehte Schriften, II.: Beitrdge zur Lehre von den letzten Dingen, 1841. Fr. Richter, Die Lehre von den letzten Dingen, 1833. Luthardt, Die Lehre von den letzten Dingen, 1861. Althaus, Die letzte Dinge, 1858. Hebart, Die zweite sichtbare Zukunft Christi, Eine Darstellung der gesammten biblischen Eschatologie in ihren Hauptmomenten, 1850. Karsten, H., Die letzten Dinge, ed. 3, 1861. Kahle, Biblische Eschatologie. Erste Abtheilung, A. T. 1870. Schmidt, Die eschatologischen Lehrstiicke in ihrer Bedeutung fiir die gesammte Dogmatik und das kirchliche Leben, Jdhrb. f. d. Theol. vols. 13 and 15. Schmid, Die Frage von der Wiederbringung alter Dinge, ibid., vol. 13, p. 102 ff. Schweizer, Chr. Glaubenslehre, ii. p. 377. Martensen, § 273 ff. Apol. 217 ; Cat. 371 ; Cat. Maj. 501 ff. ; Form. Cone. 594, 4. 719, 7. 729, 18. 374 ESCHATOLOGY. Observation. — Eschatology embraces : Firstly, the future up to the decision, both the future of individuals (death and the intermediate state) and the future of God's kingdom on earth, where the doctrines of Chibasm and of Antichrist come under review. Secondly, the doctrine of Christ's Second Coming, of the Resurrection of the Dead, and the Judgment. 1. Conscience already carries in it the fundamental features of an Eschatology,1 for the good is not even believed in as the existing and alone truly real, unless it is believed in as the power to judge the world.2 God cannot, it is true, desire to compel the wicked to goodness ; but were He to allow evb to rule for ever, there would either be no zeal in Him for the honour of the good, or no power to give effect to that zeal. ' It would therefore not merely be contrary to God's outward glory in face of the world, if He were not World-judge, but also contrary to His inner glory, for He could not be indifferent to the prevalence and dominion of good in the world without indifference to good generaby. But the honour of good not merely requires that it exist and show its superiority to evb by a judgment, but also that it reveal its inner wealth, its fulness of energy. In this way a goal of the world is posited negatively and positively. Heathenism, indeed, has but little of Eschatology. To it, questions as to Whence and Whither are secondary to life in the present. It moves only in the circle of physical life, and knows no absolute divine goal of the world, and no such goal for individuals, but has merely attempts at a cosmogony and at a doctrine of immortality and end of the world. The majority in heathenism, to pass by the dualistic rebgions, so far as their thoughts are at all directed to the future, think of the world as remaining eternaby as it is ; although a restless mutahbity is part of its constitution, a mutability however subservient to no goal lying in a straight bne, but at most to a cycle which consti tutes no progress. There also the individual person is as bttle considered as the future ; but where continuance is bestowed on him, this mostly takes the form suited to the fundamental notion of a cycle, i.e. the form of a transmigration of souls, a recurrence measured by shorter or longer periods, but without 'Eom, ii. 12 ff. 2 Hence in Gen. xviii. 25 God is already conceived as Judge of the world. CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY IN GENERAL. 375 perceptible progress as the result. It is only where personal, moral duties spring into consciousness under the influence of a more powerfully awakened conscience, that not merely are ideas of a future separation of the good and bad, of punish ments and rewards, formed, but the future of the world as a whole is also graduaby placed under an ethical point of view. Most of the heathen religions (and the lower dualistic ones also) do not reach the thought of a goal of the world, but remain entangled in an alternation between periods of triumph now on the part of the light, beneficent powers, and now on the part of the dark, harmful powers, whether they stop at the annual cycle or advance to the supposition of longer periods. The former, for example, is the case in the Egyptian and Syrian rebgions ; the latter, in Plato, the Stoa, and Buddhism. But such simple alternation is the opposite of progress, is anti-teleological. Only those dualistic rebgions, in which the antithesis of moral good and evb emerges with more definite predominance, occupy themselves more with Eschatology, and this in such a form that, after eventful struggles in the earthly world, a blessed world-goal, and an enduring triumph of the good, form part of the prospect in the future. So in the Persian and partiaby in the German religion. 2. But it is only in the sphere of revelation that such a teleology finds a secure footing. Here first there is scope for a development of eschatological doctrine, for here first the ultimate aim rises to consciousness, for which the world was created, and which must appear in reabzation at the end. The end or the goal also rules the way to the goal. But here two points are to be observed. First, that according to the 0. T. eschatology is bttle more for a long time than a doctrine of future developments to be looked for on earth, while the gaze usuaby does not extend beyond the earthly world-period. It is a future in this world, not in heaven, which the pious of the 0. T. have before their eyes. For this very reason, again, it is less the future of individual persons than of the nation and theocracy. This is in keeping with the historical earthly vocation of the nation, with the mission which Israel had to discharge in reference to the history of rebgion. That mission is represented by the law built upon Monotheism, and especially by prophecy, which announces more definitely the 376 ESCHATOLOGY. destinies of the nation, the judgments upon it, the great judg ment-day of God, and also the glorious Messianic age fobowing thereupon, which is to be a blessing to other nations. As relates to individuals, the terrors of Hades (Sheol) are not vanquished even by the faith of the pious in the O. T. Beginnings of faith in immortality are present -1 even the knowledge that death is not man's normal destiny, but con trary to his idea, is of ancient date. Enoch and Elijah prove that communion with God is a power above death, and resur rection is already employed as a figure for the restoration of the nation. But in the entire 0. T. the notion of Sheol remains essentiaby similar.2 Just and unjust are gathered in it. Even the former consider Hades a loss in comparison with the earthly bfe. A doctrine of the separation of the two according to the lot deserved is not yet found. In a word, the 0. T. gives no more precise information as to the ultimate fate of individuals — of the pious and godless.3 3. Christianity alone is the absolutely teleological rebgion, pointing to a definite decision in the future in reference to individuals and the whole. In the 0. T, Christianity itself is the essential contents of Eschatology. One might think that, after Christianity has become historic fact, prophecy is at an end, everything is fulfibed. And this was the expectation, not only of the .prophets, but of the apostles of the Lord, namely, that the end, the consummation of the world, wib come with the Messiah — nay, that the Messiah wib first of ab execute judgment, and that the revealing of His power wbl be the first thing. But in opposition even to the Baptist,4 Christ expressly describes judgment not as His first but as His last work ; and since He had not to appear first in glory, but in abasement, suffering, and dying, the o-vvreXeta aldvo? was thereby deferred, and to the first presence (Parousia) of Christ the expectation of a second was added, on the ground of the most definite statements of Christ. The division of Christ's Parousia into a first and second was not merely necessary on 1 Ps. xvi. 10, xvii 15, xlix. 15 ; Isa. xxvi 19, liii. 9 ; Hos. xiii. 14 ; Dan. xii. 2 ; Ezek. xxxvii. 3-6. 2 Cf. Oehler, 0. T. Theology, I. 245 ff. (Clark). Schultz, A. T. Theologie, ed. 1. I. 360 ff., 396 ff., II. 136. 210-220 ; and Kahle, p. 305 ff. 3 Oehler, ut supra. * Cf. Matt. iii. 10, 12, with John iii. 17. CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY IN GENERAL. 377 account of the atonement, because the work of redemption required Christ's sacrifice of Himself in suffering and death, but was also involved in the necessity of an ethical process in those to be redeemed. The glory and the sight of Christ's power could not be the first, because the sight would have corrupted the motive of surrender to Christ, and have injured the ethical character of faith. Nevertheless by this post poning of the revelation of the glory of His person and kingdom, which certainly appeared to Christian hope but a smab thing, the certain occurrence of a decision to be expected from the Messiah was not rendered in the least doubtful. On the contrary, precisely because the supreme spiritual blessing has already come in the gospel, Christian faith which trusts in God knows that the power of consummation exists to bring everything to decision for or against the good, and to cause the worth or demerit of every individual definitely to appear, so that now for the first time through the influence of the gospel everything is ripe for judgment. A pregnant eschatological element lies in Christian faith as such. Faith has experienced so much of Christ's effectual working, that in presence of what is stbl lacking, however much this may be, it possesses not merely a hope, but the certainty that the divine idea of the world wbl not remain simply a fair but impotent picture of imagination, and that Christ, by the absolutely sufficient power over sin, the world, the devil, and death dwebing in Him, wbl not leave the work He has begun a ruin and frag ment, but will complete it. Nay, the faith of the Church already descries Christ coming again, as He advances un- halting and undelaying to the end through His unbroken activity in the world. And under this aspect faith recognizes the beginning of the judgment and the end as already come , with Christ's manifestation.1 In reference to the future, bebevers are not limited to opining or wishing. Christians are a prophetic race,2 they know of the end and completion of the divine work begun. And thus, under the influence of Chris tian hope, which anticipates the end — the next fruit of faith — Christian wisdom forms its ideas of purpose or ideals, and draws from hope the valiant spirit of love, enabling it with true stedfastness (inrofjtov^) to desire the right goal in the right way. 1 John iii. 19, xii. 47 ff. 2 1 Pet. i. 3, 4, cf. ii. 9. 378 ESCHATOLOGY. 4. The distinctive feature of Christian Eschatology is its relation to Christ's person, a thought expressed with special clearness in the doctrine of Christ's Second Advent. Christ's person, conceived in the New Testament as ever actively at work, and in due time again becoming visible, gives colour and impress to every point in Christian Eschatology. Not merely wib the ultimate destiny of every one be decided by his relation to Christ, and communion with Him form the centre of blessedness to the blessed — not merely will He be Judge of the world, because He is the Son of man ; He will also raise the dead, and bebevers will be made like His glorified body in the Resurrection. The character also of the intermediate state depends on the relation to Him, and its duration on the occurrence of His Second Coming to judgment. Finally, ab conflicts and advances of the Kingdom of God, of which He is Head, are connected with His name and continued activity. If theology relegated Him to a secondary position in reference to the consummation, it would make Him a person of transient importance, — a view which by reflex influence must necessarily disorganize the whole of Christology and the doctrine of God's self-revelation. 5. The presupposition of the consummation of the Church and the Kingdom of God is the consummation of individual bebevers. Again, since bebevers leave the earth with out being saints,1 the perfecting of individuals is dependent on their personal continuance or immortality, which, however, needs to be distinguished from the resurrection. There is no absolutely cogent proof of immortality. As the doctrine of Man showed, its certainty rests on likeness to God, i.e. in the last resort on God.2 The true idea of God places the worth of man and personality so high, and makes God's gracious purpose of communion with man so certain, that immortality has its guarantee therein. On account of his essential relation to God, man has an infinite destiny and the capacity not to die, which through God issue in the full reabzation of eternal life in reference to bebevers. Butj the relation of the wicked also to God is a relation of infinite importance, such 1 According to Cat. Maj. 601. 502, we are only altogether pure and holy at the Resurrection. Cf. F. C. 719, 7 : sin cleaves to the soul. 1 Matt. .xxii. 29-32. Cf. vol. i § 42. CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY IN GENERAL. 379 as nature has not. Some (and not merely Socinians) concede immortabty to the regenerate only,1 whereas the unconverted wicked will sooner or later be overtaken by annihbation. Observation. — In the early Church many voices were lifted up in favour of the view that man has no natural immor tality, but that it is only a gift of Christ's grace, e.g. Arnobius, and see the article " Tatian " by Moller in Herzog's Th. Realencyc. This view has been still more commonly adopted in modern days to avoid the idea of eternal punishment, and to secure a harmonious conclusion of the history of the world. So Weisse, Rothe, and others, and especiaby Edward White.2 In behalf of this view it may certainly be asserted, that no immortabty in the sense of the soul's incapability of death in virtue of its own strength can be set up. That the proof of the immortabty of the soul from the simplicity of its essence is not conclusive,3 we have seen before. Accord ing to Ps. civ. 29, the consequence of God withdrawing His breath is that the creature perishes. As matter of fact, our soul has not bfe in itself (i.e. the power of life) by nature, for otherwise it would possess self-existence (aseitat), which indeed Rothe ascribes to perfected spirits. But in the proper absolute sense this belongs only to God (of whom, therefore, it is said that He alone has immortabty), in a relative sense indeed also to the creature, but only in such a way that God causes His conserving will to co-operate every instant. But whbe on these grounds it must be conceded that both the formula : non potest mori and : non potest non mori must be rejected in respect of the soul in itself as in respect of the body, and consequently the formula: potest mori is applicable to the soul considered by itself, it does not follow from this, that a reaby human being falls a prey to annihbation and only the regenerate are really immortal, for the possibibty remains of a continuance of life having been conferred on all men by God. In no case can the death of the body be regarded, as is done by Materialism and Pan theism, as the cause of the death of the soul in the case of the non-regenerate. Rather must it remain certain that the human soul is in itself superior to physical potencies and 1 Which is imparted, according to Dodwell, through the medium of the true Church and its Sacraments, and therefore not to Dissenters. 2 In his work, Life in Christ. The French translation of the work by C. Byse, under the title, L'immortaliU conditionnelle, 1880, gives in the preface a long list of advocates of this view in Switzerland, England, and North America. In Germany, Nitzsch is mentioned alongside Rothe, Gess, H. Sohultz with doubtful authority. 3 Vol. ii. § 42. 380 ESCHATOLOGY. beyond their reach, and therefore is able at ab events to outbve the destruction of the body. It would be another question whether the soul cannot be disorganized and led to destruction by hostile powers within itseK, i.e. by evil, on which point something wib be said later on. In the present connection it is enough to see the possibbity established of the harmonious consummation of the kingdom of God through the fact that the prospect exists of its deliverance from all hindering hostbe elements, i.e. unless they consent to incorporation in the kingdom, the deliverance being effected either by the elements fabing a prey to destruction, or being excluded from God's consummated kingdom. Only on the supposition that a being really human could pass into a lower class of beings, so that bkeness to God became utterly extinct in him, could the capacity for immortabty become extinct in him. 6. But Christianity not merely proclaims immortabty; according to it, there is also a consummation in reference to individuals.1 A mere progress in infinitum in the diminution of evil cannot suffice. Evb is no infinite power bke good. It may, indeed, be said that consummation would be uniformity. But rather the nature of evil is to tend to the monotony of death. Vitality and wealth lie in the positive, the spirit and the divinely good, which cannot lack the corresponding nature for the exhibition of itself in the individual and the com munity. Sin hinders the unfolding of the personality in agreement with the rich variety of the faculties designed for harmonious co-operation ; but the power of evb can never pre clude the consummation of believers, for, while it is absolutely culpable, it is not absolutely strong, but a finite force (Grosse), the power of redemption, on the other hand, being infinite. The latter is the power of indissoluble eternal bfe, never exhausted, so that evil must be vanquished and excluded simply by the continuous growth of the power of sanctification. 7. But as bebevers, instead of remaining a fragment, will attain consummation, so the Church and the kingdom of God wbl do the same.2 The isolated individual cannot be perfect. This would be no true consummation, for he is also a member and stands in need of the whole in order to his own blessed 1 Phil. i. 6 ; Eph. i 3, 4 ; 1 Cor. xv. 22. 2 John x. 16, xvii. 13, 19, 23 ; Eph. i. 10 ; 1 Cor. xv. 28. CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY IN GENERAL. 381 consummation. The generic consciousness, perfected in love, cannot attain to its absolute satisfaction and realization with out communion. Again, without individuals, who have to carry .the whole in themselves, and in whom the whole must live, without their conservation and consummation, there would be no consummation of the whole organism, members — whole and part — reciprocaby requiring each other in order to per fection. But, more precisely, the following features are necessary to the consummation of the whole. First. The completion of the members constituting the organism. Therefore the succession of generations, and the supply of living members from those generations, must con tinue untb the organism has obtained all its essential members. It must not be inferred herefrom, either that ab men wib be incorporated as sanctified members in the organism, or that on the falling away of one class the organism must remain incomplete. For, apart from the consideration that, supposing God had a foreknowledge of what is free, He may have taken into account who will exclude themselves from the organism in sketching its idea, in virtue of His infinite creative power He may cause the suc cession of generations to go on until the number necessary to completeness is fibed up. Therefore, whoever are lost, a com pensation through the divine creative power must be supposed.1 Secondly. To the actuabty of the Church's consummation belongs also a cessation of reproduction, which continually gives the Church a new world to subdue ; and this pre supposes a transforming of earthly relations. To marry and be given in marriage pertains to the present seon,2 which did not exist always, as bttle as this earth of ours, and in the same way wbl not exist always. Granting, it might be said with some teachers, that the power of regeneration, seizing the entire person, wbl sanctify also the offspring, a pure bfe thus passing over to the children (a view, however, favoured neither by Scripture nor experience), even this would be an essential alteration in earthly relations, not to say that regeneration can never become a matter of birth without losing its ethical character.3 That body and spirit in the 1 Cf. Matt. xxv. 28. Talents for the work are not wanting. 2 Luke xx. 35. 3 John iii. 3. 382 ESCHATOLOGY. present seon are asymptotes, is shown by the old age and death of Christians. The bodby and the spiritual organism are stbl in loose connection and external to each other, so that both have their special centre and their own laws of life, which is necessary on account of the moral cabing of man.1 Thirdly. None who is impure can have a place in God's perfected kingdom. Moreover, the number actually carrying the kingdom in themselves must also contain what belongs to the perfect am/ia Xpto-rov, and those not to be received into the kingdom must also stand outside the idea of God's perfected kingdom. Observation. — For obvious reasons the old Dogmatists paid little attention to Eschatology. Compared with other dogmas, this doctrine is wanting both in precision and certaintjr. And even the New Testament, as we shall see, leaves many enigmas and moot points. Hence the eschatoiogical points of doctrine may, with Schleiermacher, be cabed prophetic. But the statements of the New Testament on these points are also prophetic in the sense that there are not wanting great fixed lines, which permit an eschatoiogical doctrine to be laid down. In the ecclesiastical Eschatology hitherto the fobowing are the principal defects to be noted. First. As relates to individuals, it supposes for them no such intermediate state between this life and the consummation as to prevent decision being come to upon all, upon their definitive worth and destiny, with the conclusion of the present life. Secondly. If death decides everything, this forestabs the final judgment in reference to the lot both of the wicked and believers, for even the importance of the resurrection is threatened, if blessedness follows immediately on death without limitation. Thirdly. It is suspicious that the interest for holiness is secondary to the interest for blessedness, which is shown in the fact that the old Dogmatists make complete freedom from imperfection and sin ensue for the justified without further ado with the laying aside of the body. As relates to the whole, the old Dogmatists in the first place made no unanimous choice between the twofold possibility, whether the consummation will be a new creation or the crown of a development ; further, whether the course of the latter wib be purely immanent and gradual, or by means of crises, and in such a way that the heaviest conflicts will fall at the end ; finally, whether the victory of the heavenly forces wbl ensue abruptly, or whether an interpenetration-process of 1 Cf. vol. ii § 39. CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY IN GENERAL. 383 what is earthly with heavenly forces, effected by moral means, is to be supposed. Further, the uncertainty on the point, what the Antichristian power is (whether a heathen, universal empire, or Mohammedanism, or the Papacy, or powers of lying and hate within the Church generally, which enter into a league with the world-power for the persecution of bebevers), has influence again on the question as to the Millennium and its conception, as web as upon the notion of the nature and period of Christ's Second Coming. Moreover, down to our own days different views are held on the point, whether the earthly bfe of humanity is meant merely to be a probation and preparation for another life, in which alone the real end of bfe lies, or whether morally precious ends and works of eternal significance also form part of' the present life, ends and works in which elements of the realization of the world-goal are to be seen. This point is closely connected with the question, whether, as the Old Testament and the doctrine of a Mibennium suppose, the earthly arena and the earthly world- period are capable and worthy of becoming a representation of the Kingdom of God, or whether the reabzation of God's Kingdom is to be conceived as absolutely heavenly and super-earthly. Finally, the doctrine of the old Dogmatists respecting the consummation of the world is too spirituabstic in tone, and is unable to assign to nature enough significance in relation to the spirit. To come to an approxi mate decision on these questions ought not to be deemed impossible. If in the ancient Church Eschatology assumed a dominant position in reference to the entire faith, so that even Christology was powerfully determined and furthered thereby, the other dogmas in their present rich development have now in turn to render service to Eschatology. FIRST POINT : THE SECOND ADVENT OF CHRIST, WITH ITS PREPARATION IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD. §152. Individuals, like the Church and the Kingdom of Christ, await their consummation from the Second Advent of Christ, which forms the centre of the entire Eschatology of the New Testament, and ministers not merely to the van quishing of all hostile powers, but also to the realizing 384 ESCHATOLOGY. of the idea of the individual and the whole. This Second Advent is not made superfluous by any previous develop ment of the individual and the whole in this world or the next, since it alone brings the complete conquest of sin and death — to the Individual in the Resurrection, to the Whole by the transfiguration of the world, by the exclusion of evil and the consummation of the Church of God Symb. Apostolicum, Niccen. § 6. Athanas. §§ 37, 38. Conf. Aug. hi. : Palam est rediturus. Apol. 147, 17. 18. Cat. min. 371. Literature. — Corrodi, Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus. My Doctrine of the Person of Christ. Schmidt, Jdhrb. f. d. Theol. vols. 13. 15. The Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy were against Chibasm, e.g. J. Gerhard and Maresius. On the other hand, more favourable to it : Spener, Die Hoffhung besserer Zeiten; Bengel's Weltalter. Modern advocates of the Millennium in Ger many : the school of Bengel, v. Hofmann, Delitzsch, Beck, Baum- garten, Lohe ; Auberlen, Daniel und die Offenbarung Johannis, 1857 (For. Theol. Lib.), and Die Theosophie of F. C. Oetinger, 1859. Luthardt, Die letzten Dinge, 1861, p. 71 f.1 Rinck, Splittgerber, Koch, Disselhoff, Hebart ; more moderate, Karsten, Die letzten Dinge, ed. 3, 1861, and Florcke, Die Lehre vom tausendjahrigen Reich, 1859. Volk (in Dorpat), Der Chiliasmus der neuesten Bekdmpfung gegeniiber, 1869. Holemann, Die Stellung St. Pauli zu der Frage uber die Wiederkunft Christi, 1857. Dieterich (1857, 1858) has come forward in several writings as an opponent of Chibasm. In substance, also, Hengstenberg must be regarded as an opponent, Die Offenbarung des h. Johannes fiir solche, die in der Schriftforschen, erldutert, ed. 2, 2 vols. 1861, 1862 (For. Theol. Lib.). He supposes that the thousand years' reign lies behind us, and is to be found in the German Empire of Charlemagne up to 1806. Keil is in essential agreement with him in his Comm. z. Ezechiel (For. Theol. Lib.), and Philippi, vi. 214 ff, although such a doctrine of the Millennium is scarcely different from denying it. The binding of Satan is said to be the existence of Christianity as the State religion, and according to Keil and Phbippi is to be dated from the fab of heathenism. In 1 Like v. Hoffmann, Luthardt teaches that the present course of the world and the resurrection of the just will be followed by a rule of Jesus Christ and His glorified Church of believing confessors over the rest of humanity, who will be subject to the former, not a carnal, but a spiritual rule of peace and state of blessing upon earth, p. 235. According to Luthardt, therefore, the risen just will rule as kings upon earth with Christ over the rest of men still alive. CHRIST'S SECOND ADVENT. 385 England and North America, Anderson, Cox, Begg, and especi ally Cunningham (On the Second Coming of Christ in Glory, 1828), are Mdlenarians. On the other side : Briggs On Pre- millenarianism (in opposition to the theory of Christ's visible coming again before the thousand years' reign, a dogmatico-his- torical investigation). Respecting the Antichrist must be named in most recent days, Rinck, 1867; Phbippi, 1877. Further, Ed. Bohmer, Zur Lehre vom Antichrist nach Schneckenburger, Jahrb. f. d. Theol, vol. vi. pp. 405-467 ; Renan, V Antechrist, 1873. I. — The Biblical Doctrine of Christ's Second Advent. The expectation of Christ's personal reappearing, found in the entire primitive Church even in the case of the apostles, is not rooted merely in their personal wishes, or still less in earthly Messianic hopes, but is based upon various discourses of Christ Himself,1 which treat expressly of His Second Advent at the o-vvreXeia alcovos. Attempts have been made in various ways to explain away these statements of Christ. Some assume that the disciples wrongly understood the dis courses of Jesus. Others would limit the discourses on the Second Advent to the announcement of Christ's resurrection. Others think to succeed by explaining the two other Synop- tists e.g. by Luke. Others, again, get rid of the problem by assuming that Christ Himself erred in the discourses in question, — a view which they think compatible with His dignity. To the latter it has been rightly replied,2 that the thought of the Parousia on the lips of Jesus cannot be regarded as a conception accommodated to the times and lying merely at the circumference, but that the centre of the spiritual teaching of Jesus would be affected, if He could have erred in reference to the announcement of His Parousia ; a for, as 1 Matt, xxiv., xxv. ; Mark xiii. ; Luke xxi. (cf. xvii. 20-27, xii. 39, 40, 42-46) ; Matt. xxv. 1-13, 14-30, 31-46. Cf. Luke xix. 11 ff. ; Mark viii. 38, ix. 1, x. 28 ff., xiv. 25, 62 (with the parallel passages); Luke xii. 35-38; Matt. x. 23, xiii. 24-30, xxiii. 20 ; Acts i. 11 ; 2 Thess. ii. 8 ; 1 Thess. iv. 15, v. 23 ; 1 Cor. xv. 23 ; Phil. iv. 5 ; 1 John ii. 18 ; 1 Pet. iv. 7 ; Jas. v. 8 ; Rev. i 3, iii. 11, xix. 11, xx. 4, 11, xxii. 7, x. 12. 2 So by Weiffenbach, Der Wiederkunftsgedanke Jesu, 1873, pp. 31-67, who would refer the discourses of Jesus on His Second Coming to the resurrection. 3 Also the many testimonies to Christ's announcement of His Second Coming agree too well for them to rest on a misunderstanding of the disciples. Doenee.— Cheist. Doct. iv. 2 B 386 ESCHATOLOGY. Schleiermacher rightly saw, Christ's Second Advent forms the real centre of the entire Christian eschatology,1 and we shab recognize its dogmatic importance in reference to the Person, office, and kingdom of Christ, however important it is to take into account the figurative phraseology in the exposition of this fundamental thought. A warning against ascribing a subordinate importance to the Parousia-discourses should have been found in the circumstance, that the eschatology of the 0. T. and the Jewish expectation of the Messiah generaby contain no idea answering to the second Parousia, but regard everything as given and decided at once with the appearance of the Messiah, and that ab pre-Christian conceptions are essentiaby modified by the announcement of a second Parousia of Christ. The 0. T. prophets had spoken of the Day of the Lord, the great judgment-day of God, as the first act of the Messianic age deciding everything. Christ set forth a second Parousia as the first, and the judgment only as the last.2 But the expression Parousia certainly has various meanings. Christ promises that He will be present (irapav) in all events and developments of His earthly Church, and will always do what it needs, which presupposes not merely His continued life and participation in His Church, but also His continuous activity and power, which can and wib stand security for the Church. He therefore thinks of this presence of His (irapovald) as in part invisible, but always as real, — the former, when he says : I am present in the midst of them;8 or : I am with you always to the end of the world ; or when He promises: If any man love me, I will love him and manifest myself unto him, and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him ; 4 or when He says of faith in general, that it receives Him.6 The entire doctrine of His Word and the Means of Grace is only understood in its real divine-human import, when these means 1 Chr. Glaube, ii. 483, § 150. 3. 2 Cf. my Hist. ofDoctr. of Person of Christ. All that is known to the pre- Ghristian Jewish Apocalyptics also is, that on His appearance the Messiah will at once found a kingdom of material prosperity. A double Parousia it knows not ; later seeming indications of the ideal vanish as a deception. 3 Matt, xviii. 20, xxviii. 20. * John xiv. 18, 21, 23, 28 ; also xiv. 3 may be applied here? 5 John vi. 50-58. CHRIST'S SECOND ADVENT. 387 of grace are regarded as the outward media, through which in virtue of His heavenly, regal office, He actively continues His presence with bebevers. But He also promised His visible Second Advent. Here come in His reappearances after His resurrection, which as a fulfilment of His prediction 1 on one hand seal the certainty of His enduring invisible communion with them, and on the other were to be a real foretype of His visible, universaby cognizable Second Advent at the judgment and consummation of the world. We have to bnger on this latter return. His Parousia in the course of history has the signifi cance of a preparation in reference thereto. Ab the apostles and ancient Christendom maintain this with ab the energy of love and hope as their dearest faith. Their longing antici pated His Second Coming earber than the event showed.2 It is in keeping with this fact, that so little is found in the N. T. respecting the state of individuals between death and the resurrection. But more intimations are given respecting the phases of development through which the kingdom of Christ on earth has to run in conformity with Christ's own lot. These phases are so viewed that Christ's Second Coming is not superseded by them, but appears stib more necessary. Nor ought the Mibennium, according to the meaning of the Revelation of John, to be conceived as forestabing Christ's coming again to judgment.3 Else there would arise a collision with the general type of N T. teaching. But the Bibbcal doctrine of the antichristian powers is of importance for apprehending the entire history of the kingdom of the future. The N. T. does not countenance a theory which assumes merely a quiet, steadily growing interpenetration or subjuga tion of the whole world by Christianity in the course of history. This is the optimistic view, which is unprepared for eclipses of the sun in the firmament of the Church. The N. T. foretebs catastrophes to the life of the Church, so that in this respect also it is a copy of the bfe of Christ ; and indeed catastrophes arise not merely through persecutions on the part of Heathen and Jews in its beginning, but also out 1 John xvi. 16 ff. 2 Heb. x. 37 ; 2 Pet. iii. 9, 10 ; Jas. v. 8, 9 ; 1 Thess. iv. 15 f. ; 2 Thess. ii. 7f. ; 1 Johnii.'l8. 3 Cf. Briggs, ut supra. This is clear from what follows first after chap. xx. 388 ESCHATOLOGY. of itself, i.e. from its outward circle, on the ground of intima tions of Christ;1 according to John and Paul,2 when the Christianizing of the nations has advanced, false prophets and pseudo-Messiahs will arise, desiring to enter into confederacy with Satan and to some extent with the world-power against Christians, and to seduce to denial of Christ. These are the powers of Antichrist, conceived indeed as operating and im pelling' in the apostles' days and discerned by bebevers,8 but tending towards more concentrated manifestation, and destined in the end to reach stib greater influence. Besides Satan, mention is made here of the iropvTj (whore)4 and of false prophets* The " beast " of the Revelation is the world-power hostbe to God.6 The antichristian power is a union of the falsification of the truth and divine worship with the hostbe world-power, the result of which is a pseudo-Messiahship. Paul seems to regard the Man of Sin as an incarnation of the wicked antichristian power, and as an individual.7 In Paul he is cabed the " adversary " (avriKeiuevo*;), who raises himself against everything that is called God and divine worship. Self-deification and false worship are connected with his denial of God and blasphemy.8 He is stbl hindered in his coming forth by the Kare^mv (State and law). He himself is cabed the Lawless (avo/j,ov, almvtot is often used, which signifies in the nature of the case eternal duration in reference to the blessedness or eternal life of bebevers, but by no means denotes everywhere an endless period, for an end of the aeons is spoken of. iEons and aeons of aeons also often denote the world-period.1 Were this meaning to be assumed in reference to the punishments, the result would be indeed a duration of immeasurable length, but not an eternity of duration, — a view which may also be favoured by the passage which makes the punishment endure untb the last farthing is paid2 To this add several passages which commend the univer- sabty of grace and its ad-comprehensive power.8 Paul looks on to a time when everything shad be subject to the Son, that God may be ad -in ab.4 According to him, Christ reconcdes everything to Himself, whether on earth or in heaven. He makes all things to be gathered together in Christ, both what is in heaven and on earth.5 And although, according to the chief passage respecting the sin against the Holy Ghost, there is no forgiveness for it,6 this implies, it is true, the necessity of punishment for those gubty of the sin, but does not preclude deliverance being mediated by the punishment and its just execution.7 3. On the ground of the second series of statements, the doctrine of universal restoration (airo/caTcuTTaa-v! nrdvrav) has again and again found its friends, from Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, John Scotus Erigena, down to Petersen (about 1 Heb. ix. 26. Cf. Burnet, ut supra, p. 318 ff. Circumcision is to be an eternal usage, Gen. xvii. 13 ; Canaan an eternal possession of Israel, Gen. xiii. 15, xlviii. 4. The Mosaic laws in reference to the Passover, and many commands of a transient nature, are called an ordinance for eternity (DMjJ$>) e-9- Ex- *&• 14» xxvii- 21> x^7"1- is '> Lev> x- 15> xvi- 3* ' Num' xviii 11. The temple at Jerusalem is to be God's dwelling for ever, 2 Chron. vi. 2. Just so the kingdom of David is to be for ever, 2 Sam. vii. 13. A slave, who spontaneously binds himself by a symbolical act to his lord, is said, according to Ex. xxi. 6, to serve him for ever. That a)m corresponds to Qpi# is shown by the Septuagint and the TS.T. 2 Matt. v. 26. Punitive sufferings may be requisite to deliverance. 8 Rom. v. 18, xi 26, 32 ; Eph. i. 10 ; Col. i 16, 20. 4 1 Cor. xv. 25-28. 5 Col. i. 20 ; Eph. i. 10. Cf. John x. 16. 6 Matt, xii, 31 ff. » Matt. v. 26. 420 ESCHATOLOGY. 1700), Michael Hahn, Oetinger, also according to some hints Bengel, but especiaby Schleiermacher ; whereas others,1 instead of a universal conversion, although by a process of long-con tinuing punishments, suppose the annihilation of the wicked, either through punishment, or by assuming that only the regenerate are immortal. Certainly in the above passages Paul presupposes that no hostile power, therefore neither death nor sin, wbl maintain itseK against Christ. But ab that is certainly affirmed is the impotence of evb, and even tbe saying that God wib be ab in all, which must not be understood pantheisticaby, does not necessarby assert uni versal salvation and glorification, but may mean that God wbl be the sole governing power in all according to their cha racter, either as the Just One in opposition to the wicked who shab have lost their freedom, or as the Gracious One. In any case, they can ab merely serve the kingdom of God, not assert a power against it. On the other hand, it must be conceded, there is no dogmatic interest demanding that these are of a certainty eternaby damned and lost ; for this would imply, not merely that the possibibty of eternal sin is in cluded in God's ethical idea of the world, but, what is alto gether objectionable, that a real eternal Duabsm pertains to the Christian goal of the world. But the friends of Apoka- tastasis are not satisfied with this, but maintain the dogmatic necessity of theb view. 4. Criticism of the Dogmatic Reasons for a Restora tion of all Things. — In the first place, the sameness of man's sin and need of redemption may be abeged in favour of this doctrine. " If ab men by nature are involved ba essentiaby the same sinfulness, from which only redemption can deliver, if it were not overcome in alL the cause would be in the fact, that Christian grace did not operate with equal effect in ab. But since it is meant to apply equaby to ab, so opposite an effect could not have its reason in God ; and consequently, if ab are not redeemed, sin could not be by nature an equal power in ab, but to God would be conquerable in some, un conquerable in others, which is against the hypothesis." But this reason loses its force, if the final destiny is made, as by us, dependent not on natural sinfulness, but on the use of 1 See pp. 379, 415. THE LAST JUDGMENT. 421 the freedom for decision for or against Christ restored in alL With the universal outward and inward call is given the universal possibibty of faith; but the estabbshing of the. impossibility of unbebef by God's power would directly contradict the ethical character of the world-goal. " The divine justice" it may be further said, " is not satisfied by a number of human beings suffering eternal punishment involuntardy. Its fuU triumph is only secured, when the guilty consciousness of the sinner himself is compebed to acknowledge the justice of the punishment, which itself paves the way for a turning to the truth and to amendment." Nevertheless justice is not made more just • by the fact of its acknowledgment, and non-acknowledgment ought not to delay its mamfestation, but makes it ab the more necessary. We have no right to say that punishment is only just when it is a means of amendment. Justice, taken alone, does not need the salvation or amendment of ab.1 Universal salvation might rather be derived from the divine love. But divine love maintains its sacred, inviolable character through the fact of its being guarded by justice against abuse. Love must not throw itself away. The despisers of the love of Christ, who desecrate His sacrifice, cannot with such conduct be objects of the divine love. This love cannot force itself on any one, and undervalue its own work. Could the despisers of Christ's love be well-pleasing to God, love would declare its own work superfluous. For those who have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost (and only such, as must be conceded, can be objects of eternal damnation), there can be no love in God, because and in so far as they have identified themselves indissolubly with evil But are not the redeeming power and the victory of Christ incomplete, K enemies exist for ever who are only outwardly, not also inwardly, vanquished, i.e. who are merely impotent, but stbl evb in disposition ? " Christ's redemptive purpose indisputably embraces ab, therefore His wish would be un- fulfibed, unless ab became partakers of salvation." Christ's intercession cannot imply that redemption is imparted to those who are unwibing to accept it by personal free de cision. The gospel can only vanquish by spiritual means. If 1 Vol. iii. § 88, p. 125. 422 ESCHATOLOGY. the free wbl decides to reject the gospel, Christ cannot hinder it, or desire to supersede the spiritual process by mere power.1 But if, starting from the idea of the Church, we say : " None can be wanting to it in the consummation, who belong to its idea; but according to the N. T. everything is created for Christ, therefore ab belong to the divine idea of the Church, and thus a universal apokatastasis is required from its stand point; or, supposing that any one had never belonged to the idea of the Church, he would be thought by God as not belonging to our class of beings, but to another, and this would be Manichaean," the answer thereto is contained in what precedes. It has been shown there that the idea of the Church and kingdom of God wbl not remain unreabzed ; God's unexhausted, undiminished creative power and, wisdom wbl know how to provide for this end in the progress of generations, either by means of new individuals, or by the talent of the unfaithful for the work being given to the faithful. Power, therefore, is not conferred on sin to frustrate the thought of the consummation of the kingdom. That unbebevers are not naturaby of a different nature from be bevers, that they did not belong originally to another class of beings having no reference to Christ, is evident from the fact that definitive unbebef is only possible in their case ' through an abuse of freedom of which they need not have been gubty. The gospel had a positive relation to them also, but by their abuse of freedom they reduced theb rela tion to it to a negative one. Bebevers also are not saved by a particular predestination, but they did not abuse the freedom which the others also had ; not that this is a merit to them, but it furnished to grace the possibdity of influence and self-communication.2 1 It is more difficult to refute the objection, how it consists with the love of the God who eternally foresees also free actions to create these, of whom He knows beforehand that they are created for eternal damnation. But whether the divine foreknowledge should be so viewed that it could become a motive for non-creation, is more than questionable. The foreknowledge of definitive unbelief presupposes the creation of those who become unbelieving. ' Cf. voL ii. p. 61, and M'Cabe, The Foreknowledge of God, 1878. But the question remains : Is conservation for eternal torment conceivable ? 2 §151, p. 410. THE LAST JUDGMENT. 423 Observation. — But of course it must be conceded that the human race is a genus of beings, the members of which are able through their freedom to separate into antitheses of absolute significance, deeper than any antithesis possible among the different genera of beings in nature. But such depth of separation is only possible on the basis of freedom and original equabty. Freedom is the power to sunder spirits into the absolute antithesis of chbdren of light and chbdren of darkness, and to convert the latter into a class of beings absolutely opposed indeed to the other. But God did not create men on a duabstic basis. But do not the certitude and power of Baptism suffer, unless ab are saved ? In Baptism, indeed, God assigns to man election and His faithful covenant, which does not apply merely to the moment. If, then, a baptized one is lost, the certainty of the election testified by Baptism is gone. — But, certain as it is that election to the offer of grace by outward and inward calling is universal and absolute, stbl the election to bfe embraces only bebevers and the regenerate, and withal has regard to the use of freedom. Most of ab it may seem estabbshed, that the happiness of believers must necessarily be disturbed by the misery of the one class, especiaby since the former have the consciousness of not being better or more worthy, but on the contrary of even having contributed to the sin of others by joint respon sibility. Thus a sting seems necessarby left in the happi ness of the good, unless all are saved. In reply to this, it might indeed be said : If the damnation of some is God's holy and righteous wib, a resignation is fitting, in which no other wish is felt than one in harmony with God's wib, whose love is not surpassed forsooth by our loving sympathy. But this answer is insufficient, because mere resignation would not comport with the perfecting of personality. On the other hand, in respect to the sting lying in the consciousness of joint-authorship of sin, it must be considered that the sin which leads to damnation can never be the sin resulting from innate sinfulness alone, or to speak generally from the influence of the race, the common spbit, example or tempta tion by error. Rather the sin rendering the individual absolutely bad can only be the personal gubt of rejecting Christ, in which, of course, rejection of good itself is included, and therefore acquiescence in all other possible sin. And when further it is remembered, that only blasphemy against the Holy Ghost can be the final ground of damnation, and therefore the sin that tramples under foot the blood of the new covenant and counts it unholy, sympathy with such 424 ESCHATOLOGY. sinners must be essentiaby different from natural sympathy with members of the race ; for they of course belong to an absolutely different class of beings, for whom intercession can no longer be made, because it is ethicaby as web as logicaby impossible to desire forgiveness for those who despise it. Certainly provision must be made somehow against a Duabsm being perpetuated for ever by powers hostbe to God, instead of the consummation of our sphere of creation. 5. Clear as is the debverance given by the N. T. on the principle that unbelief damns, as little clear is the answer it gives in reference to the question as to the persons who are judged and treated in accordance with that principle. That there are damned beings, preponderant exegetical reasons prove (but we have therewith no dogmatic proposition, he- cause the latter must also be derived from the principle of faith) ; nor have we been able to find the dogmatic reasons for Apokatastasis decisive. Hence the latter also cannot be dogmatically taught. The objective reason, why no categorical affirmation can be made on dogmatic grounds, lies in human freedom. It does not admit the assertion of a universal process leading necessarily to salvation, because such process is and remains conditioned by non-rejection and free accept ance. But such ' human freedom, so ldng as it lasts, of course excludes also a categorical dogmatic affirmation, that there certainly are damned beings ; for so long as freedom of any kind exists, so long the possibibty of conversion is not absolutely excluded, be it even through judgment and damna tion to deeper and longer misery. But wherever this possi bibty issued in reabty, there self-evidently the damnation could no longer continue. The necessary, eternal duration of the rejection and damnation of the one class could only be maintained with fub precision, provided also the complete loss of freedom for conversion — absolute hardening — was taught, as is usually done by the advocates of eternal damna tion, whereupon the_ new question arises, whether such are stib men, and not rather persons that have been men, but have reaby degenerated into a lower class of beings. 6. But a third theory seems now to meet with growing THE LAST JUDGMENT. 425 assent in opposition both to the Church-doctrine and espe ciaby to the doctrine of Apokatastasis, the hypothesis of the annihbation of the wicked, which bkewise thinks itself able to make categorical assertions respecting the question of persons. We therefore dweb awhile upon it. If regard for freedom does not permit the affirmation of the doctrine, that a harmonious conclusion of history and universal restoration are secured by means of conversion being certainly universal without exception, — for if the ethical process turned into a physical one, the result attained would only he of ethical value in appearance, — this har monious conclusion might seem to be better secured by the supposition, that, because the power of immortal life resides only in Christ and bving communion with Him, those who obstinately and definitively withdraw from such communion perish and are annihbated. This theory may even pay regard to human freedom and the divme justice by leaving room for a punishment of the wicked, and making the very annihbation itseK to be effected by the consuming divine penalties, which begin from the final judgment.1 In favour of the supposition of the final annihbation of the wicked, it is abeged2 that numerous expressions are used in reference to those falling under sentence of condemnation which suggest annihbation.3 The word " death " indeed has, it is said, various meanings, but it always denotes the dissolution of a bving power. " Thus physical death so called," it is said, " is a dissolution of the bving unity, which embraces the body and the soul. Further, the sinful state of the soul is called a spbitual death, because through it the bond between the soul and God is dissolved When, then, a ' second death ' is spoken of, this may signify merely the dissolving of the soul itseK into 1 The latter is taught by the Socinians and Rothe, whereas according to Weisse (Stud. u. Krit. 1835 : Ueber die philos. Bedeutung der chr. Eschatologie, Philos. Dogmatik, § 965) annihilation enters as matter of course for all, who are not rendered immortal by regeneration. White, on the other hand, makes indeed a retributive punishment and pain fall on the godless before their annihiiation, whileseeming^ta'regard this as the act of God Himself, p. 499 ff. 2 E.g. by White/pT359ff. 3 E.g. &xu\ua, ixtipt, Matt. vii. 13 ; Rom. ix. 22 ; 1 Thess. v. 3 ; 2 Thess. i. 9 ; 1 Tim. vi. 9 : &9t\*.iwi, a-xiwattai, Matt. x. 28 ; Luke xvii. 33 ; John iii. 16, xii. 25 ; 1 Cor. i. 18. 426 ESCHATOLOGY. nothing.1 This view may WeU be reconcbed with the Scrip ture passages, which teach an eternal duration of heb-punish- ments, if alwvtos can denote an immeasurable, indefinitely long duration of punishment." — " Although," it is continued, " the notion may less commend itself, that Gbd Himself directly destroys the souls of the ungodly, we may stbl re member that an ohtological significance belongs also to the ethical, whence it would follow, that just as the appropriation of the Holy Spirit and the divine life has a significance in relation to the enhancement and invigoration of the entire human bfe, so, conversely, estrangement from God separates from the source of bfe, and the growing dominion of sin is by no means a matter of indifference to the stabibty of the spiritual faculties. Sin, moreover, has ontological significance, namely of a negative kind. This also seems to be held by ab the Church teachers, who, in order to maintain the eternity of heb-punishments, and to cut off the continuance of a possibbity of conversion, assert the complete loss of freedom in the case of the lost to be a natural consequence and punishment of sin, which again would involve, in vbtue of the connection between volition and knowledge, a complete darkening of the spirit, an extinction of all remnant of higher bght and knowledge of God. But again, however it may be open to dispute whether a being so disorganized, in whom that which makes man man — reason and freedom — is ex tinguished, ought to be cabed a man, so much seems clear, that the Church teachers mentioned acquiesce as to the chief matter in the annihbation of the ungodly. The latter are then to be viewed essentially in the light of people who have become insane, perhaps raging in impotent fury for ever, which would be a sort of annihilation of theb human character." It cannot in fact be denied that both views — that of those Church teachers, who make freedom and reason, and especially consciousness of God, to be extinguished for ever in the damned, and that of the advocates of the annbibation of the ungodly — approach very near to each other, save that the latter have in their favour, that they at least do away with the crying dissonance that would he left for the unity of the world, if alongside the world of the perfected and saved, lCf. Nitzsch, p. 413 ff. THE LAST JUDGMENT. 427 that other world of insanity and blind enmity to God con tinued eternaby. But it does not fobow from this, that we can set up the annihilation of the wicked as a dogmatic pro position, but only that, if we hold fast to the immortality of the wicked, the entbe extinction of freedom and reason as the effect of sin must not be supposed. The doctrine of the annihbation of the ungodly on its part is likewise mere hypothesis, for to assert at present dogmaticaby that there are certainly those doomed to annihdation would be incom patible with freedom. But exegeticaby this hypothesis has against it, that Holy Scripture treats as possible a debverance from imprisonment, although through heavy punishment.1 Again, it tebs against it, that, whereas Holy Scripture teaches differences of degree in gudt and punishment even after the judgment, and therefore not an infinite gubt in ab whom the judgment condemns, this hypothesis,, on the contrary, assumes one and the same highest degree of punishment for all sinners, namely annihbation (so far, namely, as the fact is left out of sight, that annihbation is also an end of ab punishment).2 Although, further, this hypothesis seems ex ceedingly favourable to the unity and harmonious consumma tion of the world, it stbl includes the disturbing element, that such glorious capacities of a godbke kind, having an essential relation to infinite excebence, and thus themselves having a share, although small, in the infinite, are supposed to perish, and be annihbated after the fashion of mere finite natural faculties.8 Accordingly, this hypothesis also cannot lay claim to unreserved acknowledgment and dogmatic authority, and we must be content with saying, that the ultimate fate of individuals remains veded in mystery, as web as whether ab wbl attain the blessed goal or not. Enough that we have the certainty of eternal bfe and of the perfecting of God's kingdom, however this may be brought 1 Matt. v. 26. (Cf. xii. 31 f., since punishment is not forgiveness.) 2 With annihilation, indeed, all punishment is at an end. But if the ungodly are not annihilated by God, but consumed by the punishments, such a view does not exhibit a just distribution of the degrees of punishment; for the sin of the worst transgressors must do its consuming work most rapidly, and thus the punishment for them would be most quickly ended, whereas it would continue so much the longer, the less the power of evil in the sinner. 3 Evil is never the substance of the soul ; this remains metaphysically good. 428 ESCHATOLOGY. about. But although knowledge on many matters in them selves ' worthy to be known is denied to us as regards Eschatology generaby, and especially as regards the present point, — knowledge which is impossible to us because of human freedom, — it yet remains for us to lay down the fobowing dogmatic propositions : — (1.) There is a judgment, which maintains the divine justice, and also, by excluding everything hostde, subserves the consummation of the kingdom of God. (2.) There is no predestination to damnation; only con tinued impenitence can be the cause of that ; hence no one who has or can have the wbl to he converted is damned for ever. (3.) The process of grace can never fab into the physical sphere. Therefore, rejection of grace remains possible, and every hope of Apokatastasis that passes into the physical sphere is to be rejected, as web as the hope of universal salvation apart from Christ. (4.) There may be those eternaUy damned, so far as the abuse of freedom continues eternaby ; but without the possi bility of the restoration of freedom, man has passed into another class of beings, and — regarded from the standpoint of the idea of man — is a mere ruin. (5.) Blessedness can only exist where hobness exists. As there is no condemned penitence,1 so there is no unholy blessedness. § 155. — The Consummation of the World and Eternal There is an eternal blessedness through the transfiguring consummation of Nature, of Individuals, and of the Kingdom of God 1. The N. T. foretells, like the Old,2 a Consummation (avvreXeia? airo/cardo-raoi,?*), when Christ shab have accom- 1 Nitzsch : the thought of an eternal damnation and punishment is necessary, inasmuch as there can be no enforced holiness of a personal being, and no saved nnholiness in eternity, System, ed. 6, § 219, p. 411. 2 Isa. lxvi. 3 Matt. xiii. 39, 40, 49, xxiv. 3, xxviii. 20. J Acts iii 21 ; 1 Cor. xv. 24-28 ; Rev. xxi. 1. ' FINAL CONSUMMATION. 429 plished His mediatorial work and led ab God's children to the Father, that God may be ab in all, i.e. that His glory may be revealed, and the authority of His will universal, — not merely the wbl of His love, but also, of His power and justice. As to details, the Consummation of Nature, of Individuals, and of the Kingdom of God is to be considered. 2. The Consummation of the natural world presupposes an end1 of the present world-period and order, which, how ever, must not be conceived as an annihbation of the world, although it is described as a conflagration of the world.2 Matter is not evb. Thus the destruction can only refer to the form of the world.8 The conflagration may precede as a means for transfiguring the world into heightened beauty, into a new heaven and new earth.4 The material of the world may be ennobled thereby. This transfiguring of nature includes not merely the erasing of ab traces of sin in the form and material of the world, but also so intimate a union of nature with spbit, that no place wbl any longer exist for decay.5 Without loss of substantiality, matter wbl have exchanged its darkness, hardness, heaviness, immobility, and impenetrableness for clearness, radiance, elasticity, and transparency.6 Although with the consummation of the earthly creation its task wbl be discharged, from this con summated cbcle of creation as a basis, an altogether new stadium may again begin, an advance to new creations with the co-operation of perfected humanity, in which God will have His being, and through which He wbl continue His work 3. As concerns the Consummation of Individuals, the promise is that the righteous shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of the Father.7 As our earthly body bore the image of the earthly Adam, so our pneumatic spiritual body shab 1 1 John ii 17. * 2 Pet. iii. 7-10. 3 1 Cor. vii. 31. See p. 382. 4 Rev. xxi. 1 ; Ps. cii. 26 ; Isa. lxvi. B According to Rothe's Theol. Ethik, liability to decay is only possible through the dissolution of the ideal and real through the expiring of the former. « Rothe, Ethik, ed. 2, ii. 481 ff. Schoberlein, Jahrb.f. d. Theol. 1861, vi. 1 ; Ueber das Wesen der geistigen Natur und LeibUchkeit. Hamberger, Die himmlische LeibUchkeit, ibid. 1862, 1. Lange, ut supra. ? Matt. xiii. 43. 430 ESCHATOLOGY. bear Christ's image.1 We shab stand in a state of unfettered vitabty. The somatic-psychical organism will be the absolutely adequate means for the action of the spirit, all mortality and passivity of the body wib have vanished. Space and time, although bfe wib stbl run in these forms, wbl no longer form restrictive bmits. The perfected, through the eternal bfe in them, have, bke God, a fount of bfe in themselves.2 " Union with all world-spheres, and especiaby the persons in them, stands open to the perfected, and therefore fellowship with them. From theb inner nature a bght wib stream forth, forming an atmosphere around them, and binding together the perfected." When we are entbely sanctified in body, soul, and spirit, the earthly distinction of sex also wib exist no longer,8 nor the earthly distinction of ages, each of which has its imperfection; rather the power of eternal bfe in cludes both eternal youth and the vigour of maturity. The new spiritual body also is raised into the fulness of spiritual energy. It wbl share in superiority to space, and be able to emulate the fleetness of thought. Since it wbl no longer form an independent centre of bfe outside the spbit and its sphere of energy, but the spbit wib have become the sole, ab-ruling centre of personabty, with the passivity and mor tality of the body ab babbity of the spirit to be tempted by it has disappeared. As relates to the spiritual side, it wbl be remote from the possibibty of sin, not through loss of freedom, but through the indestructible energy of love spring ing from union with God, from the presence of God and Christ, and from habitual debght in and through them. Consequently the consummated spirit wib, in conformity with God and Christ, possess true freedom in the fact that it can no longer become unfree. On the side of knowledge and vobtion, the soul will enjoy blessed contentment. Then wbl Christ keep the supper anew with us, and the highest solemnities of the present are but a weak foretaste of the powers of the world to come.4 Then fragmentariness in knowledge wib cease, for we shall see face to face.5 To those who love Him, God wdl give what no eye has seen or 1 1 Cor. xv. 49. Cf. 1 John iii. 2 ; Phil, iii 21 ; 2 Cor. iii. 18. 2 John iv. 14. 3 1 Thess. v. 23 ; Luke xx. 34-36. * Heb. vi. 4, 5. 5 1 Cor. xiii. 10-12 ; 1 John iii. 2 ; John xvii. 24 ; Rev. xxii. 4. FINAL CONSUMMATION. 431 ear heard or heart conceived.1 The pure in heart shall see God,2 i.e. hot merely possess Him by faith, or possess know ledge through inferences from His works, but they shab know Him as He is. They will have the power to love Him perfectly, for, as Baxter says, we shall only then rightly know His loveliness and beauty when " the heavenly faculty of perception is winged, sharpened, the highest clearness of vision." Since the heavenly body has then become a perfect organ of knowledge, God wbl be beheld by the beatified in His cosmical beingyand the world wib be beheld as fibed with God, and they will be grasped in theb immediate presence. The individual wbl be known in the light of great intuitions of the whole, and in accordance with the mutual connection between it and the whole. So far as the universe is in eternal progression, and new circles of creation are ever arising, knowledge is never concluded and yet. never a frag ment; but it can survey the whole existing at the time, and the new treasures of divine wisdom and love ever pouring forth therein. But this whole itself is like a circle extending itself farther and farther, yet always a whole, a harmonious organism. The beatified also stand to each other in the relation of mutual understanding. Not merely will there be a reunion and mutual recognition,3 but we shall behold (in which even a Socrates rejoiced) all the great spirits in the history of humanity, a Paul, John, the Pro phets, and have the noblest enjoyment in infinitely diversified febowship and love. But the centre of the blessed enjoy ment wbl be God HimseK and Christ. The highest activity of the will wbl be in perfected worship,4 consisting in adora tion, thanks, and praise, and also in joyous obedience which makes itself in godlike love an organ for God's continuous activity. This suggests the relation of blessedness to rest and enjoyment on one hand, and to action on the other. The poetic figures, which depict the enjoyment of the heavenly harmony, are especiaby borrowed from the sphere of art. Art — the beautiful — receives here at last its special place, for the nature of art is to delight in visible presentation (Darstell- ung), to achieve the classical and perfect with unfettered play 1 1 Cor. ii. 9. 2 Matt. v. 8. 3 Matt, viii 11, xvii. 3 ; Luke xiii. 28. * Rev. vii. 12, xxii. 3. 432 ESCHATOLOGY. of its powers.1 Every one, morally perfect, wib thus wed the good to the beautiful. It fobows herefrom, that in the rest pictured as the goal, as an eternal Sabbath,2 there wib be no inactivity, and also no unrest in the activity. Labour and effort have faben away, because the organ serves the spirit with absolute wfbingness while godlike work continues.3 There remains nothing to do indeed in reference to personal sin, but for this reason presentative activity stbl remains, nay, even production and the contemplating of what is produced, both with undisturbed sense of blessedness. The talents of indi viduals wib not be lost, nay, wbl be raised to higher potency, and spring from out the fount of eternal bfe without hin drance.4 The aspect of activity in blessedness is emphasized in the figure of the faithful being set over many things, the commission to rale cities and the sitting and judging, i.e. ruling the tribes of Israel.5 Further, the creations of God wbl stbl advance, and since, according to the analogy of the relation of angels to the growth of God's kingdom upon earth, the law prevails that the perfected at the time forms the fixed starting-point for further productions, the blessed wib never want an arena of satisfying activity. Since nature has acqubed perfect plasticity for the spirit, it wbl be no longer a mere place or abode of the spirit, but its property, nay, enabled to become the pure mirror of the spirit, and the wilbng adequate organ for its formations and visible presenta tions. If inquiry is made as to the contents of this working and presenting, they are the exhaustless contents of eternal bfe streaming into every individual bfe, the Triune God Himself. The Deity, infinitely rich and glorious, is apprehended and reflected back by each individuality in pecubar fashion, — a thought expressed in the gleaming jewels of many colours in the bubding of the city of God.6 Every individuality, therefore, exhibits the divine in a way no other can do, but is also receptive to each of the rest, and theb presentations. Thus, each one in loving contemplation moulds the others and their presentations in the past and present after or into itself, and the saying becomes truth, " All is yours." 1 Rev. v. 8-14, xxi. 2 Heb. iv. 11 ; Rev. vii. 16, 17, xxi. 4. 3 Schleiermacher, Christ. Glaube, ii. 500. * Luke xix. 13. 5 Luke xix. 13-17 ; Matt. xxv. 15 ff, xix. 28. 6 Rev. xxi. 11-23. FINAL CONSUMMATION. 433 A difference of degree finds place in reference to blessedness and glory, but without envy and disorder ; for every one has " the measure, which he is able to receive," and every one in his own way shares in that which is another's, through the absolute communion in love binding together the perfected. This enhances the sense of life and the force of individuality. But ab — the entire, duly organized circle of countless blessed spirits — grow, without growth implying any defect in blessed ness ; for their ground of life is the unsullied, faultless blessedness, nay, the eternal life, which is God Himself — Triune as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 4. But the city of God in the glorified universe, the temple therein which is the medium of God's presence to ab, is the Church of God. If the universe has become the holy place, it does not lack its Hobest of all. The Church is certainly a narrower idea than that of the kingdom of God ; its consummation alone would not be the consummation of the latter. But the Church is not merely humanity united with God, it embraces also the higher spirit-world having the same Head with it — Christ. Again, the Church is the animating, habowing, glorifying centre of all moral com munities, which embrace also nature in its fashion, and which only found imperfect typical manifestations of their reality or idea upon earth. The valuable, true elements of ab com munities are not merely preserved, but visibly exhibited in harmonious interpenetation without losing their distinctions. Thus is the ttoXottoikiXo'; deov a-o&ia,1 the wealth of God's creative power, revealed through the Church of God and to it, for the Church is the innermost power of consummation to ab spheres through the eternal bfe having its seat in it. The deepest ground thereof lies in the Incarnation or Godman- hood of Christ which took place primarily for it ; for in the Incarnation not merely . are God and man united, but the beginning of the consummation of nature is typically given in His resurrection. The power of His resurrection continues in the consummated new Creation of His Church, and effects also the transfiguring of the world.2 As in this Consumma tion all false interblending of evb and good, of mortal and eternal, must become separated, so also must the mutual 1 Eph. iii. 10. 2 Phil. iii. 10. Doeneb. —Che ist. Doct. iv. 2 E 434 ESCHATOLOGY. externality of spirit and nature, which is the cause of mor tality and babbity to temptation, of fickleness and instability, yield to the powers proceeding from the Risen One, in whom spirit and nature are absolutely blended. Thus Paul repre sents the matter.1 As a unity the Church is called the Bride "of Christ,2 but it is a unity in variety and multiplicity ; it is the city of God, the new Jerusalem.3 God Himself is its light and sun and everlasting day ; but the divine bght is also reflected back in varied forms from the web-ordered, firm, and glorious structure of the city. The multitude of the beatified, adoring, perfected righteous, is also united by the Holy Spirit with the Bridegroom,4 as well as united with each other by love and mutual helpfulness. After the con flicts and tribulations, especially of the last age before Christ's Second Advent, wib come the marriage-feast of the Lamb ; the Bridegroom will bring home the Bride at the new Supper,5 at that blessed and indissoluble union of the members with their Head, by which the dearest and holiest relations of earthly communions all attain their reality. 1 Rom. viii. 11-19 ; Col. i. 18 ff. ; Eph. i. 10. 2 Rev. xxii. 17. Cf. Matt. ix. 15, xxv. 1 ; Luke v. 34 ; Mark ii. 19 ; Eph. v. 24-32. 3 Heb. xii. 22 ; Rev. iii. 12, xxi. 2, 10. * Rev. xxii. 17 ; Eph. iv. 13, 16. 5 Rev. xix. 7, 9 ; Matt. xxii. 2 ff. INDEX TO THE FOUR VOLUMES. Abelaed, i. 392, ii. 343, iv. 19, 71. Absolute, primary possibility of thought, etc., i. 228, 442 ; the ground of our thinking the, 230 ; universal ground of possibility, 232, 441, ii. 108. Absolute religion, ii. 215, 221, 232, 234. Absoluteness of God, i. 190, 204, 209, 283 ; relation to personality, 339, 341, 438, 442, ii. 36, 238, 252. Absolution, iv. 326, 336, 338. Acosmism, i 237 f., 332, 340 f., ii. 45 ; ethical, 73, 248, 253. Activity of the spirit in cognition, i. 62 ; of God in knowledge, 326 f., cf. 464, ii. 112, 116, 121, 136 ; in inspiration, 185, 187 f., 201. Actus eliciti, iv. 169, cf. 290. Actus forensis, iv. 210, 214, 218, 222, 224, 228, 233, cf. 196, 201 f., 208. Adam, ii. 43, 78, 213, 331, 339, 345, 350, 354. Adoptianism, iii. 213, 221. Advent, second, iv. 142, 159, 311, 373, 383 ff., 399. Aepin, iv. 128. Alcuin, iii. 221. Althaus, iv. 402. Ambrosius, ii. 340, iv. 8, 13. Anabaptists, iii. 267, iv. 204, 267, 275, 280, 356, 391, 393, 398. Anamartesia of Christ, iii. 343, 351, 360, 366. Angels, ii. 196, 200, iii. 325. Anger of God, iii. 121, 127, 128, iv. 10, 30, 43, 73, 80, 84, 99, 104, 114, 116, 122, 166, 209, 212, 230. Anselm, ii. 339, iv. 9, 14, 21, 34, 57, 76, 103, 109. Anthropocentric Christology, iii. 258, 308, 311, 313, 318, 326. Anthropomorphism, i. 198, 461, ii. 248. Antichrist, iv. 374, 383, 388, 390, 392, 397 f. Antinomianism, i. 418, 446, iii. 389, iv. 26, 77, 207, 216, 233. 435 Antiocheians, iv. 168, 315. Apokatastasis, iv. 173, 419, 428. Apollinaris, i. 404, iii. 206, 211, 215, 219, 264, 267, 308, 313. Apologetics, i. 177 f., 338. A priori, i. 63, 309, 311 ; no a- priori given ideas, 67 ; a priori right, 288. Aquinas, Th., i. 196, 231, 330, 382, 430, ii. 27, 99, 153, 178, 339, iii. 29, 221, iv. 18, 293. Aristotle, i. 69, 289, 385, 449, iii. 368, iv. 73, 155. Arius, Arians, i. 211, 258, 350, 367, 371, 421. Arminians, i. 398, 411, 430, ii. 352, iii. 52, iv. 38, 82, 206. Arnobius, i. 207, 241, iv. 379. Ascension of Christ, iv. 136, 138. Aseity, i. 203, 205, 256, 258, 398, 409;. trinitarian, 411, 420, 426, 442, 444,.. 452, 458, ii. 363. Athanasius, i. 258, 374, 382, 452, ii.. 336, 340, iii. 209, 214, 220, iv. 8,. 10, 168. Atheism, i. 39, 89, 122 f., ii. 107, 119. Atonement, i. 140 f., 146, 462, ii. 202, 219, 261, 264, iii. 70, 121, 385; and law, 403 ; and justification, iv. 193,. 202, 222, 377 ; possible theories of,. 6, 75, 119 ; God's purpose of, 81,. 86, 98, 116, 150, 183, 218, cf. 280r 291 ; and Baptism, 286, 291. Attributa absoluta, etc., i. 204. Attributes of God, i. 187, 192; nature, 194 ; divisions, 192, 203 ; objective or subjective, 197 ; derivation, 202, 324, 453 f. ; and Trinity, 361 f., 380, 393, 412, 447, 453; share of the world in, ii. 27, 252, 410. Augustine, i. 195, 241, 246, 270, 330, 381, 387, 391 f., 452, ii. 29, 42, 94, 152, 156, 178, 337, 340, iii. 30, 45, 298, iv. 8, 10, 24, 76, 168 f., 198, 271, 314, 348, 390, 406. Authority of the community, i. 77 ; ecclesiastical, 80, 429 ; proof of, 85 ; of Scripture, 94; external, 108, 111, 436 INDEX. 113 ; scepticism and, 129 ; freedom and, 418, 428 f., ii. 127, 139, 185, 225, 230, 262, iv. 91, 251, 254, 256, 261, 304. Baadee, Fr., i 188, 198. Bacon, i. 429. Baier, ii. 351, iv. 203, 224, 352. Baldwin, iii. 64. Baltzer, ii. 102, iv. 352. Baptism, of Jesus, iii. 375, 377 ; of John, 412, iv. 246, 277, 290, 292 ; sins before, 25 ; Christian, 153, 173, 203, 238, 244, 272, 276, 285; necessity of, 293 ; stages in, 310 ; and Lord's Supper, 322, 324, 333 ; and Church, 366, 399 ; trustworthiness of, 423. Baptist doctrine, iv. 283, 297. Bartels, iii. 150, 175- Barth, iii. 150, 175. Basil, i. 383, 452. Basilides, i. 365. Baudissin, iii. 405. Baumgarten, i. 196, 201. Baumgarten-Crusius, iv. 15. Baur, ii. 209, 219, iii. 30, 175, 188, iv. 49, 256. "Bautin, i. 87. Baxter, iv. 431. Bayle, i. 282. Beauty, i. 264, 267, 271, 275, 339, 422, 458 ; perfected by the ethical, 463, cf. 284, 308, ii. 66, 169, 200, 243 ; in God, 360 ; and evil, 365, iii. 30 ; of Christ, 351 ; in the con summation, iv. 431. Beck, i 41, 164, 168, 263, ii 192, 195, iii. 52, 383. Being, is God? i 248, cf. 189, 250, 253 ; is God all ? 440 ; God thinks His, 324, 422, 439 ; ethical, 312, 316, 339 f., 427, 431 ; category of, ii. 62, 118, 201. 3ekker, iii. 93. Bellarmine, ii. 345, iii. 18, iv. 211, 226. Benecke, iii. 47. Bengel, ii. 351, iv. 389. Bennet, iv. 307. Berkeley, i. 63. Beryll, iii. 205, 209, 257. Besser, iii. 266. Beyschlag, i. 404, iii. 176, 192, 207, 255, 258 ff., 289, iv. 342. Beza, iii. 33. Biblical theology, i. 23, 170, ii. 196. Biedermann, i. 41, 200, 225, ii. 144, 368, iii. 95, 270, 276, iv. 49, 75. Billroth, i. 188, 405. Binder, iii. 92. Birt, iv. 277. Blasche, iii. 30. Blessedness, of God, i. 448, 463 f., ii. 11 ; of men, iii. 115, 120, 200, 202 ; of Christ, iii. 330, 377, iv. 125, 131, 138 ; of believers, ii. 372, iv. 230, 234, 238, 378, 382, 391, 399, 423, 428, 431. Boehme, i. 261. Boethius, i 381. Bonnet, ii. 155. Brahminism, i. 259, 281, ii. 248, 256. Brentz, ii. 351, iii. 229, 306, 381, iv. 320. Briggs, iv. 385, 387. Brbmel, iii. 266. Braeh, i 204. Budde, i. 395, ii. 153. Buddhism, i 249, ii. 32, 242, 248, 251, 256, 361, iv. 375. Bunsen, iii. 256. Burk, iv. 209, 211, 219. Burnet, iv. 415, 419. Bushnell, iii. 254, 263, iv. 59. feuxtorf, ii. 187. CsisAEiirs, ii. 342. Calixtus, i. 345, ii. 188, iii. 64, iv. 203, 367. CaUing, iv. 183, 189 f., 203, 222, 235, 274 f. Calov, ii. 187, iii. 64, 226, 382, iv. 203, 352. Calvin, i. 262, ii. 187, 355, 396, iii. 33, 37, 79, 112, 239, 381, iv. 21, 170, 192, 283, 317, 321, 326, 342, 345, 349. . Campanella, i. 399. Canon, ii. 230, iv. 247, 253, 263. Canz, i. 100. Capito, iii. 34. Caprice, in faith in authority, i. 112 ; God not, 294 f., 299, 315, 418, 427, 429, 435, 445, 447 ; not reason of the world, ii. 10, 55, 57, 249. Cardan, ii. 156. Carpocrates, iii. 202. Cassian, ii. 342. Catechesis, iv. 302, 304, 341. Catholicism, iv. 25, 140, 148, 198, 206, 230, 232, 270, 275, 281, 284, 290, 292, 315, 326, 332, 336, 348, 364, 396. Causality, i. 209, 242 ; divine, in relation to space, 248 ; objective validity of, 254 ; in relation to God, 256 ; merges in reciprocal action, 258, 421 ; self-origination of God, 267, 421 ; God causality in Athan asius, 375, in Arius, 372, in Schleiermacher, 401 ; not neces sarily temporal, ii. 28 ; God's, in creation, 35 ; the divine originates secondary, 45, 49, 54 ; determined and self-determining, 51 ; law of, INDEX. 437 91, 124 ; secondarv, 154, 161 f., 187, 201, 222 f., iii. 42, 55, iv. 252 ; pro ductive and mediate, 49. Celtic religion, i 282, ii. 253. Cerinthus, iii. 48, 213, 302, 331, 355, 376. Certainty, of faith and laws of certainty, i. 34 ; formal, 60, 62 ; nature of, 67 f. ; immediate, 70 ; religious and scientific, 72, 85, 109, 159, ii. 232, 293 ; Christian, i. 152 ; personal, 115 ; generic, 75, 79, 90 ; extent of, 74 ; of inspiration, 96 f., ii. 121, 137, 193, 200 ; of salvation, iv. 53, 71, 122, 180, 184, 193, 199, 214, 223, 227, 231, 235, 274, 286, 336. Chalcedon creed, iii. 216, 225, 238. Chaldean religion, i. 279, ii. 239. Chalybfeus, i. 262, ii. 92. Chemnitz, iii. 230, 239 f., 335, iv. 203. Chiliasm, iv. 365, 391, 393, 398. Chinese religion, i. 264, 270, ii. 238, 253. Christ, the essential contents of faith, i. 48, 178 ; historic, 115, 146 f., 415, ii. 280-294 ; His image uninventible, 287 f.; centre of Scripture, i 149, and of history of religion, ii. 236, 291 ; a new phenomenon to God, i. 331, 463 ; Christian world-principle, i. 378, 458, ii. 16 f. ; principle of conservation, 46, 57, 64 ; image of God, 78, 85, 87 ; security for im mortality, 88 ; relation to the law, 287, to angels, 96, 99, 101, to miracles, 147, 150, 159, 289; faith in, leads to Trinity, i. 415 ; omni presence of, iv. 140 f. ; personal law, ii. 370 ; excepted from evil, iii. 20, 24, 45, 48 ; the world preserved for, 58, 133, 294 ; Judge, iv. 147, 180, 377, 417 ; necessary, iii. 141 ; ideal and historic, 270 f. ; centre of world, 324, 348 ; head of humanity, 321, iv. 93, 98, 109, 115, 117, 142, 241, 311, 321, 399 ; and the Holy Spirit, 160, 163, 183, 311, 321, 399 ; and His Word, 249 ; and Church, 371 ; relation of eschatology to, 378, 399 ; the all-glorifying Head, 433. Christianity, absoluteness of, iii. 74, 319, iv. 132, 296. Christlieb, iii. 287. Christology, in relation to Trinity, i 363 f., iii. 285, iv. 139; and atone ment, iii. 48, iv. 5, 21, 26, 32, 75 ; and Lord's Supper, 321. Chrysippus, ii. 131. Chrysostom, ii. 178, 187, iv. 168, 315. Church discipline, iv. 334, 340, 342, 348, 350, 352, 363, 368. Church government, iv. 334, 342, 344. Church, preaching, i. 80, 144 ; edu cating, 81 ; iu fallibility of, 88 ; authority, 112, 429, ii. 103, 128, iii. 396, iv. 89, 136, 145, 149 f., 154ffi, 162, 204, 241, 243, 257, 267, 269, 275, 284, 366 ; and baptism, 286, 295 f., 298 f., 366; and Lord's Supper, 328, 331 ; and absolution, 337 ; invisible church, 345, 350, 357, 359 ; militant, 367 ; consum mation of, 373, 378, 380, 396, 433. Clarke, iii. 245. Clemens, iii. 222. Clemens, Alex., i. 366, ii. 237, 336, iii. 351. Clemens, Rom., iv. 10. Clericus, iii. 245. Cocceius, iii. 409. Cognition, moral, i. 61 f., 65 f., 129, ii. 75, 81 ; criterion of religion, 109, 111, 114, 117, 119, 121, 192, 195, 200, 228. Cognizableness, of God, i. 206, 211 ; imperfect, 21 2 ; of miracles, ii. 179, 181 f. Collenbuseh, iii. 360. Communicatio idiomatum, iii. 231, 238, iv. 32, 34. Communion, religious, i. 144 f., ii. 76, 121 ; with God, 115, 125, 199, 222, 225. Concord, Form of, on Christology, iii. 233 ; on freedom and grace, iv. 171, 179 ; on atonement, 26, 34 ; on Lords Supper, 320. Concupiscentia, ii. 339, 343, 347, 352, 354. Concursus, ii. 44, 49, 94, 153. Conscience, i. 105, 156, 171, 311, 436, 446 ; of the world, 318 ; the church the, of the individual, 429 ; in gene ral, ii. 50, 57, 74, 115, 117, 139, 141, 170, 200, 228, 237, 241, 262, 310, 369, 392, iii. 39 f., 126, 295, 316, 402, iv. 73, 84, 119, 174, 182, 184, 230, 336, 374. Conservation, of world, ii 18, 40, 44, 45 f., 62, 91, 95, 135, 141, 145, 153, 161, 174, 182, 187, 190, 201, 218 ff., 222 f., 229, 234, 259 ; of the genus, 301, 340, 342 ; of capacity of re demption, iv. 180 ; and Incarnation, iii. 300 ; of the soul, iv. 379. Consummation, of humanity, iii. 141, 307, iv. 165 ; of Christ, 119, 135, 138, 143, 415 ; of believers, 186, 242, 378, 396, 399, 432; of the Church, 154, 373, 378, 380, 396, 400, 433 ; of the body, 413 ; of nature and the world, 429. 438 INDEX. Continuation of Christ's offices, iv. 142, 243, 247, 271, 276, 286, 295, 305, 323, 331, 340, 370. Continued working of Christ, iv. 143, 149, 243, 291, 301, 327, 329, 377, 386. Continuity of revelation, ii. 135 f. Conversion, iv. 202, 206, 213 f., 228, 237, 284. Co-ordination, of divine attributes, i. 202, 293 f., 322, 448, 457; of the Triune Persons, 351, 353, 436. Cosmogonies, ii. 255. Cosmological argument, i. 248, 254, 265, 307. Creation, ii. 21 ff, 234, 255, 259 ; first and second, i 162, 167, 338, 343, 416; not consummation, ii. 18 f. ; out of nothing, 23, 35'; implies conserva tion, 49, 53, 64, 79 ; acts of, 41 f., 89, 90, 93, 95, 102 ; creative mo ments in religion, 114, 135, 140, 201 ; and miracles, 153 ; idea of, 363, 372, iii. 298, iv. 249, 381, 422 ; and genus, iii. 55 ; second creation, 301, 304, 307, iv. 73, 164, 178, 239, 288, 362, 400 ; and Incarnation, iii. 283, 300, 340, 342; future, iv. 429 f., 432. Creationism, ii. 88, 93 f., 341, 343, 353, iii. 18, 51, 56, 301, 341. Crellius, iv. 38. Crisp, iv. 213. Criticism, i. 95, 120, 146, 148, ii. 230. Cyprian, ii. 340. Cyrill, Alex., iii. 210, 215, 220, iv. 8, 13. Cyrill, Jer., iv. 168, 315. Damnation, ii. 356, iii. 131, iv. 28 f., 103, 229, 417, 427 f. Dannhauer, iii. 64. Darwin, ii. 43, 90, 92. Daub, ii. 98, iii. 94, 98, 261. Dawson, ii. 89. Death, i 301, ii. 66, 70, 82, 177, 262, 336 f., 339, 343, 354, 365, iii. 12, 15, 30, 114, 126, 354, iv. 79, 84, 168, 407,, 425 ; and Christ's kingly office, iii. 388, iv. 132, 135 ; Christ's, iii. 412 f., 418, 424, iv. 10, 13, 20, 28, 42, 50, 53, 70, 76, 119, 130, 322, 374, 376, 382 ; second, 418, 425. Degrees of inspiration, ii. 199, 266 f. Deism, i 48, 83 f., 93 f., 98, 125, 197, 200, 233, 235, 238, 241, 244 f., 334, 336, 340, 366, 369, 373, 377, 389, 398, 400, 412, 444, 446, 460 f., ii. 43, 45, 112, 154, 158, 161, 266, 338, iii. 79, 105, 200 f., 304, 389, iv. 46. 80, 180, 223, 260, 291. Delitzsch, ii. 353, iii. 263, 304, 406. Dependence, absolute, i. 235, ii. 110, 112, 114, 116, 124, 162, 201, 237 f., 248, 263. Descartes, i 218 ; ontological argu ment, 429, 431. Determination in God not limitation, i 198, 201, 237, 324, 441, 458. Determinism, ii. 54, 158, 349, iii. 18- 39, 83, 104, 121. Development (Becoming), i 252 f., 318, 329, ii. 33, 35, 54, 70, 72, 74, 76, 102, 128, 175, 202 ; of the absolute religion, i. 232, 236, 243 ; and evil, ii. 364, 381, iii. 20, 28, 37, 59 ; in Satan, 101 ; evil hostile to, 107 ; of the God-man, 328, 367, iv. 125, 138 ; of state of grace, 178, 223; of Church from faith, 155, 162, 358 ; in the consummation, 382, 410, 412. De Wette, iii. 405, iv. 46. Dieckhoff, iv. 330. Dieringer, i. 87, ii. 154. Diodorus, ii. 336, iii. 211, iv. 168. Dionysius, the Areopagite, i. 194, 249. Dioscurus, iii. 211. Docetism, i 48, 415, ii. 196, 219, 266, iii. 204, 219, 222, 237, 302, 341, 351, iv. 5, 33, 59, 63, 139, 327, 395. Dodwell, iv. 379. Doederlein, ii. 352, iii. 245, iv. 41. Donatism, iv. 342, 353, 364, 366. Dorner, A., i. 187, ii. 147, 152, iv. 18, 47. Doubt, i 88 f., 108; practical, 130, 133, 136, 178. Drey, V., i. 87. Dualism, i. 126, 200, 208, 245, 277, 281, 313, 335, 341, 366, 369, 461, ii. 10, 29, 36, 38, 119, 261 ; Kant, i. 222 ; precluded by ontological argument, 234, 318, 334, 361, 364, 378, iii. 18, 21, 25, 35, 38, 251, iv. 12, 67, 74, 78, 249, 416, 420, 423. Dualistic religions, i 281 f., 295, ii. 237, 253, 255, 261, iv. 374. Duns Scotus, i. 196, 201, 394, 428, 431, ii. 80, iii. 214, 221, iv. 18, 39, 82. Dyad, i 364, 376, 420. Dyothelitism, iii. 219, 359. Ebeehaed, iv. 41. Ebionitism, i 48, 148, 371, 398, 415, iii. 183, 205, 207, 213, 214, 245, 255, 258, 285f., 301, 307, 311, 331, iv. 5, 52, 279, 326, 348. 395 ; its forms, iii. 201. Ebrard, i 178, iii. 254, 263. Edwards, iv. 214. Egyptian religion, i. 275, 281, ii. 236, 242, 254, 256 f., iv. 375. INDEX. 439 Ehrenfeuchter, i. 76, 178. Eitzen, v., i 25. Elwert, i. 203, ii. 106.1 Emanationism, i 233^ 309, 365, 456, ii. 10, 24, 39, 98, 261, iii. 201, 203, 205. Empiricism, i. 62, 121, 124, iii. 355. .Encyclopaedia theol., i. 30. End, in itself, i. 271, 278, 304 ; the ethical the absolute, 308, 456 ; of the world, ii. 18, 26, 41, 53, 54, 56, 64, 68, 86, 119 ; of miracles, 179 f., 219, i. 266, 268 ; absolute, 282, 287, 292 ; highest, 310, 339, 458. Epiphanes, iii. 202. Episcopius, iii. 352, iv. 259. Erbkam, iv. 415. Erhardt, iii. 94. Ernesti, iii. 383. Eschatology, iii. 77, iv. 143, 373, 381, 396. Eschenmayer, iii. 94. 98. Essence of God, i 187, 191 f., 202; God absolute, 229, 234, 454 ; relation of divine essence to matter, ii. 37. Essenes, ii. 98. Eternal truths, i. 62, 116, 163, 284, 289, 325, 428 f., 433, 445, 452, ii. 144, 196. Eternity, of God, i. 239, 243, 337 ; of creation, ii. 21, 29 ; of the spirit, 87, 253. Ethical conception, of generic con tinuity, ii. 327 f., iii. 65, iv. 95; of Omnipotence, iii. 104, 122, iv. 82 ; of the Unio in Christ, iii. 255 f., 359 ; of power in Christ, iv. 145 ; of Christ's activity now, 146 f. ; of Church, 158, 358 ; of grace, 177 f. ; consummation by ethical means, 382 f., 393, 397; ethical progress after death, 408, 411. Ethical, ethical good, i. 167, 303, 308, ¦ 339, 343 ; perfectly ethical trini- tarian, 412, 427 f., 432, 436, 444, 454, ii. 62, 72, 74 ; in religion, 117, 124, 126, 180, 248, 252, 254, 260. Ethics and Dogmatics, i 24-30, 33, cf. 132. Eudsemonisin, iv. 38, 40 f., 62, 393. Eunomius, i. 212, 250. Eusebius, iii. 381, iv. 8, 13, 168. Eutyehes, iii. 211, 215. Evil, nature and origin, ii. 299, iii. 11 f. ; in Hebraism, 402 ; nature, ii. 383 ; different conceptions of, 359, 386 ; theories of origin, iii. 18 ; a, finite power, iv. 380 ; possibility of, ii. 14, 56, 64, 66, 71, 73 ; idea of, in heathenism, 256. Evils, ii. 65, 84, 262, 336, 354, 365, iii. 62, 65, 114, 126, iv. 5, 24, 30, j 48, 54, 63, 69, 76, 79, 83 f., 106, 112 f., 124, 230. Evolution, ii. 90. Ewald, iii. 154, 256, iv. 133. Experience, i. 28 ; sensuous, 62, 68, 72 ; of God, 73, 93 ; of divinity of Scripture, 96 ; stimulates a priori knowledge, 163. Expiation, ii. 241, 257, 264, iii. 403, 406, 423, iv. 23, 54, 57, 68, 72, 80, 85, 89, 99, 106, 212. Fabei, iv. 342. Faith, necessary to verify, i 19, 20 ; relation to dogma, 29 f., 35, 168, 171 ; idea, 32 ; basis of knowledge, 75, 159 ; in Church, 82 ; in Scrip ture, 94 ; in authority, 109 ; and philosophy, 123 ; and doubt, 128 ; and certainty, 152, 156 ; and three fold cause of salvation, 364 ; sets problems to science, 395, 413, 415 f. ; universal tendency, 161, 378 ; and verification, 308; ii. 122, 222, 230 ; and historic research, 232 ; false forms of, 372 ; and knowledge, iii. 282, iv. 195 ; and atonement, 20, 27, 35, 52, 94, 118, 123, 136, 147, 150, 154 ; and communion, 157 ; and justification, 165, 173, 186, 188, 193, 197, 210, 212, 218 f., 226, 235 ; and criticism, 254 ; and sanctifica tion, 236 ; propagated through Scripture, 250 ; through preaching, 265 ; and sacraments, 270, 275, 280 f.; and baptism, 281, 288, 290, 292,, 295, 299, 301 ; and confirma tion, 305 ; and Lord's Supper, 313, 323 f., 328, 330; in the Romish sense, 348 f. ; and the Church, 164, 242, 276, 349 f., 358, 360, 361, 365, 367, 372 ; and love, 372 ; and final goal, 377, 395. Farrar, ii. 197, iv. 415. Fatalism, ii. 33.6, 349, iv. 168, 187. Fate, i 279, 299, 315, 320, 342, 432, 434, 445, ii. 52. Faustus v. Rhegium, ii. 342. Federal theology, ii. 351. Feeling, ii. 72 ; not religion, 108, 112 ; religious, 114, 117, 119, 200, 202, 246. Fetishism, ii. 237, 244 f., 248. Feuerbach, i. 134. Feuerborn, iii. 237. Fichte, J. G., i. 64, 66, 75, 107, 224, 438, ii. 110, iii. 246, iv. 38. Fichte, Junr., i. 76, 239, 402. Fides historica, i. 93, 158, 175 ; divina, 93, 103 f., 154, 176, ii. 197. Final cause, i. 277, 309-311. Finitjide, and divine communication, 440 INDEX. ii. 16 ; and religion, ii. 112 ; and evil, 256. Fischer, K., i. 402 f. Flacius, ii. 349, iv. 129. Flatt, iii. 245, iv. 42. Fletcher, iv. 206, 213. Flbrcke, iv. 389. Foreknowledge, of the free, i. 332, ii. 58, cf. 265 f.; of sin, iii. 17, 37 f . ; of faith, iv. 175, 185, 187, 381, 422. Forgiveness, in the 0. T., iii. 408; free, iv. 82 ; complete in the N. T., 229 ; and the Lord's Supper, 322 ; and membership in the Church, 335, 338. Form and matter, ii. 23, 35. Form-principle, i. 271. Formal principle, i. 157, 418, ii. 225, 233. Fbrster, iv. 168. Freedom, i. 301, 326, 332, ii. 311 f., 327, 336, 342, 344, 352 ; and autho rity, 418 ; in God, 432, 435, 445, 447 ; willed by God, ii. 19, 33, 51, 55, 58, 73, 79, 81, 112, 115, 116 ; absolute, 118 ; positive, given by God, 120 f., 139, cf. 163, 177, 200, 247, 250, 260 ; and original sin, 357, 366 ; and law, 368 ; false, 388, 390, 393, 399 ; and evil, 374, 381, 402, 404 f., iii. 16 f., 22 ; necessary, 39, 41 ; and the genus, 45, 51 f., 55, 57, 65, 69 f., 75, 83, 102, iv. 91, 93, 216 ; in Christ, iii. 295, 327, 356, 359, 366 f. ; and dependence, iv. 64 ; and the Spirit, 161, 165 ; and grace, 168, 173, 179 f., 182, 191, 210, 222, 225, 227 ff, 235, 285 ; real and formal, 186 ; to decide for Christianity restored, 180 f., 184, 204, 283, 300, 421, 424 ; in develop ment of Church, 152, 397 f. ; in future, 412, 427 ; perfected, 430. Fries, iii. 274, iv. 46. Frohschammer, ii. 352. Fulgentius, ii. 342. Gatjnilo, i 217. Gaupp, iii. 263. Generic consciousness in relation to certainty, i. 75 f., ii. 75, 94, 121, 126, 201. Gennadius, ii.. 342. . Genus, ii. 95, 126, 134, 201, 219 ; generic sin, 324, 344, 347, 349, 358, 405, iii. 42, 46 f., 50, 54, 57, 67, 75, iv. 26 f., 95, 105, 423; generic punishment, iii. 114, 119, 130, iv. 95, 112 ; and Christ's' development, iii. 341 ; and personality in Christ, 376 ; and substitution, iv. 89, 98 ; and guilt, 95 ; and freedom, 91, 93 ; makes satisfaction in Christ, 117 ; and personality, 215 f., 241; -and faith, 162 ; perfecting of, 381. Gerhard, J., i 94, 196, 330, 382, 38.8, ii. 59, 153, 178, iii. 381, iv. 31, 109, 173, 203, 206, 208, 211, 220, 226, 235, 267, 293, 352, 392, 406, 416. German religion, ii. 238, 242, 251, 254, iv. 375. Gess, iii. 151, 167, 172 f., 194, 254, 260, 263, iv. 28, 56," 379. Gnesio-Lutherans, iv. 171. Gnosis, i. 163, 166 ; Christian, 338, 413. Gnostics, i. 249, 365, ii. 24, 335, iii. 205. God-consciousness, ground of all cer tainty, i 75, cf. 159 ; new, 155 ; not the verification of God, 184, cf. 229, ii. 67, 75, 79, 83, 94, 101, 112, 154, 169, 181, 198, 246, 259. _ God, idea of, whether innate, i. 214 ; the Christian idea true and neces sary, 170, 173, 338, 343, 416, ii. 109 ; God's act, 116 ; fundamental to religion, 235, 240 ; determines conception of evil, ii. 360, 383, iii. 42, 78 ; and various Christologies, 252 ; and theories of atonement, iv. 6, 26 f., 32, 75, 80 ; and grace, 177 ; and immortality, 378 ; and Christ's threefold office, iii. 389. God-likeness, i. 197, 417, 422, 437, 444, 456 f.; in the world, ii. 15, 25, 111, 146. God-man, ii. 220, 230 ; idea in heathenism, 260. Godmanhood, natural, iii. 340 ; essential, 349; ethical, 359>; official, 374, 381. Godet, ii. 197, iii. 254, 263. Goeschel, iii. 271, iv. 56, 59. Goltz, v. d., i 146. Goode, iv. 307. Goodness, physical, i. 267, 272, 275, 277, 293, 309, 365, ii. 124 ; ethical, i. 339, 377, 430, 456 ; of the world, ii. 65, 67, 74, 76 ; of natural law, 162 ; of God, 261. Goodwin, iii. 245, 289. Government of world, ii. 19, 53, 154, 172, 253, 259. Governmental theory, iv. 39, 103. Grace, i 19, 32, 431, ii. 80 f., 202, 337, 342, 358, 401, iii. 75, iv. 75, 190, 206, 210, 214, 225, 228, 230, 289, 296, 299 ; and justice, iii. 139, 401, 404, iv. 65 ; and freedom, 165, 169, 175 ; its kinds, 178. Grace, means of, i. 143, iv. 153, 173, 189, 204, 230, 238, 249, 258, 340, 360. INDEX. 441 Greek religion, i. 264, 270 f., 279, 289, ii. 239, 241 f., 246, 251, 255, 257. Gregory the Great, ii. 153, iv. 12, 170, 406. Gregory Naz., i. 376, 453, iv. 10, 13. Gregory Nyssa, i. 381, 391, 452, ii. 340, iv. 11 f., 415, 419. Grotius, i. 395, ii. 188, iv. 38, 82. Gruner, iii. 245. Grynaeus, iii. 239. Giider, iv. 127, 402. Guilt, ii. 335, 338, 340, 343, 347, 350, 353, 355, 358, 366, 369, 386, 398, 402, 404, iii. 43 f., 47 f., 51, 54, 60, 76, 96, 109, 128, iv. 173, 292 ; con sciousness of, i. 141, ii. 202, 241, 256 ff., 262; and Christ's high- priestly office, iii. 388, iv. 6, 10, 20, 22 f., 25, 44, 47, 49, 65, 73, 80, 84, 100 f., 102, 115, 148; transferable- ness of, 33, 40, 94 ; and repentance, 188; and justification, 201 f., 209, 212, 216 f., 228, 229 f. ; and law, iii. 403 ; and sacrifice, 405. Giinther, i. 405, ii. 352, iii. 214, 222. Hades, iv. 376, 404, 409. Hafenreffer, iv.' 203. Haferung, iii. 245. Hahn, iii. 49, 237 ; Junr., 263 ; Mich., iv. 420. Haniann, iii. 339. Hamberger, i. 188, 261, iv. 429. Hamilton, i 208 f., 430. Hanna, iv. 116. Hanne, iv. 133. Haring, iv. 72. Harless, iv. 34, 176, 273. Harmony, i. 267, 271, 284, 339, 422, 458 ; perfected by love, 463, ii. 66, 169. Harms, Fr., i. 263, ii. 40, iv. 260. Harnack, iv. 22, 55, 366. Hartmann, v., i 121, 126, 231, 268, 276, 400, ii. 36, iii. 27, iv. 47. Hase, ii. 118, iii. 407. Hasse, iii. 263. Hebrew religion, i. 215, 237, 272 £, 305, 311, 320 f., 339, 343, ii. 22, 140, 254, 259 f. Hegel, i. 115, 198, 206, 225, 242, 250, 272, 281, 314, 400, 438, ii. 12, 367, iii. 23, 27, 251, 270, iv. 48. Heilmann, iii. 244. Heinrici, ii. 320. Held, iv. 22. Hell, iv. 128 f. Hengstenberg, iii. 298, iv. 202, 230, 232, 384. Herbart, i. 122, 458. Hering, iii. 183. Herrlinger, iii. 226, iv. 171, 356. Herrmann, iii. 269. High-priesthood of Christ, iii. 337, 360, 382, 388, 397, 399, 401, 411, iv. 1 f., 52, 72, 98, 101, 112, 115, 124, 146, 151, 217 f., 224, 244, 268, 396 ; and baptism, 276, 279 ; re flection of, 303. Hilary, i. 376, 382, 452, ii. 340, iv. 8, 10, 13. Hilgenfeld, iii. 176. Hinduism, ii. 238, 241 f., 248, 254. Hippolytus, i. 366, iii. 208, 256. Hirtzel, ii. 172. History, i. 278 ; the Son the principle of, 434 ; God's relation to, 460, 462, ii. 32, 70, 79, 93, 98, 102, 124, 181, 136, 142, 163, cf. 198, 222 ; essential part of contents of faith, i. 47 ff. , ii. 223, 225, 232, 237, 249, 260, 264 f. Hbfling, iv. 282, 288, 293, 296, 299, 325. Hofmann, v., i. 233, 356, 8*87, 403, ii. 59, 97, 192, 352, iii. 49, 92, 96, 257, 263, 287, 382, 392, 405, iv. 22, 51, 54, 128, 135, 176, 384, 389. Holiness, i. 292, 300, 305, 321, 339, 433, 448, 456, ii. 101, 117, 200, 254, 354, 358 ; the gods not holy, 256 f., 258, 260, 262 ; and original sin, iii. 58 ; and law, 403 ; in the O. T., 405 ; of the Church, iv. 346, 348, 355, 359, 366 f.; and blessedness, 382. Hollaz, ii. 351, iii. 382, iv. 203, 224, 317, 352, 416. Holsten, ii. 317, iii. 175, 350, 360, iv. 50, 133. Homogeneity, of the subject and object, i. 67 f., 130 ; of the subject with Christianity, 141 ; of objective and subjective dogmas, 445. Homousia, i. 375, ii. 219. Honorius, iii. 216. Hopfner, ii. 153, iv. 205. Hugo, v. St. Victor, i. 393. Humanity of Christ, necessary to atonement, iv. 32, 60, 118, 126; perfect organ of Logos, 138, 140 ff. Humboldt, Alex, v., ii. 92. Hume, D., i. 191, 255. Humility, false, i. 106, 151; trae, 141, 151 ; in God, 447 ; in man, ii. 114, 117, 201 f., 261 f. Huss, iv. 348. Hiitter, iii. 381, iv. 203, 352. Idealism, i. 64, 115 f., 121, 124; leads to Egoism, 91, ii. 38 f., 254, iii. 246, 251, iv. 46, 48. Identity, i. 208, 236, 248, 250, 258, 422 ; ethical, 461, ii. 47, 137. 442 INDEX. Ignatius, i 368, iii. 220, iv. 153, 314. Ignorance and sin, ii. 305, 309, 312, 367, iii. 68 f., 73, 76, 115, iv. 66. Image of God, ii. 77 ; the world an, 20, 27, 45, 54, 180. Immanence, i. 242, 343, 347, 363, 365, 377, 386, 412, 414, 444, 450, ii. 18, 145, 162, iii. 279, iv. 150, 238. Immateriality of God, i. 238, cf. ii. 35 ff. Immortality, ii. 72, 82, 84, 87, 100. Immutability, i. 143, 236, 244, 316, 329, 365, 460, ii. 42, 160, iii. 122, 285, 288, 298, 328, iv. 14, 33, 80, 223. Imperfection of the world, ii. 28, 70, 202, 248, cf. 66, 71 ; of inspired men, 195. Imputatio mediata et immediata, ii. 350. Incarnation, i 115, ii. 220, 232, 234, 254 ; its necessity, 205-209, 218. ' Indifference, L 249 ; God not, 294, 429, 447, cf. ii. 80, iii. 27, 41, iv. 83. Individual in relation to person and subject, i. 444, ii. 76, 93. Individuality, ii. 26, 39, 75, 128. 193 f., 198, 223, 229, 252, iii. 348, 352, iv. 93, 162, 240, 330, 369 f. ; perfecting of, 432. Inductive proof imperfect, i. 39 f. ; for God, 213 ; for design, 266 ; for right, 288 Infallibility, ii. 185, 192, 195, iv. 152, 252, 268 f., 336, 348. Infant-baptism, iv. 192, 203, 205, 238, 277, 280, 285, 293, 304 f., 363. Infinity, i. 237 ; agrees with determina tion, 143, 198, 324, 440, 458, ii. 17 ; nature and, 67 ; of man, 86 f., 125, 247, 252. Inspiration, i. 95, 103, 147, 175, 181, ii. 141, 183 ; theory of assistance, 187 ; dogmatic exposition, 189-225, iv. 252. Intellectualism in relation to evil, ii. 367, 387, iii. 31 f. ; in relation to atonement, 382, 389. Intelligence, God, i 267, 284, 303, 305, 309, 323 ; and personality, 337 ; and Trinity, 403, cf. 439, 458 ; its co operation in creation, ii. 25, cf. 13, 34, 37. Intercession of Christ, iv. 114, 117, 144, 147, 149, 224, 234, 292, 302, 421 ; of Church at baptism of infants, 282, 295, 300, 305. Intermediate state, iv. 382, 387, 391, 401, 408. Intuition, i 70 ; intellectual, 71 ; Christian, 164, 173 f. ; God's self- intuition, 325, ii. 58, 61 ; intuition of God, 117, 120, 194. Invisibility and visibility of Church, iv. 359, 372. Irenseus, i. 366, ii. 340, iii. 141, 210, 220, 335, iv. 8, 9, 11. Irving, Ed., iii. 350, 360, iv. 50, 339. Jacobi, F. H., i 19, 75, 115, 119, 207, 440, iii. 246, 251, 268, iv. 38, 47. James, doctrine of evil, ii. 305, 315 ; Christology, iii. 158 ; Justification, iv. 195. Jehovah, i. 215, 235, 274, 280, 296, 321, 346 f. Jerome, iv. 406. Jesuits, iv. 85. John of Damascus, i. 194, 241, 380, 381, 387, 392, iii. 218, 289, iv. 8, 10. John on sin, iv. 305, 321 ff, 331; Christology, iii. 187 f. ; atonement, 422. Jolly, iv. 307. Joviniau, iv. 348. Judgment, iii. 71, 114, 118, iv. 106, 113, 118, 126, 142, 144, 165, 184, 229, 320, 330, 343, 348, 363, 374, 376, 382, 387, 391, 401, 405, 408, 410, 415. Juridical argument for existence of God, i 286 ; for immortality, ii. 86. Juridical conception of evil, ii. 326, 342, 369, 389, 401 ; jur. Unio in Christ, iii. 263; doctrine of atonement, iv. 14, 19, 76, 90, 102 f.,. 123, 216. Justice, i 191, 273, 277, 283, 286 f., 290 ; God essentially just, 293 f. ; in the world, 297, 299 ; an end in jtself, 304 ; its nature, 339, 365, 430, 455, 460, ii. 18, 57, 59, 66 ; innate justice of man, 81 ; of God, 117, 241, 255 ; in heathenism, 255, 261 ; in' the O. T., 303, iii. 401, 404 ; and holiness, i. 321, ii. 354, 358 ; and sin, 327, 351, 354, 398, 402, iii. 33, 58, 81 ; and Satan, 89, 99, 102, 105 ; and punish ment, 116, 119, 125 f., 127 f., 130 f., iv. 9, 13, 18, 23, 27, 29, 37, 48, 55, 60 f., 123 f., 425 ; retributive, 63, 72, 79, 82, 84, 212 ; not vengeance, 103 ; in Christ, 126 ; and Christ's resur rection, 134 ; and love, ii. 372, iii. 133, 135 f., 243, 277, 406, iv. 4, 7, 87, 98 f., 107, 115, 117, 124, 126, 180 f., 190. Justification, i. 55, 462, ii. 346, 372, iii. 429, iv. 20, 26, 37, 118, 146, 165, 178, 193, 195, 199, 290; and atonement, 209, 238 ; and faith, 216, 218, 223, 235; perfect, 229; and consummation, 391, 399. Justin Martyr, ii. 237, iv. 9, 168, 314, 315, 406. Justitia originalis, ii. 343, 345 ; com- INDEX. 443 mutativa, iv. 90 ; civilis, ii. 349, 396, iii. 66, iv. 178 ff. Kabbala, ii. 98. Kahle, iv. 376. Kiihler, ii. 303, 311. Kahnis, i 387, iii. 96, 260, 263, 268, iv. 28, 409. Kant, i. 60, 108, 115, 121, 218, 221, 255, 265, 286, 306, 313, ii. 371, iii. 94, 120, 246, 251, 269 f., 277, iv. 38, 42, 73, 76, 100, 173, 207. Karg, iv. 24. Keckermann, i 395, iii. 382. Keerl, iii. 150, 175, 183, 190, 206, 255, 260, 268. Keil, iv. 384. Keim, iii. 189, 345, 412, iv. 133. Kenotists, iii. 207, 237, 240, 254, 257, 259, 263, 311, 330, 333, 338, 393 f. Kern, iv. 412. Keys, power of, iv. 244, 333. Kingdom of God, ii. 25, 58, 87, 97, 126, 172, 210, 292, iii. Ill, 383, 389, 396, iv. 60, 70, 74, 142, 154, 158, 241, 422 ; the end of justification, 236, 325, 340, 380 ; on earth, 383, 395, 397, 400 ; and church, 433 ; perfecting of, 428. Kingly office of Christ, iii. 382, 387, 399, 418 f., iv. 53, 101, 114, 125, 144, 151, 244, 305, 323, 333,338,387, 396. Kinkel, iv. 135. Kirk, iv. 232. Klee, ii. 352. ' Kliefoth, iv. 175, 266, 299, 402. Knowledge, i. 206, 228, 278, 285 ; God's, 323, 328, 339, ii. 75 ; different from volition, 61, 72 ; trinitarian, i 412, 422, 438, 441 ; not an absolute end, 339, 457 ; and working, 459, cf. 309, ii. 58 ; religion not, 108 ff. ; religious, 113 ; absolute, 118 ; prior to power, iii. 35, 332 ; of Christ, 315, 327, 335, 363, 397, iv. 108, 115; natural, iii. 356 ; atonement through, iv. 76, 80, 120 ; perfecting of, 430. Konig, iv. 203. Kbstlin, i. 46, 57, 59, 164, ii. 161, 166 f., 192, 195, iii. 183, iv. 22. Krauss, iii. 381, 386. Kreibig, iv. Ill, 202, 230. Kryptists, iii. 237, iv. 32. Laotantius, iii. 32. Landerer, iv. 18, 168. Lanfranc, iv. 315. Lang, iii. 274. Lange, A., i. 40, 63, iii. 269. Lange, J. P., i 28, 455, ii. 195, 197, iii 96, 260, 299, 349, 355, 383, iv. 403, 416, 429. Lasco, a., iv. 170. Law, what ought to be, i. 305, 311, ii. 303, 306, 367, 369, 389, 397, iii. 24, 37 ; God not mere, i. 316, 339, 431, 446, 462 ; the Father gives, 433 ; legality, 112, 418, 430, 436; is Christianity ? 82, cf. ii. 57, 115, 139, 201, 287 ; law of religious history, 234, 241, 249 ; impersonal, 254 ; legal stage and Christianity, iii. 65, 400, 402, iv. 119, 190, 261 f., 289; and atonement, iii., 403, iv. 21 f., 26, 35, 38, 55, 123 ; use of, 240. Leibnitz, i. 63, 395, 431, ii. 27, 40, 362, iii. 30, iv. 39. Leo the Great, iii. 216, iv. 8. Lessing, ii. 108, 115, 395, 235, iv. 402. Ley.decker, iii. 389. Liebermann, iii. 309. Liebner, i. 174, 206, 393, 408, 410, 452, 455, iii. 207, 260, 263, iv. 142. Life, i. 253, 258, 267, 271, 308, 339, 397, 400 ; trinitarian, 411, 420, 452 ; and light, 49 ; and spirit, 459, ii. 40, 54, 64 ; of nature, 65 ; of the soul, 87, 90 ; religion, community of life, 115 f., 250 ; in the world, 45. Limborch, iii. 52. Lipsius, i. 39, 200, 440, ii. 118 ; logi cal prius , iii. 91, 95, 204,269,274, 276, iv. 74. Lbffler, iv. 41. Logic, i. 171 ; immanent in world, 268, 430 ; in God, 284, 289, 291 ; in the Trinity, 392, 422, 435 ; of love, 458, ii. 25, 29 f. Logos, i. 162, 170 ; in Philo, 349 ; in John, 356, 358 ; in Sabellius, 368 ; principle of revelation, 433 ; prin ciple of the world, ii. 40, 64, 95, 141, 219, 234 ; a«'.py.a.TixU, iii. 296 ; and the Spirit, iv. 159. Lombard, Pet., i. 381, 392 f., ii. 343, iii. 221, iv. 12, 18. Lbscher, ii. 153. Lotze, i. 241, 439, 458, ii. 156, 166. Love, i. 191, 310, 316, 322, 365, 393, 403, ii. 360, 372 ; self-love in God, i. 409, 442 ; triune, 411, 426, 431, 437 ; universal, 443 ; and the divine attributes, 448, 454-465 ; the world loved by God, ii. 19 ; ground of the world, 11, 14, 25, 53, 57, 59 ; and generic consciousness, 75 ; ground of immortality, 86, cf. 101 ; God love, 106, 117, 200, 202, 221 ; God's love and omnipotence, iii. 29, 34 ; and sin, 34 f., 81 ; in the Incarnation, 325 f., 338 ; and justice, 133, 138, 243, 277, 406, 424, iv. 4, 14, 19, 56, 60, 73, 77, 80 f., 87, 99, 107, 115, 444 INDEX. 117, 126, 421 ; substitutionary, 93, 303 ; Christ's love, iii. 397, iv. 109, 116, 124, 147, 150, 190 ; and faith, 157, 237, 371 ; and communion, 157, 162, 241, 361 ; prevenient, 118, 181 f. , 194, 207, 210, 212, 214, 222, 225, 228, cf. 288, 295, 299 f., 313 ; Lord's Supper sacrament of love, 325 ; in 1 church discipline, 343, 368 ; and Church, 361, 365, 369, 381 ; perfect ing of, 431. Liicke, i. 403, 405, ii. 192, iii. 96. Luthardt, iii. 96, 263, iv. 128, 169, 176, 384. Luther, i. 92, 98, 111, 144, 156, 391, 396, ii. 187, 197, 346, 356, 396, iii. 35, 64, 112, 1«3, iv. 343, 406 ; Christ ology, iii. 224, 308, 313, 360; theory of atonement, iv. 22, 32, 126, 170, 199, 223, 235, 255 ; baptism, 282, 288, 292, 301 ; Lord's Supper, 317, 321, 326, 330, 332 f. ; Church, 355. Macedonit/s, i 377. Magic, i. 431 ff., ii. 84 f., 136, 175, 222, 349, 358, iii. 307, 390, iv. 52, 54, 77, 89, 111, 182, 189, 217, 219, 272, 282, 285, 288, 299, 315, 328 f., 366. Malan, ii. 172. Malebranche, i. 63. Man, and nature, ii. 66, 68, 92, 95 ; and angels, 101 ; nature of man, 107, 219, 221 ; man active in religion, 116 ; in miracles, 172. Man, Son of, iii. 168 f. Manichaeism, i. 48, 137, ii. 24, 74, 193, 308, 318, 335, 339, 345, 402, iii. 34, 49, 137, 362, iv. 12, 165, 168, 178, 183, 190. Mansel, i. 208, 430, iii. 269. Marcellus, i. 369, ii. 18, iii. 205. Marcion, i. 365, 368, iv. 77. Maresius, iv. 24. Marheinecke, i 196, iii. 261, 271, 383, iv. 49. Martensen, i. 113, 174, 201, 335, 452, ii. 60, 109, iii. 96, 105, 107, 110, 112, 260, 352, 355, 383, iv. 81, 84, 108, 131, 137, 140, 409, 411. Mass, iv. 148, 314. Materialism, i. 39, 61, 89, 122, 125, 210 ; precluded, 235, 262, 265, ii. 35, 92, 94. Material principle, i. 156, 418, ii. 230, 233. Mathematical truths, i. 62, 163, 268, 284, 289, 291. Mathy, iii. 245. Matter, i. 235, 262, 271, ii. 23, 36, 100, 102, 164, 255 ; and evil, ii. 317 f., 334 f., 352, 364 f., 375, iii. 25 f., 30 f.; and the resurrection, iv. 133, 407 ; and consummation, 414, 429. Maximus, iii. 216. Means and end, i. 266, 278, 281, 297, ii. 41, 56, 59, 67, 219, 456. Measure, i 264, 267, 271, 273, 277, 284 ; and justice, 290, 296, ii. 66, 169, 200, 242. Melanchthon, i. 22, 390, 394 ff, ii. 346, 351, 396, iii. 224, 335, iv. 21, 170, 174, 203, 210, 349. Mendelssohn, i. 220. Menken, iii. 350, 360, iv. 50. Menzer, iii. 64, 120, 237. Merit of Christ, iv. 17, 26, 30, 34, 105, 210, 212, 226 f. Messianic idea, ii. 85, 267-280, iii. 145. Metaphysics, of divine self-conscious ness, i. 444, cf. 405 f. ; of love, 437, 444, cf. 426 ; argument for immor tality, ii. 86. Method, dogmatic, i 168, 172 ; in ' proofs for God, 247 ; historic, ii. 233; Methodism, iv. 191, 206, 212. Meyer, iii. 263. Mill, J. S., i. 62, 282, iii. 269. Millennium, iv. 383, 389 f. ; truth in, 398. Ministry of word, iv. 244, 256, 263. Miracles, i. 181, 213 ; moral, 430, ii. 41 f., 92, 136, 141, 146; theories, 152 ; dogmatic exposition, 161 ; teleology, 179, iii. 348, iv. 23 ; Christ's, 111. Missions, iv. 290, 294, 303, 341, 391 f. ; home, 303, 392. Modalism, i. 383, 399. Mohammedanism, i 280, 342, ii. 54, 275, iv. 383, 390. Mbhler, iv. 353. Moloch, i. 277, 280. Monarchians, i. 350, 362, 367, 389, iii. 208, 290. Monism, i. 121 f., 126, 133, 157, 365, ii. 91, 119. Monophysitism, iii. 211, 215, 222, 242,- 307, 359. Monotheism, i. 231, 363, 366 f., 377, 448, ii. 238, 244, 246, 259. Monothelitism, iii. 216, 359. Montanism, ii. 187. Moral argument, i 305. Morality and religion, i. 132, 320, 446, ii. 75, 91, 241, 259, 372, 395, 400, iv. 177. Mornseus, i. 395. Mortality of Christ, iii. 350, 353 f., iv. 125 ; of man, ii. 337, iii. 49, iv. 168, 379, 400 ; and liability to tempta tion, 430. Miiller, Jul., i. 25, 38, 173, 408, 420, ii. 161, 165, 181, 330, 375, 380, iii. INDEX. 445 46 f., 72, 96, 207, 260, iv. 174, 259, 277, 319, 342. Muller, Max, ii. 238. Munchmeyer, iv. 277, 284, 358, 366. Musseus, iv. 206. Mysticism, i. 62, 195, 200, 231, 250, 261, ii. 372 f., iii. 223, iv. 204; theory of atonement, 3, 9, 20, 50, 134 ; Lord's Supper, 314. Nagelsbach, iv. 277. National Church, i 81 f. Natural religion, ii. 115, cf. 136, 138. Natural science and religion, i. 74 ; and design, 277, ii. 39, 90, 102, 175. Nature, in God, i. 261 f., 271, 309 ; not passively in God, 263, 285 ; not God, 268, 315, 342 ; in God not creative, ii. 25, cf. 14 ; of God in relation to the world, 37 f. ; and spirit, 285, 292 f., 297, ii. 40 ff, 62, 65, 70, 84, 91, iv. 324, 327 f., 330, 382, 395, 400, 407 f., 413 ; and angels, ii. 97, 102; and religion, 117, 143, 162, 168, 175, 224, 237, 247 ft'. ; spiritual, evil, 399, 402, iii. 50 f., 55, iv. 74 f. ; in Christ, iii. 217, 224 f., 308 f., 313, 336 ; and Christ's offices, 386 ; and morality, 121, iv. 63, 83 ; and grace, 177 f. ; and the sacraments, 275 f. ; and baptism, 276, 280. Nature, system of, ii. 41, 50, 145, 153, 158, 161 f., 165. Neander, iii. 255. Necessary, the, in fact, i. 308 ; in itself, 308,' 312 ; in God, 458 ; ethi cally, 428, 434, 446, 456, ii. 20, 57, 80, 82 ; logically, i. 227, 269, 287 f., 311 ; free choice necessary, ii. 56. Neo-Kantians, iii. 269, 274. Neo-Platonism, i. 194, 249, 275, ii. 43, 252. Nestorianism, iii. 210, 219, 242, 311, 362. Nevin, iv. 307. Newton, i 241. Nicolas v. Methone, iv. 17. Nicolaus v. Cusa, ii. 11. Nirvana, ii. 251. Nitzsch, C. J., i 24, 36 f., 173, 192, 204, 416, ii. 192, iii. 96, 260, 376, iv. 54, 342, 379, 426. Nitzsch, C. L., i. 108, ii. 142, iii. 247. Nitzsch, Fr., ii. 147, iii 219, iv. 8, 13. Noesgen, iii. 268. Noetus, i. 368, iii. 205. Obedience of Christ, i. 435 f., iv. 16, 22, 32, 34 f., 40 f., 52, 109, 216 ; of value to God, 118. Occidental thought, ii. 248, 251. Ochlocracy, iv. 151. Oehler, iii. 263, 406, iv. 376. Oertel, iv. 402. Oetinger, i. 261, 263, ii. 11, iv. 401, 415, 420. Oettingen, v., i. 82. Office, teaching, iv. 263, 265, 344. Offices of Christ, ii. 203, iii. 381-392 ; kingly, 392 ; prophetic, 397 ; high- priestly, 401 ; office and person, 280, 379, iv. 124 ; in heaven, 132, 136 f., 142, 154, 243. Oischinger, ii. 352. Oleviauus, iii. 239. Oishausen, iii. 299. Omnipotence, i 261, 281, 285, 295, 298 f., 337, 430, 432, 458, ii. 15, 25, 35, 42, 45, 57, 74, 112, 114, 117, 154, 169, 200, 245, 254, 259, iii. 307, iv. 64 ; and sin, iii. 18, 29, 34, 38 ; and justice, 102, iv. 82 ; Christ's, iii. 327, iv. 145. Omnipresence, i 144, 240, 245, 337, cf. ii. 224, 254. Omniscience, i. 329, 332, ii. 254. Ontological argument, i. 214, 226, 229, cf. 191, 247, 323, 454. Opus operatum, iv. 271, 276, 280, 366. Order, God the principle of, i. 269, 277, 284, 308, ii. 200 ; higher and lower, 164, 176, 243. Organism, i 267, 271, 275 ; God absolute, 412, 421, 450 ; the world an, ii. 21, 26, 48, 54, 57, 75, 95, 127, 131, 163, 167; of God's king dom, iv. 381, 431. Organization of Church, iv. 265, 268 f., 326, 333, 338, 340, 350, 370. Oriental thought, ii. 247, 250. Origen, i. 324, 440, ii. 27 f., 32, 40, 187, 336, iii. 46, 49, 207, 220, iv. 9, 11, 13, 314, 406, 415, 419. Original guilt, ii. 340, 343, 348 ff., 353 f., iii 59, 67, iv. 10, 13, 20, 216. Original sin, ii. 302, 338, 341, 347, 354, iii. 11 f., 14f.,17, 42, 51, 55, 74, iv. 25, 29, 96 f., 406; not damnable, 423 ; and freedom, ii. 357, iii. 59, iv. 97. ¦ Osiander, iv. 26, 206. Otto, iv. 342. Paedagogy, Christian, iv. 289 ; of the Church, 299, 304, 338, 341. Pajon, iv. 259. Pancosmism, i. 122 f., 340, ii. 253. Pantheism, i. 48, 123, 200, 204, 231, 234, 241, 339 f., 365, 369, 374, 377, 390, 399, 412, 447, 460, ii. 37, 109 ff., 118, 162, 247, 249, 252, 261; its forms, i. 254 ; dynamic, 255 ; of life, 261 ; of the world-order, 305, 307 ; ethical, 317, 328, 334, iii. 104, 446 INDEX. 108, 121, 200, 215, 255, 288, 307, 321, iv. 48, 140, 259, 379. Paracelsus, ii. 156. Paret, iii. 173. Parousia, iv. 376, 387, 395. Paschasius Radbertus, iv. 315. Passover, iv. 305. Patripassianism, i. 367, iii. 205, 207. Paul of Samosata, iii. 202, 205. Paul, on sin, ii. 305, 307-310, 312, 316-320 ; Christology, iii 172-183 ; on high-priestly office of Christ, 172 ; on justification, iv. 195 f. Paulus, Dr., i. 108. Peip, i. 408. Pelagianism, i. 48, 107, 137, 373, 431, ii. 80, 125, 188, 335, 337 f., 343, iii. 44, 53, 60, 105, 137, 245, 344, 362, iv. 165, 168, 173, 177 f., 183, 190, 299. Pelt, i. 25. Penal desert, iii. 119, 125, 128, 135, iv. 10, 20, 65, 73, 81, 85 f., 101, 106, 115, 148, 188, 233. Persian religion, i. 281 f., ii. 98, -239 ff., 253 f., 261, iii. 26, 92, iv. 375. Person, in Trinitarian sense, i. 379, 448 f., 451. Person in Christ, iii. 293, 308, 310. Personality, ii. 397 f., iii. 31 f., 324 ; of God, i. 260, 319, 337, 339 f., 343, 412, 437 f., ii. 107, 111, 262 f.; and attributes, i. 447, 453 f. ; and per sons, 448 f. ; in distinction from subject, 444; Christian, 153 f., 160, 162, 418, 431, ii. 20, 76, 86, 94, 124, 136, 187, 198, 221, 243 ; of the gods, 250, 252 f. ; and original sin, iii. 51, 55 ; and the race, 54, iv. 89, 92, 94 f. ; and sin, ii. 377, iii. 70 ; and punishment, 119 ; and Christ's office, 280, iv. 143 ; free, and Holy Spirit, 161, 193, 225, 239 f., 336; and sacraments, 276, 325 ; and educa tion, 304 ; perfecting of, 401. Pessimism, i. 125 f., 128, 138, ii. 65. Peter, doctrine of, sin, ii. 305, 316 ; Christology, iii. 159-161 ; high- priesthood of Christ, 417. Peter Martyr, iii. 239. Petersen, iv. 415, 419. Peyrerius, ii. 89. Pfaff, iii. 244. Pfleiderer, O., i. 200, 206, 225, 438 f., 441, ii. 239, iii. 175, 274. Philippi, i. 191, 200, 210, 241, ii. 81, 192, 353, iii. 49, 94, 96, 188, 224, 237, 254, 271, 290, 311, iv. 28, 34, 37, 51, 55 f., 177, 384, 406, 409, 413. Philo, i. 309, 349, ii. 186, iii. 193. Philoponus, i. 385. Phoenician religion, i. 284, ii. 254 ff. Photinus, iii. 202, 205. Phrygian religion, i. 281. Physical, and spiritual, i. 276, 294, 298, 314, 339, 342, ii. 44; and ethical, i 427, 434, 458 f.; deriva tions of world, ii. 9 f., 64, 91, 250, 252 ; conception of evil, ii. 325, 335, 361, 372, 374 f., 386, iii. 31, 39, 51 ; Unio in Christ, 261 ; redemp tion, 427, iv. 3, 50, 62, 76 f., 83, 119, 272 f. ; and ethical in Christ, 135, 145, 416 ; conception of grace, 428 ; of sanctification, 409. Physico-teleological argument, i. 264, 268, 323. Pietism, iv. 71, 205, 284. Piscator, iv. 24. Pisteology, i. 31. Plato, i. 290, 293, 320, 362, 372, 427, ii. 238, 242, 251, 318, 328. 334, 368, iv. 375. PUtt, H., i. 408, iii. 254, 263. Plotinus, iii. 30. Polytheism, i. 215, 231, 237, 272, 274 f., 319, 328, 343, 345, 363, 365, ii. 235 f., 239 f., 245, 248. Ponerology, division, ii. 299 ; and atonement, iv. 1, 4, 20, 22, 27, 75, 177. Potency, i. 258, 260 ; in God, ii. 13, 37; in nature, 43, 50, 90, 137, 387. Power, in Christ's kingly office, iii. 389, 392, 396 ; in His atoning work, iv. 13, 18, 35, 39, 41 ; Christ's, perfectly revealed, 401. Praxeas, i. 368, iii. 204. Prayer, ii. 121, 238. Predestination, i. 299, 333, 336, 430, 462, ii. 332, 341, 356, iii. 16 f., 37, 52, 60, iv. 25 f., 33, 39, 65, 149, 167, 170, 183, 184 f., 224, 260, 285, 287, 348, 409, 422, 428. Pre-existence, of Christianity in God, i. 182 f. ; of the idea of right, 289 ; in Adam, ii. 44 ; of Christ, i 355, iii. 171, 174, 185, 239, 257, 283, 290 f., 294. Pre-existence theory, ii. 88, 93 ; of individuals, 337, 339, 350, 380, iii. 46, 53. Preparation for Christianity, ii. 234 ; even by heathenism, 235 f. Pressense de, ii. 197, iii. 263. Priesthood, iv. 148 f., 188, 264, 267, 335, 396. Principium essendi of Christianity, i. 169 ; cognoscendi, 169. Progress, ii. 54, 70, 74, 99, 121, 124, 136, 139. INDEX. 447 Proof, psychological, for God, i. 214. Prophecy, ii. 61, 140, 176 f, 202, 240, 259, 264, 270 ; and Christ, iii. 400, iv. 152, 262. Prophetic office of Christ, iii. 382, 388, 397, iv. 52, 55, 101, 121, 128 f., 240, 244, 247, 261, 267, 272. Providence, i. 334, cf. 462, ii. 44, 52, 62,157, 168, 225, 237, iii. 78 f. Providentia universalis, etc., ii. 62. Psychological derivation of religion, i. 39, 179, ii. 107. Punishment, i. 298 f., 430, 457, 462, ii. 57, 65, 337, 341, 348, 353 f., 366, 369, 393, 398, 402, iii. 49, 62 f., 69, 71, 76, 95, 102, 114, 120, 126, 134, iv. 417, 421; and sacri fice, iii. 406 ; and atonement, iv. 6, 10 f., 21 f., 28, 30, 36, 40 f., 50, 54, 62, 69, 73, 79, 82, 96, 99, 103, 112, 173, 233, 292 ; none for believers, 83, 119, 202, 229 f., 407, 410 ; Church discipline not, 342. Purgatory, iv. 130, 198, 230, 396, 406, 410. Pusey, Dr., iv. 232, 284, 307, 415. Quakeek, iv. 267, 275, 308. Quatrefages, ii. 92. Quenstedt, i. 196, 201, 241, 325, 328, 330, ii. 29, 187, iv. 27, 36, 173, 203, 211, 293, 392. Quietism, iii. 389. Rathmann, iv. 259. Rational idea of the absolute, i. 227 ; of design, 269, 271 ; of justice, 287 f., 297, 303 ; of the ethical, 311, 316, 415, 434. Rationalism, i. 20, 108, 116, 146, 350, 374, 391, 398, ii. 86, 135, 155, 186, 188, iii. 383, 389, iv. 41, 54, 131, 152, 173, 230, 232, 259. Raymund v. Sabunde, ii. 99. Reason and authority, i. 80 ; and faith, 99, 106 ; and history, 117, 120 ; grounded in the absolute, 228 f. ; and Christianity, 170 f., 181 f., 338, 416 ; and miracles, ii. 42, 81, 91 ; and religion, 108, 1361, 141, 232, 244, 252 f. Receptivity, in cognition, i. 66, 69, 72 f.; for God, 326, 464, ii. 19; of lower for higher, 44, 50, 53, 67, 72, 75, 79, 87, 92, 95, 106, 111, 121, 123, 129, 134, 136, 145, 154, 158, 167, 175, 189, 193, 198, 227, 237, 260; for Christ, iii. 284, 342, 348 f.; for substitution, iv. 89, 93, 97, 117 ; for grace, 165 f., 179, 188, 216, 228, 234 ; of human nature for the divine, iii. 226, 230, 235, 239 ; in baptism, iv. 279, 286, 290, 299 ; in the Lord's Supper, 310, 324 f. Redemption, capacity for, ii. 335, 339, iii' 34, 46 f., 59, 69, 70, 136, iv. 86, 96, 177 f., 180, 184, 234, 363. Redemption, need of, ii. 332, 336 f., 339, 343, 389, 397, iii. 34, 43, 46, 53, 59, 67, 136, 396, iv. 86 f., 96 f., 177, 181 f., 184, 190, 234, 358, 420. Redepenning, iii. 256. Reflection of Christ's offices, iv. 243, 267 ff., 302, 326, 331, 333, 338, 340, 370. Reformation idea of faith, i. 90 f. ; doctrine of Trinity, 395 f. ; more anthropological and soteriological, 395 f., 414 f. ; unites authority and freedom, 428, cf. 414, 436, ii. 187. Regeneration, iv. 164, 178, 186, 192, 196, 229 f., 232, 238, 381 ; and justification, 203 ; and baptism, 278, 281, 288, 292, 295, 301 ; and Church, 299. Reiff, i 41, iii. 383. Reimarus, iii. 245. Reinhardt, i. 201, iii. 49, 52, 244, iv. 41. Religion, i. 119, 122 f., 131 f., 133 f., 144, 153 f., 162, 181, 183, 229, 307, 331, 341, 447. Religion, history of, ii. 233, 245 ; of heathenism, 233. Religions, i. 249 ; their ideas of God, 250, 259, 264, 275, 280 ff., 305, ii. 48, 54, 62, 76, 91, 101, 106 f., 114 f., 133, 139, 194, 237, 245. Renan, ii. 181, iv. 133. Repentance, ii. 304 ; Christ the principle of, iv. 101, 122, 190, 289 ; doctrine of, 187, 206, 228. Resurrection, ii. 84 f., 170, 337; of Christ, iv. 132, 147, 309, 317, 330 ; of the dead, 374, 378, 382, 389, 392, 401, 405 ft'., 410, 413, 433. Reusch, i. 399. Reuss, iii. 189. Reuter, iv. 19. Revelation, i. 92, 100, 107, 179, 182, 229, 237, 342; in O. T., 346; trinitarian, 350, 356 f., 358, 370, 451, 453, ii. 69, 116, 133 f. ; notes of, 135 f. ; form of, 140 ; contents, 199 ; in relation to sin, 202 f. Rhossis, iv. 316. Ribbeck, iv. 277. Richard v. St. Victor, i 393. Riehm, iii. 263, 404, 406. Right, i. 276, 287 f., ii. 200, 243, 257 f. ; a priori, i 288, 292, 303, 310. Rinck, iv. 402, 406. 448 INDEX. Ritschl, i. 189, ii. 142, 234, 243, 305, 368, iii. 45, 72, 121, 124, 126, 270 ; his Christology, 274 f., 344; opposed to doctrine of offices, 383, 386 ; on atonement, 405, 425, iv. 60 ff, 74, 215 ; on the Church, 353. Ritter, i. 71, 130, 188, 227, 363, ii. 50, iii. 201. Rocholl, iv. 140. Roehr, iii. 245. Roman religion, i. 264, 270, 272, ii. 251, 255, 257. Romang, i. 205, iii. 96. Rothe, i. 24, 75, 174, 193 f., 201, 261, 327, 335, 407, 463, ii. 14, 18, 29, 46, 53, 60 f., 103; 107, 141, 144, 152, 158, 161, 163, 165, 178, 181, 192, 352, 366, 375, iii. 13, 21, 32, 84, 96, 104, 255, 263, 321, 349, 355, 373, iv. 108, 133, 136, 153, 353, 379, 413, 425, 429". Rougemont, ii. 199, iii. 331. Riickert, iv. 308. Sabeanism, ii. 98. Sabellianism, i 258, 351 f., 358, 367 f., 379, 388, 398, 421, iii. 205, 208, 245, 255, 257, 285 f., 289. Sack, K., i. 180, ii. 195, 197, iii. 349. Sacrament, iv. 151, 153, 156, 244, 270 ; and Word, 272 ; and faith, 275, 281 ; and Christ, 274 ; and Church, 346, 350 f., 355, 360, 364, 368, 370 f. ; offer of grace in, 286, 291, 300, 312, 329, 337, 423. Sacrifice, ii. 241, 257, 288, 303, iii. 402, 414 f., 421 f., iv. 9, 13, 107, 146. Sadeel, iii. 239. Samson, iv. 79. Sanctification, iv. 24, 37, 55, 72 f., 77, 94, 100, 119, 121 f., 193, 197 f., 201, 206, 209, 212 f., 214, 225, 230, 232, 234, 238, 325, 380, 408. Sartorius, i. 25, 408, 455, iii. 260, iv. 56, 59, 140, 175, 330. Satan, ii. 322, 330, 337, 340, 354, iii. 14, 27, 420, iv. 8f., 14, 16, 20, 51, 54, 76, 120, 128 ; Biblical doctrine, iii. 85 f. ; ecclesiastical doctrine, 91 f. ; dogmatic doctrine, 97 f. Satisfaction, iv. 13, 17, 21 f., 29 f., 40, 68, 83 f., 85 f., 98, 107, 115, 193, 224. Scepticism, i. 61, 110, 112, 122, 124, 128, 223, 255 f., ii. 252, 258, iv. 67. Schelling, i. 115, 131, 198, 224, 231, 233, 249, 252, 309, 314, 400, 406, ii. 12, 38, 40, 69, 89, 99 f., 229, 246, 249, iii. 27, 46, 94, 98, 251, 260, 270, iv. 48, 403. Schenkel, ii. 74, iii. 89, 95, 108, 123, 224, 228, 256, 258, 263, iv. 24. Schefzer, iii. 64. Schiller, ii. 367. Schism, iv. 367, 369 f. Schleiei-macher, i. 20, 34, 37, 130, 1721/182, 199, 205, 208, 227, 242, 245, 313, 333, 401, ii. 29, 59, 61,- 74, 971, 1071, 113, 116, 118,, 125, 137, 144, 152, 158, 192, 194 ; doctrine of evil, iii. 21, 34 ; of Satan, 89, 94, 112 ; of punishment, 126 f Christ ology, 251, 255, 268, 308, 311, 342, 345, 360; of Trinity, 286; of Christ's offices, 383, 387 ; of atonement, iv. 37, 51, 87; of Christ's con tinuous working, 143, 150; of grace, 173; of the Church, 245, 303; of Scripture, 253, 256 ; of baptism, 289 ; of the Lord's Supper, 326 ; of Christ's Second Coming, 382, 386 ; of the Apokatastasis, 4l5, 420. Schmid, C. F., i. 168, ii. 192. „ O., iii. 345. K., ii. 43, 90, 155. H., iv. 46. ,, R., iii. 298, iv. 31S. Schmidt- Warneck, iv. 219. Schmieder, iii. 263. Schneckenburger, iii. 204, 238, iv. 24, 203. Schoberlein, i. 261, 394, 426, ii. 94, iii. 357, iv. 56, 277, 429. Schopenhauer, i. 121, 1261, 276, 400, ii. 361, iii. 27, iv. 47. Schultz, iii. 274, 360, iv. 376, 379. Schultze, iii. 192. Schwarz, iii. 321. Schweizer, i. 38, ii. 106, 147, iii. 382, iv. 24, 65. Science, independence of historical re search, ii. 233 ; among the heathen, 258 ; its abuse, ii. 395. Scienlia Dei libera, etc., i. 325, 327, 336, ii. 13, 351, iii. 50, 53, 64. Scotus Erigena, iii. 30, iv. 419. Scripture, i. 36, 42 1, 91, 95 1, 101, 146 1, 157, 168, 172, 175, 213, ii. 186, 188, 230, iv. 248, 251, 253 1, 2611,327. Self-affirmation or self-preservation, i. 295, 310, 322, 327, 339, 365, 373, 435 1, 443, 447, 455, 460, ii. 12 1, 255, iii. 122, 139, 243, iv. 56, 83 1, 871 Self-attestation of the truth, i. 89 1, 156, 159, 162, 170 1, 181, ii. 186, 230; of Christianity, i. 172, 178, 183 ; of God, 259, 420, ii. 36. Self-communication, i. 311, 365, 370, 376, 443, 447, 456, 460, ii. 12, 16 1, 19, 39, 106, 120, 124, 146. Self-consciousness, i. 601, 671, ii. 67, 72, 83, 94, 120, 184, 198, 2451, 247, INDEX. 449 251, 265 ; dependent on God-con sciousness, i. 75, ii. 118, iii. 23 ; Christian, i. 155, 167 ; triune, 422, 438 1, 451, ii. 13; God's, i 337, iii. 31 ; of Christ, 309, 364, 377 ; new, iv. 161. Self-constitution, ii. 47, 49 ; original in man, 95, 110, 124. Self-determination, i 319, 438, ii. 121. Self-distinction in God, i. 258, 412, 422 ; of God from world, ii. 20. Self-existence. See Aseity. Self-redemption, iii. 136, iv. 86, 178, 218. Self-reproduction, ii. 45, 50, 62. Semi-Arians, iii. 203. Semi-Pelagians, ii 342, iv. 165, 169, 173, 179, 183. Semisch, iv. 9. Semites, ii. 2381, 245. Semler, iii. 93. Sengler, ii. 262, 315, 405. Sensuousness and sin, ii. 366-374 1, 379, 382, 385, 390, 400, iii. 35. Separatism, iii. 390, iv. 242, 357, 364 f. Servetus, i 399. Severus, iii. 216. Sieffert, iv. 134. Simon, iv. 58 f. Simplicity of God, i. 196, 198, 202, 235, 236, 294, 376, ii 58, 61. Sin, its relation to Incarnation, i. 177, ii. 103, 124, 128, 191 1, 201, 202 1, 225, 227, 247, 262, 264 ; universality of, ii. 3041, iii. 11, 43, 133 ; in dis tinction from evil, ii. 371 ; against the Holy Ghost, iii. 72, iv. 94, 287, 417, 421 ; in distinction from guilt, 48 1, 65, 67 1, 72 1, 80 f. ; in the regenerate, 240 ; and error, 369 ; abolition of, 384. Slavic religion, i 282, ii. 253. Socinians, i. 200, 241, 334, 350, 391, 398, 430, iii. 202, 245, 331, 382, iv. 33, 38, 40, 60, 65, 82, 316, 333, 379, 415, 425. Socrates, ii. 238, 368, iv. 174, 431. Solity of God, i 197, 233, 280, 282, 296, 342, 365, 443 1, 458 ; of the God-man, ii. 207, 209 ; of inspired men, 191, 246, 257. Son, i. 350, 383, 425, 434, ii. 40 ; of God, iii. 151, 167, 171. Sophocles, ii. 238. Soul of Christ, iii. 332, 336, 341, iv. 31, 127, 130 ; and body, 413 f. ; its substance good, 427. Soul, sleep of, iv. 403, 411 ; transmigra tion of, iv. 374, 401. Souls, care of, iv. 244, 268, 304, 342. Space, i. 238, 460, ii. 30, 224. Species of men, ii. 89, 92. Dornek. — Christ. Doct. iv. Spencer, iii. 269. Spener, iv. 392. Spinoza, i. 198, 218 ft, 251, 256, 277, 400, 431, 439. Spirit, and nature, i 284 1, 293, ii. 41, 62, 66, 71, 163, 168, 175 ; relation of justice to spirit, i. 299, 304; God, 277, 282 1, 337, 439 ; the Spirit in the O. T., 346 ; triune, 350, 359, 416, 421, 423, 437, ii. 221, 227, 230; man as spirit, 72, 84, 87, 102. Spirit, Holy, iii. 343 1, iv. 143, 146, 154, 156, 193, 197, 231, 235, 240 f. ; and the "Word, 249, 268 ; and the Scripture, 253, 257, 259 ; and com munion, 162 ; and baptism, 278 ; and the Church, 345 1, 350, 366, 371 ; and Christ, 399. Spirituality, i 244, 276, 283, 285, 294, 323, 437, 451, ii. 62. Splittgerber, iv. 406. Stages of evil, ii. 325, 384 1, 391 ; of guilt, iii. 60, 76 ; of death, 118 ; of punishment, 130, iv. 427 1 ; of receptiveness, 91, 93 ; of the sense of justification, 231. Stahl, iv. 56, 353, 358. Stancarus, iv. 26. State, ii. 241 1, 255, 257, 263, 293, iii. 121, 127, iv. 60, 82, 89, 95, 151, 303, 339, 343, 388, 3901 States of Christ, iii. 225, 228, 232, 235 1, 242, 252, 254, 337 ; and offices, 382, 3851, 3901, iv. 32. Staudenmaier, ii. 352. Staudlin, iv. 47. Steffens, iv. 411. Steinbart, iv. 41. Steinheil, iv. 415. Steinmeyer, iii. 173, 263. Steinwender, iii. 298. Steitz, iv. 316. Steudel, iii. 52, iv. 402. Stier, iv. 50. Stoa, i. 307, 320, 362, 368, ii. 242, 396, iv. 375. Storr, i 103. Strauss, i. 318, ii. 154, 284, iii. 188 261, 309, 321, iv. 131, 133. Stroh, iv. 50. Subjectivism, moral, ii. 370 1, 389, iv. 89 ; in Christology, iii. 246 ; in doctrine of atonement, iv. 38, 77, 148, 152 ; in the Church, 156. Subordination, i. 348, 350, 367, 383, 385, 390, 398, 409, 436, 452, iii. 266, 289. Substance, i. 251, 253, 258, ii. 47, 247 ff., 253; in Arius, i. 372. Substitution, ii. 213, iii. 4071, 414, 420, 423, 427, 429, iv. 8, 34, 40, 44, 52, 55, 86 1, 89, 107, 116, 147, 201 ; 2F 450 INDEX. magical and productive, 92, 1181, 151, 161, 193, 216, 234 ; and bap tism, 279, 290, 292, 295, 325. Suffering of Christ, iv. 27 1, 30, 36, 39, 57, 104, 109 ; necessary, 111 ; sym bolic theory, 121. Supererogatory works, iv. 16, 35, 85. Supper, Holy, iv. 244, 272, 293, 305, 324 1, 333 ; partaking of unbelievers, 3181, 3291; exclusion from, 368; and Christ, 399. Supralapsarianism, iii. 33, iv. 170. Supranaturalism, i 20, 37, 991, 103, 107, 116, 147, 179, 244, 3971, ii. 1361, 162, 171, 186, 190, 230, iv. 54, 259. Suso, H., i. 143. Stisskind, iv. 43. Swedenborg, i. 399, ii. 97, 187, iii. 97, 245. Sympathy of Christ, iv. 52, 56, 106, 114, 148. Synergism, iv. 169, 171, 173, 179, 181. Syrian religion, i. 275, 279, 281, ii. 2541, 257, iv. 375. Tatian, iv. 379. Teleology, i. 264, 274, 277, 305, 309, ' 454, 456, ii. 25 1, 32, 36, 52, 67, 71, 84, 901, 120, 144, 157, 169, 179, 224, iv. 374 ; Christian, 416. Terminus gratis, ii. 356, iv. 382, 412. TertuUian, i 81, 164, 366, ii. 103, 219, 340, 350, iii. 208, 257, 294, 298, iv. 314, 406. Testaments, O. andN., iv. 131, 221, 261. Testimonium Spiritus S., i. 92, 95, 97, 172, iv. 71, 1601, 197, 199, 201, 231, 235. Theodore of Mopsuestia, ii. 69, 319, 336, iii. 49, 54, 211, 213, iv. 168. Theodoret, iv. 11. Theodotus, iii. 202. Theologia naturalis, i. 44, 100, 189, 265. Theopaschitism, iii. 257. Theophilus of Antioch, i 240. Theosophists, i 261. Thetie theology, i 22, 170. Thiersch, iv. 353. Tholuck, i. 97, 188, ii. 188, 192, 195, iii. 183. Thomasius, i. 193, 200, 386, 411, 413, 415, 452, 455, iii. 96, 195, 207, 237, 260, 264, 298, 333, 382, 391, iv. 22, 55, 176, 275. Thought, discursive, i. 71, 73 ; on the way to knowledge, 226, 307, 311 ; not absolute per se, 305, 310 ; and mental representation, 441. Thumm, iii. 226, 237. Tichonius, iv. 348. Tieftrunk, iv. 43, 47. Time, in relation to God, i. 238 1, 329, 460, ii. 291, 87, 102, 145, 224. Tbllner, iii. 245, iv. 24, 41. Tradition, ii. 224, iv. 152, 255. Traduciamsm, ii. 88, 93, 340, 350, 352, iii. 298, 301. Transcendence of God, i. 119, 197, 2421, 274, 336, 340, 346, 363, 366, 377, 412, 414, 443, 447, 460, ii. 171, 146, 162, iv. 150, 238. Transubstantiation, iv. 311, 315. Trendelenburg, i. 68, 252, 427, ii. 12. Tridentine creed, ii. 344, iv. 170, 202, 316. Trinity, i. 349-465, 311, 316 ; in the O. T., 345 1; in the N. T., 349 ; in the Apostles, 352; history of doctrine, 361 ; attempts at synthesis, 390 ; positive exposition, 412 ; immanent, logical, 422 ; physical, 420 ; ethical, 419, 426, 456 ; economic implies immanent, 3501, 363 1, 370,417; . connection with divine attributes, 365, 370, 380, 448 ; economic, ii. 17, 20; world-forming, 271, 54, 65, 1451, iii. 286, 291, iv. 189, 158; and baptism, 280. Tritheism, i. 381, 383, 409, 426, 448, 452, iii. 219, 289, 312. T^esten, i. 37, 191, 205, 4041, ii. 192, iii. 96, 260. Typology, ii. 267-270. Ubiquity, iv. 139. Ullmann, iv. 17. Union of natures in Christ, forms of, iii. 210, 217 ; answers to idea of God, 252, 261 ; union and develop ment, 330 ; and atonement, iv. 5, 251, 1251; sacramental in Lord's Supper, 326. Uniqueness of Christ, iii. 347 ; neces sary to atonement, iv. 1071, 117. Unity of God, i. 231, 282, 377, ii. 238, 252, 2541; in Hegel, i 400; as organism, 449, 451 ; of the world. idea, ii. 26 1 ; of the world, 41, 43, 48, 91, 101, 145, 160, 162, 167, 176 ; of mankind, 92 ; of consciousness, ii. 118 ; of nature and spirit, 180 ; of divine and human in history of religion, 198, 235, 242 ; of God and man, iii. 307, iv. 160, 193, 208, 217, 223 ; of Christianity, 271 ; of grace, 272, 324 ; of Church, 151, 339, 341, 346, 348 1, 366, 370, 433 ; of doc trine, 364. Universal religion, ii. 125, 131, 135, 200. Universality of Christianity, ii. 2331; INDEX. 451 of grace, 358, iv. 167, 199, 211, 223, 225, 2361, 287, 405, 409, 419, 4221; of atonement, 251, 131. Urlsperger, i 399, iii. 245. Ursinus, iii. 239. Valentin, i 365, ii. 12, iii. 206, 215. Venturini, iii. 245. Via negationis, ete., i. 202, 268. Vigilantius, iv. 348. Vincentius, ii. 342. Voigt, iii. 260. Vorstius, i. 241. Wagner, R., ii. 94. Walch, i 201, iii. 245. Wegscheider, i. 350, 398, ii. 188. Weiss, ii. 318, iii. 167, 176, 183, 263, 287, iv. 128. Weisse, i 130, 239, 261, 4021, ii. 30, 99, 157, iii. 256, iv. 22, 133, 379, 425. Weiszacker, iii. 189, iv. 72, 84. Werenfels, i. 97. Westcott, iv. 137. Whately, iv. 307. White, iv. 379, 415, 425. Will, i 305, 309, 315, 330, 337, 339, 441, ii. 40 ; divine will as Providence, 54, 61, 721, 81, 201 ; religion not, 108, 110 ; religious, 114, 117, 119, 121, 144, 156, 200 ; and knowledge, 3071, 309, 3361, 368, 381, iii. 332; Ego the product of, 312 f. ; of Christ, 315, 335, 355, 359, 363, iv. 107 ; and faith, 299 ; perfecting of, 431 1 Wisdom of God, i. 191, 273, 277, 296, 303, 311, 322, 3231, 339 ; (in the 0. T. iii 346, 348), 424, 448, 458, ii. 15, 53, 57, 101, 1541, 157, 200, 202, 224, 263, 368, 371 ; and evil, 381, iii. 32, 80 ; of Christ, 397, 400, iv. 152 ; in the doctrine of atone ment, 14, 19, 86. Wolf, i. 98, 399, ii. 65, 86, 110. Wolleb, iv. 24. Word, in the O. T., iii. 147 ; of Christ, iv. 143, 146, 153, 156, 189 ; of God, 244, 247 ; in stricter and broader sense, 249 ; as means of grace, 258 ; ministry of, 263 ; and the Spirit, 259 ; and sacraments, 270, 272, 324 ; and Church, 346, 3501, 355, 360, 364, 368, 371 ; and Christ, 250, 2721, 386. Works, good, ii. 338, iv. 1691, 188, 2331; faith and repentance not good works, 212 ff. ; ana the atonement, 41, 45. World-consciousness, ii. 1001, 154, 1801, 185, 198, 245, 248, 251, 259 ; and God-consciousness, 75 ; new, 155, 166 ; and self-consciousness, 439 ; medium of religious con sciousness, ii. 22, 67, 75, 83. World, government of, i 299, 305, 430, ii. HO; 249 ; and evil, 327, 351, 353, 3651, 388, 393, 397, iii 78, 82, 114, 121 ; and Satan, 102, 108 ; and atonement, iv. 56, 63, 821 World-idea,, i. 293, ii. 16 (cf. 13, 20, 311), 49, 53, 87, 95, 1371, 145, 159, 168. World, origin from God, ii. 91, 13 ; a religious question, 21. World, perfection prepared for, ii. 27, cf. 64, 68, 70, 74, 76 ; of man, 78, 82, 99, 177. Wbrner, iii. 254, 263. Wycliffe, iv. 348. Zanchius, iii. 239. Zeller, ii. 162, iii. 188, 201. Zezschwitz, iii. 268, iv. 128, 215. Zbckler, ii. 89, 91. Zwingle, ii. 347, iii. 49, 238, iv. 311, 3161, 322, 326, 333, 345, 353. END OF VOLUME IV. MORKIBON AND GIBB, EDINBURGH, PRINTERS TO HEK MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. T. and T. Clark's Publications. In Four Volumes, imperial 8vo, handsomely bound, price 18s. each, COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., LL.D. Volume I. THE SYNOPTICAL GOSPELS. By PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., and MATTHEW B. RIDDLE, D.D. Volume II. ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL. By W. MILLIGAN, D.D., and W. F. HOULTON, D.D. THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. Bt the Vert Rev. Dean HOWSON and Rev. Canon SPENOE. Volume III. (Shortly.) Romans. By Philip Sohafp, D.D., and Matthew B. Riddle, D.D.— Corinthians. By Principal David Beown, D.D. — Galatians. By Philip Schaff, D.D.— Ephesians. By Matthew B. Riddle, D.D.— Philippians. By J. Rawson Lt/mby, D.D.— Colossians. By Matthew B. Riddle, D.D.— Thessalonians. By Marcus Dods, D. D. —Timothy. By E. H. Plumptee, D. D. — Titus. By J. Oswald Dykes, D.D.— Philemon. By J. Rawson Lumby, D.D. Maps and Plans — Professor Arnold Guyot. Illustrations -W. M. Thomson, D.D., Author of ' The Land and the Book.' From the Right Rev. the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. ' A useful, valuable, and instructive Commentary. In all the interpretation is set forth with clearness and cogency, and in a manner calculated to commend the volumes to the thoughtful reader. The book is beautifully got up, and reflects great credit ou the publishers as well as the writers.' From the Right Rev.' the Bishop of Winchester. 'I have looked into this volume, and read several of the notes on crucial passages. They seem to me very well done, with great fairness, and with evident knowledge of the controversies concerning them. The illustrations are very good. I cannot doubt that the book will prove very valuable.' From ' The London Quarterly Review.' ' The second volume lies before us, and cannot fail to be successful. We have care fully examined that part of the volume which is occupied with St. John — of the Acts we shall speak by and by, and elsewhere — and think that a more honest, thorough, and, in some respects, perfect piece of work has not lately been given to the public. The two writers are tolerably well known ; and known as possessing precisely the qualities, severally and jointly, which this kind of labour demands. We may be sure that in them the highest Biblical scholarship, literary taste, and evangelical orthodoxy meet.' From • The Record.' ' The first volume of this Commentary was warmly recommended in these columns soon after it was published, and we are glad to be able to give as favourable a testimony to the second volume. . . . The commentators have given the results of their own researches in a simple style, with brevity, but with sufficient fulness ; and their exposi tion is, all through, eminently readable. . . . The work is one which students of even considerable learning may read with interest and with profit. The results of the most recent inquiries are given in a very able and scholarly manner. The doctrines of this Commentary are evangelical, and tho work everywhere exhibits a reverence which will make it acceptable to devout readers. ' T. and T. Clark's Publications. HANDBOOKS FOR BIBLE CLASSES. 'These volumes are models of the multum in parvo style. We have long desired to meet with a Series of this kind— Little Books on Great Subjects.'— Literary World. THE EPISTLE OF ST. PAUL TO THE GALATIANS. mitt) EntrDtfurtttra aitB fiottts [Price Is. 6d. By the Eev. Professor JAMES MACGEEGOE, D.D. THE POST-EXILIAN PROPHET S- HAGGAI, ZECHARIAH, MALACHI. WHLiO) ffnttolmttton anil Jiotes lPrice 2s- By MAECUS DODS, D.D. ' Thoughtful, suggestive, and finely analytical.' — Evangelical Magazine. THE LIFE OF CHRIST. By Eev. JAMES STALKEE, M.A. [Price is. 6d. 1 As a succinct, suggestive, beautifully written exhibition of the life, of our Lord, we are acquainted with nothing that can compare with it.' — Christian World. THE CHRISTIAN SACRAMENTS. By Professor JAMES S. CANDLISH, D.D. [Price is. ed. ' An admirable manual ; sound, clear, suggestive, and interesting.' — Free Church Record. THE BOOKS OF CHRONICLES. By Eev. Professor MUEPHY, Belfast. [Price is. u. 'We know no Commentary on the Chronicles to compare with this, considering the small size and cost.' — Wesleyan Methodist Magazine. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH. OTttfr Introtmction ano faattB [Price 2s. By Eev. JOHN MACPHEESON, M.A. ' This volume is executed with learning, discrimination, and ability.'— British Messenger. THE BOOK OF JUDGES. By Eev. Principal DOUGLAS. [Price u. 3d. ' This volume is as near perfection as we can hope to find such a work.'— Church Bells. THE BOOK OF JOSHUA. By Eev. Principal DOUGLAS. [Prke is. u. THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. By Eev. Professor A. B. DAVIDSON [Shortly. SCOTTISH CHURCH HISTORY. By Eev. NOEMAN L. WALKEE, M.A. [simay. T. and T. Clark's Publications. Just published, Seoond Edition, demy 8vo, 10s. 6d., THE HUMILIATION OF CHRIST, IN ITS PHYSICAL, ETHICAL, AND OFFICIAL ASPECTS. By A. B. BRUCE, D.D., PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, FEEE CHURCH COLLEGE, GLASGOW. 1 Dr. Bruce's style is uniformly clear and vigorous, and this book of his, as a whole, has the rare advantage of being at once stimulating and satisfying to the mind in a high degree.' — British and Foreign Evangelical Review. ' This work stands forth at once as an original, thoughtful, thorough piece of work in the branch of scientific theology, such as we do not often meet in our language. ... It is really a work of exceptional value ; and no one can read it without perceptible gain in theological knowledge.' — English Churchman. ' We have not for a long time met with a work so fresh and suggestive as this of Pro fessor Bruce. . . . We do not know where to look at our English Universities for a treatise so calm, logical, and scholarly.' — English Independent. By the same Author. Just published, Second Edition, demy 8vo, 10s. 6d., THE TEAINING OF THE TWELVE ; OE, (^position of passages in tfje ffiospels Ktfjioitino; tfje Efoclbe IBiscipIes of Sesus ttnoer discipline for tfje ^nosttesIjiiJ, 'Here we have a really great book on an important, large, and attractive subject — a book full of loving, wholesome, profound thoughts about the fundamentals of Christian faith and practice.' — British and Foreign Evangelical Review. ' It is some five or six years since this work first made its appearance, and now that a second edition has been called for, the Author has taken the opportunity to maka some alterations which are likely to render it still more acceptable. Substantially, however, the book remains the same, and the hearty commendation with which we noted its first issue applies to it at least as much now. — Rock. , 'The value, the beauty of this volume is that it is a unique contribution to, because a loving and cultured study of, the life of Christ, in the relation of the Master of the Twelve.' — Edinburgh Daily Review. T. and T. Clark's Ptiblicdtions. Just published, in crown 8vo, price 6s., THE INCARNATE SAVIOUR. A LIFE OF JESUS CHRIST. By Eev. W. E. NICOLL, MA. 'It commands my warm sympathy and admiration. I rejoice in the circulation of such a book, which I trust will be the widest possible.' — Canon Liddon. - ' There was quite room for such a volum&. It contains a great deal of thought, often penetrating and always delicate, and pleasinglv expressed. The subject has been very carefully studied, and the treatment will, I believe, furnish much suggestive matter both to readers and preachers.' — Rev. Principal Sanday. In crown 8vo, Eighth Edition, price 7s. 6rf., THE SUFFERING SAVIOUR; OR, MEDITATIONS ON THE LAST DAYS OF THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST. By F. W. KRUMMACHER, D.D. ' The work bears throughout the stamp of an enlightened intellect, under the teaching of the Holy Spirit, and of a profound study of the Word of God.' — Record. ' The reflections are of a pointed and practical character, and are eminently calculated to inform the mind and improve the heart. To the devout and earnest Christian the volume will be a treasure indeed.' — Wesleyan Times. BY THE SAME AUTHOR. Just published, Second Edition, in crown 8vo, price 7s. 6d., DAVID, THE KING OF ISRAEL: A PORTRAIT DRAWN FROM BIBLE HISTORY AND THE BOOK OF PSALMS. At the close of two articles reviewing this work, the Christian Observer says: 'Our space will not permit us to consider more at large this very interesting work, but We cannot do less than cordially commend it to the attention of our readers. It affords such an insight into King David's character as is nowhere else to be met with ; it is therefore most instructive. In demy 8vo, price 7s. 6<£, SERMONS TO THE NATURAL MAN. Bt WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D.D., Author of ' A History of Christian Doctrine,' etc. ' Characterised by profound knowledge of divine truth, and presenting the truth in a chaste and attractive style, the sermons carry in their tone the accents of the solemn feeling of responsibility to which they owe their origin.'— Weekly Review. In One Volume, crown 8vo, price 5s., Third Edition, LIGHT FROM THE CROSS: SERMONS ON THE PASSION OF OUR LORD. Translated from the German of A. THOLUCK, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Halle. ' With no ordinary confidence and pleasure, we commend these most noble, solemnizine and touching discourses.' — British and Foreign Evangelical Review. . ,;ke ,:;;•- E^SITY LIBRARY 3 9002 05457 9850 J» »fe*? " (X/1 l» «* ' ' "wj'y1. y V*fTV' -r«. V . ¦ *' i 01 ¦v "":-::,:- '¦ - - ?« - • v. .,:'< fi^^mm >#«* ""Je^M.,