J^-Y^Qf^J^Ci-t^"! COMPLETE AI>D AUTHENTIC HISTOEY.- ,\ OF THE BATTLE txirv'BU^KER fflJ J 17^^ if, 1775; DERIVED ?ROM THE BEST AUTHORITIES. BY ALDEN BRADEORD, ESQ. { \ I- .- i BOSTON: J. N. BRADLEY & CO, DAILY MAIL OEFtGE ADVERTISEMENT. The propriety, at this particular time, of publishing a full, and authentic account af the Battle of Btinkjr Hill or Breed's Hill— the opening scene, as it were, of the great drama which gave a nation to the earth — will be ap parent to every mind. Tlie completion of that grtat Monumbnt which is to transmit perhaps to ages yet unborn the fame of one uf the greatest achievements in histi^ry — great in the surpassing brave'J of those who participated in its dangers, and greater in its effects upon the then fearful struggle for in dependence against the most powerful nation of the earth — is certainly an occasion which demands a full, complete, and impsTtial his- lory of the transaction. This history has been given by aioEN Beacfohd, Esquire, in the following pages : and of the truthfulness of this history, no better evidence need be adduced, than the fact that a copy of it was placed among the other archives Under the comtT stone of the Monument. To a former edition of this work (which is now ot ouf print.) Mr. Bradford appended the following remarks : As there have been severaV accounts, here tofore given, of the Battle of Bunlcer Hill, il rnuy be thought unnecessary again to bring (he subject before the public, and irg'possiljle to say any thing of iinportance~'B^t to be found in former narratives. It may be ob served, that some of those accounts have been found to be pariial and incomplete j and that some were written not so much for the purpose of giving a correct vjew of all the events, as, to establish particular facts, before denied or doubted. Jt has been suggested that a more particular yet brief statement of that enterpnze would be acceptable to the public at this time. Inquiries are often made on the subject, and are likely to be re^ repeated, as a formal celebration of that ever memoraiile event is soon to take place. The most correct and perfect account, which has been given, was by Colonel S. Sw«TT, by way of Appendix t» a second edi tion of the Life of General Iskaei Ptttnajb, published about seven years ago. The de sign' of the writer of the following narrative is to give a concise statement, and yet to re cord whatever is material and important. Having examined and compared all iormer accounts with diligence, and received some additional statements, tie believes that it will not be considered a mere republication of oth er and earlier accounts. He has confined himself to the transactions of the day and the event, with reference only to some circum stances closely connected therewith ; nor has he indulged in any remarks which belong more properly to the historian or to the ora tor. BosUm, May 20lh, 1825. BATTLE OF BUNKER OR BREED'S HILL. The battle in Charlestown, Massa chusetts, which was fought between the British and Americans, on the 17th of June 1775, was an event of great interest, and importance. It was the Jiirst real trial of strength and courage between the troops of the pa rent country and of the provinces. The. affair at Lexington and Concord, on the 19th of April preceding, could hardly be called a battle. Though a few guns were fired by the militia as sembled under arms at Lexington, af ter they were attacked, yet no attempt was made by them to oppose the ^arch of the British, who were ten times more numerous.* And at Con- «^rd Bridge, where a part of the Brit ish troops was opposed with much spirit and bravery, there was nothing really deserving the name of a formal battle. Ti]|»^^ritish were pursued, indeed, oa their return to Boston, but in % very irregular manner, as the militia collected on the occasion were not sufficiently numerous to justify them in offering a serious contest. But that at Breed's Hill was a hard ?General Heath says, "The British advan ced towards the militia, ordered them to dis perse, huzzaed, and fired upon them. Seve lal were killed and wounded, and the rest dispersed." Gordon says, "The huzzaing and firing produced an immediate dispersion; though some of the militia fired before op as they were dispersing. The British account was, "that the militia when ordered, to dis perse, immediately retired in confusion)' but that several guns were fired upon the king's troops from behind the stone wall ; by which one man was wounded, and Major Pitcaim's horse was shet." fought battle. Large detachments of American and British troops were closely engaged in martial combat for several hours.* The contest was most severe and bloody. A fair trial was exhibited of the military powers of each. It would seem that a battle must have been expected by the Americans, yet so little was done by way of pre vious preparation, and so unequal were they in discipline, in arms, and in numbers, to meet the British, that it may be considered by some as a rash and imprudent measure to chal lenge an engagement as they did. Tjje event indeed, proved their cour age and heroism, notwithstanding their final defeat. They contended against the enemy with a desperate resolution, as if the liberties of their country depended ¦ upon the issue of that single battle. And perhaps it is not too much to say, that it did so in a great degree.. The British received a formidable check. They had melancholy evi- den^ie of the resolution and bravery of the provincial troops. From that battle they learned to appreciate aright the character of Americans. They were convinced of the great suflfering and bloodshed which would attend the contest in which they were enga ged. And from that day, they feared to attempt (what if they had attempted *The first attack was made between two and three o'clock ; and the Americans did not retreat till about six o'clock. It is said, in a letter from a British officer, that the battls continued for Jiearly four hours. Battle oj nmmf ttm. might have proved most disast(|gs to the American cause) an attack, our undisciplined troops; aiMM , as a regular army, furnigfied vviti necessary military- storAp'and a: they ought to have dotjS We have suggested^ -tnat the'i ¦ of Creed's Hill wkg , krash affal the part of the Americans. If so. considered, at the time, by many judicious men in the Provincial Cons grass andCommittee of Safety, though the majority of the latter did finally sanction the enterprise tven War ren, ardqnt and resolute as he was, ' considej-j&.d it a desperate undertaking. No renisonable man could have suppo sed that the Americans would main tain their position so near Boston, where the British had 10.000 regular troops, and when they, had command of the waters of Chai les river by their ships gf war. Had the latter been as su'ocesslul as they jiad reason to cal culate, t'ley would, with the troops* they landed at Charlestown, have dri ven the Americans| from their works *There are diflferent accounts of the number of British troops engaged in this battle. Some have stated them t^ be three, and oth ers five thousand. General Gage, in his offi cial account, said that there were about 2000 By comparing several early statements, it ap pears thai somewhat more than ihre« thous and first landed at Charlestown, and made two attacks upon the Amfricans : and tha about 1000 passed over afterwards as a rein forcement; and jaining those of the first de tachment who survived,- made the third attack when the redoubt was carried. trhe whole number of provincials eugaged did not, probably, much exceed 2000. Some indeed, have supposed there were only about 1500 Those who went on to Breed's Hill the evening of the 16th, have usually been estimated at 1000 or 1200 : being Prescoti's, parts of Briose's and Fryels regiments, a ue- tachment of 120, wiih four lieutenants, from General Putnam's Regiment, under command of Captain Knowlton ; and one artillery com paoy. The regiments, at this time, consisted of tpn companies of sixiy men each ; but ve ry few of them were full. The reinforce ments, which were sent on the next day, though belonging to several regiments, did not probably exceed 1000, (and some of these arrived only in time to protect and cover the retreat.) "These consisted of two regiments (which afTofded but a partial shelter, almost destitute as they were of can non as well as of powder;) and pur sued th'erh to Cambridge, where gene ra! Ward was stationed with the mam body of the provincial troops ; who would probably have been routed by such a powerful force. Tl e plan of taking possession of the heights of Charlestown was adop ted, in conseouence of intelligence that the British general intended to occupy that position, and also the high land on Dorchester ^ eck, on the south of Boston, in order to extend his situation, and to take advantage of possessing these commanding pla ces, to attack the provincials at Uam- bri.lge or Roxbury, whenever he might think it proper.* It was not (rom New Hampshire, under Stark and Reed; two more companies of Putnam's regiment, commanded by Chester and Clark ; parts of Little's Whitcomb's brewer's, Nixon's, Qer- rish's, iini Gardner's regiments, the latter of which was not ordered oii to the field till a late hour, and after the first attack of the British, though its brave commander was anxious to march at the first alarm. There is proof that only parts, even of those incom plete regiments, were in the battle. *.3oon after the aflair at Lexington and Concord, of the 19th of April, the "minute men" (so called) and others, to the number of about 15 OOU assembled in the vicinity of Boston. Many of them were wiihout efficient and complete equipments. In powder they were very deficient. And as to artiUiyp(,.it was little more than a name. Of thes^men nearly 10 000 ^belonged to Massachusetts ; Connecticut* "New Hampshire and Rhode Island furnished the residue. General Ward was commander in chief by order of Provincial Congress of Massachusetts ; General Thomas was second" in command, and was statio. ed at Roxbury. .»Washington had not taken the chief command. He was appointsd about the middle of June, by the Continental Con gress, and arrived at Qambridee on the 3d of July ; when the troops were soon organized as a national army. It is probable howevet, that before he took the command, all the troops collected acknowledged General Ward as chief; and that there was an understand ing to act in concert, and with some regulari ty and system, though the organization of the troops was not perfect. A contrary supvosi- t:on would imply extreme inattention or want of military knowledge, beth in the Com- Battle of Bunker Hill. until the 15th of June that the Amer icans determined to occupy the for mer spot. Why more time was not allowed for preparation is not known It is probable th,ere was an apprehen sion that the British intended to take immediate possession.* The detachments ordered upon this most hazardous enterprise consisted ol about 1200 men, under the particular , and immediate command of Colonel William Prescott of Pepperell in the county of Middlesex. Far the greats er part of the detachment belonged to Massachusetts, and chiefly in that county, and included a part of Colo nel Bridge's and a part of Frye's re giments, with about 120 from Gene'» ralj" Israel Putnam's regiment (from Connecticut,) with Captain Knowl ton, as their chief officer.^ Putnam mittee of Safety, and in the officers assembled: several of whom had been in the campaigns ol 1756, 1757, and 1758.^ sj ; *It is said by those who were then livin.s, and in a situation to know all the circumstan ces connected with the enterprise, that it was undertaken at the particular instance of Gen eral Putnam, and that Colonel Prescott re quested to have the post, in which he so bravely distinguished himself. Putnam ex pressed the opinion, that something must be done (unprepared as they thei^ were for oflen- aive operations,) to employ the men and to accustom them to 'Military service. He con ducted the expedition to Noddle's and Hog Islands, in Boston Harbour, the last day of May, to prevent a .large quantity of sheep from falling into the hands of the British, in ,which he discovered great activity and cour age ; and on the 10th of June he marched, from Cambridge to Charlestown, with most of the provincial troops collected at the for mer place. This was done in full sight ol the British in Boston, and with a view to ex cite the spirit of emulation and courage in the militia, who were then assembled in aims for the defence of the country. tThongh called General, he had then com maad only of a regiment, which was the case with several general officers in Massachusetts at that time. The other Conecticut troops were stationed at RoxBaty. tJudge Grosvenor, now living, was a lieu tenant in this corps, and was wounded t'je next day at the rail fence. The statement latelj made by him is as follows: — "I was one of the detachment from General Putnam,s re giment, posted at Cambridge. On the even- accompanied this detachment, and according to the testimony of several respectable witnesses who were in the expidition, had the superintendance of itf and ordered where the fort should be ; or gave his advice, which even if he attended as a volunteer, must have had ranch influence. That he had the official and authorised command* may be difficult to prove ing of the 16th of June, Captain JCnowlton, with four subalterns and 120 ".ifen, were de tached aad marc'ned to Breed's Hill, with others of Massachusetts. \ General Putnam was with us a d attended to laying out the ground for erecting the redoubt. He return ed to Cambridge that night, and attended ear ly the next morning. He was on the hill re peatedly during the day ; and particularly at the posting of the troops in the redoubt, and at the arm of the ditch leading north towards Mystic River, and at the rail fence adjoining the river. Colonel Prescott was constantly wifh the troof ^, and commanded in the fort ; but General Putnam was backwards and for wards from Cambridge during the day, to bring on reinforcements. He commanded and ordered the troops engaged with regular ity and satisfaction, so far as I know." — "When the British landed at Moreton's point, the detachment under KnowltoU) from Put- n3m's regiment, was ordered by the General to take post at a rail fence on the left of the breastwork. This was promptly executed. Each man was furnished with a pound of powder and forty-eight balls. No corps was posted at the rail fence, save our own, at the time the fire began." tDiflerent opinions have prevailed on this point. But on comparing all the circumstan- aes and transactions of 'he occasion, by recol lecting the conduct of Putnam, as stated by several persons in the battle, and by other citizens who were on Charlestown heights as volunteers, and by|assuming t^at such an im portant enterprise would not have been under taken by advice of the Council of War or Committee of Safety, without some system (although the short time they had to make arrangement, and the important organization of the American troops prevented it being en tirely regular and complete,) it will appear that he was, in fact, the commander in chief, He evidently acted as such ; and either had the apjpointment by General Ward, or by de- , signation and consent of the Council of War. He superintendwl the works the night of the 16th; was there again early on the morning of the 17th; directed Knowlton to the rail rence, when the enemy landed at Mpreton's Point ; advised to carry the entrenching tools s Battle of Bunhcr Hill. by direct evidence. The orderly book of General Ward is silent on the subject. Putnam was a very ac tive as well as a bra\'e officer, and had seen much military service in a former war between France and England. Colonel Gridley/wdiS also with "the detachment, and acted as engineer. . This detachment of provincial troops proceeded to the peninsula of Charlestov\n late in the evening of the 16th of June. They paused on Bunker H^; but after some consul tation ^hey concluded to advance to. Breed's Hi!!,.Avhich lies nearer to Boston by about 150 rods, and is about the same distance from the banks of Charles River.* It was nearly midnight wlien they began to throw up a redoubt (as had been pre viously ordered by a Council of War at Cambridge,) for a partial defence against the British, who they could not but believe would soon attack them. As a fortress, of which they were to retain permanent possession, they could not have proposed it ; for 19 Bunker's Hill; and there ordered another bjeastwork to be thrown up, though when the enemy advanced to the attack he relinquished it, and marched his men to the lines ; was seen riding along the lines, diiecling and an imating the troops ; and often rode to the Neck and beyond, [n urge on the recruits ; and in company with Prescott, covered the rear of the Americans on their retreat. SiiU perhaps he had not that entire and complete command which would have been given, if the army had been perfectly organize;!, antj the ex|iedition regularly and niaiurely prepare ed. That he wa8 o/ten on Bunker HtU where he could take ^ full view of the whole ground and of all the troops engaged, both British and American, and rode to the Neck to hasten and urge on the reinforcements, instead of re maining posted either at the isdoubtor at the rail fence go to prove rather that he was commander of the expedition, than that he was inacttve or out of place. "¦In a direct line, Copps' Hill, at the north ern part of Boston, where the Britith had a fortress, is about a half a mile fmm Bree'"j Hill, in CharlesKiwn, No reason can he giv en why the Americans chose to f.irtify Breed's rather than Bunker Hill hut that it \va nearer to Boston. Bunker Hill is much more elevated, and would have been more difTicult to attack by the on^my. without more cannon and a greater supply of ammiinitioii, tHey must have known that they could not long hold out against the superior iind formida ble force of the British in Boston. Such was the opinion even of the sanguine and heroic Putnam, eicpress- ly given by hi'm to General Warren, when he came on the field, when the enemy were advancing to the attack. In the course of the night, when the works were in forwardness and the men industriously eiigaged in cOm> pleting them, General Putnam returs ned to his quarters, in Cambridge". But early in the morning, on hearing the cannonade of the British, which began soon after the break of day, from their fort at the northern part of Boston, and their ships of war in Charles River, he repaired again with great alacrity to Charlestown. Du ring the night. Colonel Prescott, at* tended by Major Brooks,* proceeded to the margin of the river, to ascer>- tain whether the British were alarmed and were preparing to attack them ; but all appeared quiet. At an early hour of the morning, Prescott sent to General Ward.f at Cambridge, for provisions and reinforcements. His men were fatigued, and the works *Brooks was Major of Bridge's regiment. He comtnand 'd a battalion of minute men in the affair at Concord, on the 49th of April. During the war of the revolutipn, he held a colonel's commission, and was repeatedly dis tinguished for acts of bravery, and in high estimation as a correct disciplinarian. He died the first of March last, universally re peated and beloved, sincerely and deeply la- tnenied. tit is argued that if General Putnam had the regular and official command of the expe dition, he would have made the request to Ward for provisions and recruits and that Prescott would have applied to Putnam, and not to Ward, for any assistance ha needed. Phit Putnam was on the field early, there is full proof; and it also appears that he was active at the redoubt, and in his endeavors to bring on more men. It is not improbable that he jiiined with Prescott in the message to Ward for reinfoicements. It is evident that there was a want of perfect organization and system iu the military movements of the day. Battle mediately hadbetw^een General Ward and others, as to the propriety of sends ing more troops from the main body at that place. It was believed the British would avail of the circum stance of a great portion ot the .pro vincials being at Charlestown, to make an attack on Cambridge, by passing directly over the bay from the western part of Boston,* disperse the men retained tltere, and destroy the scanty stores collected ; which would J rove a disaster that it would be impossible to repair. It was con sidered necessary therefore, to retain a large force at Cambridge, notwith standing the perilous situation and ur gent request of Prescottl The remainder of Putnam's regi ment, stationed in the easterly part of Cambridge, near Inman's farm, so called, were very desirous of march ing to Charlestown'; but General Ward believed their service would be more important in checking the Brit ish, should they come out from Bos ton and make an attack upon head quarters."!" At a later hrur, however, th«y were permitted to • proceed to Charlestown, for the sil^ipoit of their fellow citizens thtire engaged- These were commanded by Captains Ches ter, Coit,"and Claik, and reached the *At this lime the British had liot landed at Charlestown, and it wiis uncitun where they would make aa attack. tPot a simitar reason, tio doubt, the pro vincial troops at Rnxhury were not ordered to reinforce those at 'Jharle.«town. It would have left the American camp, in that place wholly exposed to the British ; who 'might have easily marched fro.Ti Boston and made an.attack upon it. rail fence, where Knowlton was sta'- tioned, just as the engagement began. At an early hour in the forenoon, Gardner's regiment was ordered to proceed down the Charlestown road, near the foot of Prospect Hill, and there to remain till further orders should be given them.* In this sitU" ation they remained until after one o'* clock ; when seeing the enemy's boats pass over to Charlestown, the Co. one! consulted with his officer, and ii; was agreed to march immediately tg>-tfe5^ heights of Charlestown. X,/^"^ In the meantime, it had,ibeen G^on>. eluded by General Ward to send to Medford for some New Hampshire Militia, under Cols Stark and Reed.t who were ordered to Bunker Hill, for a support to those already there. It was between ten and eleven o'clock when the messenger was despatched from Cambridge with these orders. The brave New Hampshire men sooii prepared to obey. But it was about one o'clock when they left Medford ; and must therefore have been two o'>< clock, or later, when they reached Bunker Hill. They were in season however, to repair to the lines on the left of the redoubt, at the breast work and rail fence (where the Connecti cut troops, under Captain Knowlton, were by the special direction of Gen eral Putnam, already stationed,) when the attack was first maae by the ene my. Putnam, who rode to Bunker Hill and even to the neck, or still farther, to hasten on the reinforcements, wl ich were requested and expected as soon as the British landed at More- ton's Point, met the New Hampshire troops, and entreated their immediate presence at the lines ; with which they as readily complied. He also probably t'irected or advised the posi- tScammon's regiment was ordeired to Lech- mete's Point, and Little's still nearer to the Neck. tThis proves that Ward had \he command , ol all theji'en in the viciitiiy.evcn from oth er colonics ; or that there was a liisposition to act in concert under his direction, for the contm.'in dtfuwi-i. Battle of Bun/cSr~MiU. tion most suitabe for them " to take. Parts of Little's regiment, sent on from Cambridge, and of Gardner's, already mentioned, arrived on Bunk er Hill just before or about this time, and were directed chiefly to the rail fence, but some to the redoubt. At this time also it was, or a few moments earlier (for it was just before the Brit ish made the first attack,) that .Judge Winthrop (as he told me) he saw Put nam and Warren conversing together 'XTittl^n 'he 'ear of the eastern part of theBreastwork on the felt of the for^*, A soldier in Knowlton 's com pany also states that just as the battle begun, he saw General Putnam ear nestly engaged in rallying some men, who were retreating towards Bunker Hill; and that after he had drove back as many as he could, he rode to wards the redoubt. In the '•ourse of the forenoon, not withstanding the heavy "fire of the Bri tish from their ships of war, and their fort in Boston,, a redoubt was thrc/wn up by tl e Americans of about six rods square, and a breast work on the left of it, extendi„ig down the declivity of the hill, about seventy feet. East of this breastwork, and a little northerly in the rear of it, was the rail fence, at which the {ew Connecticut men were first placed, and afterwards the New Hampshire troops and two more com panies of the Connecticut forces, as well as some belonging to Massachu setts, who came on about the same time.* The rail fence stretched al most to Mystick River; and an effort was made by the Connecticut troops, under Knowlton, to render it some thing like a protection, by adding another fence in the vicinity, and throwing up =ome grass recently mown against it. Colonel Prescott commanded in and at the redoubt, which had just been finished under his inspection. He *It appears, from some accounts, that a part of the New Hampshire miliiia, and Kome ot Massachusetts, were placed at the breastwork in the low land between the redoubt and the rail fence. had sent two companies down into the street towards the ferry way to recon noitre, but they were soon recalled and placed in and near the fort. Some of the men with Prescott, were on the exterior of the redoubt, but near it on the right and left. He seems to have had the sole command of this impor tant post, while Putnam was urging on the recruits and inspecting the troops in other parts of the peninsula. Not only was the detachment, un der Captain Knowlton, ordered to the rail fence on the left, but most of the fresh troof)s which come on the fieldy as reinforcements, , were directed to take the same position. The redoubt was sufficiently furnished with men to act with effect, though deficient in cannon, ammunition, and bayonets, to enable them to repel the British who were superior both in numbers and equipments. A part of Little'a regiment seems to have been the only troops ordered to the redoubt, in ad dition to those stationed there at an earlier hour. On the left, at the breastwork and rail fence, a large force became in«. dispensable. The movements of the British soon after they formed for the attack, fully indicated their purpose to march a large detachment near the margin of Mystic River, at a consid erable distance northeast of the re doubt, and then to make an attack in the rear of it. A great portion of i their troops were so disposed of as soon to render this plan most evident; while another party of them preptired to advance Erectly in front of the re doubt, Prescott was in full prepara tion to receive them at the fort ; and all the attention and activity of Put nam were put in requisition to meet them on the left, and to prevent their advancing in that direction. Accor dingly we find, from all the testimony aiven at the time and subsequently that General Putnam was making ev ery possible effort to forward fresh t' oops to that quarter. For this pur pose, soon after the British landed, he rode to the Neck and far beyond, and urged the scattered companies Missing Page Missing Page Battle of ^Bunker Hill. 13 his proposal. The provincials there fore, passed over the Neck ; and sorai posted themselves at Winter and Proipect Hills, within a mile and a halPjOf Bunker Hill, and others pro- ceetJed to Ward's head quarters, at Caraibridge, a distance of about three mile^ Just at the moment the word was given to retreat. General Warren who was near the redoubt, received a mus ket ball in the head, and immediately expired. He was President of the Of the ofiicers killed or mortally wounded in tiie provincial regiments,. \vere General Joskfh Warren, CoU onel Thomas Gardner, who survi ved n few days: Lieiitenaht Colonel Parker, who was mortally wound ed, and died the wfeek( after in pri son in Boston ; Majors M'Clary and Moore. \ The Americans justly |Considered this defeat a great disnste'r,-but they did not despond. It taugh^ them tjj^ courage of their men, and 1*116 ijg^s- Provincial Congress and of the Com- "sity of greater discipline ajiTprepa- ration. Tjie want of^-'system and military subordination was fully per ceived. To this in part, was attribu ted the final failure of that glorious enterprise. It would be unjust per haps, to accuse any one, then in mil itary or civil autnority, of inactivtty, or want of spirit and zeal. The contest was a glorious one to Ameri cans ; for unprepared and unfurnish ed as they were with military stores mittee of Safety at this time; and three days before had been appointed Ma jor General of the Massachusetts trbopS. On this occasion he was merely a volunteer. His ardent and patriotic feelings led him to the scene* ¦ of danger, as soon as he heard the threateiaed attack. He was among the most eminent of the many brave men, who, at that critical period, were ready to sacrifice everything for the liberties of the country. The slaughter on this pccasion was very great. The British.^ had nearly 1800 killed and wounded ; and the Americans e-'stimafed theirs at about 350. Some statements have given different numbers. But the above may be considered as very near the truth. Governor Gage's account, prepared soon after the battle, gave only 30n0 in the engagement ; and 1100 killed and wounded. it was his. policy to make a favorable re pot t. From the most accurate cal culation it is evident that the whole number of the British engaged could not have been less than 4000 ; and soon after the battle it wag reported and generally believed, that the whole number of the enemy killed and wounded amounted to 1500; ninety of which were commissioned officers.* Of the provincials, 250 were wounded and 136 killed and missing ; thirty of the latter were afterwards known to have returned to their respective homes the night follovvi:ig the battle. *ln vol 2nd., Hist. Soc , it ia said moie than 1700 were ktlled and wounded' and implements, a different result could not have been, justly expected. That greater reinforcements were not provided, was perhaps the fault of no individual. But had they been furnished, the British tvould proba bly have b ;en checked and repulsed, in their third attack, at. they were in the two former. The enemy could boast only of having obtained posses sion of the field for which they con tended. But it was not without double-!he number of men to those' witii whom they engaged. And they wf5re convinced by inel.incholy facts, tnat the provincials ware top brave to be despised, or to be attacked ex cept by superior numbers, and with every advantai;;e of a competent ar.- tillery and a full supply ol military stores. *' hough the American troops remained for several months almost wholly uithout cannon, and deficient to an alarmingdegree, of the essentia article of powder, the British made no attack upon their lines, nor at tempted any offensive operations. '•^r^'- p