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PBO. WALEHY.
LOND01I PHOTOCRAVTIBE SYTJD L
THE LIFE

LIEUTENANT-GENEKAL
SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD
V.€., O.O.B., G.C.M.G.,
Knight of the Legion of Honour, Grand Gordon of the Medjidie,
First Class, &c, &c.

CHAKLES WILLIAMS, F.J.I.
Author of " The Armenian Campaign, 1877," " Notes on Transport in Afghanistan, 1878-9,"
" Hoiv we lost Gordon'* <£¦<?., &ct

' Since these arms of mine had seven years' pith
Till now  they have used
Their dearest action in the tented field,
And little of thiB great world can I Bpeak
More than pertaius to feats of broil and battle.
 The story of my life
From year to year ; the battles, sieges, fortunes
That I have pass'd." Othello, Act I., Scene 3.

LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MAESTON & COMPANY
LIMITED
Sit. 39uttfttcn'tf Houtf*
Pettee Lane, Fleet Stbeet, E.O.
1892

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WI.LLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, Limited,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARIKG CROSS.

YALE

Co
THE EIGHT HONOURABLE
GENEEAL SIE GAENET JOSEPH
VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, E.P, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., 4c., &c„
Commander of the Forces in Ireland,
lis fflalmat,

CONTAINING AN IMPERFECT BECORD OF THE NOBLE CAREER
OF HIS "OLD AND DEAR COMRADE," TO WHOM THE
ARMY " OWES A DEED DEBT OF GRATITUDE "
WHICH IT . " WILL BTE-AND-BYE
ACKNOWLEDGE,"
Jfs 'Jirsaibneir
BY HIS EVER OBLIGED AND OBEDIENT SERVANT
CHARLES WILLIAMS

PREFACE.

A taste for Military Biography is one of the features
of the time. There does not seem to be any adequate
reason why it should be confined to worthies who have
passed away. And, in one instance, the demand for a
life of a living soldier, General Viscount Wolseley, was
so great that edition after edition was called for in a
very short time. The life of Sir Evelyn Wood covers
all but the same period as that of his former chief
and warm friend. It is even more romantic. Its active
phases began earlier in youth, and the two careers have
run in nearly parallel grooves. But the story of one
differs materially from the story of the other.
During the late Infantry Manoeuvres in South Hants,
I became acquainted with the fact that Sir Evelyn
Wood's devoted mother, and, after her death, his sister
Mrs. Steele, had, rather to his perturbation, privately
printed, for the benefit of his family, a record of his
Life. The privilege of a perusal of it was accorded to
me, and I conceived the idea that, told on a more
extensive scale, the story was one which could not fail

VI PREFACE.
to interest the world and to prove an example to young
soldiers. But, although it has been my good fortune to
have received the most ample and kindly assistance
from many of Sir Evelyn's brother officers, it is well
that it should be thoroughly understood I am solely
responsible for every statement made in the book, and
that the subject of the work has not seen any
single passage in the text. The reason for this will
be apparent to any one who does me the honour of
reading the book. There are still smouldering contro
versies of which the embers had to be touched, and as
regards which Sir Evelyn's mouth is closed at once by
his official position and by reasons that, if they would
not be binding on everybody, are, at any rate, binding
on him. The whole truth about one of these contro
versies may never be known so long as he lives, but
an adequate idea of it may be obtained from these pages.
I would only add that the composition of the book has
been a labour of love in the intervals of a busy and
active winter.
C. W.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTEE I.
AFLOAT AND ASHORE.
Parentage, Birth and Education — A Distinguished Family —
Larky but Good-natured — Afloat — In the Black Sea —
First Promotion — Bombardment of Odessa — The " saucy"
Areihusa — Heroic Ignorance — Landing Troops in the
Crimea — Ashore — Distinguished Conduct — Shell in the
Magazine — A Veteran's Eeminiscence — High Testi
monials — Badly Wounded — Eecommended for the V.C.
— Commended by the Commander-in-Chief — Leaves the
Navy — Eussell on the Eedan — Wood Conspicuous for
Gallantry ....... page 1
CHAPTEE II.
BOOT AND SADDLE.
A Dashing Dragoon — Eeturns to Turkey — Very ill in
Hospital — Admiralty Meanness — The Legion of Honour
— The Medjidieh — An Historic Parallel — The Indian
Mutiny — "Death or Glory " — -Arrival inlndia — Learning
Hindustani — Outpost Work — In Action — High Praise —
Great Gallantry — Commands a Eegiment at Twenty-two
—The V.C. at last— The " Penn'orth of Bronze "—A fine
Testimonial — Unjustly censured — Between two Fires — ¦
Euming a Eajah — A beau ideal Sowar — Promised another
Eegiment — Home Again— Major at twenty-four — Eiding
a Giraffe — Bobbed but not Murdered . . . .16

Vill CONTENTS.
CHAPTEE III.
STUDY AND STAFF WORK.
Desk % Work — A.D.C. in Ireland — An Essex Highlander —
Another Exchange — Brigade-Major at Aldershot — After
the Fenians — Good Practice — An " Help-meet " — Staff
Promotion — Enters the Temple — Another Exchange —
Wood with Wolseley — Selected for Active Service, page 43
CHAPTEE IV.
ASHANTI AND HOME AGAIN.
Off to Ashanti — The fault of the Dutch — A broken Eeed —
Frightened Fantis — Breaking the Spell — Harassing the
Enemy — An Ashanti Panic — High Commendation — King
Coffee's double face — Again wounded — The Advance on
Coomassie — Whipping into Action — Two of the 90th —
The C.B. — Called to the Bar — Honours and Offers —
Away to South Africa . . . . . .52
CHAPTEE V.
IN KAFFIKLAND AND ZULULAND.
Eestless Kaffirs — Clearing the Bush — A Skirmish — Cutting
tracks— Kaffirs " On the Jump "—The Chief Slain— More
commendation — Commanding at Utrecht — A long March
— Ketchwayo's raiders — Discontented Boers — A serious
Eesponeibility — The right thing to do — Boer Allies —
A mapless Eegion — Frontier Dispositions — Coercing
Ketchwayo — An Independent Command — A Patrol at
Midnight — Zulu Drill — Disaster at Isandhlwana — Posi
tion at Kambula — Buller raids — A party Assegaied — A
careful Ofiicer — -A plucky Sergeant — A Chief Submits—
Wood Brigadier-General and K.C.B. — Zulus impressed —
In the Morning Mist — Shot from a Cavern — A Narrow

CONTENTS. IX
Escape — Sad loss — The Modern Troglodytes — A Costly
Diversion — Boers and Natives desert — Zulu Advance —
A Narrow Escape — A Fog Envelope— Zulu Hurry —
Battle of Kambula — Ten to One — The Official Eeport —
Heavy Zulu loss — The famous Flying Column — Ap
proaching Ulundi — Total defeat of Zulus — Compliments
from Sir Garnet — The Eapture of the Fray — Presenta
tions of Plate — Welcome Home — County Compliments —
Dinner from the Bar — Eegimental Colours — High Ideals
— A sad Mission — The Prince Imperial — Carey's Flight
— Sixteen Wounds in Front — Funeral Honours — Belfast
and Chatham ....... page 66
CHAPTEE VI.
AMONG THE BOERS.
In Boerland — A Eevelation — Preparing for a Struggle —
Ministerial vacillation — The Boers' High Hand — The
94th attacked — Sir G. P. Colley advances — Two Eepulses
— Soldiers and Politicians — Laing's Nek — MajubaHill —
Boers Victorious — Colley killed — Wood in Command —
Also High Commissioner — " Backing and Filling " —
Wood advises Fighting — Boer Treachery — Bi-lingual
despatches — " Friendly Communications " — Wood pro
mises victory — His Political Position — Being Supplanted
— Eepublican Flag Lowered — Meeting the Boers — The
British Surrender — Falsehoods in Parliament — Sham
Eesponsibility — Crafty Designs — An Exposure — Lying
Legitimate — Eoyal Commission — Wood Dissents — A
Shameful Convention — Compromising Compliments —
Again at Chatham— G.C.M.G  121
CHAPTEE VII.
IN EGYPT.
Arabi Pacha — Bright and Bombardment — French Fractious-
ness — The Facts of the case — Sir S. Northcote's Views —
b

CONTENTS.
Danger at Constantinople — Wood at Alexandria —
Wolseley's Plans— Arabi Misled— The Fortune of War
—A Brigade eating its Heart out — End of the Kebellion
— Parliamentary Thanks — Appointed Egyptian Sirdar-
Creating an Army— The Feeble Fellaheen— The Indian
Model— Formation of Staff— The first Eecruits— Very
raw Material — The Cholera Comes- — Charles Baker —
Disasters inthe Soudan— The- Mahdi— A Plucky Com
mandant — Gladstonian vacillation — The Eescue of
Gordon — Wood's services — Passing the Cataracts —
Advantage of Naval Training — Line of communications
—Chief of the Staff— Off to Gakdul— Wood fired at—
Eesigns as Sirdar — Thanks from the Khedive — A grand
Decoration — Thanks from the Government — Invalided
home — Empty Thanks  page 159

CHAPTEE VIII.
HARD WORK AT HOME.
The Army's Chief Eeformer — Setting up Supply — Teaching
Night Attacks — Long Distance Eides — Mounted Infantry
— Its History — Skobeleff on Sharp-shooters — Wood on
Mounted Infantry — Proposed Scheme — Bianconi cars —
Complimented concerning Colchester — Improved Fire
Tactics — Transference to Aldershot — Decentralisation —
The Army Service Corps — Useful Eeforms — Economy
and Efficiency — Feeding for work — Improved Vaccine —
The School of Cookery — Transforming Aldershot —
Instructive Manoeuvres — Soldiers' Privileges . . 205
CHAPTEE IX.
SIR EVELYN AS A SPORTSMAN.
A Mighty Hunter — A tender-hearted Soldier — The Hamp
shire Packs — Sport encouraged — A Bayard of to-day . 240
Appendix ......... 248

THE LIFE OF
LIEUT.- GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.

CHAPTER I.

AFLOAT AND ASHORE.

Parentage, Birth and Education — A Distinguished Family — Larky
but Good-natured — Afloat— In the Black Sea — First Promo
tion — Bombardment of Odessa — The " saucy " Arethusa —
Heroic Ignorance — Landing Troops in the Crimea — Ashore —
Distinguished Conduct — Shell in the Magazine — A Veteran's
Eeminiscence — High Testimonials — Badly Wounded — Eecom-
mended for the V.C- — Commended by the Commander-in-
Chief — Leaves the Navy — Eussell on the Eedan — Wood
Conspicuous for Gallantry.
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Evelyn- Wood, V.C,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Knight of the Legion of Honour,
and Grand Cordon of the First Class of the Order of
the Medjidieh, was born at Cressing, in Essex, on
February 9th, 1838, the youngest son of the Eeverend
Sir John Page Wood, Baronet, vicar of the parish,
and subsequently rector of St. Peter's, Cornhill, in the
City of London, of which his father had been Lord
Mayor, while Sir Evelyn's uncle was Lord Hatherley, B

2 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Vice-Chancellor and Lord Chancellor of England. The
City of London has given many great men and great
families to this country, but scarcely one house in our
days which has attained equal reputation.
When he was nine years old he was sent to Marl
borough, where he remained two years in what is called
the Grammar School, and in February, 1849, he was
passed on to the " College." Here he remained for
three years, and was just fourteen when he left it to
enter the Eoyal Navy. Several of his contemporaries
remember nothing very particular about him ; others
have a lively recollection of his amiability, while a
certain combativeness appears to have impressed others.
But all these impressions are inevitably coloured by the
knowledge of subsequent years. His house-master was
the Eev. Frederick H. Bond, who tells me that the
" so-called house-masterships of the early days of Marl
borough College implied so very slight a connection
between master and pupil that, unless there was some
other tie between them, it led to no intimate knowledge
of conduct and character, such as nowadays generally
follows this relationship in our public schools." Mr.
Bond adds, that Master Wood was a pupil " durino- that
short but trying period of comparative insubordination
in the school, about which so many absurd exaggerations
appeared in the ' School Magazine ' in after years,
when it was the fashion there to ignore all the diffi
culties of the early start, and to speak contemptuously

A NAVAL CADET. 3
of the ' Dark Ages ' of the school." The Eev. John S.
Thomas, the present Bursar, says that
"Sir Evelyn joined the school in February, 1849, at
the age of eleven, and left us at Easter 1852, when he
immediately entered the Navy. I joined the school a
year before he did and I was two years older than he,
but I remember him very well, although we were not
intimately associated in our school life. He was, as I
recall him, an exceedingly high-spirited active little
fellow, who entered with delight into every enterprise
which suggested a lark, and a vent for the superabun
dance of his own spirits, but always with absolute good
nature." One who knows him well says, " Here, at least, the
boy was father of the man."
Unlike the naval cadets of to-day he went through
no training-ship course, and was, perhaps, none the
worse officer on that account ; but, having passed the
required examination on April 15th, 1852, he joined
H.M.S. Queen, under Captain Charles Wise, in the
Channel Fleet on July 3rd. On the 14th April, 1854,
a memorable year for many another besides Cadet Wood,
he received the following certificate from his uncle,
Captain Michell, who had succeeded Captain Wise :
" These are to certify the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty, that Mr. E. Wood served as naval cadet on
board Her Majesty's ship under my command, from the
B 2

4 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
3rd day of July, 1852 (with an original entry of the
15th of April, 1852), to the date hereof, during which
time he conducted himself with diligence, sobriety, and
attention, and was always obedient to command.
"Given on board H.M.S. Queen, this 14th day of
April, 1854. "Fred. T. Michell, Captain."
H.M.S. Queen had joined the Fleet at Constantinople
in the latter part of 1853, and in January had gone on
into the Pontic Sea, of which, under its more familiar
name of the Euxine, Lord Byron has made an oppro
brious remark. The occasion of this move was the
Eussian massacre of Turkish sailors at Sinope or Sinoop.
Thus, even in the first stage of his public life, had the
parson's young son some experience of " the Operations
of War." And it was while waiting for the develop
ment of diplomacy that he passed his examination for
midshipman according to the following certificate :
"Pursuant to an order from Fred. T. Michell, Esq.,
Captain of H.M.S. Queen:
"We, whose names are hereunto subscribed, have
examined Mr. Evelyn Wood, naval cadet of H.M.S.
Queen, touching his qualifications to serve as a midship
man in Her Majesty's Navy, and find as follows : —
" He produces logs for the period he has served as
naval cadet, and certificates of his conduct during that
period : he also affords satisfactory proof of his being
fourteen years of age.

HIS FIRST FIGHT. 5
"He has a due knowledge of arithmetic, geometry,
and trigonometry, and a practical acquaintance with
the use of the quadrant and the manner of making
observations for ascertaining the latitude and longitude
therewith, and he can keep a ship's reckoning by the
common rules usually called a ' day's work ; ' he has also
a due knowledge of steering and managing a boat under
oars and sails, and of knotting and splicing.
"Given under our hands on board H.M.S. Queen, in
Kavarna Bay, this 15th day of April, 1854.
" F. W. Burnett, Commander.
" John N. Laverty, Naval Instructor.
"Approved, Fred. T. Michell, Captain."
Mr. Wood was entitled to wear the white patch on
the collar just one week when he was under fire from
the batteries protecting Odessa, which was bombarded
by his ship. The occasion was exciting enough. I do
not find any mention of Midshipman Wood in the
records of this, his first fight, but he saw a sight which
may well linger on his memory, for probably no man
will ever witness such another in all the ages to come.
These were the times when the steam wreath (to adopt
Mr. Cholmondeley Pennell's beautiful idea) had not yet
wholly wrapt the white-winged fleet — " meet cloak ! it
was their winding-sheet." In the Black Sea squadrons
there were many powerful and beautiful ships as yet
propelled by sails alone. Among these was the
Arethusa, a fifty -gun frigate. The vessels went in one

6 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
after the other and engaged the batteries ashore (where
just a little before H.M.S. Tiger, having got aground,
had been obliged to strike to a battery of horse-
artillery) . When it came to the turn of the Arethusa
she went in like the rest, without any steam power to
bring her out. The Admiral signalled to her to come
back ; but her captain, though he had not a blind eye
like Nelson, had as good an excuse. He replied to the
signal, " Not understood ! " and took his beautiful craft
in under all plain sail, delivered his broadside, came
round, and in coming let fly with his stern guns, and
then, completing his pivot movement, delivered the
other broadside and got out unharmed, amid the hearty
cheers of the fleet. If Henry Evelyn Wood took no
leading part in this his first smelling of gunpowder, no
great time was to elapse before he made a name that
many of his seniors might well envy. In May, June
and July his ship was cruising off Sebastopol, prevent
ing the Eussian vessels in the harbour from repeating
their Sinope feat, which they seemed indisposed to
attempt in view of the presence of British sailors. On
the 14th and 15th September Mr. Wood was engaged
in boats landing troops at Eupatoria, responsible, though
not, under the circumstances, distinguished work. On
the 20th of the same month he had an opportunity of
seeing part of the Battle of the Alma from the tops of
the Queen ; and when Balaclava was, according to Sir E.
Hamley, stupidly made the base of operations, he was

ASHORE IN THE CRIMEA. 7
transferred thither for service in the Naval Brigade.
In less than a week after joining ashore he had nearly
won the Victoria Cross, then " in the air " but not yet
gazetted for sixteen months more, having volunteered
to lead a working party which brought into cover a
quantity of powder under a heavy fire from an exposed
position just where the fire of the Eedan and the Malak-
hoff crossed. Almost a twelvemonth later Captain
(afterwards Sir) William Peel, E.N., wrote to the Eev.
Sir John Page Wood, Bart., as follows respecting this
act :
" September 6th, 1855.
" Your son was only known to me through his gallant
behaviour. On the 17th of October he volunteered,
with Mr. Daniels, my other A.D.C., to bring up powder
from the rear through a fire which daunted others ; and
the spirit he showed on that occasion was not exceptional,
but was maintained throughout. It was the more noble
as there were no spectators. The names of these two
heroes are known through the whole army, and I almost
thought it inconvenient having two such spirits round
me. I trust his wound is doing well, it must be very
tedious and painful. " Yours very truly,
"William 'Peel."
The next day after this powder expedition, the
young middy contrived to again distinguish himself,
and in the course of the afternoon, standing in the

8 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
21 -ton battery, Captain Peel thanked Mr. Wood, in the
presence of the guns' crews under his command, for
having mounted and extinguished, under a very heavy
fire from the Malakhoff and the Eedan, the roof of a
magazine which had been set on fire by Eussian shells.
A senior officer twice shouted in tones of alarm that
there was a shell in the magazine which lay under
the parapet of the battery. When he turned round, the
Essex midshipman was seen serenely, if vigorously,
trampling out the incandescence of tarpaulin and wood
which had resulted from the explosion of the projectile,
and which would, no doubt, have ultimately, if not
quite immediately, reached the combustibles within.
These two acts Captain Peel specially reported to Lord
Eaglan, the Commander-in-chief; and later in the
winter, his lordship, in presenting Mr. Wood to Marshal
Niel, mentioned them to the future victor of Solferino.
The winter passed ; how, only those survivors know
who declare with Sir Evelyn Wood that the safety of
the force was due to nobody so much as to William
Howard Eussell. In the spring began the Second
Bombardment ; and on the 9 th of April Mr. Wood was
again thanked before his men for the heroic act of
repairing the parapet, at an angle of the 21 -ton gun
battery, under the same very heavy fire which had des
troyed it. But there was no other, no head-quarters
or national reward, for an act which would have
won the Victoria Cross for an older hand. Already the

BEAUTIFUL COURAGE. 9
midshipman had seen this coveted distinction given to
Mr. Daniels for the achievement of the 17th of October,
in which Mr. Wood had unquestionably set the example.
Sir William Peel, however, did what he knew would be
very grateful to his youthful subordinate when he wrote
Sir John Page Wood, under date H.M.S. Leander,
April 18th, 1855 :
" You will be glad to hear that not only did your son
show the most beautiful courage in battery, but his
conduct and manners are as exemplary as his courage."
A month later Sir William got Mr. Wood appointed
his aide-de-camp, as the letter of the 6th September has
already shown. Here may well be introduced a letter
sent last autumn to a distinguished officer from Sergt. -
Major H. Burke, 1st V. B. Queen's West Surrey Eegi
ment, which tells of two of Wood's exploits :
" Sir, " In forwarding you my record of service for your
recommendation that I may be granted by H.E.H. the
C. in C, the medal and annuity for long and meritorious
service — I beg to inform you that during the Crimean
War, in the 21 -ton gun battery, in which General Sir
Evelyn Wood, who was there a midshipman in the
battery, a tumbrel of powder came up one morning in
the early days of the siege, and Captain Peel and a
Naval officer called for volunteers to empty it into the
I was one of the men who came forward to

10 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
do so. Sir Evelyn Wood, as the midshipman present
at the occasion, will perhaps recollect Captain Peel's
words after the tumbrel was emptied — they had no busi
ness to send powder at that time of the day, and that it
should have been sent up at night ; if a shell happened
to strike it, it would be serious, and he would report
it. I think also he was the midshipman who, where
our battery blew up a magazine at Malakoff (and we
cheered) took the Union Jack off the bank and planted
it on the parapet. He hardly got down when a round
shot or shell from the enemy's batteries cut the staff.
He mounted the parapet a second time and called to
some tars to bring him some sand-bags to prop it up.
He scarcely had got down the second time when it was
struck for a third time, and on getting up, finding there
was no staff to plant it by, spread it out on the top of the
parapet. If, sir, you would kindly ask General Sir
Evelyn Wood, having served under fire with him in
the Crimea, to interest himself in your recommendation,
and use his great influence with H.E.H. to make my case
a special one — after nearly fifty years in Her Majesty's
service in different parts of the world, as will be seen in
my record, I shall be ever grateful to him."
In due course came along another achievement,
destined similarly to go unrewarded, except for a barren
notice twice in despatches. It was on Waterloo day
that this act of derring do was accomplished, and with
it ceased for a time the active work of our middy. An
assault was made on the Eedan. This is not the place

STORMING THE REDAN. , 11
to describe the plan of operations, and their result.
They are written by an immortal pen on paper that will
never fade. The Naval Brigade was mainly told off to
the right storming column. During the assault Wood
was twice wounded, but he insisted on going on, and
he actually carried a ladder to the abattis, and was the
only naval ofiicer engaged who reached the Eedan. Sir
Stephen Lushington commanded the Naval Brigade at
this time ; and he wrote the following letter to Captain
Michell, whose father (Wood's grandfather), had been
Captain Michell, E.N., and admiral in the Portuguese
service : " Camp before Sevastopol, 10*30 a.m.
" June 19, 1855.
" My dear Michell,
" You will be sorry to hear your young nephew
Wood has been wounded by a grape shot in the arm.
The shot struck the bone obliquely, and was cut out
when he got into camp. I saw him in the trenches,
and he bore it like a hero. He was Peel's aide-de-camp ;
and Peel endeavoured to keep the boy from the murder
ous fire into which they plunged with the scaling-
ladders, but he would take no refusal, and went out
with the rest. Wood will be at Kazatch to-day, in
Lord Eaglan's carriage. Will you have a boat ? "
Captain Peel also wrote to his brother Frederick, who
was a year older than himself, and six years older than
the present Speaker of the House of Commons — three
sons of whom even a great Prime Minister might well be

12 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
proud, if there is consciousness beyond the grave. He
said :
" Would you let Sir Page Wood know that his gal
lant son behaved with extreme intrepidity ? He was,
or is, my aide-de-camp, and received a severe wound
from a grape-shot, but will not lose his arm. I can
assure you that I thought more of that boy than
of anything else, and tried in vain to plead some
excuse for getting him out of the way ; but he would be
my aide-de-camp, and it would have been a worse blow
to have denied him. Thank God ! he is safe ; and it
was such a relief to me."
No sooner had Lord Eaglan heard that Mr. Wood
was injured, and would have to go on board, than he
ordered his carriage to be at his disposal to the port,
and sent a staff-officer to say so. Nor did his appreci
ation of the bravery of our hero stop there, for, in reply
to a letter from the young man's uncle, he wrote :
"I am very glad to have had the opportunity of
being in the smallest degree useful to your nephew,
Mr. E. Wood, whose distinguished career cannot fail to
enlist everybody in his favour. I am rejoiced to hear
that he is going on well."
Whose distinguished career ! It is a commendation
to have lived for, and died for, from one's Commander-
in-chief. But " the boy " of Lushington, " that boy "
of Peel, was only seventeen years and not four months

MORE KICKS THAN HONOURS. 13
old when he was sent on board the Queen, after nine
months' service ashore, during which he never missed a
day's duty. He was never to do another under the
pennant. Dr. Liddell, the Director-General, described
the wound as follows : — " Struck on the left fore-arm by
a grape shot which entered the posterior aspect of the
arm, glanced from the ulna, which it laid bare, and
passed underneath the integuments to the front of the
forearm, where it lodged." The shot was extracted the
same day. Admiral Lushington gave Wood balm for
his wound by informing him that he had been recom
mended (at last) for the Victoria Cross, his name
standing third on the list, in order of merit. But he
did not get the decoration, though this was the third
time he had fairly won it. The world is for those who
know how to wait. But it is scarcely surprising that
Mr. Wood was rather sick of a service in which work
was so hard, knocks so plentiful, and recognition so
scanty. Lord Eaglan, indeed, mentioned him in des
patches as having " particularly distinguished " himself,
and working throughout the whole siege ; Admiral Lush
ington not only gave him a formal certificate but added
" an extra " : "I can strongly recommend this young
officer for his gallantry and good conduct during the
whole time he was under my command." And, when
the City of London entertained the Naval leader at
a banquet, Wood was one of three Lord Lyons
thought it right to mention with especial encomium :

14 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
" All behaved well ; but I doubt if in the whole history
of chivalry we could find anything finer than the
conduct of Captain Peel and his two gallant aides-de
camp, one of whom was wounded placing the scaling
ladders against the walls of the Eedan," the " one "
being now Sir Evelyn Wood. For three weeks he
remained on the Queen in hope of getting ashore again,
but as he did not mend rapidly he was sent to the
Sailors' Hospital at Therapia, and after a while to Eng
land. At home he seems to have exercised a very
great deal of the sagacity which has long distinguished
him. He appears to have thought that there was no
great chance for an aspiring man in the Navy. He was
not yet eighteen, it is true, and with luck he might ex
pect in due time to attain flag-rank. But the war was
languishing to its close ; and he had seen enough of the
Navy to know that in time of peace the opportunities
of distinction are for the naval lieutenant few and far
between, while in time of war he gets more kicks
than decorations. However this may have been in his
case, he determined to leave the Navy, and he sent in
his resignation to the Admiralty on the 7th September,
being then only seventeen years and seven months old,
and with a reputation that many an admiral might be
proud of. With unusual promptness, the Whitehall
magnates accepted the resignation, and expressed their
regret " that so gallant an officer is lost to the Naval
Service."

russell's record. 15
Dr. W. H. Eussell, in his invaluable book on " the
British Expedition to the Crimea," thus refers to the
close of Wood's naval career, in the account of the
assault on the Eedan :
" The detachments from the Naval Brigade consisted
of four parties of sixty men each, one for each column,
but only two of them went out, the other two being kept
in reserve ; they were told off to carry scaling-ladders
and wool-bags, and to place them for the storming
parties. Captain Peel who commanded was wounded,
his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Wood, the then midship
man of H.M.S. Queen, displayed the greatest gallantry ;
though badly wounded in the arm, he got up to the
abattis and rendered himself so conspicuous for a
gallantry, of which he had indeed given several proofs
on previous occasions, that Lord Hardinge presented
him with a commission in the 13th Light Dragoons, on
his expressing a wish to change into the Army."
And, respecting the opening of the Second Bombard
ment in April, though he does not refer to the exploit
at the parapet, Dr. Eussell shows in a few living words
something of the conditions under which it was achieved.
"The Sailors' Brigade suffered very severely; although
they only worked thirty-five guns in the various batteries,
they lost more men than all our siege-train, working, and
covering parties put together."

1G LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.

CHAPTEE II.
BOOT AND SADDLE.
A Dashing Dragoon — Eeturns to Turkey — Very ill in Hospital —
Admiralty Meanness — The Legion of Honour — The Medjidieh
— An Historic Parallel — The Indian Mutiny — " Death or
Glory" — Arrival in India — Learning Hindustani — Outpost
Work — In Action-^High Praise — Great Gallantry — Com
mands a Eegiment at twenty-two — Tho V.C. at last — The
" Penn'orth of bronze " — A fine Testimonial — Unjustly cen
sured — Between two Fires — Euffling a Eajah — A beau ideal
Sowar — Promised another Eegiment — Home Again — Major at
Twenty-four — Eiding a Giraffe — Eobbed but not Murdered.
There is something more than a suspicion of a pre-
arrangement about the resignation of Midshipman Wood.
There was not much fame left for him to earn in
the Navy, and if his soul yearned for something more
active than keeping harbour watch, or looking after the
.holystoning of decks, or sounding for coral reefs, or
winning prize money over a slave dhow, his attitude
is at least comprehensible by the landsman. It is re
ported of the late Admiral Farragut that when some
long-shore man asked him where he would like to be in a
future naval battle, he replied " Give me at least one foot
on the shingle every time." Mr. Henry Evelyn Wood

A BAD LOOK OUT. 1 7
was to see his future fighting ashore. He had been in
Eussia as a sailor, he now sought to go there as a soldier.
On the morrow of his resignation from the Navy, he
entered the Army as a cornet in the 13th Light Dragoons,
now the 13th Hussars. His commission was given him,
we have seen, without purchase, probably at the instance
of Lord Eaglan, and expressly as an acknowledgment of
his services in the Crimea. The Blue and Buffs were in
Turkey, and Cornet Wood, having joined the depot at
Dorchester on the 1st of October, left it and embarked
for Constantinople five days before Christmas. If, in
that time, he passed Eiding School, he could have
known nothing about riding before, since every Eiding
Master knows, or is ready to maintain, that it takes
three months to get rid of the civilian seat. But this
by the way. He got to his regiment, one of the juniors
in which was Col. Stanley Clarke, now equerry to the
Prince of Wales, and had not long joined when his
former privations and the terrible winter of the Byzan
tine Bosphorus told their tale, so he went down with
diarrhoea, low typhoid fever, and pneumonia of the right
side, accompanying disease of the apex of the right lung.
Five days out of hospital, and nearly two months in,
at Scutari, brought him to a state of partial convalescence,
thanks to the nursing of his mother, Lady Wood, who
devotedly went out to look after her beloved boy. But
peace was concluded, and there was no use in staying,
even had the doctors been willing. He was compulsorily c

18 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
invalided home, being allowed the special privilege, in
consequence of his weak state, of having his regimental
servant with him. Meanwhile his people at home had
bought him a step, and he became lieutenant a week
before his eighteenth birthday. He reached England on
May 16th, and, little more than a month after, he was
decreed a Chevaliership in the Legion of Honour. Thus
he was rewarded by a foreign country before his own
land gave him so much as a medal. Nay, more, the
Admiralty had the incredible meanness to strike his name
out of the list of recommendations for the Victoria Cross,
on the ground that he had left the Navy, declaring that
it meant to reserve the decoration for those afloat. On
this matter Sir S. Lushington characteristically wrote
the young chevalier : " You have no one in the world
to thank for the Legion of Honour but your own gallant
conduct throughout the war, from the day you made me
a saucy speech when acting as my guide, to the last
crowning act when you walked up from the Eedan with
a huge grape shot sticking in your arm, and which, by
the way, I took for the bone protruding. I still hope to
see the Victoria Cross on your breast, though it does look
as if the said cross has died a natural death. With that
I had something to do." It is not clear whether the
Admiral had something to do with the death of the
cross, or with the recommendation of Mr. Wood for it ;
there is probably a little of both meanings in the
phrasing, as there was, and to some small extent is, a

WOOD AND PETERBOROUGH. 19
school which believes there should be no rewards for
acts of exceptional valour, since every act of valour
comes within the plain circle of a soldier's or sailor's
duties. Long after the Admiralty had struck the name
of Wood from the list of those recommended for the
bit of blue ribbon and the penn'orth of bronze, Sir S.
Lushington wrote Sir J. Page Wood :
" Your son was one of the first officers I recommended
for the Victoria Cross, and certainly one of the most
gallant in the Naval Brigade. My letter still remains
at the Admiralty, as well as a remonstrance I wrote on
finding his name among those left out [ ? not finding his
name among those left in]. It is still my opinion that
Mr. Wood deserves the Victoria Cross as much as any
one I recommended at the same time, not excepting his
gallant chief, the late Sir William Peel."
Before these lines were written, however, many things
had happened ; Mr. Wood had been gazetted to the
Medjidieh of the fifth class, " Eoyal Navy," the Lords
of the Admiralty not caring to act up to their avowed
principle in anything but the Victoria Cross. And
the Indian Mutiny had broken out.
So far there is a certain parallel between the career of
Sir Evelyn Wood, and that of a very famous and self-
reliant general in our earlier history. Charles Mordaunt,
Lord Mordaunt by inheritance, Earl Mordaunt by
creation, and Earl of Peterborough by inheritance, went
C 2

20 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
into the Navy in his youth, a hundred and eighty years
before our hero, and changed into the Army, opening his
service ashore, also with a siege, that of Tangier. But
the early years of the fiery earl in the land service were
not full of stirring work such as fell to the lot of Lieu
tenant Wood. At first, as has been seen, there was
nothing but disappointment in the young soldier's
military service — disappointment due to illness caused
by exposure. Yet he was soon to have his chance and
to use it. When the Tiger sprung on the slumber
ing Lion Mr. Wood applied for an exchange from the
Blue and Buffs to a regiment serving in Hindustan.
But it was not easy to effect an exchange when the very
attempt to return home would have branded a man as a
coward for life. So, as there are more ways than one of
cooking an egg, another way was found for Mr. Wood to
compass the desire of his heart. He was transferred at
his own request to the 17th Lancers, the " Death and
Glory Boys," whose acquaintance he had already made
in the Crimea, and whose proud motto, "pro Rege, pro
Lege, pro P atria conamur" he might well have taken
as his own from that day to this. Three months, how
ever, were lost before the transfer was settled, and then
no time was lost in embarking. But those were slow
days. There was no eighteen or nineteen days' run from
London to Bombay, and Mr. Wood, though he started
in October, did not reach the city " primis in Indis "
until just before Christmas. The regiment lay in canton-

AT FIRST IN INDIA. 21
ments at Kirki, four miles from Poona. He was here for
four or five months, and during that time he received the
Crimean medal, with clasps for Inkerman and Sebasto-
pol, and the fifth class of the Turkish Medjidieh, as well
as the Turkish war medal, and he did not waste time. At
first it seemed as if he would be out of all the fighting,
but that was not his fault, and indeed there were many
dozens of men then as zealous in like case. He set him
self to do the right thing, to qualify himself for employ
ment by learning the native tongue which " goes " all
over India. In May 1858, when a squadron of the 17th
was marched to Mhow, a cantonment near Indore, the
capital of Holkar's territory and the seat of the Gover
nor-General's Agent for Central India, Wood went
with it. On the march the native officer in charge of
the commissariat deserted, and Mr. Wood, who was
already acting as interpreter in Hindustani, assumed
charge of supplies, his first experience in a department
in which, as we shall see, he has done great things.
From Mhow he took a departure in more senses than
one when he was asked for by the ofiicer commanding
the 3rd Bombay Cavalry. A force had been ordered to
march against Tantia Topee, the one leader of the Mutiny
whose military talents had proved conspicuous, and who,
as Sir William Hunter has well said, " had previously
inspired Nana Sahib with all the capacity for resistance
he had ever displayed." For a month Mr. Wood was
continuously employed on harassing outpost work, and

22 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
then he commanded the advanced guard squadron of the'
3rd Bombay Cavalry at the action of Eajghur, one of
several districts and towns of the same name. At this
action the rebels lost six-and-twenty guns. Six months
afterwards his services were placed on record by Major-
Gen. Michel, C.B., commanding the Malwa Division as
follows : "Lieutenant Wood.
" On marching from- Mhow in August, 1858, the left
wing, 3rd Bombay Cavalry, being deficient in officers,
he volunteered to take charge of a squadron, and whilst
in command was present in the action of Eajghur, where
his squadron did excellent service. He also com
manded these men at the actions of Sindwaho and
Kurai." But he had had the good fortune to attract the
attention of the Viceroy even before General Michel's
order was issued. He was mentioned favourably in the
despatch of the Brigadier-General for his conduct at the
fight of Sindwaho, and nearly a month before he was of
age he had the Governor-General speaking of him thus
in General Orders :
" January ISih, 1859.
" Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis, 1st Lancers (Bombay),
in separate command during a portion of the day, brings
specially to notice, &c. &c, as does Colonel De Salis, the
gallantry of Lieutenant Wood of the 17th Lancers, who
having from paucity of officers in the 3rd Bombay

ON THE STAFF. 23
Cavalry volunteered, during the campaign, to command
a troop of 3rd Light Cavalry on this occasion (action at
Sindwaho) almost single-handed came up and attacked
a body of the enemy."
Earlier still, he had the consciousness that his services
were highly appreciated. Before he had been in the
field two months, he had been appointed Staff-Officer to
the column commanded by Colonel Benson, now Lieu
tenant-General Benson, C.B., Colonel of the 17th
Lancers. And a month later he was made Brigade-
Major to the force under Brigadier-General Somerset,
a post which he doubled with that of Intelligence Officer,
having charge of all duties connected with natives. He
guided the column during a forced march of 176 miles,
and began the new year well by bringing the force upon
the enemy on January 1st, when the rebels were badly
beaten. By the middle of April, Tantia Topee had
been at last run to earth and captured, owing his end
to a betrayal. Before Mr. Wood rejoined his regiment,
now at Gwalior, he had marched some five thousand
miles in the brief campaign ; but a recognition such as
was given him by his Brigadier was a reward that repaid
him for all his toils. General Somerset wrote to the
Adjutant-General : " Camp, Puchore,"April 15th, 1859.
" Sir, " Having this day received the Divisional Order,
breaking up the Brigade under my command, I feel it a

24 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
duty to bring to the notice of the Major-General
commanding the Division, the name of a most deserving
young officer, Lieutenant Wood, 17th Lancers, who has
been my Brigade-Major since the brigade was formed
on the 10th December, 1858, with whose previous
services and conspicuous gallantry in action, the Major-
General is already acquainted. It therefore only
remains for me to say that in the various duties that
have devolved upon Lieutenant Wood, as my only Staff-
Officer, while under my command, he has shown the
most unvaried zeal, particularly on occasions of the
rapid pursuit of the enemy — calling for the utmost
exertion from all — especially from one whose position
did not admit of his taking advantage of the few short
hours that others had for rest, as well as the highest
intelligence and facility in the management of native
Indians, quite unusual in one so lately arrived in the
country. I have, therefore, to request that you will
submit to the Major-General my strongest recom
mendation of Lieutenant Wood, as an officer of zeal and
ability, whose past services have entitled him to con
sideration, and -whose many good and high qualities
especially fit him for employment upon the Staff of the
Army or with Native Cavalry."
Yet it is but a few months since, at and after the
Berkshire Manoeuvres of 1890, people were talking and
writing of Sir Evelyn Wood as a " mere infantry
Officer;" General Michel knew better than that more
than thirty years before, when he wrote to Lady Wood :

HIGH COMMENDATION. 25
" Mhow,
" June 15th, 1859.
"My Dear Madam,
" My only kindness to your son consisted in picking
out one of my very bravest and best officers for active
employment in the field ; he has so far justified my
choice, that I have been enabled to place him in the
Irregular Cavalry, where his energy and talent will be
sure to be appreciated."
And even in his own regiment he was looked upon
as a fully qualified and trained cavalry officer, for before
he had rejoined a month he had been sent to Bombay to
receive from home, and train, recruits for the 17 th. But
he did not reach "the Fort." On his way through
Mhow he was caught and at once sent off, on June 15th,
to join, as Brigade-Major, General Beatson's Brigade of
Irregular Horse at Aurungabad, one of eight towns
called after the Emperor Aurungzebe, and identified as
the place in the Nizam's Territory. Soon after he had
taken up the appointment, and such an appointment
was surely never before given to one of his age,
General Beatson wrote to the Adjutant- General at
Simla :
" I take this opportunity of thanking the Com
mander-in-chief for appointing Lieutenant Wood, 17th
Lancers, as my Brigade-Major. In this officer I have a
strong proof that it is not having passed a long time
with native troops which alone renders an officer fit for

26 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Irregular Cavalry. Lieutenant Wood's knowledge of
his duties as a cavalry officer, his zeal and energy in all
situations, render him more valuable as a staff-officer
with Irregular Troops than most officers I have met in
India, who have been all the period of their service
with the native corps. I say the above irrespective of
Lieutenant Wood's knowledge of the native languages,
but in that respect also, though he has been only about
eighteen months in India, he is superior to most officers
who have been here ten years."
General Beatson's confidence in Mr. Wood's know
ledge of the native tongues was justified a couple of
months later, when he passed the Examination Com
mittee in Bombay with flying colours. At the end of
November the Brigade of Irregular Horse was broken
up, and Mr. Wood, still a Lieutenant, and not yet
twenty -two, was appointed commandant of the 1st
Eegiment Beatson's Horse. There were still about India
bands of robbers, the waifs and strays of the Eebellion,
well-armed, desperate, daring, and with abundant
sympathisers in the native villages. Within four
weeks he had distinguished himself in his new post.
The story is so clearly told in the following despatch
from Colonel Sir Eichmond Shakespeare, Agent to the
Governor-General in Central India, that it is only need
ful to cite the text :

DERRING-DO. 27
" KuLOOKEERA, "January dih.
" Sir— "1. I have the honour to forward copies of letters,
noted in the margin, from the Political Agent, Bhopal,
and the officer commanding the 1st Eegiment of Beat-
son's Horse.
" 2. A band of robbers has for some time infested the
jungles between Beora and Muksudnuggur. They have
committed several depredations in the Barseah district,
and have been frequently attacked by different parties.
" 3. A Potail, of the name of Chemmun-Singh, has
incurred their enmity by having given information
regarding their movements. They contrived to capture
this man, and carried him off to the jungle, where they
intended to hang him.
" 4. Lieutenant Wood, after a long march, arrived at
Sindhora, a post held by his regiment, and there he
heard of Chemmun-Singh's capture. He immediately
started with a Duffadar and four Sowars of his own
regiment, and a Naick and six Sepoys of the Bareilly
Levy. "5. After proceeding twelve miles from Sindhora, a
fire was perceived in a dense jungle.
" 6. Lieutenant Wood dismounted, and leaving three
Sowars to hold the horses, advanced through the jungle
on foot with the rest of the party. After walking three
miles through very thick jungle they found themselves
at 1 a.m. within twenty-six feet of the rebels.
" 7. Four or five were awake, but all the rest, to the
number of seventy, were asleep.

28 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
"8. Lieutenant Wood fired a volley, and rushed
forward into the nullah amongst the rebels, followed by
the Duffadar and Sowars of his regiment keeping well
up with him. Several rebels were killed, the remainder
fled, leaving their arms, and the Potail Chemmun-
Singh was released.
" 9. Had the Naick and six Sepoys (Bareilly levy)
kept close to Lieutenant Wood, a greater number of
rebels would doubtless have been killed ; but to have
released Chemmun-Singh under such circumstances will
have an excellent effect, and Lieutenant Wood deserves
the highest credit for his noble conduct in thus
releasing him.
"10. I feel sure that the conduct of Lieutenant
Wood, and that of the Duffadar and Sowars who
accompanied him, will be noticed and rewarded by his
Excellency the Viceroy."
Sir Eichmond Shakespeare's anticipation that notice
and reward would follow the report of this feat was
justified. The Under Secretary to Government ac
knowledged the " gallant service rendered by Lieutenant
Wood on this occasion;" but Lord Canning, whose
administration had suppressed the mutiny, and whose
wise display of mercy at the right moment earned for
him the jeering epithet of " Clemency Canning," did
more than acknowledge the service. He caused the
story to be brought before the Queen, and the result is
to be read in the London Gazette, dated from the War
Office on September 4th, 1860 :

THE VICTORIA CROSS. 29
"The Queen has been graciously pleased to signify
her intention to confer the decoration of the Victoria
Cross on the undermentioned officer of Her Majesty's
Army, whose claim to the same has been submitted for
Her Majesty's approval, on account of acts of bravery
performed by him in India, as recorded against his
name, viz., 17th Lancers — Lieutenant Henry Evelyn
Wood- — for having on the 19th October, 1858, during
the action at Sindwaho, when in command of a troop
of the 3rd Light Cavalry, attacked with much gallantry,
almost single-handed, a body of rebels who had made
a stand, whom he routed ; also, for having subsequently,
near Sindhora, gallantly advanced with a Duffadar and
Sowar of Beatson's Horse, and rescued from a band of
robbers a Potail, Chemmun-Singh, whom they had cap
tured and carried off to the jungle, where they intended
to hang him."
It is given to few to win and wear the proud dis
tinction of the penn'orth of ribbon and penn'orth of
bronze, and to fewer still to win and wear it after
having four or five times earned it, and after being
previously recommended for it in vain. And now that
it had come, we may be very sure it was not so welcome
as it would have been in the days when the ribbon
would have been blue instead of red. My lamented
friend Vice- Admiral Sir William Hewett was more lucky.
He got the Victoria Cross for an act of bravery, surely
not more notable than that for which Mr. Wood was
recommended for it ; and he lived to have it " recorded "

30 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
that he would have had it once more granted if he had
not already possessed it. I do not recall another case
in which two recommendations have gone forward for
the same man save that of Major Berryman, 17th
Lancers. And I know that to the day of his death Sir
William Hewitt thought he ought to have had a bar on
his bit of blue ribbon. Surely there should be some
outward and visible sign of fortune or merit so rare as
to win the Cross by a " double event." If that should
ever be granted, Her Majesty will not fail to remember
that Sir Evelyn Wood was deprived of the Victoria
Cross (blue) because, as a mark of her favour, she had
given him a commission in the Army !
And, before he got his Cross, he had showed that he
was as conscientious as he was brave and energetic. He
was a young lieutenant, put in command of a regiment,
of which he was to make the best. It was in a very
bad state, and early in March he reported so, recom
mending at the same time that it should be disbanded.
A month later the condition of the regiment was
recognised by the military authorities, but it was not
until May-day that orders came to discharge the men
he considered inefficient, and with the remainder to
raise the 2nd Eegiment of Mayne's Horse for service in
Central India. This was scarcely done when, as the
Seronge district was infested by fugitive bands of rebels
and their sympathisers, the Supreme Government
proposed to send thither two European battalions,

" POLITICALS." 31
whereupon Sir Eichmond Shakespeare wrote to the
Government : "I assure you that I believe the services
of those two officers, Lieutenants Bradford and Wood,
will be of more avail in restoring order than any
number of English soldiers." The Lieutenant Bradford
here mentioned is none other than the present Chief
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, and a eon-
temporary of Wood at Marlborough. A finer testimonial
no two young officers need wish for. But he who gave
it was soon to virtually withdraw it in the case of one
of them, on, as it would appear, rather insufficient
information. Still, as the case may show young officers
what they may have to take from "Politicals," it is
worth citing in detail. I am honestly of opinion that
the race of Politicals in India has very much improved.
Soldiers have had, however, to bear a good deal from
them even so recently as the Afghan days of 1878-9,
and the Manipur disaster of last year might never have
occurred had the political and the military power been
concentrated in the same head. The experience of
General Nott in Afghanistan showed him the impos
sibility of advantageously having " two captains of a
ship." And there has been a tendency of late years to
recognise this fact and to act upon the knowledge. Sir
Eichmond Shakespeare was indeed a colonel who had
made a reputation in Central Asia, where he was
reverenced for many a day as " Shiekh Sefeer " (see my
old friend Dr. Wolffs " Mission to Bokhara," passim).

32 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Sir Eichmond had not, like Politicals of to-day, half
the power taken out of his hands by officials at the far
end of a telegraph wire, who, of course, always know
all about everything a good deal better than the expert
on the spot. He was virtually supreme, though there
is a tradition of a living general, then far from " wires,"
who is said to have told a Political that if he attempted
to interfere he would be put in irons and sent " down."
The facts before us in the matter of Lieutenant Wood
areas follows: In July 1860 Mr. Wood while patrol
ling in the Goona district, received an order from the
Brigade-Major to go and arrest three rebels, two of
whom were the late senior native officers of the rep-i-
ment Wood had caused to be disbanded. The text of
the order is important :
" The Commanding officer wishes you to go down at
once and apprehend them by means of the Eajah him
self; take him with you, and don't let them have a
moment's notice. If you want more men let us know
sharp, and how many."
Lieutenant Wood, being given to obeying orders,
obeyed this one in the spirit in which it was given.
He secured two of the three men, who were later sent
across the "Black Water" to penal servitude in the
Andaman Islands. But Sir Eichmond Shakespeare was
pleased to take exception to the " manner " in which
the young officer addressed the Eajah, who was not

AN UNJUST CENSURE. 33
very willing to go rebel-hunting at "a moment's
notice." He had to go, and that " sharp." So far Sir
Eichmond might have conceivably been in the right.
He did not stop there. He went on to blame Mr.
Wood for trying to take the Eajah with him in effecting
the arrests. But on this point Mr. Wood had no more
option than in moving at all. He was to go " at once,"
and he went at once, not after an interval of three days.
He was told to take the Eajah, and he took him. What
must have been his surprise when he found himself
censured for obeying orders ? We have since seen a
senior officer rewarded for disobeying orders. " Kismet —
it is Fate." The censure having been received through
the proper military channel, Major Mayne, commanding
Mayne's Horse, wrote the letter here given under date
of August 7, 1860, and in reading it 'twere well to bear
in mind that the subject of it was not yet twenty -two
and a half years of age :
" Sir, " I have the honour to inform you that, in obe
dience to the intention of your letter, I have communi
cated the contents to Lieutenant Wood, commanding
2nd corps, Mayne's Horse.
" 2nd. Lieutenant Wood has in consequence sent in
his resignation of his appointment, which I forward for
your consideration. I have remonstrated with Lieu
tenant Wood, but he is too discouraged to remain under
present circumstances. D

34 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
" 3rd. I greatly regret there has been cause for his
incurring your censures, but it is my duty to report to
you the essential services that this officer has rendered
since he joined me, in carrying out the harassing details
of organising the 2nd corps of my Horse. His un
wearied energy ; his close attention to details ; his
admirable temper ; his strict discipline ; the physical
activity he daily exerts to teach his men the use of arms
and horses ; his unceasing intercourse with his officers
and men ; his unremitting endeavours to make himself
thoroughly acquainted with their habits and language ;
his disregard of self and personal trouble, and the
critical knowledge he has obtained of his profession,
form a very long list of high qualifications.
" 4th. But I have daily noticed them with intense
satisfaction — I may say hourly — for from where I write
I can see — hardly avoid observing — all that passes at
Lieutenant Wood's quarters.
"5 th. I have never met with an officer of Lieutenant
Wood's age (not yet 23 years) who gave higher promise
of making a brilliant soldier. His whole heart and
soul are in his work ; and he is an impersonation of
Sir Charles Napier's beau ideal of an Irregular Horse
man, for he is intent on his duty, in eating, drinking, and
sleeping, while his gallantry and devotedness in the
field have won for him the recorded praise of Lord
Eaglan, Sir William Peel, and all who knew him
in the Crimea, where he was recommended for the
Victoria Cross, and of all under whom he has served in
India. " 6th. I beg that, strongly expressed as the above

A BRILLIANT SABREUR. 35
character is, it may not be considered as over-estimated,
for I believe that all who are intimate with and have
studied Lieutenant Wood will accord him as high an
eulogy. " 7th. Lieutenant Wood is much loved in the brigade,
and I consider his resignation as a loss to the public
service." On the 28 th September this passage appeared in
Brigade Orders : " Head- Quarters, Goona,
" September 28th, 1860.
" Lieutenant Wood's earnest energy, his love for and
knowledge of his profession, and his approved bravery
mark him as a brilliant sabreur ; and in raising the
2nd corps, and in service in the field, these have been
conspicuous." But this was not all. Colonel Travers, commanding
the Brigade of Mayne's (or Central India) Horse, who
had been told by Mr. Wood that he would have no
objection to return to Central India in case of Sir E.
Shakespeare's departure, wrote : " Goona,
" October 4th, 1869.
" My dear Wood,
" I am glad to find that you are thinking of
returning to India and are anxious to join us again, for
I enquired slightly, and was led to believe you had
other views.
"If at any time a cavalry regiment under my com-
D 2

36 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
mand becomes vacant, and I can manage to place you
at its head without injustice to others, believe me it will
afford me sincere pleasure, and I shall esteem myself and
the Government so far fortunate.
" Your untiring zeal, great patience, and tact are well
known to me.
" I am not acquainted with any man who has stronger
or better claims, or, with your professional abilities, would
do it greater justice.
" I consider that you have great qualifications for such
a command, and that you carry with you the respect
and goodwill of all, having maintained strict discipline
at the same time."
Lord Strathnairn laid the whole matter before Lord
Canning, who replied that he should have no objection
to Lieutenant Wood being employed again in a corps
under the " Supreme Government." And, a little later,
Lord Strathnairn told Mr. Wood at Benares that he
would give him the first command of Irregulars vacant
after his return to India. Now, see how slander lives !
I was told on the Nile, with an ominous shake of the
head, signifying there was a dreadful story behind, by
a man who had spent a long time in India, but who,
being now dead and gone, shall be nameless, that Wood
had been very insubordinate in India, and had to be
sent home. Here is the fearsome story of his insub
ordination, which reflects a great deal more credit on him
than on the person who felt himself aggrieved, and

HOME COMING. 37
proved so incapable of appreciating that what he cen
sured had been done in the most careful and prompt
performance of the most explicit orders. And the story
of his home-coming is no less clear even after the lapse
of over one-and-thirty years. In October Mr. Wood
was ordered to Calcutta to appear before a Medical
Board. The records of such things do not readily dis
appear. Here is what is to be gleaned from the Eeport.
Mr. Wood had now been two and a half years fighting
and patrolling, resting, when he did rest, in bivouacs or
under canvas, through three hot seasons and two mon
soons. He was suffering from exposure and modified
sunstroke and was accordingly invalided to England,
not a bit the worse for Sir Eichmond Shakespeare's
censure, and having the satisfaction of carrying with
him a copy of the following letter from Major-General
Sir John Michel, K.C.B., to the Chief of the Staff:
" Sir, " I have the honour to report that an officer of the
forces under my command during the late operations in
Central India, whose rank by the regulations of the
service precludes him from general promotion, has so
highly distinguished himself, and his services have been
of such extreme value to the State, that I deem it my
duty to bring these services to the notice of his lordship
the Commander-in-Chief, in the hope that he may think
fit to obtain from the Horse Guards such recognition of
his services as will obtain for him brevet promotion, when

38 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
he has obtained his rank of Captain. The officer to
whom I allude is Lieutenant E. Wood, 17th Lancers.
His services under my command are as follows :
" On marching from Mhow in August, 1858, the left
wing 3rd Bombay Cavalry being deficient in officers, he
volunteered to take charge of a squadron, and whilst in
command was present at the action ofthe Eajghur, where
his squadron did excellent service ; he also commanded
these men at the actions of Sindwaho and Kurai.
" On the formation of a light column under Lieutenant
Colonel Benson, 8th November, 1858, he was named
Staff-officer, and was present at the different rapid pur
suits under Colonel Benson and Colonel Somerset, and
was present at the fight at Burode, on the 1st January,
1859. His extraordinary activity, zeal, energy, and judg
ment, together with his utility from having so rapidly
passed in the Hindustani language, combine to render
him a most valuable officer, and one whose services
deserve reward, and whose promotion would be an
advantage to the service."
Mr. Wood reached England three days after Christmas
1860, and on the next 16th April, became captain in
the 17th Lancers by "purchase." This gave the
authorities the chance of recognising the Indian services
of the sailor-soldier. But they were slow to avail
themselves of the opportunity. It was not until the
19th August, 1862, that Captain Wood became Major
in the Army, or Brevet-Major, as the rank is called, he
being still but a regimental captain in the Blue and

THE FIGHT AT RAJGHUR. 39
White Lancers. However, there he was, Major Wood,
at the age of twenty -four-and-a-half.
There are two or three curious glimpses of his life
to be found in a very scarce volume by Assistant
Surgeon Sylvester, published in Bombay in 1860, under
the title " EecoUections of the Campaign in Malwa and
Central India." Not once does the doctor mention the
name of the youth of whom he writes so frankly. But
the identity of the individual is unmistakeable. Des
cribing the fight at Eajghur the doctor says after
detailing General Michel's advance to ascertain Tantia's
position :
" The position of his cavalry was discerned to be in
line on alhill amidst much brushwood and jungle, and they
in turn sent out two of their officers and about sixty
troopers, who advanced down the face of the hill towards
us, but as our small numbers did not admit of investiga
tion, the General ordered a troop of the 3rd Light
Cavalry forward in skirmishing order to drive them back.
This was done by a cornet of that corps, whose ardour led
him on some distance until he came in sight of one of
the enemy's guns. Collecting seven or eight of the
troopers nearest him, he made a dash at it and took it
again ; pressing on, accompanied by an officer of the
17th Lancers, and a few of the 3rd Bombay troopers
who had been able to keep pace ; when suddenly this
zealous but small band emerged on an open plateau
where the enemy had placed two pieces of cannon, two
hundred infantry and about sixty Sowars. They opened

40 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
a volley of musketry, and about forty of the cavalry
pursued, for our small party had been obliged to ride
for their lives, and indeed the cornet was not very far
in advance of a very long spear carried by one of the
rebel horsemen, who seemed bent on making use of it ;
but luckily the sight of the Lancers, who had been
steadily coming up, caused him and his fellows to rejoin
their force."
A few days later, " the 3rd Bombay Cavalry were in
support of two guns on the left and near a field of high
jowaree, when they observed a body of the rebels emerge
from it, who opened a galling musketry fire on the
troopers and wounded several horses. The officer com
manding retired them from their too close proximity,
and the rebels formed into a rude square or gole, being
composed of Bengal sepoys of the 36th Eegiment and
Velliatees. An officer of the Lancers doing duty with
the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, on seeing them, attacked them
singly and alone, commencing with a Velliatee, who
chanced to be the corner man, while the others stood at
the charge with musket and bayonet unwilling to move
from their formation, in which they seemed to feel
security. The Velliatee, having escaped the first blow
aimed at him, drew a two-handed sword and made a
furious onslaught ; but as he in turn missed his aim he
fell under the officer's charger, and was now in a fair
way to be pinned to the earth, but rose again to the
fight. At this crisis (and it was rather a serious one
with the gallant young soldier who attacked them) a
young trooper of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry charged to
the rescue ; the Velliatee immediately turned his

RIDING A GIRAFFE. 41
attention on him, and aimed a blow which grazed his
back, severed the horse's crupper and part of the saddle,
sinking deep into the spine of the animal. The trooper's
well aimed blow clove the skull of the rebel. Three of
the group now threw down their arms and shouted for
forgiveness, but the next was for fighting and the
officer now engaged him. He clubbed his musket with
the bayonet fixed, and as he raised it to deliver a pon
derous blow, the point caught in the drapery of his
waist, delayed the descent of the musket butt, and at
the same time exposed his chest to a thrust which ran
completely through him. By this time the troopers
of the 3rd Light Cavalry had arrived and finished the
work so well begun."
But this young officer was not content with his
serious work, so he must needs expend a portion of his
superfluous energy in one of the " larks " he was fond
of when in statu pupillari. Colonel Somerset and his
Brigade-Major were on their way to act against
Ferozeshah, who had crossed the Ganges to join Tantia
in the Banswarra jungles. Passing through Jowra they
were entertained by the Nawab, who, to again cite from
Dr. Silvester :
" Is fond of, and possesses, good Arab horses, and
a collection of rarer animals, cameleopards, lynxes,
cheetahs, &c, and here a rather amusing scene pre
sented itself. The Brigade-Major volunteered to ride the
giraffe, and the Eajah had it brought out barebacked, the

42 LIEUT. -GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
bridle consisting simply of a piece of rope round the
creature's neck. Vaulting from the balcony on to its
back, the Brigade-Major started, at first at a spanking
pace. . . . but when the giraffe attained his gallop, the
movement actually induced a sort of sea-sickness in the
daring rider, although four years' service in the Navy
had rendered him proof against that malady at sea.
Until thus affected, he rode like a centaur, while the
beast's awkward bounds and gyrations caused great
merriment. At length down came the rider, who first
received a blow on the head from the knee, and then in
the face from the giraffe's foot ; it seemed to threaten a
fatal termination. The Brigade-Major was borne away
insensible,, and did not recover for some hours."
The campaign was not to close without another mis
fortune for Mr. Wood ; it is described as follows :
"At Barode a letter was found from a Jalraputtan
official, which directed supplies to be laid in for Tantia
and his force. It was evidently a document of guilt, as
the Vakeel offered the Brigade-Major of the force a
thousand rupees for it, saying it could be of no service
to him. This sum and more was refused. Soon after
this the natives played another trick to get possession
of it ; they robbed his tent of all it contained save his
bed and himself, carrying away his clothes, four medals,
and a number of urzees his moonshee had given him to
read, to perfect himself in the Hindoostanee tongue ;
but the letter had been put for safe keeping in the field
treasure chest, under a sentry, so that they again failed
to obtain it."

( 43 )

CHAPTEE III.
STUDY AND STAFF WORK.
Desk Work — A.D.C. in Ireland — An Essex Highlander — Another
Exchange — Brigade-Major at Aldershot — After the Fenians —
Good Practice — An "Help-meet" — Staff Promotion — -Enters
the Temple — Another Exchange — Wood with Wolseley —
Selected for Active Service.
Before Major Wood obtained even nominal field
officer's rank he had long realised that in soldiering no
man need hope to obtain eminence without hard work,
not in the field only, but at the desk also. Even as a
boy he had been a constant reader, now he resolved to
read with a definite purpose. The result was that he
decided to seek entrance into the Staff College — and in
August, 1862, he successfully competed at the entrance
examination. He joined in the following February.
But, meanwhile, he had left the cavalry. He exchanged
into the 73rd, or Perthshire regiment, now the Second
Battalion of the Black Watch, to which he was gazetted
on October 21st. He joined this fine battalion at
Plymouth, and for a while, therefore, wore bonnet and
kilt and sporran and plaid and claymore. At the Staff
College Major Wood was distinguished for his assiduity

44 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
among a body of hard workers, but I do not find that
he was very specially noted for success in any subject
except Hindustani.
Towards the close of his period of study he received
a very marked compliment. The Commandant of the
Staff College became Major-General and was appointed
to the command of the Dublin District, which then, and
until quite recently, included the Curragh. Major-
General Napier offered to Major Wood the post of aide-
de-camp on his staff, and in January, 1865, he joined
the general in Dublin. Those were not days of hard
work in the army like these, yet Major Wood learnt a
great deal from his brief experience with the troops in
Ireland. And it was briefer than such opportunities
usually are. For, early in 1866, General Napier was
transferred to the charge of the Department of Military
Education, and that is not a post to the holder of which
an aide-de-camp is allowed. So Major Wood was once
more returned to regimental duty, but not with the
73rd ; to it he had belonged for more than three years,
when he exchanged into the 17th (now the Leicester
shire regiment). He was not without a certain reputa
tion as a Staff-Officer already, and he was soon to
increase it, when he was selected as Brigade-Major of
the 3rd Infantry Brigade at Aldershot. So much was
he soon thought of, that when the Fenian disturbances
began in the South of Ireland in the autumn of 1866,
he was picked out to be Staff-Officer to Sir Alfred

PIKES INSTEAD OF POTHEEN. 45
Horsford. It was here I first saw him — quiet, alert,
indefatigable, often misled by the reports of the
peasantry but pitting against their cunning a shrewd
ness very peculiarly his own. I remember that from
the platform of Limerick Junction men could be seen
drilling on the Galtee Mountains, but they had always
vanished when troops went after them. I believe arms
were generally concealed in illicit distilleries, the trade
of potheen-making having been temporarily abandoned
for the more attractive game of rebellion. The whole
country was as much in the secret of one thing as the
other. And it was even more difficult to tell where the
arms were kept than where the vile poison was being
produced from spoiled grain, since there was no thin
wreath of " smoke that so gracefully curled " to tell that
a still was near. But if the unlawful drillers were not
to be caught — and I do not remember a case of their
seizure — they yet came before long to recognise that the
defiance of the troops could not be continued with
impunity, owing to the watchfulness and the activity of
the small flying columns that were organised, each as
fully equipped for defence against a sudden attack as
though it had been operating against Afridis on the
North West Frontier of India or dacoits in Burmah. So
far as it went the practice was excellent for a man
destined to take part in so many " little wars." With
the end of the dark days and the long nights came the
end of the disturbances in Ireland, and Major Wood was

46 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
free to return to his duties at Aldershot, where he had
not missed much, for those were not the days when
nearly the whole of the winter was devoted to preparing
for thorough training in the summer. From the time
he joined our greatest camp he was a steady student of
the phases of modern war, and he paid especial attention
to the Bohemian campaign, which taught so many
lessons in tactics, soon to lead to bloody results nearer
home. But in the study he did not neglect the office.
Perhaps he cannot, to this day, be considered a first-rate
man of business, but he has an instinct in detecting a
blunder, and he has a complete knowledge of routine,
which has stood him for many a day in good stead.
While he was Brigade-Major he took a step which
makes or mars most men. When he was in Ireland he
had fallen in love with one of Erin's fairest daughters,
sister of Viscount Southwell, who became the Honour
able Mrs. Wood at Eyde on the 19th September, 1867,
her birthday. For four-and-twenty years, during which
she bore to him three sons and three daughters, she was
indeed "an help-meet" to her husband. There are
some who go so far as to say she " made " him, but he
alone can know how far her gentle wisdom inspired his
life. For nearly a quarter of a century she was his
better half in more than the conventional sense of the
words, and, although she was a devout member of the
elder branch of the Church Catholic, religion was not
with her a matter for disputation with her Anglican

AN HELP-MEET. 47
husband, but a thing to live for and up to. She taught
her children to think liberally of forms of belief other
than her own, and she was wont to declare that there
was abundance of proof of a living faith among
thousands of Protestants. To this day many a soldier
and soldier's wife and bairns "rise up and call her
blessed ; " and indeed, when the moment came for disease
of the heart to claim its victim, there was many a
weeping woman at Colchester and at Aldershot who felt
that more than Sir Evelyn had lost, " awhile," the best
friend they had ever possessed.
Notwithstanding the brief holiday consequent upon
this, one of the most blessed and happy of unions, there
were some people at Aldershot who conceived the young
Brigade-Major was far too active, and when, after a
couple of years, he was promoted from Brigade-Major
to the post of Deputy- Assistant- Adjutant General, which
he assumed in November, 1868, there were not a few
who thought he was likely to prove a thorn in their
sides. He could not be idle. If he had not work he
was always making it. And in default of drill during
that winter, he set himself to a more thorough study of
Military Law than had been required from him at the
Staff College. This led to some study of our legal
system and lore in general, and, in the end of April,
1869, he passed the prescribed examination and entered
the Middle Temple as a student-at-law. In July he was
staff-officer to the Wimbledon column, by Sir Alfred

48 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Horsford's special request, and in the following year he
became a substantive unattached major, but by pur
chase. Thus he had bought his three substantive steps
from the time Lord Hardinge gave him his cornetcy.
Altogether, it may be broadly said that, up till this time,
he had put as much money into the army as he had
taken out of it. Even his brevet step, eight years
before, had done him no substantial good in the way of
military advancement ; but we shall presently find out
that he owed something to the purchase system after all,
since it raised him to a position in which future com
mand became easily within reach.
Major Wood was chosen to be chief Staff Officer of
the Wimbledon column in July, 1870. Such a record
may seem trivial to those who do not know that there
is scarcely any duty on which an officer can be put
which gives more opportunity for tact and ability in
dealing with men and officers than one of these little
parade columns affords. General Lysons, name beloved
by volunteers, under the endearing disguise of " Dodgy
Dan," bore testimony to the fact that to Major Wood's
"untiring energy and watchfulness the order and
regularity of the column " were principally due. It was
in the nature of the man from the first to act up to the
Biblical injunction, "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do
do it with thy might." Sir Walter Scott puts into the
mouth of Margaret of Anjou, in " Anne of Geierstein,"
a fine saying concerning two Englishmen attached to

A USEFUL OFFICER. 49
her suite : " They are come from a country in which
men are trained from their infancy to prefer their duty
to their pleasure." In Sir Evelyn Wood, from first to
last, we have an example of the working out of this
principle. And, when we come to the one point in his
career of which the army and the country have enter
tained a doubt, we shall find he was more sinned
against than sinning ; and that he even risked his
reputation when once convinced that his duty at the
moment required him to do so. In the spring of 1871
Major Wood appears in the new character of a sur
veyor. He was employed in Berkshire looking out for
ground for manoeuvres. Though nothing much came of
the outing then, it bore fruit nineteen years later, and the
Major was told by the Assistant-Quartermaster-General
that his " sketches were very well done indeed and very
well turned out in every way."
The opinion of his superiors of him, at this period of
his life, cannot be better brought out than by citing the
words of successive officers of eminence. General Sir
James Yorke Scarlett, on taking leave of the Aldershot
command, wrote to him saying "how thoroughly he
appreciated his services, especially in the field, where
they have been so useful." And when, some nine
months later, there arose a question of the continuation
of his appointment from three years to five, Sir
Archibald Alison, then A.A.G. at Aldershot, and
afterwards to command the camp in immediate ante-
E

50 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
cedence to the subject of his encomium, wrote to General
Sir J. Hope Grant, commanding, concerning Major
Wood: " I believe I express your opinion of him, as well as my
own, when I add that he is an admirable officer, equally
good in the office as in the field ; an excellent horseman,
of great activity, has perfect judgment, and is fully
qualified to undertake the duties when the Adjutant-
General is absent. From his long experience of field
services, and his thorough acquaintance with the ground
in Berkshire, which he has recently been employed in
surveying, I am sure he would be of the greatest assis
tance to you, on the staff, in the camp of instruction
there, this autumn."
The recommendation was not agreed to, though such
appointments have since been conferred for five years.
And it was as well. For he went back to regimental
duty for a time, having exchanged into the 90th Eegi
ment, now the Cameronians, 2nd Battalion, in which
Lord Wolseley served in the Crimea. He went to
Salisbury plain as D.A.A.G. ofthe Army, under H.E.H.
the Duke of Cambridge, thus getting a glimpse of Head-
Quarters' work. He had joined the 90th in Scotland and
accompanied it back to Aldershot in the July of 1872.
Lord Wolseley was A.A.G. at Head-Quarters, and he
wrote Major Wood how glad he was to have him with him
in Dorset and Wilts. Thus began a connection which

WARNED FOR WORK. 51
continued for many a day to the satisfaction and credit
of both officers. In January, 1873, Major Wood became
a Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel by seniority, this being the
first real fruits of his sums spent in purchasing previous
steps. At the beginning of April he was made Com
mandant of the School for Auxiliary Forces at Aldershot,
and in August was selected as D.A.Q.M.G. of the
Army Corps assembled for manoeuvres at Cannock Chase.
While there he was warned by Lord Wolseley for service
on the Gold Coast, and left the manoeuvres on August
27 th, proceeding by steamer from Liverpool on Septem
ber 12th. As he went from Cannock he received a copy
of Army Corps Orders, as follows :
"Major-General D. Lysons, C.B., with all his staff,
regrets sincerely the departure of Lieutenant-Colonel
Wood, V.C, D.A.Q.M.G., whose energy and great value
as an officer have caused his selection for more important
duties."

E 2

52 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.

CHAPTEE IV.
ASHANTI AND HOME AGAIN.
Off to Ashanti— The fault of the Dutch— A broken Eeed—
Frightened Fantis — Breaking the Spell — Harassing the Enemy
— An Ashanti Panic — High Commendation — King Coffee's
double face — Again wounded — The Advance on Coomassie —
Whipping into Action— Two of the 90th— The C.B.— Called
to the Bar — Honours and Offers — Away to South Africa.
Few of our little wars have excited more interest
among the people than the expedition which Sir Garnet
Wolseley commanded for the punishment of the aggres
sion of King Coffee Calcalli upon our Gold Coast pos
sessions. It was not, perhaps, the value of our territory
there which contributed in any degree to the feeling
among the great bulk of newspaper readers. For,
indeed, the Gold Coast has a very bad name among folks
at home. And the climate is as bad as ever fancy
painted it. There is only one European in the colony
to every ten thousand natives. In fact, the Coast is
unworthy the name of colony, but it is an impor
tant trading territory, and it supplies us with a very
large quantity of raw material for our manufactures.
Although we had a station there from the year 1618, and

ASHANTIS AND FANTIS. 53
were fully represented by an incorporated company as
early as the year 1662, yet we and the Dutch had never
precisely defined the limits of our land until 1868, when
a separation of interests was effected. Of this England
took little or no notice. It was an affair of adminis
tration, and went down pretty much as a matter of
course. But this transfer led to very serious results.
The Dutch had got on well with the Ashantis, in spite
of the horrors of the local " customs," and the frequent
massacres of human beings, for reasons half of super
stition, wholly of savagery. In matters of commerce
the fault of the Dutch has seldom been squeamishness.
But every Sunday school child in England had been
taught to look to Ashanti and Dahomey as contemporary
illustrations of the " dark places of the earth, full of the
habitations of cruelty," as King David put it. When
the Ashantis, in what would nowadays be called the
Hinterland, came to realise that they had lost their con
veniently blind friends from the Netherlands, they did
not like it. And they came to the conclusion that they
could drive the few British into the sea. So they
invaded the coast, and occupied a Protectorate of ours
owned by a tribe called Fantis. They also blockaded
our forts, or stations. This sort of thing not even a
Government rapidly falling into decrepitude could well
stand, and when news came that Colonel Festing, of
the Eoyal Marine Artillery, had not without difficulty
beaten back King Coffee's legions it was time to act.

54 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
And the Government acted with characteristic vigour !
It appointed Sir Garnet Wolseley to the command of the
troops (half a battalion of Marines) and it made him
Administrator of the Gold Coast. It was not an appoint
ment or a duty which most people would covet, and
there did not seem to be any credit likely to be got out of
it. But it was a mission of danger, and the post of danger
is the post of honour. The General (local only at that
time) would have had no difficulty in fifiing up a Staff
to ten times the dimensions he had fixed upon in his
own mind. And among those officers on whom he most
depended was Lieutenant-Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C,
who left Liverpool on September 12th, and reached the
Gold Coast on October 2nd, when he received the
following order from Sir John McNeill, Chief of the
Staff: " I am desired by Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley,
C.B., K.C.M.G., to direct you to proceed to Elmina,
accompanied by the officers specified in General Orders,
for the purpose of raising a body of loyal natives for
service against the Ashantees, at present invading the
Protectorate of the Gold Coast."
Colonel Wood landed at Elmina the same day to take
up his duties. He raised first of all a corps of coolies
for transport, and organised an Intelligence Department.
And before the 14th October he had got together a
small native force which, if it did not cover itself with

WOLSELEY AND WOOD. 55
glory in the whole of the campaign, was, nevertheless,
good enough to march into the bush, in which the
Ashantis trusted as much as to their own undoubted
bravery, and inflict a defeat on the enemy at Essaman.
The next morning he received from the General a letter
containing the following passages :
" Cape Coast Castle, 5-30 a.m.
" October 15th.
" My dear Wood,
"What hour did you get back last night? I
watched you through a glass until you got close to the
marines we left on the beach, and your movements
looked so pretty that one might have thought them a
strategic movement across the ' Long Valley.' .... I
have to congratulate you upon the very able manner in
which you did everything yesterday. I am very much
obliged to you. The operations were well carried out,,
and all your previous arrangements were admirable."
Without entering into the history of this brief and
brilliant campaign, it may be said that the original
idea of Mr. Gladstone's first government was that, save
a few marines and West India troops, the bulk of the
force was to consist of native allies. These allies,
mostly Fantis, were already known to be among the
most cowardly of mankind, and it could have been
with no great confidence that Lieutenant-Colonel Evelyn
Wood and Major Baker Eussell began to raise and drill
two native regiments. Thanks to the co-operation of

56 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Captain, now Sir, Eedvers Buller, Captain Fremantle,
E.N, Colonel McNeill (who was badly wounded in the
arm), Captain Brackenbury, E.A., and Captain Crease,
E.M., the attack on Essaman was a success, and in the
opinion of Sir Garnet Wolseley was the turning-point of
the war, as it broke the spell regarding the invincibility
of the Ashantis in the bush. The Ashanti commander-
in-chief decided to retreat. But in spite of the success
at Essaman, it became clear that nothing could be done
in an effective way without European troops. Wood's
troops consisted of Cape Coast volunteers, and of men
from Elmina, Kossu, and Bonny, very unpromising raw
material. When the news of the Essaman success got
home it was acknowledged by Mr. Cardwell, who wrote :
" I have had the honour of laying this despatch and
the enclosure before the Queen, and have received her
Majesty's commands to convey to you, and to Lieu
tenant-Colonel Wood, who, under your general direction,
was in immediate command, Her Majesty's approbation
of the able and gallant conduct of the officers, non
commissioned officers, and men on that occasion. I
observe with great satisfaction the terms in which you
speak of the services rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel
Wood, V. C  "
For ten days Colonel Wood was engaged in recon
noitring through the bush, and then he proceeded to
the head of the road, but not before the Fantis had
exhibited every variety of cowardice that might be

A PANIC. 57
expected from previous experience. Meanwhile Sir
Garnet was down with Coast fever, dangerously ; and
when he recovered he ordered an advance by Mansu.
On the 27th November, Colonel Wood, who had been
directed to harass the enemy, " to hang on his rear and
attack him without ceasing," was pushing the enemy's
rear-guard near Faisowah when his troops became
unsteady, and his column of less than 300 natives was
nearly surrounded. He retired and was followed five
miles by the Ashantis. But then it was the turn of
the latter to become panic-stricken, and they " broke up
their camp and retired precipitately through the
night with torches, scarcely stopping till they reached
the Prah." The King wrote to Sir Garnet complain
ing of this attack on his retreating force, and adding
that his troops " lost all their sick men and all their
property," and the General replied :
"As regards the attack upon your retreating army
at Faisoo, it was made only by a small party of my un-
drilled black troops, who were ordered to fall back as
soon as they found where your army was ; yet it caused
the whole of the Ashantee army to retreat in the utmost
haste and confusion, leaving their dead and dying every
where along the path."
This picture was certainly not overdrawn, for the
main Prahsu road was found strewed with the corpses of
Ashantis, disease and starvation having decimated their

58 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
ranks more than the sword. The last verb in this sen
tence is decidedly inadequate to express the fact, if it be
true that " of the 40,000 warriors who originally in
vaded the Protectorate at least one half perished." In
spite of the cowardice of the native levies, and with the
assistance of but a few marines and blue-jackets, the
first phase of the war was brought to a satisfactory
ending, and the General was not wrong in attributing
the result to " the untiring exertions of the few care
fully selected Staff and Special Service officers who "
had accompanied him, and whose hard work, exposure,
and privations had been so cheerfully endured for two
and a half months before he wrote. In the same sense
he further said to the Secretary for War, under date
of December 5th : —
" . . . .Of the special service officers, where all have
worked so hard and so earnestly, it is no easy matter to
particularise individuals. The two seniors, Lieutenant-
Colonel Wood, V. C, and Major Eussell, have each
raised a regiment. . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Wood com
manded at the engagement of Essaman, as mentioned in
my despatch of the 15th October, in which I stated my
appreciation of the manner in which he carried out the
orders he had received. He is now commanding the
advanced posts from Mansu to the river Prah, and
displays both zeal and ability in the discharge of his
duties  I have great pleasure in bringing the
names both of Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, V. C, and
Major Eussell to your special notice."

HUTTING. 59
And the General was not alone in his views, for the
Commanding Eoyal Engineer spoke to the same effect :
" I have to request you will bring to the notice of
his Excellency the Major-General, the great assistance I
have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, V. C, who
has aided me in every way. Indeed I cannot express
too strongly how much I am indebted to Colonel Wood
for this assistance."
The help was very substantial which was thus hand
somely acknowledged. Major Home has recorded one
phase of it :
" The great difficulty at Prahsu was the want of
hutting materials. On the south bank the palm-leaves
were almost entirely deficient, and they had to be
procured from the north bank of the river .... 200
to 300 men of Colonel Wood's regiment, with two or
three European officers, were ferried across daily, to cut
palm-leaves and stakes for hutting."
But this extract only tells a small part of the story
how, on the arrival of the European troops, under Sir
Archibald Alison as Brigadier, with Colonel Greaves as
Chief of the Staff — " all that there was of a Chief of the
Staff," as a great friend of his subsequently described
him, with reference to a humorous affair in Cyprus —
they found all the way from the coast to the Prah care
fully constructed huts built by the native troops and
labourers under Colonel Wood.

60 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
The General arrived at Prahsu in advance of the
European troops on January 2nd, 1874, and by the
15th all was ready for the column, for which there were
lying prepared a month's provisions for 3,520 fighting
men and 3,000 carriers, in spite of continual desertions
of Native allies. Negotiations which the General knew to
be futile were carried on for some time with the Ashanti
king, both before and after the crossing of the Prah
by the force, between the 15th and the end of January,
on the last day of which the savage " threw off the
mask." The General advanced in four columns forming
a sort of square, designed to meet the enveloping or
outflanking tactics of the enemy. Colonel Wood com
manded on the right, where he " encountered so heavy a
fire that he directed his men to lie down." Of the fire the
General himself confessed he had not known one heavier,
so it is no wonder that before the action was won, which
it was at a quarter to two in the afternoon, having
lasted for some six hours, Colonel Wood was badly hit
in the chest by a slug, and had to be carried several
miles to the hospital. In a hurried despatch addressed
to the Secretary of War the next day Sir Garnet
Wolseley said :
"... My whole force divided into four columns . . .
Eight column, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Wood, V.C. ;
Naval Brigade left wing, Wood's Eegiment, Eait's
artillery, two rocket detachments, Eoyal Engineers'
detachment . . . Up to 1*30 p.m. the enemy kept up a

A MARCH IN A DELUGE. 61
very heavy fire on Lieutenant-Colonel Wood's column,
whose right was extended into the bush, east of
Egginassie . . . The officers commanding the columns
performed their difficult task most excellently, and were
efficiently aided by their staff. Lieutenant-Colonel
Evelyn Wood, V.C. was wounded while at the head of
the troops."
But though the slug wound was so severe, Colonel
Wood managed to get out of hospital on February 3rd,
and, though weak, he marched throughout the night,
and overtook the General at 4 a.m. the next day, in
spite of a "pitiless storm," a "deluge of rain which
never ceased throughout the night." He was thus in
time for the final action at Ordahsu, which threw open
the path to Coomassie, and in this he took his place at
the head of his Native regiment and led the advance.
In the following months, like his General, Colonel
Wood returned to England, to find that his services had
been fully recognised in the despatch sent by Sir
Garnet from Coomassie on the day after the occupation
of that blood-stained capital, in the following passage :
"... The two native regiments raised on the coast
were commanded throughout the war by Brevet-Lieu
tenant-Colonel E. Wood, V.C, 90th Light Infantry, and
by Brevet-Major B.C. Eussell, 13th Hussars. Both
these officers have upon many occasions been placed in
very difficult positions, requiring the exercise of high
military qualities, and have invariably carried out their

62 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
very arduous and trying duties most efficiently. I take
the liberty of bringing to your especial notice, as those
upon whom the brunt of this war has fallen, these and
the other combatant officers named below, who originally
came out with me or followed me by the first mail
steamer." In June, 1874, Colonel Wood delivered before the
United Service Institution a lecture on the Ashanti
Expedition, Mr. Gathorne Hardy, now Lord Cranbrook,
in the chair. This lecture gives a capital word picture
of the campaign ; but, as the chairman said, the lecturer
had spoken of everybody's services rather than his own.
Nevertheless, there is one passage from which a fair
idea may be gathered of the difficulties that were over
come in the native material on which Ministers had
originally intended to all but exclusively depend :
" On the 7th November, 1000 Cape Coast men, who
had been directed by Colonel Wood to join him at
Essecroom, arrived at Abrakampa, in order, as they said,
to fight under the General's eye. At 2 p.m. they were
paraded, facing the bush, and a more extraordinary
battle array was never seen. In the British Army,
corps quarrel for the position on the right of the line ;
here each company struggled for and edged away to the
left, I imagine because it was the point further removed
from the Ashantis. In front was a line of stalwart men,
bigger than the Ashantis, all well armed with Enfield
rifles. Behind them were their chiefs with whips.

PERSUADING A CHIEF. 63
Behind the Fantis chiefs, were Kossoos with drawn
swords. When ordered to advance, the Fantis moved
forward a dozen paces and then stopped. The chiefs
belaboured all within reach, and the Kossoos menaced
the most backward, including many of the chiefs. In
time all but the kings were out of sight, and they
showed no intention of venturing into the bush, till
some Officers who were looking on, having been for
bidden to go forward, used more than ' verbal persuasion,'
to quote the words of a despatch ; and, indeed, one
gifted Officer used so much persuasion towards a chief
as to spoil a strong umbrella. Yelling and firing, the
Cape Coast men advanced as the ever-menacing Kossoos
closed on them. Once in the bush, however, they were
more at liberty, and, squatting down, they let the Abras
pass to their right. These, on reaching Anismadi, the
Ashanti camp, observed the last of Amanquatsia's army
moving off. Not anticipating an attack, they had left
much spoil and many slaves in camp, and several fell
into our hands, though some were slaughtered in sight
of the Abras, one Ashanti being shot while actually
cutting a young mother's throat, a baby being on her
back." It is worth noting that, at this time, Sir Garnet
Wolseley's substantive rank in the Army, though he had
acted as Major-General in Ashanti, was " Major, half-
pay, late 90th Eegiment," and that Colonel Wood's
similar rank was " Major, 90th Foot." On the last day
of March he was gazetted Brevet-Colonel, and had a

64 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Commandership of the Most Honourable Order of the
Bath conferred on him. Within a month he was called
to the Bar by the Honourable Society of the Middle
Temple. In the beginning of July he rejoined the depot of his
regiment at Hamilton, and little over two months later
he was appointed Superintending Officer of Garrison
Instruction for the United Kingdom, including Ireland.
In the following August he served as A.Q.M.G. of
General Herbert's Division in the Autumn Manoeuvres,
and on St. George's Day, 1876, he was appointed to the
like post in the Aldershot Division. After more than a
year of sound and useful work, he arranged the concen
tration of a so-called Army Corps in Windsor Park on
July 9th, what time it appeared more than likely the
said Corps would soon have to see foreign service in the
neighbourhood of the Black Sea. General Sir Thomas
Steele thanked him before Head-Quarter Staff for " the
perfect arrangements of the day." In August, 1877,
General Napier, Governor of the Eoyal Military College
at Sandhurst, offered him the place of Commandant of
that Institution, but the prospect of war prevented the
acceptance of the post. A little later, the similar post
at the Staff College was declined for a like reason. But
Turkey was to be left to fight her foe unaided, and all
hope of taking part in an Eastern Campaign was for the
time being shattered, when the 90th Eegiment was
ordered to South Africa, and Colonel Wood, as its senior

ASHANTI AND HOME AGAIN. 65
major, resigned his Staff appointment to follow it, being
employed on " Special Service " until the time came
when he was ordered to take over the command. On
the day after the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, he
^anded at East London, and nine days later was sent to
command the troops near Keiskama Hoek, which was
threatened by an attack from insurgent Kaffirs. Thus
began a service in South Africa which was to prove alike
interesting and important.

66 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.

CHAPTEE V.
IN KAFFIRLAND AND ZULULAND.
Eestless Kaffirs — Clearing the Bush — A Skirmish — Cutting Tracks
— Kaffirs " On the Jump " — The Chief Slain— More Commend
ation — Commanding at Utrecht — A Long March — Ketch wayo's
Eaiders — Discontented Boers — A Serious Eesponsibility — The
right Thing to do — Boer Allies — A Mapless Eegion — Frontier
Dispositions — Coercing Ketchwayo — An Independent Com
mand — A Patrol at Midnight — Zulu Drill — Disaster at
Isandhlwana — Position at Kambula — Buller raids — A Party
Assegaied — A Careful Officer — A Plucky Sergeant — A Chief
Submits — Wood Brigadier-General and K.C.B. — Zulus im
pressed — In the Morning Mist — Shot from a Cavern — A
Narrow Escape — Sad loss — The Modern Troglodytes — A
Costly Diversion — Boers and Natives desert — Zulu Advance
— A Narrow Escape — A Fog Envelope — Zulu Hurry — Battle
of Kambula — Ten to One — The Official Eeport — Heavy Zulu
Loss — -The Famous Flying Column — Approaching Ulundi —
Total Defeat of Zulus — Compliments from Sir Garnet — The
Eapture of the Fray — Presentations of Plate — Welcome Home
— County Compliments — Dinner from the Bar — Eegimental
Colours — High Ideals — A Sad Mission — The Prince Imperial
— Carey's Flight — Sixteen Wounds in Front — Funeral
Honours — Belfast and Chatham.
It would be foreign to the nature of this volume to
enter into any question of colonial policy in which its
subject had not an initiative or controlling hand. But

CLEARING THE BUSH. 67
it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to trace the posi
tion of affairs from the time Colonel Wood landed at East
London, which was the same day that the command of
the troops in South Africa was handed over by General
Sir A. T. Cunynghame to (local) Lieutenant-General the
Hon. F. A. Thesiger, now Lord Chelmsford. For some
time before this one of the periodical fits of restlessness
had taken possession of the Kaffir and other tribes, and
it had broken out into hostilities in or before February,
1878. The Transvaal had been annexed in 1877, and
with it the country of Sekukuni, a chief of Basuto
descent, but the most powerful feudatory of king Ketch
wayo of Zululand. The Transvaal Boers had no real
right to the country, and previous to the annexation
Sekukuni had beaten the Boers badly. But even before
any Zulu troubles arose there had been a brisk little
war with the Kaffirs, ending with the death of the chief
Sandilli. This man had given a great deal of trouble ;
and Colonel Wood was destined to take a prominent
part in breaking his power. Five days after taking
command at Keiskama Hoek he led a column of Eegu-
lars and Volunteers up the Quilli mountain, and for the
next ten days was employed in clearing the Kaffirs out
of the Peri bush. On the 28th March, in the words of
General Thesiger :
" The enemy showed themselves in considerable
numbers on the open ground between the Goza
F 2

68 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
heights and the precipice west of Haynes Mill ; and I
ordered an attack for the following morning. The com
bined movements of Colonel Wood and Commandant
Frost were well carried out."
And this day there was a smart skirmish between
Wood's mixed column and the enemy. The attack
on the 29th did not lead to much more than another
skirmish, so far as Colonel Wood was concerned, but
what there was of it the general thus describes :
" The Kaffirs made an obstinate stand, and drove
them (Fingoes), killing Captain Webster of this division
while gallantly leading on his men. At this moment
Colonel Wood's force . . . opportunely appeared on the
high ground above the bush and effectually carried out
its instructions."
The Kaffirs being driven off, Colonel Wood was
employed until April 5 th in the necessary but tiresome
work of cutting tracks through dense bush. On that
day the friendly natives searched the bush and reported
it clear of foes. The next day he descended the moun
tain and had a skirmish at Burn's Hill, west of the
Intaba Dodo river, and soon after he had the satisfaction
of being joined by the headquarters and five companies
of the 90th Eegt., to the command of which he had
succeeded at the beginning of the month. On the last

SKIRMISHES. 69
day of the month he had a serious fight. He com
manded three columns, in all about 1,500 men, which
attacked and defeated the Kaffirs in the Intaba Dodo
bush, himself accompanying the right column, which
had the most of the fighting. The General reported
that: "About 6. 45 A.M., heavy firing was heard from
Colonel Wood's direction  The path by which
this column had to advance was surrounded by dense
bush, which completely screened the Kaffirs  By
sunset the day's work had been satisfactorily concluded.
.... Our loss, except Colonel Wood's right column,
was slight."
On the 8th, Wood's column once more ascended the
Goza heights, and had a skirmish at McNaughten's
Kranz, Buffalo Eange ; while on the 12th, the Fingoes
under his command had yet another skirmish, in
accordance with the orders of the general " not to cease
harassing the Kaffirs day or night." The general added
" the officers in command are not likely to lose sight of
these orders." Colonel Evelyn Wood was not likely to
do so at any rate. From the 12th to the end of the
month he was engaged in clearing the bush of the
Buffalo river, and in searching for fugitives, the war
being virtually at an end, as the General informed the
Home Government on Waterloo Day, and even a week
before. No hostile Kaffirs had been found in the

70 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Buffalo Bush ; but there was always a chance of further
fighting so long as Sandilli, the head and front of the
rising, was at large. He was slain in a skirmish on the
30th, and the rising immediately collapsed. The general
reported of Wood as follows :
" From the 9th to the 29th May, the troops under
Colonel Sir Evelyn Wood gave the rebels no rest. . . .
Colonel Evelyn Wood, V. C, C B., 90th Light Infantry,
on special service in South Africa, has had command
of a separate column of Imperial and Colonial troops,
from the time that I assumed the direction of military
operations in the field. I cannot speak too highly of
the good service rendered by this officer. He has
exercised his command with marked ability and great
tact. I am of opinion that his indefatigable exertions
and personal influence have been mainly instrumental
in bringing the war to a speedy close. I would beg to
draw attention to the names of those officers who are
especially brought to notice by Colonel E. Wood."
On Midsummer day, Colonel Wood took command of
a column which was ordered on a march of 510 miles
from King William's Town to Natal by way of Pondo
Land. He reached Maritsburg with the column on
September 1st, having meanwhile paid a visit, on a
political mission, to the town of Umfundisweni, in
Pondo Land. Six days later he was appointed to the
command of the troops in the Utrecht district, just
over the border from Natal in the Transvaal, and his five

BOERS RESTLESS. 71
companies of the 90th regiment were to follow him, as
the other companies were already there. It was on the
17th that he took up the command, and in view of
troubles coming fast and thick, he proceeded two days
later to Luneburg, where he was engaged for some time
in the purchase of transport. Meanwhile Ketchwayo's
men had destroyed all the Dutch homesteads from the
river Pungolo to the river Pi van, the Zulu king having,
as long before as February, instigated Sekukuni to make
an attack on a chief named Pokwana, who was friendly
to the English, and who was able, with a little help,
to beat off the assailants. Captain Clarke, commissioner
for the district, having remonstrated with Sekukuni,
that chief replied that the English were afraid to fight,
that the country was his, that the white people must
leave, and that he was quite ready for war. [See Official
Narrative of the Field Operations connected with the
Zulu War of 1879.] The Boers also began to be restless,
and to jopenly express discontent. The local forces being
slightly strengthened, one of Sekukuni's chiefs was ter
rified into submission, but the great man himself was
very active in opposition. And before he could be
suppressed, Ketchwayo was ready to take the field in
person, nominally on account of some disputed territory
near the Blood river, but really because he had trans
ferred to the British the detestation which he had
nourished against the Boers, so that the Zulu war which
followed was in fact a heritage which we took over in

72 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
connection with the annexation of Zululand. On
October 1st the General wrote as follows to Colonel
Wood: " Sir Bartle Frere is very anxious to give some
encouragement to the German settlers at Luneberg,
who have sent him a petition pointing out the pre
carious position in which they are placed. I have told
him that at present it will be quite out of the question
to send them any troops ; and I doubt much when the
whole of the 90th are concentrated at Utrecht it will be
prudent to weaken that garrison."
Yet two companies of the 90th were taken to Lune
berg, Colonel Wood reporting his action and stating
that unless the settlers were protected they would leave
their station. To this despatch he received the follow
ing reply :
"You have taken a serious responsibility upon
yourself, and I doubt very much whether you have
acted wisely. However, you may depend upon my
backing you up, as of course in your position you were
bound to act in whatever way you considered necessary,
under what I presume were very pressing circum
stances." The High Commissioner had no doubts on the matter,
and Sir Bartle wrote :

THE GERMAN SETTLERS. 73
"As regards Colonel Wood's advancement of a de
tachment to Luneberg, it is to my mind clear it was
the right thing to do. . . . They appealed to Colonel
Evelyn Wood for that protection which he was, as I
conceive, as much bound to afford them as if they had
been living in Pretoria. ... I think he deserves our
'gratitude and acknowledgments for taking the respon
sibility of saving us from such a disgrace."
And later on he wrote to the Colonial Secretary as
regards another raid :
" It will be in the recollection of Her Majesty's
Government that this is by no means the first raid
made by Umbelini, with the connivance if not under
the orders of Cetewayo, in whose country he lives. It
is simply a specimen of the horrors from which Colonel
Wood saved the German settlers in the little town of
Luneberg by sending a company of troops to their
protection when threatened by Umbelini two or three
months ago."
On the same subject Sir H. Bulwer, Governor of
Natal, wrote of Umbelini's raid :
" About the same time, or a few days later, another
kraal across the Pongolo, this time close to the Lune
berg settlement, was attacked by his people, who killed
men, women, and children. This act, following upon
the notice given by the Zulu headman, Faku, caused a
great deal of excitement among the German settlers at

74 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Luneburg, and to reassure the settlement Colonel
Evelyn Wood sent from Utrecht a detachment of
troops to Luneberg, which had the effect of effectually
stopping any further raid in that direction."
Lord Chelmsford himself admitted the effect of the
act, and wrote that Colonel Wood had " done wonders
with the Dutchmen ; " and added, " I am quite sure'the
High Commissioner will be as much obliged to you
from a political point of view as I am from a military
one. At the same time Colonel North Crealock,
Assistant Military Secretary, forwarded Colonel Wood
a Minute from the High Commissioner :
" I shall be much obliged if His Excellency the
Lieutenant-General will convey my thanks to Colonel
Evelyn Wood for the judgment he showed throughout
these proceedings."
In November our hero visited Andries Pretorius, an
influential Boer, residing near Laing's Nek, in the
Transvaal, to endeavour to induce him to join the
British troops in the event of war with the Zulus.
Early in December he convened a meeting of Dutch
Boers at Utrecht, who promised to accompany him if
necessary. On this Sir J3artle Frere wrote to the Home
Government :
" I have but little doubt that the firm, conciliatory,
and judicious treatment of these gentlemen by Colonel

THE STRATEGY. 75
Evelyn Wood will have an excellent effect, not only
locally, but generally throughout the south-eastern
Transvaal districts."
The frontier of Natal was about 200 miles in length,
" divided into two nearly equal faces, forming a re
entering angle in the neighbourhood of Eorke's Drift."
On the side of the Transvaal the country is compara
tively open, and easily watched, but on the southern
side Zululand is " broken and mountainous, and in
many places covered with thick forests." These forests
evidently furnished a screen behind which the Zulus
could choose their rendezvous for a raid into Natal. It
was therefore obviously wise to be beforehand with
Ketchwayo, and, adopting the advice of the old Eoman,
" carry the war into Africa." No maps of the country
existed, but at length the main routes were ascertained,
and General Thesiger divided his force into five
columns, with the object of marching on Ulundi, the
king's principal kraal. Later on the number of columns
was reduced to three, to advance simultaneously from
the Lower Tugela Drift, Eorke's Drift, and Utrecht.
The command of the first or right column was given to
Colonel Pearson, commanding the second battalion of
the "Buffs;" the centre column was confided to
Colonel Glyn, commanding the second battalion 24th
Eegiment ; and the left column was given to Colonel
Wood, who was already on the spot at Utrecht. Be-

76 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
sides these columns there was to be a fourth, composed
of friendly natives of Natal, for the most part, which
was to move later on between the. centre and the right
columns. In the first days of January, Wood's" column
assembled near Balte Spruit, and " consisted of eight
companies first battalion 13th Eegiment, and eight of
the 90th, four guns 11th battery, 7th Brigade, Eoyal
Artillery, with the Frontier Light Horse, Mounted
Boers and Wood's Irregulars, or a total of about 200
mounted men, 1,500 European Infantry, and 300
natives, with four guns and two rocket troughs." On
the 4th January the column advanced to the Blood
river. On the same day Sir Bartle Frere, the High
Commissioner, handed over to the general — now become
Lord Chelmsford, by the death of the fine old gentleman
who, having been, like Colonel Wood, a midshipman,
had attained the dignity of Lord Chancellor — the task
of coercing Ketchwayo, unless he agreed to the British
terms by the 11th of the month. On the 6 th the Blood
river, though in flood, was crossed, and on the 10th,
Bemba, the chief of the district, submitted, and was
sent with his people to Utrecht. On the same day the
concentration of each of the three columns was com
pleted. For the moment it appeared that Wood's
column had the best of the country, which was more
open than that before the other columns. But he was
not to have a free hand, for danger being supposed to
lurk more especially in front of Glyn's centre column,

MARCH THROUGH A MARSH. 77
Wood, 35 miles off, was to keep himself in readiness to
hold out to him a helping hand. Accordingly, on the
10th, Colonel Wood started down the left of the Blood
river, an affluent of the Buffalo, and at once found
himself in a very difficult country. He had two guns,
six companies 90th, and six companies 13th, with most
of his mounted men, and two battalions of friendly Zulus
known as Wood's Irregulars. The ground was for the
most part marshy, and numerous small streams had to
be crossed, their banks being previously cut down.
Nevertheless, in four hours no less than 9 miles had
been covered, and then the column halted for the night,
or rather till 2 in the morning of the 11th, when the
march was resumed in " darkness and fog." First went
a flying column, under the Brigadier, composed of the
Frontier Light Horse, two guns, 24 marksmen in mule
waggons, 600 of Wood's Irregulars. The remainder,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert, went in support at a
distance of several miles. The flying column made nine
miles, and got within twelve of Eorke's Drift by eight
o'clock, when Lord Chelmsford was met. The general,
having seen the centre column safely across the Buffalo
without opposition, had ridden out with an escort to
meet the left column. The news he brought rendered
the further advance of Colonel Wood unnecessary. He
accordingly returned to the camp at Bemba's Kop, but
owing to heavy rain did not reach the camp until
' the morning of the 13th. This operation, though as it

78 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
turned out useless in a direct sense, had two advantages.
It accustomed the troops to the presence of the Zulus,
who, though not yet actively hostile, were in the bush
in great numbers, and it provisioned the force by the
capture of many head of cattle. Of the state of the
command Lord Chelmsford wrote on January 14th to
the Secretary of State for War :
" I was completely satisfied with the account Colonel
Wood had given me of the efficiency of his column,
with respect to its transport and commissariat and its
ability to move forward at once. I attribute the satis
factory state of the column to Colonel Wood's energy
and military knowledge."
And on the same date Colonel Wood was appointed
Political Agent in Northern Zululand, while a day or
two later he was, in Lord Chelmsford's words :
" Instructed to act altogether independently. . . .
He will take up a position covering Utrecht and the
adjacent Transvaal frontier wherever he considers his
force can be most usefully employed."
Eeconnaissances were made on the 15th and 17th by
the mounted troops, and on the 18th the column
advanced ten miles eastwards to the Sand river, or
Insegene, the Irregulars, in advance, having a slight
skirmish on the eastern side of the White Umvalosi
river, which further on runs down three miles to the
south of Ulundi. After a day's halt, if not absolute rest,

ZULU DRILL. 79
the column moved on the 20th to the White Umvalosi,
near the kraal of a chief named Tinta, who promptly
submitted, and was sent to Utrecht under escort. A
reconnaissance made to the top of a table-mountain in
the Zungi range was warmly received by the enemy and
had to retire. On the next day a strong stone laager
fort was completed and the stores moved into it, under
the guard of a company from the 13th and one from
the 90th regiments. That midnight a patrol, in three
sections, one under the command of Lieutenant- Colonel
Buller, and another under Colonel Wood, set out for the
Zungi range, and gained the ridge unopposed at 6 a.m.
The force united and passed to the eastern end of the
range, having on the way discovered the Zulus drilling
on the central eminence, called the Inhlobana mountain,
to the number of about 4,000 men. " Their evolutions,
which were plainly visible with the aid of a glass, were
executed with ease and precision, a circle, a triangle,
and a hollow square with a partition across it, being
formed rapidly by movements of companies." Evidently
here were foemen, though savages, not unworthy of
British steel. The force now descended the mountain,
and at 7 p.m. gained a camp which had been formed by
Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert below the south-eastern
extremity of the range. A halt on the 23rd was
followed on the morning of the next day by an advance,
when, at half past 7- a body of Zulus was met and
defeated north of the Inhlobana mountain. While this

80 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
skirmish was in progress the news reached Colonel
Wood of the disaster to the centre column at Isandh-
lwana on the 22nd, when "52 officers, and 806 white
non-commissioned officers and men were killed," besides
200 to 300 native troops, and the Zulus " became pos
sessed of two 7-pounder guns with their ammunition, and
of about 800 Martini-Henry rifles, with some 400,000
cartridges." In consequence of this reverse Colonel
Wood acted prudently and well by at once falling back
on his camp on the White Umvolosi at Fort Tinta.
Colonel Wood remained at Fort Tinta the day of the
26th, loading up the burdens of twenty waggons, and on
the 26th marched nine miles towards the 'Ngabaka
Hawane mountain, twenty miles to the east of Utrecht.
But he was in no hurry to fall back faster than was
needed, so he halted from the 27th till the 31st on the
White Umvalosi, and only then proceeded a short
distance further to a good position at Kambula, on the
south-eastern side of the mountain, where water and
wood were plentiful and where he established a strong
entrenched camp. Next morning Colonel Buller took
about 140 mounted men to the Makulusini kraal, thirty
miles or more to the eastward, this kraal being "a
centre of resistance and a rallying point " for the most
hostile natives. He got there at half-past twelve, hav
ing been over eight hours on the road. He had guarded
his line of march by leaving thirty men in the pass, and
with the rest he advanced into the basin of the hills,

BULLER RAIDS. 81
and galloped up to the kraal, from which the " Zulus
fled in all directions." The kraal of 250 huts was burnt,
some cattle were captured, and the party got back the
same evening to Kambula without loss. Such is often
the result of happy audacity. The Staff map makes the
burning of the kraal take place on the 2nd of February,
but the Official History leaves no doubt it was on the
1st. On the 3rd the Fort at Kambula was finished, and
armed with two guns ; and from the 5th to the 7th two
parties went scouting about in search of Zulus, but
found none. They returned from their vain search on
the 7th, and on the 10th Colonel Buller was out again
eastward to his old ground on the Inhlobana mountain,
where he got 500 cattle without " any serious resistance."
From considerations of transport for wood, the fort was
on the 13th moved two miles nearer the mountain
summit, and on the same day Buller went off to punish
a chief named Manyanyoba who was raiding the Intombi
valley, near Luneberg, and although this chief had been
joined by Umbelini, the Zulu who had ordered the
Germans away from their farms the previous September,
and had in February committed a number of murders in
this valley, the Zulus were routed out of the caves in
which they took refuge, and slain to the number of
thirty-four. Some cattle were taken. Other raids were
made by a force under Colonel Eowlands, V.C, without
much result, and on the 26th that officer was despatched
to Pretoria in consequence of the attitude of the Boers,
G

82 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
so that Colonel Wood remained in sole charge of the
district. On the 17th Uhamu, a half-brother of
Ketchwayo, offered to surrender, but was unable to do
so until the 4th March, when he; was brought in with
700 followers. Before he reached Luneberg, a company
of the 80th Eegiment was sent out under Captain
Moriarty, to escort a convoy of waggons with supplies
to Luneberg from Derby. It met some of the convoy on
the Intombi river, an>d there formed laager, where it
was inspected the night of the 11th by Major Tucker.
At four o'clock on the morning of the 12th, a sentry was
fired at, and the laager on the left bank was rushed,
with disastrous results, Moriarty and most of his men
being assegaied as they left their tents. A party on the
right bank, under the command of one Lieutenant
Harward, opened fire, but in the face of it 200 Zulus
got across the river, whereupon the gallant Harward
bolted on horseback, as hard as he could pelt, in the
direction of Luneberg, four and a half miles off, to
" procure reinforcements," leaving his detachment with
out an officer. However, there was a plucky sergeant,
named Booth, who was equal to the occasion, showed a
bold front to the Zulus, and brought his band off with
out loss. Mr. Harward was court-martialled, but was
acquitted, yet did not escape such a " wigging " at
the hands of Lord Chelmsford and the Commander-in-
Chief at home, that his combatant career soon came to a
close.

KETCHWAYO S BROTHER. 83
Uhamu's surrender was of some value, and much
was thought of it at the time by the superior authorities.
Sir B. Frere said in a despatch :
" Much credit is due to Colonel Wood and to Captain
Macleod, who acted under his orders, for the temper,
judgment, and patience they have shown in their
dealings with Uhamu. There were at first the gravest
suspicions in the minds of persons claiming more than
an ordinary knowledge of Zulu affairs as to whether
Uhamu was not, in Ketchwayo's interest, devising a
scheme to entrap Colonel Wood. There is no doubt but
that this defection from Ketchwayo is in every way an
event of considerable importance."
And Lord Chelmsford said :
" It will be within your recollection that Colonel
Wood for many months past has reported his belief
that this important chief would separate himself from
' the King when opportunity offered, and Colonel Wood
has always treated the natives of Uhamu's district, when
it was possible to do so, in a manner which would induce
them to join, as Uhamu."
Colonel Wood's own report ran :
"Uhamu came in as reported on the 10th inst., and
having requested me to get in his wives and family,
I sent off on the 12th inst. twenty of his men to en-
G 2

84 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
deavour to collect his people. Early on the morning of
the 14th a party consisting of 360 rifles under Lieu
tenant-Colonel Buller, C.B., 30 burghers under Piet
Uys, and 200 men of Uhamu's under direction of Mr.
Lloyd left this camp. Lieutenant-Colonel Buller, C.B.,
was in command of the patrol. I accompanied the
patrol in order to see the country, and because I con
sidered my presence would be an inducement to
Uhamu's men to accompany, as the latter has begged
me to look on his men as my " dogs." Leaving the
camp at 5 p.m. on the 14th, we reached the caves
near Inhlangawine Inambruid, twelve miles to the east
of the sources of the M'Kusi rhrer, and about forty-five
miles from this camp, at 9 "30 p.m. The last seven
miles occupied three hours, as we had to cross a very
difficult hill. We started back at about 9 a.m., and
reached the Zunguin range on the evening of the 15th
inst. A few shots were fired at us from the Inhlobane
range. The position is stronger and more difficult to
take than I anticipated. I have now returned to camp
at 1 P.M., bringing with me 958 souls of Uhamu's
people." The Special Border Agent, at Umvoti, reporting on
an interview with some Zulus said :
" One of them at a private interview told the Bishop
and myself confidentially that the change in Cetewayo's
tone is principally caused by the defection of Uhamu.
They perceive. plainly it is the beginning of the break
up of the Zulu power."

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOOD. 85
Sir B. Frere wrote :
" I have in other despatches expressed my sense of
the importance of Uhamu's defection from Cetewayo,
which I entirely concur with his Excellency Lord
Chelmsford in thinking is mainly due to the ju
dicious management of Colonel E. Wood and Captain
Macleod." And Lord Chelmsford was not less emphatic :
" I congratulate you upon Uhamu's surrender — the
whole credit I consider lies with you."
In consequence of this, following upon so much dis
tinguished service, the General asked that the local rank
of I Brigadier-General might be conferred on Colonel
Wood, which request was granted by the High Com
missioner on the 3rd April, ere a despatch from him
reached home with this passage :
" Before active operations recommence for further
advance in Zululand I wish to bring to the special notice
of Her Majesty's Government the great value of the
services performed by Colonel Evelyn Wood, in com
mand of the 4th column, and Colonel Pearson, of the 1st
column of the forces now in the field.
" 2. His Excellency Lieutenant-General Lord Chelms
ford has, I am sure, very fully reported on the mili
tary bearing of their operations in Zululand. What
I would now specially bring to the notice of Her

86 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Majesty's Government is the political effect of their
steady maintenance of positions so far advanced into
Zululand as to render an invasion of Natal by the Zulu
army in force an operation of extreme peril.
* * * *
" But I should place foremost in the list of causes
the undaunted bearing of the two columns commanded
by Colonels Wood and Pearson, and I beg warmly to
recommend the conduct of both officers for the special
approbation of Her Majesty's Government."
And the effective instrument of the promotion read
thus in General Orders of April 8th :
" His Excellency the High Commissioner has been
pleased to approve of Lieutenant-Colonel and Brevet
Colonel Wood, V.C, C.B., 90th Foot, holding the local
rank of Brigadier-General while employed in command
of a brigade in South Africa. Dated 3rd April, 1879."
The Queen, on the 23rd June, gave effect to the wishes
of the High Commissioner by appointing Colonel Wood
a Knight Commander of the Bath.
For some time it had been rumoured that Ketchwayo
was bent on throwing his whole army on Wood's
column, which a Frenchman named Grandier, who
escaped from Ulundi, reported to be the " only com
mando " the Zulus were afraid of. The Border Agent at
Umvoti reported to the same effect, and thought Wood
might have to encounter as many as 25,000 men. He

A DIVERSION. 87
added, " The Zulus are much impressed with the skill
with which this force has been handled, and are afraid it
may push on for the Inhlazatze and threaten the Eoyal
kraal. Bishop Colenso heard that the whole army
would probably be sent " to try and overwhelm Colonel
Wood's column." Even as early as January 28th Lord
Chelmsford wrote Wood : " You are now forewarned,
and must be prepared to have the whole Zulu force on
top of you one of these days."
Between the 14th and 18 th of March, Colonel Wood
accompanied Colonel Buller on an expedition to bring
in a number of Uhamu's men who were hiding from the
Zulus in caves on the Umkusi river, forty-five miles east
of Kambula. As many as 958 were thus brought in,
with little opposition, but something else was done ; it
was found out that the southern side of the Inhlobana
mountain was occupied by from 800 to 1000 of the
enemy. This led to a reconnaissance, when Lord
Chelmsford announced an intention of marching to the
relief of Etshowe, and asked that a diversion should be
attempted on March 28th. A movement was accordingly
made against both ends of the mountain, the eastern
under Colonel Buller, the western under Colonel Eussell.
The former had 300 mounted men and 400 natives, and
after a march of thirty miles, bivouacked five miles from
the south-east of the mountain. The latter had 250
mounted men, a rocket detachment, a battahon of
Wood's Irregulars, and 150 of Uhamu's men. After a

88 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
march of fifteen miles, he bivouacked four miles west of
the mountain. Colonel Wood with his Staff, consisting
of Captain the Honourable Eonald Campbell, Mr. Lloyd,
political assistant, and Lieutenant Lysons, as orderly
officer, reached Eussell's bivouac on the night of the
27th, and went eastward at half-past three on the
morning of the 28th. Buller left his bivouac at the
same time and crept, with the utmost difficulty, though
shielded by the morning mist, up a steep path, " hardly
passable for mounted men" in a re-entering angle of
the mountain, to the summit, which could not have
been gained in the face of serious opposition. Although
the Zulus on the top were surprised, they stood to their
weapons, killed two officers, and mortally wounded one
man. Colonel Wood, who had just received the news
that he had been awarded the grant of £100 a year
for distinguished service, dismounted, and was leading
his horse up the steep slope, with his Staff and a
small escort, a little ahead of some men under
Colonel Weatherly, when, in the words of the Official
Eeport :
" At a short distance from the top, a severe and well-
directed fire was opened on the party from some holes
in the rocks above. By this fire, Mr. Lloyd was mortally
wounded, and Colonel Wood's horse was killed, and as
these and other casualties appeared to be caused by
shots from one cavern in particular, Colonel Wood

SHARP AFFAIRS. 89
ordered Colonel Weatherley to send some of his men to
the front to dislodge the Zulus from this hiding-place.
As there was some little delay in obeying this order,
Captain Eonald Campbell dashed forward, followed by
Lieutenant Lysons (known throughout this campaign
as ' the boy'), and three men of the 90th, but just as
they reached the dark entrance of the cavern, Captain
Campbell fell dead, shot through the head by a Zulu
lying hidden within. His death was speedily avenged
by his companions, and the cavern was cleared."
Colonel Wood saw Campbell and Lloyd buried lower
down the slope, while Buller cleared the summit of the
mountain, three miles in length by half that distance in
width, collecting two thousand head of cattle. Soon
afterwards, Buller saw a Zulu army about six miles off,
estimated at 20,000 strong, coming from the south-east.
About an hour later, Wood saw the Zulu army, and
ordered Eussell to get into position on the Zunguin
Nek. There was some difficulty in identifying the spot,
and Eussell took up a position six miles from the place
intended. Buller went down the west side of the
mountain, harassed by natives from the caves, and the
Zulus closed with the assegai on the scattered members
of the party. " One officer and about sixteen men were
lost, and at this spot fell Mr. Piet Uys, the gallant
leader of the Boer Contingent, who had rendered such
valuable services to Colonel Wood's column." Buller's
troops got greatly disorganised, and would probably

90 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
have been cut to pieces, had the Zulu main body
attacked. As it was, the small loss sustained was
mainly at the hands of the inhabitants of the mountain,
the modern Troglodytes. The expedition got back to
Kambula camp with less loss than might have been ex
pected. But Wood had assuredly created a diversion for
the General. He sent Lord Chelmsford this telegram :
" We assaulted the Inhlobane successfully yesterday,
and took some thousands of cattle ; but while on the
top, about 20,000 Zulus, coming from Ulundi, attacked
us, and we suffered considerable losses, the enemy re
taking captured cattle. Nearly all our natives deserted
last evening."
Colonel Wood's report of this affair was as follows :
" I have the honour to report that the Inhlobane
mountain was successfully assaulted and its summit
cleared at daylight on the 28th by Lieutenant-Colonel
Buller, C.B., with the mounted riflemen and the 2nd
battalion Wood's Irregulars, under the command of
Second Commandant Eoberts, who worked under the
general direction of Major Leet, commanding the corps.
I joined Colonel Eussell's column at dusk on the 27th
inst., at his bivouac about five miles west of Inhlobane
mountain. I had with me the Hon. E. Campbell,
district staff officer of No. 4 column, Mr. Lloyd, my
political assistant, Lieutenant Lysons, 90th Light In
fantry, orderly officer, and my mounted personal escort,

A HARD ROAD TO TRAVEL. 91
consisting of eight men 90th Infantry, and six natives
under Umtonga, one of Panda's sons. Soon after 3 a.m.
I rode eastward with these details, and at daylight got
on Colonel Buller's track, which we followed. Colonel
Weatherly met me, coming westward, having lost his
way the previous night, and I directed him to move on
towards the sound of the firing, which was now audible
on the north-east face of the mountain, where we could
see the rear of Colonel Buller's column near the summit.
I followed Colonel Weatherly and commenced the
ascent of the mountain immediately behind the Border
Horse, leading our horses. It is impossible to describe
in adequate terms the difficulty of the ascent which
Colonel Buller and his men had successfully made — not
without loss, however, for horses killed and wounded
helped to keep us on his track where the rocks afforded
no evidence of his advance. We soon came under
fire from an unseen enemy. Ascending more rapidly
than most of the Border Horse, who had got off the
track, with my staff and escort, I passed to the front,
and, with half-a-dozen of the Border Horse, when within
a hundred feet of the summit, came under a well-directed
fire from our front and both flanks, poured in from
behind huge boulders of rocks. Mr. Lloyd fell mortally
wounded at my side, and as Captain Campbell and one
of the escort were carrying him on to a ledge rather
lower, my horse was killed, falling on me. I directed
Colonel Weatherly to dislodge one or two Zulus who
were causing us most of the loss, but as his men did not
advance rapidly, Captain Campbell, Lieutenant Lysons,
and three men of the 90th, jumping over a low wall,

92 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
ran forward and charged into a cave, where Captain
Campbell, leading in the most gallant and determined
manner, was shot dead. Lieutenant Lysons and Private
Fowler followed closely on his footsteps, and one of
them, for each fired, killed one Zulu and dislodged
another, who crawled away by a subterraneous passage,
reappearing higher up the mountain. At this time we
were assisted by the fire of some of Colonel Buller's men
on the summit. Colonel Weatherly asked for permission
to move down the hill to rejoin Colonel Buller's track,
which he had lost, and by which he later gained the
summit without further casualties. At this time he had
lost three dead and about six or seven wounded. Mr.
Lloyd was now dead, and we brought his body and that
of Captain Campbell half-way down the hill, where we
buried them, still being under fire, which, however, did
us no damage. I then moved slowly round under the
Inhlobane mountain to the westward to see how Colonel
Eussell's force had progressed, bringing with the escort
a wounded man of the Border Horse and a herd of sheep
and goats driven by one of Umtonga's men. We
stopped occasionally to give the wounded man stimu
lants, unconscious of the fact that a very large Zulu
force was moving on our left across our front. We were
about half-way under the centre of the mountain when
Umtonga saw and explained to me by signs that a large
Zulu army was close to us. From an adjacent hill I had
a good view of the force. It was marching in five
columns with " horns," and dense " chest," the Zulu
normal attack formation. u The Ulundi army being, as I
believe, exhausted by its rapid march, did not close on

WHOLESALE DESERTION. 93
Colonel Buller, who descended after Uhamu's people the
western point of the mountain.
******
"We reached camp at 7 p.m., and Colonel Buller,
hearing that some of Captain Barton's party were on
foot about ten miles distant, at once started in heavy
rain with led horses and brought in seven men, as we
believe the sole survivors of the Border Horse and
Captain Barton's party, who, being cut off when on my
track, retreated over the north end of the Ityenteka
Eange." During the night of the 28th, all Wood's Irregulars
deserted, and early in the morning all the Dutchmen left
the camp. Spies brought information that the whole
Zulu force was marching on Kambula camp, but as it
was short of fuel a party was sent up the mountain.
A dense fog enveloped the camp, and when it lifted, at
ten o'clock, the Zulu army was seen in motion. With
out undue haste the wood party was recalled, dinners
quietly ordered for half-past twelve, after which the tents
were struck. This act appeared to the Zulus as prepara
tory to a retreat, so they hastened their attack, the ad
vance having previously been deliberate. But the proverb
has it that " more haste makes worse speed." And the
Zulu hurry enabled Wood to defeat one wing before the
other came into action. There were at least 20,000
of Ketchwayo's lieges, and all the force Wood had to
dispose of was the 90th Light Infantry, a battalion of

94 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
the 13th Light Infantry, and the battery with a few
mounted men, the total being 1,998. Thus there were
more than ten Zulus to each man in laager or in the out
lying fort two hundred yards to the eastward. This
fort at its western end was connected by a palisade sixty
yards long with a cattle laager lying south on the brow
of a steep bluff. The fort was occupied by companies of
the 13th and 90th. Dinner being got over — but to avoid
repetition, it is better to cite Colonel Wood's report :
" The camp was vigorously attacked by four Zulu
regiments from 1'30 to 5 '30 p.m. The chief command
was exercised by Mnyamane, who did not come under
fire, and Tymgwayo. The army left Ulundi on the
24th inst ; four regiments were left near Ekowe and
four left at Ulundi. Early in the forenoon Captain
Eaaff, who was out reconnoitring, sent me one of Oham's
men. He told me he was behind with the captured
cattle. He put his head badge into his pocket and was
recognised by a friend who was ignorant of his having
joined us. He marched with the Zulu army to the
Umvolosi. At daybreak he went out drinking and
persuaded his companions that they were recalled, ran
away to Eaaff s men, and told them how the attack
would be made at dinner-time. About 11 a.m. we saw
dense masses approaching, moving in file, towards the
Inhlobane mountain from near the Umvolosi. Two
companies which were out wood-cutting were recalled,
the cattle brought into laager with the exception of
about 200 which had strayed away from those whose

THE FIGHT AT KAMBULA. 95
duty it was to herd them, in the direction of the natives.
At 1*30 the action commenced. The mounted riflemen
under Colonels Buller and Eussell engaged an enormous
crowd of men on the north side of the camp. Being
unable to check them, the men retired inside the laager
followed by the Zulus until they were within three
hundred yards, when their advance was checked by the
accurate firing of the 90th Light Infantry, and the
Zulus spread out to front and reaf of camp. The attack
on our left had slackened, when, at 2"15 p.m., heavy
masses attacked our right front and right rear. The
enemy, well supplied with Martini-Henry rifles and
ammunition, occupied a hill not seen from the laager,
and opened such an accurate fire, though at long ranges,
that I was obliged to withdraw a company of the 13 th
Eegiment at the right rear of the laager. The front,
however, of the cattle laager was stoutly held by
another company of the 13th. They could not see the
right rear, and as the Zulus were coming on boldly, I
ordered Major Hackett of the 90th Light Infantry with
two companies to advance over the slope. The Zulus
retired from their immediate front, but the companies
being heavily flanked I ordered them back ; whilst
bringing them in Major Hackett was dangerously, and
as I fear, mortally wounded. The two mule guns were
admirably worked by Lieutenant Nicholson, E.A., in
redoubt, until he was mortally wounded. The horses
of the other four guns, under Lieutenants Bigge and
Slade, were sent inside the laager when the Zulus came
within 1,000 yards of them, but these officers, with their
men and Major Tremlett, E.A., to all of whom great

96 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
credit is due, remained in the open the whole of the
engagement. In Major Hackett's counter-attack Lieu
tenant Bright, 90th Light Infantry, an accomplished
draughtsman and a most promising young officer, was
wounded, and died here during the night. At 5 "30 p.m.,
seeing the attack slackening, I ordered out a company
ofthe 1-1 3th Eegiment to the right rear of the laager
to attack some Zulus who had crept into the laager, but
who had been unable to remove the cattle. I took
Captain Laye's company of the 90th Light Infantry to
the edge of the krantz on the right front of the cattle
laager, and they did great execution among a mass of
retreating Zulus. Commandant Eaaff at the same time
ran on with some of the men to the rear of the camp and
did similar execution. I ordered out the mounted me»,
who, under Colonel Buller, pursued for seven miles the
flying Zulus retreating on our left front, chiefly com
panies of the Amaqulosi under Umcwayo, killing great
numbers, the enemy being too much exhausted to fire in
their own defence. From those we have taken, it
appears that the column first attacked our left, and then,
being repulsed, went round to our front. Eear and
right were composed of the Nokeuke-and Umbonambi
and Unkandampenvu regiments. The Amaqulosi at
tacked the front, the Ulundi and Umcityu the right
front, and the Ngobamokosi the right. We are still
burying Zulus, of whom 500 are close to our camp."
This account is clear and precise, save in one point.
Colonel Wood characteristically omits the part of Ham
let in the drama. No one would guess from it that it

PERSISTENT ATTACKS. 97
was by Colonel Wood's order Buller and Eussell drew
the fire of the enemy and compelled the premature
attack. The little party of horsemen, some hundred
strong, had attacked a body of not less than 2,000 men,
and, as the Official Eeport says, Zulu discipline, though
good, was not good enough for this sort of thing. So
the right horn of the army was rolled back when it
came up to the attack on the north. The left worked
round the western face, and the centre came up again at
the southern front. A company of the 13th, in the
cattle laager, had to withdraw, and the attack was
evidently about to be pushed on to the main laager,
when Wood ordered a counter attack by two companies
of the 90th, under Major Hackett. This did good for
awhile ; but the foe was too strong, and the companies
fell back within the laager. The Zulus continued to
attack for three hours more, but were always driven
back by the steadiness of the fire from the laager and
the fort, and the coolness with which the guns of Trem-
lett's battery were served mainly from a point between
the two. At half-past five, when the men were
becoming rather weary, it was a question in the mind of
more than one spectator which side would tire the
sooner. The Zulus began to shake ; and then Wood
threw a company of the 13th into the cattle laager, to
retake it, and a company of the 90th, which he
accompanied on to the verge of the bluff, where they
poured a heavy fire into the mass of foes below. If
H

98 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
there had been any doubt of the issue before, that
settled the business, and Buller and Eussell and their
mounted men, who had been assisting in the defence
within the laager, now mounted and turned the retreat
into a rout, pursuing for seven miles, and until night
fell, the almost unresisting throng, who: unlike English
men, as history tells us, did know when they were
beaten. Moreover, they realised the fact so thoroughly
that there was no more Zulu trouble in the Kambula dis
trict, though Utrecht, close by, offered to the men of
Ketchwayo a tempting object for loot, since, save by a
small fort, it was otherwise undefended than by the
Kambula camp in advance of it. It almost goes without
saying that it turned out afterwards Colonel Wood had
underestimated the number of Zulus killed. In a tele
gram to the general he put it at 1,200. A Zulu who
was present afterwards said that the Ngobamokosi
" could not face the bullets  No one could face
them without being struck  The Umbonambi
regiment .... were cut to pieces — quite destroyed."
The total loss could not have been less on the Zulu side
than 2,000 men.
Eeinforcements having arrived from England the dis
tribution of the force on the frontier was altered, and
Major-General Newdigate was posted to the command
of the Second Division, including the Utrecht District.
But the little body that had done such glorious work at
Kambula was not broken up. It retained its independ-

A GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY. 99
ence, and a free hand, under the title of "Brigadier-
General Wood's Flying Column." These arrangements
were promulgated on the 13th April, and on the 14th
Wood took up fresh ground for his camp for sanitary
reasons, some 600 or 700 yards to the west of that
which had seen such good work on the 29th March.
The loss of life on the 28 th at Inhlobana (the loss in
white men) had been no less than twelve officers and
eighty men killed, and seven wounded, out of a strength
of 400 under Buller, to say nothing of the native loss,
which could not be ascertained owing to the desertion of
seven-eighths of the survivors. On the following day
the loss was only eighteen non-commissioned officers and
men killed, and eight officers and fifty-seven non-com
missioned officers and men wounded, but there were many
subsequent fatalities among the latter. A " Gazette
Extraordinary " was issued at Newcastle, Natal, on
March 31st, in which Sir Bartle Frere said :

" The entire defeat of the determined attack made by
this large force, after an action of five hours' duration,
and the pursuit of the routed Zulus for several miles,
cannot fail to have a great effect on the whole Zulu
force, and on the future progress of the war. H. E. the
High Commissioner begs Lord Chelmsford will convey
to Colonel Wood and the officers and men specially
named by him, the High Commissioner's thanks for the
effectual services thus rendered by the 4th column."
h 2

100 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
The Secretary for War thought it sufficient to say
that it "seems" the force had acted with a gallantry
and determination worthy of great praise. Lord, then
Colonel, Stanley is not by any means an old woman,
but one cannot avoid thinking, in this connection, of
Hamlet's reproof to his mother — " Seems, Madam, nay
it is ; I know not seems."
After the Kambula fight, as has been said, the Zulu
army dispersed, small raiding parties only approaching
the Transvaal frontier, mostly in the Pongola Valley ;
but Wood is not the man to leave much to chance, and
he had patrols constantly moving through the district.
In May, the patrols pushed in various directions to
discover the easiest approaches to Ulundi. On the 8th
of the month, the Flying Column left Kambula, and
moved, in a south-easterly direction, across the Umvolosi
river. On the 20th, with a patrol, the Brigadier
searched for and buried the remains of some Europeans
who had fallen on the 28 th March. On the 2nd of June
the Flying Column took its place four miles in front of
the Second Division, and mostly kept that relative posi
tion up to and during the march to Ulundi. It, indeed,
went towards Landtman's Drift on the Buffalo river on
the 7th June, and returned on the 15th, escorting 600
waggons, and other vehicles, containing six weeks'
supplies, and the following day again went ahead of the
Second Division. On the 27th, the Brigadier despatched

OLUNDI. 101
his mounted troops to his left, and destroyed ten military
kraals, without opposition, the Zulus being concentrated
at Ulundi. On July 3rd, he crossed the Umvolosi and
reconnoitred over the Ulundi plain. The next was the
momentous day, and here Lord Chelmsford may be per
mitted to speak for himself :
"Umvolosi Eiver, near Ulundi.
" July 4th, 1879.
" This morning a force under my command, consisting
of the 2nd division under Major-General Newdigate,
numbering 1,870 Europeans, 530 natives, and 8 guns,
and the Flying Column under Brigadier-General Wood,
numbering 2,192 Europeans and 573 natives, 4 guns and
2 Gatlings, crossed the Umvolosi river at 6-15, and
marching in a hollow square, ammunition and en-
trenching-tool carts and bearer company in its centre,
reached an excellent position between Nodwengo and
Ulundi about half-past eight a.m. This had been
observed by Colonel Buller the day before.
" Soon after half-past seven the Zulu army was seen
leaving its bivouacs and advancing on every side.
" The engagement was shortly afterwards commenced
by the mounted men.
" By nine o'clock the attack was fully developed. At
half -past nine the enemy wavered ; the 17th Lancers,
followed by the remainder of the mounted men, attacked
them, and a general rout ensued. By noon Ulundi was
in flames, and during the day all military kraals of the
Zulu army and in the valley of the Umvolosi were

102 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
destroyed. At two p.m. the return march to the camp
of the column commenced."
Lord Chelmsford brought especially to the notice of
the Secretary for War the name of Brigadier-General
Wood, who had become Sir Evelyn eleven days before.
Three days later, Lord Chelmsford wrote again to
Colonel Stanley :
" I cannot refrain from bringing again to your special
notice the names of Brigadier-General Evelyn Wood,
V.C, CB  whose service during the ad
vance towards Ulundi from the advanced base, and
during the recent successful operations near Ulundi,
have been invaluable.
" Brigadier-General Wood, although suffering at times
severely in bodily health, has never spared himself, but
has laboured incessantly night and day to overcome the
innumerable difficulties which have had to be encoun
tered during the advance through a country possessing
no roads."
Now this was very nice of Lord Chelmsford, for it is
evident from the Official Eeport that it was Sir Evelyn
Wood's column which really won the victory of Ulundi.
This may be seen from the following slight narrative.
It was Colonel Buller, with the mounted men of the
Flying Column, who on the 3rd July found the nature
of the country and the strength and position of the
enemy's forces. It was they who crossed the Umvolosi

RELAXATION OF WORK. 103
in the morning at 6 o'clock. It was they who began
the battle, and it was the 13th which bore the brunt of
the Zulu attack. When the Zulus broke under the
lances of the 17th, it was the mounted men of the
Flying Column who completed the rout. They also
burnt the kraals, which finished the business, except the
capture of Ketchwayo.
On the 10th of July, the Flying Column marched
towards Kwamagwasa, and reached that deserted Mission
Station the next day, when the construction of a fort
was at once commenced. From the 13th to the 15th it
marched to St. Paul's. On the day after Ulundi fight,
however, Sir Evelyn wrote in his report of the action as
follows :
" His Excellency has frequently been good enough to
speak with approbation of the order, regularity, and
celerity of this column. I feel that eighteen months of
incessant work in the field, which has not been without
anxiety, more or less constant, makes it advisable, both
in the interest of the service and for the sake of my own
health and efficiency, that I should have a relaxation of
work, if only for a short time. I desire, therefore, to
place on record that the good service done by this
column is due to the cheerful, untiring obedience of
soldiers of all ranks, which has rendered my executive
duties a source of continued pleasure, and to the efforts
of the undermentioned staff, regimental and departmental
officers, many of whom have worked day and night to
carry out my wishes."

104 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
On the next day Lord Chelmsford wrote :
" The Lieutenant-General commanding desires to
place on record his hearty appreciation of the gallantry
and steadiness displayed by all ranks of the force
under his command during the battle of Ulundi." He
added : " The two columns being about to separate, the
Lieutenant-General begs to tender his best thanks to
Brigadier-General E. Wood, V.C, C.B., for the assistance
rendered him during the recent operations."
This praise cannot be said to have been overdone.
But there was now one at hand whose praise is praise
indeed, seeing he well knows how to convey every shade
of censure. In a letter of the 9th from Port. Durnford,
Sir Garnet Wolseley said :
" My dear Wood, Just a line to congratulate you on
all you have done for the State. You and Buller have
been the bright spots in this miserable war, and all
through I have felt [proud that I numbered you both
amongst my friends and companions-in-arms."
This was followed up, on the 17th, by the following
General Order from the same staunch friend :
"In notifying to the army in South Africa that
Brigadier-General Wood, V.C, C.B., and Lieutenant-
Colonel Buller, C.B., are about to leave Zululand for
England, General Sir Garnet Wolseley desires to place
on record his high appreciation of the services they have
rendered during the war, which their military ability

GENERALS RECOGNITION. 105
and untiring energy have so very largely contributed to
bring to an end. The success which has attended the
operations of the Flying Column is largely due to
General Wood's genius for war, to the admirable system
he has established in his command, and to the zeal and
energy with which his ably conceived plans have been
carried out by Colonel Buller."
Just a week later, Lord Chelmsford, who had resigned,
warmed up a little, and in a speech he made at Maritz-
burg, he said :
" I never would hav.e believed it possible for any
general to receive such assistance and devotion as I
have experienced from my men ... It would be
invidious to particularise individuals and services, but,
when I look back eighteen months, two names stand out
in broad relief, the names of Wood and Buller. I can
say that these two have been my right and left sup
porters during the whole of my time in this country."
The next day he wrote to Wood :
"My hearty congratulations on your promotion to
K.C.B. ; it ought to have been given to you months ago.
As the authorities have apparently woke up and realised
the fact that you had not in any way been rewarded for
your good work in the old Colony and at the beginning
of this war, I hope they will also understand that a
good deal is still due to you for Ulundi."

106 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
In a "Narrative of the Field Operations connected
with the Zulu War of 1879," published in 1881 by
Messrs. Sampson Low and Co., I find some interesting
notes on Sir Evelyn Wood. At Keiskamma Hoek, Mr.
F. W. Streatfield, the author, says :
"I had never met Colonel Wood before, though I
knew him well by reputation. I am thankful to say it
was my good fortune to serve under him for two
months, and most thoroughly did I appreciate the
privilege of having such a soldier as my commanding
officer and such a man as my friend ... I feel grateful
indeed to him for many an arduous duty and weary
march made light by the kindly tone in which the order
was given that they should be done ; and for the many
pleasant and peaceful hours passed in his tent, where he
ever ceased to be the commanding officer and became
the genial, warm-hearted friend, with never varying
kindness and hospitality. Let not the reader imagine
that a duty slurred over, or ineffectually carried out,
would meet with but a gentle rebuke from Colonel
Wood. Far from it. On duty he is to others as to
himself, hard as adamant ; and woe betide the careless,
slovenly soldier who happens to serve under him."
I learn further from Mr. Streatfield's pages that one
night Colonel Wood had a narrow escape on a patrol at
Buffalo Heights "through not hearing a soldier's
challenge. He was -shot at at short range, but luckily
missed." Colonel Wood got fever in May, 1878, but

more compliments. 107
was " as well as ever" by the middle of June, thanks
to the care taken of him in "Brown's House," as the
hospital was called, " near Hudson's Store."
"At Ulundi," said Archibald Forbes, in the famous
dispatch he took to the frontier, 110 miles, in fourteen
hours, riding through the night, " Evelyn Wood's face
was radiant with the rapture of the fray as he rode up
and down behind his regiment exposed to a storm of
missiles." On the 5 th August, Sir Evelyn left Cape Town for
England, and ten days later the following despatch was
sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by Sir
Bartle Frere :
" I cannot permit Major-General Sir H. E. Wood,
V.C, K.C.B., and Colonel Eedvers Buller, V.C, C.B., to
leave this colony without venturing to call the attention
of Her Majesty's Government to the political services
rendered by these officers during the two years and a
half they have served in South Africa. It is not my
province, nor is it necessary, I should say a word
regarding the military services they have performed,
and I have already brought to the notice of Her
Majesty's Government the important bearing which the
position of Sir H. E. Wood's column in Zululand from
January to July, had on the safety of Natal and the
Transvaal; but I would beg to call attention to- the
excellent political effects of the dealings of these two
officers with the colonial forces and with the colonists in

108 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
general. Up to 1878 there had always been among the
colonists somewhat of a dread of the strict discipline
which was, as they thought, likely to be enforced by a
military officer were they to serve under him, and a
great distrust of Her [Majesty's officers generally to
conduct operations against the Kaffirs. The feeling has
now, I believe, disappeared among all who have served
under General Wood and Colonel Buller. They have
shown the colonists that military officers can deal with
volunteers as with their own men, and lead them to
assured victory without sacrificing or risking more than
is necessary in so doing. To the experience of their
treatment of officers and men under them, is largely due
the readiness with which officers of the regular army
are now appointed to positions in the Colonial forces in
the Colony, and the good feeling which obtains at this
moment between the Imperial and Colonial troops now
in the field in Zululand. I would particularly notice
the influence which both officers gained over their
Dutch auxiliaries and the Dutch population of the
Transvaal districts bordering on Zululand. I believe
that whenever Sir E. Wood and his gallant second-in-
command may serve again in the Transvaal, they will
find all who served under them in Zululand anxious
again to join Her Majesty's forces in any capacity that
may be desired."
And on the 16th of October Sir A. Horsford, Military
Secretary at Army Head-Quarters, informed Sir Evelyn
Wood that a communication had been received from the

TESTIMONIALS. " 109
Colonial Office, bringing to notice the very valuable
political services rendered by him while in command of
a column in Zululand ; and informing him that this
communication had afforded much gratification to the
Commander-in-Chief, who had caused a record of the
same to be made in the records of the Department,
where it lies entombed among a vast amount of much
more curious matter.
Before Sir Evelyn left South Africa, he received a
silver shield from the inhabitants of Cape Colony, and
an address with a handsome piece of plate from the
people of Natal. But it was when he landed at Ply
mouth, on August 26th, that he learnt, once more, the
people of England are not ungrateful to their heroic ser
vants. At various points he was recognised and heartily
greeted ; but it was in his own county of Essex that the
popular welcome took the warmer tone of personal friend
ship. When he had paid the necessary visit to the
Adjutant-General, Sir Evelyn took train at Fenchurch
Street for Eainham, accompanied by his wife, Lord
Hatherley, his uncle, and a number of friends. At the
little station, which was decked with bright bunting, dank
with unintermittent rain, he was met by Sir Thomas Len
nard, his brother-in-law. Nearly every house and every
church along the road to Belhus was bright with national
flags, and at the entrance to the demesne there was* a
profuse display of ensigns and devices, while guards of
honour of the 2sd Essex Artillery and the 1st and 15th

110 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Essex Eifles were in attendance. One device bore the
legend " Welcome Home," and another contained illus
trations of Sir Evelyn's medals and decorations. He
was received with hearty cheers from a large assembly,
including many of the leading people of the neighbour
hood and indeed the county. The vicar of the parish
presented an address conceived in an excellent spirit,
and prefaced and followed by a speech quite unexcep
tionable in manner and matter. In his reply Sir Evelyn
said :
" One of the most 'pleasant moments of my life in
South Africa was when I saw the way in which my men
said ' Good-bye ' to me — the men of whom, as it was
commonly said, I worked their souls out, the men I
worked with day after day and night after night, and
whom I had necessarily treated with the sternest
discipline — these men in saying ' Good-bye ' to me said
it in a manner I can never forget  With the
soldiers under me, from the buglers to the colonels, as I
was telling the Adjutant-General this morning, during
the eighteen months I have been in South Africa, I have
never had a single disagreement."
A hearty cheer followed the conclusion of the brief
speech, and then a procession was formed through the
village of Aveley and into the park at the other end, a
mile away. The procession was headed by about forty
yeoman farmers of the district, followed by the band of

HOME HONOURS. Ill
the training ship Cornwall and the volunteers with their
bands. The General's carriage had the horses detached,
and was drawn by some fifty labourers, who dragged it
to the fine old mansion where Sir Evelyn's mother was
waiting to greet her honoured son. Sir Thomas and
Lady Barrett Lennard dispensed liberal hospitality to
all comers. Some days before, at a meeting in Chelms
ford, it had been resolved to offer Sir Evelyn a county
welcome in the county town, and this decision was
ratified by a larger meeting at the Cannon Street Hotel.
But other honours were to intervene ; he was knighted
by the Queen at Balmoral on the 9th September, and
was received by the Prime Minister, Lord Beaconsfield,
at Hughenden Manor on the 30th of September. He
was present at the Livery dinner of the Fishmongers'
Company, of which his grandfather and father had
been members, where he paid the warmest tribute of
admiration to numbers of soldiers, living and departed,
who had done their duty in the Gaika, or Kaffir, and in
the Zulu campaigns. In rebutting the absurd accusa
tions of inhumanity against the troops, he casually
said :
" I can assure you that the only Zulu I personally
chastised was one who declined to help us to carry a
decrepit woman from a mountain where she must have
starved. When I tell you it was the man's mother, you
will pardon this practical effort to induce the heathen to
honour his parent."

112 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
The county demonstration took place on the 15th
October at Chelmsford, where a platform was erected in
front of the Shire Hall, enclosing one of the guns
captured in the Crimean War. All the notabilities of
the county were present, and Sir Evelyn, with his wife
and eldest daughter, arrived from Danbury Palace,
accompanied by the Bishop of St. Albans. He was re
ceived by a guard of honour of the 1st Essex A.B.
Volunteers, and a large crowd, for the day was observed
as a general holiday, heartily cheered the brilliant Essex
soldier, who wore his uniform as Colonel of the 90th
Light Infantry. Sir Charles Du Cane presented the
sword of honour, as well as the service of plate, and
happily cited the confession of Ketchwayo that it was
the victory of Kambula which gave the mortal blow to
the Zulu power. The sword bore on the blade an in
scription to the effect that it was presented to Sir
Evelyn " in recognition of the eminent services rendered
by him to his country during the recent arduous
campaign in Zululand, and of the conspicuous zeal,
energy, and gallantry, which have distinguished his
entire military career." The speech in reply laid down
the principle of action of an English officer :
"Whatever party, whatever policy may direct the
wars which are the result of England's Imperial range,
the true soldier always fights for home and country. It
was well said ' Pro aris et focis ' is the life of patriotism.
Battles are no longer fought on the hearthstones of these

BALL AND BANQUETS. 113
islands, but on the boundaries where our vast rule has
extended ; and whether it is in Africa or in Afghanistan
that the soldier fights, he resembles the spell-bound hero
of old legends, who travelled in a circle over hundreds
of miles but never got far away from home."
In the evening about 400 gentlemen sat down to a
banquet in the Corn Exchange, which was gay with
decorations and trophies bearing the names of battles
wherein the guest of the day chiefly distinguished him
self. Once more he assigned the praise to his comrades,
for, as Archibald Forbes had somewhere said, "it is in
Evelyn Wood's company that one hears least of Evelyn
Wood." A ball wound up the festivities of the day.
The last of the series of banquets was unique. On
November 1st, the Bar of England entertained Sir
Evelyn Wood at dinner in the Hall of the Middle
Temple, the Attorney-General in the chair, while among
the guests were all the judges who were not on circuit.
Sir John Holker made an admirable speech in propos
ing the toast of the evening to the hero of Kambula,
who had been for five and a half years entitled to wear
wig and gown. Although, three centuries before,
Drake had been honoured with a banquet in Middle
Temple Hall, yet he was not a lawyer. And although Lord
Erskine, like Sir Evelyn, had been both midshipman and
soldier before he was lawyer, while the first Lord
Chelmsford had served in the Navy and fought at
Copenhagen before being called to the Bar, yet the fact
i

114 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
remains that the banquet of All Saints' day, 1879, was,
and will probably long remain, like a notable of old
time concerning whom Seneca wrote :
Quseris Alcidae parem ?
Nemo est nisi ipse.
In a speech delivered by Sir Evelyn at Grocers' Hall
on the 25 th November in the following year, I find a
passage very characteristic of the man ; and this appears
to be a convenient connection in which to insert it.
Eeferring to a proposal then in the air for abolishing
Eegimental Colours, Sir Evelyn remarked :
" It is suggested that they are cumbersome, and are
the cause of sacrifices. After all they are what ? — a
coloured rag on a stick, and is it worth while to risk
men's lives for a piece of tawdry silk % You might as well
say that because honour is invisible, and faith impalpa
ble, they do not exist as load-stars for the mind.
Colours are potent to check disaster, to rally fugitives,
to inspire attack. In the confusion of battle, when for
mations become disordered and men's nerves are shaken,
they act as a sort of movable fortress ; a breast-work
made up of a determined sense of duty ; an ideal round
which leading spirits group and form an impregnable
reality that snatches victory, and in saving an army
preserves the honour of the country. We read how
Napoleon at Areola, how Halkett at Waterloo, and many
other leaders at critical moments, electrified their soldiers
by bearing colours to the front. Whatever continental

A SAD MISSION. 115
Armies may do, I hope that we, whose few soldiers have
often to withstand the shock of overwhelming numbers
of brave savages, will not give up this strong incentive
for men to hang together  The chivalry that is
shown in the defence of any high ideal, whatever may be
its symbol, is surely never wasted. The actors . . . may
perish, but the example remains, and their history will
serve as an inspiration in the future. Were this a simple
and technical question, I would apologise for touching on
it, but it is to my mind a moral question interesting to
all Britons, and involving some of the brightest aspects
of the gloom of warfare."
Meanwhile Sir Evelyn had been back to Zululand on
one of the saddest missions that was ever confided to
any man. I left out of the brief story of his services in
the war against Ketchwayo all mention of the death of
Prince Louis Napoleon. That most pathetic incident in
a campaign full of heroic memoirs deserves a section to
itself. The late Prince Imperial of France, who had his
" baptism of fire " nine years before in the first fight of
the campaign which ended the Third Empire, had
frankly given his services to the country that lent him a
refuge and had passed, with credit, through the Eoyal
Military Academy at Woolwich. He had gallantly
volunteered for active work in Zululand, though he was
" the only son of his mother and she was a widow."
Great had been the searchings of heart among some of
the highest in England when the request to be allowed
I 2

116 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
to go out was received. Yet how could it be refused ?
He was a soldier and, as the fates would have it, a
British soldier. The Zulu power was hostis humani
generis. As no dynastic or international questions were
involved in the war, there could be no better opportunity
for the young Prince to put in practice the lessons he
had received on Woolwich Common. So he went out
with the reinforcements, and on the redistribution of
the force he was attached to the Staff of the Second
Division, under Major-General Newdigate. There, as
at Woolwich, he became an universal favourite. His
special work was in connection with the Quartermaster-
General's department, including the selection of routes
and camping grounds, under Lieut. -Col. , now Major-
General, Sir Eichard Harrison. He had taken part in
more than one ofthe necessary reconnaissances, and when
the Division had crossed the Blood river on the 31st of
May, and moved onwards to Itelezi Hill on the follow
ing day, the country had been thoroughly examined,
and not a Zulu had been seen ; so it is no wonder that in
sending an officer forward to select a camping ground
only a small escort should be sent with him, namely six
troopers of Bettington's Horse and six of Shepstone's
Basutos. The officer sent was the Prince Imperial.
He was accompanied by Lieutenant Carey of the same
department, who obtained permission to join the party,
in no sense in command, but merely to obtain some veri
fications of observations made on a previous recon-

THE PRINCE IMPERIAL. 117
naissance. A friendly Zulu was told off as a guide,
but the six Basutos did not put in an appearance, and
instead of waiting to have them replaced the party
started off at a quarter past nine in the morning. At
Itelezi Hill at ten o'clock the party was met by Col.
Harrison, who spent some time in selecting a good water
supply. Then leaving the A.Q.M.G., the party moved
on and gained the summit of one of the flat-topped hills
with which the region abounds. Here the Prince made
a sketch of the country, and about half-past two the
party descended towards a kraal near the Itvotvosi river.
Up to this time no sign of the enemy had been noticed, but
in the kraal some dogs were prowling about, and some re
mains of fresh food were found, showing that the kraal had
been occupied but a short time before. The ground near
the kraal was covered, save towards the north and north
east, with long coarse grass and Indian corn some five
or six feet in height. At three o'clock the Prince ordered
the escort to " off-saddle " and " knee-halter " for grazing.
The men made some coffee, and a rest was enjoyed till
ten minutes past four, when the Zulu guide reported
that he had seen a Zulu come over the hill. Then the
horses were caught and saddled and the Prince gave the
order " prepare to mount." As the party was obeying,
a volley was fired at them within fifteen yards of the hut
by some Zulus, who had crept up through the grass.
The troopers were unable to reply, as, by some astound
ing blunder or carelessness, their Martini-Henry carbines

118 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
had been allowed to remain unloaded. The volley hit
nobody, but it effectually frightened the horses, before
the troopers had got control of them. The Prince, in
the act of giving the word " mount," was unable to get
his leg over the saddle of his terrified charger, and he
ran alongside it as it followed the plunging horses of the
escort, which got completely out of hand. The Prince
then tried to vault on his horse, not a great feat for one
so active as he was, but the saddle wallet he caught tore
away, and so the horse escaped. The Zulus apparently
fired after the first lot of the runaways, and brought down
one of them, while another trooper and the native guide
remained at the kraal and were not seen alive afterwards.
When Mr. Carey had got across a " donga," or dry bed
of a storm stream, he learnt that the Prince was left
behind, and had been noticed running to the donga pur
sued by Zulus. The Prince's horse being seen riderless,
and it being apparent that the ground was occupied by
a goodly number of the enemy, Mr. Carey made no
effort to ascertain the fate of the Prince, contenting him
self with the assumption that he had fallen. So he and
four troopers bolted to the Second Division camp by
Itelezi Hill. In order to get away from the Zulus, Mr.
Carey crossed the river Tombokala, and after riding four
miles fell in with Sir Evelyn Wood and Colonel Buller,
who were looking out for a track for the advance of the
Flying Column the next day. By this time it was all
but dark, the 1st June in the Southern Hemisphere

SIXTEEN WOUNDS. 119
having as brief daylight as the 1st December in England.
Nothing could be done but wait till the dawn, and that
had scarcely shown itself when strong parties were sent
out from both camps to examine the ground. There
was no long delay in ascertaining the worst. One
trooper lay where he had been shot, the other nearer the
kraal ; and not far from the first one, in the bed of the
donga, lay all that was mortal of the hope of the
Imperialist party in France, and the death of him had
been worthy of the illustrious race from which he sprung.
He had turned and faced the savage horde, and had
emptied his revolver into them. Then his sword was
useless against the assegais, and he fell where he stood,
with sixteen wounds, all in front, like " the noblest
Eoman of them all." A bier was formed with some
lances and a blanket, and the body was carried to an
ambulance, and so taken to the Second Division camp.
The doctors used such preservative measures as were
possible, and the body was dispatched to Pietermaritz-
burg the same evening, under an escort of the 17th
Lancers. It reached the capital of Natal just a week
later, and was received in solemn state by the townsfolk.
In due course it was taken to Durban and there em
barked on H.M.S. Boadicea, which at Simon's Bay
transferred it to H.M.S. Orontes for conveyance to
England, where it was interred for a time in the chapel
at Chiselhurst, and now rests in the Mausoleum at
Farnborough.

120 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
The bereaved mother made up her mind soon after
peace was restored by the capture of Ketchwayo, to visit
the scene of her son's glorious death, and it was only
natural that Sir Evelyn Wood, who had been the first to
arrive on the scene, should be selected to accompany the
Empress, who was — Oh, the pity of it ! — left without a
throne, a husband, or a child. This was in March, 1880.
In the previous December he had been appointed to the
command of the Belfast District, with the rank of
Brigadier-General, but he was only in charge of the
Ulster head- quarters seventeen days, when he was trans
ferred, with a similar rank, to Chatham, and here he
assumed command on the 12th January. His mission in
March was obviously one requiring the utmost tact and
delicacy. It occupied three months ; and when the
mournful visit had been paid, and the Empress returned
to England, it was said, by a high official at court, of
her cicerone, that " well as Evelyn Wood had done
whatever he had put his hand to, he had never achieved
a greater success " than as guide and companion to the
august lady who had been left so conspicuously alone in
the world.

( 121 )

CHAPTEE VI.
AMONG THE BOERS.
In Boerland — A Eevelation — Preparing for a Struggle — Ministerial
Vacillation — The Boers' High Hand — The 94th attacked —
Sir G. P. Colley advances — Two Kepulses — Soldiers and
Politicians — Laing's Nek — Majuba Hill — Boers Victorious —
Colley killed — Wood in Command — Also High Commissioner
— " Backing and Filling " — Wood advises Fighting — Boer
Treachery — Bi-lingual despatches — " Friendly Communica
tions " — Wood promises Victory — His Political Position —
Being Supplanted — Eepublican Flag Lowered — Meeting the
Boers — The British Surrender — Falsehoods in Parliament —
Sham Eesponsibility — Crafty Designs — An Exposure — Lying
Legitimate — Eoyal Commission — Wood Dissents — A Shameful
Convention — Compromising Compliments — Again at Chatham
— G.C.M.G.
We now approach a period of the career of Sir Evelyn
Wood for which he has been greatly blamed. It must
be confessed that I felt this question involved very
much, as the Army notoriously has done, for more
than ten years. But there are two sides to every
question ; and I think it is demonstrable that Sir
Evelyn Wood has been silent under provocation such
as no soldier of our time has received, and has had

122 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
his reputation risked, if not, happily, destroyed by one
of the most deliberate attempts to deceive the Eng
lish people of which history furnishes an example. It
will be necessary to bring this out presently. For the
moment it will be well to proceed with the narrative of
events. He was just beginning to feel his feet at Chat
ham, having been little over five months actually in the
command, when he was warned once more for service in
South Africa, and his Letter of Service was dated 6th
January, 1881. On the 14th he sailed from Plymouth,
and he landed at Durban on February 12th, and three
days later assumed command of a column of reinforce
ments at the Biggarsberg, marching on to Newcastle
where, according to Major-General Sir George Pomeroy
Colley, it arrived on the 17th "in excellent order."
Already the Government at home was beginning to fear
the responsibility — the Parliamentary responsibility — of
offending a section of its supporters by maintaining
the annexation of the Transvaal formally approved by
the previous Parliament. We have seen that during the
early part of the Zulu war, which was undertaken in the
first instance to protect the Boers and the German
settlers from Ketchwayo and Sekukuni, his vassal, the
Boers had been restless, and the small contingent which
had responded to Wood's call had deserted on the
morning of the fight at Kambula. For three years,
indeed, the Boers had been preparing for a struggle to
recover their independence ; and when they found Mr.

BOERS AND BRITONS. 123
Gladstone apparently firmly seated in power they
resolved to assert their claims by the strong hand. The
Government at home was without a policy at first. But
before long it showed that it meant to fight the Dutch
men. Major-General Sir G. P. Colley was instructed to
take the most energetic measures. He was not only in
command of the few troops remaining in Natal and the
Transvaal, but he was High Commissioner. He had
been specially recommended for the position by Sir
Garnet Wolseley, who had said, being authorised to say
in the name of the British Government, in a speech at
Pretoria, and in the most emphatic way, that no political
change in England would lead to the withdrawal of
British rule from the Transvaal. In the Queen's Speech,
written by Mr. Gladstone for the opening of the session
of 1881, Her Majesty was made to speak of "maintain
ing my supremacy over the Transvaal, with its diversi
fied population ; " and the same Prime Minister, in debate
on the Address in answer to the Speech, said that the
Queen's supremacy had given a pledge to the large
native population. Lord Kimberley, as Colonial Secre
tary, in the House of Lords said very much the same
thing. So conclusive was this thought to be, that the
Boers telegraphed to England their " bitter disappoint
ment" with the decision of the Government. And,
indeed, they had reason to be disappointed, after the
language Mr. Gladstone had employed on the platform
when, to use his great rival's words, he was in a

124 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
"position of more freedom and less responsibility." But
the Boers had not waited for the decision of Government
or the opening of Parliament. On the 16th December
a patrol had fired on the escort of Major Clarke, the
Landrost. On the 20th, Colonel Anstruther was taking
250 men of the 94th regiment from Lydenberg to
Pretoria, when he was stopped by a body of Boers, who
handed him a letter forbidding him to go further. He
announced his intention of following his orders, and was
incontinently fired upon by a number of Boers, who
killed poor Anstruther and eighty-six men, besides
wounding a number of others, of whom twenty-six
soon afterwards died. No wonder the Speech from the
Throne, the following month, announced that measures
were in progress for the prompt vindication of Her
Majesty's authority. As one of these measures, Colley
made a laager at Newcastle, provisioned it for thirteen
days, and collected 1,300 men. He advanced on the
28th January with a thousand men, at half-past six in the
morning, and was speedily repulsed with the loss of
seven officers and eighty men killed and a hundred
wounded. It was a bad beginning, but there was to be
a worse ending. On the 7th February the Boers stopped
the post, and on the 8th Colley attempted to reopen
communications, but was again repulsed. However,
there was a hope of an avoidance of further trouble.
On January 27th Sir Hercules Eobinson telegraphed to
Mr. 'Brand, President of the Orange Free State, that if

THE BELEAGUERED GARRISONS. 125
" avowed opposition ceased forthwith " the British
Government would frame a scheme which would meet
the views of " all enlightened friends of the Transvaal."
As nothing came of this proposition, and as the Boers
remained entrenched on Laing's Nek, Sir G. Colley,
having been reinforced by Wood's column, sent Wood
promptly to the rear, though he used him for a re
connaissance once in the direction of Wesselstroom. On
the 16th Lord Kimberley had telegraphed Sir Evelyn,
and General Colley replied :
"Latter part of your telegram of 16th to Wood not
understood. There can be no hostilities if no resistance
is made ; but am I to leave Laing's Nek, in Natal
territory, in Boer occupation, and our garrisons isolated,
and short of provisions, or occupy former and relieve
latter ? "
Colley had estimated that the garrisons were short of
food on the 19 th, and the same day he was instructed
not to march to their relief nor to occupy Laing's Nek ;
then, it is again advisable to say, held by the Boers.
The exact words of this message are worth giving,
seeing Lady Bellairs, in her book on the subject, seems
to blame the military authorities on the spot for not
having provided for the relief of the garrisons :
" 19th February. — It will be essential that garrisons
should be free to provision themselves" — but surely
Lord Kimberley had heard of the Irishman who took

126 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
two French prisoners, and when he was told to bring
them along answered they would not let him — "and
peaceful intercourse with them allowed ; but we do not
mean that you should march to relief of garrisons or
occupy Laing's Nek if arrangement proceeds. Fix
reasonable time within which answer must be sent by
Boers." This reasonable time having been allowed,
without result, Sir G. Colley proceeded with the
measures which the Queen in her most gracious Speech
had authorised him to employ. Wood had been sent to
Maritzburg to supervise base-arrangements and the
march of reinforcements. In order that there should be
no misapprehensions about the exact situation, it may be
well to give in extenso a despatch from Lord Kimberley
to Governor Sir Hercules Eobinson, dated February
16th, 1881!:—
" I have received following telegram from Sir G.
Colley : ' 13th. Letter received from Kriiger. Purport.
— Anxious to make one more effort to stop bloodshed.
Boers driven to arms in self-defence ; views continually
misrepresented ; if deed of annexation cancelled willing
to co-operate with British Government ; everything for
good of South Africa. Know that English people will
be on their side if truth reached them ; are so strong in
this conviction that would not fear inquiry of a Eoyal
Commission, which they know would give them their
rights ; ready therefore, if troops ordered to withdraw
from Transvaal, to give free passage and withdraw from

DEFIANCE. 127
their positions. If annexation upheld will fight to the
end.' I replied to-day as follows : ' Your telegram 13th
received. Inform Kriiger that if Boers will desist from
armed opposition we shall be quite ready to appoint
Commissioners with extensive powers, and who may
develop the scheme referred to in my telegram to you of
8th inst. Add that if this proposal is accepted, you are
authorised to agree to suspension of hostilities on our
part.' Message ends."
Therefore, the Boers having rejected Lord Kimberley 's
ultimatum, there was nothing for it but to see whether
they were to succeed in armed rebellion, and be allowed
to impose terms upon the power of England which they
had insulted and defied, even to the shedding of blood.
On February 26th Colley occupied Majuba mountain,
overlooking Laing's Nek, and the Boers did not find him
out till the next day. Then he was attacked at seven in
the morning and his forces badly beaten, he himself being
among the victims of the Boers. At six o'clock that
evening Sir Evelyn heard of his death, and sent the
news to the Home Government as follows : " Colley
occupied Majuba mountain last night. . . . Was
attacked 7 a.m. Eepulsed all attacks till 2 "30 p.m.
when our people were driven back, losing heavily. I
shall go back to Newcastle to-morrow." He was as good
as his word, for he left Maritzburg for Newcastle before
daylight on the 28th, on which day he became Major-
General (local), in virtue of his appointment as second

128 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
in command. He also became High Commissioner, in
consequence of his appointment as Deputy High Com
missioner. Three days out of the first four in March he
was interrogated by the Colonial Secretary as to CoUey's
steps to communicate with the Boers according to his
instructions, and Sir Evelyn replied as follows : — " Colley
wrote 21st February to Joubert offering to suspend hos
tilities, if answer was received within forty-eight hours."
Thus, in taking up the responsibilities of his predecessor,
Wood's first step was to convince the Government at
home that their instructions had been fully carried out
by the lamented Colley, than whom no man had a
greater reputation among soldiers of the period. Thus,
at the moment Sir Evelyn Wood took over charge in
both a civil and a military capacity, this was the
situation : — The Boers were in active rebellion ; they
had shot our soldiers to death ; the Queen had pledged
herself to assert her supremacy, but her Ministers were
making attempts secretly to condone the offences ; the
general in charge of the operations had been ordered to
make a proposition to the Boers ; he had done so ; the
proposal had been treated with contempt ; the general
thereupon proceeded, with an insufficient force, to the
measures the Sovereign and the Ministers were pledged
to ; he was beaten, and the Ministers insulted his
memory by demanding, after his death, whether he had
carried out his orders in a loyal spirit. The prospect
before Sir Evelyn was not a nice one. It was plain he

129
could not trust the Ministry to honestly back him up in
anything like energetic measures. They promised him
reinforcements. They even offered him more than he
desired. They wished to send him six battalions and
some cavalry. He asked that only three battalions
should be embarked, and that no more cavalry should
be sent. Up to the 4th March the Government were
urging Sir Evelyn forward with one hand, and beck
oning to the Boers with the other. On the 4th Sir
Evelyn remonstrated, suggesting that no steps should
be taken in the way of a movement against the Boers
before he was ready, which would not be for a day or
two, owing to want of food and the non-arrival of re
inforcements which were delayed by the swollen rivers
—indeed, it would be impossible to be ready within a
week. But, he added, and this point must be expressly
borne in mind, that he must ask to be allowed, when he
was ready, to disperse the Boers before any negotiations
were further carried on. He declared he must act
within a week if Potchestroom were to be saved, adding :
" as I hear they have breadstuffs only till 15 th and then
mealies, but how much I do not know ; when I move I
am confident, with God's blessing, of success." The
next day he telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary at
noon :
" I anticipate hearing from Joubert soon. Fear, until
Boers are defeated, leaders, if altogether excluded from
amnesty, will continue hostilities if they can ; but on
K

130 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
the other hand, the very unfavourable weather and
their admitted certainty of eventual suppression may
cause dispersion. Sir G. Colley was very averse to
pardoning leaders, and your telegram of 10th implies
such cannot be granted. Instruct me fully on this
point, for much will turn on it, and, reflecting on
similar struggles in |history, I do not attach as much
importance to punishing leaders as did Sir G. Colley,
though I would not recommend allowing them to remain
in Transvaal, nor would I accept them as representatives
of the people. In discussing settlement of country, my
constant endeavour shall be to carry out the spirit of
your orders ; but considering the disasters we have
sustained, I think the happiest result will be that, after
accelerating successful action, which I hope to fight in
about fourteen days, the Boers should disperse without
any guarantee, and then many, now undoubtedly
coerced, will readily settle down. In any negotiations
Joubert will probably make dispersion contingent on
amnesty. I may be cut off from communicating with
you, and if you wish to avoid further fighting, I
suggest, while giving me no instructions for the future
settlement, you should empower me, if absolutely
necessary, to promise life and property, but not resi
dence, to leaders. This I would not do if dispersion
could be effected without it. Mr. Nelson arrived ; left
Potchestroom on 19 th February. Garrison on half
rations; short of water sometimes. After 15 th March
will have tinned meat and mealies, but not fire-wood.
Winsloe talked of firing off all ammunition before he
surrendered. I hope to relieve them by end of month."

RESPONSIBILITY ON THE CABINET. 131
Nothing could well be more statesmanlike and more
like a benevolent soldier than this series of propositions.
On the same afternoon, four hours later, he telegraphed
to Lord Kimberley : " Joubert asks how far I will
co-operate in Brand's propositions. I have offered to
meet him to-morrow at Laing's Nek. Shall follow
strictly the line of your instructions." Nothing can be
much clearer than that he had now shifted the whole
responsibility for what might follow on to the shoulders
of Lord Kimberley and his colleagues in the Cabinet.
On the next afternoon he met Joubert, and in order
that the invested garrisons might not be starved into
surrender while the Boers were taking their time over
the proposals of the British Government, he accepted
an armistice for eight days. His official message
was :
" Have signed agreement with Joubert for suspension
of hostilities till midnight, 14th March, for the purpose
of receiving Kriiger's reply and any further communi
cations. We have power of sending eight days' supplies
to our garrisons, and Joubert has undertaken to pass
them through Boer lines, and, on arrival of provisions
at such garrisons, the blockading and besieging parties
will cease hostilities for eight days. I hope you
approve." The Boers carried out their arrangement in all cases
except at Potchestroom, the most important point,
K 2

132 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
perhaps, of any. There the Boer leader, Cronjee, de
liberately withheld from the garrison the news of the
armistice. The place accordingly fell into his hands by
the surrender of the commandant, who saw death by
starvation staring him and his troops in the face. On
the night of the same 6th March Sir Evelyn Wood
telegraphed to the Secretary for War :
" Want of food prevents advance for about ten days.
Ingagane and Incandu are impassable, I have therefore
lost nothing in suspending hostilities, and gained eight
days' food for garrisons most in want. Hope you and
His Eoyal Highness approve."
There was a subtle distinction between the replies
received from the two departments under which Sir
Evelyn was acting. From the Colonial Office the
telegram came " Her Majesty's Government approve
armistice." From the War Office the text was :
" Military conditions of armistice approved." On the
next day, the 7th, Wood telegraphed at 2 p.m. :
"Gist of Kriiger's answer to Colley's of 31st
February. In conjunction with members of Govern
ment here, have satisfaction to assure you that we are
very grateful for the declaration in the name of Her
Majesty's Government, that, under certain conditions,
they are inclined to cease hostilities. It appears to us
that now, the first time since unlucky annexation, there
is chance of coming to peaceful settlement. Our hearts

A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. 133
bleed over necessity of shedding more blood of burghers
and soldiers. In our opinion a meeting of representa
tives from both sides will probably lead speedily to
satisfactory result, therefore suggest representatives
from both sides should be present, with full powers to
determine preliminaries of honourable peace and ratify
same." This was from the men who had commenced the war,
who had shot down our men in open and flagrant
rebellion, who had, till now, treated with contempt Sir
George Colley's proposals in the name of the British
Government. To most Englishmen it would seem that
their hearts bled a little too late. But Lady Bellairs
let the cat out of the bag by saying (p. 403 of her book)
" The peace was, though, a foregone conclusion, even at
the time the armistice was agreed to ! " That is the
key to the whole position. On the 8th Sir Evelyn
Wood was informed that the Government would treat
with any of the Boer leaders, apparently including the
men who had in person invaded Natal territory, and
even the miscreant Cronjee, who had obtained the
surrender of Potchestroom under false pretences :
". . . . We should make no exception as to persons
with whom we will negotiate, requiring only that they
shall be duly authorised representatives of Boers with
power to act on their behalf. We understand Kriiger's
answer as opening way to further proceedings on basis

134 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
of preceding communications, and we now propose to
appoint Commissioners, whose names I will state at
earliest moment, who will examine whole matter and
will be ready for friendly communications with any
persons appointed by Boers."
Sir Evelyn Wood, like a soldier, an Englishman,
while disclaiming any desire of fighting for fighting's
sake, urged that the dispersion of the Boers by force
should precede any negotiation. " I recommend decided
though lenient action, and I can, humanly speaking,
promise victory. . . I undertake to enforce dispersion."
What was the reply, after four days' cogitation, by the
Cabinet, and the pressure of the " important friends "
the Boers were always boasting they had in England,
may it not have been, Ireland ? Sir Evelyn was
ordered to inform the Boers on what terms they could
have peace. His instructions, dated March 12th ran :
" Inform Boer leaders that if Boers will undertake to
desist armed opposition and disperse to their homes, we
are prepared to name the following Commissioners. . . .
Commission would be authorised to consider the follow
ing points." Meanwhile Mr. Gladstone had been
declaring, even before the disaster at Majuba, that there
would be no more fighting under any circumstances.
The day after Sir Evelyn had got his instructions to
carry out a policy of which he had solemnly recorded
his disapproval, he telegraphed to Lord Kimberley at
half past nine in the morning :

EIGHT HOURS TALK. 135
" Krllger, sending Eeuter's 22nd February message
with Mr. Gladstone's statement that steps to avoid
bloodshed will be taken, asks how far my instructions
go. I have replied I am still awaiting your orders, and
shall be at Prospect to-day."
On the 16th, from 10 in the morning till 6 in the
evening, Wood conferred with the Boer leaders, ex
plaining fully to them the terms offered by the British
Government, and three hours later he sent the subjoined
message to the Colonial Secretary :
". . . . After eight hours' talk I am confirmed in
the opinion expressed in my telegram of 5 th instant,
words 131 to 139, i.e., but considering the disaster we
have sustained I think the happiest results will be, that
after accelerating successful action which I hope to fight
in about fourteen days the Boers should disperse with
out any guarantee, and then many now undoubtedly
coerced will readily settle down."
In Boerland as in Ireland there were a number of
total irreconcileables who professed to represent " The
People," and by virtue of " social pressure," in other
than Sir Arthur Helps's sense, contrived to force into
the ranks of their adherents many who wanted nothing
better than to be allowed to go about their business,
with a secret conviction that the British Crown was as
good a rule to live under as any Eepublic existing,

136 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
probable, or possible. Of Sir Evelyn's recommendation
to be allowed to retrieve the Majuba and other defeats
before proceeding further with negotiations, Lord
Kimberley loftily took not the least notice, but made
certain observations, always weakening down, on some
objections raised by the Boers. On the 20th he sent
for further instructions an hour before midnight, the
Armistice having now expired six days, the last straw,
almost, in the endurance of a soldier being worded as
follows :
" I have not heard from you result of communications
with Boers as to my telegram of 17th. We rely on
you, unless military necessity requires immediate action,
to give time to consider points on which you may be
unable to come to agreement with Boer leaders."
It seems to me that seldom, if ever, in the history of
England has a prominent, trusted and reasonably
ambitious soldier been put in a more difficult position.
If he had been merely a soldier, he might have got out
of the difficulty by resigning. But he was wedged into
his place by the fact that he was also an official under
the Colonial Office. And it is in the minds of not a few
people that the Government deliberately took advantage
of a fact which honourable men would have ignored —
namely, that Sir Evelyn Wood belongs to a family
traditionally " Liberal," that his brother had stood for

A SUPPLANTER. 137
Essex, pledged up to the neck to Mr. Gladstone's policy,
and that he was as likely to stretch a point, therefore,
in favour of any orders proceeding from the Government
as any soldier in the Army. At the same time, the
Ministers, who were thus straining Sir Evelyn's allegiance
as a soldier almost to breaking point, were preparing to
supplant him by another general, Sir Frederick Eoberts,
who happened to be home at the time from India
with all his honours thick upon him. Indeed, Sir
Frederick and his staff, including General Newdigate,
were already close at hand, prepared to do as the
Government would. If the thing were to be done, and
remonstrance was to be of no avail, it was clearly not
much matter who put his name to the document which
conferred immunity upon the rebels ; and besides giving
them virtually what they wanted, screened the men who
had slain our soldiers on undoubtedly British territory,
to which the Boers had never even laid claim. On the
21st, the shameful Convention was concluded on the
responsibility of the Government, and in accordance
with its terms and instructions. Sir Evelyn Wood had
evidently no more responsibility for the document than
a private soldier, who, under the orders of his officers,
burns or blows up a house, has for the value of the
premises. Yet that twelve and a half hours' sitting of
the Conference, with its resulting document dated March
21st, left a very bad impression on the Army, an
impression which has lasted until now, and which it is

138 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
to be hoped the facts I am adducing will remove once
and for ever. On the 22nd, the Government tele
graphed its ratification of the Convention, which it
might well do, seeing it was in every word dictated from
Downing Street. One who was behind the scenes at the
time has expressed his opinion of this Convention and
the arrangement which afterwards resulted from it,
that " While Mr. Gladstone would not waste the hair of a
man's whiskers for the honour of England, or to show
the world that our soldiers cannot be slain with impunity
while engaged in obeying lawful orders, he was prepared
to force this Convention and the terms into which it was
subsequently interpreted on the Boers, if necessary with
all the might of England, just to show he would not be
contradicted." The Government lost no time in endeavouring to
saddle Sir Evelyn Wood with part at least of the
responsibility for the Convention of the 21st March.
On the same day the message was sent ratifying the
agreement Lord Kimberley craftily telegraphed, totally
ignoring the General's repeated remonstrances, as
follows :
" Her Majesty's Government desire to convey to you
their high sense of your conduct in the recent
proceedings, and the skill and judgment you have

COMMAND CONTINUED. 139
shown throughout in your communications with the
Boer leaders."

The next day brought the further information, " all
your military arrangements up to the conclusion of
peace negotiations approved," and this : " with reference
to my telegram of this date, Sir F. Eoberts, General
Newdigate and Staff, return direct from the Cape. You
therefore continue in present command." Meaning, if you
raise any more difficulties, we can find men to do as we
wish. But Sir Evelyn Wood was not going to let Lord
Kimberley 's attempt to cite him as approving what had
been done pass without a protest. He telegraphed back
on the same day : " Sincerely grateful to Government
for appreciation of efforts in carrying out their wishes.
Eeferring to words 'happiest results' &c, in my
telegram of 5th March, I meant that a series of actions
fought by six companies could not affect our prestige,
but Boer leaders had lit a fire which was beyond their
control, and would be quenched more easily after a
British victory." This was letting Lord Kimberley
down very easy. But we shall see that Sir Evelyn had
not changed his mind on the subject.
On the 26th March, Lord Kimberley directed Sir
Evelyn to proceed to Pretoria, the order being put in
the form of a suggestion : " Subject to arrangement for
the meeting of Commission, consider whether it would
be desirable that you should visit Pretoria, to explain

140 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
agreement and confer with authorities there as to
provisional administration." The rebel Boers were now
elevated to the rank of " authorities." The following
day this reply was sent : " Yours received. Sent
yesterday to place relays of horses. Most important I
should go when Commission meeting is settled. As
entire distance is four hundred miles, you will lose touch
of me for ten days." On the 4th April he reached
Heidelberg on his way to Pretoria, and thence he
reported to the Secretary for War : " Eepublic flag
flying here when I arrived last night. Twenty armed
men and two Boer leaders urged in absence of chiefs
they could not lower it, but on my pointing out
consequence, flag was lowered this morning." See
what a little firmness and sense of public duty does
even with obstinate ignoramuses like the Boers. He,
indeed, threatened that if they did not haul the flag
down he would do it himself. That might have been a
dangerous thing to do, but Wood has never recked of
danger where duty was to be done, and it would proba
bly have led to a resumption of hostilities, which might
have been rather a bad thing for the Boers, who were
not anxious for more fighting, as they had been informed
by those conveniently treasonable friends of theirs in
England that they had only to remain passive to get
all they wanted. On the same 5th, Sir Evelyn reached
Pretoria, and left it two days later. On his return to
Newcastle he telegraphed, under date of 11th of April :

INVERTEBRATE ADMINISTRATION. 141
"Personally warmly received by residents, but very
bitter feeling against the Imperial Government." No
wonder. People despise and detest a vacillating, flabby
policy, even when it makes for their wishes. And
uneducated men, like the Boers, were bound to suppose
that the invertebrate character of the British Adminis
tration was assumed for the purpose of playing them a
trick. On the 8th April, Sir Evelyn Wood met the Boer
leaders at Heidelberg. They apologised for the conduct
of their Commandant at Potchestroom, who, by
suppressing the news of the armistice, and concealing
the fact that provisions were near at hand, induced
the British garrison to surrender. He reported on the
11th: " Saw Boer leaders night of 8th at Heidelberg ; they
admit conditions of 6th March were not observed at
Potchestroom, Cronjee having suppressed notice of
armistice. They expressed sincere regret, and that
their country should not remain under blame of having
acted wrongly they suggested capitulation should be
cancelled. They acquiesced in my replacing same
military force, and will return at once all articles sur
rendered." In the course of the next few days the Government
at home were seized with a sudden fit of courage and
pride. They resolved that Potchestroom should be re-

142 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
occupied, to strike terror into all and sundry the Boers,
forgetting that the Boers had agreed to the policy in
advance. However, there was this in it, that the leaders
of the Dutchmen could not answer for their followers,
and it was possible that the re-occupation might be
resisted, not by the permission of Kriiger and Joubert,
but by Cronjee or some other such irresponsible person.
Even in such a simple matter as this re-occupation, the
British Government at home could not run straight.
They pretended that Potchestroom was to be taken
back for an indefinite time, but they issued instruc
tions that it was only to be held for twenty-four
hours ! Was there ever such a discreditable display
on the part of any body of public men 1
As there were undoubtedly signs that the Boers
might strike on this subject, it was necessary to be
prepared for emergencies, and Sir Evelyn Wood was so
assured that the position of Englishmen as regards the
Transvaal would be intolerable, that he urged the
Government to allow him to let the Boers re-occupy the
Nek, when he was perfectly ready to drive them from it,
and then, when they were beaten, to extend to them
such favours as the Cabinet should decide to grant.
This was his policy all through, and it was so to the last.
His reiterated advice on the subject was contained in
the despatch of April 19th : " I should allow them to
re-occupy Nek. We are quite ready. This will give a
decisive military result, and the happiest result for the

A MISSING LINK. 143
country. I guarantee we dislodge them." The Boers
finally were of the mind that they had better not
provoke the Cabinet which they had sure information
was only too ready, as soon as chance offered, to admit
the success of the rebellion, and to reward the Boers for
having had the kindness to slaughter a few hundred
British soldiers. So they agreed to the opening of the
Commission. Accordingly, on the 7th May, Sir Evelyn
Wood opened the Eoyal Commission ; his brother Com
missioners, Sir Hercules Eobinson, Governor of Cape
Colony, and Sir J. H. de Villiers, Chief Justice at the
Cape, a person of Dutch descent, and one who had
frequently shown that in his judgment blood is thicker
than water, not having arrived, and the Cabinet being
impatient to begin the work of surrender. While the
Commission is holding its preliminary sittings let us
take a peep at home.
The Ministry was being attacked for its chicken-
hearted policy in both Houses of Parliament. A doubt
was not unreasonably felt whether the Legislature was
in a position to pronounce upon the whole question. It
was judged impossible that the papers submitted to the
public could tell the whole story. There was evidently
a missing link somewhere. In reply to not the first
question on the subject, the Under Secretary was put
up in the House of Commons. Mr. Grant-Duff, now
and deservedly the Eight Honourable Sir Mountstewart
Elphinstone Grant-Duff, is one of the most honourable

144 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
men who have sat in Parliament in our day and genera
tion, and he cannot be held responsible for the answer
put in his mouth, especially as it is believed that not
even the whole of the Cabinet knew what was being
done. The operation was in the hands of two or three
men, who worked en secret, and did not even leave
records of what they did in the Department concerned.
Assuredly they did not take an Under Secretary into
their confidence. Well, here is what Mr. Grant-Duff
was instructed to say on May 9th :
" The whole history of the transaction in question is
in the hands of honourable members, and we had no
communications, telegraphic or otherwise, with regard to
it beside those already published."
Nothing could be more explicit, if true. But I shall
show that it was not true. For in the month of July,
two months after Mr. Grant-Duff had been told to say
what has been cited, there was " presented to Parlia
ment," a paper containing portions of Sir Evelyn
Wood's despatches which had been cut out of the
papers concerning which the Government had made the
asseveration that they were complete. But this is not
all. Prominent, though subordinate, officers who were
on the spot say that there were communications in the
nature of precise and secret instructions which have never
seen the light to this day, and on which both the mili
tary authorities in South Africa and the civilians felt

MINISTERIAL "RESPONSIBILITY." 145
themselves obliged to act. I understand that they do
not exist in the archives of the Colonial Office, and I
have been informed that when the Conservatives came
into office in 1885, suspicions being rife anent the truth
fulness of the representations made to Parliament, an
investigation was set on foot in the Department, and en
quiries made elsewhere, for the discovery of the missing
documents, but without result. Nevertheless, the
documents do exist. Parliament and the people were
deliberately deceived by a distortion of the truth, by
statements made on the responsibility of Ministers — if
all responsibility of Ministers is not now a sham since
the disuse of impeachment — and, by a course of con
duct which is not to be paralleled in the history of a
free country, Members of the Cabinet sat by and heard
the Under Secretary make, solemnly, a statement to
Parliament which at the time they knew to be untrue.
And the attempt was continued to throw all the re
sponsibility, under the guise of imputing credit, on Sir
Evelyn Wood. So craftily was this done that it is no
wonder the army believed he had acted in a way that
many soldiers deemed dishonourable. I have shown
that he protested at every step of the transaction, and
his protests were not yet exhausted. The attempt was
continued, among others, by Mr. Chamberlain. Speak
ing at Birmingham in the first week of June, while the
Commission was still sitting at Pretoria, as it was to sit
for two months longer, he said : L

146 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
" When the conditions of peace were arranged by Sir
Evelyn Wood, he had under his command something
like 12,000 troops, more than the adult population of
the whole of the Boers in the Transvaal." Inference
suggested, he could have used them if he had liked. " I
have used the name of Sir Evelyn Wood : he is known
to you and to every Englishman as one of the bravest
soldiers and most skilful commanders in the British
service. But I say that, in my humble judgment, he
has earned a higher title to admiration, and the respect
of his fellow-countrymen by his loyalty in arranging
satisfactory terms of settlement, and by resisting the
temptation, which might well be strong to a soldier, of
using his overwhelming force in order to avenge a
military disaster, than he would have done if he had won
the greatest victory, or had entered the Transvaal in
triumph over the dead bodies of its slain."
I pause to suggest that Mr. Chamberlain, though of
the Cabinet, was not one of the members of the Cabinet
which " worked the oracle," and that he knew of what
was going on just as much as it was thought con
venient for him to know. I say I do not conceive that
when Mr. Chamberlain made this speech he knew that
Sir Evelyn Wood had repeatedly asked leave to use the
force at his disposal, and had protested in every way in
his power, short of embarrassing the Government by his
resignation, against the craven policy he was instructed
to carry out, and of which he expressly, on every

A PLOT. 147
occasion, threw the entire responsibility upon Her
Majesty's Government. The orator proceeded :
"While we were prepared for every emergency, we
did not think that we were justified in closing the door
to a peaceful settlement. The overtures for the settle
ment came, in the first instance, from President Brand,
President of the Orange Free State. ... In the second
place overtures came from the Boer leaders. Mr. Kriiger,
their Vice-President, wrote to Sir George Colley to say
that he was confident in the justice of their cause, and
he was so certain the English people would deal fairly
with him, if they only knew the true facts, that he was
willing to submit his case to a Eoyal Commission to be
appointed by the Queen. We thought that those were
terms which ought to be accepted, and we instructed Sir
George Colley, if certain conditions could be obtained, to
arrange for a settlement upon that basis. Among the
conditions the first and most important was that the
Boers should desist from armed opposition."
Just so. But the Boers, so far from desisting from
armed opposition, treated with silent contempt Sir
George Colley's proposals, and when he, after allowing
them three times the limit of time he had fixed, pro
ceeded to do his duty, he was shot down with a large
number of the other soldiers of the Queen. But this is
how Mr. Chamberlain glided over this most pregnant
fact : l 2

148 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR! HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
" While the correspondence was going on, and in the
midst of negotiations, the British troops unfortunately
on three several occasions, marching in inferior numbers
to attack the strong position of the Boers, met with a
repulse. Those events were deplored by us as they must
be by everyone, but they did not seem to us to consti
tute a reason why we should withdraw the offer which
we had previously made. In those attacks we were the
aggressors." It was safe to say this when Sir George
Colley was lying dead. " But the Boers, and those
losses, greatly as we grieve for them, do not make
the original cause of the war more just," (was this
Minister right then, or were Her Majesty's Ministers
right when they composed the Queen's Speech? see
page 123, — they could not be right both times) " or the
prolongation of this miserable and inglorious struggle
more desirable and expedient. Therefore when Sir
Evelyn Wood, acting on his own responsibility,
arranged for an armistice," — (yes, an armistice for
the purpose of relieving the garrisons until he was
ready to relieve them by force, not an armistice be
cause he wanted peace with the rebels till he had wiped
out the stain upon the British reputation) " we ap
proved his proceeding" — it has been seen that the
" we " at the War Office had not precisely the same
tongue as the "we" in Downing St. — " and when the
terms of peace were arranged " — still, it will be noted,
the insinuation that Sir Evelyn Wood had made the

QUIBBLES. 149
arrangement off his own bat — " when the Boers accepted
our proposals exactly as we had all along made them,"
but not until they had shot down a Major-General and
over a hundred of his men — " we rejoiced in the prospect
of settlement without the possibility of further effusion
of blood, whether of Englishmen or of Dutchmen. We
had accepted without a victory terms which were the
best we could reasonably expect the greatest victory
could give us." " We had accepted ! " Why, just a minute
before the speaker had said the terms were of our own
making. But " we had accepted " was not used care
lessly. It was employed as part of the plan of pretend
ing that all which had been done was done by, as well as
through, Sir Evelyn Wood. But there is something
more to be said. Mr. Chamberlain had Mr. Gladstone's
own warrant for the declaration that the Boers were not
the attackers of Her Majesty's troops. Here we can
pit against him the words of Sir Evelyn Wood himself,
who, in addressing the Natal Legislative Council as the
representative of the Queen, on the 6th of October
following, spoke of " the attack on a detachment of Her
Majesty's troops near Bronker's Spruit."
There was no little shock experienced by the public
conscience when Mr. Parnell stood in the witness-box of
the Commission Court and calmly avowed that he had
made a statement in the House of Commons which he
knew at the time to be untrue. It was astonishing to
note, at the same time, the actual or assumed indif-

150 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
ference to this admission by some of the prominent
politicians of the period. A most distinguished general
is not, perhaps, so far wrong in his fact as in his
derivation when he habitually deduces the origin of the
word " parliament " from parler — to speak — and men-
tire — to lie. At any rate the astounding coolness of
the declaration of the Irish leader, which made the three
distinguished judges look more serious than even at any
other part of the long and painful enquiry, seemed to
show that in his opinion lying is a perfectly legitimate
part of the political game. But if lying, in Parliament
and to the representatives of the people, is not legiti
mate, still less is it legitimate when it involves the
reputation of a soldier, absent in foreign parts, who has
a right to expect that not only the truth, but the whole
truth and nothing but the truth shall be told to the
public concerning his actions, either as fighter or as
planner, or as negotiator, or as ruler. Of course there
are many things, in the way of intermediate discussions,
which it is not for the public interest to have disclosed,
but what can be easier than to say so ? The plea has
never yet been advanced in vain before the Legislature.
It is an entirely different thing to say to the House of
Commons that every single thing has been laid before it,
that there has been no reserve whatever, that all in
structions, telegraphic or otherwise, have been "pre
sented to Parliament." If such a statement is not
absolutely true it is most mischievous. The Queen's

MURDER WILL OUT. 151
Government cannot be carried on, upon any sort of
popular principles, if this sort of thing is to become
common, or even if it is to be done with impunity on
special occasions. And it is folly and worse than folly
to suppose that Parliament can be deceived in the
long run. " Murder will out." So will facts. We have
got rid of the superstition that it is the duty of an
ambassador " to lie abroad for the good of his country."
It cannot be tolerated that Parliament and the country
should be deliberately deceived on a vital question by-
false assertions, and it is equally inconvenient, to say
the least, that ministers should attempt to shield them
selves under the segis of a trusted soldier when they
themselves have directed every, even the smallest,
particle of the policy and the pleas for that policy
against the steadfast protests of the soldier whom they
thus contrive to involve in the discredit of the trans
actions. It is within my knowledge that one of Sir
Evelyn Wood's most distinguished and warmest old
friends thought so badly of him in consequence of minis
terial declarations, to the unveracity of some of which his
eyes had already been opened and were to be further
opened in the course of time, that he said in the bitter
ness of his heart " Colley would never have made such a
peace." And to this day that eminent man has never
been able to trust himself to speak upon the subject. But
he will now learn, in common with the country at large,
that the statement Mr. Grant-Duff was put forward to

152 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
make was untrue, not, probably, to Mr. Grant-Duffs
knowledge, but to the knowledge of those who put that
Under-Secretary forward to make it, and who heard it
made. And I have to challenge contradiction of this
assertion. There were other most important communi
cations which passed between the Government and Sir
Evelyn Wood, communications going to the root of the
whole matter, which were not presented or even hinted
at to Parliament. Sir Evelyn Wood has never opened
his mouth, I believe, in reference, direct or indirect,
to these suppressions. He has been content to live
down the foul imputations to which he was deliber
ately exposed by unscrupulous politicians, careless of
his or any other reputations if only they could clear
themselves of , responsibility for treason to the interests
and the honour of the country. But that he has lived
them down his repute to-day demonstrates. I can
not think, however, this is any reason for concealing
the fact that he suffered sadly in the estimation of
soldiers because he was alleged to be a consenting party
to what was wholly and solely the act of the Govern
ment of the day. But, when this has been said, I con
fess there does not seem to me to be any remedy save
an address to the Queen requesting that the suppressed
documents should now be produced. Their existence
became known through a mere accident, and if they are
not in the Colonial Office, as there is reason to believe,
they are not the only set of papers of public interest

ZULULAND AGAIN. 153
which have been retired for personal reasons from the
national archives, or improperly kept out of them.
On April 13th Sir Evelyn was appealed to by Mr.
Osborn, the Eesident in Zululand, to intervene in a
quarrel between Zulu Chiefs, and the next day Lord
Kimberley instructed the General to accept the reference,
and call on Mr. Osborn to report the facts for his decision.
It is scarcely necessary to say that this matter had to
stand over until the Boer Commission had come to a
conclusion, but it may here be noted that Sir Evelyn
visited on August 21st, with an escort of 300 mounted
troops, the Inhlazatie mountain, in Zululand, where he
met the Zulu Chiefs and conferred with them, giving
his decision, " as the Queen's representative, under the
agreement by which the Chiefs bound themselves to
accept the arbitration of the British Government."
Sending his escort back, he went on to the chief village
of the Swasi King to inform him of his future relations
with the Transvaal. After some days with Umbandeen,
at Lotili, he went to Delagoa Bay, for Durban, by way
of the Lebombo mountain and the flats to the east of
it. This service was acknowledged in a dispatch of
November 1st, as follows :

" I am quite satisfied with the result of your visit to
Umbandeen, which will no doubt have been very useful,
and I think you have done all that was possible in the
circumstances to settle Zulu affairs."

154 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Meanwhile, before the Commission had sat for a
month, Sir Evelyn found himself once more opposed to
the views of the Government, which were shared by Sir
Hercules Eobinson and Sir J. H. de Villiers, his brother
commissioners. He was doubtful of peace being main
tained under the proposed settlement, and on both the
4th and the 5 th of June he asked to be allowed to
withdraw from the Commission. This was refused in a
dispatch from the Colonial Secretary dated the 9th :
" We appreciate your motives in suggesting retirement,
but cannot accept your offer. . . . Our agreement with
majority of Commission on boundary question does not
imply any diminution of our confidence in you." There
is a vulgar proverb that " Fair words butter no par
snips," and it was certainly no pleasant position for an
English officer of high military rank to be kept sitting
at a Board where his suggestions were made only to be
overruled by his fellows and by the Government he was
supposed to represent. There is no reason to suppose
that Sir Evelyn found his position any less intolerable
than others would have done ; but he held on, perhaps
hoping against hope, until the end came, which was on
3rd August. Then was signed one of the most shameful
Conventions recorded in British history — in the record
of that realm of which the motto, respected by every
party between Queen Mary's days and Mr. Glad
stone's, was Nulla vestigia retrorsuw. That dishonourable
Convention does not bear the signature of Evelyn

CRAVEN COUNSELS. 155
Wood, who recorded his dissent from it in a separate
paper. Thus we have seen that, from the beginning of his
period of responsibility, Wood was in no degree
responsible for any act or omission which was in any
degree contrary to the principles happily recognised in
the army, if not by all classes of what some one has
called the " perfidious politicians " among us. His
advice was systematically overridden by Mr. Gladstone,
and so many of that gentleman's colleagues as he chose
to admit to his craven counsels. Lord Salisbury put
the matter in a nut-shell when he said at Willis's
Eooms : " the precious lives of British soldiers were
thrown away for the sake of a cause which the English
Government had already decided to surrender." The
only act which was not expressly dictated by Ministers
at home was the conclusion of the Armistice of March
6th, which I have shown was due to Wood's desire to
re-provision the Transvaal garrisons who were in peril
owing to the failure of Colley to drive back the rebel
Boers. Even if that act be considered as resulting from
an error of judgment — and there are few men in these
days who would have taken the responsibility of leaving
the garrisons to their fate — the fault did not necessarily
lead to the betrayal of British interests and the dam
nation of British prestige which followed it, and which
no man could be expected to foresee.
When the betrayal was compassed, the infamy

156 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
achieved, the treason consummated, the politicians at
home continued to beslaver Sir Evelyn with their
compliments. It has been seen how Mr. Chamberlain
had misrepresented Sir Evelyn's acts and sentiments at
Birmingham, and Mr. Gladstone said on the 26th July
in the debate in the House of Commons : "I cannot
name that distinguished man without expressing the
debt we owe to him for the qualities, both civil and
military, which he has displayed ; " but gave never a
hint that the subject of his encomiums differed from the
Government as totally as it is possible for one man to
differ from another. Yet why, it may be asked, did
not Sir Evelyn Wood persist in his resignation
repeatedly sent in ? The answer is not difficult to those
who know the man. He has been distinguished all his
life for self-sacrifice, even in a profession whose habitual
self-sacrifice is scarcely appreciated by the country as
it deserves to be. He would not abandon his post
though he totally disagreed with the policy of those
who begged him to continue to represent not his, but
their, views and purposes. Nothing, even in the career
of Sir Evelyn Wood is more highly honourable to the
character of the British officer than this abnegation of
self, always guarded as it was by personal and official
protests against the orders he consented to carry out,
and the responsibility for which he left at the doors of
the gentry who are said, by a fiction of the Constitution,

BACK AGAIN. 157
which would be amusing if the matter were not so
serious, to be "responsible" for them.
The disgraceful Convention having been signed, Sir
Evelyn was free for other duties, and he reached Maritz-
burg on September 11th. As Governor of the Colony
of Natal, he opened the Legislative Council on October
6th. On the 11th December the Government offered
him the permanent post of Lieutenant-Governor of
Natal, which he declined, and on the 22nd he left the
Colony and paid a visit to Inhambane, in Portuguese
territory, proceeding on to Quillimane on the northern
mouth of the Zambesi river, whence he went to have a
look at Mozambique. Then he visited Zanzibar and
travelled home, where on February 14th he resumed the
command at Chatham, now with the " pukka " or " firm "
rank of Major-General, to which he had been gazetted
on the 12th August 1881. Under date of March 16th,
1882, Sir William Harcourt, as Secretary of State for
the Home Department, made him an offer in the follow
ing terms :
" Sir, " Though I have not the honour of your personal
acquaintance, the great esteem and admiration which I
entertain of the services rendered by you in the cause
of recent events in South Africa induce me to make to
you a proposal for which I have received the sanction
of the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of State for
War. The post of Governor of the Isle of Man is

158 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
vacant, and, if it were agreeable to you, I should be
happy to submit your name to the Queen to fill that
office. I should not have thought of proposing to so
distinguished a soldier as yourself a civil office if I had
not ascertained from the military authorities that the
temporary discharge of its duties would form no im
pediment in the future to your military career.
" Of course if any considerable command offered
itself to you, you would be at liberty to accept it, to
cancel it, and rejoin the Government when you
pleased." Although the post in Mona is worth £1,800 per
annum, and the Chatham command not much more
than £1,000, Sir Evelyn declined the appointment, and
he began the spring by commanding a Division at the
Volunteer Eeview. On the 20th February previous,
he had been promoted Knight Grand Cross of the
Order of SS. Michael and George, thus gaining the
highest position in the Order to which he had been
admitted a simple knight thirty months before.

( 159 )

CHAPTEE VII.
IN EGYPT.
Arabi Pasha — Bright and Bombardment — French Fractiousness —
The Facts of the Case — Sir S. Northcote's Views — Danger at
Constantinople — Wood at Alexandria — Wolseley's Plans —
Arabi Misled — The Fortune of War — A Brigade Eating its
Heart Out — End of the Eebellion — Parliamentary Thanks —
Appointed Egyptian Sirdar — Creating an Army — The Feeble
Fellaheen — The Indian Model — Formation of Staff— The First
Eecruits — Very raw Material — The Cholera Comes — Charles
Baker Pasha — Disasters in the Soudan— The Madhi — A
Plucky Commandant — Gladstonian Vacillation — The Eescue
of Gordon — Wood's Services — Passing the Cataracts — Ad
vantage of Naval Training — Line of Communications — Chief
of , the Staff — Off to Gakdul — Wood fired At — Eesigns as
Sirdar — Thanks from the Khedive — A Grand Decoration —
Thanks from the Government — Invalided Home — Empty
Thanks.
On the 21st July 1882, Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed
to the command of the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, of
the force destined to operate in Egypt against Arabi
Pacha, who had proved himself more than a match for
his master, the Khedive Thewfik, who had three years
before succeeded his exiled father, the Khedive Ismail,
who had done so much for the material benefit of

160 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Egypt, and towards its financial catastrophe. It is
popularly supposed that the bombardment of Alex
andria, which has been well called " one of the greatest
political crimes of modern times," was almost an
accident, due to the military preparations of Arabi
threatening the fleet. Nothing has done so much to
foster this delusion as the time and manner of the
retirement from the Government of Mr. John Bright.
It appeared from that as if the chief of the Peace Party
had been suddenly outraged in his tenderest feelings by
the bloodshed of the 11th July. But nothing can be
further from the truth. It is true that the bombard
ment was not intended to open the campaign, but the
campaign had been decided on upon the 3rd of the
same month, and it had been contemplated, and in a
sense prepared for, by order of the Government, from
the end of June, while it had been reckoned with as " a
military problem " for " many months " (see the official
Military History of the Campaign of 1882, by Colonel
J. F. Maurice, E.A.), and that must have been on the
initiative of the Secretary of State for War, a member
of the Cabinet. The French Government had also
agreed with the British Government to actively inter
fere by force of arms months before ; so if Mr. Bright
did not know well what was going on he must have
been kept deliberately in ignorance by his brethren in
the Cabinet. When the pinch came, however, the
French fleet did not come up to the scratch, and indeed

SOME HISTORICAL FACTS. 161
ran away from the scene of action. And the seal was
put to the reversal of French policy when the Vote of
Credit was refused by the French Chambers on the 29 th
July. Then, it is now said, the British Government
decided to act alone. This is sheer misapprehension, for
Sir Archibald Alison had left England on the 6 th July,
and Sir Garnet Wolseley's Plan of Campaign was
definitely approved on the 3rd. These facts depend on
official military testimony. Moreover, Sir Beauchamp
Seymour, known in the navy as " the Swell of the
Ocean," had threatened Arabi on the 10th, and com
municated his intention to fight the next day to Her
Majesty's Government, so that they had every oppor
tunity of checking him if they did not wish him to
bombard the city. Nothing but Mr. Gladstone's
jealousy of " the unspeakable Turk " prevented the
employment of Ottoman troops in Egypt to restore
order. Four days after the bombardment the Govern
ment, with consummate hypocrisy, had joined in an
" Identic Note " to the Porte, " requiring it to send
troops to Egypt to repress disorder," when we had
already prepared to act alone ashore if need be. No
wonder the "letting out of the waters" caused great
alarm in England among those who had some knowledge
of the international situation thus created. The fol
lowing extract from a letter written by Sir Stafford
Northcote, who was before long to act as Foreign Secre
tary under the title of Earl of Iddesleigh, was given to
m

162 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
me at the time for publication, but I reserved it for
various reasons, none of which now exist. It was
written immediately after the occupation of Cairo, and
may be taken as a concise summary of the true situation
from the point of view of most reasonable men with a
competent knowledge of the position into which we had
drifted through Mr. Gladstone's persistent dislike to use
the natural means for ending an intolerable difficulty,
that is, the employment of Turkish troops :
" The military success in Egypt is of course a great
thing for the Government. I still hold, however, that
the Egyptian policy, taken as a whole, has been far
from satisfactory, and that we have reason to look for
ward with some anxiety. The whole question of our
relations with Turkey may, and I think probably will,
be opened ; and if it is to be handled in Mr. Gladstone's
peculiar fashion there will be much risk of British
interests on the one hand, or of European complications
on the other.
"It is almost essential that the Egyptian settlement
now to be made should give this country preponderating
authority. But this will not be easily achieved without
giving umbrage to some other Powers. Eussia in par
ticular is likely to think that she must get some counter
balancing advantage ; and the direction in which she
will look for it will probably be Asiatic Turkey. The
Sultan will of course be in a bad humour at our success,
and perhaps the Porte may not be indisposed to play
into the Eussian hand. Should this happen, we must

SIR. S. N0RTHC0TE. 163
remember that none of the European Powers have any
interest in our Asiatic empire, and that they would
rather see us engaged in a conflict with Eussia and
Turkey than not.
"A firm and sensible tone six months ago would have
obviated the whole of the Egyptian difficulty, and would
not only have saved the great waste of life and money,
but would have averted the complications which are now
so likely to arise.
" A full explanation of the policy of the Government
ought to be demanded when Parliament re-assembles."
Within a month of the date of this letter, I received
a letter from an official of the Turkish Government at
Constantinople informing me that the " perfidy " of the
British Cabinet in regard to Egypt had led to serious
negotiations between the Eussian ambassador and the
Palace, from which the Porte was excluded, having for
their object the guarantee of all Ottoman territory by
the Czar. The letter continued :
" The Eussians are so keen on this project, which,
however, originated with the Palace, and not with the
Imperial Embassy, that they offered to forego the whole
of the war indemnity, and to lend us sufficient money to
enable us to make a railway from the Bosphorus to the
Persian Gulf. They seem to have over-reached them
selves by their tempting offers, and to have awoke the
never long slumbering suspicions of His Majesty. So I
think the danger is over, as neither Austria nor Eng-
m 2

164 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
land, to say nothing of France and Germany, could
dream of accepting such a state of affairs unless beaten
in a prolonged war."
Three years later I found, on inquiry at Constanti
nople, that my informant's information was perfectly
sound, that the project, consequent on Mr. Gladstone's
Egyptian policy, had been originated in the military
entourage of the Sultan, and that the scheme came to
nothing solely because the " Eussian Bear " opened his
mouth too wide.
It may now be seen how the policy pursued brought
us within measureable distance of the greatest war this
generation has seen. And these facts are mentioned
here not in connection with general policy, but only as
facts to be borne in mind when we come to consider the
peculiar responsibility that devolved on us, in relation
to certain matters that came to be very much in Sir
Evelyn Wood's hands.
Sir Evelyn left Portsmouth on the 4th August, and
landed at Alexandria on the same day as the Comman
der-in-chief, Sir Garnet Wolseley, though not from the
same ship — he happened to have a faster one, which
gained two days on that conveying the " Chief."
Consequently Wood was not in the series of operations
under Sir A. Alison which were adopted, among other
reasons, in consequence of a telegram from Sir Garnet at
Gibraltar to attract Arabi's attention to Alexandria by

THE CHANGE OF BASE. 165
" daily reconnaissances towards the flank of his position,"
following on one sent from London on the 31st of July,
" keep Arabi constantly alarmed." Had the corres
pondents present but known the contents of those two
messages they would scarcely have made themselves the
gobemouches they turned out to be. It was not until
the 20th that even Sir Edward Hamley was told of the
true base Sir Garnet was going to seize on, though Sir
Edward was to be one of the Generals of Division. And
in the letter telling him that the real base was to be
Ismailiawere these words : — " When you open this keep
the news to yourself, tell no one, and do nothing beyond
showing as many men as you can conveniently in Arabi's
front, and giving him as many shell from any of your
guns of position that can reach him in his works." There
seems to be a couple of words missing, but the text is
copied from the Official account. Sir Garnet added : "I
shall bring you on as soon as I can, as I shall want every
available man I can get for my fight near Tel-el-Kebir,
if Arabi will only in kindness stay to fight me there."
It may here be mentioned that in Sir Garnet's original
Memorandum, dated July 3rd, Tel-el-Kebir was named
as the scene of the big fight. Unless the secret had
been confided to Sir Evelyn before he left England, or
unless he had guessed it for himself, it must be assumed
that he knew nothing of the purposes of the " Chief"
when he was called on by Sir E. Hamley to help in an
affair the same day the latter received the letter, a part

166 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
of which has been already quoted. He had, on the
19th, led a reconnaissance with half a battalion of the
1st Berkshire along the canal banks from Alexandria
towards Arabi's position at Kafr-Dowar, having one man
killed by the troops which at this time were pluming
themselves on always driving the English Kafirs back,
and trusting to the flooded state of the Delta and the
inundation in front of Arabi's position, to which, four
teen miles from Alexandria, the Egyptian leader had
retired after the bombardment of the city on July 11th.
At 4 p.m on the 20th, Hamley moved his two brigades
out to threaten Kafr-Dowar, Sir A. Alison with the
1st Gordon Highlanders and the Cameron Highlanders
forming the 3rd Brigade, and Sir Evelyn Wood, with the
1st South Stafford and the 1st Berks forming the
2nd. Alison, accompanied by Hamley, moved out
from the Palm Grove at the back of the city and
advanced across the dry bed of Lake Mareotis " towards
the enemy's works, manceuvring there as if to attack
the main front." Wood moved out along the Mahmu-
dieh Canal towards the right of Arabi's position. The ¦
Egyptians, perhaps a little puzzled by the strange time
of day chosen for commencing an attack, nevertheless
evidently believed that the British infidels were going to
make their supreme effort, and " opened fire from one
very large gun, and apparently from three smaller ones,
and also firing many rockets, which, as well as the shells
from the large gun, passed over the troops, exploding

ARABI DECEIVED. 167
mostly behind them." The Egyptians, having developed
their full force, the two brigades fell back without
casualties, and retired within the lines. Arabi here
upon claimed a big victory, and that he should do so was
part of the little game that was being played with him.
He was being induced " to believe a lie " by the evidence
of his own senses, and that he did hug the delusion to
his soul is clear from his confession, after he had been
for some time an exile in Ceylon, that he had never
known of the transfer of the greater part of the troops
from Alexandria to Ismailia, and had believed the latter
force was a new body altogether. On the 21st the
reconnaissance was repeated, with a similar result, and
again the Egyptians scored a bloodless victory, which
was celebrated far and wide through the land of the
Pharaohs. Then the reconnaissances were discontinued,
as by this time the 1st Division had got a good hold on
Nefisha Junction, and had the whole railway from Suez,
as well as the Sweet Water Canal running parallel with
the line, in its hands, and Ismailia protected against an
attack from the force lying on the trunk of the Sweet
Water Canal between Nefisha and Cairo.
On the 26th Hamley became impatient of inactivity,
but indeed he had been far from idle, as he had
materially added, under the skilled eye of Colonel
Maitland, E.E., to the defensive works of Alexandria,
so as to leave the city safe with a comparatively small
garrison ; though Sir Edward Malet, the most able repre-

168 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
sentative of the Foreign Office, thought the city ought
not to be left without a strong body of troops. On the
26th, Hamley opened fire from his two 7-inch guns to
make Arabi show his strength in artillery. On the 24th
and 27th there were skirmishes, and on the 28th there
was received a message from Ismailia, which had been
sent on the 26th, but was delayed by the telegraph
clerks at Alexandria. This was the text of the message
from the Chief of the Staff, General Sir John Adye :
"It is proposed that you embark for Ismailia with
Alison and Highland Brigade (four battalions), and for
the present that Wood with his brigade (three and a-
half battalions), the Derbyshire and Manchester, two
garrison batteries Eoyal Artillery, and Malta Fencibles,
remain as garrison of Alexandria. This, with assistance
of navy, is deemed sufficient, but before order is given
state concisely your views after consultation with Malet.
The police duties will be performed by the soldiers, and
any marines or sailors landed to be sent to the front.
Sir B. Seymour concurs in this. General Harman is
coming to command at Alexandria, and a depot of 1,830
men will reach Alexandria about 16 th September. We
hope shortly to bring on Wood and his brigade. Use
War Office cypher."
The " shortly " never arrived. Sir E. Hamley wished,
as the ground towards the west at El Meks was getting
drier every day, to show Arabi that he could not with

COMMANDING AT ALEXANDRIA. 169
impunity consider that an exposed point, and he there
fore contemplated having a little affair on his own
account with the Highland Brigade. But on letting the
" Chief" know of his intentions, the stopper was put on
in the following laconic despatch : " No ; embark as
soon as all ready : desire Sir E. W. to remain on
defensive and risk nothing." It was rather an
inglorious role for " Sir E. W.," and not the sort of
thing he had been used to at all ; but the situation was
none of his making, and his occupancy of the position
was essential to the success of the plans that were being
carried out, so to speak, round the corner. On the
last day of August, Hamley, with Alison's Brigade, left
Alexandria for Ismailia, and Wood took over the
command. On the 10th September, upon which the
garrisons of Kafr Dowar, the Aboukir forts, and the
lines in front of El Meks surrendered, having been much
weakened owing to the newly found necessity for Arabi
to turn his attention to the line of the Sweet Water
Canal, and to trust to inundations to prevent an advance
on Cairo by the direct railway or the Nile, Sir Evelyn
proposed to attack a force of the enemy at Mandora, and
communicated this desire to Sir Garnet. The reply was
dated Kassassin, 11th September, 2 p.m., and was thus
worded : " You must act on the defensive and risk
nothing until after my action, when I may be in a
position to let you act, but make no forward movement
without orders from me." Thus, by the necessity of

170 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
the case, a fine brigade was, as Colonel Maurice says,
left in Alexandria eating its heart out, and no man in
the brigade more so than its head. But this is the
fortune of war, and, since the days of King David, it has
been ever so, according to the ordinance which he made
for the guidance of Israel, "as his part is that goeth
down to the battle, so shall his part be that tarrieth by
the stuff : they shall part alike " in honour as in loot,
for Moses had laid down the like reward (Numbers
xxxi. 27) for all " them that took the war upon them."
The big fight of the campaign over, and Sir Garnet,
thanks to the swoop of the cavalry as he had long
before foreseen, in possession of Cairo, it only remained
to disperse some stragglers at Tanta, which was done
by Sir Archibald Alison, and to enforce the surrender
of Damietta, which was committed to Sir E. Wood in
the following order : " Cairo, 21st September. Take
two of your battalions and Maltese Artillery and
proceed by way of Tanta to the neighbourhood of
Damietta to secure surrender of its Garrison." But the
black troops there did not need much forcing. Their
leader, Abdelal, gave himself up, and his men dispersed.
On the 17th October Wood left Egypt, and twelve days
later he resumed the command at Chatham. On the
26th he had been included in the Vote of Thanks in
Parliament, and in November the Adjutant-General
communicated to him the said Vote, adding an acknow
ledgment of " the energy and gallantry with which you

SIRDAR. 171
have executed the services you have been called upon
to perform."
Just a fortnight later Lord Granville wrote as
follows : — " Foreign Office,
" November 28th, 1882.
"Dear Sir Evelyn,
" It is most important to get the best possible man
to be the first of the English officers in the Egyptian
service. Everything depends upon it. Should you be
willing that I should tell Dufferin you would be
available for the post. ..."
After consulting his military superiors, Sir Evelyn
agreed to undertake the task of organising a new
Egyptian Army. Very few competent officers envied
him the job. But the brilliant Irishman who had
succeeded Sir Edward Malet had confidence in the
appointment. He wrote to the Foreign Secretary on
the 4th November :
" The Khedive and the Egyptian Government are
delighted with Wood's nomination. His rank will be
that of Sirdar, the highest known, and more than
Commander-in-Chief." In the course of the month the Sirdar left England
for Cairo.
To the average man the situation was distinctly
discouraging, and the ablest critics would not have

172 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
judged failure harshly, so manifold were the difficulties
to be overcome before the slightest progress could be
made. The old Egyptian Army had been destroyed,
and we had destroyed it. The fellaheen in its ranks
had melted away after Tel-el-Kebir like the proverbial
snow off a summer slope. At the best they had been
indifferent material for war, poor food for powder.
Oppressed for scores of ages, their one desire was to live
and die in the peaceful seclusion of their patches of
fertile land of Nile ooze, upon which, as Shakespeare
puts it into the mouth of Lepidus, the seedsman
" scatters his grain, and shortly comes to harvest."
Eather than go soldiering the peasants would pay the
uttermost farthing that could be squeezed out of them
by their half-bred Turkish tyrants through the torture
of the courbash ; for soldiering meant in the case of most
of them perpetual exile to the far Soudan, exile worse
to a most domesticated race than the death it almost
certainly involved. The corvee, or forced labour gangs,
were, in the eyes of the fellah, a sort of relative paradise,
contrasted with entering the army. The pomp and
circumstance of glorious war had no charms for him.
He never saw that side of the shield. The army was
to him perpetual slavery, without hope of amelioration
of his lot. So far as some American officers could teach
him the military art he was instructed, but they had
little to do with him directly. The officers who had to
do with him, for all practical purposes, were the half-

ORGANISATION. 173
bred Turks already mentioned — Turks spoiled by a
Circassian strain, crossed sometimes by Nubian blood.
The officers were called by Turkish titles, pasha, or
ferik, or lewa, meaning general of division or of brigade,
and so on downwards, miralai, colonel, kaikakam,
lieutenant-colonel, bimbashi, i.e. head of 1,000, major,
yuzbashi, i.e. head of 100, captain, mulazim, lieutenant,
and colaghassi, with the prefix sagh or sol, and in
Turkey, at least, pronounced colassi, leader, of right or
left wing, otherwise adjutant-major. The sergeant was
shaush, or chaush, the corporal onbashi, or head of ten,
and this in a country in which Arabic is the popular
tongue. The words of command, indeed the whole
drill book, were in Turkish. There was a good oppor
tunity, in teaching the new drill, to change all this and
make the drill directions in a language " understanded
of the people." But the change was then not made, for,
I think, political reasons. And, after all, though the men
in light blue behaved much worse than the men in dark
blue when they both had to fight the Eussians in 1877,
the Egyptian troops were and are a portion of the
forces of the Ottoman Empire.
The first thing to be done was to arrange the
organisation. Here the Indian model was followed, not
slavishly but in the main. Sir Evelyn was of course
Sirdar, but he was also his own Chief of the Staff. Yet
he only allowed himself the luxury of one aide-de-camp,
Lieutenant E. Stuart Wortley, 60th Eifles, who had

174 LIEDT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
local rank as major. Lieutenant Colonel Fraser, E.E.,
had the local rank of colonel, and was Assistant-
Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, while Captain F.
G. Slade, E.A., was, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel,
A.A. & Q.M.G. Colonel Grenfell, of the 60th, now
Sirdar, was a brigadier-general of Infantry, Lieutenant
Colonel Duncan, E.A., was colonel and commandant of
the artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel T. Taylor, of the
19th Hussars, had his own rank as commandant of a
cavalry regiment. Major C M. Watson, E.E., was
Surveyor-General, with the rank of colonel, and there
were seventeen other officers, ranging from majors to
lieutenants, who got a step of local rank as commanding
battalions or batteries, or in second command, while
some of them were supernumerary for obvious reasons.
The composition of the army was not decided on
without anxious consultations between Lord Dufferin
and Sir Evelyn Wood, and in his recent exhaustive
work on the Soudan Major Wingate states that on one
occasion Lord Dufferin, " with apparently an open
mind on the question," said, " Many persons argue that
Egypt requires no army at all." It does not, however,
appear that the remark is capable of this interpretation,
for the very idea of the new army was Lord Dufferin's
own. In due course it was decided that the force
should be 6,000 men, subject to the requirements of the
Soudan, and the main part of the force was to be fur
nished by the fellaheen. Sir Evelyn had, or thought

THE FALLAHEEN. 175
he had, reason to trust these mild peasants, for when
Kafr-Dowar was occupied by his troops the day after
the occupation of Cairo, according to the tenour of the
Official Military History — the morning after Tel-el-Kebir
according to Major Wingate — he was much struck by
the demeanour of the veterans of the old army who had
been garrisoning the fort of Aboukir, and who were so
much chagrined at having to surrender without a fight
that they sullenly " hurled their rifles into the waggons,
tore off their accoutrements and flung them after
them," before marching away in dogged silence. It
was in view of the high reputation of Turkish soldiers
(which Turkish soldiers deserve, but scarcely the
" sheep " who ran away at Cerkovna and elsewhere on
the 21st-24th September, 1877) that it was decided to
stiffen the regiments " by the admission among them of
the descendants of the hardy warriors who carried the
standards of Mohammed Ali from Cairo to Konia." It
was no doubt this better class of men who had stood to
their guns in the batteries of Alexandria on the 11th
July. There is on record the opinion of Sir Evelyn Wood
that " he never had the slightest doubt as to what kind
of soldiers he was going to make." The expression is
a trifle equivocal ; but undoubtedly from the first the
Sirdar believed in the material ready to his hand. As
soon as the number of men had been settled the
governors of fourteen provinces were ordered to send to
the Barrage, near Cairo, recruits pro-rata of the popu-

176 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
lation. This brought into the ranks of course men of
varied races, Arabs and fellahs, Copts and Mussulmans.
As they were mixed in origin so their value as soldiers
greatly varied. However we had long ago solved
a like problem in India, and if the troops of Bombay or
" the benighted province " are not and probably never
will be equal to those of Bengal and the North-West
Provinces, why it must be admitted that the latter have
great differences of value among themselves. And the
problem was " tackled " on Indian lines. It was a good
thing for the experiment that, in the first instance, the
men selected " were of a finer stature and greater
suitability than those obtained since." From the
beginning it was determined that the police should
constitute the first reserve for the army, a second
reserve being formed from the police. That is to say,
men were to serve four years in the army, four in the
police and four in the reserve. After a while, almost
six years, the service was changed to six years in the
army, five in the police, and four in the reserve.
There were two brigades, each consisting of four
battalions. The first brigade was placed in the very
capable hands of Colonel Grenfell. The first battalion
was under Major Chermside, the second under Major
Holled Smith, the third under Major Hallam Parr, and
the fourth under Major Wynne. The second brigade
was committed to Lewa Shuhdi Pacha, and included the
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th battalions. Count Delia Sala

THE CHOLERA. 177
Pacha translated the English drill-books into Egyptian-
Arabic ; and the recruits under firm and kindly manage
ment speedily showed much interest in both the
barrack yard drill and the bayonet exercise. But
Major Wingate amusingly tells us that the use of the
rifle was another matter ; " the manner of holding it.
the use of the sight, the importance of the trigger, were
but constantly recurring novelties to them for a long
period. When it came to intricate calculations as to
the allowance necessary for a side wind, the question
was summarily decided by the officer in command
moving his firing party six yards up wind." Now the
marksmanship is said to be very fair, and to bear com
parison with that of European troops. The praise is
not exuberant, perhaps, but it will serve to show what
the advance has been. Before the force had been eight
months in existence the cholera came, and, in spite of
prompt medical organisation, swept away not a few of the
soldiers. When the fell disease had gone, the work went
on apace ; and recruiting regulations were established,
imposing compulsory service, though its burthen is very
light, upon all males attaining the age of 19 years.
They are examined by a recruiting commission estab
lished in each province ; and only sons are excused, as
well as those medically unfit, the remainder being
balloted for in the proportions required. But the
recruits are not taken away until they are 23 years old.
From 1,200 to 1,500 men are required every year, and as
N

178 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
in the four years, from 19 to 23, there are always 150,000
men on the books, the drain on the country is very slight.
The recruit, in the first instance, has to put in three
months in a depot battalion at Cairo, so that the fellah's
eyes are opened, right off, to the grandeur of the capital
of which they talk in the remotest districts with even
more wondering admiration than the village labourers in
England tell of " Lunnon." It is a matter of chance, at
the expiration of his three months, whether the young
soldier goes to Wady Haifa, or Suakim, or remains in
the rich Delta. His pay as a private is the same every
where and amounts to £3 2s. 9d. a year, besides a liberal
ration. If promoted to corporal, he receives £4 18s. 5d.
per annum. As sergeant he gets £6 3s., as major
£8 4s. 10d., and as warrant officer £18 9s. There is
a premium on election to continue the service, but if
the soldier refuses he goes into the police. This force
was originally organised by hapless Valentine Baker
Pacha, who was succeeded by Charles Baker Pacha,
whose autobiography will make a good bit of reading
when it comes to be published, for he was originally in
the merchant service, volunteered in the Mutiny^days
up country, joined the Bengal Police, and, on the 27th
September, 1858, won the Victoria Cross by, at the head
of a few horsemen, charging a thousand rebels, the feat
being described as decidedly " gallant as any charge
during the war." He served under his namesake, who
was no relative, in Turkey for some years on the insti-

SOME SUCCESS. 179
tution of the gendarmerie, and, like some of the other
English " civilians," showed in the campaign in the
Balkans that he did not draw a very fine line between
civil and military functions in dealing with the invaders.
Then he followed Valentine Baker to Egypt, and took
his place when that sorely tried and most delightful man
reached at last " the rest that remaineth." If the Army
needs increase, owing to any sudden emergency, the
police are at hand to fill up the ranks, and their places
are taken by old policemen, who go into the second
reserve. Is it impossible to carry out some such plan in
England if we continue the short service system ?
Native officers are carefully trained as cadets in a mili
tary school, somewhat on the Sandhurst model ; and most
of those now captains of companies have been so intro
duced to the Army. This is administered, under His
Highness the Khedive, by a civilian minister at war, who
has a vakeel, or under secretary. The vigorous training-
through which the Army was put from its first assembly
soon showed excellent results ; and on the last day of
March Sir Evelyn paraded eight battalions and two
squadrons before the Khedive and Lord Dufferin and
the Ministers. The next day His Lordship, writing to
Earl Granville, said :
" An amicable rivalry has been set on foot between the
two brigades, one of which, as your lordship is aware, is
entirely officered by Egyptians, and the other in the
higher grades by Englishmen, and General Wood is dis-
N 2

180 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
posed to admit that the Egyptian brigade is perhaps the
more advanced of the two, owing to the greater facilities
possessed by its officers in explaining what they want
to their men."
This was when the brigades had been only formed
about two months. Just a month later, Lord Dufferin,
being about to give up his post to Sir Edward Malet,
wrote :
" My Dear Wood,
Before quitting Egypt I cannot help expressing
to you in the warmest terms I can command my appre
ciation of the extraordinary energy you have exhibited
in the creation of the Egyptian Army. Though not a
military man, I am quite capable of understanding the
innumerable difficulties you have had to encounter.
I am sure it will be a satisfaction to you to know that
the success of your efforts is recognised by every one,
by the Khedive, by his Ministers, and by the European
colony, as well as by Her Majesty's Government. That
you should have been able to do so much in one
particular department is in itself a most happy augury
with regard to the endeavours made by others to improve
the condition of the Egyptian people. The justice, the
humanity, and the consideration with which you have
treated your men have already changed the point of
view from which the native regards military service, and
all your countrymen are proud to think of the effect
your character and conduct have produced upon all who
have come into contact with you.

PROGRESS. 181
" I must ask you to express to your officers the high
sense I entertain of the services they are rendering to
our Egyptian friends, and to assure them that I have
not failed on several occasions to make known to Her
Majesty's Government my satisfaction with their
work. " Believe me, my dear Wood, yours sincerely.
" (Signed) Dufferin."
I have mentioned that the cholera gave a good deal
of trouble in the autumn. Before there was any sign of
it, Sir Evelyn had left Cairo for a short furlough in
England. He had reached Port Said when the news
followed him, and he felt that his place was among his
troops. So he at once sacrificed his holiday and his
private affairs, which at the time called for some
attention, and returned to Cairo. Besides serving on
the Sanitary Commission, he, in the same month of July,
took charge of the Soudan Bureau : the moral of this
remark lies in the application of it, as will be seen anon.
What was done for the soldiers is well described in a
despatch from Sir Edward Malet, which is singularly
entombed among the " Commercial " Papers presented
to Parliament, and systematically neglected by that, as
well as too many other sections of the British public :
" Cairo,
" August llth, 1883.
" My Lord, I have the honour to enclose herewith to
your lordship copy of a letter which I have received

182 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
from Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood, forwarding copy
of a report addressed by him to His Highness the
Khedive on the cholera epidemic among the Egyptian
troops at Cairo. I cannot forward Sir Evelyn's report
without adding a word to record the high admiration
which the conduct of the English officers towards their
men has elicited ; Sir Evelyn Wood and his staff and all
the officers have worked night and day at the measures
necessary to ward off and mitigate the disease, and their
efforts have met with an almost unhoped for success.
Beyond the immediate benefit of the saving of life which
they have obtained, an example has been given of self-
devotion which may have lasting consequences for good
on the promotion of the respect and regard of the men
towards the officers. It is probably the first time that
any outward sign has been given that the lives of the
soldiers are of value, for, if attacked, each man has been
treated with the same care that would have been be
stowed upon an officer. " I have, &c,
" (Signed) Edward B. Malet."
Everything was done that skill, care, and forethought
could suggest to make the young army fit for service.
But there were able and experienced critics who saw
something of the force who did not believe in its stay
ing power. Perhaps some of the officers engaged in
training were among these pessimists. Certainly the
Sirdar was not. But the annihilation of the " army "
of Hicks Pasha in the Soudan threw more than a doubt

DANGER COMING. 183
upon the quality of the material of which the new force
was composed. Nor was this doubt assuaged by the
total defeat of Valentine Baker Pacha at El-Teb. On the
contrary, it was intensified as accounts of the battle came
to hand in more and more detail. The battalions there
became panic-stricken at the first contact when the
cavalry retired, and were " massacred without even an
attempt to resist." What had been was only too likely
to be again, whatever the training might be in barrack
squares. But Sir Evelyn had faith in himself and his
officers. He persevered, and though I am no great
believer in the fighting capacity of the Egyptian troops,
other than the Soudanese battalions, it must be con
fessed the success of the training was complete, so far as
it has been tested. However, the supreme test was not
applied for a long time. The Army, it was held, was
for the defence of Egypt, not for the purpose of enabling
Egypt to hold the Soudan. There the revolt of
Mahommed Ahmed, the "Mahdi," was sweeping all
before it, but not a man from Egypt could be allowed to
go south of Dongola. The British^ officers saw the dan
ger growing and approaching, and they offered their
services over and over again. But they had their offer
for their pains. At length there came a time when
it was quite clear the Soudan trouble could be trifled
with no longer, and an attempt was made to raise in
Albania a brigade of Turks. No better man than Zohrab
Bey could have been chosen for the task of recruiting

184 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
for the service of Egypt, whose troops, as has been said,
are at least nominally part of the forces of the Ottoman
Empire, some of the Albanian nizam. He was of a
family long connected with the Levant, though he was
born in Scandinavia, where his father had held a
consular position. A perfect master of Eastern tongues,
Zohrab added to this invaluable knowledge, tact, judg
ment, and the habit of command. Intrigues were at
once commenced by the Power which makes it her
business to thwart English action everywhere, and soon
the attempt had to be abandoned ; but not before a
battalion had been raised and placed under Major
Grant. This battalion was incited to mutiny, and Grant
faced it single-handed, with no other weapon than his
revolver, and compelled the men to lay down their arms,
thereto incited by the fact that Grant had shot some
who attempted to use their bayonets on his person.
So this scheme having gone to smash, it was decided, not
too soon, to raise a Soudan battalion. From the first
the idea commended itself to those, even, who had been
least hopeful about the fellaheen force. The men
were mainly deserters from the side of the rebels, and
having no domestic ties, were less averse to distant
service than the meek inhabitants of the Delta. How
ever, they soon took to wedlock, and were happy enough
to get from the Government not only their own pay un
diminished, but an allowance for their wives. Of their
pluck no one needs to be assured who has seen them

SOUDANESE PLUCK. 185
come, under their savage leaders, at English picked
troops armed with Martinis. And from the first they
stiffened the Egyptian ranks in a very needful way.
Their pluck is really one of their defects, as their officers
complain. They are so fond of close quarters that it is
difficult to restrain them until what may be called the
psychological moment in tactics, and they are much
slower than the fellaheen in learning their drill. But
they have the invaluable quality of self-confidence, and
they have given a good account of themselves and the
foe, whenever and wherever called upon. Four
English officers are allowed to each battalion instead of
three, and they are divided into six companies of 126
each ; the first battalion was Major Hallam Parr's, now in
command of the Somersetshire Light Infantry at Aider-
shot, an officer who, humanly speaking, is bound to rise
to very high employment. This Soudanese backbone
speedily had an effect upon the soldiers from Lower
Egypt, and before long we began to hear of emulation
and prowess among the " sheep-like " fellahs. By degrees
the Soudanese battalion grew into a Soudanese Brigade,
which has been proved on many a frontier field to be
worthy of all the confidence felt in it.
The Sirdar was, at the middle of 1884, in command
of a force that seemed likely to be more ornamental than
useful, not from any fault of itself or its officers, but
because it was to be limited to the defence of Egypt
proper ; and at the time nobody had a very clear idea

186 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
what was to be the limit of " Egypt proper." A squad
ron, a battery and a battalion were indeed sent by Sir
Evelyn in April to Suakim, and, a little later on, another
battalion went as reinforcement. But the time was
coming when the Egyptian army was to be of real use
in a military if not a militant sense. After the usual
amount of vacillation by Mr. Gladstone and his inner
circle of councillors, a half-hearted resolution was taken
in August to organise an expedition for the rescue or
relief of General Charles Gordon, always with the hope,
and, indeed, expectation that it would turn out to be
unnecessary. The Sirdar was charged with the prepar
ations for an advance of English troops up the Nile,
under the direction, as was then intended, of Major-
General Earle, who had been in charge of the line of
communications from the Ismailia base in 1882. Sir
Evelyn accordingly, on the 14th August, moved his head
quarters to Wady Haifa, a few miles below the Second
Cataract of the Nile, where was the terminus of a
short railway built, like a similar small line flanking the
First Cataract, for the purpose of facilitating goods traffic
with the Soudan. The condition of both these lines was
disgraceful ; and when, later on, Lord Wolseley remarked
of the Assouan line that it was the worst railway he had
ever seen, it was drily observed that he had not seen
the line of Wady Haifa. This latter point was the
limit, at the time, of steam navigation. The native
name for the Second Cataract is Bab-el-Kebir or the

THE NILE QUESTION. 187
Great Gate : thereby signifying that it is the most
formidable of the entrances to the Soudan. On the 26th
of August the command of the expedition, which should
have begun in June at the latest, and for which all the
plans were virtually ready by April, was definitively given
to Lord Wolseley. In a despatch from Lord Harting-
ton to Major-General Sir F. Stephenson, commanding in
Egypt, the first measure recommended was " to provide
for the passing up the First and Second Cataracts of as
many of the Nile steamers as it may be possible and
expedient." I decline responsibility for the grammar of
this sentence. During the summer, when the Nile was
at its lowest, Commander Hammill, E.N., had made an
exhaustive examination of the Nile between the second
and third cataracts, and had reported strongly against
an attempt to transport the troops by river ; and
Admiral Lord John Hay, Commander-in-Chief in the
Mediterranean, advised strongly against the use of
boats. Sir Evelyn Wood had been at first inclined to avoid
the Second Cataract altogether, and to recommend that
the expedition should follow the route taken by General
Gordon from Korosko to Abu Hamed. But when the
river route was decided upon, he threw himself heartily
into the project. He made up his mind that the
steamers, or some of them, could and must be taken
over, or rather through, the cataract. The senior naval
officers thought this was impossible, but that is a word

188 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
not found in Wood's dictionary. He reported to the
chief of the staff ^at Cairo on the 8th September, as
follows :
"  request, have visited rapids in second
cataract, below which the steamer Nasif-el-Kheir is
lying  considers there is considerable risk for
the steamer, and some for the crew, and asks may we
incur this. I reply, speaking for Egyptian Government,
I will risk the steamer, and recommend risking the
Eoyal Navy, but if this is declined I wish 
authorised to help me to put the steamer through with
the Egyptian army, and possibly some English officers
on board. We both urge for immediate reply, as each
day's delay adds to our difficulties."
Lord Wolseley reached Cairo on 9th September, and
on the 10th appointed the Sirdar to be " General of
Communications south of Assiout," he having been pre
viously in command of all troops south of that point,
which is the termination of the railway from Cairo.
The General in charge at Cairo would take no responsi
bility for passing the steamers over the Great Gate, and
sent the following message :
" It is impossible for me to approve the details of the
work which you and .... are carrying out. I must
leave it to you to endeavour to pass over the steamers
or abandon the attempt, as you and .... can best
measure the dangers and difficulties."

OVER THE CATARACT. 189
And Admiral Lord John Hay replied :
" The operations you are engaged in must be attended
with considerable risk in any case, but under any cir
cumstances, in accordance with .... instructions, he is
to do his best to carry out the wishes'of the general in
command, bearing in mind that he having stated his
professional opinions, the general is wholly responsible
for what happens either to steamers, officers, or men.
Please show this telegram to .... for his guidance."
Well, the operation was accomplished. It was done,
as an Irish doctor expressed it, "wit' aise an' iligance."
These qualities were more perceptible to Sawbones Bey
than to me,. and indeed the operation was so singular
and curious that it was well it was so easy, if indeed
not more so was the operation of getting a nugger, or
ordinary sailing Nubian craft of some 40 tons, through
the huge U-shaped notch which forms the eastern side
of the bab, or gate, and over which the stream was run
ning fast and strong the day Lord Wolseley went to see
the performance of the sailor men, assisted by crowds of
Nubians, sent up for the purpose by the Mudir of
Esneh, and by a number of natives belonging to the
vicinity of the cataract, who claim a traditional right to
get vessels through or past the obstructions. I venture
to reproduce a portion of my description of the modus
operandi :

190 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
" I was in good time to see all that was to be seen —
the nuggers being secured one after another in the deep
smooth water below the Gut to the two stout hawsers,
by bearing on which alternately as needed, or both
together when required, great gangs of men, a couple of
hundred each in number, could, with the help of huge
leading blocks, walk away with the boats. That the
least mistake was fatal was shown by the wreck of a
nugger which only the previous day had not been
properly steered — had broached on to the rocks, had
been overturned, throwing her crew into the foaming,
rushing water, from which they all safely swam to the
shore like crocodiles, diving in the current and rising
clear of it ; and now all that was left of a 10 -ton boat
was some shapeless heavy planks and a shivered mast.
But in Lord Wolseley's presence there was no mistake.
The nugger sailed out of the shelter of the lower pool,
and shook violently as she was straightened up by the
hawsers and felt the great rush of water through the
Gut, which is about twice the length of an ordinary
English lock, with not greater fall than we often have on
the locks of some of our larger canals or rivers — in fact,
I have seen nearly as great a rush of water through a
Thames lock after a freshet when both gates were
thrown open ; but the force of the fall was greater, the
eddies were stronger, want of purchase more evident,
the danger far clearer. The signal being, however,
given by a blue-jacket stationed with two hand-flags on
the same high ridge of blackened porphyry, on which
Lord Wolseley and his staff stood, the nugger entered
the pass and steadily went through it, violently starting

A PULL ALL TOGETHER. 191
like a human thing as she felt now this eddy, now that
main current, and always the compelling hawsers, the
helmsman following his own judgment, but the strain
on the hawsers being modified by a keen-eyed tar, who
signalled to the officers in charge of the gangs. Slowly,
and, as it were, timidly, she crept along between the
generally rounded, but frequently sharp, rocks bounding
the bed which received what Scott calls the roaring-
linn, and one watched her with curious interest, which
had nevertheless little of doubt in it as to the result.
At length, instead of a rushing stream the nugger had
to mount a furiously curving, impetuous avalanche of
water. Here she buried her high stem for a fraction of
a second, and then, proudly rising, followed the line
common to the two hawsers, till after a five minutes'
combat with one of the greatest forces of nature, she
swung round, the starboard hawser being opportunely
slacked, into safety for the moment in a little harbour
above the Gut. The total rise is said to be only 15ft.,
at high Nile in 170 yards, but now it is fully 20ft., and
three-fourths of this is in the final climb, if the word
may be permitted."
We had here an admirable piece of work clone jointly
by the two services, appropriately enough under the
chief direction and on the responsibility of a man who
belonged to both. Sir Evelyn had no fear of the respon
sibility. Such a burthen sits more lightly, perhaps, on
the shoulders of one who has had a naval training than
on one who has risen slowly to a position in which he
is called upon to take rapid decisions. I remember a

192 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
casual remark of Lord Charles Beresford to the effect
that the training in the Navy was better than that in
the Army, because from the first moment a youngster,
whether midshipman or even naval cadet, is sent off
in charge of a boat, he is as much captain of that
boat as his superior is captain of the ship. Thus, in
the Navy, responsibility begins early and as a matter of
course. In the Army, until now, a man may have had
no occasion to form a rapid judgment on anything till
he was a dozen years in the service, and his mental
habits had become formed and fixed. Hence we have
seen both in Egypt and in Manipur examples of dawd
ling, for lack of clearness and decision of judgment,
leading to the gravest results. But the Navy some
times dreads difficulties ashore. And, putting aside the
admirable work done by Captains Poore, Montgomerie,
Van Koughnet and others in steamers and ashore, it
must be confessed the s management of the nuggars and
boats on the Nile was a triumph for the Army, and
most of all for Lord Wolseley, Sir Evelyn Wood, Sir
Eedvers Buller and Sir William Butler.
Sir Evelyn was charged by Lord Wolseley with
duties which were none the less difficult because they
were performed without the stimulation found in actual
contact with the enemy. In a letter written on board
H.M.S. Iris, conveying the Commander-in-chief from
Italy to Egypt, and dated 6th September, are to be
found the following passages :

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. 193
" I should like extremely that you would take the
position of General of Communications, to command all
these troops, and be responsible for feeding the Expedi
tionary Force in front." Again : " This position which
I ask you to take is, I know, a most difficult, arduous,
and responsible one, but its duties are those which I
also know you could discharge with credit to yourself
and great advantage to the public service."
What could the answer be to a request so handsomely
put ? Of course an assent was forthcoming, and on the
12th September there arrived a telegram at Wady
Haifa from Cairo : " Extremely glad you accept." On
the 23rd Lord Wolseley communicated to Sir Evelyn
the following message from the Secretary for War :
" Very glad that you have been able to employ
Wood in a post where his energy and power of organis
ation will be specially valuable ; please let him know
this. Hope Egyptian army under him will be utilised
as much as possible."
Eight days previously the following appeared in
General Orders :
" The Queen has approved of the following : — Major
General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C, G.C.M.G., &c, now
commanding the Egyptian Army, to be a Major-
General on the Staff for employment on the lines of
communication of the forces on the Nile, dated
September 15th, 1884."

194 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
The result of his work at Wady Haifa, combined
with the admirable dispositions of his old comrade, Sir
Eedvers Buller, Chief of the Staff to Lord Wolseley,
may be summed up in a sentence : Not a man of us,
even 1,500 miles from our base on the great Midland
Sea, ever went without the material for two good meat
meals a day, for nearly six months, while comparative
luxuries abounded more than in any other campaign of
the seven I have made, and the only things we went
short of, with the Desert Column, from first to last, and
these only for three or four days, were sugar and
tobacco. So plentiful was the supply, indeed, that
when we came away from the fortified camp by
Metemmeh we had to destroy as much food as would
have fed the column for a fortnight, and would have
provisioned Khartoum for nearly as long had we not
thrown away the chance of getting there. This waste
was due to the absence of camel transport, and was
altogether unavoidable. But it was the only blot upon
the system of ' feeding the force in front ' of Wady
Haifa. It was not until three months had been passed in work
at the Second Cataract that Wood received permission to
go to the advanced base at Korti, and he did not arrive
until we had started across the Bayuda Desert. Before
long his services at and in front of Korti became indis
pensable, and when Sir Eedvers Buller was sent with the
Eoyal Irish Eegiment across the Desert to rescue us from

ORDERED TO THE FRONT. 195
the difficulties of our own making (as Major Wingate's
book has now absolutely established), Sir Evelyn suc
ceeded him as Chief of the Staff, in addition to his duties
as Sirdar and General of Communications. A little later
he was ordered to Gubat or Abu Kru to decide con
cerning the future movements of the troops there —
movements which might have involved a clash on
Berber, if the camel transport had been sufficient, a
design which I alone was able at once to penetrate, and
which not more than one per cent, of the column realised
until it was abandoned owing to the impossibility of
getting transport. The orders given to Sir Evelyn when
he left Korti on February 15 th included these points :
"At this distance from Gubat, and with only im
perfect information before me, it is not possible for me
to decide with absolute fixity, in complete detail all that
is to be done  Such are the broad features
of the course I wish followed, and writing here and at
present I see nothing to prevent its being successfully
carried out. It may be, however, that on arrival at
Gubat circumstances unknown to me may lead you to
consider it necessary either to abandon the advance on
Berber altogether, or in proceeding with it to keep up
at the same time some or all of the desert posts. I
have full confidence in your military judgment. If,
therefore, when you reach Gubat, you and General
Buller concur in considering the plan I have indicated
cannot be executed with reasonable safety, you may
vary or abandon it as seems best to you on the spot."
o 2

196 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
It looked then as if the proverb of the wise king had
something in it—" Where no Wood is [margin, without
wood] there the fire goeth out ... As coals are to
burning coals and Wood to fire." Sir Eedvers Buller at
this time was junior to Sir Evelyn, and, if the dash for
Berber had taken place, the latter must have had the
direction of it. But, save once a little later, Wood had
nothing to do with fire this journey. Approaching
the Pools of Gakdul he heard the news that Buller was
already retiring, because he had nothing else to do
unless he had received a reinforcement of a thousand
fresh camels, to take the places of those worn out from
fatigue and privations. On my way back I found Sir
Evelyn in charge of Gakdul, and right energetically had
he set himself to remedy many of the defects of the
place which the Guards' Camel Corps had originally put
in order, and in which poor Sir Herbert Stewart had
spent the last breath of his brilliant young life. Here
he remained for a fortnight, covering the retirement of
the Desert Column, and on the 3rd March he started for
Korti, with all the stores that had been accumulated at
the Pools, having previously sent to the base all the
sick and wounded. On his way down he picked up the
Heavy Camel Corps at some other pools we had not
touched on our way up, pools called Magreikh, where
Colonel the Hon. Eeginald Talbot had fortified himself
with a series of ingenious little pepper-boxes of rough
stones on the hills surrounding the water supply. Here

RESIGNS THE SIRDARSHIP. 197
Sir Evelyn, while inspecting the works, was fired at by
one of a few Mahdists who had followed the force across
the desert but had not ventured on previous contact
with it. He arrived at Korti on the 14th March, and
on the last day of the month he resigned his post as
Sirdar of the Egyptian army. Though there may have
been other reasons for this step, it is necessary to go no
further in search of them than the announcement of the
following day accounts for. Then he was appointed to
command all troops in the field to the south of Dongola.
It seems he had determined on the resignation for some
time, as I find Sir Evelyn Baring writing to him on the
18th March:
" .... I must write a line about your resignation.
I think you are quite right to resign. You will be able
to carry away the conviction that you did all that mor
tal man could be expected to do to make an army out
of very indifferent material. I shall never forget all
the support and assistance you gave me during a period
of very great difficulty. ..."
When I was up the Nile it was a kind of small
treason to say a word against the material of the
Egyptian army, but, before I came clown, it was
beginning to be depreciated openly. As a matter
of fact, Sir Evelyn's decision had been taken about the
time he left Wady Haifa for Korti. But it was pro
bably then subject to the provision for the army of

198 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
certain things which the Sirdar considered necessary.
The following letters from the late Khedive will convey
as much of the facts of the case as it is desirable to
enquire into. It is necessary to say that these are
holograph letters, and that they are printed as they were
written : " Palais Abdine,
" Decembre 24, '84.
" Mon cher Sirdar,
" Je n'ai pas voulu manquer de vous ecrire pour vous
exprimer combien je suis bien peine de savoir que vous
etes decide de me quitter apres cette expedition.
Comme vous savez, et je vous ai deja dit plusieurs fois,
dit verblement, que j'apprecie hautement toute votre
attention et bon soin et travail pour ma jeune armee, et
le choix des officiers a qui je leur dois ainsi et rendre
justice toute ma satisfaction. Croyez mon cher a ma
sincere reconnaisance et toute l'amitieque j'ai pour votre
personne. Vous connaissez mon caractere quoique vous
voulez me quitter, mais moi je ne vous oublerai jamais.
" Votre affectionne " (Signed) Thewfik."
"Palais Abddte,
" Janvier 10, 1885.
" Mon cher S. E. Wood,
" J'ai recu avec beaucoup [ ? du plaisir] votre lettre
et pour les soldats Tures je suis entierement [ ? de votre
opinion] et appreuve votre decision, quant au travail, de
mes troupes je n'ai jamais doute du zele et d'activite de
mes braves officiers Anglais ; que je n' euse de parler
toujours d'eux d'une maniere tres satisfaisante pour les

RECOGNITION. 199
indigenes. J'espere avec patience et les jeunes gens que
nous aurons instruit et en leur donnant une bonne
education ils seront des officiers qui remplirent leur
devoir. Quant au budget de l'armee je suis de votre
avis, mais malheureusement la politique se mele et on
m'a demande plus que cela, mais l'avenir prouvera que ce
chiffre est bien inferieur ; mais mon cher general je n'ai
qu'a vous etre bien reconnaissant et remerciant a tous ce
que vous ecrit c'est tres franc peutetre meme vos com
patriots vous blamant. " Votre bien affectionne
"(Signed) Thewfik."
Some months later the following was received :
" Abdeen Palace,
" April 20th.
" Je me fais un grand plaisir de vous conferer le grand
cordon de Mejidieh comme temoignage de ma vive
satisfaction pour les services que vous m'avez rendus en
reorganisant mon armee. Les insignes vous seront
remises par le Sirdar Grenfell Pacha, qui part d' ici
Jeudi. "Mehemet Thewfik."
Lord Granville wrote from the "Foreign Office,
"May 10th, 1885.
" Sir, " I have had much pleasure in forwarding to H. M.
Secretary of State for War the letter from Major-

200 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
General Sir E. Wood inclosed in your despatch, No.
368, of the 28th ultimo, in which Sir Evelyn calls
attention to the good services rendered by British
officers, who have assisted him in the organisation of
the Egyptian army. Her Majesty's Government fully
appreciate the services of these officers, but their thanks
are especially due to Sir Evelyn Wood himself for the
energy, zeal, and ability with which he has devoted
himself to a task in itself arduous and increased by the
difficult circumstances in which it has been undertaken.
I should be glad that Sir E. Wood should be made
aware of the high sense which the Queen and Her
Majesty's Government entertain of his services, and
which they feel sure is shared by the Khedive and the
Egyptian Government.
"I am, &c,
" Granville."
In June Sir Evelyn was invalided to England. No
wonder, after all he had gone through from December
1882. But perhaps neither climate, fatigue, nor illness
had as much to do with his break-down as worry. He
was the victim of a Government that was playing a
double game, and issuing orders not to him, but that
affected him, which orders it treated as so secret and
confidential that no record of them remains in the
public archives, and of course they were much too
private to be made public by the party that " trusts
the people." As it was in Zululand, so it was in Egypt.
The Janus of Downing Street was secretive even from

MORE RECOGNITION. 201
the members of his own administration. But there was
a time at hand for " dethroning the dynasty of deceit
and imposture," to adopt a phrase of " D'Israeli the
younger." On the 3rd July, Sir F. Baring enclosed
the above F. 0. letter to Sir Evelyn with the following
covering epistle :
" Sir, " It affords me special pleasure to be the medium
of communicating to you the enclosed despatch from
Lord Granville, as I have had excellent opportunities of
appreciating the excellent services which you rendered
when in command of the Egyptian army.
" I have the honour to be, Sir,
" Your most obedient, humble servant,
" F. Baring."
But already there was another hand at the helm of
British foreign affairs, and this letter is the first I can
trace from the new Administration :
"Foreign Office,
" July 15th, 1885.
" Sir, " I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to
transmit to you herewith a warrant under her Majesty's
royal sign manual, dated the 7th instant, granting unto
you Her Majesty's royal licence and authority to accept
and wear the insignia of the Grand Cordon of the First

202 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
Class of the Order of the Medjidieh conferred upon you
by His Highness the Khedive of Egypt.
" I am, sir,
" Your most obedient, humble servant,
"J. Pauncefote."
On July 18th Sir Ealph Thompson, Under-secretary
for War, wrote to General Wood, enclosing the despatch
of May 10th: "War Office,
" July 18th. 1885.
" Sir, " I am directed by the Secretary of State for War
to transmit to you direct, as you have now left the
Egyptian army and are in this country, the enclosed
copy of a despatch which has been addressed by Earl
Granville to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Cairo,
stating that Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate
the services of the officers brought to notice by you, as
having assisted you in the organisation of the Egyptian
army, and expressing the thanks of the Queen and Her
Majesty's Government to yourself for your services in
connection therewith.
" I have the honour to be, sir,
" Your obedient servant, " Ealph Thompson."
So now we have brought Sir Evelyn Wood home once
more, and it remains to say that the money demanded
for the Egyptian army has had to be given, la politique,
of which the Khedive spoke, to the contrary notwith-

THE PRESENT EGYPTIAN ARMY. 203
standing, and that the army now consists, not of the
6,000 men originally agreed upon with Lord Dufferin,
but of 14 battalions of infantry, 5 squadrons of cavalry,
6 batteries of artillery, 2 camel corps, with details of
staff, etc., in all numbering 12,633 men, besides 64
British officers, of whom 6 hold the rank of Pacha ; 600
native officers, of whom 4 are Pachas ; while there are
160 native officers on the half-pay list, and as many as
1,142 on pension, so that the ineffective list is even a
more disproportionate burthen on the country than is
our own.
In August Lord Wolseley announced the withdrawal
of the Nile Expeditionary Force, and in his despatch of
August 25 th he thus referred to his old comrade :
"Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C, G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B., was the General of Communications, and
brought the utmost zeal to bear upon the arduous and
difficult duties of the position. Our line of communica
tions by rail, river, and desert from Alexandria to
Gubat was about 1,500 miles in length. The responsi
bility of supervising it was great, but thanks to Sir E.
Wood's ability and energy, and to the efficient support
he received from the large staff of officers under his
command, the army operating in the front was well fed
and provided with all it required. The officers and
men of the Egyptian army under General Wood's
immediate orders worked along this line with indefatig
able earnestness and with the best possible results to
the welfare of the expedition 

204 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
" I wish also to bring to your notice the names of
some officers who have specially distinguished them
selves, almost all of whom I think it would be in the
interests of the service to promote while they are still
young and efficient  Major-General Sir H. E.
Wood  "
I cannot find that Sir Evelyn Wood got any promo
tion, or other reward for his great services in Egypt and
the Soudan. In October, indeed, he received, in common
with every other soldier and sailor, the clasp for the
Nile, refused to the pariahs of correspondents who had,
nevertheless, acted under heavy fire in a military
capacity at the request of two senior officers. G.C.M.G.
he already was, K.C.B. he already was, major-general
he already was. And he was no more at the end of his
three years in Egypt than he was at the beginning
of it, no more when he had finished his Soudan labours
than when he began them. The recommendation of
the Commander-in-chief went for nothing in his case.
But I have an idea the neglect of the recommendation
drew the two men yet closer, and that, consequently,
Sir Evelyn did not suffer in the long run. The time was
at hand when he would have a chance such as has
fallen to the lot of many, but of which nobody had
hitherto availed himself to the extent that we shall
learn of in due course.

( 205 )

CHAPTEE VIII.
HARD WORK AT HOME.
The Army's Chief Eeformer — Setting up Supply — Teaching Night
Attacks — Long Distance Eides — Mounted Infantry — Its
History — Skobeleff on Sharp-shooters — Wood on Mounted
Infantry — Proposed Scheme — Bianconi cars — Complimented
concerning Colchester — Improved Fire Tactics — Transference
to Aldershot — Decentralisation — The Army Service Corps —
Useful Eeforms — Economy and Efficiency — Feeding for Work
— Improved Vaccine — The School of Cookery — Transforming
Aldershot — Instructive Manoeuvres — Soldiers' Privileges.
Brief, indeed, was the holiday that fell to Sir Evelyn
Wood after he reached London ; but of the last twelve
years he had been seven to eight in tropical or sub
tropical climates, with the consequence that he had at
least twice been ordered to England. Now he was to have
a long spell at home, with work not less serious in its
nature, and perhaps more far-reaching in its effects than
any he had achieved in the field. It is not too much
to say that Sir Evelyn has been, since 1885, the chief
reformer of the British Army. In saying this, moreover,
one does not ignore, or even minimise, the immense
service Lord Wolseley has done to the land forces of the
Crown, and the Naval forces to boot, since he has pro-

206 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
claimed the maxim that the first and principal service is
the Navy. All that any man could do, tied by the leg
as he was, in his official position as Adjutant-General, has
been done by his lordship ; but as example is better than
precept, so Lord Wolseley is the first to confess that Sir
Evelyn Wood has " done more to modernise the Army, to
clear away all the old bow-and-arrow prejudices that have
kept us and still keep us from military efficiency — fight
ing efficiency — than any half dozen of other men " Lord
Wolseley knows of. And it is worth while to devote
some space to a consideration of what he has done and
is doing, and has attempted and is aiming at in his
work. It is well known to experts and in a sense to
military critics, but the country at large has little
notion of the silent revolution that has been accom
plished and is still going on in military matters in
England. Lord Wolseley has been vehemently assailed
for his theories of reform. He has been equally blamed
for not doing more to carry out his theories. One of
the weekly military papers is never tired of sneering at
what it calls " Ballyhooley tactics." But it does not
condemn continental nations for the very thing it
objects to among ourselves. Be these tactics right or be
they wrong, one thing is beyond dispute ; what has been
done practically by Sir Evelyn Wood is neither more nor
less than what Lord Wolseley has been advocating in
print and verbally ever since he saw the necessity of
abandoning fossil futilities in military matters. And

wolseley's principles — wood's practice. 207
now, at last, though " provisionally," we have in " In
fantry Drill, 1892," the official promulgation of the new
theories, and the chain of responsibility made complete,
through General Officers, from the Queen to Mr. Thomas
Atkins the younger, but not yet so complete in admin
istration as in instruction.
The two campaigns in Egypt had shown that money
poured out of the military chest in exact proportion to
the unpreparedness of the Supply Department. It was
worth the whole cost of the two campaigns to have
brought this lesson home to the country and — a much
more difficult matter — to some of the authorities in Lon
don. Hence, before Sir Evelyn Wood had been many
weeks at home, he was nominated a member of a
Committee devised by the Hon. Guy Dawnay, M.P., for
the purpose of " drawing up Eegulations for the Organ
isation of the Lines of Communications of an Army in
the Field." That occupied a good deal of time in the
winter, and it may be considered the first practical step
in the reforms which have since been carried on. Lord
Wolseley had resumed the post of Adjutant-General on
1st October, and Sir Eedvers Buller that of Deputy
Adjutant-General to the Forces on their return from
Egypt, and of course their great knowledge of the sub
ject was at the disposal of the Committee. In the
following April, Sir Evelyn was placed in command of
the Eastern District with the position of Major-General
on the Staff. He was not long there before the practical

208 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
nature of the man asserted itself. He began to teach
Night Attacks to his Command. He realised that these
invasions of slumber must play a greater part than
heretofore in military work. Considering how very
nearly half-trained troops like those of Arabi Pacha had
been to discovering and thwarting Lord Wolseley's
well laid plans for the assault of Tel-el-Kebir, and
that his plans would have been out of the question had
he not discovered that the Egyptians were in the habit
of withdrawing their tentacles at night and only feeling
towards their front at dawn, the veriest tyro in military
knowledge must see that if Night Attacks are to be
made they must be practised sedulously until every
officer and man knows his place and work in them, and
knows not only what to do but what to avoid. Sir
Evelyn first drew up the scheme for this exercise. The
practice began in August and before long was " approved
for the Army." The following month he obtained per
mission to practise " Long Distance Eides " with
mounted troops. This has since been " ordered to be
carried out by the Cavalry."
And here we have reached a convenient point for
touching upon a subject of great interest and impor
tance — the history and organisation of Mounted Infan
try. The belief appears to be general that the idea
of mounting infantry began and, so far, ended with
Colonel Hutton at Aldershot. It goes without saying,
that officer has never made any claim that would bear

MOUNTED INFANTRY. 209
any such interpretation. History abounds with exam
ples of expeditions effected by the prompt use of
quadrupedal transport in ancient and comparatively
modern times. Not to go beyond our own island
story, it will be remembered that Eobert the Bruce
achieved one of his greatest successes by getting his
men over the ground more rapidly than by marching
on foot.
" It was in 1332 a.d., that Bruce invaded England,"
in the words of a chronicler to whose works I was much
addicted in the days of my boyhood, " and conceived the
bold idea of ending the war by capturing the person of
the king of England ; and having mounted his infantry
upon hardy, light footed Scotch ponies, he suddenly
appeared in front of the English army, after a very
rapid march. The enemy on this occasion were skilfully
posted on the ridge of a hill, and could only be
approached by a narrow, steep pathway. But Bruce
knew better than any commander of the age how such
difficulties were to be encountered, and while he sent
Douglas and Eandolph to storm the pass, he turned the
English position by means of a body of Highlanders, who
easily scaled the mountain, and attacked the enemy in
flank and rear. The English army was soon routed ;
Edward himself escaped to Bridlington with great
difficulty, leaving all his baggage and treasure behind
him, while Walter the Steward chased the fugitives as
far as York, before which city he halted till the evening
with only 500 men-at-arms, to see if the enemy would
p

210 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
come out to the encounter. The Scottish army
returned home unmolested, and laden with spoil."
The great Earl of Peterborough, of whom I have
spoken before, also employed mounted infantry in 1705.
An anonymous writer says :
" Having disposed of his infantry for the protection
of Catalonia, according to the urgent desire of Charles,
he resolved to go in pursuit of Las Torres at the head
of 200 weary horsemen, although in cavalry alone the
latter was 3000 strong. He accordingly pursued the
enemy with incredible speed, hung upon their front,
flank, and rear, and cut off their stragglers and patrols
so successfully, that the retreating army were fully con
vinced that the English were in as great force as had
been reported.
" This impression the earl also contrived to establish
wherever he went ; his handful of followers was in
variably mistaken for his bodyguard in advance of the
main army, and thus towns and whole districts were
kept in subjection by the mere terror of his presence.
His method of creating soldiers for this effective kind
of flying warfare was equally wonderful. He sent for
a regiment of foot soldiers to reinforce his small band
of troopers. He had previously purchased 800 horses,
and caused saddles and accoutrements to be transported
to him by sea, and on the arrival of the reinforcement
he immediately mounted the whole party on horseback,
and thus in ten minutes transformed a regiment of foot

SKOBELEFF ON SHARPSHOOTERS. 211
into one of showy and most efficient cavalry. [?] By
a similar species of magic he obtained a respectable
infantry from the provincial militia, and being thus
provided with both horse and foot, he advanced to the
desperate service of relieving Valencia, which was
besieged by a strong force under the Duke of Arcos."
Coming down to our own days, in 1878 Mr. Archibald
Forbes had a letter in the Times recommending the
formation of a corps of scouts from the ranks of retired
officers to do pretty much what some of us want
Mounted Infantry to attempt. But I believe Mr.
Forbes has since come to the conclusion such a body
could not be formed from such materials, of which he
has not as high an opinion as he had at the first blush.
Quite independently, in 1878, I sent home for publi
cation from Pera a series of suggestions for a mounted
corps of sharpshooters. It was written after a long
conversation following luncheon in the Club Commer-
ciale et Maritime — now the Club de Constantinople —
with General Skobeleff. I remember particularly, on
one point that arose in the chat, a dictum of Skobeleff
that the loss of a General of Division was, at the critical
moment of a battle, equal to the loss of a Brigade ; the
loss of a General of Brigade equal to the loss of a
Battalion ; and the loss of a Battalion Commander equal
to the loss of a Company. On speaking of " cold blooded
picking off" he said, in his matter of fact way, that,
the object of fighting being to win battles, it little
p 2

212 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
mattered how the battle was won so long as it was
won. My propositions consequently involved the
following points :
" That a corps of marksmen should be formed out of
volunteers, not necessarily volunteered to serve with
the army everwhere, with special rates of pay, but
not to be called out, save in case of necessity, for
more than a month's annual training, and to be officered
in the proportion of one officer to every ten men.
" That the corps should be mounted on cobs. . . the
equipment to be as light as possible, but to include a
set of picketting pins and a hammer, with a saddle
valise for carrying a large supply of ammunition, and a
leather case for the rifle, which should be of the Match
Eifle class, and sighted up to not less than 2,000 yards
with fine sights, that could be replaced, in case of
accident, from additional sights carried in the valise.
" That the corps, being well paid for its services,
should have no claim upon the Government save in
case of disabling wounds, but should have servants told
off to it in the proportion of two to every ten men,
though the men should be bound to clean and feed
their own horses.
" That two squads should be told off to each brigade,
but that six squads should always remain as Divisional
troops. "That the sharpshooters formed in America during
the Civil War should be the model for the corps,
subject to the provision for mounting the men, who
should be provided with not less than 400 rounds and

views in 1878. 213
an entrenching tool, by which they could cover them
selves in an open country.
" That no one should be admitted to the corps over
the age of 23, and no one allowed to remain in it after
31, and that only the cadres should be kept up in time
of peace, save for the field-firing practice.
" That a revolver and a sword should form part of
the equipment, and that the dress should consist of a
Norfolk jacket, a low helmet, stout boots, loose, or
capable of being loosened, at the instep ; riding trousers,
not breeches ; and a waterproof cloak, ample enough to
cover the rifle on horseback."
I think now as I thought then, that there would be
an ample supply of young Britons for such a corps,
and that it would prove very useful in the field. The
only thing I have omitted from my draft of nearly
fourteen years ago is a proposition " that a specific part
of the duty of the corps should be to pick off the
prominent officers on the other side, while they might,
exceptionally, be employed on scouting duties." The
first point was inserted under the influence of a conver
sation with my Muscovite friend ; but in justice to him
I must say he, at a subsequent date, withdrew the
proposal about picking off, remarking that some people
might call it deliberate assassination, and not covered
by the rules of war, a view, he considered, especially
likely to commend itself to general officers, though, as
the shooting improved, it would be found that the

214 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
practice of picking off could not be prevented and
might as well be recognised as not. The other point,
about scouting, I withdraw. Scouting cannot be done
by sharpshooters, except quite incidentally, without
sacrificing their raison d'etre.
However, long before either Mr. Forbes or myself had
moved in the matter, Sir Evelyn Wood had, unknown
to me, addressed to the Duke of Cambridge a Memo
randum on the subject, and had, equally unknown to
me, delivered a lecture on it to officers of Volunteer
Corps at the United Service Institution. Even he
did not pretend to be the originator of the idea in its
modern form, though he has proved to be the officer
without whom it would not have taken a practical
shape. The following citations from the lecture in
question will be found interesting. The experience
gained during the war of 1870-71, has confirmed the
opinion long held by many soldiers that " mounted
riflemen are now essential to every enterprising army. . ."
" The late Field-Marshal Sir John Fox Burgoyne, one
of the ablest of the race of soldiers now passing away,
urged a friend and junior in the service to consider and
propose a scheme for mounted riflemen. He wrote :
' The art of applying mounted infantry to the greatest
advantage is as yet unknown.' He goes on to record
his opinion that such troops should not be allowed to
grow into cavalry. He thought it was worthy of con
sideration whether cavalry should not be divided into

MEMORANDUM ON THE SUBJECT. 215
two perfectly distinct services — one of heavy cavalry
to be held in reserve with an army in the field ; and
the other to be attached to divisions, and to partake
more of the characteristics of Mounted Infantry than of
the Hussars of the present day. With the wisdom of a
veteran, when his attention was invited to one peculiar
organisation of mounted troops he was careful to enun
ciate his opinions on ' principles ' only, and to declare
at the same time, that ' he had very little knowledge of
the particulars of essentially cavalry service.' It must
be borne in mind also that he recorded an opinion
shortly before his death, that ' in this country the
effective strength of cavalry and field artillery is kept
habitually on too low a scale.'
" Before submitting my proposals, I asked for the
opinions of several general and other superior officers,
and I have found that while nearly all are agreed as to
the necessity of possessing mounted riflemen, many
differ as to the mode of carrying them to the scene of
action. It has been urged against the suggestions I am
about to place before you, that they are not original. I
should be ignorant and presumptuous if I laid any
especial claim to originality on this subject. It appears
to me that to attempt to do so is absurd. Where many
minds are at work on a theme some must seize the
same ideas. My scheme is merely a return to dragoons
proper. These useful troops have long since ceased to
exist. Of course I do not speak of those cavalry

216 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
soldiers who were transformed by a stroke of the pen
and a change of head-dress from nominally Light
Dragoons into Hussars. The Dragoons to whom I refer
were those foot-soldiers mounted on horses or ponies,
who, on emergencies, carried a comrade en croupe. Such
were the Dragoons created by Marechal de Brissac in a.d.
1551, to serve with the French army in Piedmont. The
Marshal profited greatly by this device.
" The first official record of such troops in our service
dates from a Eoyal Warrant of 1672, which ordains as
their arms — matchlocks, bayonet or great knife. On
the 19th November 1683, the Scots Greys were raised ;
and you will find in Grose's Antiquities an engraving
of the dragoon of that day, carrying his firearm slung
on his back. Those raised in the first part of the
17th century are thus described by Lord Orrery in his
Brief Treatise of War, published in 1649. ' Except in
cases of surprise, they seldom fired on horseback :
they never charged : they were, in fact, infantry on
horses to enable them to make more rapid movements.'
Pere Daniel, who lived 1649 - 1728, in his History of
the French Army, uses almost the same terms, and says
— they were employed for the ' maintenance and sur
prising of strait (narrow) ways, bridges, and fords,
and that one man held his own and ten horses while
their riders were fighting on foot  '
" Let us grant that spurs are necessary for cavalry,
indeed for any soldier who fights hand-to-hand on

NO SPURS. 217
horseback, and this fact no one who has undergone that
excitement can doubt. I, however, assert that mounted
infantry should never fight on horseback ; and when on
foot, there can be no doubt, spurs are very much in the
way. This is no new opinion. Waalhausen, who wrote
in a.d. 1616, says : ' A dragoon does not require boots
or spurs, for they would be a hindrance rather than an
advantage while he is acting on foot.' I cannot
improve on this advice.
" If we succeed in overcoming all the difficulties I have
noticed :
" Eeconciling the contradictory rules of moral train
ing :
" Adding to an over-burdened man additional labour :
" Inducing the cavalry to put off their handsome,
but for infantry work, unsuitable dress :
" How shall we add to the armament of the dragoons,
a rifle which will enable them to meet infantry on
equal terms ?
" It is idle to expect men to be content with a weapon
ranging 600 yards when their enemy hits them from a
distance of 1,000 yards. The fact of great battles being
still settled by rifle fire at 400 yards does not obviate
the necessity of light infantry marksmen having the
best long range weapon procurable.

218 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.

"PEOPOSED SCHEME.
" The scheme I submitted last year was as follows : —
"1st. The Officers and men to be in the first instance
selected from, and to return to, infantry ; they should
join on probation for three months.
" Trained officers and soldiers of the other branches to
serve at least three months with infantry and to go
through a course of musketry.
" 2nd. The men to carry on their backs the Eegulation
Infantry Eifle, which should, however, be shortened
and improved and a better arrangement made for the
back sight, and a sword-bayonet by the side ; to wear
no spurs ; to carry a Hussar whip on the bridle ; to wear
the infantry head-dress and coat, but trousers pulled up
a little, and gaiters as high as the present cavalry
boot ; gaiters with buckles and straps, or Wellington
boots, laced on outside, to admit the foot easily.
"It is essential to maintain an infantry coat and
head-dress, in order to impose on the enemy, as
mounted troops are not feared when in small numbers.
" 3rd. Drill as infantry, except that all movements
should be by rank entire.
" 4th. No polished horse equipment or harness should
be allowed.
" 5th. The high cantle should be abolished, to facilitate
mounting and dismounting, or a hunting saddle
adopted, no valises being carried on the horses. A
leather saddle cloth should be used.

OFFICERS AND MEN. 219

" Selection of Officers.

" Men who ride well, have good eye-sight, are ready,
self-reliant, can talk one foreign language at least, have
obtained a first-class certificate at Hythe, can sketch
(very roughly), have gone through the short course of
electric telegraphy, good regimental officers.
"n.b. Men who have hunted, or who have been
accustomed to study country, preferred.
" Non-commissioned officers, active, intelligent young
men, marksmen, the sergeant to possess a first-class
certificate of education. They should go through the
short course of electric telegraphy, and be able to read
a map. " Soldiers.
" Smart, intelligent, but small men, of one year's
service ; marksmen or first-class shots. Must possess a
third-class certificate of education. If enlisted specially,
to serve six months with infantry, or till the above
qualifications are obtained.

" Pay.
" That of cavalry — but horses and saddlery found for
officers. The number of marksmen to be unlimited.
Every corporal in possession of a first-class certificate of
education, to receive one penny per diem extra.
Privates, one penny for second-class ditto, two-pence
for first-class certificates, since their superior education

220 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
would render them, on detached service so much more
valuable. " Organisation.
"The organisation suggested of 150 all ranks per
company, would bring about 133 of all ranks on
parade." Sir Evelyn went on to propose that a part of the
force should be mounted, not on horseback but on
double Irish, or Bianconi, cars, which are now giving
place in Ireland to chars-a-banc on all the tourist
routes. These cars were tried by the last but one Lord
Ailesbury for the Wiltshire Yeomanry, about the time
of the Salisbury Manoeuvres, and I shall never forget
the impression their mobility made on me as they
" flew " the rough places of Salisbury Plain after the
fashion of Horse Artillery. But they were soon after
wards discontinued by order of Army Head- Quarters,
not because they were in any way inefficient, but
because they were judged to be not quite the thing for
Yeomanry. There is no earthly doubt that in most
countries where there are roads, or even beaten tracks,
they would be an admirable aid to Mounted Infantry.
At the same time they could never do the work that
lightly made men on sturdy ponies could effect in
almost any country if only they would forswear the
vanity of spurs. Not one in a hundred of them can
ever learn to use the rowels, and the spurs are a sad

CARRYING THE RIFLE. 221
trouble on tangled ground. If we are, as I hope, to
have Mounted Infantry in increased numbers, it should
be laid down as an axiom that the only iron allowed on
the heel should be a steel blunt point, like the tip of
the shuttle in a hand-loom. This could not injure the
horse, while he would feel it, and it would be no
encumbrance even in a bramble-brake. The question
of carrying the rifle on the man and not on the horse,
insisted upon by Sir Evelyn, presented some difficulty
at one time, and appears to present some difficulty to
Colonel Hutton's men at Aldershot even now. But
General Keith Fraser solved the problem several years
ago, in regard to the cavalry, though prejudice has
prevented the adoption of the invention as yet. And
for Mounted Infantry the Fraser sling and bucket is
just the thing. When the man is up, the weight is on
the horse ; when he is afoot, either voluntarily or
compulsorily, his rifle accompanies him. So far as we
have gone with Mounted Infantry, to Sir Evelyn Wood
belongs the most of the credit, though a good share of
it must also be attributed to Lord Wolseley, whose
pertinacity when he was in Pall Mall caused the
tentative adoption of the force as a part of the new
Army system. It goes for very little, with me, that other
Powers have not yet followed our lead in this matter.
Even the Germans are not infallible judges of what to
do and what to avoid, and Major Henderson, in his
admirable little book on the battle of Spicheren, has

222 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
shown of what value a small body of Mounted Infantry
would have been to General Von Kamecke at one part
of his badly blundered action, which he won almost in
spite of himself. Major Henderson's words are :
" A few mounted infantry who could have left their
horses and scouted through the thickest woods, would
have rendered invaluable assistance. Their equipment
would have made it exceedingly difficult for the cavalry
troopers to work dismounted amongst the thick under
growth of the steep hill-sides."
In such an open country as Armenia, I have, for
fourteen years, been convinced Moukhtar Pacha would
have won the campaign against Loris Melikoff had he
possessed five hundred Mounted Infantry, as that force
would have been quite sufficient to have disputed the
ground against Lazareff, when he made his turning
movement down the Arpa valley on the 14-15 October,
1877 and took the Aladja Dagh and Moukhtar's three
Divisions in rear, what time Eood and Heimann
attacked in front what they had frequently found an
impregnable position. It is true the Eussians had
received reinforcements, while Moukhtar's force was
much depleted ; but it was Lazareff's movement that
did the business, and Moukhtar could have prevented
that with half a battalion of Mounted Infantry, to hold
the ground to his extreme right until he had sent a
couple of battalions forward. Indeed I have never

A MODEL DISTRICT. 223
seen a country, except the swamps of Nicaragua and
Costa Eica, in which a general with ideas would not find
as much use for Mounted Infantry as for any other arm
of the service. Only they must be infantry, and not
masquerade as cavalry.
Mr. Dawney's Committee had reported in general
terms concerning many pressing improvements, and
Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed, in September 1886,
President of a Committee to work out details of various
schemes. In the following month the troops at Col
chester were inspected by H.E.H. the Commander-in-
Chief, and the next day the following letter was sent by
the Adjutant-General :
" His Eoyal Highness was very much gratified by all
he saw at the inspection of the troops under your
command at Colchester yesterday, the efficiency and
general appearance of the troops being all that could be
desired." But a fortnight later arrived another letter which Sir
Evelyn doubtless valued as much as the approval of the
veteran royal duke. It was from Lord Wolseley, who
wrote :
" Yours is our model District in every respect, so I
send you the enclosed to read. I am very anxious
generals commanding districts should interest them-

224 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
selves in this field-firing, for on the manner in which it
is carried out depends our military efficiency."
The beginning of the year 1887 saw Sir Evelyn
appointed president of a committee to consider and
report whether for a service rifle the magazine should be
attached permanently or semi-permanently, or be
detachable at will by the soldier. The report was
called for solely on the tactical question, without
reference to the construction of any particular form of
magazine or indeed of rifle. A couple of months later,
he was told off to a committee for revising the es
tablishment of the medical service for an army in the
field. As if this, and the command of a District, were
not enough to keep his hands full, he was directed to re
write the section on " Outpost Duties " in the " Field
Exercise," and this was evidently such a trifle in the
minds of those in authority that he was ordered to draft
instructions for the supply of ammunition to infantry
before an enemy. This last order was, as the saying is,
" rather large." I venture to say that in nothing is our
military organisation more certain to break down in
the field than in the supply of ammunition to the fight
ing line. It is not conceivable that the mule and hand
bag system will survive the first trial across a fire-zone
against a civilised enemy. The very next month he
was called upon to revise the Musketry Fire Tactics in
the Field Exercise Book, though this was the beginning

ALDERSHOT. 225
of the Drill Season. In August he was made president
of a committee to report on the difficulties in the way
of providing ranges for Volunteer Corps. In a word,
there was nothing this man of all work was not expected
to lend a hand to. And yet he got through it all, and
found plenty of time to take very good care of his own
District. On the 4th October he was verbally thanked
by the Duke of Cambridge for the state of Colchester
garrison as H.E.H. found it on inspection, and the
approval was formally recorded in a letter from the
Adjutant-General's Department two days later.
But Colchester was soon to lose him. He had made
it, his native District, the model District, as Lord
Wolseley had officially written. He was recommended
to succeed Sir Archibald Alison in the command of
Aldershot. Will it be believed that there was a great
indisposition shown to sanction the transfer from Col
chester ? The claims of seniority were so sacred, under
the circumstances, that selection was to go to the
wall, if selection meant the choice of the man con
spicuously singled out for the work which the pro
gress of our army now rendered indispensable at our
chief camp. One of the stoutest and strongest and
longest fights known in Pall Mall took place around
the question of the Aldershot command. It is the
blue ribbon of the English military Districts. For
now the command at Aldershot includes the command
of the First Army Corps for foreign service.

226 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
At length the contest was finished ; and it resulted in
the appointment looked forward to with so much hope
by the reformers in the army. Mr. Stanhope has
recently triumphantly retorted on these reformers that
they are not agreed upon what they want, and are at
sixes and sevens among each other. This is in the
necessity of the case. But Sir Evelyn Wood has
always known what he wants. If he has any far-
reaching schemes he conceals them effectually from his
most intimate friends. He works at what is within
reach. That is the secret of his success, and of his
popularity among the old as well as the young school in
the service. Whatsoever his hand findeth to do he
doeth with his might. There is nothing too small for
his personal attention. Mountains are made of atoms.
Eome was not built in a day. Here a little and there a
little, as the prophet Isaiah put it. Continual dropping
wears away the hardest stone — even the obstinacy of
the warriors who, like the Bourbons, never learn any
thing, and never forget anything. Everybody recognises
Sir Evelyn's single-mindedness even when least agreeing
with him. His one idea is the well-being of the service.
He " gets on " with the most diverse folk. He can hit
hard when he likes, but he rarely likes, in these latter
days at least. If a man is a worker, the good that is in
him will be brought out, and so long as it is possible he
will be not only allowed but encouraged to work in the
way he can work best. All this has been seen at Alder-

DECENTRALISATION. 227
shot most conspicuously. It is over three years since he
went to Aldershot. It is no exaggeration to say they
are the most eventful three years in the modern history
of the army. A revolution has taken place in the com
mand — a silent, but not less thorough revolution — which
has caused a perhaps unconscious progress in other com
mands. In some it has avowedly been imitated. In
the words of the one man most conspicuously able to
judge, Sir Evelyn "has done more to modernise the
army, to clear away all the old bow-and-arrow preju
dices that have kept us, and still keep us from mili
tary efficiency — fighting efficiency — than any other half-
dozen men I know."
And the first thing that deserves to be noticed is the
decentralisation that has been effected in the instruc
tion, and is now officially, though as yet " provision
ally," recognised. The old theory was that instruction
was not much the business of anybody but the com
manding officer of a battalion and the adjutant and
sergeant-major. So far as company instruction was con
cerned it was left pretty much in the hands of colour-
sergeants. Now all that has been changed. It is going
to be changed even in the Guards as soon as quarters
have been provided for company officers. At Aldershot
the captain of a company is made personally responsible
as in the German army, and as he should be in any
common-sense army, not only for the discipline and the
interior economy of the company, but the training also.
Q 2

228 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
It is to him that the men look for all that finer kind of
tuition which follows the mere goose-step and squad era
in the military career. He has to see and even himself
teach, everything that is required by the soldier in the
way of knowledge, how to conduct himself in the field.
Mr. Spencer Wilkinson, in his thoughtful little book,
The Brain of an Army, puts the German system in a
nutshell when he says :
" Eesponsibility and authority begin with the smallest
units, the company, squadron or battery. The captain,
the commander of such a unit, is the lowest officer who
has the power of punishment."
The reader who knows something of Germany will
note the word " power."
" In his hands lies in peace the training, and in war
the leading of the company, squadron, or battery. The
lieutenants, and in a lower sphere the non-commissioned
officers, are his assistants acting under his responsibility.
In the company, to take the infantry as the type, the
captain is supreme. The methods of instruction, the
distribution of time, and the order to be followed in the
process are matters which he settles according to his
own judgment. His superiors abstain from any inter
ference. They are concerned only with the result, of
which they satisfy themselves by inspection at the end
of the period assigned to company training. If any of
the soldiers have not been properly instructed, or if the

THE CAPTAIN'S INFLUENCE. 229
company is not fit to take its place in the battalion,
that is the captain's fault, and he is likely to lose his
chance of promotion. "
Major Henderson's description is not less clear and
succinct :
" The higher authorities consistently maintain the
high position of the company commander, and crush
every attempt to curtail his prerogatives or to lessen
his responsibilities. From the first day the recruit falls
in upon the barrack square he is under the eye of his
captain. The whole of his military knowledge, his
rewards and his advancement, he owes to the officers of
his own company. For the economical administration
of his command, for its comfort and well-being as well
as its efficiency, the captain bears the sole responsibility.
On the bonds thus created between officers and men
may be cited the opinion of a well-known Prussian
author : — ' The captain is the only officer between whom
and the soldier a personal relation exists in peace time.
He knows every individual soldier in the most intimate
manner, and the soldier, on his part, is well aware that
his captain so knows him. It is upon this relation that
the common influence rests, which he, above all other
officers, has over the individual soldier as well as over
the whole company.' "
The wholesale adoption of German customs has been
carried quite far enough in this country by those who

230 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
have not recognised the essential difference between a
volunteer and a compulsory service army. In some
respects it has been carried to a ridiculous extent, and
the difference in the soil is quite sufficient to account
for the failure of the attempt to transplant. So this
treatment of the company as the unit of instruction and
discipline has been adapted, rather than adopted, at
Aldershot. We wear our rue with a difference. But,
so far as is possible in an army where men and officers
are constantly changing even during the drill season, we
have taken over at Aldershot the essential principle of
the German company. Indeed it is encouraged so far,
this responsibility of the company commander for the
company training, that I heard towards the end of the
late drill season of a captain who saw a junior staff-
officer hanging about a seven o'clock parade ground
and went up to him requesting him to go away, lest his
mere presence should seem to impugn the Home Eule
principle of the company. When the matter was
reported, the action of the captain was approved. It is
possible that the system has been carried as far in our
service as the genius of our voluntary system will
permit ; but there can be no question about the im
provement in the working of battalions since the present
style was taken in hand. The commanding officer and
the adjutant have less work and worry thrown upon
them, and have more time to study the details of batta
lion command and developed tactics. This is one of the

SETTING AN EXAMPLE. 231
best pieces of work to be mentioned as a consequence of
Sir Evelyn Wood's tenure of the Aldershot command,
And, as has been hinted above, the influence of the
teaching has not been confined to regiments and batta
lions that have had their training at Aldershot. There
has been a gradual levelling-up even in districts in
which it is thought a mark of superiority to keep to the
old paths, and shun anything new like the whispering
of the evil one, unless it is to be found laid down in
rigid black and white in some volume of red sheep.
And now the principle has been laid down, and in red
sheep As he has done with the company officers, taking
them out of the hands of the colonels and adjutants, so
has Sir Evelyn managed to break down the professional
shyness of the field officers. When he first went to the
greatest standing camp, though, perhaps, Aldershot may
soon have to surrender its pride of place to the Curragh,
War Games were sometimes played. But practically no
interest was taken in them. People did not believe in
learning war " over a paper country." The new general
saw that an ounce of example was worth a pound of
precept, so he and his brigade commanders took to
playing war-games on big maps frequently among them
selves, and in a short time colonels and majors felt
the desire to emulate the victories and defeats of their
seniors. It is scarcely going too far to say that nowhere,
not even in Westminster Town Hall, is the War Game

232 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
played in this country so frequently or enthusiastically
as in the Aldershot Club House. And the mention of
this edifice leads me to note that in January 1890, the
Club was over head and ears in debt. Sir Evelyn took
it in hand. It is now a flourishing institution, a very
pivot of a good deal of the life of Aldershot.
Perhaps the most striking of his improvements is that
in connection with the Army Service Corps. This body,
the re-creation of the former Commissariat and Transport
Department, is the child of General Sir Eedvers Buller,
the Adjutant-General, when he was Quartermaster-
General. On it he spent much time and pains, and
brought to bear the experience both of one who had
suffered from the confusion incidental to the old system,
and of one who, when Chief of the Staff, had to
organise the greatest Supply work that had ever been
attempted in respect of distance and difficulty. The
Eoyal Warrant constituting the Corps had been issued
on December 11th, 1888, so that it had been little more
than a year in existence when Sir Evelyn went to
Aldershot, and it may be said truly enough to have had
but little chance of success in that twelvemonth. It
was a strange bantling, in which nobody felt bound to
have any more interest than lay strictly in the way of
duty. The new chief made up his mind to change all
that. He brought to the task of helping the A.S.C to
achieve its purpose — and what a task it was is known to
a good many people now — the happiest personal relations

SUPPLY. 233
with Sir Eedvers Buller, his old associate in Ashantee,
Zululand, in Boerland, and on the Nile.
He had the advantage of soon obtaining as his second
Adjutant-General, or Quartermaster-General, a Staff
College graduate who had, as Colonel of the Eoyal Irish
Eifles, won a reputation for his care of his men, and who,
at Candahar, had seen the outcome of the work of the
Indian supply system, before, during and after the
famous or infamous break-down of camel transport. He
had also, as the head of the branch of the Corps stationed
at Aldershot, a practical farmer in the person of Colonel
Grattan, one of the most intelligent and indefatigable of
Irishmen, and one of the men who never think anything
is done so long as aught, however slight, remains to be
done. The three men thoroughly understood one
another, and they set themselves to the Herculean task
of breaking down the contract system which had
fastened its grip on not only the British Army but the
British tax-payer. Hay and oats were supplied by
contract, and while the last farthing was screwed out of
the farmer, the worst possible stuff that could be passed,
under the eyes of a not too vigilant and not too well-
informed body of officers, was supplied to the service.
Now the Army Service Corps buys its own oats in Mark
Lane, to the great advantage of the public, both as
regards price and quality. A large proportion of the
hay is bought from farmers in the neighbourhood, and
what cannot be got there is bought by A.S.C. officers

234 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
elsewhere. The outcome of the system, so far as it has
been developed, and it is still in the tentative state, is
that not A.S.C. officers, but the officers of the Division
generally get to learn in peace a most essential part of
their work in war. The horses are well fed, and get
their full allowance, as no one has any longer any
interest in depriving them of a single oat. The price of
hay and oats has fallen all over the country, because
contractors are, with reason, afraid that the Aldershot
system will soon be introduced everywhere. Meat is at
present got by contract, but the end of the system is at
hand. While it lasts, however, its dangerous elements
are reduced to a minimum by the most rigid and careful
inspection. Eegimental officers are now understood to
appreciate the great advantages of the new Supply work,
and to encourage their subordinate officers and men to
lend the A.S.C. every assistance in their power. Officers
are detached to the A.S.C., or sent to London, to take a
course of lessons in judging the quality of supplies, and
in a very few years it will be thought as much to the
discredit of an officer to be ignorant of the quality and
fair cost of supplies as it is now to know nothing of his
squadron, battery, or company drill. Another important
principle has been laid down in the course of the experi
mental A.S.C. work at Aldershot, that is, to feed horses
according to the work they have to do. I can well
remember the horror of an excellent friend of mine, a
cavalry officer, with whom I was lunching, when he

FEEDING FOR WORK. 235
received the order to reduce, as an experiment, the
ration of oats and hay during the winter, so as to have
a reserve for the drill season when, instead of standing
or lying idle in stables, his steeds would have to pay
for their keep. But he is a loyal officer, and on the
whole he leans to the forward school in the army. So,
though he at first reported against the experiment,
which was indeed carried too far ; he is now one of the
warmest advocates of "feeding for work." The ration
for animals in the service is ample if it be properly
husbanded, and now when animals are called on for
hard work they can get extra rations to the extent of
from two to six pounds of oats a day, according to the
economy which has been exercised, and the nature of
the task to be imposed upon them. All this is done out
of what used to be simply wasted in stable, or " missing "
in other ways. Classes for the instruction of officers in
the purchase of supplies are now a regular feature of the
Aldershot training.
One of Sir Evelyn's first cares at Aldershot was to
superintend the commencement of an institution for the
supply of pure vaccine matter throughout the service.
Before its establishment the lymph purchased by the
Medical Department in the camp cost £250 per annum,
only a small quantity of doubtful source being obtained,
the balance of the vaccinations being with difficulty kept
up by arm to arm transfer. Now the great bulk, if not
yet the whole, of the vaccinations in the service are from

236 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
animal lymph, the cost of it being £80 a year. Up to
the 10th November, 1891, material had been prepared
at Aldershot for 98,168 people, the cost of which has,
all told, been £213, though in the open market it
would have cost £4,900. Down to the end of 1891
material had been issued for 104,000 vaccinations, and
this without the occurrence of one single case of con
tamination, or blood poisoning in any shape, such as
the patients were liable to under the old system. The
lymph is prepared under the personal care of Veterinary
Captain F. Smith, Professor of the Army Veterinary
School, who issues daily lymph sufficient for three
hundred people.
Sir Evelyn's care for the soldier is limited in no sense
whatever. He took the School of Cookery under his
observation from the first, and consequently the feed
ing of the soldier has greatly improved throughout the
army. If he could procure for Mr. Atkins a free vege
table ration, and, when on field duty, a free grocery
ration, he believes the lot of the British private would
leave little ground for complaint. He personally selected
the sites for the new buildings which are transforming
the face of Aldershot, and he took especial care to see
that the barracks should have proper recreation rooms
and canteens, so far as could be provided out of the sums
allowed. The accommodation in these new barracks and
huts will be equal to that of the best military edifices in
the world. He has brightened the Cambridge Hospital

MANOEUVRES. 237
by starting a fund for the purchase of pictures to adorn
the walls, and has secured presentation portraits of
nearly all the Eoyal Family for the various wards. He
has recently started a Games Fund, out of which all
sorts of games are purchased for the amusement of the
patients. A still more notable attempt to alleviate the
lot of the suffering was the purchase of a piano for the
Hospital, and, under the auspices of himself and the Hon.
Lady Wood, weekly concerts for the sick were started,
and much appreciated. He has the beer in the canteens
and the milk served to the men analysed at uncertain
times, and his plan of canteen management, which he
started at Colchester, has resulted at Aldershot in not
only an improvement in the quality of the beer but in
a much greater profit to the canteen funds, which are
expended for the benefit of the men. He is very
particular that the soldier shall have proper clothing in
winter, and that old clothing is kept for hard or dirty
work, so that the men are not put to any cost for drills
and manoeuvres.
In the matter of manoeuvres he has left his mark
not on Aldershot only, but on the army. In 1890 he
utilised the Government ground at Woolmer Forest for
infantry work over a region known to but few of the
officers, and to none of the troops. The weather was
vile in the extreme, but a good deal of instruction was
afforded. Somewhat later he took six cavalry regiments
to the west of Berkshire, where, on the downs flanking

238 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
the Vale of the White Horse, he carried out a series of
experiments which at least showed that the manoeuvres
were very necessary to our English cavalry which so
seldom gets an opportunity of working together on an
adequate scale. In 1891, it was found impossible, owing
to shooting rights, to obtain proper ground for cavalry
work, but he brought together six regiments, of whom
three remained in barracks at Aldershot, while three
others, under General le Quesne, encamped at Bourley,
on the London and Winchester road, and the daily con
tact was on or near Frensham common, a very rough
piece of ground lying between the two camps. Objec
tion having been made the previous year to the cavalry
manoeuvres taking place under what it pleased some
folks to term an infantry general, the Horse Guards gave
the direction over to Major-General Keith Fraser, C.M.G.,
the Inspector General of Cavalry, but Sir Evelyn was
frequently on the ground, with his keen eye " all over
the place," as one expressed it. Later in the year he
took two Divisions to the South Downs, where were held
the most instructive set of manoeuvres yet seen in
England, in spite of many drawbacks, chiefly on account
of the weather, which ultimately caused the abandon
ment of the programme before it was more than two-
thirds completed. It was here that the advantage of the
new Aldershot training came out. ' Troops, though good,
who had not passed through it, were so obviously inferior
to those who had, that the Aldershot work stood at

A REPROACH REMOVED. 239
once vindicated. Some of the best officers in England
held and hold that no proper manoeuvres can be held in
England without the passing of a Manoeuvre Act, to give
power to the military authorities to take what ground
they want for such purposes, subject of course to com
pensation for injury done to the occupiers. I cannot see
the use of such an Act of Parliament unless the Treasury
can be induced to set aside a much greater sum each
year than it has ever yet been prevailed upon to allot.
Until this is done, Sir Evelyn Wood, and he alone, has
found the solution of the difficulty. With a very small
allowance, which has not been exceeded, he has managed
to do something to remove from the British Army the
reproach that it knows no instruction or practice, save
against savages, outside the area of the Long Valley, the
Fox Hills and the Curragh of Kildare. What were the
difficulties to be overcome the military reader presum
ably already knows, but the lay reader, whether states
man or politician — terms too often confounded in these
latter days — can only learn the whole truth from
the words of Sir Evelyn himself in the document
which he addressed to Sir Eedvers Buller at the con
clusion of the West Meon manoeuvres. As this paper
deserves to be ranked a historical document I have no
hesitation in placing it on record in an Appendix.

240 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.

CHAPTEE IX.
SIR EVELYN AS A SPORTSMAN.
A Mighty Hunter — A tender-hearted Soldier — The Hampshire
Packs — Sport encouraged — A Bayard of to-day.
Mr. Alexander Pope once remarked, in a little
known poem, that
" Proud Mmrod first the bloody chase began —
A mighty hunter, and his prey was man."
Sir Evelyn Wood is a mighty hunter in the con
ventional sense, as well as that in which the poet
seems to be supported by the best authorities among
divines. From his earliest days he has been in the
saddle, and he keeps up the sport almost, I was going to
say, as a religious duty. He is ever among the first
flight where
" . . . . The bold youth strain up the threat'ning steep,
Eush through the thicket, down the valleys sweep,
Hang o'er their coursers' heads with eager speed,
And earth rolls back beneath the flying steed."
I think I hear some town-bred paleface mutter — " Of
course as a soldier he is naturally fond of all kinds of

A TOUCHING STORY. 241
cruelty." That was the sort of thing the late John
Bright, for example, would have thought, or, maybe,
said, just as he libelled the British soldier on the word
of some anonymous liar about Abu Klea. But, as a
matter of fact, Sir Evelyn is the most tender-hearted
man alive. Nearly twenty years ago he told, with
broken voice and streaming eyes, to an audience of
Volunteer officers the following story of
" A battalion of our army encamped on the banks of
a river. In front was a deep, impassable ravine, on the
far side of which, distant about a quarter of a mile in a
straight line, grazed a herd of cattle. The men had
existed some days on biscuit and tea, and were
naturally desirous of animal food. Three officers and
some natives in our service rode round the head of the
ravine, turned a number of the cattle, and began to
drive them towards the encampment. Suddenly, a
vast number of hostile natives sprang out of their
ambush between the party and their camp. The subsi
dised natives disappeared, and the three Englishmen
turned and rode for their lives. Two got out of shot,
but the horse of the third fell, with a broken leg, and
the rider was nearly overtaken by the natives, when his
two companions missed him. Turning their horses they
rode back, and my informant saw one of them drive off
his horse, for it clung to him after he had dismounted.
The three stood back to back, and when the battalion
got to the spot, their comrades lay together, horribly
mutilated, but with eleven dead foes around them. R

242 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
"It is a story to make us feel proud of belonging to
the same country as those two men, yet, when I was
narrating the circumstances, in a country house, a young
gentleman, who is engaged in mercantile pursuits, said
to his father : ' Don't you think they were great fools
to go back ? ' The father replied : ' I should hope any
gentleman would have done the same.' '
More recently by a good deal I have seen Sir Evelyn
fairly break down as he recited the same story, which, I
think, few can read without emotion. But he hunts now-
a-days as he hunted in his hot youth for the exercise
without which, to him, life would scarcely be worth
living ; for the sake of the pleasure of bringing into play
the qualities of nerve and coolness with which he is
exceptionally endowed in the face of danger, and for the
example it sets to the younger officers under his
command. I have heard of one day in the late season,
when he hunted from dawn till dark, and then, making
up by self-sacrifice for the little bit of self-indulgence,
sat from dark till pretty nearly midnight settling, with
some of his generals, some details of the new Drill-book.
Mr. Garth's and the "H. H," and some other Fox-
Hounds, with the Eopley and Knaphill Harriers are all
within easy rides. The meets of all the packs are
published in Divisional Orders. These packs are all
better attended than used to be the case by officers
from the Division, and the military work, so far from
falling off in quantity or quality, has shown a remark-

SPORT GALORE. 243
able improvement in both respects, many officers think
on account of the energy begotten by the hunting. It
is one thing to subscribe to a pack of hounds, and quite
another to find sport for it. This has been successfully
achieved at Aldershot. Not without difficulty have
foxes been preserved in a locality which, though bleak
and barren enough, is in nearly every part continually
beaten by the foot of man or horse. But after several
failures perseverance has had its wonted reward, and
now a couple of days' sport a week can be counted upon.
For those who cannot afford a mount, there are Foot
Beagles, and an association exists for stocking and pre
serving game on the Government ground at Woolmer
Forest. This and every other athletic, or social, or
educational, or charitable enterprise has found at Aider-
shot warm supporters in Sir Evelyn Wood and his
family. It is many years since a well-known sporting writer —
it was in the middle of the Zulu war — bore testimony
to the qualities in the hunting field of Evelyn Wood.
From that source I learn a little item of Crimean days
hitherto unknown to me. It is that when the bad
winter of 1854 was at its worst, and "horses dropped
like flies in the cold," young Wood kept a Eussian
pony for the drag-hunts that were established, and this
pony survived when others succumbed, because his
owner " gave up to it his only blanket, and sedulously
exercised it whenever a heavy snow-storm had fallen."
r 2

244 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
It was added — in 1879 — that "Master Euskie still
survives, and enjoys a hearty old age."
" We next hear of Cornet Wood as hunting in
Dorsetshire with that fine old sportsman, Mr. Farqu-
harson, and Major, now Colonel, Arthur Tremayne
used to declare that he had often heard of men going
straight, but he had never seen it done literally by any
one excepting the ' Admiral,' as Wood was dubbed in
the regiment. Some of the gallant 13th Light Dragoons
may yet remember a remarkably high single rail over
which it is recorded that the Admiral stopped the field.
During his long spell of active service in India, Wood
became an expert in pig-sticking, and got first spear
with a hyena — an exploit of which we dare say he was
prouder than he was of charging a squadron nearly
single-handed, or of attacking seventy rebels with an
escort of two native soldiers  At a later period
Captain Wood became well-known in the south of
Ireland, hunting from Cahir, and after wards was equally
well-known with the Ward Union. He was a great
friend of the master, that prince of good fellows, Mr.
Morrogh, and a warm admirer of Charles Brindley (the
whip), as who was not ? We fancy that Wood's habit of
riding very slowly at his fences was based on Brindley 's
example and precept. At a dinner of the W. U. Hunt
the ' Soldier from Dublin ' was enthusiastically toasted.
' You are all too kind,' he said, adroitly ; ' the fact is,
whenever I go out with the Ward, I always make a
point of asking the name of any man who shows me
the back seams of his coat, and that's why I have so

" HORSE-SENSE." 245
many acquaintances among you.' It was in Ireland
Wood became the owner of the notorious big chestnut
Vagabond, who had ' a back like a town ' and kicking
power in proportion ; he had been sold and returned on
his owner's hands again and again, and most people
were glad to get rid of him at any sacrifice ; he was
one of the finest timber jumpers possible, and it is said
that, during the twelve seasons Wood hunted him, he
got him to do everything in the world except fall ; but
to the day of his death no man ever got him alone to
the meet, excepting his master. Probably the best
successor to Vagabond General Wood has ever possessed
is the big brown Wargame (a son of Theobald), pur
chased at the Belhus sale of 1877 ; this horse is known
to have greatly distinguished himself in Mr. Garth's
country, and on one occasion was seen to clear finely a
seemingly impossible fence, which, in fact, consisted of
a bush-fence, a park paling, and a haha. Wargame
accompanied his master to Africa, and once, when the
latter had lost the track in a region utterly unfamiliar
to horse and rider, the horse probably saved the rider's
life, for he persisted in turning away from the course
they had hitherto taken, and on its being left to him
to decide, he went straight for the English encampment,
and thus escaped an ambush of the enemy. It is said
that the principal chief in Pondoland admired Colonel
Wood's big brown horse immensely, and begged to
have a deal, but was somewhat taken aback to find the
value of an English hunter of that character was
estimated at forty oxen, i.e. £400 ; the chief vainly
offered many wives instead and retired horseless. Those

246 LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY EVELYN WOOD.
good men and true who have met General Wood in the
hunting field, whether in Ireland or at Aldershot, with
the Hon. H. Petre's staghounds, or with the Essex
Union or East Essex foxhounds, will corroborate our
estimate of his performances when we say that his
riding is as bold; as his judgment is good ; he has an
extraordinarily quick eye for a country and its weak
places, and always gets to the end of the longest runs
with the least possible amount taken out of his horse,
always in the right place, i.e. right in front, but with
out an atom of jealousy ; he is a model for our hunting
youth, and none the less so, that he is extremely
patient with, and considerate of, his mounts."
Nearly every word in this passage may, reading
soldiers for mounts, be applied to Sir Evelyn Wood as a
commanding officer. He has turned many a vagabond
into a good man and an efficient and trusty servant of
Queen and country. He manages his war game as
easily as his steed, and his judgment is as sound in the
field against the enemies of his country as it is after
Brer Eeynard. In one of his vamped up mottoes Sir
Walter Scott attributed to an Old Play this passage :
" All live by seeming.
The beggar begs with it, and the gay courtier
Gains land and title, rank and rule, by seeming ;
The clergy scorn it not, and the bold soldier
Will eke with it his service."
A greater man than Scott has put in the mouth of
the veriest villain that even his mind conceived the

A LIVING BAVARD. 247
phrase : " Men should be what they seem." Perhaps
to no one is it given to show to man the heart and
spirit as Heaven sees it. But if there is in this broad
realm of ours a man who, judged by every test that can
be applied by contemporaries, is what he seems, a
Bayard among living- men, " without fear and without
reproach," that man is Henry Evelyn Wood. In a life,
of the events of which this is a very imperfect tran
scription, he has never attempted aught that he has not
accomplished where success was possible to man, and
he has gained credit and renown out of every employ
ment that has been entrusted to him. It may be there
are other, and lofty, duties that fate has in store for
him in the service of his Sovereign. And, whatever
duties he may undertake, all who know him will be
confident he will perform them with a single eye to
the honour of the Army, the glory of his country, and
the progress of humanity. There is but one fear for
his future : it is that denounced in the Gospel to him
of whom all men speak well.

( 248 )

APPENDIX. Aldershot,
November 20th, 1891.
Adjutant-Genekal, In order to facilitate arrangements for a repetition of
Autumn Manoeuvres, I commence my report on those held
this year by detailing briefly the numerous preliminary steps
which were necessarily undertaken to obtain the use of the
land.
I. PEELIMINAEY AEEANGEMENTS.
1. Selection of Geound.
During the Autumn of 1890 I examined ground between
Basingstoke and Alresford, but abandoned the idea of its
use owing to a scarcity of water, and the number of woods
on the high ground lying between those two points.
At the close of the year I communicated with Sir Nelson
Eycroft, Bart., of Kempshot Park, Basingstoke, whose son,
Captain W. H. Eycroft, 7th Dragoon Guards, surveyed the
country lying between Wolverton on the North, and Oakley
and Whitchurch on the South.
After a careful inspection of the ground, I asked permis
sion of the landlords to communicate with their tenants
(Appendix A).
My request for use of the land was received in a most
generous spirit by landowners and farming tenants on the

APPENDIX. 249
North side of the district. The Earl of Carnarvon gave per
mission for the encampment in his park of 6000 men, who
would have been necessarily placed close to the woods in
which pheasants are reared, whilst on the South side Mr.
Portal placed at my disposal land on which his dairy cattle
are fed. However, after several visits to the ground and
personal interviews with the shooting tenants, I found it im
possible to overcome their objections, and was reluctantly
obliged to abandon the scheme.
In the meantime a Staff Officer had examined the country
in the vicinity of Petersfield, which had the serious dis
advantage of scarcity of water and an absence of suitable
encamping grounds. These difficulties induced me to look
over some ground in North Hampshire, and after similar
preliminary steps had been undertaken, selection was made of
a suitable tract lying between Stockbridge and Winchester.
Here, however, again the interests of shooting tenants
prevented our arrangements being completed. It must, I
think, now be taken for granted that Manoeuvres without an
Act of Parliament are not possible where the sporting rights
are leased to persons residing out of the district. Eventually
the ground about Petersfield was selected, subject to my
obtaining leave from all the landowners and occupiers.
On the 1st December, 1890, I asked permission for the
assembly of two Divisions of Infantry with a proportion of
other arms, which was approved on the 28th January, 1891.

2. Arrangements with Occupiers.
Letters similar to that shown in Appendix A were sent to
the seven largest landowners, and subsequently a Staff Officer
visited all the occupiers concerned.

250 APPENDIX.
Some difficulty was experienced throughout the Manoeuvres
owing to our finding it impossible to obtain a representative
committee of occupiers, although we received great assistance
from Mr. Bonham Carter, Major Woods, Captain Le Eoy
Lewis, and others. All our propositions, however, were
accepted in a cordial spirit by owners and occupiers.
On the 6th May I rode over the ground and selected the
approximate positions of the camps, and on the 9th June I
reported to you on the area for the proposed Manoeuvres.
Several communications were received towards the end of
August, pointing out that owing to the unusually inclement
weather harvest operations had been materially delayed, and
suggesting that the Manoeuvres should be put off to a later
date. Some persons went so far as to propose the end of
September. On the 3rd of September I again visited the ground, and
decided that the Manoeuvres should be put off until the 10th
September, or about 10 days later than would have been
necessary in an ordinary season.

3. Maps.
700 Manoeuvre Maps were specially prepared by the
Ordnance Survey Department (see Appendix B). These were
issued to the troops, and a 6-in. Ordnance map was given to
the Generals of Divisions. The 2-in. map had 100ft. contours
marked on it, and was apparently enlarged from the 1-in.
I imagine the process would be more troublesome, but the
result might be more satisfactory, if the 2-in. maps were
reduced from the 6-in. ; nevertheless the map answered well
and gave general satisfaction. Although there were not many
names in this sparsely occupied country, yet spots could

APPENDIX. 251
generally be identified by the numbers indicating the
contours. There were one or two minor errors, for example
" Hockham," near East Meon, is not known locally by that
name. It would have been better if the difference between
the 1st class and 2nd class roads could have been more clearly
shown. All the maps were mounted on linen except ^th, which
were prepared on paper, and five on specially prepared tough
paper. There is a general agreement of opinion that in spite
of the linen map becoming indistinct from wet and folding
(which may also affect the accuracy of the scale), yet they are
the most suitable for regimental officers, while for General and
Staff Officers the best map is the paper one cut into squares
and mounted on linen.
4. Assembly and Insecption op the Divisions.
On the 1st September two Infantry Divisions having been
formed (with the exception of one Battalion of the Grenadier
Guards coming from Ireland and one Field Battery at Hilsea),
they were inspected on the 2nd by His Eoyal Highness the
Commander-in-Chief, dressed and equipped as they were in
tended to march.
Eive-and-a-half Battalions had joined the command towards
the end of August, and the opportunity was taken of causing
them to work out tactical schemes during the time they were
compulsorily delayed at Aldershot, so as to place them on
more even terms with the troops stationed here.

252 APPENDIX.

II. DESCEIPTION OE THE MANCEUVEE GEOUND
AND CAMPS.
1. Ground.
My unsuccessful efforts to obtain the use of ground in the
North of Hampshire were prolonged, because it was evident
from the first that difficulties would be experienced as regards
camps in the Meon district, and although the weather was
unusually severe, yet even with ordinary weather, difficulties
must always be anticipated on similar geographical for
mations. The ground over which we were permitted to work is
bounded on the north by the road from East Meon to West
Meon, on the west by the river Meon, on the south by the
road from Brockbridge, north of Windmill Down, to Clanfield,
and on the east by the South- Western Eailway. Its area is
seven miles from east to west by five miles from north to
south. (See Map, Appendix B.)
One dominant ridge, generally 400 feet above the river
Meon, runs in a north-westerly and south-easterly direction
through three parts of the area to Tegdown, where the ridge
turns sharply to the north-east, its culminating point being
nearly 600 feet higher than East Meon.
When the ground was first examined it was feared that this
ridge might prove unfavourable to all tactical schemes, since
scouts could look down from it into either camp ; but the plan
of placing the summit of the ridge out of bounds, except
during the actual operations, obviated difficulty on this point.
The Camp on the eastern side of the ground should, if
possible, for tactical reasons, have been placed near Buriton,

APPENDIX. 253
but as the Meon river, which rises one mile south of the
village of East Meon, is the only water supply available for
the district, it was necessary to place the camp for one Division
there, while the other Division was placed at Soberton, about
6J miles distant by the track over the Downs, and 10 miles
down stream following the course of the river.
The choice of camping ground at East Meon was further
restricted to the left bank of the river, where there were a few
meadows, the fields on the right bank being under cultivation,
with crops in many cases still standing when the Manoeuvres
were terminated.
One narrow lane ran through the proposed site for the camp
and was generally below the fields on either side, which were
for the most part small and not well adapted for camps. In
the more elevated fields the slopes were too steep for men or
horses to rest, and in the lower fields the surface was too flat
to allow of the water running off; indeed, it was within two
feet of the surface.
The Camp at Soberton left little or nothing to be desired so
far as the Head-Quarters of the Division and one Brigade were
concerned, but it was necessary to place the 2nd Brigade
either on arable land and stubble fields, or to remove it 2000
yards from the water. This last alternative was adopted.
The Mounted Infantry was encamped in an arable field,
which, like those at East Meon, became a sea of mud after
three days' heavy rain.
The Head-Quarters Camp of the Umpire-in-Chief was placed
at West Meon, nearly equidistant between the two Divisions.
The principal Staff Officers lived in a private house, which
was hired at their own expense, for the fortnight. There can
be no question that such an arrangement, which prevails on
the Continent, and which, although not at present sanctioned

254 APPENDIX.
by regulation, is what would be done on service, is most con
ducive to the public interest.
2. Water Supply.
The water supply within the area of the Manoeuvres was
dependent on the river Meon, the supply from which was suffi
cient and of good quality.
East Meon. — It was necessary to arrange for drinking water
to be pumped into the water carts on the road at some little
distance from the stream ; a plentiful supply for horses was
obtained by pumping into troughs from a leat close to the
road. Water for washing was arranged for by troughs in one
of the fields between the camp and the river.
West Meon. — The water supply was a comparatively simple
matter, and met all requirements, except for bathing, for
which there were no facilities at either camp.
Soberton. — Here the water supply was well arranged so far
as the power of obtaining such existed, but both the drinking
water and the water for washing had to be delivered to the
camps by carts and stored in tanks ; the horses were watered
near the stream.
At Soberton hill camp, on account of the distance to the
water, a rectangular tank capable of holding 5000 gallons was
dug out and lined with tarpaulin. This answered well, but in
future should it become necessary to thus store water, a pump
should be fitted to the tank through which all water
should be drawn. By such an arrangement there would be
less waste, greater convenience to the troops, and the water
would be kept cleaner and the ground round the tank drier.
The supply in the tank at Soberton hill was not used for
cooking or drinking purposes, water for which was stored

APPENDIX. 255
separately in tanks brought from the buildings now being con
structed in the Stanhope lines, Aldershot.
I am not satisfied that the arrangements I made for the
supply of water would have been sufficient if the hot weather
of the first three days had continued. During Manoeuvres in
England there should be facilities for the men to wash not
only their feet but their bodies.
I am of opinion, from the experience gained at these
Manoeuvres, that the water supply to camps, whether standing
or otherwise, is so important a feature in the duties of the
Eoyal Engineers as to deserve special attention.
3. Sanitation.
The experience gained last year was not fully utilised in all
respects. More screens were issued for latrines and urinals,
but for want of proper instruction beforehand the trenches in
the screens were not properly placed and in consequence men
urinated against the walls of the screens. In future, poles
should be provided for all latrines.
In one Division, although the camp was surrounded by
hedges, no adequate arrangements were made to save the ground
from being polluted, and when the Divisions changed camps
on the 16th of September, the ground was left by this Division
in a very dirty state.
Special precautions should be taken to ensure that the camps
occupied by Volunteers are kept clean, as from want of practice
this is not generally done.
The issue of brooms is essential to the due conservancy of a
camp. On service they would be provided by the troops from
hedges, brushwood, &c, but as this is not feasible in England
they should be issued on requisition.

256 APPENDIX.

4. Supply Depot.
Whenever it can be arranged these should be situated close
to a main road, with an entrance and exit staked and corded,
the Depot of the Army Service Corps being in the same
field. A Divisional Depot for 6000 men requires at least six acres,
and the more nearly square the field is the more convenient it
will be.
As the Army Service Corps is the first to move out and the
last to come in, in this case being under canvas for three
months against a fortnight for the troops, great considera
tion should be given in selecting the best camping ground
for it.

III. THE MAECH (TO AND FEO BETWEEN ALDER
SHOT AND THE MANCEUVEE GEOUND).
1. Infantry.
The Divisions marched from Aldershot on the 7th and 8th
September, respectively, and reached Soberton and East Meon
in good order, with the exception of a portion of one Division,
in which, owing mainly to want of experience of field service,
the men suffered one very hot day from being marched in too
close order, and also from badly fitted boots. The orders laid
down clearly that the boots were to be previously carefully
inspected and that 100 yards distance was to be preserved
between battalions, and 10 yards between companies whenever
the force was not in the immediate vicinity of the enemy.
These orders were not properly carried out in this Division.
The number of men falling out varied in proportion to the

APPENDIX. 257
care taken by the officers to ensure proper attention being
paid to the fitting of boots and socks and the cleanliness of
the feet. During the march to the Manoeuvre ground the
numbers of men who fell out ranged from llf per cent, in one
battalion to one man in 750 in another battalion, the total
per-centage averaging 2£. Another way of putting this is —
that 73 fell out in one battalion to one in another. I appre
hend insufficient attention was given to Part V. (II.) Eoute
Marching, Infantry Drill, 1889, and stricter discipline is
necessary in this respect.
In some cases great pains had been taken before the
Manoeuvres to harden the men's feet, and in marching to Meon
one or two men fell out in one battalion which had previously
practised marching in Marching Order (the men carrying
381bs. besides clothes).
I do not wish, however, to imply that the men did not
suffer, for the Commanding Officer of this battalion informed
me that, on making an inspection, he found the soles of the
feet of several men who had not fallen out were quite raw.
Pride in the Eegiment and the Captain's influence kept these
men in the ranks.
I refer to this subject under the heading of " Boots," but on
the earlier days of operations such casualties must be expected
amongst men who are not at regular duty and whose feet
therefore become soft ; and it must, moreover, be borne in
mind, that as the men were not medically inspected before
leaving Aldershot, there were many in the ranks who were from
various causes unfit to march.
In some corps there is a tendency, especially in rifle batta
lions and light infantry, to exceed the prescribed rate of
marching. This practice should be rigidly repressed and the
rate should be frequently verified by an officer with a watch at

258 APPENDIX.
the rear of the column. The length of pace should also be
tested. The practice was tried by marching bands in the
centre of battalions, and it answered so well that I recommend
it should be enforced, the band being placed in the centre aud
the drums in front of the battalion, reversing their positions
on alternate days. During the march back, one Division
covered the distance of 19 miles with practically no one falling
out of the ranks, the men marching not only cheerily but very
well. It must, however, be remembered that on the advice of
the General Officers and Principal Medical Officers the men
did not wear valises.
Military Chiropodists — Some Commanding Officers are
in favour of a certain number of men in every battalion or
corps being instructed as chiropodists, as the neglect of corns
swells the list of men who fall out on the march. I recommend
the experiment be tried.

2. Horse Artillery.
A Horse Artillery Brigade Division of two Batteries, and
the Mounted Infantry (strength 350 officers and men), were
ordered to leave Aldershot on the 14th September, at such an
hour as would bring them to West Meon at 6 a.m. on that day,
in time to take part in an operation which was to commence at
8 a.m. The march of the Artillery from Aldershot to West Meon
(23j miles), and thence after the tactical operations to
Soberton, was no test, as one battery with the service equipment
of 12-pounder B.L. guns carried no ammunition, and the other
battery was supplied with a lighter experimental equipment
and lighter 12-pounder B.L. guns. The hope that the trial
would bring to light the capabilities of each battery was, there-

APPENDIX. 259
fore, not fulfilled. The work during the operations on this day
was also very easy on the horses.
3. Mounted Infantry.
The same march, made by the Mounted Infantry, reflected
great credit on the officer in command. There were 8 casual
ties, and although the efficiency of the horses would be even
greater with more knowledge on the part of some ofthe officers,
yet considering their short mounted service, and the fact that
the majority of the men had only been mounted for a very
short time, the result is very creditable to the officer in com
mand and all those serving under him.
4. Transport.
The system of moving the transport of each Brigade im
mediately behind its troops should be abandoned, as horses
walk faster than men and are kept continually starting and
stopping, causing the shoulders and necks to be rubbed and
leaving no time for feeding.
In future, I propose to march all the transport in one,
column in rear of the Infantry. This, with proper arrange
ments at the start, should not cause any appreciable delay in
the arrival of the baggage.
5. Eegimental Transport.
Two battalions, the 1st Durham Light Infantry and the
Grenadier Guards, both outside the normal strength at Aider-
shot, had no regimental transport on charge.
In future manoeuvres it will be better that the usual propor-
S 2

260 APPENDIX.
tion of regimental transport should be attached to similarly
situated battalions from the Army Service Corps, with drivers
complete. This will save trouble, correspondence, and many
requisitions.

IV. EEMAEKS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE
OPEEATIONS. 1. Programme.
During the Manoeuvres of the Infantry Columns at Woolmer
in 1890, and in previous years, all the schemes were made out
by the Umpire-in-Chief. It was thought this year that owing
to the higher rank of the officers and the practice enjoyed by
many of them in setting schemes and in acting as Chief
Umpires, it might be well to decentralize and leave a part of
the instruction in their hands.
The programme, therefore, issued on the 5th September
(Appendix C) placed on the General Officers commanding the
two Divisions the duty of instructing those under them for six
out of the twelve days available for the Manoeuvres.
The general result of this attempt at decentralising the
instruction was very satisfactory, although the teaching
varied according to the experience of the officers in com
mand ; owing probably to the want of practice in setting
schemes they did not always induce a collision, and in some
cases the men were under arms for longer periods than upon
the days when the Divisions were opposed. This should be
prevented in future.
The schemes given by me were issued overnight to the
commanders of the two opposing sides, who were instructed
that they were not to be shown to anyone but their senior

APPENDIX. 261
Staff Officer until half-an-hour before starting from camp for
the points of assembly on the day of the operations (see order
Appendix D).
The question of giving troops an occasional rest day other
than Sunday was debated, and it was decided it would be un
desirable to leave any day wholly unoccupied. I recommend
that this decision be adhered to for the future.

2. Value of Operations in a Strange Country.
Advantage was taken of the experience gained at the
Cavalry Manoeuvres in 1891, and Officers were prohibited
from riding over the Manoeuvre ground when not engaged in
the operations. This, together with the imposing of a neutral
zone, half-a-mile broad, over which parties from either camp
might not pass, added greatly to the interest and value of the
instruction. Although the additional labour of the Ordnance Store
Department is very great, yet the system of the Divisions ex
changing camps at the end of the first week is well worth the
extra trouble imposed. 3. Distinguishing Dress.
On the 2nd day of the Manoeuvres, owing to the heat of the
sun, both opposing forces wore helmets, from which some
confusion resulted. I endeavoured to rectify this by
purchasing locally some calico, strips of which were worn on
the left shoulder. The effect was not quite satisfactory, and I
recommend a proposal made by Lieutenant-General His Royal
Highness the Duke of Connaught, that we should assimilate
our practice to that adopted in the German Army, by putting

262 APPENDIX.
white cap covers on the head-dress of one side. There will
remain the difficulty with those corps which have white
helmets, but this affects a small number only of those generally
employed. The expense would not be great, as the covers will be required
for Infantry only, the weather in England being seldom suffi
ciently hot to inconvenience seriously mounted men. I pro
pose to purchase calico and to have it made up into helmet
covers by next drill season at a cost of £60. I estimate this
will suffice for 7000 men.
In my report of the Cavalry Manoeuvres, dated the 25th
October, 1890, 1 recommended that the cocked hat should be
abolished for Manoeuvres, and I ask permission to carry this
out for the future. Every Staff Officer when coming under
fire this year removed his cocked hat and walked about bare
headed, because opposing troops were invariably directed to
fire upon any officer with this too conspicuous head-dress.
4. Infantry.
The most noticeable point in the Infantry during the
Manoeuvres was the great improvement in fire discipline, and
in the skill of the company officers in handling their
commands. There was a much more correct appreciation of
ground and its bearing on the operations taking place than
last year, and briefly it may be asserted with confidence that
the advantage of careful " Company Field Training " was very
apparent. Officers' Chargers. — It is worthy of consideration
whether the limit of height of Infantry officers' chargers
should not be from 14-2 to 15-2. Horses of this size can be
obtained at a lower price. They thrive better on a small

APPENDIX. 263
allowance of forage, and are much more suitable from the
facility of mounting and dismounting than animals 16 hands
high, which are now often used.
5. Artillery.
I laid down that this arm was not to be employed as a rule
over 2500 yards. This generally answered well.
The orders given as to the verification of ranges were not
transmitted to the batteries of one Division and were not acted
on in either Division, and the consequence was a failure to
obtain much useful instruction.
In several instances batteries were pushed forward up lanes
before it was ascertained that the exits from such were free
from the enemy. The Artillery officers were not generally
sufficiently supervised by those under whom they were
serving. In many instances they received orders such as
" Take up the best position you can," or, " Conform." On one
occasion the Artillery of one Division took up its first position
within 500 yards of unshaken Infantry. The batteries of the
Divisions occasionally came into position at such long
distances the one from the other, and with such independent
action, that on service they might have been destroyed in
detail. Artillery fire must be concentrated and directed by one will.
Infantry should not be expected to successfully attack
Infantry which has not been temporarily shaken by Artillery,
and whose Artillery has not been at least temporarily put out
of action.
On the 12th September, the officer commanding one of the
opposing forces placed one battery of his Artillery on low
ground, 210 feet under a steep hill, and when the force was

264 APPENDIX.
driven back no instruction was apparently sent to assist the
battery commander in regaining the line of retreat. In
consequence, he attempted to ascend the hill with a gradient
so steep, that although three of the guns reached the summit
yet the fourth stuck fast, and all of them were so delayed
that the enemy's Infantry arrived within 500 yards before half
the hill was surmounted. Thus the battery must have been
captured. The ammunition wagons, which could not breast
the hill, were left below untiltthe conclusion of the operations.
The only satisfactory point in this movement was the skill of
the officers in leading on the easiest gradient and the good
driving of the men. The three teams ascended 212 feet in
410 yards, the total distance traversed being 632 yards. I
watched the horses as they were going home, and am of opinion
this quarter-of-an-hour's work took more out of them than a
long day's march.
The Cordite blank cartridge being made up of 150 pieces of
brown paper makes the ground very untidy. It will probably
be necessary when manoeuvring on private property to make
some arrangement for clearing it up. There is little smoke from
this cartridge and it is soon dissipated. The smoke from the
service charge of the same substance will, however, be greater
in volume.

6. Cavalry (Divisional Squadrons).
The scouting did not quite satisfy me, bearing in mind that
the squadrons employed had been at Aldershot for two drill
seasons, and had during that time taken part in two Cavalry
Drills and Manoeuvres.
As .a rule messages were sent back only when the enemy
was visible. The squadron leaders seem scarcely to have

appendix. 265
appreciated the importance to a General of negative informa
tion, that is, that the enemy had not been sighted.
There was a tendency to dismount to employ fire action
when Infantry was available in the immediate vicinity of the
squadron. This arose from the want of practice in officers of
all arms of working in conjunction with arms other than that
to which they belong.
In one Division the mistake was made of ordering a
squadron leader not to fight on any account, and acting on
these orders he allowed a company belonging to his force to
be surrounded without an effort to extricate it. These orders
I was obliged to cancel.

7. Eoyal Engineers.
The good work carried out by the Field Companies and
Telegraph Battalion, Eoyal Engineers, is detailed under
another part of this report. Sections of the Companies were
employed on several occasions to mark entrenchments, but
the most important tactical work of the Eoyal Engineers, that
of preparing an entrenched position which had been proposed
for the 19th September, was necessarily abandoned owing to
the rain.

8. Balloon Section.
The country was not favourable for the use of balloons, and
yet their utility is undoubted when one force stands on the
defensive, and the experience gained fully repaid the cost of
taking a balloon down with the troops, although the
Manoeuvres were terminated prematurely.
The force of wind prevented its ascent on two occasions,

266 APPENDIX.
and on another day the operations were cut short by a dense
fog. The average strength of the wind at the ground level on
the summit of the hills was about 12 miles an hour. It is
assumed that when it is more than 20 miles an hour, i.e., the
equivalent of a " gentle breeze," the motion of the car will be
too great to permit of useful observations.
It was found by experience and confirmed by experiment
that as the force of the wind over the crest of the ridge was
always considerably greater than elsewhere, it answered better
to make the ascent from the valleys even with the disadvantage
of paying out more rope.
If balloons are to be at the disposal of Commanders for
Manoeuvres there should be one with each of two opposing
forces, as the advantage they give is great.
9. Yeomanry and Volunteers.
The Officer Commanding Hampshire Yeomanry asked per
mission on 28th July for his Eegiment to take part in the
Manoeuvres for a week, and such arrangement was sanctioned
by Horse Guards War Office letter of 8th August. The Com
manding Officer accounts for the small muster (40) owing to
the retarded harvest operations. The Officers of the Regiment,
two of whom were attached to my Staff, are in many cases
landowners and the men are occupiers of land. They helped
materially, not only in rendering the Manoeuvres possible by
facilitating the arrangements for the use of the land, but also
in minimizing claims for damages.
Five shillings per diem for every mounted man was paid
to the Officer Commanding ; Camp equipment was also
supplied. The 1st Volunteer Battalion of the Hampshire Regiment

APPENDIX. 267
also received authority to take part in the Manceuvres for a
week and brought 698 officers and men at one time, but this
number varied from day to day.
10. All Arms.
Prior to the Manoeuvres officers were directed to study care
fully the " Rules for the Conduct of Field Manoeuvres," and a
recapitulation was placed before them on the 5th September
(see Appendix C), of the mistakes which had been noticed
most frequently at Aldershot during the last two years. The
result showed that much trouble had been taken to master the
subject and to avoid similar errors. The failing most apparent
is that of officers considering only the branch of the service to
which they belong. Many officers have not sufficient confi
dence to give decided orders to the other arms of the service ;
thus officers of the same force were observed working in the
immediate vicinity but independently of each other. Com
manders of units neither asked for nor gave information to
other units operating near them. Infantry when joining
Artillery in action seldom or never enquired as to the range.
When attacking strong positions it was observed that suffi
cient reconnaissances were not made, that time was not given
for the action of Artillery fire, and that the Staff did not direct
the general movement.
The study of the Umpire Rules caused, however, all com
batants to appreciate and accept unhesitatingly the decision of
Umpires, and to conform to them with less demur than I have
hitherto seen. 11. Umpire Staff.
It has been suggested to me, and I think with reason, that
it would be well if the Umpire-in-Chief saw the Umpires for a

268 APPENDIX.
few minutes before the conference, since officers do not like
criticizing the actions of their superiors before an assembly of
other officers. This preliminary conference would enable the
Umpire-in-Chief to elicit points which afford useful instruction
and are now sometimes not brought out, from the hesitation of
Umpires to remark on the conduct of their superiors. The
reports by the Senior Umpires on a day's operation should be
received by the Umpire-in-Chief within three hours of the
termination of the operation. It is of the greatest importance
to get the criticism published without any delay.
In selecting Umpires it is desirable as far as possible to
choose officers who have been recently serving with troops.
When officers of the Head-Quarter Staff are employed, if they
have been some time away from their corps they should attend
at least half-a-dozen of the tactical days at Aldershot prior to
being detailed for this duty.

12. Casualties during Tactical Operations.
In order to deal with the difficulty of stragglers, who in
recent wars have become very numerous during the progress
of an Infantry fight, orders were given on the 5th September
to practise measures to meet such cases (see Appendix E).
In many instances," however, the Umpires forgot to give
the units placed out of action the piece of paper (see form
attached, Appendix F) specifying the time, and considerable
difficulty arose in the case of units placed out of action during
a retirement, as they could not readily regain the rear of the
force to which they^belonged without causing confusion.
I concur with the views of some Umpires that troops as a
rule should not lose instruction by being placed out of action
for more than half-an-hour, and although it is necessary for all

APPENDIX. 269
troops to remain for five minutes on the spot in order that
their adversaries may take notice of the result, I think it
would be better, in the absence of specific instruction from the
Umpire, which should be given when necessary, that at the
conclusion of five minutes after the Infantry have piled arms,
the Cavalry have dismounted, or Artillery have limbered up,
to the front, that they should all go to the rear of their re
spective forces, Infantry marching with reversed arms, and the
mounted branches at a walk.

13. Some of the Errors Observed during the
Operations.
Some of the schemes assigned far too extended a position
for the force available for its occupation, and similarly in
attacking the position, the attacking force was often unduly
extended. Occasionally sufficient thought was not given to the orders
contained in the Special Ideas. For example, an officer on
the 15th September being ordered to march and attack the
enemy vigorously, in spite of the fact that he was aware the
enemy was only a rear-guard, elected to make a turning move
ment instead, and thus gave the rear-guard time to escape.
There was occasionally a tendency on the part of officers
who have not been employed with large forces to act in a
manner which would not have been attempted in war.
Signallers. — One of the faults was that signals on both
sides were read by the opponents, and this fault occurs during
nearly every tactical day at Aldershot. It might be well that
some instruction on this point should be given to the classes
while they are being taught at the School of Signalling. This
remark has been passed to the officer concerned.

270 APPENDIX.

14. Ammunition.

Owing to the early termination of the Manceuvres the ex
penditure of ammunition was much less than I anticipated.

28 rounds per gun.
12-5 per man.
15
13
100 per gun.

R.A. 121b. B.L 
Magazine Rifle 
Martini-Henry Rifle
Cavalry & Royal Engineers
Machine gun 
Great pains were taken to economise the ammunition, and in
the orders issued on the 1st September, 1891, a maximum of
ten rounds per man for a Divisional and five rounds for a
Brigade field day was allowed. I think I was unduly appre
hensive of the expenditure, and it would have been better to
have fixed the maximum at fifteen rounds per man, as the
husbanding of ammunition, although useful as a means of
instruction, has the disadvantage also of occasionally rendering
it false.
The time has arrived when smokeless powder should be
issued both to Infantry and Artillery, so that some judgment
may be formed of any changes which may be required in tactics.
As the Continental nations have now had it under trial for
two years, and this year were using nothing else, I think an
effort should be made to issue sufficient by the 1st February,
1892, for the field training of the companies, and that sufficient
should be issued by 1st May for the use of all arms at all field
days in 1892.
The small allowance of ammunition we are able, for eco
nomical reasons, to expend at Manoeuvres gives but little
instruction in practising the supply to the firing line. I have
been urged to place some limit within which neither small

APPENDIX. 271
arm ammunition carts nor mules may be taken forward. I
am loath to suggest any such limitation, fearing it may grow
into a practice on service, and thus give an excuse for not
getting up ammunition as close as may be sometimes possible.
I think the difficulty may be best met by instructing the
Umpires to rule, when necessary, the ammunition supply out
of action. This I propose to add to the Umpire Rules,
para. 18.
As one or more rounds of ball ammunition were picked up
on the field of exercise it is certain that the certificate hitherto
rendered (Appendix G),"although stringent, is not sufficiently
effective, and I propose to add the words, " That an officer felt
at the bottom of every pouch."
15. March Past.
The Right Honourable the Earl of Northbrook, G.C.S.I.,
Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, to whom I wrote, consented
and attended to salute at the March Past, which, in order to
ensure the presence of the Hants Yeomanry and Volunteer
Battalion, had been arranged to take place on the 19th
September. Unfortunately the weather was too unfavourable
for the parade.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.
1. Supply.
Aldershot being treated as the base, Divisional Depots were
established at East Meon and Soberton, with an intermediate
rest camp at Bordon.
Flour. — This was bought at Bishop's Waltham, in the

272 APPENDIX.
district, and the purchase being completed three days before
the export of rye from Russia was prohibited, the " best
Household " was obtained at £1 8s. Gd., or lid. per sack less
than we pay at Aldershot for " London No. 2," the market
value of which is 3s. per sack less than "best Household."
The bread was good. For the first three days the ovens had
scarcely sufficient bottom heat. In future, where the bakery
is on wet clay, the ovens should be burnt for a week before
baking is commenced.
Meat. — Beef was supplied by the Aldershot contractor who,
after some negotiation, supplied the camps at the Aldershot
prices ; this lost us the opportunity of training the Army
Service Corps Officers to purchase. The quality of the meat
left nothing to be desired, all the beef being English, except
one lot of Canadian. I have been urged to purchase in the
district ; the cost would be rather more, which need not, however,
be considered, if the gain were adequate ; but as Manoeuvres
can only take place in sparsely populated districts, I apprehend
that the advantage would fall to some middleman, as sufficient
cattle could not be obtained locally. It would probably have
been better if a central butchery had been established in the
vicinity of Warnford, about half way between the camps.
Oats. — Oats were purchased in the London markets at the
market rates, the bulk being black Swedes at 40 lbs. to the
bushel, the balance being thin-skinned white Russians at
41 lbs.
It has been recommended that the oats should be purchased
in the district, but the remark made in paragraph on Meat
applies in this case. There will be no substantial advantage
to the farmers unless the oats grown in the district are
purchased, and this is not possible in the sparsely cultivated
districts where only Manoeuvres can be held by permission of

APPENDIX. 273
farmers. At the Manoeuvres in 1890 some farmers endeavoured
to sell us oats bought in the London market, and for us to
have made such purchases would not have been an advantage
to the district.
Hay. — Hay was purchased at the average of £3 9s. Id. per
ton. I consider the quality was generally good, although,
from want of storage and owing to the necessity of collecting
it a considerable period in advance, many trusses were mouldy.
This applied in a lesser degree to some of the oats.
One Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery and one squadron
leader condemn the hay unreservedly, and state that it was
not only in many cases mouldy, but that generally it was
poor in quality. As, however, the damaged hay, together
with all the trusses rejected as mouldy was bought by farmers
near Soberton for £2 per ton, and near East Meon for more
than its original cost, I think that the farmers' estimate of the
hay was probably more accurate than that of the two officers
who have not been through a course of instruction in judging
the quality of supplies. All undamaged surplus hay was
carted into Aldershot.
Firewood. — This was purchased in the district, the average
price being 8s. 8d. per ton. i
2. Rations and their Preparation.
The quality of the rations was so good that no ration boards
were held in one Division after the first day.
Field Kitchens. — It is desirable in future that greater
uniformity in the arrangements of the kitchens should be
enforced. Amongst the battalions of the Aldershot Division two used
field kitchens constructed according to Regulations and In-

274 APPENDIX.
structions for Encampments, page 37. Two battalions used
their kettle to form a trench as directed in page 38. Seven
battalions used gratings which were generally of the following
dimensions, 5 feet by 4 feet by 1 foot, weighing about 50 lbs.
and costing 12s. per set, one set of gratings being required
for every 100 men ; they are made to fold up and pack fairly
close, but as the extra weight would amount to between four
and five hundred lbs. per battalion, their use on field columns
or manoeuvres should be forbidden, since they could not be
carried on service. The present service camp kettle, supple
mented by the mess tin or canteen lid, provides sufficient
means for cooking purposes in the field.
The arrangements for the messing and cooking in the field
were not satisfactory. Owing to the inexperience of regiments
there was occasionally a delay in obtaining the dinners after
coming into camp. I recommend that the supervision of the
arrangements of this nature be made the special duty of the
second in command both in camp and quarters.
It is worthy of consideration, if, as I recommend, a free
grocery ration is supplied during the Manoeuvres, whether
cocoa should not occasionally be substituted for coffee.
Fuel. — The present allowance of 3 lbs. per man is ample,
and although I do not recommend any diminution, it is certain
that the whole of it is seldom expended.
Messing. — The diet of the different battabons varied con
siderably. One battalion had stews every day, the sergeant
cook stated he could not obtain flour to give the men pies.
Four battalions gave no extras at breakfast ; the other battalions
gave either butter, cheese, or tinned meat. The Mounted
Infantry had a hot meat breakfast daily, by taking one-fourth
of the ration meat for that purpose, under the following
system : — Half the men of each company had half a pound of

appendix. 275
ration meat, the other half having bacon, liver, &c, and on
the following day the arrangement was reversed. This left
every man with three quarters of a pound of meat for dinner.
Butter, cheese, or dripping was given daily at tea time. It
appears that except in one battalion, enough dripping was
saved to provide a free issue of puddings.
Bread. — There was, as usual, considerable waste, and this
is I apprehend inevitable with British soldiers until the daily
ration of it is issued to them in two portions.
Some Commanding Officers complained that when the
Divisions changed camps half the bread ration should have
been issued over night. There would have been no difficulty
in making such an arrangement had any commanding officers
made the request. There is a tendency in our service to lean
too much on the Supply department.
Groceries and Vegetables. — Groceries were supplied
from the Eeserve Depot.
Some of the corps had no vegetables on the day they
marched into camp, and I think the time has come when we
should approximate our system in field columns and manoeuvres
to the conditions of service in the field. The vegetables, as
usual, were provided, or supposed to be provided, under
regimental arrangements, that is 28 different units were
making separate contracts. It is obvious that this is not a
good plan, and I recommend that not only vegetables but
that milk be provided by Government.
Great care must, however, be taken that good supplies are
issued at reasonable rates, for contractors were able to supply
the groceries at a halfpenny per ration less than the price
charged by Government. This point requires immediate
attention. I recommend that paragraph 17, Allowance Eegulations, be
T 2

276 APPENDIX.
altered, and that groceries be supplied at cost price, unless,
indeed, the issue is made free during the Manoeuvres.
Indents. — The instructions contained in paragraph 13 of
Aldershot Divisional Orders of 1st September, 1891 (Ap
pendix H), were scarcely ever carried out in the Divisions as
regards the 36 hours' notice, and the Supply officers deserve
great credit for furnishing rations at short notice.
Some commanding Officers have represented that there was
a delay in making the issues, but this arose mainly from the
late receipt of regimental indents.
Special Free Issues from Canteens. — During the first
day of the Manoeuvres in some battalions the men, although
ordered to be supplied with something from the canteen,
received only one biscuit. I gave instructions that a more
adequate supply should be issued, but there was great diversity
of treatment in this respect. In some corps as much as £8
was expended during the 16 days on every 100 men, and in
another corps as little as £2. The general average being
£5 12s. Sd. We recognize that horses require more food in
camp than in stables. The time has come to admit the same
argument for the men, and I recommend that the General
Officer in command be allowed to provide what extras, in
addition to \ lb. of meat, he thinks are absolutely necessary,
at Government expense, up to a certain sum to be authorised
beforehand. It is estimated it will not cost more than l^d.
per man per diem, it being given on. days only when the larger
forces are opposing each other. This year the amount would
have been about £300. 3. Transport.
Horses. — This work, always heavy, has been this year
exceptionally so, owing to the inclement weather and heavy

APPENDIX. 277
roads. At the commencement of the preparations the Army
Service Corps had 80,000 lbs. reserve of oats economised
during the preceding winter months, which enabled the trans
port horses to be rationed up to 18 lbs. of oats per diem,
according to their work.
Some of the horses fell off greatly in the first instance, but
this is attributable to the want of experience on the part
of some officers, as in other companies doing more work the
horses retained their condition.
Nearly all the Army Service Corps transport having been
taken out with the two Divisions the Officers Commanding
Eoyal Artillery and Eoyal Engineers supplied teams for
returning camp equipment and local duties at Aldershot
between the 7th and 22nd September.
The Eoyal Artillery also provided transport for clearing
Bordon and Whitehill on the termination of the Manoeuvres.
The conduct of the Army Service Corps leaves nothing to
be desired. For three months they have been doing even
more work than they would have to do on active service, and
nothing could be better than the spirit that they have shown
throughout.
4. Ordnance Store Department.
Equipment. — In order to economise transport, Ordnance
Store Depots had to be formed some time in advance, viz., on
the 20th July at East Meon, and on the 5th August at
Soberton, for a Division at each place, and also rest camps at
Bordon and Whitehill each for a Brigade, and the difficulties
of the department were still further enhanced by the changing
over of the Divisions to the camps of their adversaries after
the first week, with the additional difficulty of the varying
strength of corps.

278 APPENDIX.
The two sets of camp equipment, each for over 6,000 men,
had to be transferred the same morning. This change of
camps adds greatly to the value of the tactical instruction
afforded to the troops, but it is obvious that it increases the
work and responsibility of the Ordnance Store Department.
It necessitated the sending out of 2576 tents and 44,C00
blankets, and other equipment, representing a total value of
£35,000 if new. Possibly, from want of practice, the demands
were not formulated properly, but the capacity of the Senior
Ordnance Store Officer is shown by the fact that only one bale
of 25 blankets remained undrawn at Soberton, and none at
East Meon, while all demands were met.
Last year more stores than absolutely required were trans
ported to Berkshire, but this error was avoided in the recent
Manoeuvres. I invite attention to the Eegulations for the scale of Camp
Equipment for Field Service. It is too limited for Peace
Manoeuvres. On the other hand, the standing camp scale is
far too large. I submit a scale (Appendix I) which, if ap
proved, I shall issue as the Aldershot Manoeuvre scale. That
some decided scale of this nature is necessary is shown by the
fact that of the six Field Batteries taking part in the
Manceuvres, not two demanded on the same form, and no two
batteries demanded on the same scale. This would have been
obviated if the demand had been put forward by the Officer
commanding the Brigade Division.
At one camp, when the Division marched out all the units
attempted to hand back their stores at the same moment.
This will probably result in some expense to the troops,
which might have been avoided by better Divisional arrange
ments. The Senior Ordnance Store Officer has drawn my attention

APPENDIX. 279
to the fact that soldiers do not know how tents should be
packed and put into the valises. I propose to add an in
struction on this point to the field training of companies.
The experience gained at the Manceuvres showed that I
might have made better arrangements for the equipment
issued to' the Army Service Corps employed on convoys.
This will be obviated in future years.
It is worthy of consideration whether it will not be an
economy during Peace Manoeuvres to have special tents for
the reception of stores, as the hospital marquee hitherto used
for this purpose is not suitable. If my suggestion is approved,
I am prepared to submit a proposal for the construction of one
which will save money for the public. If this is not approved
the hiring of a barn would, I think, be advantageous for
storing of camp equipment, when it can be done.
Eegulations supplied by the War Office were sent down as
they are originally printed in 1890, and not being up to date
were practically useless.
I am reporting separately, in a confidential paper, on the
officers employed in the department, who all worked with the
greatest energy and good will. Ordnance Store duties cannot
however, be learnt in a few months, and our difficulties were
increased by the fact that the aggregate service in the depart
ment of the five officers employed under the Senior Ordnance
Store Officer amounted only to 36 months.

5. Pay of Troops.
Officers commanding units, acting under the advice of the
Station Paymaster at Aldershot, took with them as a rule £25
in silver, while Canteen Presidents took about £25 in bronze.

280 APPENDIX.
Arrangements were made with the local bank at Petersfield to
cash cheques as required.
The system of paying companies of battalions weekly, but
on different days, enabled much less cash to be taken than
would otherwise have been essential, as it was found that a
great part of the money circulated through the canteen, and
the president of the canteen was generally able to hand to the
Captain of C company a considerable part of what he paid to
A company two days previously. I recommend that in future
we should trust less to canteens and brewers, and that each
battalion should be allowed transport for a safe, the weight of
which should be fixed.

6. Field Telegraphs and Telephones.
Early in August a line was run from Aldershot to Bordon
for convenience of the Service in forming Depots at that place.
At the end of the month the 1st Division Telegraph Battalion
proceeded to West Meon, laying a line via Whitehill to that
place and also to East Meon, Soberton, and Hambledon. The
Hambledon line was in communication with the Postal System.
On the 7th and 8th September, telephone exchanges were
established in each of the respective camps, and on the 15th a
telegraph line was laid between West Meon and the Yeomanry
camp at Exton ; in all a total of 57 miles.
On the 4th, 16th, and 18th September, special lines were
erected up to the actual zone of operations, and the movements
of the troops were reported back into camp. Two officers
weze told off for the purpose of reporting, while a third
remained in camp to follow the operations on a map ; this was
useful as a practice, but I do not, for the present, suggest its
possibility in war.

APPENDIX. 281
The Director of Army Telegraphs considers that the office
work was severe, and advocates a wider circulation of the
advantages of the Telegraph Battahon being made among the
Post Office servants in order to induce a greater number of
trained telegraphists to enlist.
The Telephone Exchanges were much used during the
Manoeuvres and reduced considerably the work of orderlies.
The Press messages were sent by correspondents to Peters
field to be forwarded by rail. The instruments in use in the
Military Offices do not transmit messages as quickly as the
Post Office fast speed instruments, and the supply of operators
was bmited. 7. Post Office.
In one Division a Post Office was established with a sorter
furnished by the Post Office at Petersfield. Two non-com
missioned officers assisted the Post Office official. The ex
penses of the non-commissioned officers were guaranteed by
the Post Office. The arrangements worked well, and such are
necessary in these days of parcel post, and where postal dues
must be collected. 8. Cyclists.
The question of establishing a permanent section of cyclists
for orderly duty in every corps is well worthy of consideration.
Cyclist orderlies were found very useful during the Cavalry
Manoeuvres of 1890, as they were during the Cavalry Drills of
1891, and again in the recent Autumn Manoeuvres, when
their services were invaluable. Their employment saves wear
and tear and exposure of horses, as the cyclist can be kept
under cover : he can also be kept close at hand and gets away

282 APPENDIX.
sooner. He delivers messages quicker than a mounted
orderly and can move in frosty weather when a horse cannot
well do so. In hilly country, with heavy lanes, however, he is
useless. The pace would improve if men were permanently employed
on the duty, and there would be less damage to machines.
Probably the best machine for military purposes has not yet
been introduced. To save clothing, of which there is consider
able wear and tear, the cyclist should be given cord pantaloons
and stockings.
Two of the battalions which marched into Aldershot to take
part in the Manoeuvres brought cyclist sections composed
mainly of non-commissioned officers. In the section of one
battalion there were 6 colour-sergeants and sergeants out of 10
men. The practice of the non-commissioned officers and men
riding on machines that will not carry a rifle should be for
bidden. As in most other innovations the means have hitherto
been found by voluntary efforts, battalions having mounted
the riders out of regimental funds.
If the system is to be officially recognized it will be desir
able to send an armourer to one of the makers' shops, so that
after being instructed, he may himself instruct the riders in
executing repairs which at present are unnecessarily trouble
some and costly of execution. 9. Printing.
The hektograph did not answer owing to the damp weather.
Either type writers or a small printing press is recommended
for the use of each Division. Type writers cannot take the
place of letterpress printing at Army Head-Quarters in the
field.

APPENDIX. 283

VI. EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING.
1. Officers' Equipments.
During the Manoeuvres the articles of equipment aud
clothing carried by officers differed in nearly all battalions.
Some carried capes, some great- coats, some haversacks and
field-glasses, while others carried nothing except a sword, and
the mode of carrying articles varied even in battalions, and
probably will do so until a General Order is issued. The first
step towards ensuring uniformity is to lay down what the
officers shall carry in peace and in war.
In my opinion for manoeuvres the mounted officer should
carry a sword on his waistbelt, with field-glasses over the left
shoulder and haversack over the right shoulder, and on his
saddle a water-bottle and cape or great-coat. Company
officers should carry sword, rolled cape attached by two straps
to waistbelt in centre of back to be worn when men carry
great-coats or capes, haversack over the right shoulder, field-
glasses and water-bottle over the left shoulder. A sealed
pattern field-glass as to size and case should be laid down.
It is generally agreed that the long boot worn by Infantry
officers is not suitable for any but show parades. The Infantry
officer should regard his horse as a means of conveyance only
to the fight, as once he comes under fire he cannot remain
effective when in the saddle.
In many regiments which come here it is necessary to forbid
the practice of wearing field boots which is common indeed in
the service. These are, I believe, a compromise towards
getting something to look smarter than a gaiter, but the part
around the ankle after a time gets hard and cracks. I think

284 APPENDIX.
the balance of advantages is in favour of all Infantry officers,
both mounted and company, wearing shooting boots, panta
loons, and putties.
2. Kersey Frocks and Trousers for Men.
These are, I think, sufficiently good if they were not altered
after they leave Pimlico. Every regiment which comes to
Aldershot has its clothing made too tight. At the conclusion
of last year's drill season I noticed one of the best battalions
here with trousers very tight at the knees. I caused it to be
inspected and the trousers compared with the sealed pattern,
ascertaining that over 50 per cent, of the trousers had been
taken in at the knees after the commencement of the furlough
season. Greater pains should be taken to check such altera
tions of clothing. It is worthy of consideration whether we
should not treat the Infantry like the Cavalry who have a
working and walking out dress. This might be done by
keeping the tunic for the latter use.
3. Boots.
The boot as issued would be good enough if the sole were
not so rigid, as it does not come to the shape of the man's foot.
Once the boot is in possession of the soldier, it is in too many
cases misused, the heel which should be kept low and broad is
replaced by a high and small one, and in many cases repairs
are very badly carried out. The practice, moreover, of con
stantly blacking the boots makes the leather inelastic and
hard. Soldiers are very averse to dubbing their boots, on
account of the loss of appearance. In many instances the
men are allowed to fit themselves with boots with the almost

APPENDIX. 285
invariable result that after a few days' wear the great toe of
the man can be seen protruding over the point of the boot.
To soften the leather of boots they should have a fish oil
worked into them by hand, and boots intended for wear
should be put into good condition a week before a march, and
during the last week before a march they should be worn
daily. 4. Shirts.
I have noticed that many of the men of battalions who join
the command wear linen or cotton shirts. This should be
forbidden, but will never be checked until in the Army, as in
the Navy, it is laid down that officers are to see frequently the
underclothing of their men on parade.
5. Socks.
We have received a new pattern sock, the seam of which is
brought to the side of the heels. I have not yet got the
official report, but it is much liked and will probably help to
reduce the number of sore feet. As compared with the
previous pattern these socks protect the feet better, they fit
better, and do not slip down around the ankle. It has been
suggested that they last better if they are soaked in water
before being worn.
6. Helmets.
The difficulties of obtaining a sightly head covering which
shall give sufficient protection from sun and rain, and allow
the soldier to fire when in marching order in the prone posi
tion, has not yet been overcome, and I fear it cannot be
accomplished. It might be better to let the soldier have in
England a show helmet, giving him a sun helmet when he

286 APPENDIX.
goes abroad. It is obvious that the several different patterns
for the Colonies and India which exist cannot be necessary.
One pattern for warm climates is sufficient. The soldier never
walks out in a helmet for pleasure, as no helmet which is
made in large numbers can ever be as comfortable as a cap.
I am myself content, for service purposes, with the Morion
shaped one brought forward last year by an officer of the
Head- Quarter Staff, which enables the Infantry soldier to
shoot or a gunner to lay a gun by a Scott's sight.
The round cap worn by the Infantry (Guards) is not
serviceable ; the Officer Commanding the only battalion that
wore it reports that his men's caps are completely ruined, and
he thinks there is scarcely one cap fit for wear on parade,
although the Manoeuvres lasted only 16 days for the
battalion.
7. Water Bottles.
The order that the bottles should be filled and inspected
every morning before the troops left camp was in many
instances disobeyed. This should receive attention in future.

8. Shoeing.
The shoes being made of very soft material, wore quickly,
and were very thin, and many broke in half. Horses were as
a rule shod before going to the Manoeuvres, and one pair of
shoes was carried for each horse, but this was not sufficient for
even a fortnight.
The nature of the soil caused many to be lost. One
squadron lost 29 shoes, the Field Artillery with about three
times the strength, only lost 24, which indicates that some-

APPENDIX. 287
thing also is due to careless shoeing-smiths. The Artillery
had, however, only 50 sets of machine made shoes.
After the return march to Aldershot it was found that many
horses of one of the Divisional squadrons were suffering from
bruised feet. This squadron had only been employed for 13
days, mainly on turf and over cultivated land.
Unless we can ensure better than we have done that the
machine made shoes shall be of fair quality, I should like to
reconsider my recommendation made last year that 50 per
cent, should be shod with them.

9. Eemarks on Experimental Equipment.
Water Bottles — (Lewes Pattern). — These are of two
kinds, one iron enamelled the other tin, both fitted with a
filter which in a short time gets rusty and useless, and in
addition the arrangement is too elaborate to be suitable for
troops. The tin pattern soils the men's clothing and the
enamel on the iron one soon chips. (Boyes' Pattern and
New Pattern Iron Enamelled). — Both these bottles are
favourably regarded, the iron being covered with felt. As the
reports on these two, which differ only in their shape, were
equal, I have had the bottles passed to other corps for further
comparison and report, which is to be rendered on the 1st
January, 1892.
Water Troughs — (Molyneux-Seel). — These form a useful
addition to the water cart, enabling water-bottles to be quickly
filled and preventing waste of water.
Drinking Cup. — I caused a drinking cup to be attached by
a chain to each cart. This is convenient and prevents the
waste of water incurred by the men holding their mouths down
to the tap hole.

288 appendix.
Entrenching Tools (Woodgate). — These were tried for
carriage. The combined carriage of pick and bayonet and of
spade and bayonet is not satisfactory, but when carried singly
they are easier for the men than the Wallace tool. Some
slight alterations are now being made to raise the carriage
higher than the hips, and a further trial will be carried out.
Axes — Pick and Felling (Hogan's combined). — I re
commend the adoption of this tool for pioneers. The weight
of the axe head gives greater force when the tool is used as a
pick, and similarly the weight in the pick allows of a more
powerful stroke with the axe.
Head Collars (Stud Attachments). — These were used
by the Eoyal Artillery, Eoyal Engineers, and Army Service
Corps, but are approved of by the Eoyal Artillery only. I
cannot recommend their adoption, believing there is nothing
so serviceable as a strap and buckle, for all stud holes fray
out. Frog Sword Saddle (Mark II). — The Mark II. is an
improvement, but the ring strap should be slightly wider,
while the stud should be lower and should be riveted right
through. Hoof Pickers.— I recommend their being carried on the
shoe case behind the sword. They are so seldom used except
to remove tan when the horse comes out of the Eiding School
that it seems scarcely worth while to put them on the men's
bodies. Trace Hooks (Experimental). — These are certainly an
improvement on the existing pattern. Spare rubber rings
should be taken on service to replace those which may be
damaged. Horse Collars — (Steel). — There can be no question that
these form the most satisfactory collar for Army Service Corps

appendix.

289

work. They make so much noise, however, by the rattling of
the links and, what for want of a better name I must call hame
hooks, that I do not recommend them in their present form
for fighting units.
Swivels, Piling (Magazine Rifle). — The piling swivels
are now quite satisfactory.
Lightening Load of Cavalry Horse. — With the view
of lightening the load at present put on the Cavalry horse, as
laid down in the Manual for Field Service, Cavalry, 1888,
Appendix IV., pages 56-57, I obtained sanction for the
following articles, packed in the corn sacks, being carried in
forage carts, of which two were allotted to each squadron.

Corn sack
Picketing gear
Ankle boots .
Horse brush .
Clothes brush .
Stable sponge.
Oil bottle
Pot of grease .
Pocket ledger .
Spare boot laces
Service cap
Flannel shirt
Drawers Socks . . .
Towel ...
HoldallHousewife

lbs.

ozs.

1

13

3

4

3

13

0

11

0

4

0

1

0

4

1

n

0

2

0

2

0

n

1

i

1

Oi

0

5

0

Si

0

10

0

3|

IT

290

APPENDIX.

lbs.
ozs.
Brought forward
. 15
H
Pad for surcingle
and surcingle
. 0
12±
Spare pants
. 2
s
Putties 
. 0
8
Cape ...
. 2
0
Forage net
. 2
2i
Waterproof sheet
. 2
5
24
13
The experiment answered well, the officers who carried it
out reporting favourably on it.
It was, however, brought to notice that the forage cart is not
properly balanced for this sort of work. It is too short in the
body, causing the load to ride high, with the result that re
adjustment frequently becomes necessary on the march.
I think a light four-wheeled wagon is better adapted for
this purpose than a two-wheeled vehicle, in spite of the danger
that, once we get to four wheels four horses will be demanded,
and there is risk of overloading.
The four-wheeled wagon is more easily packed, and does not
require the nicety of adjustment which is essential with the
forage cart, and which I do not think would be attended to in
the hurry of packing up on service. Moreover, the load of
the four-wheeled wagon, even when hastily packed, does not
shift to any appreciable extent.
One of the squadron leaders considers that the picketing
gear should be carried on the horses. I do not agree with this,
as, if horses have had a hard day's work they will stand quietly
enough fastened to a peg, by the head rope, until the carts
come up, and one peg could be carried on the sword for this
APPENDIX. 291
purpose, the head rope being already on the horse. If the
horses have not had a hard day's work, there will not be much
delay before the arrival of the carts.
I strongly recommend that a specially constructed light four-
wheeled wagon, with a cover, be sent to Aldershot for trial as
soon as possible.
VII. MISCELLANEOUS. 1. Weather.
The week ending 12th September can be described as bright
and warm, the last four days being very hot. There was,
however, a pleasant breeze on the top of the Downs. On the
13th September the weather, though still warm, became
cloudy, and the glass went back 3-10ths, rain falling during
the night. On both the 14th and 15th September it was fine
in the early morning, but steady rain commenced about 9 A.M.,
and continued during the whole day. The 16th and 17th
September were fine, cloudy, and cool, but the glass continued
to fall steadily. On the 18th September heavy rain fell from
early morning until the evening, and the hills remained covered
with mist the whole day. On the 19th very heavy rain fell
from early morning and continued without intermission, so
that in the forenoon the orders were issued to abandon the
Manceuvres ; and as no improvement in the state of the weather
occurred for many days after the return to quarters, this
decision was fortunate. 2. Bands in the Villages.
The playing of the bands in the villages became very
popular, although it would have been more appreciated if I
had given longer notice, and the hours had been somewhat
U 2

292 appendix.
later, for owing to the delay in the harvesting many of the
villagers were still on the fine days working in the fields at
5 o'clock. If, however, the hour had been made later than
4 p.m. the bands would not have got back to their camps until
after nightfall. 3. Police.
The conduct of the troops was so good that very little
assistance was required from the police in maintaining order.
The Military Mounted Police in each camp might have
been reduced by two, and they should have arrived there
before any of the troops.
The Chief Constable of the County furnished four mounted
constables, two were located near each Divisional Camp ; but
they were mounted on horses untrained to military sights and
sounds, and the undivided attention of their riders was not
given to their duties.
4. Time Gun.
This proved to be of great use in ensuring punctuality.
In future it should be fired at 8 or 830 p.m., and last post
should not be later than 9 '30 p.m.
5. Canteens.
In future, when Militia or Volunteers join camp with the
Line, the arrangements for canteens and tentage should ap
proximate nearly to those of the rest of the force.
VIII. HEALTH.
1. Health of Men and Medical Arrangements.
From our experience this year it is evident the number of
medical officers I had detailed, two for each Division, was not

appendix. 293
sufficient ; as, although the health of the men was good, yet
with young soldiers, the numbers who reported sick were
greater than two medical officers could inspect before the daily
work of the Division commenced. The greatest number which
reported sick in either Division in one day was 240. During
the 16 days' absence from Aldershot, 2400 reported themselves
sick, but of these 41 per cent only were placed under treat
ment ; of these 29 per cent were treated in camp, whilst 12
per cent were sent to Aldershot. Of the cases sent to Aider-
shot 114 were for venereal, 26 for blistered feet, and the
remainder from other causes, principally rheumatism. (See
Appendix K.)
The selection of tobacco which is to be sold in Eegimental
canteens requires special attention. At present it is generally
too strong for consumption by the soldier whose marching and
accuracy in shooting is materially affected by its use. On
service the soldier could not use these tobaccos without the
risk of originating or aggravating heart disease.
The Medical Officer in Charge of one Division states in his
report on the 2nd day's march to the Manoeuvres that " all the
cases of vertigo, with pains in the chest, palpitation of the
heart and shortness of breath, so common amongst young
soldiers, are I believe entirely due to a combination of tobacco
and prolonged exertion."
There is fashion in this taste as in every other, and it is
most desirable to gradually estahhsh the fashion of smoking
tobaccos of milder brands than those at present sold in
canteens. I recommend this question be taken up at once.
I now regret that I did not utilize the Manoeuvres for the
testing of a field hospital. In Section V., sub-section 4, I
allude to the necessity of teaching soldiers how to roll and
place in its valise the bell tent. It is thought there may be

294 APPENDIX.
considerable difficulty in repacking a field hospital into the
regulated space by any except those who have had considerable
practice in doing so. I recommend I be permitted to send
out a field hospital when employing field columns next year.

2. Health of Horses.
The general condition of the horses remained good in spite
of the very inclement weather. Epizootic fever had prevailed
in one Cavalry regiment before the squadron detached from it
left Aldershot, but partly owing to the care which the squadron
leader took of his horses, they returned, if anything, in rather
better condition than they were in when they started.

IX. COMPENSATION FOE DAMAGES.
Many owners who were willing to give permission for the
troops to manoeuvre over their land objected to encampments
being formed on it, and therefore two forms of agreement were
draw out (see Appendices L and M), to take the place of the
one form used in 1890. Except as at Churn last year, where
the owner, Lord Wantage, gave the whole of his encamping
ground without making any charge, it will be generally
necessary to have these two forms, and to hire the land actually
used for encampments, because as pasture is favourable for
the troops to encamp on, so is the damage of it likely to be
serious in continuous wet weather.
The prices paid on this occasion for grass land averaged £1,
and for arable land 15s. per acre, and it was stipulated that no
claims should be made except for damage to hedges and gates,
and that the troops were on vacating the ground to fill in all

APPENDIX. 295
excavations to the satisfaction of the owner. Too much
trouble cannot be taken by officers to ensure that the troops
fill in tent trenches, rubbish pits, latrines, &c. The amount
claimed at Soberton was heavier than it would have been, in
consequence of neglect in this matter.
As the system of Manceuvres without an Act of Parliament
progress, ground for encampments will probably be procured
at much lower rates, as there is no doubt arable fields benefit
greatly by being used as camping grounds for men and horses. I
suggest I be permitted to send an officer into the Meon-Soberton
district in 1892, to report on the state ofthe crops on fields where
troops were encamped. Appendix N shows clearly the com
pensation paid for damages, rent of ground, use of water, and
grants in aid of roads. The total amount exceeds what would
be paid under ordinary conditions of weather. In continuous
rain the camps must be shifted frequently, and consequently a
larger area of ground is required.
I made the mistake of not sending the Military Police
forward before the advanced parties arrived on the ground.
These parties are always under less control than the regiments,
and their conduct "gave rise to the only claim made for wilful
damage. Greater attention might have been paid by officers to the
prevention of damage, when marching home after the " Cease
Fire " had been sounded.
In future it might be well to tell off two officers to take
charge of spectators. This would add not only to the com
fort of the latter,. but would prevent their getting into the
way of the troops and doing damage to crops.
The occupiers named an assessor, but it was not found
necessary to call in his assistance, as the claims on the whole
were fair and just, and the patriotic spirit of the owners and

296 appendix.
occupiers enabled the officers representing the War Office to
settle them without difficulty.
About 10 days after the termination of the Manceuvres, all
claims having been received, the assessors went down to the
ground, and having come to an understanding with the
claimants, paid the money due to them on the spot, taking a
receipt. All claims except those for damage of roads were
disposed of in two days. This was greatly appreciated by
those concerned, who dislike correspondence.
Sutlers' Wagons. — Most of the damage done to the roads
for which compensation has been demanded this year has been
by Sutlers' wagons, mainly those hired by brewers ; the great
cause of difference between the service and the Sutlers' trans
port being that the army wagon carries two tons with a 3-in.
tyre, while the others carry four tons on wheels with 2-in. tyres.
I am considering the subject, but any tax imposed on the
wagons would eventually be paid for by the troops.

X. EXPENSES.
The sum placed at my disposal for Drills and Manceuvres
this year amounted to £5179. Later I was directed, if
possible, to provide for Cavalry Drills, which were not con
templated when the original amount was granted.
These drills cost £414, leaving £4765. The actual cost of
the Manoeuvres was;£4246, or £519 less than the amount
available. (For details see Appendix 0.)
The expenditure is under my estimate, which is accounted
for by the period of manoeuvres having been curtailed.
It is right that I should place on record how much my
duties were [lightened by the assistance I received before and

APPENDIX. 297
during the Manoeuvres from you and other members of the
Head-Quarter Staff. Your presence on the ground enabled
me to effect a considerable saving, for after visiting the camps
on Friday evening, the 18th September, I came to the con
clusion that should the weather continue very inclement next
day, it would be well to disperse the troops. I communicated
with you early next morning, and having obtained your
concurrence, immediate steps were taken, which resulted in
the whole of the mounted troops marching to Aldershot, with
the exception of one Field Battery which marched to Hilsea,
and the Infantry of one Division reaching Woolmer, except
one battalion of it which proceeded by rail to Woolwich, and
another which marched to Portsmouth that night.

XI. EESULTS OF EXPENDITUEE.
On the 23rd September I recorded my great satisfaction
with the conduct of all concerned during the Manoeuvres. I
then wrote : —
"Soldiers of all ranks have shown unflagging interest in
the work, and the cheerful manner in which the great dis
comfort of the last few days, caused by bad weather, was borne
by them impressed the Lieutenant-General Commanding most
favourably. " He has received from many of the residents living in the
neighbourhood of the manoeuvre ground, and from the civil
police, uniformly satisfactory accounts "of the behaviour of the
troops." From what I have learned from several different sources of
information, I am confident that the conduct and general
bearing of the troops created a most favourable impression in

298 APPENDIX.
the district in which they were working ; this is the more
remarkable, as I have good reason for believing that the
massing of so many young men around quiet villages was
regarded with great apprehension by many in the neighbour
hood, but was fortunately removed by the behaviour of the
men. This happy result was doubtless brought about to a
great extent by the care exercised by the officers, not only in
maintaining discipline, but also in so watching over the comfort
of the men that they had no reason for desiring to leave
camp. In tactical skill, officers of all ranks have improved to a
very great degree ; but the improvement in military spirit, in
eagerness to learn and to submit cheerfully to great physical
discomforts, is even more remarkable, and this spirit reacts
naturally on the lower ranks.
While there has been this great improvement amongst
Eegimental Officers, increased efficiency of Staff and Supply
Departments was manifested to at least an equal degree. In
the Manceuvres of former years, most of the Supplies were, I
believe, obtained by contract, whereas on this occasion, as
also in 1890, everything was obtained through the Army
Service Corps.
The sudden abandonment of the Manoeuvres, necessitating
the conveyance of rations, which had been already prepared at
Soberton and East Meon, to Woolmer, was carried out without
any difficulty or friction. This was in no way due to my
exertions, but to the knowledge, energy, and skill of the Staff
and Supply Officers serving with me, to all of whom I am
greatly indebted.
I am reporting separately on the attainments of all the
Staff and Commanding Officers, but I must here record that
in the whole of the arrangements before and during" the

APPENDIX. 299
Manoeuvres, the Aldershot Divisional Staff, by taking all
details off my hands, enabled me to devote my time to the
initiation and consideration of tactical schemes, and thus to
endeavour to obtain for the country the best value for its
expenditure. (Signed), EVELYN WOOD,
Lieutenant-General.
This document does not leave much opportunity to
the general officer who may be called upon to succeed
Sir Evelyn Wood in the direction of Autumn Manoeu
vres. And, indeed, it is a common remark among
experienced soldiers at Aldershot and elsewhere, that
whatever may be the type of the coming man, he will
find so much progress has been made at the great camp,
that the machine will pretty well run alone if he will
but let it. But there remain a few points to be noticed
in the work at Aldershot, where an officer of rank and
culture and renown writes to me :
" No detail is too small for Sir Evelyn, no under
taking too great. What he does he does thoroughly."
Another high staff-officer has said to me ; " When he
leaves Aldershot I don't know where a successor will
be found, for few men have so much fire under the
boiler." Even the sanitary arrangements he sees to personally,
and inspects frequently, at unexpected moments. If
genius consists, as has been said, in an infinite capacity

296 appendix.
occupiers enabled the officers representing the War Office to
settle them without difficulty.
About 10 days after the termination of the Manceuvres, all
claims having been received, the assessors went down to the
ground, and having come to an understanding with the
claimants, paid the money due to them on the spot, taking a
receipt. All claims except those for damage of roads were
disposed of in two days. This was greatly appreciated by
those concerned, who dislike correspondence.
Sutlers' Wagons. — Most of the damage done to the roads
for which compensation has been demanded this year has been
by Sutlers' wagons, mainly those hired by brewers ; the great
cause of difference between the service and the Sutlers' trans
port being that the army wagon carries two tons with a 3-in.
tyre, while the others carry four tons on wheels with 2-in. tyres.
I am considering the subject, but any tax imposed on the
wagons would eventually be paid for by the troops.

X. EXPENSES.
The sum placed at my disposal for Drills and Manoeuvres
this year amounted to £5179. Later I was directed, if
possible, to provide for Cavalry Drills, which were not con
templated when the original amount was granted.
These drills cost £414, leaving £4765. The actual cost of
the Manoeuvres was~-£4246, or £519 less than the amount
available. (For details see Appendix 0.)
The expenditure is under my estimate, which is accounted
for by the period of manoeuvres having been curtailed.
It is right that I should place on record how much my
duties were [lightened by the assistance I received before and

APPENDIX. 297
during the Manoeuvres from you and other members of the
Head-Quarter Staff. Your presence on the ground enabled
me to effect a considerable saving, for after visiting the camps
on Friday evening, the 18th September, I came to the con
clusion that should the weather continue very inclement next
day, it would be well to disperse the troops. I communicated
with you early next morning, and having obtained your
concurrence, immediate steps were taken, which resulted in
the whole of the mounted troops marching to Aldershot, with
the exception of one Field Battery which marched to Hilsea,
and the Infantry of one Division reaching Woolmer, except
one battalion of it which proceeded by rail to Woolwich, and
another which marched to Portsmouth that night.

XI. EESULTS OF EXPENDITUEE.
On the 23rd September I recorded my great satisfaction
with the conduct of all concerned during the Manceuvres. I
then wrote : —
"Soldiers of all ranks have shown unflagging interest in
the work, and the cheerful manner in which the great dis
comfort of tho last few days, caused by bad weather, was borne
by them impressed the Lieutenant-General Commanding most
favourably. " He has received from many of the residents living in the
neighbourhood of the manoeuvre ground, and from the civil
police, uniformly satisfactory accounts 'of the behaviour of the
troops." From what I have learned from several different sources of
information, I am confident that the conduct and general
bearing of the troops created a most favourable impression in

298 APPENDIX.
the district in which they were working; this is the more
remarkable, as I have good reason for believing that the
massing of so many young men around quiet villages was
regarded with great apprehension by many in the neighbour
hood, but was fortunately removed by the behaviour of the
men. This happy result was doubtless brought about to a
great extent by the care exercised by the officers, not only in
maintaining discipline, but also in so watching over the comfort
of the men that they had no reason for desiring to leave
camp. In tactical skill, officers of all ranks have improved to a
very great degree ; but the improvement in military spirit, in
eagerness to learn and to submit cheerfully to great physical
discomforts, is even more remarkable, and this spirit reacts
naturally on the lower ranks.
While there has been this great improvement amongst
Eegimental Officers, increased efficiency of Staff and Supply
Departments was manifested to at least an equal degree. In
the Manoeuvres of former years, most of the Supplies were, I
believe, obtained by contract, whereas on this occasion, as
also in 1890, everything was obtained through the Army
Service Corps.
The sudden abandonment of the Manoeuvres, necessitating
the conveyance of rations, which had been already prepared at
Soberton and East Meon, to Woolmer, was carried out without
any difficulty or friction. This was in no way due to my
exertions, but to the knowledge, energy, and skill of the Staff
and Supply Officers serving with me, to all of whom I am
greatly indebted.
I am reporting separately on the attainments of all the
Staff and Commanding Officers, but I must here record that
in the whole of the arrangements before and during the

APPENDIX. 299
Manoeuvres, the Aldershot Divisional Staff, by taking all
details off my hands, enabled me to devote my time to the
initiation and consideration of tactical schemes, and thus to
endeavour to obtain for the country the best value for its
expenditure. (Signed), EVELYN WOOD,
Lieutenant-General.
This document does not leave much opportunity to
the general officer who may be called upon to succeed
Sir Evelyn Wood in the direction of Autumn Manceu
vres. And, indeed, it is a common remark among
experienced soldiers at Aldershot and elsewhere, that
whatever may be the type of the coming man, he will
find so much progress has been made at the great camp,
that the machine will pretty well run alone if he will
but let it. But there remain a few points to be noticed
in the work at Aldershot, where an officer of rank and
culture and renown writes to me :
" No detail is too small for Sir Evelyn, no under
taking too great. What he does he does thoroughly."
Another high staff-officer has said to me ; " When he
leaves Aldershot I don't know where a successor will
be found, for few men have so much fire under the
boiler." Even the sanitary arrangements he sees to personally,
and inspects frequently, at unexpected moments. If
genius consists, as has been said, in an infinite capacity

300 APPENDIX.
for taking trouble, then does Sir Evelyn deserve the
name which is, however, too often bestowed upon eccen
tric incapables. All experimental equipment is tried
under his own eyes, and he personally tests it all, down
to the smallest detail. The new ranges at Bisley and Ash
were made under his care and individual supervision by
military labour in the shortest possible time, and at a
cost almost ridiculously small in comparison with that
of other ranges of not one-tenth the capacity. Lastly,
he secured for the soldier, not in Aldershot camp only,
but throughout the land also, the great boon of travel
ling by rail, and most lines of steamers, at a reduced
rate, equivalent to return journey for a single fare, and
this privilege was extended to the soldier's family, if
" on the strength." As a claim has been put forward,
elsewhere, for the initiation of this concession, it may
be said, once for all, that Sir Evelyn personally " inter
viewed" the managers of the various railway and
wrote to the managers of the steamboat lines on
the subject, and did the work entirely " off his own
bat," scarcely anyone being taken into his confidence
on the subject until the privilege had been secured.
Moreover, at Aldershot every opportunity is given to
the soldier to avail himself of the concession, as the
General holds that there is no recruiting sergeant equal
to the holiday -making soldier, if he be smart, sober, well
conducted and contented, as everyone is made at
Aldershot if the thing be possible. I have watched the

APPENDIX. 301
reforms of the past three seasons there with a very
searching eye. I have sought every opportunity of
ascertaining the opinions of all ranks on the matter.
And from general officer to private there is but one
opinion, which is that Sir Evelyn has but one fault,
an ineradicable fault : he is up much too early for the
convenience of those who are late of getting to bed, or
are heavy sleepers.

( 303 )

INDEX.

Administrative Services, 271-282
Adye, Gen. Sir John, 168
Africa, see Ashanti, Egypt, South
Africa, Transvaal, Zululand, &c.
Ailesbury, Lord, 220
Aldershot, Brigade Major Wood at,
44, 46-48, 51-64, 225-247 ; Ee
port of Autumn Manoeuvres, 1891,
at, 248-301
Alexandria, bombardment of, 160,
164, 167, 175
Alison, Sir Archibald, 49, 59, 161,
164-170, 225
Alma, battle of the, 6
Ammunition, Autumn 1891, Ma
noeuvres, 270, 271
Anstruther, Col., 124
Arabi Pacha, 159-170
Arethusa, H.M.S., 5, 6
Armenia, 222
Army, Sir E. Wood and the British,
205-208
Army reform, Lord Wolseley and,
206-208
Army Service Corps, 232-235
Artillery, horse, Autumn Manceuvres,
258, 259, 263, 264
Ash, range at, 300
Ashanti War, 52-63
Autumn Manoeuvres, 1891, at Aider-
shot, report of, 248-301

Baker Pacha, Charles, 178, 179
Baker Pacha, Valentine, 178, 179,
183
Balaclava, 6
Balloon section, Autumn Manoeuvres,
265, 266
Baring, Sir R, 197, 201
Barton, Capt., 93
Bayuda Desert, 194
Beaconsfield, Lord, 111
Beatson, Gen., 25, 26
Belfast, Sir E. Wood at, 120
Bemba, Chief, 75, 77
Benson, Lieut.-Gen., 23, 38
Berber, 195, 196
Beresford, Lord Charles, 192
Berryman, Major, 30
Biggs, Lieut., 95
Bisley, range at, 300
Black Sea, in the, 5-7
Black Watch, Major Wood joins the,
43,44
Blood Eiver, the, 71, 76, 77,*116
Boers, the, 67, 71, 81 ; warj with,
121-158
Bond, Eev. F. H., 2, 3
Boots, Sir E. Wood and, 257, 284,
285
Booth, Sergeant, 82
Brackenbury, Capt., 56
Bradford, Lieut., 31

304

INDEX.

Brand, President, 124, 147
Bright, Mr. John, 160, 241
Brindley, Charle3, 244
Bruce, Eobert the, and mounted
infantry, 209, 210
Buller, Sir Eedvers, 56, 79-81/84, 87-
108, 192, 194-197, 207, 232, 239
Bulwer, Sir H., 73
Burgoyne, Sir J. P., and mounted
riflemen, 214
Burke, Major H., 9, 10
Burn's Hill, skirmish at, 68
Burode, fight at, 38, 42
Butler, Sir William, 192
Cairo, 171, 188
Calcutta, Lieut. Wood at, 37
Cambridge, Duke of, 51, 225
Cambridge Hospital, 236, 237
Campbell, Capt. Eonald, 88-93
Camps for Autumn Manoeuvres, 1891,
252-254
Canning, Lord, 28, 36
Canteen management at Aldershot,
237, 292
Cardwell, Mr., 56
Carey, Lieut., 116-119
Carnarvon, Earl of, 249
Casualties, Autumn Manoeuvres,
Aldershot, 268, 269
Cavalry at Autumn Manoeuvres,
264, 265
Chamberlain, Mr. J., 145, 149
Chatham, Sir E. Wood at, 120, 157,
170
Chelmsford, Sir E. Wood at, 111, 112
Chelmsford, Lord, 67-70, 72, 74-78,
83-85, 87-106
Chemmun-Singh, capture of, 27-29
Chermside, Major, 176
Chiropodists, military, 258
Cholera in Egypt, 177, 181
Clarke, Col. Stanley, 17
Clarke, Capt., 71, 124

Clothing, Autumn Manoeuvres, 283-
291
Club House at Aldershot, 232
Coffee Calcalli, King of Ashanti,
52-63
Colchester, 225
Colenso, Bishop, 84, 87
Colley, Major-Gen. Sir G. P., 122-
134, 147, 155
Colours, Sir E. Wood and regimental,
114, 115
Compensation for damages, Autumn
Manceuvres, 294-296
Constantinople, 17, 164
Cookery, School of, Aldershot, 236
Coomassie, 61
Corps of sharpshooters, 211-214, 222,
223
Cranbrook, Lord, 62
Crealock, Col. N., 74
Crease, Capt., 56
Crimean War, 5-17, 21, 112, 243,
244
Cronjee (Boer leader), 132-134, 141
Cunynghame, Gen. Sir A. T., 67
Curtis, Lt.-Col., 22
Cyclists at Autumn Manceuvres,
281, 282
Damages, Compensation for, Autumn
Manceuvres, 294-296
Damietta, 170
Daniels, Mr., 7, 9
Dawnay, Hon. Guy, 207, 223
Decorations, &c, of Sir E. Wood;
the Legion of Honour, 18; the
Medjidieh of the Fifth Class, 19 ;
the Crimean Medal, 21 ; the Vic
toria Cross, 29, 30; appointed a
K.C.B., 86 ; knighted at Balmoral,
111; promoted G.C.M.G., 158;
First Class of the Order of the
Medjidieh, 202
Delia Sala, Count, 176, 177

INDEX.

305

De Salis, Col., 22
Desert Column, the, 194
Dragoons, 216, 217
Dublin, Major Wood at, 44
Du Cane, Sir C, 112
Dufferin, Lord, 174, 179-181
Duncan, Col., 174
Earle, Gen., 186
East London, 67
Egypt, Sir E. Wood in, 159-170 ;
and army in, 171-185, 197-204,
208
Elmina, Gold Coast, 54
El-Teb, Baker Pacha at, 183
Engineers, Eoyal, at Autumn Ma
nceuvres, 265
Equipment, Autumn Manceuvres,
283-291
Errors observed in Autumn Ma
noeuvres, 269
Erskine, Lord, 113
Essaman, attack on, 56, 58
Etshowe, Belief of, 87
Expenses of Autumn Manoeuvres,
296-299
Faku, Zulu headman, 73
Fantis Tribe, the, 53-63
Farquharson, Mr., 244
Farragut, Admiral, 16
Fenian disturbances in Ireland, 44-
46
FestiDg, Col., 53
Field Telegraphs _ at Autumn Ma
noeuvres, 280
Fishmongers' Hall, Sir E. Wood at,
111
Forbes, Mr. A., 107, 113; and a
corps of scouts, 211, 214
Fowler, Private, 92
Fraser, Gen. Keith, 174, 221, 238
Fremantle, Capt., 56

Frere, Sir Bartle, 72-76, 83, 99, 107,
108
Frost, Commandant, 68
Gakdul, pools of, 196
Games Fund at Aldershot, 237
German customs in British Army,
229-231
German settlers at Luneberg, 72, 73,
81, 122
Giraffe, Major Wood's ride on a, 41,
42
Gilbert, Lieut.-Col., 77, 79
Gladstone, Mr., and the Ashanti
War, 55 ; and the Transvaal War,
123, 134-136, 138, 149, 155-157 ;
and Egypt, 161-164, 186
Glyn, Col., 75, 76
Gold Coast, 51-63
Goona district, the, 32, 35
Gordon, Gen. Charles, 186, 187
Goza heights, the, 69
Grandier, Frenchman named, 86
Grant, Gen. Sir. J. H., 50
Grant, Major, 184
Grant-Duff, Mr., 143-145, 151, 152
Granville, Lord, 171, 179, 199, 200
Grattan, Col., 233
Greaves, Col., 59
Grenfell, Col., 174, 176
Grocers' Hall, Sir E. Wood at, 114,
115
Ground for Autumn Manceuvres,
252-254
Guards Camel Corps, 196
Gubat, 195
Hackett, Major, 95-98
Hamley, Sir Edward, 6, 165-170
Hammill, Commander, 187
Harcourt, Sir William, 157, 158
Hardinge, Lord, 15, 48
Hardy, Mr. Gathome. See Cran-
brook, Lord. X

306

INDEX.

Harman, Gen., 168
Harrison, Major-Gen. Sir Eichard,
116, 117
Hartington, Lord, 187
Harward, Lieut., 82
Hatherley, Lord, 1, 2, 109
Hay, Admiral Lord John, 187, 189
Health of men during Autumn
Manoeuvres, 292-294
Henderson, Major, 221, 222, 229
Herbert, Gen., 64
Hewett, Vice-Admiral, Sir W., 29,
30
Hicks Pacha, 182, 183
Holker, Sir John, 113
Home, Major, 59
Horsford, Sir Alfred, 45, 48, 108
Hunter, Sir William, 21
Huntsman, Sir E. Wood as a, 242-
247
Hutton, Col., 208, 221
Idde&leigh, Earl. See Northcote,
SirS.
Indian Mutiny, the, 19-42
Infantry at Autumn Manoeuvres,
Aldershot, 256-258, 262, 263
Infantry, mounted, Sir E. Wood,
208-224
Inhambane, visit to, 157
Inhlobana Mountain, 79, 81, 90-99
Inhumanity, accusations of, in Zulu
War, 111
Ireland, Major Wood in, 44-46
Isandhlwana, 80
Isle of Man, Sir E. Wood offered the
Governorship of, 157, 158
Ismailia, 165, 167
Joubert, Gen., 128-135, 142
Kaffirs, war with the, 65, 67-70
Kafr-Dowar, 166, 169, 175

Kambula camp, 80-82 ; fight at, 93-
100, 112
Kassassin, 169, 170
Keiskama Hoek, 65, 67, 106, 107
Ketchwayo, king, 67, 71-112, 120
Khartoum, 194
Kimberley, Lord, 123, 125-127, 131,
134, 136, 138, 139, 153
Korti, 194-197
Kruger, President, 126-135, 142, 147
Kurai, action of, 22, 38
Kwamagwasa Mission Station, 103
Laing's Nek, 125-129
Laye, Capt., 96
Leet, Major, 90
Lennard, Sir Thomas, 109, 111
Lewa Shuhdi Pacha, 176
Liddell, Dr., 13
Lloyd, Mr., 88-93
Luneberg, 71 ; German settlers at,
72, 73, 81
Lushington, Sir Stephen, 11, 13, 18
Lyons, Lord, 13, 14
Lysons, Gen. D., 48, 51
Lysons, Lieut., 88-92
Macleod, Capt., 83, 85
McNaughten's Kranz, skirmish at,
69
McNeill, Sir John, 54
McNeill, Col., 56
Magreikh, pools at, 196
Mahdi, revolt of the, 183-204
Maitland, Colonel, 167
Majuba Hill, 127
Makulusini kraal, 80
Malakhoff, the, 7, 8, 10
Malet, Sir Edward, 167, 168, 171,
180-182
Manceuvres at Aldershot, 237-239;
report of Autumn, 1891, 248-301
Mansu, advance on, 57
Manyanyoba, Chief, 81

INDEX.

307

Maps used Autumn Manceuvres, 250,
251
March, the Autumn Manceuvres,
1891, 256-260
Marlborough, Mr. Wood at, 2, 3
Maurice, Col. J. F., 160, 170
Mayne, Major, 33-35
Medical service, the, 224
Metemmeh, 194
Mhow, 21, 25
Michel, Major-Gen., 22, 24, 37-39
Michell, Capt., 3, 11
Midshipman, Mr. Wood a, 4, 5
Montgomerie, Capt., 192
Mordaunt, Charles, 19, 20
Moriarty, Capt., 82
Morrogh, Mr., 244
Moukhtar Pacha, 222
Mounted Infantry, Sir E. Wood and,
208-224 ; at Autumn Manceuvres,
259
Musketry Fire Tactics, 224, 225
Napier, General, 44, 64
Napoleon, Prince Louis, 115-120
Natal, 70, 75, 86, 109, 157
Navy, Cadet Wood in H.M.'s, 3-16
Newdigate, Major-General, 98, 101,
116, 137, 139
Nicholson, Lieut., 95
Niel, Marshal, 8
Nile Expedition, the, 186-197, 203,
204
Northbrook, Lord, 271
Northcote, Sir S., 161, 162
Nott, Gen., 31
Nuggers for the Nile Expedition,
189-192
Odessa, bombardment of, 5
Ordahsu, action at, 61
Ordnance Store Department at Aider-
shot Manceuvres, 277-279
Osborn, Mr., 153
Outpost Duties, 224

Parliament, and the Transvaal, 142-
153
Parnell, Mr., 149, 150
Parr, Major Hallam, 176, 185
Pay of troops at Aldershot Ma
nceuvres, 279
Pearson, Col., 75, 85, 86
Peel, Sir Wm. (Captain E.N.), 7-15,
19
Peterborough, Earl of, and mounted
infantry, 210, 211
Pokwana Chief, 71
Police at Autumn Manoeuvres, 292
Pondo Land, 70, 245
Pontic Sea, 4
Poore, Capt., 192
Portal, Mr., 249
Post Office at Autumn Manoeuvres,
281
Potchefstroom, 129-134, 141, 142
Prahsu, 59, 60
Pretoria, 139, 140
Pretorius, A. (Boer), 74
Printing at Autumn Manceuvres, 282
Programme of Aldershot Autumn
Manoeuvres, 260, 261
Promotions of Sir E. Wood : to mid
shipman, 4, 5 ; to cornet in 13th
Dragoons, 17; to lieutenant, 18;
to major, 38, 39; A.-D.-C. at
Dublin, 44 ; to Brigade-Major, 44 ;
to Major-Gen., 127 ; &c.
Queen, H.M.S., Cadet Wood on, 3-15
Quesne, Gen. le, 238
Quilli Mountain, 67
Eaaff, Commdt., 96
Eaglan, Lord, 8, 12, 13, 17
Eajghur, action of, 22, 39-42
Eanges for Volunteer Corps, 225
Eations, at Aldershot Autumn Ma
noeuvres, 273-276

308

INDEX.

Eedan, the, 7, 8, 10, 11
Eeform, Lord Wolseley and Army,
206, 207
Report of Autumn Manoeuvres, 1891,
at Aldershot, 248-301
Rifle, the Egyptians and, 177 ; the
Magazine, 224
Roberts, Comdt., 90
Eoberts, Sir Frederick, 137, 139
Robinson, Sir Hercules, 124, 126, 143,
154
Eorke's Drift, 77
Rowlands, Col., 81
Russell, Major Baker, 55, 58, 61
Eussell, Col., 87-90, 94-99
Eussell, Dr. Wm. Howard, 8, 15
Eussia, 5-17 ; and Turkey, 162-164
Eycroft, Sir Nelson, 248

Salisbury, Major Wood at, 51
Salisbury, Lord, 155
Sandilli, Chief, 67, 70
.Sanitation, during Autumn Ma
noeuvres, 255, 299
Scarlett, Gen. Sir J. Y., 49
Scheme for Mounted Infantry, Sir E.
Wood's proposed, 218-221
Scouts, Mr. A. Forbes and a corps of,
211
Sebastopol, 6
Sekukuni, Chief, 67, 71
Seronge district, the, 30
Seymour, Sir Beauchamp, 161, 168
Shakespeare, Col. Sir R., 26-37
.Sharpshooters, a mounted corps of,
211-214
Sindhora, 27-29
Sindwaho, action of, 22, 29, 38
Skobeleff, Gen., and sharpshooters,
211-214
Slade, Capt., F. G, 95, 174
Smith, Major Holled, 176
.Smith, Capt. F., 236

Somerset, Brigadier-Gen., 23, 24, 38,
41
Soudan, Egypt and the, 183-204
South Africa, Sir E. Wood in, 64-
112, 121-158
Southwell, Viscount, 46
Sportsman, Sir E. Wood as a, 240-
247
Spurs, Sir E. Wood and, 216, 217
Staff College, Major Wood at the,
43, 44, 64
Stanhope, Mr., 226
Stanley, Lord, 100, 102
Strathnairn, Lord, 36
Streatfield, Mr. F. W., 106, 107
Steele, Gen. Sir T., 64
Stephenson, Major-Gen. Sir F., 187
Stewart, Sir H., 196
Supply Depot, Autumn Manoeuvres,
256, 271-276
Surveyor, Major Wood as a, 49
Sylvester, Surgeon, 39-42

Talbot, Col. Hon. E., 196
Tanta, 170
Topee, Tantia, capture of, 21-24, 39-
42
Taylor, Lieut.-Col. T., 174
Tel-el-Kebir, 165, 170, 172, 208
Telephones at Autumn Manoeuvres)
280, 281
Temple, Major Wood a student at
the Middle, 47, 48 ; called to the
Bar, 64 ; dinner at, 113, 114
Thesiger, Gen. F. See Chelmsford,
Lord.
Thewfik, Khedive, 159, 179, 198, 199
Thomas, Eev. John S., 3
Thompson, Sir Ealph, 202
Times, Tlie, letter in, re Scouts, 211
Tinta, Chief, 79, 80
Transport, Aldershot Autumn Ma
noeuvres, 259, 260, 276, 277

INDEX.

309

Transvaal, 67, 75 ; war with the,
121-158
Travers, Col., 35
Tremayne, Col. A., 244
Tremlett, Major, 95-98
Tucker, Major, 82
Turkey, 17, 64
Turkish troops, Mr. Gladstone and,
161-164
Uhamu, half-brother of Ketchwayo,
82, 83-85
Ulundi, 75, 94, 100-107
Umbelini, Chief, 73, 81
Umfundisweni, visit to, 70
Umkusi Eiver, 87
Umpire Staff, Autumn Manceuvres,
267, 268
Uys, Mr. Piet, 89
Vaccinations at Aldershot, 235, 236
Van Koughnet, Capt., 192
Victoria, Queen, Sir E. Wood
knighted by, 111
Victoria Cross, Mr. Wood and the,
13, 19 ; gains the, 29, 30
Villiers, Sir J. H. de, 143, 154
Volunteers at Autumn Manoeuvres,
266, 267
War Games, 231
Water Supply during Autumn Ma
noeuvres, 1891, at Aldershot, 254,
255
Watson, Major C. M., 174
Weather during Autumn Manoeuvres,
291
Weatherly, Col., 88, 92
Webster, Capt., 68
Wilkinson, Mr. Spencer, 228
Wimbledon, 48
Windsor Park, Army Corps in, 64

Wingate, Major, 174, 175, 177, 195
Wise, Capt. Chas., 3
Wolseley, Lord, 50, 51, 104, 123, 203-
208, 221, 223 ; and the Ashanti
War, 52-63; in Egypt, 161-171,
186-196
Wood, Sir John Page, 1, 7, 9, 19
Wood, Lady, 17, 25
Wood, the Hon. Mrs., 46
Wood, Lt.-Gen. Sir H. E., birth and
education, 1-3 ; on H.M.S. Queen,
during the Crimean War, 3-16 : in
the 13th Dragoons, 17-20; joins
the 17th Lancers in India, 20-42 ;
at the Staff College, 43 ; in Ireland,
44, 45; marriage of, 46, 47 ; student
at the Middle Temple, 47, 48 ; at
the Ashanti War, 52-63; called
to the Bar, 64; service in South
Africa against the Kaffirs, 65-70 ;
the Zulu War, 71-114; and the
Prince Imperial, 115-120; among
the Boers, 121-158; and Arabi
Pacha, 159-171 ; and the Egyptian
Army, 171-186 ; the revolt of the
Mahdi, 187-204 ; mounted infantry
and other army reforms, 205-225 ;
at Aldershot, 49-51, 225-239 ; as
a sportsman, 240-247; report on
the Autumn Manoeuvres at Aider-
shot, 248-301
Woolmer Forest, 237, 243
Wortley, Lieut. E. Stuart, 173
Wynne, Major, 176
Yeomanry at Autumn Manoeuvres,
266, 267
Zanzibar, 157
Zohrab Bey, 183, 184
Zululand, 67 ; war with, 71-112

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