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THE RISE OF WELLINGTON
BY
GENERAL LORD ROBERTS, V.C.
WITH INTRODUCTION BY
LORD FREDERICK HAMILTON AND SIR DOUGLAS STRAIGHT
EDITORS OF THE " PALL MALL MAGAZINI5: -'

GENERAL STR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, K.P,, 1803.

THE RISE

OF

WELLINGTON

BY

GENERAL LORD ROBERTS, V.C.

WITH PORTRAITS AND PLANS

LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON AND COMPANY
LIMITED
^t IBunstan's 3§ouse
Fetter Lane, Fleet Street, E.G..
1895

LONDON :
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, Limited,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

7 1

INTRODUCTION.

When the proposal for a series of republications in
book form of some of the more important articles and
short stories appearing in the pages of the Pall Mall
Magazine vi^as first made to us by Mr. R. B. Marston,
we accepted it without hesitation, perceiving at once
that an admirable medium would thus be provided by
which much valuable literary matter might be made
knpwn to an even wider circle of the public than
the readers of the periodical of which we have the
conduct. Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley's graphic
and analytical papers on the " Decline and Fall of
Napoleon," which constitute the first volume of
the Pall Mall Magazine Library, achieved, as
we are able to say from personal knowledge, a
very remarkable success not only in England
and America, but on the Continent ; especially in
Paris, where they were translated and published in ^
book form. Much the same may be said with regard
to General Lord Roberts' valuable and instructive
articles on the " Rise of Wellington," which found

INTRODUCTION.

especial favour with military readers in all branches
of the Service, and we have reason to think that the
collection of these into a single and handy volume
will meet with the general approval of military men,
and might form a valuable text-book for military
students. The articles commenced by Viscount
Wolseley and continued by Lord Roberts are now
being followed in the pages of the Pall Mall
Magazine by Lieut.-General Sir Evelyn Wood's
papers on " Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign," and
we hope from time to time to be able to secure other
able military writers as contributors to deal with
subjects having an equal historical interest. We
conclude by saying that the Publishers have our
hearty sympathy and will have our lively co-operation
in the publication of the PALL Mall Magazine
Library, and so far as lies in our power we shall
endeavour to assist them in making each successive
volume such as to entitle it to a foremost place in
the literature of the day.

Frederick Hamilton.
Douglas Straight.
Editors Pall Mall Magazine.

1 8, Charing Cross Road.
March, 1895.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGE
General Sir Arthur Wellesley, YL.V. frontispiece.
Tippoo Sultan  8
Plan of the Attack upon the North West
Angle of Seringapatam  lo
Lord Harris . . 14
General Lake . . 20
Plan of the Battle of Assaye .... 25
Battle of Assaye . To face page 32
Major-General Baird . . 43
Sir Hew Dalrymple  54
Lieutenant-General the Hon. John Hope . 59
Colonel George Murray .... 67
Sir John Moore . . . . . 71
Battle of Talavera . Tofacepage 76
Major-General Beresford  78
Lord Castlereagh . . .... 83
Plan of Massena's Retreat. Combat of Sabugal,
iBii  87
The Storming of Badajoz To face page 96
General Lord Hill, G.C.B  97
h

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGE
Plan of the Passage of the Nive. Battle of
St. Pierre  105
Map of Spain and Portugal . . ^ . . no, iii
Wellington  126
England's Hope, 1815 . . . Tofacepage 128
H.R.H. Frederick, Duke of York and Albany,
F.-M., Commander-in-Chief . . . .142
Field-Marshal von Blucher  145
Plan of The Field of Waterloo . . .158
The Marquess of Anglesey  162.
Facsimile of Portion of Despatch Written from
Waterloo to Lord Bathurst the Day after
THE Battle  167, 168
Napoleon's Flight from Waterloo To face page . 176
Napoleon  187

THE.
RISE OF WELLINGTON.

" The foremost quality in a general is that he shall
have a cool head, which receives just impressions of
things ; which is never confused, nor allows itself to
be dazzled or thrown off its balance by good or bad
news." — Napoleon.

CHAPTER L
The military career of Wellington naturally divides
itself into three periods — the Indian period, the
Peninsular period, and the period during which he
commanded the AUied Forces in the Netherlands,
terminating in the battle of Waterloo. I propose,
therefore, in three chapters, relating in turn to each of
these periods, briefly to describe the principal inci
dents of this great soldier's life, and to show how the
experience he gained first in the East, and afterwards
in South- Western Europe, so developed his natural
B

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

talents and administrative capacity that he was
finally able to meet and overthrow the French
Emperor, whose genius for war had up to that date
been regarded as absolutely unrivalled.
Arthur Wellesley, the fourth son of the first Earl of
Mornington, was born in 1769, and was educated first
at a private school in Chelsea, and subsequently for
a short time at Eton, whence he was removed to a
military coUege at Angers, in France, presided over
by an engineer officer, the Marquis of Pignerol.
Being looked upon as the dunce of the family, and
described by his mother as being " food for powder
and nothing more," it was determined, according to
the custom of those days, to provide him with a
livelihood in the army, and at the age of seventeen he
obtained an ensigncy in the 41st Foot. His family
interest being powerful, he was rapidly promoted,
becoming a lieutenant after nine months' service as
ensign, a captain after three-and-a-half years' service
as lieutenant, a major after less than two years'
service as captain, a lieutenant-colonel after five
months' service as major, and a colonel at the age of
twenty-seven, after less than three years' service as
lieutenant-colonel. He was attached to the cavalry
as well as the infantry, being transferred from the
4i.st Foot to the 12th Light Dragoons, thence to the

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 3
76th Foot, the I Sth Light Dragoons, and finally to
the 33rd Foot, of which he obtained the command
in 1793.
While stationed at home he sat in the Irish House
of Commons as member for Trim, and was also for
some time aide-de-camp to the Lord-Lieutenant of
Ireland. In 1794 he accompanied his regiment to Antwerp,
where it joined the force under the command of the
Duke of York, and took part in the movement on
Breda, and the engagement at Boxtel, a village on
the river Dommel. On this occasion Lieutenant-
Colonel Wellesley behaved with conspicuous judg
ment and gallantry — so much so, in fact, that he
attracted the favourable notice of General Dundas,
who afterwards entrusted him with the duty of
covering the retreat of the British army. This retreat
was conducted under great difficulties by Count
Walmoden, a Hanoverian general, to whom the Duke
of York had handed over his command ; and after
suffering the most grievous hardships and privations
during the winter of 1794-9S, the troops reached
Bremen and re-embarked for England early in 1795.
This first experience of field service was, no doubt,
extremely valuable to Wellington in after years. It
must have taught him that soldiers even of the best
B 2

4 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
quality, well drilled, disciplined and equipped, cannot
hope to be successful unless proper arrangements are
made for their supply and transport ; and unless those
who direct the operations have formed some definite
plan of action, and have sufficient zeal and profes
sional knowledge to carry it out. If the French
generals had taken full advantage of the opportunities
which the incapacity of the EngUsh and German com
manders threw in their way, the British force must
have been annihilated. As it was, Wellington con
sidered it " a marvel that any one belonging to the
force escaped."
On its return to England LieutenantvColonel
Wellesley's regiment was quartered at Warley, while
he proceeded on leave to Ireland. Apparently dis
gusted at the mismanagement of the troops em
ployed in the Low Countries, he made up his mind
to leave the army, and in June 179S applied to
Lord Camden, then Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, for
a civil post under the Irish Government. He wrote :
"You will probably be surprised at my desiring a
civil instead of a military office. It is certainly a
departure from the line which I prefer ; but I see the
manner in which the military offices are filled, and I
don't wish to ask you for that which I know you
cannot give me." This application was unsuccessful ;

THE JNDIAN PERIOD.

and in the autumn of the same year Wellesley's
regiment was ordered to join in an expedition directed
against the French settlements in the West Indies.
The ships in which the troops embarked were driven
back by stress of weather to Spithead, and the
proposed operations being abandoned, the 33rd Foot
was landed and quartered at Poole. A few months
later the regiment was ordered to India, and arrived
in Calcutta in February 1797. Shortly after Colonel
Wellesley had reached India, the Governor-General,
Sir John Shore, offered him the command of an
expedition which was intended for the capture of
Manilla ; and, all the necessary arrangements being
complete, the troops embarked and proceeded as far
as Penang. Owing, however, to apprehensions of
danger within India itself, the force was recalled, and
Colonel Wellesley returned to Calcutta, whence he
started early in 1798 on a visit to Lord Hobart,
the Governor of Madras. Two months later Lord
Mornington, Wellesley's eldest brother, replaced Sir
John Shore as Governor-General, and at once took
into consideration the critical state of affairs in
Mysore, where Tippoo Sultan, the son of Hyder
Ali, continued his late father's fanatical animosity
towards the EngUsh, and had allied himself with the
French Republic, hoping for its aid in attacking

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

the East India Company's possessions in Southern
India. The first step to be taken by the Governor-General
was to secure the friendship, or at any rate the
neutrality, of the Nizam, and for this purpose it was
essential to re-establish British influence at that ruler's
court, and induce him to consent to the disbandment
of a portion of his troops which had become formid
able owing to its being officered by Frenchmen. This
precautionary measure was successfully accomplished,
and a fresh treaty of alliance was entered into be
tween the Nizam and the Government of India in
1798 ; the French officers in the Nizam's service were
dismissed and sent home ; the force to which they
belonged was broken up, and a subsidiary force, 6000
strong, under British officers, took its place. While
all this was going on Wellesley had been sent with
his regiment from Calcutta to Madras, and on his
arrival at the capital of the Southern Presidency, he
undertook, in communication with Lord Clive, the
Governor, and General Harris, the Commander-in-
Chief, to organise the commissariat, transport, and
ordnance train needed for an advance upon Seringa
patam. Feeling that the presence of the Governor-
General would stimulate the local authorities to the
exertions required to bring the campaign against

THE INDIAN PERIOD.

Tippoo Sultan to a successful issue, he induced his
brother to transfer temporarily the headquarters of
the Government of India from Fort William to Fort
St. George.
The army of the Carnatic was assembled at Vellore
early in 1799, and on February uth it began its
marches towards Seringapatam, being joined a week
later by the Hyderabad subsidiary force under British
officers, as well as a contingent of the Nizam's cavalry.
The 33rd Foot was attached to this force, which
numbered altogether about 16,000 men, and Colonel
Wellesley was appointed to its command.
Simultaneously with the advance of the Madras
army, a Bombay corps commanded by General Stuart
was landed at Cannanore, and moved up the Western
Ghauts to a point named Sedasir, where it was
attacked by Tippoo. Tippoo was repulsed with some
loss, and retired to the vicinity of Seringapatam,
whence, after a short halt, he marched eastward for
about twenty miles, and came into contact with
General Harris's troops at Mellavelly. Being there
defeated for the second time, he withdrew into
Seringapatam, in front of which place he threw up a
line of field intrenchments. General Harris resolved
to make a night attack on these defences, and the
operation was entrusted to Colonel Wellesley and

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

Colonel Shaw. The latter's attack was successful ;
but owing to inadequate reconnaissance, as well as the
darkness of the night, and the thickness of the jungle,
Wellesley entirely failed in his object, and lost twelve

TIPPOO SULTAN.

grenadiers of the 33rd, whom Tippoo made prisoners
and tortured to death by causing nails to be hammered
into their skulls. The next morning, however, Tippoo's
intrenchments were carried without difficulty, and
shortly afterwards Seringapatam was invested by

THE INDIAN PERIOD.

General Harris, who meanwhUe had been reinforced by
General Stuart's column. On May 7th, 1799, the city
was taken by assault, the command on this occasion
being given to Major-General Baird, and the reserve
in the trenches being placed in charge of Colonel
Wellesley. The garrison fought with remarkable
obstinacy, and in the course of the struggle Tippoo
Sultan was killed in front of one of the city gates.
The treasure captured in Seringapatam was valued at
about ;^i,20o,ooo sterling, and Colonel Wellesley's
share of it amounted to ;^7000 in money and ;^I200
in jewels. Two days after the assault. Colonel
Wellesley was ordered to relieve General Baird as
Governor of Seringapatam — a favour which, whether
he owed it to his own merits, or to his being the brother
of the Governor-General, was not unnaturally resented
by the officer whom he superseded. After serving on
a mixed commission appointed to report on the future
government of Tippoo's dominions, Colonel Wellesley
was invested with supreme civil and military control
over the province and capital of Mysore, and in this
capacity exhibited administrative abilities of a very
high order. In May 1800, the Governor-General
nominated Colonel Wellesley to the command of an
expedition which it was proposed to send to Batavia
with a view to inducing the, Dutch to cede the

THE INDIAN PERIOD.

island of Java to the English. This offer he declined
after consulting the Governor of Madras. His reason
for doing so was that he considered it a more impor
tant work to put a stop to the depredations of the
noted freebooter, Dhoondiah Waugh, who had been
seized and imprisoned by Tippoo, but regaining his
liberty on the fall of Seringapatam, had established
himself with a large following of about 40,000 men in
the Mahratta territory, between Goa and the western
frontier of Mysore. A British force was accordingly
assembled on the Tumbudra river, and the troops
being divided into three columns, a vigorous effort
was made to surround the band of marauders, and
capture its chief. After a series of long and rapid
marches through an arid and difficult country,
Wellesley came in contact with the main body of the
enemy at Manauli, a small fort about fifty miles east
of Belgaum, and after a cavalry skirmish pursued it
for a hundred and fifty mUes to KonaguU on the
Tumbudra, where, on September loth, he again
attacked with his cavahy. This engagement was
decisive, Dhoondiah being killed, and his followers
completely broken up and dispersed.
Colonel WeUesley had declined the command of
the proposed expedition to Batavia when it was first
offered him, but on his return to Mysore after Dhoon-

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

diah Waugh had been disposed of, he received orders
to proceed to Trincomalee, where the force originally
intended for the annexation of Java was still being.
collected. At this period the attention of the Govern
ment, both at home and in India, was fixed on Egypt,
which had been occupied by the French with the
object of converting it into a base of operations against
the British possessions in tUe East. The idea of
annexing Java had not been entirely abandoned, but
the Government of India was inclined to think that_
it might be more advantageous either to capture
Mauritius, then a French colony, or to despatch an
Indian contingent to the Red Sea, where it might co
operate with the force which was being prepared by
the home authorities for the purpose of driving the
French out of Egypt. The question was decided by
the receipt of a despatch from His Majesty's Ministers,
ordering the Government of India to send 3000 men
to Egypt ; and Wellesley, who on his arrival at Trin
comalee was apprised of this order, at once arranged
on his own responsibiUty for the troops assembled at
that port to sail for Bombay, notwithstanding strong
remonstrance from the Governor of Ceylon. When
called to account for acting in this matter without the
sanction of the Governor-General, Wellesley justified
himself on the ground that the movement from Trin-

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 13

comalee to Bombay would greatly expedite the
arrival of the force at its ultimate destination, Bombay
being the only port at which the requisite provisions
and stores were obtainable, and where the transports
could procure an adequate supply of fresh water before
starting on the voyage to Kosseir in the Red Sea.
On reaching Bombay, Colonel Wellesley. received
the unwelcome news that the Government of India
had appointed Major-General Baird to command the
expedition, and that his own position would be that
of second in command ; the Governor-General ex
plaining to him in a very kind letter that the number
of troops employed had rendered it necessary to
appoint a general officer to the chief command, and
giving him the option of returning to Mysore if he
objected to serve under General Baird. Wellesley
was bitterly disappointed at being, as he conceived,
unfairly superseded, though the officer appointed to
the command was much senior to himself, and he
expressed his indignation in very forcible terms to
his brother Henry. Still, he was disinclined to avail
himself of the Governor-General's permission to return
to Mysore, and he only did so because a severe attack
of illness prevented him from accompanying the expe
dition. On his recovery, in May 180 1, Wellesley resumed

14 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

the government of Mysore, and for nearly two years
occupied himself with the civil and military adminis
tration of that province.
In April 1802, at the age of thirty-three, and after
fifteen years' service, he became a Major-General, his

LORD HARRIS.
promotion having been strongly urged upon His
Royal Highness the Duke of York by his brother
the Governor-General, who himself two years before
had been raised to an Irish marquisate, with the
title of the Marquis Wellesley.

THE INDIAN PERIOD. iJ
About this time the evacuation of Egypt by the
French had relieved the Government of India from
the fear of extemal attack, and it seemed a fitting
opportunity to extend the influence of the East India
Company over the Mahratta confederacy, which at the
beginning ofthe century was extremely powerful, and,
if its members had acted in unison, might have
seriously endangered our ascendency in the East.
The nominal head of the confederacy was the Peshwa,
Bajee Rao, whose capital was Poona ; its principal
members were Sindhia, Holkar, the Raja of Berar,
and the Gaekwar of Baroda. Of these Sindhia was
the most formidable, possessing a numerous army
with strong artiUery and well-equipped cavalry. In a
semi-independent position, but still owing allegiance to
Sindhia, there was a force commanded by the French
adventurer Perron, numbering 30,000 infantry and
8000 cavalry, with 250 guns. This force, which was
fo a great extent officered by Frenchmen, occupied
the important strongholds of Agra, Delhi, and Aligarh,
and dominated the rich country between the Jumna
and Ganges. The Raja of Berar was master of a
large extent of territory to the north of the Nizam's
dominions, stretching from Cuttack on the east to
EUichpore on the west. Nagpore was the Raja's
capital, and his army consisted of about 20,000

i6 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

disciplined cavalry and 10,000 infantry. Holkar's
possessions lay between those of Sindhia on the east
and the Bombay Presidency on the west. His army,
composed chiefly of cavalry, and, like Sindhia's, com
manded by French officers, numbered about 80,000
men. Holkar and Sindhia, however, were extremely
jealous of each other ; and the former, thinking that
the latter exercised undue influence at the Peshwa's
court, crossed the Nerbudda in 1802, marched upon
Poona, and defeated the combined forces of the Peshwa
and Sindhia. Bajee Rao fled from his capital and
sought refuge in British territory at Bassein, where he
threw himself upon the protection of the East India
Company. Taking advantage of this occurrence, the
Governor-General at the close of 1802 entered into
a treaty with the Peshwa, known as the treaty of
Bassein, which stipulated that the British Government
should reinstate Bajee Rao at Poona, and guard him
against the aggression' of the rival Mahratta states,
while he on his part should be entirely guided in his
foreign policy by the Government of India, should
employ no Europeans hostile to the British, and should
assign territory sufficient to meet the cost of a sub
sidiary force similar to that maintained by the N,izam,
and exclusively commanded by British officers. The
Governor-General hoped to be able to carry this treaty

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 17

into effect without provoking the open hostility of the
Native States more or less directly concerned. The
provisions of the treaty, however, were so opposed to
the interests of the prmcipal Mahratta chiefs, especially
those of Sindhia and the Raja of Berar, that Lord
WeUesley could not but recognise the strong probability
of their endeavouring by force or intrigue to recover
their ascendency at Poona, or to obtain compensation
in some other direction. To guard against such a con
tingency, the Governor-General determined to mobUise
a portion of the army of each Presidency, and so to
distribute the troops at his disposal as to bring effec
tive pressure to bear on the states likely to oppose
his policy. In November 1802 a force of 19,000 men,
drawn from the Madras army, was concentrated at
Hurryhur, on the north-west frontier of Mysore, and
shortly afterwards orders were given for a division
from Bombay, about 7000 strong, to be in readiness to
operate in the direction of Surat and Broach. A force
was collected at Calcutta for the occupation of the pro
vince of Cuttack ; and General Lake, the Commander-
in-Chief in India, was to be prepared to advance from
Cawnpore with 14,000 men against Perron's army hold
ing Delhi, Agra, and the North-West Provinces. Three
reserve corps were also to be formed, for the purpose of
covering the possessions of the British and their Allies.
c

1 8 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

The first of these corps was to hold Poona and support
the Peshwa's authority, the second was to take up a
position on the river Kistna for the protection of the
Nizam's territory, and the third was to be established
at Mirzapore and Benares for the defence of the
Ganges valley. Such a dissemination of force might
under other circumstances have led to disaster, but,
owing to the mutual jealousy of the Mahratta chiefs,
combined action on their part was hardly to be appre
hended, and the results of Lord Wellesley's bold and
comprehensive scheme fully answered his expecta
tions. In February 1803 Major-General Wellesley, who
was then at Seringapatam, received instructions to
occupy Poona and reinstate Bajee Rao. Proceeding
at once to Hurryhur, he assumed command of about
10,600 of the Madras troops assembled at that place ;
and the Nizam's contingent numbering 8400 men,
under Colonel Stevenson, was also placed under his
orders, and directed to join him on the march.
Leaving Hurryhur on March 9th, he effected a
junction with Stevenson's troops on April 1 5th ; and
three days later he received news that Ararat Rao,
whom Holkar had entrusted with the Peshwa's
authority on the latter escaping to Bassein, intended
to burn Poona before retiring from that city on the

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 19

approach of the British force. Wellesley determined,
if possible, to save the city from destruction ; and,
escorted by a cavalry detachment only 400 strong, he
reached Poona by a forced march, in which he covered
not less than sixty miles in thirty hours. Ararat Rao
was taken by surprise and precipitately withdrew,
after sending a submissive message to the British
commander ; and Poona was occupied, without oppo
sition, on April 20th. Bajee Rao was replaced on
the musnud on May 13th, and the British force
remained at his capital for some months, during
which General Wellesley organised a pontoon train,
repaired his ordnance carriages, provided dep6ts and
magazines for the supply of his troops, and brought
his transport and coraraissariat services into a
thoroughly efficient state. In the raeantirae Holkar
had retired to Indore, but Sindhia and the Raja of
Berar had assuraed a threatening attitude, and
collected a large array at Burhanpur, on the river
Taptee, near the Nizara's northern frontier. It
became evident from the raovement of their troops
that, as soon as the rains were over and the rivers
fordable, these Mahratta chiefs intended either to
invade the Nizam's territory or to operate against the
British in the direction of Poona. Towards the end
of June the Governor-General conferred full miUtary
C 2

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

and political powers on General Lake in Northern
India and on Major-General Wellesley in the Deccan,
and authorised them to take such action with regard
to Holkar, Sindhia, and the Berar Raja as might be
necessary to maintain the treaty of Bassein and to

GENERAL LAKE.

protect the rights and interests of the Government of
India and its Allies. Wellesley at once called upon
Sindhia and the Raja of Berar to prove their friendly
intentions by withdrawing their troops from Bur
hanpur to the stations where they were usually
quartered. He warned them that should they decline

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 21
to do so he would attack thera ; and, as a preliminaiy
to decisive action, he raoved his force from Poona
towards Ahraednagar, a fort and city at that tirae
held by Sindhia. The Mahratta chiefs refused to
withdraw unless the British force and the Nizara's
contingent also retired to their ordinary cantonments.
Wellesley accordingly declared war, and proceeded to
attack Ahraednagar, which after a siege was captured,
with slight loss, on the uth August. The possession
of this place greatly facilitated the offensive opera
tions which Wellesley had in view, as it furnished an
advanced base covering his main line of coraraunica
tion with Poona and Bombay, guarded the western
portion of Hyderabad, and prevented the Mahratta
chiefs from receiving any assistance frora Southern
India. Advancing frora Ahraednagar on. the 17th
August Wellesley crossed the Godavery, and reached
Aurungabad on the 24th of the same month-; and
early in September Stevenson seized Jalna, an im
portant fort on the Mahratta frontier.
On the 2 1st September Stevenson's force joined the
raain body, and arrangeraents were raade to attack
the united forces of Sindhia and the Raja of Berar on
the 24th. Owing, however, to defective inforraation
as to the disposition of the enemy's troops, Wellesley
ordered Stevenson to move by a different road frora

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

that taken by the force under his own immediate
command, so that on the 23rd he alone encountered
the Mahratta army strongly posted behind the river
Kaitna, with its left supported by the village of
Assaye and its front defended by 128 guns. The
Mahrattas numbered 50,000, while Wellesley's force
consisted of 1500 British and about 6500 Native
soldiers, with only 17 gun*. The troops, cavalry
horses, and gun bullocks were greatly fatigued by a
march of twenty-four miles ; but, after a rapid recon
naissance, Wellesley resolved on what he called
" the desperate expedient " of at once attacking the
enemy. The Mahrattas were drawn up in a long
line with their infantry and artillery on the left and
their cavalry on the right, a detachment of the latter
being posted in front of the Kaitna in order to
observe the movements of the British force. Welles
ley decided to engage the left, and to do so he Had to
march along the eneray's front and to cross the
Kaitna by a ford within easy range of the extrerae
left of the Mahratta position. On perceiving the
object of this raovement the French officers in com
mand of the Mahratta infantry and artillery changed
front with adrairable precision, so as to bring their
line parallel to that of the British infantry. The
latter, after crossing the ford, was drawn up in two

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 23

lines, supported in rear by the 19th Light Dragoons
and the regular Native cavalry, and covered on its
left flank by the Mysore and Peshwa's irregular
cavalry. The General's intention was to push for
ward his left and thus penetrate the centre of the
enemy's line. By sorae mistake, however, the officer
commanding the piquets, which were upon the right,
led imraediately up to the village of Assaye, and this
advance was followed by the 74th Foot in the second
line, which had been ordered to support the piquets.
The result was a serious break in both the infantry
lines, and severe loss to the piquets and the 74th
Regiraent. Matters becarae so critical that the
British and Native cavalry had to charge into the
Mahratta batteries in order to extricate what was left
of their infantry in this part of the field. On the left
the 78th Foot and the Sepoy battalions advanced
with the utmost gallantry, and, after firing only two
rounds, engaged the enemy with the bayonet. The
Mahratta infantry at last gave way, abandoning
their guns, and our Sepoys pursued the fugitives up
to the nulla or ravine which ran along the rear of the
position. A number of Mahratta gunners sheltered
themselves beneath their guns, and, as soon as the
tide of battle had passed thera, they rose up, and,
turning their pieces round, began to fire on the rear of

24 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

the British force. Wellesley averted this danger by
placing himself at the head of the 78th Regiment and
the 7th Native Cavalry, and, by a vigorous charge,
again made himself master of the enemy's artUlery.
This final charge decided the fortune of the day : the
Mahrattas broke, and fled in all directions : 1 200 of
the eneray were killed on the field of battle, and 800
more during the pursuit ; and 98 guns, with a large
amount of ammunition and stores, were captured.
Unfortunately the pursuit was not carried out so
¦promptly and effectually as Wellesley desired, for our
regular cavalry had lost its cohesion, owing to the
necessity for eraploying it to extricate the piquets and
the 74th Foot in their premature attack on the village
of Assaye. On the British side the loss was ex
tremely heavy, araounting in killed and wounded to
43 British officers, 540 non-coraraissioned officers and
soldiers, 36 Native officers, and 1238 non-cora
raissioned officers and soldiers.* Wellesley t himself
* Every officer of the 74th Highlanders present with the
regiment was either killed or wounded, except Quartermaster
James Grant, who, when he saw so many of his friends fall in
the battle, resolved to share their fate, and, though a non-
combatant, joined the ranks and fought to the termination of
the action.
t Colin Campbell, brigade-major to General Wellesley, writ
ing about Assaye, said : " The General was in the thick of the
action the whole time, and had a horse killed under him. No

r

c . ''fi. rr7'/Jj,' of '..'¦i.s'sr.E, -^

s,-i<t"-,i,ii,r :':'. \*'):v

t^- ¦  : 

\ :

26 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

had one horse shot and a second piked under him.
It was an infantry battle won almost entirely by the
use of the bayonet. The regular cavalry played a
secondary, but useful, part in the action, while the
irregular cavalry did little raore than protect the left
flank from Sindhia's horsemen. The troops seriously
engaged were outnumbered by ten to one, and lost
more than a third of their total. The next day
Stevenson's force arrived in time to join in the
pursuit of the scattered Mahratta army, after which it
was ordered by Wellesley to march north of the
Taptee and lay siege to Burhanpur and Asirgarh ;
Wellesley hiraself undertaking to cover Stevenson
while thus eraployed, to protect the lines of cora
raunication, and to defend the frontiers of the Nizara
and the Peshwa. As a striking instance of Native
duplicity, it may be mentioned that both these chiefs,
who owed everything they possessed to the Govern
ment of India, did their utraost to thwart the opera
tions of the British comraander. The Nizam's officials
refused to accommodate our wounded in the fort of

man could have shown a better example to the troops than he
did. I never saw a man so cool and collected as he was,
though, I can assure you, till our troops got orders to advance,
the fate of the day seemed doubtful ; and, if the numerous
cavalry of the enemy had done their duty, I hardly think it
possible that we could have succeeded."

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 27

Dowlatabad ; and the conduct of the Peshwa was
even more unfriendly, as he not only neglected to
furnish the supplies which he had proraised, but
intrigued with Sindhia and the Raja of Berar
against us.
While these events were taking place in the
Deccan, equal activity had been displayed on our
north-west frontier and in the neighbourhood of
Cuttack. On th'e 7th August General Lake started
from Cawnpore with 14,000 men, and after defeating
Perron's troops before Aligarh, besieged and captured
that stronghold. Perron thereupon signed an agree
ment not to fight again against the British, and was
allowed to withdraw to Chandernagore, where he
embarked for France, taking with him the enormous
wealth which he had araassed in Sindhia's service.
He was succeeded in coramand of Sindhia's troops
by another Frenchraan, naraed Bourquien, who
retreated to a strong position covering Delhi, frora
which he was driven by General Lake with a loss of
68 guns and 3000 raen, the British casualties being
only 400 killed and wounded. Delhi fell into the
conqueror's hands, and the Mogul eraperor. Shah
Alum, was replaced on the throne, and became a
pensioner of the East India Company. Bourquien
and the French officers serving under him made

28 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

terms with General Lake, and were permitted to
leave the country ; and the Mahratta troops, thus
deprived of their leaders, fell back on Agra, where,
on the IOth October, they were again defeated and
dispersed. The Agra garrison shortly afterwards
surrendered, and the British force occupied the fort,
which contained a large dep6t of stores, 164 guns,
and 28 lakhs of treasure. Sindhia, with surprising
obstinacy, determined to continue the struggle, and
formed a fresh corps about 16,000 strong with 70
guns, out of the reraains of Perron's regiraents,
supplemented by fourteen of the best battalions of
his own array. This corps was attacked by Lake at
Laswarrie, near Agra, on the ist November; 5000 of
the Mahratta troops were killed or wounded ; and
the whole of Sindhia's guns, baggage, and stores
fell into the hands of the British.
On the eastern side of the Peninsula the district of
Cuttack, forraing part of the Raja of Berar's territory,
was occupied without much opposition by a column
under Colonel Harcourt ; and on the western side
Colonel Woodington, acting under General Wel
lesley's orders, besieged the fort of Broach, which
belonged to Sindhia, and took it by assault on the
29th August. Thus assailed on the north, south, and
west, Sindhia endeavoured to gain time by proposing

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 29

an arraistice, in which the Raja of Berar was not
included ; and this was agreed to early in November
by General Wellesley, who considered it would be ad
vantageous to break up the alliance existing between
the two Mahratta chiefs and to continue the war against
the Raja of Berar. While negotiations were going on
between Wellesley and Sindhia, Colonel Stevenson
was directed to raarch frora Asirgarh, which had
recently been captured, towards the Raja of Berar's
territory, and to lay siege to the fort of Gawilgarh.
Wellesley intended to cover and support Stevenson's
operations with his own force ; but on approaching
Gawilgarh he received information that Sindhia,
contraiy to his agreeraent, had united his troops with
those of the Raja, and taken up a position threatening
the line of advance. Effecting a junction with
Stevenson's coluran, Wellesley raoved in the direction
of the enemy, and on the 29th of November, after a
march of twenty -six miles, found the Mahratta army
drawn up in front of the village of Argaura.
Although it was late in the day, Wellesley decided
to attack, and drew up his troops in two lines,
the infantry in front, the regular cavalry in the second
line supporting the right, and the irregular cavalry
on the left. The British force numbered about 14,000,
exclusive of 4000 irregular horse ; and the Mahratta

30 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
force, consisting chiefly of cavalry, numbered 40,000.
When the first line came under the enemy's guns,
three of the Sepoy battalions which had behaved
with great gallantry at the battle of Assaye were
seized with a sudden panic and fled. " Luckily," the
General remarked in a letter to his brother's military
secretary, " I happened to be at no great distance
from them, and I was able to rally them and re
establish the battle. If I had not been there, I am
convinced we should have lost the day." This
incident necessitated the front line being reformed,
which caused some delay ; but eventually the infantry
advanced with great steadiness, the right being
pushed forward with the object of turning the
enemy's left. On the failure of two attempts on the
part of the enemy's cavalry to throw the line into
confusion, which were repulsed with great slaughter,
the Mahrattas abandoned their position, leaving
38 guns with- all their araraunition and stores on the
field. The cavalry of the British force pursued the
eneray by raoonlight for several miles, destroying
large numbers and capturing many elephants and
camels. The total loss on the British side was not
very serious, amounting to 46 Europeans and Natives
killed and 293 wounded.
This victory having opened the road to Gawilgarh,

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 31

Wellesley ordered the troops under his immediate
comraand, together with Stevenson's column, to
resume their march on November 30th, and after a
short investment the fort was taken by assault on the
ISth December, with a loss on the British side of only
126 killed and wounded. The governor of the fort,
his principal officers, and the greater part of the
garrison lost their lives ; and 52 guns, 2000 English
muskets, and a large quantity of ammunition fell
into the hands of the besiegers. These operations,
corabined with the successes achieved in other parts
of India, resulted in the Raja of Berar and Sindhia
suing for peace ; and in December 1803 WeUesley
concluded treaties with them, under which they ceded
in perpetuity to the East India Corapany the
iraportant cities of Delhi, Agra, Broach, and Ahraed
nagar, transferred territory yielding an annual
revenue of three raillions sterling, and engaged not
to take any Europeans into their service except with
the sanction of the Government of India.
Early in 1804 Wellesley set out on his return
towards Poona, but on his way he found it necessary
to break up a band of Mahratta freebooters who had
been plundering along the western frontier of the
Nizam's dorainions. Taking with him one British
and three Native cavalry regiments, and a small

32 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

detachraent of infantry, he raade a forced march of
sixty miles in thirty hours, and coraing up with
the Mahratta force, already in retreat, he charged
it with his cavalry, and completely routed and dis
persed it.
Wellesley visited Borabay on his way to Poona,
and frora the latter place subraitted an application to
the Comraander-in-Chief in India for leave to return
to England on the ground of ill-health. He also
resigned the railitary and political powers vested in
hira by the Governor-General. Frora Poona he was
ordered to Calcutta, which place he reached at the
beginning of August, by way of Seringapatara and
Madras. The following raonth the news arrived of
the reverses sustained by Colonel Monson, who had
been selected by General Lake to command a force
intended to drive Holkar out of Rajputana. Owing
to Monson's vacillation and incapacity, this force was
disastrously defeated, and Holkar's success seeraed
likely to encourage Sindhia and the Raja of Berar to
renew their struggle against the British power. The
Governor-General offered his brother's services to
General Lake, but the latter preferred that Wellesley
should resume his previous command in the Deccan,
and accordingly he returned to Seringapatam at the
end of Noveraber. In Deceraber Holkar was de-

BATTLE OF ASSAYE.

To face fi, 32.

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 33
feated by Lake, and all danger of a Mahratta
corabination was at an end.
In February, 1805, Wellesley again asked to be
allowed to return to England, his health not having
improved, and prolonged service in India being
extremely distasteful to him. The Governraent and
the railitary authorities raised no objection, and he
erabarked at Madras towards the end of March.
Before leaving India he received news of his appoint
raent to be an extra Knight Corapanion of the
Bath, which, under the original constitution of the
order, was a higher distinction than the Grand
Cross of the Bath is at present, and the thanks of
the King and Parliaraent were coraraunicated to
him in a general order by the Governor-General in
Council. There can, I think, be little doubt that rauch of
Wellington's subsequent success in the Peninsula was
due to the experience he gained in India as a soldier,
a politician, and an adrainistrator. The dunce of the
family, the soraewhat frivolous aide-de-carap to the
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, the young mah whom his
mother considered to be only food for powder, was
able to show in the retreat from Antwerp to Bremen
that he knew how to manoeuvre his battalion and to
comraand a rear-guard. On his arrival in India he
D

34 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
found himself in a country where in almost every
matter the power and influence of the Governor-
General were supreme, and the Governor-General
being his brother, he was quickly placed in a position
of responsibility, which gave him the opportunity of
developing his talents as a soldier and statesman in
the best of all schools — the school of practice. It
cannot be denied that in early life WeUington owed
much to family influence, and to a systera of pro
raotion which would now be stigraatised as jobbery.
On the other hand, he took full advantage of every
chance that was thrown in his way, and by his
industry and capacity fully justified the exceptional
favour with which he was treated.
The following appear to rae to be the raost
interesting points in Wellington's early career. First,
the hardships suffered by the British soldiers in the
retreat through Holland seera to have irapressed upon
hira the necessity for keeping troops eraployed on
field service in the best possible fighting condition,
and his views on this point were strengthened by
what he observed and learned in India, the result
being that no coraraander has ever realised more fully
than he did that the efficiency of a field army can
only be raaintained by attending most carefully and
constantly to the organisation of its several depart-

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 35
ments. When the force was being prepared at
Madras and Vellore for the siege of Seringapatam,
Wellesley himself supervised the commissariat and
transport arrangements. Later, when he was en
trusted with an independent command, his first
thought was to improve his bullock train ; and in
order to suppleraent his departraental resources he en
couraged the Brinjarries, or itinerant grain merchants,
to attach themselves to his force by proraising them
protection and liberal treatment. He took every
precaution to ensure the safety of his convoys, and
gave the most minute instructions for the periodical
replenishraent of his supply dep6ts. He spared
neither tirae nor trouble in deaUng with such raatters
as the repair of his ordnance carriages and the
provision of a pontoon train. Finding when he
occupied Poona that serious delay was likely to occur
in procuring new gun wheels -frora Borabay, he
established workshops of his own, and he drew up an
elaborate raeraorandura on the subject of pontoons,
in which he not only gave the diraensions of the
requisite boats and equipraent, but described in detail
the method of laying a bridge. He was strongly
averse to the system of requisitions, as being alraost
certain to demoralise the troops and alienate the
population of the country. He always endeavoured,
D 2

36 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

therefore, to obtain supplies either by transporting
them from his advanced depdts, by purchase on the
spot, or through the agency of the Brinjarries.
Indian campaigns of a century ago resemble in their
main features those which have been carried on in
later years on the borders of our Indian Erapire. It
is one of the peculiarities of Asiatic warfare that
the facilities and resources which are furnished by
European civilisation for the concentration, raove
raent, and subsistence of large bodies of raen are
either entirely wanting, or exist in such a rudimentary
forra that considerable skill and practical experience
are required to turn them to the best account. A
coraraander of troops in India cannot hope to be
successful unless he has acquainted hiraself with every
detail of his profession. He must know not only how
to manoeuvre and fight, but how to feed and clothe
his men, to arrange for their payraent, to provide for
the care of the sick and wounded, and to iraprovise
the raeans for overcoraing the countless difficulties
which are continually presenting theraselves in the
course of a carapaign, Frora the tirae of Clive up to
the present day India has been a valuable training
school for the British array, and to none were its
lessons of greater advantage than to the illustrious
soldier who in the Peninsula and 'the Netherlands

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 37

adhered to the principles and methods which he had
learnt in the East.
The rapid development of WeUington's administra
tive talents is in the highest degree reraarkable.
Placed, at the age of thirty, at the head of the civil
and miHtary government of Mysore, he quickly
restored order throughout that conquered province,
and though, in his opinion, the natives of India, both
Hindus and Mohamraedans, were incurably vicious,
cruel, and deceitful, he acted towards thera with such
fairness and liberaUty that they accepted his rule as a
welcorae change from the tyranny of their own princes.
He displayed the same equitable and indulgent spirit
in his dealings with the Nizam and the Mahratta
chiefs, and it was mainly owing to the confidence
which he inspired in the rainds of Sindhia and the
Raja of Berar that he was able to conclude treaties
with thera so. advantageous to the East India
Corapany. He had to be constantly on his guard
against the treachery and duplicity of the Native
rulers, who, while norainally the Allies of the British
Government, did their utmost to defeat his plans and
embarrass his movements. Nevertheless he uniformly
acted in the most conciliatory manner towards them,
and by raaintaining the strictest order and discipline
araong the troops under his command, did all in his

38 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
power for the protection of the life and property of
the people of the countiy. He thus established
British prestige and the influence of the British
Government throughout the Deccan and Southern
India. Another point deserving of notice is Wellington's
correct appreciation of our position as an alien Power
controlling a vast and heterogeneous Oriental popula
tion. He pointed out, in words as true now as when
they were written, that the Government of India
depends for its stability on the sword, and that, as
our responsibilities becorae greater with the extension
of our territory, the cost of the array must proportion
ately increase. To use his own words, "the con
clusion of the most successful foreign war in India,
that by which the raost formidable enemy may have
been subdued, if it gives an accession of territory,
must bring with the territory a necessity to increase
the array, because the governraent must be established
in the new territory, and supported, as well as in the
old, by the power of the sword. The want of know
ledge, or rather of recollection of these facts, is the
cause of all the coraplaints of high miUtary establish
ments and expenses." Is not this the case at the
present tirae ? A cry is being raised against the cost
of the army in India, in forgetfulness of the fact that

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 39
Baluchistan and Upper Burraa have within the last
fifteen years been added to the Empire, and that the
rapid advance of a rival Power has obliged us to
strengthen and improve our army, and to spend
raoney on the necessary defence of the North-West
Frontier. It seeras also to be forgotten that the
revenue of India is collected in rupees, while raany of
the charges for the army have to be paid in sterling.
With respect to the distribution of the array in
India, Wellington was at first in favour of keeping
the greater portion of the troops in standing caraps,
and of holding only those fortresses which appeared
to be indispensable to the internal security of the
country. Before he left India he changed his views,
and recoraraended that raost of the existing forts
should be kept up, and that the troops in each
province should be concentrated in a few healthy
and well-situated cantonraents, with their field equip
age always in readiness. This arrangeraent, he
thought, would increase the mobility of the troops,
and would adrait of their discipline and training, as
well as their health, being more carefully attended to.
Of the soundness of this principle there can be no
doubt, but for many years after Wellington's departure
from India an opposite course was followed, until the
disasters of the Mutiny impressed upon the Govern-

40 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
ment and the military authorities the advantages of
concentration. It is also worthy of note that Wellington was
strongly in favour of encouraging the Native States
to keep up arraies capable of taking the field and
assisting in the defence of the country. This policy,
I am glad to say, has lately been accepted by the
Government of India, and the Iraperial Service
contingents raaintained by the principal feudatories
of the Erapire will, if judiciously managed, add very
raaterially to our railitary strength.
As regards the knowledge of strategy and tactics
displayed by Wellington in the course of his field
operations, it is evident that he fully realised the
suprerae importance in Eastern warfare of prompti
tude of action, and audacity in assuming the offensive
even though the enemy raight be enorraously superior
in nuraber. This was shown at the battle of Assaye,
where, if he had hesitated in the sraallest degree,
a serious defeat, instead of a brilliant victory, would
have been the result. On that occasion his dis
positions are certainly open to criticisra. His
knowledge of the enemy's moveraents was so de
fective that he carae upon the Mahratta army a day
sooner than he expected, and before he had been
joined by the large portion of his force which was

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 41
under Colonel Stevenson's coraraand. Having, how
ever, resolved to attack, he marched his troops along
the eneray's front in the iraraediate presence of a
large body of Jiostile cavalry ; and the ford by which
he crossed the Kaitna was not only under the fire of
the Mahratta artillery, but capable of being easily
defended by a detachraent of the Mahratta infantiy.
" Luckily," he wrote, " they did not occupy the ford.
If they had, I must have gone lower down ; and
possibly I should have been obliged to make a road
across the river, which would have taken so rauch
tinie that I should not have had day enough to
attack." When the river had been crossed the
premature advance of the right of his line threw the
infantry on that flank into confusion, and to relieve it
he had to make use of his cavalry, which consequently
lost its cohesion and was unable to make a vigorous
pursuit. At the battle of Argaum the arrangeraents were
raore carefully raatured, the entire British force was
united, and the eneray, dispirited by a previous defeat,
did not offer the sarae stubborn resistance as at
Assaye. Here again Wellington's promptitude and
decision were displayed, for he engaged the enemy at
once, though his troops were fatigued by a long
march and it was late in the day before the attack

42 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
could be deUvered. So with the sieges of Ahraed
nagar, Burhanpur, Asirgarh, and Gawilgarh ; they
were conducted with skill and foresight, and the
general plan of carapaign was admirably designed to
protect the Allies of the East India Corapany, to drive
the Mahrattas out of the Deccan, and to break up the
alliance between Sindhia and the Raja of Berar.
The first three voluraes of "Wellington's Dis
patches," which relate to India, throw considerable
light on his personal character. He seems to have
been an ambitious man, with a high opinion of his
own qualifications and services. He had no fear of
responsibiUty, and whatever duty was entrusted to
hira he desired to carry it out free frora all interference
or control on the part of equal or superior authority.
There is no doubt he rendered most valuable
assistance to the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras
army in supervising the transport and commissariat
arrangements previous to the advance on Sering
apatam ; and it appears that General Harris not only
treated him with friendship and confidence, but also
brought his services to the special notice of his brother
the Governor-General. Still he complained to the
latter that the Coraraander-in-Chief adopted his ideas
without giving him due credit for fhem, and remarked :
" I wish for several reasons that you had a com-

THE INDIAN PERIOD.

43

raander-in-chief under you who, when he approved
of the conduct of an officer, would have a sufficiency
of spirit to make known his approbation." When
Seringapatam had been captured, and Wellesley was
appointed Coraraandant of that city in supersession
of Major-General Baird, he jdoes not seem to have

MAJOR-GENERAL BAIRD.
reaUsed that the latter officer had been hardly treated,
or that he himself owed his exceptional advanceraent
to his relationship with the Governor-General. When
he was made military and civil Governor of the
province of Mysore, it had at first been intended to
associate with him a civU commissioner, who had been

44 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
attached to the Nizam's contingent during the
campaign. WeUington refused point blank to divide
his authority with any one, expressing himself to the
Marquis Wellesley in the following forcible terras :
" I intend to ask to be brought away with the army
if any civil servant of the Company is to be here, or
any person with civil authority who is not under my
orders ; for I know that the whole is a system of job
and corruption from beginning to end, of which I and
ray troops would be made the instruments." Then
followed his raortification at finding that the Govern
raent of India had thought proper to appoint a Major-
General to coramand the expedition to Egypt, and
his annoyance at the selection of General Baird. On
this occasion he wrote to his brother Henry : " This
supersession has ruined all my prospects, founded
upon any service that I raay have rendered. ... It
must have been occasioned either by my own mis
conduct, or by an alteration in the sentiments of the
Governor- General. I have not been guilty of robbery
or murder, and he has certainly changed his raind ;
but the world, which is always good-natured towards
those whose affairs do not exactly prosper, will not,
or rather does not, fail to suspect that both, or worse,
have been the occasion of my being banished, like
General Kray, to my estate in Hungary." Just before

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 4S

Wellington left India he wrote very bitterly about the
East India Corapany : " I have served the Corapany in
iraportant situations for many years, and have never
received anything but injury from the Court of
Directors." There is, however, nothing to show in
what particular way he had suffered at the hands of
these gentleraen.
The failure of Wellington's health was, no doubt,
one of his principal reasons for deciding to return to
England. At the sarae tirae he had corae to the con
clusion that it was opposed to his own interests to stay
longer in India, as he felt convinced that his services
in that country, however distinguished they raight be,
would give hira no claira to advanceraent in the horae
army. " I think," he says, " that I have served as
long in India as any man ought, who can serve any
where else ; and I think that there appears a prospect
of service in Europe, in which I should be more likely
to get forward." And again — " I acknowledge that
I never have been very sanguine in my expect
ations that miUtary services in India would be con
sidered in the scale in which are considered sirailar
services in other parts of the world."
It is pleasant to notice that, during his stay in
India, Wellington, though extremely strict in matters
of discipline, was kind and considerate to the troops

46 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
under his command, and was respected and liked by
his officers. Mr. Gleig, in his Life of Wellington,
quotes the following passage from a letter written in
1 802 by a young officer of the East India Company's
Service to his friends in England : " Everything goes
well, because Colonel Wellesley is in comraand.
Whatever he undertakes he does adrairably.
Perhaps it was hardly fair to eraploy hira rather
than General  ; but we are all delighted to have
him at our head, he makes us so confident and sb
comfortable." Major-General Nicolls refers in his
journal to the attention paid by Wellington to the
sick and wounded after the battle of Assaye. He
furnished them with wine from his own stock, re
peatedly visited them, and made every possible
arrangeraent for their comfort. He regarded it as
most iraportant frora a financial and railitary, as well
as from a humanitarian point of view, that proper
care should be taken of the health of the British
soldier in India. Writing to Colonel Murray on the
subject of the barracks at Surat, he observed : "Every
attention must be paid to economy, but I consider no
thing in this country so valuable as the life and health
of the British soldier, and nothing so expensive as
soldiers in hospital. I request you to pay particular
attention to their discipline and regularity, and to pre-

THE INDIAN PERIOD. 47
vent their getting intoxicating liquors, which tend to
their destruction." Wellington's appreciation of the
good qualities of our Native soldiers is shown by his
repeatedly coraparing thera in after life to the
Portuguese troops, who, towards the close of the
Peninsular War, attained a very high standard of
efficiency. " The Sepoys," he used to say, " like the
Portuguese, would go anywhere and do anything,
when led by British officers and supported by British
troops." So highly was Wellington esteeraed in the array of
the Deccan, that, when he relinquished his coraraand,
the officers who had served under his immediate
orders presented hira with a service of plate of the
value of two thousand guineas.
There are raany other points of interest in WelUng
ton's Indian career, with which I ara unable to deal
within the liraits of this article. His indefatigable
industry, his sound and cool judgraent, and his
political sagacity were as reraarkable as his military
talents. A masterful, ambitious man, he went home
apparently somewhat disappointed with the results of
his eight years' service in the East, and determined
to push his way in a wider field than India afforded.
Yet during those eight years he had risen to the rank
of Major-General and becorae a K.B., had acquired a

48 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
large araount of prize raoney at Seringapatam and in
the Deccan, had been entrusted with high military
command, and had filled important adrainistrative
and political appointraents. His return to England
was opportune. His country needed the services of
an officer who to the vigour and audacity of youth
united a sound judgraent, an equable teraper, and a
thorough knowledge of his profession. His oppor
tunity was not long in coraing, and "the Sepoy
General," as he was contemptuously styled by those
who underrated the value of an Indian training, was
soon to show the nations of Europe that he could be a
match, and raore than a raatch, for the Marshals of
France.

( 49 )

" In the beginning of each war England has to seek
in blood the knowledge necessary to ensure success ;
and, like the fiend's progress toward Eden, her con
quering course is through chaos followed by death." — •
Napier, ' Peninsular War.'

CHAPTER II.
As stated in ray previous chapter, Major-General Sir
Arthur WeUesley, K.B., left India in March 1805,
and, after an absence of nine years, reached England
in Septeraber. Shortly after his arrival, he was
selected for the coraraand of a brigade in an ex
pedition to Hanover under Lord Cathcart. But the
victory which Napoleon gained at Austerlitz in
Deceraber broke up the European coalition against
him, and the British troops had hardly landed in
Gerraany before it was found necessary to recall
them. On the return of the expedition, in February
1806, Major-General Wellesley was appointed to
command an infantry brigade at Hastings, and soon
afterwards was elected Meraber of ParUaraent for
E

so THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

Rye. He took an active part in the House of Com
raons in defending his brother's administration as
Governor-General of India, which had been impugned
by a party opposed to the territorial aggrandiseraent
of the East India Corapany. General Wellesley's
clear exposition of the nature of our rule in India
and of the perils which had been avoided by the
adoption of a resolute course of action in dealing with
the Mahratta States, convinced a large raajority of the
House of Coraraons, and a vote was passed in support
of his brother's policy.
In September 1806 the death of Fox led to the
formation of a new Ministry, with the Duke of Port
land at its head. The Duke of Richmond was
appointed Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and in April
1807 Major-General Wellesley accepted the- office of
Chief Secretary for that country. During the early
part of the same year the victories of Eylau and
Friedland made Napoleon absolute raaster on the
Continent, and induced the Emperor of Russia to
enter into an alliance with the French, the terms
of which were ostensibly embodied in the treaty of
Tilsit. In connection with this treaty, however, there
were certain secret articles, one of them being that
the Danish fleet should be placed at Napoleon's
disposal. This arrangement seriously menaced the

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 51

sea power of England, and the British Goverhment
determined to despatch a corabined naval and military
expedition to Copenhagen for the purpose of seizing
tUe Danish ships, dockyard, and arsenal. The troops
ordered on this service, numbering 27,000 men,. were
coraraanded by Lord Cathcart; the reserve, con
sisting of four infantiy battalions with sorae Gerraan
horse, being placed under Major-General Wellesley.
The object of the expedition was kept a profound
secret until the force had arrived at its destination,
when Lord Cathcart called upon the Danish Govern
raent to place its fleet' and maritime stores in the
temporary custody of England, pending the conclusion
of a general European peace. The Prince Royal of
Denmark refused to accede to this summons, and
endeavoured by all the means in his power to prevent
its enforceraent. Lord Cathcart, therefore, invested
the city, and directed General Wellesley with a
division about 5000 strong to attack and disperse the
Danish troops operating in the field. Wellesley found
the latter, to the nuraber of about 14,000, occupying a
position at Kioge, the front of which was protected by
earthworks ; and after a short engageraent defeated
thera -with considerable loss. Meanwhile, batteries
had been constructed by the investing army ; and,
after being bombarded for three days by these
E 2

53 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
batteries, and by the guns of the British fleet, Copen
hagen capitulated, and the demands of the British
Governraent were coraplied with. England thus ob
tained possession of fifteen line-of-battle ships, several
frigates, and 20,000 tons of naval stores. The action
taken by the Cabinet was not only prompt and
decisive, but also somewhat unusual, if judged by the
ordinary rules of international coraity. On this account
it has been condemned by many Continental writers.
Nevertheless, the course adopted appears to . have
been justifiable, on the ground that Napoleon's secret
compact with Russia threatened our maritirae su
premacy — and consequently, our national existence-—
by handing over to the French Emperor the resources
of a neutral state, which, however well disposed
towards us, was too weak to preserve its neutrality.
General Wellesley distinguished himself in Zealand,
not only by his defeat of the Danish troops at Kioge,
but by the strict discipUne which he maintained among
his own men, and the protection which he afforded to
the inhabitants of the island.
The expedition returned to England in October,
General Wellesley preceding it by a few weeks in
order to resume his functions as Secretary for Ireland.
In February 1808, he received the thanks of ParUa
ment for his conduct at Copenhagen, and in the July

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. S3
following, he was appointed to comraand an expedi
tion which was being asserabled at Cork for operations
in Portugal or the south of Spain.
Before describing Wellington's carapaign in the
Peninsula, it seeras desirable briefly to refer to the
condition of affairs then prevailing in that part of
Europe. After the conclusion of the treaty of Tilsit,
Napoleon had, for the tirae, disposed of all his Conti
nental enemies, and, at the instigation of Russia, he
resolved first to subjugate Portugal, and afterwards to
expel the Bourbon dynasty from Spain, substituting
his brother Joseph for Charles IV. Russia encouraged
the French Emperor in his designs upon the Peninsula,,
first, in order to withdraw his attention from Poland,
and, secondly, in the event of a general peace, to secure
his assent to the incorporation in the Russian Erapire
of Finland, Wallachia, and Moldavia. Napoleon was
anxious to corapletely subjugate Portugal, because
that countiy was the traditional ally of England, and
an extensive and lucrative trade was carried on
between the two nations. He also regarded it as
necessary to his Continental systera, and conducive to
the strength and permanence of his dynasty, that a
meraber of his own faraily should replace the Bourbons
on the Spanish throne. The Portuguese as a race were
well disposed towards England, and ready to welcorae

54 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
British assistance in raaintaining their independence.
The Spaniards, on the other hand, wished to be
left alone to raanage their own affairs ; and though
they objected io French interference, and greedily
accepted the money and stores which the British

\
SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.
Government so lavishly supplied, they appear to have
disliked the English even more than they did the
French. This is shown by the speech which Castaiios
made to the French officers after the affair at
Baylen, when he remarked : " Let not Napoleon
persevere in aiming at a conquest which is unattainable.

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. S5

Let him not force us into the arms of the English.
They are hateful to us, and up to the present moment
we have rejected their proffered succours." The
revolt of the Spanish colonies in America, increased
the ill-feeling against England. This revolt was as
ruinous to Spain as it was advantageous to our own
raerchants, who were enabled to participate in a trans
atlantic trade which had previously been monopolised
by the parent kingdora.
As regards the Portuguese and Spanish troops, both
at first were equally useless, not on account of the
inferiority of the raw raaterial, but because the officers
were bigoted, conceited, and devoid of any idea of
discipline and subordination. The Portuguese, how
ever, were wise enough to recognise their own ineffi
ciency, and to submit theniselves. to the control of
British officers, under whose supervision they gradually
improved until, in Wellington's opinion, they became
equal to the native troops ofthe East India Company.
The Spaniards, a manly and martial race, with
glorious military traditions, could neither learn nor
forget. They would not tolerate for a moment the
interference of any foreign agency with the discipline
and organisation of their soldiers. " I am quite con
vinced," said WeUington, "tha:t the Spanish officers
would rather subrait to France than consent to give

56 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
to us the sraallest authority over their troops ; neither
will they allow that our officers know more than their
own." And yet these troops were so badly commanded
as to be almost worthless. Wellington remarked of
thera : " They are mere children in the art of war.:
they know only how to advance, how to take to flight,
and reasserable again, as if they were in a state of
nature." One of their own generals, the Duke of
Albuquerque, speaking of Cuesta's array, raade the
following adraission : " In our raarches we stopped to
rest like a flock of sheep, without taking up any posi
tion. By-and-by we resuraed our journey like pilgriras,
without paying any attention to distances, order, or
formation." Napoleon was of a similar opinion.
Writing in August 1808, he said : "The whole body
of insurrectionary forces is incapable of beating 25,000
French in a good position." And Berthier, in a letter
to Joseph Bonaparte, dated January 31st, 1810,
observed : " The Eraperor considers that the English
alone are forraidable in Spain. The rest are the
raerest canaille, which can never keep the field."
Another obstacle to the proper organisation of the
national forces for the defence of the Peninsula was
the violent aniraosity that existed between the
Spaniards and Portuguese — an aniraosity of long
standing, which had been fostered by the convention

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. S7

entered into by Napoleon and Charles IV. in 1807,
providing for the expulsion frora Portugal of the
reigning house of Braganza, and the partition of that
country and its colonial possessions between France
and Spain.
Yet- another difficulty was the state of official and
popular feeling in England. The British Governraent
had but little confidence in the capacity of its railitary
coraraanders. Pitt, as Lord Rosebery points out in
his Life of that statesman, "had no generals. He
discovered the genius of Wellington, but did not live
to profit by it." Previously, when Lord North had a
list of officers submitted to hira for the coraraands in
Araerica, he observed : " I know not what effect these
naraes may have on the enemy, but I know they
make me trerable." " It was doubted," says Lord
Londonderry, " whether among our own generals there
could be found any capable of opposing the experi
enced and skilful warriors of France. We had never
been accustomed to carry on war upon a large scale
except in India ; and in India it was beUeved, for 'the
successful conduct of a campaign, talents of the first
order were hardly required." On the other hand the
British public attached undue value to the national
spirit and patriotisra of the Spaniards. They
imagined that enthusiasra could take the place of

S8 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
dicipline and training, and when they saw Spain over
run, and the Spanish fortresses and capital occupied
by French troops, they were inclined to blarae their
own officers rather than the arrogance and irabeciUty
of those responsible for the organisation of the Spanish
array. From the foregoing remarks it will be seen
that, in attempting to maintain the independence of
the Peninsula, the British Government was under
taking a task of extraordinary difficulty, and that a
successful issue could not be hoped for unless our
operations against the French were directed by a
coraraander possessing railitary, diploraatic, and
administrative talents of quite an exceptional order.
Fortunately for England and Europe, such a man
was forthcoming in the person of Wellington.
In the summer of 1807 Napoleon sent a force under
Junot to invade Portugal and occupy Lisbon. Shortly
afterwards the principal Spanish fortresses were seized
by the French, and an army under Murat's comraand
captured Madrid in March 1808. Two raonths later
Charles IV. ceded his throne to the French Eraperor,
who norainated his brother Joseph to succeed the
Bourbon king. Joseph entered his capital in July,
but had not been there many days before the Spanish
nation rose in revolt, attacked the French troops, and
forced their new sovereign to retire behind the Ebro.

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD.

59

The British Ministiy assisted the Spaniards with
large supplies of money and warUke stores, and in
July 1808 determined to send an expedition to the
Tagus with the object of expelling the French from
Portugal and inducing the inhabitants of that countiy

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE HON. JOHN HOPE.
to join in the insurrection against Napoleon. The
expeditionary force at first nurabered about 9500
raen, and the coramand of it was given to Wellesley,
who in April 1808 had been promoted to the rank of
Lieutenant-General. General Wellesley received his
instructions from Lord Castlereagh on June 30th.

6o THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
A fortnight later the Cabinet thought it desirable to
raise the force to a strength of 30,000 men, and to
appoint Sir Hew Dalrymple to the chief comraand,
with Sir H. Burrard as second in command. Under
this new arrangement Lieutenant-General Wellesley
was to command one of the four divisions of the
army, the other divisional comraanders being Lieu
tenant-Generals the Hon. J. Hope, Lord Paget, and
Mackenzie Fraser. General Wellesley sailed from
Cork early in July, and after touching at Coruiia in
order to ascertain the state of affairs in Northern
Spain, resolved to disembark his troops at Mondego
Bay, in preference to the mouth of the Tagus, which
was defended by forts held by French soldiers and
by Russian men-of-war. Major-General Spencer,
who was coraraanding a corps about 4800 strong at
Cadiz, was ordered to join General Wellesley, and
fortunately arrived at Mondego Bay about the sarae
tirae as the convoy frora Cork. The French troops
at Junot's disposal did not exceed 20,000 raen, and
of these not more than 17,000 were available for the
defence of Lisbon. One of his divisions, under
General Loison, was posted at Estremoz, on the
Spanish frontier. This he recalled by the Abrantes
road, and sent Laborde from Lisbon to check the
British advance and effect a junction with Loison at

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 6i
Leiria. General Wellesley, whose force, including the
reinforceraent frora Cadiz, nurabered less than 14,000,
and was especially weak in cavalry and artillery,
raoved rapidly southward, forestalled Laborde in the
occupation of Leiria, and corapelled hira to retire
upon Roli5a, a village covering the road to Torres
Vedras. Laborde was thus prevented frora joining
Loison, whose division had only just reached San
tarera. On August 17th WeUesley attacked Laborde
at Roliga, and, after a severe engageraent, in which
the British lost 420 killed and wounded and the
French 600, drove hira back towards Torres Vedras.
The next day the British coraraander did not follow
up the enemy, first, because his cavalry numbered
only 470 sabres, and secondly, because he had received
news ofthe arrival of two additional brigades frora
horae, and thought it advisable to take up a position
near Vimeiro to cover their landing. This opera
tion occupied two days, and during the interval
Junot was able to bring up Loison's division, and to
concentrate and reorganise his troops at Torres
Vedras. Marching thence on the evening of August
20th, he attacked early next raorning the position
held by the British at Viraeiro. It had been
Wellesley's intention to assurae the offensive and to
cut off the enemy from their base by a flank march

62 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
along the sea coast, but the proposal was negatived
by Sir H. Burrard, who reached Maceira Bay on the
20th, but did not disembark until the following
morning. The result of the engagement at Vimeiro
was entirely in favour of the British' force. The
French lost 1800 killed and wounded, and thirteen
guns, while the casualties on" the English side did not
exceed 720. "General Burrard appeared on the field
of battle, but did not interfere with the dispositions
of his predecessor in command, except to halt one of
the brigades at a most inopportune rnonient. By
noon the fate ofthe day was decided, and Wellesley
proposed at once to push forward with five brigades
with the object of forcing Junot into the Tagus valley,
while three other brigades, penetrating the defiles of
Torres Vedras, might occupy Mafra and cut off the
French from Lisbon. Burrard hesitated, consulted
his subordinates, and decided not to raove. This
resolve so annoyed Wellesley that he reraarked to
his staff: "Gentlemen, there is nothing for us to do
now but to hunt red-legged partridges." Burrard's
excessive caution enabled Junot to regain, on the
evening of the 21st, the position at Torres Vedras
which he had previously occupied, and the next day
Sir Hev^ Dalrymple landed and assumed the chief
comraand. He also was in doubt whether to await

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 63

reinforcements ' or to order an iramediate advance,
when the question was settled for him by Junot, who
proposed an arraistice ahd subsequently opened
negotiations for the evacuation of Portugal by the
French array. General Wellesley was present as an
assessor when the terras of the arraistice were being
discussed between the French General Kellerraann
and Sir Hew Dalryriiple ; and although he considered
that the conditions acceded to by the British com
raander were tinduly favourable to the enemy, he
signed t'he preliminary meraoraridufn, dated August
22nd, at the request of General Dalrymple, who
regarded it as derogatory to his own dignity as a
coraraandef-in-chief to treat directly with an officer
of inferior rank. The final convention was negotiated
by the Quartermaster-General of the force. Colonel
George Murray, and signed by hira and General
Kellerraann on August 30th.
Writing on Septernber 6th to the Bishop of Oporto,
General Wellesley remarked : " Sir Hew Dalrymple,
the present Comraander-in-Chief, landed on the
morning of August 22nd ; and on that evening he
negotiated in. person with the French General Keller
mann. an agreeraent of the suspension of hostilities.
I was. present during the negotiation of this, agree
ment ; and, by the desire of the Comraander^in-Chief,

64 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

I signed it. But I did not negotiate it, nor can I in
any manner be considered responsible for its con
tents." A week before he had written privately to
Lord Castlereagh, informing hira that matters were
not prospering, and that he wished to leave the army.
He added : " I have been too successful with this
array ever to serve with it in a subordinate situation,
with satisfaction to the person who shall coraraand it,
and of course not to rayself." On Septeraber Sth he
again addressed Lord Castlereagh in the following
terms : " It is quite irapossible for me to continue any
longer with this array ; and I wish, therefore, that you
would allow rae to return horae and resume the duties
of my office ; or, if not, that I should remain upon the
staff in England ; or, if that should not be practicable,
that I should reraain without eraployraent." Sir Hew
Dalrymple was equally disinclined to retain General
Wellesley's services, and conveyed to him Lord
Castlereagh's proposal that he should be sent to
exaraine the northern provinces of Spain and report
on the possibility of defending thera against a French
invasion. Wellesley declined this raission, pointing
out to Sir Hew Dalryraple that he was not a topo
graphical engineer, and could not pretend to describe
in writing such a country as the Asturias. Sir Hew
Dalryraple apparently accepted this as a valid excuse,

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 65
for he suggested that officers of the Quarterraaster-
General's departraent might more fittingly be era
ployed on such a duty.
General Wellesley was eventually perraitted to leave
the array, and he reached London on October 6th.
Before his departure the general officers who had
served under hira while he was directing the opera
tions presented him with a piece of plate, of the value
of a thousand guineas, as a testimony of their high
esteem and respect, and of their satisfaction at having
had the good fortune to serve under his coramand.
On Wellesley's return home a great outcry was
raised against the convention of Cintra, and the public
were inclined to throw the blarae on hira, rather than
on Sir Hew Dalrymple, who was really responsible.
The Governraent, however, recalled Sir Hew and his
second in comraand, and asserabled a court of inquiry,
which arrived at no specific conclusion on the subject
of the armistice and convention, merely advising that
no further proceedings should be taken, and declaring
that unquestionable zeal and firraness had been dis
played by Generals Dalryraple, Burrard, and WeUes
ley. The popular indignation having by this raeans
been pacified, the thanks of Parliament for the victory
of Viraeiro were accorded to General Wellesley in
January 1809. F

65 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
In the raeantime the chief comraand of the British
array in Portugal had devolved on Sir John Moore,
who was feebly supported by the horae authorities,
and rauch hampered by the ill-advised interference of
Mr. Frere, the British Minister at the headquarters of
the provisional Spanish Government. In Noveraber
1808 Napoleon, after confirraing his alliance with
Russia and obtaining the Tzar's recognition of Joseph
as King of Spain, proceeded to Vittoria to assurae the
command of the French forces in the Peninsula. He
there issued a proclamation to his soldiers, proraising
thera an easy victory over the British array, and
assuring thera that " le hideux leopard qui souille la
Peninsule de sa presence prendra honteuseraent la
fuite a notre aspect." The French Eraperor rapidly
overthrew the Spanish levies, and occupied Madrid on
Deceraber 4th. Here he received intelligence that
Sir John Moore was advancing into the north of
Spain to the relief of the capital, and at once con
centrated an overwhelraing force for the purpose of
cutting off the British army from the Tagus and the
Galician ports. Moore had reluctantly committed
hiraself to an offensive movement in answer to the
earnest appeal of the Junta and Mr. Frere, and he
naturally relied on the co-operation of the Spanish
troops and civil authorities. Receiving, however, no

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD.

67

support either in men or in supplies, he found hiraself
in an extreraely perilous position, and was obliged to
withdraw as rapidly as possible. In spite of innuraer
able difficulties, he conducted his retreat in a most
masterly raanner ; and after reaching Coruna, on
January 12th, 1809, defeated the enemy on the i6th.

COLONEL GEORGE MURRAY.
and died a hero's death on the field of battle. The
British troops erabarked the next day unmolested by
the French, and Marshal Soult, who was in command
of the latter, caused a monument to be erected in his
opponent's honour. Moore's reputation has been
unjustly assailed. He was one of the ablest and
F 2

68 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
most progressive of British generals ; but, in common
with most of his countrymen, he raade the mistake of
supposing that the undisciplined Spanish forces could
offer an effective resistance to the veteran soldiers of
France. This belief appears to have been shared at
the tirae by Wellington, who, in a letter to the Hon.
C. Stewart, dated Septeraber ist, 1808, referred to
Sir Hew Daliymple's inaction in the following words :
" I do not know what Sir Hew Daliyraple proposes
to do, or is instructed to do ; but, if I were in his
situation, I would have twenty thousand raen at
Madrid in less than a raonth frora this time."
In the spring of 1809 the general state of affairs
was as follows. The British Ministry was perplexed
and the nation dispirited by Sir John Moore's retreat.
The Opposition also took the opportunity of de
nouncing more violently than before the policy of
intervention on behalf of Spain and Portugal. Napo
leon, after raaking hiraself master of the whole of
Spain, had started in January for Paris, where he
began his preparations for another carapaign against
Austria. The British troops reraaining in Portugal
under Sir John Craddock's comraand were left with
out funds or supplies, while they were threatened on
the north by Soult's occupation of Oporto and on the
east by the presence of Victor's array in the Tagus

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD.

valley. At one time the Cabinet had almost decided
to withdraw frora the Peninsula, but before issuing
orders to that effect they consulted General Wellesley,
who, in a convincing raemorandura, urged on the
Governraent the feasibility of defending Portugal, and
of training the Portuguese troops under the super
intendence of British officers, so as to render thera
capable of facing the French. He pointed out that a
defence of this nature would be extreraely useful to
the Spaniards in their contest with France, and that it
could be effected by the employment of a British
force of about 30,000 men, provided that England was
prepared to afford very extensive pecuniary assistance
and strong political support to the Portuguese nation
and that the organisation and control of the Portu
guese array was placed entirely in the hands of the
British comraander. These views coramended them
selves to His Majesty's Ministers, the more so as the
certainty of an early rupture between France and
Austria encouraged them to persevere in their struggle
against Napoleon ; but still they were by no means con
fident of success, or disposed to devote all the energies
and resources of the nation to the vigorous prosecution
of the policy which Wellesley recomraended.
In. choosing an officer for the chief coramand in the
Peninsula, a difference of opinion appears to have

70 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
arisen in the Cabinet ; but eventually Wellesley's
high military reputation and great social and political
influence carried the day, and the Government en
trusted him with the duty of giving effect to his own
proposals. He accordingly resigned the office of
Chief Secretary for Ireland in April 1809, and at once
proceeded to Lisbon, where he took over the com
raand from Sir John Craddock. A raonth before,
Major-General Beresford, who had been appointed to
the comraand of the Portuguese forces with the local
rank of Marshal, had arrived, and begun his re
organisation by selecting British officers for all the
raore important railitary posts. With the help of
these officers and by his own tact and ability he
gradually raised the Portuguese troops to a high
standard of discipline and efficiency. General Welles
ley had the chief command of the Portuguese as well
as ofthe British array, and in July 1809 he was given
the rank of Marshal-General in the Portuguese service.
Napoleon, on leaving Spain, had given orders to his
generals to continue the operations he had begun,
with the object of driving- the English out of the
Peninsula, and bringing the whole country into sub
jection. Soult was directed to occupy Oporto by
February 5th, on which date he was to instruct
General Lapisse, who commanded a division at

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD.

71

Salamanca, to march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and
Abrantes. Reinforced by Lapisse, Marshal Victor,
who was stationed in the Tagus valley, was to
threaten Lisbon from the east, while Soult was ^o
advance upon that city from the north. As soon as

^i^'-.

SIR JOHN MOORE.

Lisbon had been captured, and the British force com
pelled to evacuate Portugal, Soult was to place a
portion of his troops at Victor's disposal, and the
latter, operating through Merida, was to raake hira
self raaster of Seville. This plan was ably conceived.

72 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
but depended for its success on the promptitude with
which it was carried out by the French commanders,
and on their being able to overcome the resistance of
the British array. Soult's troops had been greatly
fatigued by their rapid pursuit of Sir John Moore,
and consequently were unable to occupy Oporto
before the end of March. Victor, however, on the
28th of that raonth defeated the Spanish general,
Cuesta, with iramense slaughter, at Medellin, east of
Merida ; and the following day a French division,
under Sebastiani, routed another Spanish force at
Ciudad Real, about a hundred miles south of Madrid.
Lapisse, instead of moving towards Abrantes on the
Tagus, joined Victor on the Guadiana at Merida on
April 19th. The French, therefore, were exceedingly
strong in Spanish Estreraadura ; but, owing to the
Emperor's instructions, Victor awaited Soult's advance
on Lisbon before crossing the Portuguese frontier.
When WeUesley landed on April 22nd he perceived
that Soult and Victor were too far apart to afford
each other mutual support, and that he had it in his
power to act against either. He considered it of
primary importance to expel the French from Oporto,
and thus cany out his scherae of raaintaining the
integrity of Portugal, and using that country as a
base of operations against the French in Spain.

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 73

After taking the necessary steps to prevent, or at any
rate to retard, any raoveraent that Victor might
atterapt in the direction of Lisbon, Wellesley rapidly
concentrated his force, consisting of 13,000 British,
3000 German, and 9000 Portuguese soldiers, at
Coirabra, and, raarching in two colurans, reached the
Douro on May 12th. He found Soult's array in
occupation of Oporto, separated frora hira by a deep
and rapid river, three hundred and twenty yards in
width. He possessed no bridge equipraent, and all the
country boats had been removed to the right bank of
the stream. Massing his artillery on a height which
coraraanded a strongly walled enclosure on the
opposite bank, he directed Captain Waters, a staff
officer of unrivalled activity and resource, to procure
sorae boats in which a crossing could be effected.
Captain Waters was fortunate enough to discover an
old boat hidden araong the rushes and filled with
raud. In this, aided by a few peasants, he raanaged
to cross the river, and finding four barges with no
guard over them on the enemy's side, he succeeded in
bringing them away without attracting attention.
Detaching a column under General John Murray to
cross the river at Avintas, three miles above Oporto,
and thus threaten the French line of retreat, the
British commander managed to send over troops

74 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
sufficient to hold the walled enclosure before the
enemy realised his intention ; other boats were pro
cured frora up-streara ; the river was crossed at
several points ; and eventually the French were
driven out of Oporto w(ith such rapidity and in such
confusion that General Wellesley at four o'clock that
afternoon dined at the table which had been prepared
for Marshal Soult. General Murray failed to attack
the French flank in conformity with his instructions.
Had he done so, a large portion of the retreating force
would have been destroyed. As it was, Oporto fell
into the hands of the English, and Soult was com
pelled to retire through Braga on Orense in Galicia,
where he arrived on May 19th with only 18,000 raen,
having lost 6000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, as
well as his guns, araraunition, baggage, stores, and
railitary chest.
Having thus for the tirae disposed of Soult,
Wellesley turned his attention towards Victor's array
quartered in the valley of the Upper Tagus ; and this
was the raore necessary as General Lapisse had
seized the bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, and
Soult, after reorganising and re-equipping his troops,
was beginning to move in a south-easterly direction
to Zamora on the Upper Douro, with the object of
reinforcing Madrid. In transferring his operations to

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 75
the south, Wellesley had serious difficulties to over
corae. The rapid march from Lisbon to Oporto, and
thence in pursuit of Soult, had sent over 4000 of his
raen into hospital ; provisions were scarce ; the
soldiers' shoes and clothing were in bad order ; their
discipline had been impaired by success ; and money
was not forthcoraing, either to pay the troops or to
purchase suppUes. Moreover, Cuesta, who was in
chief command of the Spanish army, refused to act as
Wellesley recommended. The result was that the
British force was detained -in the neighbourhood of
Abrantes until the end of June. Wellesley had about
22,000 men at his disposal, while Cuesta's army, with
its headquarters at Oropesa, nurabered about 33,000.
The French had 250,000 soldiers in the Peninsula, but
out of these only 50,000 were immediately available
to oppose the British advance, 33,000 being under
Victor, 12,000 under Sebastiani, and 5000 under
Joseph. At the end of June, Soult, then at Zamora,
received orders from Napoleon to take up a position
north of the Tagus valley, and, as soon as Wellesley
had committed hiraself to a forward raovement, to
cross the mountains and fall on his flank and rear.
On July 20th the British troops joined Cuesta's array
at Oropesa, and it was arranged that the corabined
force should advance towards Madrid, while Venegas,

76 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
with another Spanish column 26,000 strong, should
approach the capital from the south through Toledo
and Aranjuez. Venegas failed to march at the
appointed tirae, and the French army was able to
concentrate undisturbed at and near Toledo from the
24th to the 26th July. On the 22nd Wellesley
entered Talavera, and wished to attack Victor the
next day, before the troops under Sebastiani and
the king had come up. But Cuesta refused on
the ground that July 23rd was a Sunday. On the
24th Soult received orders frora Joseph to raove
at once frora Salaraanca on Plasencia, but he obeyed
in such a dilatory raanner that the three corps
under his command were not assembled in the
Tagus valley until August 5 th. On July 27th Victor
attacked the British and Spanish forces, which
were drawn up on the right bank of the Tagus, with
their right flank resting on Talavera. The Spaniards
in front of that flank were defeated, and fled with
their artillery many miles to the rear, only 4000 out
of a corps of 10,000 returning to the field of battle.
On the left flank the British troops held their own.
The next day Victor renewed the combat. Sir
Arthur was watching the advance of the French,
when Colonel Donkin was sent by the Spanish
general Albuquerque to report that Cuesta had made

battle of talavera.

To face f. 76.

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 77

terms with the eneray. With iraraovable coolness
Wellesley read the letter, desired Colonel Donkin to
return to his brigade, and continued his own recon
naissance. At two o'clock in the afternoon the battle
began, Victor's object being to turn the left and break
through the centre of the British line. In this he
failed, owing not only to his opponent's readiness of
resource and tactical skill, but also to the surpassing
gallantry of the British soldiers. In this engageraent
the British loss exceeded 6000 killed and wounded,
inclusive of five general officers, and that of the
French was over 7000. " The battle of Talavera,"
says Joraini, "restored to the successors of Marl
borough the glory which for a whole age seeraed to
have passed frora thera," and it caused Napoleon to
change his opinion regarding the bravery of British
troops and the capacity of their leaders. The next
day the two arraies remained in presence of each
other, but the British were reinforced by the cele
brated Light Division, 3000 strong, under General
Cranford, which in twenty-six hours accomplished a
march of sixty-two railes, and, although each soldier
carried a load of from fifty to sixty pounds on his
back, left only seventeen stragglers behind. On
July 30th Joseph became anxious about the safety of
Madrid, and fell back on the Alberche, and shortly

78 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
afterwards Wellesley received information that Soult,
with 37,000 raen, had reached Plasencia with the
intention of cutting him off from his base. It had
been arranged with Cuesta that the raountain
passes giving access to Plasencia should be guarded
by Spanish troops, but these had fled on the ap-

major-general BERESFORD.

proach of the French columns without firing a shot.
Wellesley now found himself in an extremely critical
position, being threatened in front and rear by forces
equal or superior to his own ; he could place no
reliance on his Spanish Allies ; and his own army was
almost starving, owing to the failure of the local

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 79
authorities to provide the supplies and transport
which they had proraised. He extricated himself,
however, by a rapid raarch, crossed the Tagus at
Arzobispo, arrested Soult's advance by breaking
down the bridge of boats at Almaraz, and retired
through Truxillo and Merida on Badajoz and Elvas.
The enemy attempted nothing further, and the several
corps soon separated, their leaders being unable to
agree upon a united course of action. This expedi
tion taught Wellington that he had to face the same
difficulties which baffled Sir John Moorg. In Brial-
raont's words, it showed him " the ignorance and
wrongheadedness of the Spanish generals ; the worth
lessness of their troops ; the blind hostility of the
Juntas ; the apathy of the Spanish people ; their
insane hatred of the Portuguese ; and their unsatis
factory disposition towards the English soldiers, with
whom they were never on good terms." Thence
forward up to the end of the war Wellesley wisely
resolved to act independently, and to rely on his own
resources and his own soldiers.
In August 1809 Sir Arthur Wellesley was created a
peer with the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley and
Viscount Wellington of Talavera, and in the succeed
ing February he received the thanks of Parliament
and a pension of ;^20oo a year for three lives. This

So the rise OF WELLINGTON.
pension was strongly opposed by the Corporation of
London, the Coraraon Council representing that Wel
lington " had exhibited in the carapaign of Talavera,
with equal rashness and ostentation, nothing but a
useless valour." The grant was also censured by the
Opposition in both Houses of Parliament.
Returning to Lisbon in October 1809, Wellington
gave orders for the construction of the celebrated
defensive works at Torres Vedras. He afterwards
visited Seville and Cadiz, where he raet his brother,
the Marquis Wellesley, who had been appointed
ambassador at the seat of the provisional Spanish
Governraent. Towards the close of the year the
raain body of the British troops was transferred from
Badajoz and Elvas to the Mondego valley, and
General Hill was left at Abrantes to guard the valley
of the Lower Tagus. In the meantime the French
Emperor, having made peace with Austria, ordered
100,000 men to be collected on the Spanish frontier,
and proposed, early in 18 10, to lead them himself
into Spain. In November 1809 the Spanish armies
were signally defeated at Ocaiia by Marshal Mortier,
and at Alba de Tormes by General Kellermann ; and
in January 1810 Joseph invaded Andalusia, overran
the whole province, and captured Seville. Napoleon
was so rauch occupied with .public and private affairs.

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 8i

especially with his negotiations for a marriage with
a Russian or Austrian Princess, that he abandoned
the idea of personally directing the operations in the
Peninsula ; but he sent large reinforceraents into the
country, and appointed Soult to the chief command in
Spain, while Marshal Massena was selected to lead an
army into Portugal.
In England the nation had been mortified by the
failure of the Walcheren expedition, and the hospi
tals were crowded with soldiers suffering from the
Walcheren fever. Recruits could hardly be obtained
even by the offer of high bounties, and the expenses
of the war were causing grave financial embarrass
raent. A disagreeraent between Mr. Canning and
Lord Castlereagh was followed by a duel and by
the dissolution of the Portland Ministry. Another
Government was formed under Mr. Perceval, in which
Lord Liverpool replaced Lord Castlereagh as Secre
tary for War. Wellington perceived that the new
Cabinet was disposed to withdraw the British army
from the Peninsula, and, as he did not wish to give
any pretext for such a decision, he refrained from
asking for the reinforcements and suppUes which
might have enabled hira to defend the Portuguese
frontier. His plan was gradually to fall back on the
Torres Vedras lines, and to take measures for laying
G

82 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
waste the districts in which the French army would
operate. Stringent orders were given that the people
should be compelled to destroy their mills and
bridges, drive away their cattle, abandon their homes,
and cany with them everything that could be made
use of by an invading force. As a result of these
measures, the French troops, who lived by requisition
and plunder, would starve in front of Lisbon, and
would be obliged to retreat or disperse in order to
obtain food and forage.
In June 1810, Massena, with 80,000 raen under his
orders, began the carapaign by besieging Ciudad
Rodrigo ; and although the Portuguese and Spanish
authorities entreated Wellington to raarch to its relief,
he steadfastly refused to do so. Ciudad Rodrigo
surrendered early in July, and Alraeida was next
invested. This fortress was expected to raake an
obstinate defence, but owing to the explosion of the
raain raagazine it became untenable, and had to be
given up after a short siege. The possession of these
places furnished the French comrnander with good
bases for offensive action, and at the beginning of
Septeraber he marched towards Viseu, which he
reached on the 21st. Wellington had meanwhile;
concentrated his force in the Mondego valley, and
resolved to dispute the passage of that river, His

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD.

83

reasons for engaging the eneray were, first, that his
array was dispirited by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo
and Alraeida, and required a victory to restore its
confidence ; and, secondly, that the devastation of the
country in front of Lisbon was not yet corapleted.

^S?.'55-

LORD castlereagh.
He accordingly took up a position on the Sierra de
Busaco, where the enemy, about 56,000 strong,
attacked him on September 27th, but were repulsed
with much slaughter. The French loss in this engage
ment amounted to 4500 killed and wounded ; that of
G Z

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

the British and Portuguese to about 1 300. After the
battle Massena drew off towards the sea, and con
tinued his advance through Coimbra upon Leiria by
the coast road, while Wellington retired by easy
raarches through Condeixa and Leiria to Torres
Vedras. The French had hardly quitted the Mon
dego when their line of coraraunication with Alraeida
was interrupted by a detachraent of Portuguese
Militia, and shortly afterwards a sirailar force sur
prised the garrison of Coimbra and captured Massena's
dep6ts and a large number cf his wounded. On
October lOth, the French Marshal found himself in
front of the triple line of entrenchments, which had
been constructed with such secrecy that, until he
reached them, he was absolutely unaware of their
existence. The lines, defended by about 30,000 raen
and 250 guns, were irapregnable, and the country
around thera was a desert. Massena raight at once
have retreated, or he might have crossed the Tagus,
threatened Lisbon from the left bank of that river,
and based his further operations on Spanish Estrema
dura, where supplies were plentiful. He did neither,
and his array soon becarae demoralised by inactivity
and starvation. Towards the end of October he
found it necessary to establish his headquarters at
Santarem, while Wellington remained within the

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 85
Torres Vedras entrenchraents, which he strengthened
frora day to day, and corapleted by a line of works on
the left bank of the Tagus. Massena sent General
Foy to make an urgent appeal to Napoleon for
assistance, but the Emperor was preparing for the
invasion of Russia, and refused to supply the rein
forcements asked for. He gave orders, however, to
Marshal Soult, who was then occupied in besieging
Cadiz, to march a force about 30,000 strong towards
Abrantes, and desired his brother Joseph to push
forward in the direction of Alcantara. Soult was
disinclined to raove ; nevertheless, he slowly collected
a siege train and, advancing northward, captured
Merida, Olivenga, and Badajoz, which were held by
Spanish garrisons. Shortly after the surrender of
Badajoz, which took place on March uth, 1811, Soult
heard that the English were attempting the relief of
Cadiz, and he therefore returned to Andalusia.
Towards the-" end of February Massena found it
impossible to maintain his position at Santarem, and
on March 2nd the French army began its retreat,
destroying, as it marched, the baggage, ammunition,
horses and guns which irapeded its progress, burning
the towns through which it passed, and putting raany
of the inhabitants to death. Wellington, who during
the winter had received reinforceraents frora England,

86 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
followed the eneray on March 7th, and attacked the
French rear-guard coraraanded by Ney at Porabal on
the uth, at Redinha on the 12th, at Cazal Nova on
the 14th, and at the passage of the Ceira on the 15th.
On arriving at Celorico and Guarda, Massena, whose
troops now only numbered 40,000, proposed to march
southwards to the Tagus valley at Alcantara, and
there to recomraence operations against Lisbon, in
conjunction with Soult and Joseph. Ney refused to
coraply, and after a sharp altercation between the two
raarshals, Massena reraoved hira from his command,
and appointed General Loison to take his place. But
before the French army could evade the pursuit of
the British force, Wellington crossed the Guarda
mountains, and forced the enemy to retire across the
Coa on Sabugal, where, on April 3rd, he attacked
and defeated Reynier's corps, which was holding that
town. The next day the French crossed the Portu
guese frontier, and four days afterwards Massena
passed through Ciudad Rodrigo, where he left a
division, and fell back on Salaraanca. During this
Carapaign the Marshal had lost 30,000 men, and had
been defeated in every -action in which his troops had
been engaged. The miseries which Portugal endured
on this occasion, rather than submit to the rule of
Napoleon, are thus described by Colonel Jones, R.E.,

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

who was serving with the British force : — " Nearly two
thousand square miles of countiy remained for five
raonths with scarcely an inhabitant ; eveiything it
contained was devoured by the eneray, or destroyed
by the season. In the space iraraediately bounding
the positions of the two arraies, not perraanently
occupied by either, the- produce of the harvest
perished, scattered over the ground, and the vintage
raouldered on the stalk ; flocks of innuraerable sraall
birds, drawn to the spot by instinct, fattened un
raolested on the ungathered grapes ; and latterly, the
very wolves, conscious of security, or rendered more
daring by the absence of their accustomed prey,
prowled about, raasters of the countiy, reluctantly
giving way to the cavalry patrols which occasionally
crossed their track."
The Perceval Ministry was rauch encouraged by
the disastrous retreat of the French, and congratulated
Wellington on the success of his defensive operations.
He also received the thanks of Parliaraent for the
liberation of Portugal.
During his pursuit of Massena, WelUngton heard of
the surrender of Badajoz, and deterrained to detach
Beresford for the purpose of investing that fortress
and retaking Olivenga. Beresford accordingly started
on March i6th, with 20,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry,

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD.

and i8 guns, and reached Carapo Mayor on the 25th ;
but great delay occurred in crossing the Guadiana, as
the Spaniards had neglected to provide a bridge of
boats, and the only timber procurable was ill adapted
for the construction of a trestle bridge. Eventually
the troops had to cross the river upon rafts, an
operation which occupied three days, and gave the
French tirae to repair the defences of Badajoz, pro
vision the place, and raount their artillery. As
Beresford approached, Marshal Mortier retreated
¦towards Seville, leaving a garrison in the fortress and
a detachraent at Olivenga. On April 21st, Wellington
arrived frora the north, reconnoitred Badajoz, and
arranged with Beresford for its speedy capture. In
the meantime, however, Massena had reorganised his
army at Salamanca, and, with the aid of such rein
forceraents as he could collect, atterapted to relieve
Almeida, which had been invested by the British
army. Hearing of this movement, Wellington left
Badajoz, rejoined the main body of his troops, and
took up a position at Fuentes d' Onoro, between
Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. There on May 3rd
and 5th he successfully resisted the French onslaught,
the British and Portuguese losing about 1800 killed,
wounded, and prisoners, and the French 2700. On
May 6th, Massena again fell back on Salamanca, and

90 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
in the night of the loth, General Brennier, cora
raanding the Almeida garrison, broke through the
investing force and rejoined the French army.
Shortly afterwards Napoleon removed Massena from
his comraand, and replaced hira by Marshal Marmont.
While these events were taking place in the north,
Beresford had begun the siege of Badajoz, and
hearing that Soult was marching to its relief with
19,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, and 40 guns, he
deterrained to take up a position in advance of the
place. He accordingly raoved to Albuera, where, on
the night of the iSth, he effected a junction with a
Spanish column under General Blake. The Spaniards
were worn out by fatigue and starvation, and their
leader was -.too conceited and obstinate to obey the
orders which were given hira. The total force at
Beresford's disposal araounted to about 32,000, of
which number 7000 were British and 10,000 Portu
guese. On the morning of May i6th Soult attacked
the Allies, and so nearly defeated thera that Beres
ford was preparing to retreat. Luckily, however.
Colonel Hardinge, Quartermaster-General of the
Portuguese array, took upon hiraself to order the
advance of the FusiUer Brigade under General Cole,
and this raovement turned the fortune of the day.
In the following passage, perhaps the raost irapressive

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 91
In his history, Napier records the surpassing gallantry
of the British troops during the concluding phase of
this combat. " Nothing could stop that astonishing
infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no
nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of their
order ; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark
columns in their front, their measured tread shook
the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the
head of every forraation, their deafening shouts over
powered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts
of the tumultuous crowd, as slowly and with a horrid
carnage it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the
attack to the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did
the French reserves mix with the struggling raulti
tude to sustain the fight, — their efforts only increased
the irreraediable confusion, and the raighty raass,
breaking off like a loosened cliff, went headlong down
the steep ; the rain flowed after in streams discoloured
with blood, and eighteen hundred unwounded men,
the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British
soldiers, stood triuraphant on the fatal hill."
Soult's loss had been so heavy that the next day
he reraained inactive, and the day following he with
drew to await the arrival of reinforcements,. Wel
lington, with two divisions, reached Elvas frora the
north on May 19th, and continued the siege of

92 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

Badajoz, Soult meanwhile establishing himself at
Llerena, where, in the middle of June, he was joined
by a column under Drouet, and subsequently by
Marmont's force frora Salaraanca. His troops being
greatly outnurabered, and an attempt to capture
Badajoz by assault having faUed, Wellington decided
to raise the siege and to retire beyond the Caya.
This operation was skilfully effected by June 19th,
and shortly afterwards the French raarshals separated,
Soult going south to guard Seville against the attack
of a Spanish force under Blake, and Marraont taking
up a position on the Tagus between Talavera and
Alcantara. In July Wellington transferred the greater part of
his array to the province of Beira, north of the Lower
Tagus, with a view to surprising Ciudad Rodrigo ;
but early in August the French provisioned that
fortress for two raonths,- and on September 23rd
Marmont, who had moved to Salaraanca, opened
coraraunications with the garrison and threw in eight
raonths' supplies. Wellington, therefore, drew back
frora Ciudad Rodrigo to the position of El Bodon,
where Marraont attacked hira with his cavalry and
artillery, on Septeraber 25th. During this action a
square formed of the 5 th and 77th Foot was charged
on three of its faces at the same moment without

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 93

being broken. AUhough the English gained the day
at El Bodon, WelUngton's flank divisions had not
come up, and he thought it expedient to retire
towards the Coa. His outposts were attacked by
Marmont at Aldea da Ponte without any decisive
result, and the following day the French commander
retreated, a portion of his troops returning to Sala
manca and the rest to the Tagus valley. Thereupon
the British force established itself on the Coa, with
headquarters at Freneda, and renewed the blockade
of Ciudad Rodrigo.
During the reraainder of the year 1811 nothing
further was atterapted, but Napoleon withdrew a
large proportion of his veterans frora Spain for the
invasion of Russia, replacing thera by an equal
nuraber of young soldiers ; and Wellington secretly
collected a bridge and siege train and other equip
raent necessary for the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo.
Marraont, believing that the British force would
reraain inactive during the winter, had reduced the
garrison of that place to 1800 raen, when Welling
ton suddenly crossed the Agueda on January 7th,
1 8 12, and began his investment the same day. The
siege was vigorously conducted, and on the evening
of the 19th the fortress was assaulted and captured by
two columns led by Picton and Cranford. During

94 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
the siege and assault the Allies lost 90 officers and
1200 raen killed and wounded, among the killed
being General Cranford. Three hundred of the
garrison were kiUed, and 80 officers and 1500 soldiers
taken prisoners. In the fortress were found an
iraraense quantity of araraunition and 150 guns,
including Marmont's siege train. In recognition of
his services on this occasion Wellington received an
earldom and an additional pension of ;£'2000 a year ;
he was also created a grandee of Spain with the title
of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.
While Marmont, under Napoleon's orders, was
collecting his troops at Salamanca, and preparing for
an advance on Almeida, WeUington resolved to lay
siege to Badajoz, and, transferring the greater part
of his army frora Beira to the valley of the Guadiana,
invested that fortress on March i6th. Marraont was
anxious to co-operate with Soult in the defence of
Badajoz, but was warned by the French Eraperor not
to interfere. The siege was pushed on in spite of
the terapestuous weather, swarapy ground, interrupted
comraunications, and imperfect appliances. Soult,
believing that Badajoz was in no immediate danger,
began to assemble a large force at Llerena, but on
April 5th the breaches appeared to be practicable,
and Wellington decided to assault the place the

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 95
following evening. The issue was for sorae time
doubtful, as the garrison, under General Philippon,
defended theraselves with great gallantry ; but finally
the heroic valour of the British troops overcame all
resistance, and Badajoz was taken, with a loss to the
besiegers of more than 5000 men, of whom over 3500
fell in fhe assault. Of the garrison only 1300 were
killed or wounded. As soon as he had got possession
of Badajoz, it had been Wellington's intention to
operate against Soult's army at Llerena ; but the
neglect of the Spaniards to throw supplies into
Ciudad Rodrigo, which was threatened by Marraont,
obliged hira to return to the north. Soult shortly
afterwards fell back on Seville ; and General Hill,
having surprised the French and broken the bridge
over the Tagus at Alraaraz, severed the direct line
of coraraunication between that city and Madrid.
Wellington then caused the bridge at Alcantara to
be repaired, and took steps to iraprove the navigation
of the Tagus and Douro, thus providing a short and
secure line of communication between his troops on
the Agueda and those in the Tagus valley, and con
necting the Portuguese frontier with his bases on
the seaboard.
When Marraont, who had advanced as far as
Sabugal and CasteUo Branco, heard of the fate of

96 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

Badajoz and the subsequent movement of the British
troops in support of Ciudad Rodrigo, he withdrew to
Salaraanca ; and there Wellington deterrained to
attack hira. Crossing the Agueda on June 13th, he
invested with one division the fortified posts which
Marraont had constructed in front of the city, while
with the reraainder of his troops he operated against
the French array, which fell back on the Douro. The
strength of the defences having been underrated,
considerable delay occurred in reducing them, and
the French garrison did not surrender untU June 27th,
ten days after the investraent. During this interval
Marraont was reinforced, and took up a strong
position on the right bank of the Douro. Wellington
followed to the left bank, but found the enemy in
such strength, and was himself so erabarrassed by the
want of raoney, and consequently of supplies, that he
conteraplated a retreat to the Portuguese frontier.
Marmont resolved to assume the offensive ; and,
suddenly crossing the Douro at TordesiUas on
July 17th, raanoeuvred for several days in close
proximity to the British army, his object being to
regain Salaraanca and cut off his opponent's retreat.
The result of these manoeuvres was generally favour
able to the French, until on July 22nd WelUngton,
seeing his opportunity while the enemy were engaged

THE STORMING OF BADAJOZ.

To face p. lfi.

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD.

97

in a coraplicated evolution, attacked and completely
defeated thera. Marraont had his arra broken and
was severely wounded in the side, and Wellington
was hit by a spent shot ; the French lost about 6000

GENERAL LORD HILL, G.C.B.
After a painting iy O. Da.-we, R.A.
killed and wounded, including seven general officers,
and the AUies over 5000, including six general
officers. In recognition of this victory the Cortes
conferred the order of the Golden Fleece on the
British commander, and appointed him generalissimo H

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

of the Spanish armies. WelUngton also received the
thanks of Parliament and a money grant of ;^ioo,ooo,
and was advanced in the peerage to the rank of
marquis. General Clausel, who succeeded Marshal Marmont
in the comraand of the French array, fell back on
Burgos, and Wellington moved towards Madrid, which
he entered on August I2th, Joseph having retired
towards Valencia, where he ordered Soult to join him
with the array of Andalusia. On September ist
Wellington quitted Madrid, and, raarching north,
drove Clausel out of Valladolid on the 7th, and on
the 1 8th occupied the town of Burgos. The next day
he began the siege of the fortress of Burgos, which
was strong, heavily armed, and garrisoned by 1700
French soldiers under General Dubreton. The place
held out for more than a month, and meanwhile
General Souham, who had been sent from France to
succeed Clausel, had collected a force of 40,000 strong
at Briviesca, while Soult, having joined Joseph at
Almanza, was advancing on Madrid. On October
22nd Wellington raised the siege of Burgos, and on
the 29th he crossed the Douro and retreated upon
Salamanca. At the same time General Hill fell back
from Madrid, and rejoined his chief on November Sth.
The French armies, under Soult and Souham, had

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 99

also united, and threatened to cut off their opponents
from Ciudad Rodrigo ; but WeUington, by a bold
flank march, evaded the enemy and reached the
Agueda on Noveraber 19th. There he halted for
sorae months, distributing his troops so as to guard
the Portuguese frontier ; the French withdrew at the
same time, and took up a position stretching from
Valladolid to Toledo.
During the winter the British Government sent out
considerable reinforceraents to the Peninsula, and
WelUngton, having reorganised the Portuguese array,
did his best to improve the administration of the
Spanish army, and to prepare for an advance in the
spring. On the other hand, the condition of the
French troops rapidly deteriorated. Napoleon con
tinued to withdraw more of his old soldiers, replacing
them by untrained conscripts ; and such differences
of opinion arose between the King and his railitary
advisers that no comprehensive scherae of action
could be decided on. Joseph was so much offended
by Soult's opposition to his views that, in writing to
the Emperor, he declared, "Either the D.uke of
Dalmatia raust quit Spain or I will." The ablest
French commander in the Peninsula was accordingly
recalled, and placed at the head of the Imperial
Guard in Germany. Napoleon sent orders to Joseph
H 2

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

to raove his court from Madrid to Valladolid, and
there to concentrate the armies of the south, the
centre, and Portugal, so as to be ready to fight if the
AlUed force attempted to advance upon France.
These instructions reached Joseph by the middle of
February 1813, but his raoveraents were so dilatory
that he was not established at Valladolid until the
beginning of April, and even then his arraies, instead
of being concentrated, were dispersed over a wide
extent of country. The King imagined that Welling
ton's first object would be to occupy Madrid, and the
British commander encouraged this belief by false
reports and deceptive movements. He had fully re
solved, however, to operate through the northern
provinces, where he had ready access to the sea,
where the Spanish troops from Galicia and the
Asturias were capable of rendering very material
assistance, and where the defeat of the French army
would sever its coraraunication with France, and- thus
necessitate its withdrawal to the Pyrenees.
On May 1 5th the left wing of the British array, num
bering -about 40,000 men, under Sir Thomas Graham,
crossed the Lower Douro, and raarched through the
Tras-os-Montes towards the Esla. On the 22nd, the
right wing, 38,000 strong, began its advance through
Salaraanca on Zamora. On the 31st the left wing

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD.

forded the Esla, and the next day Zaraora was
occupied, and the junction between the two wings
secured. Wellington's force now amounted to 70,000
British and Portuguese, and 8000 Spanish soldiers from
Estremadura. The number of the latter was raised
to 20,000 on June 3rd by a reinforceraent of 12,000
Galicians frora Benavente. To this force the King
could only oppose 35,000 infantry, and 10,000 cavalry,
and he was therefore obliged to retire frora Valladolid
to Burgos. Wellington followed the French closely,
and by threatening their right, induced Joseph to
evacuate Burgos, a fortress which a few months before
had successfully resisted the whole British army.
Crossing the Ebro, the King took up a strong position
where he might await reinforceraents and dispute the
eneray's passage ; but Wellington moved rapidly to
his own left by roads believed to be impracticable,
crossed the river unopposed by bridges higher up the
stream, and established a new base at Santander. On
the evening of June i8th, the French staff received
the news that their right flank had been turned, and in
confusion and dismay the array was withdrawn the
sarae night by a forced raarch to Vittoria. Arrived
at Vittoria, Joseph did nothing for several days, except
to send away a convoy of stores and sick under an
escort of 4000 raen. On the 21st WelUngton attacked

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

and routed the eneray at Vittoria, capturing 1 50 out
of 152 guns, all the French ammunition, their public
and private baggage, and one million sterling of
treasure ; also the pictures, jewellery, and other
plunder which the King and his generals were carry
ing out of Spain. Marshal Jourdan's baton was found
in the King's carriage, and was presented'by Welling
ton to the Prince Regent, who gave him in exchange
the baton of a British Field Marshal. The French
loss on this day araounted to 6000, and that of the
AlUes to about 5200. Joseph retreated through
Pamplona, the garrison of which he strengthened, and
General Foy retiring through Tolosa threw a detach-.
ment of good troops into San Sebastian. With the
exception of these garrisons and of the force in
Valencia and Catalonia, coraraanded by Marshal
Suchet, the French army had been driven out of
Spain. When Napoleon, who was at Dresden, heard of
Wellington's success, he ordered Soult to start at
once for Paris, and having there conferred with the
War Minister, to continue his journey to the Spanish
frontier. On his arrival he was to assume the chief
coraraand, and, as arrangeraents were being raade to
supply hira with a reinforceraent of nearly 100,000 men,
the Eraperor hoped that he would be able to make

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 103
head against the British, Portuguese and Spanish
forces. Soult left Dresden on July ist, reached Bayonne
on the I2th, and on the 2Sth raarched on Pamplona.
Sir Thomas Grahara had begun the siege of San
Sebastian on the loth, but was repulsed in his
atterapt to take the fortress by assault on the 25th.
Wellington thereupon converted the siege into a
blockade, and turned his attention to the right of his
line, which was threatened by the French Marshal.
Concentrating the right and centre divisions near
Paraplona, he stopped the eneray's advance by a
series of very skilful raanoeuvres. On July 28th he
defeated Soult at Sorauren ; and on August 2nd the
AlUed troops reoccupied the position on the Pyrenees,
frora which they had teraporarily fallen back. San
Sebastian was taken by a second assault on August 3 ist,
and the garrison capitulated on Septeraber 8th, after
a raost gallant defence of the castle or retrenchraent
to which it had retired. The loss to the Allies in
killed and wounded during the second assault exceeded
2500 men, among the killed being Colonel Fletcher,
the Chief Engineer ; and the total loss throughout the
siege and blockade was not less than 5600. The
garrison coraraanded by General Rey nurabered 3000,
of whora over 1700 were killed or wounded.
On October 7th Wellington took Soult by surprise.

104 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
and crossed the Bidassoa with the sarae skill as he
had displayed in crossing the Douro in May 1809.
By this raoveraent the British force turned the right
of the French and forced thera back on the Nivelle.
On October 31st Paraplona surrendered, and on
Noveraber loth the whole Allied army invaded
France, driving the enemy out of their fortified posi
tions on the Nivelle, and capturing 51 guns, much
ammunition, and raany prisoners. On Deceraber 9th
Wellington crossed the Nive, and during the four
succeeding days fought and repulsed Soult, who
attacked first the left and then the right of the British
army. During this prolonged conflict, the Allies lost
about 4600 men, killed and wounded, and the French
5800, besides three Gerraan regiraents which deserted
to the British side on the evening ofthe roth. Leaving
two divisions under Sir John Hope to blockade
Bayonne, the British comraander followed up Soult's
retreat, and on February 27th, 18 14, attacked and
defeated hira on the Gave de Pau at Orthez. From
the 24th to the 26th of the same raonth, the naval
squadron, under Adrairal Penrose, assisted in throwing
a bridge over the Adour below Bayonne — a wonderful
feat, considering that the river was deep, rapid, subject
to the action of strong tides, defended by a flotilla of
gunboats and a large body of troops on the right

io6 TIIE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
bank, and 360 yards wide at the point of crossing.
The bridge being corapleted, Bayonne was closely
invested, and Soult drew off in the direction of
Toulouse. WelUngton crossed the Adour at St. Sever
on March ist, and on the 8th he detached two divisions
under Beresford to occupy Bordeaux. Soult atterapted
to resurae the offensive on March 13th, but was
repulsed with such vigour that he fell back through
Tarbes on Toulouse, where the last battle of the
Peninsular War was fought on April loth. In this
final engageraent the French lost 3200 killed and
wounded, and the Allies 4600, of whora about 2000
were Spaniards. On each side four generals were
wounded. The next day Soult withdrew from
Toulouse, leaving eight guns and his wounded behind,
and the day following the town was occupied by the
British force. Napoleon having abdicated, and the
Bourbon dynasty being replaced on the throne of
France, the war came to an end.
On April 2 1st Wellington issued a general order
thanking his troops for " their uniform discipline and
gallantry in the field, and for their conciliating con
duct towards the inhabitants of the country." Shortly
afterwards the British army was broken up, the
cavalry marching through France and embarking at
Boulogne, and the infantry embarking at Bordeaux.

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. io-j

Only a portion of the latter returned to the United
Kingdom, many gallant soldiers being sent to perish
at New Orleans or to die of yellow fever in the West
Indies. On May 3rd, 18 14, Wellington, who a year before
had been made a Knight of the Garter, was advanced
in the peerage to the dignity of a duke, and in the
following month he was granted by Parliaraent a
further sura of ;^ 400,000.
During the second phase of Wellington's career the
qualities which he raost conspicuously displayed were
soundness of judgment, tenacity of purpose, and self-
control. He had raade up his mind that the best
way of beating the French was not to be afraid of
them. Just before he left England for Portugal, in
1 808, he remarked : " The French have beaten all the
world, and are supposed to be invincible. They have
besides, it seeras, a new systera, which has out-
raanoeuvred and overwhelmed all the arraies of
Europe. But no raatter, ray die is cast. They raay
overwhelra, but I don't think they will outraanoeuvre
rae. In the first place, I ara not afraid of thera, as
everybody else seeras to be ; and secondly, if what I
hear of their systera of raanoeuvres be true, I think it
a false one against troops steady enough, as I hope
raine are, to receive thera with the bayonet. I suspect

io8 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

that all the Continental armies were more than half
beaten before the battle began."
In the second place, he was deterrained not to run
any great risk -of disaster, generally to adopt a
defensive attitude, and only to fight when he felt
reasonably certain of success. He fully appreciated
the difference between the French systera of conscrip
tion and the EngUsh systera of voluntary enlistraent ;
and he knew that under the latter the home Govern
ment could not be expected to make good the heavy
losses which the French Eraperor was in a position to
disregard. On this point he observed, with reference
to a plan of operations which had been submitted for
his consideration : " The scheme raight answer well
enough if I could afford, or the British Governraent
or nation would allow, of my being as prodigal of
raen as every French general is. They forget, how
ever, that we have but one array, and that the same
men who fought at Viraeiro and Talavera fought the
other day at Sorauren ; and that, if I ara to preserve
that army, I must proceed with caution. Indeed, this
becoraes doubly necessary, as I see that, notwith
standing the fondness of the British nation for the
sport, they began to cry out the other day upon the
loss of 300 or 400 raen in the unsuccessful storra of
San Sebastian."

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 109

Then, again, he perceived how advisable it was to
avoid the Continental system of making war support
war. And this for two reasons. First, because troops
fed by forced requisitions or plunder in such a country
as Spain or Portugal would inevitably suffer such
privations as gravely to irapair their efficiency and
diminish their numbers ; and, secondly, because it
was essential to secure the confidence and good-will
of the civil population. In all his operations Welling
ton paid unremitting attention to his coraraissariat
arrangements, kept his troops within easy distance of
his bases on the seaboard, and carefully protected his
lines of coramunication. From 1809 until the spring
of 18 1 3 he made use of Lisbon and Oporto as his
principal centres of supply and reinforceraent ; and
when he began his advance upon the Pyrenees, he
established his dep6ts, raagazines, and hospitals at
Santander and other ports on the northern coast of
Spain. His lines of communication being shorter and
safer than those of the French, and funds or credit
being available for the purchase of such stores as
could not be imported from England, the British
soldiers were better fed, clothed, and equipped than
their opponents. In a letter dated January r;^ 26th,
18 II, to his brother, the Marquis Wellesley, Welling
ton estimated the yearly casualties among the French

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THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

troops on field service, due to the want of a properly
organised coraraissariat, at not less than one-half.
He said : " The French array is certainly a wonderful
raachine ; but if we are to forra such a one, we raust
forra such a governraent as exists in France, which
can with impunity lose one-half of the troops em
ployed in the field every year only by the privations
and hardships imposed upon thera."
Another conspicuous instance of Wellington's sound
judgraent was the conclusion he arrived at that
Portugal was a country capable of being defended by
a raoderate nuraber of troops, and likely to furnish
the raost advantageous base for operating against the
French in Spain. Portugal being long and narrow,
and provided with good harbours and two navigable
waterways, the British comraunications were short
and direct ; dep6ts could be formed unknown to the
enemy on either the Tagus or the Douro ; and the
French, having no means of ascertaining the probable
direction of attack, were generally surprised and
defeated before they could concentrate all their
available forces. Moreover, the Portuguese were too
much opposed to the French and the Spaniards to
be unfriendly to the English. They allowed their
soldiers to be trained and coraraanded by British
officers, their foreign and infernal policy was guided

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 113

by the British Minister, and they even consented to
abandon their horaes and lay waste their fields in
order to deprive their invaders of the raeans of
subsistence. Wellington's tenacity of purpose was evinced by his
steady adherence to the policy which he regarded as
likely to prove successful. He was deterrained to run
no unnecessary risk, to spare his troops as rauch as
possible, and never to coraproraise his coraraunications
by a too bold or too hasty advance. When feebly
supported by the British Governraent, when funds
and reinforceraents were denied hira, and when he
was menaced by the enemy in apparently over
whelraing strength, he never wavered in his resolve
to hold on to Portugal, and thence to resurae the
offensive as soon as a fitting opportunity offered. He
was equally firra and prudent when he had gained
sorae great victory, and the British public claraoured
for the iraraediate expulsion of the French from the
Peninsula. On one occasion — after the battle of Tala
vera — he was very nearly cut off from his base, owing
to a mistaken reliance on the co-operation of the
Spanish troops. Thus taught a lesson which Sir John
Moore had to learn at the expense of his life, he
thenceforward trusted entirely to hiraself, although he
continued to treat the Spanish generals with courtesy I

tt4 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
and forbearance, and to make what use he could of
the soldiers under their coramand.
Nothing is'^more reraarkable than Wellington's self-
control in dealing with his own subordinates, and with
the provisional governraents of Portugal and Spain.
During the raost critical period of the war, several of
his generals, who regarded it as hopeless to continue
the struggle, not only freely expressed their opinion
on the subject, but went horae on leave, and used all
their parliaraentary influence to procure the with
drawal of the British array. The two raost influential
raerabers of the Portuguese Governraent, Principal
Souza and the Bishop of Oporto, forraed a party
hostile to the British, neglected to pay or feed the
Portuguese troops, wrote anonymous threatening
letters to Wellington, and raade arrangeraents for
libelling and caricaturing hira in England. In a letter
to Sir Charles Stuart, dated July 20th, 18 13, he
reraarked : " I must say that the British array, which
I have the honour to coraraand, have raet with
nothing but ingratitude from the Governraent and
authorities in Portugal for their services." The
Spanish Governraent was actuated by an equally
hostile spirit. On July 2nd, 181 3, Wellington ad
dressed Don Juan O'Donoju, the Spanish Secretary
for War, in the following terras : — " You are aware of

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 115
my disposition and desire still to serve the Spanish
nation as far as is in ray power. There are liraits,
however, to forbearance and subraission to injury ;
and I confess that I feel that I have been raost
unworthily treated in these transactions by the
Spanish Govemraent, even as a gentleraan." Writing
four months later to his brother Henry about the
attack raade upon hira by the Spanish Press, with
reference to the siege of San Sebastian, he ob
served : — " The only reason why I noticed the libel in
the Duende was, that it affected Sir Thoraas Grahara
and the officers of the array ; and I was convinced
that it was written under the direction of that greatest
of all blackguards, the Minister at War." Wellington
was naturally a man of strong teraper, and no doubt
felt extrerae annoyance at the intrigues which en
dangered his plans, and the obstacles placed in his
way by those to whom he had a right to look for
assistance and support. But he was too great a
man to show his feelings; he recognised that every
prominent servant of the state must be exposed to
envy and detraction ; and he treated scheraing
generals and factious politicians with equal for
bearance, and probably with equal contempt.
It is impossible, within the liraits of a magazine
article, to discuss the merits of Wellington's strategy
I 2

ii6 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
and tactics during the Peninsular War. Suffice it to
say that, generally with inferior nurabers, and always
with a raixed, and therefore a not altogether reliable
force, coraposed partly of British and partly of
Portuguese and Spanish troops, he raet and defeated
the ablest of Napoleon's raarshals. He appears to
have developed in the course of a five years' campaign
tactical ability of the highest order ; and, comraanding
as he did a body of veteran soldiers inured to war,
and well trained in rausketry and fire discipUne, he
displayed suprerae railitary genius in being the first
to recognise the advantages of an extended order
of attack. Writing in April 1811 to Captain Chap
raan, R.E., he reraarked: — "We have given the
French a handsorae dressing, and I think they will
not say again that we are not a manoeuvring army.
We may not manoeuvre so beautifully as they do ; but
I do not desire better sport than to meet one of their
columns en -masse with our lines."
As a strategist he knew his own mind and kept
his own counsel. The passage of the Douro and
occupation of Oporto, the retireraent into the lines of
Torres Vedras, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Badajoz, and the advance through the Tras-os-Montes
before the battle of Vittoria, are instances of masterly
combinations which took the eneray entirely by

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 117
surprise. Wellington's sieges have often been criti
cised on account of their occasional failure and the
great loss of life which attended them even when
successful. The fact is, however, that the appliances
and ordnance for siege operations were very defective ;
few, if any, sappers were attached to the British array,
and the eneray being generally more numerous than
the besieging force, and only wanting tirae to concen
trate, the places could not be taken at all unless they
were taken quickly. Wellington, therefore, had no
choice in the raatter. He was obliged to sacrifice his
soldiers in order to avoid the delay which would have
defeated his plans, and to corapensate for deficiencies
in skilled labour and siege equipment. Another
point, on which considerable stress is laid by General
Brialraont and other writers, is the alleged failure of
Wellington to follow up his victories by vigorous
pursuits. Here again he appears to be blaraed sorae
what unreasonably. His array was a sraall one, the
British Governraent supplied hira with reinforceraents
in a sparing and dilatory raanner, and, whenever
discipline was relaxed by success, the British soldiers
were liable to get out of hand and to disperse in
search of plunder. This tendency was strikingly
exeraplified after the battle of Vittoria, when for
eighteen days 12,500 raen were absent frora the

ii8 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
colours, engaged in marauding araong the raoun
tains. The success which attended Wellington's operations
in the Peninsula is to be ascribed not only to his
own railitary and administrative genius, and to the
coolness, courage, and obstinacy of his troops, but
also to the fact that the Control of the British and
Portuguese forces was centred in one man, who also
exercised a predominant influence over the pro
visional governments of Spain and Portugal. How
ever able a nuraber of officers may be — and there
can be no question as to the ability of the French
marshals — they cannot be expected to think alike,
or, if given co-ordinate authority, to act in unison.
Napoleon's disinclination to appoint a suprerae head
over the French arraies in Spain caused jealousy,
vacillation, and confusion. The Emperor himself
sent orders which, being written at a distance and in
ignorance of the course of events, almost invariably
arrived too late to be applicable to existing circum
stances. To each marshal was assigned a distinct
sphere of action ; and as they viewed each other with
considerable jealousy, they very rarely co-operated
at the proper tirae or in the proper direction. Even
when they atterapted to do so they were liable to be
reprimanded by Napoleon, who, for exaraple, when

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 119

Marmont proposed to assist Soult in the defence of
Badajoz, told the former that " he was meddling with
matters that did not concern him," and that " Badajoz
was not committed to his charge." The King, with
Marshal Jourdan as his chief of the staff, was given
a nominal control over the commanders of the several
French armies ; but these commanders reported to
Napoleon direct, and continually disregarded Joseph's
instructions. Without a supreme head present on the
spot, whether that head be a coramander-in-chief like
Wellington, or a chief of the staff nominally subor
dinate to a royal personage like Von Moltke, it is
impossible that military operations on an extended
scale can be conducted with the unity of purpose
and continuity of action which are essential to
success ; and on this account the diffusion of responsi
biUty and authority which Napoleon permitted and
encouraged did rauch to neutralise the great nuraeri-
cal superiority of the French troops eraployed in the
Peninsula. A further point to be noticed is the extraordinary
diploraatic skill which Wellington displayed in
dealing with the Portuguese and Spanish authorities.
They disliked hira, but they feared hira ; and by
keeping his own counsel, and setting one party
against another, he managed to get his_ own way

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

without seeraing unduly to interfere with the civil
government. Here his Indian training was of great
service. Brialraont observes : " Wellington's long
experience of Indian intrigue gave hira pecuUar
facilities for counteracting the selfish and shifting
policy of the Peninsular nations ; while his active par
ticipation in the governraent of Mysore had developed,
to a great degree, the ability which was natural
to hira in the administration of political and civil
offices. A leader deficient in these qualities would
probably have failed in Spain, however great in other
respects his military talent might have been."
Finally, WelUngton's industry was indefatigable ;
and if genius is correctly described as being an in
finite capacity for taking pains, he had every right to
lay claim to that gift. Whatever matter came under
his consideration, whether railitary, political, or finan
cial, he dealt with it proraptly and exhaustively.
His correspondence alone would have taken up the
whole tirae of any ordinary raan, and in addition he
had his own responsible duties as a comraander-in-
chief in the field to attend to. Moreover, he had
only one or two generals under hira on whora he
could rely to carry out his instructions without his
own personal supervision ; and he was often obliged
himself to undertake the duties of subordinate officers,

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD.

to whora, in spite of his repeated remonstrances,
leave of absence had been granted by the Horse
Guards. In a letter to Lord Liverpool he remarked,
" I ara obliged to be eveiywhere, and, if absent from
any operation, something goes wrong." And in
another letter he inforraed the sarae Secretary of
State that " the consequence of the absence of some
of the general officers has been that in the late
operations I have been obliged to be general of
cavalrj' and of the advanced guard, and the leader of
two or three columns, soraetiraes on the sarae day."
The spirit which actuated Wellington is perhaps best
described in his own words : " I work as hard as
I can in every way in order to succeed."
There is one feature in Wellington's character
which to sorae extent dirainishes our adrairation for
his great quaUties as a raUitary coraraander. He was
wanting in syrapathy, and inclined to speak harshly
and ungenerously of the officers and raen who served
under him during the Peninsular War. After cap
turing Oporto, he wrote : " I have long been of opinion
that a British army could bear neither success nor
failure." And again: "The army behave terribly
ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success any
more than Sir John Moore's array could bear failure.
I am endeavouring to tame thera ; but if I should not

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

succeed, I raust make an official complaint of them,
and send one or two corps home in disgrace." After
the battle of Vittoria he addressed the Secretary of
State as follows : " It is quite irapossible for me or
any other raan to coraraand a British array under the
existing system. We have in the service the scum of
the earth as coraraon soldiers ; and of late years we
have been doing everything in our power to relax the
discipline by which alone such men can be kept in
order. The non-commissioned officers are as bad as
the men. It is really a disgrace to have anything to
say to such men as some of our soldiers are." Again
he reraarked : " We shall do no good until we change
our systera so far as to corapel all ranks to do their
duty." Again : " The ignorance of their duty of the
officers of the array who are every day arriving in
this country, and the general inattention and dis
obedience to orders by many of those who have been
long here, increase the details of the duty to such an
extent as to render it almost irapracticable to carry it
on ; and, owing to this disobedience and neglect,
I can depend upon nothing, however well regulated
and ordered." Again : " Nobody in the British army
ever reads an order as if it were to be a guide for his
conduct, or in any other manner than as an arausing
novel ; and the consequence is that, when coraplicated

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 123
arrangeraents are to be carried into execution, every
gentleman proceeds according to his fancy ; and then,
when it is found that the arrangement fails, they
corae upon rae to set raatters to rights, and thus ray
labour is increased tenfold." Once more : " The fact
is that, if discipline means habits of obedience to
orders as well as military instruction, we have but
little of it in this army. Nobody ever thinks of
obeying an order, and all the regulations of the Horse
Guards, as well as of the War Office, and all the
orders of the army applicable to this peculiar service,
are so much waste-paper."
These strictures raay have been natural and ex
cusable at the time they were written, but, pubUshed
as they were with Wellington's approval twenty-three
years after the close of the war, they seem rather
exaggerated and ungracious, especially when it is
reraerabered that he used to declare that with such
an array as he led in the Peninsula he could go
anywhere and do anything, that he eulogised the
uniform discipUne, good conduct and gallantry of the
officers and raen in his farewell order of April 21st,
1 8 14, and that to their exertions and sacrifices he
owed his fame and fortune.
It is curious to contrast Napier's opinion of the
Brirish soldiers who served in the Peninsula with

124 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
Wellington's description of them as being " a rabble "
and " the scura of the earth." In the second volurae
of his history Napier says : " That the British infantry
soldier is raore robust than the soldier of any other
nation can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815,
observed his powerful frarae, distinguished araidst the
united arraies of Europe ; and, notwithstanding his
habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue and
wet and the extreraes of cold and heat with incredible
vigour. When corapletely disciplined — and three
years are required to accomplish this — his port is
lofty and his raoveraents free, the whole world cannot
produce a nobler specimen of railitary bearing ; nor
is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does
not, indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which
would lead hira to dictate to his comraanders, or even
to censure real errors, although he may perceive
thera ; but he is observant and quick to coraprehend
his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm
and resolute in danger, and more than usuaUy
obedient and careful of his officers in moments of
imminent peril. It has been asserted that his un
deniable firraness in battle is the result of a phleg-
raatic constitution uninspired by raoral feeling.
Never was a raore stupid calurany uttered ! Napo
leon's troops^^fought in bright fields where every

THE PENINSULAR PERIOD. 125
helraet caught some gleams of glory, but the British
soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy.
No honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his
name to the applauses of his countrymen ; his life of
danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his
death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore t Did
he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of
ills, sustain the raost terrible assaults in battle un
moved, overthrow with incredible energy every oppo
nent, and at all times prove that, while no physical
railitary qualification was wanting, the fount of
honour was also full and fresh within him } " So far
as my own experience goes, I have every reason to
believe that Napier's estimate of the British soldier's
character is more correct than Wellington's.
In bringing this present chapter to a close, I
cannot do better than quote the description given by
the French historian, M. Alphonse de Beaucharaps,
of the position which Wellington had achieved during
the second phase of his railitary career ; " Napoleon
raistook his destiny in not condescending to coramand
in person the expedition of 1810. He did not per
ceive that he was winking at the inordinate growth
of a narae that Europe would soon be terapted to
oppose to his own. Europe had plenty of soldiers
to fight hira. What it wanted was a raan. After

126 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
Europe had seen the most illustrious marshals of the
empire foiled by Wellington, it began to suspect that
it had found what it sought. Napoleon had at
length a rival."

-WELLINGTON.

( 127 )

" Nullum numen babes, si sit prudentia ; nos te
Nos facimus, Fortuna, deam, coeloque locamus."

CHAPTER III.
The abdication of Napoleon, followed by the
restoration of the Bourbon dynasty, ended the war
between France and the Allied Powers ; the Penin
sular Array was broken up, and Wellington returned
to England after having visited Paris and Madrid
At the latter place he was well received by King
Ferdinand, on whora he urged the expediency of
adopting a raoderate and constitutional course in
dealing with the Spanish people. He reached
London on June 23rd, 18 14, and was enthusiastically
welcoraed by all classes of the British public. On
July 5th he was appointed Ambassador to the Court
of France, and left England early in August to take
up his duties. But before entering upon them he was
instructed to examine personally the Belgian frontier,
and to report on the most suitable measures for put-

128 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
ting it in a state of defence. The British Governraent
thought it desirable to obtain the Duke of Welling
ton's opinion on this question, as the Kingdora of the
Netherlands had just been established by European
agreeraent to serve as a bulwark against French
aggression, and a force composed of British, Hano
verian, Dutch, and Belgian troops was then occupying
the country. In preparing his report the Duke was
assisted by several experienced officers of the Royal
Engineers ; and, after a careful reconnaissance, he
arrived at the conclusion that the frontier was so
accessible to an invader, so intersected by roads,
canals and rivers, and so devoid of the natural
obstacles which might be expected to restrict an
enemy's operations, that it would be impossible to
protect it by means of a single powerful fortress.
He recoraraended, therefore, that the cordon of
fortifications and dikes, which had been originally
constructed under Austrian rule, should be put in
order and iraproved ; and he further pointed out
certain positions which raight advantageously be
occupied by a field array resisting a French invasion.
He showed his military acumen by selecting as one of
these positions the actual site on which the battle of
Waterloo was fought in the following year.
This duty being corapleted, Wellington proceeded

England's hope. 1815.
From O'Connor Morriss *' Great Comuianders.'

To face p. 128.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 129
to Paris, where he arrived on August 22nd. He
was received with a fair show of cordiality by
Louis XVIII. and his rainisters, but in a less friendly
spirit by the Court party and a section of the Bona-
partists. His tenure of the appointraent only lasted
for about five raonths, during which no really ira
portant diplomatic questions came under consider
ation. At that tirae a strong feeling prevailed in
England in favour of the iramediate abolition of the
slave trade, and Wellington was directed to use every
means in his power to obtain the active support and
co-operation of the French Government. The French
people, however, though the advocates of universal
freedom in the abstract, were hardly prepared to
accept the views held by Mr. Wilberforce and other
prorainent abolitionists unless they obtained some
compensating advantage ; and a hint was thrown out
that the cession by England of one of the more
important West Indian Islands, such as Trinidad,
might materially facilitate the progress of the
negotiations. This proposal did not find favour with
the British rainistry, and was not seriously pressed.
The question reraained still undecided when Lord
Castlereagh, who, as Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, was representing Great Britain at the Con
gress of Vienna, found it necessary to return to his
K

I30 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
parliaraentary duties, and Wellington was chosen to
replace him. Leaving Paris towards the end of
January 1815, the Duke reached Vienna early in
February, and there found the several European
Powers quarrelling amongst theraselves about the
redistribution of the territory set free by Napoleon's
abdication. The existing state of affairs was unsettled
and coraplicated. As already raentioned, a joint
array of occupation coraraanded by the Prince of
Orange was quartered in the Low Countries, while
the German provinces on the right bank of the Meuse,
extending from Lorraine to the junction of the
Meuse and Rhine, were held by a Prussian force. In
corapensation for her efforts to overthrow Napoleon,
Russia laid claira to the whole of Poland, and Prussia
was resolved to annex the entire kingdora of Saxony.
These demands were resisted by England and Austria,
as being contrary to the wish of the populations
concerned, and likely to upset the European equili
brium ; and the objections raised to the undue
aggrandiseraent of the two northern Powers were
supported . by the representative of the French
Governraent. The Eraperor Alexander was so much
irritated at this opposition that he encouraged Murat,
who had been allowed to retain the Neapolitan throne,
to occupy a portion of the Papal States, and largely

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 131
to increase his array as a raenace to Austria and
France. Austria accordingly concentrated 150,000
raen in Northern Italy, the Russian troops which
were returning to their own country were halted in
Poland, and Prussia declared her deterraination to
keep Saxony by force of arras. A secret treaty was
entered into by Austria, France and England, and a
general European war seeraed far frora improbable.
The aspect of affairs, however, was suddenly
changed by news received on March 7th that
Napoleon had escaped from Elba ; and the sovereigns
and statesmen assembled at Vienna had to abandon
their rautual aniraosities in order to face a coraraon
danger. A few days afterwards a report was received
that the Eraperor had landed in France with only a
thousand raen at his command, and was raarching upon
Paris. At first it was thought that the French troops
would reraain faithful to the Bourbon dynasty, and
that Napoleon's enterprise would fail. Louis XVIII.
assured the Arabassadors at his Court that there was
no reason for alarra. Marshal Soult, who had been
appointed War Minister, issued an order of the day
in which he congratulated the array on having at its
head the Corate d'Artois, whora he described as " the
raodel of French chivalry." He added : " Bonaparte
raistakes us so far as to believe that we are capable of
K 2

132 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
abandoning a legitimate and beloved sovereign in
order to share the fortunes of one who is nothing more
than an adventurer. He believes this — the idiot ! —
and his last act of folly is a convincing proof that
he does so." Marshel Ney was directed by the
King to raeet and arrest the Eraperor. " Go," said
Louis XVIII. to hira : "I trust to your fidelity and
devotion." Ney proraised, in reply, that he would
bring back the usurper in an iron cage. He had not
proceeded far when his sentiraents changed. He
reraarked : " What would you have rae do ? I cannot
stop the waters of the sea with my hand." And
shortly afterwards, forraing up his troops, he read to
thera Napoleon's proclamation, and issued an order of
the day beginning — " Soldiers, the cause of the Bour
bons is lost for ever." On March 20th Napoleon
entered' Paris, and Louis XVIIL, with his Court,
fled across the Belgian frontier.
At this crisis England and the Continental Powers
were united in their determination to prevent Napoleon
from re-establishing himself as the ruler of France,
although before leaving Elba he had caused it to be
raade known that he was prepared to adhere to the
Treaty of Paris, and would in future confine himself
to the internal administration of his own country. As
usual, the first thought of England's Continental allies

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 133
was to extract liberal subsidies frora the British
Governraent. After the Peace of Tilsit Russia had
endeavoured to persuade the French Eraperor to join
her in an attack on our Eastern possessions. She had
encouraged him in his atterapt to subjugate Spain and
Portugal. Her whole policy had been to intensify the
ill-feeling between France and England, in order to
distract attention frora her own aggressive designs in
Europe and Asia. It is therefore a reraarkable illus
tration of Russian assurance to find that in 181 5 the
Tsar was particularly pressing and persistent in his
deraands for pecuniary assistance ; and it is an
equally reraarkable illustration of the soraewhat indis
crirainate generosity of British statesraen to find that
the Tsar's deraands, in common with those of the
other sovereigns, were complied with to an extent
which seems to have rendered England the general
payraaster of the AUied Forces. So far, indeed, was
this generosity carried that the British Governraent
actually agreed to pay the expenses of the French
raission at the Vienna Congress.
On March 13th the Congress of Vienna issued a
declaration placing Napoleon hors des relations civiles
et sociales, and on the 25th of the sarae raonth a forraal
treaty was concluded providing for the concentration
of an overwhelraing force on the French frontier. The

134 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

following scheme of mobilisation was decided on : — The
troops of the United Kingdora, Hanover, Brunswick,
and the Netherlands were to occupy Belgium under
Wellington's comraand. The Prussian array under
Marshal Blucher was to take up its position between
the Rhine and the Meuse. The contingents from
Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden were to asserable in
the Black Forest and Palatinate, and there to be
joined by an Austrian force, the comraand of the
whole being assuraed by Marshal Schwarzenberg.
The Russian array, raarching frora Poland through
Gerraany, was to forra upon the Rhine, the Main, and
the Moselle
Wellington left Vienna on March 29th, and
reached Brussels on April 5 th, where he relieved the
Prince of Orange of the comraand of the troops
quartered in the Low Countries. He was at first
inclined to underrate the strength and raobility of the
force at Napoleon's disposal, and he drew up a
raeraorandura, dated April 12th, advocating an
advance of the Allied armies into France by May ist.
The more accurate information which he subsequently
received led him to raodify his original estimate of the
eneray's resources ; and, besides, he found his own
array so weak and badly equipped, and coraposed of
soldiers differing so rauch in quality and nationality.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 135

that it was absolutely necessary to await reinforce
raents and supplies, and to raake a careful distribution
of the good and inferior troops so as to render the
whole force as uniforraly efficient as possible. He
thought it desirable also to iraprovise sUch fortifica
tions along the Belgian frontier as would irapede the
enemy's advance and facilitate his own movements.
And last, but not least, he ascertained that consider
able delay was likely to occur in the arrival of the
Austrian and Russian corps on the French frontier.
Writing to Lord Bathurst on May 2nd, the Duke
expressed the opinion that, if Napoleon decided to act
on the offensive, he would probably begin by attacking
the Bavarians, who, to the number of 25,000, had
crossed the Rhine and taken up a position in the
vicinity of Gerraersheira. On May 8th he seeras to
have regarded it as not unlikely that Napoleon would
act on the defensive and await the invasion of the
Allied arraies. In that case he considered the diffi
culties in the way of an advance upon Paris from the
Belgian frontier to be so forraidable, that he doubted
whether his own force, in corabination with the
Prussian army under Blucher, could raove until the
troops asserabled on the upper Rhine under Schwar
zenberg had begun their forward raoveraent and had
thus obliged the French Eraperor to concentrate upon

136 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

the Aisne. On May 9th he addressed the Due de
Berri in the following terras : " J'avoue ^ votre Altesse
Royale que j'ai toute raison de croire la force enneraie
a present rassemblee ci Valenciennes et Maubeuge tres
superieure a ce qu'elle a ete representee a votre
Altesse ; et que je ne serais pas surpris que nous
fussions attaques." The same day he used sirailar
language in writing to Lord Hill. Three days after
wards he wrote as follows Xo his brother Henry :
" There has been a good deal of raoveraent upon the
frontier in the last week, but I am inclined to believe
it is entirely defensive, and that Bonaparte cannot
venture to quit Paris. Indeed, all accounts give
reason to hope that, even without the aid of the
AUies, his power will not be of long duration." In a
meraorandura written in 1842, controverting certain
stateraents which had appeared in General Clause-
witz's history of the carapaign of 1815, Wellington
explained the exact position occupied by the British
and Prussian forces, and the alternative lines of action
for which they had to be prepared. He pointed out
that the two Allied armies guarding the Belgian
frontier were "necessarily on the defensive, waiting
for the junction of other large armies, to attain, by
their co-operation, a comraon object ; " but that " their
defensive position and immediate objects did not

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 137

necessarily preclude all idea or plan of attack upon the
eneray." Such ideas or plans had, however, to be
postponed because Napoleon took up a position " in
which his nurabers, his raoveraents and his designs
could be concealed, protected, and supported by his
forraidable fortresses on the frontier, up to the last
moraent previous to their being carried into execution.
The initiative, then, rested with the enemy ; and the
course to be pursued by the AUied generals respec
tively was to be prepared to move in all directions, to
wait till it should be seen in what direction the attack
would be raade, and then to asserable the armies as
quickly as possible to resist the attack, or to attack
the enemy with the largest force that could be
collected." He emphasised the necessity for extreme
watchfulness and caution by observing that, whatever
might be thought of Napoleon as a leader of troops in
other respects, "there certainly never existed a raan
in whose presence it was so Uttle safe to make what is
called a false movement."
I have referred in some detail to the soraewhat
inconsistent views put forward by Wellington in
regard to the nature and direction of Napoleon's
operations, in order to show how difficult it is for even
the raost sagacious and experienced coraraander to
fathora the designs of an equally able antagonist.

138 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
But, whatever scheraes he raight elaborate for the
eventual invasion of France, the Duke did not neglect
his raore imraediate duty, which was to arrange for
the rapid concentration of his army at any threatened
point, and to improve his own defensive position. On
April 30th he circulated a secret meraorandura giving
specific instructions to his subordinate coraraanders for
the raoveraent of the troops under their orders, in
the event of a French attack between the Lys and
Scheldt, or between the Sarabre and Scheldt, or by
both Unes siraultaneously. He caused the fortifica
tions of Ypres, Ostend, Nieuport, Ath, and Tournay
to be repaired and arraed. Mons was protected by
inundations and redoubts. The defences of Antwerp
were strengthened, and Ghent was covered by a line
of field works' extending frora the Lys to the Scheldt.
Audenarde also was fortified, in order to facilitate the
raovement of troops along either bank of the latter
river. Writing to the Prince of Orange on April 17th,
Wellington pointed out that the King of the Nether
lands "had but a small and very young army to
oppose to the well-disciplined French troops," and
that the inhabitants of Belgiura were not particularly
well disposed towards, the existing Government.
Under these circumstances he was of opinion that the
most useful way to employ such an army was to place

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 139

it in well-chosen works of defence. Subsequently
garrisons were allotted to the several places raen
tioned above, consisting of about 2000 British troops,
10,000 Hanoverians, and 14,000 soldiers of the Low
Countries. As explained by Colonel Carmichael
Smyth, the Coramanding Royal Engineer, " the object
of these various works was not to stop the French
from invading Belgiura, but to detain them long
enough to give the AUles time to concentrate upon
their line of operations." That this object was
attained is evident frora Wellington's account of the
concentration on Quatre Bras during the evening and
night of June 15th, his words being — "The whole
array raoved on that evening and in the night, each
division and portion separately ; the whole being
protected on the march by the defensive works
constructed at the different points referred to, and by
their garrisons."
As regards the army placed under his coraraand,
WelUngton, on arriving at Brussels, expressed his
dissatisfaction at the inadequate nuraber of British
troops despatched to the Low Countries. He re
raarked to Lord Bathurst that the Horae Governraent
had not taken a clear view of the situation, and that,
if the war was to be a short one, a great effort was
necessary. He asked for 40,000 good British infantry

140 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

in addition to the nuraber required for garrisons,
18,000 cavalry, and 150 field guns raanned by British
artiUeryraen and fully horsed. He also requested
that the entire corps of Sappers and Miners should be
sent to the scene of operations, as well as a bridge
train of eighty pontoons, a waggon train, arabulance
corps, and' proper transport for sraall arras ararauni
tion. With these equipments and reinforcements he ¦
engaged that the British army would creditably play
its jpart in the game ; but added, " As it is, we are in
a bad way." Writing to General Lord Stewart, on
May 8th, he expressed hiraself as follows : " I have
got an Infaraous array, very weak and ill-equipped,
and a very inexperienced staff. In ray opinion they
are doing nothing in England. They have not raised
a raan ; they have not called out the railitia either in
England or Ireland ; are unable to send rae anything ;
and they have not sent a message to Parliament
about the raoney." The Duke strongly objected to
the excessive number of general and staff officers
appointed to the force by the Horse Guards, and to
the selection of officers who were absolutely ignorant
of their staff duties. Writing to the Military Secre
tary, he observed : " The army — that is, the British
part of it — is excessively sraall, and it already has a
staff raore than sufficient for its numbers and organ-

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 141
isation. ... I ara certain that His Royal Highness
would wish to nominate the staff officers most capable
of serving the army and those about whora they are
placed ; and he will admit that the most experienced
— that is, those that have been serving in staff situa
tions for five or six years — are of that description.
But ofthe list you and Colonel Shawe have sent, there
are only three who have any experience at all. As
for the others, if they had been proposed to rae, I
should have rejected thera all." He wrote again on
the sarae day, "Before you send any more general
officers let me see more troops." Finding that his
reraonstrances were not well received by His Royal
Highness, Wellington thought it better to give way,
and inforraed the Military Secretary that he would
not object to having as raany officers on the staff as
the Coraraander-in-Chief chose to norainate. But he
pointed out that the staff was to a great extent
useless. Speaking of the departraents of Military
Intelligence and Military Coraraunications, he re
raarked : " It is quite impossible for rae to superintend
the details of the duties of these departraents rayself,
having already raore to arrange than I ara equal to,
and I cannot entrust them to the young gentleraen on
the staff of this army. Indeed, I raust say I do not
know how to employ thera." And he finally wrote.

142

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

on May 5th : " I think it rauch better that this
correspondence upon the Staff should cease. The
Comraander-in-Chief has a right to appoint whom he
chooses, and those whora he appoints shall be em
ployed. It cannot be expected that I should declare

W^^^^^^

H.R.H. FREDERICK, DUKE OF YORK AND ALBANY, F.-M.,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
myself satisfied with these appointments tiU I shall
find the persons as fit for their situations as those
whom I should have recoraraended to His Royal
Highness." WelUngton, as we know, had a high opinion of the

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 143
Portuguese troops, when led by British officers and
associated with British soldiers. He endeavoured,
therefore, to strengthen his array by obtaining frora
Portugal a contingent of 15,000 picked raen under
the command of Marshal Beresford. He addressed
the Prince Regent of Portugal on the subject,
and also subraitted repeated applications to the
Home Government. No objection was raised by
the authorities concerned ; the force, with artillery
and baggage-train, was asserabled, and the transports
were ready for its erabarkation. But unfortunately
Canning, who was then Arabassador at Lisbon, deter
mined to proceed by strictly diplomatic raethods, the
Souza faction took advantage of the opportunity to
oppose the despatch of the contingent, and the array
of England's traditional ally lost its chance of sharing
in the glories ofthe carapaign of 1815.
Turning now to the state of affairs at the beginning
of June, we find that the AUied troops under
Wellington's coramand were holding the fortified
posts along the Belgian frontier frora Ostend to
Mons. The right wing, under General Hill, was
stationed in the neighbourhood of Ath, and the left
wing, under the Prince of Orange, occupied Braine-le-
Comte and Nivelles. The cavalry, coraraanded by
Lord Uxbridge, was collected at Grararaont, and the

144 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

reserve of all arras was encaraped and cantoned at
Brussels, which place was also the Duke's head
quarters. The troops of all ranks nurabered al
together about 110,000, of whora a little over 49,000
(Including the King's German Legion) were British,
and the reraainder Hanoverians, Brunswickers, Dutch
raen, and Belgians. Out of this total sorae 20,000
raen were eraployed in garrisoning Antwerp, Ostend,
Nieuport, and the frontier defences, leaving a field army
about 90,000 strong, with 200 guns. Blucher's army,
consisting of four corps and nurabering 117,000 men,
with 300 guns, was quartered at Charleroi, Namur,
Dinant and Liege. At the sarae date the force at
Napoleon's disposal araounted to about 128,000 raen,
with 350 guns, and occupied cantonraents facing the
Belgian frontier, frora Lille on the left to Metz on
the right. In addition, there were sorae 53,000
regular troops doing duty in garrisons and as corps
of observation in various parts of France.
There were three courses open to the French
Eraperor. He raight have endeavoured to negotiate
with the Allied Powers ; but such an atterapt seemed
useless — at any rate until he had gained a decisive
victory — in view of the declaration placing hira hors
de la loi, and the treaty binding the Powers to con
tinue the struggle until he was driven from the

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS.

•45

French throne. Secondly, he raight have raaintained
a defensive attitude, and awaited the attack of the
Allies along a front stretching from Paris to Lyons.
But to do this would have been to diminish his
resources by abandoning a large portion of France to

FIELD-MARSHAL VON BLUCHER.
the eneray, to alienate the population of the invaded
provinces, and to dishearten his own troops. The
third course was to attack and defeat the Anglo-
Prussian force before the Austrian and Russian corps
had tirae to concentrate on the French frontier. It
L

146 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
is true that the French array was nuraerically rauch
weaker than the corabined arraies of England and
Prussia. But Napoleon's previous successes had
induced hira to believe that this inequality would be
raore than counterbalanced by his skill as a general,
and by the superiority of his soldiers. Besides, he
considered, to use his own words, that " an offensive
plan of action was alone in conforraity with the genius
of the French nation and with the spirit and prin
ciples of the war in which he was engaged." He
hoped to take the Allies by surprise, to beat them in
detail before they could unite, and to bring about a
national rising in Belgium and the Rhine Provinces.
For these reasons the third course commended
itself to the Emperor, as offering him the best, if not
the only, chance of success.
Having deterrained to assume the offensive. Napo
leon decided to operate by the valley of the Sambre,
and strike at the point of junction between the
British and Prussian forces. The long front occupied
by the Allies was exposed to attack in other direc
tions ; and he might have advanced by the Meuse
valley with the object of cutting off the Prussians
from their base at Cologne, or he might have en
deavoured to turn the right flank of Wellington's
army, driving it back in an eastward direction and

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 147
threatening its comraunications with the sea, Holland,
and Hanover. In adopting the central Une of opera
tions, it seems probable that Napoleon failed to realise
what an able and active eneray he had to deal with ;
for it is obvious that, unless he could effectually
interpose between the British and Prussian arraies
before they had tirae to concentrate on their point of
junction, he ran the risk of being attacked by thera
siraultaneously. Even if he were fortunate enough
to defeat and drive back one of these armies, the
other array raight prevent him from following up
his success by menacing his flank and rear ; while if,
under the same circurastances, he proceeded to
attack the force which had not yet been engaged, the
defeated array raight corae to its ally's assistance —
unless, indeed, its defeat had been so disastrous as
to render it incapable for the tirae of further inter
ference with his movements. Wellington was always
of opinion that the French Eraperor would have done
better if he had selected another line of operations,
and the result of the carapaign to a great extent
confirms the correctness of this view.
The concentration of the French army was carried
out with the precision and secrecy characteristic of
Napoleon's strategy, and by June 14th his force was
asserabled upon the line stretching frora Maubeuge
L 2

148 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

through Beauraont to Philippeville, within one raarch
of Charleroi, which was held by Ziethen's corps of
30,000 Prussians. Early the next day the French
troops carae into contact with the Prussian outposts,
and crossed the Sambre at Charleroi, Marchiennes,
and Chatelet, Ziethen's corps falling back in good
order first on Fleurus and afterwards on Ligny.
Blucher received the news of Napoleon's advance on
the 14th, and at once gave orders for the concentra
tion of his army at Fleurus. The same inteUigence
was first communicated to Wellington at three o'clock
in the afternoon ofthe 15th by the Prince of Orange,
whose report was shortly afterwards confirraed by
General Muffling, the Prussian Staff Officer at the
Duke's headquarters. Orders were issued forthwith
for the British array to be prepared to concentrate on
its left at a raoraent's notice, but for sorae little time
Wellington doubted whether Napoleon had really
coraraitted hiraself to an attack upon the centre of
the position occupied by the Allied forces. The
news received in the afternoon was, however, sub
stantiated a few hours later, and at 10 P.M. the troops
were directed to move upon Quatre Bras. The
reserve quartered in and near Brussels was assembled
on the evening of the 15th, and began its march to
Quatre Bras at daybreak on the i6th.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 149
On the raorning of the i6th Ziethen's corps was at
Ligny, about eight miles south-east of Quatre Bras.
ft was there joined at an early hour by Pirch's corps,
32,000 strong, and Thielman's, 21,000 strong, the
whole being under Blucher's personal coramand.
Bulow's corps, numbering 30,000, which had been
quartered at Liege, some fifty railes distant, did not
come up in time to take part in the operations of the
day. A division of the troops of the Netherlands
about 10,000 strong, coraraanded by the Prince of
Orange, was holding Quatre Bras and awaiting the
arrival of the reinforceraents which had been ordered
up at 10 o'clock the preceding evening. Wellington
left Brussels early in the morning, after having
attended with raany of his officers the faraous ball
given by the Duchess of Richmond. He reached
Quatre Bras about 10 A.M., reconnoitred the French
troops which had halted in front of the Prince of
Orange's division, and rode on to Ligny, where he had
an interview with the Prussian Comraander-in-Chief
He is said to have disapproved of the position which
Blucher had taken up between St. Amand and
Sombreffe, telling the Marshal — " Every raan knows
his own troops best ; but if I were to place ray raen
where you have placed yours, I should expect to
be beaten." Blucher's reply was — '' My raen Uke to

ISO THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
see the enemy " ; and the Duke did not continue the
discussion. But when riding back to Quatre Bras he
reraarked to his staff — "If I ara not very rauch
mistaken, the Prussians will get an awful thrashing
to-day." Wellington got back to Quatre Bras between 3 and
4 P.M. He tells us that the reserve frora Brussels
had arrived there about noon, and was shortly
afterwards followed by the Brunswick and Nassau
contingents, ist Infantry Division consisting of the
Foot Guards, and a portion of the Cavalry and
Artillery. It is only fair to say that, though the
Duke's statement on this point in his meraorandum
on Clausewitz's history is quite clear, he reported in
his official despatch that the reserve only reached
Quatre Bras at half-past two in the afternoon ; and
other authorities assert that the Prince of Orange was
not reinforced until four o'clock, and that the British
cavalry and artillery did not come up until six o'clock.
Napoleon's plans for the i6th were as follows : — He
assumed the personal coramand of the right and
centre of his array, consisting of about 73,000 raen,
with 230 guns ; and the coramand of the left, consist
ing of some 47,000 raen, with 120 guns, was given to
Marshal Ney, who had arrived frora Paris late in the
evening of the preceding day. Ney's headquarters

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 151
were at Gosselies, about eight miles south of Quatre
Bras, and there he received a letter dictated by the
Emperor at 8 A.M., desiring hira to occupy the position
held by the Prince of Orange, and afterwards to be
in readiness for a rapid raarch on Brussels. The in
structions given in this letter were singularly vague,
and indicated a raisapprehension of the true state of
affairs. Napoleon wrote : " I shall attack the eneray
if I fall in with them. Then, after the engageraent
is over, I shall begin ray raarch at three in the after
noon — perhaps in the evening. My wish is for you
to be ready to raove iraraediately after I have started.
I desire you to raake such arrangeraents as will enable
your eight divisions, on the receipt of orders from me,
to march rapidly and without check upon Brussels."
Napoleon evidently looked upon victory as assured.
The Emperor reached Fleurus at about 11 A.M.,
and personally reconnoitred Blucher's position. The
inforraation he obtained seeras to have been very
imperfect, for shortly afterwards, Soult, who was
Chief of the Staff, wrote to Ney in the following
terms : " The Eraperor coraraands rae to inforra you
that the eneray has collected a body of troops between
Bry and Sombreffe ; and that at half-past two Marshal
Grouchy, with the 3rd and 4th Corps, will fall upon
him." The body of troops thus referred to was in

152 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

reality the Prussian array, over 80,000 strong, drawn
up in readiness to oppose Napoleon's advance. It had
been the Eraperor's intention to take the Allied forces
by surprise. He appears to have taken it for granted
that he had succeeded in doing so, and he apprehended
no serious opposition to his preventing their junction.
That junction, however, had actually been effected
about midday, although Napoleon remained ignorant
of the fact until his dispositions had been made, and
his troops were engaged.
Ney began his attack on Quatre Bras at 2 P.M., and
Napoleon engaged the Prussian troops about half an
hour later. The resistance of the latter was so
obstinate, and their strength so rauch greater than the
Eraperor had anticipated, that shortly after three
o'clock, he sent an order to Ney directing hira to
manoeuvre in the direction of Bry, so as to turn the
Prussian right. As this order was being conveyed
to Ney, it was shown to Marshal D'Erlon, one of
his coraraanders, who, with a corps of 20,000 men,
and forty-six guns, was raoving up in support of
the attack on Quatre Bras. Without waiting for
instructions frora his iramediate superior, D'Erlon
decided to comply with the order, and accordingly
tumed off in the direction of Bry, which he reached
about 7 P.M. Meanwhile, Ney was being pushed back

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 153

by WelUngton, and finding hiraself in urgent need of
reinforceraents he sent pereraptory orders to D'Erlon
to retrace his steps towards Quatre Bras. The result
was that on June 17th, an entire corps with forty-six
guns spent the day in raarching to and fro between
the left and centre of the French array.
After a severe and protracted struggle, the Prussians,
as predicted by Wellington, were defeated, but not
routed, at Ligny, while the EngUsh were victorious at
Quatre Bras, driving the French back to Frasnes, and
themselves bivouacking on the field of battle. During
these engageraents, both Wellington and Blucher
narrowly escaped being killed or captured by the
eneray.* During the night the Prussian force drew off
* Blucher placed himself at the head of a body of Prussian
cavalry, and charged the French squadrons which were pur
suing his defeated infantry. His horse was shot under him,
and entangled him in his fall ; and he lay, fortunately unrecog
nised, on the field of battle until his aide-de-camp was able to
remount him on a charger taken from one of his own troopers.
At Quatre Bras Wellington accompanied a regiment of
Brunswicker Hussars, which he had ordered up in support of
the infantry of the same contingent. This regiment was com
posed of young soldiers, and being exposed to a hot musketry
fire, it fell back in confusion. The Duke was carried away
with it, and, the French Lancers charging at the moment, he
had to trust to the speed of his horse. He arrived, closely
pursued, at the edge of a ditch which was lined by the 92nd
Highlanders, and, leaping his horse across the ditch and over
the Highlanders' bayonets, he drew up in safety on the other

1 54 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
in the direction of Wavre, their retirement being con
ducted in such a leisurely manner, that on the raorning
of the 17th, their rear-guard was still at Sorabreffe.
Shortly after daybreak, Wellington coraraunicated
with General Ziethen, coramanding the rear-guard,
through Colonel Gordon, one of his aides-de-camp,
whose escort, consisting of two squadrons of the lOth
Hussars, drove in the French vedettes posted on the
field of Ligny,-
About 8 A.M. on the 17th, Napoleon proceeded to
St. Amand and spent three or four hours in inspecting
his troops, and visiting the scene of the previous day's
conflict with the Prussians. He assumed that the
latter had withdrawn eastward towards their base in
Germany, but took no steps to verify the accuracy of
this conjecture. He accordingly placed Grouchy in
command of about 33,000 men with ninety-six guns,
and directed him to pursue the Prussians through
Gerabloux in the direction of Naraur and Li^ge.
This order, which was a verbal one, was not given
until early in the afternoon. It was followed by written
instructions to the sarae effect ; and after an unneces
sary delay of at least eight hours, for which the

side. A French officer, named Burgoyne, made a dash at the
Duke, but was stopped by a musket-ball from one of the 92nd,
which passed through both his ankles.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 155
Emperor alone was responsible, Grouchy began his
raarch at 3 P.M. in a wrong direction.
In the raeantirae, ascertaining that the English
were still holding Quatre Bras, the Eraperor wrote
to Ney a letter dated "Noon, in front of Ligny,"
desiring hira to engage the enemy, and promising him
to support the attack by an advance upon Marbais.
Wellington's raain body had, however, fallen back
about 10 A.M. without interruption Or raolestation
towards the position he had selected in front of
Waterloo, and only the outposts and cavalry reraained
at Quatre Bras, under his personal coraraand. His
own account is : " No pursuit was raade of the
Prussian array, or raoveraent of any kind raade by
the French army, until a late hour in the afternoon
ofthe 17th. The largest body of French troops and
the great mass of the cavalry moved down the high
road frora Sombreffe to Quatre Bras, towards the left
of the British troops of the army of the Duke of
Wellington, -which still remained on that ground.
These were put in motion, and retired as soon as
their outposts were touched by the enemy, and joined
the main body of the army at that tirae posted in
front of Waterioo." So far, then. Napoleon had
gained no material advantage. He had failed to
anticipate the concentration, or to prevent the

156 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
junction, of the Allied forces opposed to hira ; he had
fought a double engageraent without decisive results ;
Blucher, having been defeated, had fallen back in
good order on Wavre ; and Wellington, having
gained the day at Quatre Bras, had withdrawn to a
position which offered great defensive advantages
besides being within easy reach of the Prussian force.
At nightfall the raain body of the French army,
numbering 72,000 raen with 240 guns, was collected
within a mile of the troops under Wellington's
command ; but Grouchy's corps, which had been
detached in pursuit of the Prussians, had started at so
late an hour that by nine in the evening it had only
advanced as far as Gerabloux, about fourteen railes
frora Wavre and twenty railes from Waterloo. On
reaching Gerabloux, Grouchy ascertained that a
considerable portion of the Prussian force had re
treated towards Wavre, and he reported to Napoleon
accordingly, proposing to continue his pursuit in that
direction early next raorning. This course of action
was approved by the Eraperor, but the French
troops did not quit Gerabloux until about 9 A.M. on
the 1 8th, and it was only at 11 A.M., when passing
through Sart-lez-Walhain, that Grouchy became
aware of the concentration of the whole Prussian
army at Wavre on the previous night. The heavy

THE CAMPAIGN IN TIIE NETHERLANDS. 157
rain which fell during the afternoon and night of the
17th soraewhat raodified the operations of the
following day, though it can hardly be said to have
affected their result. In the first place, the state of
the roads greatly delayed the raoveraent of the
Prussians in support of Wellington's left, while it
retarded to an equal extent Grouchy's march from
Gerabloux to Wavre ; and, secondly, the ground at
Waterloo had becorae so heavy that Napoleon de
cided not to begin the battle until 1 1 AM., by which
time he expected to be able to manoeuvre his cavalry
and artillery. The first phase of the engageraent
was an attack on the British right at the advanced
post of Hougouraont, a building surrounded by
orchards and enclosures, and occupied by a detach
raent of the Guards. The building itself was set on
fire by the French shells, and the enclosures sur
rounding it fell for a tirae into the eneray's hands ;
but eventually the assailants were repulsed, and the
defenders held their ground up to the close of the
day. This atterapt to turn the British right proving
unsuccessful, D'Erlon's corps, 20,000 strong, was
directed against the British left centre at about half-
past one in the afternoon. Moving in four dense
colurans, the French infantry quickly routed a brigade
of Belgian troops which obstructed their advance ;

BuryliiE &oiind

•5

Firms

C=l

Cavalry .. ..

BalE>3[is
Ibessssls
THE FIELD OF WATERLOO.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 159
but coming next into contact with Picton's division,
drawn up in rear of the Belgians, they recoiled in
disorder before its deadly fire. The brigade of heavy
cavalry under Ponsonby seized the opportunity to
charge the wavering masses of the enemy, driving
them back in the utraost confusion, and capturing
3000 prisoners. The cavalry continued their pursuit
as far as the batteries which had been supporting
D'Erlon's attack ; but, after sabring raany horses
and upsetting fifteen guns, they were charged in
turn by the French squadrons, and had to retire with
heavy loss, their gallant coraraander being araong the
killed. About 3 P.M. Ney agam attacked the British
left centre, and succeeded in gaining possession of
a farrahouse called La Haye Sainte, which Welling
ton had occupied as a defensive outpost covering this
flank of his position. An hour later the Duke at
terapted to recapture La Haye Sainte ; but the
Hanoverians, to whora the task was entrusted, were
repulsed by the French troops, and a gap was thus
raade in the British line, through which Ney en
deavoured to penetrate. Having no infantry ira
raediately available for this purpose, he ordered up
a brigade of cavalry, which, either accidentally or in
accordance with the Emperor's instructions, was
followed by the main body of that arm including

i6o THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
the reserve cavalry of the Imperial Guard. Welling
ton, however, brought up reinforcements ; and his
infantry, forraed into squares, stubbornly resisted the
repeated charges of the French horsemen, who had at
last to fall back completely disorganised by the cool
and accurate fire of their opponents.
We must now turn to the Prussian array, which
on the night of the 17th had bivouacked in the
neighbourhood of Wavre. In order to appreciate
the plan of carapaign of the Allied generals, it raust
be remerabered that throughout the operations
WeUington was in constant coramunication with
Blucher. As already mentioned, he had an interview
with the latter on the battle-field of Ligny. Early
the next morning he sent one of his aides-de-camp to
ascertain frora General Ziethen the line of retreat of
the Prussian force to Wavre, and shortly afterwards
he received a despatch frora Blucher conveyed by
Lieutenant Massow. He has hiraself stated that
the exact position of the Prussians and the in
tentions of their coraraander were known to him
before he broke up his own position at Quatre
Bras, and that " the two Allied armies • comrauni
cated with each other throughout tbe night of.
June 17th." Up to the battle of Ligny Wellington
and Blucher were kept in close touch with each

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. i6i

other's plans and raovements through Colonel Sir
Henry Hardinge, the British Coraraissioner at the
Prussian headquarters, and General Muffling, the
Prussian Commissioner at the British headquarters.
Hardinge was severely wounded at Ligny, and for
the next few days General Muffling had to under
take his colleague's duties in addition to his own.
Speaking of the latter officer, Wellington remarked :
" We were engaged in strict co-operation with the
Prussian army, and he necessarily carried on a very
active and almost hourly correspondence with the
Prussian headquarters, particularly after Hardinge
was wounded in the battle of Ligny." It raay there
fore be concluded that a clear understanding had
been corae to between the Allied generals that the
British array should engage Napoleon in front of
Waterloo while Blucher attacked hira on the right
flank frora the direction of Wavre. Wavre is barely
ten railes frora Waterloo, and two nearly parallel
roads connected the two places, one through Ohain
on Mont St. Jean, the other through St. Larabert to
Planchenois. In view of these facts it seeras reason
able to assume that WelUngton had arranged to be
supported, by "a strong body of Prussian troops not
later than one or two o'clock in the afternoon. At
daylight on the i8th the cavalry of General Bulow's
M

l62 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

corps was visible on the high ground in front of
Ohain, less than four railes frora the British position ;
but, owing to the bad state of the roads and several
accidental circurastances, it was two in the afternoon
before the infantry of that corps had passed through

THE MARQUESS OF ANGLESEY.
St. Lambert, and half-past four before the Prussians
deployed for attack in front of Planchenois. Napoleon
had detached General Lobau with 10,000 men to
raeet this flanking raoveraent ; but the French troops
were driven back into the village of Planchenois and

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 163

had to be reinforced an hour later by a division of
the Young Guard, a regiraent of the Old Guard, and
twenty-four guns. At 7 p.m. Ziethen's corps, march
ing through Ohain, came up on the left of the British
line, and assisted in defeating the Emperor's final
attack. For this attack Napoleon forraed eight
battalions of the Guard, hitherto held in reserve, into
two columns, two additional battalions following in
support. The columns were opposed by a line of
British infantry, consisting of Maitland's brigade of
the Foot Guards led by Wellington in person, and
they were taken in flank by the 52nd Regiment.
Being exposed to an overwhelraing fire, to which,
frora the nature of their forraation, they were unable
to reply, they halted and wavered. At that raoraent
they were charged by two brigades of British cavalry,
and after a brief struggle driven back in disorder.
At this critical raoraent Ziethen's corps, led by
Blucher, engaged the French right and carried the
position it occupied at Papelotte and La Haye.
Seizing the opportunity, WeUington ordered a
general advance of his whole Une of infantry, sup
ported by his cavalry and artillery. To use his own
words, " the attack succeeded at every point ; the
eneray was forced frora his position on the heights,
and fled In the utraost confusion, leaving behind him,
M 2

i64 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

as far as I could judge, 150 pieces of cannon, with
their araraunition, which fell into our hands."
The pursuit was begun by both British and Prussian
troops. The forraer, however, were rauch fatigued,
and both on this account and because there was not
room for thera to act along the Charleroi road siraul
taneously with the Prussians, Wellington arranged
with Blucher that the latter should follow up the
enemy throughout the night. By daybreak the
next morning the Prussian cavalry had reached
Gosselies, about five miles short of Charleroi and
twenty railes frora the battle-field ; and had captured
sixty guns' belonging to the Imperial Guard. The
Eraperor passed through Charleroi at 6 A.M., and out
of the array 72,000 strong which he coraraanded at
Waterloo, only 40,000 recrossed the Sarabre. The
total loss of the Allies on June i8th araounted to
over 23,000 killed and wounded, that of the British
being 8460, and of the Prussians 7000.
Here it should be raentioned that a portion of
Wellington's available force was not present on the
field of battle. One division under General ColviUe,
consisting of four British and five Hanoverian bat
talions, with three British batteries, was posted at
Hal, on the road between Mons and Brussels, while
a corps of Netherlanders, 1 7,000 strong, under Prince

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 165
Frederick of Orange, occupied the ground between
Hal and Enghien. It has generally been supposed
that these troops were detached with the object of
guarding the right flank of the Duke's army against
a turning movement. But it seeras most unUkely
that such a comraander as Wellington was ignorant
of the fact that the whole French army, except
Grouchy's corps, had taken up its position im
mediately in front of hira on the evening of the 17th ;
and frora sorae reraarks of his, recorded by Mr.
Gleig, it would appear that his intention in holding
Hal and Enghien on the i8th was to secure his line
of retreat in the event of his being defeated. In
Deceraber, 1825, Wellington, in discussing with Mr.
Croker the assertion raade by Napoleon, and repeated
by several military writers, that the position he had
taken up at Waterloo was a bad one, because it
afforded no practicable line of retreat, distinctly denied
that this was the case, and pointed out that the road
to Brussels through the Forest of Soignes was open
to hira. His words were : " The road to Brussels
was practicable, every yard, for such a purpose. I
knew every foot of the plain beyond the forest and
through it. The forest on each side of the chauss^e
was open enough for infantry, cavalry, and even for
artUlery, and very defensible. Had I retreated

i66 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

through it, could they have followed rae .' The
Prussians were on their flank, and would have been
in their rear. The co-operation of the Prussians in
the operations I undertook was part of ray plan,
and I was not deceived. But I never conteraplated
a retreat on Brussels. Had I been forced from
my position I should have retreated to ray right,
towards the coast, the shipping, and my resources.
And again I ask, if I had retreated to my right would
Napoleon have ventured to follow me .-' The Prussians,
already on his flank, would have been in his rear.
But ray plan was to keep ray ground till the Prussians
appeared, and then to attack the French position ;
and I executed ray plan."
While the fight was going on at Waterloo, Grouchy
received further orders frora Napoleon, written that
very morning, instructing him to continue his pursuit
ofthe Prussians in the direction of Wavre, and by
four in the afternoon he reached that town, and
became engaged with Thielman's corps, which formed
the Prussian rear-guard. After a severe struggle the
Prussians succeeded in holding their own, and re
mained in possession of Wavre during the night of
the 1 8th. Early the next morning the conflict was
resuraed, the opposing forces being still ignorant of
Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo ; and eventually the

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 167

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i68

THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

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BATTLE.

French, who were greatly superior in numbers, carried
the position, and drove back Thielman's corps towards
Louvain. Very soon, however, the French Marshal
was inforraed of the result of Wellington's victory,

THE . CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 169
and at once withdrew to Namur, which in the hurry
of the concentration had been left unguarded. There
on June 20th he was attacked by Pirch's corps, which
had been ordered on the night of the i8th to march
from Waterloo to Sombreffe in order to cut off his
retreat. The attack was repulsed with heavy loss to
the assailants, and the next day Grouchy passed
through Dinant and reached French territory without
being further molested.
In estimating WelUngton's achieveraents during
the brief carapaign which ended in the battle of
Waterloo, it must be borne in mind that he cora
raanded a raixed force of very unequal quality. The
pick of the British infantry who had served In the
Peninsular War were still in North Araerica, sufficient
tirae not having elapsed after the conclusion of peace
with the United States, to enable the Government
to bring these troops back to Europe. With the
exception of the German Legion, the Hanoverian
contingent consisted of imperfectly trained railitia ;
while the Nassau and Belgian soldiers required very
careful handling, believing as they did that Napoleon
was irresistible. The following incident, described
in WeUington's own language, illustrates the kind of
glaraour thrown by the French Emperor over some

170 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

of the Continental troops opposed to him : — " I had
three battalions of Nassau troops under my comraand.
I put thera in the park at Hougouraont, and expected
that, being old soldiers, they would keep their ground.
But the moment the French began to advance I saw
them waver. It was this which made rae withdraw
them and put a battaUon of the Guards in their place.
I ascertained afterwards, just what I expected to find,
that the name of Napoleon had beaten them before
they fired a shot ; and that if I had left thera there,
the park and probably Hougouraont itself would have
been carried at a rush."
On the raorning of the i8th Wellington's force
consisted of 25,400 British soldiers, the German
Legion 6800 strong, about 11,000 Hanoverians,
6000 Brunswickers, 3000 Nassau troops, and 17,500
troops of the Netherlands ; total 69,700 men, with
159 guns. The French array was coraposed of
soldiers all belonging to the same race and of
excellent quality ; it was 72,000 strong, with 240 guns,
and was coraraanded by the foreraost captain of the
age. That under these circurastances the Duke
should not only have held his own frora 1 1 A.M to
7 P.M., but have succeeded in driving the eneray off
the field of battle at the moment the Prussians were
in a position to take an active part in the conflict, is

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 171

a feat alraost unequalled in the annals of war. On
that particular occasion the British comraander
certainly displayed greater readiness of resource,
tactical skill, and coolness of judgment, than his
illustrious antagonist. Wellington was the only
general of the first order that Napoleon ever had to
encounter, and throughout the campaign the Emperor
appears to have underrated his opponent's ability and
failed to realise the surpassing bravery and endurance
of British soldiers. Some of the French officers who
had served in the Peninsula were better acquainted
with the fighting qualities of the British army and
the Duke's military genius. General Foy told the
Emperor that " the British infantry are the very devil
in the fight." Soult too warned his raaster not to be
too confident of success. Napoleon replied, " You
think, because he beat you, that Wellington is a great
general." And when on the morning of the i8th he
reraarked, " At last I have thera : there are nine
chances to one in ray favour," the Marshal answered
— " Sire, I know these English. They will die on the
ground on which they stand before they lose it.''
After Napoleon's defeat the Allies lost no time in
advancing upon Paris. The French frontier was
crossed on June 21st ; the following day the Emperor
abdicated for the second time, and the provisional

172 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

governraent which replaced him sent commissioners
to negotiate with the British and Prussian cora
raanders. On June 25th Carabrai and Peronne
surrendered to WeUington ; on the 28th Blucher took
Villers-Cotterets by surprise ; and on July 4th a
convention was signed for the capitulation of Paris.
It was stipulated that in three days the French troops
should evacuate the capital, and reraove within a week
with their stores and artillery behind the Loire. The
Allies at once occupied Neuilly and St. Denis, and
entered Paris on July 6th. Napoleon, who had with
drawn to Malraaison, started for Rochefort at four
o'clock in the afternoon of June 29th, a few hours
before the Prussian soldiers broke into the palace.
With the occupation of Paris, Wellington's service
in the field came to an end, but as Comraander-in-
Chief of the Allied Arraies in France, his raoderation,
sound judgraent, and irapartiality did much to ensure
lasting peace in Europe. While he insisted on the
restoration of the art treasures which the French armies
had plundered from the principal Continental cities, he
prevented the destruction of the national raonuraents
which had been erected in coraraemoration of French
victories ; and he strenuously and successfully opposed
the demand of the allies of Great Britain for a large
cession of French territory. His opinion on this

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 173

subject is well worth repeating. After pointing out
that France would never acquiesce in the loss of any
of her provinces, and that their forcible annexation
would lead to a state of arraed neutrality rather than
a general peace, he remarked : " If we take this large
cession, we raust consider the operations of war as
deferred till France shall find a suitable opportunity
of endeavouring to regain what she has lost ; and
after having wasted our resources in the maintenance
of overgrown railitary establishments in time of peace,
we shall find how Uttle useful the cessions we shall
have acquired will be against a national effort to
regain them." WeUington was also instrumental in
adjusting the claims brought against the French
nation on account of the cost of the late war, and the
daraage done to public and private property by the
French troops. The coramissioners appointed to
investigate these clairas were unable to agree, and the
Duke undertook the office of arbitrator ; the result
being that the total charge against France was reduced
frora eight hundred millions of francs to two hundred
and forty millions. As Commander-in-Chief of the
army of occupation, he took care that the expense of
raaintaining the troops, which fell upon the French
people, should be kept within reasonable Umits ; and as
soon as he thought it prudent to do so, he advised the

174 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
AUied sovereigns first to dirainish the force under his
orders, and afterwards to withdraw it, two years before
the date fixed by the treaty.
It is almost unnecessary to say that, like most
people who do good to their eneraies, Wellington was
treated with ingratitude by the nation he endeavoured
to befriend. On the occasion of his giving a ball, in
June 1816, his house in the Charaps-Elys^es was set
on fire, oil and gunpowder having previously been
placed in the cellar. Fortunately the fire was dis
covered in tirae to prevent an explosion. In February
18 18, his Ufe was atterapted by Cantillon, an old non-
comraissioned officer of the Iraperial Army. Napoleon
was base enough to leave a legacy ©f ten thousand
francs to this miscreant, in acknowledgraent of the
service which he had endeavoured to render to
France by shooting at the Duke of WelUngton ; and
a quarter of a century later. Napoleon III. caused
search to be made at Brussels for Cantillon's heirs, in
order that the money might be handed over to thera.
The Court, the Ministers, and the chief officers of the
French array behaved towards Wellington with a cold
ness which soraetimes amounted to discourtesy. On
one occasion, when he was attending a Lev^e, the
Marshals present barely acknowledged his greetings,
and after a short interval, walked away from him in a

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 175
body. Louis XVIII. had grace enough to apologise
for this act of rudeness, whereupon WelUngton raade
the apt reply— "Your Majesty need not distress
yourself It is not the first tirae they have turned
their backs on rae."
After attending the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in
October 1818, and arranging for the evacuation of
France by the Allied arraies on the ist of the
following raonth, Wellington returned to England in
Deceraber and took up the appointment of Master-
General of the Ordnance, with a seat in the Cabinet.
In July 1 8 1 5 Parliaraent had voted him an additional
grant of ;^ 200,000 for his services in the Netherlands ;
and before he -left France he was given the rank of
Marshal in the Austrian, Prussian and Russian arraies,
besides other marks of distinction too numerous to
raention. This may be regarded as the culminating
point of Wellington's career. From December 18 18
until June 1846 he devoted hiraself alraost entirely to
political affairs. Frora the latter date up to his death
in 1852 the only iraportant public office which he held
was that of Commander-in-Chief, to which on the
death of Lord Hill in 1842 he had been appointed for
Ufe by patent under the Great Seal.
When he coraraanded in the field Wellington was
fully alive to the defects in our railitary systera ; and

176 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

it is extraordinary that as a Cabinet Minister, and
afterwards as Coramander-in-Chlef, he did so little to
reraedy those defects, or to carry out rauch needed
reforras in the organisation and adrainistration of the
army. He considered the material of which the array
was coraposed anything but what it ought to have
been, but he took no steps to iraprove it. Yet, as a
raan of business as well as a practical soldier, he raust
have recognised that, under a voluntary system of
enlistraent, able-bodied raen of respectable character
were not likely to enter the ranks, at any rate in
peace tirae, unless the pay and other advantages held
out to thera were fairly equivalent to the wages of
civil labour, and unless they were certain of being
treated in a rational and considerate raanner. When
WeUington joined the Ministry after the evacuation
of France by the Allied armies he offered no opposi
tion to the inordinate reduction of our naval and
military establishraents which then took place. In
deed, he seeraed desirous of having as few tropps as
possible quartered in the United Kingdora, so as to
avoid irritating the civil population by the presence of
those to whora the nation owed its independence and
prosperity. In his Life of Wellington, Gleig, who was
a personal friend and ardent adrairer of the Duke, has
to adrait that " it raay be questioned, looking to sub-

NAPOLEON'S FLIGHT FROM WATERLOO.
By permissiott of the Berlin Photographic Publishing Company.

To /dee p. 176.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 177

sequent events, whether he did not carry the principle
of economy too far. It is certain that he reduced
both the Navy and the Army to such a state as
rendered England virtually powerless if any sudden
caU had been made on her military resources. But it
was a garae of brag between the Governraent and the
Opposition, such as will never, we trust, be played
again." What renders Wellington's action in this
matter the more unaccountable is the fact that he was
well aware of the impossibUity of upholding our
national rights and interests if England were unpre
pared for war. In a meraorandura written in 1846,
on the subject of the Spanish raarriages and the
hostile attitude of Louis Philippe, he remarked : " We
are not in a state to risk even the smallest raanifesta
tlon of angry feeling on this or any other subject.
We must first put our country in that reasonable state
of defence in which it was put after the Seven Years'
War, in which it was before the French revolutionary
war, and in which it ought always to have been kept,
particularly in late years ; but in which it would
almost appear that it had been the object of Govern
ment in modern tiraes not to place it." That the
nation would have listened to Wellington had he been
patriotic enough openly to speak his mind, and insist
•on the necessity for maintaining the defensive forces
N

178 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

of the Empire in an efficient state, is apparent from
the effect produced by the accidental publication of
his letter, dated January 9th, 1847, to Sir John
Burgoyne. He was extremely indignant at this
coramunication finding its way into the newspapers,
yet there can be little doubt that, had not the country
been thus aroused to a sense of its defenceless con
dition, no steps would have been taken to strengthen
the Army and Navy. In the letter under reference
the Duke pointed out that our naval supreraacy was
not as absolute as it had been at the beginning of the
century, and that it was unwise and unsafe to rely
wholly on our fleet for the defence of the United
Kingdora. He expressed the opinion that, under the
conditions then existing, England would not be secure
from invasion for a week after a declaration of war
with France, he explained the measures which, in his
judgment, ought to be adopted to guard against the
danger, he remarked that he had in vain endeavoured
to rouse the attention of different administrations to
this state of things, and he ended with the following
words : " I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of
age, passed in honour. I hope the Alraighty may
protect me from being the witness of the tragedy
which I cannot persuade ray conteraporaries to take
measures to avert." What Wellington omitted to

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 179
mention was the fact that, for a considerable period
after his return to England in 1818, he had held high
office, that for some years he had been Prime Minister,
that for five years he had been Coraraander-in-Chief,
and that up to the resignation of Peel's Governraent
in June 1846 he had exercised a powerful, if not a
predoralnant, influence over the policy of the Con
servative party. If then, England was, as he declared,
incapable of defending herself against invasion, surely
the responsibility rested with hira, even more than
with his colleagues or political opponents.
A careful study of Wellington's despatches pro
duces the impression that, though perfectly just and
impartial in describing the operations in which his
troops were engaged, he was somewhat chary of
bringing to notice the meritorious services of indi
vidual regiments, officers and soldiers. Lord Hill
appears to have remonstrated with him on this
subject in March 1814 ; and when Sir Stapleton
Cotton in November 18 13 urged that a medal should
be granted to the cavalry for their services in 18 10
and 18 1 2 the Duke replied that in no one instance
had it ever occurred to him to apply for a medal for
any service perforraed by the troops. He reported
the services in what he thought the clearest and
fairest raanner to all concerned ; and he considered
N 2

i8o THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
that it rested with the Government, and not with hira,
to notice the services as they thought proper. His
usual answer to those who expressed their disappoint
raent at not having received any mark of the royal
favour seems to have been that he had himself never
solicited the nuraerous honours and rewards conferred
upon him by the Crown and nation. Writing on this
subject to a General Officer in September 1813, he
observed : " I recomraend to you the sarae conduct,
and patience; and above all resignation, if after all
you should not succeed in obtaining what you wish."
This, no doubt, was sound advice, though probably
rather unpalatable to its recipient, whora Wellington
acknowledged to be specially deserving of honourable
distinction. Mr. Gleig informs us that the Duke,
after his return to England in 18 18, associated but
little with his old companions in arras. He says :
" We have reason to believe that neither Lord Hill,
nor Lord Raglan, nor Sir George Murray, ever visited
the Duke at Strathfieldsaye ; nor could they or others
of sirailar standing, such as Lord Anglesey, Sir
Edward Paget and Sir Jaraes Kerapt, be reckoned
araong the habitues of his hospitable gatherings in
Apsley House. The circle in which he chiefly raoved
was that of fashionable ladies and gentlemen, who
pressed theraselves upon hira, and were flattered, as

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. i8i
indeed they had rauch reason to be, with the notice
which he took of thera, and by his presence at their
parties." Wellington held very pronounced views on certain
points connected with the organisation of the Array ;
and though these views may now be out of date, they
are perhaps not unworthy of consideration, as being
based on his long -experience as a successful cora
raander in both Asiatic and European warfare. He
was strongly in favour of long service a'nd old soldiers.
When the Ten Years' Enlistraent Act was brought
forward, he only supported it on the condition that
duly qualified raen should be allowed to re-enlist on
the corapletion of their liraited engageraent. He
believed that the efficiency of an array depended as
rauch upon the thorough training and soldierly habits
of the men as upon the ability of the officers. On
this point Napoleon was of the same opinion, as will
be seen from the following extract from " National
Life and Character," by the late Professor Pearson : —
" Decr^s once said to the Eraperor in Council, ' I
cannot extemporise a sailor as you do a soldier. You
turn out a soldier in six months.' ' Taisez-vous,' said
Napoleon. ' Such ideas are enough to destroy an
empire. It takes six years to raake a soldier.' On
another occasion he wrote of hiraself: 'The First

i82 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
Consul did very good things, he put everything in the
right way, but he did not work miracles ; the heroes
of Hohenlinden and Marengo were not recruits, but
good and old soldiers.' "
Fully recognising the necessity for maintaining our
maritirae predorainance, Wellington was in favour of
providing such fortified harbours and bases of supply
and refitraent as would facilitate and support the
action of the fleet. He regarded the Channel Islands
as the key of our outer line of defence against French
invasion, and recomraended the construction of naval
bases in Jersey, Guernsey, and Alderney. As regards
the home army, he was opposed to the formation of a
reserve consisting of men who had completed their
terra of service with the colours. He considered it to
be the proper function of the Militia to reinforce and
support the infantry of the line, and urged that it
should be raised to a strengh of 150,000 men and
kept under training for four raonths every year.
With reference to the staff of the Array, Wellington
beUeved in the prmciple of unrestricted selection, and
stated that the only good staff officers he had raet
with were those who, being thoroughly acquainted
with their regiraental duties, possessed sufficient
natural ability to enable thera to apply on a large
scale what they had learnt on a sraall scale. He

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 183

deprecated the special instruction of officers in staff
duries, his words being: "You think that officers
ought to be educated specially for the staff. Perhaps
you would like to have a staff corps also. That is
what they do in France and in other Continental
countries, and the consequence is that their staff
corps are generally raade up of pedants and cox
combs. I am sure that I found the young gentle
men who came to rne frora High Wycorabe* to be
pretty rauch of that stamp."
During the past fifty years great changes have
taken place in the organisation of the British Army,
and, whether Wellington's advice was sound or not, it
certainly has not been followed. In his objection to
the formation of an army reserve it will probably be
adraitted that Wellington was raistaken, even by
those who believe that the reserve systera now in
force is capable of iraproveraent. It adds raost
raaterially to the railitary strength of a nation that its
array should be capable of rapid expansion, for in
sorae senses it is undoubtedly true that " Providence
is on the side of the big battalions." On the other
hand, it seeras questionable whether in the present
day we are not inclined to exaggerate the fighting
* Formerly there was a Staff College, or, as it was then called,
a " senior department," at High Wycombe.

i84 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
value of large bodies of young and inexperienced
troops, and to imitate too closely the Continental
system of military service, without paying due regard
to our own special requirements. Compared with
armies raised by conscription, the British Army must
always be sraall, and our endeavour should -be to
render it in all railitary essentials a corps ddite.
History proves that the greatest victories have not
been won by the largest arraies, but by the raost
capable coraraanders and the most efficient soldiers.
Alexander invaded Persia with only 30,000 foot and
5000 horse ; Hannibal entered Italy with but 20,000
foot and 6000 horse ; Wellington drove the French
out of Spain with barely 40,000 British soldiers.
The Duke's objection to the special education
of staff officers sounds alraost heterodox in these
days of intellectual activity and constantly recurring
exarainations. Nevertheless, it was based on princi
ples correct in themselves if not pushed to an ex
treme, and it was the outcome of his own long and
varied experience as a comraander. There can be
little doubt that the value of a staff officer greatly
depends on his being thoroughly conversant with the
details of regiraental organisation, and that the duties
of the staff are best learnt on active service. War,
however, is the exception and not the rule ; and in

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 185
tirae of peace the instruction iraparted at a staff col
lege, if properly conducted, takes the place of practical
training in the field, and tends to develop those intel
lectual qualities which are needed for the efficient
adrainistration of an army. But such instruction is
not in itself sufficient. To derive full advantage frora
it officers raust be naturally fitted for the staff ; and
those who are devoid of the tact, temper, enterprise,
resource, and bodily activity which are essential quali
fications for staff employ are not unlikely to raistake
the raeans for the end, to imagine that their proficiency
as students is a proof of their administrative capacity,
and thus to become the prigs and pedants of whora
Wellington complained. It follows therefore, that the
utraost care .should be exercised in the choice of
officers for admission into the staff college ; and that,
while due weight should be given to the possession of
a staff college certificate, the responsible authorities
should have the power of selecting the most suitable
officers for appointments on the staff, whether they
are staff college graduates or not.
In bringing these chapters to a close, I will only
add that a study of WeUington's Ufe and writings
leads me to the conclusion that he has been some
what overrated as a raan and greatly underrated as a
comraander. Stress is often laid on the strict sense

1 86 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
of duty by which he is supposed to have been specially
actuated, the inference being that personal ambition
had little to do with his efforts to succeed in the tasks
entrusted to him. That Wellington was honourable,
straightforward, resolute, and patriotic, none can
deny ; but there appears to be no instance in his
military career of his adopting a course where his
duty was opposed to his own interests, or of his being
called upon to sacrifice the latter in order to carry out
the forraer. In his case the paths of duty and of
personal advanceraent were identical, and it seeras,
therefore, hardly reasonable to assume that he
differed from other great railitary leaders— such as
Caesar, Marlborough, or Napoleon — in being devoid
of that desire for distinction and power which is one
of the raost potent incentives to -exertion. At the
beginning of the Peninsular War his own words were :
" The ball is now at ray foot, and I hope I shall have
strength enough to give it a good kick " ; and the
principal reason he gave for wishing to leave India
was that he would be more likely to get on in Europe.
Possessed of many admirable quaUties, Wellington
gained the esteera and confidence, but not the affec
tion, of his soldiers. By nature reserved and unsyra-
pathetic — perhaps a little selfish — he regarded his
array in the light of a fighting raachine. When its

NAPOLEON.
(From the Engraving by Hopwood 171 the

ue Militaire.' }

l88 THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.

task was perforraed and peace established, he ceased
to associate with the officers who had been most
intimately connected with him in the field, and he
did little or nothing to promote the welfare of his
soldiers, or to raake the nation understand what a
debt of gratitude it owed them.
The place I should be incUned to assign to Wel
lington as a general would be one in the very
first rank — equal, if not superior, to that given to
Napoleon. In estiraating the coraparative merits
of these illustrious rivals, it may be conceded that
the schemes of the French Eraperor were raore
comprehensive, his genius more dazzUng, and his
imagination more vivid than Wellington's. On the
other hand, the latter excelled in that coolness
of judgraent which Napoleon hiraself described as
" the foreraost quality in a general." It raust
also be remembered that, as soon as Napoleon had
attained supreme power in France, the whole re
sources of that country and of a great part of the
Continent were at his disposal. He could raise
enormous armies, incur vast expenditure, and sacri
fice large numbers of troops in carrying out his
plans. Moreover, he was absolutely unfettered in his
selection of the best qualified officers for commands
and staff appointments. Developing a system of

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NETHERLANDS. 189

tactics which proved extreraely effective against his
Continental eneraies, and until his last campaign only
opposed by second-rate generals, Napoleon gained
victories so decisive and overwhelraing that for a time
he was beUeved to be invincible. His presence on the
field of battle was regarded as equivalent to a force of
forty thousand men.
Wellington's operations, on the other hand, were
harapered by the vacillation and timidity of the
British Govemraent of the day, his resources were
liraited, his army was generally outnumbered by the
eneray, the reinforceraents he asked for were seldom
forthcoming, and incompetent generals and staff
officers were forced upon hira by the Horse Guards.
Above all, he must have felt that a single mistake or
disaster would probably lead to his own reraoval from
the chief command, and to the termination of the
struggle in which he was engaged. Under these un
favourable conditions he never lost confidence. As he
remarked before starting for the Peninsula, he was not
afraid of the French, although he knew that they were
capital soldiers. Believing that their tactics would be
unsuccessful against troops steady enough to fight in
line, he adopted the extended formation which gave
full effect to the accurate fire and resolute courage of
his infantry. Throughout the Peninsular War he out-

rgo THE RISE OF WELLINGTON.
raanoeuvred and out-fought the ablest of the French
raarshals. Finally, in the Waterloo carapaign, while
Napoleon raade many raistakes, Wellington raade
none. His distribution of the Allied troops along the
Belgian frontier, his rapid concentration at Quatre
Bras in concert with the Prussian army at Ligny, his
success on June i6th, his subsequent withdrawal to
Waterloo, the manner in which he handled his troops
before and during the battle, and the arrangeraents
he raade with Blucher for the flank attack from
Wavre and for the pursuit of the defeated enemy,
prove hira to have been a profound raaster of the art
of war. For a brief period the military genius of
Napoleon revolutionised Continental Europe ; that
of Wellington enabled him to lead his British soldiers,
few in nuraber but incoraparable in quality, frora
victory to victory, to raarch triumphant from Lisbon
to Toulouse and frora Waterloo to Paris, to overthrow
his great opponent, and to establish a peace which
lasted for nearly forty years.

INDEX.

Agra, 15, 17, 31 ; Mahratta troops
defeated at, 28
Ahmednagar, siege of, 21, 31, 42
Aix la Chapelle, Congress of, 175
Albuera, 90
Albuquerque, Duke of, 76 ; on the
Spanish army, 56
Alexander, Emperor, 130
Aligarh, 15
Allied Armies, the, in the Waterloo
campaign, 134, 170 ; advanced on
Paris, 171, 172
Almeida, capture of, 82, 89
Alum, Shah, 27
Amrot Rao at Poona, i8, 19
Anglesey, Marquis of, 162, 180
Argaum, battle of, 29, 30, 41
Asirgarh, siege of, 26, 27, 29, 42
Assaye, battle of, 22-26, 40, 46
Aurungabad, 21
Austria, troops in Northern Italy,
131
Badajoz, 85 ; surrender of, 88-91,
94. 95. "6
Baird, Major-General, 9, 13, 43,
44
Bajee Rao, head of the Mahratta
confederacy, 15, 17, 19; defeated
by Holkar, 16

Baroda, the Gaekwar of, 15
Bassein, treaty of, i5, 20
Bathurst, Lord, 135, 139 ; -Welling
ton's despatch to, 167, 168
Batavia, expedition to, 9, 11, 12
Bavarian army at Germersheim,
135
Bayonne, capture of, 104, 106
Beauchamps, M. Alphonse de, on
Wellington, 125, 126
Belgian frontier, Wellington ex
amines the, 127, 128
Berar, the Rajah of, 15-31, 37
Beresford, Major-General, 70, 78,
143 ; besieges Badajoz, 88-91 ;
occupies Bordeaux, 106
Berri, Due de, 136
Blake, General, 90, 92
Blucher, Marshal, 134, 145, 172,
190 ; army under, 144 ; at Fleurus,
148, 150, 151 ; at the battle of
Ligny, 153, and n. ; falls back
on Wavre, 157, 160, l6l ; at
Waterloo, 162-165
Bombay, Colonel Wellesley at, 12,
13. 32
Bonaparte, Joseph, campaign in
Spain; 53-107, 119; enters
Madrid, 58; soldiers under, 75 ;
captures Seville, 80

192

VINDEX.

Bonaparte, Napoleon, see Napoleon
I.
Bonaparte, Victor, army in the
Tagus valley, 68, 69, 71, 74-76 ;
defeats General Cuesta, 72 ;
defeated at Talavera, 77
Bordeaux, occupation of, 106
Bourbon dynasty in Spain, 53 ;
replaced on the throne, 106
Bourquien, Frenchman named, 27
Boxtel, engagement at, 3
Breda, movement on, 3
Brennier, General, 90
Brialmont, General, 117, 120
Brinjarries, the (grain merchants),
35. 36
British Army, India a valuable
training school for the, 36 ; the
cost of, in India, 38, 39 ; Welling
ton's distribution of, in India, 39,
40 ; Wellesley held in high
esteem by officers and troops of,
in India, 45-47 ; in the Nether
lands, 140-144; Wellington's
views on the organisation of, 181-
185 ; in Spain, Wellington on,
121-123; ^t Albuera,9l ; Napier's
opinion on, .123-125 ; at Water
loo, i6g, 170
Broach, fort of, 28, 31
Brussels, Wellington at, 134, 139,
149
Bulow, corps of Prussians under,
149, 161, 162
Burgos, siege of, 98, loi
Burgoyne, Sir John, 178
 , French officer named,
154 «.
Burhanpur, army of Mahratta chiefs
at, 19, 20 ; siege of, 26, 42
Burrard, General Sir H., 60, 62, 65
Busaco, 83

Calcutta, 5
Camden, Lord, 4
Campbell, Major Colin, and the
battle of Assaye, 24 n., 26 «. '
Canning, Mr., 81
Cantillon, attempt on Wellington's
life, 174
Castlereagh, Lord, 59, 64, 81, 83,
129
Cathcart, Lord, expedition to Han
over, 49 ; expedition to Denmark,.
SI. 52
Chapman, Captain, Wellington's
letter to, 1 16
Charles IV., 53, 58
Cintra, convention of, 65
Ciudad Real, Spanish force de
feated at, 72
Ciudad Rodrigo, besieged, 82, 92-
94. "6
Clausel, General, 98
Clausewitz, General, history of the
1815 campaign, 136, 137, 150
Clive, Lord, 6
Coimbra, General Wellesley at, 73
Cole, General, 90
Colville, General, 164
Commissariat and transport arrange
ments for the siege of Seringa
patam, 35
Commissariat, Wellington's atten
tion to, in the Peninsula, 109
Commons, House of, General Wel
lesley defends his brother's ad
ministration of India in, 50
Copenhagen, expedition to, 51, 52
Coruna, battle at, 67
Cotton, Sir S., 179
Craddock, Sir John, 68, 70
Crauford, General, 77, 93, 94
Croker, Mr., 165, 166
Cuesta's army in Spain, 56, 75, 76,

INDEX.

193

78 ; defeated by Victor Napoleon,
72
Cuttack, province of, 17, 27, 28
Dalrymple, Sir Hew, 54, 60-65,
68
D'Artois, Comte, 131
Delhi, 15, 17, 27, 31
Denmark, English expedition to,
50-52
D'Erlon, Marshal, 152, 153; corps
under, 157
Dhoondiah Waugh, freebooter, 1 1
Donkin, Colonel, 76, 77
Douro River, passage of the, 95,
116
Dowlatabad, fort of, 27
Dubreton, General, 98
Dundas, General, 3
East India Company, and the
Mahratta confederacy, 15-32, 37,
42 ; Wellesley and, 45
Elba, Napoleon's escape from, 131
El Bodon, Wellington attacked at,
92.93
Egypt, the French in, 12, 15, 44
England, expedition to Denmark,
50-52 ; campaign in the Penin
sula, 53-125; Spanish ill-feeling
against, 54, 55 ; the Waterloo
campaign, 1 5 7- 1 69 ; Wellington
on the naval supremacy of, 178
Eton, Arthur Wellesley at, 2
Ferdinand, King, 127
Fletcher, Colonel, 103
Fleurus, Blucher at, 148, 151
Foy, General, 85, 102, 171
France,-and Egypt, 12, 15
 , alliance -with Russia, 50, 52,
133 ; invasion of Portugal, 58

Fraser, Lieutenant - General M.,
60
French army in the Peninsula,
75 ; WeUington on the, 109, 112
French army, at Waterloo, 170
 officers in command of the
Mahratta troops, 22, 27
Frere, Mr., 66
Fuentes d'Onoro, 89
Ga-wilgarh, siege of, 29-31, 42
Gleig, Mr., ' Life of Wellington,' 46,
165, 176, 180
Gordon, Colonel, 154
Graham, Sir Thomas, 100, 103,
"5
Grant, Quartermaster James, 24 n. \
Grouchy, Marshal, 151, 154-156,
165-169
Hanover, expedition to, 49
Harcourt, Colonel, 28
Hardinge, Colonel Sir H., 90,
161
Harris, General, invests Seringa
patam, 6-9, 14, 42
Hill, General Lord, 80, 95, 97, 98,
136. 143. 175. 180
Hobart, Lord, 5
Holkar, 15-32; attacks Poona, 16,
18
Holland, Lieutenant-Colonel Wel
lesley and, in 1794.. 3, 34
Hope, Lieutenant - General, the
Hon. J., 59, 60, 104
Hougoumont, 157, 170
Hurryhur, Madras army pat, 17,
18
India, Colonel Wellesley, ex
periences in, 5-48 ; a valuable
training school for the British
O

194

INDEX.

army, 36 ; government of, depends
for its stability on the sword, 38,
39 ; armies of the Native States
in, 40
Ireland, General Wellesley chief-
secretary for, 50, 52, 70
jALNA, sieged by Colonel Steven
son, 21
Java, island of, England and, ii,
12
Jones, Colonel, 86, 88
Jourdan, Marshal, 102, II9
Junot, invades Portugal 58, 60, 62,
63
Kellermann, General, 63, 80
Kempt, Sir James, 180
Kioge, battle at, 51, 52
Konagull, Dhoondiah Waugh de
feated at, II
Laborde, General, 60, 61
La Haye Sainte, farmhouse, 159,
163
Lake, General, 17, 20, 27, 28, 32,
33
Lapisse, General, 70-72, 74
Laswarrie, battle at, 28
Ligny, 148 ; battle at, 153, 160,
190
Liverpool, Lord, 81 ; Wellington's
letters to, 121-123
Lobau, General, 162
Loison, General, 60, 61
London, Corporation of, opposes a
pension granted to Lord Welling
ton, 80
Londonderry, Lord, on the lack of
English Generals, 57
Louis XVIIL, 129, 131, 132, 175

Madras, Colonel Wellesley at, 6 ;
in control of Colonel Wellesley, 9
Madrid, captured by Murat, 58 ;
Napoleon at, 66 ; entered by
Wellington, 98
Mahratta confederacy, the, 15-32,
40, 41
Manauli, Dhoondiah Waugh de
feated at, II
Manilla, expedition to, 5
Marmont, Marsnal, 90, 92, 119;
attacks Wellington at El Bodon,
92, 93 ; defeated at Salamanca,
96, 97
Massena, Marshal, 81 ; besieges
Ciudad Rodrigo, 82 ; his re
treat from Santarem, 84, 85 ;
falls back on Salamanca, 86,
89, 90
Massow, Lieutenant, 160
Mauritius, 12
Medellin, batfle at, 72
Mellavelly, attacked by Tippoo
Sultan, 7
Mondego Bay, General Wellesley
lands at, 60
T  Valley, the, 82, 84
Monson, Colonel, 32
Moore, General Sir John, 66, 68,
71, 79, 113 ; killed at Coruna,
67
Mornington, Lord, 5
Mortier, Marshal, 80, 89
Muffling, General, 148, 161
Murat, Marshal, 130, 131 ; captures
Madrid, 58
Murray, Colonel George, 46, 47,
63, 67, 180
 . General John, 73, 74
Mysore, province of, affairs in, 5-9 ;
Colonel Wellesley, governor of,
9. 13. 14. 37. 43

INDEX.

195

Nagpore, 15
Napier, on the British troops at
Albuera, 91
Napoleon I., absolute master of the
Continent, 50; secret compact
with Russia, 50, 52, 53, 133;
invades Portugal, 58; occupies
Madrid, 66 ; master of the whole
of Spain, 68, 70 ; sends a fresh
army into Spain, 80, 81 ; with
draws a large proportion of his
-veterans from Spain, 93 ; his con
tinental system, 109 ; Wellington,
a rival of, 125, 126 ; escapes from
Elba, 131 ; the campaign of 1815,
134-174; army of, 144, 170 ;
Wellington superior to, as a
general, 188-190
Native States of India, armies in, '40
Netherlands, Wellington examines
the frontier of, 127, 128 ; cam
paign in the, 134-174
Ney, Marshal, 86, 132, 150, 151 ;
attack on Quatre Bras, 152-155 ;
at Waterloo, 159
Nicolls, Major-General, 46
Nive, Wellington's passage of the,
104, 105
North, Lord, 57
O'Donoju, Don Juan, Welling
ton's letter to, 114, 115
Ohvenfa, 88, 89
Oporto, occupied by Soult, 68, 70,
72, 73 ; the French driven out of,
74 ; Wellington's occupation of,
116
¦  , Bishop of, 1 14 ; General
Wellesley's letter to, 63, 64
Orange, Prince of, 134, 138, 143,
148-150, 165
Orthez, battle at, 104

Paget, General Lord, 60, 180
Pamplona, surrender of, 104
Paris, treaty of, 132 ; occupation of,
after Waterloo, 171, 172
Peninsula, General Wellesley's cam
paign in the, 53-125
Penrose, Ad.miral, 104
Perceval, Mr., 81, 88
Perron, a French adventurer, 15,
17, 27
Philippon, General, 95
Picton, General, 93, 159
Pignerol, Marquis of, 2
Pirch, corps of Prussians under,
149, 169
Pitt, on the lack of English generals,
57
Poland, Russia and, 53, 130, 131
Ponsonby, cavalry under, 159
Pontoons, Colonel Wellesley and,
35
Poona, 15 ; attacked by Holkar,
16 ; occupied by Major-General
Wellesley, 18, 19, 32, 35
Portland, Duke of, 50
Portugal, 112, 113; General Wel
lesley's campaign in, 53-107 ;
animosity between Spain and,
56.57
Portuguese troops, 55, 56 ; Welling
ton's opinion of the, 47, 56, 143
Prussia; and Saxony, 130, 131;
army in the Netherlands, 134,
170; defeated at Ligny, 153;
falls back on Wavre, 156, 160
Quatre Bras, concentration of
troops on, 139, 148, 149, 190;
battle of, 152-155
Raglan, Lord, 180
Rajputana, Holkar in. 32

195

INDEX.

Rey, General, 103
Richmond, Duke of, 50
¦  , Duchess of, ball given by, 149
Rolifa, battle at, 61
Russia, alliance with France, 50,
52, 133; and Poland, 53, 130,
131,
Rye, Major-General Wellesley
M.P. for, 49, 50
Sabugal, Battle of, 86, 87
St. Pierre, battle of, 104, 105
Salamanca, 71, 86-90 ; attacked by
Wellington, 96, 97
San Sebastian, siege of, 103, 108.
"5
Santander, 101
Santarem, 84, 85
Schwarzenberg, Marshal, 134
Sebastiani, French soldiers under,
72, 75
Sedasir, attacked hy Tippoo Sultan,
7
Sepoy battalions at Argaum, 30 ;
Wellington's appreciation of, 47
Seringapatam, capture of, 6-11, 42,
43. 48
Seville, 92, 95 ; captured by the
French, 80
Shaw, Colonel, 8, 141
Shore, Sir John, 5
Sieges in Spain, 117 See also
Badajoz, &c. &c.
Sindhia, 15-31, 37 ; defeated hy
Holkar, 16
Slave trade, abolition of the, 129
Smyth, Colonel C, 139
Sorauren, Soult defeated at, 103
Souham, General, g8
Soult, Marshal, 67, 119, 131, 151,
171 ; occupies Oporto, 68, 70-73 ;
driven out of Oporto, 74, 75 J ^'

Plasencia, 78 ; appointed to the
chief command in Spain, 81, 85;
the battle of Albuera, 90, 91 ;
defends Badajoz, 94 ; falls back
on Seville, 95 ; recalled by
Napoleon, 99 ; returns to Spain,
102, 103 ;- defeated at Sorauren,
103 ; at St. Pierre, 104 ; and at
Toulouse, 106
Souza, Principal, 1 14
Spain, General Wellesley's cam
paign in, 53-125 ; ill-feeling in,
against England, 54, 55 ; anj-
mosity between Portugal and,
56, 57 ; Napoleon master of, 68
Spanish Press, attack on Welling
ton in the, 115
 troops, the, 55, 54
 generals, Sira, Wellesley and,
79. 113
Spencer, Major-General, 60
Stevenson, Colonel, i8, 21, 26, 29,
41
Stewart, General Lord, 68, 140
Strategist, Wellington as a, in India,
40-42 ; in the Peninsula, 1 16, 117
Stuart, General, 7, 9
 . Sir Charles, 114
Suchet, Marshal, 102
Surat, barracks at, 46, 47
Tactics, Wellington's, in India,
40-42 ; in the Peninsula, 116
Tagus, English expedition to the,
59-^5. 95
Talavera, battle of, 76, 77
Ten Years' Enlistment Act, 181
Thielman, corps of Prussians under,
149, 166, i68
Tilsit, treaty of, 50, 53, 133
Tippoo Sultan, capture of, 5-10
Torres Vedras, Junot at, 62 ; Wel-

INDEX.

197

lington constructs the defensive
works at, 80, 81, 85, 116
Toulouse, battle of, 106
Trim, Wellesley M.P. for, 3
Trincomalee, 12
Uxbridge, Lord, 143
Valladolid, 98-100
Venegas, Spanish column under,
75. 76
Vienna, Congress of, 129, 130, 133
Vimeiro, battle of, 61, 62, 65
Vittoria, battle of, 101, I02, n6,
117. 122; Napleonat, 66
Walcheren Expedition, the, 81
Walmoden, Count, 3
Waterloo, 155 ; battle of, 157-159,
162-169, 190
Waters, Captain, 73
Wavre, Prussians at, 156, 157, 160,
161
Wellesley, Arthur, see Wellington,
Duke of.
 , Marquis, the duke's brother,
14, 44, so, 80, 109, lis,
136
Wellington, Duke of : birth and
early days, 2, 3 ; M.P. for Trim,
3 ; his first experience of field-
service, 3, 4 ; goes to Calcutta, 5 ;
sent to Madras, 6 ; captures
Seringapatam, 7-11 ; puts a stop
to the depredations of Dhoondiah
Waugh, II; goes to Bombay,
13 ; governor of Mysore, 9, 13,
14; and the Mahratta chiefs, 15-
32 ; the battle of Assaye, 22-26 ;
his success in the Peninsula due
to experience gained in India,
33-37 ; rapid development of his

administrative talents, 37, 38 ;
correct appreciation of our posi
tion as an ahen Power in India,
38 ; his distribution of the army
in India, 39, 40 ; encourages the
Native States to keep up armies,
40 ; the knowledge of strategy
and tactics displayed by him in
India, 40-42 ; personal character
of, 42-45 ; returns to England
owing to ill-health, 45, 48, 49 ;
held in high esteem by his officers
and troops in India, 45-47 ; ex
pedition to Hanover, 49 ; elected
M.P. for Rye, 49, 50 ; appointed
Chief Secretary for Ireland, 50,
52, 70 ; expedition to Copen
hagen, 50-52 ; campaign in the
Peninsula, 53-125 ; his opinion
of the Spanish and Portuguese
troops, 47, SS, 56; leaves the
army, 65 ; resolves to act inde
pendently of the Spanish generals,
79 ; created a peer, 79, 80
pursues Marshal Massena, 84-89
created a grandee of Spain, 94
given a dukedom, 107 ; qualities
displayed by him during the
Peninsular War, 107-121 ; on his
army in Spain, 121-125; examines
the Belgian frontier, 127, 128 ;
the campaign of 1815 .. 134-175 ;
on his staff officers, I40-142 ; at
Quatre Bras, 153 «., 154 n. ; the
battle of Waterloo, 155-169; his
army at Waterloo, l6g, 170 ;
in Paris, 1 72-174; appointed
Master-General of the Ordnance,
175; and Commander-in-Chief,
175 ; his policy of economy, 1 76,
177 ; on the Spanish marriages,
177; and our naval supremacy.

198 INDEX. I
178, 179 ; his views on the , West Indies, expedition to, aban-
organisation of the army, 181- doned, 5
185; overrated as a man and , Wilberforce, Mr., 129
underrated as a commander, ' Woodington, Colonel, 28
185-190 ; superior to Napoleon
as a general, 188-190 ' York, H.R.H. Duke OF, 142
"Wellingtons Dispatches": the
duke's personal character, as con- ,
tained in the first three volumes, I Ziethen, corps of Prussians under,
42, 43 ' 148, 149. 154. 163

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