The pragmatic element in the
teaching of Paul.
Douglas 0 .Macintosh.
(Amer.Jour.of Theology, vol. XIV, 1910}

YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

THE LIBRARY OF THE
DIVINITY SCHOOL

Reprinted from the .AMEincAisi Journal of Theology, Vol. XlV,: No1. 3, July 1910

THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN, THE
TE^C^ING OF PAUL l

', PRINTEEl AT THE UNIVERSITY OE CHICAGO PREYS'

THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN THE TEACHING OF
PAUL

PROFESSOR DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, PH.D.
Yale Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.

Was Paul a traditionalist, a rationalist, a mystic, or a pragmatist ?
Or, if he was not any one of these to the exclusion of the others to
what extent did he, in the construction of his ethical and theological
doctrines, depend upon tradition, speculation, mystical or quasi-
mystical experiences, and the test of practice, respectively? The
present purpose is to discuss this question, with special reference
to the last-mentioned element, viz., the pragmatic.
With all his anti-traditionalism, Paul owed an immense debt to
tradition. From the Old Testament and Pharisaic Judaism he had
derived his monotheism, predestinationism and ethical pessimism,
his angelology and demonology, and his apocalyptic eschatology
and messianism, none of which, perhaps, as general features of his
system did he ever at any time seriously question. That he was
influenced much more than he realized by the fundamental ideas of
the Greek mystery-religion and by the Logos-philosophy and ethics
of the Stoics, as well as by other contemporary non- Jewish and non-
Christian traditions, can scarcely longer be disputed.1 And
especially it must not be forgotten that, with all his independence, the
apostle to the Gentiles was so dependent upon the primitive Christian
community that, apart from its proclamation of the crucified Jesus
as the risen and glorified Messiah, his conversion to Christianity is
historically inconceivable.2 And indeed we find in Paul much more
than a mere tacit acceptance of traditional elements. In the course
of his polemical arguments he makes constant appeal to the Old
Testament, quoting it, after the manner of the rabbis, as a verbally
inspired external authority.
s Bacon, The Story of Paul, 310-20; A. Meyer, Jesus or Paul} 42; J. Weiss,
Paul and Jesus, 129.
2 Cf. Meyer, op. cit., 57. 361

362 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
But this is not to prove that Paul was a traditionalist. Indeed,
in formulating his new-found Christian convictions he was much
more independent than dependent. It was with clear consciousness
of his break with the past that he remembered how "exceedingly
jealous" he had formerly been for the traditions of his fathers (Gal.
1 :i4). He now made use of "the oracles of God," not so much to
arrive at new conclusions as to prove his conclusions to others, and
it is at most an exaggeration of the fact when Wrede says:3 "He
generally extracts from Scripture that which he himself has read into
it ... . thus escaping the yoke of the letter without derogating from
its sanctity" (cf. Gal. 3:16; 4:24-31; I Cor. 9:9, 10; II Cor. 8:15;
Rom. 1:17; 11:9, 10). His real independence is especially manifest
in his attitude toward "the law." Not only did he know himself
as emancipated from its externalism; he was determined that the
Gentile converts should not be entangled in the yoke of its bondage.
Christ was the end of the law for righteousness to the believer. More
over, in the matter of observing the statutes of the law, each individual
Christian was to be "fully persuaded in his own mind" (Gal. 5:1;
Rom. 8:4; 14:5; cf. Col. 2:4-20). More striking still is the apostle's
strenuous insistence, in his letter to the Galatians (chaps. 1, 2)
that he is not repeating in a traditional fashion any gospel in which
he had been instructed by the first Christians, or by any man. And
above all, his dependence upon the external authority of the historical
Jesus himself is so slight as to constitute one of the most striking
problems of New Testament study. His claim to be guided by the
mind of Christ (I Cor. 2 : 16) is not a reference to traditional authority;
he professes to know nothing of Christ "according to the flesh" (II
Cor. 5:16). It is true that Paul seems not always at least to have
taken special precautions to prevent Paulinism coming to be held
in a merely traditional fashion; he praised the Corinthians for holding
fast the traditions even as he had delivered the same to them (I Cor.
11:2), and the most striking feature of the "pastoral" epistles is the
evidence which they present that a hard-and-fast Paulinistic tradi
tionalism soon came to be established, in which the " form of sound
words" received from the great apostle was regarded as of primary
importance. (II Tim. 1:13). Still, so far as Paul himself was con-
3 Paul, 78-79.

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 363
cerned, this later development was the result of an oversight, rather
than something either foreseen or intended.
If then Paul is to be thought of as being in the main an independent
thinker within the realm of Christian doctrine, can this independence
be attributed to a somewhat rationalistic interest in philosophical
speculation? There is, it is true, a certain speculative element in
the apostle's teaching. At least he was no stranger to the common
human interest in consistency, rationality. His extended exposition
of the parallelism and contrast between Adam and Christ, law and
grace, sin and righteousness, death and life (Rom. 5:12-21), is but
one of the many examples of his intricate analogical reasonings (cf.
Rom. 7:1-6). He is conscious of using natural reason as a guide,
and urges others to do the same (I Cor. 11:13, I4> H Cor. 5:14;
cf. Acts 17:25, 29). He could, upon occasion, carry out the logical
implications of his premises to the bitter end (Rom. 9:14-24).
And it is not in method only, but even more in the content of his teach
ing, that Paul betrays the philosophical interest. He had his own
world-view and philosophy of history — showing the influence of
Hellenic culture, indeed, but his own, nevertheless (I Cor. 15:28;
Col. 1:15-26; Eph. 1:10, 21-23; cf- Acts 17:28). And, in particu
lar, in his remarkable christocentric cosmology with its incipient
Logos-Christology, we have what Wernle chooses to call the first
great Christian interpretation of the universe, a theology for mature
Christians, a Christian gnosis resting in considerable part upon a
speculative basis.4
But it would be even more misleading to classify Paul as a ration
alist than as a traditionalist. Against cases of speculation at variance
with tradition can be matched instances in which tradition sets definite
limits beyond which speculation must not venture (Col. 2:6-8),
and the Old Testament as a source of religious knowledge is re
garded as vastly superior to natural reason (Rom. 3:1). Indeed,
human wisdom is, in the sphere of religion, essentially untrustworthy
(I Cor. 1 : 17 — 2 : 5; 3 : 18-20), and there is danger in philosophy (Col.
2:8). "It may even be safely maintained that St. Paul scarcely ever
speculated in the interests of pure knowledge and abstract truth."3
* Beginnings of Christianity, I, 227, 333; cf. J. Weiss, Paul and Jesus, 68, 77.
s Wernle, op. cit., I, 321.

364 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
"He can be, but he does not wish to be, a philosopher."6 In other
words, Paul did not indulge in speculation; he employed it when he
found that it could serve his polemic purpose against a lingering Juda
ism or an incipient Gnosticism. And, we may add, the anti-specula
tive utterances of the Pastoral Epistles could hardly have been, at
such an early date, attributed to the apostle, if he had been favorable
to religio-philosophical speculation for its own sake.
The secret of Paul's religious independence is not to be found in
any tendency to speculation, but in his appeal to experience. It
is commonly recognized that there is a mystical element in Paul's
teaching, and it is natural to seek an explanation of this by reference
to those mystical or quasi-mystical experiences to which he so fre
quently appeals. Of these by far the most important was the Damas
cus-road experience, which marked his conversion to Christianity.
Never thereafter did he doubt that he had been in communication
with the crucified but risen and exalted Christ. This was to Paul
a typical instance of "revelation" (Gal. 1:12, 16) — "not a gradual
illumination but the marvelous event of a definite point of time."'
But there were other "visions and revelations" of "exceeding great
ness." Trance, ecstasy, and "spiritual gifts," such as the gift of
tongues and the gift of working "signs and wonders and mighty
works" in the healing of disease were among the experiences of the
apostle in which he believed himself to be in immediate contact with
the power of God and of the Christ, his Son (I Cor. 14: 18; II Cor.
12:1-12; Rom. 15:18, 19; cf. Acts 22:17; 28:8, 9). Similarly
he interprets certain emotional experiences, energizings of the moral
will as "joy in the Holy Spirit" and being "filled with the Spirit."
These special religious experiences were the source of much of Paul's
theology. The central doctrine of his gospel he owed to the first of
these great "revelations." As Weinel says, "The experience of
seeing the crucified Jesus as the Messiah is the starting-point of Paul's
dogmatic thinking,"8 and Wernle, "The Pauline gnosis proceeds
from the Spirit."9 Naturally the doctrine of the union of Christ
6 Bacon, op. cit., 318.
7 A. Meyer, Jesus or Paul ? 44.
8 St. Paul, the Man and His Work, 301.
9 Op. cit., I, 323.

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 365
with his people is made fundamental. Salvation comes through
mystical union with the crucified and risen Christ in the process of
his death and resurrection. Christ or the Holy Spirit indwelling
the believer is the source of his illumination and strength, and the
basis for his hope of final glory (Gal. 2 : 20; 5 : 16, 22 ; Eph. 3 : 17-19;
6:10; Rom. 8:9, 14, 16; II Cor. 5:17; Col. 1:27).
But Paul was far from being a mere and unmitigated mystic.
He "valued mystical experiences in proportion as they generated
spiritual force."10 "Manifestations of the Spirit" were "to profit
withal" (I Cor. 12:7). "Spiritual gifts" must be exercised and
"revelations" imparted, only when it. was "unto edifying" (I Cor.
14:26). Thus while Paul's theoretical test of revelation was its hav
ing been inspired by some unusual psychic experience, practically \
his test was its value in inspiring to ethico-religious activity. -> And
Johannes Weiss argues forcefully that the claim to have the " mind of
Christ" (I Cor. 2:16) and to be "persuaded in the Lord Jesus"
(Rom. 14:14) did not mean that the apostle's certainty in particular
judgments was "mechanically deduced from the mystical substratum,"
but that he believed himself to be judging and acting in accordance
with the spirit of Jesus' teaching.11 At any rate, Paul is no more to
be charged here with uncontrolled mysticism than with servile tra
ditionalism. Indeed the Johannine exhortation, "Believe not every
spirit, but try the spirits, whether they be of God " (I Jno. 4 : 1-3)
might have been, and perhaps originally was in substance, uttered
by Paul himself. At any rate he had other norms of doctrine than
that of mystical states of consciousness.
It begins to be evident then that Paul's appeal to experience as the
basis of his religious independence was not exclusively or even funda
mentally to abnormal personal experiences. Superior to these was
the test of practice in the interests of spiritual values. Activity and
practicality were prime characteristics of the life and mindjjf the
missionary apostle. It was but natural that his ethics and theology
should be strongly activistic. He appreciated the Gospel not as
being traditional or rational, nor even chiefly as according with cer
tain private experiences of his own, but primarily as dynamic: it
r° J. M. Campbell, Paul ihe Mystic, 21.
11 Paul and Jesus, 115, 116, 123.

366 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
was the power of God unto salvation to every believer (Rom. 1:16;
cf. I Thess. 1:5, 9). For this reason he would adhere to it, though
an angel from heaven were to preach a different message (Gal. 1:8).
The "foolishness of preaching" was accredited by its saving power
as true and divine wisdom (I Cor. 1:21, 24). Its value was a
vindication of its truth, and seemed to justify the making of all
reasoning processes instrumental to the Christian life, the bringing
of "every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ" (II
Cor. 10:5).
No one would claim, of course, that Paul was a conscious prag-
matist, but it canno t be disputed that he made great use of the prag
matic test of moral and religious truth. So far as particular duties
were concerned, he was guided by a sort of transfigured or spiritual
utilitarianism. As Weinel says, "Morality for St. Paul has no other
aim than to keep the community and the individual in a condition of
purity and of faith."12 His ambition was "to present every man
perfect in Christ" (Col. 1:28); all that could serve as means to this
end was imperative; all that bore no relation to this purpose, no matter
how ancient the tradition authorizing it, was unimportant. This
proved in some respects a most revolutionary principle in ethics.
Where there had been compulsion there was now liberty. (Gal. 5:1;
I Cor. 10:23; Rom. 14:13). The old distinction between the cere
monially clean and unclean was obliterated, and the former observ
ance of sacred days was left to individual conviction (I Cor. 8:8;
10:25, 27; Rom. 14:5, 14; Col. 2:20-23). Baptism as a Christian
ordinance was lightly esteemed (I Cor. 1:17), but inasmuch as it was
an established practice in the Christian community, it was retained
and utilized in the interests of the Christian life through an emphasis
upon its symbolic and hence ultimately ethical value (Rom. 6:1-14;
Col. 2:12, 13).
But while this new test of moral distinctions brought new liberties,
it also brought new obligations. All things were lawful, indeed, but
all things were not expedient. Though one might with perfect
impunity eat meat offered to idols, since an idol is nothing real, one
must be careful lest the exercise of his rational liberty in such matters
should prove a means of injuring his less enlightened brother. If
" Op. cit, 330.

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 367
the welfare of another should require it, one must consider himself
under moral obligation to forego his own personal liberty (I Cor.
6:12; 8:1-13; 10:23-28; Rom. 14:13-21). Under certain cir
cumstances it became a Christian duty to withdraw fellowship from
an individual as an expedient to induce him to repent (II Thess. 3 : 14,
15; I Cor. 5:5). The pragmatic test is immediately decisive against
all casuistical speculations (Rom. 6 : 1) and also, as we have already
seen, in criticism of all supposed revelations and inspirations (I Cor.
14 : 6-40) .
There were some of Paul's contemporaries apparently, to whom
this pragmatic criterion in ethics seemed very dangerous. He was
charged with teaching the boldest opportunism, the use of evil means
for the securing of good ends. But this charge the apostle indignantly
repudiated as slander (Rom. 3:8) — the very word that a well-known
l pragmatist has recently used of a similar charge against his own
¦pragmatic view of truth. What Paul did believe and act upon was
that there were many acts of which, considered as ends, the moral
character was neutral, but which, when useful for promoting the
acceptance of the gospel, became a duty, and when a hindrance thereto
morally evil, pin such cases he felt free to regard the most politic
course as morally right; he became all things to all men in order that
by all means he might save somey (I Cor. 9:18-23). According to
the particular situation confronted a certain act might be good, bad,
or indifferent. With this distinction in mind it will not be found neces
sary to assume that there was any inconsistency between Paul's
rebuke of Peter for "dissembling" at Antioch (Gal. 2:11-14) and
his advice to the Corinthians and Romans concerning the eating of
meat offered to idols (I Cor. 8:1-13; 10:20-29; Rom. 14:13-21).
Eating such meat with Gentiles was in itself a matter ethically indif
ferent; a man was neither better nor worse for eating or for refusing
to eat. But if to eat would be to encourage a "weak brother" in
participating in what was to him idolatry, it was to be avoided as evil.
And, on the contrary, if to abstain from eating would be to play into
the hands of the Judaizing Christians in their effort to impose the
yoke of Jewish legalism upon the Gentile converts, to persist in eating
as before must be regarded as a sacred duty. In the same way the
apostle's attitude toward circumcision can easily be shown to have

368 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
been free from inconsistency. Abstractly it made no difference morally
or religiously whether a person was circumcised or not (Gal. 6:15).
But if, as in the case of the circumcision of Timothy (Acts. 16:3),
observance of this Jewish custom would remove prejudice against the
heralds of the gospel and at the same time impose no unfair burden
upon any, it became a duty to use the expedient. And when, on the
other hand, legalists insisted that circumcision should be required
of all Gentile Christians, Paul deliberately left Titus uncircumcised
(Gal. 2:3-5) and later insisted that to be circumcised under such
circumstances would be to lose the value of the Christian gospel
(Gal. 5:2). In external things neither conformity nor non-conformity
was valued for its own sake, but the one or the other according as it
could better serve the ends of spiritual religion.
In any estimate of the Pauline ethics this pragmatic or telic charac
teristic must be kept in mind. Some of the apostle's injunctions were
mere temporary expedients, and were recognized by himself as such.
For example, changes of vocation and estate are advised against
"by reason of the present distress" (I Cor. 9:26). Other rules of
merely temporary and perhaps only local validity were laid down,
apparently without their limitations being fully recognized, as when
there was imposed as a universal law the injunction that women
keep silence in the churches — a much-needed precaution for the miti
gation of the "confusion" prevailing in the Corinthian church (I
Cor. 14:33-35; cf. I Tim. 2:11, 12). But even the most universal
of the ethical principles enunciated by Paul had often strikingly
obvious application to the particular case in hand, so that it seems
not unreasonable to suppose that, universal as they may be, they were
first suggested and formulated and initially verified where and as we
find them, in the attempt to relieve some merely temporary tension
in the local situation. For example, love is greater than faith or
hope (I Cor. 13 : 13) — especially for a church strong in faith and hope
(I Cor. 1:7; 13:2) but full of division, jealousy, and strife (I Cor.
1 : 10, 12 ; ^:^). But the great principles of Christian morality which
Paul reiterates throughout the hortatory portions of his epistles had
been tested over and over again within his own personal experience
and observation, and, as thus verified and held by him, were as empiri
cal and pragmatic as they were Christian.

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 369
Paul's theology, too, was strikingly pragmatic. It was, as Wernle
says "a missionary theology, the theology of an apologist."
St. Paul developed his soteriology as well as his anti-Jewish apologetic in the
midst of his missionary labors and for purely practical purposes. In order to win
over the Gentiles Jesus had to be presented to them in a wider, more compre
hensive and intelligible system; and furthermore this system had to be defended
against the attack of Jews and Jewish Christians  All his propositions —
even the most abstruse — served the practical purposes of missionary life, and were
never put forward without reference to them.13
In the genesis of the Pauline Christology three stages may be
marked. First of all, probably, was the selection by the young Phari
see of the tradition that the Messiah was to be " the Man coming with
the clouds of heaven," and spoken of as "the Son of God," in prefer
ence to the common Jewish expectation of an earthly world-monarch
of the Davidic line. This may have been, as Arnold Meyer suggests14
a deliberate choice between opposing views with the intention of squar
ing his messianic ideas with his presupposition that the flesh is inher
ently evil. The second stage was the attaching of this Christ-predicate
to the crucified and risen Jesus. This was not, of course, a purposive
judgment, to begin with, at least, but a more or less unexpected datum
of the trance-experience. The third stage, however, was clearly
purposive and pragmatic. The exalted Christology of the later
epistles (Col. 1:13-17; 2:9; Eph. 1:21-23; 3:9) was a weapon
whetted for the imminent conflict with Gnosticism, and at the same
time a series of independent religious value-judgments, expressing
with considerable "expansion of feeling" the apostle's appreciation
of the heavenly Christ. Paul's Christology, therefore, while to some
extent and in some of its aspects traditional, speculative, and mystical,
.was also strongly pragmatic.
No less so was his interpretation of the death of Christ. In the
first place there was the apologetic necessity of explaining why God
should have allowed the Messiah to suffer death. For Paul himself
this problem was especially acute, for in his view death was the penalty
of sin; the law was a law of sin and death (Rom. 5:14; 6 : 23 ; 8 : 2)—
no death without sin, no sin without death. Jesus' suffering of death,
therefore, must have been a part of his messianic work for the salva:
13 Wernle, op. cit., 226, 321; cf. 328-29. '+ Op. cit., 48.

370 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
tion of sinners.15 This vicarious suffering of the death-penalty of
sin must have been either that the people of Christ should not die,
or else that death — the perishing of the outer man, merely — might
have no terrors for them (Gal. 3:13; Rom. 5:6-10; II Cor. 5:21).
Of this interpretation the resurrection of Christ afforded at once
confirmation and explanation. Thus it was found that what had
originally presented itself as a "stumbling-block" — the idea of a
crucified Messiah — had great value as a spiritual dynamic; it was
the "power of God" (I Cor. 1:23, 24).
In tracing further the use which Paul made of the death of Christ
in his theology, it is not always easy to say whether he proceeded
from the practical need to the instrumental theory, or from the
suggested meaning to its practical application; but in any case the
practical value of the doctrine was what determined its survival.
Possibly it was by two originally separate lines of thought proceeding
in opposite directions concerning the death of Christ that Paul forged
his most powerful weapon against the attacks of the Judaizers. If
the Messiah suffered the death penalty of sin on behalf of his people,
that penalty of a broken law could no longer be required of them;
the law was therefore no longer binding in any external fashion upon
them. In spite of the dangers of this conclusion to the Christian
himself, arising out of unwarranted antinomian inferences, it was
too valuable a weapon against "the enemies of the gospel" to be
discarded. On the other hand, the necessity of supporting against
criticism the thesis that the Jewish ritual observances (for example
and especially, the sacrifices) must not be imposed upon the Gentile
converts, seems to have led to some such reflection as the following:
the sacrifices are no longer necessary since the Messiah has come,
especially in view of the death of the Christ, for that death was the
true sacrifice, which, having been offered (I Cor. 5:7), convinces us
that God is propitious, especially since it is God himself who has pro
vided the propitiatory offering (Rom. 3:25); in this we see the grace
of God, who was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself (II Cor.
5:19). In this way Paul found not only additional anti-Judaistic
considerations, but the basis of a powerful presentation of the gospel
(II Cor. 5:20; cf. Rom. 5:10).
is Shailer Mathews, The Messianic Hope in the New Testament, 196.

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 371
Coming to the doctrine of justification by faith, we find that
Wrede interprets it in such a way as emphasizes its instrumental
character, even to the point of exaggeration. Paul, he claims, had
two purposes, viz., to free the mission from the burden of Jewish
national custom, and to assure the superiority of the Christian faith
in redemption over Judaism as a whole, and he adds, " The doctrine
of justification is nothing more than the weapon with which these
purposes were to be won."16 He contends further that Paul did not
derive the doctrine of justification from his conversion, but that it
had its immediate origin, as indicated, in the exigencies of his mission
to the Gentiles. "In this case theory was the child, not the parent
of practice."1' This view of Wrede is undoubtedly an exaggerated
emphasis upon a generally neglected factor in the genesis of the doctrine
in question. But instead of accounting for this justification-doctrine
either, as is commonly done, solely by reference to the conversion-
experience, or, as Wrede does, solely by reference to the anti-Judaistic
propaganda, one should probably relate it definitely to both. There
is still much to be said for the view that the spiritual struggle depicted
in Roman 7:7-25 reflects Paul's own moral history previous to his
conversion.18 Ambitious to be found blameless in righteousness at
the coming of the Messiah, the young Pharisee had realized his pur
pose so far as the external details of the law were concerned (Gal.i :i4;
Phil. 3:5, 6; cf. Acts 26:5). But this self-centered and superficial
course did not satisfy the ethical demand nor subdue the impulses to
evil in the ardent, youthful nature. With the fanatical zeal born of
inner unrest he turned in defense of the traditions of his fathers to a
relentless persecution of the new sect of the Nazarenes (Gal. 1 : 13, 14;
Phil. 3:6; cf. Acts 26:9-11; 8:1-3; 9:12). The effect of this anti
social crusade of devastation and slaughter must have been but to
accentuate still further the impulses of the lower nature, and conse
quently to aggravate the inner tumult and self-dissatisfaction. Then
came the conversion-experience. Filled with remorse at the thought
of his former persecuting^activity and entering for that reason with
double energy into the new evangelism of proclaiming the crucified
i6 Wrede, Paul, 127.
*7 Ibid., 146.
lS Stevens, The Pauline Theology, 12-20.

372 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
Jesus as the risen, exalted, and returning Messiah, and seeking
now by this means to save men, rather than as before to destroy
them, a new love and joy and peace took the place of the former
hate and inner discord. This would inevitably come to the young
convert-missionary as a consciousness of reconciliation to God in
spite of his own previous bitter but unwitting antagonism to the
cause of God and of the Messiah, his Son. It came as a sense of
harmony with God and an assurance for the future that had never
been experienced through the previous diligent attention to the re
quirements of an external law. And just as inevitably did this new
relationship to God and to man bring such a measure of victory over
internal evil as had hitherto seemed altogether impossible. All this
had come through an active response to the "revelation" of Jesus as
the Christ.
Then must have come the period of reflection over the significance
of the death of the Messiah, as outlined above, with the consequence
that the new religious assurance and moral triumph which had resulted
from faith in Jesus as the Christ were now interpreted in juridical
terms as justification through Christian faith. For the apostle him
self this idea was in no special danger of leading to the lowering of
moral standards, for the reason that it was simply the religious inter
pretation in juridical terms of an experience which, as we have seen,
included moral achievement. But for the hearer there was the danger
of its proving misleading through its liability to misinterpretation, and
it is doubtful if the doctrine, in the form in which we have it, at least,
would have come to occupy such a prominent place in the apostle's
preaching as it did, if it had not been for the counter-propaganda of
the Judaizing Christians.
There is probably then at least this much of truth in Wrede's
contention that justification by faith as a definitely formulated and
propagated doctrine had its origin in the endeavor to guard the Gentile
churches from becoming entangled in the yoke of Judaism. As an
idea, however, it must have figured in the readjustment which took
place in Paul's own mind as a consequence of his conversion to Chris
tianity. Still, much of the apostle's certainty with reference to the
doctrine was doubtless produced by the discovery of its value in refut
ing the legalists. And we may add, in further concession to Wrede,

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 373'
that this subsequent use of the general idea may have had much to
do with its final exact content; for every idea that is successfully
applied in a radically new situation tends to be not only further veri
fied but at the same time perceptibly modified as a result of the process.
In any case, however, Paul's doctrine of justification is seen to have
been eminently pragmatic.
But the bold proclamation of the emancipating doctrine of justi
fication made more imperative than ever an emphasis upon the ethical
aspects of the new religion. To be sure the new doctrine of justifi
cation by faith favored such moral qualities as gratitude (I Cor.. 6 : 20;
II Cor. 9:15) and humility (Rom. 3:27, 28), and this last was taken
as a further point in its favor; but the apostle felt keenly the necessity
of setting forth in a more comprehensive way a complementary truth
that should emphasize the ethical aspects of the gospel. This explains
the immediate juxtaposition of the material found in the fifth and
sixth chapters of Romans. The thought of spiritual union with
Christ is that upon which main reliance is placed for this moral
dynamic. Thus we see that the most mystical of Paul's doctrines,
his doctrine of the Spirit, is perhaps even more fundamentally prag
matic than mystical. To be sure the apostle enforces his exhortations
to personal purity of life by referring to the approaching day of judg
ment and future punishment (I Thess. 4:3-6; 5:2, 6, 23; I Cor. 6:9,
10; II Cor. 5:10), but it was only with difficulty that this appeal
could be reconciled with the doctrine of the justification of the Chris
tian through faith (I Cor. 3:11-14), and the main dependence was
upon a consideration more easily harmonized therewith, viz., the
thought of spiritual union with Christ (Gal. 5:18; Rom. 8:1-17).
The mystical experience may have suggested this idea, but its prac
tical value was what gave it its chief significance in the apostle's
estimate and its undoubted prominence in his teaching. According
to the justification-doctrine it was doubtless true that the greater the
sin had been, the greater was the manifestation of grace in the justi
fication of the sinner (Rom. 5:20), but this doctrine had its value in
connection with past, not future sin. The transfer of attention from
past to future must be accompanied by a transition to the doctrine
of spiritual union with Christ (Rom. 6:1, 11). The Christian must
not use his freedom from the law as "an occasion to the flesh," but

374 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
being "in Christ" he must "walk in the Spirit" and not gratify the
desires of the flesh (Gal. 5 : 13, 16, 24). He must have regard for the
spiritual significance of his baptism as meaning such an intimate
union with Christ in his death and resurrection that the one so united
must count himself to be dead to sin and risen with Christ to newness
of life (Rom., chap. 6). As indwelt by Christ, the Spirit, the Chris
tian is to regard himself as the temple of God and to keep himself
accordingly free from all impurity (I Cor. 3:r6, 17; 6:15-20), thus
at the same time receiving and achieving sanctification (Eph. 5 : 26, 30;
II Thess. 2 : 13; cf. Phil. 2 : 12, 13). Further confirmation of the view
that Paul's interest in his doctrine of the Spirit was pre-eminently
because of its ethical value, is found in his emphasis upon the " fruits
of the Spirit" — that long list of graces and virtues beginning with
love and ending with self-control (Gal. 5:22, 23) — and the relative
insignificance he ascribes to the so-called gifts of the Spirit, especially
the speaking with tongues. The more edifying of such "gifts" are
to be earnestly desired, but the most excellent way of all is the way of
the greatest of the ethical fruits of the Spirit, viz., Christian love
(I Cor., chaps. 12-14). The language of Dr. Moffatt is scarcely
too strong, when he says: "The Spirit came to represent not so much
an ecstatic as an ethical power to Paul; it was the vital principle of
the Christian life, rather than an endowment for special occasions, and
he verified it, not in sudden raptures or transient fits of religious
emotion or any mysterious excitement of the personality, but in the
normal life of the Christian within the church."19
But it is in connection with the doctrine of the resurrection that
Paul's pragmatism becomes most overt. While ordinarily his
motive in making a religious affirmation was the consciousness of its
practical religious and moral value, this consciousness was also ordi
narily a motive leading him to seek other reasons why it should be
believed. Its value was felt to be something not coincident with but
additional to its truth, although its value was itself an additional
reason for believing in its truth. But when he comes to argue for
the resurrection — and by this term we are to understand Paul as
meaning, not the reanimation of the physical body, but the triumphant
entrance of the whole personality of the Christian into the full measure
19 Paul and Paulinism, 40.

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 375
of eternal life at some time after physical death — here the apologetic
procedure becomes different. In this connection the value becomes
the reason; the motive to the belief is frankly confessed and made
its justification. Now if this procedure were to be made the basis
of a generalization, that generalization would be manifestly false;
it is not true that all motives to beliefs are sufficient reasons for the
same. But where other proof is inaccessible and yet action is
demanded, the motive leading to a belief may be good enough to
justify, under the circumstances, the "will to believe." The best
reason then that can be given for the belief in question is the motive,
the purpose for the realization of which the belief is essential. Paul's
main argument for belief in the resurrection is to the effect that it
is so valuable, if true, that it is, it must be, true. If it is not true,
the gospel is false, there is no salvation, and the Christian is in a most
pitiable plight (I Cor. 15:13-19). But there must be a resurrection,
for Christ must surely have been raised, and this because there are so
many evils, death included, which must be destroyed, and which can
be destroyed only if it is true that he has risen from the dead (vss. 20-
26). The apostle refused to give up his belief in the resurrection,
for then he would have to believe that all he had done and suffered
had been in vain (vss. 30-32), but he felt sure that his labor had not
been in vain (vs. 58). It was further asserted in the course of the
argument that belief in the resurrection was necessary to keep the
moral standard from degenerating into that base epicureanism whose
motto was, "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die" (vs. 32).
This last amounts to an assertion of the ethical justification of the
postulate of immortality; it is a necessary truth in the sense that it is
ethically necessary to humanity. This is pragmatism, not abstractly
propounded, of course, but concretely exemplified.
But this argument for the resurrection was simply the most con
spicuous expression of the enthusiastic assurance of the apostle's
faith — an assurance which, for lack of a better term, we may call
his fighting optimism. Without questioning his pessimism so far
as the natural man is concerned — a pessimism which he had inherited
from Judaism and confirmed in his own personal experience (Rom.
7 : 7-25) and observation (Rom. 1 : 18-3 : 20) — it may be said that as a
Christian his practical attitude was somewhere between "meliorism"

376 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
and absolute, dogmatic optimism; the realization of the highest
good was to him something more than merely possible, something
less than absolutely inevitable. Recognizing the moral value of hope
(Rom. 8:24, 25), and realizing that through faith the Christian hope
becomes a working certainty, he preached a doctrine more religious
than the meliorism of Professor James20 and more morally stimulating
than that soporific modern optimism which tends to make life one
continuous "moral holiday." This inspiring melioristic optimism
found marked expression in connection with the ideas of — to
use a later terminology — "special providence," "perseverance of the
saints," and "the final consummation."
Paul's doctrine of providence was but the expression of the faith
he lived by, the enthusiastic confidence through which, when per
plexed, he was not in despair, and when smitten down, he was not
destroyed (II Cor. 4:8, 9). He met the external tribulations of his
experience with steadfast purpose, supported by that optimistic faith
of which his invincible joy was at once a factor and a product (see
Rom. 5:3). All experiences, he maintained, were for the Christian's
benefit; even what militated against physical well-being was for his
spiritual and eternal good (II Cor. 4:15-17; Rom. 8:28). He
claimed that the Christian did not ordinarily trust God for things
great enough (Eph. 3:20); when we pray, he answers us better
than we ask, for he overlooks the limitations of our understanding
and answers according to the spirit of every truly Christian petition
(Rom. 8:26, 27); he who gave us Christ will give us all things that
we need (Rom. 8:32). So complete was Paul's confidence in the
providence of God that he did not hesitate to affirm that his life would
be spared as long as his presence was needful for the churches (Phil.
1:24, 25).
With reference to the Christian's perseverance Paul's doctrine
was so shaped as to include the vital and dynamic features of confi
dence in the triumph of God's purpose for his people on the one hand,
and the sense of human responsibility for moral achievement on the
other. In bringing any individual into the first stages of the Christian
experience the purpose of God is to develop his character into conform
ity with that of Christ (Rom. 8:29, 30), and this gracious purpose
20 Pragmatism, 285 ff.

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 377
he never abandons (cf. Rom. 11:29); having begun the work, he
will continue it "until the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:6); nothing
on earth or in the heavens or in the abyss, nothing that is or ever will
be, can separate the "chosen" from the love and care of God (Rom.
8:35-39). But the human side is also emphasized. God's goodness
continues to be manifested only to those who continue in his goodness
(Rom. 11:22). Those reconciled to God through Christ will be
presented "holy and without blemish and unreprovable " on condition
that they continue steadfastly in the Christian faith (Col. 1:22, 23).
Paul himself, with all his confidence, was careful to exercise self-
control, lest he himself should be rejected (I Cor. 9:25-27). Thus
both joyful confidence and prayerful diligence, "both for himself
and those who call him friend," should characterize the Christian
(I Thess. 5 : 1 6-1 8 ; Rom. 12:12; Eph. 6:18). This two-fold attitude
was exemplified in Paul himself with reference to the Galatians.
"Did ye suffer so many things in vain?" he asks, and then adds,
"If indeed it be in vain." Again he says, "I am afraid .... lest
.... I have bestowed labor upon you in vain." But finally he
expresses his "confidence in the Lord" that they will be "none other
wise minded" than he wishes them to be (Gal. 2:4; 4:11; 5:10).
He is confident that there is no temptation over which the Christian
may not be victorious (I Cor. 10: 13), no trial over which he may not
be more than conqueror through the power of Christ (Rom. 8:37).
Contemplating the character of his Lord and being thus transformed
gradually into the same image (II Cor. 3:18), every Christian may
"rejoice in hope of the glory of God" (Rom. 5:2). It is a working,
fighting optimism.
Rightly understood the Pauline eschatology in its essence and
final form is neither depressing nor enervating, but stimulating to
the last degree. That Paul intended his doctrine concerning "last
things" to be dynamic is shown by his pedagogical emphasis of the
particular phases of his belief which the life and thought of his readers
seemed to require. In his first letter to the Thessalonians, in order
to comfort those who feared lest their believing friends who had
died might not share in the privileges of the to-be-established king
dom of Christ, he assures them that the dead in Christ will rise at
the Parousia and will be forever with the Lord (I Thess. 4:13-18).

378 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
He also makes impressive use of the idea of the imminence of the
second advent of Christ, as furnishing a motive to morality (I Thess.,
chap. 5). Assuming that Second Thessalonians is also from the
apostle, we find him in this letter correcting the impression which
seems to have been made by the former one, to the effect that the
coming of Christ was so near that all ordinary occupations might
well be discontinued (II Thess. 2:2; 3:10, n); to counteract
this he teaches them that the Christ is not immediately to appear,
but that there will be a falling away first, and that the "man of sin"
will be revealed, "the lawless one whom the Lord Jesus shall slay
with the breath of his mouth" (II Thess. 2:1-12). The effectiveness of
these teachings as a means of directing the life of the church is readily
seen; the sincerity of the apostle's own belief is, of course, indubitable;
the only question is whether in some cases the immediate practical
value of the idea may not have been the final weight that turned the
balance of his judgment in its favor.
For Paul there were three great epochs of outstanding importance
in connection with eschatology. The first was the resurrection of
Christ as the "first fruits" (I Cor. 15:20); the other two were still
future, being the second coming of Christ and "the end," the "final
consummation." With Christ at his coming would be those from
among the dead who were his people (I Cor. 15 : 23), they having been
raised to be with him in his kingdom. These would include those of
the Jews and of the Gentiles who had become believers during their
earthly lives (Rom., chaps. 9, n). Whether the "dead in Christ"
who "rise first" (I Thess. 4:16) include any who may have believed
as a result of Christ's descent into the abyss (Rom. 10:6, 7), or any
who may have been benefited by the baptism for the dead (I Cor.
15:29) Paul does not say. Those remaining alive, however, would
be changed and caught up to meet the Lord in the air and to be with
him in his kingdom (I Thess. 4:17; I Cor. 1 5 : 5 1-53) . This kingdom
or rule of the Christ is to last till "love's redeeming work is done," —
"till he hath put all his enemies under his feet," having abolished all
"rule" and "authority" and "power," including at last even death
itself (I Cor. 15:24-26). This goal of confident expectation is to
include the salvation of all Israel (Rom. 11:26) — a consummation
which Paul had devoutly wished and prayed for (Rom. 10:1), and

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 379
which he now postulates in faith as to be realized. But this was
not all. The fulness {irXfipcofia) of the Gentiles will come in (Rom.
11 :25s cf. Eph. 1:9, 10), for God's mercy will be shared by all (Rom.
11:32); everyone in the heavens, on earth and in the abyss, will
revere the name of Jesus and acknowledge him as Christ and Lord
(Phil. 2:10, 11; cf. Rom. 10:9; I Cor. 12:3); and so in Christ shall
all be made alive (I Cor. 15:22). Even the redemption of the " whole
creation" from the "bondage of corruption" is to be accomplished
(Rom. 8:19-22). This is "the end" (rb reXos, I Cor. 15:24) — the
goal, "the one divine, far-off event, to which the whole creation moves,"
when, his work finished, Christ will deliver up the kingdom to the
Father (vs. 24), unto whom are all things (Rom. 11:36), in order
that God may be all in all (I Cor. 15 :28).
But there are certain elements of contingency attached to the
fulfilment of this confident prediction. In any case the time to be
covered by this rule of Christ before the final consummation is age
long (alwvio'i, II Thess. 1:9), an indefinitely long period, during
which the sinful and unbelieving suffer punishment; the only alterna
tive to this view, apart from the hypothesis of interpolation, is to hold
that Second Thessalonians as a whole, if written by Paul, represents an
earlier and afterward transcended point of view in the Pauline
eschatology21 — a supposition as unnecessary to make as it is difficult
to prove. But more striking still is the fact that the salvation of all
Israel, which is predicted in full assurance of faith as a central ele
ment in the final glorious consummation, was just previously spoken
of as conditioned on their not continuing in their unbelief (Rom. 11:23).
It seems a fair inference, then, to conclude that, abstractly considered,
the final salvation of all was, in Paul's judgment, contingent both as
to time and as to the fact itself; but that his faith in Christ was so
unlimited that he confidently believed that he would finally accom
plish this, which was the purpose of his, as well as of the Father's
(Col. 1 :i9, 20; Eph. 1 :g, 10) universal love.22 Paul recognized that
universal salvation of persons possessing the power to continue in
21 Cf. Beyschlag, New Testament Theology, II, 279.
22 Kennedy, who argues for a different interpretation of Paul's doctrine of the
Consummation, admits that the apostle taught the universal scope of the divine pur
pose of mercy (St. Paul's Conceptions oj the Last Things, 309).

380 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
unbelief, is, in the nature of the case, hypothetical; but he neverthe
less firmly believed in its future realization, because he believed that
Christ would never abandon his undertaking until he should see of
the travail of his soul and be satisfied. Remembering that Paul held
that Christ works out his redemptive purposes for the world in part,
at least, through those whom he has already saved (I Cor. 9:1;
16:10; Col. 1:29; Eph. 3:20), so that steadfast continuance in the
work of the Lord was an essential factor in bringing to pass the desired
result (I Cor. 15:58; cf. II Thess. 3:13; Gal. 6:9, 10), one cannot
well conceive an eschatology more dynamic and vital or more mani
festly pragmatic.
It would seem then that it was the pursuit of his great ethico-
religious purpose (personal and missionary) that not only in large
measure gave rise to the great, central doctrines of the apostle but
also furnished him with his supreme test of their truth. Now, in this,
Paul at any rate practiced what the modern pragmatist preaches.23
Was Paul then a pragmatist ? Apart from the incongruity of the
name, it is further true that Paul was not fully conscious of the prag
matic method of his theological thinking, except perhaps in his argu
ment for the resurrection. His own theory of his thinking would have
made him out to be what the modern man would call a mystic, rather
than a pragmatist. But as we have seen, the pragmatic criterion is
constantly made superior to the mystical. It is perhaps best to say
that Paul was a vitalist, so far as the method of his thinking was
concerned; his theology was constituted primarily of those judgments
which he discovered to be essential to the best type of religious life.
Now there is nothing abnormal about this method. It is the
genuinely and freely human way of arriving at moral and religious
convictions. Of course Paul's view of man and the world was pre-
scientific, and much of the form of his doctrine was ephemeral,
chiefly on that account. Besides this it must be acknowledged that
"several of Paul's arguments lost much if not all of their original point
once they were carried beyond the radius of his polemic against the
Jews and Jewish Christians of his own day."24 That is, some of his
teaching was of but temporary value, just because of a pronounced
23 Cf. Schiller, Humanism, Preface and pp. 6-8.
2< Moffatt, Paul and Paulinism, 72.

PRAGMATIC ELEMENT IN PAUL'S TEACHING 381
but narrow pragmatism. But it is likewise true that the permanent
(because universally vital) element in his teaching found place there
mainly because of its broad and profoundly human pragmatism.
The mere fact of the employment of the pragmatic method is no
guaranty of truth, especially in the spiritual realm; it must be
employed with great comprehensiveness and insight and discrimina
tion. But the vital kernel of the Pauline system: God as the God
and Father of Jesus Christ; reconciliation to the gracious Father
through ethical faith; morality as the free expression of unselfish
love, in place of legalism; the ethical immanence of God in the spirit
of the truly Christian man; immortality as essential to the validity
of the highest morality, and finally, his working Christian optimism
—these are our permanent possessions just because they are so gen
uinely pragmatic, so vital, so deeply and essentially human.

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