YALE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

THIRTY YEARS

FOREIGN POLICY.
A HISTORY OF THE SECRETARYSHIPS
OP
THE EARL OF ABERDEEN AND VISCOUNT
PALMERSTON.

BY THE AUTHOR OP
"TIIE RIGHT HON. B. DISEAELI, M.P.,
A LITERABY AND POLITICAL mOGftAPHY.*'
/J- -¦:// ^ / # ¦' . f(

LONDON:
LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS
1855.
[ lite avUior of ihis work rese7-ves to MmselfiJie right of ira'ndation.~\

London;
A and G. A. Spottiswoode,
,New -street- Square.

PREFACE.

The publication of a book on Foreign Policy
at a time when the public mind is so much
excited by the great events which are hap
pening in the Crimea, and when our gallant
soldiers are struggling so bravely against diffi
culties of every kind, may apparently need an
apology. Yet the greatest victories are but glo
rious massacres unless followed by proportion
ate results. A work of this nature may possibly
render the reasons for this mighty conflict more
intelligible, and the conditions of a future peace
more explicit. The labour of the diplomatist
only commences as that of the warrior ends-
The Foreign Minister at length supersedes the
A 2

IV PREFACE.
War Minister. It is then necessary to review our
Foreign Policy, that we may know what it is we
are fighting for, and what we ought to ob
tain. The subject indeed is of vast extent. To do
justice to all the questions which Thirty Years
of Foreign Policy immediately suggest, would
require many pages. Such a work might be
much more easily written in four volumes than in
one. On reflection, however, the author de
termined to compress his subject into a single
volume. He thought that though his difficulties
might be increased by confining himself within
such narrow limits, yet, if he were in any degree
successful in his design, a much clearer and more
comprehensive view of the whole field of nego
tiation might be presented in the smaller compass
than in a work on a more extended scale. A
Diplomatic History of these times is yet to be
written ; it may possibly, at no distant time, be
attempted ; but even then a general sketch of the
various subjects must be indispensable in order
to estimate the relative influence of particular
questions. The author has striven to do impartial justice

PREFACE, 'Y
to two able ministers. He has studiously
avoided pitting one against the other. He has
endeavoured to look at the acts both of Lord
Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston from one point
of view. Carefully shunning the abstractions
in which writers on Foreign Policy, are prone
to indulge, and making full allowance for the
practical necessities of administration, the events
as they arise are considered as they would
appear to the English Secretary of State in
Downing Street, and not as they might appear to
a member of the Opposition, or to any extreme
thinker. This method of judging political ques
tions may not be popular ; it is, however, the only
one from which a just verdict on a minister can
be pronounced.
But the author could not hesitate to con
demn many of the measures which Lord Castle
reagh agreed to at the Congress of Vienna,
because they involved great moral principles,
which no minister can ever be excused for sacri
ficing. It is true that Lord Castlereagh reluct
antly consented to some of these stipulations ;
but this pleading can never be accepted as a
sufficient excuse for his public acts. Had Mr.

VI PREFACE.
Burke been alive in 1815, he would as fearlessly
have condemned some of the articles of the
Treaty of Vienna, as he did the first and second
partitions of Poland. The author has also,
throughout the book, advisedly drawn no dis
tinction between the general Treaty and the
annexed treaties of that Congress ; because, if
words have any meaning, they were under
stood to carry the same force, and can never
safely be separated. This is the principle on
which Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston
have invariably acted, and every prudent
person must admit it to be the only principle
which can ever give stability and permanence
to such engagements. An opposite doctrine
would make the Treaties of Vienna no treaties
at all, and open a chasm to dangers of which it
is impossible to calculate the magnitude.
The view which the author has taken of the
circumstances of 1829 and the conduct of Lord
Aberdeen, is not such as has generally been
adopted. But he humbly submits that it is
the correct one, and hopes that those who shall
dispute it, will not content themselves with
vague assertions, but fairly meet argument with
argument, and fact with fact. Much igno-

PREFACE. Vll
ranee has been displayed in the hasty cen
sures which have been passed upon Lord
Aberdeen. Most of the declarations of his as
sailants are so decidedly erroneous that, like
dreams, they ought to be interpreted by con
traries. Whenever they confidently represent
him as having done that of which they accuse
him, as a general rule it rnay be as confidently
assumed that he did just the reverse. One of
the most recent calumnies which has been going
the round of certain newspapers is, forsooth, that
Lord Aberdeen, in 1828, was on such intimate
terms with Prince Lieven and his family, that
the Foreign Secretary sacrificed his public duty
to this private friendship. Now the author may
simply state, on unquestionable authority, that so
far from Lord Aberdeen being as warmly attached
to Prince Lieven as has been asserted, Lord
Aberdeen's representations at St. Petersburg oc
casioned this ambassador's recall.
What is said on the Affghanistan policy will
probably surprise many persons. It, however,
curiously coincides with some passages which
Count Ficquelmont has written in a recent pam
phlet, published after that portion of this work

Vlll PREFACE.
was concluded. Count Ficquelmont has at length
spoken out ; and in his Politique de la Russie et
les Principaut^s Danubiennes, really says some
very sensible things, which it might be well for
all ministers of state to take to heart. It would
indeed be absurd to prevent Russia from en
croaching upon Turkey, and still to leave Cen
tral Asia open to her arms and her machinations.
On consideration, it may appear that there is at
least one more indispensable " point" which must
be added to the other four, before a peace worthy
of the name can be obtained.

CON T ENTS.

Intkoduction - ... Page 1
CHAPTER I.
A Historical Retrospect. — Foreign Policy of Elizabeth and
of Cromwell. — First and Second Partitions of Poland. — ¦
The Struggle against Napoleon - - 20
CHAP. n.
The Congress of Vienna - - - - 42
CHAP. in.
Canning  The Congress of Verona. — French Invasion of
Spain. — Designs of the Holy Alliance. — Portugal. —
Canning's Merits as a Statesman and Orator  New
Principles of Foreign Policy - - - 66
CHAP. IV.
The Duke of Wellington and the Earl of Aberdeen. —
Policy ofthe Wellington Administration. — Result of the
Treaty of July 6. 1827.— Public Opinion in 1829. — The
Whigs and Turkey. — Treaty of Adrianople. — The
Secret Correspondence - - - 93

X CONTENTS.

CHAP. V.

The Affairs of Greece  Neutrality of Lord Aberdeen in
the Civil War of Portugal. — State of Europe in 1830. —
Recognition of Louis Philippe as King of the French. —
Fall of the Government ... Page 137
CHAP. VI.
Lord Palmerston as Foreign Secretary. — His previous career.
— Friendship with France. — Holland and Belgium. —
Russo-Dutch Loan. — Effects of False Economy. — Treaty
of Unkiar Skelessi. — New Kingdom of Greece. — Spain
and Portugal. — The Quadruple Alliance. — Peace at any
Price - - - - - - 151
CHAP. VIL
Conduct of the Duke of Wellington while Foreign Minister.
— Interference in Spain. — Difficulties of a Liberal Minis
ter negotiating with Absolute Governments. — Choice of
an Ambassador to St. Petersburg. — The Emperor Nicho
las and the House of Commons. — A Gradual Change of
Opinion on Foreign Policy.— Precarious State of Turkey.
— Arrogance and Humiliation  Discussions on Foreign
Policy in 1836. — Mr. Bell and Circassia. — Mr. Urquhart.
— Patriotism of William the Fourth - - 193
CHAP. VIIL
Commercial Treaties of the Whig Administrations 
Treaties with Austria and Turkey in 1838. — State of the
East. — Sultan Mahmoud the Second and Mehemet Ali 
Lord Palmerston's Policy in Syria and Egypt.  Treaty of
the I3th of July, 1841. — Position of Lord Palmerston on
the Retirement of the Melbourne Ministry - 228

CONTENTS. XI

CHAP. IX.

The Power of England. — Extent of Dominion. — Disputes
with America. — Northern Boundaries. — Right of Search.
— Treaty of Washington. — Invasion of Affghanistan 
Consideration of Indian Policy - - Page 289
CHAP. X. 5
Lord Aberdeen's Foreign Policy continued to 1846  The
King of the French and his Chamber of Deputies. —
¦^ Affairs of Spain and Greece. — Count Nesselrode's
Memorandum of 1844. — Oregon Question. — Lord
Aberdeen ... . - 325
CHAP. XL
Intrigue. — Lord Palmerston again Foreign Minister. —
Spanish Marriages. — Identity of the Policies of Lord
Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston on this Question. — M.
Guizot. — Annexation of Cracow. — Discussion in the
House of Commons. — Concurrence of Opinion. — An
Apologist for the Partition of Poland. — Portugal and
Switzerland  Political Movements in Italy  Mission of
Lord Minto. — Close of 1847 - - - 360
CHAP. XII.
Count De Montalembert 's Speech on Foreign Affairs 
Italian Revolutions. — Lord Palmerston's Policy in 1848.
— Austria and Hungary. — Demands for the Surrender
of Refugees. — Diplomatic Victory of Sir Stratford Can-
> ning. — Greek Question. — Debate in the House of Com
mons  Lord Palmerston's Defence  Mr. Gladstone's
Letters to Lord Aberdeen. — Retirement of Lord Palmer
ston. — Conclusion . . - - - 392

THIRTY YEARS

FOREiaN POLICY.

INTRODUCTION.

On the 27th of December, 1852, the Earl of
Aberdeen, as prime minister of England, deve
loped his future policy in the House of Lords.
An unusually large number of peers were as
sembled, the members of the House of Commons
crowded round the throne, and the ambassadors
of all the great powers occupied seats in the
galleries. His exposition was attentively listened
to ; but the most striking passage consisted
of these remarkable words : " The truth is,
my lords, that though there may have been
differences in the execution, according to the

2 INTRODUCTION.
different hands entrusted with the direction
of affairs, the principles of the foreign policy of
the country have, for the last thirty years, been
the same." This opinion of the prime minister
has been the cause of much controversy, and has
been fiercely criticised. Party assailants, whose
object it is to represent Lord Aberdeen and Lord
Palmerston as inveterate antagonists, and as the
representatives of two opposite courses of policy,
have made this emphatic sentence of the vener
able statesman the text of much acrimonious
commentary. His enemies have not hesitated
to stigmatise this sentiment as dishonest, and
as contradictory to the whole course of a long
political career. Lord Aberdeen is, however,
a man who thinks before he speaks, and
this terse declaration may survive the inter
ested invectives which it has occasioned. To
every man who calmly reflects on the events of
his generation, these few words may afford a key
to one of the noblest problems in modern times.
They at once raise him above the angry present,
and while illuminating the past, become an en
couraging beacon for the future.
The importance of this subject cannot be
overrated. The history of Europe, the progress
and the civilisation of mankind, are inseparably

INTRODUCTION. 3
connected with the foreign policy of England.
But it has not always received the attention it
deserved. Englishmen have, during the long
era of peace, been so attentive to their domestic
reforms, and the internal administration of their
empire, that only at rare intervals have they
taken into full consideration the question of
their external relations, and the influence which
England has exercised on other nations. It is
time that we should awaken from our apathy,
and consent to be instructed even by an Austrian
statesman. As Englishmen we are under obli
gations to Count Ficquelmont. He has seen the
importance of this question, and has set about
discussing it in all its bearings. Though he is
the bitter foe of England, and believes her policy
to be in the highest degree pernicious to the
Continental governments, it is but right that we
should be taught by an enemy, and do what we
can to vindicate ourselves from misrepresentation
and malevolence. It is but right that English
men should take up the gauntlet which has been
thrown down. Not by a minister of Austria only
does our foreign policy deserve to be studied.
We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to our an
cestors, we owe it to our children, we owe
it to all future generations of Englishmen, and
B 2

4 INTRODUCTION
to all who may in the most distant times re
spect the name of England, to show that at
this momentous epoch in human affairs we were
not indifferent to our good name, nor insensible
to our glorious vocation.
Count Ficquelmont's elaborate production is
entitled. Lord Palmerston, I'Angleterre, et Le
Continent. The work might, at least, have
been expected to make its appearance while
Lord Palmerston was Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. But this was not the case.
The first volume was published after his lord
ship's retirement from the Whig Ministry ; and
the second has been issued since the accession of
Lord Aberdeen to power. Count Ficquelmont's
opinions, therefore, do not depend on circum
stances. Lord Palmerston is the nightmare that
is ever oppressing him : the two volumes which
he has produced are but the introduction to the
many that are to follow on the same inex
haustible topic. In the interval, furious pam
phlets proceed from the same fertile pen, aU
breathing detestation of Lord Palmerston, and
of this unfortunate nation. Like all great men,
Count Ficquelmont has a mission. He is the
literary champion of the three great powers, and
the mortal foe of England, and of constitutional

INTRODUCTION. 5
government. To do him justice, he likes no
English statesman : though he nominally writes
against Lord Palmerston, he certainly loves not
Lord Aberdeen. He is systematic and con
sistent because it is England herself, and not
so much any individual Englishman, that he
heartily abominates.
As an indication of the ideas entertained by a
considerable number of official people on the
Continent, this book deserves more attention in
England than it has yet received. The first
volume was perused with much curiosity ; but
English politicians thought they had done enough
by laughing at the absurdities it contained, and
troubled themselves no further about Count
Ficquelmont and his philosophy. This was a
great mistake. Foolish as the book may appear
to us, it is not therefore harmless. Because we
see plainly the ignorance and prejudice of every
page, we must not suppose that they are so
obvious to the rest of the world. This work
has been widely circulated and eagerly read.
It has not only been studied by Frenchmen,
Austrians, and Prussians, but in many instances
implicitly believed ; and the advice Count Fic
quelmont gives has been, systematically acted
upon, by more than one minister of state at
B 3

6 INTRODUCTION.
Vienna and Berlin. In treating it with the con
tempt it deserves for its intrinsic value, we forgot
that the individual who offered it was no mean
personage. Once a follower of Prince Metternich,
a late ambassador at the court of St. Peters
burgh, an ex-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and the man who was lately spoken
of as the probable successor of Count Buol again
in the Foreign Office, Count Ficquelmont must
be considered as a very eminent politician. He
can neither be despised, nor forgotten, nor set
aside. He is an enthusiast, and his enthusiasm
is all directed against this country.
The manner in which Englishmen have been
treated in the Austrian dominions, the rancorous
hatred which some Austrian politicans have pro
fessed to England, is no longer inexplicable. It
was really stimulated by the Czar of Russia,
for purposes which we can now sufficiently
comprehend. This fluent author, with all his
profound political metaphysics, is the dupe
of Russian diplomatists. He believes he is pa
triotically writing in favour of Austria, while
he is in reality playing the reckless game of the
northern Autocrat. When the Eastern question
had risen to such a tremendous magnitude, and
all who had the interests of Austria most sin-

INTRODUCTION. 7
cerely at heart, saw clearly that her safety
depended on the maintenance of European tran
quillity ; and when it was evident that had the
German courts united closely with the Western
powers, the peace of the world would, even at
the close of the last year, have been preserved ;
Count Ficquelmont suspended the third volume
of his great work, and wrote a pamphlet entitled
Le C6t4 Religieux de la Question d'Orient, vio
lently abusing England, and counselling the sus
picious policy of inaction. No person can doubt
that the prime source of the eloquent author's
inspiration at that important crisis, was the
astute potentate whose court Count Ficquelmont
had long adorned, and for whom he professes
such deep veneration.*

* Though Count Ficquelmont entered public life under
the auspices of Prince Metternich, and though it was by
this statesman that the Count was sent as ambassador to
Russia twenty-five years ago, it must not be imagined that
Prince Metternich ever shared in this author's extravagant
prejudices against England. There has been an Austrian
minister. Prince Schwartzenberg, who went even as far as
Count Ficquelmont in detestation of this country. But
Metternich has never been the slave of such miserable anti
pathies. In 1828 he was very desirous of a close alliance
with England ; and it was only after his efforts to discipline
and combine Europe against Russia had failed, through the
B 4

8 INTRODUCTION.
But the literary Count is a great philosopher.
He considers himself a most scientific statesman.
Not satisfied with the mere political routine of
cabinets, he gives his readers a why and a
wherefore for everything, and deals familiarly
with the incomprehensible. At his touch even
Lord Palmerston becomes an abstraction, an
"incarnated word," and England a body that
this word abuses. The respect for law and
order habitually shown by Englishmen, is most
ignorance and dishonesty ofthe courts of France and Prussia,
that he sent Count Ficquelmont to St. Petersburgh to con
ciliate the Etnperor Nicholas. It was then that this diplo
matist first became the passionate and furious enemy of
England, which he has since shown himself to be. Singu
larly enough, General Krasinsky, in the interviews he had
with Prince Metternich at that very time, was endeavouring
to instil the same prejudice against England into the mind
of the Austrian prime minister, with which the Czar, only
too successfully, was inspiring the Austrian ambassador.
" England," said the Eussian emissary to Metternich, " would
ruin all kinds of commerce in Europe ; her ministers are merely
merchants decorated with ribbons." But what did the Chan
cellor of Austria reply ? " Oh," said he, " these are the old
anti-Anglican prejudices of Napoleon." Such, indeed, they
were ; but they had been implicitly adopted by Nicholas,
and were inculcated by himself and his agents in every
court of the Continent. The Austrian empire can have no
worse enemies than such shallow enthusiasts as Count Fic
quelmont. (Eeport of Count Krasinsky to the Emperor Ni
cholas, June 8th, 1829.)

INTRODUCTION. d
philosophically deduced from the plain fact of
England being an island. It is, he' tells his
readers, owing to maritime discipline that we
live in habits of obedience. The howling billows
which break upon our shores, proclaim inces
santly that it is only by the principle of sub
mission we can become masters of the watery
element which would otherwise keep us for ever
prisoners in our island. Hence the greatness of
England is inseparably associated with the spirit
of loyalty; the mechanical obedience which every
sailor pays to his captain's commands, is at the
bottom of our respect for the law ; it is therefore
simple, natural, innate. The doctrine of in
nate ideas which our great countryman Locke
combats at the commencement of his " Essay on
the Human Understanding," was not the mere
product of the great metaphysician's brain.
Those who have denied that such a doctrine
was ever held by philosophers, must now ac
knowledge their error. We are ourselves living
witnesses of the fact. An Austrian statesman
holds that Englishmen have an innate principle
of obedience in their breasts ; and that we plainly
illustrated this extraordinary principle at the
time of the Great Exhibition.
The Crystal Palace occupies no inconsiderable

10 INTRODUCTION.
portion of Count Ficquelmont's first volume. A
careful reader must see that the fairy structure
was the cause of much of this author's indignant
eloquence. He did us the honour of visiting
England at that exciting season. His august
form mingled with the crowds of sight seers, who
sated their delighted eyes with the wonders of
industry and art. As he mused on the objects
before him, two dark spectres crossed his path
and disturbed his pleasant dreams. These were
Mazzini and Ledru Rollin, walking arm in arm
about the galleries as comfortably as though
there were no monarchical scaffolds in the world.
Was it in human nature that this should be
endured ? Count Ficquelmont's heart almost
burst with indignation ; his fingers itched to
inflict summary chastisement on the two revolu
tionists and rebels. But he was obliged to
restrain his emotions ; and from that moment lost
all pleasure in visiting the Crystal Palace which
Lord Palmerston had just christened the Temple
of Peace. Count Ficquelmont never set his foot in
it again. " A nice Temple of Peace indeed," he
said sardonically, "in which such men are the
worshippers ! " He resolved to make a literary
crusade against England ; and it must be ac
knowledged that he has faithfully kept his vow.

INTRODUCTION. 11
He has powerfully contributed to produce that
violent antipathy to every thing English, and that
absolute idolatry of every thing Russian, which is
so prevalent among the Austrian aristocracy.
Whatever may be the polite assurances of diplo
matists, it is certain that this deeply rooted
aversion to England must have important poli
tical effects, and it is necessary to treat seriously
this singular production of intellectual diplo
macy. William Wilberforce once remarked that
England was too honest to have any permanent
connection with the Continent. Count Ficquel
mont eminently illustrates that excellent man's
observation ; for he cannot even suppose the pos
sibility of English disinterestedness. Not a
single action of our statesmen is by him attributed
to any motive but extreme selfishness. Those
who gain their notions of political affairs from
this book must believe that English ministers are
monsters of perfidy, and the ministers of Russia,
Austria, and Prussia, models of political morality.
According to Count Ficquelmont, England is a
wolf, and Austria a lamb. The Continent would
be a heaven upon earth if England would but let
it alone. Her want of principle, her falsehood,
her recklessness, her disregard of law and justice,

12 INTRODUCTION.
have produced all the discontent and misery of
Europe. The neglect of truth Count Ficquelmont con
siders the most remarkable characteristic of
English politicians. He most acutely shows that
this vice originates in our constitutional govern
ment. We are partisans from the cradle. Every
Englishman is of a party, and carries about with
him the secret of his party. He is always in the
presence of his political opponents endeavouring
to find out their secret and to keep his own.
This habit of self-restraint naturally engenders
duplicity. Our most eminent member of parlia
ment is the best dissembler. He is a general
concealing his plan of the campaign and holding
himself prepared for every manoeuvre. Thus, to
the mind of the philosophical Count it plainly
appears that this kind of habitual dissimulation
gives its impress to the national character, forms
the political morals of the country, and causes
our political life to be nothing more than a
perpetual intrigue. How then can it naturally
be expected that an Englishman should have
a different morality when dealing with other
nations ? If we are false at home, we must be
false abroad.
And this is the wisdom of a statesman. This

INTRODUCTION. 13
is what a minister of Austria has learnt in the
highest diplomatic stations. It is a man capable
of drawing such conclusions and publishing them
as the products of the highest wisdom whom
courtiers and monarchs reverence, and who may
once more guide the foreign affairs of a great
empire in times of extraordinary difficulty, when
one false step must inevitably bring about its
dissolution. At the sight of such a pheno
menon we can only console ourselves with an
apophthegm of antiquity, and say, that the gods
first smite with madness those whom they de
vote to destruction.
But we have, indeed, come to a pleasant state
of things. England has fought the battles of
the continental sovereigns, heartily struggled in
their cause, subsidised their armies, spent with
unexampled profusion her treasure and blood
in order to maintain them on their thrones;
allowed herself to be abandoned and betrayed
by them, and again by them to be abandoned and
betrayed ; loaded her own shoulders with a debt
which almost staggers credibility; when peace
was brought about, generously stipulated for
no advantage of her own, and even allowed
herself to be considered an accomplice in crimes
from which she received no benefit; and the

14 INTRODUCTION.
result is, that she is branded as the most per
fidious of traitors, and as the most unscrupulous
of all nations ; that she is at length obliged to
form a close alliance with her old enemy, in
order to protect herself from the hostility of her
ancient allies who owe their crowns to her tre
mendous exertions, her unparalleled fortitude,
her unprecedented public spirit. From this we
may at least learn the harsh wisdom inculcated
by experience. Now, when the British Temple
of Janus is once more opened, the curtain rising
on another exciting drama, our flag floating in
the Baltic and the Black Seas, and our soldiers
marshalling for combat on far-distant shores ;
now, when Englishmen may be called upon to
endure sacrifices of which they may yet little
dream ; when the map of Europe is spread out,
and many of the present demarcations of states
may be effaced, it is not unworthy of our con
sideration how our former favours have been
received by those who have been the object of
them, how deeply fervent are their grateful be
nedictions, how faithfully they have kept their
engagements, how deserving they are of the
heavy mortgages we have made of our revenues
for their benefit.
It becomes a duty for us to ponder on the

INTRODUCTION. 15
history of the last forty years. A new era has
begun : a strange future dawns upon us. The
important transactions in which our diplomatists
and statesmen have been engaged during this
century, which must be regarded as one great
chapter in universal history, may very fitly be
reviewed. In the period extending from the
Battle of Waterloo to the commencement of
European hostilities at the present moment, our
statesmen may have committed many errors;
they may have been guilty both of imprudent
neglect and imprudent intervention ; they may
have trusted too much to the professions of
others ; they may have supposed that their con
temporaries were as sincere, as disinterested, as
magnanimous, and as ardently desirous of the
welfare of mankind as they themselves have
been ; but Avithout prejudging the points at
issue, it may be confidently asserted, that no
candid person after a fair interpretation of
motives, and a just consideration of the diffi
culties against which our ministers have had to
contend, will.venture to pronounce a verdict of
which Englishmen have in their national cha
racter any reason to be ashamed.
With due deference to Count Ficquelmont,
and to some politicians even in this country,

1 6 INTRODUCTION.
it may well be questioned whether our most
serious mistakes have really proceeded from too
much meddling with the affairs of the Continent.
Our greatest errors may have rather been from
too much indifference. We may have too fre
quently been the mechanical tools of continental
politicians ; and their present dislike of our
country may arise from the fact that we are
determined to be their mechanical tools no
longer. Where statesmen once led, they are
now obliged to follow. The mind of this nation
is becoming every day more and more enlight
ened ; every day the people are growing more
and more sensible of the immense debt they owe
to humanity. That debt must be paid. We are
not now to be terrified by the bugbears of inter
vention and revolution ; for we see clearly,
that there are great powers, whose policy is a
systematic intermeddling with smaller states,
and that the most complete despots are the
most reckless revolutionists. Is it for them to
upbraid us with our unprincipled interventions ?
Such a reproach comes somewhat strangely from
the mouth of an Austrian politician. No nation
has carried the principle of intervention to such
an extent as Austria ; she is not satisfied with
offering advice ; she is not satisfied with threat-

INTRODUCTION. 1 7
ening ; she is ever throwing her sword into the
scale, in her dealing with the small states of the
Italian peninsula. Her policy is a mere armed
intervention : she decides all her disputes by the
hand of power.
There is a wide difference between the moral
influence of England and the unscrupulous mili
tary occupations ofthe Continental Powers. The
admonitions which English statesmen have from
time to time given to our humbler allies, have
not been interested. It is from no selfish regard
to the interests of England, but from a desire to
see more attention paid to the dictates of justice
and mercy, that our ministers have expressed
their sentiments. Such advice is, of course,
odious to those who pride themselves in making
the will of the sovereign the only law of govern
ment. It is natural that these two opposite
principles should clash. As long as the state of
the Continent is as it is, and England remains
as she is, it is idle to suppose that this country
can ever be a pleasing object of contemplation
to governments that were once supposed to be
our cordial allies. The very existence of Eng
land is an intervention with arbitrary power.
This influence cannot be destroyed, except by
sinking our island beneath the seas that roll
c

18 INTRODUCTION.
around us. It does not depend on our states
men, nor on the mere form of our government.
A country enjoying the blessings of peace, law,
order, and liberty, must ever have a greater
weight in the nations of the world than one
distracted by civil war, oppressed by the armed
heel of tyranny, and regarding its rulers as its
greatest enemies ; a country possessing bound
less wealth, mighty resources, and an overflow
ing commerce, must naturally be superior to one
full of bankruptcy, discontent, and ruin. It is
the triumph of freedom over despotism, riches
over poverty, justice over injustice.
Nor is this the first time that it has been the
peculiar blessing of England to be called by the
infinite wisdom of Providence, in times of dark
ness and disorder, to exert the same beneficent
influence on the civilisation of the world. Nor
is this the first time that unscrupulous rulers
have reaped what they have sown, and then
have blamed the seasons and nature, and every
thing but themselves. Man is now what he has
always been; and the operations of cause and
effect are just what they ever were. If we
would see the seed time of the present discon
tents, anarchy, and military usurpations, we
must examine the deeds of the Congress of

INTRODUCTION. 19
Vienna. If we would see the results of inter
vention, and of non-intervention, we must cast
a rapid glance at the history of the last two
centuries. Then the way will be clear to follow
with precision the march of events during this
generation. An ancient moral will assume a
new form. Great truths are ever old ; delusive
paradoxes only are new.

c 2

20 FOREIGN POLICY.

CHAPTEE I.
A HISTORICAL EETKOSPECT. — FOREIGN POLICY OF ELIZA
BETH AND OF CROMWELL.  FIRST AND SECOND PARTITIONS
OF POLAND  THE STRUGGLE AGAINST NAPOLEON.
We have before now had an enemy making
use of fanaticism as an ally, declaring him
self the champion of the orthodox faith, and
endeavouring by this means to grasp at uni
versal dominion. It may be well for us to re
member how our ancestors have acted in times
much more dangerous than ours, and when they
faced a despot much more formidable. A direct
attack was made on their national independence;
the conquest of England was openly attempted;
the means of resistance were not a twentieth
part of what they are at this day. Then, as
now, Europe was torn by dissensions ; then, as
now, England was ruled by a female sovereign.
We are still proud of the reign of Elizabeth ;
the hearts of Englishmen throb when they re
member their virgin Queen. The foreign policy

FOREIGN POLICY OF ELIZABETH. 21
of her long reign was the wisest, the most glo
rious, the most triumphant in the whole range
of the English annals. It ought ever to be held
in remembrance by our statesmen ; it deserves
especially the attention of those who set them
selves resolutely to preach the doctrine of non
intervention. Never before was the name of
England so much respected, never was her in
fluence so great abroad, never did she place
herself so gallantly between the tyrant and his
prey. Nor was this policy adopted through any
romantic notions. It was the simple law of
self-preservation. Our great princess wisely
saw that her own glory, and even the existence
of her kingdom, were inseparably associated
with the prosperity of all Protestant states who
were endangered by the intrigues and the arms
of Philip the Second.
It requires little imagination to find a certain
resemblance between the Spanish Emperor who
was the enemy of Queen Elizabeth, and the
Russian Emperor who is now the enemy of
Queen Victoria. Philip the Second was a consum
mate hypocrite, and his hypocrisy was disguised
under the appearance of a zeal for orthodoxy.
No power could trust to his professions. He
prided himself on using for his purposes his
credulous admirers, who supposed that the reli-
c 3

22 FOREIGN POLICY.
gious maxims which were ever on his lips must
have some effect on his conduct. Europe was
in his day divided into two great parties; the one
struggling for religious freedom, and the other
fanatically bent on keeping all the world under
its dominion. By assuming the leadership of
the Roman Catholic party, Philip made every
enthusiastic devotee of the ancient faith a poli
tical instrument by which he endeavoured to
overturn the thrones of his neighbours, and
extend his own authority.
England was placed in direct antagonism to
Spain. The wise statesmen who surrounded
the English throne were not afraid of being
called revolutionists and agitators ; they pro
ceeded systematically to support their religious
brethren in every part of Europe. In the
Netherlands, in Scotland, in France, wherever
people were resisting oppression, or conscien
tiously struggling for their religious liberties,
the protecting hand of England was seen. Such
calm wisdom, united with such determined
energy, is unexampled in our history. The
achievements of Burleigh and his grave col
leagues dwarf all the diplomatic feats which
have ever received the applause of parliaments.
England knew how to do good and avoid evil,
how to hold her own amid all the convulsions of

FOREIGN POLICY OF ELIZABETH. 23
that distracted time. Parsimonious and cau
tious as EHzabeth was by disposition, at a great
conjuncture she rose to a height of moral
heroism which to the degenerate politicians of
later ages must seem incredible.
Her conduct, when the sovereignty of the
Low Countries was offered to her, admirably
illustrates her foreign policy. Her ablest minis
ters trembled ; she was warned not to succour
rebels; the cause of all sovereigns was repre
sented to her as being the same ; a holy alliance
was by some considered advisable. Ireland was
in a worse condition than even in 1797. The
English were a divided nation. The fleet was in
significant, and there was no regular army. An
atterapt to succour the Flemings was certain to
involve Elizabeth in immediate hostilities with
the mighty power of Philip. Having carefully
calculated all the consequences, she decided on
rejecting the allegiance of the Flemings, but
also on giving them at once assistance. The
effect of this magnanimous resolution is well
known. Philip was braved, his Armada de
stroyed, and PloUand called into existence.
When the balance of power was again disturbed
by another overbearing monarch, the Dutch were
our most faithful allies ; they gave to us a sove
reign whose genius for foreign policy was only
c 4

24 FOREIGN POLICY.
inferior to that of Elizabeth ; and England rose
to be the first power in the world. This
was the fruit of that generous policy which
took for its basis the principle of intervention.
The result was entirely beneficial: by protecting
others, we secured the greatness of ourselves ;
we felt that every power was interested in the
great battle for religious liberty ; and that
England had an illustrious duty to perform
in the great commonwealth of nations. What
would have been the effect of an opposite
policy? Had Philip been allowed to give the
law to Europe, had the brave Flemings been
subdued, and the Roman Catholic religion firmly
established in Spain, France, and the Low
Countries, the next step would have been to
invade Scotland and Ireland. What would then
have become of the civil and religious freedom
of England ?
It has been ably shown, that the warfare
between Protestantism and Catholicism in the
sixteenth century has now taken another form,
and is seen in the conflict between consti
tutionalism and absolutism. This analogy was
first pointed out by Burke ; it was carried still
further by Sir James Mackintosh, and it has
been eloquently illustrated by Mr. Macaulay.
The spirit of the two eras is essentially the

FOREIGN POLICY OF ELIZABETH. 25
same. The social condition of France is not
unlike what it was in the age of Henry the
Fourth ; and it will be well for that gallant
nation, if some portion of the spirit of the glorious
Prince of Navarre shall be displayed in the per
son of her present ruler. The English alliance
was of the greatest benefit to the French nation
when it was slowly recovering frora that dis
astrous civil war which had so long laid the
country desolate. The English alliance may now
be of the greatest benefit to the French nation as
it is breathing from the long struggle between
political factions which have made a constitutional
government almost impossible. Because Henry
the Fourth was faithful to Queen Elizabeth, he
saw himself securely seated on the throne. If
the Emperor Louis Napoleon be faithful to
Queen Victoria, he may transmit his empire to
his descendants, reconcile the friends of liberty
to his administration, unite the glories of his
uncle with the virtues of Henry the Fourth, and
leave a name more illustrious than that of any
conqueror or any hereditary sovereign. That
France became prosperous, that Henry the Fourth
triumphed over all his difficulties, was due in a
great measure to Elizabeth, and her spirited in
tervention. She gave her money readily to her
French ally ; and,^ sparing as she was of the blood

26 FOREIGN POLICY.
of her subjects, she willingly equipped English
battalions in his cause. This was true policy, as
all wise intervention must be. As Henry grew
powerful, Elizabeth's inveterate enemy Philip of
Spain gradually grew weaker, and Holland rose
into importance. The Queen was not, however,
satisfied with merely giving liberty to the Dutch,
or of vanquishing her proud and haughty
antagonist. She was wise and circumspect;
and anxiously wished to unite all the seventeen
provinces of the Netherlands into a powerful
republic, that might have been a rampart to
the ambition of both Spain and France. Before
this noble design could be matured, our great
princess died ; and with her departed her lofty
policy, and much of the English glory.
The two princes of the House of Stuart, who
succeeded Elizabeth, had neither her generous
patriotism nor magnanimity. It was not from
a succession of favourites like Somerset and
Buckingham that a wise and dignified foreign
policy could be expected. As soon as the nations
ceased to fear, they began to despise, the name of
England ; and from the time of EHzabeth to the
time of William the Third, our kings were only
in name English sovereigns. The foreign policv
of the great Protector is now a hackneyed theme
of eulogy. It is indeed surprising to see with

FOREIGN POLICY OF CROMWELL. 27
how little trouble our country rose from the state
of imbecility into which it had fallen, to be again
regarded as the foremost European power. This
latent force is always inherent in the nation ; all
that is ever necessary is the spirit to call it forth,
and the hand to wield it. It is only requisite for
an English king to respect himself, that he may
be respected throughout the world. The two
first Georges had neither the genius of Elizabeth,
of Cromwell, nor of William the Third ; but they
knew how to assert their dignity ; and the country
never again sank into the former state of
weakness which seemed natural to it while the
Stuarts were on the throne. The fact is un
deniable that every sovereign in our history of
whora we are proud, has firmly and courageously
administered the foreign policy of the country.
When George the Third came to the throne he
resolved to be peaceful and conciliating. Tlie
old system of foreign policy was abandoned, and
the consequences soon began to develope them
selves. The greatest crime in modern history
was perpetrated, and from the effect of that
crime we and all Europe are still suffering. It
would not be difficult to show that most of the
wretchedness and turbulence of this generation,
the formidable aggrandisement of Russia, and
all the evils we are now called upon to resist,

28 FOREIGN POLICY.
sprung from the first partition of Poland in 1772.
Our ministers ought never to be forgiven for
their culpable blindness and apathy while that
iniquity was in progress. The sins of the fathers
have indeed been visited upon the children. We
should not now with France be at war in
defence of Turkey, had we wisely intervened
with France in defence of Poland seventy-eight
years ago. The peace of the world might have
been preserved, the principles of public law
might have been asserted, and the American
war might have been avoided, by opposing with
resolution that shameful spoliation of the oldest
European nation.
We have seen the consequences of intervention,
and we may now look around and see the conse
quences of non-intervention. The most bitter
thought attending the consciousness of our
neglect is that we did not err from ignorance.
The inevitable disasters which have resulted from
that enormity were all foretold. In the Annual
Register for that very year 1772, a most im
pressive warning came from the pen of Edmund
Burke; and it is melancholy to contrast his
earnest and emphatic language with the feeble
sentences of the King's speech on the meeting of
Parliament. * The ministers in their profound
* Nineteen years after the first partition of Poland,

FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND. 29
wisdom deemed the partition of Poland unworthy
of notice in the address from the throne. With
this indifference so plainly exemplified, it is
astonishing to find Count Ficquelmont gravely
accusing us of having been the principal cause
of that partition. We are acting now, he says, to
Turkey, as we formerly acted to Poland, and
England, not Russia, will subvert the Turkish
Empire. The manner in which this extraor
dinary assertion is made out is curious.
The interests of the Greek religionists was the
plea of the Empress Catherine for the first occu
pation, and the subsequent partition, of Poland;
just as the Emperor Nicholas has under the same
pretences interfered in the affairs of Turkey, and
endeavoured to bring about its overthrow. The
tactics are precisely similar ; and it says little for
the sagacity of diplomatists, that the second ma-
Burke still firmly repeated his emphatic condemnation of
that infamous deed. He said, that weak and careless as the
French ministry was in the last days of Louis the Fifteenth,
he had peculiar means of knowing that had our government
been prepared, in 1772, to interpose in order to prevent the
partition of Poland, France would have united with England
in the cause. There is, then, no excuse for the English
Cabinet. Burke visited France immediately after the con
summation of this iniquity, and spoke of what he had
personally learned in mixing with French politicians of
every description, and frora conversing with the French
ministers.

30 FOREIGN POLICY.
noeuvre has nearly been as successful as the first.
In the last century, the great majority of the
Poles were Roman Catholics, and it cannot be
denied that for a long while they had grievously
oppressed their fellow-countrymen, who, under
the name of Dissidents, had, by express stipu
lation, a right to every privilege of free citizens.
The injured Poles formed themselves into con
federacies, and after the diet of 1764, in which
the Roman Catholic majority, more outrageously
than ever, violated the treaty of Oliva, they
asked for the mediation of the powers who
guaranteed that arrangement. The ambassadors
of Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, presented me
morials in their favour ; and because England
did the same. Count Ficquelmont accuses this
country of having really been the cause of the
nefarious proceedings of the sovereigns who
afterwards divided Poland. The logic of this is
truly wonderful. England was bound to pro
test against the violation of that treaty when
directly appealed to, by those in, whose interest
some of its important provisions were made.
But what connection the mild and judicious
memorial of our minister, Mr. Wroughton, had
with that shocking outrage of all law and justice
six years afterwards, it is impossible to imagine.
All that England can be blamed for, is that she

FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND. 31
supposed Russia and Prussia really were sincere
in their remonstrances, and believed them to
have had the interests of the Dissidents at heart.
But the fact is, Frederic and Catherine cared
nothing for Greeks, Calvinists, or Lutherans.
The welfare of the religionists was a mere
pretence ; what these sovereigns wanted, as the
event clearly showed, was political power. The
Russian troops surrounded Warsaw ; resolu
tions were dictated by the Russian ambassadors,
and transmitted to Moscow for the approval of
the Empress. Thus the influence of Russia
became firmly established ; her armies inter
sected the country, and measures were gra
dually taken for facilitating the direct blow
which was about to be struck at the national
existence of Poland.
It is certainly true, as Count Ficquelmont
alleges, that Austria was not the principal agent
in the first partition. There can be no doubt,
that on this occasion, as on others, she was
compelled by her two powerful neighbours to
become the participator in their crimes. Austria
has always been the reluctant assistant in the
designs of Russian aggrandisement. But this by
no means renders her conduct justifiable, or even
excusable. All who shared in the spoils of the
partition must bear their portion of the guilt.

32 FOREIGN POLICY.
The manner in which Austria acted, was per-
haps the worst of the three confederates in evil.
For she professed to be the friend of Poland ; it
was under the mask of friendship that she occu
pied those provinces; and a very short while
before the act of partition was declared, the
Empress Queen wrote letters to the King of
Poland, full of friendly assurances, and the most
solemn promises never to rob him of any of his
dominions. Frederic and Catherine might be
considered open foes, but the blackness of
Austria was doubly dyed ; for she was trea
cherous and cowardly. She saw well the con
sequences of the deed. She knew that what
ever might be her present gain, she was certain
of ultimate loss ; for Poland was the natural, and
might have been the insurmountable, barrier of
Germany against Russia, and when that was
removed, the way was clear for the despot of
the North to advance his legions to the banks of
the Rhine. What made the folly of Austria
still more apparent, was that the designs of the
Russians upon Turkey were at that time publicly
avowed, and the weakness of the Ottoman Em
pire plainly demonstrated. It was during that
very year, while Catherine was dictating terms
to Turkey, grasping at the Crimea and at the
absolute control of the Black Sea, that Austria

SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND. 33
submitted to assist her in partitioning Poland.
No policy was ever more infatuated. And can
Count Ficquelmont think, that because the first
design of the partition did not come from the
Court of Vienna, that his country is absolved
from the guilt in which she participated, and by
which, while seemingly acquiring additional ter
ritories, she lost so much positive strength ? In
this case, as in others, indeed, where Russia has
been concerned, Austria has frequently erred, not
so much from a desire of doing wrong, as from
a fear of doing right. Russia and Prussia have
generally joined together; and then Austria has
been dragged with them. This was seen at the
first partition of Poland ; it was seen as clearly
at the second ; it was seen still more openly at
the Congress of Vienna.
The second partition of Poland was even more
shameless than the first, for it was made, as the
present attack on Turkey has been made, for the
express purpose of preventing reform. King
Stanislaus Augustus had just given the Poles a
constitution, which Burke has immortalised in
his Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs.
The most violent abuses had been remedied ;
order established ; the exorbitant privileges of
the nobles abandoned ; legislatorial chambers
instituted ; a fair prospect, such as made Burke
D

34 ' FOREIGN POLICY.
exult for the future of Poland, seemed dawning.
And what was the consequence ? The rapacity
and jealousy of Russia were roused, and at the
very moment when the crowned heads affected
such horror of the atrocious deeds of the French
republicans, a new treaty of partition was signed.
Six weeks after they had virtually dethroned the
King of Poland, interfered with his legal rights,
and occupied his territories, the famous procla
mation of the Duke of Brunswick was issued, in
which he asserted that the pious allies were in
march to arrest the strokes levelled at the throne
of France, to subdue the excesses of faction, and
to restore legitimate authority. It was natural
that such a declaration should have been con
sidered hypocritical. It was natural that the
allied sovereigns should have been suspected of
meditating the partition of France. Such an
alliance could not be expected to prosper: its
failure was inevitable. The humiliation of
Prussia, the defeat of her armies, and her pu
sillanimous desertion of what she represented as
the cause of sovereigns, were the consequences
of her conduct to unhappy Poland.
There was no pretence of the interests of the
Greek subjects of King Stanislaus Augustus
being attacked, when this second outrage was
committed. These blasphemous vindicators of

SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND. 35
monarchical authority kept no terms with the
rest of mankind. Their interference was ex
pressly to subvert a constitution ; thus the
struggle between despots and constitutions had
already begun. Catherine of Russia placed her
self at the head of the absolutism of Europe, and
was then as ever firmly seconded by her faithful
aUy, Frederic William of Prussia. At this
time, as in 1772, the Russians were decidedly
victorious over Turkey. The fate of the Otto
man Empire was then in the balance, and for
the first time we behold the English ministry
awakened to the necessity of rescuing Constan
tinople from the hands of Russia. Mr. Pitt
stirred up the old jealousy between Austria and
Prussia, and by his interposition the triumphant
legions were stopped in their victorious march.
But Mr. Pitt did not discern the intimate con
nection that there has ever been between Turkey
and Poland. He did not see that it was useless
to stop the advance of Russia in the south, if
she were allowed to proceed unimpeded in the
west. He did not see that to rescue Turkey, it
was necessary to save Poland. All the calam
ities of this century might have been avoided,
had there been a powerful constitutional mon
archy at Warsaw, relying for its independence,
not on treaties, but on the irapetuous blood of

36 FOREIGN POLICY.
Sarmatia. And such there might have been.
The materials were abundant, they were even
taking the form of vitality, when the unscru
pulous hand of Catherine rent them asunder,
and she gorged her voracious appetite with the
remains. The hour of the dismemberment of
Turkey has been that of the dismemberment of
Poland. As they have fallen together, so ought
they to rise together.
We yet feel the effect of Mr. Pitt's great
error. He thought the continental sovereigns
as disinterested as England in their inten
tions on taking up arms. The consequences
were soon seen. England had scarcely aban
doned her neutrality, her troops had not yet
joined the allied powers, when Prussia began to
make terms for herself with France, and her
armies were weakened on the Rhine, that she
might get her full share of the spoils on the
Vistula. The war against revolutionary France
never was a war of alliance. England was the
only power heartily earnest in the cause. Prus
sia, Russia, and Austria had each selfish objects
to attain ; instead of avenging the crimes of
Robespierre and Danton, they were intent on
ccro.mitting crimes of their own. While they
were reprobating the annexation of Avio-non
and the two cities of the Comptat to the French

STRUGGLE AGAINST NAPOLEON. 37
territories, two of them were eager to annex a
great kingdom to their own dominions ; and the
other, therefore, resolved to indemnify herself
by adding the places taken during the war, to
her empire. The truth cannot be denied:
the monarchs were as bad as the republicans ;
hence the miseries of Europe ; hence the blood
shed, the follies, the crimes of three generations.
The lax political morality was indeed epidemical.
Napoleon was certainly not worse than Cathe
rine, Frederic William, or Ijcopold. It is im
possible for Englishmen to sympathise with the
heartlessness of the sovereigns with whom it
was the misfortune of this country to be allied.
They were always ready to join France in those
rapacious actions which we have been taught to
abominate. The secularisation, or in reality,
the confiscation, of the ecclesiastical states of
Germany, was as shameful an action as any that
the raost inveterate enemies of kings ever com
mitted. This was the work of Prussia. The
most atrocious of Napoleon's deeds was his
treachery to Venice, and the division of her
possessions. This was perpetrated in conjunc
tion with Austria, who thus acquired the power
of oppression in Italy, which has been so well
exercised even up to the present day. Who can
regret the disasters of Jena and Austerlitz ?
i> 3

38 FOREIGN POLICY.
We can but be indignant that England was ever
the abused ally of such unprincipled powers,
and admire at least the abilities of our most
determined foe. However great were the sacri
fices England made, however enormous was the
wealth which she threw broadcast over the Con
tinent, the sovereigns of Europe acted almost
invariably as though no such thing as a reci
procal obligation could ever exist. Such has
been the treatment which this country has ever
received from the governments which arrogate
to themselves the exclusive title of the Three
Great Powers.
The grief and disappointment of Burke when
he saw in what the alliance his eloquence had so
powerfully excited was terminating, is weU
known. His bitter irony against the allies is as
frequent as his energetic declamation against the
republicans. He saw the future that was im
pending over Europe. He saw that the madness
of governraents was as bad as the recklessness
of the Jacobins. His last years were saddened,
because he was convinced that he had thought
better of kings and eraperors than they de
served, and the consciousness of the terrible
chastisement they would receive, haunted his
last hours. Such was the end of all those
bright hopes, those eloquent and ardent pic-

STRUGGLE AGAINST NAPOLEON. 39
tures of society, that lofty and comprehensive
wisdom which so highly distinguished this great
man. He was right even when his views
seemed most erroneous. Had there been any
real virtue in the courts to which he appealed,
Europe might have been saved, and a great
constitutional monarchy established in France,
before all the traditions of ancient glory had
been forgotten, and all loyalty to the Bourbon
dynasty hopelessly extinguished. As it was,
the allied sovereigns were never truly respected
by Frenchmen, because it was clearly seen that
what they wanted to set up in that illustrious
nation, was a viceroy of their own. The re
storation of a Bourbon dynasty looking for
support, not to France but to Russia, Austria,
and Prussia, was an impossibility. But this
was what was projected, and it consequently
failed. The armies of the despotic monarchs never
conquered the French emperor. It was the
patriotisra, the nationality of the multitude
which on being at length roused, drove Napoleon
from his throne, and trampled the tricolor in the
dust. It must be confessed that if Napoleon
overran Europe, if he dictated terras to every
continental state, if he violated the laws of
nature and of nations, the criraes iraputed to
D 4

40 FOREIGN POLICY.
him were shared by at least three of his great
antagonists. They made him powerful; they
made hira an eraperor ; and had it depended only
upon them, he might have been a powerful
emperor still.
We now know that all the appeals to pa
triotism and nationality, made by the alHes when
they commenced their final struggle against the
French emperor, were as insincere as that devo
tion to the cause of religion and order, so loudly
professed in their former manifestoes against the
French republic. Like the unfortunate Margaret
of Anjou in Shakspeare's Richard the Third, or
like the Fates in Greek tragedy, the figure of
Poland cannot, by any artifice or crime, be pre
vented from disturbing the visions of power and
dominion in which the tyrants of modern
Europe would indulge ; and the spectre of a
noble nation cowardly murdered haunts them to
their doom. We may well tremble when we
look back through so many stormy years^ and
trace the terrible evils which have sprung from
that great public crime ; and on seeing the
retributive punishment which impends over the
titled descendants of those who perpetrated that
iniquity, we may humbly and piously recognise
the justice of Heaven.

STRUGGLE AGAINST NAPOLEON. 41
As it was the desire to share in the spoils of
Poland which first neutralised the forces of the
raonarchs who fought against the republic of
France ; so it was the question of Poland
which nearly made Russia, Prussia, and Austria
disagree while the Congress of Vienna was
sitting, and which certainly prevented that paci
fication of Europe from having any prospect of
permanence. How little adversity had taught
wisdom to the allies may be seen from one sig
nificant fact : even before Napoleon had been
vanquished, and while the fortune of war was
still doubtful, a secret treaty was signed at
Reichenbach between the three Powers by which
Poland was divided into three equal parts. But
at the Congress of Vienna, it appeared that even
the proverbial honesty which freebooters are not
shameless enough to disregard when they share
the produce of their knavery, did not influence
the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, who de
liberately violated their solemn engagement to
Austria, and set the treaty at nought. As it
was in the beginning, so it was to the end.

42 FOREIGN POLICY.

CHAP. II.
THE CONGRESS OP VIENNA.
The conduct of the champions of order and
legality at the Congress of Vienna was as selfish
and unscrupulous as the worst actions of Napo
leon. On whichever side of the map of Europe
we may cast our eyes, we shall find reason for
amazeraent at the work of diploraatie wisdom
commenced at Vienna in 1814. The great con
queror had been overthrown, legitimacy had at
length triumphed, and it was now to be seen
how the rights of established governraents were
to be vindicated.
One great principle, and only one, can be dis
cerned in all the labours of monarchs and their
plenipotentiaries at that memorable epoch. It
was distinctly proclaimed that might was omni
potent over right ; that all international law was
abrogated ; that the weaker states of Europe
were abandoned to the mercy of their stronger
neighbours. Monarchical selfishness here reached
its climax; an impassible barrier between go
vernments and their subjects was estabhshed;

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 43
they were understood to have no common in
terest, no coraraon right. The most important
stipulations of the Congress were dictated at the
point of the sword by those very sovereigns who
had so severely suffered by the sword, and
henceforth it was the sword, and the sword only,
that was to govern. Nothing could be plainer.
Even the proprieties of deliberation were not
maintained ; the great raen who met in Congress
thought themselves so far above the rest of man
kind that they would not even condescend to be
hypocrites. When the Emperor Alexander in
sisted, in opposition to Austria and England, on
appropriating alraost the whole of Poland, what
reason did he give ? "I have three hundred
thousand raen under arras," he said; and this
proved, especially when he was supported by his
good friend the King of Prussia, to be a most
weighty and sufficient reason. After this, could
it be affirmed with truth that Europe had reco
vered its freedom ? Who could rejoice at the
overthrow of the military tyrant who was at least
a hero and a genius ?
Russia did not drive Napoleon from his throne ;
nor ought she to have been permitted to take
the lion's share of his spoils. There was much
talk of gratitude for the deliverance of Europe ;
but there was no gratitude due to the Cossack.
In the darkest hour of modern Europe, when

44 FOREIGN POLICY.
Austria and Prussia were both subjugated, and
England alone, with that dogged obstinacy which
is so characteristic of the nation, carried on the
war, the patriotic Czar was ready to take from
Prussia and Austria their acquisitions in Poland.
At that terrible moment Russia was the humble
ally of France ; and only roused herself to resist
the French Emperor when it became evident
that he was bent on dragging her to his foot
stool. Even then it was not Russia, but Nature
and the treachery of his allies, that defeated the
conqueror of the world. At the commencement
of the French revolutionary war Catherine broke
the strength of the alliance by her designs on
Poland, and was the cause of their subsequent
misfortunes. And, again in the last treraendous
conflict on the plains of Waterloo, the Russian
legions were far away when the fate of Europe
was decided.
But it is certain that gratitude to Russia was
the cant of arabassadors at the Congress of
Vienna; yet she obtained nothing from grati
tude ; all that she acquired was by force. For
the spoils of Saxony the King of Prussia sup
ported the claims of Alexander; thus the
Russian power was established beyond the Vis
tula, and the independence of Continental Europe
was but a name. To every man capable of re
flection, to every man who could take long views,

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 45
it was as certain as any matheraatical deraon
stration that this settleraent was only moraentary.
The seeds of worse evils were sown by the state
physicians who had undertaken to cure the fear
ful raalady which had so long convulsed society.
If one potentate raore than another was vitally
interested in resisting the claims of Russia to
the grand duchy of Warsaw, it was that so
vereign who supported thera. The King of
Prussia was really laying his own dominions
open to the Czar, and through them all Germany,
by supporting Alexander's pretensions. From
that moment the Plouse of HohenzoUern be
came the vassal of the Roraanoffs. Of all coun
tries Prussia is the most completely destitute
of natural defences. Whenever hostilities com-
raence on the side of France, her provinces on
the left bank of the Rhine raust fall into the
power of an invader. When she is threatened
on the side of Russia, her territory on the right
bank of the Vistula must suffer the same fate.
Even in a time of peace, Konigsberg belongs
in fact more to Russia than to herself. But
when the Muscovite dominion was fully esta
blished at Warsaw and extended as far as Kalisch,
the strong line of natural defence forraed by the
Vistula was completely broken. Thus Prussia
being left absolutely defenceless, is ever compelled

46 FOREIGN POLICY.
to keep an immense army on a war footing;
other powers follow her example, and a heavy
draw on the resources of the Continental States
is by this means maintained. Though Berlin is
situated between the Elbe and the Oder, it is only
below Breslau that the Oder offers any obstacle
to an invader, and the capital of a great monar
chy is almost at the mercy of an eneray from the
East. If the dictates of justice were to be disregarded,
if nothing but temporary expediency was to
prevail, if Poland was for ever to be extin
guished as a nation, it would have been far better
for Prussia to have possessed that ancient re
public than Russia ; for by that raeans the in
fluence of the Czar over Western Europe might
have been securely barred. But such conside
rations were neglected ; Europe was to be de
livered, and France and England were to evince
their gratitude to Russia in the manner we now
witness. It would seem that the Germans, with their
blind confidence in the Czar, never ima
gined that the day might come when he would
be their enemy. Austria is almost as defence
less in her frontier as Prussia. Olmutz in
Moravia, and Leopoldstadt in Hungary, are the
first fortified places on which an Austrian army

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 47
can fall back, in the event of hostilities with
Russia. The natural defences indeed, such as the
strong mountain range which seems to protect
the heart of the Austrian empire, might be
an irresistible rampart, when defended by a
brave and patriotic people. But alas, that the
Machiavellian counsels of the Czar should ever
have been listened to, so that even the glorious
watchword of Hungary, " Moriamur pro rege
nostro Maria Theresa," cannot now be expected
to pass frora lip to lip when the day of Austrian
necessity shall dawn !
Europe may never recover frora the effects of
that great abandonment of his duty to hiraself,
to Germany, and to Western Europe, of which
the King of Prussia was then guilty. The
proud and noble German nation was at that tirae
curbed, and we see too well that it has not yet
freed itself frora the bit. Of Austria it raay be
said with sorae truth, that she has too often been
the victim of circumstances ; but for Prussia
there is no excuse. Gross injustice to Poland
was indeed poorly compensated by gross injus
tice to Saxony. Prussia should have looked for
allies to the west, and not to the north-east.
Those north-eastern winds are ever cold and
blighting ; while they prevail, the lovely flowers
of freedom and civilisation can never thrive.

48 FOREIGN POLICY.
Russia has been the only gainer in the long
rivalry between Austria and Prussia. From
this narrow-minded and unworthy antagonism
the loss to Germany has been incalculable.
When Austria was at length obliged to acquiesce
in the dismemberment of Saxony, she anxiously
insisted that Dresden should not become a
strong fortress, lest her Bohemian frontier
might be endangered. This demand the Em
peror Alexander thought natural and proper:
of course he did ; for while apparently securing
Austria from Prussia, it weakened the defence of
Germany on the Elbe. The more the treaties
signed at the Congress of Vienna are examined,
the more clearly does it appear that Russia was
the only power to which they were an unmixed
good. The policy of Prussia and Austria was most
foolish ; its injustice was even more repre
hensible ; the excuses made for the partition of
Saxony by the one, and the annexation of Lom
bardy and Venice by the other, are miserable
sophistries. It Avas said that the King of Saxony
had adhered to Napoleon's fortunes, and was
consequently to be dealt with as an enemy, as
though aU the Three Great Powers had not till
very lately worshipped the star of the French
Emperor, and only deserted him when it was

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 49
falling from its sphere ; and as though the. King
of Saxony could be considered a free agent,
when his person and his capital were both in
Napoleon's power. These apologies for injustice
are as insulting to the understanding, as they
are shocking to the moral feelings. In plain
words, the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia
was another partition of Poland, and the junc
tion of Lombardy and Venice with Austria was
a still further aggravation of the wrongs done
by the treaty of Campo Forraio. While in
dustriously subverting all the works of Buona
parte, the high contracting parties at the Con
gress of Vienna scrupulously took care to iraitate
his criraes.
France appeared at the Congress as a sorrow
ing Magdalen. Victory, so long her constant
companion, had at length deserted her, and she
stood with shame and contrition among the
representatives of her foes. But she was France
still. Broken, humbled, defeated, dismayed, she
was still, and could not be other than, a noble
nation. She was raore to be respected in
her fall, than sorae of her eneraies in their day
of triumph. All of thera but one had crouched
in the dust before her ; none of thera singly had
vanquished her ; it had tasked the united efforts
of Europe to withstand her ; there she stood,

50 FOREIGN POLICY.
silent, unpitied, exhausted, but with the warm
blood StiU at her heart, the old fire in her eye,
and the proud consciousness of undying glory
on her brow.
The future now began to be foreshadowed. It
is not difficult to discover in the whispered objec
tions France ventured to make to some of the
ambitious projects entertained by Russia and
Prussia, an approach to the alliance with
England which was in succeeding years to be
fully established. After the battle of Waterloo,
an intiraate union of the two Western powers
becarae a great political necessity. The allied
governraents boasted much about their gene
rosity in allowing France to remain in the con
dition in which she was in 1789. But her
position was not, and could not be, the same as
on the eve of the revolution. The whole face of
Europe was changed ; and the relative position
of France had materially altered. It might
have been seen clearly that the annihilation of
Poland had upset the ancient balance of Europe;
and that at this very Congress, it was not our
nearest neighbour whom we had most to dread.
Even Russia, systeraatic in everything, was not
prepared to consent to the partition of France;
for Alexander saw well that the King of Prussia
might thus be metamorphosed from a most de-

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 51
voted friend into a most formidable adversary.
Powerless as France then was, and dependent
as was her king on the alHed sovereigns, it
ought not to be forgotten that she resisted as
much as was in her power the injuries done to
Saxony, to Genoa, and to Norway.
But it is of England that the patriotic citizens
of those much wronged countries have most
reason to complain. The individual who con
ducted our negotiations at Vienna is now no
more ; the great warrior to whom the triumph
of the European despots was principally owing
has also departed ; the arrangeraent contem
plated by the Congress has been almost in every
respect unsettled : it can now serve no purpose
either of ministers or of leaders of opposition
to conceal the truth. It is then the painful
but iraperative duty of the historian and the
philosopher to declare loudly that the treaties to
which the broad seal of England was affixed at
the Congress of Vienna, were most dishonourable
to the nation, and to the statesman who repre
sented the English Government. These treatises
are indeed indefensible : the object which they
professed to accomplished was not attained ;
Europe was not tranquillised ; the progress of re
volution was not checked ; it was even provoked
and encouraged by such wicked compacts. How
E 2

52 FOREIGN POLICY.
indeed could it be otherwise ? This agreemeni
was in the strictest sense revolutionary ; estab
lished rights were even more unscrupulously
violated than by the Jacobins of 1793 ; every
sentiment of patriotism and nationality was
outraged ; nothing but the selfish interests of
three great monarchies was respected. Even the
healing influence of Time, that sooner or later
alleviates the injustice inflicted by raan, has not
rendered the stipulations of the peace less re
volting. Turn where we raay, the wounds then
given are still green ; prescription has not sanc
tified those incongruous unions ; the progress of
forty years has not raade them venerable. The
treaties made " In the name of the raost holy and
undivided Trinity " at Vienna, reraain accursed
both by God and raan.
England had taken no part in either the first
or the second partition of Poland ; until 1814 her
hands were stainless. It was only in the raoment
of victory, after Providence had blessed her arms
with such unparalleled success, that she con
sented to be the accomplice in evil deeds for the
sake of winning the applause of the despotic
courts. She gained nothing herself by those
measures ; but she ought to have prevented them ;
most certainly she ought not to have co-operated
in them. She should even have braved the

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 53
menace of Alexander ; she should have had the
courage, in the cause of justice and humanity, to
defy the united legions of Prussia and Russia.
Nothing is ever gained by littleness in great
affairs. We may depend upon it, that had her
voice been earnestly raised against the dis
memberment of Saxony, the annihilation of
Poland, and the union of Norway with Sweden,
backed as the remonstrances of the English
monarch raust have been by the great English
General, at the head of that gallant host which
he hiraself boasted of being able "to go any
where and do any thing," her appeal would have
been listened to, and the great triuraph at
Waterloo have been surpassed by a still nobler
moral victory. To what a height she must then
have been exalted among the nations ! The
world had a right to expect this duty from her;
and had her representations been of no avail, if
the rights of the weaker were to be so shamefully
sacrificed at Vienna, the least to be expected
from our governraent was that it should have
perceived that an English diplomatist had no
business there.
Yet what after all had England to fear from
those hundred thousands of Russian troops on
which the Czar so confidently relied ? It was
England that had supplied Russia with the
E 3

54 FOREIGN POLICY.
sinews of war. The financial resources of
Alexander were drained, and had it not been
for the seven miUions of English gold which he
received in the two years of 1814 and 1815,
the Russian troops never would have been seen
in the plains of Champagne, never would have
influenced the decisions of the Congress, never
would have threatened the liberties of Europe.
But as long as our ministers could pass the
army and navy estimates, and induce Parliament
to sanction subsidy after subsidy to foreign
powers, they thought that they performed aU
the duties of an enlightened administration.
Great men are not always ready when they
are wanted. England at that time needed
statesmen, and she appeared to have none.
The poHticians who filled the highest offices of
the state had acquired their power from their
ostentatious hatred of the Pope and Napoleon.
This was then considered the whole duty of a
statesman ; this coraprehended all the qualifi
cations for a ruler of mankind. But these
quaHfications, such as they might be, were in
dispensable ; and the consequence was, that the
indignant wisdom of a Mackintosh, a Brougham,
a Horner, a Romilly, was laughed at by the five
hundred ardent Protestants who implicitly con-

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 55
fided in a Castlereagh, a Liverpool, and a Van
sittart. England has won great battles, founded raighty
empires, established a constitutional government
such as has never yet been equalled, produced
the greatest of dramatists and the greatest of
political philosophers; but she has never been
able to negotiate successfully a great, advan
tageous, and glorious peace. Again and again
have the acquisitions of her arms been sacrificed
through the incorapetence of her diploraatists.
At the peace of Utrecht, the triumphs of Marl
borough were rendered fruitless through the dis
honesty of Bolingbroke. At the peace of Paris,
the trophies of Chathara were surrendered by
the Earl of Bute. And now, at the Congress
of Vienna, the political and coraraercial advan
tages of England, dearly purchased as they had
been by six hundred millions of debt, were
abandoned through the weakness and ignorance
of Castlereagh. He doubtless meant well; he
did not act wrong through any sinister motives ;
but he was, from the beginning to the end of
those important conferences, over-reached by
the European sovereigns, and their able but
unscrupulous ministers. He believed that they
were sincere in their professions. He supposed
that they would fulfil the promises they had
£ 4

66 FOREIGN POLICY.
made to their subjects. His vanity was flat
tered by thus meeting on equal terms the great
potentates of the world. Their insidious com
pHments almost turned his head ; and during
his residence at Vienna, he evidently forgot
that he was the minister of a constitutional
monarchy. He thus permitted hiraself to be
entangled in schemes which had nothing but
despotic selfishness to recommend them ; lent the
name of England to those immoral treaties by
which millions of human beings were disposed
of like counters, without the slightest regard to
their feeHngs or interests; and involved this
country so deeply with the worst projects of
absolutism, that her fair fame was tarnished,
and the evils she countenanced incalculable.
He never seems to have reflected that disgrace
ful as some of those arrangements were, they
were more disgraceful to the English minister
who agreed to them, than to those who pro
jected them, and for the simple reason that he
was the minister of a free country, the repre^
sentative of a nation that boasted of its happy
and liberal constitution, the nation that pro
fessed to have done so much for the indepen
dence and freedom of the world.
The fact that England herself acquired vir
tually nothing, and lost much by those treaties.

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 57
does not make the spectacle of our guilt less
odious. England was not even in the elevated
situation of the villain who consents to assist
in nefarious transactions for a consideration.
Lord Castlereagh gloried in the generosity of
his country. Since we had taken the office of
Paymaster General for Europe, some of the
tempting fields of commerce which we had
fairly won might have been opened to us.
But Lord Castlereagh was far above such sor
did notions. Of commercial matters he knew
nothing and cared nothing. It was enough
that Napoleon had been vanquished, that the
Bourbons were once more placed upon the
throne of France, and that the Emperor of
Russia was our very good friend.
But if England chose to exhibit herself as an
example of disinterestedness, she was at least
bound to take care of her allies. Sweden had
been faithful to her in great difficulties. When
Russia declared war against England, in servile
obedience to the coraraands of Napoleon, she
seized upon Finland, as a guarantee of the good
intentions of the Court of Stockholra, and posi
tively refused to acknowledge the neutrality of
Sweden. Now here was a case, in which, if
Lord Castlereagh had had the least claim to
statesmanship or ordinary foresight, or had felt in

58 FOREIGN POLICY.
any degree the obligations of honour, he could not
have shrunk from seeing justice done. Sweden,
even by the acknowledgments of Prussia and
Russia themselves, had deserved well of the allied
sovereigns. The least that she had a right to ex
pect from the Congress of Vienna, and especially
from England, was that Finland should be again
restored to her crown. But her representations
were contemptuously disregarded, and that im
portant province of the Baltic, which belonged
to Sweden by every law of nature and of
nations, by the bonds of race, of religioh, of
glory, and of prescription, was ceded to Russia.
The brave Finlanders were thus given to a
master whom they detested, and, as some com
pensation to Sweden, the British fleet was igno
miniously engaged in forcing the equally brave
Norwegians from the dominion of Denmark
which they loved, that Norway might be given
to Sweden in exchange for Finland. By this
preposterous arrangement, the position of Russia
in the Baltic was strengthened, her less powerful
neighbours more than proportionately weakened ;
and by the acquisition of Finland, she gained
a most valuable supply of daring seamen, who
at once made her navy a formidable rival to
that of England. The Finns, who now
man the Russian ships of the line, cannot be

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 59
despised even by the stoutest sailors, who are
so eager to display their noble qualities amid
the angry waves and the narrow channels of
the Russian coast. Many of our finest ves
sels, and the blood of many of their brave de
fenders, must be sacrificed before Finland can
be taken from Russia, and the irabecile blun
dering of Lord Castlereagh reraedied. This
minister had the most boundless confidence in
the Czar, who so generously perraitted us to
keep the Ionian Islands. We might take them,
and Malta, and be thankful. Lord Castlereagh
felt the raost lively emotions of gratitude. But
the horizon was not altogether free from clouds,
even in that halcyon hour. There had been
a loud outcry about the wrongs of Saxony
and Genoa, from the opposition in the British
Parliament. Our allies were offended at such
plain speaking ; they were indignant that there
should be any corner of the earth in which
the injustice of their actions could be denounced
in open day : Lord Castlereagh had to listen to
many serious remonstrances on this subject, and,
it was said, condescended to make sorae humble
apologies for this presumptuous freedom of his
countrymen. Who could look on such a bril
liant constellation of majesty, and reraain un-
dazzled ? Is it to be wondered at, if the pro-

60 FOREIGN POLICY.
jector of the expedition to Walcheren began
to be somewhat ashamed of being the Foreign
Minister of a merely constitutional monarchy?
Other rainisters were not annoyed by what might
be said of them in Parliament. Other ministers
were not so much compromised by the blunder
ing answers of their colleagues, that they were
obliged to write and teU them not to answer
any questions on foreign policy until their
return. Other ministers had not to face, on
arriving horae, the keen criticism of the Whigs
who could not be silenced, and whom it was
not easy to answer. The blessings of our
excellent constitution decidedly appeared more
and more questionable to Lord Castlereagh the
longer he remained at Vienna, among the dis
tinguished sovereigns and accomplished diplo
matists, who decided on the fate of raen and
nations without hearing a raurraur, and by a
single stroke of the pen.
Still it was necessary, on his return, for him
to take his seat on the rainisterial benches of
the House of Coramons. He courageously
met his opponents face to face, and attempted
to defend negotiations which really admitted
of no defence. Perhaps the most singula^
specimens of logic and oratory preserved even
in the many volumes of Parhamentary Debates

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 61
which now threaten to excite the wonder of
future ages from their rapidly increasing nura
bers, are those speeches of Lord Castlereagh
in support of the treaties which he had so
recently signed. He considered it a sound
and conclusive reply to Sir Jaraes Mackin
tosh's raoral reprobation of the outrage on
Saxony, to declare that " the object was to give
Prussia additional force, and increased popula
tion was that force." This is the reasoning of
plenipotentiaries on the rights of nations ; it is
not surprising that such logic has resulted in
the terrible catastrophes of the last forty years.
But popular leaders are frequently as blind
and reckless as the servants of arbitrary sove
reigns. Even the raerabers of the opposition
did not show theraselves rauch distinguished by
political sagacity. In discussing the new boun
daries of erapires it was France that they kept
constantly in view, and it was France that they
raost professed to fear. If Lord Castlereagh was
to blame in trusting too implicitly in the pro
testations of Alexander, so also were some emi
nent politicians who believed themselves to be
the charapions of national freedom. The Whigs
of that day were not behind the Tories in their
devotion to the Czar. It may perhaps be more
correctly said, that the alliance with Russia

62 FOREIGN POLICY.
received especially the approval of that distin
guished section of the Whigs who followed in
the footsteps of Charles Fox. They reraerabered
how their favourite statesman had so enthusias
tically declared himself in favour of an intimate
union with Russia. They reraerabered the
Ocsakow negotiations. They remembered what
cordial sympathy there had formerly been
between Mr. Fox and the Empress Catherine,
who had placed the bust of the English states
man beside those of Cicero and Demosthenes.
The views which Burke entertained with regard
to the developement of the Russian power were
certainly not held by the hereditary leader of
the Whig aristocracy. They who look atten
tively at the aspect of public affairs at the
moment when Fox and Burke separated for
ever, will find that there was another great
political question besides that of the French
revolution, on which the opinions of these two
men were diametrically opposed. It was at the
conclusion of a speech violently in favour of
Russia, that Fox first publicly announced his
decided disagreement with his old friend on
French affairs.
Neither party can make any particular pre
tensions to political sagacity in discussing the
acts of the Congress. To both of them the

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 63
future was a blank, or was filled with menacing
spectres of French ambition. But as the Holy
Alliance took shape, and its designs were seen, a
gradual change in the sentiments of both Whigs
and Tories began to operate. It was felt that
the deliverance of Europe was raore apparent
than real. It was felt that the "tyranny and
despotisra" which Lord Castlereagh took credit to
himself for having overthrown, still existed, had
indeed only changed hands, and had becorae even
more alarraing by the change. It was felt, in
the language of the poet, that after having struck
the lion down, the national life of Europe was
abandoned to the foul dominion of the wolf.
Even Lord Castlereagh hiraself at length saw
that it was impossible for England any longer
to follow implicitly in the wake of her allies.
When they declared their hostility to all free
institutions which were not voluntarily granted
by sovereigns, they only asserted what was in
strict accordance with the spirit of those memor
able treaties of the great European Congress.
But this tendency began now to be plainly
discerned. Reluctant as our ministers may
have been to confess it, they at last acknow
ledged that such assemblies of monarchs, settling
at their good will and pleasure the different
boundaries of kingdoras, annihilating some, por-

64 FOREIGN POLICY.
tioning others, and coercing every state that
could not meet them on equal terms, were
directly opposed to every principle of the British
Constitution. They set at nought every lawwhich
our ancestors struggled so long and so gloriously
to establish. They annihilated all real freedom ;
for no constitution could be called free, which
depended on the mere pleasure of the giver.
Such, however, were the ideas of freedom held
by the rulers of the world whose names were
signed to the treaties of Vienna ; and in strict
accordance with such ideas were all their pro
visions framed. It is for this reason that every
patriotic Englishman must deeply regret that
such stipulations ever received the sanction of
an English minister. Had these treaties been
strictly adhered to by the other powers, it is
difficult to see how the countenance of England
could have been withdrawn even frora the fur
ther proceedings of the arbitrary princes, with
out a breach of faith. England did not even
protest against the Holy Alliance ; by the
organ of her Government she seemed to sanc
tion its forraation. It certainly appeared that
the Prince Regent and his advisers fully ap
proved of what they durst not boldly applaud.
This state of things could not last. Fortunately
for England, the governments who surely counted

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 65
on her assistance in all their efforts, soon over
stepped all the bounds of moderation, and
showed themselves in their true colours. For
tunately for human freedom, there was one
English statesraan, who though strictly a Con
servative, had the wisdora, the genius, and the
power to break those shackles which were being
so closely forged, and to establish those sound
principles of foreign policy which have never
since been abandoned.

66 FOREIGN POLICY.

CHAP. III.
CANNING. — THE CONGEESS OF VERONA. — FRENCH INVASION
OP SPAIN. — DESIGNS OF THE HOLT ALLIANCE  PORTUGAL.
— canning's MERITS AS A STATESMAN AND ORATOR. —
NEW PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICT.
The name of George Canning excites peculiar
feelings in the breast of every sensitive student
of our parliamentary history. The enthusiasm
which the contemplation of his character kindles
is something very different from what is generally
felt for erainent statesmen. It is more akin
to what we experience in perusing a poem or
a romance, than what belongs naturally to the
stern and calculating political world in which it
is the fate of so many great men to live, and toil,
and die. The literary man finds in the character
of Canning much to sympathise with ; for this
statesman might have enriched the language with
masterpieces of EngHsh composition. Ardent,
ingenuous, learned, eloquent, accompHshed, no
mind was ever distinguished by more versatile
powers, and no EngHsh orator ever so much
delighted his audience. PoHtics mth him were

CANNING. 67
a profession ; and as with all professions which
are unrecognised, this pursuit of professional
statesraanship was by no means so remunerative
to its votary as, in his case, it was beneficial to
his country. Politics with him were an art ;
and he suffered the fate of the artist in the bustle
of active life surrounded by more worldly and
coraraonplace natures. A greater contrast it
would be difficult to imagine than that between
Canning and his predecessor in the Foreign Office.
Lord Castlereagh was to a ludicrous extent defi
cient in those intellectual accomplishments which
his rival so eminently possessed. But Lord
Castlereagh becarae, through Mr. Canning's in
firmity of purpose, the more successful rainister ;
because he applied all the energies of his some
what contracted intellect to the safe and vulgar
routine of official business ; and had the gratifi
cation of directing, at a most important crisis
in the history of the world, the man who, when
Foreign Secretary, had declared him incapable of
being Minister of War. This was the raost signal
victory ever gained by mediocrity over genius.
Happy would it have been for mankind had it
not also been, as unfortunately such triumphs
generally are, in the highest degree disastrous to
the nation. Happy would it have been had it
not in some degree dimmed the lustre of this
F 2,

68 FOREIGN POLICY.
brilliant poHtician's career, which deserves the
adrairation of all Englishmen. It cannot be
denied, that but for Mr. Canning's weakness,
Lord Castlereagh might never have been Foreign
Minister, and still more certainly never would
have represented England at the Congress of
Vienna. Mr. Canning might hiraself have been
in the Foreign Office during all the tirae when it
fell to Lord Castlereagh to direct with such un
questioned supreraacy the external relations
of the country. He raight hiraself have been
the English plenipotentiary at Vienna, and have
been a powerful raeans of preventing all the
misdeeds of the Congress ; and thus, while
directly contributing to the welfare of nations
and saving the honour of England, have gained
for himself immortal glory. He afterwards
deeply regretted that he had not had the direc
tion of the foreign policy in 1814 and 1815.
He saw that he had lost that golden opportunity
which only comes once to statesmen. The "for
tunate moment," when it is once allowed to slip
away, never returns.
It is easy to imagine the silent indignation
with which Canning must have observed some of
those public transactions which originated in
the Congress, but which he was powerless to
remedy. His residence at Lisbon through all
that eventful diplomatic period is only too signi-

LORD CASTLEREAGH. 69
ficant. He knew not what to do. He was poor ;
he could scarcely afford to live without office, and
yet office could only be obtained by keeping on
at least sorae terms with the friends of Lord
Castlereagh. The Foreign Secretary was plainly
in power for life ; the many great affairs he
had directed had given him a complete ascen
dancy in the administration. Hated by the
country, ridiculed by the Whigs, he was abso
lutely adored by the steady supporters of the
governinent, who voted night after night without
asking questions, and comforted theraselves with
reraerabering the glories of Waterloo. Canning
found it necessary first to absent hiraself frora
England, to devote hiraself afterwards to
the Indian Board, and at last to accept the
appointraent of Governor General. This is the
true explanation of that part of Canning's poli
tical life frora 1814 to 1822 ; it is irapossible to
account for his conduct satisfactorily in any other
manner. We might wish to see a man with so many
noble qualities act raore like a hero ; but it is in
dispensably necessary to paint him as he is. At
length the death of I.iord Castlereagh unexpect
edly released Canning from the fetters which he
had allowed to be placed on him, and his eman
cipated genius at once soared to that lofty height
F 3

70 FOREIGN POLICY.
at which it ever afterwards winged its way.
The five years which yet remained to him amply
redeemed his farae ; and under his auspices Eng-
land becarae once more herself.
In justice to Lord Castlereagh it must be
acknowledged that he had already objected to the
proceedings of the despotic sovereigns, and was
gradually becoming raore conscious of the real
intentions of the Holy AUiance. The moment
that the military occupation of France ceased,
the ill-sorted union of England with the despotic
governments began to dissolve. A constitutional
monarchy and the principles of the Holy Alliance
were absolutely incompatible. This even Count
Ficquelmont admits when he relates, fairly
enough, the reasons Avhy the British Government
declined acceding to the preliminary protocol of
Troppau, which was drawn up by the three courts
in order to justify their armed intervention in
putting down the Neapolitan revolution. " Such
principles," says this author, " never had been
those of England;" and he adds, "she resumed
her ancient independence, which had always been
the foundation of her policy." This is expHcit,
and requires to be remembered when judgment
is passed on the actions of the statesmen who
have StiU more recently had the management of
our Foreign Affairs. By the confession of Count

DESIGNS OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE. 71
Ficquelmont it is clear that when the same
English Minister who signed the Treaties of
Vienna was still in office, England was obliged
to withdraw from an intimate connection with
the three courts. And according also to a most
important memorandum of Lord Castlereagh, an
alliance of the great military monarchs for the
object which was then avowed, " threatened to
annihilate the secondary states of Europe."
But Lord Castlereagh went further, and de
clared that such an object was never contem
plated when the alliance was first forraed. There
can be no doubt that he believed this object was
not originally contemplated, but there can be
as little doubt that from the first it was the
design of the other governments. And this
shows how lamentably this minister was deceived
when he, even for one moment, allowed himself
and his country to countenance the projects of
the Holy Alliance. He could never have become
the decided opponent of the allies. His protests
must ever have been feeble. He admitted the
right of Austria to interfere in crushing the
revolutionists at Naples, although he refused to
adopt the general principles of the Confederacy.
But if Austria could interfere by force of arms
to destroy the constitution of Naples, according
to every rule of logic, France had an equal right
F 4

72 FOREIGN POLICY.
to interfere in overturning the Constitution of
Spain, of which that of Naples was acknowledged
to be the offspring. It is plain that when once
the crusade against Liberalism was begun, it
must produce an internecine war between two
rival opinions, and could only end in the de
struction of every free constitution, and in the
abrogation of all international law. It is not
improbable that Lord Castlereagh saw the false
position in which he was placed, and that the
anxiety of his situation preyed upon his mind,
and contributed to produce that melancholy ter
mination at once of his political and natural
existence, at the raoment when he was about
to renew his unavailing protest against that
tyrannical combination of which he had formerly
been the honest, but deceived apologist.
Mr. Canning's return to the Foreign Office
ushered in a new state of things. It Was the
comraenceraent of the political era which extends
to the present day. The diploraatists of the
Holy Alliance soon had reason to recognise the
new spirit which ruled over the foreign policy.
The rainister could neither be duped nor deS'
pised. The necessities of the tirae were urgent ;
on the day when he accepted the seals the pro
ceedings of the Alliance demanded his undivided
attention.

REVOLUTIONS. 73
During his long absence frora the Foreign
Office, the whole condition of the civilised world
had changed. When, after his quarrel with
Lord Castlereagh, he left the adrainistration in
the September of 1809, Buonaparte was omni
potent on the Continent, threatened Europe with
subjugation, and saw his mandates obeyed over
the Peninsula ; Wellington had not yet disturbed
the calculations of the imperial conqueror, and a
belief in his invincibility was rapidly becoraing
prevalent ; the Bourbons appeared hopelessly ex
pelled frora the soil of France and Spain. Four
teen years big with the fate of erapires had rolled
on, Wellington had conquered both France and
Spain for the Bourbons ; the hereditary govern
raents had been restored ; and it is indeed in
structive to find that the first act of Canning
on again becoraing Foreign Minister was a re
fusal to sanction another invasion of Spain by
France under her legitimate sovereign, who thus
proved, that after all the magniloquent professions
in favour of peace, freedora, and independence,
the rights of nations were as little respected by
the Bourbons and the Three Great Powers as they
had been by their iraraortal enemy. Much as
France had suffered by war, much as the ag
gressive spirit of Napoleon had been condemned,
the first army that crossed the French frontiers

74 FOREIGN POLICY.
after the Restoration was for the purpose of de
stroying a constitution and of establishing a des
potism. This is a curious spectacle for a
philosopher. Louis the Eighteenth was always
professing his desire to render France exactly
what she was when Louis the Sixteenth occupied
the throne. But that unfortunate monarch never.
would have done what his successor thus rashly did ;
nor, before statesmen had become familiar with
those violent acts of power which the successive
partitions of Poland, the revolutionary usurpa
tions, and the deeds of the Viennese plenipoten
tiaries brought into fashion, would such wrongs
have been tolerated. Notwithstanding the parade
of legitimacy, every thing was revolutionary.
Monarchists and republicans, the partisans of
order and the partisans of freedom, showed them
selves at heart tyrants ; and their acts and their
professions were subversive of all political mo
rality. On every side the same storm and tur
bulence raeets the saddening gaze. The angry
waters were out, and nowhere could the sacred
ark of true freedom find a resting place.
It can serve no purpose to dwell on the mis
takes and follies of the Neapolitan and Spanish
Liberals. Revolutions made by such hands had
little chance of being successful ; they were men
destitute of all the qualities and aU the experience

CONGRESS OF VERONA. 75
which are indispensable in statesmen. But
though their errors and crimes must be repro
bated, they were at least as honest and as able as
the tyrants who were forced upon thera by the
bayonets of the Great Powers. When we
attempt to justify those violent assaults on the
independence of nations for no other object than
the lowest selfishness, we are indeed guilty of
the highest treason against those moral laws
which have done so much for England.
Could the allied sovereigns have had the least
compunction or forethought, they would have
been warned by the strong remonstrances of the
great man who represented England at Verona.
It was the Duke of Wellington, the soldier who
had delivered Europe, conquered Napoleon,
placed the Bourbons on the thrones of France
and Spain, and won the independence of the
Peninsula, who now protested against the
invasion of Spain by the armies of a Bourbon.
And yet he was not listened to. His eraphatic
warning was of no avail. Canning's raeraorable
" corae what may," which announced the sepa
ration of England for ever from the schemes of
the allies, produced no change in their ultimate
deterraination. It only drew the Northern
Powers closer together, and made the league of
despotism more coraplete. They had been sue-

76 FOREIGN POLICY.
cessful in Naples, and were now to be successful
in Spain. What cared they for the EngHsh
constitution ? Might not the day come when
England herself would feel the power of the
Holy Alliance ? Had they not virtually declared
war against the Parliaraent of England when
they publicly announced that they would ac
knowledge no constitutions which had not been
freely given by Kings to their subjects ? Such
indeed was the fact. The decree of the National
Convention in 1792, by which " fraternity and
assistance" were promised to all nations who
wished to recover their liberties, was justly
considered a declaration of war against every
monarchical government. This announcement
of the Holy Alliance was as plainly a declaration
of war against every constitutional state. The
folly of the French Republicans in the days
when Jacobinism was rampant, was fully
equalled by the folly of the Legitimists in their
day of successful reaction.
That England would have suffered the same
fate as Naples and Spain, had it not been for
the power and energy of her people, cannot be
doubted. The allies, even at this time, ventured
to interfere with our government. On the
appointment of Sir W. A'Court to the post of
Ambassador at Madrid, the ministers of the

CONGRESS OF VERONA. 77
Great Powers called in a body on Mr. Canning
and reraonstrated against the choice. This step
shows to what our alliance with the despotic
courts was tending, and in what, had it not
been for the vigour and deterraination of our
statesraen, it must have ended.
The policy which England first adopted in
1822, was really forced upon her ; our rainisters
were obliged to choose between the friendship
of her Continental AUies and the blessings of
her free constitution. It was plain that both
could not exist together. This consideration
alone is enough to justify Mr. Canning and
the statesraen who have succeeded hira ; it is
enough to answer all the reproaches and the
invectives of Count Ficquelraont.
Canning, with his thoroughly English nature,
never liked congresses of diplomatists and sove
reigns. They are, in fact, monstrosities in
politics, and mere convenient apologies for ty
ranny. At what congress of the sovereigns
and statesraen of the Continent were the rights
and liberties of nations respected ? What con
gress has not had a secret object different from
that which was publicly avowed ?
It was at first supposed that the quarrels of
Russia and Turkey were to be the prorainent
topic of deliberation at Verona. But when the

78 FOREIGN POLICY.
Duke of WeUington arrived in Paris, he found
that the projected invasion of Spain was to be
the real subject of discussion. It was at that
tirae asserted, and is now beyond dispute, that
the Eraperor of Russia really encouraged Louis
the Eighteenth and his ministers in their designs
on Spain. His object was of course to produce
dissension between England and France, that he
might carry out his plans in Turkey without
being confronted by an alliance between the
Western Powers. He therefore professed great
moderation. He was willing to submit his dis
putes with the Sultan to the mediation of Eng
land. And in the meanwhile he was doing
what he could to render our alliance between
England and France impossible ; for he well
knew that England neither could nor would
approve of the destruction of the Spanish con
stitution, and that the more despotic principles
were established by the Bourbons in France,
and throughout the Peninsula, the more were
the sovereigns of these countries dependent upon
himself. He succeeded for a time. The French army
advanced into Spain. The Spanish Liberals,
who had disregarded the wise and parental ad
vice of the Duke of Wellington, to take away
aU pretence for foreign interference by making

canning's foreign POLICY. 79
some changes in their constitution, which could
not be altogether defended, were defeated. The
Bourbons triuraphed ; the carapaign was emi
nently successful ; and the white flag was once
more associated with victory. England had
preserved her neutrality ; and for taking this
pacific course our minister was as much assailed
by the Liberals at horae, as for refusing to join
in support of the invasion, he was condemned
by courtiers and emperors abroad. Such is ever
the destiny of the statesman who endeavours
to avoid extremes and to steer a middle course.
Half raeasures are always unpopular, and they
are not seldora unwise. But England could not
save the Spanish constitution ; despotism for a
moment was the rage in Spain ; the mistakes of
the legislators of Cadiz had been many and
ruinous ; Canning could only regret what he
had not the power to retrieve.
He turned his eyes to South America, and
resolved to be beforehand with the French
rainisters. If France was irresistible in Spain,
he determined that the Indies should not fall
into her power. The tardy recognition of the
independence of the Spanish colonies was not
pleasing to the EngHsh Liberals. The minister
proceeded with every due consideration to the
feelings of Spain, and anxiously endeavoured to

80 FOREIGN POLICY.
prevail on her to acknowledge what was really
a fact. It is not surprising, however, that the
Spaniards to the last raoraent resisted the stern
necessity of publicly divesting themselves of the
brightest jewels of the crown. ^ Step by step
Canning proceeded ; until at length the national
existence of the South American republics was
acknoAvledged by England. That this policy
was sound, few raen will now deny. It is true
that the great things which were once expected
from these states have not been accomplished.
But it is equally true that Spain never could
have permanently kept them under her flag.
Had it not been for England, there can be little
doubt that before this day they would have
been incorporated with the ever- extending terri
tories of the great republic of North America.
Cuba, the last and dearest possession of Spain,
is more than threatened ; and can only be saved
from the grasp of the United States by the
vigorous interposition of France and England. "
Yet there are some few writers on political
affairs to whom such considerations are of no
weight. A voluminous historian, in the second
volume of a work which is now in progress,
finds everything to applaud in the French inva
sion of Spain, and everything to condemn in
Canning's recognition of the independence of the

canning's FOREIGN POLICY. 81
Spanish colonies. After having seen the fate
of the Bourbons, and observed the irresistible
tendency of human affairs for thirty years, to
find an English author who aspires to be a great
political authority declaring that this invasion
of Spain "was not only a wise raeasure on the
part of the Bourbon governraent, but fully
justifiable on the best principles of international
law ; " * that " it was a model of energy and
raoderation," is indeed extraordinary. The
fact that such a raan exists at the present day
must be ranked among intellectual and moral
prodigies. To reason with him would of course
be hopeless. Certain politicians raust be classed
araong those ingenious inventors who atterapt
to fly or to walk upon water, and hold up
their hands with astonishraent and indigna
tion when they find that the law of gravitation
continues to act, and that their admirable con
trivances, made in opposition to every sound
mechanical and natural principle, are of no
avail. Canning was not an unsafe statesman. His
foreign policy was as admirable for its wisdom
as for its brilliancy. It only appears bold and
* See Alison's History of Europe from the Fall of Napo
leon, vol. ii. pp. 736 and 738. G

82 FOREIGN POLICY.
adventurous when compared with the tameness
and insufficiency of that which he super
seded. England was unaccustoraed to see a
man of genius, with extended views and a de
termination of his own, in the Foreign Office;
and the popularity of the minister was bound
less. But he manfully refused to lend himself
to the designs of the extreme Liberals, and
powerfully contended for those broad principles
of policy which are only worthy of a great and
glorious erapire. The interest of England was
the watchword ever in his mouth ; and he fol
lowed that interest sincerely and wisely. He
loved peace and dreaded the approach of war;
because, as he said repeatedly, the next war,
whenever it broke out, must be very different
frora any other contest. He saw that it would
be a war of opinion, a war in which hostile
principles, and not raerely hostile nations, would
be arrayed against each other. But though he
resisted the people, and even raany eminent
politicians, when they wished to see England
embark once more in war for the indefinite
object which was at stake in the Spanish inva
sion, he boldly looked war in the face when the
constitution of our " oldest ally " was menaced,
and sent British troops once more to occupy the
heights of Lisbon.

CANNING AS AN ORATOR. 83
It was natural that the success of despotism
in Spain should induce the admirers of uncon
trolled power to make an attempt on the free
constitution of Portugal. But the faith of
England was pledged to protect the dominions
of the young princess ; and the speech raade by
our Foreign Minister on the King's message
must ever be considered as one of the finest
oratorical efforts in our parliaraentary annals.
It was indeed worthy of hiraself and of the
occasion ; although the passage so often quoted,
and so loudly praised, about " calling the Old
W^orld into existence to redress the balance of
the New," scarcely deserves the extravagant
admiration it has received. His biographers
have given that sentence in capital letters, as
though the force of language could no further
go. But it means nothing. If the balance of
freedom against despotisra had depended upon
the weight of the republics of South America,
the liberties of raankind raust indeed have been
in a hopeless state, and the scale of freedora
have kicked the beara. One single province of
the United States, inhabited by the Anglo-
Saxon race, is, as a counterpoise to despotisra,
worth all the republics which the ardent orator
boasted of having called into existence. The
sentiment is hyperbolical, and can only be ex-
G 2

84 FOREIGN POLICY.
cused by supposing that it inadvertently escaped
from his lips as he was speaking in reply amid
the tumultuous cheers of the House of Coraraons.
The respectable raember who afterwards said
that on hearing this sentence he could not but
look with astonishment at the orator, and doubt
the evidence of his senses, might well do so; but
perhaps as much from the boldness of the meta
phor as from just appreciation.
Such faults are not frequent in the speeches
of Canning. His taste was only too fastidious.
He naturally shunned violent metaphors and
bombastic language. He was the last of that
race of great orators which comraenced with
Chathara. The style of parliamentary debating
changed with the reform of the House of Com
mons ; gentleraen began to talk, not to the
merabers in the House, but to the people out of
doors. The statesraan then remembered that
the cheers of his party were not enough ; that he
must have the people with him ; and adapt his
arguments to their understandings. He was
compelled to indulge in details, and avoid as
much as possible the briUiant generalities of
former speakers. Hence the age of great orators
has departed. Ministers and leaders of oppo
sition aU speak to the reporters' gaUery, and not
to the Speaker's chair, or to the green benches.

CANNING AS A STATESMAN. 85
The best speech is not that which is delivered
with the most effect in the House, but that
which reads best in the newspaper of the fol
lowing morning. Oratory has gained little by
this change. Many of the introductory expo
sitions of ministers are elaborate pamphlets ;
perhaps the hours of deliberation might be
shortened, and public business rauch facilitated,
if the prolix development of a particular line of
policy were printed before the debate commences,
and the form of our legislative proceedings be
adapted to the novel circumstances of this re
formed generation.
But however interesting this alteration in the
style of parliaraentary speaking raay be to the
student of our raanners, not much harra is done
by adhering to the old forras. A raore serious
innovation comraenced while Canning was Fo
reign Secretary. If he was the last of great
orators, he was also the first of our great states
men who became so peculiarly obnoxious to
foreign governments, that they did not hesitate
to set on foot all kinds of intrigues to bring
about his disraissal. Of all the evils that can
afflict a state, this interference of foreigners in
the appointments to the great offices of a na
tional adrainistration is the raost terrible, and
carries with it the most tremendous consequences.
G 3

86 FOREIGN POLICY.
It ought ever to be jealously guarded against,
for the man who countenances it is guilty of the
worst of treasons. We may be assured, that
however it may be disguised, whatever may
be the pretences made for it, at no time and
in no circurastances can it ever produce good.
This it is imperatively necessary to remember,
because it must happen that the minister whose
policy is raost patriotic, who is least ready to
sacrifice any of the interests of his country to
gain the 'applause of other governraents, is the
most likely to be the object of such insidious
manoeuvres. The ablest, wisest, and most public-
spirited of the statesraen of Jaraes the Second's
reign, the Earl of Halifax, was the man whom
Louis the Fourteenth and his ambassador en
deavoured to drive from the English Ministry,
because the French king knew that the accom
plished nobleman was bent on pursuing a truly
national policy, by supporting Holland, and op
posing the designs of France. When James the
Second parted with Halifax, he dismissed his
best counsellor ; and the subsequent misfortunes
of the Stuarts may be dated from that raeraorable
resignation. After the Revolution, no rainister
except Bolingbroke ever abandoned the straight
and intelligible line of English policy. From
that tirae, French influence was powerless in

CANNING AS A STATESMAN. 87
Downing Street. Much as Chathara was feared
abroad, no foreign rainister ventured to pass the
limits of his recognised diplomatic duties ; and
much as George the Second disliked his proud
and haughty secretary, he was too honest a man,
and hated France too much, ever to listen to
Foreign intriguers. George the Third also, with
aU his faults, was at heart a patriot ; and though
he was far too much inclined to draw a line
between his court and his government, though
he was only too ready to accept no rainisters but
such as were personally agreeable to hiraself,
and were the mere instruments of his individual
prepossessions, he never, through any predilection
for other sovereigns, thwarted a Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs in raeasures of public
policy. The sarae praise cannot be given to
George the Fourth. This sovereign did not
hesitate to let France know that Canning was
not agreeable to hira, and secretly to encourage
the French invasion, against which his minister
protested, and which he himself publicly con
deraned. George the Fourth had the baseness
to tell Count Marcellus, the French Charg6
d' Affaires, privately, that he was unalterably on
the same side as M. Chateaubriand and the
Bourbons, and that he highly disapproved of the
policy of his Ministry. The enlightened King
G 4

88 FOREIGN POLICY.
of England believed that Mr. Canning and the
Duke of Wellington were Radicals, because they
would not sanction this outrage on national in
dependence. The historian recently quoted,
who on this subject servilely copies page after
page of M. de Lamartine's Histoire de la Restaur-
ation, and whose horror of innovation is so well
known, cannot see the impropriety and the
danger of the sovereign having one policy, and
his ministry another. But this is an innovation
perhaps quite as alarming as a Reform Bill. This
author might have found that the objectionable
nature of such conduct on the part of a monarch,
could be illustrated even in the annals of the
French Revolution. The double policy of Louis
the Fifteenth and his courtiers powerfuUy con
tributed, as Burke clearly showed, to bring the
French Governraent into conterapt, and to pro
duce the terrible social and political convulsion,
about which this writer has compiled so many
thousand pages. But it is plain that the un
pardonable sin of Canning in the eyes of this
enlightened poHtical historian and historical
politician is, that he recalled the better days of
our history, and did not think it sufficient to
follow humbly in the track of the Holy Alliance.
This writer adopts that childish and absurd
character of Canning, which Count MarceUus
derived from George the Fourth and his flat-

CANNING AS A STATESMAN. 89
terers, and which seemed so true to that select
band of French legitimatists, who saw nothing in
the aspect of the political world, but the certain
signs of an untroubled future for the old mon
archy. But he quite forgets to mention the
account which Marcellus gives of the British
statesman's indignation on perusing the French
king's speech to the Chambers, and his memor
able prophecy of the results of such infatuated
policy. That prophecy has been literally ful
filled. No despatch brought frora the archives
of diploraacy ever exhibited any rainister in a
more glorious light than this letter of Marcellus.*
Every Englishman raust feel proud of the raan
who had the courage and the wisdom to tell
such unquestionable truths to the foolish wor
shippers of legitimacy, and give to a neighbour
ing sovereign such an eraphatic warning. This
epistle also proves how earnest our rainister was
in his resistance to the French invasion, and
how precisely the same were the sentiments he
privately expressed to the French plenipotentiary
with those he delivered in the British Parliament.
When Canning read that passage of the speech
in which it was declared that the just uneasiness
of France would be dispelled, if Ferdinand were
at liberty to give his people free institutions,
* Politique de la Eestauration en 1822-8. Par le Comte
de Marcellus, Ancien Ministre Plenipotentiaire.

90 FOREIGN POLICY.
which could only emanate frora hiraself ; in the
presence of the astonished MarceUus, who little
anticipated the effect such a sentence would
produce, he waved the document above his head
and gloriously exclaimed, " Miserable axiom! a
king free ! Do you know of one who deserves
to be free ? I doubt indeed if he ever ought to
be free. Do you think that I should be the
minister of George the Fourth if his choice were
free ? Do you suppose he can forget that I
invariably avoided the orgies of his youth — that
I always opposed his tastes and his favourites?
He hates me for my opposition, for my political
attitude, and above all — and here I teU you
nothing new — on account of old recollections of
his domestic life." And a night's reflection on
the imprudence of the king's speech, only made
the avowal of the sentiments expressed in this
address from the throne to the French Chambers,
appear more alarming to the English Secretary
of State. On the conversation being renewed
the next day, he said deliberately, as he fixed
his fine eyes beaming with generous and pa
triotic enthusiasra on the devout adorer of mon
archical authority : " Listen to me : this example
may spread even to France. You cannot be
ignorant that a deviation from the dogma of
legitimacy, almost similar to what occurred in
England, is being meditated at this very raoraent

CANNING AS A STATESMAN. 91
in France. You know the progress it has made
in the ranks of an opposition supposed to be
moderate. The head to be crowned is ready."
We have reason to thank Count Marcellus for
such revelations. They must increase, if any
thing could, the veneration with which Canning's
memory is regarded. Ministers of state have
before now thought it not unworthy of them
to say one thing to a foreign ambassador, and
another, for the sake of appearances, to the
British Parliament. Against such disgraceful
conduct it is well that Canning's example
should be set off, and that our countryraen, as
they pass his statue near Westminster Abbey,
should, amid all difficulties and dangers, have
assurance that they behold the iraage of a wise,
brave, and conscientious Foreign Secretary.
He died preraaturely, and had a raighty nation
for his mourners. But he had accoraplished that
which he had been sent to do. He had be
queathed his example to his followers, and even
to his enemies. The race of political vampires,
who fatten on corruption, and exult over the
graves of brave nations, had shrunk away at the
approach of his meridian glory. The iniquities
of the Congress of Vienna began to be confessed.
As the eyes of the people opened, they asked
themselves what they had really gained by tbeir
glorious victories, and what sort of raen were

92 FOREIGN POLICY.
those, who in their name professed to make and
unmake kingdoms, to barter away the rights of
millions, and to subsidise the armies of sovereigns,
who mystically proclaimed a crusade against
those eternal principles which had made Eng
land great and Englishmen free.
But, while heartily doing justice to Canning's
great merits, his errors must not be passed over.
His intervention in Greece was imprudent. One
of the last public acts of his life was to agree
to the memorable treaty ofthe 6th of July 1827,
which involved his country in great difficulties.
That Canning was outwitted by Russia, when
he thus embroiled England with the Porte, the
famous despatches of Lieven, Pozzo di Borgo,
and Nesselrode, afford indubitable testimony.
The generous statesraan, who, by his liberal
policy, so ably circuravented Russia in the
West, fell into the snare which she set for
hira, and becarae her tool in the East. The
man who gave the death stab to the Holy Al
liance, put the Sultan in the power of the Czar.
His sympathies for the struggling Greeks
overpowered the foresight of the statesman.
But the consequences of this poHcy were not
seen until after Canning was sleeping peacefully
in his grave, and other actors occupied the
bustling ministerial stage.

93

CHAP. IV.
THE DTJKE OP WELLINGTON AND THE EARL OP ABERDEEN. —
POLICY OF THE WELLINGTON ADMINISTRATION.  RESDLT
OP THE TREATY OP JULY 6. 1827  PUBLIC OPINION
IN 1829.  THE WHIGS AND TURKEY.  TEEATY OF
ADRIANOPLE  THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE.
For some raonths after Canning's death there
was really no government. His friends nomi
nally occupied the great offices of state, and
the routine business of each departraent was
transacted; but there was no head of the ad
ministration, and the worst effects of this ab
sence of a great responsible chief was soon
evident. An English fleet in conjunction with
those of Russia and France, sailed into the port
of Navarino, and without any declaration of
hostilities, destroyed nearly aU the effective
marine of an ally for whom we had professed
the most friendly intentions, and against whom
we were certainly not at war. The Turkish
navy never recovered the effect of that blow.
Of the victory of Navarino, at once unjust and
impolitic, England is at this day paying the

94 FOREIGN POLICY.
penalty. Such was the foreign policy of what,
by courtesy, raust be called the governraent of
Lord Goderich. Such was the disastrous effect
of not having clear and defined objects, when
fleets are sent forth to strengthen the remon
strances of the diplomatist.
At home, the want of foresight was as remark
able as in the intervention in Turkish affairs
abroad. As soon as the time for the raeeting
of Parliaraent approached, and it was absolutely
necessary to decide on the raeasures for the
session, the members of the cabinet found out that
their only agreement was in a common aversion.
Even the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not
consulted on the appointment of a committee on
finance; he very naturaUy felt indignant;
explanations only showed how little harmony
existed among such discordant colleagues; one
resignation produced another, and the govern
ment was broken up.
The Duke of Wellington then took the office
of First Lord of the Treasury.. Sorae of Can
ning's friends who continued in office were soon
corapeUed to resign, and the Earl of Aber
deen, for the first time, became Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs. The influence of
the Duke of WeUington on the foreign policy
of England has been very great ; it is from him

WELLINGTON AND CANNING. 95
that the Earl of Aberdeen avowedly derived
those leading principles which have distinguished
his ministerial career, and have especially marked
his dealings with other nations.
The same writers who delight in describing
the policies of Aberdeen and Palmerston as
decidedly different, draw the same distinction
between the policies of Wellington and Can
ning. If not correct in their opinions, these
critics are at least consistent ; but a little con
sideration will show that the positive difference
between the two earlier statesraen was as il
lusory as that between the two rainisters who
have so powerfully irapressed their character on
the European history of the last twenty-six
years. There is not the slightest reason for believing
that the Duke of Wellington disapproved of
Canning's foreign policy. It was the Duke who
was the plenipotentiary at Verona ; it was the
Duke who went to Russia to negotiate the just
interference of the powers between Greece and
Turkey ; it was the Duke who signed the pro
tocol of St. Petersburg, which settled the
grounds of intervention. To suppose that he
was the unwilling agent in these iraportant
negotiations, and that he secretly disapproved
of the memorials to which he deliberately set

96 FOREIGN POLICY.
his hand and seal, is monstrous. Of all men he
was least likely to act the dishonest part of
expressing one set of sentiments in public and
another in private. He was ever frank and
manly in the avowal of his opinions. Conscious '
of the great position he filled in the eyes of the
world, he disdained to use the paltry artifices of
the ordinary diplomatist. He never asserted
that any raeasure of foreign policy was the cause
of his refusal to take office under Canning. If
he and his friends had had such a good excuse
for their ungenerous conduct, it would certainly
have been made ; but that no such good reason
was ever given or even hinted at, is a proof that
it never existed. He was, in fact, determined
to be Prime Minister, and Peel, who was rather
jealous of Canning, and had resolved not to serve
under him, did all he could to encourage the Duke
in his pretensions. Again, when Mr. Huskisson,
Lord Dudley, Lord Melbourne and Lord Palmer
ston retired from the Wellington administration,
it was never alleged that any quarrel had arisen
on the foreign policy of the cabinet ; their re
signations were caused by a vote on a domestic
question, and by the pride and firmness of the
martial Prime Minister, who, after having once
found hiraself secure in his office, thought that he
could do without the Canningites, and would

WELLINGTON AND ABERDEEN. 97
not permit his own ascendancy to be questioned.
He was not prepared to be a nominal chief like
Lord Liverpool or Lord Goderich. He was
determined that Mr. Huskisson should not treat
him as he had a few months before treated Mr.
Herries. Hence the ministerial advocate of liberal
commercial principles found, to his astonishment,
that as soon as his resignation was sent in, it
was accepted, and that all his humiliating
. apologies could not induce the Duke to ask him
to reraain in office. Wellington's decision was
not perhaps so wise as it was brave; the expelled
ministers were men whom no adrainistration
could well spare ; but it is only necessary to
establish fully that there was not the slightest
disagreeraent on foreign policy when Lord
Palmerston resigned the office of Secretary at
War, and Lord Aberdeen accepted that of
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Whatever
differences there may have been on external
policy between the adrainistration of Wellington
and that of the succeeding Whig governraents,
they arose raore frora the dispositions of the respec
tive statesraen than frora any decided principle.
The Duke was emphatically a soldier. His
temperament was thoroughly martial. His
varied experiences in Ireland, India, and the
Peninsula, had made hira regard with no
H

98 FOREIGN POLICY. •"•:,<. V* -"
favourable eyes mere popular asserabHes. He^';
cared little for human rights; it was enougfijor''
him that men had duties. He had not otily in
English but a European character. A natu
ralised Spaniard, covered with the orders of tha^.
great nations of the Continent, holding a rank'-
in their armies, the personal friend of th^
sovereigns, the Captain- General of the arrav of
occupation, the acknowledged restorer of legiti
mate thrones, it is not surprising that his sym|Pf;
pathies were on the side of the established*'^;
monarchies. He looked generally at the means
of making governments strong, and thought not
much of what was abstractedly just. His great
victory was proverbially a king-making victory.
His glory was associated with the order of things
settled at the Congress of Vienna. Eloquent
declamations in favour of human freedom never
kindled his enthusiasm. Perhaps he experienced
a feeling of conterapt for the brilliant orators in
the British Parliament, some of whom had done
all they could to discourage England from pro
secuting the war which he brought to such a
glorious termination. Even the "liberty of
unlicensed printing," which has been the theme
of so many glowing periods, he regarded with
no peculiar adrairation. He thought of the time
when the generals opposed to hira learnt all his

, /..t'% Wellington's policy. 99
plans irova. the "rascally newspapers" which
raicistered to the patriotic curiosity of his
fcountryraen, whose battles he was sternly
fighting. Of the power of Russia in particular,
he felt little jealousy ; he believed that a Russian
amance was highly beneficial to England, and
frequently expressed much confidence in the
wisdom, and raoderation of the Czar.
This was one side of the Duke's political cha
racter. . But by itself it would give a very
erroneous and extremely unjust view of hira as a
statesman superintending the foreign policy of
England. He was at heart a patriot. That
sentiment of duty which was so strong in him,
made him spurn the idea of ever separating
hiraself from the true interest of the empire in
order to gratify the rulers whora he had so
much obliged, and who so highly praised him.
Conservative as he was on questions of domestic
policy, he becarae a Liberal when the honour of
England abroad was concerned. Like the great
English adrairal in the tirae of the Coramon
wealth, he considered that his first duty was to
serve his country whoever raight for the raoraent
be at the head of affairs, and whatever might be
the form of the governraent. Like Blake, he
would have fought as earnestly against a
monarchy as against a republic. The enemies
H 2

100 foreign policy.
of England, wherever they might be found, and
whatever might be their professed principles,
were his enemies. No party politician could
say, that the mission he undertook to Verona,
under the direction of Canning, was less effect
ually performed because he was on such good
terras with the principal supporters of the Holy
Alliance. Nor, though he thought the friendship
of Russia worth cultivating, and had even a pre
ference for the Great Northern Power, did he
ever lend himself to her designs on Turkey, nor
hesitate to declare that it was the interest and
the duty of England to oppose such encroach
ments. We may be well assured that in spite of
the blandishments ofthe present Czar, the remem
brance of his friendship with Alexander, and all
his Russian prepossessions, had the Duke of
Wellington been alive at this day and able to
lead the armies of England, he would, at the
coraraand of his sovereign, as readily and cheer
fully have drawn his sword against Nicholas as
he did against Napoleon.
But the great soldier is dead. The most
malignant partisans have now no motive for
misrepresenting his efforts for the advancement
of England. His friendly feelings towards
Russia may be admitted without any imputation
being cast upon his patriotic integrity. The

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN. 101
eminent raan who, under his auspices, became
Foreign Minister in 1828, is still aHve, to be the
mark of all the poisoned arrows which disap
pointed faction may let fly at his grey hairs.
Since the disruption of the Tory party in con
sequence of the adoption of free-trade principles
by Sir Robert Peel, the Earl of Aberdeen has
been peculiarly obnoxious to those politicians
who for some years longer professed themselves
Protectionists. They knew that this distin
guished nobleraan was one of the firraest sup
porters of their former chief. They knew that
since Sir Robert's death, the Foreign Secretary
of the Peel government was considered as the
respected and conscientious adviser of that states
man's political disciples. They knew that though
seldom inclined to distinguish himself by displays
of oratory in Parliaraent, Lord Aberdeen's expe
rience, integrity, and judgment were of immense
weight in council. It was to him that they
ascribed the little confidence which the raost in
fluential statesraan of their own party placed in
the adrainistration of Lord Derby ; and, there
fore, since he was chosen Prirae Minister of
the CoaHtion, he has been singled out for
the invectives of the Opposition. Their object
was to conciliate Lord Palraerston, whose foreign
policy they thought fit to praise most loudly; and
H 3

102 FOREIGN POLICY.
they began to condemn, in no measured terms,
that continental system of which they considered
Lord Aberdeen the representative. It is never
theless a fact, soraewhat unfortunate to the sin
cerity of those Conservative censors of the Prime
Minister's foreign policy, but necessary to be
remembered by the truthful historian, that it was
not until Lord Aberdeen assisted Sir Robert Peel
in repealing the Corn Laws, and lost the support
of the Protectionists, that they ever raised their
voices against his manner of conducting the busi
ness of the Foreign Office. It was not until they
quarrelled with hira on a domestic question that
they ever blamed hira for his foreign policy, and
began to admire that of Lord Palraerston.
During the adrainistration of the Duke of
WeUington, from 1828 to the November of 1830,
and during the adrainistration of Sir Robert Peel
frora 1841 to 1846, — that is, during all the time
Avhen Lord Aberdeen was Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, — the vehement partisans on the
benches of the Opposition were the most de
termined supporters and the most enthusiastic
admirers of the very minister whom they now
reprobate. The extreme Liberals, who always
thought Lord Aberdeen too indulgent towards
the despotic Sovereigns of the Continent, may,
consistently, stiU continue to oppose him ; but it

LORD Aberdeen's foreign policy. 103
is not for those who supported Sir Robert Peel
and the Duke of Wellington now to turn round
and denounce Lord Aberdeen for betraying the
freedom of nations.
Some of these reproaches are as ignorant and
as unscrupulous as they are unjust. It can easily
be proved that Lord Aberdeen never had that
violent attachment to Russia which has been
attributed to hira, and that his leaning object
while Foreign Minister was to encourage Austria
in maintaining her independence of her northern
neighbour. Events indeed, have been raore
powerful than the efforts of the English states
man; but it is due to him to own that while
Austria maintained a free course of action, the
ambitious schemes of Russia were in sorae mea
sure frustrated, and the Turkish Empire pre
served frora direct attack.
He has indeed ever been friendly to an Aus
trian alliance. It was in Austria that he won a
great diploraatie victory, when he induced that
country to join the confederacy against Napoleon.
All who could judge of the difficulties he over-
carae at that tirae, have borne testiraony to the
able raanner in which he conducted that irapor
tant negotiation. This is not the place to dwell
on his career as a diplomatist, or it raight easily
be shown what good service he did to Austria,
H 4

104 FOREIGN POLICY.
and how natural it was that he should have
friendly sympathies with the ablest statesman of
that empire. It might even be shown that some
of the arbitrary proceedings of the Court of
Vienna, which were at once so impolitic and un
just, and which have produced so much misery
to Austria and the world, were deeply regretted
by Lord Aberdeen, and that he did all he could
to prevent them frora being adopted.
He never was a Tory of the school of Sid
mouth and Perceval. A nobleman of a highly
cultivated intellect, distinguished in his youth
by a love of literature, his mind enlarged by
foreign travel, it is not going too far to say
that he heartily despised the cant and bigotry
so prevalent in the first quarter of this cen
tury, and that there were some very respect
able politicians who considered him rather a
dangerous Liberal. He never approved of the
Holy Alliance. In his place in Parliament he
declared, while Lord Castlereagh was still Foreign
Minister, that such confederacies of monarchs
were to be watched with the greater jealousy,
because the system was liable to so much abuse,
that it could not be too strongly condemned. On
the Roraan Catholic question his ideas were stiU
more liberal. He ever proclaimed himself fa
vourable to it, though he thought, most charac-

LORD Aberdeen's character. 105
teristically, that the repeal of the disabilities
would not produce all the good which the Whig
orators so frequently prophesied. He has the
national character of the Scotchman. The Duke
of Wellington himself was not more phlegmatic
in temperament or less inclined to indulge in any
fervid emotions. Lord Aberdeen is not, nor
ever was, an orator. Before he was Foreign
Secretary he seldom thought of addressing the
House of Lords; his talents for debate were
never developed as those of raany erainent
persons have been, in the more exciting atmo
sphere of the House of Commons. Whenever he
thought fit to rise to address the Lords, he ut
tered a few pregnant sentences in an unpretend
ing manner, with the air of one who spoke frora
necessity, and delivered his honest and matured
sentiraents. Few as his words were, they pro
duced an effect; his opinions were always thought
deserving of attention.
There is not the slightest reason for supposing
that he disapproved of Canning's foreign policy.
He did not join in any opposition when the
accompHshed statesman was First Lord of the
Treasury. His conduct at that time was per
haps more upright and intelligible than that of
either the " Protestant " rainisters who retired
from office, or the Whig politicians who ac-

106 FOREIGN POLICY.
cepted place under Canning. In the only
speech he raade during this short administra
tion. Lord Aberdeen said, that he belonged to
no opposition, "factious or otherwise;" that he
had always been in favour of Roman Catholic
eraancipation ; that the only reason why he could
not place entire confidence in the Government,
was because this measure had not been made a
cabinet question ; that he thought the manner in
which the Whigs who had joined the ministry
had agreed to temporise with this great plan of
relief which they thought so necessary, was
injurious to the fair and honourable character of
public men, and that the reputation of our
statesmen was of more importance than even
the removal of religious disabilities. There are
persons so ill-informed and so blinded by party-
spirit, as to charge Lord Aberdeen with the
disasters of Navarino and the unfortunate results
ofthe war with Russia which so much exhausted
the strength of the Ottoman Empire. He acted
just the contrary to what is iraplied in the pre
sumptuous charges of his accusers. He was not
in office when the battle of Navarino was de
cided. The first act of Lord Aberdeen as
Foreign Secretary was to aid the Porte, and he
was as much attacked by the Opposition of that
day for saying that it was our duty to support

THE WHIGS AND TURKEY. 107
the independence of Turkej'', as he has lately
been accused of being ready to consent to the
partition of the Sultan's dominions.
It is forgotten that this violent sympathy for
the Turkish cause is of a very recent date.
Araong Liberal politicians especially, it is only
within the last few years that the existence of
Turkey has ever been adraitted to be a political
necessity. The statesmen of the last gene
ration, with perhaps the exception of WilHam
Pitt, utterly detested the Turkish Government.
Even Burke, with all his eloquent wisdom, his
sagacious jealousy of Russia, and his abhorrence
of the partition of Poland, hated the Turks as
much as he hated Warren Hastings and the
Jacobins. He called them a race of savages and
worse than savages, and said that any minister
who allowed them to be of any weight in the
European systera, deserved the curses of pos
terity. It is only since the settleraent of Europe
in 1815, which so firraly established the power
of Russia, and underrained every other throne on
the Continent, that the iraportance of Turkey has
been seen. Because we now witness the singular
spectacle of the two raost enlightened nations of
Europe going to war, with the approbation of
every sincere and wise friend of freedora and
civihsation, for the purpose of keeping the Turks

108 FOREIGN POLICY.
at Constantinople, the loss of which by the
Greeks was four centuries ago considered the
most grievous calamity that ever befell Chris
tendom, sorae sanguine spirits forget how very
recently this policy has been decided upon, and
are ready to denounce Lord Aberdeen as a traitor
for not supporting the policy which he really
originated. The readers of some journals will
think it an incredible paradox to assert that it
was Lord Aberdeen who first as Foreign Secre
tary proclaimed it to be the duty of England to
maintain the independence and the integrity of
the Turkish Empire. Nevertheless such is the
fact ; and a very little reflection will place it
beyond dispute.
It is only fair to Burke, and those who until
lately execrated the Ottoman rule, to acknow
ledge that when they called the Turks barbarous,
they had many of the vices of barbarians. They
were always brave, they were always in a certain
sense generous ; but they have not often been
merciful ; and for centuries their yoke has been
heavy on the Christians. Even the reforms and
ameliorations which have been urged on the
government of the Sultan are contrary to the
spirit of the Mahometan religion, and the pre
cepts of the Koran. When the Turk becomes a
political and religious liberal, he ceases to be a

TURKISH CHARACTER. 109
Turk. He may or he may not develope into
something better ; but it is certain that on the
day he is enlightened into a reformer, after the
fashion of English ten-pound electors, the old
national heart, that once beat so proudly, must die
within him, and that neither the tricolor nor the
union-jack in which he may wrap himself, after
he has divested himself of the garb and colours
of the Prophet, can ever bring hira to life again
as a genuine Mussulman. In his chrysalis state
he may look rauch more amiable than in his
pristine condition. We may consider Abdul
Medjid as a friend ; we could only look on
Mahomet the Second as a foe. The wisdom of
Providence has in this, as in other cases, con
verted what was regarded as a curse into a
blessing. If, when Constantinople feU, many
earnest Christians wept over it as over the fall
of a second Jerusalem, the healing influence of
time has done much for Europe ; and there can
be no doubt that we should now with as much
reason regret the fall of Constantinople into the
hands of the Cossack, as our ancestors forraerly
bewailed its possession by the Turk. True
policy teaches us to put up with the evils we
have been accustomed to, rather than blindly to
rush into those we have not experienced. The
Turkish yoke is now at least endurable ; but we

110 FOREIGN POLICY.
must not forget that if statesmen in former days
would not tolerate it, it is only in our time that
it has become tolerable.
Thirty years ago this revolution in the Turkish
Erapire had begun. The work of innovation
was, however, still rude and unfashioned. Eng
lish Liberals would not believe in it ; instead of
regenerating Turkey, they were bent on raising
another nation of real old Greek heroes from the
soil of the Peloponnesus. Thus were the wrongs
of Europe to be redressed ; the age of Pericles
was to be revived; we were in this nineteenth
century to behold the glories of a liberal Athens
with her warriors, statesraen, and philosophers.
These were the visions of many Englishmen; but
they were not the visions of the Emperor of
Russia. The English Whigs and the Czar were
both bent on wresting Greece from Turkey, and
doing all the harm they could to the Sultan.
An English Liberal is the raost credulous of
politicians. The manner in which the Emperor
Nicholas made use of the democratic fervour of
our countrymen for the purpose of striking a
deadly blow at Turkey, is marveUous. Blind
and unreflecting, we never calculated conse
quences, or looked to the future. The Treaty of
July, 1827, by which the interference of the
Three Powers was decided, was, as events

RESULT OF THE TREATY OF 1827. Ill
proved, extremely impolitic. Had Canning
Hved to superintend the operations of the Allies,
the result might have been different ; but as it
was, it produced the battle of Navarino.
For six years the hostiHties between the Turks
and the Greeks had continued. For six years
the Great Powers had professed their neutrality.
For six years Russia anxiously watched her
opportunity, and almost believed that the dis
solution of the Ottoraan Empire was at hand.
She knew well that if the Greeks achieved their
independence without the aid of France or Eng
land, as long as the Turks remained in Europe
that independence would be merely norainal ;
that a kingdom of Greece would be entirely
dependent upon herself, and that a Greek state
would be a powerful lever by which all the Greek
brethren in Turkey might be moved at will, and
the Turkish Empire demolished at any moraent.
To the surprise of Nicholas, and to the disraay
of the Whigs in England, Greek patriotisra
showed itself at length not so powerful as they
supposed ; the energy of the Turkish cora-
manders was gradually subduing the insurgents,
and the authority of the Sultan was once raore
being recognised throughout the Morea. Pro
fessions of neutrality were iramediately thrown
to the winds. The Czar determined to interfere.

112 FOREIGN POLICY.
and he would have been glad to have inter
fered alone. This could not be done without
hazarding a rupture with England. The Duke
of Wellington's influence prevailed, and a com
mon intervention was agreed upon, especially
for the purpose of preserving peace. In the
name of peace the Three Powers made war on
a friendly state, destroyed its armaments, and
insisted upon the withdrawal of its garri
sons. But this was not all. When the Turkish
armies had becorae victorious in all parts of
the Morea, after the Greek armies had been
defeated, Missolonghi and Athens taken, and
the Crescent was everywhere triumphant, the
allied fleets arrived at the scene of action, and
checked the operations of the Turkish com
manders. The object for which the govern
ments professed to interfere was not accom
plished ; for instead of peace being preserved,
as soon as Nicholas saw what a loss the Turks
had sustained, he hastily separated himself from
the other mediating powers, and a disastrous
war with Russia followed the disastrous battle
of Navarino.
As we now look calmly at that naval conflict,
we are shocked at the injustice and the hypocrisy
of the allies. We syrapathise fully with that
sentence in the King's speech which declared it

PUBLIC OPINION IN 1829. 113
an " untoward event." Neither the Governraent
of France nor of England really -approved of
the victory which their fleets had gained ; and
by all sagacious politicians the result was deeply
regretted. But the English Opposition thought very dif
ferently. They were indignant that the Duke of
Wellington should have considered the affair of
Navarino as untoward ; they were indignant
that Turkey should have been called an ancient
ally ; Sultan Mahraoud was classed in their de-
claraations with the tyrants of the Continent ;
and they bitterly reproached the rainisters for
declaring that it was necessary to raaintain the
Turkish Empire. At the meeting of Parliament
in 1828, Lord Holland, who always spoke with
much dogmatism on foreign affairs, could
scarcely find words to express his horror at any
expression of sympathy for the Ottoman Empire,
and enthusiastically defended the battle of Na
varino. The Liberal members of the House of
Commons went quite as far as the Whig peers in
their detestation of Turkey, and in their want of
sympathy for her wrongs. Mr. Brougham de
clared that the battle of Navarino was a glorious,
a brilliant, a decisive, an immortal achievement ;
and even Lord John RusseU thought it as honest
I

] 14 FOREIGN POLICY.
a victory as had ever been gained from the
beginning of the world.
The success of Russia in the campaign of
1829, did not in the slightest degree alarm the
illustrious politicians of the Opposition, nor in
duce them to soften their hatred to Turkey.
The more it becarae necessary to put a stop to
the progress of Russia, the more the Whigs
condemned Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of
Wellington for endeavouring to save the Otto-
inan Empire. The ministers were far from
pleased at the consequences of the policy which
they inherited. The Duke said that it was
Canning who had settled the basis of our inter
ference with Greece ; but when he or his col
leagues ventured at any tirae to doubt of its
Avisdora, Lord Holland accused thera of not
sympathising with liberal opinions, and of
wishing to see the triumph of despotism.
At the beginning of the session of 1830, when
the feebleness of Turkey and the ambition of
Russia had been so plainly demonstrated, even
Lord Holland, had he deserved the title of a
statesman, raight have been expected to see
whose garae he was playing. The people had
taken the alarm as soon as the news arrived that
the line of the Balkan had been forced, and that
a Russian army was marching on Adrianople.

THE WHIGS AND TURKEY. 115
Ruraours of strange import had also been spread
abroad. It was whispered that a secret corapact
had been concluded between the King of France
and the Eraperor of Russia, by which the Bour
bons were to extend their dominions to the Rhine,
and Nicholas to occupy Constantinople.
It was at such a momentous crisis that our
legislators assembled for the parliaraentary
season. Even then the eyes of Lord Holland
and the Whigs were not opened. This noble
man attacked Lord Aberdeen, not for des
troying but for saving Turkey ; not for per
suading the Sultan to agree to the treaty of
Adrianople, but for not permitting the Czar to
take all the Turkish Erapire. " As a citizen of
the world," said Lord Holland, " I ara sorry that
the Russians have not taken Constantinople."
The Duke of WeUington expressed himself
strongly on the importance and the duty of
upholding Turkey ; and Lord Aberdeen rerainded
Lord Holland that Mr. Fox had also been of the
sarae opinion. The Whigs were angry with the
Foreign Secretary for asserting that their fa
vourite leader ever thought of opposing the
designs of Russia or of supporting Turkey. Lord
Holland in the House of Lords, and Lord John
Russell in the House of Commons, both pointedly
denied that Mr. Fox ever held such a notion.

116 FOREIGN POLICY.
When such were the ideas of the principal
statesraen of the Opposition, it is too much now
for writers to turn round and blame Lord Aber
deen for having been the friend of the Czar.
The Russians had alraost reached the suburbs of
Constantinople ; the Turks had neither a fleet nor
an army to oppose to the hosts of Nicholas ; their
strongest fortresses were occupied by Russian
garrisons ; the Ottoman Empire was on the verge
of ruin ; instead of wondering that Turkey lost
so rauch by the treaty of Adrianople, we raay be
thankful that she did not lose her all. The past
must not be judged by the present. We are now
unanimous on the justice of the vyar against
Russia, and in favour of Turkey. But had Lord
Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington declared
war in 1829 in defence of Turkey, they would
have been strongly opposed by a raore forraidable
section of liberal politicians than ever resisted
Pitt when he commenced hostilities against the
French republicans. Yet with public opinion
but partially in their favour, the ministers coura
geously conteraplated hostilities. It is indispu
table that the adrainistration of the Duke of
Wellington never would have permitted the
Russian battalions to enter Constantinople ; that
they had come to an agreement with Austria to
oppose the advance of the Czar, and that they

THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE. 117
had ordered the English admiral, if all means of
pacification failed, to seize the Russian fleet in
the Mediterranean. This they did in the face of
the Opposition. This they did when religious
fanaticism, popular prejudices, and liberal enthu
siasra were all against the cause of the Sultan.
It is therefore not without reason that Lord
Aberdeen lately put in his claira to have written
and done as rauch in opposition to Russia as any
English statesraan.
It raay be true that the Russian troops that
had reached Adrianople were in a critical po
sition. It may be true, as facts which have
since been brought to light seem to indicate, that
even the invading army was much weaker than
it was believed to be, and that it was suffering
severely frora privation and disease. But peace
was absolutely necessary at that tirae for Turkey.
Had the war continued two or three years longer,
even though the Turks had been able to meet
the Russians in the field, the Ottoman Erapire
must have fallen to pieces. It was completely
exhausted. The long struggle with Greece, the
innovations in the adrainistration, the destruction
of the janissaries, the anarchy and discontent of
the provinces, the loss of the fleet at Navarino,
the blockade of the Dardanelles, the fall of the
great fortresses both in European and Asiatic
I 3

118 FOREIGN POLICY.
Turkey, the defeat of every army with the ex
ception of a single force of about twenty thousand
men under the command of a disobedient pasha,
had produced a state of almost hopeless weakness
and absolute prostration. The Russian armies
were flushed with victory; however great their
losses they could have been easily repaired; and
with the command of the Black Sea, Varna, and
the eastern passes of the Balkan, it is scarcely
possible to imagine any obstacle to the certain
triumph of Nicholas. The power of Austria was
indeed great, but it was counterbalanced by that
of France ; England was not in such a condition
to engage in a great war as she now is ; and the
strength even of the Turks themselves has since
been recruited.
With Prussia and France favourable to Russia,
how could Lord Aberdeen have acted otherwise
than he did ? His hands were tied behind him.
As it was, Russia acquired by the treaty of Adri
anople no extension of her dominions in Europe,
with the exception of the islands at the mouth
of the Danube. It is true that this was an
acquisition which gave to Russia a control over
the commercial interests of Germany, and
indeed of all Europe. But if Prince Metternich,
the Austrian Minister who has ever been so
jealous of the approach of Russia to Constanti-

THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE. 119
nople, who attempted to induce all Europe to
join in an alliance in support of Turkey, and
whose policy it has been systematically to
oppose the aggrandisement of Russia, per
mitted the Czar to obtain the mouths of the
Danube, Lord Aberdeen cannot very well be
blaraed for subraitting to a necessity Avhich he
was powerless to resist. People write and speak
now, as though our rainisters, without going to
war, could have raade Russia, in that raoment of
victory, accept any terms they might have been
pleased to prescribe.
When it is considered in Avhat a raiserable
condition Turkey then was, hoAV divided and
hostile were all the nations of Europe, we raay
well wonder that Russia gained so little as she
did by this rauch vilified treaty. It Avas not the
Treaty of Adrianople which gave her the
coraraand of the Black Sea. It Avas not the
Treaty of Adrianople which gave her the
pretence of interfering with the Greek subjects
of the Porte. To those who say that Russia
ought to have accepted pecuniary corapensation,
and no increase of territory, it is sufficient to
answer, that it is not what Russia ought, but
what she would under the circurastances accept,
that Lord Aberdeen had to consider. As it Avas,
the extension of her limits was comparatively
I 4

120 FOREIGN POLICY.
small ; and the money which the Sultan agreed
to pay was beyond his resources. He was
obliged afterAvards to compound for a release
from part of his pecuniary engagements by
ceding some portion of his Asiatic possessions.
If England had been prepared to declare war in
the event of her pacific proposals being rejected,
of course the question would now assurae a very
different forra. But as peace at any price was then
the cry of the Opposition ; as a war for Turkey
Avould have been anything but a popular war;
as the Czar was omnipotent, and other great
European powers his humble admirers, no im
partial person, who fairly Aveighs all the diffi
culties of that time, can conscientiously declare
that Lord Aberdeen did wrong in acquiescing in
the Treaty of Adrianople. Those who eagerly
demanded the independence of Greece, and
insisted on the treaty of 1827, and not the unfor
tunate minister whose lot it was to atterapt to
remedy the injuries which that policy inflicted
upon Turkey, are justly censurable.
Mr. Canning did not foresee, AA'hen he agreed
to that treaty, the troubles he was preparing for
future governments, and the serious misfortunes
impending over the Ottoman Empire Instead
of preventing, it produced war, and afforded the

THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE. 121
pretext for other Avars. It alraost ruined Turkey.
It tasked the ability and patience of successive
foreign secretaries, and after years of negotiation,
the freedom of Greece Avas not securely esta
blished, anarchy and civil Avar existed, and the
ministers of France, Russia, and England had
not arrived at a definite conclusion.
The fact must now be admitted, that the policy
of Canning so far as it had reference to the
affairs of Greece and Turkey, was gravely
erroneous. Russia never supposed that peace
would be the result of the intervention of the
three PoAvers in the struggle between the Porte
and the Greeks df the Peloponnesus. The
Russian rainister deliberately acceded to a pro
tocol which, Avhile professing to maintain peace,
he knew would be the cause of war.
The Secret Correspondence places this matter
beyond dispute. These despatches, said to have
been taken from the archives of WarsaAV, are
unquestionably genuine. Neither Lord Aberdeen
nor Lord Palmerston, men surely capable of
forming a sound opinion on the subject, have
ever suspected them to be false. It is utterly
impossible that such documents, so full of the
individuality of the various rainisters to whom
they were ascribed, and so luminiously revealing
the policies of the European cabinets, could be

122 FOREIGN POLICY.
manufactured. They have the natural impress
of truth. They treat familiarly of questions
which none but those initiated into the raysteries
of diplomacy, and thoroughly masters of the
subject, could knoAV. Had they been deceptions,
a minister of any Court of Europe, or any
one having access to the Foreign Office of
England, could easily have proved them to be
deceptions. That this has not been done, that
they have repeatedly been quoted as autho
rities by leading politicians in Parliament,
ought to convince even the most sceptical of
understandings. One effect, indeed, which they
should have had, they do not seem to have pro
duced. As they incontestably proved that a
Russian Ambassador Avas a systeraatic irapostor;
that he did not hesitate to state deliberately that
Avhich he knew to be directly at variance with
truth, to quiet the apprehensions of the court to
Avhich he was sent, it is surprising how ministers
have, for many years after the publication of
these letters, trusted to the professions of the
Emperor Nicholas, and unhesitatingly declared
their confidence in his friendly intentions toAvards
Turkey and the Avhole world.
Frora 1826 to 1830, the raore the integrity
and independence of the Turkish Erapire was
threatened by the Eraperor, the more did his

THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE. 123
servants in Austria and England declare that the
integrity and independence of Turkey was an
object which he had sincerely at heart. The
more resolutely Avar was made by the Russian
generals, the more pacific were the declarations
of the Russian ambassadors. If the forces of the
Czar had entered Constantinople, ther-e can be
no doubt that the neAVS of the occupation of that
city would have reached Vienna and London a
very short while after Count Krasinsky and
Count Lieven had distinctly assured Prince
Metternich and Lord Aberdeen that the troops
of the disinterested and generous Eraperor of
Russia never had the slightest intention of
intruding into the Sultan's capital, and that
orders to retreat across the Danube had positively
been sent to General Diebitsch frora St. Peters
burg, If the ncAvs had been thoroughly authen
ticated, and explanations had been deraanded,
the Russian ambassador with a grave face would
certainly have maintained that it had happened
by mistake, and by mistake it would have been
positively announced that Nicholas had himself
awoke one fine morning and found himself in Con
stantinople. The garae of deceit would still have
been continued. This occupation of the metropolis
ofthe Greek Erapire would have been represented
as only teraporary : years, however, Avould have

124 FOREIGN POLICY.
elapsed, bale after bale of despatches would have
been Avritten, He after lie would have been told ;
and at length the Grand Duke Constantine, with
the title of a Greek Eraperor, would have been
left on the shores of the Bosphorus as his father's
viceroy. A careful perusal of a despatch of Count
Lieven to Canning, clearly establishes that the
only induceraent for Russia to act Avith France
and England Avas the hope that the Western
Powers would be obliged to raake comraon cause
Avith her against Turkey. War, not peace, des
potic selfishness, and not sympathy for an op
pressed people, were the motives Avhich Russia
entertained. The railitary reforms Avhich the
Sultan had energetically carried out, had given
the greatest alarm to Russia, and Avhatever
raight be the violations of the conventions of
Ackerraann, and the alleged injuries which Rus
sian subjects had received, it was for the pur
pose of destroying, as Count Pozzo di Borgo
plainly says, that physical and moral organi
sation which was in progress throughout the
Turkish Empire, and Avhich had never before
been witnessed, that determined the Emperor
upon war.* It was necessary that a vital at-
* Count Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, Nov. 28.
1828.

THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE. 125
tack should be made, while the work of inno
vation was yet crude, and the strength of the new
system still imraature. Count Lieven, even ven
tured, among other questions, to ask Canning,
before the treaty of July the 6th was concluded,
what would be the conduct of England, should
the Sultan refuse to comply with the terms pro
posed by the mediating powers ? * The English
minister, in a secret and confidential answer to
this communication, passed by this important
point, as one which he thought it " not essential
to dwell upon." This AA'as unwise. The contin
gency ought to have been foreseen, and distinctly
provided for, before the treaty was irrevocably
settled. In such important negotiations, nothing
ought to be left to chance. Although they Avere
pledged to act together, the English and Russian
ministers had very opposite designs. What Can
ning innocently calls "a work of conciliation and
peace," Count Nesselrode, with more sagacity,
pronounces in this correspondence, to be " a
crisis which must decide the future relations of
Russia with the Ottoman Government." f Every
measure which England took for the emanci
pation of Greece was impatiently welcomed by

* Despatch of Nov. 7. 1826.
15
27"

t Despatch of Nov. i^. 1826.

126 FOREIGN POLICY.
the Russian statesraan, who expressly says, that
his object was to place England in a position
frora which she could not possibly retreat. We
may well be surprised at the infatuation of our
ministers, Avhen they suffered themselves to be
entangled in such designs. Prince Metternich
distinctly declared, that the reason why he would
not join in the treaty for securing the indepen
dence of Greece was, because he plainly foresaw
that war would be the result. The battle of
Navarino soon confirraed the sagacious prog
nostications of the Austrian statesman. He
exerted hiraself indefatigably in the cause of
the Sultan, and could he have prevailed upon
the other poAvers, the Turkish Empire would,
even before the Treaty of Adrianople, have been
placed under a general European guarantee. He
positively declared to the Courts of France and
England, that he would sign no more treaties
between Russia and Turkey, " which are nothing
more than hollow truces, and leave in them the
seeds of new dissensions and new wars."*
How carae it then, that the intention of
Prince Metternich was frustrated, and that Russia
* These are his own words as they are reported by Count
Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode. (Secret Despatch of
December 14. 1828.)

THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE. 127
triumphantly succeeded, both in war and in
negotiation ? How came it, that the Treaty of
Adrianople, with so many clauses Avhich can
only be construed as fatal to the independence
of Turkey, and injurious to all the interests of
Europe, was signed? The answer is, that the
Treaty of Adrianople must be laid at the doors
of France, and Prussia, and the English Oppo
sition. The Duke of Wellington and Lord
Aberdeen fully shared in the apprehensions of
Prince Metternich ; every despatch in the secret
correspondence proves that they were not de
ceived, that their eyes were opened to the trea
chery, duplicity, and arabition of Russia, and
that they would have been ready to join in a
general Congress, to give effect to the project
of the Austrian chancellor. The English rainis
ters have no reason to regret the publication of
those diploraatie curiosities. So far frora offering
the leastcAridenceof connivance with Russia, these
papers show how decidedly they were opposed to
the Czar and his clever agents. One of the finest
tributes any statesman ever received to his ho
nesty, sagacity, and patriotism is given to the
Duke of Wellington by Pozzo di Borgo, in the
most valuable of all those secret despatches.
The artful diplomatist never supposed that the
Duke would see this composition ; but it is at the

128 FOREIGN POLICY.
present tirae peculiarly deserving of attention.
It proves incontestably Avhat the Duke's real
opinions were, how Httle his friendship for the
Russian Eraperor influenced his judgment as an
English statesman, and how his sterling honesty
and straightforward earnestness, backed by his
great military farae, awed even the most dex
terous of Russian intriguers.*
* " Our present situation will be appreciated with all its
advantages. The sacrifices we have made in order to obtain
them, although considerable, are by no means dispropor
tionate with the results ; and the magnitude of our resources-
displays itself still in a formidable manner to those even
who are most disposed to question them. Those truths,
M. le Comte, are evident to the French Government, whicli
has never mistaken them ; and to just and impartial persons
in this country. I will even add, from information I have
acquired, that they are equally so to the Duke of "Wellington.
This great soldier has never drawn serious consequences
from accidental successes, and from the unexpected resist
ance of the Turks. He has given to each event its degree
of importance, and has carefully avoided exaggerating its
effects. From the moment that he became aware of the
number of imperial troops that had passed the Danube, he
no longer, it is true, expected decisive results ; but he was
perfectly sensible that the relative superiority would remain
to our arms, and that discipline would triumph over enthu
siasm. It is this conviction which makes him foresee the
probability and the almost certainty of a new campaign,
and makes him apprehend the most disastrous consequences
to the Ottoman Empire ; because he thinks, with reason, that
experience will point to us the precautions we must take,
and that the Emperor has the means of preventing any from

THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE. 129
Far different, however, is the light in which
the leaders of the Opposition appear to Count
Lieven and Pozzo di Borgo. The Russian diplo
matists chuckled, as they well might, Avhen they
saw the eminent charapions of human freedom
lend themselves blindly to the worst schemes of
the tyrannical Eraperor of Russia. It was not
merely the existence of Turkey against which
the Russian arms were directed. The object
was even much greater. It was nothing less
than to place the whole of Europe, and especially
the freedom of the Western States, at the mercy
of the Czar. This is not the assertion of a
frantic visionary led astray by his vanity and
enthusiasra. Pozzo di Borgo hiraself, the cun
ning and calculating diplomatist, positively ac
knowledges to Count Nesselrode in his corres
pondence from Paris before the campaign of
1829 had begun, that the war was for the purpose
being neglected. I have acquired this information in a
positive manner from the Prince de Polignac, who has just
arrived from London, and who has communicated it to the
King and his Ministers ; and I am the more disposed to
place faith in it, because it is in harmony with that innate
sagacity which I have always found the Duke to possess
whenever he was called upon to exercise his judgment upon
questions relating to a profession in which he has excelled
in such a transcendent manner." — Secret Despatch from
Count Pozzo di Borgo. Dated Paris, 28th Nov. 1828.
K

130 FOREIGN POLICY.
" of confirming the influence of Russia on the
internal and external repose of the rest of
Europe." Hoav might those enlightened English
Liberals, who reprobated all the deeds of the
Holy Alliance, have been expected to act in
such a great European crisis ? The secret cor
respondence indicates with what eagerness the
debates in the English Parliaraent were read in
Russia, and what pleasure it gave to Count
Nesselrode and the Emperor Nicholas to find
that their policy did not want defenders, as
Count Lieven assures them, amongst the most
distinguished members of both Houses. Mr.
Brougham's vehement declamation against the
barbarism of Turkey ; Sir Jaraes Mackintosh's
observations on "the danger of any guarantee
in favour of the Ottoman Territory " ; and Lord
Palmerston's warning against an " Austro-
Turkish policy," were all imraediately reported
to St. Petersburg, and received with the great
est delight by the highest personages in the
Russian Governraent. The Eraperor of Russia,
in return, favoured his arabassadors with imperial
criticisms on the different specimens of English
rhetoric which had been sent for his perusal.
After studying the first of Lord Palmerston's
speeches on the affairs of Portugal, in which he
said that it was altogether out of the question

NICHOLAS AND PALMERSTON. 131
that England should go to war in defence of the
Sultan, and that an Austrian Alliance for main
taining the independence of Turkey was not
advisable, the Emperor Nicholas informed Count
Lieven of the gratification which the study of
that speech had given hira, and declared that
Lord Palraerston raust be regarded as one of the
greatest of English orators. The criticisra was
certainly just. But how far the sentiraents it
expressed, coinciding as these particular passages
did exactly Avith the Eraperor's own opinions,
assisted his appreciation of the speech, and
whether or not His Imperial Majesty's admira
tion of Lord Palraerston's eloquence has con
tinued up to the present tirae, there are not yet
means of ascertaining. Should the archives of
St. Petersburg, however, one day suffer the same
fate as those of Warsaw, and their contents be
disclosed to the English public, there can be no
doubt that they will afford an edifying exaraple
of political toleration. In Austria, a Liberal is
sure to be ranked as an eneray. But as long as
they are subservient to his arabitious intents,
enthusiasts of every description, politicians of
the most opposite principles. Sir James Mackin
tosh and Count Ficquelmont, M. Chateaubriand
and Mr. Cobden, have the impartial and cosmo-
K 2

132 FOREIGN POLICY.
politan applause of the orthodox Defender of
the Greek Faith.
The future historian Avill some day have to
record what an important part the Peace Society
has played on the breaking out of the great war
for the security of Europe. The Emperor of
Russia trusted to the orations of the fanatical
votaries of peace in 1853, as he forraerly trusted
to the speeches of the Opposition when he dic
tated the Treaty of Adrianople. Experience,
the surest of guides in political affairs, had
taught him that in 1829 the Duke of Wellington
and Lord Aberdeen, Avith their eyes open to the
consequences of the unfortunate treaty, had been
obliged to acquiesce in it ; and that even Sir
Robert Gordon, the brother of the English
Foreign Secretary, had advised the Sultan to
accept those hard conditions of peace rather
than continue a ruinous war. How could the
Northern Autocrat expect that the result would
have been different in the present day ? Were
not sorae of the raerabers of the Peace Society
as influential politicians as the noble lords and
honourable gentleraen Avho scouted the idea of
defending Turkey tAventy-six years ago ? Had
they not spoken the sense of their countrymen
in the great national struggle against monopoly
so that even the great and powerful government

INFLUENCE OF THE PEACE SOCIETY. 133
of Sir Robert Peel had been unable to offer a
successful resistance to the popular agitators ?
Were not the blessings of peace as obvious to
the multitude as those of cheap bread ? Could it
be anticipated that Mr. Cobden, so omnipotent
in his advocacy of one cause, Avould be so
powerless in another? Were not the principal
governments of the Continent as friendly to
Russia in 1853 as in 1829 ? In 1829 there Avas
the able Minister of Austria prepared to offer a
determined opposition to the attack on Turkey,
and the Austrian Empire was then powerful and
independent; but in 1853, with Austria almost
a dependency of Russia, and her politicians
bitterly hostile to England, the greatest obstacle
to the subjugation of the Sultan was removed.
And what was there to fear from the rest of
Europe ? What chance was there of any suc
cessful combination against Russia ? Prussia
was at this time, as in 1829, the ally and friend
ofthe Czar. A Napoleon had just ascended the
throne of France ; the just apprehensions of
England had been excited ; the English news
papers were almost unanimously reprobating in
the most unmeasured terms the new ruler of
France, and even Cabinet Ministers on the
hustings had given free utterance to the same
sentiraents. What probability Avas there that
K 3

134 FOREIGN POLICY.
an aUiance between France and England, Avhich
for twenty years had prevented the hollow truce
between Russia and Turkey from being osten
sibly disturbed, could again be cemented under
a Napoleon ? The English ministers would
doubtless protest against another invasion of
Turkey; but did not Lord Aberdeen himself
vigorously protest against the Treaty of Adri
anople without war having folloAved ?
This parallel between the state of Europe in
1829, and that at the moment when Prince
Menschikoff went on his celebrated mission to
Constantinople, which heralded the present war,
may show that there was nothing so wild and
imprudent in the recent attempt on the Ottoraan
Empire as has been represented. Appearances
were decidedly in favour of Russia. The mo
ment was well chosen. None who fairly con
sider the circumstances of the two epochs of
1829 and 1853, will venture to affirm that there
Avas much probability of a great European Avar
in defence of Turkey, after so many years of
peace, and so much passive submission to Rus
sian aggression. This was not the act of a
mad emperor ; there was much method in such
madness. The Peace Society must be blaraed for the
present Avar, as the Whigs, and not Lord Aber-

PARALLEL BETWEEN 1829 AND 1853. 135
deen, must be blamed for the Treaty of Adrian
ople. Had the Opposition of that day been as
conscious as the Ministers of the danger attend
ing Russian aggression, had the people been
then as unanimous for war as they were for
preserving peace, had the Liberals been as
enthusiastic for the Turks as they were for the
Greeks, the Governraent might have cordially
joined with Austria, and have defied the Russian
power. But to menace war, while resolved at
all hazards to maintain peace, to provoke danger,
and then to sneak out of it, would have been
utterly unworthy of any English ministry, and
especially of an administration in which the
Duke of Wellington wp^s prime minister. The
degree of ignorance Avhich has prevailed on the
negotiations of 1829, and on all the circura
stances relating to the Eastern question, is really
astonishing. Erainent politicians in the House
of Coraraons, Avho have been regarded as au
thorities on foreign policy, have spoken of Lord
Aberdeen as the maker of the very treaty against
which he protested. The minister who has been
accused of being in league with the Emperor of
Russia, was, in fact, far beyond his age, when in
1829 he saw the imperative necessity of resisting
all encroachment upon Turkey.*
* The author may be pardoned for stating that this chap-
* K 4

136 FOREIGN POLICY.
ter was written some months before the Treaty of Adrianople
was directly referred to by Lord Lyndhurst in the House of
Lords, and also before the despatch of Lord Aberdeen to
Lord Heytesbury was published. It is scarcely necessary to
add how much that remarkable despatch confirms the accu
racy and justice of the opinions here expressed. It is the
ablest and most conclusive exposure of the systematic ag
gression of Eussia ever drawn up by an English minister.
It also plainly states the most unpalatable truths to the
Eussian Government which were ever addressed from one
povver to another without being followed by a declaration of
war. Of the many volumes that have been written on the
policy of Eussia, this brief composition of Lord Aberdeen is
by far the most valuable. But this statesman never does
justice to himself when he speaks in Parliament. Even in
his explanation of the 6th July, he did not put forth half
the strength of his case. If all the circumstances of 1829,
and the prevailing opinions of politicians were considered,
the wisdom and foresight of the Minister must be acknow
ledged by every candid person. For the credit of English
gentlemen, it is to be hoped that the public have heard the
last repetition of those scandalous charges of " connivance"
which have been so readily bandied about, without the least
regard to common fairness, common candour, or common
sense.

137

CHAP. V.
THE AFFAIRS OP GREECE.  NEUTRALITY OP LORD ABER
DEEN IN THE CIVIL WAR OF PORTUGAL.  STATE OF
EUROPE IN 1830  RECOGNITION OP LOUIS PHILIPPE AS
KING OF THE FRENCH.  FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT.
The establishment of the kingdom of Greece was
the most arduous business of Lord Aberdeen
while he continued Foreign Secretary in the
ministry of the Duke of Wellington. The Em
peror of Russia, as our ministers soon found,
never had any intention of making Greece an
independent and powerful state. He opposed
the extension of the frontiei". He watched jea
lously any symptoms which it gave of national
life. He would rather permit the Sultan to
remain at Constantinople than see a real Bj^zan-
tine empire take the place of the Ottoman rule.
His policy it has ever been to prevent the groAvth
of a sound political organisation in any part
of the Turkish dominions, Avhich he regards,
whatever professions he may make, as naturally
his by inheritance. He considers himself as the
"K 5

138 FOREIGN POLICY.
guardian of Turkey ; if not his own possession,
he believes it to belong by right to his successors.
It may now without shame be acknowledged, that
there was some truth in the fear which the Op
position expressed that Lord Aberdeen did not
heartily approve of the policy which he fairly
carried out. As a traveller, and as a devoted
student of Greek literature, if ever the associa
tions of ancient history could have prevailed over
the calm wisdom of the statesman, they might
have done so in the person of Lord Aberdeen.
A quarter of a century earlier, he had assisted
to form the association of the Athenian Tra
vellers. He had been chosen President of the
Society of Antiquaries. He had travelled in
many lands. But neither the traveller nor the
antiquarian induced the Foreign Secretary to
entertain any very sanguine hopes for the con
stitutional freedom of Greece. Perhaps a per
sonal observation of the social condition of the
Morea had produced on him an effect directly
contrary to Avhat might have been expected. He
was not deceived by naraes. He knew how unfit
the descendants of Pericles and Themistocles
were for the duties of a regular constitutional
governraent after the fashion of the electors of
Marylebone. The result of the British expedition to Por-

CIVIL -WAR IN PORTUGAL. 139
tugal was, so far as it related to the maintenance
of the Portuguese constitution, scarcely more il
lustrious. This is however no reproach to the
minister by whom that expedition was sent out ;
for England was bound to repel all aggression
from the kingdom of Portugal. Our troops did
not go to preserve the constitution, though it
was the constitution which Avas really menaced.
They had not been withdrawn when Don Miguel,
Avithout foreign aid, made his first atterapt to
overthrow it. As our obligations were to the
kingdora and not to the constitution, our mi
nisters did not consider themselves bound to
interfere, and soon the English people saw a
usurper, and a despot seize, with the approba
tion of an influential portion of the people of
Portugal, on the delegated inheritance of the
infant Queen, Donna Maria.
At that time the Liberal opinions which were
soon to be triumphant in England Avere rapidly
progressing, and many respectable politicians
both in Parliament and in the country, were in
dignant at what they believed to be the apathy
of Lord Aberdeen. They stigmatised hira as a
secret partisan of Don Miguel, and of despotisra,
because he preserved an unsAverving and unsym-
pathising neutrality. Then for the first time
Lord Palmerston and Lord Aberdeen stood in

140 FOREIGN POLICY.
opposition to each other ; then for the first time
the Liberal party began systematically to condemn
the course pursued by the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. The minister had still a power
ful majority in both Houses of Parliament, and as
the Opposition had been so long out of poAver,
and the Tories had so long steadUy supported
Conservative governments, the Cabinet evidently
never suspected for a raoraent that their majority
would fail thera. They were far too confident.
In the days of Lord Castlereagh it was in vain
that Mackintosh and Horner declaimed against
the foreign policy of the Cabinet. But although
the ministers did not see it, a great change had
taken place in the mind of the nation. The
settlement of the Roman Catholic question had
severed for ever from the government a sincerely
religious multitude, who had long supported
thera solely for the sake of excluding frora Par
liament those who acknowledged the spiritual
supremacy of the Pope. For many years the
ministers who had repealed the Roman CathoHc
disabilities had resisted both that measure and a
Reform Bill. The tAVO propositions had gene
rally been classed together as dangerous inno
vations. Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wel
lington had confessed that they were wrong in
resisting the one; why should they not also be

NEUTRALITY OF LORD ABERDEEN. 141
wrong in opposing the other ? The reputation
of the Government for political sagacity had de
parted ; and the great body of the people becarae
Reforraers, both at home and abroad.
Much, indeed, raay be said for the Government.
It was easier to declaim against Lord Aberdeen
than to point out how he could have acted in any
other raanner. Had Canning been in office, it is
more than doubtful whether he would have done
otherwise than the then Secretary for Foreign
Affairs. The neutrality of Lord Aberdeen in the
affairs of Portugal can never be considered, what
ever the Opposition raight assert, an abandonraent
of the system of foreign policy which Canning in
augurated, and which the Duke of Wellington, on
taking office as prirae minister, solemnly pledged
himself and his government to pursue. When the
British troops left England for Lisbon, Canning
expressly said they went simply to defend the Por
tuguese territories from invasion. He most cau
tiously guarded himself from guaranteeing the
new constitution. He foresaw that it would not
be permanent, and that it might produce civil
commotions. In these domestic contentions he
had determined that England should not in any
manner interfere. Our neutrality was then a
mere question of policy, as in the case of the
attack on the Spanish constitution by the French

142 FOREIGN POLICY.
Legitimists; and it cannot be said that our
interests were more directly interfered with in
the one than in the other. England might re
gret the violation of the Portuguese constitution,
as unquestionably she regretted the establish
raent of despotism in Spain. But she could not
hinder what she might sincerely lament.
The French army never would have been suc
cessful in Spain had not the raajority of the
Spaniards sympathised with the invaders. Don
Miguel never would have set the constitutionaHsts
at defiance had the Portuguese sincerely desired
the blessing which Don Pedro had bequeathed to
thera. In both kingdoms, the victory of despo
tism can only be explained by adraitting what
Canning and Lord Aberdeen asserted, that the
people really at the raoment preferred arbitrary
monarchs. Surprising as this may seem to us,
when Ave think of our love of constitutional
freedom, it is not so singular when the history
of these particular countries is reraerabered. AU
their traditions were monarchical ; they had both
cruelly suffered by men who called themselves
constitutionaHsts; the most glorious period of
Spanish history began after the Cortes of CastiUe
had been dissolved by military violence ; the new
constitution of Portugal was associated in the
minds of the multitude with the loss of the

STATE OF EUROPE IN 1830. 143
Brazils, and it was the gift of one whom they
could not regard as their national sovereign.
The reaction against republican agitation had
reached its climax in the spring of 1830. Des
potism Avas once more the fashion ; society
seemed in the sarae state as in the days before
the Bastille fell ; through years of blood and
confusion vainly the patriot appeared to have
struggled, vainly the hero to have fought, vainly
the raartyr to have died. The ardent but un
wise assertors of freedom had been put doAvn in
Naples, Spain, and Portugal ; the King of France
was closely allied with the Czar of Russia ; the
disciples of Ignatius Loyola once more crowded
round the thrones of kings ; and the generous
aspirations of mankind Avere in danger of being
once more stifled by -the raonk's black cowl. East
and west, north and south, the soldier was
abroad, not to protect governraents frora foreign
eneraies, but frora the indignant hatred of their
OAvn subjects. With the spirit of freedom the
spirit of loyalty also appeared to have fled from
the earth ; Europe Avas prostrate in a duU and
unnatural trance ; the iron age of absolutism
seemed to have come ; an age without hope,
without love, Avithout faith, without reverence,
but also without rebellion. Millions of armed
men, thousands of dungeons, racks and gibbets, the

144 FOREIGN POLICY.
systematic and harmonious efforts of raany pro
found statesraen had been engaged in bringing
about this delightful era : and with scarcely a
rausket being fired, or a single warning given, in
a raoment it passed aAvay.
The ordinances of the 25th July, by Avhich
the French Charter was suspended and virtually
abrogated, boldly set the lovers of constitu
tional freedom at defiance. They calraly took
up the challenge Avhich the feeble hands of
Charles the Tenth and his Jesuits had cast at
their feet. Paris put forth its strength. The
contest was not for a moment doubtful. The
¦ Bourbons were driven from the throne, and the
popular convulsion in which the restored raon
archy disappeared, spread throughout Europe.
At the first rumour of the expulsion of Charles
the Tenth frora France, the Czar of Russia put
his legions in motion to invade France once
more, and place the ancient dynasty on the
throne by force of -arms. Nicholas never hesi
tated ; he took it for granted that what he and
his allies had once done, they could ahvays do.
He considered hiraself the Captain General ofthe
Holy AUiance, and thought it his duty to check
all popular outbreaks, however much they might
have been provoked, and however rauch justice
might be on their side. But ncAvs of tremendous

RECOGNITION OF LOUIS PHILIPPE. 145
iraport reached his ears. The Duke of Orleans
had been placed on the French throne, which was
thus identified with popular freedora, and the hoav
sovereign had been recognised by the English
Government, Avith the Duke of WeUington, the
friend of sovereigns, at its head. This intelli
gence imraediately brought the hosts of the Czar
to a stand. At the sight of England crossing
the path of despotisra, all the formidable strength
of the Holy AUiance was poAverless, and the
Cossacks slowly retraced their steps.
This recognition of the throne of the barri
cades by Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of
Wellington, had a most decisive effect. The
moral weight of England was sufficient to
paralyse the right arm of absolutism ; the ela
borate machinery of oppression which had been
brought to such exquisite perfection was broken
to pieces, and a mighty impulse was given to
the cause of nationality and freedom throughout
the world. The Czar Avas surprised that the
Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen should
have acted so readily in opposition to what he
supposed to be their settled principles. Had he
reaUy been acquainted with the characters of the
two statesraen, or even laiown the condition of
the nation which they governed, he would have
seen that it was impossible for them to haA'e
L

146 FOREIGN POLICY.
done otherwise. But recent events have shoAvn
that notAvithstanding the vaunted omniscience
of Russian diplomacy, Nicholas is extremely
ignorant of the social condition and the feelings
of England, and even of the real characters and
principles of politicians whom he ought most
especially to know. As it is possible to give too
fine an edge to a sword, it is also possible for a
diplomatist to be too skilful. A Russian emis
sary frequently believes he is deceiving others,
while he is only deceiving himself and his
master. Though the English ministers had reason to
distrust the Bourbons, though the close alliance
between Charles the Tenth and Nicholas was the
cause of sorae anxiety to thera, though they had
even begun to suspect that they had been deceived
when they gave credence to the assurance of the
French Arabassador that the expedition to
Algiers was not undertaken for the purpose of
conquest, these were not the raotives which
induced the Prirae Minister to acknowledge the
government of Louis Philippe. The Duke of
Wellington and Lord Aberdeen did not fear the
combined hostihty of France and Russia. It was
from no hysterical apprehension of this nature,
Avhatever M. Louis Blanc and Sir Archibald
Alison may believe, that our Governraent then

RECOGNITION OF LOUIS PHILIPPE. 147
acted. The English historian who has written
more than thirty volumes on the affairs of
Europe since the French Revolution, and still
can credit such a fable, has yet to learn the
alphabet of state policy. The ministers acted
on those plain principles which were first an- -
nounced by the Duke of Wellington at the Con
gress of Verona, and from which they had really
never deviated nor thought of deviating.
Had the government of Charles the Tenth been
as friendly to England as it was secretly hos
tile, our ministers would still not have shrunk
frora acknowledging Louis Philippe as King of
the French. No English Cabinet could have
refused to recognise the justifiable departure
frora the direct line of succession, and the es
tablishment of a constitutional raonarchy. The
Duke of Orleans had long been regarded as the
future sovereign of France. The exaraple of
England had been frequently quoted as showing
the advantages of such a governraent, even
before Charles the Tenth had ascended the
throne ; and in the event of the Bourbons being
dethroned, the English rainisters had never con
templated the possibility of this country going to
war to restore to them again that power Avhich
they evidently knew not how to use. They had
certainly been most ungrateful to England.
L 2

148 FOREIGN POLICY.
They had been just as forgetful of the benefits
Ave had conferred upon thera, as our other allies.
By the confession of Chateaubriand, and other
French legitiraatists, we have since their fall learnt
what we had to expect. War Avith England
was certainly contemplated. The greatest re
proach that has been raade to the Napoleonists
and the Republicans Avas that should they ever
be in the ascendant, the treaties of Vienna would
be considered as so much waste paper, and Avar
begun to extend the French frontier to the
Rhine. We have now witnessed both a Repub
lican and a Napoleonist adrainistration. By
both we have seen the national faith preserved,
and the treaties of Vienna still accepted. What
the most violent of those Avho were called
revolutionists have not done, the Bourbons
meditated doing. We knoAV that they were
inclined to put the axe to the roots of their oAvn
tree of life. We know that they had determined
to set the stipulations of the Congress of Vienna
at defiance, and, with an infatuation almost in
credible, revive the ambitious projects which
both Louis the Fourteenth and Napoleon were
unable to execute. Their punishment was just.
They despised the alliance of England, and
servilely courted Russia ; they have now not a
friend or well-wisher in this country, and are

RECOGNITION OF LOUIS PHILIPPE. 149
finally expelled frora the rich inheritance of
their ancestors. Their intiraacy with Russia
has only rendered their restoration to France
hopeless; there is not a Frenchraan Avith any
real patriotic feeling in his breast who Avould
not spend the last drop of his blood to save his
country from the degradation of accepting a
sovereign from the hands of the Czar.
It raust be regarded as a fortunate circurastance
that Lord Aberdeen should have been Foreign
Minister when the new king was proclairaed at
Paris, and should thus have given such a check to
the imperious policy of Russia. It rendered the
breach between England and the Holy Alliance
complete. It separated this country for ever
from the absolute monarchies. That this recog
nition of the Duke of Orleans as King should
have frustrated the plans of Nicholas, proves hoAV
straightforward was the policy of the English
minister, and that so far from being the accom
plice of the Czar at this time, throughout the
two years and a half Lord Aberdeen held office,
he had been invariably opposed to Russia. In
May, 1828, he had deliberately acceded to an
administration pledged to maintain the Turkish
Empire as necessary to the balance of power in
Europe ; and his last great public act as Foreign
Minister was to establish friendly relations Avith
L 3

150 FOREIGN POLICY.
the new French^king whom the Czar would have
been glad to hurl from his throne.
The news of the abdication of Charles the
Tenth and the election of Louis PhiHppe reached
England a foAV days after Parliament had been
dissolved on the accession of William the Fourth.
The popular party Avere delighted. On every
hustings this change in France was the theme
of declamation in favour of freedom; and as
England had a new sovereign and a new Par
liament, the people exerted themselves to place
in power a ncAV Ministry. The Tories were no
longer enthusiastic about the Duke of Wellington,
since he had conceded Catholic Eraancipation.
The Ministry fell. But it raust be reraerabered
that as the appointment of Lord Aberdeen as
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was not
occasioned by any question of foreign policy, so
the fall of the Wellington adrainistration and
the installation of Lord Palraerston in the Foreign
Office was also exclusively on a domestic subject.
It Avas the desire for a reform in our internal
affairs which dismissed the Duke of Wellington
and the Earl of Aberdeen, and carried the Whigs
and Lord Palmerston to Downing Street on the
stream of popular enthusiasra.

151

CHAP. VI.
LORD PALMERSTON AS FOREIGN SECRETARY  HIS PREVIOUS
CAREER  FRIENDSHIP WITH FRANCE  HOLLAND AND
BELGIUM.  EUSSO-DUTCH LOAN.  EFFECTS OF EALSE
ECONOMY. — TREATY OF UNKIAR SKELESSI.  NEW KING
DOM OF GREECE. — SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.  THE QUAD-
•' EUPLE ALLIANCE. — PEACE AT ANY PRICE.
The minister who now assumed the respon
sibility of Foreign Affairs, and Avho has been for
twenty-five years prominently before the world,
had served such an apprenticeship to the business
of administration as perhaps no other statesman
had ever passed through. There are instances
of sorae of the relatives of the first generation of
Elizabethan rainisters having been initiated in
childhood into the mysteries of diploraacy, and
designed frora their cradles to fill the highest
offices of state. But they owed their position
to faraily influence. They were connections
of Burleigh and his colleagues, and the rank
Avhich many of them attained was not always
according to their merits. Though an Irish peer.
Lord Palmerston had not many powerful friends
I- 4

152 FOREIGN POLICY.
to push him over the heads of able rivals. He
owed his appointraent to the important post
of Secretary at War entirely to the reputation
Avhich he so early acquired. For nearly twenty
years he perforraed the duties of that department
with such efficiency and success as may perhaps
have been equalled, but have certainly never been
surpassed. He was not the slave of routine, but
a zealous adrainistrative reforraer. The intricate
details of military finance, and the regulations
of the array Avere subjected to his careful super
vision; and immense iraproveraents were effected,
for which he neither received nor expected
popular applause. Fcav people but those inti
mately conversant with this department, ever
knew how much Lord Palmerston had done for
the efficiency of the service, or even had the least
idea of his great administrative abilities. When
he entered the War Office he found everything
in the greatest confusion ; but after his long
tenure of this important place he left it a model.
of order and industry.
At this tirae Lord Palmerston troubled hira
self very little about the personal differences
between Castlereagh and Canning. He had not
yet become the ardent friend of Canning, and
he confined his activity to his office.- He Avas the
Secretary at War, and Secretary at War he con-

LORD PALMERSTON. 153
tinned to be until it appeared that Lord Palraer
ston and this departraent could never be disunited.
Through all the season of youth and early raan-
hood, through all the changes of adrainistrations,
through all the vicissitudes of erapires, in war
and in peace, Lord Palmerston reraained Secre
tary at War. During that tirae the most me
morable events in European history occurred;
the most iraportant doraestic and foreign ques
tions were discussed; while year after year he sat
silent throughout the greatest debates, year after
year he contented hiraself with moving the array
estiraates: in discussions on foreign policy, Avhen
Lord Castlereagh was Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, he scarcely ever opened his lips. Such
taciturnity, when Lord Palmerston's powers as
an orator and his actions in future years are
considered, is truly wonderful and almost incre
dible. When Canning becarae Foreign Minister, Lord
Palraerston's consciousness of his great abilities
slowly awakened. He gradually overcame what
must be called, however surprising it may
seem, his habitual modesty. He spoke well on
the affairs of Spain. He spoke well and more
frequently on other topics. He began to an
nounce sorae decided opinions on the political
and coraraercial questions of the day. For Mr.

154 FOREIGN POLICY. .
Canning he now felt Avarm admiration, and ad
hered to him Avith generous fidelity when this
injured statesman forraed his ministry, and so
many influential Tory politicians sent in their
resignations and positively refused to serve under
a Prime Minister favourable to the claims of the
Roraan Catholics. Lord Palmerston had now a
seat in the Cabinet, though he still held his old
office. On the death of the Prirae Minister he
reraained Secretary at War under Lord Goderich,
and even seeraed to take a new lease of the same
place under the Duke of Wellington. But at
the raoment when it raight have been confidently
reckoned that Lord Palraerston Avould be Secre
tary at War for nineteen or twenty years longer,
he suddenly resigned with the other friends of
Mr. Canning. He gave an extreraely graceful
explanation of the reasons why he followed his
friend Mr. Huskisson out of office, declaring
that he_ fully adopted that gentleraan's com
raercial principles, and, as he distrusted his OAvn
powers, had taken him for his guide. The un
pretending demeanour of Lord Palmerston after
so many years of official services, at this crisis of
his political life, offers a reraarkable contrast to
the forwardness of other politicians Avho, after a
few months of parliamentary experience, and
sometimes as soon as they are elected, represent

LORD PALMERSTON IN OPPOSITION. 155
themselves as capable of leading the House of
Coraraons. " It may be thought presump
tuous," he said, " to imagine it of iraportance to
any one in the House or elsewhere, to know why
so humble an individual as I am accepted or
retired from office ; but it will be satisfactory,
at least to me, to set myself right with the
public." Such was Lord Palraerston on leaving
the Ministry. His successes had all been legiti
mate. With a little more pretension he might
long before have vindicated his claims to one of
the highest posts in the Government.
He was now for the first time in opposition.
Deprived of his office, the House of Coraraons
becarae the sphere of his activity. His arabition
was fully roused, and the Duke of Wellington
and the Cabinet soon had reason to regret the
day on which they permitted their modest and
retiring Secretary at War to leave the adminis
tration. Without an effort, and without giving
the Government any notice of what they had to
expect frora hira, he stood forth as one of the
ablest debaters and most effective speakers of
the House of Coraraons. But there was nothing
captious or paltry in his opposition. When the
Ministers brought in the great bill for enfran
chising the Roraan Catholics, Lord Palraerston
nobly defended Sir Robert Peel from the attacks

156 FOREIGN POLICY.
of those who Avere norainally supporters of the
Government, and said that so far from deserving
the taunts which had been levelled at him for
his inconsistency, his conduct on manfully at
tempting the settleraent of the question was "the
greatest and most glorious portion of his career."
Like Lord Aberdeen, Lord Palmerston had
always been the advocate of Roraan Catholic
Emancipation ; his speech on the second reading
of the bill was one of the ablest ever delivered on
the question, and powerfully contributed to the
final triumph of the measure.
So influential was his support to this pro
position of the Government. His criticisms on
their foreign policy were not less effective,
and it tasked all Sir Robert Peel's abilities to
raeet the antagonist who noAV took the leading
part in the discussions on the affairs of
Europe. Since the death of Canning, there had
been no speeches on foreign policy worthy of
being corapared with Lord Palraerston's two
great orations on the troubles of Portugal.
Their oratorical raerits are very high ; in sorae
respects they are even superior to the best of
Canning's speeches on alraost the same subject;
for they are less artificial, and display a vein of
genuine manly eloquence, without any mere
rhetorical refinement. Their effect was great:

POLICY OF A FOREIGN MINISTER. 157
they reverberated throughout England, sank
deep into the hearts of thousands, and announced
Lord Palraerston as the coraing Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.
To enter into any detail of the vast European
transactions in which Lord Palmerston has been
engaged, would occupy many volumes, and
might even then be far from satisfactory. Little
of the principles and policy of a Foreign Minister,
is to be learnt from rows of Annual Registers ;
still less can any extracts frora speeches delivered
in the House of Coramons give a just idea of
his career. The Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, when he speaks in Parliament, in reality
addresses the whole civilized world. He is
obliged to suppress much that in other circum
stances he would gladly utter, and to say much
that, if not altogether false, is at least only
parallel with the truth. He is compelled to
speak with the reservation, and frequently with
the insincerity, of a diplomatist. Yet there raust
be a clue to a course of policy ; and with a little
judgraent and patience it raay be unfolded. A
rapid glance at the raost important affairs in
their order, as they arise, will indicate much that
is not to be seen written in State Papers, or printed
in Hansard's Debates. The principle ofthe philo
sophy of Lord Bacon applied to a long series
of foreign affairs, is a sure guide, and must

158 FOREIGN POLICY.
conduct an impartial observer to the truth.
There is seldom only one course open to a mi
nister. He is generally obliged to make a choice
between evils. He never can answer all the ob
jections of his opponents. It is easj'' for an in
genious mind to find poAverful arguments against
any policy. Gerard Harailton believed that so
rauch could be said both for and against any
measure, that it was impossible to decide which
course was the best ; and he contentedly lived
without any earnest convictions. But this was
the reasoning of a weak, a timid, an abject
spirit. To do any good, or be worth anything,
Ave must heartily believe that in politics, as in
every other business in this world, there is a
right and a Avrong, a truth and a falsehood.
Making aUowance for difficulties, not expecting
impossibilities, and avoiding all raere abstrac
tions, we raay thus fairly estimate the characters
of our statesmen. The past cannot be recalled ;
and instead of troubling ourselves about hoAV
raany courses were open to a Minister, we may
endeavour to understand that Avhich he has taken.
Not what he might have done, but what he has
done may be profitably considered. He is thus
tried by his own standard ; he is the mirror of
his own glory or shame.
Amid the reform excitement. Lord Palmerston

LORD PALMERSTON FOREIGN MINISTER. 159
commenced his career as Foreign Minister. The
whole of Europe was in comraotion; frora France,
as a centre, the spirit of Reform had pervaded
the Continent. Then was seen how futile had
been the efforts of the Holy Alliance, how little
good the treaties of Vienna had accomplished,
how inflararaable was the popular spirit which
was supposed to have been extinguished. Bel
gium threw off the yoke of Holland ; the Poles
rose against Russia ; over the Alps and through
Italy the revolutionary contagion rapidly spread ;
the thrones of the Peninsula tottered ; the re
motest corners of Europe felt the effects of the
wild explosion.
Here was a world in which even the abilities
of the greatest of huraan intellects raight find it
an arduous task to govern. The first act of the
English Minister was to draw the bonds of
friendship closer between England and France.
The two Governraents began to be considered as
allies. For the first tirae a French alliance was
spoken of with respect. It was indeed a critical
moment. The peace which had endured for
fifteen years seeraed about to end ; war not only
appeared, probable, but was believed to be inevi
table. The good understanding established
between the tAvo Western PoAvers, at that
crisis unquestionably saved Europe frora this

160 FOREIGN POLICY.
calaraity ; and to Lord Palmerston is due the
credit of having, notAvithstanding the sneers of
politicians who foretold a speedy quarrel, per
severed to perfect that union. The necessity of
such a concert was indeed evident ; approaches
to it were made by Lord Aberdeen when he re
cognised the government of Louis Philippe : it
was no new policy, no departure frora a former
systera. Circurastances, more influential than
statesraen, Avere gradually bringing about this
friendly feeling : England and France had com
mon objects and coraraon eneraies ; whoever
raight have been the rainister, such a friendship
between the two great neighbouring nations
must have been forraed.
Had other councils prevailed, Belgium must
have imraediately becorae again a battle field
between thera, and every European governraent
might have joined in this shock of arms. The
king of the French saw the importance of con
ciliating England ; the time had not yet come
when he durst venture to display any dynastic
views on other countries and set the Enghsh
Ministry at defiance.
The affairs of Belgium were soon the most
pressing business of the Foreign Secretary.
In at length deciding that it was irapossible to
unite Holland and Belgium again under the

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM. 161
sceptre of the King of the Netherlands, Lord Pal
merston did not, any more than in his friendship
Avith France, carry out a new line of policy.
Before the late Government resigned, the King
of Holland had appealed to the Treaty of Vienna,
and Lord Aberdeen had distinctly refused to assist
him with the forces of England in reducing the
Belgians to submission. When the Conference of
the Great Powers raet in London, a coraplete se
paration Avas not indeed decided upon ; but it Avas
seen that in thus departing from the treaties of
Vienna, statesmen only conforraed to the cir
curastances of the case ; the folly of this arrange
ment, the masterpiece of Lord Castlereagh's
genius, had been fully exemplified : a permanent
union between Holland and Belgium was clearly
an irapossibility. The difficulties of a final
settlement, owing to the King of Holland on one
side and to the Belgian people on the other, were
very great, and for a long tirae seeraed insuper
able. That all obstacles were at length over
come, that a prince connected with England was
placed on the throne of Belgium, that religious
differences were reconciled, and a happy and
prosperous constitutional raonarchy founded,
aU this was the work of Lord Palraerston;
and when he is reproached with the failure of
M

162 FOREIGN POLICY.
other constitutional experiments, it is but justice
to reraeraber those which have succeeded.
No insurrection ever proraised less to end in
the perraanent establishment of a moderate con
stitutional monarchy than that of Belgium ; none
has ever had happier results. The Belgians
were not indeed very grateful to their bene
factor; because, while asserting their indepen
dence, he would not permit them to deprive the
Dutch sovereign of territories Avhich peculiarly
and incontestably belonged to Holland. There
Avas nothing in the wisdom and foresight of the
men who took the leading part in the revolt, to
hinder it from terminating like many other in
surrections of that year. The agitators were
Avild and reckless. At one tirae they even
elected the Duke of Nemours as king, although
they must have known that such a choice would
involve thera in a European war, withdraw from
them the raoral support of England, and menace
the ncAV kingdom Avith destruction. The steady
hand of Lord Palraerston steered their frail
vessel through all the sunken rocks' and dan
gerous shallows which threatened to wreck it
before it reached the open sea, and it now sails
bravely along in the Avake of England, defying
the fury of the elements.
When the Treaty of Vienna, by Avhich Bel-

THE RUSSO-DUTCH LOAN. 163
giura and Holland were connected, was signed,
England undertook to support the credit of the
new state. Fortresses were to be built, debts
were to be paid, ready raoney was to be found ;
and hence originated the payraent of that cele
brated Russo-Dutch Loan which has so much
displeased our liberal and economical politicians.
The wisdom of the agreement may be questioned.
It was supposed that the creation of the King
dom of the Netherlands was essentially an
English interest ; and that when we thus con
sented to pay at stated and recurring periods
part of the debt to Russia, we gave to the Czar
a powerful raotive for not taking any measures
likely to disturb the quiet of this political crea
tion of Lord Castlereagh and the Congress of
Vienna. But in spite of all the fine phrases of
diplomatists, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, if
it could have endured, must, by bridling France
and Prussia, have been as much a Russian as an
EngHsh interest. It is certain that when the
Czar had any good reason for becoming the
enemy of this kingdora, the mere payraent of a
sum of money would scarcely convert him into a
sincere friend. And this payraent of gold to
induce one Power not- to act contrary to the
interests of another, can scarcely be distinguished
from a tribute. A great nation such as England
M 2

164 FOREIGN POLICY.
should surely be able to protect her own in
terests without subsidising other sovereigns that
they may respect thera ; and to pay for friend
ship is in reality to give a preraium to hostility.
The moment too that it might become of vital
iraportance to Russia to oppose the welfare of
the Netherlands, it required no prophetic facul
ties to see that the few raillions which our
rainisters added to her treasury would not pre
vent her frora being the antagonist of this small
state. But whether the policy of the transaction was
good or bad, Avhen the treaty had been con
cluded, there can be no doubt that the honour
of England was pledged to the punctual pay
raent of her share in the loan. After the sepa
ration from Holland had been decided upon at
the Conference in London, Lord Palraerston still
continued to pay the raoney as it becarae due,
though it had been expressly stipulated in the
treaty that all payments should cease in the
event of the provinces of Belgium being dis
united frora Holland, and though the Dutch had
refused to pay their share of the debt, when the
Great Powers consented to sever Belgiura from
the dorainions of the King of the Netherlands.
The public out of doors were angry. The Op
position eagerly seized the opportunity for an

THE RUSSO-DUTCH LOAN. 165
attack on the Reform Ministry. Powerful as
the Whigs were at that time, many of their own
supporters voted against thera, and they de
feated the resolution which Mr. Herries brought
forward conderaning the course the Foreign
Secretary had taken, by a very sraaU raajority.
Lord Palmerston defended himself ably. He
contended that nations should be raore li
beral in their interpretation of pecuniary en
gagements than individuals ; that such agree
ments as that for the liquidation of the Russo-
Dutch loan should be construed according to the
spirit and not merely according to the form. It
might appear strange, he said, that we should at
one tirae pay Russia for supporting the union of
Belgiura and Holland, and at another tirae pay
her for supporting their separation. But after
all, the principle was the same. It was at one
tirae considered to be the interest of England
that the Low Countries should be united; it was
now the interest of England that they should be
separated ; Russia now as before had given the
assurance that she would adapt her policy re
garding Belgium to our interests; hence the
spirit of the former treaty remained, although it
had apparently become a dead letter. The money
was therefore paid, and continues now to be
paid, even when England is at war with Russia.
M 3

166 FOREIGN POLICY.
While this may demonstrate the absurdity of the
original agreement, it shows how anxious our
rainisters were to preserve the faith of England,
and how scrupulously they shunned any pre
tences for evading pecuniary engagements.
At the sight of such an exaraple of national
integrity, contrasted with the spectacle of public
swindling which other countries have exhibited,
Englishraen may well be proud of their nation
and their statesraen. Such conduct was wise
and upright. The saving of one or tAVO millions,
had we repudiated the debt, would have been
wretched economy, since the national credit raight
have been injured. By taking advantage of the
change of circumstances to declare ourselves
free frora the obligation, it is easy to calculate
what we should have saved, but very difficult
to estiraate what we raight have lost. National
credit is national Avealth ; and the honour of the
state the inheritance of the citizen.*
* As these pages are passing through the press, the
Eusso-Dutch Loan has again been the subject of discussion
in Parliament. Lord Dudley Stuart moved certain resolu
tions, to the eflPect that as Eussia had flagrantly violated the
Treaty of Vienna by not keeping the Sulina mouth of the
Danube free from obstructions, the payment of the loan
should be suspended. Sir William Molesworth, in a very
luminous speech, opposed the resolutions ; and the House,
by a great majority, ratified the opinion of the Government,

THE RUSSO-DUTCH LOAN. 167
Count Ficquelmont himself does not venture
to charge us with dexterously slipping out of
our pecuniary obligations. This strict adher-
that even when we are at war, and though unquestionably
Eussia had been guilty of repeated violations of those
treaties to which her faith was pledged, a regard to public
credit required that the payment should be continued. This
decision was right. Sir William Molesworth's arguments, in
reply to Lord Dudley Stuart, were unanswerable. But they
did not in the slightest degree prove that the original ar
rangement was either politic or wise. The four colonies
which England received were not worth six millions, nor
one million ; and to represent our agreement to pay part of
the Eusso-Dutch Loan, as the payment of a sum of money
for the purchase of these colonies, is really to give a most
mistaken idea of the whole transaction. If the exertions of
Eussia for the independence of Holland justified the pay
ment by other states, of the loan which she had con
tracted in that country, all the kingdoms and empires
of the Continent would have been much more justified
in taking upon themselves some portion of the immense
national debt which England had contracted in the course
of the struggle for European independence. What were
the "heavy expenses which Eussia had incurred in de
livering the Netherlands from the power of the enemy,"
to the enormous liabilities which England herself had in
curred by fighting the battles of the whole civilised world ?
If England only obeyed the instinct of self-preservation in
thus stubbornly carrying on the contest, did Eussia do more
when, at the eleventh hour, after Napoleon had been be
trayed by fortune and by his allies, she united for tho
deliverance of Holland ? In fact, all this is mere cant. The
idea of giving to Eussia " a strong pecuniary motive to
identify her policy with ours respecting Belgium," is ridi-
M 4-

168 FOREIGN POLICY.
ence to the treaties of Vienna which our minister
then displayed, Avas worthy of the respect of
the civilised Avorld. But it did not find imita
tors. Russia especially, who had gained so
much from these arrangements, and who has
always been so ready to insist on the conformity
of other Powers, Avas even then setting them at
defiance. No person can read the particular
Treaty by which Russia acquired nearly all
that had not yet been partitioned of Poland,
and deny that a free constitution and the rights
of the Czar Avere expressly connected together.
The sarae treaty Avhich gave Poland to Russia
gave a constitution to the Poles. Until 1830 a
constitution of some sort they possessed. It
could not indeed be called free ; it had been
violated at the raere pleasure of the Czar ; his
actions had clearly showed that he applied the
culous. The truth is, that the Minister who first agreed to
pay the Eusso-Dutch Loan was foolish, and the people of
England for many generations, until the year 1915, must
pay for his folly. Yet Lord Dudley Stuart was mistaken in
wishing to see the payment of this loan suspended under
present circumstances. The motives of this generous noble
man are, however, always pure ; his sentiments are generally
exalted ; his enthusiasm in the cause pf the oppressed is
worthy of all respect. It is good that there should be such
men in the House of Commons, firmly attached to great
principles, and occasionally obliged to dissent from Ministers,
but scornfully refusing to play the discreditable game of
nominal leaders of Opposition.

POLAND. 169
principles of the Holy Alliance to Poland, and
considered the constitution as depending upon
his convenience. The cruelties which the Grand
Duke Constantine inflicted on the people who in
an evil hour had becorae Russian subjects, would
be thought incredible were they not estab
lished by incontestable evidence. When the
news of the successful revolution in France ar
rived at Warsaw, the aspirations for freedom
which the Poles raust ever indulge until they are
extirpated, induced thera also, with the rest
of the down-trodden millions of Europe, to
attempt the recovery of their independence.
Heated by resistance, sanguine from their first
successes, and wildly expecting assistance frora
France and England, they at length forraally
renounced aU allegiance to the Czar. But the
cruel yoke of the Cossack was not to be
shaken off. In spite of the treraendous efforts
Avhieh the intrepid patriots, with the hereditary
valour of their race, made for their freedora, they
were at last defeated: WarsaAv surrendered, and
vengeance A\'as taken. The constitution was
subverted. The Poles were now formally treated
as a conquered people.
They had unquestionably acted imprudently
in pronouncing the deposition of their tyrant
before they were certain of achieving their inde
pendence. They committed the same mistake

170 FOREIGN POLICY.
as the Hungarians did some years later. Even
Lord Palmerston acknowledged that they were
the aggressors ; but he anxiously endeavoured
to befriend them as much as was in his power.
Before the Russian troops entered Warsaw, and
while the result of the struggle was undecided
though it Avas but too probable, he had informed
Nicholas that he thought the Treaty of Vienna
still in force, and that the right of Poland to her
constitution had not been forfeited by the rebel
lion. It was besides asserted in the proclama
tions to the Russians, while the conflict Avas
raging, that this insurrection was only partial.
It was therefore grossly unjust, even had the
Treaty of Vienna not existed, to punish a whole
nation for the fault of individuals. Although
England had acquired little else by the treaties
of Vienna, still as one ofthe contracting parties to
them she had the privilege, as Lord Palmerston
maintained, to reraonstrate against their violation.
This she did, Avhen our rainister declared his
opinion, that by express treaty, Poland had a
right, which no rebellious acts could annul, to a
constitution. The Czar, however, treated such
an opinion with high disdain. He not only
insisted that he had the right of conquest to do
as he pleased with Poland as with any other
portion of his dominions, but in the teeth of
France and England he revived the doctrine of

FALSE ECONOMY. 171
the Holy Alliance, denied the right of the Poles
to a constitution, which he thought a free gift
after the treaties had been settled. In this un
scrupulous interpretation of those solemn com
pacts he was supported by Prussia and Austria.
It was clearly evinced by these three Powers,
that the treaties of Vienna existed for their own
peculiar use, and that England had nothing to
do but to acquiesce in any meaning which an
absolute sovereign might choose to put upon
them. Thus while we paid the Russo-Dutch
loan, even after Holland herself had refused to
pay it, because we shrunk from the very shadoAV
of a breach of faith pledged by one of those
treaties, Russia did as she pleased Avith another,
and England raight remonstrate to her heart's
content. We were obliged to submit to this affront in
silence. War was of course out of the question.
This was the golden era of the economists ; the
Government professed peace and reforra ; the
array and navy estiraates Avere dirainished ; ships
were laid up, and soldiers and sailors disbanded,
that certain ministers raight receive the applause
of frugal politicians, who looked upon every far
thing spent on warlike objects as worse than
thrown away. The year 1832 has been taken
as one of the model years of these misnamed

172 FOREIGN POLICY.
economists. They have looked back on it in
succeeding times Avith admiring despair. At no
other period were the array and navy regarded
Avith so little favour by the popular party in the
House of Coraraons. The raore the estimates Avere
reduced, the more were the rainisters cheered,
and the more Avas their pacific policy praised.
Every shilling that Avas saved, every pension
that was abolished, and every reduction in
military and naval establishraents, was eagerly
applauded, and considered as a tacit censure
on the Duke of Wellington and forraer govern
ments. Even the administration of the army
Avas interfered Avith; and popular orators, as
in the days of the Comraonwealth, resolutely
endeavoured to control the Coraraander-in-Chief.
That tAVO raillions were saved out of the esti
mates was thought the most brilliant financial
triuraph ever won by the genius of a Chancellor
of the Exchequer, and it Avas eloquently extolled
in leading articles. But much as this econo
mical feat was admired by members of great
towns, it may be confidently pronounced that
Count Nesselrode and the Emperor Nicholas
were even still raore delighted.
While the Porte declined in strength, the
Pasha of Egypt was growing more poAverful than
his nominal superior. In the conflict with

THE PASHA OF EGYPT. 173
Greece, the fleet and soldiers of Mehemet Ali
were the mainstay of the Sultan's authority : and
so ably had they been organised and comraanded,
that had not the great European nations inter
fered, Ibrahim Pasha raust inevitably have
reduced the Greeks to subjection. As Turkey
w^as hurabled in war with Russia, the Pasha of
Egypt husbanded his resources, and gradually
becarae in everything but in narae, independent.
This extraordinary man displayed such vigour
and ability in conducting the affairs of his
province, as would have distinguished the most
illustrious statesmen of Europe. He had ren
dered groat services to the Sultan, and as gene
rally happens in such cases, was dissatisfied with
his position, and aspired to be soraething raore
than a subject to one who was scarcely able to de
fend himself. Ibrahim invaded Syria, defeated
the armies of the neighbouring Pasha, took Acre,
and in defiance of the coraraands of the Porte,
led his victorious array to Daraascus. He then
proceeded to Aleppo, and drove before him all
the troops with Avhich the comraanders of thc
different provinces attempted to stay his onward
march. A brilliant victory opened to hira the
passes of the Taurus. Master of Syria, he de
scended into Kararaania, and after a bloody con
flict routed the remaining forces of the Sultan

174 FOREIGN POLICY.
under the command of Redschid Pasha, who was
himself wounded and taken prisoner. It seemed
that the Eastern Problem was about to find an
unexpected solution. There was nothing to
prevent the Egyptian general from dictating
terms to the Sultan under the walls of Constan
tinople. And now were seen the consequences of the
systera of econoray which the English rainisters
had thought fit to pursue. The Sultan in this
extremity applied to England for assistance ; he
asked for a fleet, and the greatest naval power in
the world had none to send. Our Government
was obliged to raake this hurailiating confession,
and the Sultan had no alternative but to accept
the support of Russia. The Czar, raore pro
vident than our statesmen, had ships and men at
hand. The Russian fleet immediately entered
the straits from the Black Sea ; fifteen thousand
raen were at once encaraped at Scutari, and a
powerful army was soon ready to cross the
Danube. Turkey Avas thus thrown into the
hands of her worst enemy. To get rid of his
defenders, the Sultan consented to most of the
terms of Mehemet Ali ; and before the Russian fleet
and army left the Bosphorus, the Porte was com
pelled to agree to the celebrated treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi, by which for eight years the Emperor

THE TREATY OE UNKIAR SKELESSI. 175
of Russia was in reality the master of Constan
tinople, the undisputed owner of the Black Sea,
and the lord paramount of Turkey. He acquired
the right of interference in the affairs of the
Eastern Empire, made the Sultan his vassal,
and shut the DardaneUes against his enemies.
Through the infatuated econoray of our re
forraers, the Czar gained in peace raore than he
had done through years of successful war. The
two millions which our Minister of Finance
saved in the Army and Navy Estimates of 1832,
had nearly all been recklessly taken from what
was required to build ncAV ships and to purchase
new stores. With the exception of some two
hundred thousand pounds frora the array extra-
ordinaries, and sorae raiserable savings from the
expenses of the militia, all this economy Avas a
mere financial phantasmagoria.
It was in vain that we blustered after the
treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had come to light. It
was in vain that we at last set to work to get
ships ready for sea, and, in concert with France,
sent thera to the scene of action. It was in vain
that after Count Orloff had triuraphed, and the
Russian forces had quitted Constantinople, taking
the treaty away with them, that an English fleet
sailed to the DardaneUes, from the Dardanelles
went to Smyrna, and from Smyrna returned to

176 FOREIGN POLICY.
Malta. Our economical reforraers had been
gratified. Our ministers had been praised for
their carefulness of the public money. We had
saved two millions. We had lost Turkey. Eng
land could only send a state paper when Russia
sent line-of-battle ships.
The blarae of this economical imprudence
must principally fall on the Ministers. It is
no excuse that they yielded to the wishes of their
supporters, or even to a majority in the House
of Commons. It cannot be too strongly incul
cated that the Ministers who sacrifice the vital
interests of the State to gain a little present
popularity, are raore deserving of the condemn
ation of posterity, than the most reckless dema
gogue who propounds scheraes which he in his
heart believes to be pernicious to his country.
All the members of the first Reform Ministry
must bear some portion of the blame which at
taches to them for their want of foresight.
Although there can beno doubt that LordPalmer-
ston was not personally favourable to those reduc
tions in the estiraates, the effect of Avhich Avas to
render our navy inefficient at a most important
political crisis, and to deliver the Sultan bound
hand and foot to the mercy of the Czar of Russia,
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs raust
take his share of the censure which falls upon

EFFECTS OF FALSE ECONOMY. 177
the Cabinet. It was especially the duty of the
statesraan entrusted with the raanageraent of
Foreign Affairs not to consent to any raeasure
Avhich might diminish the moral weight of Eng
land, and prevent her from fulfilling the impor
tant obligations which might devolve upon her as
the richest and the most erainent raeraber of the
great commonwealth of nations. Had it not been
for the vigorous exertions of the French ambas
sador, Count Orloff would at that tirae have suc
ceeded in obtaining for his sovereign all that
could have been requisite for paving the way of
Nicholas to Constantinople.
The danger to Westei-n Europe was not, how
ever, so great as it would have been two years
earlier. England and France were friends ; and
although in no condition to Avage an unexpected
Avar, raight soon have wrested by force of arms
all the acquisitions of skilful diploraacy frora
their jealous and watchful antagonist. They
were even at that time frustrating in Greece the
deeply laid scheme for raaking the new kingdora
a mere dependency of the Russian Empire.
The Turks had scarcely left the Morea when
the Greeks began to quarrel among theraselves.
The President of the unorganised raonarchy Avas
the dexterous agent of Russia. For a tirae it
seemed that all the endeavours for the freedom
N

178 FOREIGN POLICY.
of Greece would end in giving them another
tyrant. A civil war broke out. The chiefs of
the islands rebelled, and the Russian fleet was
actively engaged on the side of the President.
But Capo d'Istrias fell under the dagger of the
assassin, and his brother was unable to establish
the government. Lord Palmerston saAv that
there was no hope of quiet or liberty for Greece
until he could send them a King, and exerted him
self to bring the negotiations, which had been so
long pending, to a successful terraination. It
was the interest both of England and France
that a sovereign should be chosen out of a sin
cerely constitutional family, and it was thought
that if the limits of the State could be extended,
there Avould be less probability of Russian intrigues
prevailing. The Czar had, indeed, thrown many
difficulties in the way of a final settlement. But
Lord Palmerston had more sanguine hopes of
Greek patriotism and virtue than Lord Aberdeen.
His energy and perseverance at length succeeded.
He had the gratification of seeing the gulfs of
Volo and Arta decided upon as the boundary of
emancipated Greece, though this increase of
territory was purchased frora the Porte for half
a raillion. The credit of England, with that of
the other tAvo Powers, Avas pledged for three
additional millions ; thus, as usual, the English

THE NEW KINGDOM OF GREECE. 179
sympathy for freedom ended in a loan ; and the
young King, little prescient of Don Pacifico,
prepared to meet his illustrious subjects, who
promised hira that the Muses would in person
descend from Helicon to bid him welcorae.
He arrived at Athens, and Greece was tran
quillised. But much yet remained to be done
before a constitutional government, deserving of
the name, could be established ; ten years more
of delay in preparing a real constitution, with
representative chambers, passed by before the
expectation of English Liberals could be at all
realised. The finishing touches to this monarchy
had not been given before the garae of foreign
factions coraraenced ; the union of the three
Powers was dissolved ; and the welfare of
Greece sacrificed to the raoraentary ascend
ancy of France or Russia. The kingdora of
Greece ihay be considered a failure, but that
failure is no reproach to Lord Palraerston,
nor even to constitutional government. The
state of Greece has never had a fair trial. If it
has failed, the reason is that neither Russia nor
France would permit it to succeed. The Czar
frora the first only intended that the new King
should be a puppet of his own, and the French
monarch, when he at length thought fit to Avith-
draw frora a close intimacy with England, en-
N 2

180 FOREIGN POLICY.
deavoured by every means to counteract the
influence of our Foreign Minister in Greece as
in other countries.
Lord Palraerston had just tirae to congratulate
hiraself on the success of his efforts in the
Peloponnesus Avhen other struggling constitu
tionalists required his care. Civil war once
raore raged both in Portugal and Spain. Don
Pedro had returned to Europe deterrained to
assert the rights of his daughter to the crown of
Portugal, and Don Carlos was fully resolved to
dispute with his niece the possession of the
Spanish throne. By a singular coincidence,
there were tAvo feraale sovereigns under age, and
opposed by two uncles who wished to deprive
thera of their crowns. Don Miguel had at least
the semblance of popular support ; he reigned in
some sort through the Avill of the people ; and
though he was stained Avith raany crimes, he Avas
at least for a time, the King of Portugal. But
Don Carlos had never sat on the throne of Spain .
His claira Avas founded on the Salic Law, which
had been introduced by the Bourbons, and
was no part of the old national law of the
monarchy. It had even been formally repealed.
Though his right had been once acknowledged
by the Avill of Ferdinand, and by a decree of the
Cortes, a more recent wUl of the same King, and

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 181
a more recent decree of the sarae asserably, had
annulled their former declarations. What they
had given, they had also taken aAvay. The same
authority that had once recognised the pretensions
of Carlos, had subsequently declared thera void.
The eldest daughter of Ferdinand Avas clearly sove
reign of Spain. When the adherents of Donna
Maria and her father took possession of Lisbon,
and she was proclairaed Queen, Don Miguel Avas
no longer by any title King of Portugal. It is to
be feared that neither the regent Don Pedro nor
the regent Queen Christina Avere devoted to con
stitutional principles. But circurastances made it
necessary for them to seek the support of those
Avho professed liberal opinions, and their cause
was supported by all who wished to see des
potisms overthrown and constitutions established.
Lord Palraerston had now, as in the case of
Greece, an opportunity of carrying into practice
the principles Avhich he had professed in oppo
sition. Though the governraents of France and
England declared themselves neutral in these
civil contests of the Peninsula, they unequivo
cally showed to which cause they wished success.
The Spanish constitution had been overthroAvn
by the French Legitimists ; the new King of
France could therefore only desire to see it re
stored. Don Miguel, while he held poAver in
N 3

182 FOREIGN POLICY.
Portugal, had persecuted the subjects of France
and England, and the fleets of both countries had
separately demanded reparation in the waters of
the Tagus. Don Carlos had been obliged to fly
from Spain, and had joined Don Miguel in
Portugal. The cause of the two pretenders, as
of the tAVO young queens, was evidently the same.
On the one side Avere despotisra, usurpation, and
ecclesiastical tyranny ; on the other hereditary
right, constitutional government, and religious
toleration. The English people at that day strongly sym
pathised with the Spanish and Portuguese patriots.
While Don Miguel ruled in Portugal and the
constitutionalists were expelled from Spain, the
political exiles naturally sought refuge on our
shores. Nurabers of those dark, mustached,
picturesque strangers might be raet in Regent
Street and Oxford Street. Subscriptions Avere
raised for them ; fathers of families Avere pestered
by enthusiastic acquaintances to permit unfor
tunate refugees to teach their children the lan
guages of the Peninsula. What the Hungarian
is now in England, those who fled from the
tyranny of Ferdinand and Miguel Avere five and
twenty years ago.
When the news arrived that Don Pedro was
maintaining himself successfully in Oporto, that

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 183
a gallant English sailor had destroyed the fleet
of Miguel, that the Spaniards were bent on
restoring their constitution, defending their
young Queen, and resisting that instruraent of
absolutism and of the priesthood, Don Carlos,
the people of England heartily rejoiced. A field
was opened to ambition. Reports were spread
of young adventurous Englishmen becoming at
one step generals in the service of Isabella and
Donna Maria.
The English Government gave every encou
ragement to the restless multitude who Avere so
eager to fight the battles of the Queens on the
Peninsula. Checkmated at Constantinople,
Lord Palmerston was victorious at Madrid.
Early in 1834, the despotic Powers had another
Congress at Vienna, but very different from the
great meeting of 1814. In those twenty years
the world had rolled on notwithstanding all the
efforts which kings and ministers had raade to
stop it. Austria, Russia, and Prussia were noAV
obliged to content themselves with agreeing to
deHver up any disaffected subjects of their re
spective crowns. Though the Conference at
Vienna was represented as a revival of the Holy
Alliance, and the questions discussed were kept
secret, this league of despotism was no longer
what it had lately been. It Avas met by our
N 4

18-1 FOREIGN POLICY.
ministers Avith a constitutional league of the four
Western States, and Europe now seemed divided
by treaty, as it had long been by opinion, into
two opposite political systems. On the side of
absolute poAver were seen Austria, Prussia, and
Russia ; on the side of popular government,
England, France, Spain, and Portugal. Lord
Palmerston had repeatedly asserted that consti
tutional states were the natural allies of Eng
land, and now was displayed for the first time
in European history the two forras of govern
ment decidedly arrayed against each other. The
Quadruple Treaty followed so closely after the
assembly of the despotic sovereigns at Vienna,
that it must be regarded as an answer to it on
the part of France and England.
By this treaty we engaged to assist the tAvo
regents of Spain and Portugal with a naval
force to establish the power of their governments
throughout the Peninsula. France agreed to
do Avhatever raight be thought necessary to aid
in this good Avork. Nothing was said about
constitutions in the treaty, though it Avas under
stood that it A\"as a constitutional alliance of the
Four Courts. As such Lord Palmerston con
sidered it, and such he proudly called it in the
House of Coraraons.
On the wisdom of this policy there Avere dif-
erent opinions. The Ministers were accused of

TIIE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE. 185
departing from the principle of non-intervention,
which even Mr. Canning had asserted in 1822,
and which Lord Palraerston had then defended.
The Foreign Secretary replied that there was no
reserablance between the two cases. In 1822 an
army of two hundred thousand men invaded
Spain. Had we then interfered, we must have
gone to war with both France and Spain. Now
there were no large armies to contend against,
nor was it necessary for England to go to Avar ;
the Governraent had only given British subjects
permission to enter the service of the Queen of
Spain. Don Carlos was our enemy. It was an
English interest that the Queen of Spain should
succeed. The phrases " Constitutional Spain,"
and "Constitutional Portugal," were emphatically
and expressly used by Lord Palmerston in dis
cussing this question. The triuraph of Donna
Maria and Isabella the Second was considered as
a triuraph of the constitution.
And such it was. Our constitutional allies
thought fit, as their dorainions were raore settled
and their thrones raore firmly established, to
forget some of the liberal professions which they
had made in their hour of adversity. Those
who expected to see the Peninsula become a
perfect pattern of constitutional freedom were
egregiously disappointed ; and, judging the design
by the result, they have represented the Quad-

186 FOREIGN POLICY.
ruple Treaty and the subsequent endeavours Lord
Palmerston made for the Queen of Spain, as
futile works, neither ably planned nor ably ex
ecuted. This condemnation is unjust. The
design of our great constitutional artificer was
good ; the materials he was obliged to work with
Avere not of the very highest qualities ; but the
groundAvork of a just, liberal, and beneficent
form of government was laid down, and raay in
the end be the foundation of a glorious constitu
tional edifice. Justice will then be done to the
patriotism, integrity, Avisdom and foresight of
the English Minister. The small carping
critics Avho expect irapossibilities, and on being
disappointed are dissatisfied with everything,
will be forgotten. Better days are yet to
corae for Spain and Portugal. Regents, rainis
ters, and sovereigns pass away like shadows ;
but those noble gerrainations of national life
which are nurtured even araid the iraperfections
of a constitutional raonarchy, may one day be
developed, and the Peninsula becorae the happy
abode of public freedora.
Opinions govern raankind. Since the great
despotic and barbaric power of the North sets
itself resolutely to support the arbitrary govern
raents of the world, it is surely wise policy in an
English rainister to endeavour to diffuse the

THE HOLY ALLIANCE. 187
blessings of constitutional government. This is
the only effectual method of frustrating the
arabition of Russia, and of securing the nation
ality of Western Europe. The Emperor of all the
Russias discovered this truth long ago ; hence the
Holy Alliance, and the jealousy with which the
least indication of popular ascendency in the
West has been Avatched. A people who acquire
freedom, must, on the day when their liberties
are secured, becorae the natural enemies of
Russia, and the natural allies of England.
This Prince Metternich never knew, notwith
standing his sagacity and experience ; and
therefore all his efforts for opposing the onward
raarch of the Czar have been futile, and he has
had the mortification of seeing his country, the
more the absolute system was remorselessly
carried out, sink by degrees, until it seemed a
raere dependency of her unscrupulous neighbour,
who was in secret the raost deadly foe of
Austria. When the Russian influence was raost
predorainant at Vienna, the proceedings of the
Austrian Court were raost tyrannical ; and should
Austria ever become the cordial and fervent ally
of England, she must first, in self defence, adopt
at home a more liberal, generous, and national
policy. It is a mistake to suppose that Austria
was the prime mover in putting down the con-

188 FOREIGN POLICY.
stitutionalists of Naples ; it AA'-as Alexander of
Russia Avho inspired the deluded statesmen of
the Empire with the design, and allowed them
to mulct the Kingdom of Naples of two hundred
millions of francs as the price of that precious
assistance.* Thus it has ever been. Austria
has frequently had the odium of raeasures of
Avhich her insidious ally has been the projector.
Don Carlos and Don Miguel were both avowedly
in friendly coraraunication Avith Russia, and had
they been victorious, raust have been mere agents
of Nicholas. The possession of the Peninsula
would have been anything but a conteraptible
acquisition ; at the very least it might have
weakened the antagonistic attitude of Western
Europe. Even the King of Naples counts for
somebody among the potentates of the Avorld:
it Avould be better to see him the friend of Eng
land than the friend of Russia ; and he too may
yet be ungrateful to his illustrious master.
After endeavouring to give a rapid sumraary
* Count Pozzo di Borgo, in 1828, when the policy of
Metternich was decidedly hostile to Eussia, bitterly accuses
him of ingratitude to the benefactor of Austria, and mentions
Alexander as the monarch who really " dispelled the revo
lutionary storm" in Naples, and overthrew the Carbonari. —
(Despatch ofthe 28tk November, 1828.)

LORD PALMERSTON AS FOREIGN MINISTER. 189
of the most iraportant affairs in which Lord
Palmerston took such a prominent part during
the first four years of his management of the
Foreign Office, it must be candidly acknowledged
that his actions, though not ahvays successful,
bore honourable testimony to his energy, pa
triotism, and sagacity. The treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi was indeed a grievous blow to England,
and cannot but be regarded as discreditable to
the Whig Government. But the truth is, that
Lord Palmerston had not attained an ascendancy
in the cabinet of the Reform Ministry ; beyond
the sphere of his department he had little influ
ence, and he was not, like many of his associates,
an enthusiastic econoraist. His great abilities
were not generally recognised. He was only super
ciliously tolerated by the noisiest of his colleagues
who had not recovered from the excitement of
the Reform Bill, and looked upon the Govern
ment of England as their exclusive right for at
least half a century to come. They had not
learnt the important political truth, that there
are times and occasions when the best thing a
minister can do, is to do nothing. It would
have been well had they alloAved the agitation
to settle down ; but they blindly hurried on,
until many of their moderate supporters took
fright, and even the King, whom they had counted

190 FOREIGN POLICY.
upon as their own, turned Avistful glances to
Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington.
The great majorities of the Whigs soon dimin
ished even in a Parliaraent of their own choosing.
That a Conservative administration was con
sidered for a moment possible, two years and
a half after the great Bill had been passed,
shoAvs how rauch more cautious the people were
than their rulers.
But Lord Palmerston had little to do with
the particular questions which frightened raany
moderate politicians, nor Avith the personal quar
rels which almost sealed the fate of the rainistry.
His foreign policy had certainly been in 1833
directly censured by the Lords; but a counter
vote had been called for in the other House and
responded to by the Coraraons. He proceeded on
his course. Warlike as his policy Avas thought,
he boasted, and justly boasted, sorae years later,
of having, araid dangers of every kind, araid Avars
and ruraours of Avars, preserved the peace of
Europe. When he accepted office war seemed
so inevitable that a friend told hira that though
an angel were to corae down from heaven
and Avrite his despatches, peace could not be
maintained for three months longer. Nearly
four years however had passed aAvay, and still
there had been no message from the Throne

PEACE AT ANY PRICE. 191
informing the two Estates that His Majesty
had found it necessary to prepare for hostilities.
But this is not the highest praise which the
minister fairly deserves. Not only had he pre
served tranquillity, not only had he scrupulously
kept faith with other governments, not only had
he strictly adhered to all obligations, but though
occupying a seat in a cabinet pledged to peace,
reform, and retrenchment, he had adopted a
high tone to other nations, and shown himself
jealous of the dignity of England, and a sturdy
guardian of her honour. To declaim on the
evils of war is the easiest of all mechanical
exercises. Even the composition of a set of
affecting coraraonplaces on the blessings of
peace requires scarcely a raore brilliant exertion
of human genius. From the proceedings of the
Peace Society contrasted Avith the energy and
ability of the statesmen whora Mr. Cobden has
repeatedly accused of warlike tendencies, we
may learn that an avowedly pacific policy is not
unlikely to produce war; and that Avhile the
nature of man reraains as it is and has been
since the creation, a too eager desire to maintain
peace at any price is sure to end in war at any
price. Lord Palmerston has proved by experi
ence that an English minister can only negotiate
successfully with jealous, overbearing, and hos-

192 FOREIGN POLICY.
tile governments, while he lets it plainly be seen
that the friendship of England is worth culti
vating, and her enmity to be dreaded. In the
interest of peace itself, while holding out the
olive-branch in one hand, he must with the
other firmly grasp the sword.

193

CHAP. VIL
CONDUCT OF THE DUKE OP WELLINGTON WHILE FOREIGN
MINISTER. — INTERFERENCE IN SPAIN.  DIFFICULTIES OP
A LIBERAL MINISTER NEGOTIATING WITH ABSOLUTE GO
VERNMENTS. — CHOICE OF AN AMBASSADOR TO ST. PETERS
BURG.  THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS AND THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS.  A GRADUAL CHANGE OP OPINION ON FOREIGN
POLICY. — PRECARIOUS STATE OF TURKEY.  ARROGANCE
AND HUMILIATION.  DISCUSSIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY IN
1836.  MR. BELL AND CIRCASSIA.  MR. URQUHART. 
PATRIOTISM OF WILLIAM THE FOURTH.
The short administration of Sir Robert Peel was
not distinguished by any important measures of
foreign policy. But this interregnum showed
that the policy of England did not depend on
the raere personal inclinations of any Minister,
however erainent ; for though the Duke of Wel
lington was Foreign Secretary, and though he
disapproved of the Quadruple Treaty, Lord
Palmerston himself confessed, on again returning
to office, that the Duke had fairly carried out
the principles of the former Whig Governraent.
He did raore. He endeavoured to raake the
contending parties of the Peninsula adopt a
more raerciful mode of warfare than they had
hitherto acted upon, and by proposing a con-
0

194 FOREIGN POLICY.
vention by which a cartel for the exchange of
prisoners was regulated, atterapted to put an end
to those raurders in cold blood of Avhich both
factions were alternately the perpetrators and
the victiras.
After a few raonths of opposition, the Whigs
returned in triuraph to the rainisterial benches.
The secret intrigues of that factious period have
not yet been fully divulged ; but it is certain
that Lord Palmerston's return to the Foreign
Departraent Avas not the raatter of course which
it has generally been assuraed. Many of the
Whig statesraen had long been engaged in pa
triotically underraining and thAvarting each
other; and even their proud and high-minded
chief, Earl Grey, felt himself the object of much
private jealousy. It is not then surprising that
the Foreign Secretaryship was offered by Lord
Melbourne to Lord John Russell, and that it
was only after the Leader of the House of
Coraraons had declined it, and selected another
post in the Governraent, that Lord Palmerston
was again appointed to the Foreign Office.
He at once turned his attention to Spain.
The civil war in that roraantic kingdom AA^as a
slow fever ; neither party had energy to subdue
the other; the military operations Avere feeble;
there was no tone in the political body. It was
only in coraraitting criraes that the leaders

INTERFERENCE IN SPAIN. 195
showed theraselves able and resolute. When
England agreed to assist the Queen of Spain to
establish peace in her dominions, it is clear that
although the Ministers only undertook to aid
the Spanish Constitutionalists with a naval force,
that in the event of tranquillity not being speedily
established, they could not refuse to make still
further efforts in the cause of the Queen. The
distinction which the opponents of Lord Pal
merston's policy made between a land and a
naval force, was not very satisfactory. It
was a distinction without a difference. We had
unquestionably interfered for the purpose of
supporting the daughter of Ferdinand ; and the
honour of the nation demanded that our inter
ference should be effectuah The true objection
to the Order in Council by which the Foreign
Enlistment Act was suspended, and still more to
the equipment of the Spanish Legion, Avas that
the means were not the best to attain the end
that was proposed. But they were the best that
Lord Palraerston had it in his power to employ.
The French Governraent, after having at first
put its hand to this work, thought fit in 1836 to
look back : for the first time since the accession of
the Orleans dynasty, a serious difference on this
subject occurred between the two Cabinets ; and
Lord Palmerston was left to his own resources.
o 2

196 FOREIGN POLICY,
It was not then his fault, if he did not adopt
raore decisive and efficient raeasures, for secur
ing the success of his policy in Spain.
Sufficient allowance has never been raade
for the peculiar and unprecedented difficulties
Avhich beset Lord Palmerston on every side Avhile
he was Foreign Secretary under the Adminis
trations of Earl Grey and Lord Melbourne. A
great popular revolution had just been accom
plished at horae. A sudden change in the exe
cutive had foUoAved the recent change in the
representative portion of the Legislature. The
Foreign Minister of a Reforra Cabinet had to
Avalk in new and untrodden Avays. The old
diplomatic path of his predecessors was closed to
hira ; for, as a Liberal statesman, frora the rao
ment of taking office, he becarae the object of
distrust to one half of the governraents of
Europe. No diplomatic phrases, no general pro
fessions, could efface the consciousness that the
principles of his party were diametrically op
posed to the cherished designs of the despotic
Courts. This antagonism was a fact. Sorae of
the raost distinguished Whigs had all their lives
severely reprobated the measures of the kings
and emperors of the Continent. They had at
length come into power Avhen all Europe was in
a state of revolt and excitement, and when the
popular mind of England was deeply agitated.

AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA. 197
Lord Palmerston found himself denounced as a
friend of despotism because he was compeUed to
accept the treaties of which his own colleagues
and their supporters had disapproved. On the
other hand, he was looked upon as a revolutionary
firebrand, because he would not acquiesce in the
tyrannical proceedings of Austria and Russia.
Do what he raight, he was sure to offend the
prejudices either of those who had long been
regarded as the allies of this country, or of those
enthusiastic charapions of Liberal principles who
could not understand that their theories must
admit of some coraproraise if they were to be at
aU applied to the raixed condition of good and
evil which ever pervades all huraan, and espe
cially aU political, affairs.
The extraordinary obstacles which the Foreign
Secretary everywhere raet with, cannot be better
exemplified than by relating the perplexities
which attended the selection of an ambassador to
Russia. When the Whigs came into office. Lord Heytes
bury was the representative of England at the
Court of St. Petersburg. He Avas asked to
remain, though his political opinions were not
exactly those of the Ministers. In the autumn
of 1832 he was, however, compelled to retire
through bodily indisposition. In times of quiet
o 3

198 FOREIGN POLICY.
and regular government, it would not have been
difficult to find a successor. But this was not
such a period, and the English Ministers had a
most deHcate task to perforra. Lord Palraerston
appointed Sir Stratford Canning as arabassador
to Russia ; and a better choice, so far as England
was concerned, could not possibly have been
made. This diplomatist had long been farailiar
with all the secrets of Russian intrigue ; and
Avas knoAATi to be attached to a Liberal policy.
His raerits were fuUy recognised in England,
and they were also recognised by the Eraperor
Nicholas, who, as soon as he learned that Sir
Stratford Canning had been fixed upon as the
successor of Lord Heytesbury, imraediately in
forraed Lord Palraerston that the new arabassador
was not agreeable to hira, and that he would not
be received. The Minister was thrown into
a dilemma. If he chose another person for the
post, he admitted the right of the Emperor of
Russia to annul a diplomatic appointment of
the King of England. But it was of course
impossible for the ambassador to proceed to
St. Petersburg. Lord Palraerston contented
himself with giving a silent protest against this
somewhat unexpected and arrogant interpo
sition. No other person was substituted ; and
until the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert

CHOICE OF AMBASSADOR. 199
Peel forraed their Governraent, England neither
had, nor Avas prepared to have, an arabassador
in Russia. Yet it was during this interval that
the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and the subsequent
Treaty of St. Petersburg were negotiated, which
materially affected the interests of Europe and
the balance of power.
The Duke of Wellington was not satisfied with
the reasons which had induced the late Foreign
Secretary not to acquiesce in the objections of
Nicholas. He thought that, as an independent
sovereign, the Emperor of Russia had a right to
decide whether he would or would not receive
any individual who had been appointed by an
other Court as its representative in his dominions.
He determined on iraraediately sending an ara
bassador. The Marquis of Londonderry was
chosen, when the Duke raet with a difficulty
quite as unexpected as, and not altogether dis
similar from, that which had prevented Lord
Palraerston from sending Sir Stratford Canning.
The Marquis of Londonderry was the brother
and heir of the late Lord Castlereagh, to whose
title, indeed, he succeeded. He professed great
veneration for his deceased relative, fully adopted
his principles of foreign policy, and looked upon
him as the Avisest and most brilliant of states
men. Every departure from his brother's poli-
O i

200 FOREIGN POLICY.
tical systera the noble Marquis had passionately
conderaned. His opinion was, that our only
safety depended on a stedfast adherence to the
arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, and on
keeping England firraly united with the arbi
trary powers of Europe. On a very recent
occasion, he had spoken conteraptuously of the
syrapathy for Poland Avhich was so prevalent in
France and England, and which our Ministers had
not cared to conceal. He had, in defiance of the
Liberal raerabers in both Houses, eraphatically
called the Poles rebels. When his appointment
as arabassador was known, a cry of indignation
arose, and the noble Marquis and the Emperor
of Russia were taught a raeraorable lesson. It
Avas soon seen that even the brother of Lord
Castlereagh, the Duke of Wellington, and all the
Aveight of the Ministry, could not offer a success
ful resistance to the popular spirit Avhich had
been infused into the foreign policy. It was
soon seen that if the Emperor Nicholas Avas
poAA^erful, the Coraraons of England were not
quite impotent.
Mr. Shell raoved for a copy of the appoint
raent. In an eloquent and sarcastic speech, he
detailed the aggressions of Russia, and showed
that the noble Marquis Avas not a fit person to
be sent to St. Petersburg as the ambassador of

NICHOLAS AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 201
England. Some even of the Ministerial papers
ventured to regret the choice which the Duke
of WeUington had made ; and Lord Stanley, who,
on other questions, was gradually separating
himself frora the Whigs, and growing every day
more friendly to Sir Robert Peel and the Conser
vative party, rose during the debate and said that
he could not but consider the appointraent ex
tremely improper. Sir Robert Peel made a dex
terous speech in reply; but it was irapossible even
for hira, with all his poAvers for debate, to meet
the real point at issue. In his celebrated Tam
worth Manifesto, and in the debate on the Ad
dress, he had pledged himself to carry out the
foreign policy of the Whig Government. Yet
it was notorious that the Marquis of London
derry was in every respect opposed to that
policy, that he gloried in his opposition, that he
was the enemy of Poland, and now even the
eneray of Turkey. He had declared, raost ab
surdly, that the Emperor of Russia had a right
to do as he pleased in Turkey, since England
had chosen to take her own course in Belgium.
He had spoken with conterapt of the friendship
of France, and had conderaned our interference
in Spain. As the appointraent had not been
officially made out, the motion was of course not
formally carried. But the discussion had pro-

202 FOREIGN POLICY.
duced a great effect. It was clear that though
Sir Robert Peel had said that he would not ad
vise the Crown to cancel the appointment. Lord
Londonderry was almost as effectually stopped
from proceeding to St. Petersburg as Sir Strat
ford Canning had been. On the next evening,
without comraunicatiug with the Governraent, the
Marquis declared that it was irapossible for him
now with any propriety to undertake his mission.
The Duke of Wellington said that such an inter
ference as that which the House of Coraraons
had made, was an attack on the prerogative of the
Crown. And such, in a certain sense, it was.
And such, in a certain and even worse sense,
since no just cause for the objection could be
alleged, Avas the veto which the Czar had pro
nounced on the appointment of Sir Stratford
Canning. Thus diamond cut diamond ; and a
reformed House of Commons gave the presump
tuous Autocrat a Roland for his Oliver.
The experience of a few years had done much
to aAvaken the English Parliament to the real
position of Turkey and Russia. It is evident
that even Lord Palmerston had much more
decided opinions on this subject, than when his
speech of the 1st of June 1829 excited the
admiration of the Emperor Nicholas. The
English Liberals had fully withdrawn from

CHANGE OF OPINION. 203
the false position into which they Avere driven
by their generous, but unwise, syrapathies
for the Greeks. Freedom of some sort the
modern Athenian patriots had undoubtedly
gained; but it had cost a considerable sum of
money ; and now, as in the days when a horror
of Republicanism had allied our government
with despotism, England had to pay -by far the
greater portion of the bill. The economists
grumbled, and forgot their diffusive liberalisra ;
Lord Palmerston, on more than one occasion,
was obliged to remind them of the pecuniary
obligations which they had contracted when it
was the fashion to speak of the Greeks as dis
playing "the energy of their fathers." The
days when a noble poet might hope, by taking
part in the Greek insurrection, to regain the
popularity which he lost by his licentiousness,
and Avhen an allusion to the patriotism of the
Greeks was sure to be the climax of every speech
in favour of freedom, were gone by. Orators
no longer rounded their periods with the happy
aUiteration of Missolonghi and Marathon. The
name of Sultan Mahmoud Avas no longer men
tioned with execration. Englishmen began to
be sensible of the great stake which they had
depending on the fate of the Turkish Empire.
The despatches taken from Warsaw were beino-

204 FOREIGN POLICY.
published in The Portfolio, and though this
publication was, as a comraercial speculation,
unsuccessful, and though there was necessarily
rauch exaggeration and extravagance in its pages,
as unfortunately there ever are in whatever its
enthusiastic, but not very diplomatic, proprietor
undertakes, it unquestionably did much good
araong the select few who thought it deserving
of attention. There Avas evidence enough of the
designs of Russia, and of the unscrupulous
manner in which they were being carried out ;
and the public were now convinced of what
would be the consequences of her success in the
East. It was time. Turkey had grown, while the
ignorance of England lasted, alraost a Russian
province, and in a short time, had this indiffer
ence continued, must have really become one,
without honourable raembers beinff aware that
anything particular had happened. The Dar
danelles were effectually closed to us. Russian
troops garrisoned Silistria. It was to Russia
alone that the Sultan could look for assistance
against the premeditated attacks of a powerful
vassal. Russian medals Avere even being dis-
tributed, by the express command of Nicholas,
among the Turkish soldiers.
Nothing could be more transparent than the

PRECARIOUS STATE OF TURKEY. 205
motive of the Russian Eraperor in sending
these medals. It Avas for the purpose of raaking
the Sultan odious to his own subjects, and par
ticularly to all sincere Mahoraetans, who would
thus clearly see that the venerated chief of their
race and religion was the raere dependent of a
detested, an infidel, a hostile sovereign. Even
at this last extreraity, the Sultan ventured to
resist the mandates of his artful protector. A
whole year elapsed, and the medals Avere still
in the possession of the governraent. At first
the Prussian arabassador gently reminded the
Sultan of the gifts Avhich his generous master
had sent to the Faithful who had been the com
panions of the Cossacks in the carap at Unkiar
Skelessi. He entreated ; he insinuated the dis
pleasure of the Emperor ; then he covertly
threatened ; and at length he openly bullied.
The Sultan, having no confidence at this time
in the ready assistance of the Western Powers,
though he knew Avell that these raedals were
really, and were intended to be, mere badges of
servitude, and raight even provoke an insurrection
in the streets of Constantinople, was at last
obliged to comply. The most insolent con
queror never iraposed harder conditions on the
most abject foe, than Russia now, in a period
of peace and Avith professions of friendship,
drove the Sultan to fulfil.

206 FOREIGN POLICY.
An English arabassador was indeed wanted
at St. Petersburg ; and Lord Palraerston at last
chose the Earl of Durhara for that very arduous
office. Both France and England had v^ainly
protested against their exclusion frora the Dar
danelles. They both requested permission for
an armed vessel of each nation to enter the
Black Sea ; the one for scientific purposes, the
other for the conveyance of our arabassador
to Persia through the Straits to Trebisond.
Both Governraents were virtually refused ; and
the ansAvers to their requests were in both
instances dictated to the Sultan by the Russian
ambassador. Lord Palraerston tried the experiraent again
when the Earl of Durham was proceeding to
Russia. He took the route of the Black Sea.
He Avas received with great courtesy by the
Sultan, but found that the prohibition was still
resolutely enforced. A Russian man-of-war,
AAdth her colours proudly flaunting in the breeze,
saluted the vessel which carried the English
arabassador, and which had not a single gun on
her decks to return the courtesy. All the artil
lery of the English ship had been landed at the
Dardanelles, or had been stowed away in the
hold. The virtue of submission on the one side,
and the vice of arrogance on the other, could

ARROGANCE AND HUMILIATION. 207
scarcely be carried further. But beneath even
this depth there was a lower deep. When the
Earl of Durham approached Odessa, not a shot
was fired in honour of the presence of the
EngHsh ambassador. On his reraonstrating,
the governor affirraed that it was all a raistake ;
but such omissions never happen by mistake.
It was one of those petty insults which the
sovereign of a great Erapire seems to delight in
offering. As no person is too high for the
hostility of the Emperor of Russia, so no one is
too low. An ambassador and a waiting-maid are
equally the objects of his attention. To aim
at the empire of the world, and not to disdain
the acquisition of an ice-house ; to be at once
mighty in his ends and paltry in his raeans, are
the characteristics of this imperial crusader of
the nineteenth century.
Such repeated indignities as England received
at this time, would in any other age have inevit
ably caused war. The peace was, however, still
unbroken. The calaraities which all Europe
had suffered in the last treraendous conflict for
empire and dominion had been so terrible and
so protracted, that the civilised nations of the
West shrunk frora the responsibility of again
disturbing the apparent tranquillity of the world,
and many respectable and most conscientious

208 FOREIGN POLICY.
people began to feel a horror, which may be
justly called irrational and effeminate, at the
mere prospect of war.
A judicious observer might have felt con
vinced that the national spirit would again
promptly display itself whenever it was rightly
invoked. This sentimental dread of war has
indeed not unfrequently been most prevalent
just before the rupture of peace, and in the
history of England it raay be seen that imme
diately before the comraenceraent of their most
glorious conflicts with despotisra and oppression.
Englishmen have been most raistrustful of their
strength, and least sanguine about the conse
quences of hostilities. There are not wanting
instances of prirae rainisters having confidently
predicted a long era of peace a few raonths
before great wars, which agitated the whole world,
have broken out. In the year 1790 before the
comraenceraent of the war against French Re
volution, which drew England and so many
nations into its raighty vortex, Mr. Pitt's speech
on the introduction of his budget Avas a raagni
ficent ode on the brilliant prospects of peace which
he expected to continue unbroken for a long
period .
An attentive observer raight have seen that,
notwithstanding all the pacific professions of the

DISCUSSIONS IN 1836. 209
Whig Ministers and their liberal supporters, that
a war with Russia was sure one day to come.
In all parts of the globe the two nations met in
opposition, and the greatest forbearance and
circumspection were necessary at every step
which Lord Palmerston took.
The year 1836 deserves especial mention as
one in which the House of Commons shoAved
unequivocally that hostility to the ambition
of the Czar, which was now more and more
forced upon every considerate statesman. The
discussions on foreign policy in the session of
that year were of peculiar excellence. There
were three great debates which had almost ex
clusive reference to Russia. On the 19 th of
February, Lord Dudley Stuart brought forward
the whole question of Russian policy, and in
a speech of great merit, traced the steady
and almost unresisted progress of the great
Northern Power, as it had gone on for years
extending its territories, and establishing its
blighting influence over the rest of the world.
Sir Stratford Canning introduced the affairs of
Cracow to the attention of the House. He showed
that in the recent occupation of that town by
Austria, Prussia, and Russia, the Treaty of
Vienna had been glaringly violated, and that in
not communicating to England, as one of the
p

210 FOREIGN POLICY.
contracting parties at the Congress of Vienna,
the long premeditated plan of triumphing over
the independence of this last remnant of Poland,
this country had been treated with studied dis
courtesy. Mr. P. M. Stewart also did his part
in rousing the public from their lethargy, by
explaining the peculiar relation of Turkey to
Russia, and illustrating by numerous examples
the iraportant commercial interests which were
threatened by the uncontrolled authority the
Emperor Nicholas had now acquired on the
Danube, and on the shores of the Black Sea.
Gentleraen of every party spoke on these great
questions ; but if in raany of the orations there
was rauch patriotisra, there was little wis
dom. Lord Palraerston was freely censured;
and yet war was earnestly deprecated. What
then could the Minister do ? Not, surely, as
sorae raerabers advised him, menace, and yet
shrink from carrying his menaces into effect.
Sir Robert Peel, in a powerful and comprehensive
speech, exposed with scorn and indignation the
unworthiness of such a policy. His arguraents
were unanswerable. He said, most conclusively,
that we could not go to Avar for generalities. If
we had been injured, it was necessary to specify
the injury, and prove that redress had been
refused. If any particular treaty had been vio-

DISCUSSIONS IN 1836. 211
lated, it was necessary to specify that treaty, and
prove that the honour of the nation had been
outraged. The House could not then limit itself
to a general resolution, declaring that it was the
duty of the Government to protect the commerce
and the political interests of the country in
certain quarters of the globe. Much more than
this, or nothing at all, ought to be done. If the
representatives of the people thought that the
Sovereign had been injured, it was their duty
at once to go to the foot of the throne, and
assure His Majesty that they were ready to sup
port him in every measure which might be
deemed necessary for the defence of his just
power and influence throughout the world.
Lord Palmerston's replies in their substance
did not differ from what Sir Robert Peel
expressed. But he Avas of course in another
position; he had at once to give conciliatory
answers to the merabers who had made the
motions, and also to say nothing at which
Foreign Powers could take offence. In answer
to Lord Dudley Stuart, he adraitted that the
power of Russia was very great, and that her
territories were stiU extending ; but then, he
said, her principal acquisitions had been made
while the other states of Europe were involved
in war, and that therefore the best raethod of
p 2

212 FOREIGN POLICY.
resisting Russia was to preserve peace. He
agreed with Sir Stratford Canning that there
was no excuse for the Northern Courts occupy
ing Cracow, which in the treaty of Vienna had
been solemnly declared to be "for ever" a free
city. They might have been justified in requir
ing the removal of any turbulent refugees ; but
not in thus, on the least delay in complying
with their deraands, pouring soldiers into a
town which the treaty of Vienna stipulated
that foreign troops should on no account enter.
He also agreed Avith Sir Stratford Canning, that
in not giving the least notice to the English
Ministry of what was conteraplated, an un
friendly spirit was indicated ; but it was at the
sarae tirae an involuntary testiraony to the
justice of our Government, which they knew
would never sanction such proceedings. He
enunciated also the great principle that it was
not by the relative iraportance of a state and its
ability to resist aggression, that the right or
wrong of such assaults on its independence
should be judged ; and Lord Palraerston Avas
unquestionably justified, according to every law,
moral, political, and international, in maintain
ing that CracoAv had as much right as Prussia or
any other great Power, to have its frontier re
spected. But, unfortunately, the spirit of the

DISCUSSIONS IN 1836. 213
treaties of Vienna was different. Unfortunately,
it was taken for granted in the memorable Con
gress, that whatever the Great Powers thought
fit to do, the small states had no business to op
pose ; that the declared will of Russia, Prussia
and Austria Avas sufficient to bear doAvn everv
fence of law, and justice, and truth, and right.
The Foreign Secretary heartily acquiesced in
all that Mr. Stewart had said on the iraport
ance of the coraraercial intercourse of England
with Turkey. That trade had prodigiously in
creased even in tiraes of war and disorder. It
was necessary that the Governinent of England
should keep a watchful eye upon Turkey, and be
ready in her hour of need to render her as
sistance. But the Minister treated with dis
dain the insinuations that the Government had
any dread of the power of Russia, or was
disposed to submit to any insults Avhich she
might think fit to offer. On this iraportant
question the language of Lord Palraerston was
unequivocal. He professed an earnest desire
to keep the peace ; but, notwithstanding all his
pacific professions, one iraportant reservation
lurked behind, which was only the raore obvious
for not being ostentatious. Nothing could be
raore adrairable than the manner in which Lord
Palraerston at this time declared his adherence to
p 3

214 FOREIGN POLICY.
a pacific policy, and at the sarae tirae expressed his
firra determination to subrait to no wrong frora
any Power whatever. He could never be raisun-
stood. Nor, as the decided attitude which he
held for so raany years, and the dread with which
he was regarded on the Continent, proves, was
he ever raisunderstood. When speaking on
questions of Foreign Policy, he knew what to say
and what to avoid saying ; how to join courteous
language with energetic action ; how to raake a
few sentences delivered in the House of Cora
mons reverberate in the ears of the proudest
and haughtiest of the absolute Sovereigns, with
more salutary effect than all the elaborate de
spatches ofthe ablest diplomatists could produce.
He thus hit between wind and water. He kept
at bay the wild and rapacious bear of the North,
that was ever watching the moraent to clutch its
victim. Lord Palmerston denied the correctness of
the stateraent which Lord Dudley Stuart raade
of the raanner in which the Earl of Durhara was
conveyed to Odessa, and of the entrance of the
Black Sea having been refused to the English
ships of war. On this point there has been rauch
discrepancy ; it was of course the interest, and
even the duty of the rainister to interpret the
actions of, Russia at that tirae as favourably as

CRACOW. 215
possible ; since it was understood that there had
arisen no absolute necessity for Avar, and mem
bers of all parties wished to preserve peace.
But it may easily be believed that the real facts
were nearly as they have been stated. They
have never been proved to be false ; and Lord
Palmerston in many important points, even
while questioning, really confirmed, much of
what had been alleged. He acknowledged
that the vessel was not "heavily armed." He
acknowledged that the governor of Odessa had
not saluted it because he mistook it for an
unarmed vessel. There was then no raaterial
difference in the two stateraents ; and when
allowance is made for the diplomatic varnish
which all the parties concerned, Turks, Russians,
and English, were interested in putting upon
these transactions, there can be Httle doubt
which account is the nearer the truth.
The hostile spirit which such acts as these
plainly demonstrate was still more openly dis
played during this eventful year. Lord Pal
merston, in the course of the discussion on
Cracow, had pledged himself to send a consul
to that town. The Russian and Prussian
bayonets had retired, but the Austrian troops
still remained. It was soon intimated that no
English consul would be permitted to reside in
p 4

216 FOREIGN POLICY.
Cracow by the lords and raasters of that unfor
tunate state, whose freedom they had guaranteed
for all tirae. This affront England had also to
subrait to, and thus were the treaties of Vienna
thrown in the face of the English Minister.
Still the raaintenance of peace was the order
of the day. There were indeed sorae irapetuous
gentleraen who Avere so eager for a rupture
with Russia that they resolved if the Eraperor
would not afford England a good cause for war,
they would raake one. In the pages of the
Portfolio some eloquent articles had appeared
showing the iraportance of the coraraerce of
Circassia to England, the bravery of that people,
and the injustice of the war which Russia had
for sorae time been waging about the Caucasus.
The right of Russia to the coast below the river
Kouban was based on the Treaty of Adrianople,
but was by no means clear and indisputable.
The Circassians too, although they had norai
nally acknowledged the Sultan as their raaster,
Avere far from admitting that he had the power
to dispose of them without their consent, and
hand them over to their hated foe. The brave
warriors of the Caucasus were not inclined to
acquiesce in the sentiraents of srailing diplo
matists ; they thought that nations could not be
transferred from one OAvner to another, after the

MR. BELL AND CIRCASSIA. 217
fashion of the statesmen of Vienna and St.
Petersburg, like so raany head of cattle. Follow
ing the natural impulse of their unsophisticated
hearts and understandings, they trusted to their
good SAVords; nor have they trusted in vain.
A blockade had been established by Russia
along the coast, and its existence comrau-
nicated through the ambassador .at Constan
tinople to the British Government ; but as the
ministers, without positively denying, did not
think fit to recognise the justice of the claim
which the Emperor was enforcing, the blockade
had never been notified in the Gazette.
This passive resistance did not satisfy the
inspirer of the Portfolio, and the sraall circle of
which he was the centre. Lord Palraerston was
against his will to be driven into a war. A
certain back-stair influence was brought into
play ; confidential coraraunications were held
with Sir Herbert Taylor, the King's private ,
secretary ; hints were given ; sorae obscure
officials, who were supposed to know the opinions
of their chiefs, looked mysterious ; and Mr. Bell,
a merchant, was inspired with the design of
sending a cargo of salt to Circassia, and of thus
bringing the question to an issue. That the
Secretary of State raight incautiously counte
nance his speculation, he first entered into a

218 FOREIGN POLICY.
correspondence with Lord Palmerston. But
the Minister was on his guard, and was fully
resolved to have nothing to do with this
officious attempt to bring about a catastrophe.
Mr. Bell Avas inforraed that he raust judge for
himself, that Lord Palraerston could not give
advice to any raerchant on a private commercial
enterprise, that for all recognitions of blockades,
the Government raust refer hira to the Gazette.
Mr. Bell eagerly desired the Governraent to
authorise his coraraercial and political designs ;
Lord Palraerston cautiously abstained frora giv
ing hira the least encourageraent. Trusting,
however, to the proraptings of what he vaguely
terraed the Foreign Office, though contrary to
the obvious raeaning of the letters of the Foreign
Secretary, Mr. Bell, like the enterprising and
patriotic merchant that he was, set out for
Constantinople. There the regulations of 1831
and 1836 were shown to him by no less a person
than the English ambassador. The risk to be
incurred was now plain. Mr. Bell hesitated,
and thought of abandoning his cherished project
of giving the Circassians the opportunity of
purchasing his excellent cargo of salt, whatever
the fiscal regulations of Russia and the stringent
law of blockade might say to the contrary. The
Secretary of the Embassy was excited ; he felt

MR. BELL AND CIRCASSIA. 219
that the great moraent of his life was now drawing
near. He advised Mr. Bell to proceed, notwith
standing the language of Lord Palmerston and
Lord Ponsonby. Was not the private secretary
of the King more powerful than the Secretary
of State ? So thought Mr. Urquhart, and in full
reliance on his wisdom, the Vixen entered the
Black Sea, and at last let go her anchor in the
bay of Soudjouk Kale. No time was lost in
informing the natives of the saline comforts
Avith which the sloop was freighted. But before
anything could be done, down came a Russian
brig-of-war ; the Vixen was seized, carried igno
miniously into Sebastopol and confiscated as a
contraband trader. It seemed as though Mr.
Bell had determined to make the capture and
loss of his vessel doubly sure. He was not
satisfied with breaking the blockade ; he was
not content with sending a cargo of an article
which Russia had prohibited from being im
ported into Circassia at all ; but his vessel also
entered a port which lawful trading ships were
forbidden to approach.
Mr. Bell called on the English Government
for vengeance ; full reparation at least he ex
pected to receive. He implored the assistance
of the House of Coraraons. But whatever
might have been the justice or the injustice of

220 FOREIGN POLICY.
the proceedings of Russia in Circassia, Lord
Palraerston felt that he must either acquiesce in
the legality of the confiscation, or go to war in
vindication of Mr. Bell and his sloop Vixen.
The pacific alternative was preferred; Mr. Bell
was ruined; and his name appeared in the
Gazette, where he coraplained that the notifica
tion of the Russian blockade had ncA'er been.
His history illustrates the danger which an
English raerchant must expect to incur when he
will becorae a politician, and atterapt to solve
experiraentally grave problems of international
law. But the narae of Mr. Bell and of his ship
would long ago have been forgotten, had they
not been associated Avith the fall of the inge
nious Secretary of the Erabassy at Constanti
nople, who Avas unquestionably the prirae mover
in the business. A man of genius raay be
known by his works. The plan of the voyage
of the Vixen has altogether the irapress of Mr.
Urquhart's raind. He has never denied that he
did persuade Mr. BeU to proceed, after Lord
Ponsonby had advised him not to go. He has
never been able to prove that Lord Palmerston
directly or indirectly sanctioned the expedition.
In thus encouraging a merchant to take a
course which might involve the country in

MR. URQUHART. 221
serious difficulties, he had been guilty of a gross
breach of official duty. Mr. Urquhart was
Secretary of the Erabassy ; and it is the business
of a diploraatist to endeavour to raaintain peace ;
but the course which he prorapted Mr. Bell to
pursue raight easily have produced war. For
such conduct there could be no excuse. If
every English diploraatist in every part of the
globe were thus to act on his own individual
opinions, without the direction of the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, and rashly en
courage proceedings for trying disputed ques
tions, it is obvious that there never would
be a single year of peace. Lord Palraerston
could only take one step. Mr. Urquhart had
applied for leave of absence ; he was inforraed
that he could not be perraitted to return to his
post ; but the rainister kindly assured him that
he would keep the reason of his dismissal a
secret even from the ambassador at Constan
tinople. This consideration for his feelings did not
satisfy Mr. Urquhart. Trusting to private in
fluence, relying on the friendship of Sir Herbert
Taylor, and on the remembrances of kindness
in the highest quarter, he had proudly ventured
to brave the irapotent displeasure of the Foreign
Secretary. But he found, to his disraay, that

222 FOREIGN POLICY.
the Secretary of State, as the responsible servant
of the Crown, was not the contemptible automa
ton that he had supposed hira to be. Mr.
Urquhart was disraissed ; but he has never been
able to consider calmly the reason of his disgrace.
He iraagined that he had fallen a victira to his
honest and uncompromising patriotism. Dark
suspicions entered his mind. He had long been
a raarked raan for his opposition to Russian in
trigues. His ruin had been resolved upon ; and
though holding the seals of the Foreign Office
of England, he was convinced that the English
minister was a Russian agent.
With the restless energy of a man labouring
under one idea, and stiraulated by the goads of
wounded vanity and disappointed arabition, Mr.
Urquhart frora that raoraent becarae the re
lentless eneray of Lord Palraerston. He de
nounced the wickedness of the minister in
market-places. Pamphlet after pamphlet and
article after article came forth in the same spirit
from the press. Paid lecturers traversed Eng
land from one end to the other, aU declairaing
on the criraes of the Foreign Secretary, who had
sacrificed the best interests of the country in
the person of Mr. Urquhart. The dismissed
Secretary of Embassy saw the hand of Russia in
everything. Whatever Lord Palmerston did,

MR. URQUHART. 223
and whatever he left undone, Avas, in Mr. Urqu
hart's opinion, the result of his appaUing trea
chery. In justice to Mr. Urquhart it must be allowed
that he had carefully studied the Turkish ques
tion. At a tirae when most diploraatists, and
even statesraen, were following the old policy of
routine, and loudly professing their confidence
in the Emperor Nicholas, he saw the iraportance
of the dorainions of the Sultan, and the direction
in which Russia was sinuously advancing. The
first draft of the coraraercial treaty between
England and the Porte was drawn up by hira,
and Lord Palraerston has readily given him the
credit which was his due. Had the knowledge
which he possessed of the political and comraer
cial relations of the East been guided by sound
judgraent, he might have done his country
inestimable service. Frora the imprudent man
ner in which he enforced his views, his expe
rience and inforraation were detriraental to the
cause he wished to support. By rushing wildly
into extreraes, by indulging in exaggeration
when even the plain truth seeraed hyperbolical
to those who had not mastered the subject, he
imparted an air of ridicule to the whole question,
and actually prevented the public mind from
giving it the earnest consideration which it might

224 FOREIGN POLICY.
otherwise have done. The absolute necessity of
resisting Russia, and of defending Turkey, is
now generally admitted ; but it ought not to be
forgotten that Mr. Urquhart was long an object
of derision for pertinaciously pronouncing the
sarae opinions. What, when he first spoke of it,
appeared to his astonished listeners as a mon
strous paradox, is now a simple truism. Shame
ful as has been the rancour Avhich Mr. Urquhart
has exhibited tOA^'ards Lord Palraerston, this
statesraan has never stooped to depreciate the
considerable attainraents of his virulent adver
sary, who has suffered the coraraon fate of those
Avho have the misfortune to be right at the
wrong time, and who, though they may be sin
cere and upright in their general principles,
when their own personal interests and passions
are concerned, mistake private malevolence for
public spirit.
Mr. Urquhart has been unquestionably correct
in arguing, as he has always done, that through
out this long period Russia has contemplated the
certainty of a war Avith England. That peace
reraained undisturbed for so many years was not
owing, as it has sometimes been stated, to the
wisdora of the Emperor of Russia, but to the
singular prudence and forbearance of our states
men. The energy of Nicholas was perpetuaUy

UUSSIA's PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 225
directed to those objects which he kncAV raight
at length raake him dispute the naval supreraacy
of England. The state of the Continent afforded
hira the pretext for keeping up that iraraense
display of military force Avhich excited the ap
prehensions of Europe. But it was no dread of
revolutionists and republicans, it was no jea
lousy of the power of France and Austria, that
made the Eraperor of Russia labour incessantly
to organise powerful fleets, both in the Baltic
and the Black Seas, and exhaust all the resources
of science and art in building fortresses which
he felt proudly confident would be irapregnable.
This was for the purpose of opposing England,
and England alone. It was for this that his
fleets paraded in the Baltic. It Avas for this
that naval reviews were the raost cherished
arauseraents of the restless potentate. It was
for this that cannon bristled at Cronstadt and
Sebastopol, and that fortification after fortifica
tion was rapidly being raised.*
To such an extent had these arraaraents been
carried, that they had for sorae years been the
* " Although," wrote Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode in
1828, "there is no probability of seeing an English fleet in
the Black Sea, it would be prudent to fortify Sebastopol well
against all approaches by sea. If ever England should
break with us, against this point will her attacks be directed
if she believe it attackable." — Dispatch, 28<A November.
Q

226 FOREIGN POLICY.
cause of anxiety to the British Government.
Lord Palmerston had to ask for explanations.
It was a subject on which William the Fourth
himself felt strongly. After the violent speech
at Warsaw in the October of 1835, there could
be no doubt that the passion and arrogance
which the Czar then showed himself to possess,
Avould some day endanger the peace and security
of the civilised world. The King of England
felt that it was not for him to submit to such
raenaces. He went even beyond his Ministers.
As a sailor, he could judge of the rapidly in
creasing naval strength of Russia, and he knew
that all these mighty preparations were covertly
intended to dispute the maritime ascendancy of
England. To the last day of his life this riA^alry
occupied his mind. He cordially approA^ed of
Lord Palmerston's policy in Belgium, Portugal,
and Spain, because he thought that every effort
to establish a free constitution raust directly
frustrate the plans of Russia. WiUiam the
Fourth had raany deficiencies ; he was not a
great man; but he had the sentiraents of an
English King.
The regrets of his people followed hira to the
grave. In the few years he had filled the throne,
much had been done for justice, freedom, and
civilisation. Nor was the work of the Foreign

ENGLAND UNDER WILLIAM IV. 227
Secretary of the Reform Ministry, during his six
years of office, such as future generations will
blush to remember. The Holy Alliance had
been left far behind ; its palsying influence had
been shaken off for ever. England had gone on
her own way, trusting in that future in which
the great men of forraer times believed ; that
glorious future which, in spite of the indifference
and contempt of their less gifted countrymen, a
Shakespeare, a Raleigh, a Bacon, and a Milton
saw, even " as an eagle mewing her mighty
youth ; " that future to which Elizabeth appealed
Avheii she defied the civil and religious tyrant of
her age.

Q. 2

228

CHAP. VIII.
COMMERCIAL TREATIES OF THE WHIG ADMINISTRATIONS.
 TREATIES AVITH AUSTRIA AND TURKEY IN 1838. 
STATE OF THE EAST. — SULTAN MAHMOUD THE SECOND
AND MEHEMET ALL  LORD PALMERSTON's POLICY IN SYRIA
AND EGYPT.  TREATY OF THE 13TH OF JULY, 1841. 
POSITION OF LORD PALMERSTON ON THE RETIREMENT OF
THE MELBOURNE MINISTRY.
And now another maiden ascended the English
throne. At the age of eighteen Victoria found
herself the mistress of a realm greater, nobler,
and fairer than any princess in ancient or
modern times had ever inherited. She Avas at
the head of the civilisation and the freedom of
the world. All that Elizabeth and her warriors
and statesmen had ventured to hope, all that
her great poet had imagined, was now a inighty
reality. There was no land in which the British
language was not spoken ; there was no sea on
which the British flag was not respected ; there
were no people fighting for their liberties by
whora the British Constitution was not admired.
The young sovereign might well marvel at the

COMMERCIAL TREATIES OF THE WHIGS. 229
splendour of her inheritance, and tremble at her
responsibilities. She might well ask for the
support of The Being who raises and destroys
empires, Avho makes and unmakes kingdoras,
and who sets up and pulls down the diademed
minions of the earth.
The liberal governments of Spain and Portugal
still existed, after a certain fashion. Queen
Victoria, in her days of sanguine hope and gene
rous enthusiasm, might earnestly wish for the
success of Isabella and Donna Maria. In Por
tugal, however, after all the services that
Englishmen had rendered, our countrymen were
very unpopular. In Spain, after so many
exploits of the British Legion, some of its recent
efforts had been disastrous. The civil war stiU
continued ; but the British auxiliary force, at
the hour of their sovereign's accession, was just
being dissolved.
Lord Palmerston had a difficult task to
perforra. It was in vain that he endeavoured
to apologise for the bad success of his exertions
to tranquiUise Spain. It was in vain that he
appealed to those great principles of constitu
tional governraent which were so justly dear to
his friends. His Spanish policy was veheraently
attacked, and it must be confessed that there Avas
much plausibility in some of the objections which
Q 3

230 FOREIGN POLICY.
Sir Robert Peel and his foUoAvers made. So
far, it had certainly been unfortunate; and all
who judged by the event were furious against
the Minister. Yet any other course raight have
been quite as severely criticised, and perhaps
with quite as rauch reason.
Lord Palraerston suffered much in popu
larity. Even the English Liberals scarcely sym
pathised Avith him ; he Avas not considered a
very earnest reforraer. His great abilities were
not yet acknowledged ; he was not ranked among
statesmen ; he was at best thought a good man
of business, combining pleasantry and jocularity
with a certain steady paced industry. He Avas
a raark for the scurrility of all the opponents of
the Whig governraent. Even Sydney Smith,
the great wit of the reforraers, in the letters
to Archdeacon Singleton, Avhich amused all
England, joined the assailants of the Ministry in
disparaging the Foreign Secretary. He was
called by opprobious names ; he Avas constantly
derided by some of the most poAverful organs of
the press. Of all the members of the Whig
cabinet, perhaps Lo?'d Palmerston was the most
generally abused in the first year of her present
Majesty's reign. Yet few of them Avere less
retiring, or less directly responsible for some of
those serious' mistakes Avhich Aveakencd and

COMMERCIAL POLICY. 231
divided the popular party. Credit AA'as not
given to him for the measures in which he had
been undoubtedly successful. He justly pointed
to Belgiura as the result of his energetic diplo
macy. He was met by a laugh and a retort
that he had coraposed seventy protocols on the
subject. Yet, so delicate Avas the question then
agitated, so raany conflicting interests were
involved in it, so nearly was all Europe on the
threshold of Avar before it was finally decided,
and so much was the pacific settleraent at last
brought about due to Lord Palraerston, that
had not his assailants been blinded by party
spirit, they must have seen that as long as the
Minister succeeded in raaintaining peace, it was
no reproach to hira that he had drawn up
many protocols, even though he had Avritten not
seventy only, but seventy times seven. In fact
Lord Palraerston succeeded in this and in other
threatening negotiations because of that sarae
restless activity Avhich Avas iraputed to him as a
fault. So harassing were the obstacles he
everywhere raet 'with, and so perplexing the
jealousies of rival sovereigns, that a less deter
mined man Avould long before have given up in
despair his efforts at conciliation, and allowed
matters to take that course towards which they
seemed irresistibly tending. Q 4

232 FOREIGN POLICY.
The admirable patience and activity of the
Foreign Secretary were never more thoroughly
exercised than in his atterapts to induce foreign
governments to consent to commercial treaties on
the simple and honest principle of reciprocity.
Lord Palmerston's comraercial treaties are a
peculiar feature of his ministerial career. They
have been much misunderstood, and raost ab
surdly misrepresented ; and because he Avas not
in every instance successful they have been
ridiculed, like most of his arduous endeavours
to increase the power and influence of his
country. The mere mention of a commercial
treaty has excited in sorae rainds a sensation of
horror. It is at once associated Avith a series of
endless and wearisome negotiations which are
sure to hav^e no useful result. Nor is this pre
judice altogether destitute of some appearance
of reason. Difficult and almost hopeless it Avas
to get many foreign governraents to admit that
the world was Avide enough for thera all, and
that free coraraercial intercourse would ulti
mately benefit all nations as much as England.
Frora the year in which peace Avas established
by the downfal of Buonaparte, our generous allies
showed their gratitude to England, who had
subsidised them so largely, by carrying on a ncAV
and extraordinary war. Brigades of custom-

LORD palmerston's COMMERCIAL POLICY. 233
house officers now sprang up in grim hostility
to the produce and manufactures of this country.
Wherever the British raerchant went, he was
met by a fiscal blockade. An English ship of
war raight have much raore easily destroyed a
hostile fortress, than all the comraercial raarine
have traded advantageously where the custom
houses in a continental port had been established.
Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France might
have subjects of dissension among themselves ;
but on the propriety of excluding the produce
of England they were unanimous, and they
waged a coraraon Avar.
Lord Aberdeen, during the adrainistration of
the Duke of Wellington, had striven to persuade
those who represented themselves as friendly
governments, to adopt a better system. Nor
had he been altogether unsuccessful. In some
instances the rigid code had been relaxed;
several commercial treaties had been agreed to ;
and in these negotiations, as in others of a
different kind. Lord Palmerston only proceeded
on the course which his predecessor had begun.
But he laboured at this work earnestly and
indefatigably. Again and again rebuffed, again
and again he renewed his efforts. The Duke of
Wellington in the lines of Torres Vedras
scarcely displayed calmer resolution and more

234 . FOREIGN POLICY.
unshaken energy than Lord Palmerston in his
war against the prohibitive customs duties of
the Continent. He also had his Mr. Perceval.
More than one President of the Board of Trade
seriously talked of resigning his office in disgust
rather than continue longer what he regarded
as a fruitless and interminable contest. This
fight for free trade or comraercial reciprocity
was indeed a hard one ; for it is rauch easier to
gain a victory by force of arras than prevail on
subjects, rainisters, governraents, and sovereigns
to rise superior to their vulgar prejudices and
frankly acknoAvledge their errors.
The tAVO most important of the fourteen com
mercial treaties negotiated while Lord Pahner
ston was the Foreign Secretary of the adminis
trations of Earl Grey and Lord Melbourne, were
those with Austria and Turkey, concluded in the
year after Her Majesty became Queen of England.
Their effects were not raerely coraraercial ;
they had iraportant political consequences. The
position of Turkey must ever be greatly affected
by the relations in Avhich England and Austria
may at any time stand towards each other.
The treaty with Austria, therefore, greatly
concerned Turkey, as the treaty Avith Turkey
greatly concerned Austria. Lord Aberdeen, in
1829, settled a commercial convention with

COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH AUSTRIA. 235
Austria, which, to a limited extent, carried out
the principle of reciprocity. But it was only
to endure ten years. As the tirae when it
would expire drcAV near. Lord Palraerston had
of course to provide for such a contingency.
The coraraercial treaty of 1838 was on the same
principle as the convention of 1829, but of
much wider application, in a still more liberal
spirit, and of a rauch raore perraanent nature.
The obvious effect of the fourth article of
this treaty, by which it is stipulated that the
raerchant ships of both nations shall freely
navigate the Danube throughout its whole
course, Avas evidently of the raost vital irapor
tance. Its tendency was to counteract the
control over that river which, by a " fraudulent"
interpretation of the treaty of Adrianople, and
by every kind of false representations and artful
raanoeuvres, Russia had succeeded in establish
ing. In the just and vigorous execution of
this article, the political independence of Austria
and her comraercial prosperity Avere deeply
interested. Every industrious raechanic in the
dominions of that empire saw the necessity and
the value of this treaty. The news of its
ratification was received with joy. Prince
Metternich was loudly cheered when he appeared
on the exchange of Trieste; in Hungary, and

236 FOREIGN POLICY.
Avherever a wish existed to oppose the baneful
influence of Russia, it Avas felt that a great
success had been achieved.
The coraraercial treaty Avith Turkey was a
gigantic step in the same direction, and was
even still mightier in its results. It was justly
regarded as another triumph over Russia.
Throughout Europe it Avas said that the diplo
matists of Nicholas had received a check even
in their chosen field of conflict, and where they
thought themselves assured of their triuraph.
Frora the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to 1838,
the Sultan could scarcely be considered his own
master. But he now once more resumed his
independence. The struggle in the Divan
betAveen England and Russia was knoAvn to all
the world, and the unscrupulous agents of
Nicholas Avere successfully encountered by the
plain, manly, and frank diploraacy of the English
statesraan. Examined by the abstract principles of poli
tical economy, this comraercial treaty will be
found far frora satisfactory. It has many short
comings ; it has some absurd stipulations ; it is
certainly not a perfect specimen of what a com
mercial treaty, according to the doctrines of free
trade, ought to be. But if some of the terras of
the treaty are hard, they are not harder to the

COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH TURKEY. 237
British merchant than to the subjects of the
Sultan. It is agreed that England shall enjoy
all the advantages of the most favoured nation ;
that British goods shall pay three per cent.
import duty, with an additional duty of two per
cent, on their transport and sale ; that the Porte
may levy an export duty of three per cent. ; and
that instead of the interior duties, Avhich were
such a serious hindrance to the diffusion of our
manufactures in the Turkish dominions, a
certain fixed impost shall be levied. Such were*
the leading provisions of the treaty. It, however,
recorded the readiness of the Sultan to settle
the commercial affairs of other nations on a
similar foundation ; and its whole spirit was in
effect to break the strong chain of raonopoly
which Russia had so long been forging, Hnk by
link, round the Turkish Erapire.
This was the great object of the negotiation ;
and to this the raere coraraercial arrangeraents
were secondary. For this it was worth while to
make some sacrifices, and to acquiesce in sorae
restrictions to which, in different circumstances,
neither Lord Palraerston nor any other minister
would have given their consent. In Paris,
Vienna, and Berlin, it was admitted, even by the
partisans of Russia, that she had been defeated

238 FOREIGN POLICY.
by England ; and other governments began to
rouse themselves from their apathy.
But Mr. Urquhart, who now saw his labours
corapleted by another person, did not join in the
shout of triumph which was echoed over Europe.
He declared, in no equivocal language, his sus
picions of Lord Palmerston's duplicity. He
eagerly perused the treaty Avhen it Avas given to
the public. Sorae of the articles were different
from those of the original draft ; sorae of thera
were not so beneficial to England as his pro
jected articles. He felt for his masterpiece of
coraraercial wisdora that love which a father
feels for his child, or a poet for the creation of
his genius. He was indignant that there
should have been any alterations, omissions, or
additions. He thought his work ought to have
been ratified precisely as it had been originally
planned. He believed that it was not the
business of a negotiator to accept the best terms
that he could obtain, but the best that could
possibly be imagined. Smarting frora his re
cent hurailiation, and full of his suspicions of
treachery, he was now convinced that the whole
treaty was a mere deception, that the paw of
the great bear could be discerned in it, and that
all England, and all the merchants and statesmen

MR. URQUHART. 239
of Europe, were deceived when they applauded
it as a victory over the Iraperial Dictator.
Had the commercial advantages of the treaty
been as illusory as Mr. Urquhart supposed, it
would not foUoAV that England had gained
nothing by that negotiation. It is certain that
Russia stood aloof, and refused her adhesion.
It is certain that all the other Powers ap
proved of it, and hastened to joined England.
It is certain that -some years later Russia
thought fit to foUoAV the example of this country,
and thus tacitly admitted the justice and the
utility of the treaty. It is certain, too, that
Lord Palraerston's success was universally be
lieved in by the most experienced politicians ;
and in political affairs even the mere opinion of
success is alraost as iraportant as the reality.
The fiction grows into a fact ; and araong
nations gives that weight and influence which
the clearest statistical tables soraetiraes fail to
command. This Avas eminently so in 1838. If this
success Avas imaginary, its consequences were
certainly not iraaginary. The word " Palraer
ston " becarae a great one in Europe ; it became
a talisman Avhich has not yet lost its magical
virtue. Never, since the days of Chathara, did
the simple name of an English statesraan carry
with it such power : it was a power of which

240 FOREIGN POLICY.
Englishmen may be honestly proud, for it did
not depend on arraed battalions nor on the
mere physical force of an empire ; it Avas a
power essentially moral; a poAver founded on
opinion ; a poAver in Avhich the public spirit
of England was embodied, disciplined, and
arrayed against that unscrupulous and vain
glorious despotism which, Hke a black cloud at
first no bigger than a man's hand, after having
gradually spread over the whole northern
and eastern horizon, noAV impended over the
West, depressing the hearts of all lovers of true
freedom, and darkening the face of nature.
It A\'as well for the world that Lord Palmer
ston had attained a great position and acquired
a reputation for courage, energy, and determina
tion. The state of the East soon required the
coraplete exercise of these raasculine qualities.
Mehemet Ali had never abandoned his design
of rendering himself a great potentate indepen
dent of the Sultan, and recognised by Europe.
The dread of his intentions, and the hope of
succour from England, were the raotives
Avhich led the raore enlightened of the Turkish
ministers to consent to the commercial treaty.
Already the Pasha of Egypt had refused to pay
his annual tribute to the Porte. Already his
great military and naval preparations had
excited the apprehensions of the Sultan, and the

MAHMOUD II. AND MEHEMET ALI. 241
attention of every statesraan. Already he
had even taken upon himself the sacred rights
of the Sultan as caliph and chief of Islam,
and had ventured to interfere with the adminis
tration of the holy cities which are so deeply
venerated by all true Mussulmans.
Sultan Mahraoud the Second was fast hasten
ing to the torab ; but feeble as he was through
his infirmities, though his frarae was torn by
excruciating agony, and his mind still more
tortured by the fear that the empire which he
had so ably endeavoured to save, was on the
brink of destruction, he resolved, with the spirit
of his great ancestors, not to submit to the
usurpations of his ambitious subject. In the
spring of 1839, the Commander of the Faithful
collected a powerful army on the banks of the
Euphrates, and prepared to contend for the
rights of which he Avas the sacred and hereditary
guardian. A formidable force, on the other
hand, was asserabled at Aleppo under the
command of Ibrahim Pasha. A great European
and Asiatic crisis Avas drawing near.
The catastrophe which the Ministers of France
and England had deprecated ever since the
treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had come to their
knowledge appeared imminent. If the Sultan
R

242 FOREIGN POLICY.
should be defeated, Russia would have a fair pre
tence for rushing to his rescue and confirming
her influence at Constantinople. If the troops
of Nicholas should be once more quartered at
Scutari, it might be doubtful whether they would
ever return. If the Russian fleet once held the
Dardanelles, another Cronstadt, another Sebas
topol, raight soon be erected in that iraportant
position, even with the permission of the Sultan,
and under the pretext of defending him ; then
the sure and speedy dissolution of the Turkish
Empire would be inevitable ; and the Sultan
becorae to the Emperor of Russia what the Great
Mogul became to the East India Company. He
might still reside in a palace on the Bosphorus ;
he might still be surrounded by all the pomp
and ceremonial of eastern magnificence ; treaties
raight still run in his name; but all political
power, all real authority, must have departed
frora him; his glorious heritage must have
passed to his ostensible protector ; and the
dominion of Russia would only have been more
secure, and the state of transition rendered
more easy, by this norainal independence. Of
all the "raodes of doraination" which Lord
Aberdeen in 1829 so sagaciously foresaw, Avhen
so raany liberal politicians Avere the slaves of
prejudice, this would unquestionably have been

MAHMOUD II. AND MEHEMET ALI. 243
the most "irresistible." The Sultan would
have been placed, like his predecessor Bajazet,
in a cage, of Avhich the Emperor of Russia
would have kept the key.
It was this result which all the civilised
nations of the world had so deep a stake in
averting. It was this result which it was the
especial duty of Lord Palmerston to prevent.
He had given the Porte clearly to understand
that should Mehemet Ali boldly carry matters
to an extremity, it might expect aid from
England. France had been consulted, and the
Governments of the two great Western nations
Avere ostensibly united. But the French
Ministry was in an extreraely unsettled state.
Louis Philippe would be his own prirae min
ister ; few eminent French statesraen would
long consent to occupy a second place in a
governraent in which they were thought to be
the chiefs ; and a succession of precarious
administrations rapidly followed each other.
As the King of the French was known to
be personally favourable to the alliance with
England, a strong party opposed to his Govern
ment grew dissatisfied with the system of
foreign policy of which the connection with
England was the foundation.
When the Eastern difficulty broke out, the
E 2

244 FOREIGN POLICY.
action of the two Governments was apparently
harraonious. It is true that even then a differ
ence of opinion might be discovered : France
evidently regarded the Sultan as the aggressor,
while England considered that the quarrel had
been forced upon him by his aspiring servant.
But this seemed of slight importance. A
coramon jealousy of Russia, and a fear of the
advantages which the Emperor might take,
should the Sultan be by the fortune of war
rendered helpless as in 1833, sufficed to keep
the Western Powers together.
The events of a few short raonths proved that
the doubts which the EngHsh and French Minis
ters expressed of the inability of the Sultan to
resist the aggressions of Mehemet Ali were well
founded. The general of the Sublime Porte
was corapletely defeated, and there was nothing
to prevent Ibrahira Pasha from marching to
Constantinople. Before the news of the rout of the Turkish
array reached the Bosphorus, Sultan Mahmoud
slept with his fathers. He retained the energy
and deterraination of his character to the last.
Araid the distractions of his erapire, the rebellion
of his dependents, and the raiseries of a social
and political revolution, with an enfeebled frame
and a broken heart, he had displayed the

MAHMOUD II. AND MEHEMET ALI. 245
quahties of a hero. It may be well questioned
whether Mehemet Ali hiraself, whose abiHties
were so rauch praised, and whose star Avas
rising so proudly in the East, had in all the
vicissitudes of his life and his struggles from
obscurity to glory shown more genuine great
ness, more unshaken courage, and more real
genius than this unfortunate Sultan, who in such
a sad hour prayed his last prayer and breathed
his last breath. He had stood by the couch of
a declining empire, and had not despaired. In
defiance of the prejudices of his subjects and
the sneers of Europeans, he had striven to revive,
when it seeraed at the last gasp, the expiring
dorainion of his house. With none to encourage,
AvIth none to guide hira, he had made a political
resurrection, and had given organisation to a
state which A\^as nothing but a mass of ruins.
The work he had performed was far beyond the
abilities even of the most loquacious of political
reforraers. He had struggled earnestly and
wisely ; and had earned a new and peculiar
kind of glory by arresting the progress of decay.
Where all seeraed prostration and death he had
sown the seeds of energy and life ; and they
only required time and repose to grow and
fructify. He deserves to be regarded as one
of the greatest of the Sultans. Mahomet, when
B 3

246 FOREIGN POLICY.
he last shook the dust of Mecca frora his feet, and
first raised his standard amid the barren sands
of Arabia, was not, apparently, engaged in a raore
hopeless cause than Mahmoud the Second Avhen
he resolved to make war on the corruptions,
abuses, and prejudices of Turkey, to destroy the
Janissaries, and to introduce the improvements
of European civilisation into the Eastern Empire.
In 1839 that numerous race of political phi
losophers who only judge of such efforts by
their immediate success, pronounced this work
of regeneration to be a decided failure. Lord
Palraerston was, however, not one of them. He
had fully adopted those ideas Avhich he still
holds, and argued in 1839 as in 1853, that the
condition of Turkey was not irremediable ; that
the signs of progress raight be seen; and that
with care, patience, and wisdora, the valour of
the Mussulmans, under an enlightened adminis
tration, might yet constitute a forraidable ram
part against the ambition of Russia. And on
this principle the English statesman acted.
Unfortunately the French Ministry had not
the same far-sighted views. They believed that
nothing could perraanently save Turkey, and
they considered Meheraet AH the only raan
capable of successfully resisting the forraidable
northern Power. From this difference of opinion

LORD palmerston's POLICY IN THE EAST. 247
sprung many future dissensions. But other
powerful motives were also in operation. Since
the acquisition of Algiers, an acquisition which
the Deputies foolishly pledged themselves, in an
answer to an address from the Throne, on no
account to relinquish, they thought of gaining
an influence in the East through Mehemet Ali,
so as effectually to oppose the influence which
Russia possessed through the Greek subjects of
the Porte. A protectorate was to be met by a
protectorate, and influence was to be arrayed
against influence. To Frenchmen Egypt had
peculiar associations. When Napoleon was tired
with the monotony of Europe, it was to that
country he turned with longing eyes and lofty
aspirations, as the spot from which a new and
mighty empire rivalling that of Alexander
might radiate. It was there that he was en
countered by the genius of England, and his
gigantic projects crushed in the bud. From
that tirae Frenchmen supposed that England
herself had designs upon Egypt, and that her
policy in the East was directed even by the
mere instinct of self-preservation to this great
object. It was in vain that our Ministers
asserted that they did not Avish for Egypt, that
if it was offered to us we would not accept it,
and that all Ave wanted in Egypt was a road.
B 4

248 FOREIGN POLICY.
These professions were answered by an incre
dulous smile. They Avere classed with the
virtuous and humble declarations of the Em
peror of Russia that he did not want Constan
tinople. The ncAvspapers of Paris were full of
such notions; and surely their editors raay be
excused for entertaining them, when the great
Autocrat, up to the present time, and not
withstanding all his experience of our disinte
restedness, had the same fixed idea. Egypt Avas
the luring bribe he held out to Sir Hamilton
Seymour, in order to induce the English Mi
nisters to assist him in the partition of Turkey,
when he thought the seasonable tirae had come.
The French Government may even be excused
for despairing of the future of Turkej''. Ne\'er,
surely, was a great empire left in a more dis-
as^ous state. Abdul Medjid, a mere youth of
seventeen, had just been seated on the tottering
throne of his deceased father. His army was
disorganised. Two or three weeks after his
accession his fleet deserted to the eneray.
There was discord among the ministers, dis
content in the capital, and rebellion triumphant
in Syria. The Russian troops and ships of Avar
might at any moment appear in the Bosphorus,
or at any moment Ibrahim Pasha might lead his
forces to Constantinople. But one ray of hope

LORD palmerston's POLICY IN THE EAST. 249
StiU bearaed on that lowering horizon. The
English fleet was in an efficient state ; the reso
lution ofthe English Minister was not doubted;
the English admiral menaced Alexandria, and
EngHsh men-of-war were standing off Tenedos.
It was known in Constantinople, and what is
more it was also known at Alexandria, at
Sebastopol, and at St. Petersburg, that the
moment a Russian squadron or the Egyptian
troops approached Constantinople, Lord Palraer
ston had deterrained to force the Dardanelles,
and that at any cost the flag of England should
also wave in the sea of Marmora.
It is at such terrible conjunctures that the
spirit of a statesman is shown. Then it is seen
whether he has only capacity to drift on the
current of events, or genius and courage to
command those circumstances of which, with
vaciUation or feebleness, he must inevitably
becorae the victira. And it is doing Lord
Palmerston but scanty justice to acknowledge
that with his colleagues trembhng at the respon
sibihties they were sharing with hira, coldly
supported by his friends, in a rainority in the
Cabinet, and with the Government but drao-gino-
on its existence from day to day, he was fully
equal to the occasion and gave no sign of
wavering.

250 FOREIGN POLICY.
In council he was manfully seconded by Lord
John Russell. But one of the Whig Ministers
was not satisfied with a silent protest against
his policy. Lord Holland still held his opinions
of 1829. He still held all his prejudices against
Turkey, and, there is reason to believe, was the
cause of much embarrassment to the Foreign
Secretary. He shared the sentiments of the
French poHticians with regard to Mehemet Ali,
and gave to a French diplomatic agent private
assurances which were widely different from all
the public declarations of Lord Palraerston.
Thus 'the French Ministers were misled, and the
serious raisunderstanding with England brought
about. But Lord HoUand died before these
Eastern negotiations were concluded, and peace
was fuUy established in the Levant. His speeches
on the foreign policy of England should be studied
by all who would follow the progress of opinion
and the sentiraents of parties throughout the last
thirty years. He was an honest politician, a
raan of excellent intentions, a raunificent patron
of literature. But he scarcely deserved all the
panegyrics which his friends have pronounced
over his tomb, and hence their eulogies have
been in a certain sense injurious to his fame.
His posthumous publications have been severely
criticised ; and when read without that personal

LORD Holland's opposition. 251
interest which they acquired frora the social
qualities of their author, do not justify the
claims which have been made to the approbation
of posterity. Lord Holland was proud to ac
knowledge himself the pupil of Mr. Fox; and
" Mr. Fox's pupU " he raight be called even
when he was a grey-haired old man. His mind
never expanded beyond the confines of that
select political circle of which he was so eminent
a member. He never did justice to Edmund
Burke, but had the same jealousy of that great
man which Mr. Fox's political followers felt im
mediately after the publication of the Reflections
on the French Revolution, and the consequent
disruption of the Whig party.
Lord Holland's interference in this difference
between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan was
certainly pernicious. But for some tirae all
promised well. France took the initiative in
professing a desire to preserve the integrity and
the independence of the Ottoraan Erapire. She
stopped the raarch of Ibrahira Pasha ; and the
circular which was sent to her servants in the
East by the French Governraent Avas admired
and imitated by the other four Powers. It
left nothing to be desired. A satisfactory
termination to the troubles of Turkey seemed
speedy and certain. The iraportant note

252 FOREIGN POLICY.
addressed to the Porte when it was about to
concede many of Mehemet All's demands, and
Avhich virtually placed the Sultan under the
protection of all Europe, was believed to have
been first suggested by France. It was cer
tainly a great point gained, and one on Avhich
the Western PoAvers might sincerely congratulate
each other. It was a surrender of the exclusive
pretensions which Russia had so long made, and
which she had secured by treaty at Unkiar
Skelessi. The French fleet continued to cruise
with the English in the Mediterranean ; and the
orders Avhich Lord Palmerston sent to Admiral
Stopford Avere previously transmitted to Paris
for the consideration of the French Governraent.
Nothing could be more straightforward than
the proceedings of the English Foreign Secretary.
All that Avas necessary for firra union was corre
sponding openness and corresponding sincerity.
Vienna Avas proposed as the place in Avhich the
plenipotentiaries of the five Powers were to deli
berate on the Eastern question. But Russia had at
that time an instinctive jealousy of the interference
of Austria in Turkey, and at length it was agreed
that London should be the seat of this great
European conference. Had the French Ministry
and the French nation been in a proper mood,
they would have seen that the fact of the metro-

LORD palmerston's POLICY IN 1839. 253
polls of England being chosen for the Congress
when the Western PoAvers were closely united,
was another and still more decisive advantage.
But the French Ministry and the French nation
were bent on being unreasonable. They were
resolved to give Russia every opportunity for
breaking that generous alliance founded on com
mon interest and comraon freedora, which had
for ten years excited her apprehension.
And this was the key to the moderation which
the Emperor Nicholas then showed. He endea
voured by every means to gain the confidence of
Lord Palmerston, or, at all events, to prevent
him from taking any measures in the East de
cidedly hostile to Russia. To acquire the con
fidence of the Foreign Secretary was indeed
impossible ; but if the proposals of Russia were
fair, he was surely not precluded, even by his
alliance with France, frora giving them his sup
port. He had shown a determined hostility to
the schemes of Nicholas in many ways, and in
many lands. He had taken a resolute, and even
menacing attitude. Russia had received from
him, even since Mehemet Ali had rencAved his
eflPorts for independence, one of the sharpest of
remonstrances. There was no mistaking the
Note of October 26th, 1838, frora Lord Palmer
ston, to our Ambassador at St. Petersburg. It

254 FOREIGN POLICY.
informed the Emperor of A\"hat he might expect
frora his intrigues in Persia, and what was the
lirait to the forbearance of England. The de
bates in Parliaraent since the treaty of L^nkiar
Skelessi, had given the Minister a moral strength
with which he could fearlessly undertake great
things. The hour of action had arrived ; there
was the power of a great nation, and the ability
and courage to use it well.
In the summer of 1839, the merabers of the
Conference on Eastern Affairs assembled in Lon
don. Every effort was made to keep their de
liberations secret ; but it was soon knoAvn that
there was a serious disagreement between France
and the other four Powers, on the measures to
be pursued for the support of the Sultan and
the pacification of his dorainions. The opinion
of England had been long given, and had never
A'aried. She regarded Meheraet Ali as a rebel,
and considered his suramary expulsion from
Syria the first and essential element of a future
peace. When he had restored the Turkish
fleet, and evacuated the proAdnces he had
wrongfully seized, then, and not until then.
Lord Palraerston, said terras raight be granted
to hira by which he could retain the hereditary
pashalic of Egypt. The opinion of Austria was
not widely diverse. Prince Metternich thought

LORD palmerston's POLICY IN 1838-9. 255
the Sultan might again become master of Syria,
either during ^lehemet All's Hfe, or at his death.
Russia was ready to agree to either the plan of
Austria, or that of England ; and it cannot be
denied, that the sacrifices she made, and the
modest and dignified tone she then used, were
highly creditable to the prudence and discretion
of the Emperor, and contrasted painfuUy with
the impracticability of the French Government.
France had pledged herseK to maintain the in
tegrity and independence of the Sultan, and yet
treated Mehemet Ali as his equal. She could
not consent to use force against the Pasha. He
might be persuaded to make " concessions." The
French IMinisters would use their influence over
him for that purpose ; but stiU he might retain
the hereditary possession of Syria, and Avield the
power of that province for the defence of the
Sultan, Avhom he would then be able and willing
to shield frora the attacks of all his enemies.
France looked upon Mehemet Ali as the strong
man in the East, who might play the sarae part
towards the Sultan, as the Mayors of the Palace
had once played to the efferainate and incompe
tent successors of Charlemagne.
This policy was based on two suppositions,
both of which were wrong. It was assuraed
that Meheraet All's power was not a raere

256 FOREIGN POLICY.
anomaly, but a sound organic development
which would continue to exist after he Avas in
his grave, and that the Sultan and his Ministers,
being incapable of conducting the administra
tion, required a protector of sorae sort to pre
serve their erapire from falHng to pieces. Now
Mehemet Ali was an old raan ; he was pro
verbially a raerciless ruler ; he cared nothing
for the happiness of the people he governed ;
his dorainion was siraply founded on brute
force ; it had no raoral cohesion, and was not
likely to be handed down in its strength and
integrity to his descendants. He was hated by
the very people of whora Hberal France wished
to raake hira the perpetual raaster; his cruelty
had driven them to desperation; rebellion had
succeeded rebellion, and the Christian population
of Syria especiaUy shuddered at his present and
prospective tyranny. Was it for such a person
and for such a cause that the friendship of
England was to be sacrificed ? The Sultan was
certainly weak, but it was Mehemet Ali who
had made him Aveak. It was Mehemet Ali who,
in 1833, had driven the Porte to accept the pro
tection of Russia. It was Mehemet Ali who
was now, by his vain and senile dreams of
independence, jeopardising Turkey, and again
giving the Emperor Nicholas the occasion, Avhich

BARON BRUNNOW'S MISSION. 257
France so much feared, of sending his fleets and
armies to Constantinople.
A more mistaken course of policy than that
which the French press, and in consequence the
French ministers, then advocated, was never
adopted by a great nation. It alienated Eng
land without conciliating Russia. It united in
opposition those who, Hke Lord Palraerston,
believed that the Turkish Empire was capable
of regeneration under the Sultan, and those
Avho, like Count Nesselrode, wished to see the
power of the Czar firmly extended to the Dar
danelles. Weeks slipped aAvay, and the five Powers had
come to no decisive resolution. Every effort to
prevail on France to act in concert Avith the rest
of Europe, had failed. Lord Palmerston had given
the French ministers distinctly to understand,
that if it was found impossible for France to
unite with the other Powers, she was not to be
surprised if they, at last, deterrained to act with
out her co-operation. Russia had taken pains
to send Baron Brunnow on a special raission to
England; the French Governraent well knew that
he had arrived in London on the 15th of Septem
ber, and they might have easily guessed that his
object Avas to dissolve the alliance of the Western
Powers. Comraon prudence might surely have

258 FOREIGN POLICY.
suggested the necessity of no longer standing
aloof. Common sense might have shown that
it was not likely four great nations would sacri
fice their settled principles to the opinions of a
single Power with whom they did not agree.
But it was all vain. The statesraanship of
France seemed spell-bound.
The accounts written by Baron Brunnow and
Lord Palraerston of their conversations on the
troubles of the East in the auturan of 1839 are
very interesting and amusing. As the impracti
cability of France was established, the friendly
professions of Russia to England increased.
Baron Brunnow was all frankness and candour.
He expressed the gratification of the Emperor
on finding how little difference there Avas in the ¦
opinions of England and Russia on the affairs
of the Levant. He was happy to find that Lord
Palmerston now appeared to have raore con
fidence than he had forraerly professed in the
good faith of Russia. The Emperor felt that he
deserved this confidence. Pie wished to give the
fullest explanations, and his earnest desire was
to be on the most friendly terms with England.
On the differences between the Pasha of Egypt
and the Porte, his Iraperial Majesty could have
but one opinion. The Sultan was a sovereign
and an ally ; Meheraet Ali, a revolted subject.

PROPOSALS OF RUSSIA. 259
All that was necessary for maintaining peace
was that Russia and England should come to a
clear understanding. They Avere the " two
governments," * and the other PoAvers would
agree to what they, when united, might
determine. He highly approved of the coercive
measures Lord Palmerston recoraraended. But
if the coasts of Syria and Egypt were blockaded,
and all the supplies of Ibrahira Pasha's army
intercepted, might not he in a moment of despe
ration, as he had threatened, advance to the
Bosphorus and overawe Constantinople ? Was
it not then necessary. Baron Brunnow said, _
that Russia and England should previously
settle what course should be taken, and be
fully prepared for such an emergency ? The
Emperor had a plan to propose which he had no
doubt would be quite satisfactory and produce
the happiest results. If England Avould agree to
* In the opinion of the Emperor Nicholas, there are ever
only two Governments in the world. Whenever he has any
flattering overtures to make, it is his custom to inform the
ambassador of the state he desires to conciliate that there
are only two Governments. Sometimes one of these Govern
ments is England, sometimes the United States of America,
and sometimes it is Prussia; but while the name of one of
the Powers of which the Emperor condescends to acknow
ledge the existence, may vary according to circumstances,
Russia is invariably the other, and remains, in his mind,
the only perpetual and unchangeable Government.
s 2

260 FOREIGN POLICY.
it, Nicholas would pledge hiraself not to renew
the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which he was
aware had been regarded with rauch distrust.
He would give assistance to the Sultan, not as
under the obHgations of that treaty, which
however he still considered binding, but as the
agent of the five Powers. His forces would be
the forces of the alliance ; as the forces of the
alliance they would raove to protect Constanti
nople, and as the forces of the alliance, when
that service should be perforraed, they would
retire. The other Powers Avould not of course
. remain inactive. A convention might settle
Avhat work France, Austria, and England should
respectively execute. But, as a general rule,
Avhatever was necessary to be done in Syria and
Egypt, raight be done by these three Powers,
Avhile all the operations requisite Avithin the
Straits and in Asia Minor, should be perforraed
by Russia.
This Avas the proposition of his Iraperial
Majesty, coraraunicated by Baron Brunnow to
Lord Palraerston. Here was the explanation of
the frank, candid, raagnaniraous, and disinterested
professions of the Eraperor of all the Russias.
The gist of the matter was, that whatever might
happen, England should confine herself to the
Mediterranean, and that Avithin the Dardanelles

LORD palmerston's POLICY IN 1839-40. 261
Russia should have free scope to cement her
power and extend her influence. It was the
treaty of Unkiar Skelessi under another name,
and with the difference that the Western Powers
were to negotiate their own exclusion from the
sea of Marmora, and permit Russia, with their
eyes open, to be the ruler at Constantinople.
Lord Palraerston informed Baron Brunnow that
the Government of this country fully reciprocated
all the friendly declarations of the Eraperor.
But the Foreign Secretary had a slight raodifi-
cation to propose in the imperial plan. It Avas a
very slight one ; but if it could not be agreed to
the English Minister would be reluctantly com
pelled to reject the propositions altogether. The
moraent that the Russian fleet entered the
Bosphorus to defend the Sultan, the Dardanelles
raust also be opened, and a few English ships of
war under their national flag also enter the waters
of the Porte. They would not go to raenace
Russia, but merely to assert the principle that
the Straits were not open to one European Power
and shut to another.
Baron Brunnow Avas extremely sorry that this
was the decision of the English Government. He
had not received instructions on that particular
point. He must refer it to the Eraperor. But
in the mean while rauch valuable time might be
s 3

262 FOREIGN POLICY.
lost. Could not something be decided ? Could
not England at once undertake decisive opera
tions against Mehemet AH, and leave the question
of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to be settled
by a subsequent arrangement ?
The Baron was pressing. He urged every
argument to persuade Lord Palmerston to take
some irrevocable step. But the minister was
not to be deceived. Until Russia had agreed to
alloAV the flag of England to appear in a certain
part of the Sea of Marmora, should the necessity
for such interference occur. Lord Palmerston
would not permit himself to be inextricably in
volved in a series of raeasures on which the fate
of Asia and of Europe depended. He was placed
at that time in a most difficult situation. Ibrahim
Pasha might appear with his victorious troops in
the vicinity of Constantinople. Ru ssia might pour
her armies into Turkey. All this time Mehemet Ali
Avas busily engaged in strengthening his position.
The merciless conscription was actively going on ;
new battalions were daily drilled and paraded in
the streets of Cairo ; the united fleets of Turkey
and Egypt were daily being made more efficient.
Every day the necessity for iraraediate action
was raore irarainent, yet every day the joint
action of the five Powers, through the obstinacy
of the French Ministers, Avas raore hopeless. It

LORD palmerston's POLICY IN 1839-40. 263
seemed as though Lord Palmerston would be
obliged to quarrel with France, and yet have
no definite agreement with Russia.
In the January of 1840, Baron Brunnow re
turned to England. He brought with him the
consent of the Emperor to the alterations Lord
Palmerston required in the original propositions.
If events compelled Russia to send her armies
and vessels to Constantinople, England and
France might each send three line-of-battle ships
through the Dardanelles. The firmness of the
Foreign Secretary had prevailed. The treaty
of Unkiar Skelessi Avas thus virtually abrogated
and was not to be renewed. The concessions
then made by the Emperor of Russia Avere not
confined to England ; all the advantages Avere
equally to be shared by France,
But a ministerial crisis occurred in that
kingdora. All negotiations were suspended
from February to .May. Lord Palmerston
hoped that the new Ministry, when it was at
length established, would be more conciliating;
but in that hope he was disappointed. M.
Thiers was not more inclined to coerce Mehemet
Ali than Marshal Soult had been. For twelve
months negotiations had been carried on, and
yet no agreement Avas concluded ; for tAvelve
months France alone had prevented the action
s 4

264 foreign POLICY.
of the rest of Europe ; after twelve months of
diploraacy it seemed that the five Powers were
further frora coraing to a satisfactory arrange
ment than Avhen the conference first met. In
July 1839, France was the most eager for the
common interference of Europe in the affairs of
the East; but in July 1840, France had rejected
every proposition which had been made to her,
and she stood alone.
What was to be done ? To Avait for the ad
hesion of the French Governraent to the objects
of the four Powers, would be waiting for what
raight never corae. To inforra M. Thiers of the
intentions of the other courts raight easily be
construed into a menace, and would certainly
give hira an opportunity of warning Mehemet
Ali ofthe designs against him, and cause the Pasha
to be fully prepared to offer a determined resist
ance. The French telegraph would be imrae
diately called into requisition, and probably the
plan of the alliance frustrated. Contrary to the
intentions of Lord Palraerston, sorae of the
pacific projects to which France had been asked
to agree, were sent to the Pasha of Egypt
by the French Minister. The English states
man had also been informed frora very different
quarters, that the French ambassador at Con
stantinople was endeavouring to persuade the

treaty of the 15th july, 1840. 265
Porte to accept the terms which Meheraet Ali
had offered, independently of all coraraunication
with the Governments that had undertaken to
settle the question. ^Reluctantly, but resolutely.
Lord Palraerston carae to a decision. On the
15th of July, just within the year from the time
when the collective note of the five Powers was
presented to the Porte, and the war between
Mehemet AH and the Sultan taken under the
consideration of Europe, a Convention was signed
between Russia, England, Prussia, and Austria,
with the Sublime Porte, without the concurrence
or the knowledge of France.
By this convention the fate of Mehemet Ali
was decided. The corabined Powers advised the
Sultan to grant to the Pasha the hereditary pos
session of Egypt, the coraraand for life of the
fortress of St. Jean d'Acre, with the title of
Pasha of Acre, and the adrainistration of the
south of Syria. If this arrangeraent was not
accepted by Meheraet Ali in ten days after it
had been communicated to him, he was only to
be offered the Pashalic of Egypt, which if he
did not accept before the expiration of the ten
following days he would be offered no terras
whatever, but have to abide the fortune of war,
and the united strength of the European sove
reigns.

266 foreign POLICY.
Two days after this important document was
signed, a meraorandum was delivered to M.
Guizot, the French ambassador in London, in
forming hira of Avhat had been decided, and ex
pressing the regret of the other Powers that
they had been compelled to come to such a
determination without the assent of France.
The effect on the rainds of our ardent neigh
bours was electric. Their pride and vanity
were deeply Avounded ; and stiraulated by all
the organs of their Government, they seeraed
alraost frenzied. Just before the prorogation of
Parliament in the auturan. Lord Palraerston in
the House of Coraraons gave an explanation of
his conduct, and laid all the blame on the French
Ministry. He had not isolated France ; France
had isolated herself. She would not act with
the other PoAvers ; they had therefore at last
been obliged to act without her. No effort had
been spared to prevail on her to join with thera;
project after project, proposition after proposi
tion, had been raade to her, but all in vain. A
plan founded on the suggestion of General
Sebastiani himself, the late French ambassador,
had even been offered at last by the English
Foreign Secretary, but that also was rejected.
Lord Palmerston deeply regretted that he could
not induce France to unite with the other Go-

CONDUCT OF M. THIER'S. 267
vernments, but after so rauch time had been
lost, and when the state of the East was so pre
carious, he could take no other course. He had
none but friendly feelings towards France. He
regarded, her alliance as of inestimable value.
This speech, far from calming the irritation of
the French people, only made them still more
furious. It was pouring oil upon fire; the
flame blazed fiercer and fiercer. M. Thiers'
conduct at that tirae was little creditable to his
wisdora or his philanthropy. Before he was
placed in the responsible position he then occu
pied, he had spoken eloquently in favour of the
continuance ofthe alliance withEngland. He had
even confessed that France and England had op
posite vicAVS on the Syrian question, but that it
was only as the negotiations proceeded, and the
sentiraents of the two Governments were ex
plained, that the attachment of France to Mehemet
Ali had been disclosed. But now his vanity was
incensed. He had prided hiraself on his genius for
foreign policy ; he had supposed that he could
oblige the English Minister to follow hira in his
course; and he had been wrong in all his calcula
tions. He did not think it unworthy of him as
the head of the Government, to rouse by every
means the passions of the multitude, and to pre
cipitate his country into a Avar Avith all Europe,

268 foreign policy.
but especially with England. He made iraraense
preparations for a great European conflict, spoke
in the tone of a braggadocio, and thought that
he could intimidate Lord Palmerston from carry
ing out the line of policy which he had pledged
hiraself and his country to follow.
Had the Foreign Secretary been a weak or hesi
tating minister, he might have trerabled at the
difficulties by which he Avas environed ; he raight
have sacrificed the interests of Turkey, and de
graded hiraself in the eyes of all Europe without
conciliating M. Thiers and his extravagant ad
mirers. The French Minister had always
asserted that the measures of coercion which
Great Britain raight take on the coast of Syria
and Egypt Avould fail. He expected the Pasha
to offer a successful resistance to the English
forces ; he hoped that France might then be caUed
in as a mediator ; that by her interposition the
dominion of Mehemet Ali over Syria Avould be
secured, and the French influence corapletely
established along the shores of the Mediterra
nean, In a despatch to Mr, Bulwer, dated August
31st, Lord Palraerston fully vindicated the
course which he had taken, and proved M.
Thiers to be hopelessly in the wrong. This
able paper was printed and sent to all the courts

M, THIERS AND LORD PALMERSTON. 269
of Europe. It greatly increased the reputation
of the Minister, and satisfied aU candid minds of
the fairness and ability with which he had con
ducted those difficult negotiations. M. Thiers'
reply to this public document was feeble and
inconsistent ; it only proved that he had never
had a definite policy. The quibbling spirit in
Avhich he atterapted to argue that the integrity
and independence of the Ottoraan Erapire only
raeant the frustration of the plans of Russia and
not the preservation of the Porte from the ara
bition of Meheraet Ali, was utterly unworthy of
a statesraan. Lord Palraerston was not deterred by all the
raenaces of the French Minister, nor by all the
exciteraent of the French people, frora executing
what he had deterrained. The energy and
rapidity with which the operations were con
ducted offered a singular contrast to the long
and tedious delays which France had caused
before a final decision could be made. The
work of the diplomatist had now ended ; the
tirae for action had arrived. It was now to be
seen Hoav far M. Thiers' repeated assertions ot
the inefficiency of the raeans with which Lord
Palraerston proposed to reduce Mehemet Ali to
submission, were correct; and whether success
Avas to crown, or defeat to stigmatise, the policy

270 FOREIGN POLIUi-.
which the English Minister had adopted. It
was indeed a moment of tremendous responsi
bility. The power and ability of Mehemet Ali
were undoubtedly great. The peace of all
Europe now depended on the speedy and cora
plete success of our sailors and marines on the
coast of Syria. One mistake, one moment of
vacillation, and in the existing state of the
French nation, all Europe Avould spring to arms.
With the love for peace which Avas professed by
so many respectable politicians, dismissal, dis
grace, and even irapeachraent raight be the fate of
the brilliant statesraan who failed in such a bold
stroke of policy. The Duke of Marlborough in
the battle-field when the bullets rained raost
thickly, never showed raore bravery than Lord
Palraerston as he calraly awaited, in the unima
ginative atraosphere of Downing Street, the issue
of his great combination, and the proverbial
hazards of Avar.
No time was lost. Mehemet Ali was imrae
diately inforraed of the terras Avhich the Sultan,
by the advice of the four Powers, was disposed
to grant. He endeavoured to negotiate directly
at Constantinople. His proposals were not
accepted ; and Avithout consulting the allies, the
governraent of the Porte pronounced his formal
deposition from the Pashalic of Egypt. Of this

OPERATIONS IN SYRIA. 271
step. Lord Palraerston disapproved; and as
surances were given to France that it was not
to be considered a final sentence. The coasts of
Syria and Egypt were declared to be in a state
of blockade. Admiral Stopford, with the British
fleet, some Turkish vessels, and two Austrian
frigates, approached Beyrout. After a bom
bardment of four days, Soliraan Pacha, with
the Egyptian troops under his coraraand, was
corapeUed to evacuate tha town. Commodore
Napier took Sidon by storra, and ever ready for
action either by sea or land, advanced into the
raountains and defeated Ibrahira Pasha. The
Lebanon was soon cleared, Ibrahira's array,
from Avhich France expected so much, dispersed,
and hiraself a fugitive. But the most illustrious
and decisive exploit of all was the capture of the
great and, it was deemed, impregnable fortress
of St. Jean d'Acre, the key to all the mUitary
positions of Syria and to the Empire of the
East. To the surprise of all the world and to
the incredulous wonder of the population of
Syria and Egypt, it was taken by the British
squadron after a bombardment of three hours.
At two o'clock in the afternoon the firing
coraraenced ; at five it ceased, and the Egjrptian
troops began rapidly to leave the toAvn which
had been reduced in a short time, so destructive

272 FOREIGN POLICY.
had been the fire of the ships, to a heap of
sraoking and blackened ruins. The next raorn
ing the fortress was forraally restored by the
English Comraodore to the authority of the
Sultan. 'This series of rapid, brilliant, and triuraphant
actions effectually did Meheraet All's business.
In two months the bugbear which to France
appeared of such portentous magnitude had been
made, by the genius and vigour of the English
Foreign Secretary, and the skill and valour of the
English sailors, to dAvindle into very harmless
dimensions. England had put forth her strength
for a raoment, and only for a raoment : and the
greatness of Meheraet Ali, and the irapending poli
tical convulsions of the East, had vanished before
it like a dream. The raeans which M. Thiers had
but a few raonths before pronounced quite inade
quate to the purposes in view, had proved
quite sufficient. Even the dreaded advance of
the Russian forces to Constantinople had been
avoided, and all necessity for such interference
obviated. By insisting that England should
send three ships of war through the Dardanelles
whenever the Russian fleet entered the Bos
phorus, Lord Palraerston had given Russia a
powerful raotive for not acting at all except in
the last extreraity. The Russian fleet was lying

CHANGE OF THE FRENCH MINISTRY. 273
idly at Sebastopol Avhile the English squadron
was acting so decisively in Syria.
Before all the operations against Mehemet Ali
had been undertaken, M. Thiers, happily for the
peace of the world, ceased to be prime minister
of France. On the bombardment of Beyrout
he asked the King to sanction the immediate
completion of the armament, the speedy convo
cation of the Charabers, and the departure of
the fleet for Alexandria, to give by its presence
Avhat he termed, a moral support to Mehemet
AH. The King of the French, as anxious for
the raaintenance of peace as his prirae rainister
was eager for war, rejected these demands.
The Ministry resigned. By the mediation of
the Duke of Broglie the quarrel was for the
raoraent patched up ; but when the time for the
preparation of the King's speech drew near, the
ministers again renewed their proposals which
were again rejected; and the Ministry finally
retired. M. Guizot was sent for from London,
and a cabinet in which he held the office of
Foreign Secretary, and Marshal Soult those of
President of the Council and Minister of War,
was formed. As M. Guizot had ahvays been
warmly attached to England, these ministerial
changes were considered favourable to the
maintenance of peace.

274 FOREIGN POLICY.
But it is right to acknowledge that to Louis
PhiHppe the chief merit is due of having
prevented the breaking out of hostilities. Since
it Avill be necessary to speak of the policy which
he pursued some years later Avith strong disap
probation, it is only just to allow him the glory
of endeavouring at this moraent of frenzy to
bring the French nation into a better teraper,
and of discountenancing the violent schemes of
his ministers. Louis Philippe lived to be a
recreant to honourable, just, and liberal prin
ciples. He lived to be the eneray of Lord
Palraerston, Avho would not support his selfish
plans for the aggrandiseraent of his faraily. He
lived to be in his old age an outcast and a
Avanderer, and his bones are buried in a foreign
soil. But Englishmen, as they look upon his
tomb and reflect on the vanity of all earthly
grandeur, may forgive the errors and crimes
Avhich the King of the French comraitted in the
last years of his reign, on reraerabering the Avords
he uttered at Boulogne, when the cry for Avar
against " perfidious Albion " was resounding
throughout France. •' As long as I live," said
he, "there shall be peace between France and
England." The excitement Avas beginning to subside.
Other subjects of interest were dividing the at-

CAPTURE OF ACRE, 275
tention of the gallant nation Avith the slights
Avhich it imagined the honour of France had
received in the Eastern dispute. The wickedness
of Madarae Laffarge raade the Parisians partly
forget the Avickedness of Lord Palmerston, The
Chambers had asserabled, the ncAV Ministry A\'ere
successful in every division, Avlien the news of
the capture of Acre arrived in Paris, and once
more drove the French people almost beside
themselves with rage and mortification. This
was the very fortress which, when defended by
Sir Sidney Smith and his brave seamen, had re
sisted all the efforts of Napoleon, and stopped
the conqueror in his victorious career. In 1799
Buonaparte had himself confessed that in this
town the fate of the East was involved ; in 1840
the success of the carapaign in Syria depended
on the impression which the English cannon
might raake on the same battlements. Its cap
ture by Napier Avas as fatal to the power of
Mehemet Ali as its defence by^Sir Sidney Smith
had been to the destiny of Napoleon. But it
had resisted Napoleon and his triumphant legions
for many Aveeks ; the siege had been conducted
on the most scientific principles; torrents of
blood were shed and prodigies of French valour
performed. From an attack Avhich had not
lasted one autumn afternoon, Acre had noAA-
T 2

276 FOREIGN POLICY,
fallen. Such success seemed miraculous. Lord
Palraerston for a short time Avas to the French
nation Avhat he is still to General Count Ficquel
mont, a dQvil in human form, whose machina
tions were execrable, but whose poAver was
irresistible. It was well that M. Guizot could reply to all
the remonstrances of the advocates of war that
Mehemet All's expulsion from Syria Avas an ac
complished fact. Had the struggle been pro
tracted, had the Pasha been in any degree suc
cessful, both the King ofthe French and his philo
sophical rainister raight have been unable to resist
the popular torrent Avhich was rushing so furiously
to war. It Avas the reliance upon the support of
France Avhich had raade Mehemet Ali, when his
strength was still unbroken, persist in his pre
tensions. Now, hoAvever, France counselled sub
mission and the Eastern difficulty rapidly ap
proached its terraination.
Napier, covered with the laurels he had so
recently won, appeared off Alexandria. He en
tered into a convention Avith Meheraet Ali, hy
Avhich the Pasha agreed to evacuate Syria and
deliver up the Turkish fleet as soon as he was
officially assured that the Sultan had granted to
him the hereditary possession of Egypt, The
Porte, howcA^er, Avas noAV inflated Avith victory.

TREATY OF THE 13th JULY, 1841, 277
and for a tirae refused to reinstate Meheraet Ali
in the GoA'ernment of Egypt. Admiral Stopford,
Napier's superior officer, also thought that
the hero of Acre had gone beyond his poAvers in
signing the Convention, and refused to sanction
the arrangement. A mischievous delay might
have occurred. But Mehemet Ali Avas dispirited
and overawed. He Avas informed by the autho
rity of the English Government that he would
be maintained in the pashalic of Egypt if he
Avould within three days evacuate Syria and sur
render the Turkish fleet. He professed his en
tire subraission, and threw hiraself at the feet of
the Allied Powers, Some perplexing difficulties
still reraained at Constantinople, but they Avere
merely technical ; Mehemet Ali was defeated,
Syria restored to the Sultan, the east tranquil
lised : Lord Palmerston had triumphed.
And noAV nothing remained but to restore the
good relations Avith France which in the course
of these eventful negotiations had been unfortu
nately interrupted. In a fcAV months this also
was accomplished. On the 13th of July 1841,
a treaty Avhich Lord Palmerston regarded as an
act of reconciliation between France and the rest
of Europe was concluded.
This celebrated document, on Avhich so much
has depended and may yet depend, Avas not prolix.

T 3

278 FOREIGN POLICY.
In 1809 England bound herself to respect the
sanctity of the Dardanelles which she had forced
some tirae before, and agreed that no ships of
Avar under her flag should enter the straits
Avithout the consent of the Porte. So far as
England Avas concerned the treaty therefore left
matters just as they had previously been. But
noAv the other PoAvers took the same engagement,
Russia also made a general renunciation of any
intention of obtaining an exclusive ascendancy
in Turkey, The integrity and independence of
that state Avas declared by the five Powers to
be of essential iraportance to the Avorld, and the
Ottoraan Erapire was forraally taken under the
protection of all Europe.
This Avas the spirit and plain meaning of the
treaty of 1841, about which so much has been
said and written. Lord Palmerston has posi
tively asserted it to be, Avhat all the statesraen
of Europe at the time considered it, a complete
abandonment on the part of Russia ofthe treaty of
Unkiar Skelessi, He believed that it settled the
relations of the Ottoman Empire with the Govern
ments of Europe, on a much more satisfactory
foundation than had ever before been established.
In fact, untU noAv, Russia was the only one of
the great Powers of Europe which could justly
be thought to have had a policy in the East ; the

TREATY OF THE 13tH JULY, 1841, 279

other Governraents had left the fate of Turkey
to be decided by the chapter of accidents. The
consequence was that Russia had nearly gained
everything, and Western Europe alraost lost
everything. The treaty of the 13th of July —
July seeras to have been with our statesraen the
chosen month for treaties on the affairs of Turkey
— did do much for Europe, if it did not do all
that sagacious and far-sighted statesraen raight
think necessary for permanent tranquillity. What
it accomplished, it accoraplished Avithout Avar. It
Avas essentially a pacific arrangeraent. Without
rousing the apprehensions of Russia, it put into
a definite shape the fears and the hopes of Europe,
and thus indicated the means and provided the
nucleus of a better systera than had yet been
thought possible.
The way to judge of the value of this treaty
and of the ability of the British Minister Avliose
narae is attached to it, is not to examine it by any
abstract principles of what may be necessary
after a war for the security of Europe and the
independence of Turkey ; but to compare it with
the treaties of Adrianople and Unkiar Skelessi,
and with the chaotic state of things which it
superseded. In an indirect manner it did carry
out the design which Prince Metternich en
tertained in 1828, of placing the integrity of the
. T 4

280 FOREIGN POLICY.
Ottoraan Empire under the public guarantee of
the Great Powers. If allowance be made for
the circurastances of the tirae, this treaty raay
well be acknowledged to be one of the most
masterly achievements of an English statesraan.
The principle it contained, though iraperfectly
developed, was of universal application. It
raight easily be extended ; it could not, without
a violation of the public law of Europe, be set
aside. Before this treaty was agreed to, Avhat
ever step Russia might take in the East was a
mere question of policy and of convenience ;
she could noAv raake no atterapt on the inde
pendence of the Porte without breaking her
plighted faith, and giving all the other four
PoAvers a right, Avhich would becorae a duty, to
oppose her by force of arms. The present
alliance of the Western PoAvers and the nominal
adhesion of the Germau Courts to their prin
ciples, are indeed the necessary results of this
Treaty of 1841.
Throughout the two years this Eastern crisis
continued, Mr. Urquhart was eloquently pro
phesying that Lord Palraerston Avould betray
Turkey to Russia. Noav that it Avas terrainated,
Meheraet Ali beaten, and the treaty ratified, it
Avas necessary he should justify himself in the
eyes of the multitude by showing that his pro-

TREATY OF THE 13tH JULY, 1841. 281
phecies had been fulfilled. He affirraed that
the clause prohibiting the ships of war of the
five PoAvers frora entering either the Straits of
the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles in a tirae of
peace Aviihout the consent of the Sultan, was all
that Russia required, and instead of abrogating,
really confirraed, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.
Sorae politicians, who are by no means inclined
to agree AAdth Mr. Urquhart in other respects,
have also, since the comraenceraent of the present
Avar, expressed their dissatisfaction with this
diplomatic AVork of Lord Palmerston, and have
thought that the Dardanelles and the Black Sea
should be open at all times to the fleets of
France and England. They have even gone so
far as to say Avith Mr. Urquhart, that nothing
more would be necessary for destroying the
ascendancy of Russia and frustrating her de
signs in the East, because Avith the Black Sea
and the Straits once free, everything else must
inevitably follow.
This question is of so much importance that
it is quite necessary it should be thoroughly
understood. Unless just ideas are entertained
upon it, all the sacrifices and exertions the
people of France and England are making Avill
be in vain. It is not by any means the simple
matter which it at first sight appears. In con-

282 FOREIGN POLICY.
senting to the exclusion of ships of war from the
Dardanelles, Lord Palmerston did nothing more
than acknowledge the right of the Sultan to the
control of the stream which Avas bounded on
both sides by Turkish territories. The prin
ciple on Avhich he acted, and which he took care
to explain to Baron Brunnow, can scarcely be
questioned by those who represent themselves
as especially the friends of Turkey. It Avas this,
that as the jurisdiction of every state extended
to three miles beyond loAv-water mark, and as
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were in
general not more than six miles wide, the au
thority of the Porte was by international laAV
unquestionable over both these Straits, Avhich
were at once the keys of the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean, Yet the politicians who are so
anxious at once to defend Turkey and see the
Black Sea open to the line-of-battle ships of all
the world, raust comraence to carry their
theories into practice by abrogating this right
of the Sultan over his own seas, A singular
raethod of securing the integrity of the Ottoraan
Empire, and of doing away Avith all foreign
interference Avhich ia said to have done so much
mischief I
And is it so certain that should these Straits
become a highway to the navies of all nations,

TREATY OF THE 13tH JULY, 1841. 283
that the adA^antages would be all on the side of
the Western PoAvers ? The same arrangement
which would give the right of entrance to the
Black Sea to France and England, Avould give
the same right of entrance into the Mediter
ranean to Russia, Russian ships of war raight
then, according to this notable plan for pro
tecting Turkey, anchor at any tirae under the
walls of the Seraglio, overawe Constantinople,
and coraraand the windoAvs of every drawing
roora, A pleasant spectacle for the idle gazers
from the banks of the Bosphorus ! An admir
able sedative to the placid dreamers on a Turk
ish divan ! A sure Avay of providing for all
contingencies !
The most poAverful state in the world would
be ruined by such raeans of strengthening it.
No plan was ever less adapted for the safety of
such an empire as that of Turkey, with insur
rections so frequently arising in the capital.
The best course to adopt raay be doubtful ; but
Avith the naval forces of Russia still powerful in
the Black Sea, there can be no doubt that this
arrangeraent would be the worst. On such a
question it is impossible at the present moment
to express a decided opinion. It deraands the
gravest attention of statesmen. But in 1841
the power of Russia in the Black Sea was pre-

284 FOREIGN POLICY.
ponderant, and every candid person must con
clude that Lord Palmerston did the best he
could under the circumstances in agreeing to
the treaty. The terras were not indeed equit
able ; to have made thera in any degree fair, the
entrance to the Dardanelles should have been
made to depend on the passage of the Pruth by
Russia, or on the event of any invasion of
Turkish territories. But this inequality was
partly obviated by the declaration of the five
Powers in favour of the independence and in
tegrity of Turkey. The Sultan might noAv,
Avhen any attack Avas threatened, call for the
assistance of his allies, and open the Dardanelles
to the fleets. Had France acted cordially Avith
England throughout the tAVO years of negoti
ation, there can be no doubt that even in 1841,
still more advantages might have been acquired.
But as, through no fault of Lord Palmerston,
the union of the two Western PoAvers had been
broken, it cannot be denied that unsupported as
he Avas, he made the best of the occasion. To
all sagacious observers it Avas evident that the
English statesman Avas pressing Russia hard;
and that ever since the treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi the Eraperor Nicholas was losing his
exclusive hold on Turkey. It Avas a great
diplomatic error indeed to force the treaty of

TREATY OF THE 13tH JULY, 1841. 285
Unkiar Skelessi on the Sultan at all. It at once
showed the Governraents of Europe their dan
ger, and suggested the means of prevention.
There A\'as no doing away with the immense
raoral effect Avhich the brilliant naval operations
in Syria had produced on the excitable rainds of
the natives of the East. The fall of Acre had
astounded thera ; in the tents of the Arabs the
naraes of Palraerston and England Avere whispered
with fear and reverence. Who could raeasure
the strength of that nation, Avhich had so easily
and so rapidly accoraplished such raighty results ?
Unaccustoraed to enter into reasons of state, they
only judged by what they had witnessed. They
saw that Russia remained quiescent, while Eng
land acted with energy and decision ; and the
star of the Emperor Nicholas seeraed pale to their
wondering gaze, while that of Queen Victoria
shone upon thera brightly and gloriously from
the western heaven.
But it was not in the East alone that the
vigour and success of Lord Palmerston's Foreign
Policy had worked a great change in the minds
of men. Englishmen have naturally rauch pa
triotisra. They now forgot their raere party
prejudices in hearty adrairation of the Foreign
Secretary of the Melbourne Governraent. Lord
Palmerston had graduaUy risen in public estima-

286 FOREIGN POLICY.
tion, as his colleagues had declined. In 1831
his claim to such an important office, as that of
the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, had been
questioned. Ten years had passed away, and the
popularity of the great chiefs of the first Reform
Ministr)' had departed. They had quarrelled
among themseh^es ; some of them had gone over
to the Conservative benches; the credit for
statesraanship of the reraaining Whig statesraen
had long been on the Avane. Lord Palmerston,
Avhom they once patronised, Avas noAV their raain-
stay. While the Ministry Avas breaking up, the
Foreign Secretary preserved his reputation un-
daraaged in the general wreck.
On domestic questions the greatest differences
of opinion prevailed in Parliament. The country
was tired of the long dorainion of the Whigs.
They were assailed, it raust be adraitted, with
much unfairness ; they suffered much unmerited
obloquy. It Avas easy to find fault Avith them, but
not so easy to substitute better measures than
those which they, in their last extremity, pro
posed for the consideration of the nation. But
the people were not yet prepared to appreciate
the coraraercial policy of the Ministers. The
finances were in a most unsatisfactory state.
The Aveakness of the Governraent was plain to
every understanding. Jealous and powerful in-

LORD PALMERSTON AND THE WHIG CABINET. 287
terests, trembling with selfish anxiety for their
monopolies, thrcAV all their weight into the scale
of the Opposition.
Six Aveeks and four days after the Treaty of the
13th of July was signed, the Whig Ministry, in
consequence of their defeat on the Address, re
tired. This is a fact of no slight iraportance in
estiraating the raany obstacles Avhich Lord Pal
merston had surmounted. He knew not how long
he might continue Foreign Secretary. The Mi
nistry raight resign office at any tirae. On any
day the superintendence of these intricate negotia
tions raight be handed over to another statesman ;
but he had no reason to coraplain of his country
raen. He was enthusiastically applauded by the
whole nation. Faction for a raoraent forgot to
howl. Malevolence Avas silent. Even the rage
of those great egotisras called " great interests,"
Avas not directed against the Foreign Secretary.
Whigs and Tories, Protectionists and Free
Traders, joined Avith one voice in adrairation of
the statesraan who had acted so intrepidly and
Avisely, the leading part in that great eraergency.
He stood forth frora among his humble and de
feated colleagues, as the representative of a great
national policy. In an age priding itself on its
economical and prosaic disposition, he had given
to the Foreign Policy of England something of a

288 FOREIGN POLICY.
heroic character. He had shoAvn that, even in
the present state of Europe, with Governments
existing on no principle, and adopting the
poorest means for attaining the most paltry ends,
an English statesman, if he were worthy of his
calling and of the great nation which he professed
to govern, might still, by comraanding energy,
make other rulers, even in their own despite, obey
his impulse, and cause his power and will to be
felt and respected to the farthest limits of the
civilised world.

289

CHAP. IX.
THE POWER OP ENGLAND.  EXTENT OF DOMINION.  DIS
PUTES WITH AMERICA.  NORTHERN BOUNDARIES. — RIGHT
OP SEARCH.  TREATY OF WASHINGTON.  INVASION OP
AFFGHANISTAN. — - CONSIDERATION OP INDIAN POLICY.
The Foreign Secretary of this great erapire
ought to possess superhuraan faculties. So ex
tensive are the dorainions over which he raust
exert some kind of presiding influence, that he
ought to know everything, to see everything, to
be present everywhere and at all times. Seated
in Downing Street he has to look down from his
lofty elevation with serene and affable dignity on
all the provinces and dominions under the sway
of his Royal Mistress.
Much ingenuity and eloquence has been dis
played in picturing the mighty power of the
Emperor of Russia, extending so far from north
to south, from east to west. His dominion may
be raighty, and raay raenace the independence of
the Western states and the balance of poAver in
u

290 FOREIGN POLICY.
Europe. It has rapidly increased, and ought
now, when the opportunity presents itself, to be
dirainished. But we must not delude ourselves.
It is possible to present a sketch of the terri
torial, political, and commercial greatness of
England quite as imposing as that with which
our minds have been dazzled of the greatness
ofthe Autocrat of all the Russias.
At this very tirae Meheraet Ali was not the
only potentate Avho learnt frora experience the
raight of England. While the negotiations and
demonstrations relating to the Turkish Erapire
were in progress, we had other Avork on our
hands. Our soldiers were entering Candahar
and Ghuznee ; our sailors were apj^roaching
Canton and disturbing the august slurabers of
his celestial raajesty. Chinese mandarins Avere
drowning themselves and cutting their own
throats in despair at the terrible spectacle of the
efforts of the English barbarians, when the won
derful tidings of the capture of Acre were being
carried from caravan to caravan, from camel-
driver to carael-driver in the Great Desert.
So transcendently was the railitary and naval
power of England exerted in the different parts
of the globe that French and Araerican politicians
Avere filled Avith envy. Their language Avith re
spect to England indeed curiously resembles that

VAST EXTENT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 291
of Mr. Urquhart with respect to Russia. The
right of search had long been to them the cause of
much suspicious animosity. They pointed to our
African squadron as an instrument for extend
ing our commerce, and not as a proof of our
love for suffering humanity. The philanthropy
of England was in their opinion mere hypocrisy.
England had military stations in all parts of the
globe ; by the fortress of Gibraltar and Malta, her
occupation of the Ionian Islands, and her suc
cesses in Syria, she was now the undisputed
mistress of the Mediterranean. She was omni
potent in India ; but not content with her Eastern
empire, she was now meditating the conquest of
China. By the possession of St. Helena and the
Cape of Good Hope, aU the coraraerce along those
boundless shores becarae her own. The Falk
land Islands secured to her all the trade passing-
round Cape Horn. Trinidad gave her all that
was necessary for exclusive dominion in the
Caribbean Sea. She was armed at all points.
She never rested, never hesitated, but was ever
pushing onward without fear and without rash
ness; relying on the wisdom of her statesmen,
the energy of her people, and the valour of her
armies.* * This is no exaggeration of the jealous feeling prevalent
in the United States and in France at this period. It is a
u 2

292 FOREIGN POLICY.
Such were the ideas then entertained of the
British power by statesraen in Paris and Washing
ton. There Avas soraething unworthy of two great
nations in this petty jealousy; but they had
some excuse for the feeling. The convention of
the 15th of July 1840, though at length acquiesced
in by the French Governraent, was neither for
gotten nor forgiven. With the United States
we had many disputed questions, some of which
dated from the treaty by Avhich their indepen
dence was acknowledged by England, in 1783.
There were others of more recent origin. The
right of search as it affected the vessels sailing
under the flag of the United States in the African
seas, had grown up since England had commenced
her crusade against slavery ; but it might be con
sidered as the raere assertion, in a different form,
and in a tirae of peace, of what we had formerly
maintained in a time of war. This difference
Avas not, like some others, raerely between the
United States and England. Lord Palraerston
had zealously exerted hiraself to get all nations
to acknowledge this right of search, by treaty ;
it Avas adraitted to be a violation of strict inter
national law ; and that no slaver of any nation
literal representation of facts as they are expressed in a re
port of a Committee on Foreign Affairs to the House of
Representatives, U. S., 13th of February, 1841.

RIGHT OF SEARCH. 293
could be captured by a British ship of war unless
a treaty on the subject had been signed by that
particular power. With the extension of con
stitutional freedora this right had been extended.
They went, such was Lord Palraerston's inde
fatigable energy, hand in hand together.
In 1831 and 1833, when the friendship of
England was of so rauch iraportance to the
struggling constitutional raonarchy of France, the
government of the king of the French had con
sented to a partial recognition of the right.
Another treaty of a much more decided nature
was being negotiated, when the disagreement on
the affairs of Turkey broke out ; but this business
was brought to a stand, and when Lord Palmer
ston left office, had not been finally settled. The
admission of the right of search was considered
as one of the tacit obligations which nations
contracted when they were assisted by the En
glish minister in their constitutional attempts,
and their governments could not do less than
acknoAvledge it, though not always with the
best grace. Prussia, Austria, and Russia were
not likely to have any of their subjects engaged
in the slave-trade, and they at last consented to
agree to the same treaty. But what the despots
of the Old World agreed to on behalf of the
slave, the enlightened republicans of the new
u 3

294 FOREIGN POLICY.
pertinaciously refused to concede. The truth
of the matter was just as Lord Palmerston
declared it to be ; it was not so much the honour
of the Araerican flag as the institution of slavery
itself, which was thus indirectly but stubbornly
upheld. None can doubt this opinion on perusing
attentively the despatches of Araerican states
men. Mr. Webster, the able advocate of the
sanctity of the stars and stripes, expressed, even
in his correspondence with English ministers,
sentiraents which those who believe, as every
christian man iri this country now happily does,
legalised slavery to be contrary to every raoral
and religious principle, cannot read Avithout
horror. In fact, if there was any hypocrisy
associated Avith this right of search it was not
that of England who wished to maintain it, but
that ofthe southern states ofthe Union, who most
indignantly resisted it, and covered their selfish in
terests, narroAV prejudices, and foul tyranny over
their fellow creatures Avith the flag Avhich was
the syrabol of their national honour.
In the social condition of the United States,
and with their deeply-rooted jealousy of England,
this question Avas sufficiently serious. But there
were disputes of a different kind which had been
exaggerated by national susceptibility to such a
magnitude as to disturb the pacific relations of

AMERICAN BOUNDARY QUESTION. 295
the two countries. The northern boundaries had
never been precisely defined ; and statesmen, in
the spirit of antiquaries, set themselves gravely
to interpret the treaty of 1783 to gratify the
pretensions of their countrymen. That treaty
was drawn up by men who were entirely ignorant
of the territories whose liraits they atterapted to
settle ; nor was this ignorance surprising, when
the inhabitants of Maine and New Brunswick,
when the difference was so loudly canvassed
both in England and Araerica, were quite as
ignorant. In 1830, Lord Aberdeen arid the President of
the United States had agreed to submit the
points in dispute to an arbitrator ; and the king
of the Netherlands was chosen for the honourable
office of deciding the subject at issue between two
great nations. The king of the Netherlands was
as much perplexed as the British and American
diplomatists had been from the want of all satis
factory knowledge of the unexplored regions.
He however raade his award. Lord Palraerston
on coraing into Office was prepared to accept this
decision. But difficulties intervened from the
other side of the Atlantic, and this arbitration
came to nothing. A joint coraraission was pro
posed by the President of the United States, and
after a voluminous correspondence in 1837 and
u 4.

296 FOREIGN POLICY.
1838, Lord Palmerston believed that it would
be adopted. But on sending the draft of a
convention to regulate proceedings, to America,
he found that the ministers of the United States
considered it unsatisfactory. The regulations
which they in return proposed were not accepted
by Lord Palmerston ; and he at last sent out a
commission of his own to New Brunswick for
examining the disputed territory. The British
coramissioners reported strongly in favour of the
British claims.
But had they intended to Avrite a satire show
ing the contemptible nature of the controversy
which threatened to hurry two great nations,
connected by so many sacred ties, into a bloody
and ruinous war, rather than a topographical de
scription of the regions through Avhich the boun
dary line was supposed to pass, they could not, by
the utraost efforts of iraagination, have said any
thing more to the purpose than what was con
tained in sorae of the opening paragraphs of their
report to the Foreign Secretary.
They found the land a wilderness. Maps
could teach them nothing. A few American
settlers whom they met in particular neighbour
hoods could teach them nothing. Nothing was
known of the country nor of the sources of the
river which watered the territory. Some Indian

AMERICAN BOUNDARY QUESTION. 297
hunters only occasionally broke the silence and
desolation of the wild expanse. It was not
from the ardent republicans of Maine, nor from
the hardy agriculturists of New Brunswick, that
any information could be obtained. Two in
telligent Indians whom the comraissioners fortu
nately enlisted in their service, and who from
having once hunted over these grounds possessed
rude maps made by their OAvn hands out of
sheets of bark, were their sole guides in latitudes
where no civilised man had ever before set his
foot. They had scarcely concluded their labours
when the winter set in with such violence that
the industrious and patriotic coramissioners were
glad to make the best of their way homeward, to
draw up their report in the more comfortable
quarters of the Foreign Office.*
The correspondence on the right of search and
the north-eastern boundary was still going on
and rapidly increasing in bulk when Lord Aber
deen again accepted the post of Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs in the governraent of
Sir Robert Peel. He fully adopted the argu
ments Lord Palmerston had used on the right of
search. He disclaimed, as Lord Palraerston had
* Report of G. W. Featherstonhaugh, and Rich. J.
Mudge, CoQimissiouers, to Lord Palmerston, April 16th,
1840.

298 FOREIGN POLICY.
disclaimed, any right of searching American
vessels, as such. But he maintained, as Lord
Palmerston had maintained, that a visit from an
English man-of-war to ascertain that a vessel
really belonged to the nation whose colours
she hoisted, was no violation of international
law, and could afford no just ground of com
plaint. Much, however, was said on both sides.
If one mail took out an able paper from the
English minister, another soon brought back a
scarcely less able reply from the other side of
the Atlantic, There seemed to be no end to
written arguraents. But it was quite necessary
that something satisfactory should at length be
decided upon. In the unsettled state of the
negotiations events were every day occurring
raore and more perilous to the friendship of
England and the United States. Sir Robert
Peel and Lord Aberdeen determined to send
out a special arabassador, invested Avith full
powers to negotiate a treaty on the two
questions of the right of search and the
boundary between New Brunswick and the
States, Their choice of a plenipotentiary
indicated the pacific spirit in which they had
resolved to settle this troublesorae business.
Lord Ashburton had been the most eminent
raerchant ofthe most eminent mercantile country

LORD ASHBURTON SENT AS AMBASSADOR. 299
in the world. He had evinced, when the last
war between the two nations was begun, his
syrapathy for the United States; his ideas on
colonial questions were known to be extreraely
liberal. He sailed from England on his mission
of peace in February 1842, and in a few weeks
landed safely at New York.
The vanity of the citizens of the Union was
gratified by the arrival of this special ambassador
from England. He was applauded and enter
tained with rauch enthusiasra. By the 9th of
August the treaty of Washington was signed
between Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton, and
the ratifications were to be exchanged at London
in a few weeks.
If slavery could be put down by words,
nothing could be raore satisfactory, as certainly
nothing ever breathed a loftier raoral tone, than
some of the introductory passages of this treaty.
Clarkson and Wilberforce might have exulted
over the preamble. But if the evils generated
by the practice of diplomatists could be eradicated
by their saintly professions, this would be a
beautifiil world indeed. Who could suppose
from the pious and mystical declarations in the
bond which incorporated the Holy Alliance, that
it was a raere instrument of some selfish and un
scrupulous despots who had leagued themselves

300 FOREIGN POLICY.
together against their own subjects for the worst
purposes of tyranny ? Who could suppose from
the treaty of Washington, in which the traffic in
slaves is stigmatised as " crirainal," in which the
United States and England bind themselves to
maintain an armanent of not less than eighty
guns on the coast of Africa for its suppression,
and in which they agree to remonstrate with
the powers in whose territories slave markets
are held, that one of these two nations had a
most barbarous system of legalised slavery in its
own dorainions, and that one of the statesmen
whose names were attached to it was in favour
of its continuance? The right of search is not
once raentioned in the treaty. It Avas neither
abandoned nor adraitted. The general declaration
against slavery expressed in the treaty of Ghent,
were reasserted with the additional clause for the
raaintenance of a certain force.
But Lord Ashburton cannot be blaraed for not
obtaining better conditions for the slave. He
only conformed to those circurastances to which
all statesraen must raore or less submit. The
raost stringent treaty with the United States for
the suppression of slavery must be useless as long
as slavery, as an institution, exists in the great
republic. It is beginning at the wrong end. It
is not on the high seas, but in the Southern

TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES. 301
States of the Union that the first effectual bloAv
at the existence of slavery can be struck. As
long as there is a demand for negroes, notwith
standing the resolutions of Exeter Hall and the
humanity of British legislators, the market will be
supplied. As it is, while we domineer over the
slave-traders of Spain and other humble na
tions, we are really coercing the weak, and al
lowing the great sinner, because he is strong,
to go scot free.
By the first seven articles of the treaty this
northern boundary was at last defined, and
all apprehensions of war arising from this dispute
were extinguished for ever. This is the conso
latory fact, in comparison with which, the ques
tion whether England conceded more than she
justly ought to have done, is a very trifling one.
The treaty was, however, strongly attacked by
the Opposition in the session of 1843. The
Ministers had humiliated England. They had
sacrificed all the points at issue in order to main
tain peace. The honour of England had been
disregarded by Lord Ashburton and Lord
Aberdeen. These are the vulgar cries of all
oppositions when peace by mutual concession
has been preserved. Their value on this occasion
must be judged by the value of the desolate
regions through which the boundary line had

302 FOREIGN POLICY.
been drawn. Lord Palmerston's objections were
indeed expressed with consuraraate ability, and
were in the abstract not inappropriate. Undue
concession certainly does occasionally endanger
rather than secure peace.
Yet it would seera that when a nation is to
make a stand it should be for soraething reaUy
tangible ; when a great people takes up arms it
ought to be for soraething worth fighting for.
There is a dignity in concession as well as in re
sistance. When the difference is about such
barren territories as those frora Avhich Her Ma
jesty's coramissioners were nearly frozen out,
there is as much glory in yielding some points
for the sake of a permanent settlement, as in
leaving the Avhole dispute open to the uncertain
contingencies of the future. But that there had
been no unworthy concessions must be evident
from the fact that the terms agreed upon were
more favourable to England than those which the
King of the Netherlands had formerly awarded :
and at that time even Lord Palmerston, who noAV
blaraed the treaty of Washington, was ready to
accept that judgment.
England had then enough of wars on her
hands. She dictated a glorious peace in China,
and made a most advantageous comraercial
treaty Avith that self-complacent empire. The

REVERSES IN AFFGHANISTAN. 303
dark clouds which had been lowering over our
Indian dominions ever since the governinent of
Sir Robert Peel entered office, Avere being
gloriously dispelled. But the gloora which these
calaraities left on the rainds of the people ren
dered them little disposed to comraence new wars
Avith a nation of their own blood for worthless
territories. The mere name of Affghanistan seems still
synonymous with disaster. The series of mis
fortunes which followed each other in a sad and
uninterrupted funereal procession can never be
forgotten. They have obliterated the remem
brance of the patriotic exultation Avhich the
storming of Ghuznee and the march to Cabul
produced in 1839, Some of the men who then
most loudly applauded the policy of Lord Auck
land, afterwards, when the moraent of disaster
came, raost reviled hira and the Whig Govern
ment, They could not see that Lord Palmer
ston's foreign policy had nothing at all to do
Avith the errors which had been comraitted, and
from which the dreadful loss of the army of
occupation proceeded. These errors were purely
military ; they had not the slightest connection
with the original policy of the expedition ; and
to attribute the massacre in the Khoord Cabul
Pass to Lord Palraerston is just as absurd as to

304 FOREIGN POLICY.
attribute the glory of the conquest of Scinde to
Lord Aberdeen,
When politicians in England becarae con
vinced of the danger of Russian aggression, and
of the necessity of eraploying means to oppose it,
the natural consequence was that the alarm
should also spread as far as the English erapire
in the East, The year 1836, which has been
indicated as the comraenceraent of this an
tagonisra 'to Russia at Westminster may also be
considered the time when it became plainly
evident at Calcutta. The failure of the comraer
cial mission to Cabul, the unmistakable evidence
of the presence of Russian agents in Persia and
Affghanistan, Avere enough to disquiet the minds
of Indian statesmen. Soon even more substan
tial reasons for apprehension were afforded, and
events occurred Avhich required the serious con
sideration of those who Avere entrusted Avith the
administration of British India, A Persian
array advanced against Affghanistan, and on
the 23d of Noveraber 1837, laid siege to He
rat ; and it seeraed clear that Cabul and Can
dahar were also to be seized upon as the base
of further operations. Those Avho knew not
where Herat was, nor what was the iraportance
of the position, both in a railitary and political
point of view, raight deride the fears of the In-

REVERSES IN AFFGHANISTAN. 305
dian Governraent ; but it was irapossible for
statesmen to look with indifference on the move
ments of Persia and Russia. The Emperor
Nicholas evidently thought the war of much im
portance, and his agents urged the Shah of
Persia to proceed, and proraised hira assistance
in money and men. Nor was it merely on the
frontier and in the far north-west that the
opinion of the approaching downfal of the East
India Company was prevalent. The natives of
India were in a state of feverish exciteraent ; there
were in the earth and in the heavens presages
of revolt and trouble ; wild and anxious glances
were cast on that threatening northern horizon ;
men spoke to each other of the storm that was
gathering on the mountains ; and it was openly
prophesied in the greatest towns and the most
remote villages of India, that the tirae was noAv
coming when the English dominion Avould ter
minate. The Mahometan population prepared
to Avelcorae the Mahoraetan invaders ; they con
fidently predicted that the A\'-hite-faced infidels,
who had so long lorded it over all true believers,
would soon be driven into the sea. That ex
quisite political baroraeter, the public securities
in India, rapidly fell, and pointed with its de
licate index to the coraing storm. Black indeed
to all who looked upon thera, seemed the clouds

dUb FOREIGN POLICY.
that were bearing down upon the plains of India.
An uneasy sense of an oppressive weight in
the poHtical atmosphere, was experienced at once
by natives and English, from the highest to the
loAvest functionaries of the Corapany and the
CroAvn. The Government at home as well as the Govern
ment in India received the most positive and
authentic intelligence that intrigues were going
on, and that plots Avere thickening for the over-
throAv of the English empire in Hindostan.
Lord Palraerston remonstrated strongly Avith
the Court of St. Petersburg ; Russia disavowed
sorae of her agents ; but still preparations were
actively continued. The Governor-General and
his advisers carae to the resolution of raeeting
the danger half-way by placing a nominee of
their OAvn on the throne of Cabul, and of teaching
the fierce tribes a useful lesson in their rocky
Avildernesses. If any thing could prove the
apparent necessity of this resolution, it would
be the fact that the instructions from England
recommending this policy, and the despatches
from India announcing to the Government at
horne that such Avas the decision of the Indian
administration, crossed each other on the high
seas. No policy seeraed ever raore justified by

INVASION OF AFFGHANISTAN. 307
necessity than this invasion of Affghanistan.
No policy can be more triumphantly justified on
all the principles which regulate the intercourse
of states and kingdoras. It Avas not undertaken
for the raere selfish purpose of conquest, but
was purely a defensive policy. Those who look
upon the reasons for the expedition not frora the
local and detached view of Indian politics, but
from a comprehensive survey of the general
European system, will not find their vision dis
torted by that bloody exhalation which rises
before the eyes of some authors while on this
subject, and altogether perverts their judgment.
It is rauch to be regretted that one gentleraan
who writes with rauch ability, who generally
thinks cori-ectly, and Avhose knowledge of Indian
affairs is great and unquestionable, has so far
been misled by this optical delusion as to speak
of the misfortunes at Cabul as the just punish
ment of an "unholy and unrighteous policy;" to
picture aU the sufferers in the business as work
ing under the influence of a curse ; and to quote
texts of Scripture in order to raake the retri
bution appear more awful and impressive,*
Curses and Scriptural texts are rhetorical figures
* Kaye's " History of the War in Affghanistan," through
out, and particularly vol. ii. p. 250. and 670.
X 8

308 FOREIGN POLICY.
from which writers on recent political events
would do Avell to abstain. If it was unholy and
unrighteous for the British to invade Affghanis
tan, it was unholy and unrighteous for them to be
in India at all. And there is as little real piety
or huraanity, as there is wisdora or justice, in
depicting our gallant countryraen in the passes
of Affghanistan as under the awful shadow of a
Divine vengeance, when they were slaughtered
by the knives and jesails of their barbarous and
treacherous foes.
On the 1st of October, 1838, the Governor-
General issued his j)roclaraation, in which it
was announced that the British array would
enter Affghanistan. Troops Avere soon on their
raarch to the frontier.
A great array crossed the Indus. Candahar
was speedily in the possession of the British
troops. The strong fortress of Ghuznee was
taken by storra in two hours. The victorious
array entered Cabul in triuraph, and success
fully accoraplished its mission. In the whole
history of British India no carapaign was ever
more brilliantly executed than that of 1839, in
Affghanistan. The residents in India were
transported with joy ; the press of England
applauded ; honours were showered on the
leaders of the expedition. When Russia shortly

INVASION OF AFFGHANISTAN. 309
afterwards declared war against Khiva, and her
armies advanced into districts so near to Aff
ghanistan, where so many warlike chieftains
were waiting impatiently for the promised sup
port of the Czar, the march of the British army
to Cabul was considered a master-stroke of
policy. It was regarded as a bold challenge
thrown by England, from those mountain fast
nesses through which even Tamerlane was said
to have bought his way, to all comers who
should venture to dispute her ascendancy in
Asia. Until the 2nd of November^ 1841, nothing
had occurred to excite the serious apprehensions
of the array at Cabul, But the English were
wrapped in an apathetic state of unconscious
ness of danger, and never awoke to the certainty
of evil until their savage and cunning ene
mies were at their doors. In the raidst of a
disaffected and Avarlike population, far frora
their own frontier and from the reach of succour,
the simplest military precautions Avere neglected.
Rules of which every civilian can at once see
the necessity, and which raere instinct would
dictate to the rudest barbarians, were disre
garded by the British officers. The array was
separated frora its suppHes. The cantonments
were surrounded by hills which offered the
X 3

310 FOREIGN POLICY.
greatest advantages to an assailant. No attempt
had been made to strengthen the fortifications.
Those dreadful defiles through which all coramu
nications with India raust pass, were held at Cabul
by fierce tribes Avhom the English Commander
had never, until it was too late, thought of secur
ing as friends, or guarding against as enemies.
General Sale, on his Avay homcAvards, forced the
Khoord Cabul Pass ; but before he had reached
Jellalabad, the misfortunes at Cabul had begun.
Flaraes Avere unexpectedly seen issuing frora a
house in the city, inhabited by Sir Alexander
Burnes. News reached the Coramander-in-
Chief that the unfortunate gentleman who, sup
posing the attack to be scarcely serious, Avould
not permit his guard to fire on his enemies, had
been murdered with his brother and another
Englishman, Some troops Avere sent to suppress
a riot ; they found a rebellion. The canton
ments were soon besieged ; the coinraissariat,
through the extraordinary negligence of having
been placed in a spot far frora the reach of the
body of the army, was destroyed by the eneray ;
after a siege of sorae weeks provisions were
exhausted, all resources were failing ; and the
soldiers, Avho had so long .been reposing in in
dolent security, now found themselves in danger
of dying by starvation, or of being forced to

FAILURE OF THE ATTEiMPT. 311
surrender to their assailants, who Avere as fero
cious and as untaraeable as the tigers and
hyenas that howled and laughed amid the 'dark
jungle and steep precipices of those dreadful
passes which separated them from their country
men. Negotiations commenced. The sarae fatuity
Avhich had brought the unhappy Englishmen
into their difficulties attended them to their
mournful catastrophe ; but the pity Avhich is felt
for their fate prevents their errors from being
harshly condemned. It was agreed that all
Affghanistan should be evacuated, that hostages
should be given, and that provisions should be
supplied to the troops on their horaeward
journey. On neither side was the engageraent
properly kept. The English envoy listened to
private overtures which were only intended to
ruin hira; he, and those Avho accorapanied him,
AA^ere beguiled into an arabush ; the lifeless trunk
of Sir William Macnaghten Avas ignominiously
exhibited in the bazaar of Cabul ; and his com
panions to the place of conference were either
murdered or carried into captivity.
Again negotiations Avere resumed ; but harder
terms were now proposed and accepted ; the
troops were to leave the greater portion of their
artUlery. A hard winter set in. The snow fell
X 4

312 FOREIGN POLICY.
in heavy flakes. The dispirited array at length
began that fearful march which so few indivi
duals were to survive. It is needless to multiply
details. When the troops left Cabul their num
bers were about 4,500 soldiers, and 12,000
camp followers ; Avhen they arrived at Jugdul-
luck, a distance of but thirty-five miles, out of
the Avhole host only 300 people reraained. One
single person alone arrived at Jellalabad to teU
the tale of horror. Even the few officers and
soldiers who had not been raassacred on the
road were prisoners.
The insurrection extended to Jellalabad,
Here it was raet by a soldier of distinguished
skill, courage, and resolution, who at all hazards
determined to defend his position to the last, so
that any of the raiserable stragglers who should
yet eraerge from the defiles raight have a place
to rally round. And now for the first tirae
since the coramencement of these disasters, we
seem to be reading of the exploits of British
soldiers. General Sale's conduct at that awful
moment was above all praise ; he redeemed the
military reputation of England in India ; by his
heroic defence of Jellalabad, which Avas the key
of Eastern Affghanistan, the tide of war Avas
once raore turned, and rolled back upon the
enemies of the British narae.

AFFGHANISTAN EVACUATED. 313
The news . soon reached Calcutta, Troops
were slowly assembling, but with no definite
object, when Lord EUenborough arrived at the
seat of government. The raeasures of the new
Governor -General were, after some deliberation,
vigorous and decisive. General Pollock marched
from the Indus, fought his AA'ay through the
Khybur Pass, and effected a junction Avith Sale
and his brave comrades at Jellalabad. Some
months were spent in recruiting the forces, and
preparing for an advance. At length the array
entered the formidable defiles, and corapletely
routed their savage eneraies Avherever they
ventured to offer any opposition. A great battle
Avas fought ; victory returned to the British
ranks ; and the English standard was proudly
hoisted on the citadel of Cabul. In the raean
while. General Nott, having held his own po
sition at Candahar, wisely deterrained to join
General Pollock at Cabul, that all resistance
might be effectually put down. Thus the two
armies, marching as on two sides of a triangle,
met at the point where the first errors and mis
fortunes had originated, and our hold on Affghan
istan seemed again secured.
But it had been resolved by the authorities in
England and in India that these mountainous
districts should be evacuated. The Governor-

314 FOREIGN POLICY.
General issued a proclaraation, giving his reasons
for that decision. The magnificent bazaar at
Cabul was destroyed, and a considerable portion
of the toAvn reduced to ashes. Ghuznee, which
had been lost, and again won in the course of
the troubles, suffered the same fate. The armies
marched homeward, leaving anarchy and con
fusion in their rear. Enraged to fury by the
spectacle of the bones of their slaughtered
countrymen bleaching in the Avinds, and scat
tered by the wild beasts which had fed upon their
bodies, the troops committed raany dreadful
devastations as they passed by the scenes of the
recent calamities.
It is possible to approve of the resolution
which the Government took of abandoning Aff
ghanistan in 1842, Avithout joining in the loud
clamour Avhich Avas raised against the Govern
ment of 1838. That claraour Avas in every
respect disgraceful to the fickle multitude who
joined in it, and who Avere in haste to make
amends for their former indiscriminate appro
bation by equally indiscriminate censure. The
time, perhaps, has now come Avhen these rash
judgments of the moraent may be corrected,
and the events in Affghanistan impartially con
sidered without going off into hysterics. No
thing is raore unjust than to judge of the policy

RUSSIAN INVASION OF INDIA. 315
of yesterday by the blind panic of to-day, and
regardless of the great to-raorrow. That suffi
cient for the day is the good or the evil of it, is
no infallible maxira, even Avhen applied to the
contracted interests of an individual ; it is the
height of folly Avhen applied to the expansive
necessities of a great nation.
England has not yet done Avith Affghanistan.
The time raay not be far distant when our Indian
army shall, under happier auspices, coraplete the
work which was planned in 1838, apparently
accoraplished in 1839, and apparently abandoned
in 1842. A war Avith Russia was once declared
by English statesraen to be an iraprobability ; it
Avas barely adraitted to be a possibility ; it is
now a fact. It is also a fact, that before the
forces of the Autocrat met with those reverses
on the Danube, and about the Caucasus, which
have compelled hira to confine his operations to
a defence of his own territories, that a Russian
army was on the point of raarching for Cabul.
There can be no doubt what its fate would have
been ; but there can be as little, that, had not
so many adverse circumstances happened to
Russia nearer horae, the experiraent would have
been tried. The Eraperor Nicholas has never
meditated an attack on our Indian frontier by
his own troops alone ; he relied on his gold and

316 FOREIGN POLICY.
on the venality of the robber chieftains, Avho,
Avheii supported by a small body of regular
troops, would be ready, for pay and plunder, to
undertake anything. Other conquerors have
before now descended on India through those
passes. Surely it is not absurd to conclude that
what has been done before raay be atterapted
again. On this question statistics are no infaUible
guide. Great conquerors have generally set the
calculations of statistical tables at defiance. Men
of science have not done enough to demonstrate
the irapossibility of an invasion of Hindostan
from the north-Avest, when they show that the
Russian commissariat is poor, and that thousands
of soldiers must perish in the long march. Gold
is as powerful as steel. At the exhibition of
the yellow metal the wonderful metamorphosis
of the old poet is every day accomplished ; every
day, at the sight of this talisman, from dragon's
teeth spring up armed Avarriors. What happened
on the Sutlej but three years after our evacu
ation of Affghanistan, ought at least to teach us
how dangerous it is to alloAV Avarlike poAvers to
exist and strengthen themselves on our frontiers.
In a moraent, 70,000 fighting men, with a for
midable compleraent of artillery, and trained in
the military science of Europe by French officers.

HOW INDIA MUST BE DEFENDED, 317
stood ready to contend against the British
power, and the erapire of Hindostan depended
upon the result of one bloody and dubious day.
The Governor-General at that tirae was fortu
nately himself a great soldier ; but all his skill
and prowess was put to the test before the
enemy was completely overthrown. He threw
himself into the thickest of the conflict, and
fought under the Commander-in-Chief; because
he knew how serious the danger was, and that
to falter would be destruction. Yet there were
at that time profound sages in India and Eng
land, proving to their own satisfaction and the
satisfaction of most of their readers, that England
had nothing to fear frora any eneray beyond the
Indus, and that all who recoraraended the ne
cessity of tiraely precaution were foolish vision
aries. Even though the facts were as the opponents
of Lord Auckland stated thera, the conclusion
drawn frora thera raight still be questioned. It
would be a raiserable policy for a great erapire
to place its safety in deserts and mountains, and
not on its OAvn ability and readiness to resist all
attacks. It is by her own courage and vigour
that England has won and must keep India.
What would be the conduct of a wise Governor-
General should he have reason to believe that a

318 FOREIGN POLICY.
Russian and Persian invader was really ap
proaching ? He would not think of merely
collecting his forces on the Indus, and there
awaiting the advance of his assailants, with their
Avild auxiliaries from the mountains. As soon
as he had received intelligence that a Russian
army Avas advancing frora the Caspian, and
before it could effect a union with the troops of
the Shah, and Avith all the predatory and war
like hordes that would be eager to join it, the
Coraraander of the British forces would be
ordered to raarch on Affghanistan, occupy Cabul,
and siege Herat, Avhich has been justly called
" The Gate of India." Even those writers Avho
have blamed the British Government for deciding
on the invasion of Affghanistan Avhen the Persian
array, prorapted by Russia, was besieging Herat,
have been corapeUed to confess that it is on the
possession of this very place, and the surrounding
country, that the defence of India raust depend.*
* Mr. Kaye, in his elaborate and excellent work on
Affghanistan, sinks the character of the historian in that of
the advocate, in order to make the policy of 1838 appear in
all respects erroneous. Yet even he quotes the military
report on the defences of Herat, and says, " It is only by
the Herat route that a really formidable well-equipped army
could make its way upon the Indian frontier frora the re
gions on the nortli-west. Both the nature and tlie resources
of the country are such as to favour the success of the in-

HERAT, 319
It Avould then be criminal neglect to allow an
enemy to establish himself in such a position.
At any cost the Herat route would have to be
held by the English forces ; and there, and not on
the Indus, would the great battle have to be fought
to decide who were to be the future masters of
India. There the English general might laugh
to scorn the efforts of every adversary. With
all just precautions, such as were unfortunately
neglected by Sir William Macnaghten and
General Elphinstone, the British dominions in
Hindostan Avould be unapproachable. Certain
destruction would attend aU assailants ; and the
Indian Empire would be invulnerable from all ex
ternal eneraies. The rapidity and brilliancy Avith
which the hurailiations of the army were re-
vader. All the materials necessary for the organisation of a
great army, and the formation of his depots, are to be found
in the neighbourhood of Herat. The extraordinary fertility
of the plain has fairly entitled it to be called the " Granary
of Central Asia.'' Its mines supply lead, iron, and sulphur ;
the surface of the country, in almost every direction, is
laden with saltpetre ; the willow and poplar trees, which
furnish the best charcoal, flourish in all parts of the country ;
whilst from the population might at any time be drawn
hardy and docile soldiers to recruit the ranks of an invading
army. Upon the possession of such a country would depend,
in no small measure, the success of operations undertaken
for the invasion or the defence df Hindostan." — Kaye's
History of the War in Affghanistan, vol. i, p. 203.

320 FOREIGN POLICY.
deemed in 1842, showed indisputably that
England could, had she pleased, have held
Affghanistan, The withdraAval of the troops
was a raere consideration of econoray. The
policy which Sir John M'Neil recoraraended, of
converting the Affghans into a friendly nation,
by strengthening their power, promoting a
social corapact araongst thera, and thus erect
ing thera into a barrier against all invaders from
the north and west, has a very specious appear
ance. But it is in reality most insecure, and
never could be long the means of peace and
defence. We could not ahvays depend on the
continuance of the friendship of races habitually
treacherous. The same strength and organis
ation we might establish in Affghanistan could
be as easily turned against ourselves as against
our eneraies. In fact, with reason, or without
reason, we should find ourselves corapeUed to
guard against our own friends in Affghanistan.
The value of this policy had really been tried.
It was tried with the Sikhs. It was with the
protection and friendship of England that the
Maha-rajah Runjeet Sing became the ruler of a
powerful state. He died ; and his army was
turned against us ; our friends became our
deadly enemies, Avhom Ave were obliged at last

OUR INDIAN EMPIRE. 321
to subdue. Is not the result of this experiment
enough to show the irapossibility of raaking
eternal friends of warlike and barbarous races
on our frontiers ?
Lord Auckland went to India with the inten
tion of peacefully administering the government
ofthe Indian Erapire, and of acquiring no ncAV
territories. He was essentially a man of peace.
But he found, as all other governor-generals have
found, that it was irapossible to fix any perraa
nent boundaries to the British dorainions in Hin
dostan. Lord EUenborough, like his predecessor
and successors, sailed for India with the raost
peaceful intentions. But he could scarcely have
issued frora Simla the proclaraation in which he
announced the evacuation of Affghanistan, and
his adoption of " a pacific and conservative
policy ; " he could scarcely have declared that the
government of India was " content with the
limits which nature appeared to have assigned to
our Indian Erapire," Avhen he found hiraself
obhged to resort to arras, and to undertake ano
ther conquest. Scinde was then subdued and
added to our dorainions ; and beneficent Nature
made no coraplaint, though the East Indian Di
rectors did, but kindly accoraraodated herself to
the circumstances which dictated the necessity of
extending the frontier, and of vindicating our
Y

322 FOREIGN POLICY.
authority. The tirae soon carae Avhen even Lord
EUenborough was accused of being too warlike ;
and one of the reasons of his recal was that he
was projecting raore wars. Lord Hardinge then
undertook the governraent of India, firmly
attached to a pacific policy ; yet he had not been
a year in office before another war began ; and
in his first proclamation on the subject he de.
clared another extension of the frontier, and the
country between the Beas and the left bank of
the Sutlej was annexed to the English territories.
And not only so. The terraination of the war
and the stringent conditions of peace iraposed by
the Governor-General, left the governraent of La
hore norainally independent, but really in a state
of vassalage ; and since then the whole of Runjeet
Sing's empire has been incorporated with the
British dominions. Our advance has been resist
less and ine\dtable ; the tide of British con
quest is flowing ouAvard and ever onward. It is
as useless to coraraand, like Canute, the billows
on the sea shores to corae no farther, as to
stay the progress of England in Asia. The stern
law by which we hold India neither perraits us
to retrograde nor to stand still. Wars are forced
upon us, territories are annexed, and states are
subjugated, by the very condition of our exist
ence.

OUR INDIAN EMPIRE. 323
The great problem of erapire remains for us to
solve in Affghanistan. Either we must govern
these fierce tribes, or they will end by helping
our enemies to govern us. Either we must rule,
or be ruled. Liraits, which Avere once thought
settled for our Indian Empire, have long been
passed ; races almost as wild as the Affghans
have been tamed down and raade obedient; from
savage enemies they have been converted into
brave Sepoys, who have faithfully folloAved the
standard of England in bloody battle fields.
Whatever raay be said to the contrary, the rugged
raountains of Affghanistan raay one day becorae
the citadels of our strength, and the irapregnable
bulwarks of our power. It is not, then, by the
past, nor even by the present, but by the future,
that the wisdom of this policy must be finally
deterrained. At a time when the outcry against the policy
which produced the invasion of Affghanistan Avas
loudest, when the newspapers were stiU full of
harrowing details of the calamities which had
fallen on the unfortunate troops at Cabul, when
invectives against aU who had, or were supposed
to have had, any share in originating the expe
dition were delivered in Parliaraent and through
the press. Lord Palraerston stood forward, and
with admirable moral courage declared, that this
Y 2

S^4 FOREIGN POLICY.
policy was sound, and that, with ordinary pru
dence, it would have been successful. He was
answered with shouts of derision. For a time
his voice was droAvned in the storm of indigna
tion which burst from the lips of honourable
members. The tremendous ironical cheers which
greeted the statesman as he proceeded, unawed
by the rage he had provoked, to repeat his asser
tions, still ring in the ears of those who were
present that night in the House of Commons.
And when the great war that is now being waged
shall have ended in great results ; when not only
Turkey, but Central Asia also, shall be saved
from the power of Russia ; when the " King of
Kings" shall no longer reraain under the delusion
that his northern neighbour is his raost powerful
protector, and either British influence or British
arras be omnipotent in Persia ; when Englishmen
shall travel securely through every pass in
Affghanistan, the power of their nation be firmly
established far beyond the Hindoo Koosh, and
the Indus throughov the long course of its
stream become one of the great highways for
British coraraerce, these "derisive cheers" of
short-sighted politicians ought to ring in the
ears of posterity.

325

CHAP. X.
LORD ABEEDEEn's FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUED TO 1846. 
thb king op the french and his chamber of de
puties. — affairs op spain and greece. — count
nesselrode's memorandum; oe* 1844. — ¦ Oregon ques
tion.  LORD ABERDEEN.
The history of our foreign policy during the five
years of Sir Robert Peel's government is pecu
liarly barren in great events, or in great political
controversies. Europe was at peace, and seemed
resolved to remain at peace. Monarchs and their
advisers endeavoured, by their mutual corapli-
ments and assurances, to persuade themselves
and each other that the revolutionary hurricane
was over, and that courts and thrones were now
secure. The history of France at this time is a
history of fulsome compliments exchanged be
tween the King of the French and his two repre
sentative Chambers. Louis Philippe assured the
Deputies that they never before enjoyed such a
good constitution, and the Deputies assured Louis
Philippe that they never before had such a good
king. Session after session these insincere decla-
Y 3

326 FOREIGN POLICY.
rations Avere repeated, and both parties were
painfully conscious of the falsehood they were
acting and speaking. A collection of the
addresses of the French Chambers to Louis Phi
Hppe during his eighteen years of royalty AVould
form a curious volume. It would clearly illus
trate the meaning of parliaraentary government
in France. It Avould abound in more foolish
platitudes than were ever uttered by the repub
licans of the first revolution. The old repub
licans, Avith all their criraes, were at least in
earnest ; but what can be said for those raen Avho
were devotedly attached to the Orleans dynasty
in the evening, and becarae furious haters of
monarchy in all its forras the next morning ? As
the hour approached when the reign of the King
of the French was to cease, and he was to fly
from the soil of that beautiful France whose loy
alty to hiraself, his children, and his grandchil
dren had been so frequently paraded, the out-
Avard devotion of the Deputies to their poor idol
increased in veheraence and extravagance.
Louis Philippe wisely proraoted the continu
ance of that English alliance which the treaty of
the 15th of July, 1840, had so grievously endan
gered. He could not do otherAvise ; for where
but in England could the monarch of the barri
cades hope to find sincere support ? The King

FRENCH POLITICS. 327
of the French was wise in his generation ; he
could look for no friendship frora Russia, Prussia,
nor Austria ; he could only trust in England.
Ou this subject there has been rauch raisconcep-
tion. When Lord Palraerston was accused of
ingratitude for deserting France, the nature of
the connection between the two countries Avas
not understood. No French politician has ever
been able to deny that the support which England
gave to the French constitutional monarchy in
the first years of its existence was most valuable.
Had it not been for England, there Avould have
been in 1831, as in 1814, a general European
combination against France : the monarchy of
July was opposed, by the very fact of its
being, to the legitimate monarchies of the Conti
nent : in upholding it, as the British ministers
did, the antagonism of Europe was broken, and
they conferred a great favour without receiving
any in return.
As tirae roUed on, and the King of the French
thought hiraself raore firraly seated on his throne,
his obligations towards England were considered
as an encumbrance. He was eager to show to
the world that he could pursue an independent
course of policy, and that he was not exclusively
the ally of England. High and arabitious thoughts
of founding a family now occupied his breast.
Y 4

328 FOREIGN POLICY.
He becarae ashamed of his rank as the Citizen
King, and Avished to rival the old European mo
narchs. That intense desire for matrimonial
alliances with the proud despotic families of the
Continent, which, Avhen it once establishes itself
in the hearts of constitutional princes, is sure to
make them traitors to their sacred trust, and lead
them step by step to their ruin, was no stranger
to his bosom. His first hopes were directed
toAvards Spain, where, by Lord Palraerston's
energy, there had been erected at least the sem
blance of a free monarchy. He secured a Avorthy
accoraplice in his schemes in the person of the
Queen Mother. Long before the Eastern differ
ences had arisen, Louis Philippe had taken
a separate course in the peninsula, and had
shown much raean jealousy of England. In
1836, the alliance between the two Governments
was evidently becoraing less and less cordial.
The French Governraent positively refused to
adopt the raeasures which the English states
man proposed for the coraplete and iraraediate
pacification of Spain, In Greece a keen rivalry
was springing up. In the sraall states partly
dependent on the Western Powers, there were
at last seen French and English parties vio
lently opposed to each other. Lord Palmerston
was not to blame for this state of things ; it

FRENCH POLITICS. 329
could easily be shown that in every instance he
was purely on the defensive, and that it was the
French ministers who first separated theraselves
from him, and not he Avho first became their
opponent. At last the aggressions of Mehemet
Ali demonstrated to all Europe the disagreement
of the two Governraents, Here again France
chalked out a course for herself, and the cora
plaint plainly raade by M. Thiers, and gently
hinted by M. Guizot was, that Lord Palraerston
did not give up his decided principles of policy
for the sake of the friendship of France. There
was soraething very unstatesmanlike in such a
reproach. No country has a right to make its
alliance the price of the abandonraent of a course
of policy Avhich the rainister of another country,
Avhen he supposed there Avas a perfect understand
ing between them, had conscientiously determined
to follow. It would have been easy for Lord
Palmerston to retort, that surely the friendship of
England was worth more to France than the suc
cess of a usurper in Syria. The truth of the
matter was, that the French Ministry were
entirely dependent on the French Chambers, and
that the representatives interfered so irregularly
and so inconsiderately with the executive admi
nistration, that no steady policy could be carried

330 FOREIGN POLICY.
out in concert with England or with any other
nation. Lord Aberdeen had not been many months in
office, when he Avitnessed a striking exemplifica
tion of the strange and unprecedented manner
in which the foreign affairs of France Avere now
conducted. In the December of 1841, a con
vention for a still more effective suppression of
slavery was signed by all the five PoAvers. The
French Charabers interposed by a note which
conderaned the right of search as it had been for
raally conceded, and M. Guizot could not but
refuse the ratification of the new treaty. The
strongest argument used by the ardent deputies
against this convention Avas, that it had been
drawn up by Lord Palraerston, who had also
signed the convention ofthe 15th of July, 1840.
The English alliance was not now popular in
France, and M. Guizot endured rauch obloquy
for still adhering to this policy. Not satisfied
with frustrating the convention of 1841, the
French Charabers regretted the concessions of
1831 and 1833, They inserted a paragraph in
their reply to the Address frora the throne,
hoping that the Ministers Avould press negotia
tions for bringing the coraraerce of France exclu
sively under the surveillance of the national flag.
The treaty of Washington, by which they supposed

M. GUIZOT. — M. THIERS. 331
that Lord Aberdeen had forraally surrendered to
Araerica the right which was enforced against
France, made thera still more desirous of abro
gating the earlier treaties. With the annual
resolution in favour of the nationality of Poland,
they now began annually to pass their resolution
in favour of the national flag of France. To those
Avho are accustomed to the systematic working
of the English Legislature, in which questions of
foreign policy are invariably considered questions
of confidence, this frequent interference of the
French Chambers with the business of the adrai
nistration, appears raost unparliamentary. An
English Ministry which should once be reminded
of its duty by a vote of the House of Commons,
would immediately retire. But representative
government in France Avas of another kind ; and
Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen made every
aUowance for the difficult circumstances in which
M, Guizot Avas placed, and did all they fairly
could to keep hira in office. They felt that,
although this statesman had many faults, and
although his conduct in the last two years of his
ministerial life proved him to be by no means
worthy of that unliraited confidence and regard
which he at this tirae received frora England,
yet he Avas raore to be trusted than his political
rival, M. Thiers, who had obviously no decided

833 FOREIGN POLICY,
principles, and was the mere mouthpiece of the
French journalists.
While this good understanding continued, and
was every day more necessary for both Govern
ments, they raoved harraoniously together, and
their energy, instead of being spent in neutrali
sing the action of each other, was beneficially
exerted for promoting good governraent in coun
tries to which their influence extended. In 1843,
Greece and Spain, which might be considered
both as the creations and the victiras of France
and England, were disturbed by rebellions that
assuraed the form of revolutions. The Regent,
the Duke of Victory, was driven from power,
and was obliged to seek an asylum in England.
He was received here with the respect Avhich Avas
due to his character, and the sympathy Avhich
one Avho had been a true friend to our Govern
raent had a right to expect. The French press
had long reproached our rainisters for supporting
Espartero ; but it will scarcely now be denied
that in supporting hira Lord Palraerston and
Lord Aberdeen supported the best interests of
Spain. Nevertheless, the King of the French
and the Queen-raother, Maria Christina, rejoiced
at his fall ; they thought now that the garae was
in their oAvn hands ; and these two devoted chara
pions of liberty and morality secretly exchanged

KING OTHO. 333
many hearty congratulations. They did not
foresee that the fall of Espartero, who opposed
their vile scheraes, was an evil omen to them
selves and to their race.
The bloodless revolution effected in Greece
was in all respects harmless. King Otho Avas
simply reminded of the constitution which had
been proraised to his subjects in 1833, and to
which the raodern Athenians had a raost unques
tionable right; he was also told that "it would
be expedient " for him not to confine his friend
ship to his Bavarian countrymen Avho had fol
lowed him to Greece, and who, supported by the
Russian ambassador, monopolised the honours of
the new kingdom. Both Lord Palraerston and
Lord Aberdeen have been rauch blamed for not
insisting on the Greek constitution being carried
earlier into effect. But the event showed whose
fault it Avas that King Otho had not fulfilled his
engageraents. All raonarchs who are honoured
with the friendship of the Russian Autocrat,
become singularly oblivious of their constitu
tional promises. As soon as the revolution had
been accomplished, and his Greek Majesty had
promised to comply with the wishes of his sub
jects, a vessel of war carae to the Piraeus by the
peremptory order of Nicholas, and conveyed the
Russian ambassador frora the classic shores.

334 FOREIGN POLICY.
Constitutional Greece thus lost the coun
tenance of the Eraperor of Russia, but the con
duct of the King of Prussia in the sarae year
was quite to his taste. The States of Posen also
reminded Frederic William of the assurances
they had received, and the institutions they had
been promised in May 1815. The reply of the
King of Prussia raay stand for a model of des
potic dignity and royal reasoning. The address,
he said, Avas highly irregular. He " entirely
disapproved of its sentiraents and proposals."
He would enter into no explanations relating to
the " indecorous allusion to the royal decree of
May 1815, snch decree being not obligatorj'^
upon us."
In the sarae spirit " the sovereign princes and
free towns of Gerraany" sent, in the spring of
1844, their plenipotentiaries to Vienna, and after
having been harangued by Prince Metternich,
passed resolutions against all evil-disposed persons
who could think of dividing the regal power, or
of appealing to the articles of the Treaty of
Vienna. Both the general and separate trea
ties of that Congress, it was plainly declared,
Avere to be interpreted by governments in the
manner which might appear to them most ex
pedient. What would be said of individuals who
should announce to the world that they had
determined to construe their written obligations

AUSTRIA'S SUICIDAL POLICY, 335
in any form which might most suit their con
venience ? Have governments no shame ? If
Prince Metternich had been that enlightened and
profound statesman which one of his admirers
in England has declared him to be, he would
have seen that there were clouds in the Eastern
horizon orainous of the tirae when Austria must
either adopt a moderate constitutional policy, or
consent to be for ever at the feet of Russia. In
1843, negotiations had been going on relating to
the disputes between Russia and Turkey, on the
insurrection in Servia ; by the deposition of one
prince and the election of another, Russia arro
gantly affirmed that Turkey had violated her
treaties ; and the Emperor demanded the expul
sion of. the neAV ruler, and the disraissal of his
agents. Austria, in her eagerness to traraple on
the liberties of her own people, Avas gradually
abandoning her old traditional policy. She as
serted that this dispute Avas not of European
interest, that it might be left to be settled by
Russia and Turkey alone, that it was not of so
much importance as to require the interposition
of the great Powers. Lord Aberdeen thought
that since Prince Metternich did not see the
necessity for interference, it would be useless for
the Western Powers to complicate relations,
when there was no general concurrence on the

336 FOREIGN POLICY,
means to be eraployed. He has been lately much
attacked for not seizing the occasion, and acting
with more decision against Russia, But this
was scarcely a direct attack on Turkey ; and the
Emperor Nicholas had then no intention of
pushing matters to an extremity. Austria was
particularly interested in the state of Servia,
and yet Austria remained passive. Lord Pal
merston, hoAvever, censured the government for
the indifference which was displayed ; and Russia
has certainly proved that any forbearance shown
to her is likely to be raisunderstood.
When M. Guizot was assailed in the Charaber
of Deputies for not rendering raore efficient aid
to Turkey on this Servian dispute, he defended
himself as the English Ministers did, by pointing
to the apathy of the Austrian Government. He
said that he could not do otherwise than follow
the exaraple of Austria and England. But the
Western Powers Avere not entirely quiescent ;
without assuming a hostile attitude, they exerted
their diploraacy in favour of Turkey.
An incident occurred on an island of the
Pacific, which for a raoment threatened to com
promise the friendship of the French and English
Governraents. Great iraportance was attached
to it at the time ; but now it is only Avorth re
calling as affording a conclusive proof that Avhile

SIR ROBERT PEEL's POLICY. 337
Lord Aberdeen was Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, the Government was not influenced by
that preposterous love of peace at any price with
which this minister had been reproached. The
policy of Sir Robert Peel's administration was
essentially and avowedly pacific ; for the sake of
peace they even made some sacrifices ; but to
these sacrifices there was a lirait. The Ministers
were engaged in carrying out a great coraraer
cial experiraent ; by their domestic policy they
were diffusing content and happiness throughout
the land, and conferring an inestimable boon on
many future generations. Since it is certain
that Free Trade would not have been established
in a time of war, it is raost inconsistent in those
who approve of that coraraercial policy to blame
their rainisters for being anxious to avoid all
causes of quarrel, and to conduct all affairs
with other nations in the spirit of peace. When,
however, a wrong was inflicted by a French
admiral on a British subject, a missionary, who
had perforraed the duties of a consul at Tahiti,
redress was proraptly deraanded by Lord Aber
deen, and Sir Robert Peel spoke sorae strong
and unraistakable words in the House of Cora
mons: "A gross outrage, accompanied by a
gross indignity, has been comraitted," said the
Prime Minister; and the indemnity required

338 FOREIGN POLICY.
from the French Government was immediately
promised and speedily given.
But the affairs of Otaheite had been the sub
ject of many discussions in the French and
English Parhaments, before the news of the
insult offered to Mr. Pritchard reached London.
The Eraperor Nicholas had Avatched the events
in the Pacific. Not even to the English Opposi
tion was the calraness and raoderation of Lord
Aberdeen raore displeasing than to his Iraperial
Majesty, He fondly hoped either that the
French Charabers Avould compel M, Guizot to
support the imprudent raeasures of Adrairal
Dupetit Thouars, or that Lord Aberdeen would
be obliged by public opinion in England to
demand concessions from the French Govern
ment which it could not honourably grant. In
both desires he was disappointed. The liberal
party in France inveighed against M, Guizot,
and many politicians in England declairaed
against Lord Aberdeen; but to retain the friend
ship of France without losing the confidence of
Russia was surely no conteraptible diploraatie
achieveraent, and this fact indicates more than
volumes could express, the wisdom and dignity
of Lord Aberdeen's policy in. 1844,
Yet this was the time Avhen that engagement
between the English Government and the Russian

RUSSIAN MEMORANDUM OF 1844, 339
Emperor was entered into, which has been so
much raisunderstood, and so eagerly raisrepre
sented. It was in the June of this year that Ni
cholas visited England. It Avas on conversations
held with Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen
during the brief sojourn of the Czar in this coun
try, that the celebrated Memorandura of Count
Nesselrode was based. This docuraent has lately
been presented to Parliaraent by the command
of Her Majesty ; it has been referred to by the
official journal of St. Petersburg in justification
of the recent attack on Turkey ; and the English
Opposition, echoing in this respect the tone of
the Czar's organ, have spoken of it as a secret
Meraorandum stipulating for the partition of the
Ottoman Erapire, In justice to the English
minister it requires sorae consideration.
The first thought that raust strike an impar
tial person on attentively reading the document
on which so much stress has been laid, is
that it has an extremely innocent appearance.
There raay be evil in it, but it certainly does not
shoAv itself at the first glance. It would seera
to be one of the most harmless, one of the most
pacific, and one of the best intentioned of state
papers. Beginning Avith the declaration that
Russia and England are rautually convinced of
the necessity of maintaining the Ottoman Porte
7, 2

340 FOREIGN POLICY.
in its independence and territorial possessions,
as the best corabination for the general interests
of Europe, the Meraorandura proceeds to affirra
that Russia and England have therefore an equal
interest in uniting to strengthen that empire, and
to shield it frora all dangers ; that it is absolutely
necessary the Porte should be left in peace, and
not be disturbed by diploraatie bickerings, or by
uncalled-for interference in its internal affairs ;
that as the Porte, counting on the jealousies
araong the states of Europe, has a constant ten
dency to escape frora its engageraents, it should
not be confirraed in this delusion, but that all
the great Powers should raake coraraon cause in
seeing justice done to each other. That another
coraplaint is the difficulty of reconciling the
Sultan's sovereignty AAdth the interests of the
Christian population ; that the Ottoraan ministers
should be impressed Avith the iraportance of treat
ing the Christians with mildness; but that the
representatives of the great Powers, A\'hile insist
ing on this truth, ought scrupulously to guard
against any exclusive dictation, and exert all their
influence to keep the Christians in obedience to the
Sultan. That if this course be followed with raode
ration and calraness, it is likely to be successful,
and all complications affecting the tranquillity of
the Ottoraan Erapire may be avoided. That still it

RUSSIAN MEMORANDUM OF 1844. 341
is not to be concealed that this empire holds
within itself raany elements of dissolution ; and
that unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall,
in spite of all the efforts of friendly cabinets to
preserve it. That it is not given to human fore
sight to settle beforehand a plan of action for an
unknown case ; but in the uncertainty impending
over the future, one fundamental idea may admit
of application: if Russia and England, in the
event of such a catastrophe, shall have come to a
previous understanding as to a comraon course
of action, the danger will be rauch diminished ;
and the more so because that understanding will
have the full assent of Austria, between Avhom
and Russia there was an entire conforraity of
principle. That the reason of this was very
siraple ; by land Russia exerted over Turkey a
preponderant action ; by sea England held the
sarae position ; isolated action of these two
PoAvers raight do much mischief; united, it must
produce a positive benefit. That this principle
was agreed upon during the Emperor's last
residence in London ; and the result was the
eventual engageraents that if anything unfore
seen should occur in Turkey, England and
Russia would consult together on the measures
they raight take in coramon. That the object of
the understanding was to uphold the Ottoraan
z 3

342 FOREIGN POLICY.
Empire in its present state as long as it could
be upheld ; but if it should crumble to pieces,
to enter into a previous concert on all matters
relating to the establishment of a ncAV order of
things, and together to take care that the changes
AA'hich must occur might not be detriraental to the
rights and security of the two states, and to the
balance of poAver. That as the policy of Austria
is perfectly identified with that of Russia, if
England were to act in concert with thera, France
must be oblie'ed to follow in the course decided
upon at St, Petersburg, London, and Vienna;
and a conflict between the great Powers be
obviated, and peace raaintained even in such
serious circumstances.
This is the Meraorandura of June 1844, free
as rauch as possible from mere diplomatic for
malities, and expressed in as plain English as the
tortuous and uncouth phraseology of Count
Nesselrode Avill alloAv. At best, however, some
of the sentences are sufficiently vague, and op
posed to the idioms of our language. For the
sake of truth and fairness it is Avell that' it
should be given entire, that every one may judge
for himself whether the accusations founded
upon it are just. Did Lord Aberdeen in adrait
ting the correctness of this Meraorandum agree

CHARGES AGAINST LORD ABERDEEN. 343
to the partition of the Ottoman Empire ? Does
he stand confessed a traitor to the best interests
of England, and in connivance for the worst of
purposes with the Eraperor of Russia ? These
heavy charges have been publicly raade by the
Leader of Opposition in the House of Coramons ;
and he seeraed quite unconscious of the position
in which he placed both Lord Aberdeen and
hiraself by giving them utterance. He made
the accusation that I^ord Aberdeen, in the highest
post to which a British subject can aspire, was
a deliberate traitor, and therefore guilty of the
greatest crimes. Never in our parliamentary
history was such a charge made by a leader of a
party against the head of a governraent. It is
not that Lord Aberdeen Avas a weak or a rais-
taken rainister; but that in his long political
career he had coraraitted, and was then habitually
comraitting, high treason. He who raade such
assertions was bound, even though he stood
alone in his opinion, to bring forward a motion
of impeachment, or admit himself to be a calum
niator. No member of parliaraent, rauch less
the leader of a great party, has a right to bandy
such accusations about, and then shrink from
brinsfino; them to a definite issue. This is not
political warfare. It is not a question of public
principle, but of private honour.
z 4

344 FOREIGN POLICY.
No individual, Avhether he be a member of
parliament or a simple citizen, can declare his
neighbour to be guilty of larceny or forgery,
without being compelled to substantiate his asser
tions before a legal tribunal, or to make ample
compensation to the object of his defamation. Is
the moral responsibility of the public man who
accuses a prirae rainister, not of inconsistency,
not of Avant of judgment, not of laxness of prin
ciple, but of downright treachery, less than the
legal responsibility of the citizen ? What is the
magnitude of the crimes comraitted by the hurable
prisoners in our police courts and halls of justice,
corapared with that of the prime minister who
betrays his sovereign and his country ? The
member who, in his place in Parliament, even
hints his suspicions of such base conduct, ought
at once, whatever may be the party conveniences
of the hour, to make his accusations good,- or
ever afterwards remain silent. The same charges
which the leader of Opposition has brought
against Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Urquhart brought
against Lord Palraerston. But of Mr. Urquhart
this may at least be said, that as soon as he had
obtained a seat in Parliament, he did make a rao
tion for papers avowedly for the purpose of
framing articles of irapeachraent. So much can
not be said for the Leader of Opposition, though

CHARGES AGAINST LORD ABERDEEN. 345
he Avas in a position of much greater responsi
bihty, and ought surely to have had very strong
evidence, amounting to much more than a moral
conviction, before such charges ever passed his
lips. When chaUenged by Mr. Gladstone to
bring forward a vote of want of confidence, as,
after what he had said, it was his especial duty
to do, he only thought of replying by a quibble
that he would move a vote of want of confidence
in the Ministers as soon as they proved that they
had any confidence in theraselves. And this in
a tirae of Avar ! What Avould be said of the ma
riner who, Avhen his vessel was among the
breakers, should declare that he would not
remove a treacherous pilot from the helm, be
cause some of the crcAV Avere as much convinced
as himself of the evil intentions of the man to
whora the safety of the ship and the lives of all
on board Avere entrusted?
The Eraperor of Russia had, doubtless, an ob
ject in coraing to the understanding he did Avith
Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen. He doubt
less thought that he had gained an important
point in securing their adhesion to the plan of
action which was then defined. To appreciate
this document, like others emanating from the
sarae source, it ought to be read backwards.
Beginning Avith the last sentences instead of the

346 FOREIGN POLICY.
first, the design of the Meraorandum is at once
seen. It is contained in the few words, " If Eng
land, as the principal Maritime Power, acts in
concert with Russia and Austria, it is to be sup
posed that France will find herself obliged to act
in conformity AAdth the course agreed upon be
tween St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna."
This is the key to the awful paper Avhich has
been said to be so diabolical in its object. The
reason why the Czar was so anxious that England
should pledge herself not to act Avithout consult
ing Russia in any Eastern conjuncture, was
simply because he feared that the Western Powers
might, some day, act without his consent or knoAV-
ledge, and that Russia might be left in that sarae
state of isolation in Avhich France had been placed
through the perverseness of M. Thiers in 1840.
The cA'ents of that year had raade a deep impres
sion on the mind of the Emperor. The alliance
of France and England, Avhich seemed, notAvith
standing any occasional differences, to become
more natural and raore systeraatic every day,
was to hira a constant cause of apprehension. He
did not doubt that the two nations could effectu
ally prevent his influence frora being predomi
nant in Turkey, and paralyse, even in the moment
of action, the movement of his fleets and armies.
The vigour and rapidity Avith which England

THE " ENTENTE CORDIALE." 347
had at last decided the fate of the Pasha of Egypt,
whose power had long appeared so menacing,
inspired even the proud Autocrat with sorae fears
for his own future ; and he dreaded that, should
the forces of France and England be once com
bined, and skilfully directed against himself, his
destiny might not be very different from that of
Mehemet AH.
In his northern capital he eagerly lent his ear
to his dependents, who assured him that after
the humiliation France had suffered at the hands
of England in 1840, the two countries could
never again be sincere allies. Lord Aberdeen
had not, however, been long in office, Avhen, to
the alarm of Nicholas, he made use of the words
" entente cordiale," as expressive of the relations
of the tAVO Governments. Nor was this a mere
diplomatic phrase ; it Avas an undeniable fact, of
which the political events of the last three years
had afforded abundant evidence. This under
standing had for its principle a just respect for
the rights of all nations, and originated in the
esteem and confidence with which M. Guizot and
Lord Aberdeen were ihutually inspired. The
influence which the EngHsh minister thus ac
quired in French councils could be the cause of
no jealousy to other states ; for it Avas exercised
for the general Avelfare of Europe, and Avas

348 FOREIGN POLICY.
cordially approved by Prussia and Austria. It
depended upon no treaty. In it there was
nothing exclusive. The friendship of these two
eminent statesraen gave it all its life and vigour.
Yet all this time the French press was inveighing
against the ambition of Russia, and inculcating the
duty of opposing all the attempts of the Czar to
establish his dominion in Turkey. Pacific as Avas
the policy of M. Guizot, it could not be concealed
frora Nicholas that the French Governraent was
even then proceeding in its career of conquest in
Africa, and that the French fleet, under the com
mand of the Prince de Joinville, was performing
some A'ery brilliant actions. The jealousy of
England had not been roused, even by the bora-
bardment of Mogador. An English squadron
Avatched these operations in the Mediterranean ;
but the English Ministry shoAved not the least
intention of raaking the war a cause of quarrel
between the two nations. It was evident that
the French people looked to the conquest of Al
giers as the basis of still greater operations. It
AA'as evident that the state ofthe Ottoraan Erapire
and the policy of Russia in the East had sorae
thing to do Avith the determination of France to
maintain her hold, at all hazards, on Algiers.
The Emperor of Russia also kncAV that the
government of thc King of the French, obeying

LORD Aberdeen's policy. 349
the impulse of the nation, was ready, had not
Austria and England held back, to have made
even the Servian quarrel a case for intervention.
There could be no doubt that if England should
unite with her, France would be prepared at
any time to oppose Russia in the East. How
was this danger to be prevented ? How was it
possible to hinder the Western PoAvers from
coraing to sorae secret arrangeraent to rescue
Turkey ?
One course, and only one course, was open.
Without England, France could do nothing.
Unsupported by England, the naval power of
France was scarcely equal to that of Russia.
Alone, it was evident that France never could
make the Eastern difficulty a cause of war, and
that Russia, both by land and sea, would be more
than a raatch for all the forces which France
might bring, either into the Baltic or the Euxine.
It was therefore necessary to make any pledge to
England, in order to bind her in return not to
take any decisive resolution on the affairs of
Turkey, without consulting Russia. With this
object, the Emperor Nicholas arrived in London,
professed his anxiety to raaintain the Ottoman
Erapire, relinquished all excluslA^e views of
aggrandiseraent, proraised to abstain from any
interference in Turkey, and to take no steps in

350 FOREIGN POLICY.
the East without previously asking the opinion
of the English Governraent.
Did Lord Aberdeen act rightly in consenting
to such engageraent ? This question may unhe
sitatingly be answered in the affirmative; and
it may also be confidently added, that any other
minister Avould have agreed to the same terms.
Had Lord Palmerston been in the Foreign Office
at the time, he would have acted in the same
manner. As in 1841 he thought it much to gain
the assent of Russia to the convention by Avhich
her exclusive pretensions to Turkey were given
up, so in 1844 he Avould have considered that an
engagement by which the Eraperor of Russia
agreed to do nothing in the East without first
coramunicating his intentions to the English
Ministers, declared that the integrity and the
independence of the Porte should be respected,
not only renounced for hiraself, but for all the
princes of Europe, any right, as Christian rulers,
to dictate to the Porte for the advantage of its
Christian subjects, and proraised not to harass
the Sultan by diploraatie bickerings and per
petual interference, was in the same spirit as the
recent treaty, and provided for the tranquillity
of the Ottoman Empire.
The only sentence in the Memorandum to
which any objection can be made, is that in

NICHOLAS' WANT OF HONOUR. 351
which it is stated that France would be compelled
to adopt the same measures as the other PoAvers
of Europe. But it is right to reraeraber that
this passage was not written by Lord Aberdeen,
but by Count Nesselrode ; and that though it
was plainly the intention of the Russian minister
to continue the isolation of France in her Eastern
policy, yet the English Government Avas on the
best of terms with that of France, and Avas not
by this agreement obliged to consent to anything
of which France might disapprove. Under any
circurastances it was extremely unlikely that
England would corae to any final decision on the
affairs of Turkey without endeavouring to obtain
the concurrence of France in the same resolu
tions ; and as the tenor of the Memorandura
was iraraediately communicated to M. Guizot,
and as the relations between the two Governments
increased rather than diminished in cordiality, it
is obvious that this document was understood to
mean, what Lord Aberdeen believed it to be,
a positive engageraent on the part of Russia,
aU the raore stringent because it Avas not in the
form of a treaty, never to encroach on the power
ofthe Sultan, nor to do anything affecting Turkey
Avithout the knoAvledge of England.
By what process of reasoning the Eraperor of
Russia should have lately indicated this Memo-

352 FOREIGN POLICY.
randura of Nesselrode as a justification of his
conduct, and as a proof of Lord Aberdeen's
participation in his scheraes, it is impossible to
conceiA'e. The paper declares, on the word of a
sovereign, his desire for the maintenance of the
Ottoman Empire ; the Emperor Nicholas avow
edly has attempted to overthrow the power of
the Sultan, and his quarrel with England arose
simply frora the fact of her believing that Turkey
had still a strong principle of life within her.
The paper stipulates that no Power, nor all
the Powers together, should interfere Avith the
sovereign rights of the Sultan ; the Eraperor
Nicholas declared war against the Porte, because
it Avould not consent to hand over to hiraself the
allegiance of all the Greek Christians in Turkey.
The paper stipulates that Russia should do
nothing in Turkey without the knowledge of
England ; the Eraperor Nicholas not only neg
lected to inforra the English Ministers of what
his real intentions were, but gave them assu
rances which were directly contradicted by facts,
and spoke of nothing but peace to our ambas
sador, while the conduct of his agent in Turkey,
and his acts on the frontier, breathed nothing
but war. The Memorandum, instead of proving
Lord Aberdeen's complicity, only proves the
Czar's own Avant of honour and good faith ; just

LORD Aberdeen's policy. 353
as the protocol of 1826 spoke of peace, when
Russia only intended war, so the Autocrat con
strued his engageraent to support the integrity
of Turkey, to raean the partition of the Ottoman
Empire. And there are politicians in England,
who, judging of others by themselves, and adopt
ing the Czar's notions of morality and honour,
while professedly opposing his policy, are ready
to join in the same interpretations of treaties
and state documents.
On the morning of the 6th of October, three
months after the visit of the Eraperor of Russia,
the King of the French landed at Portsraouth,
and was raost enthusiastically received by the
governraent and the nation. The arrival of
Louis PhiHppe in England was regarded as a
pledge of future peace ; and the harraony of the
two kingdoras was not at any time interrupted.
They might take different vicAVS of the state of
affairs in Spain and Greece, but there was no
open antagonisra such as there had been some
years earlier, and was again to be some months
later. At length another convention for the
suppression of the slave trade was agreed upon,
and the irritability of the French nation was
soothed by the concessions which Lord Aberdeen
made to their flag.
Even in America, France and England main-
A A

354 FOREIGN POLICY.
tained a coraraon action, and, much to the indig
nation of some Araerican politicians, ventured to
question the pretensions they put forth to decide
all disputes according to their interests, and
without regard to the opinions of those European
governraents, which, having territories on the
Araerican continent, had a right to an opinion
even on questions of transatlantic policy. The
assertion of the doctrine of Mr. Munroe may
one day involve the United States in a war with
the whole of Europe. The inaugural address of
Mr, President Polk has the sarae tenor as
certain declarations raade by the Eraperor
Nicholas of Russia. The great Republic of
Araerica and the great despotism of Northern
Europe have many points of resemblance. Some
American rulers have made sirailar pretensions,
and had not wiser counsels prevailed in 1846,
and had not a statesraan of so much moderation
as Lord Aberdeen been in the Foreign Office of
England, the aspiring republicans raight have
suffered the sarae fate as that which is impend
ing over the proud Autocrat,
As soon as the ratifications of the treaty of
Washington were exchanged, Mr, Fox, the repre
sentative of England, informed the American
Government that, by the command of Lord Aber
deen, he was ready to commence negotiations for

LORD Aberdeen's policy, 355
settling the boundary to the west of the Rocky
Mountains, This question had long been a
subject of controversy. In 1818, 1822, and 1826,
Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning had both
endeavoured to decide the claims of their govern
ments to the territories of Oregon : a teraporary
arrangement had been made in 1818, and in 1827
was continued for an indefinite period ; but the
respective rights of England and the United States
to Oregon still reraained undeterrained. Lord
Aberdeen did wisely in atterapting a final settle
ment of the dispute. To leave such questions
open for so many years, and to suffer them to
recur from tirae to time in a raore formidable
form, was a policy not creditable to statesraen.
Years, however, slipped away frora the tirae when
Lord Aberdeen's despatch to Mr. Fox was sent
across the Atlantic ; one President of the United
States succeeded another, and negotiation fol
lowed negotiation, but the difficulty still re
mained, and becarae greater than ever.
To enter into any detail of the arguraents on
either side would now be useless. The neigh
bouring regions were not then of so much value
as they have become since the discovery of gold
in California, The navigation of the river
Columbia, Vancouver's Island, and the harbours
on the shores of the Pacific, might seera of import-
A A 2

356 FOREIGN POLICY,
ance to the future of a great nation ; but all the
natural, coraraercial, and political advantages of
the whole Oregon territory would have been
dearly purchased by a war between the North
American republic and Great Britain, It raust
have checked the developeraent of the United
States for half a century.
But there were no apprehensions of Avar while
the negotiations were going on between Mr. Pa-
kenham and Mr. Calhoun. Lord Aberdeen's
proposals were declined, his offer of arbitration
Avas also rejected. Still, though the English
minister thought the rights of his governraent
incontestable, and though the Araerican rainister
considered the clairas ofthe United States equally
unquestionable, no angry feeling had yet been
enffendered in the course of the discussion. It
was only on the delivery of Mr. President Polk's
inaugural address that the business becarae
serious. The new President, in this political
effusion, after alluding to his youth and inexpe-
erince, fervently invoked "the aid of Almighty
Providence " to guard the country frora the mis
chiefs Avhich might proceed frora " an unwise
policy " : and the first year of Mr. Polk's admi
nistration shoAved that there was only too rauch
reason for such an invocation. He told his fellow-
citizens that their title to the whole territory of

LORD Aberdeen's policy. 357
Oregon was " clear and unquestionable," and
that he considered it his duty to uphold their
right. This address was delivered on the 3rd of
March, 1845, and before the end of the raonth
was perused with astonishraent in England. The
President's words were justly regarded as threat
ening ; and politicians of all parties expressed
their deterraination not to subrait to such unbe
coming language. "Lord Aberdeen, in the House
of Lords, said in answer to Lord Clarendon, amid
cheers frora all sides of the House: "With the
most anxious desire for peace, I still trust that
this question may be amicably settled; but if
not, Ave possess rights ' clear and unquestionable,'
which, by the blessing of God, and the support
of Parliament, the Government is prepared to
maintain." This is not the declaration of a minister ready
to accept peace at any price, as Lord Aberdeen
has sometiraes been represented. Lord Palraer
ston never took up a more decided position,
than Lord Aberdeen, on both the subjects of
Tahiti and of Oregon, in these five years of
office, deliberately assumed.
As an illustration of the spirit in which Foreign
Affairs were conducted, this Oregon question pos
sesses much interest ; but in other respects it is
now of little importance. The honour of the
A A 3

358 FOREIGN POLICY.
settlement belongs exclusively to Lord Aberdeen.
The suggestion of the coraproraise was his last
great act as Foreign Secretary. It was Avhile the
adrainistration of Sir Robert Peel held office
until Lord John Russell had forraed his cabinet,
that the news of the acceptance of the proposals
by the Araerican Government reached England.
These northern boundaries were now settled,
and every difficulty from this cause removed.
Thus, what had so long perplexed Lord Castle
reagh, Mr. Canning, and even Lord Palmerston,
Avas now happily concluded ; and it may be
doubted whether any statesman but Lord Aber
deen could, after so much bad feeling had arisen,
have preserved peace between the two nations,
so jealous of each other, and yet so eternally
associated, without sacrificing the honour or the
interest of either. It was a worthy conclusion of
his career as Foreign Minister ; a career which,
if it be not distinguished by great combinations,
energetic action, or unrivalled brilliancy, if it
be not of the kind which charras the imagination,
dazzles the eye, or leads the understanding
captive, has much in it that deserves the appro
bation of his countryraen, as standing for the
model of a quiet, dignified, and pacific policy,
offending no national prejudices, engendering no
fierce heart-burnings, making no inveterate

LORD ABERDEEN'S POLICY. 359
enemies ; but conciliating allies, maintaining a
steady neutrality araid the angry contentions
of an age, divided as no other age was ever
divided, between mad rulers and mad subjects,
and being at once just and friendly to the
humblest as well as to the greatest states of
the world.
To be popular with the politicans of taverns
and vestries has never been the arabition of this
statesraan. He has disdained to flatterthe national
pride ; he has never rainistered to the vanity at
the expense of the interests of Englishraen. A less
apathetic temperament, Avitli greater sympathy
for the suffering raultitudes of Europe, and a
more apparent hatred of oppression, such as the
noblest and wisest of Liberal Conservative states
men, Edmund Burke, possessed, may sometiraes
seem desirable in the ideal portrait of an English
minister. But Lord Aberdeen must be taken as
he is. He has the proud consciousness of never
having expressed a sentiment he did not feel, and
of never having stooped to buy popularity at
the price of his self-respect. His narae will be
remembered with gratitude by the people when
many popular favourites and all his malignant
enemies shall be forgotten. It will be well for
England if she never shall have a Foreign Secre
tary less sincere and upright than Lord Aberdeen.
& A 4

360

CHAP. XI.
INTRIGUE.  LORD PALMERSTON AGAIN FOREIGN MINISTEE. — •
SPANISH MARRIAGES.  IDENTITY OP THE POLICIES OF
LORD ABERDEEN AND LORD PALMERSTON ON THIS QUES
TION  M. GUIZOT. — ANNEXATION OP CRACOW.  DIS
CUSSION IN THE HOUSE OP COMMONS.  CONCURRENCE OF
OPINION  AN APOLOGIST FOR THE PARTITION OF POLAND.
 PORTUGAL AND SWITZERLAND. — POLITICAL MOVEMENTS
IN ITALY. — MISSION OF LORD MINTO.  CLOSE OP 1847.
When Sir Robert Peel's Governraent resigned
in the Deceraber of 1845, and Lord John Russell
atterapted to construct a Whig Cabinet, the
question of the Corn Laws was not, as the public
soon learnt, the only difficulty which the new
Prirae Minister had to raeet. It appeared that
there was at least one hereditary Whig statesman
who could not appreciate the value of Lord Pal
merston's clairas to be once more Foreign Secre
tary, and who set about resisting his pretensions.
The son of the great prime minister of the
great Reform Cabinet could not of course suppose
that he would ever be excluded frora a Liberal
Ministry. It seeraed irapossible to do without

POLITICAL INTRIGUES. 361
Lord Grey ; but very easy to do without Lord
Palmerston. This singular delusion was per
sisted in, and Lord John Russell found hiraself
obliged to relinquish the task which he had con
scientiously undertaken.
This failure, had it not been for the intrigue
against one Avho had shown so rauch ability both
in office and in opposition, and whose only criraes
were his success and his patriotisra, was not
much to be regretted. It was better that Sir
Robert Peel should again return to office and
coraplete the work he had begun. But the effect
of Lord Grey's opposition to Lord Palraerston's
resuraption of the duties of Foreign Minister did
not end with the political abortion of Deceraber
1845. It was known abroad that it was on
account of Lord Palraerston's sentiraents and
conduct with regard to France that one of the
nobleraen of the Whig party had thus questioned
the propriety of the appointraent. The King of
the French and his ministers could not but agree
with Lord Grey ; thus when Lord Palraerston
did again becorae Foreign Minister, sorae raonths
later, notwithstanding that he had in the interval
visited Paris, and done all he could to reraove
this unfavourable irapression frora the minds of
the rulers of France, he found, from no fault of
his own, his relations with that Government seri-

362 FOREIGN POLICY.
ously coraplicated. Experience alone could teach
some great Whig politicians the value and the
importance of the statesman who honoured them
by adhering to their party, and throwing the
weight of his ability and popularity into their
political scale. They did not know that the
people of England, when forraing their judgraent
on foreign policy, are not partisans ; that all they
require is patriotisra, courage, and sagacity ; and
that they will always stand by the minister who
Avill stand by the country.
When Lord Palmerston retired from office in
1841, France and England were vigorously en
gaged in thAvarting each other in Spain. England
indeed had no other object than the success of
that constitutional system A\'hich she had so
powerfully contributed to establish ; and our
minister therefore only supported that Spanish
poHtical party which he considered best able
and raost willing to carry out the principles of
good governraent. The soundness of Lord Pal
merston's views have been justified by tirae and
experience. No person Avho knows anything
of the Peninsula will now deny that the Pro-
gresista party is by far the purest and the most
honest of the sections into which the Spanish
nation is divided. The Moderados, who enjoyed
the patronage of France, were in fact the mere

SPANISH MARRIAGES. 363
instruments of the Queen Mother, Maria Chris
tina; she was really the head of this faction,
and by such a leader the foUoAvers may be
judged. There were doubtless some men
amongst thera of virtue and talent ; but for the
most part they were a mere cabal of greedy,
corrupt, and unprincipled politicians. As such
they were the fittest for carrying out the scheraes
for the aggrandisement of his faraily, which, the
longer the King of the French reraained on the
throne, he with raiserly prudence the more
restlessly pursued. While Espartero reraained
in power, the fear that England raight carry off
the prize he thought so captivating, and raarry
the young Queen of Spain and the Infanta to
princes of her own choosing, rendered Louis
Philippe anxious to consent to a compromise. At
first M. Guizot assured Lord Aberdeen of the will
ingness ofthe French Government to co-operate
with England to effect the two marriages. But
one reservation was included in the offers which
France made. So early as in 1842 she informed
the Governments interested in this question, that
she would not consent to any prince but one of
the House of Bourbon marrying the Queen of
Spain. This was a soraewhat extraordinary position
for a constitutional governraent, such as that

364 FOREIGN POLICY.
of the King of the French, to take on a
question relating to an independent kingdora.
It was a revival of the doctrine of legiti
macy, and a revival of the pretensions of the
French Bourbons to control the affairs of
Spain. To this principle, as an abstract propo
sition, no English rainister could consent. The
French Governraent, to be sure, professed great
respect for the independence of Spain, and for
the free choice of the young Queen. But M.
Guizot thought that they might be reconciled to
such a liraitation. What would be said in private
life of the father of a large family, Avho should
declare his great consideration for the personal
independence of a young heiress, and yet in
sist on her marrying one of his family ? It
was never asserted, when the declaration was
raade, that the Queen of Spain had any peculiar
predilection for the descendants of Philip the
Fifth ; and such a condition as that proposed by
King Louis PhUippe was absolutely unwarrant
able. Yet as a fact indicative of the spirit in
which these negotiations Avere conducted by the
French Gorernment, this iraperious announce
ment deserves attention. It shoAvs the dif
ferent relations in which France and England
stood, and accounts for much that subsequently
occurred.

SPANISH MARRIAGES, 365
England did not in any manner attempt to
influence the choice of the Spanish Court. Yet,
surely, if any Government had an excuse for
interfering with the raarriage of the Queen of
Spain, it was that of England ; for had it not
been for England, the Queen of Spain raight
never have worn the diadera. Lord Palraerston
had exposed hiraself to much obloquy, and even
put to hazard his OAvn position in the English
Cabinet, for the purpose of supporting the
constitutional cause in Spain. When France
hung back, he stUl persevered. What right,
then, had France, which England had not, to
dictate on the question of the marriage of the
Spanish Queen ? Such a pretension might have
been intelligible in the governraent of Charles
the Tenth; but it was treason against all con
stitutional principles when put forward by the
mimsters of Louis PhUippe,
In 1846, it was the object of M, Guizot to
make out that there was a marked difference
between the policy of Lord Aberdeen and Lord
Palmerston on these Spanish Marriages, He
wished to imply that the secretary of the Peel
Government fully admitted the principle that
none but a Bourbon should aspire to the hand
of the Queen ; and that it Avas only Avhen the
Whig minister returned to power, that any diffi-

366 FOREIGN POLICY.
culty arose. But this is most incorrect. Lord
Aberdeen's opinion on that point was precisely
the same as Lord Palraerston's ; to every
Englishraan it must be obvious that it could not
be otherwise. For some time after this notifica
tion of M. Guizot, Lord Aberdeen, according
even to the acknowledgment of the French
Government, was most reserved. Though he
had not opposed the French policy, it was not
until the visit of Her Majesty to King Louis
Philippe at Eu, in the September of 1843, that
the ministers of the two nations came to any
satisfactory understanding. That was a tirae
of great festivity. Louis Philippe did all he
could to entertain his illustrious guest : there
were grand pic-nics in a truly royal style ;
there were reviews ; there were balls ; but,
araid all this rejoicing and raagnificence, which
served to fill the columns of newspapers, and
gratify the curiosity of the raultitudes on
both sides of the Channel, the King had a
keen eye to business ; and the great topic of
conversation in the royal circle was the Spanish
marriages. The comraon opinion is, that it
was decided between the Foreign Secretaries
of the two Governments, that France should
abstain frora proposing one of the sons of the
King for the hand of the Queen of Spain, and

SPANISH MARRIAGES. 367
that England should not put forward a prince of
the House of Coburg. But when the French
Government declared its intention of confirming
the choice of the Queen to the Bourbon family,
it also voluntarily pledged itself to exclude the
French princes frora the candidateship. On
that subject, then, there could be no further
engagement. Lord Aberdeen only promised not
to do, what he never had any intention of doing :
he never intended to force a Prince of Coburg
on the Spanish nation as the consort of their
Queen ; and it was easy for him to say, that if
such a prince were proposed, he would not
receive the support of England. As it was im
possible for him to answer for the actions of
other people, and especially for the conduct of
such an irapulsive personage as the Queen
Mother, beyond this he could not go.
It was Maria Christina, and not any English
minister who caused the Prince of Coburg to be
seriously regarded as a candidate. She cordially
hated her two nephews with that passionate
hatred which only relations can feel for one
another. Her first wish was that the Queen
should have for her husband one of the sons of
King Louis Philippe. When she was with diffi
culty made to coraprehend the irapossibUity of
gratifying this desire, she began, with the sarae

368 FOREIGN POLICY.
iraportunity to demand the Prince of Coburg.
Louis Philippe took the alarm. The match
making propensities of these two kindred
spirits were fully aroused. Lord Aberdeen's
conduct was scrupulously just, without being
so favourable to the partizans of France as M.
Guizot represented it, when he atterapted to
make out a case against Lord Palpierston, in
order to justify the miserable trickery for which
this French statesman and philosopher raust be
held responsible. On the one hand Lord Aber
deen positively prohibited the English am
bassador from taking any steps to advance the
pretensions of the Prince of Coburg in oppo
sition to France ; and on the other, he assured
the Spanish minister that though Spain had
strong reasons for choosing a consort for their
sovereign frora the Bourbon faraily, yet, should
the Spanish Government and the Spanish Queen
decide otherwise, they might count on the syra
pathy and support of England against any at
terapts that France raight raake to interfere with
their independence. This is surely not adopting
the vieAvs of France, nor did M. Guizot, in 1845,
think so, whatever he raight say in 1846 and
1847. The facts can speak for theraselves.
In the September of 1845, Queen Victoria,
when returning from Germany, paid the King of

SPANISH MARRIAGES. 369
the French a short visit. When she appeared off
Tr^port, the water was very low ; and all her
good subjects were much amused on learning
that she was conveyed to land in that apparently
unkingly vehicle, a bathing machine. The mar
riages of the Queen of Spain and the Infanta
were again discussed, and Lord Aberdeen and
M. Guizot again arrived at a conclusion. Ano
ther positive promise was made by the French
minister ; the fear lest the Prince of Coburg
should obtain the support of England, caused
the King and his Foreign Secretary to pledge
themselves that in the event of the Duke of
Montpensier being the accepted suitor of the
Infanta, their marriage should not take place
until all danger of the two crowns of France
and Spain being united in the family of Orleans
had been obviated by the birth of an heir to the
throne. The conference of the two statesmen
was most friendly; Lord Aberdeen was frank
and sincere ; from that tirae all reasonable sus
picion of England acting contrary to the wishes
of France, had King Louis Philippe really desired
to pursue a fair and honourable policy, ought to
have been set at rest. To prove that Lord Pal
raerston was the aggressor, and M. Guizot on the
defensive, when the final resolution of breaking
faith with England was taken, it would be neces-
B b

370 FOREIGN POLICY.
sary to show that from this second visit of her
Majesty to Eu until the moraent when Lord
Palraerston again becarae Foreign Minister, the
relations of the French Governraent with Lord
Aberdeen had been perfectly cordial.
Instead of this being the case, a very short
tirae after the consultation and understanding,
M. Guizot's suspicions were again awakened by
his agent, and Lord Aberdeen was distinctly in
formed by the French ambassador, that if the
narae of Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg con
tinued to be mentioned in Spain as that of one
of the candidates for the hand of either of the
Spanish princesses, France would consider her
self free from the obligations she had contracted
to England, and would press the marriage of the
Duke of Montpensier Avith the Queen. Nor did
M. Guizot confine himself to Avords. Lord
Aberdeen assured him that he might make his
mind easy, for that England had no wish to
propose the Prince of Coburg. The French
minister, in direct violation of his engagement
with England, and while Lord Aberdeen was
yet in power, sent positive instructions to M.
Bresson to propose the Duke of IMontpensier as the
husband of the Queen or of the Infanta.* After
* M. Guizot to M. De St. Aulaire, Feb. 1846. M.
Guizot's own words, when defending himself in the Cham-

SPANISH MARRIAGES, 371
this it was surely uiiAA'-orthy of M, Guizot to say
that Lord Palmerston was the cause of the sub
sequent rupture. The French Government, in
their blind eagerness to turn the two raarriages
to the account of their sovereign, were evidently,
according to their own despatches, as distrustful
of Lord Aberdeen as of his successor.
The objections raade by M. Guizot to Lord
Palmerston's conduct were raost frivolous. The
English statesraan, it appeared, was to be
blamed because he did not inform the elec
tors of Tiverton, on his re-elections, who
should marry the two Spanish princesses ; be
cause he took a month after entering office to
consider the question; and because, in his
ber of Peers in the session of 1847, are enough to prove
his duplicity, and that, six months before Lord Palmerston
returned to office, he had resolved, if he could not have
altogether his own way, of breaking with England.
" Shortly afterwards," said he, " the name of the Prince
of Coburg having been put forward by an eminent person
in Spain, I felt alarmed, and wrote to Lord Aberdeen
who replied that I might rest perfectly reassured, and that
I had nothing to fear on that side. M. Bresson, however
insisting that an intrigue was on foot to favour a Coburo-
candidate, I wrote to him on the Vith of December, 1845 to
be on his guard, and as the arrangement was contrary to the
doctrine maintained throughout the affair by France, to
defeat the pretensions of the Prince of Coburg, by all the
means in his power, and to propose ihe Duke of Montpensier
either for the hand of the Queen or the Infanta.'"
B B 2

372 FOREIGN POLICY.
despatch of the 19th of July, he made mention
of " a Coburg the more and of France the less."
All this is very pitiable. To corae frora the
mouth of a statesman acquainted Avith England,
with public opinion in this country, and with
the personal character of our public men, it was
indeed paltry and ridiculous. Had Lord Pal
merston been inclined to act as M. Guizot sus
pected him of doing, he never would have had
a single defender in Parliament nor in his own
Cabinet. Frora the raerest selfishness, if frora
no higher raotive, he would have hesitated be
fore committing himself to such a policy. But
Lord Palmerston, as everybody in England
knows well, was incapable of acting in that
perfidious manner. Whatever his faults may
have been while Foreign Minister, such petty
intrigue, falsehood, and trickery as M. Guizot
imputed to him, are not in his nature. He raay
have had too little regard for the feelings of
foreign governments ; he may in his despatches
have told them disagreeable truths in a dis
agreeable manner ; but his most relentless ene
mies have generally admitted that in the whole
course of his extended political career, he has
been eminently manly, frank, and true.
To go into an exaraination of the arguraents
M. Guizot Avas driven to use in his attempt to

SPANISH MARRIAGES. 373
excuse his conduct ; to inquire whether he was
at Hberty to give to an English Arabassador
cue day, a positive assurance, which was directly
contradicted by his acts of the next ; to recount
ah the shuffling, recrimination, and deceit which
these unfortunate marriages engendered, would
be now superfluous. The reason revolts, and
the heart sickens, at the mere consideration of
such excuses. That they should have been
made by a great philosopher called in an en
lightened age from the professor's chair to go
vern a great kingdom ; that they should have
been made by the great exponent and historian
of civilisation, is perhaps the most humiliating
spectacle of the degradation of genius and phi
losophy since Lord Bacon was sentenced for
corruption on the seat of judgment.
The raeans employed by the French Govern
ment to induce the Spanish Court and Ministry
to act in complete subservience to the views of
King Louis PhiHppe, were the simplest in the
world. Of the two sons of Don Francisco de
Paula, Don Enrique was considered the most
capable ; for this reason he was less approved of
than the other by France, as the future consort
of the young and inexperienced Queen. Both
Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston had given
the preference to Don Enrique ; and M. Guizot
B B 3

374 FOREIGN POLICY.
made a show of inviting Lord Aberdeen to
unite with France, in recommending his pre
tensions. The Moderado party and Queen
Christina were then omnipotent at the Spanish
Court ; but Don Enrique had placed himself at
the head of the Progresistas ; and his success
would probably bring about a change of govern
raent. Letters were shown by M. Bresson, the
representative of the French Governraent to the
Queen Mother, and to the Moderado rainisters,
irapljdng that France and England had now
agreed to support Don Enrique. The resolution
of the Queen Mother and her political friends
was soon taken. They determined, as M. Bres
son well knew they would, to marry the Queen
to the rival brother ; and to prevent Don En
rique being proposed for the hand of the Infanta,
made it a condition, as M. Bresson Avell knew
they would, that the marriage of the Infanta
with the Duke of Montpensier should be solem
nised at the sarae tirae. Thus was this game of
perfidy and intrigue played out. M. Guizot
blaraed Lord Palmerston for even mentioning
the name of the Prince of Coburg, and still,
with much inconsistency, represented himself
as yielding to the importunities of the Queen
Mother.* * Lord Aberdeen's private letter to M. Guizot, dated the

SPANISH MARRIAGES. 375
It Avas on the night of the 28th of August,
1846, when the peaceful citizens of Madrid were
wrapped in their slurabers, that, in the raidst of
a midnight orgie, the consent of the young
Queen was wrung from her ; and the official
gazette announced the next day, to the astonish
ment of all her subjects, that Her Majesty had
decided on raarrying her cousin, Don Francisco.
M. Bresson, in answer to Lord Palmerston's
statement, denied that there was any orgie, or
that he had taken any part in forcing the con
sent of the Queen. Noav, it may be true that
the French diplomatist never left his own house
during that eventful night ; but it is no less
true, that he left a very efficient agent at the
palace, Maria Christina, who was both able and
willing to do and say all that might be neces
sary. Lord Palmerston had good authority
for what he said; nor, when it is remembered

16th of September, 1846, and published in the twenty-first
number of the " Kevue Eetrospective'' is an unanswerable
proof of the identity of his policy with that of Lord Pal
merston's in the Spanish marriages. Lord Aberdeen
declares that he might have done exactly as Lord Palmerston
did, in mentioning the Prince of Coburg's name, and that
after all that had been said and written, he could see no
difference on the question between Sir Eobert Peel's Govern
ment and the succeeding ministry. — Revue Retrospective,
No. 21. p. 324. B B 4

376 FOREIGN POLICY.
what scenes have since been witnessed at raid
night within the same palace walls, is this orgie
at all improbable. M. Bresson's assertion will
not go for much ; night and darkness, and re
velry Avere the fitting accessories of that deed
which blackened the fair fame of a great philo
sophical statesman, sacrificed the welfare of
Spain, made more than one diadera tremble on
the head of its wearer, and discredited the cause
of constitutional freedom throughout the world.
From the tirae when the announceraent of the
intended marriages arrived in London, the close
friendship and alliance AA-hich had united England
with the Orleans dynasty Avas broken for ever.
From that time England took her own course,
and left the false King and his false Government
to their deserved doom. Frora that time the
friends of all true freedora, the noblest philan
thropists, and the wisest statesmen shrunk with
horror at the spectacle of meanness, immorality,
and folly which was seen on the other side of
the English Channel. The throne of the barri
cades had been weighed in the balance, and found
wanting. All earnest raen, whether partisans of
raonarchy or of liberty, could not but deride and
hate that aborainable constitutional governraent
which had betrayed its trust, and coraraitted
crimes from which the raost servile tools of ab-

ANNEXATION OF CRACOW. 377
solute power in Europe would have shrunk frora
attempting. Retribution on all the actors in that heartless
tragedy was signal and immediate, Louis
Philippe and his minister were both obliged to
fly for refuge to the country they had wronged.
But the King of the French is now no more :
his minister lives to contemplate the work of his
own hands. To have seen the dynasty he had
so zealously endeavoured to serve ignominiously
expelled from France, to have seen its fall re
garded throughout Europe as merited, to have
seen all the leading politicians of England look
with joy at the frustration of those fine scheraes
of dynastic aggrandisement, to have seen the
English Governraent happily and gloriously allied
with a French Emperor, whom the House of
Orleans had persecuted, and one of whose proud
est thoughts is that he deserved their enmity, to
have seen, above all, the horrible exhibition of
vice and shamelessness on the Spanish throne ;
and to be conscious that all this, and more than
this, was his wojjk, that it was the natural
operation of cause and effect, and that with it in
all future ages his name must be inseparably asso
ciated, must, to one possessed of a heart beatino-
with sensibility, and a mind capable of reflection,
be a punishment more terrible than any that
Dante has iraagined of the daraned, and to which

378 FOREIGN POLICY.
all the tortures of fiends and furies would be
heavenly repose.
Iniquity begets iniquity. The utter destruc
tion of the independence of Cracow, and its an
nexation to the Austrian dominions, was the
first consequence of those ill-omened Spanish
raarriages, and the dissensions between France
and England. On the 10th of October the two
marriages were celebrated : about the end of
that raonth King Louis PhiHppe had the exqui
site gratification of receiving at Paris the Infanta
as Duchess of Montpensier ; on the 6th of No
veraber was signed at Vienna a convention,
"revoking and suppressing" the treaties by
which the independence of Cracow had been
guaranteed for ever. M. Guizot then began to
learn Avhat he had lost in sacrificing the alliance
with England. He reraonstrated ; he protested ;
he went so far as to declare that the whole of
the treaties of Vienna had for the future no
existence. The rainisters of the three great
Powers treated M, Guizot's words and acts with
conterapt ; as indeed they had only too much
reason for doing. How could the perpetrator of
the Spanish marriages remonstrate with any
propriety against the iniquities of other states
men? The injury done to Cracow was a grievous
one ; but the crime was not of a deeper dye than
that comraitted in Spain.

ANNEXATION OF CRACOW. 379
Lord Palraerston, too, protested against the
annexation of Cracow, as he had protested
against the consuraraation of the wickedness on
the other side of the Pyrenees. England stood
alone, strong in her oAvn moral strength, and
fearlessly condemned the tyrannical conduct of
the three despotic Courts, as she had condemned
the hj^ocritical French Government. Lord
Palmerston demolished the manifesto by which
Prince Metternich pretended to vindicate the
proceedings of the three Powers ; and Her
Majesty, on opening Parliaraent for the session
of 1847, declared the annexation of Cracow to
be "a raanifest violation of the treaty of Vienna."
If the year 1836 is to be regarded as that in
which a strong public hostility to Russia was
first indicated in the British Parliaraent, so this
year 1847 must also be considered as the begin
ning of an epoch when the Conservative party
had entirely worked itself free from that close
connexion with the arbitrary Powers of Europe
which it had inherited from Lord Castlereagh.
The principles of true political morality and
the vivifying sentiments of manly English na
tionality were now applied by Tories, as well
as Whigs and Radicals, to the consideration of
our foreign policy. The tyrannical conduct of

380 FOREIGN POLICY.
the Austrian Government after the insurrection
in Silesia, the base and bloody massacre in
Gallicia, and the final conterapt for rights and
treaties in the recent annexation, had produced
their natural effect on the minds of English
gentlemen. The most respectable Conservatives
united with one voice in supporting the protest
of Lord Palraerston ; the allusions to Cracow in
the debate on the Address, and the discussion
of the 4th of March on the same subject, were
cheering syraptoras of healthy politics and
earnest patriotisra. When Lord John Russell
rose early to speak on Mr. Hume's resolutions,
the full sympathies of the House were with him,
and his speech was one of the best he ever deli
vered on a question of foreign policy. The
prirae rainister who in the face of Europe could
enunciate such noble sentiraents was indeed in
a glorious position, and performed his duty well.
One of Lord John Russell's sentences on this
occasion deserves to be blazoned in letters of
gold above the speaker's chair, and to be re
membered in every discussion on foreign affairs.
" Though in some of the late transactions in
Europe," said Lord John, " our protests have
been disregarded, our raoral force has been in
creased and fortified ; for there is no treaty
either ancient or raodern which avc have either

ANNEXATION OF CRACOW. 381
violated or set at nought." The loud cheers
from all sides of the House of Coraraons en
dorsed this eraphatic sentence of the Minister.
Men whose lives had been spent in opposition
to each other were now all of the sarae opinion.
Not only Lord John Russell and Lord Palraer
ston, not only Mr. Hume and Mr. M. Milnes,
but Sir Robert Peel and Lord Mahon, as well
as Lord Sandon and Sir Robert Inglis, repro
bated the annexation of Cracow, and gave their
approbation to the policy of the Government.
They might disagree on the propriety of sus
pending the Russo-Dutch loan ; but it must be
recorded that all the supporters of the Coalition
Ministry Avere, so early as 1847, heartily united
on this vdtal question affecting the relations of
England with the Continent.
One exception, indeed, there Avas in that
general chorus of unanimity. One politician
there Avas Avho, not content with defending the
annexation of Cracow, with eulogising Prince
Metternich, and with approving of the violation
of particular treaties of Vienna, also advanced
doctrines Avhich appeared to countenance the
disregard of all treaties and all public faith,
Avhenever two or three despots raight join to
gether. Nor did he stop here. As an historical
fact it ought not to be forgotten, that in this

382 FOREIGN POLICY.
discussion, Avhich comraenced on the 4th of
March, 1847, and which was continued for three
nights, there was one member of the British
House of Coraraons who, a few raonths after the
tirae when the blood of the aristocracy of Gal
licia had been poured out like water in a cora
raon massacre, thought it a fitting opportunity
for calumniating all the Polish nobility, and for
defending the first partition of Poland. Never,
from 1772 until this time, had this detestable
public crime, in Avhich so many other detestable
public crimes have originated, found an apologist
in any raeraber of any English party. Liberal or
Conservative. Even during the supremacy of
Lord Castlereagh, even in the days of the Con
gress of Vienna, even when the hatred of revo
lutionists was most violent in England, no poli
tician in our Parliament ever stepped forward to
apologise for that atrocious deed. The peculiar
glory of Mr. Burke is, that what he stigmatised
in 1772, when at the head of the Whig oppo
sition, he still stigmatised in 1791 and in 1796,
Avhen he had becorae the champion of the Con
servatives, and the advocate of the allied sove
reigns. But in the reforraed Parliaraent, and
when all the evils of that crirae Avere obvious to
the meanest understanding, an apologist for the
partition of Poland was uoav seen. He declared.

ANNEXATION OF CRACOW, 383
and those who listened to hira could scarcely
believe their ears, that " there must have been
some good cause for that great and nuraerous
race having raet the doom which they had en
countered ; " that " he had no sympathy for the
race so partitioned ;" that " Poland was a ready
conspirator, and a pamperer of the lusts of her
aristocracy ;" that " it was not the great Powers
who had caused the fall of Poland ;" that those
who denounced the massacre in Gallicia, and
spoke well of the Polish nobility, " raised a false
cry, and appealed to morbid passions." The
orator sneered at Lord Palraerston, He sneered
at Sir Robert Peel, He sneered at Sir Robert
Inglis. They knew nothing of high statesraan
ship or political raorality ; but the individual
who now addressed them was there to teach
both these iraportant sciences. The House lis
tened in silence to this reraarkable speech, the
like to which had never before been uttered
within those walls. It was in a different
strain frora any oration on foreign policy
that Chathara, or Burke, or Fox, or Pitt, or
Canning, or Peel, or Palraerston, had ever
spoken. This was the Ncav Toryisra ; this was
the NeAV Morality, Merabers were shocked;
the people out of doors, when they read that
speech in the newspapers, Avere shocked. It was

384 FOREIGN POLICY,
considered alraost incredible that such sentiments
should have been expressed. But raore incre
dible things than this have now been witnessed.
That orator has lately, as Leader of Opposition,
represented himself as the supporter of a liberal
systera of foreign policy, and he has even accused
Lord Aberdeen for being in league with Russia,
and blaraed hira for being friendly to Austria,
though Lord Aberdeen has never, through any
connivance with Russia, or partiality to Austria,
thought of defending the partition of Poland.
Lord Palmerston replied to this speech in a
thoroughly statesmanlike manner. He proved
the orator to be mistaken both in his facts and
his inferences. It was not necessary, said the
Foreign Secretary, for those who blamed the
annexation of CracoAv, and considered it a viola
tion of the Treaty of Vienna, to rely upon the
annexed treaties. The 6th and 7th articles of
the general Treaty were quite sufficient for the
purpose. Nor was it true, as it had been stated,
that when the Kingdom of the Netherlands was
dismembered, the only Governments Avhich inter
fered in the matter were Russia and England :
the convention of separation Avas signed by the
ministers of all the five Powers, and by one as
soon as by another. Thus the argument of the
leader of opposition, based on the fact that par-

ANNEXATION OF CRACOW. 385
ticular treaties might be set at nought by one
party, without the consent of the other contract
ing poAvers, and without injury to the general
treaty, was fully met, and his instance of the
establishment of the kingdom of Belgium proved
tobe quite erroneous. Another arguraent which
has found its way into the books of some pro
fessedly liberal writers on this question, and
which Avas also stated by this parliamentary
advocate of annexation, is just as unsubstantial
as those which Lord Palmerston so conclusively
answered. Because the secret history of the
establishment of the state of Cracow was that
the Three Powers could not agree which of them
should possess it, and therefore raade it inde
pendent in 1815, it did not follow that when they
had come to att' understanding in 1846, they had
either a moral or a legal right to destroy that
independence. The raost severe condemnation
of the conduct of the three Governments was that
pronounced by Sir Robert Peel. A more huini-
, hating confession, said this conservative states
man, than for such great Powers as Prussia,
Eussia, and Austria, to inforra the Avorld that
they could not protect theraselves frora the dis
turbances in Cracow without overthrowing its
independence could not possibly be made. All
the pretences for this act are indeed contemptible.
c c

386 FOREIGN POLICY.
In the year 1847 there was in the aspect of
the political world much to gratify the partisans
of constitutional government. Had it not been
for the terrible convulsion of the following spring,
the hopes of many good raen raight have been
realised. As we now look back at the pheno
mena, they seem indeed only the mutterings of
the impending storra. But Avisdom after the
event is not always infaUible ; it was the merest
chance that the throne of the King of the French
fell Avhen it did ; though nothing could have
permanently upheld it, it might, Avith all its
rottenness, have stood for some years. Unfor
tunately, at the tirae Avhen in Germany and Italy
the aspirations for freedora were assuming a
definite shape, and the multitude were ready to
listen to the counsels of prudence and modera
tion, a republic was proclaimed in Paris, Europe
became frenzied with excitement, and Avild poli
tical visionaries bent on carrying out their insane
projects through blood and rapine took the lead.
When they Avhose natural place in society
was at the bottora suddenly found theraselves at
the top, raoderate reforms were despised, and
nothing but extreme revolutions and Jacobin re
publics would satisfy the craving of the popular
raind. But the end had not yet corae.
In 1847, free constitutions and political re-

SWITZERLAND AND POLAND. 387
forms became the rage. Men were eagerly
seeking for novelties ; princes suddenly deter
mined to be popular ; and at the head of this
fashionable and liberal raovement were the King
of Prussia and the Pope of Rome. There were
insurrections, too, in Portugal and in Switzer
land ; there were military occupations and mo
narchical jealousies ; there was rauch coaxing,
and bullying, and protocoling ; it was a busy
and eager time for sovereigns, ministers, and
people ; and the busiest araong the busy was, as
ever. Lord Palraerston. He was fairly launched
in his eleraent. His mediation and advice were
in continual request ; few of the political pilgrims
to Downing Street went aAvay unsatisfied from
the shrine. Lord Palmerston's advice Avas freely,
honestly, and, in most instances, Avisely given.
All the disappointra^ents of that sanguine period
have been visited upon his head ; but, in fact, it
is as absurd to blame hira for the failure of the
potato crop in Ireland as for the failure of many
of these new constitutions, Avhich had no sooner
sprung up than they were destroyed.
Nor Avas the labour of the English Secretary
of State thrown aAvay. He kept the crown on
the head of the Queen of Portugal. He hin
dered Austrian and French troops frora invading
Switzerland, and frora destroying, under the
c c 2

388 FOREIGN POLICY.
pretence of religion, the independence of thc
Federal Diet. That the policy of Lord Pal
raerston, in these two countries, Avas wise and
just, experience has proved. Even Avhen the
rcA^olutionary deluge swept over Europe with
such terrible violence, Portugal and Switzerland
reraained uninjured in the general devastation.
Had the extrerae liberals in Portugal tri
uraphed, it is easy to see that a military des
potisra and the success of the Miguelists raust
have been the final result of the Portuguese
insurrection. Had the seven Cantons, Avhich
had leagued themselves together under the narae
ofthe Sonderbund in 1847, offered a successful
resistance to the forces of the Diet, that victory
must in 1848 have been speedily reversed, and
perhaps have entailed most disastrous con
sequences on the brave and ancient republic.
The true policy in both these cases was that
which Lord Palmerston followed. In Portugal
he supported the throne of Donna Maria, but
insisted on the conformance of her governraent
to those constitutional principles Avhich it pro
fessed to respect, and on Avhich the raonarchy of
the daughter of Pedro was founded. In Switzer
land, it Avas not what he did, but Avhat he pre
vented others frora doing, that was so highly
beneficial to the welfare of the raountaineers.

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN ITALY. 389
France and Austria were eager to assist the
Catholic Cantons; King Louis PhiHppe had
undertaken to support abroad that systera of
Jesuitism, against which the revolution of 1 830
Avas a protest ; and he united with Austria for
the purpose of introducing those foreign influ
ences into SAvitzerland, which raust have been the
consequences of the success of the Sonderbund.
Before Lord Palmerston agreed to the mediation
of the Five Powers, he insisted on the principle of
the intervention being distinctly laid down ; sorae
delay occurred before the convention was settled ;
and before it could be presented to the Diet, it
had triumphed by force of arras. The evils of
intervention frora abroad and disunion at horae
Avere happily prevented in Switzerland ; the
terrible storra that Avas about to rage throughout
France, Gerraany, and Italy, passed over the
Swiss raountains, and Avhile comraitting frightful
ravages on all sides, respected the peace, liberty,
independence, and traditions of that gallant
little republic, so strongly fortified by nature,
and so bravely defended through centuries from
the armies of the oppressor by hereditary valour.
The first indications of the hurricane might
even then be heard in the sunny plains of Italy.
The sky indeed seemed brighter than usual; the
hearts of all patriots beat with a fonder hope ; at
c c 3

390 FOREIGN POLICY.
Rorae the Avord "freedom" Avas once more
openly uttered in the streets haunted by the
glories of a Brutus and a Cicero ; and though
the Austrian bayonets glittered in Ferrara, the
genius of Italy appeared to be reviving, while
constitutional England prepared to throAV before
it her protecting shield.
Menaced by Prince Metternich, scarcely sup
ported by M. Guizot, the new Pope and the
patriots Avho trusted in hira looked to Lord
Palmerston for advice and aid. The head of the
Church of Rome turned away frora the govern
ments Avhich professed his faith, and asked
assistance frora the statesman of the great Pro
testant Erapire. It has since been seen that
this reforraing Pope had indeed no settled prin
ciples of liberty ; that he spoke of freedom and
professed to emancipate his people, without
having at all calculated the consequences of his
acts, or the means to attain his ends. To see
himself applauded as the champion of popular
rights, Avas to hira a new and exquisite luxury ;
but it was a very dangerous luxury, and one
in Avhich he does not seera inclined again to
indulge. Lord Palraerston answered to the call of the
Italian liberals. In the autumn of 1847, he ac
credited Lord Minto on a special mission to the

CLOSE OF 1847. 391
courts of Turin and Florence. At first this
nobleman seemed to be perfectly successful;
throughout Italy his counsels were requested
and attended to; he advised raoderate reforras
and pacific raeasures ; under his superintendance,
the poHtical moveraents in Italy were happily
progressing. Had it not been for the treraendous
impulse given to the revolutionary spirit by the
great outbreak at Paris in the following year,
there can be Httle doubt that Lord Minto's
diploraatie mission to the Italian States, and the
cause of Italian independence, Avould have had
a very different terraination to that which they
unfortunately experienced.
The year 1847 ended with peace restored in
Portugal and SAvitzerland, with the French go
vernment discredited by its recreant policy and
organised corruption, with the cry for reform
echoing through France, with Austria sternly
attempting to keep down the popular spirit in
Lombardy, and intimidating the Italian princes
who had yielded to the wishes of their people.
Lord Palraerston Avas closely watched both by
subjects and sovereigns.

c c 4

392

CHAP. XII.
COUNT DE MONTALEMBERt's SPEECH ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. —
ITALIAN REVOLUTIONS.  LORD PALMERSTON's POLIOT IN
1848.  AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY.  DEMANDS FOR THE
SURRENDRB of REFUGEES. — DIPLOMATIC VICTORY OP SIR
STRATFORD CANNING.  GREEK QUESTION.  DEBATE IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.  LORD PALMERSTON'S DEFENCE.
— MR. Gladstone's letters to lord Aberdeen. — re
tirement OF LORD palmerston.  CONCLUSION.
The eloquent Count de Montalerabert delivered
a great oration in the French Charabers of Peers,
on the 13th of January, 1848. His eyes rolling
with a fine frenzy, he scanned the political hori
zon, and after taking a deliberate survey of all
Europe, his gaze becarae fixed on one figure,
Avhora he regarded as another Eolus, ready to
let slip the revolutionary Avinds frora their caves.
There was no danger from Italy, there Avas no
danger frora the rainisters of Austria, the social
condition of France gave this great religious
politician no cause for apprehension. From one
man alone, and his detestable machinations, was
there any reason for fear; and that individual
was the Secretary of State of the Queen of

MONTALEMBERT'S SPEECH, 393
England, He was the great offender. It Avas
he who, at the time Avhen France and Austria
Avere about to make a deraonstration in favour
of the SavIss Catholics, insisted on a previous
understanding, while he pressed on hostilities in
Switzerland, and thus secured the triuraph of
the Radicals, He was the executioner of Cathol
icism. He was kindling a flarae which Avould
cross the Channel, and show that prosperity,
liberty, and justice were not the privilege of one
nation alone. " When noble peers," said Count
de Montalerabert, " stand up in this tribune and
speak what they think of the Eraperor of Aus
tria, and Prince Metternich, I raay surely declare
my opinion of Lord Palraerston."
This address excited rauch interest. It was
copied into the English newspapers, and formed
the theme of raany leading articles. Editors
in France and England echoed the tone of the
orator, and there Avas probably not one of the
kings, courtiers, or ministers, about to expiate
years of misdeeds by flight and exile, who did
not impute the unsettled state of society to Lord
Palmerston, and not to their own raisgovernraent
and folly. This was the cant of the period.
Wherever there were disorders coramitted or
revolutionary outbreaks apprehended, Lord Pal
merston Avas sure to be considered the cause of

394 FOREIGN POLICY.
all troubles. This minister justly said, that no
imputation could be raore vulgar or more un
founded than to accuse hira of wishing to excite
discontent; in fact, such an iraputation was
just as absurd as to represent Lord Aberdeen as
wishing to see absolute poAver established in all
countries. The party spirit of the raoraent gave
a currency to both these charges ; and they Avere
only too much authorised by these two states
men themselves. Lord Aberdeen most unjustly
said that Lord Palraerston endeavoured to create
revolutions ; and Lord Palmerston most unjustly
retorted that Lord Aberdeen endeavoured to
make despotisms.
Lord Minto's journey to Italy was much
blamed by the Opposition in the session of 1848.
Every Englishraan may now, on looking back
Avith calmness on the fearful agitation of Europe,
be thankful that this well-intentioned but unfor
tunate mission, was the most important subject
of controversy in Parliaraent at a tirae Avhen the
King of Prussia w^as compelled to leave his
" beloved Berliners," Avlien the Eraperor of
Austria w^as obliged to fly twice frora Vienna,
when the barricades of Paris were taken by
storra after a deadly conflict, Avhen the Austrian
troops were driven out of Milan, the King of
Bavaria forced to abdicate, the King of Naples

ITALIAN REVOLUTIONS. 395
all but lost Sicily, and even the good Pope found
himself obliged to escape in disguise frora Rorae.
Lord Palraerston's mediation was asked both by
the Eraperor of Austria and the King of Naples.
Austria went so far as to offer to give up Lom
bardy ; and if the Court of Vienna felt their
hold on Italy so desperate. Lord Palraerston
cannot be censured for not thinking better of
the chances of Austria than herself. Mediation
was then an irapossibility. The only arbiter to
whora the excited populace could be raade to
listen was the sword. The tirae for compromise
was in 1847, and at that tirae Austria refused
with contempt to hear the counsels of moder
ation. Some of the Governments of Italy, '
indeed, were prepared to accept Lord Minto as
an umpire ; but after the revolution in Paris,
they were powerless to resist the contagion of
that fierce distemper. Again, a few months
later, when Palermo was exposed to such a
terrible borabardraent, it Avas the duty of the
English representative to atterapt to stop that
wholesale massacre and devastation. It was
not, however, by supplying arras to the Sicilians
that this end could be attained ; and there was
an error of this nature coraraitted, which, had
it been the effect of design, would have been
highly censurable. But it was not so. Lord

396 FOREIGN POLICY.
Palraerston strongly and repeatedly asserted that
all his efforts were made in order to bring about
peace and moderate reforms. He could not be
ansAverable for the success of his exertions at
such a tirae ; but that he sincerely raeant Avell
there can be no doubt whatever. His advice
Avas never once given in Italy until it had been
earnestly desired ; and if it was not followed, he
only experienced the coraraon fortune of advisers,
AA'hose opinions are seldora acted upon unless
the_y happen to coincide Avith the sentiraents of
those to whora they are given.
In Spain, however, he did, without being re
quested, state in plain words Avhat his ideas were
on Spanish politics, and foretold Avhat the effect
of the policy pursued in that country would be.
The prophecy has very lately been fulfilled ; the
despatch was iraraediately returned. Unques
tionably it Avas not such an epistle as ought to
be written by the rainister of one independent
Governraent to the rainister of another. As un
questionably, however, in that terapestuous tirae.
Lord Palraerston, who had done so rauch for the
Spanish dynasty and the Spanish Government,
had a right, even unasked, to advise the rulers
of that nation. The despatch in which his
opinions were conveyed, was not intended for
the perusal of the Duke of Sotomayor ; and Mr,

LORD palmerston's POLICY, 397
Buhver, in presenting it, comraitted an error in
judgment ; but if, instead of being offended at
the tone of it, the Spanish Government had
taken the course the English minister recom
mended, the throne of Queen Isabella would
have been rauch raore secure than it now is, and
the public morality of Spain in a much better
condition. Time has generally brought about a
sure revenge for Lord Palraerston ; one after
another his eneraies have fallen. His most
bitter foes, too, have been alraost without excep
tion, like Count Ficquelraont and the Eraperor
of Russia, either secretly or openly, also the
most bitter foes of England.
In Belgiura the effect of the seventy protocols
was now seen. While great erapires were
dashed upon the rocks, this little kingdora tri
umphantly rode out the storm. The Radicals of
1831 had, through the wise Government of King
Leopold, becorae prudent politicians, and now
rejected with disdain all the advances of the
French propagandists. After such a successful
experiraent, it is irapossible to declare that
swords and bayonets are the only efficacious
remedies for curing popular distempers. The
Belgians in 1831, were quite as impracticable as
the Italians and Gerraans of 1848 ; and though
it may be necessary to use military force as a

898 FOREIGN POLICY.
teraporary expedient, it is only by such methods
of government as the King of Belgiura adopted
and steadily adhered to, that revolutions can
perraanently be prevented.
In this terrible year it was not the folly of
the raobs nor the recklessness of popular leaders
that was most remarkable; the most humiliating
exhibition of all was that of royal cowardice.
The great King of the I'rench, the great Em
peror of Austria, and the great King of Prussia,
as well as the little German and Italian Princes,
raade before the world the sarae pusillaniraous
display. The Avhite feather was the fashionable
plurae in courts, and raonarchs kept raonarchs in
countenance. But the raost ridiculous of all the
ridiculous sovereigns of 1848 was certainly Fre
derick Williara the Fourth, King of Prussia,
Even the old King of Bavaria with his wild
mistress did not appear half so foolish as
His Prussian Majesty with his great promises,
his long speeches, his abject flattery, his raean-
ness, and his tiraidity. He shouted as loudly for
Gerraan unity as the most rabid radical at Frank
fort, He cringed to the populace. He cringed to
the students. He would do anything, say any
thing. He forgot all his obligations to Russia and
Austria ; he atterapted to rob the King of Den
raark of a portion of his territories with as little

PRUSSIA AND DENMARK. 399
compunction as any liberal felt who wished to
dismember the House of Hapsburg and Lorraine.
When such Avas the morality of Kings, how could
they expect the ignorant and excited multitude
to have better principles than theraselves? To
enter into an arithmetical calculation of the
criraes perpetrated respectively by the people
and by Kings, and to set one against the other,
would be a dangerous and questionable pro
ceeding. The balance might, however, be found
in some degree even. The evil was certainly
not, as such writers as Count Ficquelmont incul
cate, all on one side.
The conduct of the King of Prussia to Den
mark was much less excusable than the con- 1
duct of the King of Sardinia to Austria., The'
invasion of Schleswig was less defensible than ;
the invasion of Lombardy ; for the hatred of
the Lombards to the Austrian was intense ; and
notwithstanding all that has been said to the
contrary, they were treated with great brutality;
while the King of Denmark had given his
subjects in SchlesAvig, as in other parts of his
dominions, a constitution, and his Government
had been peculiarly mild and tolerant. In Eng
land the King of Prussia had no defenders ; nor
in any part of Europe except among the violent
partisans of German unity in Frankfort. The

400 FOREIGN POLICY.
family ties Avhich are now supposed to be so
strong betAveen the courts of St. Petersburg and
Berlin as to prevent the House of Hohenzol-
lern frora striking a single blow in defence of
the independence of Europe, were not strong
enough to prevent the two Courts frora taking
decidedly opposite sides on the coraparatively
uniraportant question of the Duchies of SchlesAvig
and Holstein. Prussia raay be the tool of Russia;
but the Emperor Nicholas has shoAvn that he at
least Avill never be the tool of his German brother-
in-law. When German interests are subserAdent
to his own purposes, the Autocrat respects them;
but as soon as they corae into antagonisra with
his policy they are conteraptuously set aside.
The Russian fleet, coramanded by the Grand
Duke Constantine, was off the coast of Denraark
Avhile the Prussian array was in Jutland, and
was quite ready, had the necessity arisen, to act
offensively against the forces of the Emperor's
good brother and faithful ally.
Much learning has been displayed in discussing
the rights of the Duchies of SchlesAvig and Hol
stein. The intricacies of the historical parts of
this question resemble the long diplomatic con
troversy Avliich began Avith the Prussian invasion,
and was not finally concluded when Lord Pal
raerston left the Foreign Office. The arrange
ment made Avhen hostilities were first suspended

AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY. 401
between Denmark and Prussia, shoAved how
commanding was the position of the English
statesman. Wherever line-of-battle ships might
float, the influence of England could not but
prevail, and the weight of Russia becorae com
paratively light. In the contest that was going
on in the plains of Hungary, the relative power
of England and Russia was entirely changed.
There Russia was strong, and England weak ;
and because Russia was strong and England
weak, the constitutional liberties of Hungary
were destroyed, and with them the political
independence of Austria. Lord Palraerston saw
well the nature and the consequences of the
struggle frora the beginning. Had sorae of those
exiled Hungarians, Avho have since blaraed hira
for not raore resolutely becoraing the charapion
of their nation, understood the coraprehensive
bearings of the question as Avell as he did, the
result raight have been very different. They
unhappily acted as though they were deterrained
to give Russia the occasion to interfere, instead
of confining themselves to the siraple assertion
of their rights. They desired to raake the
struggle not merely a Hungarian, but a universal
conflict in which all the oppressed nations of the
earth might at once find a simultaneous deliver
ance ; and like all such great abstract schemes,
D D

402 FOREIGN POLICY.
formed in opposition to circumstances, their
heroic endeavours ended in a glorious but lament
able failure. Polish generals fought for Poland
in Hungary ; their aim was to prevent Hungary
from ever again becoming united with Austria ;
Avith this object were the resolutions ofthe 14th
of April, 1849, passed by the Hungarian Cham
bers. They raet at the tirae with the approba
tion of Bera and Derabiuski ; and all politicians
who look on the greatness of the conception, and
not to the possibility of its execution, have praised
the Hungarian patriots for thus carrying raatters
to an extremity.
Very different, however, raust be the opinion
of the calm and impartial observer. He raay at
once adrait that he cannot see his way to the
realisation of such plans, and confess that they
are infinitely beyond his capafcity. Such was the
opinion of Lord Palraerston ; such Avas the opin
ion of Lord Aberdeen. These resolutions Avere a
serious error ; they afforded Russia a justification
for raarching her troops into Hungary, and they
also effectually hindered the English minister
frora undertaking any raediation at that tirae with
any prospect of success. To insult the exile who
has sought an asylum in England would be most
ungenerous ; but the truth must be told : the
great Hungarian chief Avho Avas the principal

AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY. 403
author of these resolutions, can see plainly the
mistakes of every one else, but is quite blind to
his own. His standing accusation against Lord
Palmerston is, that the Foreign Secretary did
not feel himself justified in receiving an Hunga
rian ambassador, and of thus provoking a rup
ture with Austria and Russia. But, had M.
Kossuth intended to place it entirely out of Lord
Palmerston's power to render any assistance to
the constitutional cause of Hungary, these reso
lutions were quite sufficient for that purpose.
When the cause ceased to be constitutional, the
Russian sword could be the only arbitrator.
Count Nesselrode's manifesto, by Avhich the
governments of Europe Avere informed that the
Emperor Nicholas had determined to support by
force of arms the House of Hapsburg, followed
close on the publication of M. Kossuth's resolu
tions. It cannot be denied that Count Nessel
rode had only too rauch reason for stating that
the plans of the leaders of the insurrection had
becorae greater with the success of their arras ;
that they had exhibited the raost hostile inten
tions against Russia; that her Polish provinces
were threatened ; and that under the circura
stances, and when directly appealed to by Austria,
she could not remain inactive.
This despatch of Count Nesselrode was singu-
D D 2

404 FOREIGN POLICY.
larly raoderate in its tone ; and however much
Lord Palmerston might regret the Russian inter
vention, he could not have prevented it. M.
Kossuth has indeed declared, that he asked
neither for the money of England nor for the
blood of England ; that all he required was one
little word, and that this Avord Lord Palmerston
refused to speak. This is easily said. But that
"little Avord," so innocent in appearance, inusthave
raeant war, or it could have meant nothing. To
suppose that Austria, when backed by the arms
of Russia, Avould yield to the raere moral force of
England is absurd. The Hungarian struggle
was, indeed, watched with great interest in this
country ; the good Avishes of the people Avere
strongly in favour of the insurgents ; and it is
impossible not to respect the reasons for that
generous syrapathy. There is much in coraraon
between the national character of the Hungarian
and the Englishraan ; and no raan Avith a heart
in his breast could be indifferent while such a
contest Avas in progress. But nevertheless, Eng
land could no raore have gone to war in 1849
for Hungary, than she could have gone to war
in 1829 for Turkey. Those avHo blarae Lord
Palraerston in the one case, are just as unreason
able as those Avho blame Lord Aberdeen in the
other. The cloud which M, Kossuth sees hang-

AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY, 405
ing over Westminster Hall because of the answer
Avhich Lord Palraerston returned to his eraissary,
is a cloud which has settled down on his own
understanding, and prevented hira from making
any allowance for the circurastances in Avliich
the English Secretary of State was placed, and
for the great responsibilities of his position.
The first duty of an English rainister is to
England, He cannot be a cosraopolitan ; he
must be a patriot. There is a tirae for all things
and for all men. The time, though near, had 1
not yet corae for England to raeet Russia in open ii
conflict. The lists had not yet been opened ; the
place for the deadly grapple had not yet been
chosen ; the gauntlet had not yet been cast at
her feet. As long as Russia avoided any direct
hostilities against England, and faithfully adhered
to treaties, however injurious sorae of these trea
ties might be to the interests of Europe, it was
not for the English Governraent to seek an occa
sion for a quarrel. Public opinion in England
would not have permitted it ; the sentiraents of
all civilised Europe would not have perraitted
it ; and had England once directly interfered in
the conflict between Hungary and Austria, she
must have been prepared to accept all the pos
sible results of that intervention.
Lord Palmerston did not believe that there
DO 3

406 FOREIGN POLICY.
was then any chance of seeing a Hungary inde
pendent of Austria, or a Poland independent of
the Three Powers. But nothing less than this.
after the resolutions of the 14th of April, wf
have satisfied Bem and Derabinski, and M,
suth. Until coraplete victory had crowned
efforts of one side or the other, both the co.
tending parties would have refused the terms
Lord Palmerston raight have officially proposed.
They would both have laughed in his face ; and
he raight justly then have been blaraed for that
officious interraeddling which has too frequently
been laid to his charge.
But it is not true that he watched the contest
with stolid indifference. In priA'ately repre
senting to Austria the dangers she incurred by
calling in Russian assistance, and a,dvising her
in the raost friendly raanner, to agree to any
coraproraise with her disaffected subjects, rather
than place the iraperial crown in the power of
her insidious northern ally, he did all that he
fairly could do until the conflict was decided,
Austria, indeed, raadly rejected his advice ;
though, had Lord Aberdeen been in office, he
would raost unquestionably, with the A\"elfare
of Austria sincerely at heart, have given her the
same counsel.
The success of the Russian troops, and the

AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY, 407
conduct of one of the Hungarian generals, soon
rendered the termination of the war and the
subjugation of Hungary inevitable. Then Lord
Palmerston hoped that Austria would not be
blind to her own interests, and that she would,
by accepting his offer of raediation, give him
the opportunity of strengthening her independ
ence, and of releasing her frora the shackles of i
Russia. In vain, however, were all atterapts
made to awaken the Austrian Governraent to a
true sense of its position. Prince SchAvarzen-
berg, a raan of violent passions, and furious in
his prejudices against England, could see nothing
but his own wretched antipathies. Lord Pal
merston raade a final effort, in a despatch of the
28th of August, 1849, to induce the House of
Hapsburg to make " a generous use " of the
victory which another Power had gained for it,
to respect " the ancient constitutional rights of
Hungary," and to provide for the "future
strength of the Austrian Erapire," Prince
Schwarzenberg would not listen to such repre
sentations. He thought fit to send, in reply, a
foolish and insulting despatch, in which he
reminded the English minister of " unhappy
Ireland," and of other dominions of the British
Crown, in which he supposed the authority of
this empire vvas reduced to the same miserable
D D 4

408 FOREIGN POLICY,
condition as that over which he presided. No
thing could be raore unbecoraing than such a
reply to such a coraraunication. No words can
describe as it deserves, the puerile conduct of
the Austrian rainister, who, at a tirae Avhen the
Erapire had only been saved by the direct
interposition of another Power, could turn round
upon England, and in ansAver to sorae good ad
vice, display his impotence and his arrogance,
his poverty and his pride.
It was not long before the teraporary cessation
of the existence of Austria as an independent
political power began to be felt throughout
Europe. At the very tirae Avhen Lord Pal
raerston was coraposing that warning despatch
of the 28th of August, which was so ungraciously
received at Vienna, Sir Stratford Canning Avas
Avriting frora Constantinople, that the Austrian
Minister had deraanded the persons of all the
refugees who, after their defeat, had fled across
the Turkish frontier. The EngHsh arabassador
iramediately counselled resistance, and assured
the Sultan of the support of his Governraent.
He justly observed that the neutrality of Turkey
had been rauch raore violated during the Hun
garian contest by the invasion of the Principa
lities and the passage of the Russian troops from
the Principalities into Transylvania than by the

DEMAND OF REFUGEES. 409
sympathies of the Porte for the Hungarians. The
Emperor Nicholas had acted as though these
two provinces really belonged to his OAvn Erapire,
and had not the slightest connection withj
Turkey. And now he had resolved, with
Austria at his feet, to shoAv to the world that
the Sultan Abdul Medjid Avas indeed his slave.
Imperious at all tiraes, the tone of the Czar's
agents was now still more iraperious. Though
the first demand Avas made by Austria, it AA'as
evident that Russia Avas the real actor in the
drama. Austria Avas never thought of at all ; i
she was only obeying the coraraands of her
raaster. An autograph letter from Nicholas
and some strong declarations from his ambassador
succeeded to the Austrian application. Russia ,
demanded the Poles ; her vassal, the Hungarians ;
but the spirit of both demands was the sarae.
The Turkish ministers were alarraed ; but
under the influence of Sir Stratford Canning
they persisted in their refusal. Then was seen
the real value of the Treaty of the 13th of July,
1841. Then was seen whether Russia had lost \
or gained in the long diplomatic struggle from 1
the treaties of Adrianople and Unkiar Skelessi.
She found herself powerless ; she found the
British Ambassador the directing spirit of the
Divan ; she found that even in the raoment of

410 FOREIGN POLICY.
her success in Hungary and with Austria in her
power, the Porte ventured to look her steadily
in the face, and bid her defiance. All the
manoeuvres of the Emperor, all the dexterity of
his diplomacy, all his military occupations, all
his raoderation in 1839, and his careful watching
of events, had ended in securing the triuraph of
the English Minister. He saAv that in tAventy
years he had not advanced a step towards
Constantinople. He saw that comparing 1829
with 1849, he had clearly lost ground. This he
might have suspected before, but now it was
evident to the whole world. FoLjthe first time
since the days of Peter the Great, the star of the
House of Romanoff Avas receding in the East.
Judging by the experience of 1839 and 1849,
was it so very certain that the throne of the
Constantines would become the inheritance of
the successors of Nicholas ? Was it not England
who now gained in every Eastern crisis ? Tliese
forebodings crossed the raind of the Eraperor;
and frora the raoraent Avhen he was obliged to
content hiraself with seeing the refugees sent
into the interior of Turkey, and placed under
close surveillance, instead of being surren
dered to the tender mercies of the iraperial
court-raartials, his resolution to retrieve his_ po
sition in the East by some bold diplomatic

SIR STRATFORD CANNINg'S DIPLOMACY. 411
stroke, such as the mission of Prince Menschikoff,
was-taken. The affair of the Holy Places, by
which France, encouraged by the exaraple of
England, attempted, though in a more question
able manner, to gain for herself an influence in
the East in decided opposition to Russia, only
confirmed hira still more strongly in this deter
mination. There were, however, some great obstacles to
be overcome before the decision could be acted
upon with any chance of success. Sir Stratford
Canning was raised to the peerage for his great
services in the diplomatic war. Public opinion
in England was strongly in favour of the stand
which the Porte had made against the united
power of Russia and Austria. All parties had
concurred in approving the policy of the Govern
ment ; as in 1840, so at this time, the EngHsh
people on this great question had rallied round
the ministry. Lord Palmerston, too, was still
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The
promptitude with which this Minister had,
without any communication with Russia, sent
the fleet to Besika Bay, shoAved what might be
expected from him in future. The Emperor
Nicholas weU remembered what the same states
man had done in the past. The pale shade of
Mehemet AH rose before the haughty Eraperor,

412 FOREIGN POLICY.
and pointed to the Minister in the Foreign
Office of England. In both instances. Lord
Palraerston had acted, according to his OAvn
significant language, " like a raan who raeant to
do what he professed."
It would have been well had not the Minister
soon afforded his political opponents in England
and the Eraperor of Russia an opportunity for
working his overthrow. Had the fleet, on its
return frora the Turkish coast, quietly an
chored in sorae luxurious haven, satisfied with
its achievements in Besika Bay, and betAveen the
outer and inner castles of the Dardanelles, Lord
Palraerston raight have rested safely on the lau
rels he had won ; but rejoicing in one victory
over Russia, he had resolved to have another
triuraph. He had deraonstrated that he was raore
than a raatch for the Czar in Turkey ; he now
made up his mind to try a fall with hira in Greece.
The Governraent of King Otho, trusting in
the protection of the Eraperor Nicholas, had
presumed to treat with the most contemptuous
indifference the reraonstrances of the British
Minister. His Hellenic Majesty had never
forgotten the advice which England gave hira
when he thought of freeing hiraself frora his
constitutional engageraents. The plain repre
sentations Avhich both Lord Aberdeen and Lord

STATE OF GREECE. 413
Palmerston made to hira rankled in his heart,
and under the skilful diplomatic surgery
of Russia, festered into a positive hatred to
England and everything English. The sys
tem of brigandage, the curse of the Turkish
rule, continued even under the rule of Kinsr
Otho. The most barbarous tortures were in
flicted, the laws violated, the judges corrupted,
and outrages of every kind committed with the
connivance, sanction, and encouragement of the
Court of Athens. Though the Greek subjects
of King Otho were treated with great cruelty,
and though the condition of his little king
dom was most disgraceful, the lonians and
Maltese, and all who had any right to be con
sidered subjects of the British Crown, were
peculiarly the marks for insult and oppression.
They were whipped and thumb- screwed ; they
Avere robbed and pillaged ; the unarmed boats'
crew of a British ship of Avar was beaten by
the Greek soldiers, and taken into custody.
Mr. Finlay, a gentleraan of Scottish origin,
could get no payraent for some land, of which
the king had taken possession to build a pa
lace upon and lay out a garden. M. Pacifico,
a Portuguese Jew, had his house broken into,
and his furniture destroyed by a mob in open
day, and Avithin a short distance of the guard-

414 FOREIGN POLICY.
house. For all these raultiplied and raanifold
injuries redress Avas deraanded; for none of
thera could any reparation, or even any apology,
be obtained. Yet all these raen were British
subjects ; and all of thera, however hurable their
condition, had therefore clairas on the British
flag. On the 26th of Deceraber, 1849, the English
Minister at Athens informed the Greek Govern
ment that it would act unwisely if, counting on
the forbearance of England, it neglected to
satisfy the demands which had been raade. The
threat was no unraeaning one, as King Otho and
his little Court soon learnt to their surprise and
di.sraay. The English squadron appeared off
the coast. Twenty-four hours were specified as
the tirae in which, if no negotiation was entered
into for the purpose of settling the clairas, a
forraal deraand would be raade. No satisfactory
answer was given ; a forraal deraand was raade
by Mr. Wyse ; and other tAventy-four hours
were allotted as the period for corapliance.
The Greek Minister, strong in the support of
France and Russia, refused to yield, and appealed
to these two guaranteeing PoAvers of the ncAV
Kingdora. King Otho's Government was in
forraed that none of their vessels would be
allowed to leave the Pirteus. The stearaer Otho

RUSSLA DEFIED IN GREECE. 415
ventured out, and was soon in the power of
the English adrairal ; ^ " reprisals " were now
made against the hurable navy of his classic
Majesty. There was of course no resisting the
huge line-of-battle ships which, after protecting
Turkey, now threatened Greece. King Otho
and his Ministers protested against such violence,
and confessed their weakness. An embargo was
next laid on the mercantile marine ; so stern
and unyielding had now become the patient
English Minister, and so boldly was the influence
of Russia defied. The French Government hav
ing offered its good offices, they were accepted
by Lord Palmerston, though he carefully guarded
himself from surrendering in any degree the
principle of the clairas. Baron Gros went to
Athens for the purpose of amicably arranging
the business ; but M. Pacifico's demands were
a sad stumbling-block in the way of a satisfactory
settlement. A misunderstanding occurred be
tween the British and French diplomatists ;
Baron Gros declared his mission at an end ;
force was again resorted to ; and unfortunately,
while in London an equitable convention was
being concluded between Lord Palraerston and
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the Governraent at Athens
was compelled to yield at discretion to Mr. Wyse
and the British fleet. A serious difference be-

416 FOREIGN POLICY.
tween France and England Avas the consequence
of this raistake, and the French Arabassador
left London for Paris.
Nor Avas this the only evil attending this
naval deraonstration against Greece. A powerful
political party in England, composed of many
different sections, highly disapproved of the
manner in which this affair had been conducted.
The Emperor Nicholas thought that now the tirae
Avas corae when Lord Palraerston could be driven
frora office, and a forraidable despatch Avas ful
minated frora St. Petersburg at the head of the
EngHsh Foreign Secretary. All his political
adversaries corabined against hira, and the House
of Lords passed resolutions by which his policy
in general, and his conduct to Greece in par
ticular, Avas eraphatically censured. A supporter
of the Ministry moved counter resolutions in the
House of Coramons, and the finest debate on
foreign policy Avhich has ever been witnessed
began on the 24th of June 1850, and was bril
liantly raaintained for four nights by all the
ablest speakers and most influential politicians of
that great assembly.
Lord Palmerston, on the second evening of
the discussion, in a speech Avhich excited the
Avonder of all who listened to him, and Avhich
Avas as much adraired by his opponents as by his

LORD palmerston's DEFENCE. 417
friends, proceeded to vindicate the policy' that
had been so elaborately arraigned and so vehe
mently condemned. The shades of evening
gathered round him as he continued to address
the House, and before he had concluded, the
dawn of morning shone through the windoAVS on
a still attentive audience. Yet so masterly had
been the effort, so clear the exposition, so inter
esting the narrative, and so dignified and mo
derate the tone, that probably not one listener
felt the least sensation of weariness. Nor was
this the only marvel. The minister grew warmer
and raore aniraated as period after period flowed
from his lips, and appeared to deliver his lofty
peroration, in which he boldly challenged the
verdict of the Coraraons, with as much freshness
and strength as when he first comraenced to
speak. All who looked upon the statesraan that
night, and observed his manly bearing, his digni
fied courage, his earnestness, and the consummate
ability with which he handled all the subjects he
touched, all who remembered the great negotia
tions with which for so many years his name
had been associated, and who saw Avliat youthful
fire was yet burning brightly under the grey
crust of age, could not but feel that high emotion
to which Sir Robert Peel afterwards gave utter
ance, and acknoAvledge that whether the cause
EE

418 FOREIGN POLICY.
the orator so ably defended Avas right or WTong,
he Avas in hiraself one of the raost perfect repre
sentatives of the English character that has ever
lived upon this earth, and a just source of pride
to the country Avhose interests and whose honour
he had so long, so faithfully, and so patriotically
upheld in every part of the Avorld.
On the next evening of the debate, a great
speech, of which the highest praise that can be
given to it is that it was a Avorthy reply to that
of Lord Palraerston, was delivered by Mr. Glad
stone. There were raany very excellent ad
dresses raade ; but these two speeches stand out
from the rest as masterpieces of very different
kinds, and embodying the sentiments of tAvo
A'ery different statesmen.
On the Greek question public opinion is yet
divided. The weakness of Greece has pleaded
strongly in her favour Avith some poHticians,
A^'ho thought, and justly thought, that the ne
cessity for undertaking offensive measures
against such a humble State ought to haA^e been
obvious to all mankind, that every effort should
have been made to effect a pacific settlement,
and that full Avarning should have been given,
not to Greece alone, but to France and Russia
as protecting PoAvers, before the strong arm of
England had been raised even in a just cause

LORD palmerston's DEFENCE. 419
against such a puny raeraber of the great com
raonwealth of nations. There was no glory to
be gained in coercing Greece ; and if Russian
influences were to be corabated, the place for in
timidation was not Athens but St. Petersburg.
British subjects are unquestionably entitled to
protection when residing in foreign lands ; and
if that protection cannot be afforded them by the
legal tribunals of the country, Avith all due re
spect to the House of Lords, they have then a
good right to look for it at the hands of their
Government. But before their claims are en
dorsed by the Foreign Secretary, he ought to be
sure that they are not exaggerated, and that
they are in every respect honest. It is not
enough to insist that the offending Power should
disprove the accusations of an alien ; it is the
duty of the inj ured person to prove to the satis
faction of his Government, before caUing upon it
for assistance, that his deraands are strictly just.
If this reasoning be sound, and the principle
correct, it is irapossible to approve in every re
spect ofthe manner in which M. Pacifico's clairas
were adopted and enforced. In this demonstra
tion against Greece, and in the raediation of
France, there Avere certainly many errors com
raitted ; but it is not clear that Lord Palmerston
Avas to blarae. The best scheraes are Hable to
E E a

420 FOREIGN POLICY.
miscarriage ; the best diplomatic agents sorae
tiraes raake mistakes ; and Lord Palraerston Avas
not the raan to extricate hiraself frora an era-
barrassing position by accusing his subordinates.
Though it raust be adraitted that there were
blunders and indiscretions in this interference,
it may be questioned Avhether it was fair to
single Lord Palmerston out, and while driving
hira from office, to brand his Avhole public
career. This Avas the design of Sir Jaraes Gra
hara's veheraent invective ; and there was much
in it that Avas painfully invidious and unneces
sarily acrimonious. It is a relief to turn from
.that speech to Mr. Gladstone's, in which there
Avas nothing said but what a high-minded poli
tical opponent raight justly express.
The doctrine of Roman citizenship, though
extreraely flattering to national pride, certainly
cannot be applied in the present state of the
world. In the days of Roraan glory there was
but one state, one empire, one people, one law ;
but in the raultiforra and coraplex relations of
modern Europe, neither Oliver CromAvell nor
any statesman can free hiraself frora those in
ternational regulations which, whatever sorae
theorists raay imagine, are founded on the accu
mulated experience of ages, and are estabhshed
especiaUy for the defence of the weak against

CIVIS ROMANUS SUM. 421
the dictatorship of the strong. Yet this doc
trine of Roman citizenship would, on the one
extrerae, as the doctrine of the Peace Society on
the other, come to the sarae conclusion, and end
in overthrowing all the barriers of international
law, and in handing mankind over to the mercy
of the most powerful and the most unscru
pulous of tyrants. But the civis Romanus
sum, as it is introduced into Cicero's magnifi
cent oration, was raost properly brought for-
Avard. The tortured Roraan is raade to appeal
to a law which his oppressors, and even the
people of the provinces acknowledged; and
Cicero, who, like Burke, was as great a raoralist
as a politician, orator, and philosopher, acted
quite rightly in putting it in front of his
accusation against a Roraan governor. Burke,
too, might, for the sarae reason, justly assert
the same principle in his denunciations of Has
tings ; for he was only insisting that the morals
and the laws of England should also shield the
natives of India, and that a crime perpetrated
in Hindostan Avas of the same dye, and merited
the same punishraent, as a crime perpetrated in
the United Kingdom. But to assert this civis
Romanus sum in other countries, and against
the jurisdiction of foreign Governments, is to
misapprehend the spirit in Avhich the Roraan
E E 3

422 FOREIGN POLICY.
orator used the exclamation. And to represent
Lord Palmerston as maintaining, in his quota
tion of the same words, that his countrymen,
when abroad, Avere above the laws of other
nations, and that they did not recognise the
legal authorities of the countries in which they
found theraselves, is, perhaps, equally to mis
apprehend the meaning of the English states
man. He could only intend saying, that if
Englishmen could not obtain justice frora Go
vernraents abroad, they should have, in their
endeavours to seek it, the raoral, and, if neces
sary, the raaterial support of their Governraent
at home. In the principle, as thus understood,
both the Lords and Coraraons of England, as
Avell as the great body of the people in every
rank and condition, cannot but heartily agree ;
for to deny it would be to adrait that their
countrymen in all lands raight be considered
passive victiras of oppression and extortion,
Avherever there Avas an arbitrary king, a cruel
minister, a corrupt tribunal, or an ignorant po
pulace. Mr. Gladstone and Lord Palmerston,
after all, meant the same thing, however rauch
their opinions raight seera opposed.
There was indeed one part of Mr. Glad
stone's speech which, admiring it as every one
must do as a whole, was quite erroneous, hie

MR, GLADSTONE, 423
drew a distinction between the intervention of
Mr. Canning and Lord Palraerston ; and affirraed
that the earlier statesman had been successful in
his interference in Portugal and in South Arae
rica, while the Foreign Secretary of the Whigs
had been in alnaost every instance unsuccessful
and inexcusable in his raeddling with the affairs
of other countries, Mr. Gladstone even selected
for especial panegyric Mr, Canning's extraor
dinary sentence about " calling the New World
into existence to redress the balance of the
Old," and considered such intervention as a per
fect raodel of wisdom and success. But in fact,
Mr, Canning's South American republics Avere
not at all remarkable as successful political cre
ations ; and the British troops had scarcely been
Avithdrawn from Portugal, when the constitution
which he virtually, though not directly, at
tempted to save, was subverted. It seems then
alraost irapossible to believe that if Mr, Can
ning's intervention in Portugal and South Arae
rica was quite right. Lord Palraerston's inter
vention in Portugal and Belgium, where there
are established constitutions entirely frora his
exertions, Avas quite Avrong,
Lord Palmerston was blaraed for perilling our
relations Avith the great monarchical Powers by
his constitutional propagandisra, Mr, Glad-
E E 4

424 FOREIGN POLICY.
stone argued, Avith rauch force and eloquence,
that if England set about diffusing her political
opinions and institutions, other States would take
the sarae course ; that the narae of each Govern
raent Avould be the syrabol of a party, and the
consequence ensue that a system would be esta
blished destructive to the peace and happiness
of the Avorld, Abstractedly, nothing can be
sounder than this arguraent; but the application
of it is scarcely just. If there is one unques
tionable truth to be evolved frora the suraraary
of the foreign policy since 1815, it is this: that
it Avas not England who first set about spread
ing her opinions and forra of Governraent
throughout Europe; that she was forced at
last to do so in self-defence ; and that her
first quarrel Avith the allied Governraents
occurred in the time of Lord Castlereagh hira
self, Avhen he refused to accede to the protocol
of Trappau, which he thought contained prin
ciples most extensive in their application, and
hostile to the independence of all the weaker
States. It was because the Holy Alliance sys
tematically propagated despotisms, that England,
as a simply defensive policy, Avas obliged to
support a more generous systera. Mr. Canning
Avas as much assailed for his Hberal policy by
France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, as ever

COUNT nesselrode's DESPATCH, 425
Lord Palmerston has been. Count Ficquelmont
is surely on this subject a most unexceptionable
witness. He consistently makes no distinction
between the policy of Mr, Canning, Lord Aber
deen, and Lord Palmerston ; he considers the
principles, the objects, and the spirit of these
three statesmen as identical ; and justly dates
this liberal policy from the last years of Lord
Castlereagh's administration of Foreign Affairs,
The conclusion of Count Nesselrode's despatch
of the 19th of February, on which many speakers
laid so much stress, was really intended by the
Eraperor Nicholas to produce in the rainds of
Lord Palraerston's political opponents that in
dignation Avhich they so keenly expressed. This
finished specimen of diplomatic composition was
not written for the Secretary of State, nor for his
government. It Avas drawn up for the Opposition
in Parliaraent, and it admirably served its pur
pose. While Count Nesselrode Avas remon
strating against the blockade of Greece, he was
thinking about the Turkish Erapire, Sir Stratford
Canning's influence at Constantinople, and the
naval deraonstration in Besika Bay, He there
fore placed, as the head and front of Lord Pal
merston's offences, the entrance of the ships into
the outer portion of the Dardanelles, and con
cluded with a threatening sentence about Eng-

426 FOREIGN POLICY,
land abusing the advantages of her position,
pursuing an isolated policy, and freeing herself
from her engagements to the other Cabinets.
All these strong reproaches might justly be
throAvn back upon their author and the great
military Governments of Europe. The three
allied Powers, and not England, had abused the
advantages of their position and set themselves
free frora their engageraents to her, and she Avas
corapeUed, as in 1822, to oppose their arbitrary
proceedings. The awakened sense of the injustice of that
continental systera which Lord Palmerston had
so strongly opposed, the courage and ability Avith
which single-handed he had fought in the fields
of diplomacy the battle against Russia, acted on
the minds of many respected Conservatives, and
the raajority by which the judgraent of the
House of Lords Avas reversed in the House of
Coraraons, was not coraposed raerely of party
politicians. It Avas not merely a victory of Whigs
over Tories, The extreme Liberals of the Peace
Society swelled the ranks of the opposition, and
some men who had held high their conservative
principles in all political vicissitudes, but Avho also
had the just national feelings of Englishmen,
positively refused to join in the vote against
Lord Palmerston,

MR, GLADSTONE VISITS NAPLES, 427
After the great issue had been decided, the
session of 1850 Avas rapidly brought to a close,
and the legislators who had been sitting in judg
raent on the foreign policy of tAventy years, dis
persed themselves to the four winds of heaven.
The most intellectual and the most earnest of
Lord Palmerston's opponents went in the autumn
to Italy, and found hiraself at last in Naples.
He was travelling with no political object. Private
reasons alone had taken hira to the Continent.
He was a highly distinguished member of a party
Avhich was considered opposed to all revolutionary
disturbances, and strongly prepossessed in favour
of established governraents. In the last great
debate he had censured Lord Palraerston for his
raeasures in Italy, and had expressed himself
poAverfuUy against the conteraplated separation
of Sicily from Naples. He raight be regarded
as a friend of King Ferdinand, and disposed to
view with a favourable eye the exertions which
this sovereign and his rainisters had made to
preserve the rights of the Neapolitan monarchy.
But Mr, Gladstone beheld scenes which struck
him with horror ; he saw in action such a brutal
tyranny, without aira or purpose except for siraply
increasing huraan misery, that shocked by all he
had witnessed. Conservative and Englishraan as
he was, he felt it a sacred duty to atterapt

428 FOREIGN POLICY,
to Stop the further corainittal of such crimes.
He visited the persecuted patriots in their dun
geons. With his own hands he grasped their
chains, and endeavoured to adrainister consola
tion to those whose heads were boAved down in
despair. On his return to England he corarauni
cated the results of his huraane investiga
tions to Lord Aberdeen, in the hope that
this nobleraan's great private influence might
induce the King of Naples to unlock the fetters
his rainisters had fastened round the limbs of
good men and worthy citizens. Months, how
ever, passed away, and no relaxation of this exe
crable persecution Avas experienced, Mr, Glad
stone then reluctantly sent his Letters to the press,
and solemnly impeached, before the great bar of
public opinion, the official miscreants, who, vio
lating every divine and huraan laAV, and using
the influences of a Governraent for the most
devilish purposes, revelled in the Avretchedness
they inflicted on their felloAV-creatures. These
Letters created a great sensation throughout Eu
rope and the civilised Avorld, The Neapolitan
Ministers found themselves arraigned as criminals.
They were obliged at last to reply to these grave
accusations ; and there were Englishmen not
ashamed to countenance their feeble rejoinder.

MR, Gladstone's letters to lord Aberdeen, 429
and make a shoAv of holding the balance even
between the accuser and the accused ; as though
Mr, Gladstone's simple testiraony was not of raore
weight than the rambling assertions of any hired
apologist for such atrocities. The official reply
to Mr, Gladstone is now forgotten ; his Letters
reraain, and Avill reraain. Before hira he has a
great career; the most accurate observers of
English politics look the raost confidently to his
future ; so great are his abilities, and so high his
character, that there is nothing he raay undertake
Avhich he cannot accomplish, and no public sta
tion he may aspire to, which he cannot worthily
fill ; he may live raany years ; he raay do raany
great things ; he may occupy a great space in
the history of the reign of Queen Victoria ; but
whatever may be the lustre of his achieveraents
as a statesman, his crowning glory must ever be
the tAVO little pamphlets in which he pleaded so
nobly for the manacled Poerio and his suffering
companions. In no person did Mr. Gladstone's denunci
ation of Neapolitan tyranny find more hearty
syrapathy than in Lord Palmerston ; nor did he,
in his high official position, merely praise the
Letters in the House of Coraraons and excite
the cheers of his countrymen. He sent copies of
the work to the different Erabassies abroad, and

430 FOREIGN POLICY.
charged the arabassadors to bring them to the
knowledge ofthe Governments to which they were
accredited, that the world raight see what a hi
deous tyranny was that of King Ferdinand,
Mr, Gladstone's paraphlets produced political
consequences. His appeal to the common sen
tiraents of mankind against a barbarous systera
of injustice and oppression had united poHticians
who adraired Lord Palraerston and politicians who
adraired Lord Aberdeen, in one strong opinion.
It was asked whether the principles of these
statesraen were quite irreconcilable, or Avhether
they could not unite in one poAverful governinent,
for the honour and the Avelfare of England.
The speech which Sir Robert Peel made in
the Greek debate Avas the last he ever uttered ;
it had acquired the sanctity of dying Avords; and
that speech contained a fine eulogium of Lord
Palmerston. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs
had in 1841 raaintained and even increased his
reputation, Avhile his colleagues Avere struggling
Avith difficulties Avhich they had brought upon
themselves by precipitate plans of reform and
colonial raisgovernraent. His unrivaUed defence
of his policy had left a deep irapression on the
public raind. But at a time when no great
questions of foreign policy were being agitated,
and when the Secretary's enemies seemed to have

LORD PALMERSTON VACATES OFFICE. 431
abandoned all hope of overthrowing hira in the
House of Commons, it was suddenly announced,
to the surprise of all Europe, that Lord Pal
merston had retired frora the Whig Ministry,
All raen looked forward to the raeeting of
Parliament in the February of 1852, in order to
learn the reasons for this extraordinary cata
strophe. They were given by Lord John Russell
on the first night of the session; and they have
ever since reraained, as they were thought by
every irapartial person at the tirae they were de
livered, singularly perplexing and unintelligible.
A statesraan AAdth such good intentions and
so much simplicity of character as Lord John
RusseU cannot have a single personal enemy.
But in a Avork embracing the foreign policy of
so many years, a writer might justly be accused
of coA\''ardice if he were to hesitate in giving his
candid opinion of the explanations of the 3rd
of February, 1852, The two speeches are noAV
historical documents ; they cannot be destroyed ;
they cannot be passed over. It must then be de
clared that the reasons Lord John Russell gave
in explanation of the disraissal of Lord Palraer
ston were quite inadequate, and that no suffi
cient justification of that most serious deter
mination has ever yet been made. It was not
shown that the Foreign Secretary did anything

432 FOREIGN POLICY,
more than express a private opinion to the
French Ambassador, to the effect that, at a tirae
when civil Avar A\'as imminent in France, and
when it Avas clear that the power of the Presi
dent and that of the National Assembly could
not exist together, the arbitrary Government of
a Louis Napoleon Avas preferable to the preca
rious adrainistration of a M, Thiers and his
brethren in intrigue. Had this opinion been
wrong, it Avas still only the opinion of the
Foreign Secretary ; and there has ahvays been
a recognised distinction between private conver
sations with an arabassador and public despatches
to a foreign Government, To what a length Mr.
Canning Avent'in declaring his sentiments not
only on affairs abroad, but also on George the
Fourth hiraself, may be seen in the letters of
Marcellus. In later times it Avas the intimate
private friendship of Lord Aberdeen and M.
Guizot which, far more than the public and
forraal acts of Sir Robert Peel's administration
gave reality to the entente cordiale.
Had Lord Palmerston then been wronsr in
his opinion, he only comproraised hiraself;
but there is noAv no doubt Avhatever that
he Avas right. They Avho were once hostile,
but are noAV friendly to the French Eraperor,
may justly say that it Avas only from experience

LORD palmerston's POLICY. 433
that they could judge of the wisdora of the
raeasures . of Louis Napoleon. But Lord Pal
merston was in a different position ; ever since
the December of 1848 he had been in a situ
ation to form a good opinion of the personal
character of the ncAV Emperor, and of his most
influential rainisters. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in
particular, had been in the days of the Republic
Foreign Minister, and afterwards arabassador to
the Court of St. Jaraes's. In approving the
President's strong raeasures in the December of
1851, Lord Palraerston then, if no other states
raan did, knew well what he was doing. He
was not treading on unknown ground. The
light of the past guided him in the present, and
gave hira confidence in the future. That the
English Minister, with his great European repu
tation, with his boundless knowledge of foreign
affairs, and his sixteen years' experience in the
adrainistration of the Foreign Office, may have
gradually becorae dictatorial in his deportraent,
and not inclined to listen much to the advice of
his colleagues, raay also be true. But even for
this there is sorae excuse. He Avas not placed
in his official position to fill up a temporary
vacancy, or to register the acts of others. A
minister of his standing and character must be
taken on his own terms ; the only point to be
F F

434 FOREIGN POLICY.
settled is, Avhether the Foreign Minister of this
great erapire is to be a statesraan or a clerk.
This much it Avas necessary to say on as pain
ful a quarrel as ever occurred betAveen two Minis
ters, who are both deservedly esteemed. It was
a pitiful termination to a close friendship which
appeared until 1851 to grow stronger in the
wear and tear of public life. The difference Avas
only temporary ; Lord John Russell and Lord
Palraerston are now again in the same Cabinet,
and every Englishraan with any patriotic feeling
in his bosora raust wish that these two associates
in so raany dangers and so much glory may
continue united until the last moraents of their
political career. It is only England herself Avho
raust suffer in the unnatural contentions of her
worthiest sons.
We are now engaged in a great war which
requires all the patriotism and ability the
country can coraraand, England cannot do
without Lord Palraerston nor Lord John
Russell ; neither can she do without Lord Aber
deen. The atterapts which have been raade to
soAv dissensions, and to represent Lord John
Russell and Lord Palmerston as separated from
Mr. Gladstone and Lord Aberdeen, are wicked,
ignorant, and foolish. Those who have pro
pagated such reports know little of Lord Pal-

COALITION. 435
merston ; he is incapable of such conduct ; he has
never intrigued against the head of any Govern
ment of which he has been a raember. He was
faithful to Mr. Canning ; he was faithful to the
successive Whig Prime Ministers ; and he has
been faithful to Lord Aberdeen.
Before Lord Aberdeen's Adrainistration was
constructed, it Avas denounced as a Coalition;
and, in the House of Coraraons, a declaration
was made with much emphasis, that there Avas
something in the very nature of such a Govern
ment displeasing to the English people. Ever
since then, the organs of the Opposition, taking
the cue from their Leader, have continued re
peating, with parrot-like fidelity, this profound
aphorism. Like raost of the generalities which
proceed frora the same source, it is altogether
erroneous. There have been other Coalitions
besides that of Fox and North ; there have
been great Coalitions extremely popular ; the
most glorious War Ministries in English history
have been Coalitions. It was the Coalition be
tAveen the Tories Godolphin and Marlborough on
the one part, and the Whigs Sunderland and
Somers on the other, which made Louis the Four
teenth, in his old age, after so many years of
victory, bow his proud head to the dust. It
was the Coalition of Pitt and Newcastle which

436 FOREIGN POLICY.
gave the laAV to the House of Bourbon, and
raised the English nation to the highest pinnacle
of earthly glory. A Coalition seems especially
suited to a tirae of war, when raere party dis
sensions should be forgotten, and the wisest and
most experienced statesraen of all political deno
minations should unite with one heart and one
soul in support of their coraraon country.
Frora this review of the foreign policy,
it is clear that a war with Russia was sooner
or later inevitable. This is a raoral Avhich
every irapartial person cannot fail to draAv ;
and it raay console us araid any teraporary
difficulties, and teach us to bear with pa
tience the heavy burdens we may be called
upon to endure. Since war raust have corae, it
could not haA'e corae under raore favourable cir
curastances. Thirty years of peaceful progress
and of prudent reforra have made the English
people happy, prosperous, and contented. A
long peace, with all its blessings, carries Avith it
sorae evil; as a long war, with all its raisery,
brings with it some good. The evU of this long
peace was that an unhealthy desire for innovation
was being engendered ; men Avere infected with
a morbid, desire to raount up to first principles,
and to pry into the hidden recesses of their con-

CONCLUSION. 437
stitution. The Peace Society was another morbid
syraptora, a raoral raonstrosity, indicative to the
careful diagnosis ofthe state physician that disease
was lurking soraewhere in this great body which
seeraed at the first glance so full of health.
The good to be set off against the evil of this
war is, that all scheraes for radical change raust
be postponed ; that, anxious for the vigorous
prosecution and the final success of the contest,
the most extrerae reforraers are even desirous of
putting aside their darling projects. Tirae is al
lowed for the national raind to operate, and for
the late reforms to harmonise with the older
parts of the constitution. The most determined
of innovators and the raost stubborn of conserva
tives unite in wishing to see the war earnestly
conducted ; they have this one great principle on
which they can agree, one sentiment which
makes them feel that they have a country.
Never were the people in a better teraper than
at this time. Never was there so much to glad
den the heart of a wise statesman. With the
echo of every cannon-shot from the heights of
Sebastopol, the pulse of the nation has beat
stronger and stronger. The people are tho
roughly in earnest; and their earnestness is di
rected to a wise object. They make allowance
for difficulties, they are prepared to encounter

438 'foreign policy.
obstacles ; but they know well that there is no
retreat ; that the way to peace is through Avar ;
that all that is dear to thera as raen and English
raen is embarked in the struggle ; and that they
must either conquer or be conquered. The noble
sight which England now presents deserves the
attention of every man who considers himself a
statesraan. The rainister who cannot appreciate
this lofty spirit, and does not believe it to be of
more account in a long war than all the accu
mulations of Avealth and mechanisra, is unfit to
rule a great erapire ; for he does not understand
his own business, and knows nothing of the
high science of governraent. The people are
raore eager to give than their Ministers to
take. They are resolved not to return the
sword, they have reluctantly drawn, again to
its scabbard, until it shall have dictated a
peace which can be truly called a peace ; a
peace which shall include all the essential ob
jects of the war; and not a peace containing
such iramoral stipulations as those which re
ceived the sanction of the European Congress
of 1814 and 1815 ; not a peace such as is desired
by sorae continental politicians, by whora the
brains and hearts of raen are subjected to a
callous process of diploraatie lixivation, that they
may come out of their laboratory crystallised,

CONCLUSION. 439
like nitre, into a hard and brittle substance, but
which also, like nitre, is explosive.
The Governraent is as sensible as the people
of the magnitude of the struggle in which they
are engaged. No Minister knows it better than
Lord Aberdeen. It was because he was fully
aware of the iraportance of the war, and of the
mighty exigencies Avhich would ensue, that he
felt it his duty to the last moraent to endeavour
to preserve peace. He knew well that a contest
with Russia was not, what sorae absurd theorists
iraagined it, a raere rapid raelodraraatic spectacle,
such as may be witnessed at Astley's and the
Adelphi theatre. Lord Aberdeen is, what his
most inveterate opponent is not, a statesraan,
and a statesman of a high order. The liberal
merabers of the House of Coftiraons raay feel
confident that this Minister, with Lord Palraer
ston as his colleague, is rauch raore likely
to carry on this contest to a worthy issue
than the raan who is the only English po
litician that ever drearaed of apologising for
the partition of Poland. That deed is hated
by the people of this country because it out
raged those moral sentiments which Provi
dence, for Avise purposes, has rooted in their
hearts. It was this English raorality which,
more than the military force of the nation, van-

440 FOREIGN POLICY.
quished Philip the Second and Louis the Four
teenth. It was this English raorality which
struck down in its lofty flight the Iraperial Eagle
of Napoleon. And it is this sarae English
raorality Avhich, hoAvever hurable it raay appear
to those who are neither conservative, national,
nor Christian, has now taken its stand in the
path of the Emperor of Russia, and, more
potent than the bayonets of six hundred thou
sand warriors, will, like a sword of fire grasped
by an unseen but Alraighty hand, prevent hira
frora ever entering Constantinople.

THE END.

a. and G. A. Spottiswoode,
New-Street-Square.