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DIAZ

PRESIDENT PORFIRIO DIAZ

MAKERS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Edited by Basil Williams

DIAZ

BY

DAVID HANNAY

NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
1917

Printed in Great Britain

GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE
The author of this volume has here combined
an appreciation of a man remarkable in his genera
tion with a lively picture of an American republic,
still little known to us in Europe ; thus fulfil
ling two objects of this series. President Diaz's
achievements as a statesman, though important to his
contemporaries, appear to have had only a passing
value. But he is worthy of note by the student of the
nineteenth century, since he brought his country to a
more respectable prominence and to greater prosperity
than it had enjoyed since its original conquest by the
Spaniards ; and he also induced many outside its
borders to take an interest, however mercenary and
uninformed it may have been, in the country he
governed so absolutely and for so long a period. For
his own corner of the world, indeed, he was truly a
maker of the nineteenth century. He is also interest
ing as a type, a particularly favourable type, of the
condottieri who flourish and then vanish so rapidly on
the Central and South American scene. Mexico itself,
though so near a neighbour to the United States, is
still the most mysterious to us of all the American
countries. Perhaps it has never yet outlived the
wonderful tales brought back to Europe of Aztec
cities and civilisation and the exploits of Cortes, the

VI

GENERAL EDITOR'S PREFACE

most chivalrous of all the Spanish adventurers.
Mr. Hannay has kept for us some of the mystery in
his descriptions of the country's wild rolling uplands
and of the mediaeval adventures of his hero and his
hero's adversaries in this land of sudden surprises.
He has also made the people and the land more real
and living to us at a time when they have become
specially interesting in the politics of the world.
BASIL WILLIAMS.
September, 1916.

CONTENTS

General Editor's Preface

PAGE V

I. Introductory ....
II. The Beginning of a Career.
III. The French Intervention
IV. The Rise to the First Rank
V. The Politician
VI. The Fight for the Presidency
VII. The First Term
VIII. An Interim
IX. President for Good
X. The Indian Problem
XI. Anarchy Wells Up
BibliographyChronology Index .

29
53
86
117 144 177
207237265
2903°73°9315

DIAZ

CHAPTER I
I NTRODUCTOR Y
Josi de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz, known to all the
world as President Porfirio Diaz, was born in the city
of Oaxaca, capital of the State of the same name, in
the Republic of Mexico, on, or within a few days
before, the 15th of September, 1830.1 He was
baptised on that day in the cathedral. No Spaniards
nor Spanish-Americans of that time would willingly
have incurred the least risk that their child should die
unregenerated by the water of baptism. It is highly
probable that the future President was born on the
day on which he was baptised, or not more than three
days earlier.
His father, Jose de la Cruz (Joseph of the Cross)
Diaz, is said to have been a pure-blooded Spaniard,
but in the former Spanish colonies everyone in whom
a strain of Indian blood is not too marked to be over
looked ranks as white. When Porfirio had become
1 The letter " x,'' which is now used by the Spaniards only in words of
Greek or Latin origin adopted late in the history of their language, was
formerly employed to represent the sound " sh," which does not exist in
Castilian, but is common in the Indian tongues. The Indian pronunciation
of the President's birthplace would be Oashaca, and of his country Meshico.
But the Spaniards do not like the sound and have in practice replaced it by
the guttural " j," which is a strong " h." They write Oajaca and Mejico.
We keep the spelling we first knew and therefore mispronounce both ways.
D. B

1/

2 DIAZ
the foremost man in Mexico, his flatterers discovered
that Jose de la Cruz descended from one of the con-
quistadores. The President's enemies indeed were
ready to affirm that he was the bastard of a priest.
The first assertion is only an example of a world-wide
folly, and the second may be dismissed as a specimen
of Spanish-American political polemic. In an account
of his " Parents, Childhood and Youth," published
with his consent and aid by Genaro Garcia in 1906,
the President's father is stated to have been a poor
and illiterate man who worked as the " dependiente "
of a firm of traders. The word would be applied to a
porter or workman of that level. He ranked, in fact,
a little above the class of the " peones " or agricultural
labourers, who in colonial times were, and in practice
still are, serfs in Mexico. He was at least personally
free. In 1808 he married Patrona Mori, the daughter
of Mariano Mori, an immigrant, or son of an immigrant,
from Asturias in Old Spain, and of his wife Tecla
Cortes, a pure-blooded Mixteca Indian. The marriage *
was performed at the village of San Sebastian Etla in
Oaxaca. After working for some years in the Sierra
de Ixtlan, Jose took his half-Indian wife to Xochistla-
huaca in the province of Tlaxcala and the bishopric
of Puebla de los Angeles. Here he became a squatter
or homesteader on a piece of virgin soil. In one respect
at least Jose resembled his son. He was a hard worker.
Though he had no capital, and could neither buy
machinery nor hire much help, he contrived to plant
his little holding with sugar-cane, and he added a
small store to his cane-growing. After a few years he
had something saved and something to sell. With
the proceeds of his hard work he returned to his native
province Oaxaca, bought a little piece of ground

INTRODUCTORY 3
which he planted with " maguey," the aloe from which
the native liquor pulque is tapped. To provide an
outlet for the produce of his " magueyera " he opened
a wayside inn, a " meson," at the town of Oaxaca,
and further undertook to act as farrier and veterinary
surgeon. Jose de la Cruz, who is also said to have
been at some time farrier in a cavalry regiment, was
plainly a handy man.
Porfirio, who does not appear ever to have used his
father's " font name " (nombre de pila), was the sixth
child and eldest surviving son of these worthy people.
Another son, Felix, who in later years shared his
fortunes, was born after him. But in 1833 the father
died. No man not a politician or capitalist and usurer
had much chance of making money in Mexico in that
age of anarchy. The death of the laborious father
plunged his family into years of hard struggle with
sheer hunger. Patrona Mori made an effort to keep
the " meson " going, but had to give it up. If it were
not that the Mexican needs little and that the widow
had inherited some small handful of money from her
husband, it would be hard to see how they survived.
By untold miracles of thrift and work, aided by the
kindly heat of the sun, which makes fires rarely
necessary and warm clothes a superfluity in Oaxaca,
Patrona kept her own head and the young heads
dependent on her above water. She had relatives
among the beneficed clergy, then the wealthiest class
in Mexico, but they do not appear to have given her
much help, if any.
By one means or another, at the cost of sacrifices
more or less cruel, Porfirio was able to get some
primary education. He was placed with a carpenter
whose trade he picked up while attending ischool,

4 DIAZ
probably not for long hours nor with exact regularity.
At the age of fifteen he was placed in the local
seminary (Seminario Pontificial). The mother, be
sides wishing, as was natural, to see her son " wag
his pow in a pulpit," knew that it was far easier to
provide for ten men in the Church than for one out of
it. The licentiate Dominguez, his godfather, who
was then a canon of Oaxaca, and who later on was the
bishop, appears to have given Porfirio some aid. But
the lad, who was somewhat restive in the seminary,
had to eke out his allowance by doing odd jobs of
carpentry. During the years of studies in the seminary
he had an interval of military drill. 1846 and 1847
were the years of the war with the United States,
and Oaxaca raised a militia battalion. It was known
by the not very martial name of the " Peor es Nada,"
which may be translated as " nothing would be still
worse." It consisted wholly of boys. At this time
Porfirio had the advantage of attending a course of
lectures on " tactics " and " strategy " given at the
local Institute of Science and Art by Lieutenant-
Colonel Ignacio Uria. In the hope of seeing more
service than was offered to this corps he tramped to
Mexico, but too late to share in the war. On the whole
he showed himself a lad of spirit and resource, as when
he provided himself with a fowling-piece by buying
a rusty gun barrel from a rag and bone shop, fitting to
it the flint and steel of a broken horse pistol, and
mounting it on a butt of his own constructicn. The
historian does not record whether he ever fired his
patchwork weapon, or if so, what happened. As
Porfirio survived to use more scientific weapons, it is
probable that he never put his handiwork to a hard
test. He drilled his fellow - schoolboys, as other

INTRODUCTORY 5
warriors are said to have done, maintained discipline
by rough and ready methods, and used his command so
as to render himself a serious pest. Imprisonment
for a month in the seminary cell was the reward of one
of his achievements. In short, he was as absolute a
nuisance as only a healthy boy ought to be.
In 1849 he had finished his course at the seminary.
What he had learnt was no doubt a trifle, but he had
decided that he was not of the wood of which priests
are made even in Mexico. To the great wrath of his
godfather, the Canon Dominguez, he refused to take
orders. His mother wept and argued in vain.
Porfirio had his way, and the last ten Mexican dollars
of his father's poor hoard were spent in buying law
books for him. He had decided to take to the law.
The intention was so far put into execution that he
attended the lectures of his future chief in war and
politics during many years, the Zapoteca Indian
Benito Juarez, then professor at the Institute of
Oaxaca. He even passed his first examination in
Civil and Canon Law in 1853. But in that year events
occurred which decided that the future of Porfirio
Diaz was to be spent in winning fame, power, and
wealth in the saddle and by the sword. If the story
is not to be a meaningless series of unintelligible inci
dents, we must first understand what was the condi
tion, social and political, of Mexico when his career
began, and this we shall never be able to do if we do not
go back to the antecedents of the Republic, not of
course for the purpose of giving a history of the colonial
period, but in order to comprehend what were the
inherited beliefs and tendencies which inevitably
conditioned the minds and acts of the republicans.
Englishmen and Americans have often been less

6 DIAZ
than just because they have expected what was not
to be hoped for from the Spanish-speaking peoples of
the New World. They have generally begun by
assuming that if the Mexicans have not behaved as
they themselves would have done, the explanation of
the difference is to be sought in the mere vice or folly
of individuals. Vice and folly have abounded in
Spanish America, but when we are judging the conduct
of persons, fair criticism requires that we should allow
for what they have inherited in thought and habit
from the three centuries during which they were
colonies of Spain.
A Spanish colony was everything which an English
colony was not.
The men who founded the English colonies in
America differed in origin and character. But there
were certain points, and those of the most vital order,
on which they were similar. They came from a
country which had for centuries been a true common
wealth, a united nation. They had been accustomed
if not to actual participation in the work of self-
government, at least to the sight of it. They were
equally accustomed to the thought that they had a
share first in the making, and then in the administra
tion of the law. And then they came under a certain
influence of a religious character. Their doctrines,
their dogmas, their ideas and preferences in Church
government were not the things which mattered.
Beliefs and theories might die, or undergo inward
changes in spirit, without affecting the radical unlike-
ness which divided the English from the Spanish
colonist. If we except the few Roman Catholics who
found a refuge in Maryland, the English colonies,
north, middle, and southern, were settled by men

INTRODUCTORY 7
who, whether they came from England or from Scot
land, or were Palatines or French Huguenots, had all
alike crossed the line between the Holy Roman
Catholic and Apostolic Church and the Protestant
world. For them the Reformation in all its manifes
tations had swept away the rising circles of teachers,
rulers, intercessors — the Heavenly Host and the earthly
hierarchy — which hung over the mediasval man and
spread between him and God. Salvation to them was
not to be won by acceptance of an ancient divinely
inspired authority, by obedience to its orders, and
humble reliance on its wisdom, but by each of them
by their own faith and conduct and the will of God
acting directly on them. That the types of character
produced and fostered by this revolt against authority
in the infinitely important sphere of religion were often
unamiable and sometimes eccentric to absurdity, are
propositions nobody need take the trouble to deny.
Es irrt der Mensch so lang er strebt. The essential
truth is that Protestantism tended to foster the
capacity to think and act for yourself on all sides of
life. The men and women who would not throw the
task of saving their souls on an inspired priesthood,
who read a book and drew their own deductions,
would not be the passive flock of a mundane authority
in the business of government.
These colonists, predisposed as they were to develop
and act freely, came to an open field. The thinly
scattered tribes of Indian warriors and hunters whom
they found in front of them could neither assimilate
with them nor resist them effectually. Therefore
they could exercise no influence on the European
intruders on their forests and their hunting grounds.
A further and a most vital difference was that the

8 DIAZ
English colonists came with their wives and children
to form communities, and to till the soil.
When we turn to the Spanish colonies we meet at
once with the exact opposite of every one of these
conditions, moral or material. Spain was not a
commonwealth, a nation. It is only becoming one in
our own time. In the age of the conquest it was
a collection of kingdoms, countships, and lordships
which were held together because the same prince
was the sovereign of each of them. And these various
parts were socially divided into classes of nobles
and non-nobles, town and country, Old Christians and
New Christians, who came from converted (for the
most part forcibly converted) Jews and Moors. The
old Christians were clean in blood, and the new were
unclean— stained by admixture of Jew or Moor.
The reader, who may have heard of the power of the
mediseval Spanish cortes, the vigorous municipalities
and provincial institutions of old Spain, may be
surprised to hear that the people had no practice in
self-government. But it is true. Whatever may
have been the case in the earlier Middle Ages (and a
good deal in the way of restriction would have to be
said on that point), the confusions of the later four
teenth and the whole fifteenth century till the acces
sion of the Catholic sovereigns had disintegrated
cortes and municipalities alike. The Spaniards had
been saved from mere anarchy by the royal authority
alone. The town councils were little more than
ornaments, self-electing, or confined to a few families.
All effective power was in the hands of royal officers.
As for the law, it was an art and mystery confined to
the lawyers, who were the most useful agents of the
King. There was no jury in Spain.

INTRODUCTORY 9
When we turn to the Church as it had developed in
Spain, we see an art and mystery belonging to the
clergy. The laymen, with the exception of a few who
were effectually weeded out by the Inquisition, left
the doctrines and the dogmas to the clergy. For
themselves, they were taught to believe explicitly in
the Church and implicitly in all the Church held to be
true. What the King wills is the law. What the
Church propounds is the truth. These were the two
fundamental principles of Spanish government. When
a Mexican viceroy told his subjects that their duty was
not to think but to obey, he was stating the accepted
orthodox rule. Religion for the Spaniard was in the
main the performance of certain acts and ceremonies,
the participation in certain material means of salva
tion which the priest alone could provide. To suppose
that this double yoke was imposed by force on a
reluctant people would be to misunderstand Spanish
history altogether. The royal authority was accepted
because it was their one protection against anarchy.
The Church was obeyed because it alone by its wonder
working sacraments and its absolutions could save
them from hell fire. Orthodoxy was the honourable
distinction of the old Spaniard of clean blood.
Heterodoxy was the brand of the inferior race, the
unclean class. No submission to the Church was other
than honourable. To dare to think for yourself was
dangerous and shameful.
Now if a people with these ideas and rules of conduct
had come to " the Indies," as the Spaniards always
called their possessions in America, bringing their
wives and children for the purpose of tilling the land,
they would not have brought with them the elements
of a self-governing polity. But they came as soldiers,

10 DIAZ
as adventurers in search of fortunes to be made rapidly
by the sword, and to be taken back to be enjoyed in
Spain. With few exceptions the first comers laid
their bones in the New World after begetting a larger
or a smaller number of children by their female Indian
captives. The Government was so far from encourag
ing real settlement that it put obstacles in the way of
the colonist after the first work of the conquest. It
feared the formation at a distance of strong com
munities, because they might be tempted to consult
their own interests rather than those of the home
Government. The very merchant who wished to go
in order to look after his affairs had to obtain a permit,
which was given him for a time, and only on the pro
duction of a written certificate from his wife that she
consented to his absence. He was not to be allowed
to take her lest he should be tempted to remain. The
aim of the State was to found a dominion wherein
officials and soldiers should direct the labour of a native
population so as to produce a great revenue for the
Crown. That Spaniards continued to go is true.
Sometimes the King was tempted to allow emigration
to develop some mining industry and augment the
royal share of the bullion. Sometimes he was weak.
At all times his officials were corrupt and could be
bribed. Men who shipped as sailors or soldiers in
the galleons deserted and escaped up country, where
they knew they were sure of good pay.
There were differences between the colonies, though
they were not great. As our business is with Mexico,
it will be enough to speak of " The Kingdom of New
Spain," to give the proper official title. When it was
finally settled it extended from Central America in the
south to a vague frontier on the north, from Upper

INTRODUCTORY n
California across to Florida. Five distinct elements of
population were scattered over this vast territory —
the Creoles, the Mestizos, the Mulattos, the Zamba
higos, and the native Indians.
By the Creoles are to be understood the descendants
of Spaniards who had, or were by general consent
considered as having, no mixture of Indian or negro
blood. " Criar " in Spanish is " to breed," and,
properly speaking, whatever the Spaniard brought to
the Indies and cultivated there — his own race, his
horse, his ass, his cattle, pigs, poultry, and plants —
was criollo. The combination of Spaniard and Indian
was mestizo (mixed). When the diminution of Indian
labour and the desire of the home Government to
spare the native population led to the introduction
of negro slaves, there came the mixture of Spaniard
and black, who is the mulato. The zambahigo was the
half-bred Indian and black. Mulattos and Zambahigos
(from which comes our Sambo) were less important in
Mexico than in some other Spanish colonies. Finally
there were the native Indians of over a hundred
tribes speaking dialects of sixteen languages. For
long they formed the bulk of the population.
The Spaniard did not find a free field when he came
to Mexico. The native civilisations of America were
no doubt, as Gibbon says, " strangely magnified " by
the conquistadores who first saw them. Still the
Mexican Indians cultivated the land, built towns, and
had a social order not very inferior, if it was at all
inferior, to that of the Spaniards themselves. Mere
hunters and savages, " Indianos bravos," were met
only in the far north and south. In the central mass
of the kingdom of New Spain the natives were
" Mansos " (tame) or " Pueblo " (village) Indians.

12 DIAZ
They diminished before the Spaniard, but they did
not perish utterly, and after a time they began again
to increase. They were in various degrees capable
of some civilisation, and not all were at any time
enemies to the Spaniard. On one point the histories
of the Spanish conquest of Mexico and the British
conquest of India touch one another. Cortes won by
combining under his banner many tribes which were
in revolt against the tyranny of the Aztecs, just as the
East India Company always found native allies and
willing subjects. The army which took the Aztec
Tenochtitlan, the city of Mexico, consisted mainly of
Indians. Friendly relations and a certain interpene-
tration of the races, not only in blood, but in character,
were possible as between Spaniard and Indian. Some
of the native races maintained a measure of national
existence. This was particularly the case with the
Zapotecas of Oaxaca, to whom Benito Juarez belonged
entirely, and the Mixtecas, from whom Diaz descended
through his mother. It should be noted, too, that a
mixture of Indian blood is held to fortify in Spanish
America and in modern times carries no stigma. The
mixture of negro blood was always a discredit, for it
was considered less natural.
So far we have considered only those parts of the
population which belonged by birth to Mexico. But
there was another, and one of commanding impor
tance by its direct action and by the consequences of
its work. This was the " Peninsular " or Spaniard
from Old Spain, who came generation after genera
tion, partly to recruit but mainly to govern — as civil
officials, as soldiers, and as Churchmen. In the
eighteenth century, when the Bourbon dynasty had
modified the policy of its predecessors, they came freely

INTRODUCTORY 13
as traders. Then they commonly married in the
country, and their children recruited the Creole or the
Mestizo elements. But it is as a governor, an official,
or a priest that the Peninsular best deserves notice.
The mere framework of Spanish colonial govern
ment need not be described at large. There was a
viceroy, commonly a great noble, who was preferred
because his rank, his family connections, and his
estates at home were guarantees that he would not
try to make himself king. Beside him, rather than
below him, was the audiencia (the " hearing "), com
posed of lawyers, the oidores (or " hearers "). It was
the viceroy's privy council, and it was a law court
from which there was an appeal to the Supreme Council
of the Indies at Seville. When it sat as privy council
the viceroy presided. When it sat as a law court its
president was its chief. When the viceroy's term of
office was over, the audiencia had a right to inspect
and pass his accounts. It could make a report on his
conduct while in office. The audiencia was in fact a
check on the viceroy, and if he died in office it ad
ministered until his successor came. Under these
two was an organisation of officials who need not be
named. They were necessary subordinates and could
easily be paralleled from British India, or any Crown
colony. The Church was fully organised with arch
bishop, bishops, lesser clergy, monastic orders, and
Jesuits. No more need be said of it now except that,
by grants from the popes, the regalities of the Crown
were great in Mexico, and its control of the Church
was complete. The King was " Lord High Constable
of the Christian Army."
The machine was after all but a machine capable of
being used for good or for evil. The spirit of the

14 DIAZ
direction was the vital question. The first truth about
it is that the Spanish colonial Government was the
very faithful representative of the distrust felt for all
the elements of the Mexican population by the rulers
at home. It may be said to have been wholly composed
of Peninsulares with a few exceptions. The natural
love of the Spaniards for a place under Government
was a strong influence no doubt, but the main reason
why the Spanish Crown filled all offices by men it sent
out was the abiding dread lest the colonists should
render themselves independent. There was a real
reason for this distrust. The Spanish Law of Trade,
like our own Navigation Laws, aimed at restricting
the whole trade of its colonies to the mother country.
This was of course a grievance, and led (as the Naviga
tion Laws did in New England) to wholesale smuggling.
But there was another reason and a more potent one.
When the Government of the King in early days had
to settle its hold on the Indies with few troops it made
use of a very old device. It handed the Government
of the Indians to encomenderos. The encomendero
held his power as a trust in commendam for life, or for
a term of years, or during pleasure. He was in fact
a zemindar who controlled the Indians for the King,
raised revenue, and took his dues. By a process with
which Europe was once very familiar, the life or
temporary office became an hereditary property. That
the King was the only owner of the soil by grant from
the Pope and by conquest was a maxim which figured
in law-books. That he had the right to revoke the
encomiendas singly, or altogether, no lawyer doubted.
But the right was one thing, and the might was
another. Whenever there was the merest suggestion
of a revocation, a threat of rebellion was automatically

INTRODUCTORY 15
produced. The encomendero was so completely the
master of his Indians that they would follow him in a
revolt. He did not wish to rebel if he was let alone,
but if he was to be deprived of his holding he would
make a fight. The King of Spain was nearly as
helpless in the presence of the opposition of the united
encomenderos as any king of the eleventh century
would have been if faced by a universal refusal of
homage by the Crown vassals. When menaced by
that peril the Spanish kings yielded. They made a
struggle. Their Laws of the Indies have been praised
for .the provision they contained to protect the Indians
from ill-usage. The intention was honourable, and
every credit may be given to the good-will of the King.
In Mexico the laws did produce some effect. They
helped to save some Indian communities from
extinction by forced labour in the mines. They
secured some measure of protection for Indian towns
and endowed them with communal lands known as
" ejidos," i.e., exits. But no injustice is done to the
King if we assume that he and his advisers were quite
as anxious to clip the wings of the encomendero as to
protect the Indians. Now, if the Indies were to be
governed by the Creoles, the officers must, for lack
of any other body from which to take them, be sought
in that very class. Therefore all offices were filled
from Spain. The encomenderos, predecessors, if not
actual ancestors, of the " hacendados," the overgrown
Mexican landlords of to-day, with their five million or
even twenty million acres of land, were left in posses
sion of their power over the rural Indians, and the
Government was directed by officials from Spain.
Mexico was not without the germs of what might
have been, or perhaps only looks on paper as what

16 DIAZ
might have been, a political organisation. There
were town councils {cabildos), and there were occasions
in Spanish colonial history when delegates from a
number of these councils were assembled in a con
vention or a cortes. But cabildos and cortes alike
were the reflections of the worn-out institutions of the
mother country. The town councils were self-
electing. The outgoing members at the end of their
year of office named their successors, who at the close
of their term repaid the compliment. So a quiet
rotation of office was kept up between a select number
of privileged families. Such as they were, they would
have provided the machinery of a vigorous colonial
system of self-government if there had been any wish
for one. But there was not. Segregation, isolation,
a secretive life for family and town, have always been
notes of the Spaniards. They have never shown a
good capacity to combine for any political purpose —
have always been inclined to personal, family, and
local rivalries and distrusts. Their virtues are indi
vidual, not social, and every effort at combined action
brings out their vices. Therefore they have been
passive items in the hands of King and Church while
the monarchy and the hierarchy were vigorous.
When the life ebbed from these institutions there was
nothing to take their place except the absolute
necessity for some form of rule among gregarious men.
Therefore a Spanish colony fell into anarchy qualified
by the temporary predominance of some man with a
stick. The tragedy of the whole race at home, as in
the Indies, has been that many of the best and most
honest among them could find nothing better to do
than to fight contumaciously and pitilessly for the
only kind of social and political principle they knew —

INTRODUCTORY ij
the King and the Faith — in other words, for the dead
and the dying. Old Spain was at least directly
influenced by the great living communities about
her in Europe. In the isolation of the kingdom
of New Spain there was nothing to counteract the
faults of the race, and everything to exaggerate
them. Education could hardly be expected to exist in such
conditions. There were universities in Mexico, but
they were limited to droning over the scholastic
philosophy in its dotage. A few exceptional men
here and there might apply themselves to botany or
some other scientific subject. But there was no
training for the community, nor even for a class. It
would have been no great evil that the mass of the
population learnt nothing except to repeat their
catechism and " Ave Maria " by rote, if those who
were supposed to be schooled had had a substantial
education. But except in the Jesuit schools, where
the upper class was taught some Latin, there was
nothing beyond an endless ringing of the changes on
" Ens " and " Essentia," a perpetual rattle of dis
putation over unrealities, in phrases which the Inquisi
tion had tested and found orthodox. The candidate
for a licentiateship of laws had to read the text-books
and codes, at least after a fashion. But his training
was also one in mere disputation on points and in
terms laid down for him. The debauching loquacity
of the modern Spaniards and Spanish-Americans, the
deadly readiness of all of them to pour out torrents
of grammatical sentences which express no genuine
conviction and mean nothing, and the predominance
among them of the " attorney species " are the ruinous
inheritance left by generations of a so-called education

1 8 DIAZ
in mere gabble to the exclusion of thought and of the
study of things.
Where in all this conglomeration of fragments were
to be found the elements of a polity ? Only in the
royal authority, which all by virtue of an inherited
instinct revered even when they were provoked into
resistance by a personal grievance. Outbreaks of
disorder were not uncommon in Spanish America
during the eighteenth century. A vague tendency to
think that the land belonged to those born in it was
to be noted from time to time — the forerunner of the
revolt which began in 1810. But these outbreaks
were not directed against the monarchical principle of
the State. Men took up arms and rioted when a trade
monopoly granted by the King became intolerable.
In Mexico city there was one triumphant explosion
when a reforming viceroy attempted to stop the sale
of " pulque " in the interests of sobriety. But when
the grievance was removed all went back to the old
order. The nature of these transient outbreaks may
be illustrated by an incident which occurred some
thirty years ago in Spain. It was a year of drought,
and the inhabitants of a village in Valencia were
menaced not only by a total failure of their harvest,
but by the drying up of the wells of drinking water.
Their church possessed a crucifix of peculiar sanctity.
It was taken out and carried through the fields by a
procession with candles burning and singing of hymns.
No rain came. At last on the third or fourth day of
these pious exercises the villagers became overwrought.
Being now worked into a " rabieta," a spasm of mad
rage, they stood the crucifix upside down in the market
place, they covered it with filth, they kicked it and
threw stones at it, they abused it in the choicest terms

INTRODUCTORY 19
of Spanish blasphemy, which is not mere cursing and
swearing, but truly blasphemous. In the middle of
this crazy scene down came the rain as it does in
those parts, advancing in sheets and spouts and hurl
ing the dust up before it. And then the people saw
how useless the image was, and they were prepared
to listen to a Protestant missionary ? Quite the
contrary. The people of that village only concluded
that the Lord had been moved to pity by the sight
of the extremes to which their suffering had driven
them and had at last sent the rain. They were more
persuaded of the miraculous virtues of the image than
they were before. So the discontented colonists who
forced the King or his viceroy to give way remained
as convinced as they ever had been of the royal good
ness. But now suppose that the belief in the sanctity of
the royal authority — the medium which held together
the individuals, classes, and races which made up the
pudding-stone of a Spanish colony — began itself to
disintegrate, what would, what must, follow ? The
whole mass would have of course crumbled, and when
the process had gone far enough the pebbles or flints
once embedded in the worn-out medium would sink
into a heap. And that is precisely what happened in
Mexico. Various causes had been at work all through
the eighteenth century to dissolve the bond. There
was an increasing sense of grievance in the Creole and
Mestizo classes. As they were recruited by immigrants
from Old Spain and grew stronger, they began to
resent the exclusive possession of office by the
Peninsulares and the insolence of the official class.
It was a common observation down to the day when
Spain lost the last fragment of her colonial empire

20 DIAZ
that the non-official immigrants soon came to
sympathise with the Creoles, and that their children
were Creoles out and out. The official Peninsulares
were not only harsh administrators and generally
corrupt, but they were socially insolent. In the
seventeenth century they already avowed their
doubts whether any of the elements of the native
population were entitled to be considered as rational
beings (gente de razon). The Creoles, they said, sucked
in the Indian vices with the milk of their Indian nurses.
The Mestizos were the offspring of vicious women — a
bastard race. The Indians were children. Resent
ment of this official insolence began to extend timidly
to the royal authority itself. Then Charles III.
struck a terrible blow at the loyalty of the leading
Creoles when he suppressed the Jesuits. The company
in Mexico, as elsewhere, had aimed with great success
at monopolising the education of the moneyed classes.
The arbitrary cruelty of the treatment meted out to
them shocked their old pupils. The mass of the
population was not much affected, and the Jesuits
had many enemies among the bishops and the other
religious orders who helped to destroy them. The
King had ample support at the time, but the sanctity
of the whole Church suffered by this brutal crushing
of a great order, and the King's authority was
inseparable from that of the Church. Then came the
example of the revolt of the English plantations and
the help given to them by the King of Spain in alliance
with France. Wealthy Mexicans who visited Europe
and immigrants from Spain began to spread the ideas
of the French philosophes. The Inquisition strove
to exclude the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire, Raynal.
The community was against it, and the " enlightened "

INTRODUCTORY 21
officials whom Charles III. sent out were no friends
to the Inquisition. The King honestly desired to
remove the worst faults of his colonial administration.
Something was done, and a real stimulus was given to
the material prosperity of the colonists. But it is an
old observation that resentment against evils always
finds expression when the sufferers are beginning to
enjoy relief. Charles, a man besotted by a convic
tion of the divinity and omnipotence of his office, was
always sawing the branch between himself and the
trunk of the tree. In order to improve his means of
defending his colonies against British attack he per
mitted the formation of a Creole and Mestizo militia.
Spanish army officers, who had as little right as they
well could have to look down on any kind of troops,
laughed at the " milicianos." But these bodies pro
vided the framework of the " patriot " armies of the
immediate future.
The French Revolution re-echoed in the New World
and found discontent stirring below the surface.
There was still no actual disloyalty to the Crown.
" Viva el Rey y muera el mal gobierno " (" Long live
the King and death to the bad government ") was the
first watchword of the insurgents throughout Spanish
America. In the King there was no help. The
wretched exhibition of themselves given by Charles IV.
and his family covered the once sacrosanct royalty
with contempt. Spain was dragged along by France.
War with England cut Mexico off from the peninsula.
Unmistakable signs that the Spanish rule was nearing
its end began to appear. One of the later viceroys,
Iturrigaray, entered into a plot with the Creoles to
establish a colonial self-government. The system of
administration elaborated by Charles V. and Philip II.

22 DIAZ
was for the last time justified of its children. The
audiencia suppressed the viceroy and sent him back
to Spain, where he died in prison. When Napoleon
endeavoured to seize Spain in 1808 Mexico remained
loyal to Ferdinand VII. But it began to act for
itself, and there was nothing to prevent its inde
pendence. Spain had no troops in the colony. The
armed forces were composed wholly of native militia.
The old colonial Government had become a skeleton
held together by wire. When the French invaded
Andalusia in 18 10, and the conquest of Spain seemed
to be inevitable, Mexico might very well have fallen
away as did Buenos Ayres. It remained loyal for
another ten years because the Creoles and Mestizos
were suddenly threatened by a revolt of the Indians.
The explosion was directed, indeed, by a Creole who
was acting in combination with other men of his own
class — the priest Hidalgo. He had been much in
fluenced by the philosophy and the " sensibility " of
Rousseau. He had worked for his Indian flock and
had great popularity among them. Some schemes
which he framed for their good were brutally destroyed
by the colonial Government. It was on that provoca
tion that Hidalgo began to organise his conspiracy.
The Government got wind of what was going on and
made some arrests. Hidalgo, seeing that it was now
or never, revolted at the head of his Indian followers
not nominally against the King, but against the
Administration. What was to have been a general
colonial movement became a race conflict. Hidalgo
himself went through the evolution familiar enough
in the terrorist time in France. In the passion of the
struggle and in rage against the injustice of his oppo
nents he became convinced that the only way to

INTRODUCTORY 23
protect the oppressed was to slay the oppressors.
His philanthropy turned bloodthirsty, and he led his
Indian followers into a general massacre of Creoles
and Mestizos. In the presence of this peril the
menaced classes rallied to the audiencia and the royal
Government. The Indian revolt was put down and
Hidalgo executed. His enemies said that he died
asking pardon of God and man for his sin in letting the
mischief loose. It is equally likely that in the reaction
of feeling probable in so emotional a man he made this
confession of sin, or that his enemies invented it for
him. Whatever Hidalgo may have said or felt, it is only
too true that his insurrection was the beginning of
infinite misery for Mexico. He was succeeded as a
patriot leader by another priest, the Mestizo Morelos.
When he too was put down and executed, other chiefs
were found to continue a partisan warfare in the
mountains till 1820.
The legend of Mexican history is that this struggle
was a fight for freedom against Spanish oppression.
The sober truth is that the ten years from 1810 to 1820
were filled by the first Mexican Civil War. Spain
could for long send no troops, and she never sent more
than a few. Her resources were almost wholly
devoted to attempts to hold or to reconquer South
America. The combatants of the ten years' war were
Mexican parties. If that statement is disputed, the
proof of its truth can be conclusively given by a mere
statement of the circumstances in which the inde
pendence of the country was finally declared.
In 1820 a Spanish army, which had been collected
near Cadiz for transport to South America, revolted
at the instigation of Liberal officers. The Constitu-

24 DIAZ
tion drawn up by the Cortes in 1812 during the
Peninsular War and suppressed by Ferdinand VII.
was restored. Now this instrument of government
was odious to the clergy chiefly because the men who
made it were known to aim at the secularisation of
the Church land. So far the higher clergy in Mexico,
who were generally Peninsulares, had been loyal,
though a large proportion of the parish priests, who
were often Mestizos, and the friars of native origin
were patriots. But when they found themselves
threatened by a Radical and " godless " Government
in Spain the higher clergy also became patriots. In
combination with the Creole military leaders, whose
loyalty had worn away to nothing, they proclaimed
the independence of Mexico. The Spanish Govern
ment fell without a blow. A few soldiers from Old
Spain held the fortress at San Juan de Ulloa for a
time simply because the Mexicans had no naval force,
and the castle stands on an island opposite Vera Cruz.
But the viceroy himself had to sign the document
which announced the end of the Government he
represented. If the Creole landowners had possessed any of the
qualities of an aristocracy they could have made them
selves masters of Mexico in the years between 18 10
and 1820. But they were a mere class of persons of
fine manners who at their best were amiable and
admirable in their family relations, while at their worst
they were debauched and addicted to gambling to the
verge of insanity. There was no institution in Mexico
except the Church, and that also was divided and
lacking in faculty for government. If a revolution
is the substitution of one Government by another,
then the declaration of independence did not accom-

INTRODUCTORY 25
plish a revolution in Mexico. It was simply a formal
recognition of the already patent fact that the only
principle of government known to the Mexicans of all
shades was dead, and that nothing was left save the
innate gregarious instincts of the human animal. On
that foundation a new social and political order was
to be built.
The thirty-five years which passed between the
declaration of the independence of Mexico and the
beginning of the career of Porfirio Diaz cannot be said
to have seen even the first steps in the progress of the
work. They were full of mere anarchy. Presidents
rose and fell at the rate of about one a year. It
could not well have been otherwise. No Mexican was
any longer aware of a reason why he should obey what
was supposed to be the Government for one moment
longer than he saw occasion, or than he was restrained
by lack of means, or by terror of instant death, from
setting out to become himself a Government. After
the ten years of war, between 18 10 and 1820, the land
was full of armed factions. They had a free field in
a thinly-inhabited country full of mountains which
invited the guerrillero and the bandit. Even if a
history of a chronic state of disorder were possible,
this is not the place to make the attempt.1 But,
when we look steadily across the confusion, certain
tendencies, if not exactly political principles, are seen
to have been implied in the conflicts of contending
factions. The words " Federalist " and " Centralist " which
figure largely in the controversies of those times did
1 The reader who wishes to become better acquainted with the barren
contentions of little self-seeking men may be referred to Vols. VIII. and IX.
of " The History of the Pacific States," by Mr. Hubert H. Bancroft.

26 DIAZ
really stand for something. The framers of the first
Mexican Constitution made a slavish imitation of the
Constitution of the United States. They were the
Federalists. From the beginning there were Mexicans
who foresaw that this form of government would not
suit their country, if only for the sufficient reason that
there were in Mexico no " States." Its provinces
were not political entities, each with its own history,
character, and training in self-government, as were
the thirteen British colonies which combined to form
the Union. These critics maintained that the only
government the Mexicans understood was one by a
strong central authority. What they really wanted
was a continuation of the Spanish viceroyalty and
audiencia, but composed of Mexicans working in the
interests of Mexico. Here was a genuine pohtical
issue very fit to be settled by political methods and
argument. The career of President Diaz goes to show
that these dissenters, who were known as Centra-
listas, were right. If Mexico could have produced
Jays, Jeffersons, and Hamiltons they would in all
probability have written, not a " Federalista," but a
" Centralista." The issue was not debated politically, but was
turned into a downright scuffle of kites and crows.
It is substantially accurate to say that whoever was
at the head of affairs for the time being (having put
himself there by armed revolt) tended to be " Centra
lista " because the name went easily with the widest
possible exercise of authority. The Spaniard is
naturally " mandonT We may translate the word
by " Jack in office," but only with partial truth.
The " mandon " is not only a conceited creature who
makes the most of his office. He is always a potential

INTRODUCTORY 27
tyrant to whom no words come so easily as " Aqui
mando yo " (" I command here "), and who enforces
obedience by the most brutal or even bloodthirsty
methods. Every " mandon " is persuaded that the
whole abstract authority of the State resides in his
person, and that not only all opposition, but all
independence of judgment, is rebellion to be punished
by death. The history of Mexico is full of bloodthirsty
" Jacks in office." But a perfect readiness to suppress
and to kill is not enough to make a strong Govern
ment. It is quite capable of promoting sheer anarchy
by provoking, or absolutely terrifying, men into armed
resistance for their safety's sake. Mexico offered a
fine field for insurrection. The natural answer to the
Centralist " mandon " was the provincial Federalist,
who raised the standard of revolt, of course in the
name of Freedom. When beaten he fled into exile
if he escaped being shot. When he was victorious he
tended to become Centralist and " mandon."
In so far as real political parties existed the Centra
lists may be said to have consisted of the landowners
of Spanish descent and the Church, which was natur
ally on the side of authority. Now there were certain
conditions which did tend to solidify the Mexican
hurly-burly into a fight over material things. The old
Spanish rule, working by class and private laws to
divide that it might govern, had established its Fuero
(forum) Militar, and its Fuero Eclesiastico (the mili
tary and the Church franchises). The reader must
remember that in its original sense the word " militar "
had nothing to do with the professional soldier, the
member of a standing army. The Brazo Militar of
the mediseval Spanish Cortes — the Military arm — was
composed of the nobles. In Mexico the landowners

28 DIAZ
had been assimilated to the Brazo Militar of Spain.
They were justiciable only in their own " forum."
But so great is the power of a name that the army,
because it is " militar " in quite another sense, had
been allowed to share the franchise of the nobles of
the Middle Ages. We are sufficiently familiar with
the rights and immunities of the Church in our own
history to make it superfluous to explain what was
meant by the Fuero Eclesiastico. Mexican Church
men claimed all that the Churchmen who resisted our
Henry II. had called their rights, and they actually
possessed their privileges. The separation from Spain
had even increased their power, for it took the autho
rity of the King, which in Spanish America was great,
from off their necks. Army officers and priests could
not even be sued for debt except in their own courts.1
Army and Church were always more or less " Cen-
tralista." Therefore it became a great object with the
Federalists to abolish their franchises. As the Church
was immensely rich, owning, it was calculated, a third
of all the wealth of Mexico, hostility to its legal privi
leges inevitably went hand in hand with a longing to
secularise its property. The conflict had risen to its
acute stage when Diaz entered public life as a follower
of Benito Juarez.
1 The British reader may be surprised to be told, what is none the less the
fact, that these class franchises survive in Spain itself. An army ofiicer can
be sued for debt only before a military court. A very few years ago a
retired army officer who had committed a murder in very horrible circum
stances was tried by a military court which sentenced him to death.

CHAPTER II
THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER
While the day on which he could begin his active
career was approaching Diaz continued to work at the
law, taking pupils to support himself and his mother.
In the meantime he had before him a proof that men
could rise to power by the pen and word as well as by
the sword in Mexico, though the country was given up
to military violence. There also the story of Bertrand
and Raton has been known in public life. The craft
of the " attorney species " has not seldom made a
tool of the mere fighter. In after years and when he
was President he was always ready to confess that his
first " patron " was Don Marcos Perez, a pure-blooded
Indian, a judge and a professor of law at the Insti
tute of Oaxaca. By the friendly offices of Perez he
became well known to the leader whom he was
destined to succeed as ruler of Mexico, the Zapoteca
Indian, Benito Juarez, who had risen wholly by the
way of the law. Juarez had been, and when Diaz first
knew him was, governor of the State. It must be
borne in mind that the foundation of the power of a
party leader in Mexico has commonly been a local
influence. He becomes what is known in the slang
of Spanish politics as a " cacique." He practises
" caciquismo," and on that fulcrum he works his
lever. The cacique and his caciquismo are not of
necessity evils. Given a sound moral atmosphere and
good political instincts, and there can be no better

L,

30 DIAZ
taking-off place for a public career than the support of
a man's neighbours in his native place or his chosen
home. Mr. Chamberlain might quite fairly have been
said to have been cacique in Birmingham, Pym and
Hampden were caciques before him, and when Crom
well was called King of the Fens nothing else was
meant. But when the moral atmosphere is bad and
the politics are faction the case is altered. A local
leader rises by intrigue, corruption, or violence.
Specimens of both kinds abounded in Mexico. Many
of the chiefs who figured in the ever-recurring crises
of the chronic anarchy were no better than brigands
who levied blackmail in money or votes at the head of
their following of " plateados," so called because their
clothes and the harness of their horses were adorned
with silver (plata). A plateado was a Claude Duval
highwayman, or gentleman brigand, as distinguished
from a low footpad. Intriguer and blackmailer might
unite in the same person.
Juarez is allowed to have gained his power by
exceptionally fair methods. The fact that he de
spoiled the Church has perhaps created a prejudice in
his favour in certain quarters. But it is generally
allowed that he had been an honest lawyer, that his
political course was consistent, and that, unlike the
majority of his contemporaries, he, though not
indifferent to his interests, did not accumulate a
fortune in office. His Indian blood no doubt helped
him, but it was a legitimate advantage. The Zapo-
tecas of Oaxaca had not been degraded to the miserable
level of serfdom as the native tribes of Central Mexico
were. They were hillmen, robust and courageous —
often yeomen landowners working for themselves.
Fr ench officers who campaigned among them during

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 31
the " intervention " found them less servile than other
Indians, and saw in them a better appreciation of law
and order and common honesty. We are entitled to
believe that if they trusted Juarez they did so for
creditable reasons and that their preference was to
his honour.
In the company of these Indians Porfirio found
himself happier than under the control of the clerical
authorities of the seminary. He records in his diary
that " My intellect first expanded under the heat of
Liberal principles, and I developed and improved in
philosophical studies."
In 1854 Diaz could not enjoy the advantage of
direct personal guidance from Juarez. The Governor
of Oaxaca had been driven into exile in the United
States by the " mandon " who was then at the head
of the Government, so called, of Mexico. This was
the once notorious and, if he had not been so greedy
and so capable of brutality, the amusing Antonio
Lopez de Santa Ana. This personage was the per
fection of his type. He had the dignified personal
appearance, the grave gesture, the innate faculty for
bearing himself with an air of good manners, which in
the men of Spanish race (he was a Creole) often cover
the most complete intellectual and moral nullity.
There was nothing in his handsome head save the kind
of cleverness which can be wholly disassociated from
judgment. In his character there were vanity, greed,
and an element of animal courage which increased his
powers for mischief. In 1853, when Mexico was smart
ing from the disasters of the war with the United States
and was sick of incapable anarchists, he had been
invited to make himself Dictator in the wild hope that
he would give the tortured country its long-desired good

32 DIAZ
government. He had never shown the least proof ot
ability to satisfy that wish, but the others had been
every whit as bad, and none of them had lost a leg
in fight against a foreign enemy. Now Santa Ana
had, and on the strength of that superiority he had been
accepted as Dictator with the quality of " Highness."
In some villages he was even proclaimed as the Em
peror Antonio I. A hankering after monarchy had
never died out in Mexico among those who were more
concerned to enjoy the protection of a strong Govern
ment than to upset whatever Government there was
for their own advantage. Once in the saddle he
applied the only methods of administration he under
stood — suppressions and military executions. He
quarrelled with some of those who helped him to rise,
accusing them, truly enough no doubt, of corruption,
and driving all opponents out of the country as far
as he could. The familiar reaction followed. A
Centralist was hectoring in the capital. The
Federalists took up arms in the outlying provinces.
The first blow which Diaz struck in a civil war was
given in opposition to Santa Ana.
In 1854 his Highness the Dictator was busy putting
all dissentients within his reach under lock and key.
The friends of the exiled Juarez were the natural
victims of these measures of precaution. No one of
them was more distinctly marked out for arrest than
Don Marcos Perez, and he was accordingly confined in
a tower of the convent of San Domingo. The Dic
tator's vigilance was not unreasonable, for already the
Liberal opponents of his rule were in arms in the Mix-
teca hill country to the west of the city of Oaxaca
under the command of one Herrera. The mass of
townsmen in Mexico habitually behave as our own

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 33
ancestors did in the Wars of the Roses. They
recognise the armed man who is in possession for the
time being, reserving their right to go over to the other
side if only it can make a successful forcible entry.
Political partisans who are temporarily reduced to
silence by hostile force within the city plot to intro
duce their own friends from the outside. At such
times those who, like Don Marcos Perez, are " carac-
terizados " — that is to say, marked men — must expect
to be subj ected to precautionary arrest . At such times,
too, young and active men like Porfirio Diaz earn the
good-will of the side they elect to fight for by adven
turing to keep up communications between the plotter
within and the warrior without the walls. The future
President began his career by a feat which would be
quite in place in the biography of Chicot. We have
the story told in the future President's own words.1
He tells how when Don Marcos was arrested the
" fiscal " (i.e., public prosecutor), Pascual Leon, was
instructed to prepare the indictment. Now it hap
pened that Senor Leon owed money to Diaz and was
tardy in his payments. The creditor had therefore a
good right to drop in at the fiscal's office, avowedly in
pursuit of the debt, but with other aims, as he plainly
says. Don Pascual avoided the unwelcome visit, and
Diaz was left alone for a space. All is fair in love and
politics. The fiscal in the hurry of his retreat had
1 I quote from the official biography written by Dr. Fortunato Hernandez,
" Un Pueblo, un Siglo y un Hombre " (" A Man, a Century and a People ")
(Mexico, 1909). This is an official book published in reply to " Porfirio
Diaz, la Evolucion de su Vida " (" the Evolution of this Life ") (New York,
1908), by Don Rafael de Zayas Enriquez, a decidedly candid friend. Dr.
Hernandez says that he takes this and many other passages from the
" unpublished work " printed by Don Matias Romero " in the same simple,
concise and veracious form in which General Diaz dictated it to the short
hand writer."

34 DIAZ
left his papers lying on his desk. Porfirio's legal
education qualified him to select those which were best
worth looking at. In a very few minutes he had made
a number of notes likely to be useful to Don Marcos.
The question was how to convey them to him.
The prisoner was confined in the monastery of San
Domingo. His cell was in the lock-up of the building
wherein delinquent friars were shut up. This house
of correction, known as the turret (torre cilia), pro
jected from the main building into the yard of the
sacristy. It was lower than the body of the monastery.
The walls were thick. The cell, three metres long by
two wide, had a door with a wicket in it through
which a prisoner could be watched, and a window
high up on one side, barred heavily in the middle of
the thickness of the wall. The cell was in the top
storey of the torrecilla, and below was a door opening
on the courtyard. Sentries were posted inside both
at the door of the cell and at that which gave on to
the yard. The monastery was occupied by a detach
ment of Santa Ana's partisans. There was only one
way of communicating with Don Marcos, and that was
by dropping on to the azotea (the flat roof of the turret)
and then lowering oneself to the level of the window.
The sill was broad, and whoever could reach it could
find a footing on it and steady himself by holding the
bars. There was a shutter on the inside of the window,
but it had an opening at the top. In order to get
at the azotea of the turret it was first necessary to
reach the roof of the monastery. To come at the
higher roof it was necessary to climb the outer wall
of the garden and then climb over certain lower
outbuildings. This was the adventure reserved for
Porfirio.

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 35
He might have been unable to achieve it single-
handed, but he had the best and most trustworthy of
comrades in his brother Felix, now and at all times
till death divided them. Felix, commonly known by
his nickname " El Chato " (i.e., " Flatnose "), had
always been the comrade of Porfirio in every escapade
or hunting excursion in the Sierra. They were both
athletes and cragsmen. The feat presented no more
difficulties than were sufficient to stimulate them.
With a well-tested lasso, hemp sandals on foot, or
barefoot, they could surely reach the highest roof, and
once there the rest was plain sailing, on a conveniently
dark night.
The time was chosen, and under cover of darkness
the brothers reached the four-metre-high garden wall.
One standing and the other climbing on his shoulders,
the thatched covering (or barda) of the wall (it was, one
gathers, built of adobe, mere sun-dried brick) was soon
reached. Whichever got up first held a rope for the
other. Felix dropped down to scout for a possible
sentry in the garden. None were stationed outside
the building, a fact which does no credit to the officer
in command. Then the way to the roof of the monas
tery bakery along the barda was flat and safe. The
bakers were at work and were singing to lighten toil.
" Quien canta sus males espanta," which may be
rendered by " He who trills scares away his ills," is a
sound old Spanish proverb. The noise they were
making drowned all others for the bakers. The
brothers passed unheard from the roof of the bakery
to the roof of the kitchen (then empty), thence to the
roof of the quarters occupied by the provincial, the
superior of the house. From a small kitchen stand
ing there it was but one pull up more to the monastery

36 DIAZ
roof. The climb was no obstacle to men accustomed
to use the lasso. The noose was deftly tossed over
some solid projection. One held the rope while the
other swarmed up. Whoever was up first put his
back into it to pull up the other. The President uses
the very idiom. " Haciendo cuadril," he says. Now
the " cuadril " is the haunch bone of an animal.
Hacer cuadril is to plant the heels firm and pull with
weight and muscle, in the language of the muleteers.
The mule can show them how to do it when in one
of his frequent fits of obstinacy.
Sentries were stationed on the roof, but they proved
no obstacle. Porfirio and his brother learnt of their
existence, not by seeing them, but by the sound of
their voices as they called one another up, " Centinela,
alerta " (" Watchman, watch "). But if the repeti
tion of the call keeps the men awake at their posts it
tells a listener where they are and where he must go
to avoid them. No sentry was posted on the roof of
the turret. Those who were on the roof of the main
building were probably squatting in corners out of
the wind wrapped in blankets. For that or for some
other reason they kept so little watch that the brothers
could untie a long rope fastened to the clapper of the
convent bell and tie it to a battlement. This was to
provide themselves with an alternative line of escape
if the alarm were given below and their retreat by the
garden side were cut off.
They dropped quietly on to the solid roof of the
turret, and while El Chato watched above, Porfirio
was lowered by the lariet they brought with them to
the level of the cell window. A Latin phrase whis
pered through the airhole in the shutter told Don
Marcos that a friend was at hand. Standing on the

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 37
window cill and gripping the bars, Porfirio gave his
news to the prisoner and heard his answers. The
President does not report the matter of their talk,
but it is to be presumed that it had reference to more
than the law papers of Don Pascual. Messages were
sent to friends outside. Then the adventurers
returned as they came after replacing the bell rope.
And the feat was repeated for three nights. How
they contrived to free the lasso when they had
lowered themselves by it on their return is a question
which the reader may ask, but it is one for which there
is no answer. The services of a friend inside would
account for all, but none is mentioned. One thing is
certain, and it is that no man who rose to be ruler
of a State in the nineteenth century, outside of the
adventurous world of Spanish America, could boast
of such a feat.
Though the matter of these conversations is not
reported, we may be tolerably sure that it had refer
ence to a plot for handing over Oaxaca to the oppo
nents of Santa Ana, who in January, 1854, had drawn
up the Plan of Ayutla, so called from the place where
it was proclaimed. It was one of a long series framed
to secure the future good government of Mexico. The
Dictator, though he was beginning to be hard pressed
from all sides, held his ground as yet. In December
of that year, being perhaps inspired by the recent
shining example of Napoleon III., Santa Ana called
for a plebiscite in which the free and independent
voters of Mexico might decide whether or no they
preferred to be regenerated by him. On these
occasions, or their like, the line taken by respectable
people in Spanish and Portuguese America is one with
the answer of the Oxford undergraduate who, when

38 DIAZ
asked to sign the Thirty-nine Articles, replied cheer
fully, " Oh ! yes, or forty if you like." x
The President tells us that until the very day of the
voting he was not sure whether he would " charac
terise " himself by voting openly against Santa Ana
or be content with abstaining. The offhand remark
of a friend that abstention was the course which would
naturally be taken by those who were afraid stung his
spirit. The friend — whose name, Francisco de Enciso,
deserves to be recorded — must have part of the
credit for the bold act which marked Diaz at least in
the local world of Oaxaca as an intrepid partisan. In
1 It happened to me some years ago to travel by sea from Santos in Brazil
to Buenos Ayres with a very well bred and intelligent Argentine man of
business. In answer to a question of mine concerning a political matter,
he replied politely that he took no interest in it whatever. When a young
man and in the illusions of credulous youth he had shared in a political
movement, which of course entailed fighting. When it was over he reflected
that he had been very young, very foolish to risk his life for the sake of a
gang of intriguers who meant no good to anyone but themselves. Since
then he had left politics alone. Another Argentine of the same stamp told
me, smiling the same smile, and making the same indication of the shrug of
the shoulders, a barely perceptible movement, that a shower of rain (he
was a cattle breeder, an " estanciero," and the country was suffering from
drought) was of infinitely greater importance than any Presidential election.
The profound mistrust which Spanish-Americans of good social position
and honourable personal character feel for all politics may have had a share
in the reserve of both these gentlemen, though they trust us more than they
do most men, for they rely on our honour (" la palabra Inglesa "), a confi
dence which for us is a great asset. Yet my acquaintances were really
stating a point of view. The respectable Spanish-American acts very much
like the Arab quoted by Mr. Kinglake. When his burnos becomes intolerably
verminous he puts it on an ant-hill and the ants eat the pest. So in Spanish
America, when the politicians in office go too far, the moneyed men who
suffer too much provide this or the other military politician out of office with
the means to make a " pronunciamiento." They finance a revolution. The
Arab can shake the ants off when they have done their work, but it is not so
easy to shake off the politicians. This attitude of the industrious non-
political world of Spanish America must be borne in mind if we wish to
understand how so much bad government has been tolerated ; why revolu
tions have been so common ; and also why, in spite of bad government and
revolutions, these countries have grown in material prosperity and increased
in population. The political strife is largely a game played by a class, and
the working community goes on its way, leaving the chiefs and swordsmen
to fight among themselves.

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 39
the heat of his resolution he came to the room where
the book for recording the votes was lying open, and
there with his own hand, and avowing his deed in a
loud voice, gave his vote for General Alvarez, " the
hero of Ayutla."
The next step was to hurry from the room and the
town. Indeed, he received a warning note from
another friend, one Maldonado, telling him that the
authorities were already talking of his arrest. A third
friend, a member of the dominant faction, warned him
verbally in the streets to be off. The wine, in fact,
was now drawn and must be drunk. Nor was Porfirio
anywise unwilling to do what was needful. An open
display of preparations for flight would perhaps have
hurried his arrest. He had to get on horseback
without letting the enemy see what he was preparing
to do. No great fortune is required to keep a saddle
horse in Mexico, and he had one. Wearing a decep
tive air of indifference, he led his horse unsaddled to
the water outside the town. A friend hid saddle and
bridle in a buck-basket and sent them down to the
water covered by clothes as for the wash. Then
Porfirio saddled and rode off to join the Indian
Herrera, who with a small and ill-armed band of
Indians was already in arms for the cause in the neigh
bouring hills. It was not unlike an incident in a
story by Mayne Reid, but then the Captain wrote
about Mexico and knew it well. And now Diaz was
fairly launched on the career which was to make him
master of the Republic and earn him the respect and
confidence of the statesmen of Europe and America.
The first weeks of his new life were more arduous
than successful. Santa Ana's party was strong enough
to break up Herrera's band. Diaz had to take to

4°

DIAZ

hiding, but the tide was going against the Dictator,
and the partisans of the plan of Ayutla were able to
get possession of the city of Oaxaca. A redistribution
of offices naturally ensued, and Diaz was named sub-
prefect of the district of Ixtlan. It was a small post
given as a beginning, and was to all appearances not a
promising one. The Indians of Ixtlan were considered
to be of a very unmartial character, so much so that
they were exempted from military levies as being of
no use.
Every Mexican armed force consists of two ele
ments — the directing body of fighting politicians, or
mere brigands, and the rank and file of Indians. The
latter are simply pressed. Every political party has
at one time or another promised to give up the leva
(i.e., levy) of Indians and replace it by a fair con
scription. No party has ever kept the promise. The
Indians are too broken, too cowed, too torpid, and too
divided to resist. They submit, and their women
come with them to forage, cook, carry burdens, and
provide the only army service corps which Mexican
armies have possessed. A Mexican army is in fact a
temporary artificial tribe which camps or marches
with its swarm of women and children. So long as
they are paid and fed, these Indians obey and show a
good deal of passive courage. When not paid or fed
they desert. They pass over in masses from the losing
to the winning chief. A Mexican victory usually
meant the incorporation of the mass of the beaten side
in the ranks of the victorious army. The directing
element of the beaten side, the officers, were shot
wholesale after the battle. With such soldiers actions
tended to be fought at very long ranges, and the result
was reached through desertion, and not by blows.

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 41
The Mexican of all shades can fight fiercely in certain
circumstances, or when his passions are aroused. But
he fights best behind stone walls, or in trenches, where
his Indian passivity enables him to endure much
hammering without a sense of excessive strain on the
nerves. As for passion : what passion can a pressed
Indian feel for contending political generals and poli
tical terms which are to him meaningless ? He suffers
patiently when he cannot desert, and will meet death
in the shape of a military execution with an air of
complete indifference. M. de Keratry, who served in
the French " contra-guerrillas " during the Maximilian
adventure, writes as if he had been shocked by what
seemed to him the brutal callousness of the Mexican
guerrilleros of Indian blood whom he saw shot in large
numbers by order of the redoubtable Colonel du Pin.
It will be seen that to be appointed sub-prefect of
a district where the Indians — the Indiada in Mexican
phrase — are of such notoriously poor quality that
nobody had a wish for their services was no great
promotion. And Diaz was soon called upon to bring
help to the party. The Plan of Ayutla included the
abolition of the Fuero Militar and the Fuero Eclesias-
tico. When the Republicans, as the opponents of his
Highness the Dictator called themselves par excellence,
gained possession of the city, they of course proclaimed
the Plan. The officers of the 4th Regiment of Horse,
and those of the 10th of Foot, which were stationed
in Oaxaca, were offended at the prospect of the loss of
their privileges, and on second thoughts reproclaimed
for Santa Ana. The Republicans were driven out.
Diaz was called upon to come to the help of his friends
with the Indiada of Ixtlan. The enemy was for the
moment too strong for them, and Diaz found himself

42 DIAZ
compelled to go back to his district and disband the
Indians he had pressed. But this eclipse did not last
long. Santa Ana's folly was ruining him, and he was
soon in flight. The Republicans recovered Oaxaca.
Juarez came back as governor after a period of semi-
starvation in the United States.
He and his colleagues of the Republican party
now set to work, to organise their followers, who had
hitherto been mere guerrillero bands, into a National
Guard for the purpose of swamping the regular army.
Hereupon the professional army officers, some of whom
had acted against Santa Ana, joined forces in a body
with the equally menaced Church. And now began
a fair fight on a true political issue. On one side were
the Liberals, intent on an abolition of military and
clerical privileges, and on the other were the menaced
army officers and priests who constituted the Reaction.
The place of Porfirio Diaz was with the former.
Juarez, we are told, had begun by offering him a
major's commission in the National Guard about to
be formed. He declined the offer on the modest
ground of unfitness, and preferred to remain as sub-
prefect of Ixtlan. As he did actually accept a com
mission as captain in the National Guard in December,
1856, we may assume that he was not held back by
diffidence alone from taking service at a slightly
earlier date. His native sagacity must have shown
him that the foundation of real power in Mexico is a
local influence. He remained in his district to win it,
and he gave his first proof of his capacity to manage
his countrymen by obtaining an appreciable amount
of useful service in the field from the Indians of Ixtlan.
From that fact we may perhaps conclude that if they
had been of smalL military value hitherto the reason

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 43
was not so much that they were more pusillanimous
than others of their race, but that they were more
recalcitrant to the press. It may be remembered
that the parents of Diaz had lived for years in the
Sierra de Ixtlan, and he had relations there.
Without undertaking to go into details of the con
fused period of the overthrow of Santa Ana, we must
note rapidly that the victorious Republicans obtained
possession of the capital. Their first President was
Alvarez, the hero of the Plan of Ayutla. He proved
but a transient President, and was quite out of place ,
when he was no longer playing the guerrillero on a
hillside. Comonfort succeeded him and formed a
Ministry in which Juarez was Minister of Grace and
Justice. The career of Comonfort is unique among
Mexican Presidents, for he ended by making a pro-
nunciamiento against his own administration. He
was a moderate Conservative who had been driven to
join the Liberals by opposition to, or fear of, Santa
Ana. His conduct shows that he was prepared to go
a certain way with them in reform, for he allowed his
Minister of Grace and Justice to pass the law called
after him " Ley Juarez," which abolished the Military
and Ecclesiastical Fueros. But it would appear that
when reform was seen to be developing into a con
fiscation of the Church's property Comonfort became
frightened. He turned over to the Reaction, was
overwhelmed in the confusion he created, and fled
abroad. We may apply to him the scoffing lines
written on the Archbishop of Paris, Louis de Noailles.
" Cy git Louis cahi caha
De oui et non s'entortilla,
Puis dit ceci, puis dit cela,
Perdit la tete et s'en alia."

44 DIAZ
The united Clerical and Military parties obtained
possession of the city of Mexico and the central mass
of the country. Juarez, who as Minister of Grace
and Justice was also President of the Supreme Court,
and by the Mexican Constitution entitled to replace
the President of the Republic in case of death or
disappearance, was recognised as his successor by the
Republicans. He made his way through various
hazards to Veracruz, from whence he directed the
ensuing three years' strife with the Reaction, or
Conservative alliance, headed by that Miramon who
was destined to be shot by the side of the Archduke
Maximilian. Partly because he had the support of
the United States, which recognised him and allowed
its naval officers to intervene in his favour, but not a
little because his position at Veracruz, the chief port
of Mexico, enabled him to intercept the customs
revenue, Juarez was first able to hold his ground and
then to advance against the capital.
While the general struggle was running its course in
the centre and north Porfirio Diaz was steadily
fighting for the common cause in the south, and was
incidentally qualifying himself to succeed Juarez as
" cacique " in Oaxaca. The company of National
Guards he commanded was raised in Ixtlan, where the
hillmen would follow him, but nobody else. His
party was predominant in the State till August of
1857, when the Conservatives, led by a Spaniard of
old Spain, Cobos, who had carried a natural faculty
for guerrillero warfare to Mexico, burst in on them from
the north, and beat them badly at Ixcapa. In this
action Diaz was severely wounded by a musket bullet
in the leg. The wound laid him up for four months,
and the bullet was, for lack of a competent surgeon,

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 45
not extracted till 1859. I* was tnen taken out at La
Ventosa by an American naval surgeon whose ship was
protecting the workmen engaged in laying a road
across the isthmus of Tehuantepec.1
Even before he was cured he had resumed service.
It is characteristic of Mexican history that his chief
in this part of his life was the Mejia who made a third
with Maximilian and Miramon before the firing party
at Queretaro. At Santa Catarina when Republicans
and Conservatives were contending for the town, and
on the battlefield of Jalapa, where Cobos was defeated,
he distinguished himself as a subordinate. " The
torrent of reform," says the future President's
biographer, Senor Escudero, in his " Historic Notes,"
" was advancing in waves of blood to overwhelm the
past." The Republicans gained ground, and, after
Jalapa, Porfirio Diaz was named Governor and
Military Commandant of the district of Tehuantepec.
The isthmus of Tehuantepec lies at the south-east
end of Mexico, where it meets dense tropical forests,
and the Central American republic Guatemala. The
town and administrative district of the name lie on
the south side of the isthmus. Geographically they
occupy a section of the great Mother Range (the Sierra
Madre), which stretches along the Pacific shore. The
administrative district is of considerable size (500
square leagues), but they are square leagues of rugged
hill and tropical forest, inhabited at that time by
60,000 Indians and half-breeds. When the inhabi
tants were not torpid and utterly indifferent they were
much under Clerical influence. Juarez, who was
making head with difficulty against Miramon, could
1 This road was an American venture and was a forerunner of the Panama
Canal. The scheme was quashed by the Senate.

46 DIAZ
spare Diaz but few men and no money. On the
contrary, the new Governor was expected to raise
revenue and help the general cause by receiving and
forwarding arms to be imported from the United
States. The whole force given him for the perform
ance of these duties was 150 men.
The enterprise was, however, not quite so hopeless
as it looks on the bare statement of these facts. Most
of the inhabitants of his government did not care for
either party, and if they would do nothing to help him
they would do nothing to hinder. The Conservatives
had their hands full elsewhere, and could send no
force against him ; and there was a third condition — a
universal one in Mexico — which was much in his
favour. However stagnant life might be in the valleys
of the Sierra Madre, the scattered towns and villages
had vivacity enough to keep alive local rivalries.
The county town, as we may call it, Tehuantepec, was
in a chronic state of dissension with the town of
Juchitan. The first was Clerical and was in the hands
of a party calling itself the Patricios, the Patriots, or
Patricians, for the word can be used in both senses.
Probably for no other reason than because Tehuan
tepec was Clerical, the town of Juchitan took the other
side. Diaz chose the latter as his headquarters, as
was to be expected. The place was for other reasons
convenient to him. It is near the sea-shore, and there
fore well placed to receive stores from the United
States, whereas its rival lies inland.
Diaz held his government for two years, 1857 to
1859, gathering in what money was to be obtained and
dashing out in swift raids as occasion served. He
swooped down on the Patriots or Patricians of
Tehuantepec, who were clumsily preparing to fall on

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 47
him, and sent them flying. For this service he was
promoted to a majority. The promulgation of a new
law which abolished the old military commandant-
ships in March, 1858, and replaced them by " political
districts " made an alteration in the name, but not in
the character of his functions. Another success
against the local Clericals at La Mantequilla earned
him a lieutenant-colonelship. And then he did his
party a material service.
A considerable convoy of arms imported from the
United States had been collected at Juchitan. It
was to be sent on to the Republicans. But Juarez
could send no troops to protect it, and Cobos, who
still held Oaxaca, got wind of so useful a prize. He
prepared to make a raid into Tehuantepec and lay
hands on the weapons. They would have been
valuable to the Conservatives, who, owing to the
hostility of the United States and the occupation of
Veracruz by Juarez, were cut off from supplies and
were much distressed. The Government at Veracruz
learnt or suspected the intention of the Conservative
leader, and orders were sent to Diaz to destroy
the arms rather than allow them to fall into the hands
of the enemy. But Diaz would not submit to that
necessity without an effort, and he contrived to pass
the arms across the hills with the help of his friends at
Juchitan. While the convoy was making its way to
the persons for whom it was intended, he at the head
of his little force beat up the quarters of the intruders
from Oaxaca and delayed them effectually. By the
end of 1859 he had made himself master of the town of
Tehuantepec and had earned his colonelcy. He was
now able to come to the help of his friends elsewhere.
The political district of Tehuantepec was to Diaz

48 DIAZ
what the Eastern Counties Association was to Crom
well. The Republican forces in Oaxaca were under the
command of General Ordaz, who was struggling with
Cobos for the possession of the city. Diaz having
now beaten down the Patricios, raised 500 Indians
by the usual process of the press and marched to join
the Republican general. The venture was not at first
a successful one. When Diaz moved out from
Tehuantepec, his old Juchitan friends, who formed a
large part of his force, proved recalcitrant. They were
ready to serve in their own country, but were not
prepared to go out of it on an expedition which might
keep them from home for an indefinite period. Diaz
had to quiet a mutinous outbreak on January 10,
i860. The danger was, however, averted only for a
few days. Cobos, who appears to have known his
business, was not the man to allow the two Republican
officers to unite their forces at their leisure. He took
the sound course and marched rapidly to fall upon
them while still separated. On January 21 he
attacked Diaz at Mitla. When the Conservatives
were seen coming on, the sulky Juchitans ran away in
a body, and Diaz suffered a smart defeat. Fortu
nately for him the approach of Ordaz drew Cobos off.
He turned to deal with the new enemy, and was in his
turn beaten. This timely intervention gave Diaz
space in which to rally his following or such part of it
as had not gone back to Juchitan. He joined his
fellow-Republicans, who were now under the command
of Salinas, for Ordaz had been killed in the encounter
with Cobos.
The death of Ordaz was a bad mishap for the
Republicans. His successor proved, if not disloyal, at

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 49
least captious and dilatory. Cobos was allowed to
pick himself up. All armies of the guerrillero kind
reunite almost as readily as they scatter, and the
Conservative leader could rally on the city of Oaxaca.
While he was restoring order in his following the
Republicans were wrangling. The civil representa
tive of the Government, Diaz's old friend Marcos
Perez, endeavoured in vain to stimulate Salinas to
activity. They quarrelled, and Diaz strove to pacify
the dispute. He refused to put his superior officer
under arrest at the request of Don Marcos. Then
Juarez sent a new general, Rosas Landa, to take the
command. But his choice was singularly ill-judged,
for when Cobos took the offensive again Rosas Landa
fairly ran away, and the Republicans were beaten
out of the field. Diaz and Salinas, who held together,
took refuge in the mountains of Ixtlan.
After such a disaster the Republican forces would
appear to have been decisively disposed of in the
State of Oaxaca. And yet in August of this very year
Diaz and Salinas were in possession of Oaxaca city,
and Cobos it was who was hiding in the hills. The
victories of loose guerrillero armies are indeed com
monly barren, since they are not gained in the execu
tion of a comprehensive, well-thought-out plan. More
over, it not uncommonly happens that the desire to
put booty in a safe place, or to obtain some private
fruit of victory, or even only to enjoy a little rest,
disorganises the victorious side as fully as if it had
been beaten. Cobos was unable to follow up his
successes, and was forced out of Oaxaca because his
party was losing ground everywhere, his funds were
running dry, and his men were deserting him.
The victory of his cause in his native jState com-

50 DIAZ
pleted the first period in the public life of Porfirio Diaz.
The beginning of another was marked in a significant
manner. In i860 he received his commission as
colonel in the regular army, which had now been
reorganised by Juarez. The new model no longer
enjoyed the invidious privilege of the Fuero Militar,
but it was none the less the greatest force in Mexican
politics. When Diaz passed from the National Guard,
to which he had hitherto belonged, and became an
officer of the standing army, he, as it were openly and
officially, took his place as a candidate for the Presi
dency. Not, of course, at once, but when the oppor
tunity should come. It was natural, and we may
even say inevitable, that when he became colonel he
also became deputy in the Congress summoned by
Juarez. We must not say he was elected, because no
such thing as a free election has ever been known in
any of the republics formed out of the fragments of
the Spanish colonial empire — nor yet in Portuguese
Brazil. If Diaz came to Mexico city in i860 as deputy
for the district of Ocotlan and also as colonel in the
Oaxaca brigade of the national army the reason was
that the Ocotlans received a conge" d'elire permitting
them to choose him.
During the last stage of the war he took an active
share as a subordinate under Ortega in the field. He
was present at the battle of Calpulalpam, where the
organised forces of the Conservatives were finally
broken. But an overthrow of this kind did not by any
means entail the total defeat of the party. The Church
was fighting for everything which could stimulate it
to struggle. The Ley Juarez had deprived it of its
"fuero," which it was bound by all its principles to
consider a gross outrage. When Juarez became

THE BEGINNING OF A CAREER 51
President of the Republic his Minister of Grace and
Justice framed the Ley Lerdo de Tejada — that was
his name — by which all the property of the Church was
confiscated. This measure was one of immense
importance for Mexico. Its effects are felt to this day,
and we shall have to come back to it. For the moment
it is enough to point out that the Ley Lerdo de
Tejada not only secularised the lands of the Church,
but that it took all land in Mexico out of mortmain.
The spoliation, as the Conservatives were bound to
call this measure, affected not the Church alone, but
the Indian towns, which found themselves deprived
of the common lands which had been secured to them
by the old Spanish Laws of the Indies. If, therefore,
the Indians rallied to the cause of the Church with the
cry of " Religion y Fueros," they were not acting
from mere bigotry, nor were they fighting only for the
abusive privilege of the clergy. Their own interests
were threatened. The priest and the Indian had a
common cause.
They found a leader in Marquez, a pure-blooded
Indian of the Sierra de Queretaro. The man was a
savage who killed with joy. He fairly earned his title
of " Tiger of Tacubaya." But he was a vigorous
guerrillero leader. The French officers who saw him
later on judged that he had even the qualities of a
general. And he had the further considerable advan
tage that he was an Indian chief who could rely on
the loyalty of his tribesmen. Though Juarez was in
possession of the capital and had summoned a Con
gress, a great part of the country was in the hands of
the Conservatives. In June, 1861, Marquez made a
dash at the capital. Diaz was compelled to leave
his place in Congress and join Ortega in the field.

52 DIAZ
Marquez was driven back. His loose bands of guer-
rilleros were at a disadvantage in the open. He was
beaten at Jalatlaco and then again at Mineral del
Monte. On the first occasion Diaz attacked without
orders and won a distinct success. The Conserva
tives were described as defeated and their army as
scattered. But the reader will understand that, as
usual, being defeated and scattered by no means
entailed being brought to submission. Marquez's
guerrilleros did not make a point of honour of holding
a position. They relied on wearing their enemy down,
and they knew very well that the few thousand more
or less disciplined troops at the disposal of Juarez were
utterly unequal to the task of occupying their hills.
They divided when hard pressed, only to meet again
miles off. The Conservatives were masters of much
of the country, and Marquez was in arms when a new
and a strange chapter opened in the history of Mexico.

CHAPTER III
THE FRENCH INTERVENTION
Where the carcass is there will the eagles be
gathered together — and the vultures. The weakness
and anarchy of the late Spanish colonies marked them
out as a tempting prey for armed adventurers.
Squatters came to the territory north of the Rio
Grande, Texas, and then, not without reasonable
grounds of provocation on the part of corrupt and
brutal Mexican officials, tore it away. The slave
power in the United States saw an opening for the
extension of slavery in Northern Mexico. By the end
of 1 849 the Republic had been deprived by force of, or
had sold, all its belongings beyond its present northern
frontier. Small adventurers nibbled, or tried to
nibble, bits of Central American or Mexican land.
The Englishman who knows of the Cacique of Poyais
only from Thackeray may be excused for believing
that he was an invention of the novelist. But Gregor
Macgregor was a flesh and blood reality who has his
column in the " Dictionary of National Biography."
He tried to conquer and to found a State. The
mining camps of California bred imitators of the
Cacique in some numbers. There was Walker, known
in rhetorical phrase as the Grey-Eyed Man of Destiny.
Quite a small world of filibusters made inroads,
launched companies, and commonly ended before a
firing party. Their doings are recorded in Mr. H. H.
Bancroft's " History of the Northern Mexican States,"

54 DIAZ
Vol. II., with copious references to authorities. It is a
point not to be overlooked that the French among the
miscellaneous swarms of fortune hunters in California
cast their eyes on the province of Sonora, at the north
western end of the Mexican frontier. Schemes for
founding a French colony in Sonora were evolved and
advertised. Napoleon III. himself did more than
play with them. The object was to work the mines,
which had been profitable under Spanish rule, but
had been neglected since its fall. Two attempts to
seize on the much-exaggerated wealth of the province
were made by French adventurers under the leader
ship of the Comte de Pindray and the gentleman of
Provence who bore the imposing name Gaston Raoulx,
Comte de Raousset Boulbon. The first died in
mysterious circumstances — by his own hand or by
murder at the hands of his mates. The second, a
young dicave who had run through a fair patrimony
in a few months, had written a novel, said to be
very bad, and a good deal of such verse as poetasters
wrote with Lamartine and Alfred de Musset before
them as models, was intent on making a great deal
of money by a gambler's throw. He was shot by
the Mexicans in 1854. They may stand for the
eagles.1 The vultures cannot be better represented than by
Jecker of the notorious bonds. It is to be observed
that this financial adventurer, who was at last
murdered by the communards, was in partnership or
league with Raousset Boulbon. European capitalists
1 The reader who may care to investigate this odd backwater of American
history will find quite interesting matter in the story of his captivity, told
by M. Vigneaux, one of the companions of Pindray and Raousset Boulbon,
and in the rather frothy but amusing life of that person by the Marquis de
la Madeline. There is another by a M. de Lachapelle, which I have not seen.

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 55
had been very imprudently ready to lend money to
the Spanish-American States. The facility with
which the transient chiefs of these communities were
for a time able to raise loans had a good deal to do
with promoting their spendthrift wars. The money
was of course scandalously wasted, and much of it
was stolen by the predominant generals of the day.
A large part of the diplomatic correspondence of other
nations with Mexico was concerned with the reclama
tions of defrauded and disappointed creditors. To
them were to be added the incessant complaints of
foreign merchants, who suffered from robbery dis
guised as forced loans, or robbery naked and un
ashamed. In reality these victims suffered a good
deal less than native Mexicans. After all, they had
their Consuls and Ministers to speak for them, while
the dictator of the day had his reasons for not going
too far against the possible dispensers of loans, or the
Governments from which he might have to ask a safe
refuge. After a time honourable financial houses
declined to have anything to do with such creditors.
Then the rulers who came and went were driven to
make bargains with mere money-lenders of the Jecker
stamp. Miramon, the Conservative President ex
pelled by Juarez for one, made a bargain with Jecker.
In return for a little money down he acknowledged a
huge sum of debt.
I do not propose to swell these pages by even the
briefest summary of the diplomatic history of the
French intervention in Mexico. It has been often told
and can be conveniently read in the " Expedition du
Mexique " of Captain Niox, or, better still, in the
" History of the Second Empire," by M. Pierre de la
Gorce. But it is not an irrelevancy in a life of the man

56 DIAZ
who was to put Mexico in an honourable position,
at least for a time, to give some account of the
" bochorno," the sweltering puddle of hot mud, from
which he pulled his country. We will leave aside the
dreams of Napoleon III., the fantastic delusions of the
Spanish Court, the queer mixture of Quixotic vapours
and Sancho Panza-like gross common sense of Prim,
the wrongs of the British Embassy as told by the
Minister (Sir Charles Wyke), the fictions of the French
Minister (M. de Saligny), the produce of a disorderly
imagination coloured by financial speculations, and
the tripotages of the Due de Morny. In 1861 the War
of Secession was coming on in the United States, and
they for a time were neutralised. Then all the vague
ambitions, the self-deluding and deluded greeds of
the Raousset Boulbons and Jeckers, ran into the river
of dreams of " regeneration of the Latin race "
and creation of a barrier against the ambitions of the
United States (very rashly avowed) which flowed
through the loose imaginings in the head of
Napoleon III. The practical result was the French
intervention in Mexico and the ghastly story of the
Empire of Maximilian.
Yet it was not all the folly of a songe creux. There
was just enough reality in it to provide a solid basis
for the vapours to settle on. We shall have evidence
from the campaigns of Porfirio Diaz himself that
multitudes of Mexicans would gladly have reconciled
themselves to obey a strong, intelligent foreign
Government, which would keep order and administer
with an eye to the good of the country. There was,
too, the Church, maddened by spoliation. There
were the Indians, aggrieved by the confiscation of the
communal lands. If the work had been done honestly,

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 57
if the Church had been fairly treated as far as fair
treatment was possible in such a case, and the Indian
commoners justly compensated, the throwing of the
lands held in mortmain into " general circulation "
might have been a gain for Mexico. But it was not
honestly done. We need not take too high a tone
to the Mexicans. Considering how Henry VIII.
spoiled the English monasteries, how barons and
lairds ravened the Church lands in Scotland, what was
done in France during the Revolution, and in Spain
after 1833, we can leave the Mexicans to do the preach
ing for themselves. The fact must none the less be
recorded that a swarm of pillagers, fraudulent pur
chasers, politicians, and generals in search of booty
settled on the confiscated lands. No part of the
produce was devoted to the public good. The victims
were sore and angry. The victimisers were thieving,
scuffling, intriguing, and lying.
The mass of quiet townsmen and the peasants of
Indian blood who had some property bowed, not
unwillingly, to the foreign rule as they did to the
unending patriots, all more or less sanguinary, who
proclaimed this or that, and raised the banner of
revolt. If there had been no United States, or if the
Secession had succeeded ; if Maximilian had not been
a weak-willed and vaguely romantic person who lived
in a perpetual performance of private theatricals ; if
the Clerical party had had sense and statesmanship ;
if the mass of Mexicans who longed for peace and
security would have acted instead of waiting to be
saved by some Heaven-sent good government, the
empire might have been established and the Archduke
might have died at a great age on what was absurdly
enough called the throne of Montezuma. As every

58 DIAZ
one of these conditions was lacking, it was just a
frantic adventure.
In the spring of 1862 England and Spain had with
drawn from what they had meant should be an attempt
to recover debts, and France had been launched on
what was in plain English a scheme to conquer
Mexico thinly veiled by professions of a wish to enable
its people to decide their own destinies undeterred by
the " menaces of demagogues." General de Lorencez
was at Orizaba with some 6,000 French troops. He
had been joined by a few hundred Conservative
guerrilleros — lean and sun-dried scarecrows, half
naked, armed with lances and mounted on their wiry
nags. They and their usual tail of women and
children gave the French no very high opinion of the
military quality of the allies they were to find in
Mexico, according to the highly-coloured promises of
M. de Saligny. The Zouaves and Chasseurs d'Afrique
in Lorencez's little army had seen just such a " smala "
before. The Mexican forces sent by Juarez to watch
and oppose the French were commanded by General
Zaragoza, with whom Diaz was now serving as
brigadier in the Oaxaca contingent.
The French basis of supply was at Veracruz. This,
the principal port on the Gulf of Mexico, lies on the sea
front of the Hot Land (the Tierra Caliente), which is a
strip of marsh some sixty miles wide, swarming with
yellow-bellied mosquitoes and reeking with fever.
The inner border of the Tierra Caliente is formed by
the river Chiquihuite. Beyond the river begin the
slopes of the great snow-capped mountain Orizaba.
Here is the starting-point of the Tierras Templadas
(the Temperate Zone), well cultivated and containing
well-built towns — Cordoba, Orizaba, and others. The

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 59
Tierras Templadas rise by a gentle slope till they are
cut by a barrier of high and precipitous hills running
from north to south — the Cumbres, or Heights.
The Cumbres can be turned, but the country was
roadless and little known to the French. The yellow
fever of the Tierra Caliente had been so fatal to them
that they had drawn every man they could to the
front. Guerrilleros were pestering their communica
tions, which were but ill guarded. If Lorencez had
endeavoured to turn the Cumbres he would have
marched into the air.
In the circumstances the French general would have
done better to remain at Orizaba till the means for a
further advance were provided. But he had the
natural desire of a soldier to distinguish himself. And
then he had been assured by M. de Saligny, whose
advice he was told to take, that he had only to show
himself in the interior in order to be greeted with
effusion by the mass of the Mexicans. He knew, too,
that there were Conservative bands in the field and
that they were threatening General Zaragoza. So he
decided to advance, relying on the vast military
superiority of his soldiers and the promises of M. de
Saligny. Behind the Cumbres lies the lofty tableland of
Anahuac, the Cold Lands (Tierras Frias) of Mexico.
Two passes lead from the town of Orizaba to the plain
of Anahuac — one by the Cumbres de Maltrata is only
just practicable by wheeled carriages, and very diffi
cult. It leads to the town of San Andres Chalchico-
mula. The second goes by the defile of Acultzingo,
from whence the road is open and easy to the very
Clerical town of Puebla de los Angeles, which was the
prize he aimed at. The pass is a staircase flanked by

60 DIAZ
precipices, almost impossible to turn, and providing
two most defensible positions at the Great and Little
Cumbres, the two parallel chains forming the range.
It may be confidently asserted that if such a position
had been held by Prim with half the Spanish soldiers
who had just gone back to Cuba, or by 2,000 Boer
marksmen, Lorencez would not have forced the pass
by a front attack, not even if he had been prepared
" to cloy the jaws of death." But he was opposed by
pressed Indians who had received a mere veneer of
drill, who had never been taught to hold a position
solidly, and who were commanded by men who were
officers only because they had received commissions.
The patriot troops had just given a proof of their
quality. The first brigade of the Oaxaca contingent
had been sent to take quarters in the tithe barn of
Chalchicomula. They shambled into the yard, men,
women, and children, bringing with them a convoy of
gunpowder. The explosive was thrown down at the
" grace of God," and the women set about cooking
their husbands' dinners. The natural consequence
followed. The gunpowder caught fire and blew up.
The brigade, the women, children, horses, pack mules,
and the tithe barn were dashed to pieces. Yet that
brigade passed for one of the best in the Mexican
army. It had served under Diaz and was partly
raised by him. It would be pure waste to spend
words over the action of April 28 when Lorencez forced
the pass. Enough that eight companies of the 2nd
Zouaves and six companies of the 1st Battalion of the
Chasseurs a pied rushed a position 600 metres high
defended by some 4,000 men and 18 guns, with a loss
of two killed and 32 wounded.
Lorencez may be excused for thinking after such an

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 61
experience as this that he could safely rush at any
thing held by Mexican troops. When Zaragoza fell
back on the town of Puebla the French general
followed him nothing doubting. But he was mis
taken. The Mexicans, Indians, and mestizos were
not cowards. When they were stationed in solid
stone buildings, loopholed, they could stand well.
Puebla is a typical Spanish-Indian town, full of solid
houses and massive convents, and defended on the
east by outlying forts. The proper approach is on
the western side, and so Lorencez had been told by a
Mexican officer who joined him. In his contempt for
such soldiers, and his overweening confidence in his
own men, he simply marched along the Orizaba road
from the east, and rushed at the forts on May 5.
He had no battering train, and what guns he had —
light field-pieces — were fired at too great a distance
to produce any effect. Of course no impression was
made on the forts. The French, marching up to
unbreached walls, lost heavily, and were brought to a
standstill. Diaz contributed materially to their final
repulse by a well-timed and well-directed sortie
against the flank of their line. A violent storm of
rain came down. Lorencez fell back with a loss of
16 officers and 156 men killed, 19 officers and 285 men
wounded. Zaragoza hardly went too far when he said
that the French general made his attack con torpeza,
that is to say, in a very clumsy manner. But the
victorious Mexican's report grows almost lyrical over
the valour of the French soldiers, and it is easy to see
that the general was much and agreeably surprised
by his victory over " the first soldiers in the world."
Diaz himself was honourably candid as to his
own feelings. When in later years he dictated his

62 DIAZ
reminiscences he frankly said : " The victory was so
unexpected that we were surprised indeed by it, and
as it appeared to me to be a dream I bivouacked that
night on the field in order to confirm the reality of the
event by the dumb testimony of our enemy's dead
and those of our own forces ; by the talk of the soldiers
round the fires, and the distant glow of the enemy's
camp." The French did indeed inspire such a profound
respect for their fighting capacity in the open that no
serious attempt was made to harass them during their
retreat to Orizaba. General Zaragoza did, it is true,
follow them in time and at a safe distance, but he
made no attempt to force on an action. The siege
of Orizaba which he proceeded to form when he had
been reinforced amounted to very little more than a
passive watching of Lorencez's little army from a long
way off. General Zaragoza showed a well-grounded
prudence in abstaining from more active measures.
The result of the one offensive movement of the
Mexicans only proved their utter unfitness to meet
the French at close quarters. Orizaba is dominated
by a hill, the Cerro Borrego. When an attempt was
made to seize this position on June 14, and by a large
Mexican force, it was shattered by 140 soldiers of the
99th of the line commanded by Captain Detrie. The
Mexican force was composed of 2,000 men of the
division of Zecatecas, who were counted as the best
drilled in the Mexican army.
From early in May, 1862, till the beginning of
March, 1863, the war was at a standstill. The French
were receiving reinforcements and were preparing to
advance. Juarez was doing all that was in his power
to organise a national resistance. General Lorencez

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 63
reopened, and kept open, his communications with
Veracruz until he was recalled and replaced by
General (afterwards Marshal) Forey. Diaz, who had
been promoted to general of brigade for his services
on May 5, was appointed Military Governor of the
Veracruz district. There was, however, very little
for him to do. The only forces available for opera
tions against the invaders were the guerrillero bands
formed of men who had lived by civil strife. They
were mere brigands, whose highest achievement was
to butcher stragglers, and, when the luck favoured
them, to cut off a very small detachment. They
were perfectly ferocious, and they excelled themselves
in cruelty to those of their countrymen who were
known, or were only suspected, to sympathise with
the French. Against them the foreign authorities
organised the notorious contra-guerrillera led by
Colonel du PinI This body was recruited mainly
among the broken men — beachcombers, deserters
from ships, bullies and ruffians of all nationalities, and
no scruple — who have ever hung about the Gulf ports.
Du Pin fought the Mexican guerrilleros with their own
weapons, and proved to demonstration that European
vagabonds led by a French ofiicer could equal the
vilest excesses of native ferocity. No good was to
be done for the one side or the other by such methods
as these. Diaz might well prefer, and did prefer, to
take his share in a more honourable kind of warfare.
While the French expedition was being raised to an
adequate strength by drafts from Europe, Juarez was
preparing to defend his Government. The method he
took was perhaps the only one available in the existing
circumstances. He concentrated the arms and the
men he could scrape together at Puebla, and decided

64 DIAZ
to make a stand at that fortress. A place besieged is
a place taken unless it can be relieved from the outside,
and, as the President's power to collect another army
capable of forcing the French to raise the siege they
were certain to undertake was nil, it follows that the
forces shut up in Puebla must sooner or later be lost.
The case would seem to have been one for acting on
the maxim of Sir William Wallace — who loved better
to hear the lark sing than the mouse cheep — for
refusing to shut men up within walls, for relying on a
policy of wearing the French down by skirmishes and
stopping their advance by threatening their com
munications. So undoubtedly he ought to have
behaved if he could have relied on the support of the
whole population of Mexico. But he could not.
The mass of the people was passive, and a good half
of those who were prepared to act — that is, the
Clericals — were bitterly hostile and were co-operating
with the French. To hold Puebla strongly, make a
long defence and so gain time, was on the whole the
best course to follow. So some 15,000 men were
thrpwn into the town and there awaited the advance
of the French. The President's policy was to some
extent justified by the fact that not a few of the Con
servative leaders rallied to him when it became clear
that the country was about to be invaded by a French
army. Their patriotism was possibly stimulated by a
shrewd suspicion that a Government supported by a
serious force might be strong enough to put a stop to
the profitable game of pronunciamiento-making. Yet
they must be credited with having subordinated party
to country without renouncing their principles, for
no sooner had the French army retired before the
menaces of the United States in 1867 th_ari rno§.t of

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 65
them who survived took up arms at once in the old
quarrel. In 1863 there was a faint possibility that
all the Conservatives would follow their example, and
there was a good deal to be said for giving time to
time — dar tiempo al tiempo, as the Spanish maxim
(much acted on) has it. Zaragoza having died in the
interval, General Ortega was appointed to conduct
the defence.
The siege of Puebla was even more creditable to the
Mexicans than the repulse of Lorencez's feeble attack
on May 5. They held out from March 16 to May 17,
and then did not surrender till their provisions were
exhausted. We are told in the reminiscences of Diaz
that he and several other of the generals present urged
Ortega to take a fine which would have been more
spirited, and if successful vastly more effective, than
a pure defence. He says that when Forey's army of
26,000 men was closing round the town it advanced
in two columns, one on one side and the other on the
other. Diaz and the generals who thought with him
implored their chief to strike at the head of one of the
columns. It does appear a tenable proposition that an
army of 15,000, or according to the French of 20,000,
which possessed the advantage of acting on interior
lines and of being covered behind by the town, might
have spared men enough to concentrate a superior
force at a point of attack to deliver a shrewd blow at
the French while they were coming into position.
Ortega would take no risks and refused. His advisers
retired, some of them grumbling audibly that they
were condemned to be caught in a trap and compelled
to surrender sooner or later.
The President's memory of that council of war may
be frankly accepted as .correct. Subordinate officers

66 DIAZ
who cannot give the decision, and who therefore would
not be held responsible if it were taken and failed,
have always been ready to urge the adoption of a bold
course on wary commanders-in-chief. On the prin
ciples Diaz was no doubt right, and yet it may well be
that Ortega was not wrong. The attack from the
centre to the circumference by the lesser on the more
numerous army is no doubt a brilliant manoeuvre, but
unless it is performed with rapidity and precision it
will infallibly be disastrous. The Mexican army had
not been trained to observe what Collingwood called
" the nice concert of measures that are necessary to
success." If Ortega had tried to play the great game
of Rossbach and Leuthen and Salamanca, it is, con
sidering the quality of his troops, eminently probable
that he would have been heavily beaten, and then
Puebla would have fallen at once. The cautious line
he took had at least the merit of making it possible to
hold the French back for two months and so give time
to time.
M. Pierre de la Gorce, in his " History of the Second
Empire," tells us that when the first reports of the
siege of Puebla began to reach Paris (by steamer, for
the Atlantic cable was not laid at that date) the name
of Zaragoza — the Spanish city, not the Mexican
general — was much in the mouths of critics and also
of nervous friends of Napoleon III. There was just
enough similarity between the two sieges to save the
comparison from being altogether one of the Macedon
and Monmouth order. There was, however, one
great difference. The capital of Aragon was defended
in 1808 by its inhabitants and the countrymen of the
neighbourhood, who took refuge within its walls.
Puebla was defended by its numerous garrison. The

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 67
city was perhaps the most levitical in all Mexico — the
very centre and headquarters of the Clerical party.
Whatever sympathies the townsmen had were rather
with the enemy outside than with the defenders
within. But as usual these sympathies were entirely
passive. Forey gained nothing positive by them.
The prominent part which Diaz took in the two
months' resistance laid the foundation of his fame.
Until now he was only one of a large body of political
and semi-political generals and colonels, who were
collectively a pest. When the siege ended he was well
on his way to become a national hero. We must
therefore dwell a little on his actions and look with
some attention at the place where they were per
formed. Because Puebla " of the Angels " was, and from the
first had been, above all a Clerical city, it abounded in
massive buildings. Its sixteen convents and many
of the secular houses within it had been erected in the
most flourishing ages of Spanish colonial history.
Building material was abundant, time was no con
sideration, slave and serf labour was obtainable in
unlimited quantities. In these conditions the
Spaniards constructed as if they were building for
eternity. They brought with them an excellent
tradition of masonry, inherited, not from the so-called
Arabs, whose work in that kind was far from good,
but from the " obras de Romanos," the works of the
Romans at Merida, Segovia, and Tarragona. They
made admirable mortar, and then they held the rule
that " Lo que quita el frio quita el calor " (" What
keeps out the cold keeps out the heat "). A thick-
walled house is warmer in winter and cooler in summer.
All this stonework would have crumbled into dust

68 DIAZ
within a few hours under the fire of the guns which
have thundered in the ears of all the world since
August, 1914. But Forey had no such battering train.
The massive old Spanish walls were quite equal to the
strain of resisting his field-pieces and his eight " canons
de 12 de siege," with their reserve of six of the same
calibre. Nor had Ortega been negligent in prepara
tion. The forts on the west and south and the city
walls were looked to. Of these no more need be said.
Forey was warned by the experience of Lorencez and
made his attack from the east, where the city lies
most open. Ortega had foreseen that this would
probably be the side to be assailed. He had made a
fort of the penitentiary which stood outside the walls.
It was named the San Javier (i.e., St. Xavier). But
the real defences were within. Barricades had been
solidly constructed, house walls loopholed, mines laid.
He meant to fight from barricade to barricade, and to
force the enemy to pay heavily for every advance. It
was a reasonable calculation that Forey, whose rein
forcements must reach him across the Atlantic, could
not afford to be "a general at 10,000 men a week."
The French officer would perhaps have done better to
begin where he was forced to end, that is to say, invest
the town and starve it out, standing ready to scatter
any forces which might come to its relief. He would
have got the place quite as soon as he did, and would
have lost fewer men — a consideration of some weight
for a general who had only 26,000 with whom to
dominate a country four times the size of France.
But this thrifty course would have been painful to an
army which, justly enough on the whole, had no great
respect for the military qualities of its opponents.
So he fixed his headquarters at the convent of San

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 69
Juan on a low hill to the east of the town, and pre
pared to clear the way by taking the San Javier and
then effect a quick storm.
It is not necessary to give a detailed account of the
siege, but only to show the theatre on which Diaz was
to win distinction. As regards the general operations,
it is enough to say that the besieger's force had no
difficulty in disposing of such relieving force as Juarez
was able to send ; that the San Javier was stormed,
the city walls occupied ; and that then the real
fighting began inside. This stage lasted till April 7.
During that period the French had lost one general
and seven officers killed, 39 officers wounded, 56
soldiers killed, and 443 wounded. A casualty fist of
545 in an army of 26,000 may not appear very serious.
But the progress made was little, and the historian
of the Mexican expedition, Captain Niox, has to con
fess that this fighting amid loopholed walls, over mines,
and under falling roofs tried the nerve of the soldiers.
It made, he confesses, " une impression facheuse sur
leur moral." Forey turned the siege into a blockade
and waited till hunger compelled the Mexicans to
capitulate. Diaz was in the thick of the fighting during the last
days of March and the first of April. The portion of
the line particularly entrusted to him was composed
of the convents of San Marcos and San Agustin, which
lie respectively north and south of one another, and
the block of houses between. Puebla is built in
straight streets cutting one another at right angles.
The houses in the oblong blocks, known as " man-
zanas " in Spanish, are closely joined and inhabited
in flats. The President's reminiscences supply a lively
picture of a pas.sage of street fighting.

70 DIAZ
The French advanced till they were in possession of
the hospice facing San Marcos, and were piercing the
walls in order to bring a gun to bear on the buildings
opposite. The ground floor of San Marcos was occu
pied by shops on either side of the " zaguan " — that
is to say, the porch and passage which led into the
courtyard, the central " patio " of the building. The
door had been solidly barricaded with flagstones taken
from the ground of the zaguan and the courtyard.
An opening had been made through the wall at the
back of the yard to allow the defenders to come and
go without exposing themselves in the open. When
the French had pierced the wall of the hospice, they
fired into the San Marcos and beat in the front of the
shop to the right of the porch, and attempted to rush
the building. They advanced to blow in the door of
the zaguan, did not succeed, and then they forced
their way in through the shop.
" There was," says the President, " one anxious
moment when the fury of the French charge into the
courtyard struck my soldiers with panic so that they
went so far as to attempt to run, but the narrowness
of the opening in the wall would not allow them all to
get off. At that moment I fired a little mortar which
I had in the yard loaded with grape shot, and let
them (i.e., the French) have it near enough to singe
their beards [a quema ropa = burn their clothes, the
equivalent of the French d brule pourpoint]. It
scared them sufficiently to make them leave the
courtyard they were just about to occupy, and they
ran back into the porch."
One of the Zouaves in the attacking party made a
rush at Diaz, who stopped him by hurling a revolver
into his face. He fell, either from the force of the

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 71
blow — which was no doubt severe, for Don Porfirio
was by all testimony a very strong man — or because
he was wounded at that moment by a shot. The
President never indulges in the Munchausen vein and
generally gives ample credit to his friends and
subordinates. On this occasion he records the stout
help given him by one of his corporals. He adds a
biographical detail which deserves to be repeated for
its candid simplicity. The revolver was a second
hand one and out of order. It had been bought in a
pawn-shop, he tells us, " for at that time our pecuniary
circumstances were bad." 1
His soldiers now rallied and forced the French out.
The fighting went on for three or four days. The
French brought guns and tried to master houses here
and there by forcing their way into front rooms and
firing into and across the patios. The result commonly
was that they brought the roofs down on their own
heads. For though the walls of these old buildings
are extremely solid, the frequent earthquakes which
afflict Mexico have taught the wisdom of making the
roofs light so that they collapse easily without injury
to the shell of the house. The inhabitants who cannot
get clear away in time take cover in the thickness of
the walls at doorways. Diaz contrived to hold the
San Marcos. When the French renewed the attack
and again tried to burst into the building through the
shop, he prepared a trap. Holes were made in the
1 For the benefit of possible book-hunters and curiosity-seekers in
Spanish-speaking countries I will put a note here which my experience tells
me will not be superfluous. The adjective " viejo " (old) means second-hand.
A libro viejo or pistola vieja, like Don Porfirio's in this case, is a second-hand
book or pistol. When what is sought is a book or pistol or any other article
interesting for its age the curio-hunter should be careful to ask for a libro
antiguo or pistola antigua. The Spaniards never err in their use of the
words, and the blunders of foreigners, who usually do, are the cause of
innocent merriment.

72 DIAZ
roof and hand grenades were dropped on the intruders.
They were once more driven out. Diaz tells us with
perhaps a touch of not ill-natured malice that the
officer who commanded the final assault, when
deserted by his men and called on to surrender, replied
in the legendary Cambronne formula " The Zouaves
never surrender ! " Nevertheless he did when it
became clear that he would be shot if he proved
contumacious. The President's narrative is on the whole borne out
by the French version of the story given in Captain
Niox's History.
A few days of this work convinced Forey that he
would lose more men than he could afford to spend if
he continued in his attempt to take the town house by
house. He suspended these attacks, sent for heavier
guns from the French men-of-war in the Gulf, and
confined himself to beating off the feeble efforts of
the Mexicans to relieve the garrison and to menacing
the outer forts. When the would-be relieving army
had been routed by Forey's subordinate Bazaine at
San Lorenzo and the provisions of the garrison were
nearly exhausted (though it was afterwards shown that
the townsmen had hidden considerable stores of food),
Ortega tried to obtain a capitulation and the honours
of war. Forey insisted on surrender pure and simple.
The Mexicans laid down their arms after destroying
their ammunition. Diaz was one of the 26 generals,
303 field officers, and 1,179 company officers who fell
into the power of the French. It was quite in accord
ance with the established rules of Mexican warfare
that a large proportion of the common soldiers taken
were at once incorporated by the Conservative leader
Marquez, who had joined Forey, in his own ranks.

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 73
Of the officers, many were sent to France, from whence
they were subsequently allowed to return on the
understanding, or in the hope, that they would join
Maximilian. Some did take that course. A large
proportion of the prisoners contrived to escape within
a few days. Diaz was one of those who succeeded in
getting away. At a later period he was accused of
having broken his parole, but he always denied that
he had given it, nor could it ever be proved that he had.
When free he hurried to report to Juarez at Mexico
city. Don Benito saw that after the fall of Puebla
and the rout at San Lorenzo he was in no position to
offer further opposition to the advance of the French
on the capital. He removed his Government north
wards to the famous old mining city, San Luis de
Potosi. Diaz, whose rank as general of division was
confirmed in October, 1863, was commissioned to
raise troops in the province of Queretaro. " The city
of Mexico," said Juarez, " will be just one town more in
the possession of the French." He was perfectly right.
The occupation of the capital had no effect whatever
on the other cities and provinces of the Republic,
which had never followed its lead and enjoyed local
independence. The French had apparently forgotten
the teaching of the Peninsular War and the utter
uselessness to them of the occupation of Madrid.
Forey left Puebla on June 4, and occupied the capital
on the 1 2th. He met with no opposition. All the
townsmen asked was that he would not allow Marquez
to enter the city. When they were assured that they
would be protected against the " Tiger of Tacubaya "
and his cut-throats they decorated their houses and
welcomed the French with effusion.
A parody of Napoleon's scandalous proceedings at

74 DIAZ
Bayonne in 1808 now followed. A miscellaneous
assembly of notables was held, and it offered the
" Crown of Montezuma " to Maximilian. The vote
of this scratch collection of mere insignificances was
made to do duty for a national choice. It was not
what Napoleon and Maximilian had hoped for, but
they had committed themselves already. The Em
peror of the French could not go back without covering
himself with ridicule. After the repulse at Puebla in
May, 1862, the honour of the French arms had to be
vindicated. A foolish enterprise was to be persisted
in because it had been begun. A provisional Govern
ment conducted affairs in the name of the Emperor
Maximilian till he should arrive — that is to say, it
professed to be the Government of Mexico wherever a
French garrison was in possession on the fine of com
munications from Veracruz to the capital and in a few
places to right or to left. Everywhere else the
government, as far as there was any, was conducted in
the name of the Republic and of the President Juarez.
The unhappy Archduke and his still more unhappy
wife, Amelie Charlotte of Belgium, reached Veracruz
in May, 1864, en mal hora, in an evil hour for him and
for her. He came with the remnant of a loan raised
by the help of Napoleon and burdened by a heavy
financial obligation which he was totally unable to
fulfil. He was bound to support the French army of
occupation out of a non-existent revenue. It was the
French army which had to support him out of its
military chest, which again had to be filled from
France. The essential folly of the whole venture was made
manifest from the day that the Archduke reached his
capital. There were many Mexicans who would have

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 75
accepted a good Government from Maximilian so long
as they were not called on to make efforts or undergo
sacrifices to help him. There was only one body of
persons in Mexico who would or could have given him
effective support. They were the Clericals, and their
help was to be had on their terms only. The con
ditions they would have imposed may be fairly said
to have been all that Hildebrand or Boniface VIII.
would have claimed or Pius IX. would have insisted
on if he could. They asked for nothing less than the
entire subordination of the State to the Church, the
restoration of all Church land, the suppression of all
freedom of worship and opinion. Now it was mani
festly impossible for an Austrian archduke to submit
to such demands. It was still more impossible for
Napoleon III. He would have helped the Church if
it had allowed him, but no ruler of Frenchmen could
dare to make so abject a submission to Clerical pre
tensions. The Mexican Clericals were not amenable
to reason. They would not listen ; they scorned all
appeals to show moderation and accept facts. They
would assert and demand all as a right not to be
discussed. As it was impossible to work with the Church,
Maximilian had to fall back on efforts to win the sup
port of the Liberals. When he tried to govern as a
Mexican ruler, he soon came into collision with the
French. When he supported the French, he offended
the Mexicans. Add to this that the United States
would never recognise his Government, though he
debased himself to humble solicitations. When the
cause of the Confederacy declined and fell, it became
obvious that the Union would insist on the with
drawal of the French troops. So long as they remained

76 DIAZ
they could easily scatter the armed mobs which were
called Republican armies ; but they never succeeded
in driving Juarez over the border, though he was so
hard pressed as to be forced to send his family for
safety to American territory, and while he remained
in any corner of the country, though it were only in
some out-of-the-way hiding-place in the deserts of
Chihuahua, the Republican Government was in being.
No more need be said of the war in Northern
Mexico. The field of activity assigned to Porfirio
Diaz was in his native South. In October, 1863, he
received a commission which had perhaps more to do
with his future importance than any other incident
in his career so far. He was appointed to take 2,800
men raised in the North and to march across Central
Mexico to Oaxaca. His command was to be known
as the Army of the East and was to include the pro
vinces of Guerrero, Puebla, and Oaxaca. To reach
his command he had to pass the line of communication
of the French army, watched as it was by 30,000 men,
including the " traitors " who had joined the invaders.
In so far as the necessity for avoiding armed forces
was concerned, the difficulties of the feat were not
very formidable. Thirty thousand men are but few
to watch vast spaces of country thinly inhabited and
full of mountains. Allowing for his own knowledge
and the help of local guides, allowing, too, for his
freedom from the embarrassment of a heavy train of
artillery and ammunition wagons, to avoid an inter
cepting force was a comparatively small matter.
The real difficulty rather began when the French line
of communication was crossed, and the march had to
be completed through mountains covered by dense
forest where no roads were, and when even local

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 77
knowledge failed so utterly that it was necessary to
march by the compass and explore as he went.
The considerable powers of endurance of the Mexican
Indian soldiers were sharply tested, and there was
probably no passage in his life in which Don Porfirio
benefited more by his early love of sport on the hillside
and practice as a cragsman.
A glance at a fairly good map will do more to make
the march intelligible than any amount of words.
The starting-point was at Amalco, to the south of
Queretaro. From Amalco it was necessary to take a
sweep out to the west and then round south by
Molinos de Caballero, Aguangueo, Orocutia, Laureles,
Los Arcos, Almaloya, Soltepec, and Zacualpam in
order to avoid the French force stationed at Toluca,
to the south-west of the city of Mexico. From Zacual
pam Diaz and his little army had to turn south-east
to reach Oaxaca. In front of them was Tazco or
Tasco, a small place held by a native force under
French command. Diaz did not think it necessary to
avoid this obstacle. On October 26, 27, and 28, he
assailed and took it, capturing a supply of useful
weapons. From Tazco he marched by many places
of names exotic and sonorous — Tepecuacuilco, Atlix-
taca, Ixcatiopa, Xilaca-yoapas, Huitezco, south
east to Oaxaca. The reader who follows the route will
see that it led across, and recrossed, several chains of
mountains, hills which go to make up the great Sierra
Madre, many rivers which are in fact mountain
torrents, and across much sub-tropical forest.
It was not till the end of November that Diaz,
marching like the knight-errant of the Spanish ballad,
" De Sierra en Sierra, por orillas de la mar " (" From
hills to hills by the seashore "), reached Oaxaca, where

78 DIAZ
he found a state of things very characteristic of a
country distracted between anarchy and foreign
invasion. So far the provisional Government, or the
French generals, without whose direction nothing
could be done, had been too busy in the centre and the
north to pay attention to the south. The Southerners,
Sudenos in native speech, were well disposed to stay
quiet so long as they were left alone, and Cajiga, the
Governor of Oaxaca, with his secretary, Esperon, had
in fact made an arrangement with the provisional
Government whereby the State agreed to remain quiet
if it were not attacked, and to await the taking of a
national vote. In plain Castilian this meant that
Oaxaca would fall into line if the provisional Govern
ment could rid itself of Juarez — provided, of course,
that the local interests of local politicians were fairly
considered. The intrusion of Porfirio Diaz, a man
with local connections, at the head of an armed force
recruited so far away as Queretaro and the still more
distant provinces of Sinaloa and Sonora, was most
unwelcome to Governor Cajiga and his secretary, and
indeed to all who preferred a quiet life.
When the Governor met Diaz he began by pointing
out that the large powers given to the General were
unconstitutional — a common malady with " powers "
in Mexico — and went on to ask whether he intended
to make use of force. Don Porfirio states in connec
tion with a later passage of history at Oaxaca that it
was his custom to use ferocious language in order to
spare himself the painful necessity of taking harsh
measures. So he answered in, as we can imagine, a
significant tone that he certainly would use force
against the French and all traitors. The hint was
plain and effective. Cajiga and Esperon travelled

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 79
rapidly to Mexico, leaving the State of Oaxaca
headless. Constitutional pedantries were out of place
at such a crisis. Diaz stepped into the Governor's
place, and appointed as his secretary his trusty friend,
Justo Benitez. All lovers of a quiet life accepted
these irregular, but in Spanish America normal,
proceedings with passivity.
Don Porfirio now began to organise the three pro
vinces put under his command to take an active part
in the war. Another glance at the map will show that
Puebla, Guerrero, and Oaxaca were of the highest
importance to the national Government for a reason
apart from the revenue they could contribute to the
general treasury of the Republic. They flank the
whole line of communications from Veracruz to the
capital, and from the capital to the Pacific coast at
Acapulco. So long as they remained in the hands of
the Republicans they constituted a perpetual menace
to the provisional or imperial Government and tied
down a large proportion of its troops. If they had
been patriotically zealous they could have made it
impossible for Bazaine, who had succeeded to the
command of the French army when Forey was recalled
in October, 1863, to carry out operations against
Juarez in the north. If they had no such influence
the reason simply was that, as Diaz shows very plainly
in his reminiscences, the people were not zealous.
When the Empire had fallen because the only prop
which upheld it — namely, the French army — had
been withdrawn in obedience to the menaces of the
United States, it became the custom to speak of this
war as a struggle between the outraged patriotism
of a whole people and a foreign invader supported by
a few traitors. The reality was very different. The

8o • DIAZ
war was a struggle between a French army which was
absurdly unequal in numbers to the task of occupying
a country of 769,000 square miles in size, full of rugged
mountain chains, on the one hand, and on the other
that part of the population, which had ever been in
arms against some Government, and which had ever
used those same mountain fastnesses as places of arms
and of refuge. The mass of the population was passive
and would do nothing to help or to hinder either side
except under pressure.
As the Republican army could not be organised into
an effective force for offensive operations, and as the
French were too busy elsewhere to advance, months
passed before anything happened. Moreover, a
French army could not move like an encampment of
Bedouins, using its women as army service corps, and
going, as the sailors might say, " flying light." It
needed a battering train and the usual impedimenta
of a regular army. Now the south and south-east
of Mexico are separated from the centre by rugged
mountain country, in which the roads were mere
tracks, often mere beds of torrents winding between
upright cliffs of bare rock, and crossed by " barrancas "
or precipitous-sided beds of rivers, and canons, sheer
fissures of great depth. There were places on the line
from Mexico to Oaxaca where it was necessary to
wind for three or four miles in order to get from one
side to another of a narrow valley. The indispensable
preliminary to an advance on Oaxaca was the con
struction of a road, and to that Bazaine applied him
self. The campaign at the end of 1864 and the begin
ning of 1865 was made up of the construction of the
road and the fall of the city.
During the first half of 1864 Bazaine confined

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 8r
himself to pushing his outposts down to, or a little
beyond, the 18th degree of latitude. By this measure
of precaution he covered the province of Puebla and
confined Diaz to Oaxaca. The French advanced,
road-making as they went along. They found no
difficulty in obtaining native labour for pay. On the
contrary, the population welcomed them, and com
plained bitterly of the exactions of the Republican
leaders. If Diaz had had the measure of active
support which Mina and other guerrillero chiefs found
in Navarre and Catalonia during the Peninsular War,
he would have made the French pay dear for every
step in that advance. There was no lack of effort on
his part. In August, when the French attack was
beginning to develop, he dashed at them fiercely and
on the best guerrillero principles, making false attacks
to cover rapid marches across hill and dale, and falling
on posts he had selected for attack. But when it
came to actual hand-strokes his men would not stand
up to the French. Even when he caught a small
detachment of his enemy bathing and assailed them,
they seized their rifles, fought naked, and the Mexicans
were beaten off. General Brincourt, who was in
immediate command, drove the Republicans before
him and advanced to within sixty miles of Oaxaca.
He was convinced that he could get the town by a
quick attack. Bazaine, however, thought the advance
would be premature till the communications were
opened by the making of the road. Brincourt was
ordered to establish an advanced post at Yanhuitlan,
and withdrew his main force. Bazaine reserved the
occupation of the city for the time when it could be
done solidly, and for himself.
Both sides now fell to work with spade and pick,

82 , DIAZ
the French at road-making and Diaz in the fortifica
tions of Oaxaca. Mexico gained lasting advantage
from the road, but the fortifications turned out to be
of no use even for their immediate purpose. The
fact was that the position of the Republican general
was a hopeless one. Many of his subordinates were
deserting him. Officers of high rank went off either
to submit to the Emperor or to take to guerrillero
fighting, with its attendant advantage of contribution-
raising. Throughout the whole campaign, which
ended with the occupation of Oaxaca by the French
in February, 1865, the national guards of the smaller
towns either refused all obedience to the Republican
Government and stood aside from the struggle entirely,
or they openly joined the Empire. This was in fact
the period when the Republican Government was at
the lowest and when Maximilian could claim to be
gaining ground. The Civil War in the United States
was at its height. General Sherman had not yet
exposed the hollowness of the Confederacy by his
march from Atlanta to Savannah. Many Mexicans
of note who had hitherto remained loyal to the
national cause now made their submission to Maxi
milian. Among them was General Uraga, under
whom Diaz had served in earlier years. Uraga made
an attempt to draw him over to the cause of the Empire.
If he had succeeded he would have rendered his new
master appreciable service. The adhesion of the
Governor of Oaxaca would have carried with it the
submission of the whole south of the country and a
valuable addition to the resources of the empty
treasury of the Empire, and that without the need for
any sacrifice of men or money on the part of the new
Government. Maximilian and the Mexican advisers

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 83
he drew about him would have had good reason to
rejoice if such an important gain could have been
made without the aid of the French. They were very
restive under the dictation of Bazaine.
Uraga sent his son Luis with a letter to Diaz. We
cannot suppose that this was the actual beginning of
their correspondence. Luis Uraga would hardly have
been sent into the lion's den unless some security had
been given for his safe return. There is no probability,
and there is certainly no evidence, that Diaz ever
meant to desert his party. But he may have been
not unwilling to take advantage of an opportunity
offered him by the other side to affirm his loyalty.
Uraga's letter, which reached Oaxaca in November,
was plausible, and it gave Diaz reasons of an honour
able, or at least of a decent, kind why he should follow
the example set by the writer. The converted Liberal
general pointed out that the Republican armies were
all scattered and that a prolongation of guerrillero
warfare, with its usual accompaniments of raids and
extortion of contributions, could bring nothing but
misery on Mexico. He protested that he was not
asking his friend to give his aid to a French annexation
of Mexico. He declared that if he thought the national
independence to be menaced he would have continued
to resist to the last. But he was convinced that the
independence of Mexico was quite safe under Maxi
milian and that a constitutional monarchy offered
the best of guarantees for good government in the
future. The letter was indeed written with all the
instinctive understanding of a Spaniard or superior
stamp of Spanish-American how to say what you have
to say with the air becoming to a gentleman and with
dignity.

84 DIAZ
The weakness of Uraga's plea was one of which
he was perhaps not himself conscious. The deadly
readiness of men of Spanish blood to confound the
fine word with the substantial fact may have misled
him, as it has done, and daily does, many others.
There was nothing in the general's letter (nor was there
in the notorious facts of the case) to show that Maxi
milian's Government could live for six months if the
French army were withdrawn. Without its aid
the Emperor would be even less able to support him
self than the native Presidents who had come up and
had gone down at the rate of about one a year. If
he had not known this, why did he endeavour to
recruit bands of Belgian and Austrian soldiers of
fortune ?
Now, even if we refuse to allow Porfirio Diaz the
credit of having acted on principle and from patriotic
feeling (which we have no right to do without evidence)
he was certainly a man of sufficient native sagacity to
see what was patent to others. If the Empire was
wholly dependent on the continued assistance of a
French army, it was a farce to talk of national inde
pendence. And, unless there was a guarantee for a
continued French occupation, no one who joined
Maximilian could have any security for the future.
Don Porfirio professed his belief in the final victory of
the national cause and declined to take Uraga's
advice.1 It would not be worth while to go into the details of
the fall of Oaxaca in February, 1865. The measures
which Don Porfirio had taken to put the town in a
1 I have not thought it necessary to quote the letter he sent in answer
to Uraga's. It is verbose, and is written in the involved gerundial style of
modern Spanish-speaking officialdom. The mere wording of the document
was probably due to Justo Benitez.

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION 85
state to be defended, and most especially his destruc
tion of a number of houses for the purpose of depriving
a besieging army of cover, had caused deep offence.
Desertions grew more frequent, the townsmen were
sulkily hostile, there was no prospect of help from
without. Indeed, the only support Don Porfirio had
was a small mounted guerrilla led by his brother El
Chato. When Bazaine had once drawn his lines round
the town there was nothing to be done save to sur
render. It may well be that if Don Porfirio had not
ridden out to surrender on February 8 he would have
been betrayed by some of his followers.

CHAPTER IV
THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK
When Diaz, accompanied by two of his officers,
presented himself at Bazaine's headquarters, the
marshal came to what was in the circumstances a very
natural conclusion. He thought that the Mexican
general was about to do as many of his countrymen
had recently done — namely, make his submission to
the Emperor. On the face of it there was no other
explanation of a hurried surrender. Yet we have
not only the assurance of Don Porfirio himself, but a
long succession of patent facts, to prove that Bazaine
was entirely mistaken. The Mexican general sur
rendered because he knew that his garrison was not to
be relied on, and he took the most unusual course of
coming out with the white flag himself because he
could not trust any of his subordinates not to play
him some ugly trick.
Bazaine, we are told by Don Porfirio, showed very
bad temper when he was forced to see that he was in
error. He accused his prisoner of having broken
promises given at Puebla, and more than hinted at a
firing party. Diaz denied that he had given his parole
in 1863 or that he had ever promised to join Maxi
milian. A reference was made to the record taken
when Puebla had surrendered, and it was found that
Diaz was right. He had not only refused to give his
parole, but had declared that he would not adhere to
the Government set up under cover of the French

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 87
intervention. Bazaine was not the man to be deterred
from strong measures by formalities. But in February,
1865, it was becoming clear that the French must
look carefully to their going. He abstained from
taking a course which would have tended to scandal.
The garrison of Oaxaca was disposed of in the usual
way. The local levies were sent back to their homes —
nothing loth. Those who had been drawn from the
north were either sent back, or were incorporated in
the Emperor's unpaid and barely disciplined Mexican
levies, from which they in due course deserted, some
times in whole companies with their officers at their
head. Diaz was sent to Puebla, well treated but
closely watched.
At Puebla he remained till September 15 of 1865.
After the disastrous, the indeed all but ridiculous, end
of his command of the Army of the East, it might well
seem that his career was over even in such a country
as Mexico. Yet he stood higher than ever in the
estimate of his party. His failure was not due to any
fault of his own. He would have fought if his men
would have followed him, and amid the many and
scandalous defections of 1864 he had been found
faithful. Don Porfirio does not say it, nor is the thing one of
those which men freely say, but we may safely assume
that he was well content to remain for some months
quietly in Puebla under charge of the Emperor's
Austrian officers. There was for the moment little
good to be done in the field, but a man of his know
ledge and experience must have felt confident that
an opportunity to reappear with effect would present
itself before long. The decisive events of that quiet
interval did not take place in Mexico. They were the

88 DIAZ
occupation of Savannah by the Federal general
Sherman in December, 1864, and the surrender of Lee
at Appomatox in April, 1865. The full significance
of the march from Atlanta to Savannah may not have
been visible for some little time, but the mere report
that the event had happened was enough to enlighten
the most obtuse of mankind as to the meaning of
the capitulation of the commander of the army of
Northern Virginia. The Confederacy was fairly down
with both shoulders on the ground. However
ignorant Mexicans might be of what passed outside
their own range of vision, one fact was brought home
to them with convincing force. It was that some
thousands of the Confederates had fled across the Rio
Grande del Norte into Mexico. Then there was talk
of grand schemes for settling these refugees in the
country, and also whatever numbers of others might
join them later on. No course more exactly calcu
lated to exasperate every class of Mexican against the
imperial Government could possibly have been
devised. From the hacendado with his millions, of
acres down to the Indian " peon " there was one
common revolt at the mere suggestion that swarms of
Norte-Americanos, or, to use the popular name given
them, " gringos," all armed, all prompt to shoot,
pushful and overbearing, would be settled among them.
All could remember what had come of the settlement
of Sam Houston and his supporters in the once
Mexican province of Texas. They had been Souther
ners, and it was precisely the old slave-holding States
forming the Confederacy which had brought on the
war of 1848 and had robbed Mexico of much of its
territory. The suggestion was so ill received that
nothing came of it. Nothing came of ajnot dissimilar

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 89
scheme for settling a French colony in Sonora. But
the suggestions had been made, and they were equally
offensive to Mexicans and to the United States.
Mexicans who had once been disposed to agree with
Uraga that their national independence was safe with
Maximilian began to think that it was more threatened
by him and his French supporters than by anybody
else. The Federal Government would tolerate neither
French nor Confederate colonies on its borders.
Napoleon III. never made a greater mistake than when
he permitted himself to think aloud in his corre
spondence and to tell General Forey that it was his
purpose to check the expansion of the United States
over Latin America.
There was no concealment of the fact that the
Government of Washington was pressing Napoleon III.
for an answer to the pointed question when he meant
to withdraw his troops. When they were gone there
could be no reasonable doubt that the utterly artificial
Empire of Maximilian would be brought down like a
card castle. There is a close parallel between the
Empire of Maximilian in Mexico and the monarchy of
Joseph Bonaparte in Spain. The Spaniards would
certainly never have been able to drive the French
armies from their country by themselves, but if
Napoleon had left his brother to fight with no better
support than he could get from his Spanish partisans
the patriot forces would have made short work of him.
Yet if the Spaniards had frankly accepted Joseph,
then Wellington could never have forced the French
to retire. If the Mexicans had submitted honestly to
Maximilian the United States would have had no
ground for interference. In both cases native resist
ance gave the intervention of an allied force the means

90 DIAZ
of proving decisive. Both countries would have
spared themselves infinite misery if they could have
taken the intruding ruler who demanded their sub
mission. But nations do not live by material advan
tages, or common sense, alone, and the ages in which
any people could accept a lost battle as a judgment of
God, and bow for their own ultimate great good to a
William the Conqueror, lie far back in the past.
For eight months Diaz remained a prisoner. His
relations with his jailers, Austrian officers, were on the
whole pleasant. When after a time he found himself
placed under the care of Count Thun he was indeed
very closely watched, and suffered, he says, some
discourtesy. Thun tried to persuade him to write a
letter to the patriot General Lucas, who was threaten
ing to shoot certain imperialist prisoners. Diaz
refused to comply with a request which would cer
tainly have compromised himself, and would probably
have done no service to the threatened captives.
The Austrian governor retaliated by making his
captivity more strict. He was not even allowed to
go to the bath except with a sentinel to watch. Yet
his confinement cannot have been very rigid. From
his own account we hear of card parties with his
fellow-Mexican prisoners and Austrian officers. When
he had finally decided to effect another escape he had
no difficulty in opening communications with friends
outside. His trusted agent was an Indian of the name
of Hernandez, who had been a servant of his family.
Diaz could rely implicitly on the man's fidelity, but not
altogether on his discretion. When the time for
making the escape had come he instructed his follower
to wait with a horse at a place he named, but did not
say that the mount was needed for himself ; Hernandez

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 91
was told that he would be met by a prisoner who
was about to escape. In order that he might be sure
to give the horse to the right man he was supplied with
the half of a visiting card, and told that the other
would be presented by the escaping prisoner. If the
precaution, which reads like a quotation from the
memoirs of some hero of the Fronde, strikes the reader
as a needless refinement, he must remember that Diaz
knew his countrymen.
When the night fixed for his escape had come, Don
Porfirio took a rope which he had provided with the
help of a friend — a proof that the watch kept on him
was not very thorough — and made his way from the
flat roof of the convent of Sta. Caterina in which he
was confined to the roof of an adjoining house.
Beyond this house was a yard, or garden, enclosed by
a wall which ran from the corner of the building. His
plan was to let himself down from the edge of the roof
to the wall and then drop into the street. The only
support he could find for his rope was the lead figure
of a saint. He found it very shaky, but calculated
that it was fixed, though loosely, on a spike. The
rope was tied round the pedestal, and Don Porfirio,
who retained his power of swarming up a rope till an
advanced age, had no difficulty in letting himself
down. The street was empty, and all went well till
he got down to the level of the wall. When he let go
of the rope thinking to land on the coping of the wall
he missed his footing, and fell inside right on the top
of a stye full of pigs. He fell soft on the startled
porkers, but rolled over and lost the only weapon
he carried — a well-sharpened knife, the weapon which
by various names of " navajo," " punal," " curvo,"
or " falcon " comes kindly to the hand of the Spaniard

92 DIAZ
and the Creole. The squeaking of the alarmed pigs
rent the air, but the noise was too familiar to attract
unwelcome attention. Diaz picked himself up, found
a place where he could clear the wall, dropped into
the street, and walking without undue haste, passing
civil salutations with the stray night-walkers he met —
:' Buena noche " ; " Vaya Usted, con Dios " (" Good
night " and " God go with you ") — reached the place
where his henchman was waiting for him with a
horse. When once he was mounted he lost no time in
making his way to the home of the guerrillero, the
Sierra. A municipal official whom he met turned out
to be a sympathiser, and gave him a useful hint where
to meet other friends. The alarm was indeed raised
and bells rung, but he was off and beyond reach.
Now began what one biographer, Dr. Fortunato
Hernandez, has called the " epic " of Porfirio Diaz.
To put it less poetically, the next year of the future
President's life may be justly said to give us an exact
picture of the rise of a highly capable guerrillero.
He meets a few friends who follow his fortune. With
them he overcomes a few enemies and takes their
weapons. Yet other friends who will use the arms
under his direction are soon recruited, and so the ball
rolls till, one having become a few, the few become
many. The band grows into an army. It is the
history of Mina, of El Empecinado, of Chapalangarra,
of Julian Sanchez, of Jose Palarea (called El Medico),
of a whole brood of heroes of the Peninsular War, and
of Spanish America. It would be amusing enough to
follow the apparently erratic movements, the astute
stratagems, the surprises, starts, escapes, swift hand-
to-hand skirmishes, which make up the guerrillero's
career. But we must resist the temptation to dwell

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 93
at excessive length on these adventures. After all,
they were not in the case of Porfirio Diaz different
from those of other " cabecillas," or heads of guerrillas.
There were others — his own brother Felix (El Chato)
for one — who played the game as well as he could.
He is important to us because he was much more
than a guerrillero, because he was an organiser, a
general, and a man of government. It took him a
year to create a serious force, but when he had
achieved the feat he brought to the siege of the city of
Mexico not a mere overgrown guerrilla, but an army
with a well-filled and well-managed military chest.
If we look only at the marches and passages of fight
we shall lose sight of the wood because of the multi
plicity of the trees. Now the wood which really
mattered was this — that during 1866 Diaz drew the
south and south-east of Mexico into his own hand,
created a Government and a treasury, and convinced
friends and enemies alike that he was a man with aims
far above the mere acquisition of booty, and faculties
of a higher order than are needed to keep a band
together in the Sierra and use it to worry a Government.
A single incident of those important months says
much to explain his final victory over all other forces
at work in the hurly-burly of Mexican war and
politics. After one successful skirmish with a certain
Visoso, then an Imperialist, but later on a repentant
Republican, he captured the sum of $3,000. Given,
so he tells us, the moral character of some of the
elements he had to work with (every guerrilla is of
necessity a Cave of Adullam), it followed that the
$3,000 was in extreme danger of being divided in the
true brigand or piratical way at the capstan's head.
If that had been allowed to happen, his band would

94 DIAZ
soon have been no better than so many others, which
differed little, or not at all, from downright brigands.
But it was not allowed to happen. The $3,000 were
collected from grasping hands, and became the nest-
egg of a military chest from which Diaz handed
over $300,000 to the empty treasury of Juarez when
the capital was occupied. His treasurer, Manuel
Guerrero, never lacked funds altogether. How he
enforced honesty we are not told in detail, but can
guess that the secret lay in the fact that he com
manded because he was he, and they obeyed because
they were they. In the last resort Diaz could when
necessary kill his man. And then all knew that he
would take care of them.
The taking care could go to great lengths. When
nobody else was available Don Porfirio could even
tackle a surgical operation : witness the case of
the drum-major Rodriguez. The poor man had
received a wound on the leg which made amputation
unavoidable. It is hardly necessary to say that there
was no surgeon attached to the guerrilla. The whole
medical corps, such as it was, resided in the person of
an American drummer (in the sense of bagman) who
was wandering about in Mexico to sell some quack
medicine. When he was asked whether he would
undertake to perform the operation he began by
answering with all the well-known self-reliance of his
class and nation that he would. The only instru
ments available were a razor and a carpenter's saw.
It would be idle. indeed to suppose that there were any
anaesthetics. The lack of these last was, however,
made good (as it was in the Crimea) by the adminis
tration of a very strong dose of raw spirits. When the
moment came to fulfil his promise the American

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 95
became frightened and whispered to Diaz his con
fession that he dare not attempt the task of removing
the leg. Then the general did what was necessary
himself, and with the instruments named. He says
— and nobody will doubt his word — that when the
leg had been amputated he went away with the
intimate conviction that the drum-major must
infallibly die very shortly. Yet Rodriguez survived
for many years, and lived, not unhappily, on a small
pension — a remarkable instance of the American
Indian's insensibility to pain and tenacity of life.
The most promising course Don Porfirio could take
was to resume his command as general of the Army
of the East. He could have served neither his cause
nor himself by joining Juarez, who was still being
hunted from pillar to post in the northern States.
Nobody had been named to succeed him, and the
field, though occupied by the enemy, was clear of
rivals. The fact that the Army of the East had to be
made, and by him, without help from the fugitive
Republican Government was not altogether oppressing
to a man in the prime of life, and well trained in the
conditions of Spanish-American civil war. He might
feel reasonably confident of his capacity to do what
many of the party leaders of his country had done
before, namely, create his army by his own exertions.
A nucleus had gathered about him quickly. It
consisted mainly of Republican officers who had been
left without soldiers to lead through the recent
disasters of their cause. We need not deny them the
credit of having acted from conviction, but it is also
true that they had not much choice. The native
forces raised by Maximilian did not offer tempting
chances of service. The Emperor had little money,

96 DIAZ
and his troops were but poorly provided for. What
resources he could command were devoted first of all
to the Austrian and Belgian bands imported to stiffen
his Mexican levies, and then to the French officers
who entered his service as instructors of native
soldiers. These men, who brought with them senti
ments of dignity and self-respect formed in a great
European army, were apt to treat the Mexican
Imperialist officers with scant regard. Patriotic
loyalty and political convictions were strengthened for
the Mexicans who followed Diaz by resentment for
what they not unnaturally considered mere insolence.
So they fought as " reformados," to use a military
term of Spanish origin once familiar to all Europe —
that is to say, they did duty as soldiers because their
corps were disbanded or broken up, and until fortune
should give them a chance to resume their position.
The Commander-in-Chief of the as yet non-existent
Army of the East would have preferred to begin in
his native Oaxaca, but he was headed off by the
French Colonel lion and the Imperialist guerrillero
Visoso. There being no opening on that side, he
made for Guerrero. This province was one of several
parts of Mexico never occupied effectually either by
the French army or the Imperial officers. As far as
it was governed at all, it obeyed the former hero of
Ayutla, who was in fact its cacique and ruled from
his ranch at La Providencia.1
Alvarez supplied the refugees with arms — at least
with a few, some of which are reported to have been
1 Our ranch is known to all men to be the Spanish rancho, but the original
is not generally used in the sense we give it. In Old Spain rancho means a
soldier's rations. In most parts of Spanish America the name is given to a
small holding occupied by a head herdsman in the employment of a big cattle
station, i.e., an " estancia."

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 97
flint-locks. General Leyva, Colonels Cano, Segura,
and others, joined Diaz in La Providencia and put
themselves under his orders. His operations grew
more bold as he gathered strength, which he did in
pretty exact proportion to the increasing favourable
ness of the circumstances during 1866. The good
peace-loving people of Oaxaca had discovered within
a few months, or even weeks, that when they helped
Bazaine to rid them of the Republican authorities
they did not also free themselves from tax collectors
and forced contributions levied by the Emperor's
Government, which had urgent need to improve its
revenue, nor yet from the exactions of the patriot
guerrilleros. They had in fact cause to regret the
administration of Diaz, who, by the confession of his
enemies, always made a moderate use of his power.
And then it soon became a matter of common know
ledge that the days of the French occupation were
numbered. The Government of the United States
offered a steady resistance to clamour for strong
measures. It would have done a popular thing if it
had sent an army into Mexico. There was a time
when Bazaine felt called upon to take measures to
concentrate his army in view of the possibility that
General Sheridan would cross the Rio Grande at the
head of 200,000 Federal troops. But concentration
meant evacuation of all the outlying provinces north
and south. In the meantime arms, money, and
volunteers began to cross the frontier to support
Juarez. As the French drew together Republican
armies began to spring for the soil. The Republicans
who had never reconciled themselves to the intruding
Empire came out of hiding or descended from the
Sierras to be organised into regular armies. All that

98 DIAZ
element of prudent people who when the broom is to be
used prefer to be on the side of the handle began to see
that it was much safer to join Juarez than to sit quiet
and still more so than to help the Emperor. The agony
of Maximilian and his poor wife was beginning.
The southern provinces were less accessible to
American help than the northern. But very soon the
French posts on the coast and their squadrons in the
Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico had to be withdrawn.
Then help from the States came to Diaz also. His
advance was not continuously successful. Though
he had not to deal with regular French troops, but
only with Maximilian's Austrians1 and Mexicans, he
was for some time held in check and once badly
beaten. But his scattered band soon rallied, and
went on growing in force. He fixed his headquarters
at Tlapa, and from thence made his excursions either
to beat up the enemy's quarters, or para arbitrarse
algunos recursos — that is to say, to levy money and
men among the Mixteca and other Indian tribes.
By autumn he had made himself master of the open
country, and had reduced the Imperialist garrison of
Oaxaca to a state of blockade. The Government at
Mexico, sinking into ever-increasing difficulties, could
do but little to help General Oronoz, the Mexican sup
porter who held the town. At the close of September
Diaz overpowered a small body of " Hungarian "
cavalry at Nochistlan. He frankly allows that they
were only a few, but points out that their undeniable
superiority in discipline was an appreciable set-off to
1 Diaz himself speaks of his European opponents as Hungarians, but I do
not feel sure that he used the name only to designate the nationality of the
foreigners. " Ungaro " is a Hungarian no doubt, but the sense in which it is
most familiar to Spanish-speaking peoples is gipsy, or even only vagrant,
tinker. The first gipsies who followed that trade in Spain said, probably
with truth, that they came from Hungary.

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 99
their numerical weakness. This stroke exasperated
Oronoz, and he sallied from the town with some 2,000
men, resolved to scatter the Republican guerrilleros.
Oronoz may have been zealous for his cause, but he
was not quick-witted enough to handle his opponent.
He allowed Diaz to lead him into a trap of the most
simple if also of the most effective kind. The
Imperialist officer advanced, apparently without
taking the least precaution to reconnoitre, along a
road running through the Indian town or big village
Miahuatlan, at the foot of the Sierra de Cuixtla.
Diaz, who did keep a sharp look-out, laid an ambush
for him. He posted a part of his mounted men in
front of the village to meet Oronoz and draw him on.
The bulk of his force was disposed to the rear of the
village, concealed in " waves of the ground." The
function of the cavalry in front of Miahuatlan was
to run away through the village and draw the Im
perialists into an over-confident pursuit which would
carry them headlong into the middle of the ambush
in the rear. Oronoz fell into the trap, came helter-
skelter through the village, and was fired into from
both sides. His force was brought to a sharp stop.
The reaction from over-confidence to panic is in
evitable with ill-trained troops, and the Imperialists
began to turn back. Then Diaz charged and drove
them in rout before him. The official, or patriotic,
historian of this war, Sefior Escudero, talks of the
" delirium of battle " in Miahuatlan. Yet it seems that
the total loss of the Imperialists was only eighty in a
force of well over 2,000. As for the killed, the
majority were, as was the custom in Mexican conflicts,
shot after the battle. We have the authority of Don
Porfirio for the fact that twenty-two Mexican officers

100 DIAZ
whom he captured were shot. He spared the lives of
some French officers whom he took. He was nowise
given to the Munchausen style. He never indulges
in talk about deliriums of battle and so forth. There
is a tone of sobriety and an obvious desire to tell the
truth in his reminiscences which inspires confidence.
He records a detail which a writer more concerned to
give an heroic turn to the story would have omitted.
He says that the villagers of Miahuatlan, who were
" very daring and were drunk,"1 fired into the flanks of
the Imperialists and did good service by capturing
hack and led horses. The loss of these latter was
disastrous for the officers of Oronoz's ill-led column.
The victory at Miahuatlan, which was won October 3,
1866, had a considerable moral effect. It was indeed
a mere guerrillero action such as had been fought
by the hundred on Mexican soil without producing
any consequences worth noting. But it was of
immense importance in relation to surrounding
conditions. The Republican arrows were now flying
with the wind, and all the world could see that unless
help came the next step would be the occupation of
the city and the total ruin of the Imperial cause in the
south and east. Hard pressed as Maximilian's Govern
ment was, it could not allow such a disaster to happen
without making some attempt to support its officers.
A column of 1,500 of its foreign soldiers, on whom it
could rely more than on its Mexicans, was sent to
relieve Oronoz. A few days after his victory and the
retreat of his opponent on Oaxaca Diaz intercepted a
despatch from Mexico to Oronoz informing him that
the relief was on its way. He was then blockading
1 Estaban ebrios, he says ; and he adds nothing to indicate that they were
ebrios with patriotic emotion or indeed with anything but aguardiente or
pulque.

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 101
the town closely with the force he had organised and
had now brought to fair order, and with the cavalry
guerrillas commanded by his brother Felix. He was
in some danger of finding himself between two fires.
There were three ways in which he could guard against
the misfortune. He could try to storm the town before
the relieving force could come up, or he could turn on
that force itself, or he could raise the blockade. The
third course he was resolved not to take, and he did
not think his force equal to taking the first. So he
adopted the second, and carried it out with military
decision aided by a pleasing admixture of guerrillero
craft. The Republicans had already secured a footing in
the lower quarters of the town, though they had made
no impression on the barricaded, loopholed, and mined
upper part of it. Diaz knew that his opponent had
ways of learning what was going on in his camp. He
had observed in the course of his studies of human
nature that if a man wishes his secrets to be soon
proclaimed from the housetops he can take no more
effectual course than to confide them in strict confi
dence to well-selected friends. Therefore he informed
such chosen persons as he knew would not fail to blab
that he meant to assault the upper town on the very
next night. As he foresaw, Oronoz was duly warned,
and stood to arms prepared to account for any move
ment he might hear in the lines of the blockaders as
being the preliminary of an intended surprise. Then,
while the Imperialist waited for the attack which
never came, Diaz marched swiftly and in the dark to
occupy the point at which he intended to intercept
the relieving column. When at daybreak the
Republican position was seen to be empty, Oronoz

102 DIAZ
was puzzled. He suspected a trap and could not
guess what it was. The despatch which might have
enlightened him had, as we have seen, been inter
cepted. After hesitating and delaying long enough to
allow Diaz to lay his ambush for the coming column,
Oronoz did come out. But his shrewd opponent
played for his head. After posting his infantry and
guns he came back with his cavalry to a farm on the
road. The mayordomo, or bailiff, in charge was, as
he well knew, a strong Clerical partisan. So he made
ostentatious preparations to ambush Oronoz in sight
of this man, who was not put under arrest nor watched.
Of course, he ran off with his valuable information.
The Imperialist officer, who had the fear of Diaz in his
bones since Miahuatlan, fell into the trap and went in
haste back to Oaxaca.
Don Porfirio had decided to wait for the relieving
column in a place which was to have a personal interest
for him — La Carbonera. He had instructed his
subordinate, General Figueroa, to join at that spot
with certain Indians of the Mixteca hills who had
" risen at the call of patriotism." The call had of
course been sounded by the voice and in the tones
which usually summoned an " Indiada."
La Carbonera is a small plateau on the road to
Oaxaca from the north. It is divided into a larger
and higher and a smaller and lower portion by a
" cuenca," a shell or dip, through which the road runs.
It was wooded, and on the lower portion the bush was
thick. This was the part of the ground where the
infantry were stationed by Diaz. Colonel Hotze, the
Austrian who commanded the relieving force, showed
no more judgment than Oronoz. He marched till he
was brought up by the Mexicans on the lower ground.

THE RISE- TO THE FIRST RANK 103
Then Diaz, who disposed of the greater numbers,
turned his flank through the wood on the higher
ground and beat him utterly.
The well-managed affair at La Carbonera completed
the ruin of the Imperial cause in Oaxaca. Diaz had
marched on October 16 and had won his fight on the
1 8th. On the 30th the town was surrendered by
Oronoz. The interval had been largely spent in
negotiations. One of the negotiators was the bishop
Dr. Covarrubias, whose aim was to provide for
himself. He sent to ask the Republican general what
treatment he had to expect. Don Porfirio, speaking
daggers that he might frighten his man away and so
be spared the necessity to use them, replied that it was
his intention to shoot the bishop in " full uniform."
Dr. Covarrubias did not think proper to embarrass
him by giving him a chance of fulfilling his threat, but
fled hastily to Mexico along the line of escape carefully
left open for him. Yet, as after Miahuatlan, Diaz
showed no squeamishness in ordering military execu
tions of traitors. Pablo Franco, the Imperial Prefect
of Oaxaca, who endeavoured to escape at the same
time as the bishop, was taken (probably because he
was more sharply looked after) and condemned to be
shot. He appealed for mercy in vain. He had indeed
done a thing which made it difficult to pardon him.
A known Republican of Oaxaca, Justo Rodriguez by
name, had been shot by his orders. Justo's brother,
who was a portrait painter, had made a likeness of
his body after execution. Diaz hesitated, or was
thought to hesitate, as to whether he would allow the
execution. The painter sent the portrait to him with
a statement of the facts, and Franco was left to his
fate. The story stands in the official biography of

104 DIAZ
the President published so late as 1909, and with his
approval, by Dr. Fortunato Hernandez, " Un Pueblo,
un Siglo y un Hombre." It is allowed that Diaz was,
as compared with other Mexican leaders, humane.
Yet we see from this episode, and from the slaying of
the Mexican officers taken at Miahuatlan, that he was
not wholly untouched by the element of pure savagery
in which he was born and grew up. In his later days,
when he had become the pet of American and Euro
pean capitalists and " edifying letters " were written
about him by persons who had received favours from
him and hoped to receive others, details of this kind
were suppressed. Yet he had no wish to hide them
himself. He was no more inclined than Cromwell to
be beautified, at any rate not by himself, and it is most
probable that he saw nothing to conceal. He was a
governing man, but he was a Mexican. Full of blood
and battles was his youth, and full of blood and battles
was his age, and in his country it was not given him
ever to leave that life of blood.
The fall of Oaxaca was soon followed by the surrender
of Tehuantepec, the last Imperialist post in the
south. Diaz now received substantial help from the
United States in the form, not of money, but of arms.
Money he could get by raising contributions, but it
would have done him no good if he had had to spend it
in acquiring arms. The south being now reconquered
for the Republican cause, he could prepare to bring
help to his party in the centre. The French troops
were being concentrated on the line from Mexico city
to Veracruz, getting ready to take ship for Europe.
Napoleon III. was naturally much concerned to pro
vide against the risk that the evacuation should be
disgraced by some untoward incident. Bazaine was

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 105
no less desirous to come off with a good grace. The
atmosphere was favourable to intrigue, and a letter
which Diaz wrote at the time to Don Matias Romero
records that he was asked to take part in one of a
truly extraordinary character. Romero was Mexican
Minister at Washington. The Republican officers in
the south were cut off from Juarez, who was in the
northern provinces, and were compelled to communi
cate with him through the United States. So it was to
the Minister, and not to the President, that Diaz made
this surprising statement : " General Bazaine, through
a third party, offered to surrender to me the cities which
they [i.e., the French] occupied, also to deliver Maxi
milian, Marquez, Miramon, etc., into my hands, pro
vided I would accede to a proposal which he made me,
and which I rejected, as I deemed it not very honour
able. Another proposition was also made me by
authority of Bazaine, for the purchase of six thousand
muskets and four million percussion caps, and if I had
desired it, he would have sold me both guns and
powder." x
The witness for the fact that Bazaine made these
proposals is manifestly the third party who reported
them to Diaz. Twenty years after the letter to Romero
was written (in 1886) it came to the knowledge of
Bazaine, who was then living in great misery at
Madrid. It provoked him to write an angry expostu
lation to Don Porfirio, who at that later date had been
well established for some time as President of Mexico.
The unhappy exile recriminated by a counter-charge
that Diaz had written a compromising letter to him in
1 865 , and asked very reasonably for the name of the
alleged agent. Don Porfirio's answer is explicit :
1 Mrs. Tweedie's "Porfirio Diaz," p. 169.

106 DIAZ
" With regard to the second point, although some years
have now passed, I do not think that you will have
forgotten Sefior Carlos Thiele. I must tell you, since
you ask me, that he was the person whom I sent to you
to arrange the exchange of Mexican prisoners who
were in your power for those taken by me in the actions
of Nochistlan, Miahuatlan, La Carbonera, Tehuantepec
and Oaxaca, an exchange which was made with great
advantage to the French army, because I sent as a
favour all the chiefs, officers and soldiers that were
left with me when you had no officers of ours of equal
rank to exchange for them. This Sefior Thiele it was
who, in your name, made me the proposals which I
reported in the letter which has aroused your resent
ment, and who, a few months after the circumstances
to which I refer, settled in Guatemala, where he can
still be found. I should be very pleased if you could
some day persuade me that the whole affair was an
imposture on the part of this gentleman, and I would
make it known to the public who read my letter ; but
for this I need Sefior Thiele's own declaration, as the
knowledge that I have of him does not justify me in
doubting his honour."
As for the letter of 1865, Diaz avows that he could
not remember its terms, but was sure it could not do
him any harm, for he could not call to mind any deed
in his life of which he had cause to be ashamed. And
there perhaps we may as well leave the matter.
That Don Carlos Thiele, when he had been hunted up
in his retreat in Guatemala, would have confessed that
he was guilty of a mere imposture seems improbable
in the last degree. But then it is no less incredible
that a marshal of France who had a great career before
him at home should have offered to kidnap Maximilian,

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 107
Marquez, Miramon, etc., and hand them over to the
Mexican general of the Army of the East. What
price could Mexico pay to compensate him for social
and professional ruin and dishonour ? Diaz does not
tell us what the condition was that Bazaine was said
by Don Carlos Thiele to have made. Until we have
better evidence than the word of the gentleman now
retired to Guatemala to go on it is useless to inquire.
The safest course is to dismiss the whole as a story of
a cock and a bull. It is true enough that some super
fluous arms which Bazaine disposed of before he left
Mexico did come into the hands of the Republicans.
But then the Mexicans who were armed by Maximilian
were always going over with arms and baggage to the
enemy. So did the Spaniards who were recruited by
Joseph Bonaparte in the Peninsular War. Diaz says
he got them by ordering the villagers to bring in
whatever arms they had. He no doubt told the truth.
We need, however, have no hesitation in believing
that Maximilian tried to induce Don Porfirio to join
him and sent a certain M. Burnouf to give him the
invitation. The poor Emperor was desperate at the
close of 1866, and was in a mood to try to make arrows
of all wood. It was a matter of course that the offer
should be refused. Even if we put all considerations
of honour and principle aside (which, obviously, we
have no right to do), common sense would have
taught Diaz to keep aloof from an adventure which
was visibly on the brink of ruin. Even when he was
a prisoner at Puebla and the Republican cause was at
its lowest ebb, he had steadily refused even to see
Maximilian. All this conflict of insinuations and assertions serves
merely as a reminder that the French intervention

108 DIAZ
ended as it began, amid intrigues and delusions. The
Mexicans never dared to make an attack on the
retreating French troops. Bazaine shipped the last
detachment of his soldiers and sailed away with them
in the early days of February, 1867. Maximilian,
after a short crisis of hesitation, did the one thing
which could save his honour. He had committed
himself to folly, and all that remained for him to do
was to stay and die. His enemies closed on him from
north and south. On March 9 Diaz, having now
thoroughly organised his Army of the East, began the
siege of Puebla. His attack followed the same line as
Forey's — from the east and from house to house and
barricade to barricade. The defence of the Imperialists
was for a time at least resolute. Diaz was once in
no small danger from the fall of the blazing roof of a
house while he was directing the attack in person.
He had the misfortune to be rather severely burnt.
Yet the way in which the town fell on April 2 shows,
to say no more of it, that the defence was far less
resolute than Ortega's had been in 1863. What was
said is that the place was betrayed for money, but one
has to allow that this is just what would be said.
The fall of Puebla would be a final blow to the
Imperialist cause, for when the city was in possession
of the Republicans all communications between
Mexico and Veracruz were cut. Some effort must
unquestionably be tried to save it. The attempt was
made by Marquez, the Tiger of Tacubaya, who was now
in command at Mexico. If there was any man from
whom the most determined exertions in the Imperial
cause were to be expected he was this blood-stained
partisan. There was that between him and the
Republicans which seemed to make it for ever impos-

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 109
sible that there could be any question of quarter for
him. Yet the Prince of Salm Salm, who was serving
Maximilian and was actually present with Marquez's
command, believed that he played false. He left
Mexico with a force which could, if vigorously used,
have raised the siege of Puebla. It included some
Austrian troops of far better quality than the Mexican
levies, though weak in numbers. But he dawdled on
the road, and while he delayed Diaz stormed the town.
If the element of treason was absent (and all our
witnesses, native or foreign, are far from the truth if
it was often unknown in Mexican conflicts), then Don
Porfirio acted as did the Duke of Wellington when he
knew that Marmont was on the way to relieve Ciudad
Rodrigo. " Ciud M Rodrigo must be taken to-night,"
was the famous order, and taken it was. Even if there
was treason, Diaz was entitled to take advantage of
the baseness of his opponents, however much he might
despise them. " La traicion place, pero no el que lo
hace " (" The treason is acceptable, but not the
traitor "), is another Spanish proverb, and military
casuistry has always allowed of the corruption of
the enemy's officers. Be the truth as it may, Puebla
was taken, and not without some fighting.
And now the next step was the pursuit of Marquez.
On April 5, on the third day after he had occupied the
town, Diaz marched to overtake the " Tiger." He
was unable to start sooner because two or three of the
outlying forts continued to resist. The way of
surrender was made smooth, and on this occasion
there was no butchery of prisoners. Don Porfirio
found and availed himself of an opportunity to prove
that he did not nurse a grudge. When he escaped
from Puebla in September a certain Imperialist

no DIAZ
official, one Escamillo, had made a great display of
zeal by offering a reward for the capture of the
prisoner. He had talked of shooting. He was now in
Don Porfirio's power, and was reasonably nervous till
he was relieved by the good-humoured, if rather scorn
ful, words, " It was lucky for me I was not caught."
The pursuit of Marquez was pushed with energy.
On April 6 Diaz, who had left his infantry and guns
to follow and had led the pursuit with his cavalry,
came upon the enemy at San Diego Notario. Marquez
made no serious attempt to stand, and he left the
Austrian or Hungarian and Polish horsemen, com
manded by Kodolich, Wickenburg, and Khevenhuller,
to cover his retreat. A clash followed which has, as
is not unusual in all accounts of wars, been diversely
reported. The Mexican version — that is to say, Don
Porfirio's — is that the Europeans were beaten in and
the whole body of the Imperialists forced into a run.
Prince Salm Salm has it that the Mexicans were
beaten off and the retreat of the Imperialists covered.
Marquez marched hurriedly for Guadalupe Hidalgo,
to the north of Mexico, taking a curve to reach his
refuge. Diaz hoped to cut his road at Paso de
Tortolitas. He had directed another Republican
officer to occupy the pass. This officer, Jesus
Lalanne, did make the attempt, and was severely
cut up. But he delayed Marquez till Diaz could bring
his infantry and guns into action. Finally the
" Tiger " got away with the majority of his men by
sacrificing his guns and baggage and going off across
country in the regular scattered guerrilla style.
The Europeans in his army suffered severely ; but he
and his Mexicans did not shine as fighters.
The ensuing blockade and occupation of the city of

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK in
Mexico formed the honourable close to the services of
Porfirio Diaz in this war. The capitulation of the
city on June 20, the day after the execution of
Maximilian at Queretaro, was indeed the penultimate
date of the struggle. The actual last was the capitu
lation of the Imperialist garrison of Veracruz on the
28th of the same month. It was the good fortune of
the future President of Mexico that he ended this
period of his life in circumstances which made it
possible for him to combine perfect loyalty to his
cause with the utmost moderation. He had no
direct connection with the tragedy at Queretaro, for
tragedy it was in more than the loose sense of the word.
It has been much the custom of historians to draw a
distinction between the humanity of General Diaz
and the Indian ferocity of Juarez. A biographer is
bound in honour to say the best he can for his hero,
and there has been and will be much good to say of
Porfirio Diaz. But the loyalty of a biographer is one
thing and the lues Boswelliana is another. It was
possible, and even easy, to show humanity at Mexico.
It was not so easy, and it was even not possible, at
Queretaro. Can anybody give a rational reason why
the Archduke Maximilian should not have shared the
fate of the Count of Raousset Boulbon ? To say that
he was a gentleman of illustrious birth and that he
ought not to have been treated like a vulgar filibuster
is not to give a rational reason, but to make an
exhibition of flunkeyism. And apart from that con
temptible sentiment, what is there to say of the un
happy Archduke ? Napoleon III. was in 1862 the
ruler of a sovereign State, and he may be said to have
had a right to pursue any line of policy he chose,
however unwise. His officers and soldiers obeyed

112 DIAZ
their master as they were bound by military honour
and all law to do. But Maximilian was no officer of
Napoleon's. He was, with all his great pedigree,
simply an adventurer who came to fight for a throne,
for he had no sort of evidence that the Mexicans would
accept him. When he consented to sign the notorious
decree by which he refused quarter to the Republican
officers who fell into his hands he put himself on a
level with the very worst of the people he was pro
fessing to regenerate. If he had won he would have
enjoyed his victory in wealth and power. It was the
least he could do to stake his life, and when he lost
to pay the forfeit. He did so quietly and manfully,
and that was best for him. Juarez had a hard part to
play, but he did his duty. If he had done less he
would only have encouraged other younger sons of
royal houses to seek their fortunes in the disorders
of Spanish-American republics sword in hand. We
need not think that no element of revenge entered into
his decision. After all he was a Mexican-Indian.
But we have no right to affirm that revenge was his
main motive. What Diaz would have done in his
place must remain a mere matter of conjecture, but
he never explicitly condemned the President's action.
As it was, he had only to wait and watch till the
city capitulated. It is highly probable that he might
have forced his way in if he had chosen. But the
surrender was certain to come, and he was anxious to
shed no blood unnecessarily. Hunger would do the
work effectually, and the brutality of Marquez could
only serve to make the townsmen long the more
heartily for the coming of the day of his overthrow.
The savage was indeed desperate. He made a furious
display of a determination to hold out to the last,

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 113
but the main measures he took were to extort money
and scatter lies. Whoever refused to pay the forced
loans he demanded was put into prison and allowed
the smallest ration which would support life. This
kind of energy was quite in the Mexican tradition.
Juarez had done the same thing ; but Mexicans who
had money to lose, and the foreign men of business
settled among them, may well have asked themselves
what they had gained from the grandiose schemes of
Napoleon III. for the regeneration of Mexico. One
firm was robbed of $125,000 and another of $100,000.
Some part of this plunder — to say the very least of it
— was not spent on the defence of the city, but
reserved to be carried off when the time should come
to run away. Meanwhile Marquez and the Imperialist
Press, which repeated what he ordered it to say, kept
assuring the townsmen that Maximilian was victorious
in the north and would soon come to their assistance.
It is only fair to add that on May 6 he did get a
message from Maximilian reporting some successes
won on April 27, but nobody knew better than
Marquez how hollow such victories must needs be.
Though the forces of Diaz were as yet hardly sufficient
to allow him to beleaguer the city closely, he was
master of the open country, and could cut off the
supply of food. Early in June provisions were
running short and the inhabitants, if not the Im
perialist soldiers, began to suffer severely from hunger.
The one passage of what can be called fighting took
place on May 1 2. On that date General M. Diaz de la
Vega, an Imperialist officer, made a sortie to the north,
succeeded in forcing the blockading force back for
some little distance, and collecting a useful quantity
of forage. The Prince of Salm S.alm gives the whole

114 DIAZ
credit for the operation to the Austrians in the garrison.
The Mexican authorities deny that any Austrians
took part in it.
On May 16 Diaz found means to let the town know
that Maximilian had been taken on the previous day.
He had the news by telegraph. Marquez continued
to deny and to threaten to shoot. But reinforcements
began to reach Diaz from the north. On May 24 he
was joined by Ramon Corona with 15,000 men, and
by his brother Felix with cavalry from the south.
Other reinforcements followed, and the lines were
drawn closer round the city. Marquez continued to
deny and to wrangle, and as the end grew nearer his
efforts to extort money became more savage. On
May 28 he was persuaded or forced to send out a flag
of truce to verify the report of the Emperor's sur
render. Diaz showed the officer who brought it the
letter which Maximilian had sent to Baron Magnus
asking him to come with a counsel to assist in his
defence. Still Marquez would not give in, but
declared that the government now belonged of right
to a regency. The fact was that the man could not
surrender. For him there could be no quarter. His
only hope was to break out after laying hands on as
much money as he could carry and escape to the hills
and from thence to the United States. He made his
last effort on the night of June 17-18 with 6,000 men,
but was met by Diaz and driven back on the city.
And now the end came swiftly. The Austrians
refused to fight. They had been told by the Minister
Baron Lago that the Emperor had written from his
prison telling them to resist no longer, and that the
letter must have been intercepted by Marquez. They
withdrew into their barrack and stood on their guard.

THE RISE TO THE FIRST RANK 115
The conduct of these heroes does not appear to have
been calculated to persuade the Mexicans that
Europeans stood on a higher moral level than them
selves. They had renounced their nationality when
they entered the service of the Emperor. But in the
general disaster they hurried to seek protection from
the Austrian Minister Baron Lago, without making
the least effort to obtain terms for their Mexican
fellow-soldiers. Diaz, taking the whole responsibility
on himself, entered into negotiations with Baron
Lago on the 19th, and promised favourable terms of
capitulation to the Austrians. They were to keep
their personal baggage though they were required to
surrender their arms, and were secured a safe conduct
to Veracruz. While they were providing for their
safety Marquez was taking care of his. He resigned
the Government and found means to hide himself, till
he escaped to the United States. Other Imperialists
who were very badly compromised were not so
fortunate. General Ramon Tabera, who replaced
Marquez, endeavoured to obtain a capitulation, and,
on being told that he must surrender at discretion,
talked of fighting to the last. But when Diaz began
a bombardment, and made visible preparations for a
storm, Mexico surrendered on June 20. The town was
occupied next day.
With the occupation of the capital of the Republic
we come to the turning-point in the life of Porfirio
Diaz, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say the
point where he was to be called upon to show whether
he had it in him to go further and higher. His
action at this time, both during and after the siege,
seems to prove that he himself was conscious that he
stood at the place where his fate was to be decided.

116 DIAZ
He acted as if he were consciously presenting himself
to his countrymen as one who was fit to rule, and might
be trusted to use power without brutality. He con
fined himself to doing what was necessary to secure
the victory of his cause, but he avoided bloodshed as
much as he could. He took no personal revenge, and
those of the Imperialist partisans who were captured
and put to death died by order of the Government,
and not by his. If this was his purpose, he succeeded.
From the day of capitulation he was a recognised
candidate for the place of governor of his country.
He had still not a little fighting, successful and unsuc
cessful, to do, but his purely military life was over and
his political career had begun.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICIAN

At this moment when we are at the turn of the road
we must stop to make an estimate of the man, to
endeavour to see what he was in himself, and what his
work could be expected to be either in so far as it was
the expression of his own capacity, or as it was
conditioned by the elements he had lying to his hand.
There is a known difficulty in learning what any man
was, or is, in himself, and it is apt to be insuperable
when we lack, as we do in the case of Porfirio Diaz,
the guidance of a great mass of private correspon
dence. No evidence of that character has been
published, nor is it likely that any ever will be. Don
Rafael de Zayas Enriquez, author of a bitter-sweet
biographical study, has stated that he never learnt
to read or write well. The very neat handwriting of
certain notes of his published in facsimile vindicates
his penmanship, but we may take it for granted that
he was no great writer of letters. The autobiographi
cal narrative he dictated in his latter years shows no
trace of self-revelations. It is downright and purely
historical — at least, that is the case with the pub
lished parts ; and while it gives the acts it does not
dwell on the reasons nor the motives. But we may
doubt whether there was anything to reveal. As he
appears to the world Porfirio Diaz was a man who had
one rule and one great quality. He played the game,
and he loved order. The rule and the quality can be

118 DIAZ
so amply displayed in act that autobiographical reve
lations are quite superfluous. His mind was simple
and his will was clear. He had no velleities, but
always definite intentions.
This essentially practical and manly mind was lodged
in a most fortunately constituted body. He is called
tall by one who was himself very short, and of middle
height by another who judged by a different standard.
All agree that he was remarkably well put together,
though he looked somewhat taller in the saddle than
he did on foot. From this we may perhaps conclude
that, like the strong types of men belonging to the
southern, or so-called Latin, races, he was longer in
the body than the legs. It is very credible that, as
some of his critics have alleged, he liked best to be
seen and to be pictured in the saddle. Nor is it
anywise difficult to believe that he liked a big horse
rather than a small one. He belonged to a race of
horsemen. He spoke a language in which horseman
and gentleman are synonymous. It is quite likely
that he would have seen nothing absurd in the old
maxim that the man who is mounted on the great
horse is as high above his fellow-men as fortune can
place him. A strongly-built frame is a great gift of
Nature, but it must be completed by a sound con
stitution and a freedom from any tendency to
disease. That Diaz was favoured in that respect
even beyond the fortune of well-endowed men is
proved by one patent fact. He lived either in poverty
or in constant hardship and exposure for more than
half of a life of over eighty years. He was wounded,
and badly ; he was severely burnt ; he was visited
at least once by marsh fever contracted in unwhole
some bivouacs. These injuries and invasions of germs

THE POLITICIAN 119
of disease had no weakening effect on him whatever.
They were thrown off and left no evil consequences
behind. He died of senile decay when the strong
body was worn out.
Other men have had these advantages and have
wasted them. We have the testimony of those who
hated him, and would have said -all the ill they could
of him, that he treated his powerful frame and his
fine constitution as instruments to be kept in order by
sobriety. For the first half of his life the conditions
in which he had to work constituted a perpetual train
ing. He had to ride by day and night, when his
safety depended on his nerve and his vigilance. But
if he had not observed the famous rules of Blaise de
Monluc he would not have borne the strain even in
his youth.1
From the time that he became the political head of
his country he made it his aim to keep himself in
training. He could not have adopted this rule if he
had not been prepared. His habits do not give us the
chief reason why he rose, for men of a very different
way of life had reached the place, but they do explain
better than any other knowledge we have of him why
he remained at the head for so many years. All our
witnesses tell the same tale, but the only one who need
be quoted is the most hostile, Carlo de Fornaro,
1 The four rules of Monluc will be found in the address to the lieutenants
and captains of France which he puts at the head of his Commentaries.
They do not contain the highest reasons for observing morality of conduct.
Blaise would naturally leave them to his brother the Bishop, but, speaking
as an old soldier to young soldiers, he talks excellent sense. The passage
is too long to quote, but the substance of it is that a man will never become
one of those good officers whose services are indispensable to the distributers
of promotion unless he avoids certain sins of the flesh which besot and
weaken him, so that he will not have at command the clear head, the steady
nerve, and the ever active body which can rise to all emergencies by day or
night.

120 DIAZ
author of a typical scream of Spanish-American
invective. Observe that Sefior Fornaro, in his " Diaz,
Czar of Mexico," published in several languages in
1909, speaks in this style of a passage in the history
of the President's first term of office : " This was the
finishing stroke of the most brutish, the most craven,
and the wildest orgie of blood perpetrated in the annals
of humanity ; it was an insensate Saturnalia of Gore,
the luxurious rage of an impotent, cowardly, sadic
old despot."
The event of which Sefior Fornaro spoke in these
rabid words will be told under its proper date. In the
meantime, this frenzy of abuse is a not exceptional
example of Spanish-American political polemics.
The disputants hurl terms of insult as if they were
half-bricks and with an apparent entire disregard to
the meaning or applicability of the words they use.
About fifty pages further on we get this account of the
manner of life of the " sadic old despot " : " His private
life for the last thirty years has been spotless, and
although surrounded by all the luxuries he has led a
life simple as a hermit's : in food and drink abstemious
as an Arab ; in a country where everybody smokes
he has been an exception ; where alcoholism is ram
pant he only tastes water ; where everybody goes to
bull-fights he stays at home ; does not visit theatres
except at official functions ; seldom hunts, and never
plays. Private life, personal hygiene, hard work
physical and intellectual economy, have been con
centrated for the prolongation of power through the
medium of a perfect body."
He loved no plays, he heard no music. The Presi
dency was to him, not a prize to be enjoyed, but a
redoubt to be stormed, and then held by sleepless

THE POLITICIAN 121
vigilance and the same hard fighting that was needed
to win it. Given a man of prompt practical faculty,
great physical energy, of steady purpose and strong
will, and we can easily understand why he conquered
in the midst of the feeble personalities, the social
incoherences and the pohtical nullities of Mexico.
When we have made for ourselves a picture of the
manner of man he was, we may before entering on
bis political career endeavour to attain to some
conception of what he was likely to be able to do.
That he won the Presidency and held it for a period
which makes a long reign for a king whose right was
not liable to be contested was a • feat. But was it to
be only the feat of the resolute skipper who, pistol in
hand, cows a mutinous crew and keepsrirto its duty,
or the achievement of a statesman who develops
institutions and makes a lasting Government ? A
few years ago the general disposition would have
been to put him with the creative statesmen. There
were some who doubted. It is said, and we can
believe, that Cecil Rhodes declined to enter into
certain enterprises in Mexico because he could find
no security that the peace of the country would last
longer than the life of President Diaz. He spoke with
the understanding of one who knew what government
is. The world at large was of another opinion. The
difficulty would have been to obtain adhesion to the
verdict that the regenerator of Mexico, the creator of
a new and better order, would turn out to be only a
transient keeper of the peace. Now we all know that
the old disorder welled up before the death of the
strong man who had kept it down. He seemed to
have failed, and those who had been most ready before
1909 to believe that a new heaven and a new earth

122 DIAZ
had been created for Mexico by him were not the least
disposed to think that they were disappointed by his
fault. Those who were so quick to condemn ought
to have asked themselves whether a ruler can be fairly
said to have failed if he has achieved a great measure
of success in a whole generation of effort to do the
impossible. Gourgaud, who was mentally incapable of inventing
it, has recorded a saying of Napoelon's at St. Helena :
" J'ai trouve tous les elements de l'empire. . . . Je
ne serais pas venu, qu'el est probable qu'un autre
aurait fait de meme. . . . Un homme n'est qu'un
homme." He said it beyond doubt, and his words
were profoundly true of himself and of all the rulers of
men. However great a man may be, and in whatever
field he works, he is subject to a human limitation.
He can handle what is given him to manipulate, but
he cannot create his material. The greatest of
statesmen can do no more than the sheep-breeders who
sell the wool, or the weavers who make it into cloth-
They can breed with more intelligence and so im
prove the wool, or they can improve the process of
weaving and therefore produce better cloth. The
best of them cannot create the wool-bearing animal.
Napoleon did great and lasting things, but then he had
great and lasting elements lying ready to be worked
on. There is no sort of comparison between the
French and the jarring classes of Creoles, half-breeds,
and Indians who make up the population of Mexico.
But a people may be far below the French of the
revolutionary epoch in intellect, and yet offer all the
elements out of which a stable polity may be made.
They may have ideas, aspirations, dispositions which
only need to be combined in order to produce a

THE POLITICIAN 123
Government, and an Administration which will last
for centuries. Those were elements Napoleon found
in France, and there were others. The very parts of
the Administration he framed, which still governs
France, had been rough hewn for him by the
monarchy. His Prefect was the old Intendant. His
centralisation had been begun by the kings. It
never came to full development under them, partly
because they falsified it by interference at the bidding
of personal whims, partly because it was blocked by
the mouldering remains of what had once been real
instruments of government. The Revolution burnt
the rubbish away, but the indestructible parts of the
old Administration were there to be used. All that
was necessary was to put them together. It was
the work of a constructive statesman. But a ruler as
great in capacity as Napoleon, and a wiser than he,
could not have created these elements. " Un homme
n'est qu'un homme."
Let us make a great effort and assume that the boy
who was baptised at Oaxaca on September 15, 1830,
had been a Napoleon, what could he have done with
Mexico ? He could have kept it quiet, he could have
given it some material prosperity, as Diaz did, and
that is all he could have done. When he had achieved
his utmost the Creole would have still been a Creole,
the half-breed a half-breed, and the Indian an Indian.
If, indeed, it had been possible for a man living in the
nineteenth century in a country bordering on the
United States, and in communication with Europe,
to get himself accepted as a " Son of the Gods," he
might have founded a sacred race and a lasting
institution. But that was the impossible of all
impossibles. In the age he was born into and in his

124 DIAZ
country, all he could be was to be the constable who
kept the peace, and that he could be only while his
strength lasted. We cannot, therefore, fairly ask
that Diaz should have given more than he gave. He
could only be the best of the so-called Spanish-
American tyrants. We cannot critically compare
him with a Richelieu, a Cavour, or a Bismarck, who
had all such widely different elements to deal with.
By the side of those statesmen he must needs look but
a transient, even a futile, figure. The fair comparison
is between him and other Spanish-American rulers
who have had the same problem to deal with : Francia
in Paraguay, Juan Manuel Rosas in the Argentine,
Guzman Blanco, " the great American," in Colombia,
or Barrios in Central America. He has no need to
fear comparison with any of them.
There are two other conditions which must be clearly
realised before we begin to look at his political career.
They are the physical limitations of Mexico and the
nature of the Indian population.
In some parts of South America the influx of foreign
capital, mainly British, and of foreign labour, of which
the most valuable part is Italian, has bred a consider
able material prosperity. The Argentine is the most
conspicuous example. The growth of this industry has
made it more profitable for political intriguers to levy
blackmail and take bribes than to fight. In these coun
tries the essential anarchy of the community is skinned
over, and presents a smooth surface to the passing
visitor. This has not been the case in Mexico, and is
not likely to be. A great deal is said of the natural
wealth of the country, but there is one fact which
ought to be a warning to those who are inclined to
accept all they are invited to believe on this subject.

THE POLITICIAN 125
After thirty years — if not of absolute peace, at least
of anarchy kept down by the parish constable — the
whole trade of Mexico, with its 769,000 square miles
of territory and a population estimated at 15,000,000
or so, is not equal to the trade of Cuba, which is little
more than a twentieth of its size and has a population
of 2,000,000. The estimates of population are but
plausible guesswork. No real census has ever been
taken in a Spanish or Portuguese American State.
Yet the proportion as between Mexico and Cuba may
be as 15 is to 2. If the first were really a country of
great natural wealth this would most assuredly not be
the case. It would at least be on a level with the
Argentine. But Mexico is not a country of great
available wealth.1 Old and New Spain have a curious
likeness to one another in this respect. Both have a re
putation for immense natural resources, yet both have
ever been poor, because, though they do possess rich
districts and fine mines, they consist largely of barren
rock and high tablelands of indifferent soil and ill-
watered. The communications of both are obstructed.
The tablelands of Mexico are held up by mountain
ranges on east and west. The fall to the Gulf of
Mexico is precipitous, and that to the Pacific, though
more manageable, is steep. Northward from the
plain of Anahuac the communications look easy
enough. As Humboldt pointed out more than a
century ago, it would be perfectly possible to drive a
wheeled carriage from the city of Mexico to the valley
of the Mississippi. Indeed, the caravan trade con
ducted in big prairie wagons on the Santa Fe trail
1 The reader who wishes to see this subject more fully dealt with may be
recommended to look into " A Study of Mexico," by David A. Wells (New
York, 1890, published by Appleton & Co.).

126 DIAZ
came from St. Louis, on the Mississippi, by Durango
to Mexico.1 But if the plain is smooth it is broken
by districts which are waterless. Irrigation is diffi
cult, because, with the exception of certain breaks in
Central Mexico, the mountains do not go beyond the
limit of eternal snow. The rivers of both New and
Old Spain alternate between being raging torrents,
when the winter snows melt on the hills and the
spring rains pour down, and dry river courses
(barrancas) at other times. There is in fact a great
open central road connecting. Mexico with the United
States, and that may some day prove to be the
physical fact which will decide the fate of the country.
But the road is not a good one, because it is so easy
to starve or die of thirst on it. Therefore Mexico
has not had the rapid prosperity of the Argentine and
is unlikely ever to attain to that level. Therefore,
also, foreign capital has never had the same influence
as in the southern republic. Large tracts of Mexico
are by nature poor, and when they are mountainous
are also very inaccessible. In them is a population
which gains nothing by such prosperity as there has
been, and which offers a fine recruiting ground for the
revolutionary and the brigand.
The position of the Indian population of Mexico
when Diaz began his career has already been stated
in a general way. But a few further details may be
given, because they show what was one problem of
government he had to deal with. In the north-west
along the American frontier there were certain tribes
of pure savages who had never been subdued under
colonial rule, and who grew more independent and
1 See J. Gregg's " Commerce of the Prairies," 1844, for an account, by
one who followed it, of the old Santa Fe trail.

THE POLITICIAN 127
actually aggressive under the Republic. There were
tribes like the Apaches, who were just savages.
During the French intervention they took active part
against the Mexicans. Over all the north, where the
land is held in great estates, the Indians, though
nominally free, remained in fact serfs. The Peons
(i.e., pawns), or mere day-labourers, of Indian blood
continued to be enslaved by their inherited ideas and
their improvidence. They have shown a natural
disposition for the status of serf. Strange as it may
seem, they appear to prefer the kind of fixity of
occupation they get by contracting a debt, for which
they then pay by their labour. A Peon who wishes to
acquire a wife and hut takes a loan from an employer
and promises to work it off. He never does, because
he is soon in need of food and clothes. Then he has to
indebt himself again. A truck system which he is
incapable of checking keeps him for ever in debt. One
employer may let him go to another, but only on
condition that the new master pays his debt. If he
can find an employer on these terms he simply passes
from the old master to the new. It has been said that
during the rule of Diaz the Indians sank from a
condition in which all had some estate in the land to
one in which nobody had any except the great land
owners and capitalists. A good deal of fancy has
been expended on this social revolution to the injury
of the poor. The " pueblo " Indians whom the
Spaniards found were living in a tribal and com
munal state. The laws of the Indies secured to
certain Indian towns a ring of communal land.
These lands were not respected when the Church's
endowments were secularised, and the Indians suffered.
But the fact that some Indians had definite communal

128 DIAZ
rights in specified pieces of land is far from proving
that all had rights in the soil. All the evidence goes
to show that they were serfs under Spanish rule by
law, and have continued to be so through their own
inability to rise to a better state. You cannot put a
five-fingered hand into a four-fingered glove. The
tribal and communal life is intelligible to the Mexican
Indian, and no other is. When left to himself he is
incurably improvident and idle. Foreign employers
in Mexico have thought that the sloth and carelessness
of their workmen were due to the low rate of wages,
which did not allow them to aspire to any comfort.
In the hope of stimulating them to industry they have
introduced systems of piece-work by which men
could earn twice as much as their rate of pay. They
have found that the Indians did do a better day's
work for as many days as were needed to earn the
equivalent of the miserable old weekly wage. Then they
spent the rest of the week drunk with pulque or only
just in absolute idleness. In the south among Juarez's
people and Don Porfirio's the Indians showed more
character because they had kept their old tribal organi
sation in the mountains — and the tribe had no scruple
in using the lash on the drone who was a mere burden.
The whole race has been degraded by serfdom, but
not by that only. An ancient Mexican tradition
which has at least a mythical truth tells how one
of the peoples who preceded the Aztecs on the plain
of Anahuac became utterly deboshed by drinking
pulque and fell victims to the first invader. Pulque
is in fact a terrible cause of degradation. It is easily
made, is very abundant, and so cheap as to be within
the reach of the very poor. Though not very alcoholic,
it has a peculiarly besotting effect when drunk

THE POLITICIAN 129
continuously and in large quantities. Those who
know Spanish America all agree that while the in
habitants of the low-lying lands are on the whole
sober, the mountain populations are much the reverse.
Mexico is emphatically a country of mountains and
high tablelands, and beyond all dispute it is very
drunken. What was to be done with a population
degraded to this extent by powerful causes of long
standing ? A great deal has been said about the
illiteracy of the Mexicans and the good effect which
education would produce. But the people of Mexico
have not been more illiterate than were the Englishmen
of the reign of Elizabeth or the French of the reign of
Louis XIV. Their stagnation is due to the intellectual
sloth of those who have had a chance to be literate,
and the lack of an intellect capable of responding to
education in the case of the huge majority of the
inhabitants. They can be drilled to perform some
simple industrial function in a mechanical way, but
they cannot be taught to show the intelligence of a
skilled European workman. The faculty is lacking ;
and these hopeless human beings of an inferior stock
constitute from a half to two-thirds of the population.
They are the labouring part of the nation, and they
fill the ranks of the army. The political and industrial
fabric of Mexico rests on such foundation as they
supply. Within twenty-four hours of the surrender of
Mexico Diaz took a step which must needs have, and
we cannot but believe was intended to have, the
appearance of putting him in a position not perhaps
of actual hostility to the Government of Juarez, but
of separation from his old chief. He resigned the
command of the Army of the East. His resigna-

130 DIAZ
tion was declined, but he insisted, and the President
was forced to agree to his wish on July 13. He
continued, it is true, to hold the command within the
city till the 21st, because he could not be spared a day
sooner. It is claimed on his behalf, and cannot be
seriously denied, that nothing but his firmness saved
the city from plunder and massacre. His army,
thanks to his good discipline, which was made
possible by his careful management of the money
raised in the south, was well in hand. But, as was
to be expected, his original force had been largely
recruited during the blockade by bands of patriots
who did not so much spring from the soil as descend
from the Sierras. They burdened him with offers of
assistance, which, as he well knew, covered a lively
wish to share in the spoils. His most pressing
obligation was to keep them out of the city till
measures had been taken to forestall their entry.
For twenty-four hours nobody was permitted to go
in. The interval was long enough to allow of a hasty
arrangement between the victorious general and those
of the townsmen who possessed ready money, and
therefore had the best of reasons for fearing an out
break of robbery. The first troops to enter were
picked among the bands he had brought to a fair state
of discipline, and their morality was confirmed by a
payment of arrears. When all restrictions were
removed, the less trustworthy elements of the patriot
army poured in, only to be met by what our Eliza
bethan ancestors would have called " a cooling card."
They found the plunderable parts of the city already
occupied by well-placed troops standing to arms, and
they saw a plainly-printed notice in conspicuous
places to the effect that any man caught pillaging

THE POLITICIAN 131
would be hanged out of hand. They knew their
man, and the confidence that was due to his word.
Diaz saved his cause from disgrace, and if it was
added unto him that he gained the good opinion
of the moneyed men that reward was creditably
earned. On July 13 Juarez and his Government returned
from their years of exile and wandering in the north.
The national treasury was empty, and an army of
about 100,000 men, largely armed mobs, was con
centrated in and around the city. The $300,000
from the military chest of the Army of the East which
Diaz handed over at once to the President represented
the whole of the funds immediately available to meet
all the expenses of government. The service was great
and timely. Moreover, it was not long since Don
Porfirio had given a marked proof of his loyalty.
Don Benito's term of office as President had run out
in the previous year. Some of those about him had
seized the opportunity to declare that as the Con
stitution forbade a re-election of a President he must
retire and make room for a successor. " Ote toi de la
que moi je m'y mette " is in Spanish America the
most universally acted on of all the phrases applicable
to politics. It is but just to allow that this sadly
characteristic example of Mexican anarchy met little
approval. The pushful persons who took the moment
when French troops were still on the soil of Mexico and
the intrusive Imperial Government had still an army
in the field, to stand on the letter of the law and insist
on performing the farce of holding a Presidential
election were ill looked on. The United States
continued to treat Juarez as the legitimate President,
Diaz, who controlled the whole south, might have

132 DIAZ
given serious trouble if he had had no more good
feeling and political sense than many of his contem
poraries. But, though he was by this time well
aware where he meant in the end to go, he was not the
man to show overhaste. He declared that the Indian
who had represented the independence of Mexico
during years of defeat and suffering must not be
displaced till victory was won. Juarez was formally
recognised as President in his camp.
Yet when the two met it was as friends between
whom a gulf was opening. Diaz declared in after-
times that Juarez had begun to be cold to him about
the time of the siege of Puebla. He had barely acknow
ledged the report of its capture and had added no
thanks. The explanation of his ill-will is not difficult
to find. The mere course of events had made the two
rivals. There is everywhere such a thing as serving
your cause too well. When he who renders the
service puts himself in the superior position it is hard
for the person served to feel nothing but gratitude.
Now this was what Diaz had done. Others had
fought hard and forwarded the cause, but none of
them had to their credit the recovery of the South and
the taking of Puebla and the capital. He was marked
out as a present rival and future successor. Juarez
is believed to have been a disinterested man, and yet
we must not expect too much virtue even from the
best. He was poor, and the loss of the Presidential
chair would inevitably destroy his means of support.
Cincinnatus can return to his plough when he is
Cincinnatus — that is to say, when he is not only a
virtuous man, but a patrician who owes his place in
the world to his birth, not to his means. Juarez was
a lawyer without fortune, for whom the loss of the

THE POLITICIAN 133
Presidency must entail the necessity for beginning
life again in his old age. The governorship of his
native State might have been a dignified refuge, but
he had lost his hold on Oaxaca during the war when
he was far away and Diaz was on the spot. How
could he feel friendly to the former subordinate who
was, not indeed maliciously, but by the force of cir
cumstances, supplanting him ?
Moreover, unless we are to dismiss the word of Don
Porfirio himself as worthless, he had just done some
thing which outweighed many services. He had
given the President a lesson, and a rather humiliating
one. When he reported the capitulation of Mexico
he received an order to place the French Minister,
M. Dano, under arrest and to take possession of the
archives of the Embassy. He at once refused, telling
Juarez that since they already had the ill-will of
Napoleon, they had better not add that of France by
insulting its honour. Juarez made no answer. Diaz
pressed him to send somebody else to carry out the
order, but nobody came. M. Dano, who had obvious
reasons for not wishing to be in Mexico when Juarez
returned, applied for a safe conduct to Veracruz, and
Diaz gave it at once. His prompt resignation of his
command of the Army of the East had much the
appearance of having been a measure of precaution
meant to leave him free to refuse to obey. It was
unquestionably a sign that he felt himself strong
enough to dispense with official rank.
Yet he tells us that he was at this time hard pressed
for money. During the war he had been content to
draw from the military chest he himself had filled no
more than was enough to provide for his daily needs.
He now offered to acknowledge that he had received

134 DIAZ
a third of what was due to him, though as a matter of
fact he had taken less. It was not safe to fob off a
creditor of his standing, and Juarez offered $21,000
in payment of all claims. Diaz was careful to warn
the President that he would not consider himself
bound to follow any particular line of conduct laid
down for him in consideration of this payment, and
he says he added that the issue of the money from the
treasury might be stopped if it was to be hampered
by any condition. The relations of the President and
the General must have been tart indeed by this time.
But the $21,000 were duly paid to Don Porfirio's
agent, Jose de Teresa. Diaz had spoken to Juarez of
his intention to go into business. The business he did
go into took the strange form of gifts of $17,000 to
support a newspaper, a rapid and effectual method
of evacuation. The balance was stolen in the house
of his agent, and he only recovered a half. Though
he persisted in resigning his more important com
mands, he continued at the head of the 2nd Division of
the army till i860, when he retired with the remnant
of his $21,000 to a farm called La Noria (Waterwheel),
which had been conferred on him by his native State.
In estimating these and other sums named in dollars
we must bear in mind the effect produced on the
currency of Mexico by the depreciation of silver
during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The
Republic adhered for long to the silver standard, and
its money fell in exchange value till the process was
stopped, as will be told further on, by the financial
measures of Sefior Limantour. In 1868 $21,000 made
a larger sum than they would have done when the
coin had reached its present level of 2s. o\d. He had
married his first wife, Delfina Ortega y Reges, during

THE POLITICIAN 135
the siege. We know little of Dona Delfina except
that she bore her husband three children and died
young. For two years they lived quietly on their
farm, and Don Porfirio applied himself to the cultiva
tion of the sugar-cane.
There was in after times no lack of persons who were
ready to ask him why he did not rest content to go on
planting the sugar-cane. They made it a matter of
reproach to him that he too became an agitator in due
course, and joined those who perpetuated the disorder
of the country by disobedience to the law and the
selfish pursuit of their personal ambitions. These
critics omit to show what it was incumbent on them
to prove — namely, that there was any law in Mexico
to obey save in the impotent form of mere words on
paper. As for the charge of ambition, it is cheaply
brought against every man who in any polity tries to
rise to great place. The Earl of Chatham was
ambitious, for he believed that he could save the
country, and that nobody else could. Holding that
faith, he did well to seek power. " For good thoughts,"
says Bacon, " (though God accept them) yet toward
men are little better than good dreams, except they
be put in act ; and that cannot be without power and
place, as the vantage and commanding ground." The
ambitious man stands or falls by what he does with
the power when it is in his hands. Diaz would never
have had an opportunity to do good to his country
if he had waited till a united Mexican people, or even
a well-disciplined Mexican party, came to La Noria
to interrupt him while he was cutting his harvest of
sugar-cane with his machete (his cane-knife) and peti
tion him to take the Republic in hand. He had to
win the means of doing good, and that by such

136 DIAZ
methods as the society he was born in forced him to
use. Chatham could do no other, though he was
more happily placed than Don Porfirio. He had to
co-operate with men whom he despised, and allow
them to help him for their own ends by the use of
means which his soul loathed. " The rising unto
place is laborious, and by pains men come to greater
pains ; and it is sometimes base, and by indignities
men come to dignities." Diaz was born in the midst of
a blood-stained anarchy, and had to rise by the use of
force. He is to be judged by what he did with the
power he conquered.
Anarchy is the one name for the condition of
Mexico after the withdrawal of the French army and
the death of Maximilian, as it had been before. Juarez,
it is true, was formally re-elected President at the end
of 1867, though re-election was forbidden by the Con
stitution — a tolerably clear proof of the little respect
felt for the letter of the law in Mexico. We must
believe that gratitude had a share in confirming him
in power, but it is certainly the fact that there was
nobody at that moment who could have secured
sufficient support to oppose him. Support does not
mean votes, which have never decided anything in a
Spanish-American republic, but an adequate military
force to dictate to the voters over a sufficient part of
the country. We ought not to blame Don Benito if
his administration failed to restore peace to Mexico.
The treasury was empty. Foreign nations had lost
all confidence in the promises of the Republic and
would lend no money. Indeed, civilised peoples,
except the United States, stood aloof from the
Republic for a time. The United States could not
help, for they were not then able to dispense with

THE POLITICIAN 137
foreign capital for their own needs. The country was
swarming with broken men, brigandage, and " pro-
nunciamientos." The Roman Catholic clergy, then
and for some years to come, were unscrupulous in
fomenting disorder. The Government lacked the
means to pay a regular force to do the most elemen
tary police work. It was the President's bad fortune
that the years of his administration were full of
earthquakes, bad harvests, and disease. Yet, when
every allowance has been made, it must be recognised
that the taciturn Indian patience, which had served
Juarez and Mexico well during the years of the French
intervention, was but a negative quality. It was after
all only a power to endure and more was needed to
establish order. Yet it was all that Jurarez had to
give. As his term drew to an end it became clear that the
Indian tenacity of the President, his stolid capacity
for staying where he was and looking in silent
obstinacy at all menaces, was about to be shown by
an attempt to retain his seat. In other words, he
was preparing to violate the provision of a Convention
he had helped to make. There goes a story which at
any rate conveys a truth, whether the thing happened
exactly as it is told or not. Juarez, so the tale runs,
had it out with Diaz between themselves, and said
to him by way of closing the interview : " You will
be President some day, but not while I live."
Whether these words were ever uttered or not, it is
not the less true that they state the intention of Don
Benito. He would be President while he lived, which,
of course, implied that he would make his own
re-election by setting his dependent mob of place
holders to work, by bribing, falsifying the lists of

138 DIAZ
electors, threats to use force, and at a pinch by actual
slaughter.1 It would surely tax the ingenuity of the most in
genious apologist to show that the cause of the
President was also the cause of law and order. He
was confessedly preparing to violate the law ; and
there was no means of prevailing on him to stop except
by the use of force. In the natural course of things,
there were not wanting those who were prepared to
avail themselves of the means so familiar in Mexican
politics. The name " party " must still be taken to
stand for a body of men who hold certain principles
and try to carry them out in the conduct of
government. But in Mexico nothing was at stake
except the question who was to be President. It will
avoid confusion if we use another term once familiar
enough among ourselves, and say that there were
three connections in Mexican politics — the Juaristas,
the Lerdistas, and the Porfiristas. The first were the
supporters of Juarez, largely place-holders, who have
been called Conservatives. They held the places,
and thought that all would be well if they could only
" conserve " them. The Lerdistas were the followers
of that Don Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada whose brother
Don Miguel had been Minister of Grace and Justice
under Juarez. They called themselves the " Evolu-
1 It is but a few years since a very pretty example was given in Rio
Janeiro of the " Latin " American method of consulting the free and
independent voter. It was known that the candidate who was not to be
allowed to be returned would probably receive a good many votes in a
certain district. On the day of the election the approaches to the ballot-
boxes were, in the usual way, occupied by " capangas," that is to say, negro
bullies armed with cudgels and revolvers. At an eariy hour a proclamation
was published to the effect that in view of the danger to public peace arising
from the excited passions of the district the Government had decided to
close the poll and to count only the votes given before the hour of closing.
Of course they were the votes of the " capangas."

THE POLITICIAN 139
tionists," and they held the faith that all would be
well if only in the process of evolution they could
occupy the places. The Porfiristas were, as their name
shows, the followers of Don Porfirio Diaz, and they
called themselves Radicals. It was their fundamental
principle that no good would be done till a radical
sweep had been made of the others and they were
masters of the situation. The future was to show that
they were not mistaken. Where what was at stake
was the personality of the future administrator, the
cause of the most capable man was the good cause.
The election was to be held in the autumn of 1871,
when Juarez's four years, counting from the election
in 1867, would be at an end. The Juaristas had, of
course, the advantage of the support of the place
holders. But Lerdo de Tejada had availed himself
of his ministerial position to plant not a few friends of
his own in offices where they could be useful. Diaz
had the aid of all who were not provided for by the
others, and also, it is said, of not a few old Imperialists
who, if they did not love him, hated Juarez and Lerdo.
When it came to voting each of the three connections
was found to have sufficient local influence to secure
the return of its own man in its own territory. We
hear, of course, that the power of the Administration
was employed to the full ; that towns which noto
riously contained a population of 2,000 were recorded
to have cast 2,500 votes for Don Benito ; and, in
short, that the force and fraud of a sham election was
in full swing. In spite of this vigorous employment
of the traditional methods, Juarez failed to get an
absolute majority. The votes were 5,837 for Juarez,
2,874 Ior Lerdo, and 3,555 for Diaz. The decision
rested with Congress, which as a matter of course

140 DIAZ
decided in favour of Juarez. It had been made by
him in the well-known way. His opponents showed
no more respect for the freedom of voters than he did.
They applied pressure and made bargains just as he
did. He won because his control of the Central
Government gave him the best means for applying
pressure and making bargains.
It would have been strange if the defeated parties
had rested content with this settlement. We are
assured that they were honestly persuaded that the
re-election of a President was contrary to democratic
principles. It is a nice question why the sovereign
people, which is alone entitled to choose its ruler, is
to be cabined and cribbed and confined when in the
exercise of its rights it chooses the same man twice
running. The inquiry would be the more unneces
sary in the present case, because when the course of
events carried Lerdo to the Presidency he began to
provide for his own re-election, and when later on the
Presidency came to Diaz he was more re-elected than
any man in Spanish-American history. It will be
right to state what the different connections professed
that they were going to do. The make-believe of
politicians has always a certain value, for it throws
some light on the moral and intellectual realities of
the political stage on which the fictions are thought
likely to tell on the gallery. But we would treat
some things with a respect they do not deserve if we
spoke of them as being more than what they were.
It would be easy to fill pages with the promises of
constitutional improvements made by Juarez when he
was standing for President at the end of 1867, ana^ f°r
some time afterwards. But as they were all dropped
when they had served their purpose, the enumeration

THE POLITICIAN 141
would be merely tedious. The substantial facts which
we have to bear in mind in regard to him are that he
proved doggedly hostile to the Imperialists, and that
he reduced the army wholesale.
it, His implacability to the Imperialists offended not
them only but many Mexicans who thought he simply
perpetuated divisions and causes of trouble. An
amnesty was passed in 1870, but with exceptions, and
not till many Mexicans had been driven into exile,
and many had escaped the entire confiscation of their
property by the payment of heavy fines. They
remained embittered and on the outlook for a chance of
taking their revenge. The moderation which Diaz
had shown at all times, and more especially when he
forced the city of Mexico to surrender, pointed him
out as the one leader they could best join. When he
hurried, as we have seen that he did, to disassociate
himself from Juarez, in June, 1867, he may have, he
probably had, a definite intention to offer himself to
all Mexicans as the man who would divide them the
least. The reduction of the army was no doubt a necessity.
With the best will in the world, Juarez could not in
1867 and 1868 pay, or pension, a force of 100,000 men
or so. But the officers and men who were thrown out
of employment penniless in a country poor at the best
of times, and now disorganised in its industry as in
everything else, were not in a position which made it
possible for them to look on his action with a cool
impartiality. They provided the general staff and
the rank and file of all the forces of disorder which
kept the country in a turmoil throughout his adminis
tration. It was inevitable that they should help to
recruit the connections opposed to him, and that the

142 DIAZ
leader they preferred should have been Porfirio Diaz,
a soldier like themselves, and one who had quickly
and emphatically marked his alienation from the policy
of the Indian President, and who, moreover, had
always taken great care of his own men. We shall
see that when, after a first failure and some years of
conflict, Don Porfirio became President, he made it a
rule to treat the army, that part which had fought
against him as well as that which fought for him,
with consideration. It was a proof of his faculty to
recognise facts that he always dealt with the army as
being the decisive force in Mexican politics. Then
Juarez did a thing which one cannot wholly condemn,
since he was but insisting on his rights, but was sure
to appear invidious to the multitudes of Mexicans,
soldiers included, who were not allowed to do them
selves justice. He insisted on a regulation of his
accounts with the treasury, and on the payment of
his arrears. They amounted to $75,000. He was
by general confession neither corrupt nor greedy.
When his opportunities are taken into account he
must be said to have died poor, for he left his family
only about $120,000. But the arrears he took from
an exhausted treasury were more than half the total
sum. In a country where the judgments passed on
public men are less malignant than they are apt to be
in Mexico there would not have been lacking people to
say that he used his official power for his own benefit,
and that if he strove to secure his re-election it was
because he wanted to increase his fortune. Juarez,
as a native commentator on his life remarked, died in
a happy hour for him and before " ingratitude
assassinated him," but he had himself been ungrateful
to those who had served his cause ; and we may be

THE POLITICIAN 143
sure that this sententious judgment expressed a very
common opinion.
It is insuperably difficult to discover what was the
connection of Don Sebastian Lerdo. It was visibly
the weakest of the three which divided Mexico.
When events which are now to be told carried him
into the Presidential chair, he himself treated it with
entire contempt. But his odd story must not be
forestalled. He was a Creole, an accomplished man,
and a lawyer. His brother Don Miguel had been a
foremost leader in the fight with the Church, and Don
Sebastian benefited by his popularity with the
Liberals. But the foundation of his political impor
tance was that he was President of the Supreme Court,
and therefore, by virtue of a tradition which, strangely-
enough, had survived from the colonial epoch, was
entitled to succeed the President of the Republic in
case of his death or disappearance for any other
reason. We have seen how Juarez himself when in
the same position had used this right of succession.
It may seem strange that he should have left a
political opponent in a place of so much prestige. The
probability is that he knew he could not displace Don
Sebastian without driving him into active alliance
with the Porfiristas ; and Don Benito was no bad
master of the art of dividing in order to rule.

CHAPTER VI
THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY
From 1871 to 1877 Diaz was engaged in the
struggle which ended by making him President of
Mexico. During the first of these six years his
opponent was Juarez. For the rest of the time he was
in conflict with Lerdo and then with a new enemy,
Don Jose M. Iglesias. His course was not unchecked,
nor was his victory easy.
When the Congress declared Juarez duly elected on
October 12, 1871, Diaz allowed some three weeks to
pass before he took open action. The riotous protests
made at various towns by his followers could hardly
have taken place if he had been known to disapprove
of them strongly, but he did not hasten to produce
the " plan " which invariably states the case of a
Mexican " pronunciamiento," and is the notification
to all whom it may concern that a party is in arms.
The methods used in the constitutional conflicts of the
Republic are not ours, but they have this much in
common with the usages of British or American
parties, that they include a programme or platform,
and a " good cry " with which " to go to the country."
There, too, as in countries of less picturesque ways,
political action is preceded by consultations of
managers, and a leader has to yield to the solicitations
of enthusiastic supporters. Don Porfirio states that
it was on the urgent appeals of his friends that he
finally decided to put himself at the head of a revo-

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 145
lutionary movement. The council in which the reso
lution to act was taken was held at his hacienda, or
ranch, La Noria, on or about November 8. The
programme was drawn up and the cry was raised.
As the first was subsequently revised and reissued at
other places, no more need be said of it now than that
it was based on the demand for the Constitution of
1857 and freedom of election. The cry adopted has
inevitably a somewhat ironic tone when we consider
it as having been raised by the strongest administrator
who has ever held Mexico in his hand. It consisted
of the words " Menos Gobierno y mas Libertades "
(" Less Government and more Freedom "). The
candid critic who has been freely quoted already, and
to whom we shall have to listen again, Don Rafael de
Zayas Enriquez, is of opinion that at this stage in the
" evolution " of his mind and character Don Porfirio
did truly believe that the great need of his country
was more freedom. Experience during the years
immediately following the promulgation of the Plan
of La Noria, in the opinion of the same authority,
taught him that Mexico suffered, not from over-
government, but from the total lack of governance,
or the bad quality of such as it had received, and also
that it stood in more need of discipline than of greater
freedom. The history of the next forty years cer
tainly appears to confirm the judgment of Don
Rafael. The response to the cry of La Noria was loud and
widespread. In this case, indeed, action had preceded
the word. Don Porfirio's friends had drawn the
sword before he blew the horn, for they had seized
the Government's artillery and stores in Oaxaca. In
many parts of Mexico the Porfiristas, or Radicals, or
p. l

146 DIAZ
Constitutionalists (they used that name also), rose
and took possession of the local governments. But,
though the revolt was sufficiently formidable to put
Juarez in serious danger, its progress was disappoint
ing after the first days. The peaceful elements in
the population were frightened by the prospect of a
renewal in a still worse form of the troubles of the last
years. As it has been the fate of peaceful Mexicans
to be sacrificed to armed factions, their fears might
have had no power to injure the Porfiristas. But
Juarez had an attached following which stood by
him and the control of the central Administration.
And then the rather patchwork following of Don
Sebastian Lerdo, though it was by no means loyal
to the President, was far from being disposed to
aid the Porfiristas. It did not wish to exchange
King Log for King Stork. Then the premature
outbreaks which preceded the " pronunciamiento "
of November had given Juarez the opportunity
to weaken his enemy in detail. He put down a
rising in the capital ferociously, and was even able
to take the offensive when he heard of the revolt in
Oaxaca. The old President acted with commendable prompti
tude, and he was helped by the fact that Diaz, after
seeing the movement well on foot in Oaxaca, hurried
with 100 horse to get his supporters in the centre and
north well in hand. The Juarista general, Latorre,
marched into Oaxaca, defeated Don Porfirio's
lieutenant, Luis Mier, at San Mateo Xindihui in
December, and occupied the town in January of 1872.
Felix Diaz, who was in command, found himself
unable to defend it, and, falling back on his old life,
took to the Sierra. His career was, however, short.

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 147
Before the end of the month he was surprised while
almost alone by a party of local enemies from Tehuan
tepec and murdered. The insurrection in Oaxaca
appeared to be wholly suppressed, but in Mexico, as
we have seen and shall see, this only means that it
had failed to win for the moment. The conditions
which produced it were not altered, and continued to
produce their normal consequences.
While his cause was at any rate superficially beaten
in the south, Don Porfirio was not able to make head
effectually in the centre of the country. He reached
Zacatecas, to the north of the city of Mexico, in
February. It had been already occupied by his
partisans, and we are told that he received a great
ovation. But it was far from being the case that all
was over except the shouting. The Government
troops were better armed and better organised than
their opponents. They scattered the insurgents
easily enough in the open field, winning " decisive "
victories at Cerro de la Bufa, reoccupying Zacatecas,
and gaining such successes as every Mexican Govern
ment claims to win till it crumbles. Diaz, who was
not present at any of these engagements, marched
with a body of cavalry on Mexico city itself, in the
hope of being received by a popular revolt. But
townsmen and garrison refused to move, and big towns
cannot be taken by columns of cavalry except with
their own consent. He had to retire to the State of
Jalisco and wander round the central regions still
held by Juarez. The rising had not upset the
Government, but whole States were out of hand,
particularly in the north, where Sinoloa and Chihua
hua were hostile, and there were Porfiristas every
where in sierra and plain. A small defeat in the field

148 DIAZ
would in all likelihood have brought the Government
down. The decision came in another way. Juarez
died suddenly on July 18. The disappearance of the
old leader in a great internal conflict and a struggle for
independence appealed to popular emotion. Sunt
lachryma? rerum, even in Mexico. All parties were
awed for a moment, and combined to give him " a
first-class funeral." The kindly regard for the
memory of an old foe which Swift grimly noted in
Harley and St. John when they were talking of
Godolphin, who was dead and could now do them no
harm, is a universal human sentiment. The political
world of Mexico gave Juarez his first-class funeral,
and voted him " well deserving of his country in the
heroic degree." Then it went on as before.
The removal of one of the three competitors for
power could make no change in the real condition of
the country. Yet it simplified the situation and
allowed of an interval of at least relative peace.
Lerdo became interim President by right of his place
as President of the Supreme Court. By retaining the
Ministers of Juarez, by keeping his own counsel, by
hinting hopes to his own party, by offering amnesty
on easy terms, and buying off individual leaders he
kept Juaristas and Lerdists together, and he divided
the Porfiristas. Diaz held out for a time, but by
October he had to recfcjgnise that he would only lose
by continuing in arms. * Lerdo refused to make any
further concessions in answer to letters Diaz wrote
on August 1 and September 23. In these documents
Don Porfirio only proved, I fear, that after all he too
was in the year 1872 a Mexican politician. The one
substantial word which stands in the midst of a flow
of verbiage was the demand that the amnesty should

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 149
be amended in his favour. The tenth Article of that
document declared that officers of the army who had
taken part in the late rising were to lose rank and pay,
though they were not to be otherwise punished. And
this is the appropriate place to note that, in spite of
Lerdo's firm refusal at the moment, the rank and pay
were restored before long. We may assume that
other communications of a private character took
place, but were not put on record. These compro
mises are unavoidable in parliamentary life, even when
it is conducted by " plans " " pronunciamientos," and
war cries. If the great Commoner was forced to suffer
the intrigues of the Duke of Newcastle, it is no less
true that the Duke could not have intrigued and
corrupted during a certain set of years without the
tacit assistance of the great Commoner. All the
other parts of Diaz's two letters are concerned with
the usual fine sentiments about freedom of election and
a warning that unless Government altered its ways
the arrangement now in course of being made would
turn out to be but a temporary truce. The prediction
was a safe one, even if it had not been uttered by a
man who was in a position to fulfil his own prophecy.
For the moment the way to the Presidency was
closed. Diaz returned to Oaxaca. His ranch, La
Noria, had been burnt down by the soldiers of Juarez
during the late troubles, and he now established
himself at La Candelaria. /For three years or so he
again applied himself to the cultivation of the sugar
cane, but this time he added a manufacture of chairs
to his agricultural industry. The cultivation of the
sugar-cane allows of long, quiet intervals between the
planting and the reaping. But he certainly did not
limit himself to growing sugar-cane and making

150 DIAZ
chairs. He was now the head of a powerful connection,
defeated, even scattered, for the moment, but always
capable of reuniting if its members found that their
ambitions were not satisfied. Don Porfirio, who was
a good judge of men, must have known enough of
Lerdo to feel sure that he had only to wait patiently
for an opportunity which would not fail to come.
Don Sebastian Lerdo appears , from what he did
and what we are told of him, to have belonged to a
type of man known in all countries, and certainly not
less common among Spanish-speaking politicians than
elsewhere. There was in him a combination of
dignity, not to say gravity, of outward bearing with
inward arrogance, and of frivolity of judgment, which
is fatal. Mr. H. H. Bancroft, in his " History of
Mexico," gives it as his belief that Don Sebastian had
a love of mystifying the people about him. Now few
of those who indulge in this form of humour are found
to be able to keep their enjoyment of the joke to
themselves. They triumph, and indeed it is not
always possible to hide the mystification from the
victim, and it is especially hard when the point of the
jest lies in depriving him of a place or keeping him out
of one. The sufferer is forced to recognise that he has
been made to look like a fool. There is no more
effectual way of gaining enemies than to indulge in
these feats of ingenuity. The Duke of Wellington,
on one of the rare occasions on which he con
fessed to have made a mistake, said that it lay in
having proved another gentleman to be a fool, for
nobody likes to be thought a fool. On one occasion
Lerdo mystified the whole population of the city of
Mexico by holding a premature ceremony of inaugura
tion of the Veracruz railway, with a great flourish of

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 151
trumpets. The arrogance of the man, and the
frivolity, too, came out when he made a public
declaration of his belief that he owed his place to
constitutional right and was not bound to consider
anybody. He was technically right, since he had
succeeded Juarez by virtue of his office as President
of the Supreme Court, but he was in that place
because he was a party leader. It was not wise to tell
his followers that he had outgrown the need of their
support. And then, too, he had drawn over many
of the Porfiristas by giving them to understand that
he would choose some of his Ministers from among
them. Yet he kept them at arm's length. And he
did a still less intelligible thing. He treated his own
party as a negligible quantity, and chose his Ministers
entirely among the Juaristas. The Lerdistas were
naturally angry. He was accused of corruption and
of underhand dealings for his own advantage with the
foreign capitalists who were now beginning to lay the
Mexican railways, as also of sacrificing the interests
of Mexico to British creditors. But these accusations
were probably the result rather than the cause of his
unpopularity. Withal he might have completed his
term of office in peace if he had not sought his
re-election in the usual way, which it would be unneces
sary as well as tiresome to repeat. The time was ripe
and Don Porfirio came out of his retirement to
conduct another constitutional campaign.
And now we have come to the last " Plan," and as
it really did produce some definite and long-lived
consequences, it is worth while to look at the thing
with some attention. It was in all ways typical of the
political world of Spanish America, in its inception,
its development, and its result. Lerdo did not forget

152 DIAZ
the part he had played to Juarez, and thought it wise
to take his precautions against any possible display
of independence by the present holder of the post of
President of the Supreme Court, Don Jose Maria
Iglesias. Don Jose had been a steady supporter of
Juarez and had borne the heat of the day during the
Imperial interlude. He was an important man in
his party, and Don Sebastian no doubt looked upon
him as very capable of nursing ambitious views on
the national Presidency, to which, as we have just
seen, the Presidency of the Supreme Court had thrice
served as a stepping-stone. One of the most valued
and honourable functions of the court was to decide
on the legality of the election of a national President
in case any dispute did arise. Now, as Don Sebastian
was quite resolved to be elected and to use all means
to that end, it followed that he could not lay himself
open to the risk of seeing his return quashed for
irregularity. The probability that this judgment
would be given was strong, for not only was Don
Sebastian resolved to be national President regardless
of law, but as the President of the Supreme Court was
interim President of the Republic sede vacante, it was
obvious that in the act of declaring the return of
another to be irregular Don Jose would seat himself
in the Presidential chair. To get rid of Sefior Iglesias
and put a person more likely to prove compliant in
his place would at the first blush appear to have been
the simple course. But it was not simple. The
summary dismissal of Don Jose Maria would have
offended his friends, and would have given the
Porfiristas, whose opposition was certain, good ground
for asserting that the court had been packed and
so for disregarding its judgment. Nor was it at all

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 153
sure that anyone else who might be put in his place
would not be tempted to display a manly and pro
fitable regard for the majesty of the law.
Mere dismissal was therefore not to be thought of.
Lerdo believed that he had found a more excellent
way. He made a new rule with the help of his docile
Congress, and it was that the right of examining into
the legality of elections ought on all sound principles
to belong to the electoral college which directed the
taking of the poll. Of course Don Jose protested
against that new little law of the President's, declared
it unconstitutional, and offered his resignation. To
let him go in* these circumstances would have been
equivalent to dismissal. So Lerdo refused to accept
his resignation. A stormy interview followed. Don
Jose protested that the law was no law, but he kept
his place. It was obvious that his presence on the
bench must be dangerous to Lerdo, for in the certain
event of a denial of the legality of the election the
President of the Supreme Court would insist on main
taining that he had jurisdiction. Lerdo must have
considered this the lesser danger of the two. He left
Iglesias in possession of his place and went on his own
way, relying on being able to enforce his will when the
time should come. What Iglesias might do would
depend on what the Porfiristas could do. If they
were beaten it would not be difficult to dispose of him.
The election was treated as the farce which it was
by Diaz and his party. He left his farm, La Cande-
laria, in December, 1875, to open the campaign. On
this occasion the course first adopted differed from that
followed three years before. Diaz left his supporter,
Don Fidencio Hernandez, to begin the rising in
Oaxaca. He took ship in the British steamship

154 DIAZ
Corsica with several friends, and went to Brownsville,
in Texas, just opposite the Mexican port Matamoros,
at the mouth of the Rio Grande, which is here the
border line between the two republics. His purpose
was to cross the river and take command in the field
at the opportune moment. In the meantime he
directed operations from safe headquarters.
The first move was made in Oaxaca with complete
success. Don Fidencio Hernandez found no difficulty
in scattering the small body of Federal troops which
tried to oppose him and the ill-armed " Indiada " he
led. The town of Oaxaca was easily taken, Govern
ment arms and rifles seized, while the Government
troops were incorporated in the revolutionary army.
Hernandez observed the traditional forms by issuing
the regulation plan at Taxtupec. As it was modified
by Diaz himself later, and produced on a second
occasion as the Plan of Palo Blanco, no more need be
done now than just note its appearance and name.
The happy beginning in Oaxaca was well followed
up. In a very short time the " banner of revolt "
was being raised in all the four quarters of Mexico.
As some troops adhered to Lerdo, and as General
Latorre, who had been loyal to Juarez, was also true
to him, some smart fighting in the Mexican way took
place. Diaz himself crossed the frontier on March 22.
Don Porfirio found that the Plan of Taxtupec was not
wholly acceptable to the anti-Lerdinas. It provided
for much they were in arms to secure, the removal of
Lerdo being the essential point of the whole. But the
Plan also provided that Don Porfirio should be General
of the Revolutionary Army and that the right to act
as Government should be given to him. Now the
Northern leaders were not disposed to accept a chief

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 155
named for them by Oaxaca. Diaz saw the necessity
for a little judicious face-saving and modified the
wording slightly. The preamble, which recited the
sins of Lerdo, needed no alteration. The Plan as
finally settled provided that the Constitution of 1857,
with the amending Acts of 1873 and 1874, should be
" the supreme law of the Republic." That the ineligi
bility of an outgoing President should also be a supreme
law till such time as it was made a constitutional
reform. That Lerdo and all his men were naught.
That governors of States who accepted the Plan were
to be kept in office. Those who did not were to be
removed and replaced by nominees of the General-in-
Chief of the Revolutionary Army. Another election
for President was to be held within two months of the
occupation of the capital by the said Revolutionary
Army. That the President of the Supreme Court was
to be interim President of the Republic (this was the
face-saving clause) provided that he accepted this
Plan in all its parts (this was the condition which ren
dered the face-saving clause quite harmless). That in
case of his refusal the General-in-Chief was to be in
vested with executive power. That the next Congress
was to set about the work of constitutional reform
and to provide guarantees for the independence of
municipalities. That all generals and officers who
accepted this Plan — no limit of time being fixed for
acceptance — were to be maintained in the possession
of their rank and emoluments.
The really important parts of the Plan of Palo
Blanco were the clauses which put the President of
the Supreme Court " between the sword and the wall,"
and the last. If Iglesias accepted the whole Plan he
put himself in the hands of the General of the Revo-

156 DIAZ
lutionary Army, who would take care that he should
not be elected definitive President for the full term of
four years. But this was not Don Jose Maria's
reading of the constitutional law of Mexico. His
view was that when the President of the Supreme
Court became interim President of the Republic, sede
vacante, he alone was to have power to replace
governors or do whatever else was necessary to make
his own election sure. He pointed to the recent
precedents of Juarez and Lerdo, and stood on constitu
tional practice with all the tenacity of the strictest
sect of the Pharisees.
For a time he was able to give substantial trouble to
Diaz. He left the capital and entered into negotia
tions with persons of influence. His claim was that
from the end of November, 1875, when the term for
which Lerdo had been elected closed, he was interim
President of Mexico, and government was to be con
ducted in his name. He found a good deal of support
in the North. It was the trouble given him by
Iglesias rather than a small check at the hand of
Lerdo's troops at Ixcamula which decided Diaz to
return to the South in June. He had made good pro
gress, had taken Matamoros, had been joined by
partisans, and had collected an army about him. His
revised plan of campaign was to go himself to New
Orleans and from thence by sea to Veracruz, then
put himself at the head of the Oaxacan forces. In
the meantime General Gonzalez, on whom also he
could rely, was to lead the revolutionary soldiers who
adhered to Don Porfirio across country to the hill
country of Puebla. Here the two were to meet and
advance on Mexico.
And now we have to leave high matters of politics

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 157
and strategy and return for a last dip into the world
of Dumas and Mayne Reid. The coming President of
Mexico, a man of forty-five, head of a party and an
army, had to go through an adventure such as would
become the hero of a boy's book. Diaz recrossed the
frontier of the United States and went to New
Orleans. There he took passage for Veracruz in the
coasting steamer City of Habana in the character of a
Cuban doctor. The steamer put into Matamoros to
pick up passengers and cargo — that is to say, she lay
four miles off that indifferent port till they were
brought to her in lighters. When the passengers
came aboard they turned out to be Lerdist soldiers
who had surrendered to Diaz not long before, had
been released by him, and knew him by sight. He
was of course recognised at once, and knew he was.
So long as he remained in the City of Habana he was
in no danger, but there was every probability that he
would be arrested when he reached Veracruz. In
this fix he had recourse to a device which might per
haps have suggested itself at one time of his life to
Bismarck, but which we can by no effort of fancy
make credible in the cases of Cavour, Thiers, or Mr.
Gladstone. He took to the water and made a
determined effort to swim the whole four miles to the
shore. Now Diaz could swim, but a man must be an
uncommonly strong swimmer and in good practice to
be able to swim four miles. The gallant attempt to
reach his friends in Matamoros went indeed near to
ending in a disaster. He began to become exhausted.
A boat had to be sent from the ship to pick him up.
The captain of the City of Habana was no doubt a
humane man, but he had a strong motive for not
allowing Don Porfirio to be drowned. Spanish and

158 DIAZ
Spanish-American port authorities have a lively
passion for enforcing quarantine and for levying fines.
If the number of passengers and crew actually on
board had not coincided exactly with the list made at
Matamoros the steamer would pretty certainly have
been detained and a fine levied.1
When Don Porfirio was back in the steamer he was
again in danger. But luck or good management
came to his assistance. The purser of the steamer
proved a friend in need. He contrived to conceal the
future President in his cabin — in a sofa seat, it is said,
a very trying place to hide in during June or July,
and in the Gulf of Mexico. At some period in the
course of this adventure a bribe passed into the hands
of somebody, but the truth is now in all probability
past recovery, and the details of the story as it is
commonly told are somewhat hard to work out by
anyone who knows the routine of a passenger ship and
a seaport.2 The substantial fact is alone important,
and it is that Diaz was helped to escape at Veracruz
by the officers, or an officer, of the City of Habana
1 The ways of Spanish-speaking officialdom are not ill-illustrated by this
little incident which came under my own observation. A British ship had
entered the port of Barcelona. The local health officers were taking the
number of her crew to see that it coincided with the list. While the call was
being taken the captain, who was on the bridge, had occasion to give an
order to the deck. He bent over the rail of the bridge, taking off the sun
helmet he wore and holding it out at arm's length behind the back of the
mate, who was standing beside him. The health officer counted in the sun
helmet and accused the captain of having one more on board than he
acknowledged in the list. This was of course an excuse for a fine. When
the facts were explained the officials accused the skipper of playing a
practical joke on them, and he was fined for disrespect to the authorities.
The British skipper, it is true, does play jokes of a very irritating character
on " the authorities." One of them who was capable of this and greater
things, being pestered just when he was about to leave by two customs-
house officers who were prowling in search of an excuse to fine or to extort
a bribe, inveigled them into his cabin, gave them beer, locked them in, got
under way, and carried them with him to his next port, which was on the
coast of Africa.
2 Cf. " Porfirio Diaz," by Mrs. Tweedie, pp. 253 — 255.

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 159
disguised as a sailor. And then the other fact that
leaders of great parties have to go through these
adventures in Spanish-American States tells us much
of the level at which those communities stand.
In Veracruz he had friends, not only in politics, but
in business, and he was personally liked by them for
fair dealing. He had, as we know, a varied experience
in escapes, and was moreover well acquainted with the
country he had to cross. Between what help he found
and his own resources, which must have included
some money, he succeeded in reaching Oaxaca in July.
Meanwhile Gonzalez was working South, and had
reached the Tlascala hill country between Mexico city
and Veracruz, while Diaz was getting ready to
advance from Oaxaca. Lerdo's danger was steadily
increasing. Iglesias was threatening him from the
North and the Porfiristas were gathering force in the
South. Gonzalez was between him and Veracruz and
had cut the new railway at three places. Yet events
did not move fast. In the climate of Mexico it is the
heat of summer rather than the cold of winter which
sends armies into quarters. October was well ad
vanced before Diaz had come sufficiently forward to
be in a position to effect his junction with Gonzalez
and other friends who were in the mountain country
of the State of Puebla. Matters had now come to the
point when a defeat in the field would mean the total
ruin of Lerdo, while a victory might, and in all
probability would, be of no more than temporary use
to him. The disaster came on November 16.
General Alatorre, with the Lerdist forces, had his
headquarters at Teotitlan. This town lies about half
way between Oaxaca on the South, from which Diaz
was advancing, and the mountains east of Puebla,

i6o DIAZ
where Gonzalez and other Porfirista leaders gathered
to the North. These last had just been reinforced by
General Tolentino, who with his men deserted the cause
of Lerdo. Alatorre had the advantage of operating
from the centre to the circumference, and with it the
risk that he might be simultaneously attacked on
both sides. It was the worst, and not the best of his
position which was to be his lot. He tried to intercept
Diaz and get the chance to beat his enemies in detail.
But Don Porfirio's little force of some 4,000 men was
not hampered by much baggage or train, and he had
campaigned all over the country for years. It was
not very difficult for him to turn Alatorre's position
and push for the hills to the North, and so he did.
Alatorre followed, and on the evening of November 1 5
caught him up. But Diaz could now venture to stand,
for his friends were near. He took up his position at
Tecoac, north of Huamantla. It was too late to begin
a battle on the evening of the 15 th, and during the
night he was joined by some of his friends from the
Sierras. Gonzalez, with the main force, was still at
some distance, but was advancing. The battle of
Tecoac, the crowning mercy of the war, is said to have
been very sanguinary — and indeed it must have been
if Alatorre lost, as he said he did, 1,900 killed and 800
wounded. Such a proportion of killed to wounded
may be said to be unknown to European armies. But
little faith is due to Mexican statements of numbers.
Don Porfirio was hard pressed, and in some danger of
being driven from his position, when Gonzalez
suddenly intervened, falling on Alatorre's right flank.
The rout of the Lerdists was complete. Alatorre, it
is said, was utterly surprised by the onset of Gonzalez,
for he had supposed that the troops he saw approach-

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 161
ing were reinforcements which he expected to receive.
Tecoac was therefore a little battle of Waterloo, in
which Diaz was Wellington, Gonzalez was Bliicher,
Alatorre was Napoleon, and the supposed reinforce
ments may stand for Grouchy. The usual conse
quences of a Mexican victory followed in a measure.
Three thousand prisoners passed over to the victorious
side, but Diaz did not shoot the officers he took.
As Lerdo's whole strength lay in the troops who still
stood by him, the game was up after Tecoac. He
showed that he realised the facts, for on November 20,
four days after the battle, he fled from the capital,
taking the till with him : $200,000 taken from the
treasury and the Montepio (the state pawnbroking
establishment) were loaded in the wagons which he
took to the coast under protection of an escort of
1,000 cavalry. Accompanied by some of the more
hopelessly compromised of his friends, he fled to the
Pacific coast, took ship, and found a refuge in the
United States.
His partisans could hardly be expected to go on
fighting when he had fled, and, indeed, they lost no
time in coming over to the victorious side. And now
Diaz reaped the first benefits of the final clause of the
Plan of Palo Blanco. It provided, we may remember,
that all generals and officers1 who should accept the
Plan were to retain pay and rank. The adherents of
the eleventh hour were to be even as those of the first.
The object of Don Porfirio was to unite all the military
factions under himself, and to drive nobody to
desperation. When the Lerdist officers were abso-
1 The Spanish formula is " generales, cabos, y oficiales " — that is to say,
generals, commissioned officers, and non-commissioned officers. The
phrase ought not to be translated by " generals, chiefs, and officers," as it
sometimes is.

1 62 DIAZ
lutely running in their haste to make their junction
with him in time there was nothing to stay the occupa
tion of the capital. He entered it on November 23.
With Don Sebastian in flight and his military forces
hurrying to join the conqueror, only Don Jose M.
Iglesias remained to be disposed of. During the
advance of Diaz from the South Don Jose had been
in active correspondence with him, and, indeed,
letters continued to be exchanged between them, and
friends were busy trying to bring them together till
November 27, three days after the occupation of the
capital. There was, and could be, no novelty in the
discussion. Diaz was prepared to recognise Iglesias
as interim President till a new election could be held
if he would accept the Plan of Tuxtupec — that is to
say, be content with holding a purely honorific place
for a time, and perhaps retaining his position as
President of the Supreme Court. Don Jose was
resolute to be interim President — without restrictions
— to " make " his own election as President of the
Republic. He was known to intend to keep the
revolutionists of Tuxtupec at a safe distance from office.
As a lawyer he would have no liking for revolutionary
generals. It was characteristic of the pedant lawyer
mind at all times and everywhere, and particularly
characteristic of the Spanish slavery to mere sonorous
words, that Don Jose Maria does really seem to have
believed that he could put a hook in the nose of
Leviathan with his windy constitutional theories and
mere phrases. He seems never to have doubted that
nothing save a hopeless perversity could prevent the
general who had upset Lerdo from immediately giving
up all he had fought for, and going meekly back to
Candelaria, when he was told to respect the august

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 163
dignity of the President of the Supreme Court. The
patent facts that in such a country as Mexico the
only possible ruler was a soldier, that Diaz could be
beaten only by some other fighting man, and that
even if a general from the North got the better of
him in the name of Iglesias the real master would be
that general, and not Don Jose Maria, produced no
impression on the legal-minded man. To him facts
were naught, and words were the only realities.
There was nothing to be done with him but to keep
him in play till the coast was clear of Lerdo, then
clap your hat on, exclaim there must be an end of
this, and call in Harrison's Regiment of Musketeers.
And this is precisely the course which Porfirio Diaz
followed. For a short time Mexico was in the curious position
of possessing two provisional Presidents. Don Por
firio took the government provisionally in hand when
he occupied the capital. Iglesias in the North
protested that he alone was provisional or interim
President, and he appeared to be collecting a con
siderable force. Queretaro, San Luis, Potosi, Zacatecas,
and Aquasculientes proclaimed for him. The general
who commanded in Jalisco put himself and his
soldiers at the orders of Don Jose. The Lerdists in
the North seemed to be every whit as ready to support
him as those of the South were to adhere to Diaz.
Each chief formed a Cabinet, and if appearances had
corresponded to realities, there would have been
every prospect of a war between North and South in
Mexico. But as a matter of fact there was no relation
between the appearances and the realities. Diaz was
master of the capital and of the communications with
Veracruz, as well as of the South. He had possession

164 DIAZ
of the richest parts of the territory of the Republic,
and he controlled the chief source of its revenue — the
custom duty levied at Veracruz. The northern
provinces, which Iglesias seemed to dominate, form
the largest part of Mexico, but they are the poorest
and the least inhabited. Iglesias's treasury was
empty, and there was no prospect that it would be
filled. Diaz was in possession of whatever Lerdo
had left behind, and he had the means of getting more.
His character for moderation and probity stood him
in good stead. All classes could remember how careful
he had been to protect property and keep the peace in
1867. The classes which could dispose of money were
not averse to trusting him. And then, too, the hopes
of all the peaceful elements in the country were
drawn to him because he was the man least likely to
divide the country and most likely to make quiet
possible in the future. It was true that he was a
revolutionary general who had plunged the nation
into another spasm of strife, but Lerdo was so
thoroughly unpopular that few were disposed to blame
the Porfiristas for getting rid of him. On the other
hand, it was known that Iglesias wished to suppress
the Porfiristas entirely by excluding them from office,
not only in the Federal Administration, but in
their own States — that is to say, he was supposed to
intend to take the very course which was certain to
make trouble chronic.
These things being thus, it followed that Iglesias
could have no support except from the generals and
politicians in the worst sense of the word who were for
the time being collected about him. And where were
the causes for which they could be expected to go on
fighting ? No racial distinction marked the North

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 165
off from the South ; and as for questions of principle
to be fought over, there was only one, and it was as
ill-calculated to nerve men to effort or self-sacrifice
as could well be imagined. The Northern men were
asked to go on fighting in order to give effect to Don
Jose Maria's interpretation of the constitutional
rights of the President of the Supreme Court. It
certainly was not enough.
Therefore, though Iglesias was supposed to have the
support of an army of 20,000 men and Diaz could
collect only half that number, when, after naming a
governor to act for him in his absence, he marched out
of the capital early in December, all opposition to the
General of the Revolutionary Army disappeared
without a fight. Iglesias did make one effort to
oppose him, but only by persuasion. When Diaz
entered Queretaro without meeting the least resis
tance on December 20, he was asked to agree, and did
agree, to a final meeting, with his rival. The interview
took place at the farm of La Capilla (the Chapel),
about three miles from Queretaro. Iglesias again
laid his case before Diaz and expounded constitutional
orthodoxy. But he was no longer of any value as an
associate or even puppet. His men, who indeed were
starving, were deserting him in troops with their
officers. Diaz told him that he had refused to take
the interim Presidency on condition that he accepted
the Plan, and that he could not expect that the offer
should be renewed. Don Jose abased himself so far
as to offer to accept a Ministry named for him by Diaz.
But the offer was declined. Then he retired from Silao
to Guadalajara, and there on January 2, 1877, issued
a final proclamation to the people of Mexico. Having
made his last protest, he took ship at Manzanillo, and

166 DIAZ
retired to exile at San Francisco. Diaz made a
progress of a peaceful and triumphant character
through the northern provinces, and in February was
back in the capital, the acknowledged master of
Mexico. He was already President, for the election
had been ordered to be held by his representative
during his absence. The election of electors — on the
American principle — took place on January 28. As a
mere detail it is perhaps as well to mention that out of
10,878 votes of electors chosen in 181 districts,
10,500 were for Porfirio Diaz. There were other
forms to be observed. The actual election of the
President, or opening of credentials of the selected
electors, and the election of Congress, were fixed for
February 11 and 12, just after the President's return
from the North. The Congress was to meet on
April 1, and on May 2 Diaz was declared by the
Legislature to be the duly elected President. His
term was to date from the time when he took posses
sion of the Government after the flight of Lerdo.
Therefore his four years would be over in November,
1880. If now the question What, if anything, had been
gained for the cause of freedom, good government,
and progress by some two years of fighting F is put,
the answer is easy to give. It had been decided that
the man who was most capable of giving Mexico at
any rate an interval of peace and well-directed
administration was to be at the head of affairs, with a
fair prospect of continuance in office. The elements
of his power can be easily realised. First of all were
his personal reputation and his character. There were
no doubt men in Mexico, and even several of them,
who could have fought the battle of Tecoac, or could

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 167
have conducted a campaign of guerrilleros every whit
as well as he. There was nobody who had the same
general reputation, the support of followers in all
quarters of the Republic, and the confidence of the
moneyed men, native and foreign, who could give
financial help at a pinch. His moderation, his
capacity to administer, his probity, and his energy
were trusted. Therefore all who were tired of anarchy
turned to him. The longing for peace and for some
chance to enjoy a little material prosperity, which had
caused the non-militant part of the population to
hold aloof from him during the struggle with Juarez,
were now in his favour. He had turned out to be the
most promising man after all. But we must make
no mistake on one point. All the other forms of
support which he could rely on would have been
insufficient if he had not won the confidence of the
army. He himself had no delusion on the subject,
and he shaped his conduct accordingly.
The first speech he delivered to his Congress on
April 1, 1878, ends with a passage which is full of
instruction on this vital matter. In it Don Porfirio
tells Congress explicitly that he had restored the half
of all military pensions which Juarez and Lerdo had
taken away for reasons of economy. Faith, the
President said, must be kept with the army. The
Congress was asked to help him to carry out that
obligation. It was given to understand, politely
indeed, but with precision, that it simply must
conform to the will of the President and the army.
And not only must pensions be restored to their full
figure, but the army on foot must be paid. The
problem which this necessity forced on President and
Congress alike was hard to solve. Thanks to the

1 68 DIAZ
" commendable circumstance " x that all the armed
foUowings of the two defeated chiefs had come in, and
had incorporated themselves in the Revolutionary
Army, the national army was now in point of numbers
far beyond the limit last fixed by Congress. The
emptiness of the treasury was notorious. Yet these
men had been promised the confirmation of their rank
and continuance of their pay or a secure pension if
they would adhere to the Plan of Palo Blanco. They
had with very few exceptions adhered, and they must
not be disappointed. Some, it was true, who were
really in revolt out of pure resentment against Lerdo,
had no wish to continue in arms. Some others who
had taken arms under pressure on both sides were glad
to be off home to their brown wives and the naked
children who were tumbling about their patches of
sugar-cane or their " magueys." But even when a
large percentage had been withdrawn from the army
made up of the three lately in the field, there remained
a much larger body than the force last voted by Con
gress. But empty as the treasury then was, and
whatever and whomsoever was forced to wait, faith
must be kept with the soldiers. It was not only a
question of honour, but of elementary common
sense. Everybody in Mexico knew very well what
had followed the wholesale reduction of the army by
Juarez. Even from the merely practical point of
view, keeping faith was likely to prove the cheaper
course. But there was an obligation of honour and of
patriotism to treat the army well. The soldiers of all
1 " Plausible circunstancia " in Spanish. But the Castilian " plausible,"
though identical in spelling and origin with our " plausible," does not mean
the same thing. It inherits direct from its mother " plauso " (applause),
and implies " really deserving of praise " — " a specious pretext " in the old
and good sense.

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 169
parties had just shown a capacity for combined action
in the interest of the country such as had never so far
been displayed by any body of Mexican civilians.
Mihtary government is an evil beyond peradventure,
because it demonstrates the total lack of political
faculty in all other parts of the State. But it is the
least of evils when it is the alternative to anarchy.
An army, even one which as a military force is bad, is
at least an instrument of government. A mob of
wrangling, intriguing, self-seeking politicians and
political lawyers — Carlyle's " attorney species " — is
a mere generator of anarchy. The firmness Diaz
showed in enforcing justice for the army was one of
the best proofs he gave of good political faculty.
Without a united, contented army there could be no
stable government in Mexico. The fact that he suc
ceeded in doing what no Mexican ruler had done before
is the demonstration of his better practical faculty,
and of his humanity too. By keeping faction from
producing its ruinous consequences among the soldiers
he gave the land about a generation of peace ; and he
was able to get this control over the army because he
had not shed blood in mere cruelty. In 1878, except
for the executions after Miahuatlan, when it could be
fairly alleged that the victims were indeed in the full
sense of the word traitors, his hands were clean of
blood. His government was based on military force
because no other foundation could be laid in Mexico.
His administration will be told later on. But the
beginning of the story is the most appropriate place
in which to consider, what were his method and his
spirit. We have already seen with what care Diaz
made and kept himself fit to wrestle with the responsi
bility and the long hours of work which the Presi-

170 DIAZ
dential office entailed on a man who would not treat
it merely as plunder to be enjoyed. Yet Diaz might
have worked, and have worked himself to early ruin,
if he had been a mere " mandon." But then no man
who came to power in Mexico or in any Spanish-
American State was less " mandon " than he. The
note of that class of person is that he is intoxicated
with conceit of his own grandeur and strength. He
prefers to order and to overbear. He supposes that
because nothing can be done unless some force stands
ready for use in case of need and in the background,
anything can be done by force employed in a suffi
ciently ruthless spirit. It is not necessary to know,
to think, to look ahead, to learn, to consider others.
The order and the application of force are enough.
Acting on that principle the Santa Anas, Marquezes,
even Don Jose Maria Iglesias, had waded from puddle
to puddle of blood, and amid manifestations of self-
will really not far removed from the delusions of a
lunatic asylum, till they went headlong over some
precipice. Bold Bayard, who lept before he looked
because he was blind, had been the prevalent model
in the poor, anarchical country. Don Porfirio was
never known to leap before he looked. He was the
last man in the world to imagine that because you can
shear the sheep it is safe to try to shear the wolf. It
was said in praise of our own Drake that he was a
hearer of every man's opinion, but commonly a
follower of his own. When a leader's own opinion is
based on the best he can get from others and can
combine, no better description of a managing man
could well be given. And it is allowed of Diaz that
he felt his way and thought his work out. When as
President he had obtained full command of the

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 171
machinery of administration he put out feelers
through the Press, and he " tuned his (newspaper)
pulpits." When he had especial reason for looking
ahead he would appoint competent men to inquire for
him and report. He would hear them in private, and
he allowed the utmost freedom of speech. For him
self he listened patiently, and his questions were
pertinent. When he knew all there was to learn he
could act for himself.
It would be strange if nobody had ever discovered
that Porfirio Diaz was after all a figurehead, and that
the merit belonged to some subordinate. Napoleon,
as we have all heard, owed his victories to Berthier,
and Wellington could do nothing without his Murray.
The real brains of Don Porfirio were known by some
sagacious persons to be deposited in the head of Justo
Benitez, his secretary. But the time came when the
President dispensed with Justo — we shall see in what
circumstances — and was never a penny the worse for
losing him. That he could use the services of others
was obvious enough. No man could rule who was
unable to employ agents. But Porfirio Diaz is com
monly said to have reposed little trust except where he
had chosen his man. Mexican politicians who had
held a conspicuous place in public life before 1878
found that he kept them at arm's length. Don Matias
Romero, who had been Mexican envoy at Washington
during the French intervention, and Don Ignacio
Mariscal were almost the only exceptions.
Some time passed, we must suppose, before he had
perfected his method or had completed his staff.
And there were differences between his first term of
office and those which followed. Yet he was the same
man in 1878 that he was later on — practical, not

172 DIAZ
blinded by self-conceit, ready and eager to work hard,
open to hear the good advice and profit by the know
ledge of others, but no less capable of forming his own
opinion, fixing his line of policy and acting for himself.
He stood there ready to do all the good that it was in
him to do for his country. If the good he was able
to achieve was in the main transient, the fault must
be shown to have been wholly his before he is blamed
for failure. A far greater man, one who was a
teacher and an inspirer, might have raised the moral
and intellectual level of Mexico. At least one shrinks
from saying that he could not. But we must take
Porfirio Diaz as he was, a practical man, a born man
of government who could keep order and administer
ably. He, we are told — and the facts bear out the
judgment — soon came to the conclusion that nothing
more was within his scope. " Less government and
more freedom " had been his maxim. A short
experience convinced him that " Less politics and
more administration " was what the country required.
Politics in the world he was destined to live in meant
intrigue with or without military violence, and nothing
more. It was a curse, and from it he tried with con
siderable success to preserve the land. More adminis
tration when the object was a good one and the
methods were rational was a blessing for as long as it
could last. To it he applied himself, and it called for
the strenuous exertion of all his faculties and the firm
use of the military force he had gathered behind him.
Don Rafael de Zayas Hernandez sums up the general
situation of the country in terms which are borne out
by the universal testimony of others : " He found the
treasury empty, credit lost, a complete lack of confi
dence, foreign relations either broken off or suspended,

, THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 173
serious difficulties with the United States were press
ing, and much judgment and tact, steadiness, and
patriotism were needed to avert so much danger and
save the national honour."
The most elementary needs of an orderly society
were not supplied. The whole country was swarming
with bandits, who kidnapped men of means and held
them to ransom. The trains from Veracruz dared
not leave the stations without a guard. Murder
and robbery were of daily occurrence. And all
these crimes were committed with impunity, for there
was no means of suppressing them. The evil was of
old standing. It dated from the rising of Hidalgo in
1 8 10. It had been intensified by the war between
Liberals and Conservatives and the French inter
vention. Nothing, or nothing really effectual, had
been done to amend this long permanent anarchy
during the administrations of Juarez and of Lerdo.
The preliminary to whatever other good was to be
done must needs be the restoration — or perhaps we
ought to say the establishment for the first time in
the history of the Mexicans as an independent people
— of security. But the Government was hemmed in
by a vicious circle. Without good administration
there could be no development of national prosperity.
And yet, without the resources which industry and
prosperity supply, how was it possible to provide —
that is to say, to pay for — a capable administration ?
In the presence of such a hopeless-looking task
clamouring to be performed, a ruler and a whole
people might very well think that politics, even of a
higher order than what had gone by the name in
Mexico, could wait till a good administration had made
it possible for work to^be resumed. A nation must

m

DIAZ

live before it can philosophise. The problem for
Mexico was how it was to live — or rather the problem
for the man who assumed the task of finding a solution
was how he could enable a country which had no
corporate will of its own, but only a plaintive longing
for good government, to exist as a community
at all.
It was a great misfortune, and an evil inherited from
the past, that the President could look for no help
from the Church. Its power was still great in many
parts of the Republic — in, for instance, the thinly-
inhabited Pacific State Michoacan. The wealth and
the great lands were gone, but the hold of the Church
on the fidelity of the poor Indian, and mostly Indian,
population was strong. Its help would have been of
the highest value to a Government which desired to
raise the standard of morality and industry in the
working classes. But that aid could not be given
by the Church, nor asked for by the State. The
Church had been despoiled and could not forgive the
despoiler. The reader who has no personal experience
of the relations between the clergy and the State in
the so-called Latin countries of to-day finds it hard to
realise the depth of the gulf between them. " El
Gobierno es un ladron " (" The Government is a
thief ") is the compendious formula of the clergy in
Spain and in most of its old colonies. They cannot
forgive the " el grande latrocinio " (" the great rob
bery ") ; neither can they forgive the compulsory
civil marriage which was introduced by Juarez and
cannot be abolished. They must condemn it on
religious grounds, and they do not detest it the less
that it was expressly meant to be injurious to them.
The high marriage fees exacted by the Church have

THE FIGHT FOR THE PRESIDENCY 175
been said to have been one of the reasons why the
Mexican peon indebted himself to an employer. The
civil marriage was meant to deprive the Church of
this source of revenue also. The compulsory secular
education of which much is heard, and something is
seen, in Mexico was no less odious. We need not go
out of our own country to learn how very offensive to
religious people is an education divorced from religion.
We need not go to Mexico to know how a clergy resents
being deprived of the great opening for good work
(that is, when they are pious men) or the immense
power (that is, when they are only human) which is
conferred on them by the control of education. So
because of grievances and on doctrinal grounds the
clergy were hostile to the Government of Porfirio
Diaz. Nor was that all. Those who have not lived in
the midst of it cannot realise the fury of distrust,
hatred, and repulsion which animates those who
stand over against the Church. An Englishman may
think that his Established Church asks for too much,
and gives itself airs. He does not, or he is a very rare
exception if he does, grow hot against it as a fount
of mental imbecility and moral corruption. Now the
anti-clerical of the Latin countries very commonly
does. So President Diaz had to endure the reproaches
of some of those who had fought with him under the
leadership of Juarez. Though he gave back no lands,
though he enforced the law which imposed civil
marriage, though he would not suffer the clergy to
appear in clerical dress in the streets, nor so much as
allow the ringing of church bells, they accused him of
truckling to the clergy and encouraging the corruption
of the people because he did not put a stop to such

176 DIAZ
functions as the coronation of a certain sanctified
statue of the Virgin.1
Meanwhile the clergy were denouncing him as a
persecutor. All through the administration of Lerdo,
who was peculiarly odious to the Church because his
brother was the author of the law which secularised
the Church lands, and then till far into the rule of Diaz,
there took place a series of clerical riots in towns and
villages. The worst were in Michoacan, but there
were others elsewhere. A President who had by the
ears two such wolves as the militant clerical and anti
clerical parties had need to keep a firm hold of them.
1 To prevent the ringing of church bells may look like a contemptible
piece of petty persecution. But a church bell may be rung by way of
demonstration or counter-demonstration. A few years ago it was my luck
to attend a political meeting of a Liberal shade in a Spanish city. It was
held in a hall. On the other side of the street was a convent. For al ong
time, and until the police struck in, the: onvent bells were rung madly
with the very probable intent, and certainly with the result, of rendering
the speakers half-inaudible. There was an overflow meeting in the street.
The clerical demonstration was resented, and if there had not been a strong
force of constabulary on the spot the convent would have been attacked.
The constabulary officer in command had to tell the superior of the convent
that he was provoking a riot, and to order him to stop the bells.

CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST TERM

Diaz settled himself, not in the official residence of
the President, the former Palace of the Viceroys, but
in a private house, to struggle with the hopeless-
looking problem he had undertaken to manage.
Like other tasks, it grew less terrible when resolutely
tackled than it had appeared to be from a distance.
If we could gain access to the very private and con
fidential papers of Mexican moneyed men and foreign
capitalists whose interests were bound up with the
restoration of order, we would no doubt learn how the
new Government was supplied with the funds which
tided it over its first days. In most Spanish-American
political conflicts there are holders of the purse-strings
who keep in the background but who provide the
military chest. Some body of interested moneyed
men no doubt did for Porfirio Diaz what the bankers of
Paris did for Napoleon in the interval before Brumaire,
when he was as yet only General Bonaparte and not
even First Consul. When the immediate need had
been met, the difficulty of finding a revenue equal to
calls which could not be neglected was not insuperable.
The army did not need to be laboriously persuaded
before it could understand that a revenue must be
secured if it were to enjoy the pay, allowances, and
pensions to which it was entitled. It was a fact
patent to the dimmest intelligence that as the best
part of the national revenue came from the customs

178 DIAZ
levied at Veracruz, the road to the main seaport must
be opened and kept open. Therefore the President
had the willingly-given help of officers and soldiers in
effecting the first piece of work to be done.
Armed men in competent numbers and in a reason
able state of discipline had no great exertions to make
before they could establish a fair working state of
order in the more vitally important regions. It is
true that many of the so-called soldiers were by origin
brigands and guerrilleros. But it is also true that most
of them had taken to these lines of life because there
was very little else for them to do. They were poachers
who were quite disposed to adopt the honest trade of
gamekeeper. Diaz made prompt and effectual use
of their better aptitudes. The organisation of the
excellent constabulary known as " guardias rurales "
did not begin with Diaz, but it was vastly improved
and developed by him. The rurales in their brown or
buff uniforms, high steeple-crowned sombreros, well
armed and well mounted, were to constitute not the
least useful of the President's instruments of govern
ment. He recruited them freely among the men who,
under himself or other " caudillos " and " cabecillas "
of the days of disorder, had learnt all the mountain
paths and hiding places they were now to supervise,
in the course of years of guerrillero and bandit adven
ture. They were masters of all the devices they had
practised, and now, having decided to exchange a life
in which long intervals of sloth and hardship were
relieved by occasional and uncertain hauls of booty, for
regular pay and a position of social credit, they became
a terror to such evil-doers as they themselves had been
in their unregenerate days. The perhaps imaginary
Irishman who confessed that he and his friends were

THE FIRST TERM 179
not afraid of the soldiers but of the police very exactly
expressed the sentiments which were rapidly instilled
into disorderly Mexicans. A company of soldiers
might be befooled, but not a detachment of old prac
titioners who knew the country as they knew the palms
of their hands, who were everywhere, and who knew
not only the places but the persons, who would learn
at once whether any man was absent from the house
where he ought to be, and why. The methods
adopted by the rurales may not have been, and indeed
were not, what would be suffered in the kindred Irish
Constabulary. They were nearer the ways of the
Spanish Civil Guard. A practice which in Mexico
was even embodied in a law — the " Ley Fuga " (the
" Law of Flight ") — gave the rurales large powers of
summary jurisdiction. If a man did not surrender at
once when summoned, or if when being taken to prison
he attempted to escape, they were authorised to shoot
him on the spot. As from the nature of their work it
commonly happened that there were no witnesses of
the resistance to arrest, or attempt to escape, save
the rurales themselves, we can understand that sum
mary executions were nowise uncommon. We may
take it as pretty certain that when a man was a
notorious offender who had given trouble, and par
ticularly if he was one who at any time had injured
a member of the corps, he always offered resistance or
attempted to escape. But it is not said that the
rurales abused their power grossly, or in order to
extort an advantage of any kind for themselves. And
it is a fact that men who have inherited Spanish blood
and ideas are very tolerant of the use of summary
methods in dealing with criminals. They trust
rurales or civil guards more than they do the civil

180 DIAZ
tribunals which they believe to be corrupt, and they
think the summary ': quatro tiros " (four shots) of
the constabulary vastly preferable to the lumbering
procedure of the courts. Within no long period life
and property were tolerably safe in the valley of
Mexico, on the Plain of Anahuac, and over a broad
belt of country on either side of the road to Veracruz.
If the police in the towns was not so good, at least
there began to be a police of which we may say that
it did deserve the name given to the corps to which
Diaz had belonged in his boyhood, " Peor es nada "
It was a " better than nothing."
There was another kind of predatory creature, who
was all the more dangerous because his offences were
more subtle than robbery under arms and were
beyond the scope of the rurales. The public service
swarmed with bribers and blackmailers and thieves.
The long disorders which had favoured brigandage
were no less friendly to the corrupt official. When
even the army could not be paid, nor the interest on
the public debt, it followed that the civil officials had
to go without their salaries — or at any rate without
regular payment. The armed men were allowed to
recoup by rapine — an unrivalled training for highway
robbery — and the civil officials to gain a livelihood
by corruption. The advantages of the position were
so great that places under Government were eagerly
sought for. Men of influence provided for their
trusty followers by foisting them on a public office.
It was calculated that when Diaz became President
there were 2,000 confessedly superfluous officials in
the public offices of the capital. They were, it is true,
not entirely free from check. The great men at the
head levied a part of their dishonest gains as a

THE FIRST TERM 181
consideration for giving them a wide margin of free
dom. Corruption had in fact got to the point when
it could be flaunted. Mr. Wells, who visited Mexico
a few years after 1878, was not unacquainted with
graft in his native United States, but he found it
avowed, even after the reform had begun in Mexico,
with an audacity which was new in his experience.
He heard of a countryman of his own who passed for
being exceptionally familiar with lobbies and lobby
ing. This old practitioner had a concession to secure,
or some other interest to be served, and he approached
the important person whose approval was needed
boldly. " If you will arrange that for me," he said,
" I will pay you $5,000 and keep the transaction a
strict secret." " If you will made it $10,000 you may
tell all the world," was the answer. The story in
slightly different forms is told of many lands, but it is
not thought plausible save in certain conditions of
public morality.
The new President did at least charge home on the
pest. Having the whole armed force in his hand, and
the army being well persuaded that if it was to receive
its pay and allowance out of the revenue of Mexico
($17,000,000) some reasonable measure of honesty
must be shown in handling the money, he could use
the broom freely. It would be rash indeed to affirm
that bribery and corruption ceased either then or
afterwards. But the staff was cut down to just
proportions to begin with. A stronger measure,
which only a very firmly planted ruler would have
dared to take, followed. A tax was levied on all non-
military salaries. In a country where direct taxation
was not known save in the form of a poll-tax on Indian
labourers and was vehemently hated, the Government

1 82 DIAZ
officials were subject to income tax. The measure,
hard as it was, could not be spared in view of the
distressed condition of the Treasury. Don Porfirio
set an example of sacrifice by consenting to the reduc
tion of his own salary from $25,000 to $15,000. He
lived very quietly in his house in the Calle de la Moneda
(Mint Street),1 and was as unpretentious in his way of
life as he was accessible to all sorts and conditions of
men. His disinterestedness compared well with the
rather grasping action of Juarez, and must have had a
wholesome effect. But he did not rely on compulsory
sacrifice and good example alone. He knew that life
must be made tolerable for those whose services are
indispensable. Therefore he began by taking care
that the reduced salaries should at least be regularly
paid. When by 1896 the revenue had grown, and
the sacrifices imposed in 1878 were no longer necessary,
the tax on salaries was taken off. At a still later date
the scale of pay was raised to meet the increased cost
of living. To employ no more clerks than are needed
to do the work and to pay them a salary on which
they can live decently are the two antecedent con
ditions of the formation of an honest public service.
The truth has been patent for centuries. The mis
fortune of many countries has been that it was ignored.
President Diaz did try to establish these conditions, and
it is a credible proposition that the corruption which
continued to exist did not go beyond what was normal
in England till the end of the eighteenth century.
The simplicity of his life, the accessibility of the
President, and his readiness to hear all men who
wished to speak to him had much to do with the uni-
1 In Spanish moneda is money, una moneda is a coin. La Casa de la
Moneda, or for short La Moneda, is the Mint.

THE FIRST TERM 183
versal popularity he earned and kept for years. They
would have had their effect in any country, but they
were particularly valuable in Mexico. They were made
possible partly by the general simplicity of existence,
but still more by the fact that the people had inherited
their standard of manners from the Spaniard at his
best. The Spaniard is always willing to recognise
rank, but he expects to be " treated like a man " and
without " vapours." The neat indications of rank
which can be made by the use of the Don, the Sefior, or
the unadorned Christian name, are understood by all
— by Pedro as well as by Don Luis. So there is the
less fear that Don Luis will lower himself, or Pedro
will presume when they talk together " like men."
And because the formulas are fixed and their ortho
doxy is undisputed and universally known, the man
who has risen from the ranks drops with wonderful
ease into the ways and bearing of a " gentleman born."
There is no uncertainty as to what is the right thing
to do, and therefore but little of the underbred
uneasiness of the parvenu. Sefior Fornaro will have
it that Don Porfirio learnt the dignity he showed in
his later years after his second marriage to a lady of
a good Creole stock. Sefior de Zayas says that in his
earlier years he was timid in his bearing. Timidity
may be due to an absence of mere self-conceit.
Foreigners who saw him were of opinion that long
before he was President he had the air of a soldier
and a gentleman. It was not only because Mexico
is a republic, but because the Mexicans were in part
Spaniards, and trained in the old Spanish standard,
that the son of the innkeeper at Oaxaca, who had also
been farrier in a cavalry regiment, was perfectly at
home as head of the State.

1 84 DIAZ
In the meantime popularity, military support, and
the general longing for peace and freedom to work
were none too much to bear Diaz up in the task before
him. There were three dangers he had to face. To
put them in their order of real importance they were :
the relations of Mexico with the United States ; the
distress of the national finances ; and a remnant of
armed faction which plotted, agitated, and broke out
sporadically for a time. Unless he had averted the
first he would have striven in vain to overcome the
second and the third. From the day on which he
became President till that other thirty-three years
later when he sailed from Veracruz amid the down
fall of his labours, there can have been few days,
and there cannot have been a single month, in
which the relations of his country to the United
States did not give him cause for thought and
anxiety. The great power to the north has hung,
and hangs, over Mexico like a mass of snow or
earth which some act of folly or accident may turn
into avalanche or landslip. Questions of the dip
lomatic order pressed for solution, and behind
them, giving them an almost awful importance,
were physical, geographical, social, and financial
forces. It is a literal statement of fact, that for a Mexican
ruler the exterior world is divided into the United
States and all the rest. If the first is friendly, the
second can do him but little harm. If the first is
hostile, the second can render no help. In 1878 there
was a strong probability that the United States might
become actively hostile. Before going further let us
gjiard ourselves with care against the risk of seeming
to agree with those critics, of whom some of the most

THE FIRST TERM 185
trenchant have been Americans,1 who have said that
the United States have been aggressively brutal to
their neighbour. Individual Americans have behaved
badly to Mexico, but the Government of Washington,
which alone acts for the United States, has on the
whole shown much long-suffering in its dealing with the
unruly and provocative community on its southern
border. The numerous and chronic disputes between them
have arisen from two kindred sources — the disorders
of the border, and the losses caused to American citi
zens by or through the internal confusions of the
Spanish-American Republic. Putting aside the con
ditions of the border for the moment, the two sides
may be treated together, to begin with, simply because
there was always a question of compensation to be
paid for wrongs inflicted on individuals. There were
cases in which the sufferer was a Mexican ; and then
the one claim had to be set off against the other. The
Mexican grievances mostly arose from the border, but
the Americans had suffered everywhere. There were
cases of violence practised on individual citizens of
the States in various ways, but the worst of all were
the constant extortions of forced levies of mihtary
service and money. On paper the Mexicans had often
a good case, and their diplomatists, who are by no
means lacking in quickness of wit, could frequently
seem to put the United States in the wrong. They
could, and they did, argue with much verbal force
that these levies and contributions did not constitute
a true grievance, because they were not imposed on
1 Mr. Wells, for instance, does not mince matters. He declares roundly
that the United States have played the part of a great bully to their weaker
neighbour, and that opinion is far from being peculiar to him.

1 86 DIAZ
Americans alone but on the whole body of the
inhabitants. Now it is a tenable proposition that
if a man will settle in a foreign country in search of
some advantage to be obtained for himself he has no
ground for claiming better or other treatment than is
shown to the people among whom he has of his own
free will chosen to live. But this is only true when
the country he lives in offers good guarantees for order
and equal treatment in a uniform and legal way.
Moralists and sentimentalists may refuse to make a
difference between country and country. They may
ask why did you go where the kind of treatment you
desire to receive was notoriously not to be found ?
The answer is perhaps illogical, but it is a good one.
It is, we go because the world is so constituted that
we do and we must. If the question is why do you
make a difference between one country and another ?
the answer is perfectly logical. It is that they are
different. There is no parity between the obligation
to pay taxes, to conform to police rules, to submit to
expropriation for public services, or to the compulsory
use of property in a time of war, to which an American
might be called upon to yield in England or France,
and the outrages — the " avanias " — of Turkish pashas
and Chinese mandarins. Now the whole case of
America was that the wrongs which its citizens had
suffered in Mexico at the hands of Santa Anas and
Miramons were of the same nature as the excesses of
pashas and mandarins. If Mexico wished to be
treated like England or France she must offer the
same guarantees, and that she had notoriously never
done. Therefore she must expect to be classed with
Turkey or China. And in sober fact the United States
were right. Since they were they must be allowed to

THE FIRST TERM 187
have shown moderation. Even if we look back to
and beyond the war of 1 848 the Union can fairly say
that it endured more and retaliated less than European
Governments have done. A comparison between their
policy to Mexico and that of the Marquess of Wellesley
to the Mahratta rulers or of the British Government
to China (a much more stable country than Mexico)
ought to be in their favour in the opinion of those who
condemn the use of force.
After the war of 1 848 there had been long discussions
which dragged on till 1876. When at last a settle
ment was made it left Mexico with the obligation to
pay $4,125,622 in yearly instalments of $300,000 to
begin in January, 1877. A rebate of $150,622 to be
deducted from this sum was made for proved Mexican
claims. It is not unworthy of notice that the
$4,125,622 was all that remained of 2,000 American
claims which amounted to $556,788,600. The com
missioners who examined the accounts presented to
them had to reduce to fair proportions whole floods of
greedy pretensions, supported by a positive frenzy of
mendacity and forgery. The story had a sequel
which can hardly be quoted against the United States.
Among the claims presented and supported by the
United States Government were two made by a Mr.
Benjamin Weil and by the La Abra Mining Company
for $487,810 and $681,041. The Mexican Govern
ment protested against them as fraudulent, and they
became the subject of litigation in the States. The
law's delays dragged the case on till 1900, when the
Court decided against Mr. Weil and the company.
Then the United States Government both refused to
collect any more for them and refunded the payments
which had already been made. It should be added

1 88 DIAZ
also that the umpire chosen by both sides in 1873 was
Sir Edward Thornton, British Minister at Washington.
In 1877 the demand of the United States for the
payment of the first instalment due in January was
to be met. The sum of $300,000 was not a heavy
one for a revenue of $17,000,000. But the revenue
had not been collected when Congress met in April,
and further delays would be dangerous. Indeed,
there was no regular channel by which a request for
time could be made. The Government of Washington
treated Diaz as only one military adventurer the
more, and did not so far recognise him as lawful
President. It is to be presumed that this refusal of
recognition was meant to be a form of coercion and a
warning, since it is difficult on a survey of Mexican
history to see that the election of Diaz was less lawful
than those of his predecessors with extremely rare
exceptions — if, indeed, there was more than one.
The attitude of the United States Government was of
course an encouragement to the irreconcilable Ler
distas who were plotting in their places of exile in
Texas. The first instalment of $300,000 must be
paid off, and it was paid by having recourse to the
familiar expedient of a forced loan. Henceforward
the payment was regularly discharged till the whole
award was cleared off in 1890. In April, 1878, after
the second instalment had been supplied, the United
States Government did at last recognise President
Diaz, and the relations of the two Governments became
as friendly as the unending disputes on the frontier
allowed. These last did not end, and have not ended when this
page is being written. They are secure of a renewal
of life so long as the condition of the country on the

THE FIRST TERM 189
Mexican side of the line and the population on the
northern side remain the same. When after the
disastrous war of 1848 Mexico was deprived of all
the territory it claimed to hold north of the Rio Grande
— more than half the total area of the Republic — the
Mexicans remained, as was but natural, angry and
apprehensive. It is true that this vast expanse of
territory was of little value. Much of it was waterless
and barren, but to a far greater extent it was worthless
because it was not inhabited by a useful population.
A few settlements of Mexican half-breeds were lost
in empty deserts, and among tribes of Red American
Indians, Apaches, and others only less bestially
ferocious than they. Mexico herself could supply
no colonists, and the story of those whom she had
invited to Texas from abroad was not encouraging
either to them or to her. Still, Mexicans could hardly
be expected to bear their loss with indifference. It
was not possible that they should be without fear of a
new American advance. The best and, in the long
run, the only effectual defence would have been to
settle the country on the right bank of the Rio
Grande up to El Paso, and then on the south of the
line running westward from El Paso to the Pacific,
which together marked the new frontier. But the
Mexicans had no overflow of their own to settle in
these regions, and they could not draw on the popula
tion of Europe. The conditions which have allowed
of considerable German and Italian settlements in
Southern Brazil and the Argentine did not exist for
such remote, and before the construction of railways
such inaccessible, regions as Chihuahua, Coahuila,
Sinaloa, and Sonora. The peninsula of Lower Cali
fornia and the maritime States both on the Pacific

190 DIAZ
Coast and on the Atlantic were, it is true, open to
immigration from the sea. But the Mexicans were in
fear of all immigrants. Schemes for the establishment
of a French settlement in Sonora, whether pushed by
mere filibusters like Pindray and Raousset-Boulbon,
or more peaceful speculations advocated by Jecker
or patronised by Napoleon III. during the Empire,
were equally repugnant. The Mexicans were sus
picious of all " gringos," and were persuaded that
these intruders meant mischief to them. They
looked with hostility on the pushful newcomers, as did
the Gauchos of the Argentine Pampas on the Euro
peans who displaced them and threatened to rob them
of their very " chiripas." 1
Except on the sea-coast and in a few ports, Mexico
was represented in the great belt of territory which
stretches from Lower California to the Atlantic by a
sparse population of herdsmen, vagabond seekers for
" bonanzas," bits of luck in the shape of pockets of
gold, half-breeds, and broken men. In 1877 and for
some years afterwards the United States had not
subdued their own territory to complete order — and
especially not in Arizona and New Mexico, which
stand over against Chihuahua and Coahuila. Then
the half-breed herdsmen and their like on the Mexican
side were not the only inhabitants. Where they could
not occupy the land, hunting Indians roamed, or
Pueblo Indians lived their old communal life. In
these conditions it would have been strange if the
border had not reproduced all, or more than all, that
our own ancestors knew under that name. The
1 The " chiripd " is the shawl which the riders of the Pampas wrap round
the middle of the body as a protection against the cutting winds from the
South Pole. An odd and rather indecent story has been invented to account
for an article of dress which really explains itself.

THE FIRST TERM 191
Indian tribes on the northern side began to burst into
Mexico as they felt the pressure not only of the rifles,
but of what was more deadly by far to them, the
economic conditions created for them by the ad
vancing whites who broke up or enclosed their hunting-
grounds and were exterminating the bison. From
Mexico as from a place of refuge they raided back on
the enemy who had starved and forced them out.
The unfailing products of an unsettled border — the
cattle-lifters, half-breed, and white — could not be
lacking. In fact they swarmed. Most troopers are
agreeably picturesque figures on the pages of Sir
Walter, but Willie of Westburnflat or the Devil's
Dick of Hellgarth are less attractive when seen in their
native characters of cattle-lifter, horse-thief, fire-
raiser, blackmailer, and murderer.
There was another personage at work who had been
unknown to the Middle Ages — to wit, the land specu
lator. Northern Mexico was the country of the
" hacendados," the great landowners whose acres
were counted by the million. But there was land to
sell, and it will occur to everybody as but natural that
a title more or less good could be obtained in Mexico
at a very cheap rate. It could in fact be acquired
in Mexico for a few cents an acre. If only the country
could be transferred to the sovereignty of the United
States the market price would promptly rise to the
same number of dollars. Of course there were not a
few holders of titles — Mexicans too in many cases —
who were perfectly ready to foment any disorder in
the hope that the United States might be tempted or
provoked to make another advance and annex another
belt of Mexican territory. The change of sovereignty
would promptly have interpreted itself for them into

192 DIAZ
a very profitable transaction. Nor was there wanting
on the American side a lively desire for new land to be
settled, or, what was more innocent, for the greater
security which would come of the presence of the
United States cavalry on the right bank of the Rio
Grande. In short, pretext, provocation, speculation,
and the just resentment of the Government at
Washington might combine at any moment. There
fore it was that the United States hung over Mexico
like an impending avalanche or landslip. Indeed
it was thought that but for the firmness of President
Hayes the whole mass would have been precipitated
during Don Porfirio's first Administration, and that,
no doubt, was one main reason why he was resolved,
and was able, to bring his countrymen to pay the
$300,000 a year of indemnity according to the terms
of the award of 1876.
There was, however, more to be done. If the
Mexicans suffered from Indian and other raiders who
came across the border from the American side, the
citizens of the United States lost far more by the
raiders who came from the south, for the sufficient
reason that they had incomparably more to lose.
Pursuit of the offenders was useless when they could
take refuge across a border and could not be followed.
There is no reason to believe that the United States
would have wished to send their troops across the
frontier in pursuit of Indian or half-breed raiders if
the Mexican Government would have maintained a
proper ward of the marches. But that it would not
and could not do. Like other Spanish American
communities, it was far too ready to take advan
tage of its own wrong, to plead that because it was
anarchical, and therefore very poor, it ought not to be

THE FIRST TERM 193
summoned to perforniits elementary functions. When
it was shown to be incompetent to the injury of its
neighbours, it stood on its dignity. When during the
Administration of Juarez it was asked to consent to
allow American troops to cross the frontier, it declined.
The American Government was honourably patient
and took the perfectly fair course of offering reci
procity. Till 1 877 nothing was done. In the confused
condition of Mexico in these years it was often not as
much as possible to say who was the Government, or
where was the Government, at any given moment.
In 1877, just when Diaz was really beginning to bring
the country to order, the condition of the border,
especially where it marched with the new well-
inhabited and prosperous State of Texas, had reached
a point where the sufferers declared that the nuisance
was no longer to be tolerated. The reputation of the
Texans is that not very much is required to bring them
to the fighting pitch. Some among them by general
admission were on the same moral level as Mexican
cattle-lifters. Every raider was not born south of the
Rio Grande. There were some who had first crossed
the river from the north, and to whom Mexican
territory served as a no man's or debatable land,
where they could find refuge. But that is only
another way of saying that the Mexican Government
did not govern. The grievance was not all on one
side, but it was real, and it was worse for the richer of
the two countries.
In June, 1877, the United States Government gave
instructions to General Ord, the officer commanding
in Texas, to cross the frontier in pursuit of Mexican
marauders. He was, however, told to act in harmony
with the local authorities and to ask their help.

194 DIAZ
These instructions showed a desire to make com
pliance as easy for the Mexican Government as the
state of the case permitted. None the less the advance
of the American troops would have constituted an
invasion. The action of the United States, or rather
the threat to take action, created a serious difficulty
for Diaz. If he yielded, he would have discredited
himself in the eyes of his countrymen, and then some
body would have been found to set the old anarchy
boiling again. If he had taken a very high tone with
the United States, he might, indeed he certainly
would, have provoked a war in which Mexico would
have suffered grievously. No such result was desired
on either side. President Diaz took a line which, while
satisfying the susceptibilities of his countrymen, was
really a compliance with the just demands of the
United States. He sent General Trevifio to the fron
tier with a competent body of troops and with public
orders to resist General Ord by force if he advanced.
It was generally believed, however, — and the opinion
seems a plausible one — that General Trevifio was
privately instructed not to be officious in putting
himself in the way of the American general. This
measure was accompanied by a vigorously-worded
protest against the proposed action of the United
States as contrary to international law. But the
protest was followed by the adoption of measures to
bring the border to quiet. It was allowed that they
were effective and that the marauding was abated.
It is not rash to assume that General Trevifio and
other Mexican officers, acting under the wholesome
stimulant applied by America, administered a good
deal of Jeddart justice and Halifax law on the right
bank of the Rio Grande.

THE FIRST TERM 195
The trouble did not cease, for it arose from the
natural wealth of the soil in such growths. But
President Diaz convinced the United States that he
meant well, and that if he were not unduly hampered
he would do better. After he had been recognised in
April, 1878, the two Governments joined to provide
a remedy. In 1880 the States asked for an arrange
ment, regularly recognised and recorded, by which
their troops might cross the line in pursuit of
marauders. President Diaz, after consulting with his
Congress (mainly, one imagines, from politeness and
for form's sake), consented to a treaty, not, however,
signed till July 29, 1882, when he was not in office.
By this treaty the regular troops of each Government
were to be authorised to cross into the territory of the
other on certain conditions. The entry must not be
made on settled land, nor go within six miles of any
settlement. It must be notified at once to the local
authorities, and the pursuing force must retire when
the capture was effected or the trail was lost. Con
ventions of this kind have since been repeatedly made
and renewed. President Diaz had secured for his
country equality of treatment, though it was not he
who actually signed the treaty of 1882.
The line adopted by the two Governments was the
best available, but it is obvious that there was a
considerable danger in such reciprocity as this.
When one side was impatient and perhaps unduly
scornful, and the other was susceptible and not without
resentment, collisions were not unlikely to occur.
One did in 1886. An American officer, Captain
Crawford, crossed the frontier into Chihuahua on a
proper occasion with a few United States soldiers and
a large proportion of Apache scouts. By a misfortune

196 DIAZ
such as was inherent in the case, a body of the Mexican
Chihuahuan guard which was in pursuit of other
raiders fell in with Captain Crawford's detachment.
Misled, as it alleged, by the sight of the Apache scouts,
it concluded that it had to do with a body of plunder
ing Indians. It attacked and Captain Crawford was
killed. The incident excited, as may be supposed,
much anger in the United States. But a war was not
desired, and Diaz, who was now back in the Presi
dency, had the confidence of the American Govern
ment. It recognised that Captain Crawford had not
observed the terms of the treaty with exact care. He
was entitled to cross the frontier, but only with regular
troops. The greater part of his command consisted of
Apache scouts who could not be so described. The
trouble was smoothed over, but when collisions of
this character were likely to occur vigilance and good
will must have been taxed on both sides to keep
friendly relations from being broken.
His first Administration did not give President
Diaz the chance of putting the finances of Mexico on
a better footing. He was indeed tempted to do them
some damage. But they may be allowed to stand for
a space while we turn to his struggle with the condi
tions which had to be subdued if he was to go on doing
any measure of good on any side of Government.
The new President had bound himself by all " Plans ' '
issued by him — La Noria, Textupec, and Palo Blanco
— to establish the rule that no immediate re-election
for the Presidency was to be allowed in future. And
this rule was to apply to the governors of the States.
He had also bound himself tacitly by the final clause
of the Plan of Palo Blanco, and explicitly by definite
promises he gave in a public letter published after

THE FIRST TERM 197
his return to the capital from the north in February,
not to govern with or for one party, but for the nation,
and with the help of men of all parties who would
frankly give their aid. Now nothing was easier than
to persuade Congress to pass a nice little law forbidding
re-elections. Laws can be made with a light heart in
countries where they are but little respected. Nobody
in Mexico can have believed sincerely that the new
constitutional law would prove to have more virtue
than the long series which had preceded it. But to
govern without strict regard to party was by no manner
of means so easy, for it implied that the President
must disappoint some at least of those who helped
him to rise to power. And in such a country as Mexico
this meant that the disappointed persons would
protest with the use of force. Then, too, a patriot
President resolved to rule free from the bonds of
party was no less sure to offend those of his opponents
who would be content with nothing less than all, and
it was a matter of course that they would take up
arms. President Diaz had to meet trouble from both
sides. Those who have heard how he gave peace to Mexico
may be surprised to be told that there was no year of
his first Administration in which there was not fighting
somewhere. But a year of peace in Mexico was one
in which only local conflicts occurred. It would be a
wearisome task to go through a long list of these
scufflings of kites and crows. Their incidents were
monotonous and barren. The characters of the
persons concerned were of the poorest. It will be
enough to take one example of each class of disturb
ance, the explosion of disappointed personal ambition
and the violent outbreak of pure insurrection.

198 DIAZ
General Marquez de Leon — no connection with the
Marquez who was Tiger of Tacubaya — had been one
of the supporters and agents of General Diaz in the
north-west. He was a native of Lower California.
This man was one of those who considered that the
President had not rewarded his services as they
deserved. He was of course intent on gaining his
revenge, and he had the power to do mischief. In the
course of his political activities in previous years he
had acquired a useful connection in the State of
Sinaloa. Sinaloa is the State which lies directly south
of Sonora on the Pacific coast, and the northern end
of it is in the Gulf of California, opposite Marquez's
native State. Having connections in both, it was
possible for him to combine them. And he was
presented with an opportunity by a local disturbance
in Sinaloa. The governor, Cafiedo, had fallen out
with his fellow-Sinaloans on constitutional points
which the absence of evidence makes it difficult to
master. Judging by analogy, we may conclude that
what was at stake was the control of the spigot of
local taxation. " Pronunciamiento " was in the air,
and such a well-practised wire-puller as Marquez de
Leon was had no great difficulty in turning a local riot
into a general rising. The immediate command in
Sinaloa was given by him to one Jesus Ramirez, who
was locally popular. He himself passed into Lower
California. During the whole of 1879 and much of
1880 these two were engaged in keeping up the banner
of revolt by " several pronunciamientos " and
" opportune seizures of funds," to quote the demure
prose of Mr. H. H. Bancroft. Skirmishes occurred,
repulses, captures, the ups and downs of the guerrillero-
cum-bandit wars proper to those constitutional con-

THE FIRST TERM 199
flicts. At last Jesus Ramirez was shot in a skirmish
by Federal troops, and Marquez de Leon, finding the
game was going against him, disbanded his men and
fled to the United States. Meanwhile there were
other fights for freedom in the same or very similar
conditions going on in other parts of the Republic.
They were taken as matters of course and treated as
of no consequence. In the address to Congress at the
beginning of the session of 1879 President Diaz
referred to them in terms which show how calmly a
state of anarchy in solution and always on the point
of precipitating was accepted by the strongest man of
government in Mexico : " Some events have occurred
in different parts of the country of which, though they
have provoked transitory confusion and local diffi
culties, it cannot be said that they affect the general
peace of the Republic or menace established order."
Each by itself these outbreaks were but little more
dangerous than strike riots. The wide extension of
them and their persistence was none the less a menace
to " established order," for it showed that anarchy
was bred in the bone of the Mexicans. In the speech
with which he prorogued the Congress in September,
President Diaz made a dry and laconic reference to
another manifestation of this same evil which had
occurred at Veracruz. It was the event to which
Sefior Fornaro referred in the screech of fury quoted
above (see p. 120). It was far too characteristic of
the country, too significant of the conditions with
which a ruler who would keep order has to deal, and
it touches the personal character of President Diaz
too closely to be lightly dismissed.
Our story has already shown that Veracruz was a
point of peculiar importance, because it was the main

200 DIAZ
port of entry for Mexican trade, and the place where
the bulk of the customs was collected. For that
reason it was always guarded by Government with
exceptional care. But for that reason also the seizure
of the town was always a great object with insurgents
of all colours. They were not likely to forget that
Juarez had won against the Conservatives and
Miramon very largely because he had been able to
occupy and hold the port. If the place could have
been captured the Government would have found
itself deprived of funds at a critical moment. There
was no lack of intriguers in Mexico who were capable
of making this simple calculation. Irreconcilable
Lerdistas were ready to combine with disappointed
agitators of the stamp of Marquez de Leon. In the
spring of 1879 a conspiracy was undoubtedly on foot.
It may have been ineptly contrived, for the Lerdistas
generally were clumsy conspirators, but it was
genuine. The plan was to bring about a mutiny in
two Government gunboats lying near Veracruz, the
Libertad and the Independencia, and then act in
combination with Lerdista conspirators on shore who
had returned secretly from their exile in Texas. The
fighting leader was to be Mariano Escobedo, a veteran
of the French war, and he had with him " some colonels
of known dash — Lorenzo Fernandez, Bonifacio Topete,
Carlos Fuero, Jose B. Cueto, and others." There
were other intriguers of the wire-pulling rather than
of the fighting order within the town.
President Diaz was too well aware of the vital
importance of keeping a tight hold on the place to
have neglected the precaution of putting it in safe
hands. The governor was the Luis Mier y Teran to
whom he had entrusted the command of his following

THE FIRST TERM 201
in Oaxaca at the time of the rising against Juarez.
Teran x had gone through various fortunes. He was
a prisoner when Lerdo fled from Mexico, and it
was he who brought the news of the flight to Diaz.
He was devoted to Don Porfirio. Don Rafael de
Zayas describes him as a perfectly illiterate rough
diamond of jovial temperament and breezy popularity
hunting manners. He was commonly known as El
loco Teran (Rattlepate Teran) — a description answer
ing to our " good old So-and-so," and implying more
condescending approval than respect. Perhaps the
reputation of the man as a kind of noisy buffoon
misled the conspirators into underrating the danger of
incurring his suspicions. They were to discover that
all this genial hail-fellow-well-met outside covered a
capacity to be ferocious in the most extreme Mexican
style. It may very well be the case that some of those
engaged in this particular plot entered into it because
they found conspiracy almost as exciting as the
gambling for which most Mexicans have a furious
passion. Even among more sober peoples men have
been known who found an irresistible attraction in
the game of conspiracy. The French Royalist Hyde
de Neuville tells a story of the famous Chouan, George
Cadoudal, which he gives as being by no means an
instance of idle talk. They were escaping together in
an open boat, and were on their way across Channel
1 The reader may perhaps not always know what is the meaning of such
a name as Mier y Tera'n — that is, Mier and Teran. The second surname
is that of the mother. Diaz himself, for instance, was Diaz y Mori. Whether
the two names are habitually used depends on whether they are easily
pronounced together and other considerations, such, for instance, as the
convenience of being able to distinguish Seflor Ramirez y Lopez from Sefior
Ramirez y Sanchez. A man sometimes prefers to use his mother's surname,
and this was the case with Mier y Teran, who is commonly spoken of as
Teran only.

202 DIAZ
to England. In the middle of the night Cadoudal
suddenly asked him if he had reflected on what was
the first thing the King ought to do when he was
restored. Then he supplied the answer. It was to
shoot them both, for, said the Chouan, they had
become so wedded to this kind of life that they would
never be able to lead any other. And Hyde acknow
ledges that the humorous judgment of George had a
basis of truth. There were certainly not a few
Mexicans with whom plotting and " pronunciamien-
tos " had become a habit. They followed their bent
lightly and they talked too much. Teran became
aware that some trouble was brewing and laid hands
on one of the " characterised " members of Lerdo's
party. Martial law had not been proclaimed in
Veracruz, and the governor thought it best to observe
the forms. He applied to Don Rafael de Zayas, who
was Federal judge of Veracruz at the time, and asked
him to commit other prisoners. Don Rafael, from
whose narrative these details are taken, declined to
comply with the governor's request. Teran was
angry, and did not hesitate to accuse the judge of
tepidity in the cause of public order.
The arrest of the " caracterizado " may perhaps
have stimulated the fighting element in the conspiracy
to immediate action. The gunboats which were to be
seized were lying, not in the poor roadstead of Vera
cruz, but at Tlacotalpam to the south-east, where the
Papaloapam and the Alvarado rivers run together and
form a species of delta and a lagoon. The anchorage
is connected with the sea by a narrow passage. The
town of Alvarado stands on the north-west side of
the entrance and Tlacotalpam on the inner side of
the lagoon. The proposed coup was only partially

THE FIRST TERM 203
successful, but the Libertad was seized during the
absence of her captain, who was ashore, and by a
party from Alvarado. The captors made off with her
to the eastward and took her to Carmen, at the end
of the Lagoon de Terminos in Yucatan. Here while
the leaders of the plot were ashore in search of
" fortunate seizures of money " the boatswain and
the loyal part of the crew retook the Libertad and
brought her back.
In the meantime Teran had been promptly in
formed of the seizure of the Libertad. He telegraphed
at once to the capital for orders and received for answer
the words " Fusilalos en caliente " (" Shoot them hot
and hot," or red-handed). Teran did not wait for a
second order, but at once shot a whole batch of the
Lerdistas he suspected, and buried them immediately.
He seems himself to have been aware that this sum
mary execution would be blamed, for he reported to
the Government that an attack had been made on the
barracks at Veracruz, and that assailants nine in
number had fallen in action. In view of what fol
lowed it is not easy to see why Teran put himself to
the trouble of lying. The truth was notorious. The
execution caused more excitement than might have
been expected in a country where shooting of prisoners
had been so common. But hitherto the firing parties
had been busy with the officers of defeated armies.
In this case those who had suffered belonged to families
of substance and to the class which had kept in the
background to pull the wires and work revolutions
for their money. Their families insisted that an
inquiry should be held. The Government was slow
to meet their request, but at last, on July 13, some
three weeks after the execution, the bodies were

204 DIAZ
exhumed. It was then found that they were tied
with ropes, which of course showed the absolute
falsity of Teran's assertion that they had fallen in
open fight.
Having obtained this amount of concession, it
would have been, on the face of it, easy, one would
think, for the families to force the Government to
bring the general to a real trial. Yet they failed.
It is true that he was brought before the grand jury
in the capital in May, 1880, and that his case was put
before Congress more than a year afterwards in
November, 1881, when the President's first term was
over. Both bodies declared they were incompetent
to try him. He was never punished by the law.
There is no honest reason for concealing the manifest
truth that if he escaped punishment it was because
Don Porfirio did not choose to allow him to be
punished. But, that being so, we naturally wish to
understand why, in spite of public emotion and
newspaper clamour, the President's popularity was
not in the least diminished by an act for which he
must be held responsible, and which was as savage as
any recorded in Mexican history.
Writers who have undertaken to draw Diaz as of
blameless walk and conversation according to an
approved European model have passed over this
episode in silence. Others who wished to show a
certain measure of independence have endeavoured
to prove that the famous " Fusilalos en caliente "
only meant that Teran was to shoot the mutineers
on the Libertad if he could catch them red-handed.
This is the kind of apology for which no human being
could really be grateful. It endeavours to save Don
Porfirio's moral character at the expense of his

THE FIRST TERM 205
common sense. If that was what he meant he could
easily have said so in terms which could not be
misunderstood. He knew Teran well. His telegram
was worded, not in the official and polite third person
singular, but in the familiar second, which is never
used except between very close friends or relatives — ¦
" fusilalos," not " fusilelos." It was a personal
encouragement from one old friend to another to hit
hard. Knowing the man as he did, Diaz must have
been woefully lacking in judgment if he failed to
foresee that Teran would take the message for a
direction to do some such thing as he did.
There are only two ways in which such an incident
as this of the massacre at Veracruz can be judged.
Either there was no excuse for it, or it needed none,
as being one of those actions not laudable in them
selves, even cruel, which were none the less done for
the good of the State. If Mexico was a country in
which the Government could move with a strict
regard to law, then Teran was a murderer, and Diaz,
who undeniably aided him to escape punishment,
abetted the murder. But if Mexico was not such a
country, but one in which there was no respect for the
law, and where many men, greedy, self-seeking, or
feather-headed, were for ever trying to let loose the
forces of anarchy and bloodshed which had just been
chained up, then there was no murder nor abetting
of murder. There was a merciful rigour which at the
expense of nine lives averted far greater slaughter.
The fact was that for two years before the summary
shooting at Veracruz the unhappy country had been
worried by local outbreaks and raids from across the
frontier, all frivolously undertaken, all ill-conducted,
all encouraged underhand by wire-pullers who laid

206 DIAZ
plots and advanced money. Escobedo, who was to
have co-operated with the Veracruz mutineers, had
been taken in 1877 and had been allowed to go free
on parole. Yet he was scheming again. If the
country was to attain to a lasting peace there must
be an end of this. Since moderation and persuasion
could not bring that end about by gentle means, then
an example must be made. The people who intrigued
between four walls, found money and pulled wires,
must be taught that there was some danger in being
too busy. They were taught once and for all. It is
allowed that the terror produced by the blow struck
at Veracruz was profound and lasting — so lasting
that it was felt thirty years afterwards. The in
triguers realised that for the future no half-measures
would be taken with them. They cowered down,
and from that day " pacifism " became possible.
Diaz could afford to be moderate because the dis
orderly elements had learnt that they must keep
quiet. Yet his hand was always heavy on recalcitrant
minorities. In his later years possible competitors
for the Presidency used to vanish into prison, and
did not always come out. Governors of States whom
he could trust were kept in office for life in spite of the
Constitution. Only a blindly obedient servant could
hope to be appointed or retained as " gefe politico "
of a district. Spies and informers were used without
scruple.

CHAPTER VIII

AN INTERIM

The first Administration of President Diaz was
timed to end in November, 1880. He had spent the
first year of the four which constituted his legal term
in fighting for his position. The three which followed
were spent in clearing the ground and in laying down
the lines on which his future government was to be
conducted. The first process has been sufficiently
illustrated by the story of Marquez de Leon and the
Veracruz conspiracy. But it is necessary for the full
understanding of the subject to add that the President
showed a most consistent determination to shake
himself free of all bonds of party or connection in his
choice of men to serve the State. He made many
changes of Ministers and he took, one after the other,
several who had served his predecessors. Ignacio
Mariscal, an accomplished diplomatist and linguist ;
Rubio, who had been one of the followers of Lerdo,
and had fled with him to the United States ; Berrio-
zabel, who had been Minister of War with Iglesias,
and others, were reconciled to the new ruler. They
were joined with his secretary, Justo Benitez, with
Gonzalez, who had decided the day at Tecoac, and
other Porforistas of the early times. By this policy
of judicious selection the President gained a double
advantage. He provided himself with a staff of
capable agents, and he deprived other parties and
connections of their ablest leaders. In his case, as

208 DIAZ
in that of all men, death of others and mistakes of
rivals had helped him to fortune. Juarez was gone ;
Lerdo had made himself odious ; Iglesias had taken
no hold. No one else rose above the crowd suffi
ciently to counterbalance his popularity. But of
him also the maxim Faber fortunce quisque suce holds
good. He had known how to take advantage of the
chances which fortune put in his way. And as he
rose step by step he persuaded an ever-increasing
number of those Mexicans whose support was valuable,
and, what was quite as much to the purpose, of those
foreigners whose aid was needed by every Mexican
ruler, that their interests were safer with him than
with any other. The Mexicans were those who
longed for peace and an opportunity to attain to
prosperity. The foreigners were capitalists whose
financial aid was indispensable in so poor a country,
and one where so much was to be done in the way of
public works.
When we inquire what it was that the President
aimed at above all else during his tenures of the
Presidency we cannot hope to find an answer more
conveniently, or in more satisfactory form, than in the
pages of the two volumes somewhat largely named
" The Authentic History of the Administration of
General Diaz." The licentiate Ricardo Rodriguez,
who published this compilation in 1904, went too far
when he called it a history. It is a collection of the
speeches which the President made at the opening and
prorogation of Congress at the beginning of every
April and in the middle of the following September
of each year. These " discursos " are akin to the
messages of the Presidents of the United States,
though they are never framed on the same ample

AN INTERIM 209
scale. They show every sign of being the President's
personal work, if only because of the great similarity
of their style to that of the biographical notes from
which quotations have been made above. Like these
notes, the speeches are singularly free from the faults
of garrulity and mere rhetoric which are so commonly
to be found in Spanish and Spanish-American political
oratory. The President tells Congress what is to be
done, what has been done, or what it would be
desirable to do, in plain, straightforward sentences,
unhampered by involved parenthetical clauses and
inter-locked gerunds in "ando" and "iendo." The
style we know is the man, and it is part of the biography
of Porfirio Diaz that he was silently contemptuous of
formulas and that his mind went directly to things,
and to the work which the eye can see and the hand
touch. Though he was neither a man of letters, nor
desirous to be one, he by mere virtue of clearness of
head and directness of mental aim, did not seldom
attain to command of the well-knit short sentence and
the alert prose of the Spanish writers of the good
epoch. He was not, to be sure, Mariana, nor Lope de
Vega, whose prose was an example to Europe, but he
can stand with the explorers and the captains of
Charles V. and Philip II., who were both manly and
sober. Now when we look at the matter of these speeches
we find that what predominates is public works.
Other things are there, the advantage of getting rid of
the abuses which had grown from the old practice of
farming the Mint and of the destructive form of tax
named " Alcabala," and so on; but in the main the
President presses on the attention of Congress such
substantial things as railways, roads, drainage,

210 DIAZ
bridges, afforestation, the dredging and construction
of ports — in short, the equipment of tools Without
which no country can make use of its resources. And,
as this was what the peaceful and industrially inclined
part of the population of Mexico knew to be most
necessary, the prominence the President gave it in
all his measures and speeches tended to root the con
fidence felt in him more deeply.
Yet his first term of office could see only the promise,
or at the utmost the beginning, of the good work, and
in Mexico there was then, and we now see that there
still is, but the poorest of security for the continuance
of any good work apart from the personality of the
dominant administrator.
This serious consideration was in fact forcing itself
into the minds of a good many Mexicans by the year
1880. In 1877 Congress had embodied the great
principle of the " Plans " published by Diaz himself
at various times and at La Noria, Textupec, or Palo
Blanco in a law. It had then provided, as far as the
law could, that no President, nor governor of a State,
could be re-elected at the conclusion of his term of
office. Such re-election was, it seems, contrary to
democratic principles. The President or governor
must retire and wait his turn. He was not dis
qualified for ever, but his terms of office must not be
consecutive. It is needless to say that in the act of
making this law the Congress assumed that elections
for President and governor were formalities in
Mexico, or else that it tacitly confessed that the people
did not consider re-election undemocratic. If the
sovereign people did hold that faith and was free to
choose, what compelled it to re-elect any man ? But
Congress knew very well that elections were mere

AN INTERIM 211
matters of form, and that such words as " elector,"
" voter," " sovereignty of the people," " democratic,"
and so forth, had no meaning for the huge majority
of Mexicans. They stood for institutions and ideas
borrowed from abroad, and applied to Creoles, half-
breeds, and Indians, to whom they were completely
alien, and with whose real sentiments they had no
sort of organic connection. They made a mere mask
which in moments of passion or sincere emotion was
thrown aside as artificial and as useless. The law of
1877 was simply one of many other attempts to
provide a paper-barrier which should restrain the
actual tenant of office from turning himself into a
tyrant in the proper force of the term. A really
beneficent ruler was the most dangerous of all
" tyrants " in that sense. He was exactly the man
who was least likely to be met with opposition when
he took measures to perpetuate himself in office, and
thereby to block the road to those who wished to
enjoy their turn. How far Diaz did at any period
of his life believe that a mere Congress-made rule of
this kind would prove to possess any virtue of its own
is a question which he might himself have found it
difficult to answer in his later years.
Before his first term was over he must have learnt
that there were many in Mexico who would have been
glad enough to see the Congress undo in 1880 what it
had done in 1877. If Diaz had lent himself to their
wishes there can be no doubt that the Legislature
would have done as it was told, and that he would
have been re-elected at once. But the law had been
so recently passed, and Diaz had so repeatedly
declared against " the principle of re-election," that
he would have discredited himself, if not in Mexico,

212 DIAZ
where declarations for or against principles had never
had much meaning and had come to have none, then
at least in the United States. Moreover, as we shall
see, it was not absolutely necessary for him to retain
office in order to keep control of affairs.
It is a truth which if men were not in practice so
blind to it would be a platitude, that in politics no
paper Constitutions, or other constructions of words
printed and called laws, are of the slightest avail
against the facts of the case. Power in Spanish
America has resided, resides, and will continue for
long to reside, in some person or connection of private
persons who can coerce rivals by armed force. Their
power is personal, however it is obtained, and it either
overrides Constitutions or finds some way of evading
them. The Constitution of the United States is a
reality, and the American people has an inherited
respect for law. Yet we know what has become of
the attempt made by the fathers of the Republic to
arrange for the choice of a President by a process of
double elections. The constitutional law made by
the Mexican Congress in 1877 has had the same fate.
It was one of many made in Spanish America to pre
vent any particular man from perpetuating himself
in office, and they have always proved equally futile.
When they have not been set aside by force a coach
and four has been driven through them.
The first of the two processes needs no explanation,
but a few words will not be wasted in accounting for
the second. They are in fact necessary in order to
render the next stage in the life of Porfirio Diaz
intelligible. We have within the last few years become acquainted
with the political term " rotative." It came from

AN INTERIM 213
Portugal, where it seems to have been invented, but
the thing is common to the whole Iberian peninsula
and its colonies, and is also ancient. Don Rafael
Altamira, the most learned of contemporary Spanish
historians, has found traces of it in Biscay and in the
Middle Ages. It is simply an arrangement by which
two persons or connections agree to " rotate " in
office. The reader must not be misled by memories
of Republicans and Democrats, Whigs and Tories,
Liberals and Conservatives, when considering this
Iberian institution. There is no question here of an
appeal to the country with or without a dissolution, of
a victory of a party at the polls, and of a transfer of
office from a defeated to a victorious side. The
election is always made by the politician in office as
an alternative to the more destructive, and not less
corrupt, method of calling the troops into the streets
and the guerrilleros to the hillsides. We may say
that it marks a distinct progress from a state of
anarchy to one of constitutional order. The rotative
system was highly developed in Spain, and worked,
on the whole, well during the reign of Alfonso XII
and the regency of the queen-mother Maria Cristina.
Don Antonio Canovas went out and Don Mateo
Praxedes Sagasta came in. Then Don Mateo went out
and Don Antonio came in. In every case the incoming
Minister " made " his own Cortes, care being taken
that the " outs " should be allowed a becoming
proportion of seats.
Wherever a Spanish-American republic has attained
to a state of peace it has been by the adoption of a
rotative system. Absolute smoothness of working is
perhaps not to be looked for. The outgoing connec
tion may find the door effectually locked behind it by

214 DIAZ
the rotators in office who will not keep to the spirit of
the bargain ; or, again, the " ins " may try to lock
the door and fail. In either case there is trouble and
a reversion to the old rough method of " pronuncia-
miento." But in many cases the arrangement
works. The President whose term is drawing to an
end, and who is forbidden by the Constitution to
seek for immediate re-election, selects a safe man to
succeed him. He superintends the election and gives
his personal support to his friend. Four years later
the parts are reversed. Guzman Blanco brought this
essentially Iberian adaptation of constitutional
government to great perfection in the Republic of
Colombia. With or without the guidance of his
example, and perhaps by the light of his own sagacity
and that of his advisers only, Diaz prepared to
perpetuate his personal influence and to prepare his
own return to the Presidency at the end of four years
by a rotative arrangement. A safe man was to be
chosen, and to him was to be entrusted the duty of
continuing the work begun, on the distinct under
standing that he would repay the service when the
time came to clear off the debt.
The choice of a trustworthy locum tenens presented
difficulties. The best associate would be one who
would carry out the bargain in the letter and the
spirit of his own free will and mere motion. But such
perfect harmony of brotherhood was hard to find.
The next best resource was someone who would not
be able to break the bond if he should be tempted to
play false. He must be one who had no dangerous
amount of popularity and influence of his own. Yet a
mere figurehead, a mere nonentity would not suffice.
Diaz wished to serve the interests of his country too

AN INTERIM 215
honestly to be prepared to leave them at the mercy of
a bungler, simply in order to smooth the way for his
own return to office by showing that he was indis
pensable. The President for the next four years must
in fact be qualified to allow good work to go on, and
yet not quite equal to making an independent position
for himself. Tact and insight were much needed for
the task of selecting " a safe man."
Those who profess to have been well-informed
affirm that the President began by making choice of
his secretary, Don Justo Benitez. They had fought
together in the dark days of the French invasion.
Benitez had worked hard for his chief during the
struggle with Lerdo. It is true that he had not always
avoided giving offence in quarters where Diaz looked
for support. But he had been loyal, and the very
fact that he had committed errors of management in
dealing with persons tended on the whole to show
that he would not be a dangerous substitute. So he
was chosen, and in order that he might be put in a
position of sufficient prominence to appear worthy of
the Presidency he was to be sent on a mission to
Europe. But Don Justo broke down under the test.
A lively French contemporary who was employed to
negotiate with Wolsey has recorded that the cardinal
began by saying " The King." Then he said " The
King and I," then the formula became " I and the
King," till at last he took to using the bald first
personal pronoun. Don Justo had no doubt heard
persons of insight say that he was the " intelligent
soul," the alma pensante of his chief, and had come to
look upon himself in that light. He soon showed
too much independence, and spoke too much in the
ego et Rex meus tone. Such haste in claiming the

216 DIAZ
first place was a warning and Don Justo was dropped.
Then, so it is said, President Diaz's thoughts turned to
Teran. But the outcry raised over the general's fierce
dealings with the Veracruz conspirators rendered him
dangerous as a locum tenens. The President did indeed
prove that he would not allow the general to suffer for
displaying excess of zeal in carrying out the order
" Fusilalos en caliente " — if excess of zeal there had
been. But he could not take too much of Teran's
unpopularity with some of the Mexicans on his own
shoulders while the scandal was fresh, and attempts to
bring the general to a genuine trial were still being made.
Whatever the true truth as to the tentative selec
tions may be, we know that the candidate finally
chosen was Don Manuel Gonzalez. He was the general
to whom the President had entrusted the command
of the infantry of his army during the struggle with
Lerdo in the north. His timely appearance on the
right flank of Alatorre's line had decided the battle
at Tecoac. He had been for a time Minister of War
for Diaz. The President could rely on his loyalty, and
his position was such as to justify his candidature.
The election was held and passed off peacefully because
Diaz kept order, and also because four other candi
dates, one of whom was Justo Benitez, were allowed
to canvass freely and to receive a decent show of
support. But the influence of the President was
thrown openly on the side of Gonzalez, who was
elected by an immense majority. The Congress
declared him duly returned on September 25, and he
entered on his term of office on December 1, 1880. In
the speech which closed the session of that year Diaz
congratulated Congress on the good order which had
reigned during an election, though the public had taken

AN INTERIM 217
unusual interest in the contest. All constitutional
government requires the aid of fictions, and Mexico
has its own.
The real character of the transaction is sufficiently
displayed by a single fact. Diaz offered his active
support to the new Administration, and was invited by
his successor to take a portfolio in the new Cabinet.
It was characteristic of him that he took the depart
ment of Public Works. In that office he was able to
apply himself to what was of most interest to him,
while keeping a watch over the whole administration.
He showed himself particularly attentive to the new
harbour and railway works at Tampico. They were
not without a certain political interest. The Gulf
coast of Mexico is ill-provided with ports. Hitherto
the interior tableland had been wholly dependent on
Veracruz, which is but a narrow anchorage between
the rocky little island of San Juan de Ulloa and the
mainland, and the route inland has to climb a very
steep ascent. Tampico lies to the north by west of
Veracruz at the mouth of the Panuco River, which is
navigable for a short distance, and close to the lagoon
of Tamaulipas. It is just at the southern point of the
State of that name. The natural harbour is not a
good one for large ships, but it is on the whole better
than Veracruz. By improving the port and connect- l
ing it with the capital the Central Government would
free itself from the dangerous old dependence on what
had been the sole outlet and entry place for trade.
We can therefore easily understand why Don Porfirio,
who looked forward to his own return to office, should
have shown a special desire to forward the works. In
fact, the whole question of " works " was becoming
predominant in Mexico, and whoever had the general

218 DIAZ
direction of them stood fair to be the most important
man in the country.
Though the statement may gppear to be rather in
contradiction with what has been said above, it was
probably the very importance of the post which
induced Diaz to retire from the Ministry at the end of
a year. He gave as his reason for withdrawal — and it
must be allowed that it was a plausible one — that he
found some of his colleagues were of opinion that he
overshadowed them. They were certainly not wrong,
and it must be allowed that his presence in the
Cabinet was too well calculated to emphasise the real
nature of his relations to the new President. The
general rule in Spanish America is that the outgoing
rotator pays a visit to Paris. The sailors have a
saying that an old mainstay makes a bad foresheet.
A man who has once been skipper is an uneasy first
mate, and that is particularly likely to be the case
when there is an understanding that he is to resume
command of the ship in the future. Diaz must have
felt himself awkwardly placed before the year was
out ; and moreover he must have foreseen coming
trouble arising out of this same question of works. He
was to have his hands free of it. The story may be
left till it can be treated as a whole. In the meantime
Diaz withdrew from the Cabinet and returned to his
native Oaxaca, where no doubt by previous arrange
ment he took up the governorship.
Oaxaca, as we know, was not only the State to which
he belonged by birth, but it was that one wherein he
had been " cacique." Influence there had been the
foundation of his power. Of late he had not seen
much of his home, but the time might be at hand when
he would need Oaxaca again. The laws of 1877 had

AN INTERIM 219
limited a State governor's tenure of office to a year.
Diaz, as was usual with him, played the game strictly.
He spent twelve months on the Administration of
Oaxaca, which had, as can easily be believed, fallen
into considerable confusion since he issued the Plan
of Textupec. The question of works followed him
here, and his tenure of the governorship was made
notable by strenuous efforts to promote the construc
tion of the railway across the isthmus of Tehuantepec
from Santa Cruz on the Pacific to the port with the
rather unmanageable Indian name Coatzacoalcos on
the Bay of Campeachy. Coatzacoalcos was officially
deposed in favour of the easier, if less characteristic
and sonorous, Port Mexico. When his twelve months
were over he returned to the capital, and took up
his residence in Humbolt Street, in a house which
became his own and was afterwards occupied by his
son Felix.
For a short time, and in so far as retirement was
possible for one who was known to be about to resume
the Presidency, he lived apart from politics. But the
interval was filled for him by an event of the first
consequence for his future life. He had become a
widower during his first term of office. We know
little of the lady whom he married during the siege of
Mexico. But the second Sefiora de Diaz was to be
almost as conspicuous a figure of the political and
social life of the country as her husband. A certain
reserve must be used in speaking of a lady who is still
alive, even when there is nothing but good to be said.
The facts which can be mentioned without risk of
intrusion are that his second wife was much younger
than himself and was by birth a lady who had received
and had profited by a more serious education than has

220 DIAZ
usually been given to the daughters of Creole families.
Dona Maria del Carmen Romero Rubio was the
daughter of Don Manuel Romero Rubio, who had been
one of the Ministers of Don Sebastian Lerdo,1 had gone
into exile with him and had returned. He was after
wards one of Don Porfirio's Ministers.
La Sefiora de Diaz (for why should we say Mme.
Diaz ?) has confided to Mrs. Tweedie that she had had
a girlish admiration for Don Porfirio, and had, in
fact, regarded him with the sentiments which Desde-
mona felt for Othello. The President who had been
and was to be was nowise insensible to a homage
which we are given to understand was not disguised.
His attentions — so his biographer, Sefior Godoy,
records — were noted in Mexican society. Nobody
was surprised when his marriage was announced and
took place in November, 1882. It was a happy one
in private and public ways alike. Don Porfirio never
showed the least tendency to fall into the folly of some
of his predecessors who tried to surround themselves
with a sham court. He maintained a " republican
simplicity " of life. But there is room in the simplest
life for dignity and good breeding. Indeed, there is none
in which those qualities can be shown with greater
merit. To dress richly and well is comparatively
1 Spanish feminine names are not always clearly understood by us, and a
few words on the subject may not be amiss. The full married name of the
President's wife would be Maria del Carmen Romero Rubio de Diaz. In
social life the full name is reduced to Carmen de Diaz. It is safe to say that
every Spanish woman is baptised by the name of Mary, though she may
have and may prefer to use another Christian name — or font name, " nombre
de pila." But it is usual not to give the mere name Maria. One of the
personifications, or attributes, or qualifications of the Virgin is added :
" Maria del Carmen," " Maria de los Dolores," " Maria de la Concepcion,"
" Maria de la Incarnacion," " Maria de la Asuncion," " Maria de las Nieves,"
or local virgins, as " Maria del Pilar," " Maria de Guadalupe," " Maria de la
Pefia de Francia," and many others. Some of them have familiar abbrevia
tions — ¦" Concha," for Concepcion, or " Blanca," for Nieves (" the Snows ").

AN INTERIM 221
easy. To dress very simply and very well is a test
of good taste. It was part of the exceptional position
which President Diaz took among Spanish-American
rulers that his household was presided over by a lady
who would have been at home in the society of a great
European capital. The education of women in the
different Spanish-speaking communities has a ten
dency to develop a somewhat narrow form of piety
which shows itself in an excessive deference to the
clergy. Whatever the opinions of the master of the
house may be — and in the educated class they are
generally those of indifference to religion — the wife is,
except in rare cases, a " clerical." It is believed that
the education of La Sefiora de Diaz had been of a
kind to save her husband from this source of lack of
sympathy. Shortly after his second marriage General Diaz
enjoyed the only visit to a foreign country which he
was able to make as a pure holiday in his life. It was
certainly not for mere reasons of convenience, nor of
economy, that he went to the United States. It
would have been at least as easy for him to have
crossed the Atlantic to Paris. But the city which has
so strong an attraction for most Spanish-Americans
did not draw him. Even on a honeymoon he
obviously did not forget that the Union is far more
important to Mexico than all the rest of the world.
We may take it for granted that he was in search of
more than rest and amusement, that he wished to see
and become known to the influential people in a
country with which he was to have close relations.
General Grant visited Mexico in 1880. He did not
come for any political purpose properly so called,
though he may be said to have come in connection

222 DIAZ
with matters which entered largely into the inter
national relations of the two republics. In 1880 the
public career of General Grant was over and he was
beginning to enter into those unhappy business
ventures which embittered his last years. What he
represented when he came to Mexico was the growing
conviction of American capitalists that Mexico was
becoming a country in which investments might be
profitable because they would be safe, and that
President Diaz was the man to secure the safety.
During the year of his visit to the States and the
Exhibition at New Orleans matters had been ripening
for a change in Mexico. The administration of
General Gonzalez had begun in peace and amid every
appearance of content and of nascent prosperity, only
to end in a very different state. It has been said that
the first two years were a golden age, but were
followed by such an outburst of waste and corruption
as had never been seen even in Mexico. The blame
was freely laid on the shoulders of President Gonzalez.
Rhetorical phrases of this stamp inspire distrust.
We ask ourselves how and why the general should
have violated an ancient maxim by suddenly becoming
turpissimus between the end of the second and the
beginning of the third year of his administration.
It is not enough to say that he was generally and
fluently abused. Gonzalez may not have been
perfectly disinterested, and in fact it is allowed that
when he retired from office he had provided for
himself. Mr. H. H. Bancroft, who writes in the most
friendly spirit to him, has to make a concession of a
rather significant kind : " It was said that the source
of his fortune, which has been grossly exaggerated,
was due to peculation ; when the fact is, that at a

AN INTERIM 223
time of such material development as Mexico derived
from the administration of Gonzalez, it was an easy
matter for any intelligent and shrewd man to acquire
wealth in enterprises of recognised utility to the
country, as was done by many others, some of whom
were not at all friendly to the President." The
apology is rather of the nature of a paving-stone
which, when used to squash the calumnious insect,
falls on the head of the person to be defended. Presi
dent Gonzalez was the ruler of the country in which
enterprises of recognised utility were being carried
on by foreign capitalists who stood in need of coun
tenance and sometimes of subventions from the
Government. In such cases a shrewd and intelligent
man who has the power to give or withhold may indeed
easily make his profit by accepting what Mr. Pepys
called compliments, without going over the blurred
line which divides indelicacy from bribery pure and
simple. But he has need to be careful if he will keep
himself untouched by the accursed thing. As Gonza
lez was not known to have had means of his own to
use for purposes of speculation, it is to be feared that
the fortune he took away with him from office, which,
though it might well be grossly exaggerated, was
confessedly not a pure invention of the enemy, had
its origin in compliments made to him by the moneyed
men. We need not make too much of this. Many
others did the same beyond all doubt. That office
should lead to fortune was as well understood in
Mexico as it was in the England of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. President Diaz, who was
born in poverty, and whose official emoluments were
never great, acquired a fortune, and it would be
difficult to say how he did so except by a very similar

224 DIAZ
use of shrewdness and intelligence. If one must find
an explanation for these things, it can be found
without doing violence to probability, in the supposi
tion that the best of Mexican rulers entered into
transactions of the same character as those invest
ments of navy balances in Indian funds, and for his
own benefit, which have such an ugly look in the trial
of Lord Melville. Yet Melville was the friend of
Pitt and the patron of Sir Walter Scott, who defended
him fiercely. Moreover, he made a good head of the
navy at a great crisis in our history.
Gonzalez might have taken the compliments and
might have speculated safely with balances, and yet
have retired without reproach, if certain troubles for
which he was nowise responsible had not come to a
head in the latter part of his Administration. They
all had their origin in " public works " and financial
distresses, and they ran their courses in close connec
tion with one another.
President Gonzalez might complain with entire
justice that the difficulties which overwhelmed him in
the last year of his tenure of office had their origin in
the Administration of his predecessor. We have
seen that President Diaz was intent on developing the
resources of his country, and showed himself very well
aware that the first step to be taken was to make them
accessible. Therefore the indispensable preliminary
to all else was the construction of railways. Nothing
could well be more true. But Don Porfirio had not
learnt from Benjamin Franklin that there is such a
mistake as " paying too much for your whistle."
Railway construction, except along the plain which
rises gently from the Rio Grande to the valley of
Mexico, is bound to be costly. The rise from Veracruz

AN INTERIM 225
to the capital is one of 7,000 feet in a distance of
263 miles : 2,500 feet of this rise have to be overcome
within 12 miles — at the edge of the Plain of Anahuac,
where it fells almost in a precipice to the Tierras
Templadas. The construction was a great engineering
feat, and one we may be proud of, for it was carried
out by a British firm. But the working expenses were
high. The outlay was hugely increased by a piece of
jobbery. Don Antonio Escandon, the concessionnaire
of the line, added $6,743,938 to the cost of construc
tion by causing the line to be increased by 120 kilo
metres (85 miles) in order to serve certain mills and
lands of his own. The subvention he received from
Government was $7,056,619. In order to cover
interest on capital and working expenses the freights
were high, though they were much below the cost of
carrying goods on mule-back, the only method
hitherto available. The Veracruz line had been com
pleted in 1873, and President Diaz was not responsible
for the extravagance or the jobbery. His error was
that he did not take warning by the history of this
enterprise, but granted subventions to projectors of
new lines on a colossal scale. In the last year of his
Administration he promised $64,000,000 — a huge sum
for a Government to engage to find, even by instal
ments, out of a revenue which in 1880 had just risen
to $24,000,000 from the figure of $17,000,000, at
which it stood in 1877.
It is commonly said that when Diaz's first term
ended in 1880 he left a balance in the treasury, and
that when he returned to office at the close of 1884
he found nothing. Such a statement as this must
have been made in reliance on the lack of knowledge
among those to whom it was directed. That there was

226 DIAZ
money not yet paid out of the exchequer may be
believed. But there was no part of the revenue,
either in hand or likely to be paid in, which was not
earmarked, and far more than covered by obHgations
which were about to mature. The railways were not
the only claimants. Subventions had been promised
for drainage works and harbours. All the schemes
which swarmed at the end of 1880 were not as much as
begun to be executed. A good many were put in
execution and carried far enough to give the projectors
a claim for part of their subventions. Then they were
left unfinished. Not a few of these undertakings
were, in plain English, " bubbles." They had no
commercial nor industrial foundation. It was true
that on the whole the railway-making of this period
did in the end profit the country, and it is not less true
that the revenue rose from $24,000,000 to $33,000,000
in about four years. But in the meantime the
expense was out of all proportion to the returns, and
the growth of the revenue was largely fictitious. It
represented the customs dues levied on the material
imported for these as yet unremunerative works.
The amounts which were going out in the form of
subventions largely exceeded what was coming in as
customs dues. And these dues were of course added
by the importer to the price of the material for which
in the end the Mexicans were to pay. For the
moment the Government appeared to be in the
enjoyment of a handsome surplus. The working
expenses of the administration (which for a reason to
be given did not include payment of interest on the
debt) were estimated at $22,000,000. As the revenue
had risen, on paper at least, to $33,000,000, it would
appear that there was a surplus of $11,000,000. But

AN INTERIM 227
this sum was about a sixth part of the subventions
promised to railways alone in one year of Don
Porfirio's first term. And then it must not be
forgotten that, as Mexico was quite incapable of pro
viding the capital for all these works herself, the
creditors were foreign capitalists. The debtors, who
were called upon to pay sums far in excess of their
resources, were the native Mexicans.
One does not need to be a profound financier in
order to be capable of understanding that as his term
of office drew to an end General Gonzalez found him
self in the position defined by the colloquial Spanish
phrase as " between the sword and the wall " (" entre
la espada y la pared "). There was not enough to
pay everybody. Therefore somebody must go unpaid.
It has been counted for pure righteousness to the
General that he decided not to impose any sacrifice on
the capitalists who were demanding these subventions.
They were paid to the full, and in order that they
might not suffer he stopped the payment of all the
salaries of all the civil officials of his Government.
The soldiers, who had at command very convincing
arguments why they should be satisfied, continued to
receive their pay. We can easily believe that the
foreign capitalists applauded the President's tender
regard for the national honour. It is the easiest thing
in the world to say that the Mexicans ought not to have
incurred obligations without considering whether
they could fulfil them. An extremely modest critical
faculty can point out that if parliamentary govern
ment had been a reality in Mexico the Congress would
have put an impossible barrier in the way of the
speculative temerity of President Diaz. If a country
cannot force its Government to act with good sense,

228 DIAZ
it must suffer for its weakness. All this is the most
obvious of the obvious. Whether the foreign capi
talists, who were not unacquainted with the financial
and industrial condition of Mexico, and who had every
means of learning that the contracts they made could
not be carried out without injustice to somebody,
were blameless for the wrong done is too big a question
to discuss here. The Mexican officials who were de
prived of their salaries considered themselves as robbed
for the benefit of the foreigner. They were not the
less angry because they could see that General
Gonzalez was accumulating a modest fortune by a
shrewd and intelligent participation in works of public
utility. They did not take a large view, but simply
said that he had been bribed by foreign capitalists
to satisfy their greed at the cost of the hapless civil
officials. If there was an outbreak of corruption and
pillage at the close of the General's term, one reason
is perhaps that so many of the agents of his Govern
ment had been deprived of all other means of subsist
ence. If President Gonzalez had inherited trouble
from his predecessor, he repaid the ill-service by leaving
him a no less serious difficulty to overcome.
When an important and vocal section of the
Mexican community was in this excusable state of
irritation, the President added two other grievances
to the causes of the unpopularity which overwhelmed
him. One he could not well help ; the other was the
result of mere bad management. The first was the
long-drawn-out dispute over the British debt ; the
second was a Mexican version of our " Wood's half
pence " — the exasperating blunder made with the
nickel coinage. Both were to be left for Diaz to settle.
The debt was a sore of some sixty years' standing,

AN INTERIM 229
for it dated from 1824. It had been founded by the
Federalist agitators who with Santa Ana at their head
had upset the " empire " of Augustin Iturbide. The
Mexican Government issued bonds for £3,200,000 at
5 per cent. The whole was taken up by a London
financial house (B. A. Goldschmidt & Co.) at 58.
The figures are sufficiently eloquent as to what was
thought of the security, which was the whole revenue
of Mexico. The Republic got in fact about £2,000,000
and had to pay 5 per cent, on £3,200,000. That the
bargain was not a good one mattered little to those
who controlled the spigot of taxation in Mexico for
the time being. They would not have to answer for
the payment, and in the meantime they handled
£2,000,000. Neither, presumably, did the future
weigh much on the minds of the financiers, who passed
the stock on to the too confiding investor. The secu
rity was bad, and the usual sequence of events was
unrolled. Next year the Mexican Government was
in the market with another loan of £3,200,000 — this
time at 6 per cent. It was taken by another financial
house (Barclay, Herring & Co.) at 86|. Then in due
course came the inevitable irregularities of payment,
reductions of interest, capitalisation of arrears, and
so forth. The same old bad debts were rearranged
and renamed. Somebody was paid for services, or,
in English-Chinese phrase, took " squeezes," but the
bondholders were paid by fits and starts and very ill
or were not paid at all. If the protecting shade of the
Monroe doctrine had not loomed in the Gulf of Mexico
the Republic would probably have been taken in hand
very much as Egypt was to be. But the Monroe
doctrine did stand in the way, and the sorrows of the
bondholders never got beyond the stage of being the

230 DIAZ
subject of diplomatic correspondence. If the holders
of the bonds lost their investments Mexico obtained
no good from the money. The fortunes accumulated
by Santa Ana and other politicians alone remained to
show where it had gone. As the anarchy grew worse
the ways of Mexican politicians grew more violent.
The culmination of the whole miserable story was the
forcible seizure in the British Embassy by Miramon
of a sum of money set aside for the payment of British
creditors. This was the last provocation which
stimulated the British Government to join with
France and Spain to enforce some attention to their
claims. The common action of the three was dissolved
when the designs of Napoleon III. were revealed. If
British creditors received any satisfaction it was
because they were able to intercept part of the loan
raised in France under the patronage of Napoleon III.
and forjthejbenefit of Maximilian.
When Juarez by virtue of the protection of the
United States issued victorious from the struggle in
1 867 he declared that all the Governments which had
recognised the archduke had thereby declared war on
the Republic. War dissolved all treaties and obliga
tions. He expelled foreign Ministers with the excep
tion of the representative of the United States. Little
by little and step by step relations were renewed. The
North German Confederation set the example in
1869, and when France resumed diplomatic intercourse
in 1880 the only Power which still sent Mexico " to
Coventry " was Great Britain. When it is remem
bered that during these years a British company com
pleted the Veracruz to Mexico Railway, and that
British men of business prospered in the country, it
would seem that the lack of a Minister did no harm.

AN INTERIM 231
The fact, of course, is that the more serious among
Mexican politicians were perfectly well aware that they
could not afford to offend the capitalists of the great
creditor nation, however high might be the tone they
allowed themselves to take with its Government,
from which they had nothing to fear thanks to the
protection of the Monroe doctrine.1 In spite of many
loud complaints of ill-usage and occasional injury by
common criminals, or officials who lose their heads
in fits of greed or rage, foreigners in general, and
British subjects in particular, suffer incomparably
less from the vices of Spanish-American government
than do the natives.
By the time that Gonzalez became President the
debt had rolled up in snowball fashion till it had,
what with original capital and arrears of interest
capitalised and further arrears of interest on what had
been capitalised, reached the figure of £18,383,761.
Though Mexico seemed to get on very well without
holding diplomatic relations with the British Govern
ment, and though British capitalists showed no
1 An incident which happened in another Spanish-American republic
may help to explain the comparative unimportance of Ministers and Consuls
to those British subjects who are in the service of great financial concerns.
An engineer in the employment of a British-made and managed railway
took upon himself to give first aid to a native " peon " whose leg had been
accidentally broken in a railway station. When the native doctor was
called in he asked indignantly wh.6 had dared to perform a surgical operation
to the detriment of his monopoly. When he was told, he caused the
engineer to be arrested. If the good Samaritan had had to wait for help
from Minister or Consul he would have waited a long time while the corre
spondence was following the proper course. Fortunately for him another
resource was used. The local manager telegraphed to headquarters. The
chief of the company in the province went to the governor. In a few minutes
the governor's secretary was on his way to the local station in a special train.
The company's representative had simply told the governor that its servants
must not be treated in this style. The officials were suspended and the
engineer was released. Nor did he hear any more about the matter, though
he had undeniably laid himself open to a fine for performing a surgical
operation without a diploma.

232 DIAZ
reluctance to risk money in the Republic, yet Presi
dent Gonzalez and his advisers could not but be aware
that Mexico could not go on for ever without regu
lating her relations with the great money market
of the world, and Great Britain was aware that she
could not keep Mexico " in Coventry " for ever. Of
course, the settlement of the debt dispute was to
be the preliminary to better relations in the future.
Approaches were made on both sides ; unofficial con
sular visits were made by Great Britain. Sir Spencer
St. John, a diplomatist who knew Spanish-America
well, came to Mexico to arrange for the resumption
of diplomatic intercourse. Don Ignacio Mariscal
came to England from Mexico on a similar mission.
Settlements were proposed, discussed, rejected, taken
up again. The main purpose of the Mexican Govern
ment was to consolidate the debt and raise more
money with which to carry on, and meet the first
coupons when they became due. By the final
arrangement, which was maintained by President
Diaz, Mexico was to contract a consolidated debt of
£17,200,000, of which £14,448,000 was to be acknow
ledged to the bondholders and £2,752,000 was to be
set aside for " expenses of conversion."
The President had probably made as good a settle
ment as was possible, but at the end of his Administra
tion when the transaction was completed he was so
unpopular that he was sure to be blamed for whatever
he did. The Mexican public said that they were being
burdened by a debt vastly in excess of any sum the
country had ever received. They did not consider
that the greater part of the sum represented interest
which Mexico had promised to pay and had not paid.
They accused the President of intending to steal the

AN INTERIM 233
£2,752,000, and they resented certain new taxes which
he had imposed with the consent of Congress to enable
the Government to meet its obligations. The last
days of his Administration were disturbed by riots,
and he left the burden to be taken up by his successor.
In all these matters Gonzalez had found confusion
provided for him to deal with. But in the matter of
the nickel currency, he made trouble for himself, and
bequeathed it to his successor. There was a lack of
small currency in Mexico. Something smaller than
the old gold and silver coins was needed. As the
country had its mints and abounded in metals,
nothing would appear to have been more simple than
to make the necessary small change at home. The
course taken was certain to arouse distrust. Nickel
coins were made in the United States and sent to
Mexico to be stamped. From the first there was a
pretty manifest suspicion that some swindle lay behind
the introduction of these coins. And it is not to be
denied that, whatever the intentions of the Govern
ment may have been, the nickels lent themselves to
swindle. They were divided into one, two, and five
cent pieces. The sizes were so ill-judged that it
would have paid dishonest officials well to melt down
the one and two cent pieces and recast them as five
cent pieces. No limit appears to have been fixed to
the amount for which these pieces of token money were
legal tender. The limit put on the total amount to
be struck, some £400,000 (about $4,000,000 Mexican
dollars), was believed to be a mere blind. It was
thought that vastly greater sums of nickel would be
issued. It followed that if a creditor or an employer
was free to pay debt or wages in these coins the
creditor or workman would find himself in possession

234 DIAZ
of nothing better than a handful of tokens of no
intrinsic value.
The nickels were rejected from the very beginning.
Stronger Governments than the Mexican have failed
in the attempt to force a distrusted currency on a
whole population. Peoples who will submit to
extreme degrees of religious and political oppression
have been known to revolt against this form of attack
on their pockets. However docile the bulk of the
Mexicans may be, they showed a disposition to take a
violent course against the nickels, and President
Gonzalez's Ministers thought it would be prudent in
them to try to insinuate these coins into circulation
by gentle methods. If there was no element of fraud
in the device they chose, their moral character can be
vindicated only at the expense of their intelligence.
They sold large quantities of these tokens to merchants
at discounts which in some cases went as high as
25 per cent. As the Government could not refuse to
take its own money in payment at the nominal value
without utterly destroying its credit, and as no limit
was put to the amount for which the nickels were legal
tender, the obvious result followed. The astute men
of business presented them in payment of customs
dues. The coins were soon back on the hands of the
Government after inflicting a loss on the revenue in
the course of their brief tour out and home. As for
the mass of the population, after a preliminary period
of protest and agitation it fairly broke into riotous
assembly. Even if the Government could have relied
on the soldiers it would have been beaten. But the
rank and file of the army were like to be as great
sufferers as any other class. There could be but one
end to such a conflict between any Government and

AN INTERIM 235
the instincts of human nature. The nickels were
howled down, and President Gonzalez had to go to
Congress with a request that it would help him to
withdraw them in some decent manner.
If Diaz had ever entertained a doubt whether his
locum tenens would keep to the understanding between
them he must have been reassured by the course of
events at the end of 1883 and throughout 1884.
Gonzalez had become so utterly unpopular that he
could not have broken the compact if he had tried
to play false. Nobody in the country had the least
interest in supporting him unless it were the capitalists,
and they had nothing to gain, but, on the contrary, a
great deal to lose, by helping him to launch on an
adventure which would soon have plunged the country
back into all the troubles of Lerdo's time. A Presi
dent of Mexico can do a great deal in the way of
imposing a dummy successor on the country, but not
when he has offended all the civil servants, when he
has no certainty of support from the army, and when
all the elements of the population are banded against
him. The fact that there was no general rising and
that no " Plans " were promulgated in any of the
States showed that the increase of employment due
to the introduction of foreign capital to be spent on
railways, harbour works, etc., was turning the atten
tion of the Mexicans to more profitable forms of
activity than " pronunciamientos." But the fact
that apart from,, a few street riots in the capital and
some towns the peace was kept is best explained by
the universal conviction that Diaz would soon be back
in the Presidency. Nobody appeared against him,
and when the election was held in September he
received 15,999 votes of a total of 16,462 delegates.

236 DIAZ
There is no reason to suppose that Gonzalez made any
attempt to prevent the return of Don Porfirio. He
was, it is true, accused of attempts to poison the
President-Elect, and also to kill him by engineering
an accident on the Irolo Railway, on which Diaz was
travelling. But these are the little vivacities of
Spanish - American political controversy. Nobody
believes such accusations, and least of all those who
make them. President Gonzalez retired to enjoy his
fortune in peace, and President Diaz took up the
reins in December, 1884, to hold them for twenty-
seven years.

CHAPTER IX
PRESIDENT FOR GOOD
There is no reason for breaking the narrative by
aay further accounts of Presidential elections in the
life of Don Porfirio Diaz. Elections there were in a
purely formal way. But everybody in Mexico knew
well that they meant nothing. First Congress
amended the law which forbade immediate re-elec
tions. Then it removed all restrictions. Then in 1904
it prolonged the President's term of office from four
to six years. No competitor appeared in any of the
elections so called of 1888, 1892, 1896, 1900, and 1904.
An opponent did come forward in 1910, but the end
was then at hand, and the story must be left till we
reach its date. It is enough to say here that for about
twenty-seven years he was by common consent, and,
to judge by appearances, to the satisfaction of all,
the master of Mexico. Francia, the Despot of
Paraguay, governed for nearly as long, and did in one
vay more than Don Porfirio, for he died in power, and
he founded a kind of dynasty. No other Spanish-
American tyrant has achieved as much as either of
them, and Francia had a far easier task than the
ruler of Mexico.
During those twenty-seven years, or rather during
twenty-six of them, Diaz was the Government of
Mexico. It was not because Congress approved that
he was re-elected and his term was not prolonged.
Congress approved because its master directed it to give

(238^

DIAZ

its approval. In other words, the Government of
Mexico was, in the technical sense of the word, " a
tyranny." A single man had taken to himself all the
powers of the State, and was not a whit the less tyrant
because he used them to the best of his ability and
with the help of the wisest advice he could obtain for
the general good. No great event, or succession of
events, divides these twenty-six years of rule into
periods. Their history cannot be told chronologically
— or at least nothing is gained, and some quite
unnecessary repetition is incurred, if we follow the
mere order of time. We have one single subject to
deal with — the manipulation of Mexico by President
Diaz. It may be divided under heads for purposes
of convenience and for its better understanding, but
it cannot be intelligently arranged by mere dates.
And the subject is the sincere effort of a strong-willed
and clear-headed man to cure a chronic anarchy, by
police repression, by the spread of mere school educa
tion, and by the development of material prosperity.
It will be interesting to see how far he succeeded.
The spectacle of a strong man resolutely engaged in
" getting things done " is always to be looked at
respectfully. But the political instruction of the
story, and even the true meaning of it, are to be
sought rather in the reasons for his failure. For, as
we now must confess, he did fail. He would not
have succeeded, even if he had died in possession of
power, as Francia did, and the anarchy had broken
out after his death. But it burst forth while he was
alive, and drove him into exile, from which he never
returned. After all he had done for Mexico he came
to the same end as some of the least sympathetic of
Spanish-American despots — Juan Manuel Rosas, for

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD (239)
instance. What, then, did he really do ? And was it
his fault that his work bore so little fruit ? The answer
to the second question can wait, and, indeed, cannot
be given till we have replied to the first.
We may begin by allowing that he did all that lay
within the power of a strong, resolute, and very
laborious man who commanded a sufficient armed force
to endow his country with all the material instruments
capable of being used to produce material prosperity.
It was a considerable feat, and well deserving to be
studied. But in the face of what we are forced to see
to-day one becomes a little impatient with the effusions
of writers who but a few years ago were assuring us
that because of the roads, railways, drainage, mining,
and new harbours which were already made or in
process of being made, because of a growing revenue,
and recurrent surpluses, a new heaven and a new
earth had been created in Mexico. The races who ran
their courses on the great central plain, in Oaxaca, or
Yucatan before the Spaniard came executed public
works, which may have been " strangely magnified "
by uncritical writers, but were none the less far from
contemptible when they are considered as the achieve
ments of peoples who had not the use of domesticated
animals, and were forced to work with stone and copper
tools, and yet they lie overgrown by tropical forest, or
crumbling amid the degraded descendants of the
peoples who had once the energy and ingenuity to
build them. The Spaniards constructed " obras de
romanos " while they ruled in " the Indies," but we
know how their colonial empire ended. And these
vanished Indian communities and their destroyers
did their great works by themselves. They were not
left in debt to foreigners when the work was done.

240 DIAZ
Mexico was so indebted. The work was done for her
by foreign skill and capital. Every mile of railway
represented an increase of the hold which the foreigner
had on her land and her resources. Everything, there
fore, is not said when we are asked to note that whereas
there were only 567 kilometres all told of railway
when Diaz became President, the mileage had risen
to 16,285 kilometres by 1906. We want to know what
she paid for this increase in her means of communica
tion and to what extent her people profited indivi
dually. We hear that the national revenue trebled
without any great increase in taxation, and that the
surpluses were frequent and large. In 1906 — 1907 the
surplus reached the remarkable figure of $29,209,481
out of a revenue of about $88,000,000. With these
figures alone before us we do not expect to find that
the national debt has increased in the same proportion.
And yet it has. The traveller who finds the streets
of Mexico city greatly improved, parks laid out, a
national opera-house built at great expense, sees the
proofs of increasing civilisation. But he sees them
only because he does not look below the surface, or
because he keeps entirely to a few towns. A national
opera-house in a very fine style of French architecture
has been built out of municipal funds in the city of
Sao Paolo in Brazil. When one of the authorities
was asked why so much money was spent on a theatre
when the people of the town have little liking for this
form of amusement, and rarely leave their houses at
night, he replied that the building would impress
foreigners with an idea of the opulence of SSo Paolo
and would in short be a good advertisement. If the
foreigner who is to be impressed goes for an hour's
drive out of the town he will find the population living

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 241
in huts of thin mud walls with but thatched roofs,
and in conditions which preclude not only comfort
but even common decency. There is not a little of
such civilisation as this in Spain and Portugal them
selves, and there is far more in Spanish and Portuguese
America. Whoever goes but a very short way out of
the towns goes centuries back in civilisation ; and he
goes from the outward appearance of opulence to a
reality of dire poverty. The prosperity which is shown
in public works, increases of revenue, French fashions,
and buildings in the towns does not seem to affect the
mass of the population in the least. Even a rise in
wages seems to do no good, for it is accompanied by,
or is the result of, a rise in prices.
In order to begin doing what it was given him to
do, President Diaz had to start his second term by
bringing the finances back into order, and to do that
he had to make what was in fact a confession of error.
He had swamped the revenue by granting subventions
to the contractors — foreigners all of them, even when
there was a Mexican figurehead to the enterprise.
General Gonzalez had met the difficulty, as we have
seen, by sacrificing his own employees and paying the
foreign capitalists. He may or may not have had
personal reasons for maintaining the national honour
at such a cost, but it is certain that he put the Mexican
Government on the road which must infallibly lead
to a renewal of revolts and anarchy. President Diaz
boldly reversed his predecessor's course and did not
shrink from making what was in fact a practical
confession of his own errors. He restored the salaries
of the civil servants, but with the abatements already
mentioned, which were for the moment put as high
as 25 per cent. The figure was lowered after a time

242 DIAZ
to 10. The means to do this act of bare justice were
found by suspending payment of the interest of a
floating debt, and by withdrawing the subventions
which he had promised to give when he was in office
before. This was, of course, neither more nor less than
a partial bankruptcy, but the drastic measure did not
hurt President Diaz in the estimate of the capitalists.
They must have known that the measure was neces
sary ; they had profited much already, and they
foresaw large advantages in the future if only the
peace could be kept. So long as the President did
provide Mexico with a working Government, capital
and labour between them could do the rest by drawing
vast quantities of marketable materials from the soil
of Mexico.
Industry asked for defence from mere violence while
it was engaged in obtaining and transporting the
material, and that the President did give. We have
seen how he had begun the work during his first term.
He had not then been able to do more than make a
good start, and there had been a fall from the standard
he then reached during the Administration of General
Gonzalez. Mexico was still a land of brigandage.
We who have never quite succeeded in putting a stop
to dacoity in India ought not to reproach the memory
of the Mexican Government of that time if it took
years to get the upper hand of the bandits. In a
thinly-inhabited country full of hiding-places, with a
very poor population who have no cause to fear the
robber, and can even sympathise with him, brigandage
is a very difficult pest to cure. It was particularly
hard to suppress in Mexico because the most valuble
part of the national produce was still bullion, the most
desirable form of portable property to the highway-

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 243
man. Until railways had been much developed, and
President Diaz had had time to extend the action of the
" rurales " to all parts of the Republic, the transport
of the gold and silver from the mines to the ports was
never quite safe. Indeed, it was not until the police
had been brought up to the level of their task that
the trains themselves were secure. They were occa
sionally stopped and robbed.
The bullion was carried to railway stations or ports
in convoys or caravans known as " conductas." This
word applied originally not to the " recuas " or strings
of mules which carried the booty in earlier days, or
the wagons which came to be used afterwards, but to
the armed guard sent with them as a protection.
Even an escort was not always enough in a country
where the brigands operated in bands which might
be numbered by the hundred and the roads ran through
mountain passes or through bush. The mine owners
adopted a device to improve their own chance of
escaping loss and to puzzle the bandits. They took
to sending the bullion in iron wagons which were heavy
to drag along, but were for that very reason trouble
some to carry off across country. They were elabo
rately barred and locked so as to be hard to open.
The calculation was that the brigands would be unable
either to carry them off or break into them before an
armed force could be brought up to recover the spoils.
When Mexicans were reproached with the little
security their country afforded to the honest trader
they were apt to reply that the care the Government
took to provide escorts was the best proof of its desire
to protect life and property. The desire was no doubt
sincere, but the execution was defective till President
Diaz's " rurales " were in full working order. But it

244 DIAZ
is allowed that by the close of his second term the
settled parts of Mexico had become safe. And this,
it must be confessed, was the condition antecedent
to every other kind of improvement.
It was also far easier than the task imposed by
ancient fiscal error on the Government of Mexico. A
valuable trade can be conducted without any measure
of Government protection where the traders can go
armed in bodies and defend themselves. The once-
flourishing trade of the prairies in the Santa Fe trail
owed nothing to the police either of the United States
or of Mexico. There was none, and the- traders who
carried their goods in the prairie wagons defended
them against wild Indians and robbers alike with their
rifles. But a bad system of taxation produces a
universal and pervasive evil, which can only be over
come, and that but partially, by another evil all but
as bad as itself, which is smuggling. There was
smuggling in Mexico, but mainly on the northern
frontier, and its operations did not extend southward
across the belt of desert which divides the north from
the centre of the Republic. The rest of the country
suffered from a system of taxation inherited from the
old Spanish colonial Government. It was of a nature
to be destructive to all industry. A ref orma tion which
should sweep it away and replace it by something
more rational was quite as necessary as either public
works or public security if Mexico was to reach the
level of prosperity attainable by its poeple. But it
was far more difficult to obtain. Any Mexican, official
or unofficial, who had average commonsense and was
an honest man, would see easily enough that without
facilities for transport there could be little or no trade,
and that without security for life and property there

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 245
could be no industry, or but little. It was equally
easy for him to see that roads and railways would
provide the facilities, and that a good constabulary
would establish the security. But when the matter to
be considered was the reform of an old-established
system of taxation, to which everybody was accus
tomed, and in the continuance of which many were
interested, there was no chance of the same unanimity
as in regard to such simple questions as roads and
police, and the remedy was likely to be hard to find.
There was no mere question of the suppression of a
recognised evil. One system of levying a contribu
tion from the pockets of the taxpayer was to be
replaced by another, and somebody was sure to be
afraid that the change would do him a damage.
There were indeed three classes of great influence in
Mexico who would certainly oppose any effective
reform. The problem was so continually prominent
during the whole Administration of President Diaz
that any account of his government in which it was
passed over would be most incomplete.
The substance of the whole question may be divided
under two heads. There were taxes in Mexico which
by their very nature were destructive of all industry,
and therefore could be properly dealt with only by total
abolition. There were taxes which, though reasonable
in themselves, were so unfairly apportioned that they
did about as much harm as the others, and failed to
produce an adequate revenue.
The tax-exacting devices which were so bad that
they could be amended only by abolitions were the
" alcabalas," the " portazgos," and the internal
customs barriers. All three had been imported from
Spain, where they had produced their full effect by

246 DIAZ
killing the nascent industry of the country, and
they had continued their destructive course in Mexico.
The first has always been quoted as the very perfection
of a thoroughly bad tax. It was an excise levied on
goods sold in the market or by public auction. In
spite of its Arabic name it was of Roman origin. Of
course it was not always equally heavy, nor levied
with equal severity. Mexicans got off more lightly
than the Spaniards of Old Spain. In the mother coun
try the alcabala (or alcavala) went as high as 14 per
cent, of the price of the goods at one time, and the
country was sensibly relieved when it was reduced to 6.
When in 1885, the first year of Don Porfirio's second
Administration, Congress voted the general alcabala
for all the Republic, it fixed the rate at " one half of
1 per cent, upon the value in excess of $20 of trans
actions of buying and selling of every kind of mer
chandise, whether in wholesale or retail, in whatever
place throughout the whole Republic." The same
impost was put on " all sales and resales of country or
city property ; upon all exchanges of movable or
immovable property ; on mortgages, transfers, or
gifts, collateral or bequeathed inheritances ; on bonds,
rents of farms, when the rent exceeds $20.00 annually,
and on all contracts with the Federal State, or
municipal Governments." One-half of 1 per cent, does
not sound like a heavy impost. But this was only
the Federal alcabala. The States and municipalities
levied others to provide their local revenue. Some
times they levied an ad valorem duty, sometimes they
imposed a fixed charge on the article. Whatever the
rule was the alcabala was a killing pest, because it
required for its collection a swarm of officials and an
endless fuss of inspection. Of course, it tended to

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 247
have the effect which, as Adam Smith pointed out,
was inseparable from such an impost. " Through the
greater part of a country in which a tax of this kind is
established nothing can be produced for distant sale.
The produce of every part of the country must be
proportioned to the consumption of the neighbour
hood." It is obvious that this must have been the
effect. The alcabala was levied on the ox when it was
sold to the cattle-dealer. Then again when the dealer
sold it to the butcher, on the hide when sold to the
tanner, on the tanned hide when sold to shoemaker or
saddler, and on the saddle when sold by the maker to
a tradesman, or by a tradesman to the customer. At
every step there was an inspection to be undergone,
forms to be filled, stamps to be fixed. No circulation
of goods was possible under such a perpetual down
pour of officialdom and taxation.
It is not enough to say that such a system of taxa
tion would ruin any industry. It could not be applied
in a country in which active industry existed without
producing universal rebellion. On the only occasion
on which an attempt was made to apply the alcabala
to an industrial community — when the Duke of Alva
tried to impose it on the Spanish Netherlands — it did
what political oppression and religious persecution had
failed to do — it united all the Netherlanders, Protestant
and Catholic, in one universal rebellion. The Duke,
arbitrary and brutal as he was, and his King, Philip II.,
who was as stiff-necked as the general, were forced to
withdraw. The " alcabala " could be levied in Spain
because there was little, and in most parts of the
country there was no, movement of trade. Each
district used up its own raw material, and the goods
passed direct from the handicraftsman to the pur-

248 DIAZ
chaser. In such an unindustrial state of a population
it is indeed difficult to see how the vast majority are
to be made to contribute to the revenue except in some
such way. A bad tax must be imposed because no
other would have any effect. If we need a proof we
can take the case of British India. Our salt tax is a
bad one, but it is only by the use of an impost of this
character that the huge majority of the inhabitants
can be made to bear a part of the taxation. But the
salt tax is a long way short of an alcabala. If, how
ever, we can see how this Spanish adaptation of the
Roman " Vectigal Rerum Venalium " came to be
fixed on Spain and its colonies, we are also forced to see
that when imposed it had an invincible tendency to
petrify the population in its stagnancy.1
The " portazgo " was another inheritance from
Rome. It was a charge imposed on all ships which
entered a Mexican port, and was paid for a licence to
trade. It was in proportion to the value of the goods
brought, but it did not release them from the obliga
tion to pay the alcabalas. The natural result was that
it tended, not only to limit commerce, but to prevent
the rise of a coasting trade. For instance, all goods
brought into Lower California across the Gulf from
Sonora or Sinaloa, or vice versa, paid the portazgo as
well as the alcabalas. If brought in by land from the
north, they only paid the alcabalas. So it actually
suited a Mexican trader better to bring in his goods
1 The alcabala was more like the Roman " vectigal," because in the
ancient world so large a part of the population lived as slaves or serfs on the
vast estates. Slave handicraftsmen worked up raw material supplied by
slave agriculturists and herdsmen. The community was self-sufficing.
The same conditions prevailed on the great landholdings in Mexico and in
some parts of Spain. And on that fact we may base an observation for
which many other supports could be produced. It is that no other country
has inherited so much directly from the Roman Empire, and has so carefully
preserved what it inherited, as Spain.

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 249
from the United States across the border than to
buy from his own countrymen. The portazgos were
more limited in their incidence than the alcabalas,
but within their scope they were quite as fatal.
The internal customs barriers are not so strange to
us as the alcabalas. We, in fact, had one till Lord
Randolph Churchill swept it away — the shilling a ton
tax on coal imported into London. If few noticed it
while it lasted, or now remember its obscure existence,
most of us knew the French " octroi," and many of
us have heard of the Spanish " consumos." They are
municipal impost duties levied on whatever is to be
eaten, drunk, worn, or burnt within the town.1 But
these municipal dues were not all. There were cus
toms barriers between province and province. There
were in France under the monarchy, and in Spain till
recent times. They survived in Mexico, and in spite
of all attempts at reform they go on because the local
authorities must have a revenue, and also because a
part of the money is taken for account of the central
Government. A piece of goods imported across the
1 As an instance of how the " consumo " works I give this experience of
my own. Some years ago an English merchant in Madrid sold a huge
steam threshing machine to a landowner in Granada. It had been exhibited
at an agricultural show. In order to move it across Madrid from one
railway station to another the merchant had to hire a team of oxen — twelve
in all. Now oxen when introduced into Madrid for the meat market are
subject to " consumos." This team was not to be slaughtered, for it was
brought in from the country outside to drag the weight. But the story of
the machine and the transport across Madrid might be a fraud. So the
town council insisted on the deposit of the consumo as a guarantee of good
faith. The sum of 1,000 pesetas, say £40, was paid on the understanding
that it was to be refunded so soon as the draught cattle had gone out again.
Here was a ceremony not tending to the facilitation of business. But this
was not all. The town council liked to show the best possible revenue ;
so it was very punctual in insisting on the deposit of the money, which went
duly down on the receipt side of the balance. But for the same reason it
put off the repayment as long as it possibly could. The merchant had to
" hacer antesala " (dance attendance in ante-rooms) for some time before
his deposit was refunded ; and was lucky if he had not to oil the wheels of
the official machinery with palm oil.

250 DIAZ
frontier or at a seaport would be taxed over and over
again before it could reach the customer. No wonder
if an article priced at $30 on the frontier costs $100
when sold to the customer in an inland city. Sydney
Smith's famous joke on the British taxation of his
day was an under-statement of the Mexican fiscal
system. There was hardly a transaction of daily life
which had not its corresponding tax — not even a
marriage, a christening, a dance, or a funeral. To
make all safe the tariff of a Mexican town might, and
at least in some cases did, contain such a clause as
this : " All articles which are not contained in the
present tariff remain subject to the pleasure of the
authorities of the city of Guerrero to levy upon them
a contribution which they think right and just."
We are by no means at the end yet. A licence was
required for the practise of any trade. In a country
in which the journeyman workman rarely earned
more than 20 or 25 cents for his day's work he had to
pay a monthly poll tax of 12 cents. This was the old
Spanish " pecho," or breast tax, levied on all who were
not " noble." It was just the " karrach," or tribute
levied by the Arabs on all Christians. The only
difference was that whereas they took it from the
unbeliever the Christian States took it from the trades
men and the poor and exempted the gentry.
And with that detail we come to what was not the
least destructive, and still less the least unjust,
feature of the Mexican fiscal system. It has been
noted already that the landowning class in Mexico
claimed to reproduce the " brazo militar " of the
mother country — that is to say, the nobles who
were exempt from personal taxes, and to an extent
variously fixed by custom or royal privileges from

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 251
the " alcabalas." The Church was of course equally
favoured. Now it is calculated that the whole of the
land of Mexico was held by about 6,000 persons. This
figure does not include the Indian communities,
which in out-of-the-way places went on living their
old communal life, tilling their bits of ground and
dividing the produce according to rules older than the
Spanish conquest. But it did cover by far the greater
part of the country. These masters of the land were
able to defeat the humane Laws of the Indies to a
great extent. They would combine to protect their
own profits if for no other purpose. The King's laws,
as a favourite phrase of theirs had it, were to be
" obedecidas y no cumplidas " — obeyed, but not
carried out. They went on the statute-book, and they
went no farther. The same power which enabled
them to render the laws meant to protect the Indians
of little effect was used to save themselves from
taxation. The secularisation of the Church lands
made no difference. The plundered property passed
into the hands, of intriguers, who got it for nothing,
or purchasers who paid derisive sums, and they con
tinued to escape taxation. There were land taxes,
but they were low and were dishonestly assessed.
Land not in actual cultivation — of which there was
much in the vast Mexican estates — escaped taxation
altogether, even though it was appreciating in value.
There are no countries in the world in which a smart
undeveloped land tax is more urgently called for than
in the former colonies of Spain and Portugal in
America. More might be said without exhausting the subject,
but we have already seen enough to enable us to under
stand why the mere construction of railways or the

252 DIAZ
improvements of ports might fail altogether to better
the condition of the mass of the population of Mexico.
They enabled mine owners to gain easier access to the
metal and carry it to the ships for export. They
enabled the merchant who imported such goods as
the richer classes could afford to buy to bring their
imports more rapidly, and also more cheaply, to the
small market open to them. But while alcabalas
continued to be levied on the scale defined by Congress
in 1885, and customs barriers stood round every State
and every town, the mass of the population would be
never a jot the better save for such day's wage as they
could earn in the capacity of mere labourers. This
was a temporary gain. For the rest the very large
majority of Indians and the mestizos would go on as
before — dressing in goat-skins warranted to last for
years, the roughest of cotton shirts, blankets woven
by their women folk, and wearing sandals made of a
sole of leather and tied on by thongs which they
fixed themselves. The revenue grew by and for the
capitalist. The people could not buy nor sell without
bringing a flight of tax-collecting vampires down on
them. Their small balance of money went mainly in
the pulque shop. No wonder if Mexico possessed in
the " Leperos " one of the very worst vagabond
populations in all the world.1 A wailing song went
about in Mexico at the very end of Don Porfirio's
rule. " The negro of Cuba," so it said, " is free and
lives by his day's pay. Only the Mexican Indian
eats little and lives ill. He lives in a poor hutch.
1 The similarity of the word Lepero (to leper) must not deceive the
reader. A leper in Spanish is " leproso," or popularly " gafo." " Lepero "
is a word of uncertain origin, and is supposed to be an adaptation of an
Indian word. Lepers there are in Mexico, but they are usually known as
" pintados " (painted or blotched).

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 253
They pay him with aguardiente, to make an end
of his race. All the world knows it, my heart ; all
the world knows it." It is " a doleful song " —
" steaming up a lamentation and an ancient tale of
wrong." x
There was a clear understanding in Mexico of the
evil consequences of the fiscal system. A conference
on the subject had been held in the capital during the
Administration of General Gonzalez. The delegates
were competent judges, and, as the Spaniards would
say, " they talked pearls." One and all agreed that
while the alcabalas and the internal customs barriers
remained in existence the country was doomed to
beggary. But they were equally unanimous in
declining to propose a remedy. They said, and with
truth, that, whatever the vices of these barbarous
old methods of taxation might be, they provided the
only means by which the States and municipalities
could raise a revenue, and they were the sources of a
good part of the receipts of the Federal Government.
This was the vicious circle in which the Government
was confined. The taxes kept the country stagnant
and poor, but abolition would render all administra
tion impossible. It would for one thing entail the
disbanding of the army, and that, of course, meant
anarchy. There were, no doubt, men in Mexico who
1 I add the Spanish. Even a reader who does not know the language,
but will give the vowels the broad sound, will be able to catch the " doleful "
lilt of the lines : — " El negro de Cuba es libre
Y vive de sa jornal.
Solo el Indio Mexicano
Come poco y vive mal
Vive en un pobre jacal.
Le pagan con aguardiente,
Pa que la raza se acabe,
Lo sabe toda la gente mi vida,
Toda la gente lo sabe."

254 DIAZ
were quite well aware that the remedy was to impose a
just land tax and house tax and income tax ; to take
the alcabala off everything else and quadruple it on
pulque ; to lower the outrageous import duties
imposed on manufactured goods for the benefit of a
handful of mills which produced bad cotton shirts to
be sold at a high price. But to do all this implied a
land valuation, a huge amount of work, and the
command of time. It implied something more —
namely, that reform would deeply offend the caciques
who controlled the Governments of the States and
the municipalities, as well as the swarms of officials
who lived on tax-collecting — and bribes for not collect
ing — together with the owners of houses and land who
had hitherto contrived to escape taxation nearly if
not altogether. This last class might be politically
useless — and indeed had proved that it was — but
under the Republic, as under the old Spanish
monarchy, it could act to defend its pocket. It
could, as it often had done, pay for a pronunciamiento.
That this was no imaginary peril is proved by one
single fact. When, after many years, there came a
revolt against the " autocracy of General Diaz,"
the immediate cause of the rising was that a
certain family in Northern Mexico, whose members
owned among them 20,000,000 acres of land, spent
£250,000 in financing the outbreak. In the end
they brought murder on some of themselves, but
in the interval they had plunged Mexico back into
anarchy. This was, if a threadbare image may be used again
just for once, the Augean stable which President Diaz
had to clean if Mexico was to attain to its possible
level of prosperity. The attempt was made and

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 255
persevered in, but, it is to be feared, with something
far short of complete success. Accurate information
of what was really done is hard to obtain. Nothing,
indeed, is easier than to find from " The Authentic
History " of Sefior Ricardo Rodrigues, or the life of
the President by Sefior Jose F. Godoy, that the
abolition of the alcabalas was the constant care of the
Government, and that steady progress was made in
the good work. But it is to be remembered that
neither of these books makes as much as a pretence to
being critical or complete. The first is a collection of
the President's speeches to Congress published when
he was standing for his prolonged period in 1904.
The second is an electioneering pamphlet published in
New York in 1910, when he was standing for the last
time, and was addressed rather to the American than
to the Mexican public. The Federal Government
might renounce the alcabala so soon as the growth of
the national customs allowed, but that the different
States dispensed with the old familiar method of
obtaining money is not proved. The fact, no doubt,
is that they continued to be levied within the different
States, or at any rate some of them, and to produce
all their old bad effects. The inter-State customs
barriers were certainly not wholly swept away, and
if they have not reappeared during the recent troubles
the conduct of the adventurers and caciques who
have been tearing the poor country to shreds has
been contrary to nature. ..,
Finance would in any case be likely to be the weak
side of a Spanish or Spanish-American Government.
Nothing in the training of Don Porfirio was calculated
to turn his thoughts in that direction. He con
fessedly managed the funds he raised in the South

256 DIAZ
during the French intervention with probity and
success ; but that was a simple business. The mer
chant shipper of the old times carried a bag with him
to sea. He put into it what he received for freights
and took out of it what he had to spend for the expenses
of the voyage. What remained was the profit. A
partisan leader could do as much, but to understand
the principles of good taxation was another and a
more complicated matter. The Spanish mind does
not turn readily to the study of finance. It was
possible for the President to find a good Home
Secretary in Sefior Rubio, his father-in-law, and a
good Minister for Foreign Affairs in Sefior Mariscal.
But it does not appear that he had a good financial
adviser at his elbow till he found one in Sefior Liman-
tour, the son of a French man of business, born in
Mexico, but not naturalised till he was twenty years
old. In spite of all obstructions, the mere mainten
ance of peace, even with an accompaniment of local
disorders in the States — which, let it be noted once
more lest we forget, never ceased entirely — the making
of railways and so forth, the development of mines,
and some improvement in agriculture, produced
greater well-being in some classes and a growing
revenue. The world thought that Mexico was on the
way to an industrial development which would bring
prosperity and orderly habits with them ; and con
tinued to believe so till the crash came.1
1 I am conscious that much is lacking here for a full account of Mexico's
financial and industrial position, but can only say that the real truth is not
to be obtained. Travellers who have been in Mexico since 191 1 have found
signs of prosperity, and have been told that times of trouble are not so bad,
because in peace so much was taken away to be spent out of the country
which now remains at home. Does this mean anything except that Mexico,
being a debtor nation, had to export in peace to pay its debts, whereas in
time of trouble it repudiates and keeps the things for which it went into debt i
That gives an air of prosperity for a time.

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 257
Yet while we recognise, as we must, that much in the
work done by President Diaz was transient and super
ficial, it would be most unfair to deny that, even so,
his achievement was honourable. In no other Spanish-
American State has a ruler been able to increase the
revenue by the growth of industry and to secure a
succession of real surpluses. In 1896, and for the first
time in its history, Mexico could show a revenue of
$50,000,000 and an expenditure of $45,000,000. The
surplus made it possible for the President to relieve
hii officials from the heavy deductions made from
their salaries. The revenue continued to increase till
it reached $101,385,000 in the financial year 1908 —
1909. In the year 1906 — 1907 the surplus had been
$29,209,481. During this period his treasury had
had to contend with difficulties which affected all
Governments but were peculiarly severe for Mexico.
The depreciation in the value of silver hit a country
which still retained the white metal as its standard,
and allowed free coinage, very hard. Its currency
was discredited, and the chief of Mexican exports fell
in value. Silver had been freely coined in the eleven
private mints which farmed the privilege of coining
money from the State. The coins were an article of
export brought by other nations for use in the Chinese
trade. This flood of money which was depreciating
rapidly threatened to make the exchange ruinous for
Mexico. The Republic was steered through the crisis
partly by stopping the mints, and partly by the adop
tion of the gold standard in 1902. It does not in the
least detract from the credit due to President Diaz
that the actual manager of these financial operations
was the Franco-Mexican Sefior Jose Limantour. * An '
admiral or general who sees the wisdom of some

258 DIAZ
suggestion made by a subordinate and acts on it is
entitled to all the credit of whatever measure of success
it may achieve. It is to his credit that he sees the
wisdom of the advice, and it is by his authority that
the right thing is done. To him belongs the honour of
turning what was but an idea and mere words into a
profitable act. The chief in war or peace who will
not take advantage of the capacity of his subordinates,
lest he should be supposed to be influenced by them,
makes an exhibition of gander vanity ; and moreover
he is not doing his best to fulfil his duty. Now it has
always been a great fault of the Spanish character that
it has lacked the capacity to see and give free play to
the capacity- of subordinates. The " mandon " will
do everything himself, and will do nothing that may
appear to come from another lest his dignity should
suffer. The type of this too prevalent Spanish
littleness is the immortal Don Gregorio de la Cuesta,
who hampered Wellington during the Talavera cam
paign. He refused to move his army at the English
General's suggestion for fear that his soldiers should be
led to doubt his wisdom when they saw him act by
advice. In a very brief space he was ignominiously
bundled out of the position he had refused to leave
when he might have moved freely. There was nothing
of Don Gregorio in President Diaz. He never gave a
better proof of his fitness to rule than when he detected
and utilised the financial capacity of Sefior Limantour.
Critics who were enlightened by the course of events
after 1910 have blamed Don Porfirio on the ground
that the surpluses shown by the revenue in the last
years of his Administration were largely gained by
making dangerous reductions in the army. But it is
more than doubtful whether the evils which followed

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 259
the revolt financed by Madero in 19 10 could have
been averted by the maintenance of a larger army.
What if the army did as it had often done before in
Mexican history — what if it divided against itself ?
The smaller army did so divide, and a larger would
probably have behaved in just the same way. A
tendency to disorder and a lack of national sentiment
are bred in the bone of all Mexico, of which the army
is but a part, and will out in the flesh. This sup
position that a stronger army would have kept the
peace. for ever is but a mere guess.
It is, on the other hand, a fact that such measures
as the purchase by the State of railways and the
drainage of the Mexico valley represented in different
degrees lasting gains. By every purchase of a railway
the country did to some extent free itself from tribute
to the foreign capitalist. It was far too poor to free
itself entirely. These transactions appeared to give
promise that the days when Mexico was looked upon
as a species of booty, and when it granted concessions
wholesale in order to attract foreign capital, and in
many cases to speculators of very indifferent character,
might be passing away. The purchase of the Vera
cruz-Pacific line in 1904 was a case in point. This line,
which must not be confused with the Veracruz-Mexico,
was built by an American company. The builders
got into difficulties and suspended payments in 1903.
As the fine started from Cordoba, on the Veracruz-
Mexico route, and ran south to the railway across the
isthmus of Tehuantepec, it was of importance to the
Government for the purpose of maintaining communi
cations with and its hold over Oaxaca. And then it
provided a connection between the Gulf and the
Pacific. A certain element of politics or of self-

260 DIAZ
defence supplied a motive for the measures which the
Mexican Government took to acquire control of the
Central and the National lines. Both were built by
American capital, and they connected Central Mexico
with the United States. The first crosses the frontier
at El Paso del Norte on the Rio Grande and reaches
the capital by the great plain. The National enters
the Republic at Laredo in Texas and runs to the capital.
It was completed as a narrow-gauge line in 1888 and
widened by 1903. In this case the Government of
President Diaz acquired a commanding interest and
the control of the lines in order to protect itself against
possible dictation on the part of American capitalists.
Of course the chance that such measures as these
would prove of lasting benefit to the country depended
on how far it could continue to possess an honest and
businesslike Government.
The drainage of the valley was a gain pure and simple
if only because it resulted in an immense saving of
life. The actual work could be adequately described
only by an engineer, or by one not ignorant of the
engineer's art. Yet without that skill we can all of
us look at a mechanical achievement of this order from
the point of those for whom it is done. The valley of
Mexico is a great bowl of which the rim is formed by
mountains. The water drains from the mountains
into the valley and has no natural exit. When the
Spaniards entered " The Valley," as they called it, par
excellence, the soil was still largely covered by forests
which held the water and delayed evaporation. The
Aztec " pueblo " Tenochtitlan, on the site of which
the city of Mexico now stands, was surrounded by
what the Spaniards called a lake, but what appears to
have been in reality a very watery swamp, which after

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 261
a rainy season and the melting of snows was entirely
covered, and became navigable by vessels of shallow
draught. Within a few generations of the conquest
the Spanish hatred of trees which has desolated large
parts of their own country had begun to produce its
effects in " The Valley." The forests began to go,
the balance of water, and of wood to absorb and hold
the water, was upset. Being no longer confined as it
had been, the drainage from the hills flowed more
rapidly where the slopes gave it free way. The position
of the lasting deposits, of the waters which drained
from the hills shifted. The alternations between the
lowest and the highest levels of the lakes became more
violent. The city came to stand not in, but on the
side of, its lake, which was the lowest of the three in
the valley. So it was increasingly menaced at the
times of high floods. Apart from this chronic peril,
the city, because of its position, was subjected to
another and perhaps a worse evil.
It stood almost on the level of the lake into which
it was drained. The sewers had a very slight fall.
Therefore the refuse was not carried well clear.
What was borne away went to fill up the lake and
create a further obstruction for the drains. At last
the city stood on a vast network of cesspools. Only
the extreme dryness of the climate, due to the height
of the valley above the sea, preserved the population
from being wholly destroyed by disease. It escaped
this fate because refuse when exposed to the air dries
hard. Even so the death-rate rose to sixty in the
thousand, or more than twice the figure of Bombay.
The Spaniards are not a provident people. If they
had been more in the habit of looking ahead carefully,
Hernan Cortes, who was one of the wisest of them,

262 DIAZ
would not have allowed himself to be tempted to
found his city on the site of the Aztec " pueblo." He
would have chosen a higher position, of which he could
have found many and good in " The Valley." Pride
and a wish to plant his foot on the very neck of the
conquered pagan misled him. By his decision the
city which was for long the greatest in the New World
was doomed to perpetual danger and disease. In the
first times of the seventeenth century the necessity
for taking precautions had become so pressing that the
task was taken in hand. But it was not taken in the
right way. Dams were built round the city to keep
out the floods, and of course they blocked the exit of
the drainage. A great attempt to provide an outlet
for the overflow of " The Valley " waters — a true
" obra de los Romanos " — was promoted by the
viceroys. It was the huge cutting of Nochistongo.
The cutting is used by the Central Railway, but it
never served the purpose it was meant for. The
viceroy's Dutch engineer Maartens, who transliterated
his name to Martinez, misjudged his problem. The
work was done in the too common Spanish way — by
spasms of feverish activity under the stimulus of recent
disaster, alternating with long intervals of neglect.
Multitudes of Indians perished by forced labour and
bad management, and " The Valley " was not drained.
The Republic and Maximilian's Government found
the problem still to be solved. Plans were made,
foreign engineers were called in, but resources were
lacking. They were not available till after President
Diaz had been firmly seated in 1884; and then
twenty years passed before the outlet which now
drains " The Valley " to the north and into the bed
of the Tula river, which reaches the sea at Tampico,

PRESIDENT FOR GOOD 263
was completed. The work was at first entrusted to a
British firm, and when the enormous cost of keeping
their works clear of water as they went on compelled
them to withdraw, it was completed as a State under
taking at an expense of $9,000,000. A canal 35 kilo
metres long running from the north of the city carries
the water to a tunnel of ten kilometres which opens on
the valley of Tequixquiac. It was a great date in the
modern history of Mexico when President Diaz in
1903 broke through the last screen of rock with a
pick and could say that after more than 180 years of
labour, error, and delay the work was done. Even
then a price had to be paid for the original mistake of
the Conquistador. When during the Administration
of President Lerdo or of President Juarez an American
firm of engineers was consulted, they doubted whether
the drainage could be carried out at all, and they added
that if it ever were the withdrawal of so much water
from the soil would probably bring the city of Mexico
down in ruins through the shrinking of the ground
and the settling of the foundations. Their fears and
doubts were excessive ; but the soil has shrunk and
the foundations have settled, so that much of the
city is out of the perpendicular.
Finance is confessedly of vital importance for all
nations at all times, but in telling the life of statesmen
and rulers of the nineteenth century it is not often
necessary to dwell on their patronage of public works.
In the great settled States of the modern world it is no
more necessary to insist on their merits in that way
than on their achievements in the slaughter of savage
monsters. Yet there was a time when the leader of
men had need to be a mighty hunter before the Lord,
because superiority had to be established over the

264 DIAZ
wild beasts which contended with the human animal
for the dominion of the earth. A ruler of Mexico was
first bound to see that his country was provided with
the instruments of industry, which in a settled,
prosperous State are the products of the normal
activity of the community. When Carlyle was writing
his admirable essay on the Despot of Paraguay,
Francia, he rebuked one of his authorities who had
laughed at the South American " Perpetual Dictator "
for publicly using a theodolite in the streets of
Asuncion. " O Robertson," he asks, " if there was
no other man who could observe with a theodolite ? "
President Diaz was better helped than Rodriguez
Francia, but in the main his position in an anarchical
Spanish-American community was the same. He had
to stand over everything and see the work done. His
enemies have asserted that his merits in the matter
were small, for the needful roads, railways, harbours,
and drainage would have been without him. How
do they know ? The palpable fact is that through
him they were done — and the rest is guesswork.

CHAPTER X

THE INDIAN PROBLEM

To have brought the finances into good order, and
to have provided the Republic with the means of
attaining to the level of prosperity at which a recur
rence of the old disorders would be intolerable, was
much. But it was far from being enough to secure
the future of Mexico. What remained to be done was
to inspire the whole population with an understanding
of the value of order, and a desire for prosperity. A
strong ruler who could rely on the army could do the
first. But no strength of personal character, and no
mihtary force, could do the second by themselves.
They required the co-operation of the people who were
to be governed. And in Mexico that co-operation
was lacking, not altogether, but very largely. Sefior
Limantour is reported to have said that the great
obstacle in the way of the development of the pro
sperity of Mexico has been that a bare 20 per cent, of
the Mexicans care for those material advantages which
are desired by more developed or more ambitious
races. And this is what is meant here by the Indian
Problem. The name does not imply, and is not meant
to imply, that 80 per cent, of the population of Mexico
is of pure Indian blood. Whatever the proportion
may be (and the facts are very ill known), it is not so
high as that. But a large number of the mestizos are
far more Indian than white, not only in blood, but in
ways of thinking and of life. They are part of the
Indian problem, and that is just this : " How are you

266 DIAZ
to persuade men, who do not value what civilised
Europeans or citizens of the United States consider
as indispensable things, to work in order to gain them
as the European will, and to desire what he desires ? "
If they cannot be persuaded, how are they to be
forced ? For if Mexico is to become orderly and
industrial they must needs be brought to give their
aid. They are the rank and file of the whole industrial
army, and without their co-operation nothing per
manent, nothing which will raise the whole body of
the population, can be done. It is hard for us to
realise that there are peoples who would not value the
things we value if only they had the chance of knowing
them, and yet it is true. We must not suppose that
because an Indian here and there might rise as Juarez
did, or as a few had done in the Church under colonial
rule, the whole of them had any desire to change their
way of living. The contrary was the case. Neither
are we to suppose that because they were unhappy and
believed themselves to be oppressed (as they did) they
wished to enjoy the kind of existence acceptable to
prosperous white men. Their grievance was that they
were not allowed to live in their own ways. Of these
there were two — the way of the wild Indian, who was
a hunter and a raider ; the way of the tame Indian,
who would, if he could, have lived a communal life
in his traditional style. Until this great and torpid
obstruction to a healthy national life is removed,
Mexico will not only not be entitled to take a place
among civilised States, but it will not even be the home
of a real nation.
If President Diaz made no attempt to conquer this
hostile condition to his country's true welfare he must
stand condemned as a statesman. A mere interval of

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 267
internal peace maintained by a vigorous police is a
good for so long as it lasts. But it may go and leave
nothing behind it. A statesman is a ruler who does
leave something done for ever, and something not
merely material, not only roads or bricks and mortar.
If all Diaz was able to achieve were measures of violence
which intensified old evils and perpetuated old and
cruel injustices, then he stands ill as a statesman and as
a man. Now it is a fact which his biographer is bound
to face that Diaz has been accused both of failing to
try to improve the lot, and with it the character, of
this vast Indian population of Mexico, and of acts
which intensified injustice and cruelty. The floods
of praise, often fulsome in tone, poured out by his
admirers, official and voluntary, have had a counter
part of invective. The tone of these hostile judges does
not indeed inspire full confidence. They are too much
addicted to mere shrieks of invective, and they show
absolute credulity in accepting every tale of cruelty
or corruption they may have heard. Their rule of
criticism is too often no more than this, that whatever
is said to the credit of Don Porfirio is a proof of the
sycophancy or the self-seeking of the witness. What
ever is said in the way of abuse is to be accepted with
confidence because it is hostile. Yet there are certain
facts which are not to be denied. The plantations of
Yucatan cannot be hidden, nor can the fate of the
Yaquis. If they are what we are told, and if President
Diaz was responsible for perpetuating the first and
for bringing about the second, a very great deduction
must be made from the measure of praise which ardent
admirers have considered his due. Such things could
not stand alone. Exceptions of that kind are not
heard of in countries where a Government hates

268 DIAZ
iniquity. They stand out because they are extreme
examples of a prevailing condition.
A few sentences must be enough to deal with the
case of the true wild Indians. They did not constitute
a serious difficulty except on the northern frontier,
where they were represented by the Apache race in all
its many subdivisions. Good kind-hearted people are
apt to be shocked when they hear it said that there
is nothing to be done with such human beings as these
cruel red men were but to suppress them. And yet it
is the unhappy truth. They were our fellow-men,
and they were what they were because they had been
produced by very ancient conditions. But these same
ancient conditions had so fixed them that they had
lost the power to change. In the great human family
they represented those individuals who are to be
found everywhere who are born callous and greedy
and incapable of recognising their obligations to others.
Every society has to suppress them, if not by the
swift process of capital punishment, then by segregat
ing them and leaving them to die slowly within four
walls. It was not the case with these untamable
Apaches that they could not but be what they were.
In the country over which they roamed to plunder and
murder there were kindred red men who built
" pueblos," tilled the soil, and used arms only to
defend themselves against the Apaches. For genera
tions the province of Sonora was protected against
them by the valour of the Opatas, who were " pueblo "
Indians. The people of the pueblos learnt something
from the white men, even if it were only to breed cattle.
They listened to the priest, and if all they learnt from
him was superstition the fault was not wholly theirs.
The Apache took nothing but what must needs be

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 269
used for evil. All the subdivisions of the race were
not equally malignant, but as a rule the Apache took
only what would increase his powers to kill. If he
learnt to use the horse, that was because he employed
it to raid farther and faster. If he acquired any
manufactured article, it was one that would serve for
war. When, therefore, at the beginning of his second
Administration President Diaz did enter into co
operation with the United States troops to suppress
the Apaches by downright killing, or by confining
them to reservations where they withered in pauperism
and hopeless competition with the industrial supe
riority of the white man, he was only discharging
the elementary duty of a ruler.
The case of the Apaches along the northern frontier
was a very simple one. But there were other wild
Indians whose case was nowise simple. The long
anarchy which began in 18 10 had completed the
destruction of those ecclesiastical missions — Jesuit
and Franciscan — which had honestly, for some
generations, done their best for the Indians. The
best they could think of was to keep them in a state
of perpetual childhood because they were not gente de
razon, not rational creatures, and because " of such is
the Kingdom of Heaven." Even before the suppres
sion of the Jesuits the missions had, in the judgment
of their critics, somewhat declined from their first
standard. By the constant inculcation of childish
ness they had themselves become childish After
the suppression the missions declined still further
under the rule of the Franciscans. The revolution
ruined them, and in the frightful confusion which
ensued their flocks reverted to savagery of a vagabond
order. How to bring them back to a settled life was

270 DIAZ
the great question which pressed on the honour and
the conscience of the rulers of Mexico. They were
scattered about in many parts of the Republic, but
mainly in the northern regions. The painful facts are
that for long nothing was done, and that very little
has been done to this day. The remedy which suggests
itself as the best available would have been to collect
them, or entice them to collect, in conditions which
as nearly as might be would represent the kind of
orderly life they understood — that of the " pueblo "
Indians. But if that was to be done those " pueblo "
Indians who still survived in a fair state of order and
prosperity must be justly treated. The treatment
they received is but too fairly represented by the story
of the Yaquis. As it is typical, and as it touches the
reputation of President Diaz very closely, the tale
must be told at some length. Writers who made it
their business to praise everything the President did
without stint have spoken of these Indians as blood
thirsty savages. Let us look at the facts.
This Indian people came first in contact with the
Spaniards in 1533. Cortes was still in the country
and was sinking a large part of his great fortune in
voyages of exploration to the north-west in search of
the passage which, as he believed, must exist between
the Atlantic and the North Pacific. Some of his
rivals were engaged in the same work. One of them,
Nufio de Guzman, pushed up by land through Sonora
in search partly of the passage, partly of gold mines.
The first Eldorado of the Spaniards was in " Quivira,"
a fantastic kingdom placed by imagination in the
modern Arizona or in New Mexico.1 In the course of
1 The Quivira which did come into existence was a later Spanish settle
ment in New Mexico.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 271
his advance he crossed two rivers which run from the
Sierra Madre to the Gulf of California — the Moyo and,
north of it, the Yaqui. Two peoples known to the
Spaniards by the names of these rivers occupied their
valleys. They were settled people who lived in
pueblos and raised crops, and they were kindred.
The Yaquis were the most numerous of the two.
They offered a stout opposition, and, though defeated
by the better arms of the invaders, they inspired the
Spaniards with a certain measure of respect. The
two came to terms. The Spaniards acknowledged
the Yaquis as the owners of the valley. The Yaquis
accepted a priest and a mission. Throughout the
whole colonial period they lived on tolerable terms
with the Spanish rule, though not without an occa
sional brush. The cause of conflict was always the
same. The Yaquis resented the intrusion of white
prospectors for mines and other intruders into their
land. When provoked by these aggressions, they
fought, and on the whole with success. They ended
by falling out with the missions, but only when the
missionaries became too grasping. When the colony
became independent they took all they heard about the
rights of man and equality and so forth as being really
meant. They soon discovered that the Mexican
Republicans did not consider that those fine principles
applied to " pueblo " Indians, and they found that
they were assailed by new aggressions on their valley.
So they defended themselves, as before, under a
leader known as " Bandera " because he carried about
a banner with a picture of the Virgin on it, which he
had taken from a church and which, he said, had
belonged to Montezuma. At this time (1825 — 1828)
the Yaquis were seen by our countryman, Lieutenant

272 DIAZ
R. W. H. Hardy, R.N., a gentleman who had taken
part in the conquest of Java and in the expedition to
New Orleans, and who in the times of peace and no
employment was prospecting for pearls in the Gulf of
California. And this is his judgment on them : " The
Yaqui nation is spread over every part of the province.
They are miners, gold-diggers, pearl-divers, agri
culturists, and artisans ; and in the arts of peace,
by far the most industrious and useful of all the
other tribes in Sonora." Other witnesses bear out
Lieutenant Hardy. They note that the Yaquis
succeeded in cattle-breeding, and that they came in
numbers to plant and take in the harvest in parts of
Sonora occupied by white settlers. When they had
earned their money they went back to the valley
which, by right of occupation dating back for cen
turies and by the written records of Spanish colonial
authorities and Mexican Republicans, was theirs.
We need not picture the Yaquis as mild children of
poetry and nature. They could fight hard for their
rights and, like other fighters, could strike from
passion. If some were stout-hearted, some, in the
fallen state of human nature, would probably be
quarrelsome and arrogant. But men do not hold
their rights because they are of unspotted virtue, but
because they have a title recognised by the law. Now
by all the laws of God and of Mexican men the Yaqui
Valley belonged to the Yaquis. " Qui terre a guerre
a," says the French proverb. There were disputes
between them and their kinsmen the Moyos over
boundaries, and in a country where the law was so
feeble as it has long been in Mexico these disputes led
to broken heads. They have produced the same
consequences in more civilised lands. The Indians

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 273
resented the intrusion of white trespassers, and if they
had not they would have been robbed. But though
human and therefore liable to passion, they were an in
dustrious people and helpful to their white neighbours.
We can well believe that the task of dealing at
once firmly and fairly with such a population was
not without its difficulties. An experience of three
centuries had rendered the Yaquis suspicious and
touchy. They were on the outlook for aggressions,
and prepared to repel them by the only means of
defence which had been effective in the past. But
an honest and humane Government would not have
failed to understand that the one condition on which
the Yaquis could be kept in peace was absolute justice
of treatment, and that was impossible unless their
claim to the sole possession of their land was recog
nised. It is only too certain that this condition was
lacking. When Mexico settled down to comparative
peace during the first Administration of President Diaz
and his successor, General Gonzalez, a great revival
of agricultural, mining, and other industry began in
Sonora. The State had been half-depopulated during
the early days of the gold-mining development
in Upper California. The white inhabitants had
swarmed over the border to share in the wealth to be
drawn from the mines. The Indians were left alone.
After 1 880 the tide of immigration set in again. Sonora
was known to possess great natural resources. The
French enterprises of Pindray, Raousset — Boulbon,
and Jecker had aroused interest in the country.
Mexico was naturally enough desirous to possess a
California of her own, and very soon the Yaquis saw
that they were again menaced in the enjoyment of
their lands.

274 DIAZ
The full truth as to what happened during the last
twenty years of the nineteenth century is hard to
learn. Impartial observers were not hkely to be
present. There is much unsupported assertion and
much heated rhetoric on both sides. But the main
fact is not to be denied. The Mexican Government
took a course which had for its inevitable end the
destruction of the Yaqui people. It and its admiring
advocates have asserted that these Indians were a
horde of savages. Against this is to be set the testi
mony of American railway-makers and foreigners of
several nationalities interested in Sonoran mines and
land which agrees entirely with the words of Lieutenant
Hardy quoted above. The fact appears to be that
the Mexican Government had no idea how to develop
the resources of Sonora otherwise than by making
huge concessions of land to " concessionnaires " who
were often its own pohtical supporters. These men
intruded, prospected, marked out claims, and so forth,
without the least regard for the rights of the occupiers
of the soil. The Yaquis took up arms, and then fol
lowed a war which lasted from 1886 to the first years
of this century. It cost the Mexican Government a
sum estimated at $51,000,000, and it entailed the
destruction of the most industrious part of the Indian
population of the whole Republic. For a time the
Yaquis made head, but when the Mexican troops
were re-armed with the Mauser rifle they were over
powered. A remnant held out in the Bacetate
Mountains, in the background of that valley. The
great majority were reduced to slavery. They were
not even enslaved in Sonora. They were transported
in gangs under escorts of soldiers and rurales to the
sisal hemp plantations of Yucatan or the tobacco

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 275
plantations of the Valle Nacional and there sold, under
certain hypocritical disguises, as slaves.
The traffic reached its highest level after 1904, and
was as open as ever was the trade of the African Slave
Coast at its worst. The captives were shipped at
Guaymas, the chief port of Sonora in the Gulf of
California. Thence they were taken by steamer to
San Bias, on the Pacific Coast in the State of Jalisco.
From San Bias they marched over rugged ground
escorted by soldiers and rurales in what was known as
a " coffle " (i.e., cafila = caravan) in the days of the
African slave trade, to San Marcos the farthest point
then reached by the Pacific branch of the Mexican
Central Railway. The train carried them — men,
women, and children — to Veracruz, where they were
shipped for Progreso in Yucatan. The co-operation
of the police and the troops disposes of all pretence
that this vicious traffic was a matter of private fraud
carried on without the knowledge of the State. The
Government of Mexico was as much concerned in the
trade as ever was a negro " king " in the kidnapping
of the miserable creatures who were brought down
from the interior to the slave ships lying to receive
them in the Bonny river. When delivered in Yucatan
$60 a head was paid for them by the sisal planters.
They were not called slaves. Slavery is abolished by
the Constitution of the Mexican Republic. The theory
was that they were " peones," field hands, who, like
others of their class in Mexico, were working off debts
due to the planters. The debt was the $60 paid to
the Government for the command of their enforced
services.1
1 The world was shocked when the story of the Yaquis was told by Mr.
John Kenneth Turner, of California, in his " Barbarous Mexico." He was
t z

276 DIAZ
This is surely a most deplorable story of a failure to
govern humanely and in the interest of the whole
country. There is worse to be said of it, but for the
moment, and until we are done with other stories
akin to that of the Yaquis, it is enough to note the
administrative ineptitude of the thing. In Mexico,
which is burdened by a great population Indian, or
nearly pure Indian, in blood, thriftless, degraded,
half savage, or, what is worse, formed of once tamed
Indians who have reverted to savagery, no wise
Government would have tolerated the destruction of a
community of men and women who worked freely and
well, and who lived an orderly life, raising crops of
maize and sugar-cane within its own borders, and
eking out its poverty by labour on railways and by
taking in harvests. It would have borne with the
natural suspiciousness of the Yaquis, and while it
suppressed the excesses of individuals among them it
would have abstained from ruining the whole com
munity. To enrich a handful of pohtical hangers-on
and speculators it took the very opposite course.
And that is not all. The sins of the Yaquis, real and
alleged, were made the excuse for a similar persecu
tion of other " pueblo " Indians — Opatas, Punas, and
so forth. The number of " bond servants " dragged
accused of hysteria and of being animated by a personal grievance. Mr.
Turner does indeed write as if the zeal of the Lord's house had eaten him
up. It is not credible that Yucatan planters should have shown not only
utter indifference to, but absolute glee over, the high percentage — a third or
so — and the very early date of the deaths among their purchases. Men of
business who had paid $60 for the labour of a Yaqui " bond servant "
cannot surely have rejoiced over his or her death before the price paid had
been worked off. Yet I accept Mr. Turner's account of the trade as sub
stantially true — in the first place because it is borne out by other testimony,
and in the second place because it is perfectly consistent with the recent
Brazilian rubber forest scandal, and with what I know, from the testimony
of credible witnesses given to me in the countries themselves, to be the case
in other Spanish-American countries.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 277
from Sonora to Yucatan and some other places far
exceeded the Yaqui population even if it had lost
none of its members in battle and a remnant had not
saved itself in the hills. If the fate of this hopeful
race stood alone it would be a shameful blot on the
government of Mexico. But it was not. It was only
the most odious example of similar offences against
humanity and true statesmanship which were com
mitted all over Mexico.
The henequen or sisal hemp plantations of Yucatan
were not supplied with forced labour from Sonora
only. They were helped to provide themselves with
bond servants from among the native Indian popula
tion, the Mayas. In this case there was some shadow
of an excuse for the brutality shown to the victims.
The Mayas, to judge by the buildings they have raised
during centuries, and long before the Spaniards
appeared on the coast, were endowed with a better
natural intelligence than other native races. But
they had been utterly barbarised during their long
conflict with white intruders. There is only one
name for the whole history of Yucatan since it was
first visited by Panfilo de Narvaez. It is disgusting.
It is one long record of brutal aggression and bestial
retaliation. What the Spaniards did not teach the
natives was taught them by English logwood cutters
in Campeachy, a gang of buccaneers, pirates, armed
smugglers, and kidnappers. The Mayas proved very
apt pupils. As much of the country was covered by
dense tropical forest, they continued to possess fast
nesses into which their enemies could never penetrate.
They defended themselves — and the miasmas of
their swamps helped to defend them — against inva
sion. They sallied out to raid and massacre. The

278 DIAZ
long tale of mutual slaughter grows nauseous. At
times the Spanish settlements appeared to be on the
verge of extinction. Then the white race regained
ground. As mere slaughter was accompanied by the
capture and subjugation of women, a half-breed race
was formed. The planters as a rule belong to this
class of mestizos. They would prefer independence
to union with Mexico, and they do demand with
success a very considerable measure of local self-
government. But they need the support of the
Republic, and so profess a certain loyalty. According
to what has been the rule in all Spanish America,
these mestizos are more merciless to the pure Indian
race than the Spaniards themselves. The outcome
of centuries of cruelty has been for Yucatan the domi
nation of a small class of half-bred planters who grow
rich by the forced labour of Indian serfs. If the
possession of better weapons and a great show of
municipal improvements in their pet town, Merida,
constitute civilisation, then Yucatan is civilised. If
the sacrifice of a whole population to the interest of a
few, if cruelty and slave-driving, are barbarous, then
Yucatan is in a state of barbarism. If a planter is a
humane man, he treats his slaves better than does a
mere brute. But a condition in which decency of
behaviour depends wholly on the virtues of indi
viduals, and is not enforced on all by the law, is one of
barbarism. And the most humane of planters does
not live on his land, but in a fine house in Merida. He
has an agent, an " administrador," who manages for
him, and has an office in the town. The plantations
are ruled by overseers (" mayordomos ") who are
expected to get the work done. The treatment given
to the bond servants depends on these men, who are

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 279
bound to show a profit. All experience teaches us how
they have ever been wont to secure the desired gain.1
Between these two extremes of Mexico, Sonora to
the north-west and Yucatan at the south-east, there
were varieties and degrees in the treatment given to
the " peones " and the weaker portions of the inhabi
tants of Mexico. In the Valle Nacional, to the south
of Cordoba on the Veracruz to Mexico line, there was
a reproduction of the conditions which prevailed in
Yucatan. In this case the plantations were devoted
to growing tobacco. The bond servants were largely
provided by the industry of a class of agents known as
" enganchadores " (crimps : gancho in Spanish is a
hook), who corresponded exactly to the rascals once
well known in the West of England as " the Spirits."
Their business was to hire labourers for the West
Indian and Virginian plantations. They made lying
promises, and when their dupes reached their destina
tion they found themselves in a condition of slavery.
The " enganchadores " worked in this way for the
tobacco plantations. The Valle Nacional is long, is
shut in by steep hills covered with tropical forest, and
well watched at its entry and exit by the police. The
bond servants who tried to escape were commonly
captured and brought back. A fine was imposed for
the attempt to break their contract, and it was added
to the debt they were working off. Some, however,
did escape and told their tale. The character of the
Valle Nacional was well known. In addition to the
bond servants who had been obtained in this way there
1 I do not dwell on certain details of flagellations, the treatment of the
women, etc., etc., on which eye-witnesses have been copious. Such
abominations are incidental to slavery wherever it exists. There are Blue-
books and other sources of knowledge to tell us what was done in Jamaica
by British men and women who were alive not very long ago.

280 DIAZ
were others obtained in another fashion. They were
simply crimped by the police under pretence that they
had committed minor offences. Sometimes they had
committed them, and were punished by the magis
trates by being sent into slavery. It may be added
that many of the tobacco planters in the Valle
Nacional were Spaniards. That fact helps to account
for the massacre of immigrants from Old Spain which
occurred after the fall of Don Porfirio in 191 1.
The judicious reader of such stories as these finds,
and rarely fails to use, an opportunity to express
doubts as to their exact accuracy. He suspects
exaggeration at least. And often he is right. The
witnesses who have been revolted by the spectacle of
wrong and misery do not stop to look at the other side,
to note the cases where those who have power exercise
it with moderation, nor do they always remember
that those whose misfortunes are the result of their
own misconduct can invent plausible tales of oppres
sion. Yet the substantial truth of the pictures drawn
of Yucatan and the Valle Nacional is certain, and in
a wholesome state of society the errors or even the
sins of men and women are not punished by turning
them into mere instruments for money-getting, to the
advantage of small bodies of employers who happen to
be useful to the persons who command the public
services for the time being, and who dignify themselves
by the name of " the State." If judicious persons
cannot believe that the police and the judicial autho
rities can lend themselves to such bad practices as
have been mentioned above, their knowledge of
Spanish and Portuguese America must be greatly to
seek. It may be laid down as a rule to which there
are few exceptions that no man who approaches the

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 281
courts in those countries can hope, we need not say so
much as for justice, but for a bare leave to state his
case, unless he comes with money in his hand. The
money, it must be understood, is not for the payment
of lawyers' fees, but as a gift to the judge, in order to
obtain his attention. The fees will have to be paid in
due course. Again it must be borne in mind that in
these countries what ought to be judicial acts are often
performed by administrative officers. Fines can be
arbitrarily imposed ; no protest will be listened to till
the money is paid ; there is no way in which a single
man can enforce a hearing of his grievance, and while
he continues to complain, the authority goes on
imposing fines. If he fails to pay, he is arrested, and
then it is a short step to send him to the tobacco
plantations of the Valle Nacional or other penal
settlement. A distinguished Argentine statesman
who was paying a visit to Europe was asked by an
illustrious personage whether there was any adminis
tration of justice in his country. He answered
laconically " Algo " (some, or just a little), and he put
the case as high as he could.1
1 Such charges as these ought not to be made without evidence to support
them. I would not repeat them unless they seemed to me to be proved.
My experience goes to show that they are true. I heard on the best authority
in Buenos Ayres of a case which shows what ill-use can be made of an
administrative officer's power to fine. A commissioner of police for one of the
districts of the city wished to make a mistress of the daughter of an Italian
tradesman. As she would not consent, and the father supported her, the
commissioner ruined him by a succession of fines, and he was driven to go
to another town. But for the fear of giving too much offence to the Italian
Government, the man and his daughter would probably have been arrested
as anarchists and would have disappeared from sight. It may be remem
bered that a few years ago the Italian Government did forbid the engage
ment of its subjects for labour in the Argentine. It was the only way short
of a declaration of war by which to put a stop to outrages of the kind just
mentioned and worse. There is no obscurity at all as to the use which is
habitually made of the " anarchist " law in the Argentine. The son of a
arge employer of labour told me frankly that it was " terrible," but very
useful. " For," said he, " when my father has trouble with one of his men,

282 I DIAZ
Where such administrative and judicial conditions
prevailed it is easy to understand how the great Indian,
or nearly Indian, population of Mexico might have
bitter grievances at all times, and also how their
sufferings might be intensified under the rule of
President Diaz, and because of its very virtues. This
may sound like a paradox, but a few moments' atten
tion will show that it is a mere statement of intelligible
fact. Under the old colonial rule, and during the
long anarchy which began to be suspended for a time
about 1877, Mexico was a very torpid country. The
Indians might have no rights, but apart from the
forced labour of the mines, which was of long standing,
nobody profited by demanding much from them.
The land everywhere to some extent, but to a very
great extent in the north, was too big for the people.
The peon could squat on and work a little piece of
ground for his small needs. He might be unable to
produce a title, but he interfered with nobody. It did
not pay to drive him, for a greater production would
have been of no advantage when there were few means
of making a profit by sale. Except those hacendados
whose possessions were immense, everybody was poor,
and, save a few tradesmen, everybody was idle.
A great change began when the country settled
down. There was a Government in power eager to
develop its resources and compelled to invite the
co-operation of the foreign capitalist. This being so,
the land grew to have more value as pasture, for culti-
he says to the police ' That man is an anarchist,' and they take him away."
What this means is that the employer pays the police a yearly sum for their
good-will. It also means that a man so arrested is sent to one of the islands
on the Argentine coast and left to support himself by fishing. He generally
dies of starvation in about three months. Yet the Argentine Republic is
more orderly and less brutal than Mexico.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 283
vation, and for mining. And now it became the
interest of people who could enforce attention to their
wishes because they held the purse-strings to insist
on a sharp examination of the titles by virtue of which
the land was used. The case was complicated by the
fact that, land having been superabundant, and water
in the greater part of the country rare, what had been
thought sufficiently valuable and disputable to be
made matter of record were not titles to land, but
water rights. Land could be found anywhere.
Water to irrigate it had to be obtained by industry.
It follows that if there was to be a general inquisition
into titles, a quo warranto, nothing could be easier
than to show that very much, perhaps the greater
part, of the land in the Republic was " tierra baldia,"
that is to say, unowned land, and therefore domain of
the State, and at its disposal to give or to sell. A no
less obvious consequence would be that the purchaser
or grantee of the land could within his own bounds
cut off access to the water. A water right was of
no value to a man who could not use the adjacent
land. In these conditions it might well happen that
grave injustice might be done, and done with punc
tilious attention to a law. All that was needed was
that the law should allow a prospector to peg out and
claim unoccupied land and require it from the State,
all land which was not held by a producible title being
counted unoccupied. And this was the course taken.
By the land law of 1886 anyone was authorised to
" denounce " — that is to say, to point out — a space of
land as " tierra baldia " and to claim to acquire it on
payment of a small due to the State. The burden of
proof that it was not " tierra baldia " was thrown on
those who were making use of it, and occupancy was

284 DIAZ
not accepted as a title. There was no Statute of
Limitations in Mexico, and there was on the part of the
State — i.e., the politicians in office — a very firm grip
of the principle nullum tempus occurrit regi. When,
therefore, we hear in the President's addresses to
Congress of the marking out of " tierras baldias,"
what is to be understood as implied is that somebody
poor, obscure, and mostly Indian was squeezed out of
the corner he had looked upon as his, to be worked for
himself. We hear, it is true, that care was taken to
provide " ejidos " for Indian villages, and if this had
been done fairly, and under the protection of an
independent judiciary, it would have been the better
for Mexico. But that which depended for its just
execution on the honour of Government officials and
the independence of the courts was not done at all, or
was very ill done. As a matter of course only the
small men suffered. The great landholders, whose
titles were often very doubtful, could take care of
themselves. They could make use of interest to avoid
inquisition into what they wished to conceal, or they
could acquire a title at a cheap rate, or stand in with
the speculative capitalist.
As Mexico had to look abroad for capital, schemes
for development of the resources of the land had a
consequence which in the end proved very injurious
to the popularity of President Diaz. It was inevitable
that a large part of the " tierra baldia " which was sold
to " denouncers " passed into the hands of foreigners,
of whom the majority came from the United States.
A jest much repeated in Mexico tells how a country
man expostulated with the President on the readiness
he showed to allow Americans to acquire land, and
how he answered that they would have it all some day,

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 285
and might as well be made to pay while payment could
still be demanded. The serious part of the jape lies
in its inclusion of the fact that these foreign purchases
were lawful only with his consent. His readiness to
agree to them must be taken as proof of his approval
and of a policy he pursued for years. It goes with
other actions of his which had a disastrous effect.
He encouraged European colonists to form land settle
ments, and, though the results were but meagre, the
little done in this way was enough to rouse much angry
feeling. The poor little colonies, mainly of Italians,
were considered as a menace by the natives. And
then the President at least allowed of an attempt -to
introduce Chinese and Japanese labour. The attempt
was equally offensive to Mexicans and Americans.
Though not much was done, yet that little also was
enough to provoke ill-feeling. The very industrial
virtues of the Chinese made them odious in Mexico,
as in the United States and our own colonies, though
not for exactly the same reasons. It would have
been hard indeed even for Chinese thrift to lower the
standard of living of the labouring classes of Mexico.
But the fear was that they would displace the native.
After the fall of the President a dreadful massacre of
Chinese was made at Torreon, on the Texan border.
The immediate cause was the unfounded belief that
certain Mexicans had been poisoned in a tavern kept
by a Chinaman, but the real cause was the hatred felt
for the whole race. Their industry was their chief
sin, but it is also a fact that the floggers and bullies
employed to terrorise the bond servants in Yucatan
and the Valle Nacional were often Chinamen, and that
the women on the plantations were compelled to live
with them for the purpose of breeding little slaves.

286 DIAZ
Against all this evil we have to put the fact that the
outlay of foreign capital in Mexico did give increased
employment and raise wages. Indirectly it helped
the " peones," who were not subject to the plantation
system ; and that, too, was a gain as far as it went.
But a very general experience shows that the dis
content born of oppression is more loudly expressed
when the sufferers begin to experience some relief.
As they gain in strength their fear diminishes, their
desires grow, and their claims increase. Of course,
they are accused of ingratitude, as the Mexicans have
been. The critics should remember that the improved
lot may still be bad, and that old memories rankle.
Nor do the better wages of a time of industrial
expansion always last, while the vices of a social
system are apt to endure. Mexicans of the labouring
class had always before them the spectacle of the
caravans of Yaquis who were carried right across the
country into slavery in Yucatan or the Valle Nacional,
and the expelled squatters. If they did suspect their
white masters of a wish to exploit them, or even get
rid of them to make room for Chinese labour, their
distrust cannot be said to have been absurd.
In so far then as this Indian population, which was
often not the less Indian because of a slight admixture
of European blood, was concerned, there is nothing to
show that the long Administration of President Diaz
did any lasting good or supplied any promise of
improvement. There is not even evidence that the
President as much as wished to raise its moral and
intellectual level. This neglect of what ought to
have been treated as an elementary duty cannot surely
be counted to him for righteousness. But before we
join those who condemn him wholly let us remember

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 287
that " a man is only a man." He cannot shake
himself quite free from the inherited dispositions of
the society he hves in. If he could he would only
become alien to it and incapable of governing. It
may look discreditable to Diaz that though he was
largely of Indian descent himself, and could profess
pride in his Mixteca ancestry, he did nothing for
his red kinsmen. But Juarez was a pure-blooded
Zapoteca, and he did no more. He, too, married a
Creole wife, and forgot his people and his father's
house. The truth is that the Mexican Indian who has
risen in the world, and the mestizo, who is half, or
more than half, European, alike wish to be even as the
Creoles of Spanish descent — to rank as whites. And
what else could they be expected to wish ? Juarez
has been absurdly blamed for not turning Mexico into
an Indian republic. If he had made the attempt he
would have banded against him all the Creoles and
all the mestizos who wished to rank as Creoles. In face
of their hostility he would not have lasted for a week.
Even if we make the wild supposition that he had tried
and had succeeded, what could he have done ? He
could have won only by a general massacre of the
dominant classes and by turning Mexico into an
Indian Hayti. The conquerors would have returned
to the tribal state with its unvarying conditions —
perpetual war between " pueblo " Indians and wild
Indians, and the domination of the softer tribes by the
more ferocious. Long before it had come to that the
troops of the United States would have been in posses
sion of all Mexico.
Juarez could not wish for an Indian republic ; and
still less could Porfirio Diaz. What he was bound to
wish for was the closer assimilation of Mexico to the

288 DIAZ
standard of a civilised European State by the develop
ment of its industry and the maintenance of peace.
In order that he might succeed he had need of money ;
and money was to be obtained only by the help of the
foreign capitalist. Nothing was more natural than
that he should be chiefly concerned to satisfy those
whose aid was indispensable to him, and that in this
struggle for industrial prosperity the Mexican Indian
should have been treated as a mere tool. That is not
what would have happened if the man had been greater
and the society about him more healthy and higher-
minded. In that case the governors of Mexico would
have understood that nothing of real lasting good was
to be obtained by perpetuating a great cause of
anarchy. This Indian population had always been
the instrument of adventurers and insurgents because
it was torpid subjected and so miserably poor that
it did not lose by being drafted into guerrillero bands
and rebel armies. So long as it remained as it was it
would always serve that purpose. But Diaz was not
a great moral and political reformer. He was a
vigorous Spanish-American " tyrant " who strove to
keep good order and promote material well-being in
such ways as his own upbringing and the elements he
disposed of allowed. Before he could take in hand a
great work of social reform in Mexico he must have
had command of a clean-handed, competent adminis
trative staff — some equivalent, in fact, for our own
Indian Civil Service, and an independent judiciary,
prepared to try to do justice. He had no such aid,
and therefore could not have done the work even if he
had wished. That he never showed the wish deprives
him of all claim to rank with the greater statesmen.
It leaves him a strong administrator and nothing else.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM 289
Whether he could have done more if he had tried to do
justice to the Indian population is a speculative
question. We know that he had to learn before he
died how little it avails a country to put money in its
purse for a time at the cost of nursing and increasing
the rage, hate, envy, and the sense of wrong which
provide the rank and file of anarchical armies.

CHAPTER XI
ANARCHY WELLS UP
Those of us who have never felt the temptation to
cling to power may wonder why few rulers of men have
known how to leave the world before the world left
them. What satisfaction can it be to struggle on
" Bankrupt of life yet prodigal ease " ? In 1904,
when his sixth term of office came to its end, President
Diaz was seventy-four. He was still enjoying the
vigour of body which he owed primarily to an excellent
constitution, but in no small measure to the stern
discipline he imposed on himself. None the less, he
was old, and extreme age lay just before him. His
place was no ornamental sinecure, but a heavy toil.
He is known to have expressed a wish to retire and to
visit Europe, which he had never seen, while it was
still in his power to enjoy travel. Yet he stayed, and
when his seventh term of office, which had been
prolonged from four to six years, ended, also in 1910,
he again stayed. Why ?
Astute persons who believe in nothing but their own
capacity to see quite through the deeds of men are
ready to provide an explanation. It was greed ; it
was the love of power ; and all professions to the
contrary are but the purest hypocrisy. And no doubt
it is the fact that those who have held command are
unwilling to pass into the ranks again. We may
suspect, without pretending to sagacity, that Diaz did
listen, with a predisposition to believe, to foreign

ANARCHY WELLS UP 291
envoys, his own ministers, and those about him who are
known to have told him that he was indispensable and
to have implored him to stay. Yet we can now see
that they were right. He alone stood between
Mexico and anarchy. He was tied to the stake and
must bearlike fight the course. By staying he put
off the day of danger, and a space was given in which
to prepare for the time when his place must needs be
vacant. The election, so called, was not quite as others had
been. There was no opposition, and the part of the
electors did not vary. But up to this time there had
been no Vice-President in Mexico. The President of
the Supreme Court stood ready, as we have seen in the
cases of Juarez and Lerdo, to take the accidentally
vacant chair. But in 1904 it was felt to be no longer
safe to rely on the lawyer who happened to preside
over the Supreme Court. A politician trained to the
work must be provided to stand by the President
ready to replace him if he died, and to succeed him if
in 1 910 age should have deprived him of the capacity
to hold the reins. The precaution was wise, but the
choice made was unfortunate. His understudy and suc
cessor was expected to continue the same " system " —
to keep the peace, to promote industry, and to protect
foreign capital. In order that he might be able to
fulfil this programme he must have a certain measure
of popularity, the confidence of the capitalists, and
the capacity for hard work. There was a time when it
was assumed that in the new industrial age the most
appropriate successor for Don Porfirio would be his
Minister of Finance, Don Jose Limantour. But there
was a difficulty in the way. The Constitution provided
that the President of Mexico must be native born, and

292 DIAZ
Sefior Limantour was by birth a Frenchman, and had
not been naturalised till he was twenty. It is true
that Constitutions are subject to revision in Spanish
America, and that Congresses will commonly revise
or do whatever other thing they are bid to do.1 But
in 1904 the anti-foreign feeling was rising, and the
selection of a financier of alien origin might have been
dangerous. The understudy chosen was Don Ramon Corral.
Don Ramon has been made the theme of an immense
amount of abuse in the best style of Spanish-American
polemic or of renaissance literary blackguardism. All
that may be left standing on its own basis. It is
enough to say that he was connected with land
company speculations in Sonora, was associated with
American capitalists, and was not in good health. As
an " Americanised Mexican " he was peculiarly repug
nant to the patriotic sentiment of the north of Mexico
and not a persona grata in the south. If the choice
was due to the influence of " foreign plutocrats " and of
" Wall Street " it afforded a wondrous example of the
extent to which business men can be besotted by their
reliance on the " power of money."
There was a peculiar reason why the creation and
nomination of a Vice-President should be carried out
with great tact in the choice of the person. The
measure was a most intelligible warning that steps
were being taken to perpetuate the " system of Diaz."
The view taken of it is quite lucidly explained by Don
1 It was only the other day that a President of the Argentine Republic,
finding his Congress inclined to be sulky and to go on strike, arrested a
quorum, marched them to the House in charge of the police, and stood over
them till they did as they were told. The same sort of thing might happen in
any part of Spanish or Portuguese America, except in Chile, where the power
is in the hands of a species of oligarchy of landowners.

ANARCHY WELLS UP 293
Francisco Madero in his little treatise " La Sucesion
Presidencial en 1910." Sefior Madero is a person who
will play a considerable part in the last stage of the
life of President Diaz, and it is well to know who he
was before we listen to what he said.
The Madero family was of Spanish origin and, as it
seems, of rather recent settlement in Mexico. It
possessed much land in Coahuila, the border State
which lies next to Chihuahua to the east ; and it was
very wealthy. Francisco, who was still very young
when he came forward in Mexican politics during the
seventh term of President Diaz, had been educated
partly in the United States and partly in Europe. In
the course of his travels he is said by those who profess
to know and to admire him to have adopted some of
those opinions which more sober-minded people call
fads. He was a vegetarian and a spiritualist.1 It is
obviously not quite safe to accept the testimony of a
man of credulous turn. Yet Sefior Madero may be
trusted when he says that the creation of a Vice-
President and the choice of Sefior Corral mark the
starting-point of a definite movement of opposition.
There were, he says, Mexicans who thought that a
time had come for a change in the " spheres of power."
But up to 1904 they were prepared to wait till age and
fatigue or death should remove Don Porfirio. When
they saw that steps were being taken to perpetuate
1 If we can trust some of those who praised him, he would seem to have
been in the habit of consulting the crystal, or the cards, or some other form
of divination. It is said that when he had the now notorious Zapata in his
power, and might have shot him according to all Mexican precedent, he let
him go. The reason given is not that he thought such an act brutal, or was
reluctant to execute without form of law. It is that he had been magically
" told " that his own death would follow Zapata's within twenty-four hours.
This is the sort of story which would be told of such a man, and I would be
sorry indeed to vouch for the truth of the tale. But the stories told of a
man are in their way evidence. Nobody would have invented or believed
such gossip (if mere gossip it was) of Santa Ana, or Juarez, or Diaz.

294 DIAZ
the possession of office by those about him, they felt
that they must act, which means that they must
conspire. They might have had patience if they had
known that the disappearance from the scene of
President Diaz would leave the field clear, but if it
were only to mean that another and perhaps heavier
hand were to control the same machine they must
resist. Nothing could well be more likely, and the
course of events during the next six years would be
enough to prove that many felt in this way even if we
had not the direct testimony of a witness. Even if
Sefior Madero tells us only what he thought, then, in
view of the part he took, his statement has a sub
stantial value.
On the surface all looked well to those who saw the
Republic from abroad, or if they came to it came only
as visitors to look at the improvements and report
astonishing progress. Between 1904 and 1906 there
appeared quite a crop of books full of the most
hopeful descriptions and predictions. It came to be
a commonplace that the evil times were over for
Mexico. In 1907 Mr. Elihu Root visited the capital,
and many festivities were held and fine speeches were
made. The eloquent American praised President
Diaz as the greatest of living statesmen. Mr. Root
struck a note which was echoed far and wide. At the
end of a book published in New York in 1910 by Don
Jose Godoy, the author publishes a long collection
of what really sound like testimonials to the efficacy
of some invention or patent medicine. They are
examples of all the laudatory things said of President
Diaz. Sefior Godoy's book was in fact an electioneer
ing puff, and one feels in regard to many of the other
books that they represent what business interests

ANARCHY WELLS UP 295
would wish investors to think of Mexico and its
Government, and very little else. When in 1909
President Diaz met Mr. Taft at Paso del Norte the
toasts and the ceremonies were those which we are
accustomed to hear of when Sovereigns hold an
interview. In short, there was no failure in the flow
of official assurances that all was well with Mexico
within and without.
While persons whose first purpose was neither to
see nor to tell the whole truth were saying smooth
things the unrest of Mexico was growing more acute.
It is a significant fact that just when the " coffles " of
enslaved Yaquis were beginning to defile across
Mexico in shameless publicity — that is to say, from
1904 onwards — the Socialists grew very restive. It
is not a whit less significant that just before Mr. Elihu
Root came in 1907 there had been a very long and
very savage anti-American agitation in Mexico. It
was said in a picturesque way that an American
" Sicilian Vespers " was averted with great difficulty.
When Mr. Taft met his brother President at Paso in
1909, one of the subjects of their unreported conversa
tion must have been the recent flight of exiles from
Mexico and the trouble they gave Governments.
Everybody who cared to learn the facts knew that
only the vigilance of Washington prevented the
territory of the United States from being used as a
basis of operations for a rebellion in Mexico ; and even
this guarantee for peace was not at all times sufficient
It is all but impossible to guard every part of a frontier
seventeen hundred miles long of which much is not,
or is barely, inhabited. In 1908 there was an out
break in Coahuila which had notoriously been
prepared in the States.

296 DIAZ
There is always an extreme difficulty in getting at
the whole truth of events which have happened very
recently ; and yet we may venture to assume that
not much is to be learnt about the insurrection which
finally drove President Diaz to Europe beyond what
appears on the surface. The reasons given in the
last chapter why the peace he had kept for a time
unprecedented in Mexican history should at last be
broken are also sufficient to account for what in that
country and in the circumstances was a natural event.
If anything needs to be added, it is that as Diaz
came near his eightieth year he could no longer work
as he once did. Don Francisco Madero asserts that
this was the case. It follows that he fell into the
hands of those about him. They intercepted the
truth, so Don Francisco asserts, and it is consistent
with probability. It is the fatal defect of all purely
personal government that it grows old with the ruler
before it dies with him. In a monarchical country
what descends to the grave with an Elizabeth or a
Frederick the Great is a personal method of using an
institution. But what of necessity went into exile
with the President of Mexico was all government.
Don Porfirio could quote this fact in answer to the
question why he decided to re-elect himself once
more in 1910. He had had many warnings from 1904
onwards that by persisting in office he would provoke
trouble. Open disorder, Socialist or Liberal, had been
repressed with apparent success. The " acordada "
(secret police) kept watch. Those who threatened to
become dangerous were arrested and sent to the
castle of San Juan de Ulloa, or driven to escape over
the American border. There the United States kept
an eye on them, and, instigated, so we are assured, by

ANARCHY WELLS UP 297
Wall Street, repressed their plots. But though a
smooth surface was preserved by these vigorous
measures, there were signs which could not be ignored
that mere police vigour would not be enough. The
Press of Mexico is free only by the letter of the
Constitution;- and as the electors are free. Yet even
the Press began to say strong things about the
" caciquismo " of the President's rule. The great
re-election theme began to be discussed. It was a
sign of the times that a very curious compromise
found favour with some. They were ready to consent
that the President should be chosen again in the old
way — in other words, that the voters should do as
they were bid in so far as he was personally concerned.
But they had a device for introducing true liberty of
election. It was that the electors should be absolutely
free to vote for or against the Vice-President, Don
Ramon Corral. The compromise was infantile. Don
Ramon had been selected as President's understudy
precisely because he was expected to continue the
so-called Diaz system with the same men as colleagues
or agents. If he were to be defeated at the polls —
and on the supposition that the election was to be free
he most assuredly would be — the system would be
defeated too. Don Porfirio would be reduced to a
figurehead. It was not a position he could be expected
to accept ; nor ought he to have accepted it. Mexico
is not a country which can be governed by a figure
head. The so-called compromise broke down at once
when tested.
The fact that everything was at stake became more
apparent in 1909 when the Central Democratic Club
produced a scheme of reform. It contained a great
many generalities, and not a few sentiments, but there

298 DIAZ
was one proposal in it which was undeniably sub
stantial. This was that the office of Jefe Politico
should be abolished, and that the Jefes should be
replaced by an elected board or committee. Of
course this change would have taken away the whole
foundation not only of the " Diaz system " but of the
edifice of government in Mexico. The novelty was to
be accompanied by electoral reform at large — free
election for governors and President. Anyone who
knew what government meant in Mexico could see at
once that the practical result of such a constitutional
device must infallibly be a fight in the literal sense of
the word in every district of every State in the
Republic. What Porfirio Diaz may have thought or decided
in foro interno is mere idle speculation. We know
with sufficient accuracy what he did. When the time
for the new election of 1910 drew near he said he
would not stand again, and he broke his promise.
That is the substantial fact. Did he break his word
from mere longing to retain office, and was his
promise a sheer hypocrisy ? Or did he decide to
continue in office simply because he must ? There
are good reasons for thinking that the last is the true
explanation. The reader is asked to excuse a repeti
tion of the statement that there was but one choice for
Mexico — namely, between a vigorous personal govern
ment by some one man, working with a trusty staff of
agents, and anarchy. Since this was the fact, as the
events of the last five years have amply demon
strated, was Diaz to blame if he refused to retire before
he could leave the country in strong hands ? It is at
least a tenable proposition that he would not have
been justified. Even if he saw no chance of finding a

ANARCHY WELLS UP 299
competent successor, he was to be excused for endea
vouring to put off the evil day so long as he could.
In 1909, before the1 election was formally open, a
proof was given of the resolution of some Mexicans to
break down the " system." The opponents of Don
Ramon Corral decided to oppose his re-election — they
did not so far openly oppose the President — and they
chose General Reyes as their candidate. General
Reyes had been for some years Governor of the State
of Nuevo Leon. He was therefore a part of the
" system." But he had been a popular governor and
had local influence. From all that can be seen of him
from this side of the Atlantic, the General appears to
have been a moderate man of a kindly disposition, but
of not much force of character. He did not, so it
seems, exactly put himself forward as an opponent of
Don Ramon, but his friends, or the party which
thought he would be useful to them, did it for him.
Of course this was opposition, and, if it was allowed,
would set a bad example. Measures were taken to
suppress the agitation, and the Reyista party (a
Mexican party nearly always names itself after a
person, rarely after a principle) retaliated by riotous
demonstrations. The demonstrations were put down
and General Reyes was sent on a mission to inquire
into the military systems of Europe. It was not harsh
treatment, but Reyes had many friends in the army.
He went, and before leaving America he gave an
interview to newspaper reporters in New York which
leaves nothing to be desired as a profession of faith in
the virtues of Don Porfirio and the necessity of
retaining him as President.
The disappearance for the time being of General
Reyes left the field free for Don Francisco Madero.

300 DIAZ
One cannot but have a certain compunction to speak
unkindly of a man who came to such a shocking fate.
And yet if he had not been butchered with a barbarity
exceptional even for Mexico, it would be hard to keep
one's hands off Francisco Madero. Enthusiasts have
been found to call him " a star " and what not equally
laudatory. Yet, to anyone who will take the trouble
to read his book " The Presidential Election " and to
learn his actions, he appears to have been neither
more nor less than an example of the " ligereza " —
the feather-headedness of a certain stamp of Spaniard.
He was the pitiable victim of his own errors, and so
we may prefer to say all the good we can of him. It
is honourable to him that his little book is free from
the foul scolding so common in the political journalism
of his and kindred countries. But a man needs more
than some sense of decency before he is justified in
letting loose a civil war. He must have ideas and a
cause to fight for. Now it is impossible to make out
from Sefior Madero's statement of his case that he took
up arms for anything except the sacred principle that
the places of dignity and emolument ought to go round
in a truly democratic country. There is not a trace of
any attempt on his part to face the dominant fact
that Mexico is not a democratic country nor one in
which the choice of rulers, upper and under, can be
left to the free and independent electors. The theory
of the orthodox democratic doctors, says Madero, is
so and so, and we must apply it regardless of facts,
conditions, and experience. The man was, in short,
a pedant. It is characteristic of him and his unhappy
class that, while he speaks with a humanity which
must be credited to his honour of the cruel treatment
of the Yaquis and other Indians, he gives no sign of

ANARCHY WELLS UP 301
having thought out any definite plan for righting
their wrongs, nor to have reflected on the principles
which ought to guide a Government in dealing with
such a population. He has nothing to offer but
sentiments and the promise that, if only there is a
change of persons in the Presidency and the governor
ships of the States, all will be well in Mexico. It is
said that he was kind to his own Indians, but it is not
said that the truck system, which by its very nature
worked for evil, was rejected on the Madero estates.
There is something suspicious in his candid-looking
confession that his family had no private reason for
disliking the " system " of President Diaz. Whenever
the Maderos had occasion to appeal to the courts or
the Administration at the capital their interests had
always been treated with equity. What this may
very well mean when translated into the language of
mere truth is most probably nothing but just this —
that the courts and the Administration were always
ready to meet the views of an influential family. The
Maderos were quite as well disposed as any other
wealthy connection to make use of the much-abused
system for their own ends. We need not be surprised
to hear that when Don Francisco did become President
his " good nature " made it impossible for him to
check the rapacity of his relatives. There is a kind of
good nature, as well as of good intention, which paves
the road to hell.1

1 I am not quoting Dr. Johnson, but a Portuguese proverb which says
that the road to etc., etc. — a far wiser saying than the Doctor's famous
explosion. It is not perhaps of much use to refer the reader to books which
he can only obtain by writing for them to Mexico or to Havannah, but if he
by accident comes across a book by the name of " La Parra, la Perra, y
la Porra " (" The Wild Vine, the Bitch, and the Cudgel "), he will see a fine
example of the mere froth of words which surrounded the whole Madero
adventure. La Parra was the name of Madero's hacienda.

302 DIAZ
If there had not been general discontent in Mexico
with more than the clinging to office of Don Porfirio
and his connection, such a man would have had no
opportunity to play a part. And if he had not had
command of a long purse he would probably not have
cut much of a figure even as it was. But, the two
going together, he was the man who hastened the day
when Mexico was to return to anarchy.
Before the movement in favour of electing General
Reyes had been quashed, and the General had sailed
on his mission to inquire into the mihtary systems of
Europe, Madero was simply a " joven distinguido "
(a youth belonging to an opulent family). But he
now came forward as a candidate for the Presidency
itself. It is quite unnecessary to spend words in
saying what this implied in Mexico. What it meant
for Don Francisco was that he was arrested shortly
before the election was due, in July 1910. The charge
was first that he had helped to protect one Estrada,
a partisan of General Reyes, from arrest ; then it
was altered into a charge of insulting the nation.
Finally he was accused of insulting the President.
This at least was the account given by his friends.
The formula preferred was of no consequence, and
any other pretext would have served for a measure
which had no end but to silence a politician who
threatened to give trouble. The enemies of President
Diaz have been put to it to explain why Madero
was not shot. They have cleared up the mystery by
describing a pathetic scene in which La Sefiora Diaz
implored and persuaded her ferocious husband not to
add another to the already long-drawn-out list of his
murders. This is precisely what would be said by
anyone with a moderate inventive faculty. Madero

ANARCHY WELLS UP 303
was not shot, but preserved to be butchered by one
or several of the wild beasts he had helped to let loose
on his country. He was only kept in jail and out of the
way of doing or suffering harm till the election was over.
It being clear that no real election would be
tolerated, and as the Government disposed of an
adequate armed force, President and Vice-President
were declared duly returned by the unanimous voice
of the people. In September President Diaz presided
over the last peaceful ceremony he was to witness in
Mexico, the celebration of the independence of the
country, which has been made to date from the rising
headed by Hidalgo. We have seen what that
emotional priest had really done. A spectator who
knew the facts of the state of the country might well
have asked himself whether the revival of that
memory was not ominous. His doubts would have
been justified, for the rule of President Diaz had not
then a year to live.
The mere events of his fall need not be recorded
here. That Madero took up arms in Chihuahua in
January and that by May the " Diaz system " had
collapsed are, with one other about to be named, the
essential facts. There were no encounters deserving
the name of battle. No faculty and no energy were
displayed, either in attack or defence. The rigime
which had given Mexico some thirty years of growing
material prosperity and the appearance of order fell
to pieces, and this happened (here we come to the
third fact which is to be kept in mind) because the man
on whom all depended had himself broken down under
the pressure of age. Don Porfirio bore up gallantly,
keeping himself upright by sheer strength of will,
speaking of his intention to take command of the

304 DIAZ
forces in the field, if the rising became really dangerous,
till his body failed him. On May I he was still
insisting on a compromise by which he and Madero
were both to retire, and a desperate bid for popularity
was made by a change of Ministry. But the long
fight had ended in defeat. Anarchy was bubbling
up on all hands. The United States were threatening
intervention. The insurgents could safely refuse to
listen to any terms and could insist that the uncon
ditional retirement of the President must be the
preliminary to every other measure. Porfirio Diaz
himself was prostrate, and the acts of his Government
were as the blows of the exhausted athlete which have
lost their force. He was confined to bed and his
strong body was showing the first signs of senile decay.
He could see no one outside of his own family save
Sefior Limantour, who alone of his old ministers
remained with him. On May 18 his resignation was
announced to the Congress in words which cannot
have been his, and he prepared for exile. There were
still among the soldiers, whose interests he had always
considered, loyal men enough to see to it that the old
President should not be subject to insult or outrage
while he was leaving the country. He, his family, and
those of his associates who had no choice but to go into
exile with him were protected on the way to Veracruz,
where they took ship for New York. General Huerta,
who was to succeed him, to avenge him vilely on
Madero, and in the end to join him in exile, saw to the
safety of the party. It was assailed on the way to
the seaport, and the escort had to fight it through.
On the pier Diaz listened, hat in hand, a pathetic
figure, to the last words of farewell spoken to him on
his native soil.

ANARCHY WELLS UP 305
From New York he sailed to Europe, and from that
time forward his Hfe passed into the privacy of his
family, where we have no right to follow him. After
spending some time in the south of Europe, he went to
Paris in May, 1914. He died there on July 2, 1915,
amid the roar of a storm which left the world with but
little attention to give to a fallen President of Mexico.
This book has been written to no purpose if it is
necessary to spend words in summing up the career
and the character of Porfirio Diaz. If a final verdict
is to be given it must be something like this. He
showed the world what was the utmost that his country
was capable of doing in order to qualify itself to
take its place among civilised and progressive States.
All it has been able to do has been to produce a
resolute, heavy-handed man who could keep an
incurable anarchy within bounds for an unprecedented
period of years. That man had no other nor higher
aim than to develop resources, build public works,
enable foreign capital to promote industry and make
profits for itself. All this he did, and an admiring
world took him for a great reformer whose work would
last. But, much as it seemed to be, it was naught
if we look beyond the outward and visible things
which money and labour can produce between them,
and try to pierce into those inward and spiritual
things which alone make the health of a nation, and
without which all the triumphs of industry are but
pearls on the swine's snout. He rose to rule a
country which could not possess real unity save if it
had been endowed with a strong monarchy and a
capable aristocracy. Monarchy was impossible, and
there were not the most beggarly elements of an
aristocracy. Police order for a time he could give, and

306 DIAZ
nothing more. Under cover of that police order the
outer world put its hand on Mexico and brought the
country appreciably nearer the day when the huge and
growing mass of power on its northern border will
spread over it — by what movements we do not
know, but as surely as water flows from a higher
to a lower level. At no period in man's history
has a chronic, sanguinary, brainless anarchy been
allowed to live for very long beside order and political
capacity and thought. He could not even add
strength to the mere mechanical unity of his country,
for he lived to see the northern provinces in process of
being torn away by a mere brigand, while his own
nephew was erecting an independent power in his
native Oaxaca. He failed, perhaps because he was
not great man enough, but more surely because he had
not to his hand the elements with which more could be
done. Un homme n'est qu'un homme.

&

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bancroft, H. H. " History of the Pacific States of North
America." 34 vols. San Francisco. 1882 — 1890.
The " History of Mexico," 1517 — 1857, forms vols. iv.
to ix. of the whole work. The Histories of the North
Mexican States — Texas, Arizona and New Mexico — are
in vols, x., xi., and xii. Full, impartial, well informed,
with many quotations from documents, and copious
references to authorities.
" Datos Biograficos del [Biographic Data of] General
Porfirio Diaz." Published in the office of the Patria news
paper. Mexico. 1884. Official and partisan, but contains
useful documents.
Escudero, Ignacio M. " Apuntes Histdricos de la Carrera
Militar del [Historical Notes of the Military Career of] Sefior
General Porfirio Diaz." Mexico. 1889. Partisan, but full
of details.
Zayas Enriquez, Rafael de. " Porfirio Diaz, La Evolucion
de su Vida " [The Evolution of his Life]. New York. 1908.
A critical and not always friendly study by a well-informed
writer. Rodriguez, Ricardo. " Historia Autentica de la Adminis-
tracion del [Authentic History of the Administration of]
Sefior General Porfirio Diaz." Mexico. 1904. A collection
of the President's addresses to Congress.
Hernandez, Fortunato. " Un Pueblo, un Siglo, y un
Hombre " [A People, an Epoch, and a Man]. Mexico. 1909.
An answer to Zayas Enriquez — inspired by the President.
Garcia, Genero. " Porfirio Diaz, sus Padres, Nifiez,
Juventud " [his Family, Childhood, and Youth]. Mexico.
1906. Useful details of early years (largely supplied by
Porfirio Diaz).

308 DIAZ
Fornaro, Carlo de. " Diaz, Czar of Mexico." No place of
publication is given, but probably New York. 1909. An
invective. Godoy, Jose F. " Porfirio Diaz, President of Mexico."
New York. 1910. The work of an official and a partisan.
Madero, Francisco J. " La Sucesion Presidencial " [The
Succession to the Presidency]. Mexico. 1911. A party
pamphlet, but a useful statement of the views of opponents of
the re-election of Porfirio Diaz in 1910.
Tweedie, Mrs. " Mexico as I saw It." London. 1901.
" Diaz." London. 1906.
Turner, J. K. " Barbarous Mexico." London. 191 1. A
book inspired by passionate indignation, but well informed
and the work of an eye-witness whose spirit was honourable.
Niox, G. " Expedition au Mexique." Paris. 1874. A
good narrative of the French intervention by an eye-witness,
and based on official papers.

CHRONOLOGY
1810. Rising of Hidalgo in Mexico.
„ Beginning of revolt of Spanish colonies in La Plata.
1820. Revolt of Spanish army at Cadiz.
„ Mexico declares her independence.
1821. Iturbide proclaimed Emperor.
„ Is expelled by Federals.
1823. Ferdinand VII. of Spain restored by French army.
„ British Government recognises independence of Spanish
colonies.
„ Monroe President of U.S.A., propounds Monroe
Doctrine.
1830. (Sept. 15.) Porfirio Diaz baptised, probably born, at
Oaxaca.
„ Andrew Jackson President of U.S.A.
1833. Santa Ana President of Mexico.
1835. Rosas becomes Tyrant of Argentine.
1837. Accession of Queen Victoria.
1838 — 1839. French send naval expedition to secure redress
from Mexico for outrages on French subjects.
1845. J. H. Polk President of U.S.A.
„ Beginning of war between Mexico and U.S.A.'
1848. Diaz volunteers, but sees no service.
(May 19.) War ended by peace of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Mexico cedes territory beyond Rio Grande, and
California.
„ Revolutionary movements in Sicily, France, Germany,
Italy, and Hungary.
„ Gold discovered in California.
1849. First Panama surveys made.
1850. Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.
1851. Napoleon III. Emperor of French.
1852. Rosas expelled from Argentine.

>5

310 DIAZ
1853. Santa Ana Dictator in Mexico.
1854. Revolt against Santa Ana.
„ General Alvarez issues Plan of Ayutla.
„ Diaz joins guerrilla of Herrera.
1855. Panama Railway made.
„ Diaz sub-prefect of Ixtlan.
1856. Civil war in Mexico.
„ Alvarez and Comonfort successively Presidents after
expulsion of Santa Ana.
„ Diaz captain in militia of Oaxaca.
1857. ^ew Constitution of Mexico.
,, Legislation against judicial privileges of clergy and
army.
1858. Clerical and military revolt against the Constitution.
„ Comonfort turns against his own Government. Driven
into exile.
„ Benito Juarez becomes interim President of Mexico.
„ Diaz Governor of Tehuantepec.
1859. Government of Juarez at Veracruz.
„ Civil war between Juarez at Veracruz and Clerical
party, led chiefly by Miramon.
„ U.S.A. Government favours Juarez. Buchanan Presi
dent.
„ Diaz supports Juarez in Tehuantepec. Promoted
lieutenant-colonel and colonel.
1 861. Juarez recovers capital and expels Miramon.
„ He rejects claims of Great Britain, France, and Spain
for compensation.
„ Spanish troops under command of Prim land at
Veracruz.
„ Abraham Lincoln President of U.S.A.
„ Beginning of War of Secession.
1862. British and French forces join Spaniards at Veracruz
in January, but the British and Spanish withdraw
in May.
„ The French advance into the interior.
„ (May 5.) Diaz, now brigadier, takes part in repulse of
French at Puebla.

CHRONOLOGY 311
1862. Lorencez superseded in command of French forces by
Forey in August.
1863. Puebla besieged and taken, March 29 — May 18.
„ Diaz a prisoner, but escapes.
„ Promoted general of division.
„ French enter Mexico city on June 5.
„ Diaz leads expedition to Oaxaca in October.
1864. The Archduke Maximilian accepts offer of the crown of
Mexico in April, lands at Veracruz in May, and enters
Mexico on June 12.
„ Civil war in U.S.A. at its height. U.S.A. Government
continues to recognise Juarez and refuses to recognise
Maximilian.
„ The French, after defeating Juarez in North, begin
advance on Oaxaca in autumn.
„ Austria and Prussia invade Holstein and Schleswig and
take them from Denmark (January and February).
1865. (Feb. 8.) Diaz, finding no support in population,
surrenders Oaxaca. Remains prisoner till he escapes
in September.
„ (April 9.) Surrender of Confederate General Lee at
Appomatox.
„ (April 15.) Assassination of Abraham Lincoln.
„ U.S. Government press the French to name date on
which they will withdraw.
„ Diaz resumes his command in south and south-east of
Mexico.
1866. Diaz gains ground in Oaxaca. Retakes city on
Oct. 30.
„ French begin to evacuate Mexico.
„ War between Prussia and Austria.
„ (July 3.) Battle of Sadowa.
„ (Aug. 23.) Peace of Prague.
1867. French complete evacuation of Mexico in February.
The Republican forces gain ground on all hands.
„ (April 2.) Diaz takes Puebla.
„ (May 15.) Surrender of Maximilian at Queretaro.
„ (June 19.) Execution of Maximilian.

312 DIAZ
1867. (June 21.) Mexico surrenders to Diaz.
1868. Diaz in retirement.
„ Overthrow of monarchy in Spain. Suez Canal com
pleted.
1869. General Grant President of U.S.A.
1870. Franco-Prussian War and fall of the Empire.
1 87 1 . Diaz becomes leader of party which opposes re-election
of Juarez.
Renewed civil war in Mexico.
(Jan. 18.) King of Prussia proclaimed German
Emperor in Versailles.
(March 18 — May 21.) Revolt of the Commune in
Paris.
(May 10.) Treaty of Frankfort signed.
1872. (July 18.) Death of Juarez.
Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada interim President of
Mexico.
Diaz submits and retires to Oaxaca.
1873. Opening of Veracruz to Mexico Railway."
Frontier troubles with U.S.A.
Unsuccessful attempts to arrange Mexican debt.
Mexico resumes diplomatic relations with all Powers
except Great Britain.
1874. Restoration of monarchy in Spain.
1876. Diaz heads a revolt to oppose re-election of Lerdo de
Tejada.
(Nov. 13.) Wins decisive battle at Tecoac and is
proclaimed interim President.
Formation of La Societe Civile Internationale du Canal
Interoceanique to promote construction of Panama
Canal.
1877. Diaz expels J. M. Iglesias.
Pacifies Mexico and begins to pay indemnity to U.S.A.
Hayes President of U.S.A.
1878. Diaz recognised as President of Mexico by U.S.A.
„ (May 28.) The Bonaparte-Wyse concession for the
construction of Panama Canal granted by Colombia.
„ (Dec.) The Veracruz massacre.

>>

CHRONOLOGY 313
1 879. International Congress to discuss plan of Panama Canal
held in Paris.
„ War between Chile and Peru.
1880. End of Diaz's first term as President.
1881. (Jan. 31.) Formation of company directed by Lesseps
to work the Wyse concession for Panama Canal.
1882. Arrangement made between U.S.A. and Mexico allow
ing the, regular forces of either State to pursue
marauders over border.
1884. Riots in Mexico caused by treaty to settle foreign debt
and the issue of nickel coinage.
„ Diaz becomes President for the second time. Settle
ment of foreign debt confirmed.
1888. Ruin of Lesseps' Panama Company
„ Congress authorises the re-election of Diaz.
1889. Revolution in Brazil. Pedro II. deposed and republic
established.
1890. The indemnity due to U.S.A. by Mexico is paid off.
1892. Diaz is re-elected President.
1894. New Panama Company formed.
1 895 . Settlement of Mexican frontier dispute with Guatemala
by friendly offices of U.S.A.
„ Grover Cleveland President of U.S.A.
1896. Re-election of Diaz.
„ The Venezuelan frontier dispute creates strained
relations between Great Britain and U.S.A.
1898. War between U.S.A. and Spain.
„ Spain loses Cuba and Porto Rico.
1900. Re-election of Diaz.
„ Hay-Pauncefote Treaty signed.
1901. Death of Queen Victoria. Accession of King
Edward VII.
1902. (June 19.) The New Panama Company cedes its
rights to U.S. A.
1903. The drainage works of the Valley of Mexico are
completed.
1904. Re-election of Diaz for term of six years. Office of
Vice-President created and Ramon Corral chosen.

314 DIAZ
190(5 — 1907. Popular outbreaks against U.S.A. in Mexico.
1909. (Oct. 16.) Meeting of Diaz and President Taft at
Paso del Norte.
„ First signs of revolt against the Government of Diaz in
Mexico.
„ Diaz announces his intention not to stand again.
1910. Re-election of Diaz.
„ Centenary of Independence of Mexico.
„ Madero, his opponent for Presidency, rises in revolt.
„ Death of King Edward VII.
191 1. The revolt spreads.
„ The health of Diaz breaks down, he resigns in May,
and leaves for Europe.
1914. (Aug.) Outbreak of European War.
1915. (July 2.) Death of Diaz in Paris.

INDEX

Acultzingo, Pass of, forced by
French, 60
Alatorre, General, supports Lerdists
defeated by Diaz at Tecoac, 159 —
160
Alcabalas, Mexican excise, 245 etseq.
Alvarez, General, President, 43 ;
aids Diaz in Guerrero, 96
Amelie Charlotte, wife of Maxi
milian, comes to Mexico, 74
Apaches, suppressed, 268 — 269
Appomatox, capitulation of Con
federates at, 88
Argentine Republic, cause of pro
sperity of, 124
Bancroft, H. H., quoted, 53
" Bandera," Yaqui chief, 271
Bazaine, General, afterwards Mar
shal, defeats Mexicans in San
Lorenzo, 72 ; Commander-in-
Chief, 73 ; prepares to occupy
Oaxaca, 80, 81 ; takes, 85 ;
anger with Diaz, 86 — 87 ; corre
spondence with Diaz, 105, 107 ;
evacuates Mexico, 108
Benitez, Justo, secretary to Diaz,
79 ; supposed to inspire Diaz,
171 ; why rejected as successor
to Diaz, 215
Blanco, Guzman, President of
Colombia, and the " rotative
compromise," 214
Brazo Militar, what meant, 27
Brincourt, French General, opposed
to Diaz, 81
Cacique, what meant, 29 ; of
Poyais, see Macgregor, Gregor.
Candelaria, La, Diaz's second ranch,
'49
Carbonera, La, action at, 102
Cerro Borrego, defeat of Mexicans
at, 62

Cerro de la Bufa, action at, 147
Chalchicomula, San Andres de, 59 ;
explosion at, 60
Church in Mexico, reasons for
opposition to Diaz, 174 et seq.
Cobos, General, Conservative leader,
wins battle of Ixcapa, 44 ;
defeated at Jalapa, 45 ; defeats
Diaz, 48 — 49 ; is defeated, ibid.
Colonies, British and Spanish com
pared, 7, 9
Comonfort, President, his erratic
policy and exile, 43
Consumos, Mexican octroi, 249
Corona, Ramon, General, joins
Diaz, 114
Corral, Ramon, elected Vice-Presi
dent, 292 ; re-elected, 296 ; oppo
sition to, 297, 299
Crawford, Captain, U.S. Army,
killed in Chihuahua, 195
Dano, M., French Minister, pro
tected by Diaz, 133
Debt, Mexican public, 228 et seq.
Detrie, Captain, defeats Mexicans
at Cerro Borrego, 62
Diaz, Felix (El Chato), younger
brother of Porfirio Diaz, his
birth, 3 ; aids his brother, 34 —
37 ; reinforces his brother, 1 14 ;
in arms with his brother, 146 ;
murder of, 147
Diaz, Jose de la Cruz, father of
President Diaz, 1, 2, 3
Diaz, Jose de la Cruz Porfirio, see
Diaz, Porfirio.
Diaz, Maria del Carmen Rubio
Romero, Sefiora de, second wife
of President Diaz, 219 et seq.
Diaz, Porfirio, birth, 1 ; education,
2, 3 ; volunteers in war with
United States, 4; enters seminary,
ibid. ; refuses to enter Church, 5 ;

316

INDEX

studies for the law, ibid. ; com
municates with Marcos Perez in
prison, 34 — 37 ; votes against
Dictator and becomes guerrillero,
39 ; Sub-Prefect of Ixtlan, 40,
42 ; raises company of National
Guard, 44 ; wounded at Ixcapa,
ibid. ; Governor of Tehuantepec,
45, 48 ; defeated at Mitla, 48 ;
hides in Ixtlan, 49 ; helps to retake
Oaxaca, ibid. ; colonel in regular
army and deputy for Ocotlan, 50 ;
services in field, ibid., 51, 52 ;
takes part in defence of Puebla,
61 ; quoted, 62 ; promoted
General of brigade, 63 ; Governor
of Veracruz, ibid. ; his policy for
the defence of Puebla, 65 ; de
fends San Marcos and San
Agustin in, 69 ; quoted, 70, 71 ;
becomes prisoner of war, 72 ;
escapes, 73 ; appointed to com
mand Army of East, 76 ; his
march to Oaxaca, 77 ; assumes
government of, 78, 79 ; operations
against Bazaine, 81 ; ill sup
ported, 82 ; refuses to join Maxi
milian, 84 ; forced to surrender,
85 ; threatened by Bazaine, 86 —
87 ; sent prisoner to Puebla,
ibid.. ; refuses to intervene on
behalf of Imperialist prisoners, 90 ;
escapes from Puebla, 91, 92;
forms new Army of East, 93, 96 ;
performs surgical operation, 95 ;
defeated by Imperialists but
gains ground, 98 ; his victory at
Nochistlan, ibid. ; and at Miahu
atlan, 99 ; his skilful operations,
101 ; victory at La Carbonera,
102 ; takes Oaxaca, 103 ; rigo
rous measures at, ibid. ; com
pletes recovery of South and
East, 104 ; correspondence with
Bazaine, 105 — 107 ; refuses in
vitation of Maximilian, ibid. ;
besieges and takes Puebla, 108 ;
operations against Marquez, 109,
1 10 ; begins siege of city of
Mexico, 112, 113 ; surrounds city,
114; his conduct during siege,
115; estimate of his character
and capacity, 116, 121 ; hit

separation from Juarez, 129 etseq.;
protects French Minister, M.
Dano, 133 ; his financial position,
134; retires to La Noria, ibid. ;
his first marriage, ibid. ; reported
conversation with Juarez, 137 ;
opposes Juarez in election of
1867, 139 et seq. ; heads revolt
against Juarez, 144 et seq. ; has
to yield to Lerdo de Tejada, 148
et seq. ; retired to La Candeiaria,
149 ; heads rising against Lerdo
de Tejada, 151 et seq.; goes to
Texas, 153 et seq.; invades
Mexico, 154; his difficulties with
local leaders, 155 ; takes Mata
moros, 156; returns to United
States, ibid. ; sails for Oaxaca,
and his adventure on the way,
ibid, et seq. ; takes command in
Oaxaca, 159 ; his victory at
Tecoac, 160 ; occupies city of
Mexico, 162 ; marches against
Iglesias, 165 ; elected President,
166 ; insists on keeping faith
with army, 167 et seq. ; his method
of government, 170, 172 ; diffi
culties of his position, 173 et
seq. ; hostility of Church, 174
et seq. ; reform of public services,
181 ; simplicity of his life, 182,
183 ; relations with United States,
184 et seq. ; settlement with, 187
et seq. ; recognised by, 188 ;
difficulties on frontier, 188 et
seq. ; approves action of Teran
in massacre at Veracruz, 200 —
206 ; First Administration ends,
207 ; matter and style of his
addresses to Congress, 209 ; on
end of his first term takes Ministry
of Public Works, 217 ; resigns
and takes Governorship of
Oaxaca, 218 ; second marriage,
219 etseq.; visit to United States,
221 ; probable origin of his for
tune, 223 ; his error in regard to
financing of public works, 225 ;
re-elected President, 235 ; subse
quent re-elections, 236 et seq. ;
beginning of his second term, 241 ;
choice of Minister of Finance, 257 ;
makes reductions in army, 259 ;

INDEX

317

purchases of railways, 259 — 260 ;
charges of inhumanity brought
against, 267 ; co-operates with
United States to suppress
Apaches, 269 ; favours capitalists
and land companies, 284 et seq.; re
elected in 1904, 290 — 291 ; meets
Mr. Taft on frontier, 295 ; his
strength begins to fail, 296 ;
decides to be re-elected in 1910,
ibid, and 298 ; struggles to
maintain his position, 303 ; his
strength breaks down, 304 ;
resigns and leaves country, ibid. ;
death in Paris, 305
Dominguez, Canon, afterwards
Bishop of Oaxaca, godfather of
Porfirio Diaz, aids in his educa
tion, 4

Escandon, Antonio, concession
aire of Veracruz line, 225
Forey, General, besieges Puebla,
65 — 72 ; occupies city of Mexico,
73 ; superseded by Bazaine, ibid.
Fornaro, Carlo de, abuse of Diaz, 120
Franco, Pablo, Imperial Prefect of
Oaxaca, executed by Diaz, 103
Fuero militar and eclesiastico,
what meant, 27

Gonzalez, General, left in com
mand by Diaz in North, 156;
elected President in 1880, 216
et seq. ; his Presidency, 222
et seq. ; retires, 235
Gourgaud, Baron, his quotation of
Napoleon, 122
Grant, General Ulysses S., visits
Mexico, 222
Guardias Rurales, reorganised by
Diaz, their origin and functions,
178 et seq.

Hardy, Lieutenant R. W. H., R.N.,
his account of Yaquis, 272
Hernandez, Fidencio, commands
for Diaz in Oaxaca, 153 et seq.

Hidalgo, priest, his revolt, 22;
death, 23
Huerta, General, protects Diaz, 304

Iglesias, Jose Maria, 144; Presi
dent of Supreme Court, 152;
conflict with Lerdo de Tejada,
ibid, et seq. ; his pretensions, 155
et seq. ; supported in North, 156 ;
his opposition to Diaz and
defeat, 162 et seq. ; escapes to
United States, 166
Indiada, meaning of term, 40, 41
Indians, Mexican, causes of their
poverty, 126 — 128 ; why pro
sperity of Mexico did not benefit
them, 282 et seq.
Ixcamula, action at, 156

Jecker, and Jecker bonds, 54, 55
Juarez, Benito, President of Mexico,
is Professor at Oaxaca, 5 ; his
influence in Oaxaca, 29 ; exiled,
3 1 ; Governor of Oaxaca, 42 ;
resists French intervention, 63
et seq. ; passes Ley Juarez, 43 ;
becomes President, 44 ; leaves
city of Mexico, 73 ; behaviour to
Maximilian, 112; re-elected, 131,
136; tries to perpetuate himself
in office, 137 et seq. ; his death,
148

Lago, Baron, Austrian Minister,
arranges capitulation of city of
Mexico, 114, 115
Lepero, vagabond class, 253
Lerdo de Tejada, Sebastian, Presi
dent of Supreme Court, his party,
138 ; stands as President, 139 ;
becomes President on death of
Juarez, 148; his character, 150 ;
political errors, 151 ; over
thrown, and escapes to United
States, 161
Lerdo de Tejada, Law so called, 51
Ley Fuga, its purpose, 179
Limantour, Jose, financier, 135 ;
becomes Minister of Finance,
256 ; Minister of Finance, 257 ;

3i8

INDEX

quoted, 265 ; indicated as succes
sor to Diaz, 291 — 292 ; adheres
to Diaz, 304
Lorencez, General, commands
French troops in Mexico, 58 j
defeated at Puebla, 61 — 62

Macgregor, Gregor, Cacique of
Poyais, 53
Madero, Francisco, his origin, 293 ;
opposes Diaz, 299 et seq. ; his
opinions, 300 ; imprisoned, 302 ;
revolts, 303
Magnus, Baron, assists in defence
of Maximilian, 114
Marquez, General, called Tiger of
Tacubaya, Conservative leader,
51, 52 ; his defence of city of
Mexico, 112 et seq.; endeavours
to relieve Puebla, 108, 1 10 ;
defends city of Mexico, 113
etseq.; his escape, 115
Marquez de Leon, General, revolts
in Sinaloa and Lower California,
198
Matamoros, taken by Diaz, 156, 157
Mateo Xindihui, San, action at, 146
Maximilian, Archduke, Emperor of
Mexico, his character, 57 ; reaches
Mexico, 74 ; resists claims of
Church, 75 ; recognition of re
fused by United States, 75 ;
. painful position of, 89 ; his
fall and death, m, 112
Mayas, Indian tribe of Yucatan, 277
et seq.
Mexico, Republic of — colonial
period, 10 — 22 ; first civil war in,
23 ; declares its independence, 24 ;
anarchy in, 25 ; condition in 1859,
53 et seq. ; its physical defi
ciencies, 124, 125 ; city of,
besieged and taken by Repub
licans, 113, 115 ; drainage of, 260
et seq.
Miahuatlan, action at, 99
Michoacan, disturbances in, see
Church
Mier y Teran, Luis, see Teran.
Miramon, General, leader of Con
servatives, 44 ; borrows money
from Jecker, 55

Mitla battle, 48
Mori, Patrona, mother of Porfirio
Diaz, 2 ; widowed, 3
Moyos, Indian tribe in Sonora, 271

Napoleon I., Emperor, quoted, 122
Napoleon III., Emperor of French,
reasons for his intervention in
Mexico, 56
Nickel currency, story of, 233 et seq.
Noria, La, Diaz's ranch, 134 ;
proclamation of, 145 ; burnt, 149
Nufio de Guzman, Spanish explorer,
discovers Yaquis, 270

Oaxaca, State and City, Porfirio
Diaz born in, 1 ; taken by ene
mies of Dictator Santa Ana, 40 ;
retaken, 41 ; taken again, 42 ;
taken by Republicans, 49 ; sur
rendered to French, 85 ; risings
in, 144, 153; Diaz becomes
Governor of, 218
Ord, General, instructed to pursue
marauders in Mexico, 193
Ordaz, Republican General, killed,
48
Orizaba, defence of by French, 62
Oronoz, General, Imperialist Gover
nor of Oaxaca, 98 et seq.
Ortega, Dona Delfina, first wife of
Diaz, 134
Ortega, General, Governor of
Puebla, 65 et seq.

Palo Blanco, plan of, 154 et seq.
Perez, Marcos, Professor, patronizes
Porfirio Diaz, 29 ; imprisoned,
33 ; in civil war, 49
Pin, Colonel du, commands French
counter guerrilla, 63
Pindray, Comte de, filibuster, his
death, 54
Portazgos, ship taxes, 245, 248
Prim, General, commands Spanish
troops in Mexico, 56 et seq.
Puebla de Los Angeles, repulse of
French at, 61 ; siege of by
French, 65, 72 ; Diaz takes, 108

INDEX

319

Queretaro, siege of, in
Quivira, supposed Eldorado, 270
Ramirez, Jesus, revolts in Sinaloa,
198 ; shot, 199
Raousset-Boulbon, Gaston Raoulx,
Comte de, filibuster, his career,
5+
Reyes, General, chosen as candidate
for Vice-Presidency, 299 ; exiled,
ibid, and 302
Rhodes, Cecil, his view of Mexico,
121
Root, Mr. Elihu, visit to Mexico,
and his praise of Diaz, 294
Rosas Landa, General, Republican
leader, his misconduct, 49
Rotative compromise, meaning of,
212, 214
Saligny, M. de, French Minister in
Mexico, 56 ; misleads General
Lorencez, 59
Salinas, General, Republican leader,
his failure, 48, 49
Salm Salm, Prince, quoted, 109, 113
Santa Ana, Dictator of Mexico, his
character, 31
Sherman, General, occupies Savan
nah, 88
Sonora, Province, mines of, and
raids of filibusters on, 54
Tabera, Ramon, General, surrenders
city of Mexico, 1 1 5
Taft, Mr., President of United States,
meets Diaz on frontier, 295
Tecoac, battle of, 160
Tehuantepec Isthmus, 45 et seq.
Teran, Luis Mier y, General, sup
ports Diaz, 146 ; Governor of
Veracruz, his character and bru
tality, 200 — 206 ; rejected as
successor to Diaz, 216
Textupec, plan of, 154 et seq.

Thornton, Sir Edward, British
Minister at Washington, -arbi
trates between the United States
and Mexico, 188
Tierra Baldia, meaning of, 283
Tolentino, General, joins Diaz, 160
Torreon, massacre of Chinese at, 285
Trevifio, General, instructed by
Diaz to restore order on frontier,
194
Turner, J. R., author of " Bar
barous Mexico," quoted, 275
United States, their patience with
Mexico, 184, 187
Uraga, General, goes over to
Maximilian and attempts to
seduce Diaz, 82 — 83
Valle Nacional, tobacco planta
tions of and slavery on, 279 et seq.
Vega, Diaz de la, General, makes
sortie from Mexico, 113
Veracruz, headquarters of Repub
lican party, 44 ; massacre at,
200 et seq. ; railway from to
Mexico, 225 ; Pacific railway line
purchased by Government, 259
Walker, filibuster, 53
Wyke, Sir Charles, British Minister
in Mexico, 56
Yaquis, Indian tribe, story of, 270
et seq.
Yucatan, Province, 275 ; sisal
hemp plantations of, 277 ;
slavery on, 278 el seq.
Zapoteca, Indian tribe, their
character, 30
Zaragoza, General, defends Puebla,
58 et seq. ; his death, 65

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