YALE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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JL MEMO IB

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OF

THE LAST YEAR

OF THE

War FOR INDEPENDENCE,;

IN THK

[ HX)llFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,

CONTAINING

i AN ACCODXT OF THE OPERATIONS OF HIS COMMANDS
IN THE TEARS 1864 AND 1865.

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g LIEUTENANT-GEXERAL JX-BAL A. EARLY,
or TBE PBOTISIOSAL ABMT OF TfiE COJTFKDKHATE STATES.

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tBBLISHEl) BY CHARLES W; BU:P^pftF ff^yjg
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^ MEMOIR

OP

THE LAST YEAR

OF THE

WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE,

IN THE
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,
COXTAININQ
AN ACCOUNT OF TIIE OPERATIONS OF HIS COMMANDS
IN' THE YEARS 1864 AND 1865.
LIEUTEXANT-GENERAL JURAL A. EARLY,
OT THB PEOVISIOSAl -IBMV Or THK COSPEDERATE STATM,

D E D I C A T E n
So li)i ^tmots of tbt il^ttoic StaJt, SdIjo ftll f iattinjj foi liiettj, 3ftigf)t Sc Justiw.

¦ /j£0 VINDICE."

PUBLISHED BY CHARLES W. BUTTON,
1867

KTOTE B-ST THE X'XJBLISHETl.

The author of this work, having generously placed it at the disposal of the
Memorial Associations of Virginia, — engaged in the pious task of collecting the re
mains of the Southern soldiers who fell on Virginia battle-fields, with the view of
enclosing and marking their graves, — it is published at the lowest possible cost,
for the purpose of raising funds for this praise-worthy object. All the profits
arising from the sale of the work will be sacredly appropriated to the end in view .
In a letter to the publisher Gen, Early says : "Perhaps I might have made some
thing by. a sale of the work ; but I wanted to keep clear of all suspicion of writ
ing a book for money." He adds: "You can judge whether it is worthy of
republication. One thing is certain — it contains the truth," And nobody who
knows Jubal A. Early as we know him, will question his veracitv.
Apart from the intrinsic merits of the work, — as a valuable contribution to the
history of the late war — revealing facts connected with a campaign that has not
been understood even by our own people, — it is hoped that the laudable object of
those who have incurred the expense of republishing it, will secure for this pro
duction of a gallant and meritorious officer an extended sale.

Gc.5G.355l:>

PREFACE .
Under a solemn sense of duty to my unhappy country, and
to the brave soldiers who fought under me, as well as to my
self, the following pages have been written.
When the question of practical secession from the United
States arose, as a citizen of the State of Virginia, and a
member of the Convention called by the authority of the Leg
islature of that State, I opposed secession with all the ability I
possessed, with the hope that the horrors of civil war might be
averted, and that a returning sense of duty and justice on the
part of the masses of the iJTorthern States, would induce them
to respect the rights of the people of the South. "While somia
Northern politicians and editors, who subsequently took rank
among the most unscrupulous and vindictive of our enemies,
and now hold me to be a traitor and rebel, were openly and
sedulously justifying and encouraging secession, I was la
boring honestly and earnestly to preserve the Union.
As a member of the Virginia Convention, I voted against
the ordinance of secession on its passage by that body, with
the hope that, even then, the collision of arms might be avoided,
and some satisfactory adjustment arrived at. The adoption of
that ordinance wrung from me bitter tears of gri^ef ; but I at
once recognized my duty to abide the decision of my native
State, and to defend her soil against invasion. Any scruples
which I may have entertained as to the right of secession,
were soon dispelled by the mad, wicked, and unconstitutional
measures of the authorities at Washington, and the frenzied
clamour of the people of the North for war upon their former
brethren of the South. I then, and ever since have, regarded
Abraham Lincoln, his counsellors and supporters, as the real

IV PREFACE.
traitors who had overthrown the constitution and government
of the United States, and established in lieu thereof an odious
despotism ; and this opinion I entered on the journal of the
Convention when I signed the ordinance of secession. I
recognized the right of resistance and revolution as exercised
by our fathers in 1776, and, without cavil as to the name by
which it was called, I entered the military service of my State,
willingly, cheerfully, and zealously.
"When the State of Virginia became one of the Confederate
States, and her troops were turned over to the Confederate
Grovernment, I embraced the cause of the whole Confederacy
with equal ardoui-, and continued in the service, with the de
termination to devote all the energy and talent I possessed to
the common defence. I fought through the entire war, without
once regretting the course I had pursued; with an abiding
faith in the justice of our cause ; and I never saw the moment
when I would have been willing to consent to any compromise
or settlement short of the absolute independence of my
country. It was my fortune to participate in most of the great military
operations in which the army in Virginia was engaged, both
before and after G-eneral Lee assumed the command. In the
last year of this momentous struggle, I commanded, at differ
ent times, a division and two corps of General Lee's Army, in
the campaign from the Rapidan to Jaines River, and, subse
quently, a separate force which marched into Maryland,
threatened WaBhington City, and then went through an event
ful campaign in the Valley of Virginia. I^o detailed reports
of the operations of these different commands were made
before the close of the war, and the campaign in Maryland
and the Valley of Virginia has been the subject of much com
ment and misapprehension. I have now written a narrative of
the operations of all my commands during the closino- year of
the war, and lay it before the world as a contributien to the
history of our great struggle for independence. In givino- that
narrative, I have made such statements of the positions and
strength of the opposing forces in Virginia, and such reference
to their general operations, as were necessary to enable the

P R E F A 0 F. v
reader to understand it ; but I do not pretend to detail the
operations of other commanders.
I have not found it necessary to be guilty of the injustice of
attempting to pull down the reputation of any of my fellow
officers, in order to build up my own. My operations and my
campaign stand on their own merits, whatever they may be.
ISTor, in anything I may have found it necessary to say in regard
to the conduct of my troops, do I wish to be understood as, in
way, decrying the soldiers who constituted the rank and file of
my commands. I believe that the world has never produced a
body of men superior, in courage, patriotism, and endurance,
to the private soldiers of the Confederate armies. I have
repeatedly seen those soldiers submit, with cheerfulness, to
privations and hardships which would appear to be almost
incredible ; and the wild cheers of our brave men, (which were
?o different from the studied hurrahs of the Yankees,) when
their thin lines sent back opposing hosts of Federal troops,
staggering, reeling, and flying, have often thrilled every fibre
in my heart. I have seen, with my own eyes, ragged, bare
footed, and hungry Confederate soldiers perform deeds, which,
if performed in days of yore by mailed warriours in glittering
armour, would have inspired the liarp of the minstrel and the
pen of the poet.
I do not aspire to the character of a historian, but, having
been a witness of and participator in great events, I have given
a statement of what I saw and did, for the use of the future
historian. "Without breaking the thread of my narrative, as it
proceeds, I have given, in notes, comments on some of the
errors and inconsistencies committed by the commander of the
Federal army. General Grant, and the Federal Secretary of
"War, Mr. Stanton, in their reports made since the close of the
war; also some instances of cruelty and barbarity committed
by the Federal commanders, which were brought to my im
mediate attention, as well as some other matters of interest.
As was to have been expected, our enemies have flooded the
press with sketches and histories, in which all the appliances of
a meretricious literature have been made use of, to glorify
their own cause and its supporters, and to blacken ours. But

someor

VI PREFACE
„_ Southern writers also, who preferred the pen to the sword
„ musket, have not been able to resist the temptation to rush
into print; and, accordingly, carping criticisms have been
written by the light of after events, and even histories of the
war attempted by persons, who imagined that the distinctness
of their vision was enhanced by distance from the scene of
conflict, and an exemption from the disturbing elements of
whistling bullets and bursting shells. Perhaps other writers
of the same class may follow, and various speculations be
indulged in, as to the causes of our disasters. As for myself, I
have not undertaken to speculate as to the causes of our failure,
as I have seen abundant reason for it in the tremendous odds
brought against us. Having had some means of judging, I
will, however, say that, in my opinion, both President Davis
and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did all for the
success of our cause which it was possible for mortal men to
do ; and it is a great pri-sdiege and comfort for me so to believe,
and to have been able to bring Avith me into exile a profound '
love and veneration for those great men.
In regard to my own services, all I have to say is, that I
have the consciousness of having done my duty to my country,
to the very best of my ability, aud, whatever may be my late,
I would not exchange that consciousness for untold miUions.
I have come into exile rather than submit to the yoke of the
oppressors of my country ; but I have never thought of attrib
uting aught of blame or censure to those true men who, after
having nobly done their duty in the dreadful struggle through
which we passed, now, that it has gone against us, remain to
share the misfortunes of their people, and to aid and comfort
them iu their trials ; on the contrary, I appreciate and honour
their motives. I have not sought refuge in another land from
insensibility to the wrongs and sufferings of my own country;
but I feel deeply and continually for them, and could my life
secure the redemption of that country, as it has been often
risked, so now it would be as freely given for that object.
There were men born and nurtured in the Southern States,
and some of them in my own State, who took sides with our
enemies, and aided in desolating and hijmiliating the land of

P K E P A C E . VII
their own birth, and of the graves of their ancestors. Some
of them rose to high positions in the United States Army, and
others to high civil positions. I envy them not their dearly
bought prosperity. I had rather be the humblest private sol
dier who fought in the ranks of the Confederate Army, and
now, maimed and disabled, hobbles on his crutches from house
to house, to receive his daily bread from the hands of the
grateful women for whose homes he fought, than the highest
of those renegades and traitors. Let them enjoy the advant
ages of their present positions as best they may ! for the deep
and bitter execrations of an entire people now attend them,
and an immortalily of infamy awaits them. As for all the
enemies who have overrun or aided in overrunning my country,
tliere is a wide and impassable gulf between us, in which I see
the blood of slaughtered friends, comrades, and countrymen,
which all the waters in the firmament above and the seas
beneath cannot wash away. Those enemies have undertaken
to render our cause odious and infamous ; and among other
atrocities committed by them in the effort to do so, an humble
subordinate, poor Wirz, has been selected as a victim to a
fiendish spirit, and basely murdered under an executive edict,
t^flinded on the sentence of a vindictive and illegal tribunal.
Let them continue this system ! they are but erecting monu
ments to their own eternal dishonour, and furnishing finger
posts to guide the historian in his researches. They may'
employ the infamous Holt, with his "Bureau of Military .Jus
tice," to saciifice other victims on the altars of their hatred,
and provost marshals, and agents of the "Freedman's Bureau,"
may riot in all the license of petty tyranny, but our enemies
can no more control the verdict of impartial history, than they
can escape that doom which awaits them at the final judgment.
During the war, slavery was used as a catchword to arouse
the jpassions of a fanatical mob, and to some extent the preju
dices of the civilized world were excited against us ; but the
war was not made on our part for slavery. High dignitaries
in both church and state in Old England, and puritans in New
England, had participated in the profits of a trade, by which
the ignorant and barbarous natives of Africa were brought

VIII P R 'E V A C -E
from that country, and sold into slavery ih the American Col
onies. The generation in the Southern.States which defended,
their country in the late war, found ^mongst them, in a civi
lized and christianized condition, 4,000,000 of the descendants
of those degraded Africans. The Almighty Creator of the
Universe had stamped them, indelibly, with a different colour
and an inferior physical and mental organization. He had not
done this from mere caprice or whim, but for wise purposes.
An amalgamation of the races was in contravention of His
designs, or He would not have- made them so different. This
immense number of people could not have been transported
back to the wilds frora- which their ancestors were taken, or if
they could have been, it would have resulted in their relapse
into barbarism. Reason, common sense, true humanity to the
black, as well as the safety ot the white race, required that the
inferior race should -be kept in a state of subordination. The
condition of domestic slavery, as it existed in the South, had
not only resulted; in a great improvement in the moral and
physical condition of the negro race, but had furnished a class
of labourers as happy and contented as any in the world, if not
more so. Their labour had not only developed the immense
resources of the immediate country in \vhich they were located,
but was the main source of the great prosperity of the United
States, aud furnished the means for the employment of mil
lions of the working classes in other countries. Nevertheless,
the struggle made by the people of the Soutli was not for the
institution of slavery, but for the inestimable right of self-
government, against the domination of a fanatical faction at
the North;" and slavery was the mere occasion of the develop
ment of the antagonism between the two sections. That rio-ht
of self-government has been lost, and slavery violently abol
ished. ^ "Fonr millions of blacks have thus been thrown ou
their own resources, to starve, to die, and to relapse into bar
barism ; and inconceivable miseries have been entailed on the
white race.
The civilized world will find, too late, that its philanthropy
has been all false, and its religion all wrong on this subject ;
and the people of the United States will find that, under the

PREFACE. 12
pretence of "saving the life of the nation, and upholding the
old flag," they have surrendered their own liberties into the
hands of that worst of all tyrants, a body of senseless fanatics.
When the passions and infatuations of the day shall have
been dissipated by time, and all the results of the late war
shall have pass'ed into irrevocable history, the future chroni
cler of that history will have a most important duty to pei<
form, and posterity, while poring over its pages, will be lost
in wonder at the follies and crimes committed in this gen
eration. My narrative is now given to the public, andthe sole merit I
claim for it is that of truthfulness. In writing it, I have
received material aid from an accurate diary kept by Lieu
tenant William W. Old, aide to Major General Edward John
son, who was with me during the campaign in Maryland and
the Shenandoah Valley until the 12th of August, 1864, and the
copious notes of Captain J. Kotehkiss, who acted as Topo
graphical Engineer for the 2iid Corps and the Army of the
Valley District, and recorded the events, of each day, from the
opening of the campaign on the Rapidan iu May, 1864, until
the affair at Waynesboro' in March, 1865.
J. A. EARLY.
November, 1866.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

This work was written under an imperative sense of duty,
as a matter of historical evidence; and, for re'asons which will
be understood, I determined from the beginning not to make
it a source of personal profit. The first edition was published in
Canada at my own expense for gratuitous distribution, and was
necessarily limited. Some errors and inaccuracies which una
voidably crept into that edition,— the greater part being mere
typographical mistakes, — have been corrected, though these
corrections make no material change iu any of the statements
of facts contained in my narrative ; and this edition is pub
lished for the benefit of the Ladies' Memorial Associations of
Virginia, which have undertaken the work of collecting the
remains and marking the graves of the Confederate dead, who
fell on the battle-fields of that State. Let it not be supposed
that this appropriation has been made because these Associa
tions are in my own dearly loved State. No ! the feeling.4
which have dictated it are not confined to her limits, bnt
embrace the whole South, from the Potomac to the Rio
Grande. Our enemies are in the habit of referring scoffingly
to Virginia as the "sacred soil ; " and in the hearts of all her
true sons and daughters, her soil is, and from tirae immemorial
has been held sacred.; as well because of the associations
connected with her history, as because it is the land of their
birth, and with that soil mingle the ashes of their ancestorn.
This sentiment all true men everywhere must appreciate and
honour. But the soil of Virginia is now, and henceforth will
be, held sacred in the hearts of all true Southern mon and
women, because she has been baptized in the blood and has
received into her bosom the remains of thousands upon thou-

XII PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION,
sands of the truest and noblest sons of the entire Confederacy.
It is from this consideration that I have made the appropria
tion designated.
When the duty assumed by the ladies of Virginia shall have
been fulfilled, it ^v\R carry consolation to the hearts of many
mourning mothers and widows in the savannahs of the South,
as well as upon the far distant plains of Texas, whose heart.s
will yearn with gratitude towards their noble sistei-s r>f the
grand old State — grand even in her inisfortunes.
J. A. EARLY.
Toronto, February 1st, 1867.

CAMPATCtX in VIRGINIA,
FROM THE
RAPIDAN TO JAMES PIVEH,

INTRODUCTION.
On the 3rd of May, 1864, the positions of the Confederate
Army under General Lee, and the Federal Army under Lieu-
tenant-General Grant, in Virginia, were as follows : General
Lee held the southern bank of the Rapidan River, in Orange
count}-, -with his right resting near the mouth of Mine Run,
and his left extending to Libert}' Mills on the road from
Gordons-sdlle (via Madison Court House) to the Shenandoah
Valley ; while the crossings of the river on the right, and the
roads on the left were watched by cavalry. Ewell's corps was
on the right. Hill's on the left, and two di-visions of Long-
street's corps were encamped in the rear, near Gordonsville.
Grant's army (composed of the Army of the Potomac under
Meade, and the 9th corps under Burnside,) occupied the north
banks of the Rapidan and Robertson rivers; the main body
being encamped in Culpeper county, and on the Rappahan
nock River.
I am satisfied that General Lee's army did not exceed
50,000 effective men of all arms. The report of the Federal
Secretary of War, Stanton, shows that the "available force
present for duty. May 1st, 1864," in Grant's army, was 141,166,
to-wit : In the Army of the Potomac 120,386, and in the 9th
corps 20,780. The draft in the United States was being ener
getically enforced, and volunteering had been greatly stimu
lated by high bounties. The North- Western States had ten-

14 INTRODUCTION.
dered large bodies of troops to serve one hundred days, in
order to relieve other troops on garrison and local duty, and
this enabled Grant to put in the field a large number of troops
which had been employed on that kind of duty. It was known
that he was receiving heavy reinforcements up to the very time
of his movement on the 4th of May, and afterwards ; so that
the statement of his force on the 1st of May, by Stanton, does
not cover the whole force with which he commenced the cam
paign. Moreover, Secretary Stantou's report shows that there
were, in the Department of AV'ashington and the Middle
Department, 47,751 available men for duty, the chief part of
which, he says, was called to the front after the campaign
began, " in order to repair the losses of the Army of thc Poto
mac;" and Grant says that, at Spotsylvania Court House,
" the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th [of May,] were con
sumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforce
ments from Washington." His army, therefore, must have
numbered very nearly, if not quite, 200,000 men, before a
junction was effected with Butler.
On the 4th of May, it was discovered that Grant's Army
was moving towards Germanna Ford on the Rapidan, which
was ten or twelve miles from our right. This movement had
begun on the night of the 3rd, and the enemy succeeded m
seizing the ford, aud effecting a crossing, as the river was
guarded at that point by only a small cavalry picket. The
direct road from Germanna Ford to Richmond passes by Spot
sylvania Court House, aud when Grant had effected his cross
ing, he was nearer to Richmond than General Lee was. Prom
Orange Court House, near which were General Lee's head
quarters, there are two nearly parallel roads running east-
wardly to Fredericksburg — the one which is nearest to the
river being called " The old Stone Pike," and the other " The
Plank Road." The road from Germanna Ford to Spotsjdva-
nia Court House, crosses the old Stone Pike at the " Old Wil
derness Tavern," aud two or three miles further on, it crosses
the Plank Road.
As soon as it was ascertained that Grant's movement was a
serious one, preparations were made to meet him, and the

INTRODUCTION. 15
troops of General Lee's Army were put iu motion — Ewell's
corps moving on tlie old Stone Pike, and HiU's corps ou the
Plank lload ; into which latter road Longstreet's force also
came, from his camp near Gordonsville.
Ewell's corps, to which my division belonged, crossed Mine
Run, aud encamped at Locust Grove, four miles beyond, un
the afternoon of the 4th. Wlieu the rest of the corps moved.
my division and Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division were
left to watch the fords of the Rapidan, until relieved by
cavalry. As soon as this was done, I moved to the position
occupied bj- the rest of the corps, carrying Ramseur A\ith nie.
Ewell's corps contained three divisions of infantry, to-wit:
.Johnson's, Eodes', and my own (Early's). At this time,
one of my brigades (Hoke's) was abseut, having been with
Hoke in North Carolina ; aud I had only three present, to wit :
Hays', Pegram's, and Gordon's. One of Rodes' brigades (1!.
D. Johnston's) was at Hanover Junction. I had about 4,000
luuskets for duty; Johnson about the same number; and
Rodes (including .Johnston's brigade) about 6,000.

iJATTLEH OF THE A\^1LDERNE8S.
OPERATIONS OF EARLY'S DIVISION.
On the raorning of the 5th, Ewell's cordis was put in motion,
my division bringing np the rear. A short dLstance from the
Old Wilderness Tavern, and just in advance of the place where
a road diverges to the left from the old Stone Pike to the Ger
manna Ford road, the eneray, in heavy force, was encountered,
and Jones' brigade, of .lohnson's division, and Battle's brigade,
of Rodes' division, were driven back in some confusion. My
division was ordered up, and formed across the pike: Gordon's
brigade being on the right of tho road. This brigade, as soon
as it was brought into line, was ordered forward, and ad
vanced, through a dense pine thicket, in gallant stA'le. In
conjunction Avith Daniel's, Doles', and Rainsonr's brigades, of
Rodes' division, it drove the enemy back with heavy loss, cap
turing several lumdred prisoners, and gaining a commanding
position on the right. -Johnson, at the same time, was heavily
engaged in his front; his division being on the left of the pike,
and extending across the road to the Germanna Ford road,
which has been mentioned. After the enemy had been re
pulsed. Hays' brigade was sent to Johnson's left, in order to
participate in a forward movement; aud it did move forward,
some half-a-mile or so, encountering the enemy iu force ; but,
from some mistake, not meeting with the expected co-opera
tion, except from oue regiment of Jones' brigade (the 25th
Va.), the most of which was captured, it Avas drawn back to
.Johnson's line, and took position on his left.
,Pegram's brigade was subsequently sent to take position on
Hays' left; and, just before night, a very heavy attack was
made on its front, which Avas repulsed Avith scA'cre loss to the
enemy. In this aff'air, General Pegram received a severe
wound in the leg, Avhich disabled him for the field for some
months. During the afternoon there was heavy skirmishing along the

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 17
Avhole line, several attempts having been made by the enemy,
Avithout success, to regain the position from which he had been
driven ; and tlie fighting extended to General Lee's right, on
the Plank Road. Gordon occupied the position which he had
gained, on the right, until after dark, wheu he was withdrawn
to the extreme left, and his place occupied by part of Rodes'
division. The troops encountered, in the beginning of the fight, con
sisted of the 5th corps, under Warren ; but other troops were
brought to his assistance. At the close of the day, Ewell's
corps had captured OA'er a thousand prisoners, besides inflict
ing on the enemy very heaAw losses in killed and Avounded.
Two pieces of artillery had been abandoned by the enemy,
just iu front of the point at which Johnson's right and Rodes'
left joined, and were subsequently secured by our troops.
After the withdrawal of Gordon's brigade from the right,
the whole of my division was ou the left of the road diverging
fi-om the pike, in extension of Johnson's line. All my bri
gades had behaved handsomely; and Gordon's advance, at the
time of the 'confusion, in the beginning of the tight, was made
Avith great energy and dispatch, and Avas just iu time to pre
vent a serious disaster.
Early on the morning of the 6th, the fighting was resumed,
aud a very heavj- attack was made on the front occupied by
Pegram's brigade (now under the command of Colonel Hoff'-
man, of the 31st Virginia Regiment) ; but it was handsomely
repulsed, as were several subsequent attacks at the same point.
These attacks were so persistent, that two regiments of
.Johnson's division Avere moved to the rear of Pegram's bri
gade, for the purpose of supporting it; and, Avhen an offer was
raade to relieve it, under the apprehension that its ammuni
tion might be exhausted, the men of that gallant brigade
begged that they might be alloAvcd to retain their position,
stating that they were getting along very Avell indeed, and
Avanted no help.
During the morning, the fact Avas communicated to General
Ewell, by our cavaliy scouts, that a column of the enemy's
c

18 BATTLES OP THE WILDERNESS.
infantry was moving between our left and the river, with the
apparent purpose of turning our left flank; and information
was also received that Burnside's corps had crossed the river,
and was in rear of the enemy's right. I received directions to
watch this column, and take steps to prevent its getting to our
rear ; and Johnston's brigade, of Rodes' division, which had
just arrived from Hanover Junction, was sent to me for that
purpose. This brigade, with some artillery, was put in posi
tion, some distance to my left, so as to command some bye-
roads coming in from the river. In the meantime General
Gordon had sent out a scouting party on foot, which discov
ered what was supposed to be the enemy's right flank resting
in the woods, in front of my diAdsion; and, during roy absence
Avhile posting Johnston's brigade, he reported the fact to
General EavcII, and suggested the propriety of attacking this
flank of the enemy with his brigade, Avhich was not engaged.
Ou my return, the subject Avas mentioned to me by General
EavcII, and I stated to him the danger and risk of making the
attack under the circumstances, as a column was threatening
our left flank, and Burnside's corps was in rear of the enemy's
flank on which the attack was suggested. General Ewell con-
t;urred with me in this opinion, and the impolicy of the attempt
at that time was obvious, as we had no reserves, and, if it
failed, and the enemy showed any enterprise, a serious disaster
Avould befall, not only our corps, but General Lee's Avhole army.
In the afternoon, when the column threatening our left had
been withdrawn, and it had been ascertained that Burnside had
gone to Grant's left, on account of the heavy fighting ou that
flank, at my suggestion. General EavoU ordered the movement
which Gordon had proposed. I determined to make it Avith
Gordon's brigade supported by Jqlmston's, and to follow it up,
if successful, Avith the rest of my division. Gordon's brigade
was accordingly formed in line near the edge of the woods in
Avhich the enemy's right rested, and Johnston's in the rear,
with orders to folloAV Gordon aud obey his orders. I posted
my Adjutant General, Major John W. Daniel, with a courier,
in a position to be communicated with by Gordon, so as to
inform me of the success attending the movement, and enable

BATTLES OP THE WILDERNESS. 19
me to put in the other brigades at the right time. As soon as
Gordon started, which was a very short time before sunset, I
rode to my line and threw forward Pegram's brigade in a posi
tion to move when required. In the meantime Gordon had
become engaged, and, while Pegram's brigade was being
formed in line, I saw some of Gordon's men coming back in
confusion, and Colonel Evans, of the 31st Georgia Regiment,
endeavoring to rally them. Colonel Evans informed me that
his regiment, which was on Gordon's right, had struck the
enemy's breastworks and had given way. I immediately
ordered Pegram's brigade forward, and directed Colonel
Evans to guide it. Its advance was through a dense thicket of
underbrush, but it crossed the road running through John
son's line, and struck the enemy's works, and one of the regi
ments, the 13th Virginia, under Colonel Terrill, got posses
sion of part of the line, when Colonel Hoffman ordered the
brigade to retire, as it was getting dark, and there was much
confusion produced by the difficulties of the advance. Gordon
had struck the enemy's right flank behind breastworks, and a
part of his brigade was thrown into disorder. In going
through the woods, Johnston had obliqued too much and
passed to Gordon's left, getting in rear of the enemy. Major
Daniel, not hearing from Gordon, had endeavored to get to
him, when, finding the condition of things, he attempted to
lead one of Pegram's regiments to his assistance, and was shot
down while behaving with great gallantry, receiving a wound
in the leg which has permanently disabled him. Notwith
standing the confusion in part of his brigade, Gordon succeeded
in throwing the enemy's right flank into great confusion, cap
turing two brigadier generals (Seymour and Shaler), and several
hundred prisoners, all of the 6th Corps, under Sedgwick. The
advance of Pegram's brigade, and the demonstration of John
ston's brigade in the rear, where it encountered a part of the
eneiny's force and captured some prisoners, contributed ma
terially to the result. It was fortunate, however, that darkness
came to close this affair, as the enemy, if he had been able to
discover the disorder on our side, might have brought up fresh
troops and availed himself of our condition. As it was.

30 BATTLES OF THB WILDERNESS.
doubtless, the lateness of the hour caused him to be surprised,
and the approaching darkness increased the confusion in his
ranks, as he could not see the strength of the attacking force,
and probably imagined it to be much more formidable than it
really was. All of the brigades engaged in the attack were
drawn back, and formed on a new line in front of the old one,
and obliquely to it.
At light on the morning of the 7th, an advance was made,
which disclosed the fact that the enemy had given up his line
of works in front of my whole line, and a good portion of
Johnson's. Between the lines, a large number of his dead had
been left, and, at his breastworks, a large number of muskets
and knapsacks had been abandoned, and there was every in
dication of great confusion. It was not till then, that we
ascertained the full extent of the success attending the move
ment of the evening before. The enemy had entirely aban
doned the left side of the road, across which Johnson's line
extended, and my division and a part of his were throAvn for
ward, occupying a part of the abandoned works on the right
of the road, and leaving all those on the left in our rear. This
rendered our line straight, the left having been previously
thrown back, making a curve.
During this day there was some skirmishing, but no serious
fighting in my front. The loss in my division during the
fighting in the Wilderness was comparatively light.
On the morning of the 8th, it was discovered that the enemy
Avas leaving our front and moving towards Spotsylvania Court
House. General Lee's army was also put in motion ; Ewell's
corps moving along the hne occupied by our troops on the day
before, until it reached the Plank Road, where it struck across
to Shady Grove, which is on the road from Orange Court
House to Spotsylvania Court House.
On reaching the Plank Road, I received through General'A.
P. Hill, who was sick and uuable to remain on duty, an order
from General Lee, transferring Hays' brigade from my division
to Johnson's, in order that it might be consolidated with
another Louisiana brigade in that division, whose Brigadier-

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 21
General had been killed at the Wilderness, and Johnston's
brigade from Rodes' division to mine ; and assigning me to
the temporary command of Hill's corps, which was still hi
position across the Plank Road, and was to bring up the rear.
I accordingly turned over the command of my division to
Gordon, the senior Brigadier left with it, and assumed com
mand of Hill's corps.*
•In his official report, Grant says: "Early ou the 5th, the advance corps, the Sth, Major-
Oeneral G. K. Warren commanding, met and engaged the enemy outside his entrenchments
near Mine Run ;*' and further on he says : " On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances
showed that the enemy had fallen behind his entrenched lines, with pickets to the front
covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days
fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field,
notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he could wait an attack behind his
works." In mentioning his movement toward Spotsylvania Court House, he says : " But the
enemy having become aware of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to
reach there first" If these statements were true, the only legitimate inference is that Gen
eral Lee had an entrenched line on, or near Mine Bun, previously established ; that tho
battle commenced immediately in front of the works on this line ; and that, after the two
days fighting, he had fallen behind them to wait an attack. Whereas the fact is, that the
only entrenched line on, or near. Mine Bun, was that made, on its west bank, when Meade
crossed the river at the end of November, 1863, and which was used for that occasion only.
The fighting In the Wilderness began eight or ten miles east of that line, and at no time
during that fighting was it used for any purpose. The " entrenched lines " occupied by our
army on the moming of the 7th, were slight temporary works thrown up, on, or in front of
the battle-field, though it is probable that, at some points, the line may not have been so far
to the front, as our troops had advanced; as, in takmg it, regard was necessarily had to tho
conformation of the ground. On our left, as will be seen above, the line was advanced in
front of Grant's own line of the previous day.
Grant says General Lee had the advantage of position. As the latter had to move frora his
lines on the Bapidan and attack Grant in the AVilderness, how happened it that he was
enabled to get the advantage of position, after the two days fighting. He also says that Gen
eral Lee was enabled to reach Spotsylvania Court House, flrst, because he had the shorter
line. The fact is, that, as the two armies lay in their positions at the Wilderness, thoir lines
were parallel to the road to Spotsylvania Court House. Grant had the possession of the
direct road to that place, and he had the start. General Lee had to move on the circuitous
route by Shady Grove, and he was enabled to arrive at the Court House first with part of his
infantry, because his cavalry held Grant's advance in check for nearly an entire day.

BATTLES AROUND SPOTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE.
OPERATIONS OF HILL'S CORPS.
Hill's Corps was composed of Heth's, Wilcox's, and Ma
hone's (formerly Anderson's) divisions of infantry, and three
battahons of artillery under Colonel Walker. When I took
command of it, the infantry numbered about 13,000 muskets
for duty.
General Lee's orders to me, were to move by Todd's tavern
along the Brock Road to Spotsylvania Court House, as soon as
our front was clear of the enemy. In order to get into that
road, it was necessary to reopen an old one leading from Hill's
right, by which I was enabled to take a cross road leading into
the road from Shady Grove to Todd's tavern. The waggon
trains and all the artillery, except one battalion, was sent
around by Shady Grove. About a mile from the road from
Shady Grove to Todd's tavern, the enemy's cavalry videttes
were encountered, and Mahone's division was thrown forward
to develope the enemy's force and position. Mahone encoun
tered a force of infantry, which had moved up from Todd's
tavern towards Shady Grove, and had quite a brisk engage
ment with it, causing it to fall back rapidly towards the former
place. At the same time. General Hampton, who had com
municated with me, after I left the Plank Road, moved with
his cavalry on my right and struck the enemy on the flank and
rear ; but on account of want of knowledge of the country on
our part, and the approach of darkness, the enemy was enabled
to make his escape. This affair developed the fact that the
enemy was in possession of Todd's tavern and the Brock Road,
and a continuation of my march would have led through his
entire army. We bivouacked for the night, at the place from
which Mahone had driven the enemy, and a force was thrown
out towards Todd's tavern, which was about a mile distant.
 *
Very early next morning, (the 9th,) I received an order from

BATTLES OP SPOTSYLVANIA C. H, 23
General Lee, through Hampton, to move on the Shady Grove
road towards Spotsylvania Court House, which I did, crossing
a small river called the Po, twice. After reaching the rear of
the position occupied by the other tAvo corps, I was ordered to
Spotsylvania Court House, to take position on the right, and
cover the road from that place to Fredericksburg. No enemy
appeared in my front on this day, except at a distance on the
Fredericksburg Road.
Early on the morning of the IOth, I was ordered to move
one of my divisions back, to cover the crossing of the Po on
the Shady Grove road; and to move with another division, to
the rear and left, by the way of Spotsylvania Old Court House,
and drive back a column of the enemy which had crossed the
Po and taken possession of the Shady Gxove road, thus threat
ening our rear and endangering our trains, which were on the
I'oad leading by the Old Court House to Louisa Court House.
Our line was then north of the Po, with its left. Field's
division of Longstreet's corps, resting on that stream, just
above the crossing of the Shady Grove road. The whole of
the enemy's force was also north of the Po, prior to this move
ment of his. Mahone's division was sent to occupy the banks
of the Po on Field's left, while, with Heth's division and a bat
talion of artillery, I moved to the rear, crossing the Po on the
Louisa Court House Road, and then following that road until
Ave reached one coming in from Waite's Shop on the Shady
Grove Road. After moving about a mile on this road, we met
Hampton gradually falling back before the enemy, who had
pushed out a column of infantry considerably to the rear of
our line. This column, was, in turn, forced back to the posi
tion on the Shady Grove Road, which was occupied by what
was reported to be Hancock's corps. Following up and cross
ing a small stream just below a mill pond, we succeeded in
reaching Waite's Shop, from whence an attack was made on
the enemy, and the entire force which had crossed the Po was
driven back with a loss of one piece of artillery, which fell
into our hands, and a considerable number in killed and
wounded. This relieved us from a very threatening danger,
as the position the enemy had attained would have enabled

24 BATTLES OF SPOTSYLVANIA 0. H.
him to completely enfilade Field's position, and get possession
of the line of our communications to the rear, Avithin a veiy
short distance of which he was, when met by the force which
drove him back. In this aff'air, Heth's division behaved very
handsomely, all of the brigades, (Cook's, Davis', Kirkland's,
and Walker's,) being engaged in the attack. General H. H.
Walker had the misfortune to receive a severe wound in the
foot, which rendered amputation necessary, but, othenvise, our
loss was slight. As soon as the road Avas cleared, Mahone's
division crossed the Po, but it was not . practicable to pursue
the affair further, as the north bank of the stream at this pomt
Avas covered by a heavily entrenched line, Avith a number of
batteries, and night was approaching.
On the morning of the 11th, Heth was moved back to Spot
sylvania Court House, and Mahone Avas left to occupy the
position on the Shady Grove Road, from which the enemy had
been driven.*
My line on the right had been connected Avith Ewell's right,
and covered the Fredericksburg road, as also the road leading
from Spotsylvania Court House across the Ny into the road
from Fredericksburg to Hanover Junction. Wilcox AA'as on
my left uniting with Ewell, and Heth joined him. The enemy
had extended his lines across the Fredericksburg Road, but
there was no fighting on this front on the IOth or 11th, except
some artillery firing.
On the afternoon of the 11th, the enemy Avas demonstrating
to our left, up the Po, as if to get possession of Shady Grove
and the road from thence to Louisa Court House. General
Hampton reported a colura of infantiy moAdng up the Po, and
I was ordered by General Lee to take possession of Shady
Grove, by hght next morning, and hold it against the enemy.
To aid in that purpose, two brigades of Wilcox's diAasiou,

* It will be seen that, after tlus aftiiir, t held, for a time, both of Geneva! Lee's flank.'-,
which was rather an anomaly, but it could not be avoided, as we had no reserves, and the
two otlier corps, being immediately in front of the enemy, in line of battle, and alraost con
stantly engaged, could not bo movsd without great risk. It was absolutely necessai-y to
occupy the position held on the left by Malioue, to avoid a renewal of the danger frpm
which we had escaped.

BATTLES OF StOTSYLVANlA C, ll. 25
(Thomas' and Scales') were moved from the right, and Mahone
Avas ordered to move before light to Shady Grove ; but during
the night it w&s discovered that the movement to our left was
a feint, and that there Avas a real movement of tho enemy
towards our right.
Before daybreak on the morning of the 12th, Wilcox's bri
gades were returned to him, and at dawn, Mahone's diAdsion
Avas moved to the right, leaving Wright's brigade of that divi
sion to cover tho crossing of the Po on Field's left. On this
morning, the enemy made a very heaAy attack on EavcU's front,
and broke the line where it Avas occupied by Johnson's division.
A portion of the attacking force swept along Johnson's line to
Wilcox's left, and was checked by a prompt movement on the
part of Brigadier-General Lane, who was on that flank. As
seon as the firing was heard, General Wilcox sent Thomas'
and Scales' brigades to Lane's assistance, -and they arrived just
as Lane's brigade had repulsed this body of the enemy, and
they pursued it for a short distance. As soon as Mahone's
division arrived from the left, Perrin's and Harris' brigades of
that division, and subsequently, McGowan's brigade of Wil
cox's division, Avere sent to General EavcU's assistance, and
Avere carried into action under his orders. Brigadier-General
Perrin was killed, and Brigadier-General McGowan severely
Avounded, while gallantly leading their respective brigades
into action; and all the brigades sent to EavcU's assistance
suffered severely.
Subsequently, on the same day, under orders from General
Lee, Lane's brigade of Wilcox's division, and Mahone's own
brigade (under Colonel Weisiger), were thrown to the front,
tor the purpose of moAdng to the left, and, attacking the flank
of the column of the enemy which had broken Ewell's line, to
relieve the pressure on him, aud, if possible, recover the part
of the line which had been lost. Jjane's brigade comraenced
thes movement and had not proceeded far, when it encountered
and attacked, in a piece of woods in front of my line, the 9th
corps, under Burnside, moving up to attack a salient on my
front. Lanp captured over three hundred prisoners, and three

25 BATTLES OF SPOTSYLVANIA C. H.
battle flags, and his attack on the enemy's flank, taking hini
by surprise, no doubt, contributed materially to his repulse.
Mahone's brigade did not become seriously engaged. The
attacking column which Lane encountered, got up to within a
very short distance of a salient defended by Walker's brigade
of Heth's division, under Colonel Mayo, before it Avas discov
ered, as there Avas a pine thicket in front, under cover of Avhich
the advance Avas made. A heavy fire of musketry from
Walker's brigade and Thomas' which was on its left, and a
fire of artillery from a considerable number of guns on Heth's
line, were opened Avith tremendous eff'ect upon the attacking
column, and it Avas driA'en back with heaAy loss, leaving its
dead in front of our Avorks. This affair took place under the
ej-^e of General Lee himself. In the afternoon, another attempt
was made to carry out the contemplated flank movement, Avith
Mahone's brigade, and Cook's brigade of Heth's diA-ision, to be
followed up by the other troops under my command; but it
Avas discovered that the enemy had one or more intrenched
lines in our front, to the fire from Avhich our flanking column
Avould have been exposed. Moreover, the ground betAveen the
lines was very rough, being full of rugged ravines and covered
with thick pines and other growth; and it was thought advis
able to desist from the attempt. The two brigades Avhich Avere
to have .commenced the moA-ement, Avere then thrown to the
front on both sides of the Fredericksburg road, and, passing-
over two lines of breastworks, defended by a strong force of
skirmishers, developed the existence of a third and much
stronger line in rear, Avhicli Avould have aft'oixied an almost in
superable obstacle to the proposed flank movement. Thi*t
closed the operations of the corps under my command on the
memorable 12th of May.
Between that day and the 19th, there Avas no serious attack
on iny front, but much manoiuvring by the enemy. General
Mahone raade two or three reconnoissances to the front, Avhich
(iiscjoscd the fact that the enemy Avas gradually moving to our
riglit. In raaking one of thera, he encountered a body of the
enemy Avliich had got possession of Gayle's house, on'^tlie left
of thc road leading from our right toAvards the Fredericksburg

BATTLES OF SPOTSYI,VANIA'C. H. 27
and Hanover Junction road, at which a portion of our cavaliy,
under Brigadier General Chambliss, had been previously
posted, and drove it back across the Ny.* Another reconnois
sance, handsomely made by Brigadier-General Wright, who
had been brou|:ht fi-om the left, ascertained that a heavy force
of the enemy was between the Ny and the Po, iu front' of my
right, which Avas held by Mahone, and Avas along the road
towards Hanover Junction. To meet this movement of the
enemy. Field's division Avas brought from the left and placed
on my right.
On the 19th, General Ewell made a movement against the
enemy's right, and to create a diversion in his favour, Thomas'
brigade was thrown forward, and drove the enemy into his
Avorks in front of the salient, against which Burnside's attack
had been made on the 12th, while the whole corps was held in
readiness to co-operate Avith Ewell, should his attack prove
successful ; bnt, as he was compelled to retire, Thomas was
AvithdraAvn. Subsequently, the enemy retired from Heth's and Wilcox's
fronts; and, on the aftemoon of the 21st, Wilcox was sent out
on the road leading from Mahone's front across the Ny, with
two of his brigades to feel the enemy, and found him still in
force behind entrenched lines, and had a brisk engagement
Avith that force.
While Wilcox was absent, an order Avas received by me,
from General Lee, to turn over to General Hill the command
of his corps, as he had reported for duty. I did so at once,
and thus terminated my connection -with, this corps, which 1
had commanded during all the trying scenes around Spotsyl
vania Court House. The officers and men of the corps had
all behaved well, and contributed, in no little degree, to the
result by which Grant was compelled to wait six days for rein-

*The Mattapony Kiver, which, by its junction with the Pamunkey, forms A'ork Biver, is
formed by the confluence of four stream.s, called respectively, the "Mat," "Ta," "I'o," and
"Ny." The Ny is north and east of Spotsylvania Court House, and behind it the enemy did
raost of his manoeuvring in my front. It unites with the Po, a few miles to tlie eastand south
of Spotsylvania Court House, and both streams are difficult to cross, e.xcept where there ini'
bridges.

28 OPERATIONS AT HANOVER JUNCTION.
forcements from Washington, before, he could resume the
offensive, or make another of his flank movements to get be
tween General Lee's army and Richmond.

HANOVER JUNCTION.
OPERATIONS OF EARLY'S DIVISION.
i'he movement of the enemy to get between our army and
Richmond had been discovered, and on the afternoon of the
21st, Ewell's corps was put in motion towards Hanover Junc
tion.* After turning over to General Hill, the command of
his corps, I rode iu the direction taken by Ewell's corps, and
overtook it, a short time before day on the morning of the
22nd. Hoke's brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel LeAvis, this
day joined us from Petersburg, and an order was issued, trans
ferring Gordon's brigade, uoav under the command of Briga
dier-General Evans, to Johnson's division, which was placed
under the command of General Gordon, Avho had been made
a Major General. This left me iu command of three brigades,
to wit: Pegram's, Hoke's, and Johnston's, all of which Avere
very much reduced in strength. My Adjutant General, Major
Daniel, had been disabled for life by a wound received at the
Wilderness, and my Inspector General, Major Samuel Hale,
had been mortally wounded at Spotsylvania Court House, on
the 12th, while serving with the division and acting Avith great
gallantry during the disorder which ensued after Ewell's line
Avas broken. Both were serious losses to me.
On this day, (the 22nd), Ave moved to Hanover Junction,
and, next day my division was posted on the extreme right,
covering a ferry tAvo or three miles below the railroad bridge

* Hanover Junction is about 22 miles from Biohmond, and is at the intersection of the
Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad witli the Central railroad front Eichmond
west, via GordonsviUe and Staunton. It is on the direct road from both Spotsylvania Court
House nnd Fredericksburg to Riohmoud. The North .\nna River is north of the Junction
about two mili^, and the South Anna about three miles south of it. These two sti-eama unite
south of east, and a few miles from tho Junction, and form th« Pamunkey River.

BATTLES OP COLD HARBOUR. 29
across the North Anna. While at Hanover Junction my
division was not engaged. At one time it was moved towards
our left, for the purpose of supporting a part of the line on
which an attack was expected, and moved back again without
being required. It was, subsequently, placed temporarily on
the left of the corps, relieving Rodes' division and a part of
Field's while the line was being remodelled, and then took
poration on the right again.
During the night of the 26th, the enemy again withdrew
from our front.*

BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR.
OPERATIONS OF E"WELL'S CORPS.
On the 27th, the enemy having Avithdrawu to the north
bank of the North Anna, and commenced another flank move
ment by moving down the north bank of the Pamunkey,
Ewell's corps, now under my command, by reason of General
EweU's sickness, was moved across the South Anna over the
bridge of the Central railroad, and by a place called " Merry
Oaks," leaving Ashland on the Richmond, Fredericksburg and
Potomac railroad to the right, and bivouacked for the night at
Hughes' cross road, the intersection of the road from Ashland
to Atlee's station on the Central railroad with the road from

* At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps,
and Breckenridge with two small brigades of infantiy, and a battalion of artillery. These,
with Hoke's brigade, were the fir.st and only reinforcements received by General Lee since
the opening of the campaign. Yet, Grant's immense army, notwithstanding the advantage
gained by it on the 12th of May, had been so crippled, that it was compelled to wait six days
at Spotsylvania Court House for reinforcements from Washington, before it could resume
the offensive. Breckenridge's infantry nimibered less than 3,000 muskets ; yet. Grant puts it
15,000, and he makes an absurd attempt to cast the whole blame for the failure of the cam
paign, so fer, on Butler; to immolate whom, he makes a digression in his account of the
operations at Hanover Junction, and says : " The army sent to operate against Bichmond
having Hermetically sealed Itself up at Bermuda Hundreds, the enemy was enabled to bring
the most, if not all the reinforcementobrought from the South by Beauregard against tho
Army of the Potomac.'' Hetherefore determined to tryanother flank movement, and to get
mora reUfaroement* from the army st Bermuda Hundreds.

39 BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR.
the Merry Oaks to Richmond. Next morning I moved by
Atlee's station to Hundley's corner, at the intersection of the
road from Hanover Town, (the point at which Grant crossed
the Pamunkey,) by Pole Green Church, to Richmond, Avith the
road from Atlee's station, by Old, Church in Hanover Coupiy,
to the White House, on the Pamunkey. This is the point
from which General Jackson commenced his famous attack on
McClellan's flank and rear, in 1862, and it was very important
that it should be occupied, as it intercepted Grant's , dirjeet
march towards Richmond. All these movements were made
under orders from General Lee.
My troops were placed in position, covering the road by
Pole Green Church, and also the road to Old Church, with my
right resting near Beaver Dam Creek, a small stream running
towards Mechanicsville and into the Chickahominy. Brigadier
General Ramseur of Rodes' division, was this day assigned to
the command of my diAdsion. Ewell's corps, the 2nd of the
Army of Northern Virginia, now numbered less than 9,000
muskets for duty, its loss, on tbe 12th of May, ha-ving been
very heavy.
On the 29th, the enemy having crossed the Tottopotomoy,
(a creek running just north of Pole Green Church, and eastr
Avard to the Pamunkey,) appeared in my front on both roads^ .
and there was some skirmishing, but no heavy fighting.
On the afternoon of the SOth, in accordance with orders from
General Lee, I moved to the right across Beaver Dam, to tiie
road from Old Church to Mechanicsville, and thence along
that road towards Old Church, until we reached Bethesda
Church. At this point the enemy was encountered, and his
troops which occupied the road, were driven by Rodes' diyi
sion towards the road from Hundley's corner, which unites
with the road from Mechanicsville, east of Bethesda Churck
Pegram's brigade, under the command of Colonel "Edward
Willis of the 12th Georgia regiment, was sent forward, Avith
one of Rodes' brigades on its right, to feel the eneniy, and
ascertain its strength; but, meeting Aviih a heavy force behind
breastworks, it was compelled,, to retij:;e, jvijJiJi^the

BATTLES OP OOLD HARBOUR. 31
valuable officers and men, and among them Avere Colonel
Willis, mortally wounded, and Colonel Terrell of the 13th Vir
ginia regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel Watkins of the 52nd
Virginia regiment, killed. This movement showed that the
enemy was moving to our right flank, and at night, I withdrCAA'
a short distance on the Mechanicsville road, covering it with
my force. AVTien I made the mo\'eraent from Hundley's
corner, my position at that place Avas occupied by a part of
Longsti-eet's corps, under Anderson.
On the next morning my troops were placed in position on
the east side of Beaver Dam across the road to Mechanicsville,
but Rodes was subsequently moved to the west side of the
creek. Grant's movement to our right, towards Cold Harbour, Avas
continned on the 31st, and the 1st of June, and corresponding
movements were made by General Lee to meet him, my com
mand retaining its position Avith a heavy force in its front.
On the 2nd, all the troops on my left, except Heth's division
of Hill's corps, had moved to the right, and, in the afternoon
of that day, Rodes' division moved forward, along the road
from Hundley's corner toAvards Old Church, and drove thc
enemy from his intrenchmente, noAv occupied AAdth hea\y skir
mish lines, and forcfed back his left towards Bethesda Church,
where there was a heavy force. Gordon swung round so as to
keep pace with Rodes, and Heth co-operated, following Rodes
and taking position on his left flank. In this movement there
Avas some heavy fighting and several hundred prisoners were
taken by us. Brigadier-General Doles, a gallant officer of
Rodes' division, was killed, but otherwise our loss was not
severe. On the next day (the 3rd), Avhen Grant made an attack at
Cold Harbour in which he suffered very heavily, there were
repeated attacks on Rodes' and Heth's fronts, those on Cook's
brigade, of Heth's division, being especially heaVy, but all of
them were repulsed. There was also heavy .skirmishing on
Gordon's front. During the day, Heth's left was threatened
by the enemy's cavalry, but it was kept off by Walker^s brig-

32 BATTLES OF CQLD'. HARBOUR.
ade under Colonel Fry, which covered that flank, and also re
pulsed an effort of the enemy's infantry to get to our rear. As
it Avas necessary that Heth's division should join its corps on
tho right, and my flank in this position was very much ex
posed, IwithdreAV at the close of the day to the line previously
occupied, and next morning Heth moved to the right.
My right noAV connected with the left of Longstreet's corps
under General Anderson. The enemy subsequently evacua
ted his position at Bethesda Church and his lines in my front,
and, having no opposing force to keep my troops in their lines,
I made two efl'orts to attack the enemy on his right flank and
rear. The first was made on the 6th, when I crossed the Mata^
daquean, (a small stream, running through wide swainps iu
the enemy's rear), and got in rear of his right flank, driving in
his skirmishers until we came to a swamp, which could be
crossed only on a narrow causeway defended by an intrenched
line with artillery. General Anderson was to have co-ope
rated with me, by moving down the other side of the Matada-
quean, but the division sent for that purpose did not reach tiie
position from which I started until near night, and I Avas
therefore compelled to retire as my position was too much ex
posed. Ou the next day (the 7th), a recoimoissance made in front of
Anderson's line, showed that the greater part of it was uncov
ered, and, iu accordance Avith instructions from General Lee,
I moved in front of, and between it and the Matadaquean^;
until my progress was arrested by a ravine and swarap which
prevented any further advance, but a number of pieces of ar
tillery Avere opened upon the enemy's position in flank and
reverse, so as to favour a movement from Anderson's front,
which had been ordered but was not made; and at night I re
tired from this position to the rear of our lines.
Since the fighting at the Wilderness, Grant had made it au
invariable practice to cover his front, flank, and rear, Avith a
perfect uetAvork of intrenchments, and all his movements were
made under cover of such: works. It Avas thei-efore very diffi
cult to get at him.

BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR, 3^
On the nth, my command was moved to the rear of Hill's
line, near Gaines' UiW; aud, on the 12th, I received orders to
raoA-e, with the 2nd Corps, to the Shenandoah Valley, to meet
Hunter. This, therefore, closed my connection Avith the cam
paign from the Rapidan to James River.
^Vhen I moved, on the morning of the 18th., Grant had al
ready put his ai-my in motion to join Butler, on James River,
a position Avhich he could have reached, from his camps on
the north of the Rapidan, by railroad and transports, without
the loss of a man. In attempting to force his Avay by land, he
had already lost, in killed and Avounded, more men than Avere
iu General Lee's eutire army ; and he Avas compelled to give
up, in despair, the attempt to reach Richmond in that way.*
*Graut, in de.«cribing his movement from Spotsylvania Court House to Hanover JunotioJi,
nays : " But the enemy again having the shorter line, aud being in possession of the main
roads, was enabled to reach the North-.\nna in advance of us, and took position behind it."
.Ind wheu he speaks of his final determination to join Butler, he says : "After the Battle of
thp AVildernes,-. it was evident that the enemy deeraed it of the first importance to run no
risk with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or,
feebly on the offensive, immediately in front of them, aud where, in case of repulse, he
could retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than T was willing to make,
.ill could not be accomplished that 1 designed north of Kichmond.''
Mr. Secretary Stanton, with a keenness of stragetic accumen whicli i,s altogether unpar-
alled, says: "Forty-three days of desperate fighting or marching, by day and night, forced
back the rebel army from the Bapidan to their intrencliment,? around Richmond, and car
ried the Army of the Potomac to the south side of James River. The strength of the enemy'.s
force when the campaign opened, or the extent of his loss, is not known to this Department.
Any inequality between Lee's army and the .-Vrniy of the Potomac, was fully compensated by
the advantage of position."
AS'e are left in the dark whether it was the desperate fighting or the desperate marching
which did all this; but, however that may be, it was a wonderful achievement, especially
when it is considered that the Army of the Potomac raight have been carried to the south
bide of Jaraes Kiver by transports, and Lee's army thereby forced back to the intrencli-
ments around Richmond, without the "Forty-three days of desperate fighting or marching,
by day and by night," and without thc loss of men sustained by Grant. There are aomo
who think Stiinton i> slyly making fun of Grant ; but, il lie is not, and is in dead earneKl, tin:
question naturally arises, in the mind uf one nut as gifted ah the Kcdt-ral Sei^retary of War:
How happened it that, if Lee was being constantly forced Ijuck, Cur forty-tlu-cc diij's, ovm- ;i
di-tanee of more than eighty miles, lie always had the shorter line, and possession of the
main roads, and got thc advantage of position, and had time to fortify il ?
I happen to know that Generjil Lee always had the greiitest an.xiety to strike at Gram in
tho open field ; and I should like to know when it was that the latter operated on the del'i n.
bive, or olTensive either, e.xcept behind, or immediately in front nf, far better inticMii;linient,s
than General Lee's array, with its limited mean,^, was able to make. .\n inspeetiun of the
battle-fields, from the Rapidan to tlio Jame", will show that (Jnint's army did a viisi de:il
more digging than General Lee's.
The truth is, that tho one comraander was a great captain, and perfect master of his art,
while the other had none ofthe requisites of a great captain, but merely possessed the most
ordinary brute courage, and had the control of unlimited numbers and means. Yet, it It

34 NOTE ON THE REPORTS OF GRANT AND STANTON.
claimed that Grant fights and writes hotter than Alexander, and Hannibal, and Ciosar, and
Xapoleon, and all the rest ; and when, in the exercise of his great powers of composition, he
turns the batteries of his rhetoric on Butler, I say, in his own classic language, "Go in !"
Vou can't him a lick amiss. I cannot, however, bnt be amused at the eft'ort to make Butler
thc scape-goat ; and cannot help thinking that Grant ought to have known, beforehiind, that
lie (Kutlcr) was unfit to make war. except on defenceless women and children, and that the
trophies valued by him were not those won at the cannon's mouth.
i(i-ant, iu his report, has enunciated fhe leading principles of his strategy, and he is cer
tainly entitled to the credit of having practised them, if not to the merit of originality. They
were : "First, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of ¦
thc enemy;" and. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy,
and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if by nothing else, there should be nothing left
to him but an equal submission, with the loyal section of our common countiy, to the con
stitution and laws of the land." (Alas ! what has become of the constitution and laws ?) This
latter principle was more concisely and forcibly expressed by Mr. Lincoln, when he de
clared Ills purpose to " keep a pegging," The plain English of the whole idea was to con
tinue raising troops, and to oppose them, in overwhelming numbers, to the Confederate
.\rniy, until the latter should wear itself out whipping them, when a newly-recruited armi-
might "go in and win." And, this was actually what took place in regard to General Lee's
.irniy. (irant ha^'ing established his fame as ji writer, as well as fighter, 1 presume he will give
the M'orld the benefit of his ideas, and piililish a work on strategy, which I would suggest
ou^ht to be called " The Lincoln-Grant or Pegging-Hammer Art of AA'ar.''
He has made some observations, in his report, about the advantages of interior lines of
communication, supposed to be possessed by the Confederate commanders, which are more
specious than sound. The Mississippi River divided the Confederacy into two parts, and
the immense naval power of the enein,v enabled him to render eomniunication across that'
river, after the loss of New Orleans aud Memphis, always ditflcnlt, and finally to get entire
liossession of it, Ou the eastern side of it, the railroad comniunieations were barely suffi
cient for the transportation of supplies, nnd the transportation of troops over them was
always tedious and difficult. The Ohio I!i\'er. in the AV'est, and the Potomac, in the East,
with the mountains of AVestern A'irginia, rendered it impossible for au invading army tn
march into the enemy's country, except at one or two fords on the Potomac, just ea.st ofthe
Hlue liidgo, and two or three fords above Harper's Ferry. The possession of thc seas and
the blockade of our ports, as well as the possession of the Mississippi, the Ohio and Poto
mac Kivers, with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the railroads through Pennsylvania,
Clhio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee, enabled the enemy to transport troops,
from the mcst remote points, with more ease and rapidity than they could be transported
ovcr the railroads under thc control ol the Confederate Government, all of which were iu
bad condition. 'The enemy, therefore, in fact, had all the advantages of interior lines ; th.it
is rapidity of coraraunication and concentration, with the advantage, also, of unrestricted
communication with all tho world, which his naval power gave him.

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND
AND
THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA.

INTRODUCTION.

The Valley of Virginia, in its largest sense, embraces all
that country lying between the Blue Ridge and Alleghany
Mountains, which unite at its south-western end.
The Shenandoah Valley, which is a part of the Valley of
Vir^nia, embraces the Counties of Augusta, Rockingham,
Shenandoah, Page, Warren, Clarke, Frederick, Jefferson, and
Berkeley. This valley is bounded on the north by the Poto
mac, on the south by the County of Rockbridge, on the east
by the Blue Ridge, and on the west by the Great North Moun
tain and its ranges.
The Shenandoah River is composed of two branches, called,
respectively, the "North Fork" and the "South Fork," which
unite near Front Royal in Warren County. The North Fork
rises in the Great North Mountain, and runs eastwardly to
Avithin a short distance of New Market in Shenandoah County,
and thence north-east by Mount Jackson to Strasburg, where
it turns east to Front Royal. The South Fork is formed by
the union of North River, Middle River, and South River.
North River and Middle River, running from the west, unite
near Port RepubUc in Rockingham County. South River rises
in the south-eastern part of Augusta, and runs by Waynes
boro', along the western base of the Blue Ridge, to Port Re
public, where it unites with the stream formed by the junction
of the North and Middle rivers. From Port Republic, the

36 INTRODUCTION.
South Fork of the Shenandoah runs north-east, through the
eastern border* of Rockingham and the county of Page, to
Front Royal ill Warren county.
The North Fork and South Fork are separated by the Mas
sanutten Mountain, which is connected with no Other moun
tain, but terminates abruptly at both ends. Its northern end
is washed at its base, just beloAv Strasburg, by the North Fork.
Its southern end terminates near the road betAveen ' Harrison
burg and Conrad's Store on the South Fork, at which latter
place the road through Swift Run Gap in the Blue Ridge
crosses that stream. Tavo valleys are thus formed, the one on
the North Fork being called " The Main Valley," and the
other on the South Fork, and embracing the County of Page
and part of the County of Warren, being usually known by
the name of "The Luray Valley." The Luray Valley unites
Avith the Main Valley at both ends of the mountain. There is
a good road across Massanutten Mountain, from one valley to
the other, aud through a gap near New Market. South of this
gap there is no road across the mountain, and north of it
the roads are very rugged and not practicable for the march of
a large army Avith its trains. At the northern or lower end of
Massanutten Mountain, and between two branches of it, is a
valley called "Powell's Fort Valley " or more commonly " The
Fort." This vallej^ is accessible only by the vei-y rugged roads
over the mountain which have been mentioned, and through
a ravine at its loAver end. From its isolated position, it was
not the theatre of military operations of any consequence, but
merely furnished a refuge for deserters, stragglers, and fugi
tives from the battle-fields.
From Front Royal the Shenandoah River runs along the
Avestern base of the Blue Ridge to Harper's Ferry, where it
unites with the Potomac, Avhich here bursts through tlie moun
tains. The mountain in extension of the range of the Blue
Ridge from this point through Maryland and Pennsylvania is
called "South Mountain."
Strictly speaking, the County of Berkeley and the greater
part of Frederick are not in the Valley of the Shenandoah.
The Opequon, rising south-west of Winchester, and crossino-

INTRODDCTION. 37
the Valley Pike four or five miles south of that place, turns to
the north and empties into the Potomac sohie distance above
its junction with the Shenandoah; the greater part of Frede
rick and nearly the whole of Berkeley being on the western
side of the Opequon.
Little North Mountain, called in the lower valley "North
Mountain," runs north-east, through the western portions of
Shenandoah, Frederick, and Berkeley Counties, to the Poto
mac. At its northern end, where it is called North Mountain,
it separates the Avaters of the Opequon from those of Back
Creek. Cedar Creek rises in Shenandoah County, west of Little
North Mountain, and running north-east along its western
base, passes through that mountain, four or five miles from
Strasburg, and, then making a circuit, empties into the North
Fork of the Shenandoah, about two miles below Strasburg.
The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crosses the Potomac at
Harper's Ferry, and passing through Martinsburg in Berkeley
County, crosses Back Creek near its mouth, runs up the Poto
mac, crossing the South Branch of that river near its mouth,
and then the North Branch to Cumberland in Maryland.
From this place it runs into Virginia again and, passing
through North Western Virginia, strikes the Ohio river by
two stems terminating at Wheeling and Parkersburg, re
spectively. There is a railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester,
called " The Winchester and Potomac Railroad," and also one
from Manassas Junction on the Orange and Alexandria Rail
road, through Manassas Gap in the Blue Ridge, by Front
Royal and Strasburg, to Mount Jackson, called "The Manas
sas Gap Railroad;" but both of these roads were torn up and
rendered unserviceable in the year 1862, under the orders of
General Jackson.
From Staunton in Augusta County, there is a fine macadam
ized road called " The Valley Pike," running through Mount
Sidney, Mount Crawford, Harrisonburg, New Market, Mount
Jaefeson, Edinbrttg, Woodstock, Strasburg, Middletown, New-

,38 INTRODUCTION.
town, Bartonsville, and Kernstown to Winchester in Frederick
County, and crossing Middle River seven miles from Staunton,
North River at Mount Crawford eighteen miles from Staunton,
the North Fork of the Shenandoah at Mount Jackson, Cedar
Creek between Strasburg and Middletown, and the Opequon
at Bartonsville, four or five miles from Winchester. There is
also another road west of the Valley Pike, connecting these
several villages, called the "Back Road," and, in some places,
another road between the Valley Pike and the Back Road,
Avhich is called the "Middle Road."
From Winchester there is a macadamized road, via Mar
tinsburg, to Williamsport on the Potomac in Maryland, and
another, via Berryville in Clarke County, and Charlestown in
.Jefferson County, to Harper's Ferry. There is also a good
pike from Winchester to Front Royal, which crosses both forks
of the Shenandoah just above their junction ; and from Front
Royal there are good roads up the Luray Valley, and by the
way of Conrad's Store and Port Republic, to Harrisonburg
and Staunton.
From Staunton, south, there are good roads passing through
Lexington, in Rockbridge County, and Buchanan, in Bote
tourt County, to several points on the Virginia and Tennessee
Railroad ; and others direct from Staunton and Lexington to
Lynchburg. The Central Railroad, from Richmond, passes through the
Blue Ridge, with a tunnel at Rockfish Gap, and runs through
Waynesboro and Staunton, westwardly to Jackson's River,
which is one of the head-streams of James River.
This description of the country is given in order to render
the following narrative intelhgible without too much repetition.
In the spring of 1864, before the opening of the campaign,
the lower Shenandoah Valley was held by the Federal troops,
under Maior-General Sigel, with his head-quarters at Win
chester, while the upper Valley was held by Brigadier-General
Imboden, of the Confederate Army, with one brigade of
cavalry, or mounted infanti-y, and a battery of artillery.
When the campaign opened, Sigel moved up the Valley, and

INTRODUCTION. 30
Major-General Breckenridge moved from South- Western Vir
ginia, with tAVO brigades of infantry and a battalion of artil
lery, to meet him. Breckenridge, haA-ing united his forces
AA'ith Imboden's, met aud defeated Sigel, at Ncav Market, on
the 15tii day of May, driA-ing him back towards Wincheste)'.
Breckenridge then crossed the Blue Ridge, and joined Gen
eral Lee, at Hanover Junction, Avitli his tAvo brigades of in
fantry and the battalion of artillery. Subsequently, thc Fede
ral Genei-al Hunter organized anether and larger force than
Sigel's, aud moved up the Valley; and, on the 5th day of
June, defeated Brigadier-General William E. Jones, at Pied
mont, between Port Republic and Staunton — Jones' force
being composed of a very small body of infantry, and a cavalry
force which had been brought from South- Western Virginia,
after Breckenridge's departure from the Valley. Jones Avas
kiUed, and the remnant of his force, under Brigadier-General
Vaughan, fell back to Waynesboro. Hunter's force then
united with another column which had moved from LeAvis-
burg, in Western Virginia, under the Federal General Crook.
As soon as information was received of Jones' defeat and
death, Breckenridge was_5eKt back to the Vallej', Avith the
force he had brought Avith him.

MARCH TO LYNCHBURG, AND PURSUIT OF
HUNTER.
On the 12th of .June, Avhile the 2nd Corps (EavcU's) of the
Army of Northern Virginia Avas lying near Gaines' Mill, in
rear of Hill's line at Cold Harbour, I received verbal orders
from General Lee to hold the corps, Avith two of the battalions
of artillery attached to it, in readiness to move to the Shenan
doah Valley. Nelson's and Braxton's battalions were selected,
and Brigadier-General Long was ordered to accompany me as
Chief of Artillery. After dark, on the same day, AATitten in
structions were given me by General Lee, by which I was
directed to move, Avith tho force designated, at 3 o'clock next
morning, for the Valley, by way of Louisa C. H. and Char
lottesville, and through BroAvn's or Swift Run Gap in the Blue
Ridge, as I might find most advisable ; to strike Hunter's
force iu the rear, and, if possible, destroy it ; then to move
down the Valley, cross the Potomac near Leesburg in Loudon
County, or at or above Harper's Ferry, as 1 might find most
practicable, and threaten AVashington City. I was further
directed to communicate with General Breckenridge, AA'ho
Avould co-operate Avith me in the attack on Hunter, and the ex
pedition into Maryland.
At this time the railroad and telegraph lines between Char
lottesville and Lynchburg had been cut by a cavalry force from
Hunter's army ; and those betAveen Richmond and Charlottes
ville had been cut by Sheridan's cavalry, from Grant's army ;
so that there was no communication Avith Breckenridge.
Hunter Avas supposed to be at Staunton AA'ith liis aaIioIc force,
and Breckenridge Avas supposed to be at AVaynesboro, or Rock-
fish Gap. If such had been the case, the route designated by
General Lee would have carried me into the A^allej^ iu Hun
ter's rear.
The 2nd Corps uoav numbered a little over 8,000 muskets

MARGH TO LYNCHBUKW. 41
for duty. It had been on active and arduous service in the
field for forty days, aud had been engaged in all the great
batties from the Wilderness to Cold Itarbour, sustaining very
heavy losses at Spotsylvania C. H. where it lost nearly an
entire division, including its commander, Major-General John-
. son, who was made prisoner. Of the Brigadier-Generals with
it at the commencement of tiie campaign, only one remained
in command of his brigade. Two (Gordon aud Ramseur) had
been made Major-Generals ; one (G. II. Steuart) had been cap
tured; four (Pegram, Hays, J. A. AValker, and R. D. John
ston) had been severely Avounded ; and four (Stafford, J. M.
Jones, Daniel, and Doles) had been killed iu action. Constant
exposure to the weather, a limited supply of provisions, and
two weeks' service in the swamps north of the Chickahominy
had told on the health of the men. Divisions were not
sti-onger than brigades ought to have been, nor brigades than
regiments. On the morning of the 13th, at 2 o'lclock, Ave commenced
the march ; and, on the 16th, arrived at the Rivanna River,
near Charlottesville, haAdng marched over eighty miles in four
days.* From Louisa C. H. I had sent a dispatch to Gordonsville, to
be forwarded, by telegraph, to Breckenridge ; and, on my ar
rival at Charlottesville, on the 16th, to which place I rode in
advance of the troops, I received a telegram from him, dated
at Lynchburg, informing me that Hunter Avas then in Bedford
county, about twenty miles from that place, and moving on it.
The railroad and telegraph between Charlottesville and
Lynchburg- had been, fortunately, but slightly injured by the
*On the loth, we passed over the ground, near Trevillian's depot, on which Hampton and
Sheridan had fought, on the 11th and 12th. Hampton had defeated Sheridan, and was then
in pursuit of him. Grant claims, in his report, that, on the llth, Sheridan drove our cavalry
"from the field, in complete rout;'" and says, when he advanced towards Gordonsville, oi]
the 12th, "he found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits,
.about five railes from the latter place, and too strong to si»ccessfully assault."
This is as thoroughly a fancy sketch as can well be manufactured. There was not an in
fantry soldier in arms nearer the scene of action than with General Lee's army, near Cold
Harbour; and the "well-constructed rifle-pits" were nothing more than rails put up in the
manner in which cavalry were accustomed to arrange tiiem to prevent a charge. Sheriilau
mistook some of Hampton's cavalry, dismounted and fighting on foot, for infantry; and the,
statement was made to cover his defeat.
F

42 MARCH TO LYNCHBURG.
enemy's cavalry, and had been repaired. The distance be
tween the two places was sixty miles, and there were no trains
at Charlottesville, except one which belonged to the Central
road, and was about starting for Waynesboro. I ordered this
to be detained, and immediately directed, by telegram, all the
trains of the two roads to be sent to me Avith all dispatch, for
the purpose of transporting my troops to Lynchburg. The
trains were not in readiness to take the troops on board until
sunrise on the morning of the 17th, and then only enough
were furnished to transport about half my infantry. Ram
seur's division, one brigade of Gordon's division, and part of
another Avere put on the trains, as soon they were ready, and
started for Lynchburg. Rodes' division, and the residue of
Gordon's, were ordered to move along the railroad, to meet
the trains on their return. The artillery and wagon trains
bad been started on the ordinary roads at daylight.
I accompanied Ramseur's division, going on the front train,
but the road and rolling stock were in such bad condition that
1 did not reach Lynchburg until about one o'clock in the after
noon, and the other trains Avere much later. I found General
Breckenridge in bed, suftering from an injury received by the
fall of a horse killed under him in action iie.ar Cold Harbour.
He had moved from Rockfish Gap to Lynchburg by a forced
march, as soon as Hunter's movement tOAA-ards that place AA-as
discovered. When I showed him my instructions, he A-ery
readily and cordially oft'ered to co-operate Avith me, and seiwo
under my command.
Hunter's adA-ance from Staunton liad been impeded by a
brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier-General McCausland,
which had been managed Avith great skill, and kept in his
I'ront all tiio A\'ay, and he Avas reported to be then advancing
nn the old stone turnpike from Liberty, in Bedford County,
by NcAv Louflon, and Avatched by Imboden Avith a small force
of (iavalry.
As General Breckenridge Avas unable to go out, at his re
quest. General D. IL Hill, Avho happened to be in towu, had
made arrangements for thc defence of the city, with such

OPERATIONS AT LYNCHBUEQ. 4S
troops as were at hand. Brigadier-General Hays, who was an
invalid from a wound received at Spotsylvania Court House,
had tendered his services and also aided in maldug arrange
ments for the defence. I rode out with General Hill to ex
amine the line selected by him, and make a reconnoissance of
the country in front. Shght works had been hastily thrown
up on College Hill, covering the turnpike and Forest roads
from Liberty, which Avere manned by Breckenridge's infantry
and the dismounted cavalry of the command which had been
Avith Jones at Piedmont. The reserves, invalids from the hos
pitals, and the cadets from tiie Military Institute at Lexington,
occupied other parts of the line. An inspection satisfied me
that, while this arrangement was the best which could be made
under the cu-cumstances Avhich General Hill found himself,
yet it would leave the town exposed to the fire of the enemy's
artiUery, should he advance to the attack, and I therefore de
termined to meet the enemy Avith my troops in front.
We found Imboden about four miles out on the turnpike,
near an old Quaker church, to which position he had been
gradually forced back by the enemy's infantry. My troops, as
they arrived, had been ordered in front of the works to
bivouac, and I immediately sent orders for them to move out
on this road, and two brigades of Ramseur's diAdsion arrived
jnst in time to be thrown across the road, at a redoubt about
two miles from tlie city, as Imboden's command was driven
back by vastly superior numbers. These brigades, \vith two
pieces of artillery in the redoubt, arrested the progress of the
enemy, and Ramseur's other brigade, and the part of Gordon's
division which had arrived, took position on the same line.
The enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery on us, but, as night
soon came on, he went into camp on our front.*
* Hunter's delay in advancing from Staunton had been most remarkable, and can be ac
counted for only by the fact, that indulgence in petty acts of malignity and outrage upon
private citizens was more congenial to his nature than bold operations in the iield. He had
defeated Jones' sraall force at Piedmont about ten miles frpm Staunton, on tho flth, and
united with Crook on the Sth, yet he did not arrive in front of Lynchburg until near night
on the 17th. The route frora Staunton to Lynchburg by which he raoved, which was by
Lexington, Buchanan, the Peaks of Otter, and Liberty, is about one hundred miles in dis
tance. It is true McCausland had delayed his progress by keeping ooustantly iti his froul,
but an energetic advance would have brushed away MoCausland's etnaU fort*, and Lyncli-

44 (..PERATIONS AT LYNCHBURO.
On my arrival at Lynchburg, orders had been given for the
immediate return of the trains for the rest of my infantry,
and I expected it to arrive by the morning of the 18th, but it
did not get to Lynchburg until late iu the aftemoon of that
day. Hunter's force was considerably larger than mine would
have been, had it all been up, and as it was of the utmost con
sequence to the army at Richmond that he should not get into
J,.ynchburg, I did not feel justified in attacking him until I
could do so with a fair prospect of success. I contented my
self therefore with acting on the defensive on the 18th, thi-ow-
ing Breckenridge's infantry and a part of his artillery on the
front line, while that adopted by General Hill was occupi-ed by
the dismounted cavalry and the irregular troops. During the
day, there was artillery firing and skirmishing along the line,
and, in -the afternoon, an attack -yas made on our line, to the
right of the turnpike, which was handsomely repulsed Avith
considerable loss to the enemy. A demonstration of the
enemy's cavalry on the Forest road, Avas checked by part of
Breckenridge's infantry under AVTiarton, and McCausland's
cavalry. On the arrival of the cars from Richmond this day, Major-
Generals Elzey and Ransom reported for duty, the former to
command the infantry and dismounted cavalry of Brecken
ridge's command, and the latter to command the cavalry.
The mounted caA-^alry consisted of the remnants of several hri-
gades divided into two commands, one under Imboden, and
the other under McCausland. It was badly mounted and
armed, and its efficiencj' much impaired by the defeat at Pied
mont, and the arduous service it had recently gone thi'ough.
As soon as the remainder of my infantry arrived by the
railroad, though none of my artillery had gotten up, arrange
ments Avere made for attacking Hunter at daylight on the 19th,
but, sometime after midnight, it Avas discovered that he was
moving, though it Avas not known whether he Avas retreating,
or moving so as to attack Lynchburg on the south where it
burg, with all its manufacturing establishments and stores, would have fUlen before assis
tance arrived. A subsequent passage over the greater part of the same roufo showed how
Hunter had been oraployBd.

PURSUIT OF HUNTER. 45
was vulnerable, or to attempt to join Grant on the south side
of James River. Purauit could not, therefore, be made at
once, as a mistake, if either of the last two objects had been
contemplated, would have been fatal. At light, however, the
pursuit commenced, the 2nd Corps moving along the turnpike,
over which it was discovered Hunter Avas retreating, and
Elzey's command on the right, along the Forest road, while
Ransom was ordered to move on the right of Elzey, with Mc
Causland's cavalry, and endeavor to strike the enemy at
Liberty or the Peaks of Otter. Imboden, who was on the
road from Lynchburg to Campbell Court House, to watch a
body of the enemy's cavahy, which had moved in [that direc
tion the day before, was to have moved on the left towards
Liberty, but orders did not reach him iu time. The enemy's
rear was overtaken at Liberty, twenty-five miles from Lynch
burg, just before night, and driven through that place, after a
brisk skirmish, by Ramseur's division. The days march on
the old turnpike, which was very rough, had been terrible.
McCausland had taken the Avrong road and did not reach Lib
erty until after the enemy had been driven through the town.
It was here ascertained that Hunter had not retreated on
the route by the Peaks of Otter, over which he had advanced,
bnt had taken the road to Buford's depot, at the foot of the
Blue Ridge, which would enable him to go either by Salem,
Fincastle, or Buchanan. Ransom was, therefore, ordered to
take the route, next day, by the Peaks of Otter, and endeavour
to intercept the enemy should he move by Buchanan or -Fin
castle. The pursuit was resumed early on thc morning of the
20th, and on our arrival in sight of Buford's, the enemy's rear
guard was seen going into the mountain on the road towards
Salem. As this left the road to Buchanan open, my aide.
Lieutenant Pitzer, was sent across the mountain to that place,
Avith orders to Ransom to move for Salem. Lieutenant Pitzer
was also instructed to ride all night and send directions, by
courier Ifrom Fincastle, and telegraph from Salem, to have the
road through the mountains to Lewisburg and South- Western
Vir^nia blockaded. The enemy was pursued into the moun-
tatei^t'Bttford'a^ap, bathe had taken poeseflBitm of the erest

48 PURSUIT OP HUNTER.
of the Blue Ridge, and put batteries in position commanding a
gorge, through which the road passes, where it was impossible
for a regiment to move in Hne. I had endeavored to ascertain
if there was not another way across the mountain by which I
could get around the enemy, but all the men, except the old
ones, had gotten out of the way, and the latter, as well as the
women and children, Avere in such a state of distress and
alarm, that no reliable information could be obtained from
them. We tried to throw forces up the sides of the moun
tains to get at the enemy, but they were so rugged that night
came on before anything could be accomplished, and we had
to desist, though not until a very late hour in the night.
By a mistake of the messenger, who was sent Avith orders to
General Rodes, who was to be in the lead next morning, there
was some delay in his movement on the 2l8t, but the pursuit
Avas resumed very shortly after sun-rise. At the Big Lick, it
Avas ascertained that the enemy had turned off from Salem
towards Lewisburg on a road which passes through the moun
tains at a narrow pass called the " Hanging. Rock," and my
column was immediately turned towards that point, but on
arriving there it was ascertained that the enemy's rear guard
had passed through the gorge. McCausland had struck his
column at this point aud captured ten pieces of artillery, some ,
waggons, and a number of prisoners ; but, the enemy haAdng
brought up a heavy force, McCausland was compelled to fall
back, carrying off', however, the prisoners, and a part of the
artillery, and disabling the rest so that it could not be removed.
As the enemy had got into the mountains, where nothing use
ful could be accomplished by pursuit, I did not deem it proper
to continue it farther. A great part of my command had had
nothing to eat for the last two days, except a littie bacon which
Avas obtained at Liberty. The cooking utensils were in the
trains, and the effort to have bread baked at Lynchburg had
failed. Neither the waggon trains, nor the artillery of the
2nd Corps, were up, and I knew that the country, through
which Hunter's route led for forty or fifty miles, was, for the
most part, a desolate mountain region ; and that his txoops
were taking everything in the way of provisions and forage

PURSUIT OP HUNTER. 47
which they could lay their hands on. My field oflicers, except
those of Breckenridge's command, were on foot, as their
horses could not be transported ou the trains from Charlottes
ville. I had seen our soldiers endure a great deal, but tiierc
was a limit to the endurance even of Confederate soldiers. A
stern chase of infantry is a very difliicult oue, and Hunter's
men Avere marching for their lives, his disabled being carried
in his provision train Avhich Avas uoav empty. My cavalry Avaa
not strong enough to accomplish anything of importance, and
a further pursuit could only have resulted in disaster to my
command from want of provisions and forage.
I was glad to see Hunter take the route to Lewisburg, as I
knew he could not stop short of the Kanawha River, and ho
was, therefore, disposed of for some time. Had he moved to
South- Western Virginia he would have doue us incalculable
mischief, as there was no troops of any consequence in that
quarter, but plenty of supplies at that time. I should, there
fore, have been compelled to follow him.*
My command had marched sixty miles, in the three days
pursuit, over very rough roads, and that part of it from the
Army of Northem Virginia had had no rest since leaving
Gaines' Mill. I determined, therefore, to rest on the 22nd, so
as to enable the waggons and artillery to get up, aud prepare
the men for the long march before them. Imboden had come
up, following on the road through Salem after the enemy, and
the cavalry was sent through Fincastle, to Avatch the eneniy
*Grant, in his report says; "General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give bat
tle, retired frora before the place" (Lynchburg). This is a little remarkable, as it appears
that this expedition had been long contemplated and was one of the prominent features of
the campaign of 1861. Sheridan, with his cavalry, was to have united with Hunter at Lynch
burg, and the two together were to have destroyed General Lee's comraunications and
depots of supplies, and then have joined Grant. Can it be believed that Hunter set out on to
important an expedition with an insufficient supply of ammunition? He had fought only
the battle of Piedmont, with a part of his force, and it was not a very severe one, as Jones'
force was a small one and composed monly of cavalry. Crook's column not being there
was not engaged. Had Sheridan defeated Hampton at Trevillian's, lie would have reached
Lynchburg after destroying the railroad on ihe way, and 1 could not have reached there iu
time to do any good. But Hampton defeated Sheridan, and the latter saw " infantry " " too
strong to successfully assault." Had Hunter moved on Lynchburg, with energy, that place
would have fallen liefore it was possible for mo to get there. But he tarried on the way for
purposes which will hereafter appear, and when he reached there, his heart failed hiin and
he was afraid to fight an inferior force, and then there was discovered, "A want of aramuni
tion to give battle." ,

48 MARCH DOWW THE VALLEY.
and annoy him as he passed through the mountains towards
Lewisburg, and also ascertain whether he would endeavor to
get into the Valley towards Lexington or Staunton.

MARCH DOWN THE VALLEY, v^D OPERATIONS
IN THE LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND.
At Lynchburg, I had received a telegram from General
Lee, directing me, after [disposing of Hunter, either to return
to his army or carry out the original plan, as I might deem
most expedient under the circumstances in which I found my
self After the pursuit had ceased, I received another dispatch
from him, submitting it to my judgment whether the condition
of my troops would permit the expedition across the Potomac
to be carried out, and I determined to take the responsibilily
of continuing it. On the 23r(i, the march was resumed and
we reached Buchanan that night, Avhere we struck again the
route over Avhich Hunter had advanced.* Ransom's cavalry
raoved by Clifton Forge, through the western part of Rock
bridge, to keep a lookout for Hunter and ascertain if he should
attempt to get into the Valley again.
'''The scenes on Hunter's route from Lynchburg had been truly heart-rending. Houses
had been burned, and helpless women aud children left without shelter. The country had
been stripped of provisions and many families left without a morsel to eat. Furniture and
bedding had been cut to pieces, and old men aud women and children robbed of all the
clothing they had except that on their backs. Ladies trunks had been rifled and their
dresses torn to pieces in mere wantonness. Even the negro girls had lost their little finer}-.
AVe now had renewed evidences of the outrages committed by Hunter's orders in burning
and plundering private houses. AVe saw the ruins of a number of houses to which the
torch had been applied by his oiders. At Lexington he had burned the Military Institute,
with all of its contents, including its library and scientific apparatus ; and Washington Col-
lego had been plundered and the statue of AVashington stolen. The residence of Ex-Gover
nor Letcher at that place had been burned by orders, and but a few minutes given Sirs,
Letcher and her family to leave the house. In the same county a most excelUmt christian
gentleman, a Mr. Oreigh, had been hung, beenuse, on a former occasion, he had killed a
straggling aud marauding Federal soldier while in tbe act of in.sulting and outraging tho
larlies of his family. These are bnt sonic ot the outrages committed by Hunter or his
orders, and 1 will not insult the memory of the ancient barbarians ot the North by calling
them "acts of A'andalism," If those old barbarians wore savage and crael,theyat least had
the manliness and daring of rude soldiers, wilh occasional traits of magnanimity. Hunter's
deeds wore those of a uialigiiaut and cowardly fanatic, who was better qualified to make war
upon helpless women and children than upon armed soldiers. The time consumed iu the
perpetrirtion of those deeds, was the salvation of Lynchburg, with its storo-s, foundries, anfl
factories, which were so necessary to our army at Eichmond.

ilARCH DOWN THE VALLEY.

ID

On the 26th, I reached Staunton in advance of the troops,
and the latter came up next day, which was spent in reducing
transportation and getting provisions from Waynesboro, to
which point they had been sent over tiie railroad. Some of
the guns and a number of the horses belonging to the artillery
were now unfit for sei-A-ice, and the best of each were selected,
and about a battalion taken from Breckenridge's artillery,
under Lt Col. Eng, to accompany us, in addition to the two
battalions brought -with the 2nd Corps. The rest were left
behind with a portion of the oflicers and men in charge of
them. The dismounted cavalry had been permitted to send
for their horses which had been recruiting, and Col. Bradley
T. Johnson, who had joined me at this place with a battalion
of Maryland Cavalry, was assigned to the command of Jones'
brigade, Avith the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, that
brigade haAdng been reorganized and the two Maryland bat
talions attached to it. General Breckenridge had accompanied
us from Lynchburg, and, to give him a command commensu
rate v?ith his proper one, and at the same time enable me to
control the cavalry more readily, Gordon's divison of infantry
was assigned to his command in addition to the one under
Elzey, and Ransom, in charge of the cavalry, was ordered to
report to me directly. Major-General Elzey was relieved from
duty at his own request, and the division under him was left
under the temporary command of Brigadier-General Vaughan.
The official reports at this place showed about two thousand
mounfed men for duty in the cavalry, which Avas composed' of
foxir small brigades, to wit : Imboden's, McCausland's, Jack
son's, and Jones' (now Johnson's). Vaughan's had not been
mounted but the horses had been sent for from South-western
Virginia. The official reports of the infantry showed 10,000
muskets for duty, including Vaughan's dismounted cavalry.
Nearly, if not quite half of the corapany officers and men
were barefooted or nearly so, and a dispatch had been sent
from Salem by courier, and Lynchburg by telegraph, to Rich
mond, requesting shoes to be sent to Staunton, but they had
not arrived.
Another telegram Avas received here fr-om General Lee, atat-
6

50 MARCH DO'lVN THE VALLEY.
ing that the circumstances under which my original orders
Avere given had changed, and again submitting it to my judg
ment, in the altered state of things^ whether the movement
down the Valley and across the Potomac should be made.
The accession to my command from Breckenridge's forces had
iiot been as great as General Lee supposed it would be, on
account of the disorganization consequent on Jones' defeat at
Piedmont, aud the subsequent rapid movement to Lynchburg
from Rockfish Gap, but I determined to carry out the original
design at all hazards, and telegraphed to General Lee my pur
pose to continue the movement.
The march was resumed on the 28th with five days' rations
in the waggons and two days in haversacks, empty waggons
being left to bring the shoes when they arrived. Imboden was
sent through Brock's Gap in the Great North Mountain to the
Valley of the South Brauch of the Potomac, with his brigade
of cavalry aud a battery of horse artillery, to destroy the rail
road bridge over that stream and all the bridges on the Balti
more and Ohio railroad from that point to Martinsburg. The
telegraph line was repaired to New Market as we marched
down the Valley, and communications kept up Avith that point
by signal stations. On the 2nd of July we reached Winches
ter,* and I here received a dispatch from General Lee, direct
ing me to rgmain in the J^ower Valley until everything was in
readiness to cross the Potomac, and to destroy the Baltimore
and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal as far
as possible. This Avas in accordance Avith my previous fleter-
mination, and its policy was obvious. My provisions were
nearly exhausted and if I had moved through Loudon, it would
have been necessary for me to halt and thresh AA-lieat and have
it ground, as neither bread nor fiour could be otherwise ob-
*Un this day we passed through Newtown where several houses, including that of a Meth
odist minister, had been burned by Hunter's orders, because a part of Mosby's command
had attacked a train of suppUes for Sigel's force, at this place. The original order -was to
burn the whole town, but the officer sent to execute it had revolted at the cruel mandate of
Ids superior, and another had been sent who but partially executed it,alter having forced the
rieiiple to take an oath of allegiance to tho United States to save their houses. Jlosby's bat
talion, though culled "guerillas" by tho enemy, was a regular organization in the Confede
rate Army, and was merely serving on detached duty under General Lee's orders. The attack
on the train was an act of legitimate warfare, and the order to burn Newtown, aud the burn
ing of the houses mentioned were most wanton, cruel, unjustiflable, and cowardly.

OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 5 .
tained ; which would have caused much greater delay than was
required on the other route, where we could take provisions
from the enemy. Moreover unless the Baltimore and Ohio
^"?^1£2?4J^?5_^21^J^Pj ^^ enemy would have been able to move
troops from the West over that road to Washington.
On the night of the 2nd, McCausland was sent across North
Mountain, to move doAvn Back Creek, and burn the railroad
bridge at its mouth, and then to move by North Mountain
depot to HaonesAdlle, on the road from Martinsburg to Wil
liamsport; and, early on the morning of the 3rd, Bradley
Johnson was sent by Smithfield and Leetown, to cross the rail
road at KearneysvUle, east of Martinsburg, and unite with
McCausland at Hainesville, so as to cut off the retreat of Sigel,
who was at Martinsburg with a considerable force. Brecken
ridge moved, on the same morning, direct for Martinsburg,
with his command preceded by Gilmor's battalion of cavalry,
while I moved, with Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, over the
route taken by Johnson, to LeetoAvn. On the approach of
Breckenridge, Sigel, after very slight skirmishing, eyacuated
Martinsburg, leaving behind considerable stores, which fell
into our' hands. McCausland burned the bridge over Back
Creek, captured the guard at North Mountain depot, and suc
ceeded in reaching Hainesville; but Johnson encountered a
force at LeetOAvn, under Mulligan, which, after hard fighting,
he drove across the railroad, when, Sigfil, having united AAdth
Mulligan, Johnson's command Avas forced back, just before
night, on Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, which had arrived
at Leetown, after a march of tAventy-four miles. It was too
late, and these divisions were too much exhausted, to go after
the enemy; and, during the night, Sigel retreated across the
P«3tomac, at Shepherdstown, to Maryland Heights.
On the 4th, Shepherdstown Avas occupied by a part of Ran
som's cavalry. Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions moved to
Harper's Ferry, and the enemy was driven from Bolivar
Heights, and the Village of Bolivar, to an inner line of works
under the cover of the guns from Maryland Heights. Breck
enridge, after burning the railroad bridges at Martinsburg,
and across the Opequon, moved to Duffield's depot, five miles

52 OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND.
from Harper's Ferry, destroying the road as he moved. Dur
ing the night of the 4th, the enemy evacuated Harper's Ferry,
burning the railroad and pontoon bridges across the Potomac.
It was not possible to occupy the town of Harper's Ferry,
except with skirmishers, as it was thoroughly commarided by
the heavy guns on Maryland Heights; and the Sth was spent
by Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions in demonstrating at that
place. In the afternoon, Breckenridge's command crossed the
river at Shepherdstown, and Gordon's division was advanced
-over the Antietam, towards Maryland Heights. At night, con
siderable stores, which had been abandoned at Harper's Ferry,
were secured; and, before day, Rodes' and Ramseur's diAdsions
moved to Shepherdstown, and crossed the Potomac early on
the 6th, Lewis' brigade, of Ramseur's division, being left to
occupy Harper's Ferry with skirmishers.
On this day (the 6th) Gordon's division advanced towards
Maryland Heights, and drove the enemy into his works.
Working parties were employed in destroying the aqueduct of
the canal over the Antietam, and the locks and canal boats.
On the 7th, Rodes moved through Rohersville, on the road
to Crampton's Gap in South Mountain, and skirmished Avith a
small force of the enemy, while Breckenridge demonstrated
against Maryland Heights, with Gordon's division, supported
by his other division, now under Brigadier-General Echols,
who had reported for duty.
While these operations were going on, McCausland had
occupied HagerstoAvn, and levied a contribution of $20,000,
and Boonsboro' had been occupied by Johnson's cavalry. On
the 6th I received a letter from General Lee, by special courier,
informing me that, on the 12th, an effort would be made to
release the prisoners at Point Lookout, and directing me to
take steps to unite them with my command, if the attempt was
successful ; but I Avas not informed of the manner in which
the attempt would be made — General Lee stating that he was
not, himself, advised of the ]Darticulars.
My desire had been to manoeuvre the^^emy out of Mary-
land Heights, so as to enable me to move djreotiy from Har-

OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, 6,S
per's Ferry for Washington; but he had taken refuge in his
strongly-fortified works, and, as they could not be approached
without great difficulty, and an attempt to carry them by as
sault would have resulted in greater loss than the advantage
to be gained would justify, I determined to move through
the^aps of South Mountain to the north of the Heights. On
the 7th, the greater portion of the cavalry was sent across the
mountain in the direction of Frederick; and, that night, the
expected shoes having arrived and been distributed, orders
were given for a general move next morning ; and an officer
(Lieut.-CoL Goodwin, of a Louisiana Regiment,) was ordered
back to Winchester, with a small guard, to collect the strag
glers at that place, and prevent them from following.
Imboden had reached the railroad, at the South Branch of
the Potomac, and partially destroyed the bridge, but had not
succeeded in dislodging the guard from the block-house at that
place. He had been taken sick, and very little had been ac
complished by the expedition ; and his brigade, now under
the command of Colonel George H. Smith, had returned.
Early on the moming of the Sth, the whole force moved ;
Rodee, through Crampton's Gap, to Jefferson ; Breckenridge,
through Fox's Gap; and Ramseur, Avith the trains, through
Boonsboro' Gap, followed by LeAvis' brigade, which had started
from Harper's Ferry the night before, after burning the trestle-
work on the railroad, and the stores which had not been
brought offl Breckenridge and Ramseur encamped near Mid-
dletoAvn, and Rodes near Jefferson. Ransom had occupied
Catoctan Mountain, between Middletown and Frederick, with
his cavalry, and had skirmished heavily with a body of the
enemy at the latter place. McCausland was ordered to move
to the right, in the afternoon, and the next day cut the tele
graph and railroad between Maryland Heights and Washing
ton and Baltimore — cross the Monocacy, and, if possible, oc
cupy the railroad bridge over that stream, at the Junction near
Frederick. Early on the 9th, Johnson with his brigade of cavalry, and a
battery of horse artillery, moved to thie north of Frederick,

54 BATTLE OF MONOCACY.
with orders to strike the railroads from Baltimore to Harris
burg and Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the Gunpowder,
also to cut the railroad between Washington and Baltimore,
and threaten ,the latter place; and then to move towards Point
Lookout for the purpose of releasing the prisoners, if we
should succeed in getting into Washington. The other troops
also moved forward towaj-ds Monocacy Junction, and Rajoa-
seur's ' division passed through Frederick, driving a force of
skirjpaishers before it.

BATTLE OF MONOCACY.
The enemy in considerable force under General Lew Wal
lace, was fonnd strongly posted on the eastern bank of the
Monocacy near the Junction, with an earthwork and two block
houses commanding both the railroad bridge and the bridge
on the Georgetown pike. Ramseur's division was deployed in
front of the enemy, after driving his skirmishers across the
river, and several batteries were put in position, when a sharp
artillery fire opened from both sides. Rodes' division had
come up from Jefi'erson and was placed on Ramseur's left, cov
ering the roads from Baltimore and the crossings of the Mo
nocacy above the Junction. Breckenridge's command, -with
the trains, was in the rear between Frederick and the Junction,
while the residue of the cavalry was watching a force of the
enemy's cavalry which had followed from Maryland Heights.
The enemy's position was too strong, and the difficulties of
crossing the Monocacy under fire too great, to attack in front
without greater loss than I was -willing to incur. I thereifore
made an examination in person to find a point at which the
river could be crossed, so as to take the enemy in flank.
While I was engaged in making this examination to my right,'
I discovered McCausland in the act of crossing the river with
his brigade. As soon as he crossed he dismounted his men,
ajad Ady.a?iced uapdly sgaiB8t,fee .wemy's left flaok, w\Mi ]b*

BMTLE GF MONOCACY. 55
threw into confusion, and he came very near cajituring a bart-
tery of artillery, but the enemy concentrated on him, and he
was gradually forced back obstinately contesting the ground.
McCausland's movement which Avas very brilliantly executed,
solved the problem for me, and, as soon as I discovered it,
orders Avere sent to Breckenridge to move up rapidly with Gor
don's division to McCausland's assistance, and to follow up his
attack. This division crossed at the same place, and Gordon
Avas ordered to move forward and strike the enemy on his left
flank, and drive him from the positions commanding the cross
ings in Ramseur's front, so as to enable the latter to cross.
This movement was executed under the personal superinten
dence of General Breckenridge, and, while Ramseur skir
mished -srith the enemy in front, the attack was made by Gor
don in gallant style, and, Avith the aid of several pieces of
Bang's artillery which had been crossed over, and Nelson's
artillery from the opposite side, he threw the enemy into great
confusion and forced him from his position. Ramseur imme
diately crossed on the railroad bridge and pursued the enemy's
fljdng forces, and Rodes crossed on the left and joined in the
pursuit. Echols' division which had been left to guard thc
trains, was ordered up during the engagement, but was not
needed. The pursuit was soon discontinued, as Wallace's entire
force had taken the road towards Baltimore, and I did not
Avant prisoners. Wallace's force I estimated at 8,000 or 10,000
men, and it was ascertained that one division of the 6th Corps
(Rickett's) from Grant's army, was in the fight. Between 600
and 700 unwounded prisoners fell into our hands, and the
enemy's loss in killed and wounded was very heavy. Our loss
in killed and wounded was about 700, and among them were
Brigadier-General Evans wounded, and Colonel Lamar of the
61st Georgia regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Tavener, of the
17th Virginia Cavalry, and Lieutenant Hobson, of Nelson's
artillery, killed. The action closed about sunset, and we had
marched about fourteen miles before it commenced. All the
troops and trains were crossed over the Monocacy that night,
so as to resume the march early next day. Such of our
wounded as could not be moved in ambulances or otherwise,

56 OPERATIONS IN FRONT OP WASHINGTOX.
were sent to the hospitals at Frederick under charge of com
petent medical officers, and our dead were buried. During
the operations at Monocacy, a contribution of $200,000 in
money, was levied on the city of Frederick, and some needed
supplies were obtained.

OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON, AND
RECROSSING THE POTOMAC.
On the 10th, the march was resumed at daylight, and Ave
bivouacked four miles from Rockville, on the Georgetown
pike, having marched twenty miles. Ramseur's diAdsion
which had remained behind for a short time to protect a work
ing party engaged in destroying the railroad bridge, was de
tained for a time in driving off the party of cavalry which had
been folloAving from Maryland Heights, and did not get up
until one o'clock at night. McCausland, moving in front on
this day, drove a bo,dy of the enemy's cavalry before him, and
had quite a brisk engagement at Rockville, where he en
camped after defeating and driving oft" the enemy.
We moved at daylight on the llth; McCausland moA'-ing on
the Georgetown .pike, while the infantry, preceded by Im
boden's cavalry under Colonel Smith, turned to the left at
Rockville, so as to reach the 7th street pike which runs by
Silver Spring into Washington. Jackson's cavalry moved on
the left flank. The previous day had been very Avarm, and
the roads were exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain
for several weeks. The heat during the night had been verv
oppressive, and but little rest bad been obtained. This dav
Avas an exceedingly hot oue, and there vvas no air stirring.
While marching, the men were enveloped in a suffocating
cloud of dust, and many of them fell by the way from exhaus
tion. Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I
pushed on as rapidly as possible, hoping to get into the fortifi-

OPERATIO^;y IN FRONT OF WASHINaTOK, 57
cations around Washington before they could be manned.
Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him into the Avorks
on the 7th street pike, and dismounted his men and deployed
them as skirmishers. I rode ahead of the infantry, and arrived
in sight of Fort Stevens on this road a short time after noon,
when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned.
Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately ordered
to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out skirmish
ers, and move into the works if he could. My whole column
was then moving by flank, which was th« only practicable
mode of marching on the road we were on, and before Rodes'
division could be brought up, Ave saw a cloud of dust in the
rear of the works towards Washington, and soon a column of
the enemy filed into them on the right and left, and skirmish-
ere Avere throAvn out in front, while an artillery fire was opened
on us from a number of batteries. This defeated our hopes of
getting possession of the works by surprise, and it became
necessary to reconnoiti-e.
Rodes' skinnishers were thi'owii to the front, driving those
of the enemy to the cover of the works, and Ave proceeded to
examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was prac
ticable to carry them by assault. They were found to be ex
ceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be en
closed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works in
front of each pierced for an immense number of guns, the
whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and
strengthened by palisades and abattis. The timber had been
felled within cannon range all around and left on the ground,
making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach
Avas raked by artillery. On the right was Rock Creek, run
ning through a deep ravine which had been rendered impas
sable by the felling of the timber on each side, and beyond
were the works on the Georgetown pike which had been re
ported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as fer as the eye
could reach, the works appeared to be of the same impregnable
character. The position was naturally strong for defence, and
the examination showed, what might have been expected, that
every appliance of science and unlimited means had been used
H

58 OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON.
to render the fortifications around Washington as strong as
possible. This reconnoissance consumed the balance of the
day. The rapid marching which had broken doAvn a number of
the men who were barefooted or Aveakened by prcAdous expo
sure, and had been left ih the Valley and directed to be col
lected at Winchester, and the losses in killed and wounded at
Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Monocacy, had re
duced my infantiw to about 8,000 muskets. Of those reraain
ing, a very large number Avere greatly exhausted by the last
two days marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, and I
Avas satisfied, Avhen avc arrived in front of the fortifications,
that not more than one-third of my force could have been
carried into action. I had about forty pieces of field artillery,
of AA'hich the largest Avere 12 pounder Napoleons, besides a few
[lieces of horse artillery Avath the caA-alry. McCausland re
ported the works on the Georgetown pike too strongly manned
for him to assault. We could not move to the right or the
left without its being discovered from a signal station on thc
top of the " Soldier's Home," Avhicli overlooked the country,
and the enemy Avould have been enabled to move in his works
to meet us. Under the circumstances, to have rushed my men
blindly against the fortifications, Avithout understanding the
state of things, aa'ouM have been Avorse than folly. If Ave had
any friends in Washington, none of them came out to give us
information, and this satisfied me that the place was not un
defended. I knoAv that troops had arrived from Grant's array,
for prisoners had been captured from Rickett's division of the
Iith Corps at Monocacy. From Sharpsburg I had sent a mes
sage to Mosby, by one of his men, requesting him to cross tiio
l^otomac beloAv Harper's Ferry, cut the railroad and telegraph,
and endeavour to find out tbe condition of things in Washino--
ton, but he^had not crossed the river and I had received no in-
tbntiation from him. A northern paper, AAdiich Avas obtained,
gave the information that Hunter, after moA'ing up the Ohio
River in steamboats, AA'as passing over the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad, and I knew tiiat he Avould be at Harper's Ferry soon,
as Imboden had done very littie damage to the road west of

OPERATIONS IN FRONT OP "WASHINGTON. 59
• Martinsburg. After dark on the llth, I held a consultation
¦with Major-Generals Breckenridge, Rodes, Gordon and Ram
seur, in which I stated to them the danger of remaining where
we were, and the necessity of doing something immediately,
as the probability was that the passes of the South Mountain
and the fords of the upper Potomac Avould soon be closed
against us. After interchanging Adews with them, being very
reluctant to abandon the project of capturing Washington,
I determined to make an assault on the enemy's works at day
light next morning, unless some information should be re
ceived before that time shoAving its impractibility, and so
informed those officers. During the night a dispatch Avas re
ceived from Gen. Bradley Johnson from near Baltimore, in
forming me that he had received information, from a reliable
source, that two corps had arrived from Gen. Grant's army,
and that his whole army was probably in motion. This caused
me to delay the attack until I could examine the Avorks agaiu,
and, as soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front
and found the parapets lined Avith troops. I had, therefore,
reluctantiy,>to give up all hopes of capturing Washington,
after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the Capitol, and
given the Federal authorities a terrible fright.
Grant in his report says, in regard to the condition of things
when I moved towards Washington : " The garrisons of Balti
more and Washington Avere at this time made up of heavy
artillery regiments, hundred days men, and detachments from
the invalid corps." And, in regard to the force of Wallace at
Monocacy, he says : " His force AA-as not sufficient to ensure
success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it
resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy and
thereby served to enable Gen. Wright to reach Washington
Avith two divisions of the 6tli Corps, and the advance of the
19th Corps, before him." Stanton says in his report: " Here
(at Washington) they (we) Avere met by troops from the Army
of the Potomac, consisting of the 6th Corps under General
Wright, a part of the Sth Corps under General Gilmore, aud
a part of the 19th Corps, just arrived from New Orieans under
General Emory." Taking Grant's statement of the troops

00 OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON.
which had arrived from his army as the most reliable, they
were sufficient to hold the works against my troops, at least
until others could arrive. But, in addition to those which had
already arrived, there Avere the detachments from the invalid
corps, called, I belicA'c, the " Veteran Reserves " (of which I
was informed there were about 5,000), the heavy artillery regi
ments, the hundred days' men, and, I suppose, the part of the
8th Corps mentioned by Stanton. To all these may be added
the local troops, or militia, and the government employees.
Some of the northern papers stated that, between Saturday
and Monday, I could have entered the city ; but on Saturday
I was fighting at Monocacy, thirty-five miles from Washington,
a force which I could not leave in my rear ; and, after dispos
ing of that force and moving as rapidly as it was possible for
me to move, I did not arrive in front of the fortifications until
after noon on Monday, and then my troops were exhausted,
and it required time to bring them up into line. I had then
made a march, over the^ circuitous route by Charlottesville,
Lynchburg, and Salem, down the Valley, and through the
passes of the South Mountain, which, uotAviths^anding the
delays in dealing Avith Hunter's, Sigel's, and Wallace's forces,
is, for its length and rapidity, I believe, Avdthout a parallel in
this or any other modern war — the unopposed marauding ex
cursion of the freebooter Sherman through Georgia, not ex
cepted. My small force had been thrown up to the very walls
of the Federal Capital, north of a river which could not be
forded at any point within 40 miles, and with a heavy force
and the South Mountain in iiiy rear — the passes through which
mountain could be held by a small number of troops. A
glance at the map, Avhen it is recollected that the Potomac is a
wide river, and navigable to Washington for the largest vessels,
will cause the intelligent reader to wonder, not why I failed to
take Washington, but why I had the audacity to "approach it
as I did, with the small force under my command. It was
supposed by some, who were not informed of the facts, that I
delayed in the lower Valley longer than Avas necessary; but,
an examination of the foregoing narrative Avill show that not
one moment Avas spent in idleness, but that everv one was em-

RECROSSING THE POTOMAC. 61
ployed in making some arrangement, or removing some diffi
culty in my way, which it was necessary to make or remove,
so as to enable me to advance with a prospect of success. I
could not move across the Potomac and through the passes of
the South Mountain, with any safety, until Sigel was driven
from, or safely housed in, the fortifications at Maryland Heights.
After abandoning the idea of capturing Washington, I de
termined to remain in front of the fortifications during the
12th, and retire at night, as I was satisfied that to remain longer
would cause the loss of my entire force.
Johnson had burned the bridges over the Gunpowder, on the
Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened Baltimore, and
started for Point Lookout, but I sent an order for him to re
turn. The attempt to release the prisoners of which I was in
formed by General Lee, was not made, as the enemy had
received notice of it in some way. Major Harry Gilmor, who
burned the bridge over the Gunpowder on the Philadelphia
road, captured Major-General Franklin on a train at that
point, but he was permitted to escape, either by the careless
ness or exhaustion of the guard placed over him, before I was
informed of the capture.
On the aftesnoon of the 12th, a heavy reconnoitering force
was sent out by the enemy, which, after severe skirmishing,
was driven back by Rodes' division with but slight loss to us.
About dark we commenced retiring and did so without moles
tation.* Passing through Rockville and PoolsviUe, we crossed
the. Potomac at White's Ford, above Leesburg in Loudon
County, on the moming of the 14th, bringing off the prisoners
captured at Monocacy and everything else in safety. There
was some skirmishing in the rear between our cavalry and that
of the enemy which was foUoAving, and, on the afternoon of
* Oraut says : " On the 12th, a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens to
ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost 280
in killed and wounded. The eneray's loss was probably greater. He commenced retiring
during the night." In regard to the same affair, Stanton says : " By these troops (AVright's,
Gilmore'a, and Emory's) the enemy was driven back from Washington and retreated hastily
to Virginia, pursued by our forces under General Wright." Grant's statement is correct,
with the exception of the estimate he places on our loss. Corament on Stanton's is unnec-
cessary when it is compared with that of Grant.

62 OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY.
the 14th, there was some artillery firing by the enemy, across
the river, at our cavalry which was watching the fords. Besides
the money levied in Hagerstown and Frederick, which was
subsequently very useful in obtaining supplies, we brought off
quite a large number of beef cattle, and the cavalry obtained a
number of horses, some being also procured for the artillery.*

RETURN TO THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS
THERE.
We rested, on the 14th and 15th, near Leesburg, and, on
the morning of the 16th, resumed the march to the Valley,
through Snicker's Gap in the Blue Ridge. Hunter had arrived
at Harper's Ferry, and united with Sigel, and the whole force
had moved from that place, under Crook,, to Hillsboro', in Lou
don, and a body of cavalry fi'om it made a dash on our train,
as we were moving towards the Valley, and succeeded in setting
fire to a few waggons, but was soon driven off by troops from
Rodes' and Ramseur's diAdsions, and one piece of artiUery was
captured from the enemy.
 1 
I' On the night of the 12th, the house of Postmaster-General Blair near Silver Spring was
burned, and it was assumed by the enemy that it was bumed by my orders. The fact is,
that I had nothing to do with it, and do not yet know how tho burning occurred. Though I
believed that retaliation was fully justified by the previous acts of the enemy, yet I did not
wish to incur the risk of any license on the part of my troops, and it was obviously impolitic
to set the house on flre when we were retiring, as it amounted to notice of our movement.
Some of my ofHcers thought the burning w.as done by some person in the neighborhood,
who took advantage of our presence to commit the act with impunity. It may have been
occasioned by a shell from the enemy's guns, sorae of which went in that direction late iu
the day, or it may have been the act of sorae of my men ; and a number of them had abund
ant provocation for the act, in the sight of their own devastated homes as they marched
down the Valley on Hunter's track. In retaliation for the burning of this house, two Fede
ral gunboats with a body of soldiers on board were sent up the Bappahannock Eiver, on
which there was not a Confederate soldier, to burn the house of tlie widow of the brother of
the Hon. Jaines A. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of AVar, ant^ she and her little children
were turned out of doors, and tho house with all its contents consigned to the flaraes. A
card was lelt, signed by Butler or his order, stating that the house was burned in retaliation
for the burning of the Hon. Montgomery Blair's house. This retaliation upon a widowed
lady and her orphan children, by a combined military and naval expedition, was wortliy of
the agent selected, and the cause in which he was engaged. But, though it was very con
genial to his nature, I do not regard Butler as alone responsible for this act. The odium of
it should attach to his superiors Lincoln and Grant, he being the favorite of the forraer, and
the subordinate of the latter, and at that time, serving under his immediate orders.

OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY. 63
^ On the morning of the 17th, Ave crossed tiie Shenandoah, at
Snicker's or Castleman's Ferry, and took position near Berry-
Adlle— Breckenridge covering the ford at the ferry, and the
river above and beloAV, and Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions
the roads from Harper's Ferry.
Ou the 18tii, the enemy, having moved through Snicker's
Gap, appeared ou the banks of the Shenandoah, and there was
some skirmishing. In the afternoon, a heavy column of bis
infantry made a dash at Parker's Ford, one mile below the
ferry, aud crossed over, after driving back the picket of ona
hundred men at that point. Breckenridge moved Gordon's
and Echols' divisions to the front, and held the enemy in check,
while Rodes' diAdsion was brought up from the left,' and at
tacked and drove him across the river, witb heavy loss, and in
great confusion.
On the 19th, the enemy's main body still occupied the east
ern bank of the Shenandoah, and smaller columns moved up
and doAvn the river, to effect a crossing. Imboden, with his
OAvn and McCausland's cavalry, resisted and repulsed one of
these columns, which attempted to cross at Berry's Ferry, with
considerable loss to the enemy. The horses of Vaughan's
cavalry having been brought from South-western Virginia, his
small force had been now mounted. On this day I receiA^ed
information that a column under Averill was moAdng from
Martinsburg towards Winchester, and, as the position I held
near Berryville left my trains exposed to expeditions in the
rear from Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, I determined to
concentrate my force near Strasburg, so as to enable me to put
the trains in safety, and then move out and attack the enemy.
This movement was commenced on the night of the 19th ;
Ramseur's divdsion, with a battery of artillery, being sent to
Winchester, to cover that place against Averill, while the stores,
and the sick and wounded Avere being removed, and the other
divisions moAdng through Millwood and White Post to the
Valley Pike at NeAvtown and Middletown.
Vaughan's and Jackson's cavalry had been watching Averill,
and, on the afternoon of the 20th, it was reported to General

«4 OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY.
Ramseur, by General Vaughan, that Averill was at Stephen
son's depot, with an inferior force, which could be captured,
and Ramseur moved out from Winchester to attack him ; but,
relying on the accuracy of thg informa,tion he had received.
General Ramseur did not take the proper precautions in ad
vancing, and his division, while moving by the flank, was sud
denly met by a larger force, under Averill, advancing in line
of battle, and the result was that Ramseur's force was throAvn
into confusion, and compelled to retire, Avith the loss of four
pieces of artillery, and a number in killed and wounded —
Brigadier-Generals Lewis and Lilly being among the wounded,
and Col. Board, of the 58th Virginia Regiment, among the
killed. Colonel Jackson made a vigorous charge with his
cavalry, which enabled Ramseur to rally his men, restore order,
and arrest the jirogress of Averill before he reached Winches
ter. The error committed, on this occasion, by this most gal
lant officer, was nobly retrieved in the subsequent part of the
campaign. I received, at Newtown^ the news of Ramseur's
misfortune, and immediately moved to his assistance -with
Rodes' division ; but, on arriving at Winchester, I found that the
enemy, after being checked, had fallen back a short distance ;
and, as another and much larger column was moving, through
Berryville, I did not go after Averill, but moved the whole
command to Newtown — the stores, and such of the wounded
and sick as could be transported, having been gotten off.
On the 21st, my whole infantry force was concentrated near
Middletown ; and, on the 22nd, it was moved across Cedar
Creek, towards Strasburg, and so posted as to cover all the
roads from the direction of Winchester.
A report having been sent to me from Mt. Jackson, that a
force of the enemy Avas moving from tiie Valley of the South
Branch of the Potomac to that place, Imboden was sent to
ascertain its truth, and it proved to be false. We rested ou
the 23rd, while waiting to ascertain the movements of the
enemy, and during the day a report was reieeiA^'ed from the
cavalry in front, that a large portion of the force sent after us
from Washington, was returning, and that Crook and Averill
had united, and were at Kernstown, near Winchester.

BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.
On the reception of the foregoing information, I determined
to attack the enemy at once ; and, early on the iporning of the
24th, my whole force was put in motion for Winchester. The
enemy, under Crook, consisting of the " Army of West Vir
ginia," and including Hunter's and Sigel's forces, and Averill's
cavah-y, AA-as found in position at Kernstown, on the same
ground occupied by Shields, at the time of General Jackson's
fight with him, on the 23rd of March, 1862. Ramseur's divi
sion was sent to the left, at Bartonsville, to get around the
enemy's right flank, while the other divisions moved along the
Valley Pike, and formed on each side of it. Ransom's cavalry
AA'as ordered to move in two columns; one on the right along
the road from Front Royal to Winchester ; and the other on
the left, and west of Winchester, so as to unite in rear of the
latter place, and cut oft' the enemy's retreat. After the ene
my's skirmishers were driven in, it was discovered that his
left flank, extending through Kernstown, Avas exposed, and
General Breckenridge was ordered to move Echols' division,
now under Brig.-Gen. Wharton, under cover of some ravines
ou our right, and attack that flank. This movement, which
was made under Gen. Breckenridge's personal superinten
dence, AA'as handsomely executed, and the attacking diAdsion
strack the enemy's left flank in open ground, doubling it up
and throAving his whole line into great confusion. The other
divisions then advanced, and the rout of the enemy became
complete. He was pursued, by the infantry and artillery,
through and beyond Winchester ; and the pursuit was con
tinued by Rodes' division to Stephenson's depot, six miles from
Winchester — this division then having marched twenty-seven
railes from its position west of Strasburg. The cavalry had
not been moved according to my orders ; and the enemy, hav
ing the advantage of an open country and a wide macadamized
road, was enabled to make his escape with his artillery and
I

66 BATTLE OP KERNSTOWN.
most of his waggons. General Ransom had been in very bad
health since he reported to me at Lynchburg, and unable to
take the active command in the field; and all my operations
had been impeded for the want of an efficient and energetic
cavalry commander. I think, if I had had oue on this occa
sion, the greater part of the enemy's force would have been
captured or destroyed, for the rout Avas thorough. Our loss,
in this action, was very light. The enemy's loss in killed and
Avounded was severe, and two or three hundred prisoners fell
into our hands; and, among them. Colonel Mulligan, in com
mand of a division, mortally wounded. The infantry was too
much exhausted to continue the pursuit on the 25th, and only
moved to Bunker Hill, twelve miles from Winchester. The
pursuit was continued by our cavalry, and the enemy's rear
guard of cavalry was encountered at Martinsburg ; but, after
slight skirmishing, it evacuated the place. The whole de
feated force crossed the Potomac, and took refuge at Maryland
Heights and Harper's Ferry. The road from Winchester, via
Martinsburg, to Williamsport, was strewed with debris of the
rapid retreat — twelve caissons and seventy-two Avaggons hav
ing been abandoned, and most of them burned.*

EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYL-
\^ANIA— BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG.
On the 26th Ave moved to Martinsburg, the caAalry going to
the Potomac. The 27th and 28th Avere employed iu destroy
ing the railroad, it having been repaired since Ave passed over
it at the beginning of the niontb. While at Martinsburg, it
A\as ascertained, beyond all doubt, that Hunter had been again
indulging in his favourite mode of Avarfare, and that, after his

¦•¦ Grant, iu his report, entirely ignores this battle, in which tbe enemy's forces were supc-
linr to mine, and merely says : "About the aith it became evident that the enemy was again
advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 0th corps, which was at AVashington,
was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper » Ferry."

EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND. PENNSYLVANIA. 67
return to the Valley, while we were near Washington, among
other outi-ages, the private residence^ of Mr. Andrew Hunter,
a member of tiie Virginia Senate, Mr. Alexander R. Boteler,
an ex-member of tiie Confederate Congress, as well as of tiie
United States Congress, and Edmund L Lee, a distant relative
of Genei-al Lee, all in Jefferson County, witii their contents,
had been burned by his orders, only time enough being given
for the ladies to get out of the houses. A number of towns
in the South, as A\'ell as private country houses, had been
burned by the Federal troops, and the accounts had been her
alded forth in some of the Northern papers in terms of exul
tation, and gloated over by their readers, while they were re
ceived with apathy by others. I now came to the conclusion
that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough, and that
it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to its
enormity, by an example in the way of retahation. I did not
select the cases mentioned, as having more merit or greater
claims for retaliation than others, but because they had occur
red within the limits of the country covered by my command,
and were brought more immediately to my attention.*
The toAvn of Chambersburg in Pennsylvania was selected as
the one on which retaliation should be made, and McCausland
was ordered to proceed with his brigade and that of Johnson '
and a battery of artillery to that place, and demand of the
municipal authorities the sum of $100,000 in gold, or $500,000
in Umted States currency, as a compensation for the destruc
tion of the houses named and their contents; and, in default
of payment, to lay the town in ashes, in retaliation for the
* I had often seen delicate ladies, who had been plundered, insulted and rendered desci-
late by the acts of our most atrocious enemies, and while they did not call for it, yet in the
anguished expressions of their features while narrating their misfortunes, there was anuitci
appeal to every manly sentiment of my bosom for retribution which I could no longer with
stand. On my pas.sage through the lower A'.-vlley into Maryland, a lady had said to me, with
tears in her eyes, "Our lot is a hard one and we see no peace ; but there are a few green
spots in our lives, and they are, when the Confederate soldiers come along and we eau do
soraething for thera." May God defend and bless those noble women ofthe Valley, who so
often ministered to the wounded, sick and dying Confederate soldiers, and gave their last
morsel of bread to the hungry ! They bore with heroic courage the privations, sufferings,
persecutions and dangers, to which the war which was constantly waged in their midst ex
posed them, and upon no portion of the Southern people did the disasters wliich fitially be
fell onr army and country, fall with more crushing effect than upon them.

08 EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA.
burning of those houses and others in Virginia, as Avell as for
the towns Avhich had been burned in other Southern States.
A written demand to that effect was sent to the municipal
authorities, and they Avere informed what would be the result
of a failure or refusal to comply with it. I desired to give the
people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their toAAm,
by making compensation for part of the injury done, and
hoped that the payment of such a sum Avould have the desired
effect, and open the eyes of the people of other towns at the
North, to the necessity of urging upon their government the
adoption of a different policj-. McCausland was also directed
to proceed from Chambersburg towards Cumberland in MarA--
land, and levy contributions in money upon that and other
towns able to bear them, and if possible destroy the machinery
at the coal pits near Cumberland, and the machine shops, de
pots, and bridges on the Baltimore aud Ohio railroad as far as
practicable. On the 29tli, McCausland crossed the Potomac near Clear
Spring, aboA^e Williamsport, and I nioA^ed with Rodes' and
Ramseur's divisions and Vaughan's cavalry to the latter place,
while Imboden demonstrated with his aud Jackson's cavalry
towards Harper's Ferry, in order to withdraAv attention from
McCausland. Breckenridge remained at Martinsburg and
continued the destruction of the railroad. Vaughan drove a
force of cavalry from Williamsport, and went into Hagerstown,
Avhere he captured and destroyed a train of cars loaded with
supplies. One of Rodes' brigades Avas crossed over at Wil
liamsport and subsequently withdraA\n. On the SOth, Mc
Causland being Avell under AA'ay, I moved back to Martinsburg,
and on the 31st the Avhole uifantry force Avas moved to Bunker
Hill, AA'here Ave remained on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of August.
On the 4th, in order to enable McCausland to retire from
Pennsylvania and Maryland, and to keep Hunter, who had
been reinforced by the 6th and 19th Corps, and had been oscil
lating between Harper's Ferry and ]\Ionocacy Junction, in a
state of uncertainty, I again moved to the Potomac with the
infantry and Vaughan's and Jackson's cavalry, while Imboden
demonstrated towards Harper's Ferry. On the Sth Rodes' aii'd

E-XPEDITION INTO MARYLAND XND PENNSYLVANIA. Cf)
Ramseur's divisions crossed at Williamsport and took position
near St. James' College, and Vaughan's cavalry went into
Hagerstown. Breckenridge, with his command, and Jackson's
cavalry, crossed at ShepherdstoAvn, and took position at Sharps
burg. This position is in full view f'rofii Maryland Heights,
and a cavalry force Avas sent out by the enemy to reconnoitre,
which, after skirmishing Avith Jackson's cavalry, was driven
off by the sharpshooters of Gordon's division. On the 6th,
the whole force recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and
moved towards Martinsburg ; and on the 7th we returned to
Bunker Hill.*
« AVhile at Sharpsburg on this occasion, I rode over the ground on which the battle of
Sharpsburg, or Antietam as it is called by the enemy, was fought, and I was surprised to see
how few traces remained of that great battle. In the woods at the famous Bunkiird or
Tnnkei^ChUTeh, where, from personal observation at the battle, I expected lo find the trees
terribly broken and shattered, a stranger would find difficulty in identifying the marks of
the bullets and shells.
1 will take occasion here to say that the public, North or South, has never knowu how
small was the force with which General Lee fought that battle. McClellan's estimate is very
wide ofthe mark. From ptersonal observation and conversation with other ofiicers engaged,
indnding Gen. Lee himself^ I am satisfied that the latter was not able to carry 30,000 men
into action. The exhaustion of our men in the battles around Eichmond, the subsequent bat
tles near Manassas, and on the march to Maryland, when they were for dayS without anything
to eatexcept green com, was so greatthatthe straggling was frightful before we crossed the
Potomac. As an instance of our weakness, and a reminiscence worthy ot being recorded.
which was brought very forcibly to my mind while riding over the ground, I will state the
following facts : In the early part of the day, all of Gen. Jackson's troops on the field except
my brigade (A. P. Hill had not then arrived from Harper's Ferry) were driven from the field
in great disorder, and Hood had taken their place with his division. My brigade, which
was on the extreme left supporting some artillery with which Stuart was operating, and had
not been engaged, was sent for by General Jackson and posted in the left of the woods at
the Dunkard Church. Hood was also forced back, and then the enemy advanced to this
woods— Sumner's Corps, which was fresh, advancing on our left flank. My brigade, then
numbering about 1000 men for duty, with two or three hundred men of Jackson's own di
vision, who had been rallied by Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, and when there was an inter
val of at least one half a mile between us and any other part of our line, held Sumner's
corps in check for some time, until Green's division of Mansfield's Corps penetrated into
the interval in the woods between us and the rest of our line, when I was compelled to move
by the flank and attack it. That division was driven out of the woods by my brigade, while
Grigsby and Stafford skirmished with Sumner's advancing force, when we turned on it, and,
with the aid of three brigades — to wit : Anderson's, Semraes', and Barksdale's— which had
just arrived to our assistance, drove it from the woods in great confusion and with heavy
loss. So great was the disparity in the forces at this point that the wounded oflicers who
were captured were greatly mortified, and comraenced making excuses by stating that tho
troops In their front were raw troops, who stampeded and produced confusion in their
ranks. McClellan, in his report, says that Sumner's corps and Green's division encoun
tered, in this woods, '-overwhelming numbers behind breastworks," and he assigns the
heavy losses and consequent demoralization in Sumner's Corps as one of the reasons for
not renewing the fight on the 18th. We had no breastworks nor anything like them in that
woods on the 17th, and, on our part, it was a stand-up fight there altogether. The slight
breastworks subsequently seen by McClellan were made on the 18th, when we were expect
ing a renewal ofthe battle.

TO BURNING OP CHAMBERSBURG.
On the 30th of July McCausland reached Chambersburg,
and made the demand as directed, reading to such of the au
thorities as presented themselves the paper sent by me. The
demand was not complied with, the people stating that they
were not afraid of having their town burned, and that a Fede
ral force was approaching. The poUcy pursued by our army
on former occasions had been so lenient, that they did not sup
pose the threat was iu earnest this time, and they hoped for
speedy relief McCausland, however, proceeded to carry out
his orders, and the greater part of the town was laid in ashes.*
He then moved in the direction of Cumberland, but, on ap
proaching that town, he found it defended by a force under
Kelly too strong for him to attack, and he AAdthdrew towards
Hampshire County in Virginia, and crossed the Potomac near
the mouth of the South Branch, capturing the garrison at that
place and partially destroying the railroad bridge. He then
invested the post on the railroad at New Creek, but finding it
too strongly fortified to take by assault, he moved to Moore-
field in Hardy County, near which place he halted to rest and
recruit his men and horses, as the command was now consid
ered safe from pursuit. Averill, however, had been pursuing
from Chambersburg with a body of cavalry, and Johnson's
brigade was surprised in camp, before day, on the morning of
the 7th of August, and routed by Averill's force. This re
sulted also in the rout of McCausland's brigade, and the loss
of the artillery (4 pieces) and about 800 prisoners from the
Avhole command. The balance of the command made its way
to Mount Jackson in great disorder, and much weakened.
This affair had a very damaging effect upon my cavalry for the
rest of the campaign, f

'*' For this act I, alone, am responsible, as the ofiicers engaged in it were simply executing
my orders, and had no discretion left them. Notwithstanding the lapse of time which has
occurred, and the result of the war, I am perfectly satisfied with my conduct on this o6ca-
sion, and see no reason to regret it.
t Grant says, in reference to this expedition under McCausland : " They were met and de
feated by General Kelly ; and, with diminished nurabers, escaped into the mountains of
West Virginia j" and he makes no allusion whatever to AveriU's affair. There was no de
feat by Kelly, but there was one by Averill, as I Jiave stated. This shows how loose Grant is
as to his tacts. So far as we were concerned, the defeat by AveriU was worse thau it could
have been by Kelly.

RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL, AND SUBSEQUENT
OPERATIONS, UNTIL THE BATTLE OF
WINCHESTER.
On the 9th, Imboden reported that a large force had been
concentrated at Harper's Ferry, consisting of the 6th, 19th,
and Crook's Corps, under a new commander, and that it was
mo-dng towards Ben-yville, to our right. The new comman
der proved to be Major-General Sheridan, from Grant's army.
On the 10th, we moved from Bunker Hill to the east of Win
chester, to cover the roads from CharlestoAvn and Berryville to
that place ; aud Ramseur's division was moved to Winchester,
to cover that place against a force reported to be advancing
from the west; but, this report proving untrue, it was sub
sequentiy moved to the junction of the Millwood aud Front
Royal roads. On the morning of the llth, it was discovered
that the eneray was moving to our right, on the . east of the
Opequon, and my troops, which had been formed in line of
battle covering Winchester, were moved to the right, towards
Newtown, keeping between the enemy and the Valley Pike.
Ramseur had a brisk skirmish with a body of the enemy's
caA-alrj' on the Millwood Road, and drove it back. Imboden's
and Vaughan's brigades had a severe fight with another body
of cavalry at the double toll-gate, at the intersection of the
Front Royal road with the road from White Post to NewtoAvn ;
and it Avas discovered that there had been a considerable acces
sion to that arm from Grant's army. -Just before night, Gor
don had heavy skirmishing near Newtown, Avith a large force
of cavalry, which advanced on the road from the double toll-
gate, and drove it off'. We encamped near Newtown ; and, on
the morning of the 12th, moved to Hupp's Hill, between Stras
burg and Cedar Creek. Finding that the enemy was advanc
ing in much heavier force than 1 had yet encountered, I de
termined to take position at Fisher's Hill, above Strasburg,

72 RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL.
and await his attack there. Imboden, Avith his brigade, was
sent to Luray Valley, to watch that route ; and, in the after
noon, we moved to Fisher's Hill. I had received information
a few days before, from General Lee, that General Anderson
had moved with Kershaw's division of infantry and Fitz Lee's
division of cavalry to Culpeper C. H. ; and I sent a dispatch
to Anderson, informing him of the state of things, and re
questing him to move to Front Royal, so as to guard the Luray
Valley. Sheridan's advance appeared on the banks of Cedar Creek,
on the 12th, and there was some skirmishing Avith it. My
troops were posted at Fisher's Hill, with the right resting on
the North, Fork of the Shenandoah, and the left extending to
wards Little North Mountain ; and we awaited the advance of
the enemy. General Anderson, moved to Front Royal, in com
pliance with my request, and took position to prevent an ad-
A'ance of the enemy on that route. Shortly after I took posi
tion at Fisher's Hill, Major-General Lomax reported to me to
relieve Ransom, in command of the cavalry, aud McCausland
and Johnson joined us with the remnants of their brigades.
Sheridan demonstrated at Hupp's Hill, Avithin our view, for
several days, and some severe skirmishing ensued.
Upon taking position at Fisher's Hill, I had established a
signal-station on the end of Three Top Mountain, a branch of
Massanutten Mountain, near Strasburg, which overlooked botii
camps and enabled me to communicate readily vrith General
Anderson, in the Luray Valley. A small force from Sheri
dan's army ascended the mountain, and drove oft" our signal
men, and possession was taken of the station by the enemy,
AA'^ho was in turn driven away ; when seA'eral small but severe
fights ensued over the station, possession of it being fiually
gained and held bj' a force of one hundred men under Cap
tain Keller of Gordon's division.
On the morning of the 17th, it was discovered that tiie ene
my was falling back, and I immediately moved forAA'ard in
pursuit,, requesting General -A.nderson, by signal, to cross the
river at Front Royal, and move towards ^Vinchester, Just

0PERATI0^"8 IN THE LOWKR VALLEY. 73
before night, the enemy's cavalry and a body of infantry,
reported to be a division, was encountered between Kernstown
and Winchester, and driven tiirough the latter place, after a
sharp engagement, in which Wharton's division moved to the
left, and attacked the enemy's infantry, and drove it from a
strong position on Bower's Hill, south of Winchester, while
Ramseur engaged it in fi-ont, and Gordon advanced against the
cavalry on the right.*
On the 18th we took position to cover Winchester, and Gen.
Anderson came up with Kershaw's division of infantry, Cut-
shaw's battalion of Artillery, and two brigades of cavalry
under Fitz Lee. General Anderson ranked me, but he
declined to take command, and oft'ered to co-operate in any
movement I might suggest. We had now discovered that Tor-
bert's and Wilson's diAdsions of cavalry from Grant's army, had
joined Sheridan's force, and that the latter was very large.
On the 19th, my main force moved to Bunker Hill and
Lomax's cavalrA' made reconnoissances to Martinsburg and
Shepherdstown, while Anderson's whole force remained near
Winchester. On the 20tii, our cavalry had some skirmishing with the
enemy's on the Opequon, and on the 2l8t, by concert, there

* when Hunter was relieved I had hoped that an end was put tr) bis mode of warfare, but
1 had now to learn how the new commander proposed to carry on the war in behalf of " the
tiest government the world ever saw," f-o called). Sheridan bad commenced burning barns,
mills and stacks of small grain and hay. and the whole eounti-y was smoking. Among many
other.- the bam of a respectable farmer near Newtown, whose n.ame was Chrisman, had been
Lnirned within a few steps of his hou,''e, and the latter saved with great difficulty, notwith
standing the fact that Mr. Chrlsnian had received frora General 'lorbert, in command of the
Federal cavalrj', a written protection stating that for some weeks he had taken care of, and
showed great kindness to, a badly wounded Federal soldier. In passing through Middle-
town I was informed that one of my soldiers had been tried and hung as a spy. The grave
at the foot of the gallows was opened, and the body was recognized by his brother and the
oflicers of liLs company as a privatcof the ifith Ncirtli Carolma regiment. This man had
heeii found by the eneniy iu Middletown, in attendauee on a Confederate soldier whose leg
was amputated, and he had claimed to be a eiti/.en, but a paper was found on his person
-bowing that he had been forraerly detailed as a nurse in the hospital. On this state of
facts he was hung as a spv. He wa» not employed in any ."ui'li capacity, and ho wsis so illit-
ente not being able to read or write, th,-it his appean.nec and evident want of intelligence
precluded the idea of his being so eraployed. 1 would have retaliated at once by hanging a
commissioned officer, but the enquiry which I made furnished some reason for believing
that the man had remained behind, and endeavored to pass for a citizen to avoid service in
our army and I did not therefore wish to risk the lives of my officers and men who were in
the enemy's Imnds, by making his a casc for retaliation. His execution by the enemy, how
ever, was none the less wanton and barbarous.
K

74 OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY.
Avas a general movement towards Harper's Perry — my com
mand moving through Smithfield towards Charlestown, and
Anderson's on the direct road by Summit Point. A body of
the enemy's cavalry was driven from the Opequon, and was
pursued by part of our cavalry towards Suramit Point. I en
countered Sheridan's main force near Cameron's depot, about
three miles from Charlestown, in a position which he com
menced fortifying at once. Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions
Avere advanced to the front, and very heavy skirmishing en
sued and was continued until night, but I Avaited for General
Anderson to arrive before making a general attack. He
encountered Wilson's division of cavalry at Summit Point, and,
after driving it off', went into camp at that place. At light
next morning, it was discovered that the enem}- had retired
during the night, and his rear guard of cavalry was driven
through Charlestown towards Hall-town, where Sheridan had
taken a strong position under the protection of the lieavj' guns
on Maryland Heights. I demonstrated on the enemy's front
on the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, and there was some skirmishing.
General Anderson theu consented to take my position in front
of CharlestoAA^n and amuse the enemy Avitli Kershaw's division
of infantry, supported by McCausland's brigade of cavalry on
the left and a regiment of Fitz Lee's cavalry on thc right,
Avhile I moved Avith my infantry and artillery to Shepherds-
toAvn, and Fitz Lee Avith the rest of the cavalry to WilHains-
port, as if to cross into ^Maryland, in order to keep up the fear
of an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania.
On the 25th Fitz Lee started by the Avay of LeetoAvn and
Martinsburg to WiUiamsport, and I moved through LeetoAvn
and crossed the railroad at Kearneysville to Shepherdstown.
After Fitz Lee had passed ou, I encountered a very large force
of the enemy's caA'alry between LeetoAvn and .IvearneysviJle,
Avhich Avas moving out Avith several days forage and rations for
a raid in our rear. After a sharp engagement Avitii small arms
and artillery, this force was driven back through Shepherds-
toAvn, where we came very near surrounding aud capturino- a
considerable portion of it, but it succeeded in making Its
escape across the Potomac. Gordon's division, which°was

OPERATIONS IN THE LOIiVER VALLEY. - 75
moved around to intercept the enemy, became heavily engaged,
and cut off the retreat of part of his force by one road, but it
made its way down the river to the ford by another and thus
escaped. In this affair, a valuable officer, Colonel Monaghau
of the 6th Louisiana Regiment, Avas killed. Fitz Lee reached
Williamsport, and had some skirmishing across the river at
that place, and then moved to Shepherdstown.
On the 26th I moved to Leetown, and on the 27th I moved
back to Bunker Hill; while Anderson who had confronted
Sheridan, during the two days of my absence, with but a di
vision of infantry and a brigade and a regiment of cavalry,
moved to Stephenson's Depot.
On the 28th, our cavalry, Avhich had been left holding a Hne
from Charlestown to Shepherdstown, Avas compelled to retire
across the Opequon, after having had a brisk engagement with
the enemy's cavalry at Smithfield. On the 29th, the enemy's
cavalry crossed the Opequon near Smithfield, driving in our
cavalry pickets, when I advanced to the front with a part of
my infantry, and drove the enemy across the stream again, and
after a very sharp artiUery duel, a portion of my command was
crossed over and pursued the enemy through Smithfield towards
CharlestoAvn. We then retired, leaving a command of cavalry
at Smithfield, but it was compelled to recross the Opequon, on
the advance of a heavy force from the direction of Charlestown.
Quiet prevailed on the 80th, but on the 31st there were some
demonstrations of cavalry by the enemy on the Opequon,
which were met by ours. On this day, (31st), Anderson moved
to Winchester, and Rodes with his division went to Martins
burg on a reconnoissance, drove a force of the enemy's cavalry
from that place, interrupted the preparations for repairing the
railroad, and then returned.
There was quiet on the 1st of September, but, on the 2nd, I
broke up my camp at Bunker Hill, and moved with three
diAdsions of infantry and part of McCausland's cavalry under
Col. Ferguson, across the country towards Summit Point, on a
reconnoissance, while the trains under the protection of Rodes'
di'vision were moved to Stephenson's depot. After I had

76 OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY.
crossed the Opequon and Avas moving towards Summit Point,
Averill's cavalry attacked and drove back in some confusion,
first Vaughan's, and then Johnson's cavalry, which were on
the Martinsburg road, and the Opequon, but Rodes returned
towards Bunker Hill and drove the enemy back in turn. This
affair arrested my march, and I recrossed the Opequon and
moved to Stephenson's depot, where I established my camp.
On the 3d Rodes moved to Bunker Hill in support of Lo
max's cavalry, and drove tbe enemy's cavalry from and be
yond that place.
A letter had been received from General Lee requesting
that Kershaw's diA'isiou should be returned to him, as he was
very much in need of troops, and, after consultation vrith me.
General Anderson determined to recross the Blue Ridge Avith
thai division, and Fitz Lee's cavalry. On the 3rd he moved
towards Berrjwille for the purpose of crossing the mountain
at Ashby's Gap, and I Avas to have moved towards Charles
town next day, to occupy the enemy's attention during An
derson's movement. Sheridan, however, had started two di
visions of cavalry through Berryville and White Post, on a
raid to our rear, and his main force had moved towards Rer-
ryville. Anderson encountered Crook's corps at the latter
place, and, after a sharp engagement, drove it back on the
main body. Receiving information of this affair, I moved at
daylight next morning, with three divisions, to Anderson's as
sistance, Gordon's division being left to cover Winchester. I
found KershaAv's division extended out in a strong skirmish
line confronting Sheridan's main force, Avhich had taken posi
tion in rear of Berryville, across the road from Charlestown to
that place, and Avas busily fortifying, Avhile the cavalry force
Avhich had started on the raid was returning and passing be
tween Berryville and the river to Sheridan's rear. As may be
supposed, Anderson's position was one of great peril, if the en
emy had possessed any enterprise, and it presented the appear
ance of the most extreme audacity for him thus to confront a
force so vastly superior to his own, while, too, his trains were
at the mercy of the enemy's cavalry, had the latter known it.
Placing one of my divisions in line on Kershaw's left I moved

OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER '^ALLEY. 77
with the other two along the enemy's front towards his right,
for the purpose of reconnoitring and attacking that flank^ if a
suitable opportunity offered. After mo\dng in this way for
two miles, I reached an elevated position from which the ene
my's line was visible, and within artillery range of it. I at
first thought that I had reached his right flank, and Avas about
making arrangements to attack it, when casting my eye to my
left, I discovered, as far as tiie eye could reach with the aid of
field glasses, a line extending towards Summit Point. The
position the enemy occupied was a strong one, and he was
busily engaged fortifying it, having already made considera
ble progress. It was not until I had had this view that I real
ized the size of the enemy's force, and as I discovered that his
line was too loug for me to get around his flank, and the posi
tion was too strong to attack in front, I returned and informed
General Anderson of the condition of things. After consul
tation with him, we thought it not advisable to attack the en
emy in his intrenched lines, and we determined to move our
forces back to the west side of the Opequon, and see if he
would not move out of his works. The waggon trains were
sent back early next morning (the 5th) towards Winchester,
and about an hour by sun Kershaw's division, whose place had
been taken by one of my diAdsions, moved towards the same
point. About two o'clock in the afternoon my troops were
withdrawn, and moved back to Stephenson's depot. This
Avithdrawal was made while the skirmishers were in close
proximity and firing at each other ; yet there was no effort on
the part of the enemy to molest us. Just as my front division
(Rodes') reached Stephenson's depot, it met, and drove back,
and pursued for some distance, Averill's cavalry, which was
forcing towards Winchester that part of our cavalry which
had been watching the Martinsburg road.
It was quiet on the 6th, but on the 7th the enemy's cavalry
made demonstrations on the Martinsburg road and the Ope
quon at several points, and was repulsed.
On the Sth it was quiet again, but on the 9th a detachment
of the enemy's cavalry came to the Opequon below Brucetown,

78 OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY.
burned some mills, and retreated before a division of infantry
sent out to meet it.
On the 10th, my infantry moved by Bunker Hill to Darkes-
ville and encountered a considerable force of the enemy's cav
alry, which was driven oft', and theu pursued by Lomax
through Martinsburg across the Opequon. We then returned
to Bunker Hill, and the next day to Stephenson's depot, and
there was quiet on the 12th.
On the 13th a large force of the enemy's cavalry, reported to
be supported by infantry, advanced on the road from Summit
Point and drove in our pickets from the Opequon, when two
divisions of infantry Avere advanced to the front, driving the
enemy across the Opequon again. A very sharp artillery duel
across the creek then took place, and some of my infantrj'
crossed over, when the enemy retired.
On the 14th General Anderson again started, Avith Ker
shaw's division and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, to cross
the Blue Ridge by the way of Front Royal, and was not mo
lested. Fitz Lee's cavalry was left AAdth me, and Ramseur's
division was moved to Winchester to occupy Kershaw's
position. There Avas an aft'air between one of Kershaw's brigades and
a division of the enemy's cavalry, while I was at Fisher's Hill
and Anderson at Front Royal, in which some prisoners were
lost ; and, subsequently, there were two affairs, in which the
outposts from Kershaw's command were attacked and cap
tured by the enemy's cavalry, one in front of Winchester and
the other in front of Charlestown, which I have not underta
ken to detail, as they occurred when General Anderson was
controUing the operations of that division, but it is proper to
refer to them here as part of the operations in the Valley.
On the 15th and 16th my troops remained in camp
undisturbed. The positions of the opposing forces were now as follows :
Ramseur's division and Nelson's battaUon of artillery were on
the road from BerryviUe to Winchester, one mile from the
latter place. Rodes', Gordon's and Wharton's divisions, (the

POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES, 79
last tAVO being under Breckenridge,) and Braxton's aud King's
battalions of artillery Avere at Stephenson's depot on the Win
chester and Potomac railroad, Avhich is six miles from Win
chester. Lomax's caA-alry picketed in my front ou the Ope
quon, and on my left from tiiat stream to North Mountain,
AvhUe Fitz Lee's caA'alry watched the right, having small pick
ets across to the Shenandoah. Four principal roads, from po
sitions held by the eneniy, centered nt Stephenson's depot, to
wit: the Martinsburg road, the road from Charlestown via
Smithfield, the road from the same place via Summit Point,
and the road from BerryviUe via J ordan's Springs. Sheridan's
main force AA-as near BerryviUe, at tlie intrenched position
Avhich has been mentioned, while Averill was at Martinsburo-
with a division of cavalry. Berryville is ten miles from Win
chester, nearly east, and Martinsburg twenty-two miles nearly
north. The crossing ofthe Opequon on the Berryville road is
four or five miles from Winchester. From BerryviUe there
are two good roads to Front Royal, via Millwood and White
Post, and from ilillwood there is a macadamized road to Win
chester, and also good roads via White Post to the Valley pike
at Newtown and Middletown, the last two roads running east
of the Opequon. The whole country is very open, being a
limestone country, which is thickly settled and well cleared,
and affords great facihties for the movement of troops and thc
operations of cavali-y. From the enemy's fortifications on
Maryland Heights, the country north and east of Winchester,
and the main roads through it, are exposed to vieAv.
The relative positions which Ave occupied rendered my com
munications to the rear very much exposed, but I could not
avoid it without giving up the lower Valley. The object of my
presence there Avas to keep up a threatening attitude towards
Maryland and Pennsylvania, and prevent the use of the Balti
more and Ohio railroad, and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal,
as well as to keep as large a force as possible from Grant's
army to defend the Federal Capital. Had Sheridan, by n
prompt movement, thrown his whole force on the line of my
communications, I would have been compelled to attempt to
cut my way through, as there was no escape for me to the right

80 POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES.
or left, and my force was too weak to cross the Potomac while
he was in my rear. I knew, my danger, but I could occupy
no other position that would have enabled me to accomplish
the desired object. If I had moved up the Valley at all, I
could not have stopped short of New Market, for between that
place and the country in which I was there was no forage for
my horses ; and this would have enabled the enemy to resume
the use of the railroad and canal, and return all the troops from
Grant's army to him. Being compelled to occupy the position
where I was, and being aware of its danger as well as apprized
of the fact that very great odds were opposed to me, my only
resource was to use my forces so as to display them at differ
ent points with great rapidity, and thereby keep up the im
pression that they were much larger than they really were.
The events of the last month had satisfied me that the com
mander opposed to me was without enterprise, and possessed
an excessive caution which amounted to timidity. K it was
his policy to produce the impression that his force was too
Aveak to fight me, he did not succeed, but if it was to conAdnce
me that he was not an able or energetic commander, his strat
egy was a complete success, and subsequent events have not
changed my opinion.
My infantry force at this time consisted of the three divisions
of the 2nd Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, and
Wharton's diAdsion of Breckenridge's command. The 2nd
Corps numbered a little over 8,000 muskets when it was de
tached in pursuit of Hunter, and it had now been reduced to
about 7,000 muskets, by long and rapid marches and the vari
ous engagements and skirmishes in which it had participated.
Wharton's division had been reduced to about 1,700 muskets
by the same causes. Making a small allowance for details
and those unfit for duty, I had about 8,500 muskets for duty.
When I returned from Maryland, my cavalrx- consisted of the
remnants of five small brigades, to wit: Imboden's, McCaus
land's, Johnson's Jackson's, and Vaughan's. Vaughan's had
now been ordered to South- Western Virginia, most'of the men
having left without permission. The surprise aud rout of
McCausland's and Johnson's brigades by Averill at Moorefield,

POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OP THE TWO ARMIES, 81
had resulted in the loss of a considerable number of horses
and men, and such had been the loss in all the brigades, in the
various fights and skirmishes in which they had been engaged,
that the whole of this cavalry, now under Lomax, numbered
only about 1,700 mounted men. Fitz Lee had brought with nim
two brigades, to-wit : Wickham's, and Lomax's old brigade (now
under Colonel Payne), numbering about 1,200 mounted men.
I had the three battalions of artillery which had been with me
near Washington, and Fitz Lee had brought a few pieces of
horse artiUery. When I speak of divisions and brigades of
my troops, it must be understood that they were mere skele
tons of those organizations.
Since my return from Maryland, my supplies had been
obtained principally from the lower Valley and the counties
west of it, and the money which was obtained by contributions
in Maryland was used for that purpose. Nearly the whole of
our bread was obtained by threshing the wheat and then hav
ing it ground, by details from my command, and it sometimes
happened that while my troops were fighting, the very fiour
which was to furnish them Avith bread for their next meal was
being ground under the protection of their guns. Latterly
our flour had been obtained from the upper Valley, but also
by details sent for that purpose. The horses and mules, in
cluding the cavalry horses, were sustained almost entirely by
grazing. I have no means of stating Avitli accuracy Sheridan's force,
and can only fonn an estimate from such data as I have been
able to procure. Citizens who had seen his force, stated that
it Avas the largest which they had ever seen in the VaUey on
either side, and some estimated it as high as 60,000 or 70,000,
but of course I made allowance for the usual exaggeration of
inexperienced men. My estimate is from the foUoAving data:
In Grant's letter to Hunter, dated at Monocacy, August 5th,
1864, and contained in the report of the former, is the folloA\'-
ing statement : " In detaiUng such a force, the brigade of cav
alry now m route from Washington via Rockville, may be taken
into account. There are now on their way to join you three
other brigades of the best cavaliy, numbering at least 5,000

82 POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES.
men and horses." Sheridan relieved Hunter on the 6th, and
Grant says in his report, " On the 7th of August, the Middle
Department and the Departments of West Virginia, Washing
ton, and the Susquehanna were constituted into the Middle
Military division, and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to
the temporary command of the same. Two divisions of caA'
alry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson were sent
to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached
him at Harper's Ferry on the llth of August." Before this
cavalry was sent to the Valley, there was already a diAdsion
there commanded by Averill, besides some detachments which
belonged to the department of West Virginia. A book con
taining the official reports of the chief surgeon of the cavalry
corps of Sheridan's army, which was subsequently captured at
Cedar Creek on tbe 19th of October, showed that there Avere
present for duty in that Corps, during the first A\'eek in Sep
tember, over 11,000 men, and present for duty during the week
ending the 17tli day of September, 10,100 men. The extracts
from Grant's report go to confirm this statement, as, if three
brigades numbered at least 5,000 men and horses, the two
divisions, when the whole of them arrived, with Averill's
cavalry, must have numbered over 10,000. I think, therefore,
tbat I can safely estimate Sheridan's cavalry at the battle of
Winchester, on the 19th of September, at 10,000. His infantry
consisted of the 6th, 19th, and Crook's Corps, the latter beiug
composed of the " Army of West Virginia," and one division
of the 8th Corps. The r%prt of Secretary Stanton shows that
there Avas in the department of which the " Middle Military
division" was composed, the following "available force present
for duty May 1st, 1864," to-wit :
" Department of Washington  42,124.'"
; " Department of West Virginia  30,782."
" Department of the Susquehanna  2,970."
" Middle Department  5 627."
raaking an aggregate of 81,503 ; but, as the Federal Secretary
of War in the same report says, " In order to repair the losses
of the Army of the Potomac, the chief part of the force
designed to guard the Middle Department and the Department

POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THIS TWO ARMIES. 83
of Washington was called forward to the front," we may
assume that 40,000 men were used for that purpose, which
would leave 41,503, minus the losses in battle before Sheridan
reUeved Hunter, in the Middle MiUtary division, exclusive of
the 6tii and 19th Corps, and the cavalry from Grant's army.
The infentry of the Army of the Potomac was composed of
the 2nd, Sth, and 6th Corps, on the 1st of May, 1864, and
Stanton says the " available force present for duty " in that
army on that day, waa 120,886 men. Allowing 30,000 for the
artiUery and cavalry of that army, which would be a very
liberal aUowance, and there would still be left 90,385 infantry ;
and ii is fair to assume that the 6th Corps numbered one-third
of the infantry, that is, 30,000 men on the 1st of May, 1864.
If the losses of the Army of the Potomac had been such as to
reduce the 6th Corps to less than 10,000 men, notwithstanding
the reinforcements and recruits received, the carnage in Grant's
army must have been frightful indeed. The 19th Corps was
just from the Department of the Gulf and had not gone through
a bloody campaign. A communication which was among the
papers captured at Cedar Creek, in noticing some statement of
a newspaper correspondent iu regard to the conduct of that
corps at Winchester, designated it as " a vile slander on 12,000
of the best soldiers in the Union army." In view of the fore
going data, without counting the troops in the Middle Depart
ment and the Departments of Washington and the Susque
hanna, and making liberal allowances for losses in battle, and
for troops detained on post and garrison duty in the Depart
ment of West Virginia, I think that I may assume that Sheri
dan had at least 35,000 infantry against me. The troops of
the 6th Corps and of the Department of West Virginia, alone,
without counting the 19th Corps, numbered on the 1st of May,
1864, 60,782. If Avith the 19th Corps, Sheridan did not have
35,000 infantry remaining fi-om this force, what had become
of the balance? Sheridan's artiUery very greatly outnum
bered mine, both in men and guns.
Having^been informed that a force was at work on the rail
road at Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the 17th of
September, Avith Rodes' and Gordon's division, and Braxton's

84 IvXPEDITION' TO MARTINSBURG.
artiUery to Bunker Hill, and, on the morning of the 18th, witii
Gordon's division and a part of the artiUery to Martinsburg,
preceded by a part of Lomax's cavalry. AveriU's division of
cavalry was driven from the town across the Opequon in the
direction of Charlestown, and we then returned to Bunker
Hill. Gordon was left at Bunker HUl, with orders to move to
Stephenson's depot by sunrise next morning, and Rodes' divi
sion moved to the latter place that night, to AvMch I also
returned. At Martinsburg, where the enemy had a telegraph
office, I learned that Grant was with Sheridan that day, and
I expected an early move.

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.
At light on the morning of the 19th, our cavalry pickets at
the crossing of the Opequon on the BerryAdlle road were driA'en
in, and information having been sent me of that fact, I imme
diately ordered all the troops at Stephenson's depot to be in
readiness to move, directions being given for Gordon, who
had arrived from Bunker HiU, -to move at once; but, by some
mistake on the part of my staff officer, the latter order was
not delivered to General Breckenridge or Gordon. I rode at
once to Ramseur's position, and found his troops in line across
the Berryville road skirmishing Avith the enemy. Before
reaching this point, I had ascertained that Gordon was not
moving, and sent back for him, and now discovering that the
enemy's advance was a real one and in heavy force, I sent
orders for Breckenridge and Rodes to move up as rapidly as
possible. The position occupied by Ramseur was about one
mile and a half out from Winchester, on au elevated plateau
between Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run. Abraham's
Creek crosses the Valley Pike one mile south of Winchester,
and then crosses the Front Royal road about the same distance
south-east ofthe town, and, running -eastwardly, on the south
ern side of the BerryviUe road, crosses that road a short dis
tance before it empties into the Opequon. Red Bud Run

BATTLE OP WINCHESTER. 85
crosses the Martinsburg road about a mile and a half north of
Winchester, and runs eastwardly, on the northern side of the
Berryville road, to the Opequon. Ramseur was therefore in
the obtuse angle formed by the Martinsburg and Front Royal
roads. In front of and to the right of him, for some distance,
the country was open. Abraham's Creek runs through a deep
valley, and beyond it, on the right, is -high open ground, at the
intersection of tiie Front Royal and Millwood roads. To
Ramseur's left, the country sloped oft^ to the Red Bud, and
there were some patches of woods which afforded cover for
troops. To the north of the Red Bud, the country is very
open, affording fiaciUties for the movement of any kind of
troops. Towards the Opequon, on the front, the Berryville
road runs through a i^aAdne, Avith hills and woods on each side,
which enabled the enemy to move his troops under cover, and
mask them ont of range of artiUery. Nelson's artillery was
posted on Ramseur's line, covering the approaches as far as
practicable ; and Lomax, -with Jackson's cavalry and part of
.Johnson's, was on the right, watching the valley of Abraham's
Creek and the Front Royal road beyond, while Fitz Lee was
on the left, across the Red Bud, with his cavalry and a battery
of horse-artiUery, and a detachment of Johnson's cavalry
watched the interval between Ramseur's left and the Red Bud.
These troops held the enemy's main force in cheek until Gor
don's and Rodes' diAdsions arrived from Stephenson's depot.
Gordon's division arrived first, a little after ten o'clock, A. M.,
and was placed under cover in rear of a piece of woods behind
the interval between Ramseur's line and the Red Bud, the de
tachment of Johnson's cavalry having been removed to the
right. KnoAvingthat it would not do for us to await the shock
of the enemy's attack, Gordon was directed to examine the
ground on the left, Avith a Adew to attacking a force of the enemy
which had taken position in a piece of wood in front of him,
and while he was so engaged Rodes arrived Avith three of his
brigades, and was directed to form on Gordon's right, in rear of
another piece of woods. While this movement was being exe
cuted, we discovered very heavy columns of the enemy, which
had been massed under cover between the Red Bud and the

86 BATTLE OP WINCHESTER.
BerryviUe road, moving to attack Ramseur on his left flank,
whUe another force pressed him in front. It was a moment of
imminent and thrilling danger, as it was impossible for Ram
seur's division, which numbered only about 1,700 muskets, to
withstand the immense force advancing against it. The only
chance for us was to hurl Rodes and Gordon upon the flank of
the advancing columns, ¦ and they were ordered forward at
once to the attack. They advanced in most gaUant style
through the woods into the open ground, and attacked vrith
gi-eat vigor, while Nelson's artillery on the right, and Braxton's
on the left, opened a destructive fire. But Evans' brigade @f
Gordon's division, which was on the extreme left of our
infantry, received a check from a column of the enemy, and
was forced back through the woods from behind which it had
advanced, the enemy following to the very rear of the woods,
and to within musket range of seven pieces of Braxton's artU
lery which were without support. This caused a pause in our
advance, and the position was most critical, for it was apparent
that unless this force was driven back the day was lost. Brax
ton's guns, in which now was our only hope, resolutely stood
their ground^ and, under the personal superintendence of
Lieutenant Colonel Braxton and Colonel T. H. Carter, my
then Chief of Artillery, opened Avith canister on the enemy.
This fire, was so rapid and well-directed that the enemy stag
gered, halted, and commenced falUng back, leaving a battle-
flag on the ground, whose bearer was cut down by a canister
shot. Just then. Battle's brigade of Rodes' diAdsion, which
had arrived and been formed in line for the purpose of advan
cing to the support of the rest of the division, moved forward
and swept through the woods, driving the enemy before it,
while Evans' brigade was rallied and brought back to the
charge. Our advance, which had been suspended for a mo
ment, was resumed, and the enemy's attacking columns were
thrown into great confusion and driven from the field. This
attacking force of the enemy proved to be the Sixth and Nine
teenth corps, and it was a grand sight to see this immense body
hurled back in utter disorder before my two divisionsj num
bering a very little over 6000 muskets. Ramseur's di'vision

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 87
had received the shock ofthe enemy's attack, and been forced
back a little, but soon recoA-ered itself. Lomax, on the right,
had held the enemy's cavalry in check, and, vrith a part of his
force, had made a gallant charge against a body of infantry,
when Ramseur's line was being forced back, thus aiding the
latter in recovering from the momentary disorder. Fitz Lee
on the left, from across the Red Bud, had poured a gaUing fire
into the enemy's columns with his sharpshooters and horse-
artiUery, whUe Nelson's and Braxton's battalions ha4 per
formed wondei-s. This affair occurred about 11 A. M., and
a splendid victory had been gained. The ground iu front
was strewn -with the enemy's dead and wounded, and some
prisoners had been taken. But on our side. Major General
Rodes had been killed, in the very moment of triumph,
whUe conducting the attack of his division with great gal
lantry and skUl, and this was a heavy blow to me. Briga
dier-General GodAvin, of Ramseur's division, had been killed,
and Brigadier-General York, of Gordon's division, had lost
an arm. Other brave men and officers had fallen, and we
could illy bear the loss of any of them. Had I then had
a body of fresh troops to push our victory, the day would
liave been ours, but in this action, in the early part of the
day, I had present only about 7000 muskets, about 2000 cav
alry, and two battaUons of artillery with about 30 guns ; and
they had all been engaged. Wharton's division and King's
artiUery had not arrived, and Imboden's cavalry under Colonel
Smith, and McCausland's under Colonel Ferguson, Avere
watching the enemy's cavalry on the left, on the Mar
tinsburg road and the Opequon. The enemy had a fresh corps
which had not been engaged, and there remained his heavy
force of cavalrj-. Our lines were now formed across from
Abraham's Creek to Red Bud and were very attenuated. The
enemy was stUl to be seen in front in formidable force, aud
away to our right, across Abraham's Creek, at the junction of
the Front Royal and MiUwood roads, he had massed a division
of cavalry Avith some artiUery, overlapping us at least a mile,
while the country was open between this force and the Valley
Pike, and the Cedar Creek Pike back of th,e latter; which

88 BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.
roads furnished my only means of retreat in the event of dis
aster. My line did not reach the Front Royal road on the
right, or the Martinsburg road on the left.
When the order was sent for the troops to move from Ste
phenson's depot, General Breckenridge had moved to the front,
Arith Wharton's division and King's artillery, to meet a cavalry
forcejwhich had driven our pickets from the Opequon on the
Charlestown road, and that division had become heaAdly en
gaged with the enemy, and sustained and repulsed several
determined charges of his cavalry, while its own fianks were
in great danger from the enemy's main force on the right, and
a column of his cavalry moving up the Martinsburg road on
the left. After much difficulty and some hard fighting. Gen.
Breckenridge succeeded in extricating his force and moAdng
up the Martinsburg road to join me, but he did not reach the
field until about two o'clock in the afternoon.
In the meantime there had been heavy skirmishing along
the line, and the reports frotn the front were that the enemy
Avas massing for another attack, but it was impossible to tell
Avhere it would fall. As the danger from the enemy's cavalry
on the right was very great and Lomax's force very weak,
Wickham's brigade of Fitz Lee's cavalry had been sent from
the left to Lomax's assistance. When Wharton's division
arrived, Patton's brigade of that diAdsion was left to aid Mtz
Lee in guarding the Martinsburg road, against the force of
cavalry which was advancing on that road watched by Lomax's
two small brigades; and the rest of the division was formed in
rear of Rodes' division in the centre, in order to be moved to
any point that might be attacked. Late in the afternoon, tAvo
divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force which
had been watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crook's
corps, which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time
on tbat flank, on the north side of Red Bud, and, before
this overwhelming force, Patton's brigade of infanti-y and
Payne's brigade of cavalry under Fitz Lee were forced back.
A considerable force of the enemy's cavalry then swept along
the Martinsburg road to the very skirts of Winchester, thus
getting in the rear of our left flank. Wharton's two other

BATTLE OP WINCHESTER. 80
brigades were moved in double quick time to tiie left and rear,
and, making a gallant charge ou the enemy's cavah-y, with the
aid of King's ai-tiUery, and some of Braxton's guns which
were turned to the rear, succeeded in driving it back. The
division was then thrown into line by General Breckenridge,
in rear of our left and at right angles Avith tiie Martinsburg
road, aud another charge of the enemy's cavalry was hand
somely repulsed. But mauy of the men on our front Une,
hearing the fire in the rear, and thinking they Avere flanked
and about to be cut off, commenced falling back, thus produ
cing great confusion. At the same time. Crook advanced
against our left, and Gordon threw Evans' brigade into Une to
meet him, but the disorder iu the front line became so great
that, after an obstinate resistance, that brigade was compeUed
to retire also. The whole front line had now given way, but
a large portion of the men were raUied and formed behind an
inditterent line of breastworks, which had been made just out
side of Winchester during the first year of the war, and, with
the aid of the artillery which was brought back to this posi
tion, the progress of the enemy's infantry was arrested.
^Vharton's division maintained its organization on the left,
aud Ramseur fell back in good order on the right. Wick
ham's brigade of cavalry had been brought from the right, and
AA'as in position on Fort Hill, just outside of Winchester on the
west. Just after the advance of the enemy's infantry was
checked by our artUlery, it was reported to me that the enemy
had got around our right flank, and as I knew this was per
fectly practicable, and was expecting such a movement from
the cavalry on the Front Royal road, I gave the order to re
tire, but instantly discovering that the supposed force of the
enemy was Ramseur's division, which had merely moved back
to keep in line with the other troops, I gave the order for the
latter to return to the works before they had moved twenty
paces. This order was obeyed by Wharton's division, but not
so well by the others. The enemy's cavalry force, however,
was too large for us, and having the advantage of open ground,
it again succeeded in getting around our left, producing great
confusion, for which there was no remedy. Nothing was now
M

90 BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.
left for us but to retire through Winchester, and Ramseur's
dirision, which maintained its organiza;tion, was moved on the
east of the town to the south side of it, and put in position,
forming the basis for a new line, while the other troops moved
back through the town. Wickham's brigade, Arith some
pieces of horse artillery on Fort Hill, covered this movement
and checked the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. When the
new line was formed, the enemy's advance was checked until
night-fall, and we then retired to Newtown without serious
molestation. Lomax had held the enemy's cavalry on the
Front Royal road in check, and a feeble attempt at pursuit
was i-epulsed by Ramseur near Kernstown.
As soon as our reverse began, orders had been sent for the
removal of the trains, stores, and sick and wounded in the
hospitals, to Fisher's HUl, over the Cedar Creek Pike and the
Back Road. This was done with safety, and all the wounded,
except such as were not in a condition to be mo\-ed, and thosn
Avhich had not lieen brought from the field, were carried to
the rear.
This battle, beginning with the skirmishing in Ramseur's front,
had lasted from daylight until dark, and, at the close ofit, Ave
liad been forced back two miles, after haring repulsed the
enemy's first attack with great slaughter to hira, aud subse-
(|uently contested every inch of ground Avith unsurpassed
obstinacy. We deserved the victory, and Avould have had it,
but for the enemy's immense superiority in cavalry, which
alone gave it to him.
Three pieces of King's artillery, from Avhich the hoi"ses Avero
shot, and Avhich therefore could not be brought oft", were lost,
Imt the enemy claimed five, and, if he captured that number,
tAVO were lost by the cavalry and not reported to me. My loss
ill killed, Avounded and prisoners was severe for the size of my
force, but it Avas only a fraction of that claimed by the eneray.
Owing to its obedience to orders in •returning to the works, the
lieaA'iest loss of prisoners Avas iu Wharton's division. Amou?
the killed were Major General Rodes and Brigadier General
(TodArin. Colonel G. W. Patton, commanding a brigade, was

BATTLE OP -WINCHESTER. 91
mortally wounded, and feU into the hands of the enemy.
Major General Fitz Lee was severely wounded, and Brigadier
General York lost an arm. In Major General Rodes I had to
regret the loss not only of a most accompUshed, skiUful aud
gallant officer, upon whom I placed great reliance, but also of
a personal friend, whose counsels had been of great service to
me in the trying circumstances A\-ith which I had found my
self surrounded. He fell at his post, doing a soldier's aud
patriot's duty to his country, and his memory will loug be
cherished by his comrades. General Godwin and Colonel
Patton were both most gallant and efficient officers, and their
loss was deeply felt, as Avas that of all the brave officers and
men who feU in this battle. The enemy's loss in kiUed and
wounded was very heavy, and some prisoners fell into our
hands. A skillful and energetic commander of the enemy's forces
would have crushed Ramseur before any assistance could have
reached him, and thus ensured the destruction of my whole
force; and, later in the day, when the battle had turned
against ns, Arith the immense superiority in cavalry which
Sheridan had, and the advantage of the open country, would
have destroyed my whole force and captured everything I had.
As it was, considering the immense disparity in numbers and
equipment, the enemy had very little to boast of. I had lost
a few pieces of artiUery and some very valuable officers and
men, but the main part of my force and all my trains had
been saved, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was
far greater than mine. When I look back to this battle, I can
but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the incapa
city of my opponent.*
* The enemy has called this battle, "The Battle of the Opequon," but I know no claira it
has to that title, unless it be in the fact that, after his repulse in the fore part of the da> ,
some of his troops ran back across that stream. I have always thought that instead of beiux
promoted, Sheridan ought to have been cashiered for this battle. He seeras to be a sort of
pet of Grant's, and I give tho following extracts from the report of the latter, to show tha
strange inconsistency of which he is guilty to magnify Sheridan's sorviees. In his .Mon".-
acy letter to Hunter, Grant says : " From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that tho eneray has
raoved north of the Potomac in large force, pusli north, following hira and attacking him
wherever found; follow him if driven south of the Potoraac, as long as it in safe to do so.
Iflt is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then pusli
south with th« main force, detaching, under a competent commander, a sufficieut lore.' iii

AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL.
At light on the morning of the 20th, my troops moved to
Fisher's Hill without molestation from the enemy, and again
took position at that point on the old line — ^Wharton's dirision
being on the right, then Gordon's, Ramseur's, and Rodes', in
the order in which they are mentioned. Fitz Lee's cavalry,
now under Brigadier-General Wickham, was sent up the Lura}-
VaUey to a narrow pass at Millford, to try and hold that val
ley against the enemy's cavalry. General Ramseur was trans-

look after the raiders and drive them to their horaes." And further on in the same letter
he says ; " Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south, and to do this, you want to
keep him aiwaj's in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes." AVhen Sher
idan relieved Hunter, this letter of instructions was ordered to be turned over to him, and
two divisions of cavalry subsequently joined hira; yet Grant says in regard to Sheridan's
operations: "His operatious during the month of .\ugust and the fore part of September
were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes,
principally by the cavah-y, m which we were generally successful, but no general engage
ment took place. The two armies lay in ^ueh a position, the enemy on the west bank ofthe
tDpequon creek covering AA'inchester, and our forces in front of BerryviUe, that either could
bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would open to the eneray the States of Maryland
and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him.
Under these circumstances, I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally
the use' of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesape-ike and Ohio Canal, which
were both obstructed by Ihe enemy, became so indispensably necessary to u,s, and the im
portance 01 rellevin,g Pennsylvania aud ^laryland from continuously threatened invasion
so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph tho order
(or an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as to what
would bo the probable result, I loft City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his
head-quarters, to decide after eonfereuee with him what should be done. 1 met him at
Charlestown, and he pointed out so directly how each army lay, what he u-ould do thc moment
he was authorizeil, and expressed such confidence of .success, that I saw there were but two
words of instruction necessary— go iu." In the letter to Hunter there is no hesitation about
i!ni initiative, aud yet, notwithstanding this letter was turned over to Sheridan for his
.L'uidanoe, and two divisions of cavalry subsequently sent to him, and the further fact that he
)iad been operating both on tho offensive and defensive during August and the fore part of
,'-;.ptember, the impression is sought to be made that his ardor was restrained by some sort
of orders, of which no mention is made in Grant's report. Really this is verv curious, and
i.rraut's admission of his hesitation in allowing tho initiative to be taken, and "the statement
that tho Baltimore and Oliio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal were so
obstructed, and tho invasion of Pennsylvania and Maiyland so constantly threatened, as to
.¦oui pel him to tlirow off that hesitation, convey a groat corapliraent to the efficiency of my
small force. The railroad is twenty-two railes from Winchester at the nearest point, and the
lanal over thirty and north of tho Potomac, while Sheridan was much ueai-er to both. That
Grant did find it necessary to say to Sheridan, "go iul" 1 can well believe, but that tile lat
ter was panting for the utterance of that classic phrase, I must be allowed to regard as
upooryphal. °

AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL. 93
ferred to the command of Rodes' division, and Brigadier-
General Pegram who had reported for duty about the Ist of
August, and been in command of his brigade since that time,
Avas left in command of the dirision preriously coramanded by
Ramseur. My infantry was not able to occupy the whole line
at Fisher's HiU, notwithstanding it was extended out in an
attenuated line, with considerable intervals. The greater part
of Lomax's cavalry Avas therefore dismounted, and placed on
Ramseur's left, near Little North Mountain, but the line could
not then be fuUy occupied.
This was the only position in the whole Valley where a
defensive Une could be taken against an enemy moring up the
Valley, and it had several weak points. To have retired beyond
this point, would have rendered it necessary for me to fall
back to some of the gaps of the Blue Ridge,, at the upper, part
of the Valley, and I determined therefore to make a show of
a stand here, vrith the hope that the enemy would be deter
red from attacking me in this position, as had been the case in
August On the second day after our arrival at this place, General
Breckenridge received orders from Richmond, by telegraph,
to return to South-Western Virginia, and I lost the benefit of
his services. He had ably co-operated with me, and our per
sonal relations had been of the most pleasant character.
In the aftemoon of the 20th, Sheridan's forces appeared on
the banks of Cedar Creek, about four miles from Fisher's
HiU, and the 2l8t, and the greater part of the 22nd, were
consnmed by him in reconnoitring and gradually moving his
forces to my front under cover of breast Avorks. After some
skirmishing, he attained a strong position immediately in my
front and fortified it, and I began to think he was satisfied with
the advantage he had gained and would not probably press it
further; but on the aftemoon of the 22nd, I discovered that
another attack was contemplated, and orders were given for
my troops to retire, after dark, as I knew my force was not
strong enough to resist a determined assault. Just before sun
set, however. Crook's corps, which had moved to our left on
the side of Little North Mountain, and under cover of the

94 AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL.
woods, forced* back Lomax's dismounted cavalry, and advan
ced against Ramseur's left. Ramseur made an attempt to meet
this movement by throwing his brigades successfully into line
to the left, and Wharton's division was sent for from the right
but it did not arrive. Pegram's brigades were also throAvn
into line in the same manner as Ramseur's, but the movement
produced some disorder in both divisions, and as soon as it was
observed by the enemy, he advanced along his whole Une, and
the mischief could not be remedied. After a very brief con
test, my whole force retired in considerable confusion, but the
men and officers of the artiUery behaved with great coolness,
fighting to the very last, and I had to ride to some of the offi
cers and order them to withdraw their guns, beforte they would
move. In some cases, they had held out so long, and the roads
leading from their positions into the Pike were so rugged, that
eleven guns fell into the hands of the enemy. Vigorous pur
suit was not made, and my force fell back through Woodstock
to a place called the Narrow Passage, all the trains being car
ried off in safety.
Our loss in killed and wounded in this affair was sUght, but
some prisoners were taken by the enemy, the most of whom
were captured while attempting to make their way across the
North Fork to Massanutten Mountain, under the impression
that the enemy had possession of the Valley Pike in our rear.
I had the misfortune to lose my Adjutant General, Lieutenant
Colonel A. S. Pendleton, a gallant and efficient young officer,
Avho had served on General Jackson's staff during his VaUey
campaign, and subsequently to the time of the latter's death.
Colonel Pendleton fell mortally wounded about dark, while
posting a force across the Pike, a little in rear of Fisher's Hill,
to check the enemy. He was acting with his accustomed gal
lantry, and his loss was deeply felt and regretted.*
-'^ In his account of the battle of AVlnchester, Grant says : " The enemy rallied and made a
staiid in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where ho was attacked and agaiu defeated with
heavy loss on the 20th." This makes Sherid.an pursue and attack with great promptness
and energy, if it were true, but it will be seen that the attack was not made until late on the
afternoon of the 3rd day after the battle at AVinohester, and that the movement on my loft
flank was again made by Crook. If Sheridan had not had subordinates of more abUity and
energy than hiuvself, I should probably havs had to write a different history of my Valley
oampaign.

RETREAT UP THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS
UNTIL THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK.
On the morning of the 23rd, I moved back to Mount Jack
son, where I halted to enable the sick and Avounded, and the
hospital stores at that place to be carried oft". In the afternoon
AverUl's dirision of cavalry came up iu pursuit, and after some
heavy skirmishing was driven back. I then moved to Rude's
HUl between Momit Jackson and Ncav Market.
On the morning of the 24th, a body of the enemy's cavalry
crossed the North Fork below Mount Jackson, and attempted
to get around my right flank, but was held in check. The
enemy's inftintry soon appeared at Mount Jackson, and com
menced moring around my left fiank, on the opposite side of
the river from that on which my left rested. As the country
was entirely open, and Rude's Hill an elevated position, I could
see the whole movement of the enemy, and as soon as it was
fully developed, I commenced retiring in line of battle, and in
that manner retired through New Market to a point at which
the road to Port Republic leaves the Valley Pike, nine miles
from Rude's Hill. This movement was made through an
entirelv open country, and at every mile or two a halt was
made, and artillery opened on the enemy, who was pursuing,
which compelled him to commence deploying into line, when
the retreat would be resumed. In this retreat, under fire in
Ime, which is so tiying to a retiring force, and tests the best
qualities of the soldier, the conduct of my troops was most
-admirable, and they preserved pert'ect order and their line
intact, notArithstanding their diminished numbers, and the fact
that the enemy Avas pursuing in full force, aud, every now and
then, dashing up with horse artillery under the support of
cavalr}"^, and opening on the retiring lines. At the last halt,
which was at aplacecaUed " Tenth Legion," near where the
Port RepubUc road leaves the Pike, and was a little before sun-

96 RETREAT UP THE VALLEY.
set, I determined to resist any further advance, so as to enable
ray trains to get on the Port Republic road; and skirmishers
were sent out and artillery opened on the advancing enemy,
but, after some sldrmishing, he went into camp in our view,
and beyond the reach of our guns. At this point, a gallant
officer of artillery. Captain Massie, was killed by a shell. As
soon as it was dark, wc retired five miles on the Port Re
public road and bivouacked. In the morning Lomax's cavalry
had been posted to our left, on the Middle and Back roads
from Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg, but it was forced back
by a superior force of the enemy's cavalry, and retired to the
latter place in considerable disorder. Wickham's brigade had
been sent for from the Luray Valley to join me through the
New-Market Gap, but it arrived at that gap just as we were
retiring through New-Market, and orders were sent for it to
return to the Luray Valley and join me at Port Republic. In
the meantime, Payne's small brigade had been driven from
Millford by two divisions of cavalry under Torbert, which had
moved up the Luray VaUey and subsequently joined Sheridan
through the Nfew-Market Gap. This cavalry had been
detained by Wickham Avith his and Payne's brigades, at
Millford, a sufficient time to enable us to pass New-Market
in safety. If, however, it had moved up the Luray Valley by
Conrad's store, Ave would have been in a critical condition.
On the morning of the 25th, we moved towards Port Repub
lic, which is in the fork of the South Fork and South River,
and where the road through Brown's Gap in the Blue Ridge
crosses those rivers, in order to unite with Kershaw's dirisiou,
which had been ordered to join me from Culpepper C. H.
We crossed the river below the junction, and took position
between Port Republic and Brown's Gap. Fitz Lee's and
Lomax's cavalry joined us here, and ou the 26th, Kershaw's
division with CutshaAv's battalion of artillery carae up, after
having crossed through Swift Run Gap, and encountered and
repulsed, beloAv Port Republic, a body of the enemy's cavalry.
There was Ukewise heavy skirmishing on my front on the 26th
Avith the enemy's cavalry, which made two efforts to advance
towards Brown's Gap, both of which were repulsed after brifik
fighting in which artillery was used.

OPERATIONS IN ims, itPPER VALLEY. "97
Having ascertained that the enemy's infantry had halted at
Harrisonburg, on the morning of the 27th I moved out and
drove a division of his cavalry from Port Republic, and then
encamped in the fork of the rivers. I here learned that two
divisions of cavalry under Torbert had been sent through
Staunton to Waynesboro, and were engaged in destroying the
railroad bridge at the latter place, and the tunnel through the
Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, and, on the 28th, I moved for
those points. In making this movement I had the whole of
the enemy's infantry on my right, while one division of cav
alry was in my rear and two in my front, and on the left was
the Blue Ridge. I had therefore to move with great circum
spection. Wickham's brigade of cavalry was sent up South
River, near the mountain, to get between the enemy and
Rockfish Gap, whUe the infantry moved in two columns, one
up South River \rith the trains guarded in front by Pegram's
and Wharton's dirisions, and in rear by Ramseur's division,
and the other, composed of Kershaw's and Gordon's divisions,
-with the artUlery, on the right through Mount Meridian, Pied
mont and New Hope. McCausland's cavalry, under Colonel
Ferguson, was left to blockade and hold Brown's Gap, while
Lomax, with the rest of his cavalry and Payne's brigade,
AA'atched the right flank and rear. Wickham's brigade having
got between Rockfish Gap and Waynesboro, drove the enemy's
working parties from the latter place, and took position on a
ridge iu front of it, when a sharp artillery fight ensued.
Pegram's division, driving a small body of cavalry before it,
arrived just at night and advanced upon the enemy, Avheu he
retired in gi-eat haste, taking the roads through Staunton and
west of the Valley Pike, back to the main body. A company
of reserves, composed of boys under 18 years of age, which
had been employed on special duty at Staunton, had moved to
Rockfish Gap, and another company of reserves from Char-
lottesrille, with two pieces of artillery, had moved to the same
point, and when the enemy advanced towards the tunnel aiul
before he got in range of the guns, they Avere opened, and he
retired to Waynesboro.
On the 29tb and SOth, we rested at Waynesboro, and an

98 OPERATIONS IN THE CPFEE VALLEY.
engineer party was put to work repairing the bridge, which
had been but partially destroyed.
Ou the 1st of October, I moved my whole force across the
country to Mount Sidney on the VaUey Pike, and took posi
tion between that place and North River, the enemy's forces
having been concentrated around Harrisonburg, and on the
north bank of the river. In this position we remained until
the 6th, awaiting the arrival of Rpsser's brigade of cavalry
which was on its way from General Lee's army. In the
meantime there was some skirmishing Arith the enemy's cav
alry on the North River, at the bridge near Mount Crawford
and at Bridgewater above.*
On the 5th, Rosser's brigade arrived and was temporarily
7ittached to Fitz Lee's division, of which Rosser was given tlie
coramand, as Brigadier-General Wickham had resigned. The
horses of Rosser's brigade had been so much reduced by pre
vious hard service and the long march from Richmond, that
the brigade did not exceed six hundred mounted men for duty
when it joined nie. Kershaw's division numbered 2700 mus
kets for duty, and he had brought with him CutshaAv's bat
talion of artillery. These reinforcements about made up my
losses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and I determined to
attack the eneray in his position at Harrisonburg, and for that
purpose made a reconnoissance on the 5th, but on the morn
ing of the 6th, it was discovered that he had retired during
tbe night down the Valley.f

* Grant says that, after the fight at Fisher's Hill, " Sheridan pursued him with great energy
through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Eidge." A*'ith how much energj'
the pursuit was made, and how rauch truth there is in the statement that I was driven
I hrough " Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Eidge," will be seen from tho
foregoing account. .\ portion of my cavalry passed through Harrisonburg, but none of my
"tiler troops, and none of them through Stauutou. and I did not leave the A'alley at all.
Had Sheridan moved his infauliy to Port Republic, I would have been compelled to retire
1 hrough Brown's Gap, to get provisions and forage, and ilwould have been impossible lor
me to return to the A'allcy until he evacuated the upper part ofit.
t While Sheridan's forces were near HaiTisonbur,g, and mine were watching them, three of
our cavalry scouts, iu their uniforras and with arras, got around his lines near a little town
¦ ¦ailed Dayton, and encountered Lieutenant Meigs, a Federal engineer officer, with two sol
diers. These parties lauie upon each other suddenly, and Lieutenant Meigs was ordered to
surrender by one of our scouts, to which he replied by shooting and wounding the scout,
who in his turn fired and killed the Lieutenant. One ofthe men with Lieutenant Meigs
was captured and the otljer escaped. For this act Sheridan ordered the tow* of Dayton to

MOVEMENT DOWN THE VAL1.EY. 99
When it was discovered that the enemy was retiring, I
moved forward at once and ai-rived at New-Market with my
infentry on the 7th. Rosser pushed forward on the Back and
Middle Roads in pursuit of tiie enemy's cavalry, which was
engaged in burning houses, miUs, barns and stacks of wheat
and hay, and had several skirmishes with it, while Lomax also
moved forward on the Valley Pike and the roads east of it. I
halted at New-Market with the infantry, but Rosser and Lomax
moved down the Valley in pursuit, and skirmished successfully
\rith the enemy's cavalry on the Sth ; but on the 9th they en
countered his whole cavalry force at Tom's Brook, in rear of
Fisher's HiU, and both of their commands were driven back in
considerable confusion, with a loss of some pieces of artillery ;
nine were reported to me as the number lost, but Grant claims
eleven. Rosser ralUed his command on the Back Road, at
Columbia Furnace, opposite Edinburg, but a part ofthe ene
my's cavalry swept along the Pike to Mount Jackson, and then
retired on the approach of a part of my infantry. On the 10th,
Rosser estabUshed his line of pickets across the Valley frotn
Columbia Furnace to Edinburg, and on the llth Lomax was
sent to the Luray VaUey to take position at Millford.

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK OR BELLE GROVE.
Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send part of
his troops to Grant, I moved down the Valley again on the
12th. On the moming of the 13th we reached Fisher's Hill,
and I moved with part of my command to Hupp's Hill, between
Strasburg and Cedar Creek, for the purpose of reconnoitring.
The enemy was found posted on the North bank of Cedar
Creek in strong force, and, while we were observing hira, with
out displaying any of my force except a small body of cavalry,
a division of his infantry was moved out to his left and stacked
be burned, but for some reason that order was countermanded, and another substituted for
biirniug a large number of private houses in the neighborhood, which was executed, thus
ioflictilig on no^i-combatants and women attd children a most wanton and cruel punishirifut
for a justifiable act of war.

100 BATTLE OK CEDAR CREEK.
arms in an open field, when a battery of artillery was run out
suddenly and opened on this division, scattering it in great
confusion. The enemy then displayed a large force, and sent
a division across the creek to capture the guns which had
opened on him, but, AA'hen it had advanced near enough, Con
ner's brigade of Kershaw's division was sent forward to meet
this division, and, after a sharp contest, drove it back in con
siderable confusion and Avitli severe loss. Conner's brigade
behaved very handsomely indeed, but unfortunately, after the
enemy had been entirely repulsed, Brigadier-General Conner,
a most accomplished and gallant officer, lost his leg by a shell
from the opposite side of the creek. Some prisoners were
taken from the enemy in this affair, and Colonel WeUs, the
division commander, fell into our hands mortally wounded.
The object of the reconnoissance haring been accomplished, I
moved back to Fisher's Hill, and I subsequently learned that
the 6th Corps had started for Grant's army but was brought
back after this affair.
I remained at Fisher's Hill until the 16th obserring the
enemy, with the hope that he would move back from his very
strong position on the north of Cedar Creek, and that we
Avould be able to get at him in a difiereut position; but he did
not give any indications of an intention to move, nor did he
evince any purpose of attacking us, though the two positions
were in sight of each other. In the meantime there was some
skirmishing at Hupp's Hill, and some with the cavalry at
Cedar Creek on the Back Road. On the 16th Rosser's scouts
reported a brigade of the enemy's cavalry encamped on the
Back Road, and detached frora the rest of his force, and Rosser
was permitted to go that night, Avith a brigade of infanti-y
mounted behind the same number of cavalry, to attempt the
surprise and capture of the camp. He succeeded in surround
ing and surprising the camp, but it proved to be that of only
a strong picket, the Avhole of which Avas captured — the brigade
having moved its location.
At light on the morning of the 17th, the whole of my troops
were moved out in front of our Unes, for the purpose of cover
ing Rosser's return in case of difficulty, and, after he had

BATTLE OP. CEDAR CREEK. 101
returned. General Gprdon was sent Arith a brigade of his diri
sion to Hupp's HiU, for tiie purpose of ascertaining by close
inspection whether the enemy's position was fortified, and h^
returned with the information that it Avas. I was now com
peUed to move back for want of provisions and forage, or attack
the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him from
it, and I determined to attack. As I was not strong enough to
attack the fortified position in front, I determined to get around
one of the enemy's flanks and attack him by surprise if I cotild.
After General Gordon's return fr-om Hupp's Hill, he and Cap
tain Hotchkiss, my topographical engineer, were sent to the
signal slation on the end of Massanutten Mountain, which had
been re-established, for the purpose of examining the enemy's
position from that point, and General Pegram was ordered to
go as near as he could to Cedar Creek on the enemy's right
flank, and see whether it was practicable to surprise him on
that flank. Captain Hotchkiss returned to my headquarters
after dark, and reported the result of his and General Gordon's
examination, and he gave me a sketch of the enemy's position
and camps. He informed me that the enemy's left flank, which
rested near Cedar Creek, a short distance above its mouth, was
Ughtly picketed, and that there was but a small cavalry picket
on the North Fork of the Shenandoah, below the mouth of the
creek, and he stated that, from information he had received, he
thought it was practicable to move a column of infantry between
the base of the mountain and the river, to a ford below the
mouth of the creek. He also informed me that the main body
of tbe enemy's cavalry was on his right flank on the Back
Road to Winchester. The sketch made by Captain Hotchkiss,
which proved to be correct, designated the roads in the enemy's
rear, and the house of a Mr. Cooley at a favourable point for
forming an attacking eorumn, after it crossed the river, in
order to move against the enemy and strike him on the VaUey
Pike in rear of his works. Upon this information, I deter
mined to attack the enemy by moving over the ground desig
nated by Captain Hotchkiss, if it should prove practicable to
move a column between the base of the mountain- and the
river. Next moming, General Gordon confirmed the report

102 BATTtii os^ dftiAft cittelik.
of Captain Hotchkiss, expressing confidence that tiie attack
could be successfully made on the enemy's left and rear, and
General Pegram reported that a movement on the en«Qiy's
right fiank would be attended with great difficulty, as the
banks of Cedar Creek on that flank were high and precipitOns
and were well guarded. General Gordon and Captain Hotch
kiss were then sent to examine and ascertain the practicability
of the route at the base of the mountain, and General Pegram,
at his request, was permitted to go to the signal station on the
meuntain to examine the enemy's position himself from that
point. Directions were given, in the meantime, for everytiiing
to be in readiness to move that night (the 18th), and the divi
sion commanders were requested to be at my quarters at two
o'clock in the afternoon, to receive their 'final instructions.
The river makes a circuit to the left in front of the right of
the position at Fisher's HiU and around by Strasburg, leaving
a considerable body of land between it and the mountain, oh
which are several farras. Whenever Fisher's Hill had been
occupied by us, this bend of the river had been occupied by a
portion of our cavalry, to prevent the enemy from turning the
right of the position, and it was noAv occupied by Colonel
Payne with his cavalry numbering about 300. In order to
make the contemplated movement, it was necessary to cross
the river into this bend, and then pass between the foot of tbe
mountain and the river below Strasburg, where the passage
Avas very narrow, and cross the river again below the mouth of
Cedar Creek. The enemy's camps and positions were visible
from a signal station on Round Hill in rear of Fisher's HUl,
and had been examined by me from that point, but the dis
tance was too great to see with distinctness. From the station
on the mountain, which immediately overlooked the enemy's
left, the view was very distinct, but I could not go to that point
myself, as the ascent was very rugged, and it required several
hours to go and come, and I could not leave my command for
that time. I had therefore, necessarily, to rely on the reports
of my officers.
General* Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, on thei^ return
reported the r6ufe betweeil tiife' inouiitaiii and river which

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 103
was a blind path, to be practicable for infantry but not for
artillery, and a temporary bridge was constructed under Cap
tain Hotchkiss's superintendence, at the first crossing of the
river on our right. The plan of attack on which I determined
was to send the three divisions ofthe 2nd Corps, to-wit: Gor
don's, Ramseur's, and Pegram's, under General Gordon, over
the route which has been specified to the enemy's rear, to
make the attack at 5 o'clock in the morning, which would be
a little before day-break — to move myself with Kershaw's and
Wharton's diAdsions, and all the artillery, along the Pike
through Strasburg, and attack the enemy on the front and left
flank as soon as Gordon should become engaged, and for Ros
ser to move -with Ms own and Wickham's brigade, on the
Back Road across Cedar Creek, and attack the enemy's cav
alry simultaneously with Gordon's attack, while Lomax should
move by Front Royal, cross the river, and come to the Valley
Pike, so as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which
he was to judge by the sound of the firing.
At two o'clock, P. M., all the dirision commanders, except
Pegram, who had not returned from the mountain, came to
my headquarters, and I gave them their instructions. Gor
don was directed to cross over into the bend of the river im
mediately after dark, and move to the foot of the mountain,
where he w^ould rest his troops, and move from there in time
to cross the river again and get in position at Cooley's house,
in the enemy's rear, so as to make the attack at the designated
hour, and he was instructed, in advancing to the attack, to
move for a house on the west side of the Valley Pike called
the "Belle Grove House," at which it was known that Sheri
dan's headquarters were located. A guide who knew tbe
country and the roads was ordered to be sent to General Gor
don, and Colonel Payne AA'as ordered to accompany him with
his force of cavalry, and endeavor to capture Sheridan him
self. Rosser was ordered to move before day, in time to
attack at 5 o'clock next morning, and to endeavor to surprise
the enemy's cavalry in camp. Kershaw and Wharton were
ordered to move, at 1 o'clock in the morning, towards Stras
burg under my personal superintendence, and the artillery

104 BATTLE Of- dEbis CREEK.
was ordered to concentrate where the Pike passed through the
lines at Fisher's HiU, and, at the hour appointed for the
attack, to move at a gallop to Hupp's HiU — the movement
of the artiUery being thus delayed for fear of attracting
the attention of the enemy by the rumbling of the wheels
over the macadamized road. Swords and canteens were
directed to be left in camp, so as to make as little noise
as possible. The diAdsion comraanders were particularly
admonished as to the necessity for promptness and ener^ in
all their movements, and they were instructed to press the
enemy with vigour after he was encountered, and to allow hiin
no time to form, but to continue the pursuit until his forces should
be completely routed. They were also admonished of tha
danger to be apprehended from a disposition to plunder ttie
enemy's camps by their men, and they were enjoined to take
every possible precaution against it.
Gordon moved at the appointed time, and, after he had
started. General Pegram reported to me that he had discov
ered, from the signal station on the mountain, what he sup
posed to be ail intrenchment thrown up across the road ovier
which Gordon would have to advance after crossing the river
the second time, and that the signal operators had informed
hira tbat it had been thrown up since Gordon and Hotchkiss
made their examination; and he suggested the propriety of
attacking the enemy's left fiank at the same time Gordon made
liis attack, as he Avould probably have more difficulty tiian had
been anticipated. I adopted this suggestion, and determined
to cross Kershaw's division over Cedar Creek, at Bownian's
Mill, a little above its mouth, and strike the eneray's left flank
simultaneously Avith the other attacks, of which purpose notice
was sent to General Gordon by General Pegram. At one
o'clock on the morning of tbe 19tli, Kershaw and Wharton
naoved, and I accompanied them. At Strasburg, KershaAv
moved to the right on tiie road to Bowman's MiU, and Whar
ton moved along tbe Pike to Hupp's Hill, with instructions
not to display his forces, but avoid the enemy's notice until
the attack began, Avhen he Avas to move forward, support the
artiUery when it came up, and send a force to get possession

BATTLE OP OEDAft CREEK. 1D5
of the bridge on the Pike over the creek. I accompanied
Kershaw's division, and we got in sight ofthe enemy's fires at
half-past three o'clock. The moon Avas now shining and we
could see the camps. The division was halted under cover to
await the arrival ofthe proper time, and I pointed out to Ker
shaw, and the commander of his leading brigade, the enemy's
position and described the nature of the ground, and directed
them how the attack was to be made and foUowed up. Ker
shaw was directed to cross his division over the creek as
quietiy as possible, and to form it into column of brigades as
he did so, and advance in that manner against the enemy's left
breastwork, extending to the right or left as might be neces
sary. At halt-past four he was ordered forward, and, a very
short time after he started, the firing from Rosser on our left,
and the picket firing at the ford at Avhich Gordon was cross
ing were heard. Kershaw crossed the creek without molesta
tion and formed his division as directed, and precisely at five
o'clock his leading brigade, with little opposition, swept over
the enemy's left work, capturing seven guns, which were at
once turned on the enemy. As soon as this attack was made,
I rode as rapidly as possible to the position on Hupp's Hill to
which Wharton and the artillery had been ordered. I found
the artUlery just arriring, and a very heavy fire of musketry
was now heard in the enemy's rear from Gordon's column.
Wharton had advanced his skirmishers to the creek capturing
some prisoners, but the enemy still held the works on our left
of the Pike, commanding that road and the bridge, and opened
Arith his artiUery on ns. Ourartillery was immediately brought
into action and opened on the enemy, but he soon evacuated
his works, and our men from the other columns rushed into
them. Just then the sun rose, and Wharton's division and the
artillery were immediately ordered forward. I rode in advance
of them across the creek, and met General Gordon on the op
posite hilL Kershaw's division had swept along the enemy's
works on the right ofthe Pike, which were occupied by Crook's
corps, and he and Gordon had united at the Pike, and their
divisions had pushed across it in pursuit of the enemy. The
rear dirision of Gordon's column (Pegram's) was crossing the

106 BATTLE OT CEDAR CREEK.
river at the time Kershaw's attack was made, and General
Gordon moved rapidly to Cooley's house, formed his troops
and advanced against the enemy with his own division on the
left, under Brigadier General Evans, and Ramseur's on the
right, with Pegram's in the rear supporting them. There had
been a delay of an hour at the river before crossing it, either
from a miscalculation of time in the dark, or because the cav
alry which was to precede his column had not gotten up, and
the delay thus caused, for which no blame is to be attached to
General Gordon, enabled the enemy partially to form his lines
after the alarm produced by Kershaw's attack, and Gor
don's attack, which was after light, was therefore met with
greater obstinacy by the enemy than it would otherArise have
encountered, and the fighting had been severe. Gordon, how
ever, pushed his attack with great energy, and the 19th and
Crook's corps were in complete route, and their camps, with
a number of pieces of artillery and a considerable quantity of
small arms, abandoned. The 6th corps, which was on the ene
my's right, and some distance from tiie point attacked, had
had time to get under arms and take position so as to arrest
our progress. General Gordon briefly informed me of the
t;ondition of things, and stated that Pegram's dirision, which
iiad not been previously engaged, had been ordered in. He
then rode to take command of his division, and I rode forward
on the Pike to ascertain the position of the enemy, in order to
continue the attafck. There was now a heavy fog, and that,
Avith the smoke from the artiUery and small arms, so obscured
objects that the enemy's position could not be seen ; but I soon
came to Generals Ramseur aud Pegram, Avho informed me that
Pegram's division had encountered a division of the 6th corps
on the left of tiie Valley Pike, and, after a sharp engagement,
had driven it back on the main body of that corps, which was
in their front in a strong position. They further informed me
that their divisions were in line confronting the 6th corps, but
that there was a vacancy in the line on their right which ought
to be fjlled. I ordered Wharton's division forward at once,
and directed Generals Ramseur and Pegram to put it where it
was required. In a very short time, and whUe I was endeavor-

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 10?
ing to discover the enemy's line through the obscurity, Whar
ton's division came back in some confusion, and General
Wharton informed me that, in advancing to the position
pointed out to him by Generals Ramseur and Pegram, his
division had been driven back by the 6th corps, which, he
said, Avas advancing. He pointed out the direction from which
he said the enemy was advancing, and some pieces of artillery
which had come up were brought into action. The fog soon
rose sufficiently for us to see the enemy's position on a ridge
to the west of Middletown, and it Avas discovered to be a strong
one. After driving back Wharton's dirision, he had not
advanced, bnt opened on us with artillery, and orders were
given for concentrating all our guns on him. In the mean
time, a force of cavalry was advancing along the Pike, and
through the fields to the right of Middletown, thus placing our
right and rear in great danger, and Wharton was ordered to
form his division at once, and take position to hold the ene
my's cavalry in check. Woffbrd's brigade of KershaAv's
division, which had become separated from the other brigades,
was ordered up for the same purpose. Discovering that the
6th corps could not be attacked with advantage on its left flank,
because the approach in that direction was through an open
flat and across a boggy stream with deep banks, I directed
Captain Powell, serring on General Gordon's staft", who rode
up to me while the artillery was being placed in position, to
tell the General to advance against the enemy's right fiank,
and attack it in conjunction Arith Kershaw, while a heavy fire
of artillery was opened from our right ; but as Captain Poav-
ell said he did not know where General Gordon was, and
expressed some doubt about finding him, immediately after he
started, I sent Lieutenant Page, of my oAvn staff, with orders
for both Generals Gordon and Kershaw to make the attack.
In a short time Colonel Carter concentrated 18 or 20 guns ou
the enemy, and he was soon in retreat. Ramseur and Pegram
advanced at once to the position from which the enemy Avas
driven, and just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily
on the right, and Pegram's division was ordered to move to
tbe north of Middletown, and take position across the Piko

108 BATTLE - OF CEDAR CREFJ£. .
against the cavalry. Lieutenant Page had returned and in
formed me that he delivered my order to General Kershaw,
but the latter informed him that his dirision was not in a con
dition to make the attack, as it was very much scattered, and
there was a cavalry force threatening him in front. Lieuten
ant Page also stated that he had seen Gordon's division in
Kershaw's rear reforming, and that it was also much scattered,
and that he had not delivered the order to General Gordon,
because he saw that neither his division nor Kershaw's was in
a condition to execute it. As soon as Pegram moved, Kershaw
was ordered from the left to supply his place. I then rode to
Middletown to raake provision against the enemy's cavalry,
and discovered a large body of it seriously threatening that
fiank, which was very much exposed. Wharton's division
aud Woftbrd's brigade were put in position on Pegram's right,
and several charges of the enemy's cavalry were repulsed. I
had no cavalry on that flank except Payne's very small brig
ade, which had accompanied* Gordon, and made some captures
of prisoners and waggons. Loraax had not arrived, but I
received a message from him, informing me that he had
crossed the river after some delay from a cavalry force guard
ing it, and I sent a message to hira requiring him to move to
Middletown as quick as possible, but, as I subsequently ascer
tained, he did not receive that message. Rosser had attacked
the enemy promptly at the appointed time, but he had not
been able to surprise him, as he was found on the alert on that
flank, doubtless owing to the attempt at a surprise on the night
of the 16th. There Avas now one division of cavalry threaten
ing my right fiank, and two were on the left, near the Back
Road, held in check by Rosser. The force of the latter was
too weak to make any impression on the enemy's cavalry, and
all he could do was to watch it. As I passed across Cedar
Creek after the enemy was driven from it, I had discovered a
number of men in the enemy's camps plundering, and one of
Wharton's battalions was ordered to clear the camps, and drive
the men to their commands. It was reported to me subse
quently that a great number Avere at the same work, and I sent
all my staft' officers who could be spared, to stop it if possible,

BATTLE OP CEDAR CREEK. 109
and srders were sent to the divisioh commanders to send for
their men.
After he was driven from his second position, the enemy had
taken a new position about two miles north of Middletown, and,
as soon as I had regulated matters on the right so as to prevent
his cavalry from getting in rear of that flank, I rode to the left,
for the purpose of ordering an advance. I found Ramseur and
Kershaw in line with Pegram, but Gordon had not come up.
In a short time, however, I found hira coming up from the rear,
and I ordered him to take position on Kershaw's left, and
advance for the purpose of driving the enemy from his new
position — ^Kershaw and Ramseur being ordered to advance at
the eame time. As the enemy's cavalry on our left was very
strong, and had the benefit of an open country to the rear of
that flank, a repulse at this time would have been disastrous,
and I therefore directed General Gordon, if he found the
enemy's line too strong to attack with success, not to make the
assault. The advance was made for some distance, when Gor-^
don's skirmishers came back reporting a line of battle in front
behind breast works, and General Gordon did not make the
attack. It was now apparent that it would not do to press my
troops further. They had been up all night and were much
jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack thc enemy in
the early morning, their own ranks had been much disordered,
and the men scattered, and it had required time to reform them.
Their ranks, moreover, were much thinned by the absence of
the men engaged in plundering the enemy's camps. The delay
which had unavoidably occurred, had enabled the eneray to
rally a portion of his routed troops, and his immense force of
cavalry, which remained intact, was threatening both of our
flanks in an open country, which of itself rendered an advance
extremely hazardous. I determined, therefore, to try and hold
what had been gained, and orders were given for carrying off
the captured and abandoned artillery, smalls arms, and wag
gons. A number of bold attempts were made during the sub
sequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry, to break our
line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed. Late in
the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced against Ram-

110 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK.
seur's, Kershaw's and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ram
seur's and Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed in my
view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion
of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between
Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line,
when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon
followed. General Gordon made eveiy possible eft'ort to rally
his men, and lead them back against the enemy, but without
avail. The information of this aff'air, with exaggerations,
passed rapidly along Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, and their
men, under the apprehension of being flanked, commenced
falling back in disorder, though no enemy was pressing them,
and this gave me the first intimation of Gordon's condition.
At the same time the enemy's cavalry, obserring the disorder
in our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was ag^
repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and rally Kershaw's
and Ramseur's men, but the mass of them resisted aU appeals,
and continued to go to the rear without waiting for any effort
to retrieve the partial disorder. Ramseur, however, succeeded
in retaining with him two or three hundred men of his divi
sion, and Major Goggin of Kershaw's staff", who was in com
mand of Conner's brigade, about the same number from that
brigade; and these men, aided by several pieces of artillery,
held the enemy's whole force on our left in check for one hour
and a half, until Ramseur was shot down mortally wounded,
and the ammunition of those pieces of artiUery was exhausted.
While the latter were being replaced by other guns, the force
that had remained with Ramseur and Goggin gave way also.
Pegram's and Wharton's divisions, and Woff'ord's brigade bad
remained steadfast on the right, and resisted all eff'orts of tiie
enemy's cavalry, but no portion of this force could be moved
to the left without learing the Pike open to the cavalry, which
would have destroyed all hope at once. Every effort to rally
the men in the rear having failed, I had now nothing left for
me but to order these troops to retire also. When (they com
menced to move, the disorder soon extended to them, but Gen
eral Pegram succeeded in bringing back a portion of his com
mand across Oedar Creek in «a orgaaiaed couditioiQ, beldinf

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. Ill
the enemy in check, but thia small force soon dissolved. A
part of Evans' brigade had been raUied in the rear, and held a
ford above the bridge for a short time, but it followed the exam
ple of the rest I tried to rally the men immediately after
crossing Cedar Creek, and at Hupp's Hill, but without success.
Could 600 men have been rallied, at either of these places, who
would have stood by me, I am satisfied that all my artillery
and waggons and tho greater part of the captured artillery
could have been saved, as the enemy's pursuit was very feeble.
As it was, a bridge broke do'wn on a very narrow part of the
road between Strasburg and Fisher's HiU, just above Stras
burg, where there was no other passway, thereby blocking up
all the artillery, ordnance and medical waggons, and ambu
lances which had not passed that point ; and, as there was no
force to defend them, they were lost, a very sraall body of the
enemy's caAralry capturing them.
The greater part of the infantry was halted at Fisher's Hill,
and Rosser, whose command had retired in good order on the
Back Road, was ordered to that point with his cavalry. The
infentry moved back towards New Market at three o'clocd
next morning, and Rosser was left at Fisher's Hill to cover
the retreat of the troops, and hold that position until they were
beyond pursuit. He remained at Fisher's Hill until after ten
o'clock on the 20th, and the enemy did not advance to that
place while he was there. He then fell back without molesta
tion to his former position, and established his line on Stony
Creek, across from Columbia Furnace to Edinburg, seven miles
below Mount Jackson. My other troops were halted at Nbaa-
Market, about seven miles from Mount Jackson, and there was
an entirely open conntry between the two places, they being
very nearly in sight of each other.*

» Grant saj-s in his account of the battle of Cedar Creek : " The enemy was defeated with
great slaughter, and the loss of the most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had
captured in the morning. The wreck ot his army escaped during the night, and fled in the
direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson." Htanton.whn
seems to think it his duty to improre ou all Grant's statements, says : " The routed forces of
the enemy were pursued to Mount Jackson, where he arrived without an organized regi
ment of his army. All of his artillery and thousand.s of prisoners fell into Sheridan's hands.
These successes closed miUtary operations in the Shenandoah Valley, and a rebel force
appeared there vo more during m war." The reoklOBsness of these statements, of both Grant

112 BATTLE 'OF CEDAR GREEK.
Lomax had moved, on the day of the hattie, on the Froht
Royal road towards Winchester, under the impression that the
enemy was being forced back towards that place, and he did
not reach me. When he ascertained the reverse which had
taken place in the latter part of the day, he retired up the
Luray Valley to his former position at MiUford, Arithout
molestation. My loss in the battle of Cedar Creek was twenty-three pieces
of artillery, some ordnance and medical waggons and ambu
lances, which had been carried to the front for the use of the
troops on the field; about 1860 in killed and wounded, and
something over 1,000 prisoners. Major-General Ramseur fell
into the hands of the enemy mortally wounded, and in him,
not only ray comraand, but the country sustained a heavy loss.
He was a most gallant and energetic officer whom no disaster
appalled, but his courage and energy seemed to gain new
strength in the midst of confusion and disorder. He feU at
his post fighting like a lion at bay, and his native State has
reason to be proud of his memory. Brigadier-General Battle
was wounded at the beginning of the fight, -and other valuable
officers were lost. Fifteen hundred prisoners were captured
from the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed and
wounded in this action was very heavy.
This was the case of a glorious victory given up by my own
troops after they had won it, and it is to be accounted for, on
the ground of the partial demoralization caused by the plun
der of the euemy's camps, and from the fact that the men
undertook to judge for themselves when it was proper to retire.
Had they but waited, the mischief on the left would have been
remedied. I have never been able to satisfy myself that the
enemy's attack, in the afternoon, was not a demonstration to
cover his retreat during the night. It certainly was not a vig-

aud Stanton, will appear from the above narrative, as well ivs iVom my subsequent operations
in the Shenandoah A'alley. A^'ould it be believed that this wreck of my army, which fled in
such wild dismay before its pursuers, carried from the battle-field IStii) prisoners, who were
sent to Richmond— subsequently confronted Sheridan's whole force north of Cedar Creek,
for two days, without his attackl ug it, and sent out expeditions which captured two import
tant posts, with over 1000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery, in the limits of Sheridau'.s
CO mmand ? Yet such was the case.

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 113
orous one, as is shown by the fact that the very smaU force
Arith Ramseur and Goggin held him in check so long; and the
loss in killed and wounded in the division which first gave
way, was not hea-vy, and Avas the least in numbers of all but
one, though it was the third in strength, and its relative loss
Avas the lea«t of all the divisions. I read a sharp lecture to
my tioops, in au address pubUshed to them a few days after
the hattie, but I have never attiibuted the result to a want of
courage on their part, for I had seen them perform too many
prodigies of valor to doubt that. There Avas an individuaUty
about the Confederate soldier which caused him to act often in
hattie according to his own opinions,|and thereby impair his
OAvn efficiency; and the tempting bait offered by the rich
plunder of the camps of the enemy's well-fed and well-clothed
troops, was frequently too great for our destitute soldiers, and
caused them to pause in the career of victory.
Had my cavalry been sufficient to contend Avith that of the
enemy, the route in the morning would have been complete ;
as it was, I had only about 1200 cavalry on the field under
Rosser, and Lomax's force, which numbered less than 1700,
did not get up. My infantry and artillery was about the same
stiength as at Winchester. The reports of the ordnance offi
cers showed in the hands of my troops about 8,800 muskets,
in round numbers as foUows: in Kershaw's division 2,700,
Ramseur's 2,100, Gordon's 1,700, Pegram's 1,200, and Whar
ton's 1,100. Making a moderate allowance for the men left to
guard the camps and the signal station on the mountain, as
well as for a fcAv sick and wounded, I went into this battle
with about 8,500 muskets and a little over forty pieces of
artillery. The book containing the reports ofthe Chief Surgeon of
Sheridan's cavalry corps, which has been raentioned as cap
tured at this battle, showed that Sheridan's cavalry nurabered
about 8,700 men for duty a fiew days previous, aud from infor
mation which I had received of reinforcements sent him, in
the way of recruits and returned convalescents, I am satisfied
that his infantry force was fully as large as at Winchester.

114 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK.
Sheridan was absent in the morning at the beginning of the
fight, and had returned in the afternoon before the change in the
fortunes of the day. Nevertheless, I saw no reason to change
the estimate I had formed of him.*
It may be asked, why with my small force I made the
attack ? I can only say we had been fighting large odds
during the whole war, and I knew there was no chance of les
sening them. It was of the utmost consequence that Sheridan
should be prevented from sending troops to Grant, and Gene
ral Lee, in a letter received a day or two before, had expressed
an earnest desire that a victory should be gained in the Valley
if possible, and it could not be gained without fighting for it
I did hope to gain one by surprising the enemy in his camp,
and then thought and still think I would have had it, if my
directions had been strictly complied with, and my troops had
aAvaited my orders to retire.f

CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.
After the return from Cedar Creek, the main body of my
troops reraained in their carap for the rest of the raonth with
out disturbance, but on the 26tli of October the enemy's cav
alry attacked Lomax at Millford and, after sharp fighting, was
*The retreat of the main body of his army had been arrested, and a new line formed
behind brea.stworks of rails, before Sheridan arrived on the field; and he still had immense
(tdds against me when he made the attack in the afternoon.
t ,^ sill,y story was circulated and even published in the papers, that this battle was planned
{Uid coiiduoted by one of my subordinates up to a eertiiln point, when my arrival on the field
stopped the pursuit and arrested the vietor.v, Ni> ottieer or soldier on that day received an
order from uie to halt, unless he.was goinjc to tbe rear. My orders were to press the enemy
from the beginning and give him no time to form, aud when I found that my troops had
luilted, I endeavoured to advance again, but I discovered it would not do to press them fur
ther. Those who have knmvn me from my youth, as well as those who came in contact with
me iluring tho war, know that I was not likely to permit any other to plan a battle for me, or
iissume my duties in any particular. A'et 1 was always willing to receive and adopt valuable
suggestions from any of my officers. ^
There was another fal.se report a,s to my personal habits during the A'alley Campaign, which
ohtaiued some circulation and eredenee, but which I would not notice, except for the fact
that it was referred to on the floor of the Confederate Senate by two members of that bodj'.
The utter falsehood of thia report was well known to all my staff and General oflicers, as well
as to all others who associated with me.

CLOSE OP THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 115
repulsed. Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send
troops to Grant, and that the Manassas Gap Railroad was
being repaired, I moved down the VaUey again on the 10th of
November. I had received no reinforcements, except about
350 cavalry under General Cosby from Breckenridge's depart
ment in Southwestern Virginia, some returned convalescents,
and several hundred conscripts who had been on details which
had been revoked. On the llth, on our approach to Cedar
Creek, it was found that the enemy had fallen back towards
Winchester, after having fortified and occupied a position on
Hupp's HUl subsequentiy to the battle of Cedar Creek.
Colonel Payne drove a small body of cavalry through Middle-
town to NewtOAvn, and I followed him and took position south
of the latter place and in riew of it. Sheridan's main force
was found posted north of NcAvtown, in a position which he
was engaged in fortifying. I remained in front of him during
the llth and 12th, Rosser being on my left flank on the Back
Road, and Lomax on my right between the Valley Pike and
the Front Royal road, -with one brigade (McCausland's) at -Ce-
darriUe on the latter road. Rosser had some skirmishing with
the enemy's cavalry on the llth, and on the 12th two divisions
advanced against him, and after a heavy fight the enemy was
repulsed and some prisoners captured. Colonel Payne, who
was operating immediately in my front, likewise had a sharp
engagement Arith a portion of the enemy's cavalry and defeated
it. When Rosser was hearily engaged, Lomax was ordered
to his assistance with a part of his command, and, during his
absence, late in the afternoon, Powell's division of the ene
my's cavalry attacked McCausland at Cedarville, and, after a
severe fight, drove him back across the river with the loss of
two pieces of artiUery. At the time of this aff'air, a blustering
wind was bloAring and the firing could not be heard ; and
nothing was known of McCausland's misfortune until after we
commenced retiring that night. In these cavalry fights three
valuable officers were kiUed, namely: Lieutenant Colonel
MarshaU of Rosser's brigade. Colonel Radford of McCausland's
brigade, and Captain Harvie of McCausland's stafl'.
Discovering that the enemy continued to fortify his position,

116 CLORE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.
and showed no disposition to come out of his lines Arith his
infantry, and not being wUUng to attack him in his intrench-
ments,"after the reverses I had met Arith, I determined to re
tire, as we were beyond the reach of supplies. After dark on
the 12th, we moved to Fisher's Hill, and next day returned in
the direction of NcAA'-Market, where we arrived on the 14th,
no effort at pursuit being made. I discovered by this move
ment that no troops had been sent to Grant, and that the pro
ject of repairing the Manassas Gap Railroad had been
abandoned.* Shortly after onr return to New-Market, Kershaw's division
was returned to General Lee, and Cosby's cavalry to Brecken
ridge. On the 22nd of November two dirisions of the enemy's
cavalry advanced to Mount Jackson, after haring driven in our
cavalry pickets. A part of it crossed over the river into
Meem's bottom at the foot of Rude's Hill, but was driven back
by a portion of my infantry, and the whole retreated, being
pursued by Wickham's brigade, under Colonel Munford, to
Woodstock. On the 27th, Rosser crossed Great North Mountain into Har
dy County, with his oavu and Payne's brigade, aud, about the
29th, surprised and captured the fortified post at New Creek,
ou the Baltiraore and Ohio rail-road. At this place, two regi
ments of cavalry Avith their arras and colours were captured,
and eight pieces of artillery and a very large araount of ord
nance, quarter master, and commissary stores fell into our
hands. The prisoners, numbering 800, four pieces of artillery,
and some waggons and horses, Avere brought off', the other
guns, which were heaA'y siege pieces, being spiked, and their
carriages and a greater part of the stores destroyed. Rosser
also brought off several hundred cattle and a large number of
sheep from Hampshire and Hardy counties.
This expedition closed the material operations of the cam
paign of 1864 in the Shenandoah Valley, and, at that time, the
 I 
*From Grant's account of the battle of Cedar Creek, it woidd be supposed that the 6th
Corps was returned to the army of tho Potomac immediately after that battle, but the truth
Is that no troops were sent from Sheridan's army until in December, when tho cold weather
had put an end to all operations in the field by infantry.

CLOSE OP THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN, 117
enemy held precisely the same portion of that valley, which
he held before the opening of tiie campaign in the spring, and
no more, and the headquarters of his troops were at the same
place, to-wit: Winchester. There was this difference how
ever : at the beginning of the campaign, he held it with com
paratively a small force, and at the close, he was compelled to
employ three gorps of infantry and one of cavalry, for that
purpose, and to guard the approaches to Washington, Mary
land, and Pennsylvania. When I was detached from General
Lee's army. Hunter was advancing on Lynchburg, 170 miles
south of Winchester, Arith a very considerable force, and
threatening all of General Lee's communications with a very
serious danger. By a rapid movement, my force had been
thro'wn to Lynchburg, just in time to arrest Hunter's march
into that place, and he had been driven back and forced to
escape into the mountains of Western Virginia, with a loss of
ten pieces of artillery, and subsequent terrible suff'ering to his
troops. Maryland and Pennsylvania had been invaded, Wash
ington threatened and throAvn into a state of frantic alarm, and
Grant had been compelled to detach two corps of infantry and
two divisions of cavalry from his army. Five or six thousand
prisoners had been captured from the enemy and sent to Rich
mond, and, according to a published statement by Sheridan,
his army had lost 13,831, in killed and wounded, after he took
command of it. Heavy losses had been infiicted on that army
by my command, before Sheridan went to the Valley, and the
whole loss could not have been far from double my entire
force. The enemy moreover had been deprived of the use of
the Baltimore and Ohio rail-road, and the Chesapeake and
Ohio canal, for three months. It is true that I had lost many
valuable officers and men, and about 60 pieces of artUlery,
counting those lost by Ramseur and McCausland, and not de
ducting the 19 pieces captured from the enemy; but I think I
may safely state that the fall of Lynchburg with its foundries
and factories, and the consequent destruction of General Lee's
communications, would have rendered necessary the evacua
tion of Richmond, and that, therefore, the faU of the latter
place had been prevented; and, by my subsequent operations.

118 CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.
Grant's operations against Lee's army had been materially
impeded, and for some time substantially suspended.
My loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at Winchester and
Fisher's Hill, had been less than 4,000, and, at Cedar Creek,
about 8,000, but the enemy has attempted to magnify it to a
much larger figure, claiming as prisoners several thousand
more than my entire loss. How he makes out his estimate is
not for me to explain. He was never scrupulous as to the
kinds of persons of whom he made prisoners, and the state
ments of the Federal officers were not always confined to the
truth, as the world has probably learned. I know that a num
ber of prisoners fell into the enemy's hands, who did not be
long to my command : such as cavalry men on details to get
fresh horses, soldiers on leave of absence, conscripts on special
details, citizens not in the service, men employed in getting
supplies for the departments, and stragglers and deserters from
other commands.
My army during the entire campaign had been self sustain
ing, so far as provisions and forage were concerned, and a con
siderable number of beef cattle had been sent to General Lee's
army ; and when the difficulties under which I laboured are
considered, I think I may confidently assert that I had done as
well as it was possible for me to do.*

•^ Some attempts have been made to conipare my campaign in the Valley with that of Gen
eral Jackson in the same district, in order to cast censure on me; but such comparison is not
necessary for the vindication of the fame of that great leader, and it is most unjust to me,
as the circumstances under which we operated were so entirely dissimilar. It was my for
tune to serve under General Jackson, after his Valley campaign until his death, and I have
the satisfaction of knowing that I enjoyed his confidence, which was signally shown in his
last oflScial act towards me ; and no one admires his character and reveres his memory more
than I do. It is not therefore with any view to detract from his merits, that I mention the fol
lowing facts, but to show how iraproper it is to compare our campaigns, with a view of con
trasting their merits. 1st. General Jackson did not have the odds opposed to him which I
had, and his troops were composed entirely of the very best material which entered into the
composition of our armies, that is, the men who came out voluntarily in the beginmng ofthe
war ; while my command, though comprising all the principal organizations which were with
him did not contain 1,500 of the men who had participated in the first A'alley campaign, and
there was a like falling off in the other organizations with me, which had not been mth Gen.
Jackson in that campaign. This was o.wing to tho losses in killed and disabled, and prisoners
who were not exchanged. Besides the old soldiers whose numbers were so reduced, my
command was composed of recruits and conscripts. 2ti'tl. General Jackson'.<i cavalry was
not outnumbered by the enemy, and it was far superior in effioiency— Ashby being a host in
himself; while my cavalry was more than trebled in numbers, ahd far excelled in arms,
equipments, and horses, by that of the enemy. 3rd. The Valloy, at the time of his cam-

CLOSE Of THE VALLE"? CAMPAIGN. 119
Shortly kfter Rosser's return from the New Creek exfiedi-
tion. Colonel Munford was sent with Wickham's brigade to the
counties of Hardy and Pendleton, to procure forage for his
horses, and, cold weather having noAV set in so as to prevent
material operations in the field, the three divisions of the 2nd
Corps were sent, in successiou, to General Lee, — ^Wharton's
division, the cavalry, and most of the artillery being retained
Arith me.
On the 16th of December, I broke up the carap at NcAA'^-Mar-
ket,\and moA'ed back towards Staunton, for the purpose of
estabi^^ng my troops on or near the Central railroad —
Lomax's cavalry, except one brigade left to watch the Luray
VaUey, having previously moA'ed across the Blue Ridge, so as
to be able to procure forage. Cavalry pickets were left in front
of New-Market, and telegraphic communications kept up with
that place, from which there was communication with the
lower Valley, by means of signal stations on the northern end
of Massanutten Mountain, and at Ashby's Gap in the Blue
Ridge, which overlooked the enemy's camps and the surround
ing country.
The troops had barely arrived at their new camps, when
information was received that the enemy's cavalry Avas in
raotion. On the 19th, Custar's dirision moved from Winches
ter towards Staunton, and, at the same time, two other divi
sions of cavalry, under Torbert or Merrit, moved across by
Front Royal and Chester Gap towards Gordonsrille. This
information ha-ring been sent me by signal and telegraph,
Wharton's di-rision was moved, on the 20th, through a hail-

s

paign, was teeming with provisions and forage from one end to the other; while my com
mand had very great difliculty in obtaining provisions for the men, and had to rely almost
entirely on the grass in the open fields for forage. 4th. When General Jackson was pressed
and had to retire, as well when he fell backbefore Banks in the spring of 1862, as, later, when
he retired before Fremont to prevent Shields from getting in his rear, the condition of the
water courses wa.s such as te enable him to stop the advance of one column, by burning the
bridges, and then fall upon and defeat another column; and, when hard pressed, place his
troops in a position of security, until a favorable opportunity offered for attacking the
enemy; while all the water courses were low and fordable, and the whole country was open
in my front, on my flanks, and in my rear, during my entire campaign. These facts do not
detract from the merits of General Jackson's campaign in the slightest degree, and far be if
from me to attempt to obscure his well earned and richly deserved fame. They only show
that I ought not to be condemned for not doing what ha did.

120 CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.
storm, towards Harrisonburg, and Rosser ordered to the front
with all the cavalry he could collect. Custar's division reached
Lacy's Spring, nine mUes north of Harrisonburg, on the
evening of the 20th, and, next morning before day, Rosser,
Avitli about 600 men of his own and Payne's brigades, attacked
it in camp, and drove it back doAvn the Valley in some con
fusion. Lomax had been advised of the movement towards
GordonsAdlle, and, as soon as Custer was disposed of, Whar
ton's division was moved back, and on the 23rd a portion of it
Avas run on the railroad to Charlottesville — Munford, who had
now returned from across the great North Mountain, being
ordered to the same place. On my arrival at Charlottesrille
on the 23rd, I found that the eneray's two cUvisions of cavalry,
Avhich had crossed the Blue Ridge had been held in check
near Gordonsville by Lomax, until the arri\'al of a brigade of
infantry from Richmond, when they retired precipitately. I
returned to the Valley and estabUshed my headquarters at
Staunton — ^Wharton's division and the artillery being en
camped east of that place, and Rosser's cavalrj- west of it;
and thus closed the operations of 1864 Arith me.*
* At the close of the year 1864, Grant's plans for the campaign in Virginia had been bafiled.
and he had merely attained a position on James River, which he might have occupied at the-
beginning of the campaign without opposition. So far as the two armies, with which the
campaign was opened, were concerned, he had sustained a defeat, and, if the contest had
been between those two armies alone, his would have been destroyed. But, unfortunately,
he had the means of reinforcing and recruiting his army to an almost unlimited extent, and
there were no means of recruiting General Lee's. Four years of an unexampled struggle
had destroyed the finances of the Confederate Government, and exhausted the material out
of which an army could be raised. General Lee had performed his task as a military com
mander, but tho Government was unable to furnish him the means of properly continuing
the war ; and he had therefore to begin the campaign of 186,1 with the remnant of his army
ofthe previous year, while a new draft and heavy reinforcements from other quarters had
furnished his opponent with a new army and largely increased numbers. The few detailed
men sent to General Lee, after the revocationof their details, added nothing to the strength
of his army, but were a positive injury to it. 'Ihe mass of them had desired to keep out of
the service, because they had no stomach for the fight, and when forced into it, tliey but
served to disseminate dis,satisfaetion in the ranks of the armj\ Some writers who never
exposed their own precious persons to the bullets of the enemy, have written very glibly
about the desertions from the army. Now, God forbid that I should say one word iu justifi
cation of desertion under auy eh'ouinstances. I bad no toleration for it during the war, aud
never failed to sanetiun and order the execution of seutenoes for the extreme penalty for
that offence, when submitted to me ; but some palliation was to be fouud for the conduct of
many of those who ilkl desert, in fhe fact that Ihey did so to go to the aid of tlieir
families, who they knew were suffering for the necessaries of life, while many able-bodied
young men remained at home, in peace aud plenty, under exemptions and details. The
duty to defend one's country exists independently of any law, and the latter is made to
enforce, not create, the obligation. By the law, or the vmwise administration of it, a man

OPERATIONS IN 186 5.

On the 2nd of January, 1865, 1 had a consultation with Gen.
Lee at Richmond, about the difficulties of my position in the
VaUey, and he told me that he had left me there with the smaU
command which still remained, in order to produce the impres
sion that the force was much larger than it really was, and he
instructed me to do the best I could.
Before I returned from Richmond, Rosser started, with
between 300 and 400 picked cavalry, for the post of Beverly
in Western Virginia, and, on the llth, surprised and captured
the place, securing over five hundred prisoners and some stores.
This expedition was made over a very mountainous country,
amid the snows of an unusually severe Avinter. Rosser's loss
was very light, but Lieutenant-Colonel Cook of the Sth Vir
ginia cavalry, a most gallant and efficient officer, lost his leg
in the attack, and had to be left behind.
The great drought during the summer of 1864, had made
the com crop in the Valley a very short one, and, as^Sheridan
had destroyed a considerable quantity of small grain and hay,
I found it impossible to sustain the horses of my cavalry aud
may be exempted from enforced service, but he cannot be released from the sacred duty
of defending his country against invasion. Those able-bodied men who flocked abroad to
avoid service, and were so blatant in their patriotism when beyond fhe reach of danger, as 1
have had occasion to learn in my wanderings, as well as those who sought exemptions and
details under the law, with a view to avoid the dangers and hardships of the war, were to all
intents and purposes deserters, and morally more criminal than the poor soldier, who, in the
i^ony of his distress for the sufferings of his wife and little ones at home, yielded to the
temptation to abandon his colours. There were some cases of exemptions and details,
where the persons obtaining them could be more useful at home than in the field, and those
who sought them honestly ou that account are not subject to the above strictures, but there
were many cases where the motives were very different. The men whose names form the
roll of honor for the armies ofthe Confederate States, are those who voluntarily entered the
service in the beginning of the war, or as soon as they were able to bear arms, and served
faithfully to the end, or until killed or disabled ; and 1 would advise the unmarried among
my fair countrywomen to choose their husbands from among the survivors of this class, and
not from among the skulkers. By following this advice, they may not obtain as much pelf,
but tbey may rest assured that ^hey will not be tbe mothers Qf cowards, and their posterity
will have no cause to blasb for tbe conduct of their progenitors.

122 OPEEATIONS IN 1865.
artillery where they were, and forage could not be obtained
from elsewhere. I was therefore corapelled to send Fitz Lee's
two brigades to General Lee, and Loraax's cavalry was brought
frora across the Blue Ridge, Avhcrc the country was exhausted
of forage, and sent west into the counties of Pendleton, High
land, Bath, Alleghany, and Greenbrier, where hay could be
obtained. Rosser's brigade had to be tcraporarily disbanded,
and the men alloAved to go to their homes with their horses, to
sustain them, with orders to report when called on. — One or
two companies, whose homes Avere doAvn the Valley, being
required to picket and scout in front of New Market. The
men and horses of Lieutenant-Colonel King's artiUery were
sent to South-Western Virginia to be wintered, and most of
the horses of the other battalions were sent off', under care of
some of the -men, Avho undertook to forage them until spring.
Nelson's battalion, with sorae pieces of artillery with their
horses, was retained with me, and the remaining officers and
men of the other battalions were sent, under the charge of
Colenel Carter, to General Lee, to man stationary batteries on
his lines. Brigadier-General Long, who had been absent on
sick leave for some time and had returned, remained with me,
and most of the guns which were without horses were sent to
Lynchburg by railroad. This was a deplorable state of things,
but it could not be avoided, as the horses of the cavalry and
artillery would have perished had they been kept in the VaUey.
Echols' brigade of Wharton's division was subsequently sent
to South-Western Virginia, to report to General Echols for
special duty, and "McNeil's company of partizan rangers and
Woodson's company of unattached ^lissouri cavalry were sent
to the County of Hardy— Major Harry Gilmor being likewise
ordered to that County, Avith the remnant of his battalion, to
take charge of the whole, and operate against the Baltimore
and Ohio railroad ; but he Avas surprised aud captured there,
fit a private house, soon after his arrival. Two very small bri
gades of Wharton's division, and Nelson's battalion with the
few pieces of artillery which had been retained, were left as
my whole available force, and these were in Avinter quarters
near Fisherrille, on the Central raUroad between Staunton and

OFERATIONS IN 1806. 123
Waynesboro. The telegraph to New Market and the signal
stations from there to the loAver VaUey were kept up, and a few
scouts sent to the rear of the enemy, and in this Avay was my
front principally picketed, aud I kept advised of the enemy's
movements. Henceforth my efficient and energetic signal offi
cer. Captain Wilbourn, Avas the commander of my advance
picket line.
The winter was a severe one, and all material operations
were suspended until its close. Late in February, Lieutenant
Jesse McNeil, who was in command of his father's old com
pany, Arith forty or fifty men of that company and Woodson's,
made a dash into Cumberland, Maryland, at night, and cap
tured and brought off' Major-Generals Crook and Kelly with a
staft' officer of the latter, though there were at the time several
thousand troops in and around Cumberland. The father of
this gaUant young officer had performed many daring exploits
during the war, and had accorapanied mc into Maryland, doing
good service. When Sheridan was at Harrisonburg, in Octo
ber, 1864, Captain McNeil had burned the bridge at Edinburg
in his rear, and had attacked and captured the guard at the
bridge at Mount Jackson, but in this aff'air he received a very
severe wound from which he subsequently died. Lieutenant
Baylor of Rosser's brigade, who was in Jefferson County Avith
his company, made one or two dashes on the enemy's outposts
during the winter, and, on one occasion, captured a train loaded
with supplies, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.
On the 20th of February, an order was issued by General
Lee, extending my command over the Department of South-
Western Virginia and East Tennessee, previously commanded
by General Breckenridge — the latter having been made Secre
tary of War.
On the 27th, Sheridan started from Winchester up fhe Val
ley with a heavy force, consisting, according to the statement
of Grant, in h'is report, of " two divisions of cavalry, number
ing about 5,000 each." I had been informed of the prepar
ations for a movement of some kind, some days previous, and
the information had been telegraphed to General Lee. As

124 OPERATIONS IN 1865'.
soon as Sheridan started, I was informed of the fact by signa^
and telegraph, and orders were immediately sent by telegraph
to Lomax, Avhose headquarters were at Millboro, on the Cen
tral railroad, forty miles west of Staunton, to get together all
of his cavalry as soon as possible. Rosser was also directed to
collect all of his raen that he could, and an order was sent by
telegraph to General Echols, in South-Western Virginia, to
send his brigade by rail to Lynchburg. My own headquarters
were at Staunton, but there were no troops at that place except
a local provost guard, and a company of reserves, composed
of boys under 18 years of age, which was acting under orders
of the Conscript Bureau. Orders were therefore given for the
immediate removal of all stores from that place. Rosser suc
ceeded in collecting a little over 100 men, and with these he
atterapted to check the eneray at North River, near Mount
Crawford, on the 1st of March, but was unable to do so.
On the afternoon of that day, the enemy approached to within
three or four miles of Staunton, and I then telegraphed to
Lomax to concentrate his cavalry at Pond Gap, in Augusta
County, southwest of Staunton, and to follow and annoy the
enemy should he move towards Lynchburg, and rode out of
town towards Waynesboro, after all the stores had been
removed. Wharton and Nelson were ordered to move to Waynesboro
by light next raorning, and on that raorning the (2nd) their
comraands were put in position on a ridge covering Waynes
boro on the west aud just outside of the town. My object, in
taking this position was to secure the removal of five pieces
of artUlery for which there Avere no horses, and some stores
still in Waynesboro, as well as to present a bold front to the
eneray, and ascertain the object of his moveraent, which I
could not do very Avell if I took refuge at once in the moun
tain. The last report for Wharton's command showed 1,200
men for duty ; but, as it was exceedingly inclement, and rain
ing and freezing, there Averc not more than 1,000 muskets on
the line, and Nelson had six pieces of artillery. I did not
intend making my final stand on this ground, yet I was satis
fied that if my men would fight, which I had no reason to

OFERATIONS IN 1885. Iffi
doubt, I could hold the enemy in cheek until night, and then
cross the river and take position in Rockfish Gap ; for I had
done more difficult things than that during the war. About
12 o'clock in the day, it was reported to me that the enemy
was advancing, and I rode out at once on the lines, and soon
discovered abont a brigade of cavalry coming up, on the road
from Staunton, on which the artillery opened, when it retired
out of range. The enemy manoeuvred for some time in our
front keeping out of reach of our guns until late in the after
noon, when I discovered a force moving to our left. I imme
diately sent a messenger with notice of this fact to General
Wharton, who was on that flank, and with orders for him to
lookout and proride for the enemy's advance; and another
messenger, with notice to the guns on the left, and directions
for them to fire towards the advancing force, which could not
be seen from where they were. The enemy soon made an
attack on our left flank, and I discovered the men on that flank
^ring back. Just then, General Wharton, who had not
received my message, rode up to me and I pointed out to him
the disorder in his line, and ordered him to ride immediately
to that point and rectify it. Before he got "back, the troops
gave way on the left, after making very slight resistance, and
soon everything was in a state of confusion and the men com
menced crossing the river. I rode across it myself to try and
stop them at the bridge and check the enemy, but they could
not be raUied, and the enemy forded the river above and got
in our rear. I now saw that everything was lost, and, after
the enemy had got between the mountain and the position
where I was, and retreat was thus cut off', I rode aside into the
woods, and in that way escaped capture. I went to the top of
a hill to reconnoitre, and had the mortification of seeing the
greater part of my command being carried off' as prisoners,
and a force of the enemy moving rapidly towards Rockfish
Gap. I then rode with the greater part of my staff and 15 or
20 others, including General Long, across the mountain, north
ofthe Gap, with the hope of arriving at Greenwood depot, to
which the stores had been removed, before the enemy reached
that Jdace ; but, on getting near it, about dark, we discov6red

126 OPERATIONS IN 1866.
the enemy in possession. Wc then rode to Jarman's Gap,
about three miles from tho depot, and remained there all night,
as the night Avas exceedingly dark, and thc ice rendered it
irapossible for us to travel over the rugged roads.
The only solution of this affair which I can give, is that
my men did not fight as I had expected them to do. Had
they done so, I am satisfied that the enemy could have been
repulsed ; aud I Avas and still am of opinion that thc attack at
Waynesboro was a mere demonstration to cover a movement
to the south toAvards Lynchburg. Yet some excuse is to be
raade for my men, as they knew that they were weak and the
eneray very strong.
The greater part of my command was captured, as was also
the artillery, Avhich, with five guns ou the ears at Greenwood,
made eleven pieces. Very few were killed or wounded on
either side. Tho only person killed on our side that I have
ever heard of was Colonel William H. Harmon, who had for
merly been in the army, but then held a civil appointment ;
and he was shot in the streets of Waynesboro, either after he
had been made prisoner, as some said, or while he was
attempting to make his escape after everything was over. My
aide. Lieutenant William G. Calloway, who had been sent to
the left with one of tho messages, and my medical director.
Surgeon H. McGuire, had thc misfortune to fall into the
hands of the enemy. All the waggons of Wharton's command
were abseut getting supplies ; but those Ave had with us, inclu
ding the ordnance and medical waggons, aud my own baggage
waggon, fell into the hands of the enemy.*
* Grant, in speaking ot this affair, says : " He (Sheridan) entered Staunton on the 2nd, the
enemy having retreated on Waynesboro. Thence he pushed on to AVaynesboro, where he
found tho enemy iu force in an intrenched position, under General Early. Without stop
ping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried,
and 1,600 prisoners, 11 pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, 200 waggons
and teams loaded with subsistence, and 17 battle-flags were captured." This is all very
brilliant; but, unfortunately for its truth, Sheridan was not at Waynesboro, but was at Staun
ton, where he had stopped with a part of his force ; while tlie affair at Waynesboro was con
ducted by one of his subordinates. The strength of my force has already been stated, and
it was not in an intrenched position. I am not able to say how many prisoners were taken,
but 1 know that they were more than my command numbered, as a very oonsidorable num
ber of recently exchanged and paroled prisoners were at the time iu the A'alley, on leave of
absence tVom General Lee's army. I not only did not have 200 waggons or aaylhiog like it,
but had no use for them. Whera- tho .17 batlle-aaga could have boon £otton, I canuoi
Imagine.

OPERATIONS IK 1865. J27
On the 3rd, I rode, with thc party that was with me, towards
Charlottesville ; but, on getting near that place, we found the
enemy entering it. We had then to turn back aud go by a
circuitous route under the mountains to Gordonsville, as tho
Rivanua River and other streams were very much swollen.
On arriving at GordonsviUe I found General Wharton, who
had made his escape to Charlottesville on the night of the af
fair at Waynesboro, and he was ordered to Lynchburg, by thc
way of thc Central and Southside Railroads, to take command
of Echols' brigade, and aid in the defence of the city. General
Long was ordered to report to General Lee at Petersburg.
The aff'air at Waynesboro diverted Sheridan from Lynch
burg, which ho could have captured without difficulty, had he
followed Hunter's route, and not jumped at the bait unwilling
ly offered him, by the capture of my force at the former place.
His deflection from the direct route to the one by Charlottes
rille, was without adequate object, and resulted in the abandon
ment of the eft'ort to capture Lynchburg, or to cross the James
River to the south side. He halted at Charlottesville for two
or three days, and then moved towards James River below
Lynchburg, when, being uuable to cross that river, he crossed
over the Rivanna at its mouth, and then moved by the way of
Frederick's HaU on the Central Railroad, and Ashland on the
R. F. & P. RaUroad, across the South and North Annas, and
down the Pamunkey to the White House.
At GordonsvUle about 200 cavah'y Avere collected under
Colonel Morgan, of the 1st Virginia Cavalry, and, Avith this
force, I watched the enemy for several days while he was at
Charlottesville, and when he was endeavoring to cross the
.James River. When Sheridan had abandoned this effort, and
on the day he reached thc vicinity of Ashland, while I was
riding on the Louisa Court House and Richraond road,
towards the bridge over the South Anna, with abont 20 cav
alry, I came very near being captured by a body of 300 cav
alry sent after me, but I succeeded in eluding the enemy with
most of those who were with me, and reached Richmond at
two o'clock next morning, after passing twice between the

121 ©fERATieWS IN 1865.
enemy's camps and his pickets. My Adjutant General, Cap
tain Moore, however, was captured, but made his escape.
Lomax had succeeded in collecting a portion of his cavalry
and reaching Lynchburg, where he took position on the north
bank of the river, but the enemy avoided that place. Rosser
had collected a part of his brigade and made an attack, near
New-Market, on the guard which was carrying back the pris
oners captured at Waynesboro, with the view of releasing them,
but he did not succeed in that object, though he captured a piece
of artillery; the guard was compelled to retire in great haste.
He then moved towards Richmond on Sheridan's track.
After consultation with General Lee, at his headquarters
near Petersburg, Rosser's and McCausland's brigades were
ordered to report to him under the command of General Ros
ser, and I started for the VaUey, by the way of Lynchburg, to
reorganize what was left of my command. At Lynchburg a
dispatch was received from General Echols, stating that
Thomas was moving in East Tennessee, and threatening South
western Virginia with a heavy force, and I immediately went
on the cars to Wytheville. From that place I went with Gen
eral Echols to Bristol, on the state line between Virginia and
Tennessee, and it was ascertained beyond doubt that some
important movement by the enemy Avas on foot. We then
returned to Abingdon, and while I was engaged in endeavor
ing to organize the small force in that section, so as to meet
the enemy in the best way we could, I received, on the 30th of
March, a telegraphic dispatch from General Lee, directing me
to turn over the command in Southwestern Virginia to Gene
ral Echols, and in the Valley to General Lomax, and inform
ing me that he would address a letter to me at my home. I
complied at once with this order, and thus terminated my mil
itary career.

CONCLUSION.
In tho afternoon of thc 30th of IMarch, after' having turned
over the command to General Echols, I rode to Marion in
gmythe county, aud Avas taken that night Avith a cold and
cougV so ^violent as to produce hemorrhage from tho kings,
and prostrate me for several days iu a A'ory dangerous condi
tion. AVhile I Avas in this situation, a heavy cavalry force
under Stoneman. from Thomas' army in Tennessee, moved
through North Carolina to the east, and a part of it came into
Virginia from the maiu column, and struck tho Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad at Xcaa' Kiver, east of Wytheville ; whence,
after destroying the bridge, it raoved cast, cutting off all cora-
raunicatiou Avith Richmond, and then crossed over into North
Carolina. As soon as I was in a condition to be raoved, I was
c-irried ou the railroad to Wytheville, and was proceeding
thence to my home, in an ambulance under the charge of a
surgeon, when I received, most unoxpectedly, the news ofthe
surrender of General Lee's army. Without the slightest feel-
ing of irreverence, I Avill say, that the sound of the last trump
would not havc been more unwelcome to my ears.
L'nder the disheartening influence of the sad ncAvs I had
received, I proceeded to my home, and I subsequently
received a letter from General Lee, dated on the SOth of
.March, explaining the reasons for relieving me from coramand.
As a copy of that letter ha.s been pubUshed in Virginia, with
out any knowledge or agency on my part, it is appended to
this narrative. The letter itself, which was written on the
very day ofthe commencement ofthe attack on General Lee'^
Unes which resulted in the evacuation of Richmond, and just
ten days before the surrender of the Army of Northern Vir
ginia, has a historical interest; for it shows that our great
commander, even at that late day, Avas anxiously and earnest
ly contemplating the continuation of the struggle with unaba
ted vigor, and a full determination to make available every
element of success.

130 CONCLUSION.
Immediately after the battie of Cedar Creek, I had written
a letter to General Lee, stating my Arillingness to be relieved
from comraand, if he deemed it necessary for the public inter
ests, and I should have been content with the course pursued
towards me, had his letter not contained the expressions of
personal confidence in me which it does; for I knew that, in
everything he did as commander of our armies. General Lee
Avas actuated solely by an earnest and ardent desire for the
success of the cause of his country. As to those among my
oountrymen who judged me harshly, I have not a word of
reproach. When there was so much at stake, it was not un
natural that persons entirely ignorant of the facts, and forming
tlieir opinions from the many false reports set afloat in a time
of terrible Avar and public guttering, should pass erroneous and
severe judgments on those commanders Avho mef Avith
reverses. I was not embraced in the terms of General Lee's surrender
or that of General .Johnston, and, as the order relicA-ing me
from command had also relieved me from all embarrassment
HS to the troops which had been under mc, as soon as I Avas in
a condition to travel, I started on horseback to the Trans-Mis
sissippi Department, to join the army of General Kirby Smith,
should it hold out ; with the hope of at least meeting an hon
orable death Avhile fighting under the flag of mj' country.
Before I reached tbat Department, Smith's army had also been
surrendered, and, Avithout giving a parole or incurring any
obligation Avhatever to the United States authorities, after a
long, weary and dangerous ride from Virginia, through the
States of Nortli Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, Arkansas and Texas, I fiually succeeded in leaving
the country; a voluntary exile rather than submit to the rule
of our enemies. J. A. EARIjY.

APPENDIX

LETTER FROM GENERAL LEE.
\>
"Hd.-QeS., C. S. AEMIE3,
"SOtU March, 186^.
" Lt.-Generai, j. a. Eakly, Franklin Co., 'Ta.
"Qesebal, — My telegram will have informed you that I deem a change of
Commanders in your Department necessary ; but it is due to your zealous and
patriotic services that I should explain the reasons that prompted my actioii. The
situation of affairs is such that we can neglect no means calculated to develop the
resources we possess to the greatest extent, and make them as efficient as possible.
To this end, it is essential that we should have the cheerful and hearty suppoirt of '
the people, and the full confidence of the soldiers, without which our efforts would
be embarrassed and our means of resistance weakened. I have reluctantly arrived
at the conclusion that yon cannot command the united and willing co-operation
which is so essential to success. Your reverses in the Valley, of which the public
and the army judge chiefly by the results, have, I fear, impaired your influeude
both with the people and the soldiers, and, would add greatly to the difficulties
which will, under any circumstances, attend our military operations in S, W. Vir
ginia. While my own confidence in your ability, zeal, and devotion to tho cause
is unimpaired, I have nevertheless felt that I could not oppbse what seems to be
the current of opinion, without injustice to your reputation and injury to the ser
vice. I therefore felt constrained to endeavor to find a commander who would be
more likely to develop the strength and resources of the country, and inspire the
soldiers with confidence; and, to accomplish this purpose, I thought it proper to
yield my own opinion, and to defer to tiiat of those to whom alone we can look
for support.
I am sure that you will understand and, appreciate my motives, and no one will
be more ready than yourself to acquiesce in any measures which the interests of
the country may seem to require, regar^dless of all' persoual considerations.
Thanking you for the fidelity and energy with which you have always supported
my efforts, and for the courage aiid devotion yon have ever rnanifested in tlie ser
vice of the country, I am, very respectfully and truly,
Your ob't serv't, R. E. LEE, Gen'l."

Since the foregoing narrative was written, I have seen, in a newspaper pub
lished in the United States, the following communication : —

132 APPENDIX. "PId.-Qrs., Battalios U. S. Ikfantet,
"Camp near Lynchburg, Va.,
" Feh. 7. 1866.
"C. \y. BuTTOS, Esq., FAitor Lynchburg Virginian.
" Sib, — I have received a communication from the War Department, Adjutant-
General's Office, relative toji newspaper slip, containing a copy of General Lee's
letter to General Early, on removing him from command. The letter is dated
Headquarters C. S. Armies, March 30, addressed" to Lieut,-Gen. Early, Franklin
C. H., Virginia, and is said to be in your possession, it having appeared in your
paper. The Secretary of War considers that the original letter properly belonge
to the Archive office.
" I am directed by Major-General Terry, commanding this Department^ to pro
cure said letter, and I therefore call your attention to the matter, and request that
you deliver to me the original letter in your possession, in compliance with my
instructions, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. E. LATIMER,
Brevet Major and Captain llth U. S! Infantry,
Commanding Post.''
This demand for General Lee'^ private letter to lae, and the attempt to. enforce
it by military power, sliow hoAV wide has been the dep,artnre from the original
principles of the United States Government, and to what petty and contemptible
measures that Government, as at present administered, resorts in domineering
over a disarmed and helpless people. I have the pleasure of informing the
Hon. Secretary of War, and the keeper pf the "Archive Office," that the original
letter is in my possession, beyond the reach of provost ra.arshals and agents of the
Freedmen's Bureau, or even Holt with his Bureau of Military Justice and his
suborners of perjury.

STATISTICS SHOWIKO THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE TWO
SECTIONS DURING THE WAR.
The census of the United States for 1860 showed an aggregate free population
of 27,185,100 ; of this, 4S8,28S were free blacks, of which the larger proportion
wore in the Southern States ; but it is not necessary to consider that element in
this estimate, though to do so would make it raore favorable for the Confederate
States. Ofthe above 27,185,109 of free population, there were in the States form
ing the Southern Confederacy, as follows :
Alabama  529 ig^
Arkansas  32^ 333
I'lofiJa  Tsicsc
"Georgia  .•.  695,097
Kentucky  030,223
Louisiana  370,913
Mississippi  „  3M,C00

APPENDIX. 133
Missouri  1,063,852
North Carolina  0aii686
South Carolina  ,.  ,..,  ,  301,271
Tennessee... —  ,.  S3j, oc3
Texas.,  420, 661
Vii^inia  1,106,190
Aggregate  7,670,224
Kentucky undertook to a^ume a neutral position, but she was sdbn overrun by
Federal troops, and her government and a very large proportion of her populac ¦
tion took sides with the North. Those of her citizens who were not aweii by Fed-,
eral bayonets, formed a State government and joined the Confederacy^masy-of
her young men going into the Confederate army ; but, in fact, whatever may
have been the sympathies of the people, her moral influence aa well as the benefit
of her physical strength were given to the Federal Governinent. The legiti'mate
Qovernment of Missouri sided with the South, as very probably did the majority
of her people, bnt she was also overrun at a very early stage of the war by' Eede-
eral troops, andl^er legitimate Government subverted by force; andthe benefit of
her resources and physical strength was likewise given to the United States, not
withstanding the fact that a large number of her men joined the Qonfederate
army. Terhaps the number of men added to the strength of the Confederate, army
from Kentucky and Missouri did not exceed the accession to the Federal army
from Western Virginia, Eastern Tennessee, and some other of the Southern SJates,,
and that, in estimating the relative stoength of the two parties at the beginniitg,'
it would be proper to reject Kentucky and Missouri from the e^siimate of the Con
federate strength. The free population of these two Stat^ amounted to 1,988,575,
and without them there would be left on the Confederate side, a free populp,tion of.
5,581,649 against a similar population of 21 ,603,460 on the Federal side, which
would make the odds against us very nearly four to one. But I will divide the-
popnlation of these Stat«s equally between the parties, and this will gike a free
popolation of 6,575,937 Confederates, against a similar population of 20,609,172
Federals, which makes the odds more than three to one against us in the begiHi-',
ning, without considering the fact that the Northern people had possession of the
Government, with the army and navy and alf the resources of that Government^
while the Confederate States had to organize a new government, and providg,an,
army and tlie means of supplying it with arms as well as everything else. Notr
withstanding this immense odds against us, I pi-esume there is scarcely a Confed-
j erafe, even now, who does not feel confident that if it had been "handS off and a
lair fight," we would have prevailed ; but an immense horde of foreign mefeena-
ries, incited by high bounties and the hope of plunder held out to them,Jl||fi3|ed*!to
the Federal army; and thus was its size continually growing, while the Confede
rate army had to .rely on the original population to keep up its strength. Any
accession of troops from Maryland was moro than counterbalanced by those
obtainedirom Western Virginia by the Federals, without counting East Tennes
see or other quarters. The Federal Government was not satisfied with recruiting
its army from abroad, but, as the country was overrun, the southern BegroeB were
forced into its service, and thus, by the aid of its foreign jBeroenariea;.a9|ffee„
aegro recruits, it was enabled finally to exhaust the Confederate army. \ '¦' '¦
* To show the immense strength of tha Federal army, the following extracts are

134 APPENDIX.
taken from the rsport of the Federal Secretary of War, Stanton, which was sent
to the Congress at its session beginning on the first Monday in December, 1865.
In that report he says :
" Official reports show that on the 1st of May, 1864, the aggregate national mil
itary force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred and seventy thousand
seven hundred and ten, to-wit:
Available force present for duty  C62,.345
Ou detached service in the diflferent military departments  109,348
In field hospitals or unfit for duty  41,266
In general hospitals or on sick leave at home  75,978
Absent ou furlough or as prisoners of war  66,290
Ab.sent without leave  15, 481
Grand aggregate  970,710
" The aggregate available force present for duty May 1st, 1864, was distributed
in the different commands as follows :—
Department of Washington  42,124
Army of the Potomac  .' 120,380
Department of Virginia and North Carolina  59,133
Pepartment of the South  18, 165
Department of the Gulf.  61,866
Department of Arkansas  23,060
Department of the Tennessee  74,174
Department of the Missouri  15,770
Department of the North- West  5,295
Department of Kansas  4,798
Head-quarters Military Division of the Mississippi  470
Department of the Cumberland  119,943
Department of the Ohio  35,416
iVortheru Department  9,540
Department of West Virginia  30,782
Department of the East  2,828
Department of tha Susquehanna  2,970
Middle Department  5,027
Ninth Army Corps  20,780
Department of New Mexico  3. isi
Department of the Pacific  5 141
, Total  082,345"
And again : —
"Official reports show that on the 1st of March, 1865, the aggregate militarv
force of all arms, officers aud men, was nine hundred and sixty-five thousand five
hundred aud ninety-one, to-wit: —
Available force present for duty  602,598
On detached service in the different military departments  132. 538
Infield hospitals and unfit for duty  35.628
In general hospitals or on siek leave  143,419
Absent on furlough eras prisoners of vpar  31 (595
Ab.sent without leave  jg 553
Grand aggregate  905,591
"This force was augmented on the 1st of May, 1865, by enlistments, to the
number of one million five hundred and sixteen, of all arms, officers and men
(1,000,516)."

APPENDIX. 1S5
And again he says : —
"The aggregate quotas charged against the several Slates under all
calls made by the President of the United States, fi'om tho 15th
day of April, 1861, to tho 14th day of April, 1865, at which time draft
ing and recruiting ceased, was  2,769,049
"The aggregate number of men credited ou tho several calls, and put
into service ofthe Tuited Stau\-i, in the army, navy, and marine
corps, during the above period, was  2, 6,56, 603
"Leaving a deficiency on all calls, when the war closed, of.  102,596"
This does not include that portion of tho Federal forces consisting of the regular
army, and tlie negro troops raised in the Southern States ; which were not raised
by calls on the States, It is impossible for me to state the number of troops
called into the service of the Confederate Government during the war, as all its
records fell into the hands of the United St-ates authorities, or were destroyed, but
I think Ican safely assert that the "available force present for duty" in the Fede
ral army, at the beginning or close of the last year ofthe war, exceeded the entire
force called into the Confederate service during the whole war ; and when it is con
sidered that the troops called into the United States service during that time, num
bered more than one-third of the entire free population of the Confederate States,
men, women, and children, the world can appreciate the profound ability of the
leaders, and the great heroism of the soldiers, of that army which finally over
came the Confederate army, by the " mere attrition " of numbers, after a prolonged
struggle of four years. They can be excelled only by the magnanimity of the
conquerors.

GOTTEN T S

CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA FROM THE RAPIDAN TO JAMES RIVER.

Introduction  13
Battles of the Wilderness — Operations of Early's Division  16
Battles of Spotsylvania Court House — Operations of Hill's Corps  22
Hanover Junction — Operations of Early's Division  28
Battles of Cold Harbour — Operations of EweU's Corps  29
CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA,
Introduction  35
March to Lynchburg and Pursuit of Hunter  40
March down the Valley and Operations in the Lower "\'all€y and Maryland.. 48
Battle of Monocacy  54
Operations in front of Washington and recrossing the Potomac  56
Return to the Valley and Operations there  62
Battle of Kernstown  65
Expedition into Maryland and Pennsylvania — Burning of Chambersburg  66
Retreat to Fisher's Hill xtnd subsequent Operations until the Battle of Win
chester  71
Battle of Winchester  i  84
Affair at Fisher's Hill  02
Retreat up the Valley and Operations until the Battle of Cedar Creek  95
Battle of Cedar Creek or Belle Grove  9P
Close ofthe Valley Campaign  '.  114
Operations in 1865  121
Conclusion  129
APPENDIX,
A. Letter frora General Lee  131'
B. Statistics showing the relative sti-ength of the two Sections during the War.. 133

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