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HENRY FOX
FIRST LORD HOLLAND

A STUDY OF THE CAREER OF
AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY POLITICIAN

THAD W. RIKER, M.A„ B.Litt. Oxok

VOL. I

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1911

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
rUBLISHER TO THE UNIVEESITY Or OXFORD
LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW Y'ORK
TOEONTO AND MELBOURNE

CONTENTS OF VOL. I PAGE
INTRODUCTION  13

CHAPTER I
Rival Lieutenants . ... 27
CHAPTER II
The Cumberland Party  84
CHAPTER III
Perfidy and Revenge  1.57
CHAPTER IV
The Ministry- and the War Party . 22.5
CHAPTER V
Subsidies and Recruiting . 295
CHAPTER VI
Secretary of State . . .'UU

A2

PREFATORY NOTE
A FEW words may not be amiss on the authorities
upon which this work is based, as well as its general
purpose, arrangement, and method of treatment.
Some difficulties have to be faced in any attempt
to draw an accurate sketch of Henry Fox. Apart
from his published memoirs (covering the first few
years of George Ill's reign) and some scattered
letters from various sources, we have few of his
own writings on which to base our judgement of his
character and career. The chief source for a study
of Fox (apart from such of his own writings as we
have) must still be the unpublished papers belong
ing to the Duke of Newcastle, which bring one
closely in touch with the politics of the time, and
especially with that ministry with which Fox was
so closely identified. Next in importance are
Walpole's Memoirs of the Reign of George II, which
give us our principal information relating to Fox's
career under Pelham, and his activity in Parliament,
both then and later. One is thus compelled too
often to look at Fox through the spectacles of
his enemies, for in this number must Walpole

6 PREFATORY NOTE
be included before he completed his narrative.
Incidentally I may say that in his earlier memoirs
he treats Fox (unlike many others) with com
parative fairness, but in the Memoirs of the Reign
of George III he certainly does not, and I have
decided to regard his later testimony as doubtful,
unless it can bear the test of comparison with
other authorities. A less important but far more
trustworthy authority is Lord Waldegrave, who
gives us in his Memoirs much information of
a political nature. Added to this, we have the
published correspondence of Chatham, Walpole,
Lyttelton, Chesterfield and the Grenvilles respec
tively, for occasional material not elsewhere found.
One of the most valuable sources of information
as giving us Fox's expressed attitude on matters
of policy and his own version of different events is
the Diary of Bubb Doddington ; and since many, if
not most, of his important entries are substantially
confirmed by other sources, I have come to regard
him as a remarkably accurate witness. The pub-
hshed letters of Fox (to which I have alluded) are
to be found chiefly in the Bedford Correspondence,
the Devonshire Papers quoted extensively in
Torrens's History of British Cabinets, the Dighy
Papers in the eighth report of the Historical Manu
scripts Commission, the appendices to Walpole's

PREFATORY NOTE 7
and Waldegrave's Memoirs respectively, the selec
tions from the H anbury Papers published in Coxe's
Memoirs of Lord Walpole, and some letters from
the Lansdowne Papers in Fitzmaurice's Life of
Shelburne, — the latter being (together with Fox's
own Memoirs) our chief authority for the events
of his life during the years 1761-3. There are two
small unpublished collections of letters in the
British Museum addressed to his friends Williams
and CoUinson respectively, and I have also found
an important letter (only part of which has been
printed) in the Coxe collection in the British
Museum. His Foreign Office dispatches are, of
course, in the Public Record Office.
For the general background of the work my
chief sources have been Coxe's Pelham Administra
tion for the period with which it deals, and the
Newcastle and Hardwicke Papers respectively for
the later years with which the work is concerned.
A few words regarding Fox's own Memoirs may
not be out of place. Whereas it is true that his
judgements of men and of movements must some
times be treated with caution, the facts which he
gives us nearly always bear the test of comparison
with the Newcastle Papers and with the contem
porary evidence in Fitzmaurice's Life of Shelburne.
It is to be regretted that Fox gives us no account of

,8 PREFATORY NOTE
his work for the Peace in 1762, since our sources
(based either upon Walpole or the Newcastles) are
usually to his prejudice, and we cannot properly
test them. Perhaps more unfortunate for our pur
pose is the almost entire lack of information upon
his career under Sir Robert Walpole.
Of secondary authorities I am chiefly indebted
to Dr. von Ruville, who gives us, in my opinion,
a clear and generally accurate portrayal of the
elder Pitt, and to M. Waddington, who tells almost
all that one need know of the diplomatic negotia
tions in the years 1754-6. Lastly, I must pay
my tribute to Lecky's great work, which must
always remain of the highest value in depicting
the ' spirit ' of the eighteenth century.
I should like here to acknowledge my indebted
ness to Prof. E. A. Smith, of Princeton University,
for his kindness in allowing me to utilize his
transcripts of Mirepoix's letters, and to Mr. J. A.
Herbert, of the British Museum, for his unfailing
courtesy and helpful attention while I was engaged
in the work of research in the manuscript room.
I am also indebted to Miss Clara W. Bragg, of
Columbia Library, and to Mr. Henry Hinds and
many other good friends, for their valued assist
ance in various features of the work ; and above
all to Mr. Grant Robertson, of AU Souls College,

PREFATORY NOTE 9
Oxford, for his helpful criticism and advice through
out the undertaking. I cannot hope that the book
may not reveal many blemishes of one sort or
another, but without his careful perusal I should
certainly have overlooked much that required
modification. Finally I wish to take this oppor
tunity of expressing my gratitude to Dr. William
Hunt for a few words of encouragement that will
never be forgotten.
So far as arrangement is concerned, I may say
that I deemed it advisable, in view of the occasional
complexity of political motives and movements, not
to subject myself invariably to a strict chronological
order in the planning of consecutive chapters ;
yet I have always desired to keep the reader
conscious of the general inter-relationship of coin
cident movements treated topically as separate.
The Introduction to a study of politics might have
been lengthened out indefinitely, and the tempta
tion to discuss the origin and evolution of a
system of corruption has naturally been a strong
one ; but some discrimination had obviously to be
made, and accordingly the Introduction is but a
preliminary survey and a study of certain aspects of
the period as a whole. The two opening chapters
are also more or less introductory ; yet we must
needs trace the rise of Fox to prominence as well as

10 PREFATORY NOTE
treat of the condition of parties during the Pelham
Administration. It is not, as we shall see, until
1754 that Fox reaches his political maturity ;
while the terminating point in his pubhc career
is his definite retirement in 1763. It has been my
intention that his social hfe and later years should
lie outside the present work, since without his
private papers little can be added to what Sir
George Trevelyan has so admirably given us in his
little volume. The Early History of Charles James
Fox. Still, in order that the reader, after finishing
the pages devoted to his career, may obtain some
impression of the brighter side of the man's
character, I have added a final chapter dealing
with the subjects just mentioned, as weU as pre
senting an effort to form some definite conclusions
regarding his career as a whole.
Since Fox was primarily a politician, this
biography has been essentially a history of politics
during the period in which his active career is
comprised, and my purpose has been to deal with |
the subject, in a measure, from the standpoint of
political parties, and especially factions within those i
parties. Whereas I have always desired that Fox
should be the central figure of the picture which
I have drawn, I have tried also to depict the 4
various administrations in which he was concerned

PREFATORY NOTE 11
as I conceive them ; and more especially the
character and policy of his three prominent
contemporaries, — Newcastle, Pitt and Bute. It
has thus been my endeavour, in a general way, to
analyse the character and development of the
Newcastle ascendancy, to note the contrast pre
sented by the short supremacy of Pitt which
followed, and to trace from the beginning the
influence and power of Bute. But the chief motif
of the picture I have always intended to be Fox
himself — his particular qualities, his work, his
party, his place in the history of the period, and
the reasons why he never attained to greatness.
The ' inner mysteries ' of the War and Pay Offices
are well worthy of future treatment, but until
the Holland House papers are published it will
be hardly possible to give a proper exposition of
these features of his activity, and so I have dwelt
but briefly upon the subject. Party-management
— whether in parliamentary debate or ' practical
politics ' — must inevitably be the central theme
of a study of Fox's career.
A study of Henry Fox is justified, I think, on three
main grounds — first because it gives us an insight
into the character and importance of politics during
his time, secondly by reason of his well-known
rivalry with the elder Pitt (a rivalry duplicated in

12 PREFATORY NOTE
the second generation), and thirdly because he
happens to be the father of one of the world's most
illustrious statesmen. To make a hero of Fox
would be virtually impossible, and I certainly have
no desire to do so. But the only way to present
him fairly before the bar of History is to depict
the politics and political methods of his age ;
and this has been my endeavour — at the risk
sometimes of being tedious and diffuse. Pitt once
called Fox ' the blackest man that he ever knew '.
If I have shown that he was actually no ' blacker '
than most of his contemporaries (when they got
the chance), but was simply more successful in
a system of politics that was ' black ', I shall have
accomplished all that Fox deserves by way ofi
rehabilitation. Others have already done justice
to his abilities.
T. W. R.

INTRODUCTION
It has been the privilege — or the misfortune —
of three of the great nations of Europe to attain in
' the course of their history a degree of ascendancy
that has been dangerous to the civilized world.
' Spain in the sixteenth century, and France in the
, seventeenth (and again in the late eighteenth and
' early nineteenth) have exhibited that common ideal
of patriotism which, when pursued with extraordi
nary success, has been regardless of the rights and
feelings of nations, and in the end has reacted
painfully upon the object of its being. The fact
that there was no limit (other things being equal)
to the extension of a nation's power was to a large
degree the result of the absolute want of morality
in international relations. Each nation may be
said to have had such a code unto itself, which
(however we may determine its pecuhar advantages)
was scarcely to be regarded as other than its own
selfish interests or the interests of its dynasty.
Moreover, France and Spain had each, in its early
ascendancy, thriven on its contempt for popular
rights. The claims of individuals were for long an
unfelt element. It was England who of aU great
modern states was first to feel that the soul of
a nation's polity existed elsewhere than in the
Crown. Herein, we may say, lies the fundamental

14 HENRY FOX
reason why the upward march of England in the
eighteenth century differed widely in aims and
character from the rise and progress of the other
two states. And yet the lesson is very much the
same, and the results are in many respects compar
able. Indeed, both in motive and in object, the
ascendancy of England was quite as perilous to the
world as the aggressiveness of Louis or the intrusive-i
ness of Philip. It was the result partly of somef
conception of democracy and partly of a conscious-j
ness of insularity that England steadily acquired!
her means of enforcing a maritime tjrranny. Com-I
mercial interests dictated an arrogant imperiahsm.;
On the one hand, no dynasty in England was
allowed to compete for the primacy in Europe ;
on the other hand, no rival existed sufficiently
strong or far-sighted to be able to chaUenge her
sovereignty of the seas. If it is true that France
and Spain had disturbed the balance of power in
Europe, it is equally true that Great Britain
disturbed the balance of power in the world.
But here again a policy, both aggressive and
triumphant, reacted painfully upon the interests
of the nation which pursued it. The victories of
Marlborough had opened the way to future great
ness. The installation of George I had made the
policy of the nation practicable. Both at home
and abroad the Whigs' commercialism was un
scathed; for the tyranny of France was ended and
the power of the Tories broken. Hence the minds
of Englishmen were turned from the problems

INTRODUCTION 15
of domestic statesmanship, and they settled them
selves down to a period of selfish materialism.
It would seem as though the Revolution had in
their minds sufficiently vindicated their claims to
the right of self-government. The peaceful torpor
of the reigns of the first two Georges presents an
interesting contrast to the conflicts over measures
in the reigns of William and Anne. It was the
existence of two strong parties which had made
such struggles possible ; and the novelty of a
recent revolution had developed an ardour for
legislating. But as soon as the Whigs had
released themselves from vigorous competition,
they were content to bask in the sunlight of the
rising commercial state. The fear of a reaction
was but slight when their policy itself was so
profitable. And so, while Chatham humbled
France and raised the standard of imperialism, the
Liberalism of England was stunted in its infancy.
It is perhaps in England that we see the indolent
spirit of the eighteenth century most interestingly
typified. Too often has a struggle for wealth
crowned with material prosperity had an enervating
effect upon the better nature of men. Such had
been the misfortune of the Whig Party in England.
Not only were they fortified by an insidious system
of corruption, but they represented (broadly speak
ing) a plutocratic oligarchy, which suffered no inno
vation, however salutary, to hamper their primacy
or jeopardize their interests. Since, moreover, they
held sway over the Commons (from 1688 the centre

16 HENRY FOX
of authority), neither king nor minister was suffered
to pursue a policy that was not acceptable to the
commercial hierarchy. Thus the despotism of
a party had in a sense supplanted the despotism
of the Crown.
In many respects there is little doubt but that
the nation benefited ; but there were several
classes that suffered, and there were dangerous
forces to be wrestled with — the more dangerous in
proportion as time lent them strength. We have
dwelt on one aspect of a maritime tjTanny, and we
shall study hereafter the effects of corruption.
Since the cynicism, the selfishness, and the almost
entire absence of principle on the part of most
public men were both the cause and the reflection
of the political system in vogue, it would certainly
have been strange if the output were other than
frequently selfish and brutal. Hence we may note
(as a few examples of this evil) the rehgious and
economic persecution of the Irish ; the various '
disabilities of Nonconformists, Jews, and foreign
Protestants ; the t5T:annical treatment of Atter-
bury and Murray ; the obstinate maintenance of
septennial parliaments; the diplomatic coercion of
Austria; and the naval aggression against France.
CommerciaUy or politically these measures might
be justified, but the motives behind them were none
the less selfish.
And yet, notwithstanding abuses of power, we
must bear in mind that the tyranny of England's
commercial system is hardly more to be reprehended

INTRODUCTION 17
in its way than the corrupt and despotic govern
ment of France, or the semi-feudal decadence of
the Empire. England was still the most prosperous
and enlightened country of Europe, far in advance
of her rivals in solving the problems of government,
of justice and of finance. It was the misfortune
and stigma of England that after going to such
lengths with the problems of statesmanship she
should have deliberately decided to pause in her
work. Where everything depends upon a system
of politics corrupt to the core, and no opposition
exists with sufficient force or integrity to rouse
public sentiment to appreciate these conditions —
where, finally, there is an almost invincible organi
zation with men at the head who are guided by
nothing but the interest of the party that made
them, we have practically the regime of an indo
lent and unprogressive oligarchy. It is scarcely
improved when one man, shrewd in his perception
of the means of keeping his grip on the power he
has amassed, is able to determine the policy of
the Government. In such a system as we have
outlined reform is virtually impossible.
Walpole was in many respects a benevolent
despot. He did not labour, it is true, to remedy
existing abuses, and it is probable that he left
politics worse than he found them. But with all
his callous indifference and want of moral con
ceptions, Walpole carried through a programme
that enormously benefited both party and country.
The groundwork of his policy was simple in the
U5G -R

18 HENRY FOX
extreme: he avoided aU risk of disturbance at
home and abroad, and gave the nation every chance
to utiHze its natural channels of wealth. The
result was a period of great national prosperity.
It meant peace, but not an ignoble peace ; the
means of strength without the employment of
them ; and the concentration of energies without
the abuse of them. Gradually, it may be said,
the foundations were laid of Chatham's world-wide
imperiahsm. But Walpole had enemies to whom his ascend
ancy was a barrier. While he did no more than
appease the appetite of plutocrats, it was almost
impossible to dislodge him ; but let him commit
one political indiscretion and his enemies would
find an interest in undermining his power. It was
Walpole's poUcy to suffer no resistance. But to
agree with him was only to bask in the shadow of
his greatness. Hence, the struggle of individualism
against monopoly.
We need not trace the steps which led to the
great Minister's fall. Once the Opposition had
gained the weapon of pubhc sentiment, the power
of Walpole was fataUy shattered. The rivals
whom he had feared were unreconciled to ex
clusion ; while the nation which he had benefited
was weary of a period of flourishing stagnation,
and yearned to try the strength which the Minister
had given it. And so, little by little, the great
structure collapsed. It then became the duty of
the victors to prove their right to the spoils.

INTRODUCTION 19
Who, then, were the men who led the Opposition
to victory ? First, there was Newcastle, Walpole's
trusted subaltern, who had intrigued against his
chief in the days of his decline. Next, there was
Pulteney, the eloquent orator, who looked only for
revenge, and had scorned all emoluments. Thirdly,
there was Carteret, briUiant but erratic, whose diplo
matic talents had roused Walpole's distrust. Finally
there was Pitt, who, with Lyttelton and others, had
whipped up the nation's enthusiasm for war. Such
were the men who were now caUed upon to act.
But a process of elimination was at once to take
place. Pulteney suddenly bartered his popularity
for a peerage and was granted the earldom of Bath ;
while Pitt and his little party proved unacceptable
to the others, and were hated by the King. This
left the field open between Carteret and Newcastle.
The one had talent, the other experience, and each
possessed a portfolio as Secretary of State ; while
the Duke's younger brother, Henry Pelham, who
had kept himself clear of the conspiracy against
Walpole, would accept nothing as yet but the Pay
Office. For the Treasury was selected the in
offensive Lord Wilmington — a significant reaction
after the reign of an over-powerful First Minister.
It was a foregone conclusion that Walpole's
policy would be reversed — in fact it had been so
already. The war with Spain, which Walpole's
tact might possibly have averted, had become
suddenly absorbed into the more extensive and
more serious war between Austria and her plunder-
B2

20 HENRY FOX
ing neighbours ; and here at last was Carteret's
golden opportunity.
There is no doubt but that the new guide of
England's foreign pohcy was a man of extra
ordinary gifts. In intellectual training, shrewdness
of conception, and diplomatic boldness, he was
perhaps unsurpassed by any of his age. But
Carteret's great weakness was his lack of that very
weapon which his less able but more methodical
rival possessed ; he held no pohtical strength of
his own. Despising the drudgery of the manifold
details, which the times rendered necessary if the
broader results were to be attained, he had taken
no pains to cement the allegiance of his colleagues
or gain the semblance of a party, while he steadily
ignored aU authority but the King. The history of
the last ten years should have led him to respect
the sensitive seK-complacency of Newcastle. In
that oversight lay the veto of his projects and the
termination of his lease of power.
It was accordingly a struggle between the per
sonahty of Carteret backed by the royal favour,
and the power of Newcastle founded upon a
large parhamentary following and assisted by the
sentiment of the nation, now easily induced to
beheve that British interests were being sacrificed
to Hanover and Vienna. In such a state of affairs
— especially considering the importance which
politics possessed in the eighteenth century —
there was scarcely any question which force would
prevail. In July 1743 Lord Wilmington was sue-

INTRODUCTION 21
ceeded by Pelham as First Lord of the Treasury.
An attempt on the part of Carteret to set up his
old associate. Lord Bath, had met with complete
failure. Thereafter it was only a question of time
when the briUiant diplomatist would be forced to
capitulate ; and when at last every resource had
been tried, and tried in vain, Lord Carteret yielded
up the Seals (November 23, 1744).
The foreign poUcy of Carteret (who became Earl
Granville in that same year) cannot be expounded
here in detail. It was rigidly continental, and,
in consequence, reactionary. Whilst the proper and
traditional influence in determining the Govern
ment's foreign policy was the nation's commercial
interest, the trend of Carteret's policy lay entirely
in the direction of a system of foreign alhances.
And herein lay the best pohtical capital for his
enemies. Without doubt the real enemy of Car
teret was France, and Austria was but a stepping-
stone for the attainment of his ends ; but the King
had other interests, and the King was aU the
backing upon which Carteret could depend. Thus
the secondary — and yet very important— influence
in shaping British foreign pohcy was the security
of the Electorate of Hanover. When the Whigs
engaged the Elector to come over and become their
sovereign and guarantee their constitution against
the legitimist dynasty, the price of that bargaui —
at least tacitly admitted — was the guardianship
of Hanover ; and if, moreover, the Whigs thus
confirmed their ascendancy by aUiance with this

22 HENRY FOX
coUateral branch of the old royal house, the Elec
torate was certainly entitled to some measure of
regard. Walpole would have let this (as weU as
other contentious questions) remain dormant ; and
while it is hardly correct to say that he was for
peace at any price, he was thoroughly aware that
the interests of trade were the primary consideration,
and that peace was essential. It was for this reason
that the Austro-Hanoverian policy of Carteret, with
its hopes and its entanglements, showed unmistak
able signs of a reaction. The two men regarded
even the alliance with Vienna from whoUy different
standpoints. Moreover, while it is true that the
formation of a continental ' system ' financed by
Great Britain was but an imitation of Townshend's
policy in 1725-7, the magnum onus in such a pohcy
was the task of persuading the Commons to vote
the necessary grants, since the Minister was working
ostensibly in the interest of the Elector of Hanover.
The political capital for his enemies is obvious.
No doubt the task of trimming between Crown
and Parliament would alone have been considerably
perplexing to Carteret, but when we consider also
his lack of political support, it is clear that no
chance of his maintaining himself was possible. In
the present instance jealousy was probably the
moving factor and a hostile organization precipi
tated his ruin.
Thus the real cause of Carteret's downfaU was
not merely his alleged neglect of maritime interests
in favour of Hanover. The case is, rather, a singu-

INTRODUCTION 23
larly striking example of the importance of political
power in the middle of the eighteenth century.
Organized on a custom of profuse and systematic
bribery, and fortified by a seven years' tenure,
the House of Commons might defy a statesman
as long as it willed, unless he were the one who
actuaUy controlled its prerogatives. By the force
of obligation, the purchase of votes, and the several
evils of the existing electoral system, it was hardly
a difficult matter for a preponderance of boroughs
to slide under the control of one politician or one
political interest. Similarly the Cabinet, which
had thriven under the Whigs' dynastic policy, was
equaUy submissive to the dominant interest — the
fountain whence sprang aU official success. The
one thing to dread was, of course, public sentiment,
but unhappily that force is notoriously patient.
In the case of Carteret, who lacked both of these
important supports, failure could only be doubly
inevitable. Walpole is regarded as the arch-
organizer of corruption, and his vicious system
was passed on to be pursued with equal success by
his heir and nominee, Henry Pelham, and by the
latter's brother, the Duke of Newcastle.
The man who succeeded Wilmington at the
Treasury and Walpole in parhamentary manage
ment was an odd composition of strength and
weakness. To read him correctly one must reahze
that the keynote of Pelham's pohcy was concihation.
It was for this that he overlooked the shortcommgs
of coUeagues, acquiesced in the wiU of his brother.

24 HENRY FOX
and submitted to rather than educated public
sentiment. Yet probably no one was more
eminently fitted to weld together the atoms of
party and faction than this man of quiet dignity
and timid caution.
InteUectuaUy the First Minister was neither
brilliant nor versatile. Though a capable financier,
he showed a lamentable ignorance of foreign affairs,
and he was both too deeply a pohtician and too
little of a statesman — in the ideahstic sense — ever
to become a successful reformer. In the House of
Commons he was particularly efficient — was a grave
but clear and forceful speaker, an accurate judge
of the temper of his audience, and tactful in his
dealings with its members. His learned biographer
has caUed his ' knowledge, more useful than
extensive ; his understanding more sohd than
brUliant '. In toto Henry Pelham was a Minister
who woxdd ensure the nation against a fatal
retrogression or an egregious error ; and impress
temporary stability by a pohcy of pacification.
The Duke of Newcastle had at the same time
more force and more weakness than his brother.
His crowning fault, a lust of power, suffered no
man (if weaker) to thwart his wUl, whUe his pre
conceived notions of the correctness of a policy
were fatal ahke to the nation and to himseU.
Moreover the impulse of fear could drive him many
lengths beyond PeUiam's limit in concession, whUe
on the other hand it might lead him into violence
never contemplated by the calmer brother.

INTRODUCTION 25
As politicians, each had his special merit which
supplemented the other's — Newcastle rather as an
organizer, Pelham as the tactful regulator. Very
early in his career the Duke had laid the foundations
of their parliamentary power, and though neither
possessed the finishing touch of Walpole — a mag
netic control — the Duke was fuUy his equal in
the pertinacity and skill of a corruptionist. The
structure which he was rearing under the very eye
of Walpole became the bulwark of his own and his
brother's future power ; and yet outside of it he
was politicaUy beneath contempt.
^ Neither may have been, in pohtics, unselfish ;
but Pelham could be loyal even to a f aUen Minister.
Newcastle, on the other hand, was aU his life true
to no one but himself — not even invariably true
to the one man whose cleverness could govern him,
and whose famUy, interest justified the necessary
patience. If Pelham's nature knew no treachery,
Newcastle had an appetite for intrigue that was
insatiable. His vanity — which always made him a
prey to flattery and over-confidence — was attended
by a temper that was irascible when crossed, and
seldom if ever inspired respect ; for he had neither
his brother's quiet dignity nor the latter's ambition
— secondary, if you will — to justify his high station.
NaturaUy his self-love made him enjoy the role of
patron, and such an office he could administer
inteUigently and well.
As a Minister, the Duke showed exemplary
industry ; in aU save politics was a man of honour ;

26 HENRY FOX
and revealed no trace throughout his long career
of any sordid desire to enrich himself. Outside of
his chosen sphere he was enhghtened, benevolent,
and, like Pelham again, moraUy upright. Perhaps
if his period of supremacy had been less fraught
with difficulties and dangers, the verdict of his
torians might have been other than what it is.
We have now considered briefly the political
world in the period preceding the Pelham Ad
ministration. The power of one man has given
way to the power of many, which, in turn, is
foUowed by a struggle between two factions,
resulting in the dual ascendancy of the Pelhams.
The work of destruction is at last completed. The
task for the brothers is now the moulding and
cementing which shaU form the constructive side
of their policy.

CHAPTER I
RIVAL LIEUTENANTS
' Fox you cannot do without.' Such was the
counsel given by Lord Orf ord ^ to his chosen
successor in a letter in which he dwelt upon the
value of certain men in the Commons ; ^ such in
fact may serve as our introduction to the great
party leader, who had until now impressed few
save the man who read his contemporaries so
accurately. Although his career might be said to
lie before him, Fox had long since passed the
halcyon days of youth. He was at this time in
his fortieth year, a man slightly above medium
height, thick-set without any of the stoutness
apparent in his later years, and graceful in his
posture and carriage. In colouring he was very
dark and of feature rather unpronounced ; but
a slightly projecting upper-lip seemed to indicate
a merry humour that might have come out when
bidden, and a pair of keen eyes gave character to a
face that was in most respects rather commonplace.
1 On his retirement from office Walpole was raised to the
House of Lords as Earl of Orford.
2 Orford to Pelham, August 25, 1743 : Coxe, Pdham Ad
ministration, I. 91. (The reader is asked to note that whenever
a letter is cited in evidence, reference is made to the page or
(in the case of MSS.) the folio on which the letter begins.)

28 HENRY FOX CH.
His father. Sir Stephen Fox, had been a man of
average intellect and more than average integrity.
The son of parents of humble extraction, he had
begun life, it is said, as a chorister, and ended it high
in the public esteem. Yet there was little that was
striking in his abilities, and he rose more by his
perseverance and quiet dignity than through any
display of conspicuous talent.
Evelyn writes of Fox's kindly and upright
character ; and his vote against the impeachment
of Clarendon showed the independence of his
political mind. It was Clarendon, indeed, who had
persuaded Charles II, while in exile, to place the
interests of his household under the inteUigent care
of Stephen Fox, and the latter had the honour to
be the first to announce to his royal patron that
the military despot no longer lived to keep him
from his heritage. But duty had its reward.
Before the year of the Restoration had elapsed
Fox was graciously appointed Paymaster-General
of His Majesty's forces — an office just created to
meet a pressing need. Five years later he was
knighted, and in 1679 he became a commissioner
of the Treasury.
All this, no doubt, gives us evidence of his
loyalty. In politics Fox was naturaUy of the creed
whence Tories sprang — a creed that was fittingly
exemphfied in the career of the minister Danby.
But perhaps the only blot upon an enviable
reputation was the discovery that he had corrupted
twenty-seven members of the House of Commons,

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 29
— at the instance (as we may deduce) of his master,
or possibly of Danby.' Fortunately this seems to
have counted for little in the easy political ethics
of the reign of Charles II.
Fox appeals to us as a man who made the most
of what was in him. A shrewd mind, a generous
heart, a certain measure of independence, and
a fidelity that comes of gratitude — such of his
qualities are worth remembering when we come
to study his son. But Sir Stephen was no leader ;
he had none of the parliamentary talent or political
ambition which distinguished his more famous
son and grandson. On the other hand, he never
showed himself a political opportunist ; it was
rather his tact and his sincerity that enabled him
to rise with credit and avoid disgrace throughout
a period of uncommon pitfaUs. He was, as Sir
George Trevelyan says, a favourite with four
monarchs and with twelve successive parliaments.
On the accession of James, Fox seems to have
preserved his reputation for loyalty without
sacriflcing his religious beliefs,* and was so far
successful in a difficult position that he remained
acceptable to the new regime that foUowed. Yet
it was characteristic of the man that he had refused
to unite in the measures against the King, ' whose
and his brother's bread he had so plentifuUy
' See Anchitel Grey's Debates of the House of Commons
(1667-94), VII. 315-24. The truth came out as the result of
a Parliamentary inquiry.
* Sir Stephen was offered a peerage on condition of becoming
a Catholic, but declined.

30 HENRY FOX ch.
eaten of.' ^ He continued to serve the Government
of WiUiam in spite of aU the shifts of politics ; and
it was not until the reign of Anne that he retired
into private life to enjoy the Uberal dispensing of
a wealth that no one grudged him.® Such, it
seems, was Fate's reward for prudence. In a time
when many men had played for greater stakes and
lost, Stephen Fox amassed a fortune from his
privileges as Paymaster.' Was it unnatural that
a son of his should foUow in his footsteps ?
Yet all Sir Stephen's labour and ingenuity seemed
vain, as no son of his had sons that might inherit
his great wealth. Being, however, ' unwilling that
so plentiful an estate should go out of his name,'
and being also ' of a vegete and hale constitution ',
Sir Stephen, when seventy-six, took to himself
I a second wife * — the daughter of a clergyman of
Lincolnshire, by whom he had four chUdren. The
5 Memoirs of the Life of Stephen Fox, Kt., p. 83.
^ Evelyn writes of his wealth as ' honestly got and unenvied,
which is a marvel '. In 1680 he estimated Fox's fortune at
£200,000.— ilfemotVs and Diary (ed. Bray, 1827), HI. 36.
' Fox gave his friend, Pepys, some account of the way he
gained his wealth. It seems that he advanced money on his
own private credit to pay the weekly w^ages of the army, on
condition of deducting a commission of one shilling in the
pound. Then, if at the end of four months the Government
was unable to pay its debt, the Paymaster received 8 per cent
on all the money owed him. — Pepys, Diary (ed. Wheatley),
VI. 126. Doubtless the chronic insolvency of Charles II was
responsible for such opportunities.
8 Christian Hopes was her name. A brief account of her
parentage, with correction of certain erroneous traditions, is
given in Chester, Westminster Abbey Registers, p. 262.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 31
younger of the two sons was Henry, born Septem
ber 28, 1705. Christian, the youngest daughter
and twin-sister to Henry, died in the foUowing
January as the result of a faU from a window.*
The other three chUdren, Stephen, Charlotte and
Henry, lived to enjoy the ' plentiful estate '.
Sir Stephen Fox died in 1716, and three years
later his good wife foUowed him. Almost the only
glimpse we have of Lady Fox is in the advice she
left her sons, — in the curious document stiU to be
read in Henry Fox's boyish hand.^*" ' Don't be
a fop, don't be a rake,' she counselled the elder.
' Mind on your name, Stephen Fox ; that I hope
wiU keep you from being wicked. You, Harry,
having a less fortune, won't be subject to so many
temptations ; but withstand those you have when
you grow up. Then you'U learn to swear, to rake
about, to game, and at last be ruined by those you
unhappily think your friends.' The mother could
not foresee that her younger son was the one to
encounter the greater temptations of a political life.
Henry Fox's birthplace was Chiswick, where his
father had built the villa in which he had ended
his days. Of his boyhood we know almost nothing,
save that he entered Eton in course of time, and
chance made him a pla3rfellow of Pitt, Lyttelton
and Hanbury Williams. Whether the great rivalry
that later became so prominent a factor in his
career had its beginnings on the banks of the placid
» Collins, Peerage, IV. 538.
1" Liechtenstein, Holland House, I. 41.

32 HENRY FOX ch,
stream at Windsor, is not for us to learn ; nor have
we any records of his proficiency in his studies,
save a reputation for classical knowledge " which
he shared with his rival. At the age of fifteen Fox
entered Oxford, matriculating at Christ Church,
February 20, 1721 ; ^^ but we know that he never
obtained a degree, and he is said to have left
Oxford in 1724.^' Doubtless we are safe in assum
ing that he had wasted his opportunities and faUen,
rapidly into debt. His nominal aUowance until he
came of age was £200 a year — with what additions
we do not know — but we are given to understand
that he squandered all he had, or at least aU he
could lay hands on. Our next record of Fox is
a journey to France, where he made the acquaint
tance of the Duchess of Portsmouth, sometime
mistress of Charles II. Just how or why he
obtained an entree into the lady's social circle is
unfortunately not told us, but Fox had very
winning ways — a trait which may be considered
in his case as both an advantage and a misfortune.
It is even said that she gave him freely of her
purse ; but at aU events an inherent passion for
gambling and a heedless disregard for morals in
1^ Liechtenstein, Holland House, I. 43. We find that Fox
used to indulge in a Latin correspondence with Lord Hervey.—
Hervey, Memoirs of George II (ed. Croker), I. xhx. As we may
gather from an anecdote of Shelburne's, Sir Robert Walpole
greatly envied Fox's avidity as a reader. — Fitzmaurice,
Life of Shelburne, I.
12 Alumni Oxonienses (ed. 1888), II. 487.
1^ Creasy, Memoirs of Eminent Etonians, p. 308.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 33
the capital of the light-hearted world had speedily
depleted his patrimony ; and in this situation he
returned to a home where unfortunately there had
been no older or wiser head to counsel him."
The prospects of Fox on his return were not very
encouraging, and, having remained by inheritance
a Tory, he met with signal defeat in his first effort
to secure a seat in the House of Commons.^^ Clearly
he was on the wrong side, as conditions then
existed in the political world. StiU, if it was
certain that his political fortunes were wofuUy in
need of material assistance, it was equaUy certain
that both taste and talent pointed the way to a
public career — if only he could convince the men
in power that his abilities were worth a trial. His
first duty, then, was to change his political creed
and become a Whig — a step which probably
involved but little hesitation on his part. His
elder brother, Stephen, had already become a
protege of the Ministry through his intimacy with
the dissolute but influential Lord Hervey, and in
1735 was temporarily designated for the position
of secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.^®
1* The facts about his sojourn in France are given us by
Creasy, p. 308, and Chesterfield's sketch of Fox, Chesterfield's
Letters (ed. Bradshaw), III. 1426.
15 He was elected and took his seat, but was thrown out as
the result of a petition. — Walpole, Memoirs of George II, 80.
1^ The idea was abandoned, as Lord Scarborough (whom
Fox was to serve) declined, in the end, to accept the post.
— Hervey, Memoirs of the Court of George II (ed. Croker),
II. 163-4.
U56 C

34 HENRY FOX ch.
Fox had, therefore, every inducement to attach
himself to the one party which could amply repay
his services ; whUe in the meantime his natural
attractiveness and facility for making friends
easily won him the useful companionship of such
men as Hervey and Thomas Winnington." And
so Fox drank with them and gamed with them and
patiently awaited an ' opening '. And it came at
last, in January 1733, in the shape of a subordinate
post under the Treasury — that of Receiver-General
of the Revenue for certain counties.^^
It is easy, of course, to point to this pohtical
conversion as Fox's first exhibition of indifference
to methods in the attainment of ends. Yet we can
hardly feel sure that he may not have been simply
throwing off an ancestral cloak which for obvious
reasons never fitted him.^* Certainly Fox was by
nature too independent — ^too lawless perhaps—
to remain a Tory by conviction ; and since
Toryism meant Jacobitism, it would clearly never
appeal to such a man as Henry Fox, who was
neither a visionary on the one hand nor an ideahst
on the other. But his action from another aspect
" Walpole tells us that on one occasion Pox served as
Hervey 's second in a duel. — Memoirs of George //, I. 81. See
below, note 26.
1^ Gentleman's Magazine for 1733, p. 48 ; London Magaziiie
ior 1733, p. 43.
1^ Sir George Trevelyan observes that certain rites in his
father's household were quite calculated to give him a distaste
for Toryism. See Russell, Memorials and Correspondence of
Charles James Fox, I, 4.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 35
was certainly political. It was perhaps the
connexion which Stephen Fox enjoyed with pro
minent supporters of the Administration — a bond
close enough to induce him to decline a bribe
from the Ministry's enemies ^" — that prevented the
younger brother from committing a blunder which
might have meant for him years of discontent
and unsatisfied ambition. Fox never, in fact,
attempted to curry favour with the factious
Prince of Wales. In other words, he attached
himself to the main body of Whigs which supported
Walpole, instead of following the path of dangerous
intimacy with the man who was at the same time the
heir of George II and the patron of the Opposition.
Here is where Fox and Pitt diverged at the
outset. The latter, together with George and
Richard Grenville and George Lyttelton, was
enjoying the patronage of Lord Cobham, who
held a high place in the ranks of the factious
minority of Whigs — the smaU but determined
foUowing of Frederick, Prince of Wales ; con
sequently, while Fox was serving Walpole, his
future rival was paying court to the Prince's mis
tress, Lady Hamilton.^^ Obviously such might
well have been a promising policy to pursue,
20 Stephen was offered the promise of a peerage by the Prince
of Wales on condition that he should abandon the Ministry ;
and Hervey made good use of his friend's refusal in recom
mending him to the King. — Hervey, Memoirs, III. 45.
-1 Autobiography of Shelburne, Fitzmaurice, Life of Shel
burne, I. 60.
02

36 HENRY FOX ch.
if the King's son had possessed the sUghtest sem
blance of integrity or talent ; but when we add
the fact that the usual scheme of advancement
depended upon a system of widespread corrup
tion, emanating from the men who possessed
the principal means with which to corrupt, we
can readily perceive that the man who followed
the usual course of place-hunters and ofl&ce-seekers
would be far more likely to succeed in the end
than he who sought to rise by methods less
conventional. Of course, it was one thing to
grasp at a sinecure, and quite another to rise to
a post of prominence. Yet here again Fox was
in no danger of courting faUure, for he seems
to have possessed intuitively a peculiar alertness
for observing opportunities. The fact that he once
chose the wrong leader in the course of his career
was due rather to cupidity of the moment than to
any lack of perception as to the wiser course to
follow. At the outset of his career Fox took no
chances. And so, not discouraged by present circum
stances, this young ne'er-do-weU appUed himself
dUigently to politics, and fostered an ambition
which soon came to the notice of Sir Robert
Walpole. With his keen, if sometimes cynical,
insight into human character, the great organizer
saw in Fox an adjutant fitted by natural talent
for the political jobbery so indispensable to
Ministers. It was probably under his auspices
that Fox made his first entry into Parliament in

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 37
1735 for the borough of Hindon, in Wiltshire ; and
six years later he was returned for Windsor, which
he represented continuously until the dissolution
of 1761. On aU occasions during his political
apprenticeship Fox kept both his eyes and his ears
open to the changes and conditions around him.
In 1737, by carefully observing the tactics of the
Opposition, he was enabled to warn his friend,
Hervey, that the Prince would certainly bring into
Parliament his quarrel with the Crown over the
fixing of his aUowance.^^ Not only was his pro
phecy borne out by the course of events, but the
Ministry could easily discern his value as an
observer of political undercurrents. When the
suspicion came to be felt that a supposititious son
might appear at the Prince's court, Hervey
promptly sent Fox to Walpole as a man who was
both ' sensible ' and ' clever '—in fact just the one
most fitted for the task of ' making discoveries '.-^
Such services from a subordinate were almost
certain to bring advancement; and already in 1737
Hervey had got his friend appointed Surveyor-
General of the Works, ' an office not only creditable
but worth above eleven hundred pounds a year '.-^
It was Fox's first promotion in his political career ;
and he never forgot his debt to the great man who
had humoured Hervey' s wish and given his friend
a start. Four years later Stephen Fox was likewise
'-- Hervey, Memoirs, III. 41.
•^3 Ibid. III. 180.
-¦* Ibid. III. 146 ; Gentleman's Magazine for 1737, p. 334.

38 HENRY FOX ch.
remembered, receiving as his reward the barony of
Ilchester.^^ It may be weU to note here, in passing, that Fox
had ceased to be a bachelor. In February 1733
he had married Penelope Dyves, one of Queen
Caroline's maids of honour.^® Little is known of
the bride, or whether the marriage turned out
happily. We know that she died within the
next few years ; and no children were born of the
union. In Parliament Fox gave no startling display of
brilliancy, and seems rather to have won his spurs
by slowly acquired reputation for keenness of logic
and soundness of argument. The first record we
have of his parhamentary activity was on the
9th of June, 1737, when the House discussed the
manner of dealing with the case of Captain Porteous,
the unpopular commandant who had been mur
dered by a mob in Edinburgh. Speaking in favour
of a motion to impose heavy penalties upon the
offending city. Fox asserted his belief that the House
was unanimous in abhorring both the principles and
25 LotTdon Magazine for 1741, pp. 257-8.
26 Gentleman's Magazine for 1733, p. 100 ; London Magazine
for 1733, p. 98. Mrs. Fox was a niece of Mrs. Charlotte Dyves
Clayton, afterwards Viscountess Sundon, one of the leading
figures in the society and politics of the Court during the life
time of Queen Caroline. The aunt seems to have been intimate
not only with Walpole but with his leading henchman, Lori
Hervey (see Thomson, Memoirs of Viscountess Sundon, II,
chaps, ix and xi), which may account for the beginning of hi&
acquaintance with Fox.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 39
the persons concerned in the outrage, and main
tained that it was the duty as weU as to the interest
of every gentleman present to bring to justice not
only the criminals directly concerned, but those
whose neglect had facilitated the outrage. He
scouted as absurd the notion that dweUers in the
adjacent country could have come in and per
petrated so open a crime without detection ; and
concluded by warning the House against the
probable effects of slackness of authority — par
ticularly in a country liable to rebellion.^'
On January 4, 1738, Fox moved the address in
the Commons, with an eloquent tribute to the late
Queen ; ^^ and during the same session he distin
guished himself by defending the Administration
when the enemies of Walpole, in spite of the
anticipation of war, sought to reduce the army
from 17,000 to 14,000 men.^^ Indeed no one with
common sense could have reasonably done other
wise. It was Pitt and other demagogues of the
Opposition who, after trying to bring on a war,
were yet willing to imperil their country's success
therein, if only the Minister they hated coiUd be
driven to quit his office. Thus Fox was resisting
one of the most selfish and contemptible efforts in
the history of English politics. It is needless to
2' Parliamentary History, X. 302-5. A good brief account
of the Porteous outrage is given by Mr. Leadam, Pol. Hist.
Bng. (ed. Hunt and Poole), IX. 352. The city guard had been
deprived of their arms by the plotters, and the onlookers were
tacit accomplices in the outrage.
28 Ibid. X. 367-8. 29 Ibid. X. 407-14.

40 HENRY FOX ch.
depict him as a patriot. He was simply a sensible
man and a loyal adherent of Walpole.
Both on the question of raising a body of
marines ^ and on that of augmenting the army '^
Fox showed his practical reasoning powers ; and
on the former occasion he reprehended the growth
of animosities, which he saw only too plaiiUy were
shattering the First Minister's supremacy. But
that which we note with particular interest —
though we have only the bare mention — is the
fact that on March 8, 1739, Fox was roused to
defend the recent convention with Spain '^ from the
' abusive ' attacks of WiUiam Pitt.** It was but
natural that the loyal adherent of the Ministry
should in time cross swords with his old school
fellow, whose loss of a cornetcy, as a pimishment
from Walpole, had rankled unceasingly in his
ambitious mind. In the present case Fox was
again standing for common sense against dema-
gogism.**
30 Parliamentary History, XI. 164-8. » Ibid. XI. 976-8.
32 Walpole's diplomatic solution for avoiding hostilities with
Spain. It was approved by a majority of thirty-seven, but
could not well become operative owing to the nation's increas
ing ardour for war.
3* Selwyn to Townshend, March 10, 1739 : Coxe, Memoirs
of Sir Robert Walpole, III. 519. Pitt's speech may be found
in Parliamentary History, X. 1240.
3* See von RuviUe, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (Eng.
trans.), 1. 160. From A Collection of the Parliamentary Debates
in England (printed m 1740), XV. 439, it would seem as though
Fox and Pitt had come into collision on February 3 of that
year. In other words, according to the arrangement of the

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 41
Participating in various measures, important
and otherwise. Fox uniformly and unflinchingly
supported the man to whom he owed his start in
the world of pohtics. Not only did he refuse to
side with the majority of leaders when Walpole's
power was steadily declining, but he continued his
defence of the great Minister long after the latter's
fall. On the 9th of March, 1742, when an inquiry
was moved into Walpole's administration for the
past twenty years. Fox showed his adeptness for
picking flaws in the arguments of the Opposition.
After deploring the revival of old animosities
at a time when union was so sadly needed, he
proceeded to expose the weakness of the charges.
Any appropriation of the public funds for cor
rupting the members of the House he admitted
to be criminal ; but the logic of the Opposition,
as a means of proving the charge, was somewhat
in this wise : the measures of the Administration
have been criminal, and therefore Parliament must
have been corrupt to have passed them. If such
ground were to be taken, it would be going back
.speeches in that collection, Fox would appear to have replied
to Pitt in the course of the debate on the attempted reduction
of the army, distinctly indicating him by the words ' the
gentleman who spoke last except one ' . But a reading of the
two speeches plainly shows this to be an error ; and we find
it corrected in the Cobham compilation (Parliamentary
History, X. 417-23), Fox's speech being inserted to precede
Pitt's ; while the \\ords, ' one gentleman ' are substituted for
"the gentleman who spoke last except one'. This arrange
ment makes Fox reply to the Tory leader, Shippen, and it is
very clear that it is the latter's arguments that he refutes.

42 HENRY FOX ch.
over the disputes of years. The assertion that
corruption existed because members did not
represent the feelings of their respective con
stituencies Fox considered far from having been
proved. He was certain that electors were not
intimidated by ' the dregs of people ', as had been
the case in the excise dispute of 1733, and he
felt convinced that ' the better sort ' were in con
trol—^' men of fortune and understanding '.^ He
concluded by cautioning the House against any
thing that might exert a harmful influence on
foreign relations, involving, as it naturaUy would,
the disclosure of diplomatic secrets.**
On the 10th of December — nearly nine months
after the fall of Walpole — took place the second
bout between the two future rivals of the Lower
House. The question being that of the advisability
of taking Hanoverians into British pay. Fox
brought up as an argument the superiority of the
Hanoverians over the more typical mercenariesr
The former, he asserted, being under the same
ruler as Englishmen themselves, were therefore
most unlikely to regard exclusively their own
particular interests. He would vote for the
measure, he said, till better were proposed. Pitt
replied that the Administration would soon losl,
its ' ablest defender ', inasmuch as the present
measures were so weak that scarce any alteration
could be of advantage to the nation.*®
^ Parliamentary History, XII. 461-6.
36 Ibid. XII. 1030-3. The compliment to Fox's abilities

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 43
Pitt's retort was but an indication of what might
take place between two ambitions ranged on
opposite sides. A year later we find a more
noteworthy encounter. When, in December 1743,
the customary motion was made to address the
King in reply to his speech, Pitt embraced the
opportunity to deliver a furious phihppic against
the Carteret Administration. After inveighing
against the policy of Carteret and the conduct of
the war, he turned upon the Pelhams and depicted
them (though with less censure) as the subservient
instruments of an obnoxious favourite. Then
came out the intemperate proposal to omit the
address altogether — as a blow, not at the sovereign,
but at the sovereign's advisers. ' If we put a
negative upon this question,' he declared, ' it may
awaken our Ministers out of their deceitful dream.
If we agree to it, they wiU dream on till they have
dreamed Europe and their country as weU as
themselves into perdition. If we stop now, the
nation may recover ; but if by such a flattering
address we encourage them to go on, it may soon
become impossible either for them or us to retreat ;
and therefore,' he concluded, 'for the sake of Europe
as well as my country, I shaU most heartily join
in putting a negative upon this question.' *'
deserves notice. As for the rest, Pitt probably meant that
nothing could be of benefit to the nation till all the old
measures were repealed and new ones substituted.
*' See Coxe, Pelham Administration, I. 117-8 ; Almon,
Speeches and Anecdotes of Pitt, I. 68 et seq. The last-named
authority gives Pitt's eloquent though unreasonable tirade

44 HENRY FOX ch.
Fox was among the first to repel the insult to
the Crown and the Administration. ' The present
debate,' he exclaimed, ' is such a one as I never
was witness to in this House before, and hope I
never shall again. It is not a debate as usual about
the form of our address . . . The question must be
whether we shaU return any or no address by way
of answer to the most gracious speech His Majesty
has been pleased to make us from the throne. And
wiU any gentleman so far violate his duty to his
sovereign as to give a negative to such a question?
In most questions I must confess I am weU enough
satisfied with seeing a majority upon what I think
the right side . . . but upon this question ... I
should be sorry to see one contradictory vote.'
He showed at length the extreme impropriety of
such a proposal, and after indulging in a vigorous
defence of the Ministry, he declared that the omis
sion of an address would evince such disrespect
toward His Majesty as would certainly lead to a
rupture between King and Parliament, and might
end in civil war. At least they should have the
' common decency ' to amend the address rather
than omit it altogether.*^
against Carteret. Coxe's account is taken from Parliamentary
History, XIII. 152-70.
_* 38 Parliamentary History, XIII. 206-18. The practice of
holding the Ministers responsible for the contents of the royal
speech, which they themselves had written, had not yet been
sanctioned by custom. The speeches were still ostensibly the
King's work. Hence the odium which Wilkes incurred during
' the next reign.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 45
The grave remonstrance of Fox was sufficient
to restrain the Commons from an unpardonable
step. The man who had bowed to his impulse
was characteristicaUy relying on the force of
ridicule rather than reasoning. Pitt, as Walpole
says, spoke to the passions; Fox, to the under
standing. It was Fox whose head was clearer ;
and yet those very powers of reasoning were too
often tinged with cynicism, and his finest mental
qualities were clouded, as were Pitt's, by the
forces of self-interest. Pitt, on his side, was
impulsive and impolitic. It was hardly strange
that the Pelhams should have hesitated to employ
him ; *^ for the force of eloquence could burn deep,
and it was not pleasant even to be singed by it.
It is a curious anomaly that Fox was defending
the measures of the men who had overthrown his
patron, whereas Pitt, one of the insurrectionists, was
no longer acting with his feUows. Doubtless the
latter's stand was the outcome of neglect. Dropped
by his confederates after Walpole's faU, he had also
incurred the hatred of the King for his slighting
remarks upon Hanover ; *° and together the two
38 Orford's weight with the new Ministers, however, ^\as
sufficient to exclude the ' Boy Patriots ' (as Pitt and his friends
were derisively called). Moreover, the Prince, whose favour
Orford had succeeded in obtaining, was only too easily per
suaded to sacrifice his following.
*" Pitt's unbridled attacks upon Walpole and Carteret led him
naturally, and perhaps unintentionally, into the habit of giving
offence to the King. On one occasion he treated Dettingen
(in which the King had taken a conspicuous part) more as

46 HENRY FOX ch.
misfortunes may weU have seemed to the desperate
man an almost impenetrable barrier. But the
motives of his rival are less easy to ascertain.
Whether Fox had early attached himself to Pelham
as an avowed foUower of the late jMinister, or
was counseUed by Orford himself to avoid the
snares of Opposition, does not readUy appear.
Probably he looked upon Pelham as the natural
heir of the great ^Minister's parhamentary over-
lordship, and we know that his late patron had
commended him to Pelham in most emphatic
terms.*^ Now in the same month his reward
came in the shape of a seat at the Treasury
Board. Pitt, as one may surmise, was stUl unappreciated.
The only other promotion of note was the appoint
ment of Wionington, a friend of Fox, to the vacant
post of Paymaster-General. The different shades
of opposition to Carteret were so complex that the
new First Commissioner was forced to defer his
ministry-bmlding till the Secretaries had fought
their combat to a finish.
MeanwhUe Fox had considerably enhanced his
pohtical fortunes by advancing his social status.
Having faUen in love ^vith the eldest daughter of
an escape than as a victory ; on another he intimated that
His Majesty was a breaker of treaties ; while his favourite
pastime was rousing national sentiment against Hanover,
which he once spoke of as a ' baneful little electorate '. Thus
Pitt's impulsiveness during this period was responsible for one
of the costliest blunders of his career.
^ Page 27.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 47
the Duke of Richmond,*^ he had courted her with
aU the zeal and confidence that was characteristic
of the man. Georgiana Caroline Lennox was
great-granddaughter of Charles II by Fox's old
benefactress, the Duchess of Portsmouth, and the
high social standing of her father, as well as her
own personal beauty and charm, made Lady
Carohne an exceptionaUy desirable match. It was
therefore hardly strange that a young plebeian,
only on the threshold of political prominence, was
considered whoUy beneath the notice of the
Lennoxes. As it happened, another suitor had
been already granted the parental blessing.
But royal blood and ducal pride had smaU
weight with the resolute young lady; and fear
ing the result of a promised interview with her
dreaded suitor. Lady Caroline had her eyebrows
shaved to ensure his defeat, and forthwith
eloped with Henry Fox. The marriage took
place on the 2nd of May, 1744, in the house of
the bridegroom's friend. Sir Charles Hanbury
WiUiams." The anger of the parents is easy to imagine.
Not only were the Foxes positively refused forgive
ness, but friends and relatives of the young couple
were required to prove their innocence of all com-
*2 Master of the Horse, and consequently a titular member
of the Cabinet. He was a close friend of both the Pelhams.
« Gentleman's Magazine, XIV. 281 ; Trevelyan, Early History
of C. J. Fox, p. 9. Lady Caroline was born April 26, 1723,
80 she was more than seventeen years younger than her
husband.

48 HENRY FOX ch.
phcity.** But the tongues of the outside world
were not so easUy sUenced ; and the affair was
bruited abroad with a noise almost suggestive of a
political convulsion. Not even the Cabinet was
immune. Lord GranviUe, having received a special
emissary from Newcastle with the story, remarked,
' I thought our fleets or armies were beat, or Mons
betrayed into the hands of the French. At last
it came out that Harry Fox was married, which
I knew before. . . . This was what he was con
cerned about. Two people, to neither of whom
he was related, were married against their parents'
consent. And this man is Secretary of State ! ' ^
The Pelhams were, in very truth, sorely per
plexed. If they shrank from losing the favour of
the Master of Horse, of equal value was the
assistance of his son-in-law in the Commons.
But at first they affected a dignified disapproval.
Newcastle, a close friend of Richmond, spoke of
the marriage as ' a most unfortunate affair ', and
Pelham, though deeply attached to Fox, dropped
the familiarity of ' Dear Harry ' and commenced
his letters with ' Dear Sir ' for several months.
His sister, on the other hand, showed a much
** ' I could teU you more,' wrote Sir Charles to his bosom
friend. ' They are very angry with the Duke of Marlborough
and me. I was spoke to about it and said whatever I had done
was in consequence of our friendship, which was the chief thing
in all the world I was proudest of. And that nothing would
ever make me repent doing what you desired me, because you
could not ask me to do anything wrong.' — Liechtenstein, 1.60.
« Williams to Fox, May 15, 1744: Ibid. I. 63.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 49
broader spirit. Having positively declined to give
up her friendship for the young bride, she went so
far as to declare that if Lord Ilchester had been
in his brother's place, they ' would have jumped
at the match ' ; and where was the difference ? "
No doubt the dignified reserve of the young
offenders themselves, as well as the independence
and partiality of some of their friends, did much to
assuage the parents' resentment ; but a hardly
less cogent motive was the valued support of Fox
to the Administration, and his growing reputation
as a party orator. A few lines from the pen of
Chesterfield put the matter very clearly, ' Their
Graces,' wrote His Lordship, ' are at their own
motion reconciled to Fox and Lady Caroline.
They were aware, I believe, that in case of any
changes Fox stood foremost, and thereupon
thought it right to take him in time, and not to
stay till the view of interest was too strongly
marked.'*' Yet this letter was written in 1748,
and more than four years had elapsed before they
could bring themselves to pardon the offending
pair. It was not until May of that year that Lady
Caroline received a formal letter (signed by both
parents) restoring her to the family affections and
consenting to accept the son-in-law.**
** Most of these details are given us by Williams in a letter
to Fox, May 15, 1744: Ibid. I. 62.
*' Chesterfield to Stanhope, April 8, 1748: Correspondence
of Chesterfield (ed. Bradshaw), II. 862.
*8 The Duke and Duchess of Richmond to Lady Caroline
Fox, May 26, 1748 : Liechtenstein, I. 68.
use J)

50 HENRY FOX ch.
When at length the position of Lord Granville
had ceased to be a question or an obstruction,
Pelham was free to begin weaving his variegated
pattern of an administration. After a conference
with some of the leading malcontents (notably
Lords Cobham, Gower and Chesterfield) a useful re
inforcement was gained by the Ministry and several
changes were effected. The Seals, wrested from
Granville, were given back to Harrington, a personal
friend of the First Lord ; while Gower, whose
Toryism was growing cold, was glad to resume the
Privy Seal (which he had some time ago resigned
out of loyalty to his party). Some distrust was
manifested at the selection of the Duke of Bedford
to preside at the Admiralty ; *' but his recent
opposition to Walpole, his debating quaUties in the
Upper House, and, more than aU, his by no means
insignificant parliamentary clientele made him too
valuable a recruit to omit ; besides this, his eleva
tion brought in his friend the Earl of Sandwich to
serve under him at the board, and the latter's
industry and breadth of intelligence were as well
recognized as his laxity of morals. But the most
decisive victory for the Ministry was the nomina
tion of Chesterfield, a cousin of Harrington, as
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, in the teeth of the
*' ' Vain, proud and wrong-headed,' wrote Richmond,
' I fear you will have a great deal of plague with him.'—
Richmond to Newcastle, December 11, 1754, or Brit. Mus.
Add. MSS., 32703, f. 464. Bedford was a man of noble
lineage and great wealth. He had been one of the most
strenuous opponents of Walpole in the House of Lords.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 51
King's personal dishke. It was the second great
triumph of the Pelhams over their sovereign.^
But for Pitt nothing was yet found. The
Pelhams — in consequence of Cobham's sohcitations
— were ready to promise him the post of Secretary-
at-War, which he seems to have coveted, but
unluckily this appointment the King positively
refused to sanction, and the brothers ceased to
importune him,^^ probably because one triumph
was deemed enough for the present.
In the Cabinet the Pelhams had no one to fear
but each other. Shortly after their accession to
power Newcastle had disclosed to their common
friend the Chancellor how greatly he envied the
position which Pelham held by virtue of his office at
the Treasury. His brother, he complained to Hard
wicke, had been taught by his predecessor that
he, like Orford himself, must be First Minister
in everything. Greater influence in Cabinet and
Commons were ' indeed (he admitted) great ad
vantages ', and yet they ' may be counterbalanced,
especially if it is considered over whom these
advantages are given '.^^ Goaded perhaps by the
coldness of the King, who knew whence had come
¦'•'' Chesterfield, it will be remembered, was one of the Prince
of Wales's faction, and had consequently been instrumental in
exciting the opposition to Walpole. Like Pitt, he had infuri
ated the King by speaking contemptuously of Hanover. But
his present appointment well exemplified the desire of the
Pelhams to construct a ' broad-bottomed ' administration.
^1 Coxe, Pelham Administration, I. 197.
52 Newcastle to Hardwicke, November 7, 1743.
d2

52 HENRY FOX ch.
the blow that felled his favourite, and pleading as
an excuse the disfavour he scented among his
colleagues, the Duke gently insisted that his
brother should aUow him an equal share of his
ministerial power, and that they should ' have no
reserve either public or private from each other'.'*
Pelham apparently acquiesced in the scheme of
partnership, little realizing perhaps how thoroughly
he was, and would be, swayed by his elder
brother. In foreign affairs there was little or no deviation
from the broad outlines of GranviUe's policy.
Secretary Newcastle took care to forget that he
had ever frowned upon a policy of subsidies, and
the Pelhams were prompt in renewing the bounty
to the Empress-Queen.^* But in the war itseh
Fortune had seldom been more fickle. Everything
seemed to turn upon the conduct of Frederick of
Prussia, whose military prowess and diplomatic
unscrupulousness kept Europe in ceaseless turmoil.
Yet it must be noticed that British victories had
for a time become less and less frequent. The
52 Newcastle to Pelham, January 19, 1745: Coxe, Pelham
Administration, I. 205.
5* In January 1745 a quadruple alliance was formed of
England, Holland, Austria and Saxony. Thus a subsidy was
planned for Saxony as well. Formerly Newcastle had been
much opposed to the King's inclination to subsidize Saxony ;
but that was when Carteret was directing the Government's
policy, and politics furnished the motive. For Newcastle's
and Hardwicke's views at that time see Coxe, Pelham Ad
ministration, I. 163-5.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 53
vengeance of the elements rather than any atom
of skiU on the part of the Channel Fleet defeated
an attempt of the French to invade England ; and
in the Mediterranean a more noticeable case of
mismanagement occurred. A squadron under
Admiral Mathews having encountered a Franco-
Spanish fleet off Toulon, was prevented from
winning a decisive victory by the refusal of Vice-
Admiral Lestock, the second-in-command, to
obey the signals for engaging the enemy. The
next day, when a pursuit of the shattered allies
was ordered, it was Lestock who might have re
trieved the lost opportunity, but for the conduct
of his superior, who unaccountably ordered the
fleet to retire. The miscarriage seems to have
been occasioned by a deadly feud between the
two commanders, which rendered co-operation
impossible. Mathews, whose responsibility, as superior officer,
was the greater, having suspended Lestock, was
recalled to support his charges against him ; and
the two men carried on a somewhat heated corre
spondence of 'queries and answers',** while Lestock
was suffering an irksome delay pending arrange
ments for the trial he had solicited.
The difficult question came up before the
Commons in the spring session of 1745, and it was
moved that the House should resolve itseU into
a committee of inquiry into the miscarriage in
56 These are printed in the Gentleman's Magazine for 1744,
pp. 545-51.

54 HENRY FOX ch.
question.*® So much feeling was shown by the
supporters of both the offenders that witnesses
were summoned from far and near. After evidence
had been coUected and discussed for several days,
and finaUy closed, each of the principals having
been heard in his own defence. Fox rose to plead
the cause of Lestock.
He began by taking exception to two features
of the Admiral's conduct subsequent to the
miscarriage. First, he had sent Lestock home
without any specific charge (for the ' queries
and answers ' could not properly be caUed one)
and without a single witness to support such
a measure ; secondly, though he had reached
England in September and must have known
that Lestock was pressing day and night for a
trial, yet when, by discretion of the Admiralty,
he was requested to present his charge and a
list of witnesses, he let seven weeks elapse
before he answered the letter ; and when he did
finaUy write, he excused his delay on the pre
tence that his papers were mislaid — ' an odd
excuse for one who had been so eager to raise
a clamour against the Vice -Admiral, and lay
the whole odium upon him, when others were
5^ Pelham at first opposed the motion on the ground that the
committee would not have the requisite authority to judge
the case ; but finding the current of opinion against him, and
conscious of the force of public clamour for a judgement of
the question, he reluctantly yielded, and the resolution was
passed. — Tindal, Translation and Continuation of Rapin's
History of Eng., XXI. 43.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 55
equally guilty, and to exercise the highest act
of authority over a man grown decrepit in the
service.' Fox concluded by hoping that his
judgement had been impartial during the in
quiry, but that the Admiral had yet to prove
that his conduct was consistent with humanity
and justice.
Mathews then replied that, for an ' impartial
speech ', Fox's was the ' severest he had ever
heard '. He expressed his opinion that the facts
in the ' queries ' did constitute a charge, and
protested that the witnesses could not be readily
withdrawn from the King's service ; and, further
more, it was quite true that his papers had been
delayed at sea. The tardiness of his letter to the
Admiralty he did not explain.
On the 9th, George Grenville, a friend of Pitt,
and a man whose abilities were ripening with
experience, suggested that the evidence should be
drawn up and presented to the King, to the intent
that those should be tried whom His Majesty should
name (there being several minor officers under
suspicion as weU). Then, as a preliminary to the
fulfilment of that suggestion, he moved three
resolutions, the import of which was that there
had been miscarriages of which certain persons
were guilty. These were passed.
Fox, however, expressed disapproval of Grenville's
unspecific representations, particularly as witnesses
were ready to throw all blame upon Lestock,
leaving Mathews unscathed ; and if, moreover, the

56 HENRY FOX ch.
evidence were to be published, they would have
timidity as an additional motive for hiding the
truth. He, for his part, desired a general address,
requesting a court-martial to judge those whom
the committee should specificaUy name. PeUiam
agreed in the main with Grenville, and Wilmington
with Fox.
The following day Fox moved his resolution for
an address to the King, requesting a court-martial
to be held upon the admirals and several sub
ordinate officers. An amendment was then offered
by a member named Vyner, and supported by
Pelham, that Mathews's name should be struck
from the list. This occasioned a warm opposition
from Fox and his supporters, among whom were
Grenville and WiUiam Murray, the Solicitor-
General. Fox, in particular, contended that how
ever conclusively Mathews had proved his valour,
he was unquestionably responsible for the gross
laxity of discipline in his squadron, and guilty
of strange contrariety of conduct on his o\m
part. It was, therefore, unfair, he repeated, to
fling all the blame upon the second-in-command.
Vyner' s amendment was buried under an adverse
majority of 133, and Fox's resolution was then
passed. The King accepted the plea, and a long and
tedious court-martial was held. In the end,
Lestock, whose defence had rested mainly on
technicalities regarding signals, was bonourably
acquitted, while Mathews, against whom counter-

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 57
charges had been preferred, was declared incapable
of serving His Majesty in future.*'
Fox's conduct throughout the inquiry was de
scribed as ' much to his credit ',** and the ultimate
outcome was certainly due largely to his efforts.
He appears to have been a personal friend of
Lestock, who left him a token of gratitude in
his will.*^
The war had, in the meantime, taken a sudden
turn by the spirited defence on the part of the
French against a threatened invasion of their own
land. England, from her nearness to the field of
operations, was naturally looked to for leadership
among the AUies, and in December the King's
younger son, the Duke of Cumberland, had been
selected to command the army of the invaders.
The appointment might well be open to question,®"
5' Our chief authority for the discussion in the Commons is
Parliamentary History, XIII. 1250-99. Further evidence is
given in Tindal. It is only necessary to add here that so
complete a reversal in the relative situations of the two
admirals was grossly unfair, for Mathews was much the better
officer. But technicalities convicted Mathews as truly as thej'
had acquitted Lestock. As was characteristic of the time,
the two courts-martial clung to a literal interpretation of the
law instead of passing judgement in a liberal spirit. See Royal
Naval History (ed. Clowes, 1898), III. 105-6.
58 This was stated by Philip Yorke (afterward Lord Royston)
in his Parliamentary Journal. ' Henry Fox,' ^v^ites Walpole,
' has gained the greatest honour by his assiduity and capacity
in the affair.' — Walpole to Mann, April 15, 1745: Letters of
Horace Walpole (ed. Toynbee), II. 83.
59 Diet. Nat. Biog., XXIII. 115.
*" The Duke was only in his twenty-fifth year, and had had

58 HENRY FOX ch.
and certainly won no justification by its result.
The momentous reverse at Fontenoy marked
another turning-point in the war ; for the vic
tors, assisted by the paucity of the AUies' troops,
swept through the Low Countries with scarce a
check. But the Administration was to have a still
harder problem to face. Scarcely had it digested
the mortification of Fontenoy, when a blow long
suspected and longer feared was directed against
the reigning dynasty. Unassisted by the French
Court and without its immediate knowledge, the
Young Pretender successfully landed in Scotland
and gathered a small but determined foUowing.
The invasion which followed and its initial success
were quite sufficient to create consternation ; and
the alarm — especially in Government circles — was
appalling. Fox, writing to Hanbury Williams,
had early betrayed his forebodings : ' The rebels
are got twenty-four miles on this side Cope, and
are in full march to Edinburgh, or stiU farther
but a slight apprenticeship to arms. The probable reason for
the appointment was that the King wanted it for himself,
and opposed the choice of Cumberland on that account. —
Stone to Newcastle, February 16, 1745: Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.,
32704, f . 72. The Ministry were naturally indisposed to have
the King leave the country while the terrors of Jacobitism
were still so rife, and felt, perhaps, that the appointment of
Cumberland would be likely to offend him less than any other
selection for the command ; while the Duke's valour at
Dettingen would serve as the pretext. But the choice of
Cumberland for such a crucial enterprise must ever remain one
of the gravest blunders of the Pelham Administration.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 59
south. . . . England, Wade ®^ says, and I believe,
is for the first comer ; and if you can tell whether
the six thousand Dutch and the ten battalions of
Enghsh, or five thousand French or Spaniards,
will be here first, you know our fate.' ®^
The Cabinet and War Office were given a diffi
cult problem that needed instantaneous solving ;
it was the problem of defending a country that was
civilian by tradition and unprepared through stress
of circumstances. Dutch troops had been sum
moned in accordance with an old treaty stipulation,
and ten battalions were called from the English
army in Flanders, narrowly escaping annihilation
before they sailed ; ®* but the apathy of the
English people in general was one of the deepest
stains upon a proud and patriotic nation.®* If
rural communities and commercial centres cared
so little that the grandson of James II was winning
victories against a government that revolution
had made free, how was it any wonder that politics
were decadent and statesmen thought of little
but themselves !
Since the tiny force under General Cope seemed
for a time the only available strength, thirteen lords
volunteered to raise regiments for the national
cause. But the offer, unfortunately, was not so
®i Field-Marshal, and Commander-in-chief until Cumberland
succeeded him.
^2 Coxe, Memoirs of Lord Walpole, p. 284.
"^ See Fortescue, History of the British Army, II. 132.
^ See Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century,
I. 421, 468.

60 HENRY FOX ch.
generous or so effective as at first appeared.
Walpole sums up the matter succinctly : ' Had
they paid them too, the service would have been
noble ; being paid by the Government obscured
a little of the merit — paid without raising them
would deserve too coarse a term. It is certain
that not six of the thirteen regiments were ever
raised, not four were employed. . . . The chief
persons at the head of the scheme were the Dukes
of Bedford and Montagu.'
The status of the proposed troops was naturally
submitted to considerable and caustic criticism ;
for the obligation was liable to be much em
phasized, and the noble benefactors insisted on
their own terms. ' Fox,' writes Walpole, ' was
hotly opposed to the plan, especiaUy the design
of giving rank to the officers,' ®* for the noble
colonels had appointed their dependants and
relatives to serve on a par with veterans of many
years' standing. Encouraged by the reluctance of
the King in the matter, Fox and Winnington, in
combination with Jacobite Tories, attempted to
defeat it in the Lower House ; and the former
took occasion to inveigh particularly against the
Duke of Montagu.
Pitt, on the other hand, defended the regiments
warmly, wishing, it was said, to curry favour with
Bedford, Gower and Hahfax, three peers who
were instrumental in the enterprise. More probably
it was Pelham who had influenced his action.
*5 Walpole, Memoirs of George II (ed. Holland), I. 446-7.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 61
At aU events, since Pelham, as representative of
the Administration, now added his own support,
the colonels were easily able to triumph over the
terrors of the Jacobites and the shrewd scepticism
of Fox.®® The Prince of Wales expressed his feelings
by drinking Fox's health in a bumper with three
huzzas for opposing the First Lord.®'
Meanwhile, the Dutch troops having been
recalled, Hessians were summoned in their stead ;
while the force from Flanders formed the nucleus
of a promising host — to be entrusted to Cumber
land, as fitting defender of his dynasty. In
addition the Ministry decided in February to
continue the noble regiments whose term had
lately expired, and utUize their services for four
months longer. This at once caused Fox to renew
his opposition, and he strove to persuade the
House to postpone decision, on the ground that
the invaders were checked and the expense un
necessary ; and though defeated by the Ministry's
majority, his satisfaction must have been great
when tidings of the rebels' plight arrived soon
afterwards with the additional news that Gower' s
regiment had mutinied upon hearing that their
term of service was to be continued beyond
^^ Walpole to Mann, November 4, 1745 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, II. 145. As before, in the case of Lestock, Fox was
again in opposition to Pelham. In both cases he was probably
acting according to his convictions, yet at the same time
desirous of giving his chief a hint that if he was to be loyal to
the Administration, it would be'advisable to promote him.
*'' Walpole to Mann, November 15, 1745: Letters, II. 148.

62 HENRY FOX ch.
the term for which they had enhsted.®^ Nor had
the Pretender been beaten. Despite some initial
success, Cumberland had met with a reverse in
January at Falkirk.
In the midst of the dangers that beset the
tottering throne, a revolution in the Administration
threatened to tear away the last vestige of execu
tive energy. Although Granville was no longer
officially a member of the governing circle, the
Pelhams had long been suspicious of the influence
and favour he still maintained at Kensington.
Nor was distrust abated by the persistent indiffer
ence with which the King treated his Ministers ;
and even Pelham himself, less naturaUy suspicious
than his brother, was forced finaUy to reahze the
weakness of their position. Sombre whisperings
in the Closet might with dignity be overlooked,
but the total lack of sympathy with his conduct of
the war was fast becoming unbearable. Even his
necessary measures of defence met with the utmost
disdain. Granville censured the despatching of
the English battalions, and Tweeddale, Secretary
of State for Scotland,®' treated the alleged dangers
with unqualified contempt.'" The one balm for
the wounded First Lord would have been the
acquisition of Pitt (now the ally of the Ministry) ;
«8 Walpole to Mann, September 5, 1745: Letters of Horace
Walpole, II. 171.
®9 This office (which had customarily commanded a seat in
the Cabinet) was abolished in January, 1746.
™ Fox to Williams, September 5, 1745 : Coxe, Memoirs of
Lord Walpole, p. 284.

1 RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 63
but this proposal the King steadfastly negatived.'^
It was hence that the Pelhams determined to take
advantage of the crisis, and force upon him the
concessions which they wanted.
The conflagration, so long smouldering, had
needed only the gusts of Jacobite rebeUion to
make it burst forth in aU its fury. Weary of
the dictation of Ministers whom he hated, and
driven perforce into a choice of two alternatives
(concession or resistance), the King at length
prevailed upon Bath and Granville to attempt the
forming of a new administration.'^ Obviously the
'1 Another attempt had been made on the 5th of February
to induce the King to relent and make Pitt Secretary-at-War ;
but His Majesty flatly refused to consider the proposition, and
in this resolution Bath encouraged him. It appears that the
Ministry then made a show of giving up the point (Coxe,
Pelham, I. 290), but after they had decided to threaten resigna
tion, they entered into a much closer union with Pitt and his
friends. This treaty (Anecdotes of Chatham, I. 108-9) was
made on the 9th, and the evening of the same day the King
was again importuned — and again without success. On the
following day Harrington resigned — the first to do so, by
pre-arrangement at the meeting of February 8, which we
mention in the text (p. 64).
'2 It would appear from Coxe's Pelham Administration,
1. 288, that the King took the overt initiative in bringing about
a rupture. Yet the fact remains clear that the Pelhams would
have precipitated it in any event. Obviously their intention
now was to anticipate their enemies by forcing them to make
up a ministry before they were in any sense prepared to do so.
Meanwhile they had but to await the King's expected failure
in order to make good their recent promises to Pitt. Dr. von
Ruville considers Pitt and his friends the most to blame of all
the persons concerned, since they were evidently making use

64 HENRY FOX ch.:
test of their capacity for such a task would He in
their power to win immediate and effective assis
tance. The outlook was not extremely encouraging ;
and an effort to secure Harrington faUed dismaUy.'*
A practical possibUity was Chesterfield, although
his absence in Ireland would incur dangerous delay.
But Henry Pelham had not moulded a ' broad-
bottomed ' administration in vain, and the time
had arrived when the deftness of the buUder should
be realized. At a conference at the ChanceUor's
on the evening of the 8th, Newcastle, Harrington
and the First Lord had concurred with Hardwicke
in a resolution to resign, and two days later this
was carried into effect. Others of the Ministry
foUowed, tUl the wavering Chesterfield was almost
alone. Deserted during a great national crisis, the King
may weU have regretted his conspiracy ; but his
two heutenants remained undaunted. On the next
day Bath kissed hands for the Treasury, and the
Seals were conferred upon Granville — one office
for himself and one for whom he would. A few
of a national crisis in order to impose themselves upon the
Govenmient. — WiUiam Pitt, Earl of Chatham (Eng. trans.),
I. 260-1 . No doubt the Pelhams were very much afraid that
Pitt, if not satisfied, would go over to the Opposition.
'^ On his way from a conference in the Closet on the 6th of
February, Bath had met Harrington, to whom he remarked
confidingly, ' I have advised the King to negative the appoint
ment of Mr. Pitt, and to pursue proper measures on the
Continent.' ' Those who dictate in private,' coldly rephed
Harrington, ' should be emploj^ed in public. ' — Coxe, Pdham
Administration, I. 289.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 65
others accepted seats in the new Ministry, but
more refused aU assistance ; and Winnington,
importuned while in act of tendering his resigna
tion, frankly told the ministry-makers that their
cause was hopeless.'* GranvUle, more bold than
his associate, would have had the King appeal
to the mercy of Parliament ; '* but His Majesty
saw only too clearly that the power of the Crown
was hopeless to combat a party which itself
controUed the Commons. As for GranviUe, it was
the veteran's last effort to free his captive master
and to gain back power for himself. In course of
time he would become the servant of ministers but
never again their rival.
FaUure being acknowledged, the mediation of
Winnington brought the First Lord and the
Crown to an understanding, and the seceding
Ministers returned to office. But the Pelhams
were not wiUing to make of their victory a grate
ful accommodation. The King must see whence
power was derived, and pay the penalty of his
restlessness. And so it turned out that the
Ministers declined to come back without Pitt as
one of their coUeagues.'® It is true that theic
'* Diary of Lord Marchmont : Marchmont Papers, I. 174.
'5 Memoirs of a Celebrated Character (Richard Glover), p. 41.
'« The Newcastle faction to the King, February 13, 1745 :
Add. MSS., 35870, f . 117. The successful stand of the Pelhams
on this point, and still more the King's inability to supplant
them by a new Ministry, are clear and interesting evidences
of the strides which cabinet government had taken under
Walpole's long ascendancy.
1156 K

66 HENRY FOX ch.
protege had sought to obliterate the impressions
created by his wounded pride and accordingly
renounced his ambition for the War Office;" but
his recent support of the regiments, and especially
his resistance to a measure attacking corruption,"
were services too valuable to go entirely unre
warded — and the more so when they reflected that
Pitt, when snubbed or flouted, was a dangerous
man to deal with. And so with tearful eyes the
defeated monarch was forced to sanction his
appointment as Vice- Treasurer of Ireland — a lucra
tive position that might conveniently be occupied
tiU better should be found.
Such was the last chapter of an episode which
had begun and now ended with the ambition of
WiUiam Pitt. It was not to the credit of any
of the figures involved that the dynasty had
weathered the storm. The whole affair shows
plainly enough the pitiful want of patriotism in
the politicians of that age.
Freed from back-stairs influence, the Ministry
were now ready to meet the danger to the
" Newcastle to Chesterfield, February 18, 1746: Coxe,
Pdham Administration, I. 292.
'* The measure (presented by the Opposition) had attacked
the exertion of illegal influence upon elections. Pitt pleaded
that such a measure during a civil war was ill-timed, — Von
Ruville, I. 257. So also, we might add, were his recent efforts
to secure an office from the Ministry. Moreover, a national
crisis had not deterred him from attacking corruption when it
was carried on by Walpole. Evidently the evil appeared to
him in a different light now that he was allied with the existing
system and no longer its opponent.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 67
royal house with more confidence in the issue ; and
the end came late in April on the famous field of
CuUoden. But Cumberland refused to spare the
beaten foe ; and at twenty-five the ruthless young
Prince was haUed with the epithet of ' Butcher ' — a
not unmerited reward for his orgy of victory. The
Ministry, however, thought only of their relief
after a particularly trying crisis ; and Pitt proved
so warm an advocate of a proposed pension to
the Duke, that His Majesty expressed a wish that
he should be the one to move the vote in the
Commons.'® Two days after the battle Fox lost his friend
Winnington,^ who had obstinately refused to see
a competent physician tiU Fox's insistence had
come too late to save him.®^ The Paymaster was
an odd but not unusual combination of good and
bad. Horace Walpole caUed him the wittiest
man he had ever known, whUe a careless disregard
of morals underlay one of the keenest capacities
for business that the Administration had found.
The same love of revelry which characterized the less
dissolute minds of Fox and Sir Hanbury Williams
had knit them in a common bond with Winnington,
and the three had long been boon-companions.
Some changes in the Ministry came as a con-
¦" The King's wish was not gratified, as Cumberland said he
would be ' much better pleased if the Premier moved it '. —
Cumberland to Newcastle, May 7, 1746 : Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.,
32707, f. 149. ^ April 18, 1746.
*i Walpole to Mann, April 25, 1746; Letters of Horace
Walpole, II. 189. E 2

68 HENRY FOX ch.
sequence of the new vacancy. Sir WiUiam Yonge,
who had been Secretary-at-War since 1736, was
an exceedingly able man, but Ul-health had
impaired his usefulness for departmental work,
and the Ministers agreed that he must be removed.
He was accordingly transferred to the Vice-
Treasurership of Ireland, to succeed Pitt, whose
fortune Winnington' s death had so opportunely
furthered. Besides being promoted to the Pay
Office, the man who had ' alternately buUied and
flattered Mr. Pelham ',®^ was given a seat in the
Privy Council ; it was aU, and perhaps more than,
he could have expected. The King is said to have
shed tears of mortification, and Cobham, who felt
keenly the termination of his old influence, de
nounced him as a ' wrong-headed feUow that he
had no regard for '.*^
MeanwhUe Fox, who had waited so long and so
patiently for recognition of his faithful aUegiance,
was appointed Secretary-at-War, and a member
of the Privy Council.®* ' It is thought,' wrote
Newcastle to Richmond, ' that as affairs now
stand in the House of Commons, nobody but
Mr. Fox can succeed- Sir WUliam Yonge ; ' ** and
82 Walpole to Mann, November 4, 1745 : ibid. II. 145.
8^ Diary of Lord Marchmont : Marchmont Papers, I. 176.
Cobham naturaUy resented the fact that Pitt, by allying
himself closely with the Pelhams, had demonstrated that he
had no further need of his former patron.
^ London Gazette, no. 8,556.
85 Newcastle to Richmond, May 6, 1746; Add. MSS., 32707,
f. 149.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 69
the injured father-in-law had to content himself
with veUing his acquiescence under a protest
against the Ministry's partiality.^®
Whether Pitt stiU coveted the place he had
formerly demanded is more than we can teU. The
biographer of Fox is tempted to regard this as one
of the latter's early triumphs in that long rivalry.
The brothers at the helm were meanwhile as
unharmonious as ever. Newcastle, clutching at
the hope of regaining his lost favour in the Closet,
supported the desire of the King and the Duke
of Cumberland to prolong the war ; while Pelham,
on the contrary, was disheartened by the vast
expense, which seemed to bring nothing but
reverses in the field. Yet he lacked the force of
character to insist upon a different policy, and his
weakness was fast hastening the doom of Harring
ton, who, as he saw with regret, was being mystified
and slighted. 8'
But the First Lord and the Junior Secretary were
not the only ones to feel the despotic spirit of
Newcastle. The Duke of Bedford, ever since his
elevation to the headship of the Admiralty, had
been cogitating a scheme for the effectual expul
sion of the French from their settlements on the
86 Richmond to Newcastle, May 7, 1746 : ibid., f. 155.
8' No doubt the report was true that Harrington's depart
ment (the North) was steadily encroached upon. — Marchmont
Papers, I. 184. Newcastle affirmed that he had corresponded
^^'ith Sandwich only in his private capacity (Bedford Corres.
1. 171), but we can readily see the embarrassments which would
result from such a practice.

70 HENRY FOX ch.
St. Lawrence.88 But whereas no positive objection
seems to have been made (and some troops for
the purpose were actuaUy mobihzed in Ireland),
the project was apparently aUowed to languish
simply from want of Cabinet encouragement ; and
before the end of the year (1746) the expedition,
which Bedford had so carefuUy mapped out, was
clearly and definitely abandoned. 8" Yet, abortive
as the policy proved, it bore politicaUy a two
fold importance. In the first place it gave
Bedford a cause for lasting resentment against the
coUeague whose co-operation had been essential
to his success ; and secondly, it marked the first
conspicuous sign of the programme of that faction
which would later come into play under the
leadership of Cumberland. If the chiefs of the
Administration took no interest in America, a
party would graduaUy be formed, and gain the
strength to force this issue. MeanwhUe the hope
of conquering Canada was put off for a decade,
and the one British gain, the island of Cape
Breton, was destined to be relinquished at the
Peace of Aix-la-ChapeUe.®°
All these marks of tyranny Pelham must have
seen with biting chagrin. In October the differ-
88 Joint representation of the Duke of Bedford and others
to the Duke of Newcastle, March 30, 1746 : Bedford Corres.
L65. 89 Grenville to Bedford, December 1, 1746 : ibid. I. 199.
^ It will be recalled that this was restored as the only
means of inducing France to abandon her conquests in the
Low Countries.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 71
ences between the brothers became so acute that
Pelham asked the Duke's secretary, Andrew
Stone, to be the channel of all intercourse between
them. NaturaUy all the Ministers were more or
less involved in the matter. Harrington was
staunch in his support of the First Lord ; whUe
Chesterfield, if we are to believe Fox, was ' more
open and violent for peace than any of them '.^^
Fox himself regarded a cessation of the war as
absolutely imperative, and declared that New
castle was the oiUy one who frowned on peace
except the ChanceUor, Hardwicke, who sided with
him ' to keep the governing of him '.^^ Doubtless
Fox was correct. Certainly the mihtary situation
was no less serious than he believed ; for the
army of the Marechal de Saxe was steadily ad
vancing, apparently to the destruction of HoUand.
But great as were the dangers of his policy,
Newcastle would brook no opposition to his
despotism in the Cabinet, and, a pretext having
arisen from the fraternal quarrel,®* the one man
who acknowledged Pelham as his mentor was
forced to yield up his office. Chesterfield, much
to the astonishment of the First Lord, who had
not been consulted,** was appointed to succeed
"1 Fox to Williams, December 28, 1746: Coxe, Pelham
Administration, I. 342.
92 Diary of Lord Marchmont: Marchmont Papers, I. 231.
9^ Harrington had supported Pelham in one of the quarrels
between the brothers on the subject of peace. Hence New
castle insisted upon his dismissal.
9* Fox writes that Pelham was much chagrined at the

72 HENRY FOX ch.
Harrington, while the latter repaired to Ireland
to fiU his cousin's place. Thus the two Stanhopes
were exchanged.
In the session of Parhament 1746-7 little of
note took place. Fox as Secretary-at-War intro
duced the army estimates, and reported a reduc
tion of expenses in the King's personal guard, for
which the Commons voted an address of thanks to
their sovereign.®* Subsequently both Houses, at
Newcastle's instance, passed the so-caUed Act of
Grace for aU concerned in the late rebeUion.
In September 1747 Fox apparently suffered
from an iUness which rumour seems to have
exaggerated. Barrington, an ambitious member
of the Cobham faction, already imagined himself
Secretary-at-War, and entrusted his candidature
to George Grenville.®® The fact, however, that
Walpole, an intimate friend of Fox, makes no
mention of it in his correspondence leads one
strongly to doubt that Fox's life was at any time
in danger.
Meanwhile Newcastle turned again to strike an
opponent of his policy. It might have been
predicted from the first by any one who knew the

downfall of Harrington, whom he had been hoping to save. —
Fox to Williams, October 28, 1746. The First Lord frankly
regarded him as the victim of Cabinet dissensions. — Pelham
to Trevor, October 29, 1746: Coxe, I. 341.
95 Parliamentary History, XIII. 1439.
96 Barrington to Grenville, September 5, 1747 : Grenville
Papers, I. 68.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 73
temper of the elder Pelham, that a man of Chester
field's force and inteUigence could not but become
an object of jealousy to his coUeague. His Lord
ship was not a cipher like most of the Cabinet, and
having given Ireland a more than usuaUy successful
administration, he plumed himself on his abUity
to secure the long-desired peace.®' The inevitable
result foUowed. The new Secretary's department
was steadily encroached upon,®8 and an effort to
secure a favour through Fox and Lady Yarmouth
(the King's mistress ®®) made his coUeague suspect
a counter-influence in the Closet. ^"^ Other provo-
9' We may certainly wonder with Fox (letter of October 28th)
why Newcastle should have chosen not only one of the Stan
hopes, but an outspoken advocate of peace. Chesterfield
earnestly laboured to gain this object — partly through the
agency of his friend DayroUes, Ambassador at the Hague, and
was consequently much annoyed by the coincident corre
spondence of Newcastle and Sandmch. — Ernst, Memoirs of
the Life of Chesterfield, pp. 331-2.
98 Fox to Williams, February 17, 1748: Coxe, Pelham Ad
ministration, I. 389.
99 The King's mistress, the Countess of Yarmouth, was the
one who best understood his moods, and in consequence she
often played an intermediary role between the King and his
Ministers. Her attitude was generally regarded as a fairly
accurate barometer of the humour of the Closet.
10" Ibid. ; Ernst, Chesterfield, pp. 331-2 ; Marchmont Papers,
1. 226. Chesterfield's request was for a colonelcy for his cousin,
George Stanhope, but he failed to obtain it. Certainly
Newcastle was quite needlessly suspicious when he supposed
that the King was influenced by a man he had always detested .
Lord Marchmont writes that the Duke was ' so jealous of the
Closet that he could not endure that any one should have
credit there '.—Ibid. I. 261.

74 HENRY FOX ch.
cations arose between the Secretaries, and finaUy,
on February 6, 1747, Chesterfield tendered his
resignation. Who was now to succeed to the difficult position
of coUeague to the Duke of Newcastle ? Three
men had been virtuaUy turned out because they
proved themselves obstacles to tyranny, and the
last two were certainly not picked for genius in
diplomacy. SmaU wonder that the post was not
assiduously sought.
The Duke himself (so Fox teUs us) expressed
a preference for Lord Sandwich,^"^ with whom
he had become intimate in the diplomatic world,
and whom he doubtless regarded as a devoted
adherent. The other candidate, prominently men
tioned though not himself seeking the honour,
was the Secretary-at-War, who thus writes of it
to his friend WiUiams : ' You wiU expect I should
say something of myself, as having been so much
named on this occasion. You will beheve, that
when Lord Chesterfield resigned, I felt with regard
to the Seals as I shaU with respect to the see of
Winchester when that prelate dies. Indeed, I no
more thought of the one than I did of the other.
The Duke of Newcastle declared early he would
name nobody ; Mr. Pelham said the same. Hence
standers-by named everybody, and amongst the
rest, me. All Sandwich's enemies were my friends ;
or, to express it better than by the word enemies,
those who wished him not to succeed, as it would
101 Fox to Williams, February 17, 1748.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 75
be too strong a declaration in favour of the war
like system. Joined to these, who were numerous
and of rank at court, the voice of the House of
Commons was much in my favour, and of none
more loudly than Lyttelton, Pitt, &c. I flatter
myself that from personal affection, too, I had
more active friends than I could have imagined,
or is usual ; and this has been a pleasure to me.
On the other side, as I never had thoughts of it,
or pretensions to it (though spirit enough to
undertake it, if it came strangely in my way) ; as
the execution of it might have been attended with
great discredit to myself, and certainly with much
uneasiness ; and as the whole of this transaction
has been such as leaves me the honour of being
talked of for it, without the reproach of having
pretended to what I could not attain, I am in
my mind as easy as ever I was, and shall go on
in my own track as cheerfuUy as ever, with as
little thought as I had of being Secretary of
State.' 1°^
There is little reason to suppose that Fox had
aspired to succeed Lord Chesterfield, and there is
certainly no evidence on record that he made any
move in the affair. But the fact which is most
significant — the fact which gave him justifiable
pleasure — was the evident recognition that his
abilities merited promotion. It was not without
some cause that his name had been prominently
mentioned for an office as important as the
102 Fox to Williams, February 17, 1748.

76 HENRY FOX ch.
Secretaryship of State. 'Mr. Fox,' wrote Lord
Anson, of the Admiralty Board, 'whose abUity
and credit in the House of Commons are great, will,
in my private opinion, push both the brothers
whenever he sees a fair opportunity ; for he does
not want ambition, nor any qualities that are
necessary to raise a man in this country to the
height of power.' ^"^ Such expressions are pretty
high praise ; nor are they from the pen of a political
friend. Presumably we may regard them as
correctly denoting his reputation. Surely Fox him
self was not so unduly modest as to fail to appre
ciate his value to the Ministry. He had already
' pushed ' them once when he became Secretary-at-
War. If he showed no desire to mount higher at
present, it was probably because he felt that
ambition would be better satisfied if he waited
tiU he could acquire such political strength as
would render him practicaUy independent of the
Pelhams. To have become the coUeague of New
castle without the means of restraining PeUiam
when his brother played the tyrant would have been
politically suicidal. The downfaU of Carteret was
not without its lesson.
If PeUiam's opinion had had its proper value,
there is reason to believe that his friend Fox
would have been nominated to the post, arduous
and hazardous as it was. Not that the latter
would have possessed added weight in the Com
mons, but because he might be reasonably reckoned
103 Barrow, Life of Anson, p. 199.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 77
upon to represent the views of Pelham and exert
a restraining influence against his brother's mono
poly of foreign policy. His past career gave him
reputation for an energetic spirit combined with a
politician's tact. There was hope that such a man
might be able to serve with Newcastle and yet win
some renown.
But if Pelham was unconsulted, Newcastle
was foiled. With the probable intention of
soothing Bedford for the disappointment he had
suffered in his colonial scheme, Newcastle hinted
that the Duke should be offered the Seals, ex
pecting beyond a doubt that he would decline
the offer in favour of Sandwich. But in this
the ducal schemer miscalculated, and Bedford
accepted the proffered offer — to serve, as he
said, for six months.^"* In that statement one
may perhaps discern the refuge of one who knew
the Duke of Newcastle.
It would be tedious and unnecessary here to
enumerate the several steps by which the pro
tracted war was eventuaUy brought to an end and
peace concluded. Overtures had come from the
French side as early as June 1746 ; but a dispute
having arisen between the envoys concerned in
the negotiation, hostilities were again renewed,
and fraught with the same disasters to the
AUies. Finally, in August 1747, Saxe again signi
fied his willingness for peace, and suggested a
conference with the Duke of Cumberland to that
104 Fox to Williams, February 17, 1748.

78 HENRY FOX ch.
end. Pelham did not disapprove the choice, but
Newcastle seems to have distrusted the Duke's
capacity,"* and, as usual, carried the Cabinet
with him.
By a compromise the Duke was aUowed nominaUy
to head the mission, whUe the active work was put
in the hands of his friend, Sandwich, who departed
under a load of troublesome instructions. A con
gress having been arranged at Aix-la-ChapeUe,
the preliminaries of peace were signed April 30,
1748, and after much bickering among the Allies
the definitive treaty was concluded, October 18.
In aU this struggle on the subject of peace, Fox
and Pitt were officiaUy unconcerned. WhUe their
positions respectively were nearly on a par, they
could scarcely be considered to hold more than sub
ordinate offices, neither of which was accompanied
by a seat in the Cabinet. Fox, as we have seen,
went so far as privately to urge the cessation of
hostihties ; but Pitt— naturaUy the more out
spoken of the two — seems to have trusted in
silence as the better device. Shortly after the
signing of the treaty. Fox atoned for his past
criticism of Newcastle by writing a letter to the
Duke in which he praised both the treaty and the
Duke's share therein ; "® and Newcastle (then at
105 Not without reason. The Duke of Cumberland had had
no experience in diplomacy, and it was doubtful if he possessed
the temper necessary for so delicate a task.
106 Fox to Newcastle, November 15, 1748 : Add. MSS., 32717,
f . 198. A month before Fox had sent a few lines of congratula
tion.— Ibid, f. 86.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 79
Hanover) was so gratified that he read the letter
to the King. His Majesty (so the Duke replied)
was pleased to believe that the nation echoed the
sentiments of Fox, as the latter had intimated."'
But the Secretary-at-War must have laughed in his
sleeve when he thought of this letter ; for Han
bury Williams had been his only consideration,
and to us at least the motive of his eulogies is
shamefully transparent.^"^
In the prosecution of his duties as Secretary-at-
War, Fox seems to have been dUigent and pains
taking, scrupulous in his inquiries into abuses,
and acting in hearty co-operation with the Duke
of Newcastle, whose love of managing brought
him into all departments. Nor was Fox ever
wanting in tact in his deahngs with his inquisitive
overlord, seeing Avith the pohtician' s eye the
fruit that might be plucked for his friends, whose
interests he had so much at heart. He was
grateful to His Grace for ' civilities ' to his nephew,
Harry Digby ; "® and the question of Hanbury
WiUiams's career was one which he never aUowed
the Secretary to forget.^" Fox had vainly tried
to get his friend the embassy at Turin, but
107 Newcastle to Fox, November 26, 1748 : ibid. f. 321.
108 He even mentioned Williams in the letter in question.
See also below, note 111.
109 Fox to Newcastle, August 3, 1750 : Add. MSS., 32722,
f. 40. Digby was a son of Fox's sister, Charlotte, who had
married Edward Digby, son of William, fifth Lord Digby.
110 Fox to Newcastle, July 8, July 19, and October 15, 1748,
and June 22, 1749.

80 HENRY FOX ch.
by dint of perseverance he was able to procure
for him a task almost equally attractive."^
When in 1749 the resignation of Doddington
left vacant the office of Treasurer of the Navy,
Fox was tempted to make a bid for a post more
lucrative than his own ; but the King and the
Duke of Cumberland ' so earnestly pressed him
to remain Secretary-at-War that he could not
refuse '.^^^ While Fox presided at the War Office,
the Duke felt that he had a friend upon whom he
could rely in the department that was nearest his
heart. By way of compensation Fox was to be
gratified by the promotion of WUhams as special
envoy to the Court of Berlin ; "^ and the coveted
post fell eventuaUy to Henry Legge, when Lyttelton,
who was Pelham's choice, had failed of re-election."*
Pitt, ever since his outburst in 1743, had been
a stalwart supporter of the Administration in the
Lower House. If he had gained a promotion
twice, he might well hope to succeed once more ;
and his interest in foreign affairs pointed to the
seals of the Secretary of State. In the meantime
the Pelhams had rewarded him (for the elections
of 1747) with the rotten borough of Seaford ;
111 The privilege of carrying the blue riband to the Margrave
of Anspach, a ' profitable commission ', which Newcastle had
twice promised ; but Fox seemed not to trust him. — ^Fox to
Newcastle, June 22, 1749 : Add. MSS., 32718, f . 252.
112 Walpole to Mann, March 23, 1749 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, II. 365.
113 Works of Charles Hanbury Williams, II. 208.
11* Phillimore, Memoirs of Lyttelton, II. 477.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 81
and the elder brother seems to have shown a
particular interest in his cause that was not whoUy
creditable to either of them."* But Pitt, on his
side, was as indifferent as usual to appearances, and
it mattered little to him that the outraged con
stituency should try to unseat him. Now and
then some opponent in Parliament would have the
hardihood to assail him for abandoning his earlier
principles ; but the only effect of such a feat was
to court a torrent of abuse, and in general the
members had, themselves, too much reason for
avoiding any question of political ethics.
So now that Pitt was tamed and trained in the
ways of ministerial rectitude, the rivalry, which
had once promised to be so noteworthy, slumbered
until new issues or new interests should divide the
two. In fact we have seen Pitt lending his support
to the proposition of giving Fox the Seals, while
the latter, on his side, wrote of the Paymaster as
a man whom he 'liked and admired'."® Indeed,
if the two men had not been so utterly different
in tastes and temperament, their brief skirmish in
1743 might have been the last. But Pitt cared too
much for notoriety and Fox too little for public
opinion ; the former paraded his principles in
public life, the latter had too few to parade (even
had it accorded with his nature to do so) ; while
115 See the interesting account in Torrens, History of British
Cabinets, II. 107 ; also von Ruville, I. 284-5.
n' Quoted by Coxe from a letter of Fox to WiUiams,
Memoirs of Lord Walpole, p. 414.
1156 J.

82 HENRY FOX ch,
each nursed ambitions that knew no scruple.
Such failings were mutuaUy incompatible.
Fox had remained true to Pelham, as he had
been to Walpole, though occasional opposition to
the former on minor measures showed the distinc
tion in his mind between the two chiefs. Bred
in the school of politics of which Walpole had
been so adept an organizer. Fox was politicaUy
a tjrpical representative of his time. He had
neither the taste nor the talent ever to become
a reformer, and he was not of the stuff that en
genders a constructive genius. Lord Bath paid
him the tribute of being ' the ablest speaker on
business in the House of Commons '."' There
indeed lay his work.
In jobbery and lobbying Fox was exceptionally
expert. He knew the price of each vote, and he
could read the nature of the man with whom he
had to deal ; more than that, he had the art of
winning friends and attaching them to himself ;
and their interests became his. But above aU he
knew the House of Commons thoroughly, with aU
its shortcomings and fluctuations, and it was in
the Commons that he chiefly proved his value to
the Ministry.
As a speaker, Fox practised few of the dexterous
arts in which pohtical orators so often indulge ;
and his delivery showed a tendency to hesitate,
which sometimes impaired the impression he
wished to create; but his speeches were practical,
11' Harris, Life of Hardwicke, II. 379.

I RIVAL LIEUTENANTS 83
if they were not eloquent, and at times exhibited
such ingenuity and spirit that his animation and
rapidity, as Archdeacon Coxe describes it,^" was
more striking from his former hesitation. Quick
to reply, keen and often humorous in repartee,
but above all sound and logical in judgement, he
had a lawyer's insight into the weak points of
an argument, and seldom if ever aUowed his
passions to gain the mastery of him.
Pitt had the force of eloquence and could awe
and impress where he could not convince. Fox
had the power to convince where he could not
charm. But the two champions had scarce drawn
their swords. The long duel was still before them.
118 Coxe, Memoirs of Lord Walpole, p. 410.

f2

CHAPTER II
THE CUMBERLAND PARTY
Ever since the faU of Bolingbroke the Whig
Party had been supreme in the counsels of the
British nation. It had triumphed in its pohcy
of resistance to militant Catholicism, and had
built up the all-controUing dyarchy of Cabinet
and Commons. In a moment of public alarm the
Septennial Act had been passed, curtaUing the
opportunities for popular reform ; and the new
dynasty, which was in a sense the outward and
visible sign of their power, was slowly but surely
rendered secure. In 1719 the Upper House, once
the battle-ground of Shaftesbury and Danby, had
failed utterly to unloose the fetters which bound
them to the Lower ; while the foreign character
of the rulers of the new dynasty made as yet an
obstructive King and a Tory Minister a fleeting
memory of Stuart days.
But the Whigs, freed from the dangers of spirited
competition, lost also its wholesome effects. They
grew overbearing, overconfident. By corrup
tion in politics the House of Commons became
little better than a well-organized machine for
plutocratic Whiggism ; while the long period of
peace and prosperity which attended Walpole's

ch. II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 85
government, was only an opportunity for making
Whig supremacy the more sure. FinaUy, the
widespread apathy, which seemed to characterize
the first half of the eighteenth century, was but
reflected in the absence of political integrity
among most of the leaders in the State. In short,
a long tenure of power had proved enervating.
The infusion of a new spirit was what the Whig
Party needed, but seemed unable to obtain.
Yet even a triumphant party may have its
sources of weakness, and the Whigs were not free
from serious forces of disintegration — yea, within
their very midst. Perhaps in the breakdown of the
Walpolean supremacy are to be seen the first signs
of that force which revealed their gradual decay.
The assault upon Walpole was in no sense a war
of principles ; it was, rather, an outbreak, half
vengeful, half self-interested, of selfish men just
wresting themselves free of the great power that
had kept them in durance and painful unity so
long. To keep these atoms of discord in check by
gathering them all into one conglomerate unit was
the prime endeavour of the man whom Walpole
had named his heir. But such a union was
purely a bond of temporary expediency. The
evil of faction, vt^hich had made itself felt in Wal
pole's declining years, would rise again so soon as
the governing power was found to waver ; and
Whiggism had never a foe more fatal than Thomas
Pelham-HoUes, Duke of Newcastle.
The Tories had but a remnant of their ancient

86 HENRY FOX ch.
influence. Their reputation ruined by Bolingbroke
and their credit weighed down under the paU of
Stuart pretensions, what hope had they of ever
laying low their powerful rivals ? It was vain for
them to clamour for more representative parlia
ments while the bulk of the party adhered silently
to Jacobitism. The usual tactics of an Opposition
would deceive no one. Lacking a straightforward
and practicable policy, they were helpless to
combat a party which had adopted as its basis
the commercial interests of the nation and a con
stitutional king. Wanting in the means of growth
and deficient in effective leadership, the Tories
remained but an insignificant element, powerless
and unf eared. When finally, in 1 745, the overthrow
of the last Stuart pretender made them henceforth
a national party and supporters — against their
will — of that very dynasty, which Walpole's rule
had made secure, they had not the sagacity — ^nor
perhaps the patience — to embrace their oppor
tunity ; but, following the example of some
disaffected Whigs, the Tories brought their shat
tered fortunes to a factious prince, and Unked their
fate with that of Leicester House.
It was Egmont, the guiding spirit of the Tories,
who had effected this coahtion in 1749.^ But
1 Walpole to Mann, May 3, 1749 : Letters of Horace Walpole,
II. 368. Lord Egmont — who, by the way, was the holder of an
Irish peerage, and therefore not entitled to a seat in the House
of Lords — was an earnest and upright man, but not of sufficient
force to impress his personality upon the party. An interest
ing estimate of him is to be found in a note by the second

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 87
Egmont himself was lacking in the principal
requisites for leadership, whUe Dashwood, Nugent,
and Dr. George Lee were men of merely secondary
abihties, and even that gay intriguer, Bubb
Doddington, with all his imperturbable vanity,
could add no real strength to the cause when he
resigned his office in order to devote himself whoUy
to the Prince. The importance of Leicester House
was not to be felt till a subsequent ministry should
prove its incapacity.
But a less clamorous though much more signifi
cant party ^ was gathering strength and coherence
within the ranks of the Whigs themselves. For
some years the Duke of Cumberland had been the
friend, and, to a certain degree, the patron of the
Earl of Sandwich, who in turn was near the heart
and mind of the Duke of Bedford. The connexion
Lord Hardwicke on the back of one of Newcastle's letters to
his father. ' Lord Egmont,' he writes, ' who had abilities,
was a particular (sic) mysterious man, and made very little of
his ambition. He did not draw well with the others, and
could not endure Mr. Pitt.' Egmont had now been recently
appointed a lord of the bedchamber to the Prince.
2 I acknowledge that I am using the term ' party ' rather
loosely. Properly speaking, the Cumberlands represented
a political ' faction ', for a ' party ' is generally regarded as
standing for some definite principle or principles. Yet since
the Whigs were at present the only political party of any
real importance, and formed a plexus of widely different
opinions if not interests, and since the period (so far as politics
are concerned) was essentiaUy one of faction — to the extent
that the principles of Toryism, for example, were almost lost
sight of — there may be some justification for using the broader
and more dignified term.

88 HENRY FOX ch.
between the first two has been noticed in the case of
the peace negotiations ; while the last two were
closely aUied in the question of Chesterfield's
successor for the Seals. Just how Henry Fox
became attached to the Duke of Cumberland does
not appear, but we soon find him a welcome
habitue of the circle at Windsor Lodge, where the
Duke lived with his unmarried sister, the Princess
Amelia. Thither Fox also brought his friend
Williams, whose proverbial wit must have whiled
away many a dull hour for the young soldier, now
forced to endure the monotony of peace.
Fox himself was gracious and entertaining, and
even Chesterfield, who seems to have dishked him,
admits that he ' had a wonderful dexterity in
attaching individuals to himself '.' That he was
popular in social circles is certainly beyond
question. His besetting sin, a fondness for the
gaming table, made him the boon companion
of many ; and the sources of his income were
certainly not limited to his official salary. In the
autumn of 1748, his friend, Horace Walpole, writes
that he took a £10,000 prize ; * and whatever were
the means. Fox's life may assuredly be credited
with financial success. Then, besides a liberal and
expansive purse and a fondness for entertaining,
he had the good fortune to possess a father-in-law
who enjoyed a social position as high as any among
3 Chesterfield's Sketches : Corres. of Chesterfield, III. 1726.
* Walpole to Montagu, October 20, 1748 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, II. 346 ; see also letter of AprU 22, 1751.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 89
the peers. When we add to this that Fox was a
man of recognized ability, and though personaUy
attached to Pelham and his politics, was far from
approving of his brother and the ChanceUor, it
is not strange that his value was appreciably high
to the ' Cumberland Party '.
Relieved from the burden of war, the First Lord
was now free to emulate the beneficent rule of his
late patron ; but it was his misfortune that
a united cabinet seemed beyond the range of
possibility. Whereas it was Pelham's aim to lull
the murmurs of discontent, whether in office or
out, it seemed as though Newcastle were mentally
and raoraUy incapable of co-operation with a
colleague at the Foreign Office. In the spring of
1749, ill-feeling between the two Secretaries had
reached the verge of a crisis ; * while the Duke
of Bedford's intimacy with Windsor Lodge came
in time to be regarded as little less than a
conspiracy by his sensitive colleague. Pelham,
naturally unsuspicious, and anxious to conciliate
so important a circle, was glad to accept the
cordiality which Cumberland offered ; but the
presence of the First Lord at Windsor Lodge gave
no measure of confidence to Newcastle, who
seemed not to trust his brother, and felt his own
exclusion the more keenly.®
5 On the occasion of the King's preparations for visiting
Hanover.— Walpole to Mann, March 23, 1749: ibid. II. 365.
* ' I think it a little hard,' he writes to Pelham from abroad,
* that the Duke of Cumberland and the Princess AmeUa should

90 HENRY FOX CH.
There was also an added reason for Newcastle's
suspicions, as well as a more definite cause for his
estrangement from Bedford. It appears that some
differences over the recent peace negotiations '
had produced a coolness between the director
of foreign policy and his quondam favourite,
the Earl of Sandwich. Not unnaturaUy the
Duke of Cumberland took up the cause of his
friend, although willing to promote a reconcilia
tion if that were possible. The explosion which
followed is best described by Fox in a letter to
WiUiams : ' Sandwich gave His Royal Highness
a carte blanche. His Royal Highness proposed an
use me so cruelly as they have done : excommunicated me from
all society, set a kind of brand or mark upon me and aU who
think with me, and set up a new, unknown, factious young party
to rival me and nose me everywhere. This goes to my heart.
I am sensible if I could have submitted and cringed to such
usage, the pubhc appearances would have been better, and
perhaps some secret stabs been avoided ; but I was too proud,
and too innocent, to do it.' — Newcastle to Pelham, May 20,
1750 : Coxe, Pdham Administration, II. 336.
' The episode had been another consequence of the long
dissension in the Cabinet on the subject of peace. The
embarrassments in the present case are not difficult to appre
ciate : at Hanover were the King and Newcastle, endeavouring
to direct the whole negotiation ; at London were the Lords
Justices (the Cabinet ex officio), earnestly desirous of peace ;
and at Aix were the envoys of the several nations concerned
in the war, unable to agree upon terms. Sandwich having
received contradictory orders, and knowing the sentiment of
the majority of the Cabinet, delayed the execution of his latest
instructions (designed to coerce Austria), and in consequence
was censured by the Duke of Newcastle. See Coxe, Pdham
Administration, I. 463-4, II. 1-5.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 91
accommodation. His Grace never honoured the
Duke with any answer ; left him off, grew cool,
impertinent, and inveterate. In the same manner,
a letter from the Duke of Newcastle to the Princess
A  had pert, not to say impertinent, expressions
in it, which, instead of explaining, he aggravated,
when he came home ; and a breach ensued.'
An open quarrel with the Cumberlands was more
momentous than Newcastle was likely yet to
appreciate. For his own part jealousy was per
haps always the predominant influence. The Duke
of Bedford Fox once described as 'the most un
governable and governed man ' that he ever knew.*
But however truly in the main he might suffer
a friend to lead him, the Duke seldom faUed, at
such times, to concoct a violent surprise; and he
was both more inteUigent and more independent
than his contemporaries were wont to think him.
Rough in his manner, but honest in his convictions,
the Junior Secretary was of a temper that was
capable of much stubborn resentment, yet far
from intractable if handled with tact. Unhappily
the Duke of Newcastle had neither the tact nor
(apparently) the wiU to cultivate a coUeague who
was neither docile nor opinionless ; and a tendency
of Bedford's to act independently within his
own department — and that too with success® —
8 Fox to WiUiams, December 15, 1751 : Coxe Papers, Add.
MSS., 9191.
9 In the autumn of 1748 Bedford again proved his interest
in American affairs by a plan to colonize Nova Scotia with

92 HENRY FOX ch.
awakened in Newcastle aU the jealousy of one long
accustomed to a sovereign sway in foreign affairs.
It was inevitable that the Duke of Newcastle
should try the same tactics which he had employed
with so much success against Harrington and
Chesterfield ; and at times the King seemed quite
disposed to dismiss the offender, who had never
taken pains to win his favour by harmless flattery.
But Bedford was more callous than Chesterfield,
and the First Lord was too wary a pohtician to
alienate without reason a valuable wing of the
party. Newcastle pleaded, expostulated, even
threatened resignation — but aU in vain." Instead
of the usual brief conflict with success assured, the
Senior Secretary was soon to see the King and
Lady Yarmouth espouse the cause of Bedford,"
veterans of the late war, a matter on which he consulted Fox
and PeUiam, but not — as far as we know — ^Newcastle. — ^Bedford
to Cumberland, October 28, 1748 : Bedford Corres. I. 572.
Later Bedford aroused his coUeague's jealousy anew by settling
a delicate question involved in the relations of England and
France over Nova Scotia. The matter lay entirely within the
Duke's department, and he seems to have co-operated with
Lord Albemarle, Ambassador at Paris, without reference to
Newcastle, and at first without consulting him. ' Dear brother,'
complained the latter in one of his protests from Hanover,
' think what such a man so made is capable of doing and then
think the rest.' — Newcastle to Pelham, June 17, 1750.
10 Once the Duke went so far as suggest that both he and
his brother should give way to a Cumberland-GranviUe
administration ; but Pelham had no desire for a useless exUe,
and the extravagant proposal led to another rupture between
the brothers. — Bedford Corres. II. 88-9.
11 Coxe, Pelham Administration, II. 126.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 93
and in the end the fact would face him that he
had converted a circle of friends into what was
virtuaUy a political party, with its single watch
word — antipathy to himself.
There was still another dispute in the Ministry,
which demands a brief consideration. The Duke
of Newcastle had no sooner seen peace assured
than he indulged himself with dreams of a grand
alliance of continental powers. Dissuaded from
this undertaking,^^ the Duke later embarked upon
a project that should make him the arbiter of
Europe and the defender of its ancient system, the
balance of power. The plan was, in short, to
secure by subsidies a majority of the Imperial
electors to support Maria Theresa's son for King
of the Romans. To accomplish this, a network of
intrigue — against which France was only too eager
to play a counter-rdle — was the inevitable policy
for the Duke to pursue. Stripped of aU delusive
euphony it was a plain question of buying votes.
Pelham, whose greatest virtue was economy, did
not disguise his disapproval.^* It was only with
great reluctance that he consented to the Bavarian
subsidy (declaring publicly that it would be the
last), and he was not without reason indignant when
12 Pelham deprecated a policy of subsidies in time of peace.
The disagreement resulted in another cessation of intimacy
between the two. — Ibid. II. 47-8.
1^ Perhaps for the sake of peace in the Cabinet, Pelham had
certainly not at first discouraged the project. But later on
we find him writing, ' Your foreign politics I protest I do
not understand.' — Ibid. II. 344.

94 HENRY FOX ch.
a treaty with Saxony foUowed. Yet the Duke
was able as usual to bully his brother, and a
bribe was next planned for the Elector Palatine.
Williams, who had the purchase of the Saxon vote
in charge, assured Newcastle that Fox would lend
his support to the great scheme." Whether or not
Fox really ' approved of subsidies ' (and evidence
seems to show that he did") it is quite unlikely that
he concerned himself seriously with problems of
foreign politics. When caUed upon to support the
Administration in the Commons, he would always
be content to trust the judgement of the Cabinet.
But the negotiations with the Elector Palatine
marked the end of the affair. As soon as some
concessions were expected from the Empress-
Queen, she revealed the spirit which underlay her
whole attitude on the subject. She had no objec
tion to a foreign power buying her son his rightful
succession, but she refused to give up territory
as the price in the transaction. And so ended
Newcastle's chimerical scheme for improving his
Government's relations with Austria.
It was only natural that the endless quarrels
in the Cabinet should be carefuUy noted by the
two foremost of the men outside. For Fox there
was no advantage to be gained from lessening his
1* Newcastle to Pelham, June 20, 1750 : Coxe, Pelham
Administration, II. 345.
15 In December 1751 he spoke with regret of the abandon
ment of this particular scheme. — Fox to WiUiams, December
15, 1751.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 95
accustomed loyalty to Pelham ; but Pitt — perhaps
with a view of succeeding Bedford when the time
should come " — sought to ingratiate himself with
the Duke of Newcastle. One is tempted to smile,
in view of coming events, on reading with what
ardour he defends the Bavarian subsidy, and in
wordy commendation expresses approval of his
patron's foreign policy." And this was the man
who had railed against Carteret !
A crisis was reached when the Paymaster feU
ruthlessly upon one of Pelham's measures in Parlia
ment " and tore it to shreds with merciless oratory.
Was his restless spirit tired of exclusion from the
pleasures of the Cabinet and indignant that three
Secretaries had been chosen without regard to him ?
or was he merely venting his spleen on PeUiam
for Newcastle's benefit ? " At aU events the
1^ Such is the plausible view advanced by Dr. von Ruville. —
William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (Eng. trans.), I. 293-4.
" Pitt to Newcastle, August 24, 1750 (Corres. I. 44), July 26,
1750, and February 25, 1751 : Add. MSS., 32721, f . 421 ; 32724,
f . 143. ' Your very affectionate friend ' was Newcastle's
occasional method of closing his letters to Pitt ; and the
correspondence between the two seems to have been extremely
intimate and confidential.
18 The measure of reducing the number of seamen from
10,000 to 8,000. Pelham was forced into such measures of
economy by Newcastle's expensive speculations in diplomacy.
19 Although the supposed poUtical advantage of ingratiating
himself with Newcastle was the probable motive for Pitt's
action, the remarks of Horace Walpole are worth noting.
' The key to this (act),' he writes, ' you wUl find in his own
behaviour ; whenever he wanted new advancement, he used
to go off. He has openly met with great discouragement now ;

96 HENRY FOX ch.
world seemed to believe the latter, and Newcastle
did not hesitate to recognize the service.^" At
this time the discord between the brothers was at
its acutest stage, until Pelham, to avoid irre
trievable rupture, wrote a formal overture inviting
reconciliation. ^^
Parliamentary history of 1748-50 was uninter
ruptedly dull. Except for a trifling question of
whether the summer assizes should be held at
Buckingham the two rival orators were never
divided, and Pitt took little part in the debates
of 1749-50.
In the spring of the former the Cumberlands
actively supported some measures of Lord Anson
respecting naval judicature,^^ which were dropped,
however, because of their unpopularity. During
most of these years Fox kept an almost unbroken
silence, but in 1750 the efforts of the Commons were
though he and we know Mr. Pelham so well that it wiU not be
surprising if, though baffied, he still carries his point of Secre
tary of State.' — Walpole to Mann, February 9, 1751 : Letters,
II. 31. Undoubtedly Pitt's ambition for the Seals was at the
bottom of the whole affair.
20 See his interesting letter to a relative. Colonel Pelham. —
Coxe, Pelham, II. 144. ' Dear Pitt,' wrote Newcastle m a letter
to his wife, ' is the best of aU, and is turning his thoughts to
everything that can be of use.' The Duke not only enlightened
him as to foreign policy, but laid bare his heart on the subject
of his estrangement from his brother over the Bedford affair.
See Chatham Corres. I. 43, 47, and 54.
21 Coxe, Pdham Administration, II. 145.
22 Walpole to Mann, March 23, 1749 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, II. 365.

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 97
largely directed to military measures, in which Fox,
as Secretary-at-War, was particularly interested.
On the 23rd of January the House having re
solved itself into a committee on the Mutiny BiU,
attention was given to the clause enacting that
' no officer should be liable tp trial a second time
for the same offence, unless in the case of an appeal
from a regimental to a general court-martial.' Fox
introduced the amendment proposed by the com
mittee : ' and no sentence, given by any court-
martial and signed by the president, shaU be hable
to be revised more than once.' Egmont then sug
gested omitting ' more than once '.
Pitt, Murray and others supported the com
mittee's amendment. Fox declared that he had
opposed it as tending to weaken the oath, since,
if Parliament should decide to inquire into the
proceedings of a court-martial, it would be easy
for the officers implicated to secure the passage
of a biU forcing the court-martial to disclose in
dividual opinions. But although he was stiU of
the opinion that the amendment was urmecessary,
he could see that a majority of the House favoured
it, and hence he would not oppose ; yet, on the other
hand, he would consent to no further amendment,
lest it should render the oath insignificant. He then
delivered an able speech in defence of the oath of
absolute secrecy, which he begged should not be
exposed to unnecessary encroachments ; and con
cluded by warning the House of the danger of
aUowing a naval officer to learn the names of those
U56 ft

98 HENRY FOX ch.
members of a court-martial who had impeached his
conduct. The inclusion of ' more than once '
was agreed upon by a vote of 177 to 125, after
which the original motion was carried.^ Fox's
attitude had shown both a desire to express his
honest views, and a realization of the completeness
of Parhament' s subservience to its chief.
On February 7 Colonel George Townshend intro
duced a clause ensuring non-commissioned officers
from aU punishment other than those imposed by
court-martial. Fox was among the speakers who
opposed the innovation, which was ably defended
by its author, but fimaUy overruled by a vote of
178 to 109.^
In the winter and spring of 1751 debates waxed
warmest over comparatively unimportant matters,
and one of the fiercest battles was fought in
January over an election case. Lord Trentham,
son of Earl Gower (both father and son were now
identified with the Cumberland Party), having
stood for Westminster in December of the past
year, had defeated his opponent Sir George
Vandeput by a substantial majority ; "^ but the
23 Parliamentary History, XIV. 621-2 ; 627-31.
24 Ibid. XIV. 641 ; 654-6.
25 Lord Trentham, having been recently appointed to the
Admiralty, was thus compeUed to stand for re-election. In
1745 there had been considerable opposition to his candidature
at Westminster, and since the opposing candidate was sup
ported by Leicester House, the conflict had virtuaUy been a
struggle between the princes — ^resulting in a Cumberland
victory.— Gregs, History of Parliamentary Elections, p. 110.

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 99
scrutiny which foUowed seemed inexcusably pro
tracted. In the end the High BaUiff sustained the
election of Trentham, but the adherents of the
losing candidate had been guUty of much obstruc
tion and violence, among whom was a gentleman
of reputed Jacobitish tendencies, the Hon.
Alexander Murray.
Soon after Parliament opened after its winter
recess a petition in favour of Vandeput was pre
sented by a certain Mr. Cooke, not only charging
the High Bailiff with unwarrantable delay in
the aforesaid scrutiny, but also attacking Lord
Trentham. The latter then retahated by reading
a letter in which Cooke had praised him in the
highest terms.
At this Egmont, who had no liking for a famUy
that had deserted the Tory standard, remarked
that at least the letter was ' honest flattery', and
rather irrelevantly expressed his personal obligation
to Westminster. Fox, whose partisanship likewise
never cooled, said in reply that ' of aU men
Egmont had had the smaUest obligation to West
minster ', which, by rejecting him, had exposed
the doctrine of 'honest flattery'.*® Fox and Pitt
Bedford admitted that the election cost him £7,000, and Gower
paid the heavy expenses of the scrutiny. — Walpole to Mann,
January 31, 1 750 : Letters of Horace Walpole, II. 423. Vandeput
was under the patronage of Egmont, who wanted to recover
his interest at Westminster.
26 Defeated at Westminster in the elections of 1747, Egmont
had obtained through Fox's courtesy a seat for Weobley. The
latter had then the dissatisfaction of seeing Egmont become
g2

100 HENRY FOX ch.
were for summoning the High BaUiff to vindicate
his conduct, and when the latter had been acquitted,
Murray and others were summoned to the bar to
answer for lawless interference. NaturaUy the
Tories had espoused the cause of the accused, and
Nugent declared bitterly that Lord Sandwich was
the author of the measures against Murray.
The Opposition, led by Egmont and sometimes
reinforced by Pelham and others, showed through
out a manly desire to shield the culprit from
unreasonable resentment, but Fox, who raUied the
younger Whigs, seemed bent upon violent measures.
After the examination of Murray had been brought
to a conclusion, and Fox had summed up the case
with much the same abihty that he had shown
in the defence of Lestock, it was resolved by an
enormous majority to commit the prisoner to
Newgate ; ^' but not content with this victory, the
eager prosecutors prevaUed upon the timid Pelham
to consent to the proposal that Murray should re
ceive the sentence upon his knees. On the latter's
dignified but persistent refusal Fox moved that his
soon afterwards a lord of the bedchamber to the Prince. On
the other hand, the Tory leader had hoped to find in Fox an
aUy against Pelham, and was likewise deceived. — Walpole,
Memoirs, I. 31 ; Corres. III. 34. Probably these misunder
standings led to the subsequent disUke which existed between
the two.
^ The motion convicting Murray of violence was passed by
the enormous majority of 136 out of a total vote of 210.
Doddington writes in his Diary (February 18, 1751), that he
' never saw an accusation worse supported by anything but
nu^mbers '.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 101
prospective quarters be changed to the ' Little
Ease ', a prison so barbarously constructed that
an occupant could neither stand erect nor lie at
length. To this suggestion, however, the First
Lord refused to consent, and the Commons were
saved from an act of tjrranny more worthy of the
rule of James I than of an Hanoverian regime.
The month of February was spent intermittently
in discussing how little comfort the injured man
should be aUowed, a matter that varied according
to his health ; and the case languished till the end
of the session, which set the prisoner at liberty.
In the next session, exasperated by pamphlet
criticism, Pelham tried to relieve an uneasy con
science by warmly denouncing Murray and sup
porting a renewal of the case ; but the persecution
was fortunately terminated by the news that the
intended victim had retired to the Continent. ^8
The conduct of PeUiam, but more particularly of
Fox, in the shameful affair had produced a striking
example of the intoxication of an overbearing
party and an irresponsible House of Commons.
Whatever sins the First Lord committed are
usually traceable to his craven statesmanship, but
in Fox was shown a degree of cruelty, that is
almost inexplicable in view of the genial, kindly
nature that endeared him to so many.
28 The chief authorities for the case of Murray are : Walpole,
Memoirs of George II, passim ; Letters, II. 429-30 ; Parlia
mentary History, XIV. 870-901 ; Coxe, Pelham Administration,
II. 183-6 ; London Magazine for 1747, pp. 291-3, 362-6.

102 HENRY FOX ch.
Soon after this a question came up of equaUy
slight importance, but since it was, like the case
of Murray, a matter that concerned the rights
of a subject, the House found opportunity to
\vrangle to its heart's content. General An-
struther, Lieutenant-Governor of Minorca, being
unpopular and for that reason suspicious, had
entertained distrust of Sir Harry Erskine (who
commanded a regiment there) on the ground that
the latter was forming a conspiracy against his
character. He accordingly brought the younger
man to trial, which resulted in an acquittal.
This verdict should have satisfied Sir Harry
Erskine, but he was too headstrong to be content
with one victory and deliberately commenced a
second chapter of the quarrel. On the occasion of
a motion of Lord Egmont, who argued that An-
struther had contravened the Mutiny Act, Erskine
snatched the opportunity to inveigh against the
General. Hence the foUowing day (February 20)
Anstriither himself appeared in the House and
another altercation took place, which seemed,
however, to be the last appearance of the affair.
But the quarrel was not even then suffered to
slumber. On March 4 Colonel Townshend proposed
a rigid parhamentary inquiry into the aforesaid
court-martial and concluded with an aUusion
to Anstruther's conviction in 1738, on charges of
oppressing the islanders. Erskine was on his feet
again with complaints of partiality, which PeUiam
forthwith treated with scorn, although he declared

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 103
his wiUingness that Anstruther should be brought
before a court-martial. Pitt gave the motion the
warmest support.
Fox, on the other hand, protested that no one,
even though guilty, could be brought to trial for
offences committed prior to the Act of Grace,
and could not refrain from hinting that Erskine' s
disavowal of a desire for revenge was having a
strange effect. The lawyers sustained Fox almost
to a man ; and when a motion by the Secretary-
at-War had reduced the number of papers to be
introduced, Erskine was given two days to prepare
his charges.
The following day Townshend presented a peti
tion against Anstruther from a certain inhabitant
of Minorca, and Pitt supported it with much
vehemence. This roused Fox, who ridiculed Pitt's
warmth, and warned the House that the accept
ance of the petition would give a handle to any
other inhabitant who believed the General guilty.
The petition, on Fox's motion, was rejected by
a vote of 97 to 58. The King, on being informed
of the debate, asked if Pitt was now trying to
curry favour with Egmont.
On the 11th Erskine brought in his charges,
which proved to be a very slight explosion after
a great deal of smoke. Townshend subsequently
made another effort to convict Anstruther, but
after much bickering over technicalities, and a
persistent defence of Anstruther's interests by
Fox, it was decided that the Act of Grace was, as

104 HENRY FOX ch.
Fox had asserted, sufficient legal defence for the
General. Pitt, seemg that he had been treading
on uncertain ground, sought shelter under an
expressed desire to reform the Mutiny BiU, and
the House was content with the promise from
both parties that they would carry the quarrel no
further.*® Fox had felt throughout that resentment against
Anstruther for his vote in the Porteous case had
been the motive for the long struggle to indict
him, and he knew that Erskine, as nephew of the
Duke of ArgyU, was extremely likely to have been
prejudiced. That Fox had not shown equal fair
ness in the proceedings against Murray is certainly
regrettable. Walpole in one of his letters remarks
that ' the affair would be a trifle, if it had not
opened the long-smothered rivalry between Pitt
and Fox '.^
Meanwhile, with Pelham's concurrence, Nugent
xinearthed the biU for the naturalization of foreign
Protestants,^^ to which there appeared at first
but little opposition. But on February 26, when
the bUl was read for the second time, the First
Lord received a shock that he had long had cause
to expect. Fox, who had formerly opposed the
biU to please him, refused to change his attitude
29 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. passim.
30 Walpole to Mann, March 13, 1750: Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 37.
81 Pelham had brought forward the measure in 1747, but
finaUy dropped it on the appearance of opposition.

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 106
now when Pelham supported it. But of more
pointed significance was the conduct of the satel-'
lites of Bedford, who showed their contempt f or ,
the First Lord by leaving the House before the\
division.'^ The Cumberlands had struck their
first blow.
The biU, committed on the 26th, came up before
the committee on the 8th of the foUowing month ;
and to Pelham's great rehef the Secretary-at-War
showed his evident desire to wipe out suspicion of
connivance with his faction. SkilfuUy vindicating
his desire to appear consistent. Fox declared himself
opposed to the bill, but open to conviction, and
after Pelham had pointed out the advantages to
be derived, the Secretary rose to assure him that
he was convinced.'^ The bUl was finaUy thrown
out after an enforced adjournment of the Houses,
opinion being so violently against the measure that
PeUiam yielded to popular prejudice. Fox and
Pitt did some skirmishing on the day of its decease
— ' Caesar and Pompey squabbling when they had
nothing to say.' ^*
On March 20, 1751, the rivalry between the two
brothers royal, and the greatest anxiety of the
King himself, was brought to an end by the
death of Frederick, Prince of Wales. The childish
82 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 47-8. Bedford himself
had affected to approve of the bill.
88 While Pitt ^^•as availing himself of this fine opening for
ridicule. Fox is said to have murmured, ' He is an abler speaker
than I, but, thank God, I have more judgement.' — Ibid. I. 53.
34 Ibid. I. 79.

100 HENRY FOX ch.
petulance of his whole hfe had given his country
men httle cause to admire him, or to rejoice in the
anticipation of his succession. But in the httle party
which had owned him as their patron, despair was
more than ever rampant. Pitt and the other
Cobhamites, who had once found consolation at the
Prince's court, had long ago seceded to the Ministry,
and now many Tories foUowed in their train to
escape political effacement. Lee was frank in
acknowledging the f utUity of their cause,^ and only
Doddington and Egmont seem to have refused to
give up hope.
Meanwhile the Cumberlands — especiaUy Fox and
Bedford — were gaining greatly in popularity, and
probably increased in numbers. Perhaps the only
reason why they never secured an ascendancy over
the Ministry was the selfish pohtical caution — or
was it loyalty ? — of the Secretary-at-War. To
Cumberland, who had doubtless questioned him on
the proper pohcy of the party to pursue. Fox
pleaded his ' unavoidable connexion with Mr.
Pelham \^ It is clear that he was in no wise
ready to risk incurring the enmity of the Ministry,
or to relinquish his present rdle as the trusted
adjutant of Pelham. Hence when a dispute
occurred between Sandwich and Halifax (President
of the Board of Trade), which naturaUy divided
85 And consequently joined the forces of the Administration
in debate. — Fox to WiUiams, December 15, 1751 : Memoirs of
Lord Walpole, p. 379.
8« Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 60.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 107
the Cumberlands against their coUeagues in the
Ministry, Fox frankly told Bedford, who had
counted on his support, that in aU disagreements
he must act with the First Lord. The advantage
of the Pelhams over Bedford was obvious. Out
voted in a subsequent Cabinet meeting at Bedford
House, the latter had fresh cause for resentment
against the magnates of the Ministry.*'
Several facts, however, made it apparent that
Bedford was a very different sort of antagonist
from Harrington or Chesterfield. The attitude of
many of his party in the Commons might weU
be taken as indicating defiance, while a sudden
indifference to the affairs of his office brought
upon him the disfavour of the sedulous Pelham.
Yet abrupt dismissal was stUl to be avoided, if pos
sible ; while a retirement in favour of Sandwich —
to which Bedford was supposed to be inclined —
would not free the Ministry from a factious party.
Again and again the Duke of Newcastle begged for
his colleague's removal ; but his appeals seemed
only to rouse the exasperation of the King, who
declared (so Fox tells us) that any one, who im
portuned him further on the subject, would himself
be considered the aggressor.88
Meanwhile a new question arose, which
threatened to widen the guK between the factions
^ The details of this affair are given in ibid. I. 53-4 ; 59-60.
Bedford told the Pelhams that their opposition was personaUy
directed against him ; this they denied.
88 Coxe, Pelham Administration, II. 163.

108 HENRY FOX ch.
and increase the difficulties of the Administration.
More momentous far than the death of the Prince
was the field of argument which it opened respect
ing the provisions to be made against the King's
demise. The new heir-apparent was a duU, un
promising boy of twelve, completely subjected to
the opinions of his mother, who regarded with
unfeigned jealousy the King's partiality for his
younger son. Of aU this Fox was fuUy aware,
and having an evident desire to see the Prince in
more wholesome surroundings, he suggested his
removal to St. James, where the mother's influence
could not penetrate.8® But Pelham neither pos
sessed the courage of Fox, nor shared the latter's
distrust of Leicester House ; and though he kept
the advice a secret, his timidity restrained him
from a step that might create a temporary uproar,
however greatly he might stand to profit in the
end. For the present, therefore, Pelham resorted
to his usual half-way measures by surrounding the
young Prince with men, like Lord Waldegrave and
Andrew Stone, upon whose loyalty he felt that he
could rely.
The King naturally wished the regency secured
to the son he had always loved ; but the Pelhams,
who kept an eye on the distracted Tories, had
reason to feel that Leicester House was a safer
piUar of support than the party which held the
irrepressible Bedford. A compromise was finaUy
devised by which the Princess should be regent,
89 Walpole, Memoirs of George III (ed. Barker), IV. 92.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 109
with sole guardianship of the heir-apparent, but
subject in the governmental office to the dictates
of a councU, headed by the Duke of Cumberland,
and composed of the chief officers of state as weU as
four additional members to be designated by the
King's will.*" The Chancellor, to whom was given
the task of drawing up the biU, was urged to
preface it with words about the ' tenour of the
English constitution ' — as a mask, no doubt, to the
personal element ; but the Duke told Fox with
much bitterness that His Lordship had explained
to him that circumstances might make it incon
venient. ' That crisis,' added Cumberland, ' must
be when I am out of the question.' Yet, despite
his disappointment, the Duke was careful to avoid
a rupture ; and both Bedford and Sandwich gave
their support to the bill.
The question had been formally opened on
April 21 by Newcastle in the Peers and Pelham
in the Commons, both steering out of their natural
course to eulogize the Duke of Cumberland. It
was not, however, until May 13 that the Commons
began a serious discussion of the measure, and little
opposition seemed then to appear. The Lords,
for their part, were almost unanimous for the
biU, and a vote for committal passed the Upper
House with an insignificant negative of 12 votes
out of a total of 118. It was subsequently passed
in amended form, with the same unanimity.
But in the committee of the Lower House on
40 May, Constitutional History, I. 108.

110 HENRY FOX ch.
the 16th, a struggle, long deferred, broke out in
bitter, if indeed short-hved fury. After a pre
liminary skirmish, in which the Speaker, who had
yielded the chair to PeUiam, raised several objec
tions to the bUl on constitutional grounds,*^ Fox
rose to fight the battle of his patron. One of the
weak points of the bUl was the clause which ruled
that any persons ' concurring in order to change
the form of government ' were to ' incur the
penalties of praemunire ', which usuaUy signified
outlawry and forfeiture ; and the astute Secretary-
at-War was quick to see the opening it gave for
contention. After affecting to approve of the biU as a whole,
he averred that the praemunire clause was couched
in terms so ambiguous that whoever had penned
it was, in his opinion, justly worthy of its penalties.
* Can fourteen persons,' he declared, ' have power
and not want more than their share ? and if the
Regent and her council should proclaim the young
King major a year before the time specified, would
not a man in the street, who haUooed at such a
proclamation, be guilty of a praemunire ? ' ' The
crime,' he added, ' is too uncertainly described for
such heavy punishment, and of aU times, a
minority is the worst to subject a people to penal
laws.' He would prefer impeachment as a definite
punishment for such offences ' as it could only be
*i Doddington reports that Speaker Onslow made a ' very
fine speech '. — Diary, May 16, 1751. He was answered by
Murray and Charles Yorke (son of the Chancellor),

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 111
meant to come at great persons, who should attempt
to disturb the settlement '.*^
At this juncture Pelham, his placid temper un-
nsuaUy ruffled, caUed the speaker to order with
the rebuke that the praemunire clause was not
then a matter before the House.
When in course of time the clause respecting the
council became the subject of debate, Pitt gave
his support to the nomination of a restrictive
board, and was warmly answered by Fox.*^
Striking more from confidence in his logic than
sincerity of conviction, the latter exclaimed, ' It
is absurd not to give the Princess the whole power
of Royalty, because she is not caUed Queen.' As
for the Council, he behoved they would assist her,
but ' if not ', he added, ' whoever should advise
her to make a speech to Parliament would be
guilty of a praemunire.^
Pitt replied that the tendency of such a speech
would not be to alter a plan of regency, but to
check faction, and declaring himself of Mr. Fox's
opinion on the question, he protested that they
must have misunderstood each other. He then
went out of his way to eulogize the late Prince,
and thinking, no doubt, of the feud in the royal
*2 Fox's contempt for the legal profession was then shown
by his sneering remark that the whole clause might as well be
omitted, ' because every man, without being a lawyer, ought
to know what his regent can or cannot do.'
*8 Since Fox must certainly have preferred that the power
of the Princess should be restricted, we may infer that he was
simply trying to throw the whole bUl into contempt.

112 HENRY FOX ch.
house, he declared that ' in any case he should not
be for laying power where there may be a tempta
tion to prolong it'.
The covert insult was to say the least iU-advised,
and in view of the fact that the Duke had made
no attempt to combat the intentions of the
Ministry, it was unkind in the extreme. But the
good friend of Cumberland was quick to repel
the insinuation. ' A regent,' was his retort,
' cannot be more dangerous than a King ; ' and
after a few additional remarks the Secretary-at-
War signified his contempt by leaving the House
before the division.
Next day, however. Fox was again at his post,
ready to renew the fight upon the praemunire
clause. After exposing with much skill the
obscurity with which the clause had been framed,
he declared that the crimes marked for punishment
by this law should be known with certainty, and
not be subject to constructions. ' The door of the
house where the plague is should be marked, and
then whoever enters, let him die ! ' Among the
phrases he objected to were the words ' in order to
vary the settlement ', adding ironicaUy that by
the same rule a man would be guUty of robbing,
who went to a goldsmith's in order to rob. Later,
after a fling at Murray, he inquired whether, in
case an unsuccessful attempt was made in Parlia
ment to repeal the act, the attempters would be
guilty of a praemunire. When Yonge soon after
ward defended ' concurring ' on the ground that it

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 113
meant more than the other words foUowing, Fox
ridiculed him sharply for his ' reverence for the
sanction of tautology '. Thus, as Walpole remarks,
the debate degenerated into a dispute, ' more
worthy of grammarians than of the House of
Commons.' **
Fox himself had no reason to doubt the issue,
but his party insisted upon a division, and the
clause was found to be passed by a vote of 126
to 40. After the debate Pelham reproached Fox
for not having ' spoken like himself '. 'I know
it,' the latter retorted, ' if I had, I would have
said ten times more against the bill.' ^
The attitude of the Secretary-at-War in riddling
the provisions of a biU certain to pass in its main
scheme at least, was undoubtedly due to his
loyalty to the man whom he felt to be undeservedly
put aside, and it must be admitted that the victory
of the Princess portended results which even Pox
could not have foreseen. But in its bearing upon
the Ministry his conduct was significant. While
too careful of his own ambition to create a disturb
ance on Bedford's account, he made it clear that
the situation was quite different when the cause
of Cumberland clashed with the Pelham interests.
Thus in a sense Fox had reached the parting of the
ways. Henceforth the First Lord was not to
** For the debates on the Regency BUl see Walpole, Memoirs
of George II, passim ; Doddington, Diary, May 7, 8, 10, 13^
and 16, 1751 ; Coxe, Pelham, II. 168-75.
*5 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 115.

use

H

114 HENRY FOX ch.
regard him as blindly devoted to the Pelham
ascendancy. The Duke of Cumberland, on the other hand,
had throughout maintained his dignified reserve.
When the ChanceUor gave him an account of the
bill, his sole response was, ' Return my thanks to
the King for the plan of the regency. As for the
part allotted to me, I shall submit to it, because
he commands it, be the regency what it wUl.'
Then, fearing that Pelham might lose the force
of the reply, if transmitted through a friend, the
Duke requested Fox to repeat it to the Minister,
bidding him expressly not to omit the word,
' submit'. 'It is a material word,' he added, 'and
the Lord ChanceUor wiU remember it, however he
reports it. ' *® It is hardly reasonable to suppose that
His Royal Highness was excessively ambitious for
political power, but his feelings were deeply wounded
by what he regarded as a personal slight and he told
Fox that it ' marked him a bad man to posterity '.*'
It is not unlikely that he felt that the Pelhams
were revenging themselves for his patronage of the
party that contained Bedford and Sandwich.
On the 20th the Regency BiU in its entirety
passed the House of Commons, and Fox did not
deny it the honour of his vote. About the same
time the King had an interesting conversation
with the Secretary-at-War, which showed their
common affection for the man who had lost.
« Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 89-90.
« Fox to WUliams, December 15, 1751 : Add. MSS., 9191.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 115
His Majesty began by asking whom he would have
made regent. ' Sir,' replied Fox, with becoming
modesty, ' I never thought I should be asked
and therefore never thought — if it was impossible
the Duke should.'
' My affection was there,' replied the King, and
then without discussing the ' possibility ', he said
that he had a good opinion of the Princess, but did
not feel that he knew her. After commending the
restrictions provided, he finally asked : ' What did
you say against the bill ? Do you like it ? Tell
me honestly.'
Fox replied, ' If you ask me. Sir — No. What I
said against it was because what was said for it
was against the Duke.'
' I thank you for that,' was the King's reply.
' My affection was with my son. I assure you,
Mr. Fox, I like you the better for wishing weU to
him. The English nation is so changeable. I don't
know why they dislike him.'*8
Apparently Fox said nothing in Bedford's
interest. Perhaps he had not even thought of him,
since they were not then the intimate friends that
they later became ; or possibly Fox was piqued by
the Duke's conduct on the Regency Bill. At all
events we know that Fox was most careful about his
connexions ; and on one occasion when Sandwich,
fearing a rupture and not anxious for dismissal,
had begged him to carry a ' reconciling message '
to the First Lord, Fox politely but firmly declined
^8 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 137-8.
h2

116 HENRY FOX ch.
the commission.*® Clearly he must above aU
avoid the imputation of being factious. Yet, so
far as the Duke was concerned, there were certainly
grounds for greater intimacy between the two
through their common affection for a yoimg
member of the Commons, Richard Rigby by name,
a jovial, crafty, unscrupulous man, who had
succeeded in supplanting Sandwich as the con-
troUing influence at Woburn.^"
The affair of the Regency BiU — even though
Bedford had been quiet — ^hastened without doubt
the crisis between the two Secretaries. The Duke
of Cumberland was suUen and inwardly hostUe,
and the danger of having two prominent enemies
in the Cabinet was not to be hghtly regarded.
Fox, foreseeing the storm, and being very anxious
to keep Bedford in the Cabinet, advised His Grace
to resign and accept a smaUer office to ' save his
honour ',®^ such a one having long been open to
him — the post of Master of the Horse.^^ But the
little Duke — whether tutored by Sandwich or
Rigby, we cannot say — maintained a provoking
reserve, and the Duke of Devonshire's son, the
Marquis of Hartington, was finaUy given the post
left vacant by Richmond's death.^^
49 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 60.
50 Fox to WUliams, December 15, 1751 : Add. MSS., 9191.
51 Ibid. : Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 162.
52 The notion of giving this post to Bedford as compensation
for removing him had long been a topic in the correspondence
between Newcastle and Pelham.
58 The Duke of Richmond, Fox's father-in-law, died on

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 117
Pelham, as Leader of the House of Commons
and Minister as weU, felt only too keenly the
extreme value of a harmonious Parliament, and
he also knew from bitter experience the disposi
tion of his elder brother; it was in short from
his perpetual aim to keep the political world in
peaceful torpor, rather than from an ounce of
partiality to Bedford, that he had shrunk from
consenting to the elimination of the Duke's party.
But when these votes on more than one occasion
had shown a tendency to go astray, the Leader of
the Lower House began to do some careful
cogitating. It would be serious if he should lose
Fox, who was already wavering, and might accept
with alacrity an excuse for severing the bond ;
yet, after aU, Henry Pelham was a politician
before he was anything, and he thought he knew
his man.
If the First Lord had aheady given serious
thought to the matter, certainly the necessity had
now taken a more definite mould, and he told
Lady Yarmouth, with un-Pelham-like firmness,
that ' in his opinion the present state of affairs
would not do ', after which he wrote to his brother
August 8, 1750. During his closing years Fox and Lady
Caroline had amply atoned for their disobedience in the past.
The Duchess, who was inconsolable, foUowed her husband little
more than a year later ; and the education of the two sons
(the young Duke and the Earl of March) was the subject of
much anxious correspondence between Newcastle and Fox,
chiefly concerned, it would seem, with the escapades of the
elder at Geneva.

118 HENRY FOX ch.
that it was ' in the King's power ' to act.®* These
excellent brothers, so unlike in most respects,
had at least one trait in common, which was to
put responsibility, if possible, upon some one else.
Without difficulty, and probably without ex
planation, the Pelhams persuaded His Majesty to
dismiss Lord Sandwich, whom they knew he
disliked, being confident that Bedford's faU would
result from the ruse. Sandwich received word of
his conge at Windsor Lodge, and Legge brought
the news to the Duke at Woburn, who took the
hint without delay. But a few days later the hot-
tempered ex-Secretary aUowed himself the satisfac
tion of arraigning Newcastle in the Closet with
a scrupulous disregard for euphemism ; and the
King obliged His Grace by refusing audience to
the Duke of Newcastle for several weeks.^®
But at last it was done. The First Lord, ' drawn
always ' (as Fox expressed it®®) ' by the Duke of New
castle and generally dragged,' had finaUy given
way to his unamiable brother. In vain might the
Duke beseech His Majesty to receive him, and
even write a long memorial, throwing responsibility
upon the King ; " the calmer brother at the
54 PeUiam to Newcastle, March 16, 1751 : Add. MSS., 32724,
f . 190. We can see that Pelham had made up his mind shortly
before the Prince's death, and this latter event had strengthened
him politically owing to the acquisition of the Tories.
55 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 164-5, 172.
5« Fox to Williams, December 15, 1751.
5' Newcastle to the King, undated : Coxe, Pelham Adminis
tration, II. 401.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 119
Treasury Board was only concerned with the effect
of the move upon pohtics. True, there was no
unpleasant aftermath. Yet we cannot help wish
ing that the brothers could have looked in at
HoUand House on June 21, when Fox, Rigby and
Marlborough laughed with unmeasured scorn at a
printed panegyric of the Duke, and His Grace of
Blenheim told how he had entrapped the Senior
Secretary into an admission that silence still
reigned in the Closet.®*
With the removal of Bedford, the leadership of
the Cumberland Party devolved naturaUy upon
Fox. True, he was not — as his predecessor had
been — an occupant of high ministerial office ; but
his intimate friendship with the Duke of Cumber
land, and — by virtue of that — his cordial relations
with the King, above aU his position as leading
debater for the Administration, gave him a distinc
tion quite unique among his party. Beyond
the fact that Trentham quitted his seat in the
Admiralty and Rigby waxed sarcastic over Bed
ford's successor,®® the Cumberlands revealed no
added hostility, and Gower, the Duke's own
father-in-law, was greatly vexed because his son
showed so much spirit.
58 Rigby to Bedford, June 27, 1751 : Bedford Corres.
II. 94.
59 Rigby, with sarcastic recoUection of four upheavals, wrote
to Bedford that his successor, who ' does not understand the
word " resign", and has never heard of a Secretary of State
being turned out, concludes that he is in for life ' . — Rigby to
Bedford, June 27, 1751.

120 HENRY FOX ch.
MeanwhUe a compliment was paid to Fox from an
unexpected quarter. Granville's keen eye had not
been closed during the recent convulsion, and we
can imagine the grim humoiir with which he regarded
the third removal from the position he had once
adorned and perhaps, by force of contrast, merited
stUl. But wit and wine were, after aU, poor
substitutes for talents going to waste, and in Fox's
growing credit he saw a chance to clamber upon
the stage once more. Accordingly he paid prompt
and vigorous cotirt, hoped to have a word with
Fox in HoUand House, and expressed a desire to
become reconcUed even to that man who had
blasted his career. The subtle response was not
the least discouraging: 'They have paved your
way.' Next day GranviUe made good use of the over-
tiire by attributing the initiative to Fox ; ®*'
and the latter may very weU have remembered
this when he remarked about a year later to
Rigby that he would not take GranviUe's word
for a farthing, nor trust him for half an hour.®^
It was no doubt largely in the hope that the
Closet woiUd moderate its coldness, that Newcastle
persuaded his brother to countenance a recon-
cUiation with their old antagonist,®^ and Granville
was accordingly appointed to the Presidency of
the CouncU. Other changes were the promotion
^ Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 171.
61 Rigby to Bedford, June 2, 1753: Bedford Corres. II. 125.
*2 Coxe, Pelham Administration, II. 190.

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 121
of Anson (son-in-law of the ChanceUor) to succeed
Sandwich at the Admiralty, whUe for Bedford's
office the Duke found in the Earl of Holdernesse
a man who was in every respect fitted to become
his vassal. Of course His Grace would feel the
pangs of jealousy at times — that was to be ex
pected. But there were no more quarrels between
rivals at the Foreign Office.
The closing months of 1751 were comparatively
uneventful. In November the Duke of Cumberland
suffered from injuries due to a faU from his horse,
and consequently found much comfort in Fox's
daUy visits ; ®8 the Pelhams, however, were care
fuUy excluded, in spite of their apparent interest —
whether real or feigned — in the convalescence of
the invahd. Upon the Duke's inquiring how the
brothers behaved. Fox answered, ' Both cried ;
the Duke of Newcastle over-acted it, but Mr. Pel
ham seemed reaUy concerned.' The judgement of
His Royal Highness was that Newcastle wept
because he thought it his duty to caU that morning,
but ' PeUiam,' concluded the Duke, ' ... is such
a feUow that I can believe he was in earnest.'
The King, stiU wishing perhaps that his son had
triumphed in the regency question, remarked to
Fox, ' He has a head to guide, to rule and to
direct.' This Fox afterwards reported to the
Duke, who said his father had talked to him in
88 ' His iUness,' wrote Fox, ' sho\\"ed his affection and regard
for me to be greater than I ever before presumed to think it.' —
Fox to WUUams, December 15, 1751 : Add. MSS., 9191.

122 HENRY FOX ch.
the same strain. ' Why then. Sir,' rephed the
faithful friend, ' don't you just put him in mind
in those fits of tenderness of what he has done
to prevent your doing so ? ' But Cumberland felt
that it would be useless now that the regency
had been settled, and that such remonstrance
would certainly give pain to His Majesty.®* Had
George II hved a century sooner, no cautious
Pelham coiUd have stamped out the embers of
royal independence.
Why Fox never gained an influence over the
King is difficult to understand. As the Duke of
Cumberland's champion he might appear as the
most natural favourite of His Majesty ; and yet
it never can be said — even in 1757 — that he
possessed much power in the Closet. Of course,
the Duke of Newcastle may have seen fit to
prevent it, for he was not above misrepre
senting a man whose influence was to be feared ;
and in later years Fox's own blunders as a
pohtician may have earned the King's contempt.
But at all events the Secretary-at-War could
never be sure of the royal favour, and even
the career of his dearest protege, WiUiams,
occasionaUy met with checks. When the envoy
was returning home from Saxony in June 1752,
the King obstinately refused to receive him in
Hanover,®® and the Duke was distressed for fear
8* Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 184-5.
65 ' He wants to come,' complained the King, ' to talk his
wit everywhere, and you to have him to talk politics to.'

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 123
lest Fox should hold him accountable for this
affront to his friend.®®
The fact was, neither brother could weU afford
to lose Fox's support. In diplomatic problems he
accepted the Duke's views without question, and
in Parliament — when no conflicting interest was
involved — he was stiU the trusted supporter of
Pelham. Thus he had defended the measure which
occasioned the secession of Pitt and his friends,®'
and he spoke in support of the Saxon Treaty, which
Bedford attacked with vehemence — the latter's
first overt act of hostility since his dismissal.
Emboldened perhaps by the ex-Secretary's ill-
humour, the Opposition then presented a resolution
against all subsidies in time of peace — a move
which provoked Pelham to an unwontedly bitter
invective against his annoyers. When he asked
the Secretary-at-War after the debate whether he
66 Newcastle to Hardwicke, May 17, 1752: Add. MSS.,
32722, f. 100.
6'' Pelham's measure to reduce the number of seamen, to
which we have already alluded. Fox's speech — a reply to
Thomas Potter, one of the Cobhamites (or Pittites, as we should
perhaps call them, for Cobham had died in 1749) — showed
that he had carefuUy grasped the Newcastle standpoint with
regard to a system of subsidies. Since Pelham's measure was
opposed by Newcastle, we can justly credit him •with having
acted in a most cautious and politic manner. He supported
Pelham but he humoured Newcastle. The point which he
made in his speech was that the money saved by this reduction
in the number of seamen could be wisely spent in cementing a
system of alliances on the Continent. — Parliamentary History,
XIV. 854-60.

124 HENRY FOX ch.
had spoken too strongly. Fox retorted, ' No, as
they began, though you originaUy gave the
provocation.' ' Oh, Fox,' answered the other
reproachfuUy, ' you did not feel for me as I shoiUd
for you in the same circumstances.' ®* The episode
shows plainly that the way of a pohtician is hard,
if he be not whoUy caUous. It might be easy
enough for a Cabinet intriguer to subsidize half
Europe, but quite a different matter for his
brother to justify and paUiate a system with
which he had no sympathy. During the foUowing
autumn Pelham frankly expressed his feelings to
Doddington, and questioned both the pohcy and the
way it was conducted. After thus linburdening his
mind, with the added complaint that he ' had been
misrepresented ', the First Lord was treated to
the cold consolation that not only had some one
attributed the pohcy to him, but that Doddington' s
own vote had been influenced thereby. ' Who
said that ? ' Pelham inquired, ' Pitt ? '
No, responded Doddington, he thought it was
Fox ; whereupon Pelham miu-mured, ' Oh —
Fox,' with most evident uneasiness.®® The aUega-
tion may weU have been false, but it created an
unpleasant suspicion of double-dealing on the part
of the Secretary-at-War.'®
68 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 222-3.
69 Doddington, Diary, October 4, 1752. ^
^0 It cannot be regarded as certain, however (even if the
aUegation be true), that Fox was amusing himself at Pelham's
expense. It is quite possible that he simply used Pelham's

n THE CUMBERLANT) PARTY 125
Fox had, in fact, a somewhat difficult part to
play. He was in no wise desirous of jeopardizing
his position by a close union with Bedford ; and
yet it was essential that he should not only impress
the Ministry with his importance, but preserve the
confidence and esteem of his exceedingly useful
foUowing, the Cumberland Party. Moreover,
although PeUiam was stUl in his prime, and there
was no expectation of a change in the Ministry for
many years to come, stUl the Secretary-at-War was
not averse to storing up strength for ' that distant
day '. ' It is prodigious ' (so Lord Hillsborough
told Doddington) how many friends he has made,'
and the former seemed struck with the frankness
¦tvith which he treated his pohtical associates.'^
Perhaps sometimes this candour was a screen for
his caution. It would not be weU for his party
to think that he was playing them false out of
loyalty to Pelham, and yet he could not go to
the lengths Bedford wished, and he always refused
to make enemies in cases of trifling importance.
When Murray and Stone were arraigned on the
ridiculous charge of having drunk the health of
the Pretender, Fox would give no encom-agement
to Bedford when the latter joined the outcry agaiost
them. On one occasion when asked if the matter
should be reported to Cumberland, Fox answered
name in getting Doddington's vote for an established poUcy
of the Administration. It was certaioly not Fox's fault that
Pelham accepted that policy against his own better judgement.
"1 Doddington. Diary, November 27. 1752.

126 HENRY FOX ch.
shortly that ' the Duke never concerned himself
out of his province, the army '.'"
It was perhaps during the early months of 1753
that Fox's reputation stood at its highest point.
As yet it was suUied by no act of his own, and if
enemies existed, who frowned upon his ambition
or his politics, we have at least no record of them.
Bedford might stUl raise the hopes of the Opposi
tion, but the bulk of the party found a safer
anchorage in Fox.
We have now to consider the first serious offence
which Fox committed against his own reputation,
and almost the only example in his parhamentary
career when personal hatred mastered his self-
control. Shortly after the opening of the year
1753 Lord Bath instigated the lawyers to reform
the existing conditions relative to marriage, a lack
of regard for the sacred office having been long
a menace to society at large. Although there
was already legislation in force, the means of
evading it were many ; and the evU was further
aggravated by the nefarious practice of numerous
clergymen who had dropped out of active work
and now earned their livelihood by marrying
any one who applied to them, without scruple or
inquiry. NaturaUy such a traffic was often
promoted by underhand means, and the heir
of a noble house was frequently decoyed into an
act that brought ruin to his career and a stain
upon his name.
¦2 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 266.

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 127
The first effort at reform having been badly
handled, the ChanceUor himself took up the cause
and framed a biU which was destined to yield
most beneficial results. No marriage (other than
those of Jews or Quakers) was henceforth to be
valid unless celebrated by a priest in orders ; and
before such ceremony could take place, either
banns must be published in the parish church for
three successive Sundays, or else a costly licence
obtained from the archbishop — conditional in the
case of minors on the parents' consent. The
greatest defect of the Clandestine Marriage Bill
— the withholding of aU recognition from Noncon
formist ceremonies — found, strangely enough, no
place in aU the bitter speeches that were made
against the measure. Yet the very need of its
provisions is evidence enough of the low moral
tone of the age that gave us Wesley.
The biU was iatroduced in the House of Lords
on May 19, and hotly opposed by the Duke of
Bedford ; but otherwise there was little resistance,
and the measure was sent down to the Commons
after some amending. But in the Lower House
(where discussion commenced on May 7) the
Opposition were more numerous and more violent.
Conspicuous on the offensive were the Speaker
himself, Nugent, Townshend and Fox ; and
personalities were indulged in to an extent un
known for many years. Horace Walpole, whose
hatred of the Pelhams had placed him among the
opponents of the biU, speaks much of the humour

128 HENRY FOX ch.
that interspersed the debates, and gives a lively
picture of the bitter animosities shown. On one
occasion the Speaker, furious at being misrepre
sented, gave the lie to the Attorney-General, and
a serious affair was only narrowly averted. Another
day the youthful Charles Townshend entertained
the House by a clever portrayal of himself as an
injured younger son, who could not compete with
his elder brother, if secret marriages with heiresses
were to be prohibited. It was found, however,
that the latter could change his mood entirely, and
he marked his Parliamentary debut by bitter and
personal attacks upon the ChanceUor himself.
But far the hardest blows were dealt by Fox, who
promised to dispute every inch of ground, and
kept his word. His own clandestine marriage was
enough to interest him in the question, but the
dislike which he apparently felt for the lawyers,
and which he had shown in the course of the
regency debates, was now even more strikingly
exemplified. Always disposed to aim at the
ChanceUor in particular, he haUed him as their
' mufti ','8 and ridiculed His Lordship under the
name of Dr. GaUey (the King's chaplain), who had
written a pamphlet, Walpole teUs us, in which he
had declared that fathers were ' too apt to forgive '.
' I thought,' continued Fox, ' that the Gospel
'8 ' He laid open the chicanery and jargon of the lawyers,'
writes Walpole, ' the pride of their mufti, and the arbitrary
manner of enforcing the bUl.' We are not told what this
' arbitrary manner ' was.

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 129
enjoined forgiveness, but pious Dr. GaUey thinks
fathers are too apt to forgive.'
Each day the House sat tiU late, while Fox and
Pelham sparred unceasingly, the latter fighting
valiantly the battles of his friend, although it is
said that he disapproved of the measure itself.
Perhaps long practice in defending Newcastle's
treaties had made him adept in manufacturing
arguments ; at all events we are told that the
numbers against the bill diminished after the
Minister had taken his stand upon it.
On the 30th the Committee considered the clause
respecting the consent of parents, and Fox amused
the House at the expense of the ChanceUor.'*
Finally Charles Yorke, who was provoked into an
effort to avenge his father, declared with emphasis
that such conduct was ' new in Parliament, new
in politics, new in ambition ', and after defending
the Chancellor in glowing terms, he predicted
that Fox would rue his impertinence.
Fox answered quickly, ' Is it new in Parliament
to be conscientious ? I hope not. Is it new in
politics ? I am afraid it is. Is it new in ambition ?
'* A certain member named Wibraham, in defending the bill,
had said : ' If you have a sore leg, will you not try gentler
remedies first.' Fox replied by teUing the story of a physician
who wished to amputate a friend's leg, but the latter would not
consent tUl a more merciful one was caUed in for consultation.
' The surgeons conferred. The ignorant one said, " I know it
might be saved, but I have given my opinion ; my character
depends upon it, and we must carry it through." The leg was
out off.'
1156 T

130 HENRY FOX ch.
It certainly is (he added with a sneer) to attack
such authority.''
This caUed for Pelham's interference and the
Secretary-at-War was properly rebuked.
The next day, however, found Fox as incorri
gible as ever, and when Sir Robert Henley and
the Solicitor-General gave mutuaUy contradictory
arguments in favour of the biU, he is said to have
made sport of them both. On June 1, a clause
proposed by Fox himself was discussed, in which
he introduced the suggestion of legitimizing aU
chUdren born out of wedlock if the parents after
ward married. It is possible that Fox was not
greatly interested in the result, although it was
the only piece of legislation he ever attempted ;
but his supporters shouted, ' Aye ' so loudly,
when the vote was taken, that the Speaker
declared it carried, and so compeUed Pelham to
divide the House. It was then found to be lost by
102 votes against 26.
On the 4th the Marriage Act was read for the last
time in the Commons. Nugent, who had been in
the foreground from the first, repeated his attacks
on the biU, and Charles Townshend foUowed
shortly after, not confining himself this time to
destructive analysis, but venturing to prescribe
a proper register of marriages as a preventative of
polygamy. HUlsborough,'® who spoke next, criti-
'5 Lord HUlsborough, a friend of Fox, was, like Egmont, the
holder of an Irish peerage, and therefore not entitled to a seat
in the House of Lords.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 131
cized Townshend as having a manner so engaging
and a voice so musical that it pleased the ear, even
though it failed to pervert the understanding.
After his friend had finished his speech of
defence, it was Fox's opportunity, and it is easy to
imagine the wondering interest which must have
played over the faces of his audience as he rose to
address them. What new stratagem of argument
or ridicule would he devise ?
' As I cannot pretend,' he began, ' to have any
music in my voice, I am afraid the noble lord will
receive neither pleasure nor interest from what
I am to say upon the present subject.' Then
snatching up his copy of the bill, he exclaimed,
' There is not so much as a clause, hardly indeed
a sentence that has not been changed since the
bill came down from the Lords, and no less than six
or seven clauses have been added. But this I need
not tell you. I shaU show it,' and he held up the
sheet to the full view of the assembled House.'®
Here Murray, who was seated beside him and
observed the red ink with which Fox had inserted
the various amendments, remarked audibly, ' How
bloody it looks ! '
Fox turned quickly. ' Yes, but thou canst not
say / did it. Look,' he said, glancing at the
Attorney-General, ' what a rent the learned Casca
made. Through this (turning to Pelham) the weU-
beloved Brutus stabbed.'
'6 As in the case of the Regency BiU, Fox was endeavouring
to show that the details of the measure had been Ul-considered.
1-2

t t

132 HENRY FOX ch.
Then taking up a discussion of the biU, he assaUed
it chiefly on three points : (1) that it would
increase rather than decrease immorality ; (2) that
it tended to convert the nobles into an exclusive
clique ; and (3) that it would undermine the
industries of the nation by making marriage diffi
cult for the poor. After a brief consideration of
the first point, in which he endeavoured to prove
that a woman's position would be less secure than
before, he said, ' To accumulate the whole of
society into a few families, is inconsistent with the
happiness of every society, and to throw it aU into
the hands of our nobility is inconsistent with our
constitution, in particular. It is not the increase
of their military power that we are at present
afraid of ; it is an increase of their elective power,
and the increase of their elective power will be of
more danger to our constitution than ever the
military power was.' Turning from these strange
assertions to tactics to which his legal mind was
better fitted, he argued that instead of promoting
marriage among the poorer people, the proposed
act would obstruct it. The present laws, — laws
which had come down, indeed, from Catholic times
— it must be granted, made both the proclamation
of banns and a licence necessary. ' But even the
High Church itself never took upon it to declare
that to be void, which was in itself valid, both by
the law of God and the law of nature ; for such is
every marriage not prohibited by these laws . . . ,
let it have been contracted in never so clandestine

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 133
a manner, let the inequahty between the con
tracting parties be never so great, with regard to
rank and character in the world.' He showed that
by a complication in the Church Calendar a mar
riage could be delayed a month, and if the con
tracting parties knew not how to write, how could
the Minister enter them upon the register ?
Furthermore, if the vicar and curate of a particular
parish should be iU or absent, it would appear that
aU marriages in that chin:ch or chapel must be
indefinitely suspended, and if both parties lived
in that parish, they could be married nowhere else.
He seconded Townshend's suggestion of a register
as a substitute for both hcence and banns.
' And aU these inconsistencies,' he exclaimed,
' aU these dangers we are to expose ourselves to,
lest the daughter of a noble or rich father should
marry a footman or a sharper ; ' " and he argued
with some reason that there was something amiss
in a daughter's character or education if she was
thus led astray.
Growing warmer in his attack, he did not
hesitate to aver that the instigators of the bUl
would be accomphces in many atrocious crimes.
' We ought not,' he concluded, ' to think of pre
venting clandestine marriages, even of the most
infamous sort, by exposing the public to so many
inconveniences and dangers, as I have shown it wiU
'" This was, of course, totaUy untrue. The dangers of the
noble class were of comparatively slight importance in the eyes
of the promoters of the biU.

134 HENRY FOX ch.
be exposed by the bUl, now for the last time under
consideration ; and therefore I shall most heartily
give my negative to its being passed as a law.'
The arguments of Fox were ably refuted by
Murray, who, taking a broader view, showed first
that the status of a woman was improved by the
introduction of fixed rules to replace ambiguity,
secondly that the fact that a man attained his
majority at twenty-one would obviate the dangers
of an exclusive oligarchy, and thirdly that usage
had demonstrated that publishing of the banns did
not discourage the poor from marrying. The bUl
with its numerous amendments was passed by
a vote of 125 to 56, and was ready for final decision
in the Lords. '8
It is noticeable that Fox refrained from attacking
the author in his final appearance in debate, and the
fact that he explained in one of his speeches that
he had not designed to abuse the ChanceUor, and
appeared anxious to make amends — aU seem to
show that his warmth had carried him f lu'ther than
he had intended. The real explanation of his
vindictive, personal invectives is to be found, as
he himself betrayed to Pelham later,'® in the
unextinguishable resentment that he felt against
Hardwicke and Newcastle for the desertion of Sir
'8 Authorities for the debate in the Commons : Walpole,
Memoirs of George II, passim ; Letters of Horace Walpole,
II. 160-3, 168-9 ; Rigby to Bedford, June 2, 1753, Bedford
Corres. (for Fox's proposed amendment) ; Parliamentary
History, XV. 1-86 ; see also Coxe's Pdham, II. chap. xxx.
'9 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 305.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 135
Robert Walpole, whom Fox had idolized.8° True
in the latter case, the charge has been shown
to be improbable in the former, but Fox had
his own manner of gauging his contemporaries,
and cyiiicism was the natural bent of the age.
' As Christian charity,' writes Walpole, ' is not
the most eminent virtue of either of the cham
pions, this quarrel is not hkely to be soon recon
ciled.' 81
It remains yet to speak of the author's own part
in the affair. Fox had expressed his gratitude to
Bedford for opposition to the biU, and confessed
that foreseeing a violent response from the
ChanceUor, he was pleased with the thought of
an aUy in the Upper House.®^ On the 6th the
measvire which had suffered such a careful over
hauling in the Commons came up for final decision
in the Lords ; and it was now that Hardwicke
found his opportunity for revenge. After express
ing with dignity his astonishment that the biU
should have caUed forth so much odium, the
ChanceUor gave way to his indignation against
Fox and Townshend. ' It would not, indeed,
have been surprising,' he declared, ' that young
men in the warmth of their constitution should be
averse to any regiUations which seemed to inter-
80 As HiUsborough told Doddington, ' Fox reaUy loved that
man.' — Doddington, Diary, November 17, 1752.
81 Walpole to Mann, July 12, 1753, Letters of Horace Walpole,
III. 165.
82 Rigby to Bedford, June 2, 1753.

136 HENRY FOX ch.
fere with their passions and sanguine pursuits ; but
it was very extraordinary to see grave and solemn
persons turn a law so necessary for the public good
into an engine of dark intrigue and faction, and
into an occasion of forming a party and trying its
strength.' After expatiating on the profligate
principles supported by the enemies of the bUl,
and acknowledging the kindness of those who had
defended its author in the face of the storm,
he turned again to strike the Secretary-at-War.
' I despise the invective,' he exclaimed, ' and I
despise the retraction. I despise the scurrUity
(for scurrUity I must caU it), and I reject the
adulation.' He then closed with a warning against
those candidates for power, who had shown their
contempt for law, and who, if they ever attained
to power, would be likely to prefer force to order
and even subvert the constitution.88
The admonition may have invited the charge of
exaggeration, but the warmth behind it needed no
apology. As for Fox, the prorogation of Par
liament prevented the retorts his anger prompted,
but that same evening, having already been
apprised of the ChanceUor's tirade, he declared to
a circle of his friends in the Lower House that he
would have made ample return, if the session were
not at an end.
With regard to the impression created by the
quarrel — especiaUy upon the King — accoimts differ
83 Birch to Yorke, June 9, 1753 : Harris, Life of Hardwicke
II. 490.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 137
widely ; 8* but however undisturbed His Majesty
may reaUy have been at an insult to Newcastle's
friend, Charles Yorke was probably correct when
he wrote that the King told his father, ' he never
had done righter in his life '.^® Meanwhile Pelham
strove to reconcile the two enemies — with, appar
ently, smaU success.8®
The report that Fox was to be dismissed 8' was,
of course, an absurdity, when we measure the
importance of his abilities to the Ministry. But
from the standpoint of political expediency. Fox
had certainly committed one of the gravest errors
of his career. There is evidence to show that
Hardwicke never forgave the insult, and when the
8* According to Chesterfield, Fox carried his complaint to the
King, who retorted that the aggression had come from him ;
and then Fox, to soothe the Ministers, invited them to Holland
House. — Chesterfield to Stanhope, June 23, 1753 : Corres. of
Chesterfield, III. 862. Walpole, on the other hand, gives us
a very different picture : Fox was induced by Cumberland to
present his own version to the King, who received him
graciously, and beUeved his assertion that he was not indulging
in intrigues or politically connected with Bedford (that is, in
league with the Opposition) ; and then, after condemning the
intrigues which had undermined Walpole's power, Fox was so
far successful in his interview as to gain a favour for one of his
dependents. — Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 306. Probably
both accounts are exaggerated. Certainly Walpole A\ould have
laiown that Fox had entertained the Ministers if that story had
been true.
85 Harris, II. 498.
86 Pelham acknowledged to Fox that he knew neither
would forgive the other. — Walpole, Memoirs of George II,
I. 304-5.
87 Walpole to Montagu, June 11, 1753: Letters, III. 163.

138 HENRY FOX ch.
death of Pelham severed the link between the
Administration and the Cumberland Party, Fox's
prestige was not enhanced by the growing influence
of the ChanceUor.
But at present Fox had lost no perceptible
ground ; and m general he took care to impress
the Ministry with his loyalty. Thus when his
brother-in-law,88 the Earl of KUdare (reputedly a
political protege of Fox 8®), begged support for his
party in Ireland, he met with a cold response.
To Newcastle Fox declared that he ' was not and
would not be in any cabal against the Minister.'
The Duke thought he added ' at any time ' but
was uncertain.®®
The Duke of Dorset, having outlived much of his
usefulness, and having begun his heutenancy in
Ireland with his son. Lord George SackvUle, as his
secretary, had endured two years of uninterrupted
struggles and intrigues. The conceit and inex
perience of Lord George made him a ready
instrument for the machinations of Primate Stone ;
and the jealousy of the Archbishop, as weU as the
overweening pride of the Speaker, converted the
Government of Ireland into a seething furnace of
dissension. With the Speaker was closely connected
the Primate's bitterest enemy, the Earl of Kildare,
88 KUdare had married Lady Einih- Lermox, his wife's sister.
89 Armagh to Newcastle, May 26, 1752 : Eng. Hist. Rev.,
XX. 514.
90 Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 3, 1753: Add. MSS.,
35414, f. 110.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 139
who conjectured naturaUy that his connexion with
Fox could give him weight at WhitehaU, and
accordingly hastened across to England in the
winter of 1753-4 to gain a hearing for his cause.
Fox told Pelham that the King seemed to dishke
the Irish Lord intensely, and had desired him to
restrain Kildare from asking an audience which
His Majesty felt he had no right to expect.®^ Fox
consulted the First Lord as to the advisability of
speaking himself to the King in his brother-in-law's
behalf ; but Pelham's advice was that KUdare
should conduct his own business, although he
suspected that the Earl's brother-in-law might be
coaching him in the matter. StiU he seemed
confident in Fox's loyalty, and believed his pro
fessions of friendship.®^
Finding himself in more or less disfavour,
Kildare disclaimed any representation of party
interest, and having written assurances that he had
never expected an audience with the King,®^ he
succeeded in allaying the suspicions of the Ministers.
91 The King preferred that KUdare should submit his business
to the Ministers. This decision would, of course, be displeasing
to Kildare, who wanted to complain of the Ministers themselves.
See Lecky, History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century, I. 465.
The English Government had long been in the habit of exploit
ing Ireland as a source of wealth, or — possibly \^'e may say —
political plunder. *
92 Pelham to Newcastle, January 7, 1754 : Coxe, Pelham
Administration, II. 495.
98 ' The King said to Mr. Fox that he thought Lord KUdare
could not expect to be very well received.' — Note in the hand
writing of Newcastle's secretary: Add. MSS., 35414, f. 121.

140 HENRY FOX ch.
Pelham hinted broadly that consultation with Fox
had instigated the politic move, but, there being
no longer a disposition to distrust the Earl's
sincerity, the Ministers sent him back with care-
fuUy-worded consolation.®*
Fox managed often to throw off the cares of his
department and to forget the innkeepers of Lewes
or the abuse of Edinburgh Castle long enough to
entertain lavishly at Holland House, which he had
rented in 1749, and which was becoming more and
more a sphere of political influence. Not un
naturally was Fox pleased with being the leader
of a party that owned Cumberland for its patron
and was honoured in the ranks by men like Sand
wich, Bedford, Marlborough and the Gowers.
Williams could inspire them with his wit, Rigby
employ his trickery in the cause, and HiUs
borough lend his house to further their unity.
Lord Albemarle and the young Duke of Richmond
might perhaps be reckoned in the number ; and
Devonshire, despite his friendship for the First
Lord, was a promising possibility now that Harting
ton had become attached to Fox. Even the Duke
of Grafton, whose devotion to the Pelhams had
never been questioned until a misunderstanding
over Kildare,®® was commonly believed to be in
sympathy with the ever- widening circle.®®
9« Pelham to Newcastle, January 8, 1754 : Coxe, Pdham
Administration, II. 496.
95 Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 3, 1753.
96 See Doddington, Diary, March 7, 1754.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 141
Was it then strange that Fox should have begim
to try his wings in view of soaring higher when
opportunity offered ? Indeed if credence is to be
placed in Walpole, he was fuUy conscious of the
strength he was amassing. Shortly after the
episode of the Marriage Act, he had said to the
Duke of Cumberland, ' If they turn me out,®'
I shaU not acquit Mr. Pelham, nor shaU I spare him.
Let him raise up Murray ; Mr. Pelham knows he has
betrayed him, but is willing to forget it. I know he
fears me still more ; he has often told me I was like
Mr. Pulteney. It may be vanity, but I am stronger
than Murray, I am stronger than Mr. PeUiam.' ®8
Such aUeged assertions, even though perhaps
a trifle exaggerated, at least reflect the turnings of
an independent mind that awaits, but chafes at
having to await a higher plane for its activity. It
is in fact only too easy to surmise that the Secre
tary-at-War was not loth to picture in his mind
a large ' utopia ' where Henry PeUiam no longer
existed. True, he would not oppose the latter whUe
he lived, but ' if accidents should happen ', he ' pre
tended to succeed ' ; and meanwhile he ' should en
deavour to be next, and consider himseU as such '.®®
Perhaps this avowal of his pretensions woiUd have
sufficed without the scheming. At aU events —
whether or not Fox feared the Pelham contingent
9' We have already noted the rumour that he was to be
dismissed. 98 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 305.
99 Doddington, Diary, November 27, 1752.

142 HENRY FOX ch,
(whom such boldness must certainly have put on
their guard) — Lord Waldegrave speaks positively of
his efforts to ensure his own succession whUe Pelham
was still alive, and adds that more support would
have been given him by his friends, ' if, instead of
snatching at the succession, he had cooUy awaited
until it had been delivered into his hands '.^°°
Yet we must not imagine that the Cumberlands
— albeit the strongest — were the only political
element to compete with the Pelham interest for
the leadership of the Whigs or the capture of the
' succession '. We know that Doddington had
urged the Princess to reconstruct the party of
Leicester House,^®^ and we have reason to suppose
not only that she accepted the suggestion but that
she quickly enticed the Tories who had deserted
in 1751 into returning once again to the accustomed
camp of disaffection. FinaUy there were the
Pittites — Barrington, Potter, Wilkes, the Towns-
hends, George and Richard GrenviUe (now Earl
Temple), Sir George and Sir Richard Lyttelton,
and lastly Pitt himself — always ready to fling
themselves into any programme that seemed
politically promising. It was said that they had
planned to form an opposition as soon as Pelham
should die, but that Lyttelton had unwittingly
betrayed the secret. ^"^ Apparently Pitt and his
100 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 24.
101 Doddington, Diary, January 25, 1753.
102 This is on Shelburne's authority and probably correct. —
Fitzmaurice, Life of Shdburne, I. 74-5.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 143
party were studiously biding their time. Indeed
since aU his devoted cringing to Newcastle had
yet not availed to secure him the succession to
Bedford, Pitt had given up talking in Parliament,
and must simply await events before determining
a new move.
The Marriage Act was not the only important
measure discussed by Parliament in 1753, but our
records of Fox's activity are scanty and unsatis-
factory."8 The new year, which gave promise of
being duU and uneventful, was soon to take on
a different guise. On Wednesday, March 6,
the word went abroad that Henry PeUiam was
dead. He had been in poor health for some time,
but was thought much improved, until a sudden
relapse had ended the Minister's career. His
peaceful parting with the world at early dawn
seemed altogether incongruous with the struggles
for his mantle when day was ushered in ; yet
without doubt it exemplified the need of just such
a man in the period in which he had been Minister.
Henry Pelham could never have ruled by person
ality or magnetism, but he had been a past-master
in the art of compromise, and such a rdle had
proved adequate to the needs of the time. Yet
the essentially material character of Pelham's
108 Evidence is confined to Doddington, Diary (February 1 ,
1753, and March 7, 1754), and was ^\ritten chiefly to indicate
Fox's tendency to play fast and loose with Pelham. We have
no record of any part that he took on the Jew BiU — a measure
which the First Lord eventually abandoned through his lack
of political courage in the face of opposition.

144 HENRY FOX. ch.
attitude toward his feUow men had generated as
little love as it had stimulated httle of enmity ;
and grief for the departed Minister was speedily
forgotten in the greed of faction to grasp his power.
Pelham had died about six in the morning.
Before eight Fox was at his friend Hartington's,
to exact his active assistance. Likewise early in
the morning he sought out Pitt, whose endorsement
might prove valuable in the eyes of many. Nor
was Newcastle unsolicited, or Hardwicke uncon-
ciliated ; and the latter's spiteful pen mentions
' three humiliating and apologizing messages that
came within a few hours after Mr. Pelham's eyes
were closed."* The Chancellor had neither for
given nor forgotten.
It is clear that Fox was making a most active
canvass for the post he felt that he merited.-^®®
Many might nurture hopes, but none stood in so
enviable a position as he. Was he not the legiti
mate successor of Walpole and Pelham ? Who
was there whose services had been more valued
in the Lower House ? Who better understood the
inner workings of that system that produced
10* Hardwicke to the Archbishop of Canterbury, March 11,
1754 : Harris, II. 511 ; Hardwicke to Pitt, AprU 2, 1754 ; Pitt
to GrenvUle, March 11, 1754 ; Doddington, Diary, March 14,
1754. 105 Walpole must certainly have been thinking of the days
following, when he wrote that Fox ' acted reserve and retire
ment and expected to be wooed '. — Memoirs, I. 330. It is
possible that Fox confined his efforts to one day of campaigning,
and then kept in the background for fear of overdoing it.

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 145
infaUible majorities ? Who, in fine, could boast of
confidence from both the great wings of the Whig
party ? With such advantages in hand. Fox
could not but declare that the place ' was but his
due, and he would give way to no one '.^®®
But ere another day was done. Fox found himself
in no wise the only combatant in this ' war of
succession '. Two men were for a time on people's
lips almost as much as the Secretary-at-War ; they
\wevG Murray, the Solicitor-General, and the never-
to-be-forgotten Paymaster.
In solid inteUigence and dignity the former knew
no superior ; he was likewise a master of the
inge.nuities of debate, and in some respects sur
passed even Fox in the art of convincing the
wavering voters. But his distinctly judicial mind
would be naturaUy regarded as incompatible with
the manifold qualities required by a chief minister,
and his personal popularity was impaired by
a Scottish birth and a quasi-Tory reputation.
Pitt's candidature, like Murray's, was tolerably
passive, so far as the man himself was concerned.
It was inconsistent with his animus superbus to
revive his smothered hopes or even recaU some
pleasant obhgations ; and as a consequence the
devoted sateUites of the talented orator seemed
strangely indifferent to the gossip that was
mouthed by the idlers at White's. But even if
his importance had been at that time appreciated,
the uncertainty of Pitt's health was a reasonable
106 Doddington, Diary, March 7, 1754.
U56 K

146 HENRY FOX ch.
objection, whUe stiU more serious was the royal
ban with which his youthful impetuousness had
been punished.
While the Cumberland Party naturaUy pushed
the claims of Fox, Leicester House was represented
in the arena by (Dr.) Sir George Lee, Treasurer
of the Prince's Household, an upright and ' unex
ceptionable man ', who had come over to the
Administration with the tacit approval of the
Princess, and as he had offended no one then, it
would, as Walpole remarked, offend no one now,
if having been awarded the post he were ever
turned out."' The Princess might have found a
weapon in Murray for resisting the Cumberlands,
but the Solicitor-General was not of the pa.rty
of Leicester House, and her treasurer would be
a likelier tool. Other names mentioned with
more or less frequency were Speaker Onslow,
Henry Legge (Treasurer of the Navy), Sir George
Lyttelton and George GrenviUe (leading members
of the Paymaster's faction), and two friends of
Newcastle, Lords Dupplin and Barnard."® These
were never active aspirants, nor in the front rank
of speculation like Fox, Murray, Pitt, or Lee.
The choice designated by public opinion was
certainly Fox. He was the ' ablest man in
107 Walpole to Mann, March 7, 1754 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 216.
108 Rchester to Digby, March 11, 1744: MSS. of G. W.
Digby, Esq., Hist. MSS. Comm., Report VIII, app., part 1,
p. 329.

n THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 147
Pariiament, had acted steadily with the Whigs,
and had in their eyes the seeming right of succes
sion '."® On the, 8th Chesterfield writes what he
has just heard and believes — that Fox is to succeed
Pelham as First Commissioner of the Treasury
and Chancellor of the Exchequer. His Lordship
adds that he is not sorry at the promotion, and
exquisitely commends the prospective First Lord
for a ' frank and gentlemanlike manner '.^^®
But there were several by no means trifling
obstacles to Fox's prospects of success. The very
fact that he represented the party of the Duke of
Cumberland was an objection in the minds of the
many who remembered the King's son as the
' Butcher ', and were quick to raise a cry of
mihtarism ; then the Scots hated him not only
for his connexion with the Duke, but also for the
unforgiven part he had taken in the cases of
Porteous and Anstruther, and statesmen would
hesitate to offend the northern country, whose
feelings were already so deeply wounded ; thirdly,
the lawyers remembered his violent attacks in
the regency and marriage controversies, and the
Chancellor's opinion was no smaU factor in in
fluencing the whole body ; lastly — and again an
ill result of his patron's backing — the efforts of
Leicester House would be employed against him
to the bitter end. The Princess believed and
109 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 329.
110 Chesterfield to Stanhope, March 8, 1754: Corres. of
Chesterfield, III. 1089. K'2

148 HENRY FOX ch.
feared that he would win the desired succession,
and did not disguise the intensity of her hatred."^
She was not aware then that Fox had tried to
meddle in her household "^ — the personal detesta
tion was yet to come ; but it was enough now
that Cumberland, her mortal enemy, would lurk
behind the throne — such a prospect was not to be
endured. We should now turn to consider the sentiments
of the PeUiam interest, which after aU, whatever
the feelings of kings or princes, was stiU the
paramount element. His Majesty had announced
early that he had no favourite to nominate,"* and
submitted the choice to the Cabinet, only stipulat
ing that Devonshire's vote should be added to those
of the others ; ^^* and the Duke was forthwith
summoned from Derbyshire, — a proceeding which
somewhat retarded the settlement."® The King
had also added grimly — with a thought perhaps
111 Doddington, Diary, March 9, 1754 ; Waldegrave,
Memoirs, p. 22 ; Walpole to Mann, March 7, 1754, Letters of
Horace Walpole, III. 216.
112 The Princess did not hear of this until after Hanbury
WUliams's death, in 1759. Walpole teUs us that Fox had
written a confidential account of the affair to WUliams ; and
when the latter's papers came into the hands of his brother,
the letter was for some reason communicated to the Princess.
— Walpole, Memoirs of George III, IV. 92 n.
118 Hardwicke to Canterbury, March 11, 1754 : Harris, II. 511.
11* Hardwicke to Pitt, April 2, 1754 : Phillimore, Memoirs of
Lyttelton, II. 457.
115 Digby to ' Neddy ', March 11, 1754 : MSS. of G. W.
Digby, Esq., Hist. MSS. Comm.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 149
of the obnoxious Paymaster — that he hoped they
would not think of recommending any one who
had ' flown in his face '. Hardwicke perceived, or
thought he perceived, a lurking partiality for Fox
in the royal mind.^" At any rate the ChanceUor
was not idle while his friend mourned, and he saw
in Fox's prospective triumph a serious — perhaps
an almost fatal — consequence. When it was
reflected that a new election was draAving nigh, it
was clear that Fox knew too much ; ^" and where
talent works as magic, it is important to have it
on the right side. Just how much Newcastle was
privy to these cogitations does not appear ; but
Devonshire, arriving late on the 9th,^^8 .^y^g
astounded by the offer of the Treasury with aU the
support that he could want. This the old Duke
had the good sense to decline."®
The Chancellor had been apparently contem
plating a division of the spoUs. Some trusted
peer might have the greater office, while — if the
seals of the Exchequer were thought too great
a fall in hopes — ^the King might confer upon Fox
the Secretaryship of the less important department
of the South, which Holdernesse now held. By
such a shuffling of the leading posts, the Duke of
116 Hardwicke to Canterbury, March 11, 1754.
n' ' To have the plan of elections in safe hands (wrote Hard
wicke) was the immediate fundamental object '. — Hardwicke to
Canterbury, March 11, 1754.
118 Ilchester to Digby, March 11, 1754.
119 Hardmcke to Canterbury, March 11, 1754.

150 HENRY FOX ch.
Newcastle would slide into the vacant headship
of the Treasury.^'®
Pitt, meanwhile, was venturing a few comments
of his own. Fox, he admitted, held the highest
qualifications, both in seniority and talent, for the
seals of the Exchequer. Dr. Lee, however, would
not be a poor selection for the post, although
GrenviUe would be his own preference, if it were
his right to nominate. StUl another alternative
would be to ' secularize the Solicitor-General '.
In aU this, not a word of his own ambition. StUl
more significant was the omission of aU mention
of the greater of the two offices. Was he hoping
that his friends would detect a hint without the
unpleasant condescension of importuning them
outright ? ^"
120 Such is the substance of the ChanceUor's ideas, as ex
pressed in his letter to the Archbishop. — ^Ibid. As regards
the object of Fox (to become First Lord of the Treasury and
ChanceUor of the Exchequer) Chesterfield cleverly remarks
that the Newcastles chose rather to ' kick him up-stairs into
Secretary of State '. — Chesterfield to Stanhope, March 15,
1754: Chesterfidd Corres. (ed. Bradshaw), II. 1090.
121 The conduct which Pitt prescribed for his little foUowing
is also woirthy of attention. It would seem that the betrayal
of their hostUe intentions (p. 142) had not only dissuaded him
from putting the plan into execution, but determined him to
enforce a doubly cautious neutrality on his party. Chiefly
(he writes) ought they to aim at strengthening the Princess
against the King's demise (a significant remark, since it would
seem to indicate that Pitt had come to place more hope in the
quarter which he had once deserted for the sake of serving the
Pelhams than he now reposed in the ungrateful Newcastle).
As for their behaviour they should be careful not to ' talk big ',

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 151
On the 10th the whole city was sure that Fox
would win the coveted prize, and his nephew
believed that he thought so himself, though in
what way it would be given he could not guess.^^^
Pitt had predicted that such would be the out-
come,^^' and Murray brought his candidature to an
or in any way be thought to ' utter threats ' ; nevertheless
they should show themselves keenly aware of the ' foul play '
which had been dealt them in the Closet (an evident thrust at
Newcastle) ; and whilst they must not declare themselves
free because of Pelham's death, they should ' look about and
fish in troubled waters, and perhaps help trouble them in order
to fish the better'. The importance of his health they were
inclined to over-estimate (is this another hint ?), and he would
see them in person as soon as possible, as letters were a poor
substitute. Meanwhile there was strength in unity, and they
themselves had the health to act (doubtless another hint). He
particularly cautioned them not to let any one sound them
without authority to make offers ; but in the meantime it would
be well for Temple to surround himself with the party at dinners
(evidently a design to assure the Newcastles of the unity of the
little faction), and also to entertain both the family of the
Chancellor on the one hand and the courtiers of the Prince of
Wales on the other. Grenville's time would certainly come, he
felt ; for ' Fox is odious and wUl have difficulty to stand at
some future time ' . The only associate of whom (for obvious
reasons) Pitt felt some distrust, was Sir George Lyttelton, and
he wished that an allusion to Newcastle's ' feebleness ' should
not be reported to Sir George. — Pitt to Lyttelton and the
GrenvUles, March 7, 1754 ; Pitt to Temple, March 7, 1754 ;
Pitt to Temple, March 11, 1754: Grenville Papers, I. 106,
HI, 112.
122 Digby to Digby, March 11, 1754 : MSS. of G. W. Digby,
Esq., Hist. MSS. Comm.
123 That is, Pitt predicted that Fox would become ChanceUor
of the Exchequer. — Pitt to Temple, March 7, 1754. We have
noticed that he carefully omitted all mention of the Treasury.

152 HENRY FOX ch.
end, assuring Fox through Stone that he had no
wish for the honour. ^^*
But the Scots were still rampant and Ilchester
heard on the 10th that ArgyU and others had
induced Newcastle to bid for the place himself.
Various plans were talked of, such as Fox for
Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Secretary of State,
with Newcastle in the Treasury ; but the Duke's
acceptance in the former case ' would depend upon
whether power was lodged in the First Lord of the
Treasury or in the ChanceUor ' . ^^® Nothing could be
guessed at. Fox said, until Newcastle had conferred
with the King, who as yet had seen no ' plan '.^^®
Meanwhile, for Newcastle and his friends, it was
anything to beat Fox. ' You know my opinion
of that gentleman,' was Hardwicke's comment in
Avriting to Pitt later of the affair. ^^' Fox might
get relatives to send condolences to the bereaved
brother, but the sting of being asked a favour on
the day of mourning was a hard thing even for the
man who gloried in his benefactions ; ^^® and Fox's
own activity had shown a marked lack of poignant
sorrow.
124 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 330.
125 Ilchester to Digby, March 11, 1754.
126 Digby to ' Neddy ', March 11, 1754.
12' Hardwicke to Pitt, AprU 2, 1754.
128 It was probably through a delay in the post that New
castle had received an application from one of the Digbys on
the day that Pelham died. Fox could only hope that a letter
of condolence would atone for the seeming lack of consideration.
—Digby to ' Neddy ', March 11, 1574.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 153
It is said that the motive for keeping the heart
less aspirant from gaining the Treasury was to
offer him a lower office, which he would be bound
to refuse, and would in that way arouse the resent
ment of the King,^^® who was in reality the chief
element to be feared. After all, could it be
imagined that the man who lurked behind the
scenes of strife, yet was conscious aU the while
that the headship had been his in aU but name for
eleven years, would not determine that in some
way the prize should remain in his family ? Surely
not, when his trusted friend and confidant was
able and wiUing to secure his triumph !
Hardwicke knew that His Majesty should be
the one to confer the honour, but he feared that
such would be too great a risk, imless the royal
servant should do as he were told.^^° Judging, in
fact, from his manoeuvre with the Archbishop of
Canterbury,^8i ^g c^n readily imagine how skUfuUy
the affair was managed. When the Cabinet met
on the momentous evening of the 12th of March,
the astute lawyer read an announcement that His
129 Doddington, Diary, March 14, 1754.
180 Hardwicke to Pitt, AprU 2, 1754.
181 The Archbishop being unable to attend the crucial meeting
of the Cabinet on the morrow, Hardwicke wrote to him a long
letter (Harris, II. 511), entering fully into the Newcastle
programme, and even dictating an ' ostensible ' letter (as he
expressed it) which the Archbishop should send to be read at
the meeting. Nor did Hardwicke stop there. He not only
begged his friend to send also a ' separate private letter ', but
went so far as to instruct him in the manner of framing it.

154 HENRY FOX ch.
Majesty had decided to separate the offices which
PeUiam had held, that then he had ' cast his eyes
upon ' the Duke of Newcastle for First Commis
sioner of the Treasury, and Henry Legge for
Chancellor of the Exchequer ; finaUy Fox should
be Secretary of State for the department of the
South.^82 That the poll taken was unanimous for
the nominees is hardly necessary to mention.
Newcastle himself had had the delicacy to be
absent from the meeting.
Thus the result of the hard-fought struggle was
what any observer of Cabinet subservience or
Newcastle methods during the lest decade could
not have reasonably failed to expect. Hartington,
to whom the denouement may possibly have been
a surprise, had been the one selected to negotiate
with Fox ; and the Marquis had already been
specially commissioned by Newcastle — in anticipa
tion of the Cabinet meeting — to promise Fox the
management of the House of Commons with a
disposal of some of the offices and the most minute
intelhgence of how the secret-service money should
be spent (although the expenditure of the latter as
well as most of the parliamentary patronage should
be reserved for the First Lord). He added also his
personal wish that Fox would consent.^®*
182 Succeeding Holdernesse, who was transferred to the
department of the North. — Minute of meeting, Powis House,
March 12, 1754 : Add. MSS., 35870, f. 245.
138 Digby to Digby, March 14, 1754, MSS. of G. W. Digby ;
Walpole to Bentley, March 17, 1754 : Letters of Horace Walpole,
III. 291.

II THE CUMBERLAND PARTY 155
Fox was frank in announcing that he did not
comply with willingness and had never sought
the office ^^* (too ironicaUy true!),Jbut accepted
the Seals next morning, Hartington having already
apprised the Duke of his success. ^^® Thus Fox
was to be lifted from the War Office to a post of
commanding importance.
But the new Secretary had failed to secure the
greater prize — ^failed because he had no influence
in the Cabinet, and because his credit with the King
was not strong enough to intervene in his favour.
Perhaps his ducal chief had taken too much for
granted and had not played upon the King's
affections. Perhaps, too. His Majesty had reaUy
thought that Fox would be the choice and so had
left the selection to the Cabinet, only to find
that the Cabinet meant the Newcastle interest,
and that he himself was to be their instrument.
18* Digby to Digby, March 14, 1754. Fox's chief consolation
seemed to be the fact that the Newcastles apparently intended
to exclude Egmont. Yet, in spite of his disappoiatment, we
can see from the tone of his letter to Digby on the 12th that
he felt no little pleasure at the prospect of becoming Secretary
of State. That he realized that his own fitness lay in the
direction of the Treasury rather than the Foreign Office is
perfectly clear ; but that was but one aspect of his new pro
motion. The entire management of the House of Commons,
and the feeling that he might strengthen his own interest by
the use which he should make of the offices at his disposal,
were arguments quite suflBcient to prevent him from sulking
over Newcastle's victory. The more important object of his
ambition was stUl open to him.
185 Hartington to Newcastle, March 11, 1754: Add. MSS.
32734, f. 218.

156 HENRY FOX ch. n
Agauist such odds the Cumberlands had but
little chance.
But the Newcastles could afford to be mag
nanimous. The next day, under the auspices of
Lord Hartington, a reconciliation was patched up
between the ChanceUor and the new Secretary-
elect, whatever reservations the latter may have
aUowed himself from ever acting heartUy with his
old enemy. In the meantime the secret coimcU of
two had sent Stone to assure the Princess of the
necessity of the unwelcome promotion."®
Despite the failme of his main endeavour. Fox's
credit had but little diminished since he made an
enemy of the man who had just foimd ample
revenge. He might be invited, in time to come, to
that very post Avhich he had now faUed to obtain ;
but it was only now that he was appointed to
a high office of state through a general recognition
of his ability and by virtue of a reputation not as
yet shattered by his own rapacity or cunning.-'^'
136 Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 28, 1755: Add. MSS.
35415, f. 80.
13' ' He has some faults,' writes Waldegrave (a very impartial
observer) ' but more good qualities ; is a man of sense and
Judgement notwithstanding some indiscretion, and with small
allowance for ambition, party, and politics, is a warm friend,
a man of veracity, and a man of honour.' — Memoirs, p. 25.

CHAPTER III
PERFIDY AND REVENGE
Newcastle at last held the reins of power
tightly in his grasp. That he had himself been
behind the scenes directing his own cause, can be
strongly suspected, if not perhaps proved ; but at
all events, thanks to his faithful friend, the
ChanceUor, he had triumphed over aU the factions
that would have robbed him of his heritage — he
was supreme ! No longer had he a niggardly
brother in control of the exchequer of the State,
grudging a subsidy or siding with an iniquitous
Secretary. There was no one to emulate his pre
ponderance in the Closet, and the two troublesome
parties of Cumberland and Leicester House were
for the moment subdued. Nothing seemed, at first
thought, to hinder the inauguration of an absolu
tism that was so near and dear to his heart.
In the selection of Legge for ChanceUor of the
Exchequer the Duke felt that he could not have
hit upon a more efficient tool for the subsidiary
office. The son of Lord Dartmouth had a know
ledge of finance that would amply compensate for
the First Lord's lack of experience, and being a
parvenu in the political world, he was scarcely to
be thought of as unpleasantly ambitious. As for

158 HENRY FOX ch.
Holdernesse, he had proved himself to be of one
mind, and that was the Duke's.
There was only one spot in his self-appointed
absolutism which Newcastle believed might be
dangerously vulnerable, and that was the new
Secretary of State. Long experience had taught
the new commander that monopoly, and that
alone, could render his control of foreign affairs
a positive certainty and lull the suspicions of his
jealous mind. The past spoke eloquently ; un
sympathetic co-operation had been a motive for
Townshend's resignation in 1730 ; ^ it was the
undoing of four who foUowed in his steps,
Granville, Harrington, Chesterfield and Bedford —
a quartet of widely different dispositions and
mentalities, but all, in more or less degree, con
spirators against the exercise of tyranny, and all
had bowed their necks to the Pelham ascendancy.
Now, more than ever, if he were stiU to dispense
his blessings to foreign princes, he must have a
man as Secretary of State who would be his pawn
and nothing else. Could he trust Fox ?
Still another misgiving harassed his mind. He
had agreed to impart the secrets of his elaborate
system of corruption ; he was to share them with
the one who of all men was oldest and shrewdest
in the traffic, and who headed a party that knew no
loyalty to Ministers, now that Henry Pelham was
dead. Beyond a doubt he would be adding to the
1 Walpole to Newcastle, December 26, 1754: Brit. Mus.,
Add. MSS., 32737, f. 491.

m PERFIDY AND REVENGE 159
power of one who already had a prodigious foUow
ing in the Commons and a predominating influence
in the patronage at the War Office.^ Would it be
wise, then, to deposit those precious instruments
of power with the man who had striven in vain
for the Treasury ?
The answer seemed inevitably negative. The
Duke of Newcastle was not the man to begin his
career of omnipotence with a palpable weakness.
A long night's brooding over the fraUties of his
political contemporaries had left him unconvinced
that all would join hands in leaving him supreme,
and the man who must be given his first lesson in
ministerial submissiveness was Henry Fox.
After the ChanceUor's absolution had been ten
dered under a veil of polished platitudes, Harting
ton brought his friend to Newcastle House where
an evening conference had been appointed as a
personal guaranty of the terms delivered by
messenger. The power-loving Duke was always
a gracious host and this was the initiation of
a quondam foe. But no sooner had the conversa
tion turned to particular conditions, than the
treaty seemed at once a fantasy and the initiation
a surrender. Fox mentioned the secret-service money. New
castle told him that his brother had never imparted
2 Waldegrave . states that Fox ' had the distribution of
mUitary preferments, which added greatly to his strength by
furnishing the means of gratif3ang his dependents '. — Memoirs,
p. 21.

160 HENRY FOX ch.
the inteUigence of its disposal. Fox at once
disclaimed any intention to lay hands on a
penny of it, but if he were to have the absolute
direction of the House of Commons, he must
know who had been ' gratified ' and who had not ;
for how otherwise could he speak to the members
without appearing ridiculous ? It was mere
mockery when the Duke then averred that he
would give the confidence to no one else.
' Who is to have the nomination of officers ? '
Fox inquired. ' I, myself,' was the reply. ' And
who the recommendation ? ' ' Any member of the
House of Commons.' Thus the promise of a share
in the appointments was forgotten also.
Fox then asked concerning the list of members
to be assisted in the coming election, which to his
knowledge Pelham had bequeathed. ' I will
come,' he proposed, ' and look it over with Your
Grace.' ' No,' the Duke answered, ' I wiU look
it over with Lord Dupplin, and then show it to
you.' 8
Such shuffling clearly showed that Newcastle
was determined to break his word. He did not,
indeed he could not deny, in the presence of
Lord Hartington, the terms of the offer he had
made through the latter ; but ' he endeavoured
3 He did so on the 15th. — Memorandum, Newcastle House,
November 15, 1754: Add. MSS., 32995, f. 69. DetaUs of the
interview between Newcastle and Fox are given in Walpole,
Memoirs of George II, I. 331-2; Doddington, Diary, March
15, 1754.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 161
to palhate, explain, and excuse himself : that his
anxiety of mind, the affliction of his family, and
grief for the loss of his brother had quite disordered
his memory ; that possibly he might have ex
pressed his meaning in improper words ; but
certainly it could not have been his intention to
give Fox that share of power which he now
claimed.' * Such was the violence of a man who
would quake at the consequences.
Hartington was unreserved in his condemnation
of the perfidy, and angrily declared that he would
' never have anything to say to His Grace '.®
But Fox's resentment lay deeper. He was too
discerning a politician not to see that Newcastle
thought that his favourite game was in danger,
and he was likewise aware that he had been duped
by one of his own profession, however greatly
inferior in intelligence and force. Yet the offer
had been once so tempting that Fox was still
a restless prey to indecision ; ® he was eager to
show his skill in management ; his spirit was
restless with ambition. But he had never yet been,
* Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 19.
5 H. Digby to Lord Digby, March 14, 1754 : MSS. of G. W.
Digby, Esq., Hist. MSS. Comm., Report VIII, App., part 1,
p. 222. Walpole being ever ready to misrepresent the men
whom he disliked, the testimony of Fox's cousin is more to
be trusted than the former's statement that Hartington
' expressed no resentment '. Even according to Walpole His
Lordship remonstrated with Newcastle and insisted that the
Duke's stand was contrary to the message he had received.
— Memoirs, I. 332.
6 Ibid.
1166 T.

162 HENRY FOX ch.
for the sake of advancement, the tool of any man —
much less of one whom he despised. He had no
doubt the foresight to see that ambition itself, in
such a guise, would soon be smothered.'
In this frame of mind, while Hartington was
informing the Chancellor, and probably trying in
vain to commit him. Fox was enjoying the counsels
of his party. The Duke of Cumberland would have
him throw up so doubtful an honour ; the younger
Walpole was even more vehement in his arraign
ment of the would-be autocrat, and impressed upon
his friend the danger of being detached from his
party after all power had been curtailed ; ® but
a letter from Williams, written in haste about
midnight, imploring him in the strongest terms
not to yield to such abuse, seemed, as Lady
Caroline afterwards reported, to be the factor
that clinched his determination.®
The following day, the 14th, Fox wrote to
Newcastle, requesting him to obtain the King's
permission for declining the Seals, since, in view
of the contradiction of the terms first offered, he
' Fox had expected the entire management of the Commons
— ^which would have reconciled him in a measure to his dis
appointment in failing to gain the Treasury. But under the
revised conditions he would have been simply a subordinate —
and that without the means of acting with efiiciency.
8 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 334.
9 The letter was eight or nine pages long, so Sir Charles
must have felt strongly on the subject. — Hchester to Digby,
March 23, 1754 : Hist. MSS. Comm., Report VIII. Walpole
mentions WiUiams's efforts, and seems, on the whole, to be
pretty weU informed as to this whole affair.

ni PERFIDY AND REVENGE 163
could not be answerable for His Majesty's affairs
in the House of Commons.^® The letter before
being sent was submitted to Hartington, who said
' there was not a word too much, and it would be
justified everjrwhere '.^^ Newcastle's reply was
sent the next day, expressed extreme concern, but
went into no particulars.^^ Hardwicke wrote to
his friend, ' Do what one can, some people wUl lie.'-^^
AU who voiced their sentiments — Henry Legge
and Lord Hchester excepted ^* — seemed to feel
that the short-lived Secretary had taken the noble
course. The Speaker declared that he had acted
with great honour, and coiUd not have done
differently.^® A note in Fox's own hand (in a letter
of Digby' s) evinced the resentment he plainly felt :
' Harry has given so particular an account that
I will only say that I would not be a shabby dog ^®
to be the King of France, and I will not be Secretary
of State.' "
10 The letter is given in fuU in Walpole, Menwirs, I. 334-5.
11 Fox to Digby, March 14, 1754, Hist. MSS. Comm.,
Report VIII.
12 Newcastle to Fox, March 14, 1754 : Add. MSS., 32734,
i. 245.
18 Hard^vicke to Newcastle, March 18, 1754: ibid. f. 269.
1* Fox's brother was more likely to think of a lost chance of
obtaining an earldom than to consider the politician's stand
point. 15 Digby to Digby, March 14, 1754: Hist. MSS. Comm.,
Report VIII.
16 This was a favourite expression of Fox's ; see Life and
Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, p. 116 n.
1' PS. m Fox's hand, letter of Digby to Digby, March 14, 1754.
L2

164 HENRY FOX ch.
One of Fox's first steps after his resignation
was to caU on Lady Yarmouth, who received
a copy of his letter to Newcastle and promised
to show it to the King. She graciously expressed
her regret at what had happened,^® a^id the
Secretary-elect might have been tempted to believe
that the Minister's action was condemned in the
Closet. On the 15th, on Newcastle's invitation. Fox and
Hartington repaired to the ChanceUor's, where an
effort was made to explain away former promises
and institute a settlement. But civilities could
not efface the past, and, as the First Lord was not
prepared to make material repentance, the con
ference broke up after three hours with nothing
gained.^® It is no doubt probable that the
Newcastles had been in terror lest they had
raised a viper in their midst. To drive Fox
into opposition had not been a part of their pro
gramme ; and yet such a result was eminently
possible. Chesterfield, a careful observer extra
arenam, evidently expected that such would be
the case, and that ample would be the opportunity
for revenge.^® But Fox was doubtful if such
a course would enhance his prospects. The Duke
of Bedford had tried it, and was he not out of
18 Digby to Digby, March 14, 1754.
19 Fox having declined to accept the Newcastle interpretation
of the word ' management '. — Ilchester to Digby, March 18,
1754: Hist. MSS. Comm., Report VIII.
20 Chesterfield to Stanhope, March 15, 1754: -Corres. of
Chesterfield, IIL 1090.

in PERFIDY AND REVENGE 165
everything ? And such men as Egmont, his
inveterate foe,^^ would be in the group with
whom he would have to work. No, there were
better chances of revenge whUe stiU a member
of the Administration. To force his pretensions
upon the man whose innate folly was bound sooner
or later to drive him to the brink of ruin — such
was a longer but a shrewder game.
So on the 16th, having asked an audience with
the King, Fox announced his desire to remain
Secretary-at-War.^^ His Majesty had already read
the famous letter to Newcastle, which had been
handed to him by the ChanceUor in an audience
on the day it was received (March 14). ^8 jjg ^[^
not press Fox to reconsider his determination, but
gently reproached him for ingratitude to himself,
adding that his visitor had expected too much.
' Perhaps, Sir,' replied Fox, ' I did ask too much ;
but they were more in fault, who promised and
broke their word ; Lord Hartington is witness.
I shall speak with truth, not with modesty. I
might be a great man in the House of Commons,
if I would be Secretary of State at the head of
an Opposition — but I prefer serving Your Majesty
as a private man, without seeing the Duke of New
castle. He promised me his confidence. I never
¦21 See chapter ii, note 134.
22 Walpole to Bentley, March 17, 1754: Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 219.
23 Digby to Digby, March 14, 1754: Hist. MSS. Comm.,
Report VIII.

166 HENRY FOX ch.
can believe him more. I am honest ; he is not.' ^*
Privately Fox remarked that he hoped and believed
he had gained in public esteem by his action, and
to have accepted the seat would have been the
part of a knave and a fool.^®
Meanwhile the Ministry of Newcastle had
received its final organization. In Sir Thomas
Robinson, Master of the Wardrobe and sometime
Ambassador to Vienna, the Duke found the
humble instrument he desired. The latter had
given promise of much ability in foreign affairs,
but in managing the Commons he was only too
likely to show the hand of inexperience. How
ever, it was the Newcastle principle to employ
second-rate material for offices of primary im
portance, and there was much wisdom ahead to
be learned. Legge and his master ' did not love
each other ',^® and the slight which the former was
given on his first appearance at the Treasury ^' was
something the little man would certainly seek to
repay in similar coin ; but at present each had an
interest at stake that required some dissembling,
and the Duke was still pluming himself on having
secured a faithful slave for second place at his
2* Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 335-6.
25 Fox to Digby, March 23, 1754: Hist. MSS. Comm.,
Report VIII.
26 Digby to Digby, March 20, 1754 : Hist. MSS. Comm.,
Report VIII.
2' Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 340. It was unlike
Newcastle to be discourteous, but Walpole may have over-
coloured the account.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 167
Board. Meanwhile the faithful Murray was pro
moted to succeed Sir Dudley Ryder as Attorney-
General (the latter being advanced to the Chief
Justiceship) ; ^^ and Lord Dupplin, a never-failing
aUy, was to be the special agent in corruption.^®
Nothing was offered in the way of promotion
to the aggrieved Paymaster, who had complained
that Fox and Legge had both been awarded
priority ; although Hardwicke wrote to him that
he and Newcastle had done the best they could,
and with His Grace at the head of the Administra
tion there were ' hopes '.®® MeanwhUe to soothe
his mortification. Sir George Lyttelton was given
the lucrative office of Cofferer and the latter
secured for his friend, GrenviUe, the post which
Legge had vacated. Even Charles Townshend had
not appealed in vain, 8^ and if the rest of the
' Cobham cubs ' were forced to wait, it was only
because the Ministry had no more blessings to
bestow.^^ Nor can it be assumed that such
28 Left vacant by the death of Chief Justice Lee.
29 Walpole to Mann, March 28, 1754: Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 224.
30 Hardwicke was well versed in the Newcastle habit of
expecting something in return for nothing, and he took occasion
to fiatter Pitt on his abUities in the House of Commons. ' I
^vUl not suffer myself to doubt,' he wrote also, ' that you will
continue to take an active part.' — Hardwicke to Pitt, April 6,
1754: PhiUimore, II. 456.
81 Townshend to Newcastle, March 11, 1534: Add. MSS.,
32734, f. 216. He was appointed one of the Lords of the
Admiralty. 32 Barrington wrote to Newcastle to get a promise of an

168 HENRY FOX ch.
generosity was whoUy disinterested ; for the hope
of weakening Pitt through the purchase of his
following undoubtedly had place in the minds of
the men who feared him.
The Cumberlands had more cause than any other
faction to harbour feehngs of discontent. Lord
Gower being advanced in years, an effort was made,
a-pparently with success, to induce him to resign
the Privy Seal — a change especially desirable in
that the Duke of Rutland, a more active member
of the party, aspired to the place.^8 But Lady
Gower evidently disliked the arrangement, and
tried to persuade the ChanceUor to act in their
behalf without consulting Newcastle. The whole
matter was of a delicate nature, and gossips being
too much interested, a report went abroad which
Hardwicke so far departed from his usual placid
dignity as to pronounce a ' lie \^ Newcastle,
sensitive that any one should believe the ChanceUor
would ever act contrary to their confidential friend
ship, was eager to use his friend's denunciation
and was promptly rebuked by the cautious lawyer.®®
employment redeemed (ibid. f. 229), but learned afterward
that ' aU the employments were given away '. — Doddington,
Diary, March 31, 1754.
33 Walpole to Mann, March 28, 1754 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 224.
84 Memorandum, AprU 6, 1754: Add. MSS., 32995, f. 178.
35 ' Putting things down in writing is something like
a,dvertising, and I may be drawn into an altercation with
Lady G. about words. It is reaUy below Your Grace, and I
have stomach enough to think it below me too.' — Hardwicke
to Newcastle, April 3, 1754: Add. MSS., 32735, f. 20.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 169
Just what intricacies there were in the whole affair
is hard to unravel, but the fact remains that Gower
was allowed to retain his office in peace, and no
new aspirant from among the Cumberlands was
given advancement. Fox, as Secretary-at-War,
was not a member of the Cabinet, and the Duke
of Devonshire, who was becoming affiliated to
the party, had long been out of active office.
Pitt was kept informed of everything by his
faithful foUowers, Lyttelton and GrenviUe, and had
thus received an account of Fox's letter, and all
that had happened in the Ministry.®® At one
time it was reported that his life was in danger ; 8'
but this chronic distemper of his was an uncertain
thing with strange vagaries, and Grenville, who
recorded the matter, may not have understood it.
At aU events the baneful malady did not prevent
a spirit so ambitious from reaching out for power.
His long letter to Newcastle on the 24th was
a combination of humility and reproach. At the
beginning was a touch of flattery ; His Grace had
done wisely to take the Treasury himself, and this
might lay the foundation of a system, ' so fast as
not to be shaken hereafter'. But for himself, he
would ask His Grace if twenty years' service had
merited such treatment. Under present circum
stances he could not act prominently in Parlia
ment — his situation was too ' degraded ' for such
86 Doddington, Diary, June 10, 1754, Lyttelton to Grenville,
March 18, 1754: Grenville Papers, I. 115.
8' GrenvUle's narrative: ibid. I. 431.

170 HENRY FOX ch.
services to be expected. Then, as if swept into
more direct language against his wiU, he declared
that he had flattered himself that His Grace would
bring forward an ' instrument of his own ', would
employ the occasion at hand ®® to eradicate the
royal displeasure, and reserve the first opening
in the office of Secretary of State. Instead of
that three men had been given precedence. Yet
the Paymaster was merciful ; he did not scruple to
praise Robinson as a man of worth and abUity ; ^®
the choice of Legge too he approved. After final
professions of attachment and an undivided heart,
the pompous effusion was brought to a close.*®
Newcastle's answers to such torrents of ex
postulation and remonstrance were quite too poor
a balm for a pride so wounded. It is said that
a coolness had sprung up between the two before
Pelham's death ; *^ and this the Paymaster attri-
88 Pelham's death is meant. Pitt had hoped for a shake-up,
^^hich would result in his obtaining some promotion.
89 Later Pitt made his famous remark to Fox with regard
to Sir Thomas's leadership in the Commons : ' He (Newcastle)
may as weU send his jack-boot to govern us.' — Walpole,
Memoirs of George II, II. 101.
40 Pitt to Newcastle, March 24, 1754 : Add. MSS., 32734,
f. 322.
*i Grenville's narrative, Grenville Papers, I. 429. This was
due in all probabUity to Pitt's disappointment in not being
appointed to succeed Bedford in 1752 (see p. 95). Dr. von
RuvUle intimates (I. 321) that Newcastle probably strength
ened the King's obstinacy toward Pitt ; and such was un
doubtedly the latter's meaning when he wrote of the ' foul
play ' in the Closet (chap, ii, note 121). But whereas it is
quite true that Newcastle did not want a man of force in the

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 171
buted to his recent opposition on two points in
Parliament ; *^ for those two ' crimes,' he contended,
he was ' punished '. But had he not expiated
those offences ? *8 Lyttelton had told him he would
' receive some commands ',** and patiently had he
waited, but they had not come. In vain was his
wistfulness hinted ; he had humbled himself, and
yet to no purpose.
Tantalized by meaningless excuses, and yet still
loth to give up hope, the mortified egotist feared
that His Grace might think the gout an obstacle.
This indisposition, he assured the Duke, was such
Ministry, and rightly believed (as he found to his sorrow in
the case of Fox) that such a man would be iU content with
a power as fettered as the Duke thought necessary, there is
certainly no evidence to show that Newcastle was guUty of
anything more than simply refraining from advancing Pitt's
claims. Owing to the King's disUke of the Paymaster, a
passive attitude was quite sufficient. Finally, we may add
that both Newcastle and Pitt had too innately the character
istics of the politician to be able to inspire much mutual
respect. In so far as Newcastle and Hardwicke held out false
hopes or expressed an interest which was palpably insiacere,
we can hardly blame Pitt for distrusting them. On the other
hand, how can we read these laudatory epistles of Pitt's
\\ithout regarding them as the quintessence of political
dissimulation 't
*2 His conduct in the cases of the reduction of the seamen
(p. 95), and of the charges against Anstruther (p. 103).
*8 Pitt to Newcastle, March 24, 1754. Pitt was aUuding
shrewdly to the support he had given Newcastle's foreign
policy. We must remark that it is rather odd to think of Pitt
bringing forward his defence of a system of subsidies as
a reason for being granted an employment by Newcastle.
¦»* Pitt to Newcastle, March 1754: Chatham Corres. I. 85.

172 HENRY FOX ch.
as might render him unable to perform the duties
of the Exchequer, but the office of Secretary did
not so much require uninterrupted health, and
a successor might be appointed at any time (was
this a reproach ?). ' But I own freely,' he added,
' that I should have thought myself much less
satisfied as to my own person if Mr. Fox had been
put at the head of the House of Commons by the
King's favour, than I am at present. I should in
that case have been mortified for Your Grace and
My Lord Chancellor — very little for myself.' *®
Such a remark was not only attempted ingratia-
tion ; it showed an unworthy satisfaction in his
rival's disappointment.
To Hardwicke's letter,*® which had emphasized
the royal aversion in spite of determined efforts to
remove it, Pitt's reply showed the agony of despair.
The weight of royal displeasure was too great ;
it had crushed him. ' A decent and innocent
retreat ' was aU he asked now. The letter con
cluded with an acknowledgement of the favour to
his friends and verbose apologies for his own
presumption.*' The unappreciated genius of the
Pay Office had wasted words in vain.
But Pitt was not alone in his sorrow. Fox had
meanwhile begun to harbour remorse. It was not
pleasant to be out of the whirl, while lesser men
were bustling to and fro. He might indeed have
45 Pitt to Newcastle, AprU 5, 1754: Chatham Corres. 1. 101.
46 PhiUimore, Memoirs of Lyttdton, I. 456.
47 Pitt to Hardwicke, AprU 6, 1754: Chatham Corres. I. 103.

m PERFIDY AND REVENGE 173
accepted the second conditions, had they been
anterior to the first, but he could not have de
meaned himself in a point of honour. Yet he fUled
his ducal patron with his own misgivings and
blamed his friends for their counsel. Ilchester had
said aU along that he had let things ' shp through
his fingers merely upon punctilio ',*® and perhaps
the less ambitious brother was right.
Yet Fox's disappointment and Pitt's laments
were not the only symptoms of disaffection. The
powerful pair who governed the Administration
were not a little tortured by the ridicule of
unfeeling bystanders.*® It was in vain that
Hardwicke sought to convince himself that the
King must be displeased with Fox's refusal ; he
was only too ready to fear that His Majesty
would frown upon Robinson, and there was no
knowing the effect of Fox's ' aggravated repre
sentation '.®° Small wonder, then, if consolation
was found in a false move on the part of the
enemy.
48 Ilchester to Digby, March 23, 1754: Hist. MSS. Comm.,
Report VIII. The same day as this letter Fox himself writes
in a very different tone (see note 25), and hence Ilchester may
at first have let his personal views exaggerate what was
simply an unreasoning discontent. But a later letter of
Ilchester's (dated May 4) gives us the same story, and it is
quite possible that Fox was beginning to regret his recent
display of dignity.
49 As is evident from Hard\\icke's letters to Newcastle of
March 18, and March 23, 1754: Add. MSS., 32734, ff. 269,
307. 50 Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 19, 1754: ibid., f. 281.

174 HENRY FOX ch.
Fox's friends were tired of reproaches from the
man they had encouraged to preserve his self-
respect, and those among them who were ministers
no doubt longed for sympathetic company in
a dweUing where the servants were made to
feel their insignificance. As early as the 19th —
before Robinson finaUy took the Seals — the new
ChanceUor of the Exchequer had sent a message
intimating that Fox might yet recover his docility.
But Hardwicke's stand was firm ; Sir Thomas
Robinson had already been put forward, and,
in view of Fox's thoughtless veracity, they
could not with dignity change their candidate.®^
Still such a proposition had the look of surrender
in it, and if the messenger had only been one of the
Cumberland chieftains, the ChanceUor would not
have been on his guard against a feint.
But a second manoeuvre a little later was
corroborative even though by no means wholly
reassuring. Hartington was qoncocting a plot in
which proposals were to be laid before the King on
the 20th with careful omission of Fox's name —
a moye described by the ChanceUor as ' not only
captious but insidious '.®^ His Lordship accord
ingly determined to assure himself that the King
would ' support his servants ',®8 and to make matters
doubly safe, it had been proposed at first that
Holdernesse should precede Hartington in the
51 Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 19, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32734, f. 281. 52 ibid.
53 Quoted from his letter of March 26th.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 175
Closet ; ®* but in the end the ChanceUor was suffi
ciently sanguine to omit the precaution.®® The
Cumberlands were in fact offering submission
when it was too late. Whether Fox was more than
a passive accomplice in the scheme does not
appear,®® but his friends were no match for the
subtle lawyer, and seemed strangely unaware that
the advantage was momentarily in the hands of
the pair whose wounded pride had now been
healed. In April the costly farce of elections for the new
Parliament took place. Not only had Opposition
been paralysed ever since the Prince's death, but
there was no one of the least importance among
them save Egmont, and the latter would have the
54 Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 19, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32734, f. 281.
55 Apparently the First Lord and the ChanceUor were working
a good deal in the dark, and Legge seems to have been their
chief informant. According to that not always trustworthy
messenger, Hartington believed that Fox should make sub
mission unconditionally, and with this in view the former was
to see the King again on the 30th. Again the proposal was
made of having Holdernesse precede him in the Closet. —
Newcastle to Hardwicke, March 29, 1754: Add. MSS., 35414,
f. 130. Evidently the Newcastles were much in dread of the
possible lengths to which the Cumberland Party would go.
Hardwicke believed Fox's refusal of the Seals had been ' the
result of some new consultation ' (letter of March 18), and
Newcastle hinted that the Duke of Devonshire was behind
these latest plots (letter of March 29).
56 Fox made it appear, according to Newcastle later, that he
was simply aUowing the Duke of Devonshire to amuse himself
with certain schemes,

176 HENRY FOX ch.
fight of his life to secure his seat for Bridgewater,
The Pittites were now eligible for a share of the
Ministerial bounties, and it was a pleasure for the
little faction to be scrimmaging for seats in close
communication with their new patron -at the
Treasury. Meanwhile Potter, one of the ' dis
reputables ' who found entree to Pitt's court,
kept his important friend duly informed of all
political gossip that concerned their interests.
Pitt himself had secured at least one favour. The
beneficent master of boroughs without number had
saved him from probable disaster by the gift of
a safe candidature for Aldborough in Yorkshire,®'
and the Paymaster again refrained from burdening
his mind with reflection on the Pelham methods.
Fox was as usual returned for Windsor, but being
out of humour, kept apparently aloof from the
leading featm-es of the drama, and the Cumber-
lands in general took little interest in the election.
Sandwich, however, had the short-lived satisfac
tion of carrying two seats for St. Michael in Corn
wall in spite of violent opposition. Doddington,
who was bent on having Newcastle secure him a
pardon from the King for his desertion to the side
of the Princess, was working hard to redeem his
promise to the late First Commissioner, namely the
capture of six seats at his own expense.®® Besides
that task, the ex-Treasurer of the Navy had pro-
5^ A letter from Pitt to his benefactor shows us his usual
obsequience at this time : Chatham Corres. I. 85.
58 Doddington, Diary, November 7, 1753.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 177
mised to make a determined effort to secure
Egmont' s defeat ; ®® and aU these engagements
were remembered by the new First Lord. In his
brisk notes the amiable intriguer records three days
' spent in the infamous and disagreeable com
pliance with the low habits of venal wretches ' ; ®°
but they were not without recompense ; the six
seats were secured and Egmont was saved only —
so it was said ®^ — by iUegal votes which the mayor
acknowledged as such but did not exclude.
The elections in the main revealed much the same
tactics as were generaUy employed while Newcastle
was the voter's friend. If indeed there were few
counter-influences, there was always a vast horde
who cared little for parliaments or premiers, but
knew the value of their own political prerogatives.
Whether they were more avaricious than usual,
or Newcastle was particularly punctilious in begin
ning his primacy with a splendid appearance, we
are told that never was bribery so profuse as on
this occasion.®^ Although much had been settled
before Pelham's death, there were many who had
still to be persuaded with guineas that their services
were still desirable under the new commander.
The new Parliament met for a few days in May.
59 Doddington, Diary, October 9, 1753.
60 Ibid., AprU 14, 15, 16, 1754. Doddmgton told Newcastle
that his expenses, when figured up, would amount to £2,500
—Ibid., AprU 26, 1754.
61 Ibid., AprU 17, 1754.
62 Walpole to Mann, March 7, 1754, Letters of Horace Walpole,
III. 216.

1156

M

178 HENRY FOX ch.
Pitt, being pressed by Newcastle for his opinion
of it, replied, ' Your Grace will be surprised, but
I think Mr. Fox should have been (put) at the
head of the Commons.' ®® This was magnanimous
on the part of the ambitious Paymaster, for only
a short time previously Fox on his side had
expressed his willingness ' to serve with and under
Mr. Pitt '.®* Newcastle might remember and con
nect the two cases, as weU as Pitt's own letter of
April 5, but at present he was still absorbed in
the pleasures of electioneering.
In the end there was nothing to suUy the com
pleteness of the victory. A larger number of Whigs
were to compose the new Parliament than ever
had been since the Revolution,®® and the luiim-
peachable First Minister had some cause to exult.
The King was not tardy in expressuig his satis
faction ; ®® and Pitt's own election committed him
— ostensibly at least — to the Newcastle system.®'
68 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 340.
64 Lyttelton to Hardwicke, March 23, 1754, Harris, Life of
Harduncke, III. 3. It is not unlikely that each of these
malcontents had— even as early as this — the idea of an aUiance
in mind.
65 Torrens, II. 189. Only 42 seats had even been contested.
— Tindal, Translation and Continuation of Rapin's History
of Eng., XXI. 510.
66 Hardwicke to Newcastle, AprU 23, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32735, f. 178.
6' Pitt wrote on the 20th (ibid., f. 139) and again on the
22nd (ibid., f. 142), acknowledging his obligations to New
castle. In the former letter he writes, ' I consider my political
life as spme way or other drawing to a conclusion, or rather as
arrived at its period.'

in PERFIDY AND REVENGE 179
But the elated First Minister was not permitted
to rest long after his exertions, or to delude himself
with the notion that a stupendous parliamentary
majority meant a similar equanimity in the
Ministry. From the time of the election in AprU
tiU the opening of Parliament in November, the
jealousy of Legge, the haM-revengeful ambition of
Fox, and the Minister's own inexperience in the
ways of the House of Commons, formed a confused
labyrinth of intrigue such as compromising PeUiam
had never known, and his power-loving brother
was always more or less to endure untU he should
consent to relegate a secondary inteUigence to
a secondary position.
The months of May and June wore an iUusory
calm. It was about the middle of July that the
harbinger of discord alighted, and from the
direction of the Minister's own Treasury Board.
Henry Legge, besides being a practical man of
business, was an habitual dabbler in the in
tricacies of party politics. Clever enough to see
Newcastle's faUings, and thoroughly discontented
with his own position in the governing circle,
Legge was quick to perceive the advantage of
coalescing with the malcontents of the hour as
a means both of compelling respect for his own
opinions and of paving the way to greater power.
It was during the lethargy of summer, when
ministers bore their official burdens as lightly as
possible, and the truce among parties was unbroken
save by occasional growls from Hayes or HoUand
M 2

180 HENRY FOX ch.
House, that the crafty conspirator of the Treasury
waited on His Grace for the purpose of feehng the
ground. This was on July 18, and Newcastle
wrote the same day teUing of the interview. Legge
talked in a cursory fashion of the House of Com
mons, and mention of prominent members finally
led him to converge upon Pitt and Fox. For the
former he felt that the Whigs had no cause to feel
so much displeasure ; in regard to the latter his
comments were by no means new inteUigence to
the Duke, who gathered that Fox had made some
professions, but exactly of what sort did not appear.
What Legge gained from the coUoquy is not
recorded, but he probably got the Newcastle
measure of the two giants, and was content with
merely clearing up some doubts in his mind.
But before the Duke's letter was sealed or sent
a postscript was added that resembled a hurri
cane after the gentlest of breezes. Rumour had it
that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had pointed
out the incongruity of a ' Tory head to a Whig
body'^; arid so dreadful a calumny as this" the"
Chancellor must sift to the bottom. The affront as
applied to Murray, his most trusted lieutenant
in the Lower House, seemed to evoke no emotion,
but to himself the First Lord felt it an unpardon
able outrage. In a paroxysm of grief or rage the
Duke threatened to join Fox rather than have any
further regard for his subordinate at the Treasury.®®
68 Newcastle to Hardwicke, July 18, 1754: Add. MSS.,
35414, f. 143.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 181
The motives for this act of treachery are probably
to be found in Legge' s aforesaid dissatisfaction
with his position, and an innate love of mischief, aU
the more dangerous by reason of his skiU and
perspicacity. Legge had once been a bane to
Sir Robert Walpole ; the King had no patience
with him ; and at Woburn he was cordiaUy
detested. While Newcastle was threatening to lay bare
the infamy of Legge, the Secretary-at-War was
growing more and more weary of a secondary
position among colleagues of inferior capacity.
His nascent misgivings have already been noticed,
but from now onwards they took a more definite
form, and that form was latent conspiracy. In
August he nearly created a scandal in the Foreign
Office. Holdernesse had apparently neglected to
inform him of some army order sent to the West
Indies, intelligence which as Secretary-at-War he
had a right to expect ; and not disposed to argue
with a cipher that was so by ministerial design,
he carried his complaint to the King. The action
— as even Newcastle admitted — was crowned with
' some success '.
A few days after this episode, both the under
lying motives of Fox and the partiality of the
Duke of Devonshire, long suspected, were at length
unmasked. Stone had it from Fox that the Chan
cellor had sounded the Duke regarding the state
of mind of the War Office, and had been met with
the suggestion that a seat in the Cabinet would

182 HENRY FOX ch.
be a useful concession. This, Devonshire pro
tested, was mentioned without the knowledge of
Fox,®® and it was indeed probable that he was
giving only a definite colour to the other's ma
chinations. Meanwhile the King was puzzling aU sides.
On the one hand he praised Robinson to Newcastle
as superlatively able and punctual, and flattered
the Duke with the additional remark that the new
Secretary was the best that he had ever had save
Newcastle himself ; '® whUe on the other hand he
gave significant tokens of an interest in Fox and his
coquetry with the Cotirt. Lady Yarmouth went
even further, and not orUy received numerous
visits from the Secretary-at-War, but took him
about in her post-chaise as well. Fox naturaUy
recounted his ill-treatment of March, and the
story got back to Newcastle through a con
fidential friend.'^ The much-dreaded plotter said
also that he had not seen Devonshire, which
meant no doubt that he was stUl disinclined to
make a personal demand ; yet he aUowed himself
69 Minute taken by Stone, August 30, 1754: Add. MSS.,
35414, f. 173.
'0 ' I can hardly write it without blushing,' was Newcastle's
comment. — ^Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 1, 1754 (first
letter of that date) : Add. MSS., 32736, f . 388.
'1 Baron Munckhausen, the Hanoverian Ambassador. He
was long one of Newcastle's political agents, especially in
dealing with Leicester House, where the Baron was popular.
In one of his letters Newcastle writes of him as ' the best friend
we have '.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 183
to say that if Newcastle were not satisfied with
their present relations, he might surely have
' taken a handle ' from the suggestion of Devon
shire.'^ The much-harassed First Minister was ready
at this stage to believe anything or suspect any
one. This fighting with phantoms in the dark was
something to which he was whoUy unused. At
one moment his jealousy found a victim in the
Chancellor ; '® this, being a trifle, was speedily
ended by the King's salve to his vanity — an
episode we have just noted ; but the Fox-Devon
shire conspiracy was estimated at quite all its
face-value, and possibly at more. The manoeuvres
of Fox the Duke regarded as ' outward reconcilia
tion ' only. ' They know as well as we do,' he told
his sympathetic adviser, ' the dissatisfaction of
Mr. Pitt, the open opposition of My Lord Temple,
and the pragmatical discontent of Mr. Legge. They
then consider who there is of weight in the House
of Commons, upon whom we can depend ; they
can easily see that there is no one but thd Attorney-
General ; and from thence they conclude (and
with reason) that if they can blacken him with the
Whigs, we shall neither be able to employ him
with success nor he be willing to be employed, and
"2 Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 1, 1754 (second letter
of that date) : Add. MSS., 32736, f . 392.
'8 The point in question was the responsibility for the choice
of Robinson, whom the King liked. — Newcastle to Hardwicke,
September 1, 1754: ibid. f. 388.

184 HENRY FOX ch.
in this they are right . . . ; this is the first scheme
of the year.' This, Newcastle decided, had been
the origin of the violent Whiggism of Legge;'*
so, when the First Lord should become cold to
his ChanceUor of the Exchequer, and the latter
should complain of want of confidence. Fox, the
' hero of the Whigs ', would, by defending the
Attorney-General, worm his way into favour.'®
This conception of the intrigue, though probably
extended to undue dimensions in the last particular,
shows how uneasy lay the head that ruled the
Ministry. Pelham would have courted, parleyed,
yielded ; but, though equaUy timid in most
instances, Newcastle preferred to engross his
power and shudder, rather than luU discontents by
seeming to share it. Meanwhile the Cumberlands
had become active again, and with what result
was yet to be seen.
Newcastle was no doubt right in believing that
the campaign against Murray was instigated by the
fact that he was the only man of considerable
debating power who was loyal to the Administra
tion and not fishing in troubled waters. But
whether these attacks were from any one but Legge,
and whether Fox and Legge were in collusion at
'4 ' They (the Cumberlands) are now (wrote the Duke) to
make this little Legge declare himself a Whig, that he owed
hie situation to the Whigs, and that he was so good as to
declare to everybody that I was a Whig.' — ^Newcastle to Hard
wicke, September 1, 1754 : Add. MSS., 32736, f. 388. All this
seems very trivial, but the Duke was evidently overwrought.
'5 Ibid.

m PERFIDY AND REVENGE 185
aU — beyond a common desire to force the Duke's
hand — must depend on our rejection or acceptance
of Newcastle's belief. The Duke even felt that if
Murray could not be whitewashed he would have
to make room for Fox as the only way of muzzling
his promoters.'®
Hardwicke's reply, in its main theme, was regret
that he had had any part in the affair with
Devonshire. Fox, he wrote, had omitted most of
what was said ; and for his own part, he would
make no further move in the affair. He added,
however, with a show of resignation, ' If any other
person shaU be inclined to bring him in, I can (only)
acquiesce in it, as aU personalities between that
gentleman and me are now quite over as if they
had never been.' " The plot against Murray was
not touched upon, unless a second letter was
written and destroyed. The lawyer's instinct
sometimes required his letters to be burned.
MeanwhUe, coincident with these efforts to
satisfy aspirations, and stir up troubles for an
unpopular First Minister, was the more commend
able and no less important desire of many to ensure
success to the King's measures in the House of
Commons. When the Sovereign concurred in
Robinson's nomination, he had made it clear that
the responsibility for its success must lie solely
¦6 Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 1, 1754 : Add.MSS.,
32736, f . 388.
" Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 3, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32736, f. 413.

186 HENRY FOX ch.
with the Ministers ; '® and the conviction was strong
in the mind of the First Lord that his chance of
peaceful supremacy, as weU as his only means of
outdoing his adversaries, was a quiet and well-
ordered session. Robinson, having lived the life of
a diplomat, and but little experienced in domestic
policy or parliamentary methods, was naturaUy
reluctant to undertake the management ; '® Mur
ray's support of measures could always be counted
on, but his judicial position wotQd exclude him
from the r61e of a subordinate jobber ; and Pitt
had already announced his intended silence,®"
since the door to success was stiU closed. New
castle thought much of measures, and had consulted
his friend, Barnard, on finance,®'^ but for men to
support them he was, in the last weeks of September,
still utterly at sea.
The Princess had been one of the first to feel
concern, and showed magnanimous self-sacrifice by
offering to submit to Fox, although he was the last
man she would have liked.®^ Such an idea was of
course snatching at Devonshire's voluntary sug
gestion. About a fortnight's thinking made Her
Royal Highness wish she had held her tongue, and
she now looked with dread upon the prospect of

'8 Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 26, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32734, f . 359.
™ Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 22, 1754 : Add.MSS.,
32736, f. 554. so Pagg 169.
81 Second letter of September 1.
82 First letter of September 1.

in PERFIDY AND REVENGE 187
a Fox-Newcastle reconcUiation.®® Lady Yarmouth
was, however, more consistent in her opinion :
a leader was essential in the House of Commons ;
and the choice must be Fox or he would make it
impossible for any one else ; furthermore, he must be
a minister. Such was evidently the Court's doctrine,
and, in view of events in August, Hardwicke had
felt that her behaviour was worth regarding.
At last the little OianceUor of the Exchequer
had flung his bomb into the troubled camp. The
idea from which all these hints proceeded was no
less than a proposed innovation — of no little
constitutional importance — whereby the recognized
Leader of the House of Commons, without the need
of any titled office in the Ministry, should have
unquestioned access to the royal Closet for all
business of the Lower House. Such a scheme would
practicaUy have meant that-unless the Jjrst Lord
were himself ajnember of the Lower House, some
other politician, much more closely in touch with
the Commons, could thereby form an aUiance
with the King against his Cabinet. No wonder
Newcastle stood aghast when its author expounded
his opinion ; 8* and even the imperturbable Chan
cellor, when apprised of it, was scarcely less con
cerned at this dream of a ' single leadership ',
88 Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 21, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32736, f . 554.
84 The interview in which Legge took itupon himself to
advise"" Newcastle is described by the latter in his letter to
Mugay, Seg^ber 28, 1754 : ibid., f^91.

188 HENRY FOX ch.
reposing beyond a doubt in the person of Fox.
' When that is established,' he declared, ' in the
degree they mean it, there will in my apprehension
be an end of Your Grace's chief power as the
Minister of this country.' 85 Obviously the tower
of ' absolutism ' was shaking.
Meanwhile the King, when he did not rail against
Pitt, talked much of Fox.®® He felt certain that
the latter would not ' carry his ill-humour into
opposition ', and it was plain that his partiahty
was for the Secretary-at-War. All the satisfaction
he received from the First Lord was the assurance
that Hartington should inform his friend of the
' plan ' for the coming session,®' and the Duke
himself would ' talk strongly to Mr. Legge '.®®
Lady Yarmouth assured Newcastle that Fox
' would be content with little ', but the Duke
feared that ' that meant a great deal . . . and may
end in the whole or an attempt for it'. In other
85 The Chancellor cautioned his friend against talking too
much of Legge's idea, lest it ' propagate the doctrine '. —
Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 27, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32736, f . 583.
86 On one occasion he threatened to give Pitt's office to Fox.
But there is no evidence to show that Pox would have wel
comed this transference.
8' The Duke decided not to employ Stone for this purpose
because ' it would have more connexion with the late trans
action (see p. 181), and that, I think, we should steer clear of '.
Newcastle was evidently much afraid of Devonshire's sug
gestion and what it might lead to.
88 Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 21, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32736, f. 554.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 189
words, if the very least that could be expected was
that there must be a Minister in the House of
Commons, responsible for the management thereof,
the powerful man at the War Office seemed more
and more inevitable ; his stock in Lady Yar
mouth's keeping was yielding greater interest than
ever, and the Duchess of Dorset was not only
paying homage to Fox but also making herself the
channel of some advances from the Duke of Bedford,
who, tired of fruitless opposition, was knocking
gently for admission.8® It must have seemed,
indeed, as if the whole group we have designated
as the ' Cumberland party ' was plotting to secure
a place or to wrest a portion of the First Lord's
power. The failures of Dorset in Ireland were in
fine accord with the Duke of Marlborough's
ambition to succeed him ; ®® and Marlborough's
interest in Fox's designs on the Cabinet,®^ as well
as Legge's endeavours to get Sandwich a pension,
are both indications of the understanding which
seemed to obtain between members of this faction.®^
89 Newcastle expressed his intention of encouraging these
' overtures '. — Newcastle to Murray, September 28, 1754 ;
Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 27, 1754.
90 No doubt Marlborough's ' passion for Ireland ' was at the
bottom of the Duchess of Dorset's interest in Fox and Bedford.
She thought, by concUiating the Cumberlands, to save her
husband. This view is expressed by Hardwicke in his letter
of September 27.
91 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 362.
92 Legge seems to have been the active agent of aU the
prominent members ; for he also urged Newcastle to ' satisfy '
the Duke of Cumberland, whatever that meant. — Newcastle

190 HENRY FOX ch.
We can hardly blame Newcastle for planning to
promote good feeling by a grand ' parliamentary
dinner ' — but should he ask Fox ? ®® Hardwicke
replied that he deemed it ' very proper ', since Fox
was to be acquainted with the ' plan ' for the
coming session.®*
Newcastle was by this time fuUy convinced that
Pitt, Fox and Legge had tacitly or otherwise
agreed that there must be a minister of authority
in the House of Commons ; at last, the Duke
declared, the secret of their conduct was out, and
the man in whom their confidence centred was only
too obvious. All roads led without deviation to
Fox. Legge indeed might make him less palatable,
but Pitt (whose complicity in the intrigue seems to
have been considerably exaggerated) was expected
sooner or later to force Fox upon them. ¦ The crisis
was acute, but Newcastle was stiU several paces in
advance of putting his sovereignty in jeopardy ;
that was to come. ' Who ', he asked the Attorney-
General, ' can share the Ministry with Mr. Fox, or
any one who ... is Minister in the Closet for the
House of Commons ? ' ®® That was where the boot
pinched. Newcastle was no more wiUing to give
a leader of the Commons the proper and efficient
to Murray, September 28, 1754. Doubtless Legge was court
ing the Cumberlands in order to further his own prospects,
98 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 2, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 24.
94 Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 3, 1754: ibid., f. 27.
95 Newcastle to Murray, September 28, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32736, f. 591.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 191
power than he was when he broke his word to Fox
on the 13th of March.
The Duke's own recipe for success in the House
of Commons convicted him of his inexperience.
In his partnership with Pelham his contribution to
their supremacy had been threefold : he gave
England obtrusive prominence abroad; he made
the Cabinet bend to his wUl ; and he gave the
constituencies their preliminary lesson in un
swerving loyalty to the Pelham interests. But
the actual breaking, training and driving of
opinionless members in the school of infaUible
majorities was the duty of the brother at the
Treasury. The Duke of Newcastle had httle
more insight into the political workings of the
House of Commons than the most roystering idler
of White's or Newmarket. Hence it was that he had
dared to entrust his peace of mind and his coveted
absolutism to the hands of a Vienna diplomat.
But now, when at last it had been forced upon
him that his greed of power had carried him beyond
the bounds of practicability, the Duke lent his
thoughts to concocting a new plan — actuaUy as
little effective as the previous one, and so aerial
as to be almost ridiculous. Since it had to be
realized that the late Master of the Wardrobe had
a natural distaste for the diet prescribed, the First
Minister's recipe was a division of the duties :
Robinson should give the House the necessary
instructions ; the ChanceUor of the Exchequer
would talk upon the revenue ; and the Secretary-

192 HENRY FOX ch.
at- War and Paymaster would in some vague way
be expected to provide the necessary oratory ;
more than aU, there was the Attorney-General to
rely upon for making a panacea out of nothing ;
and finaUy in the ' second rank ' (to use the Duke's
term) were men like Nugent, Dupphn, HiUs
borough and Charles Yorke, most exceUent clay
for modeUing automata. Such, in brief, was the
' system ' Newcastle mapped out for the session of
1754-5.®® Legge gave a half-hearted consent to play
his part in the medley,®' and the concurrence of
the rest was taken for granted. As yet the
pantomime was stiU to be acted.
While Fox and others were weaving a web of
intrigue about the man they detested, the AchiUes
of the Pay Office stood apart, nursing his wrath in
suUen exclusion. There is no evidence to prove
that he had helped in fomenting dissension, but
the very isolation of the man at Hayes and Stowe
seemed to breed suspicion in the minds of the men
who had cajoled but not advanced him. Com
munity of interests, however, was drawing him
closer to the King's son and his party. In August
the Duke had enlisted Fox to write to Pitt with
respect to the deplorable situation of invalid
soldiers,®® who, being unpaid during iUness and
96 Newcastle to Murray, September 28, 1754 ; Newcastle to
Hardwicke, September 21, 1754.
9' Newcastle to Murray, September 28, 1754.
98 Fox to Pitt, August 20, 1754: Chatham Corres. I. 110.
These soldiers were inmates of Chelsea Hospital, which
Charles II had buUt at the instigation of Sir Stephen Fox.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 193
convalescence, were driven by debt into the
clutches of usurers. Pitt readUy consented to
contrive some measure of relief,®® and the mat
ter was also reported to Newcastle.^®® The final
solution was a pension for half a year during
convalescence, and the commendable reform even
tually passed Parliament on its second reading. The
initial credit of the undertaking belonged properly to
Cumberland, rather than to Pitt, who as Paymaster
would naturally have the matter in charge ; but the
affair has the stamp of the cordial aUiance that was
being cemented between Pittites and Cumberlands.
In the autumn the exigencies of colonial affairs
were to tighten the bond. The French pioneers, who
had found such a lucrative traffic in the fur trade of
the American West, had pushed their converging
ways up the vaUeys of the Ohio and Mississippi until
the English colonies in the East were practicaUy
hemmed in. Inevitably the right of possession must
in large measure depend upon settlement, but the
French were only settlers in so far as scattered
trading-posts gave colour to their claim ; whUe
the English colonists, more concerned with com
merce than with traditions of discovery, and better
situated geographically for expansion, were gradu
ally intruding upon the zone which France regarded
as her inalienable share. The broad question of
rights is one we hardly need discuss. Where money
99 Pitt to Fox, August 20, 1754: Chatham Corres. I. HI.
100 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 2, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32737, f . 24.
1156 jf

194 HENRY FOX ch.
is the object, rights may easUy be coined ; and how
natural that the colonists, with their consciousness
of boundless area, should speedUy take advantage
of the absence of fixed frontiers ! Thus far Acadia
and the AUeghanies were the principal points of
contact, and in vain a commission of dehmitation
sat at Paris to discuss them. Peace through mutual
concessions was a solution in no wise hopeless, but
for commissioners of the two countries to seek
a common interpretation of treaties purposely
vague was becoming an anachronism. And so the
disputes miUtiplied through apathy; and the resiUt
was a great deal of barrier warfare, known but httle
heeded by the mother-countries across the ocean.
Indeed it was only when friction was intensified by
a struggle for the head-waters of the Ohio that the
dangers which had lurked beneath emerged rudely
into prominence. The crisis was reached in July
1754, when Major George Washington capitulated
to the French ; the tidings reached England during
the first week of September.
The English Ministers were divided in their
opinions and distracted by the delicate problem of
an ostensible war in time of peace. GranvUle had
felt aU along that the colonies themselves were
potentiaUy strong enough ; ^®^ and his own idea
(though long disregarded) was to make inteUigent
use of the material in America. But when the
news of Washington's defeat came to biu"den the
101 Newcastle disagreed with this view. — Newcastle to Hard
wicke, September 4, 1754 : Add. MSS., 32736, f. 424.

m PERFIDY AND REVENGE 195
minds of anxious politicians, the blame had
certainly to be put somewhere, and Newcastle and
Hardwicke agreed that it was ' monstrous ' that the
colonists could not or would not help themselves."^
It was the inevitable day of reckoning after years of
calculated indifference. Only once had a partial
effort been made to foUow GranvUle' s policy ; "® and
now, when reminded of his failure, the Duke thought
only of the effect it might have upon home politics.
What if his numerous enemies should seek pohtical
capital in this news ? And yet, with Parliament an
uncertain factor, he trembled at the thought of
expenditure ; and Hardwicke, always ready to dodge
an unpleasant problem, was thoroughly in accord."*
102 Newcastle to GranvUle, September 5, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32736, f . 432 ; Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 7, 1754 :
ibid., f. 436.
103 The resolution was taken at a Cabiuet meeting on June
14th that some project of union between the colonies should
be prepared. In August some such plan was drafted by the
Board of Trade, but Hardwicke had no confidence in the
policy (ibid.), and the long delays which had ensued were
eventually to kUl it. When at last the plan was submitted to
Robinson in the first week of September, the time had come
for more vigorous measures. We should add, moreover, that
Governor Shirley's efforts to resist French encroachments on
the Kenebec had been seemingly the motive for holding the
above meeting. — Palfrey, History of New England, V. 128 ;
Minute, Newcastle House, June 14, 1754: Add. MSS., 32995,
f . 266. The Board of Trade's ' plan ' may be foimd in
Documents r dative to the Colonial History of New York (ed.
O'CaUaghan), VI. 903-6.
104 Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 21, 1754: Add.MSS.,
32736, f. 554 ; Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 27, 1754:
ibid., f . 583.
n2

196 HENRY FOX ch.
But the Cumberlands and Murray were out
spoken in their desire for vigorous action. The
Attorney-General felt that the greatest need was
for officers, and the fact that there were more
than enough in Ireland would make it practicable
to dispatch a number to America. He even
suggested that a commander should be sent,"® and
some one else proposed that a civUian of weight
should go too. This, of course, affected Newcastle,
who had a lively vision of Halifax fiUing a r61e
with which he would not be able to meddle ; and
was consequently much relieved when His Majesty
rejected the idea.^®®
Almost a month having been spent in saying what
ought to be done without doing it, it was at last
decided — despite the ChanceUor's resistance "' —
that the ruling spirits of the Cabinet should confer
with Cumberland on the 26th for the purpose of
considering what action should be taken."® We
can imagine how easUy Cumberland dominated
the situation, and it was resolved ' after much
debate (so Newcastle tells us) to send forthwith
105 Murray to Newcastle, September 7, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32736, f. 438.
106 Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 21, 1754.
107 WhUe consenting (albeit reluctantly) to attend the con
ference suggested, Hardwicke felt that no action whatever
could be taken until ' authentic accounts ' should be received
of ' the defeat and its consequences '. His letter (Septem
ber 22) is full of objections, and its whole tone spells delay. —
Add. MSS., 32736, f. 554.
108 No evidence of any meeting of the full Cabinet on the
question has come down to us.

in PERFIDY AND REVENGE 197
two Irish regiments to Virginia '. In vain Gran
ville urged his opinion that the colonies should
raise the needed army.^®® His Royal Highness had
confidence only in regular troops,"® and it was his
policy which triumphed.
Newcastle's programme, in a nutshell, was to do
as little as might be consistent with his desire to
avoid ' the reproach of doing nothing '.^^^ Against
so personal a view of the situation the men with
more patriotism and less political stake were
speedily arrayed ; and Pitt showed his sympathy
with the active spirits in the Cabinet by insisting
that GranviUe's idea was no less important than
Cumberland's, and now at this moment was the
time for a decisive blow.^^^ Very probably the
Duke regretted that he had aroused this dangerous
adviser ; but now that he was plainly on the losing
side, there was nothing to do — ^from the Pelham
standpoint — but claim the credit of such suggestions
before it was too late. So the decision was taken
to raise two regiments in the Colonies, and send
them aU the necessary equipment for a second
109 Newcastle expressed his opinion that a strong American
army, such as GranvUle wanted, would have meant a ' general
war '. — Newcastle to Murray, September 28, 1754. Perhaps
in this view may be found the reason for the apathy regarding
a general concert of the colonies.
no See Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 390.
m Quoted from his letter of October 12 to Hardwicke.
112 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 2, 1754. The occasion
of this advice was Pitt's visit on the 1st for the purpose of
discussing outpensioners. See p. 93.

198 HENRY FOX ch.
expedition against the French. Hardwicke ex
pressed the hope that Pitt would lend his support to
the plan in Parliament,"® and evidently distrusted
a politician so erratic ; but the only course now
left to the two chiefs was to put off the second
measure and minimize expenses.^"
Whether Fox had any precise views on colonial
policy it is difficult to say. But undoubtedly he was
fuUy aware of the Duke of Cumberland's desire for
vigorous action, and thoroughly despised the
pusiUanimity of the Cabinet. His friend Bedford
had suffered the mortification of seeing an un
resisted project lie in the office of a colleague until
it faded into oblivion ; and, profiting by this
instance. Fox determined that no office under his
direction shoiUd be sunk into inertia by a jealous
First Minister. He was at a disadvantage in not
being a member of the Cabinet, with a voice and
a vote that might enforce his patron's wishes, and
he was not even always asked to attend that he
might know all the opinions that were offered ;
yet after aU something might be made of that very
118 Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 3, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 27.
114 This was confessedly Newcastle's intention (Newcastle to
Hardwicke, October 2). Before his interview with Pitt, and
apparently after Granville's poUcy had been seriously con
sidered, he requested Robinson to defer writing to the two
commanders selected for the regiments ; and though now
obliged to give way on this point, he was determined that the
second expedition should wait until winter or the foUowing
spring. — Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 2 and 12, 1754.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 199
ignorance of plans and purposes, and Fox deter
mined that the two expeditions should be fitted out
simultaneously, instead of aUowing one to be post
poned, as Newcastle intended."® Pursuant to this
design, he framed a letter to the Duke, October 6,
and stated (rather peremptorily) the plans and re
quirements of the War Office."® The same day —
as though anxious not to terrify his parsimonious
chief — he assured Secretary West of the Treasury
that ' everything in his office had been considered in
the most economical manner '."' But the quiver
of the Secretary-at-War was not yet empty. On
the foUowing day he demanded and received the
royal signature for the warrants to raise the colonial
regiments, as well as for the list of officers selected
to command them.^^® Evidently the War Office
was taking the law into its own hands.
It is unfortunate that we are unable to determine
exactly the part which Cumberland was playing in
this systematic coercion of the Ministers. That
he conferred with Fox "® and expressed ideas to
115 There is some reason for suspecting that Fox's attitude
was responsible for the instructions to Robinson which we have
noted. In the same paragraph Newcastle had previously
written, ' I send Your Lordship Sir Thos. Robinson's letter,
with an account of what has passed with Mr. Fox.' Doubt
less any move in the direction of an energetic policy would
immediately serve to put the Duke on his guard.
116 Fox to Newcastle, October 6, 1754: Add. MSS., 32737, f. 51.
1" West to Newcastle, October 7, 1754: ibid., f. 73.
118 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1754 : ibid.; 107.
119 Anson aUudes to one conference between the two in his
letter to Newcastle on the 12th : ibid., f . 129.

200 HENRY FOX ch.
which the latter gave effective shape is eminently
likely ; and we know that he had supreme dnection
of aU mihtary arrangements — which thus included
the selection of his friend Braddock to command.
MeanwhUe the other departments of the Adminis
tration would be easily led (whether correctly or
not) to suspect the presence of his hand, and it
was just on this awe of so important a personage
that Fox knew so well how to trade. The pre
dicament of the Newcastles can readUy be judged.
Secretary Robinson, who was used to moving slowly
and foUowing Newcastle's lead in politics, was not a
little disturbed by aU this haste, and he took the step
of warning the First Lord both that the warrants
had been signed and that the Board of Ordnance
was to advertise for ships on the morrow. ¦^^®
GeneraUy it may be said that it required con
siderable provocation to evoke from Newcastle
more than a plaintive letter to the ChanceUor or
a crafty insinuation to the King ; but in the
present case the Secretary-at-War was evidently
determined to go as far as the Cabinet would let
him, and haste in one measure led natinaUy to haste
in another. Deeming it useless to detain Deputy-
Commissary Pitcher for the sake of a quartermaster
whom Anson was trying to find in Flanders
and hardly expected before a fortnight,^^^ Fox
120 Robinson to Newcastle, October 7, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 61.
121 Robinson to Newcastle, October 11, 1754: ibid., f. 105.
Fox intended that Pitcher should depart on the 15th, and

ni PERFIDY AND REVENGE 201
announced in the Gazette (October 8) that all
officers appointed to command the regiments in
America should ' repair forthwith to their posts '. ^^^
But one tactical mistake gave a handle to his
enemies. Fox neglected in his haste to assure
them that the Commissary was weU provided.^^®
It was, in fact, the case of Pitcher which seemed
to pass the Cabinet's limit of endurance ; for even
Anson, convert as he was to GranvUle's policy,^^*
was thrown into dismay at Fox's seeming indiffer
ence to consequences.^^® To Newcastle, on the
contrary, the question was only political. At last
the time had come for the sensitive autocrat of the
Treasury to make his power felt ; and he forthwith
prevaUed upon the King to suspend all orders which
had been given in his name untU a meeting with
Fox could be held and an explanation demanded.
IncidentaUy we can gather the latter's force of
determination from the fact that His Majesty
doubtless hoped that he could force the appointment of
another quartermaster.
122 London Gazette, no. 9,413.
128 Anson to Newcastle, October 12, 1754. It is not so much
a certainty that Fox was neglecting to provide the troops with
rations as that his general hurry — and especiaUy the order
in the Gazette — had given that impression. Whether or not
Fox was simply deferring the matter, Anson quickly took the
case into his own hands.
124 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 2, 1754.
125 Anson may also have been annoyed at some orders to
the Admiralty, which created general confusion. ' Thus Your
Grace sees,' wrote Robinson to Newcastle (October 12), ' that
no great stop is put to their speed.' — Add. MSS., 32737, f . 135.

202 HENRY FOX ch.
confessed his astonishment at the haste of the War
Office, but ' Mr. Fox told me it was to be so and
what could I do ? ' ^^® But Newcastle, too, was
capable of hurrying when political motives impeUed
him, and the very next day the inner circle of the
Cabinet held a meeting, at which Fox was sum
moned to be present. Yet, whUst ' everything '
was described as ' extremely civil ', Newcastle
could extract the mention of only one order that
Fox had given — and this the docile King straight
way set aside, as having been sent without his
knowledge. At the same meeting — probably at
Fox's instance — the question of augmenting the
Irish regiments was debated, but finaUy negatived. ^^'
And yet still the Secretary-at-War seemed incor
rigible : now he worried the First Lord and his
chief adviser by holding long conferences with
Pitt ; ^^8 now he hired transports without awaiting
the sanction of the Treasury Board.^^® Even after
Pitcher's departure had been authoritatively post
poned Fox endeavoured (though unsuccessfully)
to override the order ; ^8® and in the meantime —
126 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1754.
12' Ibid. ; Minute of meeting, Newcastle House, October 9,
1754. 128 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1754. ' I suppose
in time,' Hardwicke remarked drUy, ' fire and water may agree.'
—Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 13, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 147.
129 Fox to West, October 11, 1754 : ibid. 133. Fox declared
' the time would not admit of it ' .
180 Robinson to Newcastle, October 26, 1754: ibid. 201.
The ChanceUor declared peevishly that Fox's game was to give

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 203
in order first to confer with Cumberland — he had
a meeting of the Cabinet postponed until the 16th.
Perhaps the only comfort of the conservative
element in the Ministry was the fact that the
quartermaster's return was ' precarious ' and Fox
apparently ' stopped in his speed '.
The difference on colonial policy, whUe never
descending to the level of an actual quarrel, was
the Duke of Newcastle's first serious encounter
with the Cumberland Party, and to the man who
had triumphed over Bedford the affair must have
been as humiliating as it was ominous for the
future. Hardwicke agreed with the Duke that
the advertisement in the Gazette was contrary to
the secrecy intended by the Cabinet, and also had
something to say of what ' some persons ' would
do with their power if they had it. ^8^ It was only
too clear that a vital matter of policy had been
wrested from their hands. On the 16th — as we
may suppose — the Cabinet held its intended
meeting, and doubtless aU points that were under
dispute were finaUy settled. Though we lack
specific information, it appears from a letter of
Newcastle's shortly afterwards ^82 that the combined
policy of Cumberland and GranviUe was accepted
the colonies the impression that the Government was stUl
unprepared, and thereby to discredit the Ministry. But Fox
hardly merited this censure, for he would certainly have been
very glad to see Braddock embark almost as soon as Pitcher.
181 Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 13, 1754.
132 Newcastle to Walpole, October 26, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 207.

204 HENRY FOX ch.
in its entirety, and aU differences between the
Duke and Fox over expenses were decided against
the former. Nothing had been left to the Duke but
to write a soothing letter to Paris, and the episode —
which is chiefly important as marking an official
and decisive recognition of the problem of colonial
defence — may perhaps be regarded as closed.
Fox in the recent proceedings was apparently
serving two ends. Whatever may have been his
honest belief respecting his country's colonial
interests, his chief aim seems to have been the
furtherance of his patron's martial policy, which,
revealing to us thus early the germ of the War
/Party, had gained its first triumph over the
J Ministry. The other motive-force which actuated
the Secretary-at-War was no doubt secondary, but
was, in fact, himself. If mutual discontent in the
spring and summer of 1754 had paved the way for
a Fox-Pitt alliance, the perfect agreement of the
two in a strenuous mihtary policy was quite
sufficient to consummate it. It was during this
very controversy on military matters that the First
Minister, in a patronizing endeavour to flatter his
subaltern of the Pay Office, was met with a stinging
rebuff ; ^®® and, according to Fox's friend, HiUs-
183 According to Doddington, when the First Lord wished
to consult Pitt on some question relative to the colonies, the
latter broke in with, 'Your Grace, I suppose, knows that I
have no capacity for these things and therefore I do not desire
to be informed about them.' — Doddington, Diary, October 8,
1754. This may have been the inauspicious beginning of the
interview, already mentioned, note 112.

m PERFIDY AND REVENGE 205
borough, the two men of the Commons had united
in a positive compact to usurp and dissect the
ministerial hegemony : the Paymaster to secure
the Seals, and the Secretary-at-War the greater
office at the Treasury. It is doubtful, however,
if the miion went as far as this. Such a combina
tion wore a look of reality which the respective
dispositions of the aUies would never permit in
practice. It came nearer to the nature of an
armed truce than of an entente cordiale.
The last week of October and the first week of
November were mainly expended, so far as the
First Minister was concerned, in further pre
parations for the parliamentary initiation of his
Administration. Some difficiUty was encountered
in getting recruits for moving and seconding the
address, but this was obviated in course of time,
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was flattered
with the prospect of writing the usual circular
letter. ^8^ Yet the dawn of peace was stiU far
distant. RebeUion was no less rampant in the
camp, and 'that creature of ours', Legge, who,
Newcastle had declared, should be treated with
'authority and contempt ',^85 ^as still disturbing
the repose of the man who had raised him to
political prominence.
While the press of colonial business was such
as to make interruptions annoying, the ChanceUor
134 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 21, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
35414, f. 203.
185 First letter of September 1.

206 HENRY FOX ch.
of the Exchequer opened his heart to Sir Thomas
Robinson on his real or imagined grievances.
If he should be expected to reply to Fox in debate,
it was simply beyond his capabilities ; Fox was
' able and terrible '. He could only promise to do
his best, but his advice was decidedly to make
Pitt Secretary of State and bring Fox into the
Treasury (probably his own post being meant).
The readiness with which Newcastle feU into the
trap of the mischief-maker is only one instance
of the weak side of the Duke as a politician,
or, in other words, the weakness of a deliberate
absolutist who could not magnetize, and would
not conciliate. Instead of treating Legge with
' authority and contempt ', or instead, perhaps,
of treating him as a friend to be trusted and
confided in, the First Minister worried himself
as well as others in striving to ' probe the wound '
(as he expressed it ^®®) for the diagnosis of a case
that was chronic. Legge no doubt considered the
proposed system for Parliament ridiculous, but
a suspicion that he found delight in plaguing the
Minister who thought him ungrateful is irresistible.
Fox, in the mind and fears of the First Lord, was
becoming more and more inevitable."' The Duke
gave the sumptuous dinner which he had intended
for the prominent members of the House of
Commons, and deliberately omitted the Secretary-
at-War — an act which the cautious Chancellor
186 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 21, 1754.
187 Ibid., October 24, 1754: Add. MSS., 32737, f. 191.

m PERFIDY AND REVENGE 207
thought a grave mistake."® Simultaneously the
papers were fuU of Fox's name as the prospective
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Newcastle
regarded this as another bit of Legge's devilry.
More efforts were talked of for suppressing the
crafty intriguer — his behaviour should be laid
before the King, and the threat should be ad
ministered of taking his hint seriously.^®®
A few days later Newcastle himself saw Legge,
and listened to him with the interest that only
a man was able to feel whose own capacity for
intrigue was inexhaustible ; it was Greek and
Greek. Legge professed this time to have had an
interview with Pitt, who, according to the former,
would no longer advance a claim to the Seals, if
the King would ' take notice of him ' and ' treat
him with confidence ' ; "® but ' Fox ', declared the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, ' must be Secretary
of State,' and this could be done by removing and
indemnifying Lord Holdernesse.
Newcastle was puzzled at the Paymaster's new
turn — which is probably true as represented — and
remarked that when formerly he had ' flung out '
this idea himself, Pitt had ridiculed it unsparingly.
As to Fox, the First Lord sheltered himself under
188 Hardwicke to Newcastle, November 9, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 328.
139 Newcastle to Hardwicke, November 8, 1754: Add. MSS.,
35414, f. 218.
140 It is interesting to note the very low political value which
Pitt was forced to set upon his services at this time. Two
weeks later the case would have been different.

208 HENRY FOX ch.
the fragUe excuse that ' the King would not do it '.
To Hardwicke he revealed his certainty that the
meaning could only be a triple aUiance to gain
control of the Commons and thence of the Adminis
tration."^ Without some phantom to conjure up
terror, Newcastle would have found life unbearable.
Meanwhile the session at last opened, on
November 14, and Sir George Lee — by the courtesy
of Leicester House "^ — moved the address in the
Commons. Potter essayed to clamour against
France, but Egmont gave no cause for alarm, and
the speech of the ChanceUor of the Exchequer
made Newcastle banish aU doubts of the fitness of
his chosen assistant."8 Legge pretended, however,
to be sorry at the King's pleasure in his feat, and —
to use Robinson's expression — he dreaded being
' flattered higher than his wings could reach '.^**
Election disputes were of necessity the first
problems for the House to deal with. In cases in
which Marlborough and Sandwich were concerned
against the Administration, Fox took a leading
part on behalf of his friends. Petitions against
the sitting members for St. Michael easUy obtained
the sympathy of Newcastle, who entertained
grave doubts of support from any candidate of
Sandwich's ; and the Earl's effort to defer a
141 Newcastle to Hardwicke, November 17, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
35414, f. 233.
142 The matter was arranged by Stone, on Newcastle's behalf.
— Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 21, 1754 : ibid., f. 203.
143 Undated letter of Hardwicke's : Add. MSS., 32737, f. 344.
144 Robinson to Newcastle, November 16, 1754 : ibid., f . 350.

in PERFIDY AND REVENGE 209
hearing was defeated by a majority that showed
no sluggishness in perception. Fox, however, let
no opportunity slip of crossing the Duke of New
castle, and Pitt, at first neutral, had finaUy thrown
in his lot with the Cumberlands."®
The Fox-Pitt aUiance was partly responsible for
some new troubles among the ' Cousinhood ', as
Pitt and the Grenvilles and Lyttelton were caUed.
In the first place the Paymaster and the GrenviUes
had deeply resented Lyttelton' s efforts in the
spring to reconcile them with the Administration,
and protested that they would speak for them
selves. Lyttelton, both because he had been under
obligations to Pelham ^*® and on account of the
compliment he felt to be implied in Newcastle's
selection of him as representative of the Pittites,
was now reluctant to join the others in Pitt's
informal opposition ; hence a coolness had arisen
between Sir George and the Paymaster.^*'
At this juncture the discomfited Cofferer found
a second opportunity of fUling the post of messenger
for the Administration. The Duke of Bedford had
taken no part in the Cumberlands' intrigues of
the summer and autumn, beyond a reported
willingness to become reconcUed, and was still
reigning over his little court at Woburn in con
temptuous isolation. Lyttelton, having heard
through the younger Walpole that it was not
146 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 352-3.
146 See page 80.
14'' GrenvUle's Narrative, Grenville Papers, I. 429-30.
use O

210 HENRY FOX ch.
impossible to beguile him into the Administra
tion, obtained Newcastle's blessing for the mis
sion, and, repairing to the Duke's old adversary,
he offered him carte blanche in Newcastle's name.
Nothing could have better pleased the proud little
Duke who had so long been thirsting for revenge.
But as if an indignant repulse from Woburn were
not sufficient mortification, the wretched scape
goat found that his patron would glibly deny all
complicity whatever, and when Bedford turned to
punish the messenger by reporting the affair to Pitt,
the breach in the Cousinhood was complete. "8 Sir
George was tempted now to write to his late host and
palliate the circumstances of his negotiation, but
Newcastle had time to prevent such an exposure."®
In the meantime, though no open hostilities
could be shown by two occupants of ministerial
office, the First Lord had to encounter an insidious
opposition that made his political life unbearable.
On the afternoon of the 25th a discussion took
place in the Commons on the petition of the
/disreputable Wilkes against his successful rival,
Delaval by name. It would be hard to say which
of the two was the more steeped in corruption,
but Delaval defended himself in so witty a speech
that the House was convulsed with laughter.
148 Walpole to Bentley, December 18, 1754, Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 271.
149 A letter to Bedford, December 2, 1755 (apparently sub
mitted to Newcastle but never sent) : Add. MSS., 32737, f . 410.
Perhaps we may find in this a reason for Lyttelton' s appoint
ment in 1755 as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

m PERFIDY AND REVENGE 211
This roused Wilkes's friend the Paymaster, who
strode down from the gallery, and worked himself
into mild hysteria at the levity of a dignified
House of Commons on such a subject as bribery.
The self-righteous occupant of a Newcastle borough
was loud and plaintive in his warning, lest they
' should degenerate into a little assembly serving
no other purpose than to register the edicts of
one too-powerful subject '. Such indeed was the
eloquence of Pitt that the ' mote in his own eye '
was doubly unnoticeable to men whose diet, so
long prescribed, was taken as a matter of course ;
and Fox declared the speech ' the finest . . . Pitt
ever spoke '. But it was rumoured that the First
Lord's digestion was temporarily impaired."®
The evening of the same day an even more
serious blow was dealt, for it held up to ridicule
the First Lord's most trusted pawn. Pitt, for the
purpose of eulogizing Lord Fane, a friend of the
Bedfords, moved a later day for a Colchester
petition, since that of Reading — in which Fane
was concerned — would demand particular atten
tion. ' This need not have called up a secretary
of state (as Fox wrote of it afterwards) ; but Sir
Thomas Robinson rose and with warmth . . .
asserted, that it would be a short cause and, on
the side of the sitting member, a poor cause."^
Pitt handled Sir Thomas roughly for his in-
150 Fox to Hartington, November 26, 1754: Waldegi'ave,
Memoirs, p. 146.
151 Ibid. 0 2

212 HENRY FOX ch.
discretion ; and when the latter complained in
response that he had never been ambitious for the
office he now held, the Paymaster affected to believe
him, and then aiming beyond the weU-intentioned
instrument, he added that he ' thought him as able
as many that had of late years occupied that office
or was likely to fill it '.
Fox went still further in humiliating the in
offensive Secretary. If one of the greatest men
in the House, he remarked drily, pronounced it a
poor cause, it would indeed be a poor cause ; but
he imputed it to his inexperience ; he was the
first great man, and Fox hoped would be the last,
that ever pronounced on a cause unheard."^ He
excused Sir Thomas on the ground that his honour
able service abroad accounted for his total ignor
ance in the present procedure.
It was the long-expected crisis in this war of
revenge. ' Thus,' wrote Fox, ' we are already
got to a point which I hardly thought a whole
session could have brought us to.' "8
Three days later the thriUs of minor men were
again aroused by thrusts of oratory. Taking
advantage of the usual aUusion to Jacobitism in
a discussion of the Mutiny BiU, Pitt lashed the
Attorney-General with scarce a cessation in two
ringing speeches."* On every occasion possible
152 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 355.
153 Fox to Hartington, November 26, 1754.
154 The detaUs are given in Fox's letter to Hartington,
November 28, 1754 : Waldegrave, p. 150.

m PERFIDY AND REVENGE 213
Pitt sought to humble Murray and Fox to vex
Robinson. The Attorney-Greneral appeared little
consoled by GranviUe's encouraging remark that
' resolution should be shown ' ; "® temper and
subtlety were hard to preserve when personalities
were so freely indulged in.
Fox explained to Hartington that the purpose
of Newcastle, Hardwicke and Granville, to depress
the Commons, could only be expected to meet
with resistance ; "® and he had no fear that the
Devonshires would desert their friends despite the
First Lord's boast of Cavendish regularity. Such
an overlordship, in Fox's behef, was anything but
Whiggism ; and it is interesting to compare this
standpoint of the great parvenu in social and
political prominence with his former dread of
an aristocratic oligarchy in connexion with the
Clandestine Marriage BiU. About this time the
Secretary-at-War and the Paymaster had a con
ference of two hours, no doubt to review their
situation, but Fox was chary of professions;"'
155 Waldegrave, pp. 31-2.
156 Fox is apparently charging the inner clique of the
Cabinet with having too much power. Robinson and Holder
nesse, being ciphers, required no mention. Of course, to Fox
the House of Commons was everything ; and he beUeved, like
Pitt and Legge, that a member of that body should wield the
principal authority.
15'' Fox gives us no inkling of what went on at the meeting,
except that its purpose was a discussion of their situation on
the expectation of overtures to one of them from the Ministry.
' A difficult conversation,' Fox writes ; ' I managed it, I think,
as well as such a conversation could be managed. I am sorry

214 HENRY FOX ch.
there was not much sympathy between these
comrades-at-arms after all.
But the aspirants to an absolutist ministry felt
that such shocks as these were aU too liable to
prove fatal to their tower of strength. It was not
in Newcastle's programme that his trusted slaves
should be held up to the derision of the multitude,
not even as a foil to their omniscient master. It
was less bearable when he himself was exposed
as a prey to demagogues. No, clearly such
behaviour could not go on. Pitt, His Majesty
might, of course, dismiss, and Fox must certainly
be spoken to, informed of the King's ' dishke of his
manner and connexion ', as weU as warned of the
danger to Fox himself, if he should continue such
misdemeanours ; he might even be bought by
the hope of His Majesty's favour, but certainly
some way must be devised for breaking his con
nexion with Pitt."® Either the latter must be
dismissed from the King's service, or one or the
other of them be admitted further into the mystic
councils, and this could hardly be granted to
Pitt, considering the aversion of the Closet.
Something, the First Lord knew, must be done.
Yet on the eve of resolution his ambitious spirit
still rebelled. Would he be reaUy safe if either
of his great enemies were in his intima sacra ?
it is too long to give you any account of it in a letter.' — Fox to
Hartington, November 28, 1754.
158 Memoranda for the King, November. 1754: Add. MSS.,
32995, f. 355.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 215
While his mind thus wavered, a fleeting ray of
hope seemed to suggest the word ' Tory ' ; and
as quick to show sudden temerity as he was to
yield to imagined terrors, the Duke wrote to
Hardwicke significantly of ' two removals ', and
what might be done with the nominal Opposi
tion. Egmont should be immediately brought
into the fold, and Legge, whose chicanery he had
at last penetrated, might be transplanted in favour
of Sir George Lee."® Pitt told Fox that such a
galaxy (with Murray added) meant ' the Testament
politique of Bolingbroke lodged in great hands '.^®®
But such attempts were mere strutting in the
face of ruin. The inevitable issue faced New
castle that he must either dismiss Pitt or acquire)
Fox. The former alternative might sever the
alliance, but would it silence either tongue ? and
might not the Paymaster be driven further into
opposition ? After much anxiety of heart capitu
lation triumphed over revenge.^®^
Meanwhile the King had already summoned
Fox to justify his conduct. Pitt's wordy rhap
sodies and rhodomontades he had not the patience
to hear, but Fox he knew and liked. The King
inquired pointedly of the Secretary-at-War
whether he had united with Pitt to oppose his
159 Newcastle to Hardwicke, November 28, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
35414, f . 230.
160 Fox to Hartmgton, November 28, 1754.
161 Regarding Pitt the final decision was ' to leave him under
the uncertainty in which he now is '. — Minute, Powis House,
December 10, 1754: Add. MSS., 32995, f. 368.

216 HENRY FOX ch.
measures. Fox denied that he had done so ; which,
if true, demonstrated the entire informality of the
union. But when the King asked him if he would
support the royal measures with the spirit in which
he was so conspicuous, his visitor replied that it
must depend upon his means for doing so ; where
upon the King commended his ability and honesty,
deprecated his warmth, and extracted a promise
that he would submit to negotiation.^®^
The delicate task was now confided to Lord
Waldegrave, governor of the Prince of Wales,
a man who could be caUed a friend of all parties
and who was universally esteemed and respected.
Newcastle fashion, it was determined to possess Fox
with the least possible concession, and the first
step was inevitably to dangle before him that
well-worn and overrated phraseology : ' respect
and confidence of the Ministers,' and ' grace and
favour from His Majesty '.^®8
But the Newcastles must certainly have thought
Fox a simpleton (or else they could make them
selves believe anything), if they entertained for
a moment the notion that anything so intangible,
so assuredly transitory, would seduce him into
their camp. They were magnanimous enough to
drop hints of an employment more desirable by
£1,500 per annum than his present one ; they were
willing to keep the Pay Office for him, whenever
162 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 361-2.
163 Projected answer for Lord Waldegrave : Add. MSS.
32995, f. 58.

in PERFIDY AND REVENGE 217
it should be vacant (this Waldegrave at once
declared would never be considered ^®*) ; but ah
such propositions were mere waste of time and
mental energy. Not only would Fox in no wise
relish the imputation of being bought by money,^®®
but he positively declined to consider an office now
possessed by his aUy."® In fact it was unnecessary
164 Memorandum, December 3, 1754: Add.MSS., 32995, f. 360.
165 Fox to ColUnson, December 22, 1754 : Add. MSS., 28727,
f. 42.
166 Fox to Pitt, Chatham Corres. I. 125. This letter and
others from the Chatham Corres., purporting to belong to
AprU, 1755, are, for some cause, misdated. The reasons for
this conclusion are as f oUows :
(1) There is no apparent evidence elsewhere of a negotiation
with Fox in April, 1755 — not even in the Newcastle papers,
or in the printed memoirs of Waldegrave, who was the mediator
employed according to these letters.
(2) There would be no occasion for such a negotiation then.
Fox having already become a member of the Cabinet Council ;
and yet the latter is thrice distinctly mentioned in this corre
spondence attributed to AprU.
(3) The question is discussed in these letters of giving Fox
* the lead in the House of Commons '. But this point we know
— from the documents printed in Liechtenstein's Holland
House and from the Newcastle memoranda — was settled in
December, 1754.
(4) The letters, ' Fox to the King ', in Holland House and
Chatham Corres., though dated respectively December 10,
1754, and April 25, 1755, are almost identical ; and an
insertion, which was in the former, and not in the latter, was
due to a suggestion of the Duke of Cumberland's after the
writing of the first draft. We find, moreover, that the last
sentence in Pitt's copy is bracketed — undoubtedly because
there was a question of expunging it, and this was done, as we
see by the Holland House copy. We should remark finally in
this connexion that the date of the latter document is correctly

218 HENRY FOX ch.
to recaU that the King had spoken to him of
removing Pitt for his benefit,"' for Fox to perceive
reproduced from the original among the CoUinson papers in
the British Museum.
(5) Too many letters in the Chatham Corres. bear the same
date. A reading of the contents of the six letters, dated
April 25, makes it almost impossible to beUeve that they could
all have been written on the same day.
(6) The fact that Fox's name appeared in the Gazette on
April 26 (as the editor of the Chatham Corres. observes) as
one of the Council of Regency to act in the King's absence is of
no significance, for Fox was already a Cabinet CounciUor at
that time, and no elaborate negotiation would be required to
admit him to the Regency. Furthermore the Cabinet CouncU,
not the Regency, is the object mentioned in these letters, as
we have already noted in ' (2) '.
(7) FinaUy, such cordial relations between Pitt and Fox,
as these letters would certainly imply, were extremely unlikely
to have existed in AprU, four months after Fox had become
an ally of the Newcastles ; whereas at the present time Pitt
may have supposed that Fox would use his influence to procure
him some promotion.
It would seem, therefore, that this correspondence belongs to
December. The so-called ' Remarks on the Preceding Corre
spondence ' (I. 134) may, on the contrary, belong to April,
for a distinct allusion is made to an ' overture made through
Mr. Walpole', which, we know, took place in AprU; or it may
possibly have been written long afterward at some time when
Pitt was reviewing the experiences of the past, and by confusing
the sequence of events was led to date wrongly aU these letters.
Such a solution is not a little plausible from the fact that one of
Fox's letters (I. 128) in this collection bears at the end simply
the word ' Friday ' , and therefore may not, originaUy, have been
dated at all. The only letter which has its date unbracketed
in this published collection is the last one of the series.
16' Fox to Pitt, Chatham Corres. 1. 125. The King must have
made this suggestion during the audience of November 29,
already mentioned.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 219
the gauzy transparency of the Newcastle motives.
To have turned out one aUy and substituted the
other would have been a stroke of pohtics par
excellence. Waldegrave gathered that Fox would like his
present office made into a third Secretaryship of
State ; but this notion was the outcome of one of
the first meetings, when suitors and sued were
equally bashful about coming to terms. Perhaps
Fox became disgusted by these ' soundings ' ; at all
events he finaUy came out boldly with the demand
for the leadership in the Commons, tempered, it is
true, with a wiUingness to forgo the enjoyment
of the mysteries behind. ^^88
But Newcastle had even less desire now to give
away that responsible position than when he had
offered Fox a curtailed authority on the 13th of
March. To yield an inch to a man of ability seemed
worse than to yield a mile to one of Robinson's
calibre ; the very thought was horrible. No, it were
better to make his royal puppet say that there had
been a misunderstanding, that His Majesty could
not have consented to give him ' the lead ' in the
Commons ; in fact there should be no acknowledged
leader there. It is amusing to notice that the
Duke stopped Waldegrave short, when the pro
posal of Fox was reported, and declared that the
King could never have intended it ; he (Newcastle)
' would ask the King '. It is only necessary to add
168 Memorandum, December 3, 1754 : Add. MSS., 32995,
f . 360.

220 HENRY FOX ch.
in this connexion that His Majesty confirmed the
Duke's opinion "® — how or why is unfortunately
not writ in the chronicles of the Newcastles.
Fox was now a little puzzled as to what he
should do. He was asked to put his demands in
writing, and it was hard for him to decide whether
to teU the King virtuaUy that he would have
nothing further to do with the affair, or to catch
at an idea of the Duke (it sounds so like Newcastle !)
of acting the r61e of Leader without recognition as
such."® It happened that Pitt was whoUy in his
confidence throughout the negotiation, and whether
or not a meeting that night with the Paymaster
settled the question. Fox finaUy feU back upon
Devonshire's old scheme of the Cabinet Council "^
in addition to his demand of the ' lead '. He woiUd
desire ' no change of employment ' or ' pecuniary
advantage ', but only ' a mark of His Majesty's
favour ' — to give his position weight "^ — and of this
request there could be but one interpretation.
Since then, the First Lord's caprice had robbed
him of the nominal leadership. Fox proceeded to
write his revised demand, and both Cumberland
169 Fox to Pitt: Chatham Corres. I. 124.
1™ Ibid. : Memorandum, December 3, 1754, Add. MSS.,
32995, f. 360.
I'l Urged now by his friend, Marlborough. — Walpole,
Memoirs, I. 363. We can imagine with what avidity the
Cumberland party would push forward its most prominent
member. Marlborough, Uke Legge, had an object before him.
i'2 Fox to the King, December 10, 1754: Liechtenstein,
Holland House, I. 47.

Ill PERFIDY AND REVENGE 221
and Pitt v^ere consulted with respect to the wording.
The former warned his friend against compromising
his future, and strongly advised that the insertion
' in the present state of the Hov^e of Commons ' be
made to prefix his wUlingness to remain in his
present employment ; "® but Pitt objected to this
on the ground that it would signify, as regards
Fox, a surrender, throw suspicion upon his own
ambition, and indicate the existence of an aUiance,
of which there was clearly enough talk already.^'*
Fox doubted the force of both the latter objections,
and accepted the Duke's suggestions. He told
Pitt, however, that he would take upon himself aU
responsibility with the King, and, having denied
in general the aUegation that they were in aUiance,
he would teU His Majesty alone privately that he
' could not venture on the weak scheme, unless
strengthened by Pitt's acquiescence '."® In his
final letter to the Paymaster on the subject, he
declared that nothmg was so terrible as the thought
of themselves ' in conjunction with ' the Newcastles
and ' in their service '.^'®
Meanwhile the hint had been promptly taken b}'
i"8 Fox to Pitt: Chatham Corres. I. 129. That is, ' in the
present state of the House of Commons,' Fox ' desired no
change of employment '.
1'* Pitt to Fox : Chatham Corres. I. 130.
"5 Fox to Pitt: ibid. 1. 131.
i'6 Fox to Pitt: ibid. I. 132. Fox's inclusion of Pitt would
seem to indicate that whilst their separation was plainly inevit
able, he desired to break the bond between them as gently as
he could.

•>0'>

HENRY FOX ch.

the anxious chiefs. Ininiediately on receipt of
Fox's message (dated December 10) the First Lord,
the ChanceUor and the Lord Pi'esident met to
consider \\hether any lesser employment ^^•ould be
likely of acceptance, and were forced to conclude
in the negative."' Accordingly, decision having
been made, the King replied to Fox tA\o days
later through Waldegrave, that the Secretary-at-
War's terms were accepted, and room woiUd be
made for him in the Cabinet Council."® But the
Newcastles fortified themselves against a possible
danger by adding in the message (for the King
was only a shadowy figure throughout) a distinct
assurance that though Fox should possess tho
actual ' lead ', Sir Thomas Robinson should con
tinue to possess priority in the Commons, and the
new Councillor should have no separate power or
confidence outside the Ministers."® Thus was
Fox caught and caged for the King's service.""
1" Minute, Powis House, December 10, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32995, f. 368.
i'8 The ICing to Fox, December 12, 1754 : Liechtenstein. 1. 48.
i"9 The Khig's message to Waldegrave, December 12, 1754
(Add. MSS., 32995, f . 374), and to Fox, December 12 (Liechten
stein, 1. 48). At the last moment Newcastle seems to have
feared that Fo.\ would not sell out so readily, for we find him
writing, ' The King to talk strongly to resist Mr. Fox , if he
begins to act wi'ong.'— Add. MSS., 32996, f, 372.
180 Waldegrave's comments on the negotiation are worth
noting. ' Fox,' he writes, ' during the Avhole negotiation
behaved like a man of sense and a man of honour — very frank,
very explicit, and not very unreasonable ; but the Duke of
Newcastle lost all the merit of every concession by conferring

in PERFIDY AND REVENGE 223
Whose was the victory ? For the moment the
winner could be only one person, and that Fox. He
was careless in many respects of his political wel
fare ; besides, his uUierent good natui'e recoUed from
disappointing the King, even a king so mmistry-
ridden as Grcorge II : and such, in fact, is the tone
of a letter written afterwards to a friend, in which
he also says, ' I would have no pecuniary advantage
lest it be said that Friend Fox was bribed.' ^®^ If
he were not, in effect, ' bribed,' we can only
explain that he wanted the promotion he received,
and swaUowed the whole mouthful for purposes of
his own. But beneath this midoubtedly there
lurked the feeling of intense resentment for the
indignity dealt him m March ; he had plotted,
provoked, resisted, and now at last had forced the
Duke's hand ; and that was sweet revenge ! His
qualities were appreciated far more than they
would have been had he bowed to the perfidy of
eight months ago, and he had given his enemy a
period of intrigue and misery that was in itself
a pleasing vengeance. Now he was securely in the
Cabinet and enabled in some degree to promote
his patron's policy with greater prospect of success ;
and that, too, would be striking his foe. The
motives of Fox may have been mixed and man)',
his favours with bad grace, and it was easy to foresee that tliis
peace and amity would not be long." — Memoirs, p. 34. Walde
grave was undeniably right.
181 Fox to CoUinson, December 22, 1754 : Add. MSS..
2S727, f. 42.

224 HENRY FOX ch.
but the spectre of his downfaU had not yet cast its
shadow. It is, however, the broader and deeper effects of
an action that must be weighed for its justification ;
and as motives make men, so men, foUowing
their motives, affect the destiny of their State
and their own fortunes within it. Fox knew
the innate rottenness of the machine of which
he submitted to become a wheel. He knew also
the vigour and independence of the man with
whom he had been connected. Between these two
he chose the former, and in that act lay the greatest
political blunder in his career. Had he continued
in the union with WUliam Pitt, Time would have
claimed his exploits, and Public Opinion would
have dragged him to the top. But he chose to
board a derelict rather than to sink it, and ere
his enemy recovered new vitality, the star of Henry
Fox was for ever dimmed.

CHAPTER IV
THE MINISTRY AND THE WAR PARTY
The termination of this dangerous alliance gave
Newcastle at last a breathing speU. True, the
invasion of his Cabinet was somewhat humiliating ;
but having successfuUy separated his two foes in
the Commons, the Duke had no reason to anticipate
conspiracy in the Council ; and peace once more
in Parliament seemed just then the surest cure for
the maladies of the Ministry. Nevertheless when
Fox had privately renounced his connexion with
Pitt, the advantage of apprising the latter and
thereby adding emphasis to the separation was
too tempting a one to be missed.^ As for the Pay
master, if he had any comments to make, we are
not told what they were ; but it was certainly
unnecessary to inform him that the alliance with
Fox was at an end.
The King was probably the most dissatisfied of
aU who had been interested in the affair. The
stubborn Sovereign was by no means convinced
that the acquisition of the Secretary-at-War was
a better remedy than the alternative of turning
1 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 369. Walpole's sus
picions, however, must not be aUowed too great weight in view
of his prejudice against Newcastle and the ChanceUor.
1156 p

226 HENRY FOX ch.
out the Paymaster, and although he let the
ChanceUor harp on the agreement that Fox
should have no interest in the Closet outside the
Ministry, the audience which His Lordship received
on the 14th of December was in many respects
rather stormy.
After an amicable discussion of the main features
of the political outlook, the King suddenly turned
upon the ChanceUor with the demand, ' But, My
Lord, what is your opinion about turning out
Pitt ? ', ' and then followed the question,' wrote
Hardwicke the day afterwards, ' with his usual
description of him and censure of his behaviour.'
The ChanceUor was not a man easUy embarrassed,
and his shrewdness of judgement invariably saved
him from indiscretion. He was quite ready to
concur in the King's denunciation of the Pay
master, but strongly deprecated the notion of
removing him ; and he cleverly threw the respon
sibility upon Fox, who, he said, had excused him
self from ' taking a personal part ' against Pitt,
if the latter were to be dismissed.^
2 This would certainly seem to imply that Fox was prepared
to oppose Pitt, if the latter, in pursuance of their old poUcy,
continued his attacks upon the Ministry. There is no better
evidence that the alUance was dissolved. On the other hand,
we may perceive that Fox was equaUy determined not to
compass the sacrifice of his old aUy. Thus his refusal to
countenance what would have signified — so far as he himself
was concerned — a mean betrayal of a former ally was
sufficient excuse for the Newcastles to put forward in
opposing the King's desire. Hardwicke's object was probably
twofold : not only did he save Pitt from dismissal, but he

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 227
' And I assure you,' interrupted the King, ' he 's
done himself no good by it.'
This was exactly what the Chancellor wanted.
He had succeeded in making the Monarch believe
that the real efficiency of the new CouncUlor
depended upon the continuance of Pitt in nominal
favour ; and the King, after a final fling at the
man he detested, consented to leave the matter in
abeyance.® The Paymaster was little aware how near he had
come to losing the office which he needed aU the
more now that in the course of the autumn he had
taken a wife.* Perhaps actuated by a sense of
his danger, or possibly undecided as to his plans,
he discreetly held his tongue, and there was not
a word of reproach for Fox, or any audible lament
on his own impotence. Indeed, considering the
fact that in spite of the obligation he owed to
Newcastle for his seat in Parliament, and to
that nobleman's brother for his present office, he
had nevertheless — as Lyttelton took occasion to
threw upon Fox the responsibUity for the King's disappoint
ment. By so doing, he would encourage the King to disUke
his new Cabinet Councillor, and consequently preclude the
UkeUhood of Fox's acquiring a separate strength in the
Closet. Such was a possibiUty which we have seen that the
Newcastles had dreaded.
8 Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 15, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 449.
* Pitt's extravagant tastes always led him to Uve beyond his
means, and dismissal would have meant the loss of a salary
of £3,000 a year. Lord Temple, his brother-in-law, had to
come to the rescue when the King at last dismissed him, in 1755.
P2

228 HENRY FOX ch.
point out ® — been so imgrateful as to assist Fox
in forcing the Duke's hand, it must be candidly
acknowledged that the Ministry were treating him
far better than he deserved. Yet the ChanceUor
and his imperious friend were not the kind to
overlook an injury from a mere impulse of charity ;
they saw, rather, that their interest lay in letting
the Paymaster alone.® To a man of Pitt's tem
perament, this ignoring of him was perhaps the
hardest punishment they could have inflicted.
Fox, for his part, appeared perfectly content.
The Duke of Devonshire may have smUed when he
told Hardwicke that the Secretary-at-War was
' very weU satisfied with what he had done, and
beheved he would go on very well ', for the old
Duke had reaUy proved himself a most successful
schemer ; and an inroad of the Cumberlands into
the Newcastle phalanx was something to produce
real pleasure. Fox, having caUed on Hardwicke
the evening of the 15th, received the latter's con
gratulations, and the ChanceUor was pleased that
the friends of the Administration were at least
not offended by the new promotion.' Whether the
Princess was mentaUy included in the number
5 Lyttelton's Observations: PhiUimore, III. 477.
6 In resigning, Pitt would have been regarded simply as
a discontented office-seeker ; but if dismissed, he would
undoubtedly have attracted aU the popularity which naturaUy
attaches itself to an iU-used opponent of an unpopular Ministry.
Pitt would them be in a position to enter an avowed opposition
— and with exceUent prospects.
¦^ Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 15, 1754.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 229
cannot be said, but the ChanceUor was soon after
ward given reason to believe that she was greatly
alarmed.8 The new Cabinet CounciUor subsequently de
lighted his employer by speaking favourably of
Sir Thomas Robinson, upon which the King
remarked keenly, ' Now Fox wiU have no pre
tence.' ® But if this was good logic, it showed too
little knowledge of Fox. Perhaps a reason for the
unswerving fidelity which he exhibited for certain
friends during his career was the fact that he
never served faithfully those whom he had cause
to despise ; it certainly should be noted that he
told Doddington — just when is not recorded — that
he ' neither had, nor would have any obligation to
the Duke of Newcastle '. If the First Lord took him
for a friend, he would, according to Doddington,
only deceive himself, as Fox never pretended to be
one. This was said to Halifax some months
later." There was no evident intention of forgiving
Legge, because certain difficiUties had been solved ;
and Sir George Lee consented to succeed him if the
Ministry insisted. ^^ Neither was the design to
8 Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 21, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
35414, f. 232.
9 Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 26, 1754 : ibid., f . 238.
10 Doddington, Diary, May 24, 1755.
11 On the condition, however, that he should retain his
present employment \vith the Princess . Sir George beUeved his
health too uncertain to warrant his anticipating a long tenure
of office ; and he wished to guard against a chance of future

230 HENRY FOX ch.
secure Egmont abandoned in the face of the greater
acquisition from the Cumberlands.^^ The King
delighted Newcastle by readily consenting that the
former should become Comptroller of the Household
in the room of Lord HUlsborough, and have a seat
in the Privy CouncU as weU. This would of course
mean that something else would be given to Fox's
friend as compensation ; and the Duke wrote to his
' Oracle ' (as he sometimes caUed Hardwicke) that
he had obtained ' a sort of tacit consent to find
out something for Legge '. In fact, ' What shaU
we find for Legge ? ' " was for some time the
chief question under consideration, for the Pelham
family were ever apprehensive of incurring en
mities, and to Newcastle's mind every man could
be appeased by emolument. The Duke was also
pleased to observe that the Secretary-at-War
showed no signs of harbouring jealousy on account
of the favours shown to the Tory leader, whom he
had once openly despised.
isolation. — Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 21, 1754.
Lee's caution was justified by later events.
12 In justifying Fox's promotion and the prospective
' system ' for the Commons, Newcastle writes, ' What has been
done has been done by mature consideration with, and by the
approbation of. My Lord ChanceUor. We watch every motion,
and are both fuUy convinced that hitherto the part we have
taken is the most prudent and the most safe. We only want
to complete our system and our security by making Sir George
Lee ChanceUor of the Exchequer and giviag some consider
able employment to My Lord Egmont.'— Newcastle to Lady
K. PeUiam, January 25, 1754 : Add. MSS., 32852, f . 260.
18 Quoted from Newcastle's letter of December 26.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 231
On the 25th died the superannuated Lord Privy
Seal, whom Newcastle had once tried in vain to
remove ; and the vacant post was promptly con
ferred upon the Duke of Marlborough, whUe the
Duke of Rutland, another relative of the deceased,
became Lord Steward. The latter appointment
Hardwicke felt to be a distinctly strong one, on
account of his family connexions ; ^* and Anson
was for sounding the new Lord Gower as a possible
pupil to be educated for the Ministry." It cer
tainly appeared as if the Administration were
pluming itself on a fairly complete capture of the
Cumberlands, who now possessed five votes in the
Cabinet, with a chance of gaining more. But might
not Fox discover some strength therein ?
His Majesty, according to the Duke, had recently
flattered him by saying, ' I have made you, as it
were. First Minister ; you wiU be informed of
everything,' and Fox told GranvUle the King had
expressed the same to him in even stronger terms. ¦^®
This declaration, though later much modified, may
have been far too sweet a draught for one of New
castle's unquenchable thirst for power ; at any
rate the Duke was destined to spend the last days
of 1754 in the deepest humiliation it had perhaps
ever been his lot to suffer.
1* Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 26, 1754 (first letter
of this date) : Add. MSS., 32737, f . 485.
15 Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 26, 1754 (second letter
of this date) : ibid., p. 487.
16 Newcastle to Hardwicke, January 2, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32852, f. 27.

232 HENRY FOX ch.
An appointment being needed for the weU-paid
office of Groom of the Stole, the King expressed
decided preference for the Earl of Rochford. It was
only natural that His Majesty should desire the
new appointment to be in accord with his personal
liking, but to this the veteran dispenser of patronage
was seemingly loth to consent. Newcastle and
Hardwicke agreed that Rochford was not to their
taste," and the Duke (thinking possibly of Dorset)
would have had the post left open tUl some pohtical
exigency should bring to hght a fitting nominee."
In the meantime, at the elder Walpole's instance,"
he urged the promotion of the Earl of Orford to a
vacancy in the Bedchamber,*® perhaps with a view
of inculcating forgetfulness of the past.
But George II had always known his chief
servant better than the latter gave him credit for,
and when the Duke opened his plan. His Majesty
told him with much asperity to confine himself to
the Treasury. ' You wiU have enough to do to
set that right,' was the King's retort. ' You have
been attacked or objected to for meddling ^%ith
everything.' The words were like a thunder-bolt. Newcastle,
in aU hkehhood, cowered, as no mention is made-
1' Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 29, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 516.
18 Newcastle to Leeds, January 6, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32852,
f. 136.
19 Walpole to Newcastle, December 26, 1754: Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 491.
20 Newcastle to Hardwicke, January 2, 1755.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 233
of a reply in the long letter that he wrote relating
the episode. Perhaps bitterer than the actual
affront to his face was the knowledge that the
Secretary-at-War had used much the same language
regarding him, and had evidently convinced the
King. The Duke was certain that Fox was
poisoning the royal mind against him. Rochford,
he hinted, was but a creature of the Cumberlands,
and the many candidates whom Fox was pushing
for emolument, as well as the Duke's own liberality
to the Albemarles,^^ would make the world believe
that he (Newcastle) had become a mere dependant
of the Secretary-at-War. Thoroughly crushed,
the veteran time-server begged the faithful Chan
ceUor to win back the King from the hands of the
conspirator and pluck out the sting of his cruel
words. ' I leave myseU entirely to your Lordship,
to dispose of me as you please. . . . Pray go and
see the King. When you are once in the Closet,
I have no direction or advice to give.' ^^
Not content with the letter to his mentor, the
Duke wrote also to Andrew Stone, begging him to
see Hardwicke that evening and give him a detaUed
account of the tragedy. The greatest mortification
of aU is apparently in the concluding remark :
' The public wiU ascribe it to the late transaction
21 The family of Lady Caroline Fox's uncle. Lord Albemarle,
who died heavUy in debt during December 1754. Correspon
dence between Fox and Newcastle on the subject may be found
in Add. MSS., 32737, ff. 501, 524.
22 Newcastle to Hardwicke ('most private '), January 2, 1755 :
Add. MSS., 32852, f. 27.

234 HENRY FOX ch.
with Mr. Fox.' ^® To have it thought that the new
Cabinet Councillor — and not he — ^had been the
real conqueror, was something not to be borne.
Hardwicke's friendship never proved wanting
in the hour of need. He willingly went to Court,
and found the Closet in good humour. But when
he spoke to the King of a vacant colonelcy for his
son Joseph, the royal graciousness suddenly ex
pired and the sign for dismissal was given. New
castle had taken pains to write that he had had
the intention ' of mentioning Joe, to Fox, but upon
consideration thought it was better not ; the
Duke ^ might make ill use of it, and he could
hardly think Fox would make a good one '.^® This
had been a politic stroke to put at the end of his
appeal, for the Chancellor's dearest ambition was
the advancement of his sons — a consideration
which more than once repaid him for the exact
ing friendship of the First Lord.
But His Lordship's imperturbable dignity was
far from being shattered by any whim of Royalty,
and, ignoring the King's sudden turn, he began to
assure him how completely the latter had mis
interpreted the Duke's suggestion to suspend the
appointment of a groom of the stole.
The King blazed out at this. ' The Duke of
Newcastle meddles in things he has nothing to do
with. He would dispose of my Bedchamber,
28 Newcastle to Stone, January 2, 1755.
24 Cumberland was commonly spoken of as ' the Duke '.
25 Newcastle to Hardwicke, January 2, 1755.

IV THE :\nNISTRY AND WAR PARTY 235
which is a personal service about myself, and
I won't suffer anybody to meddle in. I know what
he wanted.'
Hardwicke saw that his last resource would now
be needed to defend his friend, and forthwith laid
himself open to blame for having thought of
Dorset, whom the King had spoken of recalling
from Ireland, as a proper choice for the Stole ; but
Dorset should never hear of it.
' Could you think,' rephed the King, ' I Avould
make an old man of seventy' my Groom of the
Stole ? '
Hardwicke answered graveh* that that objection
had not occurred to him. He then turned the
subject to a careful description of the manifold
ramifications of the First Lord's duties, and
assured the King that whereas it was designed to
spare him aU this business, it was alwaj's con
ceded that final decision lay with His Majesty.
' Ministers,' he impressed upon the King, ' bear aU
the blame and resentment of the disappointed
persons, and they can never carry on his affairs
without some weight in the disposition of favours.'
The King answered that he ' had seen too much
of that in the country already', and Hard-«icke
was forced to continue his explanations and
remonstrances ; but aU to no purpose.^® His
Majesty was out of humour and did not disguise
the fact.
26 Hardwicke to Newcastle, January 3, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32852, f. 63.

236 HENRY FOX ch.
Stone wrote to Newcastle the day afterwards that
it was highly probable that Rochford had already
been notified of the King's intention to promote
him,^' and it eventuaUy turned out that the royal
wUl had its way, even to the extent of giving the
Earl of Essex the place that Orford coveted.^®
For once in his life George II had overruled his
Ministers. One point upon which both Stone and the
ChanceUor disagreed with Newcastle was the
attributing of the episode and the appointment to
Fox.^® Hardwicke told His Grace frankly that he
believed the Secretary-at-War had no interest in
the three candidates the Duke mentioned to Stone,
and professed to impute it aU to the Duke of
Cumberland and his sister, together with Lady
Yarmouth, who perhaps meant no harm. In
reference to the royal censure Hardwicke was
2' Stone to Newcastle, January 3, 1755: Add. MSS.,
32852, f. 69.
28 Robinson to Newcastle, January 2, 1755 : ibid., f . 31 ;
Newcastle to Walpole, January 2, 1755 : ibid., f . 41.
29 Hardwicke told Newcastle that he purposely refrained
from mentioning Fox in his audience on the 2nd, as he was
convinced that the King would only upbraid him for his
prejudice. — Hardwicke to Newcastle, January 3, 1755. An
interesting instance of how Newcastle could deUberately
misrepresent facts when it suited his purpose may be found in
his letter to Walpole, January 2, expressing regret at Orford's
disappointment. In explaining Fox's promotion to the Cabinet,.
he says that he ' consented to a measure to satisfy some great
persons '. Presumably the King and the Duke of Cumberland
are meant.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 237
probably right, but it is not at aU improbable that
Fox was making use of his audiences with the
King to secure benefits for his dependants, and
Rochford' s accession to the Cabinet was sure to add
stiU further to his strength. Whether, however. Fox
was seeking to supplant Newcastle as receiver of
applications — a condition the Duke suspected —
cannot definitely be determined.
The storm having subsided, the Duke, though
perhaps somewhat the worse for his handling, was
at last able to breathe freely again ; and having
written to three aspirants for the Stole that their
apphcations had failed, he turned his mind to the
absorbing question of the session of Parliament, now
on the eve of reopening. On the whole the pros
pect was exceedingly bright. It could, of course,
never be known when a torrent of abuse might
burst forth from the Paymaster, but Fox was re
garded as safe, and Egmont had been advised of his
elevation to the Privy Council ; ®® this last appoint
ment, it was hoped, would reconcile the Princess
to the new arrangements. Yet an evidence of the
fact that the two ruling spirits felt themselves
always to be treading on thin ice may be seen
in the apprehension which even the ChanceUor
suffered at a warning of the King to be ' upon their
guard against the next session '. ' Is it possible
for His Majesty to know of any scheme to disturb
his Administration and not to crush or discourage
80 Newcastle to Egmont, December 24, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32737, f. 477.

238 HENRY FOX ch.
it ? ' ®^ As the admonition had been given a few
days before the rupture in the Closet, the King
may simply have been amusing himself at then-
expense ; or was there after all a lurking suspicion
of Fox ?
Shortly before the adjournment the two new
recruits fenced over a clause in the Mutiny BiU,
which Egmont from long precedent could not resist
the temptation of attacking, even though he was
virtuaUy pledged to the Administration. The
result was an unexpected phihppic from Charles
Townshend, who treated the Tory leader so
mercilessly that the latter is said to have excused
himself from accepting the employment which the
Ministry had promised him. 82
On the 29th of January (after the reopening of
the session) Fox astonished his fellow members by
proposing that the House shoiUd sit the foUowing
day, which had hitherto been observed as a hohday
in commemoration of 'King Charles's martyrdom'.
From heirs of the Revolution this extinction of
a Jacobite custom should have found no little
justification ; but popular assemblies are wont to
be sensitively tenacious of their traditions ; and
though a warm debate ensued between the Speaker
81 Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 26, 1754.
82 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 364-5. The King was
intensely amused at the episode, ' which I treated (wrote
Hardwicke) with more gravity'. — Hardwicke to Newcastle,
December 15, 1754: Add. MSS., 32737, f. 449. The office in
question was evidently the comptroUership (see p. 230), not
the treasurership, as Walpole states.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 239
and the mover, the former's righteousness pre
vaUed. 88 One of the members present attributed
Fox's motion to ' an ambition to please his
sovereign '.8* Perhaps — considering his recent in
trigues in the Closet — ^there is some truth in the
suggestion. The Sheriff-depute BiU 85 was one of the first
measures to come up during this session, and the
Speaker having ' uttered one of his pompous
pathetics couched in short sentences ', Fox replied
in a speech full of artful derision. This brought
Pitt to his feet, who ' wished that Fox had omitted
anything like levity on this great principle ', and
declared that two points of the debate had affected
him with sensible pleasure : the admission that
judicature ought to be free, and the universal zeal
to strengthen the King's hand ; liberty, he affirmed,
was the best loyalty.
Fox, who had all along argued that the magni
tude of the question was exaggerated, retorted
that if he had honoured the fire of liberty, he now
honoured the smoke. In all of this the Secretary-
at-War was supporting the Administration, which
regarded the affair as a ' Scotch cabal ' ; and
88 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 369.
84 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report I, part 6, pp. 257-8.
85 ' The new Lord- Advocate of Scotland moved that the bill,
passed seven years before, for subjecting the sheriff-depute
to the King's pleasure during that term, and which was on
the point of expiring, after which they were to hold their offices
for Ufe, should continue some time longer on the present foot.'
— Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 369-70.

240 HENRY FOX ch.
Newcastle asked West®® to persuade Fox to
attempt a private conversion of the Speaker — a
move which seemed to be a wise one, as Murray
hinted that Fox would avoid going to lengths
with Pitt.8'
Another case which occupied much of Par
liament's time was a petition lodged against
Sandwich's successful candidates from St. Michael.
The Chancellor was disposed to believe the Earl's
doubtful statement that it was ' a private affair
unconnected with party ' ; but Fox, who espied a
lawyer among the petitioners, threw himself into
the struggle with such energy that he carried
a division in the face of four lawyers and
Nugent, aU arrayed against the cause of the
sitting members.
Newcastle had evidently at first conceded the
election to the Cumberlands ; but when the Tories
saw that the vote was sufficiently close to make
their own wishes the deciding factor, they decided
that Newcastle's interests were preferable to those
of the Secretary-at-War ; and consequently offered
Newcastle their votes on certain conditions, one
of which was that he 'should dismiss both Fox
and Pitt. This demand on the part of the Tories
was certainly a gross overestimate of their value.
A recent conference of the two orators with
86 Secretary of the Treasury and one of Newcastle's useful
poUtical agents.
8' Newcastle to Hardwicke, February 15, 1754 : Add. MSS.,
32852, f. 469.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 241
Sandvtich had worried the Duke not a little,®® but
such a proposal as this was absurd ; for the
attachment of an extra borough to one party or
another was not for one instant to be weighed with
the loss of the man he had lowered his dignity to
secure. The result was the triumph of Sandwich
in the Committee.
But the Tories seemed stUl to shrink from
giving their strength to the man who had
uniformly attacked their chieftain, and having
met on the morning of March 24 to concert a pro
gramme, they resolved to ' cancel aU their engage
ments to defeat Fox '. Thus when the case came
up for final decision, the curious anomaly appeared
of a house voting down what it had itself decided in
a committee. The members for St. Michael were
unseated by a majority of 24, and Fox had the
small satisfaction of giving Sir George Lee ' a set-
down ' (to quote Rigby) after the struggle was
over.8® Such cabals were but an insignificant
feature of a remarkably quiet session.
But the peace which Newcastle enjoyed in
Parliament was more than counterbalanced by
rebellion in the Cabinet — the place of all places
in which the Duke would have thought him
self secure. Unfortunately, neglected evils, like
neglected wounds, are certain to bring retribution ;
88 Newcastle to Hardwicke, February 22, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
35414, f. 263.
89 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 375-8 ; Rigby to
Bedford, March 24, 1755 : Bedford Papers, II. 156-
U56 Q

242 HENRY FOX ch.
and two problems of foreign policy of the most
crucial character confronted the anxious Ministry :
they were, in short, the defence of His Majesty's
Electorate in Germany, and the adjustment of the
difficulties with France in America, now growing
daily more serious.
The certainty prevailed more and more strongly
as time went on that the Peace of Aix-la-ChapeUe
was nothing more than a truce. Besides the
differences with France (to be mentioned later),
the anger of the Empress-Queen at being dis
regarded in the decision of the two great Western
powers to bring the late war to a conclusion had
been in no sense assuaged in the course o:^ucceeding
years, and the fact that she owed her imperial
dignity largely to Great Britain seemed of slight
weight beside the consequences of England's
second desertion of Austria in order to make
a separate peace with France. Maria Theresa
could never be wholly reasonable while the King
of Prussia retained Silesia, and hence had arisen
her unwillingness to make peace in 1748 — a peace
in which she was obliged formaUy to relinquish
ber rights to that province.
One has frequently to observe that it is often
easier for two bitterly hostUe powers to become
reconciled after a treaty has settled their dis-^
putes than it is for the powers luiited in one
war to remain allied in the next struggle, Many
<of the points of difference between England and
Austria had their origin long before the War of

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 243
the Austrian Succession had won for Maria Theresa
the imperial crown ; and little real effort had
been expended by either power to adjust difficulties
which were certain to become more and more
aggravated in the course of succeeding years. By
the Utrecht settlement of 1713 the Spanish Nether
lands were (as a means of defence against Bourbon
ambition) ceded conditionaUy to the House of
Hapsburg ; while the interests of the Maritime
Powers (as England and HoUand were caUed) were
further safeguarded by the re-enactment of com
mercial restrictions, which dated back to 1648.*®
Four years later, for better defence against Bour
bon ambition, the Court of Vienna was induced
to participate in an arrangement known as the
' Barrier Treaties '. This compact — the cause of
so much future friction — compeUed Austria to bear
the expense of the Dutch garrison, now introduced
into the barrier towns, besides furnishing an annual
subsidy to the Estates-General of HoUand ; further
more, the commercial disabilities of the Flemings
were now confirmed by treaty. Thus instead of
being reaUy a sovereign province of the Empire,
the Low Countries were virtuaUy regarded as an
Austrian fief, to be held on the understanding of
proper defence against the French, and absten-
*o One of the best studies of the commercial disabUities of
the Belgians, and the struggle which resulted over the question,
is Mr. Hertz's article, 'England and the Ostend Company,'
Eng. Hist. Rev. XXII. 255 et seq.
Q2

244 HENRY FOX ch.
tion from injury to the interests of the Maritime
Powers. ^^^lat might have foUowed, had the Emperor,
Charles VI, possessed a greater measm-e of common
sense is, of course, difficult to judge. As a matter
of fact he spent most of his life in fruitless and mis
directed intrigues, and a half-hearted endeavour to
free his distant subjects from commercial trammels
met with decisive failure in 1731. The policy of
Charles VI Avas essentiaUy dynastic, and it was for
this reason chiefly that he surrendered to the
INIaritime Powers and resumed an aUiance which
his own behaviour (very seldom influenced by
Flemish considerations) had some years ago
severed. The result was that these two powers
alone — whatever their motives " — had been true
¦11 The motives of England are well analysed by Dr. Bright
in his admirable Uttle book, Maria Theresa (pp. 23-4). ' It
has been customary,' he writes, ' to speak of the chivalrous
conduct of England in offering aid to the oppressed Queen.
Such a vaunt is futUe. The motive of the English people was
hatred of the Bourbons ; the motive of George and liis Minister
was the safety of his Hanoverian dominions, and the desire
to appear before the world as the arbiter and peacemaker of
Germany. To gain this end scheme after scheme was sug
gested. . . . The advantage of Austria did not appear to be
considered ; on the contrary, for the sake of strengthening the
coaUtion bj' the addition of Sardinia, strong pressure was con
stantly brought to bear upon the Queen to induce her to cede
a further portion of her dominions to that encroaching power.'
AU such dictaition, administered without regard to the Queen's
cardinal aim (i. e. to recover SUesia), accounts very considerably
for the qualified gratitude wliich Maria Theresa felt for her
only important ally.

IV THE ^IINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 245
to their pledges when the Emperor died ; but
despite their aUiance SUesia was lost. And here
we have the key to Maria Theresa's foreign policy.
The recovery of SUesia — a hope which the Pelham
^Ministry in their mUitary straits had relinquished
— must somehow or other be effected by the Court
of Vienna.
In the years 1750-2 the Duke of Newcastle, as
Ave have seen, had attempted without success to
buy for the Archduke Joseph the coveted title
of King of the Romans. This was the Duke's
luxurious prescription for soothmg Austria's feelings
and effecting a reconcUiation. But such a remedy
could never hope to reach so deep a malady. It
was Kaunitz, the far-sighted ambassador at Paris,
who had early become convinced that oiUy by
aUiance with France (the hereditary enemy of the
Hapsburgs) could the lost province be recovered
from Frederick. Of this policy the Empress
secretly approved, and Kaunitz was made Chan
ceUor of the Empire in 1753.
]\IeanwhUe the old barrier question had arisen i/'
agam. The Empress woiUd contribute nothing to
the refortif^ing of the bamer towms (dismantled m
the late war) mUess her Flemish subjects were
given some measure of commercial hbertj- ; *^
whUe the new ChanceUor showed himself bitterly
*'- The Empress had suspended payment of the annual
subsidy stipulated by the Barrier Treaty, and Hanbury
WiUiams, sent in 1753 to remonstrate, was whoUy unable to
alter her attitude.

246 HENRY FOX ch.
hostile to a diplomatic arrangement so obviously
humihating. With every month the relations of
England and Austria became more and more
strained, and communications from the Duke
of Newcastle were so frequently of an irritating
nature that Keith, the English ambassador at
Vienna, occasionaUy declined to transmit them.*8
Prussia, although conceived to be in the ' system '
opposed to England and Austria, had suffered
more from the just suspicions of her treachery
entertained by others than from any actual hostihty
that she herself had shown. Had it not been for
George II' s dual position as King of England and
Elector of Hanover, the importance of Prussia's
policy would not have been so keeiUy reahzed.
But as things stood, Prussia was perfectly capable
of overawing the other states of Germany, and for
purely selfish reasons it was better for Greorge to
have Frederick as his friend than as a suUen
neighbour who might at any time become an
enemy. Furthermore, an aUiance between them
would have guaranteed Hanover from the rapacity
of other powers, as weU as from the suspected
designs of Prussia herself.
But there was one seemingly insuperable obstacle
to an understanding between the sovereigns, and
that was their mutual hatred. The most for
midable opponent of Carteret's ' system ', Frederick
had never sought to disguise his contempt for his
uncle, and ill feeling between them was constantly
*8 Coxe, History of the House of Austria, II. 349.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 247
aggravated by rival claims to a duchy or some other
triviality of German politics. Then, besides a
dispute over damages which Frederick claimed for
losses to his merchants during the late war, England
was not happy in her choice of envoys sent on
successive missions to the Court of Berlin.^ In
view of aU this it is obvious that only by an un
looked-for series of circumstances could the two
sovereigns be convinced that it was to their
respective interests to become reconciled. When
in the course of a tour in Western Germany
Frederick passed not far from his uncle's chateau,
it was quite impossible to persuade the English
King to arrange an interview; and even New
castle had the shrewdness to see and deplore the
lost opportunity.*®
In the meantime the Duke of Newcastle showed
that his passion for subsidies was by no means
appeased of restrained by failure during his
brother's lifetime. Persistent in the pursuance
of the ' Hanoverian ' policy, which Granville had
bequeathed,*® the Duke first engaged to subsidize
the little principality of Hesse, which should place
** Both Legge and WUUams had been unfortunate in
diplomacy at Berlin. Of course one of the chief grievances
against Frederick was his weU-known repudiation of obUgations
relative to the ' SUesian loan '.
*8 Newcastle to Holdernesse, June 24, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32656, f . 155.
*6 The poUcy might be termed ' Austro-Hanoverian ' until
the Austrian feature broke down at the Peace of Aix-la-
ChapeUe. See Ward, Great Britain and Hanover, p. 165.

248 HENRY FOX ch.
a smaU army at Hanover's disposal in case of
possible invasion. Secondly, he endeavoured with
out success to inveigle Denmark into adding
herself to England's list of debtors.*' But far the
most difficult of the Duke's diplomatic speculations
was undoubtedly his effort to secure the Court of
St. Petersburg as a menace to Frederick on his
northern frontier. Not from any lack of enmity
toward Prussia was the enterprise an arduous
one ; it was, rather, because the Czarina's advisers
saw the hope of augmenting their fortunes from
the Newcastle policy. To overcome a strenuous
opposition in the Russian CouncU and satisfy the
cupidity of England's chief advocate, the Great
ChanceUor, was evidently too considerable a task
for the talents of the English Ambassador, and
the terms proposed by Russia in February were
too exorbitant to be considered.*® Meanwhile the
treaties with Saxony and Bavaria, which had
been concluded when no war was imminent, were
about to expire at a time when their object might
at last be attained ; *® and since HoUand (not
withstanding the efforts of the Princesse Gouver-
nante, who was George II' s daughter) was not only
'» Holdernesse to Robinson, May 25, 1755 : Add, MSS.,
32855, f . 190. Hardwicke was said to have felt much reUeved
at the Duke's faUure. — Hartington to Newcastle, May 16, 1755 ;
ibid., f . 26.
*8 Dickens to Newcastle, February 8, 1755: Add. MSS.,
32852, f. 392.
*9 Waldegrave mentions this curious situation when he attacks
the Ministry's foreign policy. — Memoirs, p. 42.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 249
loth to contribute a share of these subsidies but
in all ways indifferent to her ancient alliance,
the Duke of Newcastle could actuaUy rely on no
important power in Europe save the amicably
neutral Court of Madrid.
In March, while a letter from Keith might have
tempted the Ministers to be reaUy sanguine that
Austria would come into their terms,®® another
written by Yorke the same day from The Hague
attested to an impending rupture in some belated
negotiations over the Barrier question.®^ The
problem lay unsettled, and April had partly
elapsed, when at last the Court of Vienna made a
determined effort to seek a solution.®^ Unhappily,
its proposal revealed the same unending difficulty.
The Empress was ever dominated by suspicion of
Prussia, and if she were expected to protect
w Keith to Newcastle, March 4, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32853,
f. 82.81 Yorke to Newcastle, March 4, 1755 : ibid., f. 97.
^2 Vice-Chancellor CoUoredo, on behalf of the Emperor
Francis, expressed the wiUingness of his court to furnish 50,000
troops for the defence of the Low Countries on condition that
Russia should raise 50,000, the German princes 30,000, and
the English Government 10,000, besides subsidizing Russia,
Bavaria, Saxony and Hesse. The Emperor's fear of Prussia
may be clearly read in these demands ; and yet they can hardly
be called exorbitant, if we consider that the Maritime powers
were much more concerned than Austria in any question of
maintaining the integrity of the Low Countries. CoUoredo
added wisely that he looked for a general war, unless the
rupture with his court was soon healed. Communication of
CoUoredo to Newcastle, and plan (dated April 16) : Add. MSS.,
32854, f. 145, 150.

250 HENRY FOX ch.
Hanover from Prussian invasion, her own posses
sions must be accorded a like guarantee ; ®® and
so, above aU things, an aUiance with Russia must
be managed.
y On the 18th the inner circle of the Cabinet —
of which Fox was not a member — ^held a meeting ®*
and, whUe declining to make definite promises,
once more caUed upon the Court of Vienna to send
immediate assistance for the defence of the Low
Coxmtries. This was oiUy reviving the most
delicate of the points at issue. The Empress,
through fear and distrust of Prussia, was un-
AviUing thus to draw strength from the heart of
her dominions; whUe both HoUand and Austria
(equaUy desirous of averting war from the Conti
nent) felt that England, whose difficulties with
France were the real cause of danger to the Low
Countries, should accordingly be expected to bear
the principal burden of their defence. But this
would be too much for Newcastle's credit in
Parliament. Hence the endeavours of England to
coerce her aUies.
On the 19th Holdernesse sent word to the First
Lord that he understood that Austria would be
content with but a third of the demands she had
proposed ; ®® and the contre-projet of England —
dictated soon afterwards from Hanover — was cer-
88 Not only were subsidies to German princes demanded, but
also a guarantee for the Empress's hereditary possessions.
54 Minute of Meeting, AprU 18, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32995, f . 79.
55 Holdernesse to Newcastle, AprU 19, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32854, f . 182.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 251
tainly composed in that spirit. UnluckUy for
England, the Empress was whoUy misimderstood,
and she flatly refused to send an army to Flanders
untU the treaty with Russia was concluded.®® In
an ultimatum of the foUowing June the whole
position of Austria was clearly defined,®' but by
that time aU reasonable hope of accommodation
was at an end.
MeanwhUe ' Royalty was trembling for his
Hanover ', and despite the imminent outbreak of
hostUities with France, the King determined to
seek his native hearth and effect what he could in
the way of paper promise of succour. The
Ministers would fain have detained him, nominaUy
because the King would be in danger if a continent
so combustible should be hghted into war, but
more particularly, perhaps, because they dreaded
the appointment, as Regent, of the Duke of Cum
berland, who might circumvent their pohcy and
precipitate a war the conduct of which woiUd
devolve upon them.®® In some things, however,
George II would not be crossed, and the Ministers
had to yield.
Not so every one, however. A certain Lord
PoiUett notified the Peers that he would move an
address in protest against the King's plan to leave
the country. It would be hard to say whether
56 Holdernesse to Newcastle, May 28, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32855, f. 236.
5' See Waddington, Louis XV die Renversement des Alliances
pp. 137-9.
58 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 383.

252 HENRY FOX ch.
amusement or consternation was the chief emotion
of his audience, but had the noble lord displayed
as much courage as he won notoriety, the pusiUani-
mous Ministers might perhaps have taken him
seriously. The intended mover may or may not
have been actuated by the rejection of his applica
tion for the Stole in December ®® ; and no doubt
the act was disrespectful and unprecedented ; but
it certainly can be asserted with some justice that
the King had shown a marked lack of regard for
his realm when he vetoed the wishes of the
Cabinet, and his Parliament had a right to tell
him so.
Poulett seems to have been intimate with Fox,®°
whom he told of the dire invectives he had in
store for His Majesty, and Hardwicke thought the
Secretary-at-War should inform the King of the
details of his coming humiliation.®^ But Fox had
a better way of serving his Sovereign. When the
appointed day arrived, Poulett kept the Lords
waiting a fuU half-hour whUe he whispered
mysteriously to some of his coUeagues, untU he
finally declared that he ' had nothing to trouble
them with '.®^ Fox had evidently persuaded him to
abandon his intention, and wrote to Newcastle the
59 Newcastle to Poulett, January 2, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32852, f. 39.
60 Poulett was probably one of Fox's numerous dependents.
61 Hardwicke to Newcastle, AprU 12, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32854, f. 99.
62 Rigby to Bedford, April 17, 1755 : Bedford Corres.
II. 160.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 253
same day that the ' measure was at an end '.®8 The
Earl meanwhile, deeply regretting his impetuosity,
wrote to Fox and Lady Yarmouth entreating
them to present his apologies to the King.®*
But, perhaps tormented for his cowardice, or
hopeless of receding with dignity, Poulett presently
changed his mind,®® and the motion was actuaUy
made a few days before the King's departure. It is
needless to add that he won no support from his
hearers, and Chesterfield, after censuring the im
propriety, moved and carried an adjournment.®®
Thus ended Lord Poulett' s career in history.
Two days later Parliament was prorogued. It
had been, since the beginning of the winter holi
days, a comparatively uneventful session; and
Newcastle had cause to look back upon it with
considerable satisfaction, in that the precious
anxieties of his diplomatic soul had suffered no
unpleasant digression. Chesterfield had observed
to a friend that Fox had ' evidently the lead
there ',®' and it was quite true that the latter had
practically been Leader in all but name. Still the
63 Fox to Newcastle, AprU 17, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32854, f . 137.
It was obviously against the interest of Fox and his party to
prevent the King's departure.
6"! Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 384.
65 Fox wrote the information to Halifax, who communicated
it to Newcastle. — Hahfax to Newcastle, April 19, 1755 : Add.
MSS., 32854, f. 192.
66 Walpole to Bentley, May 6, 1755 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 304.
6' Chesterfield to DayroUes, February 4, 1755 : Correspondence
of Chesterfield, III. 1119.

254 HENRY FOX ch.
exercise of his fidelity had not been overtaxed, and
Pitt had not forced him into unpleasant problems
of discrimination.
The dispute over the provisions for a regency
wiU claim our attention later. The counciUors who
usuaUy met were Cumberland, GranviUe and, less
frequently. Fox, Anson, Robinson, Newcastle and
Hardwicke. Grave doubts were entertained as
to whether the first three would co-operate with
the others,®® for Fox was becoming intimate with
GranviUe, and the triumph of that element in the
past autumn was not forgotten. But this was
the least of His Majesty's cares, and on the 28th the
King took his departure for Hanover, accompanied
by Secretary Holdernesse and, as usual. Lady
Yarmouth. The Sovereign, having arrived in his beloved
Electorate, turned every thought to its defence in
event of future war, while Holdernesse, calculated
by nature to become the slave of any one who
pointed the way, energeticaUy seconded his master
by scattering despatches broadcast and receiving
envoys of petty principalities. In June the
Hessians were definitely secured by treaty, and
the Elector of Hanover was evidently meditating
an impenetrable hedge of buffer states, of which
Bavaria should become one and Saxony another.®®
68 Harris, III. 23.
69 Austria was, of course, nominaUy included in any con
templated system. Mr. Ward points out — what indeed seems
quite obvious — that the chief fiaw in any such design would

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 255
Even the Duke of Brunswick was eagerly courted,
though his dominions were not great and his
sympathies were likely to be Prussian.'®
For a time the treaty-makers at home, up- \
holders of the same policy, on a greater scale, with
a greater exchequer, were content to let the King
amuse himself ; but when at last it became obvious
that the electoral funds were insufficient to appease
the ancient greed of German potentates, and that
help was therefore expected from His Majesty's
kingdom, the Duke of Newcastle began to fear for
his prospects in Parliament.'^ The ' plan ' sub
mitted by Holdernesse would cost — according to
the Duke's estimate — nearly two miUion pounds,'^
and the ChanceUor considered such extravagance
unjustifiable.'® Cumberland, for his part, was
opposed to any continental ' plan ' and declared
a war in Europe during that year impracticable.'*
Nevertheless letters continued to besiege the
Ministry with requests for assistance, and when
finally the First Lord's remonstrance only met with
be the sundry and varied objects pursued by the different
aUies concerned. Great Britain and Hanover, p. 147.
''o Charles, Duke of Brunswicke-Wolfenbiittel, had married
the sister of Frederick the Great.
'1 Newcastle to Holdernesse, ' entre-nous ' , Svly 11, 1755:
Add. MSS., 32857, f. 180.
'2 Newcastle to Holdernesse, July 18, 1755 : ibid., f. 159.
Excluding ' extraordinaries ' he estimated the expense as
£1,400,000.— Newcastle to Hardwicke, July 13, 1755 : ibid. 82.
¦^8 Hardwicke to Newcastle, July 14, 1755: ibid., f. 91.
'^ Newcastle to Holdernesse, July 18, 1755 (second letter) :
ibid., f . 182.

256 HENRY FOX ch.
fresh demands,'® the latter decided that his royal
master must be silenced forthwith. An important
meeting of the inner clique was held on the 30th of
July to discuss the King's appeal, and reply was
sent immediately to Holdernesse that ' aU proper
assistance should be given for the defence of His
Majesty's dominions if now attacked, which assis
tance should be confined singly to that act ' ; but
' any subsidiary treaties to be made for this purpose
should be entered into by the King as Elector ' ;
although (they wrote) he might guarantee his
assistance as King, if the princes in question should
be attacked on his account. As for the expense
entailed, His Majesty should submit an estimate
to the Council and they would do what they could
in the way of obtaining assistance from Par
liament."
/ The minute, most evidently inspired by the Duke
of Newcastle, showed a marked fear of exciting
the nation by another system of subsidies, and
there was also perhaps an underlying dread of the
Cumberlands, whose policy was to limit the war
strictly to the colonies and the sea. Cumber
land himself had been conspicuously absent from
the meeting," although it had been decided to
'5 Holdernesse to Newcastle, July 23, 1755 : ibid., f . 308.
¦^6 Minute to be laid before the King. JiUy 30, 1755 : ibid.,
f. 489. '' Cumberland's absence is certaioly to be regarded as
strange. Possibly he purposely kept out of aU discussions of
German affairs, in order — by allowing the Duke a monopoly
in this one department of pohcy — to give his opponents a

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 257
admit GranvUle; and it was he, the First Lord
assured Holdernesse, who had insisted upon the
insertion urging the King's return.'® The old
statesman was fuUy aware that neither mUitary
power nor diplomacy could exert a free hand whUe
the Sovereign of England was encircled by con
tinental powers.
While the Duke of Newcastle's mind was the
scene of an anxious struggle between, on the one
hand, a desire to render Hanover safe, and make
himself and his Government play a great role on
the Continent, and, on the other, a fear of the
consequences at home when no Pelham lived to
protect him against the possible hostility of Parlia
ment, a far more pressing problem demanded
the attention of the many-sided Ministry. To
France, more than to any other power, the Peace
of Aix-la-ChapeUe had proved of little more value
than an armistice. Difficulties — especially in
America — which were consequent on the vague
ness of the Treaty of Utrecht, had multiplied
in the years that followed that settlement ; yet
little disposition had been shown to study the
situation in its essentials, and the French and
English colonists were forced into the habit of
thinking and acting for themselves. The neglect
had been due at first to the lethargy which a long
certain interest in letting him have a free rein in the problem
of deaUng with France and the outbreak of naval hostUities.
'8 Newcastle to Holdernesse (' entre nous') August 1, 1755:
Add MSS., 32857, f. 506.
1186 T,

258 HENRY FOX ch.
period of peace had infused, and later (so far as
England was concerned) to the haphazard policy
of the PeUiam Administration in foreign affairs.
When a man reaUy did appear in the Enghsh
Ministry who realized the importance of the
American problem,'® he found such a total lack of
sympathy with his plans, that we can hardly deem
it strange that the Treaty in 1748 should have left
the boundaries more than ever in dispute ; and
meanwhile the situation had been so aggravated
by neglect that a permanent and definitive settle
ment must appear to us weUnigh impossible.
Hence the abortive industry of a boundary com
mission, and hence the utter divergence in the views
which the two courts entertained of their rights.
The Cumberland Party, as we have seen, had
gained in influence by espousing a policy of action.
They made no pretence of their ability to arrange
matters by diplomacy, and they are rightly sus
pected of aiming at a settlement by force. Perhaps
they regarded war as inevitable ; at aU events they
harboured no scruples against endangering the
peace, and the triumph of the party in October
1754 has already been described. If ambassadors
could not, or would not, adjust the difficulties,
vigorous action — even at that late date — was
hardly more to be reprehended than sheer neglect.
But the policy of arming in time of peace was
¦^9 The Duke of Bedford's scheme for the expulsion of the
French from Canada during the late war has already been
mentioned.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 259
a dangerous one — especially when blood had been
already shed in the forests of Pennsylvania — and
time was to show that one step led only too easUy
to another, until retrocession with dignity was
impossible. Meanwhile the Government of Louis XV pre
served an indolence and irresolution that no
amount of danger seemed likely to shake. No
ulcer like the Cumberland Party in England needed
probing for the sake of peace ; and the France of
1754 was not the France of Louis XIV, or even of
the Regent Orleans. If indeed the Court of Ver
sailles shared the iniquitous ignorance of their
rivals across the Channel, it was equally true that
they had not the means for giving blow for blow 8®
if England should suddenly choose to support
her colonists or precipitate a war. The French
successes in India had been due rather to the
cleverness of her agents sent thither than to
the efficiency of the military strength expended,
and English neglect, and that alone, had saved
France serious losses in America. Her fleets, once
the glorious defenders of the Mediterranean, had
dwindled to a few helpless squadrons, while acute
financial depression made a thorough renovation
impossible. Moreover, in a case where a strong
navy was the only feasible remedy, the French had
to face the inevitable results of their iU-conceived
80 France, for example, had only 45 men-of-war to cope with
England's 89. — Lacour-Gayet, La Marine militaire de la
France sous Louis XV, p. 243.
R2

260 HENRY FOX ch.
policy of making the maritime strength whoUy
subordinate to, and dependent upon the army.8^
For these reasons the Court of Versailles had over
looked many causes for provocation, and the Due
de Mirepoix, the ambassador to London, was
thoroughly imbued with the desire of maintaining
peace at any cost.
The attitude of the English Ministry is somewhat
difficult to define. The British Ambassador at
Paris, the Earl of Albemarle, was a dissolute and
reputedly incompetent man; but he enjoyed great
popularity at the French Court, and his sudden
death, in December 1754, was deeply regretted.
If he is open to criticism for not doing more to
reconcile the two countries, it would neverthe
less be more just to blame the half-hearted efforts
of his superiors at home — men who, as Mirepoix
declared, were dans la disposition de ne considerer
que les convenances.^^ Cumberland was, of course,
unshaken in his determination to provoke a war,
while Fox, who was equaUy outspoken in his
hostility to the Court of VersaiUes, was probably
responsible for an order sent to the Admiralty,
January 20, to equip seventeen ships of the line
' without loss of time '.®® But in Robinson we find
81 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 288.
82 Waddington, Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances,
p. 75.
88 Robinson to the Lords of the Admiralty, January 20, 1755,
Adm. sec, in-ldters, 4120, Pub. Rec. Off. M. Waddington
credits Fox with having signed the order, but I confess I have
been unable to find any despatch except the above.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 261
little more than the subservience expected of him ;
while the correspondence of his mentor, the Duke
of Newcastle, forces one to believe that he had
neither settled convictions nor a definite policy. It
was consequently not difficult for the more positive
views of Fox and GranviUe to gain ground.
The first meeting of the Cabinet to discuss these
delicate questions took place apparently on
January 21,®* although our only hint of its pro
ceedings is Mirepoix's information that Fox
assumed an attitude of hostility to Newcastle.
Whatever may have been the exact policy Fox
was seeking to enforce, the Secretary-at-War was
certainly regarded by Mirepoix both as the leading
advocate of a strong and active navy and as the
most inveterate enemy of France in the English
Cabinet. Pursuant to these convictions, the French
Ambassador tried to impress Newcastle with the
danger of having so violent an associate ; and
contended that much trouble might be averted by
securing the dismissal of the man France most
distrusted. For obvious reasons Newcastle was
far from agreeing to such an idea ; ®® while Mire
poix, in no wise reassured when Fox assumed
a more pacific attitude, placed all his hopes in
GranviUe as the balance-wheel of the Cabinet.®®
8* We find the arrangements for the meeting in a letter from
Newcastle to Holdernesse, dated January 19, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32852, f. 188.
85 Mirepoix to Rouille, January 23, 1755 : Archives des
Affaires Etrangeres, Angleterre, t. 438, f. 35.
86 Mirepoix to RouiUe, January 30, 1755: ibid., f. 70.

262 HENRY FOX ch.
Meanwhile, Mirepoix having (at his own request)
received full powers to treat, a very select gather
ing — consisting only of Newcastle and his three
principal supporters — met on February 7, and
empowered Robinson to enter into negotiations
with him, the Secretary being instructed to propose
the immediate evacuation of the districts upon
the Ohio and the demolition of aU forts and settle
ments therein.®' Such might weU have constituted
an excellent basis for a complete settlement, for
Mirepoix had aheady been authorized to propose
an armistice of two years (that disputes might be
investigated) ,88 and Newcastle was prepared to
accept this in principle.8® But unfortunately the
French Ambassador was hampered by his com
pulsion to refer aU matters to Rouille, his superior ;
and the English Cabinet, graduaUy becoming
dominated by Cumberland counsels, was quick to
assume an attitude of uncompromising obduracy.
Dreading, perhaps, the import of this hmited
gathering of the friends of peace, Cumberland
himself wrote to Newcastle on the 11th, urgently
8' Minute of meeting, Newcastle House, February 7, 1755 ;
present : Newcastle, Hardwicke, Holdernesse, and Robinson :
Add. MSS., 32996, f. 25.
88 RouiUe to Mirepoix, February 3, 1755, Waddington, p. 76.
89 Newcastle does not specify the length of time he would
be wiUing to consider, apparently leaving the matter to be
determined at a meeting of the Concilidbulum. ' That there
should be a suspension of arms for (blank) months ' is the way
he expresses himself. — Memorandum, Powis House, February 9,
1755 : Add. MSS., 32996, f. 27.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 263
begging him ' not to neglect the little time that is
left for preparation ', ' as no natural enemy ought
to be trusted.' ®® Possibly this moved the First
Lord to repent his concUiatory attitude ; for
another meeting was held on the 20th — this time
GranviUe was present — and the result was a precise
and rather sweeping elaboration of England's
claims in America, designed to form the basis of
the present negotiation.®^
One is certainly at a loss to find any inteUigible
policy on the part of Newcastle. The only point
which seems clear is that in his heart he wanted
peace, and — in January at least — had believed
that hostilities would be averted.®^ Whether he
cherished the fear that to wage a great war success
fuUy would be beyond his administrative powers is
difficult to conjecture. But having, apparently,
no settled convictions, he feU an easy prey to the
full tide of Cumberland determination. One party
knew perfectly what it wanted, and the more the
First Lord vacillated, the more surely the Cumber-
lands gained ground. In vain Mirepoix pleaded the
programme which the lethargy of his court
dictated ; Fox and Cumberland had not sent
Braddock to America for the purpose of preventing
a rupture, and the Government now insisted upon
90 Cumberland to Newcastle, February 11, 1755 : Add.MSS.,
32852, f. 420.
91 Minute of meeting, WhitehaU, February 20, 1755 : Add.
MSS., 32996, f. 34.
92 Newcastle to Keene, January 27, 1755: Add. MSS.,
32853, f. 277.

264 HENRY FOX ch.
an immediate and definitive settlement. Un
happily they scorned to make concessions, and
peace without concessions was hopeless. And so,
when Mirepoix brought forward, in addition to
the plan of an armistice, a proposal very simUar
to that which had been concerted in the meeting
of February 7th,®® the Cabinet replied by a contre-
projet, March 7, which would have taken away terri
tory long occupied by the French, practicaUy driven
their lines back to the Wabash and St. Lawrence
and endangered their communications with the
islands of St. John and Cape Breton.®* No conces
sion worth mentioning was offered in return, and
Mirepoix, hitherto inclined to be sanguine, could
readUy divine that such a verdict would never be
accepted by his court.
It is an evidence of the irony of history that great
events often turn on a momentary delay. En
couraged by an assurance of Newcastle — probably
behind the backs of his coUeagues — that the contre-
projet was not an ultimatum,®® Mirepoix held
93 A synopsis of the French proposals is given in Waddington,
p. 79. The evacuation of the Ohio country and the destruction
of the several forts under discussion would have meant
reciprocal concession, while the addition of an armistice of two
years might be regarded as necessary for the success of the
measure. 9* Ibid., pp. 79-80. These proposals did not materiaUy
differ from the resolutions of February 20, except in their
proposed determination of the territory assigned to the five
nations and the consequent restriction of the French to the
land north of the St. Lawrence.
95 Ibid., p. 84.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 265
several conferences with Robinson, and so far
succeeded in whittling down the English demands
as to gain for the moment a great diplomatic
victory.®® In a letter which scarcely shows that he
reaUy grasped the situation, Robinson endeavoured
to assure Newcastle that he had done his best in
the way of a compromise, and the treaty was to
be ' definitive ' — which he seemed to regard as his
particular title to commendation.®' But unfortu
nately no compromise, however prudent, could be
signed by the Ambassador without the authoriza
tion of his court ; and the pacific intriguing of New
castle and Robinson was very soon discountenanced
at a meeting of the Cabinet. If Mirepoix is correct
— and there is reason to believe him — it was Gran
viUe whose clever manoeuvres forced adjournment
of the question.®® When word arrived from
Rouille, as irresolute as usual, the Cabinet felt no
longer any compulsion to wear the mask. At a
meeting on April 3 the ' inner clique ' reverted
96 For the terms of the arrangements see ibid., pp. 84^5 ;
cf. Sir Thomas Robinson's Three Points of Accommodation,
dated March 26, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32996, f . 61.
9' Robinson to Newcastle, March 22, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32853, f. 437.
98 It appears that when the Cabinet seemed incUned to
commit themselves to an acceptance of Mirepoix's compromise
proposals, GranvUle suggested that they ought not to proceed
to anything new until the oflScial reply to the contre-projet had
been received. It was a clever appeal to Newcastle's love of
the punctUious, and it succeeded. — Mirepoix to Rouille, March
28, 1755, Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Anglderre, t. 438,
f. 339.

266 HENRY FOX ch.
definitely to the position which it had taken when
it shaped the contre-projet.^^ Thus ended — in-
gloriously — the Mirepoix-Robinson compromise ;
and thus perished the last chance of a peaceful
settlement between the two countries.
Of the part which Fox played in shaping the
course of events there is little evidence as yet on
record. Neither he nor Cumberland had a vote
in the inner councils, and the work of a political
intriguer is seldom visible to the historian. But
whatever his actual influence, the Cabinet's policy
was his ; and if we may now imagine that
the scene has suddenly shifted from the Cabinet
to the Commons — the ministerial design was very
soon to cast its shadow. Before Mirepoix had
received the dilatory response of his senseless
court — in fact only three days after Robinson
announced his work — the King addressed Parlia-
y-'ment in a spirit very different from that of the
hopeful little compromise. After assuring the
Houses (March 25) of the vigorous support which
would be given British pretensions in America, he
was rewarded the following day by a vote of a
miUion on credit — a measure which we are told
had been concerted with Fox's approval.^®® Even
Bedford played a rdle in the triumph of his
99 Minute of meeting, April 3, 1755: Add. MSS., 32996, f. 69.
The Cabinet took the occasion to express its dissatisfaction
with the extract from Rouille's letter of March 27, which
Mirepoix had communicated to it.
100 West to Newcastle, March 22, 1754 : Add. MSS., 32853,
f . 439.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 267
party, when he bitterly assaUed the ' inadvertency
of the Ministers \^°^
Mirepoix had made the deduction — even before
his ' affair ' with Robinson — that Newcastle's
power was waning and a revolution in politics was
imminent."^ It was GranviUe (so he reported in
April), who had now the complete ascendancy ;
and GranviUe, he continued to feel, was the truest
friend of peace. ^°8 Indeed it should rank among the
Lord President's greatest triumphs in diplomacy
that he was able so long to delude the Ambassador
with enigmatical assurances.^®* Not, in fact, untU
the official notification was handed him, announcing
the English Government's adhesion to the contre-
projet, did the Frenchman begin to realize how
thoroughly the old statesman had duped him."®
101 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, 1 . 382. Mirepoix mentions
Fox, Bedford and Sandwich among the men responsible for
rousing the war-spirit of the nation. — Mirepoix to RouiUe,
April 25, 1755.
102 Mirepoix to Rouille, March 10, 1755 : Archives des Affaires
Etrangeres, Anglderre, t. 438, f. 270.
103 ]y[irepoix to RouiUe, April 6, 1755 : Archives des Affaires
Etrangeres, Angleterre, t. 438, f. 362.
104 Mirepoix seemed much in the dark as to GranviUe's
meaning when the latter told him that some things could be
done tacitly though not agreed upon openly. At another
audience the Lord President assured him that England would
not begin any hostihties. Whatever his grasp — or lack of it —
Mirepoix regarded such remarks as a ' half -overture of accom
modation'. — Mirepoix to RouUle, April 10, 1755 : Archives des
Affaires Etrangires, Anglderre, t. 438, f. 383.
105 Mirepoix then held GranviUe responsible not only for this
notification (in wliich suspicion he was probably correct) but

268 HENRY FOX ch.
But if Mirepoix was disiUusioned, he was not the
only victim ; for the power-loving Newcastle was
foundering in the current. When a meeting of the
older statesmen was held to discuss the regency
question, the redoubtable Duke of Devonshire
insisted that Cumberland shoiUd be made ' sole
regent '. Newcastle, who saw the danger, was said
to be distracted. To exclude so great a personage
was virtually impossible ; yet how could he aUow
himself a partner in the leadership ? In the end,
despite Devonshire's protests, he succeeded in
forcing a compromise : His Royal Highness to be
the leading member of a councU of regency, that is,
the Cabinet ex officio. ^'^^ But Cumberland's very
admission was a staggering blow to the peace,
and Mirepoix was justified now in urging his own
recaU.1®' We can hardly doubt that France, had she pos
sessed any other ruler, would have deliberately
even for having instigated the King's trip to Hanover and the
Duke of Cumberland's appointment to the headship of the
Regency. GranviUe's object, Mirepoix decided, was to take
affairs completely out of the hands of Newcastle. As for his
Lordship's pretences of desiring peace, the Ambassador was
wholly unable to understand them or penetrate his purpose. —
Mirepoix to RouiUe, May 1, 1755 : Archives des Affaires Etran
geres, Angleterre, t. 439, f. 64.
106 Authorities for this episode : Doddington, Diary, May 27,
1755 ; Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 35 ; Walpole, Memoirs of
George II, I. 384.
107 Mirepoix mentioned particularly the fact that Lord
Hertford, who had been designated to succeed Albemarle, did
not dream of departing to his new post. — Waddington, p. 93.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 269
unmasked her enemy, and been ready to accept the
chaUenge. But the Government of Louis XV
appeared to want peace at any price ; and so the
negotiations were continued, even when failure was
inevitable. There is little doubt that the English
Cabinet — whatever the motives of individuals —
was now resolved upon war. Newcastle, never
persistently staunch to a losing cause, had soon
found himself borne along by the tide ; and
GranviUe, as we have seen, had held the keys to
the situation. We can readily gauge the full extent
of the latter's studied duplicity when we now con
sider the plot which had long been operating
against the peace. Long before the course of
diplomacy had reached the phrase of ultimata —
in fact, whUe Mirepoix and Robinson were still
working hard upon their compromise — the inner
circle of the Cabinet met to frame a startling
policy. It was resolved at two small meetings ^®8 —
on March 18 and 24 — that measures should be taken
to intercept any French fleet which should be
bound for North America for the purpose of landing
troops. The resolution was confirmed by a full
Cabinet on April 10, and the command of the
expedition was assigned to Admiral Boscawen.
The extraordinary scheme may or may not
have emanated from the brain of GranviUe. The
design has been attributed to the Cumberlands on
the ground that they believed a war should be
108 The minutes of these meetings are given in full in
Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, I. 364.

270 HENRY FOX ch.
precipitated in the summer, when by reason of the
fishing industry the fleets of France were weak in
/itaen."® But such a policy meant the beginning
of a new phase in the struggle ; for hitherto
expeditions had been sent for no other purpose
(at least nominaUy) than that of defence. ^^® It
was, in fact, as though France had endeavoured
to stop Braddock while yet on the high seas.
But this was not the only peculiar feature
of the plot. When Mirepoix's suspicions were
aroused by a rumour that such a policy was
intended, Newcastle, Robinson and Granville
united in assuring him that they were entirely
unfounded.^" It was CromweU's coup of 1655,
109 Von RuviUe, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, 1. 364.
110 It has sometimes been urged by apologists of the Boscawen
affair that to have endeavoured to wrest from the enemy the
means of organizing hostilities was virtuaUy an act of defence.
However this argument may be regarded — and the writer
himself feels that the integrity of international relations would
be hard to preserve under such conditions — it certainly has
no place in the letters of Newcastle. On July 1, for example,
we find him writing : ' We had confined all our offensive
measures to America.'— Add. MSS., 32856, f. 433. Clearly
the standpoint of the British Cabinet was entirely one of
expediency. They thought that by striking a severe blow
under cover of the ensuing negotiations, so distinct an advan
tage would be given them that France would feel helpless to
defend her possessions in America. Great Britain would then
be in a position to dictate terms.
Ill Waddington, p. 97 ; Memorandum, dated July 30, 1755 :
Add. MSS., 33020, f. 374. A further touch of reaUsm is added
to the affair by the fact that the Ministers practised some of
their deception while dining with Mirepoix as the latter's
guests.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 271
decked in the polished cynicism of the eighteenth
century. Once the step was taken, the Cabinet never
faltered. On the 17th the smaller body met again
to raise the number of Boscawen' s ships from
seven to ten ; "^ and on the 23rd orders were sent
Admiral Hawke to ' use great despatch ' in getting
another squadron in readiness for action. "8 Four
days later Boscawen sailed away on his momentous
voyage ; and the next day commenced — with the
King's departure for Hanover — the regime of the
Council of Regency. From now on the Duke of
Cumberland was the active leader of the War
Party. Hitherto we may suppose that Fox and Gran
ville had been the principal champions of action.
But now the leader of the party, assisted by
Marlborough and the two just mentioned, had
every chance of overriding the more peaceable
members of the board. In the meantime the settled
programme was vigorously enforced. Three days
after the French fleet sailed unsuspiciously from
Brest the Council took the resolution of sending
more vessels to reinforce Boscawen."* About a
fortnight later inteUigence arrived that the latter
112 Not including one frigate also added. — Minute of meeting,
Newcastle House, April 17, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32996, f. 77.
118 The Admiralty to Hawke, April 23, 1755 : Adm. sec,
out-letters. Pub. Rec. Off.
n* Admiral Holburne was sent with six ships of the Une
and one frigate. — Minute of meeting, Newcastle House, May 8,
1765 : Add. MSS., 32996, f. 97.

272 HENRY FOX ch.
had been outmanoeuvred and defeated ; "® but
as the report was unconfirmed, the CouncU con
tinued to put their trust in diplomacy and a capable
admiral. That Newcastle felt any qualms of conscience
in letting himself be made the pawn of the War
Party in this double game is certaiiUy not evident
from his letters. But the possible effect of the
inevitable awakening upon the different courts of
Europe was naturaUy bound to disquiet a Minister
who realized that England was without an effective
aUy. Thus, when Mirepoix, discouraged by Cum
berland's elevation, prophesied a general war as
certain,^^® the Duke was not a little frightened by
a threat which served to confirm the prediction
of Kaunitz, communicated from Vienna.^" Indeed
the fact that England was whoUy unprepared for
such an emergency gives us ample cause to reflect
both on the reckless obstinacy of the War Party
and on the vacillating temper "8 of the man who
115 Secret intelligence from Paris, May 17, 1755 : Add.
MSS., 32855, f. 302.
116 Newcastle to Keene, April 28, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32854,
f. 304.
11' Keith to Holdernesse, March 24, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32853, f. 466.
118 It is interesting, in view of Newcastle's attitude at this
time, to read some sentiments he expressed during the foUowing
autumn. ' The notion,' he writes, ' of obUging France to
confine the war to the sea and to America I always thought
difficult if not impracticable, and might, as it certainly wiU,
prove dangerous to the country at last, by forcing them in
a manner to give their whole attention to their marines, which

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 273
best knew the situation on the Continent. What
it all might lead to no one of the CouncU could
guess. In their own minds they had solved the '
question of whether the struggle in America could
be kept distinct from the affairs of Europe. It
only remained to be seen whether any such rigid
limitation were possible.
To Fox, who looked forward to a powerful navy,
and was characteristicaUy heedless of methods and
consequences, any question of strategy must only
have appeared tedious. But the Newcastles must
reason — if only in trifles ; and the question which
now taxed the inteUigence of the CouncU was
what to do with Hawke and his squadron of
seventeen vessels. Here at Spithead was the force
which the Council considered potentially the
gravest danger to the peace.
Newcastle was as usual in an agony of dilemma.
Some instructions must be determined if Hawke
were to be sent out, but what should he do in the
event of his meeting the French ? If an attack
should be made in home waters without previous
declaration of war, and whUe a negotiation was still
pending, the charge of a ' breach of faith ' would
certainly be made against England, and a general
war might ensue, which would find the Govern
ment unprepared. Yet, on the other hand,
Boscawen's orders were of such a nature as would
they actuaUy do ; and are, or I am afraid very soon wiU be,
superior to us at sea.' — Newcastle to Lyttelton, November 1,
1755 : Add. MSS., 32860, f . 273.
use q

274 HENRY FOX ch.
in themselves bring on a war — a view which, we
might remark, would have been wiser had it been
held earlier. Then came the strange idea that
if the French merchant-fleet returning from the
West Indies should be intercepted and captured,
' they would strike such a blow at first upon their
trade as would make the whole kingdom of France
cry out against war.' ^^® AU this was submitted to
the ChanceUor for criticism.
Hardwicke thought at first of consulting Devon
shire on the perplexing problem, but the latter
having conveyed the suspicion that he was averse
to giving an endorsement of a programme aheady
determined, the ChanceUor deemed it wiser to talk
with Anson than with one of the Cumberlands.^^®
In the opinion of the First Lord of the Admiralty,
Hawke's instructions might be ' innocent and infer
no mischief '. Such a view, of course, made no
provision against emergencies ; but the ChanceUor
could now excuse himself from expressing any
definite opinion. Fortunately Anson told him the
fleet would not be ready to saU for a fortnight ;
119 It further occurred to the Duke that the nation would
¦demand some return for the outlay in equipping the fleet.
Plainly his mind was divided between the fear of public
sentiment on the one hand, and dread of the Government's
3)oUcy on the other, while no less clearly was betrayed his
anxiety on what Granville might say and do on the whole
proposition. — Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 8, 1755: Add.
MSS., 32855, f. 442.
120 Newcastle had asked the ChanceUor to consult Robinson,
¦Grafton, Devonshire and Anson, but the first two proved to
,be out of town. — Ibid.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 275
and this further inducement to procrastinate was
all that Hardwicke needed.^^^
A meeting of the Council was held on June 9
in Cumberland's apartments, and Anson, who had
agreed that something must be done, carried the
proposal that the ships should sail ' to exercise
their men '. Meanwhile further delay was possible
from the plea of submitting aU resolutions to
Hanover, and Newcastle eagerly sheltered him
self under the knowledge that the King had always
the last word.^^^ On the 28th the message arrived
that His Majesty accepted Anson's proposal ; ^'^^
but the number of questions he put to the Council ^^*
seems to show that he felt somewhat mystified in
these matters, and the Secretary-at-War went so
far as to allege that Newcastle himself framed the
message. ^^®
Meanwhile Cumberland had caUed another meet-
121 Hardwicke's reply to the First Lord was worded with
much care, and avoided giving any advice on the subject. It
would hardly do, he said, for the fleet to remain at Spithead
all summer, which ' wiU amount to a resolution to do nothing
at all '. Yet there would also be objections if it went out
and likewise did nothing — though unforeseen events might be
aUeged as an excuse. — Hardwicke to Newcastle, June 8, 1755:
ibid., f. 442.
122 Newcastle to Holdernesse, June 13, 1755, and to
Hardwicke, June 28, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32855, f . 479 ; 32856,
f. 329.
128 Holdernesse to Newcastle, June 22, 1755 : ibid., f. 93.
124 Holdernesse to Robinson, June 22, 1755: ibid., f. 99.
125 Doddington, Diary, July 21, 1755. False as was the
assertion, it shows plainly the distrust and contempt with
which the War Party regarded the First Lord.
S2

276 HENRY FOX ch.
ing, and Newcastle, who arranged to meet Hard
wicke beforehand, was plainly in dread of its
import.^^® His terrors were justified. At a meeting
of the leading counciUors on the evening of the
29th His Royal Highness was ' absolutely for
declaring that Hawke should have hostile orders ',
and was also ' much set upon breaking the negotia
tions '. The erratic Lord President observed that
enough had been done already ; while Hardwicke
characteristicaUy advised that ' all should be left
open for future deliberation '. But the violence of
Cumberland was not to be overborne, and in
the end the Council decided as he wished. ^^' To
transmit the proposals to Hanover was the duty of
Newcastle himself ; ' you see the dilemma I am
in,' he declared, ' the D. certainly wishes nothing
but war.' ^^®
But the triumph of the War Party was scarcely
more than momentary ; for Newcastle had the
minute, and he altered it judiciously.^^® The fiUl
126 Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 28, 1755.
12' Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 30, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32856, f. 394.
128 Newcastle to Holdernesse, July 2, 1755 : ibid., 446.
129 Newcastle suggested to Hardwicke the advisabiUty of in
serting ' it may be necessary ' to prefix the resolution regarding
Hawke (ibid., f . 394) ; but in the minute of the meeting, which,
though evidently revised, bore the date June 29, it was
suggested that, should the French reply prove unsatisfactory,
the negotiation should be regarded as severed, and ' if the
negotiation should be absolutely broke off . . ., it may then
be advisable that Sir Edward Hawke should in such case saU
with the fleet now at Spithead, or a sufficient part thereof, and

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 277
CouncU met July 1 ; and the Cumberlands' only
resource was a move in self-defence.^®® In the
minute despatched to the King the CouncU freely
admitted that the nature of Hawke's instructions
should depend upon future circumstances, but if
the next communication from France should not
prove satisfactory, they wished to know if the
King would aUow them to sever the negotiation ;
and finaUy, as the orders to Hawke must largely
depend upon this question, they earnestly desired
His Majesty would be pleased to accord them fuU
powers.^81 It is regrettable that the CouncU had
not made this request before — which might have
prevented much delay. But shifting responsi
bUity was the Newcastles' favourite refuge ; and
even when discretionary powers had arrived, the
ChanceUor expressed his opmion that no action
should be taken. ^8^
One may weU feel that an abrupt severance of
that he should have orders to act hostUely against France ' ;
although the ' nature and extent ' of such orders should
' depend upon events '. — Draft of minute, at H.R.H. the
Duke's apartments, June 29, 1755 : Add. MSS., 35870, f. 247.
Thus the CouncU was once more at a deadlock.
180 The War Party felt, in aU probabUity, that aU efforts
would continue to be useless, if the resolutions of the meeting
must always be sent (through Newcastle's hands) to the King
for endorsement. If, however, the minute taken at a meeting
could be final, they might hope for some definite action.
181 Minute of meeting, WhitehaU, July 1, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32996, f. 160.
182 The ChanceUor advised delay untU the next despatches
from Vienna should arrive. — ^Hardwicke to Newcastle, June 14,
1755: Add. MSS., 32856, f. 91.

278 HENRY FOX ch.
the negotiations, such as Cumberland had desired,
might have materiaUy lessened the coming stigma
of Boscawen's intended aggression. At aU events
Cumberland had not the diplomatic guUe of
GranvUle, and much preferred a frank and open
attitude of hostility.
But before the Council of Regency had seen the
wisdom of ending the negotiations the news reached
London, July 14, that Boscawen's blow had f aUen."®
The affair had indeed yielded little to compensate
for an evident breach of faith — ^for aU but two
of the French vessels had escaped under cover of
a fog ; but the long suspense was over, and France
could see that her rival felt no longer any com
pulsion to respect the peace. On the 22nd Mire
poix received instructions to depart immediately
without taking leave.
The problem of Hawke's instructions should now
have been easily solved. Only complete success
could justify a policy of aggression, and only by
continuing formidable could England sustain her
dignity. Yet now, as truly as before, the New
castles shirked the issue ; and though Hardwicke
timidly suggested that Hawke should be sent out,^®*
Robinson, faithful to his chief, tried in vain to
persuade the Ambassador that Boscawen's act
had been xmauthorized.^®® Such shuffling may
188 Anson to Newcastle, July 14, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32857,
f. 93. 18* Hardwicke to Newcastle, July 14, 1755 : ibid., f. 91.
185 Waddington, p. 104.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 279
well liave disgusted Cumberland, who caUed a
meeting on the foUowing day. though — perhaps
owing to GranviUe's absence — no decision what
ever was taken. ^®® On the 17th a fuU ComicU was
held for the express purpose of deciding what
action should be taken in virtue of the new powers.
It was then that Cumberland, who steadUy
scouted all danger of provoking a war on tlie
Continent, became involved ui an argument with
Newcastle on the subject. But as no agreement
could be reached, the Comicil resolved simply to
send Hawke to Torbay to await fmther instruc
tions, i'"
And yet even Newcastle must have seen that
sooner or later the question must be faced. How
ever firmly he stuck to the notion that the area of
war could be limited, the Cumberland pohcj'^ of
aggression was but claiming its logical resiUts. It
was due perhaps in pait to this irrefutable fact
that he came at last to contemplate a battle
nearer home, though he insisted that the object
must be worthy of the blow.^®® and obviouslv
Boscawon's case had taught them aU a lesson.
Again on the 21st the leaders battled over the
problem, and once again the War Party were
thwarted by a trick. Cumberland was ' in-
'¦'"' NewoAstle to GranviUe. July l'->. 1735 : Add. MSS.,
SJS57. f. HI.
18" Xewoastle to Holdernesse, July IS. 1755 : ibid., f. ISi!.
'•'* Ibid.; Newcastle to Holdernesse (' cntre nous'). July 22.
17.V.: Add. MSS., 32S57, f. 298.

280 HENRY FOX ch.
variably for taking everything of every kind ',
and TU-ged that they should avaU themselves of
every opportunity ; GranviUe, on the other hand,
would leave aU trade unharmed, and ' not (as he
expressed it) vex yoiu" neighbours for a httle muck ' ;
whUe Newcastle, as usual, was trying to find some
' middle way '.^®® Doubtless disagreement in the
ranks of his opponents had afforded the Duke some
comfort, and in the end he yielded to GranviUe,
though not without a struggle. Hawke was thus
to be aUowed to take any men-of-war but not to
attack merchant vessels ; ^*° and Anson had obhged
the War Party by ordering the Admiral to get his
fleet in readiness ' with aU possible despatch '.^*^
The Cumberlands had won a victory — though, as
wUl appear, an illusory one.
In the course of a discussion with Fox and
Marlborough after the meeting, the First Lord
dropped the suggestion that Hawke himself might
best decide whether and when to attack the enemy.
Fox must have laughed, if it were he who answered,
' Hawke is too wise a man to do anything at aU,
which others, when done, are to pronounce he
ought to be hanged for.' "^
But httle did it profit Fox and Marlborough
189 Quoted from a letter of Newcastle to Holdernesse,
July 18, 1755 ; Doddington, Diary, July 21, 1755.
Ko Newcastle to Holdernesse (' private '), July 22. 1755 :
ibid., f. 295.
1*1 The Admiralty to Hawke, July 21, 1755, Adm. sec.,
out-letters. Pub. Rec. Off.
1*2 Doddington, Diary, July 21, 1755.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 281
if they laughed at the First Lord's vagaries ; ^*8
for Newcastle's sateUites were carefuUy trained.
Next morning Anson begged for reconsideration,
suggesting that the instructions should be so
changed as to apply only to ships of the line.^**
A meeting of the ' select members of the Regency '
(as Fox put it) was held apparently on the 22nd,
and the instructions were then found to have been
altered. How deeply the Cumberlands resented
this may be judged from Fox's indignant recital ;
whUe Cumberland showed his own wrath when
he vented his feelings to his party. It was not,
in fact, until Newcastle had (equivocaUy) insisted
that the changes were conformable to His Majesty's
wishes that the leader of the War Party finaUy
yielded. When the instructions came up for
ratification by the fuU CouncU, Fox asked Anson
pointedly if there were not some objections to
them. ' Yes ', admitted the Admiral, ' a hundred ;
but it pleases those at the upper end of the table,
and wUl signify nothing, for the French will
declare war, if they have not done it already.' "®
Three times had the First Lord outmanoeuvred
his enemies ; and the aUusion to the King was the
cleverest of his tactics. And yet, in spite of aU,
the Cumberland perseverance had largely been
repaid ; and surely it would not be long before
1*8 See Doddington, Diary, July 21, 1755.
!*• Newcastle to Holdernesse, Jidy 22, 1755 (' enlre nous ').
1^ Doddington, Diary, August 18, 1755 ; Newcastle to
Holdernesse (' erUre rums'), July 22, 1755.

282 HENRY FOX ch.
men ceased to take him seriously. Fox, for his
part, was quick to repent the impulse which had
led him to sign the new orders, and strongly
protested to Newcastle against the ' absurdity '
(as he expressed it) of first beginning a war, and
then taking no notice of the weapons that were
to be used against you. The Duke of Marl
borough hkewise remonstrated ; and Cumberland
himself was soon seconding his friends."® In fact.
Fox gives us to understand that Newcastle was so
peevish that he ' would hardly speak to His Royal
Highness '."' However this may be, he was
certainly inflexible. Had not the orders been
limited, he wrote to Hanover, the war would
have begun in the Channel within forty-eight
hours."® But the War Party, after precipitating a rupture
with France, was not to be beaten in a comparative
trifle. Though failing again to make his protests
successful,"^ His Royal Highness had stiU the
chance of calling a meeting, and proclaiming his
opinions to others besides Newcastle. And so, on
the very day (August 5) of his latest reverse, he
notified to Anson (who was dining at HoUand
House) a meeting to take place on that evening ;
and the result, as we might naturally suppose, was
1*6 Newcastle to Holdernesse, August 6, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32858, f. 3 ; Doddington, Diary, August 18, 1755.
14' Ibid., August 3, 1755.
1*8 Newcastle to Holdernesse (' private '), July 22, 1755.
1*9 Doddington, Diary, August 18, 1755.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 283
an unlimited instruction to Hawke. ^®° Next day
a full Council endorsed the decision. ^®^ At last the
War Party had triumphed.
Robinson wrote to Hanover that the instructions
now given to Hawke were tantamount to a declara
tion of war.^®^ Yet, as Waldegrave keenly ex
pressed it, ' either extreme had been better than this
compromise.' ^®® Only as a chance of freebooting
could the policy be justified as profitable. Before
the end of the year 300 trading vessels and 6,000
seamen were taken by the Enghsh fleets.^®*
But somewhat over a fortnight after the struggle
in the Council was ended, that figure who in states
manship and character was nothing if not original,
and of whom old Newcastle felt always a certain
dread, came to a meeting after having ' dined ' (so
Newcastle significantly observes), and could find no
finer sport than to tease the First Lord pointedly on
the part he had played so Ul.^®® It is perhaps a fitting
episode with which to end this foolish controversy.
Great consternation naturaUy took place at the
150 Doddington, Diary, August 6, 1755; Newcastle to
Holdernesse, August 6, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32857, f. 310. New
castle was now afraid that Cumberland would insist upon
extending -these orders to aU His Majesty's fleets, but ap
parently no such suggestion was made.
181 Robinson to Holdernesse, August 6, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32858, f. 1.
1^2 Robinson to Holdernesse, August 6, 1755.
153 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 48.
18* Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p. 285.
165 Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 22, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32858, f. 241. Granville even criticized Cumberland on this
occasion.

284 HENRY FOX ch.
Court of VersaiUes upon the news of Boscawen's
treacherous attack.^®® M. Bussy, who had gone
as envoy to Hanover, found it necessary, of course,
to return — much to the disappointment of New
castle, who had hoped to hire him for information,
though a certain M. Cressener, who had access to
much inner intelhgence of affairs, had aheady
been engaged for similar purposes. Meanwhile,
although diplomatic relations had ceased between
the two courts, the French persisted in their policy
of respecting the peace ; and when a frigate, bound
for South Carolina to land its new governor, was
captured by a French squadron, the Court of
Versailles ordered prompt release of the prize.
Whatever were the motives — and one is tempted
to doubt that righteous indignation was the chief
one — it was clearly determined to fix upon England
the whole odium of this piracy.
While Cumberland and Fox were dominating
the naval policy of the Ministry, it must not be
supposed that Leicester House was digesting its
wrath in meekness or silence. The truth leaked
out at the time the King was leaving for Hanover
that His Majesty intended negotiating a marriage
between his grandson and a princess of Brunswick.
Her Royal Highness, who knew the prospective
156 Secret enclosure from Cressener, July 20, 1755 : Add.MSS.,
32857, f. 365. Newcastle heard that RouUle was proposing
to impugn England before every Court of Europe, and was
talking loudly of the ' pyratterie de cette nation et la faussde de
ses ministres '. — Newcastle to Holdernesse, July 22, 1755.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 285
bride and dreaded a diminution of her own in
fluence, at once set about prejudicing her young
son against the match, although the King per
sisted in the negotiation, abetted by Newcastle,
whose mind was always elated at the idea of
making treaties. The Princess also felt deep
resentment at the presence of Cumberland and Fox
on the Board of Regency ; and she complained
much of the First Lord, who was humouring the
King's whim, and would always fall back on the
excuse of ' his party ' requiring this or that.^®'
But the Duke of Cumberland was in no way
disposed to lord it over the less favoured members
of his family. If he had never given them cause
to think kindly of him in the past, there was an
excellent opportunity, now that his position was
assured, for giving a manifestation of goodwiU.
With this desire he visited the Princess in person,
and proposed to take his two nephews on a
pleasure excursion to see the new fleet at Ports
mouth. Uncertain what course to pursue, the
Princess avoided giving a direct answer ; but
later she concluded to accept the invitation, and
instructed the Prince's governor to make the
necessary arrangements.'®® Then at last, when
Waldegrave informed his mistress that the plans
had been made to start, he found to his disappoint-
15' Doddington, Diary, May 27, 1755; Waldegrave, pp. 30-1,
40-1. 158 Stone to Newcastle, June 24, 1755: Add. MSS., 32856,
f. 165.

286 HENRY FOX ch.
ment that the Princess had already put off the
trip — a decision which practicaUy amounted to
a refusal.^®® Cumberland was apparently indifferent to the
discourtesy. But Fox was dejected, having an
ambition to mute the two rivals on the only firm
ground for the Cumberlands to stand upon.^®®
It was an odd notion, but not an uncommon one
at the time, that the 'Butcher' was of much the
same calibre as Richard III, and meant nothing
but harm to his youthful nephews ; ^®^ but however
much the idea may have impressed itself upon the
boys, the hatred of the Princess lay undoubtedly
far deeper.
During the early months of 1755 scarce a soimd
had arisen from the underling at the Pay Office.
If it is true that Pitt resented the preference shown
to Fox, he had at least given no sign that such was
159 Doddington, Diary, June 29, 1755. The Newcastles,
who felt injured in not being consulted in the affair, were
naturaUy but little disturbed by the denouement. — Hardwicke
to Newcastle, June 27, 1755: Add. MSS., 32856, f. 270.
The Duke's only ground for disappointment was his wish that
there might be less friction between the two branches of the
royal house. — Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 27, 1755 :
ibid, f . 272. A cordial union between the two would, on the
other hand, have been equaUy unwelcome.
160 Doddington, Diary, June 29, 1755. We can hardly go
so far as to say that Fox had been proposing a coaUtion ; but
no doubt the thought was present in his mind, as a means of
turning Newcastle out of office. Hence it is possible that it
was he who instigated Cumberland's invitation.
161 Jesse, Memoirs of the Court of England, III. 190.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 287
his feeling, and his former aUy, with characteristic
finesse, had ' expressed the most earnest desire ' to
continue their acquaintance, ' professing that his
views and ideas were stiU the same.' ^®^ However
Pitt may have reaUy felt toward the man he once
described as ' odious ', he would hardly have been
likely to reprobate the policy of the War Party,
the germ of which he had himself supported when
he and Fox were allies. But tantalising as must
have been his exclusion from all share in his
Government's foreign policy, there was one thing
he could not endure much longer, and that was
neglect of his own political, value. Hence it was
that ?ibout the middle of April Pitt awoke from his
lethargy and determined to compel recognition.
The elder Horace Walpole ('Old Horace', as he
was popularly caUed) whose prestige had once
been considerable among the Whigs, had the hope
of cementing a union of both Fox and Pitt with the
Ministry, and hence his wishes aptly coincided with
the Paymaster's yearnings for promotion. Through
the medium of Walpole, Pitt enlightened Newcastle
that he would not demand the Seals at present, but
162 GrenviUe's narrative, Grenville Papers, 1, 432. GrenviUe
leads us to infer that this was said at the time at which Fox
dissolved their alliance in order to join Newcastle, Doubtless
Fox was perfectly wUUng to remain in Pitt's good graces, if
the latter were wiUing ; and he was certainly too experienced a
politician to believe that his present position was likely to be
permanent. On the other hand, the statement of Walpole
(I. 398) that he tried to get Legge to suggest to Pitt that he
make a bid for the Exchequer, whUe he (Fox) should have the
Pay Office, has too much the air of gossip to be credible.

288 HENRY FOX ch.
he insisted upon knowing whether or not he should
have them at the first opportunity ; in the mean
time he must have the ' royal countenance ', and
especiaUy some ' pledge of security ' (which we
may suppose meant a seat in the Cabinet)."® The
response was not explicit, and certainly ' not
flattering '. The Paymaster must indeed have
163 Harris, III. 35. The two chief authorities for this inter
view are Walpole (Memoirs, I. 397) and Doddington (Diary,
July 16, 1755), who substantiaUy agree as to the facts. Wal
pole, however, explicitly attributes the initiative to Pitt,
while Doddington ascribes it to 'Old Horace', whether sent
by Newcastle or not he caimot say positively. It seems indeed
inconceivable that Newcastle should have deUberately stirred
up trouble where there had been only an acceptable sUence ;
and in April no poUtical reasons could have justified an
experiment so risky. Besides, we shaU note later that Fox
expressed his conviction in June — a whole month before the
subsidy agitation — that Newcastle had no intention of treating
with anybody. If, on the other hand, we study the position
of Pitt, the motives for an overture on his part are thoroughly
inteUigible. However true it may have been that Old Horace
gave him the impression that his visit was by authority — ^for
such appears to have been the impression, if Pitt's ' Remarks '
(Chatham Corres. I. 134) are to be considered authentic — it
was clearly Pitt, not Newcastle, who had most reason to bend
the knee. No man of Pitt's temperament could stand political
exclusion indeflnitely, and no inherent sense of dignity was
Ukely to restrain him after the way he had cringed to
Newcastle in the spring of 1754.
Such, then, are the grounds for the writer's belief that Pitt's
biographers err iu attributing the initiative to Newcastle.
Dr. von RuviUe himself admits (I. 358) that in AprU ' Pitt's
support had no immediate value to Newcastle ' ; and it was
not till the month of July that the subsidies — much to the
Duke's astonishment — ^began to meet with opposition.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 289
reckoned greatly on the First Minister's terror of
him, whereas the autocrat of the Cabinet, having
passed through an harmonious session of Parlia
ment, was in one of his sanguine moods, and
had no intention of jeopardizing his power by
making room for a firebrand. In fact Fox had
it from Hartington that the meeting of the First
Lord with Walpole — which took place two days
before the King left for Hanover — ended rather
unpleasantly for the emissary.^®*
As for Pitt, it may have been to cover his
mortification that he told Fox later what depth of
scorn he felt for the Duke of Newcastle, who was
so often successful in ' attempting to make fools
of aU mankind'."® No one would perhaps be
wUling to gainsay the charge, but in the present
instance was it exactly Newcastle's fault ?
But Pitt had not emerged from a wilderness of
obscurity to be crushed at the first blow ; if he
could not force the bolt of the Foreign Office or
drive the First Lord into a panic, he must at any
rate turn and rend some one. It happened that
certain indications had lately come from Leicester
House that the prodigal might return and be
welcome."® What surer passport, therefore, than
164 Doddington, Diary, July 16, 1755.
165 Fox to EUis, June 2, 1755 : Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 157.
166 Walpole remarks keenly that from the moment of ' old
Horace's' faUure, Pitt "cast his eyes toward the successor', —
Memoirs, I. 397. There at Leicester House was a chance of
reconstructing his poUtical power. See also Shelburne's
autobiography: Fitzmaurice, I. 59.
1156 rj.

290 HENRY FOX ch.
to quarrel openly with the faction the Princess
detested ?
Early in May both the great men of the Commons
were present at a gathering in Lord Hillsborough's
garden. Thinking Fox had taken his leave, Pitt
declared to his host that his connexion with Fox
was over ; the other was now a regent and a
cabinet councillor, and he (Pitt) would be ' second
to nobody '. Just then the Secretary-at-War
rejoined the company, and Pitt, being unable to
cool his passion, made a simUar but stronger
declaration to Fox himself. If the latter ' suc
ceeded and so made way for him, he would not
accept the seals of Secretary from him, for that
would be owning an obligation and superiority that
he would never acknowledge ; he would owe
nothing but to himself ', and then he became
more and more extravagant in his language.
Fox, however, kept his temper, and indeed was
possibly as much amused as he at first had been
astonished. Having at last found an opening to
put in a word, he asked his quondam friend what
would put them on the same ground ; whereupon
Pitt made the enigmatical reply ' A winter in the
Cabinet and a summer's Regency '.^®'
16' Doddington, Diary, May 9, 1755. It would appear that
Pitt's jealousy of Fox's increasing prominence was too strong
for him to hide, especially if we are to suppose that he now
wanted a Cabinet seat (see above) and was unable to obtain it.
Fox must have wondered not a little at this outburst, and it
was not tiU some time later that he came to regard it as a
political device.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 291
Hillsborough, a friend of both men, tried after
wards to effect a reconciliation ; but Pitt repeated
that, whereas he ' esteemed Mr. Fox, aU connexion
with him was at an end'."®
In fact the Paymaster found this pastime so
congenial to his unbridled emotions that he could
not desist with one tirade. A few days after the
first encounter he drove in state to Holland House
to renew the battle, and was soon reiterating his
sentiments.^®® Fox asked his guest if he had suspected him
of having tried to rise above him ? No, Pitt
had not.
' Yet ', persisted Fox, ' we are on incompatible
lines ? '
Not on ' incompatible ', was Pitt's answer, but
' convergent ' ; sometimes they might act together,
but ' for himself, he would accept power from no
hands '. He then continued his protest against
Fox's position as Regent. ' Here is the Duke,
king ; and you are his minister.'
' Whatever you think,' replied Fox with much
spirit, ' the Duke does not think himself aggrand
ized by being of the Regency, when he has no more
power than I have.' Fox afterwards repeated it
168 Doddington, Diary, May 10, 1755.
169 Doddington alludes to the second encounter in an entry
on May 13, but has not heard the particulars. Walpole, who
gives us the detaUs, is certainly wrong in assigning it to July,
as we know from Fox's letters and from Doddington's entry
on July 16. The second meeting, according to Fox, took
place on the 12th of May. T 2

292 HENRY FOX ch.
to the Duke, who quite agreed with his friend's
view."® The visit of the Paymaster was of some
length, and according to Fox he expressed strong
feelings of friendship for him and much enmity
toward the Duke of Newcastle ; ' at aU events,'
wrote the Secretary-at-War to his friend, Harting
ton, ' I am, in Pitt's opinion, blameless.' "^ His
Royal Highness, as also the Devonshires, felt
nevertheless that the matter should be kept as
quiet as possible for fear of injuring Fox,"^ and
the occurrence was actuaUy unknown to the
Newcastles for several months.
But Pitt had not yet exhausted himself, and
spoke complainingly to many, of Fox's growing
intimacy with GranviUe, which had been one of
the stumbling-blocks of the first meeting, and
which Fox himself at first beheved to be the point
at issue. ' It was one of my crimes,' wrote the
Secretary-at-War, ' that Lord GranvUle was my
friend, . . . who was so much Pitt's enemy.' But
Horace Walpole regarded it as significant that the
day before the visit to Holland House Pitt had
been a guest of the Princess ; had she been im-
appeased by his first outbreak and sent him to
make another ?
1™ Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 397-8. Fox and
Cumberland may have been thinking of the latter's faUure to
become ' sole regent '.
I'l Fox to Hartington, May 13, 1755 : Waldegrave, Memoirs,
p. 155.
i'2 Ibid. ; Fox to Elhs, June 2, 1755 : Waldegrave, p. 157.

IV THE MINISTRY AND WAR PARTY 293
Childish as the episode may be considered, it
was not without its decisive effect upon Fox.
The mistake that he committed when he accepted
a seat in the house of the Newcastles was now
beginning to show its fuU force. Too clever to
become Pitt's tool, he was not single-hearted
enough ever again to be his aUy, and when the
importance of Pitt came at last to receive recog
nition. Fox's pohtical fortunes were on the decline.
The acceptance of the Cabinet-seat had been
practicaUy a token of submission ; so Pitt must
have read it, and so in later times he proved that
he did ; for Fox it was a f aU of fifty per cent in his
pohticed value.
Yet it may have been that he was careless now
of what might affect his career. Perhaps his
ambition had died when he learned in ^March 1754
the real nature of the person with whom he had
to deal for place and power. Perhaps, finaUy,
he had thought only of the task of supporting the
man whom he honoured above aU others ; and
indeed had he but resigned when Cumberland's
power was terminated, ' le bon feu de la guerre,'
as the City caUed him,^'^ miglit yet have atoned
for his desertion of Pitt. But in his continuance
lay a mistake that proved fatal.
StUl, even as it was, Fox had gleaned some
advantage. In the spring and summer of 1755 he
had seconded his friend's pohcy in Cabinet and
1*8 Fox to Devonshire, November 4, 1755; Torrens, II.
240.

294 HENRY FOX ch. iv
Regency, and, with the weapons thus forged, had
helped inflict another blow upon the man he justly
hated. Once again had peril arisen from that
faction, which Newcastle had created and Pelham
had so rightfuUy dreaded. The Cumberlands
were now the War Party and the ultimate result
was ' Minorca '.

CHAPTER V
SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING
Perhaps the only palliation for the part which
the Duke of Newcastle plays in history is the
indisputable fact that the crisis which confronted
him in almost every part of the world was quite
enough to stagger a far more capable man than he.
Deficient in the force and creative skUl which
marks a statesman of genius, he thought of nothing
but clinging to power by a policy of trimming.
He trimmed between a sovereign with continental
interests and a somewhat insular Parliament
whose chief concern was commerce ; again, he
trimmed between the War Party and the over
cautious Hardwicke ; and he trimmed between his
fear of isolation (in event of war) and a stubbornness
which blunted all his arts of conciliation ; and
finally his dread of war itself was often counter
balanced by political timidity. His vision was
ever narrow ; his policy — when he possessed any —
was too often dictated by the politics of the
moment. Diplomacy alone may be said to have
lain within his ken ; and yet he was sadly deficient
both in the capacity for bold conceptions and in
the ability to guide. Of what use was aU his experi
ence in diplomatic wiles when he was willing to let

296 HENRY FOX ch.
the danger of unadjusted difficulties with France
creep further and ever further upon the possibilities
of peace, and meanwhile stood, as he himself con
fessed, distrusted both at Vienna and the Hague ? ^
And all this time the nation was admittedly un
prepared for war.^
We have already mentioned the conclusion of
the treaty with Hesse, which was ratified by the
Council on June 24.® The ChanceUor, when
desired to affix the great seal to the transaction,
' only bowed,' declared Fox, ' and their Lordships
signed it as a matter of course.' * Evidently
Newcastle was unopposed by any member of the
Council, and it only remained for the Commons
to accept or reject the subsidy. In the meantime
— ^though WiUiams had been sent to St. Petersburg
to try his luck with bribes — the treaty with the
Czarina was far from being assured ; and Austria
and Holland were as obdurate as ever. ' The
Queen of Hungary wiU have nothing to do with
us ' ® — so Fox declared to Doddington, with con
scious satisfaction in Newcastle's failures.
While affairs abroad were presenting an almost
hopeless tangle, the state of politics at home was
1 Newcastle to Yorke, July 4, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32856,
f. 461.
2 Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 7, 1755: Add. MSS.,
32855, f. 381.
3 Newcastle to Holdernesse, June 24, 1755: Add. MSS.,
32856, f. 153.
4 Doddington, Diary, August 18, 1755.
5 Ibid., July 22, 1755.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 297
growing more and more intricate and perplexing.
The first political crisis had been ended by Fox's
promotion ; but the latter's purchased aUegiance
was no more than a truce in the political battle.
The growing ascendancy of the War Party and the
factious conduct of Leicester House were both in
a measure the inevitable consequences of New
castle's incapacity as a political leader. Thus
whUe Halifax, voicing the general opinion, was
loud in his strictures upon the Ministry,® the
Cumberlands were stronger than ever before, and
Pitt was in collusion with Leicester House.
Shortly after the scene at Holland House, Sir
Richard Lyttelton betook himself as emissary to
the ' Cousinhood ' to inquire on behalf of Lord Bute
(the Princess's confidential adviser) what terms
they would demand for entering into a closer
connexion with Leicester House. Several meetings
came about as a result, and Pitt was assured ' in
the strongest manner ' of the Princess's ' protection
and support '.' It was the logical sequel of Pitt's
quarrel with Fox ; and one of the conditions of
the treaty which followed was a promise on the
part of the Pittites to ' oppose the Duke of Cum
berland and raise a clamour against him '.® So Fox
was apparently right in regarding the quarrel as
trumped up by Leicester House. Now, as a result,
the two centres of disaffection had become one.
6 Doddington, Diary, May 24, 1755.
' GrenvUle's narrative, Grenville Papers, I. 432.
8 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 39.

298 HENRY FOX ch.
Whether or not he suffered anxious moments
at times, the First Lord seemed disposed to let
well enough alone. ' In a word,' wrote Fox to
Hartington, ' the Duke of Newcastle is so far from
courting that he seems afraid of being courted,
which he is in no danger of.' ^ Fox firmly believed
that, whatever his ' managements ' at Leicester
House, Pitt had no understanding with New
castle ; ^® and the latter — except for some overtures
to Kew ^^ — kept remarkably free of intrigues.
In less than a month, however. Fox's words
were but partly true ; for the First Lord did
become ' courted ' — and by the man he had so
recently snubbed. Jemmy Grenville, being closeted
one day with the Duke, went freely into the wrongs
of his friend, who he said yearned for ' confidence
and regard ' — which, being an ' equivocal ' ex
pression, like most of Pitt's, gave occasion for
much speculation on the part of the Newcastles.
Hardwicke interpreted the meaning as ' employ
ment ', but something lower than Secretary of
9 Fox to Hartington, June 2, 1755 : ibid., p. 159.
10 Fox to Ellis, June 2, 1755: ibid., p. 157.
11 Fox tells us that Newcastle and Hardwicke were trying to
gain a foothold at Leicester House — he understood, by dis
paraging the Duke of Cumberland — but that their efforts had
not succeeded. — Fox to Hartington, June 2, 1755. As far as
it concerns Cumberland, the story may well have been gossip ;
but it is not at all unlikely that the Newcastles were seeking
to establish a counterpoise to Pitt, the man who had just
become the prot6g6 of Leicester House. Not infrequently in
politics the Newcastles followed a move by a counter-move.
See below, note 67.

v SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 299
State ; ' possibly the lot of his guardian friend.
Fox, might serve the turn, and Cabinet ComiciUor
may satisfy pro hie ct tutnc' If so, the Chancellor
believed it would be a ' cheap bargain '.^"
Pitt was obviously a puzzle to all parties. Fox
had believed — at any rate before the former's
junctiou \\ ith Leicester House — tliat his rival had
no plans wliatover : ^® and ' Old Horace ' was still
inclined to tliat opinion." Certainly the Pay
master's behaviour was peculiar, for not long after
the rupture with Fox, Pitt's confidential mouth
piece. Lord Temple, had ' taken great pains ' to
assure Doddington how well satisfied they aU felt
with the Secretary-at-War ; ^® and now the great
orator was making overtures " to the First Lord,
whom he had recently condemned to the Prmcess
in tho most scathing terms. ^' Possibly this latter
action was merely a political device, smce the
Princess had her own grievance against Newcastle,'®
and (according to Fox) the Dulve and his adviser
had tried in vain to obtain forgiveness.'® At all
'- Hardwicko to Newcastle. July 5. 1755: Add. MSS.,
;5l\S,-.(i, f. 484.
'•' Fox to Hartington, May 13. 1755 : Waldegrave. p. 155.
1^ Fox to ElUs, June 2, 1755.
''" Doddington, Diary, Ma\ l>0. 1755. Such dupUcity was
powerless to deceive an old intriguer Uke Doddington. As
tlii.s happened before the " treaty ' \\"ith Leicester House,
the diivrist oonoluded that they were fearful of their position.
It looked as if Pitt may have cherished some uiisgiviugs.
16 Through Gi-enville.
1" Ibid. 1* Pages 284-5.
19 Fox to Hai'tington, June 2. 1755. See note 11.

300 HENRY FOX ch.
events, these fluctuations tend to show that whUe
discontent was general, the elements of discord
had as yet formed no policy. AU that was needed
was an instrument — Avhat it was to be wiU soon
appear. MeanwhUe unfriendliness of foreign courts and
domestic opposition to subsidies warned the Duke
of Newcastle of the necessity of making his plans
for the next session of Parliament. Fox would
at least be passively loyal, and might be induced
to become active as weU ; but it was not so much
a question of the number of heutenants in the
corps as the amount of strength in the ' enemy '
— a term which of course signified nothing as yet.
On the 11th of July the Duke wrote his first letter
to Hanover on the perplexing problem. The
danger-mark was undoubtedly Pitt, who had
begun to stir again, and Egmont, who might be
caUed the vizier of Leicester House and was known
to be foremost in its councils.^® In the first place it
must be considered what would satisfy the Pay
master, who might be contented with a promise
of the ' royal countenance ' — another way of saying
that the ban of excommunication might be hfted ;
but, if this proved too vague, the Duke hoped they
' might be aUowed ' to assure him of a seat in the
Cabinet CouncU. ' Mr. Fox has been gratified in
the manner he desired, and therefore can have no
objection to any of these regulations, made without
any partiality, and singly with a view to carry
20 Doddington, Diary, June 21, 1755.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 301
His Majesty's measures in these difficult times in
the House of Commons, it being always to be
understood that proper regard and confidence
should be showed to Mr. Fox.' As to Egmont,
the Tory leader had been disappointed by the
retarded promotion to the Household, and a
Vice-Treasurership of Ireland must be found
somehow, else he would certainly return to the
Opposition. Lee would do very well for the
business of the Exchequer ; and the allegiance of
these three would make all things safe. Such were
the tentative suggestions which Newcastle commu
nicated to Holdernesse.^'^ ' In all administrations,'
he lamented, ' some one must be the butt. I am
very undeservedly so at present.' ^^
In none of these letters to Hanover — and he wrote
three on this occasion — was there any allusion to
the conference which took place five days previously
between the Paymaster and Charles Yorke, and
which Hardwicke had arranged.^® Doubtless Pitt
21 Newcastle to Holdernesse, July 11, 1755: Add. MSS.,
32857, f. 37.
22 Newcastle to Holdernesse (entre nous), July 11, 1755 :
ibid., f. 53.
23 The ChanceUor — in order apparently to avoid seeing Pitt
himself, which Newcastle had suggested — planned that his
son Charles should meet the Paymaster at a levee, and that,
he thought, might ' open something '. — Hardwicke to New
castle, July 5, 1755. Charles managed it so weU that Pitt
was induced to call upon him on the following day (July 6).
Nevertheless the Paymaster 'talked in such a complaining
manner of the Duke of Newcastle ' that Yorke, who had been
instructed to propose a meeting ^^ith Newcastle on his own

302 HENRY FOX ch.
had just become aware of the First Lord's clash
with the War Party, and conditions both at home
and abroad had brightened his political prospects.
He now told his suitor impatiently that since the
Duke would not terminate his proscription by the
Closet, he should abandon his insistence on a
promise of the Seals ; but no longer was it a ques
tion of ' confidence and regard ', which in practice
meant nothing at all ; he would accept no favour
from Newcastle, or ever owe him an3rthing ; and
he was evidently incensed at being approached
without something definite. The Chancellor's son
was powerless to stem this flood of wrath. So
Newcastle, who had welcomed his enemy's over
tures ^* as a means of feeling the ground, had only
received a trouncing for his pains. ^®
On the 20th the faithful Holdernesse replied
authority, deemed it wiser for the interview to be put off till
Hardwicke might ' judge of the effect ' of what Pitt had said.
Apparently the latter had seen Hardwicke for a few minutes
just before visiting Yorke, and it is possible that the Chancellor
had told him that Yorke wished to see him.
24 Page 298.
25 The authorities for the interview are Doddington, Diary,
July 16, 1755 ; Yorke to Hardwicke, July 7, 1755 ; Harris,
Life of Hardwicke, III. 29. NaturaUy the Ministers, whose
relations with foreign powers had already become seriously
strained, were quick to avail themselves of overtures seemingly
so humble. As usual, too, the Duke wished to purchase
services as cheaply as possible. At the same time he was
indisposed to offer anything tangible without having first
obtained the royal consent ; and as yet the movement against
the subsidies seemed scarcely sufficient to make such an effort
distinctly imperative.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 303
to his friend's appeals for royal consent to the
' system ' he was contemplating. The result was
not very assuring. Lady Yarmouth had entered
heartily into the plan, but the King had done
little more than listen. Obviously hatred of Pitt
was the principal barrier. The Earl had at first
suggested that a smile would be more appreciated
than a Cabinet seat, but in a later audience,
becoming braver, he added that ' a little outward
civility might be the means of preventing Pitt
from forcing himself into the Closet '. This was
the best that the Secretary could do for the present,
although he seemed to be hopeful.^®
In the meantime the murmurs against subsidies
were growing louder, and the Hessian Treaty being
now a fait accompli, the air was charged with
resistance. Yet, so far as the Duke could perceive,
his lieutenants were showing no disposition to
rebel, and the most he could do was to anticipate
revolt by striving to secure all who might be
tempted in that direction. The Duke's con
sternation can therefore be imagined when dis
affection took root in his own Treasury Board.
When the warrant for the Hessian levy-money,
after being passed by the Lords Justices, came
before the Treasury for signature, Newcastle,
having signed first, handed it to his Chancellor of
the Exchequer, who silently passed it over (without
signing) to Dupplin and Nugent ; and West told
26 Holdernesse to Newcastle ('entre nous'), July 20, 1755:
Add. MSS., 32857, f. 262.

304 HENRY FOX ch.
his superior officer — who had not observed the
incident in question — that Legge was loud in his
opposition to the measure. AU this Newcastle
reported to the King through Holdernesse.^'
The little Chancellor had, in fact, found a bhssf ul
revenge upon the master who had shghted him and
talked of his insignificance. Newcastle at first
wondered if he was in coUusion with any one,^®
and in the meantime, PeUiam-like, he strove to
smother the flames. Of course Legge must be
dismissed, but it would not be wise, thought the
First Lord, to let him go out empty-handed, and
if the King would give him a peerage, the rascal's
silence would be cheaply purchased.^® Lee was
fortunately ready to fill his place, and a few days
later the Duke was gratified by the King's consent
to promote Egmont and Pitt in the manner
desired.®® But the ' patriotism ' of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer had become the cry of the hcfur. For
the first and only time in his life Henry Bilson
Legge was famous. Leicester House, quick to see
a harbinger of discontent, was eager to welcome
the offender, and Pitt forthwith introduced him
'^ Newcastle to Holdernesse, July 25, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32857, f. 354.
28 Newcastle to Holdernesse (first ' entre nous ' ), July 25, 1755 ;
ibid., f. 356.
29 Newcastle to Holdernesse (second ' entre nous '), July 25,
1755: ibid., f. 262.
30 Holdernesse to Newcastle ('entre nous'), July 20, 1755:
ibid., f. 262.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 305
to the Princess and her friends, much to the
annoyance of GrenviUe, hitherto the Paymaster's
favourite.®^ So after a year of intrigue against
the Ministry, and fast and loose play with the
Cumberlands, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had
at last found a haven in Leicester House.
The Cumberlands — at aU events their chiefs —
were out of favour with all parties. Fox, who
had made a friend of Stone as well as Granville,
said the former had lost his influence in Leicester
House on that account ; ®^ and the young Prince
felt such aversion to his uncle that Waldegrave,
one of the most peaceable of men, was in despair.
But with the magnates of the Ministry the party
was hardly less at variance ; and His Royal
Highness, not content with dominating the Council,
was now threatening to blow up an opposition to
the Treaties. ' Sea war, no continent, no subsidy ! ' .
was the universal cry ; ' and you may imagine,'
wrote Newcastle to his underling abroad, ' that the
Duke's constant discourse . . . must add weight
to such language.' ®® Shortly afterward the First
Lord became so fretful that he refused to speak
to His Royal Highness, and the Secretary-at-War
came in also for a share of His Grace's dislike.®*

31 GrenviUe's narrative, Grenville Papers, I. 433.
32 Fox to Hartington, July 16, 1755 : Waldegrave, Memoirs,
p. 160.
33 Newcastle to Hardwicke ('enlre nous'), July 25, 1755:
Add. MSS., 32857, f. 362.
34 We have already noted the circumstances, p. 282.
1156 Ij

306 HENRY FOX ch.
Perhaps Newcastle felt emboldened just then
because the Cumberland foreign policy had received
a temporary set-back and Hawke was to sail with
limited instructions, ' AU this ', declared Fox
(in speaking also of the Hessian Treaty), is weak
and ruinous.' ®®
No amount of urging could make Legge sign
the Hessian warrant ; he ' stiU persisted in his
patriotism ', ®® and Newcastle could not get rid of
him because his conduct was so popular that
dismissal might make it more so. The one hope
of breaking up the cabal was to detach Pitt. ' To
send for him,' wrote the Duke to Hardwicke,
' will raise his vanity and his terms . . . but I should
think Charles might write to him that something
had happened since their last conversation, to
make Your Lordship wish to see him, when he
next comes to town.' The Duke felt that Hard
wicke must be the one to beard the lion, for he
it was, ' as Pitt and every one knew,' who had saved
him from dismissal, and they had corresponded
since. In the meantime Stone was ordered to
ask the Princess to ' assist '.®'
35 Doddington, Diary, August 3, 1755.
36 Rigby to Bedford, August 21, 1755: Bedford Corres. II.IQ5.
3' Newcastle to Hardwicke, July 26, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32857, f. 382. ' Your Lordship must judge,' he wrote, ' how
we shall get at him (Pitt).' For his own part, he said, Pitt had
' never been near me since he personally feU upon me in the
House of Commons.' This was doubtless an allusion to Pitt's
tirade against the ' edicts of one too powerful subject '. See
p. 211.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 307
Hardwicke did not venture to refuse the un
pleasant commission, but the King's consent to
Pitt's advancement had been a trifle vague, and
he faUed to see that the Cabinet had any authority
to make promises.®® The Chancellor was not fond
of standing on doubtful ground.
On the 9th of August Hardwicke had his chance
' to feel the pulse of the great Pitt ',®® as his friend
put it, and the interview lasted an hour and three-
quarters. His Lordship began craftily with Pitt's
offences of the past year, and assured him that he
and Newcastle had laboured for the Paymaster
till the latter had made it impossible for them to do
so longer. The Seals had been out of the question
when Pitt demanded them through Walpole,*® but
since then the ChanceUor felt that they had gained
ground, and were at all events authorized to speak
to him.
Pitt was modesty personified. He had never
wished to force himself into the Secretary's office,
never would wish it until the King should be
inclined to give it, and cared far more for the
38 Hardwicke to Newcastie, July 28, 1755 : ibid, f . 396.
39 Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 8, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32858, f. 39.
*o According to the account which Pitt gave to Doddington,
the former took sharp exception to the suggestion that he had
' so much desired the Seals ', and denied that he had ever
applied for them. Doubtless he remembered with morti
fication Walpole's failure, and was anxious to disavow all
complicity in that errand. Pitt was not above equivocation
when politics dictated it.
u2

308 HENRY FOX ch.
King's favour than for any employment.*'^ But
the obstacle which seemed insuperable, was the
eternal question of the Treaties, which Pitt said
would entaU a ' general plan ' for the Continent,
and that the nation could not afford. As it was,
the American and maritime war — of which he
approved — would increase the expense and the
debt. He then expounded the notion (which
certainly showed no little judgement, as well as
political courage) that any loss of Hanover would
be but temporary, and it would be cheaper to
buy it back when the war was finaUy ended. We
can readily see that Pitt was feeling his way to a
change of tactics. These remarks on the question
of policy contain his first endorsement of the policy
of the War Party. Indeed it would seem as though
he had quite lost faith in continuing to expect the
good graces of Newcastle.*^
After the ChanceUor finished a reply in defence
^ According to his own version Pitt intimated poiutedly
that His Majesty's antipathy proceeded from misrepresenta
tion. Both the suspicion and the expression of it were
natural at this time — especially if we consider his repeated
disappointments, but no mention of this is given us in the
ChanceUor's account.
*2 We may judge this hope to have been his principal reason
for not espousing the cause of the War Party against New
castle. In allying with Leicester House he had quietly forged a
political weapon for use if necessary, but up to this time he had
hoped, as Newcastle's position became less secure, that the First
Lord might finaUy employ him. But as flattery had failed, and
neutrality was arduous — and so far not successful — Pitt's
patience was becoming exhausted.

v SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 309
of the subsidies, Pitt inquired what Fox, Lee and
Legge thought of them,*® as he could not stand
alone. Hardwicke was unable to say, although
he thought they could be relied upon ; but when
Pitt declared that he could not act without his
friends, the ChanceUor replied that their conduct
rested with him. The question of the Cabinet
Council was brought up several times, but Pitt
on every occasion parried it.**
One thing which seems almost humorous was
the plan which Hardwicke laid to bring Newcastle
into the toils, a scheme to which the Paymaster
consented, with the assurance that he would see
the Duke whenever the latter requested it. The
Chancellor did not think Pitt woiUd adhere to his
objections to the subsidies, but would go on making
difficulties upon measures, a design which was
probably to enhance his own value.*®
*3 This must have been simply a bit of finesse on Pitt's part.
He knew well enough what Legge's opinion was, and it is more
than probable (considering his close tie with Leicester House)
that he knew Lee's as well ; while mention of Fox was probably
intended to arouse the fear that the two were united. At any
rate, whether or not Pitt was trying to push the ChanceUor
into a corner, the latter easily saved himself when the Pay
master spoke of his ' friends '.
** Obviously Pitt would not be satisfied with anything but
the Seals. But he may have thought it good policy not to
make any decided refusals. Such might have effectuaUy
closed the door to all future negotiation.
*5 Hardwicke to Newcastle, August 9, 1755 : Harris, Life of
Hardwicke, III. 30. Pitt's version of the above interview (if
reported accurately) is given us in Doddington, Diary,
September 2, 1755.

310 HENRY FOX ch.
Newcastle replied to his friend's account of the
affair, that his own view of the case corresponded
with Hardwicke's, but that they ' must have
him if possible '. His letter then consisted of a
long list of questions which his evident fear
of the forthcoming interview made him afraid
to take the personal responsibility of answering.
Could he avoid suggesting the Seals to the King ?
Should he show the famous Cabinet minute, re
nouncing a continental ' plan ', *® and thereby risk
its misuse ? Should he speak to Fox, who would
soon know all and think himself imdermined,
&c. &c. ? *' To aU of which the ChanceUor
patiently made answer number by number, only
begging that as he intended to leave for Wimpole
to spend a short holiday, he might not be sent for
' without absolute necessity '.*®
At last it had come out unmistakably that Pitt
was hostile to His Majesty's proposed ' system ' on
the Continent, and would be likely, indeed, to
oppose it on the floor of the Commons. It was
a puzzling situation for the Ministers, and the news
that two such prominent figures were committed
against the Treaties might bid fair to start a general
revolution against them in the coming session.
If Pitt were to be bought, the Newcastles knew
*6 The minute of July 30. Hardwicke answered the question
in the negative.
« Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 12, 1755 : Add. MSS.
32858, f. 114.
*8 Hardwicke to Newcastle, August 12, 1755 : ibid, f . 120.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 311
that the bargain must be made before more voices
were raised in the common cry, and even then the
Paymaster's habits of contradicting past principles
might not stand this particular strain.
But if the much-sought orator had presaged
a violent opposition, the designs of Leicester
House lay deeper. Ex-Secretary Yonge *® having
conveniently died, it was arranged that Newcastle
should meet Egmont on the 26th and offer him
the vacant Vice-Treasurership. With a view to
assisting in the matter, Mr. Cresset, secretary to
the Princess, having assured the First Lord of Her
Royal Highness' s satisfaction with matters then
on foot, offered to ' prepare ' Egmont for the
interview ; and as these two were the most
influential vassals of the Princess, the measure
seemed decidedly auspicious. The shock must
therefore have been great when Newcastle learned
shortly afterward that Lee, the man who had for
nearly a year been designated for the Exchequer,
had come out against the Treaties.®® Fox had
heard a month ago that the Princess had forbidden
Sir George to accept the office,®' and now the truth
seemed only too apparent ; and this was number
*9 Fox's predecessor as Secretary-at-War. A few days
before he died Yonge was asked to give up his Vice-Treasurer
ship for a pension on the Irish establishment (Newcastle to
Yonge, July 26, 1755), and the Duke was soon enabled to give
Egmont a hint that he could have the place.
50 Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 22, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32858, f. 241.
51 Fox to Hartington, July 16, 1755 : Waldegrave, p. 160.

312 HENRY FOX ch.
three ! Whether indeed Egmont' s jealousy would
induce him to take the opposite side ®^ was yet to
be revealed, but what was this double game that
Leicester House was playing ?
The meeting with the Tory chief took place in
due form and was, in effect, a fiasco. The vizier of
the tiny court had nothing to say on the subject
of the Treaties, but he refused to take any action
without Pitt, to whom he professed the greatest
attachment. He was subtle enough also to dis
parage the value of an alliance between Pitt and
Lee, and craftily suggested a peerage for his son,
which Newcastle said was for the time being
impossible. There the matter ended except that
His Lordship made excuses when it came to decision,
and put the Duke off with such astute diplomacy
that the latter felt satisfied with the interview.®®
It was certainly a nest of intrigue that Pitt had
chosen for his political abiding-place. The terms of
his surrender were now obvious ; the price which
he had paid had been the open rupture with the
party of the King's son, now more and more hated.®*
In other words it was a plain case of throwing over
the Cumberlands in order to get the strength to
embarrass Newcastle and force a passage into
52 Lee and Egmont were notably on bad terms.
53 Newcastle to Stone. August 26, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32858,
f. 294.54 Fox to Hartington, July 16, 1755. Cumberiand's
presence in the Regency was the point which most rankled in
the mind of the Princess. Doubtless his success increased
her antipathy.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 313
office. The knights of Leicester House were
masters of wiles and strategy, but it is doubtful if
they ever penetrated the real transparency of
Pitt's ambition. Fox told Rigby he might expect
a session in Parliament such as he had never
before seen, and a bustle that would suit even him.®®
The Secretary-at-War had more than one interest
in the political world. When it dawned upon the
minds of IMinisters that Dorset was not the man
to aUay discontent in Ireland, it was difficult to
find a successor without bringing upon them the
Duke's displeasure. Thus most of the year 1754
had been spent in haU-way measures.®® But by
December the strife had become so bitter that
a change of lieutenants was felt to be imperative ;
and as the Duke of Devonshire had once held the
lieutenancj'^ with conspicuous success, it was but
natural to think that his son might inherit his
qualities and profit by his experience ; while
Hartington's friendship with Fox might be ex
pected to keep the unmanageable Kildare in
55 Rigby to Bedford, August 21, 1755, Bedford Corres.
II. 166-8.
56 It was at first decided to send a lord-deputy to straighten
out the tangle, but when affairs in Ireland became for a time
less troublesome, the Cabinet resolved to relinquish the idea ;
and the government was formally vested in three lords justices
to act in Dorset's absence. — Minute of meeting, Newcastle
House, April 9, 1754 : Add. MSS., 32995, f . 209. Some months
later the Duke of Marlborough revealed his ambition to succeed
Dorset (see p. 189) ; but it was possible to postpone the settle
ment of the question until the foUowing year, when Hartington
was at last chosen as Dorset's successor.

314 HENRY FOX cH.
partial order ®'' — such were the chief motives for
picking one of the Cumberlands.
The new lieutenant repaired to his troublesome
charge in the early spring of 1755, accompanied by
his secretary. Colonel Henry Seymour Conway.
The months which immediately foUowed showed
admirably the success of the new Viceroy's temper,
but the constant cabals in the Irish House of
Commons and the difficulty in reconcUing the
Speaker (Ponsonby) with the Primate brought
Hartington to a determination to exert a freer
hand ; and to this intent he dispatched his
secretary to prevail upon the Ministry to omit the
Archbishop from the Board of Regency when next
it should be named.
But no sooner had Conway fulfiUed his mission
and Newcastle persuaded the Primate to ask
personally for his own sacrifice,®® than Hartington
became afraid of the decision he had taken, and
suggested a lord deputy as a means of making the
5' It was aUeged that Fox, having Hartington under his
influence, had intrigued to secure his appointment. — Emly
MSS., Hist. MSS. Comm., Report VIII, app., part 1, p. 179, a.
If Fox indulged in any intrigues for this purpose, it was
probably through his influence over his brother-in-law KUdare,
who had ample opportunity of making so much trouble that
the Ministry would be driven to appointing one of the Cumber-
lands. But however indirect Fox's efforts may have been, he
had certainly much influence over the irresolute Hartington.
58 Newcastle, in consenting to this measure, reveals his fear
of the possible effect upon the Ministry if Parliament were to
meet whUe Irish pohtics were in disorder. — Newcastle to
Hartington, July 23, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32857, f. 315.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 315
removal unnecessary. The First Lord was, of
course, quick to lay hold of the opportunity to
avoid an act which might lose him his friendship
with the Archbishop.
Kildare had already told Conway through Fox
that the movement on the part of the Primate was
aU that he could have desired.®® The Secretary
was now beside himself with mortification and
resentment, and persuaded both Devonshire and
Fox to write the Marquis urging him to hold to his
former resolution.®® Fox had suspected aU along
that Newcastle and Hardwicke were on the watch
for some serious blunder on the part of the
Viceroy that would justify his recaU ; ®^ but
however true this may have been in theory, the
Cumberlands being more than a match for their
rivals in the Regency, the Marquis had been left
pretty much to himself.
Fox's letter moved Hartington to reconsider his
position and after an ineffectual attempt on the
part of the Viceroy to make Kildare give up the
Speaker, the Primate was eventuaUy dropped from
the Board.®^
On August 11 Ambassador Williams wrote that
the convention with Russia had at last been
concluded.®® According to Fox, the Duke had sent
59 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 386-7.
60 Rigby to Bedford, August 21, 1755 : Bedford Corres. II. 165.
61 Fox to EUis, June 2, 1755 : Waldegrave, p. 158.
6- Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 388.
63 WilUams to Newcastle, August 11, 1755: Add. MSS.,
32858, f. 102.

316 HENRY FOX ch.
more money than the Regency had any idea of ; ®*
and the King was furious at the Ambassador for
having expended so large a sum.®® But Sir Charles
had speedily discovered that nothing but immense
donations would induce the Great ChanceUor to
swing the Russian Court in his favour, and New
castle had willingly abetted the Ambassador
rather than abandon the very kernel of his foreign
policy. Just to what extent the clever envoy
distributed his bribes will probably never be known.
' The subsidy ', wrote Doddington, who got it
from Fox, ' was £100,000 per annum for four years
to hold in readiness 50 to 60,000 men, for which,
when we employ them, we are to pay £100,000 per
annum.' ®® Fox had added that he supposed
similar ' considerations ' would be offered to
Bavaria and other states.
While Pitt was forging his weapons, to wield them
with telling effect in the next session of Parliament,
and Egmont, according to Fox, was waiting to
consult his ally before committing Leicester House
to either cause, it remains to be asked what policy
the Cumberlands would pursue in the great
question. Would they join hands with the party
that ever regarded them as a menace and detested
their royal champion, or would they endorse the
64 Doddington, Diary, July 21, 1755.
65 Holdernesse to Newcastle, August 29, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32858, f. 302.
66 Doddington, Diary, August 18, 1755. The amount of
the subsidy was £55,000.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 317
plans of the Administration which they had suc
cessfuUy undermined from the time that Fox had
pushed his way into the Cabinet, until a fleet
received instructions that were likely to precipi
tate war ? Excepting for the moment the frail
chance that some might act from conviction
simply, it was practically a question of balancing
the dislike entertained for Leicester House against
the contempt felt for Newcastle ; but since the
little Court at Kew ®' had too much at stake
just then to give more than intimations of its
feelings, the Cumberlands succumbed to the
temptation of driving Newcastle still further into
embarrassment and distress. The party might
reasonably prophesy success. In 1754 they had
made good their claims to take a share in the
Government, and room being made for them they
had virtually made the First Lord a servant of his
Cabinet ; now in the fuUness of their victory the
time was ripe for flinging him out of what little
control he had.
The Duke of Devonshire sounded the key-note.
On August 10 Fox had written to the Lord
Lieutenant that his father was so rabid in his
opposition to the Treaties that he was likely to
attack them openly.®® Before a week had passed
the Duke had made good the expectation. The
6' Country residence of the Prince of Wales, where he and
his mother were now spending the summer.
68 Fox to Hartington, August 10, 1755 : Walpole, Memoirs
of George II, I. 531.

318 HENRY FOX ch.
nation, said Devonshire, could not stand the
expense of a naval war against France and support
Hanover as well ; the Electorate must take care
of itself. The reason for the ' system ', the Duke
believed, was the subservience of the First Lord,
who would not contradict the King in anything.®"
Such was the opinion of a statesman not to be de
spised. Whether or not the Marquis of Hartington
shared his father's views was yet to be discovered.
The Lord Lieutenant, though he inherited the
integrity of his father, was not endowed with his
insight or his courage, and constant difficulties in
Ireland might well make him wish to keep the
Administration at home in good humour ; but to
be on the safe side Newcastle determined to aUow
him carte blanche in his lieutenancy, in the hope
of appeasing the family.'® Woburn had long
maintained an unbroken silence ; yet Rigby
expressed the hope that Legge would bring his
opposition on to the floor of the Commons,'^ and
this was sufficient to signify that the Duke of
Bedford was at least passively in sympathy with
his party.'^ As for Sandwich, he had become
obsolete, and no one cared to learn what his views
69 Doddington, Diary, August 18, 1755.
™ Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 399.
'1 Rigby to Bedford, August 21, 1755 : Bedford Corres.
II. 165.
'2 We also learn that Pitt mentioned the subsidies to
Bedford, who 'talked warmly and sensibly about them'.
This discussion must have taken place some weeks later. —
Doddington, Diary, September 2, 1755.

v SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 319
might be ; but GranviUe told the First Lord that
there were countless men of prominence who were
secretly against the Treaties, and opposed to any
subsidy whatever.'®
The Duke of Cumberland would, of course, be
watched with anxiety by both sides. NatmaUy
he was privy to the intended policy of his party,
and long ago was known to disapprove of a con
tinental ' plan ', and a possible diversion from the
maritime war. He was not of a nature to enjoy
tlie products of diplomacy whether good or bad,
and since it was not given him to bring on a con
tinental war and resume his pleasant role of
soldiering, he had satisfied himseU with temptmg
France into hostilities on sea. When Fox had told
him that the Duke of Newcastle in one of his
wavering moods had expressed his preference for
a naval war. His Royal Highness had laughed
with unmeasured scorn, declaring that that was
because the Duke ' could get nobody to take his
money '.'* Yet the leader of the Cumberlands
seemed not as bitter as many of his party, while
his extra-ministerial position put him above any
personal interest in crowding out the Newcastles ;
besides he had never shown in behalf of his
faithful following the aggressive insistence of
Bedford or Fox. But so far as the present pro
gramme was concerned His Royal Highness
told the Secretary-at-War, in effect, that he
"3 Doddington, Diary, August 18, 1755.
'4 Ibid., July 22, 1755.

320 HENRY FOX ch.
regarded the subsidies distinctly in the light of a
mistake, and that the nation would show extreme
reluctance and dislike for them.'® Being the son
of the King, he could hardly do more than announce
his opinions.
But what of Fox, — the forensic champion of
the Cumberland interest, the politician to whom
men would look for leadership in opposition or
defence ? Would he remain in the bosom of the
Ministry and put the Treaties through the House
of Commons, or would he cross the Rubicon and
enter Opposition as leader of his party ? Horace
Walpole, the younger, writes that he had ' dropped
intimations of his dislike to the Treaties ' ; '® and, if
quoted correctly, he had clearly implied that the
subsidy to Hesse was ' weak and ruinous '." When
he and Doddington came to discuss the Russian
Treaty some time later. Fox neither denied that the
King of Prussia would refrain from an attack upon
Hanover, nor allowed himself to be drawn into an
argument for or against the ability of Russia to
prevent it.'® On the other hand, he wrote to
Hartington only a short time before some comments
that give us an inkling of his real notions : ' We
have made a treaty with Hesse and another with
Russia, to be followed with other subsidies, or
these wiU be useless ; and if followed by other
'5 Doddington, Diary, August 18, 1755.
'6 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 400.
'¦^ Page 306.
'8 Doddington, Diary, August 18, 1755.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 321
subsidies, how can we find money to pay or place
to assemble these troops ? And perhaps, I may
add, members to vote for them.'
Such comments certainly do not seem to be the
result of partiality to subsidies ; yet, on the other
hand, they imply no resolution whatever. After
touching upon Devonshire's opposition and Legge's
avowed opinion, he writes further : ' I have been
more cautious in giving, I may say in forming
mine ; but have by not singing it at the Cockpit,
kept myself at liberty. Pitt's and Egmont's
opinions in this regard, I don't know.' '®
Thus it is to be seen that Fox was playing a
careful part. He was not an adept in foreign
affairs, like his friend Bedford, and he was neither
so independent nor so impulsive as Devonshire.
It plainly had occurred to him that the subsidies
were a heavy expense, and common sense con
vinced him that half-way measures of that sort
would be useless. He was also quite aware that
Newcastle would not be likely to stop at one or two,
if he could help it, but might be calculated to devise
a ' system ' such as he had set on foot in the days
when PeUiam had suffered him to harass the Court
of Vienna. Yet Fox was willing to let others
battle with such problems. His own sphere was
essentially the House of Commons and its various
features. If his professional services were valuable
'9 Fox to Hartington, August 10, 1755 : Walpole, Memoirs of
George II, I. 531. Evidently Fox had not heard the detaUs
of Pitt's interview with Hardwicke.
U56 V

322 HENRY FOX ch.
to any party, then he woiUd form his decision on
subsidies and fix the price ; and as far as political
ties were concerned, the Cumberlands were after
aU but an association to embarrass Newcastle,
and in Fox's mind a means of making himself
a power. For these reasons the Secretary-at-War
was ' cautious in forming his opinion '.
Thus it may be seen that the party of Cumber
land, with more or less enthusiasm according to the
several natures of its members, was oddly enough
arrayed on common ground with the Pitt-Leicester-
House coalition in opposition to the Administration.
Hardwicke advised Newcastle that he was ' credibly
informed ' of a cabal in the Commons against the
subsidies, and that ' Mr. Fox is secretly in it '.
Evidently the Ministry was painfuUy conscious of
the dangerous unity which a popular cry might
effect even between mutuaUy hostile factions — but
the Secretary-at-War had stiU kept them guessing.
Shortly after this the Lord President made an
appointment with the First Minister on the plea
of important disclosures respecting the House of
Commons, and the foUowing day, August 20, the
interview took place. GranviUe informed the
Duke that the opponents of the subsidies intended
to attack them on the first day, taking a handle
from the address to the King. In the front rank
would be Pitt and Legge, while Egmont and Lee
would probably concur ; and in fact the latter
had already condemned the Ministry's ' system ',
although GranviUe had done his best in its defence.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 323
His Lordship then came to the motive of the
interview. Fox must be satisfied or he would
go into opposition. The latter had been with
him twice lately, and had said that Egmont
would not accept the intended overture, and Pitt
(this, Newcastle inferred, had come from Fox)
would never become reconciled to the First Lord,
as that would be incompatible with Legge's inevit
able dismissal. Fox spoke also of the opposition
his party was plotting, but declared that he ' had
hitherto kept himself free and would do so tiU the
time came nearer '. What he wished was to become
Newcastle's lieutenant, and GranviUe added that
he believed his friend would give up every other
consideration for the sake of the Duke.
Newcastle must have been astonished, to say the
least, at this tale, which in writing of it he described
as ' extraordinary '. He told Granville it was im
possible for Fox, in view of his ' higher connexions ',
ever to be his ' lieutenant ', and he could not regard
him in that light ; he wanted no ' lieutenant '
who would be a ' general ' over him — this, no
doubt, with a wince at the recoUection of the
War Party.
To this the smooth-tongued statesman replied
that the House of Commons would certainly force
him to employ one, and then — as though to
emphasize the crisis — he added that Fox had told
him that he had not signed the orders for the rati
fication of the Hessian Treaty, and that, as Legge's
act had been immensely popular, this new stroke
X 2

aM HENBY FOX oh.
of Fox's had tlie same end in view. At tlve
oloae of the interview the Earl proposed signifl-
oantly. and in fact insisted long upon it, that
Secretary Robinson sliould be ^'©nlo^'ed to the
House of Lords.
Newcastle's opinion of the episode waa that
Fox feared the effect which the negotiations witli
Pitt and Egmont \\'ould haA*e upon his own value,
and had enlisted GranviUe to make tlie best
bargain he could for him. *The mtccedamum,*
was the Duke's comment, " can never take place.' *"
Fox, however, in a letter to HaHington throws
very different light upon tlie subject. ' The
Duke of Newcastle,' he wrote. * told a friend of
mine tliat he had an overtui"© from me by Lord
Granville, wliidi is not ti'u© ; but His Grace might
perhaps, from what Lord Grajiville said, conclude
it cam© from m©.* "*
Was it, or was it not an overture ? In other
words, was Fox telling the trutli ? It would seem
from this letter that he was in no sense indignant
at his friend's efforts on his belialf. but had not
in any way autliorized them. He was no doubt
quite ready at this time to consider terms, and of
course he may have been taking care to delude
Hartington and other members of the party until
the transaction was done ; there is also the possi-
«o Nowoftstla to HardM-loko. August 23, 1708; ,\dd. MSS..
32858. f. 241.
w Fo.xtoHartington, Soptembetl, 1785; Walpole, jlf«mw'.«
of Qeorg» IT, IL 834.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 325
bility that he had dropped informaUy certain hints
to GranviUe, which he secretly hoped the latter
^\ould carry further. Yet, on the other hand, it
is quite possible that the Lord President was of
his own accord speaking on behalf of one whose
accession to the ' inner clique ' would be a pleas
ing contrast to ministers ^hom the old diplomat
could not but regard with contempt. ' My Lord
GranviUe,' said Fox to Doddington two days
before the Earl became his advocate, ' told the
Duke of Newcastle that he would be served himself
as he and his brother had served him.' The
remark had been flung out by Fox in a discussion
of the Treaties.*^
The wary Lord Chancellor was quite in accord
with Newcastle's view of the coUoquj', but he felt
that overtures from the Cumberland quarter
should be treated with civility, — ' so far keep
them alive.' He did not believe Fox would go
into opposition, since it would ruin him ; and he
sniffed at his omission to sign the order for the
ratification, which he attributed to the fact that the
' lower end of the table ' were frequently ignored.^
Fox was meanA\-hile watching events with sharp
unerring eye. He had dined with some of the
82 Page 320.
''^ ' 1 fancy ', added the Chancellor, ' he wiU hardly boast
i)f that, when the King comes over.' — Hardwicke to Newca.stle,
August 23, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32858, f . 259. Fox had certainly
not ' boasted ' of the fact in hi.s letter to Hartington, but he
was doubtless aware that he had a trump card to play, if he
ever should desire to play it.

326 HENRY FOX ch.
Prince's servants, including Stone, one evening,^*
and doubtless picked up some valuable bits of
news from the table-talk. At any rate he kept
himseU constantly informed of aU the gossip that
was current, and imagined that the First Lord
wished to secure him, through Cumberland's
mediation.** Pitt, he knew, would be sohcited
again, but Legge was reported as saying that
the Paymaster was ' in no disposition to be paid
with such counters as His Grace had to give
him '. 'I think,' wrote Fox to Hartington, ' he
(Newcastle) told your father that the Russian
Treaty was not done yet — he must mean "ratified ",
which is an equivocation ; but he told Pitt absolutely
that he knew of no other but the Hessian, which
was to my knowledge an absolute falsehood.' *®
The same day Newcastle wrote a letter in great
perturbation to Chief Justice Ryder. It seems
that Fox desired to bring his nephew, Harry Digby,
into Parhament for a borough that Ryder had
been intending for his son. The Secretary-at-War,
who regarded Newcastle much as one thief looks
upon another, refused to accept the excuse that the
84 Stone to Newcastle, August 18, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32858,
f. 197.
85 Fox to Hartington, August 29, 1755 : Walpole, Memoirs
of George II, II. 532.
86 Fox to Hartington, September 1, 1755 : ibid. II. 534. If
Newcastle made this statement to Pitt, it must have been in
a private message, as the Duke did not see him untU the notable
interview of September 2. But the natural supposition is that
Fox was misinformed.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 327
Duke's interest in the constituency was derived
entirely from the Chief Justice, and insisted that
' the case of Tiverton was the case of every Cornish
borough '.*" The First Lord, who was worried
nearly to a state of coUapse over the situation in
the pohtical world, was too fearful of consequences
to aUow Fox a motive for Ul-humour, so he signified
his surrender by asking Ryder to write his wUling
ness to relinquish the project. ^^
In the meantime the Duke was preparing for
his long-awaited struggle with the Paymaster.
Much had happened since the overtures through
Hardwicke — much that must certainly have ren
dered Pitt's services more marketable. While at
home the defection of Lee and the busy intrigues
of Fox and Egmont gave the Duke's projected
' system ' every evidence of faUure, abroad the
defeat of Braddock and the definitive breach with
Austria must have strengthened the suspicion
that rlie Ministry was tottering. More than all,
the War Party, coercive and triumphant, were
threatening to join the Princess in an organized
resistance. Yet if only Pitt could be induced to
tender his assistance the Ministry might be saved !
The meeting was originaUy designed for an earher
?¦ That is, under Crown patronage, and hence at the disposal
of tiie First Lord.
** Newcastle to Ryder. September 1, 1755: Add. MSS..
32n5S. f. 3S6. However much Fox may have been pacified,
the request was apparently refused, as the son of the Cliief
Justice was eventuaUy returned for Hverton. — ParHameHtary
Hi.str'-v. XV. 300.

328 HENRY FOX ch.
date, but Cresset had asked to have it deferred, and
Newcastle had hoped that signified some helpful
promptings from Leicester House.^* But the Duke
dreaded the interview as though it were the plague,
repeatedly hinting that he needed the ChanceUor's
personal encouragement ; whUe the latter continued
nevertheless to enjoy his weU-earned recreation,
not a little pleased, perhaps, to see his friend
attempt the task which at least two emissaries had
undertaken for him. ' It wiU be a most disagreeable
conference,' wrote Newcastle to Holdernesse, ' but
there is no help for it ; ' ^^ while to Hartington, with
whom he corresponded regularly on Irish business,
he opened his heart much as though it were a swan-
song he was penning, remarking among other
things, ' I can go out and easily, but not be a cipher
in office.' ^^ The Duke of Newcastle was not a
cipher, but as to the former statement — alas, if he
could but have seen himself through others' eyes !
On the evening of the 2nd of September New
castle received his expected visitor and they talked
for two hours and a haU without interruption.
Like Hardwicke, the Duke began first to discuss
Pitt's own position and prospects,®^ and ended with
the offer which Pitt had desired in April — 'the
89 Newcastle to Hard^vicke, August 22, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32858, f. 241.
90 Newcastle to Holdernesse, August 29, 1755 : ibid., f . 329.
91 Newcastle to Hartington, August 30, 1755: Walpole,
Memoirs of George II, I. 532.
92 It is amusing to read how the Duke quibbled over the word
' designation ' until Pitt caught him up and exposed the bluff.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 329
King's countenance ', with the addition of a seat
in the Cabinet Council.
But stress of circumstances had made the Pay
master a very different person from the neglected
genius who had yearned for recognition in the
spring, and the price of his services proved pro
portionately higher. He gave his host distinctly to
understand that he ' could not and would not take
an active part in the House of Commons, unless he
had an office of advice as well as of execution ' ; he
' would not, like a lawyer, talk from a brief '. The
Lower House, in his opinion, was but an ' assembly
of atoms ' ; the ' great wheels of the machine were
stopped ' ; ^* and no mere seat in the Cabinet (so
he had said) would enable him to act with efficiency.
He then added that whereas the Duke did not
know the House of Commons, he ' might say with
out vanity that he did better than anybody ' ; ^*
and that what it most needed was the presence of
a minister who should be the direct avenue of
business between the Commons and the King.
It was Legge's old idea resuscitated !
93 According to his own account, as given by Doddington,
Pitt told Newcastle that ' his system of carrying on the business
of the House of Commons would not do ' . This was a censure
of the mongrel ' system ' which we have noticed for the session
of 1754-5, and which had not j'et been altered, in so far as there
was still no recognized leader in the House.
9* Hardwicke, who was not unskilful in reading character,
had advised his friend to flatter Pitt with respect to his
abUities in the Commons ; but it would seem that the latter
made it impossible. Newcastle may weU have thought of Fox's
abilities, but he made no answer to the conceit.

330 HENRY FOX ch.
Pitt then grew bolder as he became animated on
the subject. He actually told his host that he
should "give up some of his sole power' ; but when
the latter denied the existence of such " sole power".
the Paymaster assured him that he approved of
a peer in the Treasury, but hinted that other
officers must receive their proper support. This
reminded bim of Legge. whom he praised in the
most superlative degree, entirely justifying his
conduct ; iU-usage, he said, had made him the
favourite of the Commons.*^ Finally, upon a
reference to the Seals, he told the Duke that since
the King liked his Secretaries too weU to remove
them (with compensation elsewhere), that fact in
itself must decide him against taking an active part
in the Commons.
This shoiUd surely have been sufficient : but
Newcastle was fain to take up the Treaties, and
adduced aU the arguments of which his shallow
brain could think. But Pitt was violent in his
disapprobation, ridiculing the Hessian Treaty in
particular, whereas the Russian could be justified
only in time of peace. He woiUd support the
former ** if it would put an effectual stop to others.
but would not support a whole system of treaties ; *'
^ He spoke of him as the chUd of the Whigs '.
9* ' As a mark (thus runs Pitts account) of the affection of
a ruined nation for the honour of its King, who had entered
into a rash engagement '.
^" Pitt, according to his own version, went so far as to suggest
patfitig the Czarina and the Landgrave of Hessse to let their
engagements faU through, adding. ' WTiere would be the

V SUBSLDIES AND RECRL1TING 331
and if Devonshire should oppose them in the
Lords, he would echo him in the Lower House.
Against this tirade the Duke of Newcastle only
wasted his breath, and after persuading Pitt to
agree to a second meeting, at Powis House,'* the
conference ended.** The Duke was satisfied with
his visitor's civUity. but got no hope of any change
in his resolution.
Three alternatives occurred to the First Lord,
as he wrote next day to his ' oracle '. He might
resign and let Fox succeed him at the head of the
Administration — ^that is, ' yield to the cabal ' ; ^"^
he might remain, with Pitt as Secretary and Legge
in his present post : or he might accept Fox's
overtures, and expect others to help with their
support."^ 'To give aU the answers," rephed Hardwicke,
' which naturaUy occur to his (Pitt's) ill-founded
objections, would exhaust the language.' The
ChanceUor decided that the Paymaster was even
haughtier than when he (Hardwicke) had talked
\vith him, and suspected that he was, in plain
harm of it ? ' It is odd that Newcastle makes no mention of
this singular proposal.
** The ChanceUor's town-house.
99 The two authorities for the interview are Newcastle" s
letter to Hardwicke, September 3, 1755, and Doddington,
Diary, September 3, 1755. Walpoles brief report of it is hardly
worthy of notice.
i"* In other words, to the Cumberland Party and its ad
herents. 101 Newcastle to Hardwicke, Septembers, 1755 : Add. 5ISS.,
32S58, f. 408.

332 HENRY FOX ch.
English, teasing Newcastle for the Seals. If a
promise, then, could be secured from the King,
that alone, he believed, would be sufficient to
make Pitt perform ' an active part '. As for the
issue, the first alternative, he continued, would be
criticized as a ' second resignation ' in a time of
great distress, ^"^ and would moreover be flinging
Fox at the King without giving him any choice in
the matter ; the second must be obnoxious to the
King, must weaken Newcastle's own position, and
give a chance for Pitt to make unpleasant remarks
on the former transaction with Fox ; -^"^ but of the
last proposition which the Duke mentioned the
ChanceUor approved thoroughly. Fox had a party,
a patron and the personal inclination of the King.
Pitt could not boast of any party, or any support
at Court, and had the aversion of the King ; and
an additional advantage of getting the Secretary-
at-War would be his unpopularity with Leicester
House. ^"* It might seem that the ChanceUor felt
that the Princess would have her deserts.
Two more meetings with Pitt took place, but
both quite in vain. Newcastle was unable to
persuade himself that he ought to ask for the Seals
from the King,"^ and Pitt finaUy rested his ulti
matum on his objections to the Russian Treaty
102 The first one was in 1745 during the Jacobite rebeUion.
i"8 An aUusion to the perfidy of March, 1754.
10* Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 4, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32858, f . 442.
105 Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 6, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32859, f. 5.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 333
and (a new obstacle) on his unwiUingness to act with
Fox.^"^ As the Secretary-at-War could not very
weU be told that he must be sUent or go into
opposition, merely because the Paymaster would
support the Administration, the second objection
was manifestly ridiculous. Pitt had expressed
much the same notion to Doddington on the night
of the interview. After giving him a detaUed
account of the Duke's overture, and discussing all
possible material for the campaign in the Commons,
he finally took occasion to state his objection to
Fox, of whom he had nothing to complain; but
since he was not sui juris (aUuding to the Cumber
land interests), Pitt could not act with him,
besides Fox was intimate with his greatest enemies :
GranvUle, Stone, and Murray.^*"
The Duke of Newcastle was now driven to
adopt his ' third alternative ', which Hardwicke
had advised and which necessity seemed to require.
In some ways Fox was the last man he would have
wished to enlist. The party which he had so much
reason to fear, and which had lately shattered his
ascendancy in the Cabinet, might more than ever
intrude its opinions upon the Government ; and,
even though the King had at last returned from
Hanover (thus bringing the CouncU of Regency to
an end), the Ministry would be no more secure
io« Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 15, 1755 : Add.
MSS., 32859, f . 86. Conscious of his faUure, Pitt was probably
intentionaUy widening the breach.
10' Doddington, Diary, September 3, 1755.

334 HENRY FOX ch.
if the leadership were transferred from Cumberland
to his most faithful supporter. Yet, on the other
hand, if Fox should accept the management of
the Commons, and of necessity the defence of the
Treaties, that very faction which he dreaded might
be split up, or better still, might be assimilated
into the Administration. Whether this advantage
occurred to the Duke at the time is extremely
doubtful, but he certainly knew that Fox, if united
with Pitt in opposition, would almost inevitably
wreck his measures and bring about his fall ; for no
one save Murray — and he a man of little courage
— could be depended upon to keep the Commons
in obedience. Thus the salvation of his policy
and his power was in the hands of the orator of
the Cumberlands.
Fox, for his part, was readily accessible.
Whether he had authorized GranviUe or not, he
did not deny the story to the Newcastles ; and
though one may argue that it was not his duty
to drive home every bit of gossip that arose from
the recesses of Claremont,"* it was truly unnatural
for him wiUingly to remain in a false position.
The fact seems obvious that he accepted the Lord
President's campaigning as a good stroke of
politics, and waited only for the word that would
make him master of the situation. How dearly
he paid for the speculation will be shown in the
next chapter.
Ten years' experience and adroit counsel had
108 The Duke of Newcastle's country-house.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 335
made Fox an exceedingly efficient Secretary-at- v
War. His several speeches on mUitary questions
show the insight which he possessed into more than
one feature of his department ; and his genius for
management as well as his characteristic energy
gave the War Office a stimulus that showed itself
notably in the prompt measures against the
French in America. Nor must it be considered
that a Secretary-at-War has necessarily an insignifi
cant position, merely because he is not as a rule
in the vanguard of the Ministry. In Fox's case
it might be almost said that the War Office was
the storehouse of his power and that of the
Cumberland party. If the association of the
Commoner and His Royal Highness were mutuaUy
profitable, there was also in that unity a consider
able power. While the Duke could feel that his
military projects would not lack punctual execution,
his redoubtable friend was enabled to exert an
unlimited influence in the matter of preferment ;
in other words. Fox was practically an autocrat in
military patronage,^"* and he who is chief in one
sphere of government is not a cipher in others.
AU of this helped the Cumberlands to become
what they were — a loosely-bound, but always
influential, and sometimes dominant faction in
the State. Would it appear strange, then, if Fox,
the artful corruptionist, and the staunch supporter
of Cumberland, should hesitate to yield such effec
tive machinery into another's hands ?
109 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 401.

336 HENRY FOX ch.
And yet he did not waver. Stone and GranviUe
were the mediators selected to entrap him — ^the
latter ' at once the victim, the creature, and the
scourge of the Duke of Newcastle '. In a moment
of doubt and fear the ' aspen Duke ' offered to
make way for the Earl himself, who laughingly
replied that he was ' not fit to be First Minister '.""
He next offered to resign, but the King had not
forgotten 1745 and would not hear of it."^ Yet
GranvUle's sneer may have suddenly put the Duke
on his mettle ; at aU events, when the Lord
President proposed that Fox should have the
Exchequer, he was apprehensive of having the
Secretary-at-War in a relationship so close and
possibly dangerous to his power, and answered
His Lordship that in that case they would never
agree a fortnight. ^^^ No, he would abandon that
mongrel system he had adopted hitherto and
give Fox the sole Leadership of the House of
Commons. The 20th to the 22nd was largely taken up in
meetings between the tempters and the tempted.
At the first interview (on the 20th) Fox remarked,
' My Lord, is it not fit that this should be the last
time we should meet to try to agree ? '
' Yes,' agreed the Duke, ' I think it is.'
110 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 402.
Ill Newcastle to Lady Katherine PeUiam, September 26,
1755 : Add. MSS., 32859, f. 219.
112 ' They quarreUed about it ', wrote Fox. ' I gave readUy
in to the Duke of Newcastle's opinion.' — Fox to Hartington,
September 23, 1755 : Walpole, Memoirs of George II, II. 535.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 337
' Then,' said Fox, ' If Your Grace thinks so, it
shaU be so.' ^»
The next day Newcastle wrote to his new convert,
Hartington, that he and the ChanceUor would do
aU they coiUd to arrange a settlement with the
Secretary-at-War, and ' act in the utmost consent
and confidence with him '."* They could not as
a matter of fact help themselves. Fox was per
fectly aware that the scales were in his favour,
and he soon proved himseU in no wise as tractable
as the Duke had expected, ^\^le^eas he was only
too glad to accept the management of the Commons
— upon the terms, it must be admitted, that he had
refused eighteen months before — he insisted upon
a special mark of favour from the King, which he
chose to translate as the seals of the Secretary of
State."^ Obviously the terms caUed for more
concession than the Newcastles had been prepared
to make.
Upon one point, however, the Duke felt that he
must quiet his mind before his final acceptance.
Fox had said they ' must stand or f aU together ' ;
this somided very assuring, and yet Mas it not Avise
to make certain that such unity would be real ?
n* Walpole, Memoirs of George II, II. 402. ' I told the Duke
of Newcastle ', wrote Fox to Hartington (September 23) ' that
this was the last time I would ever come to see if we could
agree. And so it is.'
n* Newcastle to Hartington, September 20, 1755 : Add.
MSS., 32859, f. 158.
115 Newcastle to Hartington, September 22, 1755: ibid.,
f. 183. U56 V

338 HENRY FOX ch.
Newcastle persuaded himself that the King was
Fox's only chance of acquiring power outside the
Ministry, and His Majesty must repeat the assurance
he had given last December.^^^
Now the King had always liked Fox, but he was
essentiaUy a man who admired a force that was
greater than his own. The late Queen and the
Earl of Orford had both succeeded in impressing
themselves upon the man who wore the crown,
and he let them govern him, because they knew
how to do it without hurting his vanity. GranviUe,
in a later day, became almost his idol, although it
is true that the influence he exerted was of quite
another sort. But when even GranviUe degener
ated into political subservience, his power in the
Closet became noticeably lessened. So it may
have been with Fox. The King knew to what
Newcastle's abilities amounted, and he could see
that Fox was wiUing to lower the strength of his
real character by submission to a man whom he
might have ruined ; he may have believed also that
his son's party was no longer to be the weighty
factor in the mind of the ambitious Secretary-at-
War, and he reahzed that the Duke of Newcastle
would never wiUtngly consent to aUow the Cumber-
lands to become masters.
Accordingly when the First Lord informed him
what Fox had said, the King replied, ' He may
very well fall without you ; ' and Newcastle was in
ecstasies at the further assurance that Fox should do
116 Newcastle to Lady K. Pelham, September 26, 1755.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 339
nothing — even in the House of Commons — without
the previous sanction of the First Minister. All
this the Duke was capable of exaggerating, when
he wrote about it afterwards to his sister-in-law ;
but he felt untold satisfaction. ' He has an office,'
he declared, ' which the King told me he would do
ill in.^" He can seldom see the King without
My Lord Holdernesse. He is removed from the
Secretary of (sic) War, and so far removed from the
Duke. But above aU it has given me an opportunity
to show the world that the King would put into that
office (as he has done) the man the most declared
friend of mine, My Lord Barrington, without con
sulting the Duke.' ^^* The Duke of Newcastle may
have felt that his treatment at the hands of the
chieftain of the Cumberlands was amply revenged.
Meanwhile GranviUe had been banished from
his agreeable role as being ' too warm ', ^^^ and
Newcastle determined to try his hand alone at
driving the bargain, while poor Waldegrave, who
happened to have an unenviable reputation for
expertness in diplomacy of this sort, was persuaded
to be present. The final meeting (which was a very
long one) took place apparently on the 22nd, and
the Duke, finding the master of the War Office fixed
11' This might be regarded as a rather interesting expose
of Newcastle's attitude toward the fiUing of high offices of
state. 118 Newcastle to Lady K. Pelham, September 26, 1755.
We can see how complete was Newcastle's intention of
circumscribing Fox's power.
119 Newcastle to Hartington, September 20, 1755.
Y2

340 HENRY FOX ch.
in his determination, accepted the conditions. ^^
Fox also mentioned the names of five persons whom
he wished to receive preferment ; ^^ after which
the Duke and his obhging friend went their way.
Thus Fox became by designation Secretary of
State, displacing Sir Thomas Robinson, who would
return to his old post in the Bedchamber, with
an added pension of £2,000 on the Irish establish
ment as a salve to his feelings. Barrington, who had
been Master of the Wardrobe during Sir Thomas's
sojourn in the ^Ministry, was named as the futm-e
Secretary-at-War ; and Fox, on hearing of the
nomination, had written to Newcastle that he
beheved Cumberland would give the Viscount as
decent a reception as he could ' reasonably desire '.^
The prediction was not only fulfiUed, but was
actuaUy realized through Fox's own efforts. Bar
rington aUowed the present Secretary-at-War to
present his respects to His Royal Highness, whUe
both men promised to receive the prospective
occupant ' very civUly ', and the Duke went so
far as to say that he had no choice of his own for
the office, even if it had been left to him.^ The
pacification of his ducal patron was Fox's first bit
of pohtics for his new friends.
1^ Newcastle to Hartington, September 22 and 25, 1754 :
Add. MSS., 32859, S. 183, 201.
121 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 402.
1^ Fox to Newcastle, September 20, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32859, f . 255. Barrington, as also Robinson and Fox, would not
come Formally into possession of his new post untU November.
123 Barrington to Newcastle, September 27, 1755 : ibid;, f . 246.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 341
To promise the furtherance of the Treaties was
of course unnecessary, but Fox took occasion to
teU the King in an audience on the 23rd that he
was for them, whether in or out of office.^^
GranviUe had told His Majesty previously that
he could not speak for his friend's views, and
obviously for the reason that Fox had been
reserving his decision tUl the time shoiUd come for
him to act. The latter now assured Hartington
that he would defend them upon any consideration,
' and in the act of vindicating the measure, declare
war on the Minister '.^^'
MeanwhUe the Ministry sorely needed vindication. ,
In August had come the news of Braddock's
defeat and the utter coUapse of the chief expedition
sent out in 1754 ; while its resvdt as far as the
Administration was concerned was to make it
aU the more in need of capable reinforcement.
Hardwicke had thought that this disaster had in
duced Pitt to raise his terms in the conference with
Newcastle the first week in September ; ^^® and its
effect upon people in general was inevitably to
124 Fox to Hartmgton, September 23, 1755 : Walpole,
Memoirs of George II, II. 535. Fox expressed his approval of
the Russian Treaty on the ground that it was a ' preventative
measure'. — Newcastle to Hartington, September 25, 1755:
Add. MSS., 32859, f. 201.
126 Fox to Hartmgton, September 23, 1755. Possibly Fox
was trying to cover the discomfitiu'e he felt in having deserted
to the enemy of the Cumberlands. His declaration is absurd
as it stands.
i2« Hardwicke to Newcastle, September 4, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32858, f. 442.

.342 HENRY FOX ch.
increase their hostility to a system of subsidies
which would divert attention from the Colonies.
In the meantime, as we have taken occasion to
note, the long-desired return of His Majesty had
terminated the dominance of the War Party in
the administration of foreign affairs, and the Duke
of Newcastle was again supreme. With Cumber
land's power at an end, and Fox an apostle of
the Newcastle system, the situation roughly con
sisted in an established policy of aggression from
which there was no turning back save by con
cession, ^ith an administration that had neither
the ability nor the hardihood to gain profit from
the Cumberlands' ill-advised legacy. In other
matters the Ministry was swayed by its op
timism. The Hanoverian problem had received
the Newcastle solution, and diplomatic entrench
ments were raised around the dreaded man at
Berlin. Early in the autumn Frederick had
manifested some willingness to draw closer to the
court of his uncle,-^^' but the English Ministry was
not inclined to be diverted from the policy already
established, and some indirect correspondence led
to no tangible results. It was diplomatic coquetry
and little else. Frederick dared not hazard a rupture
with Louis XV (with whom he was still in alliance)
unless perfectly assured of an adequate compensa
tion ; and as the Due de Nivernais was expected
soon to arrive in Berlin, a renewal of the Franco
is' Frederick to Michel, September 23, 1755 : Add. MSS,,
32859, f . 193.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 343
Prussian alliance (very soon to expire) was emi
nently probable. MeanwhUe the English Ministry
had no interest in letting the Russian Treaty appear
as a mistake, on the eve of a session of Parliament.
How far Fox could prevail upon his party to
follow his lead was a question. Hartington had
already surrendered to the Treaties, but Chats-
worth was supposed to be still on the war-path, and
Woburn was ominously silent. To the Marquis,
Fox wrote that the King deplored the Duke of
Devonshire's ultimatum, and the son set about
painting the Russian Treaty in the brightest
colours possible ; in the meantime the Duke of
Newcastle was immensely pleased with himself
and his chosen Secretary. To his Scottish friend,
the Duke of Argyll, he wrote that he felt persuaded
that the arrangement would be lasting ; ^^^ while
in a letter to the Lord Lieutenant he declared,
'We are both satisfied with each other at present,
and I doubt not but we shaU continue to be so.
It seems the resolution and intention of both
parties.' ^^' AU this appeared very roseate ; but
Chesterfield's prophetic irony came pretty near the
truth, when he remarked, ' The Duke of Newcastle
128 Newcastle to ArgyU, September 27, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32859, f. 237.
129 Newcastle to Hartington, September 30, 1755 : ibid.,
f. 281. In a previous letter (September 25) he had written,
' Your friend Fox and I (I hope) are determined to be good
friends to each other. We are now engaged in the same cause
and in the same bottom.' The sUght doubt expressed by
' I hope ' has now disappeared.

344 HENRY FOX ch.
has turned out every one else, and now he has
turned out himseU.' ^^
In violent contrast to the satisfaction of the
First Lord was the wrath of Leicester House on
hearing the news. As soon as the Princess
extracted the details from Cresset, she was almost
beside herseU with anger,^^ and her secretary
deduced that, whUe she would not oppose the King's
measures herseU, she would make no effort what
ever to instU obedience in her servants. Such
a threat was only too likely to be sincere ; and
Newcastle ^^Tote in one of his ' weekly journals '
to the ChanceUor that Lee had declared that he
' could not act with ' Fox, and that Egmont, whUe
more concUiatory than his rival, was unwilling to
' come in alone ' ^^^ — a reservation that was no
doubt perfectly safe.
The truth of the matter was — although New
castle shut his eyes to it — that the attitude of
Egmont and Lee was but a rephca of the
Princess's own feelings. Hardwicke declared
keenly that she had only herself to blame for the
elevation of Fox, since she had steadUy declined
180 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 403.
181 She declared that she was maltraitee ; and added that
whereas she had once been under some obUgations to New
castle, now ' nous sommes quits '. — Newcastle to Hardwicke,
September 28, 1755: Add. MSS., 35414, f. 80. 'In short,'
concluded the Duke, in relating the scene as he had heard it,
' rage and fury appeared through the whole.' — Ibid.
182 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1755: Add. MSS.,
32860, f. 13. He seems to have referred to Pitt.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 345
to use her influence with Pitt."' But the King
showed more shrewdness than any of them when
he observed, ' The Princess is angry with Fox only
for being against the Regency Act ; and he was
right (added the Sovereign) to be for my son
rather than (for) her.' ^^ The Lord President had
also an insight into the situation ; and whereas
he had congratulated the First Lord that with
Fox's accession the dangers were now past,^*^ stUl
it would be far from wise to begin the new session
with a proselyte of Leicester House in the Treasury;
and since Legge had refused to resign of his own
accord,"^ it was GranviUe's opinion — which Lady
Yarmouth persistently echoed — that an example
should be made of him.^*' The King told New
castle frankly that His Grace was wanting in spirit,
and the Countess assiu-ed the monarch that the Duke
was solely responsible for the ministerial apathy.^*^
188 Hardwicke expressed a wish that the King might be
induced to reassure her, and suggested that at least GranviUe
should be sent to calm her temper. — Hardwicke to Newcastle,
September 29, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32859, f. 263. The Duke
eventuaUy sent Munckhausen, who was civiUy received, but
when he endeavoured to explain the necessity of Fox's pro
motion, she ' put off the discourse '. — Newcastle to Hardwicke,
October 4, 1755 : ibid., f. 357.
184 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1755.
18S GranvUle to Newcastle, September 25, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32859, f. 208.
136 Walpole to Mann, September 29, 1755: Letters of Horace
Walpole, n. 347.
13' Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1755.
138 Newcastle to Hard\^icke, October 18,1755: Add. MSS.,
32860, f . 86.

346 HENRY FOX ch.
Yet the First Lord, perhaps because he had stiU
a lurking fear of its effect upon the nation, plainly
hesitated to take positive measures against the
ChanceUor of the Exchequer, who for more than
a year had been proscribed, but never had been in
danger ; and when he did talk vigorous language,
it was because he feared that GranviUe would say
that his jealousy had withheld the office from Fox."*
Dupplin, he ftnaUy concluded, would be his first
choice, now that Lee was out of the question,^*"
and the former could be conveniently disposed of
at the end of the session.^*^ The shifting and
transplanting of his numerous parasites was never
a hard problem.
The ChanceUor generaUy reflected more broadly
than his friend, but he seldom gave his advice save
when it was solicited, and he had to depend for
most of his information on the First Lord. He
agreed with GranviUe that ' examples should be
made ', though, with characteristic procrastina
tion, he would put off the evU day tUl Parlia
ment opened — advice which was eagerly accepted.
Meanwhile His Lordship saw clearly the advantage
of decimating their enemies, and favoured Egmont
(who he believed would be wUhng to act with Fox)
1^9 GranvUle, as we have seen, had suggested this office
for Fox.
1*0 Pitt had ' bit him to the bone ' was the way the Chancellor
expressed himself . — Hard\vicke to Newcastle, October 13, 1755 :
ibid., f . .30.
1*1 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1755.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 347
rather than a man like Dupplin, whom the Opposi
tion would malign as an ' absolute fool '."^
Seemingly the greatest comfort of the First Lord
was the King's attitude toward the prospective
Secretary of State. Abreu, the Spanish am
bassador, had written to his court that the new
chief of the department of the South would be
in aU things subservient to the Conciliabulum, as
Granville had dubbed the ' inner clique ' ; "^ and
Newcastle noticed that his ingenuity — for there
is little doubt that he instigated the letter — met
with marked approval in the Closet. ' I am glad,'
said the King on hearing of it. ' I told Fox that
the Ministry had brought him in, that if he did not
behave well, they would quarrel with him, and so
should I too. Fox is not popular.' Whereupon
the First Lord eagerly depicted the dislike which
the City felt for the Secretary-at-War. Yet Fox
was not the only one out of favour with His Majesty.
When the Ministers asked Lady Yarmouth if there
was any hope of his recognizing Pitt when the
latter came to Court, Her Ladyship made it clear
that the King had spoken of him in terms so
scurrilous that Newcastle made an emphatic dash
of omission in his letter relating the episode."*
1*2 Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 13, 1755.
1*3 Fox's Memoirs, Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox,
p. 9.
1** Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 4, 1755. The episode
is speciaUy worthy of note in view of the tendency of some
writers to underestimate the King's hatred of Pitt and over
estimate Newcastle's desire to blacken him. It was about this

348 HENRY FOX ch.
Certainly the King felt a hatred for- Pitt that he
never would feel for his rival.
While the Newcastles were intrenching them
selves in the Closet, Fox was not idle in the
furtherance of ' the cause '. It was decided that
he should not enter his new office till after the
address was voted in the House of Commons,
since the promotion entailed his standing for re
election, and just as all his time was required now,
so also his presence would be demanded later, to
ensure a good impression for the Administration
on the opening day.^*® With this end in view he
penned the usual circular to members of the
Commons upon whom he thought he could depend,
but made it of rather more personal a character
than was customary,"® being determined that all
over whom he had the remotest influence should
time that the Duke also heard (from GranvUle) of the rupture
between the two Commoners in May. Hardwicke, on receiving
the account, remarked that it was ' curious, and quite in one (of
them)'s style '. — Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 13, 1755.
1*5 Robinson to CarUsle, October 2, 1755 : CarUsle MSS.,
Hist. MSS. Comm., Report V, app. 6, p. 209; Walpole,
Memoirs, II. 419.
146 The letter, as given by Walpole (ibid., pp. 420-1) ran as
f oUows : ' Sir, — The King has declared his intention to make
me Secretary of State, and I (very unworthy as I fear I am of
such an undertaking) must take upon me the conduct of the
House of Commons. I cannot therefore weU accept the office
tUl after the first day's debate, which may be a warm one.
A great attendance that day of my friends wiU be of the
greatest consequence to my future situation, and I should be
extremely happy if you would for that reason show yourself
among them,' to the great honour of &c. &c.

v SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 349
if possible attend on the day of the Address.
Newcastle felt a moment's distrust of the expression
' to have the conduct of the House of Commons ',
but he had to admit that Fox's behaviour at
present was above reproach, in which opinion the
chief of the Admiralty concurred. ^^' When, how
ever, the letter was recited to Newcastle imder
somcAvhat unfavourable circumstances, the sus
picious words seemed to rmg with sinister designs ;
and the ChanceUor, who was sure there was a
'meaning in it', declared that 'there had been
times in which such circulars, he beUeved, would
have been brought before the House. ^** In very
truth these two were mortaUy afraid of the very
man whom they had engaged to terrify others.
Leicester House was quick to see an opening in
any shp on the part of its enemies, and Lee forth-
"' Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 4, 1755. The only
apparent reason why the words ' to have the conduct of the
House of Commons ' should have evoked suspicion was its
juxtaposition in the letter to the announcement of the King's
intention. The ' conduct ' or management of the House was
never delegated by the King, but by the controlling influence
in the Cabinet. But ' conduct ' could hardly be more objec
tionable than the usual expression ' lead ' — that is, to have
the ' lead ' in the Commons. It is more than possible, however,
that Newcastle himself feared that the new manager ^ as giving
the Commons the impression that he was to have entire
authority in the disposition of emplojinents and the use of the
secret-service money, which, as the King once said (Walpole,
Memoirs, I. 335), had always been exclusively in the hands of
the First Lord of the Treasury. But Hardwicke's objection
wae more likely the one we mentioned first.
1** Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 13, 1755.

350 HENRY FOX ch.
with attacked Fox not only for the ' presumptuous
letter ', but also for having forced upon the King
the payment of an exorbitant pension ' to remove
the honestest, best and ablest man ', &c. This was
said to his friend Hume Campbell, who faUed to
shake him in his opinion. But the King was more
reasonable — or else he was biassed by every token
of rebellion from his daughter-in-law — and declared
it ' nonsense . . . Fox might be attacked for his
letter, if it was an indiscreet one, . . . but could not
be attacked for coming into office before he had done
anything.' "* But these were ominous weeks, and no
one realized this so much as the Duke of Newcastle.
Fox was indeed so much in the spirit of winning
recruits that he even wrote to Legge, asking him
if he would consent, as a favour, to preside at
the Cockpit,^^" where the Ministry's well-trained
majority were usually called together to learn their
catechism the night before the opening of a session.
But Newcastle was too bitter against his Chancellor
of the Exchequer to think very favourably of the
artifice,^®^ and Legge was too shrewd to be entrapped.
Frustrated in his aim of confounding the Oppo-
1*9 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 18, 1755.
150 Fox to Legge, October 2, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32859, f . 323.
Fox was doubtless hoping to win over Legge by appeaUng to
his vanity.
151 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 4, 1755. Hardwicke
remarked that the letter was one of the ' oddest ' he had ever
read ; did it proceed from confidence in Legge, he wondered,
or from contempt ? — Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 6, 1755 :
ibid., f . 398.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 351
sition. Fox turned to more likely material, in
which he reckoned Doddington, SackvUle and the
stiU reticent Bedford. The ex-Treasurer of the
Navy was a man of slender principles and most
sordid motives, but his nominal adherence to
Leicester House would make him a useful pawn
to represent the measures of the larger court, and
his popularity in the social world meant the possi
bUity of further accessions. Fox had the advantage
of numbering him among his friends, and he knew
that the notorious intriguer could be bought as
soon as his vanity was sufficiently satisfied.
On the 2nd of October Doddington dined at
Fox's expense at the Thursday Night Cafe m
Hammersmith, and the Secretary-at-War expended
much time and tactics in sounding his guest. The
ex-Treasurer was unwUhng as yet to concoct a
definite answer, but he spoke of A^dshing to bring in
Sir Francis Dashwood, whUe in aU things he must
' be weU with ' Hillsborough, Murray, HalUax
and Fox himseU. But he evidently parted from
his companion without making up his mind.
Fox was disposed however to be sangume ; he
knew the old placeman was eager to come back
to employment, but had probably declared openly
against the Treaties — a fact which created natural
hesitation. Newcastle should enhst Hahfax and
Murray — so he wrote the First Lord — and that
too without loss of time.^^^
15-! Fox to Newcastle, October 2, 3, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32859,
f. 345.

352 HENRY FOX ch.
The Duke was prompt in all matters of pohtics,
and he obeyed his lieutenant without delay. Yet
he certainly was imposing greatly on good nature
when he now wrote to the man whose appeals for
a garter had been persistently ignored, and there
was not even a suggestion of reward for the
disappointed Earl if he consented to lend his
assistance. Places were promised for his two
friends, Hillsborough and Doddington ; but that
was the extent of the Duke's atonement. ^^^ Yet
Halifax had in mind the Cabinet Council and
probably believed he saw an opening.
On the 6th, Murray, who had agreed to contri
bute his aid in the transaction, ran across Fox by
accident and heard that aU was not going weU.
Doddington complained of iU-treatment, and the
shrewd Attorney-General decided that higher terms
must be offered. He urged Newcastle to assume
the negotiation himself, and above aU to lose no
time in the matter. ^^* When the Duke obeyed,
he found that Murray had in no wise under
estimated the situation. In his valuation of him
self Doddington was not uiUike the most sordid
of German princelings ; and the First Lord was
pained to confess that he was more rabid than
Pitt on the subject of the Russian Treaty ; when,
in fact, the Duke had appeared surprised that Fox
had not explained the Treaties, the other had said
153 Newcastle to HaUfax, October 4, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32859, f . 369.
154 Murray to Newcastle, October 7, 1755 : ibid., f . 417.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 353
that he ' didn't believe Mr. Fox understood them
himself ' ^^® — which was probably true. In his
account to the ChanceUor the Duke added that
the attitude of Leicester House ' operated more
than all other circumstances put together '.^^®
Shortly afterwards Newcastle learned that Egmont
stood well with Lee,^®' and if such reconciliation
had indeed taken place, the Duke knew that the
Tory chief was further than ever from their hopes.
Lady Yarmouth would have the King talk person
ally to his grandson, ^^* but this last resource was
not tried. Meanwhile the expectation of opposition
was said to be almost universal,^^* and Newcastle
must redouble his efforts to secure Doddington.
On the 19th the Duke met his intended friend
again, and, no doubt after much wrangling, some
preliminaries were drawn up,^^° considerably in
excess of Doddington's just expectations, and
slightly burdensome to the First Lord if he had
been really disposed to take them seriously.
Nothing more than a hint of something exalted
155 Doddington, Diary (ed. 1828), app., pp. 270-1.
156 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1755.
15' Ibid. ; Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 18, 1755.
158 Ibid.
159 Hartington to Newcastle, October 7, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32859, f. 413. Chesterfield, who was more in touch with the
country than with the City and Court, had written of late,
' The next session, which now draws near, wUl, I believe, be
a very troublesome one ; and I reaUy thirUi it seems doubtful
whether the subsidiary treaties with Russia and Cassel will
be carried out.' — Chesterfield's Corres. III. 1138.
160 Doddington, Diary (ed. 1828), app., pp. 275-6.
1156 7

354 HENRY FOX ch.
was actually given to Doddington himself, but he
was apparently satisfied with the promises for his
friends. Fox was already seeking to win SackviUe as
another valuable recruit, and managed to induce
him to resume relations with Claremont. But
Newcastle was grieved to see that Lord George
was exceedingly reserved (although he ' paid a
personal compliment to Mr. Fox ') ; such was the
quaUty of his gratitude to Newcastle for saving
his father from disgrace ! "^ Later it appeared
that Lord George might yield somewhat, but he
insisted that he should receive a ' special mark of
favour as the price of his support ', and this the
Duke was apparently not yet prepared to obtain
for him.^®^ Lord George's bent was the army,
and he hesitated to take any step that might
endanger his prospects.^**
The work of recruiting was not entirely the
policy of one side in the matter of the Treaties.
Thomas Potter was a member of the Pitt-Leicester
House party who was peculiarly fitted for political
handicraft. The Duke of Bedford was in particular
the man for whom both sides would fight, and
Potter felt much pleasure in having coaxed His
161 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1755.
162 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 18, 1755.
163 Memorandum by SackvUle: Stopford-SackviUe MSS.,
Hist. MSS. Comm., Report IX (octavo), I. 49. SackviUe was
shrewd enough to be unwilling to become closely identified
with the present Administration. — SackvUle to Newcastle,
November 10, 1755: Add. MSS., 32860, f. 434.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 355
Grace into condemning the Subsidies. As for
Newcastle, the Duke ' hoped in God no one of his
friends, particularly Mr. Fox ', would attempt to
interfere with the First Lord's destruction. ' And
now,' wrote Potter to GrenviUe, ' let Mr. F. and
the Duke of Cumberland come and welcome.' "*
In fact the intrepid Potter appeared so successful
that Temple thought to make the affair conclusive.
Unfortunately the Earl was a man totally deficient
in tact, and as the little Duke was of an inflammable
temper, the meeting was cold and indecisive.^®^
Potter accordingly returned to the r61e he enjoyed.
The Pittites were fearful that the Duke might be
prejudiced by the Cumberland version of the great
rupture ; Potter must therefore contrive that the
story should be skilfully ' turned '.
But Bedford was too wary. He listened with
patience to his guest's explanation, but loyalty
kept him from accepting it entirely until he had
Fox's own account ; for hitherto his information
had come from Rigby. He was disposed, however,
to criticize his friend in the light of his recent
promotion, which had saved the Minister they all
hated ; and, as for measures, he believed thoroughly
in a sea war, but condemned the Subsidies, though
he refused to make his attitude public as yet."^
Very soon afterward Fox himself tried his
16* Potter to Grenville (letter undated) : Grenville Papers,
I. 137. 165 Ibid.
166 Potter to Temple (letter undated) : Grenville Papers,
I. 140,
Z2

.356 HENRY FOX ch.
hand at winning the old Cumberland leader. He
first prevaUed upon Marlborough to consent to
relinquish the Privy Seal,'^*' in case that office should
prove sufficient bait, and then wrote to Gower
asking him to make Bedford the offer. ^® The Earl
was glad to beheve that the Duke of Newcastle had
nothing to do with the transaction, but he refrained
from giving his brother-in-law any personal advice. ^^
The Duke made answer the next day and the plan
seemed to have f aUen through. Bedford was not
only unwilling to be a part of any Administration of
which Newcastle was a member — a determination
he had held from the time he resigned the Seals —
but was also emphaticaUy opposed to the Treati^.
He concluded by expressing his regret that he
could not oblige Fox, for whom no one could wish
better than himself.^"' The Secretary-at-War, on
receipt of the Duke's decision, sent the First Lord
an account, which the larter repeated to the
ChanceUor. ¦^''^ Not east down by his faUure, Fox
saw his friend at a conference of three hours on
the 31.st, but the Duke stUl refused to join any
Administration of Newcastle" s, and would not
recant on the subject of the Treaties.^'-
1®^ Walpole, Memoir? of George II, I. A*)5.
168 Fox to Gower, October 14. 17.5-5 : Bedford Corres. II. l&S.
1® Gower to Bedford, October 14, 175-5 : ibid. H. 167.
Gower enclosed Fox's letter.
I'o Bedford to Gower, October 15. 17.5-5 : ibid. II. 170.
I'l Newcastle to Hardwicke, ijet.ber IS, 175-5.
1'- Fox to Xewca.?tle. November 1, 17.5o : Add. iLS>,
32860, f. 266.

v SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 357
Notwithstanding his ill-starred endeavour, P'ox
must have found some relief therein. Had the
Duke of Bedford determined to foUow Devonshire
into open hostUity, there would have been a sad
parting of the ways for the two friends ; but
luckily the Duke had said that he ' would never
again give in to another Leicester House opposi
tion '."' ' This is honest and open ', wrote Fox
to the Marquis, ' and were he not afraid of
being thought to be governed, he would be doing
right.' 1'*
The Marquis of Hartington was a valuable
member of the Cumberland group of secessionists.
On the 7th he had written to Newcastle endorsing
with pleasure the promotion of his friend of HoUand
House. ' It will of course make Mr. Pitt more
outrageous,' he wrote, ' and I take it for granted
he will flame out most furiously, but as you wiU
have a strong majority, I should hope it wUl not
be attended by any bad consequence.' ^'' The
Lord Lieutenant had not then received the dis
cretionary powers which had been promised him,
but Fox had reminded Newcastle of the urgency
of the case,^'* and the First Lord had already
i'3 Probably an aUusion to his co-operation with the late
Prince's party in effecting the overthrow of Walpole.
1'* Fox to Hartington, November 4, 1755 : Torrens, History
of British Cabinets, II. 240.
"5 Hartmgton to Newcastle, October 7, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32859, f. 413.
178 Promised, as we have already noted, by way of a bribe
to the Devoushii'cs.

358 HENRY FOX ch.
sent the despatches on the way. The Duke was
eager that Hartington should explain the Russian
Treaty to his father,^'' although he did not add
that the favour to his son was calculated to move
him. The Marquis did what he could, but he was
not immediately successful.
Fox was still loth to lose Bedford. Both as
a man of more than ordinary abUity, and as one
of the original members of the Cumberland ' anti-
Newcastle society ', the Duke must not be aUowed
to foster hopes in the breasts of the Ministry's
enemies. The Secretary-elect had suggested that
Hardwicke be urged to try his fortunes at Bed
ford House,^'^ and Newcastle himself beheved
that the Chancellor could wipe out prejudices,
Avhere Fox would not take the pains to do so.
Moreover it hurt the Duke's sensitiveness to
responsibility that he should now be ' distinguished
from the rest of the Ministers'."®
A severe cold prevented Hardwicke from repair
ing to Bedford House the next night, but the day
following that, November 3, the ChanceUor enjoyed
a long and indecisive colloquy. Bedford was
pleased with Fox's promotion, but Hardwicke saw
no way of bringing in Newcastle's name or the old
points of disagreement, and practicaUy aU he could
1" Fox to Newcastie, October 2, 3, 1755 : Add. MSS.
32859, f. 345.
i'8 Fox to Newcastie, November 1, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32860, f. 266.
i'9 Newcastle to Hardwicke, November 1, 1755 : ibid., f . 268.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 359
do was to explain the Russian Treaty, adding
a favourite argument of the Administration, that
France would probably bid for the Swedish fleet,
and the Court of St. Petersburg would make a useful
balance-wheel. But beyond acquiescing in the
Hessian Treaty, Bedford gave his guest small
satisfaction.^^" A few days later, however, a little
hope was gleaned from the assurance of Fox that
Rigby had promised to vote for the Treaties, and,
of course, with Bedford's approval.^^^
Meanwhile the canvassing for votes and speakers
was pursued uninterruptedly and in all directions.
The First Lord's plan, it will be remembered, was
to raise an able corps of debaters to second the
recognized leader ; consequently much thought
was at first directed to the acquisition of Lord
Marchmont's brother, Hume Campbell, who was
known as a speech-maker of more than usual fire.
UnluckUy the King put his veto on the proposi
tion,"- and the buying of CampbeU was necessarUy
deferred ; but Hillsborough was no mean orator,
and, as he was an infiuential member of the Cumber
land party, his purchase — probably through Fox's
efforts — caused not a little pleasure. Murray was,
of course, chief of staff to the commander, and
Oswald as weU as Nugent (of the Treasury Board)
could be relied upon for efficient assistance, both
180 Hardmcke to Newcastle, November 3, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32860, f. 324.
"81 Fox to Newcastle, November 7, 1755 : ibid., f. 402.
18- Newcastle to Hardwicke, November 1, 1755.

360 HENRY FOX ch.
of them being speakers of ability. Finally, 'old
Horace ', who had been indiscreet enough to dislike
the Treaties, must be converted by the promise of
a peerage. ^^^ After the initial battle the First
Lord hoped that many of the Opposition would
fall off, and Alderman Baker had cheered him with
good news from the City. If Fox should act
sincerely, the Alderman declared that he would
' risk his head ' that they carried everything in
the House of Commons. ' We are not now,' he
declared, ' to be governed by speeches, that is over.
All we want is a man to lead us on, and, depend
upon it, we will follow.' ^^* Thus may be seen the
need, which had long been felt, of a responsible
manager for the Commons.
Meanwhile the time for the session was fast
drawing near and the mover of the Address was
not chosen. Fox still clung to the idea of enlisting
SackviUe, who, he thought, would be the fittest
to move the Address in the Commons.^** The
Chancellor was approached with a hint to lend
his second son for the purpose, but the crafty
lawyer was always conservative in any matter
that might possibly be prejudicial to his family,
and he refrained from giving a definite opinion. "°
183 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 18, 1755.
18* Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1755.
185 Fox to Newcastle, November 7, 1755. SackviUe's
definite refusal was not written until the 10th.
186 Newcastle to Fox, November 8, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32860, f. 414,

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 361
At all events no time must be lost, thought
Fox, for nobody would care to do it ' if spoke
to late '. "'
Newcastle was not inclined to feel the necessity
for such haste, and, knowing the force of obligation,
he assured Fox that Barrington would consent ' on
a day's notice '. A conference between the two
managers was apparently held on November 10,
and Lord Hillsborough was finally persuaded to
undertake the task ; so that point was settled.
The First Lord showed as tireless an energy as
his lieutenant in routing out members to attend on
the first day ; and he spent most of the intervening
weeks in writing letters to his brother peers for
this purpose. To explain the Russian Treaty, to
repeat the assurance that the Chancellor and he
had been the instigators of the new appointment,
and either to mention some obligation to himself
or to hold out some hope of emolument — such is
the method of campaigning disclosed in these
epistles. Not content with this, the Duke enlisted
Stone and Granville to assist in the canvassing,"^
for the Ministry were keenly alive to the probable
effect of making a good show in the initial skirmish,
and Newcastle even went the length of asking
Hartington to send all their friends in Ireland to
swell the numbers."" Walpole had recently written
to a friend, ' We expect the Parliament to be
18' Fox to Newcastle, November 7, 1755.
188 Newcastle to Fox, November 8, 1755.
189 Newcastle to Hartington, October 15, 1755.

362 HENRY FOX ch.
thronged, and great animosities.' ^^° But if the
two adepts in corruption had done their work
thoroughly, the shafts of Pitt and Leicester House
were blunted already.
On the day of the meeting at the Cockpit, Fox
sent word to the Chancellor that the Duke of Bed
ford had not only promised to send his dependents
to the gathering, but expressed a desire to speak
for the Address in the Lords ;"^ and the day
following the Secretary-elect repeated his assurance
to Newcastle. ^*^ Meanwhile Hardwicke was work
ing on the Address, to the composition of which his
Grace of Woburn had contributed some sugges
tions.^'^ On the eve of the great struggle the Secretary-
designate presided at the Cockpit and saw with
satisfaction that Bedford had kept his word.^"*
Conspicuous for their absence were Pitt, Legge,
Grenville and the Townshends ; ^^^ but Fox had
mustered the largest assemblage ever seen there,^®®
and every foe was clearly known. As for himself,
in two days more the War Office would cease to be
190 Walpole to Bentley, October 31, 1755 : Ldters of Horace
Walpole, III. 360.
191 Fox to Hardwicke, November 12, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32860, f. 454.
192 Fox to Newcastie, November 13, 1755 : ibid., f. 469.
193 Ibid. ; Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 405.
19* Fox to Hardwicke, November 12, 1755.
195 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 405.
196 289 members were present. — Walpole to Conway,
November 15, 1755 : Letters of Horace Walpole, III. 365.

V SUBSIDIES AND RECRUITING 363
his, while the fun of managing majorities would
be its compensation. Would it pay ? was the
question to be answered. Walpole showed no
little sagacity when he observed that Fox would
either be ' First Minister ' or be ' ruined '.^'^
Such indeed was an accurate resume' of the case.
There was no half-way position.
19' Walpole to Mann, September 29, 1755 : ibid. III. 349.

CHAPTER VI
SECRETARY OF STATE
Henry Fox in a certain sense had reached the
crisis of his career. He was elevated — or would be
in two days — to the highest public office which he
had yet filled. Once before he had received this
appointment, but honour and dignity had at that
time compelled him to refuse it. He was now
entering the office with his eyes open, and he knew
what to expect, both from the man whom he was
forced to acknowledge as his overlord, and from the
foreign entanglements to which the policy of his
own party had contributed. In the management
of the Commons, with all its manifold requirements
and ramifications. Fox was unquestionably without
a peer ; it was his own sphere, his art, his cut-and-
dried life-work (if nothing intervened to change
his feelings), in short the haven of his highest
aspirations. But unluckily this was but half, and,
in justice to his country, the less important half,
of the duty that was before him. He was about
to take upon himself the burdens of a Secretary of
State. Would he be the cipher in office that
Robinson had been and Holdernesse was still, or
would he show the fitness for statecraft that would
compel his employers to let him control his depart-

oh. VI SECRETARY OF STATE 365
ment, and, in short, that would impress his own
personality upon British policy abroad ? He
had not the advantage of a diplomatic trainmg,
which even Sir Thomas Robinson had had, and in
foreign affairs he had too often taken his cue from
the Duke of Cumberland, or shaped his attitude
to meet some political end. The very policy which
the Government was then adopting Mas, accord
ing to aU our evidence, in disagreement with his
inmost feelings. True he might not openly blunder,
but to fail of high success under a man like
Newcastle was to become a cipher in office and
nothing more.
The criticism of Fox from a political standpomt
must, of com'se, depend upon another question.
If he should be able to raise himseU ui the eyes of
the nation, he might raise his party as well, and
give his patron once more the power he had
wielded. Nothing but the fiercest cabal could
dislodge him, if he should prove a consummate
diplomatist, or — perhaps by virtue of the royal
Duke — an organizer of military glory. The un
known talent of Pitt, the unsuspected aims of
Leicester House, would be as nothmg in his path.
But such results as these would be his only justifica
tion for reinforcing a tottering Administration.
As the Duke of Bedford declared, m speaking
of his friend's promotion, ' He has saved the
Duke of Newcastle, who without his acceptance
was absolutely undone ; he could have rmi no
risk in standing out. as Pitt had refused first, and

366 HENRY FOX • ch.
as, if the Duke of Newcastle fell, he stood first
in the graces of the Closet ; he might have refused
with much more safety than he did a year and a
half since, and, as he lost no favour then, he could
have lost none now.' ^
The truth was, Fox failed to realize that so far
as his real political value was concerned, he had
' lost no favour then ' ; and he was of too active
and impatient a nature to play the waiting game
that so wearied and exasperated his rival. Instead
of that, he submitted to climb still higher on a
rotting hulk that was doomed to sink with all its
crew, unless his own talent and spirit could repair
the seams. Even graver is the situation when we
consider that he had now no solid support behind
him. The little party, which he had first supported
and later captained, had in its power the chance
sooner or later to lay low the man whose childish
ness and incompetency had brought it into being.
It is hardly too much to say that now in this very
month of November the Cumberlands, by joining
the opposition to the Treaties, could have turned the
Newcastles out of office ; and yet the man who, in
debating power and parliamentary talent, was
the very essence of the party, had deserted its
acknowledged standards, and virtually stamped out
its political existence.
But the most serious phase of Fox's error was
one that was yet to be felt, one which he could not
1 Potter to Temple (letter undated) : Grenville Papers,
I. 145.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 367
have perceived in its full strength now, and one
out of which he would later find profit at the
expense of his fellow Whigs. While the Cumber
land Party existed, it was bound to be a teUing
weapon against the other faction of the royal
house ; the Duke was foremost in the King's
affections, and the Princess dared not step too far.
Now, however, by the annihilation of that party
and the subordinating of its members to another
interest, the Cumberlands were no longer in a
position to cope with the little element that would
soon wax great. There is indeed small doubt but
that Bute had long been engaged in laying the
foundations of his future power, and time would
show that the Leicester House of 1756 would be
very different from the Leicester House of 1755,
when its only conspicuous champion was hated
by the King and unheeded by the Commons.
Thus the time had clearly come when Henry
Fox was called upon to prove his mettle. If he
could coerce his colleagues by persuasion or prac
tical domination, he might vindicate his course ;
but only thus could his political career be saved.
Walpole had stated the truth when he declared
that Fox would be Prime Minister or be ruined.
Parliament opened on the 13th of November, and
as had been prophesied, advantage was taken from
the Address in answer to the King's Speech, to
assail the two Treaties. ' The details of the
speeches, which were very long,' wrote Horace
Walpole to his cousin, ' and some exceedingly

368 HENRY FOX ch.
fine, it would be impossible to give you in any
compass.' ^ Most of the prominent figures for
and against the policy of the Administration made
their comments in clear and spirited language in
defence of the principles they had espoused.
Grenville spoke well, Murray even better, whUe
WiUiam Gerald Hamilton, a friend of Fox, made
his debut in a speech that won him an enduring
fame.* But the chief honours of the evening were
taken by the Paymaster, who ridiculed Egmont's
arguments, deprecated the use of the King's
name in speeches, declaimed loudly for a naval
war, and poured critical irony on the engagement
with the Czarina. Yet he disclaimed ' rancour
to any man who had set himseU at the head of
this measure ; as yet that man had only his pity ' ;
for it would ' hang like a millstone about his neck
and sink the Minister along with the nation'.
Later he made the famous simile in reference to
Fox and Newcastle : ' I remember at Lyons to
have been carried to see the conflux of the Rhone
and Saone ; this a gentle, feeble, languid stream ;
the other a boisterous and impetuous torrent —
but they meet at last ; and long may they continue
united to the comfort of each other, to the glory,
honour and security of the nation.' *
2 Walpole to Conway, November 15, 1755 : Ldters of
Horace Walpole, III. 365.
* It was his one notable achievement, and he earned tho
nickname of ' single-speech HamUton '.
* The speech abounded in theatrical efforts. He later im-

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 369
Fox rose after Pitt's long speech was finished,
but was tired from his long campaigning, and said
little. ' We are no longer representative,' he began,
' if a great majority is not declarative of the
sentiments of the nation. Are we to feel no justice
and gratitude unless the King asks it of us ?
Nobody has used the King's name so often as the
honourable gentleman. He has shown a strong
curiosity to know whose the measure was, while he
said he intended to arraign only the measure.' *
The battle was waged till nearly five in the morning,*
and ended in a complete victory over the Opposition,
which even failed to secure the elimination of aUu-
sions to Hanover from the Address.' 'The new
friends, the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Fox, had 311
to 105,' * and after the first division there were but
pressed his hearers by depicting the King as far removed from
honest counsellors and surrounded by frightened Hanoverians.
After prophesying national bankruptcy, he concluded by
saying that the French beUeved that England had not ' sense
and virtue enough to make a stand ' — a feeling ui which he
thought he concurred.
5 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 412-17.
6 Walpole to Conway, November 15, 1755 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 365 ; West to Newcastle, November 14, 1755.
' The portion of the Address which gave most offence to
the Opposition ran as follows : ' We think ourselves bound in
justice and gratitude to assist Your Majesty against insiUts
and attacks, that may be made upon any of Your Majesty's
dominions, though not belonging to the Crown of Great Britain,
in resentment of the part Your Majesty has taken in a cause,
wherein the interests of this kingdom are immediately, and so
essentiaUy concerned.'
8 Walpole to Bentiey, November 16, 1755 : Letters, III. 368.
iir,8 A a

370 HENRY FOX ch.
89 votes against 290 for the Ministry. Bedford's
considerable following had been unanimous in
their support of the Administration ; while most
of the Leicester House party were arrayed on the
opposite side, although Egmont had cast in his
lot with the Ministers — no doubt much to their
surprise. In the Upper House nothing happened
deserving special mention, except that Harting
ton, who had dreaded the first day,® was spared
further anxiety. The Duke of Devonshire had
been absent from the House of Lords, and the
dissolution of his party had probably discouraged
him. After the debate Fox said to Pitt, ' Who is the
Rhone ? '
' Is that a fair question ? ' asked the Paymaster
in reply.
' Why, as you have said so much that I did not
desire to hear,' answered Fox, ' you may tell me
one thing that I would hear. Am I the Rhone, or
Lord GranviUe ? '
' You are GranviUe,' was the sage response.^"
9 Hartington to Newcastle, November 27, 1755 : Add.MSS.,
32861, f. 106.
10 An aUusion evidently to the fact that they were both
members of the War Party. The ' gentle stream ' and
the ' impetuous torrent ' referred to the division of parties
which had existed in the CouncU of Regency. Temple
said afterward that the Rhone was meant to represent
Cumberland, Fox and GranviUe : and the Saone, Newcastle,
Hardwicke and Murray. — Walpole, Memoirs of George II,
I. 418.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 371
On the 14th Fox kissed hands for the Seals,"
and Barrington formaUy replaced him at the War
Office. Six days later, since an ' Opposition in
Administration ' ^^ was in no wise to be tolerated,
Pitt, Legge and GrenviUe were notified that His
Majesty had no further need of their services.
It was clear that the gauntlet had been thrown
down by the Paymaster and that the new Secretary
had picked it up. Henceforth it might be expected
that the Ministers would be as one in enforcing the
policy of the Newcastle Administration.
Sir George Lyttelton was the choice selected to
fill the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
Bedford won another mark of commendation by
promising not to oppose his re-election for a
borough in which he apparently had the interest.^*
' Judge how entertaining it was,' exclaimed
Walpole in a description of the first day's
debate, ' to hear L5rttelton answer Grenville,
and Pitt, Lyttelton.' " The ex-Cofferer had in
fact risen upon the ruins of the little party
which had declined to appreciate him, and was
now a disciple of its bitterest enemy. His
11 Newcastle to Hartington, November 15, 1755 : Add. MSS.
32860, f. 480; Gazette, no. 9,528. The date is incorrectly
given by Walpole as November 15.
12 Quoted from Walpole's letter to Mann, November 16,
1755 : Letters of Horace Walpole, III. 370.
13 Fox to Newcastie, November 20, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32861, f. 41.
1* Walpole to Bentley, November 16, 1755 : Letters of
Horace Walpole, IIL 368. A a 2

372 HENRY FOX ch.
convictions on the Subsidies were all that could
be desired.^*
The day after the ministerial purging, war
became fiercer than ever in the House of Commons.
Colonel Townshend, who had been frequently
frustrated in military matters by the ex-Secretary-
at-War, now trumped up a pretext for attacking
Fox's circular letter. He declared in the course of
his harangue that ' this was an unconstitutional
act of a Minister, as desirous of power as ever
Minister was, and who was wiUing to avail himself
of his colleague's friends, though not fond of
owning his colleague's measures ; however, the
foundations of his power were laid on a shattered
edifice disfigured by his novelties'. The Colonel
produced the letter, which he said had made him
begin to think that he was not invited to support an
Address to the King, but to vote people into place.
Fox rose in defence of his late tactics, admitted
the indiscretion, but ' don't ', he exclaimed, ' let
this additional irnprudence be imputed to me,
that I should be thought to have addressed one to
that gentleman.' He denied any undue infiuence
in the letters, declared that they had not been
worded with the thought that any gentleman
might show one of them, and assured his audience
that they were not sent ' promiscuously, but to
'5 Lyttelton defended a system of subsidies on the ground
that Hanover was endangered only by her connexion with
England. — Lyttelton's Observations : PhUlimore, Memoirs of
Lyttdton, II. 480.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 373
gentlemen of great consideration '. 'I may have
written a sUly letter,' he concluded ; ' I am sure
one of them was sillUy addressed.'
Townshend replied that hundreds could repeat
it by heart, and he renewed his attack with
increasmg warmth ; but his ' awkward acrimony ',
as Walpole puts it, turned the sympathies of the
House to the offending writer. Alderman Beck-
ford then said, ' It is usual for those in great
offices to be imprudent. I have great regard for
the gentleman in question ; he has abUities—
the rest have not. We have a better chance with
a man of sense.' " The speaker did not realize
perhaps that even a ' man of sense ' cannot always
sway a Cabinet.
But this was but a foretaste of the wrangle that
was to foUow. The next busuiess was a motion
for the number of seamen, introduced by Welbore
Ellis, a friend and recent placeman of Fox. Pitt,
after others had spoken, took occasion to deplore
the lamentable condition of the comitry, ' so
undone by the siUy pride of one man or the timidity
of his coUeagues — who would share his pride but
not his danger '. He condemned the shameful
neglect that had existed since the late war (men
tioning specificaUy PeUiam's reduction of the
seamen in 1750), and said the country had been
dehvered to His Majesty a wreck. The whole peril
arose, he declared, from the struggle for power —
and what was its motive ?
16 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 421-2.

374 HENRY FOX ch.
Fox, in reply, defended Pelham's measiu-es on
the ground of compulsory economy, and though
intimating that the matter was whoUy irrelevant
to the present question, he could not resist ex
claiming, ' So not voting 2,000 more seamen in
a time of peace was betra\'ing the comitry ! ' He
said he woiUd never hear !Mr. Pelham's measures
censured without defending them ; as for those
' struggles for power " and their ' motive ' — ' let
those who have struggled most and longest for
power teU ! ' ' If,' he concluded, ' the honourable
gentieman thinks the security of the country has
been neglected, he should have mentioned it to
Grovernment in time, and not have reserved it tUl
it is too late.'
Pitt neglected the arguments of his opponent to
resort to his weU-wom plea of injured innocence.
and rephed in tones of deep lament that he had
been ' traduced to his master " and his ' fair name
assassinated ' ; but he might have had what the
honourable gentleman at a long distance of time
so gladly accepted. The honourable gentleman
was not yet Minister — not quite yet — though his
sense and virtue might make him so. But even
so, if he had been in ^Ir. Fox's situation, to have
had the honour to approach his sovereign, he
should not have rested a night without laying
before him the miserable state of the kingdom and
getting every assistance for its defence.
Fox rephed with a sneer that he was certainly
not a\\arc of any offer that the honom-able gentle-

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 375
man had refused. He dared affirm, he said, that
no one had ever ' traduced ' Pitt in the Closet,
that he for his part had never done him any harm
there, and whoever would do so was the worst of
men. When, moreover, it was inferred that no
one who approached the King had either sense
or virtue, that ' sense and virtue ' must obviously
be somewhere else. 'How shaU the King hear of
them ? ' he exclaimed, ' I fear this House wUl not
inform him.' In conclusion he declared that he
would support the King's measures to the extent
of his abilities, and when they were contrary to
his opinion, he would do ' as an honest man ought,
adhere to his opinion and desire to be dismissed.'' "
The altercation, continued in several successive
speeches, was one of the longest and bitterest
that had ever taken place between the two adver
saries. Fox had appeared almost whoUy on the
defensive, and ' he was chiefly to be admired ', said
one of his hearers, ' for his great command of him
seU, which the warmth he had used to show, now
made remarkable.' But anger would have avaUed
him little, just as it had often lowered Pitt, and
had hurt Fox himseU in his attack upon Hardwicke
1' Fox himself had not adhered to the principle that an
officer should resign before opposing the Administration of
which he was nominaUy a supporter ; but now that he had
more definitely espoused the Newcastles' cause by becoming
Secretary of State, he could feel that he might taunt his rival
without fear that his own conduct would be instanced. Nor
shoiUd it be forgotten that Pitt was stUl enjoying a seat in
PaiUamenL for ..Udborough, a Newcastle borough.

376 HENRY FOX ch.
in 1753. Certainly he had never wielded the
shafts of bitter sarcasm with more telling effective
ness than in this debate.
The discussion was taken up later by Murray,
who had lain in wait to take advantage of any
slips the ex-Paymaster should make, and now
forced him to admit that the Seals had never been
offered him." Such artless political lying did Pitt
more harm than good. It was comparable to his
pretence, on another occasion, of the ' respect '
which he had felt for the great Walpole. We can
hardly deem it strange that his audience should
have laughed at him.^*
The First Lord was filled with delight at the
accounts which he received of the skirmish. To
Hartington he wrote, ' I consider Your Lordship
will have heard that in the debate on the fleet
Mr. Fox and the Attorney-General got a complete
victory over Mr. Pitt. There was a good deal of
altercation between Pitt and Fox, and I may say
the latter did very well, and had the better of his
antagonist.' ^°
Indeed, the Ministry's strength m the Commons
seemed almost impregnable. Even the party of
Leicester House was less formidable, now that
18 For the account of the day's debate : Walpole, Memoirs
of George II, 1. 422-30 ; notes by West (which he sent to New
castle), November 21, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32861, f . 55 ; Dupplin
to Newcastle, November 21, 1755 : ibid., f. 61.
19 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 436.
20 Newcastle to Hartington, November 29, 1755: ibid.,
f. 131.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 377
Egmont, their chief, had declared for the Treaties ;
although ' for sonic rca.^ou ' (which Newcastle
underlined meaningly) he would not accept an
employment at present.-' Just what Egmont's
game was is not clear ; he was certainly not acting
with Pitt or Lee, and yet he seemed unwilling to
become identified with tlie Administration. He
had some time ago expressed approval of tlic
Russian Treaty, but, as Newcastle now intimated,
was unwilling furtlicr to endanger his favour with
Leicester House, or divorce himself from his party.
l\leanwliile the more conservative of the Tories,
whose fundamental principles were independent
of the tactics of the Princess. ' hated both
Fox and Pitt so much (writes Walpole) that
they sit still to sec them axoitv one another.' "
Pitt was evidently not master of these patriots
of Wyudham's creed, and whether the Pi'incoss
could influence them in his favour, or Egmont lead
them to take measures against him. A\as what
time and Toryism alone could teU.
The new Secretary and the ex-Paymaster did
not bury their animosities on the day of the Sea
men's Bill. On the 3rd of ^lay they took opposite
sides on a motion for giving sailoi-s a share of the
prizes they should capture. Fox ridiculed Gren
ville's 'pathetic speech' in favoiu- of it, which
brought Pitt to his feet in defence of his friend,
-' Nowoastle to Hartington, November 2;>. 1755.
*> Walpole to Mann. November 10, 1755: Letters of Horace
Waltolc, 111. 370.

37S HENRY FOX cu.
admittuig, however, that Fox had spoken logicaUy
if not feehngly.^
On the 5th tliey fenced more skUfuUy. When
the Secretary-at-War moved an augmentation of
the army, Pitt seconded the proposition ui one of
his most eloquent efforts, agaui harped upon the
coiuitry's miprepai'edness for war. and in the
com-se of his speech aUuded artfuUy to Fox's
opposition to the regiments in 1745, when
Bedford had been one of the abettors of the
movement. But Fox \^as ui no Mise overreached by tlie
artifice, and, eager again to take advantage of Pitt's
silence dm-nig the last session, he declared that
smce Fi-ance had aroused them to action, his
opponent should have made his speech sooner.
' If he had made it," he added, ' I am sme I should
lia\-e remembered it : 1 am not apt to forget his
speeches.' He then tamited Pitt for not bruiguig
m a miUtia-biU as a means of settling the difficul
ties : and finaUy takmg up the matter of tlic
regiments, he showed that he stUl stood on the
same gromid,-* and paid a resoimduig tribute
to the DiUce of Bedford — the more forceful m
-^ Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 431-6.
-•' It wUl be remembei-ed that Fox had greatly doubted the
practicability of such a scheme, and that events had borne him
out (see pp. 60-2). It was, of coiu-se, absurd for Pitt now to
express the idea that the regiments had ' saved the oountry "
in 1745 ; and such a falsehood may show that he was oon-
scious of his imworth^- motives at thai time, anil was seeking
to justify himself.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 379
proportion as he condemned the Duke of Montagu,
another of the noblemen concerned.-^
Pitt answered that he had not given the alarm
last year because he had been deluded mto beheving
that there woiUd be no war. Such an excuse as
this was, of course, worse than no reply at aU.
He had verUy not uttered a word hi favoiu" of
vigorous action before the present session opened : -"^
yet he coiUd not have been deaf to the rumoiu's
that spread from the Continent, and he had
sho^^^^ his real attitude when he seconded Fox and
the Cumberlands in the preceding axitunni. In the
session foUowing, when the situation across the
Atlantic had become blacker, there had been no sign
of discontent, no plea that the War Party was
hurr^-ulg Great Britaui into a war for which she
was MH/>/t/xoY(/. He was now endeavouring — laud
ably, it is true — to infuse a little of his own spuit
into the moribimd ^linistry that imderestimated its
ta^k : but he had, as Fox pointed out, been late
in committing hiniseU. \Mien during the past
two years the great orator was sulking at Hayes
and Sto^\e, not patriotism but mortified personal
ambition was the paramomit emotion; and Fox
was quick to see the weapon in his hand.
The day was soon to come when the fate of
^ Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 437-42. Rigby also
giive Bedford an accotmt.
* That is. in ParUanient. Pitt had supported the Cumber-
lands in the Braddo<.k controvei-sy in 1754, but pohtics had
kept him c^Ueut in the scjssiou which foUowed.

380 HENRY FOX ch.
the foreign treaties would be definitely decided.
No one, of course, supposed that they would
faU to pass the Houses, but would the King's
measures be supported by a majority large
enough to impress the wavering minds through
out the country ? Fox, for his part, had not
ceased his active canvassing merely because of his
first triumph, and during the last week in November
as weU as the first haU of December, he worked
indefatigably for the great cause.
The Ministry had Uttle difficulty in finding
aspirants for the places left vacant by the late
removals. The suddenness of Lyttelton's appoint
ment was in marked contrast to the long discussion
of who should be Legge's successor, but in spite
of his Ul health ^ Sir George might weather the
storm, and Newcastle seldom if ever considered any
thing but makeshifts. So many recruits had to
be provided for that Lords Dupphn and Darlington
were given the Pay Office between them, and the
unpopularity of the latter for his connexion with
the Mansfield-Stone scandal of 1753 gave rise to
the remark that nothing showed more conclusively
the dimensions of the Duke's absolutism."^ Jemmy
GrenvUle had resigned his place on the Treasury
Board out of loyalty to his brother, and Charles
Townshend was soon afterward dismissed ; but their
2' Lyttelton to Newcastle, February 2, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32862, f. 317.
28 Walpole to Bentley, December 17, 1755 : Letters of
Horace Walpole, III. 375.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 381
posts were stiU vacant. It was in fact decided that,
as the crucial days of the Treaties had not yet come,
no other disposition should be made until the
hohdays, when the new officials might prepare for
re-election.^^ One who certainly must be secured to the
Administration was Hume CampbeU. Fox had
vetoed the suggestion of the Pay Office for some
reason,^" and the young Scotsman had made the
ChanceUor furious by repeating some gossip he
had heard about Charles Yorke ; ^^ but the First
29 Walpole to Mann, December 4, 1755 : Letters of Horaoe
Walpole, III. 373. Hardwicke had demurred at first, but finally
gave in to the First Lord, who felt that, whereas removals
could not be avoided after the events of the first day, it was
nevertheless wiser to defer the elections. — Add. MSS., 32861,
ff. 131, 298.
^ Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 445. The fact may
lead one to wonder if Fox was not — even as early as this —
cherishing the thought that he himself might some time have
a desire for this lucrative post. A joint Paymastership was
perhaps less Ukely to be permanent than a single occupancy of
the place ; and Fox could not have possessed an implicit
confidence in the staying powers of the Newcastle Administra
tion. Furthermore, we have noticed one former occasion
when a lucrative office had at least been a temptation ; and
Potter could not have written without some ground when he
ranted of Fox's 'thirst for power and money'. — Grenville
Papers, I. 140. It was well known that Fox was a seasoned
gambler. But the point is brought up only as a possibiUty. Fox may
simply have had some one else in mind for the Pay Office ;
and certaitUy we have no reason to feel that he was not
anticipating a successful career in his present office.
31 Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 5, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32861, f. 200.

382 HENRY FOX ch.
Lord knew that too many orators could not be
arrayed against the terrible champion of the
Opposition, and so appealed to Fox ^^ to try his
diplomatic skiU with Scottish placemen, and find
a vacancy somehow. The late Secretary-at-War
in the role of negotiator with Scotsmen, especiaUy
with the Duke of Argyll,^ was httle short of
ludicrous, but Fox had an abundance of pohtical
courage, and CampbeU received the office of
Registrar of Scotland.^ The King had, of course.
changed his mind and consented to the promotion.^
Doddington's reticent dignity was finaUy shat
tered when GrenviUe's late post of Treasurer of the
Navy was held out invitingly : and the accession
of this arch-intriguer meant that Harry Pumese
and Sir Francis Dashwood would probably foUow
in his train. Halifax must be coaxed into good
humour, as he could influence Oswald, one of
the ablest speakers of the House ; and Arundel
and others must be bought with Irish pensions.^
*- Newcastle to Fox, December 12, 1755 ; ibid., f. 2M.
^ ArgyU was a cousin of Sir Harry Erskine, whose case
against Anstruther had been opposed by Fox.
** Displacing the Marquis of Lothian. Fox had met with
considerable difficulty in this exploit (Fox to Newcastle.
January 2, 1756), but after he succeeded in procuring Aigyfl's
assistance in getting Lothian to relinquish the office, he finaUy
decided to risk the latter's displeasure by offering it to
CampbeU in any event. — ^Fox to Newcastle, January 10, 1756 :
Add. :MSS., 32S62. f. 65.
^ Newcastle to Fox, December 12. 1756.
^ Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 14. 1755 : Add. itS.'^..
35415. f. 124.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 383
Indeed so large a corps was desired for the defence
of the Russian subsidy that some figures of days gone
by were exhumed and paraded in order to swell
the number. Walpole was much amused at the
accession of Furnese and especially Lord Sandys,^'
sometime an enemy of Orford, and now secured by
the influence of the Chancellor. ^^ Dashwood, being
of the Princess's faction, was unable to accept office,
but Newcastle had it from trustworthy authority
that he would ' be pleased with the offer and it
would have a very good effect '.^^
Fox's chief ambition in this connexion was to
complete the good work, already begun, of winning
over the members of his old party. Marlborough
was not likely to go astray, and HiUsborough had
already come over, but the reaUy indispensable
member was his friend at Woburn, who could
attract his numerous relatives to the cause. He
accordingly assured himself that Newcastle would
pull Sandwich out of obscurity,*" and thereby was
enabled to secure the Duke of Bedford without
3' Walpole to Mann, December 21, 1755, Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 380.
38 Hardwicke to Newcastle, December 21, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
,32861, f. 357.
39 Newcastle to Fox, December 12, 1755.
*o Newcastie to Hartington, November 29, 1755. Fox had
urged the claims of Sandwich soon after he began his work for
the Ministry ; but Hardwicke persuaded Newcastle that
favours to His Lordship might wisely be deferred tUl some
complaint should arise which required such a remedy. —
Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 4, 1755 ; Hardwicke to
Newcastle, October 6, 1755.

384 HENRY FOX ch.
difficulty.*^ A few days later he met the much-
sought statesman at an evening dinner, and was
able to write the First Lord that ' he was just what
he (Newcastle) would have him, and as much Lord
Chancellor's as if he had never been out of place '.*^
Fox felt, however, that the bargain would be more
certainly fulfUled if Gower were given a place in
the Cabinet, as Bedford would probably ask it
anjTvay ; *^ and Newcastle even signified his con
sent to find something for Rigby, at the Secretary's
request. Gower was finally appointed to the old
office of his father, supplanting Marlborough, who,
in turn, became Master-General of the Ordnance ;
while Sandwich was persuaded by Fox to accept
Egmont's discarded post, the Vice-Treasurership
of Ireland,** and Rigby won a seat in the Board
of Trade,*® which had to satisfy him for the present.
Hartington seemed greatly pleased with this
practically complete fusion of his party with the
Administration, and wrote to the First Lord that
the accession of his ' cousin of Bedford ' was
a master-stroke in politics, while the acquisition
of Sandwich would do much to bring Newcastle
*i Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 6, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
35415, f. 122.
42 Fox to Newcastie, December 12, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32861, f. 282.
^ Newcastle to Fox, December 12, 1755.
** Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 20, 1755 : ibid.,
f. 357.
*5 Walpole to Mann, December 21, 1755 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 380.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 385
closer to His Royal Highness.** MeanwhUe the
little Duke pacified his conscience by refusing to
accept any office, and he wept when he consented
to vote for the Treaties.*' But Fox might weU be
pleased with his work, for most of the prominent
Cumberlands had now foUowed in his footsteps.
But the purchase of voters by places and pensions
was in no wise the only feature (nor in this case, the
most important feature) of Fox's work for the
Subsidies. There was stUl that potent force of so
much value in his deahngs with the less ambitious
figures of a corrupt poUtical world. ' Pitt ... is
a much better speaker than I am,' he wrote to his
friend, CoUinson. ' But tickling the palm, not the
ear, is the business now, and he that can do the
first is the best orator, let him speak ever so Ul.' *^
Cynical as the words are, they spoke the absolute
truth. Of what use were Pitt's histrionic dis
tortions, when lucre cotUd satisfy wants, whUe
logic could pacify the conscience ? Such were the
two weapons which Fox was able to wield — and
such were aU that he needed for his purpose.
The relations of the manager and his chief
appeared to be amicable, if we may judge from the
absence of complaints in Newcastle's epistles to
the ChanceUor. In one letter he writes, ' Fox has
*6 Hartington to Newcastle,. January 12, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32862, f . 88.
*' Walpole, Memoirs of George II, I. 405.
« Fox to CoUinson, January 25, 1756 : Add. MSS., 28727,
f.42. U56 Bb

386 HENRY FOX ch.
been with the King this morning. He is very right
in every disposition proposed as to employment ; ' *^
and ' very affectionately yours ' occurs at least
once in the course of his correspondence with the
new Secretary. Yet Walpole teUs us, ' The Duke
of Newcastle and his coadjutor, Mr. Fox, squabble
twice for agreeing once ; as I wish so weU to the
latter, I lament what he must wade through to
real power, if ever he should arrive there.' ^°
Certain it is that the Cumberlands had nearly as
many of the new appointments as the friends of
Newcastle, although the fact by no means proved
unselfishness on the First Lord's part. Fox,.
Newcastle and Hardwicke were sole members of
the appointment committee, and perhaps that was
why GranviUe was ' out of humour ' and insisted
that he ' could have done better '.^^
On December 10 the second debate ^^ upon the
Treaties took place. Barrington commenced the
struggle in the Lower House by moving to refer
the Russian Treaty to the Committee of Supply —
a motion which Potter vehemently opposed on the
ground that the Treaty was an infraction of the
*9 Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 6, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
35415, f. 122.
50 Walpole to Mann, December 21, 1755 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 380. Walpole probably writes what he wants
to believe. There is no trustworthy evidence that the two men
' squabbled '.
51 Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 15, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
35415, f. 129.
52 ' A long and warm debate ', wrote Stone to Newcastle.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 387
Act of Settlement and therefore unconstitutional.^
Fox rephed to this, that the gentleman's accusa
tion was too weighty for his conclusion ; ^\'as
he content, after aUeging such crimes, with pre
venting the Treaties from being referred to the
Committee ?
The Junior Secretary was foUowed by Hume
CampbeU, Newcastle's recent discovery m the way
of oratorical volcanoes, in a spirited speech chiefly
leveUed against Pitt. He talked much of the
daUy invectives that were thrown out without
foundation, and said that ' it woiUd be more maiUy
to introduce a charge and prove it ; if it faUed,
it ought to bring the censure of the House on the
false accuser '.
Pitt then rose, and caUing him to order ' Uke
an angry wasp ',®* he made both a violent arraign
ment of the Treaties, and a bitter personal attack
upon CampbeU as weU as upon lawyers in general.
Stone afterward criticized the speech as being
' without any weight ', but in the fire and majesty
of his eloquence the ex-Paymaster was undoubt
edly at his best, and the neophyte who had
attacked him soon cowered beneath his thrusts.
But Fox had been his rival too long to be awed
by his genius in oratory, and rising in defence of
53 This plea, advanced by Potter, Pitt and others of the
Opposition, is weU analysed by Dr. von RuvUle (Clwtham,
I. 383-4), \\ho shows how Mun-ay logicaUy refuted the charge.
^ Walpole to Bentley, December 17, 1755 : Letters of
Horace Walpole, III. 375.
B b2

388 HENRY FOX ch.
CampbeU, he assaUed Pitt in a speech of much
sarcasm and ingenuity. With reference to Pitt's
invectives, he said the House had been so accus
tomed to them from that quarter that they had
lost aU force within these walls and even ^rithout ;
and the Ministry had ' sense and virtue ' enough
to look on them only as amusements of the day.®^
Hume CampbeU afterwards broke sUence, but
seemed to have lost aU his power to impress.®*
The motion was carried by a vote of 318 to 126,
and five days later, after another pitched battle
(though less bitter than that of the 10th "), both
Treaties were passed by Parhament, ' notwith
standing (wrote a friend of Fox) they were so much
abused without doors.' In the Commons the
vote for the Russian Treaty was 263 to 69 ; for
55 ' Mr. Fox ', wrote Stone to Newcastle, ' defended both
his friends (Murray and CampbeU) with great spirit and
abUity, and to the general satisfaction — as weU as the measure
of the Treaties and the Administration in general. . . . Upon
the whole it was a day of great success, and a great superiority
in argument as in numbers.'
56 He acknowledged his debt to Fox by saying that he had
not expected such support — ^he would ' study to deserve it '.
5' One Uttle episode in the Lords on that day is worthy of
notice. Hardwicke, in the course of an able speech in defence
of the Treaties, declared with some bitterness that ministers
" were sometimes Uke angels, sometimes Uke monsters ' ;
whereupon Temple repUed cuttingly that he did not know
whom the Lord ChanceUor depicted as ' angels ' but he had
sometimes heard one man padnted as a ' monster ' — he did
not know how he would be represented now. Inasmuch as
Hardwicke had never foi^otten his quarrel with Fox so keen
a thrust must have touched him to the quick.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 389
the Hessian 259 to 72.^^ Stone, West and Dupplin
had faithfuUy noted down the proceedings in the
Commons, and the First Lord must have sighed
with relief that his greatest anxiety was now at an
end. And Fox had saved the Subsidies.
Foreign courts had not been asleep while
England was trying to find her Treaties palatable.
Disgusted with the feebleness of the Court of
"VersaiUes, and shaken in his trust in the military
efficiency of France as a balance-wheel to Russian
hostility, Frederick had resolved to deceive his
credulous ally, and gain immediate admission into
the opposite system by a reconciliation with
England. The first step was to learn the exact
nature of the Convention of St. Petersburg, and
to this end his ambassador at London requested
Fox for a copy. But Fox was cautious in a matter
that concerned the policy of his new chief, and he
referred Michel to Holdernesse and Newcastle.®®
Michel then caUed upon Holdernesse, and a copy
was sent to him four days later. At the same time
proposals were made by the Ministry *° which
58 Authorities for the closing scenes of the struggle : — Notes
by West, December 10, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32861, f. 271 ;
Stone to Newcastle, December 10, 1755 : ibid, f . 275 ; Letters
of Horace Walpole, III. 375-6 ; Walpole, Memoirs of George II,
I. 454^82 ; Digby to WUUams, December 23, 1756 ; Stone
MSS. (Brit. Mus.), 263.
59 Holdernesse to Newcastle, November 21, 1755 : Add.
MSS., 32860, f. 59.
«o The solid advantages which the EngUsh Government
offered Frederick were (1) guarantee of SUesia, (2) protection

390 HENRY FOX ch.
Frederick accepted with alacrity, and an under
standing was reached actually more than two
weeks before the Russian Treaty passed the House
of Commons,
Meanwhile, as diplomatic revolutions can seldom
conceal their smoke, every effort was made, and
no amount of money spared by the Court of
Versailles to keep the Prussian King in the pre
sent ' system '.^^ Unluckily for his court, Nivernais
had reached Berlin too late to convert Frederick
from his policy, and the French ministers, who had
refused to give actual credence to the rumours of
a rapprochement,^^ now found themselves the
victims of their own blindness as well as the
trickery of Frederick. After several conferences
between Michel on the one hand, and Newcastle,
Fox and Holdernesse on the other, the Convention
of Westminster was concluded, January 16, 1756.
' The two parties,' wrote Newcastle to the Lord
Lieutenant (now by his father's decease Duke of
Devonshire), 'engage to prevent the entering or pass
age of any foreign troops (viz. French or Russian)
which shows this is a certain consequence of our
from Russia, and (3) settlement of pending disputes. It was
agreed that Frederick should pay the interest on the SUesian
loan, whUe Holdernesse was to offer him not less than £20,000
as indemrufication for the prizes taken by the British fleets
during the late war.
^ InteUigence from Cressener, December 2, 1755 : Add.
MSS., 32861, f. 169.
*2 Waddington, Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances,
p. 194.

VT SECRETARY OF STATE 391
treaty with Russia. . . . Both kings are pleased
with each other.'"* The treaty was naturally
followed by an exchange of ambassadors, and
Sir Andrew Mitchell departed to represent England
at the Court of Berlin.
The results of such a renversement must in
evitably be far-reaching. Through a policy of
subsidizing that had penetrated even to the
Court of St. Petersburg, the Duke of Newcastle
had, by unintentionally forcing the King of
Prussia into an alliance, been chiefly instrumental
in changing the recognized system of Europe.
Austria could never be expected to remain in an
association of which Frederick was a member, and
France could not follow the Prussian lead while
her relations with England were in a state of chaos
that was war in all but name. One can hardly
censure the Newcastle Ministry for a movement
so effective that its error lay perhaps only in the
tardiness of its inception, but whether or not
a general war could have been averted if such
action had been taken earlier is at least a debatable
question. Fox's position as Secretary of State for the
southern department brought him into diplomatic
relations with the peaceable courts of Turin and
Madrid, while any negotiation with France likewise
passed through his hands. The amicable feelings
of Sardinia were carefully maintained by her
"•' Newcastie to Dovonahiro, January 17, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32802, f. 121.

392 HENRY FOX ch.
ambassador at London, Comte de Viri, and no
further mention need be made of that court. In
Spain diplomatic pohcy had long been shaped by
a shrewd Irishman, General WaU (sometime
ambassador to England), who, by virtue of the
King's favour and confidence, had avaUed himseU
of a revolution to become, to aU intents and pur
poses. Prime Minister. Newcastle was not only
perfectly aware that the absolute security of Spain's
neutral position lay in the Irishman's continued
control of Spanish diplomacy, but he made it
his special endeavour to aUow no interruption
of the friendly relations which had existed since
the special treaty signed with Madrid after the late
war ; and fortimately Ambassador Keene, though
not a briUiant man, was eminently fitted to second
the Ministry in preserving these feelings of cor-
diahty. ' For God's sake don't abandon us,' the
Dtike wrote to WaU in his characteristic style.
' I mean don't let anything make you quit your
station. AU countries have their Pitts and then-
Foxes, but with proper resolution and management
that may be withstood eveiywhere.' ** This letter
bore the date of AprU 28, when Newcastle httle
realized that Henry Fox would ever become the
departmental secretary for Spanish affairs.
In addition to the business of diplomacy with
certain courts Fox had also the general supervision
of the colonies — though the work of a more
64 Newcastle to WaU, AprU 28, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32854,
f. 309.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 393
detaUed character was in the hands of the Board
of Trade. The office of Secretary for the southern
department was clearly of a nature to afford rare
opportunities to a man who, like Fox, possessed
a talent for organization ; and both the disunion
among the American colonies and their long
neglect by the Government presented strikingly
promising material for the hand of a fearless
innovator. But Fox was not the man for such
duties ; he had never had experience in problems
requiring initiative, and the forces which he (of all
men) knew best how to direct were after all
tangible individuals, not vague and distant com
munities ; he was conscious of danger on a broad
horizon, but lacked any real penetration ; and
being wholly devoid of creative instinct, he was
naturally powerless to influence the Cabinet —
which always presented the appearance of regard
ing the colonies as a bore. The only matter
commending itself to the Ministry as reaUy impor
tant was the case of General Shirley, Braddock's
successor in America. Like Cumberland in Eng
land,*^ Shirley amused himseU with dreams of
conquering Canada ; and in 1755 he had com
menced to work out some scheme without waiting
the tedious interval for the Government to signify
its approval. AU this naturaUy disturbed the
colonies in the even tenor of their ways, and Sir
WiUiam Johnson, whose popularity was growing,
85 Newcastie to Hardwicke, August 4, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32857, f. 568.

394 HENRY FOX ch.
and whose favour was higher with the Board
of Trade, went so far as to threaten resignation
unless his authority should be made independent.
The upshot of the affair was the recaU of Shirley
on March 13, 1756. ' This is not owing to any
dissatisfaction with your services,' wrote Fox
evasively, ' but on the contrary it is the King's
intention as a mark of his royal favour to appoint
you Governor of Jamaica.' ** But some unex
pected events had meanwhUe considerably aggra
vated the case. Two intercepted letters to the
Due de ^Mirepoix *' revealed the extent or supposed
extent of Shirley's designs against the French.
Cumberland and Halifax were aghast ; and Fox
proposed that the chiefs of the Cabinet should
confer on the subject in the Duke's apartments
on the 29th. ' I don't suspect Shirley of treachery,'
he wrote to Newcastle, ' but I have no doubt of
his having great schemes, and that he trusts the
execution to traitors, and that he ought not to
stay in America.' ^ Cumberland was, as usual,
more violent, and urged that the General shoiUd
be brought home a prisoner ; but Fox, with the
support of Hardwicke, prevaUed for the ' gentler
method ',*^ which — judging from Fox's letter on
the 31st — was the immediate recaU of the Gteneral,

66 Palfrey, History of New England, V. 145-6.
6' Fox to Webb, March 31, 1756 : Dartmouth MSS., Hist.
MSS. Comm., Report XIV, app. x, p. 7.
68 Fox to Newcastle, March 27, 1755: Add. MSS., 32864, f. 12.
69 Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 31, 1756 : ibid., f. 38.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 395
clothed in the pretext that he was needed by the
Government for deliberation on the colonies.'"
The whole affair was of slight importance in com
parison to the general crisis ; but it represents
our only picture of Fox as a prominent figure
engaged in the settlement of a colonial problem."^
It was oiUy in cases like this that his political talent
could serve him. He was no more capable than
Newcastle of directing the concerted action of
England and her colonies in America.
The policy of Versailles was admittedly puzzling.
Mirepoix had declared that his court would carry
the war into every part of Europe,'^ but since the
burst of wrath which followed the Boscawen
episode the Court of Versailles had given few
grounds for exciting alarm. Yet, was not this very
apathy a subject for suspicion ? for even with
a government as feeble as that of France there is
assuredly a limit to a policy of preserving peace
at the cost of trade. Small wonder, then, that
toward the close of the year the Duke of Newcastle
received constant intelligence of a hostile nature.
'0 Fox to Shirley, March 31, 1756 : Penn. Archives, II. 558.
Fox bade him ' repair to England with aU possible expedi
tion ', and sent another recall later under flying seal. — Fox to
Loudoun, May 8, 1756 : Dartmouth MSS., Hist. MSS. Comm.
'1 The most that we can say of Fox in his capacity as
Secretary of State was that he proved a capable official. The
energetic tone of his despatches is \vell exempUfled by his letters
to colonial governors.
'2 Newcastie to Holdernesse, July 11, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32857, f. 40.

396 HENRY FOX ch.
Not only was it proposed to put an army in the
field, but Hanover was selected as the special object
of attack '^ — the surest means (so probably it was
thought) of checking England's activity on the sea,
^ But in point of fact the Court of VersaiUes was
still shutting its eyes to the exigencies of the con
flict with England, and determined to make one
more effort for peace with its formidable rival
across the Channel. In January, RouiUe communi
cated with Secretary Fox (by way of the French
Ambassador at The Hague) to the effect that his
court was ready to treat for peace, provided that
England, as an indispensable preliminary to the
negotiation, should return the prizes she had won by
* piraterie ' and 'brigandage '.'* Acceptance of such
a stipulation would of course have saved French
honour, but placed England in a most unpleasant
light.
n/ The EngUsh Ministers, who had obviously
carried their policy too far to admit of retrocession,
showed little hesitation in the course they should
pursue. Fox replied to Rouille's memorial that
he had laid the proposal before the King without
delay, and His Majesty had absolutely refused
the preliminary demand. The response further
charged the French court with having been the
'3 IntelUgence from Cressener, January 12, 1756 : Add. MSS.
32862, f . 86.
'* Walpole to Mann, January 25, 1756 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 390 ; RouiUe to Fox, December 21, 1756 : West
Papers: Add MSS., 34728, f. 40. (Doubtiess Walpole's
informant was Fox.)

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 397
aggressors during a period of peace, of which Fox
added, 'on a les preuves les plus authentiques."'^
The French had declared that faUure to comply
with their demand would be regarded in the light
of a declaration of war, and the events which tran
spired after this last faUure to heal the breach
showed that the Court of VersaUles was disposed
to accept the inevitable, and prepare for imme
diate hostUities.
Meanwhile, in ParUament, measures were almost
entirely of a miUtary character, and frequently
became the occasion of sharp encounters between
Fox and Pitt. On January 23, when the aUeged
tyranny of Knowles, Governor of Jamaica, was
brought up for discussion. Fox apparently took
the part of the offender. This was enough to rouse
Pitt, who struck at his rival for ' endeavouring
to screen the guilty ', and then went out of his
way to pay court to Beckford, the friend of Fox
who had introduced the case.'* Five days later, in
a debate on the proposal to reward the distin
guished services of British commanders in America,
Pitt declared with warmth that England had
a ' disjointed ministry ', which united in ' corrupt
and arbitrary measures '.
Fox took up the chaUenge with great fire. After
'5 Fox to RouiU6, January 13, 1756 : Add. MSS., 34728,
f. 40.'6 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, II. 3. Beckford eventuaUy
transferred his affections entirely to Pitt. ' Toad-eater to
the mountebank ' Fox rather inelegantly labels him in his
Memoirs.

398 HENRY FOX ch.
thanking Pitt for the great service he had done
him by his attacks, he assured him that he knew
of no such disunion ; he believed Pitt himself did
not, or he would join one part of the Administra
tion against the other as he had done formerly.
' His complaints,' he concluded, ' being general,
prove a general harmony, except with one family ;
and their clamours will never pass for the voice of
the nation.' " This was a fierce onslaught upon
the Cousinhood, and Grenville, who felt chronic
dissatisfaction with himseU and every one else,
broke out into angry remonstrance at the affront.
But the speeches of Fox — if we are to believe his
own account — met with resounding applause, and
' he (Pitt) and Grenville were like men beside
themselves, lost in passion ' ; while the Speaker
told Fox afterward that ' if Pitt . . . did not provide
better matter to make his fine speeches upon, he
would soon grow as insignificant as any man who
ever sat in the House '.'* Such was certainly
" ' Your Grace cannot imagine,' wrote Fox to Devonshire,
' how excessively angry he was at this last — I think only —
smart thing.' We can well imagine that Pitt was angry. The
clever allusion to his support of Newcastle against Pelham in
1750 (see p. 95) was only too likely to have telUng effect,
and the speaker — according to Fox — declared that the latter
had won a ' complete conquest ' in this debate. Fox himself
deplored the fact that Dupplin, by calling Pitt to order,
' prevented him (to use Fox's words) from exposing himself,
and me from exposing him stUl more.'
'8 For this debate — Fox to Devonshire, January 31, 1756 ;
Torrens, History of British Cabinets, II. 274 ; Walpole, Memoirs
of George II, II. 4-5.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 399
a reflection on the intrinsic value of Pitt's powers
of eloquence, and Onslow was not wont to be
partial, or hasty in his judgements. But the truth
seems to have been that Pitt had not yet struck
the right chord to gain the sympathy of his hearers.
It required national disasters to accomphsh that
end, and at present there were few grounds for
caUing the Ministry ' disjointed '.'*
During the month of February the question of
accepting an offer of four Swiss battalions for
American service became a vehicle for much
heated discussion, most of which was whoUy
irrelevant. Charles Townshend had asked Fox
more than two months previous to consent to an
inquiry into the management of American affairs,
and added that if Fox refused to present the
necessary papers he would do so himseU, as they
were all at his disposal.®" For some reason the
plan was suffered to slumber, but Fox probably
believed that the present question, being pertinent
to America, would be employed by Townshend as
a pretext for renewing his policy. At any rate the
'9 According to Walpole, Fox told his rival after the debate
that, far from there being any friction between Newcastle and
himself, there «ere men — and Pitt knew that he meant the
Townshends — who had offered to give up their aUegiance to
Pitt if the First Lord would relinquish the Junior Secretary,
but that Newcastie had refused. — Memoirs of George II, II. 5.
This may very weU have been gossip ; and yet Walpole would
have been glad to beUeve the Mirustry ' disjointed '.
80 Fox to Newcastie, December 3, 1755 : Add. MSS., 32861,
f. 186.

400 HENRY FOX ch.
former's accurate memory had stored up some
remarks of Townshend that he had heard, dis
tinctly implying that no grievances of the Ameri
cans existed ; and Fox anticipated hostihties by
repeating them now ' with aU the art and severity
imaginable '.
The young orator of the Pittites was dumb
founded. When he could find words to express
himseU, he rephed in a speech of much wit and
cleverness, but he protested that he had never
complained of civil oppressions in the Colonies.
Fox, eager to press his advantage, responded that
it gave him much satisfaction to hear that there
was no oppression in the civU government, ' and
thus (writes Walpole) pinned down Charles Towns
hend from producing a detaU of grievances that
he had prepared on American affairs.' ^^
In one of the debates, probably on the same
measure, Pitt rose with much anger to condenm
the action of the Ministry in dismissing Sir Henry
Erskine from the army on accoimt of his vote
against the Subsidies. The aUegation was un
doubtedly true, and the injustice was only too
manifest ; but Pitt often aUowed his resentment
to pass the bounds of parhamentary etiquette, and
when he made the charge without qualification, his
calmer rival promptly called him to order and
forced him to modify his assertion."" The combats
81 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, U. 20-1.
82 Ibid., p. 9. It might be pointed out here that Pitt himself
when he became Prime Minister as Lord Chatham, deprived

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 401
of these two great rivals seemed the daily enter
tainment of the assemblage. ' The House of
Commons,' wrote Walpole to Conway soon after
this debate, ' is dwindled into a very dialogue
between Pitt and Fox. . . . Sometimes it is a little
piquant ; in which, though Pitt has attacked. Fox
has generally had the better.' *'
Lyttelton, neither in debate nor in financial
expedients, showed himself an especially capable
member of the Ministry. One of the measures in his
budget was a proposed tax on plate, which proved
so unpopular that Fox had to do some special cam
paigning to be sure that Parliament would remem
ber its subservience. In this work he was ably
seconded by Rigby, and was soon able to report
to his chief a successful outlook.®* Yet feeling
was so strong against the measure that Newcastle
would have abandoned it rather than risk a
manifestation of weakness in the Commons ; had
not Fox, who could argue on any subject to which
he gave his attention, restrained the First Lord
from a concession that might compromise the
a man (Edgcumbe) of a subordinate position for no other
reason than because he wished to confer the office upon a
sateUite of his own. As evidences of political immoraUty,
there is not much distinction between the two cases ; although
it is, of course, true that there was less excuse for making the
army a victim of party politics.
83 Walpole to Conway, February 12, 1756 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 395.
8" Fox to Newcastle, March 20, 1756 (first letter of that
date) : Add. MSS., 32863, f. 396.
HOG 0 c

402 HENRY FOX ch.
dignity of the Administration.^^ With some help
from Fox in the debates ®* the bUl was finaUy
passed, but one of the divisions had revealed
a bare majority of nine, and it was fortunate for
the Ministry that a proposed tax on bricks — also
unpopular — ^had been abandoned.*' This was a
shock to Newcastle's strength in Parhament that
was almost unprecedented in his history, and
Bedford did not disguise his concern.^ It is even
reasonable to suppose that but for Fox's efforts,
the ]\Iinistry might have incurred disaster. Could
it be possible that patronage was losing its power ?
MeanAvhUe the ^Ministry had begun to feel the
terror of unseen foes. In January, Devonshire
sent Fox an anonymous letter to the effect that
the French would invade Ireland and Scotland in
July, an intelhgence which corroborated a report
already received by Robinson when Secretary.**
During the next few weeks advices of a hostUe
nature came with uncomfortable frequency :
85 Walpole to Conway, March 25, 1756 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 407.
86 Lyttelton to Lyttelton, !March 1, 1756 : PhiUimore,
Memoirs of Lyttdton, II. 508. Lyttelton's praise of Fox's
part in the debate might be set beside Walpole's assertion
that neither Fox nor Pitt spoke with much understanding. —
Memoirs of George II, II. 3.
8' Lyttelton to Newcastle, IMarch 1. 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32863, f . 150.
88 Hardwicke to Newcastie, March 21, 1756 : Add. MSS..
32863, f. 418.
89 Devonshire to Fox, January 24, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32862,
f. 210.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 403
France had designs upon English trade and seaports,
and the King was urged to attack Port Mahon ; "^
she was indignant at the Prussian Treaty as
a ' breach of confidence and regard ' ; *^ plans were
being made to attack British vessels, and Marshal
BeUe-Isle had presented a plan to the King for
two expeditions, one against England, the other
to attack Minorca ; *^ France would invade both
England and Ireland, and expected by taking
Portsmouth to march upon London ; also (in the
same report) the Court of Vienna had been
sounded.** During the month of February secret
intelligence from Paris continuaUy besieged New
castle about the projected invasion of England, and
the huge army to be employed for that purpose.
But as early as the 4th of that month the First
Lord had received an advice that Minorca was to
be surprised — and the report had been repeatedly
confirmed.**
90 Secret IntelUgence from Cressener, January 26, 1756 :
Add. MSS., 32862, f. 220.
91 Intercepted letter of Bunge to Hopken, January 31, 1756 :
ibid., f. 299.
92 Intercepted letter of Bunge to Hopken, February 6, 1756 :
ibid., f. 383.
93 Secret InteUigence from Cressener, February 9, 1756 :
ibid., f. 402. The report appears to have been true in a
measure. Cressener probably knew that the Abbe de Bemis
had dined with the Austrian Ambassador on the 4th (see
Waddington, p. 312), and naturaUy deduced that the rupture
with Prussia had led to some new projects.
94 ' A state of the inteUigence relating to the preparations
at Toulon and the design against the Island of Minorca
C c 2

404 HENRY FOX ch.
The terror of Newcastle seemed heightened by
every fresh rumour of French activity. The army
must certainly be augmented — but how ? There
was no efficient mUitia to be counted upon, and
regiments of volunteers, obtained by noblemen's
generosity, had already proved a fiasco. GranviUe
had long ago suggested Hessians for service in
Scotland *^ — a proposal in which Hardwicke had
concurred ; ** and it was finally decided (in virtue
of the treaty) to send for this contingent to defend
the English nation in case the reported invasion
should actually materialize. But 8,000 mer
cenaries seemed a tiny force to defend England,
and Waldegrave writes sadly, ' We first engaged
in a war, and then began to prepare ourselves.' *'
Fox was keenly alive to the unpreparedness and
the danger. In explaining the necessity of sending
two battalions from Ireland to America, he wrote
to Devonshire in part : ' There is not in aU the
west and north of England a single soldier . . .
you have a militia and ability to raise troops,
which we have not. Recruits come in very slowly
received between the end of December 1755 and the 6th of AprU
1756 : ' Add. MSS., 35895, f . 169 et seq. Of the reports received
in January the first came from MarseUles, the second from
Bern, and the third from Turin. These specificaUy mentioned
Minorca as the point threatened ; but intelUgence before this
had attested to the active preparations of the French at
Toulon. 95 Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 12, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32860, f. 13.
96 Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 13, 1755 : ibid., f. 30.
9' Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 56.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 405
. . . America is in the utmost danger, and without
speedy assistance, our military affairs there (will
become) desperate. If a landing of any consider
able number of men is effected in either Great
Britain or Ireland, the one island must certainly
assist the other. But America must not be given
up to avoid danger incurred only on account of
America.' **
Yet Newcastle was divided between his fears
of imminent invasion and his eagerness to make
a diplomatic scheme prove its merit. Holland
continued to evade or refuse her treaty-obligations
to provide 6,000 men, and Fox, Granville and
Anson had told the First Lord that he would never
get them ; ** yet he persisted in his short-sighted
policy rather than ask for Hanoverians, or (which
would have been far better) set on foot a militia-bill
that would be of a quick and operative nature.
This last, it might be urged, was the oiUy honour
able and patriotic remedy.
In the interim of suspense the First Lord
thought to raise additional regiments on the Irish
establishment, and sent instructions to Devonshire
to that effect.*"" But the consolation — or excuse —
98 Fox to Devonshire, January 31, 1756 : Torrens, History
of British Cabinets, II. 273.
99 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, II. 30.
100 Newcastie to Devonshire, March 7, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32863, f. 214. Devonsliire himself had been the author of the
proposal, since he beUeved that the raising of two regiments
ostcii.sihly for Irish defence would l)c more likely of acceptance
by the Dublin Pailiamcnt than tho money-request wliich

406 HENRY FOX ch.
was not aUowed him. At a Cabinet meeting on
the 12th of March, it was decided that the pro
posal could not be carried out without the sanction
of the English Parhament,^"^ and Fox took upon
himseU the task of contradicting the former letter
to the Lord Lieutenant. ^"^ The crisis in foreign
affairs had begun to bring out the first signs
of dissension in the Ministry ; would it in time
bring dissolution ? was the question. MeanwhUe
Frederick was aUowed to mediate between the
two Western Powers "^ — an attempt which was
clearly doomed to faUure.
On the 1st of March Keene wrote to Under-
Secretary Amyand of the English Foreign Office,
bidding him inform Fox that Spain's object was
' friendship in particular and peace in general '.^"*
This was indeed assuring ; and yet the fact could
not properly be overlooked that the temptation
of the Spanish Court was great. France was
putting constant pressure upon her southern
neighbour to come into the war ; she would take
^Minorca at her own expense, and hand it over to
Newcastle had meditated. — Newcastle to Devonshire, February
6, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32863, f . 3 ; Devonshire to Newcastie,
February 24, 1756 : ibid., f. 77.
101 The decision may have been actuated by the dread of
Irish troops, which, as the Cabinet weU knew, was a very general
feehng in England. Apparently Newcastie had acted hastUy
and without consulting his coUeagues.
102 Newcastle to Devonshire, March 13, 1755 : ibid., f. 273.
Fox's letter is not in evidence.
103 Newcastle to Devonshire, March 7, 1755.
104 Keene to Am\-and, March 1, 1756 : ibid., f. 144.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 407
Spain, and would even assist in the recapture of
Gibraltar if Spain would only provide fifteen ships
of the Une, to continue in the service ' until '
(wrote Cressener' s agent) ' she has reduced England
to reasonable terms '.^"^
Perhaps if General Wall had not been at the head
of the party that had overthrown Ensenada and
the French cabal, he would have succumbed to the
golden opportunity of striking England at a time
when her fortunes were at the lowest ebb ; and
had Spain offered to attack Minorca and thus
allowed France to turn her whole attention to
operations in the north, it would be hard to say
to what extent disasters would have fallen upon
the English Government. But, fortunately, far
from agreeing to this, the Court of Madrid offered
to mediate between England and France — a plan
which Newcastle told Fox deserved ' serious con
sideration ',*°^ even though Frederick was already
pursuing the same end. In view of all this England
owes some debt to General Wall.
The Spanish Minister's commendable design was
carefully put into operation, and its failure not
long deferred. On the 22nd Keene wrote to Secre
tary Fox that the French Court insisted that
the preliminary demand made through RouiUe in
January was unalterable ; "' and word also reached
105 Secret intelUgence from VersaiUes, February 22 and
March 17, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32863, ff. 59, 322.
106 Newcastie to Fox, March 7, 175() ; ibid., f. 218.
10' Kceuo tu Fox, March 22, 175U : ibid., f. 434.

408 HENRY FOX ch.
Newcastle that the Prussian attempt had met with
simUar failure.^"* In the same letter from Keene
much credence was apparently given to the per
sistent rumoTU"s of a Franco-Austrian convention,
and the alleged articles of the supposed treaty
were revealed in full. FinaUy the Ambassador
announced that Spain had received inteUigence
that Port Mahon was to be attacked in April.
The day after Keene' s letter was written — and
hence some time before it was received — Holder
nesse sent Keith a long list of instructions,^"* among
which we may note that the Ambassador was to
paUiate the significance of the treaty with Prussia
and (above aU things) learn the truth respecting
the rumours of a Franco-Austrian understanding.
With these instructions Keith dUigently com
plied ; ^^" but since his recent efforts to conciliate
the Empress had only added weight to the pressure
of Austria upon the ministers of Louis XV,"^ it is
108 Hardwicke to Newcastle, March 21, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32863, f. 448.
109 Holdernesse to Keith, March 23, 1756 : ibid., f. 459.
110 Keith appUed first to Kaunitz, who told him that he had
been commanded not to discuss the matter. Getting no
satisfaction from either ChanceUor or Emperor, Keith finaUy
asked an audience of the Empress ; but here again his efforts
met with failure. ' Too late ! ' was her observation on the
question of a better understanding with England ; and the
Ambassador told his chief that the instigator of her forward
policy was Kaunitz, who ' had got absolute power, as if by
witchcraft, of the Empress's spirit'. — ^Keith to Holdernesse,
May 16, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32865, f. 1.
Ill Waddington. Louis XV die Renversement des Alliances,
p. 324.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 409
hardly strange that his efforts were now to prove
futile. The policy of Kaunitz had at last reaped
its fruit. Even before the Convention of West
minster secret negotiations had been set on foot
with the Court of Versailles, and although a
Franco-Prussian alliance was not whoUy incom
patible with Frederick's recent policy, and although
for a time the Court of VersaUles showed its
characteristic wavering, the fact became none the
less clear that the pride of his Most Christian
Majesty had sustained a blow that nothing could
alleviate save revenge. Thus it came about that
the shrewd diplomacy of Vienna was crowned at
last with success, and on May 1, 1756, was con
cluded the famous Treaty of Versailles — the second
phase of that diplomatic revolution, which made
a general war inevitable.
Meanwhile the crisis was fast being reached in
England and her Ministry. Some time ago Fox
had written, ' We are undoubtedly going to be
invaded in more parts than one, and perhaps in
Ireland at the same time. And we — that is, the
people — despise it. The more they fear France,
the less they will, I imagine, do in their own
defence when the time of danger comes.' ^^^ This
was rather pessimistic, but Newcastle himseU
realized the situation with the keenest agony ; yet
he had failed to see that if the ' people ' were inert,
it was because they were not encouraged to be
otherwise ; and, having wasted a season in futile
11- Fox to Devonshire, January 31, 1756 : Torrens, II. 273.

410 HENRY FOX ch.
despatches to The Hague, he was forced to believe
that Hanoverians must be added to the expected
contingent from Hesse, or the dreaded tidal-wave
from across the Channel would submerge him at
his post, and the nation, which he had thought
might conciliate the powers by subsidies, would be
helpless to defend herself in the hour of need.
There is, in fact, no denying the Ministry's fears, in
view of what was expressed in writing by New
castle, Fox, and others. Whether there was any
real likelihood that so bold an attempt would
be made upon the British Isles, and whether
they were justified in beheving as they did, is
perhaps an unanswerable question. Pitt is said
to have pronounced the present means of defence
sufficient. -^^^
On the 23rd of March the King notified the Houses
that he had summoned the Hessians, and replies
were made, that of the Commons being the work of
Fox and Murray. ^^* The former had been as zealous
as usual in hunting up support for the King's
measures ; and so Bedford had promised to send
every one over whom he had the least infiuence,
while the Cavendishes had been likewise solicited. ^^^
' Fear predominated so much,' wrote Walpole, in
his account of the day's events, ' that the cry was
113 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, II. 31.
n* Fox to Newcastle, March 20, 1756 (first letter of that
date). us Fox to Newcastle, March 20, 1756 (second letter of that
date).

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 411
for Hanoverians too.' "** It was not, however,
until the 29th of April that the King was asked for
his electoral troops, SackviUe being then prevailed
upon to move the address for that purpose ; and
the Administration was supported by 259 votes
against 92. When the estimates were brought in
a few days later, Pitt rose and lashed the Ministry
for their flagrant neglect ; this waste on Hessians,
he said, would have conquered America, or saved
Minorca of which he despaired ; they had even
waited till now before asking for troops, and the
neglect appeared wilful. ' Had we been secured
here,' he exclaimed, ' the fleet might have gone
safely to Minorca,' — the neglect looked wilful ; and
he concluded by a scathing portrayal of a disjointed
and irresponsible Ministry.
Fox replied that nobody would be glad to
receive advantage from the loss of Minorca, and
asked if Pitt wished to see a sole minister.
' No,' was Pitt's retort ; he had no wish to see
a sole minister, but ' a system and decision '.
' The loss of Minorca,' he continued, ' must be
caused by infatuation or design, for miners for
Fort St. Philip are only raising now. Indeed, were
Mr. Fox " sole minister ", there would be decision
enough.' ^^'
The bitter diatribe was most emphatically just,
and no one knew this better than Fox. Indeed it
116 Walpole to Conway, March 25, 1756 : Letters of Horace
Walpole, III. 407.
'" Walpole, Memoirs of George II, 1. 34-5.

412 HENRY FOX ch.
must have cheered him considerably when Pitt
had implied that vigorous action was beyond the
Secretary's power to inaugurate. In all questions
Hardwicke was certain to be in unison with
Newcastle ; Holdernesse and Robinson were little
more than automata ; while Anson was generaUy
reckoned upon to stand with his father-in-law.
Finally, the erratic Lord President had doubted
if a single ship of the line could be spared for the
Mediterranean."^ So Fox as a member of an
Opposition in the Conciliabulum was in helpless
and unhappy solitude. The fact that the Cabinet
in its broad sense was hardly ever convoked is
apparent to any reader of the papers and despatches
of the period, and Granville's term, Conciliabulum,
is employed more than once in the letters of the
time. It is therefore almost needless to point
out how a small number of men were enabled
to dictate the foreign policy of the Government ;
and in the existing conditions of the present
little circle, it meant that Newcastle was virtuaUy
dictator. Meanwhile the question had been forced upon
the Ministry of doing something to save Minorca,
inasmuch as the reports of French designs had
been too numerous to be overlooked. ^^* Intelhgence
118 Lyttelton to Lyttelton, August 8, 1756 : PhUUmore,
Memoirs of Lyttelton, II. 519.
119 Reports of the designs on Minorca fairly flooded the
Ministry during February. — ' State of the Intelligence,' &c. :
Add. MSS., 35890, f. 169. See note 92.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 413
written from Paris on the 8th of March had declared
that the attack upon the island was intended
beyond a doubt,^^" adding that the motive was to
induce England to weaken her army at home ;
and a month later word was received by the First
Lord that preparations for the expedition were
aheady far advanced. ^^^ Fox had done what he
could to make his coUeagues reahze the danger
and see the necessity of sending a squadron to
protect the island. The condition of both Gibraltar
and Minorca had long been an object of neglect by
his late department, and Governor Tyrawly of the
latter place was in England at the time and fully
acquainted with the weakness of Port Mahon and
its fortifications. According to Fox, the Duke of
Cumberland had, as long ago as last Christmas,
advised sending relief, and the Secretary himseU,
during the first week of March, had urged the
despatch of a strong squadron to meet the emer
gency. ^^^ But fear of France's hazardous invasion
and the First Minister's parleys with the Dutch
had caused the Secretary to be outvoted ; and soon
the mad scramble for defenders of the Channel
would paralyse the Ministry's action when at last
it should be taken.
On the 15th of March Fox wrote to Keene that
120 Secret IntelUgence, March 8, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32863,
f. 224.
121 Secret InteUigence, March 20, 1756 : ibid., f . 394.
122 Pox said that he 'could not prevaU '.—Doddington,
Diary, May 7, 1756.

414 HENRY FOX ch.
Admiral Byng would be despatched ' with a superior
force ' to the Mediterranean ; ^-^ and on the 27th he
sent the Admiralty the necessary instructions.^-*
About a week seems to have sufficed for the equip
ment of the expedition, for on the 7th of AprU,
Byng, with Admiral West as second-in-command,
left Spithead with ten ships of the hne.
Three days after the departure of the English
squadron from Spithead, the expedition of Riche-
heu, consisting of twelve ships of the hne (com
manded by Admiral de la Gallissonniere), and
transports carrying about 12,000 troops, saUed
from Toulon ; and a landing being effected on
^Minorca a week later, the siege of Port Mahon was
commenced. The British defenders consisted of a garrison
of less than 4,000 men tmder General Blakeney,
with a squadron of five ships, under Commander
Edgcumbe, to protect the harbour ; ' Blakeney
and Edgcumbe wrote with great spirit as if they
feared nothing. The first was a good officer, but
rather superannuated ; the other a mettled young
man without much experience or knowledge.' ^"^
Blakeney was undoubtedly hampered by want of
sufficient officers, since not only was Grovemor
Tyrawly absent from his post in the time of
123 Fox to Keene. March S, 1756 : F 0. Papers, Pub.
Rec. Off.
12^ Fox to the Admiralty, March 27, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32S95. 125 Lyttelton to Lyttelton, April 28. 1756 : PhUUmore,
II. 505.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 415
danger, but all of the colonels of the regiments
were said to be away on furloughs as weU.^^®
Edgcumbe, seeing the inferiority of his little fieet,
landed some marines to assist the garrison, and
then sailed away for Gibraltar.
The smallness of the French fleet was known
with a fair amount of certainty by the English
Ministers ; yet why did they not make victory
reasonably sure by giving Byng a greater margin
of superiority ? The answer depends for its explana
tion on two facts : first and chiefly, the condition
of the British navy at the time, and secondly, the
need, or supposed need, of vessels in the Channel
to protect the British Isles in cases of attempted
invasion. From a report produced after later
investigation it appears that at this time the
British navy numbered but 168 vessels, of
which 44 (including Hawke's squadron) were in
service abroad, and 53 employed as convoys of
trade, or to cruise off different points in the
British Isles for defensive purposes. Of the
remaining 71, 58 were out of commission, either
from shattered condition, deficiency in equipment,
or lack of men. This leaves a balance of only
13 ships, ' ready for immediate service upon an
emergency ; ' and the extreme scarcity of sailors
— a situation which had necessitated an embargo
(March 3) on all shipping ^^' — was probably account-
126 Mahon, History of Eng. IV. 65.
12' Disposition of H.M.'s ships from January 1 to May 1,
17.50 : Add. MSS., 33047, f. 24.

416 HENRY FOX ch.
able for the fact that only ten of the thirteen
avaUable ships were given to Byng.
The exact number of vessels detaUed for home-
defence is not clear, but Hawke certainly had
nineteen ships of the line employed for watching
the movements of the Brest and Rochfort squad
rons of the French ; and, whUe it would appear
that some of the aforesaid vessels cruising at
different points on the English and Irish coasts
might easUy have been recaUed, the Ministry's
terror of a French descent had evidently decided —
if they had considered the point at aU — that such
a measure would be inexpedient. In other words,
Hawke had been given an ample squadron, but
was not then sufficiently trusted ^^ to intercept an
expedition encumbered by convoys of troops.
But apart from considerations of what might or
might not be done with the material at hand, since,
in view of the breach with France, an attempt
upon Minorca had not only been a possibUity,
but had been constantly proclaimed from various
sources, it is clear that the British navy was in no
way prepared to meet the emergency ; and there
is no evidence to show that during the crucial
years of 1754 and 1755 Anson had made any
128 The nervousness of the Admiralty may have been partly
due to the attitude of the admirals in service. Writing to
Newcastle, June 6, Anson complains, ' I don't know how it
comes to pass, that unless our commanders-in-chief have
a very great superiority they never think themselves safe.' —
Add. MSS., 32865, f. 221. Apparently Anson did not at this
period inspire the navy with much confidence.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 417
representation of the state of affairs at the Admiralty.
It is possible, of course, that he reported the matter
to his colleagues of the Conciliabulum ; but in any
case the Admiralty needed a thorough renovation,
and it had been Anson's duty to see that it was done.
Byng's instructions sent to him, 3Iarch 30, were
perfectly exphcit. He was to put to sea ' imme
diately ' and proceed ' with the utmost expedition '
to Gibraltar. He must then ascertain whether
any French squadron had passed through the
straits, and as such a movement would probably
mean that it was bound for America, he should
send a detachment (specified) under Admiral West
to make for Louisburg ; but whether this should
be the case or not, he was to go ' without a mo
ment's loss of time ' to Minorca, with or without
the above detachment according to the above
circumstances. He was then ' to use all possible
means in his power for it's (Port Mahon's) relief ',
unless the place should not be attacked, in which
case he should impede or intercept the French
fleet by stationing himself off Toulon. The
Admiral was further instructed to exert the
utmost vigilance throughout in protecting Minorca
and Gibraltar from any hostile attempt.^^*
Two days afterward Byng had written the
Admiralty, with regard to the instructions received :
' I . . . shaU use every endeavour and means in my
129 CampbeU, Lives of the Admirals, i\. 454-5. The in-
Btructions to take a battaUon from Gibraltar «ere sent him the
next day.
U56 j„ ci

418 HENRY FOX ch.
power to frustrate the design of the enemy, if they
should make an attempt on Minorca, knowing the
great importance of that island to the Crown of
Great Britain.' i^"
Fowke, the Governor of Gibraltar, had mean
while been instructed by a despatch, dated
March 21, both to receive a regiment of fusUiers
which had been sent with Byng, and also to place
under the latter's command a detachment from
his regiments that would in aU equal a battalion.^^^
A week later, at the instance of the Admiralty,
which seemed now to be teeming with action, an
order was sent, in effect rescinding the previous
one, since it commanded Fowke both to let the
regiment of fusiliers go on its way, and to
detach the aforesaid battalion, if Port Mahon was
' in any likelihood of being attacked '.^^^
The Cabinet and the Admiralty had now done
aU the work they considered necessary, and must
content themselves with awaiting results. Fox had
written to Keene on the 1st of April that great
hopes were entertained that Byng would frustrate
the French designs, ^^^ and inteUigence was at hand
(though unconfirmed) to the effect that the French
fleet was poorly equipped and manned.^^* On the
130 Byng to the Admiralty, AprU 1, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
35895, f . 342.
131 Barrington to Fowke, March 21, 1756 : ibid., f. 366.
132 Barrington to Fowke, March 28, 1756 : ibid., f. 368.
133 Fox to Keene, AprU 1, 1756.
134 ' French and EngUsh Army and Fleet ', dated September
10, 1756 : Add. MSS., 33047, f. 65.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 419
10th Newcastle assured Devonshire that all would
be safe if orUy Byng reached Minorca in time ; ^^^
and faUed perhaps to realize that if Byng were too
late, the whole weight of criminal responsibility
would fall upon himself and his coUeagues.
While navies were moving, diplomacy was not
idle, and Austria, who, as Keene informed Fox,
had given Spain a hint of her impending conven
tion with France, was now trying artfully to ingra
tiate herseU with the Court of Madrid."* Fox's
reply questioned the authority of the reports
respecting the aforementioned design, as Abreu,
the Spanish ambassador in London, knew nothing
of it. The Secretary also enclosed a warning, which
Keene was to give General Wall, of inteUigence
received in England to the effect that a French
intrigue was on foot at the Spanish Court to get
the General dismissed from office. ^^'
Fox's despatches were invariably concise, straight
forward and pertinent, and when he ultimately
retired from office, the Court of Spain paid him the
tribute of its regret, as weU as commending his
' candour and capacity '."^ How far he influenced
diplomatic proceedings is difficult to ascertain,
owing to the apparent scarcity of minutes and
other material relative to meetings ; but in
135 Newcastle to Devonshire, April 10, 1756 : Add. MSS.^
32864, f. 204.
138 Keene to Fox, AprU 5, 1756 : ibid., f . 153.
13' Fox,to Keene, AprU 23, 1756 : ibid., f. 374.
138 Keene to Holdernesse, December 5, 1756 : Add, MSS.,
32869. f. 426.
D d2

420 HENRY FOX ch.
occasional letters we find traces of suggestions
that he offered in the way of alterations or omis
sions. Although essentially a man of action, he
was powerless (as we have said) against the New
castle phalanx in the Conciliabulum, and he lacked
that capacity for administrative leadership which
might have compelled this body to foUow his
guidance. And yet, devoid as he was of every kind
of constructive statesmanship, he had certainly
more forethought than any of his coUeagues, and
hence his concern for Minorca — a feeling in no way
allayed by Anson's assurance that ' Byng's squadron
could beat anything the French had or could have
in the Mediterranean '."* Such was clearly the
sentiment in which Cabinet and Admiralty con
curred, and Boscawen, in command of ten ships
of the line recently put into shape, sailed on
April 29 with orders to reinforce Hawke,"" — an
action which was possibly due to the report "^
that no less than 80,000 men were to take part in
139 Doddington, Diary, May 7, 1756. Newcastle, writing
to Fox the next day, tells us that Anson considered Byng
' strong enough '. This feeling had been somewhat intensified
by a letter which Secretary Clevland of the Admiralty had
received from a captain on duty in the Mediterranean, and
which appeared to show that Byng outnumbered his opponent.
La GaUissonniere. — Harvey to Clevland, AprU 17, 1756 : Add.
MSS., 32864, f . 306. But Fox, who seemed to disagree with
every one, took a different view of the letter, and declared that
there was ' bad as well as good in it '. — Fox to Newcastle,
May 7, 1755 : ibid., f. 478.
"0 Disposition of H.M.'s ships, January 1 to May 1, 1756.
i« Received April 20. . _

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 421
the intended invasion of England."^ But this fleet,
had it been sent to the Mediterranean instead,
might have justified the hope that Byng would be
reinforced in time."*
That Fox argued strongly against this over-
concentration is certainly not a point that is in
evidence. Quite apart from the seeming useless-
ness of remonstrating with his colleagues, the
Secretary himseU was a victim of the general
panic. •^** The only feature distinguishing the
attitude of Fox from that of the others was the
fact that he alone seemed to look beyond these
fears ; and when the suspicion haunted him that
a new fleet was being detained merely to assist
the Hessian transports,"® such indifference as this
to Minorca was more than he could stand. True,
the Cabinet in this instance was blameless, but
the grounds for distrusting it were justified.
1*2 Secret inteUigence from VersaUles, April 9, 1756 : ibid.,
f. 190.
1*3 Boscawen's fieet might well have reached Byng in time.
True the latter had been a month in reaching Gibraltar, but
he had the misfortune of encountering violent gales. New
castle, for his part, had expected that Byng would arrive off
Port Mahon in three weeks' time. — Newcastle to Devonshire,
AprU 27, 1756 : ibid., f. 411. At aU events the idea was weU
worth the trial, and Fox at any rate should have urged it in
view of his feelings regarding Minorca. But when the Cabinet
met, on May 8, the effort was too late.
>** See page 409.
"5 Hardwicke teUs us that Fox had misconstrued the
minute of the meeting on the 6th — that, in short, no such
idea had ever been entertained by the Cabinet. — Hardwicke to
Newcastle, May 9, 1756 : ibid., f . 304.

422 HENRY FOX ch.
On May 7 Fox took the step of writing to New
castle, urging that Boscawen be ordered to detach
a number of ships to be sent immediately to the
relief of Port Mahon ; "" and incidentaUy this fact
seems to show that the Secretary had thought a
private letter to the chief of the Ministry would be
more propitious for the success of his proposal than a
mention of it to the docile Cabinet the day before.
Newcastle replied that he concurred in Fox's
plea for action, but that when Cumberland had
made a similar proposal to Anson, the latter had
protested against weakening Boscawen's fleet, and
suggested that three or four large ships should be
sent from England for the purpose."' It seems that
at the time of Boscawen's departure there had
been but eight ships in port and ' in good condition ',
and ' only two fit for service, and those in want of
men ',^*® — which may account for the smallness of
the number proposed by Anson.
On the evening of the same day (May 8) Fox,
Anson, Holdernesse and Hardwicke held a meeting
and decided that four ships of the line (with one
regiment placed on board) should be sent imme
diately to reinforce Byng ; and the proposed
alternative of drawing from Boscawen's squadron
was abandoned without dissent."* Fox had finally
1*6 Fox to Newcastle, May 7, 1756.
1*' Newcastle to Fox, May 8, 1756 : ibid., f. 483.
1*8 Disposition of H.M.'s ships, January 1 to May 1, 1756.
'*9 Clevland to Newcastie, May 9, 1756 : ibid., f. 504 ;
Hardwicke to Newcastle, May 9, 1756.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 423
roused his colleagues ; but the change had come
too late. The reinforcement in question — which
in a general way had been decided upon as early
as Byng's departure ^®" — was eventually raised to
five ships of the line and sent under Admiral
Brodrick; but the delay attending the despatch
of Boscawen's squadron and in rendering the other
vessels seaworthy had precluded any advantage
in sending the fleet at all.
Outvoted generaUy by his colleagues, Fox had
at the same time to bear the brunt of attacks in
Parliament. He once declared his willingness to
defend Newcastle in everything he could, but as
for palliating his refusal to anticipate war and arm
sooner, that was something he could not and would
not do.^®* A few weeks ago his sincerity had so
far got the better of his habits as a politician that
he insisted upon yielding to the pressure of the
Opposition and giving support to a militia-bill. ^^^
Newcastle well remembered that Fox, no less than
Pitt, had clamoured that augmentation of forces at
home should have been made earlier,^®* but he now
150 ' French and English Army and Fleet ' (already cited).
151 Doddington, Diary, May 17, 1756.
152 Murray was right in holding him responsible for the
success of the biU in the Commons. — Murray to Newcastle,
May 24, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32865, f. 104. It is more than
hkely that Fox, who had the management of the Commons,
could have prevented its passage, if he had so desired ; and
the fact seems clear that he wanted the Opposition to succeed.
Hence Newcastle's assertion that he and Pitt were in aUiance.
153 This confirms Fox's account to Doddington ; but we
are not told just when Fox made these appeals.

424 HENRY FOX ch.
wrote sarcastically of the Secretary's attitude
(asserting that the two were in alliance), and
bewailed the fact that he (Newcastle) was being
selected as the sole target of attack.^®* Revenge
was certainly found later when the Newcastles
defeated the bill in the Upper House,^^^ and the
Duke had expressed — strangely enough — ^hisfearof
strengthening the Crown and instilling in the people
a fondness for arms.-^^* It was his preference,
rather, that a nation whose prestige was quite un-
dimmed by any rival, should depend upon foreign
troops for her defence.
For Fox, defending the Ministry meant defend
ing it against Pitt. The latter said later that
Anson was ' not fit to command a cock-boat in
the river Thames ' ; ^®' but he must then have
changed his mind, for he now praised the First
Lord of the Admiralty and levelled his attacks at
Newcastle.^^^ ' I answered as well as I could,' wrote
Fox to His Grace, ' but the isle of Minorca is
15* Newcastle to Hardwicke, May 8, 1756.
155 "Walpole, Memoirs of George II, II. 46.
156 Newcastle to Devonshire, AprU 10, 1755 : Add. MSS.,
32864, f. 204.
15' Almon, Anecdotes of Chatham, I. 158.
158 Hardwicke endeavoured to soothe Newcastle by declaring
that one in Pitt's position would invariably attack the head
of the Government, and that in so domg there would always
be ' a mixture both of maUce and politics '. ' As to his
scheme (sic) of " wiUuUy intending to lose Minorca in order
to make a bad peace" ' (see p. 411), he continued, 'it was
scouted andridiculedbyeverybody.' — Hardwicke to Newcastle,
May 9, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32864, f. 504.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 425
a weight that is not easy to debate under.' ^¦'* The
point which exasperated the Secretary most was
the habit the Duke had of vaunting his own
innocence and laying the blame upon others :
nobody blamed him ; the City imputed nothing
to him, as ' the sea was not his proArince ' — an
insinuation against Anson that he would have been
quick to repel under other circumstances. Fox
did not tell the Duke (who was dining at Holland
House) that the City was in reality very indignant
at the neglect of Minorca ; but he informed him
that, in answering attacks in the Commons, he (Fox)
was obliged to discriminate a little, although he had
wiUingly defended him as ' answerable only in an
equal degree with his colleagues '. The Duke still
persisted that no one could blame him.^^"
Newcastle's own arguments to Fox some days
previously are almost ingenuous in their utter lack
of breadth and comprehension. ' The occasion of
all our misfortunes,' he writes, ' and that will
encrease every day, is that we are not equal to
the work we have undertaken . . . and rather than
own this truth when any misfortune happens, the
Ministry are to be blamed.' So far as Minorca
was concerned, he did not think ' the defence of
that was difficult ', though he was ' not more
concerned to defend it than others '."^ The First
Lord was, in fact, too sure of his personal righteous-
159 Fox to Newcastie, May 7, 1756.
160 Doddington, Diary, May 17, 1756.
161 Newcastie to Fox, May 8, 1756.

426 HENRY FOX ch.
ness to realize the difficulties of his defender in
the Commons.
This bhnd confidence of Newcastle, which was
certain to be imitated by the nerveless shadows
of the inner clique, had the effect of making
Fox consider his personal situation. Would the
oligarchy of the Cabinet make a scapegoat "^ of
the man who disagreed with them ? The thought
was not a pleasant one, but yet the noticeable
dissatisfaction with him naturaUy made it the
more poignant. Meeting Murray one day, who
praised him for his able defence of the Ministry
a few days before, Fox thanked the Attorney-
General, and then asked him as a favour to teU
Granville what he thought of his conduct in
general during the session. This makes one
wonder if Fox was clinging to the hope that
Granville would be independent enough to differ
from his colleagues. Murray did what he could
to assure his fellow in the Commons, but he thought
that Fox must have reason to believe that the
King was displeased with him — ^hence the message
to Granville, who was intimate with the Crown."*
The probability is that Fox was dissatisfied with
himself and dreaded the consequences of his
ambiguous position.
Meanwhile Admiral Byng, after a stormy passage,
had reached Gibraltar on Sunday, the 2nd of May.
He was at once informed that Minorca was in
162 He used this expression to Doddington, and dwelt upon it.
163 Murray to Newcastle, May 24, 1756.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 427
a state of siege, and naturaUy expected that his
fleet should receive the reinforcement prescribed.
But Fowke, on the basis (as he aUeged ^") of a
possible alteration of the Cabinet's pohcy during
the time which had elapsed since the despatches to
him were written, immediately convoked a cotmcil
of war, which gave its unanimous decision against
weakening Gibraltar in the manner directed,
although consenting to Bjmg's request that Edg-
cumbe's squadron be replenished with sailors.^®"
The discretionary power, which Fowke had thus
claimed, was purely an assumption, and under
no circumstances justifiable from a military stand
point. Yet, notwithstanding the council's decision, the
Governor must have felt some uneasiness, in that
he offered to let Byng have the detachment. The
Admiral replied that he deemed the reinforcement
for Edgcumbe to be sufficient."^ The Governor's de
cision was then promptly reported to the authorities
at home, who had certainly shown no belief in any
change of circumstances. Indeed Barrington had
written to Fowke on the 12th ordering the detach
ment of a battalion for Brodrick' s command, ^^' and
Secretary Fox had sent a despatch under fiying seal
through Keene, likewise announcing the Cabinet's
164 Fowke to Barrington, May 6, 1756 : Add. MSS., 35895,
f. 368. 165 CouncU of War held at Gibraltar, May 4, 1756 : Admiralty
In-ldters, Pub. Rec. Off.
166 Fowke to Barrington, May 6, 1756.
16' Barrington to Fowke, May 12, 1756.

428 HENRY FOX

ch.

intentions."* The Ministry was clearly putting
its utmost weight into the expedition.
Admiral Byng was known as a brave man and
a conscientious officer, but he seemed to lack
confidence in himself, and was cowed by the weight
of responsibility attached to an expedition of such
moment. He had done nothing, moreover, to
justify his promotion to so important a command,
and had previously shown a tendency to be easily
discouraged."* It would seem as though the
Admiralty had picked him because the more
capable admirals were required for the Channel
service, in which interest chiefiy centred because of
the expected invasion. In his letter to Clevland,
written on the day of his arrival at Gibraltar,
Byng showed distinctly his spirit of dejection. He
would do all he could to relieve Blakeney, but
information received made him doubt his ability
to render assistance, and ' if he failed to relieve Port
Mahon ',"" he would next consider the question of
defending Gibraltar. The letter showed no desire
to falter in duty, but it seemed to be designed to
prepare the Admiralty for the failure he expected.^'^
168 Fox to Keene, May 10, 1756 (enclosing despatch to
Fowke) : F. 0. Papers, Spain, no. 151, Pub. Rec. Off.
169 On receiving a certain commission in 1746 Bjmg pleaded
that he was ' not equal to the task ' — an episode which New
castie may have forgotten. See Torrens, History of British
Cabinets, II. 96-7 ; Leadam, Pol. Hist, of Eng. (ed. Hunt and
Poole), IX. 441. I'o The itaUes are mine.
I'l Byng to the Admiralty, May 4, 1756 : Admiralty In-
Letters, Pub. Rec. Off.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 429
Having waited at Gibraltar six days (apparently
for repairs), Byng put to sea with the fourteen
vessels of his command,^'^ and on the 18th came
in sight of the French fleet. Although slightly
outnumbering his opponents, he carefully avoided
engaging on the next day, and was even slow to
fight on the 20th when the wind was in his favour.
It is needless to relate in detail the conflict which
took place later on the same day ; Byng employed
antiquated and hazardous tactics, while La Gallis
sonniere seems to have made good use of his
opportunities."^ The result was indecisive.
Having sailed under cover of the night to a point
well out of danger, Byng, in spite of the fact that
the French admiral had also retired, made no
effort to renew the action, but waited for some
reason until the 24th, when he held a council and
represented both his hopelessness of success and
his fears for Gibraltar. The council, which must
have included Admiral West, tmanimously endorsed
his opinion, and the decision, with five reasons
appended, was transmitted to the Admiralty."*
Fowke, before hearing of the disaster, replied to
Fox's letter of the 10th, promising to comply with
his orders received, unless (as he implied) his
action should be affected by intelligence from
"2 Four vessels from Edgecumbe's squadron being added.
"3 See Mahan, Infiuence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 286-9.
"* CouncU of War, on board H.M.'s ship Ramillies, at sea, on
Monday, May 24, 1756. The minute is printed in Campbell's
Lives of the Admirals, IV. 81.

4W HENRY FOX

CH,

Byng or .Minorca. He deprecated the orders,
however, and strongly supported his conduct
respecting the former instructions."*
On the .3rd of June the Ministry received the
inteUigence of Fowke's disobedience, and Barring
ton promptly reprimanded him by letter, declaring
him superseded by Tyrawly, who would imme
diately saU to reUeve him of his command."® The
whole fatal news having arrived the same day,"'
the Cabinet (or its ruling members) met that
evennig, and voted to deprive Byng and West of
their commands. Admiral Hawke being sent to
relieve the former and see that both were brought
home under arrest."* AU this was, of course, too
late to save Port Mahon, which feU on the 27th of
June after a stubborn and praiseworthy defence.
Blakeney, the veteran commandant, was com
mended by the King,"* and rewarded with a
barony. ^^"
Both Cabinet and Court were in the greatest state
of excitement over the fatal conduct of Byng. Fox
wrote to Devonshire on the 3rd, and to Bedford
i'5 Fowke to Fox, June 2, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32865, f. 177.
"6 Draft of the letter among the Newcastle Papers :
ibid., f. 213.
1" It is said that the news was first divulged by d' Abreu,
the Spanish ambassador, who had received a letter from
La GalUssonnidre. — Walpole, Memoirs of George II, II. 59.
"8 Fox to Devonshke, June 3, 1755 : Torrens, II. 289.
"9 Barrington to Blakeney, draft in Newcastle Papers :
Add. MSS., 32865, f. 217.
180 Mahon, History of England, IV. 7 1 .

VI SECRETAKY OK SPATE 431
on the 4th, the lamentable tidings. Ciunberland
alone tried to be cheerful by urging that Minorca
might yet be saved, and Fox told Bedford that he
heartily wished he could believe so."* Meanwhile
war had already been declared against France on
the 18th of May ; and Parliament had been pro
rogued on the 27th — probably at Fox's instance —
lest the news of some misfortune might reach the
members while in session."^
When the disastrous news became public, the
outcry was too great to be silenced or unheeded.
Lampoons appeared, which knew no respect for
ministers, and portended ill for the Admiral.
Newcastle, frightened nearly into hysteria, pro
mised that Bjmg should be speedily hanged,"'
while in the Cabinet he spent his time blaming
Fox, or casting opprobrium on the man who had
thrown away his opportunities of victory. Fox,
for his part, returned the compliment to the First
Lord,"* and is said to have felt that the indirect
cause of the disaster was the refusal of the Dutch
to send a contingent in the spring ; "^ which, if
true, would seem to mean that in Fox's opinion
the necessity of transporting the German troops
prevented the sending of further strength. But
excuses could not mitigate the seriousness of the
181 Fox to Bedford, June 4, 1756 : Bedford Corres. II. 195.
182 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 58.
183 Walpole, Memoirs of George II, II. 70.
18* GrenviUe's narrative, GrenviUe Papers, I. 435.
185 Almon, Anecdotes of ChatJuim, I. 158.

432 HENRY FOX ch.
facts, and he now received information from Keene,
which he felt only half revealed the situation ; the
account, wrote Fox to Newcastle, confirmed the
previous one of La Galhssonniere, whatever Byng
might say of his own victory and the plight of the
French."" Unquestionably the time was drawing
nigh when either the Admiral or the Ministers
must suffer — which it should be, or whether it
should be both, must be determined by the weight
of public sentiment or parhamentary power.
And what of the invasion of England, so long
heralded from the Continent ? Advices from Paris
ceased altogether to mention it, and the secret
agents who absorbed aU gossip, useful or otherwise,
to retaU to the First Lord, became speedily
interested in the Franco-Austrian aUiance. Plainly
it must have dawned on the timorous Ministry
that France had brought off a most clever feint,"'
186 Fox to Newcastle, June 24, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32865,
f. 417. Byng's account of the battle (in a letter to the Ad-
mu'alty) seems straightforward and manly. A French
translation of it appears in M. Faucher-Saint-Maurice's Le
Contre-amiral Byng devant ses Juges et devant I'Histoire,
Royal Soc. of Lon., vol. XI. sec. 1, pp. 70-2.
18' Mr. Corbett, in his recent work, England in the Seven
Years' War, endeavours to show, chiefiy on the basis of an
intercepted letter, that the invasion was seriously intended.
French writers do not hold this view. M. CoqueUe, in his
Les Projds de Descente en Anglderre (Revue d'Histoire diplo
matique, XV. 606), writes : ' On salt que Louis XV prefera
quelques mois plus tard engager la glorieuse mais sterile
conquete de Port-Mahon.' The itaUcs are mine. It seems
hardly plausible that the French, after maldng such elaborate
preparations for a descent upon England, should have suddenly

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 433
and the loss of Minorca had been the penalty for
their blunder. Yet an epUogue seemed to be
found in some inteUigence that came to Fox from
Abreu, whose name the former desired should not
be mentioned in the connexion."^ The report dis
closed an intended descent by the French from
Dunkirk, and Fox promised to propose to Anson
that some smaU ships should be detailed to lie off
that port and watch for hostUe movements."^
Whether or not the suggestion was ever carried
out, the rumour seems to have been the last of
its kuid, which beset the guUible First Lord or his
pessimistic Secretary.
The tidings having come of the fall of Port Mahon,
Fox busied himself with pondering problems that
were on hand, and some possible solutions for
them. A long letter which Abreu had shown
him, impressed him with the entire confidence
which WaU felt in his ambassador at London ; ^^°
and Fox thought the present opportunity an
excellent one for bringing Spain into active aUi
ance with England. Pursuant to this design, he
suggested in a Cabinet meeting that negotiations
be commenced with Spain for the purpose of
persuading her to accept Gibraltar in return for
changed their pohcy, unless, as we suppose, they had been
made with design.
188 Fox to Newcastle, June 24, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32865,
f. 417.
189 Newcastle to Clevland, July 31, 1756 : Add. MSS.;
32866, f. 322.
190 Fox to Newcastie, July 3, 1756 : ibid., f. 32.
U66 E e

434 HENRY FOX ch.
Port Mahon, implying presumably that the Court
of ]\Iadrid should undertake its recapture.
Newcastle, astounded by the proposal, put it
off with some such comment as ' a bold stroke ' or
' a great conception ', and his subservient col
leagues without doubt took their cue and kept
sUence. But with Fox the idea was not banished
by one rebuff. About the 9th or 10th of July he
had a long talk with Count Viri on the subject,
and evidence appeared later that he also ap
proached Abreu on the matter. At last reports
of these conferences reached the sensitive ears of
the First Lord, whose friendship for the Sardinian
Ambassador was often justified by personal profit
from the latter's duphcity, and he conjured his
friend not to consider the matter on any account.
The probabUity is that Fox, conversant as he was
in affairs at Madrid, was eager to overtrump the
French offer of Minorca — now aU the more prac
ticable from the French point of view — and con
sidered that an exchange of fortresses plus Spain's
participation in the war wotdd be immensely
advantageous for England. It was, in fact, a time
when the Mhiistry needed a spectacular triumph to
wipe out its criminal blunder, and however shaUow
may have been Fox's patriotism, he knew the art of
politics and he understood the situation of himseU
and his coUeagues. But to Newcastle, the mono
polist in initiating foreign pohcy, and the man
who had thwarted the redoubtable Bedford in
1748, the scheme of his lieutenant seemed only to

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 435
breathe indiscretion and revolt."^ No more was
heard of the eccentric plan tiU Pitt took it up to
no purpose in 1757.
The Treaty of VersaiUes, Avhich Imit France and
Austria in a common bond for the coming struggle
on the Continent, met with no surprise in England,
having long been predicted, reported and de
scribed by inteUigence from the Court of Madrid,
the ambassador at Vienna, and secret service in
Paris ; but it was not tiU the 8th of June that
the Ministers received an authentic copy of the
terms."^ On that day the faithful Abreu handed
the text of the treaty to Secretary Fox, who
passed it among his colleagues."* Three days
afterward Newcastle wrote to Yorke that the
long-established 'system' of Europe was totally
dissolved, and then plunged into an exposition of
the proper courses and methods to be pursued as
the result. "* As a matter of fact the new treaty was
191 Newcastle to Hardwicke, July 12, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32866, f. 141.
192 The first sight of anything authentic relating to the Treaty
of VersaiUes was obtained by accident. Secretary Clevland
looked over Abreu's shoulder whUe the latter was reading a letter
to Anson. — Anson to Newcastle, June 7, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32864, f. 229. The news having leaked out, Abreu concluded,
no doubt, that he might as well earn the gratitude of the Ministers
by giving them a copy of the Treaty, which he did the next day.
193 Fox to Newcastle, June 8, 1756 : ibid., f. 231.
194 Newcastle to Yorke, June 11, 1756 : ibid., f . 231. New
castle's method of discrimination between oneself and ' the
other fellow ' seems to have been readily grasped by tho
Ambassador, who observed in reply that whereas the Conven-
E e 2

436 HENRY FOX

CH.

no more offensive in character (as yet) than the
English alliance with Prussia, and it was the Duke
himself, as we have seen, who had originaUy touched
the spring which brought this revolution into being.
But the Duke of Newcastle's dreams of a great
alliance against France need never have been
penned."^ By steadily ignoring the real purport
of Austrian policy, the Court of VersaiUes had
been enticed into an alliance that was foreign to
its interests and ruinous to its fortunes. The
capture of Port Mahon was the one briUiant
triumph in the most humiliating war that France
had ever waged. Yet it must be admitted that to
seek compensation in Germany for inevitable losses
in America was not of necessity a short-sighted
policy on the part of a nation essentially mUitary.
The difficulty lay in the hopeless incapacity of the
Government of Louis XV. France remembered
her military prestige, not conscious that that
prestige was a phantom of the past.
Of the distant Court of St. Petersburg the
English Ministers could never believe themselves
sure, and Viri probably felt safe when he gave
tion of Westminster had detached an aUy from the enemies
of Austria, the Treaty of Versailles meant the abandonment
of an old aUy to league with the enemy of the latter. — Yorke
to Newcastle, June 18, 1756 : Add. MSS., 32865, f. 339.
196 Austria, Russia, Holland, and the states of the Empu^e
should assist England and Prussia in the measures against
France.— Newcastle to Yorke, March 23, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32863, f. 467. The sketching of diplomatic combmations was
a pastime to which Newcastle was passionately devoted.

VI SECRETARY OF STATE 437
hopes that Sardinia would join with England if
Russia fulfiUed what was expected of her."^ By
skilful diplomacy WiUiams kept the Russians
ignorant of the Convention of Westminster until
the Czarina had ratified her treaty with England ; "'
but the anger that followed revelation could admit
of but one result. It was said with positive
certainty that the Court of Vienna had consulted
the northern nation before uniting with France,"*
and so, when the latter added her pressure
upon the Czarina, the mask was at last flung off.
The half-hearted lady, upon whom Newcastle had
staked so many hopes, had consented to his
whims only because she saw in them a possible
means of menacing Prussia. Eventually she
joined actively in the opposite ' system ', and,
together with Sweden (whose friendship for France
had ripened during the summer "^), became a mem
ber of that confederacy which nearly brought
Frederick to his knees. Even Spain was for one
moment thought to waver,^°° and France persis
tently cherished the hope that she would renew
her natural alliance ^"^ ; that she waited until the
196 Newcastie to Yorke, June 11, 1756.
"' WiUiams to Holdernesse, AprU 11, 1756 : P.O. Papers,
Russia, no. 62, Pub. Rec. Off.
198 Barck to Hopken, June 23, 1756: Add.MSS.,32866,f.322.
199 Barck to Hopken, July 8, 1756 : ibid., f. 66.
200 Memorandum for the King, August 16, 1756 : Add. MSS.,
32866, f. 468.
201 Secret IntelUgence from Cressener, August 1, 1756 :
ibid., f. 333.

438 HENRY FOX ch. vi
chances of success were so smaU is only to be
explained by a subsequent change of rulers and its
immediate effect upon WaU. At present the friend
ship of England was not idly to be tossed away.
In August, 1756, apprised by treachery of an
elaborate coalition against him, Frederick peremp
torily demanded an explanation from the Court
of Vienna, and when the request was indignantly
refused, he marched a force of 60,000 into Saxony,
and thus began the Seven Years' War.
A new and wider arena is now opened. France
has diffused her strength by plunging into a bitter
European quarrel, and in that act has abandoned
her opportunities against a country whose directors
Fox said, ' were no more able to carry on this war
than his three chUdren.' ^"^ Thus French policy
helped England to weather the storm until Pitt
should arise as the saviour of her empire.
202 Doddington, Diary, May 17, 1756.

END OF VOL. I.

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