YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

THE SECRET SERVICE

OP THE

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE

OR,

3^olu the viTonfcbcrate Cruisers toere Squippeb.

BY
JAMES D. BULLOCH,
NAVAL REPRESENTATITE OP THE CONFEDERATE .STATES IN EUROPE DURING
THE CIVIL WAR.

IX TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. II.

NEW YORK :
P P r T N A .M ' S SONS
27 & 29 WEST 23ed STKEET.
1884.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTEE L
PAGE
English PoHtical Parties and the Civil War. — Pertinacity of
Air. Secretary Seward. — Vacillation of the Liberal Govern
ment. — Prejent Position of the Liberal Party. — The French
Proclamation of XeutraJity. — Arrangements for building
cruisers at Bordeaux. — Appropriation of £2,000,000 for Iron
clads by Congress. — Financial difficulties. — Propositions to
purchase vessels from the French Navy. — Correspondence
concerning the vessels building in France.- — Deceptive atti
tude of the French Government. — The vessels sold by their
imperative orders. — Panic at Boston and New York regard
ing the Confederate cruisers .... 1-67

CHAPTER IL
Alisconception by the United States of the attitude of the
EngUsh and French Governments. — Repurchase of the Sphinx
from Denmark. — Precarious condition of the Confederate
Cause at that period. — Correspondence concerning the
despatch of the Stonev:all {Sphinx) from Copenhagen in con
junction with the City of Richmond from London. — The
Stonewall's challenge to the United States ships Niagara and
Sacramento. — Surrender of the Stoneicall to the Cuban Govern
ment at the end of the War. — Her subsequent delivery to the
United States  68-10.5

iv CONTENTS.

CHAPTER III. PACE
Jubilation in the United States at the loss of the Alabama.—
Admiral Farragut's criticism on the action. — The moral
law inoperative in time of war.— The United States and
privateering.— United States precedents favourable to the
Confederates.— Difficulty of settling the affairs of the Alabama
and supplying her place.— The Sea King, afterwards the
Shenandoah. — Correspondence respecting the Slienandoah and
the Laurel, with the instructions to the officers concerned. —
Smallness of the crew of the Shenandoah.— Yolxmieers from
her prizes. — Her cruise amongst the whalers. — Means taken
to stop her proceedings at the end of the Civil War. — Her
return to Liverpool and delivery to the United States repre
sentatives. — Loyalty of the crews of the Confederate cruisers.
— Inactivity of the United States Navy. — Summary of the
injury done to American commerce by the cruisers . 106-189
CHAPTER IV.
Admiral Farragut and his achievements.— The Federal and
Confederate naval forces compared. — abortive attempts at
shipbuilding in Confederate ports. — The Ordnance Service of
the Confederate Navy Department. — Financial arrangements
at Richmond and in Europe. — English ironworkers sent out
to the Confederate Government.- — The Confederate States
Representatives at Bermuda, Nassau, and Havana. — The
purchase and despatch of the Coquette. — Vessels bought for
the commercial purposes of the Confederate Government.^
Embarrassments arising from speculative contractors and from
friendly offers of vessels. — Commander AL F. Alaury. — The
Georgia and the L'appaJiamwck. — The Pampero. — Total cost of
the Alabama, Florida, and Slienandoah . . . 190-276
CHAPTER V.
Official dispositions of Holland, Brazil, Spain, Portugal, France,
and Great Britain to the Confederate States. — The position
assumed by Mr. Soward at tho beginning of the Civil War.  I
The policy of the British Go^•ernment — English feeling in

CONTENTS. V
favour of the North. — Facts about slavery in America. —
English sympathy transferred to the South. — Lack of courtesy
and dignity in United States representatives. — The Alabama
Claims. — SjTiopsis of the negotiations respecting those claims.
— Position of the British Government in regard to them. —
The three rules of the Treatj- of Washington. — A possible
application of them to the United States . . 277-411

CHAPTER VL ,
V
Position of the Confederate Agents at the end of the War. —
Financial difficulties. — The United States and the property
of the Confederate Government — Proceedings against Messrs.
Eraser, Trenhohn and Co. by the United States Government.
— Presidents Lincoln and Johnson. — The 'reconstruction' of
the Southern States. — Political condition of the United
States at the present day .... 412-438

THE SECRET SERVICE

COXFEDERiTE STATES IN EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.
English PoHtical Parties and the Civil War. — Pertinacity of Mr.
Secretary Seward. — VacUlation of the Liberal Government. —
Present Position of the Liberal Party. — The French Proclamation
of Neutrahty. — Aorangements for building cruisers at Bordeaux. —
Appropriation of £2,000,000 for Ironclads by Congress. — Financial
difficulties. — Propositions to purchase vessels from the French
Navy. — Correspondence concerning the vessels building in France.
— Deceptive attitude of the French Government. — The vessels sold
by their imperative orders. — Panic at Boston and New York
regarding the Confederate cruisers.
The compilers of the ' Case ' which was laid before the
Tribunal of Arbitration at Greneva on behalf of the
United States, asserted that England was the ' arsenal
and treasury ' of the Confederate States. The Board of
Trade returns demonstrate that both belligerents drew
upon Great Britain for the ' sinews of war,' but that the
United States obtained them in far greater quantities and
with incomparably less difficulty than their adversary.
However, the statement was in itself true, although the
VOL. II. 30

2 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
inference which it was the purpose of the ' Case ' to
suggest was not true.
It is hardly an exaggeration — it certainly is not a
mere ' figure of speech ' — to say that Great Britain is
the arsenal, treasury, and dockyard of the greater part
of the world. There is scarcely a civilized country which
is not a debtor to England, either for a direct loan, or
for help to develop her resources by the construction of
what are called ' internal improvements.' British guns
and British powder do duty in every war. British- built
ironclads form a part of nearly every foreign navy, and
the commercial flags of many countries cover hulls of
the well-known British type. No one whose faculties
are not dwarfed by prejudice, or whose powers of obser
vation are not contracted by national conceit, can or will
deny that in the great mechanic arts, in building ships
and manufacturing the heavy engines to propel them
especially. Great Britain has outstripped all competitors.
She actually owns about sixty per cent, of the world's
shipping, and has suppHed to others a portion of the
remaining forty per cent.
France, in regard to ships, at least, has been excep
tionally independent, and both Germany and Italy are
diligently extending their dockyard capacities ; but I
think a practical man who wanted a first-class ship and
engines, or a large quantity of well-made arms for
quick delivery, or a batch of great guns in which he
could feel confidence, or any heavy iron or steel work
would almost instinctively come to England to supply
his want ; and if a foreign company wished monev for
some great engineering enterprise, they would be "more
likely to carry the scheme to London than to any other
capital, and would look for the money in Lombai-d
Street before going anywhere else.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 3
This was certainly the view taken by the Confederate
Government at the beginning of the Civil War. It was
to England that their agents were first sent, and it was
to England that they looked for a quick supply of all
necessities. Her Britannic Alajesty's Proclamation of
Neutrality was issued on Alay 13th, 1861. That docu
ment began with the usual preamble, then cited the
clauses ofthe Foreign Enlistment Act (second, seventh,
and eighth ) which were most likely to be infi'inged, then
expressed a kindly intimation that the primary object
was to save British subjects from the danger of breaking
the law through inadvertence, and finally warned all per
sons that they would incur the penal consequences ofthe
statute and of the law of nations if they offended them
in any particular.
The proclamation was eminently British, and therefore
eminently constitutional. There was, first, the royal
acknowledgment of the supremacy of the law, then the
loving solicitude for the subject, then the warning to all
parties not to infi-inge the statute, then a plain straight
forward statement that those who did offend would be
left to take the consequences, whether by due process of
law within the kingdom, or by such penalties as a
belligerent might inflict if the offender was caught with
out the kingdom. There was nd voluntary exposition
of the law in the proclamation, no dogmatic prohibition
against specified acts ; everyone was commanded not to
infringe the statute, but he was left to discover precisely
what was forbidden and what was permissible through
his own instincts, or, if he was wise and prudent, by the
help of those who were learned in the law.
To the representative of a belligerent the document at
first blush seemed very plain and very satisfactory. He
had only to consult two or more eminent gentlemen of
30—2

4 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the ' wig and gown,' and to walk within the lines pre
scribed by them, in order to obtain all that it was
admissible for him to buy with money, and to be sure of
what he could do, without fear of penalty, or the feeling
that he was oppressed by a load of obligation. It has
been shown in a previous chapter that the Confederate
agents took every practicable precaution, and made every
possible effort to discover the intent, the scope, and the
technical meaning of the law. They seem to have been
correctly advised, because the opinion given them by
counsel at the very beginning of the war was confirmed
by the official statements of Ministers of the Crown, and
afterwards settled beyond further dispute by the decision
of a court of law. However, the Confederate Govern
ment soon found that even in constitutional England the
declarations of Ministers do not always estabhsh a policy
with the rigid constancy of the Aledes and Persians, and
that a Secretary of State can enforce restraints upon trade,
and can practically hinder a traffic which is not only
guiltless in principle, according to his own previous show
ing, but which the duly constituted courts have declared
to be legal.
It is neither my wish nor my pm-pose to impute
unworthy motives or fears to any British Alinister, and
nothing would induce me to write a single sentence
that could influence the people of the South to harbour
an unkind thought against Great Britain. I have
already expressed the opinion that a great majoritv
of the people of England sympathized Avith the South,
and I could name many eminent men in both Houses of
Parliament who took the trouble to examine the questions
at issue betAveen the two sections of the Union, and who
were satisfied that the South Avas riglit in principle and
justified in law. Some of the leadhig literary jom-nals

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 5
of the kingdom Avarmly espoused and ably defended the
Southern cause during the Avhole of the contest, and
have not been moved fi'om their political opinions,
or persuaded to shrink from expressing them on all
suitable occasions, by the glamour Avhich success has
cast ovei' the opposite and victorious side.
The commissioners and the principal agents of the
Confederate States in England had opportunities for
learnina: the feelinos of different members of the Govern-
ment, and of prominent men in both of the great parties,
with a very near approach to certainty. I shall not be
gudty of the indiscretion of classifying the Cabinet
by name, but I may say that it was a common belief
among the representatives of the Confederate States that
two members of the ^Ministry, at least, were very favour
able to the South, and that still another would have been
disposed to give some support to certain members of the
House of Commons who Avished to bring in a motion for
the recoonition of the Government at Richmond, if he
had not been impressed Avith the belief that the separa
tion of the States was final, and that it would be both
unnecessary and impolitic for the Government to give
undue offence or encouragement to either of the com
batants. The Liberal Party was in power during the whole of
the war, and the same Party, and a Cabinet composed of
very nearly the same Ministers, were again in power at the
time when the Treaty of Washington was negotiated in
1871 — a treaty whose object it was to settle the 'Alabama
claims,' and which resulted in the Geneva Arbitration,
and the £3,000,000 damages. I have never thought
that the leaning towards either side in the American
Civil War was due to any well-defined Party tendencies
in Great Britain. I have the strongest possible reasons

6 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
for believing that if the Conservative Party had been in
power, their policy would have been strictly neutral,
and the Confederate Government would not have been
recognised. But at the same time I believe that the
Advanced Liberals, or Radicals, as they are sometimes
called, and who are generally supposed to have Repub
lican tendencies, were favourable to the North. The
politicians and statesmen of that class are in general
harmony with the Liberal Party, and most independent
observers think they ai^e gradually getting the control of
it. Those Advanced Liberals had persuaded themseh'es
to regard the Government of the United States as ' a
Government for the people by the people,' and they
feared that a final dissolution of the Union would be con
sidered a failure of the Republican form of GoA'ernment,
and would check, if not destroy, the progress towards
a more Democratic system in Europe.
The temperament and type of mind which inclines
a man to Radical and thorough changes, makes him
also ardent, active, and aggressiA'e. He rarely if CA'er
convinces his open and avowed political adversary, Avho
is altogether a person of different mould, but he as
rarely fails to persuade, or to overcome by his restless
untiring energy, the scruples of those who are bound to
him by hereditary loyalty to a Party name, which has
come to be associated in their minds with ideas of
benevolent legislation and philanthropic progress, but
who are nevertheless often startled by the suddenness
and rapidity of the forward moA'ement.
There were some strong men of the above type in the
counsels of the Liberal Party, if not in the Cabinet, at
the time of the Civil War, and the ardour with which
they supported the Federal Government, and the
vehemence with Avhich the}' denounced the Southern

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 7
leaders and the Southei-n people, are still fresh in the
memory of those representatiNcs ofthe Confederacy who
survive. 'Even at this late date, when the best men at
the North and at the South are trying to forget the
injuries inflicted upon each other during the strife,
AA'hen there seems to be a groAving desire on both sides
of the Potomac to shun all references to the causes
of the war, and to fix the memory and the hearts of the
people upon subjects of past history which they can
dwell upon Avith feelings of common sympathy, the
English Radical, true to his unfailing instincts, and
heedless of the fact that the lately dissevered States are
again both in amity and in union, continues to arouse
the bitter memories of one side, and to inflame the
jealous suspicion of the other, AA'ith no other visible or
imaginable purpose than to illustrate some favourite
political crotchet.
As recently as last year (May, 1882) a leader ofthe
Radical Aving of the Liberal Party, and a member of the
Cabinet, used the opportunity, while delivering a literary
address, to taunt the South with reference to that
' institution ' which expired seventeen years ago, and
chose for his illustration a poem which is none the less
unfair in spirit because its statements may be borne out
by exceptional facts. Is it possible that men filling
high and responsible positions can think it prudent and
politic (I do not say friendly and Christian-like) thus
to remind the six million Anglo-Americans of the
Southern States that there are still among the leaders of
that Party which now governs England probable future
Ministers who can thus ignore the duties of international
comity, and who wilfully transgress those rules of cour
tesy and respect for the feelings of others which are
commonly thought to be essential marks of a Avell-bred
man in private life ?

VOL. II.**

8 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Everyone even moderately acquainted with American
political history, and who knows anything of the exi
gencies of Parties in the United States, must be aware
that it is possible for a comparatively small minority of
the electors in that country, when impelled to act and
vote together by some common feeling, to hold the
balance between the two principal Parties, and when
such a contingency arises at the time of a Presidential
election, they may have it in their power to determine
the foreign pohcy of the Government. This may be
seen now in the tampering of both Parties with the
question of Chinese immigration, each wishing to con
ciliate the trans-Rocky-Mountain States.
Thoughtful and observant men perceive a danger to
England in the Irish American vote. If any con
siderable portion of the Southern people should be im
pelled by a feeling of irritation against England to cast
their votes with that already embittered faction at the
North, the complications of the Irish question might be
increased so as to become a permanent menace and real
danger to Great Britain. Men at the South Avho read
and reflect would regret such a course of CA^ents, and the
alliance which would tend to produce such consequences ;
but Avhere universal suffrage prevails, it is the floating-
masses who tm-n the scale ; and they, as all experience
has shown, act fi-om impulse, and not from con-
Adction. I would like, so far as it is in my poAA'er, to convince
the people of the South that a vast majority of both of
the great Enghsh Parties, and of the people of Great
Britain generally, have the most kindly feelings for the
United States, without reference to geographical divi
sions, or the partialities Avhich Avere manifested durino-
the Civil War. I confidently believe that the best men
among Conservatives and Liberals alike have no other

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 9
wish than for the happiness, prosperity, and perpetuity
of the American Union. I belioAo that sympathy for
the South was more general among Conservatives than
among Liberals ; byt probably this difference was only
apparent because the Radicals, who are a section of the
Liberal Party, were to a man, so far as I know, for the
North. The Conservative and the ]\Ioderate, or genuine
Liberals, whatever Avere their opinions or sympathies
during the war, have ceased to foster any ill-will tOAvards
either side, and they haA-e the good sense and the good
feeling to aA-oid all reference to irritating reminiscences
when they have occasion to speak of the United States.
The unadulterated Radical is, hoAA^ever, too thorough to
be fettered by the dictates of prudence or the restraints
of a politic reserve. To refi-ain from expressing an
opinion because it might wound his neighbour's feelings,
or unnecessarily irritate his opponent, seems to him
very like the suppression of the truth. He confounds
bluntness Avith honesty, and in the eagerness to enforce
his views he adds denunciation to argument. His
Liberalism consists in an unlimited license to all others
to think and to act as he dictates. He is full of flattery,
and practises even an appearance of subserviency, to
those who wiU take the lead in measures that he ap
proves, but becomes restive and even dictatorial if there
is any hesitation or sign of halting. The labouring
man is his hobby, the peer and the landowner are his
aversion ; but it is noticeable that his fondness for and
interest in the artizan and the workman are not so
much for the individual as the class, and are manifested
rather in exciting their jealousy and ill-Avill against
those who are above them than in stimulating their
pride and arousing their energies with the laudable pur
pose to elevate themseh^es. It seems hardly possible

10 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
for a ' Radical ' to defend a principle or to support a
policy Avholly upon the merits of the questions involved,
and then to accept the result with patience if defeated,
and Avith moderation if successful.
During the American Civil War the English Radical
took sides with the North. He defended the action of
the Federal Government with ardour, and praised the
patriotism of the Northern people with enthusiasm. He
condemned the leaders of the South Avith harshness, and
traduced the whole population south of the Potomac
with heat and passion, embracing them in one general,
sweeping, all-inclusive denunciation. He seized upon
slavery as an effective ' cry ' by which to prejudice the
public mind, and persisted in asserting that the North
was fighting to free the slave, in spite of the declaration
of President Lincoln and a joint resolution of both
Houses of Congress that the war was undertaken for the
restoration of the Union, and not for the abolition of
slavery. So long as the world lasts there aatII be found
in it men of hot temper and dogmatic avlII, and there
fore an exhibition of vituperatiA'e passion and intolerance
must be expected from them whenever the course of
public events is contrary to their A\ishes or theories.
But the ' Advanced Liberal ' had an undoubted riffht to
his opinion, whether founded upon prejudice or calm
conviction ; and the Southern people A^ill, I am sure, be
glad to forget the opprobrious epithets which were cast
upon them during the heat of the struggle, now that
' grim-visaged war ' has given place to cheerful, smiling
peace with its bounteous blessings, if they are not con
stantly reminded of them by indiscreet references to the
irritating subjects Avhich disquieted their minds and
aroused their resentment in the trying times between
the attack upon Fort Sumter and the surrender of Lee
at Appomatox Court-house.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 11
It is not impossible — indeed, if the Liberal Party
remains in power it is not improbable — that a Radical
^Minister of Foreign Affairs may have to treat upon
some delicate and important question of international
polic}- AA-ith an American Secretary of State, or a Presi
dent of the United States, who followed Lee through the
Virginian campaigns, or Avho Avas born and bred in the
same part of the country as Jefferson DaAds and Stone-
Avall Jackson ; and it Avould clear the negotiation of
some embarrassment if the English representative could
feel conscious that he had done nothing to perpetuate a
family feud after the opposmg parties had composed
then- differences and were ag-ain living: in union and
harmony. No public man could now Avin the favour of
any respectable body of electors in Ncav York or Massa
chusetts by speaking iU ofthe South or of the Southern
people, and no man would be tolerated in Northern
society who attempted to keep up the animosities of the
war, and certainly no foreigner can hope to gratify either
North or South by words or acts whose manifest tendency
would be to irritate or offend either side.
K I mention Earl Russell's name in this connection,
it is not Avith the purpose to class him among the
Radicals, or to intimate that he ever did use language
in respect to either Xorth or South which could be con
strued into ridicule or reproach. Whatever may have
been his lordship's private opinions as to the merits of
the contest, or Avhatever may have been his sympathies,
I have ncA'er seen in one of his numerous despatches, or
in the published reports of his speeches, a single sentence
or utterance which could arouse the personal hostility of
any reasonable Southern man. Earl Russell, as the
Foreign Secretary, was necessarily the active member of
the Cabinet in carrying out its neutral policy, and is

12 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
not to be held individually responsible for what either
Federal or Confederate may have thought objectionable
in that policy. In saying that his sympathies Avere
Avith the North, I merely give currency to the impres
sion commonly held by the representatives of the Con
federate States in England during the war, and I can
give no other grounds for the impression than the
opinion to the same effect which was often, and I may
say unanimously, expressed by those politicians and
other frequenters of the London clubs and London
Society with whom we were brought in contact. But I
do not now affirm that Earl Russell carried out the
neutral policy of the Government v^ith a deliberate pur
pose to favour one belligerent ; all that T say is, that the
course pursued by him was not in accordance with the
principles laid down by himself and his colleagues, and by
the judgment of the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer.
It must be admitted that his lordship had a very
trying and difficult office to fulfil. The LTnited States
Minister gave him no peace and but little rest. The
duty of replying to the long argumentative despatches
of Mr. Adams, and the perusal of the numerous consular
affidavits which accompanied them, must haA-e been a
very serious labour, and it is only fair to remember that
there was no recognised Confederate agent who could
address him officially and freel}^, and thus modify the
effect of the statements on the other side, or set before
him reasons for non-interference. The Radical element
within the Liberal Party, if not actually within the
Cabinet, Avas also a strong and active force, alwaA's
exercised to check the Government in any apparent con
cession to the South, and ever striAdng to nullify the
benefit Avhich the Confederate States might obtain from
their recognised position as belligerents.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 13
The speeches of individual ^Ministers, and the official
despatches of Earl Russell, laid doAvn certain rules of
action, and clearly set out the principles of neutrality it
was their purpose to enforce. The}- would have no
enlistment of her Majesty's subjects to serve either
belligerent, nor any arming of ships within any portion
of the British dominions. Yessels-of-Avar should not lie
in British ports to watch each other's movements, and
they should not use British harbours as places of outfit
and supply fi-om which they might issue to cruise
against their enemy. But the British tradesman Avas
to be as little hampered as possible, and was to be left
fi-ee to sell and deliver arms and ammunition, and even
ships suitable for warlike purposes, to either belligerent.
There was no difference in principle, and no distinction
in laAV. between the traffic in one or the other of the
above articles, and her Majesty's Government could not
strain the principles of neutrality to suit a particular
case, or apply them especially and Avith discriminating
rigour to the trade of shipbuilding alone, because that
Avould tend to impede and embarrass a business in which
great numbers of her Majesty's subjects found a source
of honest livelihood.*
These were the principles to which the British Govern
ment clearly committed itself, and anyone who AAdll take
the trouble to read the Parliamentary debates on ques
tions affecting the action of Great Britain as a neutral,
or the despatches of Earl Russell, will perceive how
strongly and repeatedly those principles were asserted,
and their justice and fairness defended, by members of
the Cabinet. There is no doubt that the plainness Avith
* See Earl Russell's letter to Mr. Adams, Oct. 26th, 1863, 'North
America,' No. 1 (1864), 'The Alabama,' continuation of corre
spondence presented to Parliament, March, 1863.

14 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
which members of the Government spoke in reference to
the equality of both belligerents before the law, and the
repeated declarations that a British merchant might sell
an unarmed ship to either North or South as lawfully as
he might sell a rifle or a sabre, gave dissatisfaction and
offence to Mr. Seward, who, as was said in the ' British
Case,' wanted her Majesty's Government to discover
what articles the Confederates most needed, and then to
strike them off the list of goods which might be legally
dealt in.
The statements of Ministers in regard to neutral
duties and the freedom of trade Avith belligerents Avere
never withdrawn nor even modified by any counter-
declaration in Parliament, but the practice of the
Government became, under the joint pressure of Mr.
Seward's remonstrances and the influence of the ex
treme Radicals, more and more restrictiA-e with reference
to the especial wants of the Confederates, until at last
they did practically enforce the very policy which it is
alleged in the ' British Case ' that the United States
wished them to agree to at the beginning. Her ]\Iajesty's
Government have realized the truth of a saying which
has almost obtained the force and currency of a proA-erb,
namely, that a concession of principle, or the j^elding of
a point to strong and persistent pressure and persuasion,
is never received in the spirit of a spontaneous offering,
and is never remembered Avith gratitude.
The Southern people believed that a policy once
clearly enunciated by a British Ministry would be con
sistently followed, and they thought that it was only
necessary to keep within the lines of that policy, in order
to obtain all that their necessities required. They
watched Avith interest, but att first Avi thout misgiving,
the vigorous efforts by appeal, by argument, and even

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 15
by threats, which were made by the United States to pro
cure a change in that policy. They kncAv that those
efforts were strongly supported by the extreme politicians
who belonged to the Party then in power, but still the
rules of action laid down were plain and emphatic. They
had been stated by the ^Ministers chiefly responsible for the
foreign relations of the country, and had been defended
by the law officers of the Crown. They were afterAvards
confirmed in principle by judicial sentence.
When the GoA-ernment at Richmond contemplated the
situation of affairs, there did not appear to be any cause
to fear that the declarations of ^Ministers would prove to
be mere figures of speech, or that a judicial decision
would be made inoperative by the action of a Secretary
of State. However, it is now a matter of history that
the hopes of the Confederate Government and of the
Southern people were ill-founded. Her Majesty's
Government yielded to the joint pressure from within
and from ivithout, and they did at last precisely what
the United States demanded in the beginning, and what
several members of the Government had declared they
could not do without shoAvdng favour to one belligerent,
and interfering unjustly and unduly with one particular
branch of trade, which they had often affirmed was
quite as proper in principle and in law as any other.
¦The Southern people were naturally disappointed at the
unexpected wavering of the British Government, and if
at the time they felt irritated and resentful, it can hardly
be thought surprising. But they found no opportunity
to express their resentment by effective remonstrance,
and they have practically condoned the injury, and
I believe would soon forget it altogether if the Radicals
win only let by-gones be by-gones.
Mr. Seward, however, was in a different position.

16 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Having carried his point by a combination of persuasion
and bravado, greatly helped by the efforts of his
Radical allies, he never did forget, and never did forgive,
the impartial utterances of Ministers and the original
intent expressed by them to give a fair field and no
favour to either side. He appears to have kept a record
of every indiscreet admission by a member of the
Government, of every speech which could be distorted
into an encouragement to the South, while the words of
comfort and support to the United States, and the great
final concession, were forgotten, or at least cast aside.
His fixed and unalterable purpose was to extort fi:om her
Majesty's Government, not only an acknowledgment
of their original error, but retribution for it, and he
bequeathed his purpose and his policy to his successor
in office.
The diplomatic correspondence and the records of the
Geneva Arbitration demonstrate the vigour and relent
less zeal with which that purpose and policy were
prosecuted. It is noAV known that six years after the
war the United States Avrung from Mr. Gladstone's
Government (the same Party, and in part the same
Ministers, Avho Avere in poAver in 1861-65) an expi-ession
of ' the regret felt by them for the escape of the
Alabama and other vessels from British ports, and for
the depredations committed by those vessels,' * and
finally induced them to submit the questions at issue to
a Tribunal of Arbitration, not, however, to be decided
according to the principles and rules of international law
in force and binding upon all nations at the time when
the alleged causes of complaint were said to have arisen,
but upon certain ncAV rules, especially agreed upon by
the contracting parties — rules which are binding upon
* See Article L, Treaty of May 8th, 1871.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 17
no other Powers, and AA'hich, together a\ ith the expres
sions of regret, and the Ministerial admissions, Avhich Avere
most adroitly used by the advocates of the United
States, placed Great Britain in a A-ei-y weak position
before the Arbitrators.
The A^acillation of her ^lajesty's Government in dealing
Avith the questions Avliich grew out of the American Civil
War, and the A-ery apparent contradiction between the
polemical theory of neutral duties expounded by a
portion of the Ministry and the practice of those duties
by the Secretary of State who directed the foreign policy,
can only be understood and explained by taking into
account the peculiar condition of that Party to Avhich
the Ministry belonged.
It is manifest to independent observers of English
politics that the Liberal Party embraces within its ample
fold two principal sections, whose policy would lead to
very different results if carried out in its entirety. Those
tAvo great diArisions of the Party are held together by a
traditionary link, and by agreement upon certain general
principles of reform in regard to domestic affairs and
some not very clearly defined doctrines with reference
to colonial and foreign policy ; but they seem to differ
A-ery widely both as regards the extent of the required
reforms and the mode in which they should be accom
plished. That diAdsion of the Party whose wish it is to
proceed most swiftly and thoroughly in the direction of
reform, and Avho also manifest the purpose to withdraw
more and more fi-om international politics and from
imperial control over the colonies, has been for the last
quarter of a century increasing its power and influence.
It has not yet achieved complete control of affairs, and
cannot strictly and specifically direct the policy of the
Government ; but it has for some }'ears held a position
VOL. II. 31

18 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
of so much authority and influence, by reason of its
increasing numbers and the vigorous energy of its
members, that no Liberal Ministry is possible without
its support, or without one or more representatives fi-om
its ranks in the Cabinet. Now, it would be wholly out
of place, in a narrative of this kind, to discuss Enghsh
Party politics, or to pronounce an opinion whether the
principles of the Advanced Liberals Avould conduce
more to the happiness and Avealth of Great Britain and
to the maintenance of the Empu-e than a more Conserva
tive policy ; but it is not improper to state, what it seems
to me must be manifest to all disinterested students of
current English history, that so long as the Liberal
Party is not impelled by a common motive, and is not
controlled by statesmen Avho agree upon the method as
well as in respect to the general principles upon which
the home and foreign policy of the country shall be con
ducted, there must continue to be confusion, apparent
contradictions, weakness, vacillation, and more or less
sacrifice of prestige, accompanied sometimes Avith loss of
money. The lack of consistency, and the inabihty to follow
in practice the line of policy laid down in theory by the
Ministry during the American Civil War, cost Great
Britain £3,000,000, and placed the country in a very
weak and undignified position before the Tribunal of
Arbitration at Geneva. England Avas made to stand
before that international court in the character of a
defendant — I Avas almost going to say a criminal. She
was represented by the plaintiffs to have acknowledged
her sin and to have apologized for it ; she was charged
through her officials Avith all sorts of complicity Avith
fraud against her oAvn municipal laws, and with con
nivance at the violation of her neutrality ; and really.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 19
the reply to all this seems to have been rather a plea for
mitigation of damages than a bold, confident, unflinching
repudiation of the chai-ges and insinuations.
If the independent critic looks at the condition of
English affairs noAv, in the year 1882,* he Avill perceive
lamentable confusion and danger to the Empire both
at home and abroad — Ireland disturbed, discontented,
mutinous ; the Eastern Question, Avith its necessary
appendages, in a chronic state of fermentation ; the
House of Commons A\Tangling over measures declared
to be of vital importance, and yet often wasting days in
discussing- side issues and abstract questions, which,
when they have been determined, settle nothing.
The difficulty is the same as that which caused the
vacillation during the American Ci\dl War — the impos
sibility of making the theory and practice of the Govern
ment tally, the inability to confirm by official act and
by legislation the policy and the promises sketched out
in ^Ministerial speeches and other forms of declaration.
The Southern people may, I think, feel assured that
the course pursued by her Majesty's Government
towards the Confederate States was not the outcome of
an unfiiendly and unsympathetic feeling on the part of
the majority of British subjects to them or to the cause
for which they were fighting; but it arose fi-om the
necessity of a sort of compromise between the Ministers,
who wished to conduct the foreign policy of the country
at that time upon what they had pronounced to be the
proper Hne of neutral duty and due consideration for
every branch of home trade, and those extreme men in
their Party who, after the policy was declared and pub-
* This chapter was written in June, 1882, as explained in the
preface, and the Egyptian War was in prospect.
31—2

20 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
lished, urged and enforced a modification to suit their
special leanings.
Until the great Liberal Party can decide which section
of its leaders shall assume the control of its pohcy, and
is prepared to give to that section undivided support,
the people of Great Britain must make up their minds
to submit to some confusion in public affairs, some
apparent vacillation and inconsistencies in the action of
' Liberal Cabinets.' It is manifest that the Liberal
Party is undergoing the process of readjusting its con
stituent forces, and the future policy of that Party will
depend upon which class of politicians may gain the
ultimate ascendency, and whether their control of affairs
proves to be thorough and undisputed. It appears to
be practically impossible for two sections of the same
Party, who differ materially concerning the methods of
government, to agree upon a middle course which shall
fulfil the conditions of a ' happy mean.' Experience has
shown that the action of a political organization in that
condition is intermittent, and is actiA^e or passive, vigor
ous or feeble, according as the opinions of one or the
other section prevail at a given time, or on the occasion
of a particular emergency. Sometimes the influence of
the two factions is so nearly in equilibrium that nothing
can be done, and then public affairs drift until there is a
crisis, when the ship of State has to beat up to the lost
position, like a vessel working to Avindward against a
leeward tide.
The Commissioners of the Confederate States per
ceived, as the war progressed, the tendency of her
Majesty's Government to drift from the position as
sumed by the leading Ministers of the Crown in their
interpretation of neutral duties and the fi-eedom of trade.
Mr. John SHdcll, the Commissioner to France, occupied

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 21
in many respects a more favovirable position for dis
covering the purposes and feelings of the Government to
Avhich he was accredited than his colleague in England.
Although not officially recognised as the diplomatic
agent of the Confederate GoA^ernment, he Avas permitted
to communicate Avith the ^linisters of State, and even
with the Emperor himself, freely, and it may almost be
said confidentially. He was thus able to discover from
the highest sources whether it was the purpose of the
Imperial Government to enforce Avith rigour the restric
tions set out in the declaration of neutrality, or whether
the strict and explicit terms of that declaration would
be made pKable in the common interests of every branch
of French trade.
The Proclamation of Neutrality issued by the Em
peror Napoleon III. was published nearly a month after
that of her Britannic Majesty, namely, June 10th, 1861,
but the prohibitions were much more emphatically stated.
Instead of a general enumeration of what was contrary to
law, and a warning to all persons not to transgress, it
set out under fiA^e heads or clauses the precise and specific
acts that would not be permitted, or which were forbidden.
The third clause was in these words : — ' II est interdit
a tout Fran^ais de prendre commission de I'une des
deux parties pour armer des vaisseaux en guerre, ou
d'accepter des lettres de marque pour faire le course
maritime, ou de concourir d'lme maniere quelconque a
I'equipement ou I'armament d'une navire de guerre ou
corsaire de I'une des deux parties.'
The above clause, it AviU be perceived, forbad any
French subject to co-operate in any manner whatever in
the equipment or armament of a vessel-of-war or a pri
vateer for either belligerent, and French lawyers after
wards consulted were unanimous in the opinion that

22 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the Government would be bound to prevent any ship
leaving France for the service of the Confederate States.
There was no question here of the probable interpre
tation of a somewhat ambiguous statute, no dependence
upon a Government pledged by constitutional require
ment, as well as by habitual usage, to submit questions
involving the rights of individuals to the legal tribunals.
The Executive Government of France was at that time
well-nigh autocratic, and it was fully understood that
whatever might be the declared policy, it might and
could be modified in practice without any public notice
or any formal appeal to the law courts to determine the
meaning of specified statutes.
It was generally believed at the time, and so far as I
know it has never been doubted, that the British and
French Governments came to an early agreement that
they Avould act in general concert during the American
Civil War. It is, I believe, equally well known that
the French Emperor was more favourable to the recog
nition of the South than the Government of her Britannic
Majesty, and that at one period of the war he Avas pre
pared to take decisive action in that direction, but was
deterred by the disinclination of the British ^linistrv to
follow. The reasons why the Confederate Government sent
their agents to England in the first place have already
been stated. The dogmatic prohibitions of the French
declaration of neutrality confirmed the prudence of that
course from a business point of AicAv. In Enoland it
was reasonable to expect more liberty of action, a fi-eer
as Avell as a cheaper market, and surer means of dis
covering what might be safely attempted. In France,
everything might and probably would depend upon the
secret purposes of the Chief of the State, and the effect

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 23
AA'hich the chances of success or defeat to the South
might have upon him.
It is no part of the object of this narrative to discuss
the general policy of the French Government during the
CivU War, or to suggest how far the desire to acquire a
predominating influence in ^Mexico may have inclined
the late Emperor to favour the South. Manifestly, an
Imperial Government would stand a better chance of
sustaining itself m ^lexico against two rival Republics,
than against one imdivided Democratic Union pledged
to resist European interference A\dth the balance of power
in America.
A French army on the left flank of the Confederacy,
and fi-ee transportation of contraband goods through
Mexico, might have been a very encouraging support
to the Government at Richmond, and the privilege of
getting ships fit to break the blockade, and to cover the
import of indispensable supplies into Wilmington and
Charleston, might have been a judicious concession to
that Government. Some such reflections have doubtless
occurred to many who watched the course of events at
the time. Confining myself in these respects to a simple
record of historical facts, I will only state that during
the year 1862 Mr. Slidell received intimation that if the
Confederate Government would make arrangements to
build ships-of-Avar in France, the builders would not be
interfered with, and that the vessels when completed
would be permitted to leave the French ports upon any
plausible plea the builders might state. The sugges
tions were made to Mr. Slidell by persons who were in
positions of close relationship with the Emperor, and
when he became satisfied that they were made with
authority, their purport was reported by him to the
Secretary of State at Richmond, and in the autumn of

24 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
1862 he wrote and advised me to come to him in Paris
for consultation on the subject.
When Mr. Shdell first made the suggestion, I was
unable to take any decisive action. The contracts on
behalf of the Navy Department in England were so
large, that there appeared to be a startling deficiency in
the financial arrangements to meet them, and although
Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co. had already made
advances to the Navy Department, and did afterAvards
pledge their own commercial credit at critical periods,
yet at the particular time in question they Avere under
such heavy advances for the War Department that
I could not ask them to take further liability. I
explained the situation of affau*s to ]\Ir. Slidell, but
he was much impressed with the importance of the
assurances he had privately receiA'ed, and urged me
to come to Paris and try the French dockyards as
soon as the finances Avould admit of fresh operations,
instead of depending- upon the wavering pohcy of the
British Ministry, and the probable delay, expense, and
publicity of a law-suit.
The Secretary of the Navy Avas especially desirous to
keep a sufficient number of cruisers afloat to thoroughly
alarm the enemy for the safety of his commercial
shipping, and thus to draw off his best ships from
the blockade in order to protect it. He had no sooner
learned the havoc the Alabama and Florida Avere
committing than he instructed me to send out at
least four ships of similar type, to provide against then-
loss or capture. He made every possible effort to
supply the necessary funds, and finally arranged with
the Secretary of the Treasury that a part of the
£3,000,000 European loan then in contemplation should
be devoted to that purpose. He informed me that a

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 25
special fiscal agent of the Treasury Department would be
sent to Europe to manage the distribution of the loan,
and to assume a general control of the finances, and that
he would be fiilly instructed as to the requirements for
the naAy.
Ll March, 1863, the success of the loan seemed to be
assured, and both ^Ir. ]Mason and ]Mr. Slidell thought
that in view of the official advices I had received, that
a portion of it would be appropriated for the specific
purpose of building additional cruisers, I might venture
at least to make all the prehminary arrangements.
I had preAdously reported to the Navy Department
the manifest signs of a purpose in the British Ministry
to enforce the Foreign Enhstment Act more rigidly with
reference to ships than any other articles of trade, and
had reported my purpose to act upon the information
^Ir. Shdell had received and upon his advice. About
the middle of March, 1863, Mr. Shdell sent the business
agent of a large shipbuilder to inform me what his
principal could undertake, and I went immediately
to Paris to put affairs in such train that the work
could be begun as soon as the financial arrangements
were satisfactorily settled. Mr. Slidell made an appoint
ment for a joint consultation between himself, the
builder with whom he had already conferred, and me.
The class of vessel and the armament did not require
much consideration, the chief, and indeed the only
important points for serious dehberation, were the terms
of the neutrality proclamation, and the probable chance
of getting the sliips to sea when completed.
The shipbuilder who thus came forAvard to supply
our wants was M. L. Arman. His establishment was at
Bordeaux ; he had done much work for the French
navy, was then building two iron-cased floating batteries

26 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
and a very large troop-ship for the Government, and
there could be no doubt that he had the plant and
all the necessary staff and commercial credit to justify
his undertaking large contracts for any description of
ships. M. Arman Avas also a deputy in the Corps
Ldgislatif for the Gironde; he had been personally
decorated in his own shipyard at Bordeaux by the
Emperor, and during the whole period of the transac
tions which followed, he appeared to have no difficulty
in obtaining personal intervicAVs A^dth the Minister
of State, M. Rouher, and even with his Imperial Majesty
himself. M. Arman stated that he had been confidentially
informed by the Minister of State that the Emperor was
willing for him to undertake the construction of ships
for the Confederate Government, and that when the
vessels were ready to be delivered, he would be permitted
to send them to sea under the French flag to any point
which might be agreed upon between him and the
representative of the Confederate States.
I mentioned to M. Arman that building the ships
with such an assurance from the GoA'emment, it would
not be necessary to practise any concealment as to their
mere character and equipment, and it Avould soon be
apparent that they Avere vessels intended not for com
merce, but for Avar. There was no reason, I said, to
suppose that the United States would be less desirous to
prcA-ent ships leaving French than English ports for the
service ofthe Confederate Goa- ernment, nor Avas it likely
that their representatives Avould be less Avatcliful m
France than they Avere in England, and I suggested that
as soon as it became apparent that he Avas buildino-
vessels suitable for Avar, the United States Minister
would learn the fact through his spies, and he Avould lay

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 27
his suspicions before the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and I asked how he thought the matter Avould then be
dealt with ?
He rephed tliat the probability of such an inquiry had
been fully considered, and he had been informed that if
he Avould apply to the proper public department for
authorization to complete, arm, and despatch the ships
for a specified purpose, Avhich Avas in itself laAvful, the
Government would not force him to make any further or
more specific explanations, but that he would be per
mitted to despatch them to the destination set out in the
original apphcation, on the plea that the Government
could not impede a legitimate branch of French trade.
He furthermore said that he had informed the Emperor
that he purposed building the ships for trading between
San Francisco, China and Japan, that they would be
cUppers, having great speed both under canvas and
steam, and would be armed for defence against pirates in
the Eastern Seas, and with the view to possible sale
to either the Chinese or Japanese Government. M.
Arman assured us that the Emperor fully understood
the matter, and so did M. Rouher, and that there would
be no difficulty in arranging all details with the several
Executive Departments under whose supervision it
would be necessary for him to act. He should simply
state, without the shghtest hesitation, the purpose for
which he was building the ships, and ask for the
necessary authorization in the usual formal matter-of-
course way.
I had no means of testing the statements of M.
Arman in regard to his personal communications Avith
the Emperor and M. Rouher, but they confirmed
the intimations that had been conveyed to Mr. Slidell
through persons of position who Avere in close relations

28 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
with the Imperial Court, and who had inspired hun
with confidence by having communicated other informa
tion of approaching events which proved to be correct,
and could not have been foreseen or obtained by clandes
tine means. Mr. Slidell was very confident that the
policy of the Imperial Government, and the purposes the
Emperor then had in Adew, were such as to render
it very desirable that the Confederate States should
be able to maintain their position, and he had reason to
believe that the hesitation of England alone prevented
their recognition by France.
My course under the circumstances was clear. My
instructions were to keep as many cruisers at sea as
possible, and I could only exercise my own judgment to
the extent of determining the best class of vessel, the
places where they could be built with the least fear of
seizure or detention, and the mode of putting them in
commission as Confederate ships-of-war afterwards. The
result of the consultation with Mr. Slidell was that I
proceeded to Bordeaux, inspected M. Arman's premises,
and finally arranged with him all the particulars for
four clipper corvettes of about 1,500 tons and -lOO-horse-
power, to be armed with twelve or fourteen 6 -inch rifled
guns — the ' canon raye de trente ' of the French navy,
that gun being adopted because of the facility of having
the batteries constructed in France from the official
patterns. There was some delay in beginnuig the work, by
reason of the incompleteness of the financial arrange
ments ; but General Cohn J. McRae, the fiscal agent of
the Treasury, arrived about the 1st of May, and he was
able to make such ai-rangements that not much time was
lost. The designs and specifications of the ships AA^ere
settled on the 15th of April, and by the middle of June

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 29
good progress had been made, and the engines Avere
fully up to the vessels in condition. Time Avas, of course,
an essential element, and M. Arman Avas so full of other
work that he could not undertake the four ships for
the prompt delivery required — ten months from date of
contract ; he therefore arranged with M. J. Yoruz, of
Nantes, for the construction of two of them.
]\I. Yoruz was an eminent u-onfounder and engineer,
and a member of the Corps Legislatif for the Loire
Inleriem-e. He employed a local shipbuilder to put up
the hulls, but he assumed the entire responsibility for
the ships, and subsequently undertook the construction
of the guns and their gear for all the ships. I am glad
of this opportunity to bear Avitness to the business
capacity, the commercial and personal integrity, and the
kindly social qualities and intelligence of M. Yoruz ; and
I do so now because it will obviate the necessity of
fi-equent allusions to bim in the further account of our
operations in France. M. Arman was the principal
actor in those transactions. He it was who invariably
went to see the Minister of State in reference to them,
and it was he who was permitted to see the Emperor on
the subject. M. Yoruz never alleged that he had
received any personal communication from a member of
the Government Avith reference to building the ships for
the Confederate States, but he received due authorization
to make the guns for them, and he did not doubt that
their ultimate destination was perfectly well known, and
he did not anticipate that there would be any difficulty
in despatching them from France when they were com
pleted. When, as will afterwards appear, the Imperial Govern
ment changed its policy, and not only forbad M. Arman
to send the ships to sea, but peremptorily ordered him

30 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
to sell them to a neutral State or permanently lay them
up, M. Yoruz closed his part of the transaction promptly
and in a business-like and equitable manner. He sold
the two vessels in his charge to a foreign Government,
completed them for account of that Government,
rendered a prompt statement of the transaction, and
refunded the amount he had received from the Con
federate agent, with due proportion of the profit at
which he had been able to sell the ships. M. Yoruz
effected this satisfactory settlement without employing
any expensive intermediaries, and proved himself to be a
thorough man of business in this as well as in other
enterprises which he conducted for me during the war,
fulfilling his engagements always with promptness and
scrupulous fidelity. Having made the foregoing state
ment, I shall hereafter mention M. Arman alone in
connection with the ships, as he conducted all the
efforts which were made to avoid the necessity of selling
them. On the 30th of June, 1863, I received a despatch
from the Secretary of the Navy, which he considered to
be of such importance that it Avas sent by a special
messenger. Lieutenant G. S. Shryock, of the Confederate
Navy. The followmg is a copy of the despatch : —

' Confederate States of America,
' Navy Department,
'Richmond, May Gth, 1863.
' Sir, —
' Herewith you Avill receive copy of a Secret Act
of Congress appropriating £2,000,000 for the construc
tion of ironclad ships-of-war in Southern Europe, which
Act was induced by the belief that we cau have such
vessels constructed and equipped in France and de-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 31
livered to us upon the high seas or elsewhere. The
President has selected you as the agent of the Govern
ment to accomplish the important object thus provided
for by Congress. In a-Icav of the great improvements
which theory and experiment have produced in the con
struction and equipment of armoured ships in France
and England, as well as of your thorough knoAvledge of
the subject and yom- means of observation, it is deemed
expedient to leaA^e to your judgment, untrammelled by
instructions, the size and details of the vessels, subject
to the consideration that in draft of water, speed and
power, they must be able to enter and navigate the
Mississippi riA^er ; that their first trial must be a long
ocean A-oyage ; that their antagonists carry 11 -inch and
15 -inch guns; and that they must be completed and
delivered at the earliest day practicable. . . . You will
regard the .£2,000.000 as the only fund for building,
equipping, manning, providing, and furnishing the
vessels for one year's service. Your immediate atten
tion to this subject is important, and every effort must
be made to haA-e the ships completed at the earliest day
practicable. To this end I suggest to you a conference
with Mr. SlideU. ' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) S. R. Mallory.'
At the date upon which the above letter was received,
I had already been in conference with Mr. Slidell, with
the result, as has already been explained, of an engage
ment with M. Arman for four wooden screw corvettes
of great speed. On many accounts I should have pre
ferred building the ironclads provided for by the Act of
Congress in England, but it had ere then become manifest
that her Majesty's Government would not permit any

32 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
vessel ' suitable for Avar ' to leave a British port unless
the ownership was clearly and explicitly accounted for,
and that ownership was satisfactory. Moreover, it was
now equally manifest that the Government at Richmond
Avere satisfied with the friendly hints and suggestions
that had been thrown out from the Tuilleries, and felt
assured that it was only necessary to act with due pru
dence and in a strict mercantile Avay, and ships might be
had in France as well as rifles and cannon. It was only
necessary, according to the intimations voluntarily
A'ouchsafed, to refrain from violating the neutrality of
France by enlisting French subjects, or by engaging in
hostilities too quickly after leaving French jurisdiction,
and no branch of trade would be interfered with. This
was the purport of the confidential statements made to
ilr. Slidell, and reported by him to the Secretary of
State at Richmond, and it was in rehance upon them
that the appropriation was made by the Confederate
Congress to enable the Navy Department to build war
ships in France.
At the time of my Ansit of inspection to 31. Arman's
works at Bordeaux on the business of the corA'ettes I
had examuied the two armour-cased batteries he was
building for the Imperial Navy, and we had discussed,
and he had made drawings of, an armour-cased vessel
of dimensions and draught suited for serAdce on the
Southern coast. Mr. Mallory had directed me to o-et, if
possible, less draught of Avater than that of the^'rams
building in England ; but upon receipt of the specific
instructions of May 6th, founded upon the Secret Act
of Congress, it was necessary still further to modify the
plans to some extent.
An expert will perceive at a glance that the problem
proposed by the Secretary of the Navy was not easy of

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 33
solution. Yessels-of-Avar, suited for service in the
Mississippi riA^er, must be of light draught and com
paratively short ; they must haA-e great steam-power, to
contend with the rapid current, and they must also be
handy, Avith capabihty to turn in short space. To oppose
other vessels armed Avith 11 -inch and 15 -inch guns they
must be well protected A\-ith armour, and then to get to
their fighting ground they must make a sea-A'oyage of
5,000 mdes. The design finally selected was for a
A-essel of the following dimensions and steam-power —
the measurements reduced to English standards. Length
between perpendiculars, 171 feet 10 inches ; breadth to
outside of armour, 32 feet 8 inches ; mean draught,
with 220 tons of coal, battery, and all stores on board,
14 feet 4 inches. Engines, 300 horse-power nominal,
twin scrcAvs, working separately, so as to be capable of
a counter motion at the same time. The armour- plating
was 4| inches amidships, tapering gradually to 3^ inches
at the extremities, in single plates, manufactured by
^lessrs. Petin G^udet and Co. at Rive de Gier. The
details of specifications for ship and engines provided
for everything to be of the A^ery best quahty, conforming
in dimensions and material to the types of the Imperial
Navy, and the guaranteed speed was not less than
twelve knots in smooth sea, vrith 220 tons of coal and
all other weights on board. The bunkers were, however,
planned to contain 290 tons of coal. In calculating the
displacement, 100 tons was allowed for guns and
ordnance stores, and the arrangement was to have one
heavy gun forward, to be mounted in a fixed armoured
turret, so as to be fired in the hne of the keel or on
either bow, and two 6 -inch rifled guns in an after turret
or casemate. The bow guns were to be 300-pounders
of the Armstrong pattern, and they were made to
VOL. II. 32

34 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
M. Arman's order by Sir William Armstrong at
Elswick ; the lighter guns were to be made in France.*
The question of ' ways and means ' confi-onted us here
again, as in all our undertakings. The Secretary of the
Navy informed me that every possible effort would be
made to place the amount appropriated by Congress in
Europe as quickly as possible, but to start the work
there was no other immediate resource than the loan.
General McRae, the financial agent of the Treasury, was
fresh from Richmond. He had been adAdsed of the con
templated Act of Congress, and knew the earnest wish
of the Government to haA-e the u-onclads built ; but he
found himself overwhelmed with drafts in favour of the
purchasing agents ofthe War Department, and there were
many contracts rapidly maturing, which demanded cash
payments, and for which the credit ofthe Government was
pledged. The bankers of the Treasury, ilessrs. Eraser,
Trenholm and Co., were also hard pressed. The only
way of remitting to them was by produce shipped through
the blockade, and as the system of blockade-running ex
clusively on Government account had not yet been fully
adopted and organized, the only means of shipping was
by private vessels, which wanted most of theu- space for
account of their owners. After consultation with the
Commissioners, Messrs. Mason and Shdell, and General
McRae, it was not deemed prudent to begin more than
two of the ironclads until I had heard more definitely
from the Navy Department hoAv the amount appropriated
by Congress was to be made available in Europe.
I may just state, en passant, that the Secretary of the
Navy was never able to place the amount in Europe— at
least, for the exclusive purposes contemplated in the Act.
Other pressing needs of his own and the other branches of
* Two 70-pounder Armstrong guns were afterwards substituted.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 35
the Government more than absorbed all the proceeds of
produce that could be got tlirough the blockade, and
onl}- two ironclads Avere ever begun in France. In fact,
there was a tune when the fiscal agent could not have
supplied the funds to meet the instalments, if relief had
not come fi-om the compulsory sale of other ships. In
\dew of the subsequent acts of the French Government,
which will be narrated in due course, it was fortunate
that we did not embark more largely in shipbuilding
enterprises in France.
I haA-e always understood that when the proposition
to raise a loan in Europe was first broached, the Con
federate Government was not greatly impressed with the
scheme, and was somewhat reluctant to accept the offer
of the bankers who proposed to undertake the negotia
tion. After some discussion it was, however, determined
to make the experiment with the moderate amount of
£3,000,000. The financial enterprise was undertaken
by ilessrs. Erlanger, of Frankfort and Paris, and they
managed the transaction with great skill and abihty.
When the prospectus Avas issued there was a prompt and
gratifying response. In a very short time the amount
subscribed was £15,000,000, or five times the amount
wanted, and it was thought that a much larger sum still
would have been offered if it had been applied for. The
financial agents of the Confederate Government lamented
their inability to issue bonds for the whole amount
offered, but, looking back upon the transaction now, all
must feel gratified that the loss to the European public
was limited to the smaller figures.
The necessities of the financial situation defined the
extent of our naval operations in France, and on the
16th of July, 1863, I closed a contract Avith M. L.
Arman for two ironclad vessels of the dimensions and
32—2

36 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
power aforementioned. About a fortnight after the
completion of the arrangements in respect to the above
contract, I received a cypher despatch from the Secretary
of the Navy, on the subject of getting ships in France,
and as it affords conclusive proof of the hopes that were
held out and the expectations which were aroused at
Richmond in consequence, I think a portion of its
contents may properly be given here, as a part of
the facts necessary to a full understanding of that
strange episode in the war which forms the chief subject
of this chapter. The following is an extract from
the above-mentioned despatch, dated ' Richmond, ]\Iay
26th, 1863':—
' My letter of the 6th instant enclosed you a copy of
a Secret Act of Congress, relative to building ships
abroad. Since that letter was written I haA-e received
additional assurances, which I regard as satisfactory, that
iron-plated ships-of-war can be constructed in France by
French builders and delivered to us ready for service
upon the high seas or elsewhere.
' Heretofore I have brought to your attention an
intimation which I deem not unworthy of notice, from
the quarter whence it reached me, that one or more
of the ironclads of the French NaA-y might be so trans
ferred as to come into our possession ; and as I have
heard only incidentally from you on the point, and
know that you have recently, by your Adsit to France,
had an opportunity of learning the value of this sugges
tion, I again ask your attention to it.
'The immediate possession of tAvo or three good
armoured ships, capable of entering the ]\Iississippi,
would be of incalculable value to us, and though the
hope of thus obtaining them is not sanguine, I still
deem it proper to attempt it. You Avill therefore, if you

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 37
have not already acted, take such measures for this
purpose as you may deem best.'
In reply to the portion of the foregoing despatch
which referred to the possible purchase of one or more
ironclads fi-om the French Navy, I informed Mr.
Mallory that 'inquiries have been and continue to
be made. Most of the ironclads already built or noAv
under construction for the European Powers, are either
too large, and of too heavy draft for our especial
purposes, or they are mere floating batteries, too small
and heavily armed to cross the Atlantic'
The subject was fully discussed with Mr. Slidell, and
he did not see how the negotiation could be opened in
such a way as to get the proposition before the Emperor,
unless it should appear that he had determined to
recognise the Confederate Government independently of
England, and there was no evidence that he intended to
take any such decisive step alone. Mr. Slidell thought
that we should be content with the covert intimation
that no ship -builder we might employ would be pre
vented fi-om despatching the vessels to sea when they
were completed. Personally, I fully agreed with Mr.
Shdell, and on the general question I subsequently wrote
to the Secretary of the Navy as follows : —
' You may rely upon it that the purchase of men-of-
war fi"om any of the European navies is not practicable
under existing circumstances. The transaction would
necessarily be managed through intermediaries, who,
from the very nature of the negotiations, would be forced
to sacrifice principle by prevaricating, and then all sorts
of objectionable means would have to be used, even
bribei-y, and after all we would only get cast-off vessels.
I make these remarks as the result of experience, for I
have had propositions from many persons, and I know
wherein they are all wanting.'

38 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
The construction of the corvettes at Bordeaux and
Nantes and the two ironclad vessels progressed rapidly,
and for some months there did not arise any question
which suggested a doubt in regard to the purposes
of the Imperial Government in respect to their departure
when completed. On the 23rd of November, 1863,
I reported that the armoured vessels were quite three-
fifths finished, and that the corvettes would probably be
ready for sea within the contract time ; but by that date
affairs began to change in their aspect. The American
papers began to discuss the probable destination of the
ships, and it was stated that Mr. Dayton, the United
States Minister, had addressed a protest to the French
Government against their completion, and it was even
affirmed that he had been assured by the Minister
of Marine that none of the ships would be allowed
to leave France. Commenting upon these uncomfortable
rumours in a subsequent despatch (Nov-ember 26th,
1863) to the Secretary of the Navy, I vsTote as
follows : —
' The extent to which the system of briber}^ and
spying has been and continues to be practised by the
agents of the United States in Europe is scarcely
credible. The servants of gentlemen supposed to haA-e
Southern sympathies are tampered with, confidential
clerks, and even the messengers from telegraph offices,
are bribed to betray their trust, and I have lately been
informed that the English and French Post Offices,
hitherto considered immaculate, are now scarcely safe
modes of communication. . . .
' Mere suspicion is not, I regret to say, the basis of
Mr. Dayton's protest. He has furnished the French
Government with copies of certain letters alleged to
have passed between the builders, which go to show

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. Z9
that the ships arc for us. The confidential clerk Avho
has had charge of the correspondence of M. Yoruz, one
of the parties to the contracts, has disappeared, and has
unfortunately carried off some letters and papers relating
to the business. 31. Yoruz has not yet discovered the
full extent to which he has been robbed, but is usinsr
every effort to trace the theft to its source, and to dis-
coA'er how far he can prove complicity on the part of the
United States officials. AYe know that the stolen papers
contain evidence that the ships are for us, for the fact
has been so stated by the ^Minister of Marine to one of
the builders ; but the French Government has only thus
become aware of a transaction it Avas perfectly well
informed of before. Indeed, I may say that the attempt
to build ships in France was undertaken at the instiga
tion of the Imperial Government itself When the con
struction of the corvettes was in progress of negotiation,
a draft of the proposed contract was shown to the highest
person in the Empire, and it received his sanction — at
least, I was so informed at the time. At any rate, I
have a copy of the letter addi-essed to the builders by the
Minister of Marine, giving authority to arm the corvettes
in France, and specifying the number of guns, and I
have the original document signed by M. Chasseloup
Laubat himself, granting hke authority for the rams.
It can never, therefore, be charged that the Confederate
States Government, through its agent, has violated the
neutrality of France by attempting the construction of
ships in her ports, and if 3Ir. Dayton has received the
assurances we see printed in the American papers, the
time is rapidly approaching when the policy of the
Imperial Government in reference to American affairs
must be positively and definitely expressed. . . .
' The builders are still sanguine that they will be

40 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
alloAved to send the ships to sea, but I confess that I do
not see any such assurance in what they say, and the
manner in which the protest of the American Minister
has been received is well calculated to confirm my
doubts. When Mr. Dayton went to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs with a complaint and with copies of
certain letters to substantiate it, the ^Minister might
have said, " These are alleged copies of the private cor
respondence of two prominent and highly respected
French citizens ; they could only have come into your
possession by means of bribery or treachery. I cannot,
therefore, receive them as CAddence, and must insist that
you produce the originals and explain how you came to
be possessed of them." It strikes me that such a course
would have effectually silenced 3Ir. Dayton, and we
could have felt some assurance of getting our ships to
sea. Instead of this, the stolen letters have been re
ceived without hesitation, and the United States officials
profess to be satisfied with the action, or promised action,
of the French Government. The builders ai-e sent for,
and warned by the niinister of 3Iarine, and although
those gentlemen come from their interviews stiU pos
sessed by the belief that the ships will be allowed to
depart, and thus, as I said before, excite hopes, I cannot
be bhnd to the significancy of the above circumstances.
' My behef is, that the construction of the ships will
not be interfered with, but Avhether they will be allowed
to leave France or not Avill depend upon the position of
affairs in America at the time of their completion. If
at that time our cause is in the ascendant, the local
authorities Avill be instructed not to be too inquisitive,
and the departure of our ships will be conniA^ed at. If,
on the contrary, the Federal cause prospers, the affair of
the "Confederate ships" will be turned over to the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 41
responsible niinister s of the Empire, who will justify
their claim to American gratitude by a strict enforce
ment of the neutrality of France. Hoping always for
the best, I shall not permit any fears to create delay in
the progress of work. The ships shall be ready as soon
as possible, and every effort shall be made to get them
to sea in the manner least calculated to compromise the
French authorities, if they choose only to be judiciously
blind.' On the 18th of February, 1864, I reported further to
the Secretary of the NaA-y as foUows : —
' I have the honour to enclose herewith duplicate of
my despatch of November 26th, 1863, on the subject of
the ironclads and corvettes building for us in France,
wherein I A'-entured to express some apprehension as to
the policy the Imperial Government would pursue when
the ships approached completion. That policy has been
pronounced sooner than I anticipated, and the Emperor,
through his Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Marine,
has formally notified the builders that the ironclads
cannot be permitted to sail, and that the corvettes must
not be armed in France, but must be nominally sold to
some foreign merchant and despatched as ordinary
tradins: vessels. I believe that M. Arman has acted in
a perfectly loyal manner thus far in these transactions,
and he sincerely regrets the present turn of cA^ents. He
has proposed that a nominal sale of the vessels should
be made to a Danish banker, and that there should be a
private agreement providing for a re-delivery to us at
some point beyond the jurisdiction of France. This
would simply be substituting France for England, and
then Denmark for France, and the Danish banker for
Messrs. Bravay, and if the two most powerfiil maritime
nations in the world have not been able to resist the im-

42 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
portunities of the United States, it would be simply
absurd to hope for success through the medium of
Denmark, a weak Power at best, and just now struggling
almost hopelessly for her very existence.* The propo
sition was therefore declined, as it only involved an
increased and useless expenditure of money Avithout a
hope of profit. . . . This case may be summed up in a
very few words. It is one of simple deception. I never
should have entered into such large undertakings except
with the assurance of success. I was, not as a private
indiAddual, but as an agent of the Confederate States,
invited to build ships-of-war in France, and, so far at
least as the corvettes are concerned, received every pos
sible assurance that they might be actually armed in
the ports of construction. During three or four months
after the contracts were made, the work advanced very
rapidly, but latterly there has been a gradual falling off,
which caused me to fear that the builders had received
some discouraging intimations from the Government. I
am not fully convinced on this point, but the result
would seem to indicate that my suspicions were not
unfounded. By affording refuge to our ships at Calais,
Brest, and Cherbourg, the Imperial Government has
shown us more favour than that of her Britannic
Majesty, and I presume that the Emperor, trusting to
the chances of war and diplomacy, hoped that, before the
completion of the ships, affaii-s both in America and
Europe would be in such a condition as would enable
him to let them go without apprehension. He noAV
favours us so far as to tell us frankly to sell out and
save our money, but this can scarcely amehorate. the
disappointment. . . .
* Then engaged in war Avith Prussia and Austria in respect to the
Holstein-Schleswig Provinces.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 43
' The two Bordeaux ironclads and the four corvettes
would have been a formidable attacking squadron, and
would haA-e enabled its commander to strike severe and
telling blows upon the Northern seaboard. The loss of
the u-onclads changes the Avhole character of the force,
and deprives it of its real power of offence. It is difficult
to predict AA'hat may be the state of Europe even a
month hence, and how the progress of events may affect
the chances of getting the wooden ships to sea. I shall,
however, make every effort to get at least two of them
out, to supply the places of our present cruisers should
the casualties of the sea reduce their number. There
really seems but httle for our ships to do now upon
the open sea. Lieutenant-Commanding Low, of the
Tuscaloosa * reports that in a cruise of several months,
during which he spoke over one hundred vessels, only
one proved to be an American; and she being loaded
entirely on neutral account, he felt forced to release her
after taking a bond. The Alabama also only picks up a
vessel at intervals, although she is in the East Indies,
heretofore rich in American traffic. Nevertheless, if all
our ships should be Avithdrawn, the United States flag
would again make its appearance ; and it is therefore
essential to proAdde the necessary relay of vessels.
There is, however, no resisting the logic of accomplished
facts. I am now convinced that we cannot get ironclads
to sea, and unless otherwise instructed, I will make no
more contracts for such vessels, except Avith such a
pecuniary guarantee for actual delivery upon the ocean
as will secure us against loss.'
M. Arman having received positive instructions not
to attempt to send the ironclad vessels to sea, but being
still permitted to suppose that the corvettes would not
* Prize of the Alabama, commissioned by Captain Semmes.

44 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
be stopped if sent to sea without their guns, it was
arranged with him to push the completion of the latter
vessels to the utmost, and to go on with the armoured
ships more leisurely, while we were considering what
might be done with them. The course of events and the
denouement is more clearly and fairly explained in the
following despatch, written to the Secretary of the NaA^y
at the time, than by any version I could give of the
transaction now. The despatch referred to was vmtten
June 10th, 1864, and was as follows : —
' It is now my painful duty to report upon the most
remarkable and astounding circumstance that has yet
occurred in reference to our operations in Europe.
Previous despatches have informed you under what
influences, impressions, and expectations I undertook
the construction of ships of war in the building-yards of
France, and how smoothly and satisfactorily the work
progressed for several months after it was begun. I
reported to you when it became evident that the Govern
ment was interfering and checking the progress of the
work, and finally informed you when the authorities
forbade the completion of the rams, and directed the
builders of the corvettes to sell them.
' When the consultation between Messrs. Mason,
Slidell, and myself was held in Paris, the result of
which has already been reported to you, it was unani
mously agreed that the ironclads must of necessity be
sold, but it was thought that the corvettes should be
completed, as the builders were confident that the
Government would not interfere with then- departure, if
despatched as commercial vessels, and under the assumed
OAvnership of private individuals. Thus fortified by the
opinions and advice of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, I gave
M. Arman, the principal builder, Avritten instructions to

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 45
seU the ships, upon his representation that such a course
was necessary m order that he might be able to show to
the Minister of Mai-ine that his business connection with
me had ceased. There was at the same time an express
understanding betAveen M. Arman and me that the sale
of the corvettes should be purely fictitious, and that the
negotiations in respect to the rams should be kept in
such a state that we might get possession of them again
if there should be any change in the policy of the
Emperor's Government before their completion. Scarcely
a month since, I had a long consultation with M. Arman
regarding aU of these matters, Mr. Eustis being present.
M. Arman showed me a contract of sale of one of the
ironclads to the Danish Government, and told me he
was then negotiating for the sale of the other to the same
GoA-ernment. As Denmark was then at war, it had
been arranged that the nominal ownership of the rams
should vest in Sweden,* and that Government, I was
informed, having consented to do this piece of good
service for Denmark, M. Arman said that a Swedish
naval officer was then at Bordeaux superintending the
completion of the rams, as if for his own Government.
In the contract of sale M. Arman had agreed to deliver the
ships at Gottenberg, in Sweden, and he told me that
he had made this unusual stipulation in order that he
might be able to send the ships to sea under the French
flag and in charge of men of his own choice. " Now,"
* I reported this fact, just as I understood M. Arman to state it,
at the time of the consultation referred to ; but upon subsequent
inquiry, I learned that he did not mean me to infer that any public
official of the Swedish Government took part in the transaction,
but that a Swedish banker had undertaken to carry out the arrange
ment. However, the whole plan fell through ; the ship was actually
sold to Denmark, and was sent to Copenhagen without any disguise,
and under the French flag, with a French commander and crew.

46 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
said he, " if you are Avilling to sacrifice one of the rams,
and will consent to the bond-fide delivery of the first one,
I am sure that the second can be saved to you. When
the first ram is ready to sail," continued M. Arman,
" the American Minister Avill no doubt ask the Swedish
Minister if the vessel belongs to his Government. The
reply will be ' Yes ;' she will sail unmolested, and Avill
arrive at her destination according to contract. This
will avert all suspicion from the second ram, and when
she sails under like circumstances Avith the first, my
people, having a previous understanding with you, Avill
take her to any rendezvous that may hav^e been agreed
upon, or vrill deliver her to you or your agent at sea."
' The above is almost a verbatim report of the proposi
tion made by M. Arman, which, after some discussion
upon matters of detail, was accepted, and I have since
felt a reasonable assurance of seeing one of our rams at
work upon the enemy. A day or two after I called on
M. Arman again, taking with me Captain Tessier, my
agent in France, a man of inteUigence, a capital seaman,
and of course master of the French language. The ob
ject of the visit was to discuss the arrangements neces
sary to get the corvettes to sea, and to send to them their
armament and crews. I told M. Arman that it would
not take a long time to set everything afloat when the
proper moment arrived, but that the undertaking Avas one
which not only involved a large expenditure of money, but
which required to be managed Avith great caution and
secrecy. When the expedition Avas ready I said it would
be absolutely necessary for it to sail promptly, because
delay would cause exposure, and certain interruption
and failure Avould folloAv, and having due regard to such
a contingency, it was very important and indeed essential
that I should, if possible, get some assm-ance that when

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 47
Ave were all ready to move, the Government Avould per
mit the vessels to leave Bordeaux. M. Arman replied
that he thought there Avas no doubt about the corvettes
beuig allowed to sail unarmed, but he Avas to have a
personal interview Avith the Emperor in ten days or a
fortnight, and Avould then bring the matter to a close, by
direct appeal to his Imperial ^Majesty.
' Many details relating to the best mode of shipping
the guns, the engagement of rehable captains, and the
possibUity of getting- seamen from the ports of Brittany
were discussed, all in a most satisfactory manner. Before
separating, M. Arman expressed great regret at the
delay and interference we had met Avith, and said that
as he had made the contracts for building all the ships
in perfect good faith, and with the assurance that
his Government understood the whole transaction, and
would permit him to carry it out, he felt doubly bound
to assist in CA-ery possible way, and to assume any
responsibihty that might be necessary.
' In face of the foregoing statements, you Avill readily
imagine my astonishment when Captain Tessier arrived
here (Liverpool) yesterday afternoon, bringing me a
letter from 31. Arman, informing me that he had sold both
the rams and both the corvettes to " Governments ofthe
North of Europe," in obedience to the imperative orders
of his Government. He (M. Arman) could not write
particulars . . . Captain Tessier was charged to deliver
further verbal explanations as follows : —
'M. Arman obtained his promised interview with the
Emperor, who rated him severely, threatened imprison
ment, ordered him to sell the ships at once, bond fide, and
said if this was not done he would have them seized and
taken to Rochefort. Captain Tessier also brought me
word that the two corvettes at Nantes were ordered to

48 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
be sold, and the builders of those ships sent me, by him,
a copy of the letter of the Minister of Marine conveying
the order to them. The order is of the most peremptory
kind, not only directing the sale, but requiring the
builders to furnish proof to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs that the sale is a real one. The Minister of
Marine writes the order in a style of virtuous indigna
tion ; specifies the large scantling, the power of the
engines, the space allotted to fuel, and the general
arrangements of the ships as proving their warlike
character, and dogmatically pronounces the one to which
he especially refers " une veritable corvette de guerre."
When you call to mind the fact that this same Minister
of Marine, on the 6th day of June, 1863, AATote over his
own official signature a formal authorization to arm
those very ships with fourteen heavy guns each (canons
raye de trente), the affectation of having just discovered
them to be suitable for purposes of war is reaUy
astonishing.* ' I certainly thought this kind of crooked diplomacy
had died out since the last century, and would not
be ventured upon in these common-sense days.
Fortunately, I have a certified copy of the permit to arm
the ships, and I will get the copy of the indignant order
to sell them certified also. Captain Tessier saw 3Ir.
Shdell in Paris, Avho told him that he had been informed
of the sale, and was both astonished and indignant.'
My first impulse was to resist and to take legal
proceedings to prevent the transfer of the ships to
the purchasers. But a moment's reflection satisfied me
that such a course could not restore the ships to us  at
least, it Avas manifest that they could not be reclaimed for
use during the war. The proclamation of neutrahty
* See copy of official authorization, p. 67.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 49
issued by the Emperor of the French on the 10th of
June, 1861, contained a specific prohibition against any
aid whateA'er being given by a French subject to either
belligerent, and if the Government had determined to
enforce that prohibition strictly and literally, no effec
tive resistance coidd be offered, and no plausible evasion
could be attempted.
In England, where in theory the law is paramount,
and members of the Government had often declared that
they neither could nor would exced the restrictions as
prescribed by statute, we found that pressure could and
did overcome 3Iinisterial scruples, and that the law
might be and was not only ' strained,' but that the
judgment of a court could be made inoperative by the
interference of a Secretary of State. In France, the
neutrality laws were in themselves more specific than
the corresponding Enghsh Act, but the power of the
Executive Government to modify or to enlarge the
legal prohibitions was far greater than in England, and
while the permission or the connivance of a Minister
of State would condone any apparent contravention
of the law, his official prohibition would render an
appeal to it worse than useless.
When Captain Tessier brought me the unwelcome
and discouraging report of the forced sale of our French
ships, I was so fully occupied with pressing affairs
in England, that it was impossible for me to go to
France at once, but I sent him immediately back Avith a
letter to Mr. Slidell, and with instructions to arrange
-with M, Arman to meet me in Paris, and followed in
a few days. A consultation with Mr. Slidell resulted in
nothing but the conviction that the Imperial Govern
ment had changed the views which had been previously
expressed, and that it Avould be impossible to retain
VOL. II. 33

50 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
possession of the ships, or to prevent their delivery to
the purchasers by any process of laAV. It was manifest
that the builders of the ships were as much surprised
and disappointed by the action of the GoA^ernment as we
were. "They would not have undertaken the transaction
unless they had been impressed with the belief that the
supreme Government fully understood and approved
what they were doing, and they Avere ready and Avilling
to comply with their engagements, and to assume any
reasonable responsibility in the effort to fulfil them.
The course ofthe Civil War about this time took an
unfavourable turn for the Confederate States, and the
South began to show signs of exhaustion, which were
painfully manifest to those of us who were conscious of
the strain, and the inadequacy of the means to resist it.
The apparent change in the probable result of the
CiAdl War, the manifest evidence that the 3Iexican
enterprise was bitterly resented by the people of 3Iexico
and was also sorely vexatious to the majority in France,
and the loss of prestige Avhich failure in that expedition
Avould doubtless inflict upon the Imperial rcijime, must
have been very disquieting to the Emperor and to those
immediately attached to. his person and his Govern
ment. At the same time. Great Britain persistently
declined to join with him in any act Avhich might tend
to strengthen the South, or to bring pressure upon the
United States in respect to the recognition of the Con
federate Government, and he did not therefore feel equal
to the effort of maintaining his position at home and
abroad, with the United States for an additional and
open enemy, and the South unable to assist.
I can think of no other causes Avhy there should haA-e
been any change in the policy of the Imperial Govern
ment toAvards the South ; and as those causes are suffi-

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 51
cient to account for a departure from a course which was
adopted for 'reasons of State,' avc ma}- assume that
' reasons of State ' required the change. Nevertheless, it
was our duty to act up to the very end of the struo-o-b
as if final success Avas assured, and to relax no effort
that could in any Avay contribute to that end, or Avhich
might strengthen the position ofthe Confederate Govern
ment in seeking the reparation Avhich could have been
justly claimed from that of France for the injury
inflicted upon the South by the sudden and total change
of pohcy.
There was no reason why the GoA^ernment at Rich
mond should have refrained from making those trans
actions pubhc at the time, except that to have done so
would have borne the appearance of malice, and the
effect would haA-e been to alienate the sympathies of the
Imperial Government, which 3Ir. Slidell was assured
were still vrith the South ; but it cannot be doubted that
if the Confederate Government had been able to main
tain itself, and to achieve the independence of the
Southern States, some explanation of those arbitrary
and contradictory proceedings would haA^e been required
— at least, they Avould have been taken into account in
settling the conditions of a treaty of amity and commerce
between France and the new American Republic.
Ex- President Davis, in his history of the ' Rise and
Fall ofthe Confederate Government,' has not mentioned
either the invitation to build ships in France or the
sudden and peremptory withdrawal of the permission.
He has dealt very fully and almost exclusively with the
grand military events which marked the progress and
failure of the greatest effort ever made by any people
to obtain the right of self-government. Perhaps it might
hav^e appeared to him scarcely worth Avhile to sAvell the
33—2

62 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
contents of a necessarily voluminous history with a vain
lament over disappointed hopes which, had they been
realized, would have been too late to change the result ;
and he may have thought that the circumstances were
in themselves trivial and unimportant when compared
with the magnitude of the struggle at home, the brUhant
promise of success which at one time animated the
Southern people and encouraged them to persevere, and
the distressing consequences of the final catastrophe.
At the time when Ex-President Davis Avas preparing
his account of the origin, progi-ess, and results of the
great Civil War, the Imperial regime had itself passed
away, under circumstances of distress and affliction to
its author, and of much humiliation and trouble to France.
The contrast between the brilhant meridian of the hfe of
Napoleon IIL, when he ruled the French people Avith
autocratic will, and when his mere manner of greeting a
foreign ambassador on the occasion of a State ceremony
was thought to have a political meaning which dis
quieted all Europe, and the sudden and total extinction
of his power and his influence, might have aroused the
irony of a personal enemy, and have furnished the
occasion for the sarcasms of a hostile critic. But the
final course from the Imperial throne in Paris to the
death-bed at Chiselhurst was so swift, and the inter
vening way was so rough and painful, that sympathy
displaced all bitter memories, and compassion left no
room for malignity.
It is not improbable that Ex-President Davis per
ceived what is noAv knoAvn, that failing health and cor
poral suffering had greatly impaired the mind and
weakened the will of the late Emperor of the French,
and that even in 1864 he had neither the energy nor the
sagacity which enabled him to re-impose the Napoleonic

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 53
regime upon France, or which brought him out of the
Austro-Italian War Avith the bulk of the military
honours, and two proA-inces of his ally in addition. The
foregoing would seem to be sufficient reasons Avhy the
conduct of the Imperial Government of France towards
the Confederate States was passed OA^er in silence by an
author who was himself the chief figure and the chief
sufferer in the history he was writing. Mr. Davis was
not desirous to cast any reproach upon the fallen
Emperor, and it would have been impossible for him to
mention the encouragement the Confederate Govern
ment had received, and the subsequent denial of all
practical help, AAdthout expressing some condemnation of
both the pohcy and its author.
But in a narratiA-e whose especial object it is to give
a true and exhaustive account of the effort made by the
Confederate Government to create a navy, the trans
actions in France, and the conditions under which they
were attempted, cannot be omitted. Many persons who
are stiU living at the South know that the Confederate
Congress authorized the building of ships-of-war in
France, and they have a legitimate right to be informed
why the purpose foiled, if anyone employed in carrying
it out pubhshes a narratiA^e of the events at all. If I
thouo^ht that the mention of these transactions now
would excite the iU-will of the Southern people against
France, or that a statement of the facts would be the
origin of a grievance against the present French Govern
ment on the part of the United States, I would omit
them altogether ; but I feel assured that the South is
better and more wisely employed than in nursing its
disappointment and treasuring up Avrath, and that even
the North is settling down to a condition of mind in
w-hich contentment with the present, and hopefulness as

54 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
regards the future, are uniting to obliterate all that was
irritating and vexatious in the past.
Captain Tessier brought me the report of the per
emptory commands of the Imperial Government on the
9th of June, 1864, and I went to Paris in about a fort
night to consult with 3Ir. Slidell, and to get full ex
planations from M. Arman, who came up from Bordeaux
by especial appointment to meet me. The mystery of
the transaction appeared so profound, the disappoint
ment and injury to the Confederate States Avas so
grievous, that Mr. Slidell desired to be fully and
minutely informed, and I requested him to permit his
chief- secretary, Mr. George Eustis, to go with me to see
M. Arman and to assist in the investigation.
The official reports to the NaAy Department were full
and explicit. They mentioned cA'ery circumstance which
could help to illustrate the management of the enter
prise and the conduct of the Imperial authorities, and
the replies from Richmond demonstrated A\ith clearness
and force, both the disappointment of the Confederate
Government and the consciousness of the deceptive
hopes that had been held out to 3Ir. Slidell, and which
were also aroused by suggestions to the Secretary of the
Navy through other sources having every appearance of
genuine authority.
The despatches referred to were of a confidential
character — they were An-itten under the influence of a
disappointment Avhich naturally aroused feelino-s of re
sentment. Suspicion was excited against persons, and
they were mentioned in terms of censure which subse
quent inquiry proved in some cases to he unmerited.
To publish the official correspondence with the Con
federate Navy Department in full Avould not add weight
to the evidence, and Avould furnish no additional fact at

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 55
all essential to a complete explanation of the transac
tions. 31. Arman produced official documents to prove his
authority to undertake the construction and armament
of the ships, and the official order to sell them. He
gaA-e 3Ir. Eustis and myself a full and particular account
of his last intervicAV A\dtli the Emperor, in Avhich, as he
informed us, his 3Iajesty reproved him for the delay in
disposing of the ships, and peremptorily ordered him to
get rid of them at once, and to produce proof of the sale,
so that 31. Drouyn de I'Huys might be able to satisfy
the L'nited States 3Iinister in respect to them. Under
this irresistible pressure the corA-ettes and one of the
rams built at Bordeaux were sold to Prussia, the second
ram was sold to Denmark, and the two Nantes corvettes
to Peru. To add to the mystery of these proceedings,
and as an aggravation of the apparent treachery to the
Confederate States, we were compelled to submit to.
the despatch of the vessels to Prussia at a time when
that country was at war Avith Denmark. M. Arman
explained to us that to meet this difficulty the sale to
Prussia had been effected through a banker of Amster
dam, who had acted as the intermediary, but he in
formed us that the French Government were fully
conscious of the arrangement.
I have already stated that M. Yoruz closed up the
sale of the two ships bmlt by him, and settled the en
tire transaction in full. The financial negotiations with
M. Arman were more compHcated. At a later date, an
arrangement Avas made with him by which we got pos
session of the ram which had been sold to Denmark, and
this caused so much delay in the final settlement, that at
the termination of the war the accounts with M. Arman
-were still open. The transactions had involved large

56 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
payments and expenditures, and although M. Arman
had refunded a considerable amount at the time when
the first corvette was sold to Prussia, yet there was still
a large balance in question at the end of the war, which
has never been settled.
In the year 1867 the United States instituted a suit
against M. Arman in respect to his transactions with
the Confederate Government, and for the payment to
them of the money he had received on account of the
Confederate Navy Department, but the French Court
gave judgment for the defendant. Subsequently M.
Arman failed, whether in consequence of the above pro
secution or too great an extension of his business I have
never been informed, but the sudden termination of the
war, and the total extinction of the Confederate Govern
ment, left him in the position of freedom fi-om any legal
liability to a former representative of that Government ;
and as the French Courts decided against the claim set
up by the United States, he became, as it were, the
residuary legatee of the defunct Confederacy, and the
total of the remaining assets was left in his hands, and
was sacrificed in his misfortunes.
M. Arman died a few years after the aboA'-e-mentioned
events. It is at least due to his memory that 1 should
say that he offered to settle his accounts with me after
the close of the war ; but when he did so, we did not agree
as to the balance due, and I was not Avilluig to assume
any further responsibility with reference to Confederate
affairs. Subsequently he proposed to pay over to the
United States, by way of compromise, a considerable
amount, if I would certify the statement of accounts and
the United States Avould accept a compromise and refram
from taking legal proceedings against him. I declined
to give the certificate because the statement did not

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 57
exhibit the balance Avliich I would have claimed on
behalf of my principals, and I had no authority to
make an arrangement or compromise for their successors.*
When 31. Arman discovered that the United States
purposed to sue him, he determined to repudiate their
claim in toto, and the result prov-ed that from a pecuniary
point of Adew he was well advised.
Although the statements made by M. Arman to Mr.
George Eustis and to me in respect to his intervicAvs
Avith the Emperor and M. Rouher could not be verified
by direct inquir}-, ncA^ertheless their substantial accuracy
was proved by the course of events, and by the official
documents which he produced, and which he subse
quently gave me. 3Ioreover, if he had undertaken to
build and arm those formidable ships for the Confederate
Government Avithout a clear and distinct understanding
that the administrative and executive officials would be
restrained fi-om interference, he would have been acting
in direct -violation of law, and in open and flagrant
contempt of the specific and A-ery peremptory prohibi
tions of the Emperor's Proclamation of Neutrality, and
it can hardly be supposed that the French Government
would haA-e taken no legal proceedings against him.
As a matter of fact, he was rebuked for not selling the
ships promptly when ordered to do so, but he was
never reproved for the original undertaking. He con
tinued to occupy his seat in the Assembly, and to
receive marks of personal consideration from the highest
personages in the Government, and although the
counsel employed by the United States did their best to
* The disagreement between M. Arman and myself was not in
respect to the amounts received and disbursed by him, but I objected
to the large commissions charged for efifecting the forced sale of the
ships bj' order of the Government.

68 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
excite prejudice against him, and charged him with
breaking the municipal law, and endangering the peace
of France by taking part in an attempt to cause a
violation of her neutBttl duties, the court gave judgment
in his favour, and even compelled the United States
to give security for the costs of the suit.
Mr. Slidell also had a personal interview Avith the
Minister of Marine, about the 25th of June, 1864, and
was informed by that functionary that the affair of our
ships no longer appertained to his department, but had
been referred to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a
proceeding which fulfilled the prediction 1 had ventured
to make in regard to the action of the Imperial Govern
ment, should the Confederate cause appear to be losing
ground at the time when the ships were near comple
tion, an intimation which I made to the Navy Depart
ment in a despatch dated November 30th, 1863, which
has been given already in this chapter.
My last report to the Secretary of the Navy on
the subject of the attempt to build ships in France
was dated August 25th, 1864, and concludes as
follows : —
' It would be superfluous for nie to comment further
upon the unfortunate termination of our French opera
tions. I haA^e laid all the circumstances connected Avith
them fully before you. There was never any pretence
of concealing them from the Emperor's GoA-ernment,
because they were undertaken at its instigation, and
they have failed solely because the pohcy or intentions
of the Emperor haA^e been changed.'
The fortunes of war, it is well known, exercise a
strong influence over the policy of neutrals, and there
can be no doubt that the relative position of the two
belligerents in America had greatly changed Avhen the

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 59
Emperor of the French caused 3Ir. Slidell to be informed
that it was no longer possible for him to remain
quiescent, and that the Confederate ships in France must
he sold to some other nation, as he could not permit
them to go to sea, either armed or unarmed, unless the
United States AA-ere satisfied in regard to their destina
tion. There is no denying the fact that up to about
midsummer of 1863, the Confederates Avere able to
keep the Federal armies Avell at bay, and on several
occasions Washington Avas in more danger of capture
than Richmond, to wit, after the battle of Bull Run, the
defeat of General 3IcClellan on the Chickahominy, and
of General Hooker at Chancellorsville. This is mani
fest from the panic created at the North by the fear
of iuA-asion at those times, and the alarm and uneasiness
were forcibly exhibited in the telegraphic calls made by
the authorities at Y^ashington upon the Governors ofthe
various Northern States, to hurry forward the militia
for the defence of the capital, and the excited, urgent,
well-nigh agonizing appeals of some of the Governors,
notably 3Ir. Curtin, of Pennsylvania, and AndrcAVS, of
Massachusetts, to the courage and patriotism of the
citizens in order to arouse their zeal.
In a volume entitled ' Report of the Secretary of the
NaAy in Relation to Armoured Yessels ' (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1864), there appear a
number of letters from official persons at Boston and
New York, urgently beseeching the Secretary of the
United States Navy, 3Ir. Gideon Welles, to place and
maintain 3Ionitors in those harbours for their protection.
Under date of November 12th, 1862 (p. 596 of volume
referred to), the Committee of the Boston Board of
Trade called 31 r. Welles' s attention to ' the comparatively
defenceless state ofthe harbour of Boston,' and added :

60 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
' In view ofthe recent reckless depredations ofthe piratical
steamer Alabama, and her reported near proximity to
our bay, and also the apparently well authenticated fact
recently made public that powerful rams are now partially
constructed in England to be used by the rebels in an
attack upon our principal cities on the northern coast. . . .
it cannot be regarded strange that this community should
be pervaded by deep solicitude as to the absence of im
mediate means to make any adequate defence,' etc. The
Committee express their uiiAvillingness to embarrass the
Government, or to ' make the claims of Boston harbour
for protection unduly prominent,' but they nevertheless
affirm that ' the harbour of the third commercial city in
the Union ought no longer to be allowed by its weakness
to invite the aggression of a desperate enemy.' The
situation at Boston must have been alarming, and the
Committee seem to have been determined to spur 3Ir.
Gideon Welles's energies to the utmost. They were not
content with stating the facts of the case, but they sup
plied him with the opinion of experts. ' It is believed
by practical men ' (they wrote) ' that through Broad
Sound ' (one of the principal entrances to this harbour)
' a reckless and daring piratical ironclad steamer might
enter without serious injury and lay our city under con
tribution.' Governor Morgan, in November, 1862 (p. 597), m-
formed Mr. Welles that the municipal authorities of New
York ' have already taken some measures for raising a
fund to protect the harbour by private subscription.'
On November 18th, 1862, the Boston 3Iarine Society
took alarm (p. 598), and they backed the appeal of the
Board of Trade by a still more urgent petition for
protection. Their Committee Avrote in the followino-
terms :— ' Our citizens are deeply concerned on the sub-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 61
ject, and look to the Government .... to make such
arrangements as Avill afford that protection Avhich shall
allay their fears and anxieties.' In tlie same letter they
made a statement Avliich looks A-er}- like a confession
that Boston had earned a special claim to a little retri
butive A-engeance from the South. The statement is as
follows : — ' There are obvious reasons in the history and
condition of tiie city of Boston which might tempt an
audacious and ambitious foe to lay it under contribution
or to waste the property of its people. . . . The applause
Avith which such an act would be hailed by the enemies
of the Union in the Southern States would nerve the
invader to run the risk, while the moral effect abroad,
should it be unfortunately successful, might be disastrous
to the cause in which our country is engaged.'
YTien General Lee advanced into 3Iaryland after
defeating General Hooker at Chancellorsville, the panic
at the North revived, and in June, 1863, General John
E. Wool and 3lr. George Opdyke, the Mayor of New
York, again Avrote most urgently to the Navy Depart
ment on the subject of the inadequate defences of that
city. General Y^ool was at that time the Military Com
mander at New York, and on the 28th of June, 1863,
he Avrote a letter to the Secretary ofthe Navy (p. 604),
which contains the following startling statements: —
' The volunteers and mihtia of this city are being sent
to Pennsylvania to aid in the defence of that State.
We shall be at the mercy of any privateer that may
think proper to assail this city. The temptation is
indeed great, for the want of men to man the guns in
the forts of the harbour.'
It appears manifest from the official appeals, reports,
and statements of high civU and military functionaries
who were charged with the care and protection of the

62 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
chief cities ofthe North, that for more than twoyears after
the beginning of hostilities, those cities were harassed by
an oppressive consciousness of danger, and that extreme
efforts were necessary not wholly to capture Richmond,
but to keep the so-called ' rebels ' out of Pennsylvania.
Although the full extent of the fears entertained by the
Governors of some of the Northern States and the people
of New York and Boston was not generally knoAvn
abroad, yet all who read the accounts of the war per-
ceiA^ed that the Federal GoA^ernment had no mere re
bellion to deal with ; and during the year 1862, and
even up to the middle of 1863, it Avas very generally
believed in Europe that if the Southern ports could be
kept open so as to admit a sufficient quantity of arms
and other military supplies, the Confederate Government
Avould be able to maintain a successful defence, and
finally to win a separate and independent position.
If the rams built at Birkenhead had not been inter
fered with and then stopped by her Britannic 3Iajesty's
Government, they would have got to sea a month or
two before the time when General 33^ool was impressino-
upon the United States Navy Department the defence
less condition of Ncav York, and while GoA-ernor Curtin
Avas appealing for help from all quarters to repel General
Lee's threatened advance uito Pennsylvania. The Aveak
and accessible points along the Northern coast were
Avell known to the Confederate naval authorities, and
the Liverpool rams Avould have been sent to them, and
there can scarcely be a shadow of doubt that they would
have fulfilled in great jiart the predictions of General
Wool and the Committee of the Boston Board of Trade.
The invitation to build ships in France Avas giA'en
during the period of successful resistance at the South,
and of apparent doubt and trepidation at the North. It

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 63
was withdrawn when force of numbers and immeasurable
superiority in war material began to prevail, and Avhen
aid and encouragement Avas most needed by the weaker
side. It suited the Imperial policy, and appeared to be
consistent Avith the designs upon Mexico, to extend a
clandestine support to the South Avhen the Confederate
armies were still strong and exultant. It Avas neither
prudent nor wise to maintain a doubtful or hesitating
attitude towards the Avinning side when it became ap
parent that the prospect had changed, and that neither
the Emperor 3Iaximihan nor Mr. President Davis could
probably maintain his position. ' Voila tout ' is a brief
and terse French phrase, which expresses the explana
tion of the diplomatic summersault better than any
Enghsh equiA-alent, and its use may be pardoned on the
occasion of describing an occurrence which has special
reference to the Government of France.
There does not appear, in the correspondence between
the United States Minister at Paris and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, any evidence that either Mr. Dayton or
3Ir. Seward suspected that the Confederate agents had
been acting in France with the secret encouragement
and consent of the Imperial Government. It is not
probable, however, that the American Minister would
have mentioned his knowledge of such a fact unless
his apphcation for the detention of the ships had
been refiised. The prompt compliance with their
demands satisfied the United States, and they were con
tent to know that no hostile vessels from a French port
would ever be permitted to arouse the apprehension of
General Wool and the 'Boston Marine Society,' and
they did not care to pry into the secret history of their
origin. In the ' Case of the United States,' presented to the

64 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Tribunal of Arbitration, it is stated that the authoriza
tion obtained by M. Arman to arm the four corvettes,
and his conduct with reference to the rams, were un
known to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that
Avhen the Minister of the United States at Paris brought
the subject to the attention of M. Drouyn de I'Huys,
he took immediate steps to prevent a violation of the
neutrality of France.
When M. Arman applied to the Ministry of Marine
and the Colonies for the authorization to arm the ships,
he stated precisely what it was previously understood by
the Imperial Government that he should state, namely,
that the ships were intended for a line of packets betAveen
San Francisco, Japan, China, etc., and that the arma
ment was requh-ed for their protection against pirates in
the Eastern seas, and, moreover, to fit the vessels for a
possible sale to the Japanese or Chinese Government.
M. Arman had been told that he must give a plausible
reason for building such formidable ships, and that the
Government would not interfere Avith their despatch fi-om
France, or permit an inquisitive inquu-y into then-
ultimate destination and purpose.
The foregoing was in precise accordance AAith the
hints given to Mr. Shdell by persons in high positions
Avho were in close and constant intercom-se with the
Emperor. I have no means of knowing whether
M. Drouyn de I'Huys had been informed of the
arrangement with 31. Arman, or the intimations con
veyed to 3Ir. Slidell, but I have the original document,
signed by M. Chasseloup Laubat, 3Iinister of 3Iarine
and of the Colonies, authorizing 31. Arman to arm
the ships (see p. 67). It Avill be perceiA-ed that the
battery of each corvette was to haA^e been tweh'^e or
fourteen ' canons de trente,' and it Avill hardly be thought

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 65
credible that the experts at the 3linistry of 3Iarine, or
the officials Avho inspected the guns, A\eve deceived as to
the character of the ships, or that they ever thought
such powerful armaments could have been intended for
defence agamst Chinese pirates in the year 1863.
It will now, I think, be admitted that the fall of
3"icksburgh, by which the 3Iississipi Avas opened through
out its Avhole course to the United States gunboats, and
the Confederate States severed m twain, and the nearly
simultaneous repulse of General Lee at Gettysburgh,
were the tiu-ning-pomts of the war. Up to the date of
those CA-ents the South was able in the main to beat back
iuA-asion, and sometimes, by a supreme effort, to assume
the offensive. But by that time the drain of battle and
disease had greatly diminished her fighting population,
and the stringency of the blockade had become so great,
that it was impossible to supply the reduced numbers in
the field Avith effective arms and ammunition, and all
other necessary supphes could only be obtained at
uncertain intervals and in insufficient quantities.
During the last adA-ance upon Richmond the Con
federate troops fought with their accustomed intrepidity,
and by unflinching courage in resistance, and patient
endurance in the hnes around Petersburgh, they pro
longed the last fatal campaign for a whole year — say
fi-om ' the battle of the 3Vilderness ' to the surrender at
Appomatox Court-hou.se. But it was manifest that the
poAver of the country Avas overstrained ; and Avhile the
struggle and the resistance of the Confederate forces at
all points after the disaster at Gettysburgh was an effort
which in future history Avill place the Southern people
among those nations who are most notable for military
aptitude and proAvess, it Avas nevertheless a contest that
gave but little promise of final success. As the South

VOL. II.

66 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
grew Aveaker, the chief Euroj)eaii States became more
and more rigid and discriminating in their neutrality,
until finally they practically prohibited that branch of
trade which was most likely to afford sufficient succour
to the overmatched Confederacy, and left untrammelled
the traffic in those articles Avhich Avere most needed and
most easily obtained by the United States.
It is not my Avish or purpose to reviA^e the memory
of past disappointments, or to arouse a feeling of enmity
against those countries Avhose deceptive neutrality con
tributed to the defeat of the South. The history of the
naval enterprises of the Confederate States Avhich were
organized abroad would, hoAvever, be very incomplete,
and the disparity between the hopes entertained by the
people of the South and the results accomplished would
not be capable of explanation, unless the whole of the
facts and circumstances are fully stated. The South
has accepted the result of the war, business and social
relations are again intermingling the people of the two
sections on terms of friendship and intimacy, and the
great majority on both sides can now recm- to the events
of the war and discuss them as historical incidents, and
not as subjects for strife and recrimination. One of the
chief purposes ofthis narrative is to acquaint the Southern
people and others Avho ma}- be interested in the great
Civil 3Var with some of the transactions which appear
to be but httle knoAvii ; and I Avish to deal with the
occurrences purely as liistorical facts, and to pouit out
the natural and reasonable inferences Avithout bias or
exaggeration.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 67

COPY OF FRENCH MINISTER OF MARINE'S LETTER
GRANTING AUTHORITY TO .VRiM THE FOUR COR
VETTES.
A Monsieiu- Arman, Depute au Corps L6gislatif, Rue Godot de
Mauroy 1.
Ministfere de la Marine et des Colonies, 2"= Directoire Personnel,
2™^ Bureau, 1"= Section, Inscription Maritime,
Paris, le 6 Juin, 1863.
MoXSIEtTR, —
Je m'empresse de vous faire connaitre, en r6ponse k votre
lettre au l" de ce mois, que je vous autorise volontiers k pouvoir
d'un armement de douze a quatorze canons de trente Ies quatre
batiments k vapeur en bois et en fer qui se construisent en ce
moment a Bordeaux et k Nantes.
Je vous prie de vouloir bien m'informer en temps utile de I'^poque
a laqueUe ees navires seront prets k prendre la mer afin que je donne
les instructions necessaires a Mj\I. les chefs du service de la Marine
dans ees deux ports.
Recevez, monsieur, I'assurance de ma haute consideration,
Le Ministre Secretaire d'Etat de la Marine et des Colonies,
(Sign(i) Chasseloup Laubat.
Pour copie conforme,
(Sign6) J. VoRUZ, ain6.
It will hardly be thought by anyone that if the purpose had been
to conceal from the French Government the true destination of ships
so wholly fit for war, and so manifestly unfitted for commerce, the
attempt to deceive would have been made through the transparent
pretence that they were designed for a line of packets between San
Francisco and China.

34—2

68 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

CHAPTER II.
Misconception by the United States of the attitude of the English
and French Governments. — Repurchase of the Sphiiux, from Den
mark. — Precarious condition of the Confederate Cause at that
period. — Correspondence concerning the despatch of the Stonewall
{Sphinx) from Copenhagen in conjunction with the City of Ricli-
mond from London. — The Stonewall's challenge to the United
States ships Niagara and Sacramento. — Surrender of the Stonewall
to the Cuban Government at the end of the "War. — Her subsequent
delivery to the United States.
From the contents of the preceding chapter, it wiU
be perceived that the French Imperial Government
wholly changed its attitude of tacit encouragement to
the Confederate States just at the time when the secret
pledges were ripe for effective fulfilment, and when the
possession of the ships built under cover of official con
nivance might have supplied a great and pressing need,
and would have measurably mcreased the poAver of the
Southern States to continue the unequal contest.
One of the strangest features in the retrospect of these
Confederate operations in Europe is the evidence we
have of the misapprehension of the Ignited States in
regard to the feeling of the tAvo great maritime Powers —
England and France — towards the American belli o-erents.
In the diplomatic correspondence of the United States
during the Avar there often appear commendatory ac-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 69
knowledgments of the friendly neutrality of France and
other Continental Powers, and in the ' Case of the United
States ' presented to the Tribunal of iVrbitration at
Geneva, ' the proceedings against M. Arman's vessels '
are cited • as a proof of the fidelit}- Avith Avhich the
Imperial Government maintained the neutrality which
it imposed upon its subjects.' Her Britannic 3Iajesty's
Government, on the contrary, is denounced by Mr.
Sewai-d for its partiality to the Confederate States, and
is charged in both the official despatches and in ' the
Case ' with the graA-est offences against international
law and neuti-al duties, and the complaints and insinua
tions were often expressed in such offensive language,
and were sometimes so personal, that in reading them
now it is impossible to suppress a feeling of surprise
that they were borne so meekly, and answered with so
much forbearance.
Y'hether the Government of the United States ever
suspected the secret encouragement which the Emperor
of the French gave to the South, does not appear in the
printed correspondence, and cannot be now known.
Y'"hat 3Ir. Seward and the compiler of ' the Case ' com
mended, was the prompt, energetic action of the Imperial
Government at the critical moment, and they probably
cared very httle about the original promises or intima
tions to 3lr. Slidell, even if those promises were known
to them. The indignation, one might even say the
contempt, A\dth which they speak of the British Govern
ment of that date, appears to have been the outcome, not
of animosity against Great Britain, but of irritation pro
duced by the vacillation of her 3iajesty's Ministers.
K General Lee had Avon the battle of Gettysburgh and
had been able to hold the line of the Potomac through
the winter of 1863-64, and if, meanwhile, affairs had

70 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
gone on smoothly with Bazaine and the Emperor
Maximilian in Mexico, the answer to Mr. Dayton in
reference to the Arman ships would have been very
different to the reply which was actually giA'^en, and Mr.
Seward was no doubt conscious of that probability. He
knew that there would be a decided ansAver to a cate
gorical demand one way or the other, and that official
action would be prompt and effective, and he was im
pressed with the respect which energy and promptness
in action always inspire, whatever the motive.
The Confederate Government had greater cause to
complain of the uncertain and hesitating policy of the
British Ministry than that of the United States, because
the injury to the former Avas far greater than to the
latter ; but I can find nothing in the despatches of Mr.
Secretary Mallory, or in any other official document
from Richmond, approaching to the acrimony of Mr.
Seward's angry expostulations.
It has been impossible to give a clear and compre
hensive account of the Confederate operations in England
without pointing out and demonstrating the deceptive
character of British neutrality during the American
Civil War ; but I have not confounded the disappoint
ment which resulted from A-acillation with the chae'rin o
and vexation Avhich was provoked by a broken pledge.
It has been necessary to comment upon the difference
between the neutral duties of Great Britain, as ex
pounded by scA'cral Cabinet 31inisters, and the manner
in which they were practised by the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, but no responsible Confederate
authority has ever intimated that her 3Iajesty's GoA^ern-
ment held out the least hope that anything Avould be per
mitted which was not in accordance Avith laAv, and with
the conditions of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 71
If the Confederate States had gained their independ
ence, the only complaint they could have urged against
Great Britain would hav-e been someA\-hat in this form :
— ' You called attention to your municipal laAv, and
announced the purpose to maintain a strict and impartial
neutrality. You warned us not to infringe the specified
statute, nor to expect any faA^our which Avould imply a
departure from your neutral duties ; but in point of
fact you " strained the law "* against our agents, and as
regai-ds your declaration of neutrality, you practically
helped om- enemy by restricting our means of getting
supphes. which were fi-eely furnished to him.' The
case against France would have been very different, say
in this form : — ' Y"e had not the least purpose to come
to you for the supply of our special wants. We pre
ferred to use the dockyards of England, and to rely
upon the manifest meaning of British law and the con
stitutional mode of applying it, than upon the personal
feehng of the highest persons in the State; but you
iuA-ited us to come to you, gaA^e us pledges, and even
suggested the pretence upon which the apparent purpose
of your neutral declarations might be evaded. Then at
the critical moment you AvithdrcAV the promises, and
acted just as if you were repelling an infringement of
your neutral rights, giving us a diplomatic repulse,
whose sting was not softened by the pleasant and sym
pathetic phrases in Avhich it Avas communicated to us.'
The Confederate Government fully comprehended this
difference betAveen the conduct of England and France,
and 3Ir. 3Iallory's despatches on the subject comment
upon the hostihty of the United States to the Mexican
policy of the Imperial Government, and the improbability
of that hostility being in the least degree modified by
* Vide speech of Solicitor-General quoted in another chapter.

72 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the suppression of M. Arman's efforts to supply the
Confederate Navy Department Avith a fleet of ships.
The desire to retain a hold upon the French ships
Avas so great that every possible plan was suggested and
discussed. Mr. Slidell even had private unofficial inter
views with one or two of the 3iinisters, with the purpose
to obtain leave to complete the A^essels leisurely, on the
condition that no attempt should be made to remove
them from the ports of construction without special per
mission, or until the end ofthe war. The object was to
maintain such a lien upon the vessels that we could
regain possession of them if circumstances should at any
time induce the Imperial Government to return to its
original policy of encouragement to the South. Some
concessions Avere offered to 3Ir. Slidell which had at first
a hopeful appearance, but the ultimate conditions attached
to them were found upon reflection to be impracti
cable ; and meanwhile the builders had gone so far in
fulfilling the peremptory orders to sell, that the A^essels
Avere no longer Avithin their unlimited control.
About the 1st of August, 186-1, all efforts to come to
any arrangement with the Government Avere abandoned,
and we had the mortification to know that officers and
agents of those Avho had bought the ships were super
intending their completion. 33''hen the corvettes and
the rams built at Bordeaux were sold to Prussia and
Denmark, those Powers were at Avar about the Schlesmg-
Holstein Provinces, and during an armistice the Prussian
ships were, I believe, hurried off to their destination.
M. Arman reported this to me at the time. I continued
to keep up communication with 31. Arman, because he
had promised that if any change in the progress of the
Prusso-Danish War should induce either of the pur
chasers to dispose of one or more of the ships, I mio-ht
again get possession.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 73
33"ith the Adew to be reliably informed ofthe events at
Bordeaux, I frequently sent Captain E. Tessier there,
who acted as my agent in tliat and several other trans
actions requiring tact, prudence, and a familiar knoAV-
ledge of Contuiental languages and customs. My
appearance m Bordeaux for a single da}- Avould have
excited suspicion, and Captain Tessier Avas Avarned to
guard against exhibiting any greater curiosity about the
A-essels than a professional man visiting a maritime city
and its dockyards would be likely to show.
Captain Tessier Avas familiar Avith the designs of the
rams and the peculiar serA-ice for Avhich they Avere in
tended, namely, on a shoal coast and in the 3Iississippi
riA'er. He soon informed me that the engineer who Avas
superintending the ram bought by Denmark Avas
making alterations which materially changed the original
plan, and that the method of securing the armour-plates,
and some other portions of the work, was being done in
a manner he felt sure I Avould not approve. It is
probable that the chief object of the Danish agent was to
get the Aessel completed for immediate service, and that
time was more important in his estimation than extreme
care and nicety in construction. Captain Tessier could
only communicate secretly or confidentially with M.
Arman, and it Avas impossible to interfere in any way
Avith the acts and purposes of the actual owner.
There appears to have been much delay in the com
pletion of the Danish ram. 33'^hether the difficulty of
getting her out of France during the continuance of the
Avar AA'ith Prussia was the cause or not, I have never
been informed, but Avhen she Avas at last finished,
liostiHties had ceased, and questions arose between
31. Arman and the Danish GoA'ernment about the
acceptance of the ship. 31. Arman informed me that the

74 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Danish Ministry of Marine wished to annul the purchase,
because, as he stated, the vessel was not ready in time to
take part in the Avar, and was not wanted for the peace
establishment. The ship was, however, taken to Copen
hagen in November, and while she was there 31. Arman
sent an agent whom he often employed in his trans
actions with foreign Governments, and who represented
him in the business with Denmark, to communicate the
state of affairs to me, and to arrange for a re-delivery of
the ram to the Confederate States. The representative
of M. Arman in the negotiations for the sale of the ships
Avas of course familiar with all the arrangements by
which those already delivered had been despatched from
France, either during actual hostilities between Prussia
and Denmark, or during a short armistice. 31. Arman
had offered in October to manage the transactions with
the Danish Government in such a way as to effect a re
delivery of the ship to me ; but the vessel was then in
complete. I had every reason to suppose that the sale
to Denmark was believed to be bond fide, both by the
French Foreign Office and the United States 3Iinister,
and I thought it would be imprudent to enter into an
engagement which could by any possibility arouse sus
picion, and again draw attention to a Confederate agent.
When, however, M. Arman sent liis representative the
second time Avith a proposition for the delivery of the
ship, the circumstances had AvhoUy changed. The vessel
was clear of French interference. She was in Copen
hagen, or at least she was en route for that port, and the
purchasers Avere desirous to annul their bargain. 31.
Arman proposed to instruct his agent to manage the
negotiations at Copenhagen so as to give me time to
collect a staff of officers, prepare the necessary supply of
stores and a tender, and to select a suitable rendezvous.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 75
He said that when I Avas ready his agent Avould get
leave to engage a Danish crew to iiaA-igate the ship back
to Bordeaux, but instead of returning to that port he
would take her to the appointed rendezA^ous, and deliver
her to the Confederate officer appointed to command
her. The business ari-anoements relatino- to the manage-
ment of affairs at Copenhagen iuA-oh-ed some complica
tions, and they were not finally settled until December
16th, 1864. All the details of this transaction are as
fresh in my memory as if they had occurred within the
current year. The ship was reported to be suitably
provided A\ith everything necessary for her navigation,
and she had on board her battery, say one 300-pounder
and two 70-pounder Armstrong guns, Avith a quantity
of shot, shells, fuzes, etc., but no ammunition or small
arms. In spite of the great value which CA^en one iron-cased
vessel thus armed would have been to the Confederate
Government if she could be promptly placed at a given
point on the Southern coast, I foresaw the intricacy and
complexity of the arrangements necessary to accomplish
such a purpose, and the merely physical difficulties at
that season of the year were not to be overlooked.
Y'hen the rams were begun at Bordeaux with the full
knowledge and approval of the Imperial Government, it
was purposed, and was so stipulated, that they should be
ready for sea in 3Iay, or, at the latest, in June, 1864.
The vessels were of small size, and Avere designed for
operations in the Mississippi river and the shoal harbours
of the Gulf coast of the Confederate States. Their
draught in their best fighting trim was to have been
fourteen feet. To load them deeper would of course be
admissible for the purpose of making a passage, but

76 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
under such conditions their qualities would be unfavour
ably affected, both as regards speed and buoyancy, and
yet to get them across the Atlantic it would be necessary
to weight them heavily Avith fuel and other stores. If
there had been no interference AA-ith the work, and no
prohibition of their delivery to the Confederate States,
both rams would have been in our possession, outside of
the river Gironde, in the early part of June, 1864, and
we would have had mild summer weather to drop them
safely over to their workmg ground, with the Azores,
Nassau and Havana for coaling stations.
At the date of the proposition for the delivery of the
Sphinx, it was approaching mid-Avinter, and the vessel
was at Copenhagen, Avith all the intricacies of the
Sound, the narrow waters between Denmark and
Sweden, the tempestuous gales of the German Ocean,
the dangers of the English Channel, and the fierce
Biscay gales to encounter and OA^ercome before she could
reach a safe place of rendezvous to receiA^e her ordnance
stores and her fighting crew.
Besides this, the condition of affairs had meanwhile
greatly changed in America. The weak fortifications at
Mobile, and the mere pretence of a naval flotilla which
the Confederate Government had been able to provide
for the defence of that city, had proA'ed wholly insuffi
cient to resist the A-igorous attack of Admiral Farragut's
powerful fleet, and the bay of 3Iobile, Avith the adjacent
inland waters communicating Avitli New Orleans, were
in complete possession of the Federal military and naval
forces. The United States had also obtained conti-ol of
the Mississippi from the northern boundary of the Con
federacy to its delta, and they had got such a firm grip
of the passes of the river, and of every approach to Ncav
Orleans, that an attempt to displace them, or even to

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 77
make such a naval demonstration in that quarter as
would cause them serious apprehensiou, Avould have
required a far greater force than one small ironclad ram.
GalATston was belicA-ed to be still in possession of the
Confederate troops, but the Trans- 3lississippi States
had been completely disscA-ered from the remainder of
the Confederacy, and an eftbrt to accomplish anything
for their defence by the despatch of so small a naval
expedition to the only point accessible from the sea, and
affording- at the same time means of communication with
the interior, appeared Avell-nigh Quixotic. If any effective
aid could be rendered to the hard-pressed armies still
gallantly holding- General Grant at bay from behind the
fieldworks of Richmond and Petersbu.rgh, and striAdng
to check Sherman's march through Georgia, that support
must be sent to the Atlantic coast.
It was known in Europe that a combined naval and
mihtary attack was about to be made upon Wilmington.
The Confederate forces in the south-west were so greatly
reduced in numbers that it was quite manifest they could
not protect the open country from dcA^astating ' raids '
and keep a sufficient force in General Sherman's front to
check his march towards Savannah. In fact, he had
already passed the last effective barrier at Atlanta, and
there were only a few weak battalions betAveen the head
of his advancing columns and his objective point. The
force available for the defence of Wilmington was too
small to justify much expectation of a successful resist
ance, and General Lee's supremest efforts were barely
sufficient to keep General Grant from breaking his lines,
or turning the right of his entrenchments and so cutting
him off from communication with the interior or from
retreat. The enemy held the fortifications at the mouth
of the Savamiah river, and access to that port had long

78 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
been closed. Charleston was almost beleaguered by
land, and a powerful co-operating naval squadron made
access to the harbour impossible. The collection of a
large fleet off Wilmington, preparatory to the combined
attack upon its defences, effectually barred the Cape
Fear river from the approach of a blockade-runner.
The Confederacy Avas thus almost hermetically closed
against communication from Avithout, and the Govern
ment-was practically shut up in Richmond, vsdth scarcely
a single line of communication open with the country
lying beyond the boundary of General Lee's earth
works. The foregoing may seem to be a sensational synopsis
of the condition of affairs, but there is not a single state
ment that is not confirmed by the facts, and they haA^e
not been consciously exaggerated in any particular.
Neither the Confederate Commissioners nor the prac
tical agents of the War and NaA-y Departments were,
however, willing to admit that all hope was lost, nor
Avere they willing to cease active exertions so long as
the ExecutiA-e Government was intact, and was able to
hold possession of a port or to maintain an army in the
field. Commodore Barron and the staff of naval officers
Avho came to Europe with him to take charge of the
English ironclads were still in France, concealing them
selves as much as possible from pubhc notice, but fi-etting
under their forced inactivity, and ready, I knew full
well, to undertake any service, even though it mio-ht
appear a 'forlorn hope.'
The Commissioners, with Commodore Barron and
Major Huse, carefully considered and discussed with me
the proposed enterprise. 3Ye took account of all the cir
cumstances, the strained and Avell-nigh depleted condi
tion of the finances being a prominent difficulty, and it

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 79
Avas unanimously determined that the effort should be
made. No time AA'as lost in consultation. As soon as
it was known that the ram had been permitted to leave
Bordeaux, and was thus fi-ee from suspicion, I had
despatched Captain Tessier to Copenhagen to learn what
he could of her condition and performances during the
A^oyage. He got to Copenhagen soon after the arrival
of the A-essel, before she had been painted or otherwise
set in special good order, and found means to go on
board and make a personal but necessarily casual in
spection. He made a written report, in Avhich he said
that he had been able to satisfy himself that the vessel
exhibited no v-isible signs of straining. ' The sheer of
the ship was true, and the putty or cement filling between
the edges of the plates was not CA^en cracked. On deck
I tried the butts ofthe deck-planks, the water-way seams,
the butts and scarfs of the water-ways, covering boards
and rails, and found them all in perfect order. The
S])hinx certainly did then show no sign of weakness.'
Captain Tessier remarked upon the alterations and in
sufficient fittings to which he had previously called my
attention soon after the sale of the ship to Denmark, but
it Avas now too late to restore them, even if he could
have suggested anything of the kind to the people in
charge A\-ithout exciting suspicion.
Although compelled to be content with a hasty
examination of the ship. Captain Tessier was able to get
a copy of the ' Rapport de Mer,' or official report of the
voyage from Bordeaux to Copenhagen, made by the
French captain who took her round to the French Con
sul. The report was a mere amplification of the ship's
log for the information of the Consul, and gave the per
formance of the ship and her speed without other remarks
than that she behaved and steered well in all weather, and

80 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
that the twin screws worked satisfactorily. It appeared
from the log that from Bordeaux to Cherbourg she
averaged ten and a half knots per hour, from Cherbourg to
Beachy Head, bearing north, ten knots, the weather being
moderate and wind generally E.N.E., Avhich Avas a head
wind. After passing the South Foreland, the wind and
sea increased, and the speed was eased to five knots, and
afterwards it Avas regulated in accordance Avith the
weather. The 'report' concluded with the statement
that the ship had behaved well under all circumstances,
' especially during heavy squalls on the 5th and 6th of
November, Avhen sailing vessels were scudding under
very short canvas.'
I mention the foregoing particulars because the perform
ances of the ship were not so satisfactory when the Con
federate naval officers got possession of her, her average
speed then proving to be only eight and a half knots in
good weather, and dropping to five and even four Avith
moderate head sea. During the A'oyage to Copenhagen the
engines were in charge of an inspecting engineer from the
works of Messrs. Mazelin, Avhere they were constructed,
and the ship was probably also in the trim best suited to
her size and peculiar design, although it appears from the
' Rapport de Mer ' that she Avas loaded to fifteen feet,
Avhich Avas one foot more than her calculated fiohtina.- trim.
When she began her voyage as a Confederate ship, the
engineers in charge were strangers to both the vessel
and her engines. The only really trustworthy and
loyal engineer was a young man of hardly sufficient
experience for the position. They Avere, however, the
best men Avho could be got at the time, and it is not
surprising that a better class of artizans could not be
induced to undertake a service in Avhich the discomfort,
exposure and danger Avere manifestly greatly in excess

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUUOPE. 81
of the remuneration it Avas possible to offer. Besides
this, the ordnance stores, fuel, and other supplies iifces-
sary for the adequate equipment of the ship for the long
Atlantic A-oyage in the depth of Avinter over-Aveightod
her, and reduced her to a condition in which she was
not intended to be placed, except, perhaps, for a short
run fi-om one coast port to another, and then only
under favourable conditions of Aveather.
The inspection made b}- Captain Tessier and the
' Rapport de 3Ier ' were independent accounts of the
condition and performances of the ship, and although it
was manifest that the alterations made after the forced
sale had somewhat affected her character and efficiency,
yet it was thought advisable to go on with the arrange
ments for getting her to sea as a Confederate ship. It
was hoped that the mere knowledge of the fact that the
Confederate Government had been able to get an ironclad
A-essel in Europe, and that she was actually en route for
the American coast, would animate the spirits of the
Southern people in the struggle, which was becoming
more hopeless day by day, and there was also some expec
tation that exaggerated rumours of her power and effici
ency would reach the United States, and that the arrange
ments it might be thought necessary to make in order to
meet and defeat her attack, would cause some delay or
confusion in the proposed operations against Y'^ilming-
ton and other ports on the coast of Georgia and the
Carolinas. Captain Thomas J. Page, an old and experienced officer,
bred in the United States navy, Avho had been sent out
from Richmond to command one of the so-called Birken
head rams, was selected for the first place in the enter
prise. He had kept himself so completely out of sight
since his arrival in Europe, that it was felt to be almost
VOL. II. 35

82 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
certain that he would not be knoAA-n to any spy whom
the United States officials might possibly employ to
Avatch the ship ; besides which, he was a man par
ticularly well suited for secret service by reason of a
marked constitutional tendency to silence and reserve
when among strangers or newly made acquaintances.
Captain Page was sent to Copenhagen to pick up such
personal acquaintance with the ship as was possible, to
supervise the local expenditure, and to take passage in
her for the rendezvous.
Lieutenant R. R. Carter had returned to Europe after
his successful voyages with the Coquette, mentioned in
another chapter, and was on special service Avith me.
This officer is justly entitled to some special notice. I
was obliged to impose upon him many and A^arious
duties, often of a kind to give him hard work and much
anxiety, Avith but little chance of gaining personal dis
tinction. He was thoroughly well informed in every
branch of naval education, and had, besides, an ingenious
mind, with quick perceptions, and an admirable aptitude
for applying with intelligence and vigour the means at
hand to the end in vicAv. These qualities fitted him to
design as well as to execute, but he had a keen percep
tion of the duty as well as sound policy of stickino- close
to the plan he was appointed to carry out, and was never
drawn aAvay fi-om the course sketched out for him by the
hope of making his OAAm position more prominent, or the
expectation of creating some striking effect.
Every naval enterprise undertaken by the Confederate
Government in Europe depended for its success upon the
fidelity of each of the several agents employed to the in
structions and plans laid doAvn b}- the director of the
expedition. It Avas absolutely necessary for everyone to
whom a part in the effort Avas allotted to conform strictly

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 8.?
to the time and method of performing each detail, and in
these respects Carter Avas the most scrupulouslv loyal
man I CA-er knew. He seemed to merge his individuality
for the time being into that of his immediate chief, to
think with his mind, and to act Avith his impulse. Man}-
Avell laid schemes in Avar have been frustrated, or their
eftects neutralized by forgetfulness on the part of sub
ordinates, implicit obedience being as necessary in those
who execute, as strategic skill is required by those who
direct movements of any importance.
Failure in execution could ncA-er befall Carter's share
in an enterprise except through Avliat the French call
force majeure, and when he set about his allotted part of
an undertaking, the directing authority could turn his
thoughts to other matters Avithout harassing fear or
doubt in regard to details. I detached Carter from
special service Avith me, and he was sent to Niewe
Diep to arrange for coaling the ram at that place, to
look after other matters in connection with her, and
finaUy to join her as first-heutenant.
A A-ery necessary initiatory arrangement with reference
to the despatch of the ironclad from Copenhagen was to
select a merchant of respectability at that place to
transact the local business, and to engage a Danish
crew for the proposed voyage to Bordeaux, so that all
might be done in accordance with the laws of the
country and the customs of the port. This Avas a
matter of some delicacy, as it Avas absolutely necessary
to acquaint the agent to some extent, at least, with the
ultimate movements of the ship, and to arrange with
him a secret telegraphic code, in order that the prepara
tion and departure of the supply tender from England
mio-ht be regulated Avith due reference to the require
ments of the vessel at Copenhagen. We Avere happy
35—2

84 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
in finding a very suitable agent, avIio managed his part
of the transaction Avith prudence and fidelity. I sup
plied him with a cypher code by which he Avas able to
keep me well informed of the condition and moA-ements
of the ram, and I could send instructions and adAdce in
regard to the tender.
At the time Avhen this expedition was taken in hand,
the financial condition of the Confederate Treasury in
Europe was at a very Ioav point, and there was great
difficulty in providing the necessary cash for any un
expected purposes. Indeed, there appeared to be a
startling- deficiency of funds to meet actually existing
contracts. The greater portion of the money which
had accrued from the compulsory sale of some of our
ships had been transferred to the general Treasury
account, partly to pay interest on bonds, and partly to
pay bills drawn by the 33^ar Office at Richmond in
favour of the purchasing agents in Europe. In fact,
the Avants of the army had then become of paramount
importance, and it Avas manifest that they would absorb
the whole financial resources of the GoA^ernment. To
follow the usual practice of buying a tender, even
though there might be promise of profitable employ
ment for her afterwards, Avas out of the question.
Happily there was in London a handy steamer built
for blockade-running, and the owners had employed
Lieutenant Hunter Davidson, of the Confederate naA-y,
to take charge of her for a proposed voyage to Bermuda,
€n route for Y'^ilmington.
Mr. W. G. CrenshaAv, of Richmond, 3"ii-ginia, had
served in the Confederate army up to the close of the
campaign which ended Avith the battle of Sharpsburg
and the retreat of General Lee from Pennsylvania. He
was a merchant of approved skill and experience, and

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUUOPE. 8E
upon his return to Richmond after the abo\e-mentioiied
mihtary operation, the AVar Department made an
arrangement Avith him to go to England, and to
organize a company for the especial purpose of running-
supplies through the blockade, and to personally
superintend the purchase of commissary stores, and
such other ai-ticles as might be Avithin the range of his
mercantile experience. 3Ir. Crenshaw Avas therefore
in some deoi-ee a GoA-ernment asjent, but the essence
of the arrangement with him Avas that he should act
purely in a priA'ate character, and that he should draAV
foreign capital, as well as his own commercial credit,
into the enterprise. 3lr. Crenshaw succeeded in adding
some impulse to the trade of blockade-running, and he
built or purchased a number of good steamers, which
helped to proAdde the Confederate armies with the
means of keeping the field. The vessel above alluded
to was one of his fleet, and the happy circumstance of
her active movements being in charge of an officer
whom I knew, and whose discretion I could trust, at
once suggested her employment as the tender for our
Danish ram.
I apphed to 3Ir. Crenshaw for the loan of her, merely
informing him that I required her to take some pas
sengers and freight to a port intermediate to Bermuda,
after which she could proceed on her proposed voyage,
and stating that such temporary use of his ship would
be of great service to the cause in whose behalf we
were both interested. 3Ir. Crenshaw replied by letter,
and stated that the steamer referred to was about to
sail AAdth the purpose to take into Wilmington ' com
missary stores, and from fifty to a hundred tons of
railway supplies, much needed in the Confederacy ; the
railAA-ay companies having been admitted into the line

86 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
{i.e., his company) to enable them to get supphes for
the repair of their rolling-stock.' He added: — 'This
boat can only expect to get in on January (1865)
moon by leaving England by 26th or 28th instant, and
going with as little delay as possible to Bermuda,' and
he closed his letter thus : — ' With these facts we place
the steamer at your service, if you require her, and
enclose a letter to that effect to Captaui Davidson.
We shall be well content Avith any use you make of
her, being perfectly willing to forego the pecuniary
profit that we might make, if the service AAill be better
promoted, and Avith all the hghts before you, you are
quite competent to form a correct opinion.'
It is sufficient to say that I accepted 3Ir. Crenshaw's
generous offer, hoping and believing at the time that
the deviation from his proposed voyage and the delay
would not defeat the expectation of saving the January
moon for running the blockade. Unhappily, the delay
Avas greater than appeared likely to occur — the ship
met with a mishap after performing her serAdce for me,
and never got into Wilmington at all. In the general
crash which soon followed, I made efforts to pay full
compensation for the loss 3Ir. Crenshaw and his
associates experienced fi-om the failure of their con
templated voyage, and he made no complaint of the
only settlement it was possible to arrange; but I felt
that he must have sustained a considerable loss, and I
am happy to say that he bore it with the equ.onimity
admirably manifested by the majority of the Southern
people in contemplating their ruin at the close of the
war. Affairs were noAV in train for getting the ram away
from Copenhagen. Page and Carter Avere looking after
the principal ship; the ordnance and other necessary

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 87
supplies for her complete equipment Avere ordered, and
forAvarded to London for shipment in the tender, which
may be known as the City of Richmond, and Davidson,
as the responsible commander of that vessel, managed
the receipt and stowage of eA^erything on board.
Commodore Barron Avith his company of officers
were still in Paris, or that neighbom-hood, and he
detailed some of the latter, whom he directed to report
by letter, and to take their further instructions from
me. Two of the officers — Lieutenants W. F. Carter
and Samuel Barron — ^were brought over to London to
assist in necessary details ; the remainder, with a few
men (seventeen in all) who had served the cruise in
the Florida, Avere collected on board the Rappahannock
at Calais, and ten or eleven men already on board that
vessel were told off for the ram. These movements
and arrangements were full of exciting interest at the
time, and all performed their parts with zeal and
animation. The memories connected with them, how
ever, are not inspiriting, and there must always be a
lack of buoyancy and ardour in the narrative of an
effort which has belied the hopes and expectations
which inspired it.
There is a lustre inseparable from a successful enter
prise, and a splendour inherent to victory, which no power
of language and no play of fancy can impart to defeat.
The accounts of the great Civil War written by
Northern men are more or less gilded by the glamour of
success, and may Avell be recorded in an exultant flow of
phrases, even when kept within the limits of strict
historical accuracy. Those who venture to tell what
was done on the Southern side can only hope to
gain a hearing through the interest which belongs to the
facts themselves. They need not, and should not, affect

88 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the dying notes of the swan ; but they are restrained
fi-om attempting to counterfeit the soaring melody of the
skylark. Preparations were pushed forAvard as rapidly as
possible, both at London and Copenhagen ; but at the
latter place there were a good many difficulties and
complications which arose Avithout warning, and had to
be met and removed as best they could. Both ships
were not ready to start until January 4th, 1864, and on
that day I telegraphed our Danish agent by cypher code,
' Sail as soon as you can,' to which I receiA-ed a reply
on the 5th, to the effect that the ram would sail next day.
Then followed telegrams on the 7th, ' Ship is off ;' 8th,
' Ship has been gone one day, and I haA-e heard of no
interruption ; and again later on the same day, ' Ship
stopped ; heavy gale and snowstorm at Elsinore.' There
was then an awkAvard silence of two or three days. But
the City of Richmond was ready for sea, and had been
dropped down the river as far as Greenhithe ; to detain
her would excite suspicion, and it was necessary to get
the officers and men OA'-er from Calais and away from
England without further delay.
The most satisfactory Avay in which the subsequent
movements of the enterprise can be told will be to giA-e
the actual instructions written at the time, and extracts
from the official correspondence. 'London, January 9fh, 1865.
' Sir, —
' Lieutenant Samuel Barron leaves for Calais to
night, and will report to you in person on board the
Rappahannock at an early hour to-morroAv mornino-.
You will despatch him in charge of all the Florida's
men now on board the Rappahannock to London,

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 89
by the steamer leaving- Calais to-morroAv night; and
you AAdU also send over by the same steamer Lieu
tenant Bochert, in charge of the men now attached
to the Rappaha7}uock who haA-e been especially selected
for the serA-ice for which you have been detailed. Send
in the same steamer AAdth the men all the officers de
tailed for the serA-ice (a list of whom you liaA-e), except
Lieutenant Read. Come over to London yourself,
together Avith Lieutenant Read, by the night mail-boat
to-morrow, and report to me in person as soon as
possible after your arriA-al on Wednesday morning. I
Avish to have a short conversation with you, and to giA^e
you final instructions and despatches ; and as you will
haA-e to proceed at an early hour to Greenhithe, and
may haA-e to go on board the steamer in a small boat,
you should not be encumbered with luggage, all of
which should be sent by the steamer which conveys
the principal part of the officers and men. Lieutenant
Barron vrill repeat to you my verbal instructions and
explanations, and I need not point out to you how
necessary it is to follow without deviation the prescribed

arrangement.

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) J. D. Bulloch.

• Lieutenant G. S. Shryock,
' Confederate States Navy,
' Calais.'

Lieutenant Shryock reported to me in London at half-
past six a.m. on the llth January, and after an hour's
conversation started to join the City of Richmond,
with the following letter of instructions prepared for
him in advance : —

90 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
'London, Janvary 10th, 1865.
' Sir,— ' Immediately upon receipt of this you will pro
ceed to Greenhithe, and from thence find your way on
board the steam -ship City of Richmond, upon reaching
Avhich vessel you will report yourself, together Avith all
the officers and men sent from Calais last night, to
Lieutenant Hunter Davidson for a passage to join the
Confederate States ship Stonewall.* There will be put
on board the City of Richmond an additional number of
men, who formed part of the crew of the late Confeder
ate States ship Florida, a list of whom AAdU be handed
you by Paymaster Curtis. You Avill assume direct
command of all the officers and men, but for manifest
reasons of policy and couA^enience you Avill berth and
govern your command generally under the directions of
Lieutenant Davidson.
' When you reach the appointed rendezvous and meet
the Stonewall, you will report with your command to
Captain T. J. Page, and take all further instructions
from him. You have a list of the officers of the expedi
tion and the men sent fi-om the Rappahannock. Pay
master Curtis will muster all the other men and hand
you a list of them. I have a list of all who should be
on board, but some may be left behind, and I wish you
to instruct the paymaster to make out a correct hst of
the entire command, officers and men, and send it to me
by the pilot, or by 3Ir. Early, under cover to 31. P.
Robertson, Esq., Rumford Court, Liverpool. Lieutenant
Read will accompany you to join the Stoneirall, and
Passed- Assistant- Surgeons Green and Herty, each of
Avhom will be attached to your command for the purpose
* Stonewall was the name given to the ram Avhen she was com
missioned as a Confederate ship.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 91
of joming the Stoneicall. . . . The City of Richmond
only awaits your arrival on board to sail, and you Avill
join her at the earliest moment possible on the mornino-
ofthe llth January, 1865. ' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) J. D. Bulloch.
' Lieutenant George S. Shryock,
' Confederate States Navy.'
The following is all that is essential of the letter of
instructions to Lieutenant Davidson, and which was
dated London, January 10th, 1865 : —
' There is unfortunately a possibility that the British
authorities may stop the men who are to come from
Calais, when they arrive at Gravesend to-morroAV morn
ing, in which event Lieutenant W. F. Carter will com
municate the fact to both of us at the earliest possible
moment, Avhen we must speedily decide what course to
pursue. This cannot be finally determined in advance,
but the probabihty is that it would be absolutely neces
sary for you to sail Avith the stores and the few seamen
who may have joined the ship from London, as your own
ship might be compromised by further detention, and the
entire expedition be thus broken up.
' The Stoneiccdl, as you are aware, sailed from Copen
hagen on the 6th instant, but a telegram of the Sth
informed me that she was then at Elsinore, detained by
a heaA^ snow-storm. Since that date I have had no
communication from her, and am doubtful whether she
has sailed again or not. In the absence of any news, we
must suppose that she did not get away from Elsinore
before to-day, that she avUI require three days to get to
Niewe Diep, two days for coaling at the latter place, and
two days in addition to reach a position in the Channel

92 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
opposite the mouth ofthe Thames. If these surmises are
correct, the Stonewall Avill be opposite the mouth of the
Thames on the 17th instant, and if not detained here
beyond to-morroAV, you will have a start of six days. It
has been arranged that the Stonewall shall make an
aA^erage speed not to exceed eight knots per hour, and
this low speed has been determined upon to alloAV for
adverse Aveather. By setting off her days' runs on the
chart, you Avill be able to determine the dates upon
which she is likely to reach a position off Ushant, and
Avhen you may expect her to reach the rendezvous at
Belle Isle ; but inasmuch as the time of her saihng
cannot be absolutely determined, I hope and desire that
you will prolong your stay at Belle Isle as much as
possible, making it not less than an entire week, if you
can do so Avith safety and hear nothing of your consort.
As it is barely possible that the Stonewall may get off
sooner than we anticipate, and may arrive at Quiberon
Bay, Belle Isle, at an earlier date than we have supposed,
I think it best for you not to cruise many hours off
Ushant. Perhaps you might just lose a night there.
When you have remained at, or off. Belle Isle for a week,
it has been arranged for you to proceed to the bay of
Angra in the island of Terceira, where you will please
remain on some reasonable pretence a fcAV days, and then,
should your hear nothing of the Stoneicall, proceed to
Bermuda, where I Avill have letters awaiting you with
further advice, and notice of her movements. . . . You
know that the United States ship A^iagara is now at
Dover, waiting, I fear, to intercept your ship. I offer
no suggestion on this point, because you will knoAV how
to give her the slip Avhen you get to sea, far better than
I can point out the method to you fi-om the land. . . .
I am aware that you are actuated by the same desire for

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 93
the success of this expedition as I am, or as any other
Southerner can be, and AAdien }ou have sailed I shall
await the result with hopeful confidence'
The officers and men from the Jiapj/ahannock, after
arrival at Gravesend on the morning of January llth,
were taken on board the City of RichjiKuul by Lieutenant
33". F. Carter, Avho was sent to meet them on landino-,
and Lieutenants Shryock and Read also found their
way safely on board, and Davidson put to sea that
afternoon, but was forced to seek shelter under Cherboura- o
breakAvater fi-om a heaA-y gale, which he prudently
declined to face in the Bay of Biscay Avith his small
and heavily weighted paddle-steamer. He Avrote me
fi-om Cherbourg on the 13th : —
' It was indeed most lucky that I determined to come
doAvn Channel on the French coast, for the steamer
would have suffered on the Enghsh side from the
heavy sea, besides Avhich, I might have been forced into
one of the harbours on that side. Your officers and
men are all A-ery manageable, and avc get on very well.
The chances are now that this part of the expedition is
all right.'
The gale which droA-e Davidson into Cherbourg
proved to be one of those prolonged winter tempests
which often vex the British Channel at that season, and
he did not get away until the 18th. He wrote just at
starting to report progress, and said : ' The crew are a
splendid-looking set of fellows. We are rather croAvded,
125 on board all told, and the men must be somewhat
uncomfortable, but we manage very well.' Meanwhile
Page was doing his best to get the ram through the
Cattegat, in spite of much bad Aveather and frequent
snowstorms. Carter wrote from Belle Isle on the 25th January,

94 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
thus : — ' We left Niewe Diep at noon on the 20th instant,
discharged Dutch pilot into a fishing boat off Dungeness
on the 21st at 10 a.m., and steamed down Channel Avith
light wind and smooth sea. After passing Ushant on
the 23rd and hauling up south-east for the rendezvous,
the wind freshened to a gale, and quite a sea right
ahead. Strange to say, we shipped only spray, which
must be owing to her having lightened forward, Avith
having used coal from forAvard.' Coming through the
North Sea the little ship was well-nigh smothered, and
it was natural that the improved buoyancy should be
comforting and satisfactory. It appears from Carter's
letter that with the good weather in the Enghsh Channel
they were able to make for three days an average speed
of nine knots instead of the stipulated eight, and thus
recovered some of the loss from detention and head
Avind. The meeting of the two vessels at the rendezvous and
their departure are thus described by DaAddson, in a
letter from Funchal, 3Iadeira, dated ' Februarv 6th,
1865':— ' I left Cherbourg 18th January, and carried out
instructions on the Avay to Quiberon, where we found a
snug anchorage on the 20th, and laid quietly, permitting
no communication Avith the shore until the morning of
the 24th at 10 o'clock, when the Stoneirall hove in sight,
to the rapturous delight of all Avho were in the secret.'
After explaining the reasons why the Stonewall did
not receive the quantity of coal intended for her, and
Avhich should have been sent out from St. Nazaire, he
proceeds thus : —
'She' (the Stonewall) 'Avas in a filthy condition,
and required more labour to clean her than to get the
stores on board and stoAved afterAvards. The Aveather

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 95
was very bad and wet, too, and prevented us from lying
alongside. It was therefore hard to Avork satisfactorily.
However, on the 28th January, early, the barometer
rising and the weather promising well, the Stoneirall and
this vessel left the bay and soon ran out of sight of land,
going nine and ten knots, for San Miguel. It blew a
gale at times, Avith as heaA-y a sea as I haA^e ever seen.
The Stonewall would often ship immense seas, they
seeming at times to cover her from knight-heads to
taffirad, but yet she ne\-er seemed to be injuriously
affected by them, but would keep her course very
steadily. On the morning of the 30th January, after a
most uneasy night, we became separated about five
miles, this ship haA-ing forged ahead, and being afraid
to run off in such a heaA-y sea. About noon, however,
it moderated for a while, and the barometer rising
steadily, we kept away and ran down to her, signalling,
" How do you do ?" Answer, " All right." This was
so satisfactory that I signalled " Shall I go on ?"
Answer, " Am very short of coals, and must make a
port, Ferrol." Signalled, " Shall I follow you ?"
Answer, " Suit your couA^enience about following." '
Davidson then added that the detention of his ship
had already caused the loss of one moon for running the
blockade, and considering the necessity there was of his
getting to Bermuda quickly in order to save the next
moon, and considering also that it did not appear neces
sary to the safety of the enterprise that he should remain
any longer in company with the Stoneirall, he determined
to part company, and signalled ' Adieu,' which was
answered with ' 3Iany thanks,' and then he says : — ' At
1.30 we parted company, and at 3.30 lost sight of her,
she still heading the sea to the northward and Avest-
ward, facing the gale under easy steam, no doubt waiting

96 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
for the weather to moderate before running doAvn on the
coast of Spain.'
Captain Page also wrote from Isle d'Houat, near
Quiberon, giving a full account of his tedious delays
and the disappointment he felt at not getting a full
supply of coal, but he did not like to wait for the return
of the coal-tender fi-om St. Nazaire. He advised me
that he had taken charge of the ram on behalf of the
Confederate Government, and that 31. Arman's agent,
who was with him, had complied with all engagements
satisfactorily, and was therefore entitled to receive the
stipulated commission for his services. The Danish
crcAV were discharged and sent to St. Nazaire, and the
ram was chartered and commissioned in due form as the
Confederate ship Stonewall.
In the heavy weather after leaAdng Quiberon Bay, the
Stonewall made a good deal of water, and it was thought
that she must have sprung a leak somewhere, but OAving
to the crowded state of the ship a satisfactory examina
tion could not be made. This' apparent defect was an
additional reason for making a harbour, and when the
gale moderated. Page bore up and ran into Corunna, and
the day after arrival there he took the Stonewall across
the bay to Ferrol, 'Avhere all facilities were politely
tendered by the officers of the Naval Arsenal.'
The first advice of the Stonewall fi-om Ferrol Avas
without date, but she arrived there about February 2nd,
and Page soon began to lighten the ship by dischai-ging
some of the heavy Aveights into ' a good di-y hulk,' Avhich
the naval authorities had kindly put at his disposal,
with the purpose of finding the leak. It appears, how
ever, from his correspondence, that the facilities granted
him upon his first application were quickly Avithdrawn.
Writing to me under date of February 7th, he says :—

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 97
' To-day there came oft' an officer to inform me that in
consequence of the protest of tlie American 3linister the
permission to repair damages had been suspended, and
I must restore the things m the liulk to the ship.' Pao-e
added, however, that the commanding officer told him
that his case Avas under consitleration at 3Iadrid, and
that he thought all Avould be right in a fcAV days. In
the end pernussion Avas gi\-en to make all necessary
repairs, but many difficulties AA-ere met with, the autho
rities appearing- to be very desirous to hurry the ship off,
yet not wdling to turn her out of port in an incomplete
state. On the 10th February Page v^-rote that the United
States fidgate Niagara, Captain Tliomas CraA'^en, had
arrived ; and a few da}-s after the United States ship
Sacramento joined the Xiagarn, and both A^essels
anchored at Corunna, about nine miles distance, from
whence they could watch the Stonewall. Their presence.
Page said, gave the Spanish authorities much uneasiness.
It was now manifest that the StonewalVs movements
were knoAvn. The two United States ships at Corunna
would either attack her Avhen she attempted to leave
Ferrol, or they would follow her across the Atlantic.
Besides this, adAdce of her being at sea would be sent to
New York, and preparations would be made by the
United States naval authorities to give her a warm
reception. The leak Avas discovered to be in conse
quence of defective construction in the rudder casing,
and this, together Avith other injuries caused by the
rough handling the ship had encountered during the
tempestuous voyage from Copenhagen, satisfied Page
that the repairs would detain her several weeks at
Ferrol. He took also into consideration the latest news
from America, which appeared to indicate that the South
VOL. II. 36

98 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
could not resist much longer. Finally, he determined
to go to Paris for consultation, and he directed Carter
meanwhile to push on with the repairs. While Page
Avas absent, the Niagara and the Sacramento ran across
the bay from Corunna and anchored at Ferrol. In a
letter reporting the incident, Carter said : —
' We of course got ready for accidents, and in lighting
fires sparks flew from the funnel. In a few minutes a
barge from the navy-yard, with an officer of rank, came
alongside, asking if we meant to attack the Niagara. I
replied that we had no such intention, but purposed to
defend ourselves from an attempt to repeat the affair at
Bahia.* He said, ' This is not Brazil. The Admiral
requests that you Avill let your fires go out, and warns
you against any attempt to break the peace.' Two
guard-boats were also stationed near us, and remained
there every night while the Niagara was in port. How
ever, we kept steam all night, and the chain unshackled,
so as to get the ram pointed fair, in case the Niagara
moved our way.'
It was decided, after consultation with the Confederate
Commissioners, that, in spite of the gloomy prospects
across the Atlantic, no possible effort that could be
made from Europe should be abandoned. Page there
fore returned to Ferrol, with the purpose to pursue his
enterprise, which, I may just say in brief phrase, AA-as to
go to Bermuda, get some additional ordnance stores and
a few picked men from the Florida Avaiting there for
him, and then attempt to strike a blow- at Port Royal,
Avhich was then supposed to be the base of General
Sherman's adA-ance through South Carolina.
3"exatious delays detained the Stoneirall at Ferrol
* This Avas an allusion to tho capture of the Florida at Bahia by
the United States ship Waehmett-

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 99

until 31 arch 24th, Avhen Page got to sea. The United
States ships Niagara and Sacramento had manifested
CA'ery purpose to folloAV and attack the Stoneirall Avlien
she left Ferrol. The Niagara Avas a large, poAverful
fi-igate, mounting ten 150-pounder Parrot rifled guns;
and the Sacramento Avas a corvette, very lieaAdly armed
for her class, the principal pieces being two 11 -inch and
tw-o 9-inch guns. The Niagara was also a ship of great
speed, and could easily have kept clear of the Stone
wall'. s dangerous beak. The Stonewall was protected by
4f-inch armour, and mounted one 300-pounder and two
70-pounder Armstrong guns ; but she Avas a small ship
and low in the water, and the Niagaras battery could
have commanded her decks. Page, being quite sure
that he would be followed out and attacked as soon as
he had passed the line of Spanish jurisdiction, cleared
for action before getting under weigh, in full sight of the
two L'nited States ships. The upper spars, to the loAver
masts, were struck and stowed on deck, and the boats
were detached from the davits.
In this trim the Stoneirall steamed out of Ferrol on
the moming of 3Iarch 24th, 1865, accompanied by a
large Spanish steam-frigate. At about three miles
from the shore the frigate fired a gun, and returned
to Ferrol. The Stonewall then stood off and on all the
remainder of the day, Avith her colours flying, in plain
view of the two United States vessels, which remained
at anchor. Carter, in a letter, says : — ' We could see
the officers standing in the Niagara's tops using spy
glasses.' At dark the Stoneirall .stood close in to the entrance
of the harbour, and then, being satisfied that the enemy
did not intend to come out and fight. Page bore aw^ay
and steamed down the coast to Lisbon, where he arrived
36—2

100 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
in due course, the Niagara arriving about thirty-six
hours after him. ,
Commenting upon the failure of the Niagara and
Sacramento to follow the Stonewall and attack her. Page
Avrote me from Lisbon as foUoAvs : — -' This w-ill doubtless
seem as inexplicable to you as it is to me, and to all of
us. To suppose that those tAA-o heavily armed men-of-
Avar were afraid of the Stoneirall is to me incredible, yet
the fact of their conduct was such as I have stated to
you. Finding that they declined coming out, there was
no course for me but to pursue my voyage.'
Captain Thomas Craven, who commanded the A^zV/^/^ra,
Avas not the officer who is mentioned in another chapter
as the commander of the United States ship Tuscarora,
and who had a correspondence with the GoA^ernor of Gib
raltar in respect to the Confederate ship Sumter. Cap
tain Thomas Craven Avas an elder brother of the latter-
named officer. His conduct m making so much parade
of a purpose to stop the Stonewall, and the subsequent
failure to accept her invitation to come out and eno-ao-e
her, was a good deal criticized at the time. I haA^e no
means of knoAving w^hat explanation of his conduct he
made to his OAvn Government, and I should be sorry to
repeat any of the gossip of the period which might
suggest a slur upon his courage. His reputation in the
United States navy, Avhile I held a commission in that
service, Avas such as to place him above any suspicion.
He was certainly an able and efficient ofhcer, and I
mention the incident Avith the Stonewall as an historical
fact, and Avithout the slightest purpose to cast an im
putation upon his memory.
At Lisbon Page Avas made to feel that he was the
representatiA'e of a losing cause. He Avas permitted to
get a supply of coal, but it was manifest that the

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 101
authorities Avished him clear of the port, lie got away
as soon as possible, proceeded to Santa Cruz, in the island
of Teneriffe, replenished his fuel there, and thence stood
doAA-n mto the north-east Trades. On April 25th he
hauled up for Bermuda, but encountered north-Avest
AAdnds and heaA-A- head swell immediatelv after leavino-
the Trade winds, and being in rather short supply of
coal, he shaped his course for Xassau, arriving there
3Iay 6th. From Xassau he proceeded to HaA^ana.
At the time of Page's arriA-al at HaA^ana the AA-ar Avas
practically at an end. In a few days he learned of
General Lee's surrender, and soon after ofthe capture of
3Ir. DaAds. 3Ianifestly he could now venture upon no
offensive operation. The small amount of funds he
took from Ferrol was exhausted. Major Helm, the
Confederate agent, could do nothing for him in that
way. The position Avas perplexing, and quite excep
tional. As a last resource, negotiations were opened
with the Cuban authorities for the surrender of the ship
to them, if they would advance the money necessary to
pay off the crew.
Y'hen it Avas knoAvn through a resident merchant that
the Captain-General was willing to make the necessary
advance and take the ship. Carter was sent to state the
requirements and get the money, and his brief report of
the interview was as follows : —
' After fiA-e minutes' conversation, the Captain -General
asked what sum we required. I said " $16,000." He
said, ' Say $100,000." I replied that my orders were
to ask for $16,000. He then turned to an official at a
desk and bid him write, continued asking questions,
and when the document was handed to him for perusal,
he looked at me again and said, " Shall Ave make it

102 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
$50,000 ?" But I obeyed orders, and $16,000 was
ordered to be paid.'
Upon the receipt of the money. Page ' paid off the
crew to May 19th, 1865, and delivered the Stonewall into
the hands of the Captain -General of Cuba.' In July,
1865, she was delivered to the Government of the
United States, and the conditions of the surrender are
set out in the annexed correspondence between the
Spanish 3Iinister at Washington and 3Ir. Seward, the
United States Secretary of State. She Avas subsequently
sold by the United States to the Government of Japan.
It may be thought by those who are inclined to be
severely critical that, in the arrangements for despatching
the City of Richmond, some liberty Avas taken with the
municipal law of England, and that there was some
violation of her neutral territory. Scarcely anyone,
however, will maintain that the shipment of arms by
the steamer was illegal ; and the officers and men from
Calais were unarmed, in plain clothes, AACre not above
an hour upon English soil, and merely passed across
a minute portion of English territory as ordinary
travellers. If it is possible to construe those movements
as an offence, it cannot be said that her 3Iajesty's
Government Avas in any degree chargeable with neglect,
because neither the Customs nor police authorities could
have knoAvn of the purpose in advance, and could not
therefore have made any arrangements to stop it, even if
the state ofthe laAV Avould haA-e justified mterference.
At Calais, however, the conditions Avere A\-holly
different. A Confederate man-of-Avar was lying at that
port. She was in a dock near the railway-station, and
could be seen by every passenger en route fi-om London
to Paris in the daily mail trains. Officers in the Con
federate uniform Avalked her quarter-deck, the Confederate

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 103
flag Avas hoisted and struck morning and evening, and
all the routine and etiquette was preserved on board of
her that is commonly practised in national ships lying
in the dockyards of their own countries. Her presence
Avas permitted by the French authorities, and she was
openly used as a depot ship, because no disguise was
possible. 3Ien were collected on board of her and after
wards distributed to the Florida and other vessels on
prevdous occasions, and she was used in the same manner
to supply the wants of the Stonewall. If there was any
violation of French neutrality, it was done with the tacit
consent of the Imperial authorities, and Avithout greater
concealment than is practised in all well regulated busi
ness transactions. No information Avas asked, and none
was offered.
The L'nited States urgently pressed at Geneva the
charge that Great Britain had been both lax in her
neutral duties and partial towards the Confederate
States, and commended the rigid exactness of France.
The foregoing are some of the facts which may serve to
illustrate the true attitude of those two neutral Powers,
and may help those Avho are still interested in the
subject to determine the foundation upon which the
' Alabama Claims ' were based.
THE SUEEENDER OF THE STONEWALL.
The foUowing is the text of the correspondence between the
United States Government and the Spanish Minister at "Wash
ington, in reference to the Stonewall :
Mr. Tassara to Mr. Seward.
Washington, July lith, 1865.
The undersigned, Minister Plenipotentiary of her CathoHc Majesty,
has the honour to bring to the knowledge of the honourable the
Secretary of State, that, agreeably to official communications which

104 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
he has received from Madrid, the order has been given to the
Captain-General of Cuba to deliver the war-vessel Stonewall to the
person whom the Government of the United States may commission,
the due formalities intervening. In thus acting, the Government of
her Majesty judges that the reasons adduced in the note of the
30th of May last are not sufficient to found the right of revindica
tion which that of the United States beUeves it has over the fore-
mentioned vessel. Animated, nevertheless, by the same noble and
loyal sentiments which it has shown during the four years of the
war happily terminated in this country, it omits entering into a
discussion without object, and the Stonewall is placed at the disposal
of the Government of the United States. With reference to the
security for the expenses to the commander of the Stonewall of
$16,000, which sum, having been considered as the sole and special
cause of the surrender of the vessel, it is to be believed that the
Government of the United States will not refuse to reimburse ; it
being understood, nevertheless, that this is not a condition for the
delivery of the Stonewall, which delivery is and must be considered
absolutely unconditional. The undersigned avails himself of this
occasion to reiterate to the honourable Secretary of State the
assurance of his highest consideration. Gabriel G. Tassara
To the Hon. the Secretary of State
of the United States.
Mr. Seaa'Ard to Mr, Tassara.
Department of State, Washington, July \~th, 1S65.
The undersigned Secretary of State of the United States has the
honour to acknowledge the receipt of a note which was addressed to
him on the 14th instant by Mr. Tassara, Minister Plenipotentiary
to the Queen of Spain. In that note Mr. Tassara informs the
undersigned that her Catholic Majesty has ordered that the armed
steamer Stonewall, which has been the subject of previous corre
spondence between the two countries, shall be delivered up to the
Government of the United States, and that this decision has been
made with a waiver of discussion upon the question whether the
demand of the United States for the surrender could be maintained
upon strict principles of international law. Mi-. Tassara has been
pleased also to assure the undei-signed that the surrender has been
ordered on the ground of the mutual good-Avill Avhich has happily

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 105
prevailed between the two countries during the period of the insur
rection which has heretofore greatl}- disturbed tho relations of the
United .States Avith many of the foreign Powers. The undersigned is
still further infoi-med that while Spain will recei\o from tho United
States, as they heretofore oftorod to paj', an indemnity of $16,000,
the amount of the expenses Avhich the Captain-General of Cuba
incurred in obtaining possession of the Stonewall, yet the surrender
is tendered without making it dependent on such reimbursement as a
condition. Mr. Tassara's communication has been submitted to the
President of the United States, and the undersigned has now the
pleasui-e to inform !Mr. Tassai-a that orders will be promptly given
for the bringing away of the Stonewall from Havana, and the reim
bursement of the sum of 816,000 to the Spanish Government. It
only remains to be added that this Government appreciates equally
the promptness, the UberaHty, and the com'tesy which have marked
the proceedings of her Catholic Majesty's Government on this
interesting subject, and that the proceedings will have a strong
tendency to confirm and perpetuate the ancient and traditional
friendship of the two nations.
The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to offer Mr.
Tassara renewed assurance of his highest consideration.
William H. Seward.
To Senor Don Gabriel Garcia y Tassara,
Minister Plenipotentiary, etc.

106 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

CHAPTER IIL
Jubilation in the United States at the loss of the Alc(hama. —
Admiral Farragut's criticism on the action. — The moral law
inoperative in time of war. — The United States and privateer
ing. — United States precedents favourable to the Confederates. —
Difficulty of settling the affairs of the Alabama and supplying her
place. — The Sea King, afterwards the Shenandoah. — Correspondence
respecting the Shenandoah and the Laurel, Avith the instructions to
the officers concerned. — Smallness of the crew of the Shenandoah.
— Volunteers from her prizes. — Her cruise amongst the whalers. —
Means taken to stop her proceedings at the end of the Civil War.
— Her return to Liverpool and delivery to the United States
representatives.- — Loyalty of the crews of the Confederate cruisers.
— Inactivity of the United States Navy. — Summary of the injury
done to American commerce by the cruisers.
When the Alabama! s graceful bends and the supporting
timbers were torn and shattered by the great 11 -inch
shells of the Kearsarge, and the famous httle craft settled
down to the bottom of the English Channel with much
gurglmg of water through her riven sides, and a great
sigh as the Avind escaped fi-om her open hatchways, there
was much jubilation among ' loyal ' Americans. The
despatches of 31r. Seward, the reports of 3Ir. Adams, the
exultant congratulations exchanged by members of the
United States Consular corps, the comments of the
Northern press Avhich immediately followed that sea-
fight off Cherbourg when its result was known, appear

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 107
to have been out of all proportion to the magnitude of the
struggle and the national glory Avhich can be claimed for
the victory.
That the merchants of New- York and l)Oston should
have proved unable to suppress their exuberant delight,
is not perhaps surprising, because a Confederate cruiser
roving at Avill upon the high seas meant loss of trade and
high premiums, and her destruction held out a faint
promise of relief from loss, and a restoration of com
mercial profits and prestige. But the excitement was
not confined to the mercantile classes, nor was the
stimulus to 3Ir. ScAvard's acrid temper and pungent pen
the only effect. Captain Winslow's achicA-ement aroused
the ardour and animated the patriotism of the United
States NaA-y in an extraordinary degree. Even Admiral
Fan-agut. calm as he generally was, and capable of daring
and skilful effort, lost for a brief time at least the accu
rate poise of his judgment, and was so completely aroused
by the general enthusiasm as to be entrapped into
that popular style of expressing delight at a triumph,
which was commonly practised by the majority of the
' Union commanders ' and the ' loyal press.' Writing
to his son* on July 20th, 1864, the gallant Admiral
says : —
' The -victory of the I{earsarge over the Alabama raised
me up. I would sooner have fought that fight than any
ever fought on the ocean. Only think ! it was fought
like a tournament, in full view of thousands of French
and English, Avith a perfect confidence on the part of all
but the Union people that we Avould be whipped.
People came from Paris to witness the fight. Why,
my poor little good-for-nothing Hatteras would have
* See ' Life and Letters of Admiral D. G. Farragut,' by his son,
Loyall Farragut, p. 403.

108 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
whipped her (the Alabama) in fifteen minutes, but for
an unlucky shot in her boiler. She struck the Alabama
two shots for one while she floated. Winslow had my
first-lieutenant of the Hartford, Thornton, in the K^ear-
sarge. He is as braA'e as a lion, and as cool as a parson.
I go for Winslow's promotion.'
At the date of the above letter the Admiral was lying
off Mobile in command of a powerful fleet, composed of
fourteen wooden ships and four 31onitors, which formed
his line of battle in the attack upon the Confederate
defences a few days afterwards, and six or eight gun
boats besides. He was naturally in a martial and com
bative humour ; but the criticism upon the action off
Cherbourg breakwater appears to be rather overdrawn
and unprofessional.
As a matter of fact, not a score of people knew from
a Confederate source that the eno^ao^ement would take
place, or when, and the ' thousands of French and
English ' who are said to have Avitnessed it, must haA-e
been either the floating and idle population of a seaport,
the majority of Avhom probably did not know one ship
from the other, or they were persons who got their
information from the United States Consul, and who
AA-ere therefore hopeful, if not confident, that the Kear
sarge would win. There Avere a few naval officers who
went to the best points of observation with the expecta
tion that there would be an opportunity to take some
interesting and useful notes ; but as the ships steamed
aAvay fi-om the land some seven miles* to get Avell
beyond the ' line of jurisdiction ' before the action began,
but little of the effect could have been seen. The
* Captain 3Vinslow says seven miles. The estimate of Semmes
and his officers was that the action was fought nine miles from
Cherbourg.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 109
allusion to the Hatteras, and the hypothetical prediction
that she ' Avould haA-e AA'hipped the Alabama in fifteen
minutes, but for an unlucky sliot in her bt)iler,' can
hardly be considered as a tair — it certainly is not a judi
cious — professional criticism, the simple fiicts being that
the fire of the Confederate ship reduced her adversary to
a sinking state m /cx.v than fifteen minutes, Avhile slie
herself received so little injury from ' the tAvo shots for
one ' fired at, but apparently not into her by the
Hatteras. that she Avould not liaA-e gone into port except
for the necessity of landing the prisoners Avhich she
picked up out of the water, without leaAdng a man of
them to droAvn.
Semmes made no pretence of having performed a
great na\'al exploit in sinking the Hatteras, and Lieu
tenant - Commander Blake was in no Avay disgraced
by his defeat ; but any fair and competent naval
critic will admit that when one ship sinks another in
thirteen minutes in a night engagement, and handles
her boats so well as to pick up all hands, the feat is
creditable to the Adctor. The Kearsarge practised upon
the Alabama, for about one hour and ten minutes,
AAdth two 11-inch pivot-guns, tAvo 32-pounders, and a
28-pounder rifled gun, in broad daylight and smooth
water, before placing her hors de combat ; and Avhen
the latter ship foundered, so slowly that there Avas time
to get all of her own wounded into a boat, the remainder
of her crcAv would have drowned if it had not been for
the fortunate proximity of an English yacht and two
French fishing-smacks.
If there was either rhyme or reason in suggesting an
hypothesis, I might say that it is far more likely that
the Alabama Avould have ' Avhipped ' the Kearsarge in
fifteen minutes if the 100-pounder shell had exploded

no TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
in the latter's stern-post,* than that the Hatteras would
have inflicted that punishment upon the Alabama if she
had not received the ' unlucky shot in her boiler.'
The wreck 'of the Alabama lies at the bottom of the
' silver streak ' which separates England and France.
The remains of the Hatteras are rusting many fathoms
down in the briny waters of the Gulf of 3Iexico. These
are the facts which impartial history has already re
corded, and no suggestions of what might, could, or
should have been can bring those tAvo A^essels again to
the surface.
It does not appear to have occurred to Admiral
Farragut that by depreciating the Alabama he was cast
ing ridicule upon the excessive jubilation over the per
formance of the Ivearsarge. If his ' poor little good-for-
nothing Hatteras ' could haA^e ' whipped the Alabama in
fifteen minutes,' it is difficult to perceiA^e the ground for
setting so high an estimate upon Winslow's exploit
Avith the Kearsarge, seeing that he took about four and
a half times as long to effect the same purpose. There
are many men whose temperaments are so ardent and
whose imaginations are so actiA-e, that neither their
tongues nor pens can be kept within the limits of a plain
story, or a reasonable impartial and judicious criticism ;
but when a man has had a half- century's experience of
naval life, and can say, in the Avords of an old sea-song —
' For forty long years
I've ploughed the salt ocean.
And served my full time
In a man-of-war shiji,'
it is disappointing to find a chance and inconsiderate
burst of feeling, Avhich he has accidentally let slip in an
* See account of the engagement, vol. i., p. 284.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. Ill
unguarded moment, formally set out in print as his
estimate of a sea-fiwfit.
In fact. Captain 3Vinslow appears fi-om the records to
haA-e been the onl}- person in the United States avIio was
content to look upon liis victor}- in a moderate and
modest temper. It Avas a spirited and creditable exploit,
for which he was justly entitled to commendation, and
even to a step in rank, but that it Avas in any Avay
remarkable, Avhen compared AAdth many other engage
ments between single slups Avhich are doubtless fresh
in the memories of naA-al men, and others Avho are
famihar Avith naval history, Avill hardly be seriously con
tended. The exultation produced throughout the United States
by the destruction of the Alabama, and the vituperative
lancruage in which all who were thought to have con-
tributed to her origin and career, either by active effort
or by failure to restrain her moA^ements, Avere denounced,
must be regarded as the measure of the menace she was
to the safety of American commerce, and the ruin she
inflicted upon it, according to the estimate of the in
terested parties, namely, those who suffered by her so-
called depredations. The manifest effect which the
appearance upon the sea of a few Confederate cruisers
created upon the enemy, and the large additional in
crease of the Avar expenditure of the United States which
they made necessary, was a justification for the policy
of putting them afloat, and Avas an unintentional, although
a very practical, panegjndc upon the perseverance,.
energy, and judgment of their commanders.
The news of the sea-fight off Cherbourg and its un
happy result reached Richmond through tlie lines of the
opposing armies in 3^irginia before the official report
found access through a blockaded port, and Mr. Secretary

112 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Mallory, in a despatch dated Richmond, July 18th,
1864, Avrote me as follows : — ' The loss of the Alabama
Avas announced in the Federal papers Avith all the mani
festations of joy Avhich usually usher the news of great
national victories, showing that the calculating enemy
fully understood and appreciated the importance of her
destruction. You must supply her place if possible, a
measure which, important in itself, the information con
veyed by your letter above referred to renders of para
mount importance.'* In a subsequent despatch on the
subject, 3Ir. 3Iallory wrote as folio avs : — ' The blows of
our cruisers have destroyed the foreign trade of the
enemy, and given great discouragement to Ins whale
fisheries, the tonnage of Avhich has declined to its hmit
of 1 840, Avhile our naval operations here, including the
construction of a few ironclads, have constrained him to
add at least a hundred millions to his expenditure to
meet them.'
There can be no doubt that the destruction of unarmed
and peaceful merchant ships, while quietly pursuino-
their voyages on the high seas, is a practice not defensible
upon the principles of the moral laAV ; and it does not in
these modern times harmonize with the general senti
ments of commercial nations. At an early period of the
Avar I found occasion to call the attention of the Secretary
ofthe Navy to the subject, in a despatch treating especially
of the anticipated cruises of the Florida and Alabama;
and in that despatch I reported as folloAvs : — • The feelino-
everywhere in Europe is strongly against the destruc
tion of private property at sea, Avhich cannot alAvays be
identified as that of your enemy. The Harvey Birch
* The letter referred to Avas a report from me in reference to the
action of the French Imperial Government withdraAving the permit
to build ships in France.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 113
turns out to have been owned (in part at least) bA' a Avarm
sympathizer with our cause, and the cruise ofthe Swnfcr,
although evincing great energy skill, and tact on the
part of Captain Semmes, has resulted in no profit, but,
on the contrary, has tended to excite some feeling against
us among the commercial classes in Europe.'
The individual members of the Government at Rich
mond no doubt held opinions on the above subject which
were in harmony AAdth the common sentiment of Europe ;
and if in matters of State pohcy, and under pressure of
gi-eat political convulsions, the application of the moral
law could be regulated upon the principles which should
be paramount in the personal relations among men, they
would have been happy to spare the commerce of the
United States, and the peaceful trader would have been
left to pursue his commercial A-oyages without fear or
molestation. But no one Avill pretend that Cabinets
and 3Iinisters in their collective capacities can act under
the same restraints of conscience or of law as control
the conduct of indiAdduals in their personal intercourse
-with each other ; and when two nations unhappily fall
out and go to war, the Government of each does its best
to inflict the greatest possible amount of injury upon
the other, on the principle that the more burdensome
and afliicting the state of war can be made to the opposing
party, the more quickly Avill he consent to terms of
peace. The proposition that Governments cannot, or at least
do not, apply the moral law under the restraints which
check and control private action, needs only to be stated.
No practical man who has read history, or observed the
conduct of Governments, Avill require any demonstration.
It was true in Pagan times, when the Romans carried
the war into Carthage, and in Christian times, when the
VOL. II. 37

114 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Government at Washington permitted General Sheridan
to burn every corn-mill and destroy CA-ery blade of
corn in the Shenandoah valley because it was supposed
to be the granary of the Confederate army, notwith
standing hundreds of women and children Avere thus
left to suffer and well-nigh to starve. It was equally
true when the German armies swept up every article of
food and every bottle of wine in their victorious march
through the ' pleasant land of France.' It had its last
exposition in the bombardment of Alexandria by the
British fleet ; and the distinction between the private
interpretation of the moral law and its application by a
responsible Government has been expounded by the
Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone, the Prime 3Iuiister
of England, Avith special reference to the demohtion of
the Alexandrian forts and the invasion of Eg}'pt by the
orders of that Cabinet of which he is the chief, at a time
Avhen, according to his own statement, there was no
war between the respective countries.
The diplomatic correspondence of the LTnited States
during the Civil War teems with denunciatory assaults
upon the Confederate Government for attacking their
commerce. The Alabama, Florida, etc., are invariably
called 'piratical cruisers,' and thefr commanders 'pu-ates.'
The destruction of American ships at sea was described
by Mr. Seward, Mr. Adams, and the Consuls, as being
opposed to the sentiments of ' civilized and commercial
nations,' as 'unauthorized acts of Adolence upon the
ocean,' as the indulgence ' of a purely partisan malice,'
as ' barbarous acts,' ' malicious and piratical,' etc.
When these fierce denunciations were made current
through the Parliamentary Papers Avhich Avere issued
from time to time, the British public began to refi-esh
their historical reminiscences, and they soon learned that

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 11.5
the Confederate States were onlv conforinino- to a mode
of aggTessiA-e Avarfare invariably practised by the United
States themselves m their former a\ ars, and from the
discussions and comments Avhich frequently appeared in
the daily press, they learned that the Great Powers who
took part in Avhat is called ' The Declaration of Paris of
1856,' proposed to abandon the belligerent right of
search at sea, and to abolish privateering, but the United
States declined to join in the declaration.
In point of fact, the Great PoAvers in the Declaration
of Paris agreed to four propositions, which were in effect
as follows : — Free ships should make free goods ; neutral
property, except contraband of war, should be free from
confiscation when found on board of an enemy's ship ;
privateering should be abolished, and efficiency should
be necessary in order to legalize a blockade. The United
States were invited to assent to the foregoing proposi
tions, but declined to accept the abolition of privateering
unless the Powers would agree to a further stipulation
excepting all priA-ate property from capture on the high
seas. The counter-proposal of the United States was
not acted upon.
At a very early date after the beginning of the CiAdl
War, the Government at Washington reopened negotia
tions Avith her 31ajesty's Government with reference to
the foregoing propositions, and proposed to accept them
unconditionally. The United States would not agree to
the abohtion of privateering when it was first proposed,
unless they could secure all private property from the
liability to capture on the high seas by national men-of-
war as well by private cruisers. This was an intelli
gible course at the time, because the United States had
a very small navy, but had facilities for covering the
sea Avith privateers, and if the right to employ them was
37—2

116 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
surrendered, they would be at a great disadvantage in
a war with one of the great naval PoAvers, and it was
reasonable that they should claim the exemption of
private property from capture as a counterpoise. When,
however, the Civil War began, the United States per
ceived the danger to their own commerce from possible
Confederate privateers, and knowing that their own
regular naval force was greater than any the Confederacy
would be able to oppose to it, they Avere vsdlling to join
in the Declaration of Paris, pure and simple ; but the
negotiations did not come to any definite result.
The British pubhc learned the foregoing facts, and
they learned also that during the American 33^ar of In
dependence, and to a much greater extent during the
Avar of 1812-15, the cruisers of the United States were
repeatedly and specifically ordered to destroy British
merchant ships at sea, and not attempt to bring them
into port. In face of these facts, Avhich the over-astute
diplomacy of 3Ir. Seward either suppressed or at least
ignored, the European sentiment in respect to the action
of the Confederate Government was gradually modified,
until at last public opinion settled down to the very
general behef that the United States had no sort of
justification for their complaints and denunciations, and
that, as between the two belhgerents, the Confederates
were practising a perfectly lawful and justifiable mode
of harassing their enemy, and adding to the cost and
burden of the war Avhich was beino- Avaged asfainst them
and the violent interference Avith their claim to self-
government. It is generally knoAvn that some months afta' the end
of the war, the late Admiral Semmes, although a paroled
prisoner, was arrested at his house in Mobile, and carried
to Washington, under military guard. He was held in

CONFEDERA TE ST A TES IX E UNO PE. 117
confinement there for some time, and the purpose was to
institute criminal proceedings against liiin Avith reference
to his acts while in command of the Sumter and Alabama.
The civil authorities at AVashington seemed A-ery de-
su-ous to discover a plea by which they might sustain
the charge of piracy so often hurled at him during his
cruises, but they happily perceived in time the wicked
ness of such a proceeding, and they caught a glimpse of
the ridicule and contempt it would have aroused in
Europe, and the purpose was abandoned.
About that time, 3Ir. John A. Bolles, the Solicitor to
the NaA-y Department of the United States, published an
article in the Atlantic Monthly, under the title of ' Why
Semmes of the Alabama was not tried.' Mr. Bolles
cites Cooper's ' Naval History ' to prove that during the
' Revolutionary War ' many British vessels were cap
tured by Colonial cruisers and destroyed at sea. Referring
to the history and policy of the United States during the
war with England, commonly called the ' War of 1812,'
he says : — ' Not less than seventy-four British merchant
men were captured, and destroyed as soon as captured,
under express instructions from the Navy Department,
and in pursuance of a deliberate purpose and plan, with
out any attempt or intent to send or bring them in as
prizes for adjudication. The orders of the Department
upon this subject are numerous, emphatic, and carefully
prepared. They deserve to be studied and remembered,
and they effectually silence all American right or dis
position to complain of Semmes for having imitated our
example in obedience to similar orders from the Secretary
of the Confederate Navy.'
3Ir. Bolles gives copious extracts from the orders
issued to Captains Charles Stewart of the Constitution
and Charles Morris of the Congress, to Commandants

118 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Blakely, Warrington, Parker, Creighton, and other
officers in command of United States ships. A few will
answer the present purpose.
' The great object,' says one of the orders, ' is the de
struction ofthe commerce ofthe enemy, and the bringing
into port the prisoners, in order to exchange against our
unfortunate countrymen who may fall into his hands.
You will therefore man no prize unless the value, place
of capture, and other faA^ourable circumstances shall
render safe arrival morally certain. You will not agree
to the ransoming of any prize,' etc. Another says : —
' You Avill, therefore, unless in some extraordinary cases
that shall clearly Avarrant an exception, destroy all you
capture ; and by thus retaining your crew and con
tinuing your cruise, your services may be enhanced
ten-fold.' Again : — ' Your oavii sound judgment and
observation will sufficiently demonstrate to you how
extremely precarious and injurious is the attempt to send
in a prize, unless taken very near a friendly port and
under the most favourable circumstances. . . . Pohcy,
interest, and duty combine to dictate the destruction of
all captures, with the above exceptions.'
One of the extracts contained in 3Ir. Bolles' article is
strikingly pertinent. It is as follows : — ' A single
cruiser, if ever so successful, can man but a few prizes,
and every prize is a diminution of her force ; but a single
cruiser destroying every captured vessel has the capacity
of continuing, in full \dgour, her destructive power so
long as her provisions and stores can be replenished,
either from friendly ports or from the vessels captured.
. . . Thus has a single cruiser, upon the destructive
plan, the power perhaps of twenty acting upon pecuniary
views alone . . . and thus may the eniplo}mient of our
small force in some degree compensate for the great

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 119
inequality (of our force) compared with that of the
enemy.' 3Ir. Bolles comments upon the policy of the United
States, and the orders issued to their men-of-war, in the
following words : — ' Such Avere the pohcy and the orders
of President 3Iadison and of the Secretary of the Navy
in 1812, 1813, 1814; and such, beyond question, would
be the plan and the instructions of any Administration
under the circumstances.'
The foregoing extracts, taken from among those cited
by 3Ir. Bolles, clearly indicate the policy of the United
States when they were at war with Great Britain.*
That policy was most dehberate and determined, and the
orders were exphcit to destroy — destroy — destroy. In
comparing the practice of the United States in 1812-15
with that of the Confederate States in 1862-65, it is
important to consider the difference between the two
Governments in respect to the possession of open ports.
Great Britain was never able to keep a blockading force
at all points of the American coast, and there were a
good many ports to which there was easy access at all
times. With the Confederacy the position was very different.
There are, to begin Avith, very few deep-water ports along
the coast-line of the Southern States, into which large
prizes could have been taken, and those soon fell into
possession of the United States forces, or were effectively
sealed against entry except by SAvift steamers especially
designed for blockade -running. The United States
therefore adopted as a deliberate policy the practice of
destroying their prizes, whereas the Confederate States
* Copious extracts from Mr. Bolles' article appear in Sir A. Cock-
"bum's review of the Geneva Arbitration, and the above extracts are
taken from that source.

120 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
were compelled to permit the destruction of captures by
their cruisers because there were no home ports to which
they could have been taken. I can state without hesi
tation or reserve that the destruction of prizes by the
Alabama and other Confederate cruisers was not 'm
pursuance of a deliberate purpose or plan.' Captain
Semmes sent nearly all of the prizes made at the begin
ning of his cruise in the Sumter into neutral ports — for
example, into Cienfugos, on the south side of Cuba — and
he addressed several clear and ably written appeals to
the authorities at that and other places for permission
to leave the captured vessels, as it were, in safe deposit,
and in the interest of whoever it might concern, untd
they could be properly adjudicated. His object, and
that of the Confederate Government, was to give neutrals
who might have property on board the prizes the oppor
tunity to prove their title, and thus to escape from the
consequences of their own indiscretion in shipping their
goods under a belligerent flag. The neutral PoA\'ers
were unanimous in excluding prizes fi-om their ports on
any plea, and thus every expedient by which the im
mediate destruction of captured vessels might have been
avoided was prohibited to the commanders of the Con
federate cruisers, and they were compelled to bm-n or
scuttle the enemy's ships on the high seas, often much
to their regret.
Copies of the orders issued to the captains of the
United States ships during the war with Great Britain
were accessible to Mr. Seward, and the ' deliberate pur
pose and plan ' pursued by the Government of the
United States in reference to the destruction of British
ships must have been knoAvn to him ; but he manifested
his characteristic hardihood in AAdlfully discarding- or
ignoring every precedent which could be alleged against

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. UI
his own claims and pretensions, or Avhich could be urged
in justification of his opponents. The brusque dis
ingenuous diplomacy of 3Ir. ScAvard often did more to
arouse sympathy for the South, and toleration for the
acts of the Confederate Government, than any amount
of ai-gument in their favour could have effected, and
when the British public saAv the commotion AA^hich the
Alabama and her consorts created, and Avere reminded
that those vessels were precisely, though reluctantly,
following the example of the United States in their
wars Avith Great Britain, there was a perceptible change
in the tone of feeling, and John Bull, that is to say, the
ordinary unofficial Britisher, rather enjoyed the idea of
Brother Jonathan being metaphorically ' hoist with his
own petard.'
With the foregoing facts patent to all who have cared
to search the records, no apology for the determination
of the Confederate Government to strike at the commerce
of the United States is necessary, and when the specific
orders to replace the Alabama, quoted above, reached
England, I was already looking up a suitable vessel and
arranging the ' ways and means,' under the general dis
cretionary powers conferred upon me in the original
instructions. The despatch of a vessel from England suitable in
size, structure, and sailing qualities to keep the sea as a
cruiser involved a tA\ ofold expense, and two entirely
separate sets of arrangements. The proposed cruiser
must of necessity dispense with every vestige or simili
tude of warlike equipment, and it Avas equally indispen
sable to keep the crew and the general outfit within the
reasonable requirements of the alleged voyage. It Avas
therefore necessary to provide a second ship, to carry the
armament, extra stores, officers, and as many additional

122 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
men as could be safely embarked, to a place of rendez
vous. The supply-ship must be loaded in a different
port from the cruiser, and there must be a reasonable
and rational consistency in the business arrangements for
her outward voyage, so that the type of vessel and cargo
might be conformable to the requirements of her alleged
port of destination.
After the despatch of the Alabama and Florida, it
became manifest that no vessel especially constructed
for war could be got out of a British port. It has been
shoAAm in a previous chapter that her 3Iajesty's Foreign
Secretary had so far yielded to the pressure put upon
him by the United States Minister that he would, and
often did, order the detention of even merchant steamers
manifestly unsuited to war-like purposes, if the United
States Consul at the port of loading lodged a complaint
against her, or sent in to the Collector of Customs an
affidavit that ' he had reason to believe the vessel in
question was intended to be converted into a Confederate
cruiser.' The closeness with which the building-yards were
watched, and the secret system of inspecting ships
loading at the ports for foreign voyages which the
United States Consuls had established, was well knoAvn;
and long before the loss of the Alabama I had reported
to the Navy Department my conviction that a further
expenditure in building or buying vessels especially
constructed for war would be a useless waste of money,
as it was manifest to me that no such craft would be
permitted to leave a British port unless her Majesty's
Government Avas satisfied that she was the property of
a neutral State, Avhose Government Avould assume the
responsibility of her movements. The Navy Depart
ment had adopted the above vicAV, and the Government

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 123
at Richmond, reluctantly abandoning the hope of ob
taining in Europe vessels fit to act offensively against
the harbours on the Northern coast and in opening the
blockade, had determined at or about the time of the
Alabama's loss to apply the whole ofthe resources ofthe
Treasury in purchasing- military and other necessary
supphes, and in building- steamers suitable in speed and
structure to run the blockade, and for making short
maritime raids along the Northern coast. Such vessels
were then in course of building, under the arrangements
General Colin 3IcRae, the fiscal agent of the Treasury
was able to make, as stated in another chapter ; but the
arrangements were made at such a late period of the
war, that the best class of ships, those best suited for
dashing out of the blockaded ports and practising a
' guerilla warfare ' on the enemy's coast-line, were not
completed in time to take an active part in the war.
The Secretary of the NaA-}- did not, however, at any time
wholly abandon the purpose of keeping a few cruisers at
sea. He had specifically instructed me to supply, when
ever the state of the funds would admit, any vacancy in
the number, and had directed my especial attention to
the American whaling fleet in the North Pacific.
The first effect of the Alabama's destruction was
rather to add to the immediate drain upon the resources
of the NaA^ Department, because her officers and crew
lost everything, and itwas necessary to re- supply them.
Besides which, the men had been a long time at sea, and,
happily for them, had a good deal of pay due. Then,
also, there were rescued and wounded men at Cherbourg
and elsewhere who had to be looked after, and even the
poor fellows who had given their lives for the defence of
the Confederate flag had relatives, and their claims were
legacies which could not be suffered to remain unsettled.

124 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
The winding-up of the Alabama's affairs involved
some complications, and the expense was far greater than
if she had been the property of a recognised Government,
with diplomatic and consular agents to come forward with
their official authority and prestige, and to make open
provision for all necessities. It was not possible to collect
the Alabama's crew in one place, or to bring them
together at one time, lest it should be charged that we
were making preparations for a Avarlike expedition ; and
even in such works of mercy as relieving the ship
wrecked and distressed, it was necessary to practise a
certain amount of mystery and concealment, and to use
intermediaries, which added both to the cost and delay
ofthe settlement.
In the ordinary course of events, and from the regular
prearranged appropriation of funds, there would not
have been sufficient money in hand to fit out a fi-esh
expedition. The ' depositaries ' of the Confederate
Treasury were then, as at most times, overweighted with
liabilities on behalf of the Government ; and although
there Avas a moderate balance in their hands on account
of the Navy Department, yet in the aggregate they were
under great adA-ances, and the remittances in cotton
and other produce came forAvard Avith less and less
rapidity and regularity, in consequence of the increasing
stringency of the blockade. There was, however, an
unexpected contribution to the available assets of the
Navy Department about tAvo months after the loss of the
Alabama, by reason of the forced sale of the English
rams by Messrs. Bravay ; and after consulting the
special fiscal agent of the Treasury as to his abihty to
furnish the funds for the large contracts which Avere
then open, and for Avhich he had been directed to supply
the means, it was determined to use as much of the pro-

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 125
ceeds of the above-mentioned sale as might be required
for the despatch of another naval adventure, and I took
actiA-e steps without fui-ther delay to select and equij)
the necessary sliips.
The ordinary iron scrcAV-stoamers of commerce, as far
back as 1864, were in almost CA-ery essential particular
unfit for our purposes. They Avere constructed almost
exclusiveh- for steaming, had no arrangement for lifting-
their screw-s. and Avere masted only with the purpose to
furnish auxiliary sailing-power as a partial relief to the
engines, and for economy of fuel in fair winds.
The reasons why a Confederate cruiser should have
full sailing as well as steaming-power have been already
explained ; and those combined requirements were
especially necessary in a vessel it was the purpose to
send after the American whaling fleet in the distant
North Pacific and Sea of Okhotsk. The necessities of
our position greatly narrowed the field for selection, and
it was only through a fortunate chance that a suitable
vessel was found. In the autumn of 1863 I went to the
Clyde to look up a steamer (the Coquette) for a special
purpose, mentioned in another chapter. Lieutenant
Robert R. Carter was with me, and in the course of our
search we caught sight of a fine, composite, full-rigged
ship, Avith something more than auxiliary steam-power,
and aU the necessary arrangements for disconnecting
and lifting her screw. We were charmed with the
ship, but could only make a very hasty and imperfect
inspection of her, as she was in all the bustle of loading
for her first foreign voyage. I took, however, a careful
note of her, and learned that she was then bound for
Bombay, and would return to England in due course,
probably in eight to ten months.
As soon as the ' ways and means ' to fit out the con-

126 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
templated expedition were provided, I sent an expe
rienced broker to scour the Clyde and the principal
shipping ports, and he was so fortunate as to fall upon
the very screw- steamer I had seen at Glasgow ten months
before. He reported at once by telegraph, and posted a
letter the same day, adAdsing me that the ship had just
been discharged, was then entirely empty, and could
thus be thoroughly inspected, but that she was already
under partial engagement for another voyage, and if I
Avanted to secure her no time was to be lost. Ha-ving
perfect confidence in my broker, I telegraphed him to
buy after careful inspection. The despatch of the Secre
tary of the Navy (dated July 18th, 1864) quoted above,
Avhich contained the urgent precept to replace the Ala
bama if possible, reached me on the 30th of August,
and replying from Liverpool under date of September
16th, 1864, I Avrote on that subject as follows : —
' I have the satisfaction to inform you of the purchase
of a fine composite ship, built for the Bombay trade, and
just returned to London from her first A'oyage. She is
1160 tons builder's measurement, classed A 1 for 14
years at Lloyd's, frames, beams, etc., of iron, but planked
from keel to gunwale Avith East India teak. She is full-
rigged as a ship, with rolling topsails, has plenty of
accommodation for officers of all grades, and her " 'tween
decks " are 7 feet 6 inches high, AAdth large air-ports,
havmg been fitted under Government inspection for the
transport of troops. Her engines are direct acting, with
two cylinders 47 inches in diameter and 2 feet 9 inches
stroke, with ample grate and heating surface, nominal
horse-power 220, but indicating 850 horse-power, and
she has a lifting scrcAV. 31y broker has had her care
fully examined by one of Lloyd's inspectors, AAdio pro
nounces her a capital ship in every respect, and from

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 127
whose report I have extracted the aboA^e items. Yester
day she went into a graAdng-dock to have her bottom
exannned and the scrcAv-shaft carefully inspected, and
the report on both these points is flivourable. The log
of the ship shows her to be a fast sailer under caiiA^as,
for vrith scrcAv up she has made 330 miles in twenty-
four hours by observation. You Avill be gratified to
learn of this good fortune in finding a ship so admirably
suited to our purpose, and I will only now assure you
that no effort Avill be spared, and no precaution neglected,
which may help to get her under our flag. You may
rely upon it that the purchase of men-of-war from any
of the European navies is not practicable under existing
circumstances.' The A-essel referi-ed to in the foregoing extract Avas
perhaps the only ship of her type and class in Great
Britain, and her comely proportions and peculiarities of
structure could not fail to make her an object of interest
and attraction in the London Docks. Her fitness for
couA-ersion into a cruiser would be manifest at a glance,
and I felt confident that the spies of the United States
Consul would soon draw his attention to her, and that
she would be keenly and suspiciously watched.
I knew that to set my foot upon her deck, or to be
reported at any time within visual range of her, would
be the immediate occasion of a consular report to Mr.
Adams, which would be promptly forwarded to Earl
Russell, with the customary affirmation, and the hope of
getting the ship to sea as a Confederate cruiser would
be nipped in the bud. I felt equally certain that any
alteration of her internal arrangements or the addition
of any fittings or furniture to her cabins, not in harmony
with her mercantile character, and not required for
her return voyage to Bombay, would cause inquiry ; it

128 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Avould be discovered that she had not been taken up by
the Government for the transport of troops, and the
inference would be that she Avas preparing for ' piratical
depredations upon the commerce of a friendly Power.'
It was absolutely necessary to permit no one having the
faintest odour of ' rebellion ' about him to go near her.
She must be provided with an owner who would be
Avilling to sell her again at an out-port, and who could
be trusted to see that the essentials for her alleged voyage
Avould be provided, and that all requirements of the law
Avould be complied with.
In matters of business, and in the preparation of an
important enterprise especially, it is more satisfactory
to superintend the arrangements in person, and to in
spect their progress with one's own vision, than to behold
them through the eye of faith ; but the necessities of our
position compelled all Confederate agents to trust often
to the fidehty and judgment of intermediaries, and I can
say in my oAvn case that although I sometimes suffered
by the mistakes, and once or tAvice through the OA'^er-
zealous effort of a deputy, I was never deceived nor
betrayed. Every man in England Avho undertook to per
form a service for the Confederate States under engage
ment with me did his work Avith scrupulous honesty.
The gentleman who acted for me in the purchase of
the above-mentioned ship bought her in his OAvn name,
ballasted her with coal, and had her cleared out for
Bombay, giving the captain a power-of-attorney to sell
her at any time after leaving London. For this service
he declined to receive any remuneration AA-hateA-er, and
I promised that when she received her Confederate crew
and armament, no prize should be captured until the
captain who took her out had been allowed sufficient
time to return to England and cancel the register.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 129
The ship for the contemplated cruise being thus
secured, it was necessary to get a tender, or supply
vessel, for her as quickly as possible. I Avas adAdsed
by my broker to examine a new iron sci-cav- steamer
built for, and then employed in, the packet service
between Liverpool and Ireland. 33^ith that purpose I
made a short passage in her. She Avas strong, roomy,
a good sea -boat, and steamed thirteen knots per hour
during the run. Her draft of water Avas moderate, and
as all those qualities in combination suited her for
blockade-running, I perceiA-ed a probability of making
her earn her OA\-n expenses, or perhaps even recoup the
cost of her purchase.
The steamer referred to was called the Laurel. She
was bought, and put in the hands of a shipping agent in
Liverpool, who advertised her for a voyage to Havana,
to take freight and a limited number of passengers. The
shipping agent was informed in advance what amount
of freight and how many passengers would be forth
coming, and being a clever business man, he had no
difficulty in dechning proposals from other sources
Avithout exciting suspicion. The freight, of course,
consisted of the stores and armament for the cruiser,
and the passengers were the officers and a few choice
men for her. To allay all suspicion, bills of lading
were issued in the ordinary way, passage-money was
paid, and tickets Avere issued for the passengers under
assumed names, so that the clerks in the office of the
ship's agent would perceive that everything was going
on in the ordinary course of their business. The pas
sengers were, however, kept out of sight, and only
appeared on the night when a tug was ready at the
Prince's Landing-stage to take them on board the
Laurel. VOL. II. 38

130 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
On the 28th of September, 1864, Lieutenant R. R.
Carter arrived in Liverpool direct from Richmond. I
had requested the Secretary of the Navy to send him out
for special service with me as soon as he could be spared
from the Coquette, and his arrival was a gratifying re
sponse to my application. Carter had mentioned to the
Secretary of the Navy the handsome and handy ship we
had seen at Glasgow in the autumn of 1863, and among
the instructions and suggestions he brought me from the
Navy Department was a proposition to get, if possible,
the ship, and send her after the American whaling-fleet.
Carter and Commander John 31. Brooke had serA^ed
together as lieutenants in a scientific expedition, which
had been sent out by the United States Navy Depart
ment some years before the war, and the com-se of the
cruise had taken them over the routes and localities
frequented by the whalers. Those officers had discussed
the subject Avith the Secretary ofthe Navy before Carter
left Richmond, and he had been instructed to furnish me
with all necessary information verbally. I had obtained
from Commander M. F. 3Iaury a set of the ' Whale
Charts ' published in connection with his ' Physical
Geography of the Sea,' and it was my purpose to com
pile from them a memorandum for the information and
guidance of the commander of the proposed expedition ;
but Carter's personal experiences, refi-eshed by his con
sultations with Brooke, were a better som-ce of informa
tion than my theoretical researches could have supplied,
and while I Avas occupied Avith the details of the outfit,
he took the cruising directions in hand and prepared a
clear and able paper on the periodical localities of the
whaling fleet, which Avas included in the general instruc
tions to Lieutenant- Commanding 3Vaddell, and which
he followed to such good purpose that, in the terms of

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 131
a letter from himself, he ' succeeded in destroying or
dispersing the Ncav England AA'haling fleet.'
On the 5th of October, 1864, both vessels Avere ready
for sea. The London ship Avas directed to sail as early
as possible on the morning of the Sth, and as soon as
her depai-ture was reported by telegraph, the Laurel was
taken into the 3Iersey, and at about eight o'clock in the
evening of that same day the passengers to go in her
quietly assembled on the Prince's Landing-stage, and a
tug in waiting took them to her, and she proceeded at
once to sea.
The account of the purchase and despatch of the two
vessels having now been given in general terms, the
most important and the most interesting details cannot
be explained in a more brief and satisfactory manner
than in the subjoined extracts from the official reports
forwarded to Richmond at the time, and from the subse
quent correspondence.
Under date of October 20th, 1864, I reported to the
Secretary of the Navy as follows : —
' I have the great satisfaction of reporting the safe
departure on the 8th instant of the ship described in my
despatch of September 16th, and now that the entire
expedition is far away at sea, beyond the reach of inter
ference on the part of any United States authority in
Europe, I may venture to furnish detailed information.
The cruising ship was formerly the Sea King, the very
vessel, it appears, that Lieutenant Carter suggested fo
you in Richmond, and it is an interesting coincidence,
that while you were discussing her merits and fitness for
conversion into a cruiser, I was negotiating for her pur
chase at this distance from you. The tender, or supply-
vessel, is the screw-steamer Laurel, which I was com
pelled to purchase for the special purpose. She is,
38—2

132 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
however, a fine fast vessel, and if Lieutenant Ramsay
gets her into Wilmington or Charleston, you will find
her very useful. I enclose herevrith my letters of in
structions to Lieutenant-Commanding Waddell, and to
Lieutenants Whittle and Ramsay, and also a list of the
officers. The letters above referred to will inform you
how the two vessels were despatched, and I need only
say that the arrangements combined most satisfactorily,
and that the two vessels sailed, the Sea ICing from
London, and the Laurel from Liverpool, within a few
hours of each other.
' I heard from th.e Sea King off Deal. Everything was
in fine condition, and she was making twelve and a half
knots, under steam and fore-and-aft sails. Lieutenant
Ramsay sent me a line or two from the phot-station off
Holyhead to say that not a single package had been left
behind, and that the Laurel, though deep, had averaged
over eleven knots since leaving the 3Iersey. The battery
for the Sea K.ing consists of four 55 cwt. 8 -inch smooth
bore guns, and two Whitworth 32-pounders, besides
AA'hich, she has two small 12-pounders, which originally
belctnged to her. ... In spite of every precaution, the
Federal spies appear to have discovered that something
Avas in progress, and Mr. Adams had the United States
ships Niagara and Sacramento off the mouth of the
Thames, but they failed to identify our ship. However,
a few days after the departure of the Sea King they
Avere reported to have overhauled and detained for some
time a peaceful Spanish steamer that had just left the
Thames. ' The British Government Avill scarcely giA-e our
public ships common shelter, and Ave cannot send an
unarmed vessel in the direction of North America
without embarrassing and annoying inquiries from the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 133
Customs and Board of Ti-ade officials. But United
States ships-of-Avar are permitted to lie in English
ports and watch British ships, as in the case of the
Georgia, previously reported, and are alloAved to cruise
and overhaul neutral ships off the largest port of the
kingdom, and in waters which were once considered
exclusively British.'
The letters of instructions enclosed in the foregoing
were as follows : —
No. 1, to Lieutenant Whittle, dated October 6th,
1864: — 'You will proceed to London by the 5 p.m.
train to-day, and go to 33"ood's Hotel, Furnival's Inn,
High Holborn. Take a room there, and give your
name as 3Ir. 33''. C. Brown, if asked. It has been
arranged for you to be in the coffee-room of the hotel at
11 a.m. precisely to-morrow, and that you will sit in a
prominent position, Avith a white pocket-handkerchief
rove through a button-hole of your coat, and a news
paper in your hand. In that attitude you will be recog
nised by 3Ir.  , who will call at the appointed time,
and ask you if your name is Brown. You will say
" Yes," and ask his name. He wdl give it, and you will
then retire with him to your OAvn room, hand him the
enclosed letter of introduction, and throwing off all
disguise, discuss with him freely the business in hand.
Mr.  AviU introduce you to Captain Corbett, with
whom you are to take passage to Madeira, and you Avill
arrange Avith bim how to get on board without attract
ing notice. Say to Captain Corbett that I regret not
seeing him, but it has been thought best for me not to
go to London, as I am so well known there, and tell
him that I have full confidence in his desire to serve us,
and will be happy to make the warmest acknowledg
ments when he returns. Say that I desire him to carry

134 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
you to Madeira, and explain how he is to communicate
with the Laurel. ... It is important that the Sea King
should not be reported, and you will request Captain
Corbett not to exchange signals with passing ships, or
at any rate not to show his number. The object of
your going out in the Sea King is to acquaint yourself
Avith her sailing and other qualities, and to obserA-e the
crew. You can also inspect the internal arrangements,
and discuss with Captain Corbett the necessary altera
tions; and you can learn the stowage ofthe proAdsions and
other stores, and pick out the positions for magazine and
shell-room. Perhaps the construction of these might be
actually begun under the superintendence of Captain
Corbett. You will bear in mind that until she is
regularly transferred. Captain Corbett is the legal com
mander of the Sea King, and for obvious reasons of
policy, as well as from courtesy, you will express all
your wishes in the form of requests. When you reach
Madeira and the Laurel joins company, you Avill report
to Lieutenant-Commanding Waddell, and thereafter act
under his instructions.'
No. 2, to Lieutenant J. F. Ramsay, dated October Sth,
1864 : — ' You Avill proceed to sea to-night in command
of the steamship Laurel, and carry Lieutenant-Com
manding James I. Waddell, his staff of officers, and the
other passengers of whom you have been advised, to
Funchal, in the island of 3Iadeira, with quick despatch.
At Funchal you will hasten to take on board as large a
supply of coal as .you may consider safe, bearing in
mind that you may have to steam for twenty days. The
Sea Iving, Captain Corbett, has sailed fi-om London this
morning, and her commander has been instructed to
time his passage so as not to arrive off Funchal until
the 17th instant, by Avhich time it is hoped you will

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 135
have coaled up, and will be ready to Aveigh at a moment's
notice. The ^t'(7 lung Avill not anchor at Funchal, but
AAdU merely appear off the roadstead, and by AA-a}' of
designation AAdll hoist the official number of the Laurel,
which you will answer Avith the same number, and then
weigh and join her as quickly as possible. In com
municating afterwards with the Sea Iving you AAdll be
governed by the directions of Lieutenant-Commanding
3Yaddell, and you Avill render him all the assistance in
your power in transferring- the supplies from the Laurel
to the Sea King, and if the transfer cannot be accom-
phshed near 3Iadeira, by reason of stress of weather, or
from any other cause, you will proceed Avith him to the
second rendezA-ous. Your experience as a seaman and
your acquaintance with business * will enable you to
assist A-ery materiaUy in making the transfer and in
treating -with the men for thefr entry into the service of
the Confederate States, and your zeal and interest in the
success of the expedition are confidently relied upon.
When the transfer is completed, and Lieutenant-Com
manding Waddell can dispense with your further ser-
Adces, you Avill proceed to Nassau, New Providence,
observing great precaution in approaching Eleuthera
from the north-east. You might sight the island from
your mast-head during the day, but it would be safer to
lie off to the eastward, and time your movements so to
get in Avith the land after dark, and run down close to
the bank, arriAdng off Nassau by daylight.-j- ... As
* Although Lieutenant Ramsay held a commission in the Con
federate navy, he had been several years in the merchant service,
and he had a Board of Trade certificate of competency as master, and
was, therefore, eligible for the command of a British merchant ship.'
t The precaution was thought necessary on account of the quasi
blockade of the Bahama Channels and of Nassau by United States
ships.

136 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
soon as you arrive at Nassau you will communicate with
Mr. L. Heyleger, and show him this letter, which will
serve as an introduction. Mr. Heyleger will be able to
giA'e you the latest news from the Confederate States,
and you will consult freely with him in reference to the
propriety of taking your ship in. If you are satisfied
with the speed of the ship, take her in by all means, as
a voyage through the blockade would establish a new
character for her, and would obliterate the traces of her
past history, inasmuch as her name and nationality
could both be changed. This matter, however, I must
of necessity leave to your discretion, after consultation
with Mr. Heyleger. Should you reach a Confederate
port, report yourself at once by letter to the Secretary
of the Navy, and as my report of the expedition may
not have reached the Dejjartment, send him a copy of
this letter. Say to the Hon. Secretary of the Navy that
I respectfully request him to send you out as soon as
possible, to take command of one of the GoA-ernment
blockade-runners now approaching- completion. If after
consultation with 3Ir. Heyleger it is thought best not
to attempt the voyage iiiAvard, load Avith Government
cotton and return to Liverpool or Havre, as you may be
hereafter advised. . . . Do not let yourself be known as
a Confederate officer, except to 3lr. He}-leger, and Avhile
at Madeira allow no communication with the shore,
except through yourself, and do not show your number
to any passing ship. I AA-ish all the men avIio join the
Confederate service to sign a " quit claim " for both the
Sea King and Laurel for an expressed consideration, and
you Avill advise Lieutenant-Commanding 33"addell how
this is to be done. Write me fully from Nassau under
cover to M. .P. Robertson, Esq.'
The instructions to Lieutenant-Commanding' Waddell

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 137
Avere rather in the form of an advisory letter than specific
orders, except in respect to the purpose and direction of
his cruise. 3Iy experience AAdth the Alabama and other
expeditions Avliich were necessarily organized at out-of-
the-way places, Avhere there Avas no dockyard accommo
dation or facilities, had satisfied me that it was useless
to laA- doAvn a rig-id rule of action. Conditions of
weather and other causes might render it impossible to
equip the cruising ship at the first rendezvous selected,
and it would therefore be necessary to seek another, and
many other contingencies might arise which could only
be met by the ready wit of the officer hi charge, or that
happy inspiration which rarely fails the right-minded
man who is earnestly intent upon doing his duty, what
ever difficulties he may encounter.
The transfer of the armament and stores of the Sea
King was happily and successfully effected in the near
neighbourhood of the first rendezvous selected, and
neither the interest nor the clearness of the narrative
Avill be lessened by omitting those portions of the letter
to Lieutenant-Commanding Waddell which were merely
descriptiA-e and advisory, or merely confidential as
between ourselves. The essential portions of the above-
mentioned letter of adAdce and instruction, which was
dated October 5th, 1864, were as follows : —
' YouAvill sad from this port (Liverpool) on Saturday,
the 8th instant, in the screw-steamer Laurel, under the
command of First- Lieutenant J. F. Ramsay, taking with
you all the officers detailed for your command except
First- Lieutenant Whittle, who will take passage in the
ship with Captain Corbett, with the view of learning her
qualities and devising the best and speediest manner of
making such alterations and additions in her internal
arrangements as may be necessary, and to observe the

138 TIIE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
character and disposition of the crew. A few picked
men selected from the crew of the late Confederate States
ship Alabama, Avho have been especially retained for the
purpose, Avill accompany you in the Laurel, and will
constitute the nucleus, of the new force you will have to
organize at the place of rendezvous. Among those men
is the chief boatsAvain's -mate of the Alabama, a fine sea
man and an experienced man-of-war's man. I adAdse
you to give him an appointment as acting -boatswain as
soon as you get out of the Channel, and to explain to
him the intent of your leaving England. He A\dll
assist you materially in persuading the men of Captain
Corbett's ship to enlist. I would not, however, mention
the direction of your intended cruise to him.
' Lieutenant Ramsay will be directed to proceed vrith
quick despatch to Funchal, and to coal up the Laurel as
speedily as the facilities of that anchorage wUl admit.
For obvious reasons, there should be as httle communica
tion with the shore as possible, and none of the officers
or men should be allowed to land. Indeed, I may say
here that every precaution should be practised to prevent
the direction or intent of your voyage being known.
When the Laurel returns, or CA-en reaches Nassau, every
thing- Avill be exposed ; but then you will be far on your
cruise, and beyond the reach of interference. The main
object of the Laurel's voyage being to place you and
your officers, with the men above mentioned and the
naval stores, on board the cruising ship, and to attend
upon you until you are fairly in possession. Lieutenant
Ramsay will be ordered to goA-ern the movements of
that ship in accordance Avith your wishes, and he will
only proceed to carry out his special instructions Avhen
you no longer need his assistance.
' When Captain Corbett appears off Funchal and liis

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 139
signal is recognised, you Avill join him Avith the Laurel,
communicate with him and Lieutenant AVhittle, and
discuss the further steps necessary to transfer the
supplies fi-om the tender to 5-our own ship, Avhich }'ou
will christen Shenandoah. The quantity of stores is not
large, and the heaA-iest Aveight, in a single piece, Avill be
less than three tons. ... It is possible that the Aveather
may be fine and calm, in which case you could lash the tAvo
vessels alongside of each other ; and by steaming slowly
ahead Avith one, so as to toAv the other, and keeping Avell
under the lee of the island, the transfer may be effected
Avithout the delay and risk of seeking another anchor
age. . . . Some tact Avill be necessary in dealing with
the men and persuading them to ship ; but you will be
greatly assisted by the influence of the Alabama's men,
who are ready and willing to serve. Immediately upon
leaAdng Funchal, I would move them all on board the
Shenandoah. ... It is necessary to bear in mind that
Captain Corbett is the legal commander of the Shenandoah
(Sea King) until he formally transfers her to you, and
all action in regard to the ship and her crcAV should be
conducted through him or with his co-operation.
' In regard to pay, it is quite impossible for you to
conform precisely to the law regulating the pay of the
navy. . . . Seamen, so far as our service is concerned,
are merchantable articles, with a market value, and you
must either pay the price demanded or dispense with
their serAdces. I am satisfied, therefore, that if in the
exercise of your discretion you deem it necessary to go
beyond the established pay alloAvance, the Navy Depart
ment will take the steps necessary to legalize your
act. . . .
' W^hen the Shenandoah is formally handed over to
you. Captain Corbett will give you a bill of sale of the

140 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
ship, and you will permit him to take the register, and
such other papers relating to the previous status of the
ship as he may desire to carry with him, and I have
stipulated with the ostensible OAvner that you will make
no prizes until Captain Corbett has had time to reach
England and cancel the register, for which purpose you
should allow thirty days. It will therefore be important
for you to despatch the Laurel as soon as possible. . . .
All the work you have to do on board the Shenandoah,
such as mounting the battery, building the magazine,
and putting up such additional store-rooms as may be
required, can be done while under weigh ; and you
should therefore leave the anchorage at which your
supplies are received simultaneously Avith the Laurel,
with the Adew of insurmg your arrival upon the cruishig
ground at the appointed time. . . .
' If there should be any objection on the part of the
Colonial authorities (at Sydney) to your taking a large
supply of coal, claim your right under the Queen's Order
in Council to get a supply sufficient to carry you to the
nearest port of your own country, which is the precise
limitation of the order, and that wUl afford you an ample
supply. After leaving Melbourne or Sydney, proceed
to the New Zealand whaling-ground, and thence northerly
between the New Hebrides Islands to the Caroline
Group, Ladrones, Bonins, etc., as specified in the enclosed
memorandum.' I omit the minute sailing directions for the cruise,
references to charts, etc. The memorandum supplied a
very general summary of the proposed route, and was as
follows : — ' A fast vessel with auxiliary steam-power
leaving the meridian of the Cape of Good Hope (say on
the 45th parallel of south latitude) on the 1st day of
January, would reach Sydney in Australia in forty

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 141
days. Adding twenty days for incidental interruptions,
and leaA-ing the coast of Australia on the 1st of March,
passing through the whaling -ground between New
Zealand and Ncav Holland and the Carohne Group,
touching at Ascension, and alloAving thirty days for
incidental delays, Avould reach the Ladrone Islands by
the 1st of Jime. She would then, Adsiting the Bonin
Islands, Sea of Japan, Okhotsk, and North Pacific, be in
a position, about the 15th of September, north of the
island of Oahu, distant sixty to a hundred miles, to
intercept the North Pacific whaling-fleet, bound to Oahu
Avith the products of the summer cruise.'
The letter of adAdsory instructions to Lieutenant-
Commanding Waddell ended as follows : — ' Enclosed
hercAAdth you Avill find a form of bond to be signed by
captains of prizes you may ransom, and also short
forms of depositions to be taken from captains and mates
of prizes, and which you can extend to any degree of
minuteness you may think adAdsable in particular cases.
I can think of nothing else worthy of special remark.
You have a fine spirited body of young officers under
your command, and may reasonably expect to perform
good and efficient service.'
All the initiatory arrangements for the Shenandoah's
cruise were satisfactorily accomplished, with reference
both to the meeting of the ship and tender at Funchal,
and the prompt transfer of the stores off 3Iadefra, and
thus the delay and risk of seeking a second place
of rendezvous was avoided. The modus operandi is
sufficiently explained in the following extracts from a
despatch which I addressed to the Secretary of the
Navy, dated Liverpool, November 17th, 1864 :—
' I have the satisfaction to report that the Shenandoah
has received her officers and armament, and is now an

142 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
actual cruiser under the Confederate flag. Captain
Corbett, who was employed to take the Sea King, now
the Confederate States ship Shenandoah, to the rendez
vous, has returned to England, and from his verbal state
ment, as well as from an official report of Lieutenant
Ramsay, dated Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, October 21st, 1864,
I have learned that the tAvo vessels met at 3Iadefra with
out accident, and at the appointed time. The Laurel
jDroA^ed so fast that she arrived sooner than I expected,
and lying in Funchal Roads for two or three days after
coaling to await the arrival of her consort, the circum
stance excited some suspicion, and the United States
Consul endeavoured to induce the Portuguese authorities
to detain her, but he failed to suggest a justifiable plea.
' On the morning of the 18th ultimo the Sea King
appeared off the bay of Funchal, and having signalled as
directed, was at once recognised and quickly joined by
the Laurel. Fortunately the weather was fine, and the
tAvo ships were able to anchor under " Las Desertas,"
an uninhabited island near the main island of 3Iadeira,
and beginning work with spirit and energy, all the
armament and stores were transferred by an early horn-
on the 20th of October. On that day the two ships
separated, and Lieutenant Ramsay proceeded to Tene
riffe to land Captain Corbett and the seamen who de
clined to enter the Confederate service. I regretted to
learn that only a small minority of the men sent out in
the Sea King could be induced to enter for the Shenan
doah when the object of her cruise was made known to
them. . . . Lieutenant Ramsay reports that although
the ship started on her cruise very short-handed, the
officers Avere all in fine spirits. I feel sure that the crcAV
can be steadily reinforced from prizes. . . .
' The announcement that another Confederate cruiser

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 143
is at sea cannot fail to haA-e a depressing ett'ect upon the
foreign commerce of the ITnited States, by increasing the
rate of insurance in and upon American bottoms ; and
her appearance is at this time esj^ecially opportune, in
consideration of the loss of the Florida. I can readily
imagine Avith Avhat indignation you anIU learn of the
cowardly and murderous assault of the United States
ship Wachu-'^ett upon the Florida. It has excited very
severe comment in Europe, and the Brazilian Govern
ment seems to haA-e acted with promptness and spirit.
There is a rumour that France and England AAdll join
Brazil m her demand upon the United States for satis
faction, but both of the foriher Powers have shoAvn so
much forbearance, and Great Britain has of late been so
partial and submissiA-e in her intercourse AAdth the
United States, that it is difficult to imagine a change of
conduct. ' I find it difficult to account for the unwillingness of
the men to ship for the Slienandoah. Captain Corbett
was instructed to engage for the Sea Iving only young,
and as far as possible unmarried men, Avhose spirit of
adventure and lack of home cares would, it Avas thought,
incline them to a roving crmse. In this expectation I
hav-e been disappointed, for the majority of the men
declined to enter the service on any terms, and Lieu
tenant Ramsay, jdelding to a feeling of disappointment,
Avrites that he " never saw such a set of curs in all his
(my) experience at sea." In a hurried private note
Lieutenant-Commanding Waddell informs me that an
engineer in whom great reliance was placed to influence
the firemen to ship, and who professed to have such a
strong desire to serve the Confederate States that he was
Avilling to run the blockade, belied all his promises, and
actually did his best to persuade the men in his depart-

14 1 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
ment from remaining. You are of course aware that
no overtures can be made to men in Great Britain,
except in a few exceptional cases, and when a body of
seamen are sent abroad it must be under some legitimate
pretence, and their subsequent entry into the Confederate
service depends upon their humour, the solid induce
ments held out to them, and the tact with which the
prospects of the cruise may be represented. An officer
Avould find his hands greatly strengthened in every way
by the presence of a reliable force of sufficient strength
to give him physical possession of his ship, and which
Avould render him independent of the caprices of the
men to whom he is forced t^ appeal.
' It is not likely that a ship so suitable in every way
for conversion into a cruiser as the Sea Iving wiU be
found very soon, and it would not be safe to attempt
another adventure of the kind until the excitement grow
ing out of this one has subsided. If another proper
ship can be found, and arrangements can be made for
arming her with reasonable prospects of success, I Avill
not shrink from the undertaking ; but I am impressed
A\dth the coiiAdction that if the war continues until next
summer, a formidable naval expedition can be fitted out
at a rendezvous where there will be no danger of inter-
ruption, and to Avhich mechanics to assist in coiiA-erting
the ships can be sent AAdthout fear of discovery. I shall
have the honour to report hi detail on this subject by
Lieutenant R. R. Carter, Avhen he returns, and I will
ask you to allow him to bring out a body of men and
officers, the former to constitute a nucleus for the crcAvs
of the vessels, and to ensure safe possession of the
property at the rendezvous.'
Eighty men Avere sent out in the Sea King, and out of
that number, including a few by the Laurel, it Avas

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 14.-)
hoped that at least sixty, or even seA'enty, Avould
volunteer for the Shcnandoali. but, in point of fact, only
twenty-three consented to remain. The staff" of officers
of all grades, including- three petty-officers Avho Avent
out in the Laurel, AA-as fortunately large, numbering
nineteen, but the force to handle the Shenandoah at the
start was only forty-two, all told.
33"addell, hke most naA-al officers, had probably never
joined a ship for serA-ice before, except Avhen she Avas
fully manned and in apple-pie order for a cruise, or at a
Government dockyard, Avith ample force of men and
abundant supphes to fit her out. On this occasion he
found himself on the high seas in a ship 220 feet long
and 35 feet beam, with standing royal-yards, and fitted
to carry royal-studding-sails — everything- dirty and in
confusion, the decks lumbered v, ith the armament and
stores, and a crew of forty-two men and officers to
naAdgate the ship and equip her at the same time.
The master, Irvine S. Bulloch, the paymaster, W. B.
Smith, and the chief-engineer, 3Iatthew O'Brien,* had
made the cruise in the Alabama, and had seen some
rough-and-tumble work in discharging her tender and
equipping the ship for her cruise at the island of Ter
ceira, but the remainder of the wardroom sea-officers had
been trained by no such experiences. They were mostly
young men fresh from the United States Naval Academy
at the breaking out of the war, and had seen little or no
sea-serAdce, except in the smart school-ship, which is
sent out yearly for a summer cruise from Annapolis.
Waddell was an officer of twenty-three years' experi
ence in the United States Navy, and Whittle, the first-
lieutenant, a smart, intelligent young officer, had seen
some serAdce. Lieutenant S. S. Lee had picked up some
* O'Brien was first^assistant-engineer of the Alabama.
VOL. II. 39

146 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
rough experiences in the merchant service, and was
therefore more at home than most of the others. For
tunately, the Shenandoah had the advantage of good
steam-engines and an ample supply of coal — enough, if
need be, to steam to Sydney ; but all will admit that
the first impressions of those who had to put her in
condition for her work could not have been exhilarating.
But although the staff of officers Avas chiefly composed
of very young men, Avho were about to make their first
effort in a responsible position, they AA-ere full of pluck
and that ingrained verve and aptitude for the sea which
is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race, whether
born and bred in Great Britain, or in any part of what
Sir Charles Dilke has called ' Greater Britain,' meaning
by that broad and inclusive designation the Enghsh-
speaking countries which have been colonized by Britons.
They went to work with a will. In twenty-four hours
they had two of the 8 -inch guns and one Whitworth
32-pounder mounted. The next day two more 8-inch
and the second Whitworth were on their carriages, and
on the 29th of October, eis^ht daA-s after leaAdng the
anchorage at Las Desertas, the ports were all cut and
the whole battery of six guns was completely equipped
and in place.
Waddell wrote me a short hurried note on the day he
took command of the Shenandoah, while affected by the
disappointment occasioned by the scant response to his
appeals for volunteers and the apparently hopeless task
of reducing the chaos around him to ship-shape trim.
Under the circumstances, I Avas not surprised that the
tone of his report Avas somcAvhat desponding ; but there
was no evidence of a Avish to be out of the Avork — only
a fear that he might not be able to accomplish all that
was expected of him. If the letter had come promptly

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 147
to hand, I AA'oiild have doubtless felt some misgivings,
from a mere feeling of sympathy ; but it did not reach
me until the middle of November, and then I kncAv that
his mind Avould be at ease, for he Avould have settled
fairly down to his Avork ; and I had assured him that,
Avhatever deficienc}- there might be in the number of his
crcAV at the start, he would be able to recruit from his
prizes, as the Alabama and Florida had done. This pre
diction was fully A'erified, as, out of four prizes captured
before crossing the Line, fourteen men volunteered for
the Shenandoah, which reassured everyone on board, and
gaA-e them confidence in the final success of the cruise.
The ease Avith Avhich the Confederate cruisers were
generally able to get A'olunteers from captured vessels
was a striking peculiarity of the Civil War. The
Alabama left Terceira in August, 1862, with eighty-
fiA-e men. In January, 1863, she fought and sunk the
United States ship Hatta'as, and had then a crew of one
hundred and ten, the twenty-five additional men being
volunteers from captured vessels. The Shenandoah was
especially fortunate in this respect. From one of the
whalers captured by her every man volunteered except
the captain and chief officer. The Florida was obliged to
leave Brest in February, 1864. very short-handed ; but
when she reached Bahia, in the following October, she had
completed her crew to a full complement, almost exclu
sively by volunteers from prizes. It may be said that the
men were induced to volunteer by the wish to escape the
discomforts and confinement they had to submit to as
prisoners ; but this will hardly account for the prompt
ness Avith which they volunteered and the spirit with
which they joined in the work ofthe ships, often proving
the handiest and most contented men on board.
Thetreatment ofthe captured seamen was always kindly,
39—2

148 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
and every possible effort was made to lessen thefr hard
ships. Besides this, the rapid accumulation of prisoners
soon rendered it necessary either to ' bond ' a prize, or
to bargain with a passing neutral to take them off, and
thus it could never have been a severe strain upon the
patriotism of a ' loyal American ' seaman to spend a few
days under moderate restraint, at the very worst in single
irons, but Avith the same food and drink as his jailors,
and surely he might have borne it with patience if his
' loyalty ' had been of a genuine type, or if its seat had
been in the place where the highest and strongest and
purest emotions are commonly thought to haA-e their
origin. As a matter of fact, the captured crews of American
ships expressed but little if any veneration for the ' old
flag,' and did not appear to look upon the ncAV arrange
ment of bunting at the peaks of the Confederate ships as
a foreign invention. 3Iany of the more intelligent of
the officers, and not a few captains, expressed no ani
mosity against the South, or surprise at the secession of
the Southern States, but, on the contrary, often declared
their conviction that the war was the natural and un
avoidable consequence of the violent, unconstitutional,
and exasperating agitation of extreme politicians at the
North. I am not at all disposed to folloAv the line of argument
suggested by the foregoing statement, or to trace the
cause why seamen sailing under the flag of the United
States were so ready and AAdlling to transfer their alle
giance to a ' so-called ' Rebel Government. I merely
state an historical fact Avhich came to my knoAvledge
through official reports from the commanders of the
Confederate cruisers, and the accuracy of which I have
tested by personal inquiry, and by conversations Avith

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 149
officers of various grades and Avith seamen Avho served
afloat in Confederate ships during the Civil War.
It is not Avithin the scope or purpose ofthis narrative
to relate the adA-entures of any Confederate ship after she
was duly commissioned, excepting- in so far as may be
necessary to fairly and truly set forth the manner in
AA'hich the naval policy of the Confederate Government
was carried out, and to illustrate the conduct of the
neutral Powers towards the two bellig-erents.
After leaving Las Desertas, October 20th, 1864, the
Shenandoah shaped her course for the usual position for
crossing- the Line, and all hands were actiA-ely employed
in making the necessary alterations and stOAving away
stores. On the 15th of November she crossed the Line.
By this time she had captured scA-eral prizes, and the
additions thus made to her crew relieved the pressure
upon the originally small force on board, and relicA-ed
also the expenditure of fuel, for in the Trade winds the
sails could be used with good effect. Waddell' s object
was to reach 31elboume or Sydney in time to begin his
cruise against the whalers, in accordance with the pro
gramme, and thus to carry out the plan sketched in his
instructions. He did not therefore linger at the ' two
forks ' of the marine roads north and south of the Line,
as Semmes did with the Alabama, in order to intercept
passing traders, but made the best of his Avay to the
Australian port from AA-hich the real practical work of
his cruise was to have its beginning. Nevertheless, his
look-outs did not keep their eyes shut. Every passing
sail Avas reported, closely inspected, and if the cut of her
jib suggested her nationality, the Shenandoah's head was
laid for her, and she Avas made to show her colours and
her right to wear them. On the 25th of January, 1865,
the Shcnandoali arrived at 3Iel bourne, and up to that

1.50 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
date she had destroyed eight American ships, six of
Avhich she fell in with a; or near the great converging
points of trade in the equatorial belt of the Atlantic.
The Shenandoah entered the port of 3Ielbourne as
a regularly commissioned ship-of-war of a recognised
belligerent Government. Her flag and the commission
of her commander were her credentials, and Lieutenant-
Commanding Waddell was justified in claiming, and the
Colonial authorities could not deny him, such facihties
for repairing- and provisioning his ship as the necessities
of the case required, Avithout violating the conditions of
her 3Iajesty's Proclamation of Neutrality and the sti
pulations of international law as commonly understood.
If the Shenandoah had only required to supply ordinary
defects and to re-provision, she Avould no doubt have
been made to comply strictly Avith the ' Admiralty
Regulations,' and she A\-ould have been compelled to
quit 3Ielbourne at the expiration of forty-eight hours,
but the examination of the ship by the local engineers
Avho were employed to effect the repairs, proved that an
injury to the screw-bearings could not be got at and
properly restored Avithout taking the ship out of the
water. Application Avas made to the GoA^ernor to put
the Shenandoah on the ' shp,' Avhich belonged to a pri
vate firm, and the request was granted ; but the Colonial
authorities Avere so rigid in enforcing- the ' Orders for
the Proper Preservation of Neutrality ' Avhich had been
issued by her 3Iajesty's GoA-ernment, that the use of all
appliances belonging to the Government, and all official
assistance in repairing or provisionuig the ship, Avas
refused. Before placing the ship on the slip it was
necessary to take some of the weights out of her, and
after the repairs Avere completed a few^ days Avere neces
sarily occupied in the re-shipment and re-stoAAdng ofthe

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 1.51
discharged stores. In consequence of the aboAe-men-
tioned causes, the Shenandoah did not get aAvaA' from
3Ielbourne until February 18th, 1865, butnotAvithstand-
ing the delay, she Avas rather ahead of the time for
leaAdng the coast of Australia set out in the memorandum
for her cruise.
The ship was noAV in good condition, Avith men enough
to handle her safely, and there Avas an assurance that
every prize would, if desired, supply a reinforcement.
All on board were hi good health and spirits; the shade
of despondency Avhich had somewhat overshadowed
33'addell when he left the barren Desertas had wholly
A-anished, and he placed his ship upon the course neces
sary to fall into the prescribed route vrith a light heart
and in hopeful spirits. There does not appear to have
been an accident or a single misadventure which pre
vented Waddell from carrying out his programme, and
he followed it faithfully and AAdth success.
On the 21st of 3Ia}-, 1865, the Shenandoah entered
the Okhotsk Sea under steam, with the purpose to pro
ceed as far as Jonas Island, about two hundred miles
from the enfa-ance, which was reported to be a favourite
rendezvous for ' right Avhalers,' but the ship got jammed
in the ice several times ; moreover, there was much fog,
and the temperature was several degrees below zero.
Altogether the danger was imminent, the ship was not
fitted for forcing her way through ice-fields, and there
was no one on board who had any experience in Arctic
navigation. After making a fair and reasonable effort
to get well into the Sea of Okhotsk, and fearing- to do
the ship some irretrievable injury if he persisted, Wad
dell came out through the Amphitrite Straits, the same
by which he had entered.
The Shenandoah's course Avas now shaped for Beh-

152 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
ring's Straits, the second officer of a whaler captured
just inside the Okhotsk Sea, and Avho had volunteered
into the Confederate service, acting as a pilot to the
whaling grounds. The cruise m the Behring's Sea was
short, but effective. The Avhalers were caught in
couplets, triplets, and quartets, and no less than four
were ransomed and released in order to get rid of the
numerous prisoners. It Avas June 13th Avhen the
Shenandoah left the Sea of Okhotsk, and turned her
head to the northward and eastward to enter the gi-eat
Arctic Sea. She made the first catch on the 22nd, and
her last prize on June 28th. During those eventful sis
days she captured, and either destroyed or ransomed,
twenty-four ships.
The Slienandoah was commissioned as a Confederate
cruiser on the 19th of October, 1864, and sailed fi-om
Las Desertas on the next day. Her cruise as a ship-of-
Avar may be said to have ended on the 28th of June,
1865, because she neither captured nor attempted to
capture a single A'essel after that date. Three months
may be fairly deducted for the detention at 3Ielboui-ne
and the time occupied in making the passage fi-om the
Equator in the Atlantic to 3Ielbourne, and thence to the
localities of the Avhalers, she being then out of the
track of American traders. It appears from an extract
from her log noAv before me, that she fell in vrith and
captured only two A'cssels between the 13th of NoA-ember,
1864, and April 1st, 1865. 3Ve may say, then, that she
Avas only cruising actively in the ordinary ' fair way ' of
American commerce five months. During- that time she
captured thirt}-eight ships, thirty-four of Avhich were
destroyed, and four Avere ransomed, the latter being
converted into cartels to transport the prisoners to the
United States, or to the nearest port Avhere they could

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 153
be suitably cared for. The thirty-eight captured vessels
had crews which numbered in the aggregate 1,053 men,
and their value, according to the depositions of the
masters taken at the time ofthe captures, Avas $1,361,983.
The object ofthe Shenandoah's cruise Avas to thoroughly
disperse, and in great part destroy, the American Avhaling
fleet, and for the complete fulfilment of that object her
route and the time of her operations at each particular
locahty were carefully considered, and set out in the
instructions and memorandum giA-en to Lieutenant-
C ommanding Waddell.
I have already mentioned that the programme Avas
followed vrith unusual precision and effect up to the
28thof Jime, 1865. The original design was thatthe
Shenandoah should leaA-e the Arctic Sea in time to reach
a position sixty to one hundred miles north of the island
of Oahu, in the Sandwich Group, about September 15th,
the expectation being that she Avould then be in time to
intercept the North Pacific whaling fleet en route to the
usual place of resort after the summer's cruise. After
entering Behrins^'s Straits, 33^addell stood to the north-
ward and westward, intending to run along the coast
until abreast of Cape North, and then to work as far
into the Arctic Sea as the state of the ice would admit.
He soon, howcA'cr, found his progress completely blocked,
and he prudently and v-ery properly determined not to
risk the danger of disabling his scrcAV, if not losing his
vessel, in a struggle against obstructions she was not
fitted to encounter. Within a Aveek he had destroyed
every whaler in sight from his mastheads, or of A\^hose
locahty he could get any satisfactory information.
On the 28th of June, 1865, while coming out of
Behring's Straits and A-er}- near the entrance, the
Shenandoah fell in Avith a fleet of ten Avhalers in a lump ;

154 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
and as it w-as flat calm, she had no difficulty in capturing
them all. At an early hour in the morning she had
captured the barque Waverly, of New Bedford, and had
burned her. Of the ten last taken, two were ransomed
to receive the prisoners, and the remaining eight were
burned. This was the last day's work ofthe Shenandoah,
and on the 29th of June she left Behring's Straits, and
after clearing the Aleutian Group stood to the south
east, with the purpose to get into the track of vessels
engaged in the Californian trade, and to learn something
positive in regard to the progress of the war.
After leaving Melbourne on the 18th of February, the
Shenandoah soon passed beyond the reach of communica
tion Avith those who could give her any information —
in fact, she was wholly and completely severed from all
communication with Europe and America — and the
AA^halers she captured in the Okhotsk Sea, and the first
captures in the neighbourhood of Behring's Straits, were
all equally ignorant of what had happened during the
preceding three or four months. Lieutenant-Command
ing Waddell has stated that on the 23rd of June he
captured the ship William Thompso7i and the brig Susan
Abigail. Both of those vessels had left San Francisco
in April, and he got from them a number of San Francisco
papers, which contained the correspondence between
Generals Grant and Lee relatiA'-e to the surrender of
Lee's army. The same papers, hoAvcA'cr, contained a
statement that 3Ir. Davis and his Cabinet Avere at Dan
ville, and that ' 3Ir. Davis had issued a proclamation
informing the Southern people that the war would be
carried on Avith rencAved vigour.' None of the whalers
had later ncAvs than the above, and none of them thought
that the war was over. As evidence of this, Waddell
mentions that eight men from the ships captured on the

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 155
28th A^olunteered for the Shenandoah, and AA-ere actuall}'
shipped for her on the 29tli. He says they aa'ci-c ' men of
intelligence, all trained soldiers,' and that ' it is not to be
believed that these men Avould haA'c taken service in the
Shenandoah if they believed the Avar Avas over.'
Even in Europe it Avas not universally thought that
the surrender of General Lee would immediatcl}' end the
war. 3IanA- AA-ere of the opinion that the scattered forces
in the south-Avest would be able to unite with the troops
under General Johnston, and that resistance might be
continued in the mountainous parts of North Carolina
and Southern 3di-ginia, and that it might even be possible
for 3Ir. Davis and the ExecutiAe Departments of the
Government to reach the Trans-3Iississippi States and
to maintain a defensiA-e warfare in Arkansas and Texas,
if not Avith the prospect of ultimately recovering the
lost ground, Avith at least the expectation of securing
favourable terms of peace. It was, however, soon
apparent to those of us abroad who knew the condition
of the country, and who perceived the impossibility of
keeping even a moderate force supplied A\dth the most
indispensable necessaries, that the mortal blow^ had been
struck, and that there could be no recovery.
Personally, I felt under a very grave responsibility
with reference to the Shenandoah, which I knew to be
far beyond the reach of all the ordinary channels by
which news is disseminated, and with Avhich it Avas im
possible to communicate by any means at my command.
When 3Ir. Davis was taken prisoner, and there was no
longer a Civdl Government to control the remnant of
the mihtary forces, or to conduct the negotiations for
peace, I felt satisfied that the time had arrived when it
was no longer possible to continue hostilities either with
safety or Avith credit. It was manifest that there Avas

156 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
no longer a raison d'etre for a Confederate cruiser, and
I felt impelled to make any effort that could be attempted
in order to stop the Shenandoah in her operations, which
might at any moment cease to be legitimate acts of war,
and become, by the common law of nations, that which
Mr. ScAvard had always affirmed them to be, although
he had never acted upon the allegation.
As soon as the arrest of Mr. Davis Avas known in
England, I communicated my views to 3Ir. James 31.
Mason, the diplomatic representative of the Confederate
States, and ventured to suggest that he should request
her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to
forward through the British Consuls, at several points
which I named, letters to the commander of the Shenan
doah, containing instructions which should be in accord
ance Avith the state of affairs. When I first mentioned
the subject to 3Ir. Mason, he thought the proposal
hardly practicable, but on the 13th of July, 1865, he
addressed me the following note : —
' 28, Grove Street, Leamington,
'June nth, 1865.
' Dear Sir, —
' Recalling our late couA^ersation about taking
measures to arrest the cruise ofthe Shenandoah, 1 think
the time has come when it should be attempted, and I
knoAV of no other mode than that vou sugg-ested, of
OO ¦
proposing to the Foreign Office here that the order
might be sent through that Department. If you con
cur, let me hear by note the several points to Avhich the
orders should be sent, and send me the form of the order,
Avhich, after examining, I will return to you.
'The order must of course be sent open to Earl
Russell, and therefore worded accordino-ly. I think it
O •/

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 157
should state that in the present posture of events in the
Confederate States, and the difficulty of communi
cating with any authority there, it had been determined
here, and Avitli my full sanction as the representative of
the Government, that the Avar should be discontinued on
the ocean. Y'ou Avill knoAv best Avhat order to give as
to the disposition of the ship and her materials. On
hearing from you I will write to Earl Russell, enclose
the orders, and inqufre Avhether his Government will
transmit them through their Consuls abroad.
' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) J. M. 3Iason.
' Captain James D. Bulloch,
' Liverpool.'
In my reply to 3Ir. 3Iason I forwarded to him the
order as suggested, atid the folloAAdng is a verbatim
copy. 'Liverpool, 19 th June, 1865.
' Sir,— ' On the 9th day of April last. General Lee was
forced to evacuate the lines of Petersburgh and Rich
mond, after three days of continuous and sanguinary
battle, and on the 14th of the same month, being sur
rounded by overwhelming numbers, he surrendered the
remnant of his army to General Grant, only, however,
when its last ration had been consumed and its mihtary
supplies were entirely exhausted. This event has been
followed consecutively by the surrender of Generals John
ston and Taylor, commanding the Confederate States
troops east of the Mississippi, and of General Kirby
Smith, the Commander-in-Chief of the Trans-Mississippi
Department.

158 TIIE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
' President Davis, Vice-President Stephens, and several
members of the Confederate Cabinet, have been arrested,
and are now held as close prisoners by the United States
Government. President Johnson has formally declared
the Avar to be at an end, and has removed all restrictions
upon foreign commerce by reopening the Southern ports
to general trade. Furthermore, the principal European
Powers have withdrawn the recognition of belligerent
rights accorded to the Confederate States in 1861, and
have forbidden the entry of vessels bearing the Con
federate flag into their ports for any purpose of repair or
supply. ' I have discussed the above circumstances with the
Honourable James M. Mason, the diplomatic repre
sentative of the Confederate States in England, and in
accordance with his opinion and advice I hereby direct
you to desist from any further destruction of United
States property upon the high seas, and from all offen
sive operations against the citizens of that country.
' Ignorance of the present condition of the Shenandoah,
and of the point at Avhich this letter may reach you,
renders it impossible to giA-e specific instructions in
regard to the disposal of the ship, but you can refer to a
letter in your possession dated October, 1864, for advice
on that point. Your first duty will be to take care of
the personnel of your command, and to pay off" and dis
charge the crew, with due regard to their safety and the
facilities for returning to their respectiA^e homes.
' The orders issued by the 3Iaritime Powers Avdth
regard to the treatment of Confederate slups hereafter
indicate that you would be allowed to enter any port
for the bond fide purpose of disarming- and dismantling
the Shenandoah, and that under such circumstances you
would enjoy the protection of the laws, so far at least as

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 159
the individual safety of yourself and the officers and
men of your command is concerned. If you have suffi
cient money to pay off your crcAv in full, direct the
paymaster to take receipts fi-om each man, Avhich shall
expressly waive all further claim against yourself or any
representative of the Confederate States on account of
pay or other emolument. If you liaA-e not money
enough to pay off in full, and cannot negotiate a bill on
England, pay to the extent of your funds, and give each
man an order on yom-self, payable in Liverpool, for
the balance due to him, and come here to settle your
account. ' The terms of a proclamation lately issued by the
President of the United States are such as to exclude
most of the officers of your command fi-om the privilege
of returning^ at once to their original homes, and I would
adA-ise all of you to come to Europe, or to await else
where the further dev-elopment of events in the United
States before v-enturing to go to any part of that country,
or to the Confederate States. Circumstances you will
readily understand, and the force of which you will
appreciate, compel me to be brief and general in these
instructions, and you Avdl therefore exercise your dis
cretion in arranging all details. I will remain in Liver
pool for an indefinite time, and you can communicate
Avith me at my usual address. ' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.
' Lieutenant Commanding James I. Waddell,
' Confederate States Ship Shenandoah.'
Mr. Mason forwarded the foregoing letter to the
Foreign Office, Avith an application for its transmission
through her Majesty's Consuls, and received a prompt

160 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
reply from the permanent Under-Secretary of State.
The subjoined are copies of the letter of 3Ir. Mason to
Earl Russell and the reply : — ' 28, Grove Street, Leamington,
'June 20th, 1865.
' My Lord, —
' It being considered important and right, in the
present condition of the Confederate States of America,
to arrest further hostile proceedings at sea in the war
against the United States, those having authority to do
so in Europe desire as speedily as practicable to com
municate with the Shenandoah, the only remaining Con
federate ship, in order to terminate her cruise. HaAdng no
means of doing this in the distant seas where that ship is
presumed now to be, I venture to inquire of youi- lordship
Avhether it will be agreeable to the Government of her
Majesty to allow this to be done through the British
Consuls at ports where the ship may be expected. I
have the honour to enclose hercAvith a copy of the order
it is proposed to transmit, and Arill be obliged if your
lordship will cause me to be informed AA-hether, upon
sending such orders unsealed to the Foreign Office, they
can be sent through the proper channels to the Consuls,
or other representatives of her 3Iajesty, at the points
indicated, to be by them transmitted, when opportunity
admits, to the officer in command of the Shenandoah.
These points are Nagasaki in Japan, Shanghai, and the
Sandwich Islands. I trust that your lordship Arill, fi-om
the exigency of the occasion, pardon the hberty I have
ventured to take, and Avill oblige me by having the
enclosed copy returned to me. ' I have, etc.,
' (Signed) J, M. 3Iason.'

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 161
'Foreign Office, June •2-2nd, 1S65.
' Sir, —
' I am directed bv Earl Russell to acknoAvledge
the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant, enclosing a
copy of a letter which you are desirous of having for
warded to the commander of the Shenandoah through
her 3Iajesty's representatiA-es and Consuls at the Sand
wich Islands, Nagasaki, and Shanghai, and I am to
state in reply that his lordship has no objection to send
ing this letter to the places named and to her Majesty's
colonial and naA'al authorities, it being always distinctly
understood that the Shenandoah will be dealt with in
the courts, if claimed, according to laAV. The enclosure
in your letter is returned herewith, as requested.
' I am, sir, etc.,
' (Signed) E. Hammond.'
In conformity with the terms of the foregoing letter,
several copies of the instructions to Lieutenant-Com
manding 3Yaddell were sent by Mr. Mason to the
Foreign Office, and he was informed that they would be
forwarded in due course. I feel justified in saying, and
it is proper that I should say, that the afore-mentioned
instructions were not sent to Lieutenant- Commanding
Waddell because of the belief that he needed an order,
or even a suggestion, to induce him to cease committing
hostilities upon the ocean the moment he received in
formation that they had ceased upon the land. But if
he conformed rigidly to the memorandum for the pro
gress of his cruise, it was not probable that he would
receive any reliable information until September, as he
would only have come down from the North Pacific to a
position one hundred miles north of Oahu on the 15th
of that month, and the vessels he was there expected to
VOL. II. 40

162 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
meet Avould themselves have been ever since the early
spring- in high latitudes, and Avould have known as little
as he did of the course of events in the United States.
There Avas also but a very faint expectation that the letters
forwarded through her 3Iajesty's Foreign Office would
reach him ; still it was thought to be right, not only as
a matter of policy, but of principle, to manifest a just
appreciation of the true condition of affairs, and to put
upon record the fact that those who had heretofore been
trusted Avith the power to organize naA-al expeditions
against the United States perceived when they ceased to
be either lawful or honest, and had done A\-hat was
possible to stop their depredations.
The Shenandoah left the Arctic Sea, and was clear
of Behring's Straits on the 29th of June, 1865. She
passed through the Aleutian chain of islands under
steam, and the course was shaped for the Californian
coast, but it Avas many days before she sighted a sail.
On the 2nd of August a A-essel was seen in the distance,
and as the Avind Avas light, and 3Yaddell was very de
sirous to speak her, steam AA-as ordered, and the Shenan
doah stood towards her. The vessel proved to be the
British barque Barracouta., fourteen days from San
Francisco. She hove to, received a boat from the
Shefiandoah, and startled those on board with the report,
or rather with the definite information, that all the Con
federate armies had surrendered, that 3lr. DaA-is and
several of his Cabinet were prisoners — that, in fact, the
Confederate Government had ceased to exist as a de fwto
PoAver, and that the authority of the United States had
become paramount from the Potomac to the Gidf of
Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Rio Grande.
It will be admitted, even after the calm reflection of
seventeen years, that the commander of the Shenandoah

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 163
Avas in a critical and perplexing position. There never
had been so sudden and so total a subversion of one
national sovereignty and the substitution of another.
On the morning of that 2nd of August, 3Vaddell justly
thought that his commission conferred the right to
defend his ship against all comers on the high seas, to
take her to any neuti-al port, and to claim every privilege
that could be asked by any belligerent. Before the sun
set on that day, the document had become a Avorthless
piece of paper : he coidd not fire a shot, CA^en to save his
crew fi-om capture, and he could enter no port for shelter,
except as a political refugee or a A'oluntary captive.
In the temper then prcA-ailing in the United States,
it would have been a Avilful and blind submission to
harsh and vindictive impi-isonment, if nothing worse, to
take the Shenandoah to an American port. There can
be no doubt that immediately upon the final cessation
of hostilities the great majority of the people of the
Northern States settled themselves down to their ordi
nary pursuits Avithout giving much thought to the
manner in which the GoA-ernment would adjust matters
at the South ; and the treatment ofthe Southern leaders,
as well as the 'reconstruction' of the several State
Governments, was left m the hands of those politicians
who had obtained the control of the Republican Party,
and whose animosity against the South, and especially
against the most prominent men of the South, Avas
manifestly vindictive and of a personal character. No
one can read the speeches of several members of the
Senate and House of Representatives at that time (there
would be no difficulty in mentioning more than one
name), or can recur to the indignities and iniquities
committed by the ' carpet-bag ' Governors and Federal
ciAdl officers who were thrust upon the Southern States,
40—2

164 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
AAdthout admitting the truth of the foregomg propo
sition. The arrest and long confinement of 3Ir. Jefferson
Davis in a casemate at Fortress Monroe Avas a palpable
manifestation of vindictive personal malice and revenge.
The Government of the United States had treated Arith
him for four years on terms of absolute political equality,
they had over and over again acknoAvledged him as the
head of a de facto Government, and the President of the
United States, with the Secretary of State, had both
gone personally to Fortress Mom-oe, and had there
negotiated with the agents and representatiA-es of 3Ir.
Davis in reference to a plan of reunion. To treat him
as a malefactor was contrary to every principle of
honourable warfare ; to have arraigned him for treason
would haA^-e shocked the sense of justice, and would have
aroused the indignant remonstrance, of all civihzed
peoples, whatever might have been the seeming acqui
escence which diplomatic restraint imposes upon Foreign
Governments. It would haA-e been, and it was, indeed,
equally impossible to sustain any criminal charge against
him, because the preposterous and wicked insmuation
that he had permitted cruelty to prisoners-of-war, and
that he had the faintest possible complicity with the
assassination of President Lincoln, was scouted by CA-ery
honourable man in Europe, and Avas probably ncA-er
believed by any honest man in the United States.
Mr. Davis had been too long and too prominently
before the world to have escaped close observation and
criticism. His intellectual qualities and his moral attri
butes were not unknoAvn in Europe. His speeches in
the Senate ofthe LTnited States, especially those delivered
shortly before the time of secession, and his State papers
as the President of the Confederacy, Avere familiar to the

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 16,'.
educated classes in England, and even to manv in Con-
tinental Europe, and every sentiment expressed in them
would liaA-e served as a Avitnoss against the charges of
O O
treason and guilt which Avere insinuated, but never
boldly alleged, against him. At the end of a long and
tedious imprisonment, A\-hicli permanently impaired his
health, he was unconditionally released, Avithout any
official explanation of the causes for his confinement or
an honourable public withdraAval of the insinuations
which had been adA-ertised in the Party press. No other
judgment can tlierefore be pronounced upon the pro
ceedings against him than that they were suggested by
personal malice and enforced by Adndictive malevolence.
I should be A-ery sorry to thmk that the majority of
the people of the North approA-ed of the treatment of
3Ir. DaA-is or the • Reconstruction Policy ' of the domi
nant Party leaders ; but they made a grave mistake in
permitting the professional politicians to have their way
Avithout a check or remonstrance. The course pursued
by them inflicted more and deeper Avounds upon the
Southern heart than all the ravages of the actual
struggle, and has delayed by many years the restoration
of mutual confidence, even if it has' not wholly and for
ever destroyed the belief in the advantages, security, and
happiness to be obtained by a Federal Union and a
written Constitution.
There Avere thousands of persons at the South who
had no personal acquaintance with 3Ir. Davis, and were
not drawn to him by any ties of common friendship, or
early associations. I had never even seen him, except
during one short official interview in 31ay, 1861. But
every man with a scintilla of chivalry in his heart rebels
against the shame of expiating his own alleged faults
through the sufferings of a felloAV-creature, whoever he

166 TIIE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
may be. Every Southerner Avorthy of the least con
sideration looked upon Mr. Davis as a victim through
Avhom the Avhole South Avas being punished, and every
indignity inflicted upon him was felt to be an affront
and an indignity to all.
When the people of any country are content to give
their thoughts and energies Avholly to private occupa
tions, Avhether those occupations are for the accumula
tion of wealth or the pursuit of pleasure, and are Avilling
to leave the Government in the hands of those who make
politics a trade and the privileges and emoluments of
office their aim, that country vrill and does cease to enjoy
the true and honourable fruits of freedom. The masses
who possess the much-A'aunted right of franchise neither
select their representatives nor Avatch their conduct after
wards. The ' Caucus ' dictates who shall fill the pubhc
offices, and the so-called ' 3Iachine ' directs the pohcy of
the Government. Hence it is that a small chque of un
scrupulous but clever, energetic men, acting as the legally
chosen representatives of a majority, but often wholh-
out of accord with the best men of their Party, may and
do bring shame and disgrace upon the institutions of
their country, and have giA^en grounds for the opinion,
often expressed in these latter years, that tliere is no
tyranny so unreasonable, so unprincipled, so intolerable,
as that of a mere majority. Any careful reader of
current political history Avill be impressed Avith the con
viction that the chief danger to the perpetuity of tiie
American Union in its present form hes in the tendency
of the educated and Avealthy to be content with the
personal luxuries Avhich appear to be easily obtained in
that favoured land, and Avho find their jiatriotic hopes
exalted, if not Avholly satisfied, by the rapid proo-ress in
material wealth Avhich they behold on every side.

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 167
The foregoing reflections did not probably pass
through Waddell's mind in their entirety Avlien he got
the Barracouta' s ncAvs of the downfall of the Confederate
GoA-ernment, but he kncAV that he and all Avith him, and
like him. had been denounced in State documents and
Consular reports as ' pirates.' He kncAV that 3Ir.
Sewai'd had only been restrained from treating- Con
federate prisoners to the doom of traitors and buccaneers
by the plain and resolute threat of retaliation, and noAV
that so wholesome a deterrent had been removed, he
thought it more than likel}- that the favourite maxim
might be coiiA-erted into a practical deed, and that if the
Slaniindoah was surrendered to the United States, he
might be made a A-ictim to illustrate the soundness of a
theory which had not been abandoned, but only held in
abeyance. After some deliberation he determined to take
the ship to Liverpool, confident that Avhatever responsi-
bdities he had incurred, or Avhatever faults he might
have inadvertently committed, he would at the hands of
a British 3Iinistry and before an English Court receive
impartial consideration and a fair, equitable hearing.
The ' British Constitution ' is the freest system of
restraints and privileges that has ever been devised by
man for his own pohtical control. Perhaps its great
merit is to be found in the fact that it is not a mere
compilation of hard-and-fast rules and precepts. It is
not a formal arrangement of clauses dogmatically de
fining the priAdleges of the people and limiting the
power of the CroAvn. It is often appealed to Avith pride
and satisfaction by Britons of all classes at home, and
it is equally the object of admiration and desire by
oppressed nationalities the whole world over, and yet
neither statesman nor jurist can precisely define its
limits or prescribe the boundary of its action.

168 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
The phrase ' British Constitution ' appears to be as
broad as the British Empire and as elastic as the air of
the British Isles. It never has been compressed into a
distinct code, and has never been ratified by any Con
vention of the Estates of the liealm, or by appeal to a
popular vote. Consecutive Acts of Parliament, decisions
of the highest Courts of Appeal, and precedents founded
by Cabinets and confirmed by their successors, ever
since the days of Magna Charta, all taken together, con
stitute, I suppose, what is meant by the ' British Consti
tution,' and the power to change or modify it by the
same processes, Avithout any A-iolent wrench, or any
special appeal to the masses, whether in corporate or
ganizations or as a huge democracy, probably accounts
for the satisfactory manner in which it has hitherto
worked. The freedom of the British Constitution has some
practical drawbacks. It permits, mdeed it appears to
have originated and confirmed, a system of circumlocu
tion and ' red tape ' in the management of pubhc busi
ness which is often inconvenient, and it certainly cannot
be said to have obliterated the tendency to indiAddual
crime which is unhappily common to the whole human
race. But no fair critic of national institutions can, I
think, refuse to admit that there is no country in which
questions involving the priAdleges or rights of private
persons, the liberty and property of the subject, or his
punishment if need be, the freedom and protection of the
alien, or his extradition and surrender if demanded, are
so fairly and justly considered upon'^their merits, and
Avithout a thought of expediency or an}- fear of con
sequences, as in Great Britain. British 3linisters are
not immaculate — they are sometimes Aveak and vacil
lating, as the late Confederate GoA^ernment found to its

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 169
cost ; but there is throughout all liritain a general and
instinctiA-e antipathy to political ' jobs,' and a 3Iinister
or anyone in pubhc office who attempted to practise
them AA-ould soon find the British public on the scent,
and he would be run to earth, dug- out, and ignomi-
O ^ O
niously cast among the rubbish of damaged reputations.
The confidence of the British pubhc in the personal
integrity of those who administer the Government, not
only in the high offices of State and on the Bench, but
who manage the executiA-e departments and are the
permanent officials, is a fact that cannot escape the
notice of all who habitually take note of national charac
teristics, and that fact serves to demonstrate that the
pohtical institutions of Great Britain are sound in theory,
and that they are still in unison with the best instincts
ofthe age.
In order to manifest his full understanding of the
change in his oAvn position and in the character of his
ship in consequence of the Barracemtd s report, Waddell
at once disarmed the Shenandoah by dismounting the
guns and lowering them, AAdth all their gear and appur
tenances, below. The ports A\-ere closed, the funnel
whitewashed, and the ship was again, to all external
appearance, an ordinary mercantile scrcAv- steamer.
Having determined to bring the ship to England, no
time was lost by detours or stoppages for any purpose.
Vessels were occasionally passed, but no heed was paid
to them except on one occasion, when a change of course
at night and the use of both sail and steam was resorted
to for the purpose of parting company.
On the morning of November 5th, 1865, Tuskar was
made, being the first land sighted since taking a de
parture from the Aleutian Islands, at the entrance to
Behring's Sea, and the next day, November 6th, the

170 TSE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Shenandoah let go her anchor in the Mersey about half
a cable's length astern of her Majesty's ship Donegal.
The officers had left Liverpool just thirteen months
before, inspirited by the prospects of an adA^enturous
cruise and the hope of performing some useful service
for their country. They Avere now again at their start
ing-point, but Avith very different hopes, and not without
some misgivings. As soon as possible after anchoring,
Waddell communicated with Captain Paynter, the com
mander of the Donegal, informed him that the object in
bringing the Shenandoidi to Liverpool Avas to place her
in the possession of her 3Iajesty's GoA^ernment for such
disposition as might be proper and legal, and handed
him an official letter, addressed to Earl Russell, setting
forth all the facts and circumstances of the case, which
he requested Captain Paynter to forward.
The Shenandoah was immediately placed under de
tention by the officers of Customs, a party of men
from the Donegcd Avas put on board of her, and the gun
boat Goshawk was lashed alongside. Mr. Adams, the
United States 3Iinister, Avas promptly informed by the
Consul at LiA'erpool of the Shenandoah's arriA-al at that
port, and on the Tth of November, 1865, he wrote a
letter to the Earl of Clarendon, who was then the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the subject.
3Ir. Adams did not make a formal demand for the sur
render of the Shenan.doah to the United States, because,
as it appears from his letter, he Avas ' Avithout special
instructions respecting this case,' nor did he suggest that
Lieutenant-Commanding Waddell and the officers and
crcAv should be treated as pirates, although he alludes to
the ship as ' this corsair.' He Avas content to ask Lord
Clarendon to take such measures as might be necessary
to secure the property on board, and to take possession of

cox ELDER A TE ST A TES IN E UROPE. ] 7 1
the vessel Avith the AieAV to dehvov her to the United
States in due course. 3Ir. Adams's letter, Avith that of
Lieutenant-Commanding 3Y added, and other documents
relating to the Shenandoah, Avere referred to the laAv
officers of the CroAvn on the same day (November 7th,
1865). The laAv officers 'advised' in substance as
follows* : — ' We think it will be proper for her 31ajesty's
GoA-ernment, in comphance Avith 3Ir. Adams's request, to
dehver up to lum, on behalf of the GoA-ernment of the
United States, the ship in question, with her tackle,
apparel, ere. and all captured chronometers or other
property capable of being identified as prize-of-war,
which may be found on board her. ... With respect to
the officers and crcAv ... if the facts stated by Captain
WaddeU are true, there is clearly no case for any prose
cution on the gTound of piracy in the courts of this
country, and we presume that her 3Iajesty's Govern
ment are not in possession of any evidence Ai-hich could
be produced before any court or magistrate, for the
purpose of contravening the statement or of showing
that the crime of piracy has, in fact, been committed. . . .
With respect to any of the persons on board the Shenan
doah who cannot be immediately proceeded against and
detained under legal Avarrant upon any criminal charge,
we are not aware of any ground upon Avhich they can
properly be prcA-ented from going on shore and dis
posing of themselves as they think fit, and we cannot
adAdse her 3Iajesty's Government to assume or exercise
the power of keeping them under any kind of restraint.'
On a sub.sequent reference of the case, the laAv officers
advised again as folloAvs : — ' 3Vith respect to the question
whether the officers and crcAV of the Shenandoah may
* For the letter of Mr. Adams and the opinion of the law officers,
see 'British Case,' pp. 157, 158.

172 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
now be permitted to leave the ship and go on shore, we
have only to repeat the opinion expressed in our report
of yesterday's date, namely, that these persons, being
now in this country and entitled to the benefit of our
laAvs, cannot be detained except under legal warrant
upon some criminal charge dul}' preferred against them in
the ordinary course of the law^ If her 3Iajesty's GoA^ern-
ment are noAv in possession, or consider it probable that,
if an information Avere laid before a magistrate, they
Avould shortly be in possession of evidence against any
of these persons sufficient to justify their committal for
trial, either upon any charge of misdemeanour under the
Foreign Enlistment Act or upon the graver charge of
piracy, Ave think it would be right and proper to take the
necessary proceedings Avithout delay, in order to have
such charge duly investigated ; but at the present time
Ave are not informed of any such evidence in the posses
sion or poAver of her 3Iajest}-'s Government by which
such a charge would be likely to be established.'
The ' laAV officers' avIio gaA-e the foregfoing adAdce and
opinions, and Avhose names are attached to the docu
ments,* AA-ere Sir Roundell Palmer, Sir R. P. Collier, and
Sir Robert Phillimore. The first is iioav Lord Selborne,
Lord Chancellor of England, the second is noAv a member
of the Judicial Committee ofthe PriA'y Council, and the
third is Judge of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty
Division of the Supreme Court of Judicature. These
eminent laAvyers and judges liaA'ing declared that they
Avere not aAvare of any ground upon which the officers
and crcAV of the Shenandoah, could be indicted either for
a misdemeanour under the Foreign Enlistment Act or
for piracy, it may be assumed that those AA'ho bought
and despatched the Sea King from England Avere equally
* See ' British Case,' p. 158.

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 173
free from liability for violation of any English municipal
hiAv, and the charge of fitting out ' piratical expeditions '
fi-om Great Britain must also fill to the ground in
this case, as in all others in reference to Avhich that pre
posterous allegation has been made. All the parties
having anything to do A\dth the purchase, building, or
despatch ofthe Alabama, I^lorida, and Shenandoah were,
and continued to be, residents of England, and Avere
both amenable to the hiAv and AAdthin its reach. It is
manifest fi-om the opinions of the law officers of the
CroTvn that the numerous affidaAdts supplied by the
American Consuls contained no vahd evidence, and that
the Government instituted no proceedings because there
was no proof upon which to base an indictment.
It should be mentioned, as part of the history of the
Shenandoah, that when Captain Corbett, who took her
out as the Sea_ Iving and dehvered her to Lieutenant
Waddell off 3Iadefra, returned to England, he was
arre-ted, taken before a magistrate, and committed for
trial, upon the affidavits of some of the seamen, who
aUeged that he had attempted to enlist them, or to in
duce them to enlist, for the Confederate service. He was
tried for this alleged violation of the Foreign Enlistment
Act before the Lord Chief Justice and a special jury.
The evidence produced at the trial Avas very conflicting.
Several Avitnesses who had sailed in the ship Avete
examined for the defence, and they contradicted on
many material points the verbal testimony and the
depositions which were offered in support of the prose
cution. They stated on oath that Captain Corbett took
no part in the endeavours to induce the men to enlist,
and their statements were fully confirmed by the report
sent me at the time by Lieutenant Waddell ; in fact, he
complained of the lukewarmness of Captain Corbett, and

174 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
explicitly affirmed that he did nothing to help in providing
a crew for the Shenandoah. The jury acquitted Captain
Corbett, and no other legal proceedings were ever taken
in England in respect to the Sea Iving (^Shenandoah) or
her consort, the I^aurel.
In consequence of the opinion of the law officers of
the Crown Avhich has been quoted above, instructions
Avere sent to Captain Paynter, commanding her 31ajesty's
ship Donegcd-i Avho Avas in charge of the Shenandoedi.,
to release all the officers and men who were not ascer
tained to be British subjects. Captaui Paynter reported,
on the Sth NoA-ember, that, on receiving instructions to
the above effect, he Avent on board the Shenandoah, and,
being satisfied that there were no British subjects among
the crcAV, or at least none whom it could be proved
were British subjects, he permitted all hands to land
Avith their private effects. On the 9th of NoA^ember
Captain Paynter had an interview with the American
Consul in a tug alongside of the Shenandoah, and
arranged Avith him for the deliA^ery of the ship to
anyone he might appoint to take charge. On the
10th of November, 1865, a Captain Freeman went on
board, under orders from 3Ir. Dudley, the United States
Consul, and the Shenandoah was delivered OA-er to him
by the commander of her 3Iajesty's gunboat Goshawk,
who was then in charge ; and thus ended the career of
the last of the Confederate cruisers, Avhicli durino- the
' O
three previous years had wrought such ruin to American
commerce, and had incidentally helped so much to in
crease the supremacy of the British mercantile marine.*
Mr. ScAvard, 31r. Adams, and the Consuls, in their
* For details of the surrender of the ship to the United States,
see Lieutenant Alfred Cheek's letter and Captain Paynter's state
ment, 'British Case,' p. 159, etc.

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 175
reports and complaints in respect to Confederate cruisers,
dAvelt strongly, persistently, and tauntingly upon the
allegation that the ci-cavs of those vessels Avere British
subjects illegally engaged to Avage Avar upon a friendly
Power ; and more than a month after the surrender of
the Shenandoah to the United States and the dispersion
of her crew, 3Ir. Adams sent to the Earl of Clarendon a
deposition made by one Temple, Avho alleged that he
had served in her throughout the cruise. The object of
Mr. Adams appears to haA-e been to prove from this
man's affidavit that the crcAV of the Shenandoah were
chiefly British subjects, and that therefore they should
not have been released, but should have been tried for
violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act. Why he
should have urged a reopening of such a question so
long after the particular event, and so many months
after the end of the war, it is difficult at first to perceive ;
but as the matter was brought up again before the
Tribunal of Arbitration, the purpose of 3Ir. Adams Avas
probably to put on official record a point which the
representatives of the United States could refer to at any
future time.
In the ' Case ' presented on behalf of the Government
of her Britannic 3Iajesty to the Tribunal of Arbitration,
the aboA-e-mentioned deposition of Temple, which was
sent by 3Ir. Adams to the Earl of Clarendon, Avas re
ferred to in these words : — ' It was clearly shown, how
ever, that Temple was a person unworthy of credit, and
some of his statements in his depositions were ascertained
to be gross falsehoods. The crcAv of the Shenandoah, if
Temple's CAddence were to be believed, included Ameri
cans, Prussians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Danes, 31alays,
and Sandwich Islanders. About fifty men AA-ere stated
by him to have joined her from United States ships.'
VOL. II.**

176 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
The affidavit of Temple Avas a fair example of the
evidence and the witnesses generally tendered by the
United States Consuls to her Majesty's Government,
and it is not surprising that the laAv officers looked
upon all such Consular documents with distrust. They
accepted and acted upon them for the purposes of the
'•Alexandra Case,' and the result AA-as an ignominious
exposure on the part of the witnesses, a verdict for
the defendants which stands to this day as a complete
contradiction of the allegations against the Confederate
agents, and a bill of costs and damages amounting to
nearly £4,000, which her 3lajesty's Government had
to pay, and Avluch the United States ought to have
recouped out of the £3,000,000 awarded them at
Geneva, seeing that the suit against the Alexandra
Avas instituted at their request and in thefr interest, and
Avith the expectation that they could make good their
depositions. It has been already stated that there is no purpose in
this narrative to defend or to explain the conduct of her
Majesty's Government with any reference to the claims
set up by the United States, or the allegations of neglect
to enforce the conditions of the Foreign Enlistment Act
and the Neutrality Proclamation against Confederate
agents and Confederate ships, Avhich the representatiA'-es
of the United States brought against the British authori
ties both at home and in the Colonies. But it so happens
that the charges of ' nefarious,' ' illegal,' and ' criminal '
conduct on the part of the Confederate agents, AAdth
AA^hich the American State Papers are so highly seasoned,
are also used Avitli the purpose to coiiAdct her 3Iajesty's
GoA-ernment of unfriendliness to the United States and
of partiality to the Confederacy, and thus the counter-
statements and arguments necessar}- to refute the charges

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 177
of illegality and crime alleged against one party, serve
undesignedly as an explanation and defence of the
neglect and partiahty imputed to the other.
It is necessary that a few of the charges and com
plaints alluded to above should be specifically mentioned,
in order that the conditions under which Confederate
cruisers were equipped and kept at sea may be clearly
understood. One of the allegations of the United States
was that Confederate ships were permitted to enlist men
in British ports, and CA-en so late as June, 1882, an
article appeared in the American Army and Navy
Register, a paper purporting to be the organ of the
United States army and naA-y, in which it is stated that
the crew of the Alabama were men fi-om her Majesty's
ship Excellent, the gunnery- school ship of the Royal
Navy. As a matter of fact, not a single man was ever enlisted
in a British port for a Confederate ship. The nucleus
of the Alabama's crew was composed of the men who
sailed in the Enrica and the Bahama to Terceira.
They were the ordinary sea-faring men who can be got
together at any time in a large port like Liverpool, and
were engaged to navigate a private ship on a specified
voyage which was perfectly legal in itself Four or five
men who had been to the Confederate States in the
Fingal were taken out to join the Alabama, and those
few probably suspected that they would somehow or
other find thefr way into the Confederate service ; but
in no case was any man informed that he would be
asked to do anything or to go anywhere not specified in
the shipping articles signed by him until he was far
beyond British jurisdiction, or any responsibility which
could be attached to her Majesty's Government in
respect to his enlistment. No threat or unpleasant
VOL. II. 41

178 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
alternative was ever held out to a single man to induce
him to enlist, and in every case the engagement was
purely and wholly voluntary.
The difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of
men by ordinary and legal shipment of the crews was
so great, that in every instance the cruisers were com
pelled to leave their rendezvous short-handed, and they
filled up their number to the necessary fighting comple
ment by means of voluntary enlistments from the
American crews found on board the captured ships.
That the enlistments were voluntary, and that the men
were kindly treated, is abundantly proved by the good
discipline on board the Confederate A'essels-of-war, and
the remarkable fidelity of the men to the officers who
commanded them and to the flag under AVhich thcA' had
O t,
agreed to serve. No set of men could have behaA^ed
better than the crew of the Alabama. They showed
steadiness and pluck in the engagement vrith the
Kearsarge, and conducted themseh^es with admirable
sobriety and obedience when brought on shore fi-om the
sunken ship. One of them, named 3Iichael 3Iars (he
deserves this mention), volunteered to take charge of
some important papers for Captain Semmes. He put
them inside of the breast of his 'frock,' and jumped
overboard from the sinking ship. 33dien picked up and
carried to the Deerhound, he handed the parcel to his
commander, just as he would have delivered a package
in the ordinary course of duty.
When the Florida Avent into Bahia in October, 1864,
one watch was permitted to go on shore on liberty.
The men came on board at the appointed time Avith
out any desertion. At the time of her capture by
the Wachusett, the port-Avatch — some sixty odd men —
were on shore. They came to England with then- com-

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 179
mander, and after arrival a large number of them Avrote
me a letter requesting to be sent to some other Con
federate ship, or if not, to the Confederac}-, and express
ing a readiness to serA'c • their country ' Avhenever it
might be thought necessary. I liaA'-e the above docu
ment in my possession noAv. It is signed by every
petty officer in the port-watch, with his rating annexed
to his name, and by twenty-eight A.B.'s and ordinary
seamen as well. The behaAdour of the Shenandoah' s
crew- ui preserving then- discipline and bringing- the
ship to LiA-erpool Avithout questioning the authority of
Waddell, when they were informed of the collapse of the
Government they had enlisted to serve, may also be
mentioned. It has never been alleged, so far as I knoAv, that a
single prize was ever plimdered, or that the men show^ed
any disposition to plunder which required special and
severe restraint. If there CA-er has been such an insinua
tion, the aUegation is wholly untrue, and could be easily
disproved. In the one single case of the Shenandoah
it has been admitted that some men were added to her
crew at 3Ielbourne, but they stowed themselves away,
and were not discovered until the ship was at sea, and
so CA-en in that instance they were not enlisted within
British jurisdiction.
Pressed crews, or men enlisted under false pretences,
or through ' criminal ' and ' nefarious ' concealments,
would not have remained faithful under all the trying
cfrcumstances in which the Confederate cruisers were
placed. For six or seven years after the war I often
met a man just in from a voyage, Avho would remind me
Avith evident satisfaction that he Avas one of the ' old
Alabama's,' or some other Confederate cruiser. Often
one or more would call especially as if to report, and
41—2

180 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
they seemed to think it quite natural to advise me of
their whereabouts and doings.
Such incidents are among the agreeable and comfort
ing reflections in respect to a Avar which has left but
few gratifying reminiscences. They suggest that there
must have been some inherent right and justice in the
cause which could arouse so much fidehty among its
voluntary partizans abroad, as well as so much self-
sacrificing courage and endurance at home, or else they
must be taken as a tribute to the tact and judgment, the
suavity and kindly severity of the Confederate naval
officers, who AA'ere able to keep their ships in disciphne,
and yet to inspire the men with confidence and devotion
to their adopted flag.
Another complaint of the United States was that the
British and Colonial authorities permitted ' excessiA-e
hospitalities ' to Confederate cruisers, and practised in
some instances ' discourtesies to vessels-of-war of the
United States.' The above complaint was placed in the
' Case of the United States ' presented to the Tribunal
of Arbitration in the form of a specific charge against
her Majesty's Government, and it was alleged that the
rules adopted for the treatment of belligerent vessels
' were utterly disregarded ' in the case of Confederate
ships-of-war, and were ' rigidly enforced against the
United States.' The specifications in support of the
complaint Avere chiefly in reference to the permission
given to Confederate ships to obtain coal in British
ports, Avhereby they were able to continue their cruises.
It does not concern me to reply generally to the com
plaints of ' excessive hospitalities ' to one side, and ' dis
courtesies ' to the other. Those who are anxious on the
subject will find the groundlessness ofthe charges fully
demonstrated in the British ' Counter-Case.' I will

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 181
confine myself exclusively to the complaints Avhich refer
to the visits of Confederate ships to British ports, and
the supply of coal they Avere permitted to receive.
Dm-ing the course of the Avar the total number of visits
paid by Confederate ships to British home or Colonial
ports was twenty -five, eleven of which Avere made for
the purpose of effecting necessary repairs to engines.
Coal was obtained on sixteen of the twenty-five visits,
and on sixteen occasions the limit of stay fixed by the
regulations was exceeded by special permission or by
order. In one of the cases, howcA^er, the excess was
only two hom-s, and in one it was enforced in order to
giA'c an American merchant A-essel the advantage of
twenty-four hours' start. The total amount of coal
obtained by Confederate cruisers in British ports was in
round numbers 2,800 tons.
Let us now refer to the other side. The official re
turns — which, however, are said to have been necessarily
incomplete — shoAv an aggregate total of 228 visits of
United States ships to British ports. On thirteen of
these repairs were permitted, on forty-five coal was
obtained, and the hmit of stay prescribed by the regula
tions Avas exceeded forty-four times. The returns of the
quantity of coal received by each United States ship are
so imperfect that it is impossible to arrive at the precise
aggregate amount obtained by all of them, but it is
specificaUy stated in the British 'Counter-Case' that the
United States ship Vanderbilt alone took on board
' 2,000 tons v:ithin the spiace ef less than two months^
which is more than two-thirds of the whole amount
obtained by all the Confederate ships put together.
When it is remembered that the United States ships had
fi-ee access to their own ports, often Avithin a few hundred
miles of the places where they were permitted to obtain

182 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
coal, Avhile the Confederate ships were AA'holly dependent
upon the foreign supply, it Avill be manifest that the
complaints are easily shoAvn to have been groundless.
In the ' Case of the United States ' it is specifically
charged that in three instances Confederate ships Avere
alloAved to coal in British ports in contravention of the
regulations of January 31st, 1862, but in the British
' Counter -Case' it is proved that the coaling of the
Florida at Barbadoes was the only instance which could
be considered a departure from those rules. In the
above-named instance, the Governor permitted the
Florida to obtain a supply of coal within the limits of
the regulations upon the report of her commander that
he had run short from stress of weather.
It will be perceived that the United States were only
able to specify three instances in which the regulations
were relaxed in favour of Confederate ships, and those
cases have been reduced in point of fact to one, and that
of doubtful application. But how stands the case with
reference to United States ships ? Let it be borne m
mind that, according to the regulations referred to, no
vessel of either belligerent could obtam coal from a
British or colonial port until the expiration of three
months from the date of her last supply at the same or
any ther British port. In the British ' Counter-Case,'
pp. 117, 118, it is stated that the United States ship
Vanderbilt obtained at St. Helena, 18th of August, 1863,
400 tons of coal ; at Simon's Bay, 3rd of September,
1,000 tons ; at Mauritius, 24th of September, 618 tons.
Thus, within a period of but little more than one month,
this United States ship obtained coal at three British
colonial ports, in direct contravention of the regulations.
But this is not all — the United States ships Tu.scarora,
ICearsarge, Sacramento, Wyoming, Narraganset, Wachusett,

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 183
Mohican, and Dacotah are inentioned as havin"- been
permitted to obtain coal within the prescribed period.
The Sacramento is stated to have practised a ruse to
evade the regulations. After coaling at Cork between
July 28di and August 1st, 1864, she Avas alloAved to
receiA'e 25 tons more at Plymouth on the 16th of
August, and 30 tons more were sent to her fi-om Dover by
the United States Consul, in a vessel which left Avithout
clearance for the purpose. There are other cases of
CA'asion of the regulations by United States ships men
tioned in the British case, but the foregoing are sufficient,
when contrasted AAdth the privileges granted to Con
federate ships, to utterly quash the charges, and discredit
the complaints of ¦ excessive hospitalities ' to Confederate
cruisers and " discourtesies to vessels-of-war of the
United States.' which were so often and so petulantly
made by 3Ir. Seward and his Consuls, and appear to
haA-e been recklessly repeated in the formal legal argu
ment presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration.
It does not appear from the published documents
attached to the proceedings at Geneva that the United
States sent auA' ships in pursuit or in search of the
Shenandoah. She was permitted to sail round the
world, and destroy many American ships in a dehberate
manner, and according to a fixed programme, and never
saAv a L'nited States A'essel-of-Avar. During the two
years' cruise of the Alabama .she was met by only two
United States ships until she voluntarily went out of
Cherbourg to engage the Kearsarge. One of the two
was the Hatteras, Avhich she sunk, and the other was the
San Jacinto, too powerful a ship to engage, and from
which she escaped by a ruse.
The Florida Avas compelled to remain at Brest from
August, 1863, until February, 1864 ; and her presence

184 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
there was so well known that the United States ship
Kearsarge was sent to watch her. The Kearsarge ap
peared off, or came into, Brest Roads, September 17th,
October 30th, November 27th, December llth and 27th,
1863, and January 3rd, 1864. At the last-named date
the Florida was at anchor in the roadstead, to all appear
ance ready for sea ; but for some reason the Kearsarge
disappeared, and when she returned the Florida had
sailed. The Florida's cruise after leaving Brest, her
' raid ' to within thirty miles of the Capes of the Dela
ware, her subsequent run through the equatorial ' forks '
of the great maritime roadway, and her arrival at Bahia,
have been narrated in a previous chapter ; but during all
of this period of eight months she ncA^er saw a United
States ship-of-war until she found the Wachusett lyuig
idly at anchor in the last-named port. If the Wachusett
had been in the right place, she would probably haA-e
met the Florida in the open sea, there would have been
a fair fight, and the discreditable occurrence at Bahia
would have been avoided.
It does appear extraordinary that, with the large naval
force which the United States controlled during- the war,
O '
a fcAV Confederate ships should have been permitted to
cruise through the two great oceans at will, and to
destroy so many vessels just AA-liere any intelhgent naA-al
officer would know where to find them, and Avhere it
should have been known that the hostile cruisers would
be sent. I have not been able to obtain all the returns of
captured ships. The Florida's papers were nearly all
lost, and some of the other ships did not send regular
reports, and at the sudden termination of the war there
Avere many other things to think of, and a precise record
Avas not made. From the documents noAV in my pos
session, or Avhich have been submitted to my inspection

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 185
in past years, it appears that the regular Confederate
cruisers destroyed one hundred and seventy-five vessels ;
and this number does not include the vessels captured
and destroyed by Lieutenants -Commanding J. T. Wood
and John Wilkinson in their short dashes out of Wil
mington Avith the Tallahassee and Chickamauga.
But this was not the whole ofthe injury inflicted upon
American commerce by the few Confederate cruisers.
In the ' Case of the United States ' presented to the
Tribunal of Arbitration, some startling figures are given
to Ulusti-ate the indfrect damage. On p. 130 of the
above-mentioned document it is stated ' that while in
1860 two-thirds of the commerce of New York were
carried on in American bottoms, in 1863 three-fourths
were carried on in foreign bottoms.' On the same
page there is an account of the number and tonnage
of American A-essels which were registered in the
United Kingdom and in British North America
(namely, transferred to the British flag) to avoid cap
ture, from which I extract the following : — ' In 1861,
vessels 126, tonnage 71,673 ; in 1862, vessels 135, ton
nage 64,578 ; in 1863, vessels 348, tonnage 252,579 ;
in 1864, vessels 106, tonnage 92,052.'
I can conscientiously affirm that this destruction of
private property, and diversion of legitimate commerce,
was painful to those whose duty it Avas to direct and to
inflict it. But the United States have always practised
that mode of harassing an enemy ; and Mr. Bolles says,
in his article in reference to the proposed trial of Admiral
Semmes, that they Avould do so again under like circum
stances. It is greatly to be regretted that when the
United States wrung the Treaty of Washington from
Great Britam in 1871, and brought her Majesty's
Government before a great International Court of Arbi-

186 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
tration, the proposition to exempt private property
from destruction at sea in future wars AA-as not dis
cussed and definitely determined. Unfortunately, that
treaty and the important conclave of eminent statesmen
and jurists at Geneva haA^e settled nothing in respect to
international laAv that has any binding force upon any
Power except Great Britain and the United States, and
upon them only for the specific purposes of the treaty,
because her Majesty's Government not only agreed to
be judged by rules manufactured for the occasion, and not
applicable to neutral duties as commonly understood,
but her Majesty's Ministers Aveakened, if they did not
wholly destroy, their case in advance by imprudent
speeches in public, and by indiscreet admissions, as weU
as by a strange and unstatesmanlike A'^acillation that
gave their adversary in the case an advantage which
was manifest to all who were interested in the proceed
ings and followed them Avith attention.
The career and fate of the Shenandoah after her
surrender to the United States may be of some interest,
although the former was not lustrous, and the latter
was merely the lot common to many statel}- craft,
whether historic or commonplace. Shortly after the
surrender. Captain Freeman Avas ordered to take the
ship to New York. It was winter, and the fierce
westerly gales seemed unwilling to permit the transfer
of the ex-Confederate craft to her late enemies without
a rough protest. Captain Freeman appears to haA-e
made an earnest effort to fulfil his instructions. He
fought against head Avinds and seas for some time, but
finally returned with the ship to Liverpool, having lost
some of the upper spars and the greater portion of the
sails. The Shenandoah Avas then put up for sale, and was

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 187
finally bought for the Sultan of Zanzibar. She AA^as
fitted out with some shoAvof luxui-}- as to cabin fittings,
and itAvas rumoured that she Avas to be used as a yacht,
but, Avhether she proA-ed to be too large and too expen
sive for the convenience of the Sultan and the resources
of the Zanzibar exchequer or not, she Avas soon set
again to the peaceful occupation for Avhicli she was
originally built, and carried many a cargo of ' iA^ory,
gum, coral, and coal ' for Ms sable majesty, and
weathered the blasts of many monsoons, until at last, in
1879, fourteen years after she struck the Confederate
flag, the teak planks Avere torn from her bottom by a
rough scrape on a coral reef, and her iron ribs Avere left
to rust and crumble on a melancholy island in the
Indian Ocean.*
One of the difficulties attending- the enterprise for
which the She/tandoah (or Sea King) was bought, arose
from the necessity of providing- a tender for her, AA^hich
of course involved a large additional outlay, at a time
when other necessities were pressing, and the financial
agents were not OA-er-well provided with funds. 33''hen
it was determined to undertake the enterprise, prompt
action was absolutely necessary to insure success, and
all that could be done to secure an economical expendi
ture was to buy a good A-essel for a tender that could be
used as a blockade-runner, or would be likely to fetch
something approximate to the cost afterwards.
These expectations Avere happily fulfilled by the
Laurel. Lieutenant Ramsay carried out his instruc
tions with intelligence and energy. After parting com
pany vrith the Shenandoah off Madeira, he proceeded to
Teneriffe, and landed there Captain Corbett and the
* An interesting leader appeared in the Daily Telegrapih (London)
on her career and final shipwreck at the time of her loss.

188 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
crew of the Sea King. From Teneriffe, Ramsay pro
ceeded to Nassau, and took the Laurel from that port
into Charleston with a most valuable cargo of supphes,
shipped by Mr. Heyleger, the Confederate agent at
Nassau. Immediately after the arrival of the Laurel at
Charleston, early in December, 1864, the Secretary of
the Navy directed me to sell her Avhen she came out ;
but upon further consultation with Lieutenant Ramsay,
she was transferred to the Treasury Department at cost
price. She was then loaded vrith cotton on account of
the Treasury, and got safely through the blockade.
While in Charleston the name of the Laurel Avas changed
to the Confederate States. She Avas the subject of some
correspondence betAveen the United States Minister to
England and her Majesty's Government, which appears
to have ended with the following statement contained in
a letter from Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, in 3Iarch,
1865 : — ' Her Majesty's Government are advised that
although the proceedings of the steamer Confederate
States, formerly Laurel, may have rendered her liable to
capture on the high seas by the cruisers of the United
States, she has not, so far as is known, committed any
offence punishable by British laAv.'*
As the Laurel was transferred from one Department
of the Government to the other, there arose no question
of profit or loss ; but, looking to the service she rendered
to the Shenandoah, the freight she would have earned
on the inward cargo to Charleston if it had been carried
on private account, and her transfer at cost price, the
transaction as regards the NaA^y Department resulted in
a very substantial profit.f I cannot state whether the
* See 'United States Case,' p. 123.
t The blockade rates of freight Avere then about £50 per ton.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 189
Laurel {Confederate States) made more than one voyage
through the blockade. She belonged to another Depart
ment. I had no further control over her, and have
ncA'^er learned what became of her at the close of the
war, Avhich came to an end in a few months after her
first departure fi-om Charleston.

190 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

CHAPTER IV.
Admiral Farragut and his achievements. — The Federal and Con
federate naval forces compared. — Abortive attempts at shipbuilding
in Confederate ports. — The Ordnance Service of the Confederate
Navy Department. — Financial arrangements at Eichmond and in
Europe. — English ironworkers sent out to the Confederate Govern
ment. — The Confederate States Representatives at Bermuda,
Nassau, and Havana. — The purchase and despatch of the Coquette.
— Vessels bought for the commercial purposes of the Confederate
Government. — Embarrassments arising from speculative contractors
and from friendly offers of vessels. — Commander M. F. Maury. — •
The Georgia and the Rappahannock — The Pampero. — Total cost of
the Alabama, Florida, and Shenandoah.
When Mr. Stephen R. Mallory Avas placed at the head of
the Navy Department in the Provisional Government
which was hastily organized at 3Iontgomery in February,
1861, there Avas but little to gratify his ambition in the
high office assigned him. The entire Avant of the com
monest, as Avell as the most essential, materials and
resources for building and equipping a navy was painfully
apparent, and he must have felt how impossible it would
prove for him to satisfy the public expectations, or to
accomplish anything that Avould be accepted as CAddence
of due forethought and energy on his part. In war,
people hope for brilliant operations, if not always for
complete success, and as it is impossible for a Department
of State to explain either its purposes or the means of

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 191
fulfilling them to the general public, the absence of
strikmg results is often attributed to the Avant of genius
to plan or of energy and skill in administration.
It is difficult to imagine a more troublesome and
trying position than that aa-IucIi was thrust upon Mr.
3Iallory. His colleague at the War Office Avas com
pelled to assume grave responsibilities, and to undertake
a burdensome task. The lack of military resources Avas
quite as manifest as the want of naval materials, but
there was plenty of bone and sincAV in the country, and
hosts of ardent, gallant spirits, and these required no
urging to rally them to the flag. They were as good
material for soldiers as could be found, and the Secretarv
of War was able to collect and organize a force which
met with a notable success at a A-ery early period ofthe
contest, and the army and its administrative staff were
launched into public notice, and introduced to national
favour, vrith a prestige that the sister Department
could not imitate and the sister service could not rival.
Nothing could induce me to disparage the professional
abihty, the sense of honour, or the gallantry of those
officers of the LTnited States navy who remained, if I
may use the phraseology of the period, ' faithful to the
old flag,' an expression which in plain language simply
means that the officers from the North retained their
commissions in the navy of a Federal Union composed
of thefr own native States. But I feel bound to say
that I am not restrained from criticism or reproach by
the vigilant and resolute exertion of any moral force
opposing and overcoming a severe and acrimonious
spirit. I neither feel now, nor have I ever been moved
to, the slightest sentiment of ill-will against the personnel
of the United States navy, and I have no grudge to
gratify, and no personal injury to retaliate. There is

192 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
therefore no temptation for me to depreciate the exertions
of that corps during the Civil War, or to intimate that
the victories achieved by United States ships over the
very inadequate resistance the Confederates were able to
oppose to them have given the full measure of the skill
and daring of the American navy.
Any fair critic will admit that Farragut showed that
he had the qualities in kind which make a great naval
commander. To what degree he possessed them can
hardly be said to have been fully tested. There was
undoubtedly energy in preparation, and an admfrable ex
hibition of personal resource and courage in his opera
tions on the Mississippi and at Mobile, but then the
inefficient armament of the forts, the insufficiency of the
artificial obstructions, and the feebleness ofthe opposing
Confederate vessels, are so strikingly manifest to those
Avho have been able to obtain trustworthy reports, that
the success achieved cannot be regarded Avith much
surprise, while on the other hand defeat could only have
been the result of signal failure in the execution. From
the performances of the United States navy during the
Civil War, it may be fairly inferred that there is more
ability in the service than the opportunities revealed ;
and I have no doubt that if the occasion had required
greater exertion and higher professional qualities, the
necessary fortitude and skill Avould have been forth
coming. Lord Napier of Magdala Avas greatly commended, and
Avas raised to the peerage, because he organized and
carried out the expedition to Abyssinia with much
judgment, prudence, and skill, and the final movements
were so rapid that he effected a complete success with
very slight loss to his owai forces. He was justly
thought to have exhibited a rare union of military

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 193
quahties, to Avit, the faculty of dul}- proportioning the
means to the end, combined Avith a comprehensive
knowledge of strategy in design and tactical skill in
execution. The British Government and the militar}-
critics perceived that the occasion did not exhaust his
powers, but that there remained behind a reserve of
latent strength which might be relied upon in case of a
future and greater demand. The honours conferred
upon him were intended, therefore, to mark the estimate
AA-hich had been formed of his capacity ; but no one
thought of comparuig the inarch to 3Iagdala Avith
Bonaparte's swoop upon the plains of Piedmont and
Lombard}- in 1796, and neither English poet nor prose
writer has ever linked the names of Napier and Napoleon
in the same military chaplet.
Farragut's honours were equally well earned, and no
one can say that he might not have rivalled the historic
admirals of by-gone years if he had experienced the
same training, and had been put to the same tests ; but
the run past the forts on the Mississippi, and the
entry into 3Iobile Bay, are no more comparable to
Nelson's exploits at Copenhagen and Aboukir than the
march through Abyssinia and the storming of Magdala
are deserving of comparison with the rapid adv-ance of
the French into Northern Itafy and the ' terrible passage
of the bridge of Lodi.' There should be a fitness in
similitudes, otherAA-ise what is meant for praise de
generates into adulation.
It has been written that an indiscreet friend is more
dangerous than a prudent enemy. Admiral Farragut
commanded the largest and most powerful force that
had ever been controlled by any American naval
officer, and I have ahvays thought that the consequences
which resulted from the operations of that force in the
VOL. IL 42

194 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Avaters of the 3Iississippi were more fatal to the Con-
federac}'' than any of the military campaigns. The
achievements of Admiral Farragut's fleet enabled General
Grant to cross the Mississippi with safety, and to get
into the rear of Vicksburgh. The fall of that essential
position was thus assured. David Porter's flotilla,
Avhich had been Avorking doAA'n from the Ohio, was able
to unite with Farragut's fleet, which had forced its way
up from the Gulf of Mexico, and the Confederacy was
thus finally cut in twain. Besides the large number of
admirable fighting-men Texas could and did contribute
to the Confederate army, that great State had become
the chief source of supply for cattle, horses, and other
essentials. The entire control of the 3Iississippi by the
United States naval forces, Avhich resulted from the fall
of Vicksburgh and Port Hudson, Avas a fatal blow to
the Confederacy, and reduced the war from the position
of a contest having many probabilities of success, to a
purely defensive struggle for safety.
So far as can be learned from the current histories of
the period, the above-mentioned decisive results were
chiefly due to the exertions of Farragut, supplemented
and assisted by the untiring exertions of DaAdd D.
Porter (noAv Admiral Porter). Those two naA-al com
manders used the forces under their respectiA'e commands
Avith daring and persistent energy, and a nearer ap
proach to intuitive genius than was exhibited by any of
the military leaders on the Federal side, and they haA-e
Avon for the navy the chief credit for the ultimate suc
cess of the United States. There can be no doubt that
Generals Grant and Banks dawdled about 3dcksburgh
and Port Hudson for a considerable time to very httle
purpose, and there is no|;hing in the published records
to shoAv that they Avould ever have got possession of

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 195
those strongholds of the Confedcrac}- if Farragut and
Porter had not opened the great riA'or for them, and it
is not impossible that General Grant oavcs his great
reputation to the opportunity afforded him by Farrao-ut's
exploits on the 3Iississippi, and obtained the advantages
AA-hich enabled him to overAvhelm Lee through the con
sequences which inevitably folloAved the naval operations
in the south-AA-est.
Admiral Farragut had at least these marks of genius,
a quick and intuitive perception of the practicability of
an enterprise and a perception of the force necessary to
justify an effort. 3Mien satisfied on those points, he
never hesitated, but dehvered his blow promptly and
with all the strength he could wield. He deserved
success and won it. If a single one of the higher officers
of the L'nited States army had possessed corresponding
inspfration and vigour, the Confederacy could not have
resisted and beaten back the vastly superior powder of
the Federal Government for four years.
When the results which follow a military or naval
enterprise are notably important and decisive, the world
is not inclined to be critical as to the relative means of
attack and defence, but when biographers or admiring
feIlow-countr}Tnen seize upon the most brilliant of foreign
worthies and appropriate him as the type of their own
national hero, calm spectators are irresistibly impelled
to inquire into details and to investigate the title upon
which the comparison is founded. Admiral Farragut is
justly entitled to a monument of his own, but to insist
upon putting him upon the same pedestal with Nelson,
as some indiscreet Americans have done, is to invite a
comparison which is unfair to his Avell-earned reputation.
Nelson won his great victories over opponents Avho
were superior in force, and had, besides, great advantages
42—2

196 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
both in position and formation. Running past stationary
batteries has never been considered a very great achieve
ment by any authority on naval tactics, and the Con
federate flotillas opposed to the United States ships on
the Mississippi and at Mobile, were manifestly too weak
in numbers, armament, and manoeuvring power to offer
an effectiA'e resistance.
The Confederate States cannot be said to have had a
navy at all. The few cruisers it was possible to put
afloat formed an irregular marine force, which was too
weak to act with any effective aggressive power, and
was therefore ncA^er collected for a united attack upon
any giA^'en point. The commanders of those few vessels
Avere compelled to be content with the injury they could
inflict by the destruction of commercial ships. Semmes,
in the Alabama, gave the United States ship San Jacinto
the slip at Martinique because the disparity of force
would have exposed him to the imputation of fohy
rather than courage if he had engaged her, but he never
shunned a meeting AAdth any other United States ship,
and cruised where, according to all reasonable calcula
tions, he AA-as likely to encounter them. Apart from
Maffitt's desperate enterprise off 3Iobile, both he and
Morris took the Florida to localities Avhere it has always
appeared strange none of the enemy's ships were seen.
Maffitt Avas chased among the Bahamas, and he practised
the merest prudence in declining a combat at that time,
because the pursuing ships Avere not only greatly superior
in size and armament, but his vessel Avas shorthanded
and the crew scarcely trained to the manual of the guns.
Morris had no purpose to resort to any ruse in order to
escape from the Wachusett at Bahia. His intention,
officially reported, Avas to go to sea in open daylight as
soon as his repairs AA-ere completed, and to fight if pur-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 197
sued, as he fully expected to be. It is a pity that Captain
CoUins surrendered his own judgment and his oAvn
better instincts to the guidance of 31 r. Consul Wilson
and was thus led to perpetrate a great wrong. If he
had only waited a fcAV da}-s he could haA-e foUoAved the
Florida, or gone in company Avith her to sea, and he
Avould have had the opportunity to place his name on a
IcA^el Arith Winslow's. The Sumter, Georgia, and She
nandoah were clearly unfit for offensive warfare. They
were ordinai-y merchant A-essels, armed sufficiently to
OA-erawe, and if need be to OA'ercome any threat of re
sistance fi-om commercial ships, and perhaps to beat off
the attack of one of the converted vessels of the United
States naA-}-, but manifestly unequal to cope with the
weakest of the gunboats of the regular United States
o o
marine. The commanders of all the above-named ships,
to use a sporting phrase, were ' heavily handicapped ' in
the race for purely naval honours, and yet I may venture
to say that they shrank from no exposure and no risk,
which they would have been justified in seeking, and as
they manifested on all occasions a degree of fortitude,
sagacity, and professional skill proportionate to the trial,
it may fafrly be inferred that they had in reserve suffi
cient stored-up strength and ability to have made a
creditable use of better means and broader opportunities.
The object in getting as many cruisers at sea as
possible, and at the earliest time after the beginning of
hostdities, was, as has been previously stated, twofold.
Primarily the purpose was to destroy the enemy's
commerce, and thus to increase the burden of the war
upon a large and influential class at the North, and the
collateral purposes were to compel the United States
Navy Department to send many of their best ships
abroad for the pursuit of the Confederate cruisers, and

198 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
to increase their naval expenditure, Avhich it was thought
would tend to weaken the blockade, retard the prepara
tion for attack upon exposed portions of the Southern
coast, and also to add largely to the aggregate cost of
carrying on the Avar.
The foregoing expectations Avere not wholly realized.
The United States Navy Department did not send many
nor the most suitable vessels in pursuit of the Con
federate cruisers, and, strange to say, instead of consult
ing 3Iaury's charts and the Chambers of Commerce of
the large shipping ports, from whom the precise localities
where American trade would most require protection,
and where the attacking cruisers would be sure to go,
would best haA^e been gathered, the protecting ships
were left to make passages fi-om port to port in a pur
poseless sort of way, often arriving a day too late or de
parting a day too soon to meet the objects of their search.
It appears from the proceedings before the Tribunal
of Arbitration at Geneva that the LTnited States set up
a claim against Great Britain for the cost of maintaining
at sea the vessels that it was found necessary to send in
j)ursuit of the Confederate cruisers. Among the vessels
alleged to haA^e been employed for the aboA-e purpose,
were ' the Onward, of 874 tons, the Ino, of 895 tons,
converted merchant vessels Avithout steam-power, also
the Gemsbok, National Guard, and Sheqpiard Ivnapp,
and finally the George Mangham, a mortar (sailing)
schooner of 274 tons.'* It is hardly necessary to say
that no Confederate cruiser that was sent to sea during
the Avar Avould have been driven from her work by any
such A-essels ; indeed, even the converted ships, such as
the Georgia and Shenandoah, Avould haA-e liked no better
* See 'British Counter-Case,' pp. 139, 140; also 'Appendix to
British Case,' a-o1. vii., pp. 58, 63, 111.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 199
fun than to have encountered them in couplets or even
triplets. Even the Vanderbilt, Avholly dependent on her
engines, and requiring, as it appears from the record,
2,000 tons of coal in little more than six weeks, Avas a
most unsuitable ship to send upon such serAdce, besides
Avhich, her extreme vulnerability Avas palpably against
her. The crowns of her huge boilers, the cylinders,
condensers, and almost all the working parts of her
engines, were far aboA-e the water-line, and her two great
' Avalking beams," with their ponderous connecting rods,
stood many feet above her upper deck. All of the fore
going- were exposed to shot, and the space they occupied
was so large that she could only have escaped being
disabled by a mere chance, before she could have closed
Arith either the Alabama or Florida. I feel bound, hoAv-
CA^er, to mention that the Secretary of the United States
Navy, in a report dated December 7th, 1863, announces
in eftect that the protection of the foreign commerce of
the country was not thought to be of such paramount
importance as the sealing up of the Southern ports, for
he says that CA'cn if the probabilities of encountering the
Confederate cruisers ' were greater than they are . . .
it Avould not promote the interests of commerce nor the
welfare of the country to relax the blockade for that
object.''' It was of course open to the United States to adopt
whatever Avar policy they thought best, but it must have
required some boldness, or some obliquity of vision in
regard to the fitness of things, to claim compensation for
maintaining such wretchedly inappropriate craft as are
mentioned above for the purpose of pursuing the
Alabama and her consorts.
When the determination to attack the commerce of the
* Quoted in 'British Counter-Case,' p. 140.

200 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
United States was settled by the Confederate Govern
ment as a leading purpose of its policy, efforts were
promptly made to carry it out. The only suitable ship
remaining in the Confederate ports was secured, fitted
out, and despatched from New Orleans, and an agent
Avas sent to Europe to obtain proper vessels for the
same purpose. The particulars of the necessary pro
ceedings to carry out the above-mentioned policy have
already been narrated, but the Sumter was hardly at sea,
and the agent had scarcely reached the field of his
operations in England, before it became manifest that
there was pressing need of a naval force to defend the
numerous inlets which penetrate the Southern coast, and
to protect those harbours Avhich could be used for block
ade-running. To provide the vessels for those necessary
purposes the Navy Department was compelled to rely
upon such means as were close at hand, and the poverty
of the country was at once revealed. The United
States possessed all the resources, machine-shops, and
skilled labour necessary to quickly prepare A'^essels suit
able for operating on the Southern coast. There Avere
four national dockyards, and large supplies of materials
at each, and at certainly three of the principal Xorthern
sea-ports there were private shipbuilders, quite capable of
undertaking almost any description of Government
Avork. It is hardly necessary to add that there were
many machine-shops, cannon-fomidries, and powder-mills
in the Northern States, and there was also an ample
supply of coal and iron. These are patent tacts, and
need no proof The Navy Department of the United
States had then at its command evervthing- that could
- o
be desired, or at any rate, all that Avas really indispen
sable for the construction and equipment of any descrip
tion of vessels Avhich ingenuity and experience suggested

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 201
as best suited for blockade, for attacks upon the
Southern coast defences, or for operations in the shalloAV
sounds and inlets which penetrate the shores of nearly
every State from 3'irginia to Texas. The utter destitu
tion of the South, both as regards materials and the
means to make use of them, has already been explained
in a previous chapter. There was but one public dock
yard, Avhich, howcA-er, the Federal forces had greatly
injured before abandoning- it, and there Avas not a single
private yard fit to undertake work of any importance.
There was but one foundry, the Tredegar Works, at
Richmond, capable of casting a large gun, and that was
the only establishment AA-here forgings of any importance
could be effected. EA^eryone knows that the South was
destitute of iron, and the supply of coal was limited in
quantity and poor in quality.
The Confederate Government appears to have had no
difficulty in leaming the general purposes of the enemy,
vand it was soon known that 3Ionitors and other descrip
tions of iron-cased vessels were building at the North,
and that the foundries were turning out 11 -inch and
15-inch guns for their armament. It was impossible to
build any vessels wholly of iron at the South, because,
in the first place, the necessary material was wanting,
and secondly, there was no machinery or appliances for
manufacturing angle fron, or bending frames, etc. All
the Confederate NaAry Department could do was to
select the points least accessible to the enemy or which
could be most surely defended, and then lay down
wooden vessels, which could be cased with iron after
wards. It was necessary to use green timber, because
there were no stored-up supplies, but that would not
have been of much consequence if the vessels could
have been quickly built and otherwise prepared for

202 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
service. The necessities of the situation demanded
quick completion, and not durability of structure. But
while the materials Avere faulty, and the suitable places
for laying down the ships were few, there was no com
pensation in the ability to make speed with the work,
because of the scarcity of skilled labour.
I have not the documentary records necessary to give
a systematic account of all that was attempted, but the
very best vessels Avhich it was possible to complete were
mere make-shifts. They were plated either with layers
of thin iron, insufficiently bolted, or with ordinary
railAvay metals ; and the difficulty of bending the plates
and rails and fashioning the timber backing compelled
a resort to the Aveakest forms of structure, both as
regards the poAver to resist shot and to secure smaU
openings for ports. But the inefficiency of the vessels
in respect to strength and suitability of design was stid
further increased by the want of sufficient motive-power
to admit of their being properly manoeuA-red.
Tavo or three examples will suffice to demonstrate the
unhandiness of the miserable make-shift A-essels which
AA-ere provided for the defence of the most important
points. The Tennessee Avas built at 3Iobde,* and was the
mainstay of the defences at that harbour. She was an
unwieldy structure, the armoured portion being a citadel
79 feet by 29 feet inside ofthe backing, Avhich was com
posed of timber and plank 25 inches thick. The citadel
was constructed Avith a sloping- roof, liavdng an inclina
tion of thirty degrees ; and the iron casing Avas com
posed of 2 -inch and 1-iiich plates laid on to the thick
ness of 6 inches, decreasing in some places to 5 inches.
The A-essel herself Avas 209 feet by 48 feet beam, and
* The wooden hull was built at Selma, 150 miles up the Alabama
river, and she was towed to Mobile to receive her plating, engines,
and equipment.

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 203
her draft of water Avas 14 feet. The armament Avas
composed of six 6 and 7-inch cast-iron guns, Avhich had
been rifled and strengthened by shrinking Avrouglitdron
bands upon the breech sections. This vessel, unshapely
in design, and not over-strong either for defence or
attack, might nevertheless have made a formidable,
perhaps CA'en a successful, resistance to the entrance of
Admiral Farragut's fleet into 3Iobile if she had been
proA-ided with a pafr of poAverful engines working tAviii
screws ; but her poAver of locomotion consisted of the
paddle-engine of an ordinary river steamer, which by an
ingenious contriA-ance was made to Avork the screw-
shaft, but it was quite inadequate to manoeuvre the ship
efficiently, and she had therefore neither the speed nor
the abihty to reverse quickly which are so essential in
an armoured A'essel with a fixed battery and designed to
be used also as a ram.
Tavo A-essels of formidable dimensions and design
Avere laid doAvn at New Orleans, but, in spite of the
greatest exertions, only one Avas so far finished as to
be able to take part in the defence of the river. The
name of the one nearly completed was the Louisiana. She
was hurried doAvnto the neighbourhood of Forts Jackson
and St. Phihp three days before Admiral Farragut's suc
cessful attempt to force the passage, but she was in
very poor condition to offer any effective resistance.
She had a central ' casemate,' or citadel, for the protection
of the battery, and Avas cased Avith a covering of double
T-rails, as a substitute for plates, which could not be
obtained. The iron-casing Avas not completed when she
left New Orleans. Her engines being still unconnected,
two tugs were employed to tow her down, and gangs of
mechanics Avere still at work upon engines and hull
while she was thus in toAV. The crcAV were chiefly raAv
hands, reinforced by a company of artillerymen who had

204 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
volunteered for the occasion ; and they were actually
mounting the battery while en route for the scene of
battle. Up to an hour before the Federal fleet advanced
to the attack she had not motive-power to stem the
current ; indeed, it was found impossible to shift her
berth or to Avind her under steam, and as a last necessity
she was lashed to the shore under Fort St. Philip, in
which position she could only use a part of her guns.*
Two armour-cased vessels were built at Charleston.
After many months of hard work they were got ready
for service ; but in their case, as in most of the others,
the engines Avere the chief defect, and proved upon actual
trial too weak, and otherwise unfit to manoeuvre the
A'cssels efficiently. They were, nevertheless, taken out
of the harbour one night, and dispersed the blockading
ships ; but, owing to insufficient steam-power, they were
unable to pursue, and one of them was barely able to get
back to a safe anchorage in the harbour.
The Arkansas, another Confederate fron-cased ram,
deserves a passing notice. She was built at 3Iemphis,
and when nearly finished w-as taken up the Yazoo River
for greater safety, and Avas there completed. On the
15th of July, 1862, she dashed out of the Yazoo into
the Mississippi, dispersed three Federal ' ironclads ' who
tried to block the way, and passing through Adnural
Farragut's fleet, which lay directly in her route, receiAdng
the broadside of nearly every ship at point-blank range,
she escaped unharmed, and let go her anchor under the
batteries of Vicksburgh. On the 5th of August foUoAV-
ing, she attempted to go doAAm the river to co-operate
with General Breckenridge in an attack upon Baton
* The consort of the Limisiana was in such an incomplete state
that she could not be used for the defence of the river at all, and
she was destroyed after the Federal fleet passed the forts.

COXFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 205
Rouge ; but the engines, alAva}-s the Aveakest point in
these unhappy vessels, gave Ava}-, and not only caused
the failm-e of the expedition, but the loss of the Arkansas
herself. A short distance above Baton Rouge her port
engine broke down, but Avas got in fair Avorking order.
She was compelled to lay at anchor all night to effect
the repairs, and the next morning- she got under Aveigh,
and soon met the Federal ' ironclad ' Essex, which, with
other gunboats, was approaching- to attack her. At this
critical moment the starboard engine gave Avay, and the
patched-up port engine proA-ed wholly powerless to con
trol her movements. The unfortunate craft Avas thus
rendered helpless and unmanageable, and the officer in
command. Lieutenant Henry K. Stevens, found himself
face to face vrith one of two alternatives, the destruction of
his vessel by himself, or her capture by the enemy. He
chose the former, and he succeeded by great efforts and
clever expedients in landing her upon the river bank,
where he set her on fire, and she burned to the Avater's
edge and blew up, although every effort was made by
the enemy to secure her.""' The enemy's gunboats per
ceived that something was AATong with the Arkansas, and
had opened fire upon her before Stevens succeeded in
placing her against the bank, but he effected his purpose
and escaped with his officers and crcAV.
I have selected for examples the very best of the iron-
cased vessels the Navy Department was able to construct
AAdthin the Confederate States, and it aa-III be admitted
that they were a very inefficient means of defence
against the well-equipped, Avell-manned, well-armed, and
powerfully engined vessels of the United States navy.
Admiral Farragut appears to have had a deep-rooted
and ineradicable dislike, and even contempt, for ' iron-
* 'Life of Admiral D. G. Farragut,' p. 289.

206 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
clads,' and his feelings in regard to them are often
expressed in language which is both vigorous and
comical. Writing from Pensacola, August 21st, 1862,
he says : — ' We haA^e no dread of " rams " or " he-goats,"
and if our editors had less, the country would be better
off. Now they scare everybody to death.' Again,
September 3rd, commenting upon an order he had re
ceived from Washington to destroy the Arkaivsas ' at all
hazards,' he says : — ' I would have given my Admiral's
commission to have gotten up to the Arkansas. I wanted
a wooden ship to do it. The ironclads are cowardly
things, and I don't want them to succeed in the world.'
But notwithstanding the above opinions, her destruction
drew from him the following remark in a report to the
Secretary of the Navy : — ' It is the happiest moment of
my life that I am enabled to inform the Department of
the destruction of the ram Arkansas, not because I held
the ironclad in such terror, but because the community
did.'* The fact is, that with the gallant Admfral
ignorance, or perhaps I should say inexperience, hi
regard to the power of a really efficient armom-ed A-essel,
Avas at the bottom of his blissful indifterence.
It is certainly no vainglorious boast, but the mere
expression of a professional opinion founded upon some
knowledge of the structure of such vessels, which impels
me to say that if the two Liverpool rams which Earl
Russell detained at the request of 3Ir. Adams had been
off Sand Island Light in August, 1864, the United
States fleet would not have got into 3Iobile Bay, or if
two similar vessels had been at the head of the passes of
the Mississippi in April, 1862, no naval force then at
the disposal of the United States could haA-e passed up
to the Crescent City. Admiral Farragut never encoun-
* ' Life of Admiral D. G. Farragut,' pp. 289, 293, 294.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 207
tered an fronclad fit for the proper Avork of her class.
The Tennessee was so deficient in stcam-poAver that she
could neither be used efficiently as a ram nor aA^oid
being rammed by the attacking ship. The diagram
annexed to the plan of the naval engagement in 3Iobile
Bay represents the Tenncs-^ce A\dth a 3Ionitor and three
Avooden ships, one bearing the Admiral's flag, ramming
her on the port side, and a 3Ionitor in a raking position
under her stern. Admiral Farragut saj's ' she Avas sore
beset,' and ' we butted and shot at him until he sur
rendered.'* No professional man Avill doubt that if the
Tennessee had been a properly constructed ironclad,
Arith engine-power siuted to her size and weight, she
would have made short work of her Avooden adversaries.
But she was well-nigh helpless as regards ability to
manoeuATC, and her consorts were three insignificant
httle wooden craft, not fit to be classed as fighting ships
for hne-of-battle at all.
3Vhen the Secretary of the Confederate Navy and his
professional advisers perceived the necessity of providing
vessels for harbour and coast defences, their first per
plexity was the selection of suitable sites for building
them. Even such ports as Savannah, Charleston, 3Iobile,
and New Orleans, which offered the greatest facilities,
were so poorly protected by fortifications that for at
least six months after President Lincoln's proclamation
of blockade they were at the mercy of the United States
naA^. I have not the least hesitation in saying that up
to January and February, 1862, both Savannah and Wil
mington could have been entered by the Federal vessels
then blockading them. The foregoing opinion is based
upon a personal inspection of the defensive works, and
close daily examination of the ships off the ports, with
* ' Uie and Letters,' pp. 423, 433.

208 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
good glasses, which enabled me to clearly determine
their class and effective strength, and in some instances
to identify particular vessels. The great sounds and
estuaries which abound along the Southern coast were
wholly indefensible by any means in the power of the
Confederate Government, and several large rivers, upon
which building-yards might have been and in fact were
established, afforded access to Federal vessels ascending
from the sea, and others, taking their rise -within the
territory held by the United States, afforded equal facdi-
ties for the descent of the enemy's gunboats, which his
command of labour and material enabled him quickly to
complete. Blockaded and threatened by the way \)f the sea,
liable to attack through numerous inlets and navigable
watercourses, and open to invasion along many hundreds
of miles of defenceless frontier, it was manifestly a diffi
cult and perplexing problem to determine how the
enemy could be held aloof fi-om the very heart of the
country, and from the localities AA'here vessels could be
built so as to be safe from hostile attacks before comple
tion, or to be Avithin possible reach of the coast when
finished. By midsummer, 1861, some twelve or fifteen
wooden gunboats Avere laid down on York river and
the Pamunky in 3''irginia, and others AA-ere contracted
for at New Orleans, on the St. John's river in Florida,
at Richmond, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannali, and the
Chatahoochee. Afterwards additional vessels were
started at 3Iemphis and Nashville. The foreo-oino- were
not intended to be armoured, but after the achievements
of the Merrimac in Hampton Roads, every possible exer
tion Avas made to build iron-cased A-essels at Charleston,
Savannah, Wilmington, Richmond, and on the inland
waters of Alabama, Georgia, and the Carolinas.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 209
Many of the A-essels, AA-hile in course of construction,
were destroyed to prevent their capture by the enemy,
and in other cases they were hurried off in very incom
plete condition to safer retreats. Thus all of those
buUding on the York and Pamunky rivers were burned
Avhen General Johnston was forced back upon Richmond
by the advancing columns of General 3IcClellan, Avhose
flanks were coA-ered bA- naA-al flotillas on the James
river and on the York. Two were lost by the capture
of Nashville ; others, being still on the ways, were neces-
sardy destroyed when Norfolk was evacuated, and one
(the Arka7isa.^) was hurried up the Yazoo river in an
incomplete state, as already mentioned above.
It will thus be perceived that the effort to build a
naval force Avithin the Confederacy was attended with
many difficulties. The progress of the work was often
checked, and often wholly interrupted by the imminent
danger of attack, and the labour and expenditure of
months was sacrificed, sometimes, as in the case of the
two formidable A-essels at New Orleans, when they were
nearly ready for effective use. For the equipment of
the home-built ships it was necessary to construct and
to organize ordnance works, laboratories, and machine-
shops, and establishments of the kind were improvised
under great difficulties at Richmond, Charlotte in North
Carolina, Atlanta in Georgia, and Selma in Alabama.
Those points were selected because they Avere Avell in
the interior, and were thus as safe as possible from the
danger of sudden attack and destruction ; but that
essential advantage was not free from a counterbalancing
inconvenience, in the circumstance that they Avere far
removed from the building sites, and every piece of
machinery, and every gun, hoAvever heavy and difficult
to handle, had to be transported many miles along rail-
VOL. II. 43

210 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
ways already overAvorked by the necessary transporta
tion of supplies for the army, or, in some cases, even by
ordinary country roads.
The officers of the Confederate navy had so fcAV oppor
tunities to manifest their professional acquirements and
personal qualities — indeed, so few of them were employed
in strictly naval operations at all — that scarcely more
than some half-dozen will find their names recorded in
any future history, and the Confederate navy as a corps
will hardly appear as a factor in the Civd War. And
yet I may venture to say that among those who held the
naval commissions of President Davis, were men who
would have dared anything, and who would have won a
place in history, and made thefr short-liA-ed serAdce
famous, if they had only possessed the materials to work
with, and the opportunity to use them. I would not
fear to put that proposition to the surA-iAdng officers of
the United States navy who are old enough to have
known and who still remember their former colleagues,
and I would deposit a large stake on the result of the
ballot. It Avould be neither generous nor judicious — I
feel that it would not be even just in me — to thrust too
prominently forward the names of those officers Avho
came under my personal observation under ti-}-ing con
ditions, and in whom I had the opportunity to dis
cover distinguished fitness for naA'al enterprises. 3Iy
purpose is to manifest a just appreciation of the merits
and services of every officer AA-honi it is necessary to
mention by name, but to aA^oid cA^er}- expression of
praise that may approach to personal panegyric.
The Confederate navy had great disappointments to
bear, and speaking of the corps collectiA-ely, it may be
fairly said that they bore the trial patiently. iVt first
there was some little strife about the adjustment of rank.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 211
but it soon ended, and every man submitted uncom
plainingly to the necessities of the situation, and officers
Avho were fit to direct squadrons, and to conduct im
portant operations, Avere content to command paltr}-
flotillas of converted river-craft, or hastily and imperfectly
constructed gunboats, poorly armed, and with manifestly
insufficient iiiotiA-e-power. 3Yith such Avretchedly in
adequate means they had to meet powerful ships of
modern construction, armed with guns of the ncAvest
and best type, conscious alike of the hopelessness of the
struggle and the impossibility of achieving the least
personal renoAvn.
It requfres a high degTee of moral courage for a
military or naA-al officer to undertake an absolutely
necessary service, when his professional knoAv^ledge and
experience assure him that the enterprise contains no
element of success, and when he is conscious that the
inevitable failure Avill bring upon him the disparaging
criticisms, and often the hostile censure, of an expectant
but unreasoning public. Such were the conditions
under which HoUins attempted to block the river-route
to island No. 10, and 3Iitchell the passes of the lower
Mississippi ; and Tattnall, Lynch, Buchanan, and
Richard L. Page undertook to defend the great North
Carolina Sounds, and the water approaches to Charleston,
Savannah, and Mobile, under equally depressing circum
stances. Those men and their brother officers generally
submitted to the personal mortification of defeat with
dignified composure, and at the end of the war they re
tired to private life, and in many cases to a hard and
precarious struggle for maintenance, with a degree of
patient acquiescence which was creditable to their
manhood. I have never heard a single ex-Confederate officer
43—2

212 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
speak disparagingly of the achievements of his former
colleagues Avho remained in the United States navy and
Avho rose to rank and fortune in consequence of the war,
and I have never met one Avho appeared to be ashamed
of his own position, whether, like gallant old Tattnall, he
was employed as inspector of the port of Savannah on the
modest stipend of $1,200 a year, or serving out tea and
sugar fi-om behind the counter of a general grocer, as
some I know have done. It is probable that there are
still many persons who deny both the expediency and
equity of ' secession.' There may be some cantankerous
spirits who still maintain that ' traitor ' and ' rebel ' are
appropriate epithets to apply to those officers whose
hearts and consciences impelled them to surrender place
and fortune for the sake of a principle ; but I aaIU hazard
the opinion, that all who are capable of justly estimating
the difference between honour and shame will admit that
if the Confederate naval service has no brilliant Adctories
to record, and gained no purely naval honours, it has
manifested in its reverses qualities which are essential
ingredients of genuine heroism. Success Avas not Avithin
its grasp, but the failure was not ignominious. The
allotted duty was perilous, and the effort was unaA-ailing.
The defeat Avas decisive, and the immediate consequences
Avere crushing, but the courage which sustained the
shock of battle has been supplemented by the patient
fortitude necessary to endure the calamity, and thus the
effect of the sting has been greatly soothed.
The selection of suitable building sites for A-essels,
and safe positions for laboratories and macHne-shops,
was only the initiatory Avork of preparing a local marine
force. The materials had to be brought to the manufac
turing points, chiefly in the raAv state, and to a great
extent absolutely in the condition of their primitive

COXFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 213
elements. At the Norfolk Navy Yard there Avas
fortunatel}- a considerable number of naval guns of
varying calibres, and there Avas also a moderate quantity
of shot and shell ; and the powder-magazine, Avith its
contents, was saA-ed through the exertions of a fcAV
3^ii-g-inian naA-al officers avIio had resigned their com
missions in the LTnited States serA-ice, but had not yet
been commissioned in that of the Confederacy. Those
officers organized a party which removed a great portion
of the poAvder, and shoAved such a determination to resist
any attempt to damage the remainder or to injure the
budding, that when the dockyard was partially destroyed
and cA-acuated by the United States naval forces at the
time of the secession of 3"frginia, they left the magazine
intact. But the guns thus saved were almost exclusively of
the old smooth-bore type and pattern, and were not
therefore fit to be pitted against the modern Dahlgren,
Parrot, and other ordnance with which the wooden
ships and the newly constructed Monitors and ironclad
gun-A-essels of the United States navy were armed.
The Confederate Navy Department Avas happy in the
selection of the officers to organize and administer its
ordnance branch. At first the only possible resource
was to utihze the old guns found in stock. The material
of those guns was fortunately good, and generally they
were heavy in proportion to their calibre. Some of them
were rifled Avithout enlargement of bore, others Avere
reamed up to larger calibres and then rifled, and all,
when thus prepared, were strengthened Avith wrought-
iron bands shrunk on between the breech and trunnions.
It was then necessary to provide elongated shot, shell,
fuzes, sights, and other delicate equipments, all of which
had to be designed and manufactured quickly, with

214 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
indifferent means, and without the possibility of sub
mitting them to the tests of careful experiment and
comparison. I feel sure that the naval officers employed
in the Ordnance Bureau will not object to my selecting
Commander John M. Brooke for special mention in con
nection with that department of the serAdce. The fact
that his name was given to the improvised ordnance of
the Confederate navy is at once a testimony to the value
of his efforts, and a justification for the very imperfect
tribute to his zeal and intelligence I have it in my power
to put on record. Whatever serious injury the Con
federate gunboats or iron-cased vessels were able to
inflict upon the enemy's ships was effected with the
\ ' Brooke gun,' and the large orders for ordnance stores
which were sent to Europe, and which passed in due
course of business through my hands, bore the stamp
of his sagacious judgment and discreet superAdsion.
But notwithstanding the utmost efforts of those on
the spot, and the most ingenious dcAdces, the home
resources proved insufficient for the equipment of the
vessels built within the_Qpnfeder,ifn\ It soon became
manifest that the most essential articles could only be
obtained in the necessary quantity abroad, and the
finances of the Navy Department were ncA-er able to
AvhoUy, or even at times promptly, supply the demands
of the service within the Confederacy, and the drain of
the ocean cruisers and the general European under
takings as Avell. The shifts to Avhich the Confederate
Government were compelled to resort in the effort to
equip their military and naval forces were exceptional
and peculiar, but the consequences of putting off the
preparation for war until hostilities are imminent Avere
so clearly demonstrated by the events of 1861-65, that
no statesmen Avho have given due attention to the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 215
progress and result of the American Civil 3Var Avill be
inchned to run the risk of a great future peril for the
sake of a present shoAV of economy.
Geogi-aphical position, climatic and other physical
causes, made the Southern States almost exclusively
agricultural in their habits and industries, and although
the people were martial in their instincts, and furnished
a due quota of officers for the military and naA-al services
of the Federal Union, yet it is well known that the
principal Government factories for arms of all kinds,
and the principal arsenals for the storage and preserva
tion of the war material of the country, were in the
Northern States. Some years before the war, the small
arms had been remoA-ed from the arsenals at the South to
Springfield and other national gun-factories at the North,
for the purpose of being converted into a more modern
type, and at the date of the outbreak of hostilities a
large portion of them had not been returned. The great
cannon foundries and powder-mills were also at the
North, and hence the accumulation of war material of
every kind had always been far greater in that section
of the country^ than in the other.
So long as the States were in friendly harmony and
in close national union, the foregoing arrangement did
not appear to be dangerous or especially inconvenient,
because in case of a foreign war and the probability of
invasion, both arms and munitions could be rapidly
distributed. The Southern States retired fi-om the
Union singly and at intervals. None of them applied
for their quota of arms at the time of their secession,
and probably would not have received them if they had
done so, and hostilities began so soon after the forma
tion of a Southern Confederacy and a general Govern
ment (which at first Avas only provisional), that there

216 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Avas no time to make ready. The foregoing is, in brief,
the only explanation which can be given of the seeming
fatuity of the South in venturing upon a great war with
out due, or indeed Arithout any, preparation.
The destitution was not the result of uuAvise parsimony
in the past administration of public affairs, nor wilful
apathy on the part of those who were suddenly sum
moned to manage them. The position Avas simply this :
a close and confidential partnership was suddenly and
violently dissolved, and the assets of the firm remained
chiefly in the possession of one of the partners.
When I was first sent to England in 3Iay, 1861, the
Secretary of the Navy directed me to buy, and forward
with prompt despatch, a very considerable quantity of
naval supplies, but the most pressing and immediate
want at that time appeared to be arms and ammunition,
and the original orders were almost exclusively limited
to those articles. As soon as the determination to build
gunboats at the home ports and on the inland waters was
put into active operation, it became necessary to take a
more comprehensive A-iew of the Avants of the serAdce,
and it was at once perceived that the vessels could not
be suitably equipped Avithout largely supplementing the
home supply of CA^ery article essential to the outfit and
maintenance of a fighting ship. Orders Avere at once
sent to me in England for eA-ery description of naA-al
stores, including such articles as submarine batteries and
Avire, accoutrements for marines, clothing, blankets, iron
in every form required for ship-building, tools, and
skilled mechanics to use them, small marine engines for
torpedo-boats, poAverful marine engines for ironclad gun
boats, and, in addition, large requisitions for special
ordnance stores, according to lists and specifications
especially draAvn up by Commander Brooke. The last-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 217
mentioned included many articles of delicate, or at least
nice mechanical design, and careful su]Kn-A'ision and in
spection Avas necessary to ensure exact and satisfactory
perfection of finish, both in AA-orkmanship and material.
Among the officers sent to Europe for service in the
ironclad vessels it was hoped might be got to sea Avas
Lieutenant WUliani H. 3Iurdaugli. Besides haA-ing the
O O
special experience and general professional knoAvledge
Avhich fitted him for ordnance work, he possessed ad
mirable tact and judgment, and also the reticence and
faculty of self-control avIucIi are essential for the satis
factory performance of duties requiring secrecy. The
special ordnance stores were nearly all overlooked and
certified by him. The whole of the work was performed
creditably, and the goods passed out of the manufac
turer's hands, and went through the shipping-ports
Avithout attracting notice or causing any embarrassing
scrutiny. The execution of the foregoing special orders
brought Lieutenant 3Iurdaug-h into constant and con
fidential communication with me, and I was most
desfrous to appoint him to another and still more im
portant serAdce, but the war came to an abrupt end just
before the maturity of the enterprise in which he Avas to
have had a leading part.
The orders for general naval supplies arrived in
England at a time when the contracts for the cruising
ships were in full operation, and they alone Avould have
absorbed more than all the visible financial resources of
the Navy Department. But the excessive demand for
Avar material occasioned by the wants of both belli
gerents, coming unexpectedly even upon so ample a
market as that of Great Britain, rendered it impossible
to execute the orders en bloc — in fact, the requisitions
foUoAA^ed each other and were cumulative, hence it Avas

218 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
both admissible and prudent, as a matter of economy, to
make forward contracts providing for a steady periodical
delivery of the goods.
The earliest remittances from the Navy Department
were made in the form of bank credits and sterling bUls,
and they were not accompanied with any explanation of
the means by which they would be continued. It was
manifest that the supply of sterling and the accumula
tion of private funds in the hands of British bankers
would soon be exhausted, and the Confederate Treasury
would be compelled to devise some other means of
making the Appropriation Bills passed by Congress avaU-
able in Europe. The shoe soon began to pinch. Under
date of April 30th, 1862, the Secretary of the Navy, dis
cussing- the contracts on account of his Department,
wrote thus: — 'I have placed about 81,000,000 to your
credit with Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co., for these
objects, and hope to increase the amount to $2,000,000
soon.' The above was in addition to the remittances in
sterling previously mentioned. In rej^ly to the financial
portion of the foregoing letter, I reported under date of
July 4th, 1862, as foUows :— ' The credit of your De
partment is thus far very sound, as I have been able to
pay all liabihties very promptly. There is a double
advantage in basing all transactions upon cash pay
ments — work is more quickly done, and a-ou haA-e the
benefit of a liberal discount. In some of my contracts
the discount for cash has been as high as ten per cent.
The contracts alluded to in the cypher are for a A^ery
large amount, but not so large as the sum mentioned in
your letter of April 30th, Avhich you inform me aa-UI be
put to my credit Avith Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co.
for the specific purposes referred to in that letter. 33dth
the various incidental expenses attending such contracts,

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 219
and the cost of AA-hat you are Avell aAvare must be the
necessary adjuncts, the entire amount mentioned in your
letter Avould be absorbed, and I sincerely hope the
remittances will be regular and ample. I feel called
upon to say, hoAA-ever, that money appropriated in Rich
mond is A'erA- much reduced in amount Avhen converted
into pounds, shillings, and pence, by the high rate of
exchange, and that to complete the outstanding con
tracts will requfre £390,000 (tliree hundred and ninety
thousand pounds).'
Before the above letter reached Richmond the Secre
tary of the Navy had been fully aroused to the im
portance of keeping up the supply of funds, and the
correspondence manifests that he laboured earnestly to
that end. The Confederate Congress was liberal in
voting money grants, as was manifested in the appro
priation of 810,000,000 to the Navy Department ' for
building fronclad vessels in Southern Europe.' I have
never heard that the votes asked for by either of the
fighting Departments Avere ever cut down or refused.
But it was one thing to have a vote of credit, and quite
another to make that credit aA-ailable for use in Europe.
The manner of proceeding at the beginning- of the war,
and until the latter part of 1863, was as follows : —
Congress appropriated certain sums in gross for the
building of ships and the purchase of naval supplies,
Avhich could only be procured abroad. The Secretary of
the Navy made requisitions upon the Treasury for the
amount of the appropriations, and received in payment
Treasury notes, which Avere available for all local pur
poses, but could not be used in their original form for
purchases abroad. He was therefore compelled to devise
some means for couArerting the Treasury notes into
foreign funds, and the only course open to him after the

220 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
supply of sterling was exhausted was to buy cotton and
other produce, and ship them through the blockade to
the Government bankers, 3Iessrs. Eraser, Trenholm
and Co., whose instructions were to place the net pro
ceeds to the credit of the representative of the Navy
Department in Europe.
The War Office at Richmond included several distinct
Bureaux, designated by the titles of ' Ordnance,' ' Pro
vision and Clothing,' ' 3Iedical,' ' Nitre,' etc. ; and the
funds of that Department were apportioned between
those several Bureaux, and credited to each specifically
in the books of Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co.
There Avas a corresponding division of offices in the
Navy Department also ; but the Secretary of the NaA-y
at a A-ery early date adopted the view that it would be
more convenient to keep the whole of the financial
resources appropriated for naA'-al uses abroad in the form
of a general credit on behalf of the representative of that
Department, and Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co. Avere
instructed to open an account with me, and to place the
proceeds of the cotton shipped for account of the navy
to my credit. In advising me of the foregoing arrange
ment, Mr. Mallory instructed me to keep the accounts of
the several Bureaux separate, and to charge each Arith
the specific expenditure on its behalf; but he explained
that his object Avas to relieve me from the very possible
embarrassment of receiving an order for supphes at a
time Avhen there might be no funds to the credit of the
special Bureaux to Avhich the order referred, and I
would have to Avait for authority to make the necessary
transfer. This arrangement was a bold departure from
the customary ' red-tape ' of departmental routine ; but as
the Secretary of the NaA-y had been a participator in
revolutionizing the Government of the United States, he

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 221
did not shrink from originating a minor revolution in
the mere matter of official book-keeping.
At any rate, the arrangement AA-orkod satisflictorily. I
never had the least trouble Avitli the accounts, Avhile my
colleague of the 3Yar Department Avas often forced to
make complicated arrangements Avith the bankers, and
sometimes to assume grave responsibilities in pledging
the credit of the GoA-ernment, while waiting for instruc
tions to use the surplus funds of one Bureau to meet
the deficit of another. The anxiety of 3Ir. 3Ialloi-y
on the suliject of proAdding and maintaining the ' Avays
and means ' was clearly and strongly manifested in his
correspondence. Under date of September 20th, 1862,
he Avrote thus : —
' Since then (namely, the date of my last report), I
have endeaA-oured to place in your hands the balance
of the funds requfred for your operations, but the ex
change of the country is nearly exhausted, and can
only be procured in very small amounts. . . . Cotton
goes out in but A-ery small lots, and this, our only
source for obtaining exchange, cannot meet a tenth
part of our wants. It is CAddent to me, therefore,
that we cannot rely upon exchange for placing you
in funds, and that other means must be resorted to.
K the agent of the Treasury Department can dispose of
Confederate Bonds, even at fifty cents, he will do so ;
and he is instructed in thi's CA^nt to pay your requisi
tions upon him, to enable you to complete your con
tracts. Another suggestion occurs to me Avhich you
may act upon. You may possibly be able to obtain
advances upon our agreement to repay the amount
with eight per cent, interest in cotton, the question of
the price of the cotton to be determined when the
advances are made; and this price may be stated,

222 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
or you may agree to deliver the cotton at the current
rates here when called for. You might offer another
proposition, viz., that the amount of all advances made
to you will be expended here by the Treasury Depart
ment in the purchase of cotton on account of the
creditor, he being allowed the difference of exchange
between Richmond and London. Cotton thus purchased
would be stored by the Treasury, and kept with all
the care and diligence which the legal consequences
of such a contract would involve, and transportation to
the sea-ports and all facilities of shipment would be
extended, none but the necessary expenses incident to
such storage and shipment being required. Cotton
thus purchased would be regarded and treated as the
property of the British creditor. . . . Do not permit
our credit in Great Britain to suffer, if by any
legal act, or the exercise of all your energy, you can
avert it.'
In addition to the foregoing, the Navy Department
sent out large amounts in Confederate Bonds, with
the necessary authority to negotiate them, or to use
them in any possible Avay. It was found, however,
that sending bonds to different parties did not work
satisfactorily. Even the bond fide agents of the GoA-ern-
ment, each desirous to use them to the best possible
advantage for his oAvn special purposes, became practi
cally competitors one Avith the other.
The agents abroad perceived and reported the conse
quences ofthis unavoidable competition. The authorities
at Richmond recognised the unsatisfactory character of
the practice, even before the reports from abroad Avere
received, and in September, 1863, the Hon. J. P.
Benjamin, being then the Secretary of State, drew up a
scheme Avhich provided for a special fiscal agent, Avho

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 223
should be empowered to deal exclusively Avith all bonds.
The various heads of departments agreed to the arrange
ment ; each agent Avas directed to surrender all bonds
in his possession to the fiscal agent. General C. J.
3IcRae, who Avas instructed to negotiate them, and to
distribute the proceeds pro rata among the special
agents. The first efforts to ship cotton to Europe on Govern
ment account Avere attended Avitli great difficulty and
delay. The ships engaged hi the blockade trade were
owned exclusively by private firms who wanted the
Avhole of the freight space for their own account. The
few steamers bought by the Navy Department vrithin
the Confederacy would have been fit for voyages to
Bermuda and the Bahamas, but they were absolutely
required for the defence of the home ports and rivers,
and had already been armed and assigned to that service.
Nevertheless, the Navy Department managed to export
the staples in quantities which would haA'e been thought
large if they had been made on private account. On
the 29th of December, 1863, the Secretary wrote me as
foUows: — ' Up to this date thirty- one hundred bales of
cotton have been shipped from Charleston and Wilming
ton vid Bermuda and Nassau, to go thence to Messrs.
Eraser, Trenholm, and Co., to your credit, and ship
ments are now being made nearly every week. I have
not sufficient information from our agents at the other
ports to enable me to advise you of the whole number
of bales they have shipped, but I have reason to knoAv
that the losses by capture have been inconsiderable.'
At a subsequent date he Avrote me thus : — ' Twelve
thousand bales have been purchased by this Department
. . . and will go forward as rapidly as the limited means
of transportation Arill admit.'

224 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
The Secretary of the Navy Avrote so often and so
strongly in reference to the difficulty of placing funds in
Europe, that I ventured to suggest, as early as January,
1863, that the Government should ' have its own fleet
of packets to ply direct, and thus escape the killing
freights on private steamers.' Invited by the Secretary
of the Navy to communicate freely and to make sugges
tions on that important subject without hesitation, I
wrote him in October, 1863, as follows: —
' I learn from Mr. Charles R. Prioleau that since the
beginning of the war 100,000 bales of cotton have been
run through the blockade on account of various mercan
tile houses, and this lucrative trade not only continues,
but arrangements are now in progress to enlarge it.
At present prices, 100,000 bales of cotton would yield
nearly double the net amount of the proceeds of the
Erlanger Loan, and it would seem not only advisable,
but absolutely necessary, for the Government to take
the trade into its own hands. Southern merchants
would be deterred by patriotic feelings fi-om complaining
of such an interference with their customary traffic, and
those foreigners who have already made abundant profits
would have neither right nor reason to murmur. An
agent of your Department in the regular receipt of
cotton, even though in moderate quantities, would have
an established credit, and could extend his operations
with a feeling of confidence. ... If we could accumu
late a considerable supply here, the GoA^ernment through
its mercantile agent would not only rule the market,
but important political influences might be brought to
bear.' Replying again to the inquiries of the Department in
reference to financial matters, I wrote on NoA-ember 25th,
1863:—

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 225
' Undoubtedly the most tangible and most readily
available source of money supply is the cotton itself, and
although the risk of capture is great, and the cost of
transportation heaA-}-, the profit is so large that this
mode of remittance offers the surest and speediest re
turn, besides being eA'entually the least burdensome to
the country. I feel justified, therefore, m urging the
expediency of sending- out cotton as rapidly as possible,
and, if you think proper, I can build tAvo or three fast
hght-draught paddle-steamers to do the work between
the Confederate States and the islands, so that you might
control all the shipments for your own Department, both
waA-s.
%j
' This would be a good operation in any event. A
successful voyage or two would pay for the ships, and
if buUt to order and properly constructed, they would be
AveU suited to the coasting trade, and in the event of
peace would meet a ready sale. . . . The vessels now
under construction by buUders, and those lately finished
for blockade-running, are hurriedly put together, and
are too hght for long wear and tear, but in five months
staunch and really serviceable ships could be built, and
if your Adew of the probable duration of the war would
justify looking that much ahead, I respectfully recom
mend the above proposition to your consideration.'
Again I wrote : —
' If the NaA^ Department would take the blockade-
running business into its own hands, it might soon have
a fleet of formidable swift light-draught steamers at
work, so constructed as to have their engines and boilers
Avell protected either by coal Avhen the bunkers were
full, or cotton when they were empty. The beams and
decks ofthe steamers could be made of sufficient strength
to bear heavy deck loads without exciting suspicion, and
VOL. II. 44

226 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
then, if registered in the name of private individuals, and
sailed purely as commercial ships, they could trade with
out interruption or Adolation of neutrality between our
coast and the Bermudas, Bahamas, and West Indies.
When two or three of the vessels happened to be in
harbour at the same time, a fcAV hours would suffice to
mount a couple of heavy guns on each, and at night, or
at early dawn, a successful " raid " might be made upon
the unsuspecting blockaders. From time to time two
or three of them might be filled Avith coal, and sent out
for short cruises off Hatteras and in the Gulf of Mexico,
from Mobile, to pick up transports, etc. After a raid or
cruise, the vessels could be divested of every apphance
of war, and resuming their priA-ate OAvnership and com
mercial names, could bring out cargoes of cotton to pay
the expenses of the cruise, or to increase the funds of the
Government abroad. Such operations are not imprac
ticable, and if vigorously carried on without notice, and
at irregular periods, would greatly increase the difficulty
of blockading the harbours, and would render hazardous
the transportation of troops along the line of the coast
and through the Gulf of 3Iexico.'
In addition to the remittances by sterling biUs, by
Confederate bonds, and the shipment of cotton, the
Secretary of the Navy secured the appropriation of a
very full proportion of the loan commonly called the
Erlanger Loan to the use of his Department.
The foregoing statements in respect to the supply of
funds for naval purposes are perhaps of no great histori
cal importance now, but the Southern people made
unparalleled, or at least unsurpassed sacrifices to effect
their separation from the Federal Union, and I cannot
divest myself of the feeling that this iiarratiA-e is some
how in the nature of a report to them of the use that

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 227
was made of the resources which Averc draAvii from their
very blood.
Thousands of persons at the South kncAV (the knoAV-
ledge, unhappily, Avas only too current) that the Govern
ment were making efforts to obtain ships-of-Avar in
Europe. That Avlnch was only a hope with those in
authority became a settled couAdction and a fixed ex-
pectatidii in the minds of the people generally. The
appearance of an ironclad fleet to open the blockade and
to cover the import of the much-needed and longed-for
supplies was not to them a mere vision of fancy : it had
become to many a reality which they thought might be
accomphshed any day. They looked for the expected
succour Avith confident desire, and the disappointment
was great in proportion to the height to which their
hopes had risen.
The Southern people in the aggregate exhibited so
many admfrable qualities during their struggle, and the
consequences of their defeat were so overwhelming, that
the faUure of any particular enterprise, or the efforts of
any one individual, however important may have been
his office, is hardly worthy of mention now. But people
who are braA-e in the presence of danger, and patient
under the infliction of suffering, are not likely to be
wanting in generosity, and the survivors of those who
made the sacrifices and suffered the disappointment will
be glad to learn that the men who were placed in charge
of the great Administrative Departments of the Govern
ment were conscious of the responsibilities of their posi
tion, and devoted thefr faculties with zeal and singleness
of purpose to the serAdce of the country.
As one who was appointed to execute the general
purposes of the Administration, I can testify to the
earnest solicitude of the Departmental chiefs to provide
44—2

228 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the means, and to the encouraging support by words
and deeds they always extended to their agents abroad.
To say that no mistakes Avere made would be to affirm
that those high officials were possessed of supernatural
gifts ; but whUe the wise and prudent learn perhaps
from the failure of great schemes some surer road to
success, it is only the weak and foolish who affect a pro
found sagacity after the event, and become noisy and
malicious in their criticism.
The glamour of success imparts a brilliancy to the
fortunate enterprise which it is not in the nature of
things to expect for the effort which has faUed ; but
there are always a certain number of discriminating
minds who are able to perceive the inherent advantages
which have contributed to the success and the insur
mountable difficulties which haA'e made the failure
inevitable. Mr. Davis and his Cabinet, and the great
chieftains like Sidney Johnston, Lee, and Jackson, most
of whom have already passed away, may trust their
reputations to the impartial historian who will some day
write the history of the greatest Civil War which has
ever convulsed a nation or astonished the world.
The Secretary of the Navy not only laboured with
great earnestness to provide funds, but he certainly
wrote always with great frankness, and not only en
couraged but directed me to correspond Avithout reserve,
and to give him suggestions Avithout hesitation. I
never, therefore, felt the least embarrassment in recom
mending a change of procedure or a fi-esh departure
whenever experience or the outlook from abroad seemed
to render a particular course advisable. Difficulty and
delay in communicating sometimes prevented the sug
gestions from reaching Richmond until the most advan
tageous time for action had passed. Sometimes the experts

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 229
at the NaA-y Department anticipated the suggestions, and
orders to execute Avould cross the recommendations en
route. In compliance with the general precept to com
municate fully and freely, I wrote to the Department on
NoA'ember 7th, 1862, as folloAvs : —
' It appears fi-om Northern accounts that you are
building quite a number of rams in the home ports. It
strikes me there must be a lack of engines and the
means of making them in the Confederacy. It Avould
take but a short time to run up a number of engines,
say from sixty to one hundred borse-power nominal, as
would be suitable for any A-essels intended for harbour
defence. X p to one hundred horse-poAver good double
engrines, extra strong and low for small vessels or rams,
with large cylinders and boilers in convenient parts,
can be buUt here for forty pounds per horse-power.
Larger engines for rather less. I think there Avould be
great economy in ordering a number of engines in
England for such A-essels as you may contemplate
buUding hereafter. . . . They can be packed very com
pactly for shipment.'
In reply to the despatch containing the foregoing
extract, the Secretary of the Navy Avrote as folloAvs : —
' Your suggestion as to engines is important. ... If
the conditions of your finances will permit it, build
four marine engines to drive twelve feet screws with the
greatest poAver, and send them, if possible, in a vessel
belonging to the Government.'
Orders were subsequently sent for two more large
engines, and for tAA-elve pairs of engines for torpedo
boats. All of the foregoing Avere intended for vessels
either building or Avhich it Avas the purpose to build in
the Confederate ports, and sketches of the engine spaces
were sent at the same time, but these Avere incomplete

230 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
as to measurement and in some other particulars, which
created delay in the execution of the orders. One very
especial order was received in January, 1863, for a pair
of engines with fourteen feet screw, 'the engines to be
extra powerful, boiler surface to be amply sufficient for
working the engines to their extreme power, and
all important pieces to be duphcated.' The last
mentioned engines were intended for an fronclad, said
to be building at Richmond.
I have already stated that the want of skUled labour
was a great source of embarrassment to both the War and
Navy Departments, and great efforts were made to
obtain artizans from abroad. The Secretary of the
Navy wrote me urgently on the subject, under date
of April llth, 1863, and directed me to send out
mechanics, and if possible a leading man capable of
superintending the manufacture of Bessemer steel.
There was of course much difficulty in finding men
of good character and suitable skill, who would be
willing to take the risks of a \-oyage to the Confederacy,
with the very possible chance of capture by a Federal
cruiser, and with the assurance of much hardship even
after safe arrival at a Southern port. Only trustv and
competent men would be of any real service, and it
would have been both unjust and impolitic to conceal
from them the positive dangers and discomforts of
the proposed undertaking. To counterbalance the more
moderate but sure and regular remuneration easUy earned
in England, and the comforts and secm-ity of domestic
life at home, it was necessary to offer very substantial
emolument, and the arrangements required some time to
complete. The result was reported in a despatch treating gene
rally of the subject, and the folloAviiig extract will

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 231
sufficiently explain what it Avas found possible to
effect : —
' Owing to the high rate of pay they (skilled artizans)
receiA-e at home, I have met Avith unexpected difficulties
and delays in the execution of the above project. I
have found it wholly impossible to get a man capable of
manufacturing Bessemer steel to go at all ; indeed, I
am assured by the principal manager of the Cyclops
Steel and Iron 33'orks that the practical obstacles in the
way of starting- a Bessemer steel factory in the Con
federate States under existing circumstances would be
insurmountable. I will report more fully on this point
hereafter. ... I haA-e engaged a 3lr. Thomas Ludlam,
who has been foreman of the Low 3Ioor Iron Works,
to organize a party of skilled mechanics, and to take
them out under his own immediate charge in such a
vessel as I may provide. 3Ir. Ludlam is capable of
taking charge of a foundry for any kind of work, and,
indeed, can select the site, lay out the plan, and super
intend the erection of the building and machinery. He
can also make the ordinary tools used in such establish
ments, and imderstands the use of the steam-hammer.
He AviU take with him three principal under-foremen,
three men especially skilled in heavy casting for great
guns, three pattern makers, and by his advice I have
authorized him to engage what he calls a 'jobber,' a
most useful man in any iron workshop, a practical man
of every trade, who, 3Ir. Ludlam says, can make a
horseshoe or repafr an engine. I am told that all the
large establishments employ such a person.'
Mr. Ludlam was despatched with his party from
England in due course, but unfortunately they got
separated at Bermuda, as accommodation could not be
found for them all on board the same blockade-runner.

232 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
HowcA^er, the greater part of them got in and fulfilled
their engagements faithfully ; but owing to the pressure
of the war and insurmountable local difficulties, it Avas
found impossible to construct new works, or even to
enlarge those already in operation, and the highest skill
and quahties of the imported men could not be fuUy
utilized. The Confederate Government was represented at
Bermuda, Nassau, and Havana by three gentiemen of
great energy, industry, and business capacity. Major
N. S. Walker, after servuig in the field during the cam
paign Avhich resulted in the repulse of General 31cClellan
from the advance upon Richmond in 1862, was sent to
act as the representatiA^e of the War Department at
Bermuda, but the labour of receiAdng and forwarding
supplies for every branch of the Government was soon
heaped upon him. Mr. L. Heyleger held a cori-espond-
ing office at Nassau, and 3Iajor Charles J. Helm at
Havana. The services rendered by the aboA^e-named
gentlemen were of inestimable value, but were of that
nature which could only be known to a few, namely, to
the chiefs of Departments at Richmond, and the pur
chasing and forwarding agents in Europe. They had
the control and management of all the public business
at their respective stations. Their office was to receive
the supplies shipped from Europe, and then to forward
them to a blockaded port, and that included the super
vision of the blockade-runners, the distribution of pUots,
the arrangements for keeping up the large quantity of
coals required for the service ; and there Avas much cor
respondence and much financing to meet the necessary
expenditure. In all great Avars there are men who contribute to the
general objects of the contest, and yet must be content

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 233
with such reward as comes from the consciousness of
duty faithfully performed. The Confederate agents at
Nassau, Bermuda, and Havana Avereofthat class. Tlieir
serAdces Avere aa'cII known and appreciated by those who
had official correspondence Avith them during the war,
but a brilliant dash at the head of a troop of cavalr}-, or
participation in a successful sortie from beleagured Rich
mond, would haA-e made their names current AA-here they
are not likely to be mentioned noAV. Active service at
the fi-ont wins the ' bauble reputation.' The men AA'ho
work in the rear are not despised or even undervalued,
but they must have the nerA-e to stifle tjieir ambition.
They may expect fair and just commendation, but then
they must not aspire to stand side by side Avith those
who wear the ' myrtle crov^-n.'
The goods for the NaA-y Department were shipped
almost exclusively to Nassau, HaA-ana, and Bermuda ;
and the prompt, zealous, and inteUigent co-operation I
receiA-ed from the agents at those places justifies the
foregoing short digression, Avhich is but a small tribute
to their memory.
The danger of losing or leaA-ing behind some essential
parts of the marine engines in the necessary tranship
ment at an intermediate port Avas ahvays a cause of
imeasiness, and when the most important of those
especially ordered b}- the Navy Department Avas com
pleted, I thought its dehvery^ at a Confederate port safe
and whole Avas a matter of sufficient importance to
justify the purchase of a steamer fit for the purpose of
taking them direct from Liverpool to Wilmington.
Lieutenant Robert R. Carter had been sent to Europe
in AprU, 1863, for service in a cruising ship or in one
of the ironclads, but his qualifications made him pecu
liarly and especially useful in assisting me in the various

234 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
occupations of equipping ships, purchasing and forward
ing goods, etc. ; and, as he was with me when the
engines Avere completed, I detached him for the com
mand of the ship. The ordinary blockade-runner wo-ald
not suffice. A larger and more substantial vessel than
the usual type of steamer built for that purpose was
required, and Carter and I went to the Clyde in search
of a suitable one. We were so fortunate as to find a
twin-screw steamer of about 700 tons almost complete,
and Avere told that she Avould be ready for a trial trip in
a fortnight. A close inspection satisfied us that she had
all the requisites for the immediate purpose, and by
indirect inquiry I learned that she could be bought for a
moderate advance upon the builder's contract price. If
the calculated speed could be guaranteed, I felt sure that
the vessel would be a good purchase, because she could
not only, in all probability, take in the engines and
other valuable ordnance stores, but she Avould recoup
her cost to us by bringing out cotton.
Ships of a certain class Avere dear at that time, and the
price asked Avas high, but if the enterprise Avas advisable
at all, the difference of £1,000 more or less was not
Avorth considering. I therefore made a full bid for her
at once, on the conditions that dead weight sufficient to
immerse her to her calculated load draught should be
put in her, and that in that trim she should make not
less than thirteen knots OA'cr the measured trial course.
The offer Avas accepted, the ship was Aveighted to the
required draught, and Avas taken doAA-n the Clyde for
trial, Robert Carter and I being on board. There Avas a
fi-esh breeze bloAving directly up the Frith and the tide
Avas flood ; thus, by running over the course each way
a number of times, and taking the average, we could
arrive at a very accurate estimate of her speed.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 235
The ship was far more rigidly tried than steamers
usually are on such occasions, '\^'e steamed to and fro
between the Cloch Light and the Cumbrae for about tAVO
hours, and the average of all the runs gave a mean speed
of thirteen and a half knots. We then tried the steering;
capacity by putting the helm hard oA-er, and noted both
the time of completing the circle and its diameter. The
engines were also tested, by rcA-ersing fi-om full speed
and noting- the time required to eftect a full stop.
Indeed, the ship was tested in every possible way in
which it occurred to us that she might be tried in an
attempt to run the blockade, and as she fulfilled the
promises of the builder, the conditional offer Avas con
firmed, the ship was bought, christened Coquette, and on
the llth of October, 1863, she got round to Liverpool,
where she took the engines on board.
The Coepuette was of course registered as an English
ship, and to avoid the possibUity of seizure or detention
no contraband goods were put on board at Liverpool.
About the 25th of October she Avas safely cleared out
for Bermuda, and in the official report of the transaction
I advised the Secretary of the NaA^y as follows : —
' I have already reported that Lieutenant R. R. Carter
would go in charge of this A-essel. For obAdous reasons
she leaves here under the British flag, but Lieutenant
Carter wUl have a bill of sale in his possession, and can
change the flag whenever it may be expedient. . . . By
this steamer I send forward a pair of marine screw
engines of 200 horse-poAver nominal, with all the tools
necessary for erecting them, and also spare indiarubber
valves, and, indeed, everything necessary to keep them
in working order. The boilers are riveted up in as large
pieces as can be handled, and hammers and spare rivets
are sent for completing them. ... If Lieutenant Carter

236 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
gets in with the ship you will be able to carry out the
design of sending out cotton to meet the engagements of
the Navy Department in Europe, and should you desire
to establish regular operations of this kind, I could pur
chase two or three light draught paddle- steamers of high
speed, several of which class are now coming to com
pletion, and they could do the work between the islands
and the coast, while the larger vessel commanded by
Lieutenant Carter might be employed to ply betAveen the
islands and Europe.'
The Coquette arrived at Bermuda in due course, took
in there a very large and valuable addition to her Liver
pool fi-eight, and proceeded tOAvards WUmington. After
getting inside of the Gulf Stream the culpable careless
ness of an engineer caused an accident to one of the
cylinders, which compelled Carter to return to Bermuda,
but the next effort was successful, and he got safely into
Wilmington. In a despatch dated July Sth, 1864, the Secretary of
the Navy wrote me as follows : — ' The Coquette has been
remarkably successful under Lieutenant Carter's able
command, but her speed has so steadily declined in
consequence of deposits on her tubes, which cannot be
cleansed, that under constant apprehension of capture
he recommends her sale, Avhich I liaA-e authorized for
£16,000, AA'hich will be placed to your credit.'
The freight earned, or perhaps I should say saved for
the Government by the Coquette on her inward A-oyages,
and the profit on the several cargoes of cotton 'she
brought out, paid for the ship many times over. It
seemed at first sight an extravagant expenditure to buy
a ship merely to transport a pair of marine engines
across the Atlantic, but the position of affairs Avas ex
ceptional, and Confederate agents Avere often compelled

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 237
to act in apparent A-iolation of ordinary business princi
ples, and they were happy when the result Avas such as
to fulfil the primary and essential purpose.
Robert Carter was capable of higher class professional
work than running the blockade, and in compliance
\rith my request the Secretary of the Navy sent him
back to England as soon as the Coquette Avas handed
OA'-er to her purchasers.
The successful voyages of the Coquette and the urgent
representations of General 3IcRae (the general fiscal
agent of the Treasury), confirmed the Government at
Richmond in the conviction that it Avas of prime im
portance to adopt a systematic arrangement for exporting
cotton on account of the Treasury Department, and that
it was advisable to have steamers specially designed for
the purpose, and to sail them under special GoA'^ernment
regulations. It Avas determined that the financial ar
rangements should be made by the Treasury Depart
ment, and that when the steamers were regularly at
work the details of thefr management should be assigned
to the Secretary of the Navy.
About April — 3Ia}-, 1864, General 3IcRae was in
structed to get the scheme in operation, and he made
the contracts for raising the necessary funds, already
explained in a prcAdous chapter.* By an understanding
between the Treasury and Navy Departments, it was
arranged that the steamers should be built under my
supervision, and I was directed to place myself in com
munication Arith General 3IcRae, and assist him in every
possible way. This division of duties was in order to
relieve the fiscal agent of the responsibilities attaching
to the selection of type and the construction of the
steamers, which it was thought should have, in the
* See vol. i., chap, iii., pp. 107, 108.

238 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
interests ofthe Government, the supervision of an expert.
General McRae was very energetic in the effort to effect
a prompt and equitable financial arrangement, but the
transaction involved large cash advances, and it must
be admitted that the security he had to offer, namely, a
pledge to recoup them by the somewhat uncertain ship
ment of cotton through the blockade, could hardly be
considered ' first-class.' On the 9th of June, 1864,
General 3IcRae hiformed me by official letter that his
financial arrangements were so far complete that he had
obtained the consent of the contractors to begin the
ships. He requested me, therefore, to proceed Arithout
further delay, and was so impressed vsdth the importance
of starting the enterprise Avith the quickest possible
despatch, that he suggested the purchase of four steamers
to begin with, and that I should build the remainder of
an improved class.
What was accomphshed under the foregoing arrange
ment cannot be explained in briefer phrases than in
the following report made by me to the Secretary of the
Navy, under date of September 15th, 1864: —
* In a previous despatch I haA-e had the honour to
inform you that the duty of building and arranging for
the outward voyages of the steamers especially intended
for Government serAdce had been assigned to me, and
General McRae has since then sIioaati me the regfula-
tions adopted by the several heads of Departments,
by which it appears that the management and navigation
of the ships to and from the Confederate ports wUl
be under the control of the Navy Department. Under
these circumstances it is proper for me to report from
time to time the progress made in the construction of
the steamers, and to inform you Avhat vessels have been
bought and Avheii despatched from England. . . .

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 239
Below you will find a complete list of the steamers
bought as well as building under the foregoing- arrange-
ment. 'Bought. — Steamers (paddle). Owl, Bat, Stag, Deer,
all of the same dimensions and poAver, as folloAvs : —
length 230 feet, beam 26 feet, depth of hold 10 feet
9 inches, tonnage 771. Engines, vertical oscillating, of
180 horse-power nominal. These vessels Avere bought on
the stocks too far advanced to be modified in any material
way, but are good shi]is, Arith capacity for 800 bales of
cotton, besides coal to run out from Wilmington to
Bermuda, on rather less than 7 feet 6 inches draught. The
Owl is, I hope, by this time in 33''ilmington, and the Bat
is on her A'oyage to Hahfax, from whence she will sail
to Wilmington. The Stag avUI probably saU from this
port in ten days, and the Deer three weeks afterwards.
'Building. — Under this head there are ten steamers, as
follows : — Two paddle-steamers of steel, sister ships. . . .
These two steamers haA-e been designed and modelled
Avith great care. They Arill carry, I think, three days'
fuel and 1500 bales of cotton, on but little over 9 feet
draught, and are expected to make fourteen knots thus
loaded. Two paddle- steamers, also of steel ; length 210
feet, beam 23 feet, depth 10 feet. . . . These two are
specially designed for the shoal waters of Texas and
Florida, and* avUI carry 350 bales of cotton and three
days' fuel on a draft of 5 feet, or 650 to 700 bales and
the same quantity of fuel on a draught of 6 feet. Two
paddle-steamers, length 240 feet, beam 30 feet, depth
13 feet, horse-power 260 nominal, framed, and plated from
light load-line up -with steel, bottoms plated with
iron. Will caiTy 1,000 bales of cotton under hatches
and three days fuel on draught of 9 feet, and can carry 150
tons weight in addition on a draught of 10 feet. Two

240 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
paddle-steamers, all of steel ; length 225 feet, beam
24 feet, depth 11 feet, horse-power 160 nominal. WiU
carry 800 bales on 6 feet. Tavo twin-screw steamers ;
length 250 feet, beam 28 feet, depth 15 feet 6 inches,
engines, two pair, 130 horse-power nominal each. . . .
' You will thus perceive that there are fourteen fine
steamers either already completed or in course of con
struction for the Government. . . . The ten steamers
especially built are very fine vessels in every respect,
and can be readily duplicated, so that I hope you wUl
be relieved from the necessity of buying any more of the
ships which may be sent out on speculation. The
agreement with the two firms advancing the money to
General McRae stipulates that these steamers must be
commanded by British captains until they have been
paid for. . . . Until otherwise instructed I wiU engage
captains for the first voyages of the steamers only, at
the same rate of pay as private owners offer, and when
the ships reach Wilmington you can make such per
manent arrangements with thefr captains as may be
possible. I would suggest that as fast as the ships are
paid for, navy officers be put in command, as a general
rule, although it Avould be adA-isable to retain some of
the merchant captains in the serAdce, because among
them are a number of very clever seamen, Avith great
experience in blockade-running. The naval officers to
command the steamers should be selected v^dth reference
to special qualifications for the Avork, and should have
leave of absence for that particular employment, and the
ships ought to be kept registered in the names of private
persons, otherwise serious embarrassment niaA' arise, as
Lord Russell has stated in Parhament that if it could be
shown that the steamers trading between the Confederate
States and the British Islands were owned by the Con-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 241
federate States GoA-ernment, they Avould be considered
as transports, and would be forbidden to enter English
ports except under the restrictions imposed upon all
men-of-war of the belligerent Powers. . . .
' It has often been said that the Government cannot
compete Avith private enterprise in supplying its oavii
wants. This I am couAdnced fi-om experience is a great
mistake, and it is, besides, equiA-alent to the declaration
that even in these trying times energy and zeal can only
be obtained by money. The GoA-ernment will soon have
a number of the finest steamers that can be built for the
special purpose of blockade-running, and I venture to
assert that if proper agents are selected to manage
them, and the agents are granted the facilities and
powers that are giA-en by merchants to their agents, the
entire wants of the public services can be supplied
regularly and efficiently, and with far greater convenience
and less cost than at any prcAdous period, or by any
arrangement Arith mercantile companies.'
Under cover and by means of the arrangements for a
fleet of blockade-runners made by General McRae, the
opportunity was offered to build four steamers especiaUy
for the Navy Department. Two of the four were in
tended for service at the mouth of the Cape Fear river,
to cover the approach of steamers attempting to run
into Wilmington, and to make night attacks upon the
blockading squacfron. A short extract from the report
to the Secretary of the Navy in reference to those vessels
vrill explain both their type and purpose : —
' They have been designed as tow boats, to deceive
the Federal spies, but will requfre insignificant alterations
to convert them into serviceable gunboats for local work.
It -will only be necessary to fill up the space betAveen the
beams, and add a few stanchions under the permanent
VOL. II. 45

242 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
position of the guns. The deck plans are now in the
hands of the gunmakers, to have the carriages adapted.
The armament of each will be one 8-inch rifled gun, to
penetrate the enemy's Monitors, and one 9-inch gun,
somewhat of howitzer shape, but built on the Armstrong
principle and rifled. Experiments at Portsmouth have
shown that with the present style of traverse carriage
and slide, guns of any weight Avithin the capacity of the
deck to bear can be worked upon the smallest- sized gun
boats in her 3Iajesty's service, even in a considerable
sea ; and I was readily persuaded to rifle the 9 -inch gun,
in view of the formidable character of the shell which
can thus be used, containing a bursting charge of 15 lb.
of powder, Avhich, it strikes me, would demorahze the
crew of any wooden ship, if it did not destroy her. By
reducing the charge, and using the Armstrong pillar
fuze, a shell can be made to burst in an opposing ship
at any distance within the extreme range of the gun.'
The dimensions of the two boats were as follows:
length 170 feet, breadth 23 feet, depth 12 feet 6
inches, draught 7 feet 6 inches. They were to be
propelled by tAvin screw engines of 120 horse-power
collective for each boat, and their calculated speed was
twelve knots. The two larger vessels were designed for
the purpose of making more extensive cruises, from
Wilmington along the enemy's coast. The engines and
boilers were kept below the water-line, and compai-t-
ments were placed above them to be filled Avith cotton
for additional protection. E\-ei-y dcAdce for strengthen
ing the ships and protecting then- vital parts was
resorted to, that could be adopted without running the
risk of exciting suspicion, and AAdth the power and speed
allotted to them, and the armament they would have
been able to carry, they Avould have been very fbrnudable

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 243
ships indeed. There Avas another vessel building at the
same titne under special arrangement Avith a private
firm, AA-ho had undertaken to deliAcr her at an appointed
rendezvous. It was the purpose to use the three last-
mentioned A-essels for an expedition against one or more
of the sea-ports along the Northern coast, that of Ports
mouth, New Hampshire, especially. Besides their regular
armament, the A-essels Avere to haA'c been provided AAdth a
large supply of Hall's rockets.
Lieutenants 3Y. H. 3Iurdaugh and Robert R. Carter
had been selected to command two of the ships, and I
had apphed to the Secretary of the Navy to send out
Lieutenant J. Peml-iroke Jones to command the thfrd.
The rendezA'ous for the ships had been carefully selected,
and such precautions had been taken as seemed to
promise perfect success, but the rapidity Arith which the
closing disasters followed each other after the fall of
Wilmington, and the impression that an agressive enter
prise of that kind would hardly be justifiable as a mere
expiring effort, caused its abandonment. Before the ships
could haA-e been ready to leave England, General Lee
had surrendered, and it was impossible to communicate
Arith the civil authorities of the Confederate States.
Six of the steamers bought or built under the McRae
arrangement reached the coast in time to make one or
more voyages through the blockade, two or three more
were en route., but five or six were not completed at the
close of the war. Only one of the four built especially
for the NaA-y Department was finished (namely, one of
the small vessels for harbour service), and she Avas sent
out in command of Lieutenant John Low ; but she did
not arrive in time to perform any service.
As an historical fact, I must state that I had always
favoured the construction of vessels especially for harbour
45—2

244 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
defence and for coastwise enterprises, and had also
recommended that the Government should take in hand
the entire export of cotton by vessels especially designed
for the purpose ; but it is also true that the pressure of
affairs Avas very great upon the Departments, and it did
not appear to them advisable, or even possible, to diA-ert
funds from the purchase of supplies for the armies in the
field, and from naval undertakings which appeared to be
of greater importance, for any other objects.
There can be no doubt that the Confederate GoA-ern-
ment, and the leading men at the South also, were
deceived by the official statements of her 3Iajesty's
Ministers, and by the tone of their unofficial speeches at
A^arious places and on A-arious occasions. The official
expositions of the Foreign Enhstment Act, and the
often -repeated assertion in Parliament, and in the official
correspondence of her Majesty's Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, that unarmed ships were no more con
traband than rifles and powder, produced the belief at
Richmond that even ironclad A-essels v^dthout guns or
special naval equipment Avould not be preA-ented from
leaAdng England as the property of priA-ate individuals.
And then, also, the assurances received from the French
Imperial Government Avere such as to make the obtaining
of war- vessels in France almost a matter of certainty.
If the foregoing expectations had been realized, and
the Liverpool rams, Avith those built at Bordeaux, had
been permitted to go to sea, the Confederate Government
Avould have been able to open some of the Southern
ports to private enterprise, and could liaA-e made far
more formidable and eftective attacks upon the Northern
sea-coast than by means of the lighter A-essels which
Avere designed to combine the offices of running the

o

blockade and making hostile marine raids. 3Yhen the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 245
hopes of getting regularly constructed armour-clad
A'cssels Avere crushed, the alternative course was adopted,
and great eftorts Avere made to put it in operation, but
many obstacles stood in the Avay. 3loney AA'as more
scarce, the blockade was more efficient, and shipbuilders
were more fully employed, and thus precious time Avas
lost and opportunity was missed, and the AA'hole that
could be then accomplished Avas not sufficient to turn
the scale or to greatly delay the final result of the Avar.
3'"ery soon after the beginning- of the Avar the various
Departments of the Government at Richmond were beset
by speculators, who applied for contracts to furnish not
only the ordnance supplies Avhich would be needed to
proAdde the armies in the field, but artillery, heavy
ordnance, steam-engines, and other machinery, steamers
for running the blockade, and even ironclad vessels.
Pressed for ready cash, and gi-eatly embarrassed in
contriA-ing the means for turning the produce of the
country into funds available abroad, the heads of the
War and NaA-y Departments were induced to grant a
favourable hearing to the speculators, and many con
tracts were made, the terms being generally payment
in cotton at a Confederate port, and at a fixed price,
varying from eight to ten cents per pound. In some
instances cotton scrip Avas issued to the contractors in
advance, and in a few cases it was agreed that the agent
of the GoA'ernment in Europe should receive and forward
the goods, and pay one-half the contract price on de
livery, the remainder to be paid after the arrival of the
goods at a Confederate port.
The Navy Department, with the avowed purpose of
protecting the Government, and to guard against ex
travagance in price and carelessness in manufacture,
stipulated in respect to the most important contracts for

246 TIIE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the navy that they should be executed under my super
vision, and that I should certify to the reasonableness of
the cost, the fitness of material, and the perfection of
finish. This was doubtless, under the circumstances, a prudent
requirement, and does not appear to have been objected
to by the contractors, Avho, so far as I knoAv, were
satisfied with the conditions of payment, and had no
Avish either to supply a bad article or to tamper Arith
the market value. Cotton delivered to them in payment
at eight cents per pound, when it was Avortli two shU
lings or more in Liverpool, left so large a margin for
profit that there Avas no temptation to act unfairly in
matters of detail, and it is probable that most of the
contractors Avere very willing to shift all responsibUitj-
in regard to cost and quality from themseh-es to an
official representative ofthe GoA-ernment.
But while the requirement Avas prudent as a prelimi
nary business arrangement, it gaA-e occasion to much
trouble and embarrassment Avhich the NaA-y Department
did not foresee. When the peculiar financial position
of the country is considered, and the difficulty of
communicating Avith the agents in Europe is taken
into account, it cannot now be thoug-ht strange that the
home authorities were inclined to faA-our the proposals
of private parties, who offered to supply the necessities
of the Government on conditions which would greatly
relieve the demands upon the Treasury, and would sub
stitute as the medium of payment that staple AA-hich
could be readily controlled, in place of cash or sterling,
Avhich it Avas most difficult to supply.
The embarrassment and inconvenience referred to
above arose from tAvo causes. In the first place, the
contractors, Avho had been provided Avith a Government

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 247
officer to refer to, were inclined to throw all the labour
as well as the responsibility upon him. By a not un-
natm-al process of reasoning, each thought his OAA-n
special business Avas the most important enterprise in
which the Government was engaged, and that the
prompt and satisfactory completion of that business
should be the prime object of the supervising officer.
Secondly, some of the priA-ate indiAdduals Avho had
contracted to supply ships-of-war had no technical
knowledge of their structure, cost, or the time necessary
to build them, nor had they even thought of the bear
ings of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and the obstacles
to be OA-ercome in getting the ships out of Great
Britain. Besides the two above-mentioned causes of trouble,
there was another which did not at first appear likely to
occur, at least to the authorities at Richmond. Several
of the contractors found when they came to calculate
the cost of the undertaking they had assumed, and per-
ceiA-ed the necessitA- of making periodical payments in
cash, that they could not command the necessary funds,
and they at once began to clamour for help, and to pro
pose modifications in the conditions of the contracts, or
cash advances which I was not authorized to grant, CA'^en
if they met my approval.
Looking back upon the office it was my fortune to
occupy during the Avar, I can say that nothing gave me
so much harassing perplexity, or tried my patience and
forbearance to so great a degree, as the supervision of
the private contracts, and one at least of them is indelibly
stamped upon my mind as having greatly contributed
to the failure of those enterprises from which the Con
federate Government and the Southern people anticipated
the most important results. In a general despatch to

248 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the Secretary of the Navy on the foregoing subjects,
dated September 24th, 1862, I reported as follows : —
' . . . I feel it, however, my duty to remark generally
upon the various contracts which private individuals
have made with the Navy Department, and which I am
directed by you to supervise on the part of the Govern
ment, because I know that you cannot be aware of the
state of affairs in Europe, and are liable to be misled
by the statements of interested parties at home, Avho
may piofess their ability to fulfil any and every agree
ment. I disclaim any special apphcation of my remark
to the gentlemen who have thus far brought over con
tracts to be supervised by me, because they are all
strangers to me, and I have no Avish to interfere in the
slightest degree with their private concerns, but as a
public officer, and the recognised agent of your Depart
ment, it is my bounden duty to inform you upon all
matters which from the pecuhar circumstances of the
country are necessarily beyond the reach of your
personal knowledge.
' If these contracts were taken by persons who could
raise the money necessary to carry them out upon their
own credit, there Avould be an adA'antage in giAdng them
out, but such does not appear to be the case, and the
result therefore has been only embarrassment to me,
and a degree of publicity to the affairs of the Depart
ment which I fear may be still more embarrassing.
The best mode of explaining the manner in Avhich
contracts of the kind mentioned are put in train of
execution here, will be to sketch briefly a supposed
case. A person arrives in England Avith a contract
to build and deliA'er a ship to the Confederate Govern
ment. Being destitute of money himself, his tirst step
is to look up some one Avho can furnish the necessary

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 249
capital. Bankers of established position avUI not engage
in such irregular transactions ; he is therefore forced to
seek for some keen sharp financier Avho is ready for any
transaction wlierem there appears a chance of profit.
Such a person being found, the original contractor either
sells him the contract outright for a certain named sum,
or they agree to diAdde the profit. The capitalist, not
wishing to take the entire risk upon himself, casts about
among his fiiends for aid, each of whom must be
assm-ed of a certain gain. ... To giA-e character to the
transaction, all these persons are informed that the ship
is for the Confederate GoA-ernment, and that the Con
federate Government is responsible for the payments.
The matter is discussed, and soon comes to the ears
of those who are dealing directfy Avitli the legitimate
agents and officers of the Government ; the irregularity
of the whole transaction is commented upon, and the
credit ofthe Government is measurably injured.
' I assure you, sfr, that in this hasty sketch I have not
at all exaggerated the process by Avhich these contracts
are set in train, and it is A-ery doubtful whether a single
one of them avUI ever be brought to a conclusion. Thus
far there has not been a beginning. I attribute the
success which has heretofore attended the operations on
account of the Government in a great measure to the
caution and secrecy which have been preserved, and to
the absolute good faith with which all liabilities have
been met. Secrecy is, however, out of the question Avhen
so many indiscreet persons are employed, and future
difficulties Avill be greatly increased.
' An officer of the Government, Avith a commission in
his pocket, and orders to purchase any amount or
description of material, and with authority clearly
expressed to borrow any amount of money on the credit

250 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
of the Government, would be able to negotiate on better
terms than any private individual whose oaati personal
credit could not guarantee the transaction. My ex
perience in Europe has taught me that it is always best
and cheapest to deal with principals, and with those
who stand at the head of their respective trades or
employments ; and when contracts are given out to
intermediaries who are neither experts nor men of capi
tal, there is invariably delay, disappointment, and loss.
You will, I am sure, understand and appreciate the
motiA^es which induced me to write thus ; I Arill there
fore make no further apology. If you were in a position
to kiiOAv, or rather to learn, these things from your own
observation, I would not venture to advise you.'
The contract which occasioned the gravest anxiety
and embarrassment was one for the buUding of six fron
clad vessels, to be delivered at sea ; and the financial
conditions were that the ships should be paid for in
cotton at the market A-alue of cotton in a Confederate
port, and at the time Avhen the payments were due. The
general type of the ships was expressed in the contract,
but all details were to be worked out in England ; and
the Secretary of the Navy had attached the proviso that
the builders, the specifications, the armaments, and the
prime cost of the ships Avere to be approved by me, and
that the payments Avere to be made upon my certificate
that all specified conditions had been fulfilled. I accepted
without hesitation the eminent builders selected by the
contractor, and there Avas neither difficulty nor delay in
settling all details as to structure, cost, and time of com
pletion ; but the contractor had no personal means, and
the capitalists AA-ith whom he opened negotiations in
London required something more tangible than the
engagement to dehver a certain amount of cotton at a

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 251
Confederate port, and at an indefinite price. They soon
came to me with a proposal that I should give bonds
pledging the Confederate Government to deliver a
quantity of cotton Avliich, at eight cents per pound,
should be equiA-alent to the cost of the ships. I pointed
out to them that the whole tenor of the contract Avas
that the ships should be paid for onl}- after delivery
beyond British jurisdiction, whereas b}- signing the pro
posed bonds I should be paying for them in advance.
3Ioreover, I said that the financial conditions had been
settled in Richmond, and Avere specified in the contract,
and I had no authority to change them in any Avay.
3Ir. 3Iason. the Confederate Commissioner, was then
applied to. and he was asked to issue bonds, or to cause
some of those already in Europe to be handed over for
the purposes of the contract, but he declined to take any
responsibility in the matter. The original contractor
Avas not able to find the money from any other source,
and not a keel of the proposed A-essels Avas ever laid
doAvn. The conta-acts made by the Confederate Government
with priA-ate parties are of no historical importance, and
I Avould gladly have avoided any allusion to them, but
they found their way into the diplomatic correspondence,
and the particular one just above mentioned was intro
duced into the ' Case of the United States ' before the
Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva,* and therefore they
could not be ignored hi a narratiA-e purporting to give
a true and complete account of the Confederate naval
operations in Europe.
The contractor for the six ironclads Avas so unfor
tunate as to have some of his papers captured in a
blockade-runner, which untoAvard circumstance, added
* ' Case of the United States,' pp. 66, 67.

252 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
to his financial negotiations in London, gave great
publicity to the AA'hole transaction. He Avas spoken of
in the neAvspapers as a Confederate agent. The effect
Avas to draw attention to those armour-cased vessels
Avhich AA-ere building at the time, and there can be no
doubt that the unhappy exposure Avhich befell that so-
called priA^ate transaction contributed to strengthen the
complaints and demands of the United States 3Iinister,
and served to influence the course adopted by her
Majesty's Government in respect to the Liverpool rams,
and other vessels alleged to be building for the Con
federate States.
It is necessary to state that very few of the contracts
made by the Navy Department and referred to me were
ever completed. Some were abandoned because the
parties could not find the money, some proved to be
impossible of execution, and in other cases the articles
offered Avere so inferior that they were rejected.
There is another subject which is of no consequence
in itself, but AA-hich was often spoken of by people at the
South during the war, and has been mentioned since, in
one or two publications, somewhat in the form of a com
plaint against the Confederate Navy Department. It
was alleged that vessels suitable for war were offered to
the Secretary of the Navy, or he was advised where they
could be found, and that he was either uidifferent to the
proposals, or neglected to instruct the agent abroad to
buy them. I am able to state that the NaA-y Depart
ment received many such proposals and intimations, and
that they Avere often referred to me Avith instructions to
make due inquiry and investigations, and to miss no
opportunity of securing a good and suitable ship, AA-hen-
ever one was offered and the condition of the finances
permitted the purchase. In explanation, it is proper for

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 253
me to say that the proposals came generall a- from tAvo
classes of persons, namely, speculators. Avho Avere merely
in search of a comnussion, and did not shrink from offer
ing any patched-up hulk they could la}' hold off, or
honest men, really desirous to do the South a service, but
having no technical knowledge of ships, and no faculty
for estimating- the essential requirements of a Con
federate cruiser. The former class were soon got rid of,
but it w-as not ahvays so easy to decline the kindly meant
proposals of the latter, without leaving sometimes the
impression that there was lack of zeal, or some failure to
appreciate a good offer.
Two or three typical cases A\dll illustrate the character
of those well-meant offers, and will demonstrate their
impracticability. On one occasion the Secretary of the
NaA-y dfrected me to examine ' two vessels which he Avas
adA-ised could be bought and got to sea Avithout diffi
culty.' They were described in v-ery general terms as
' two fine steam frigates.' Upon looking into the pro
posal, the A-essels proA-ed to be two very large paddle-
steamers, formerly belonging to the Indian navy.
The ' two fine steam frigates ' Avere manifestly out of
date, or they would have been retained in the Indian
navy. Their paddles had been taken off and the coal-
bunkers remoA^ed. In that condition they were brought
to England from Bombay, and in that condition they
were offered for sale. The engines were 800 horse
power nominal, and the estimated consumption of fuel
was sixty tons per day. They were full-masted for
vessels of their class, but with paddles shipped they
were practically and essentially steamers, and the price
asked for them was £65,000 each, which was £17,500
more than the cost of the Alabama.
The reasons for not buying them were reported to the

254 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Secretary of the NaA^y in the followmg words : — ' I re
jected them because of their great draught of water,
large consumption of fuel, and number of men required
to man them, to say nothing of prime cost, which was
beyond my means. In fine, they would not make effi
cient cruisers unless we were in possession of regular
and numerous coaling depots.'
At another time a large number of steamers, said to
belong to Messrs. Overend, Gurney and Co., were thrown
out of employment, and Avere laid up in the London
docks for many months inviting the notice of specu
lators. These ships were iron screw-vessels of large
size, and with barely auxiliary sail-power. They had
no arrangements for lifting their screws, or for other
wise rendering them inoperatiA'c as drags upon the ships
when the engines were stopped. They might have
been serviceable to the United States as transports ; and
any maritime Power haAdng command of its OAvn ports,
or with colonial ports Avhere the supply of coal could be
replenished, and to whom the expense of a large and
continuous consumption of fuel was a matter of little
moment, might have found useful employment for them.
But they would have been a dear bargain to the Con
federate navy at any price, and any professional man
would have seen at a glance their unfitness for cruising
under conditions which would render them helpless
without steam, and would limit their actiA'-e operations
to the process of runnhig from one port to another in
search of fuel.
On several occasions vessels of foreign navies were
offered, or the attention of the Navy Department was
invited to them, but in every such case the ships proved
to be either defective in condition or unsuited in size
and type for the A'ery special and peculiar requirements

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 255
of a Confederate cruiser; and besides this, the parties
offering them had not given the least thought to the
manner of getting possession of the ships, and effectino-
their departure from the neutral port. It had never
entered their minds to doubt that the ships could be
bought and despatched without any difficulty, and Avhen
one offer or proposition AA-as declined, they soon cast
about and proA-ided another under corresponding or
equally unfaA-oiu-able conditions.
During the whole period of the war only one offer to
supply a A-essel for the Confederate naA^y, of a character
suited to the required serAdce, and to be delivered at
sea, was made by persons whose experience and business
position justified a serious consideration of the proposal.
Early in the year 1863, when the operations of the
Alabama had created some stir in Europe, an English
ship-building firm made me an offer to build a \-essel of
similar type, and deliver her beyond British jurisdiction.
The conditions were that there was to be no pay unless
the A-essel was actuaUy delivered at sea, but if she was
thus delivered I was to pay a stipulated sum in excess
of the cost price. The builders were quite able to wait
for thefr money, and were in a position to fully compre
hend the nature of the transaction and the responsibility
they were assuming. I therefore accepted the offer, and
reported it to the Navy Department as an enterprise
having some promise of success. The vessel Avas to
have been generally of the Alabama type, but larger,
and every possible improvement experience suggested
was adopted. The buUders at first appeared to be san
guine of getting a ship to sea which they said would
eclipse the Alabama, and they showed no signs of falter
ing until the deck-beams Avere all in place and some
progress had been made with the outside planking. In

256 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
this condition of the ship the senior partner of the firm
came to me and said that the course pursued by her
Majesty's Government in reference to ships alleged to
be intended for the Confederate Government, notArith-
standing the favourable decision in the Alexandra case,
had caused him to carefully consider his position, and
having discussed the matter Avith his solicitors, he had
come to the conclusion that the enterprise he had under
taken was impracticable. He said he Avas satisfied
that when the time arrived for despatching the ship the
Customs authorities would either exact such pledges as
would prevent his delivering her to a Confederate agent
abroad, or if he declined to give the required guarantee
the vessel would be seized, and therefore he was re
luctantly compelled to withdraw his proposal.
There was one other proposition for the delivery of a
ship at sea which was accepted, but only because it
came through a most respectable source, and not because
there was any assurance of success. An American gentle
man, of good position, a Northern man who had held
office under the United States, was residing in London
or on the Continent during the greater part of the war.
He had taken the Southern side in the issues which had
dissolved the Union, and had come abroad to avoid the
consequences of his aA'owed sympathy with the South.
The gentleman referred to was Avell known to the Con
federate Commissioners, and was recognised and received
by them as a person in full and fi-iendly agreement with
themselves on the political questions of the day. He
often appeared to be desirous of manifesting his good
will by some personal service, and more than once called
my attention to vessels which he had been informed
could be bought under conditions providing- for deliA^ery
at sea before payment, but in every case the representa-

COXFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 257
tions made to him proved to be exaggerated as regards
the fitness of the vessels, or the practicability of effecthig
the delivery.
The proposals and suggestions of the gentleman re
ferred to were always received Avith respect and con
sideration, because they Avere made Avithout the least
purpose to secure any personal profit out of the trans
action. One of the propositions was for the delivery of
an fronclad fi-igate, and the proposal came fi-om a
foreign banker, who alleged that his relations with his
OAvn Government were of such a nature that he could buy
the ship (which was then in England) on its behalf,
and would undertake to deliver her at sea to anyone
appointed by me to receiA-e her. The banker said that
very considerable amounts would have to be paid to
certain important intermediaries, and those amounts
would be included in the price of the ship, and he
stated the conditions of the transactions thus : 1st,
perfect secrecy ; 2nd, satisfactory security in London for
the payment after dehvery ; 3rd, a price which should
not exceed £.3<J0,000.'
At the time this offer was made there was nothing
like the amount named at the credit of the Navy De
partment unpledged to running contracts, but Mr.
Charles K. Prioleau told me that if I determined to act
upon the proposal, his firm would provide the required
security, and I authorized the gentleman Avho brought
the offer to say to the banker that the stipulated amount
would be lodged in a London bank, so as to be secured
to him upon the delivery of the ship, as soon as he would
propose a practicable scheme for effecting the delivery.
It would have been manifestly imprudent to lock up so
large a sum of money unless some plan of })roceeding
was suggested which common-sense could approve as
VOL. II. 46

258 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
being likely to succeed. The practical obstacles to the
undertaking must have been thought insurmountable
wdien they were critically examined, because the banker
did not repeat his proposal, after the conditions upon
Avhich the money would be deposited were named to
him. I never had any faith in the practicability of under
takings AA'hich involved the employment of expensive
intermediaries who held fiduciary positions, and whose
help to effect the desired purpose requfred them to act
unfaithfully to their trust, and I never encountered the
least difficulty in accomplishing any enterprise that was
feasible in itself by means of men who were willing to
give their services loyally and honestly for a compensa
tion fairly proportioned to the service rendered. There
was a very large correspondence AAdth persons who offered
their aid in getting ships, and looking over the letters
and propositions after this lapse of time, I congratulate
myself that the zeal which those stirring times inspfred
ncA^er so far overmastered discretion as to lead me into
enterprises which would have in some measure justified
the epithets of Mr. Seward and his Consuls. If any of
those who have charged the head of the NaA-y Depart
ment vrith lack of foresight or judgment in not buying
the vessels offered directly to him through private
parties should be induced to read this narrative. I hope
the foregoing explanations will satisfy their minds ; at
any rate, they will perceiA'e that the complaints haA^e
been heretofore directed against the wrong person, and
the alleged neglect must be placed to the account of the
subordinate agent, and not to the departmental chief
There Avere two vessels which are not mentioned in
any preceding portion of this narrative, but which were
despatched from England, and afterw^ards passed under

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 259
the Confederate flag. They were not bought or equipped
under my directions, and I am not in possession of the
minute details respecting their origin Avhich have enabled
me to giA-e a full and complete accountof every particular
incident in respect to the other Confederate vessels.
If this was a mere historical sketch of personal adA-en
tures, or a record of personal services, I Avould omit all
mention of enterprises which did not originate Avith me,
but it has been found necessary to explain the general
naval policy of the Confederate States, and to supply all
the facts which bear upon the complaints of the United
States against Great Britain, and which gave occasion
for the GencA'a Arbitration. In the diplomatic corre
spondence the names of the Confederate ships Georgia
and Rappahannock frequently appear, and they have
also a prominent place in the ' Case ' presented by
the L'nited States to the Tribunal of Arbitration. The
Rappahannock was cited by the representatives of the
United States for the purpose of contrasting the conduct
of the French Government with that of her Britannic
3Iajesty in reference to the treatment of Confederate
ships, although no claim for damages was urged in
respect to her. The Georgia was, howcA^er, put by the
United States in the same category Avith the Alabama,
Florida, and Slienandoah, and pecuniary compensation
was claimed for the vessels destroyed by her, on the
plea that her 3Iajesty's Government might and should
have prcA'cnted her leaving England, or should have
caused her to be pursued and captured afterwards,
before she had assumed the Confederate flag and had
been commissioned by a Confederate officer. Those two
ships, therefore, cannot be omitted from an historical
sketch of the naval operations of the Confederate States
in foreign parts. 46—2

260 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
In a despatch dated September 20th, 1862, the
Secretary of the Navy informed me that Commander M.
F. Maury would shortly leave Richmond 'for England
on special service,' and that officer arrived in Liverpool
about the end of November.
Commander M. F. Maury, though bred to the naval
profession, is knoAvn chiefly as a man of science, whose
researches have conferred great benefits upon commerce.
Wherever ocean winds blow, or the great marine
currents pursue their majestic flow, they have borne his
name. By careful and patient inquiry, and the applica
tion of a remarkable faculty for tracing general physical
laws, he brought the circulation of the marine Arinds and
currents so completely within the practical knowledge of
the ordinary ship-master, that he could determine his
route to the most distant ports Avith confidence, and
could calculate precisely how to shape a course so as to
secure the advantage of a favouring trade, or to avoid
delay in beating against a foul wind. By thus marking
out the great sea-routes. Commander 3Iaury conferred a
great pecuniary benefit upon merchants, especially Avhen
trade Avas chiefly dependent upon sailing A-essels, and his
happy gift of explaining philosophical subjects in grace
ful flowing phrases, and combining scientific precision
of demonstration with easy and eloquent diction, has
brought the ' Physical Geography of the Sea ' quite
within the comprehension of the ordinary reader, and
has placed his great Avork on that subject among those
books Avhich are styled popular literature.
The Confederate GoA'eriiment very probably had a
political purpose in sending Commander 3Iaury to
Europe. It may have been thought that his literary
reputation and his AAide acquaintance Avitli scientific
men Avould afford the means of spreading the Southern

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 261
A-ersion of the causes which produced the A\'ar among a
large and influential class who generally give but little
heed to politics, whether foreign or domestic.
The duty chiefly assigned to Commander 3Iaury Avas
to iuA-estigate the subject of submarine defences, and he
gave much time to researches into electricity, the manu
facture and use of gun-cotton, torpedoes, magnetic ex
ploders, and insulated Avire. He had also general
authorfty to buy and despatch a A-essel to cruise against
the commerce of the United States whenever he thought
the attempt practicable. Under the foregoing authority,
he bought, in 3Iarch, 1863, a ncAV iron screw- steamer
which had just been completed at Dumbarton, on the
Clyde. The ship was named Japan. She Avas fitted
out as an ordinary merchant steamer, and on the 1st of
AprU, 1863, she was cleared out from Greenock in ballast
for a port or ports in the East Indies. Her crew, num
bering forty-eight or fifty men, were shipped at the
SaUors' Home in LiA-erpool, signing articles for a voyage
to Singapore and any intermediate ports, and for a
period of two years. There is no doubt that she left
Greenock in the condition of an ordinary ship of com
merce. The Customs authorities certified, upon subse
quent inquiry, that ' they saw nothing on board which
could lead them to suspect that she was intended for
war purposes.' About the time when the Japan left the
Clyde, a small steamer called the Alar cleared from
New Haven for St. 3Ialo with the guns, ordnance stores,
and other necessary supplies intended for the Japan.
The two vessels met off Ushant, and running into
smooth water between that island and Brest, the arma
ment and stores were duly transferred. Commander
Wm. L. Maury, a cousin of Commander M. F. Maury,
and an officer of experience and ability, with a staff of

262 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
officers, Avas put on board, the name of the vessel was
cha nged from Japan to Georgia, and she was duly com
missioned as a Confederate man-of-war.
Some of the men who had shipped at Liverpool for
the alleged voyage to Singapore, etc., refused to enter the
Confederate service, and were brought back to England
in the Alar. In consequence of the information obtained
from those men by the United States 3Iinister, repre
sentations were made to her Majesty's GoA^emment, and
two persons named Jones and Highatt were indicted for
violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, the aUegation
being that they had induced British subjects to enter the
Confederate service. The case was tried at the Liver
pool Assizes, before Lord Chief Justice Cockburn.
' The jury found both defendants " Guilty," and they
were required to enter into recognizances of £500 each,
with two sureties of £100 each, to appear and answer
judgment. The points of law which had been raised in
the case were, however, not argued, and no penalty was
infli cted on the defendants except the payment of a fine
of £50 each.'*
As soon as the guns, stores, and some additional men
were received on board the Georgia, Commander 3Iaury
proceeded on his cruise. Passing through the Azores,
en route, he crossed the equatorial belt at the points
which have been called the ' forks of the road,' and
arrived at Bahia in May, 1863. At Bahia he replenished
stores, took in coal, and continued his cruise towards
the Cape of Good Hope, arriving- at Simon's Bay August
16th, 1863. On the passage from Bahia to the Cape of
Good Hope he captured the American ship Constitution,
loaded with coal, and replenished his stock from her.
He left Simon's Bay August 29th, and returned to the
* Taken from the report of the trial.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 263
North Atlantic, touched at Teneriftc about the middle
of October, and arrived at Cherbourg on October 28th.
It was a little more than six months since the Georgia
had left the neighbourhood of Ushant on her projected
cruise, and during that time she had captured and
destroyed six or scAcn American vessels, but Com
mander 3Iaury found that he could not remain and
cruise in the track of commerce for any length of time,
because the Georgia's sail-poAver was insufficient to
make her independent of the engines, and he Avas com-
peUed to seek a port at comparatively short intervals for
a supply of coal.
Commodore Barron was still in Paris with a greater
portion of the officers who had come to Europe with him
for service in the ' fronclads,' and being the senior naval
officer, Commander 3Iaury reported to bim. The Georgia
requfred some repairs, and the French Admiralty per
mitted her to make use of the Government dock, and the
repafrs were effected by the dockj'^ard mechanics. She
remained at Cherbourg nearly four months. Com
mander 3Iaury was detached on account of ill-health,
and Lieutenant Evans, who had been in the ship ever
since she was put in commission, and who had also
made the cruise in the Sumter, Avas placed in command.
Commodore Barron was in hopes of employing the
Georgia on a special service, and with that purpose she
was sent to cruise for a short time, but the design was
not carried out, and on the 25th of March, 1864, she
arrived at Pauillac, and proceeded to Bordeaux, where
she remained until April 28th, the French GoA'ernment
at first consenting to her remaining a fort.night for
repairs, and then tacitly permitting a further delay.
Under date of April 14th, 1864, Commodore Barron
informed me by letter that he should send the Georgia

264 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
to cruise off the coast of Morocco untU short of fuel,
then return to a European port and report to me. He
added that as soon as she was off from Bordeaux he
would turn her over formally to me for sale. I requested
him in reply to order the ship dfrect to Liverpool, and
on the 29th of AprU, 1864, he notified me of the
abandonment of the Morocco cruise, and advised me as
follows : — ' Evans sailed from Bordeaux yesterday, and
hopes to be in Liverpool on Tuesday morning.'
The Georgia reached Liverpool on May 2nd, 1864.
On the first tide after arrival she was taken into the
Birkenhead Dock, where she was dismantled, her guns
and military stores were landed, and the crew paid off
and discharged. All of the foregoing was done as
quickly as possible, in order to satisfy the authorities
that there was no intention to send the ship to sea
again as a Confederate cruiser, and in reph* to inquiries
from the Customs authorities it was stated that the
purpose was to sell her.
Shortly after the arrival of the Georgia at Liverpool,
orders were sent from London that if not bond-fide sold,
she should be required to leave the port as soon as she
had received necessary repairs. But as the statement
of the purpose to sell was borne out by the dismantling
and by an adA'ertisement in the LiA-erpool papers, no
further official inquiry was made in respect to her. On
the 1st of June, 1864, the ship Avas sold to a wealthy
and influential merchant carrying on a A'ery extensive
business in Liverpool. The purchaser remoA-ed every
vestige of war fittings, effected a charter of the ship to
the Portuguese Government, and on the 8th of August,
1864, with a British register and under the British flag,
she sailed from LiA-erpool for Lisbon.
The United States ship Niagara had been dodging

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 265
about the coast and looking into English ports for some
time, and was manifestly informed in respect to the sale
of the ex-Confederate cruiser and her subsequent desti
nation. She disappeared only a few da}'s before the
Georgia left LiA'erpool, and when the last-named ship,
confidently relying upon the double security of her
British register and her Portuguese charter, made Las
Rocas, off the mouth of the Tagus, the Niagara was
there to meet her. The result of this unhappy encounter
was that a prize crew was put on board the Georgia,
and she was sent to give an account of her proceedings
before a United States prize court. The English pur
chaser told me afterwards that the ship was sold by
order of the United States Government before any legal
forfeiture Avas pronounced against her.
The United States often made short shrift with their
neutral prizes, and dispensed with the formalities of
judicial inAestigation and condemnation, which often
followed long after the appropriation of the captured
vessel to the pubhc service. Such prompt and informal
proceedings were no doubt convenient at the time ; but
they AA-iU serve as precedents which may some day be
awkward for American merchants, whose ships may be
disposed of in like manner by a future belligerent.
During the latter part of 1863 a number of ' despatch-
boats ' belonging to the Royal Navy were offered for sale
at Sheerness, and on the 14th of November of that year
one of them, called the Victor, Avas sold to a mercantile
firm who acted for an agent appointed by Commander
M. F. Maury to effect the purchase. The Victor had
neither masts nor rigging on board, and her Majesty's
Government followed the customary practice under such
cfrcumstances, and permitted the purchasers to equip
the ship at Sheerness Dockyard, under the supervision

266 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
of a Mr. Rumble, Avho was the inspector of machinery.
No attempt was made to put any warlike equipment on
board, but only the fittings necessary to her safe navi
gation, and a party of men were engaged to take her out
for a trial trip. Before all the arrangements were com
plete. Commander Maury had reason to fear that some
suspicions had been aroused, and on the night of
November 24th, 1863, the ship was hurried off from
Sheerness, and was taken across the Channel to Calais.
During the transit a small party of Confederate naval
officers were put on board, the ship was commissioned
as a vessel-of-Avar, and she entered Calais the next day
as the Confederate ship Rappahannock.
The ship was partially in distress, haAdng had a shght
accident to her machinery, and being otherwise incom
plete in her equipment. The United States 3Iinister at
Paris made strong remonstrances on the subject, but the
French Government replied that the Rappahannock had
sought the shelter of a French port under an apparent
necessity, and she could not therefore be refused an
asylum. The further objections of the United States
Minister were overruled, or at least they were disre
garded, and the necessary equipment of the ship to
render her seaAvorthy was continued and completed at
Calais, although the Government ordered the local
authorities to take such precautions as to prevent any
preparation for an armament, or the putting of any war
like stores on board.
After the arrival of the Rappahannock at Calais,
Commander 3Iaury resigned the control of her to Com
modore Barron, Avho Avas for scA-eral months in hopes
that he might be able to send her to sea, and he con
sulted me Avitli reference to the despatch of an armament
and other necessary stores from England to a rendezvous,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 267
but it was found impossible to fix upon any time Avlien
the Rappahannock could be despatched from Calais, and
that purpose was abandoned. There Avere some questions
A\dth the French Government as to the departure of the
ship from Calais, but they are of no historical import
ance, because the final decision was that she might
leave Avithout any warlike equipment, and with no
greater number of men on board than she brought into
that port.
The detention of the Georgia at Cherbourg, her cruise
to the southward, and appearance at Bordeaux, men
tioned above, had reference to the anticipated movements
of the Rappahannock, Commodore Barron having for
some time a hope that a meeting of the tAvo ships might
be arranged, when the armament and crcAV of the former
might be transfen-ed to the latter. 3Vhen, however, he
determined to turn OA-er the Georgia to me, and directed
her to proceed to Liverpool for that purpose, the
design was of course abandoned, and no further effort
was made to remove the Rap)f)ahannock from Calais as a
A-essel-of-war, but the French Government permitted her
to remain there as a Confederate ship, and she was used
as a sort of depot, and in preparing for the despatch of
the Ste/newall she served as a convenient rendezvous for
the officers and men required for that enterprise.
On the Sth of February, 1865, I received a despatch
from the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 16th,
1864, from which the following is an extract : — ' Orders
by this steamer go to Commodore Barron to return to
the Confederate States and to direct all officers whom
you may designate to report to you for orders, and
to send the others home. He is further instructed to
turn over to you the control and direction of the
Rappahannock. . . . Conference with Commodore

268 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Barron Avill enable you to judge correctly of the situa
tion of the Rappahannock, and to reach a definite
conclusion as to the course which the interest of the
country requires in her case.' The Secretary suggested
that it was not advisable to continue the expense of
maintaining her as a ship-of-Avar at Calais, unless there
was some reasonable hope of getting her to sea.
On the 28th of February, 1865, Commodore Barron
notified me of the purport of his instructions, desired me
to designate the officers I wished to remain, and added : —
' I have instructed Lieutenant- Commanding C. M.
Fauntleroy, Confederate States steamship Rappahannock,
to carry out any instructions that you may give in
reference to the disposition of the ship, and to render
you every facility for examining into her condition, and
also to give you all the information he possesses which
may aid you in determining Avhat should be done with
her.' The ultimate fate of the Rappahannock is beyond my
ken. All that I know of her may be stated thus. On
March 31st, 1865, in a general despatch to the Secretary
of the Navy, I reported as foUoAvs in reference to her : —
' On the 28th ultimo Commodore Barron resigned com
mand as senior naval officer on the Continent, and, by
official letter, turned over all unfinished business hereto
fore under his charge. Subsequently, under date of
March 4th, he informed me that there Avas no business
under his control except such as related to the Rappa
hannock. March 2nd I ordered careful survcA' of that
ship by a board of officers. Lieutenant 3Yilliani H. 3Iur-
daugh president, directing minute examination into
condition of hull and outfit, and general statement as to
capacity for keeping the sea. Report of survey, dated
March 9th : " Outfit good, but incomplete; frame timbers

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 269
sound, but requires some ncAV deck-planks and rccaulk-
mg— can carry but four and a half days' fuel at fuU
speed, and eleven at a reduced rate; has tanks for 2,340
gaUons of water and no condenser ; and, in fine, AAdth a
crcAv of 100 men, her bunkers fuU of coal, and the stores
and outfit necessary for cruising on board, she could
only carry provisions for six weeks, and even then some
of die wet proAdsions would have to be carried on deck." '
I informed the Secretary of the Navy that in conse
quence of the above report ' I have directed Lieutenant-
Commanding Fauntleroy to pay off and discharge the
crew, detach the officers, and strip and lay up the ship.
This has been done, and she now lies in dock at Calais
in charge of a master's mate.'
Ea-cu if the Rappahannock had been in perfect con
dition for cruising, the state of affafrs in 3Iarch, 1865,
would not have justified me in sending her on a cruise.
The Confederate finances in Europe could not have
supphed the necessary funds, and, moreover, it was
manifest that the Confederate armies could not hold out
much longer. The mere cost of keeping the ship at
Calais, with a few ship-keepers, was an embarrassing ex
pense, and yet the A-essel was unsaleable. At last I got a
ship-broker to assume charge under a nominal sale, and
he brought her over to England as an English ship, but
by the time this was accomplished the end had come — the
Confederate Government had expired — I could give no
legal title to her, and I was only too glad to be disem
barrassed of all connection or concern with her. She
was, I beheve, claimed by the United States, and no
one appearing to resist the claim, she fell into their
possession. At any rate, I never called upon the pur
chaser for payment of the nominal amount for which the
ship was sold to him, nor has he made any claim for the

270 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
expenses of removing her from Calais. How he got rid
of her, or whether he was reimbursed for his outlay, I
have never inquired, but it is not likely that I would
have remained in ignorance on those points if the final
disposal of the vessel had left a deficit.
Commodore Barron AA'as well known in the United
States navy as a gallant officer. He came to Europe
buoyant with the hope of commanding the Liverpool
rams ; he bore the disappointment and the many months
of forced idleness in Paris with patience, and retired to
priA-acy and partial poverty after the war, haAdng been
denied the opportunity which would have at least afforded
him the chance of winning naval honours.
After the fall of Fort Fisher, which closed the Cape
Fear river and Wilmington to foreign trade, there was
no port left open to the ordinary blockade-runner east of
the 3Iississippi, and it became a question of very serious
consideration how to get further supphes into the Con
federacy. Commander 31. F. 3Iaui-y thought that he
might make his investigations into the subject of sub
marine defences useful in keeping open Galveston or
some other inlet on the coast of Texas, and offered to
go out for that purpose if I Avould ship the necessary
material to Havana. This proposal was carried out.
I forAA'arded to the Confederate agent at Havana, by
steamer from Southampton, the quantity of insulated
wire, copper tanks, magnetic exploders, etc., suggested
by Commander 3Iaury, and he took passage in the same
steamer. On his arrival at Havana, the ncAvs of General
Lee's surrender had already reached that place ; and that
CA'cnt Avas so soon followed by the surrender of the forces
under General Johnston that it appeared to Commander
Maury useless to make any effort to get into a Texan
port. He therefore abandoned the project.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 271
It has been mentioned hi a prcAdous chapter that
Lieutenant James H. North was sent to England at an
early period ofthe war to examine into the construction
of ironclad vessels, and that he was authorized to con
tract for a ship of that class, which, if completed and got
to sea, he Avas to haA^e commanded. Lieutenant (after
wards Commander) North contracted on the Clyde for
an armour-clad ship of the broadside t}'pe. She Avas a
large A-essel, fully up in all respects to the ships of her class
at that date ; but when she Avas almost complete it became
so manifest that her 3Iajest}''s GoA'crnment aa-ouM not
permit her to go to sea, that Commander North con
sulted the Confederate Commissioners, 3Iessrs. Mason
and SlideU ; and acting under their advice, he permitted
the builders to sell the ship to the Danish Government.
The sale was bond fide, and the ship was delivered to the
purchasers in due course, and was paid for.
Commander North was instructed by the Navy De
partment to turn over the proceeds of the sale to me for
general naval uses. Before those orders were received,
£105,000 of the amount had been loaned to the fiscal
agent of the Treasury Department to complete the sum
necessary to meet the interest on the seven per cent.
Bonds of the ' Erlanger Loan,' due September, 1864.
At a later date, October, 1864, Commander North trans
ferred to me a further sum of £67,000. Upon the re
ceipt of the transfer order from the Navy Department, I
confirmed the loan to the Treasury, and upon the requi
sition of General 3IcRae and his urgent representation
I advanced £40,000 in addition out of the Naval Ex
chequer to meet drafts drawn by agents of the War
Department. These loans were necessary by reason of the great
wants of the War Department and other heavy drains

272 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
upon the financial agents. They were immediately
reported to the Secretary of the Navy, and at a later
period the Confederate Congress confirmed them as a
permanent transfer, and by an arrangement between the
heads of Departments a still further appropriation of
the funds originally assigned to the navy was made for
the use of the army, and for the general demands upon
the Treasury.
In point of fact, no fresh naval enterprises were set in
train, nor were any fresh contracts made for that De
partment after February 1st, 1865. By that time it had
become manifest that all avaUable resources should be
appropriated to such efforts as might keep up the sup
plies to the armies in the field, or to meet the contracts
which were still open, and the numerous Treasury
drafts which were rapidly accumulating in the hands of
the fiscal agents.
Among the printed correspondence on the subject of
Confederate affairs in Europe are several letters relating
to the ' ironclad frigate built on the Clyde ' and sold to
Denmark. It appears to have been the impression of
some of the United States Consuls that she was still the
property of the Confederate States at the end of the war,
and that the sale to Denmark was a sham. The action
of the Danish Government at the time of the sale, and
the delivery of the ship by the builders, should have
satisfied them that their suspicions were unfounded, but
the statement made above is a true and precise account
of the disposition that was made of her.
The published report of a case in the Scotch Courts,
called 'The Pampero Case,' makes it necessary for me
to give some account of that A'essel. In Jime or July,
1863, Lieutenant George T. Sinclair arriA^ed in England
on special service, his orders being to build, if possible.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 273
a A'essel suited for a cruiser, and to go to sea in com
mand of her himself. In pursuance of those instruc
tions, he made an arrangement Avith an eminent firm of
builders on the Clyde for a composite scrcAv-steamer.
The A-essel Avas nearly ready for sea, but Avas still in
possession of the builders, and Avas, in fact, their pro
perty, when she was seized by the GoA'ernment. The
foUoAving extract from the published account of the
proceedings in the Scotch Courts vsdll afford all the
information in my possession, and, indeed, all that
is of any public mterest in respect to the above A-essel,
inasmuch as she ncA-er really became a Confederate
vessel at aU : —
'In November, 1863, the Pampero . . . was lying at
Lancefield Quay (Glasgow), and was detained by the
Government. This case did not go to trial. The con
dition of the ship at the time of seizure was similar to
that of the Alexandra, and had the case proceeded there
would have been in the Scotch courts the prolonged
htigation, expense, and uncertainty AA'hich had charac
terized the Alexandra case in England. Under these
cfrcumstances, the owners of the A-essel came to a com
promise Avith the Government. It was agreed that a
verdict should be entered for the Crown on one count
of the 'information,' that the owners should retain
and trade Arith the vessel, but that they should not
seU her for two years without the consent of the CroAvn.
Therefore the judgment delivered by Lord Armidale
allowed the owners to Avithdraw from the cause . . .
without any liability being incurred by any parties to
the suit, and found for the CroAvn on the 37th count,'
etc. No other attempts were made to obtain in Europe
vessels for the Confederate naval service than those
VOL. n. 47

274 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
which are described in this and the preceding chapters,
and the facts relating to those efforts have been told
without reserA-ation.
Besides the numerous opprobrious epithets applied
to the Confederate Government and its agents by 3Ir.
Seward and the Consuls, for attempting to carry on a
naval w-ar against the United States, it appears to have
been their impression that British shipbuUders, conscious
that they were acting illegally, charged extravagant
prices for the vessels supjdied to the Confederacy, and
that the ' nefarious practices ' of the Confederate agents
required a lavish expenditure of money. In refutation
of that opinion, which frequently appears in the corre
spondence — rather, hoAvever, as an insinuation than a
positive assertion — I will merely state that every trans
action conducted by me on behalf of the Navy Department
Avas based upon cash payment, and no more than actual
value at the time was paid for any articles, whether
ships or general supplies.
The peculiar position of affairs imposed upon a Con
federate agent expenses of an exceptional character,
Avhich would not have been necessary under different
circumstances. Often contraband goods had to be shipped
under disguises and concealments, in order to escape
the liability of having the A-essel seized on suspicion of
being intended for a cruiser, and Avhenever a vessel was
really despatched with the purpose to couAert her into a
man-of-war, it was necessary to proAdde a tender, and
to incur other incidental expenses. But nothing more
than actual value was ever paid for any ship, and no
risk or responsibility Avas assumed by any one who
built a vessel for me, or sold one to me on behalf of the
Confederate Government, except what is ordinarily
embraced in such transactions, and I venture to say the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 275
same in reference to any other naval agent of that
Government. A few specifications may help to confirm the above
statement, and may possibly be of some historical in
terest. The Alabama cost .£47,500 as deliA'ered by the
builders ; her naval equipments and other incidental
expenses required an additional sum of .£13,437 8s. 7d.,
and she was supphed with £20,000 as a cruising fund,
and for pay of officers and men. No remittances were
made to her AvhUe cruising, and Captain Semmes drcAv
no bUls, so that the entire expenditure on account of the
Alabama, from the time her keel was laid until she sunk
off Cherbourg, was £80,937 8s. 7d., and I do not believe
any vessel of her class was ever built and kept tAVO
years in commission for less.
The expenditure on the Florida, up to her arrival
in Brest, September, 1863, had been in cost, £35,950,
other expenses, £9,678 4s. 9d., or total expenditure to
that date, £45, 628 4s. 9d. The foregoing figures do
not include the amount which may haA-e been expended
whUe she was in Mobile, and does not include her
cruising fund, which was supplied by arrangements
with the Treasury when she left Mobile.
The gross expenditure in the purchase and all the
expenses ofthe Shenandoah's cruise was £53,715 10s. 9d.
The foregoing accounts are of course exclusive of the
cost and expenses of the tenders, but they include the
cost of everything supplied to the vessels named. In
regard to the tenders, it may be stated that if taken in
the aggregate, they much more than recouped their cost
by the successful voyages made through the blockade,
and by thefr subsequent sale after they had completed
the original service for which they Avere bought.
47—2

276 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
It is true that the Agripp)ina did not sell at her cost
price, and the freight she earned on her last homeward
voyage from Bahia did not make up the deficit ; but the
Laurel must be credited with a large sum on account of
iuAA'ard freight to Charleston. She then brought out
betAA'een 600 and 700 bales of cotton, and was sold
at cost. The other naval tender made scA'eral success
ful A-oyages through the blockade, and was then sold for
more than two-thirds of her cost. Looking at those
transactions, therefore, from a commercial point of view,
it may be affirmed that the Confederate cruisers were not
set afloat or maintained in an extraA-agant manner.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 277

CHAPTER 3^
Official dispositions of HoUand, Brazil, Spain, Portugal, France, and
Great Britain to the Confederate States. — The position assumed
by !Mr. Seward at the beginning of the Civil AVar. — The policy
of the British Government. — English feeling in favour of the
NortL — Facts about slavery in America. — English sympathy
transferred to the SoutL — ^Lack of courtesy and dignity in United
States representatives. — The Alabama Claims. — Synopsis of the
negotiations respecting those claims. — Position of the British
Government in regard to them. — The three rules of the Treaty
of Washington. — A possible application of them to the United
States.
There was one result of the Confederate naval opera
tions in Europe which 3Ir. Davis and his Cabinet could
not haA-e foreseen, and to which they had no purpose to
conti-ibute when it was determined to attack the enemy's
commerce from across the sea. It doubtless often
occurred to them, as it did to many others, that ques
tions of beUigerent rights and neutral duties would
arise, and that the United States would become involved
in comphcated discussions Avith foreign Powers, which
might in some way or other be helpful to the cause of
the South. As the Avar progressed, and they beheld the
arrogant pretensions of 3Ir. Seward, and the haughty
offensive and dictatorial tone in which he urged them, it
was thought that he would very probably draw upon
himself and upon his country something more than

278 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
diplomatic reproofs. Perhaps some even thought that
Europe would tire of the long contest, and the harassing
interruption of trade Avith the Southern States, and
Avould intervene, either by force or persuasion, to stop
the AA'ar and restore the normal conditions of commerce.
But among aU the various hopes or surmises which
may have been discussed at Richmond, or which stirred
the minds of the Southern people, no one CA'er dreamed
that Great Britain would be selected as the chief object
of 3Ir. Seward's malice, and that she — ever more yield
ing to the United States than any other Power Arith
which there was a controversy, and always more re
strictive than France, especially in the treatment of
Confederate cruisers — would have been selected to pay
the penalty of recognising the Confederate States as
belhgerents, and to recoup to the United States a por
tion of the losses inflicted by the war. No country
Avhose ports were visited by Confederate cruisers was so
restrictive and exacting as Great Britain, and no Govern
ment was more cautious and reserA-ed in granting
privileges or permitting official courtesies to Con
federate commanding officers or diplomatic agents which
could be construed into an admission of anything
beyond the merest belligerent rights.
Perhaps it would be aa-cU to give a few examples of
the action of some other PoAvers and the privileges
granted to Confederate cruisers in their ports.
Holland. — The Sumter was the first Confederate
A-essel that got to sea. She was doAvn among the wind-
Avard West India Islands in Jufy — August, 1861, and
visited during those months tAvo ports of the Dutch
possessions, namely, St. Anne's, Curagoa, and Para
maribo. She was permitted to remain at the first port
eight days, and at the second eleven days. At both

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 279
places she was alloAved to obtain coal and other supplies,
and she was received and treated by the authorities in
every respect as a national ship-of-war. 31r, Seward
remonstrated, and in one of his despatches in February,
1862, he directed the United States Minister at the
Hague to call attention to the ' subject of the intrusion
of piratical American vessels seeking shelter in the ports
of the Netherlands and their colonies ;' but the Dutch
Government was ncA-er induced to withdraw the recog
nition of beUigerent rights conceded to the South, or to
treat Confederate ships-of-war otherwise than those of the
LTnited States.
3Ir. Pike, the 3Iinister of the United States at the
Hague, insisted that the vessels of the Confederate States
were ¦ pfratical craft,' or, at best, he said, they could only
be looked upon as ' privateers,' and therefore should be
excluded from ports of the Netherlands. In reply.
Baron van Zuylen, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign
Affairs, stated the -riews of his Government, as follows : —
' The vessel armed for war by private persons is called a
" privateer." The character of such vessel is settled
precisely, and, hke her English name (privateer) in
dicates sufficiently under this circumstance that she is a
private armed vessel — name Avhich 3Ir. Wheaton gives
them ("Elements of International Law," u., p. 19).
Privateering is the maritime warfare which privateers
are authorized to make for their own account, against
merchant-vessels of the enemy by virtue of letters
of marque, which are issued to them by the State. The
Sumter is not a private vessel ; is not the property of
unconnected individuals — of private ship-owners. She
therefore cannot be a privateer ; she can only be a ship-
of-war, or ship of the State, armed for cruising. ... It
cannot be held, as you propose in your despatch of the

280 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
9th of this month, that all vessels carrying the Con
federate flag are, Avithout distinction, to be considered as
privateers, because the principles of the law of nations,
as well as the examples of history, require that the
rights of war be accorded to those States.'^'"
Brazil. — The Sumter went from Paramaribo to 3Iaran-
ham in the Empire of BrazU. She was allowed to remain
ten days, and to take in as much coal as she wanted.
The United States Consul made a protest to the Presi
dent ofthe province, but the reply was that the Sumter
was a belligerent vessel, and, as such, must be allowed
to receive all necessary supplies. The United States
Minister at Rio de Janeiro carried on a long corre
spondence with the 3Iinister of Foreign Affairs on the
subject, and denounced the conduct of the President of
3Iaranham as ' an unfriendly act towards the United
States, and a gross breach of neutrality;' but the Im
perial Government approved the conduct of their officer
in recognising the Sumter as a national ship-of-war.f
At a later period of the Avar the Florida, Geoiyia, aud
Alabama were admitted to Brazilian ports on precisely
the same footing as vessels of the United States. It was
alleged that the Alabama had violated the neutrality of
Brazil by making captures Avithin the territorial waters of
the Empire off the island of Fernando de Noronha. The
President of the province of Pernambuco, within whose
jurisdiction the alleged offence was said to have been
committed, sent instructions to the Governor of the
island to order the Alabama away, but meauAvhile she
* See 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. vi., pp. 70, 76, 77, and Sir
A. Cockburn, pp. 83, 84, for correspondence between ]\Ir. Pike and
Baron van Zuylen.
t See 'British Counter-Case,' p. 120, and Appendix to 'British
Case,' vol. vi., pp. 17, 42.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 281
had left the neighbourhood, and on 3Iay llth, 1863, she
enta-ed the harbour of Bahia, and was permitted to
remain there fourteen days.
The United States 3Iinister remonstrated, and even
went so far as to maintain that the Alabama should
liaA-e been seized and detained at Bahia; but the Brazilian
Government replied that the President of Bahia had
done right in receiAdng the Alabama, and that he would
not have been justified in refusing her the hospitalities
of the port without positiA'e CAddence of her having
infi-inged the neutrahty of the Empire. Subsequently,
instructions were issued to exclude the Alabama fi-om
BrazUian ports on the ground that she had burned
captured A-essels withm the territorial limits of the
Empire, but there never arose an occasion to enforce the
order, as the ship proceeded fi-om Bahia to the East
Indies, and did not again appear on the South American
coast. Captain Semmes wrote me a categorical denial
of the report upon which the aboA-e-mentioned instruc
tions were issued, and he would have been able to prove
its falsehood if it had been necessary or convenient for
him to bring the Alabama again into a Brazilian port.
Spain. — In January, 1862, the Sumter entered the
port of Cadiz, and was not only permitted to obtain
supphes, but she was allowed the use of a Government
dock to make her repafrs. In February, 1865, the
Stonewall Avas compelled to put into Ferrol in conse
quence of a serious leak in her rudder-casing, and she
was allowed to remain more than a month refitting. In
reply to the protest of the United States 3Iinister, the
Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs said : — ' The Govern
ment of her Majesty could not disregard the voice of
humanity, in perfect harmony with the laws of neutrality,
and does not think they are violated by alloAving a

282 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
A'essel only the repairs strictly necessary to naAdgate
Avithout endang-ering- the lives of the crew.'* Subse-
quently, in 3Iay, 1865, the Stonewall entered the Spanish
Colonial port of Havana. The Captain-General not only
recognised her as a vessel-of-war, although the Con
federate Government had to all appearance ceased to
exist, but he advanced to her commander the amount
necessary to pay off the crew.
Portugal. — From Ferrol the Stonewall proceeded to
Lisbon, Avhere she was permitted to remain the full time
to which the stay of vessels belonging to both bellige
rents was restricted, and was also permitted to take in a
supply of coal. The Minister of the United States made
the usual protest, but in reply to his representations the
Portuguese Foreign Minister wrote thus : — ' Regarding
the supply of coal, against which you insist, alloAv me
to observe that the vessel being a steamer, his 3Iajesty's
Government could not avoid with good foundation that
she should be provided Avith that article, with the same
reason that it could not deny to any saUing- vessel in
a dismantled state to provide itself AA-ith sails.'f
France. — The Sumter, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and
Rappahannock, Avere on every occasion of A-isiting French
ports received with marked consideration, and were
allowed to take supplies of coal and to repair damages
with a degree of freedom and latitude in excess of the
privileges granted them by any other Power.
The Sumter called at 3Iartinique in November, 1861.
She was permitted to remain fourteen days, and to take
in a full supply of coal, enough, in fact, to carry her
across the Atlantic. The Alabama touched at 3lartinique
in November, 1862, to meet her tender, the Agrippina.
* Quoted in 'British Connter-Case,' p. 123.
t Ibid.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 283
Her Britannic 3Iajesty's Consul at St. Pierre reported
to the GoA'ernor that he had reason to belicA'c that the
Agrippina was a supply ship for the Alabama, and that
the meeting of the tAvo ships at the island was probably
for the purpose of furnishing the Alabanui Avith coal.
The above hiformation was giA-en to the Governor before
the Alabama'.^ arrival, but it had been elicited from the
captain of the Agripipina by the Consul, and he deemed
it his duty to acquaint the French authorities Avith the
fact. In a report of the cfrcumstances to his Govern
ment, dated NoA-ember 26th, 1862,* the British Consul
says : — ' I next deemed it proper to acquaint the
Governor Avith what I had just learned. He did not
seem much surprised, and observed that if the Alabama
came into port he would act exactly as he had done on
a former occasion hi the case of the Sumter, when the
French Government had altogether approved of the
measures he had taken in regard to that A-essel.' When
the Alabama arrived a few days after, she received per
mission to remain as long as necessary and to land her
prisoners. The Florida was aUowed to remain several months at
Brest, to repair damages in a GoA'ernment dock, to land
her small arms and have them repaired by a local gun
smith, and finaUy, to discharge a large portion of her
crcAV, and to take on board other men to make good the
original number. The United States Minister at Paris
protested against the priAdleges extended to the Florida,
and especially AAdth reference to the repairs to her
machinery. 31. Droujm de I'Huys replied that ' if she
were depriA'ed of her machinery she Avould be pro tanto
disabled, crippled, and liable, like a duck Avith its wings
cut, to be at once caught by the United States steamers.
* 'British Case,' p. 107.

284 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
He said it would be no fair answer to say the duck had
legs and could SArim .... and finally he said that they
(the Imperial Government) must deal with this vessel
(the Florida) as they would with the United States
ships, or the ships of any other nation,' etc.* The
presence of the Florida at Brest gave rise to an official
conversation between M. Drouyn de I'Huys and the
American Minister, which manifests very strongly the
determination of the French Government to recognise
the Confederate States as a belligerent Power, and to
repudiate the preposterous demand of 3Ir. Seward that
their cruisers should be treated as pirates. Mr. Dayton,
the American Minister, in a despatch to 3Ir. Seward,
reported the conversation referred to in the foUoAring
words : —
' On the 19th instant ' (October, 1863) ' I received a
note from M. Drouyn de I'Huys, requesting to see me on
the next day in reference to certain matters of business.
I, of course, attended at the Foreign Office at the time
named. He then informed me that it had been reported
to him that the United States steamship Kearsarge,
Captain WinsloAv, now in the port of Brest, kept her
steam constantly up, with the vicAV, as supposed, of in
stantly following and catching the Florida upon her
leaving that port ; and that France, having resoh-ed to
treat this vessel as a regularly commissioned ship-of-Avar,
could not, and would not, permit this to be done. He
said that the rule which requires that the vessel first
leaAdng shall have twenty-four hours' start must be
applied. To avoid the difficulty Avhich, he said, must
inevitably foUoAv a disregard of this rule by Captain
WinsloAV, he requested me to communicate to him the
* See report of United States Minister, quoted in 'British Case,'
pp. 71, 72.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 285
determination of this GoA-erninent, and apprise him of
the necessity of complying Avitli the rule. Inasmuch as
nothing Avas to be gained by inviting the application of
force, and increased difficulties might foUoAv that course,
I liaA-e communicated to Captain 3Vinslow the letter, of
which I herewith send you a copy.'*
In reference to the permission granted to the Florida
to fill up the A-acancies in her crcAV, 3Ir. Dayton reported
in the same despatch as foUoAvs : —
' The determination which has been reached bv the
French authorities to aUow the shipment of a crew, or
so large a portion of one, on board the Florida while
hdng in their port, is, I think, wrong, even supposing
that vessel a regularly commissioned ship-of-Avar. I
told 31. Drouyn de I'Huys that, looking at it as a mere
lawyer, and clear of prejudices which my official position
migrht create, I thouojht this determination an error. He
said, however, that in the conference they had reached
that conclusion unanimously, although a majority of the
3linistry considering the question were lawyers.'
The Georgia was permitted to remain nearly four
months at Cherbourg, where she Avas repaired in the
GoA-emment dock, and Avas then again allowed after a
A-ery short cruise to enter the port of Bordeaux, and to
remain there a month, or a full fortnight after her repairs
were completed.
The Rappahannock, onfy' a fcAV hours after leaving a
British dockyard, entered the port of Calais, having
been transformed from an English despatch-boat to a
Confederate vessel-of-war during the run across the
Channel. Nevertheless, she Avas received by the French
authorities as a regularly commissioned ship-of-war, and
was permitted to lie in the dock at Calais to receive
* Quoted in 'British Case,' p. 72.

286 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
workmen from England to complete her engines, and to
remain in that harbour from November, 1863, until
March, 1865, flying the Confederate flag and pennant,
and actually performing the office of a depot, or receiAdng
vessel, for officers and men destined for employment in
other ships.
Most of the foregoing specifications of the privileges
granted to Confederate vessels-of-war in the ports of the
Maritime Powers have been incidentally mentioned in
the course of the preceding narrative; but they are
recapitulated Arith more particularity, and are brought
together, in order to demonstrate vrith what unanimity
the Governments of foreign States recognised the right
of the Confederacy to commission ships-of-war, and the
uniformity with which they all repudiated the assumption
of the United States that those ships were either ' pfrati
cal yessels ' or ' privateers.'
An examination of the diplomatic correspondence, and
of the proceedings before the Tribunal of Arbitration,
AvUl supply the most abundant CA-idence, not only of
the greater facilities for obtaining supplies and repafrs,
and the greater privileges generally which were allowed
to Confederate vessels in the ports of all the other 3Iari-
time Powers than were permitted to them in British
ports, but Avill also demonstrate that those Powers were
almost invariably more decided in their maimer of setting
aside the protests of the United States, and more reso-
ilutely determined to make no distinction whatever hi
jthe treatment of vessels of both parties in the Civil War
[than Great Britain ; and yet the United States, in the
' Case ' presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration, con
trasts the strict observance of neutrality of some of the
other PoAvers, and of France particularly, Avith the par
tiality Avhich they allege Avas shown to the A-essels of the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 287
Confederate States by her Britannic 3Iajesty's Govern
ment. Great stress is of course laid by the United States
upon the action of the French Government in respect to
the vessels buUt by MM. Annan and Voruz for the
Confederate States. The secret understanding Avhicli
induced the Confederate GoA-ernment to attempt to build
ships in France has been ftiUy explained in a previous
chapter. The character of that understanding may not
have been known to the 3linister of the United States,
and he may not even have suspected that Mr. Slidell
had receiA-ed covert encouragement from the Imperial
Government. But when he obtained copies of priA^ate
papers belonging to the buUders through the treachery
of a clerk, and was thus able to approach the French
3Iinister of Foreign Affairs with very plausible reasons
for official inqufry into the character and destination of
the ships, the Imperial Government was only brought
face to face Avith a contingency which must haA^e been
foreseen when 3Ir. SlideU was advised to make use of
French dockyards. 3Ir. Dayton could give the Foreign
Minister no information with which he was not already
acquainted, and the Government could not hesitate
between one of two courses.
It was possible for 31. Drouyn de I'Huys to reply
that 31. Arman Avas buUding the ships in the ordinary
course of his business, as a purely commercial transac
tion, and that he purposed to despatch them for delivery
abroad, which was not contrary to French law, and
therefore the Government could not interfere with the
legitimate tiade of the country. This is precisely what
Mr. SlideU had been told would be the answer to any
remonstrance from the United States. The alterna
tive course was to affect ignorance oi 31. Arman's

288 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
original intentions, to assume an appearance of surprise
and vexation at his attempt to infringe the Proclamation
of Neutrality, and to compel him to break his engage
ments with the Confederate agent. The Imperial
Government, for political reasons, did not feel willing to
encounter the possible danger of adopting the first
course, and there Avas no other choice but to follow the
latter. The vessels Avere not only built manifestly for Avar,
but there had been no attempt at disguise, and no
omission of any of the equipments necessary to make
them efficient as fighting ships. Magazines and sheU-
rooms Avere placed in each, and all the bolts, traverses,
and gear required for mounting and manceuvring the
guns were provided. In fact, the guns themseh-es had
been manufactured under the authority of the Minister
of Marine, and the open, undisguised purpose was
to despatch the ships from France, ready to go into
action, except in respect to their fighting crews. If
there had been no covert understanding, the usual, at
least the natural and equitable course, would haA^e been
to have seized the ships and to have taken legal pro
ceedings against the builders for their forfeiture, and
against M. Arman for infringement of the Neutrahty
LaAvs. That course Avould haA-e invoh^ed awkward
exposures, because M. Arman, not finding it possible to
deny the equipment of the ships, would have been forced
to give a true history of the whole transaction in order
to save the property from forfeiture, and as an act
of self-defence.
The compilers of the ' Case of the United States '
presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration make the
folloAving remark in reference to the forced sale ofthe
Arman ships : — ' The course pursued by France towards

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 289
these v^essels is in striking contrast Avitli Great Britain's
conduct m the cases of the Florida and the Alabama.'*
To those who may read this narrative, or who care
to search the records of the Geneva Arbitration, the!
cases -wUl not appear to be at all parallel. Setting'
aside the secret permission of the Imperial Government,
and looking only to the actual condition of the Arman
ships at the date of 3Ir. Dayton's complaint, it must be
admitted that any neutral Power Avould have had no
hesitation how to act — the obhgation to intervene and to
requfre explanation was manifest. The ships, as the
French 3Iinister of 3Iarine said, were ' veritable corvettes
de guerre,' and were ' equipped,' ' fitted out,' and
' furnished ' in every respect as fighting ships, prepared
to begin hostiUities at the moment of passing the line of
French jurisdiction. The Alabama and Florida, on the
contiary, were vessels wholly unprovided with arms or
munitions of war, and without any equipment or appli
ances which would have enabled them either to mount
or use a battery of guns. They left England as helpless
as aU ordinary merchant ships, and could have been
captured by the smaUest and most weakly armed gun
boat, Arithout the possibihty of making any resistance.
It in no way concerns me to defend the action of her
Majesty's Government against the charge of practising a
lax rule of neutiahty, and of having pursued a course
which was unfri.endly to the United States and en
couraging to the South. Those who are curious to
know what has been said on both sides must refer to the
' Cases ' presented by the two Governments to the Tri
bunal of Arbitration. My office and my purpose is to
state only such facts as wUl serve to place the action
of the Confederate Government in a perfectly true and
* See 'United States Case,' p. 73.
VOL. II, 48

290 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
clear light, and then to demonstrate that the ' criminal
proceedings ' and the ' nefarious transactions ' attributed
to the representatives of that Government have no solid
foundation, and rest upon no genuine or specific occur
rences, but that all such expressions are mere ' figures
(of rhetoric,' which the State Department at Washington
adopted as the means of manifesting its chagrin and
disappointment because the ciAdhzed world Avould not
pronounce Mr. Davis, Lee and Jackson rebels, and
refused to treat Semmes, Maffitt, Waddell and 3Iorris
as pirates.
The correspondence between 3Ir. Seward and the
United States Ministers at the Hague, Paris, and Rio
de Janefro manifests that he was angry with aU alike,
and complained vrith equal petulance against all who
extended the favour of belligerent rights to the Con
federacy, but he was never able to fix upon any other
Power a specific act which in his judgment demanded
a formal claim for damages. He found the occasion for
such a pretension against Great Britain in the fact that
ships were obtained in England which were afterwards
used to make war upon the United States, and having
found the pretext, he seems never to have abandoned for
a moment the purpose to exact retribution, but prose
cuted his aim with persistent and implacable consistency
and vigour. The ' Secretary of State ' is the member of
the American Cabinet who has the management of the
Foreign Affairs of the country, and he is the exponent
of the national Avill and the expounder of the pubhc
feehngs in regard to all that affects international rela
tions. Mr. Seward held that office during, and for some
time after, the Civil War, and he was therefore the
medium of communication Avith foreign Powers, and he
had the opportunity to impress his oaa-u vIcaa-s upon the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 291
foreign policy of the United States, and to explain that
policy in the spirit and language suited to his own
temper and taste.
I know nothing of 3Ir. ScAvard personally, and have
no purpose to criticise his special attributes, or his
management of pubhc affairs in the high office he held
under President Lincoln. It is far less my wish to
iuA^ade the domain of his private feelings, or to impugn
the motives which gaA-e life and energy to his acts. It
has been necessary to comment upon the petulant,
haughty, and dictatorial style of the official corre
spondence between the State Department at Washington
and the representatives of foreign Powers during the
CivU War, and it vrill furthermore be necessary to
demonstrate that the grievances of the United States
were urged by the Consuls, and even some of the higher
agents who got thefr inspiration from Washington, in
a manner not only out of harmony Arith the rules of
diplomatic courtesy as commonly practised, but often
in a style which was offensive.
In the statement of facts pertaining to the claims of
the United States against Great Britain, and in com
menting upon the mode of pressing them, a frequent
mention of the high functionary who both formulated the
demands and gave the key-note to the tone in which
they should be urged is unavoidable, but no fact has
been or vriU be mentioned, and no document will be
quoted, that has not already been published among the
diplomatic records, or which does not appear among the
proceedings of the Geneva Arbitration ; and in the com
ments upon the facts and documents Mr. Seward's name
cannot be separated from the statements, complaints, and
demands which were set forth by himself, or by his
authority. The author or expounder of a national
48—2

292 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
policy which becomes historic, sacrifices his individuality
so far as the public judgment is concerned. His name
ceases to be an appellation suggestive of purely personal
traits and attributes, but takes a generic form, and may
be, and generally is, used as an historical synonym for
the political events with which it is inseparably linked.
Mr. Seward is mentioned throughout this narrative in
the impersonal sense suggested in the foregoing para
graph, a practice which is necessary for a clear and
concise explanation of the subject, and which is justified
by historic precedent and example.
The Alabama was the first foreign-built ship which
took the sea under the Confederate flag, and her career
presented more that was generally interesting to the
public than the performances of either of her consorts,
hence her origin, captures, and the treatment accorded
to her by the home and colonial authorities of Great
Britain attracted more than their due share of notice,
and were the chief corner-stone upon which the United
States based their complaints against her 3Iajesty's
Government. Indeed, her name was thrust so pro
minently and at such an early date into the diplomatic
controversies which arose from the Civil War, that it
came in time to be used as the specific title by which the
murmurs, the pretensions, and finally the demands of
the United States were designated, and they are all
classed and scheduled in State Papers and in historical
reminiscences under the generic title of the 'Alabama
Claims.' But although the famous Confederate craft
Avas a prominent factor in the diplomatic war, Avhich was
Avaged for a longer time than the actual struggle, yet
the grievances of the United States took a much Avider
range than the limits of her cruise, or the injury inflicted
upon American commerce by her depredations.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 293
In order that the general reader may be able to under
stand the comprehensiA-e character of those claims, and
may also understand how it came about that England
and the United States appeared before an International
Tribunal, it will be necessary to give not only a sketch
of the general as well as the specific complaints Avhich
were urged against the GoA^ernment and people of Great
Britain, but to describe to some extent the manner in
which her 3Iajesty's GoA'ernment received and treated
the complaints during the progress of the war. _
The surrender of Fort Sumter on the 13th of April,
1861, was the initial act of the Civil War. The Presi
dent of the United States issued a proclamation on the
15th of AprU calling out troops to the number of 75,000
men.* On the 19th of April he issued another proclama-
mation, declaring a blockade of the ports within the
States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida,
3Iississippi, Louisiana, and Texas ; and on the 27th of
AprU still another, extending the blockade so as to
include the Southern ports as far north as Virginia. On
the 3rd of 3Iay, 1861, the proclamation of the blockade
was published in the London newspapers ; on the 10th
of 31ay copies of the proclamation of blockade, and of
the counter-proclamation of President Davis, were re
ceived by Lord RusseU from the British Minister at
Washington, and finaUy the blockade was officially com
municated to Lord Russell by the United States Minister
on the llth of 31 ay.
On the 6th of 31ay Lord Russell stated in the House
of Commons that after consultation with the law officers
the Government had come to the conclusion that the
* The dates and order of the Proclamations are taken from the
' British Case,' pp. 4, 5, etc., which gives the United States source
from which they were obtained.

294 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Southern Confederacy must be treated as belligerents,
and on the 14th of May her Majesty's Proclamation of
Neutrality was issued, which acknowledged the existence
of a Civil War, and thereby recognised the Confederate
States as belligerents. The example of Great Britain
was soon followed by the chief Maritime Powers in the
following order : — France, June 10th ; Netherlands,
June 16th ; Spain, June 17th ; Brazil, August 1st.
The remaining European Powers issued ' notifications ' at
various dates, prohibiting the entry of privateers or
prizes into their ports, and defining the conditions under
which the public vessels of both parties should be per
mitted to enter and receive supphes, and drawing no
distinction between them as belligerents.
Mr. Seward took prompt notice of the foregoing re
cognitions of the Confederate States, and vehemently
denied the right of other nations to acknowledge their
de facto status as that of a beUigerent Power. He affirmed
that the so-called Government at Richmond merely re
presented ' a discontented domestic faction.' 3Yriting to
Mr. Dayton on the 30th of May, 1861, he says :— ' The
United States cannot for a moment alloAV the French
Government to rest under the delusive belief that they
will be content to have the Confederate States recognised
as a belligerent Power by States vrith which this nation
is at amity. No concert of action among foreign States
so recognising the insurgents can reconcile the United
States to such a proceeding, whatcA-er may be the conse
quences of resistance.'*
In a subsequent despatch to 3Ir. Dayton (June 17,
1861), Mr. Seward says: — 'It is erroneous, so fiir as
foreign nations are concerned, to suppose that any war
* 'United States Appendix,' vol. i., p. 192, quoted by Sir A.
Cockburn, p. 82.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 295
exists in the United States. Certainl}' there cannot be
two belligerent Powers where there is no Avar. There
is here, as there has always been, one political PoAA-er,
namely, the United States of America, competent to
make war and peace, and conduct commerce and alliances
Avith all foreign nations. There is none other, either in
fact or recognised by foreign nations. . . . The French
Government says, in the instruction Avhich has been
tendered to ns, that certain facts Avhich it assumes confer
upon the insurgents of this country, in the eyes of foreign
Powers, all the appearances of a Government de facto,
wherefore, whatcA-er may be its regrets, the French
Government must consider the two contending parties
as employing the forces at thefr disposal in conformity
Avith the laws of war. This statement assumes not only
that the law of nations entitles any insurrectionary fac
tion, when it establishes a de facto Government, to be
treated as a belhgerent, but also that the fact of the
attainment of this status is to be determined by the
appearance of it in the eyes of foreign nations. If we
should concede both of these positions, we should still
insist that the existence of a de facto Government entitled
to belhgerent rights is not established in the present
case. *
On the 21st of July, 1861, he wrote on the same
subject to 3Ir. Adams as follows : — ' The United States
and Great Britain have assumed incompatible, and thus
far irreconcilable positions on the subject of the existing
insurrection. The United States claim and insist that
the integrity of the Republic is unbroken, and that their
Government is supreme, so far as foreign nations are
concerned, as weU for war as for peace, over all the
* 'United States Appendix,' vol. i., p. 202, quoted by Sir A.
Cockburn, p. 82.

296 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
States, all sections, and all citizens, the loyal not more
than the disloyal, the patriots and the insurgents alike,'
etc.* The foregoing quotations vrill sufficiently demonstrate
the position assumed by Mr. Seward on the part of the
United States, a position which foreign Powers unani
mously declared to be untenable, and at A'ariance Arith
the recognised principles of international laAv.
The views of the British Government were expressed
in a despatch to Lord Lyons, her Majesty's 3Iinister at
Washington, dated June 21st, 1861. Lord RusseU, in
the despatch referred to, mentions that 3Ir. Adams had
complained of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrahty
as having been hasty and premature, and then adds : —
' I said (to Mr. Adams), in the first place, that our posi
tion was of necessity neutral ; that we could not take
part either for the North against the South, or for the
South against the North. To this he wilhngly assented,
and said that the United States expected no assistance
from us to enable their Government to finish the war.
I rejoined that if such was the case, as I supposed, it
would not have been right either towards our admirals
and naval commanders, nor towards our merchants and
mercantile marine, to leave them Arithout positive and
public orders ; that the exercise of belligerent rights of
search and capture by a band of adventurers clustered
in some small island in the Greek Archipelago or in the
Atlantic would subject them to the penalty of piracy;
but we could not treat 5,000,000 of men, who had
declared their independence, like a band of marauders
or filibusters. If avc had done so Ave should have done
more than the United States themselves. Their troops
* 'United States Appendix,' vol. i. p. 214, quoted by Sir A
Cockburn, p. 82.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 297
had taken prisoners many of the adherents of the Con
federacy ; but I could not pcrcciA-e from the neAvspapers
that in any case they had brought these prisoners to
trial for high treason, or shot them as rebels.'*
The policy of the British GoA'ernment Avas more fully
explained and justified in a letter from Lord Russell to
3Ir. Adams, dated 3Iay 4th, 1865. His lordship is
writing on the subject of the blockade, and the action
of Great Britain in recognising the Confederate States as
a belligerent Power, and he says to Mr. Adams : —
' Let me remind you that when the Civil War in
America broke out so suddenly, so Adolently, and so
extensively, that event, in the preparation of which
Great Britain had no share, caused nothing but detri
ment and injury to her 3Iajesty's subjects ; Great Britain
had previously carried on a large commerce with the
Southern States of the U^nion, and had procured there
the staple which furnished materials for the industry of
miUions of her people. Had there been no war, the
existing treaties AAdth the LTnited States would have
secured the continuance of a commerce mutually advan
tageous and desirable. But what was the first act of the
President of the United States ? He proclaimed on the
19th of AprU, 1861, the blockade of the ports of seven
States of the Umon. But he could laAA'fuUy interrupt
the trade of neutrals to the Southern States upon one
ground only, namely, that the Southern States were
carrying on war against the Government of the United
States ; in other words, that they were belligerents.
Her Majesty's GoA^emment, on hearing of these eventsT"
had only two courses to pursue, namely, that of acknow
ledging the blockade and proclaiming the neutrality of
her Majesty, or that of refusing to acknowledge the
* Quoted by Sir A Cockburn, pp. 82, 83.

298 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
blockade, and insisting upon the rights of her Majesty's
subjects to trade with the ports of the South. Her
Majesty's Government pursued the former course as at
once the most just and the most friendly to the United
States. ... So much as to the step which you say your
Government can never regard " as otherwise than pre
cipitate," of acknowledgmg the Southern States as bel-
digerents. It was, on the contrary, your own Govern
ment which, in assuming the belhgerent right of blockade,
recognised the Southern States as belligerents. Had they
not been belligerents, the armed ships of the United
States would have had no right to stop a single British
ship upon the high seas.'*
It would be a useless waste of time and space to make
further quotations from the diplomatic correspondence on
the foregoing subject. No one who has taken any
interest in the questions of public laAv which arose out
of the Civil War, and has made the least effort to
acquaint himself vrith the views of those Powers whose
maritime position and commercial priAdleges required
them to assume a decisive attitude, can doubt that the
United States stood quite alone in the assumption that
' the Southern States were still in the Union,' that their
civil leaders ' represented merely a discontented faction,'
and that the people were only ' insurgents ' whom the
Government at Washington should be permitted to
chastise and reduce to obedience in its own fashion.
Every foreign Power with whom the United States
found it necessary to remonstrate dissented fi-om the
foregoing pretensions, and affirmed the dissent Avith so
much determination, that it would have been politic in
Mr. Sew^ard to have refrained fi-om pressing them after
* ' United States Documents,' vol. i., p. 295, quoted by Sir A.
Cockburn, p. 80.

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 299
he had once attempted to satisfy his conscience by a firm
and formal protest ; but he never ceased to rail and
wrangle, until Em-ope became tired, if not nauseated,
by his ceaseless complaints and his bitter vitupera
tions. When the Alabama was commissioned as a Con
federate ship-of-war oft' Terceira, and her visits to the
ports of several of the 3Iaritime Powers made it manifest
that all were alike determined to grant her the status of
a national cruiser, and to put her upon the same footing
as the pubhc vessels of the United States, the question
of beUigerent rights assumed a more practical form.
Mr. Seward then found a tangible cause of complaint
against Great Britain, and it must be admitted that,
having once formed the purpose to seek redress from
her 3Iajesty's Government for the alleged offence of
recognising the South as a belligerent State, and for
granting the privilege of supplying her wants in the
United Kingdom, he pursued his aim with great energy
and steadiness, until he wrung fi-om Mr. Gladstone's
Government in 1871 a confession of regret, and from
the British Exchequer the sum of $15,500,000, half of
which StUl lies in the United States Treasury for want
of a recognised claimant to whom it can be justly
paid. All that is necessary to a clear understanding of the
origin of the various Confederate cruisers has already
been fulfy explained in previous chapters ; all that relates
to the aUeged default of her 3Iajesty's Government in
respect to those vessels, which has not been made
manifest in the course of this narrative, will be found in
the proceedings of the Geneva Arbitration. A recapitu
lation of the circumstances connected with their building
and despatch from England is therefore unnecessary;

300 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
a lengthy review of the ' Cases ' presented by the two
Governments to the Tribunal, or even a synopsis of the
arguments of both sides, would require a volume, and
would not be interesting, even if it were necessary to a
satisfactory knowledge ofthe so-called 'Alabama Claims,'
and how they were made up and maintained. A few
specifications of the various complaints and the replies,
and a brief resume of the principal claims set out by the
United States in the ' Case ' presented to the Tribunal of
Arbitration, are, however, essential to a full illustration
of the whole subject.
It has been already stated that the grievances of the
United States covered a much wider field than the
charges founded upon the depredations of the Alabama
and her consorts. They were not all, or even the most
warmly asserted of them, based upon tangible acts of
omission or negligence in the performance of neutral
duties, but w^ere in the form of lamentations for the
alleged unfriendliness of her Britannic Majesty's Govern
ment, and of chagrin in consequence of the alleged want
of sympathy of the British public with the aims and
objects of the war as expounded by 3Ir. Seward.
The mere statement of the ' Case of the United States '
occupies a large Parliamentary Blue Book of a hundred
and thirty-one pages. There is a short introductory
chapter of seven pages, in which it is stated that a Joint
High Commission appointed by Great Britain and the
United States met at Washington ' in the spring of
1871,' and that statement is followed by a protocol of
the conferences of the Joint Commission as to the ' Ala
bama Claims,' and a copy of the ' Treaty of Washington,'
or so much of it as relates to the settlement of those
claims. The second chapter, or Part II. of the ' Case,'
has the foUoAving heading in very large print : ' Un-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 301
fi-iendly course pursued by Great Britain toAvards the
United States from the outbreak to the close of the
insurrection.' The foregoing somewhat sensational opening of the
' United States Case ' manifests the spirit in Avhich the
'Alabama Claims ' were prosecuted. Alleged ' unfriend
liness ' on the part of her 3Iajesty's 3Iinisters, and a
want of sympathy on the part of the British public,
formed the text of the legal exposition of those ' Claims '
before the Tribunal of Arbitration, just as they had
been the underfy-ing stimulant which gave force and
tartness to the diplomatic remonstrances from Washing
ton, and had inspired the inflammatory manifestoes of the
United States Consuls during the war.
No one can read the ' Case of the United States,' and
the arguments in support of it, vrithout perceiving that
the chief object was to prejudice the arbitrators by dis
paraging the institutions and laws of Great Britain, and
by impugning the motives of the British Government,
and seeking to cast reproach upon the particular Cabinet
3Iinibter whose office it was to administer the foreign
affairs of the country. The ' Case ' is full of such state
ments, insinuations, and allegations as follow : — ' Her
3Iajesty's Government was actuated by a conscious
unfiiendly purpose towards the United States ' — ' the
feeling of personal unfriendhness towards the United
States continued during a long portion or the whole of
the time of the commission or omission of the acts com
plained of — 'the facts established show an unfriendly
feeling which might naturally lead to, and would ac
count for, a want of diligence bordering upon Avilful
negligence ' — ' Great Britain framed its rules, construed
its laws and its instructions, and governed its conduct,
in the interest of the insurgents.' The colonial authori-

302 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
ties are said to have shown ' a persistent absence of real
neutrality which should throw suspicion upon the acts
of the British officials as to the vessels, and should
incline the Tribunal to closely scrutinize their acts.'
Earl Russell is arraigned before the Court of Arbitration
as a Minister who ' evinced a consistent course of par
tiality towards the insurgents,' and he is charged Arith
specific acts of delay in acting upon the information
furnished him by the United States Minister, which it is
insinuated arose from a friendly feeling towards the
Confederate States.
Those who wish to fully appreciate the spfrit which
inspired the representatives of the United States at
Geneva, and which actuated the compilers of the ' Case,'
must refer to the printed statements and arguments of
the two principals in the controversy. 3Iy purpose is
only to furnish such facts and to make such extracts as
may be necessary to justify the course pursued by the
Confederate Government, and to demonstrate that if, as
alleged, the sympathies of the British Government and
the British public were with the Southern people, that
' sympathy was given to them partly because they won it
by their own merit and the intrinsic justice of their cause,
and partly because the United States repeUed and turned
it from themseh-es by the extravagance of their preten
sions, and the arrogance with which their claims to it
were asserted. The allegation that the British people
were generally friendly and sympathetic towards the
South is not confined to the statements to that effect in
the ' United States Case,' but it appears throughout the
diplomatic correspondence betAveen 3Ir. Seward and the
American Minister and Consuls in Great Britahi during
the war. The fact Avas constantly affirmed and bitterly
resented by the newspapers in the Northern States ; it

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 303
was denounced by members of both Houses of Congress,
and the Northern people were manifestly offended, and
were often led to express their disappointment and sur
prise in terms of bitter reproach against the British
public. Those who have read the proceedings before the Geneva
Tribunal, and haA-e cared to examine and to compare
the statements in this narrative with the explanations
and arguments of the British representatives, have all
the data necessary to form independent opinions in
regard to the alleged partiality of her 3Iajesty's Govern
ment towards the Confederate States, and I will say
nothing on that score. But my own personal observa
tion, confirmed by the testimony of every other agent of
the Confederate Government whose duties compelled him
to reside in England during the Civil War, convinced
me that the great majority of the people in Great Britain
— at least among the classes a traveller, or a man of
business, or a frequenter ofthe clubs, would be likely to
meet — were on the Southern side. Circumstances threw
me a good deal with army and navy men, and I can
affirm that I never met one of either service who did not
warmly sympathize Arith the South.
The assertion so frequently made by the representa
tives of the United States to the foregoing effect was,
therefore, in all probability true ; but whether it was
either good taste or sound policy to make the admitted
fact a subject of official complaint, and to thrust it
prominently forward in a legal process against her
Majesty's Government, is questionable, to say the least
of it. No Minister of State can be held responsible for
the private opinions of those immediately under his con
trol ; far less can the alleged sympathies of a whole
people, or any portion of them, be justly charged as an

304 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
offence for which the responsible Government of the
country can be called to account.
There can be no doubt that the tendency of public feel
ing in England during the few months immediately preced
ing the Civil War, and for a short time after the beginning
of hostilities, was decidedly favourable to the North.
The majority of the people in Great Britain knew little
or nothing of American political history, and were whoUy
unable to trace the approach to a sectional di-vision of
Parties which had been gradually maturing, and which
had at last been fully accomplished through the Presi
dential election of 1860. They had been induced to
believe that ' the peculiar institution ' of the South was
the sole cause of the trouble ; and their well-knoAvn
sentiments on the subject of slavery in the abstract
impelled them instinctively to give their sympathies to
the North, whose cause was pictured to them, in highly
coloured phrases, as that of the oppressed negro against
the hard, exacting, and cruel taskmaster, who fattened
upon the fruit of his muscles, and yet denied him even
the consolations of religion.
The reasons why this feeling changed and was con
verted into sympathy with the South will, I think,
become manifest to all who care to read the ' Blue
Books,' the proceedings before the Geneva arbitrators,
and other public documents which record what may be
called the ' war correspondence ' of the United States.
First, then, at the very beginning of the contest the
slavery question was thrust into the foreground, and
the freedom of the slave was placed before Europe as the
motive which had aroused the philanthropic North to
action. If the political leaders and the public press in
the Northern States had been content to state their case
in moderate language, or had merely represented slavery

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 305
as a national evil from w-hich they Avished to purge them
selves, while the South insisted not only upon the right
to maintain, but to extend it, but little curiosity to test
the accuracy of the assertion Avould probably have been
aroused, and the sympathy of the English people might
have been retained. But fi-om the beginninjg those who
spoke and wrote on behalf of the North assumed a style
of iuA-ective, and mingled so much vituperative denun
ciation of the Southern people Avitli assertions of their,
OAvn patriotic impulses and purity of purpose, thatf
pubhc interest abroad was excited in a manner whicH
they did not expect.
Every possible effort was made by the Northern press
and by the pubhc men of the North to prejudice the
people of Great Britain against the South. The anti-
slavery poems of Whittier and Longfellow, the lectures
of Emerson, the letters and speeches of Motley and
Everett, were reprinted by hundreds and sown broadcast
over the British Isles. To these were added the violent
pohtical harangues of Sumner, Thaddeus Stevens, and
others in the Federal Congress, and the bitter, intem
perate, and vituperative denunciations of Wendell Philips,
Lloyd Garrison, and many others of like spirit who
were not in Congress.
The British public was startled by this deluge of de
preciation and invective. The desire to make inquiry
was aroused, and those papers which had from the first
taken the Southern side began to enlighten the people in
reference to the true causes of the war.
Benevolence in Great Britain assumes a practical
form : it partakes as little as possible of the nature of an
emotion. A man who pronounces a blessing upon the
hungry and the naked, and says to them, ' Go in peace ;
I pray that God may feed and clothe you,' is not called
VOL. II. 49

306 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
in England a philanthropist, but a hypocrite. The poor,
the needy, and the oppressed require something more than
tears and prayers to relieve their present distress, anda con
tribution of money, or a practical plan for the permanent
redress of their grievances, is worth more than all the
sighs that pity ever evoked, or the deepest and strongest
denunciations that were ever launched against the
tyrant oppressor from political platforms, or were ever
uttered in the sedate atmosphere of a lecture-room.
The information in regard to the slavery question,
which soon began to find its way to the people of Great
Britain, was not supplied from the South nor by
Southern men. Those persons from the South who
might have enlightened the public mind of Europe upon
the causes of the war, and who could have exposed the
exaggerated statements and pretensions put forth on
behalf of the North, had more urgent affairs to occupy
them. But whenever knowledge is sought and inquiry
is keenly aroused, there are always to be found men who
are willing to collect the facts and disseminate them.
Two or three leading English papers sent correspond
ents to the United States, and one — the Times — sent a
representative who wielded a ready and eloquent pen to
Richmond. Several daily papers and one or two of the
monthlies began and continued to Avrite fi-om the
Southern standpoint, 'and as the subject grew in mterest
and importance, investigation was stimulated, and the
true bearing of the slavery question, and the conduct of
the North in respect to it, was widely discussed and
explained by numerous letters to the press, by pamphlets,
and by speeches in and out of Parliament. The infor
mation thus laid before the British public was to the
following effect : —
Slavery, as it existed in America, was an inheritance

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 307
from the mother country. It Avas forced upon the
colonies against the protest of some of them, notably of
Vfrginia. At the close of the 3Yar of Independence, it
existed in aU the colonies, and was recognised as a
legal institution by the constitution of the United
States when the Federal Union was formed. From
climatic and other causes, slave labour was more pro
fitable throughout one section than the other, and the
slaA-e population gravitated by a natural law toAvards the
States lying south of the Potomac. No Northern State
emancipated its slaA-es, but the greater portion of them
were transferred to the South by sale, and the remnant
graduaUy disappeared. When the North was thus
freed from slavery, not through any self-sacrifice, but
chiefly by trade and barter, helped by natural causes, the
agitation for its abohtion elsewhere, and the abuse ofthe
South for maintaining it, began.
When Wilberforce, Brougham and Clarkson aroused
the British Government and the British people to a
sense of the injustice of slavery, their fervid eloquence
was dfrected against the institution itself, and not
against those who had inherited it, and were in no
sense responsible for its origin, and the whole country,
conscious of its complicity in founding a system which
had come to be regarded as an offence, contributed
£20,000,000, to remove the shackles from the slave, so
as to make a great act of national atonement, not a
measure of confiscation, but of true benevolence.
The agitation in the Northern States was carried on
in a very different spirit. The original Abolitionists
and the political Party leaders with whom they in
course of time became amalgamated, adopted only one
method, and that was abuse and iuA'ective. Neither
Puritan nor poet, neither statesman nor public writer,
49—2

308 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
neither State Legislature nor other corporate association
at the North, ever proposed a practical plan for the
abolition of slavery, or suggested that the wrong over
which they professed to be grieving was a national sin,
and should be redressed by a common sacrifice. Speeches
in and out of Congress, novels, pamphlets, poems,
sermons, were filled with invective denouncing the
wickedness of the slave-holder, but never contained a
hint or suggestion how the sin should be purged, or a
generous offer to share in the process.
Meanwhile, emigration was yearly giA-ing to the
Northern States increasing political power. They soon
began to use that power in passing protective laws
AA-hich well-nigh prohibited the import of 3Ianchester
goods and Birmingham wares, and thus permitted the
great mill-owners of New England to grow rich fi-om
the manufacture of slave-grown cotton, and the iron
masters of Pennsylvania to supply the implements for
its production at large profits to themselves.
Every article worn by the Southern slave, eA'^ery
tool used by him, yielded a profit to the Northern com
mission merchant, and almost CA-ery acre of slaA-e-tiUed
soil paid a tax in the form of interest upon advances to
a Northern banker or money-lender. This constant,
steady drain had graduaUy impoA-erished one section
and enriched the other, and it had become manifest to
all who examined the subject thoughtfully that the
I burden and the ' odium of slaA-ery ' rested upon the
South, while the profits accrued to the North.
NotAvithstanding the continued tirades against slaA-ery
and the slave-holder, the leaders of the Republican Party
at the North continued even up to the election of 3Ir.
Lincoln to bid for votes at the South, and fi-om those at
the North Avho Avere still desirous to give the South fair

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 309
play in the Union, by professing a respect for State
rights. The fourth article of the Republican platform
adopted at Chicago in 1860 is in these Avords : — ' The
maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and
especially the right of each State to order and control its
own domestic institutions accordhig to its own judgment
exclusiA'ely, is essential to that balance of power on
which the perfection and endurance of our political
flibric depends.' 3Ir. Lincoln, in his inaugural address,
thus expounded the policy of his administration : — ' I
have no purpose, dfrectly or indirectly, to interfere with
the institution of slavery in the States where it exists ;
I beheve I haA-e no lawful right to do so, and I have no
inclination to do so. Those who nominated and elected
me did so vrith a full knowledge that I had made this and
many simUar declarations, and had never recanted them.'
In spite of the prohibition of the slave-trade, it con
tinued to be carried on in American vessels trachng to
Cuba and Brazil, down to the very outbreak of the war,
and the vessels employed in it were almost exclusively
fitted out at Northern ports. ' Lord Lyons (the British
3Iinister at Washington) stated in September, 1860,
that in the previous eighteen months eighty-five vessels
had saUed from American ports to be employed in the
slave-trade ; of ten vessels captured in one year by the
American Squadron on the coast of Africa, seven were
from New York.'*
The foregoing statements in regard to the slavery
question, and the position of the Northern States in
respect to it, are not made as an exposition of the
subject on behalf of the South with any partizan pur
pose. I confidently affirm that they are only a fair,
though A'ery short, summary of the numerous articles
* See 'The American Union,' by Mr. James Spence, p. 151.

310 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
on the subject which appeared in the English news
papers, or which were otherwise set before the British
public during the CivU War. I have carefully elimi
nated every extravagant expression, every strained or
far-fetched inference, which appeared in the articles and
letters referred to, and I have equally omitted to mention
or to paraphrase all statements which bear the likeness
of angry retort or recrimination.
Some of the newspaper articles and pamphlets pub
lished in England during the early months of the war
gave copious extracts from the speeches of the Northern
Abolitionists and prominent men in the Republican
Party, and called attention to their violent, abusive, and
exasperating tone. Mr. James Spence, in his work
' The American Union,' furnished such extracts from
speeches of William Lloyd Garrison, as foUows : — ' So
long as this blood-stained Union existed, there was but
little hope for the slave ' — ' this Union is a lie ; the
American Union is a sham, an imposture, a covenant
--with death, an agreement with hell.' To inform the
British public hoAV the North proposed to deal AAdth the
question of slavery, Mr. Spence quoted from a book
written by a leading Abolitionist named Helper, as
follows : — ' Compensation to slave-owners for negroes.
Preposterous idea !— the suggestion is criminal, the
demand unjust, wicked, monstrous, damnable ! ShaU
we pat the blood-hounds for the sake of doing them a
favour ? Shall Ave fee the curs of slavery to make them
rich at our expense ? Pay these whelps for the privUege
of converting them into decent, honest, upright men ?'
And he adds : — ' In other passages they (the slave
holders) are compared to "mad dogs" — Avith "small
pox, as nuisances to be abated ;" they are classed with
gangs of "licensed robbers," " thieA-es," and " mur-

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 311
derers," and addressed in terms and insulted with
epithets such as none, hoAvever disinterested, can read
AA-ithout strong feelings of indignation.' Lest it should
be thought that the ' wretched ribaldry,' the coarse in-
A'cctives, and the exasperating insolence of this man
Helper were only the ravings of a maniac, or the Avild
incoherent utterances of an irresponsible fanatic, 31r.
Spence informed his readers that the book Avas addressed
to the American people, and Avas recommended for cir
culation by the signature of sixty-eight members of
CongTcss fi-om Northern States, including 3lr. William
H. Seward and 3Ir. John Sherman.
The majority of those who read the information thus
for the first time submitted to their judgment, came to
the conclusion that the North, in the aggregate, had
as much moral comphcity Arith slavery as the sugar-
planters of the 3Iississippi bottoms, or the cotton-growers
of the Gulf States, and they perceived that the Southern
people had just cause to be dissatisfied with a Union
whose protective tariff was impoverishing them, and in
which they were exposed to continuous iuA'ective and
abuse in respect to a domestic institution whose pecu
niary profit accrued in the greater part to that portion
of the country in Avhich the abuse was coined, and
from which it passed into foreign circulation. —
When the people of Great Britain learned the whole
truth, and contrasted the conduct of the North in re
ference to slavery before the war with the appeals for
sympathy after the beginning of hostilities, they per
ceived the weakness of the claim and the insincerity of
the pretext, and this discovery aroused a feeling first of
indifference to the North, and then, by a natural process
of reaction, they transferred their sympathies to the
maligned Southerner. The popular verdict in England

312 THE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Avas that 'the struggle between the North and South
was a contest for political power and ascendancy, and
that in reference to slavery the North discarded or
ignored all practical measures for emancipation, and
confined their operations to oratory, preaching, senti
mental poems, fiction, and invective.'*
The opinions of the responsible statesmen of Great
Britain may be stated in the following extract from a
speech delivered by Earl Russell at Newcastle on the
14th of October, 1861 : — 'We now see the two parties
(in the United States) contending together, not upon
the slavery question, though that I believe was probably
the original cause of the quarrel, not contending with
respect to free-trade and protection, but contending, as
so many States in the Old World have contended, the
one side for empire, and the other for independence. 'f
It does not concern any Southern man to defend the
foregoing opinion of the people and of the governing
class in Great Britain. I am simply recording facts to
illustrate the process by Avhich the United States lost
the sympathy Avhich they doubtless had at the beginning
of the secession movement, but which they never ceased
to allege was transferred to the South immediately after
the outbreak of hostilities. The attitude of both North
and South toAvards the institution of slaA'ery is now well
understood. The impartial historian of the future will
hardly represent such men as Henry Clay, John C.
Calhoun, Jefferson Davis, and Alexander H. Stephens,
in the light of hard taskmasters Avhose object was to
extend the area of slavery and to oppress their fellow-
men, while 3Vendell Philips, 3V. H. Seward, Charles
* Quoted in substance from ' The American Union,' and from
' Life and Liberty in America,' by Dr. Mackay.
t Quoted in ' United States Case,' p. 23.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 313
Sumner, and Abraham Lincoln, Avere fired by a philan
thropic zeal to circumscribe its limits, and to abolish
its practice fi-om love for the A-ictiins. No future pen,
writing with truth and fiiirness, and guided by a sense
of just impartiality, avUI exhibit Sydney Johnstone,
Robert Lee, and ' StoncAvall ' Jackson as men Avho
fought to riA-et shackles upon the slave, and Avill at the
same time describe Ulysses Grant, 3Vni. T. Sherman,
Phihp Sheridan, and Benjamin F. Butler as drawing
thefr swords to scA-er the bonds. Such a record would
be a greater travesty of history than was ever imposed
upon a credulous posterity.
Another reason why the sympathy of Europe, but
especially of Great Britain, Avas alienated from the North,
arose from the offensiA-e manner in which Mr. Seward
continued to use the terms ' insurgents ' and ' pirates '
in communicating with foreign Powers in respect to
thefr neutral duties, and their attitude toAvards the Con
federacy. The popular feeling in England on that
subject may be clearly demonstrated by the following
quotations from a lengthy paper Avritten by Sir Alexander
Cockburn, giving the reasons why he dissented from
some portions of the award of the Geneva Arbitration.
' 3Ien ' (he said) ' refused to see in the leaders of the
South the "rebels " and the " pirates " held up by the
United States to public reprobation, and thus the effect
Avhich a more generous a])preciation of the position and
qualities of their adversaries might have had in neu
tralizing the feeling in their favour, tended only to in
crease it ' (p. 114). ' Whatever the cause in which they
are exhibited, devotion and courage will ever find re
spect, and they did so in this instance. Men could riot
see in the united people of these vast provinces, thus
risking all in the cause of nationality and independence,

314 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the common case of rebels disturbing peace and order
on account of imaginary grievances, or actuated by the
desire to overthrow a Government in order to rise upon
its ruins. They gave credit to the statesmen and war
riors of the South — their cause might be right or wrong
— for the higher motives which ennoble pohtical action,
and all the opprobrious terms which might be heaped
upon the cause in which he fell could not persuade the
world that the earth beneath which Stonewall Jackson
rests does not cover the remains of a patriot and a hero '
(p. 72).
The official view was expressed in the course of a
speech by Earl RusseU in the House of Lords, 9th of
June, 1864. He said : — ' It is dreadful to think that
hundreds of thousands of men are being slaughtered for
the purpose of preventing the Southern States from
acting on those very principles of independence which,
in 1776, were asserted by the whole of America against
this country. Only a few years ago the Americans Avere
in the habit of celebrating the promulgation of the
Declaration of Independence, and some eminent friends
of mine never failed to make eloquent and stirring
orations on those occasions. I Arish, while they kept up
a useless ceremony (for the present generation of English
men are not responsible for the 3Var of Independence),
they had inculcated upon their OAvn minds that they
should not go to war with four millions, five milhons,
or six millions of their fellow-countrymen who want
to put the principles of 1776 into operation as regards
themselves.'* Again, the English official sense of decorum was
offended by the uncivil and often sarcastic manner in
Avliich the United States Consuls communicated their
* Quoted in ' United States Case,' p. 26.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 315
complants both to the home and colonial authorities. I
might give many extracts from the letters and protests
of 3Ir. Dudley at LiA-erpool, 3tr. Graham at Cape Toaa'u,
and the Consul at Nassau ; but it is hardly necessary.
Those gentlemen adopted all the opprobrious epithets of
thefr departmental chief, and hurled them at the British
officials with a reckless disregard of official courtesy, or
of the inevitable contempt Avhich they Avere likely to
excite. Sfr Alexander Cockburn says : — -' The offensive
tone which the United States Consuls aUowed themselves
to assume towards British authorities is not a little re
markable.'* 3Iany Americans of refinement and education, who
have traveUed abroad and have learned to understand
and appreciate the requirements as well as the advan
tages of diplomatic courtesy and restraint, have no doubt
felt both regret and shame because the style adopted by
some ofthe national representatiA'cs in their official papers
during the Civil War was not a httle more in harmony
Arith the standard types of public manifestoes ; but, un
happily, the exigencies of American home politics are
such that the highest and most important offices must
often of necessity be given, not to the men who are
fittest for them through training, culture, and a compre
hensive acquaintance with affairs, but to men who have
made themselves most useful and most indispensable to
the success of a particular Party, and to the maintenance
of its power. Such offices as that of Consul and others
* If any American cares to read the public correspondence of the
consular, and some even of the higher representatives of the United
States during the Civil War, he will understand how much offence
may be given through the neglect of diplomatic courtesy, and how
sympathy may be ahenated from a national cause by brusqueness
and want of tact on the part of its official exponents.

316 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
are, as it were, farmed out to the great 'wire-pullers' and
' machine ' operators ; and thus it often happens that a
village politician, who knows nothing of international
commerce or international law, whose vocabulary of
political phrases is limited to the Party slang of the day,
who never Avrote a public letter in his life, except to the
chairman of the committee for manipulating the county
vote, is suddenly transformed into a consular agent, and
is sent to an important commercial port across the sea,
where he is often required to deal Avith intricate questions
of maritime law and usage, to correspond Arith official
persons of dignity and importance, and to attend public
meetings and receptions, all of which require some pre
vious training, a good deal of technical knowledge, and
familiarity with the rules of etiquette.
If some of the United States Consuls during the
period of the war Avere more zealous than discreet, and
injured the cause they were burning to serve by thrust
ing into their official correspondence the warmth and
effrontery which they knew from experience Avas effec
tive in a political campaign at home, it is only fair to
remember that they acted according to their lights, and
that the sin lies not in the individual, but in the system
which renders such scandals possible.
As the name of Mr. Dudley, the United States Consul
at Liverpool, is of necessity frequently mentioned in
connection with the 'Alabama Claims,' it is an impera
tive act of justice for me to mention that he Avas
appointed to the consular office at Liverpool at the
beginning of the war, and Avas retained in that office
during the Avhole of its continuance, and for several years
after its close. He must therefore have won and main
tained the entire confidence of his Government. All
who examine the records Avill admit that he manifested

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 317
both zeal and abUity, although he sometimes permitted
the former to outrun his discretion. His oavii personal
statements were doubtless made in good flxith, but he
often accepted the evidence of talebearers Avithout duly
testing- the probability of the story or the character of
the informer, and thus the evidence tendered by him
failed Avhen brought to the test of judicial inquiry, and
appears to haA-e been fi-equently discredited, or at least
looked upon with suspicion, by the laAv officers of the
Crown. Liverpool, London, and Paris have often been for
tunate in escaping the ca-U consequences of the hap
hazard manner of selecting consular representatives so
often practised by the LTnited States. It Avill be remem
bered that Nathaniel HaAvthorne was once the American
Consul at Liverpool ; and the successor of Mr. Dudley,
General Lucius Fafrchild, was a gentleman whose social
qualities endeared him to many persons in England beyond
the circle of Liverpool society, and who was, besides, a
man of cultivation and knowledge of affairs, fit in every
respect to represent his country creditably in any office.
There was one branch of the public service, and one
corps of pubhc officials, upon Avhom the United States
might haA-e justly relied, not only to sustain the
national prestige abroad by skill and gallantry in battle,
but to maintain its influence through the uniform
practice of tact, judgment, and good temper.
Naval officers of all nations acquire a sort of generic
type in respect to the outward manifestations of official
decorum. The advantage of frequently appearing at
foreign Courts and mixing with high personages, the
frequent necessity of conducting important correspond
ence with Ministers of State, of attending conferences,
and taking part in public ceremonies, all of Avhich fall

318 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
within the general professional experiences of most naval
officers, prepare and fit them by habit and training to
act with dignity, self-possession, tact, and judgment
under cfrcumstances which would embarrass, if not con
found, the ordinary civilian, even though he might
be well versed in the conventional usages of polite
society. It may be very fairly claimed that the naval officers
of the United States, taken as a class, have never here
tofore shown a deficiency in that special training and in
those especial accomplishments which appear to be the
natural effects of a sea life, supplemented by naval
education and discipline, under whatever flag. Un
happily, it must be admitted that some commanding-
officers of United States ships during the war lost their
true and genuine professional poise, and by an unaccount
able inadvertence, or, as it may be hoped, a temporary
aberration, they fell into the consular A'ein of corres
pondence, and acted on some occasions in the sj^irit of
their political chiefs at home, and thus contributed to
increase that British sympathy for the South of which
Mr. Seward so bitterly complained.
In February, 1863, the Florida touched at the British
island of Barbadoes, and was permitted to take on board
some lumber for necessary repairs, and to receiA-e ninety
tons of coal. Admiral Wilkes, who commanded the
United States squadron in the West Indies, and had
been on the look out for the Florida off 3Iartinique, soon
heard of her visit to Barbadoes and the privUeges
granted her there. He proceeded at once to that island,
and sought a personal interview Avith the GoA^ernor.
Governor Walker explained the principle upon which he
had acted, but the irate Admiral was not satisfied. He
Avent on board of his ship and addressed the Governor a

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 319
letter of mingled remonstrance and reproach, Avhicli also
contained a demand for an explanation. Governor
Walker declined to give any explanation in reply to
such a letter, but forwarded it to the Duke of NcAA'castle,
who Avas then Secretarv of State for the Colonies, Avitli
a statement of the ficts.
The report of the Governor and the letter of Admiral
Wilkes were referred to the law officers of the CroAvn, to
report whether there had been any breach of neutrality
on the part of GoA-ernor Walker, or any departure from
the conditions of her 3Iajesty's Regulations. The law
officers in thefr report comment upon the incident as
foUows : — ' We are of opinion that his Excellency the
Governor of the Windward Islands does not appear to
have been guUty of shovring any undue partiality to the
Oreto {Florida), or to haA-e committed any literal
breach of her 3Iajesty's Regulations. We would take
the hberty of observing, further, that his Excellency
owes no account to Admh-al Wilkes of his conduct
in the matter of his discharge of his duties towards her
Majesty, and that the very offensive tone and language
of that officer's letter ought to apprise his Excellency of
the inexpediency of long personal interviews and ex
planations Arith him. It is manifest that upon this,
as upon other occasions, these interviews and explana
tions are made the pretext for writing subsequent letters
of this description, intended to be used hereafter very
disingenuously, as proof of charges made at the time
of the favour shown by her Majesty's officers to the
Confederate States.'
The law officers who signed the report of which
the foregoing is an extract were Sir William Atherton,
Attorney General, Sir Roundell Palmer (noAv Lord
Selborne), Solicitor-General, and Sir Robert Phillimore,

320 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Queen's Advocate; and if three such eminent jurists felt
impelled to go rather out of their official line of duty to
pass such a stricture upon Admiral Wilkes's conduct, it
is manifest that he must have trampled rather roughly
upon British susceptibilities.
The Duke of Newcastle, instructing Governor Walker
in respect to the whole occurrence, under date of July
16th, 1863, writes him as follows : — ' You were quite
right in refusing to enter into correspondence with that
officer (Admiral Wilkes) upon the matter adverted to in
his despatch of the 5th March. On this, as on other
occasions, it has become CA'ident that interviews and
explanations such as you accorded to Admiral Wilkes
were made the pretext for placing on record charges
more or less direct against officers of her Majesty. And
I think that, as the Governor of one of her Majesty's
Colonies owes no explanation of his conduct to an
officer of the United States navy, it AvUl be prudent
hereafter to avoid such explanations as far as the rules
of courtesy will alloAV. It is the wish of her 3Iajesty's
Government that matters of complaint should in general
be discussed between the two Governments concerned,
rather than betw^een any subordinate officers.'*
It wUl thus appear that the executive and the legal
branches of her Majesty's Government both regarded
Admiral Wilkes's bearing towards the Governor of
Barbadoes in the same light, and the incident must haA-e
had some effect in prejudicing the cause of the United
States. In February, 1862, the Confederate ship Sumter,
Captain Raphael Semmes, was lying in Gibraltar. The
United States ship Tuscarora, Captain G. Augt. CraA-en,
* This correspondence and the report of the law officers is quoted
by Sir A. Cockburn, pp. 166-168.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 321
came there to watch her, but wishing to avoid the
i-estrictions upon her movements to which it would
have been necessai-y to submit if she also continued to
occupy the anchorage at Gibraltar, she crossed the
hay, and took up a berth at the Spanish port of
Algeciras, fi-om AA'hich she could command a A'iew of
the Sumter, and either note her dejxarture or get daily
advice of her probable moA-enients. It appears from the
pubhshed correspondence in the Appendix to the British
Case, vol. u. (pp. 27-29, etc.), that Captain Craven was
in the habit of sending a boat across the bay, ostensibly
to communicate AAdth the United States Consul, but the
visits manifestly assumed the character of a system of
espionage upon the Sumter. At last Captain Semmes
reported the cfrcumstances to the Governor and to the
senior British naval officer, and complained of being
thus watched by an enemy in neutral waters. In con
sequence of Captain Semmes' report, a letter was sent to
Captain Craven, signed jointly by the Governor and the
senior naval officer, and the communication was as
foUows : — * ' Gibraltar, February 20th, 1862.
' Sie,— ' A boat from the Tuscarora, now at anchor at
Algeciras, came across the bay yesterday morning.
Captain Semmes complains that she pulled round
the Sumter, as if watching her. It is necessary for
the maintenance of the neutrality of this port that ad
vantage should not be taken of the close proximity of a
foreign anchorage (in some places only two and a half
mUes distant) in aid of any Avarlike purpose. Consider
ing as we do that the presence of the boat represents the
* For the following correspondence see 'British Case,' Appendix,
vol. ii., pp. 27 — 41.
VOL. n. 50

322 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
ship herself, we are of opinion that its presence, under
such circumstances, is an infringement of the rules of
which you were given a copy on the 12th instant. We
have, therefore, to request you will be good enough,
during the stay of the Tuscarora in the Spanish waters
ofthis bay, to abstain from sending your boats at all into
these waters. ' I have, etc. ,
' (Signed) W. J. Codelngton.
'F. Waedex.'
On the same day Captain CraA'en replied to the fore
going letter as follows, but addressed his reply to the
Governor alone : —
' United States' Steamer Tuscarora,
' Off Algeckas, February 20th, 1862.
' Sie,— ' I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of
your communication of this day. The complaint of the
captain of the pfrate Sumter is without a shadow of truth.
I summoned before me the coxswain of the boat, and, in
the presence of the officer who brought me your letter,
asked him as to the course he steered in returning from
Gibraltar yesterday. He replied that he came straight
across, passing somewhat to the southward ofthe Wai-rior.
The boat Avas sent over on bushiess for the ship, and
from the course taken by the officer of the boat I know,
from my own observation, that he made a great cfrcuit
to the southward. The officer Avho went in the boat has
not returned. I am mortified, sir, in thus being com
pelled to make explanations against the accusations of a
man regardless of truth and honourable sentiment. Yom-
request that I wUl not send boats to Gibraltar deprives
me of sending for mails or communicatmg with the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 323
United States Consul ; and I must in good faith inquire
whether it is right that, on the loose accusation of a
notorious corsair, you desire to prohibit me from inter
course with the town under your command.
' (Signed) G. Aug. Ceavbn.'
The Governor of Gibraltar replied to Captain Craven
as follows : —
' Gibraltar, February 2lst, 1862.
' Sie,— ' I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of yesterday, and to express my regret that you should
think it necessary to use such terms in your correspond
ence vrith me as " the captain of the pirate Sumter,"
" notorious corsair," and " a man regardless of truth
and honourable sentiment." I do not wish unnecessarily
to be made the recipient of terms of abuse levelled
against any one, stiU less against an officer who, in his
Avritten and personal communications AAdth me, under
cfrcumstances of annoyance and difficulty to himself,
has not forgotten what is due to his own position, and
to the position of those with whom he was in corre
spondence. The Government of England has recognised
the United States and the so-caUed Confederate States
of America to be belligerents with belligerent rights.
You are aware of this fact, and it renders your terms of
" pirate " and " notorious corsair," applied to a Con
federate vessel in this anchorage, incorrect, and offensive
to the authority thus granting and maintaining the
rights of neutrality. You have not touched upon the
main ground of the decision of Captain Warden and
myself as to your boats coming into Gibraltar from
Algeciras, viz., that they are, in law, part of the ship
50—2

324 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
itself, and that their presence here, coming from Spanish
waters close to Gibraltar, is an infidngement of rules
which must be observed. With regard to your being
deprived of sending for mails or communicating vrith
the United States Consul of Gibraltar whilst you are at
Algeciras, I can only say that the decision of Captain
Warden and myself, in our joint letter of yesterday,
refers only to the points mentioned in that letter ; the
use of this anchorage will be giA-en and hmited to both
belligerents equally, but it is not right for one belligerent
to obtain for his ship the advantage of absence in a
neighbouring foreign port, and of presence at the same
time in this port by means of his boats.'
' It would have been better to have made strict in
quiry into the facts as to the course taken by your boat,
before you declared the complaint to be " vrithout a
shadow of truth." I have to inform you that your
boat did not pass " straight across " from the water-port
to you, and that it did not pass " somewhat to the
southw-ard of the Warrior." Your boat went out of the
straight course materially ; it passed to the east, to the
north, to the west, and pretty close to the Sumter ; it
passed north and west of the Samarang port- vessel ;
afterwards between the Peninsular and Oriental hulk
and her Majesty's ship Warrior. These facts are estab
lished by English officers who saw your boat.
' I regret the necessity of having thus to remark upon
the expressions and statements in your letter. Difficult
questions arise, and official differences may take place
under the painful circumstances of the Avar betw-een the
Northern and Southern States of America ; but it has
ever been, and still will be, a pleasure to me to shoAv to
the navy of the United States the consideration and
hospitality which the English Government wishes to

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 325
afford to all those avIio make use of the harbours under
its control. ' I haA-e, etc.,
' (Signed) AY. J. Codeington.'
On the day after the foregoing letter was forwarded
to Captain CraA-en, he wrote the foUoAving letter * to the
Governor : —
* United States' Steamer Tuscarora,
' Off Algeciras, February 22nd, 1862.
' Sib,— ' I haA-e the honour to submit to you that on my
arrival in the waters of Gibraltar, on the 12th instant,
I receiA-ed from the Colonial Secretary, under your in-
sfructions, an official copy of " Rules laid down with
regard to belhgerent vessels entering the port."
' In accordance -with those rules, I, with the vessel
under my command, promptly departed from British
waters. I observe, however, that the corsair Sumter
remains in unchsturbed possession of her anchorage at
Gibraltar. 3Iay I ask, sir, under what section of the
rules that A-essel is permitted to remain in British
waters whUe a A-essel belonging to the United States is
excluded ? In behalf of the Government of the United
States, and under the well-defined principles of interna
tional law, I have to protest against what appears to be
a departure from those rules, which require that neutrals
shall be impartial and honest. ' I have, etc.,
' (Signed) G. A. Ceaven.'
The repetition of the epithet ' corsair,' and the general
tone of the foregoing letter, manifestly offended the
* 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., i). 41.

326 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Governor, and brought from him a reply dated on the
same day (February 22nd), from which the following
is an extract : —
' The Confederate steamer Sumter remains here under
proper authority, and I decline to discuss Avith you the
rules to which you refer, your particular interpretation
of them, or to account to you for my proceedings under
them. In reference to the last sentence in your letter —
I quote your words — that " you protest against what
appears to be a departure from those rules, which require
neutrals " (meaning, I presume, the English Govern
ment and myself, as Governor of Gibraltar) , " should be
impartial and honest." If you are aware ofthe effect of
this latter epithet, you have communicated to me for
the English Government a direct and insulting insinua
tion, as indecorous for you to have Avritten as it is im
proper for me to receive. If you are not aAvare of it, it
is right for me to show you the effect of language which,
I trust, a regard for your own position vrill prevent you
from repeating in your correspondence with me.' *
The foregoing correspondence needs no comment to
add to its point and pungency. Captain Semmes was
amply revenged for the epithets of ' pirate ' and ' corsair,'
and for the reflection which Captain Craven ventured to
cast upon his veracity, and probably no naval officer has
ever received a more dignified and yet cutting rebuke
from a high foreign functionary.
The Governor of Gibraltar at that time Avas Lieutenant-
General SirlW. J. Codrington, an officer of the highest
consideration in the British army. The senior naval
officer Avas Captain F. Warden, C.B., also distinguished
in his branch of the serAdce. Notwithstanding the pro
hibitions of the Governor and his explanation of the
* ' British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., p. 31.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 327
'rules,' Captain Craven appears to haA^e persisted in
sending- his boats to Gibraltar, which gave occasion for
the following order fi-om Captain AVarden to Captain
Chads, of her 3Iajesty's ship London, dated Gibraltar,
Februai-y 22nd, 1862* : — ' 33''ith reference to the orders
dated 21st instant, under Avliich you are acting, I have
to acquaint you that the Tuscai'ora having sent a boat
to the water-port this morning, and taken off supplies
vrithout permission, it is my dfrection that the boats of
the London are held in a state of constant preparation for
the purpose of preventing any boat belonging to the
Tuscarora from passing the London into this bay at all
so long as that ship remains in Spanish waters. It is
undesfrable that force should be used unless absolutely
necessary; but force is to be used rather than permit
any violation of the rules laid down. Similar orders
have been issued to the Scylla and Amphion.'
The United States Consuls put themselves in the way
to receive some rebukes, and 3Ir. Seward and one or two
of his diplomatic staff invited an occasional thrust, but
the 'retort courteous,' when administered by a civil
functionary, is often so concealed in the phrase which
envelops it, as to be scarcely discernible at first sight.
When, however, the ' counter-thrust ' comes from a
mUitary or naval man who knows how to wield his pen,
it goes straight to the core with the keenness of the
sabre or the sharp point of a marlin-spike. The esprit
de corps of mUitary and naval officers renders them
sensitive to slights or impertinences offered to their
immediate commanders while performing the duties of
thefr office, and they are also inclined to resent all acts
of rudeness to the representatives of their Government.
The alleged partiality of the sister British services for
* 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., p. 30.

328 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the Confederacy during the late Civil War, may very
likely be traced, in part at least, to the feeling of resent
ment against the United States aroused by the brusque
and inconsiderate manner in which some American naval
officers claimed their assumed rights, or remonstrated
against the ' rules,' which only placed them on the same
footing with their adversaries while lying in British
ports. I have no vrish to make too much of the foregoing
point, and therefore refi-ain from mentioning other
manifestations of jealousy and ill-temper which are
alluded to in the ' British Counter Case,' or which
appear in the published correspondence. But the
alleged leaning of the British GoA'ernment and people
towards the South is so prominently set out in the
diplomatic manifestoes of the United States, and in their
' Case ' before the Tribunal of Arbitration, that it
appeared to be absolutely necessary to demonstrate that
if the allegation is true, there were some reasons for the
preference. It is manifest from the published correspondence that
the purpose to seek redress from Great Britain for the
depredations of the Confederate cruisers was formed not
long after they had begun their operations, and it
appears that Mr. Adams intimated the wilhngness ofthe
United States to submit the questions at issue to some
form of arbitration as early as October, 1863.
On the 20th of May, 1865, 3Ir. Adams wrote a very
long letter* on the subject of the claims and complaints
of the United States to Earl Russell, and began by
recapitulating the points he Avished to maintain, which
he specifies under nine different heads. 3Ir. Adams
* ' British Case,' Appendix, vols, iii., i\'. Correspondence re
specting the Shenandoeth, p. 10.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 329
was not only a man of ability and of large official
experience, but he Avas a gentleman by birth and educa
tion. He was held in high personal esteem by Earl
Russell, and his courtesy, tact, and conciliatory manners
are often acknowledged. But CA-en he sometimes yielded
to the influences fi-om home, and was entrapped into
giAdng currency to the exaggerated statements which
unhappUy characterized the State Papers of that period
which received their inspfration from the Department of
Foreign Affairs at 3Yashington. The fourth point
which 3Ir. Adams mentions his purpose to maintain
is thus specified : — ' That during the whole course of the
struggle in America, of nearly four years in duration,
there has been no appearance of the insurgents as a
belligerent on the ocean, excepting in the shape of
British A-essels, constructed, equipped, supplied, manned,
and armed in British ports.'
The simple truth is that the Confederate ship Sumter
was buUt in PhUadelphia. She was bought by the
Confederate Na-vy Department in New Orleans, in April,
1861. She was fitted out at that port, sailed out of the
3Iississippi in broad daylight, was chased by the United
States ship Brooklyn, but escaped, and took several
prizes into the Spanish Colonial port of Cienfugos,
where she was received and recognised as a duly com
missioned ship-of-war, before Mr. Adams had penned his
first protest in respect to the Florida or Alabama, before,
in fact, either of those ships were launched, and long
before any Confederate ship of alleged British origin
had put to sea.
Besides the Sumter, the following named vessels were
fitted out and sent to cruise from Southern ports during
theyear 1861. Calhoun from New Orleans, Jeff Davis
from Savannah, St. Nicholas, Winslow, Sallie, York and

330 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Nashville from other ports. During the year 1862, the
Echo Avas despatched on a cruise from a Confederate
port. In 1863 the captured American shii^s' Retribution
and Boston were commissioned, and in 1864 the Chicka
mauga and Tallahassee were despatched from Wilming
ton. In the ' British Case ' (p. 7) it is stated that the
above-named vessels were reported to have captured,
in the aggregate, from sixty to scA^enty vessels.
The foregoing facts were so notorious at the date
of Mr. Adams's statement, that it is surprising they
should have escaped his memory. Moreover, in the
United States ' Case,' claims are made against Great
Britain for the depredations of nine vessels in addition
to those which it was admitted were either bought or
built in England, although neither equipped nor armed
there. The claims in respect to the foregoing nine vessels
were throAvn out by the Tribunal of Arbitration. ScA-en
of the nine were American built ships, or at least they
were bought by the Confederate States in Confederate
ports, were armed, equipped and manned Avithin the
Confederacy, and ncA'er entered a British port, if at alb
except as commissioned ships-of-war. The remaining
two were ordinary blockade-runners, buUt, it is true, in
England, but taken to Wilmington by private parties
on their own account exclusively, AA-here they Avere sold
to the Confederate Navy Department. The Avhole
number of vessels in respect to whose alleged depreda
tions the United States claimed compensation was
thirteen,* of which only four could by any possible
straining of the facts be said to haA-e been fitted out in
* In addition to the thirteen above-mentioned, claims were made
in respect to four vessels alleged to be tenders of the Florida and
Alabama.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 331
England, and yet 3Ir. Adams ventured to affirm, at so
late a date as 3Iay 20th, 1865, ' that there Avas no
appearance of the insurgents as a belligerent on the
ocean, excepting in the shape of British A-essels, con
structed, equipped, supplied, manned, and armed in
British ports.'
Many of the statements made in the voluminous
despatches of 3Ir. Seward and the United States ' Case '
could be as easily disposed of as the foregoing, by a
simple mention of the facts. The looseness of the allega
tions, and the faUacy of the conclusions founded on
them, are frequently adverted to in the replies of her
Majesty's GoA^ernment, and in the British ' Counter-Case.'
Lender date of August 30th, 1865, Earl Russell wrote to
Mr. Adams at great length in justification of the con
duct of her 3Iajesty's Government during the Civil War,
and in respect to a ' Claims Commission.' In the above-
mentioned letter Earl Russell said to 3Ir. Adams as
foUows : —
' In your letter of 23rd October, 1863, you were pleased
to say that the Government of the United States is ready-
to agree to any form of arbitration. Her Majesty's
Government have thus been led to consider what ques
tion could be put to any Sovereign or State to whom
this very great power should be assigned. It appears
to her 3Iajesty's Government that there are but two
questions by which the claim of compensation could be
tested. The one is : Have the British Government acted
vrith due dUigence, or, in other words, with good faith
and honesty, in the maintenance of the neutrality they
proclaimed ? The other is : Have the laAv officers of
the Crown properly understood the Foreign Enlistment
Act when they declined, in June, 1862, to advise the
detention and seizure of the Alabama, and on other

332 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
occasions when they were asked to detain other ships
buUding or fitting in British ports ? It appears to her
Majesty's Government that neither of these questions
could be put to a foreign Government with any regard
to the dignity and character of the British Crown and
the British nation. Her Majesty's Government are the
sole guardians of their own honour. They cannot admit
that they may have acted with bad faith in maintahiing the
neutrality they professed. The law officers of the CroAvn
must be held to be better interpreters of a British stat-ate
than any foreign Government can be presumed to be.
Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, decline either
to make reparation and compensation for the captures
made by the Alabama, or to refer the question to any
foreign State. Her Majesty's Government conceive
that if they Avere to act otherAvise they wouH endanger
the position of neutrals in all future wars. Her 3Iajesty's
Government are, however, ready to consent to the ap
pointment of a Commission to which shall be referred all
claims arising during the late Civil War which the two
Powers shall agree to refer to the Commissioners.'*
There could scarcely be a more positive declaration of
the views and purposes of her 3IajestA-'s Government in
respect to the ' Alabama Claims ' than is pronounced in
the foregoing extract from an official letter ofthe 3Iinister
of Foreign Affairs, written, not with haste, during a
heated controversy, but after peace was fully restored
betAveen the late belligerents, and when there had been
ample time to advise calmly Avith his colleagues and Arith
the law officers of the Crown, and to determine whether
there had been any illegality in the equipment of Con
federate cruisers Avithin British jurisdiction, or any failure
* 'British Case, 'Appendix, vol. iv., 'North America (1), 1866,'
p. 31.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 333
to fulfil neutral duties which could make a claim for
damages on the part of the United States tenable.
The reader avUI remember the verbal statements of
3Iinisters and of the Solicitor-General mentioned in a
previous chapter, Avhich Avere to the effect that a builder
might legaUy contract to deliver an unarmed ship of
any description to a belligerent as a mercantile trans
action ; and those statements, taken in conjunction with
the declaration contained in the extract from Earl
Russell's letter just above quoted, can be interpreted in
no other sense than that her 3lajesty's Government, in
August, 1865, declined to admit that there was any
violation of British law in the manner of obtaining ships
for the Confederate service in England, or that there
had been any defaidt in the performance of their neutral
duties which could render them hable to a claim for
compensation on behalf of the United States.
The correspondence in respect to the claims was con
tinued untU November, 1865, when Earl Russell became
Prime 3Iinister, and was succeeded at the Foreign Office
by the Earl of Clarendon. On the 21st of November,
1865, 3Ir. Adams informed Lord Clarendon by official
letter that the United States adhered to the opinion that
the claims which Earl Russell had thought fit to exclude
from consideration were just and reasonable, and there
fore saw no occasion for further delay in giving a full
answer to the proposition for a Joint Com.mission con
tained in his lord.ship's letter of August 30th, 1865,
which proposition he was instructed to say ' is respectfully
dechned.'* On the 2nd of December, 1865, Lord Clarendon
wrote a short letter to Mr. Adams, in which he briefly
alludes to a long and controversial communication
* 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. iv., p. 161.

334 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
which Mr. Adams had addressed to him on the 18th of
November.''^ Lord Clarendon vsTote as follows: — 'I
have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 18th ultimo. . . . There are many state
ments in your letter which I should be prepared to
controvert if it were not that her Majesty's Government
consider that no advantage can result from prolonging
the controversy, of which the topics are generaUy ex
hausted, but which might possibly, if continued, intro
duce acrimony into the relations between this country and
the United States ; two nations who from kindred origin
and mutual interest should desire to be knit together by
bonds of the closest friendship. . . . WhUe abstaining
therefore from any discussion of the passages in your
letter to the correctness of which I am unable to sub
scribe, it is nevertheless my duty in closing this corre
spondence to observe that no armed vessel departed
during the war from a British port to cruise against the
commerce of the United States, and to maintain that
throughout all the difficulties of the CiAdl War by which
the United States have lately been distracted, but in the
termination of which no nation rejoices more cordially
than Great Britain, the British Government haA-e steadily
and honestly discharged all the duties incumbent on
them as a neutral Power, and have never deviated from
the obligations imposed upon them by international laAV.'
During the months of December, 1865, and January,
1866, an active correspondence was kept up between
Mr. Adams and the British Foreign Office, upon sub
jects relating to the Civil War, and hi reference to a
concurrent revision of the Foreign Enlistment Acts of
¦* For Mr. Adams's letter see ' British Case,' Appendix, vol. iv.,
Parliamentary Paper, No. 1, 1866, p. 154, etc. Lord Clarendon's
letter, p. 162.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 335
the two countries, but the letter from Lord Clarendon,
quoted above, appears to have put a stop to the especial
discussion of the ' Alabama Claims ' for some time.
In 3Ia}-, 1866, there AA'as a change of Government in
Great Britain. The 3Iinisti-y Avas defeated in the House
of Commons in a diAdsion on a measure relating to the
extension of the franchise and a redistribution of seats.
The Cabinet took the adverse judgment of the House as
a vote of ' want of confidence,' and resigned. The late
Earl of Derby was requested by her 3Iajesty to form a
new Government, and thus the Conservative Party came
into power, AAdth the Earl of Derby as Prime Minister,
3Ir. Disraeli as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Lord
Stanley as Foreign Secretary. The chief offices in the
retiring Cabinet had been held by Lord Palmerston,
Earl RusseU, the Earl of Clarendon, and the Right
Honourable W. E. Gladstone. Lord Russell and Lord
Clarendon, as the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs,
appear most prominently in the official correspondence,
but Lord Palmerston by speeches in Parhament, and Mr.
Gladstone by speeches both in and out of the House,
associated thefr names especially and emphatically with
the questions which the Civil War originated, and thus
made themselves joint exponents of the policy of the
Ministry and of the Liberal Party in respect to the
neutral duties of Great Britain and the claims set up by
the United States.
The retiring 3Iinistry had held office during the whole
period of the Civil War, so that there had been no room
for divergence of views or reversal of policy. The
same Cabinet which advised her Majesty to recognise
the Confederate States as a belligerent Power, continued
to direct and control the relations of Great Britain vrith
the two contending States while the contest lasted, and

336 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
enunciated the position assumed by the British Govern
ment in respect to the claims of the United States after
the termination of the war, and after a careful con
sideration of all the demands of Mr. Seward and the
statements and arguments advanced in support of them.
It is important to consider at this point what was the
precise position thus occupied bythe outgoing 3Iinistry,
and which their successors were compelled to step into.
It may be briefly described thus : — ' Her Majesty's
Government, being the sole guardians of thefr own
honour, cannot submit their conduct to the judgment of
any other Sovereign or State without sacrificing the
dignity and character of the British Crown and the
British nation. They cannot admit that they have
acted with bad faith in maintaining their neutrality, and
they must therefore decline to make reparation and com
pensation for the captures made by the Alabama, or even
to refer the question to any foreign State. Finally, they
see no advantage in prolonging the controversy, but
while abstaining from any further discussion, they must
observe that no armed Aessel departed during the war
from a British port to cruise against the commerce of
the United States, and they must maintain that the
British Government steadily and honestfy discharged all
the duties incumbent on them as a neutral Power, and
have never deviated from the obhgations imposed upon
them by international laAv.' *
In the foregoing brief summary I have employed A'ery
nearly the precise Avords used by her 3Iajesty's two Secre
taries of State for Foreign Affairs in their final communi
cations to the United States 3Iiiiister in respect to the
'Alabama Claims,' and it certainly must appear to the
* See letters of Lord Eussell and Lord Clarendon to Mr. Adams
quoted above.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 337
ordinary reader that the retiring 3Iinisters were not
only at ease in their consciences, but that their minds
also were settled in the conviction that they had done
no Avrong to the United States, and Avould pay no claims
founded on the assumption that they had been guilty
of any breach of neutrality or default in observing the
obhgations of intei-national law.
Mr. Seward appears to haA-e given her Majesty's new
adAdsers some months of rest, but Lord Russell's refusal
to admit liabUity for the depredations of the Confederate
cruisers, and Lord Clarendon's Avish that the con
troversy on the subject should end, was not accepted as
a final and frrcA-ersible decision by the Government at
Washington. On the 27th of August, 1866, Mr. Seward
reopened the subject in a long despatch to Mr. Adams
enclosing a ' summary of claims of citizens of the United
States against Great Britain,' all of which Avere founded
upon the aUeged ' depredations committed by the
Alabama ' and her consorts upon American commerce.*
The despatch and the formidable list of claims were
transmitted to Lord Stanley in a note dated September
17th, 1866.
Mr. Seward knew perfectly well the origin of the
Sumter, and he knew that the former British Minister
with whom he had corresponded on the subject of the
'Alabama Claims ' had asserted, and had proved beyond
the poAver of controversy, that none of the ships named
by him had been either armed or manned in England,
and yet, in a despatch purporting to be written in a
friendly spirit, he reopens the discussion as follows : —
' You ' (that is, 3Ir. Adams) ' will hercAvith receive a
summary of claims of citizens of the United States
against Great Britain for damages which were suffered
* See 'Appendix to British Case,' vol. iv. (No. 1), 1867, p. 1.
VOL. II. 51

338 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
by them during the period of our late Civil War, and
some months thereafter, by means of depredations upon
our commercial marine, committed upon the high seas
by the Sumter, the Alabama, the Florida, the Shenan
doah, and other ships-of-war which were built, manned,
armed, equipped, and fitted out in British ports, and
despatched therefrom by or through the agency of
British subjects, and which were harboured, sheltered,
provided, and furnished as occasion required during
their devastating career, in ports of the realm, or in ports
of the British Colonies in nearly all parts of the globe.'
The foregoing statement, so far as relates to the
Sumter, was wholly and notoriously incorrect, and the
manner of stating the case, CA^en with reference to the
other vessels, was so grossly exaggerated and overdrawn
as to appear more like passionate and reckless assertion
than a dignified, well-considered synopsis of facts. 3Ir.
Seward then dwells upon the considerations which have
inclined the United States ' to suspend for a time the
pressure of the claims upon the attention of Great
Britain,' reviews at some length the points discussed in
previous correspondence, and AA-hich had all been beaten
threadbare, directs 3Ir. Adams to represent the most
important features, which he thinks ' may not hitherto
have sufficiently engaged the attention of the British
Government,' and finally tells him that the harmony
heretofore existing- betAveen the two countries ' has been,
as Ave (the LTnited States) think, unnecessarily broken
through the fault of Great Britain,' and can probably
never be restored unless the serious complaints then
again brought to the notice of the British Government
shall be amicably and satisfactorily adjusted.
There is one paragraph in 3Ir. ScAvard's letter of
August 27th, 1866, which strikingly iUustrates the

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 339
tendency to exaggerate fiicts Avliich characterized his
official correspondence, and demonstrates the persistency
with which he repeated broad and sweeping assertions
which could not be sustained by specific particulars.
He says : — ' Upon a candid review of the history of the
rebeUion, it is beheA'cd that Great Britain Avill not deny
that a A-ery large number of the Queen's subjects com
bined themseh-es and operated as active allies AAdth the
insurgents, aided them with supplies, arms, munitions,
men, and many ships of war.'
Did 3Ir. Seward mean that her 3Iajesty's subjects
entered into a philanthropic combination, and showered
the faAours enumerated above upon the Southern people
out of love for them, or with any political purpose to
assist in breaking up the American Union, or did he
merely mean that British tradesmen sold to the Con
federate agents whatever supphes they Avanted, and could
pay for, and honestly dehvered the goods at the times
and places agreed upon ? If he intended to convey the
former meaning, people of common -sense will think that
he was practising a hyperbolic flourish of phrases which
tended rather to dilute than to strengthen the semblance
of facts contained in them. But if his purpose was only
to affirm the latter proposition, then practical men will
say that no law, statute or moral, municipal or inter
national, requfres a tradesman to close his shop against
one of two belligerents lest he should be considered an
ally of the other, and that such legitimate trading by
any people could not be alleged as a matter of complaint
against the Government to whom they owed allegiance.
Mr. Adams forwarded a copy of Mr. Seward's despatch
with a list ofthe claims to Lord Stanley on the 17th of
September, 1866. Lord Stanley informed him verbally
that it would be impossible for him to reply Avithout
51—2

340 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
first consulting his colleagues. Some delay AA-as reason
able ; in fact, it Avas unavoidable under the circumstances,
because the members ofthe new Cabmet could not have
known the details of the clahns, the grounds upon
Avhich they were based, or the precise position which had
been assumed by their predecessors in office, and it was
therefore necessary to examine the previous official cor
respondence before deciding upon the terms of thefr
reply. On the 30th of November, 1866, Lord Stanley for
warded a long despatch to Sir F. Bruce, her 3Iajesty's
3Imister at Washington, in which he reviewed seriatim
the points contained in 3Ir. ScAvard's letter above
mentioned. It Avould be useless to repeat or even to
summarize the arguments and counter statements of the
British Foreign Secretary. He certainly did not admit
those broad assertions which Mr. Seward ventured to
believe that Great Britain would not deny. In fact, he
said that ' Her 3Iajesty's Government feel bound to
notice expressions and statements* in 3Ir. Seward's
despatch which they consider unsupported by evidence,
and Avhich, in justice to thefr predecessors in poAver and
to the honour of the country, they cannot allow to pass
unexamined. 'f
The only parts of Lord Stanley's answer Avliich are of
any practical importance now, are the fcAV sentences in
Avhicli he states the decision to which her 3Iajesty's
GoA-ernment had come, after a critical examination of
3'Ir. Seward's allegations and arguments, and the replies
AA'hich had already been made to them by the previous
* Expressions and statements in reference to arming, equipping,
and manning ships, etc.
t See Lord Stanley to Sir F. Bruce, 'British Appendix,' vol. iv.,
' North America (No. 1), 1867,' p. 26, etc.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 341
3Iinisti-y. He said : — ' Having dealt so far Avith 3Ir.
Seward's argument, and pointed out the Avide discre
pancies that exist betAA-een his views of the question and
those entertained by her 3Iajesty's Government, I now
proceed to consider the practical proposition with Avhich
he conqludes' (namely, that the British Government
should acknowledge the clahns, and agree to a plan for
their amicable adjustment). 'It is impossible for her
3Iajesty's present advisers to abandon the ground which
has been taken by former Governments, so far as to admit
the habUity for the claims then and now put forAvard.
They do not think that such liabUity has been established
according to international law or usage; and though
sincerely and earnestly desiring a good understanding
Arith the United States, they cannot consent to purchase
even the advantage of that good understanding by con
cessions which would at once involve a censure upon
thefr predecessors in power, and be an acknowledgment,
in thefr view uncalled-for and unfounded, of Avrong-
doing on the part of the British Executive and Legisla
ture.' The ground taken by the former Government was
that they declined to make reparation and compensation
for the captures, etc., or to refer the question to a foreign
State ; although they would agree to the appointment of
a Commission to which all claims arising out of the
Civil War should be referred which the two Powers
would agree to refer; but it will be remembered that the
United States had declined the proposition for a Com
mission under the limitations required by her Majesty's
Government, and that Lord Clarendon had closed the
correspondence on the subject.'" The declaration of Lord
Stanley in the above quotation from his despatch to Sir
* See Lord Russell's letter of August 20th, 1865, previously quoted.

342 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
F. Bruce, if taken by itself, could only be received as a
final decision to maintain the precise ground taken by
Earl Russell, and if that had been his purpose, the ' Ala
bama Claims ' would have ceased to be an international
question, unless the United States had thought it worth
while to make them a casus belli.
But her Majesty's Government were manifestly un
willing to leave the questions at issue in a conchtion that
Avould tend to keep alive feelings of irritation between
the two countries ; a sense of injury unredressed on one
side, and of claims unjustly pressed, and therefore neces
sarily refused, on the other. In concluding his despatch,
therefore. Lord Stanley said in effect that her 3Iajesty's
Government were fully alive to the inconvenience which
would arise from the continued existence of unsettled
claims between two powerful and friendly nations, and
that they would be willing to adopt the principle of
arbitration, provided a fitting arbitrator could be found,
and the tAVO Governments could agree upon the precise
questions to which arbitration should apply ; and he
instructed Sir F. Bruce to ascertain fi-om 3Ir. Sewai-d
whether the United States Avould accept the principle of
arbitration as proposed above, and if so, whether he
would state the precise points which, in his opinion,
should be so dealt with. Finally, Lord Stanley said that
any such proposal would require verA- dehberate con
sideration on the part of her Majesty's Government, but
that it would be entertained in a fiiendly spirit, and with
a sincere desire that its adoption might serve to renew
the good understanding formerly existing, and, as he
hoped, hereafter to exist, betAveen Great Britain and the
United States.*
* See ' British Appendix,' vol. iv., 'North America (No. 1), 1867,'
pp. 30, 31.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 343
The correspondence between the tAvo GoA-ernments
continued throughout the year 18(!7 and up to October,
1868, without approaching to anything like a definite
agreement. The discussions gradually extended so as
to include other claims besides those relating to the
Confederate cruisers, and to embrace questions of
naturalization, boundary, etc. At the aboA-e-mentioned
date 3Ir. RcA-erdy Johnson had relieved 31r. Adams as
the LTnited States 3Iinister at London, and he appears to
have had general instructions and specific powers with
reference to the mode of settling all claims and other
questions which were at issue ; and the negotiations
between him and Lord Stanley now began to take such
a practical form, that protocols were framed from time
to time to set out and record the points agreed to. I
shall confine my notices of the protocols and the subse
quent Convention exclusiA-ely to the Articles which
have reference to the 'Alabama Claims.'
On the 10th of NoA'ember, 1868, a ' Convention be
tween Great Britain and the LTnited States of America,
for the settlement of all Outstanding Claims,' was signed
in London by Lord Stanley and 3Ir. Reverdy Johnson.*
Under the terms of the aboA-e Convention the contracting
parties agreed generally to refer all claims on the part
of their respective subjects, which had been or might be
presented from the 26th of July, 1853, to a date
specified in Article IIL, to four Commissioners, two
to be named by her Britannic Majesty, and two by the
President of the United States, the Commissioners to
meet in London, and to appoint an arbitrator or umpire
before proceeding to any other business, etc. Article
VI. of the Convention referred to the ' Alabama Claims '
* See 'British Appendix,' vol. iv., 'North America (No. 1),1869,'
pp. 11—14.

344 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
and the conditions upon which they were to be con
sidered by the Commissioners were thus specified: —
' With regard to the before-mentioned Alabama class of
claims, neither Government shall make out a case in
support of its position, nor shall any person be heard for
or against any such claim. The official correspondence
which has already taken place between the two Govern
ments respecting the questions at issue shall alone be
laid before the Commissioners ; and (in the event of
their not coming to a unanimous decision as provided in
Article IV.), then before the arbitrator, without argu
ment, Avritten or verbal, and Arithout the production of
any further evidence. The Commissioners unanimously,
or the arbitrator, shall, however, be at liberty to caU for
argument or further evidence, if they or he shall deem it
necessary.' On the 23rd of November the two Plenipotentiaries
who signed the above Convention agreed to substitute
Washington for London as the place for the meeting and
sitting of the Commission.* The Convention in its
original form reached Mr. Seward on the 24th of
November, 1868,| and under date of November 27th he
wrote Mr. Reverdy Johnson, pointing out the President's
objections to it, and specifying the modifications which
he desired should be made in a number of the Articles,
in order to recommend the Convention to acceptance by
the Senate and approval by the Congress of the United
States. J Mr. Seward thought it not improbable that
her Majesty's Government would be disappointed in
finding that objections were made to the ratification of
an agreement duly signed bythe Plenipotentiaries ofthe
tAVO countries, and that they might possibly be reluctant
* See 'British Appendix,' vol. iv.. No. 1 (1869), p. 15.
t Mr. Thornton to Lord Stanley, ibid, p. 22. :|: Ibid. p. 25—29.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 345
to continue the negotiations. To meet this difficulty he
directed 3Ir. Johnson to inform Lord Stanley that the
communications betAveen the United States Government
and their Plenipotentiary had been conducted by a large
use of the ' cable,' and that there lia^l been an unaA'oid-
able misconstruction of the instructions, and a misappre
hension ofthe explanations, which they greatly regretted.
The British 3Iinister at Washington informed Lord
Stanley by cable telegrams, on the 27tli and 30th of
November, that Mr. Seward and the Cabinet at Wash
ington disapproved of the CouA'ention, and had insisted
upon certain A-ery important modifications. Lord
Stanley replied on the Sth of December by letter,
expressing his surprise, and stating that it had never
been intimated to him that 3Ir. Johnson was not acting
under sufficient instructions from his Government ;
indeed, he had been informed by him, subsequently to
the signing of the Convention, that Mr. Seward had
stated in a telegraphic despatch that if the place of
meeting Avas 33'ashington, and not London, ' all will be
right.' Lord Stanley closed his despatch with the state
ment that untU the receipt of the telegrams above-
mentioned, both he and 3Ir. Johnson were under the
impression that the Convention Avhich had been signed
was in accordance with the instructions of Mr. Seward, as
interpreted by 3Ir. Johnson himself, and would therefore
meet the approA'al of the United States Government.*
Before the foregoing despatch of 3Ir. ScAvard (Novem
ber 27th, 1868) reached London there had been another
change of Ministry. The General Election Avhich took
place in the autumn of 1868 Ijrought the Liberal Party
again into power, Avith 3Ir. 3V. E. Gladstone as Prime
* See Lord Stanley's letter to Mr. Thornton, 'British Case,"
Appendix, vol. iv., 'North America (No. 1), 1869,' pp. 16, 19.

346 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Minister, and the Earl of Clarendon as Secretary of
State for Foreign Affafrs.* Mr. Johnson had therefore
to continue his negotiations AAdth the Ministers who AA-ere
in office during the Civil War, and who were her
Majesty's advisers when the questions at issue in respect
to the Alabama and her consorts arose.
It is impossible to tell with any degree of certainty
Avhat would have been the course of her 3Iajesty's
Government at this juncture if the Conservative Party
had remained in power, and in a mere synopsis of the
actual occurrences which led up to the final Treaty of
Washington and the Geneva Arbitration, surmises and
hypothetical conjectures would be wholly out of place.
Mr. ReAJ-erdy Johnson communicated 3Ir. Seward's
despatch to Lord Clarendon on the 22iid of December,
1868, and it appears that her Majesty's GoA-ernment were
satisfied with the reasons giA-en for declining to confirm
the Stanley- Johnson CouA'ention ; at any rate, they made
no formal protest. On the 24th of December Lord
Clarendon wrote to the British 3Iinister at Washington
stating that her 31ajesty's Government were prepared to
meet the Avishes of the United States in the manner
which he would then explain. His lordship then
discussed the principles invoh-ed in the proposed modi
fications, demonstrated Avherein he thought they were
insufficient or otherwise defective, and finaUy he en
closed ' a fresh draft of Convention,' which he directed
Mr. Thornton to submit to 31r. Seward ; and if approved
by him, ' Mr. Johnson ' (he suggested) ' might be
authorized by telegraph to sign it, in which case it might
be returned to 3Vashington so as to admit of its being
* Mr. Gladstone had been Chancellor of the Exchequer in the
former Liberal Ministry, and Lord Clarendon had succeeded Earl
Eussell at the Foreign Office in the same Ministry.

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 347
laid before the Senate hy the middle of January, and
pronounced upon hy that body before the rising of the
Congress on the 4th of 3larch.'* 3Ir. Seward suggested
some alterations in the draft forAvarded by Lord Claren
don, Avhich were accepted ; and the amended Convention
was signed by the tAvo Plenipotentiaries in London on
the 14th of January, 1869.f
By the conditions of the Stanle}'- Johnson Convention
the Alabama class of claims were to be adjudicated upon
the official correspondence winch had already taken
place exclusively, AAdthout argument, written or verbal.
Under the ncAv or Clarendon- Johnson Convention, the
Commissioners were 'bound to receive and peruse all
other AAT-itten documents or statements AA'hich may be
presented to them by or on behalf of the respective
Governments in support of or in answer to any claim,
and to hear, if requfred, one person on each side on
behalf of each Government as counsel or agent for such
GoA-emment, on each and every separate claim. 'J
It very soon became manifest that the new Convention
would not fare better than the first, although Mr.
Seward's objections to the former had been received in a
spirit of concession, and his proposed alteration had
been accepted without any apparent reluctance.§ On
the l&t of February, 1869, 3Ir. Thornton, her 3Iajesty's
3Iinister at Washington, reported to Lord Clarendon
that 3Ir. Charles Sumner had presented a petition to the
Senate ag'ainst the ratification of the Convention, and
on the 22nd of the same month he further reported that
* 'British Case,' Appendix, No. 1, 1869, pp. 30—32.
t See Lord Clarendon's letter, and copy of Convention, ibid,
pp. 35—38.
J Ibid., Article IL
§ Lord Clarendon's letter above, January 16th, 1869.

348 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the Convention had been sent by the President to the
Senate for its approval, but that the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, of which Mr. Charles Sumner was
chairman, had reported adversely to its ratification.
Mr. Thornton inclosed in the last-mentioned despatch
to Lord Clarendon a ' copy of a resolution adopted by
the Legislature of 3Iassachusetts.'* The resolution was
as follows : — ' Resolved — That the 3Iassachusetts Legis
lature, in general court assembled, firmly believe that
any treaty between England and America touching the
premises aforesaid, which may be submitted now or at
any future time for ratification, which does not, by its
terms, concede the liability of the English Government
for acts of her protegees, the Alabama and her consorts,
will be spurned with contempt by the American people,
and that a ratification thereof would be dishonourable
to our nation and unjust to our citizens.'
On the 19th of AprU, 1869, Mr. Thornton informed
Lord Clarendon by letter that the Claims Convention
signed on January 14th (the Clarendon- Johnson Con
vention) ' was submitted to the Senate in Executive
Session on the 13th instant, Avith the adverse report
which had previously been decided upon by the Com
mittee of Foreign Relations,' and that it had been
rejected on the same day by the adverse A^ote of fifty-
four senators against only one in its favour.f
Mr. Thornton further reported that 3Ir. Charles
Sumner availed himself of the occasion to make a long
speech, Avhich the Senate subsequently ordered to be
made public, and it had been inserted in all the neAvs
papers of the country. 3Ir. Thornton, in giving a
synopsis of 3Ir. Sumner's speech, said that the sum of
* ' See 'British Appendix,' vol. iv., No. 1, 1869, pp. 43, 44.
t Ibid., pp. 51—53.

COXFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 349

his assertions was 'that England had insulted the
United States by the premature, unfriendly, and unneces
sary proclamation ofthe Queen, enjoining neutrality on
her Majesty's subjects; that she oavcs them an apology
for this step ; that she is responsible for the property
destroyed by the Alabama and other Confederate cruisers,
and even for the remote damage to American shipping
interests, including the increase of insurance ; that the
Confederates were so much assisted by being able to get
arms and ammunition from England, and so much
encouraged by the Queen's Proclamation, that the war
lasted much longer than it woidd otherwise have done,
and that we (England) ought therefore to pay imaginary
additional expenses imposed upon the United States by
the prolongation of the war.'
jMr. Thornton mentions that 3Ir. Sumner was followed
by a few other Senators, all speaking in the same sense,
and that 3Ir. Chandler, Senator from Michigan, seemed
to have been most Adolent against England, indicating
his desfre that Great Britain should possess no territory
upon the American Continent, and added that the
speech of 3Ir. Sumner was vehemently applauded by the
Repubhcan portion of the press, most of them openly
proclaiming that the only satisfaction the United States
Government could accept avouIcI be the cession of the
British possessions on the Continent as well as the
Bahama Islands.
Those who are familiar with the diplomatic corre
spondence which was carried on between her Majesty's
Government and the United States during the Civil
War, -wUl have perceived that the American State
Papers were all pervaded by the same spirit as that
which dictated the speech of Mr. Sumner and the
resolution of the Massachusetts Legislature. The

o

350 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Government of the United States, the chief Republican
leaders, and the most active managers of the great
political ' machine,' through which the national feehngs
and the national Avill were aroused and directed, had
laid all their plans, and had based all their hopes, upon
the supposition that the so-called ' rebellion ' would soon
collapse, or that it would be soon suppressed. They
Avere annoyed and offended because Europe ventured to
pronounce that condition of affairs to be a state of war
which they affirmed to be only an insurrection. Great
Britain was selected as the chief object of their displeasure,
and there was a manifest determination from the be
ginning, not only to exact pecuniary compensation for
alleged injuries, but to inflict upon her the indignity of
an apology for venturing to recognise the Confederate
States as belligerents, and putting them on the same
footing Avitli the United States in respect to the obtain
ing of supplies. That purpose was not specifically
proclaimed in any State Paper before the rejection of
the Clarendon- Johnson Convention ; but reading the
correspondence now, and comparing its tone vrith the
progress of the subsequent negotiations, the temper and
the aim boldly avowed in Mr. Sumner's speech and in
the resolution of the 3Iassachusetts Legislature are
easUy discerned through the light film of diplomatic
reserve which partially obscured them.
It is an admirable exhibition of principle and of moral
courage to offer a spontaneous, cordial, and complete
amende for an injury inflicted upon another, whether
through ignorance or inadvertence, and the man who
does so will increase his influence and the respect in which
he is held, by as much as the precepts of rehgion are
more excellent than the maxims of the Avorld. The
same law applies in this respect to the conduct of a State

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 351
as to an individual. But Avhen the responsible Govern
ment of a country has delibcratol}- adopted a certain
pohcy towards another country, has insisted on all
occasions of remonstrance that their conduct Avas right
in principle as Avell as in law, and after four or five
years of complaint and petition for redress, has emphati
cally declined to make reparation and compensation, or
to refer thefr conduct to the arbitration of a foreign
State,'"' it is offering them an indignity to demand, under
open menace or implied threat, that they should confess
themsehes in error and express their sorrow. To
yield under such circumstances manifests that there has
been either an unstatesmanlike rashness, precipitancy,
and stubbornness in the original acts, or else a lack of
nerve to maintain an attitude believed to be right.
Lord Derby's Cabinet had determined to maintain the
ground taken by thefr predecessors in power, but they
had expressed an earnest desire to meet the United
States in a concihatory spfrit if the two countries could
agree upon the principle of arbitration and the points to
which arbitration should apply. They did not, how
ever, remain long enough in office to impress their views
and their pohcy upon the negotiations, and all that can
be said is that the concessions they were willing to make
did not go fer enough to satisfy the President of the
United States. It seems manifest that the Government
of Lord Derby would have stood upon stronger ground,
and would have been able to discuss the questions at
issue more independently than Mr. Gladstone and his
coUeagues, who succeeded them. Neither the Conserva
tive Party nor its leaders were responsible for the policy
of Great Britain during the CivU 3Var, nor were they
implicated in the acts which had given offence to the
* See Earl EusseU's letter of August 30th, 1865, quoted above.

352 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
United States. The Avarmth which had characterized
Mr. ScAvard's official correspondence during the con
tinuance of the war Avould have had no raison d'etre
when he came to negotiate with a new Cabinet, none of
whose members had ever given cause of offence by dis
regarding his protests and complaints, or had wounded
his pride by an occasional retort, extorted by the pun
gency of his OAvn sometimes unguarded phrases.
There can be no doubt that the new Liberal Govern
ment was not in a favourable position to deal vigorously
or independently with the claims, which the United
States pressed with renewed earnestness and force as
soon as it was discovered that the original offenders
were again in poAver. It must be admitted that the course
pursued by her 31ajesty's Government during the CiAdl
War Avas neither consistent nor firm. They enunciated
their policy towards the two belligerents with clearness
and force ; they repeatedly affirmed that the pohcy was
right in principle and in law ; they over and over again
refused to reverse or to modify its general principles, and
yet they did more than once yield to pressure, and on
one notable occasion to an ill-concealed threat, and inter
fered Avith the alleged operations of one belligerent for
the benefit and protection of the other.
I am very desirous not to make a general statement
which shall convey a meaning not justified by the facts.
In a previous chapter I have given actual quotations
from speeches of several leading members of her 3Iajesty's
Government and from despatches ofthe Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of the neutral duties
of Great Britain, in direct reference to the American
CIa'U War. I feel sure that I am not overstating- the
vicAVS of her 3Iajesty's advisers at that time in repeating
that they Avere as foUoAvs : — ' A neutral may supply

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 353
either of two belligerents not only Avith arms and
cannon, but Avith ships suitable to operate in Avar ; and
her 31a,jesty's Government cannot, therefore, interfere
with the dealings between British subjects and the
" so-styled " Confederate States, whether the object of
those dealings be money or contraband goods, or even
ships adapted for AA-ar. The seizure of the Alabama
would haA-e, been altogether unwarrantable by law. She
might haA-e been legitimately built by a Foreign Govern
ment ; and though a ship-of-war, she might have formed
a legitimate article of merchandise even if meant for the
Confederate States. The Foreign Enlistment Act was
not meant to prohibit commercial dealings in ships-of-war
Arith belhgerent countries, but to prevent what the law
regards as the fitting- out, arming, or equipment of a
ship-of-war Avithin the British dominions, with the in
tent that she should be employed in the service of a
foreign belhgerent. A ship or a musket may be sold to
one beUigerent or the other, and only ceases to be
neutral when the ship is owned, manned, and employed
in war, and the musket is held by a soldier and used for
the purpose of kUhng his enemy. There must, in fact,
be a proved Adolation of the Foreign Enhstment Act to
justify her 3Iajesty's Government in preventing a British
subject from selling a .ship of any description whatever
to a foreign belhgerent.'
In the foregoing brief synopsis I have kept closely
to the spfrit, mdeed, I have used in the main the very
Avords employed in the original speeches and despatches,
previously quoted more at length, and it will be remem
bered that the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, in a
test case, confirmed the declarations of her Majesty's
3linisters, and settled the definition of the words ' fit
VOL. II. 52

354 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
out ' and 'equip,' as they are, or Avere, used in the Foreign
Enlistment Act.
Notwithstanding the clear and very definite position
thus assumed by her Majesty's Government, they gave
way to the pressure applied to them by the American
Minister and seized the Alexandra, a wholly unarmed
ship, and in a very incomplete condition, upon precisely
the same kind of evidence which they thought insufficient
in the case of the Alabama, and which proved to be false
in every material point, when put to the test at the trial
which followed. A number of other vessels unarmed, un
equipped, most of them manifestly designed for trading
purposes alone, and all of them clearly within the limits
of legal merchandise as defined by her 3Iajesty's Govern
ment, were interfered Avith or detained for inquiry upon
the complaint, or to satisfy the suspicions, of the United
States Consuls. But the most notable departure from
the principles of neutrality enumerated in the declara
tions of Mhiisters was the seizure of the so-called ' Liver
pool rams.'
On the 20th of August, 1863, the depositions fur
nished by the American Consul at Liverpool in respect
to the above vessels were submitted to the law officers
of the Crown. After some prehminary comments they
advised as follows : — ' Having regard to the entire in
sufficiency of the depositions forwarded to her Majesty's
Government by Mr. Adams to prove any infi-action of
the law, we cannot adA'ise her Majesty's Government to
interfere in any Avay AAdth these vessels. There is, in fact,
no evidence capable of being presented to a court of
justice of any intention on the part of any persons in this
country, that either of these vessels should be employed
in the belligerent service of the Confederate Government
against the United States, even if it would haA'e been

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 355
proper (had such CAddence been forthcoming) to act upon
the assumption that the laAV recently laid doAvn by the
Lord Chief Baron in the case of the Alexandra is in
correct, or that his lordship's ruling is inapplicable to
A-essels of this description, a point on AA'hich it may be
better to reserve the expression of our opinion till such a
case arises."*
In consequence of the above opinion of the law
officers. Earl Russell AAi-ote 3lr. Adams on September
1st, 1863, that her 3Iajest}-'s Government could not
interfere with the vessels, and to justify the refusal he
said : — ' A court of justice Avould never condemn in the
absence of evidence, and the Government would be justly
blamed for acting in defiance of the principles of law and
justice, long recognised and established in this country. '"j"
3Ir. Adams rephed to the foregoing on the 5th of Sept
ember, and strongly remonstrated. He said : — ' The
fatal objection of impotency which paralyzes her Majesty's
Government seems to present an insuperable barrier
ag-ainst aU further reasonincr. Under these circum-
stances, I prefer to desist from communicating to your
lordship even such portions of my existing instructions
as are suited to the case, lest I should contribute to
aggravate difficulties already far too serious. I therefore
content myself Avith informing your lordship that I
transmit by the present steamer a copy of your note for
the consideration of my Government,' etc. J
The above letter of 3Ir. Adams, with its covert threat,
proved sufficient to counteract the opinion of the law
officers, and overcame the objections of the Government
to act without evidence. On the Sth of September Earl
RusseU informed Mr. Adams, in a hasty note of two and
* See ' British Appendix,' vol. ii., pp. 336, 337.
f 'British Appendix,' vol. ii., p. 344. J Ibid., pp. 352, 353.
52—2

356 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
a half lines,* that orders had been issued which would
prevent the departure of the vessels, and he confirmed
the statement in a long despatch under date of September
llth. In the last-mentioned despatch, which has been
quoted and commented upon in a previous chapter. Earl
Russell affirms most decidedly that a ship may be
legally sold to one of two belligerents, ' and only ceases
to be neutral when she is OAvned, manned, and em
ployed in war,' and yet he closes his communication in
the following AVords : — ' I have to add that instructions
haA'c been issued for preventing the departure of the
ironclad vessels in question from Liverpool until satis
factory evidence can be giA-en as to their destination, or,
at all events, until the inquiries Avhich are now being
prosecuted with a view to obtain such CAddence shaU
have been brought to a conclusion.'f
The simplest possible summary is all that is necessary
to illustrate the vacillating policy of her 3Iajesty's
Government. They affirmed that ships of any descrip
tion were legitimate articles of trade between neutrals
and belligerents, and that they would not interfere with
such trade unless a clear violation of the Foreigrn Enlist-
ment Act could be proved. They stated that there was
no such proof in the case of the ironclad vessels, and vet
when pressed they seized the ships — what for ? Not to
bring their builders or alleged OAvners to trial, but in
order to gain timefor the purpose of making inquiries, and
thus discovering evidence against them.
When 3Ir. Seward perceived that there Avas a hmit
to the fortitude of her Majesty's Government, and that
it was possible to obtain from them in practice more
than they would admit in principle, the diplomatic
difficulties Avere greatly moderated. The representatives
* ' British Appendix,' vol. ii., p. 355. f Ibid-. PP- 358—360.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 357
of the United States had only to urge Avitli Achemence
in order to obtain, and each successiA-e concession thus
yielded under pressure made the foUowing attack more
easy, and the succeeding Adctory more complete.
But if her 3Iajest}''s Government disparaged their
prestige and weakened their position by preaching one
doctrine and practising another, they still further contri
buted to strengthen the claims and pretensions of the
LTnited States by extraordinarily indiscreet and seem
ingly thoughtless admissions. In a despatch to Lord
Lyons, dated 3Iarch 27th, 1863, Earl RusseU reported to
her 3Iajesty's 31iQister at Washington the purport of an
official couA-ersation between himself and Mr. Adams, in
which he says : — ' I achnitted that the cases of the
Alabama and Oreto were a scandal.'*
Now, the cases of the Alabama and Oreto could only
haA-e been scandalous from one of two points of view :
either the Foreign Enlistment Act did not give her
31ajesty's Government sufficient power to fulfil their
neutial duties, in which case the United States had a
clear right to ask for its amendment, or, the law being
strong enough, her 3Iajesty's Government had adminis
tered it so inefficiently as to admit of its open violation,
in Avhich latter case the United States could justly com
plain that no effort had been made to enforce its pro
visions or to punish the offenders. Earl Russell did
not mean to admit the former hypothesis, because in the
very despatch above quoted he wrote thus : — ' I said (to
Mr. Adams) that the Cabinet were of opinion that the
law was sufficient ;' and he could hardly have meant to
admit the latter, because down to the very close of the
war her Majesty's Government invariably refused to
* See ' Document ' presented to Parliament, ' The Alabama, North
America (No. 1), 1864,' pp. 2, 3.

358 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
prosecute the Confederate agents or the builders of the
ships, on the plea that there was no proof that the law
had been violated by any of them.
More than one member of the Government permitted
stUl another unguarded expression to fall from his lips or
from his pen. It was that the Alabama had ' escaped,'
or, to be more precise in the expression, they spoke
frequently of the ' escape ofthe Alabama.' Now, I have
always understood that to fly from the consequences of
breaking a criminal statute does not purge the offence,
and that the offender may be arrested and punished
whenever he can be laid hold of. The Alabama did not
go out of the port of Liverpool of her own volition. If
her departure was illegal, it Avas effected by persons who
were then and afterwards within the reach of the law?
and yet no one has ever been called to account in re
spect to her movements. We can, therefore, only class
the phrase used by Earl Russell, and the admissions of
other Ministers, among those unfortunate expressions
which slip fi-om the tongue in an unguarded moment,
which can never be recalled or explained, but which rise
up in future judgment against the speaker, often to his
embarrassment, sometimes to his shame, and to the
serious detriment of the country he represents. The
admissions were carefully noted by 3Ir. Adams, and
were effectively used afterwards in pressing the ' Alabama
Claims.' Even the Solicitor-General, when speaking as
a politician in defence of the Government, and not Arith
the caution of a lawyer, said on one occasion that 'we
(the Government) strained the law ' in the proceedings
against some of the ships, which served as an encourage
ment to Mr. Adams in urging a further and continuous
process of straining. Other unhappy slips ofthe tongue
and of the pen might be culled from the speeches and

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 359

despatches of her 3Iajesty's 3Iinisters during the Civil
War, but the foregoing are sufficient to demonstrate the
advantage which accrued to the United States from such
unguarded expressions.
But the British 3Iinisters of that day still further
compromised the country, and supplied 3Ir. ScAvard
Arith plausible data for the allegations of unfriendly
neutrality to the LTnited States Avhich are so prominently
set forth in the claims and m the ' Case ' laid before the
Tribunal of Arbitration, by speeches both in and out of
Parhament, which certainly did greatly offend the
North and did arouse a hope of 'recognition' at the
South. The stab at the North about fighting for
' empfre ' and not upon the question of slavery in Earl
RusseU' s speech at Newcastle has already been quoted in
another connection. In the same speech his lordship
said : —
' But I cannot help asking myself frequently, as I
trace the progress of the contest, to what good end can
it tend ? Supposing the contest to end in the reunion
of the different States ; supposing that the South should
agree to enter again the Federal Union Avith all the
rights guaranteed to her by the Constitution, should we
not then haA-e debated over again the fatal question of
slavery ? . . . But, on the other hand, supposing that
the Federal Government completely conquer and subdue
the Southern States — supposing that be the result after
a long mihtary conflict and some years of Civil War —
would not the national prosperity of that country be
destroyed ? ... If such are the unhappy results which
alone can be looked forward to from the reunion of these
different parts of the North American States, is it not
then our duty ... is it not the duty of men who Avish
to preserve in perpetuity the sacred inheritance of liberty,

360 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
to endeavour to see whether this sanguinary conflict
cannot be put an end to ?' *
In a speech delivered in the House of Lords, February
Sth, 1863, Earl Russell said : — ' There is one thing,
hoAvever, which I think may be the result of the struggle,
and which, to my mind, would be a great calamity —
that is, the subjugation of the South by the North.'
After some comments he added : — ' But there may be, I
say, one end of the Avar that would prove a calamity to
the United States and to the Avorld, and especiaUy
calamitous to the negro race in those countries, and that
Avould be the subjugation of the South by the North.'f
Mr. W. E. Gladstone, the Chancellor ofthe Exchequer,
said in a public speech at Newcastle, October 7th,
1862 : — ' We may have our own opinions about slaA-ery ;
Ave may be for or against the South ; but there is no
doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the
South have made an army. They are making, it appears,
a navy, and they have made what is more than either —
they have made a nation. (Loud cheers.) . . . 3Ye
may anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern
States so far as regards their separation from the North.
(Hear, hear.) I cannot but belicA-e that that CA^ent is as
certain as any event yet future and contingent can be. 'J
Lest it may be thought that the foregoing was one of
those bursts of exuberant eloquence which escape from
an orator of ardent temperament Avhen free from the
restraints and responsibilities of office, here is an extract
from a long speech by the same distinguished gentleman,
in the House of Commons, deliA'ered June 30th, 1863,
Avliile he was still a member of the Government : — ' Why,
* Quoted in ' United States Case,' pp. 23, 24.
t Ibid, p. 24.
X ' United States Case,' p. 24.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 361
sfr, we must desire the cessation of this Avar. No man
is justified in AAdshing for the continuance of a Avar
unless that war has a just, an adequate, and an attain
able object, for no object is adequate, no object is just,
unless it is also attainable. 3\'e do not believe that the
restoration of the American I'nion by force is attainable.
I believe that the public opinion of this country is
unanimous upon that subject. (No.) 3Yell, almost
unanimous. I may be right or I may be Avrong — I do
not pretend to interpret exactly the public opinion of
the country. I express in regard to it only my private
sentiments. But I AAdU go one step further, and say I
behcA-e the public opinion of this country bears very
strongly on another matter upon which we have heard
much, namely, whether the emancipation ofthe negro race
is an object that can be legitimately pursued by means of
coercion and bloodshed. I do not believe that a more
fatal error was ever committed than when men — of high
inteUigence I grant, and of the sincerity of whose
phUanthropy I, for one, shall not venture to whisper the
smaUest doubt — came to the conclusion that the emanci
pation of the negro race was to be sought, although they
could only tiavel to it by a sea of blood. I do not think
there is any real or serious ground for doubt as to the
issue ofthis contest.''"
The foregoing extracts are not now selected by me
fi-om the speeches of 3Ir. Gladstone with the purpose of
showing the bias or the opinions of a member of her
Majesty's Government in reference to the American
Civil 3Yar ; they are copied verbatim from the ' Case '
presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration on behalf of the
United States, and they were quoted in that document
with the avowed intent of demonstrating to the arbi-
* Quoted in ' United States Case,' p. 25.

362 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
trators that the Government of Great Britain did not
think the United States would succeed, nor did they
wish them to succeed, and the inference that the counsel
for the United States wished to establish was that, in
consequence of those unfriendly convictions and vrishes,
the Confederates were encouraged to obtain the supplies
in England which enabled them to prolong the war.
It is proper to mention that some years after the war
3Ir. Gladstone made an explanation of the sentiments
contained in his various speeches, and he categorically
denied that his sympathies were Arith the South, stating
that in point of fact his leanings Avere towards the North.
Of course, those explanations must be taken as decisive
in regard to the private feelings of the right honourable
gentleman, but in an historical narrative the narrator
must state the meaning that was commonly attached to
the speeches of responsible statesmen at the time they
were delivered, and he must describe the effect then
created without reference to the explanations, which,
coming long after the events, haA'e no practical im
portance. If 31 r. Gladstone, speaking as a 31inlster of the
Crown in 1862 and in 1863, thought it advisable to sum
up in eloquent language the achievements ofthe Southern
leaders, and to express the belief that their final success
Avas an event as certain as any occurrence yet future
and contingent could be — if he could say officiaUy fi-om
his place in the House of Commons that the restoration
of the American Union by force Avas not attainable, and
therefore the Avar against the South was without a just or
adequate object ; and, moreover, that it was a fatal error
to attempt the emancipation of the negro race by travel
ling through ' a sea of blood ' — it matters very little at
this late day Avhether he Avas giving utterance to an
irrepressible feeling of sympathy for the South, or was only

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 363
expressing an abstract opinion upon the result of the
Avar and the inadequacy of the object Avhich impeded the
North to wage it.
The compUers of the ' United States Case,' in the
printed argument laid before the Tribunal of Arbitration
at Geneva, make the following comment upon the several
speeches quoted above : — * It is scarcely too much to say
that his' (3Ii-. Gladstone's) 'language, as well as much
of the language of other members of her 3Iajesty's
GoA-ernment herein quoted, might well have been taken
as offensive;"* and they allude elscAA'here to the speeches
of 3Iinisters as manifesting a partiality to the South
which they allege caused her Majesty's Government to
relax the restrictions which should have been imposed
upon the Confederate agents. In support of the fore
going allegation the folloAring very pointed statement is
made : — ' The United States summon no less illustrious
a person than the present Prime 3Iinister of England '
(the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone) ' to prove not only
that the insurgents were engaged in the year 1862 in
making a navy, but that the fact was known to the gentle
men who then constituted her 3Iajesty's Government. '"f"
The foregoing comments are sufficient to settle the
interpretation that Avas put upon 3Ir. Gladstone's
speeches by the people of the North. There can be no
doubt that at the South they were received as evidence
that some of her 3Iajesty's 3Iinisters at least sympathized
Arith the Confederate cause, and they did arouse hopes of
some sort of intervention which would contribute to its
success. Every Southerner believed with Mr. Gladstone
that the war of coercion was without a just or adequate
* See 'United States Case,' House of Commons Blue Book,
'North America (No. 2), 1872,' p. 24.
t ' United States Case,' p. 58.

364 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
object, although all of them did not follow him to the
conclusion that the object was unattainable. He carried
the entire South with him Avhen he eloquently affirmed
his belief that ' a more fatal error was never committed
than that of seeking the emancipation of the negro race
by coercion and bloodshed,' even though the hot sun of
the Carolinas or of Louisiana did not inspire any repre
sentative Southerner to describe the wa}- by which the
North Avas seeking to accomplish it in the gloAving
metaphor of ' a sea of blood.' As, therefore, both
parties in the late Civil War put the same interpretation
upon the speeches at the time they were dehvered, and
one of them at least retained the impression up to the
date of the Geneva Arbitration, it does not seem pre
sumptuous to affirm that the language fairly implied the
meaning attached to it.
It is, therefore, embarrassing to be told, years after
the event, that both sides were mistaken, and that the
speaker meant quite a different thing. Such a declara
tion upsets all definite rules of interpretation, and drives
one to the conclusion that when oratory leaA^es the strict
line of argument and soars into the higher atmosphere
of eloquence and metaphor, the words are only mystic
oracles, which, like the notes of an ^Eolian harp, delight
the ear with their harmonious melody, but do not couA'cy
to the senses a distinct tune. In fact, if the declaration
is to be taken as generally applicable to the speeches of
great public orators and statesmen, it will be necessary
in the future for each speaker to supply the shorthand
writers with the key to his meaning, Avhich might be put
in a note at the foot of the ' report ' in the next morning's
papers. Thus Avould be obtained a double advantage.
The reader Avould not be mystified, and the speaker
Avould avoid the trouble of a future explanation.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 365
It seems impossible to doubt the opinion previously
expressed that the Conservative GoA-ernment of 1866 —
1868, composed chiefly of the late Earl of Derby, Mr.
Disraeli, and Lord Stanley, could have negotiated for a
settlement of the ' Alabama Claims ' Avith a much better
chance of arriAdng at a fair, equitable, and friendly result
than the Cabinet which succeeded them. Neither of the
Conservative statesmen mentioned above had given any
outward manifestations of sympathy Avith either side,
and had not irritated 3Ir. Seward, or wounded the sus-
ceptibihties of the North, by speeches which were taken
to be oftensiA-e and were at least inchscreet. They would
no doubt have been held to be responsible for the policy
of thefr predecessors, but the negotiations would in all
probabUity haA'e been carried on without any manifesta
tions of pique on the part of the United States, and
much of the harsh comment, the personal insinuations,
and the sarcastic criticisms which appear in the ' United
States Case ' would haA-e had no standing-place in that
document, as they would have been wholly inapplicable
to 3Iinisters who had given no cause of offence. But
the conditions under which the negotiations were resumed
after the Liberal Party came back into power, with Mr.
Gladstone as Prime 3Iinister, and with other members of
the Cabinet who administered the Government during
¦"he Civil War for his colleagues, rendered it almost
certain that the United States would not only urge their
claims Avith some asperity, but would insist upon such
concessions as would involve a confession of error and
an apology ; and they succeeded in extorting both after
a long and weary discussion.
The rejection of the Clarendon-Johnson Convention
was officially notified to Lord Clarendon on the 4th of
May, 1869. About the same time Mr. HamUton Fish

366 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
relieved 3Ir. Seward as Secretary of State at Washing
ton, and Mr. John Lothrop 3Iotley succeeded Mr.
Reverdy Johnson as United States Minister to Great
Britain. It appears that Mr. Motley arrived in London
on the 31st of May, 1869 ; and on the 10th of June he
called on Lord Clarendon ' to make known to him the
general tenor of his instructions.'* In the interAdew
which followed, Mr. Motley explained the reasons which
led to the rejection of the Claims Convention by the
Senate of the United States. He said that OAving to an
accident the Convention had been published in the
United States prematurely, and that in consequence it
had been unfavourably received by aU classes and parties
in the country long before it came under the notice of
the Senate. Moreover, he said that the time at which
it Avas signed was inopportune, as the late President and
his Government were virtually out of office, and their
successors could not be consulted on the subject.
Finally, he said, the Convention was further objected to
because it embraced only the claims of indiAdduals, and
had no reference to those of the two Governments on
each other, and that it settled no question and laid
down no principle. Mr. Motley furthermore said that
' in the present state of excitement which existed in
both countries, his Government Avas of opinion that to
reopen the question would be inexpedient, as it could
not be approached with the calm dehberation which was
essential to its satisfactory solution ; and he wished,
therefore, to defer the discussion of the subject.'
Lord Clarendon replied that her 3Iajestv's Govern
ment were Avilling to comply AA'ith the wishes of the
United States in respect to deferring the discussion,f
* Lord Clarendon to ]Mr. Thornton, 'British Case,' Appendix,
vol. iv., 'North America (No. 1), 1870,' p. 1.
t Ibid., p. 2.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 367
but he did not consider that there Avas auA' great excite
ment in England on the subject, and he thought it
Avould be very objectionable to postpone a settlement
indefinitely, ' and to treat the matter as a quarrel held in
suspension, to be revived onl}- Avhen circumstances might
make it the interest of either party to do so.' Mr. 3Iotley
rephed that Lord Clarendon need be under no such appre
hension, as his Government merely desired that a definite
time should be aUowed for angry feelings to subside.
After the foregoing- conversation there Avas no further
discussion ofthe subject until October 15th, 1869, AA'hen
Mr. Motley communicated verbally to Lord Clarendon
the contents of a despatch he had received from Mr.
Fish, which reopened the whole subject of the ' Alabama
claims," and on the next day he forwarded to him a
copy of the despatch, which was dated September 25,
1869.'"' Considering that 3Ir. 3Iotley had been in
structed to propose a postponement of the discussion on
the express plea that his GoA^ernment wished to reopen
the subject after calm deliberation, and when there had
been time for all angry feeling to subside. Lord Clarendon
no doubt expected to find in 3Ir. Fish's first despatch a
plain, dignified, moderate, and friendly statement of the
' claims.' He doubtless hoped that all merely senti
mental grievances would be omitted, that the inshiua-
tions, irritating epithets, and figures of rhetoric which
marred the force and weakened the effect of Mr. Seward's
State Papers would be eliminated, and that he would
have to deal Avith practical demands based upon a clear
unimpassioned statement of facts, well within the range
of plausibihty, even if not capable of ' technical proof '
m every particular. These expectations were disap-
* For Mr. Fish's despatch see ' British Case,' Appendix, vol. iv.,
'North America (No. 1), 1870,' p. 3.

368 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
pointed, and the British Foreign Minister discovered
that Mr. Fish's long and elaborate despatch Avas a mere
recapitulation of the arguments previously used by 3Ir.
Seward, stated somewhat less offensiA^ely, but retaining
most of the insinuations and many of the exaggerations
which there had been ample time to examine and to test.
The sentimental grievance crops up in the very first
page of the despatch. After sketching the origin of
what he calls the ' domestic insurrection,' 3Ir. Fish
says :• — ' In such a contest, the Government of the
United States was entitled to expect the earnest good
will, sympathy, and moral support of Great Britain.'
After expressing the ' painful astonishment ' which the
manifest absence of that sympathy produced, 3Ir. Fish
gives an elaborate rechauffee of 3Ir. Seward's complaints
against Great Britain, beginning Arith the allegation that
the Declaration of Neutrality and the admission of the
South to belligerent rights were premature and unfriendly
to the United States, that they gaA-e encouragement to
the ' insurgents,' and enabled them to prolong the con
test and to inflict incalculable injury upon the United
States, for which they had a right to claim compensation
from her Majesty's Government.
This part of the despatch does not much affect the
object of the present narrative, and as the complaint,
together with the reply of Earl Russell to it, haA'-e both
been stated in a previous chapter, it might be left without
further notice here. But Lord Clarendon, in his answer,
gave some additional reasons why the complaint was in
itself unreasonable, and AA-hy the grounds upon AA-hich it
was advanced were untenable, and a s}'nopsis of Avhat
his lordship said in reply will help to illustrate the
manner in AA'hich the so-called ' Alabama Claims ' Avere
brought before a Tribunal of Arbitration.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 369
Lord Clarendon said that at the time Avlieii the Queen
was advised to issue the Proclamation of Neutrality
hostdities had actually begun, that the Confederate
States had established a de facto Government, with all
the machinery of civil and militar}- power ; that Fort
Sumter had fallen, and the Confederate troops Avere in
occupation of the Shenandoah A-alley, and AA-ere threaten
ing Washington ; that the Confederate President had
called for a IcA-y of 32,000 troops, to which the seceded
States had promptly responded ; that the Federal Presi
dent had called for 75.000 A-olunteers, and then for 42,000
more ; that as fast as the regiments could be armed they
were marched to the defence of Washington, and that
the contenchng armies were, indeed, ' face to face.' * In
respect to the operations at sea, he said that ' on the
17th of AprU the Confederate President had issued a
Proclamation offering to grant letters of marque, and
two davs after the Federal President had declared the
Southern ports to be in a state of blockade ; that one or
more British ships had actually been captured while
attempting to run the blockade ; that Confederate pri
vateers were already at sea ; that one had been captured
on the Sth of 3Iav by the United States ship Harriet
Lane; that a few days after the American barque Ocean
Eagle, of Rockland, 3Iaine, was captured by the Con
federate privateer C<.dh.ejun, of Ncav Orleans, and that at
the same port the Sumter was fitting out for her cruise.
Lord Clarendon especially drew attention to the fol
lowing facts. He said: — ' 31r. Seward, writing at the
time, and previously to the Queen's Proclamation '
(3Iay 4), ' characterized the proceedings of the Con-
* Lord Clarendon's despatch and inclosure containing his com
ments will be found in Appendix to 'British Case,' vol. iv., 'North
America (No. 1), 1870,' pp. 11—20.
VOL. 11. 53

370 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
federates as " open, flagrant, deadly war," and as " ciAdl
war" (Congress Papers, 1861, p. 165); and in a
communication to 31. de Tassara, the Spanish Minister,
referred to the operations of the Federal blockade as
belligerent operations Avhich would be carried on with
due respect to the rights of neutrals. Judge Betts, in
the cases of the Hiawadui, etc.. said: — " I con.sider that
the outbreak in particular States, as also in the Con
federate States, was an open and flagrant ciAdl war." It
Avas also judicially decided by the Supreme Court ofthe
United States, in the case of the Amy Warwick and
other prizes, that " the proclamation of blockade was in
itself official and conclusiA^e evidence that a state of war ex
isted which demanded and authorized such a measure." '*
He furthermore cited a joint resolution of the United
States Congress in July, 1861, approving and confirm
ing the war measures of the President, in which resolu
tion the ' domestic insurrection ' of 3Ir. Fish is called the
' present deplorable Civil 3Yar,' and ' this Avar.'
In vicAv of all the foregoing. Lord Clarendon said : —
' The date at Avhich the CiAdl War actually commenced
has, therefore, been fixed by the published despatches of
the Secretary of State, by proceedings in Congress, by
the formal judgment of the United States prize-courts,
as Avell as by the universal assent of all the neuti-al
Powers concerned,' and he expresses a very justifiable
surprise that 31r. ScAA-ard's threadbare complaint of
British recognition of an accomplished and admitted fact
should be revived four years after the close of the war.
In the memoranduin forAvarded to the British 3Iinister
at Washington, Lord Clarendon remarked upon the
claims for ' vast national injuries ' advanced by 3lr.
* See, for Lord Clarendon's remarks, ' British Case,' Appendix,
vols, iii., iv, 'North America (No. 1), 1870,' p. 11, etc.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 371
Fish,* and he furnished 3Ir. Thornton witii an extract
from a speech delivered at Bristol (England) by 3lr.
Lawrence, the editor of the second annotated edition of
MMieaton.' 3lr. Lawrence Avas an American, and he
Avas speaking to an English audience just about the time
Avhen 3Ir. Fish's despatch Avas delivered to Lord Claren
don. He said : — ' As far as res^iects the complaint founded
on the recog-nition of the belhgerent rights of the Con
federates, I cannot use too strong language in pronouncing
its utter baseless character. Xo tyro in international
law is ignorant that belhgerency is a simple question of
fact. 3Vith the late Sir Cornewall Lewis Ave may ask,
if the array of a nuUion of men on each side does not
constitute beUigerency, Avhat is belligerency ? But what
was the Proclamation of the President, followed up by
the condemnation of yom- ships and cargoes for a viola
tion of the blockade winch is established, but a recogni
tion of a state of Avar ? At this moment the United
States, in claiming the property of the late Confederate
Government, places before your tribunals their title on
the feet of thefr being successors of a de facto Govern
ment. I repeat that, however valid our claims against
you on other grounds, there is not the slightest pretext
for any claim against you based on the public admission
of a notorious fact, the existence of Avhich has been recog
nised by every Department of the Federal Government.'
The foregoing is the language of the American editor
of the standard American work on international law.
But 3Ir. Seward had apparently stamped his own
peculiar vicAvs upon the State Department, and his
successor AA-as not equal to the effort of repudiating
them. In reference to the despatch of Confederate
cruisers from British ports, 3Ir. Fish writes quite in the
* 'British Case,' Appendix, vol, iv. (Xo. 1), 1870, p. 19.
53—2

372 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
vein and temper of 3Ir. ScAvard, and with very nearly
the same recklessness and exaggeration. We find in the
official communication which had been held back to give
time for calm deliberation such expressions as follow : —
' Great Britain . . . p)ermitted armed cruisers to be
fitted out ' — ' the Queen's Government . . . suffered
ship after ship to be constructed in its ports to wage war
against the United States ' — ' many ships were, vrith
ostentatious publicity, being constructed ' — ' permission
or negligence which enabled Confederate cruisers from
her ports to prey,' etc.—' Great Britain alone had
founded on recognition a systematic maritime war' —
' suffering' the fitting out of rebel cruisers.'
Anyone reading the despatch from which the fore
going extracts are taken, haA-ing himself no knowledge
of the facts, Avould suppose from the language used, that
fleets of Confederate cruisers had been built, armed, and
equipped in England and despatched from British ports.
All Avho haA-e read the foregoing pages of this work, will
perceive hoAv little of substantial truth there was in such
broad assertions, and avUI admit the fitness of Earl
Russell's comment, that many of the allegations of those
who represented the United States were rather ' figures
of rhetoric ' than plain statements of fact.
In reference to the supplies furnished to the South by
British subjects, 3Ir. Fish described the poverty of the
South thus : — ' We reflected that the Confederates had
no ships, no means of budding ships, no mechamcal
appliances, no marine, no legal status on the sea, no open
seaports, no possible courts of prize, no domestic com
mand of the instruments and agencies of modern mari
time warfare ;' and he then implies that the entire
maritime force of the Confederate States Avas obtained
in some sort of illicit Avay fi-om Great Britain, AAdth the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 373
connivance, if not with the direct consent, of her Majesty's
Government. The poverty of the Southern States in
respect to naval resources at the beginning of the Avar
Avas not overdraAvn by 3Ir. Fish ; but Avhat are the facts
in regard to the manner and source from Avhich their
Avants were supplied ? In the ' United States Case '
presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration, claims are
made against Great Britain for aUeged depredations of
ten Confederate vessels in addition to the Alabama, the
Florida, the Shenandoah, and their tenders. Every one
of the ten were either built or bought Avithin the Con
federacy ; they were fitted out, armed, and manned at
Confederate ports ; all of them sailed from Confederate
ports on their first cruises, and at least three of them,
the Nashvdle. the Tallahassee, and the Chickacnauga, re
turned in safety to Confederate ports when they had
accomphshed the purpose for which they had been des
patched. The foregoing facts could haA'e been known to
anyone who chose to inquire, and it is really marvellous
that the State Department at Washington should
haA-e advanced claims against Great Britain, based upon
statements which her 3Iajesty's Government could so
easUy disprove.
3Ir. Fish laid great stress upon the indirect injury to
American commerce.* He said : — ' Our merchant-vessels
were destroyed piratically by captors who had no ports
of thefr OAvn . . . and Avhose only nationality Avas the
quarter-deck of their ships,' etc. ' Indirectly,' he said,
' the effect Avas to increase the rate of insurance in the
United States ... to take aAvay from the United States
its immense foreign commerce, and to transfer this to the
* Mr. Fish's despatch, 'British Case,' Appendix, vols, iii., iv.,
'North America (No. 1), 1870,' pp. 3—10.

374 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
merchant-vessels of Great Britain.'* In proof of the
foregoing, he said that ' Avhile in the year 1860 the
foreign merchant tonnage of the United States amounted
to 2,546,237 tons, in 1866 it had sunk to 1,492,923. This
depreciation,' he continued, ' is represented by a corre
sponding increase in the tonnage of Great Britahi during
the same period to the amount of 1,120,650 tons.'
After a further remark to the effect that commerce was
' abstracted ' from the United States and ' transferred ' to
Great Britain, he closes that part of the subject with the
foUoAAdng startling and sensational statement : — ' Thus,
in effect, war against the United States was carried on
from the ports of Great Britain by British subjects in the
name ofthe Confederates.'
After so long a summary of grievances it might surely
be supposed that 3Ir. Fish would have put the demands
of the United States in some definite shape, and that he
Avould haA-e suggested some practical mode of adjusting
the differences between the two countries, but he did
not. On the contrary, he instructed 3Ir. 31otleA- to
inform Lord Clarendon that what he had Avritten was
not in the nature of a claim, nor did the United States
then make a demand against her 3Iajesty's GoA-ernment
on account of the injuries sustained, nor did they then
propose or desire to set any time for a settlement. f
They Avere Avilling ' to leaA'e that question, and also the
more important question of the means and methods of
removing the causes of complaint, and of restoring the
much-desired relations of perfect cordiality, etc., to the
consideration of her Majesty's GoA-ernment.'
It must have somcAvhat embarrassed Lord Clarendon
* Mr. Fish's despatch, 'British Case,' Appendix, vols, iii., iv.,
' North America (No. 1), 1870,' p. 5.
t Ibid., p. 10.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 375
and his colleagues to knoA\- hoAv to deal Avith the fore
going complaints and charges, direct and implied, all of
AA'hich AA'ere unpleasantly familiar to thom, and Avhich in
3Ir. Seward's time they had so strongly repelled ; and it
was rather aAvkward to be asked to suggest the means
and method for remoAdng the tauses of complaint, and
for settling- the account for damages, when they had
already declared that they had given no just cause of
complaint, and had declined to ' make reparation and
compensation for the captures made by the Alabama, or
to refer the question to any foreign state.''""
It would be useless to trace the further progress of
the negotiations in detail. There were other questions
besides those j^ertaining to the Confederate cruisers, such,
for example, as the relations of the United States towards
the British Possessions in North America, and Naturali
zation Laws and the fisheries, all of which gaA'e occasion
for correspondence and discussion.
In January, 1871, Sir E. Thornton (the British
31inister at Washington) informed Mr. Fish that he had
been dfrected by Earl Granvillef to propose to the
Government of the United States the appointment of a
Joint High Commission, which should be composed of
members to be named by each Government, the Joint
Commission to sit at 3Yashington, and to treat of and
discuss the mode of settling all questions which had
reference to the fisheries and to her 31ajesty's possessions
in America.
3Ir. Fish replied, January 30th, 1871, that he had
submitted the proposition to the President, and was
* Earl EusseU's despatch, August 30th, 1865, quoted previously.
t The same Cabinet, under Mr. W. E. Gladstone as Premier, was
in office, but Earl Granville had succeeded the Earl of Clarendon as
Foreign Secretary.

376 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
instructed to say that in the President's opinion the
Joint High Commission would fail to re-establish the
sincere, lasting, and substantial friendshij) between the
tAVO countries which he (the President) desired, unless
the dift'erences which arose from the acts committed by
the Confederate cruisers, and Avhich had giA-en rise to
the claims generically known as the ' Alabama Claims,'
.should be also submitted to the Commission.''' Mr.
Fish added that if her Majesty's Government Avould
accept that view, and would agree that the ' Alabama
Claims ' should also be treated of by the proposed High
Commission, he was instructed by the President to say
that the United States Avould with much pleasure
appoint High Commissioners on their part to meet those
appointed by her Majesty's Government at the earliest
practicable moment. The proposal to include the
' Alabama Claims ' in the subjects to be referred to the
Joint High Commission was promptly accepted by Earl
Granville, Avho informed Sir E. Thornton on the 23rd
of February, 1871, that Lord de Grey and the other
British Commissioners had already left England.
A brief recapitulation is necessary to a clear and com
plete understanding of the conditions under which the
so-styled ' Alabama Claims ' were at last submitted to
arbitration. When the Liberal Government Avent out of
office in 1866, the position Avas this : — Earl Russell had
categorically dechned ' either to make reparation and
compensation for the captures made by the Alabama, or
to refer the question to any foreign State ;'f and his suc-
* For the full particulars see 'Parliamentary Blue Book,' ' Corre
spondence respecting Joint High Commission,' etc., 'North America
(No. 1), 1871,' pp. 3—5.
t Earl Eussell to Mr. Adams, August 30th, 1865, quoted on
pio. 331, 332.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 377
cessor, Lord Clarendon (in the same Cabinet), in closing
the correspondence Avith 3li-. Adams on the subject,
maintained that the British Government 'had ncA-er
dcAdated from the obligations imposed upon them by
international laAv.'* 3Vhen the late Earl of Derby came
into power the discussion Avas re-opened, and Lord
Stanley, who was Foreign Secretary in his father's
Cabinet, stated that 'although her 3Iajesty's present
advisers could not abandon the ground taken by their
predecessors so as to admit the hability of Great Britain
for the claims then and noAv put forward, yet they
would be glad to settle the question, and Avere willing
to adopt the principle of arbitration if the points to
which arbitration should apply could be agreed upon.'
The Stanley-Johnson Convention was the result of the
foregoing proposal ; but the restrictions which were im
posed upon the inquiry into the ' Alabama Claims ' did
not satisfy the President of the United States, and in
consequence the Convention was never referred to the
Senate for confirmation. 33^hen the Liberal Party re
sumed office in 1868, the Claims were again pressed, and
another agreement Avas made between the two countries,
commonly known as the Clarendon- Johnson Convention.
By the terms of this latter Convention, her Majesty's
Government consented to enlarge the inquiry into the
'Alabama Claims ' so as to meet as nearly as possible
the views of the President of the United States ; but,
nevertheless, the Convention ivas rejected by the Senate,
in consequence of the opposition of 3Ir. Charles Sumner
and other extreme men, who manifestly Avished to
humiliate Great Britain by extorting an admission that
she had committed an ei-ror in permitting the Con-
* His letter of December 2nd, 1865, quoted on p. 334.

378 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
federates to trade Avitb British subjects on terms of
equality with the United States.
After the rejection ofthe Clarendon- Johnson Conven
tion the subject AA^as again held in abeyance for some
time, and AAdien it Avas reopened by Mr. Fish, although
Lord Clarendon repeated the arguments advanced against
the claims on former occasions, and Avith CA-en greater
force on some points, yet it appears from this time to be
manifest that her 3Iajesty's GoA'ernment were Avorn out
Avith the toils and vexations arising from the controA-ersy-
They AA'ere fast losing their often-avoAved consciousness
of right, and also their fortitude in resisting the claims,
whose justice they had always heretofore repelled. The
indiscreet speeches during the war, and the heedless
admissions Avhich had been clraAvn from several of the
Ministers at A'arious times, now rose up in judgment
against them. Those fatal ebullitions of fancy or of
feeling, and those unguarded slips of the pen, had fi-om
the A'ery first furnished topics of angry comment in the
American press; they had been the inspiring theme of
many orations, spoken, indeed, within the halls of Con
gress, but really meant for ' Bunkum ;' thcA- had found
their way into the very heart of society at the North,
and the ' Alabama Claims ' had thus groAvii beyond the
dimensions and importance of an ordhiary inquiry affect
ing only certain commercial interests, or certain abstract
principles of public laAv, and had come to be looked
upon in the light of a gricAance, more or less sentimental
perhaps, but none the less real, and which could not
have been removed AAdthout such an amende as would
gratify the pride, and so relieve the minds of the
Northern people from the feeling of mortification which
had aroused both their jealousy and anger. When,
therefore. Sir EdAvard Thornton informed Earl GrauAdlle

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 379
that the President thought there could be no adjustment
ofthe questions between the tAvo countries, which could
estabhsh a sincere, substantial and lasting friendship,
unless the differences ' growing out ofthe acts committed
by the scA-eral vessels which haAc given rise to the
claims genericaUy knoAvn as the '• Alabama " Claims Avere
also settled,' her 3Iajesty"s Government probably per
ceived that it would be necessar}- either to concede the
point, or to keep open a cause and source of international
h-ritation, to the existence of AA-hich they must have felt
that their own indiscretions had largely contributed.
Few, if any, will now say that the determination of
the Cabinet then in power to yield Avas not dictated by
prudence and Avorldly wisdom, but no one Avho reads
the hi.story of those tinies, and examines the diplomatic
correspondence, can doubt that it must haA'e cost the
indiAddual members of the 3Iinistry some sacrifice of
personal dignity and independence to make declarations
and concessions which implied that they had framed
then- original pohcy hastily, and had pursued it AA'ith
unreasoning stubbornness. Since the origin of the
Alabama grieA-ances no new fact had come to light, and
no new principle had been discovered, Avhich could haA-e
affected, or which did affect, the Adew her Majesty's
Government took of thefr international duties; and as
they changed their attitude only after their position
had been rendered intolerable by reason of persistent
remonstrances and long-continued reiterations of com
plaints, accompanied AA-ith many implied threats, it cannot
be said that they were spontaneous advocates of a new
and beneficent mode of settling international differences,
nor can they claim the merit of having voluntarily set
the example of substituting arbitration instead of war as
the means of composing international jealousies.

380 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
The President's refusal to agree to any Commission
to treat on other questions unless the ' Alabama Claims '
Avere also submitted for settlement was notified to Sir
E. Thornton on the 30th of January, 1871, and he must
haA'e communicated the fact to Lord GranvUle by tele
graph, because on the 1st of February he informed 3Ir.
Fish that he had been ' authorized to state that it would
giA'-e her Majesty's Government great satisfaction if the
claims commonly knoAvn by the name of " Alabama
Claims " were submitted to the consideration of the
same High Commission,' etc.*
3Ir. Gladstone's Cabinet, having thus determined to
abandon the position they had always heretofore main
tained, acted v.'ith promptness and without reserve in the
subsequent negotiations. The British Comnussioners
had all left England by the 18th of February, and the
following extract from thefr instructions Avill show that
they Avere fully authorized to make the apology the
United States had fi-om the A^ery beg-inning determined
to exact f :— ' For the escape of the Alabama and con
sequent injury to the commerce ofthe United States, her
Majesty's Government authorize you to express their
regret in such terms as Avould be agreeable to the United
States and not inconsistent with the position hitherto
maintained by her Majesty's Government as to the inter
national obligations of neutral nations.' As her 3Iajesty's
Government had hitherto maintained that they had been
guilty of no default in the practice of their neutrality,
that the Alabama was a legitimate object of mercantile
traffic, and that there Avas no evidence that anyone con-
* North America (No. 1), 1871,' vol. iv., p. 4.
t For Earl Granville's letter of instructions see Parliamentai-y
Document, 'North America (No. 3), 1871,' in Appendix to 'British
Case,' vols, iii., iv., pp. 1 — 4.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 381
nected v(dth her had violated the laAv, it is difficult to
penetrate the cause of their regret at that particular
time, or to perceive Avhy they did not express it at an
earlier date.
Everybody laments the sufferings and losses produced
by Avar, no matter Avho ai-e the sufferers, and her Majesty's
GoA^ernment had often declared their hope and desire
that the sanguinary struggle might soon cease; but they
had always during the continuance of the war, and for
years afterwards, refused to make the least concession
that would imply an acknowledgment of responsibility
for the acts of any Confederate cruiser, and yet they had
so weakened their position by indiscreet speeches and
admissions, that at last they Avere forced to express
regi-ets in such a form and in such a connection as iiatu-
raUy to admit thefr default. To say that they regretted
the ' escape ' of the Alabama and the consequent injuries
to the commerce of the United States, etc., looks very
hke an admission that they should have prevented
her departure, or punished the implicated parties, and
cannot but excite surprise that they did not frankly say
so years before.
NotArithstanding the seeming confession of guilt im-
phed in the manner of expressing their regret, her
3Iajesty's Government strenuously maintained in their
' Case ' before the Tribunal of Arbitration that Great
Britain Avas not responsible for the acts of the Alabama,
whatever they may ha\-e been.^ The general revicAv of
the aUegations and arguments of the United States in
respect to the Alabama and Florida occupies pp. 72
to 88 of the British ' Counter Case,' and the final sen
tence is in these words following : — ' Her Majesty's
Government again submit that neither in respect of the
Alabama nor Florida is Great Britain chargeable with

382 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
any failure of international duty for which reparation is
due from her to the United States.'
It is A^ery difficult to furnish a commentary upon the
conduct of the British Ministry who managed the
Alabama negotiations, which shall be clear, and at the
same time fair, without frequent repetitions or recapitu
lations of what has been said before. I have tried to
refi-ain fi-om suggesting any inferences, and from in
dulging in any criticism, except when the actual language
of Ministers or extracts from official documents have
been quoted, so that each reader might see for himself
whether the facts justify the deductions. A man must have
profited little from the lessons oflifeif he has not learned
to keep his passions and prejudices in subjection to his
judgment, and if he cannot state the conduct of others
Avho may have inflicted injury upon the cause in which
he was interested, without tampering with the facts or
suggesting unfair inferences.
The Joint High Commissioners met and held their
first conference in Washington on the 2 7th of February,
1871, and after producing- their respective full powers,
they appointed Lord Tenterden, Secretary to the British
Commission, and 31r. Bancroft Davis, Assistant- Secre
tary of State of the United States, to perform the duties
of Joint Protocolists, and agreed upon the subjects
for discussion.* Conferences Avere held from time to
time, and protocols Avere drawn up recording the progress
made in the negotiations. At the conference on the 3rd
of May, 1871, it was determined to embody in a single
protocol a general statement containing an account of
the negotiations upon the various subjects contained in
the Treaty in the order in Avhich the subjects were to
stand in that document. •}• On the 4th of 3Iay the Joint
* 'North America (No. 3), 1871,' p. 5. f Ibid., p. 8.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 383
High Commissioners met to consider the statement, in
respect to which it is only necessary to say that the
' Alabama Claims ' take precedence of all other subjects.
It appears from the statemont that at the beginning
ofthe negotiations the Americam High Commissioners
recapitulated the statements previously made by 3Ir.
Seward and 3Ir. Fish.* They said that the United
States had sustained great wrong and injury to their
commerce and material interests ' by the course and
conduct of Great Britain during the recent rebellion ;'
that the Alabama and other cruisers ' which had been
fitted out, or armed, or equipped, or which had received
augmentation of thefr force in Great Britain or her
colonies,' had inflicted heaA'y direct losses by the capture
and destruction of a large number of vessels with their
cargoes ; that a heav-y national expenditure had been
incurred in the pursuit of these cruisers, and that there
had been great indirect loss to the United States, in the
transfer of a large part of the American commercial
marine to the British flag. They said that the claims
for private property destroyed already amounted to
814.000,000, AAdthout interest, and the ' amount Avas
liable to be great!}- increased by claims which had not
been presented,' and ' that the cost to which the Govern
ment had been put in the pursuit of the cruisers could
be ascertained by certificates of the accounting officers,'
etc. Finally, ' they hoped that the British Commissioners
would place on record an expression of regret by her
3Iajesty's Government for the depredations committed,'
etc., and proposed that the Joint High Commission
' should agree upon a sum which should be paid by Great
Britain to the United States, in satisfaction of all the
claims and interest thereon.'
* For 'Statement' see 'Parliamentary Documents North America
(No. 3), 1871,' p. 8, etc.

384 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
The British Commissioners Avere not disposed to reply
in detail to the foregoing statements, but were content
to repeat the denial of any responsibility on the part of
Great Britain for the acts ofthe Confederate cruisers.
They expressed the hope that there would be no necessity
for a lengthy controversy, and proposed to submit the
whole question, both as to law and fact, to arbitration.
The Commissioners of the United States said that ' they
could not consent to submit the question of liabUity of
her Majesty's Government to arbitration, unless the
principles Avhich should govern the arbitrators in the
consideration of the facts could be first agreed upon.'*
The British Commissioners replied ' that they should be
willing to consider what principles should be adopted for
observance in the future ; but they were of opinion that
the best mode of conducting an arbitration was to
submit the facts to the arbitrator, and leave him free to
decide upon them after hearing such arguments as might
be necessary.' The American Commissioners rephed
' that they were Avilling to consider Avhat principles
should be laid down for obserA-ance in similar cases in
future, Avith the understanding that any principles that
should be agreed upon should be held to be applicable to
the facts in respect to the 'Alabama Claims.' The
British Commissioners replied ' that they could not
admit that there had been any Adolation of existing
principles of international laAv, and that their instruc
tions did not authorize them to accede to a proposal for
laying down rules for the guidance of the arbitrator, but
that they Avould make knoAvn to their Government the
A-iews ofthe American Commissioners on the subject.'
The question Avas at once referred to the home Govern
ment, and the British Commissioners Avere instructed to
* 'North America (No. 3), 1871,' p. 9.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 385
say ' that her 3Iajesty's GoA-ernment could not assent to
the proposed rules as a statement of principles of hiter-
national law which were in force at the time when the
' Alabama Claims ' arose ; but that her 3Iajesty's Govern
ment, hi order to CAdnce its desire of streng-theninff
the fi-iendly relations between the tAvo countries, etc.,
agreed that, in deciding the questions between the two
countries arising out of those claims, the arbitrators
should assume that her 3Iajesty's Government had
undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in the
rules Avhich the American Commissioners had pro
posed.' It was manifest that the United States would not be
content Arith a mere diplomatic expression of regret.
Thefr ptu-pose was to make sure of a verdict in their
favour, and to secure the award of subs'tantial damages ;
and it was. therefore, necessary to create a new law,
AA-hich should be applied to rights and obhgations de
fined and ordained by a pre-existmg laAV. By agreeing
to be judged by the new rules, her 3Iajesty's Govern
ment virtually consented to a verdict for the United
States, and placed Great Britain in a very anomalous
position. They denied the prior existence of the rules,
and yet consented that they should be the measure of
their past obligations. They affirmed to the very last
that they had not deviated in any particular from the
duties imposed upon them by international law, and had
incurred no hability to the United States ; and yet they
consented to be judged by a set of new rules so broad
and indefinite as to render a judgment against them
certain. If we are asked to admit that this was a great and
generous concession made in the interests of peace, and
in obedience to the kindly and noble precept Avhich coni-
voL. n. ^^

386 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
mands us to do AA'hat is right, though the heaA'ens fall, we
are forced to reply that the date and circumstances ofthe
surrender alike oppose that view. So far as the questions
at issue were affected either by the specifications of law
or the principles of equity, there had been not the
slightest change since the day when Earl Russell had
emphatically refused to admit any liability whatever, or
to make any compensation ; and throughout the ' Case '
presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration on behalf of
Great Britain, it is argued with force and persistency,
and the highest American authorities are quoted to
j)rove, that her Majesty's Government had violated no
international duty. The conclusion is, therefore, frre-
sistible that the members of the British Ministry were
conscious of thefr former vacillation ; and perceiving how
much they had weakened their oavii position, and given
plausibility to the claims of the United States by thefr
own indiscretions, they thought it prudent to sUence
further complaints by concessions which would yield to
the United States the substantial fi-uits of Adctory, whUe
they themselves seemingly maintained the attitude of a
vigorous defence.
But her Majesty's Government, having determined to
yield, do not appear to have paid much heed to the
language in which the rules were expressed, nor did they
take the least pains to fix upon them a common inter
pretation. In the proceedhigs before the Tribunal of
Arbitration, the United States plainly declared that they
regarded the rules as no more than a statement of pre
viously established rules of international law. In the
British ' Counter- Case ' it is admitted that certain ex
pressions employed in the rules belong to a class in
common use among publicists to define the duties of
neutrality, but the construction put upon those ex-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 387
pressions by the United States for the purposes of the
arbitration is strongly opposed.*
For example, in the British Case it is contended that
the phrase ' base of naval operations ' denotes the use of
neutral territory by a belligerent ship as a point of
departm-e, where she may await, and fi-om which she
may issue to attack her enemy, Avhereas the United
States contended that Great Britain made her territory
a base of naval operations for the Confederate States by
the mere fact of haA-frig pernntted their cruisers to obtain
occasional supplies of coal at their ports. The meaning
attached to the words ' specially adapted to warlike
use ' and ' due dUigence ' were prominent subjects of
controversy in the arguments before the Tribunal, and
the general objections of the British representatives to
the American interpretation of the rules is thus stated
in the British Counter Case : — ' Her Britannic Majesty's
Government obserAes Avith sincere regret that, as in other
particulars, so more especially in this, the Government
of the United States, instead of accepting in a fair and
reasonable sense rules which the two Powers have
engaged to observe towards one another, and to recom-
mend for adoption to other States, seems on this occasion
to have considered how they might be turned to the
greatest advantage in the present controversy, and Avith
that Adew to have stramed the construction of them to
the very utmost. The undue extension which it is pro
posed to give to the first rule does not accord Avith its
plain and natural meaning, Avas never contemplated by
the Government of her Britannic Majesty, and is alto
gether rejected by Great Britain.'f
The simple fact is that her 3Iajesty's Government
* These rules are given at the end of the chapter, p. 411.
t 'British Counter-Case,' p. 17.
54—2

388 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
gave way to the United States, and agreed to the three
rules hastily, and without fuUy appreciating the extent
to which it would afterwards be attempted to apply the
principles of the rules in determining the liability of
Great Britain. A half hour's discussion at Washington
before the fatal Treaty was signed would have saved
much argument before the arbitrators, and would pro
bably have saved to Great Britain a large portion, if not
the whole, of the £3,000,000 indemnity.
On the 6th of 3Iay, 1871, the Joint High Commission
met for the last time before the signing of the Treaty.*
The business of the Commission was merely to confirm
the general protocol of the conference held on the 4th
of May, and then followed the customary exchange of
fi-iendly congratulations. The British Commissioners
said ' it had been most gratifying to them to be asso
ciated with colleagues who were animated Avith the same
sincere desire as themselves to bring about a settlement
equally honourable and just to both comitries . . . and
they would always retain a grateful recollection of the
fair and friendly spfrit which the American Commis
sioners had displayed.'
Her Majesty's Commissioners had no doubt yielded
the concessions they were instructed to make vrith
affability and grace, and in the expectation that all cause
for acrimony and recrimination had been removed, and
that the case before the arbitrators would be conducted
in a friendly spirit, their complimentary farewell was
the natural outcome of their inward satisfaction. The
United States Commissioners, on the other hand, haAdng
virtually obtained in respect to the ' Alabama question '
all that their Government had been A-ainly contending
for during the preceding eight or nine years, were
* 'Alabama Claims— North America (No. 3), 1871,' p. 15.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 389
naturaUy in exuberant good -humour, and Avere doubtless
quite sincere in saying that 'they were gratefully
sensible of the friendly words expressed by Lord de
Grey . . . and that they had been impressed by the
earnestness of desire manifested by the British Com
missioners to reach a settlement Avorthy of the two
Powers who had committed to this Joint High Com
mission the treatment of A-arious questions of pecuhar
interest, complexit}', and delicacy.'
It has been necessary in previous chapters to com
ment upon the pecuhar harshness of tone and the angry
spirit which pervades the ' United States Case ' in the
proceedings before the arbitrators, and anyone who cares
to read the above-mentioned document will be surprised
to perceiA-e how httle the whole procedure resembles the
friendly reference of a dispute to the impartial judgment
of a disinterested tribunal. A large portion of the
reply of her 3Iajesty's GoA-ernment to the ' Statement of
Claims ' on the part of the United States is in the nature
of a defence or a remonstrance against the insinuations,
the depreciation of English laws and institutions, and
the disparaging comparisons between the conduct of
Great Britain and other countries, vrith which that state
ment bristles.
The courtly congratulations and gratifying compli
ments exchanged at 3Yashington in May, 1871, were
forgotten — at least, they were not permitted to lessen
the Adgour or to blunt the sharpness of the attack
at Geneva — and the contrast between the suave part
ing of the Joint High Commissioners, when they had
agreed to refer the questions at issue to friendly arbitra
tion, and the Ul-disguised irritation on one side, and
scarcely suppressed disappointment and mortification on
the other, furnish a melancholy example of the utter in-

390 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
adequacy of polite phrases to convey any substantial
meaning. The Treaty for the settlement of the 'Alabama Claims '
and other questions was signed at 3Vashington, 3Iay Sth,
1871, and the ratifications were exchanged June 17th,
1871. The preamble of Article I. sets forth very pro
minently ' the regret felt by her Majesty's Government
for the escape, under Avhatever circumstances, of the
Alabama and other vessels from British ports, and for
the depredations committed by those vessels.' In Lord
GranvUle's original instructions to the British Com
missioners they were authorized to express regret for the
escape of the Alabama alone, but in the Treaty that
reo-ret is made to'include ' other vessels.'
Her Majesty's Government never admitted, except in
an indiscreet conversation of one of the Cabinet, that
even the Alabama had ' escaped,' until the Joint Com
mission was about to meet. Up to the A-ery close of the
arguments before the Tribunal of Arbitration the British
representatives contended that even in respect to the
Florida ' there was no reasonable ground to belicA^'e that
she was intended to cruise against the United States,'
and they strongly urged that there Avas no ground for
suspicion in respect to the Georgia and Shenandoah;
indeed, in respect to the last-named A-essel they say that
it is not even pretended that the United States consular
authorities called the attention of her 3Iajesty's Govern
ment to her, or that anyone suspected at the time of her
departure from London that she Avould pass into the
Confederate naval service. It must, therefore, haA-e been
careless on the part of her 3Iajesty's GoA-ernment to
permit the expression of regret in respect to the Alabama
to be so extended in the A'ery preamble of the Treaty as
to include ' other vessels ' — a very indefinite expression.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 391
To admit an escape certainly seemed to implv the ac
knowledgment of some negligence in permitting the
escape. At any rate, the United States made good use
of the admission in that sense.
By the conditions of the Treat}-, Great Britain and
the United States agreed to refer all the claims ' generi
cally knoAA-n as the '• Alabama Claims,"' to a Tribunal
of Arbitration to be composed of five arbitrators, one to
be named by each of the contracting PoAvers, one by his
3Iajest}- the King of Italy, one by the President of the
Swiss Confederation, and one by his Majesty the Em
peror of Brazil. The scA-eral PoAvers named appointed
the folloAving arbitrators : — Great Britain, Sir Alexander
Cockburn, Baronet ; the United States, Charles Francis
Adams, Esq. ; Italy, his ExceUency Count Frederic
Sclopis ; the Swiss Confederation, 31. Jacques Staempfli ;
BrazU, his Excellency 3Iarcos Antonio d'Araujo, Vis
count d'ltajuba. The five arbitrators met at Geneva on
the loth of December, 1871, exchanged their respective
powers, and declared the Tribunal of Arbitration to be
duly organized.* The High Contracting Parties were
represented by agents, to wit. Great Britain by Lord
Tenterden, and the United States by John C. Bancroft
DaAds, Esq., and there Avere also counsel, whose office it
was to argue the cases of their respective Governments.
In the very nature of things it was manifest that the
British and American arbitrators would cancel each
other's votes on most, if not all, crucial points. It is
hardly possible to conceive that 3Ir. Adams would be
induced to abandon the position he had taken throughout
his long controversial correspondence with Earl Russell
* 'Proceedings of Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva— North
America (No. 2), 1873.' After several adjournments the Tribunal
met June 15, 1872, and pronounced judgment September 14, 1872,

392 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
on the subject of the claims, or that he would be con
verted to the vicAvs of their own conduct which her
Majesty's Ministers- had previously maintained by any
fresh exposition ofthe subject. It was equally unlikely
that Sir Alexander Cockburn would be couAdnced by the
arguments of the counsel for the United States that her
Majesty's Government, the laAV officers of the Crown,
and the Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer,
had misinterpreted the Foreign Enlistment Act, and
that the British authorities had neglected to perform
their neutral duties in accordance with international law.
The judgment ofthe Tribunal of Arbitration therefore
depended mainly upon the view which the three remain
ing arbitrators might take, and it must be admitted that
those distinguished statesmen were in a somewhat em
barrassing position. If the whole subject-matter of the
controversy had been submitted to them, both as regards
laAV and fact, and they had been asked to decide in
accordance with the principles and rules of international
law which Avere binding upon all nations during the
time Avhen the CA-ents upon which the claims of the
United States were based occurred, their office would
haA'e been simple enough. But they found themsehes
in the position of having to assess the amount of liabihty
Great Britain had incurred under three new rules of
very indefinite signification, and Avhich they soon per
ceived the tAVO contending parties construed very differ
ently. They Avere, in fact, required not to give judgment
upon the rules of international laAv as commonly received,
but to declare a ncAv code, which, according to the
interpretation of those Avho represented the LTnited
States, Avould render the position of neutrals in case of
a Avar between two great naval PoAvers simply intoler
able. They perceived, hoAvever, that Great Britain had

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 393
virtually confessed that she oAA'cd both reparation and
compensation to the United States by admitting that the
'Alabama and other a-osscIs ' had escaped from her
jurisdiction, and by expressing regret for the injury
they had inflicted ; and it must have appeared to them
that all previous contentions to the contrary had been
abandoned by Great Ih-itain, and that their only course
was to judge between the parties according to the con
ditions agreed upon betAveen them, and to keep the
damaoes doAA-n to a reasonable fig-ure.
The I nited States appeared before the Tribunal with
aU the advantages of a diplomatic triumph in their
favour, and could also point to such a plain confession
of defaidt on the part of their opponents, as to make it
well-nigh certain that the judgment would in the main
be faA-ourable to them. It is therefore greatly to be
regretted that their ' Case ' AA-as not drawn up in the
friendly spirit which appears to have possessed the
Joint High Commissioners in their deliberations ; on the
contrary, it seems to haA-e been written on the model of
3Ir. SeAvard's most acrimonious despatches, bears evidence
of pique and irritation which is strikingly out of harmony
Arith the character of the proceedings, and manifests the
purpose throughout to obtain a specific present advan
tage, and to secure a pecuniary profit, rather than the
desire to found an honourable precedent for the settle
ment of future international disputes, and to establish
new rules for the guidance of neutrals which both
England and America could recommend to other Powers.
But if the statement of the ' United States Case ' is
open to censure in its general features, the specific
claims are set out in a still more objectionable manner.
Special failures of duty are alleged against Great Britain,
in respect to a number of A'essels, and then she is charged

394 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
indiscriminately Avith all the losses occasioned by those
vessels, and the cost which the United States incurred
in their pursuit. In addition to the losses, interest is
claimed on the amount, which is calculated at seven per
cent, per annum, and so little care was taken to verify
the accounts, that when the specific items were sub
mitted to inspection, it was discovered that the date
from which interest was charged was, in a large propor
tion of the alleged losses, long antecedent to the dates
Avhen they were stated to haA^e occurred.*
The claims made by the United States may be classed
under two general heads, viz., ' Claims for PriA-ate
Losses,' and ' Claims for National Loss and Expendi
ture.' Under the former they included (1) claims for
the value of ships freighted with cargo destroyed by
Confederate cruisers, for the consequent loss of freight,
and the value of the cargoes ; (2) claims for A'essels in
ballast ; (3) claims by owners of whahng A-essels de
stroyed, for the value of the vessels themselves, for the
oil actually on board, and for the prospective catch of
fish — in fact, for speculative earnings; (4) claims by
American insurance companies, for insurance on ships,
cargoes, freights, and profits, alleged to have been lost
by the destruction of the vessels ; ( 5 ) claims for cap
tains' wages, personal effects taken or destroyed, and
personal damages.
The United States appear to have exercised no sort of
discrimination or oversight in testing the accuracv of
private claims, but presented them just as they Avere
handed in by the persons who alleged that they AA-ere
interested in the property destroyed. EA-eryone knows
that not much reliance can be put upon the estimate of
the interested parties in respect to the value of lost
* ' British Counter-Case,' p. 133.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 395
property they are seeking to recover, and a responsible
Government should at least test the accuracy of the
calculations of claimants before adopting them as the
basis of a national claim.
During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 some British
vessels were sunk in the Seine by the Gernian military
forces. The owners sent in a claim for £20,270.* The
German GoA-ernment was perfectly willing to pay the
actual loss incurred, but thinking the amount asked
exorbitant, they referred the claim to her Majesty's
Government for investigation, who directed the Board
of Trade to make the necessary scrutiny. After due
examination the Registrar of the Court of Admiralty
reported that the owners were only entitled to £6,899,
which the German Government paid, thus saving about
two-thfrds of the claim by the A-ery honourable and
fiiendly interA-ention of the Government whose subjects
were the claimants. The British Government in like
manner referred the claims of the United States to a
Committee appointed by the Board of Trade. A few
extracts from the reports of the Committee will demon
strate how little pains the United States took to keep
thefr demands within just limits.f
The Committee report thus : — ' We find shipowners
putting forward claims for full freights and earnings with
out any deductions AA-hatsoever, so that they are, in effect,
demanding profits at a rate exceeding 200 per cent., and
sometimes exceechng 2,000 per cent. . . . We find the
OAvners of whaling vessels demanding the whole value of
their ships and outfits, although they have received more
than 1700,000 frorn insurance companies, who at the
* ' British Counter-Case,' p. 134.
t The reports are printed in full in the Appendix to ' British
Case,' vol. vii.

396 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
same time, and in addition, put forward a claim for the
same amount. We find the charterer claiming for the
loss of the charter party or his profits thereon, whilst
the shipoAvner demands the freight in full ; and finally,
we find merchants claiming profits on their goods
at the rate of 30 and 40 and even 50 per cent, per
annum, without making any allowance for freight and
for charges at the port of destination.' In regard
to the claims on behalf of whale-ship owners for pro
spective earnings, the Committee report : — ' The total
claim in respect of the whaling and fishing vessels
amounts to about $8,500,000, about half of which is
demanded for the loss of prospective earnings, without
any deductions whatever ;' and they A-ery justly add
that such claims are perfectly illusory, and ' can be
proved, as will be shown hereafter, to be equivalent to
claiming, over and above the whole capital iuA-ested in
those speculative adventures, a profit on such capital at
a rate exceeding 300 per cent, per annum.'
Again, the Committee state that neither the English
nor American Courts have ever allowed a claim for loss
of Avages by the master in cases of collision or capture ;
but, irrespective of that, they say ' it must be observed
that the claim of the master for loss of wages when
advanced at the same time, as it iuA-ariably is in the
present case, Avith a claim by the shipowner for full
freight, is not less unjust than the claim by the owner
for the amount of his loss Avhen followed immediately
by the claim of the insurance company for the very
same amount, for it is out of the gross freiafht that the
Avages Avould have been paid, and without such payment
the gross freight could not haA'e been earned,'*
* The report states that in five cases — the Alert, Cor ington,
Catherine, General JVilliams, and Gipsey — the OAvners give credit for

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 397
A fcAV items taken from the claims for personal
effects, etc., will shoAv Avhat license the United States
aUoAved such claimants. Ebenezer Nye, master of the
Abigail, of 310 tons, claimed for upwards of §16,000, or
about .£3,200, for the loss of personal effects on board
that vessel ; the master ofthe Rockingham, of 976 tons,
claimed for loss of personal eftects, $8,054, or £1,600;
a passenger by the Winged Racer claimed $10,000 for
loss of office as Consul, and $1,015 for loss of personal
effects ; the master and mate of the Crown Point, of
1,100 tons, each adA-anced claims for $10,000.
But if the United States were careless in accepting
and presenting- extortionate and unjust claims on behalf
of private indiAdduals, they were none the less heedless
of accuracy, and indifferent to criticism, in regard to the
claims for national losses. For example, they claimed
for the value of the war-steamer Hatteras, sunk by the
Alabama, which afforded her 3Iajesty's Government the
opportunity to prove that the engagement took place so
near to a powerful United States squadron that she
could not haA'e been destroyed except for want of proper
support. They claimed for the value of the revenue-
cutter Caleb Cushing, which claim the British ' Counter-
Case ' argues ought certainly to be disallowed, because
that vessel was cut out of the fortified harbour of Port
land, in the State of 3Iaine, by boats sent from a small
fishing schooner, captured by the Florida and com
missioned as a tender.*
The claims for expenditure alleged to have been in
curred in the pursuit of Confederate cruisers were also
submitted to the scrutiny of the practical and pains-
money received from the underwriters, but in all other cases they
believe no such credit was given.
* ' British Coimter-Case,' p. 137.

398 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
taking Committee ofthe Board of Trade, and they found
it necessary to point out that the accounts upon which
that description of claims were based contained ' many
obvious errors, many discrepancies which there were no
means of reconciling, and a great number of charges
which, in the absence of explanations, cannot but be
deemed excessive.' The United States alleged that the
sailing-ship Sheppard Knapp was wrecked while in pur
suit of Confederate cruisers, and she is entered in the
claims. In reference to her, the report of the Committee
states as follows* : — ' The Avhole amount of the Sheppard
Knap)pi's outfit is charged, although in the official account
of her loss, in the report of the Secretary of the United
States Navy to Congress on the 7th of December, 1863,
p. 556, it is stated that 'her battery (11 guns) and
appointments, ordnance, yeoman's and masters' stores,
instruments and charts, provisions and clothing, spars,
sails, running and standing rigging, anchors and chains,
everything- portable and of value to the GoA'-ernment, has
been saA'ed. The only loss is the hull and the use of the
ship.'t As an example of the excessiA-e charges in the claims
for expenditure, the foUoAving vrill suffice : — ' For ex
ample,' the report says, ' the charges under the head of
medicine and surgery amount to $28,664.24. The
Medical Director-General of her 3Iajesty's NaAy states
that £2,500 (about $12,000) would probably cover the
charge for medicines and medical stores for 7,600 men
for 303 days in her Majesty's NaA-y. And this appears
to have been the total of the complements of the United
States cruisers,'
Further extracts from the Board of Trade reports, and
* Appendix to ' British Case,' vol. vii., p. 90.
t Quoted from report, 'Counter-Case,' p. 137.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 399
fiirther examples from the United States claims, are
unnecessary. Those AA-ho are curious on the subject
AviU find ample evidence in the British ' Counter Case,'
and in the ' Appendix to the British Case,' vol. Adi., that
the American Government showed little, if any, desire to
seek fan- and just compensation, and he will be forced to
conclude that the purpose was to present as big a bill as
possible, in order to allow for a probable large deduc
tion. It is hardly possible to calculate Avhat the claims
of the United States AA-ould have amounted to if they
had been aUowed in their entirety. The amount claimed
under the head of ' Expenditure incurred in pursuit of
Confederate vessels ' alone was $7,080,478.70 ;* and who
can tell AA-hat figures the double claims for ships, cargoes,
and insurance would haA-e reached, or what amount
would have expressed the prospective catch of the thirty-
eight whale-ships destroyed by the Shenandoah, and the
fourteen by the Alabama ?
The best evidence that the claims were preposterously
excessiA-e is to be found in the fact that the United
States have not been able to find claimants to whom
they haA-e been AvUling to pay more than about one half
of the moderate amount awarded by the Tribunal in
gross elcA-en or twelve years ago, and there has been
more than one discussion in Congress as to hoAV the
remainder should be disposed of. A member of the
House of Representatives is reported to have said that
in his opinion it ought to be handed back to Great
Britain. The Treaty of 3yashington and the award of the
Tribunal are too long to be given in full in this Avork.
It is hoped that so much of the former as pertains to the
' Alabama Claims ' has been sufficiently explained. Both
* Appendix to ' British Case,' vol. vii., pp. 63, 111.

400 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
documents are easUy accessible to all who care to consult
them. The actual decision of the Tribunal m respect to
each ship for whose operations the United States claimed
damages was as follows : —
The Alabama. — ' Great Britain has m this case failed,
by omission, to fulfil the duties prescribed in the first
and the third of the rules estabhshed by the Sixth
Article of the Treaty of 33"ashington.' The Florida.-—
' Great Britain has in this case failed, by omission, to
fulfil, etc., in respect to the first, second and third ofthe
rules,' etc. The Shenandoah. — ' Great Britain has nc^t
failed by any act or omission to fulfil, etc., during the
period of time anterior to her entry into the port of
Melbourne, but Great Britain has failed, etc., under the
second and thfrd rules aforesaid, in the case of this same
vessel, from and after her entry into Hobson's Bay, and
is therefore responsible for all acts committed by that
vessel after her departure from Melbourne,' etc.
In respect to the vessels called the Retribution, Georgia,
Sumter, Nashville, Tallahassee and Chickacnauga, the
decision was ' that Great Britain has not failed by any
act or omission,' etc., and hi respect to the Sallie, the
Jefferson Davis, the Music, the Boston and the V. H. Ivy,
respectively, the Tribunal decided unanimously ' that
they ought to be excluded from consideration for Avant
of evidence.' The Tribunal also decided that the vessels
captured by the Alabama and Florida, and which were
commissioned as auxiliary A'essels, must follow the lot
oftbeir principals.*
It Avill be seen, then, that the United States lodged
claims in respect to fourteen A-essels (irrespectiA-e of the
auxiliaries), and that Great Britain Avas declared to be at
fault in respect only to three, and it is, moreoA-er, impor-
* For the award respecting money indemnity, etc., see p. 411.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 401
tant to note that in the three cases in AA-hich she A\'as
judged to haA-e failed in her duties, the failure or default
was in each case stated to be, not by reason of any act
at variance with the principles of international law as
commonly understood, but for omission to fulfil the
duties prescribed by tAvo or three of the ucav rules
estabhshed by the Treaty — rules which are of course
binding upon no other PoAvers.
Let us for a moment reflect upon the consequences of
the foregoing- decision, supposmg that the rules laid doAvn
in tiie Washington Treaty are adopted as international
law. The Shenandoah, a merchant scrcAV-steamer, built,
however, with arrangements suited for carrying troops,
saUed from London, ostensibly on her regular voyage to
Bombay, and left London Arithout suspicion and without
any intimation to her 3Iajesty's Government that she
might ultimately fall into the hands of a belligerent.
31any hundred mUes from the British coast she was
transferred to a Confederate officer, who took possession
of her Arith a staff of officers, and regularly and lawfully
commissioned her as a Confederate ship-of-war. She at
once proceeded on a cruise, made several captures, and in
course of time arrived at the British colonial port of
Melbourne, in the Antipodes.
The Tribunal of Arbitration have decided that up to
the date of her arrival at 3Ielbourne the Shenandoah was
a legitimate national cruiser, and that Great Britain was
not in any respect hable for her acts, notwithstanding
her British origin. But after her departure from that
port it was discovered that some fifteen or twenty men
had joined and gone to sea in her, in spite of the vigilance
of the local pohce, who had been directed by the Governor
to prevent any attemj)t to increase the crew. The com
mander of the ShenaJidoah stated officially that the men
VOL. II. 55

402 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
got on board secretly, and were not discovered untU the
ship was at sea, and as she was lying in a large bay
and was receiving coals and other supplies which re
quired the constant passage of many boats between her
and various points on the shore, it is not difficult to
perceive that a few men could have got on board and
concealed themselves without the possibility of detec
tion by the limited water-pohce of a colonial port. The
Tribunal of Arbitration have, however, declared that
from the date at which it Avas discoA'cred that fifteen or
twenty idle and adventurous seamen at 3Ielbourne
smuggled themselves on board the Shenandoah, the
second and third rules of the Treaty were aroused into
action, and the British Government became pecuniarily
responsible for every act of war committed by her. That
is to say, because the pohce of a distant colonial port
have proved to be unsuspecting or inefficient, or have
been deceiA'ed by a ruse, the mother country is at once
saddled with an indefinite responsibihty.
Let us now apply the consequences of the foregoing
decision prospectiA'-ely to the United States. Suppose
that Great Britain and France should some day have
the misfortune to fall out and go to war Arith each other.
After the beginning of hostilities one of the steam-
packets employed in the trade between New York and
the Brazils sails from that port for Rio de Janefro,
having fulfilled every legal requirement at the port of
departure. Instead of going dfrect to Rio, she proceeds
to an uninhabited Cay on the Bahama Banks, where she
is handed over to a French naval officer, who brings
with him a staff of officers, a fcAV guns, a supply of
small arms, with other stores, shipped fi-om New Orleans,
and a number of seamen, and commissions her as a
French ship -of- Avar.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 403
The French officer Avishes to have a dash at British
commerce, and he runs to the northAvard, alonff the
American coast, burnhig and scuttlhig a fcAv Liverpool
or Bristol ships, until he finds himself short of fuel and
other supphes. He is now off the Ncav England coast,
and, shmming the large seaports for prudential reasons,
he shps hito some quiet nook, say ProvincetOAvn, at the
back of Cape Cod, or one of the small harbours in the
3Iartha's 3"ineyard Sound. There he begins to take in
such supphes as can be got. The British Consul, if
there is one, notifies the local authorities that the
Frenchman is no better than a 'pirate,' and that if
they don't mind he vrill infringe the neutrality of
the port. The mayor, or the United States marshal, or
both, are quite AviUing to do what is right in the
matter, and strict orders are giA'en that no American
citizen must enhst on the strange craft, and the local
constables are strictly enjoined to keep their eyes
open. The crew of the Frenchman meanwhile mix with the
groups of seafaring men whom they meet along the shore,
and teU them that thefr ship is a fine vessel, that there
are twenty or thirty Americans on board who are Avell
satisfied -with the fare, the treatment, and the chances of
prize-money. The cod-fishing season has been dull, and
the men have no emplo}-ment. A fcAV of them think it
would be a fine thing to have a cruise in the natty craft
they have been admiring, and Avhich, in spite of her tri
colour flag, looks every inch a New York ship ; so they
slip on board while the marshal and mayor are asleep,
and the constables are looking after other matters, and
are concealed by thefr confederates. The next day the
French commander, ignorant of the addition to his crcAV,
pays his Mils, bids a suave 'good-bye ' to the friends he
55—2

404 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
has made on shore, and steams away in search of more
British ships.
Her Majesty's Consul has all this time been fretful,
suspicious, and inquisitive. Before the Frenchman has
))een gone twenty -four hours he discoA'ers, no matter
how, that a number of men AA'hom he used to see loung
ing about the foreshore, or smoking their pipes on the
jetties, have disappeared, and some man Avho AA-as dis
appointed in getting on board supplies him Arith
CAddence that the absentees haA-e gone off in the French
man. The fact is duly reported to her 3Iajesty's
Minister at Washington, and is notified to the home
Government, and then formally to that of the LTnited
States. The French cruiser is fortunate : she picks up
a good many prizes, costly steamers, rich Arith the
freights of India, the gold of Australia, and the corn
of Chili and California. By-and-by there is peace :
France and England shake hands across the Channel.
Her Majesty's GoA'ernment compUe a hst of the captures
of British ships by the ' American piratical cruiser,' refer
the list to the Board of Trade to assess the loss, and the
bid, say for £2,000,000 or £3,000,000, is forwarded to
3yashington AAdth the following - N.B.' at foot : — ' In
accordance Avith the duties prescribed by the rules
established in the Sixth Article of the Treaty of 33'ash-
ingtoii.' Such would be the legitimate, the logical, the im-
avoidable consequences of enforcing the three rules of the
Treaty of 3A'^ashington as they were construed by the
United States and confirmed by the decision of the
Tribunal of Arbitration.
One of the most striking examples of the effort made
by the United States to extend the meaning and to
strengthen the apphcation of the rules of the Treatv is

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 405
furnished by their claim in respect to the Sumter. That
A-essel, it AAdll be remembered, ran out of tiie 3lississippi
and began her cruise in June, 1861. During her very
successful foray through the 3Vest Indies, she touched
at A'-arious ports, and Avas permitted to receive coal as
follows: — 'Cienfugos, 100 tons; Curaqoa, 120 tons;
British island of Idinidad, 80 tons ; Paramaribo, 125
tons; 3Iaranham, 100 tons. From Maranham she pro
ceeded to the French island of 3lartiiiique, Avhere she
took on board, by the written pernussion of the Governor
a sufficient supplv to carry her across the Atlantic to
Cadiz.'* Ofthe prizes captiu-ed by the »S»»?ier during the above
West India cruise, eleven were taken before she put in
at Trinidad, none from the date of leaving Trinidad
to that if her arrival at Paramaribo, two between Para
maribo and 3Iaranham, and three after leaving Mar
tinique.! It AviU be seen that the Sumter not only received a less
quantity of coal at Trinidad than at either ofthe Spanish,
Dutch, BrazUian, and French ports mentioned above, but
she did not take a single prize whUe consuming the eighty
tons she was pei-mitted to receive there ; yet the United
States asked the arbitrators to declare that Great Britain
had ' failed to fulfil the duties set forth in the three rules
in Article VI. of the Treaty of Washington,' etc. ; and
in considering the amount to be awarded to the United
States, they asked that ' the losses of individuals in the
destruction of their vessels and cargoes by the Sumter,
and also the expenses to Avhich the United States were
* See 'British Counter-Case,' pp. 67, 68, and Semmes' ' Adventures
Afloat.' t See list in Appendix to ' United States Case,' vol. iv., p. 473,

406 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
put in the pursuit of that vessel, may be taken hito
account.'* The Sumter went from Cadiz to Gibraltar, where she
Avas laid up and finaUy sold, and she never entered any
other British port as a Confederate cruiser. What the
United States asked the arbitrators to do was simply to
declare that if a belligerent ship-of-war is permitted to
purchase 80 tons of coal in a neutral port, the neutral
nation becomes chargeable Avith all the damage she may
subsequently inflict upon the other belligerent.
Throughout the case of the United States, the conten
tion appears to be that whenever a Confederate cruiser
was permitted to buy in a British port AA-hat is caUed
' an excessive supply of coal,' Great Britain was thereby
permitting her territory to be used as a ' base of naval
operations,' and made herself liable under the rules of
the Treaty to make good the injury inflicted upon the
United States by that cruiser thereafter. International
laAV permits a neutral to sell to a belligerent vessel what
ever she may require to renew her sailing or steaming
power, but not arms or munitions of war, or anything
else that Avill add to her purely warlike force. In the
British ' Counter-Case,' it is contended that the consent
of nations has drawn that line and no other, and that
there is no such thing known to international law as
' an excessive supply of coal.' In the British ' Counter-
Case ' it was shown that if the Confederate ships were
permitted to buy coal hi British ports, the Federal
cruisers got very much more, and therefore the United
States had no just cause of complaint. To AA-hich the
United States rejoined that it was Great Britain, and
not themselves, Avho AA'ere on trial.
3Yhen it is considered that the tAvo great maritime
* 'United States Case,' p. 89.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 407
Powers were engaged in a friendly arbitration, which it
was hoped Avould settle principles tending to lessen the
unnecessary burdens of war, such quibbling as the fore
going is as lamentable as it is nuAvorthy. To put the
case briefly, and from the point contended for by the
United States, if Great Britain is CA-er again eno-ao-ed in
war, and a British man-of-AA-ar should go into some port
in Alaska, or should touch at one of the Florida Cays,
and buy eight}- tons of coal, the ITnited States would be
responsible for every dollar's worth of damage she might
inflict upon her enemy's commerce afterwards, because
it must be borne hi nnnd that the Sumter was originally
fitted out at a Confederate port, and never entered a
British port untU after she had been fully recognised as
a national ship-of-war.
Does any sane man suppose that any nation, even
including the two who were parties to the Treaty, avUI
ever adopt the rules of the Treaty of Washington as the
common law of neutral duties ? The United States
would be the very first to discard them.
There is no reason to doubt that the Executive
Government of the United States has always been
AviUing to comply with its neutral duties, but the
number of vessels armed, equipped, even officered and
manned in American ports for belligerents, to wit, for
the French Republic of 1792 and the South American
States, and the histories of the Lopez expedition against
Cuba, the various filibustering expeditions of Walker,
the operations of the Cuban Junta, and the Fenian
raids, all combine to prove hoAv powerless the United
States are to prevent infringements of their neutrality.
The United States have enormous coast-lines on the
two great oceans. They have no naA'y to speak of, an
army in its grand total not equal to a single European

408 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
corps d'arm^e, no national police at all, and a popula
tion especially averse to State interference in matters of
local trade, and particularly inclined to encourage ad
venturous enterprises. There are places — they may be
counted by hundreds — along the coast of the United
States where a belligerent cruiser could enter and re
plenish her contraband stores and increase her crew
without the least danger of interference, and yet the
United States have proposed, and have obtained the
sanction of a Court of Arbitration to, an extension of
the principles of international law, involving responsi
bilities and liabilities which would make the position of
a neutral but little less onerous than that of a belli
gerent. And what have the United States gained in
return ? A transient diplomatic triumph and a paltry
$15,500,000, an amount Avhich cannot cover the regi-et
every American must feel AA-ho reads the exorbitant and
ill-considered claims that were presented to the arbitra
tors, and who learns from the British ' Counter-Case '
how largely and for Avhat reasons those claims Avere
reduced in amount.
If the principles contended for by the United States
were to be generally adopted, neutrals Avould be obliged
to prohibit all traffic Avith belligerents, and to exclude
all belligerent vessels fi-om their jiorts. Powers like
Great Britain, France, and the German Empire have
possibly the police organization and the mihtary and
naval force necessary to guard aU pohits and to enforce
their prohibitions, but the United States and many other
PoAvers are manifestly unequal to such a task, and they
could not isolate their whole population from contact
Avith maritime belligerents by any legislative or ad
ministrative restrictions.
The extension of belligerent rights Avhich the United

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 409
States claimed and practised during the Civil War in
respect to the search of neutral vessels on the high seas
and of blockade, would be favourable to Great Britain
with her numerous and poAA-erful marine, and the broad
interpretation of neutral duties prescribed in the rules of
the Treaty of 3Vashington Avoiild Avoi-k to her advantage
if she should be again draAvn into a a-reat Avar. But the
United States as a neutral would be siniplv ruined by
the application of those rules to them as a neutral Power.
American ships could not approach the hemisphere in
which either belligerent was situated Avithout the cer
tainty of search and capture, and they would incur
incalculable damages for Adolations of their neutrality,
which the}- could only prcA-ent by openly espousing the
cause of one of the belligerents, Avhich, under all the
c'u-cumstances, would probably be the safest and the
cheapest course.
The ' Alabama Claims ' afforded a favourable oppor
tunity for establishing a new and philanthropic method
of setthng international disputes, and they might have
been the means of defining the relative rights and duties
of belhgerents and neutrals, so as to have greatly simpli
fied the very complex and elastic code commonly called
international law, and to have relieved some of the
doubts and embarrassments of neutrals. But neither
Power approached the subject in the right spirit. Great
Britam yielded reluctantly, after years of opposition ; the
United States pressed their claims angrily, and demanded
exorbitant and impossible concessions. At last, when
the two Powers agreed to refer their differences to
arbitiation, they Avent before the Tribunal without any
common understanding of the rules they had bound
themselves to be judged by, and they wrangled over
thefr meaning during the Avhole hearing of the cases.

410 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Great Britain protesting to the last that the United
States sought to give them an interpretation not con
templated by her Britannic Majesty's Government at
the ratification of the Treaty.
The ' Geneva Arbitration ' must therefore be recorded
in history as a great international fiasco. It is thought
by some to have saved the cost and perU of a war between
Great Britain and the United States. This is important,
if true, and no one is iioav disposed to be critical on that
point, or desires to begrudge it the credit of haAdng
done that much in the cause of peace; but it was not the
means of founding any ncAv law, or clearly defining any
old one. It laid down no general principle whatever,
and the rights of belligerents and the duties of neutials
remain in the fog which has enA'eloped them ever since
strong maritime Powers first began to enforce the one
and exact the other — for that is the process by which
' international law ' became the ' code of nations.'
No one who has had occasion to consult the standard
authorities in respect to the rights and duties of belli
gerents and neutrals, or to search for precedents, is likely
to attempt a dogmatic exposition of the law. It has,
however, been commonly agreed heretofore that there
can be no such thing as contraband goods on board of a
neutral ship, when she is bound from one neutral port
to another. The United States, previous to the CiAdl
War, always contended for that doctrine, but during
that great struggle their anxiety to isolate the South
caused them to lose sight of CA'ery consideration but
that of a present advantage. They stopped on the high
seas, boarded, searched, and captured, neutral ships
Avhile sailing betAveen neutral ports hundreds of miles
from the blockaded coast, and have thus established pre
cedents Avhich Avill give them much trouble wheneA'er

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 411
they may occupy the position of a neutral during a Avar
between tAvo strong maritime Powers.

THE RULES PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE \l. OF THE
TREATY.
Note for P.ahe 387.
' A neuti-al Government is bound —
' First, — To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming,
or equipping, Avithin its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has
reasonable gi-ound to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on Avar
against a Power Avith which it is at peace ; and also to use like dili
gence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel
intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel being
specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to
warlike use.
' Secondly, — Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use
of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the
other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military
supphes or arms, or the recruitment of men.
' Thirdly, — To exercise due ddigence in its own ports and waters,
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation
of the foregoing obhgations and duties.'

^OTE FOR Page 400.
The award, 'va respect to money indemnity, etc., was rendered in
the following words : —
' The Tribunal, making use of the authority conferred upon it by
Article VII of the said Treaty, by a majority of four voices to one,
awards to the United States a sum of 15,500,000 dollars in gold as
the mdemnity to be paid Ijy Great Britain to the United States for
the satisfaction of all the claims referred to the consideration of the
Tribunal, conformably to the provisions contained in Article VIL of
the aforesaid Treaty.'

412 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

CHAPTER VI.
Position of the Confederate Agents at the end of the War.— Financial
difficulties. — The United States and the property of the Confederate
Government. — Proceedings against Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm, and
Co. by the United States Government. — Presidents Lincoln and
Johnson. — The ' reconstruction ' of the Southern States. — Political
condition of the United States at the present day.
Although the shifts to Avhich the fiscal agents of the
Confederate - Government were driven in thefr efforts to
supply the ever-increasing wants of the country, and
the condition of the Confederate finances in Europe at
the close of the Civil War, are not perhaps subjects
of much historical importance, yet a narrative whose
purpose it is to reveal the means by which aggressiA'e
operations against the Federal Government were or
ganized abroad, would scarcely be complete Avithout
some explanation of the peculiar and perplexing position
in which the representatiA'es of the Confederate States in
Europe AA'ere placed by the sudden and complete over-
throAV of the authority under which they had been
acting. While Mr. Davis and his Cabinet could maintain their
position in Richmond, they fulfilled all the practical re
quirements of a de facto Government, and were recognised
as such by foreign PoAvers. Even the United States were

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 413
compelled to exhibit a marked distinction betAveen their
practice and their theor}-, and Avere driven by force of
circumstances to treat in 3^frginia Avith men on terms of
entire equality, who in Washington they denounced as
' ti-aitors ' and ' rebels.'
In ordinary international wars the defeat of the
A^anquished may be so crushhig as to wholly disorganize
the pohtical institutions of the States, or even to effect
an entfre change in them, as Avas the case with France
at the close of the Franco-German Avar. But in all
modem contests between different countries there has
remained at the close of the struggle a A-ested sovereignty
in the people of the defeated States, Avhich the conquerors
themseh-es have acknowledged, and they haA-e been per
mitted to decide upon the authority who should act for
them in pledging the national fiiitli, and thus arranging
the conditions of peace. But when General Lee AA-as forced
to abandon his lines around Richmond, the Executive
Government of the Confederacy was compelled to retire
with bim or to quickly follow, and Avhen the armies
under Lee and Johnston sun-endered, and the officers
and men dispersed to their homes under parole, there
was no longer a common central authority to Avhom the
several States could refer. Indeed, after Mr. Davis and
his Cabinet were driven from Richmond they never
foimd a resting-place in which they could remain long
enouo-h to examine the conchtion of affairs and to re-
organize further resistance. President Davis was soon
captured; the 3''ice-President, 3Ir. Stephens, and the
Secretary of the Nav}-, 3Ir. 3Iallory, were shortly after
wards arrested ; 3Ir. Benjamin, who was the Secretary
of State, and General Breckenridge, the War Secretary,
happUy escaped and got out of the country ; and thus it
wiU be perceived that the civil organization of the

414 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Confederate States was destroyed simultaneously with
the mUitary power which gave it vitality.
The politicians in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, and the
Republican senators Avho had professed extreme Adews
on the question of secession, had now the opportunity
to enforce their favourite theory — a theory so often and
so vehemently enunciated by 3Ir. Seward in the declara
tions that ' the integrity of the Repubhc is unbroken,'
the so-called CiAdl War ' is only an insurrection,' the
Southern people ' are rebels,' and the Government at
Richmond ' represents merely a domestic faction.'
The Southern States were vrithout a common rallying
point, and were thus deprived of the strength wMch
results fi-om union, even if they had not been too
thoroughly exhausted to make any further resistance.
The people in the conquered States had no other resoui-ce
than to submit, and the victors, vrith an external mani
festation of clemency, imposed conditions in the way of
test oaths, political disabilities, ahen governors, universal
negro suffrage, and executive interference Arith elections,
which have left a permanent stain upon the political in
stitutions and the political integrity ofthe Avhole country.
By the conditions under which the military leaders of
the South had surrendered, the whole population actuaUy
in arms against the United States were protected against
any civil prosecution, and it would have been so manifest
a violation of those conditions to proceed against any of
them by indictment for ' treason,' that the extreme men
in the North were forced to abandon that purpose.
Reasonable men also perceived that it would not be
either rational or just to prosecute mere civihans for
alleged offences Avhich had already been condoned in
respect to the military forces of the Confederacy. It is
Avell knoAvn that, scA'cral prominent leaders of the Re-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 415
publican party Avere desirous to act Avith extreme rigour,
and were disposed to treat the vanquished Southerners
Arith all the penalties commonl}- inflicted upon traitors
and rebels, but their hot tempers and harsh counsels
were not suffered to prevail, and they Avere forced to
exhaust their malice in A-ituperative speeches, AAdiich I
refi-ain firam quoting, having- no Avish to revive animosity
on the one side, or to proAoke a blush on the other.
The cIa-U as weU as the military and naA'al represen
tatives of the Confederate States abroad Avere excluded
fi-om ' pardon,' under the so-called Amnesty Proclama
tions, which were issued immediately after the Avar, and
none of them could have returned to the United States
Arithout the certainty of arrest, imprisonment, or, under
the most favourable cfrcumstances, the alternative of
taking what has not been inaptly called the ' iron-clad
oath.' The course to be foUowed by officers, Avhether
of the cIa-U or mihtary service of the Confederate States,
at home, was plain. As sensible men, they could
only submit to the requirements of the situation, and
look for consolation to the future, with its cheering
promises of recuperative energy, wealth, and freedom.
The representatives of the Confederate Government
abroad were in a different position. Their duties had
compelled them to enter into large business transactions
¦vrith persons in many branches of trade, who had always
acted Avith scrupulous fidelity in the fulfilment of their
engagements, and who had undertaken large contracts
for forward dehvery upon the personal guarantee of
those whom they knew were authorized to pledge the
credit of the Government.
I suppose it is hardly necessary to demonstrate that
contracts made by the representatives of the Confederate
Government were valid in law, and that there Avas tiie

416 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
same reciprocal obligation to fulfil them as existed
between the agents of the United States and the trades
people Avith whom they had contracted business engage
ments. It is sufficient to state that when the sudden
collapse of the Civil Government at Richmond was knovm
in Europe, the very best legal advice was sought, and
the opinion of eminent counsel was that the acts of all
Confederate agents duly appointed by the proper
authority at Richmond, and which had been done AAdth
in the limits of their prescribed power, would be recog
nised and confirmed by the English Courts ; and that
no Confederate agent, and no person who had dealt with
him, could be held to a responsibility greater either in
kind or degree towards the United States than that
Avhicli the Confederate States could haA-e exacted. The
foregoing opinion appeared to be in accordance AAdth
common-sense and common notions of equity, and it
Avas afterwards confirmed by the judgments of the
Courts, when the United States attempted to seize pro
perty alleged to have been acquired by the Confederate
Government, vrithout acknowledging and paying the
claims or liens of those AA'ho Avere in possession.
There were two fiscal agencies of the Confederate
States in Europe during- the CIa-U War. The commer
cial house of Eraser, Trenhohn and Co. were the
bankers, or, as they Avere officially called, the ' Deposi
tories,' of the Treasury. At a very early period of the
Avar, one or tAvo sums of money Avere remitted to
special purchasing agents for specific pm-poses, and
Avere at once expended for these purposes; but as soon as
Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co. receiA'ed their official
appointment, all remittances, whether in cash sterling
or produce, Avere made to them, and they Avere instructed
to place the funds to the credit of the several Depart-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 417
ments, and to pay the drafts of the purchasing agents
in Europe, as well as bills drawn by the heads of depart
ments in Richmond, or their representatives elsewhere.
3Iessrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co. opened a special set
of books for the record of their financial transactions
Arith the Confederate States, and those hooks contained
a complete register of all the funds the Treasury De
partment was able to place in Europe by export from
home. During the year 1862, General Colin J. McRae was
sent to Europe as a special agent of the Treasury, his
functions being to regulate the disbursement of the so-
called ' Erlanger Loan,' and to negotiate the sale of
Treasm-y Bonds. The heads of the several departments
sent drafts upon him to meet the wants of their pur
chasing agents, which he had to honour from the above-
mentioned sources, and Ms office was also to do all that
was possible to keep the bankers in funds.
After the fall of Fort Fisher, about the middle of
January, 18G5, intercourse Avith the Confederate States
was cut off through the sea-ports. There were, it is
true, one or two shoal bays on the coast of Texas into
which supphes might still have been sent, but then
there was but httle chance of the Trans-Mississippi
States holding out if the military power of the Con
federacy elsewhere was once destroyed ; and as the
strategic points on the banks of the Mississippi were hi
possession of the United States, and numerous gunboats
patrolled its waters from the mouth of the Ohio to New
Orleans, no quantity of supphes sufficient to justify the
cost and risk of transport could have been got across,
even if they could have been safely landed on the Texan
shore. The financial agents of the Confederate States
saw that remittances must cease after the capture of
VOL. II. ^6

418 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Fort Fisher, which closed the last port from wMch ship
ments could be made, and they warned those who were
charged with the duties of purchasing and forwarding
to contract their operations, and to prepare for a final
settlement. Before the end of 1864 the net proceeds of the
' Erlanger Loan ' had been exhausted, and the supply
of funds from the sale of bonds, never very large, had
AvhoUy ceased after the fall of Fort Fisher, partly because
they could not probably have been sold except at a
nominal price, but chiefly because the fiscal agent, fore
seeing that the end was close at hand, felt restrained
from offering them. General 3IcRae was therefore re
duced to gi-eat financial straits, and was only able to
meet the most pressing and urgent wants by means of
the funds accruing from the forced sale of several ships,
and the transfer of those funds to the Treasury Depart
ment, which, under the circumstances, was an absolute
necessity. Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co., the bankers ofthe
Government, were in no better phght at the close of the
Avar than the special fiscal agent of the Treasury. They
had throughout the Avar used thefr OAvn commercial
credit without stint to sustain the Government, and
were nearly always under advances, at least to the 3Var
Department. During the last three or four months of
the struggle, the Richmond authorities sent several
agents to the Bahamas, Cuba, and Texas, vrith urgent
instructions to hurry in supplies, and drafts from those
agents came upon the bankers at LiA-erpool at the last
moment, in many cases Arithout advice, and when they
Avere well-nigh overwhelmed by the requirements of the
local agents.
At the time Avhen hostilities actually ceased and the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 419
authority of the United States over the whole country
was resumed, the Confederate finances in Europe Avere
in a condition of actual depletion. The only Depart
ment wMch had a balance hi the hands of the bankers
was that of the naA-y ; but that balance was not sufficient
to make good the deficits in other accounts. Messrs.
Eraser, Trenholm and Co., acting AAdth their accustomed
liberahty and pubhc spirit, informed me that they Avould
pay any habUities of the XaA-y Department for Avhich I
had giA-en a personal pledge, but they thought that I
should make the best practicable arrangements with con
tractors, so as to leave as much as possible for transfer
to the general account. The justice as well as the
hberahty of this proposition was so apparent that I cheer-
fuUy accepted it, and the final statement of account
exhibited a considerable amount still to the credit of the
NaA-y Department, wMch helped to reduce the general
balance against the defunct Government.
In those painful settlements I happUy experienced the
advantage as weU as the satisfaction which results from
dealing exclusiA-ely Avith persons of the first respecta-
bUity, because I had no difficulty in effecting arrange
ments Avith those who Avere stUl under contract with
the Navy Department through me which they were
good enough to say were satisfactory. In several im
portant cases it was not possible to pay in full, but such
settlements were made as, by leaving the property in
possession of the contractors, apparently secured them
from ultimate loss, although they might have difficulty
and delay in realizing, as the goods, fi-om their nature,
would be difficult of sale in ordinary times of peace.
The arrangements for the War Department were not
so satisfactory, because the operations had not only been
on a larger scale, but it had also been necessary to
56—2

420 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
employ a great many agents, who Avere stationed at
distant points, and could not therefore keep the bankers
and the general fiscal agent of the Treasury regularly
and accurately informed of their prospective wants.
It is generally known that the United States took
possession of all the property of the Confederate GoA'ern
ment which could be identified, and AvMch Avas witMn
the Southern States at the close of the war. The
authorities at Washington did not permit any perplexing
questions of private claims, by reason of loans to the
Confederate Government or other liens based upon deal
ings Arith a Confederate agent, to deter them from seizing
and appropriating cotton or military stores, or any other
property in Avhich it was possible to trace a Confederate
titie. Mr. Seward was not content to base the claims of the
United States upon the plea that they had succeeded by
right of conquest to the title of the Confederate Govern
ment, but he took the position that Mr. Davis and his
Cabinet having been ' merely the representatiA-es of a
domestic faction,' ncA-er did have the status of a de facto
Government, and therefore all transactions with them
were illegal, null and void. In the Southern States,
and in regard to the claims of persons to property Arithhi
the conquered territory, and therefore withhi the power
of the Federal Government, it was possible to enforce
the foregoing pretensions, but Mr. Seward soon at
tempted to apply the same principle hi Europe. The
Consuls appear to have been instructed to bring suits
against the fiscal agents of the Confederate GoA-emment
and to attach all property aa-IucIi they had reason to
believe belonged to that GoA'-ernment. A direct straight-
forAvard courteous inquiry from the United States
Minister, or from any other representative whom Mr.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 421
Seward had chosen to appoint for the purpose, formally
and officially addi-essed to either of the fiscal agents, or
to either of the cMef practical agents of the Confederate
Government, Avould have been met by a prompt and
equally straightforward reply, and all questions of right
and title to property could have been satisfactorily settled
Arithout unnecessary loss to individuals, and Avithout
sacrifice of dignity on the part of the United States.
3Vithin about three months after the surrender of
General Lee, a case iuA-olving the title to some alleged
Confederate property was brought before the late Vice-
Chancellor Sir 3Y. Page Wood (afterwards Lord
Hatherley). That learned and most conscientious judge
laid doAvn the rule, that ' whenever a Government de
facto has obtained possession of property, as a Govern
ment, and for the purposes of the GoA^ernment de facto,
the GoA-ernment Avhich displaces it succeeds to all the
rights of the former GoA'ernment and to the property
they have so acquired.' The 3d ce- Chancellor then pro
ceeded to say, in effect, that the Confederate States had
been a de facto Government, that British subjects had
the right to deal Avith that Government while it existed,
and that the United States could have no greater or
more exclusive interest in the property than the Govern
ment which they had displaced originally possessed, and
he gave judgment accordingly.
The foregoing principle being thus authoritatively
enunciated and settled, I avUI undertake to say that all
of the official representatives of the late Confederate
Government in Europe would have accepted it, and
would have loyally assisted any reputable and duly
authorized agent of the United States in winding up
affairs so as to secure to that Government their just
rig-hts. But it did not suit 3Ir. Seward's purpose to

422 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
proceed in accordance with 3^ice-Chancellor Wood's
interpretation of the laAv. He manifestly wished not
only to get possession of the Confederate property, but
to punish those who had dealt with the ' insurgents.'
Persons whom no one knew anything about were sent
to England to spy out the land, and to discover if there
Avas any Confederate property within reach. Arrange
ments were made with those persons that they AA-ere to
receive a portion of the property Avhich might be re-
coA'cred through their efforts.* The persons referred to
were soon in consultation Avith the Liverpool Consul,
and it Avas generally known that they Avere travelling
about the country and making inquisitorial inqufries
into the alleged transactions of A-arious tradespeople
Avith the late Confederate agents.
It AriU, I thhik, be admitted that these were not
dignified proceedings, and it is at least doubtful whether
any respectable Government ever before attempted to
settle important matters by such means. 3Ir. Seward
could hardly have supposed that any Confederate agent
AA-ho had due regard for his oaa'u personal honour, or Avho
retained any loyal feeling of obligation to those who had
come into business relations Avith Mm, Avould either
approach or permit himself to be approached by those
' commission agents.' I Avish to cast no reflection upon
them personally, but their office Avas one that would
not have tempted a representative of the Confederate
Government to join in their explorations.
It is worthy of mention that the plan of gettmg
possession of Confederate property through such means
did not result in much pecuniary profit. By a retm-n
published in the Congressional Document referred to
* See ' Executive Document, No. 304, House of Representatives,
40th Congress, 2nd Session.'

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 423
above, it appears that the gross proceeds ofthe propert}-
thus obtained in England during the years 1866-67
amounted to 8144,157.15 — the greater portion of
which accrued from the sale of tiie Shenandoah, AA'hich
realized 8108,632.18 — against AA'Mch are charged dis
bursements to the amount of 890,308.76. Some of
the items in the disbm-seinents are interesting- as Avell
as curious. One person receiA-ed in fees as counsel
$10,000, another styled ' special counsel ' is credited
irith 81 7,339 and a third, mentioned as 'special agent,'
got 811,963. One ofthe items is sufficiently important
to be quoted in full. It runs thus : — ' 1867, August 5th,
paid Barings, for adA-ances, £6,600 (including 150,000
fi-ancs deposited by the United States as security for
costs in suit against Arman, in France) =$45,265.04.'
The suit against 31. Arman has been mentioned in a
previous chapter. He would haA-e been glad to effect a
compromise Avith the United States to avoid the trouble
and expense of a law-suit, but the representatives of
that Government were instructed to proceed against him
upon the principle that the Confederate States had no
legal right to the money paid to him, and therefore
could give Mm no title, and they appear to have sought
to recover the whole amount it was supposed that he had
received on account of the Confederate ships. The
French Court gave judgment in favour of M. Arman,
and the Umted States were subjected to the additional
mortification of having to get an advance of 150,000
francs from 3Iessrs. Baring to deposit as security for M.
Arman's costs, a requirement very unusual, if not
unprecedented, in respect to a Sovereign State.
Yery shortly after the close of the war, the United
States Consuls in England began, in compliance with
their instructions, to harass persons supposed to have

424 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Confederate property in possession by attachments, etc. ;
and they instituted a suit against General McRae, the
general fiscal agent of the Treasury, the object being to
draw from him a statement of account and payment of
any balance in hand. The position assumed by the United
States in the above process, and the answer of General
McRae, Avere such that the Court dismissed the suit, and
no further proceedings were taken against him. A
corresponding suit was instituted against Messrs. Fraser,
Trenholm and Co., and was continued for several years.
While these various proceedings were in progress, an
arrangement was come to between 3Ir. F. H. 3Iorse, the
United States Consul in London, and Messrs. Eraser,
Trenholm and Co., AA'hich it was hoped would result
in a full exposition of the financial condition of the Con
federate States at the close of the war, and Avould also
enable the United States to obtain possession of the pro
ceeds of all property of the Confederacy in excess of the
legitimate liens against said property. By the terms of
that agreem_ent, Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co. were
to submit the whole of their books and accounts with
the Confederate Government to official inspection, and
they AA-ere to give a statement of all property of that
Government which was then in their possession, or
which might at any time thereafter come into their
hands. The property was to be sold to the best ad
vantage, the United States giving full titles ; and the
proceeds were to be appropriated, first in payment of the
claim of Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co. for OA-er-
advances to the Confederate States, wMch it Avas agreed
should be fixed at £150,000, although they alleged it to
be much more ; and all in excess of that amount was to
be paid over to the United States. 3lr. 3Iorse produced
official letters from 3Ir. ScAvard and from the Secretary

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 425
of the United States Treasury, Avhich the solicitors of
3Iessrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co. thought contained
full authority to him to make the arrangement; and
there can be no doubt that if it had been carried out,
there Avould haA-e been a foir, open, and perfectly trust
worthy settlement of affiiirs, and the United States
would not only have obtained an account of the Con
federate property remaining abroad at the close ofthe Avar,
but they would haA-e received the net proceeds Arithout
vexing so many persons with costly legal proceedings,
and placing themselves often in undignified positions
before the Courts of England and France.
As a part of the agi-eement with Mr. Morse, Messrs.
Fraser, Trenholm and Co. undertook to lay the pro
posed arrangement before the practical agents of the
several Departments of the Confederate Government,
and to represent to them the propriety of assisting in
bringing about a satisfactory settlement. When the
scheme was mentioned to me, I consented to render
every possible assistance ; and I believe all the principal
agents of the Confederate GoA-ernment would have acted
in the same spirit. No one had any other wish or pur
pose than to protect those who had fair and legitimate
hens upon the property ; and if the United States had
been AviUing to acknowledge those liens, a large quantity
of goods and materials could have been collected, which,
if openly sold without doubt as to title, would have
reahzed, together Avith the proceeds of the steamers
buUt or building under the 3lcRae contract, a sum
sufficient to have left a much larger balance to go into
the United States Treasury than found its Avay there
through the means actually adopted.
Before the arrangements between Mr. Morse and
3Iessrs, Fraser, Trenholm and Co. could be got into

426 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
working condition, 3Ir. ScAvard telegraphed 3Ir. Adams,
the United States Minister in London, ' to disavow and
reject ' it in toto. It appears from a lengthy document
issued for the information ofthe House of Representatives
in Washington,'^^ that there Avas some jealousy between
certain Consuls and other agents of the United States
abroad, and such representations were made to Mr.
Seward in respect to Mr. 3Iorse's arrangement that he
determined to annul it, and as I do not Arish to take
any part in a family quarrel, I refrain from any
comments, further than to say that Messrs. Fraser,
Trenholm and Co. could not possibly have concealed
any of their dealings with the Confederate Government,
even if they desired to do so, because the United States
had already obtained an order from the Court of Chancery
for an examination of their books by an official accountant,
and a close and thorough inspection was made of all
their transactions and accounts with the Confederacy
during the entire period of the war, under the super
vision and direction of the Solicitors of the United
States ; and thus Mr. Seward knew, or could haA-e
known, every penny of pubhc funds that came into thefr
hands as the bankers of the Confederate Government,
and could haA'e known to Avhose order, or on whose
behalf, it had been paid out. The United States Govern
ment must, then, have been perfectly well aware that the
finances of the Confederate GoA-ernment abroad were
exhausted at the close of the Avar, and their further nro-
ceedings against the bankers of the defunct Confederacy
can hardly be attributed to any other motiA-e than one
of revenge.
After repudiating the 3Iorse arrangement 3Ir. ScAvard
* See ' Executive Document, No. 63, House of RepresentatiA'es,
39th Congress, 2nd Session.'

COXFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 427
dfrected the LiA-erpool Consul to prosecute the suits
against 3Iessrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co., and that
unhappy firm Avas pursued Avith relentless zeal, and Avas
so persistently involved by their persecutors in Chan
cery and other proceedings, that it Avas hardly possible
for the partners to giA-e due attention to their private
business, and finally their financial credit Avas affected,
and they were reduced to commercial ruin.
I feel that I can speak impartially of those matters,
because no United States official CA-er gaA-e me the least
personal ti-ouble or annoyance after the war, and except
for mA' voluntarA- offer to assist in bring-ins;- the ' 31orse
arrangement ' to an equitable settlement, I should never
haA-e come in contact AAdth any one of them at that time.
In consequence of my consent to assist in the above
settlement, 3Ir. Consul 3Iorse called on me in London,
and said that Ms only Avish was to effect an equitable
arrangement wMch would secure the rights of his
Government Avithout detriment to just private claims,
and Arithout the irritation and expense necessarily
caused by htigation ; and there can be no reason to
doubt that 3Ir. 3Iorse was both sincere and disinterested
in his efforts, because by the arrangement with Messrs.
Fraser, Trenholm and Co. he was sacrificing the im
portance as weU as the profits AvMch would have been
attached to Ms office as a prosecuting agent of those
national claims.
The foreign policy of the United States during the
war was conducted in a spirit Avhich brought some dis
credit upon American institutions, and the country was
not placed in a worthy position before foreign courts of
law by their representatives after the Avar. These con
victions have been forced upon me by the necessary
perusal of a large portion of the diplomatic correspond-

428 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
ence and the reports of the legal proceedings which the
United States initiated in England and France.
In composing the difficulties at home, after the
cessation of hostilities, the ruling poAvers seemed equally
regardless of ultimate consequences, or the effect of
their action upon the national character. The evil con
sequences of the war are mainly due to the ill-advised
measures of reconstruction adopted by the politicians at
Washington, because the Southern people, properly
so called, had no voice in the matter at all. The union
between the several States of the South was not com
plete, and the various Administrative Departments of
the new Confederacy were not yet fully organized, when
hostilities began, and such preparations for the great
struggle as it Avas possible to make were effected under
the pressure of daily increasing demands, with which it
was never possible to keep pace. Hence the Confederate
Government was ever enduring an extreme tension, and
the fortitude, patience, and endurance of the Southern
people were put to a test from which there was no relief,
but, on the contrary, a ceaseless and CA'cr increasing
strain. Weeks, often months, were reqiured to collect
materials for a single battle ; and whether the issue of
each succeeding struggle Avas victory or defeat, the
exhaustion of supplies was equally thorough. Thus it
was nearly always impossible for the Confederate armies
to foUoAv up a victory ; and Avhen they met Avith a serious
check or repulse, the disaster Avas only short of being a
crushing and perhaps irretrievable catastrophe from
Avant of energy in the Adctor, or his ignorance of the
actual destitution of the vanquished. T'he poverty
of the South in respect to military resources, the great
extent ofthe country (poorly proAdded with roads), the
scattered population, and the difficulty of transport — aU

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 429
combined, not oiih- to make the labour of collecting- antl
maintaining troops in the field very arduous, but ap
peared from the beghming to render final success aa'cU-
nigh hopeless in the minds of those Avliose judgment was
superior to their enthusiasm.
All who have studied the tacts impartially avUI pro
bably admit that the successful resistance of the South
for four yeai-s was a surprising eftbrt, never excelled, if
it has been equalled, in any gTeat historic struggle of
which we haA-e a trustAvorthy record.
Experiments haA'e demonstrated that rigid objects
subjected to a breaking- strain generally give way at last
vrith a repulsive energy commensurate with the tenacity
of their resistance, and either fly into fragments, or leap
asunder Arith a Adcious sweep that makes the near
neighbourhood dangerous. At any rate, the final
rupture is always complete, thorough, and irremediable.
It was so when General Lee's grasp upon the defences
of Richmond was tom adrift. The wrench vibrated to
the A-ery heart of the Confederacy, and the Avhole fabric
feU at once into chaos.
The most lamentable CAcnt AvMch could have happened
for the South, and indeed for the whole country, did
unhappUy oceur in the assassination of President
Lincoln almost immediately after the cessation of active
hostilities. 31r. Lincoln had all the prestige of success
to strengthen Ms position, and he had also the entire
confidence of the great mass of the Northern people.
He was naturally of a kindly disposition, and had on
many occasions openly and frankly declared that all he
wanted was to ' restore the Union.' Even during the
heat and passion of the war he had expressed many
generous hopes for the final restoration of brotherly
feehng between the dissevered sections of the country,

430 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
and his first utterances after receiving the news of
General Lee's surrender appear to indicate that he re
joiced rather that a fratricidal strife was ended than
that an enemy had been beaten. Looking, then, to Ms
temperament ; to the genuine, even though somewhat
grotesque, bonhomie of his character; the prestige of
his position, and his personal popularity, it is well-nigh
certain that if he had been spared, the so-called ' recon
struction ' of the Southern States would have been
effected in far less time, and AAdth few, if any, of the evil
consequences which now unhappUy remain as memen
toes of that unquiet period.
Upon the death of Mr. Lincoln, the Yice-President,
Mr. Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, succeeded to the
higher office ; but he brought to the management of
affairs neither Mr. Lincoln's quahties nor Ms influence.
The new President was a Southern man who had taken
the side of the Federal Government against his own
State, and he appeared at first desirous to manifest a
persecutmg zeal against the Southern people equal to
the bitterest Party leaders at the North. His earher
proclamations and personal speeches exhibited a pm-pose
to act with great rigour — indeed, some of his expressions
can hardly be described as less than sanguinary. After
wards he relented, and seemed A-ery desfrous to amehorate
the harsh and ruinous measures that Congress was forcing
upon the South ; but the extreme men had then got com
plete control. The majority of the Northern people had
gone back to their private business and to their pleasures,
and the chief politicians of the dominant Party were
masters of the situation.
The President had lost the popularity which his
' loyalty ' during the Avar had Avon for him at the Nortii.
He Avas very naturally distrusted at the South, and the

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 431
Republican members of Congress who controlled the
Government treated him Avith a degree of contempt
which at last found visible and startling expression in a
serious but futile effort to remove him from office by im-
peacliment. It Avas soon manifest that 3Ir. Johnson
could do nothing to modify the scheme of ' reconstruc
tion ' proposed by the leading Republican senators, Avho
Avere supported by a large majority in the House of
Representatives. His subsequent zeal hi opposing the
wUl of Congress was almost as unfortunate for the South
as Ms earher purposes promised to be threatening and
disastious, because it stimulated his opponents to act
Arith increased energy and rigour, in order to gratify
thefr Ul-AvUl to him.
It can harcUy now l^e doubted that if the best men at
the South, whose personal honour Avas unimpeachable,
and whose influence with the white people, and Avitli the
impressionable and docUe negroes, was paramount, had
been invited to take the lead in the pacification of the
country and the rearrangement of the State Govern
ments, there would have been far less confusion, less
pecuniary loss, and fewer bitter memories. Mr. Alex
ander H. Stephens was, from personal qualities and public
services, the foremost man in Georgia. He was originally
opposed to the secession of the Southern States,* a fact
well knoAvn at the North ; but when the Convention,
elected by the people of Georgia to determine the action
of that State passed the ' Ordinance of Secession,' he
yielded Ms vrill to that of the majority, and became Yice-
President of the Confederate States.
Can anyone doubt that if the people of Georgia had
been permitted to elect 3Ir. Stephens to the office of
* He thought secession inexpedient, but did not deny the right
of the Southern States to secede.

432 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
Governor, or if the United States had appointed Mm to
that office proAdsionally, at the close of the AA'ar, the
pacification and the ' reconstruction ' of that important
State would have been effected AA'ithout violence or local
resistance ? Is it not absolutely certain that the people
of Yirginia would haA^e AA'clcomed General Lee Arith
enthusiasm as their Governor ? and will anyone now
venture to affirm that either of those men (General Lee
or Mr. Stephens) would have failed to use their influence
and their power in complete harmony with the purpose to
restore, not only the political, but the fi-aternal union of
the States ? The history of thefr lives before and after
the Civil War, the services of both to the whole Umon
in former times, and the eulogies pronounced upon
Mr. Stephens in the United States Congress on the
occasion of his death (within the current year, 1883),
furmsh a sufficient answer.*
But what are the facts in regard to the ' reconstruction
of the South ?' Mr. Alexander H. Stephens was ar
rested and taken aAA-ay from his home under some vague
charge of treason, and General Lee was saved fi-om a
like indignity only because the terms of his mUitary sur
render afforded a clear and exphcit protection against
civil prosecution. The leaders — and, indeed, all the
prominent men in the South — were disfrancMsed and
disqualified from holding any public office. The external
forms of public elections were permitted, but they were
carefully guarded and regulated by the Federal authori
ties. The management of the elections and of affairs
generally Avas given over to needy adventurers from
Northern States, Avho entered into association with the
* Distinguished men from other Southern States might be men
tioned who would ha^e acted in harmony with Mr. Stephens and
General Lee.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 433
'residuum' of the local white population; and they
contrived, with the support of the Party politicians at
Washington, to thrust the freedmen into a position for
AA'hich they were not in the least degree fitted, and which
produced an antagonism of races, the unhappy effects of
which AAdll be felt for man}- a day to come. White
men Arith neither property nor experience, aliens Avho
had no local interests and no local ties, and negroes
who could neither ' read, write, nor cipher,' were elected
to the State Legislatures, and were entrusted with the
dehcate and important office of readjusting the shattered
foundations of society, and the bankrupt finances of great
commonwealths. The result was to impose the burden of intolerable
taxation upon thousands who held all the property
wMch the raA^ages of the war had spared, but who had
had no A-oice in the election of their so-called representa
tives, and the manufacture of State Bonds whose pro
ceeds were in great part squandered ; and a further
and more unhappy effect was that of creating a sting
ing sense of injustice, and a consciousness of improper
administration, AA'Mch at first aroused feelings of
dismay and aA-ersion, and has at last taken in some
States the practical but lamentable form of ' repudia
tion.' Confessions made by leading politicians at the North
have estabhshed the fact that the ' reconstruction ' policy
of the ruhng faction was based upon the expectation
of securing the votes of the Southern States to the
Repubhcan Party, and thus to insure a continued lease
of power. But the very same men have acknowledged
that the result has not been satisfactory. The intolerable
nuisance and shame of ' carpet-bag ' governors and igno
rant, thriftless legislators drove the unquiet spirits of
VOL. II. ^^

434 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
the South into a condition of ' veiled rebellion,' which
the more orderly, Avho longed for repose, and perceived
its necessity, could not prevent. As the political dis
abilities of the whites Avere removed, or the disquahfying
Acts Avere permitted to lapse, the superior race assumed
its natural ascendency, and the pliant blacks were taken
like sheep to the polls, and voted against the very Party
Avho claimed their gratitude for giving them their freedom
and the protection of the francMse.
We have the highest possible authority for believing
that afflictions are ultimately beneficial to those who are
duly ' exercised thereby.' Surely the American States,
from the great lakes of the North to the Gulf of Mexico,
and from the tide-waters of the Atlantic to the golden
gates of San Francisco, were scourged and chastened by
that terrible Civil War. But what has been the effect
upon the political institutions of the country ? The
populous commercial cities of the North are held in the
grasp of corrupt associations, and the representatives of
the people in Congress, the executive officers of the
several States, and the highest members of the national
Government, are spoken of Avith suspicion, if not vrith
contempt, by the very people who, by the theory of the
Constitution, have the right, and therefore the responsi
bility, of choosing their oaa-ii rulers.
At the South the condition of affairs is, if possible,
even worse. The necessities of the ' reconstruction '
period have produced a large class of professional Party
whips and ' manipulators,' in Avhose hands the docile
negro, vain of his franchise, as children with a new toy, is
nothing more than clay to the potter. Flattered, cajoled,
sometimes threatened, he for the present helps to swell
the great Democratic majorities in the Southern States ;
but to-morroAV, or the day after, he may be sent flymg

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 435
like a shuttlecock to the other existing Party. To-day
he votes taxes by thousands of dollars to meet tiie
interest on State Bonds, and to-morroAV, under a
change of influences, he votes for repudiation, but
is knoAvn in the ncAv political phraseolog}- of the
period by the euphemistic title of a ' readjuster.'
Can anyone acquainted A\dth the history of 3^irginia,
that grand old CommouAvealth, ' the mother of Presi
dents,' the birthplace of 3Vashington, Patrick Hem-y,
Jefferson. 3Iadison, the Lees, and other founders of
the great Repubhc. beheve that the present pohcy of
' readjusting ' the State debt is the true popular Avill ?
Does anyone doubt that the present condition of affairs
in 3'frginia is the resiUt of an arrangement between
the leaders of the ruling Party at Washington and
the men — some ambitious and some unscrupulous — •
who have been bred since the war, and who have sold,
not thefr OAvn birthright, but that of their State, for
Federal office, or Federal favour of some sort ?
The pohticians whom the people of the North were
content to trust with the important duty of reuniting
the dissevered States do not appear to have looked very
far into the future. The more violent spoke and acted
¦with bitterness and precipitancy, and they carried their
measures for the reconstiuction of the vanquished States
by appeals to the prejudices of the moderate men of their
party, and by exciting the fear of open resistance, or
perhaps even a renewal of the Avar by the Southern
people. They deliberately set on foot a system of
managing the elections throughout the South by the
direct interference of the central power at Washington,
and with the purpose to maintain a particular party in
office, they bargained Avith the least reputable and most
io-norant of the Southern population, and have thus
57-2

436 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE
extended and confirmed over the whole country a
system of interference in the management of elections,
and of trade and barter in respect to the public offices,
which had indeed begun to prevail even before the CivU
War in the large cities, but whose baneful effects had not
yet depraved the rural districts and the least populous
States. It is a remarkable fact that the political leaders who
directed and controlled the executive and legislative
powers bf the United States at the end of the Civil
War wholly neglected to define the rights and priAd
leges of the individual States by a specific declaration.
The pretence that the war upon the South was fought
in the interest of the negro, or to effect Ms freedom,
will hardly now be affirmed by any one who is ac
quainted with the Mstory of its origin. The object of
the Federal Government, and of the States which sup
ported it, was to prevent the dissolution of the Union,
and the principle involved was that no State should
retire or secede from the National League without the
consent of the others.
It is admitted, even by the majority of those who
Avere most strongly opposed to the doctrine of State
Rights, that the Constitution Avas at least A'ague on
that point. It remains in the same condition now. So
great was the desire of the politicians to reconstruct the
Union in a manner which should serve thefr party
purposes, that they either forgot or AA-ere heedless of the
real end for which so much blood and treasure had been
expended, and although they introduced ' amendments '
in the Constitution to clearly define and secure the
designs which Avere then uppermost in their nihids, they
left the relations of the States toAvards each other, and
towards the general Government, in the precise condi-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 437
tion Avliich those questions occupied on the morning
when the echoes of Beauregard's guns at Charleston
aroused the Avhole counti-y, and involved the rival
sections in a fratricidal strug-g-le.
It was manifestly impossible for a iicav country like
the L^mted States to Avait for the gradual growth of a
Constitution like that of Great Britain. When the
American colonies achicA'cd their independence, and
formed a umon or federation for purposes of mutual
protection and mutual profit, it Avas no doubt necessary
to draw up a formal agreement to define the conditions
of the Union, and the powers of the central or general
authority. The result of the CiAdl 3Var has been to
prove that in a gi-eat democratic confederation, the
interpretation of the written document which prescribes
the relative rights and duties of the several parties rests
practicaUy Avith the majority, and the minority have no
right of appeal, and no tribunal to which they can
appeal. So long as political parties are distributed with
a near approach to equal proportions in the different
States, such Constitutional documents answer well
enough, but when questions arise which affect the
States differently, and a large group is disposed to
foUow one pohcy, and the smaller and weaker group
is impelled to a different course, then the meaning of the
compact, or constitution, or Articles of Confederation,
or whatever the document may be called, will be deter
mined by that combination of States which compose the
majority. The pohtical corruption wMch has become so lament
ably apparent since the war, and the obscurity which
exists in the national Constitution on some important
p)oints, are doubtless subjects of serious and earnest
thought to all Americans Avhose patriotism rises above

438 SECRET SERVICE OF TEE CONFEDERATE STATES.
party, and who think the United States have, a higher
and more important mission than to populate a con
tinent, to grow big crops of corn and cotton, and to
accumulate great wealth.
The injuries inflicted upon each other by the North
and the South during the heat and passion, of the
struggle were deep, but many of the most violent spfrits
have already disappeared, and thefr bitter memories
are happily buried with them. Those Avho remain of
the generation Avho took part in the war are co'nscious
of a yearly increase of brotherly feeling, and perceive
with satisfaction a growing tendency in both sections of
the Union towards a mutual reconciliation. If the
young men who have sprung into manhood since the
Presidential Election of 1860 AriU heartily unite in efforts
to restore the pristine purity of the Government, and
the primitive simplicity- of its Republican form, the
restored Unioii may have a more glorious future than
could have been attained by that which Avas dissoh'ed
in 1861, and the joy and pride of belongmg to it wiU
render the right of secession a question of no import
ance.

THE END.

BILLING AND SONS, PRINTERS, GUILDFORD .\ND LONDON".

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