ENGLAND'S
ARCH-ENEMY

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1915

ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY

ENGLAND'S
ARCH - ENEMY

A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS FORMING AN
INDICTMENT OF GERMAN POLICY DURING
THE LAST SIXTEEN YEARS

BY
DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER
AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF BELGIUM," ETC.

"That State inclines to its fall which treats Home Politics as of greater
importance than Foreign Policy." — Emile Banning (Belgian Philosopher)

PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR
AT 12, BLOOMSBURY SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.
1914

CONTENTS
PAGE
british distrust of germany i
Germany's one and only aim 16
the german plan of campaign against france 26
england and little states 37
a possible addition to the dual alliance 50
germany and belgium 64
the franco-german frontier 74
the entente between holland and belgium 90
the menace of elsenborn i03
the peace of europe 117
Germany's plan of attack 129
the neutrality of belgium 137
an object-lesson in german plans 1 49
germany and holland 1 58
flushing and the scheldt 164
peace of europe (2) 174
the knell of the triple alliance 1 86
an alliance with france 1 98
the new spirit in belgium 210
a further object-lesson in german plans 223
german designs on the congo 235
antwerp and the scheldt 249
a german encroachment on the lower ems 259
INDEX 263

FOREWORD

IN two articles published in the Contemporary Review in
the year 1898, I denounced the German Emperor as "our
arch-opponent " and " the arch-enemy of England." In a
long succession of articles published in several other
Reviews and magazines from that period down to the
present day, I have done my best in exposing each German
move on the political chessboard, and in calling attention
to the fact that Germany's one aim throughout was to oust
England from her command of the sea and thus dispossess
her of some of her colonies and dependencies.
I do not think that any other public writer has tracked
for so many years or with the same persistency the develop
ment of German policy, and the task was not easy and
met with slight encouragement. The most friendly and
considerate editor looked askance at what he termed the
alarmist article, and many of these essays had adventures
and wanderings before they found their haven in the
accepted list for publication. But the most obstinate and
deep-rooted prejudice I encountered was the general
and widespread belief, diligently promoted by the most
influential Germans resident among us, in the personal
friendship of the Emperor William and in his pacific
disposition. From many highly placed persons the
following criticism often reached me : — " We daresay you
may be right about the drift of German policy, but you
are quite wrong about the German Emperor, as he is our
friend and has no thought of war with us. We know this
on the best authority." These authorities were generally
the Cabinet Ministers, who trusted blindly to the pacific
assurances of the potential enemy, and who never gave a
thought to providing for the safety of their country. They
can never hope to be regarded by posterity as anything

viii FOREWORD
else than mere party men, actuated not by patriotism, but
by love of office.
As I am not reproducing the two Contemporary articles,
which related more especially to the Far Eastern question,
I quote here the passages from them dealing with the
Emperor personally, from which the title of this volume
is taken. I. "The Problem in the Far East" {Contemporary
Review for February, 1898):
" The action of Germany at Kiaochao has at least the one advantage
that it has compelled the British Government and the British public to
concentrate their attention on the problem in the Far East. When we
have to thank him least of all men, some recognition for providing that
timely and salutary impulse is due to the Emperor William, our arch-
opponent on the Continent, where he is credited, perhaps not figura
tively, with concluding all his political correspondence in the words of
Cato : " Hunc addio, Carthaginem esse delendam. . ." The Emperor
William must be judged by the acts he sanctions and not by the sooth
ing expressions with which he would lull us into a sense of security
or apathy. They may pass current in family circles, but they can
be allowed no weight in the Councils of State. The violence of the
speech at Kiel, when Germany was told to strike with her mailed fist
decrepit China, had to be toned down by Prince Henry's visit to
Osborne and by his frantic attempt, during that mysterious journey
to London, to deliver a personal message to the Prince of Wales, which
the latter's tact appears to have baffled. . . . When the Prince of
Wales is pursued even to his private box in a theatre (it was the Duke
of York's) so that he may have to listen to the Imperial explanation
that braggadocio at Kiel does not signify a Belshazzar's warning for
England, it is high time for the German ruler to take a lesson in
manners as well as in the arcana of Far Eastern politics."
2. " The Arch-Enemy of England " {Contemporary
Review for December, 1 898) :
" But while he lapses now and again into utterances of emotional
tenderness towards the inhabitants of these islands, the settled purpose
of his life remains. This is to make Germany the leading commercial
and Colonial State of the world. ... In the realisation of the German
Emperor's designs England stood and stands in the way. Germany
can only become the leading commercial and colonial Power by her
downfall. The consummation of that catastrophe becomes therefore the
first and the essential condition for the success of the Emperor's policy.
. . . There is great, reason to fear that there is misconception as to
the real policy and objects of the German Emperor. The time has
not come for him to display the whole of his hand, and in the mean
time his representations are accepted and he is regarded as a possible
ally." The claim of these articles to be brought together and
preserved in a more durable form than that of the monthly

FOREWORD ix
periodical must be judged by the information they may
have contained of permanent value on serious political
and military matters, many of which are still of vital
importance. I have placed the three articles of the greatest topical
interest first, but with those exceptions I have followed
the chronological order of their publication. " The German
Plan of Campaign " has been almost realised to the letter.
As the Belgique Militaire said of it last August in its final
issue before the German occupation of Brussels, " Mr.
Boulger alone foretold exactly what the Germans intended
to do in Belgium."
I have in conclusion to express my gratitude to the
Editors of the various Reviews for a double obligation-
first for having published my writings, and secondly for
allowing me to republish them here.
DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER.

ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY

BRITISH DISTRUST OF GERMANY*
" By far the most dangerous foe to England in the future." —
The late Marquis oj Salisbury.
WHEN a certain number of sentimental persons, more or
less distinguished in inoffensive pursuits that keep them
aloof from the stern and implacable competitions and
rivalries of nations and empires, meet together for the
purpose of promoting friendship and good-will between
their own people and government and the people and
government of another country, the easier and more con
venient course would be to refrain from criticism of their
proceedings for the sake of their good intentions. Such,
no doubt, would have been the general attitude towards
the Anglo-German Conciliation Committee if the meeting
at the Caxton Hall on the ist of December had stood
alone. But it was followed by other demonstrations which seem
to show that an " organised ' ' effort is being made to create
a factitious friendship between England and Germany
which the organisers by their very efforts proclaim has no
real existence. The relations of England and Germany,
as Powers, are, in the German Emperor's words, " correct,"
but as men, as communities, they must be described as
strained. To remedy this state of things there has
suddenly and mysteriously come into prominence an
organisation specially founded, it would seem, not to help
a spontaneous and natural movement of the English and
German peoples towards friendship with each other, but
* The Nineteenth Century and After, January, 1906. 1

2 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
to force England to sue for the friendship of Germany !
The concluding words of the German Ambassador's
address in London are not obscure, however surprising,
and leave no room for doubt on this point. " Englishmen,
he said, " are to show in a manner that can be heard that
they wish to be the friends " of the Germans, and then if
we " continue to do that for a little while the bad feeling
between us and the Germans will speedily pass away."
We are not merely to sue but to go on suing — as if German
friendship were of greater value to us than English friend
ship would be for Germans — and then, perhaps, after an
unspecified interval the Germans will forgive us. For
what? For Kruger messages, for Imperial vapourings
about wielding the trident and being Admiral of the
Atlantic ? Count Metternich did not tell his audience.
The scene of the more noticeable of these demonstra
tions was a recently established Ladies' Club, and it must
be admitted that Count Metternich chose for his somewhat
unusual ambassadorial display a locale in which he might
rely with some confidence on manifestations of sympathy,
and, still more important for his purpose, on ignorance —
if this may be said without offence to the fair members of
the Club — of the prosaic facts on which our distrust of
German policy and our resentment at much that has been
said and done in Germany of late years have been built
up. Still, if ladies are to figure on the political platform
in connection with questions that, until the Amazons again
appear on earth, will have to be settled by men, it is more
agreeable and appropriate that they should do so in the
guise of Irene than in the panoply of Bellona.
The remarks of the German Ambassador at this demon
stration in our own capital are not, however, to be gauged
by themselves. They must be measured by the contempo
raneous important statements in the Emperor William's
speech at the opening of the Reichstag on the 28th of
November, and in the still more remarkable speech of the
German Chancellor, Prince Billow, in the same Assembly
eight days later. Those Imperial and semi-Imperial state
ments about German relations with a Power which is
nominally on terms of amity, and whose attitude is even
admitted to be " correct," are without precedent in the

BRITISH DISTRUST OF GERMANY 3
annals of international intercourse. The language of the
Emperor William and of Prince Bulow has never been
used in official utterances except on the eve of an open
rupture and a declaration of war. There is no mistaking
the threats addressed to us from Berlin, if we do not
follow the recommendations of the German Ambassador in
London. In order to fulfil these threats we may reasonably
anticipate that the German Government will have little or
no difficulty in getting its new, formidable, and menacing
Navy Bill passed by the Reichstag, for the true gravity of
the situation is caused by the views of a large, if not the
larger, part of the German nation being thoroughly in
sympathy with the aspirations of their ruler. As a matter
of fact, expressions of civility and just consideration for
England emanate from the mouth of Herr Bebel, the
Socialist leader, alone among Germany's public men.
The question of Anglo-German relations is indeed a
matter that calls for the most serious attention of all
Englishmen, because they should be prepared for every
contingency. We do not know what the real intentions of
the German Emperor are, and although he seems now and
then to desire peace he has been so long rattling his sword
in the scabbard that it might come out at any moment
without his intending it. An order for instantaneous
mobilisation lies on his table ever ready for signature. The
fatal stroke may be given in a fit of impatience or passion,
and volat irrevocable verbum.
The German Ambassador touched on some aspects of
the question of Anglo-German relations in his speech, but
he studiously avoided the real points. In this he was but
following the lead set him by his countryman Mr. Karl
Blind in the pages of this Review a month earlier. Mr.
Blind gave his readers a good deal of ancient history,
without perceiving that the very reasons which led England
to oppose Louis the Fourteenth and the great Napoleon
are those which to-day compel us to see in Germany, and
still more in the Emperor William, our arch-enemy. It
is an irrelevancy to say that " Englishmen and Germans
have never crossed swords " in the past, when every
German paper has for many years been regaling its readers
with assertions that England ought to be chastised, and

4 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
also that it would not be difficult to do it. Mr. Blind
claims to speak for his native land from which he was
exiled fifty-seven years ago, but the " inoffensive," "un
aggressive " and " friendly " Germany that he describes
is only a figment of his own imagination. It is certainly
not the Germany of to-day. A protest also must be made
against the reference to English public writers in both the
Ambassador's speech and Mr. Blind's article. If English
men feel called upon to speak strongly on the subject of
German policy it is only because they have satisfied them
selves, by close study of German official declarations and
by carefully watching German actions, that that policy is
hostile to their country, and constitutes its greatest, I might
even say its only, peril. We have not to explain what the
German Ambassador is pleased to call " our nasty remarks
about other countries " to any one but our own conscience,
or at any other bar save that of the public opinion of our
own country. It may seem to some of us, indeed, that His
Excellency's rebuke would have been better addressed to
the German publicists who have been predicting the down
fall of England for years past, or even to Mr. Blind
himself, whose assertion that the Prussians " would have
sealed the fate of those 40,000 English troops in a trice,"
if we had intervened on behalf of France in the autumn
of 1 870, is one of those characteristic German phrases that
always gain for the Germans the love of persons not born
in " the Fatherland." Has Mr. Blind's long residence
here led to his knowing us so little that he thinks the loss
of 40,000 men even " in a trice " would have deterred
Great Britain from prosecuting to a victorious conclusion
a work to which she had once set her hand ?
The German Ambassador, as I have said, did not touch
upon the real points that explain the variance between
Englishmen and Germans. He showed skill in avoiding
them, for he must know very well what they are. But if
he is really desirous of seeing a better understanding
between the two countries and peoples, he must take note
of the main points, ignore the trivial side issues, and
satisfy us of the error of the convictions slowly forced
upon us, but that are now every day taking firmer root
in the minds of all Englishmen.

BKiiibrl DISTRUST OF GERMANY 5
The sole original cause of the estrangement of England
from, let me say, as it will please the pedants, her historical
German ally, is the unnecessary, excessive, and menacing
growth of the German Navy. If Count Metternich is not
already aware of this truth, he can easily verify the state
ment for himself, and then, perhaps, he will feel able to
report to the Emperor that the true way of disarming
English suspicion and of removing our ill feeling is to
discontinue his ever-increasing outlay on a war fleet. If
the German Emperor takes this course, and as some proof
of his good-will he can at once withdraw the Navy Bill
now before the Reichstag, he will quickly ascertain what
is the basis of British distrust. He can thus achieve a
success, with regard to producing a change in our opinion
about Germany, that the presentation of his portrait to our
military clubs, or the despatch of congratulatory telegrams
to Conciliating Committees will never effect. If the
Emperor were to do this he would be acting with true
wisdom, and at least he would be able to say that he had
done something tangible to show that he had no design
of ousting England from her paramount position on the
sea. I have given the root cause of the suspicion, and even
apprehension, with which England has regarded German
policy and proceedings of recent years. There is no refer
ence to it in the Ambassador's speech. But the growth of
the German fleet cannot be separated from the declarations
of policy made to explain that growth. It is not as a play
thing that Prussia has been forming a great navy since
the opening of the dock at Wilhelmshaven in 1869. It is
not for mere amusement that in some years her programme
of battleship-building has been even larger than our own.
The German Emperor has himself told us what his object
was and is. In the first phase it was merely to found " a
greater Germany beyond the seas." That was at the
commencement of his reign, and might have been harmless.
Soon his ambition and views became larger. His next
assertions were to the effect that " Germany's future is on
the water," that " the trident must be in our hands," and
then came the vaunting declaration that " no decision can
now be taken in distant lands or beyond the ocean without

6 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
the participation and permission of Germany and the
German Emperor." Finally, there was the memorable and
extraordinary telegram to the Tsar at Reval from the
Emperor William styling himself " Admiral of the
Atlantic!" It is true that since that telegram to "the
Admiral of the Pacific," the Tsar has lost his fleet. It is
also true since the British fleet has been redistributed on a
different plan from formerly that the Emperor William
has been more reserved in the matter of boasting about
naval power. But for material consolation he has caused
to be presented to the Reichstag a Navy Bill more extensive
and more formidable than anything of the kind in the past.
The German apologists may say, and indeed have said,
What has the growth of the German Navy to do with
you, as it is a question for the German people alone ? This
argument is transparently silly, and will not impose on
anyone. The strength of the German Navy is quite as
vital a question for us as the strength and efficiency of the
French and Russian armies are for Germany. There is no
necessity to repeat the arguments that justify our desire
and our determination to maintain our naval superiority
over all possible enemies. As Tennyson wrote : —
" The fleet of England is her all-in-all
And in her fleet her Fate."
If a German ruler ever holds " the trident " or can be
described as " Admiral of the Atlantic," our fate is sealed.
We shall become a German colony, and did not Count
Metternich say at Hamburg, before leaving to take up his
present post, that England " was the first of Germany's
colonies " ? Mr. Blind says that the German Navy was
justified because Germany had to expect attacks on two
fronts, and he reminds his reader that on paper the Russian
fleet " was " numerically stronger than that of Germany.
One may call this a belated argument, for the Russian
fleet has practically ceased to exist, and some newer " catch
phrase " than " facing attack on two sides " will have to
be found to explain or justify the present Navy Bill with
its enormous increase of ships, and its addition of about
sixty millions sterling to the Navy estimates for the next
twelve years.

tfKllISH DISTRUST OF GERMANY 7
No one can follow the growth of the German Navy
during the last twenty years without arriving at the con
clusion that it does, and is meant to, menace this country.
There is fortunately no reason as yet to believe that the
German Navy has reached a point of equality with our
own — even German optimists did not expect that till the
year 191 2 — but its proximity to our shores, added to the
fact that its whole force can be, and is, held conveniently
ready for concentration in the North Sea at the first signal,
has already compelled us to readjust our whole defence-
system, and to recall much of our scattered naval force
to its base. In many points of naval efficiency, too, the
Germans had stolen a march upon us, and it is only within
the last few years that we have remedied our shortcomings
and again forged ahead. We owe it, for instance, to
German example that our naval experts were at last com
pelled to realise that battles on the sea are to be won by
gun fire, and not by coal capacity; and the theorists of
the Baltic had come to the conclusion that battles might
be fought and won at a distance of 7,000 yards, when our
school were still wedded to the old belief of coming to
close quarters, and quite ridiculed fire being effective at
more than half the named distance. Then again we must
remember that our alleged superior building power, on
which we were wont to lay so much stress, has not been
established. In 1 899 Lord Goschen, then at the Admiralty,
in a speech intended as a reply to the German Naval pro
gramme of that year, declared proudly that " we would
if necessary build two or even three ships to every one
built by Germany." Well, the threat was not fulfilled.
We have not done, and what is more we could not do,
what Lord Goschen asserted we would. The German fleet
has ever since progressed nearer and nearer to a level with
our own.
But the question of Germany's fleet cannot be considered
alone and by itself. The policy behind it must be taken
into account. It was strengthened in the early days of its
development for the express purpose of creating " a greater
Germany," or in other words of founding colonies. Well,
Germany has obtained colonies in East and West Africa,
among the Isles of the Pacific, and elsewhere. In obtaining

8 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
them she owed much to the good-will and the assistance
of England. She has forgotten that, but no matter. Are
Germans contented with the possession of these colonial
appendages ? Have they got any profit or other satisfac
tion out of them ? Ask any German, and he will tell you
with a wry face that they have cost and are costing many
millions, and that there appears to be no limit to the
growing deficit of the Colonial Budget. The episode of
the Herrero rebellion is a still more painful subject; it
seems to have cost Germany almost as much as our last
Afghan war, and a real stable peace, for all the local
officials say, is still unassured. Yet Prince Bulow the
other day laid down the principle that " Germany has a
material interest that those territories in the world which
are still free should not be further limited," and that she
has the right of placing what value she pleases on her
claims and interests where a microscopical examination
by impartial onlookers fails to discover the existence of
any German interests at all. Such was very much the case
in Morocco, and a repetition of the proceedings at Fez and
Tangiers seems to be imminent with regard to Abyssinia.
Notwithstanding this wish to restrict the action of other
States, there is a half admission in German colonial circles
that the colonising experiments in the regions mainly
acquired by Prince Bismarck have proved more or less
costly failures. But at the same time as the admission is
made new hopes have been created by the success of
German merchants resident in British colonies. There no
failure to make the best of colonial opportunities and to
wax prosperous has to be recorded. At Singapore, in
several Australian States, the German is to the fore. He
comes to the head in every branch of trade and he ousts
the long-established Englishman. He does not display
administrative skill or organising power, that is all pro
vided for him by the British official, but as a dealer in
goods or in money his ability is not to be contested. Much
of his success is due to his readiness to work at all times
and his refusal to waste half his day in idleness or amuse
ment. But the really serious part of the matter is that this
success, which is no secret, has brought into existence a
new school of colonial propagandists in Germany. They

BRITISH DISTRUST OF GERMANY 9
show their just appreciation of facts by demanding
" ready-made colonies." " Ready-made colonies " is an
alternative phrase for conquests. Mr. Blind declares that
Germany has no designs on Holland. His assurance is far
from convincing, and is not shared by the Dutch them
selves. Moreover, Prussia never has any designs before
the moment has arrived to put them in execution. It is
the secret of the success of the Hohenzollem legend, not
to talk but to strike. But " ready-made colonies " are for
the moment to be sought for not in European-owned
dependencies, but in decrepit states like Morocco, or others
that need support like Turkey, as well as in kingdoms
recently opened by the enterprise of Frenchmen and
Englishmen to the outer world, such as Abyssinia. In
none of these territories would Germany have to take upon
herself any administrative duties. What she wants are
concessions and political influence with the ruler, so that
her counsels may alone be heeded. She has succeeded at
Constantinople, she has created an involved situation in
Morocco out of which no way of peaceful extrication may
be found, and it will not be her fault if she fails to produce
as much trouble at Adis Abeba as she has done at Fez.
As Prince Bulow asserts, " the importance of these interests
is immaterial." "Whether it is a case of five marks or
of five thousand " Germany reserves to herself the right
of deciding what her own course shall be. In plainer
words, she is ready to make five shillings' worth of
German shoddy a casus belli. The world is forewarned.
But the ambition to acquire " ready-made colonies " is
not limited to countries that are nobody's colonies. That
represents only the first phase in this later development
of the system of " world politics." As soon as the German
fleet is strong enough Germany will want the colonies of
other States. Holland, Belgium, France and then
England provide them in their likely order of attempted
acquisition. But in the meanwhile the position in each and
all of them can be surveyed and sapped.
The German Chancellor and the German Ambassador
are in error when they think that English distrust of
Germany is of quite recent growth. It began as long ago
as 1875, when it was due to the joint efforts of Queen

io ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Victoria and the Emperor Alexander that Germany was
deterred from falling upon France, and in the Bismarckian
phrase " completing her work." I have before me, as I
write, a correspondence between the late Lord Lytton on
the one side, and Lord Salisbury and Sir Henry Rawlinson
on the other, during the summer of 1877. The following
extract from one of Lord Lytton's letters in July of the
year named shows what were the views of the Beaconsfield-
Salisbury Cabinet about Germany.
In your (Sir H. Rawlinson's) very interesting letter you say that the
Queen's Government " is determined not to fall out with Russia "
because " we shall need her support before very long against Germany,
who is considered to be by far the most dangerous foe to England in
the future."
Lord Salisbury, in one or two of his recent letters to me, has hinted
at the same apprehension about Germany as a reason for conciliating
Russia at the present moment.
In face of this evidence it is impossible to contend that
the suspicion and misgivings entertained by a large pro
portion of the English people about German policy are of
recent growth, or that they have only been created by our
public writers during the last few years.
Everything that has happened since 1877 i*1 our relations
with Germany gives force to the opinion I have quoted,
but it is no longer the monopoly of statesmen to describe
Germany as England's " most dangerous foe." Mr. Blind
and Count Metternich, turning up the pages of history,
repeat what everybody knows, that England and Germany
have never been at war. What they omit to tell their
readers or their listeners is that the Germany of the past
was a very different State from the Germany of the present.
It was a Germany without a Navy. It was a Germany
swayed at first by the mild and unaggressive Hapsburgs,
and then later on divided into two separate and rival
hegemonies directed from Vienna and Berlin, which to
some extent neutralised each other. But all that is passed
and done with. The Germany of to-day is not merely
united, it is aggressive. It wields the thunderbolt on land,
it clutches at the trident on the sea. The Grand Monarque
never had such power; if the great Napoleon had it for a
time he lost it through mistakes that the Germans are not
likely to repeat. In their careful calculations there will

BRITISH DISTRUST OF GERMANY n
be no place for Moscow campaigns, or profitless enter
prises in Spain. Napoleon fell because he squandered his
strength in attempting too much; Germany, when she falls,
will not do so from any failure to concentrate her strength
on only a single and definite object at a time.
Moreover, if it is literally correct to say that " English
men and Germans have never crossed swords in war," it
is none the less true that England has several times opposed
Prussian policy in a way showing that she was ready to
appeal to the arbitrament of arms. She did so in 1815
when Prussia wished to dismember France by annexing
Alsace and seizing the Vosges frontier. Mr. Blind's refer
ence to this matter forms an interesting addition to the
Emperor William's boastful assertion that " the Germans
saved the English army at Waterloo." This is what he
wrote in these pages about the attempt of the Prussians
to secure both banks of the Rhine in 1 8 1 5 : " The Germans
all the more bitterly remembered what had happened after
the overthrow of Napoleon the First through the influence
of the Duke of Wellington, to whose aid Bliicher had
come on the field of Waterloo." Mr. Blind's argument is
that because Bliicher did his duty as a soldier and as an
ally at Waterloo, England should have acquiesced in all
Prussia's nefarious schemes. What we did was to conclude
a Convention with the King of France to defend his terri
tory against German greed.
But that was not the only occasion on which we faced
the alternative of war with Prussia. We forbade her inter
ference, and that of her colleagues in the Holy Alliance,
with France in 1830, and with Belgium in 1830-1. We
stood up for France in 1875 against a threat of inhuman
aggression that was intended to entail her annihilation,
and we sent a military commission to Belgium to prepare
the way for active operations. So erudite a person as Mr.
Blind cannot but be aware of these little passages in history
that somewhat detract from the obligatory force of the
alliance between ourselves and the Germans which has been
handed down from antiquity, and upon which he lays so
much stress. We have opposed, and we shall continue to
oppose, " the overweening ambition " of Prussia, in its
newly spun garb of Germany, just as resolutely, and, we

12 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
will not doubt, just as successfully as we opposed the
tyrants and would-be dictators of Europe in the past. But
at the same time we will not altogether abandon the hope
that a sense of her position may inculcate the practice at
Berlin of the same moderation as was displayed on the
four historical occasions to which I have referred, when
Germans learnt that they could not have matters all their
own way.
If the German Government is really desirous of remov
ing the " distrust " in this country which, as I have shown,
did not spring up yesterday, but has been slowly growing
during the last thirty years, it will modify its naval
schemes and abandon its ambition to rule the seas. Of
course I know very well that it will do nothing of the
kind; any lingering hope on that point would be stifled
by Mr. Blind's declaration that " if a Republic were estab
lished in the Fatherland its naval policy would still have
to remain the same." That being so, the distrust must
continue until active antagonism is substituted for passive
dislike and suspicion.
The people of this country, encompassed by the still
inviolate sea, do not realise the extreme gravity of the
situation in Europe. England wishes always for the
preservation of peace. Even in the face of menace and
intentional provocation — it is curious to note how in
speeches that are intended to be amicable German insolence
surely creeps in — her people still cling to the belief that
the greatest of British interests is peace. But there is a
limit beyond which it is not safe to taunt or to threaten
us. Gibes from the German Emperor are like dragon's
teeth, they may bring up men in arms as they have already
produced discord. Perhaps a glimmering of the truth has
dawned on him, for suddenly without any apparent reason
there is a change. The taunts, except for some unfortunate
expressions which reveal the true German nature, are kept
suppressed; there is a very remarkable and very con
descending display of effort to remove "profound dislike"
and to substitute friendship. What is the motive of these
proceedings? Why has the Berlin executive, which never
acts haphazardly, gone out of its way to be civil to this
country, in, it is true, a clumsy and blundering fashion?

BRITISH DISTRUST OF GERMANY 13
Why do the Emperor and his Chancellor breathe, at the
same time that they make these overtures to us for concord,
nothing but threats, alarms, and boastful vauntings in
their speeches, made not to the German nation alone, but
to the whole world ? Why are we told that Germany is
strong enough to act " without allies," and to rely solely
on herself ? England is all for peace, France is notoriously
pacific, Russia is absorbed in her own troubles, why does
the German Emperor — who in his own opinion is the
Jupiter Fulminator of the present age — flash his lightning
shafts in a clear sky ?
These are questions that must ever recur to us. If we
cannot furnish the answer to a secret that is probably
locked in the Emperor William's own bosom, and hidden
from his ministers and ambassadors, we can at least get
ourselves ready to ward off the blow whenever it comes,
and not allow ourselves to be taken by surprise. We may
in my opinion draw one safe conclusion from the Emperor's
speech and that of his Chancellor. He is contemplating
an act of aggression in which Germany will have to dis
pense with the co-operation of its partners in the strictly
defensive pact called " the Triple Alliance." The con
templation may require some months to develop into
action; on the other hand, it may terminate at any moment,
and confront us with a crisis. It is improbable that we are
his first and immediate object, and the time has certainly
not arrived for any encroachment on the rights of neutral
States. There is consequently no alternative to the con
clusion that the Emperor is on the look-out for a pretext
to attack France, and pretexts in the field of international
rivalry are ever found easily when they are diligently
sought for.
No one will seriously deny that last June France and
Germany were brought to the verge of war by the action
of the German Emperor in Morocco. The manner in which
war was then averted is still secret history, but at least
one of the most important contributories to the baffling of
the plot was the remarkable forbearance and self-restraint
of the French people. Their admirable demeanour when
confronted with an unprovoked and flagrant provocation
will not soon pass out of memory, but, as I wrote in the

14 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
July number of this Review, there is a limit to the patience
of a proud people. Already a marked change has taken
place in the tone of the French press. France is still
studiously and honestly on the side of peace, but there
has been a notable revival in the courage and confidence
of the nation. If the coming Conference on the Morocco
question reveals some fresh unpleasantries they will not be
received so quietly as was the attack on M. Delcasse; if
Berlin renews her insults they will not be taken lying down.
While the scenery and stage properties are being got ready
for a European tragedy the German Emperor makes his
effort to lull us to sleep. He must take us for children or
for fools.
If he wants the good-will of the people of this country
the Emperor William can obtain it only by removing the
causes of our distrust. On the one hand he has to curtail
instead of increasing the expenditure on the German war
fleet. Not less important, he must abandon the design of
making any unprovoked attack on France. If he makes
that attack, trusting because Russia is down that France
will be left on her own single resources to oppose his " over
weening ambition," he will commit the first stupendous
blunder in Hohenzollern history. He will be emulating
the bad example of those French " scourges of mankind "
in the past, recalled by Mr. Karl Blind, and he may dis
cover very quickly that he is not only "without allies,"
but that he has made himself an object of reprobation to
the rest of the world. The English people are loth at all
times to draw the sword. They certainly would not think
"interests of the value of five marks" or even "of five
thousand marks" worth magnifying into a casus belli.
But on the other hand they would not, and they could
not, stand idly by while Germany proceeded to shed the
life-blood of France. They would not do this in 1815
after twenty years of strife with France ; they are still less
inclined to do so now after ninety years of peace and
friendship with their closest neighbour. Nor are the races
of the United Kingdom — many of whom, like my own,*
* Personal items : Demetrius = Dermot — an old family name latinised
on the Continent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries irto
Demetrius : e.g., Demetrius de Kavanagh, my ancestor, killed as Field-
Marshal-Lieutenant under Prince Eugene at Belgrade in 1715.

BRITISH DISTRUST OF GERMANY 15
have not a drop of Teutonic blood in their veins — so blind
and stupid as not to see that the hour of German aggression
on the Vosges would be the psychological moment to put
an end for all time to Germany's claim to grasp the
trident. Boulger = Leinster sept of O'Boulger or O'Bolger, deprived of patro
nymic in Queen Elizabeth's reign (1559). William O'Bolger (Gulielmus
O'Bolgire) was the first Irishman allowed by Patent to hold lands within
the Pale by Richard Duke of York in 1453.
There is hardly any doubt that the surname Boulger has the same root
as Belgian (" Belgas " = " Bolg," skin : the race that clothed themselves
in the skins of animals). "The wild O'Bolgers of the hills," who figure
somewhat prominently in the Tudor chronicle of the campaigns with
Art MacMurragh, were in all probability of Menapian, that is Belgian,
descent.

GERMANY'S ONE AND ONLY AIM*
In different directions, from the mouth of the German
Ambassador in London, and in official statements in the
Reichsrath at Berlin, we find assertions about the improv
ing relations between England and Germany. Lovers of
peace-at-any-price, that is to say, a deceptive peace, giving
the prospective enemy time to get ready for a successful
war, implore the press not to say a word that would
irritate Germany, as if she cared a fig for what is said
about her as long as she is left in undisturbed tranquillity
to complete her plans for " the day." For an illusory hope
such as this those who have been following with close
vigilance the development of Germany's plans for twenty
years past are entreated to be silent, or when that seems
vain every effort is made to gag them by persuading editors
that frank statements are not merely indiscreet but pro
vocative. The British public is kept as far as possible in
the dark as to the true drift of German policy and the
development of the force which is to carry it into effect.
Another attempt is made in this paper to spread a know
ledge of Germany's one and only aim.
The strength and the success of Prussian policy has
always lain in its power of concentration. The Elector
of Brandenburg resolved to be King of Prussia; he joined
the Grand Alliance, his troops attracted attention on the
battle-fields of Belgium as the best drilled of the
Germans under William of Orange, and he became King.
Frederick the Great resolved to steal Silesia so that it
might serve as a wedge between Bohemia and Poland ; he
took it by superior military force and held it, thanks to
England, against the combined attack of Austria, France
and Russia. His successors continued and completed his
* British Review, May, 1914.
16

GERMANY'S ONE AND ONLY AIM 17
work of making Prussia the equal of Austria in Germany.
They succeeded, and then not content with equality, they
ousted Austria altogether from Germany, of which the
Hapsburg Empire no longer forms part. Having brought
the German princes to her heel Prussia turned on France
in 1870, and destroyed the belief in French military
supremacy. Having done all these things, Germany, as Prussia for
this phase of history must be called, took in a new
horizon. Europe had become too small for her. Her
gaze ranged over the ocean to those far distant lands
whence the raw material that would keep her factories
busy might be drawn at little cost through the cheapness
of labour and the backwardness of knowledge among
primitive races. But as she gazed she saw a new rival, a
more fortunate competitor who, by being earlier in the
race, had obtained possession of the fairest regions of
the earth. That competitor was England, and just as
Prussia had ousted Austria from Germany, so did the
new Germany set herself to the task of ousting England
from that command of the seas which had come to be
regarded here as a prescriptive right.
Germany's one and only aim then is to destroy the
belief in England's invincibility at sea, and to that end
she has created an immense navy which, whatever its value
in war may prove to be, is on paper and in organisation
second to that of England alone. But it is even more
significant to know that in the essential requirements for
the construction of a navy (shipyards, steel works, and
cannon foundries) Germany is quite on a level with our
selves even if she is not, as some say, slightly ahead of
us. But the Prussian principle has ever been to defer
striking the blow until she felt sure that the balance of
power to be brought into play on the fixed scene was in
her favour. If the question at issue were solely as tq,
whether Germany is to sttpplant England as the first
Naval Power in the World, it is probable that the present
hollow peace with its crushing and ever-increasing annual
expenditure, would remain unbroken for some more years,
simply because Germany is not yet sure that she can equal
or surpass the exploits of Tromp and De Ruyter.

18 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
But there are other elements in the problem. Germany
cannot ignore the new French army. She cannot leave
Russia out of her calculations. These neighbours suggest
matters of more immediate and imperative necessity than
the direct challenge of England's superiority at sea. For
a time she thought she could lull England to sleep while
she crippled France, but she discovered her mistake in
September, 191 1, and ever since she has been concentrat
ing all her naval power in the North Sea so that she may
give our fleet full employment, and render it impossible
for us to send an army to the Continent during the first
three weeks following the crossing of the Dutch, Belgian,
and French frontiers by her own armies.
The ultimate and final smashing of the British fleet is
to stand over for a subsequent epoch. What is immediately
to be accomplished is the hindrance and damaging of that
fleet, and of the naval harbours and arsenals behind it,
by a succession of sudden raids and desperate attacks from
Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven — seconded by the airships
and armoured aeroplanes which are being concentrated
north and south of Hamburg, directly opposite our coast
— with the object of making it impossible for this country
to send troops to the Continent in the first part of the
campaign. For this task and mission the German naval
authorities believe themselves to be ready, while the aerial
branch of their War Department has made such enormous
strides of late that it, too, is ready to take on the task.
But important as Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven are in
the German scheme of naval concentration on the shores
of the North Sea, the latest development invests Heligor
land and Borkum with separate roles of action that are
complementary to the others, but scarcely less important.
Heligoland, which we ceded to Germany on assurances
that it would only serve as a summer resort for the
merchants of Hamburg, has been fortified in such a way
as to make it resemble a miniature Malta, but still more
significant is it to find that it is to be the station for a
Zeppelin of the largest size. A revolving shed which
sinks into a concrete pit, specially prepared for its con
cealment from attack by aeroplane, has been constructed,
and for all we know to the contrary, the Zeppelin that

GERMANY'S ONE AND ONLY AIM 19
will be charged with the attempt to destroy one of our
arsenals, is already housed there. Borkum, always import
ant on account of its strong defences, is to play a new
part as the screen or cover for the torpedo squadron that
is to be concentrated at the mouth of the Ems, with its
base at Emden. Although it is not likely that this
squadron will be raised to the strength of the one at
Wilhelmshaven, the use of the Ems estuary adds another
to the available starting points for the dispatch of the
advanced force of the German fleet which is destined to
reach our coast and hamper our own concentration on, or
more probably before, the declaration of war. With
supreme confidence in the inability of the British people
to show resentment, Germany has loaded and now presents
her revolver, in the shape of a very formidable navy and
air fleet, at our head. Soon we may expect to hear the
old highwayman's challenge to "stand and deliver."
Having thus briefly noticed the means available for the
realisation of German policy, the rest of our attention will
be given to the task of discovering and describing what
that policy is. The one and only aim, thanks to the
solidity of the Triple Entente, must remain in abeyance
until other matters have been attended to, and it is now
reluctantly conceded at Berlin that the decision of the
military superiority on land must precede that on sea.
Germany's most pressing desire, therefore, is to have the
triumph of 1870 confirmed and completed as soon as
possible. But until the psychological moment arrives there is not
to be the least warning beyond such oracular expressions
as that "war sometimes comes like a thief in the night,"
with which the German official papers often qualify their
optimistic predictions. Every officer and official along the
frontiers will continue to inform those who come in contact
with them that peace is assured, that Germany is the last
to dream of war, and so it will be until the signal comes
over the wires, by telegraph and telephone, to move
forward. The word and the blow will be simultaneous.
In forming an opinion as to the drift and ends of
German policy, we should distinguish between the per
manent fixed motives and those of an incidental and

20 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
transitory nature. The former is the acquisition of com
merce, colonies, and that control of World-policy in which
Germany has a smaller share than she thinks her due. In
all these matters France is no rival or obstacle. Germany
has only this country to take into serious account. But
Germany has no free hand as long as France possesses an
army which is convinced that it will succeed in reversing
the decision of the last war. Germany would have liked
a friendly understanding with France while she concen
trated the whole of her strength on a blow at England.
When she found this unattainable she thought she could
fall on France without our interfering, and then on realis
ing the truth two years ago, all her rage and venom
fastened on this country. "England is our enemy,"
became the stock phrase from one end of Western Germany
to the other. But spleen is not a serviceable weapon in the
political armoury. It was felt that the German fleet was
not ready to play an effective part until Wilhelmshaven
could receive the High Sea squadron, and, consequently
the Moroccan crisis was composed. But the German fleet
is now believed to be sufficiently strong and well placed
to be at least very troublesome, and the German view has
once more veered round to the conclusion that the time
will shortly be ripe to fall on France, and at the same
moment deal this country a heavy blow by a sudden and
startling attack by sea and air.
Two distinct motives are impelling Germany to run all
the risks and seek a consummation for some of her plans
by force of arms. One is anxiety as to the new position
created in South-east Europe by the rise of the Balkan
States and the decline of Turkey. The other is the realisa
tion of the fact that Russia is becoming more formidable
as a military and naval Power every year.
When Berlin turns to scrutinise the Russian position, she
finds cause not for immediate apprehension, but for future
anxiety. The conviction held there that Russia cannot
mobilise a sufficiently large army to take a serious part in
a great war until several weeks after it has begun, is far
too deep-rooted to be easily shaken, but perhaps the
anticipatory mobilisations (repeated in three successive
years) in Poland of over a quarter of a million men, may

GERMANY'S ONE AND ONLY AIM 21
have somewhat shaken this belief, for it gives evidence
that Russia does not mean to be caught napping during
the later months of autumn, and if Russia can strike a
heavy blow in East Prussia and Galicia in the first fifteen
days of a war, then the strategists of Berlin and Vienna
will be very much disconcerted, and may find their best-
laid plans go awry. On the whole, however, the probabili
ties are that the German view is right in assuming that
Russian movements will still be slow, and that several
weeks must elapse before Germany and Austria will find
any formidable Russian force in front of them. This
contingency throws a greater obligation on this country to
be able to co-operate at once with France on her northern
and eastern frontiers.
Germany has very clear views as to how she is to recoup
herself for the sacrifices of the colossal war she is prepar
ing for against all her western neighbours. Germany will
bleed them white as the first step in attaining maritime
supremacy. The German Emperor once dubbed himself
the Admiral of the Atlantic; but it is the substance more
than the title that he covets. As an auxiliary in his
schemes he has incited Austria to make herself mistress of
the Mediterranean, well knowing that Austria could not
stand in this position alone. But Germany is behind her,
and new strategic railways will be directed towards the
Adriatic and the iEgean, so that a fresh impulse may be
given to German-Austrian expansion towards Asia Minor
and the Persian Gulf. These are the goals of a more or
less distant future, but the preliminaries are being arranged
without needless delay.
Under these circumstances the question must be asked —
Is the British Government ready to do its duty at once,
the moment Germany throws down the glove? Has it
made any fresh and fuller preparations since those of
September, 191 1 ? They fell very far short of what the
occasion required, and in the meantime Germany has
added another army corps to her western garrisons with
a peace effective of nearly 30,000 men. She has done the
same thing on her eastern frontier, but that is Russia's
affair, and does not directly concern us. We must remem
ber that Germany, as the main feature in her strategy, is

22 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
resolved at any sacrifice to obtain decisive successes within
the first fortnight of her armies crossing the frontier. An
indication of her view is furnished in the remark of one of
her ablest generals who declared in an address the other
day that "if the English are not in Antwerp within the
first five days of the war, they will never be in it." Yet
the Belgians believe not only that they can hold it alone,
but that it is impregnable. The German general allowed
two days for the army to get there vid Dalheim and
Roermond, and three days to take it. Which view will
prove correct?
But we are not thinking of Antwerp when we talk of
the British expedition to the Continent that must co-operate
effectively or ineffectively with the French army. The
fortune of the war will be decided not in sieges, but in the
open field, and it will be of the highest importance for
the British troops to reach the front wherever it may be
in time to participate in the opening phase. Obviously
they must be in sufficient force to deal with at least one
German army corps, and there ought to be a sufficiently
strong expedition ready to follow within a fortnight to
deal with a second army corps. It may be assumed that
we can, if adequate preparations are made beforehand,
land 200,000 trained troops on the Continent in two succes
sive expeditions at an interval of a fortnight or three
weeks, and without national vanity we can safely reckon
these as equal to 250,000 German troops. The German
official estimate of 300,000 is rather more flattering to our
self-esteem, but it is safer to take the lower scale, more
especially as the Germans claim with the estimated numeri
cal superiority the certainty of victory.
The military authorities are very properly reticent as
to what they are ready to do, but one would like to have
some tangible reason for assuming that 100,000 men* can
be conveyed across the Channel in forty-eight hours. We
must remember that the German naval attack will be timed
to synchronise with that on France and her northern neigh
bours by land, and that one of its main objects will be to
hinder and embarrass our sea operations of every kind.
* As a matter of fact, it took fourteen days to land 65,000 men in
France.

GERMANY'S ONE AND ONLY AIM 23
The infliction of even slight wounds would mean delay in
the sailing of our first expedition, or possibly its partial
arrest, and the loss of invaluable time. If the British
army got to its positions only after the French army had
scored a success single-handed, it would be a humiliation ;
if only after a reverse, it would be a calamity that might
never be retrieved. The haphazard methods of old days
will never do in this age of rapid overwhelming and over
lapping movements. The German advance pivoting round
Verdun with a front extending to the Meuse, and perhaps
even west of that river, will be at a rush, like the inundation
of an ocean moved by a submarine volcanic explosion.
There is scarcely any necessity to dwell in conclusion
on the fact which must be obvious to every intelligent
person in both France and England, that the two countries
have an equal and common interest in withstanding
together the overweening pretension of Germany to be the
mistress of Europe. The downfall of either of us must
be the death blow in a little time to the other. France is
a great military nation, England unfortunately is not,
but she has all the material available to become one.
England is still the first Naval Power in the world, and
if the struggle will only come soon, she will remain so.
But the decision of Europe's fate will not be on sea, but
on land, and all our fleet can do for us is to guard our
shores and hold the route open for ns to send our troops
to France and elsewhere, so that they may do their part in
upholding the liberties of Western Europe, and in expel
ling the would-be robber from the two kingdoms of the
Netherlands.* The number of trained men required to make up the two
expeditionary corps may not seem great when contrasted
with the enormous armies of the Continent, but they
represent a corps d' elite which would stiffen the resisting
capacity of the Dutch and Belgian armies. The opinion
may also be expressed with some confidence that both those
* The original German plan included the invasion of Holland by
seizing the bridges over the Meuse at Venlo, Roermond, and Maestricht.
It was changed because Germany thought she would gain more by
respecting the neutrality of Holland. Why the Dutch Government has
stood on one side, when it well knows that a victorious Germany will
not show it any consideration, cannot be explained.

24 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
armies would be more likely to co-operate heartily with an
English force than with a French. The moral effect, there
fore, of the presence of an English army on the Continent
fighting in alliance with France would be incalculable,
and nations and individuals, at present unduly impressed
by the formidable appearance of the German military
system, would begin to see that they had neglected to take
one important factor into their consideration when they
concluded that the establishment of a German hegemony
in Western Europe was a thing not to be averted.
But it would be a very great mistake to suppose that
England's capacity to take part in a Continental war
would begin and end with the first two expeditions. The
martial spirit of the British races is only dormant, not
dead. The colonies sent invaluable contingents to South
Africa ; they would do the same when the Mother Country
called on them to come to Europe. Some means would be
found to draft British and Indian troops to the scene, if
only to aid our garrisons in Egypt, the Mediterranean
and nearer home. With time given the Empire that sent a
quarter of a million men to South Africa would have no
difficulty in sending double that number to the Meuse and
the Rhine. The only point of doubt is not what we could
do eventually, but whether we could strike in quickly
enough with what we have available for the first round.
We must also avoid committing the error of so many
observers in the smaller States, who are in the habit of
regarding the whole of the German army of four millions
of men as of uniform and equal value. In that force there
are, let us say, one million of the very first order of
excellence, another million of the second order, and the
remaining two millions are of the third and even the fourth
order. If all goes well with the first two portions, the
last two are good enough for the work assigned to them,
because they will never be subjected to any severe test.
But they are not the kind of force with which pitched
battles are to be won in these days. We may say with
absolute certainty that half a million Britishers, one-
half regulars and the other half active men and good shots,
would in conjunction with the French army and the two
armies of the Netherlands, put an end to German dreams

GERMANY'S ONE AND ONLY AIM 25
of despoiling their neighbours for the remainder of the
century. Finally, let a word be said on the general motives behind
German policy. Germany will fall upon France, not
because she covets French territory, but simply because she
knows that she must smash the French army before her
hands will be free to concentrate all her power and
resources on the task of depriving England of her naval
and colonial paramountcy. She does not hate France as
she hates and envies England. She would like France to
be friends, and to join her in an Armada against this
country, but as she knows this desire to be hopeless, she
must first destroy the French army and pierce the line of
the Vosges fortresses. She is ready at any moment to
make the attempt, and she believes that she will succeed.
Let there be no doubt as to the German view in this
matter. From the head-quarter staff down to the humblest
private, the conviction is absolute that, however bravely
it fights, the French army will be smashed up as completely
as and more quickly than it was in 1870. It is the first
duty we owe to ourselves and to civilisation that this out
rage shall not be perpetrated. We owe it on the highest
grounds of reason and humanity, but we also owe it to
ourselves from the instinct of self-preservation for the fate
meted out to France one day will be that reserved for us
the next But to do our part we must be ready both on
sea and land to strike in at the first onslaught.

THE GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN
AGAINST FRANCE*
THE German move in Morocco has at least compelled the
public to recognise the possibility of war at an early date
between France and Germany. French opinion has shown
immense restraint in face of the Agadir provocation, but
there is a limit to the forbearance the French people will
display under German bullying, and the Berlin Govern
ment, knowing this as well as we do, are satisfied that, if
and when war suits their plans, they can have it by one
further turn of the screw, making the position intolerable
for a great and high-spirited nation.
A Franco-German war, becoming twenty-four hours
after its opening a general European war, must then be
recognised as a possibility of the near future. The pur
pose of this article is not to deal with any of the side
issues or incidental contingencies, but to give a succinct
account of the official German plan of campaign against
France, and by so doing to contribute perhaps towards its
being baffled.
The main German idea upon which the plan has been
formed is that France must be seriously damaged in the
first three weeks of the war, so that Germany may find
herself in the position of victor in the first round before
England and Russia have entered the field. It is con
sidered that the effect of serious French defeats would be
to deter England from landing troops on the Continent,
and to induce Russia to conceive that she was doing all she
need for her damaged ally by waging a defensive war
on the Vistula. The German mot d'ordre on the com
mencement of hostilities, which are to precede the formal
* Fortnightly Review, September, 1911.
26

GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 27
declaration of war, will be at all cost to get well estab
lished on French soil, and concentrate as large an army
as possible behind, that is to say west of, the line of the
Vosges, so as to fight a decisive battle somewhere in the
neighbourhood of Reims or Chalons.
There was a time when it was thought that the chances
of a direct attack on the line of the Vosges were not
inconsiderable, and that weak points might be found
between Belfort and Verdun. But this view is now held
in only a modified degree, for it is considered that the best
chance of making the frontal attack a success will be by
executing a disconcerting and menacing offensive move
ment through the comparatively open country between
Verdun and Sedan. All the French plans being based
on the concentration of the national forces at Neufchateau,
behind Toul, one of the objects of the German strategists
has been to seek a line of attack which would evade that
base of concentration, render it inapplicable to the situa
tion created by their strategy, and embarrass the French
to devise another in time.
With this end in view the Germans have for the last
fifteen years been making the necessary preparations to
secure that broadened front for . their advance which is
essential for the accomplishment of their purpose, and
these preparations are now practically completed. The
line of the Vosges is not merely exceedingly formidable
as a fortified position, but it is also exceedingly narrow.
From Belfort to Verdun, the two extremities, is no more
than 145 miles, and although Belfort might be turned by
the violation of Swiss territory, the invading army could
only operate against Lyons, which would take time, and
exercise little or no influence on the first phase of the war.
It is not safe to assume anything too positively in a prob
lem which must become modified by fresh factors from
time to time, but unless Austria can be induced to carry
out an offensive movement through Porrentruy and the
Rhone Valley, Germany will stand on the defensive in
South Alsace. The recent fortification of several places
near Mulhouse points to this conclusion. Austria's ability
to send troops into France will entirely depend on Italy's
action, and on what happens in Galicia. Yet the suspicion

28 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
cannot be suppressed that Austria would be very willing
to do something else than the supplemental raid into
France to prove her loyalty to her Prussian partner.
In any case, there is no necessity for any overwhelming
anxiety on the part of the French authorities with regard
to what may happen south of Belfort. Here, if anywhere,
the opening for an offensive movement seems more favour
able to France than to Germany. For our present purpose,
which is limited to the consideration of what is aimed at
in the first two or three weeks of the war, the southern
scene of conflict need not again be referred to.
The contracted front of the Vosges is almost as serious
a disadvantage to the army acting on the offensive as the
formidable character of its defences. The lines of possible
advance for any considerable body of troops are also
further diminished by considerable stretches of impossible
country. For instance, any advance between Belfort and
Epinal, speaking, as we are, only of large operations,
would be out of the question. There are, indeed, only
four lines of advance open to the Germans in this quarter.
They are from Metz to Verdun (two roads, one vid
Conflans, and the other vid Mars la Tour), through Pont
a Mousson to Commercy, through Chateau Salins to Nancy
and Toul, and from Strasburg to Luneville. The two last
named are available for a combined attack on Toul and
its system of dependent forts. The total frontage for the
German advance between Verdun and Luneville is then
no more than seventy miles. In this restricted space it
would be impossible for the Germans to employ more than
half a million men, and in the event of any reverse or
break-down in the execution of the plan of attack the
Germans would find themselves exposed to heavy loss
before they could get outside the range of the French
fortress artillery.
Although the German authorities are set on putting the
efficiency of the Vosges forts to the test, and also of
experimenting with some of their new theories for the
capture of fortified places, it is to the widened front that
they are mainly looking as the scene of their first victories.
From Luneville to Verdun they have seventy miles of
fortress, fort, and battery in front of them. From Verdun

(jukmajn FLAN OF CAMPAIGN 29
to Givet there are seventy-five miles of undefended country.
Longwy and Montmedy do not count as fortresses. Givet-
Charlemont and Mezieres, both on the Meuse, are more
up to date, but from Verdun to Mezieres stretches open
country with a frontage of fifty miles. This is Germany's
objective. When the French drew the line of the Vosges fortifica
tion at Verdun it was assumed that the undefended gap
south of the frontiers of Belgium and the Grand Duchy
was too narrow to admit of any considerable German
advance from Thionville, and that if it were undertaken a
favourable opportunity would offer for their assuming the
offensive under promising conditions. It is not quite
evident why the French authorities did so, but they seem
to have assumed that Germany would respect Belgian
neutrality. The German text-books of twenty years ago
encouraged this view by representing that Germany gained
by Belgian neutrality. These passages have long been
eliminated. They were made ridiculous by the elaborate
preparations for taking the offensive through neutral terri
tory from Dalheim to Treves.
Even if we leave out of account the strip flanked by
Dutch territory, Germany acquired a new frontage for the
outpouring of the enormous forces that will be employed
in the next war of 100 miles from Thionville to Aix la
Chapelle. By a converging movement, leaving the Meuse
on the right hand, that would gain seventy miles of
practically undefended country on the north-east frontier
of France. The roads intervening between German and
French territory are excellent. There are several useful
lines of railway joining the main Brussels-Metz line at
Marloie, Libramont, Arlon, and Luxemburg. Even if we
exclude Namur, the Germans gain six direct roads to the
French frontier. They have the Ourthe valley route to
Marche-Rochefort and to Marche-Ciney, both good for
Dinant, Beauraing and Givet; the Viel Salm, La Roche
and St. Hubert for Bouillon and Sedan; the Stavelot,
Bastogne, and Libramont road for Bouillon and Carignan ;
the St. Vith-Gouvy for the same destination ; the Diekirch-
Arlon-Virton for Montmedy; and the Treves-Luxemburg
road for Longwy. By the longest of the roads German

30 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
territory is only seventy miles from French; by the shortest,
Treves to Longwy, it is only thirty miles.
Having conceived the plan, the German authorities did
not tarry in making the preparations behind their own
frontier to render it capable of execution. For the last
seven years Germany has been entirely engaged in pro
viding frontier railways flanking the projected front, and
in linking them up with the two bases on the middle Rhine
at Coblentz and Cologne. In addition to the railways,
double lined and metalled for heavy traffic, sidings have
been provided at all the stations, and at suitable points
between them. Between Montjoie and St. Vith landing
spaces sufficient for over 120,000 men have been provided,
and it is confidently asserted that that force could be
thrown across the Belgian frontier between Francorchamps
and Gouvy in a single night without the Belgians knowing
what was coming, the troops to be employed being
entrained at Coblentz, Cologne, Bonn, and Gladbach.
There is not the smallest reason for hoping that this
dispatch of the advance force of the invaders would mis
carry. If the whole corps d'armees were not over the border
in the twenty-four hours, at least a sufficient part would
be over to make sure of the possession of Libramont in
half that time. It is declared that the four cavalry
regiments and four horse artillery batteries at Elsenborn
camp during six months of the year could be at Libramont
within six hours of leaving their base.
Under the present system, perhaps under any, there is
no possibility of the Belgians doing anything to arrest or
even delay this movement. General Hellebaut, the Belgian
Minister of War, made what is called a reassuring state
ment in the Brussels Chamber a little time ago. He
referred to the official arrangements made for blowing up
bridges on the railways, and otherwise rendering them
useless. With regard to the destruction of the railways
in Belgium, it must first of all be stated that for the initial
rush Germany would not use them. With Stavelot and
Trois Ponts in the hands of the German cavalry, can the
Belgian military authorities feel confident that the bridge
over the Ambleve would be destroyed ? But even if it were
destroyed it would not delay the German advance, which,

LrLKMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 31
so far as Belgian soil is concerned, is to be made by the
roads and not by rail. Belgian railways would only come
into use for the purposes of supply and reinforcements.
Even if the Belgian arrangements for placing the lines
out of use worked to perfection, the German advance would
not be retarded, and the German railway corps could
repair the damage done to the line in a comparatively short
space of time. To talk of delaying the German advance
by blowing up a few bridges between Stavelot and Gouvy
may be compared to trying to stop a cannon-ball with an
open umbrella.
General Hellebaut's admission as to the improved arma
ment of Liege has supplied a reason for the taking in hand
of the latest of Germany's strategic railways on the Belgian
frontier. A miserable little line, nine miles in all, has
hitherto served all the requirements of Eupen. This loop
line commences at Herbesthal on the main line from Liege
to Aix la Chapelle, &c, passes through Eupen and then
links on with the Aix-St. Vith line at Raeren. It is now
in course of being converted into a double-railed line
capable of supporting heavy traffic. In a vague sort of
way it was felt that there must be some project behind
this, but beyond the general principle of broadening the
front as much as possible no definite importance was
attached to it. It seems now pretty clear that the design
is to seize the Baraque de Michel, the highest plateau in
Belgium. The practical point, which is for the moment all that
need be considered, is that the Belgian measures described
by the War Minister of that country would not deter or
delay the German advance on Libramont, which may be
regarded as their first strategical objective. In violating
Belgian neutrality Germany would endeavour to convince
the Belgian Government and people that she was not
animated by any hostile spirit towards them, and there
have been some indications that she flattered herself that
her persuasive utterances would be accepted. General
Hellebaut's statement must then have administered a con
siderable shock to the German strategists, who have
regarded Belgium as a quantite negligeable. The fortified
position of Liege, well held, with its lines of communica-

32 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
tion open to Namur and Antwerp, is a very awkward fact
for the invader sweeping across the Ardennes for France.
It would not perhaps count for a great deal if all went
well at the front, but a retreating German army would
be a very favourable mark for the resentment aroused in
Belgium by the unprovoked invasion of that country.
Decidedly the existence of Liege is a material fact in
regard to the advance across the Ardennes, which the
German strategists must include in their calculations. They
will not, even for that consideration, defer the dash on
Libramont, but it will be coupled with a polite but firm
request to the Belgians delivered by another army corps
from that hastening to the Semois to allow the Germans
to take care of the Liege forts for them. What will be the
Belgian reply to that? What are the effective arrange
ments in the forts themselves to support the reply with
deeds? It will not be such a simple task as blowing up
the bridges at Trois Ponts. At least we must assume that
the guns at Chaudfontaine and Embourg will have other
work to do for a long time than to enfilade the road from
Malmedy to Stavelot.
The Germans are prepared to supplement the advance
through the Belgian Ardennes with a movement encompass
ing the six forts of Liege on the right bank of the Meuse.
Some of those forts are very strong, others are not so
strong, but what is not certain is whether the position
would become untenable if Boncelles or Evegnee were
captured or demolished. If, however, the Belgians display
the moral fortitude to hold out at Liege despite the impos
ing demonstration that the Germans intend making against
it, they ought to be able to maintain their ground until
aid reached them from both France and England. Even
if they could not accomplish so much, the arrest of the
Germans at Liege for a few weeks would secure the time
needed to organise a formidable interior place of stand
reposing on the fortified position of Namur. On the other
hand, if by lack of patriotic devotion or through moral
degeneracy Liege succumbs to the Germans at their first
summons, Namur, which is a far weaker position than
Liege, could not be converted in time into an adequate
base for national defence. Besides, the loss of Liege

ujiKiviAlN FLAN OF CAMPAIGN 33
would compromise the whole Belgian position outside
Antwerp, which is a place entirely for defensive and not
offensive action.
The completeness of the success of Germany's attack on
the north-east frontier of France would depend therefore
on the fate of Liege. If it passed into her hands in the
first few days of the war German strategists would have
no anxiety about their right flank, and would press on on
the broad front from Givet to Thionville. We have dwelt
more especially on the role of the troops marching across
the Belgian Ardennes, one entire army in the first place
to be increased to two armies as soon as the fate of Liege
was decided. This would be the right wing of the army
of invasion. But the left wing, moving through Treves,
Luxemburg, and Thionville, would be even more formid
able. Its objective would be Stenay and Vouziers. The
taking up of a strong position on the Aisne by the two
hosts moving through Belgium and the Grand Duchy
would represent the successful achievement of the first
stage in the German plan of campaign against France.
It is not easy to see how a German success up to that
point can be prevented, and it is to be hoped that France
in a vain attempt to hinder what is practically inevitable
may not squander her magnificent cavalry, which, if pre
served intact, might in the second phase of the struggle
turn the scale in her favour. To obtain her primary objec
tives, Germany is prepared to waste a large number of
men. The cost of men will not prevent her straining every
effort to attain her ends. If the French pour over into
Belgium to meet her half-way, they will be playing her
game and equalising the chances of loss. An obstinate
defence without risking too much in any pitched action
north of the Reims-Laon-La Fere line is clearly the best
French strategy. Time would thus be gained for England
to play her part, and the further German troops have got
south of the Semois the better our chance of striking at
their rear. It will not be a bad thing for France's chances
of final victory if the first great battle of the war can be
deferred until the Germans are in the Aisne Valley. It will
take the Germans much longer to get there than the three
weeks we shall require to come into action, and it is not
3

34 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
difficult to conceive a situation in which the Germans might
find themselves very uncomfortable.
On the other hand, there is a risk that the French
generals will not relish the idea of giving ground, and that
they will strain every effort to meet the Germans before
they have got off Belgian territory. This will be to fight
the Germans' battle, and to risk giving the colour to the
whole war by an initial blunder due to military pride.
They should make allowance for the conditions under
which their allies can alone come to their help. Both
England and Russia must be slow from different circum
stances. Therefore France must be patient and give
ground. Catinat is the general they should take as their
model, and reculer pour mieux sauter should be their motto.
The only way to baffle the German plan of campaign is
to leave the development of its inherent difficulties to time
and distance. The Germans will be far less formidable
at Rethel or Vouziers, if no battles have been lost by the
French before they arrive there, than they would be at,
let us say, Libramont or even Sedan. It will no doubt be
disagreeable to French sentiment to see the first battles of
the war occur on French soil, but victories there would be
better than defeats further north.
No one can predict with absolute confidence the line
that the Belgian Government will take on the outbreak of
hostilities. ' The defence or non-defence of Li£ge is only
part of the question. If it is defended, that signifies that
Belgium will take her place side by side with England and
France. If it is not defended it will still leave her real
policy open to doubt, for the Germans, on getting posses
sion of Liege or even of some of the eastern and southern
forts, would leave her studiously alone and refrain from
doing anything to irritate Belgian opinion. The test of
the intentions of the Belgian Government would be the
degree of promptitude with which it summoned England
to perform her treaty obligations in defending Belgium.
But that step would be just as much an act of hostility to
Germany as the defence of Liege would be, and therefore
the inference seems clear that if Liege is not defended the
Belgian Government would not be very energetic in calling

GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 35
upon England for aid. The German authorities seem
strangely confident that in the first stage of the war they
will not have much trouble from the Belgians, and that
if they only succeed in the campaign they will have none
at all.
I have carefully refrained from saying anything on the
subject of what this country could and would do when
the Germans violate Belgian territory. It is a case in
which it is better not to give the smallest indication of
what one conceives to be possible; but at least it may be
said that there is no reason for thinking that we should
not be able to perform a useful part in conjunction with
our allies. There is another point, however, on which it
is permissible to express a decided opinion. Whatever the
opinion of the existing Government in Belgium may be
about the two neighbours, the opinion of the great mass
of the Belgian people, Fleming as well as Walloon, is
entirely in sympathy with France. There is a German
tendency in the commercial circles of Antwerp, which is
already half a German city, and there is a sort of feeling
in bureaucratic circles that Germany would prove a good
and possibly an inevitable protector; but the mass of the
nation dislikes the Germans, as they will discover when
they come into the thickly peopled parts of the country.
Of course, this sentiment will not count for much in the
Ardennes, which is thinly populated, and where the
German legions will far outnumber the inhabitants. But
it is a force that will have to be reckoned with sooner
or later by the Belgian Government as well as the
Germans. With regard to the German plan of campaign as a whole,
there is nothing to be done except to be prepared in good
time with measures suitable, not to foil it in the first stage,
for that is impossible and will only invite disaster, but to
baffle it in the second stage, when English co-operation has
become possible. Belgian complaisance to Germany, even
if it is displayed, will not for a very long time go so far
as admitting her troops into Antwerp, and so long as that
gate remains open there is no elimination of the factor of
English participation in the defence of Belgium from the

36 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
calculations of German strategists. They are counting on
prompt successes, to be gained partly by the suddenness
of their attack and partly by the other side playing their
game, to prevent the weak points of their plan from being
discovered, and to remove the risks that attach to it in
common with all other operations of war.

ENGLAND AND LITTLE STATES*
At the commencement of the war in South Africa a Belgian
man of letters whose ability I admire — although I deplore
the prejudice which led him, in common with so many of
his countrymen, astray as to the justice of that war — said
to me : " The little States of Europe will never trust
England again!" Eighteen months later a high Dutch
official used very similar words to the effect that " the small
Powers had lost faith in England ! " In both cases I asked
the question whether the gamin who pelted one with mud
should not receive castigation, and, if he proved so
obstinate and refractory as to deserve it by biting and
kicking, whether it were not legitimate to stun and render
him helpless of further mischief even although, in com
parison of size, the difference might be as marked as
between the British Empire and the late South African
Republics. At the time it appeared somewhat unapprecia-
tive and ungrateful for the past in a Belgian and a Dutch
man to summarily depose England from the proud position
she had gained as the protector of the weak during genera
tions and even centuries, because, under provocation that
they did not take the trouble to consider and understand,
she had resorted to measures of legitimate defence against
a small but unreasonable opponent. The recent perusal of
some secret chapters of diplomatic history has strengthened
this feeling, and perhaps a reconsideration by their light
of what England has done in the past for the little States
may restore the confidence of at least Belgium and Holland
in her, and suggest to the most violent pro-Boers of
Brussels and Amsterdam that their countries may have
further need of her protection and support.
The retrospect may be limited to forty years, but it is
* The Nineteenth Century and After, June, 1902.
37

38 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
impossible to forget that our restitution of Java to the
Dutch in 1816 was not merely one of the most disinterested
acts in history, but that it bestowed on Holland the chief
if not the sole source of her national prosperity and power,
for "without Java " more than one popular Dutch writer
has declared that " Holland would be dead."
The Danish war opened the flood-gates of ambition on
the Continent and commenced the Bismarckian era. The
war with Austria brought France and Prussia face to face,
and, both States hesitating to appeal to the sword, a
period of the gravest peril set in for the group of little
States between Alsace and the North Sea. Who proved
their most, it might even be said their only, disinterested
champion then but England ? This was the more remark
able because it was a period with us of frequent changes
of Ministry, and of the dearth of capable foreign Ministers
that followed the death of Lord Palmerston. If England
had not thrown her asgis over Belgium, Luxemburg and
Holland, no one can doubt that Bismarck and Napoleon
would have sealed a truce at their expense. The cannon
of Sadowa had scarcely ceased to sound when France
proposed to indemnify herself for Prussia's triumph by
reclaiming the frontier of 18 14. What did that mean?
It meant taking Charleroi and Philippeville from Belgium,
although France was a guarantor of her integrity. It was
subsequently explained that this would entail no sacrifice
by Belgium, but it was never made clear by the Imperial
Ministers whether they meant by this that Belgium was
virtually part of France, with common commercial and
political interests, or that she should receive compensation
for the loss of Charleroi, &c, in Luxemburg. There will
always be much difficulty, unless the Empress Eugenie
throws light on the subject in her memoirs, in getting at
the true history of this period, because the Emperor
Napoleon gave his instructions verbally and Prince
Bismarck cynically observed that it was not for him "to
reveal the secrets of France." When he did speak years
later he probably said rather what he wished to be believed
than told all that really happened.
While France aimed at compensating herself in Belgium,
Prussia turned her glances in the direction of Holland.

EM GLAND AND LITTLE STATES 39
The language of Bismarck became menacing, the " reptile
press," then coming into existence under his auspices,
began to demand a rectification of the frontier with the
Netherlands. The Dutch papers replied in valiant style,
and the Dutch Government, alarmed at the prospect, turned
to England for sympathy and support. The Belgian
public were also frightened by the possible extension of
Prussian power on their north-eastern frontier, and their
journals declared that Prussia's acquisition of Limburg
would be a serious menace to their independence. When
the Dutch Minister at Berlin sounded Prince Bismarck as
to Prussia's intention towards his country he received satis
factory assurances ; but he found him very wrath with the
Belgians, and Bismarck declared, with a threatening
gesture, that " La Belgique pourrait le payer cher." There
is no doubt at that moment (January- February 1867)
Bismarck would have raised no objection to Napoleon's
taking Charleroi and Philippeville, provided that would
have satisfied the Emperor. But the Emperor wanted more,
and in another direction.
Notwithstanding the satisfactory assurances mentioned,
Dutch suspicions and fears were not allayed. The Dutch
Chambers held a secret session, and it was probably on this
occasion that the idea of a closer union with England was
first mooted. The apprehension felt on the side of Prussia
naturally turned the minds of the Dutch people and
Government also towards conciliating France, and, as it
was well known that Napoleon wanted Luxemburg, the
King of the Netherlands notified his readiness to sell it.
This was in March 1867, but it is necessary to remember
that in the previous year, while the Treaty of Prague was
being negotiated, Bismarck had dangled the possession
of Luxemburg as a bait before Napoleon, who with fatal
indecision had neglected to seize it at a moment when
Prussia could and would not have opposed the step. The
Dutch Government proposed then to secure French support
by making the ownership of Luxemburg a business trans
action for a certain number of million thalers. The policy
of the Emperor at this moment was defined in the following
terms : " After alluding to the feeling of irritation towards
Prussia which had been felt by the French people at the

40 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
results of the late war, the French Minister stated that
communications had been addressed both to Prussia and
Holland pointing out that Prussia could no longer be per
mitted to retain possession of the Fortress of Luxemburg,
and that France could not look upon the Duchy of Luxem
burg as German, inasmuch as the inhabitants had always
been Frenchmen in the eyes of France." It is important
to note that the British Government, fully informed as to
the Dutch proposal and its motives, expressed its intention
to throw no impediment in the way of this arrangement.
When three of the Powers were practically agreed as to the
transfer of Luxemburg to France, Prussia began to raise
difficulties and to affirm that German opinion would not
allow her to abandon the Duchy. The reference to German
opinion was a sort of preliminary to the publication a few
weeks later of the Treaties of Alliance with the Southern
States of Germany.
Bismarck, having made his position surer in Germany,
prepared to break faith with France. While in the throes
of the struggle with Austria he was willing to keep her quiet
by allowing her to appropriate Belgian territory and
Luxemburg, promising to repay himself at the expense of
Holland in Limburg or elsewhere. But Napoleon, with
more conscience than his opponent, missed his opportunity,
and when he proposed with the general assent to purchase
some of the territory that he had been invited to appro
priate Prussia threw aside the mask and opposed the trans
action. Prussian diplomacy then sought to attain its object
through the simpleness of England, and we were invited
to dissuade King William the Third of the Netherlands
from his plan of selling Luxemburg, which we had already
substantially approved. At the same time Prussia gave
fresh and more positive assurances at The Hague, where
apprehension about Limburg was for the moment allayed.
The consequence of these changes was that France and
Prussia were brought face to face and peace hung by a
thread. However, the good offices of England were
brought into play, a Conference to settle the Luxemburg
question was agreed upon, and -the Treaty of London of
the i ith of May 1867 arranged that the German troops were
to be withdrawn from Luxemburg, the fortress dismantled,

ENGLAND AND LITTLE STATES 41
and the Duchy formed into a neutral State guaranteed by
the Powers.
The secret diplomacy of the years 1866 and 1867 is not
exhausted by the later proposals of January 1867 to
indemnify France in Belgium and Luxemburg. They had
been preceded by a far more audacious project, formu
lated before the Seven Weeks' War, for a French annex
ation of Belgium. The full history of this scheme exists
among the archives of the Brussels Foreign Department,
and will some day be given to the world. In it the
Belgians were treated as mere chattels, the guarantee of the
Powers was dismissed as a figment of the imagination,
and France was to add the nine South Netherland provinces
to her empire. Bismarck declared that " a guarantee was
in these days of little or no value," and he considered
that neither England nor Russia would intervene to save
Belgium. Bismarck supported these views by confident
assertions about the assumed indisposition of the Queen's
Government to take part in what he called the affairs of
the day. But Napoleon, more timid and decidedly averse
to any quarrel with England, made inquiries and sounded
the British Government as to its views about Belgium.
The reply he received was not encouraging. The guarantee
that Bismarck laughed away in Berlin was regarded in
Downing Street as a solemn pledge which it would be our
duty to redeem. A suggestion to propitiate us by either
making Antwerp a free port or attaching it to Holland
failed to produce any modification of our policy and was
turned aside with chilling disdain. It was thus made clear
to the Emperor that to attempt to take Belgium as a
solatium for Prussia's success in Germany was to offend
England, and to give Prussia a powerful ally whenever
the inevitable struggle between the two military Powers
occurred. Before the Luxemburg question had been definitely
settled, apprehension again broke out in Holland at
Prussia's designs on her independence. The most alarming
reports were in circulation. The Dutch Minister in Vienna
told Lord Bloomfield that he was alarmed for the in
dependence and future safety of his country. It was said
that Bismarck had prepared an ultimatum calling on

42 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Holland at brief delay to enter the North German Con
federation. At that moment Bismarck had been making
speeches of Prussia's need of ports and colonies if she
were to become a great maritime nation, and it was argued
by his agents that the simplest way to accomplish this was
by appropriating those of a weak neighbour. Holland,
having failed in the project of propitiating France by the
sale of Luxemburg, turned more and more towards Eng
land as the most likely champion against Prussia. This
was the more necessary as by a fresh shuffling of the
political cards France seemed willing to leave Holland to
Prussia while she turned her attention to Belgium and
sought to strengthen her position in that State by a customs
union, and the amalgamation of the Belgian-Luxemburg
line with her own Eastern Railway.
The consequence of Prussian designs on Holland was
that informal and secret negotiations were begun between
some prominent members of the Government and the King
of the Netherlands for a definite union between Holland
and Great Britain. These negotiations were known to a
very limited number of persons in both countries, and were
not conducted through the regular channels. But none
the less they were carried on by Ministers who, if the affair
had reached consummation, possessed the power to give
effect to their decisions, while on his side King William
was cognisant of and a party to the discussion. At that
time Holland was threatened, not only by a foreign
invasion, but by the extinction of the Orange family. King
William had no apparent thoughts of marrying again.
His sons were dead or dying. There seemed no objection
to Holland escaping forcible union with the German Con
federation by voluntary union with the British Empire.
It might have the opposite result to what occurred in the
seventeenth century — viz. that instead of our having a Dutch
king the Dutch would have got an English sovereign —
but this did not appear very dreadful provided adequate
safeguards were found for Dutch liberty, laws and internal
independence. I am informed that one of the details dis
cussed was the question of Dutch delegates or representa
tives in the Imperial Parliament, and that the negotiations
or discussion broke down on this very point.

cinulaind AND LITTLE STATES 43
The fact that is interesting about this very secret chapter
of history is that at that time the Dutch, or rather their
king, the father of Queen Wilhelmina, saw no objection to
a union with England. And why had he no objection ?
Because he knew that, while France and Prussia were
engaged together or separately in unscrupulous designs on
the small States of Belgic Gaul, England not only had
none, but was strenuously endeavouring to preserve them
from destruction and disappearance from the map. This
contemplated union of Great Britain and the Netherlands
was not as surprising as it may appear now in the light
of pro-Boer ferment in Holland, for the policy of the
Orange family under the three Williams had been strongly
philo-British, and it was not the fault of the first king
or his son that the Princess Charlotte, instead of marrying
Prince Leopold, did not become heiress to the throne of
the Netherlands as well as of England.
It is matter for permanent regret that these informal
and personal negotiations did not reach a more advanced
stage, so that they might have been put formally on record.
Their precise course, as well as the exact cause of their
failure, remains more or less buried in mystery. They may
have broken down on some practical detail as to how the
arrangement was to work, or, as seems more probable,
there may have been a want of courage and confidence in
clinching the arrangement. Be the explanation of the
failure what it may, the mere contemplation of such a
union afforded the strongest possible evidence of com
munity of interest and international trust. From an
historical point of view the project of King William the
Third of the Netherlands recalls that of the Prince of
Orange to seek a new home if the flooding of the country
in 1670 had failed to expel the French invaders. As
nothing has occurred since to diminish England's claim to
be considered a protecting and not an aggressive Power,
there is no valid reason to-day for the Dutch public to
regard the British alliance with different eyes from those
of the Dutch king thirty-five years ago. Perhaps when the
passions of the hour are allayed judicious and gratifying
sentiments will revive.
They have a sound foundation in the incontestable fact

44 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
that England has no schemes of territorial aggrandisement
at the expense of her neighbours. In a patriotic Dutch
man's eyes this must in the long run count for much, and
reason will prevail over temporary passion and prejudice.
The threats of Germany in 1866-7 have been revived on
several occasions since, and they are only dormant now. In
1874 it was the action of German diplomacy, assisted by
the Chauvinism of the Dutch military party, that prevented
the Dutch Government accepting our mediation in the
quarrel with Acheen which has cost Holland immense
sacrifices during the last thirty years. It was in connection
with that event that Bismarck made the very characteristic
confession that "he wanted Holland to bleed to death."
In 1885 there was a still more critical phase in Germany's
treatment of the Holland question, and perhaps the secret
history of that episode contains some surprises, but in the
Far East it led Governor Loudon, of the Dutch Indies,
to declare that when the Black Eagle went up at The
Hague the Union Jack should be hoisted at Batavia. For
some years past German policy has been modified in its
expression if not its aim, and pleasant words have been
substituted for threats. The marriage of the young Queen
with a German Prince was thought to be a great triumph,
and Holland was already classed with Saxony and
Bavaria. Twelve months have damped those hopes. The
German marriage has not been a success in diminishing
the patriotism of the Hollanders. On the contrary, they
regard their dear cousins with more dislike, aversion, and
fear than before the arrival of Prince Heinrich.
If we turn to Belgium, with regard to which Great
Britain has accepted definite responsibilities, the only
definite responsibilities she has yet accepted towards any
European State, we find that they have been discharged
with unflinching spirit. The Belgian people, if we may
trust the speeches in their Chamber and the articles in their
press, do not seem to be aware of this fact. In 1866, when
Bismarck was tempting Napoleon to occupy Belgium,
British diplomacy asserted itself at Paris and made the
Emperor realise that he could only carry out his scheme
by offending England at once and bringing her into the
lists later on. In 1867, when the proposal to incorporate

ENGLAND AND LITTLE STATES 45
Luxemburg with Belgium was mooted as a solution of the
difficulty, England was not unfavourable to the step, which
might have been carried out but for the hesitation of the
Belgian Government itself, arising perhaps from some
private threat from Prussia.
The most signal service that England ever rendered
Belgium, and the clearest evidence given as to her inten
tions to fulfil her promises, were, however, afforded during
the Franco-German War. On the 17th of July 1870 the
two belligerents voluntarily announced their intention to
respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. No corresponding
declaration was made on the subject of Belgium, and
various alarming reports were afloat as to the possibility
of its becoming a field of military operations. Under
these circumstances it was necessary for the guarantors of
Belgium's neutrality and integrity to speak out and not
only to speak but to act. Two of those guarantors were
at war, Russia and Austria said and did nothing, England,
the fifth of them, spoke and acted alone. What did
she do ?
She notified the Governments of France and Prussia
that she expected them to observe the conditions to which
they had subscribed when the kingdom of Belgium was
created. It soon became clear that this was not enough
to remove all prospect of danger. England, accordingly,
entered into direct negotiations with each of the belligerent
Powers, and the result was the signature of two separate
treaties for the protection of Belgium. By the first, signed
in London on the 9th of August 1870, England agreed
to join Prussia in the event of France violating the
neutrality of Belgium. By the second, dated London the
nth of August 1870, England bound herself to join
France in the event of Prussia violating the neutrality of
Belgium. Both these treaties were to remain binding
during the progress of the Franco-Prussian War and for
twelve months after the exchange of the ratification of
any treaty of peace between the combatants.
That was how England fulfilled her obligations towards
Belgium in the hour of peril, and there can be no doubt
in anybody's mind that, so long as we do not publicly
repudiate the guarantee we accepted seventy years ago

46 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
for Belgium's neutrality as "an independent kingdom,"
we shall be as ready in the future as in the past to fulfil
them. It may do some good in the present mood of the
Belgian public to recall the simple fact that of the five
Powers which guaranteed the separate existence of Belgium
under conditions exceptionally favourable for her material
prosperity, England is the only one which has ever given
any tangible proof of her willingness and readiness to
protect her. Her two neighbours can be convicted of having
formed plans on several occasions to despoil and destroy
her in profound indifference to their own word or her
interests. Formerly Belgian statesmen leant so entirely on English
protection that they did nothing for the defence of their
country and neglected their most obvious duties. A
neutral State has its duties to perform while war is being
carried on round its borders, and it must have the means
of discharging them efficiently. A protected State must be
ready to do its utmost to assist and co-operate with those
who consent to protect it. The military arrangements of
Belgium have lagged behind the requirements of her
position, and projects of army reform have given little
or no result. The divisions of parties are so acute that
patriotism has become obscured, and the responsible rulers
may be trusting for security to the execution of insurance
treaties, similar to those signed by England in 1 870, rather
than to national efforts and timely preparation. An insur
ance treaty with an interested Power is, however, a very
different agreement from the corresponding arrangement
concluded by an absolutely disinterested Power, such as
England was and still is with regard to Belgium. The
old fable of the animals who went a-hunting with the lion
illustrates the disappointments that await the weak
when they associate themselves with the strong and the
unscrupulous. Of late years there has been an increasing tendency in
Belgium to represent that, if certain military reforms were
executed, the country could dispense with any external
guarantee and hold its own in the family of nations. If
this argument were only employed as an electioneering
device, or with the object of stimulating sluggish opinion

ENGLAND AND LITTLE STATES 47
on the military situation, there would be no reason to take
serious notice of it. But there is unfortunately little doubt
that a large number of Belgians hold this view in all
sincerity, and the conclusion to which this conviction has
led them is that the protection of England in particular
may be dispensed with. Sentiment on this subject has been
crystallised in the two following sentences. A Belgian
philosopher has said that " there are no little States, only
little minds " ; and a Belgian General of wide reputation
has written not only that she should, but that "Belgium
can rely on her own strength if properly utilised, and dis
pense with the support of England." The former was
probably lost in the mists of philosophy, the latter was
no doubt thinking of one or other of the possible insurance
treaties to which reference has been made. It is, of course,
a question for the Belgians to decide mainly for them
selves, but in making their calculations they should remem
ber that they will have to share the fate of the Power with
which they associate themselves as an ally, and that they
will have to commit themselves to a departure from the
secure haven of guaranteed neutrality before they have any
sure means of knowing to which side victory will incline.
There is also no doubt that the war in South Africa and the
long resistance offered by the Boers have unduly increased
the confidence of nations in citizen armies. The real explana
tion of that long resistance is ignored. The result is set
down to the skill, courage, and determination of the Boers,
whereas no one can doubt who has really studied the
question that the main causes of the prolongation of the
war have been the extraordinary difficulties of the country,
its vast extent, and the absence of roads and railways
throughout its greater portion. It is no disparagement of
Belgian native courage to say that Belgium is traversed
by admirable roads and railways, that it has no natural
defences, and that its artificial defences are limited to two
fortified positions as tetes de pont at Namur and Li£ge
and one fortress, in a very imperfect condition, at Antwerp.
The most self-confident Belgian would be wise to recon
sider the position of his country by the light of all the
circumstances, and, instead of disparaging the value of
the English alliance, the Belgian people should seek to

48 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
supplement and augment it by home preparations. When
the need arises the production of an insurance treaty,
making an ally of the neighbour that committed no
act of aggression, might then prove a master stroke of
policy. Something may have been achieved towards accomplish
ing this result if those in authority in Belgium will impress
on their people the fact that England is the only guaran
teeing Power that ever did anything tangible in the sense
of fulfilling its word towards them. It is proper to recall
the fact that this was done by Mr. Gladstone at a moment
when, to employ Prince Bismarck's sarcastic language, it
was thought that we did not trouble ourselves with such
matters. It was indeed a period of self-effacement, but at
the moment of our extremest indifference to Imperial
responsibilities we were still not willing to depart from
our plighted word. If Mr. Gladstone went to the length
of signing treaties in 1870 binding this country to go to
war with States with which we had no other ground for
quarrel than the desire to protect Belgium, none of our
Continental critics can doubt that, with a stronger Govern
ment and an awakened public interest in foreign questions,
we would do as much and more if to-morrow we were called
upon to redeem our pledge. This is true so long as
we hold ourselves bound by the London Convention of
1831. It is necessary to make this final reservation because our
political horizon has been enlarged of late years, and the
further ends of the world have been drawn into the current
of our affairs. Some day or other this may produce as
a consequence the wish to modify our old standing obliga
tions by withdrawing from guarantees and promises that
are only embarrassing and do not provide us with an
adequate return. It will be very regrettable for old associa
tion's sake if a commencement in the way of curtailment
should be made with Belgium, but the loose talk of Belgian
authorities, literary and military, has done more harm to
the good feeling formerly prevailing here than is credited
in Brussels. The past policy of England towards little
States might be described as guided by a genuine desire
to protect them. There is no denying that this desire has

cinulainiu AND LITTLE STATES 49
been somewhat cooled of late by a want of appreciation in
the protected and by the eagerness shown to disparage the
policy and power of England. We forgive easily, but it is
not so easy to forget, and it might be disastrous for some
of our clients if we remembered everything that they have
said of us during the struggle in South Africa when they
are confronted with a crisis of their own.

A POSSIBLE ADDITION TO THE
DUAL ALLIANCE*
ALL the Governments of Europe, it may be assumed, are
bent on the maintenance of peace, and their efforts are
mainly directed towards the creation of fresh alliances and
understandings among themselves which will conduce to
that end. When the process of dividing the States, great
and little, of Europe into clearly defined groups bound to
one another by distinct political and military engagements
has been brought to completion, then the basis of a general
peace may have been discovered. But at present we are
very far from this condition of things, which would be
termed happy if it produced the desired result. Of the
nineteen European States that possess some degree of
military power, only six have entered into any mutually
binding engagement. These six are the members of the
Triple Alliance, plus Roumania, and of the Dual Alliance.
In addition to those two arrangements for common defen
sive purposes there are the guarantees by the Great Powers
on behalf of Belgium and of Luxemburg. England is a
party to those guarantees, and beyond them she has no
Continental engagement. The remaining twelve States
have no external obligations whatever.
Notwithstanding the general desire for peace, anxiety
is rarely absent from the council chamber in the capitals
of Europe. On the one hand, alliances which are incom
plete because not comprehensive of even the Great Powers
(for England stands aloof), carry within themselves the
germs of decay and disintegration; on the other there
remains the uncertainty to which group the States outside
the existing federations will attach themselves. The
* The Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1902,
SO

THE DUAL ALLIANCE 51
factors of the problem, if not constantly changing, are still
variant in value, and its solution may be found in the
introduction of new elements just as likely as by the
competition and collision of the old. While the attraction
of some of the outside States to one or other of the chief
groups that divide Europe has become a main considera
tion at Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, opinion in those
States themselves has also for some years past been moving
in a direction favourable to the consummation of such an
arrangement. It has gone a certain way towards meeting
the wishes of those statesmen who believe that the balance
of power, and with it the future of Europe, will be deter
mined by the most skilfully formed and powerful combina
tion. What that combination will be is still obscure. In
two countries of Europe, however, the process of evolution
seems likely to produce definite results and a final decision
before very long. These two countries are Holland and
Belgium, small States as they are often termed, but import
ant by reason of their history, the intelligence and enter
prise of their inhabitants, and the high degree of prosperity
which they have attained. There is, moreover, enough
affinity and resemblance between the two peoples to amply
justify the description given me by a distinguished Dutch
officer, "one State with two Sovereigns," and the phrase
aptly illustrates an opinion that has been spreading during
the last ten years among the elite in the two countries that
their interests and policy should be regarded as identical.
This opinion, which was general enough in the Cabinet
and at the mess-table, has spread much further through
the ranks of the people during the last three years, and
under skilful direction might acquire all the force of a
unanimous national sentiment. The war in South Africa
has undoubtedly given it an enormous impetus. The Dutch
and the Belgians saw in the Transvaal a small State
attacked by a Great Power. They have applied the illus
tration to their own position. While they have been
encouraged by the evidence afforded as to the advantages
possessed by those who remain on the defensive under the
conditions of modern warfare, and led to form therefrom
an optimistic opinion as to what little States may accom
plish in defence of their independence, they have also

52 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
realised that union is necessary for self-preservation, and
this may eventually result in the practical reunion of the
Seventeen Provinces which has been a dream for over three
centuries. If the question were entirely confined to the Dutch and
the Belgians, their gravitation towards one another would
be a matter with which the rest of Europe would not
greatly concern itself. It would be effected with the
deliberation that is more or less characteristic of the two
peoples, and Europe would arrange its own affairs in
complete indifference to the topics agitating opinion at
The Hague and Brussels. But the promoters of a Belgian-
Dutch accord have seen in recent events ground for
accelerating their movements and enlarging their pro
gramme. Little States may offer an obstinate defence, but
in the end they succumb. It is not every little State that
has at its disposal the resources for war of the late South
African Republics, nor their natural defences as well. In
these days of torpedo-boats and light-draught warships
the Dutch may reasonably doubt whether their dykes
would answer as well as in the time of William of
Orange. Belgium is practically an open country outside
Antwerp. The Ardennes, traversed by splendid roads,
would offer no place of refuge for distressed freedom even
if Belgian patriotism went to the length of heroically seek
ing their shelter. Opinion is not so prejudiced across the
Channel by admiration for the Boers as to blind the Dutch
and Belgians to the fact that they do not possess the
natural advantages that made the defenders of the veldt
so formidable. For this reason the advisability, the neces
sity even, of attaching themselves to some Great Power or
group of Great Powers has forced itself upon the conviction
of the two peoples concerned, and it only remains for
circumstances to mould this persuasion into the definite
form required for the conclusion of an alliance.
There are obvious reasons why this process should prove
more rapid in Holland than in Belgium. Holland is an
entirely independent and uncontrolled country that must
trust in the main to her own efforts. She can make treaties
as she deems necessary without consulting any one. If she
likes to declare war, no one can say that she is breaking

THE DUAL ALLIANCE 53
any understanding and thereby increasing the responsi
bility of those who have contracted obligations on her
behalf. Holland is free to do what she likes, subject to the
inseparable condition that the Dutch people accept the
consequences. But it is otherwise with Belgium. She is not free to act
as Holland can. She is not less an independent country,
but she is guaranteed and bound to neutrality. A neutral
State cannot conclude an alliance without destroying the
very basis of its own existence. There is the following
additional consideration for the Belgians before deciding
to rend the bands which bind them. The extraordinary
prosperity of their country has been gained as a neutral
State, and for nearly seventy years not a shot has been
fired — at least by a foreign soldier — in what was " the
cockpit of Europe." Many Belgians may naturally think
that this prosperity and peace are due to the fact that
their country has been neutral and protected by an inter
national guarantee. Would those advantages depart if
there were no longer neutrality and the guarantee of the
Powers? Of course no positive assurance can be given on
that point, but these considerations at least explain why
so many Belgians are reluctant to quit the secure haven in
which they have so long lived happily and with waxing
prosperity. Only the apprehension that the haven may
become a trap will bring round the mass of the Belgians
to the view that the independence of their country should
be free and uncontrolled by the limitations imposed by a
guarantee. Belgian opinion is divided on most subjects;
it is only in an hour of extreme peril that it is likely to
attain unanimity on this.
At the same time two things are becoming every day
clearer. In the first place a nation of the numbers, wealth,
resources, and ambition of the Belgians ought not to need
any guarantee. They should work out their own destiny
in conjunction with their natural allies the Dutch, and in
co-operation with the friends and associates that the perils
of the hour may bring them. In the second place the
guarantors of Belgium in 1831 may at any moment think
that the term of their guarantee has been reached. The
condition of Europe now is totally different from what

54 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
it was then. Belgium herself has changed, and with the
same military organisation as her neighbours should be
well able to take care of herself. Moreover there is not a
shred of evidence to show that the guarantee of the Five
Powers possessed any meaning or value except for Eng
land. Russia was too far off, Austria too indifferent, while
France and Prussia repeatedly played games of perilous
political intrigue with each other, the counters being
Belgian independence. An international guarantee that is
demonstrably not sincerely adhered to by all the guarantors
is deceptive and dangerous. Either it possesses no mean
ing, or it must place the one faithful trustee in a false
and humiliating position. It is even conceivable that
England might find herself committed through the defec
tion of her co-guarantors to a course that would ally her
with the very Power or Powers from whom she herself
would ultimately have the most to dread. The guarantee
of Belgium by this country as one of the Powers is more
or less of an anachronism. It would be far better to sub
stitute for it a definite Anglo-Belgian treaty which would
give both countries some assurance as to what they would
do in a crisis for mutual support. For that Belgian opinion
also might manifest greater gratitude than it does for the
existing guarantee, in the reality of which it pretends not
to have much faith, although a declaration of England's
withdrawal from it without compensation would be
denounced as an act of treachery.
For these reasons the development of the external ques
tion in Belgium must necessarily prove slower than in
Holland, and probably the course taken will be dictated
by the example set by that country. Our attention, there
fore, should be mainly directed for the present to the
course of political events at The Hague.
Two radical changes have taken place in Dutch senti
ment during the last thirty years. There has been a
steadily increasing sense of the necessity of an alliance
with a Great Power, and there has also been a movement
of sympathy towards France. To students of history this
gravitation towards the ancient enemy must appear curious.
Its explanation is probably to be found in the facts that
France is not regarded under present conditions as an

THE DUAL ALLIANCE 55
aggressive Power, and that old apprehensions have been
superseded by a greater dread. There may be German
influences at the Court, but the sympathies of the Dutch
people are in an increasing measure French. They are
based primarily on the conviction that nothing need be
feared from the French even if after a war they recovered
Alsace-Lorraine and drove the Germans behind the Rhine.
They are strengthened by the conviction that there is
everything to be feared from the expansion of Germany
set on the acquisition of colonies and naval power. Dutch
opinion leans to the conclusion that if France were to go
down again before her German rival the victor would take
his compensation in Holland and Java, and that there
would then be no possibility of successful resistance. With
that conviction it is only natural that the Dutch should
conclude that their true policy is to co-operate with a still
unvanquished France in repelling a common danger. The
idea of such an alliance is rendered the more captivating
when it is believed that it would contribute towards the
maintenance of peace. The addition of Holland to the
Dual Alliance would be an asset of considerable value, but
its real importance would only become apparent after
Belgium had been brought into the same league.
No one who has visited Holland and discussed political
questions with its leading men can have any doubt as to
the drift of Dutch policy, which is unmistakably towards
France and away from Germany. There have been, it is
true, some assertions of late to the contrary, and the
Vienna press in particular has displayed amazing assurance
in declaring that the recent visit of Dr. Kuyper, the Dutch
Premier, to that city was a sort of preliminary to the
addition of Holland to the Triple Alliance. Dr. Kuyper
himself declares that he was merely employing his annual
holiday in an inspection of technical schools in Austria.
The present condition of the Triple Alliance is not so
healthy as to attract new members without more careful
consideration of its chances of durability than Dr. Kuyper
could have given to the subject during his brief visit to the
old imperial city in the dead season. Moreover Holland
would not be moved by any indiscretions of Dr. Kuyper,
even if he were capable of committing them, which is not

56 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
proved. There stands on record the fate of the De Witts
when they advocated an unpatriotic policy, as a warning
to all who would promote a course opposed to the nation's
interests and wishes.
While there is no room for uncertainty as to the direction
that Dutch policy is taking, it is, of course, very uncertain
when or how a formal declaration of its purport will be
made. The military position of Holland, although it has
been quietly improved to a surprising extent within the
last two years, is not yet such as to incline the Dutch to
risk a declaration of war, for the publication of Holland's
joining the Dual Alliance might conceivably be received
by the Triple Alliance as a defiance and accepted as a
signal for the commencement of hostilities. For this
reason the negotiations are sure to be kept secret and the
publication of any treaty deferred until it is thought that
it can be done without committing an imprudence. There
is, indeed, one essential matter that the Dutch have to
attend to before they may show their hand, and that is
the defences of Rotterdam. At present this important port,
through which passes a far larger proportion of food into
Germany than is generally realised, possesses no defences
against serious attack. Its position at the mouth of the
Rhine would be vital to Germany, and if it were strength
ened to such a degree as to convert it into a first-class
fortress Rotterdam would prove a serious thorn in her side.
At present the whole system of Dutch national defence
centres on Amsterdam. Some of Holland's best military
authorities think that it ought to rest on Rotterdam, and
all are agreed in considering that place much neglected.
The satisfactory settlement of this question will no doubt
give greater confidence to the Dutch people, and more
assurance to their policy.
But nothing will encourage the Dutch more than the
development of Belgian opinion in favour of an alliance
with them. All the bases of such a friendly understanding
have been laid. The old religious differences which mainly
led to the break-up of the short-lived kingdom of the
Netherlands are no longer acute. Holland is less aggres
sively Protestant than it was; the heads of the Roman
Catholic Church have indeed every reason to be satisfied

THE DUAL ALLIANCE 57
with the total of their followers in the land which William
the Silent was supposed to have made Lutheran for ever.
On the other side the Belgians are far more disposed to
see in their northern neighbours brothers with common
interests than when they shared the same destiny and
sovereign. The passions of the War of Liberation have
died down, and many historical students hold that they
arose from a mere misunderstanding. At the present time
a spirit of camaraderie exists between the Dutch and
Belgian armies, which might be trusted to fight well
together in defence of their common Netherlands.
If the development of Dutch opinion and Government
action has been and will continue to be slow, that of the
Belgians may be trusted to prove slower. Their history
makes them timid, the curious political conditions under
which they have lived during over sixty years explain and
justify the hesitation and doubt with which they have
approached the reform of their military system and put
off the inevitable adoption of compulsory service. They
are reluctant to quit the shelter which Europe provided for
them, although they well know that it was not done for
love of them, but simply because the Powers were safe
guarding themselves. In those days no one thought of
the Belgians. On the political chessboard they ranked no
more than a pawn. Now that Belgium is rich and pros
perous, aspiring to play a prominent part in the world of
commerce and adventure beyond the seas, and controlling
a vast colonial possession with unlimited possibilities of
development, her position and the view taken of her by
foreign Powers are widely different from what they were
when Palmerston arranged the London Conference and
Marshal Gerard marched to besiege Antwerp. Europe
may well think that such a State as now exists should be
able to walk alone, and dispense with a guarantee that has
never possessed any reality except for England. For these
reasons the Belgians who have long been advocating the
adoption of compulsory service without the privilege of
compounding for a substitute, and the increase of the peace
effective to a figure that would provide Antwerp and the
forts of Namur and Liege with adequate garrisons at all
times, are doing patriotic work. So far as actual results

58 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
go they have not accomplished much, but they have done
something towards educating public opinion on the lines
that if Belgium is to be saved the Belgians must be ready
and trained to defend their country, and that they will
find far more friends if they are able to take their own
part than if they trust exclusively to the shelter of the old
guarantee. I have ventured to assert that there is no doubt as to the
direction in which Dutch policy and sympathies have
moved. But clearly as the people of Holland are gravitat
ing towards the Dual Alliance, the tendency in Belgium
is still more marked. There the sympathy with France is
universal, so also are the dislike and dread of the Germans.
These sentiments, which seem more natural in the Walloons
than in the Flemings, are, I believe, held most strongly by
the latter. Trade competition at Antwerp, where Germany
has been working out the same cuckoo policy she is attempt
ing at Shanghai and in the Yangtse Valley, is probably at
the root of this opinion. "Away with the Germans"
would be just as popular a cry to-day as it was in the time
of the Emperor Maximilian. A combination with France
is the one political arrangement that would command the
unanimous assent of the Belgian races, and however slow
the progress may seem to those who only know what is
passing on the surface, the bases of such an alliance have
probably been well and surely laid in secret. The definitive
junction of France and Belgium, on lines similar to those
connecting Austria and Roumania, would be the natural
precursor of the more extended programme that would
bring Holland into the league. Although I have purposely
omitted all reference to Russia, Belgium and Holland are
being, to a large extent, drawn into the Dual Alliance by
her presence, and by belief in her power. Russia has a very
good name in those countries, which are largely interested
in her material development, and which have nothing to
fear from her in any event.
Two important consequences from this possible develop
ment and reassertion of Netherlandish influence and power
in the sphere of politics claim notice. In the first place,
the amount of additional strength and advantage that the
new allies would bring to the two Powers, and especially

THE DUAL ALLIANCE 59
to France, demands attention, and is well deserving of the
careful consideration of military men. In the second place,
we are bound to consider how such a development of
national opinion and policy in North-West Europe would
affect our own position and responsibilities.
Taking the points in their order, it is clear at a glance
that the junction of two highly intelligent, vigorous, and
wealthy races with the members of the Dual Alliance would
be an event of the greatest importance. The addition of
thirteen million Netherlanders to France, not as subjects,
but as allies, would redress at a stroke that deficiency of
population which places her at an apparent disadvantage
as compared with Germany. Comparisons are dangerous
and unpleasant, but in all essentials it may be affirmed that
these races are the equals of a corresponding number of
Germans. Valuable as that addition would be from the
standpoint merely of numbers, its value is enormously
increased by the question of position. Holland and
Belgium flank the uncovered side of Germany. The exist
ing position of the Germans in Alsace-Lorraine is so
strongly defended from Thionville to Strasburg that the
most sanguine French commander would probably refrain
from attacking it, preferring to stand on the defensive in
his own positions along the Vosges. Not merely would
this be an uncongenial role for the French army, but no
signal successes are ever likely to be gained in strictly
defensive warfare. An inconclusive and sanguinary
struggle would be almost as bad as a defeat for France,
because her inferiority to Germany in population would,
after it was over, be accentuated. In such a predica
ment the French generals might be induced to attempt
some hazardous movement that might lead to absolute
disaster. But the addition of Belgium and Holland to the Dual
Alliance would open up an entirely new line of attack,
and supply a field of operations congenial to the character
of the French army, and associated with some of its most
memorable successes. By Namur and Liege a Franco-
Netherlander army could operate upon Cologne and the
Lower Rhine. At Liege it would have a first-class base,
for General Brialmont's admirable forts at that place, with

60 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
an efficient garrison, are practically impregnable,* and the
fortified position at Namur would effectually cover the
line of communications with France. While part of the
French army would stand on the defensive in the Vosges,
the other part, in conjunction with its allies, would occupy
Liege and threaten Cologne. Its presence alone at Liege
would exercise a paralysing influence on the Germans at
Metz, and compel the Germans themselves to risk much to
improve the situation. Reference has been made to the
necessity for the Dutch to place Rotterdam in a state of
suitable defence. A similar obligation rests on the Belgians
to keep always an adequate garrison at Liege to hold it
against a coup de main. On the outbreak of hostilities the
Germans would not hesitate to sacrifice an immense number
of men to secure that vital position.
As alliances are formed and enlarged nowadays for the
purpose of maintaining peace, the addition of two dis
tinctly pacifically disposed States, such as Belgium and
Holland are, to the Dual Alliance would tend to strengthen
its purely defensive character. They will come out of their
shells as it were solely through apprehension lest they may
lose their own national forms of independence, Holland
because she is coveted for her colonies and for holding
the outlets of German rivers, Belgium because her soil is
threatened by each of her neighbours in search of a promis
ing field for warlike operations. Against both these perils
the only practical safeguard is the conclusion in good
time of a defensive alliance with the Powers which have
obviously no aggressive designs on either State.
Coming now to the second point, as to how such a
regrouping of the Powers would affect England, we are
first bound to note that Belgium's repudiation of her
neutrality would entail the lapse of the guarantee, which
constitutes England's chief Continental responsibility.
That obligation may be described as the natural and
logical outcome of England's historic policy towards her
neighbours. It would be matter of regret if it disappeared,
and the regret would be deepened if it were accompanied
by the breach of an ancient friendship. At the same time
* True with the artillery of that time; untrue in 1914 with Krupp's
i6"8 cannon and mortars.

THE DUAL ALLIANCE 61
it is well to look facts in the face from both the British
and the Belgian standpoints. What responsibility and
risk does the guarantee impose on this country ? What
advantage and security will it bring to Belgium ? With
regard to the former, England on the outbreak of a fresh
Franco-German war would no doubt conclude separate
conventions with the belligerents, as was done in 1870 for
the protection of Belgian soil. On that occasion Belgian
territory was not violated. For reasons already given, this
happy experience is not likely to be repeated during the
next war. The battles of the campaign are far more likely
to be fought in the Ardennes than in Alsace. England
then would apparently be committed to join the Power
whose military movements were the slowest, which is on
the face of it absurd. She could only escape from the
dilemma by openly joining one of the groups of Powers
before war was declared, which would in itself signify
the tearing up of the London Treaty. In either event this
country would commit itself to a definite combination with
one group of Powers long before it could feel sure that its
true interests were on the same side. The proper and the
honourable course would be to cancel the guarantee, and
to substitute for it an open Anglo-Belgian treaty binding
England to support Belgium against aggression, and leav
ing it for France or Germany to become a party to the
agreement by scrupulously respecting Belgian territory.
Such an arrangement would satisfy Belgian opinion in a
sense that the existing guarantee fails to do. The mass
of the Belgians seem to be ignorant of this guarantee so
far as England is concerned. I have never heard a Belgian
refer to it, and the widespread opinion is that Belgium
owes her existence to France. Among the elite of the
official, military, and literary worlds there is of course no
such ignorance, but the opinion held with regard to the
past has no bearing on the views of the present and the
fears of the future. Let it, then, be clearly stated that no
confidence is felt in the "guarantee " of England, and it
is mainly for that reason that Belgian opinion is turning
to other sources of strength and other protectors.
This is not only natural but even to be commended by
those who are most anxious for the continuance of the

62 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
entente between England and Belgium. If the " guaran
tee " is hollow and meaningless it is far better that it
should be discarded in good time than left to prove itself
a broken reed in the hour of trial. The unfortunate part
of the matter is that the sentiment of self-assertion in the
first place and of providing for self-defence in the second
synchronises with a serious development of anti-English
feeling in both Belgium and Holland. In those countries
any attempt to come to a distinct understanding with
England would at present be very unpopular. They are
only likely to realise her disinterestedness in the hour of
danger, and in the meantime they may do something that
will have the effect of throwing England into the- arms of
the Triple Alliance. It will be a bad thing for both
Holland and Belgium if they so mismanage what is in
itself a natural and laudable development of their national
policies as to convert it into a quarrel with England, but
recent occurrences have not tended to raise our opinion of
their capacity for self-control. Even if French diplomacy
is successful in winning over the whole of the Netherlands
to the Dual Alliance, it will be a poor triumph if the
process has the effect of uniting England and Germany as
they have not been united since the Seven Years' War.
The pacific and dignified entrance of Holland and
Belgium into the Dual Alliance without defiance to us or
insult to our character would not be a matter at which we
should take the least umbrage, or for which we should be
called upon to make counter-arrangements. It would be
the legitimate proceeding of two peoples who conceived
that they were menaced in their liberties and possessions.
Nor if it were brought about in a quiet fashion, with due
regard for prudence, need it imperil even for a moment
the peace of Europe. The addition of members, whose
desire for peace and freedom from chauvinism are beyond
suspicion, to the Dual Alliance would tend rather to
accentuate its pacific character than to threaten an early
assumption of the offensive. Dutch phlegm and Flemish
caution might also to some degree modify and restrain the
bellicose inclinations of French patriots. Nor would it be
altogether a misfortune for us if the strengthening of the
array in the other camp were to oblige Germany to curtail

ixiE DUAL ALLIANCE 63
her naval programme and to concentrate all her efforts on
her land forces and defences.
By whatever methods the new movement among the
peoples of the Netherlands for union between themselves
and for combination with France and Russia may be
brought to consummation, it will be well for us to be
prepared for such a contingency. They may take a period
of years in effecting their arrangements. Both races are
cautious and slow in their transaction of business, and there
are undoubtedly some military questions of organisation
that have first to be settled before the final step is taken.
On the other hand the whole question may be precipitated
by a crisis along their borders. The French have shown
admirable restraint for over thirty years, but no one can
tell at what moment their patience will reach the snapping-
point. Once they are satisfied of the intentions and
sympathy of their northern neighbours they may not wait
until tedious pourparlers have been brought to a formal
conclusion. Holland and Belgium may be thinking mainly
of peace, but they may have to conclude their new
departure to the music of the cannon. It is true that there
is always the pacific influence of Russia to be taken into
account, but Russia herself may be drawn into war in Asia,
and there is always the possibility that France, sick at
heart for the deferred revanche, may break loose from all
control. The causes which are driving Holland and
Belgium to coalesce, and to seek protectors in whose power
they believe and from whom they conceive that they have
nothing to fear, are altogether natural, and spring not
from the intrigues of statesmen but from the unfettered
and spontaneous growth of national apprehensions. Public
opinion in both countries is slowly but surely guiding their
Governments in what it thinks to be the right direction,
and moulding the national policy of the Netherlands in
the best form to safeguard their independence, prosperity,
and dynasties.

GERMANY AND BELGIUM*
If the war between Japan and Russia has revolutionised
the position in the Far East, we may before long have
cause to exclaim that it has produced a not less startling
change in the situation of Western Europe. A new Power
holds the Eastern stage, but at the same moment an old
Power, whose system of policy has always been merciless,
has acquired on the Western a military preponderance that
will call for all the vigilance of the friends of liberty if
it is to be restrained. The downfall of Russia leaves
Germany under the Prussian aegis incomparably the first
military Power on the Continent. Her numbers, and still
more the strategic advantages of her position, give her an
incontestable superiority over France, and, now that Russia
has become for the moment a quantite ne gligeable in
Europe, she is not refraining from showing her sense of it
in the old Bismarckian manner. It is settled design, not
tactless egotism, that has led the Emperor William to
affront France in Morocco, and the insult may soon develop
into an injury that no high-mettled nation could endure.
The French President and people are all for peace, but
even their patient philosophy may not have contemplated
having to receive orders from Berlin. The Moroccan
problem was to have provided France with a gratifying
triumph ; the German Emperor is bent on converting it into
a humiliation, and only the prompt and vigorous action of
Great Britain may suffice to save the situation and avert
an international calamity.
It is not only in Morocco that German policy has for
some time past been hatching mischief, and in its habitually
careless way the British Government has remained ignorant
of, or indifferent to, what was happening almost before its
* Nineteenth Century and After, July, 1905.
64

GERMANY AND BELGIUM 65
gaze. No one has ever affirmed that England follows a
settled, systematic policy in her foreign affairs. It is
nearer the truth to say that she commits a succession of
blunders, and then by a stroke of genius or good fortune
repairs them all by an alliance with Japan or the revival
of the entente cordiale. But the situation in Western Europe
is not identical with that in the Far East. In the Chinese
provinces and on the Sea of Japan, Japan has done the
work alone; in Europe, when and if the blow falls in
Lorraine, England must be ready to do her share of the
work. If it is made clear in good time that she has both
the intention and the strength to play her part in the main
tenance of the balance of power in Western Europe, the
menacing clouds at present obscuring the horizon may pass
off without breaking in a storm. But if she falters, the
blow will have been delivered before her intentions are
revealed in action, and the effort to retrieve an initial
catastrophe may prove beyond her power.
While Morocco is in everybody's mouth — and it may
just as easily furnish a casus belli as did a Hohenzollern
candidature for the Spanish throne thirty-five years ago —
there have been still clearer indications for some time past
of German plans in the sister kingdoms of Belgium and
Holland. In speaking of those States it may be necessary
to draw a sharp line between the purpose and projects of
their Governments and the sympathies of their peoples ; but
until there is a revolution the political action of a country
is directed by the ruler and his Government. The immense
progress made by the German propaganda in those States
within the last few years appears to have escaped notice.
It has been more remarkable in Belgium even than in
Holland, where a German prince is the sovereign's consort.
That the Belgian official world has long been mistrustful
of France is no great secret. In the last generation it was
the policy of Napoleon the Third that caused the dread;
in the present it is the fear that a closer alliance with her
might lead to an inroad of Republicanism fatal to
monarchical institutions. That fear has not been dimin
ished by the extreme anti-clerical action of recent French
Ministries, and the sympathy of the Catholic party in
Belgium — the larger half of the nation — has, consequently, 5

66 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
been temporarily alienated from France. This natural
tendency has harmonised with and promoted the plans
favoured by the Belgian Government. The gravitation
towards Germany through dynastic considerations has now
been encouraged, if not accelerated, by a religious move
ment that has stilled, if not stifled, the sympathy naturally
felt by two branches of a kindred race speaking to a great
extent the same tongue. But it may be very much ques
tioned whether the gravitation of Belgian opinion towards
Germany would have been so pronounced as it has become
during the last two years if it had not been also alienated
during that period to as great an extent from England
as it has been from France.
Down to the year 1885 the reliance of the Belgian nation
on the firmness and efficacy of British protection was
perfect and without doubt. In that year speeches were
made in the House of Commons to the effect that England
could no longer be expected to champion Belgium in every
eventuality. This was not an exposition of policy by the
British Government, but it was the opinion of responsible
persons who had been Ministers. The old belief in Belgium
that whatever the others might do, one of the guarantee
ing Powers might be implicitly trusted, was then rudely
shaken, and during the Boer war the unfriendly agencies
always operating in foreign countries widened the breach,
not merely by representing that England's guarantee was
not to be relied upon, but that she had not the power to
make it good. Nothing has happened since to undo the
mischief worked by designing men with regard to Anglo-
Belgian relations in 1899- 1900. On the contrary, those
relations have been made worse by the anti-Congo cam
paign. There are some persons who feign to think that
the Belgian people ought not to resent the unqualified
attacks on their system and their countrymen in Central
Africa. Their views on human nature, to say nothing of
national spirit, must be peculiar. The incontestable truth
is that the Belgian people resent these attacks just as much
as we should do any similarly sweeping charges on our rule
and our compatriots in India. The really singular thing in
the international situation is that the same sentimental
outburst, pitched in a key of frenzy, which cost us the

GERMANY AND BELGIUM 67
cordiality of the Sultan of Turkey — a really indispensable
ally for us with sixty million Mahomedan fellow-subjects
and interests that should be predominant in several of the
most important countries of Islam — has now probably lost
us the trust and goodwill of the one Continental people
that really desired to possess our friendship and confidence.
But the irony of the two occurrences is revealed in the
circumstance that it is Germany who has benefited by our
blunders. At Constantinople her influence has long been
supreme ; at Brussels the protection of Germany is solicited
and relied upon. To complete the contrast between the
results from a system of practical statesmanship and those
of an insouciant zeal for unattainable humanitarian ideals,
it would only need for the truth of my conviction to be
established that the Foreign Office was lured on in 1902-3
to make its attack on the Congo Administration by the
encouragement and half-promises of Germany.
The first object and duty of a Belgian ruler is to preserve
the neutrality and independence of his country and to keep
it free from the ravages of war. In 1870 Belgium, with the
vigilant support of England, mantained her rights intact;
during the crisis of 1875 preparations were made to ensure
the active participation of this country in the defence of
Belgium against Germany. Now the situation is altered.
The Belgians mostly fear that in any war the temptation
to the French to move down the Meuse Valley and secure
a fair field for offensive operations from Liege may prove
irresistible. The dominant wish now is to keep out the
French instead of the Germans, as in 1870 and 1875. This
desire is increased by the conviction that whilst a treaty
with Germany would deter the French from crossing the
frontier, a similar arrangement with France would not
restrain the Germans, and might very probably impel them
to commence an offensive movement for the protection of
their right flank that would entail the inclusion of a large
part of Belgium within the field of operations. The first
advantage, from the Belgian point of view, of a " protect
ing " treaty with Germany is that it would be the most
efficacious means of keeping opposing armies out of the
country. But it has other contingent recommendations that
make it scarcely less attractive. The support of a victorious

68 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Germany — and no other result appears, in Belgian opinion,
to be possible — would provide an efficient shield for the
Congo State against the alleged rapacity of England.
Finally, the ulterior risks from the friendship and protec
tion of Germany are deemed less than those from the side
of France. An easily victorious France might wish to convert
Belgium into a Departement de la Dyle, whereas Germany
would no more interfere with the dynasty than it does in
Saxony or Bavaria, and would limit any union to the
conditions of a ZoUverein.
There are obvious considerations, therefore, that explain
the gravitation of Belgium towards Germany. The practi
cal advantages are not to be overlooked; and additional
weight has been given to them by a feeling of resentment
towards the English for their attacks on the Congo
Administration, and by no little apprehension as to the
security of that State against our aggression. Of the
reality of the movement no doubt can be entertained, but
whether it has found formal expression within the four
corners of a regular convention is, naturally, one of the
closest kept secrets of diplomacy. There are, however,
many well-informed persons who are convinced that a
secret treaty was concluded, seventeen or eighteen years
ago, between these neighbours as the consequence of the
belief referred to that England might no longer be
implicitly trusted. If such an arrangement was concluded,
it is probable that its stipulations, through the lapse of
time and the change in the European position, now require
some modification, and possibly some enlargement. The
benevolent neutrality of Belgium on behalf of Germany,
to be converted into an active partnership under circum
stances that we do not know, would seriously embarrass
the French position on the north-east frontier, and would
put an end to all the favourite schemes of French
strategists. In Holland the progress of the German propaganda has
been less pronounced than in Belgium, because there was
no need to attain the same definite results. The strategical
position of Holland would count for nothing in any
imminent European struggle. The active participation of
her army alone, and without the co-operation of Belgium,

GERMANY AND BELGIUM 69
or the South Netherlands, would never turn the scale in
any great struggle. No one menaces Holland at the present
time. German policy is in accord with the wishes of the
Dutch people, who mainly desire to be left alone. There
is a spreading conviction in Holland that little States such
as it is are helpless beside great empires, and this has
fostered an apathy that precludes the adoption of a more
spirited and prescient policy. The attitude of the Dutch
in view of German aggression in the future is one of in
difference. They are assured that under no circumstances
will Germany perpetrate any act of aggression at their
expense, and as their dynasty promises before long to be
a purely German one, there are many who will philosophi
cally accept that change as an indication of the natural fate
of their country. Of course there is truth in the recent
assurances of a Dutch official, that there is a powerful party
in Holland who cling to their independence and old-
fashioned ways, and who detest the idea of being dis
ciplined by the Prussians, but unfortunately they are not
shaping the policy of their country at the present hour.
That is being done by Dr. Kuyper, and the moulding of
the destinies of this little nation in his hands is the more
insidious because his policy harmonises with the character
istics of the nation in requiring only somnolent inaction
until the opportunity for effective useful action shall have
passed by.
The defection of some States, the weakness of others,
imposes on the British Government an enormous responsi
bility at the present juncture. On its wisdom and prompti
tude during a critical period, the length of which cannot
be foreseen, the political fabric of Western Europe
depends. Germany, well knowing that the Triple Alliance
is almost moribund, and clearly perceiving that the dis
content of her own allies, as well as the profound distrust
of her intentions felt by the whole of the British people,
will soon leave her isolated in Europe, is girding up her
loins to crush France whilst Russia is too crippled to come
to her aid, and before the British people fully arouses itself
to the necessity perhaps of sending half a million men to
support the French at Chalons. To strike a people set on
peace, and with no thought of aggression in their minds,

70 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
in this sudden and unscrupulous manner will be a crime
against humanity, but history shows that it is a method
often favoured by the House of Prussia. There has been
but one slight modification in the Hohenzollern family
policy, due to what is magniloquently called the progress
of civilisation. Whereas Frederick the Great could carry
out his plans the moment he had decided to do so, the
Emperor William has to take some account of appearances
and to create a justification that shall allay the German
conscience. This may require a little time, but it will not
be difficult. In such matters the German conscience is not
hyper-sensitive. The Emperor has but to show that
through France he is striking the first blow against
England, and the trick is done. " England's Arch-enemy "
is too astute not to know that.
The paramount question of the hour is, How is England
going to prevent the perpetration of a monstrous iniquity ?
She can only do so by promptly exercising all the means
and all the influence at her disposal. It is said — I know
it is believed in the highest quarters — that Germany can
be deterred from prosecuting this adventure by the threat
— no, by the clear perception without a threat — of what
England can do upon the sea. It has been glibly written
that British intervention will cost Germany her fleet and
her colonies. This boast may not bear critical examina
tion. The German navy is not yet strong enough to cope
with the British in a contest for the mastery of the seas,
but its leaders undoubtedly look forward to put our mettle
and our efficiency to the test in the earlier phases of the
struggle, and to saving their fleet for another day in its
safe places of retreat during the later. And as for her
colonies, they are probably safe because they present no
great attractions for acquisition. The deterrent provided,
then, by what are called the certain consequences of British
intervention is not so efficacious as appears to be believed.
If Great Britain intends to restrict any intervention on the
side of France to the ocean, that will not prevent the
German Emperor from carrying out his projects. He must,
of course, be prepared to lose something ; but if he were to
triumph over France, as he is convinced that he would, his
gains would so immeasurably exceed his losses that he

GERMANY AND BELGIUM 71
could be indifferent to the latter. Among the most prized
of those gains, in his mind, would be this : If France is
again overthrown, one of the conditions forced upon her
will be the restriction of her army to a limited number,
which will leave Germany free to diminish the expenditure
on her own army and to increase that on her navy, and to
make it a really colossal force. That peril should be
considered by every British subject anxious for the security
of his island home, for it will surely be the penalty of any
shortcomings in our support of France, or in our apprecia
tion of the dangers of the existing position of affairs.
The notification that any co-operation with France
against unprovoked aggression would not be restricted to
naval operations might have a really deterrent effect, for,
although it is the custom in Germany to speak lightly of
the British Army, it is still not forgotten that we did send
a quarter of a million men to South Africa, and that,
despite many blunders, we did triumph over an obstinate
foe and great natural difficulties. If it were really believed
that we would do now what we ought to have done in
October 1870, after the surrender of Metz, then in all
probability German aggression would never emerge from
the chrysalis of "bluff"; but, unfortunately, there is
scepticism at Berlin as to the thoroughness with which we
would support France in an hour of danger. If we were
on genuinely good terms with Belgium, a means could
easily be found for showing the Germans that we were
resolved to act up to the full letter and spirit of our engage
ments and their accruing responsibilities. But, unfortu
nately, our relations with Belgium are below the surface
as bad as they can be. If they are not, it is quite feasible
to do at this moment what was done in 1875 during a very
similar crisis, and to show by the despatch of a military
commission to the Meuse that we do not intend to shirk
our obvious duties in Western Europe. But at this moment
this way of speaking does not appear to be open to us. For
the present, at all events, it is to Germany herself, and not
to England, that Belgium looks for her own salvation.
How, then, can England act expeditiously and effectu
ally for the preservation of peace? There is one course
that, if taken promptly, may ensure it, and our influence

72 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
properly exercised might avail to secure its adoption. The
peace of Europe may be saved not in Paris or London,
but in Vienna. The restraining influence of the Austrian
Emperor may effect what no other agency could accom
plish. Austria is a party to the Triple Alliance, but of
course there is no obligation on her to assist North Germany
in an aggressive war of which she did not approve. Nor
would there be any obligation on her to go to the assistance
of her ally if England joined France. The same observa
tions apply to Italy. But an intimation to this effect from
Germany's two partners might produce a salutary impres
sion at Berlin. The notification from Italy would not have
much effect, because it has for some time been realised that
no active help against France could be counted upon from
her. But such an intimation from Austria would be of very
different import. It would be touching the sore spot in the
inner mind of the North Germans when they talk about
the possibility of their coming isolation unless they strike
their blow at France quickly. Whether the Emperor
Francis Joseph can be induced, even by his fervent love
of peace, to give the counsel that will preserve it is uncer
tain, but there are strong reasons in the internal condition
of Austria herself that would justify her ruler in entering
a firm protest against the rampagious assertion of Pan-
Teutonism. But of course the essential preliminary for
any action by Austria would have to be an assurance from
this country that it would not swerve a hair's breadth from
its determination to stand by France and all those who
sought to restrain the German Emperor by word and deed.
Austria, indeed, as a member of the Triple Alliance, is
not under the same suspicion at Berlin as Italy is, but there
is an uneasy feeling there that she may not always see with
the same eyes as the Emperor Francis Joseph does. It
must be remembered that Austria did not become a party
to that alliance from fear or dislike of France. If she
joined it for any other reason than to deter Prussia from
seeking to repeat and extend her triumph of 1866, it was
with the idea of securing help against Russia. Then, after
an interval, came the revelation that Prussia had made an
" insurance " treaty with Russia against her, and since that
occurrence Austria has been engaged, and not without

GERMANY AND BELGIUM 73
success, in establishing better relations with Russia on her
own account. The fact that Russia is no longer so formid
able as she was will very likely strengthen Austro-Russian
goodwill, as both States may evidently have need of each
other. It is necessity, not affection, that has made Austria
so long subservient to her old rival on the northern frontier.
A long and gloomy period, during which the Hapsburgs
have lived in a state of enforced self-repression, may be
passing away, and the psychological moment for showing
that Austria has recovered her independent judgment* may
have come at a moment when no other agency would serve
to restrain what is called Germany, but which is really
Prussia, from embarking upon an unscrupulous but dis
tinctly tempting adventure.
Austria, like England, would be permanently injured if
the schemes for the final humiliation of France were carried
out. Her subservience to Prussia would be made per
manent, the projects of the Pan-Germans would be soon
put into effect, and the long-talked-of disruption of the
Dual Empire could not be averted. But a bold stand now
may bring salvation. Opposition to Germany may remedy
the political evils in Hungary, where the Germans are hated
with a fervour that rivals that of the typical Ulsterman
for his Catholic countryman. It will rally to the Haps
burgs all the elements of loyalty that still abound in their
wide-stretching dominions. The adoption of such a course
in the present international situation would also have no
perils, because it must be clear to everyone that it only
needs the defection of Austria to produce that isolation
of Germany, the fear of which is now said to be the main
cause of the Berlin desire to dispose summarily of France.
That result England must at all costs not permit; but, with
the horrors of war so vividly impressed upon us by what
has happened in the Far East, we must still continue to
hope that Europe may be spared similar scenes, and that,
if no other way can be found to avert the calamity, the
Austrian Emperor will say the weighty word at Berlin
that cannot be disregarded, and that must turn the scale
against the cravings of an almost insane ambition.
* These were the views of Baron Aehrenthal, whose death was an
irreparable loss to the Dual Monarchy.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER*
It is unnecessary to refer to any recent rumours or journal
istic polemics for the purpose of investing the subject of
the Franco-German frontier with topical interest, because
it always forms one of the most important and inspiring
military questions that can occupy the attention and excite
the curiosity of intelligent men. The fact that it is the
artificial boundary between two great military States and
two races whose relations have always been hostile would
alone suffice to justify an attempt to supply the general
reader with the essential facts relating to what some French
patriot once called " France's iron frontier in the Vosges."
There is no other frontier in the world that in any way
resembles that which extends for 340 kilometres or about
212 English miles from, let us say, the Swiss district of
Porrentruy to the ruins of the once famous Abbey of Orval
in Belgium. At a short and varying distance from an
arbitrary line, drawn without symmetry and in reckless dis
regard of even local convenience by an intolerant victor in
1 87 1 , France has constructed with immense patience and at
enormous cost in thirty years a fortified barrier behind
which she hoped to breathe in partial rather than perfect
security. The heights of the Vosges are crowned and
encompassed by fortress, fort and battery; strategic rail
ways have been built to facilitate the concentration of the
French army on the menaced quarter, and chosen troops
stand ready at their posts night and day to meet an onset
that will very likely come without warning. The search
lights constantly trained on the roads and railways leading
out of the German territory from the " phares ' ' that form
part of the Toul position are true indicators of the unceas
ing anxiety and vigilance of the men guarding this exposed
frontier. * Contemforary Review, April, 1906.
74

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 75
I do not propose to say a word in this article about the
position on the German side of the frontier. The exigencies
of space would alone prevent it, as not the least difficult
part of a difficult task is to compress an account of the
French positions into a limited number of pages. But it
may be remarked that Germany has ostentatiously refused
to imitate the procedure of France, and to answer the
construction of armoured fort and earthwork on Gallic
territory by the erection of similar works on her own. It is
true that she has recently added some outlying forts to
the formidable defences of Metz, but with cynical frank
ness she avows that these are intended not for defence,
but for offence, because they will command the French
railways along the frontier from Pagny to Conflans.
Germany's military plans, then, are based on the fixed
resolve to undertake the offensive at once when war is
decided on, and for their realisation the elaborate fortifica
tion of her frontier would not be a help but a hindrance.
Moltke laid down in his cold and clear way the plan to
be followed. He wrote : " On the outbreak of war " — and
some of his successors at the Berlin headquarters staff have
improved on this version by saying, " Before the declara
tion of war" — "the German army will at once cross the
frontier in the greatest possible numbers and advance
until it meets the enemy." The German plan of campaign
in a given eventuality is thus clearly defined by the great
strategist, and there has been no indication of any intention
to deviate from it. There is consequently no need to refer
to this part of the subject again. The matters that claim
our attention are to pass in review the preparations that
have been made by the French to arrest this human torrent,
to point out some defects that have been discovered by
French officers in their defensive position, and to offer some
general comments on the whole question that will assist
the reader in forming an opinion for himself as to the
strength of that carefully prepared frontier which is the
outmost guard of the roads leading from the north-east
to Paris.
It will be clearest and most convenient to divide the
subject under seven heads, which will relate to as many
groups of fortified or other positions from Belfort on the

76 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
south to Montmedy on the north. As it will be most con
venient to describe the Toul position in conjunction with
the unfortified state of Nancy, I propose to take them in
the following order : — ( i ) Bel fort ; (2) Epinal 5(3) Verdun ;
(4) Montmedy; (5) Luneville; (6) Toul; and (7) Nancy.
For the sake of clearness, however, it may be pointed out
here that topographically Toul is between Epinal and
Verdun, and that Luneville is south-east of Toul and
Nancy, and with its Fort Manonviller lies nearest of all
the French positions to German territory.
There is one matter that claims notice in the first place
more especially because it has no relation to warlike plans
and preparations. This is the extraordinary advance in
the prosperity and wealth of the border districts of French
Lorraine since the war of 1 870-1. When that struggle took
place they were to a great extent composed of wild and
sparsely-cultivated tracts ; the villages of the Vosges were
inhabited by a simple and charming people pursuing the
handicrafts of their ancestors, and the towns of the Meuse
and Moselle valleys were the tranquil centres of an old
world existence which was not to be found in any other part
of France. Nancy, the capital, had scarcely altered since
the days of the Dukes of Lorraine, who lost their duchy
to become rulers of Austria ; and as a convenient indication
of recent change it may be mentioned that the spot on
which Charles the Bold lost his life was then shown outside
the walls. Now all is different, and if something of the
change is due to the influx of French citizens from the lost
provinces who resolved to preserve their nationality at all
costs, the remarkable discoveries of the mineral wealth of
the Vosges have been the principal factor in the conversion
of a primitive region into one of the busiest and most
progressive parts of France. Within the period named,
Lorraine, which possessed scarcely a mine in 1870, has
become the most productive mineral area in France. It is
declared that three-fourths of the mineral wealth of the
whole State are now derived from this single and partially
dismembered province, and certainly the furnaces and
cinder heaps of Longwy rival those to be seen in Stafford
shire. There are some Lorrainers who assert that if
strategic considerations did not require the preservation of

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 77
the Vosges they would become the most productive mineral
region on the surface of the globe. Toul and the Haye
forest, for instance, repose on a bed of oolitic iron. The
extraordinary mineral wealth of the French districts lying
east of the fortified line that is the immediate subject of
this paper has to be remembered in considering the import
ance and the necessity of defending them, and of prevent
ing their severance from the country of which they form so
valuable a part. The change that has passed over this
region is made visible in the condition of Nancy itself,
which is no longer a quiet country town outside the main
current of national life, but a busy, handsomely-constructed
city, full of animation, occupied by rich citizens, and
reflecting in its own happy and prosperous condition the
happiness and prosperity of France. The spot on which
the rash Duke of Burgundy ended his stormy career is no
longer outside the walls; it is covered by the square that
bears his name in the new portion of the town.
There has been another and less agreeable consequence
of this mining activity. The mines have attracted large
numbers of alien workmen. Italians, Belgians, and even
Germans are collectively more numerous than the French
men engaged in this mineral exploitation. At some places,
for instance, more copies of the Gazzetta del Popolo are
sold than of the Petit Journal, and the French villagers
often declare themselves afraid to leave their homes after
dark because "ces Italiens " are too free in the use of the
knife. While the importance of this region in pacific
pursuits has so enormously increased, its strategic value
has diminished in proportion. Longwy, which under a
different dispensation might have provided France with a
base for taking the offensive, is dismantled, and the great
plain of the Woevre lies open and defenceless, giving
Germany the chance of striking at the weak and unfortified
section of the Meuse north of Verdun. Enough has been
said on these points to show that the development of
Lorraine since the last war has been unfavourable to the
possibilities of its successful defence where no fortification
has been provided, at the same time that it has made that
defence more than ever necessary.

78 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
I. The Position of Belfort.
Belfort, which successfully held the Germans in check
throughout the war of 1 870-1, and which shared with
Bitsch (now German) the glory of being the only fortified
places attacked that kept the tricolour flying down to the
signature of peace, forms the most southern fortified
position on the French side of the frontier. The Germans
cannot outflank or evade it without violating Swiss terri
tory. The temptation to do so does not exist, practically
speaking, because the not less formidable position of
Besancon, and the line of forts flanking Switzerland and
continuing as far south as Culoz, block the road. There
is another reason. Any failure of success or partial dis
comfiture in this direction would be followed by a French
invasion of Germany, and the execution of a possibly
alarming diversion across the Upper Rhine into Baden. It
is not, therefore, in front of Belfort that the Germans will
attempt the execution of their offensive movement into
France. Formerly the gap between the Vosges and the Jura was
admitted to be one of the weak points of the French
frontier. One of the justifications of French policy in old
days was the necessity of removing this weakness by
advancing the frontier to the Rhine. The loss of Alsace
revived the peril by bringing the Germans close to the
gates of Belfort. It has been again dispelled by the com
pletion of the formidable position of Belfort, which is
very different from the fortress that resisted the Germans
thirty -five years ago. The old works and forts at Belfort
have been encircled by fifteen forts, besides batteries,
occupying admirably selected sites, which command all
the roads from German territory as well as the Rhone to
Rhine canal. The eastern forts command a considerable
extent of German territory, and with the minor forts at
and near Montbeliard, commanding the passage of the
Doubs, it is almost inconceivable that any German army
would seriously attempt to force a passage by the famous
gap or trouee of Belfort. The fort of Giromagny — more
correctly that of Tete du Milieu on an eminence outside
the small town of Giromagny — crosses its fire with that of

IHE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 79
Fort du Salbert, part of the Belfort position, thus effec
tively closing all routes south of the Ballon d'Alsace.
Without employing the word impregnable it may be said
that the position of Belfort fully answers all the needs
and expectations of the French, and as it is the only group
of which it is permissible to speak in this unqualified
manner, it differs essentially from the other groups of
which we shall have to speak. Its very strength constitutes
the one drawback when computing the relative forces of
attack and defence along the frontier. A considerable
portion of the French army will be locked up in this
quarter, and no one will venture to attack it. Instead of
concentrating here twice or thrice the defending force
admitted to be necessary for the attack on fortified places
in German text books, the Germans will stand on the defen
sive with a comparatively small army on the Upper Rhine.
II. Epinal.
North of Giromagny the French line of defence retires
from the Alsatian frontier and follows the low range of
the Faucilles Hills, more or less parallel with part of the
course of the Upper Moselle. Five forts at Servance,
Chateau Lambert, Rupt, Parmont and Arches defend the
Faucilles, and connect the Belfort position with that of
Epinal. Fort Servance, the most southern of these points,
is placed on the crest of the Ballon de Servance, which
marks the point of junction of the Faucilles with the
Vosges. It is in immediate contiguity with the loftier
Ballon d'Alsace in German territory, which is unfortified
and up which it is deemed impossible to convey heavy
artillery. As the Ballon de Servance is itself at an altitude
of 3,800 feet, this assumption is in all probability well
founded. Its natural advantages have been supplemented
by art, and it is rightly considered, one of the strongest
and best equipped single forts along the whole frontier.
Its fire completely commands the high road from Mulhouse
to Epinal, the only route open for an invasion on a large
scale from Upper Alsace. The other forts on the Faucilles
command successive sections of this important road, while
easy and secure intercommunication has been provided
between all these forts by an admirable military road

80 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
carried along the unexposed side of the crest of the
Faucilles. I take the following graphic description of the
Ballon de Servance from M. Ardouin-Dumazet's vivid
"Voyage en France" (22 serie): —
At an altitude of 1,189 metres, and more than 600 metres above the
Moselle, the Fort of the Ballon of Servance spreads itself out, squat,
its traverses resembling enormous mole hills. This fort, dominated by
some 30 metres by the Ballon d'Alsace which marks the frontier, is the
most severe place of residence among all the border posts. At this
altitude in the Alps cultivation would be visible on all sides ; here only
a sparse stubble grows. The winters are sometimes terrible here. Once
the hoar frosts commence, the garrison is reduced to 50 men commanded
by a lieutenant. For six months in the year the officer is left to his
Own society, the occasional brief visits of his brother officers from the
other posts lower down alone breaking the monotony of his existence.
At Remiremont, one of the most attractive towns of the
Vosges, and defended by Fort Parmont, are the head
quarters of the division entrusted with the defence of this
part of the frontier. It is contended by French military
writers that these forts effectually guard the weak line of
the Faucilles, but this view cannot be endorsed unless the
German attack should be feeble and not pushed home.
The fifth fort named, that of Arches, commands the
passage of the Moselle where the Vologne joins that river.
The fort of Arches is well placed ; the road from Mulhouse
referred to passes through it, and it may be considered as
the advanced post of the formidable position of Epinal.
As has been frequently pointed out, it was the absence of
fortified places in the Faucilles that led to the collapse
of the franc-tireur corps in the Vosges during the old war
at the very moment that the greatest hopes were being
reposed in the consequences of their operations on the
German communications. This defect ho longer exists.
Epinal, which before the war had only a cavalry regi
ment as its garrison, is now an entrenched camp, and the
headquarters of an army corps. It is surrounded by forts
at a distance of five or six miles, and they form a circle
of not less than thirty miles in circumference. The invest
ment of this place alone would require several army corps,
and they would find it a heavy task. The position of
Epinal includes between forty and fifty forts and depend
ent batteries. The forts are connected with the central
arsenal by lines of railway which are exclusively reserved

i±ie FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 81
for military purposes. Epinal is a position of importance
not merely for defence. Its more important rdle would
be that it provides a secure and well-placed base for the
collection of one of France's main armies that might carry
the offensive into Germany, ignoring or masking the for
midable defences of Strasbourg. Placed north of the
Faucilles, it completes the defence of that section of the
frontier, and supplementing Belfort to the south it may
be said to provide almost complete security for the southern
portion of the French frontier against attack from Upper
Alsace. In this quarter also more or less complete adhesion
may be given to the views and hopes of the French as to
the efficacy of this part of their frontier defences. The
forcing of the Faucilles would be a conceivably successful
task for the Germans at heavy cost, but the advantages of
such a move, with Belfort on one flank and Epinal on the
other, are not evident.
From Belfort to Epinal there is not a mile of the frontier
that is not covered by the fire of French guns. The line
of defence trends westward, and while Belfort is practi
cally on the frontier, Epinal is nearly thirty miles from
German territory. North of Epinal occurs the first un
defended gap in the frontier. For rather more than thirty
miles from the most northern fort of Epinal to Pont St.
Vincent, the most southern fort of the Toul position,
no attempt has been made to defend the line of the
Moselle. An invader coming by Luneville can break
through here if he chooses ; but long before he could reach
Neufchateau, the rallying point for all the troops coming
from the south and centre of France, the main French army
could be concentrated there, and it is consequently not at
all probable that a German commander would risk an
advance in this quarter while the main defences of the
French remained intact.
Leaving the all-important Toul position for later
description, and jumping over it, as it were, we come now
to the line of the Meuse and the position of
III. Verdun.
Immediately north of the Toul position the line of forts
constructed for the defence of the passages over the Meuse
6

82 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
commences at Gironville and ends at Verdun. This portion
of the French defences is distinguished as that of the
Cotes de Meuse, and the fortified position of Verdun at
its northern extremity forms with Belfort, Epinal and
Toul the series of four first-class fortified military centres
in the advanced line on the eastern frontier. What is now
called the Cotes de Meuse was before the war the Argonne
Orientale, and the object of the military engineer was to
defend the points at which the Meuse could be crossed —
viz., in their order from south to north Commercy, St.
Mihiel, Troyon and Genicourt. For this purpose the
following five forts taken in the same order have been
constructed on the right bank of the Meuse : — Gironville,
Liouville, St. Mihiel, Troyon and GenicoUrt. These forts,
practically speaking, face Metz at an interval of between
35 and 40 miles. They occupy an elevated plateau which
rises sheer from the Meuse, and which has been called " a
natural rampart." Notwithstanding the great strength
of the forts and the advantages of the position, it is
believed that the Germans would strike first at this section
of the frontier defences, and for this reason the French
have made preparations here for an active defence as well
as a passive. St. Mihiel, in the centre of the line of the
Meuse, is the headquarters of what is called the mobile
defence, as contrasted with the fixed defence represented
by Toul and Verdun. A strong division is kept here in
constant readiness to take the field at once on an invasion,
and cavalry regiments are also stationed with the same
object at Lerouville, Sampigny and Liouville. Another
infantry division and a cavalry brigade are quartered per
manently at Commercy. On the Cotes de Meuse the French
have, therefore, a very considerable force ready to take the
field, in order to harass and retard a German advance from
Metz. But, strong as is the French position on this line,
it is not seriously disputed by French military authorities
that if the German main attack is made here this line must
be pierced, although it is hoped that the cost to the victor
would be very heavy. Still more important, time might
be secured by a resolute resistance for the concentration of
the main French army at Bar le Due.
We come now to the main position of Verdun, the most

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 83
southern forts of which are eighteen miles distant from St.
Mihiel, while Verdun itself is forty-five miles north by
west of Toul. Verdun has always been a strategical point
of great importance. Placed astride the Meuse which
flows through it in several channels, Verdun is on the main
road to Rheims and Paris, and Bazaine was striving to
gain it when he allowed himself to be turned *back at
Mars la Tour. It is also a station on the principal line of
railway from Paris to Metz. Consequently its defence has
been carried out in the most elaborate manner. The for
midable citadel fort on the height of Belleville which over
looks the little town is the centre of a circumference dotted
with eleven of the most powerful forts, to say nothing
of the almost countless batteries that fill up the intervals.
These forts are Donaumont, Vaux, St. Michel, Tavannes,
Rozellier, Haudanville, Glorieux, Regret, Landrecourt,
La Charme and Bois Bourrus. Tavannes is the fort com
manding the tunnel of the railway on the side of Metz.
The permanent garrison of the position is never less than
15,000 strong, and exceeds in number the civil population
of the little town. Besides being a great fortress Verdun
is a vast arsenal ; artillery parks are among the chief
ornaments of the place, and four pairs of rails lead out
of the station and continue the whole way to Rheims,
Chalons and Paris. Verdun contains all that is needful
for the concentration of two army corps, and in itself it
could resist the most energetic attack for an indefinite
period. At least three army corps would be needed to
invest it effectually, and for that reason if for no other
it may be considered very dubious if it would be attacked
at all, at least in the early campaigns of the war. We
come now to IV. MONTMfiDY,
although it has no claim to be named in the same category
as the Cyclopean works that have occupied our attention.
The first line of the French defence on the eastern frontier
terminates at Verdun. Nothing has been attempted in the
way of defending the Meuse below Verdun down to
Mezieres. There are places for easy crossings of the river
at Dun, Stenay and Sedan. Still, in the remote north of

84 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
French territory, there are the nominally fortified places
of Longwy and Montmedy. Longwy has recently been
dismantled, and if the Germans chose to cross this part
of the frontier from Thionville they would encounter no
resistance. Montmedy on the Chiers, within sight as has
been said of Orval, is still a fortified position, and as it
is forty miles within the frontier it is not exposed to
immediate attack, while owing to its remoteness and to its
lying off any important route it might enjoy immunity
from any attack whatever. Montmedy occupies a strong
natural position on an eminence. Without any pretensions
to rank as a first-class position, it is more formidable than
is generally believed, and might offer a stubborn resistance.
Still, nothing has been done to make Montmedy one of the
pivots for the defence of the Lorraine frontier, and its
capture would have little or no influence on the fortune
of any war between France and Germany.
V. Luneville.
We now return to the centre of the French position, and
here Luneville forms the advanced post. Luneville and
the powerful double fort of Manonviller would be called
on to play an important part at the very commencement of
the struggle. A glance at the map will show that Luneville
is near the frontier on the main line to Strasbourg, and
Manonviller, half-way between it and Blamont, commands
the railway as it passes from the French Avricourt to the
German. Manonviller is a fort thoroughly up to date. Its
armoured cupolas have received a concrete shell to protect
them against high explosives, and it is confidently believed
that whoever made the attempt would find it a hard nut to
crack. Luneville itself is not fortified, but it is the head
quarters of a cavalry division and of a mobile force upon
which would devolve very important and dangerous duties
on the outbreak of war. Four regiments of cavalry, dis
tinguished as the division of Luneville, are in constant
readiness to cross the frontier and to do all in their power
to hamper and delay the concentration of the German
armies. This is the reason for giving Luneville a distinct
place in this survey of the frontier defences.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 85

VI. TOUL.
In the very centre of the French position, half-way
between Epinal and Verdun, is Toul, and it may be
remarked that it is a very different Toul from the one which
surrendered to the Germans in the autumn of 1870 after a
six weeks' siege. Toul, on the Moselle, is the central point
of the strongly fortified position on the plateau covered
by the forest of Haye, which is immediately west of Nancy.
The Toul position is regarded as the key of the French
frontier, and the forest of Haye as the most advantageous
screen for the preparation of an offensive movement on a
large scale. The entrenched camp of Toul is supplemented
by two advanced forts, Frouard on the north in the fork
of the Moselle and the Meurthe, and Pont St. Vincent
on the south guarding an important crossing of the Moselle.
Behind Toul on the Meuse are the secondary forts of
Bourlemont and Pagny la Blanche Cote, protecting the
railway rendezvous at Neuf chateau. It has been contended
that so long as the French hold Toul and its advanced
forts at Frouard and Pont St. Vincent the Germans will
neither occupy Nancy nor make use of its railways. This
assumption ignores the important fact that the French
might be more reluctant to destroy their own beautiful city
than the Germans.
From the top of the central fort of St. Michel, the
mountain that constitutes the dominant point in the whole
position, a clear view can be obtained of the surrounding
country. To the north stretches the plain of the Woevre,
which some regard as a favourable ground for the display
of that French skill in manoeuvring which has won so many
of their battles. Beyond the plain can be seen on the
horizon some of the forts of the Metz position. There are
nine principal forts in the Toul position besides St. Michel.
As a German military writer once seriously proposed an
infantry attack on this position "before the French were
ready," the following description of one of these forts*
and the obstacles outside it will show that no such surprise
is possible : — * Ardouin-Dumazet, of cit.

86 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Near Villey le Sec, on a mamelon which has an altitude of 333 metres,
the map denotes that there is a fort. The village has a strange appear
ance; it half disappears behind a slope covered with shrubs and its
approaches are covered with strange obstacles. For a breadth of 20
or 30 yards iron posts are planted in squares ; between each post close
to the ground a. pointed iron stake about six inches high is concealed
in the long grass ; posts and stakes are attached by wire armed with
teeth like artificial thorns ; others hardly visible are drawn from post
to post through the grass. A man who finds himself there will tear
his coat and his skin, if he remains he will fall and be spitted on the
stakes. All this zone of caltrops precedes a deep ditch flanked by
caponnieres, that is to say by salient angles from which the Hotchkiss
guns will sweep the bottom of the ditch if the assailant reaches it. The
walls of the ditch are protected in front by sharp edged railings pro
vided with spear-like points turned downwards, the whole presenting
a savage appearance that I cannot describe. Above all this appear
emplacements for the artillery, cannon masked from the enemy's view.
Finally, behind all, to the west a concrete fort completes the defence.
It is a terrible collection of all that the military art has been able
to conceive. And here there is nothing secret about it. The village
sleeps peacefully within its enceinte, the roads pass at the borders of its
ditch. This picturesque fortress is connected with the rest of the forti
fied camp by batteries and redoubts which the strategic railway serves.
Some of these batteries are hardly visible at twenty paces, their cannon
can be fired without their presence being even suspected. Between them
shelters are dug out for the infantry.
The nine principal forts of the Toul position, besides
St. Michel, may now be named. They are Villey le Sec,
Cote-Barine, Ecrouves, Brouley, Domgermain, Charmes
la Cote, Blenod, Tillot, and Lucey, while the number of
batteries and minor defences is practically countless. At
Toul also are the fixed headquarters of the Aerostatic
Corps; and this building, in which several balloons are
always kept filled with gas and ready to issue forth to
reconnoitre, forms an important adjunct to Fort St. Michel.
A very considerable extension of the use of air machines
is looked forward to with hopeful feelings by the French
public. The permanent garrison of the Toul position is
estimated at 12,000 men. As it stands it forms a really
formidable obstacle in the path of the German invader.
It could not very well be ignored, and the French repose
great faith in its impregnability. Still, the Germans are
not less confident that they can carry, not perhaps the main
part of the Toul defences, but a sufficient number of its
outer forts to enable them to reach Neufchateau. By so
doing within the first week of the war they would seriously
embarrass all the French plans for concentration, and

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 87
turn the rear of the defences on the line of the Meuse.
The successful defence of all the points of the Toul
position is essential to the preservation of the existing line
of defence on France's eastern frontier.
VII. Nancy.
This last observation forms a suitable introduction for
the important question of the fortification of Nancy. The
city of Nancy is at the present time absolutely devoid of
any defences. Moreover, not a fort or a battery intervenes
between it and the German frontier at Vie and Chateau
Salins, and that frontier is only twelve miles distant. On
the other hand, Nancy is the headquarters of an army
corps — the 20th — which was created specially for the
mobile defence of the advanced border districts. Whether
it would act in front of Nancy, endeavouring to save that
city from foreign occupation, or retire into the forest of
Haye after some minor encounters must largely depend
on circumstances that cannot be foreseen, such as the
character and direction of the German attack and the
degree of rapidity with which the French mobilisation has
been carried out. In any case the most optimistic French
officer cannot feel any real doubt that in its present defence
less state, and on account of its nearness to the frontier,
it would be impossible to cover or hold Nancy against the
invaders, while the vain attempt to do so might entail
defeats and disasters at the opening of the campaign. Yet
it may be doubted whether any French commander would
have the resolution to abandon the capital of Lorraine
without a serious effort to defend it, and to retire his main
army intact into the shelter of the Haye forest where,
flanked by Forts Frouard and Pont St. Vincent, and with
his rear secured by the Toul position, he could fight on the
defensive with all the advantages in his favour.
Still, whatever prudence may dictate, the abandonment
of Nancy, one of the most attractive and prosperous cities
of France, must be a bitter pill. There are some who think
that the presence of the French force in the Haye forest
would make it untenable for the Germans; but that is not
the opinion of those who know that the heights to the east

88 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
of the city, such as Amance and the hills overlooking the
forest of Champenoux, provide excellent emplacements
for the German batteries and their siege artillery. From
the appreciation of this fact has arisen a demand, not
dating from yesterday but going back more than twenty
years, for the defence of Nancy by fortifying it as Verdun,
Epinal and Belfort have been fortified. Between the years
1897 and 1900 the question was most keenly discussed,
and at last it seemed to have been decided in the affirmative.
But for some reason that has never been clear the project
was allowed to again pass into abeyance, and nothing has
since been done to revive it.
A very carefully prepared scheme was drawn up in 1899
for the defence of Nancy. It was proposed to construct
five principal forts at (1) the wood of Montenoy; (2)
Amance; (3) Cercueil; (4) Lenoncourt; and (5) Dombasle.
These, with four minor forts and some batteries in the
intervals, would have made Nancy secure. It was also
pointed out that the creation of this new position would
add immensely to the strength of the already existing one
of Toul by completely covering the unfortified side of
the Haye forest between Frouard and Pont St. Vincent.
When on the nominal ground of expense the project for
the defence of the entire position of Nancy was withdrawn,
its advocates pleaded for at least the construction of two
"forts d ' arret " at Dombasle and Amance, which, with
those existing at Frouard and Pont St. Vincent, would
have provided a formidable quadrilateral, each covering
some of the weak points of the other. This minor proposal
was also ignored, so that not merely is Nancy left quite
undefended, but Pont St. Vincent, the weak point in the
Toul position regarded as a barrier to a German advance,
is left on its own possibly inadequate resources to guard
the easiest crossing of the Moselle.*
* It is obviously impossible to enter here into the details of the Nancy
question, but the reader will find them in an admirable paper con
tributed by Commandant Josset to the "Journal des Sciences Militaires"
for November, 1899.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 89
CONCLUSION.
There are various minor matters of great interest in
relation to the defence of the frontier, such as the carefully
organised service of forest guards and guides held in
readiness to join the different corps and divisions on
mobilisation, to which reference might be made, but space
forbids. The whole extent of the French defensive system
on the eastern frontier has been briefly described, and with
the diffidence of a civilian critic some weak points have
been indicated. The defenceless condition of Nancy is an
obvious blot. The line of the Cotes de Meuse and that also
of the Faucilles could probably be pierced. Pont St.
Vincent is entrusted with a task that may be beyond its
strength. But even with these defects, if experience proves
them to be so, France's fortified frontier from Belfort to
Verdun, created by her engineers and artillerists, remains
a marvellous achievement that must give her own people
good cause for satisfaction, and that cannot be refused the
tribute of respectful admiration by the foreign observer.
If there is one serious flaw in the situation it is not to be
found in the artificial defences, but in the numerical
strength of the forces guarding them. Remembering the
admitted and incontestable superior facilities of the
Germans for carrying out their mobilisation, the permanent
French garrison maintained in Lorraine must be pro
nounced too weak numerically for absolute security against
surprise. The entente with England furnishes France with
the opportunity of shifting some part of the large garri
sons hitherto quartered in the Pas de Calais and also along
the Belgian frontier to places on and nearer the eastern
frontier. In this way the defect may be repaired without
increased outlay or larger annual levies.

THE ENTENTE BETWEEN HOLLAND
AND BELGIUM*
Only a short time ago it was the fashion to say that " little
States had had their day and were doomed to disappear."
It will not surprise many persons to hear that this opinion
was one of German manufacture. It was a favourite thesis
with Stein, and in more recent days Bismarck and
Alvensleben have given frequent expression to the same
sweeping statement. But so far the prediction has not been
verified, as Europe is still dotted with the same interesting
and numerous little States which were left it by the
Congress of Vienna and the Conference of London. It is
only in Germany itself that something of this result has
been seen, for there the Prussian boa-constrictor has
swallowed up minor kingdoms and duchies, and is still
ready to repeat the process at the expense of Austria.
There have been many important changes in Europe in the
last fifty years, but, taken altogether, the little States have
held their own very well.
This fact should certainly be gratifying to those of the
Great Powers which, like England, have contributed to
their preservation in the past, and which have a vital
interest in their continued existence.
The two little States of Europe in which Englishmen
are specially interested by ties of blood and past political
action are Holland and Belgium, the old Netherlands,
which occupy the greater part of the Continental shore
opposite our Eastern coasts. It is not strictly correct, and
it is even somewhat offensive, to call them " little," for by
their intelligence, prosperity and enterprise, the twelve
million Netherlanders are in the first rank of European
* Fortnightly Review, July, 1907.
90

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM ENTENTE 91
nations. It is true that they are divided into two separate
States, yet Holland, with five million people, ranks fourth
and Belgium, with seven million people, ranks fifth among
the trading nations of Europe. But taken together the
commercial and industrial activity, judged by the trade
returns,* of these twelve million Netherlanders, is almost
as great as that of Germany, and proportionally to popula
tion greater than that of Great Britain. No English writer
seems to have taken the trouble to make this discovery by
the simple addition of their imports and exports, and by
the use of a comparative table, but it is sufficient proof in
its way to demonstrate that the term " little " is in no sense
appropriate for two of the most hard-working and enter
prising communities in the world. But they are divided,
and that is an element of weakness that has suggested to
thoughtful minds in both States the desirability of promot
ing a friendly entente which would form the basis for an
alliance whenever any danger to the independence and
integrity of these brother lands arose.
Nearly seven years ago I called attention in these pages
to the need there was for Holland and Belgium to arrive at
a common understanding about the most important of all
national questions, the security and defence of their father
lands, and to knit themselves together by friendly and
fraternal ties. The question was then quite academic, but
although there are still many difficulties in the path, it is
impossible not to see the signs that it is entering upon a
more definite and practical phase. Public opinion in both
countries has been struck by the very obvious importance
of the question, and after trifling with it in a timid and
hesitating manner it looks as if it might now receive the
popular approbation which is essential to its successful
* The figures for the year 1904 were : —
Imports. Exports. Totals.
Holland  201,627,078 165,465,556 £367,092,634
Belgium  115,400,000 89,450,000 £204,850,000
Grand total  £5715942,634
Germany  336,000,000 260,176,211 £596,176,211
Great Britain ... 551,038,628 371,015,320 £922,053,949

92 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
consummation. The meeting of the Dutch-Belgian Com
mission now sitting at Brussels will furnish the proof.
But it is necessary to speak in this matter with a certain
amount of care and caution, and it may be hoped that the
advocates of an excellent design will show the tact and
savoir faire required to bring a difficult and delicate under
taking to a successful issue. In Holland, where at first the
proposal was regarded with some coolness and dislike, it
has lately made more real progress than in Belgium. The
explanation of this is not difficult. Holland is an in
dependent State, that can make alliances as it pleases.
Belgium is a guaranteed neutral State that is declared by
some to be debarred from making any alliances at all.
There is another difference. Holland has only danger to
fear from one Power. Belgium has two powerful neigh
bours, and each may be an aggressor. There is yet another
point of difference. Holland will always have some
warning of any coming invasion ; Belgium may only know
of it when she has been actually invaded.
These weighty reasons explain why the movement for
an entente with Holland is not regarded with entire
approval by the Belgian Government, which finds the
ebullition of some of the more impetuous advocates of a
Dutch-Belgian alliance a little embarrassing. Staid officials
in the Rue de la Loi may reasonably be slightly startled
when they hear one section of the supporters of this alliance
proclaim that it will be a serviceable weapon against
Germany, and another section arguing at the same time
that it is really directed against France. No wonder then
that a douche of iced water is poured upon the proposal
in Belgian official circles whenever the occasion offers.
That would be done under any circumstances, but it is
done with special energy at a moment when the Belgian
Government relies on the goodwill and protection of both
France and Germany for the preservation of the Congo
Colony against, what is termed in Brussels, English
rapacity. Still, despite the disfavour with which the movement
is viewed in official circles in Brussels, and more particu
larly at the present juncture, there can be little doubt
that it will go on until it has achieved what is, after all,

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM ENTENTE 93
a natural union, or rather combination, between two
kindred peoples who have so much in common — even the
desire to preserve untouched their national forms of
government and their own dynasties.
At the present moment a mixed Commission of Belgian
and Dutch commercial men, and luminaries in the worlds
of industry and finance, has just been formed for the
purpose of discussing commercial questions affecting the
common interests of the two countries. These include such
matters as railway tolls, equal scales of freight, canal
navigation and the improvement of main waterways like
the Meuse. No one can magnify a conference on such
worldly material questions as these into a political cabal
for the conclusion of a secret or public military alliance.
Whatever official and political elements may be added, the
composition of the Commission is in its essence commercial,
the military caste, whether Dutch or Belgian, being con
spicuous by its absence. There seems no reason in the
world why anyone should take exception to its meeting,
or why the Belgian Government should be nervous lest the
character of the Commission might be misconstrued. Still
through, perhaps, excessive timidity, it has washed its
hands of the matter, withheld official countenance, and
left the delegates to manage the affair as best they may
be able. The Dutch Government, for reasons of a different
kind, has acted in a similar manner, so that whatever else
the mixed Dutch-Belgian Commission may be it is not an
official creation.
What it may thus lose in dignity it gains in significance
by the fact that, despite official discouragement, it has
come into being through the free and spontaneous inclina
tion of two neighbouring peoples who are of practically
the same race, and who realise the importance of being
united with regard to the course that ought to be followed
by both in commercial matters of common interest. By
this natural gravitation towards each other in matters that
affect their worldly prosperity, the Dutch and Belgians are
in some measure repairing the errors committed in the six
teenth and nineteenth centuries, when religious feuds and
dynastic blunders separated the two peoples, and assigned
them different destinies. Now that they are approaching

94 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
each other on a footing of absolute independence and abso
lute equality there is a better chance than ever of a really
durable accord between them.
The subjects that the Commission is meeting to discuss
are not likely to possess much interest for the great world
outside the two States immediately concerned. They
certainly do not provide any attractive fare for an essay in
an English Review. But, on the other hand, we are under
no restraint in treating the matter in its symptomatic aspect,
and in dilating upon the important issues for the peace
and security of Europe that may spring out of the friendly
and confidential discussions between some of the most
prominent representatives of the two States that have most
to hope from peace, and most to fear from war. Rightly
measured, a Dutch-Belgian entente is a far more practical
step towards the preservation of European peace than a
Hague Conference under the strictly limited conditions
upon which the great Military Powers will alone consent
to take part in its philosophical discussions.
Leopold, the first Kjng of the Belgians, probably the
wisest statesman of the nineteenth century, if his limited
power and opportunities are taken into account, once said
"the safety of Holland lies in Belgium." He meant that
the neutrality of Belgium guaranteed by the Five Powers
formed the bulwark of Dutch security against the aggres
siveness of France, which was thought, in his day, to have
a monopoly of that quality. But the danger with which
not merely the two little States named, but England
herself, are threatened to-day, is that Germany may at any
moment decide to move westwards and crush the two
peoples of the Netherlands before they have awoken to
the danger. The temptation to Germany to establish her
hegemony on the shores of the North Sea can even now
scarcely be restrained, and in the present position of affairs
I believe that her army would be in possession of Brussels
before the Belgian army was ready to fire a shot, and the
possession of Brussels within 48 hours of the Uhlans cross
ing the frontier into Limburg would entail the complete
disorganisation of all Belgian measures for defence out
side Antwerp. The political projects of Napoleon III.
were always visionary and somewhat fantastical. Not so

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM ENTENTE 95
those of the Prussian Headquarter Staff, who, in the words
of their Imperial director, make plans to " ride over all
their enemies." It is, therefore, as true to-day as it was
fifty years ago, although a different subverter of Belgian
independence is in question, that the "safety of Holland
lies in Belgium," for Belgium overrun and occupied by
a hostile force, Holland would be reduced to a state
of helplessness that would be followed by an easy
conquest.* But if it is true that the independence of Belgium is
essential to Holland, it is not less certain, under existing
conditions, that the active co-operation of Holland is
essential to Belgium for purposes of defence. With a
clearly-defined understanding, if not formal agreement,
to the effect that the two Powers will assist one another
against aggression, the Prussian cavalry raid into Brabant
from Dalheim would become too risky. The Dutch army
occupying the flank of the line of advance through Lim
burg could not be ignored, and the German plan of
campaign would thus have to be modified to the extent
of adopting slower methods, and slower methods mean,
in this case, time for the concentration of the Belgian
forces, and for the arrival of assistance from France and
England. In the same way, if an attack on Holland was
substituted for one on Belgium, the opportunity would be
afforded the Belgian army of carrying out a diversion in
aid of its allies from the Liege position. The whole prob
lem turns on the question of time. If the two States are
allied, or if without an alliance they have concerted a
common course of military defensive action, the problem
of time is settled in their favour, and they will find them
selves able to arrest the onward rush of the Germans. No
matter how brief that arrest may prove, it will have served
its purpose. The Belgians, who are a slow but stubborn
race, as their assailants will find out, once the struggle
has had time to warm their blood, will not be disorganised
by the sudden onset and the loss of their capital. Their
existing system of mobilisation will not have had the
* Holland will remember this fact too late if Germany prove the
victor in the present war.

96 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
severe strain imposed upon it that would reveal its defects,
and under which it would be only too likely to break down.
The Dutch army can be concentrated for co-operation
before the whole position is compromised. England and
France would be hastening to their aid, and the Belgians
would have the best of all reasons for rejoicing at not
being taken wholly unawares, in the fact that a compara
tively small part of their soil would be violated by the
feet of a hostile army. The gallant Uhlans would not be
riding over their corpses, for they would very soon be
riding back whence they came.
The objections that have been raised to the execution
of a definite convention between Belgium and Holland rest
on the supposition that a "neutral " State cannot make a
defensive alliance or conclude a military treaty with
another Power. A brief examination of the facts of the
case will show that if this view is not wholly fallacious it
gives at least an incomplete description of the actual
juridical as well as material facts of the situation. The
obligation on a "neutral " State to defend itself is in no
degree less imperative than on an ordinary free and un
hampered State. Indeed, from some points of view, the
obligation is greater, because it has contracted with its
guarantors for the maintenance of its own "neutrality"
and "independence." The mere presence and passage of
a hostile force on its soil is a breach of its neutrality. It
sins in its obligations to others by its weakness or its
neglect to provide the proper safeguards of its own defence
and security. The Belgian Government and people can
be in no possible ambiguity on this point. They have been
told it over and over again by the French authorities, as
well as by the German, and I have no doubt by the English
as well. They have been freely censured for neglecting
their duty all round, and the consequences to themselves
have been described without any regard for their suscepti
bilities. The obligation to provide the means of its own effective
defence being thus clearly established by the admission
of its possible aggressors as well as defenders, how can
the right be withheld from Belgium of concerting with out
siders common measures of mutual self-defence ? That

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM ENTENTE 97
right must exist in increased force with regard to a State
like Holland, which is not among the five guarantors of
Belgian independence, but which finds itself not merely
menaced by the same perils as beset its southern and most
intimate neighbour, but also vitally concerned in the main
tenance of the status quo in Belgium. The objections
which France and England would see in a Belgian-German
alliance, or that Germany would see in at least a Franco-
Belgian alliance, possess no force if brought to bear on a
Dutch-Belgian convention. Either of the former pacts
might fairly be represented as an offensive move, and as
even a disturbance of the balance of power, but the last is
essentially a defensive step which provides something
towards the protection of two unoffending nations, con
stitutes a menace to nobody, and, so far as the intentions
of the Five Powers which guarantee the position of
Belgium are sincere, contributes to the easier and surer
fulfilment of their own obligations. Even the most cynical
statesman at Berlin could not take open exception to an
arrangement which provided just as sure a preventive for
the French coming down the Meuse as for the Germans
proceeding up that river. Nor are there any valid reasons
to debar the Belgian Government from signing a strictly
defensive military convention with any Power other than
one of the five signatories of the London Convention. A
strictly defensive treaty would only give Belgium the same
right of striking in her own defence after attack which she
already possesses without any special treaty with Holland,
or, I may add, with Switzerland or Denmark, for once the
project of a league among the little States of Europe has
been proved to be feasible, the idea must grow in favour
among them all.
Having fully admitted the objections to any treaty
between Belgium and her two more powerful neighbours
who happen also to be guarantors of her independence and
neutrality, a few observations may be permissible with
regard to the responsibilities accepted by the whole of the
Five Powers towards Belgium, singly or collectively. The
circumstances under which the defence of Belgium will
become a practical question of the day imply a breach of
that guarantee by one of the signatory Powers. If all the

98 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
signatory Powers kept faith Belgium would be left alone,
and would consequently be secure. She need not have
fortresses, she need not have an army. But we live in a
world of imperfection, and what has to be provided
against is not the fulfilment but the breach of the guarantee.
What, then, are the practical facts with which the Belgian
nation and the Governments concerned have to deal ? I
will put the problem briefly and practically. There are
five guaranteeing Powers. Of these two do not count.
They are Austria and Russia. They can be eliminated
from the problem. Of the remainder two, France and
Germany, are under suspicion. Either may become an
aggressor for its own ambitious ends or from motives of
self-protection. The fifth Power alone is free from all
suspicion, that is England. Is it not fair to conclude that
she has rights of a somewhat different character from the
other four Powers? Nothing in the previous action of
England has betrayed an intention to assert these superior
rights, but it does not follow that because a thing has
never been done it will never be attempted. In the great
crisis for Belgium of 1870 the British Government took
the best possible action it could at that moment on behalf
of that country. It made treaties with France and with
Prussia binding it to join forces against the State that
violated Belgian territory. In 1870 no better course could
possibly have been adopted, but it would be simply ridicu
lous to repeat that procedure in the present position of
European affairs. And why ? No one can for a minute
suppose that France has the least desire to add Belgium
to its territory. Its aspirations point to the East and not
to the North. On the other hand there is the most pro
nounced desire on the part of Germany to encroach to the
north-west, and indeed, if German aspirations are to be
gratified, expansion to the North Sea, including with it
the command of the mouths of the Rhine, as well as the
Meuse and the Scheldt, is essential to the realisation of
the Pan-Germanic programme.
But all these elements of doubt and grounds of objection
have no application in the case of England. We have no
designs whatever on the Continent. The most ambitious
of our statesmen has never suggested that we should

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM ENTENTE 99
endeavour to obtain a new Calais in the Netherlands. It is
absolutely certain that if an ambitious Minister ever sug
gested such a project the country would emphatically
repudiate it. It is, therefore, evident that whatever danger
may threaten Belgium, or indirectly the States which would
suffer from a change in the position of that country, it
would not come from the side of England. For the
Belgian, therefore, the possibility of an English peril is
non-existent. Does this carry with it a greater right in the
direction of preparing effective measures for the fulfilment
of the grave obligation which England accepted in common
with the other signatory Powers, and which she alone has
the desire and intention of carrying out in the spirit and
the letter of the London Convention which assigned to
Belgium its legal position among the nations of Europe ?
This is not the purely academic question that might appear
from the form in which it is put. It has already been
considered, and once at least a practical answer was
supplied to it. We have stated what was done in 1870,
but the steps that were taken in 1875 are more applicable
to the present and the immediate future. They were not
of the nature of agreements with two possible aggressors,
but of a distinctly clear and practical character in the way
of preparation and of Anglo-Belgian concert against the
aggression of one particular Power. Our Government
emphatically threw aside the mask, and sent its officers to
Belgium to prepare for the joint defence of that country
against German aggression, and what was done in 1875
can very well be repeated in 1907 or at any subsequent
date. The importance of this action as a precedent is obvious.
England and Belgium did on one occasion lay down the
lines of joint military action during peace, although the
war cloud passed off so quickly that there was no need
to make the definite military convention that must have
followed had events taken a different course. There is
consequently no reason whatever why Holland and
Belgium should not discuss similar matters and arrive at
a very clear understanding as to what should be done
whenever they considered they were in peril of attack. For
this reason the marked tendency of the two peoples of

ioo ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
the Netherlands to come together deserves watching and
encouragement in this country, the State that is most
vitally concerned in the preservation of these countries
from absorption by a great military Power. If England
were so blind and apathetic as to allow Germany to coerce
these comparatively weak countries, or one of them, into
the state of subjection in which Prussia now holds Bavaria
or Saxony, she would have signed her own death warrant
Only a short time ago it seemed as if the reckless and
improvident action of the British Government in regard
to the Congo question was driving the Belgian people, as
well as their Government, into the arms of Germany. But
the frank and unqualified declaration, at the end of last
Session of Sir Edward Grey* that " under no circumstances
would England annex any part of the Congo State,"
and that she "would welcome Belgium's acquisition of
that colony," worked a marvellous change, and arrested
that bitter tide of unpopularity which threatened the
English name among our nearest and hitherto most
attached neighbours.
As practical men we have to consider a little calmly as
to the ways and means available for the fulfilment of our
pledges, and as to how we are to safeguard our own vital
interests in the Netherlands. We are bound in honour and
by our historical policy for centuries to defend Belgium.
To attain that end with the minimum of effort and the
maximum of result the co-operation, hearty and un
reserved, of the Belgian people is essential. There would
seem to follow as a natural consequence the observation of
some regard for Belgian susceptibilities. No one can say
that much heed has been paid to this side of the question
for some time past. A paper war has been in progress
during the last few years, in which Belgians have been
painted in very unattractive colours, and very little oppor-
* Sir Edward Grey has rendered many great and patriotic services
to his country. Among the greatest of them was this, that he first
stemmed the tide of Belgian detraction on this occasion (1906). On 4th
of August, 1914, he saved the honour of England, and became the
direct successor of Palmerston. Some day or other this story will be
told, and then his countrymen will know how one straight brave
aian rode superior to a whole Ministry of shufflers.

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM ENTENTE ioi
tunity for their self -vindication has been allowed them.
It is sufficient to record here the opinion that the anti-Congo
agitation did for a time seriously threaten the harmony
of Anglo-Belgian relations, and to recognise the satisfac
tion with which all close watchers of the situation in
Western Europe, Frenchmen as well as Englishmen, are
now noting that that agitation is on the wane, and that
a juster view of Belgian colonising efforts is coming into
vogue. If the good feeling and hearty co-operation of the
Belgians themselves are the first elements required for the
successful discharge of the duties we accepted for the sake
of our own security, as well as of that of Belgium, we are
bound to welcome every auxiliary that comes in to assist
our efforts and the attainment of our ends. No auxiliary
could be more welcome to us than Dutch co-operation in the
defence of the integrity and independence of Belgium. It
would be welcome to us if it were only to be regarded as
a perpetuation of our ancient historic alliance, as continu
ing in a new century the tradition of combined effort which
was not the least of the creative forces in this old Europe.
But it would have a more practical value still. Dutch co
operation means the concentration of all the forces of the
Netherlands for the common defence, and the final dis
appearance of the old disunion and division that so often
in the past hampered the efforts of all the Allies in the field
and the Cabinet. It would signify also that Holland had
shaken off the soporific of German schemers who have
represented that to be merged in the great German Empire
was a happier fate than the preservation of their independ
ence by the men who have been nurtured on the traditions
of William the Silent. From our point of view nothing
could be more welcome than the news that Holland and
Belgium had come cordially together and agreed that,
having many interests in common and occupying the most
exposed position in Western Europe, they had decided,
without offence to anyone, to defend their rights, independ
ence and national existence against all or any who menaced
them. There is little or no doubt that, although the
declaration will not possess the validity and weight it

102 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
would have if it emanated from the two Governments, the
Dutch-Belgian Commission will not separate before pass
ing a resolution to that effect, and certainly we in England
ought to do everything we can to encourage this movement,
and to inspire both the Dutch and the Belgians with the
absolute conviction that the aegis of England is raised
resolutely and unflinchingly over the Netherlands.

THE MENACE OF ELSENBORN*
WHEN the late General Brialmont twenty years ago was
advocating his new system for the defence of the passages
of the Meuse at Namur and Liege in the teeth of sluggish
Belgian opinion — still sluggish, I must add, on the military
position of their country — one of his most forcible argu
ments in the case of Liege was that the forts to be con
structed on his projected perimeter round that city would
command all the roads leading from Germany into
Belgium. It is scarcely necessary to say that the statement
of this distinguished military engineer, whose name will
be linked with that of Vauban when his works have been
subjected to the test of war, was perfectly accurate at the
time it was made. But it is so no longer, and it is truly
extraordinary how French and Belgian opinions have
remained indifferent to the changed position that has been
subtly brought about by the patient and persistent plans
of the Berlin Headquarters Staff on the undefended
portion of the eastern Belgian frontier in the first place,
and with regard to the uncovered northern French frontier
in the second.
Twelve years ago French military circles were a little
startled by a sudden announcement that the Germans were
establishing a new camp at Malmedy, close to the Belgian
frontier at Stavelot. The possibilities of such a camp as
affording a base for a dash across the Ardennes to Sedan
were at once realised by military authorities in Paris, and
several alarmist articles were published on the subject in
the Army journals. The German Government hastened to
give tranquillising assurances. The new camp, it was
stated in the first place, was not to be at Malmedy, but at
a spot on the wild moorland forming part of the Hohe
* Fortnightly Review, July, 1908.
103

104 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Venn, ten miles to the north-east of the old Walloon town,
and two miles and a half west of the townlet of Elsenborn.
It required some careful study of military maps to fix its
exact position, and when it was seen that the only means
of reaching it by rail was by the light railway to Hellenthal
— 14 miles east of the camp — which was itself but a branch
line from Call, a station on the comparatively unimportant
railways from Cologne and Bonn to the Eiffel, its import
ance did not appear very capital or to furnish much justifi
cation for alarm.
Taking advantage of these circumstances the German
military papers and responsible writers proceeded to give
what are called friendly explanations for the purpose of
removing all ground for suspicion from the minds of the
French. They declared that the Elsenborn camp was a
very small and tentative enterprise to which no importance
ought to be attached. The German Government had
selected it as a place for making artillery experiments
because the region was barren, remote from towns, and
with, practically speaking, no inhabitants. Moreover, only
a small number of troops were to be quartered there, and
those in temporary barracks. As a further tranquillising
measure French officers were invited to come and see the
place for themselves, and some of them, as a matter of
fact, went. They could only corroborate the German state
ments of the moment, whatever reservations they may have
made about the possible development of the camp in the
future. That development has now taken place, as I found
during a recent visit to Elsenborn, and the importance of
the place can no longer be concealed. The harmless and
inoffensive camp, as it was termed in its infancy, is rapidly
being converted into a formidable menace to its neigh
bours, and its mission has to be seriously studied by the
careful student of the present military position in Western
Europe. Before dealing with the camp itself a brief account of
the change that has taken place in its accessibility will be
instructive. The light railway to the east of the position
still stops at Hellenthal, and there is apparently no inten
tion of undertaking the expensive work of continuing it
through difficult country to Elsenborn. Nor is it necessary,

iiii-- lYij^i^ziv^ij c/r

ELSENBORN 105

for Elsenborn camp is now in direct communication with
the general railway system of Germany. West of the camp
and parallel with the Belgian frontier now runs the per
manent double railed line from Aix-la-Chapelle to St.
Vith passing through, among other stations, Weismes and
Sourbrodt. These places are named because Weismes is
the junction for the light railway to Malmedy, and
Sourbrodt is the station for the camp at Elsenborn. This
railway does not stop at St. Vith; it continues southward
to Trois Vierges, where it connects with the railway system
of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. The Belgian line
from Pepinster and Spa, as well as its branch serving the
Ambleve valley west of Trois Ponts, also joins the Luxem
burg system at Trois Vierges. A few miles north of Trois
Vierges is the important Belgian junction of Gouvy, where
there is a main line in a south-westerly direction to Libra
mont and Bertrix, two other Belgian junctions of prime
importance. Libramont is a junction on the main line from
Brussels to Metz and Alsace, and Bertrix, only ten miles
from France, may be taken as the central point of the
line running more or less parallel with the northern frontier
of France from the Meuse at Dinant to the Grand Duchy.
The reader will therefore see at a glance that the camp
at Elsenborn, whatever other significance it may have or
not, can no longer be described as inaccessible. The
Aix-la-Chapelle to St. Vith line is a permanent way, admir
ably constructed, with heavy rolling stock and express
trains which perform the journey of fifty odd miles in a
little over an hour. I know the line very well between
Weismes and Kalter Herberg, one of the two stations for
that picturesque old relic of mediaevalism the town of
Montjoie, whose name recalls the battle-cry of the Kings
of France. For the special matter we are considering the
most important station on the line is Sourbrodt, 1,860 feet
above sea level, and the highest point on the line. The
camp of Elsenborn lies rather more than two miles east
of this station, and in addition to a fine metalled road a
tramway for the conveyance of stores, ammunition, and
building material has been laid down alongside the road,
and establishes steam communication, rigidly reserved for
the military, between a siding at Sourbrodt and the interior

106 ENGLAND:S ARCH-ENEMY
of the camp. The road from Elsenborn itself to Butgen-
bach and Weismes — which does not pass through Sour
brodt — has also been levelled and metalled for the rapid
passage of troops, and especially of artillery. There is
consequently access to the camp of Elsenborn from several
sides, and it can consequently no longer be described as
occupying a remote spot difficult to approach or leave, or
as being quite detached from the other advanced bases of
the Germany army.
Even if there were no other facts to go upon it might
be safely assumed from this improvement in the means of
communication with Elsenborn that the camp had not
remained in the same embryonic state as when the French
officers visited it in 1897. As a matter of fact, it has
acquired a very special importance, and its secrets are
sufficiently valuable to be kept carefully guarded from the
outer world. A brief description of the camp as it presents
itself to-day from an outside view may best serve to bring
the scene before the eyes of the reader.
Lying astride of the main direct road from Sourbrodt
to Elsenborn the position is screened very skilfully by a
number of small fir plantations, and at only one point is
it possible to obtain what may be called a general view of
the camp, and even here the spectator has space only for
a glimpse rather than a close scrutiny. Still, it is the best
that can be accomplished, for, having established their
camp on either side of the road, the next step taken by
the German military authorities was to close that road to
traffic and to make it the central street of the encampment
reserved for the troops and rigorously guarded at all
points by sentries.
The road to the camp leads almost due east from the
station at Sourbrodt, and gradually ascends to an altitude
of 2,000 feet at its highest point, which is marked by the
Hotel -Mess on one side of the road, and the villa-residence
of the Camp Commandant on the other. The first indica
tions of a military position are, however, revealed to the
visitor or traveller approaching the camp before reaching
this point. After passing the first fir plantations on the
left of the road the full expanse of the heath or common
which ends in the artillery practice ground comes into view,

THE MENACE OF ELSENBORN 107
and amid the bracken are visible the fenced-off low
buildings that denote ammunition-magazines and store
houses for high explosives. All these are carefully guarded
by sentries, and the few paths across the heath are also
"prohibirt." A few hundred yards further on are the
only civilian residences in the whole place, the Hotel men
tioned and two photograph shops, or sheds. Then succeed
a few lines of huts, the guardhouse, and the sentry box,
where stands the vigilant sentry to prevent any civilian or
stranger entering the camp. The road to Elsenborn turns
to the right and skirts the camp, and it may be mentioned
that in contrast with the fine road reserved for the military
this is a mere track, rut-scored and resembling the approach
to a farm-yard, which no one who had once used it would
care to traverse a second time. Still this dStour enables
the visitor to get an idea of the size of the camp by measur
ing its southern side. This is over 1,200 yards in length,
and while the camp is screened by a thick plantation inside
a fence of barbed wire, it is none the less possible to count
ten rows of low barrel-shaped buildings, and in each row
twenty of them. These buildings in zinc or sheet iron are
called baraques — small barracks — and each is capable of
accommodating 50 men. On the south side of the central
street to which the innocent traveller is denied access there
are consequently 200 baraques with accommodation for
10,000 men.
Up to this point it is not possible to obtain even a glimpse
of what is on the north side of the camp. On reaching the
eastern end of the southern boundary the road joins the
one that has passed through the camp, and must once more
be described as excellent. This is only natural, for it
provides the line of communication with Elsenborn and
Hellenthal. Again fir plantations have been introduced to
intercept the view, but it is at this very point that something
can be seen of the northern half of the camp. On the right
and in a field slightly raised above the road is a cavalry
encampment, the baraques here being not in sheet iron but
in stout brown canvas. At the moment when I saw it the
regiment happened to be out at practice on the moor, and
on mounting the bank at the side of the road I found that
a clear view could be obtained of the whole extent of the

108 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
camp. The northern side slopes downwards from the
central road, and while the breadth from west to east of
the enclosed camp is 1,200 yards the depth from south to
north is certainly more than a mile. More rows of zinc
baraques similar to those described are visible, and without
exaggeration there are quite as many on the northern side
as on the southern. In addition there are several ranges
of brick buildings, which are probably the artillery
barracks, and further on another brown canvas camp
lies in the hollow for the accommodation of the second
cavalry regiment included in the permanent garrison of
Elsenborn. Elsenborn camp is therefore composed of a minimum
number of 400 zinc baraques, two cavalry camps, a range
of buildings for artillery, besides the lines of huts and
other buildings included in what may be called the outer
and less concealed area of the camp, that is to say, before
the wire fence and hedge and the vigilant sentries are
reached. Somewhere in the camp, too, is an aerostatic
station and gasometer for inflating balloons. The zinc
baraques were cited as proof ten years ago that the camp
was only experimental and unimportant. They are still
there and in excellent condition, but the extensive building
of more substantial quarters for the troops is now in
progress. New red bricks in large quantities are being
conveyed into the camp daily by trucks on the tramway
and by carts along the roads, and these, I can aver, are
being utilised for some buildings in the northern or con
cealed portion of the camp. In the course of one hour the
train passed under my view three times with one or two
trucks laden with bricks, and the probability seems to be
that the brick barracks are an addition to the dimensions
of the camp and not a substitution for the baraques.
With regard to the garrison permanently quartered here
it is difficult to speak with positive assurance, but there
are certainly two cavalry regiments, one of Cuirassiers and
the other of Hussars. There are also two infantry regi
ments. But the strongest arm of all is the artillery and
its three branches, viz., horse, field and siege or fortress,
are all represented. The due complement of engineers and
train is not wanting, so that the force at Elsenborn is one

THE MENACE OF ELSENBORN 109
fully equipped to take the field at an hour's notice. As
to its strength there can never be less than 8,000 men in
the camp, and its present dimensions are equal to the
accommodation of a force of at least three times that
number. Besides the unoccupied portion of the heath is
available for an improvised encampment, and quite a
hundred thousand men could be collected and kept there
without the least difficulty.
It will, therefore, be clear that the camp at Elsenborn
can no longer be described as a place of little importance,
seeing how much it has developed in the last few years,
and what energetic steps are being taken at the present
moment to add to its size and resources. It is also the
scene of extensive artillery exercises and of important
experiments with high explosives for siege purposes, which
are held on the ranges of hills bounding the northern
horizon looking northwards from the Sourbrodt road
towards Kalter Herberg. A considerable number of the
artillery and engineer officers, for whom there is not
sufficient accommodation in the camp itself, reside at
Montjoie, from which the artillery ranges and practice
ground are not very distant. It will thus be evident that
the importance of the camp is considerably augmented by
the sections which, for one reason or another, lie outside
the mile square within the chain fence. Even at its most
moderate computation the German force always at Elsen
born is considerably greater, for instance, than that portion
of the Belgian army which has to guard the twelve
important forts round Liege.
What, then, is the real motive of the German military
authorities in keeping a strong mobile force at Elsenborn ?
It cannot be for defensive purposes. No one has ever
credited a French general with the design of losing himself
and his army in the Eiffel or the Hohe Venn. If the French
ever came down the Meuse they would strike direct at
Aix-la-Chapelle and nothing south of it. We are forced,
then, to conclude that it can only be with an offensive
object that this corps is kept in a position so close to the
main roads traversing the Belgian Ardennes, and if further
proof were needed, it would be afforded by the fact that
the cavalry force stationed there has been so largely

no ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
increased of recent years. In 1 897 three or four squadrons
were considered sufficient for picket duty, but in 1907 two
complete cavalry regiments are kept permanently stationed
in this camp which, if we are to believe the official
story, is "exclusively reserved for rifle and cannon
practice." The offensive movement that the German War Directors
have in view can only be an advance along the excellent
roads passing through Malmedy and Ligneuville to the
Belgian towns of Stavelot and Viel-Salm respectively.
Both these places are on the Belgian railway already
mentioned to Gouvy, from which place there is, in addition
to the railway, an excellent main road to Bastogne and
Libramont. The German cavalry, aided by their horse
artillery, would have no difficulty in seizing the important
junction at Libramont the same day as the trumpets
sounded the advance from Elsenborn. Neither the French
nor the Belgians could anticipate them, and, having
accomplished that much and secured the control of the
railways in their rear — for Malmedy, the head of their
line in Germany, is only four miles distant from the
station at Stavelot — reinforcements of field artillery and
infantry would easily reach the mounted force within
twenty-four hours of its arrival at Libramont, and, in face
of that successful feat, it would be perilous, iiS^ot impos
sible, for the French, who have a considerable cavalry
force at Sedan, to attempt any advance beyond Bouillon
or, at the farthest, Bertrix. It will thus be clear that the
first stage in the probably inevitable decision to make the
Belgian Ardennes the scene of hostilities must be, under
present conditions, a complete and facile success for the
Germans. There are still many people who believe that a campaign
in the Ardennes would be attended by some of the diffi
culties and disadvantages which the French armies
experienced in the campaigns of 1793-8. But this view is
quite mistaken. The impenetrable forests have almost
completely disappeared; Napoleon himself began the work
of demolition by requisitioning the oaks for the Boulogne
flotilla. The process has been going on, more or less, ever
since, and although there are still beautiful woods and

THE MENACE OF ELSENBORN in
numerous fresh plantations, under the Belgian law, in the
Ardennes, the greater part of the region consists of open,
undulating country, traversed by some of the finest roads
to be found in Europe. As an instance of this, it may be
mentioned that at the same time as the cavalry force made
sure of the junction at Libramont, another detachment
moving from Viel-Salm by the admirable mail-post road
which crosses the Baraque de Fraiture, 1,900 feet above
sea level, the second highest point in Belgium, could occupy
La Roche and the table-land of Nassogne, the possession
of which carries with it the command of the whole of the
central and eastern Ardennes. It is unnecessary to enlarge
more upon this theme. Enough has been said to show that
the Germans hope to secure no slight advantages by an
offensive forward movement from Elsenborn whenever the
inevitable war with their principal neighbour breaks out.
But, it will be asked, what would Belgium do in face of
this flagrant invasion of her territory ? In the first place,
she could, so long as her position remains as at present,
do nothing, for the confident declaration by General Brial-
mont in 1888 that the guns of the forts at Liege commanded
" all the roads leading out of Germany " is no longer true,
the camp at Elsenborn having turned the formidable
position of Liege, and created an entirely new situation.
The only garrison kept by Belgium in the Ardennes is
stationed at Arlon, thirty miles south of Libramont, and
close to the frontier of the Grand Duchy. The occupation
of Libramont by the force described would entail the
immediate surrender of the troops at Arlon, as all their
communications would have been cut off. For the purpose
of being absolutely explicit on the subject, it may be stated
that Arlon is the garrison town of the 10th Regiment of
the Line, which represents exactly one-nineteenth part of
the total infantry of the Belgian army. As it is the depot
and rallying place for the reserves of that regiment, the
success of the German advance to Libramont would carry
with it, without a shot being fired, the disappearance,
practically speaking, of that proportion of the small
Belgian army. As a matter of fact, the retention of a
garrison at Arlon is a grave strategical fault on the part
of the Belgian War Department. Any force at Arlon at

112 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
all can have no practical value for defensive purposes,
and on an invasion of Belgium from the east, nothing
whatever could be done to save it from destruction in the
military sense. Arlon was a useful place to garrison in
1 83 1 -8, while it was still uncertain whether the Powers
would allow the Belgians to absorb or not their brother
people in Luxemburg, but since the neutralisation of that
State in 1867, the place has been useless for military
purposes, and, still worse, it forms a regular trap under
certain clearly recognised and long-foreseen contingencies.
As the Belgian Government owes it not only to itself,
but to the guaranteeing Powers, of which, as I have shown
in several preceding articles in this Review, England is the
only one it can implicitly trust, to neglect no precautions
whatever for the defence of the country, mistakes of this
nature are truly culpable. Consequently, it may be said
that, in omitting to adopt some precautions at the time of,
or since, the formation of the camp at Elsenborn, Belgium
neglected to discharge its proper duties. The Belgian
apologist may reply in helpless tones, " What could we
do?" One answer to the plea is clear and irrefutable. It
could have abandoned Arlon as a garrison town, and trans
ferred the regiment there to, let me suggest, Bastogne or
the neighbourhood of Rochefort. There is no reason why
it should not now make the change. In the worst case, if
this body of troops could not stop or retard the invader,
it would not be difficult at least to save the regiment by
withdrawing it within the fortified position of Namur.
While the danger of keeping a regimentof infantry at Arlon
is the most striking proof of improvident carelessness, it
must be stated that the whole disposition of the Belgian
army is defective. It remains exactly as it was prior to
1870, when the larger portion of the mobile troops were
kept on the south-west frontier to oppose an advance by
France, which was the old nightmare in Brussels. But the
situation to-day is the exact opposite of what it was in
the time of Napoleon III. There is not the remotest risk
of the French moving on Brussels or advancing either
through Hainaut or Flanders. If, for any reason, they
did move into Belgium, the advance would certainly be
either down the Meuse to Namur, or across the Ardennes

THE MENACE OF ELSENBORN 113
to Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle. Yet Ypres, Tournai, Mons,
and Charleroi are all heavily garrisoned, considering the
smallness of the Belgian army. Behind the places named
there are regiments of cavalry and infantry at both Bruges
and Ghent, which could be placed in a few hours alongside
the regiments in garrison there. That was an excellent
system when no one knew from one week to another what
foolish enterprise Napoleon III. might not take up. But
it is quite out of date and an anachronism at the present
time. It is still worse; it gives German aggressiveness an
undue advantage and a direct encouragement, whilst it
places France at a considerable disadvantage.
When the quite undefended position of the Ardennes is
borne in mind, this faulty distribution of Belgian troops
for the defence of Belgian territory betrays a remarkable
and culpable negligence on the part of the Brussels War
Department. When the same authorities protest that they
are helpless to do anything to avert or counterbalance the
menace of Elsenborn, their excuse is invalidated by the
fact that four of the cavalry regiments now quartered in
Hainaut and Flanders would supply a mobile force for
the defence of the Ardennes against such a raid as has
been sketched. The Germans could not possibly ignore the
presence of such a force. In making the necessary transfer
of garrisons, the Belgian Government would, of course,
be put to the expense of building new barracks, but land
is cheap in the Ardennes, and Rochefort, Bastogne, Ciney,
and Libramont would make excellent cavalry stations with
a couple of batteries of horse artillery thrown in at La
Roche and St. Hubert. These suggestions, which are made
by one to whom the Belgian Ardennes are as familiar
ground as Surrey, and which are of a simple and practical
character, will show the reader that in the writer's mind
the duty devolves on Belgium of taking steps without
delay to nullify the menace that the German camp at
Elsenborn presents for the security of her territory and the
preservation of her neutrality. There is still in all proba
bility a sufficient margin of time left before the outbreak
of a great war in Western Europe to allow of these simple
precautions being put into execution. It is the absolutely
undefended state of the Belgian Ardennes — that is to say

n4 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
the whole of the province of Luxemburg, and the greater
portions of the provinces of Namur and Liege (south of
the Meuse)— which offers so tempting and probably, in
the result, so irresistible an inducement to convert them
into the battleground for the next European war. That
state of defencelessness is a typical instance of the
remissness or improvidence with which the Belgians fail
to attend to the vital question of their own national
security. As a matter of fact, the Belgian Government has always
required stimulating by its friends to keep it up to the
level of its responsibilities in military matters. The French
Government has been somewhat backward in respect of
friendly remonstrances at Brussels, believing, perhaps too
implicitly, that the sympathies of the Belgian people were
wholly with France, and that an incursion on the part of
the Germans would only entail the adhesion of the
Belgians en masse to her side. Since the declaration of
the Entente Cordiale, too, the French Government, out of
pure delicacy of feeling towards this country, has been
more than ever averse to remonstrate at Brussels as to
Belgian neglect in taking proper precautions. It assumes
that this is primarily a matter for England, who is pledged
to the lips to maintain Belgian independence. But, unfortu
nately, English advice and English remonstrances do not
carry the great weight which ought to attach to them at
Brussels, where there is a deep and spreading feeling of
resentment at the English treatment of the Congo question.
I say it with regret that English advice there at this junc
ture produces rather the opposite effect to what it aims at
accomplishing. Instead of leading the Belgian authorities
to undertake or sanction what is recommended, it seem
ingly confirms their inaction, and even sometimes impels
them to take action of a contradictory order. France,
therefore, is leaning on a broken reed if she thinks that
English influence at Brussels, which I declare to be nil,
and for the moment a figment of the imagination based on
tradition, will avail to induce the Belgian authorities to
organise their defence as against Germany. France still
has influence there, although it is waning as the conse
quence of her political association with England, and she

THE MENACE OF ELSENBORN 115
will be wise to use it without delay and without reference
to London, so as to secure a more equitable distribution
of the Belgian garrisons, and a more effective system of
defending the roads across the Ardennes, and especially
the great main route through Gouvy, Libramont, and
Bertrix, which leads to the undefended northern section
of the French frontier, the Achilles-heel of France.
Without believing in the literal accuracy of the state
ment that a secret offensive and defensive treaty has for
some time existed between Belgium and Germany, I have
reason to know that the relations between the Governments
of the little State and the big Power have long been most
cordial, and I do not think it would require twenty-four
hours to conclude and sign a treaty of that purport, not
secretly, but openly. Nothing, in my opinion, can avert
this contingency but prompt and energetic steps by the
French Government in Brussels and also in London to
bring about a clearing of the cloudy atmosphere in Anglo-
Belgian relations. France may well see good ground for
anxiety in the almost ostentatious neglect of Belgium to
provide against the menace of Elsenborn. But if that
neglect is not merely ostentatious, but intentional, how
much more reason is there for French statesmanship to be
vigorously self-assertive, and is there not some good reason
for thinking that this may be the case in the truly extra
ordinary plan for diverting the main railway from
Germany from its existing track through Verviers and
Li6ge to a new route leading directly west from Welken-
raedt, and passing to the north of Liege ? It is certainly
true that the proposed track would be more or less under
the fire of one or two of the forts on the northern side of
the Liege perimeter, but the existing line is so completely
at the mercy of Fort Chaudfontaine (which is practically
impregnable) that it could never be utilised by an invading
force. To place improved railway facilities, as will be
done by the Welkenraedt-Louvain direct line, at the dis
posal of the conjectural invader, for whom, by neglect to
improvise a proper defence, the whole of the Ardennes has
been left alluringly open, is certainly an indication of how
the wind blows at Brussels. While our God-granted states
men have been indulging in free denunciations of the

116 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Belgian King and his officials with regard to the Congo
question, there is too much reason in my mind to apprehend
that by way of revenge that King and his government are
laying the seeds of a cordial alliance with Germany which
will exercise a profound and durable influence on the fate
of Western '¦Europe, and it can only be one to the detriment
of France as well as of England.

THE PEACE OF EUROPE*
DESPITE Hague Conferences and Temples of Peace the
international situation in this old continent of ours remains
strained, and those who care to listen can hear below the
surface the rumblings of disagreement, menace, and strife
which, since the collapse of the Tower of Babel, have
marked the history of the relations between man and his
brother-man. The rumblings are not the less minatory
because every one is so intent on smothering their sound,
or declaring that they exist merely in the imagination of
alarmists. In at least three distinct parts of what may be called
the European battle-ground, they are caused by seismologi-
cal disturbances that may at any moment provoke a vast
and incalculable human cataclysm. For those who prefer
to confront the unpleasant truth instead of taking to their
bosom the pleasing comfort of unreal fiction, the following
investigation of the bases on which the relations of the
European Powers rest at the present time will not be with
out interest, and may furnish some material for grave
reflection. Although the details vary, although many dislocations
of old power and many attributions of new power have
to be noted, the present situation of Europe is very much
the same in essentials as it has been at any time during the
three or four centuries that have passed since feudal and
mediaeval strife gave place to the struggles due to national
impulses or the ambitions of statesmen and sovereigns with
which what may be called modern policy was inaugurated.
England, ever anxious of her hold upon the sea and ever
dreaming of hostile Armadas, clings to and gropes for
the maintenance of "the Balance of Power." The great
* United Service Magazine, July, 1908.
117

n8 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
military State of the Continent, now Germany where
formerly stood France, wants to smite its neighbours hip
and thigh, so that they may no longer bar the way to
the effort that shall do for England on the sea what the
Spanish Armada did not. The Power dispossessed not '
merely of its ancient military pre-eminence but of much of
its cherished territory, now France where once it was
Germany, ponders on revenge and recovery, but grown
prudent, and still smarting from its wounds, stands
vigilant, watching for the coming of the inevitable collision
between Briton and Teuton. These still are the three giants
of Europe, great in their national characteristics, their
material resources, and their pride of race. In comparison
with them all the other States east of the Atlantic combined
have only a secondary and relative importance. France
pines for the recovery if not the restitution of what she has
lost; Germany toils for world-wide expansion based on the
robbery of what England has won; England, aroused and
alarmed at the menace, is meditating whether prudence bids
her merely rivet her panoply or by one supreme effort
strike her rival low.
No one can seriously dispute the existence of these three
overmastering national movements set in force by inexor
able and inscrutable destiny. Yet we are assured that the
peace of Europe is secure, and that it is only we insignifi
cant interpreters of the times who are the mischief-makers,
war-mongers and alarmists, that would set the world by
the ears, and without whose intervention the millennium
would arrive, and the lion would lie down by the lamb !
This view is circulated and emphasised by those who are
interested in the preservation of the belief in shams, and
whose plans are threatened by the early discovery of their
true nature and purpose. Germans, being the aggressive
force to-day in international politics everywhere, are especi
ally thin-skinned, and sensitive as to divulgations of their
plotting. Let us then turn to the consideration calmly and dis
passionately of the great problem that confronts us, and
let us endeavour to bring forth the essential factors in the
situation rather than the minor contributories.
What has for some time been the predominating fact in

THE PEACE OF EUROPE ng
the European situation ? No one can dispute that it has
been the desire, nay the determination, of Germany, under
the Prussian asgis be it well understood, not to be isolated.
Twelve months ago it really looked as if that much-to-be-
desired result in the interests of the world's peace was
almost achieved, but the scene has since changed. Berlin
has laboured assiduously in the interval, and there has
not merely disappeared the possibility of Germany being
isolated, but there has arisen the new possibility that on
certain questions she may not improbably find such sup
porters as to leave it doubtful on which side of the Euro
pean dividing line the real superiority of power lies. In
the interval she has administered a soporific to England
not merely by the German Emperor's visit, which lulled
our suspicions at a critical moment, but also by means of
a carefully organised Press campaign.
But she has done a great deal more tangible work than
this. She has strengthened her alliance with Austria by
skilfully bringing into evidence the opposition of Anti-
German Powers to the legitimate and inevitable expansion
of Austria towards the ^Egean. She has strengthened her
position in Holland, where a German prince must sooner
or later reign. She has won over a staunch ally in Sweden,
alienated by the senseless folly of detaching Norway from
her — to which England mainly contributed — the greatest
political blunder of the dawning century. Finally, she
has got the whole of the administrative and commercial
classes of Belgium at her disposal through the short
sighted and intemperate anti-Congo policy of England,
which has uprooted the old Belgian trust in her. If to
these new or strengthened alliances we add the blind
devotion of the Sultan of Turkey, controlling an army
which is not the least efficient in the world, we have an
array of forces which, on land at least, might well make a
bold bid for the hegemony of Europe.
If it is asked how this remarkable change has been
brought about in a short year, the answer can be given in
a sentence. It is through the blundering of the British
Government. Instead of looking plain facts in the face,
it has indulged in the costly pastime of giving free reins
to the sentimental, and it has heedlessly passed by the

120 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
practical and left it far behind and outside its reach. It
has certainly the Entente Cordiale with France, but so
nebulous an arrangement, worked by men who indulge in
private correspondence with Kaiser Wiihelm, can scarcely
relieve the French nation from all its ever-present and
pressing anxiety. It has an agreement with Russia, but
Russia in her present state would have but a poor chance
against the well-trained legions of the two Powers of
Central Europe. There remains, indeed, Italy, a titular
member still of the Triple Alliance yet opposed to Austria
in the Balkan peninsula, and for that reason if for no other
more likely to desert than to join her allies; but on the
field of Mars, Italy may count for less than the charitably
disposed attribute to her. While events are tending in this
direction the British Government, blindly indifferent to
facts, is approaching one of the powder magazines of
Europe with a lighted match, and if it be true that Russia
has promised her support with regard to Sir Edward
Grey's proposals for Macedonia, the hour of explosion
must be close at hand.
The two most obvious purposes that any British Govern
ment should set before itself in its Continental action are
the retention of the cordial good-will and trust of the two
peoples of the Netherlands on the one hand, and the
encouraging of the anti-Prussian forces that exist at
Vienna on the other. It is as clear as the noon-day sun
that in the present crippled condition of Russia the balance
of power in Europe rests in the hands of Austria. It is
also scarcely less clear that if England is to help France
on land against superior forces which will crush her
without that help, her only available avenue for strik
ing in with timely and effective aid runs through Belgium.
England's two main interests, therefore, are so palpably
clear that it would seem incredible, if it were not happen
ing, how she could go wilfully and wantonly out of her
way to injure her own position in those states, and to create
difficulties that should never have been allowed to arise.
The anti-Congo policy at the expense of Belgium is now to
be matched and surpassed by an anti-Austrian policy at
the expense of Prussia's half-consenting, half-reluctant
ally in Vienna. Just as we have alienated the Belgians,

THE PEACE OF EUROPE 121
and pushed them into the welcoming arms of Germany,
which is a plain disservice to France, so are we now driving
the Austrian Government to swallow all its own private
qualms and misgivings through a greater fear and sense of
irritation, and to realise that it has no choice save to rely
on its Prussian partner.
The unfortunate part of the matter is, that once Austria
takes the final step committing her in the Balkan peninsula
to the policy engineered from Berlin, there will be no going
back for her. She will have finally taken her place in the
Pan-Germanic expansion league that has been the ideal of
Berlin for so many years, and her own special idiosyn
crasies will be merged in those of the more vigorous
political entity that will at last have moulded her to its
will. The non-German elements in the Dual Empire,
moreover, will be deprived of even their desire to oppose
this tendency when they see that the way is being barred
to their legitimate and necessary expansion southwards by
the sympathisers with the worthless elements in the
Macedonian province. The sure way to stifle the disinclin
ation of Magyar and Czek to coalesce with the German, is
to close the door to Austria in the Balkans and to represent
that Italy has valid rights on the eastern shore of the
Adriatic. Yet English policy at the present moment is
riding full tilt for a collision with Austria. The deep-
rooted opposition of the Emperor Francis Joseph to
quarrelling and strife of all kinds, and the general desire
of the Powers to respect the wishes of the venerable
monarch, may retard the revelation of the change that has
taken place in Baron Aehrenthal's policy since he assumed
office, but it does not diminish or weaken the force of the
change itself. The pro-Russian statesman has by the force
of circumstances been converted into the temporary if not
the permanent auxiliary of Prussia.
If we turn to Germany herself, we see a vigorous process
of Germanification at work in the east and west of the
Empire. In Poland the process has been going on for some
years, and although Polish vitality is strong it is not at
all clear that it will survive the sapping, pressure, and
coercion that have been brought to bear upon it. Prussian
Poland is of comparatively small dimensions, and has not

isa ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
the density of population that belongs to the other frag
ments of the old kingdom that fell to Russia and Austria.
Given the necessary time, the Teutonising of the Poles
subject to the Hohenzollern is one of those processes that,
although they do not amalgamate races or unite hearts,
stifle opposition and attain the practical ends of Govern
ment. While this experimental fusing is still in the crucible
Prussia has taken up a similar task in the extreme west of
her territory where, after an interval of nearly forty years,
she has suddenly become alive to the fact that the people
of Alsace-Lorraine are still at heart as French as on the
day of their separation. The weapon to which the
Prussians have had recourse is the compulsory use of the
German tongue. They argue that a common language is
the hammer that welds peoples, when in the molten stage,
together. They have employed it, not without success, in
the Walloon districts of Malmedy and St. Vith in the
northern Eiffel (where a charming people are afraid to
express themselves in their mother tongue beyond their
doorsteps), and they hope to succeed as well in the towns
and villages of Alsace. For a long time they hoped and
believed that the lapse of a few years would bring the
Alsatian into the fold of the German family ; but the years
have passed, and the would-be brother is still an alien,
a conquered subject not an attached fellow-citizen. So
sterner and sharper measures have been adopted. The
inhabitants of the Reichsland are to be taught a new
language, their national songs are to be suppressed, and
in the course of a generation or so it is hoped that the old
attachment to France will have been stamped out. At least,
if it has not been eradicated, the Prussians are resolved
that it shall only find expression in German, for the French
language is to disappear, dying a violent death by suffoca
tion, or relegated as an ancient tongue to the universities,
coming after Greek and Latin.
And if this process does not answer, there are to be in
France's lost provinces, as already in Poland, sterner, more
severe, and, the opinion of the world when aroused will
add spontaneously, more barbarous, repressive measures.
Expropriation of property, expatriation of person, are to

THE PEACE OF EUROPE 123
follow, and if the full truth were told the would-be creators
of this fancied Germanic solidarity would not be sorry to
see the mass of the Alsatian people get up under their
tyranny and make an exodus to the western side of the
Vosges. But the surprising circumstance is, that while this
revival of mediaeval cruelty is in full swing, while Ger
many is harrying the consciences if not yet the lands of
the severed brothers under the very eyes of France, we
have to listen to the confident assurance that the peace of
Europe is assured, and that those who talk of war are
only idle scaremongers. The truth with regard to the
situation is that France, preoccupied with the religious and
social differences in her own house, has not yet realised
what is happening at her door; and that the people of
Alsace, harassed and hampered in their daily life, have
not yet been sufficiently goaded to utter the despairing cry
for help and rescue that cannot be much longer delayed.
Indifferent to the brutal coercion of Poles and Alsatians by
the same taskmasters, Sir Edward Grey is solicitous that
the blacks of the Congo should be treated with infinite
tenderness, and that Greeks and Bulgars should be obliged
to sit in amity cheek by jowl.
In all the schemes put forward for the settlement of what
is called the Near Eastern Question, the proposal to create
a Governor-General of Macedonia is the most puerile. It
can only be compared indeed to a boy playing with the
fire. In the first place, it is a needless provocation to the
Sultan, who can only see in it a sinister attempt to under
mine his authority and to bring about the further disruption
of his empire. In the second place, it is so manifestly
intended to close the door to Salonika in Austria's face,
that that Power could not help but oppose it. The pro
posal is obviously doomed to failure unless there is the
intention to resort to force to support it, and if there is this
intention the question must then be asked, what force ?
British Governments have often undertaken imprudent
adventures before, but they certainly have not done any
thing so mad as would be an attempt to force a Governor-
General on Macedonia in the face of Turkish and Austrian
opposition backed up by Germany. Prudent France,
confined rigidly to the defence of her own territory, and

124 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
more than satisfied in any desire for external adventures by
her excursion in Morocco, would not be eager to speculate
in the discovery of perfection among the lawless and
antagonistic races of the Balkan peninsula. Even if she
had the inclination she has not the power. All her legions,
and still more, are wanted in Lorraine and the Ardennes.
Nor is it conceivable that the assurance of the faint and
feeble co-operation of Russia will be held sufficient induce
ment by even the most short-sighted of British Govern
ments to take up so hazardous an enterprise as the one
that would be started by the appointment of a non-Turkish
Governor-General of Macedonia.
But from no quarter will the proposal receive such violent
opposition as from Turkey. It is a proposal to deprive the
Sultan of a good part of his legitimate authority, and it is
made too at a moment when that potentate, far from think
ing himself in a bad way from the military standpoint,
has made all his plans to deal Russia in the Caucasus as
effective a blow as he dealt Greece only a few years ago
in Thessaly. The opposition of Turkey is doubly impor
tant because it supplies the opponents of the British project
with the very fulcrum that they desire, and provides a
decent excuse and a form of legality to those who are
thinking not of Turkish necessities but their own selfish
ends. But it will be said with the airy confidence which
takes no heed of local facts and difficulties that Turkish
opposition can be easily beaten down by the British fleet,
and that, if a naval demonstration is not sufficient, then
the forcing of the Dardanelles will promptly bring the
Porte to its knees.
But "the forcing of the Dardanelles," accomplished
with ease by Admiral Duckworth a century ago — only,
however, be it remembered, to find the exit an affair of
much damage and great peril — and again by Admiral
Hornby in 1878, is one of those achievements which German
science has gone to the uttermost of its power and oppor
tunity to render more difficult if not impossible of accom
plishment in the future. While the Foreign Office is count
ing on the Navy to extricate it from any ludicrous position
in which it may find itself through the Porte proving
defiant, I wonder whether any heed has been paid to the

THE PEACE OF EUROPE 125
confident anticipation in Germany that the Forts — German-
constructed, Krupp-armed — of the Dardanelles are
destined to furnish, with good luck, one of the graves
of British naval supremacy ? Still more cause for
wonder is the continued confidence expressed in the feasi
bility of forcing the Dardanelles by the fleet, when the
true and the costless way is to deliver the attack on land
and not on water. These observations are introduced in the
hope that a little calm reflection as to the means of enforc
ing a policy of adventure in the Balkans may lead to the
abandonment of the policy itself.
For many years past Germany has been following a
most astute policy at Constantinople, and through the
Sultan she has acquired a great and ever-increasing influ
ence in the Mahommedan world. The German Emperor
has even received or assumed the title of Protector of Islam,
and the Admiral of the Atlantic knows very well what
stakes he is playing for. The time is approaching when
Germany will expect to derive some material benefit from
the course she has systematically pursued, of paying heed
only to her own material interests in every dispute or discus
sion affecting the Turkish Empire. She is the recognised
sympathiser with Turkey in regard to her claims at the
expense of Persia over the Sheiks of the Shat-ul-Arab, at
that of the Khedive in the Sinai peninsula. Going further
afield, the generality of mankind are very wide of the
truth if Germany does not count for much in the troublous
situation of Morocco, which may at any moment furnish a
casus belli between France and Germany. The enigmatic
phrases of Prince Bulow in the Reichstag, about what he
termed "the very unsatisfactory situation in Morocco,"
will not have given much satisfaction in Paris, where the
prevailing conviction is that that situation is due to the
fetters imposed on France's action by that very Algeciras
Act which was the outcome of Germany's sinister
diplomacy. The Morocco situation will not be relieved, as Prince
Biilow pretends, by respect for " the spirit of the Algeciras
Act," but by its repudiation and by leaving France a free
hand. No doubt if complications elsewhere are averted,
Germany will be willing to do this "at a price." But for

126 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
the moment Prince Biilow confines himself to vague terms
which may mean either tacit sanction or grave censure of
France's policy, as he may choose by the light of sub
sequent events to give his own interpretation to his cryptic
phrases. All the student of politics need say on the subject
is, that the German references to the Moroccan question are,
whether intentionally or not, a continuous source of irrita
tion to the French; and remembering the latent bitterness
of their feelings, this can scarcely be termed a point in
favour of peace.
A good deal has been written of late on the subject of
the extended application of the principle of neutrality to
the international status of some of the smaller countries
of Europe. It has been proposed to extend this form of
bondage on a nation's liberty, to Norway, Denmark, and
Holland. The only " neutral " state in Europe is Belgium,
and there is no question that during the seventy years that
the principle has been applied in what used to be " the
cockpit of Europe " it has facilitated the growth and
development of the Belgian nation. But in Belgium it has
now served its turn, and the more vigorous and virile
sections of her community are persuaded that she must
ere long repudiate "neutrality" and claim all the rights
with the risks of an unfettered sovereign state. This senti
ment is largely due to the growth of German and the
decline of English influence in Belgium. It is curious
to note that, while German official opinion is quite favour
able to the project of making Holland a neutral state, it is
at the same time not averse to Belgium ceasing to be one,
but the difference of view becomes easily explicable when
one puts on German spectacles.
German authorities are rather inclined to represent that
Holland is a "neutral state " already, for such a condition
of things would " suit their book." If it were so, in war
time German commerce passing down the Rhine would
merely hoist the Dutch flag and gain free and unfettered
outlet through Rotterdam to the marts of the world. It
would also put an end to the Orange tradition of sturdy
independence. But fortunately for England and France,
Holland is not yet a "neutral state," but a free and
sovereign one that can make treaties of alliance, and that

THE PEACE OF EUROPE 127
can take its own part in restraining rather than assisting
the expansion of Hohenzollern ideals and designs. On
the other hand, Belgium, not being so useful to Germany
as an avenue of commerce in war-time — for the Meuse is
not a German river — but being of incalculable importance
from the military point of view to her, the change from
a " neutral " to an independent and presumably allied state
would be hailed with unqualified satisfaction at Berlin.
How far secret agreements may have gone already towards
the attainment of this result can only be known to those
who take part in them, but it has always been inconceivable
to me, during the last five or six years of Anglo-Congolese
controversy, how indifference could be shown to the in
evitable consequences of British criticism and censure on
what Belgians had done in Central Africa in changing and
moulding the external policy of the Belgian nation and
Government. But if it is surprising that the British Government has
not foreseen this contingency it is still more remarkable
that a similar blindness has prevailed at Paris, and that
the French Government has never made any attempt to
bring about an amicable adjustment of all differences with
regard to the Congo, and thus end a lamentably bitter
controversy. France might well have acted in this matter,
for she must be the chief sufferer from any change in the
status of Belgium. Belgium will, or rather can, only
repudiate her neutrality on the guarantee of German pro
tection. The French are trusting to a broken reed if they
think that the sympathies of the Belgians with their Gallic
brothers will keep them from combining with Germany.
The Belgian view is — as we care no longer to rely on
England, which of our neighbours can afford us the more
ample and complete protection ? The conclusion that it is
Germany the foe of England, rather than France her
friend, is not wholly surprising; but for France this would
mean the turning of her defensive position in the Vosges
and the opening of the road to Paris from the north !
If there is an atom of common sense left among those
who guide British and French foreign policy, no time will
be lost in arresting the development of the tendency in
Belgium to put an end to all external trouble by merging

128 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
herself in the German system. This tendency has been
encouraged by the assurance, which is true enough as far
as it goes, that in the event of its becoming necessary for
Germany to occupy the Meuse forts and the Ardennes,
manu militari, " for the protection of Belgium," the centres
of national life and activity would be left undisturbed.
I have set forth certain facts, unimpeachable in them
selves and expressed, I trust, with seemly moderation and
modesty, that must be taken into account before acceptance
can be given to the declaration that the peace of Europe
is assured, and that not merely is the Temple of Janus
permanently closed, but that a new Temple of Peace has
been opened. As a matter of fact, calmly and coldly
stated, the peace of Europe can never be considered assured
as long as the main cause of enmity and strife remains
unremoved. Is it necessary to say that this is the continued presence
on French soil of the German as a victor ? The severance
of Alsace and part of Lorraine from France lies at the
root of all international disputation in Europe, and so
long as this wound remains open, so long as French and
German soldiers sleep with their weapons beside them on
the frontier within a few miles of each other, must there
be the risk of that great collision among the nations which
may be the day of Armageddon. The risk of this occur
ring at an early date has been increased by the harsh treat
ment of the people of the Reichsland under the resolution
passed at Berlin to establish rigid uniformity on the
Prussian standard from the Vistula to the Vosges. The
full extent and harsh features of the plan are not yet
realised in France, but when they are there may be no
possibility of restraining national resentment at a gross
wrong callously inflicted and of malice prepense.

GERMANY'S PLAN OF ATTACK*
"DELENDA EST CARTHAGO"
FROM one end of Germany to the other the following
version of history is being dinned into the ears of the rising
generation — "Naval supremacy means the mastery of the
political and commercial world. In the sixteenth century
it belonged to Spain, in the seventeenth to Holland. In
the eighteenth it was fought for by France and England ;
in the nineteenth it was possessed by England. In the
twentieth century it will be contested between Germany and
England, and Germany will emerge the victor."
For the realisation of this programme Germany has
created a most powerful battle fleet, and evolved a definite
plan of naval action against this country. Strong light
has just been cast on the size, capacity and growth of
the fleet. The purpose of this article is to draw attention
to Germany's naval plan. Even if it is not the only plan
designed by German science, it is the one which embraces
all its pet theories as to how the mastery of the narrow
seas may be wrested from this country, for it is necessary
to remember, in the first place, that the whole of Germany's
strength at sea is concentrated upon and devoted to the
immediate object of overthrowing the English Navy in
the North Sea (in Germany always called German Ocean)
and the Channel. That one object has been the constant
study of German naval experts during the last twenty
years. It is not surprising that they are as well acquainted
with those waters, even when wrapped in fog and mist, as
if they were the high road through an open country. One
German naval authority has gone so far as to call the mists
of the North Sea Germany's "natural ally."
Without going into the exact details about the German
* National Defence, April, 1909.
129 o

130 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
fleet which, thanks to Mr. Balfour's exposition, has become
better known within the last few days, there are certain
matters appertaining to that fleet which must claim atten
tion before proceeding further. In the recent debate on
the Navy Estimates it was clearly shown that England
and Germany are running a neck-and-neck race in the
matter of the construction of the highest existing type of
battleship to which the name Dreadnought has been given.
Only totals were counted and the units were assumed to
be equal. But this is not the way of counting in Germany.
It is assumed there, for various reasons, some of which I
will proceed to state, that the German unit is better than
the English in a ratio of five to four. In other words, an
equality of units on this reckoning gives Germany a
superiority of 25 per cent. As German experts do not as a
rule indulge in hallucinations, it is well worth our Admi
ralty's while to seriously examine the reasons for German
optimism, which, we may feel fully convinced, is based on
scientific deductions and not merely on national egotism
or conceit.
From the very beginning of the formation of an ironclad
navy in Germany — that is to say, from the creation of
Wilhelmshafen on the Jahde — their leading principle in
construction and tactics has been that superiority of gunfire
constitutes the one ideal object in the ship for war. To
that point all German efforts have been directed, and more
than once the British Navy has grudgingly and reluctantly
been compelled to imitate and follow suit to its younger
rival. That it will have to do so again is undoubted, for
in the German Dreadnoughts the whole of the guns can
be brought to bear on the same broadside. It is, therefore,
primarily on superior weight in gunfire that the Germans
rely in the estimated superiority of their ships over ours
of the same class and tonnage. The Germans have adopted
a method of their own for enabling all the big guns to be
used on either broadside. They have them in the tiers
on revolving platforms in turrets, like those in the
Brazilian ships now approaching completion at Elswick,
but they have also adopted a new mechanism which allows
of a gun being turned from one side of the ship to the
other with great facility.

GERMANY'S PLAN OF ATTACK 131
While the superiority of gunfire has been the first article
in the faith of the creators of the German navy, they have
not neglected the defensive element as well. They have
the belief that the armour plates turned out by Krupp are
superior to those produced in England. In testing the
accuracy of this assertion it is useless to institute a com
parison with anything Krupps make for foreign orders.
They are admittedly of only a secondary order of excel
lence. The tests applied to the plates and turrets con
structed for the Government are of a much more exacting
character, and it is contended that none to equal them are
applied in England. The point to be noted is that the
alleged superiority of the German ships to ours by five to
four is based on greater defensive as well as offensive
power. The third point on which the claim to superiority is
advanced is the better scientific training of the officers and
the superior discipline of the crews. It is claimed for the
German officer that he is a man absorbed in his profession,
and that he has a more complete mastery of the technical
work on board a modern man-of-war than the English
officer. He is also animated by superior moral force, which
is always greater with those who seek to establish a new
pretension than with those who have to maintain an old.
The superiority of the crews is based on other considera
tions, although the claim to higher intelligence is one of
them. They are more amenable to discipline, it is declared,
because they are more sober, less enfeebled by disease, and
better educated than our men. It is also contended that
the individual training is more thoroughly carried out
than with us. Finally, with regard to effective strength,
it is declared that while the total personnel of the German
fleet is given as between fifty and sixty thousand men, it
can be raised at once to one hundred thousand men, all
of whom have had naval training, immediately after the
declaration of war.
To sum up, the German claim that their unit of the first
fighting value is superior to ours by one-fourth is based on
these assumptions : superiority in weight of gunfire, in the
defensive quality of the armour, in the officers' knowledge
of their profession, and in the discipline of the crews.

132 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
There remains one further claim — superiority in strategy
and the possession of a naval plan intended, in the first
place, to bring about the disorganisation of our naval
preparations, and, in the second place, to facilitate the
landing of an invading force on our shores. The following
details will enable our readers to arrive at some conclusion
as to how far these pretensions may be held to be justified.
The first point laid down in the plan is that, war having
been decided upon, the German Government will be able
to screen its preparations, and to make the arrival of the
advance squadrons at their respective destinations the first
notification of the commencement of hostilities. This con
tention is based on the absolute readiness of the high sea
fleet to sail at a moment's notice, the perfect secrecy with
which the ships can be got ready at Kiel, and the scarcely
less complete secrecy that cloaks proceedings at Wilhelm-
shafen. No formal declaration of war is to be made. It
will be still better if the North Sea is enwrapped in its
habitual grey pall when the moment for action has arrived
The next principle set forth is to strike quickly, to strike
hard and at several places more or less simultaneously.
The object of the first attack is to interfere with our
mobilisation, to cripple our recuperative resources, and to
spread a panic by showing that many points on our coast
are exposed to attack, incapable of defence, and open to
the descent of an invading army. In this way it is assumed
that our preparations will be scattered instead of concen
trated, because we shall be unable to feel sure which point
is really aimed at by an enemy who presents himself in
several directions about the same time.
For the execution of this plan one main achievement and
two minor tasks are proposed. To take the latter first.
A small squadron, accompanied by an infantry and artil
lery force of 5,000 men, accommodated on two or three
of the American line steamers, will make a dash for the
Tyne. Its assigned object is to destroy the works at
Elswick, for which task a landing force is considered
necessary. Having done its work there, the ships and the
troops would return without delay to the Elbe. The Tyne
is about 500 miles from the Elbe. It is computed that
within two days of reaching its destination the expedition

GERMANY'S PLAN OF ATTACK 133
would be back in the safety of its own ports, having
deprived England of one of its most efficient naval yards
and military arsenals.
The second of the minor missions is to execute a raid
on the Humber, to destroy the guardship in it, to do as
much damage as possible to navigation, and to produce
the general impression that has been spoken of. The pro
bability is that this attack would be mainly one of torpedo-
boats, and of leaving the Humber estuary well sown with
floating mines. The ships assigned for this work would
remain in the North Sea, to serve as a supporting force for
the retiring fleet charged with the main mission.
A third minor movement will be against Harwich. A
torpedo attack may, if circumstances admit (the circum
stances referred to being essentially the state of the atmo
sphere), be made on the little squadron in the Orwell ; but
the idea is to make no real attack here, but to leave a
sufficient number of ships en vedette to engage and over
throw the little squadron stationed in Harwich harbour, if
it were to venture out to take the offensive or to obtain
information. These ships would also serve as the first
reserve for those retiring from the main undertaking.
The principal task before the German high sea fleet,
raised for the campaign sketched for it to a strength of not
fewer than twenty battleships (twenty-two battleships were
mentioned in the scheme from which these statements are
taken, but, of course, they were not Dreadnoughts), is to
block Sheerness, to destroy Chatham, and to execute a
torpedo-boat raid up the Thames. The instructions to the
torpedo-boat squadron are to do all the damage they can,
and to rejoin the battleship squadron as soon as they have
discharged their mission. Whether to encourage the leaders
of this forlorn hope, or because it is really believed to be
so, it is asserted that this attack will encounter little or no
opposition, as the precautions taken for the defence will
be totally nullified by the surprise of the attack.
The attack on Sheerness and Chatham represents the
serious part of the enterprise. The question of success is
admitted to depend very largely on the point whether the
German fleet of twenty battleships can get to the Nore
without their approach being heralded. If they can, then

134 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
a certain elemental success by mere superiority of numbers
is a mathematical certainty. The success may not be crush
ing, but it must count for something. It might be compared
to Sir Francis Drake's raid on Cadiz. I am minimising the
consequences, but they are not minimised in the scheme
from which I am citing. It is declared therein that, while
the attack would be audacious, because striking at the
heart of a powerful adversary, it would possess a reason
able chance of great success — the greater, it is admitted,
if the atmospheric conditions proved only more favourable
to the assailant than the defender. If the great naval base
at the mouth of the Thames were even crippled in the first
stage of the struggle, it is contended that not merely would
the mobilisation of the English fleet be rendered extremely
difficult and incomplete, but that abject terror would
prevail in the Metropolis whose outer door would thus
have been forced. Even in the event of repulse the German
fleet would by this offensive movement have given a strik
ing demonstration of its worth, and might safely and
honourably fall back on its secondary role, viz. the defence
of its own rivers and of the entrances to the Baltic.
In the Paper from which these citations are taken the
attack on the Thames has coupled with it a projected raid
on Portsmouth. This is based on the achievement of the
squadron of Prince Henry of Prussia, which in December
1897 got into Portsmouth during a dense fog, past all the
forts and guardships quite undetected. But it is declared
in a kind of addendum that, in view of the creation of the
new naval base at Dover, an attempt on Portsmouth in the
first stage of a naval war might prudently be abandoned,
for even if it achieved a certain measure of success, the
attacking force would be liable to be cut off and destroyed
on its way back in the straits of Dover.
The naval plan represents the offensive operations in
the first stage of a naval war with England. For its suc
cessful execution it counts on the element of surprise in
the absence of a declaration of hostilities, on celerity of
movement, on the superiority of ships manoeuvring in the
open sea over those stationary in harbour or river estuaries,
that is to say, taken unawares. It also largely presumes
that the English Navy will display in the hour of trial the

GERMANY'S PLAN OF ATTACK 135
qualities of cocksureness, over-confidence and contempt of
the enemy, which have cost the nation so many unpleasant
experiences on land. It is based also on the unavoidable
tactical advantage of the assailant in being able to select
his point of attack. On our fully exposed eastern coast
it is inevitable that vulnerable points should exist, but
perhaps something may be done to give Elswick greater
protection against the raid of combined land and sea forces
that figures almost in the forefront of the plan indicated.
With regard to the navigation of the North Sea in fog
it is contended that German navigators have reduced it
almost to the dimensions of a mathematical certainty.
They have, as it were, mapped it out, and from a given
point to a given point can tell, by the rotations of the
engine, with almost complete accuracy where they are. It
is an enlarged application of the practice between Dover
and Calais, where on a dark or misty night the cautious
captain stops his ship after 2,000 revolutions to find out
where he is.
The plan goes on to record that the object of this first
offensive movement is to damage the English position, to
cause delay in the mobilisation of the fleet, to destroy some
of its bases of equipment, but it adds emphatically that
the crucial test of the relative power of the two countries
will be decided not on the coasts of England but in the
North Sea, at the mouths of the German rivers, and at the
entrance to the Baltic. The principles it enunciates for
success in the one case are the same as those for success in
the other. Careful preparation beforehand, the accumula
tion of a superior force to any that can be arrayed against
it with regard to the immediate task to be undertaken,
and the capacity to hit hard and quickly — these are the
principles upon which German strategists lay stress.
But it must not be thought that even the most sanguine
of Germans anticipate that English naval power can be
destroyed at one blow or by a successful naval raid. All
that they claim is that Germany will thus, in the first
instance, destroy the pretensions of the English Fleet to
invincibility, and that if this were done England's position
in the world would at once decline. As the immediate
consequences of that national abasement it is predicted

136 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
that the Colonies would secede, India revolt, and the inter
national position of this country decline to something on a
level with that of Holland.
There are two serious points in this revelation of a settled
plan to which attention must be drawn. There is the strik
ing fact that the German naval plan is offensive not defen
sive. There is the calm assertion that the personnel of the
German navy can at any given moment be raised to an
effective strength of 100,000 men. It is not more than three
years since Sir John Fisher told the citizens of London that
they might sleep peacefully of night because our Navy
was really invincible. On a previous occasion ne had
declared that " our frontiers are the shores of the enemy."
Are these rash sayings coming home to roost ? It is not
we but the Germans who are counting on getting their
blow in first. If we wanted to anticipate them we should
need to recover Heligoland and to be convinced that the
Danish straits were well enough held to give us time to
take Kiel from the Baltic. But how can we expect vigorous
and offensive action from administrators who still trust
German assurances and who shelve the best fighting
admiral in the "fleet for telling them very much what has
been written in these pages ?

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM*
THE purport of this article is to establish the truth as to
the question of the neutrality of Belgium. For that pur
pose it will be necessary to prove several different things.
Among them I may mention the following : how it arose,
what it means, what are the obligations on Belgium, what
are the perils that beset it, and, lastly, what is its practical
value. The case of Switzerland illustrates one phase of neu
trality, viz., that of a voluntary neutrality accepted as its
distinctive attribute by a nation. The Swiss proclaimed
their neutrality of their own accord and without outside
pressure. They did not ask anybody to help them, and
they did not ask any Power or any conclave of Powers to
confirm what they declared to be their own intention.
Swiss neutrality therefore differs from every other in the
essential points that it is self-imposed and that it breathes
the fixed determination of a free people to make it good
in the teeth of hostile opposition. It is true that the Con
gress of Vienna, ratified by the subsequent treaty of Paris,
gave a European sanction to what the Swiss people
had decided upon; but this does not invalidate the
statement that Swiss neutrality was voluntary and self-
imposed. I have referred to Swiss neutrality in order to emphasise
the difference between it and that of Belgium. If Switzer
land is the most typical case of voluntary neutrality,
Belgium is the most characteristic and important instance
of what is called in international law compulsory and
permanent neutrality. The neutrality of Switzerland,
being the free act of its citizens, might be repudiated at any
* National Defence, June, 1909.
137

138 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
moment. If the Swiss were to do so in their character of
a sovereign people, all Europe could say would be that
an end had been put to an excellent arrangement. But the
neutrality of Belgium is not voluntary. It was imposed
upon her by the Powers. She could not then repudiate it
or shake it off without either defying the Powers or admit
ting that the validity of her own repudiation would have
to be sanctioned by a conference of the five Powers who
signed the final treaties of 1839, before it could have effect.
These introductory remarks are made for the purpose of
showing that Belgium, unlike Switzerland, is not a free
agent. If she were to attempt to become a free agent she
could only do so at the risk of embroiling the Powers who
took part in her own creation as a separate, independent,
and permanently neutral state, and the risk would be
nothing less than her own continued existence.
The principle of neutrality had never been applied in
the past to Belgium, which was called without much
exaggeration "the cockpit of Europe." The idea of
neutrality, however, was not displeasing to the Belgian
mind, and it is worth recalling that the great Van
Artevelde in the fourteenth century propounded it for the
Flemish communes.
When the Belgians revolted against the Dutch in 1830,
and established their own government and constitution,
not a word was said by any of their leaders on the subject
of the country posing as a neutral. The Dutch were
expelled by force of arms from, practically speaking, the
whole of Belgium, and it was recognised by the Belgians
themselves that they would have to continue to fight for
the maintenance of the independence which they had at
last won. It is clear, then, that the intention of affixing
the character of permanent neutrality to the new Belgian
State was not of home growth. It was really an idea
imported from abroad, or rather an arrangement forced on
it by the Powers. But if we turn to the earlier meetings
of the London Conference we find no reference whatever
to any proposal for establishing the neutrality of Belgium.
The suggestion seems to have found expression for the
first time during the negotiations for the acceptance of the
Belgian throne by Prince Leopold, and it probably arose

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 139
from the desire to put a permanent end to the schemes
mooted by ambitious persons for the partition of Belgium.
Whatever was the exact manner in which the idea of
making Belgium a permanently neutral state originated —
and the history of the point is not wholly free from
obscurity — it is certain that the first specific mention of
her neutrality is to be found in the "Eighteen Articles."
The reference therein is remarkably precise in explaining
the full significance of what the Powers decreed.
The text of the articles setting forth the principle reads
as follows: —
Art. 9. — Belgium, within the limits traced in conformity with the
principles laid down in the present preliminaries, shall form a per
petually neutral state. The five Powers, without wishing to intervene
in the internal affairs of Belgium, guarantee her that perpetual
neutrality as well as the integrity and inviolability of her territory in
the limits mentioned in the present article.
Art. 10. — By just reciprocity Belgium shall be held" to observe this
same neutrality towards all the other states, and to make no attack on
their internal or external tranquillity, whilst always preserving the
right to defend herself against every foreign aggression.
If the Eighteen Articles had preserved their validity
there could have been no possibility of misconstruing the
precise signification of the neutrality of Belgium. But the
Eighteen Articles were cancelled, and became null and
void within four months of their being drafted. They gave
Belgium the legitimate right of defending herself, which
she attempted to do in August 183 1, when the Dutch
invaded her territory ; but, owing to her own improvidence,
she failed to repel the invader on that occasion. On the
other hand, the Powers absolutely failed to secure for her
the inviolability of her territory which they had guaran
teed. It is true that they took steps to undo the harm
that had been done and to preserve the future independence
and inviolability of Belgium.
The revised and binding form of the Eighteen Articles
is known as the Twenty-four Articles, and this arrange
ment, more fortunate than its predecessor, became eventu
ally the text of the treaty of peace in 1839. But the
definition given to Belgian neutrality in these later articles
differs materially from that contained in the earlier instru-

140 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
ment. The matter is dealt with in Article 7, and reads as
follows : —
Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles i, 2, and 4, shall form
an independent and perpetually neutral state. She shall be bound to
observe this same neutrality towards all other states.
The guarantee of this neutrality is given in one of the
added articles (No. 25), which sets forth that the five Powers
"guarantee to his Majesty the King of the Belgians the
execution of all the articles preceding."
It is therefore clear that the promises to Belgium as the
price of her permanent neutrality by the binding arrange
ment — viz., the Twenty-four Articles — are not as ample
or as comprehensive as those given by the first arrange
ment — viz., the Eighteen Articles — which lapsed within a
few months of their being drafted.
Pundits in international law can read much into the
vague phraseology of the last-quoted article, which by its
incompleteness leaves a wide opening for ingenuity and
casuistry. Here I content myself with pointing out that
the Powers guaranteed in the last resort only the permanent
neutrality, and not the integrity of the independence and
the inviolability of the territory of the Belgian nation.
I shall make my meaning clearer before the end of this
paper, but it seems to me beyond dispute that the essential
difference between the two arrangements is this : in place
of the Powers guaranteeing the inviolability of Belgium
they threw that responsibility upon the Belgians them
selves, while they would vindicate as they thought best
the principle of her permanent neutrality later on, after
perhaps they had seen how Belgium met her own responsi
bilities. I do not think that the full significance of this
point has yet been grasped anywhere, and more especially
in Belgium. I find no recognition of it in the learned
works of the Chevalier Descamps and Professor Nys. If
the principle is such as I describe it to be, an enormous
responsibility is cast on the Belgian Government, and
inferentially an overwhelming blame must fall upon it
for having grossly neglected to discharge it. In other
words the five Powers, of whom only England and France
were sincere, placed on Belgium herself the obligation of

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 141
defending her own existence whilst they proclaimed with
much parade the really empty principle of her neutrality.
It might be argued that a conqueror would fulfil all the
obligations of the Twenty-four Articles if, on overrunning
and annexing Belgium, he were to declare that that part
of his dominions would be regarded by him as permanently
neutral in the sense demanded by them.
The formal sextuple treaty of 19th of April, 1839,
between Belgium and the five Powers adds nothing to the
matter. There is no explanation anywhere as to what the
Powers had in their mind on the subject of the dropped
phrases, " the integrity and inviolability of Belgian terri
tory." Failing to find any elucidation in the text of the
treaties or the protocols relating thereto, the question natur
ally presents itself, What was the interpretation placed
upon the exact international position of Belgium in
practice? The view taken by the Belgian Government,
and the tacit acquiescence of the Powers in that view, may
not supersede the strict juridical significance of a treaty or
other international pact, but at least it supplies the material
for an opinion on the subject which may be assumed to be
correct enough for the ordinary purposes of business. What
we find in the region of practice makes it quite clear that
the neutrality conferred on Belgium by the Twenty-four
Articles was not as wide and comprehensive as that
bestowed by the earlier Eighteen Articles. The point is of
very great importance, for it is clear that Belgian opinion
assumes too often that the earlier principle is still in force,
whereas it was dropped and became ipso facto null and
void. In this matter it can be demonstrated that Belgian
opinion has fluctuated, and that some politicians have
represented the protective character of the neutrality clause
to be far more positive and obligatory than it is.
Let us now turn to facts. In August 1831, when the
Eighteen Articles formed the basis of Belgium's inter
national position, King Leopold I., on the Dutch invasion,
at once appealed to the Powers to fulfil their promise to
protect the inviolability and integrity of Belgium. His
action was repudiated by his own Government, which
decreed that Belgium should defend herself. It was a
heroic decision, only the Government had neglected to

142 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
provide the means of execution. Its failure to establish the
national power killed the Eighteen Articles, and led to
the substitution of the Twenty-four, which were not merely
harsher for Belgium generally but less satisfactory on the
point of her neutrality.
In August 1 83 1 King Leopold I. called upon the Powers
to protect Belgium, because that was in his opinion their
duty under their own instrument. But he never did so
again, because the Twenty-four Articles of the following
November contained no stipulation to that effect. A new
judicial position was created, and the King fully appre
ciated the change. He realised that the obligation of
protecting herself was imposed on Belgium, and through
out his reign he never again asked any of the guaranteeing
Powers to come to his assistance. He did not do so in 1848
or in 1857, and why? Because it was perfectly clear to
him that the obligation of defending the integrity and
inviolability of the country rested not on the Powers but
on Belgium. The obligation of neutrality could only come
into force in the second place.
It was only after the death of King Leopold I. that a
larger significance was read into the responsibility of the
Powers for the security of Belgium. Up to 1865 it was
concluded, and rightly so, if it is remembered that the
armed forces of France and Prussia were at that period
only standing armies, that a Belgian army of 100,000 men
sufficed for the protection of the country, and such an
army was always kept at a high level of excellence under
its first king. But in 1 866 the external danger became more
serious, the political problem more involved, and although
the nominal forces of France and Prussia were not greatly
increased, it had become clear that the wars of the future
would be carried on by larger armies than in the past. As
a consequence the Belgian army sank to a lower ratio of
comparison. In other words, the real foundation of
Belgian security depreciated. At that moment too a critical
condition was created by the sudden acuteness of the
Luxemburg question, which was not merely one of the
status of the Duchy but of the material point involved in
railway communications. That crisis was overcome by the
London Conference of 1867, but anyone who will take

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 143
the trouble to consult the remarkable memorandum of the
late Emile Banning will perceive that there were thinkers
in Belgium who realised the new peril that beset their
country, and the narrow escape it had then had of being
involved in a great European struggle.
But the peril in regard to the Grand Duchy was small
in comparison with that which arose three years later from
the Franco-German War. Belgium's two great neighbours
were engaged in a mortal struggle which took place in one
phase close to the Belgian frontier. Immediately on the
declaration of war the Belgian Government took steps to
preserve its neutrality and to vindicate it if attacked. But
the result was not altogether encouraging; for the Belgian
army, which ought on mobilisation to have produced
112,000 men, only provided about 80,000. After the first
German successes of the campaign it became evident that
the Belgian army would be unable to maintain its position
if the German victors chose to cross the frontier to attack
it. At this stage England came to the rescue of Belgium
in no uncertain manner, and the incident must be placed
to the credit of the reputation of Mr. Gladstone.
In the first few days of August 1870 the British Govern
ment intervened in the struggle in an emphatic and master
ful manner. It said to the two belligerents, "You shall
not touch Belgium," and for the fulfilment of its purpose
it concluded separate treaties with each of them, engaging
itself to declare war upon whichever Power invaded
Belgium. In 1870-1, therefore, it was English intervention
which saved Belgium from invasion, and not the home
preparations which had sufficed in the time of Leopold I.
A similar, but in some respects a more acute, crisis arose
in 1875, when Germany, at the inspiration of Bismarck,
got ready to smash France. The nature of the crisis
obviously precluded any idea of an arrangement between
England and Germany. In 1870 the aggressor might to
all seeming have been either France or Germany, but in
1875 it could only be Germany. There was only one practi
cal and honourable course open to us, a military convention
with Belgium herself for the defence of her territory
against aggression. The prompt retreat of the German
Government, through the action of Queen Victoria sup-

144 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
ported by the Emperor Alexander II, rendered it unneces
sary to append the formal signature to what had been
agreed. These practical vindications, not of Belgium's neutrality
but of her integrity, tended to strengthen the conviction
among Belgians that England at least, if not the other
Powers, guaranteed the inviolability of their country, and
the consequence of this persuasion was that they abated
their own efforts to defend it and make it secure. Promi
nent politicians have stated repeatedly in the Brussels
Chamber that there was no need to increase or improve the
Belgian army because England would always defend the
country, that Belgium's best defence consisted in remain
ing weak and unprepared, and that the home garrison
which sufficed at the period of Sadowa and Sedan was still
enough in this age of armed nations. It must be admitted
that these views are not confined to a few politicians;
Belgian opinion generally is leavened by such heresies. It
is most essential, therefore, in the interests of the Belgians
themselves, that they should realise that what is guaranteed
is not the integrity and inviolability of their territory but
its neutrality. They will some day or other be compelled
to recognise this, despite the specious assurances of those
who may happen to have found a way to their momentary
confidence. But it may be said that the one stipulation carries the
other with it This assumption is not to be implicitly
accepted. Circumstances may arise on the one side or the
other to make it absolutely false. If Belgian means of
defence, if her military preparations were to decline to a
lower point than the evident state of inadequacy which
they have reached at this moment, no British Government
would propose in an emergency such military co-operation
as was offered in 1 875. And if it was manifestly impossible
to obtain effective co-operation from the Belgians them
selves in defending the integrity and inviolability of their
country, they would very quickly be informed that no
responsibility devolved on anyone in those matters except
themselves. There remains, then, the principle of the neutrality of
Belgium for which England has gone bail. The unopposed

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 145
invasion of Belgium by Germany — unopposed, for at this
moment Belgium has not merely no means of resistance,
but she has also, by according improved railway facilities,
opened more than one gate to the hypothetical invader —
destroys that neutrality at a blow. Her impotence would
make her willy-nilly the ally for the moment of the invader.
The idea of the Powers in leaving her as a kind of buffer
between France and Germany would have broken down,
but it would not at all follow that the remedy we and our
allies would apply would be the preservation of the
integrity of Belgium, compromised as it had been by the
contributory negligence of its Government and people.
The practical task before us would be to compel the invader
to retire, and the best way of effecting that object might
be found outside Belgium. But in any event it would have
been established that Belgium had failed by wilful neglect
in her duty to herself as well as in her obligations to the
guaranteeing Powers, and more especially to England,
who on several occasions had demonstrated her loyalty by
deeds. Totally different views would then come into force,
and the value of the neutrality of Belgium, as an inter
national guarantee of peace and the balance of power,
might even be subjected to fresh examination. The one
thing essential in a situation of some complexity is for the
Belgian authorities not to be caught napping, and to see
(assuming for the moment that they have the wish) that
the arrangement upon which they have so long relied for
their independence is not destroyed by their own act or
negligence. The neutrality of Belgium is a most precious principle
for the tranquillity of Western Europe, but its value dis
appears if it is not maintained intact. The question whether
it is to be so maintained or not rests primarily with the
Belgians themselves. In 1870 the Belgians drew up their
army on the Semois. In 1910, or perhaps before, will they
have their troops with sufficient promptness in the forts
of Liege, and at Stavelot and Viel Salm to close those
entrances ? No one can answer the question save the
Belgian Government itself. But the attitude of politicians
in Belgium is not encouraging. The decision of vital points
is put off from day to day. People in Brussels seem unable
10

146 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
to realise that the matter is urgent, and does not admit of
delay. The sands of Belgian independence on the old
lines may be running out without anyone appreciating the
true significance of the drift.
This brings us to the final point in the consideration of
the problem. Reference was made at the beginning of this
paper to the possibility of Belgium asserting her right to
become a free agent and repudiate her neutrality. It is
not doubtful that such a step has been seriously considered
in view of the provocation supplied by the attacks on the
Congo administration in this country. Official Belgium
at least is swayed by bitter feelings at what it regards as
the covetous and hypocritical censure of the good work
Belgians have done in Central Africa, and when there
is bitterness in the heart the brain does not always decide
wisely. By official Belgium is meant the King, the
administrators, the permanent civil service, who in most
countries keep the governmental machine in working order.
Extraneous matters are contributing to invest their views
with greater importance, and to bring them into closer
harmony with the general opinion of the country. It is
worth while to see what they are and to ponder over them.
Europe imposed a position of neutrality on Belgium for
its own security and convenience. The Belgian nation
accepted it in the first place because it could not help itself,
but it very soon saw how advantageous the arrangement
was from a material point of view, and it adapted itself
to the situation. It not merely adapted itself, but it has
assumed ever since that its security was assured by others
with a very mild co-operation on its own part. When a
nation believes that it has not to rely in the main on its
own efforts for the preservation of its independence,
patriotism undoubtedly wanes. The feeling of being pro
tected inevitably becomes part of the national sentiment,
until at last it is regarded as essential to existence. The
wise and noble appeals of Leopold I. to the Belgians to
show self-reliance and to be well prepared to resist invasion
have been forgotten. The result is that thinking Belgians
are now compelled to recognise that they have not the
means of defending their independence at the very moment
that the menace to that independence becomes more evident

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 147
and alarming. Confronted with that position of things
Belgian political parties, instead of combining for the
purpose of providing the means of meeting the national
danger, are engaged in attacking one another on points
of detail, and in retarding the introduction of the neces
sary reforms in the army. Nothing has been or apparently
will be done. Belgium has enjoyed nearly eighty years of
peace; she seems to count on its lasting till the millennium.
There is too much reason to apprehend, however, that
other motives have been at work, and if evidence were
asked of this it would be found in the faulty and antiquated
disposition of the Belgian army which leaves the whole of
the Ardennes without the smallest garrison except that at
Arlon, an isolated position where the troops are assigned
apparently to be immolated on the morrow of invasion.
The need of protection has become part of the life of
Belgium. The old faith in England no longer exists. The
present English army is not regarded as sufficiently
numerous to play the role on the Continent that it could
have played in 1870 or 1875. It is seen that the British
Navy has a desperate struggle before it to maintain its
supremacy on the seas against Germany, and if there is
an opinion one way or the other in Brussels it inclines to
favour the latter's chances. At the same time, disbelief
in the power of France and her ability to cope with Ger
many is profound. In the best-informed circles in Belgium
France is regarded as " a sick man."
It is not surprising, then, to find that the Belgian desire
to be protected by someone has led many of her leaders to
think that the protection of Germany might after all be the
most advantageous if events were to compel a choice. The
protection of Germany would in a sense be imposed, for
no one can doubt any longer that, in the event of war,
Germany's first move will be across Belgium, certainly to
the French frontier, and probably at the same time on
Antwerp as well. If the ground had been well prepared
in the diplomatic sphere, as no doubt it would have been,
there is no reason why the German advance should be
opposed. The Belgian Government would accept the
presence of German troops as the condition of the protec
tion which it desired, and which it had previously per-

148 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
suaded itself that no other Power save Germany could
provide.
The neutrality of Belgium in the sense in which it has
existed since 183 1-9, viz., that warring hosts were to respect
its frontiers, is already doomed. This has been due to a
large extent to the indifference of the British Government
to all questions of foreign policy in the first stage, and to
its irritating procedure with regard to the Congo question
in recent years, and at the present time. The result is that
English advice is no longer heeded at Brussels except
when it happens to accord with the opinion of Berlin,
and then it subserves German and not English policy. The
Belgian Government has for some time past been doing
exactly what the German Government requested, not
merely because it felt compelled, but because it wished to
do so. The real danger of this insidious advice lies in the
fact that the Belgians are required to do nothing them
selves, and they are assured that any occupation of their
country by German troops would be only temporary, and
as much localised as possible. The outlook for both
England and France in Belgium is at this moment dark
and threatening. The neutrality imposed on that country
has dulled the sentiment of patriotism, diminished the
self-reliance essential to the preservation of a state, and
induced the authorities to turn to those who seem the most
agreeable to deal with and the most conciliatory in their
treatment of Belgian interests. But over and above all
these considerations there exist in the minds of Belgian
statesmen three main convictions — distrust of British policy
mixed with displeasure at British criticism in regard to the
Congo, disbelief in the power and soundness of France,
and finally absolute belief in the overwhelming power of
Germany, and in the probably inevitable extension of its
influence to the mouths of the Scheldt, the Meuse and the
Rhine. Such is the opinion of the instructed Belgians, the
elite of their nation, and it should not be ignored.

AN OBJECT-LESSON IN GERMAN
PLANS*
WHILE many writers both at home and in Germany are
doing their best to persuade the public of the two countries
that peace is assured and Anglo-German friendship a
desirable if not an essential consummation for their happi
ness, I propose to place before your readers an object-lesson
which is based not on theory, but on fact. The circum
stances to which I refer are entirely fresh. They relate
to preparations which began no more than eighteen months
ago, and which have only just reached the stage of com
pletion. These preparations are the more significant
because they are not of a nature to attract much notice.
They do not relate to the establishment of camps or the
construction of fortresses. Not an additional soldier has
made his appearance in the localities affected. The neigh
bouring States have been provided with no visible cause
of umbrage, yet before this paper is concluded it will be
made clear that a most serious menace has risen up un
noticed, and perhaps unrealised, along the greater part
of the eastern frontier of Belgium.
To appreciate the full significance of the change, it is
necessary to take a glance into the past. When Germany
established the camp at Elsenborn, in 1896, as a summer
training ground for the Coblentz army corps, it was with
out any railway communications at all. The nearest
station was at Hellenthal, twelve miles east of the camp,
with difficult country intervening. Besides the line then
and still terminating at Hellenthal was only a light rail
way, itself a branch of the line traversing the Eiffel from
Cologne to Treves. Having established the camp at
Elsenborn, the German Government very naturally decided
* Fortnightly Review, February, 1910.
149

ISO ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
to improve the communications with it, and with this end
in view a new railway was constructed from Aix-la-
Chapelle to St. Vith, passing one mile to the west of the
camp at Sourbrodt. This railway was a single line only,
with double lines at the stations Montjoie, Kai ter Herberg,
Sourbrodt, Butgenbach* and Weismes. That it was intended
to be only a single-rail line is shown by the fact that the
high embankment raised above the valley between Mont
joie and Kalter Herberg was originally, and until eighteen
months ago, only wide enough at the top for one pair of
rails. At Sourbrodt, in those days, there were one or two
short sidings in addition to the 2 ft. 3 in. rails for the
steam tram connecting the railway station with the camp.
At the other stations named there were no sidings at all.
This was the state of things when I visited the locality
in the autumn of 1907. I shall now describe what I dis
covered last year.
Before doing so, it may be as well to state certain facts
about the locality traversed by the line to St. Vith, which
will show that the German Government would never have
undertaken the cost of making it but for its own ends.
The inhabitants of this region are not Germans. They are
Walloons, of the same race as the Belgians of Liege and
Stavelot, speaking French until the other day as their
mother-tongue. I say until the other day, because in 1905
the Germans passed a law making the use of German
obligatory, and classing French with foreign tongues.
The country was, and is still, most primitive. There are
no local resources or industries (exception being made for
Malmedy), and the Walloon population is a stay-at-home
one that does not provide many passengers for the railway.
The point to be made plain is that the single-line railway
from St. Vith to Aix-la-Chapelle, with its modest little
branch line from Weismes to Malmedy, more than sufficed
to satisfy all local needs.
In 1908 the German Government suddenly decided to
double the line of railway from Aix-la-Chapelle to
Weismes in the first stage, and St. Vith in the second. It
also decided to construct at each of the insignificant stations
* This station is now the Weywertz Junction, and the new one at
Butgenbach is on the line to Junkerath.

aim ucjxLCi-LLbbUJN IN GERMAN PLANS 151
on the route, where a few dozen cottages contain the local
population, extensive sidings capable between them of
accommodating trains that would convey a whole army
corps. Having come to this decision, the authorities wasted
no time in putting the work in hand. The high embank
ment between Montjoie and Kalter Herberg was widened
and strengthened, and, owing to the exigencies of the
position, the earthwork was piled up now on one side and
again on the other of the existing track. This section
represented the most difficult part of the undertaking, as
the greater stretch of the line traverses a fairly level plateau
not much under 2,000 ft. above sea-level, and it may be
noted that at no point is the line carried over any bridge
or viaduct. It would, therefore, be impossible for an
adventurous enemy to do it any serious injury or greatly
hinder communications along it by a daring raid.
Last May the doubling of the rails had been completed
to Weismes, the junction where the traveller changes for
Malmedy. I will now enumerate the sidings which com
plete and, in a sense, constitute the true importance of the
railway. Aix-la-Chapelle, which has always been a point
of concentration for the Prussian army on mobilisation,
has long possessed a vast field of sidings sufficient for the
requirements of an entire army corps, but their very exten-
siveness renders it difficult for the observer to say whether
they have or have not been added to in the last few years.
The natural inference, seeing what has taken place south
of Aix-la-Chapelle, would be that the number of sidings
there has been augmented. At the quite unimportant
stations north of Montjoie, viz., Cornely-Munster, Raeren,
Roetgen, and Lammersdorf , two, and in some cases three,
sidings have been added. These sidings are not in active
use. There is no local traffic to take advantage of them.
The trains are few, and run at long intervals, and the
goods traffic, except during the period of active work on
the railway was and is practically nil. The sidings have
only a military value. They stand in readiness for the
day when they shall be needed on the mobilisation of the
German army.
The addition of the sidings becomes more marked at
and south of Montjoie. At Montjoie there are four new

152 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
sidings flanking the station and on the western side of the
metals. South of the station three sidings, each at least
500 yards in length, have been constructed on the eastern
side of the track. At Kalter Herberg sidings have been
made on both sides of the line. It is not surprising, con
sidering that the station is in connection with a camp where
in summer at least there are 20,000 men, to find the most
extensive changes of all at Sourbrodt. The two modest
sidings for a few coal-trucks in 1907 have grown into a
perfect network of sidings, two south of the station, and
on the eastern side of the line, being each at least half a
mile in length and equipped with turn-tables. There are
corresponding sidings at Butgenbach, and a little north of
the Weismes junction. The result is that by the new double
line, supplemented by the numerous sidings echelonned
along the track, it has become not merely possible but easy
for the German authorities to concentrate an army corps
at or near Weismes in a very short space of time.
Before drawing conclusions from the facts enumerated,
the sketch given of railway expansion in Rhenish Prussia
must be completed by an account of the extension of the
light railway which has existed for some years between
Weismes and Malmedy into Belgian territory. Malmedy,
which in old days formed part of the same Prince
Abbotship, has continued to be in close touch and sym
pathy, as it were, with Stavelot in Belgium. The citizens
of both are of the same race, religion, and, until the new
German law, speech. No one who knows the Walloon race
can fail to be attracted by their sterling qualities, and to
have a friend in one place is to find another in the other.
Still, the diligence twice a day, with sufficient work for
the local louageurs for those who could afford the private
carriage, sufficed for all the requirements of friendly inter
course. The road from Malmedy to Stavelot is a quiet road.
I have traversed it perhaps a hundred times; unless the
diligence has happened to pass, I have generally had it to
myself. But the Germans were not satisfied. For occult
reasons they must have a railway, more especially as the
major half of the line has to be made with Belgian money.
And the Belgians, flouted by the English on account of
the anti-Congo craze, have to take German requests as

AN OBJECT-LESSON IN GERMAN PLANS 153
orders. So this Malmedy-Stavelot line has been taken in
hand with the same alacrity as characterised the doubling
of the rails from Aix-la-Chapelle to Weismes, and the
Belgians have been compelled, in defiance of local
hostility, to do their share of the work. There still remains
to be taken in hand the vital point of the line, viz., the
tunnel outside Stavelot which will connect this little railway
— an advanced guard, as it were, of the German system
— with the main Belgian line from Pepinster vid Spa and
Stavelot to Gouvy and Libramont.
If there were really vigilant Governments in London and
Paris, as there is in Berlin, this tunnel would be vetoed.
Sooner than that it should be made by German-Belgian
money, France and England ought to make it a casus belli;
but there is no far-seeing prescience either in Downing
Street or on the Quai d'Orsay. Had there been, Belgium's
co-operation in the Malmedy-Stavelot line would never
have been wrested from the authorities in the Rue de la
Loi at Brussels. Belgium has yielded in this and other
matters because she could not resist without support, and
no support was forthcoming. It is too late to veto the line ;
it is not too late to prevent the construction of the tunnel,
which is the great menace concealed in the scheme for
Belgium herself, as well as France. A light railway from
Malmedy to Stavelot, with a terminus in the fields adjacent
to the ancient Abbaye, is, I may suggest, at the worst only
a local luxury, if not a local necessity. It would have no
military value. The opposite reason explains why the
Germans have been so tenacious of the point that the line
from Malmedy to Stavelot should link on with the Belgian
main line to the Grand Duchy and the French frontier,
and that Belgium should defray the cost of the expensive
and, except for the establishment of direct communica
tions between Germany and the Ardennes, useless tunnel
on the northern side of the townlet of Stavelot.
We have, then, before us the evidence of an extraordi
nary activity in railway construction and development
within the German frontier which is not to be explained
by any local necessities arising either from population or
from industrial or mineral development. We need not
make excuses where the Germans attempt none; this

154 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
development is avowedly for military purposes. If the
reader asks why, the reply is to be found in the new
principles of strategy which have recently been formally
adopted by the German Staff. Incidentally to our subject,
it may be remarked that not sufficient attention has been
drawn here to this new strategy, which may be termed the
natural corollary of the substitution of armed nations for
standing armies. For prompt action at the scene of war,
nations require railway carriages as near their homes as
possible to carry them without a break to the frontier;
standing armies need fortresses and camps as near the
frontier as might be. With regard to our special matter,
the importance of Elsenborn camp has diminished ; on the
other hand, the double line from Aix-la-Chapelle to
Weismes (I learn that it is being continued to Montenau,
which has lately been connected with Elsenborn camp by
a fine road levelled for the rapid passage of artillery, and
which has for some years been connected with Viel Salm,
in Belgium, south of Stavelot, by an excellent carriage
route), with its accessories in numerous sidings, has become
a menace of the first significance not merely to Belgium,
but to France so far as her undefended northern frontier
is involved.
The new strategy referred to is based on the principle
that the invasion of a neighbouring State should no longer
be executed by troops already in garrison on the frontier,
but by troops conveyed by train from the interior of the
country to the points of attack. In this way no warning
is given to the assailed. It is represented that, within
twenty-four hours of the public knowledge that something
special was afoot, a hundred thousand men could be col
lected in the neighbourhood of Malmedy. Even if this
fact stood alone it would be of alarming significance, but
it does not stand alone. A very similar development of
what may be called railway facilities for the purposes of
invasion is noticeable on other main lines of communication
from Germany into Belgium. For the moment there
has been no evidence of railway activity west of Aix-la-
Chapelle on the main line to Liege, for the simple reason
that German scheming in this quarter is concentrated on
obtaining the adoption of the Welkenraedt route to

AN OBJECT-LESSON IN GERMAN PLANS 155
Louvain for Brussels and Antwerp, which would avoid
Li6ge altogether. That is a matter which requires very
close attention, but it does not come within the scope of
the present paper. The opinion may be hazarded that
Germany, being well aware what a formidable obstacle the
fortified position of Liege is in her path, will spare no
effort to nullify its importance by turning the existing
railway routes in another direction; but, unlike the
doubling of the frontier railway in the old Stavelot princi
pality, this cannot be done surreptitiously or in the dark.
If we turn a little to the north of Liege, we find what
may be called the counterpart of the railway development
that has been described between Aix-la-Chapelle and
Weismes. The town of Ruremonde, or Roermond, in
Holland, may be called the central point of interest. It
lies on the right bank of the Meuse, which is here crossed
by two bridges, and it is a station on the direct railway
from Cologne vid Rheydt to Moll, Herenthals, and Ant
werp. The intervening region is the flat expanse of the
Campine, without a fort or a garrison, and the passenger
trains cover the distance from the Meuse to the fortified
city on the Scheldt in less than three hours. Twenty years
ago the late General Brialmont pointed out that a German
invasion of Belgium might be effected from this direction,
and he was probably the first to assign any strategical
importance to Dalheim. At that time the railway travers
ing the Campine from east to west did not exist; con
sequently a German advance from Dalheim would in those
days have been directed against the middle Meuse between
Namur and Liege, and Brialmont proposed to render it
impossible by constructing a fortress at St. Trond. This
proposition was never carried into effect, and the fortifica
tion of St. Trond would have no influence now on a German
dash from Dalheim on Antwerp.
The line through Dalheim and Ruremonde to Antwerp
has always been double-railed, so there has been no need
here to do more than add to the sidings. This process
necessitated, however, the widening of the bridge over
which the line runs about 1 50 yards east of Dalheim station.
The bridge was widened for the purpose of laying a third
pair of rails connecting with a new siding on a high

156 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
embankment. This siding is about a quarter of a mile in
length. Other sidings have been constructed at the station
itself, where there are not fewer than ten pairs of parallel
rails, and again to the west of the station towards the Dutch
frontier. Thus Dalheim, from an unimportant halting-
place, has become a point of concentration of great strategi
cal importance. The stations east of Dalheim, viz., Weg-
berg and Rheydt, have also been provided with extra
sidings wholly in excess of any local requirements. It is
not concealed that these facilities are intended for military
purposes only.
Ruremonde has a Dutch garrison of under 400 men, and
there are no supports within any reasonable distance. It is
said that the Dutch Government intends to increase the
force by a battery and a few hundred men, which would be
practically useless. If the Dutch meant seriously to defend
the place, they should have a battery and a cantonment on
the left side of the Meuse commanding the bridges, and
not a small garrison uselessly quartered in the town of
Ruremonde itself, where it could be taken by surprise and
compelled to surrender at discretion. The point of import
ance is that neither at Ruremonde nor anywhere else along
the railway is there any possibility of serious resistance
being offered to the advance of, say, 30,000 German troops
on board the trains collected between Gladbach, Rheydt,
Wegberg, and Dalheim without anyone being a bit the
wiser. This force would be merely the advanced guard
of the army entrusted with the task of seizing Antwerp,
if it could, or at least isolating it from the rest of Belgium.
Enough has been stated to show that on two important
lines deliberate preparations have been made for throwing
large German forces into Belgium with the minimum
of publicity. Troops drawn from the interior of the
country would be carried swiftly and secretly to the
appointed spots, and in a single night Germany would
secure the passage of the Meuse at Ruremonde on one
side, and the important junction at Gouvy in the
Ardennes at the other. This would be the first applica
tion of the new strategical principles for invading a
country with an army conveyed to its destination by
a succession of trains for which the necessary sidings

AN OBJECT-LESSON IN GERMAN PLANS 157
had been duly prepared beforehand. The informa
tion recorded shows that this has already been done
at the places enumerated. An old Walloon friend (a
German citizen) asked me interrogatively during my last
visit whether I had not found that the Belgians were afraid
of what was coming, adding emphatically they have
reason for their fears. (" Les Beiges ont peur, n'est ce
pas?" "Ils ont raison.") At Stavelot and Viel Salm I
can vouch for the fact that the people live under the
shadow of what seems to them an imminent catastrophe.
When, therefore, German politicians and writers declare
that the policy of their country is peace, and that aggres
sion is not in their thoughts, it may be well to consider
the facts which have been set forth in these pages, and
which cannot be explained away. They are admittedly
preparations for war, and for a war of aggression. The
invasion — or perhaps it would be better to say the over
running — of Belgium is being arranged on systematic and
scientific principles. Not the slightest attempt has been
made by Belgium to baffle the design which becomes obvious
the moment the details are examined on the spot. The
Belgian Government is publishing its impotence by allow
ing the German line to cross the frontier at Stavelot, and
still more by constructing itself the tunnel which will
enable German trains to run through on to the Belgian
system, and reach Gouvy and Libramont before the
" alert e" is given to the French cavalry at Sedan. The
British and French Governments are apparently too much
occupied with theories to attend to the practical details on
which the Germans know how to concentrate their efforts
and attention. There is still time if they put themselves
to the least exertion to prevent the tunnel being made at
Stavelot. With the smallest encouragement it would be
quite easy to raise such a local agitation against the project
that the Brussels authorities would be bound to listen to the
remonstrance of those on the spot who realise the danger
of the hour. It is idle, however, to blame the Belgian
Government for its complaisance to Germany when neither
we nor France take any steps to stiffen its limited capacity
for resistance. A prompt move now may suffice to bring
to nought one of the most astute steps Germany has taken
of late in the way of preparation for martial contingencies.

GERMANY AND HOLLAND*
WHILE the best-informed persons at both The Hague and
Brussels agree in treating the alleged letter from the
Emperor William II. to Queen Wilhelmina in 1904 as
apocryphal, the discussion in the Dutch Chambers on
Baron Heeckeren's question has drawn attention to the
somewhat delicate and difficult position which Holland
occupies in the European family, and before interest in
the so-called incident has waned, it may be useful to con
tribute some pertinent information to the study of a ques
tion of recurring vitality and acuteness. It is many years
since a French writer compared the relations of Germany
and Holland to those of the wolf and Little Red Riding
Hood in the fairy tale, but the little maiden still fares to the
market unharmed, and the wolf has not yet shown his teeth.
There is, perhaps, more risk in this case of the wolf being
introduced as a friend and installed as protector of the
family than of his forcing his way in by the indulgence
of his voracity. At least such seem to be his own desire
and expectation.
There is one essential fact that must be fully grasped
and carefully remembered by those who endeavour to
appreciate the present position and to predict the political
future of Holland and its close neighbour and half-brother
Belgium — for their fate cannot be dissevered — and this
is that Holland is not a neutral State. I lay stress on this
point because the Post of Berlin in a recent important
article declared not merely that " Holland was a neutral
State," but that "England had created her neutrality,"
and the article was extensively quoted in our Press without
a line of correction anywhere. Without accuracy in facts
it is difficult to see what profitable discussion can take place
* The English Review, May, 1910.
158

GERMANY AND HOLLAND 159
on grave political matters. The words of the Post apply
with literal accuracy to Belgium, but not to Holland.
What is the exact significance of the difference ? It may
be expressed thus : Holland possesses entire liberty of
political action beyond her frontiers; in other words, she
can conclude alliances; Belgium is restricted to the defence
of her territory and neutrality, and if she were to make
an alliance in anticipation of events she would commit
ipso facto a breach of the engagements contracted in 1831
and finally ratified in 1839 as to her being " a permanently
neutral State."
Let us now revert to the year 1904. It was the year of
the Russo-Japanese War, and, so far as Holland was con
cerned, more specifically of the Dogger Bank incident, and
of the problem of preserving Dutch neutrality at her ports
in the Indian Archipelago during the passage eastwards of
the Baltic fleet. The Dutch authorities had then some
reason to be anxious, and the fact that England was the
ally of Japan could not be overlooked in their calculations.
Moreover, the feeling aroused by the Boer War, although
waning, had not yet passed away, and those in the
Chamber and the Press who preferred co-operation with
England to union with Germany conceived it to be prudent
to keep silent. The precautionary measures adopted by
Holland in 1904 would, therefore, have been susceptible
of an anti-English interpretation without attributing their
origin to the sinister advice of the German Emperor. As
a matter of fact Holland did take some steps in the direc
tion of her military and naval defence in 1904, but they
originated before that period in a general awakening of
public opinion in Belgium as well as Holland to the fact
that little States would have to fight for their independence
and not trust to the forbearance of Great Powers to
respect it.
What followed ? In Holland the new law enforcing the
conscription and abolishing the volunteer system, so far
as the infantry was concerned, was put into force, and the
practice of a partial mobilisation each year was adopted.
The latter measure was restricted to the zone of Amster
dam's defensive position, which includes the command of
the two channels of the Rhine near Arnhem and Nimeguen

160 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
respectively. The same practice has been adopted ever
since — the Dutch annual mobilisation being exclusively
one to test the efficacy of the defence of the approaches to
the commercial capital. There is no reason then to attach
special importance to the mobilisation at Westerwoort-lez-
Arnhem in the summer of 1904.
The possibility of a naval attack on Amsterdam from
the side of the Zuyder Zee had, for some years before
1904, been present to the minds of Dutch military authori
ties, but curiously enough the general impression, in 1900
at least, was that Germany and not England might deliver
such an attack. The efficiency of the defence of the Texel
was challenged, and at the same time it was pointed out
that there were no ships ready at a moment's notice to
co-operate in the defence of the entrance to the Zuyder
Zee. The consequence of this movement of public opinion
was that the forts at the Helder received new and more
powerful guns, and that an elaborate system of search
lights was installed. These precautionary measures were
far advanced towards completion, if not actually com
pleted by the end of 1903. The really important addition
made in 1904 was in the matter of naval defence. In
November of that year a measure was passed to the effect
that there should be ready for active participation in the
defence of the Zuyder Zee and the North Sea Canal a
squadron of the minimum strength of six cruisers, and a
large but unspecified number of torpedo boats. This step,
which must be regarded as essential to the defence of
Amsterdam against any attack, provides what may be
called the modicum of fact in the present allegation that
Holland adopted in the year named measures of defence
which might be interpreted as directed against England.
We have seen what Holland did; let us now turn to
Belgium. In February 1904 an order was issued from the
Belgian War Department that a commissioned officer
should sleep every night in each of the twelve detached
forts round Liege; before that order officers of the day
had always returned to the city as soon as their perfunctory
duties allowed of their quitting the forts. Far more
important than the adoption of precautionary measures at
Liege was the decision arrived at in 1906 to complete the

GERMANY AND HOLLAND 161
long unfinished outer circle of forts at Antwerp — the bul
wark of Belgium's independence — and to re-arm all the
forts in that place with the newest and most powerful
artillery. Antwerp is now fully equipped to resist attack
and to fulfil the role assigned to it in the defence of
Belgium. But Belgian preparations were not restricted to these
measures, which would have been of dubious effect with
the skeleton battalions that represented the national army.
The question of increasing and improving that army repre
sented the next phase in the development of the question,
and at last it was taken up in a serious spirit. A project
for providing the country with an efficient force divided
into two classes, one of 98,000 men for the defence of the
three fortified positions of Antwerp, Liege, and Namur,
and the other for the provision of a field army of 100,000
men with adequate reserves, was drawn up in 1904 by
authority and freely distributed under the inspiring name
of Groeninghe, which recalled the most famous Flemish
victory. The whole country irrespective of party was
stirred by the appeal.
Perhaps in a few years' time some one will make a pre
tended revelation that the impetus given to Belgian pre
parations which began in 1904 was due to external pressure.
For the moment it seems more reasonable to assume that
the Bill, finally passed into law last year, which embodies
Groeninghe's scheme, was the outcome of the aroused
consciousness of the Belgian nation as to their true position.
Many far-seeing Belgians, like the late General Brial
mont and M. Emile Banning, had insisted on their
country's need of greater military strength more than
twenty years ago. Their voices were then " as of one crying
in the wilderness," and it was with something of the bitter
ness of the unheeded prophet that Banning wrote : " A
nation only loses its independence when it subscribes in
advance to its own ruin."
I will now venture to summarise a few general conclu
sions. To tell the plain truth there is no great fear in
Holland of German aggression. No one at The Hague
believes that an incursion into the Netherlands forms part
of German plans. Even the few who do not subscribe 11

162 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
absolutely to this view limit their apprehensions to the
province of Limburg, which intervenes between Germany
and the undefended strip of Belgium east of Antwerp, and
generally known as the Campine. Some Dutch thinkers
also dread a silent absorption by Germany rather than an
open aggression, and point as proof of their argument to
the increase of German residents at both Amsterdam and
Rotterdam, where the population is said with some ex
aggeration to be already half German. But the fear of a
silent absorption never yet led a nation to take up seriously
the questions of military reform and home defence.
Far different is the view in Belgium, where the fear of
German aggression on the advent of any international
trouble in Western Europe is acute. Rightly or wrongly,
Belgian military men assign a very prominent place in the
strategical plans of German Generals to an advance across
Belgium, and so long as their army remained in a dis
organised and lamentably weak condition they held that
it would be futile to attempt to prevent it. But the recent
organic changes are reviving a more hopeful feeling, and
the pleasing theory is again coming into fashion that if
Belgium is sufficiently strong to make a good fight in
defence of the inviolability of her territory no one will
dream of attacking her, and that in any collision between
her powerful neighbours her neutrality will be as fully
respected as it was in 1 870.
Much has been written on the subject of Belgian neu
trality promulgated by the Five Powers constituting the
London Conference in 1831, accepted by Belgium at the
time of her creation and recognition, and finally embodied
in the treaties of 1839. This position did not exempt
Belgium from the common duty of all States to provide
for their own self-defence. Rather may it be said that it
made the duty all the more incumbent upon her because
she had to discharge her obligations to the guarantors as
well as to herself.
Finally, with regard to the possibility of future co-opera
tion between Holland and Belgium, a few words may be
said. A most gratifying and encouraging approximation
between the two peoples has been noticeable for the last
ten years. It has become absolutely clear that the ill-will

GERMANY AND HOLLAND 163
naturally engendered by the break-up of the old kingdom
of the Netherlands in 1830-2 has passed away, and that
Holland and Belgium are now reunited by the ties of
brotherly sympathy which have not existed since the six
teenth century. Short of a military alliance no question
arises nowadays between them that is not promptly settled
to their mutual satisfaction. As to a defensive alliance,
however, nothing can or will be done in the present phase
of affairs. Belgium is debarred by her status as a neutral
Power from concluding alliances. Holland, believing
that she is in no danger of aggression, sees no necessity for
making one, and if she ever were to depart from this
passive attitude the alliances she would form would neces
sarily have to be with more powerful countries than
Belgium. But the rapprochement of Holland and Belgium
is none the less one of the most genuine and encouraging
national movements visible in Europe at the present time,
and its moral effect, reposing of course on proper military
arrangements for home defence in each country, must con
tribute towards the safety of the whole of the old
Netherlands.

FLUSHING AND THE SCHELDT*
As I am warned by good friends in Holland that extreme
criticism of the projected fortification of Flushing will
only strengthen the position of the philo-German party in
the Netherlands by enabling it to say that England is
interfering in Dutch affairs and seeking to restrict that
nation's independence of action, it will be well to com
mence this examination of the Scheldt question with the
statement that I have long been known for my friendship
to Holland, and that I appeal to that section of the Dutch
nation which has not succumbed to German temptations
to second my efforts to remove a probable cause of differ
ences and quarrels between two friendly Powers which
would be provided by the execution of the new Dutch coast
defences. There is another Power more directly concerned
in the matter than even England. This is Belgium, and as
the reader will see in the sequel, she has rights which
Holland herself has recognised and invested with special
validity. Belgium has treaty rights, she has what I should
like to call a still stronger claim in that good-neighbourly
feeling which promised in recent years to develop into a
Hollando-Belgian Entente Cordiale. Is Holland prepared
to destroy that expectation ?
In deciding to fortify Flushing — the vote has not yet
passed the Dutch Chamber — it is permissible to think that
The Hague Government has had in its mind the idea of
fortifying the southern extremity of its coastline rather
than the consequences of that fortification to the un
restricted freedom of the Scheldt as the Belgian and inter
national water route to " the commercial port " of Antwerp.
If the Dutch people demand who has the right to veto their
fortifying Flushing, a negative reply must be given in their
favour, but a far wider issue is raised by any new circum-
* Fortnightly Review, February, ign.
164

FLUSHING AND THE SCHELDT 165
stance that would diminish or imperil the unrestricted
freedom of the Scheldt, which we must not forget, was
established as long ago as 183 1. It was established in the
first place, not by an agreement between Holland and
Belgium, not by their first treaty of the 19th of April,
1839, nor by their second treaty of the 5th of November,
1842, but by the decree of the London Conference in its
several protocols of October, 183 1. It would be futile for
anyone to attempt to deny that the construction of an
up-to-date fortress, with bomb-proof casemates and
cupolas and heavy artillery, at Flushing would be a new
circumstance of the gravest significance.
It is not surprising that Belgian opinion should see
in this undertaking a veiled design to revive the old Dutch
pretension to close the Scheldt, a pretension which was for
nearly three hundred years a substantial fact, arbitrarily
fettering the commercial and maritime development of
Antwerp. Tenacity has always been a Dutch character
istic, and when it is borne in mind how deeply Amsterdam
and Rotterdam have always felt and resented the com
petition of Antwerp, the conclusion cannot be rejected that
Dutch opinion would welcome any chance of reviving the
lapsed privileges of the Treaty of Munster. Nor is the
Belgian apprehension on the subject likely to be allayed
by the accumulating evidence of the desire of a great
Power like Germany to throttle all foreign navigation on
its rivers despite the historic clauses (Articles 108-17) of
the Treaty of Vienna declaring such navigation to be free,
and the precise stipulation of the Convention abolishing
the Stade tolls on the Elbe in 1861. At its own doors it
has an object-lesson in the neglect of the Dutch Govern
ment to do anything to improve the navigable channel of
the Meuse between Venlo and Vise, as to what a selfish
neighbour holding a river in common can do to render it
useless to the State which holds the interior position. But
for that systematic policy of the Dutch Liege would be the
centre of as great a maritime trade as Ghent or Cologne.
For Belgium, however, all riverways pale into insignifi
cance beside the necessity of keeping the Scheldt open and
beyond possibility of closure. The Dutch Government may
protest to the skies its good intentions, but Belgians can

166 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
only see in the construction of a modern fortress command
ing the four-and-a-half-miles' wide entrance to the Scheldt
the doom, sooner or later, of Antwerp.
To understand the basis of Belgian fears at this moment
the history of Dutch pretensions with regard to the Scheldt
must be passed briefly in review, and in order to appreciate
the position of which it is now expected that Belgium shall
tamely risk the loss, this first study must be supplemented
by a careful examination of all Holland contracted to do
in 1839 and 1842.
The story begins in the sixteenth century, when the
Northern Provinces of the Netherlands achieved their
independence and the Southern remained with Spain. In
1609 the first treaty of peace was signed between Spain
and the Netherlands (Holland), but the Spanish diplo
matists by an inexcusable blunder omitted to stipulate
that the Scheldt, the high waterway to Antwerp, should
be left open to navigation. The Dutch said nothing. Their
fleet commanded the channel; they knew they could do
what they wished. They simply did not allow ships to
enter or leave the Scheldt, and Antwerp slowly perished
of inanition. Having established the fact in practice, the
Dutch took advantage of the next European peace (that
of Munster in 1648) to establish it in law by securing from
the Powers the ratification of their right to close all the
channels of the Scheldt, and to deny ingress to the ships
of the whole world. Every subsequent treaty ratified the
clause in that of Munster.
France is entitled to the credit of having first challenged
this intolerable pretension. In 1792 her troops occupied
Antwerp, and the first act of the new Government was to
declare the Dutch control of the Scheldt "a survival of
feudal tyranny and a violation of the rights of man."
Two years later Holland passed under French influences,
and the Scheldt necessarily became free. The Treaty of
The Hague between Holland and France in May, 1795,
contained a clause enacting " the freedom of the Scheldt,"
and the people of Antwerp celebrated the event with much
rejoicing. During the whole period of the French regime the
Scheldt remained free, and when the Vienna Congress

FLUSHING AND THE SCHELDT 167
united Holland and Belgium in one Netherlands kingdom,
it naturally followed that the Dutch could not close the
Scheldt to their fellow-subjects the Belgians. But in 1830
the Belgians revolted against Dutch rule, and one of the
first retaliatory measures of the King (Queen Wilhelmina's
great-grandfather) was to blockade the mouth of the
Scheldt, and to revive all the old pretensions under the
Treaty of Munster and its successors. This step was a
little too much for the Powers then assembled in conference
in London, and they ordered "the raising of the blockade"
as a violation, not merely of the Treaty of Vienna, but of
the general rights of all the Powers. King William yielded
on paper to the protocol, but maintained the blockade in
practice. Eventually, however, he gave way, and the
principle was established that the powers, not less than
the Belgians, had a right to veto what was called "the
Dutch shutting the Scheldt." It ought not to be difficult
to show that a new Dutch Portsmouth at the mouth of the
Scheldt would be the most effective means of " shutting "
it that human ingenuity could devise.
We may now pass to the tortuous and protracted
negotiations for concluding a peace between Holland and
Belgium which began with an armistice in November, 1830,
and ended with the treaty of April, 1839, concerning our
selves only with the Scheldt question. In the first draft
treaty accepted by the Powers, and known as the " Eighteen
Articles," the Scheldt is not specifically named. It is
included in the provisions of Article 7, which read : —
" Art. 7. It is understood that the regulations of Arts. 108 to 117,
inclusive, of the General Act of the Congress of Vienna, relative to the
free navigation of the navigable rivers, shall be applied to those rivers
which pass through the territories of Holland and Belgium."
This Article lapsed with the instrument of which it
formed part. In October, 1831, the Eighteen Articles were
superseded by the Twenty-four Articles, which eventually
became the definitive treaty of April, 1839, still in full
force. The 9th Article, which is of the greatest import
ance at the present juncture, reads as follows, and contains
very precise stipulations about the Scheldt : —
" Art. 9. The provisions of Articles 108 to 117, inclusive, of the
General Act of the Congress of Vienna, relative to the free navigation

168 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
of navigable streams and rivers, shall be applied to the streams and
navigable rivers which separate or traverse simultaneously the Belgian
and Dutch territory.
" As touching especially the navigation of the Scheldt, it shall be
agreed that piloting and buoying, as well as the preservation of the
channels of the Scheldt below Antwerp, shall be under a common super
vision ; that this common supervision shall be exercised by commis
sioners named for this purpose on both sides ; that moderate pilotage
dues shall be fixed by common agreement, and that these dues shall be
the same for Dutch commerce and for Belgian commerce. It is likewise
agreed that the navigation of the waters intermediate between the
Scheldt and the Rhine, for going from Antwerp to the Rhine and vice
versd shall remain reciprocally free, and that it shall be subject only
to moderate tolls, which shall be provisionally the same for the commerce
of both countries.
" Commissioners shall meet on both sides at Antwerp within the space
of a month, both to fix the definitive and permanent amount of these
tolls and to agree upon a general regulation for the execution of the
provisions of the present Article, and to comprise therein the exercise
of the right of fishing and the fishing trade along the whole extent
of the Scheldt on a footing of perfect reciprocity in favour of the subjects
of both countries. Meanwhile, and until the said regulation be fixed,
the navigation of the navigable streams and rivers above-mentioned shall
remain free to the commerce of both countries, which shall adopt pro
visionally on this head the tariff of the Convention signed on March
31st, 1831, at Mayence for the free navigation of the Rhine, as well
as the other provisions of that Convention so far as they can apply to
the navigable streams and rivers which separate or traverse simul
taneously the Dutch territory and the Belgian territory."
The text of this Article is indisputable in giving equal
rights and common control to Belgium and Holland in
regard to the whole course of the River Scheldt below
Antwerp. At its mouth Holland holds both extremities
at Flushing and Breskens, but the rights of Belgium in
the open way of the river are absolutely equal with those
of her neighbour.
But in order to appreciate the full significance of Belgian
rights it is necessary to examine the protocols, and to see
what happened between the drafting of the Article as just
quoted in October, 1831, and its acceptance in the binding
treaty of April, 1839. Holland did not waive her rights
without a long struggle, and her proceedings were not
free from artifice and guile.
In March, 1838, the King of Holland gave way, and
notified his acceptance of the Twenty-four Articles, where
upon direct negotiations were commenced between Holland
and Belgium for the conclusion of the definitive separation
treaty embodying them. The contest for the definition

FLUSHING AND THE SCHELDT 169
and carrying out of the principles of possession in common,
and reciprocal freedom with regard to the Scheldt, provided
a keen tournay of wit and ingenuity between the Belgian
and Dutch negotiators, in which the Belgians did not come
off second best. The story is told in the protocols of the
Dutch-Belgian Treaty, which do not seem to be well known
in this country, but which furnish the key to the whole
question. The Dutch proposed to settle the common control of the
river by dividing it into two parts. They said to the
Belgians : You take sole charge of the river down to Lillo
— ten miles below Antwerp — and we will do the same from
Lillo to the sea. The Belgian representatives must have
smiled at this latest proposal for "the Dutch shutting of
the Scheldt." A few years' neglect of the river below
Lillo, the construction of a few apparently innocent works
of art in Dutch Flanders, would have sufficed to render the
lower Scheldt useless for navigation by ocean-going ships.
The Belgians countered the proposal with the demand
that in the event of the lower Scheldt becoming closed by
"natural events," or by "artificial works," the Dutch were
to provide a fresh navigable channel for the Belgians to
the sea, and it was the Belgian view that prevailed. The
Dutch proposal that the pilots were to be of their nation
ality was also negatived. The nationality was left
optional. Finally, the tolls which the Dutch proposed to
collect at Flushing were to be levied at Antwerp and
Terneuzen, the latter at the mouth of the Ghent canal. The
question of the tolls is no longer of importance, because
they were redeemed by the Brussels Conference on July
15th, 1863. The point to be remembered is that all these
proposals were attempts to establish the superior claims of
the Dutch over the Scheldt. They were all repelled to the
triumphant vindication of the principles of "common
possession," "common control," and "reciprocal free
dom." What is still more interesting is that during these very
discussions the case of the approach of a friendly force
to the aid of the Belgians in Antwerp was brought up, and
the theory was laid down and accepted that the Dutch
were bound to remain passive while the friendly succour

i;o ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
passed unmolested up the Scheldt. We do not find that
this admirable theory was completed by the addition of
the words, "even if Holland and Belgium should be at
war," and we may conclude therefrom that the most excel
lent and explicit of treaties is, after all, not superior to
human nature. The reservation applies to the present
situation. Who believes in the Dutch allowing a relieving
squadron to pass unmolested by a remodelled Flushing if
they did not wish to do so, because by formal treaty and
international law the Scheldt is a Belgian waterway ? At
present they would not think of stopping such a force
because their batteries at Flushing, Breskens, Terneuzen,
and Elewoutsdyk are insignificant. But when cupola forts
and the heaviest guns are substituted for these batteries,
who will vouch for Dutch moderation then ?
The utmost that has been said during the recent dis
cussions in the Dutch Chamber with the view of appeasing
Belgian apprehensions, for which Dutch opinion does not
seem to have been quite prepared, was that it did not neces
sarily follow because Flushing was to be fortified that the
Dutch would oppose a force friendly to Belgium coming
up the river. It does not seem to have occurred to these
Dutch advocates that the material fact of aid reaching
Antwerp in an hour of need being dependent on Dutch
goodwill, could only mean cold comfort to the Belgians.
At the present moment there is no hindrance to its arrival
if asked for and wanted. The new fortifications at Flush
ing will impose a hindrance. How can it be contended
then that the Belgians should not be disturbed ? How
can it be represented that the common rights of the two
countries in the Scheldt are not about to be annulled ? The
Dutch are going to close the Scheldt in the most effective
way known to man, by constructing a fortress at its
entrance that could only be captured after a long and
successful siege.
Even if the proposed fortification of Flushing were not
objectionable in itself, the arguments used in the Dutch
Chamber to justify the scheme would invest it with sus
picion. Serious legislators at The Hague have declared
that the fortification of Flushing will protect England
against Germany, and Germany against England ! This

FLUSHING AND THE SCHELDT 171
role of buffer between two mighty empires, we may say
without intending offence, seems to exceed the power and
duty of Holland. It would be wiser if she concentrated
her attention on the defence of her own frontiers, and with
regard to duty if she thought only of her obligations to
her nearest land neighbour. They have even declared that
Belgians ought to receive the news of the fortification of
Flushing with grateful feelings, because it will defend
Antwerp against her enemies on the side of the sea. They
omit to add that the definition of who are enemies and who
are not will rest with Holland. Let the matter be wrapped
up in the most specious phrases that Dutch philo-Germans
can discover, the broad and brutal fact remains that the
fortification of Flushing will wrest from the Belgians the
hard-earned rights of the last century and reduce Antwerp
to a state of tutelage in the interests of Amsterdam and
Rotterdam. The arguments advanced from the military
side of the question are so puerile that it is impossible to
come to any other conclusion than that the true reason in
the minds of the Dutch is of a commercial order. It is only
the latest form of their old desire to close the Scheldt, and
thus hinder the formidable and increasingly successful
competition of Antwerp with their own great seaports.
What is surprising is that they should think they could
hoodwink the Belgians by such a thin device.
It is not unnatural perhaps that Germany's friends in
Holland should endeavour to buttress up a case for fortify
ing the coast, and especially its southern extremity, and
for neglecting the eastern frontier, by dilating upon the
old aggressions of France. When diplomatists have a
weak case it is not unusual to turn to the armoury of histori
cal facts and precedents, out of which evidence in support
of any theory can be extracted, but in this twentieth century
it is really rather silly to try to shape public opinion by
citing the warlike ambitions of Louis XIV. and the great
Napoleon. We live in the present age, not in past centuries,
and the fact that stares everyone in the face in the estimate
of the balance of power for the peace and preservation of
the existing divisions of Europe, is the increasing strength
of Germany. This is formidable enough without little
States like Holland being seduced from the loyalty they

172 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
owe themselves and their neighbours in order that they
may subserve schemes, of the inner motives of which they
know nothing, and over the consequences of which they
can exercise no possible control. Even if the scheme for
fortifying Flushing be withdrawn, and there is at this
moment only too much reason to think that it will not be
withdrawn without strong outside pressure, much mischief
has been done by its promoters, who have caused Dutch
policy to be regarded with suspicion in both London and
Paris, and created a rift in the cordial relations of Belgium
and Holland.
Unfortunately, there is too much reason to believe that
the matter will not be concluded with even this qualified
result. The Dutch Government seems determined to go on
with the bad business, and, of course, those who like to
fish in troubled waters will encourage their obstinacy.
Already we have rumours of a secret treaty between
Germany and Holland promising military support for the
defence of the forts when built, and although the treaty
may be apocryphal, such an assurance would not fail at
the opportune moment to be forthcoming. In making
fortifications that would be injurious to the interests of
everybody else except Germany, the Dutch or any other
Government might feel sure of receiving German support
unless and until major considerations intervened. The
Dutch ministers will be stimulated by every available
argument to assert the independence of their country by
offending England and Belgium without benefiting them
selves. In these circumstances both Belgium for herself as the
principal party concerned, and England and France as the
tutelary Powers who promoted the freedom of the Scheldt,
should concert together and take measures in support of each
other's separate action to bring home to ministers at The
Hague the unfriendly and uncalled-for nature of the steps
they propose to take at Flushing. Their consequence must
be to render nugatory all the rights won not merely by
Belgium but by all the trading nations in the freeing of
the Scheldt. In 1863, for instance, England paid over
half a million sterling as her share in the amortisement of
the Scheldt tolls. She has a right to a voice in the new

f LUSHING AND THE SCHELDT 173
arrangement which would make the lower Scheldt an exclu
sively Dutch river. In a crisis, what value would the paper
charter of the Scheldt as a free way to Antwerp have in
the eyes of the Power which, either for itself or in the
interests of another country, commanded the entrance to
the river with powerful batteries and cuirassed forts ? The
protest will have to be very loud and very firm, or the
fortifications at Flushing will complete that chain of forti
fied positions which now confronts our eastern coast from
the Elbe to whatever point Dutch complaisance may place
at the disposal of Germany.
If remonstrance and protest fail at The Hague there will
be good reason to deplore the shortsightedness shown in
1 830- 1 in refusing to listen to the Belgian demand that
Dutch Flanders should be included in the new kingdom
of Belgium. Dutch Flanders (that is, Flandre des Etats)
should be part of Belgium. Its geographical position, as
well as its past history, entitled the Belgians to its posses
sion, which would have given them the left bank of the
Scheldt. It might not be inopportune to remind Holland
of the consideration shown her in this matter eighty years
ago. If nothing is gained by appealing to Holland's good
sense and neighbourly feeling, it will only remain for
Belgium to invite a conference of the Powers who took part
in the liquidation of the Scheldt tolls in 1863, for the
purpose of discussing how far the proposed fortification
of Flushing would contravene the spirit of treaties and
hinder the freedom of the Scheldt, which is a right belong
ing to all trading nations.

PEACE OF EUROPE* (2)
ALTHOUGH it is very probable that when these lines appear
in print there will be no room for talking of peace, I have
adopted the same title as was given to a previous study of
mine of the European situation which appeared in this
review a few years ago. As it is an attempt to get at the
causes of the prevailing tendency to stifle discussion, the
actual occurrence or non-occurrence of the war that now
seems imminent becomes of little or no importance because
the main conclusion is that war is sooner or later inevitable,
and that great issues have arisen which can only be settled
by the sword.
It is no new saying that war is nearest at hand when
there is most talk of peace and when the Pacifists are most
confident in the arrival of the Millennium. Perhaps this is
attributable to the unreasonable character of the expecta
tion — seeing that Europe, without going further afield,
resembles an armed camp — or perhaps there may be some
Higher Power, which, taking a just view of man's pre
tensions to perfection, conceives it necessary to correct and
chastise his vanity. And after all, if war in the old fashion
had its dark side, is there not some reason to think that
the social strife which we have seen, and with an aggra
vated form of which we are still threatened, may prove
darker? Strikes, sabotage, picketing are only brutal
appeals to force, and have none of the redeeming features
of a war waged for the greatness of one's country, the
preservation of our colonies and commerce. Man is not,
and never will be, perfect, and the nations that lose the
sense of patriotism only cumber the earth, and deserve to
disappear, be their past greatness and their present pros
perity what they may. What is more to the point, they are
* United Service Magazine, October, 191 1.
174

PEACE OF EUROPE 175
certain to succumb. Long before Rome fell the handwrit
ing was on the wall, and the end in sight. Is it the same
with England to-day ? Germans say it is, and their con
tempt for English character and power is one of the causes
that has mainly led to their recent proceedings.
The disturbing element to the peace of Europe has been
for years the magnitude of German ambition. Not content
with having the best-organised and best-composed army
in the world, Germany longs for the same supremacy at
sea. Not very successful herself at creating colonies, she
wishes to get them ready made. She can only get them
in this way by vanquishing England and appropriating
those that belong to her. So long as these views and aspira
tions are to the fore in Germany — and they are at present
in increasing force there — a good understanding between
England and Germany resembles the polite preliminaries
that pass between the lamb and the wolf, or the unarmed
traveller and the footpad. Germany is out for plunder.
The only obstacle in her path is the English Navy, and she
has got nearly level with it for the purposes of a single
campaign — a one year's war — in the North Sea.
With this exordium to commence with, let us look a little
wider afield. Germany has a great impulse, a motive force
behind her. She has clear aims, and she has almost, if not
quite, the power to carry them out in the teeth of every one.
On the other hand, England has no aims. She asks to be
left in peace to enjoy what she has, and that is precisely
what all other nations, more or less, envy her. They would
not mind the British Empire falling with a crash to the
ground if they were sure that they were not also to suffer.
German ambition is so ruthless and insatiable that all the
liberal-minded nations have satisfied themselves that the
downfall of England would be only the first step to their
enslavement. But for this a European combination against
England would have been quite conceivable.
And if England has no aims, it is dubious whether
France has any either. The cult of la revanche has long
been out of fashion. Gambetta's words, " N'en parlez
jamais, y pensez toujours," have lost their force. To rouse
the passion for la gloire, which inspired French soldiers
under the oriflamme the fleur de lys, and the tricolour would

176 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
need a military genius and a series of brilliant successes.
France, like England, has her own internal troubles. The
excess of liberty has produced a social riot which may
paralyse the arm at the critical moment.
It might be thought that Russia, having the same advan
tages as Germany in one-man rule, would have a clear goal
before her, and that she at least would know what she
wanted ; but this does not seem to be the case. Her policy
is too dispersed. Her attention is fixed on questions of the
fifth order of importance, instead of those of the first
magnitude. Persia is an instance. All England and
Russia had to do was to sign a twenty-five years' treaty :
"We agree to debar all other Powers from interfering in
Persia for this period, and we are both of us going to
consider our own convenience, and nobody else's in the
interim." Instead of this, Russia has concluded a separate
convention with Germany, which unquestionably ties her
hands, and may lead to further disputes. In comparison
with what is happening in Europe, anything that may arise
in Persia is of the fifth order of importance. But it is not
only in Persia that Russia has tied her hands. She seems
to have done something very similar in the Balkans. In
Manchuria and Mongolia she is credited with being ready
for a fresh war, but in Europe she seems less ready. If
Germany knew that Russia was prepared to throw three
millions of men, as she could, across the Vistula and into
Galicia, we fancy she would be less provocative on the
Belgian frontier. Russia has always laboured under a
disadvantage in the matter of rapid concentration. She
has added thereto by scattering her forces and by multiply
ing the objects under her attention.
On the other hand, Austria seems to have become in
fected with the same ambitious longings as her northern
partner, although we may have to wait for their full
revelation until the accession of the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand. She wants "her place in the sun" also, and
if that means a colony, we do not see why France and
England should not try and accommodate her on con
ditions. It would count for something at Vienna to show
that favours can come elsewhere than from Berlin. In the
same way Italy has secret longings. Surely France and

PEACE OF EUROPE 177
England, her friends, could ascertain what they are and
think of some way of gratifying them. Germany is ready
to do some bargaining to keep Italy in the fold of the
Triple Alliance. Is it impossible for us to do some better
bargaining to get her out of it ?
Until that has been effected we must regard Europe as
divided between the two opposing forces represented by
the Triple Alliance on the one side and the Dual Alliance,
plus the Anglo-French entente, on the other. The entente
has stood the test of time so well that perhaps we are not
going too far in speaking of one Triplice against another.
The English and French peoples are certainly at one in
thinking that a German triumph would mean their decline
and possible downfall. To avert such a calamity they are
prepared to spend their last shilling and their last man.
Eighty millions of the most civilised people in the world
are not likely to go under if they only make no mistakes
in dealing with an opponent which may be civilised in some
aspects, but which in war will show itself as ruthless as
the Hun.
The peace of Europe rests in the hands of the members
of the two Triplices, and everybody recognises that the
one to which England is attached is wholly pacific. Of
the other, two of the partners, at least so long as Francis
Joseph lives, are pacific. Consequently, of the six Powers,
only one can be labelled as set on war as the means of
attaining its ends. This is a heavy responsibility, and
from the manner in which she bears it, it is clear that she is
prepared to outrage public opinion in order to attain her
own ends. She admits that she is swayed by no higher
motive than self-interest, and a supreme selfishness is her
only God. If there were a European Areopagus, Germany
would be voted the enemy of all.
But if there is not an impartial and controlling assembly,
there is at least a bar of public opinion outside the six
Great Powers to which an appeal can be made, and from
which efficacious aid might be obtained in upholding
justice and national independence. There are fourteen
other states in Europe, and some at least of these might
play a considerable part in the matter. Unfortunately,
Turkey, the most powerful of them all, and undoubtedly 12

178 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
a great military Power, seems to have been gained over by
Germany. Her military zeal and her indebtedness to
Germany for military counsel have led her astray. Besides,
there is considerable resemblance in the German and
Turkish way of looking at an appeal to arms. There is
nothing in it that shocks their mind. Even Frenchmen,
the most martial race of former days, no longer contem
plate war except as a dread alternative to dishonour and
effacement. In a somewhat similar manner Roumania must
be placed in the same category, for she is already associ
ated with the German Powers.
Twelve states remain, and only one of these may be
considered likely to attach herself to Germany. I mean
Sweden. The eleven others are certainly opposed, if not
to Germany directly, at least to her methods of action as
displayed in Morocco. Here is a bar of public opinion
from which Germany would receive scant consideration if
they felt sure of indemnity for the consequences of their
judgment. Civilisation, culture, and true liberty are as
highly developed among them as in the greatest states.
Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland are in all points the
equals of Germany, except in military power, and they
represent a total of twenty millions of people. Their voice
should count. It would count if they would only make an
effort to support it with deeds.
If we assume that the resources of the two Triplices are
fairly equal, the only safe conclusion is that the result of
a great struggle between them will be indecisive. There
will be losses here and gains there, but we do not believe
that, for one side or the other, there will be a repetition of
the crushing blow of 1870-71. An enormous waste of life
and a prodigious expenditure will probably only avail
to leave the situation very much where it was. The best
chance for giving it a more decisive turn lies in the
introduction of the three independent nations whose names
have last been mentioned, for the co-operation of the three
little states named would probably give another aspect
to the struggle. They are not indifferent spectators of the
crisis, for they know that while larger issues are to the
fore, their own fate hangs in the balance.
As it is not at all probable that Holland would be very

PEACE OF EUROPE 179
prompt in coming to a decision, although a German in
vasion of Belgium would cause much heart-searching in
that country, her action and policy may be left for con
sideration in the last place. Belgium is the state most
immediately concerned, and she will not be able by the
force of circumstances to evade making a prompt and clear
revelation of her plans and purpose. There seems no
reason to doubt that the very first episode of the war will
be the invasion of her territory by one or more German
armies. No one can doubt for a moment that among the
Belgian people this outrage will rouse a deep and enduring
resentment. If the Germans succeed in crushing the French
and English, the resentment of the Belgians will not
greatly matter; but if they are defeated, or if their
success is partial, they may have good cause to remember it.
But if Belgium is the most directly menaced by the out
break of a Franco-Anglo-German war, Switzerland also
has to face the contingency with grave anxiety. Her turn
might not come till the second phase of the war, but it
would come all the same, and she is only prepared to wage
a defensive war on a restricted portion of her territory.
For defensive war she is not without a good chance of
success, but she has no means of assuming the offensive,
and under no circumstances would the Swiss take part in
the invasion of any one else's territory. On the other hand,
the Belgian army, should the tide of war roll into Ger
many, might very well be incorporated with the Franco-
British for purposes of an offensive move, and the exasper
ation of the Belgian public at an unprovoked invasion
would make such a step far from unpopular. It is the atti
tude and action of Belgium that is for the moment of the
chief importance after that of the Great Powers. Let us
concentrate our attention on the point. It is a very vital
question for England and France as well as for Belgium
herself. When we speak of Belgium we must remember that there
is the Belgian Government and also the Belgian people.
The Belgian people, both Walloons and Flemings, are
entirely in favour of France. "Nous n'aimons pas les
Allemands," is a common observation in Flanders and
Hainaut, as well as Liege. Antwerp, it is true, is the seat

180 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
of German influence, and some have called it already " half
a German city," but one may reasonably doubt whether
the mass of the Antwerpers have any love for the Germans.
The tendency of political life and thought in Belgium is
more and more towards liberalism, and France represents
its ideal and champion. If ever the occasion arises to make
a national decision, the Belgian plebiscite will be over
whelmingly favourable to France.
With regard to the views of the Belgian Government, we
have no positive means of arriving at a conclusion. They
are wrapped in a little mystery, and it is quite possible that
they have not definitely and irrevocably made up their
mind on the subject. Opportunism is regarded in Brussels
as one of the most statesmanlike qualities, but there comes
a moment in all questions when the clear views that can
alone prompt a wise decision should be formed and brought
into evidence. Nobody knows exactly what the Belgian
Government means to do. It wishes, of course, to be let
alone and to have no critical decision forced upon it; but
if it cannot have its wish, what will it do ? The Belgians
themselves are in great doubt on the subject, and certainly
no thoughtful Belgian can feel satisfied with what is being
done in the way of preparation for the serious contingencies
that are now looming close ahead. It seems, to me at least,
that Belgium is going to repeat the blunder of August,
1 83 1, wholly due to over-confidence, and, as Leopold I.
said, she "would not survive a repetition of that mistake."
The Belgian Government is turning a deaf ear to its true
friends, and listening to the sinister advice of its most
formidable enemy. What it does not seem to have the
faintest notion of, is that its views are quite out of harmony
with those of its own people. If the time should come
when the shortcomings of the Government were clearly
responsible for national calamities, the Belgian people
would call their rulers very severely to account.
There are a few points on which emphasis may be laid.
Belgium is bound to do her best to defend her own terri
tory, but no one has ever supposed that she has the strength
or the means to do so alone. Her duty is to call in her
friends to aid her; but if she does not call them in, and in
good time, she incurs the charge of neglecting her duty.

PEACE OF EUROPE 181
It will be no excuse or defence if she responds, "We
thought we were strong enough to stand alone." It is
perfectly obvious that Belgium has not, and never will
have, this strength ; and any one who tells her the contrary
is not her friend.
We can only hope that eventually Belgium will follow
the true course suggested by her own interests and her past
history. That course is cordial co-operation with France
and England, the two Powers that presided over her
creation and admission to the family of nations. Why
should she display such a tender regard for German feel
ings ? She has nothing to thank Germany for. If she were
to aid Germany in her plans, no one would more bitterly
regret it. The triumph of Germany would signify, not
merely the loss of her independence, but the stifling of
her individuality. But she would be committing another
and more serious kind of blunder if Germany were
not to triumph. She would have to reckon with those
who considered her defection an act of ingratitude to
them. The peace of Europe is menaced because Germany is
pining for a world-wide dominion. She is a formidable
military Power; but that is not enough. She wants to be
supreme on the sea as well. She has built up a fine navy,
but it has done her no good. Instead of satisfying her, it
has created an interminable feeling of restlessness. There
is a greater fleet at sea. It bars the way to universal
dominion. It is the only obstacle to it. These are the
sentiments that are impelling Germany to stir up a war
which will probably rage throughout the world before it is
over, and that must have the greatest consequences for
humanity. It is as clear as the day that, despite the alleged
progress of mankind, war can be forced upon us at any
moment by a potentate or a people set on the attainment of
their own ends in defiance of all considerations. Such a
moment seems to have arrived.
The question of international peace has become a matter
of wider interest than in past centuries. New factors have
been introduced into the problem. It is no longer only
Europe that has to be taken into account. The balance of
power has to be thought of, but in the scale must be also

182 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
placed the United States and Japan. Do the Berlin authori
ties think that America will not have her say in the matter ?
Distance is being annihilated, and Germany flatters herself
if she thinks that the United States will stand by while
a new aggressive force is brought into being on the eastern
shoreline of the Atlantic. The first naval reverse to Eng
land — which has yet to occur — would be the signal for the
American battleships to steam for Europe. The German
dream of ocean dominion is unattainable. It would be a
menace to everybody, and therefore the whole world will
combine against and destroy it. No one can be in any
doubt as to German procedure — she has given us too many
object-lessons — and it is beyond doubt that the realisation
of her plans would place everybody else in bondage. This
is too clear for doubt to exist about it on either side of the
Atlantic. Other considerations might induce the Japanese to claim
a right to intervene. They are the allies of England, and
they have a very chivalrous estimate of the duties of an
alliance. But they also have entered the family of nations,
and it is their strongest ambition to establish their right to
the place. A German triumph would react on the position
in the Far East just as much as it might on the Panama
Canal. The wisest course has always been found to lie in
preventing a contingency happening rather than in prepar
ing to deal with it after it has arisen, and the Japanese
have shown much wisdom. Under special circumstances,
they would not be backward in joining in our Old-World
quarrels, and a quarter of a million of their soldiers would
be a very useful help in the defence or recovery of Belgium.
It is unnecessary to say more. If peace is preserved, Ger
many will do well to remember that new factors have come
into being since 1870, and that they are against her. If
peace is broken she will have reason to remember the fact
before long.
From whatever point of view the international position
is regarded, it seems impossible to place any firm reliance
on the preservation of peace much longer. The pretensions
of Germany can only be made good by the sword, and she
has full belief in her military power. But there are other
eventualities now. Until the recent attempt at dictation

PEACE OF EUROPE 183
from Berlin, France was the most pacific state in Europe.
She did not want war ; her influence was always on the side
of peace. Germany did not give her credit for fine senti
ments or good motives. She set it down to her being afraid.
The whole corps of German officers agreed that France
admitted her military inferiority. The German is by
character a bully, but when he thinks the other side cannot
retaliate he gives full play to his domineering instincts.
Germany had convinced herself that Francewould not show
a firm upper lip. Did she not dismiss M. Delcassee five
years ago? In the interval Germany had grown so much
stronger. France would never fight — so the Berlin was sent
to Agadir.
But in this Germany went too far. The French Govern
ment had received an affront, but it preserved an attitude
of politeness. It took counsel with England, and it received
assurances that English support would prove as firm as a
rock. The Germans were too much occupied in their own
designs to remark that imperceptibly the French attitude
had stiffened, and that France confronted the possibility of
a fresh contest with Germany as a not unlikely contingency.
When the German authorities did perceive it — an occur
rence happening at the moment these lines are being penned
— they described France's plain declaration that she would
defend her honour as "a defiance of Germany." The
signs, then, are strongly in favour of war, one provoked
and precipitated by Germany for her own ends, but before
it is over she may have cause to regret her ruthless decision.
From the German point of view, obviously no one has any
rights but Germany, and we are all "to be bled white "
because we stand somewhat in her way. But even if war
is averted now, a collision before long must be regarded
as inevitable. France has recovered some of her old and
natural confidence in herself. The cult of the revanche
has been revived ; the recovery of the lost provinces is once
more an ideal. Forty years of peace have been obliter
ated, and the passions of a wounded people have been
again brought into play. Germany has roused thoughts by
her action that she never condescended to take into her
calculations. Even if Germany draws back now, and that
is the only way of maintaining peace, the day must come

184 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
when France will rise as one man and cast her threats in
her teeth.
The most interesting of the actors in the European inter
national play is Italy, because no one feels confident as
to the part she intends to play. She is Germany's ally, but
she is not bound to help her if she undertakes an offensive
war. If Germany attacks France, then, Italy can look on.
But if she looks on, Austria, the third partner, will not;
and then follows the further query — what would be the
relations of Austria and Italy, the one fulfilling her part in
the triple compact, the other holding back ? It does not
seem at all likely that, under these circumstances, harmony
could exist between Austria and Italy. Italy could not
afford to incur the risk of standing alone. She would be
bound to gravitate to the other grouping. But rumours are
already current that Italy is to receive compensation in
Africa, and that when Germany is satisfied her claims there
are to be brought forward. We shall see. The game of com
pensations being once started, it is difficult to assign a limit
for it, or to exclude fresh claimants from time to time. All
we need say is that it will be a blunder if Italy is allowed to
think that she gets what she may get as Germany's ally
rather than as the friend of France. Countries, like in
dividuals, always adhere to the more profitable connection.
It would not be a bad stroke to promise Italy all Germany's
African colonies when we have to take them from her.
Whatever other points may remain obscure, there is one
clear consequence of the recent crisis whether war ensues or
not. The rivalry of England and Germany is brought into
the limelight. It is England who has baffled Germany,
and Germany has retired for the moment, because she is
not ready for the naval war. But she will now turn all
her efforts to getting ready, and inspired by the bad
passions which the Press vituperation of England has
aroused, the German people will provide the money to raise
the German fleet to a still higher point of power and
efficiency. This will entail a still further effort and resolu
tion by England. In the end the situation will have to be
faced, that sooner than continue a ruinous competition a
clear issue will be raised, and Germany will be challenged
to stop or fight. There is already sufficient exasperation

PEACE OF EUROPE 185
in both countries to make this course seem a prudent one
to follow. The question of men has to be faced, as well
as that of money. Germany has superior resources in men,
and her wiser fiscal policy makes the foreigner contribute
much of the cost of her new navy.
As time progresses the rivalry will come more and more
clearly into view. The Hohenzollern policy is progressive.
It fixes on its goal, and it works laboriously to reach it.
In the last twenty-five years Germany has created a
formidable-looking fleet. We do not know its true power.
It may be weaker than it looks; it may be stronger. But
it has one element of strength : it has been created solely
for war with this country in the narrow seas. There is no
waste of force about it. It is a machine forged for a
specific purpose, and there is no room for doubt on the
subject. It is a question for serious consideration how long
a man or a nation is bound to remain passive while a rival,
in the full light of day, is making every preparation to put
an end to his or its existence. The day will come when
this intolerable position must cease to be, and our greatest
risk is that we may wait too long.

THE KNELL OF THE TRIPLE
ALLIANCE*
THE action of Italy in Tripoli produced by its suddenness
a shock on the public mind of this country which for the
moment disturbed the clearness of its vision and of its
reasoning power. The lovers of Peace — and we are all
lovers of peace if combined with honour and freedom from
peril — saw in it an aggravation of the international dis
turbance created by the still unsolved Moroccan question,
and they have been somewhat free in their censure of
Italian action. It is one of the worst habits of the typical
Englishman to criticise and censure others, and to do so
in ignorance of the facts and without sufficient considera
tion for the feelings of foreigners. That the Italians
should be the object of this perverse criticism is especially
regrettable when we remember how cordial our relations
have always been with them, and with what loyalty the
Italian Press and people, alone among all Continentals,
refused to take any part in the diatribes passed on this
country during the South African War. When all the
circumstances of the case are known and examined no level
headed person will doubt that Italy acted in September,
191 1, from those imperative material considerations which
compelled England herself to act in South Africa towards
the close of 1 899.
At the same time, the human mind being naturally
inquisitive, the Italians will give us permission to make a
little not unfriendly investigation into the causes that made
them act at this particular moment, and to discuss the
probable consequences of their action on the international
situation in Europe. * Fortnightly Review, November, 1911.
186

THE KNELL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 187
It may perhaps clear the ground to point out that Italy
has been generally admitted to possess reversionary rights
over Tripoli ever since France asserted her protectorate in
Tunis thirty years ago. Those rights have been recognised
in official engagements, not merely by France, but by
England also. In Tripoli Italy had been given a free
hand. It was on that basis that she became a party to
certain naval combinations in the Mediterranean which, to
put the point plainly, could not be considered as harmonis
ing with the intentions of the Triple Alliance. Italy was
at liberty to do this without breach of faith because, as I
stated three years ago, the conventions between the three
Powers constituting the Alliance relate exclusively to land
and not to naval operations. The moment for deciding
when Italy should convert her theoretical rights in Tripoli
into realities was one entirely for her judgment and
decision. She decided to act now, and she is entitled to
claim, not merely that she had good reasons for acting,
but also the full and frank acquiescence of those who had
long ago given her in anticipation their assent.
There remains, however, the piquant question, why did
Italy act at this particular juncture when Europe was just
laying aside her apprehensions of war ? Italy, too, did
not merely talk of war; she went to war, and her artillery
began to speak before editors had collected their thoughts.
The Italian Government has drawn and circulated its case
for the information of lookers-on. There were heavy
faults on the part of the Turks, Italy could show a long
list of grievances, and no one can say in face of the facts
cited that Italy had not received provocation. And yet
while we accept the case as a good one we feel instinctively
that the true cause of Italy's prompt action lies behind it.
It is a secret that may not be imparted to the world for
some time to come.
Let us take, in the first place, the simplest explanation,
which is that Italy acted entirely for and by herself alone.
Italia fara da se. She has had paper rights in Tripoli for
thirty years, but she had never done anything to enforce
them. Might they not be imperilled, if not weakened, by
continued abstinence? A new phase of the scramble for
Africa had commenced, and Italy was restricted to the

1 88 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
role of a spectator; and yet among the papers in her
Foreign Office were the protocols of France and England
acceding to her occupation of Tripoli. Is it surprising that
with the occurrences in Morocco before her eyes, and with
the possibility of German intrusion in interior Africa, Italy
should decide that there was not a day to lose in making
good her reserved rights in Tripoli and its hinterland ?
No doubt she could have entered into negotiations with
Turkey, but they would have proved, as no one can doubt,
wearisome and futile. She preferred to follow the short
and sure road of an ultimatum and the fait accompli.
Let us turn for a moment to Turkish proceedings since
the installation of the new regime, for in them may be
found some further explanation perhaps of Italy's action.
The policy of the Turkish Government since the fall of
Abdul Hamid has been, with scarcely any concealment,
provocative. It has aimed at the extension of Islamic
power in Arabia, Africa, and Persia. Under German
instigation it has striven to thwart English interests, to
undermine English influence, and to pave the way for the
supersession of English power at many points, and notably
at the head of the Persian Gulf. It has used Tripoli as the
gate into the Saharan regions, where Turkish troops have
encroached on French territory, and the emissaries of Con
stantinople have been preparing the way for a Jehad or
Holy War. If Turkish authority in Tripoli had become
strengthened by an increased garrison, the general arming
of the tribes and a stirring up of religious fanaticism, it
would necessarily have followed that Italy's paper rights
over Tripoli would become less freely recognised and more
difficult to assert. Time counted in favour of Turkey and
against Italy. The Italian Government may well be
pardoned for deciding that it could not afford to wait any
longer. In face of the situation created by Turkey's own policy,
no one will doubt when history supersedes contemporary
comment that the Porte precipitated Italy's action and
made it more uncompromising. At the same time, these
considerations do not eliminate the possibility that Italy
may have acted in Tripoli, if not at the instigation, at
least with the encouragement of one of her allies. It would

THE KNELL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 189
only have been natural that Germany at the time of her
move to Agadir should have given Italy some explanation
of her plans and some fresh assurance that, whatever
happened in Morocco, she had, as already arranged, the
reversion to Tripoli. Indeed, it will appear inconceivable
that she did not do so when it is remembered that at that
very moment the preliminary conversations for the renewal
of the Triple Alliance in 191 3 had already begun. At the
time that Germany sent the Berlin to Agadir she was con
fident of an easy triumph, and she looked forward to a
repetition of 1905. But the Agadir mission has proved very
much of a coup manque. Things have not gone at all as
Germany anticipated, and the prospect of her obtaining
anything like full satisfaction is growing more remote.
Italy apparently does not see why Germany's disappoint
ment should be passed on to her. A change is in progress
in Morocco, the political status in Northern Africa must
be affected thereby, and the hour for making good Italy's
paper rights in the same sphere had obviously arrived.
There was no reason whatever for waiting, as Germany
had given a prior assurance that she would regard Italy's
move into Tripoli as the complement of her own into
Morocco. International love, even among allies, is not so
great that Italy should forego the chance of going straight
ahead because the German train had got off the main line
and run into a siding. Germany, however much she is
embarrassed by the action of her associate, cannot reproach
her or repudiate it because she would be confronted with
unpleasant disclosures which would not read well in Con
stantinople. Without claiming to exhaust all the piquant
details of the secret history antecedent for some months
past to Italian action in Tripoli, we conceive we are not
far from the truth in alleging that Italy has acted within
her reserved rights, and that she knew very well that none
of the Powers could or would object to her enforcing them.
A very interesting and suggestive problem is placed
before us by the Italian descent on Tripoli, accompanied,
as it seems to be, by a sort of Turko-Italian war. It has
several aspects, and will be judged somewhat differently
in Paris, London, and Berlin. Let us put the French view
first. An Italian occupation of Tripoli was an accepted

190 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
fact in the political situation. Whether it came now or in
the future did not matter to France, which on this question
had no arrieres pensees. This fact explains the perfect
calm and equanimity with which the news of Italian action
was received in Paris the other day, in striking contrast
with the first emotional utterances of the English papers.
But we cannot doubt that this reasonable frame of mind
was due to the careful calculation that the Tripolitan
adventure of the southern neighbour would inevitably
prove a point in France's favour. There is no ground for
thinking that Italy has a very arduous task to accomplish,
but at least for some years a very considerable garrison will
have to be maintained in Africa, and there will be quite
enough activity and outlay to keep the Italian people occu
pied for a long time. Moreover, Italy's communications
with Tripoli must be by water, and as it would be absurd
to pretend that she is the equal in naval power, even with
the dubious aid of Austria, to France and England in the
Mediterranean, it follows that her obvious policy is to be
on good terms with those Powers. We make bold to
declare that, whether she intended to do so or not, Italy has
just given hostages to fortune that in the days of Arma
geddon she will be on the side of France and England.
Without looking so far ahead, France had no difficulty
in coming to the conclusion that Italy, well occupied in
North Africa, would be a less aggressive neighbour on the
Alps. One of the partners in the Triple Alliance had gone
temporarily or permanently out of the business to attend to
more pressing matters at a distance. For many years after
her great trouble the luck had been dead against France.
The Triple Alliance formed in 1883 threatened to efface
her, but she waited with hopeful fortitude, and her turn
came with the Alliance with Russia. France again raised
her head, but there remained the dubious question of the
relations with England. That dark cloud on the horizon
was removed by the entente cordiale, better and more to be
trusted than paper treaties; and now at a critical moment
in European history the pressure on the Alpine frontier is
relaxed, if not entirely removed. We cannot yet say that
the Triple Alliance is dead, but its knell seems audible to
the ear.

THE KNELL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 191
The point of view in London was necessarily different.
We have not to be ready to mobilise the manhood of our
race on two exposed frontiers at twenty-four hours' notice.
We ate not given to making very careful calculations
beforehand as to the combinations of possibly hostile or
friendly forces in any sudden emergency. Our way of con
ducting politics is somewhat haphazard, and certainly
unscientific. Consequently there was nothing to cause sur
prise in the first remarks on Italy's action in our Press being
characterised by an emotional irritation, and not by any
serious effort to weigh and measure the true significance of
what was taking place. The vague and elusive " peace of
Europe " was imperilled, and for a while no one seemed
to see that an event had occurred which materially turned
the scale in favour of our side. Peace, which has no mean
ing unless there is behind those who uphold it a preponder
ance of power, was rendered more assured by an act which,
however it may be concealed or patched, constitutes the
first serious breach in the Triple Alliance.
But the situation for this country, it was declared, was
exceedingly embarrassing and dangerous on account of the
large number of Mahomedans within the Empire. We do
not need to be reminded that the King-Emperor counts
more Muslims as his subjects than the Sultan of Turkey,
but this argument cuts both ways. If they are his faithful
loyal subjects it is a contradiction in terms to appeal to
Islamic solidarity as a justification for our interfering in a
matter that does not concern us, and which we have always
regarded among the things that must some day inevitably
happen. But the Mahomedan leaders here and in India
exclaim that Italy has declared an unprovoked and unjust
war on Turkey, and that if we do not hasten to extricate
the Sultan from his difficulty by quarrelling with our
excellent friends the Italians we shall forfeit their esteem.
We may reasonably hope that the Indian Mahomedans
have more sense than to act so childishly. We ourselves
have had to wage war against Sunni Mussulmans, and to
invade their territory as in Afghanistan. We have several
times had to warn the Porte itself that encroachments at
Koweit and in the Sinai peninsula would entail our declar
ing war on Turkey. We are in practical possession of

192 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Egypt — an old Turkish possession. We smashed the
Khalifa, who was certainly a pillar of Islam. We did all
these things without forfeiting the loyalty of India, and
yet in comparison with any one of them the Italian descent
on Tripoli is a small affair. How could we with any face
at all say to Italy, " You are doing a very wicked thing in
Tripoli," when we have ourselves done far worse? The
Indian Mahomedans must show a little of that good
common sense which has been so conspicuously absent at
Constantinople. It will do the Indian Mahomedans no harm to ask them
to seriously consider some simple facts. As British fellow-
subjects we have a great deal of good feeling towards
them, and we have rejoiced at seeing evidence that they
were going to devote their attention to educational ques
tions so that they might raise their community socially
and intellectually. But we can have no sympathy what
ever with pan-Islamism, which would be the gravest
possible menace to the British Empire, and we must firmly
repel the suggestion that because the Turks are of the
same creed as the Indian Mahomedans there is any call on
us to go and help them through their troubles, whether
our general policy points that way or not. The contrary
is nearer the truth, and it might be argued that in expecting
us to intervene in an affair which does not primarily concern
us these Mahomedan leaders are themselves committing
a kind of veiled treason to the British Empire, under which
they enjoy so many advantages that their Turk co-religion
ists do not share.
Let us, however, offer them such consolation as the
situation justifies. The loss of Tripoli will not make
Turkey any the poorer or weaker. It will close an outlet
for wasted force. The Mahomedan population of Tripoli
will be just as free to follow their religious exercises under
Italian rule as they were under Turkish. They will have
the advantage of lighter taxation, and as Italy will stimu
late trade and industry there will be more money to pay it.
It cannot be doubted that the Tripolitans will be very
much the gainers by the Italian annexation, just as has
happened in those parts of the old Muslim empires which
have passed under the sways of England and France. But

THE KNELL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 193
the Mahomedans are not satisfied with material considera
tions. They put forward a claim for moral injury. The
dignity of the Sultan has been abased, and the descent on
Tripoli is represented as the first scene in a drama which is
to witness the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and
the conversion of the faithful Muslims into gangs of
wandering Jews.
It is rather difficult to treat this argument seriously. The
sixty or seventy million Muslims subject to our rule have
revealed no errant inclinations. They have remained with
remarkable constancy in the places that knew them. And
if there is a plot to expel the Turks from Europe, surely
the remonstrances are misdirected when sent to London.
Ought they not to be dispatched to Berlin and Vienna ?
When this crisis springs up in the Near East it will be time
enough to discuss and judge the action of this country.
At the present moment we are only considering the Tripoli-
tan question, which in itself is a very small affair so far as
the Mahomedans are concerned. What we wish the British
Mahomedans to remember is that their view of the situation
is only one element in the problem, and that for the
moment it is not the most important element. It has to
be taken into account, but we must be allowed to shape our
course by considerations nearer home.
We return then to the point of supreme importance, which
is, how does the independent action of Italy — a member
of the Triple Alliance — affect the European interests of
England and France and the balance of power in this
continent ? There are two tests by means of which some
thing approaching a sound opinion may be arrived at.
How has Italy's action been received in the capitals of its
political partners ? Has it given satisfaction in Berlin and
Vienna ? The second test should be equally valuable as
an indication. Has it made Italy a more useful ally in
the Triple Alliance, or a more formidable foe to France
and England? These are practical questions concerning
which a considerable quantity of independent evidence is
available. If attention is fixed on them there should be
some chance of forming reasonable opinions about the
events that have already taken place, and those which will
occur as the position develops. 13

194 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Let us apply the tests and give the answers that seem
most reasonable and correct at the moment of writing.
Italy's action was freely denounced in both Berlin and
Vienna. She was accused of taking this step without pay
ing any regard to German interests and susceptibilities.
She put Germany in such a false light at Constantinople
that she contemplated intervention to avert the war until
Italy announced to all the Powers that she would not accept
intervention. While Germany saw loss of prestige and risk
to her railway projects in Asiatic Turkey, Austria was
alarmed lest Italy meditated following up her step in
North Africa by a corresponding move in Albania. In
Vienna Italy was denounced even more strongly than she
had been in Berlin. Surprise, resentment, and even
jealousy were displayed because it was alleged that Italy
had in acting for and by herself stolen a march on her
partners. These were the first honest and outspoken
opinions of the two German capitals. In them we discern
the truth.
But a little reflection sufficed to show the need of restraint
and circumspection. The two German Foreign Offices knew
very well that Italy was not merely within her rights, but
that she held proof of prior sanction. The continuance of
a censorious attitude in the Press could only result in the
weakening and possible destruction of the Triple Alliance,
whose thirtieth birthday was so near at hand. The German
Press then have trimmed their sails. Italy's moderation is
extolled because she has promised to do nothing to inflame
the Balkan peoples, and significant remarks are made to
the effect that the war will be very brief, and that an
opportunity will soon present itself for Germany to inter
vene between the belligerents. So long as it is Germany
that intervenes there is nothing to be said against the
proposition, but Germany's game is to lure this country
into that invidious position so that hereafter she may be
able to assure the Italians that it was England who wished
to fetter their action and thwart their plans. Our only safe
attitude is that of the calm spectator who takes good note
but keeps his own counsel.
But if we apply the second test we find still stronger
reasons for benevolence in judging Italy's decision to

THE KNELL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 195
occupy Tripoli. Whether intentionally or not, she has
made herself less efficient to perform her duties under the
Triple Alliance, and less formidable as a nominally hostile
neighbour to France. The most lively imagination could
not conceive Italy going to war with France at a time when
she has 40,000 of her best troops in Tripoli, with their
communications always liable to be severed by the squad
rons of England and France. For the moment Italy has
ceased to be a useful member of the Alliance, and it can
hardly be doubted that this point is fully appreciated at
Berlin. At some future stage of the question every one will
recognise that Italy's bellicose action was an extraordinary
and quite unexpected contribution towards the maintenance
of general peace, so gravely threatened by Germany's
aggressive attitude not only in Morocco but on the French
frontier. There remains the more general question, What will be
the bearing of the Tripolitan incident on the chances of
the renewal of the Triple Alliance which falls due in the
spring of 191 3? The Italian Premier, Signor Giolitti,
declared the other day, just before the expedition set sail,
his " absolute loyalty ' ' to the Alliance, and in the state
of European nerves at that juncture he could not as a
reasonable man have dropped another thunderbolt among
the affrighted nations by announcing that Italy was going
to part with her old friends and seek new ones. He fully
realised that no one would have thanked him for such a
declaration at such a moment. He made the perfectly
proper announcement that his Government was " absolutely
loyal " to its allies and also fully in harmony with its
friends, and without attempting to penetrate into dark
places it is better to accept the declaration as it stands.
But Italy by planting herself in North Africa has taken
up a new position in which her own interests will compel
her to act in harmony with England and France. She has
not annexed Tripoli in order to lose it. When her present
allies are urging her to look to the Alps much of her
attention must be turned to Cyrenaica. Facts are superior
to words, and even to promises.
It is inevitable then that Italy must become a less efficient
member of the Triple Alliance. If peace is preserved she

196 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
may not refuse her signature once more to an instrument
which she, at least, has always regarded as a bond of
peace, but there is an end to the chances of Germany's
succeeding in her repeated efforts to give an offensive force
to what was always, and still remains, a purely defensive
engagement. Italy will remain a member of the Triple
Alliance on the understanding that she is only required to
go to war with France in the event of that Power assuming
the offensive against Germany, but as this is never likely
to happen Germany may well ask herself what is the practi
cal value to her of the Italian alliance ? The present Triple
Alliance may be described as either a sham or a phantom.
Under these circumstances Germany will very anxiously
look out for a third partner upon whom she can more
implicitly rely than upon Italy. She imagined she had
found it in Turkey, but Italian precipitancy has hampered
her plans and added to her anxieties. The Turkish alliance
was, and is still, no doubt to be had, but the quarrel with
Italy must first be decently settled. Then the Balkan
nationalities have to be taken into account. They will
certainly not be on the same side as the champions of
Turkey, and if they are severely pressed there is Russia
in the background to assist them. Germany has been fish
ing in troubled waters so long that it is edifying to see her
overtaken by Nemesis after all. The wiseheads of the
Wilhelmstrasse must be hard put to it to know which way
to turn. In one direction they see an old ally slipping away
from them, or at least taking up such a guarded and
reserved attitude as to be of little practical value in the
realisation of their best-laid schemes. In the other direc
tion they are confronted with the risk of alienating a friend
and possible ally who would be much more attached and
devoted and who would enter heartily into grandiose
schemes. But they see no way of securing the Turkish
alliance in exchange for the Italian without bringing new
factors into the problem which would count as a serious
set-off. The only way out of the difficulty for Germany is to
strain every effort to restore peace, to prevent Italy slipping
away from her alliance without alienating Turkey, and
perhaps to recognise that for herself a period of penance

THE KNELL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 197
has dawned. Only four months have elapsed since she
went to Agadir in the full belief that she could browbeat
France and cajole England, and now she finds that the
cards have turned against her, and that " the ' Ercles '
vein ' ' is not exactly suitable to the occasion. Fortunately
for her, perhaps, the desire for peace is so genuine and
general that no one will seek to interfere with her efforts
towards repentance and self-effacement.

AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE*
No serious student of international politics can dispute the
fact that the entente cordiale, due to the tact, good feeling,
and statesmanship of his late Majesty Edward VIL, has
brought the French and British nations together in a sense
and to a degree that not so many years ago would have
seemed impossible. This approximation was due not to
the adoption and use of a happy phrase, but to the dis
covery that the two peoples had identical interests in
common, not on second and third rate matters, but in
regard to the paramount considerations which underlie
their position as the two leading civilised countries of
Europe. On many occasions in the last eight years the
fact that England and France stood side by side has alone
preserved the Continent from bloodshed. But an entente
is only an irregular and therefore ephemeral bond. It
would not be held good enough by Germany, Austria, and
Italy for their compact ; it does not suffice for that between
Russia and France, and how, then, could it be deemed
sufficient for the agreement to which France and England
— moved by common apprehensions, and, if so ordinary a
quality guides statesmen, by common-sense — came despite
the mutual prejudices of the past? The entente cordiale
was obviously only a transition stage to something more
definite and unqualified. If it had proved a failure, which
no one will now venture to allege, it would have signified an
irremediable breach between France and England; as it
has not proved a failure, it is clear that the time has come
to convert the entente into an alliance.
The natural inclination of Englishmen is in favour of
superb isolation. Foreign alliances are regarded by many
as mere continental entanglements. Politicians when they
* National Defence, May, 1912.
198

AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE 199
are forced by events to make an alliance are always most
anxious to find some plausible excuse for their departure
from insular tradition. When Lord Lansdowne concluded
the alliance with Japan his chief care was as to how the
country would take it. And yet history might be searched
in vain to find a country that had derived more benefit from
opportune alliances than ours. It was the failure of our
diplomatists to bring the German Powers — absorbed in the
partition of Poland — into a league against France and
Spain that lost us our North American colonies 125 years
ago. We have no reason to look dubiously on continental
alliances once we discover where our interests lie, and how
they are to be protected. Alliances have been repeatedly to
our benefit and advantage; their absence in at least the
one memorable instance referred to involved us in national
humiliation and heavy loss.
If a wise decision is to be arrived at in the present critical
phase of European history we should consider the question
of ententes and alliances as mainly a business proposition,
not, however, altogether ignoring those considerations of
sentiment which influence nations as well as individuals.
Political arrangements are not concluded between mere
automatons. Patriotism, a sense of honour, the impulse of
glory still count as something distinct from and superior
to the balance in the ledger, or the sense of ease in one's
armchair. But the fundamental principle at the root of an
alliance is community of interest. We ally ourselves with
another country because much of the separate interests of
the two dovetail with each other, and in acting together
the essential needs of both are secured and attained. That
may be called the alliance that aims at some specific advan
tages, and is more or less offensive. But there is another
alliance which is purely defensive. It is that formed
against an aggressive military State which might prove
too strong for any single adversary, and which is only to
be prevented from becoming a menace to the whole world
by the wise and timely combination of its intended victims.
That is the contingency with which France and England
have to deal, and we must hope that they will both have
no more pressing thought than how best to provide against
it together.

200 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
An alliance with France need not be made in secret, for
the reasons dictating it are obvious to any one who will
take the trouble to look at the present situation in Europe.
The centre of Europe is occupied by two military nations
numbering 115,000,000 people, and possessing armies of
over six million men. Both of those States are bent on a
policy of expansion, not merely in Europe, but across the
seas. They have associated with them as an ally a third
Power — Italy — of nearly forty millions, whose ideas are
also towards expansion. There are some reasons to hope
that Italy may change sides, but for the moment it would
not be safe to say more than that there are internal influ
ences at work pulling her in opposite directions. But even
if Italy be eliminated from the Triple Alliance, the
German Powers represent such a combined force as has
never existed on the Continent at any former epoch, except
in the uprising of the nations against Napoleon. This
force is prepared and organised not for defence but for
offence. Both at Vienna and Berlin the first principle of
strategy is the immediate transfer of the scene of war to
the territory of the neighbour designated for attack. Rail
ways have been specially constructed to enable troops to
be poured up the valleys of the Meuse and the Moselle on
one side, and down the valley of the Vistula on the other.
Never has there been such a concentration of power ; never
such a carefully elaborated scheme for the employment of
power in what it is imagined will prove an irresistible
offensive. If we turn to the other side of the problem what do we
find? In the first place, France occupying the place of
peril, exposed to the full brunt of the storm, with a very
fine army, it is true, but only forty millions of people. In
the second place, there is France's ally — Russia — a State
with enormous potentialities, but handicapped for the
struggle that looms in the near future by her size and her
inadequate internal communications. It is most probable
that the vigorous Austro-Prussian offensive will put her out
of action for several months, and during those months
France would stand alone as the guardian of Western
Europe if there were any backsliding or hesitation in this
country. Germany has the means of striking her blow at

AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE 201
once and at any chosen moment. The only force that can
deliver the counter blow with equal celerity and effect is
the British Fleet. France standing alone at the point of
danger and honour looks to England. Is she to look
in vain ?
The entente cordiale has existed for ten years to give
encouragement, but it is somewhat nebulous. The breath
of suspicion, the element of doubt, threatens from time to
time its existence, and as the formula is not binding the
opinion is not strange that it is regarded as easy of change
and even repudiation. We, in a position of comparative
security, think lightly of contingencies, but France, at the
point of danger, is more concerned with them, and cannot
help being disturbed at seeming indications of levity and
inconstancy. The value of an entente is in the obliga
tions it imposes. If there are no more serious obligations
than waving flags and toasting healths it is a valueless
understanding that must collapse amid derision. If there
are obligations, as there have been for specific occasions,
the entente amounts to an alliance, and its clauses and con
ditions should be made as clear and specific as those
between France and Russia, or between the members of the
Triple Alliance.
Let us return to the consideration of the aggressive forces
in Europe, for it is here that the true reasons will be found
for the closest possible combination between France and
England. If there were no aggressors these two countries
might remain content with the ordinary relations of two
friendly neighbours. An entente would be a needless
exaggeration of words; an alliance directed against no
visible peril would be meaningless. But the facts are too
well ascertained to admit of any doubt that force is still
the controlling element in the world's destiny, and that
those who wield the greater power and know best how to
use it will exercise sway over the rest. Last summer Ger
many was ready and prepared to strike a blow at France.
She held back because she learnt that England was ready
to join against her on sea and land. There was another
reason. Neither Austria nor Italy was inclined to embark
on an offensive adventure. But for days and weeks even
the Germany army was ready to burst over the frontier,

202 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
and when it was baulked of its anticipated prey its mood
became one of savage fury against this country, for it was
we who had stood in its path. That was an instance of the
good accomplished by the entente, and it should be appre
ciated by lovers of peace, for never was Europe nearer
a terrible and devastating war than she was last August.
But, while properly appreciative, it will be well to remem
ber that even the entente might not then have averted war
if there had not been at Vienna an aged ruler whose
feelings it was desired to spare. The time cannot be far
distant when that powerful peace factor will be no longer
available, and in the disappointed and exasperated mood
of the German army it would not be prudent to reckon on
a fresh exhibition of self-restraint.
Admitting the presence of the aggressive forces, which
cannot be seriously disputed, we may take up the considera
tion of the purposes for which they have been created and
the objects they are destined to attain. In Germany it is
admitted that France has risen from her calamities, and
that she possesses a formidable army. Before Germany
can dictate to Europe that army must be accounted for.
Germany realises that it will be a severe struggle, but she
is convinced that with the assumed rapidity and perfection
of her attack coming off she will be the victor before
Russia's co-operation can be made effective. This con
viction is based on the other assumption, that British inter
vention might also be retarded by any of the causes that
sway an ignorant democracy or a party-driven administra
tion, until it also would be more or less inoperative in
preventing the one main object of the war, which is the
smashing of the French army and the acquisition of the
Vosges fortresses. In all this sequence of thought German
optimists assumed that this country might for a certain
number of weeks be held spell-bound while they were
accomplishing their will in Lorraine and Champagne.
Last August they learnt something that made them con
clude that their calculations were faulty. England was not
disposed to look on while the fate of France was being
decided, and the intervention of England means for
Germany the granting of the necessary time to bring
Russian armies west of the Vistula.

AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE 203
The German Government made use of the golden bridge
left at its disposal to retreat by, and since then it has set
itself the task of discovering how it may disarm British
suspicions and ensure British inaction at the next crisis.
We must be clearly understood to mean by this the negotia
tions and intrigues of the German Government, and not
the manifestations of the German people, which is frankly
and brutally hostile and defiant. But the Hohenzollern
policy has always been based on careful prior calculations
since Frederick burst with 60,000 of the best-trained
Infantry in Europe on the unprepared Maria Theresa, and
perpetrated the first of its countless robberies in Silesia.
Its present calculations are to disarm English suspicion,
to bring about Anglo-German discussions and agreements,
and then to spread disappointment, and even resentment,
at our proceedings in France. It is such a simple game,
and the Englishman (as distinct from the Irish and the
Scots, who are neither so credulous nor so forgiving) is
such a bon animal, or rather simpleton, that up to a certain
point he will help forward the game that is intended for
his own discomfiture and ruin.
It is unfortunately true that there is a very considerable
section of the English public who, not alive to the main
drift and object of German policy, are averse to war
with that country, and who learnt with something little
short of dismay last September that we had been within
an ace of it. This sentiment set in motion a project or plan
for promoting a better understanding with Germany, and
this was the more easy because the Emperor William has
always enjoyed the reputation of being better disposed
towards us than the bulk of his subjects. We have to
recognise the existence of an organisation for manufactur
ing friendship between England and Germany, and, of
course, it would follow that if the accord — another entente
— were established Germany might count on a little more
latitude when she next falls foul of France than she was
given last year. The movement is in full swing at the
present moment. England is so free from earth-hunger,
so generous with the possessions of weak Powers which
do not belong to her, that she is even willing to buy a little
peace in this way by resigning herself to the role of spec-

204 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
tator. The idea is like this : The German bear is in a
savage mood ; let us offer him cakes ! The weak point is
that his appetite is insatiable.
It so happens that the contrition of the British Govern
ment at having spoilt one of Germany's best laid coups
promises to subserve the new arrangements to ensure the
triumph of its sequel. Wilfully and of its own accord it is
going out of its way to make Germany believe that we are
all rather sorry for what we did last August, and that we
intend to try not to do it again, and to give a more con
vincing air to our repentance we are offering bribes in
Africa and Asia. It is rather pitiable, and might even do
a great deal of harm, if behind the German Emperor were
not the German people brutally self-confident, devoid of
tact, and clamorously vaunting their mastery over the rest
of Europe. We should be afraid of special visits to Berlin
if there were not the candour of the German Press to show
us exactly what Germany wants and how she means to get
it per fas et nefas.
As the value of a close treaty alliance with France is to
be ascertained by a careful appreciation of the extent and
nature of the danger from Germany to both countries, no
clue to the real character and tendency of German policy
should be ignored. We have on the one hand the extra
ordinary and unexampled development of naval power,
until Germany has attained a fighting strength not so very
far short of that of England's for a first contest, let us
call it, in the North Sea. The comparison of ships is often
made, but the supply of men to work them is generally
ignored, nor does it seem to be realised that Germany
possesses a naval reserve numerically larger than ours, and
that the total personnel of her fleet (active and reserve) is
almost on a level with our own. Germany has, then, the
men to make a bid for the mastery of the seas. She has
also the ship-building capacity necessary for such a
struggle and for sustaining it. She has the two best naval
harbours on the North Sea, where as yet we have none.
But this development of naval power is only a commence
ment. It falls very far short of the full plan that German
aspirants to command the seas have in reserve. Why is it
still in reserve? Because the French army has yet to be

AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE 205
reckoned with. Let that obstacle be removed, let a new
Frankfort treaty impose on France a limited army and
an open frontier, and there will be no hindrance to
Germany's doubling her naval expenditure by the saving
on her army, and increasing its personnel to half a million
men by conscription. This is a real, and not a conjured-up
danger. The Emperor William has sometimes been con
sidered desirous of emulating Frederick the Great. A
comparison with his ancestor Frederick William I., who
prepared the means for his successor's triumphs, would
seem more appropriate.
What is the true moral for us of these contingencies ? It
is that the French army is as much the bulwark of this
country as the British navy is the complement of the
defences of France. So clearly is this fact appreciated in
Germany that there is a new school of politicians who are
urging the Government to propitiate England by a tem
porary suspension of naval activity, and to get ready to
crush France by passing heavier army votes and increas
ing the annual contingent. And it is even believed by
these persons that the British public is so credulous
that it can be hoodwinked into preserving the attitude
of a disinterested spectator of current events until
active intervention might seem both useless and too
dangerous. We may refuse to believe that the desire for peace and
the disinclination to break definitely with Germany — a
people, if not a State, with which England at least has old
ties — will so blind any Government as to induce it to play
second fiddle in a Berlin concerto, and yet we cannot be
surprised if the French people see in " special visits " to the
German capital reason for disappointment and misgiving.
Nobody has yet had cause to say that, whatever their
other shortcomings, British statesmen are unscrupulous;
on the other hand, that character has always belonged to
Prussian diplomatists; our French friends may be par
doned, then, for thinking that in a discussion or an
arrangement between such parties we are likely to get the
worst of it, and that our discomfiture, even if self invited,
must react on the objects and duration of the entente
cordiale. There is only one way out of the difficulty, and

206 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
that is the conversion of the entente into a regular alliance,
and so we return to our starting point.
No one can be so foolish as to wish that, if there is
to be goodwill and cordiality between us and the French,
the entente should not be of the greatest possible use and
value whenever such a crisis as that of last summer again
confronts us. From the practical point of view the best
of undertakings is meaningless if when the crisis arises
nothing is to be done. That was not the interpretation we
placed on the entente cordiale last September. Are we to
believe that the present interpretation is different ? This
apprehension has caused much suspicion and heart-
searching in France, where the old view is again finding
expression that England is only the false friend who
cannot be trusted. If we could only find sufficient evidence
that England is alive to the formidable menace ever grow
ing in dimensions on the other shore of the North Sea,
we would tell France that England cannot be false,
because her own existence and that of France are bound up
together; but we regret that the evidence is not sufficient.
There are nearly as many among us to believe in the good
faith and goodwill of Germany as to realise the facts as
they stand. But trust and confidence do not debar us from
making suitable arrangements. Russia is the ally of
France, but that has not prevented friendly relations
between St. Petersburg and Berlin; an alliance between
England and France would not hinder us in cultivating
the goodwill of the Germans; it would only place the
transaction above board as being subordinate to our
accepted and declared obligations towards our ally. That
would put our conduct beyond suspicion. We could never
be blamed for doing more than anyone else to assure the
preservation of peace; what would be blameworthy would
be to allow a craven desire for peace at any price to inter
fere with the duty we owe our country and our descendants.
At the present moment Europe has before it a set of
menacing and intricate problems. There is the war between
Italy and Turkey, a fruitless and mutually wasting
struggle, and yet one with which it would be hazardous
to intermeddle. Intimately connected with that matter is
the retention of Italy in the Triple Alliance, and scarcely

AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE 207
less important is the point still in doubt as to the gravita
tion of Turkey with an army which at least knows how
to fight as well as any other. But there are still graver
issues, and everyone believes that the year will not pass
without an acute crisis in the Balkans, and if the problem
of the Near East is forced upon us those who are friends
and mean to stand together will have to close their ranks
and turn their serious attention to business free from senti-
mentalism. In the present strained state of European
relations no one doubts that any aggravation of the long
existing tension must occasion a wide explosion in which
all the Powers, great and small, would be involved. It
may be confidently declared that the relations and obliga
tions between England and France furnish a key to the
future. If they are placed on the clear and sure basis of
an alliance Germany will abandon all hope of cajoling us
into a state of passivity while she deals with France single-
handed, and she will at the same time be deprived of the
opportunity of spreading disparaging words through her
agents in France as to the sincerity and constancy of
English friendship. From that point of view also an
Anglo-French treaty would be the best contributory to
peace. An Anglo-French treaty would be necessarily defensive
in character. It would follow the lines of the Franco-
Russian treaty, and of the conventions binding the
members of the Triple Alliance. It would be based on the
principle that France and England have a common interest
in the maintenance of each other's integrity as great Powers
in Europe, and that they pledge themselves to join their
forces on land and sea whenever either of them is attacked.
It cannot be seriously questioned that this is precisely what
they would be compelled to do by the instincts of self-
preservation whenever Germany threw aside her cloak and
claimed the hegemony of Western Europe. But without an
alliance, without the frank and well-considered military
and naval pre-arrangements which are only possible
between allies, that co-operation will be halting, and pro
duce but poor results. If Germany has the intentions which
she scarcely affects to conceal — only the other day in
discussing the project of an Anglo-German alliance an

208 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
important German paper proclaimed its chief merit in the
phrase, " Then Germany could dictate to Europe " — the
alliance provides the only path of safety. If she has no
such intentions, then there is nothing in a purely defensive
alliance to give her umbrage.
But there is another duty upon us, and that is to deal
straight with the nation to whom a community of interest
and peril binds us. Friendship is not a tie to play fast
and loose with. It is weakened by vacillation and insta
bility of conduct. Without an alliance, which means a
clear and definite undertaking that both sides can under
stand and which would not be deviated from, the door is
left open to admit doubt, misconception, and in the end
alienation. The French are a loyal people, and have a right
to receive loyalty in return. By temperament they are
higher strung than we are, and consequently more sus
ceptible to the influences of doubt and misgiving. They
have a right to know exactly how they stand with us, and
how we stand towards them. The entente cordiale has
been a very good introductory stage; the time has come to
convert it into a more definite agreement, and the country
that concluded an alliance with Japan for the Far East
can scarcely plead so strong a repugnance for alliances of
any kind that it will not make one with France in the West.
Let us enlarge our horizon for a few concluding remarks.
There is another Power to be brought, at some future date,
within the fold of those States which do not wish "to
dictate " to anyone, which do not vaunt of " their shining
armour," and which are really only desirous of preserving
all they deem valuable and dear. This is the United States
of America. We cannot doubt that both for France and
England Americans have a very special regard, we cannot
doubt that they have rejoiced at seeing the old rivals
laying aside the rancour of centuries and joining in friend
ship and mutual support. The closer that bond is drawn
the more gratifying will be the sight to the American
nation which knows as well as we do that neither France
nor England will ever challenge the Monroe doctrine. The
moment has not yet come for the United States to conclude
alliances. They have an enviable security which we cannot
claim, but the time is sure to come when the American

AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE 209
people will feel that their security and their power are not
to be devoted to purely selfish ends, and that they have a
duty to perform for the progress of the world in helping
those who wish to uphold free communities, and to repel
the aggressions of a military dictatorship which aims at
their overthrow. We are not so optimistic as to believe that
America would join an Anglo-French alliance within any
period that could now be safely fixed, but we are confident
that it would have her sympathy and moral support. The
day is also certain to arrive when, confronted with the new
problems raised by the opening of the Panama Canal, the
United States Government will find itself compelled to
give as much consideration to external questions as we of
the Old World have long had to do, and then it will not
be ungratifying to it to discover that in adjusting them
America may regard France and England as one, and
assume that she has friends in both.

14

THE NEW SPIRIT IN BELGIUM*
The European crisis of last summer has roused a new spirit
in Belgium, and stirred the sentiment of patriotism in the
heart of every Belgian citizen. It was a crisis in which our
interests and feelings were also concerned, but at least we
were not conscious of the profound despair due to helpless
ness and military weakness that fell upon the Belgian
people last September. For days, for weeks even, the
inhabitants of the provinces south of the Meuse lived in
constant dread that the morrow would see the German host
traversing their territory, without their Government being
able to lift a finger for their protection. There were some
Belgian authorities at the time who reposed faith in the
alleged impregnability of the Liege forts, but the revela
tions subsequently made as to their unpreparedness, the
inadequacy of the garrison, the deficiency of the munitions,
and the limitations of the forts themselves, have shown
that there was no basis for this faith, and that they would
have succumbed to a prompt and vigorous attack.
The emotion roused in Belgium by the appreciation of the
true position last September has been intensified by the dis
covery that the country was not merely not ready to defend
its neutrality, but that the unreadiness was largely due to
the improvidence of the Government. Admissions have
been made in the Belgian Chamber of a startling character
as to the deficiencies in the stores of ammunition at
Antwerp, and it would not be difficult to show that the
condition of things at Liege — the frontier fortress exposed
to immediate attack on invasion — was far worse. In face
of the opinions expressed by several leading politicians
and generals in Belgium, which I shall quote from further
on, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that if war had
* Fortnightly Review, June, 1912.
2IO

THE NEW SPIRIT IN BELGIUM 211
then taken place Belgium would have cut a miserable
figure, humiliating to herself and distressing to her well-
wishers. Under any circumstances it is not the part of a
genuine friend to hide the truth, when essential to speak,
under the guise of flattery, but in the present instance there
is the less need to do so because the Belgians themselves
are alive to it. They are so much alive to it that they are
seeking in every way to provide the remedy for past and
present shortcomings, and thus to get ready in good time
to show a better front to the invader when he next assembles
his forces along their frontier.
The points that suggest themselves for our consideration
are in the first place the evidence that Belgian opinion is
aroused on the subject of the preservation of the neutrality
of their country and the maintenance of its integrity and
independence which are wrapped up in that principle.
Better evidence could not be desired than the last debate
in the Chamber, followed up as it was by an inquiry as to
" Whether Belgium can defend her neutrality ?" instituted
by Le Journal, of Paris, to which Messieurs Paul Hymans,
Vandervelde, and Monville contributed. Having furnished
that evidence we will proceed to consider Belgium's
military position by the light of her existing army and
natural or artificial means of defence. Finally, we will
discuss Belgium's chances of realising the programme
sketched by the above-named leaders of the Opposition,
who are confident that they will be the responsible Govern
ment after the General Election which will take place
within a few days, and then we will offer some observa
tions on the need of our supplementing Belgium's national
efforts to repel a danger which we confess seems to
us far more formidable than it does even to Belgian
alarmists. There is one preliminary point to be established before
quoting the opinions to which reference has been made.
The men who express them are not merely the leaders of
what is now called the United Liberal party, but they are
the exponents of the doubts and fears that are passing
through the minds of the French-speaking half of the
Belgian nation. The existing Government is only suspected
of an unpatriotic or philosophical leaning towards Ger-

212 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
many, as the reputedly stronger neighbour, but it has been
convicted of an attempt to exalt the Flemish language at
the expense of French which has produced an agitation of
indignant protest throughout Walloon Belgium. The
intensity of the attack by the Liberal leaders on the
Catholic Government which they oppose must be attributed,
to some extent at least, to the stormy passions aroused by
the Flemish propaganda; but with every allowance made
for the bitterness of party strife, the impression left by
the inquiry of the Journal is that Belgium was not ready
to do her part last year during the critical period.
First among the contributors to the Paris paper may be
placed M. Paul Hymans, the leader of the Liberal Opposi
tion, and the Premier-designate of the future. He expresses
himself with an obvious sense of responsibility : —
" The recent debate on the neutrality and security of Belgium in the
Chamber originated in the alarm of last summer. The question which we
brought before Parliament was whether Belgium, at the critical moment,
was in » position to defend herself. That debate took place in public.
You know that we contended that at that moment we were not ready,
and I consider that this was proved in the course of the debate.
" The approach of danger provoked an intense revival of national
feeling. In a country which has now enjoyed uninterrupted peace for
three-quarters of a century, patriotic vigilance tends to become relaxed.
But the impression of an imminent danger stirred the country to its
core. At no time have the Belgians taken deeper interest in the Euro
pean situation than they do to-day. The Belgians are not, in the sense
given elsewhere to the term, ' a military people.' But they wish to live
their own life, and intend resolutely to remain independent. They will
defend themselves.
" I think myself that, while awaiting a fundamental reorganisation
of our military institutions, our present resources and means of defence
suffice for the maintenance of our independence, and for the fulfilment
of our duties to ourselves as well as to the Powers.
" Belgium is neutral, and she is so by the will of the Powers. It is
her duty to compel respect for her neutrality, and she will not fail in it.
She has also the right to ask the Powers who guaranteed her neutrality
not only to respect it, but to assist her in causing it to be respected.
I refuse to believe that this right and these treaties have ceased to
count in the eyes of the great nations of Europe."
The second opinion is that of M. Monville, one of the
ablest debaters in the Brussels Chamber and a lawyer of
established reputation. M. Monville speaks with even more
emphasis than his colleague on the lapses of the Govern
ment, and he shows that he has a very clear idea of the

THE NEW SPIRIT IN BELGIUM 213
true significance of the guarantee of Belgian neutrality by
the signatory Powers. He said : —
" The question of national defence, which was recently the subject of
debate in the Chamber, has caused great emotion in the country. It has
aroused the national sentiment. Undoubtedly Belgians are inclined to
peace, but they also wish to preserve their independence. I have
received many hundreds of letters — some written by persons scarcely
able to pen their names — all agreeing in the sentiment, ' We are, and
wish to remain, Belgians.' Believe me, when the Belgian people has to
fight for its existence it will not count money, men, or any sacrifice
whatever, nor will heroism be wanting. Citizens and workmen alike
will only think of defending their country. What Belgium has to do
is to defend her neutrality. The guarantee given by the Powers to
that neutrality does not reduce us to a state of impotence. On the con
trary, it obliges us to be vigilant and active, for it implies that we are
to make ourselves respected. Allow me to say, as a lawyer, that the
guarantee is essentially subsidiary. It is a support of the effort made
by the principal party concerned in self-defence. Neither the improvi
dent nor the pusillanimous will be defended by anyone ; they will simply
be placed under somebody else's tutelage. We have known in our
history what it was to be under the tutelage of foreigners, and the
painful recollection survives. That remembrance explains the profound
grief and resentment with which the nation realises that the country
was not prepared to defend its integrity during the critical months of
July, August, and September last year."
But of all the opinions recorded the most interesting is
that of M. Vandervelde, the leader of the Socialist party,
which is ostensibly opposed to wars of all kinds. His
opinion should be almost as much of an eye-opener for the
Socialists of this country as Herr Bebel's declaration last
year that if there were war the German Socialists would
fight for their country just like other Germans. M.
Vandervelde, speaking for the Belgian Socialists, adopts
the same strain, and declares on their behalf that they
" will fight like the others." The sense of imminent peril
must be very great, however, to induce him to use language
so strongly at variance with his ordinary practice : —
" What would the Belgian Socialists do in the event of war? The
answer is simple. When Belgium is attacked we will defend her. We
will fight like the others, and perhaps even more ardently, in the first
place to shield our families from the horrors of invasion, and in the next
place because, if any Government in Europe committed the crime of
letting loose the dogs of war, we Socialists would have a vital interest
in doing what we could to ensure its defeat.
"As a matter of fact, that defeat — remember the consequences of
Sedan — would facilitate the revolution which would be sure to break

214 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
out on the first reverse within the territory of the aggressor. We do not
wish any Power to assume a right to turn our soil into a battlefield.
Against such a. despoiler, whoever it may be, we intend to employ
resolutely all our strength.
" Let us clearly understand what we are talking about. I do not
think that war is inevitable, like a natural phenomenon such as the
equinoctial gales, or an eclipse of the moon. But still, for some months
past the peril has been real. We have been within an ace of a catastro
phe, and a similar situation may again arise. The politicians of
Belgium may reasonably differ among themselves as to the means to be
employed, but they must agree in declaring from the national, as well
as the international standpoint, that we will do everything humanly
possible to prevent the catastrophe.
" If the Socialists were in power the problem would confront them
as it does the Catholics and Liberals. We should organise our defences,
and make ready to fight for the express purpose of not being compelled
to fight. We should regard the War budget, which I would like to call
the budget of national defence, as a premium for the maintenance of
peace. For it is clear that the more we are in a position to make his"
criminal attack costly to the aggressor the more will he hesitate to
perpetrate it. . . .
" There is one point I must make clear. The Socialists will never
consent to an increase of the military contingent unless it carries with
it a proportional reduction in the period of service by way of compensa
tion." These opinions, seeing whose they are, can leave no
doubt in anyone's mind that Belgians are unanimous in the
desire to uphold the independence of their country and to
fulfil their duties upon the guarantee which established its
neutrality. Their intentions, then, are good and clear ; let
us see what are the means available to carry them into
effect, and this is the more necessary because the Belgian
ideal is to keep all combatants off her soil and to prevent
Belgium becoming once more the battleground of the
nations. The subject of army reform is not new in Belgium. It
may be said to have been more or less under discussion
ever since the Franco-German War of forty-two years ago,
but until the year 1909 nothing had been done to improve
matters. At the end of that year a new military law was
passed in the teeth of much opposition abolishing the privi
lege of pre-emption, that is to say, the right of paying for
a substitute, which was the root cause of the failure of the
French army in 1870. But even this reform had to be
purchased at a price, and a fresh concession was made to
anti-military prejudices by a decree that "only one son

IHE NEW SPIRIT IN BELGIUM 215
would be required from each family." There were also
some special exemptions from the application of the new
law of military conscription. Only two years have passed,
and it is already admitted that the results do not answer
expectations, and that the existing Belgian army is unequal
to its task. The " fine little army " that was to have arisen
Phcenix-like from the ashes of the old is no more than the
armie boiteuse of the Belgian artillery officer who has
recently written some remarkable things on the subject in
the Brussels Soir. There has, indeed, been a marked social
reform. The private may, like his French comrade, appear
in his uniform in the salon or the restaurant without attract
ing attention, but a Belgian army fit to undergo a rude
ordeal in the field has still to be created.
Even in numbers the result has proved disappointing.
The new law was expected to produce on mobilisation " a
total of 188,000 men, all young." The most sanguine esti
mate now is that the total might reach 170,000 men, but
only by including all classes up to the age of thirty-five.
With the present peace strength of 43,000 men, infantry
battalions muster no more than 400 or 450 men apiece, and
the two regiments (five battalions) at Liege, with one
battalion at Verviers, do not total over 2,000 men for the
garrisoning of twelve forts. In face of these facts the
confidence reposed by some of her politicians in Belgium's
capacity to defend herself seems to rest on an insecure
foundation. I have cited the opinions of the politicians in Belgium ;
let me give now the opinion of a Belgian General.
Lieutenant-General Ducarne (Lieutenant-General, be it
observed, is the highest grade in the Belgian army, the
King being the only General) is well known among his
fellow-countrymen as one of the ablest and most energetic
military officers they possess. Allow me, as one who has
seen them at their work for many years past, to pay a
respectful tribute to the devotion, single-mindedness, and
true patriotism of the corps of Belgian officers. They alone
have kept the lamp of devotion to their country burning
under every discouragement, despite the criminal indiffer
ence of politicians, and even in the despairing moments
when they, above all men, knew that behind them they had

216 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
no real army at all. If Belgium is saved in the end she
will owe her safety primarily to Chazal and Brialmont,
and their successors who have not swerved from the path
they pointed out. General Ducarne is one of them. Let
us note carefully what he says : —
" The invader of our soil, whether coming from the East or the South,
will seek to turn the flank of his opponent by passing through Belgium.
In all probability this passage will take place across Condroz, the
Ardenne, and Southern Luxembourg, but quite possibly the enemy
will also dispatch more or less considerable bodies of troops either
towards Dutch Limburg or towards Maubeuge. These will be second
line troo-ps. The idea of this latter movement would be to secure the
right flank of the army operating south of the Meuse, and to threaten
our communications with Antwerp.
" Under these circumstances, what would be Belgium's duty?
" According to some the remedy should be found in stationing the
whole of our field army in the centre of the country. I will not dwell
on this proposal, which I consider an infraction of our duty to Europe,
and also an affront to the dignity of the Belgian name and the honour
of our army. Belgium would be the laughing-stock of the world and
of history if, in face of invasion, its army were to stand with arms at
ease. To those who hold such a view I reply : ' It is not with arms
at ease, but with levelled arms that it must receive the enemy.' In the
event of a fresh conflict breaking out our territory would not be
respected, provided it were considered that we could not on our
resources make it respected. In that sentence Belgium's true policy
stands revealed. Indeed, it could not be otherwise. It certainly could
not be found, as was lately suggested, in such a false conception as that
Belgium, herself violating her own neutrality, should deliberately make
common cause with the belligerent which she thought the stronger, and
thus, as it were, make herself safe. Safety will never be found except in
our own efforts, in our own attitude.
" In view of the present European situation it is high time that we
should take full stock of it, and that we should loyally carry out what
we must do to secure the future of our country."
These considerations have led even the authors of the
last Army Bill to come round to the view that something
more is required than that measure to meet the exigencies
of the times, but their proposals fall very far short of the
conversion of Belgium into the " armed nation " which will
alone ensure her salvation. They propose, in the first place,
an increase of the peace establishment by the creation of
two new infantry regiments, to be numbered the 1 5th and
16th. This would mean an addition of six battalions, or
2,700 men, to the permanent strength of the infantry
without mobilisation. If the two regiments were
quartered at Liege, where barracks would have to be

THE NEW SPIRIT IN BELGIUM 217
•
constructed, the step would be doubly stimulating and
suggestive. For the information of the general reader it may be
mentioned that the infantry of the Belgian army is com
posed of one regiment of Grenadiers, one regiment of
Carabiniers, three regiments of Foot Chasseurs, and four
teen regiments of the line known by their numbers. All
these regiments, excepting the Carabiniers, have three
active and two reserve battalions each. The Carabiniers
have four active and three reserve battalions. There are
consequently nineteen foot regiments, with fifty-eight
active battalions, and thirty-nine reserve battalions. The
Grenadiers and Carabiniers are quartered in Brussels, the
1 2th and 14th line regiments are at Liege, and the 10th
regiment at Arlon. A garrison at Arlon is no longer needed
or even justifiable. It may be noted that the recent with
drawal of one battalion of the 10th to Namur is evidence
in its way of the appreciation of this fact in Belgium.
But the mere addition of 2,700 infantry on a peace
footing, or 8,000 on a war footing, is recognised as only
a stop-gap, more useful as an expansion of the existing
machinery for rapid and productive mobilisation than as
an increase of numbers. Something more is admitted to
be necessary, and the latest proposal is to drop the privi
lege of limiting the levy to one son per family, and to
substitute for it what is to be known as " general obligatory
service." By this system it is represented that an army of
300,000 men, all young, can be created by the year 191 7.
To accomplish this result the annual contingent would
have to be raised to 40,000 men, and no time is to be wasted
if the result is to be attained by the date named.
But the Socialists have declared — M. Vandervelde
repeated the ultimatum in his speech— that they will
allow of no increase of the contingent without a pro
portionate decrease in the period of service. The present
period of training for infantry is fifteen months with the
colours. I believe M. Vandervelde's idea is that it should
be reduced to nine months, and that then he would not
mind seeing the whole nation pass through the ranks. His
views are embodied in the phrase that " the armed nation
represents the transition stage to that of general disarma-

218 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
ment." For the moment his conception of the most suitable
army reorganisation for his country is the adoption of the
Swiss system, and there is no doubt that this would be the
one least likely to clash with the home life and civic
traditions of the Flemish and Walloon provinces. A
citizen army without the barrack would appeal very
strongly to Belgian opinion, and it is probably the only
system under which the country could produce half a
million willing soldiers.
The proposal, however, does not commend itself to mili
tary authorities of the old school, and the Belgian Premier,
giving expression to their views, declared that " this
national militia with its four or five hundred thousand men,
would be a crowd predestined to slaughter." But M.
Vandervelde was not to be thus silenced, and he aptly
quoted in rejoinder the opinion of the Belgian artillery
officer I have already referred to who had written : —
" Although I do not hold that the Swiss army should be our model,
I would a thousand times rather have an army of four or five corps
organised on the Swiss system than our present limping army."
It is still doubtful what course will be taken, and
whether the advocates of " general obligatory service," or
those of a national militia on the Swiss model, will prevail.
But it is now safe to assume that no drastic change, such
as the latter step would imply, will be attempted on the
eve of a General Election which will decide the fate of
the existing Government. Excepting, then, for the possible
increase of the infantry force by two new regiments, the
Belgian army must be considered for the coming summer
to have no greater numerical strength than it possessed
last. This, we are told on the best authority, will produce
170,000 men on mobilisation of all classes, and will be
composed of men up to the age of thirty-five. It may be
assumed that the ammunition and munitions of war will
on the next occasion be forthcoming in adequate quantities,
and that it will not be possible for a critic in the Chamber
to say of 1912, as he said of 191 1, that the rounds of
ammunition for the infantry at Antwerp were only one-
twelfth of their proper number. But apart from this im
provement, and with the admission that Belgium is now

IHE NEW SPIRIT IN BELGIUM 219
alive to a peril her public men and officials long pretended
to deride, the Belgian army during the coming half-year
will be in no better case to resist invasion than it was last
year. But it may be said, and it certainly will be said in
Belgium, where the public memory is very sensitive about
the millions expended upon them, that we are leaving out
of account her "impregnable" fortresses. We are doing
nothing of the kind, and it is only because Belgium has
created a few fortified positions that we think she has any
chance at all of defending herself. But these positions,
owing to their extended circumferences, and, it must be
added, their inherent natural weaknesses, require in the
cases of Liege and Namur, not an ordinary garrison, but
an army for their defence. The modest garrisons provided
for in the official plans would be incapable of holding the
positions named for any length of time. If adequate
forces are placed there and in Antwerp, then the whole
Belgian army as it exists would be employed, and no field
force would be left. The question of time is the vital point.
At Antwerp there would probably be a sufficient interval
between invasion and the moment of peril for all defects
to be made good. At Namur even a few days' respite might
be counted on, but at Liege the alarm and the blow will
be almost simultaneous. It is Belgium's first duty to be
always on guard at that point. If she can hold the eastern
forts of that position for ten days she will have done her
duty to herself and her friends. In 191 1 she would not
have held them for ten hours.
Let us dwell for a moment on one or two matters closely
connected with the security of Belgium. In the first place,
it is a country totally destitute of natural defences. The
forests of the Ardenne, regarded in ancient times as the
sure shelter of Belgic independence, are now cultivated
fields, and traversed in all directions by the best roads to
be found in the country. The Meuse, which engirdles the
more populous provinces, is crossed by many bridges, and
is bridgable at most points. In the province of Luxemburg,
and in the southern parts of the provinces of Namur and
Liege there is not a single garrison except the detached,
isolated, and useless regiment at Arlon. These are elements

220 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
of weakness which no project of army reorganisation ever
proposed in Belgium would have removed. They can only
be removed by that comprehensive national levy on the
Swiss or another system which would produce a minimum
trained force of half a million men. Without men in suffi
cient numbers — a mere handful is useless — the cupola forts
of Fleron, Chaudfontaine, and Embourg are valueless;
and the following wise words of a Belgian officer ought to
be taken to heart by his countrymen : " Let us only remem
ber that fortresses are not everything ; a nation trusting to
them is on the high road to decay."
We have now to consider Belgium's chances of realising
the results anticipated by the three Liberal leaders ; perhaps
M. Monville should be excluded, as he does not commit
himself to any optimistic opinion. Both M. Hymans and
M. Vandervelde seem to hold the view that even with the
existing means of defence, properly utilised, Belgium
could defend the integrity of her territory. It will make
the position of the present writer perfectly clear if he, who
first called prominent attention to the defence of Belgium
in these pages nearly twelve years ago, states that he does
not share this opinion, and that he believes the utmost
Belgium could do on her own unaided resources, and that
only on the assumption that she places 50,000 men in the
place to hold " the intervals," is to defend the Liege posi
tion for a fortnight. We are talking, be it remembered, of
the actual state of things, and not of the time when
Belgium may have four or five army corps raised on the
Swiss or some other system ; but the creation of a new army
is necessarily a work of time, and events will not wait on
the convenience of anyone.
However uncomplimentary it may appear, then, we must
not conceal our opinion that Belgiurn has not the means of
realising her ideal programme of making such a good show
in face of any new menace of invasion that the aggressor
will be afraid to attack her. There is no military authority
in either Germany, France, or England who, having
studied the matter, holds that view. On the contrary, they
are all agreed that for the first campaign Belgian resistance
without external co-operation will count for nothing and
can be ignored. It would be instructive to have the opinion

THE NEW SPIRIT IN BELGIUM 221
of some qualified Belgian soldier like General Ducarne
or General Heinsberger who would tell his fellow-country
men exactly what he thought without flattery or qualifica
tion. We imagine his opinion would not be very different.
This is obviously not a position in which a nation of seven
and a half millions should allow itself to be placed.
Opinions have been quoted to show that many public
men in Belgium have a very just appreciation of her peril
and her duty. They are agreed that for her own existence'
sake she must discharge her duty. But where they are
weak, or rather where they allow moral indignation to take
the place of reason, is in assuming the means of adequate
self-defence to be available when the evident truth is the
opposite. It will be idle to pass patriotic resolutions in
the Brussels Chamber when the German commander is
ordering the Liege citizens to keep quiet in their houses
from his camp on the site of what were the forts of
Embourg and Chaudfontaine.
What the Belgian authorities have to do is to compare
means and ends, and to base sound calculations upon them
in anticipation of an easily ascertainable variety of con
tingencies. Among them are some that would render the
prompt request for external aid imperative. Yet it may be
feared that Belgians generally are thinking too much of
the ideal of keeping all foreigners off their native soil so
that it may not again become a general battleground, and
too little of the practical remedy which is the admission at
the earliest possible moment of her resolute defenders. It
is the more curious to find this backwardness for, even in
her brief modern history, Belgium had one experience of
the evils of procrastination. Her refusal to admit the
French army in July, 1831, entailed the disastrous cam
paign in August of that year, which threatened her with
extinction and blighted some of her fondest hopes. We
would ask the Belgian people to face boldly the plain and
obvious truth that in the hour of peril they cannot stand
alone. They will require the support of others, and in
their own interests they should consider how that support
could be turned to the best account. Again, we wish to
make it clear that we are speaking of Belgium as it exists,
and as it will be for the next few years. When it has

222 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
become a real " armed nation " external support will be
less vital for it, and perhaps this consideration may weigh
with the Belgians to favour the adoption of the measure.
General Ducarne very rightly repels with scorn the sug
gestion that Belgium should attach herself to the neigh
bour which seemed to her to be the stronger. It would
be not only an unworthy but a perilous course, as the
Belgian estimate of strength might prove fallacious. Her
course should be guided by the sense of her own duty,
and by a reasonable conviction as to which group of
Powers would most desire to see her independence and
autonomy surviving the struggle. As Belgium is "the
creation of England and France acting together," to use
the words of Louis Philippe, she has no right to suspect
that they would wish to undo their own handiwork if she
only showed the loyalty that she displayed in 1870 to the
Charter of her existence. The new spirit that is abroad in
Belgium encourages us to believe that this will be the case.
We may doubt the possession of the means, but we cannot
close our eyes to the fact that the whole Belgian nation is
stirred at the present time by a profound sentiment of
patriotic ardour, which only needs to be diverted into the
proper channels to make it a stubborn and formidable
adversary with whom the most powerful aggressor would
in the end have seriously to count.

A FURTHER OBJECT-LESSON IN
GERMAN PLANS*
In February, 1910, I was allowed to place before your
readers an object-lesson in German plans. I am now pre
senting them with a further object-lesson based on the
development of the scheme sketched in the former article,
and showing the systematic way in which Germany is
preparing for the next great war in Western Europe.
For anyone who has seen the feats of railway construc
tion by the German Army Railway Department within the
last few years in the region stretching west of the Rhine,
north of Mayence, towards France, Luxemburg, and
Belgium, it is impossible not to pay a tribute of admiration
to the thoroughness of German plans, and to the foresight
that has guided them. If we contrast them with our own
haphazard and halting action in all military, and now
even in naval affairs, we see the proofs of the rising Empire
and the evidence of the decaying one. We see, on one
hand, national strength and wealth concentrated under a
single and central authority on the accomplishment of the
preliminaries to an immense triumph, which shall place
Western Europe in a state of thraldom to Germany; and
on the other, national strength and wealth frittered away
and wasted by a system of Party Government which is
absolutely hostile to all military preparations of any kind
whatever. Attention to the smallest detail in readiness
for war is the motto at Berlin. Neglect of the Army in
great things as well as small is the practice in London.
The German War Department pursues its course in silence.
Here peace-at-any-price is shouted from the house-tops as
a reason for cutting down military and naval expenditure.
* Fortnightly Review, February, 1914.
223

224 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
The awakening will come sooner or later, and the longer
it is put off the more terrible it will be.
In 1909 the Germans had just doubled the single-railed
line from Aix to St. Vith, equipping each station en route
with numerous sidings for detraining and entraining
troops, and they had also commenced their part of the
light railway destined to connect the border towns of
Malmedy and Stavelot. This railway, at last completed
on Belgian as well as German territory, was opened for
traffic the other day. This short line, of some five and
a half miles in length, has attracted a good deal of atten
tion, but not more than it deserves, for it unites the
German and Belgian railway systems at a point where
Belgium is quite undefended. But it may be said that this
is only a light railway, and therefore it is right to add
that its gauge is uniform with that of the main-line systems
it connects. It is quite true that the part of the connecting
link between Malmedy and Weismes — the junction for
Malmedy on the Aix-St. Vith main line — has been left
unimproved, and that owing to its bad alignment and poor
permanent way, it seemed to detract greatly from the
value of the railway of which it formed an essential part.
But its evidently intentional neglect ought to have aroused
a suspicion that the Germans had some different plan in
view, and this has now been revealed. Orders have been
issued to construct with all possible speed a new line con
necting Malmedy with Weywertz — the station immediately
north of Weismes. This line will pass by Chodes, and
along a level that will obviate any necessity for a tunnel.
In the first place, it is to be used exclusively for military
purposes, and more especially to facilitate the quartering
of a cavalry regiment in Malmedy. It is indicative of
German ways to note that the line is to be finished within
twelve months.
The entirely innocent and unimportant Stavelot-:
Malmedy line, which we were assured in the first place
was built out of regard for local requirements, is thus
proved on the morrow of its completion to be a link of
great importance in the railway chain between the Rhine
and the interior of Belgium. Its full significance, however,
will only be appreciated by those who take the following

AN OBJECT-LESSON IN GERMAN PLANS 225
fresh facts into consideration and realise from them that
the Malmedy line, far from being a separate and isolated
enterprise, is an essential part of a general scheme, which
embraces the whole of the Eifel region.
Weywertz has just been mentioned. In 1909 the exten
sive clearings then being made at this point for platforms
and sidings were spoken of as those of Butgenbach, and
no one among even the well-informed had the smallest
conception why this roadside halt had been chosen for
such an important and extensive development. It was not
until 1912 that the well-kept secret leaked out. Behind
this point, which then changed its name to Weywertz
Junction, a new double-railed line had been constructed
to the station of Junkerath on the main line from Cologne
to Treves. The railway itself, constructed without regard
to expense, across a region that rarely falls below an
altitude of 1,800 feet, is an achievement that would have
made the reputation of any civilian engineer or contractor.
It has been built without any weak point, from the military
point of view, in tunnel or viaduct. At each of the stations
along the route extensive sidings have been laid out, not
for goods trains, as there is neither population nor com
merce, but for the trains that would convey as rapidly as
possible and without a hitch the army corps drawn from
the interior of Germany destined in the first place to
invade Belgium. At Weywertz will converge the trains
coming from Aix by the western of the two parallel
railways, and from Cologne and Bonn by the .eastern of
them. This is the fact which makes the Malmedy line of
such great importance, and the new connection of that
little town with Weywertz by a direct line necessarily
enhances it. A comparatively trifling detail in the con
struction of the Weywertz-Junkerath line shows how
thoroughly the Germans had thought out every detail
beforehand. Between Stadtkyll and Junkerath a special
connection is made with the main line near Dahlem, north
of Junkerath, so that trains may proceed without delay
on the way from Cologne to Weywertz. This connecting
link is concealed as far as possible and reserved for
military trains.
The Weywertz-Junkerath line furnishes the real clue to
15

226 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
the importance of the new Malmedy-Stavelot line, and
already the German papers are talking of through trains
from Junkerath, not merely to Stavelot, but to Trois Ponts,
the station south of it on the Belgian line to the Grand
Duchy, and the junction for the line serving the Ambleve
to Rivage on the Ourthe Valley line from Liege to Marloie.
The presumably innocent Malmedy-Stavelot line is thus
seen to be a vital completing link on a railway which
stretches from Cologne vid Euskirchen across the Northern
Eifel to Weywertz on the Aix line, and thence to Trois
Ponts, the key, strategically speaking, to the Eastern
Ardennes. But the incredulous will say : " It is only a
light railway." The official authorisation states that trains
on the Malmedy-Stavelot line may travel at the rate of
forty miles an hour, although for the first three months
of working the speed is not to exceed twenty-five miles an
hour. In Belgium the maximum speed allowed on a light
railway is sixteen miles an hour. The conclusion is obvious.
The Malmedy-Stavelot line is not a light railway, but a
section of a new main-line system which has just come into
existence. Before dealing with the purely military side of
this question, let us complete our survey of the new German
railways. The Weywertz-Junkerath line is the striking achievement
in the northern part of the Eifel, but it does not stand
alone. Just as it is necessary to go behind Weywertz to
understand the full importance of the Malmedy extension,
so must we go behind Junkerath to find out the full
development and significance of German plans. The
reader will remember that the new theory of the offensive
which is to immediately follow, or even to precede, the
declaration of war is that the troops so employed will be
launched by train from the interior of the German Empire
to the frontier of the State to be invaded. It is therefore
clear that the main consideration will be to direct trains
from different parts of the country to the objective points.
A little consideration will show that the weak bit in the
German plan of concentration in the region of which we
are especially speaking has been that all the trains must
pass through Cologne. The corps for Aix-la-Chapelle
itself, for Weywertz, &c, vid Aix, for Weywertz vid

AN OBJECT-LESSON IN GERMAN PLANS 227
Stadtkyll, all have to pass through Cologne. This defect
has already been largely diminished, and will shortly be
removed altogether.
Between Bonn and Coblentz two single-railed lines have
branched off from the Rhine left-bank main line into the
Eifel. One was the line from Remagen to Adenau, and
the other that from Andernach to Mayen, Daun, and Pelm.
Before the Weywertz-Junkerath line was finished, work on
these railways was taken in hand. The Adenau line was
doubled as far as Dumpelfeld, and a new line was con
structed from that place to Ahrdorf and Hillesheim. At
Hillesheim one branch goes north to join the main Cologne-
Treves line at Lissendorf, the station immediately south
of Junkerath, while the other turns south to join the same
line at Pelm. Besides this, a new double-railed .line has
been laid from Ahrdorf, already mentioned on the
Dumpelfeld-Hillesheim line, to Blankenheimerdorf (the
third station north of Junkerath). From Remagen, there
fore, troops can now be sent by two routes to Junkerath,
thus relieving the strain on Cologne. Less is known at
present of the actual work accomplished on the Andernach
line, but it has been doubled to as far as Mayen. As the
remainder of this line to Daun and Gerolstein is exceed
ingly tortuous, it is probable that Mayen will be linked
up by a new railway with Adenau or Ahrdorf. Thus all
these secondary lateral communications will be brought
westwards so as to converge on that section of the Cologne-
Treves line which lies between Blankenheimerdorf on the
north and Pelm on the south, with Junkerath as the central
point. Before proceeding to describe the last of the new
strategic railways, which is further south, the question of
the improved facilities for crossing the Rhine claims atten
tion. Formerly the Rhine was regarded as Germany's chief
defence against France, and therefore it was left un-
bridged as far as possible. From Mayence to Cologne
there were only the railway bridge at Horchheim, the
bridge of boats at Coblentz, and the bridge at Bonn. The
old fear of French invasion is dead ; in its place has arisen
the intense desire to remove all obstacles to the prompt
invasion of France whenever war is declared. The Rhine

228 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
itself is, from this point of view, the most formidable of
obstacles ; therefore, it is to be bridged at numerous points,
and at three of them the work is far advanced towards
completion. The bridge of boats at Coblentz is to be super
seded by a permanent bridge connecting Ehrenbreitstein
with that town. Neuwied is to be connected with Weissen-
thurm, and this will give direct access from the right bank
to the Mayen line. But the most important and consider
able of all the new bridges will be that connecting
Rudesheim and Bingen. This is being constructed at very
great cost, and in the face of immense difficulties, with
the special object of giving direct communication between
the interior of Germany and the several railways in the
Nahe and collateral valleys. This bridge will be one for
a double-railed line and for vehicular and foot traffic
as well.
The importance of this bridge is that it will give direct
communication from the main lines on the right bank
(north of Wiesbaden, Mayence, and Frankfort) to the
Nahe Valley, which is the main road, as it were, to the
chief German points of concentration, on the outbreak of
war with France, viz., Saarbriick and Saargemund. To
emphasise this point, it may be mentioned that the rails
crossing the Rudesheim bridge will not connect with the
left bank main line, but will join those leading direct to
Kreuznach. Kreuznach is the present junction for two lines
leading in a south-westerly direction, one by the Nahe
Valley direct to Saarbriick, and the other to Deux Ponts
and Saargemund. These systems are in existence. The
new strategy points to an improvement of communications
with Treves by the left bank of the Moselle or across
Hunsriick from Simmern; for Treves, and its dependent
camp of Schonfelderhof, are the concentration points
against the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, just as
Weywertz-Malmedy are against Belgium and Saarbriick-
Saargemund against Lorraine.
To complete the picture, a few words must be said about
what is contemplated south of St. Vith, the present
terminus of the double-railed portion of the line from Aix.
St. Vith, in the strict sense of the term, is not a terminus.
It is, in the first place, the ending of the double-railed line

AN OBJECT-LESSON IN GERMAN PLANS 229
from Aix by Weywertz and Weismes; but, in the second
place, it is the junction of two single-rail lines of very
considerable and growing importance. One is the line to
Trois Vierges in the Grand Duchy vid Burg Reuland ; the
other is the line by Pronsveld and Priim to Gerolstein on
the Cologne-Treves line. At Pronsveld there is a branch
terminating at Waxweiler. This branch is to be connected
shortly with Kyllburg on the Treves line, already men
tioned, but the latest German plan is to connect St. Vith
with Treves by a direct line flanking the frontier of the
Grand Duchy at Vianden and Echternach, just as the
northern section flanks that of Belgium from Dolhain and
the Baraque de Michel to Gouvy. Extensive alterations at
St. Vith already indicate clearly enough what will be the
next stage of German railway development. The Grand
Duchy, like the Belgian Ardennes, is to be used as a step
ping-stone to the French frontier.
No one who takes the trouble to consider the facts that
have been set forth by the aid of a large-scale map, will
fail to see that the Malmedy-Stavelot line, far from being
a trivial matter, is part of a vast and well-devised scheme
for attaining great ends. The object-lesson has been given,
but lest it be thrown away on those who will not see and
are resolved not to hear, an effort must be made to show all
it ought to teach, and for that purpose we must remember
that north of Liege Germany has made, and is still
making, the new lines that will enable her to swoop down
on the Meuse bridges at Nijmegen, Mook, Gennep, Venlo,
Roermond, Maeseyck, and Maestricht, and thus complete
her converging movement across North Brabant and Lim
burg to Antwerp and Brussels. Thus on an arc extending
from Treves to Nijmegen (excluding from our purview
what is called the main concentration on the Saar behind
Metz) the German War Department has arranged for a
simultaneous advance by fourteen separate routes across
Holland, Belgium, and the Grand Duchy. The character
of that advance may be judged from the boast freely
uttered at German mess tables that "if the English are
not in Antwerp within five days of the outbreak of hostili
ties, they will never get there."
But of all these lines of advance the most threatening

230 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
for France, and consequently for this country in the end,
is that through the Belgian Ardennes by the roads passing
through Stavelot, Viel Salm, and Gouvy. Of these the
Stavelot entrance, thanks to the new railway, is the most
important. If Germany secures Stavelot, Trois Ponts,
and the stations south of those places as far as Gouvy
within twenty-four hours of the order to advance, as seem
ingly she counts on doing, she will obtain complete control
of the eastern half of the Ardennes, and the Belgian popu
lation of that region may be regarded as then and there
reduced to the status of a subjected people. Resistance
by the civil population would be made a penal offence,
to be dealt with by the severest reprisals, and of a military
defending force there is not, under the present dispensa
tion, the smallest vestige. Nor is there any likelihood of
garrisons being moved to this region within any reasonable
time, unless the Belgian Government receives a very
vigorous application of Anglo-French pressure. In plain
words, the part of Belgium to which Germany has gained
access by the Stavelot railway is quite undefended, and
apparently there is no chance of any improvement in this
respect on her own initiative.
At the very moment of this striking change in the south
eastern quarter of Belgium, steps are being taken by her
Government greatly to enlarge the station at Trois Ponts,
and to improve the line south of that place to Gouvy. This
line, which was originally half Grand Ducal, as jointly
held with the Prince Henri Company, is now entirely
Belgian, and is being converted into a double-railed track.
The Belgian Government is quite within its rights in
improving this or any other of its railways, but the fact
remains that in this instance the improvement must greatly
help Germany in reaching the French frontier between
Longwy and Sedan. For this additional reason, the
German intrusion into Belgian territory at Stavelot and
Trois Ponts must be regarded as full of menace to France,
and as imperilling the integrity of Belgium at a point
where her only defence lay in the poverty and inadequacy
of the means of communication. Now that express trains
are promised on a double track from Pepinster and Spa
to Gouvy, and that the Germans are already talking of

AN OBJECT-LESSON IN GERMAN PLANS 231
using the line from Junkerath to Trois Ponts and Gouvy
as a relief to the strain on the Welkenraedt-Liege route, it
is clear that the existing means of communication have
changed from an obstacle to a facility.
But the matter does not end at Gouvy. Gouvy itself is
indeed a point of little importance, although we must be
prepared to see Germany make an attempt to link it up
with St. Vith vid Beho, just as she has done Malmedy and
Stavelot; but Gouvy is the junction for the southern line
to Libramont, the key to the central Ardennes. Libramont
is on the main line from Brussels to Luxemburg, Metz and
Treves. It has branch lines that, practically speaking,
run parallel with the whole of Belgium's southern frontier
east of the Meuse. We may safely assume that Germany
will endeavour to secure by motor-car and cavalry raid
the three consecutive junctions on this main line at Marloie,
Jemelle and Libramont, while the railways from Trois
Ponts and Gouvy will give her the facilities for moving
forward with great rapidity large bodies of infantry to
the support of the flying detachments.
The preparations for a bold dash forward have thus
been brought as nearly as possible to completion in time
of peace, and with the co-operation, nolens volens, of
Belgium. We are looking mainly to the Ardennes frontier,
but it does not diminish the significance of what has been
effected there to know that the same thing has, more or
less, happened also all along the Dutch frontier. Germany
has made ready, at heavy outlay, to take the offensive at
a moment's notice, and to throw enormous forces across
the territories of two unoffending and pacific neighbours
in her fixed resolve to break through the northern defences
of France and thus to turn the formidable fortifications of
the Vosges. She has prepared for the day by bringing
fully-equipped and admirably constructed railways up to
her neighbours' frontiers, and in some places across them,
at Venlo and Stavelot for instance. An immense sum of
money has been sunk in these railways — the Weywertz line
alone represents two millions sterling — and there is not the
least prospect of an adequate return on them as commercial
ventures. They are purely military and strategical pre
parations for war with France.

232 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
There is a great reluctance in this country, even among
the initiated, to face the situation created by these new
railways, and even in Belgium, which is so close to them,
there is an optimistic belief that they represent merely the
superfluous energy of their neighbours. Like the cat with
the bird, Germany seeks to fascinate Belgium before
springing on her. But if there is blindness here, and hope
ful helplessness in Belgium, French military authorities
are fully alive to the change that has taken place in regard
to the eastern half of the northern frontier of France, and
it is no secret that they regard it with warm resentment.
France is so placed in this quarter that she cannot adopt
counter precautions of any adequate effect. She sees herself
obliged to leave the first move and the first blow in this
quarter to Germany, and that advantage might influence
the whole character of the first campaign. The only effec
tive reply in the military sense that France could make
to the German menace would be to absorb the Ardennes
herself, move up her frontier to Stavelot and Gouvy, and
construct on the Baraque de Fraiture a fortified position
like that at Lille or Verdun. This reply she is debarred
from making by political considerations, such as respect
for her guarantee of Belgian integrity and her strong
desire to spare the susceptibilities of England. .But she
may reasonably ask that her good faith and her good will
should not have to be exhibited at the expense of her own
security. The time has come, then, to call upon the Belgian
Government to take immediate and effective measures to
counterbalance the advantages that Germany has now
accumulated for the overruning of what we call the
Ardennes within forty-eight hours of the first passage of
the trains over the railways described in this paper, and
France is entitled to ask the British Government to join
with her in this vigorous and urgent demand. It is the
bounden duty of the Belgian Government to block and bar
the new line of advance opened, partly by its own co
operation, for the German armies, and this can only be
accomplished by the placing in their path of a fort or
forts, which would bring them to a speedy halt, and

AN OBJECT-LESSON IN GERMAN PLANS 233
deprive the inroad of that character of celerity and irre
sistibility which is, from the Berlin point of view, its
chief attraction.
Whether the situation would be adequately met by a
fort d'arret at Bastogne, as proposed in a previous article
of this series, or by the more extensive fortification of
Libramont and its approaches, is a matter for the consider
ation of the competent military authorities. But it is
impossible to close one's eyes to the superior claims of a
trilateral fortification of the position designated from its
central point as the Baraque de Fraiture. Protected on its
northern side by the Ambleve, it would command that
valley; its eastern section would close the routes to La
Roche and St. Hubert, while its southern side would render
any western advance from Gouvy impossible. In plain
words, the Belgians could construct at well-chosen points
along these commanding heights lines that would resemble
those of Torres Vedras for the defence of their national
existence. But unless France and England, acting together,
are very insistent at Brussels, nothing will be done. The
old silly argument that to take such steps would be to offer
provocation to Germany will be used as a reason for doing
nothing. If this argument were to be accepted, it could
only mean that Germany was to be allowed the monopoly
of provocation. Belgium will be asked to take steps, not
against anything that Germany may do, but against some
thing she has done. If she is loth to defend herself, she
must remember that her neutrality imposes upon her this
obligation for the sake of the safety of those who have
guaranteed her existence as an independent State. If she
should use the argument that her own subjects are indiffer
ent in the matter, she can be answered with absolute
assurance that the whole population of the Province of
Luxemburg consider that they have been given over,
helpless and without a blow in their behalf, to the Eastern
invader. A very serious and anxious situation has arisen from the
creation of the new network of German railways. In Paris
military opinion is unanimous that they give Germany the
means of penetrating into France within forty-eight hours

234 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
of the decision to go to war. No matter how successful
the counter moves of the French army may prove, they
cannot avert this initial and impressive success by the
Germans at a point where the French frontier is, and must
remain, weakly defended. Belgium alone can remedy
the evil.

GERMAN DESIGNS ON THE CONGO*
As the German Government declared, on violating the neutrality of
Belgium and invading her territory, that she would, after the war was
over, show her consideration for Belgium in the terms of peace, the
following paper, prepared long before the present rupture, makes clear
what that consideration will amount to. Germany may not wish to
have a second Alsace in Belgium, but she does wish and hope to rob
Belgium of her vast colony in the Congo.
DURING the Moroccan crisis three years ago, when there
was some question of compensating Germany, Sir Edward
Grey said, with characteristic clearness, that it should
"not be at the expense of the Belgian Congo." At the
time the words were uttered there was only a dim suspicion
in some quarters that Germany might have designs on the
Congo, but there is no longer any concealment in German
colonial and naval circles that the acquisition of the whole
or a good part of the Belgian territory in Africa constitutes
the first step in providing Germany with those ready-made
colonies which she so greatly covets. The question has
been treated at length in many Pan-German publications,
but of far deeper significance is the evidence furnished by
the free expression in influential circles of the opinion that
the destiny of the Belgian colony is to pass under the
Imperial flag, and that German rule is to stretch in a broad
belt across Africa from ocean to ocean. The declaration
of the British Foreign Secretary and German aspirations
and designs are thus brought into clear and seemingly
irreconcilable conflict.
While I take leave to doubt whether the true situation
is yet fully realised here, even in official circles, there is
no uncertainty or qualified opinion in Belgium as to the
drift of Germany's ' policy in Africa. Long before Sir
* Fortnightly Review, September, 1914.
235

236 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Edward Grey's declaration the authorities in Brussels had
become alive to the fact that the friendship of Berlin was
insincere, and that Germany hoped to compensate herself
for disappointments in East Africa by filching the prizes
of Belgian effort and enterprise in that vast territory which
forms the centre of the Black Continent. From not one,
but a hundred Belgians — men of competence to speak with
authority — have I received the same tale as to their German
friends and business acquaintances giving them assurances
in confidence that a victorious Germany in the next Euro
pean war would not annex Belgium, but would content
herself with appropriating the Congo. This dubious
comfort does not go far towards relieving Belgian appre
hension, for although the Belgians do not yet prize the
Congo as the Dutch do Java, they still feel a great pride
in their nascent African colony. The Germans have but
two ideas in their heads at the present time on the European
situation. One is that Germany must triumph over all her
opponents in the coming war of the nations, and the other
is that little States like Belgium must bow their heads to
the inevitable. It never enters their minds that the
Belgian people might think that they have a role to play
in Europe, and that behind Belgian patriotism is the
support of England upholding the faith of treaties and
the principle enunciated by the Foreign Secretary.
In these circumstances it is well worth devoting a little
time and space to the task of tracing the development of
German policy with regard to the Congo, so that the
springs and drift of the future action of the Berlin Govern
ment may be thoroughly understood and appreciated
before the events themselves occur. There will then be no
excuse for surprise, because in this matter, as generally,
Prussian policy is based on a settled plan slowly elabo
rated, carefully prepared and put into execution per fas
aut nefas.
German policy in the Congo originated at the time
of the unfortunate Anglo-Portuguese Convention of Feb
ruary, 1884. France and Germany refused to recognise it,
and Bismarck, fortified by French support, summoned the
Conference at Berlin which was to give a new Constitution
to Central Africa. At that time Germany was all for " the

GERMAN DESIGNS ON THE CONGO 237
international control of the River Congo," and the recog
nition of "the Belgian enterprises on the Congo as an
independent State." Bismarck was King Leopold's sup
porter for the nonce; from no one did he receive more
compliments. While some diplomatists were shaping the map of
Africa at Berlin, others were discovering the basis of a
new German colonial empire in London. Through the
good-humour and credulity of the British Government,
Germany was allowed to hasten and then to share in the
first disruption of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, and the
acquisition was of the greater importance because at that
time nearly everybody held the view that Congolese trade
would flow eastwards to the Indian Ocean. The region
of the Cataracts seemed to place an insurmountable im
pediment in the river-highway to the Atlantic. German
colonial experts were, therefore, confident that the develop
ment of the Congo region would bring a considerable
and ever-increasing transport trade across the East African
possessions, and this hope had not diminished when
German East Africa was completed by the later Anglo-
German agreement of 1890. So long as these views pre
vailed, the German Government bestowed its sympathy
and support on the Congo State, and turned a deaf ear
to the proposals of the British Government to its detri
ment. For a short period King Leopold rejoiced in the
possession of this German bulwark, but with extraordinary
astuteness he realised at an early stage the change that
was passing over German policy, and in the last years
of his reign it was to Paris rather than Berlin that he
turned for counsel and comfort. It was in the French
capital that the basis of Anglo-Belgian reconciliation over
the Congo controversy was first discovered, and by that
time there was no longer any doubt in Paris and Brussels
as to what Germany's views about the future of the Congo
region really were.
It was in 1894-5 that a first inkling was given as to
Germany's ulterior designs, and although the manifesta
tion took three separate and distinct forms, there was this
feature in common to them all, that they aimed at limiting
the independence and restricting the sphere of influence

238 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
of the Congo State. One of two things had taken place
at Berlin : it was either realised that King Leopold could
not be used as a tool, or it was held that Germany was
strong enough to dispense with subterfuges and to enforce
her views by her own will. However that may be, it was
in May, 1894, that Germany made the first move, and
once more, as, ten years earlier, it was directed against
England. These incidents pass unnoticed by a public
which seems to have lost the capacity of appreciating the
significance of current events in world-politics, but they
stand out clearly from any historical retrospect of the
period. A Pitt, a Canning, or a Palmerston would have
known how to deal with Bismarck in 1 884, or his successor,
Caprivi, in 1894, and well would it have been for our
naval superiority if we had had statesmen of their type;
but, being guided by mere politicians, we gave way on
both occasions and abandoned the ground we had occu
pied. In 1884 we dropped the Anglo-Portuguese Conven
tion; in 1894 we dropped that with the Congo State, and
of the two the latter was the more contemptible act of
moral cowardice.
In so far as the Convention of the 12th of May, 1894,
related to the lease of the Bahr el Ghazal province to King
Leopold, it is unnecessary to devote space to it here, for
to the British people the interesting part is what they lost,
and not what others might have gained. Leaving aside,
then, the contingent benefits to King Leopold and the
Belgians, two immense advantages for this country stand
out from the text of this Convention.
The third article read : — " The Independent State of the
Congo leases to Great Britain, to be administered, when
she shall occupy it, under the conditions and for the period
hereafter determined, a strip of territory 25 kilometres
broad (15I miles), extending from the most northern post
on Lake Tanganyika, which post is comprised in the strip,
to as far as the most southern point of Lake Albert
Edward." The fifth article read : — " The Independent State of the
Congo authorises the construction across its territories by
Great Britain, or by a company duly authorised by the
British Government, of a telegraphic line connecting the

GERMAN DESIGNS ON THE CONGO 239
English territories of South Africa with the sphere of
English influence on the Nile."
What purpose was the strip of territory referred to in
Article 3 intended to serve ? It was to provide the route
for one of the most important sections of the great trunk
line between Egypt and South Africa, generally called
the Cape to Cairo Railway. The telegraphic line men
tioned in Article 5 was to furnish telegraphic communica
tions across the whole of the Congo State from Rhodesia
to the Nile without any restriction as to time, direction,
or conditions. It was due to German interference that both
these advantages were lost, and although nearly twenty
years have intervened, they have not yet been recovered.
Before dealing with the railway question, which is one
of paramount importance, it will be better for the sake of
clearness to describe first the two other indications of the
change that occurred in German policy at this period.
Such trade as the Germans in East Africa had succeeded
in establishing with the interior consisted of the export
of raw spirit — Hamburg gin — and old firearms to the Arab
slave-dealers in exchange for ivory. But in 1 892-4 the Arab
confederacy was broken up by the Belgians under the late
Baron Dhanis, and the Germans lost their market. The
Congo authorities set their faces firmly against the import
of the only two articles in which the German traders dealt,
and, as a consequence, there was much discontent in official
circles, for the German Emperor's assurance that he is
" the protector of the German trader " dates farther back
than yesterday. But a complaint could not be made on
the ground that the sale of articles " prohibited " by the
Acts of Berlin and Brussels had been stopped. The
German Government was compelled to take another line.
It represented that an imaginary " premium of ten per cent.
paid by the Congo State to its agents for the ivory they
bought was of a nature to prejudice the commerce of the
German Protectorate." No such premium existed, but it
was the fact that Germany could no longer procure ivory,
chiefly because the articles she had been accustomed to
exchange for it were prohibited and refused admission.
Moreover, the market that had existed for those articles
in the Arab camps of Kassongo and Kabambare had dis-

240 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
appeared, and the Germans had no other exports ready to
take their places. But the prospect was still more serious
from the German point of view, for the tendency of all
the traffic to follow a western course soon became marked
and raised gloomy thoughts in the minds of those who
had been persuaded of the contrary. It was easy enough
for a powerful Government to allege that the cause of the
decline of German trade was the policy of the Congo
State, but the natural explanation was too obvious to
impose on anyone. It was a typical instance of trade
following the best route to the markets of the world.
We now come to the third phase of German policy as
directed against the Congo State. The considerations first
mentioned determined the German authorities to send
exploring parties into the border districts of the Congo
State, where it was known that Belgian authority was very
slight, and a more favourable moment could not have been
found, because the Arab campaign had been followed
by the Batetela Mutiny, which for a time destroyed it
altogether. They were to acquire exact geographical
knowledge of an unmapped region, information as to its
resources and the openings for trade, and finally to report
whether the Belgian occupation was " effective " or not.
Of the three points the last was the most important, for
one of the cardinal features in German African policy is
that territory which is not " effectively occupied " by the
titular owner becomes derelict and may be appropriated.
At the moment of which I am speaking the frontier between
the Congo and the German Protectorate had not been
delimited. It remained as drawn on the map at Berlin,
being there defined as " formed by the 300 parallel from
the first degree of south latitude to the i° 20' degree
of south latitude, and also by an imaginary straight
line drawn from the point of intersection of the 300 degree
of east longitude with the parallel of i° 20' of south
latitude to as far as the northern extremity of Lake Tan
ganyika." This land boundary was completed, it may be
observed, by the median line in Lake Tanganyika itself.
The main object before the explorers was to show that in
the vicinity of that boundary line Belgian authority was
non-existent.

GERMAN DESIGNS ON THE CONGO 241
Of these explorers the most important and the most
successful was Count von Gotzen. He did not find any
evidence of Belgian occupation until he got well within
the borders, but the sensational incident of his journey was
the discovery of Lake Kivu, situated half-way between
lakes Albert Edward and Tanganyika, and in close
proximity to "the imaginary straight line" defining the
frontier. The explorer pronounced " the neighbourhood of
Kivu to be extremely fertile and rich in provisions of every
kind," and he also declared that it would be necessary to
explore it more thoroughly whenever the delimitation of
the common frontier should be taken in hand. At the same
time, his fixing of the lake's geographical position showed
beyond doubt that the whole of the lake lay west of " the
imaginary straight line," and consequently within the
limits of the Congo State. King Leopold took steps to
make sure of the prize by promptly sending an expedition
to found two Congolese stations on the eastern shore of
the lake.
The German Government replied to this move by alleg
ing that Congolese subjects — to wit, the Batetela mutineers
— had violated German territory and committed various
excesses thereon. But when it realised that the King of
the Belgians had collected a force on the lake stronger than
any it could bring against it, it abandoned provocative
action on the spot, and took up the line that the time had
arrived for delimiting the frontier in an exact manner. The
German Government contended, and with justice, that this
had always been foreseen, and that a boundary drawn on
the map was only a temporary expedient. Moreover, the
discovery of a new lake, and also of the navigability of the
Ruzizi stream — connecting it with Tanganyika — which had
formerly been considered unnavigable, had introduced new
factors into the question. Although the late King Leopold
was a fervent believer in the principle of beati possidentes,
he could not withhold his consent from the appointment of
a joint delimitation commission, more especially as one
had been arranged with Great Britain in the same region.
The matter extended over many years, and resulted in a
Convention, dated the 1 ith of August, 1910, which defined
the frontier between the Congo, now transformed into a
16

242 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
Belgian colony, and the German Protectorate in East
Africa as follows : —
The median line of Tanganyika was abandoned so far
as the delta of the Ruzizi is concerned, and in its place is
substituted " the thalweg of its principal western branch."
From the northern point of the delta " the thalweg of the
principal branch of the River Ruzizi" will form the
boundary to the point where it flows into Lake Kivu.
The frontier in Lake Kivu follows a line leaving the
isles called Iwinza, Nyama Ronga, Kwidjwi, and Kitanga
to Belgium, and the isles Kikaya, Gombo, Kumenie, and
Wau to Germany, and reaching the northern shore of the
lake between Goma (Belgium) and Kissegnies (Germany).
North of Lake Kivu the frontier is traced in a more or
less straight line to the Sabinio peak, which is the meeting-
point of the three territories belonging to Great Britain,
Belgium, and Germany respectively. The practical mean
ing of this delimitation is that Germany acquires posses
sion of the greater part of the southern coast and the whole
of the eastern coast of Lake Kivu, and that north of it her
frontier is advanced considerably to the west of the old
line. But notwithstanding a far from inconsiderable local
expansion, there is nothing in this acquisition to bring
lasting contentment to the Germans, or to alter the causes
of their present discontent. Kivu is never likely to play
any important part in the internal navigation of Central
Africa. Although not so great as was once thought, the
obstacles to using the Ruzizi as a means of communication
are still considerable. Even if the lake and the river were
available for use, they would still be of value only as
part of a water route extending northwards from Tangan
yika, and that is the exact contrary of what the Germans
are seeking. It is no consolation to them to be told, while
they are straining every effort to bring trade down to the
Indian Ocean, that a shortening of route has been effected
which must benefit trade with the Nile and the Congo. It
is rather an aggravation of the original injury, and leaves,
at all events, the fundamental principles behind German
discontent unchanged.
If the Central African situation, then, is to be correctly

GERMAN DESIGNS ON THE CONGO 243
judged, it is necessary to remember that Germany is a
thoroughly discontented participant and spectator. She
finds no satisfaction in what she has acquired. With time
and the expenditure of money, East Africa might become
of value. But Germany is impatient. She wants quick
results. Already she is experiencing difficulty in maintain
ing her civil and military staffs, and to remedy part of this
evil she is meditating the formation of a foreign legion
composed of the waifs and strays of Europe. Her main
idea is that others have what she covets. In Africa the
Belgian Congo is for her a Naboth's Vineyard.
And now let us turn to the railway question, which is
the vital matter for the time being in Central Africa. By
vetoing our Convention in 1894, Germany deprived us of
the route for the Cape to Cairo Railway, and also of our
telegraph line; but for some inscrutable reason our dis
pleasure fell at the time not on the real culprit, Germany,
but on King Leopold. The next stage in the question was
reached when Mr. Cecil Rhodes came to Brussels in the
autumn of 1898 to press the claims of the Cape to Cairo
Railway on the attention of King Leopold. I was living
in Belgium at the time and fully conversant with every
thing that happened. In the first place, Mr. Rhodes was
in a great hurry, and that was not the best condition for
approaching the discussion of a very important matter.
His friends had also announced that if he failed in
Brussels he would succeed in Berlin, to which he was going
after leaving the Belgian capital. In the second place, he
was so impregnated with the paramount importance of his
great railway scheme that he overlooked the fact that the
King of the Belgians had also given some study to the
question of communications in the interior of Africa, and
certainly he was not the man to lay aside his own views
at the dictation of even the Colossus of the Cape.
Mr. Rhodes was then too urgent and too imperative to
have much chance of immediate success in his errand. It
was a question which King Leopold declared could not be
settled in a hurry, and besides he inclined to the view that
it would have to be treated in sections and not as a single
complete scheme. Beyond a personal declaration that he
was entirely in favour of fresh railways in the Congo terri-

244 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
tory as well as in Africa generally, King Leopold did not
see his way to commit himself at that juncture. Mr.
Rhodes wanted something much more ample and compro
mising, although his suggestions lacked precision and even
practicability at that moment.
From Brussels Mr. Rhodes went to Berlin, and there
the world was informed that his mission had proved com
pletely successful, and that an Anglo-German agreement
had been arrived at for the passage of the Cape to Cairo
Railway through German territory. I have in my posses
sion a letter written to me at the time by a leading English
statesman, in which this passage occurs : — " King Leopold
must be very sorry now that he did not come to terms with
Mr. Rhodes." As a matter of fact, King Leopold was
not at all disturbed. He had taken a far more accurate
view of the situation than Mr. Rhodes. He did not believe
in the durability of any Anglo-German agreement. Where
is Mr. Rhodes's German Convention now ? His admirers
would like to consign it to the limbo of forgotten things.
Shortly after Mr. Rhodes's visit King Leopold discussed
the whole question of African railways with me. He
professed great admiration for Mr. Rhodes as a typical
Empire-builder — King Leopold, despite all the personal
attacks made upon him in our Press, was a fervent admirer
of the English — and with regard to his great railway
scheme expressed his conviction that it was sure to be
realised eventually, but it seemed to him hazardous in the
existing very imperfect state of our geographical know
ledge of Central Africa to attempt to lay down at that
moment the precise route that it should follow. With
regard to the alleged agreement in the German capital,
which was the topic of the day, he spoke with emphasis :
" The physical difficulties east of Tanganyika and Kivu
are insuperable, and no trunk line from north to south will
ever, humanly speaking, pass that way."
" My part," he added, " is of a more practical and
modest character. Take the map of the Congo and you
will see that there are stretches of the Upper River which
are impracticable through the presence of cataracts, and
then a little further on the stream again becomes navigable.
I propose to build railways to replace those gaps or

GERMAN DESIGNS ON THE CONGO 245
breaches in water communication. Believe me, for a long
time the main communications must be jointly by rail and
by water. I have no doubt that the first English railway
will terminate on the southern shore of Tanganyika."
With regard to the supposition that Mr. Rhodes had
found consolation in Berlin for what was called his rebuff
in Brussels, the King indulged in a little ironical specula
tion. " You English are a most extraordinary people.
What is the most recent incident in Africa ? Why, Ger
many's repudiation of my Convention with Great Britain,
and its cancelling by your tame withdrawal. No, I am
wrong, there is another more recent still — the Emperor
William's telegram to President Kruger; and yet the
English papers are saying that / am England's enemy,
and that the Germans are going to play her game ! It is
quite inexplicable; but, in anything you write, say that the
Cape to Cairo line caxi-only be constructed through Congo
lese territory, and events will prove you right. As for
England and Germany, they are irreconcilable rivals, and
very possibly they will fight over the body of the Congo
State." The several railways grouped together under the head
of the Great Lakes system prove that the late King of the
Belgians carried out his plan, but the rapid progress of
the railway across Rhodesia and the extraordinary develop
ment of Katanga make it probable that the junction of
the two railway systems of Britain and Belgium will take
place nearer the Lualaba, or Upper Congo, than to Tan
ganyika. At all events, it is no longer doubtful that the
great trunk line from north to south will pass through the
Congo and not through German East Africa.
The arrangement of this question will not be brought
about by a formal convention between the two Govern
ments as in 1894. Each State will approach the considera
tion of its part of the great joint undertaking as a matter
of internal policy with which no outsider has any right
to interfere. But as the resources of Belgium alone would
not suffice to meet the cost of so gigantic an undertaking,
it is clear that Anglo-Belgian co-operation is preordained ;
and the successful working of the Katanga arrangement
affords encouraging proof that this can be done with

246 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
perfect harmony. With such an accord no foreign inter
ference would be tolerated, and when we remember that
" the iron horse " has almost reached the Belgian southern
frontier and that the Zambesi has been bridged, the date
of its signature cannot be very remote.
The Belgians will welcome it because it must give an
immense impetus to the development of their southern
and eastern provinces in Africa, and because they are per
suaded that much of the new trade thus created will follow
a western route down the Congo River to the Atlantic. For
that reason they have no objection to the creation of a
great trunk line from north to south. It is in complete
harmony with their own views and projects. It will bring
Katanga and Kilo nearer to Stanley Pool and the ports
of the Atlantic. The undertaking will be all the more
agreeable to them if it follows a track nearer to the
Lualaba than to Tanganyika, and indeed it may even be
said that parts of that track are ready for use in the several
existing sections of the Great Lakes railway. King Leopold
probably saw farther than he even pretended to see when
by their construction he said he would contribute his little
quota of practical value to the great scheme originally
conceived by Mr. Cecil Rhodes.
But this prospect is by no means agreeable to the
Germans. A trunk railway from north to south will bring
no trade to East Africa and the Indian Ocean. To make
it of any prospective use costly branch lines would have
to be built to connect with it from German territory, and
these would be for only a speculative result. Moreover,
that railway, although not British-owned in its Congolese
section, would in some sense or other be identified with
British enterprise and capital, and thus Germany would
see constructed in her path the very undertaking to which
she so strongly objected in 1894. It was believed at the
time that her objection was due not so much to the con
struction of the railway itself as to the temporary cession
of the strip of territory that was to serve as its track ; but
events showed that this view was not correct. The Germans
then proposed that the line should pass through their
protectorate; but their view was that it should be a purely
German line and that it should subserve German interests.

GERMAN DESIGNS ON THE CONGO 247
That meant a track considerably to the east of Tangan
yika. Thus only could there be any chance of diverting
the trade of the interior of Africa to the Indian Ocean.
In a very little time it became clear that German facilities
and co-operation were only to be obtained in so far as it
suited the views of their Government and the special needs
of their Colony. For the Cape to Cairo railway they cared
nothing at all ; nay, they regarded it with absolute aversion.
And now they are confronted with the accomplishment
of the undertaking in the near future. The natural course
of events, and no subtle diplomacy or clever dealing, has
brought it within the range of all men's vision. The exact
form in which it will be accomplished makes it more
objectionable than the original scheme, which would at
least have followed a track close to the German frontier,
and thus only short branches would have been needed to
connect the two systems. The change is not due, as may
be thought in Germany, to any settled design to isolate
German territory, but to the imperious necessity of study
ing the paying trade route, and avoiding engineering diffi
culties. The promoters of the undertaking, British as well
as Belgian, will think only of the volume of traffic and
the return on their capital ; and it so happens that there is
nothing very inviting from this point of view in the direc
tion of the German Protectorate.
The facts suffice to explain the prevailing discontent
not merely in German East Africa, but at Berlin on the
subject of Central Africa. Up to the present their Colony
has been a costly disappointment, but the outlook is even
worse. The construction of what is called the Cape to
Cairo railway will place a formidable barrier in the path
of German trade expansion, and will relegate the East
African Protectorate to a position of hopeless inferiority
for many years. The prospect grates on the nerves of all
Pan-Germans, and has given rise to desperate schemes.
The whole situation is to be changed, they declare, after
the next European war, which is regarded as a certain
German triumph, and the starting-point of that new
German hegemony which is to place ready-made colonies
at their disposal as " the spoil to the victors."
First and foremost in the list of these prospective

248 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
acquisitions is the Belgian Congo. It is there because
Germany well knows that she intends to traverse Belgium
whenever she attacks France. At one time she thought
that she could count on the inaction of Belgium while she
did so; now she knows that Belgium will defend herself
as well as she can. But Germany will be magnanimous in
her terms of peace. She does not want to be burdened
with any troublesome Walloon or Flemish subjects; she
will content herself by appropriating the Congo.
Thus do Germans hope to realise their present dream
of an African Empire stretching across the Continent in
a broad belt from ocean to ocean, opening to them the
ports on, the Atlantic and barring for ever to us the route
from north to south which has been figuratively named
the Cape to Cairo line. There is but one obstacle in their
path — the opposition of Great Britain, as foreshadowed
in Sir Edward Grey's declaration. But that much more
than words will be necessary to make it good must be plain
to all who will consider the facts and the course of events
during the last twenty years. This warning is written to
prevent anyone describing the coming revelation of German
designs on the Congo as " a bolt from the blue." They are
carefully calculated, deliberately formed, and will be
prosecuted with unswerving method. They will only be
foiled by vigilance and resolution, and by the cordial
co-operation of the British and Belgian Governments.

ANTWERP AND THE SCHELDT*
THE too-easy tolerance displayed three and a half years
ago to the latest attempt by the Dutch Government to
revive its old claim to the sole sovereignty of the Scheldt
by the fortification of Flushing has led to a position of
things that will be pronounced intolerable whenever Ant
werp finds itself in extreme straits, and perhaps at that
moment it will be too late to apply a remedy with the
necessary dispatch. Both the British and the Belgian
Governments were blameworthy for neglecting to enforce
in 191 1 the principle which they had vindicated in 1831,
1839, and finally in 1863, establishing in the first place
and recognising in the second the fact that the sovereignty
of the Scheldt had become a co-partnership between
Holland and Belgium, instead of the sole possession of
the House of Orange. In 191 1 the fortification of Flushing
was merely a paper intention; in 191 4 it is an accom
plished fact, and the hypothetical objections raised against
the project are now among the factors of the great military
and naval problem that confronts us.
It is unnecessary to narrate over again the story of
Holland's policy during two centuries of shutting the
Scheldt, or of how reluctantly she ceded at the dictation
of the Five Powers to Belgium in 1839 the "common
possession," " common control," and " reciprocal freedom "
of and on that river. It was told at considerable length
in a former article, t But when Holland's pretension to
the absolute sovereignity of the Scheldt was revived in
19 1 0 by General den Beer Poortugael, who made himself
the mouthpiece of the philo-German party at The Hague,
the Belgian Government, taking a narrow view of the
question, did not insist on the summoning of a conference
* Fortnightly Review, October, 1914. t See Ante, p. 164.
249

250 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
between the guaranteeing Powers of Belgium's independ
ence and neutrality to place the matter beyond all dispute.
There were special reasons to explain the attitude of
the Belgian Government in 1910-11. The defences of
Antwerp against attack from the lower Scheldt were weak
and inadequate, and they still remain so. It was decided
to remove this weakness by constructing two new forts
below Antwerp, one on each bank of the river, but this
plan could not be carried out because it was dependent on
the grandiose project for changing the course of the
Scheldt. Consequently the forts were not and have not yet
been built, but the weakness of Antwerp in the direction
of the river and the sea remained none the less glaring
and incontestable. The Dutch proposal to fortify Flush
ing came then at an opportune moment. It promised to
provide Antwerp with the defence towards the sea which
it lacked. That was one reason why the Belgian Govern
ment declined in 191 1 to make any protest against the
fortification of Flushing, acting on the principle that
Holland had an unimpeachable right to take whatever
steps it liked on its own soil, and leaving the question of
the sovereignty of the Scheldt over for a future occasion.
But there was another reason of a different character for
this abstention, and probably it was the one that weighed
most at Brussels. The Belgian Government desired above
all things to preserve its neutrality whenever war broke
out in Western Europe. It not merely desired to stand
outside any quarrel, but it was confident that this course
would be shown by events to be a perfectly feasible policy,
for it had no conception of the magnitude and depth of
German perfidy. It had the firmest and most loyal inten
tion to remain true to the principle on which its national
existence was based by the decree of the Great Powers,
and perhaps none of its neighbours was furnished with
more ample or repeated proofs of this intention than
Germany. Belgium had always been nervous on the subject
of French encroachment, and of recent years her military
authorities at least had not been blind to the possibility of
German invasion. But German diplomacy had insinuated
for some time past that perhaps after all England would
be the greatest danger to Belgian neutrality in consequence

ANTWERP AND THE SCHELDT 251
of her obligations to France under the Entente Cordiale.
It is not necessary to suppose that the Belgian Government
believed this, but it had an easy way of showing that it
intended its neutrality to be respected by everyone by
taking up the question of Antwerp's defence against battle
ships and battle cruisers. When local reasons led to the
postponement of the construction of its own forts, the same
result seemed ensured by the Dutch fortification of
Flushing. Not by her own act, but by that of another,
Belgium allowed an obstacle to be created in the path of
any squadron or expedition coming up the Scheldt.
Of course, this barrier was only contemplated as having
force against an enemy, but unfortunately the decision as
to who should be regarded as friend or foe passed out of
the hands of Belgium into those of Holland. As long as
Britain commands the sea there is no danger to Antwerp
from naval attack, but as long as Holland is a neutral in
the present war the Dutch Government contends that
succour cannot be sent to Antwerp by the Scheldt. It will
thus be seen that Holland has successfully revived her
claim to the sole sovereignty of the Scheldt of which she
was dispossessed in 183 1-9.
Professor Ernest Nys, of the Belgian Court of Appeal,
anticipated this very position in his treatise, L'Escaut en
temps de Guerre, published at the end of the year 191 0 : —
" Moreover, is it possible to conceive so strange a situation as this?
A war occurs in which Holland remains neutral, and at once it acquires
absolute authority over the waters of the Scheldt ; more than that, it is
obliged to forbid the entrance of a war fleet belonging to a belligerent
to the Scheldt, and its passage into Belgium when that fleet is coming
to her assistance; because, according to General Den Beer Poortugael,
the fact that the State coming to assist the other State had previously
engaged itself by treaty to guarantee its neutrality is without any
importance. " Was Holland so completely outside the guarantee the Powers gave
to Belgium? No doubt she did not guarantee Belgian neutrality, but
when signing the treaty of 19th of April, 1839, she knew what engage
ments the Five Powers had undertaken. Each of these treaties embodied
the Twenty-four Articles. Holland must have supposed that the Powers
would fulfil their obligations. Under these circumstances she assented
to those Articles. Yet it is now contended that she may, and even
that she must, oppose the mission of protection and defence that was
anticipated as being necessary in the interests of Europe herself !
11 We must not lose sight of what happened in 1870. Great Britain
made treaties declaring that she would uphold the neutrality of Belgium.

252 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
... If the need had then arisen would Holland have attempted to
pevent the British Fleet proceeding up to Antwerp?"
We know perfectly well that she would not have
attempted anything of the kind, because she had no means
of preventing it. Her pretensions only revived when she
had erected cupola forts at Flushing and placed Krupp
n. 2 inch guns inside them. Those pretensions include the
resumption of the claim that the Scheldt is a Dutch river,
that Holland alone is responsible for its neutrality, and
that this neutrality must be enforced against Belgium, the
co-partner in the navigation of the stream. The pretension
is simply grotesque, and reminds us of Canning's lines :
" In matters of business the fault of the Dutch
Is giving too little and asking too much."
In 1 83 1 the Dutch Government put forward very much
the same pretension. It based its claim on the law of
nations because it held both banks of the lower Scheldt,
but it went on to protest its good intentions, declaring that
it had no intention of hindering the navigation of the
Scheldt " except when the defence of the kingdom during
a war expressly required it." The Powers constituting the
London Conference made short work of this pretension in
a memorandum dated January 4th, 1832. "With regard
to the principle of the law of nations, the Dutch Govern
ment cannot be ignorant of the fact that the general law
of nations is subordinate to the conventional law of
nations, and that when a matter has been regulated by a
convention it is solely in accordance with that convention
that it must be decided." In plain language, the Dutch
claim to the exclusive sovereignity of the Scheldt was
rejected. When the final arrangements were made in 1839,
the eminent Belgian patriot and statesman, Charles Rogier,
said in his report : " It might be asked what more, unless
it were the possession of one of the banks of the river to
the sea, could Belgium desire to have in the division of
the sovereignty of the river ? "*
* Rogier was Minister of Foreign Affairs and knew all the facts.
He was convinced that a joint sovereignty had been established.
Besides, it must not be forgotten that this concession was the compensa
tion for the surrender of Belgian claims to Dutch Flanders, the district
on the left bank of the Scheldt below Antwerp. See my " History of
Belgium," Vol. II., p. 136.

ANTWERP AND THE SCHELDT 253
The laxity of the Belgian Government in 191 1 does not
weaken the position assigned to the Scheldt by the Powers
in 1 83 1. Holland possesses no exclusive sovereign rights
over the Scheldt. Belgium has a perfect right to request
England or France or Russia to send her help by that
river, and Holland has no right to stop the squadron or
flotilla. It is not even necessary to employ Dutch pilots,
for the Belgic-Dutch regulations for the navigation of the
Scheldt provided that half the pilots should be Belgians.
If the Dutch forts were to fire on such a squadron they
would not merely commit an act of war, but they would
be endeavouring, vainly of course, to revive " those ancient
privileges of Governments which had disappeared for
ever," as they were told in 1832.
Let us leave the juridical sphere for that of hard fact.
Belgium is engaged in a struggle for national existence
produced by the attack of a ruthless neighbour. At the
present moment that national existence is limited to the
fortified city of Antwerp. After evincing noble heroism,
after suffering incredible and incalculable outrages and
injury, Belgium is reduced to her last redoubt. The only
available door to that redoubt is held and commanded,
we are told, by Holland.
Holland has maintained her neutrality. She has
remained ' a spectator of the greatest crime in modern
history. She is quite close to the scene, and she knows
better than anyone else the infamies that have been
perpetrated in Belgium. Yet she looks on placidly and
unmoved. More than that, she claims that she has the key
of the Scheldt in her pocket, and declares that she will
keep it there. If the neutrality of that river, as she chooses
to define it, is broken her majesty will be grievously
offended, and she will have no choice but to join Germany.
It will not be disputed that if she decides to do wrong
herself she could not find a more suitable partner than the
chief wrong-doer.
But what have been her relations during the last twenty
years with Belgium? Is there not a society for Dutch-
Belgian co-operation ? Is there not a formal order to the
Dutch Army that they are to look upon "the Belgian
soldiers as true brothers"? Has it not been repeatedly

254 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
proclaimed by the most responsible writers at Amsterdam
and The Hague that the two kingdoms of the Netherlands
have a common interest, and that the fate of one must
quickly be the fate of the other ? Yet Holland has looked,
and still looks, on the agony of its brother with seeming
indifference. In the war raging throughout Europe of
Might against Right, neutrality is criminal; it is doubly
criminal in the case of Holland with regard to Belgium.
But the Dutch may say : " We are only a small State,
our army is not very big, we have much to lose." They
would be offended if they were told that they were smaller
than Belgium, they have a larger army than she had when
she began the defence of her independence and honour,
and the surest way to lose a great possession like Java is
to show that the holder is unworthy of retaining it. If
they had made cautious calculations beforehand, neither
Greece nor Servia would have risen to the height of the
reputation and influence they are acquiring in Europe.
There is a right course and a wrong course. " There are no
little States, only little minds and men," exclaimed the
great Belgian thinker, Emile Banning; and the Dutch
would do well to take the lesson to their hearts.
But we must allow for the idiosyncrasies of different
peoples, and the Dutch are more likely to understand the
matter if it is put before them as a purely business trans
action. Although they declare themselves ready to embark
upon a hopeless war, in which all countries would be
against them except Germany for the principle of the
sovereignty of the Scheldt if England were to send
succour to Antwerp, they show quite a different sentiment
when it is proposed to them that they should come actively
to the aid of Belgium. Then they say : " We are only a
little State, our army is so small, what would be its use
against the millions of Germany ?"
We will make every possible concession to Dutch opinion.
Their army is not a very large one, but it has great
traditions. If the question were put to the Dutch army :
" Shall we aid Belgium or not ?" the reply would undoubt
edly be worthy of the descendants of the men who fought
at Malplaquet and Waterloo. And when reference is made
to the millions of Germany it may be asked whether there

ANTWERP AND THE SCHELDT 255
are not other millions in the opposite scale, and whether
every month's delay will not make the preponderance
against her more marked ? What is the true moral that the
Dutch people should draw from this question of numbers ?
Is it not that they should decide to play their part worthily
in this great European crisis before the swing of the pendu
lum has made their co-operation useless and of no value ?
When Germany has been brought to her knees, when the
avenging hosts are inflicting retribution on German cities,
and above all on the robbers' nest called Berlin (" die
Rauber Stadt"), it will be rather too late in the day for
Holland to join in the hunt.
At the present moment Holland has the best opportunity
that is ever likely to present itself for efficacious and profit
able intervention. Her army, including the Landweer, is
mobilised. There is no reason to doubt that there are
nearly 300,000 men with the colours, and a very large part
of them are assembled in close proximity to the German
western frontier. The strategical position of Holland is
exceptionally advantageous, for it provides the best route
for reaching the most exposed part of Germany. The great
mining and industrial region between Crefeld and Essen
lies open and unguarded to an offensive movement from
Venlo and Roermond. Germany has denuded this region
of troops to supply her needs elsewhere, trusting that she
has hoodwinked the Dutch Government into believing that
Holland at least is safe from her rapacity. Safe from her
rapacity ! Why, it is only the other day that Germany
appropriated the Lower Ems, bottled up the Dutch fishing
fleet at Delfzijl, and forbade the Dutch to look on at what
they were doing at Emden. In the south the Dutch
Government is most exacting about the Scheldt; in the
north it accepts without protest the theft of one of its
waterways in broad daylight. Truly the glamour of
German power must have deprived the Dutch public of the
capacity of measuring facts and drawing right conclu
sions, when we see them so apathetic about the infraction
of their indisputable rights on the Lower Ems,* and so
aggressive about their imaginary exclusive claims over the
Scheldt. * The details are given at the end of this article.

256 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
The value of Dutch co-operation, then, is greatest at
the present moment. Promptly rendered, it would ensure
the security of Antwerp, which is not as perfect as is
generally supposed, and at the same time it would open
out the way for striking a blow at the most vulnerable
point of Western Germany. In plain words, Holland has
the chance of rendering the Allies a service far in excess
of her military resources. If she decided on action at the
present moment, she could contribute materially to the
shortening of the war, and thus render a sterling service
that all would appreciate. But the opportunity may easily
slip by. Antwerp may pass through the peril that besets
her, the Germans may be driven back to their own terri
tory ; when the tide of success has turned definitely against
the provokers of this European strife, then the co-operation
of Holland will seem of little moment and value. Now,
and not at a later stage, is the time for Holland to strike
in with the greatest use to the Allies, and with the greatest
reward to herself.
It is possible that the idea of a direct reward has not
yet occurred to Dutch politicians as the reciprocation for
their intervention, if timed to the right moment, which is
certainly now at hand. But just as there is certain to be
a larger Belgium after the war is over, so might there be
an enlarged Holland through the recovery of territory that
Prussia wrested from the House of Orange by simple high
way robbery.
This was in 1744-7, when Prussia deprived the Count
of East-Frisia of his possessions north and east of the
Ems as the price of allowing him to be elected Stadthalter
of Holland under the style of William IV. Napoleon
restored this province to Holland, and the recovery of the
Ems Valley with the East-Frisian Islands would be a very
valuable rounding off of the Dutch dominions. At least
it would put an end to disputes in the Dollart, and the
possession of Borkum would ensure control of the
navigable channel of the Western Ems. It is therefore
sufficiently clear that when the time comes to draw afresh
the map of Europe there will be means to reward Holland
for any good and timely service she may have rendered.
But of course the service must have been rendered, and it

ANTWERP AND THE SCHELDT 257
will have to be something more active than sitting on the
fence as a passive spectator.
Holland stands, therefore, at the parting of the ways.
She can continue to be neutral, and by interpreting her
neutrality in regard to the Scheldt, as if it was her sole
possession, she can injure Belgium and embarrass her
friends. The injury and embarrassment will be in pro
portion to the straits to which Antwerp may yet be reduced.
But if she continues in this course she cannot expect any
reward, and she must be prepared to receive the condem
nation of all right-thinking persons.
On the other hand, she can show her sympathy with
Belgium by combining with her in resisting the violation
of her soil and of the good faith of treaties. She may
make common cause with the Belgians not merely because
she has so often called them " our brothers of the Nether
lands," but because she must know, after what they have
done, that no promises made by the Germans will be held
binding. If they carry the day, Holland's time for being
plundered must come sooner or later, and then she would
receive no sympathy or support from any man. These are
the considerations that should weigh with Dutch opinion.
Given the desire to co-operate in the speedy deliverance
of Belgium from the brutal tread of the German invader —
and I do not doubt it is very widespread in Holland —
there remains the further practical question : What is the
best moment for intervention ? There can be no question
that it has arrived. The need of Belgium for effective
co-operation could not be greater, and at the same time
the high tide of German encroachment has begun to ebb.
Holland cannot have a better opportunity of joining the
Grand Alliance of the twentieth century, in emulation of
those great Netherlanders who founded the similar pact
of the seventeenth century, than now invites her prompt
decision. But, in any case, the question of the freedom of the
Scheldt route to Antwerp will have to be settled, and in
a sense favourable to the needs and wishes of Belgium.
The fortification of Flushing did not give the case of the
freedom of the Scheldt away. Holland might line the
river with forts, but that would not alter the status given
17

258 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
to the Scheldt by Europe in formal convention. They
would only provide the Dutch Government with the pro
visional means of attempting to alter or undo the decrees
of Europe on a matter which is international and not local.
But however obstinate the Dutch may be in character, it
is inconceivable that they would commit the stupendous
and costly act of folly of firing from those forts on a
British expedition sent to Antwerp either to relieve the
place or to take part in operations for the expulsion of
the German invaders. I have no doubt that the Flushing
cannon are excellent of their kind and quite up-to-date,
but in reality they are no more to be employed against
the British Navy than if they were the painted wooden
guns that used to be displayed on the walls of Chinese
towns. Of the supreme madness of turning their batteries
on British warships or transports we must acquit the Dutch
Government until positive proof to the contrary is forth
coming. But our main anxiety must be for Antwerp. We know
that it is the last visible token of Belgian independence,
but we do not know that it is impregnable. Strong as it is,
we have reasons for apprehension if a sufficiently numerous
German force should ever entirely invest it. The real
safeguard of Antwerp is to prevent such a contingency
from taking place. It can be prevented by British and
other Allied troops having a free unobstructed way up the
Scheldt. It can be prevented by the active intervention of
Holland in the war. She has only to act promptly and in
force along the German lines of communication, and then
not merely will a close investment of Antwerp become
impossible, but a German retreat must become inevitable.
Never had a small State like Holland such a chance of
playing a big part in a grave European crisis as is now
offered to the Netherlander nation and Government. Will
they seize it, or blindly let the opportunity pass by ?
P.S. Holland did not take it. Antwerp has fallen.
The sequel lies in the future. While thinking that she
might have played a braver part, we have no sympathy
with such insulting proposals as a suggested purchase of
Zealand, the home of the Sea-Beggars. We wish to see
Holland enlarged not diminished.

A GERMAN ENCROACHMENT ON THE
LOWER EMS*
As everyone knows, or those who do not know may be
referred to history, States are great robbers. In old days
the excuse was simply the law of the stronger; modern
usages require more subtle devices. An instance presents
itself in the Dollart and the Lower Ems, where Germany
has perpetrated at the expense of a weak neighbour the
first stage of a theft which may be fraught with serious
consequences. In all Dutch maps down to the present hour, in all
German maps down to at least the year 1900, the German-
Dutch frontier in the Dollart is marked by a line from
north to south, denoting clearly enough the boundary on
the eastern and western sides of Holland and Prussia
respectively. On all these maps without exception no
attempt was made to trace the boundary in the river, but
as it has always been the unbroken usage to regard the
thalweg, or fairway, as the boundary between States hold
ing the opposite banks of a river, the assumption has
always been that the middle line of the Ems channel
formed the boundary here. No one ever questioned it until
a few years ago, and we shall show that even as recently
as 1890 Prussia admitted the equal rights and position of
the Netherlands in the Lower Ems.
In 191 1 a new edition of the German Staff Map was
brought out — sheet 172 containing the Lower Ems and the
greater part of the Dollart. Some little time elapsed
before the critics, who examined it more or less casually
in the first place, awoke to the important and startling
change that had been introduced into it. In the first place
* Morning Post, May 1, 1913.
259

260 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
the eastern boundary of Holland in the Dollart had been
slightly contracted so as to terminate not at the river
channel, but in the sand of the sea polder specified as
Die Geise, lying south of it. But this change was slight
in comparison with what followed. For the first time in
cartographical history, Holland was arbitrarily provided
with a northern boundary or barrier effectively cutting her
off from the Ems altogether. The boundary is traced in
a straight line to Reide, the extreme north-east point of
the Province of Groningen, and thence drawn along the
shore past Termunterzyl, Delfzijl, Watum, &c, thus
excluding Holland from the Ems altogether. It is not
surprising if the gros bonnets at The Hague rubbed their
eyes and wondered what it all meant. They even began
to study the question a little closely, and to look up the
authorities on the subject, and they were somewhat com
forted to find that England had a right to a word in the
matter, for one of the texts bearing upon it is the Treaty
of the 2nd of July, 1824, between the King of Great
Britain, Ireland, and Hanover, on the one side, and the
King of the Netherlands on the other. Moreover, in the
year 1800 the British Government and Courts had dealt
pretty trenchantly with a claim made by Prussia in connec
tion with the capture of the Dutch ship Twee Gebroeders
that, as the Emperor of Germany had, in 1424, given his
fief Count Ulrich command of the Ems estuary to the
exclusion of Groningen, our men-of-war had violated her
neutrality. This piece of presumption was typical of Prussian
methods, and it may be pointed out that, prior to 1866,
Prussia only held East Frisia from 1746 to 18 14, when
she handed it over to Hanover. It is one of the Hohen
zollern habits to invent claims which the original holders
never thought of putting forward. But between 1800 and
19 10 Prussia had done many things which from an ordi
nary standpoint would seem to tie her hands and put
her out of court. It is hardly necessary to say that
between 18 14 and 1866 the relations of the Netherlands
Government with the British Government, as being joined
with that of Hanover, down to 1837, and with the
Hanoverian Government after the separation of the two

A GERMAN ENCROACHMENT 261
Kingdoms on the accession of Queen Victoria by the
operation of the Salic Law, from 1837 to 1866, were with
out a cloud. In those days Delfzijl was the port favoured
by trade having a far better water-way than Emden, but
in the last eight years the trade of Emden has sextupled,
while that of Delfzijl has remained stationary.
In 1870, during the Franco-German War, Prussia, turn
ing her attention to the question for the first time, made
certain proposals to the Netherlands Government for the
removal of the buoys and barrels in the Lower Ems in
the event of any attempt by the French Fleet. The pro
posals were based on the assumption that the rights and
position of the Netherlands were here exactly equal to
those of Prussia. That country, for it is a Prussian affair,
no doubt pretends that these were mere regulations of no
judicial effect, but she cannot say the same of the regular
Convention signed on her own initiative in 1896. By that
time Borkum, the island at the eastern entrance of the
Ems, which Germany has now so strongly fortified, had
become of importance, and it was necessary to supplement
"the buoys and barrels" with lighthouses. Representa
tions were made at The Hague, and as the result a
Convention was signed at Berlin on the 16th of October,
1896. The preamble sets forth that it was an agreement
between the two countries for lighting the opposite banks
of the Lower Ems, as well as for marking the navigable
channels. The Dutch text reads : " tot regeling der weder-
zijdsche verplichtingen van Nederland en Pruisen ter zake
van het onderhoud van het kustlicht op Borkum alsmede
van de betonning, bebakening en verlichting der vaar-
wegen van de Beneden Ems en van haar monden."
Article 1 specifies that Prussia is to take charge of the
lighting and staking of the Lower Ems for Borkum,
Randsel, Pilsum, and Campen, all places on the eastern
channel, whilst the Netherlands are to perform the same
duties on the whole of the Delfzijl, Watum, &c, shore —
that is to say, for the western channel. Significant as this
article is, the next adds an additional piquancy to the
affair. Article 2 stipulates that each State shall pay " the
exact half of the total cost," and under this head the
Dutch authorities have had to make a small annual pay-

262 ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY
ment to meet the superior cost on the German side. As a
final reference to this Convention, it may be mentioned
that Article 13 gives "both of the contracting parties an
equal right to remove buoys, &c, and to put out lights
when it is at war."
In face of these citations it is impossible for anyone to
deny that Prussia has always admitted Dutch sovereignty
over the left half of the Lower Ems from the Dollart to
the true entrance of the river between the Dutch island of
Rottum and the German island of Borkum. Let us treat
the whole of this water region as firm land, as it was
prior to the thirteenth century, with the Ems flowing
between, and there could only be one conclusion as to
where the frontier lay. It would be the fair water way
in the river or thalweg, which would be common to both.
Yet Prussia on her official map, and all the other maps
and atlases published since 191 1 have followed suit, has
appropriated the whole of the Lower Ems, and suppressed
Dutch rights which in 1896 she admitted to be equal to
her own.
Much more might be said, and many more texts might
be cited, but the present object is merely to draw attention
to what has been done, and enough has probably been
written for the purpose. At The Hague the idea seems to
be that this encroachment on Dutch sovereign rights may
be the preliminary to the construction of the projected ship
canal from the Rhine to the Ems, which might divert the
Rhine trade from Rotterdam. But it is probable that
Prussia has a more immediate aim. She intends to com
plete her chain of naval stations and fortresses by adding
Emden to the others, and at least it is contemplated to
make the Lower Ems behind Borkum a station for torpedo
squadrons. The ousting of Holland from the river is
obviously an essential preliminary, and, besides, Germany
may be dimly conscious of the fact that the Lower Ems
as a gulf or estuary held by two States is in international
law " an arm of the sea " open to all nations.

INDEX

' Abdul Hamid, 188
Acheen, 44
Adenau, 227
" Admiral of the Atlantic," the, 6
^Egean, the, 119
Aehrenthal, Baron, 73 n., 121
Afghanistan, 191
Agadir, 26, 183
Ahrdorf, 227
Aisne Valley, 33
Aix-la-Chapelle, 29, 105, 109, 150,
'5'
Alexander II., Emperor, 10, 144
Algeciras Act, 125
Alliances in Europe, the, 50
Alsace-Lorraine, 122
Alvensleben, Count, 90
Amance, 88
Ambleve, the, 30, 226
America, appeal to, 208-9
Amsterdam, 159, 160, 162, 165
Andernach, 227
Anglo-Belgian Convention, 238-9
Anglo-Dutch Treaty, an, 260
Anglo-German Conciliation Com
mittee, the, 1
Anglo-Portuguese Convention, 236
Anti-Congo Campaign, 66
was Germany behind it?
67
Antwerp, 35, 57, 155, 161, 165, 166,
180, 250
German view of, 22, 32, 41
Arabs, the, 239
Arch-Enemy, the, 70
Arches, 80
Ardennes, the, 32, no, 219, 230
a German occupation of the,
128
railways in, 29
Ardouin-Dumazet, M., 80, 85 n
Argonne Orientale, 82
Arlon, in, 112, 217, 219 263

Armageddon, a conceivable, 128
Army Reform in Belgium, 214
Arnhem, 159
Austria, pushed on by Germany,
21, 27
her difficulties, 72-3
relations with Prussia, 1 19-21,
176
" Balance of Power," the, 117
Balfour, Mr. A. J., 130
Ballon de Servance, 79-80
Banning, M. Emile, 143, 161, 254
Baraque de Michel, 31
Bar le Due, 82
Bastogne, no, 113, 233
Batavia, 44
Batetela Mutiny, 240, 241
Bazaine, 83
Bebel, Herr, 3, 213
Beer Poortugael, General den, 249
Beho, 231
Belfort, 27, 28, 78-9
Belgian Army, 142, 143, 161
Congo, 235-6
courage, 95
fortresses, the, 219
author's opinion of, 220-1
Belgio-German Convention, 241-2
Belgium, n, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56,
57, 60, 61, 65-8, 126, 127, 128
and England, 44-9
and Holland, 90-7, 100, 162-3
and the Scheldt, 164 et seq.,
249 et seq.
anti-German, 179-80
desire to preserve neutrality,
250-1
neutrality of, 137-48
opinion in, 35
revived patriotism in, 210 et
seq.
trade, 91 and note

264

ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENE^Y

Belgium's right to defend herself,
96
Belleville, 83
Berlin, or " the Robber City," 255
Berlin (ship), 244
Bertrix, 105
Bingen, 228
Bismarck, 38, 39, 90, 237
on England, 41
on Holland, 44
on value of guarantees, 41
Blankenheimerdorf, 227
" Bleeding white," 183
Blenod, 86
Blind, Mr. Karl, 3, 4, 6, g, n, 12,
14
Bloomfield, Lord, 41
Boer War, the, 37
Bois Bourrus, 83
Boncelles, 32
Bonn, 104, 225, 227
Borkum, 18, 19, 256, 261, 262
Bouillon, 29, 110-1
Bourlemont, 85
Breskens, 170
Brialmont, General, 103, in, 155
British Army, neglect of, 223
Brouley, 86
Brussels, 243, 244
Brussels, Conference of 1863 : 169,
172
Biilow, Prince, 2, 8, 9, 125, 126
Burg Reuland, 229
Butgenbach, 106, 150, 152
Call, 104
Campen, 261
Campine, the, 155, 162
Canning's lines, 252
Cape-Cairo Railway, 243, 244, 245,
247
Carabiniers, the, 217
Catinat, 34
Cercueil, 88
Chalons, 27, 69, 83
Champenoux, 88
Charleroi, 38, 39, 113
Charmes, 86
Chateau Salins, 28, 87,
Chaudfontaine (fort), 32, 115
Chiers, 84
China, 58
Chodes, 224
Ciney, 29, 113
Coblentz, 227, 228

Cologne 104, 149, 225
Colonies, the British, 24
Colonies, German, 7-9
Commercy, 28, 82
Conflans, 28
Congo Question, the, 100, 119
Comely Munster, 151
C6te-Barine, 86
C6tes de Meuse, 82, 89
Crisis of 1875 : 9-10, 143, 144
Cuxhaven, 18
Cyrenaica, 195
Dahlem, 225
Dalheim, 29, 155, 156,
Dardanelles, the, 124
German guns at, 125
Daun, 227
Delcass6, M., 14, 183
Delfzijl, 255, 260, 261
Denmark, 97, 126
Descamps, Chevalier, 140
Deux Ponts, 228
Dinant, 29
Dogger Bank, the, 159
Domain, 229
Dollart, 256, 259, 260, 262
Dombasle, 88
Domgermain, 86
Donaumont, 83
Doubs, the, 78
Dreadnought as unit, 130
Ducarne, Lieutenant-General, 215,
216, 221, 222
Duckworth, Admiral, 124
Dumpelfeld, 227
Dun, 83
Dutch Army, 255
Belgian Commission, a, 93
Flanders, 173, 252 n.
Prussian Convention, 261
East Africa, German, 243
East Frisia, 260
Count of, 256
Echternach, 229
Ecrouves, 86
Edward VII., H.M., 198
"Effective Occupation" in Africa,
240
Ehrenbreitstein, 228
Eifel, the (also Eiffel), 104, 109, 149
Eighteen Articles, the, 139, 140,
141, 142
Elbe, the, 165

INDEX

265

Elewoutsdyk, 170
Elsenborn Camp, 104-9, '49j "54
Elswick, 132
Embourg, 32
Emden, 19, 255, 261, 262
Ems, the, 19, 255, 256
Ems (Lower), 259, 261, 262
" England is our enemy," 20
England and Belgium, 98-9, 232-3
and Germany, 203-4, 206
and Italy, 191-2, 194-6
no foreign policy, 65
responsibility of, 169
English Expedition, an, 22, 22 n.,
24
Epinal, 28, 79-81
Eupen, 31
Europe, Rivalries in, 118
Euskirchen, 226
Evegnee, 32
Faucilles, the, 79, 80, 81, 89
Fisher, Sir J. (now Lord), 136
Fleet, development of German, 5-7
Flushing, fortification of, 164-6,
1 70-1, 249, 252
Fraiture, 232, 233
France, 125, 126, 127, iB%
France, an alliance with, ig8-2og
and Germany, war averted in
1905 : 13
and Italy, 187, 190
and the Netherlands, 59, 62-3
her perilous position, 201
Francis Joseph, Emperor, 72, 73,
121
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 176
Frederick the Great, 205
Frederick William I., 205
Frouard, 85, 87, 88
Galicia, 27
Gambetta, 175
Genicourt, 82
Gerard, Marshal, 57
German bitterness against Eng
land, 184, 203
character, 183
confidence in victory, 25, 75,
247
designs in Africa, 235-40, 247,
248
designs on Holland, 55
merchants resident in British
possessions, 8-9

German naval power in North
Sea, 18
Navy, 129-31, 204
Navy Bill, 3, 5, 6
plans, 147, 229
repressive measures, 122
Germans in Belgium, 58
Germany, ambition of, 207-8
and the North Sea, 98
and Tripoli, 189
designs of, 162-3
desire for supremacy, 175
enemy of peace, 177, 181
power of, 200
the old and the new, 10
war plan of, 200
Gerolstein, 227, 229
Giromagny, 78
Gironville, 82
Givet, 29, 33
Gladbach, 156
Gladstone, Mr., 48, 143
Glorieux, 83
Goschen, Lord, 7
Gotzen, Count von, 241
Gouvy, 29, 30, 105, 156, 157, 229,
330
Great Lakes railways, 245
Grenadiers, the (Belgian), 217
Grey, Sir Edward, great services
of, 100 and note, 235, 248
Groningen, 260
Hague, The, 44, 249
Handanville, 83
Hanover, 260, 261
Haye (forest), 85, 87
Heeckeren, Baron, 158
Heinsberger, General, 221
Helder, 160
Heligoland, 18, 136
Hellebaut, General 30, 31
Hellenthal, 104, 107, 149
Henry of Prussia, 134
Herbesthal, 31
Herenthals, 155
Hillesheim, 227
Hohe Venn, 103, 109
Hohenzollern policy, 185, 203
Holland, 23 and note, 51-7, 68-9,
126
and Belgium, 90-7, 100
and Germany, 9
and the Scheldt, 164-71, 249-57
English support of, 39-43

266

ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY

Holland, German views on, 38-9,
42, 44
not a neutral State, 158-9
opinion in, 161-2
trade, 91 and note
Horchheim, 227
Hornby, Admiral, 124
Hungary, 73
Huns, the, predicted German emu
lation of, 177
Hymans, M. Paul, 211, 212
Infantry, Belgian, 217
Italy, 72, 120, 176-7, 184, 186-97
Jahde, the, 130
Japan, 159
Japanese, the, 182
intervention in Europe, 182
Japanese Alliance, the, 199
Japanese War, 64
Java, 38
Jemelle, 231
Josset, Commandant, 88 n.
Journal, Le, 211, 212
Junkerath, 225, 226, 227
Kabambare, 239
Kalter Herberg, 105, 109, 150,
'S'j 'S2
Kassongo, 239
Katanga, 245, 246
Kiel, 132, 136
Kilo, 246
Kivu, Lake, 241, 242
Koweit, 191
Kreuznach, 228
Kruger, President, 245
Krupp's armour, 131
Kuyper, Dr., 55, 69
Kyllburg, 229
La Charme, 83
La Fere, 33
Lammersdorf, 151
Landrecourt, 83
Lansdowne, Marquis of, 199
Laon, 33
La Roche, in, 113
Leopold I., saying of, 94, 138,
141, 142, 146, 180
Leopold II., 237, 241, conversation
with, 244-5
Lerouville," 82

Libramont, 29, 30, 31, 34, 105, no,
iS7. 231. 233
Lichnovsky, Prince (German Am
bassador), 16
LiSge, 60 and note, 94, 145, 155,
160, 165, 210, 215, 219, 221,
226
forts, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35
Ligneuville, no
Lille, 232
Lillo, 169
Limburg, 40, 94, 162, 229
Liouville, 82
Lissendorf, 227
" Little States, etc.," 90
London Conference (1830-9), 48,
138-41, 252; (1867), 40
Longwy, 29, 30, 84, 230
Loudon, Governor, 44
Louvain, 155
Lualaba, 246
Lucey, 86
Luneville, 28, 81, 84
Luxemburg, 33, 38, 39, 40, 228, 229
fortress, 40
question, the, 142
Lyceum Club, the, 2
Lytton, Earl of, 10
Macedonia, 120, 123, 124
Mahomedan opinion, 191-3
Malmedy, 32, 103, 105, 150, 152,
224, 225, 226
Manonviller, 84
Map, German staff, 259
Marche, 29
Marloie, 226, 231
Mars la Tour, 28
Mayen, 227, 228
Metternich, Count Paul, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6
Metz, 28, 229
Meuse, the, 93, 113, 114, 155, 219
bridges, 229
Mezieres, 29, 83
Michel Baraque, 229
Moll, 155
Moltke, 75
Monroe Doctrine, the, 208
Mons, 113
Montb&iard, 78
Montenau, 154
Montenoy, 88
Montjoie, 30, 105, 109, 150, 151
Montmedy, 29, 83-4

INDEX

267

Monville, M., 211, 212-3, 22°
Morocco, 64, 65, 125
crisis, the, 26
Moselle, 85
Mulhouse, 27
Munster Treaty, 165
Nahe, the, 228
Namur, 32
Nancy, 28, 76, 87-8, 88 n.
Napoleon III., 38, 39, 40, 41
Nassogne, in
Near East, the, 207
Neufchateau (France), 27, 81
Neutrality, voluntary and en
forced, 137-8
Neuwied, 228
Nimeguen, 159
North Brabant, 229
North Sea Canal, 160
Norway, 126
Nys, Professor, 140, 251
Orval, 74
Ourthe Valley, 226
Pagny, 85
Palmerston, Lord, 57
Party system, a, 223
Peace of Europe, 174, passim
Pelm, 227
Pepinster, 105, 230
Persia, 176
Persian Gulf, 188
Philippeville, 38, 39
Pilsum, 261
Poland, 121, 199
Pont a Mousson, 28
Pont St. Vincent, 81, 85, 87, 88
Porrentruy, 27, 74
Post, Die, 158
Prague, Treaty of, 39
Pronsveld, 229
Prum, 229
Prussia, unscrupulous policy of, 70
Prussian policy, development of,
16-7
instances of, opposed by
England, n-12
Raeren, 31, 151
Railways, new German, 223 et seq .
Randsel, 261
Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 10
Regret, 83

Reide, 260
Remagen, 227
Remiremont, 80
Reptile Press, the German, 39
Rethel, 34
Rheims, 27, 33, 83
Rheydt, 155, 156
Rhine Canal, a, 262
Rhine, the, 126
in war, 227-8
Rhodes, Mr. Cecil, 243, 244, 245,
246
Rhodesia, 245
Rhone Valley, the, 27
Rivage, 226
Rochefort, 29, 112, 113
Roetgen, 151
Rogier, Charles, 252 and note
Rotterdam, importance of, 56, 126,
162, 165
Rottum, 262
Rozellier, 83
Rudesheim, 228
Ruremonde, 155
Russia, German views of, 20-1, 64,
120, 176, 200
Ruzizi stream, 241, 242
Saarbriick, 228
Saargemund, 228
St. Hubert, 113
St. Michel, 83, 85
St. Mihiel, 82
St. Trond, 155
St. Vith, 29, 30, 105, 150, 228
Salisbury, Marquis of (the late),
foresees the German danger, 1,
10
Salonika, 123
Sampigny, 82
Scheldt question, 164-73
stands over, 257-8
Scheldt, sovereignty of, 164-73,
249-56
Schonfelderhof, 228
Sedan, 27, 83, 157, 230
Semois, the, 32, 145
Service, period of (Belgium), 217
Shat-ul-Arab, 125
Sinai peninsula, 125, 191
Soir, the, 215
Sourbrodt, 105, 106, 150, 152
Spa, 105, 230
Stade tolls, 165
Stadtkyll, 225, 227

268

ENGLAND'S ARCH-ENEMY

States of Europe, the, 50, 177-8
Stavelot, 30, 32, 103, no, 145, 150,
*52> x57> 224, 226, 230
railway, 152-3
Stein, Baron, 90
Stenay, 33, 83
Strasburg, 28, 84
Sweden, 178
Swiss Army, the 218, 220
Switzerland, 97, 137, 178, 179
Tanganyika, Lake, 241, 242, 245
Tavannes, 83
Tennyson, quoted, 6
Termunterzyl, 260
Terneuzen, 169, 170
Texel, the, 160
Thionville, 29, 33
Tillot, 86
Toul, 28, 85-7
Tournai, 113
Treaties of 1870 : 45
Treaty of 1839 : 139, 140, 141,
167-8
Treves, 29, 30, 33, 149, 228, 229
Triple Alliance, 72, 186-93, '95
Tripoli, 186, 187, 188, 189, 192
Trois Ponts, 30, 32, 105, 226, 230
Trois Vierges, 105, 229
Troyon, 82
Turkey, 20, 119, 125, 178, 187
Turkey and Germany, 196
Twee Gebroeders, the, 260
Twenty-four Articles, the, 139, 140,
141, 142
Vandervelde, M., 211, 213-4, 217,
218
Vaux, 83
Venlo, 165
Verdun, 23, 27, 28, 29, 81-3, 232
Verviers, 115, 215
Vianden, 229

Victoria, Queen, 10, 261
Vie, 87
Viel Salm, 29, in, 145, 154, i57j
230
Vienna Congress, 137, 165
Villey le Sec, 86
Vis6, 165
Vistula, 128
Vologne, the, 80
Vosges, the, 26, 27, 28, 29, 128
frontier, 74 et seq.
mines, 76-7
Vouziers, 33, 34
Walloons, the, 150
Waterloo, 11
Watum, 260, 261
Waxweiler, 229
Wegberg, 156
Weismes, 105, 150, 152, 224, 229
Welkenraedt, 154, 231
Welkenraedt-Louvain railway, 115
Wester woort, 160
Weywertz, 150 K.,224, 225, 226, 229
Wilhelmina, Queen, 43, 158
Wilhelmshaven, 18, 19, 130, 132
William, Emperor (the Arch-
Enemy), 2, 3, 5, 6
his gibes, 12, 13
Protector of Islam, 125,
. 'S8. 205, 239, 245
William III. (Netherlands), 39, 40,
42, 43
William IV. (Stadhalter), 256
Woevre, 77, 85
Yangtse Valley, the, 58
Ypres, 113
Zambesi, 246
Zanzibar, 237
Zeppelin at Heligoland, 18
Zuyder Zee, 160

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