YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

GIFT OF
FREDERICK SHELDON PARKER
B.A., LL.d.
YALE 1873

THE

BONAPARTE LETTERS

AND

DESPATCHES,
SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, AND OFFICIAL:

FROM THE ORIGINALS

IN HIS PRIVATE CABINET.

VOLUME I.

LONDON :
SAUNDERS AND OTLEY, CONDUIT STREET.
1846.

P. SnOBEKL, JUNIOR,
3To Sftls fiopal JUigljness
51, RUPERT STREET,

PKIKTER
prince aitttt,
HATMAIIKET, LONDON.

INTRODUCTION.

It would certainly be held to argue either ex
treme affectation or the grossest ignorance to deny,
at this time of day, that one of the most extraor
dinary personages of the eventful age in which he
lived, if not the most extraordinary of them all, was
Napoleon Bonaparte. The glory with which he sur
rounded himself in so superlative a degree was of
that nature which is most apt to dazzle the great
mass of mankind, to captivate contemporaries, and
to win the admiration of posterity. But such were
the powers and resources of his mind that, had any
other combination of circumstances thrown him into
a different career, it can scarcely be doubted that,
whatever it might have been, he would have acquired
the highest distinction . to which it was capable of
leading. He would have shone, had he been a states
man, a diplomatist, an actor, and nothing more.
History has industriously deduced the prominent
features of his character from his actions, but many
minute traits have escaped its observation, Both are
sketched by his own hand unreservedly in this work,
a2

iv INTRODUCTION.
which contains the Secret and Official Correspondence
of this remarkable man during what may be termed
his apprenticeship to power, the years between his
appointment to the command of an army and his
usurpation of the government to the heads of which
he had ever professed the greatest deference.
In these Letters, not intended to meet the public
eye, he has laid bare the sentiments and motives
which influenced his actions during the busy years
over which they extend, and thus raised a monumen-
tum cere perennius — a monument more imperishable
than that designed to cover his ashes in the capital
of what was once his mighty empire. They display
his unrivalled judgment, sagacity, foresight, and dis
crimination — his indefatigable perseverance, activity,
industry, and that attention to the minutest circum
stances, without which the success of the most ably
combined plans may be endangered. But the monu
ment, like a medal, has its reverse: There we dis
cover the recklessness of the means employed for
accomplishing ends — the duplicity, fraud, hypocrisy,
perfidy, rapacity, cruelty, which cast a shade over
those higher qualities that would excite unmixed
admiration but for the purposes to which they were
applied. It is not the design of these introductory remarks
to give an analysis of the work here presented to the
public ; it is, in fact, of so miscellaneous a nature, as
not to be susceptible of analysis : their object is
simply to refer, in a desultory manner, to a few of the

INTRODUCTION. V
subjects which it embraces, so as to enable the reader
to form some idea of the pre-eminent importance,
value, and interest of this collection. They shall
commence with some brief notices of that instrument
by which the mighty events recorded in it were
achieved — the Army.
In the various wars which have carried French ar
mies into almost every country of Europe, they have
invariably contrived to earn universal execration, not
merely by the most oppressive exactions and requi
sitions, but also by the wanton destruction of ail
that they could not consume or cany away. This
barbarous spirit seems to have been first called forth
by the inhuman devastation of the Palatinate of the
Rhine, by the express command of Louvois, minister
of Louis XIV., in 1689. To ensure the safety of the
French frontier in that quarter, the neighbouring pro
vinces, some of the most flourishing in Germany, were
converted into a desert ; and to prevent the enemy
from turning the towns into fortresses, Heidelberg,
Manheim, Worms, Spire, and many other cities, toge
ther with a great number of villages, were plundered
and burned. In Spire, the French soldiers, ferocious
as their republican successors a century later, broke
open the tombs of the Salic emperors, strewed their
ashes to the winds, made footballs of their sculls,
and carried off their silver coffins. Madame de Main-
tenon called the attention of the King to these abo
minations, and Louis forbade the minister to burn
Triers, as he had already determined to do. Two

vi INTRODUCTION.
days afterwards, Louvois reverted to this measure,
adding that, to spare his Majesty's conscience any
uneasiness, he had taken the whole upon himself,
and sent off a courier with orders for its execution.
Irritated at this pertinacity, the King snatched up
the tongs, and would have struck Louvois, had not
Madame de Maintenon stepped between them. The
minister left the apartment in great perturbation.
Louis called him back. " Send off a courier imme
diately," said he, with flashing eyes, " and take care
that- he arrives in time ; for, if a single house is
burned, your head shall answer for it." Soon after
wards Louvois provoked the King by some new con
tradiction to such a degree that he grasped his cane
to chastise him. Still Louis had not the resolution
to dismiss his troublesome minister, whose pride was
so hurt by these humiliations that he survived them
only two years.
Ever since the time of Louvois, pillage and devas
tation appear to have been almost considered as part
of the duty required of the French soldier. Nor is
this wonderful, prescribed as such conduct has been
by the government and practised by the officers. In
the Seven Years' War, when Great Britain formed an
alliance with Prussia, and France, of course, ranged
herself on the side of Austria, the commander of the
French forces sent to invade Hanover was directed
by his government to leave nothing in the, electorate,
but to cut down every growing tree level with the
ground. Such was the rapacity of the Duke de

INTRODUCTION. Vii
Richelieu during the six months in which he held the
command there, that his own soldiers called him by
no other name but le petit Pere la Maraude; and so
far was he from wishing to conceal his numberless
extortions, that he built with them a splendid palace
in Paris, which was denominated by the people, as it
possibly may be to this day, le Pavilion d'Hannovre.
Their conduct in the other countries of Germany was
perfectly consistent with these directions and con
duct. Hence, the victory of Rossbach was univer
sally hailed as a national triumph over foreign hordes,
which proved themselves, whether among friends or
foes, more destructive than a cloud of locusts, more
savage than the most ravenous beasts. " It is not
the Prussians," says a Saxon memoir of that time,
" who have laid waste our fields, our vineyards, and
our gardens ; it is. not the Prussians who have tram
pled down our growing crops, who have robbed on
the highway, who have plundered our houses, who
have carried off and destroyed our provisions ; it is
not the Prussians who have desecrated . our churches
and made a mock of all that is sacred. No — it is
our friends, the French and the troops of the Em
pire, our so ardently wished-for deliverers, who have
plunged us into these miseries."
In continuation of these grievances, it is recorded
that whatever they could not consume or carry away
was destroyed or rendered useless. They broke in
pieces household furniture, casks, and other vessels,
tore up papers and books, ripped open beds, and

vm INTRODUCTION.
strewed the feathers over the fields, and slaughtered
cattle which they could not remove, and left them to
putrify in the deserted farm-yards. Twenty villages
around Freiburg were rendered desolate because the
French had sojourned in them. Nor were the private
soldiers alone to blame for these wanton excesses, of
which their officers set them the example. Thus it
is related that the Marquis dArgenson, who com
manded the French in Halberstadt, whenever he was
about to leave a house in which he had lodged, was
accustomed to break in pieces the furniture, and to
destroy the looking-glasses with a diamond.
These complaints, preferred by Germans, are fully
confirmed by the testimony of Count St. Germain,
who commanded a division of the French army at the
battle of Rossbach. Writing to a friend, he says :
" I head a band of robbers, of murderers, who de
serve to be broke upon the wheel, who ran away at
the first musket-shot, who are always ready to mu
tiny." Again : " The country is plundered and laid
waste for thirty leagues round, as if fire from heaven
had fallen upon it : our marauders have scarcely left
the very houses standing  They plundered, mur
dered, violated women, and committed all possible
abominations." To characterize the conduct of the troops of the
great nation in Germany during subsequent wars, in
the time of the Republic and the Empire, would re
quire a mere repetition of the circumstances detailed
above ; while the wholesale destruction and pillage

INTRODUCTION. IX
carried on in Portugal and Spain by every man, from
the highest to the lowest, belonging to the French
armies which successively visited those countries, is
too well known to need animadversion. Our business
at present is with the army of Italy, while commanded
by Napoleon Bonaparte.
In the very first instructions given by the Directory
to the young General, they impress upon him to
" make a point of maintaining rigid discipline, and
sparing the inhabitants all the vexations and disasters
which the scourge of war so frequently brings with
it, and which order and well-regulated administra
tions are alone capable of repressing." (Vol. i., p. 8.)
The same injunction is repeated on several subsequent
occasions, on one of which Carnot, writing in the
name of the Directory, refers to a severe order which
Bonaparte is supposed to have given, and an extraor
dinary power which he had been obliged to confer on
the Generals of Division. (Vol. i., p. 51.) This pas
sage affords undeniable evidence that the government
had invested him with sufficient authority to repress the
excesses of the troops, and the incessant complaints
in the letters of his Generals furnish evidence equally
undeniable that they could not wring from him any
power whatever for that purpose.
Meanwhile, the soldiers of the army of Italy proved
themselves to be genuine Frenchmen, clinging most
tenaciously to the traditional custom of their profes
sion : and if the General-in-chief thought fit to wink
at their outrages, it was perhaps for fear of compro-

X INTRODUCTION.
mising his popularity among them. Before he had
been a month at the head of the army, we find La-
harpe, an honest Swiss, who commanded one of its
divisions, remonstrating on this subject in very ener
getic terms. " The boundless licentiousness," he
says, " to which the troops give themselves up, and
which cannot be remedied, because we have not a
right to order a scoundrel to be shot, is hurrying us
into ruin, dishonouring us, and preparing for us the
most cruel reverses. As my character for firmness
will not permit me to witness such things, much less
to tolerate them, there is but one course for me to
take — that of retiring. In consequence, General, I
beg you to accept my resignation, and to send an
officer to take the command entrusted to me ; for
I would rather dig the ground for a livelihood than
be at the head of men who are worse than were the
Vandals of old." (Vol. L, p. 36.)
This letter of Laharpe's is dated the 17th of April :
and on the 20th two other superior officers, Cham-
barlhac, chief of the 70th demi-brigade, and Maugras,
whose rank is not mentioned, write to tender their
resignation for the same cause. To such a length
was the propensity to pillage carried, as to thwart
even the military operations. Serrurier's division
had taken the village, castle, and heights of St.
Michael, near Ceva, when his troops " fell to plunder
ing, in spite of all his efforts to restrain them. The
enemy took advantage of this stupidity to return to
the charge, and in an instant the conquerors lost

INTRODUCTION. XI
everything." — On the following day, April 20th,
Serrurier himself reports : " Several corps have been
without bread for these three days : the troops abused
this pretext to abandon themselves to the most hor
rible pillage. The corps have somewhat rallied, but
there are still wanting a considerable number of men,
who have gone off to get provisions in all possible
ways. I am ill seconded by the officers, who pillage
too : they were drunk yesterday, like the others 
If bread does not reach us, the soldiers will not
march." He adds : " We are still in want of a great
many muskets; there were two thousand deficient
before the affair."
" Unless we receive bread to-night," writes Laharpe
on the same day, " we shall be without an ounce to
morrow, and, should it even arrive, there would not
be sufficient to give a quarter of a ration to the three
brigades and to the cavalry. All the agents, store
keepers, and others, in all the administrations, are
making requisitions at random : the peasants of the
these parts are absolutely ruined : the soldiers are
destitute and their leaders disconsolate : rogues only
are enriching themselves. There is not a moment to
be lost, General, if you would save the army, if you
would not have us be considered in Piedmont as men
worse than the Goths and Vandals .... It cannot be
doubted that the inhabitants, driven to despair, will
arm and slaughter every French straggler. Above all,
it is urgent to put a stop to that host of illegal re
quisitions; or, if they must continue, it would be

Xll INTRODUCTION.
better to assemble the inhabitants, shoot them, and
then finish plundering ; for it comes to the same
point. Bread ! bread ! and again bread !" (Vol. i.,
p. 38-41.)
One more passage from a letter of the same Gene
ral's, two days later, presents so frightful a picture
of the state of troops belonging to a nation calling
itself civilized, as makes one shudder. " The soldiers
are more busily engaged than ever in theft and plun
der : peasants have been murdered by our men, and
soldiers have been killed by the peasants. Words
cannot adequately describe the horrors that have been
committed. The camps are almost deserted, the
soldiers roaming over the country more like ferocious
beasts than men; those who do not join in the atro
cities patrolling the while, with superior officers at
their head : it is of no use to drive them from one
place, they only run to murder at another. The
soldiers are culpable, but those who reduce them to
the alternative of plundering or starving are much
more guilty. In the name of humanity, in the name
of liberty, which wretches are assassinating, rescue us
from this situation ! Send us wherewithal to prolong .
our miserable existence without committing crimes.
Who would have thought that the brave fellows of the
army of Italy, after making so many sacrifices, would
have no other reward but the cruel alternative of
being famished to death or turning robbers ! The
contributions which, judiciously levied, would have
enabled us to live, are become impracticable ; the

INTRODUCTION. xm
soldier destroying in a moment what we could have
lived upon for a week without ruining the inhabi
tant." And he winds up with the indignant apo
strophe, "Can there exist a Providence, since its
avenging bolts do not crush all the villains who are at
the head of the administrations !" (Vol. i., p. 42, 3.)
It was not many days afterwards that, in a night-
attack of the Austrians on his division, Laharpe was
shot by his own soldiers, by mistake, as it is alleged ;
but his zeal in repressing their outrages seems to ren
der it questionable whether that mistake may not
have been wilful.
There were other officers of high rank in the
Italian army whose minds revolted at the atrocities
which they could not prevent. On the 9 th of May,
General Dallemagne writes : " Up to this day, I have
been making vain attempts to check pillage : the
guards which I have stationed are of no use. Ter
rible examples are required ; but I know not whether
I have the power to make those examples. An honest
and humane man suffers and feels himself dishonoured
in marching at the head of a corps in which wretches
are so numerous. Were I not at the most advanced
post, I would beg you to send as my successor a man
whose health and talents might enable him to obtain
greater success ; but I must forget self, when the
point is to labour for the glory of my country."
(Vol. i., p. 83.)
It will be seen by the preceding extracts from
Laharpe's letters to the General-in-Chief, that the

Xiv INTRODUCTION.
licentiousness, insubordination, and excesses of the
soldiers, were certainly not excused but palliated in
some degree by the extreme inattention shown to
their most urgent necessities. Numberless are the
complaints scattered throughout these Volumes of the
destitute state in which they were left, without cloth
ing, without provisions, without bread, even in some
instances without arms. It is not surprising that,
undeie such circumstances, examples of a mutinous
spirit, of cowardice, and of desertion, should have oc
curred : the only wonder is that an army so neglected
could be kept together at all. General Despinois,
writing from Brescia on the 4th of August, says, " The
division of which you have given me the command
cannot exist in the state of disorganization in which
it is at present. It is in want of everything, and not
a creature to furnish it with supplies, no commissary
of war, no agent, not even a medical officer, or an hos
pital for the wounded. It is always the case that,
when a prey to distresses and suffering all sorts of
privations, the soldier is disheartened, and it is .this
mischievous impression too that we ought to hasten
to destroy." (Vol. i., p. 265.)
Augereau, in a letter dated August 23rd, draws
this deplorable picture of a brigade which had just
joined his division : " Indeed, the condition of that
29th is pitiable: it has at most a hundred bayonets;
it has no clothes, no shoes ; I found in it volunteers
under arms without any covering but a shirt and
linen trowsers. These troops must necessarily be

INTRODUCTION, XV
armed, equipped, and clothed, or left in the rear : for
they cannot be brought before the enemy in this
state, occasioned by the carelessness of the chief."
(Vol. i.,p. 315.)
Massena makes, on the 1st of September, still
more grievous complaints. " The soldiers," he says,
" suffer cruelly : two-thirds of my division, at least,
are in want of coats, waistcoats, breeches, shirts, &c,
and absolutely barefoot. This deficiency of clothing
gives us a great many sick, and will give us a great
many more, if people never do anything but promise
without sending us necessaries. I give you notice,
General," — it is Berthier, Chief of the Staff, to whom
he is writing — " that, if the movement of the General-
in-chief takes place, the soldiers whom I command
cannot march in any way whatever ; it is physically
impossible, unless one would choose to leave half of
them half-way. I have no hesitation to tell you that
if the same attentions are not paid to my division as
to the others, I will give in my resignation and re
nounce the profession. Let it not be supposed that
I am swayed by ill humour ; it is as a free man and
fond of what is right that I thus express myself. —
I have long been applying at Verona for flour, for the
purpose of setting to work the ovens that are .within
reach of my division. I know not from what diabo
lical speculation it is that they will never send any
thing but bread ready-baked at Verona, which,
when it arrives here, is always mouldy, at least two-
thirds of it. When liquids are sent to us, it is always

XVI INTRODUCTION.
in musty casks; and, before they are landed and
delivered at the magazine, half the quantity is always
gone." (Vol. i., p. 336.)
General Kilmaine, writing on the 4th of October,
says, " Everything that comes from the magazines of
Cremona is of such execrable quality that the soldiers
had as lieve drink water as the wine, which they call,
and justly, poison ; and they care so little for what
is dignified with the name of brandy as to leave it.
I am afraid that all this causes us to have a great
number of sick. All the demons conspire against
our poor army of Italy. I know of no better way to
put an end to these abuses than to give up the con
tractors to the justice of the soldiery." Towards the
conclusion, he gives this significant hint, " Cloaks
begin to be indispensably necessary for the cavalry :
there ought to be at least a hundred to each regi
ment." (Vol. ii., p. 43, 4).
On the 25 th of October, General Chabot writes,
" The destitute state of the troops, who are in want
of every kind of clothing, is certainly liable to occa
sion some discouragement. Almost all the men are
naked, without shoes, and with little covering for the
winter which is approaching."
Louis Bonaparte, brother of the General-in-Chief,
to whom he had recently come in quality of his aid-
de-camp, having been sent to General Vaubois at
Lavis, thus describes the state of his division on the
3rd of November : " The troops are without shoes,
without coats — in short, they are naked, and are

INTRODUCTION. xvii
beginning to be daunted : they looked yesterday with
respect at the fine appearance of the Austrians in
order of battle : they are in the snow ; their state
ought to be taken into most serious consideration.
With what consequences would not our defeat be
attended ! The officers in general are worn out :
there were some who amidst the fire talked only of
retiring to their homes." The Austrians, he re
marks, " fight as they never did before : it is a ran
cour, a fury, that borders on despair." (Vol. ii.,
p. 105.)
If such was the pitiable condition of the acting
soldier, we may be prepared to expect that those in
hospitals did not fare very sumptuously. Keller-
mann Junior, who, it would appear, was commissioned
to inspect those at Brescia, describes them in these
terms : " The hospitals are not so bad as those of
Verona, but, with the exception of the wounded, the
others are absolutely destitute of things and medi
cines. A wretched, filthy paillasse, swarming with
vermin, one coarse sheet for each bed, seldom washed,
no blankets, considerable crowding — such is the spec
tacle presented by' the fever hospitals of Brescia : it
is heart-rending. The soldiers justly complain that,
after conquering the wealth of Italy at the expense
of their blood, they are debarred not only from the en
joyment of comforts, but from receiving that care and
those attentions which their situation requires. Bread
and rice are the only tolerable articles of food." The
lodgings of the soldiers are represented as surpassing
vol. i. ***b

XVUl INTRODUCTION.
in wretchedness those of the sick. "They are totally
out of repair. The most excessive filthiness prevails
in the rooms, in the corridors, and in the courts.
The soldiers are in want of straw ; they have nothing
but the refuse of the prisons of the city : the unfor
tunate sick on their passage are sent to the fort to
sleep : they ascend to it, and these hapless conquerors
of Italy, in recompence for all their hardships and
their wounds, find none but damp, unwholesome
lodgings, rotten straw, full of devouring insects, no
accommodation whatever, not even wood for cooking
their meat. These most severe privations, which they
endure here, they endured yesterday, and they will
again endure to-morrow as they pursue their route :
nevertheless, M. le Commissaire will forsooth pro
vide for their wants !" (Vol. ii., p. 4, 5.)
If, as this whole Correspondence seems to prove,
the General-in-Chief possessed the most ample autho
rity for restraining the licentiousness and the spirit
of plunder which prevailed among his troops, but
neglected to exert it, it appears equally certain that
the commissaries, agents, and civil officers of his
army, were wholly independent of' his control ;
though, it is true, these Letters furnish arguments for
a totally different conclusion. " No pity," writes
Carnot, in the name of the Directory, on the 1 6th of
May, " for dishonest administrators, who devour the
subsistence and dilapidate the resources of the repub
lican armies! Point them out to the Directory,
citizen-general ; bring them to trial ; you are on the

INTRODUCTION. XIX
spot ; you are well acquainted with their infamous
conduct and scandalous robberies; make necessary
examples of them, examples capable of deterring
those who may be tempted to imitate them in future :
it is the only way to extirpate that mania for rapine
which impunity and connivance have so disastrously
spread over almost the whole surface of the Republic.
On these shameless vampires ought to fall the first and
the just punishment reserved for audacious guilt."
(Vol. i., p. 104, 5.) From this language but one
inference can be drawn — >that the General was in
vested with ample authority for the correction of the
abuses of the civil administration of his army : but
let the reader turn to his letter of the 12 th of Octo
ber, filled with energetic denunciations, and it will be
impossible to doubt his willingness to punish. "Ever
since I have been at Milan," he says, " I have been
engaged in making war upon knaves. I have had seve
ral tried and punished, and I must denounce others to
you. In making open war upon them, it is clear that
I interest against myself a thousand voices, which
will not fail to exert themselves to convert public
opinion. I can conceive that, if, two months ago, I
aspired to be Duke of Milan, I should now want to
be King of Italy ; but so long as I have strength
and your confidence" — he is addressing the Direc
tory — " I will make merciless war on rogues and
Austrians." Commencing with the administrators general of the
finances of the army, rogues on a great scale, he de-
t>2

XX INTRODUCTION.
scends to the commissaries, who, with few exceptions,
are also " nothing but rogues ; they ought to watch,
and they furnish the means of robbing by signing
everything." Among the delinquencies of this class,
he says that a commissary named Flack was accused
of having sold a chest of bark, sent as a present to
his army by the King of Spain. He then proceeds,
" You have, no doubt, calculated that your adminis:
trators would rob, but that they would perform their
duty and have a little shame : they rob in so ridicu
lous and impudent a manner, that if I had a month's
time there should not be one of them who would not
be liable to be shot. I am continually having them
arrested and brought before a council of war ; but
the judges are bought ; there is a fair here ; every
thing is sold. An employe accused of having laid a
contribution of eighteen thousand francs on Salo has
been sentenced to merely two months' imprisonment.
And then how would you set about proving ? They
all- hang together .... The denunciations which I
make are denunciations in soul and conscience, as if
upon a jury. You are aware that it is not in my
place and with my character that I should denounce
them to you, if I had time to collect material proofs
against each of them ; they all cover one another . . .
But I am obliged to set out to-morrow for the army :
great joy for all the rascals, whom a glance at the
administration has made me acquainted with.
" In short," he thus winds up, " we want for
agents, not the tools of stockjobbers, but men pos-

INTRODUCTION. xxi
sessing large fortune and a certain character. I have
none but spies. There is not an agent in the army
but wishes for our defeat, not one but corresponds
with our enemies : almost all have emigrated on
some pretext or other : it is they who make known
our number and dissolve the spell : accordingly, I am
more upon my guard against them than against
Wurmser ; I never have any of them with me ; I feed
my army during its expeditions without them, but
that does not prevent them from hatching tales after
their manner." (Vol. ii., 26-29.)
Reverting to the peculations of the army agents,
the General, writing on the 6th of January, 1797,
repeats that "everything is sold," adding, " the army
consumes five times as much as it needs, because the
storekeepers forge orders and go halves with the
commissaries of war. The principal actresses of
Italy are kept by the employes of the French army :
luxury, licentiousness, and peculation, are at their
height. The laws are insufficient." He then re
commends a remedy, arbitrary enough it must be
confessed — the appointment of one or three syndics
to be sent yearly to the army, whose authority should
last only three or five days, and who during that time
should have power to cause any administrator of the
army to be shot. " Such magistrates," he says,
" would make everybody respect public opinion, and
observe a certain decency not only in manner and
expences, but also in the daily service. Marshal Ber
wick," he proceeds, " caused an intendant of the

xxii INTRODUCTION.
army to be hung, because he was in want of provi
sions ; and we, in the midst of Italy, having every
thing in abundance, spending in a month five times
as much as we need do, are frequently in want.
Imagine not, however, that I am soft, and that I
betray the country in this essential portion of my
functions. I have employes arrested every day; I
have their papers examined, their chests inspected ;
but I have none to second me, and the laws do not
grant sufficient authority to the General to strike a
salutary terror into that host of rogues. However,
the evil is diminishing, and, by dint of scolding, pu
nishing, and putting myself into a passion, things
will, I hope, go on with a little more decency."
(Vol. ii., p. 205, 6.)
In truth, all the orders of the Directory at home,
all the proceedings of its instrument, the army in
Italy, exhibit a system of rapine, robbery, and spo
liation, so monstrous as scarcely to be paralleled in
the history of civilized nations. Practised with eclat
by the heads of the government and their able and
willing agent, the General, and with all but impu
nity by the civil officers of the army, there would
have been too striking an inconsistency in calling the
naked and starving soldiers to a rigid account for
their outrages. The wretched inhabitants of the
countries occupied by the French troops, victims of
this threefold extortion, were encouraged by revolu
tionary artifices to seek a melioration of their fate
by forming themselves into republics independent of

INTRODUCTION. xxm
their late rulers, but under the influence and protec
tion of France, which failed not to exact an exor
bitant recompence for the favour.; while others rose
to exterminate their oppressors, and drew upon them
selves a cruel vengeance, for that most heinous of
offences against their invaders.
In this Correspondence, we find the Directory, so
far from approving the formation of republics in the
conquered provinces, with far-sighted policy dis
couraging any measures which would be liable to
obstruct the free disposal of them on the conclusion
of peace; though at the same time urging the ex
pediency of sowing revolutionary ideas in the Sar
dinian and Austrian dominions.
The extent to which these introductory remarks
are necessarily limited, forbids even a rapid sketch
of the political convulsions of the period which these
Volumes embrace : indeed it would not be necessary,
as every historical reader must be familiar with those
events. On one point, however, a few observations
may not be inadmissible.
The conquest of Upper Italy brought the Gallic
invaders in contact with the States of the Pope. An
army marched against Rome ; but the treaty of To-
lentino, acceding to all the demands of the French,
stopped its progress. The Directory having wrung
from the old pontiff Pius VI. thirty millions (of
francs) in money, bullion, diamonds, and necessaries
for the army, and an unknown value in pictures,
statues, and manuscripts, had, we find, serious in-

XXIV INTRODUCTION.
tentions of extinguishing not only the temporal
power of his Holiness, but the very religion of which
he was the head. Rewbell, writing in the name of
the Directory on the 4th of February, 1797, re
commends to Bonaparte to do all that shall appear
possible " to destroy the papal government, either
by establishing there a form of internal government
which should render the government of priests odious
and contemptible, so that the Pope and the Sacred
College should not have the least hope left of ever
seating themselves again in Rome, and should be
obliged to seek an asylum in some other place, or at
least should have no temporal power whatever."
(Vol. ii., p. 249.)
This was no new or exclusive idea. Cacault, the
French minister at Rome, had some months pre
viously suggested the formation of three republics
out of the States of the Church. The establish
ment of the Transalpine, Cispadane, and Ligurian,
had produced an absolute mania for republics. " This
may take place," continues the writer, "and yet the
Pope, the head of the universal Church, be suffered
to reside as priest, with his court of priests, "and as
pontiff, wherever he pleases, in the same manner as
he resided at Rome, before any donation of the
French had rendered him sovereign of a territory."
General Clarke coincides in these sentiments, but
objects to the time, as unseasonable for the execution
of such a plan. " France," he says, " is again be
come Roman Catholic, and we are perhaps on the

INTRODUCTION. xxv
point of needing the Pope himself for causing the
revolution to be seconded among us by the priests,
and consequently by the country, which they have
found means to govern again. If one could have an
nihilated the Pope three years ago, it would have
been the regeneration of Europe : by overthrowing
him at the present moment, should we not run the
risk of separating for ever from our government a
great number of French submissive to the Pope, and
whom he can rally round him. I firmly believe that
it is for the interest of almost all States to reduce
his power, still almost colossal, to an absolute cipher ;
but the prejudices of kings and nations are adverse
to that interest. It requires thirty years' liberty of
the press in Italy and France to bring about that
moment, and to break down the spiritual power of
the Bishop of Rome. Spain, Naples, Sardinia, and
all Italy, would join our enemies, rendered irrecon
cilable, and would never forgive us for having de
stroyed a power which subjugates and shackles them,
but which the authority of time and that of absur
dity, inculcated from principle, causes them to respect
and cherish."
The guardian angel whose interposition and pro
tection saved the Holy See from the destruction then
meditated was Bonaparte, who, aware of the boundless
influence of the Pope and the popish clergy over all
Catholics, had for some time taken pains to gain their
good will — perhaps foreseeing, in those prophetic
visions which might already have begun to float before

xxvi INTRODUCTION.
his imagination, to what advantage that influence
might some day be employed. Thus, in October, 1796,
he charged the French minister at Rome to assure
his Holiness that he was " more ambitious to be the
saviour of the Holy See than its destroyer." (Vol. ii.,
p. 81.)
Another of these efforts displays the master in the
art of cajoling. The French troops having possessed
themselves by stratagem of Bergamo, he writes on
the 1st of January, 1797, to a high functionary of the
Venetian republic, " It is with pleasure that I seize
this opportunity to do justice to the desire of public
tranquillity manifested by the Bishop of Bergamo
and his respectable clergy. I am convinced of a truth
which is daily demonstrated to my sight, that, if the
clergy of France had been as discreet, as moderate, as
attached to the principles of the Gospel, the Romish
religion would not have undergone any change in
France ; but the corruption of the monarchy had in
fected even the class of the ministers of religion :
there were no longer to be seen in them men of
exemplary life and of pure morals, like Cardinal Mattei,
the Cardinal Archbishop of Bologna, the Bishop of
Modena, the Bishop of Pavia, the Archbishop of
Pisa : in conversing with these venerable personages,
I have sometimes fancied myself carried back to the
first ages of the Church." (Vol. ii., p. 189, 190.)
These demonstrations were just then thrown away,
for the Pope, at the instigation of Austria, was engaged
in hostile preparations, and, when threatened with a

INTRODUCTION. XXV11
visit from the French, he even ventured to launch a
proclamation against them to this effect : " The dis
turbers of the public tranquillity, the unjust oppres
sors of justice, of religion, of all laws, are advancing.
They burn to make their vices and their villany tri
umphant ; deaf to the remorse of their consciences,
they despise God himself, who can blast and annihi
late them in a moment : people, you to have to defend
religion, your country, and your livelihood ! Swear,
every one of you, to save religion, to defend the
country, the State, and the sovereign — or to die !"
(Vol. ii., p. 237-)
This spirit, however, evaporated as soon as it was
known that a French corps was on march for Rome ;
his Holiness then wrote immediately to his dear son,
General Bonaparte, informing him that, " desiring
to put an end of his own accord to the differences
existing between us and the French Republic," he had
appointed plenipotentiaries to settle them. He adds,
" Assured of the sentiments of kindness which you
have manifested for us, we have abstained from any
removal from Rome, and you will thereby be per
suaded how great is our confidence in you." (Vol. ii.,
p. 256.) The General found the papal negociators
at Tolentino : the result of their conferences was a
treaty, acceding to all the demands of the French ;
and there he replied to the letter of his Holiness, in
which he congratulates himself on having had it in
his power to contribute to the personal tranquillity
of the pontiff. " All Europe," he says, " knows the

xxvm INTRODUCTION.
pacific inclinations and the conciliatory virtues of
your Holiness. The French Republic will be, I hope,
one of the truest friends of Rome" — (Vol. ii., p. 263.)
compliments dearly paid for by the increased penalty
extorted from the Pope.
It is evident from these Letters that there was no
scheme too base to be entertained by the Directory.
After the reduction of the Castle of Milan, they gave
orders for its demolition. " It is useful," they say,
" to cause this demolition and that of the barracks at
the parade to be regarded as that of another Bastile,
which Austrian despotism had hitherto employed to
keep under its yoke those flourishing countries which
seem peculiarly formed for liberty. By favour of this
idea, which you will accredit among the people, ex
cite a generous enthusiasm for the fall of that cita
del : it will awaken the ancient hatred of Lombardy
against the emperor, and make it dread the return of
his domination." (Vol. i., p. 224.)
The following scheme is of a much more treacherous
character. The Grand-duke of Tuscany was not only
at peace with France, but observed a strict neutrality ;
the rapacity of the Directory was, nevertheless, ex
cited by the property in Leghorn belonging to English
merchants, and by their orders an expedition was
sent to secure that prize. Soon afterwards, they
wrote to Bonaparte, through Carnot, to this effect :
" Reports are in circulation that the emperor, ac
cording to the probabilities of a health always pre
carious, is approaching his end. To take advantage

INTRODUCTION. xxix
of this event, it is necessary that you should be in
formed of it with the utmost possible celerity when
it has taken place. Keep up for this purpose secret
correspondence with Vienna. The Grand-duke of
Tuscany, heir to the imperial throne, will not hesitate
to repair to his capital immediately after the death
of his brother. The point will then be to prevent
him, to seize him as an enemy of the Republic, and to
occupy Tuscany militarily." (Vol. i., p. 244.) The
Emperor (the late Emperor of Austria) lived to dis
appoint this notable scheme of his adversaries.
Impatient to gain possession of Mantua, in which
Marshal Wurmser had shut himself with the remains
of his army, these petty schemers made a decree de
signed to frighten him into a surrender. This decree
was transmitted to Bonaparte ; but, surmising that it
might produce a precisely contrary effect to that
which they intended, they left him to judge whether
it was advisable to communicate it to the gallant old
soldier. Their notion was " to induce him to sur
render Mantua, by exciting in him a dread of being-
sent to Paris and there tried as an emigrant, if he
holds out to the last extremity, and by offering him
an honourable capitulation, if he consents to deliver
up that place to you. — We ought not," adds the
writer, " to neglect any of the legitimate means
which can be useful against an obstinate enemy." —
Legitimate means! — yes! with the unprincipled all
means are legitimate ! Wurmser, however, though
born in Alsace, was no emigrant : but it was easy to

XXX INTRODUCTION.
put any construction upon the laws against emigrants.
Bonaparte had delicacy enough not to insult Wurm
ser, or to expose the malignity of his masters by send
ing him this decree. (Vol. i., p. 366.)
Another of those mean, sneaking artifices, which
can be entertained only by men without honour or
conscience, relates to a person to whose name we
have no clue. It is thus detailed by Delacroix,
minister for foreign affairs, to General Clarke, under
date of December 30, 1796. " I am aware, like you,
how important it is to the interests of the Republic
not to give up to the personal sentiments of a man, or
to a more enterprising enemy, a secret which may
have an influence on the destiny of one of our national
allies : but it. seems to me that you have in your
hand a surer and easier expedient for attaining this
end. Supposing it were possible to induce Count
de M  to come to France, his apprehension here
would inevitably make a great noise, and might pro
duce serious inconveniences. He might conceive sus
picions and find means to conceal his papers from us.
He is now in a country subject to military govern
ment : but, just arrived from Tuscany, he must feel
perfectly secure ; he must have his papers at hand ;
it would be easy to seize them by causing him to be
arrested on the slightest pretext. As soon as we had
possessed ourselves of the papers, he might be set at
liberty. The government would be in possession of
a mighty means of influence over the power to which
those papers relate ; the momentary detention of the

INTRODUCTION. xxxi
Count de M. would not compromise us in the least,
and "could only be considered as a mistake. Such,
General, is the way in which I think that affair ought
to be conducted." (Vol. ii., p. 192.)
Numberless traits scattered through these Volumes
serve to confirm the homely adage, " Like master,
like man." If the conduct of the Directory was
marked by rapacity, hypocrisy, duplicity, cunning,
and even low cunning, that of their willing tool
Bonaparte rivalled it in those odious qualities; and,
on points to which his own knowledge did not extend,
he found no want of prompters. Thus the French
minister at Venice instigated him to attempt to in
tercept the Archduke, who had been governor of
Lombardy before the invasion of the French, and who
was retiring from Venice with all his treasures to the
Austrian dominions. (Vol. i., p. 1 37.) Thus, too,
Faipoult, the republican minister at Genoa, suggested
the means of facilitating any enterprise which might
be meditated against that city. (Vol. i., p. 190.)
The dawning manifestations of a naturally ambitious
spirit, elevated by extraordinary success and un
bounded flattery, could not escape the notice or fail
to excite the jealousy of the Directory. They formed,
in consequence, the plan of dividing the army of Italy,
and associating General Kellermann with Bonaparte
in the conduct of the military operations in Lom
bardy and the more eastern provinces of the Peninsula.
In this early part of his career, however, he could no
more suffer a rival in authority than he would have

XXXU INTRODUCTION.
endured one when seated, a few years afterwards, on
the imperial throne of France. The Letters in which
he urges his objections to this plan are extremely
interesting, and they were forcible enough to induce
the Directory to forego the intention. Diflering
afterwards in opinion with the Directory respecting
the treatment of the Pope, he expressed his senti
ments without scruple, and tendered his resignation on
the plea of impaired health. (Vol. i., p. 387.) Being
indulged like a spoiled child with permission to follow
his own judgment on the matter in question, we hear
no more of complaints of ill health, or offers to resign.
General Clarke was the person appointed by the
Directory to negociate a peace with Austria. Thiers
roundly asserts that he had another mission — to
wateh Bonaparte : and he has so ably summed up
the grounds for the implied jealousy of the Directory,
that his exposition will not be thought misplaced
here. " The genius of that young man," says this histo
rian of the Revolution, " had appeared so extraordi
nary, his character so absolute and so energetic, that
without any precise motive he was supposed to have
ambition. He had insisted on conducting the war
as he pleased, and had tendered his resignation when
a plan that was not his own had been marked out for
him ; he had acted like a sovereign in Italy, grant
ing to princes peace or war under the name of
armistices; he had loudly complained because the
negociations with the Pope were not conducted by

INTRODUCTION. XXXlll
him alone, and had required that they should be left
to his management ; he had treated Garrau and Sa-
licetti, the commissioners, very harshly when they
ventured upon measures of which he disapproved,
and had obliged them to leave the head-quarters ; he
had taken the liberty to transmit funds to the
different armies without any authority from the
government, and without having recourse to the
indispensable channel of the treasury. All these cir
cumstances indicated a man who liked to do himself
all that he thought himself alone capable of doing
properly .... On seeing him excite Upper Italy
against its old masters and create or destroy States,
people would have supposed that he meant to make
himself Duke of Milan. They had a foreboding of
his ambition, and he had himself a presentiment of
the reproach. He complained of being accused, and
then justified himself, though not a single word of
the Directory furnished him occasion to do so.
" Clarke, then, was sent not only to negociate but
also to watch him. Bonaparte was aware of his
errand, and, acting with his habitual haughtiness and
address, suffered him to perceive that he was ac
quainted with the object of his mission, but subdued
him in a short time by his ascendency and his fasci
nating manner, and converted him into a devoted
adherent." Bonaparte, being appointed joint plenipotentiary
for treating with Austria, conceived that the ne
gociations ought to be deferred till the reduction
VOL. i. c

xxxiv INTRODUCTION.
of Mantua ; while Clarke urged the expediency of
their immediate commencement. This subject is dis
cussed in the Note addressed to his colleague which
has already been quoted; and one argument by
which he supports his opinion is the deplorable state
of France at home, notwithstanding the glory and the
enormous plunder acquired abroad. It is instructive
to contemplate this picture, which is sufficient autho
rity for assuming that peace was not less needful for
the Republic than for her adversary.
" What," he says, " is our position at the moment
that I am writing ? — The lassitude of war is felt in all
parts of the interior of the Republic. The people
ardently wish for peace ; the armies murmur loudly
because it is not made ; that of Italy, and even the
bravest of that army, talk of and desire it. The le
gislative body wills, nay, commands it, as it were, no
matter on what conditions, and its prolonged refusal
to furnish the Directory with funds for continuing
the war is a proof of this. Your finances are null ;
agriculture claims, entices, or recalls the hands which
it sent to protect it from the foreigner ; war would
have, every day, an almost universal immorality,
which might in the sequel overthrow the Republic :
in short, all parties, harassed, wish for the end of
the revolution ; and if our state of internal misery is
prolonged, the wearied people, not finding benefit in
that which is, will be disposed to seek it in another
order of things, which will give rise to new revolu
tions, and we shall have for twenty or thirty years all

INTRODUCTION. XXXV
the calamities which these convulsions bring in their
train. In the course of this winter, whether there is
fighting, or whether things continue undecided, great
part of our soldiers will return to their homes, from
which nothing will be able to draw them : for, from
want of money, we have neither internal police nor
gendarmerie, and our constituted authorities are far
from being all pure and proof against seduction.
We must, therefore, have peace ; and, for recovering
the enthusiasm which has enabled us to conquer, it
is necessary that our enemies defer the conclusion of
it, and that there be not a creature in France who is
not convinced that the government has been desirous
of a reasonable peace, and that it has been rejected
from ambition or from hatred of our principles."
(Vol. ii., p. 201.)
The fall of Mantua soon reconciled the difference
of opinion between the two negociators.
The English reader will smile at the absurd no
tions entertained by the French on all subjects con
nected with our country and nation. Carnot, writing
on the 18th of May in the name of the Directory to
Bonaparte, acquaints him that they have reserved for
him the conduct of the marauding expedition against
Leghorn " to chastise the English ; because they con
sider that operation as of superior importance ; be
cause the fate of the island of Corsica depends upon
it in some measure ; because it will make London trem -
ble, and give a mortal blow to the English." (Vol. i,
p. 1 1 9.) A few days later, Carnot again writes : " The
c2

xxxvi INTRODUCTION.
expedition to Leghorn is the first thing to be under
taken after the defeat of Beaulieu : it [the Directory]
leaves to you the choice of the time and the means of
execution, and it will learn with warm satisfaction
the news of this triumph over the perfidious English."
(Vol. i., p. 123.) A glorious achievement, truly — the
seizure by a buccaneering army of unresisting mer
cantile establishments, in the dominions of a prince at
perfect peace with the rapacious republicans !
The instructions prescribing the conduct to be pur
sued towards Leghorn and Tuscany, from the pen of
Carnot, are well worthy of the statesmen from whom
they emanated, and the occasion on which they were
given (Vol. i., p. 88) : indeed, that whole letter is a
most interesting study for all who would wish to
learn to what base and sordid arts the republican
rulers of great nations can stoop in pursuit of their
schemes of rapine and robbery.
The simplicity of Carnot, expressing surprise at
the daring attacks of our Tars upon shipping on the
French coast, and requesting Bonaparte, in the name
of the Directory, " not to suffer the approach of these
pirates to the coasts of the Mediterranean," is truly
laughable. (Vol. i., p. 192). Equally preposterous
is the representation of Gentili, whom Bonaparte
had sent to command in Corsica, which the English
were then evacuating, that our fleet was " in infinite
dread of the' Spanish squadron, which," he says,
' must by this time have joined ours. It would be
most fortunate," he adds, " if they could but get out

INTRODUCTION. XXXVll
and go to meet them : the superiority of our force
and the fears of the enemy would ensure us the vic
tory, and those gentry would not escape unscathed
out of the Mediterranean." (Vol. ii., p. 89.) Gene
ral Gentili had not very long to wait for the grati-
• fication of his wish. The fleets did meet, and the
fight off St. Vincent's showed in what way the fears
of English sailors are expressed.
Of the character of the Italians the French govern
ment seems to have formed the most contemptuous
opinion. After it had plundered them by its agents,
military and civil, of everything that could possibly
be extracted from them, it is not likely that they
would rise in its estimation. Thus the minister for
foreign affairs characterizes them as "destitute of
energy, the slaves of the most degrading prejudices,
who would ill support the part of a free people :" and
Bonaparte himself seems to have valued them no
higher. (Vol. ii., p. 403.) The pacification of the
Continent permitted him to direct his views to the
invasion of this country, and he has the candour to
admit " the people of England are of more worth than
the Venetian people, and their liberation will for ever
consolidate the liberty and happiness of France ; or,
if we force that government to peace, our commerce,
the advantages which we shall procure for it in the
two worlds, will be a great step towards the consoli
dation of liberty and public prosperity." (Vol. ii.,
p. 408.)When, at a later period, he seriously applied him-

XXXviii INTRODUCTION.
self to the execution of this benevolent design, he
certainly acquired an ample confirmation of his idea
that the English character is indeed of a different
stamp from the Italian, or that of any other nation
which he had ever encountered.
In the month of August, 1796, after that series of.
obstinate actions in which, according to the admis
sion of an accomplished French officer, " if despair
had not forced us to fight for the preservation of our
lives, the republican army would have been destroyed
without resource;" and when " Bonaparte killed
seven horses in two days," so excessive were the
fatigues, the General makes a rather humorous report
to the Directory of the cowardice shown by the
commissaries and other civil functionaries. " It
was indispensable," he says, " to allow the troops a
few days' rest, to rally the scattered corps after so
violent a shock, and to reorganize the service of the
administrations, absolutely broken up. Some of those
gentlemen ran all the way to the Gulf of Spezzia with
out stopping. — The commissary of war Salva leaves
the army; panic-struck, he beholds enemies every
where; he crosses the Po, and communicates to all
he meets the terrors that bewilder him ; he fancies
that the Hulans are at his heels. In vain he scam
pers away for two days and two nights ; nothing can
raise his spirits ; writing to all quarters, Run for your
lives ! he arrives within two leagues of Genoa, and
— dies in twenty-four hours of a violent fever, in the
delirium of which he fancies himself wounded by a

INTRODUCTION. XXXIX
hundred swords, and still those of the terrible Hulans.
Many commissaries of war have not shown more bra
very. " Such, citizens directors, is the inconvenience of
the law which requires that the commissaries of war
should be civil agents, when they need courage and
military habits to a greater degree than the officers
themselves : the courage which is necessary for them
is wholly moral ; it is never the fruit of the habit of
dangers. I have therefore felt on this occasion how
essential it is to appoint to the office of commissaries
of war none but men who have served in the line for
several campaigns and given proofs of courage. Any
man who values life higher than the national glory
and the esteem of his comrades ought not to form
part of the* French army. It is revolting to hear
every day persons of the different administrations
confessing, and almost boasting of it, that they were
afraid." (Vol. i., 319, 320).
In Volume ii., p. 61, General Baraguay d'Hilliers
relates that he had to encounter an engine of super
stition, so frequently employed in Catholic countries,
and capable of being converted into a more mischie
vous instrument than even the weapons of war. " I
found at Lodi," he writes to the General-in-Chief, on
the 20th of October, 1796, "sparks of a religious
fanaticism which was seeking to burst forth : they
were performing miracles there ; priests certified them,
devotees circulated them, and idiots believed them.
I thought it right, under these circumstances, to take

xl INTRODUCTION.
a double measure : the first was to send for the bishop.
I spoke to him with firmness ; I declared that, if
another miracle was wrought in his diocese, and the
priests continued to abuse the tribunal of penitence,
to calumniate the French and to arm the superstitious
credulity of the people against them, he should be
personally responsible to me for it; that I would
bring him, as well as the higher clergy, before a mili
tary commission as an agent, a spy, of the court of
Rome, and an apostle of maxims contrary to the pub
lic tranquillity, and to the ministry of peace which
was his vocation. On the other hand, being informed
that, in the Lodisan, the people complained of a pro
hibition, issued I know not at what period, to ring the
bells for the service of the Catholic worship, I autho
rized them to be rung in each parish three times a
day at necessary and useful hours."
It will be seen (vol. i., p. 31) that the attention of
the Directory had early been turned to the wonder
working image of the Virgin Mary at Loretto and the
treasures accumulated there, " estimated at ten mil
lions sterling." This appeared too rich a prize not
to tempt the rapacity of the needy rulers of France,
and an expedition for securing it was suggested by
them to their General. By him, however, the attempt
was judged to be too hazardous at that time ; and
it was not till his invasion of the Roman States in
February, 1797, that he could conveniently rifle the
Casa Santa. " Loretto," he reports to his employers,
'¦'contained treasure to the amount of nearly 3,000,000

INTRODUCTION. xii
livres tournois ; they have left us the worth of nearly
one million ; I send you the Madona with all the re
lics into the bargain. That chest shall be addressed
direct to you, and you will make what use of it
you think fit : the Madona is of wood." (Vol. ii.,
p. 259).
In the Letters from the pen of Bonaparte himself
there are incessantly occurring passages strikingly
characteristic, and some almost oracular.
He writes to the Directory, " I should be glad if
you would send me two or three adjutant-generals,
who have been in the cavalry, who have fire and a
firm resolution never to make scientific retreats."
(Vol. i., p. 81.)
On another occasion he says, " Here all is going
on tolerably well : but the dog-days are coming on
at a gallop, and there is no remedy against their
pernicious influence. Miserable beings that we are,
we can only observe nature, not overcome it /" (Vol. i.,
p. 149.) On how many subsequent occasions did his
experience confirm this observation !
" As for generals of division," he tells the Direc
tory, " unless they are distinguished officers, I beg
you not to send me any ; for our mode of making war
here is so different from the others that I cannot
trust a division till I have tried in two or three affairs
the General who is to command it. . . . It is most essen
tial for the army and for the Republic to send hither
to me young men to learn to carry on a war of move
ment and manoauvres ; it is that which has enabled

xiii INTRODUCTION.
us to obtain great successes in this army." (Vol. ii.,
p. 230.)
Again, writing to the Directory, he applies for
" some good officers of artillery," for those that lie
has, with two exceptions, " are not capable of draw
ing afi&che, and only play stupid tricks : yet there is
no want of officers of engineers and artillery ; but
these are peace officers, fit only for the desk, who
never see fire : accordingly, the works of the engineers
are universally complained of in the army." (Vol. ii.,
p. 229.)
About the same time that this was written, Au-
gereau reports that he has ordered an officer of engi
neers superintending works at the tete de pont of
Ronco " to be watched, and to be prevented from
slipping away before the bridge is finished." (Vol. ii.,
p. 210.)
On the 16th of April, 1797, Bonaparte writes from
Judenburg, the limit of his march into the Emperor's
German dominions, " The best Generals and the best
troops are before me. — When you enter heartily upon
a campaign, there is nothing that stops you, and
never, since history has recorded military operations,
has a river proved a real obstacle. If Moreau is
determined to pass the Rhine, he will pass it, and if
he had passed it already, we should be in a condition
to dictate terms of peace in an imperative manner,
and without incurring any risk ; but he who is fearful
of losing his glory is sure to lose il. I have crossed
the Julian and the Noric Alps upon ice three feet

INTRODUCTION. xliii
deep ; I passed my artillery by roads which carriages
had never travelled, and everybody believed the
thing to be impossible. If I had had nothing in view
but the repose of the army and my personal interest,
I should have stopped short beyond the Izonzo. I
flung myself into Germany, to extricate the armies of
the Rhine and to prevent the enemy from taking the
offensive there. I am at the gates of Vienna, and
that insolent and haughty court has its plenipoten
tiaries at my head-quarters. The armies of the
Rhine cannot have any blood in their veins if they
leave me alone : then I shall return to Italy. Entire
Europe shall judge of the different conduct of the
two armies : they will then have the whole force of
the Emperor on their hands ; they will be over
whelmed, and it will be their own fault." (Vol. ii.,
p. 299, 300.)
Indeed, all his Letters relating to himself personally
are peculiarly interesting. It is unnecessary to par
ticularize ; but there is one of so extraordinary a
tenour that it must not pass unnoticed here.
It is dated November ] 4, ] 796, amidst that series
of hard-contested fights which preceded the san
guinary battle of Arcole. In these affairs, the " spoiled
child of Fortune," as it became customary to call the
French General, was not always victorious, and his
army of course suffered severely. " The wounded,"
he writes, reporting to the Directory, " are the flower
of the army : all our superior officers, all our best
generals, are hors de combat : all that come to me

xliv INTRODUCTION.
are so silly, and they have not the confidence of the
soldiers. The army of Italy, reduced to a handful of
men, is worn out. The heroes of Lodi, of Millesimo,
of Castiglione, and of Bassano, have died for their
country, or are in the hospital : the corps have no
thing left but their reputation and their pride. Jou
bert, Lannes, Lanusse, Victor, Murat, Chariot, Dupuis,
Rampon, Pigeon, Menard, Chabrand, are wounded ;
we are abandoned at the furthest extremity of Italy.
The presumption of my strength would be beneficial
to us ; and they are publishing in Paris, in official
speeches, that we are but 30,000 men.
" In this war I have lost few men, but all the
superior men, whom it is impossible to replace. The
brave men who are left me have before their eyes
inevitable death, amidst such continual chances and
with forces so inferior. Perhaps the last hour of the
brave Augereau, of the intrepid Massena, of Berthier,
of  is at hand ; then, then, what will become of
these brave fellows ! This idea makes me cautious :
I dare no longer confront death, which would be a
subject of discouragement and disaster for that which
is the object of my anxiety. In a few days, we shall
try a last effort : if Fortune smiles upon us, Mantua
will be taken, and Italy along with it."
It is to be observed, however, that this appa
rently desponding letter, in which, by the by, the
writer has not displayed the most scrupulous adhe
rence to truth, was really designed to move the
Directory to send him further reinforcements. His

INTRODUCTION. xiv
employers must no doubt have been aware of this
propensity to distort or falsify facts to suit a par
ticular purpose — a propensity manifested alike in his
reports, his proclamations, and his addresses to his
soldiers, in this early part of his career, and later in
those too famous imperial compositions, which gave
rise to the proverbial saying of the sarcastic Parisians
concerning any person who dealt too freely in hyper
bole — " He lies like a bulletin."
But wherefore extend these remarks ? Surely
sufficient evidence has been furnished that this Cor
respondence conveys the fresh and living impres
sions made by transactions of the moment, and a
vivid reflection of those disgraceful schemes, artifices,
and manoeuvres, which could originate only in minds
thoroughly imbued with the atrocious principles of
the revolution — that it was designed to be what it
professes to be, secret and confidential — to meet no
eyes but those of the persons addressed — unlike the
Memoirs written or dictated at St. Helena, from re
collection, after the lapse of twenty years, for the
purpose of exculpation or of producing effect.
In the last of the General's letters to the Directory,
announcing the conclusion of the treaty of Campo
Formio, he places himself by the closing declaration
in a singularly awkward dilemma. After recapitulating
the motives which had influenced him in this impor
tant transaction, he proceeds : — "If I am mistaken in
all these calculations, my heart is pure, my intentions
are upright : I have silenced the interest of my glory,

xlvi INTRODUCTION.
of my vanity, of my ambition ; I have kept in view
the country and the government alone ; I have an
swered in a manner worthy of myself the unlimited
confidence which the Directory has been pleased to
grant me for these two years. I have merited by
my services the approbation of the government and
of the nation ; I have received repeated marks of its
esteem. / have now no more to do but to mingle
again with the crowd, to grasp once more the plough
of Cincinnatus, and to set an example of respect for
magistrates and aversion for military rule, which
has destroyed so many republics and ruined several
States."— (Vol. ii., p. 389.)
Was this declaration sincere, or was it a piece of
acting, in which, as these Volumes will show, the
General was an adept ? If the former, never was a
more decided self-condemnation pronounced — if the
latter, a more consummate political charlatan never
lived.

CONTENTS OF
THE FIRST VOLUME.

PART I. PAGE
FROM THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY IN
1796 TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE WITH
THE KING OF SARDINIA  1
PART II.
FROM THE OCCUPATION OF TORTONA TO THE INVEST
MENT OF MANTUA  79
PART III.
FROM THE TAKING OF BOLOGNA TO THE SECOND
BLOCKADE OF MANTUA  167
PART IV.
FROM THE BATTLE OF ROVEREDO TO THE RESUMPTION
OF HOSTILITIES BY A NEW AUSTRIAN ARMY . 328

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.

PART I.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY IN 1796 TO
THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE WITH THE
KING OF SARDINIA.
The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte, Commander-
in-Chief of the Army of Italy.
Paris, 16 Ventose, year 4 [March 6, 1796].
The Executive Directory addresses to you herewith,
citizen-general, the instructions which it has drawn up for
the conduct of the ensuing campaign in Italy. It has
thought it right to add the authorization which it gives you
by the present to possess yourself of the fortress of Savona,
in case circumstances should render that measure usefal for
the security of the army of Italy ; and it recommends to you,
in this case, to treat the republic of Genoa with all the con
sideration which our political situation in regard to it requires.
Letourneur, President.
Instructions for the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.
The French Republic has two principal enemies to con
tend with in Italy — the Piedmontese and the Austrians.
The latter, though the less numerous, are formidable, as well
from their hatred to France, and their infinitely superior
resources of all kinds, as from their more intimate connexion
with our natural enemies the English, and above all from
the power which their possessions in Italy enable them to
exercise over the court of Turin, which is obliged to yield to
almost all their demands, and even to their caprices.' From
this state of things it results that the more immediate inte
rest of the French government ought to be to direct its
VOL. I. B

2 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
principal efforts against the Austrian army and possessions
in Italy.
<¦ It is easy to conceive, in fact, that any military move-
' ment agamst the Piedmontese and their territory is in some
measure indifferent to the Austrians, who, as we have seen
in the last campaign, seem to care very little for the dis
asters of their allies, and who, in moments of danger, instead
of seeking to protect them efficaciously, immediately separate
from them, and strive only to cover the country belonging
to themselves, which furnishes abundantly the resources
they stand in need of.
Great as have hitherto been our successes in Italy, we
have not advanced far enough into that country to with
draw Piedmont from the yoke of the Austrian army, which
has always remained master of its fate by the positions which
it has taken.
When we consider the true interests of the court of Turin,
we find them, in some measure, essentially connected with
our own, and we have no doubt whatever of the desire
which that court must feel to see the ambitious Austrian
driven out of Italy, and to obtain the Milanese as an indem
nification for the countries irrevocably united to France by
the first article of the republican constitution.
This conjecture, the probability of which needs not to be
supported by the arguments that the subject itself suggests,
seems to give rise to the following question :
If it is to the interest of the Piedmontese to unite with
the French to drive the Germans from Italy, why is not
the court of Turin solicitous to join its arms to those of the
Repubhc to accomplish as speedily as possible an object at
once profitable and glorious ?
The solution of this question must tend to enlighten us
on our political position in regard to Italy, and also on the
best course to be pursued for conquering our enemies, and
more particularly the satellites of Austria in that country.
Placed between the provinces subject to the latter and to
the French Republic, Piedmont is forced to act a part in
the present war ; and, if she had resolved to remain in a
state of neutrality, she would have had to suffer all the evils
of war without being able to enjoy a valuable prerogative
for a state of moderate strength in comparison with her
neighbours, that is, the respect which the troops that she
can join to those of one of the belligerent parties, and the

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 3
danger of a defection on their part and of their going over
to the side of the enemy, necessarily ensure to her ; which
guarantees to her the certainty of experiencing the least pos
sible annoyance at any rate from the power to which she
allies herself.
Without absolutely rejecting the idea that the King of
Sardinia may have been urged by family considerations into
the coalition against France, it may be asserted with truth,
that our position at the commencement of the present war,
and the necessity under which we found ourselves to gain
possession of the ci-devant Savoy, and the ci-devant county
of Nice, as well to attack the Austrians with advantage as
to incorporate them with France, for the security of our
frontier in that quarter, have, in some measure, forced the
court of Turin to join the party of our enemies in order to
oppose our efforts ; but, since our successes in Frimaire, the
hope of an idemnification out of the Austrian possessions in
Italy, in case of a junction with us, would no doubt have
induced the court of Turin to change sides, if France,
scarcely out of the storms of the Revolution, had had it in
her power to offer it the subsidies ensured to it by England
and Austria.
The King of Sardinia, certain that France would not
grant him a peace which would place Piedmont in a state
of neutrality, which, in the hypothesis of success on the part
of the Austrians, would evidently become null and even
dangerous to the Republic ; forced to continue the war,
was obliged to secure the means of carrying it on at the
least possible cost, and could find them nowhere but in the
subsidies and aids of all kinds, which his present allies alone
could afford him, Piedmont, crushed by the weight of taxes,
cannot furnish him with the facility of acting in a manner
more independent and more analogous to the views upon the
Milanese which it is natural to attribute to him ; and, from
this state of things, we must conclude that the court of
Turin will not sincerely consent to a defensive and offensive
alliance with us till we can furnish it with the same succours
that it receives from its present allies.
The Republic, then, not being in a condition to furnish
these succours, must not reckon upon an alliance of this
kind, until Piedmont shall be forced by the overthrow of tho
Austrians, or the presence of our armies in her territory, to
turn her arms against our common enemy.
b2

4t LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
If circumstances should bring about this propitious event,
we might expect that the Piedmontese, in obtaining the
object of their desires, and a considerable indemnification,
(the Milanese, &c.) will purchase it by all the sacrifices which
an already exhausted State is capable of supporting ; for not
only will they have to provide their own army with all that
it has need or, but the armies of the Repubhc will have to
be principally fed and maintained by them ; and, if the state
of things should force us to act in that country as in a con
quered country, we should, it is true, do it as little harm as
possible ; but we should do a great deal, since it would be
indispensable to secure our march by the provisional posses
sion, and until the peace, of the principal fortresses of Pied
mont situated on our side, and the demolition of which
would guarantee to us for the future a solid peace and
alliance with the court of Sardinia. It results from what
has been said that the sole attack of Piedmont would not
fulfil the object which the Executive Directory ought to
keep in view — that of driving the Austrians out of Italy,
and bringing about as speedily as possible a glorious and
durable peace ; instead of terminating, it would be prolong
ing the war, since the Austrians, remaining intact, would
have no reason for putting an end to it ; and, England
having it in her power at any time to transmit subsidies to
the Piedmontese army, things would continue upon nearly
the same footing that they were at the conclusion of the
last campaign.
The continuous and sole attack of Piedmont presents,'
moreover, greater obstacles from the number of sieges which
it would be necessary to undertake at the very opening of
the campaign ; and it has behoved the Directory to fix its
views particularly upon a system of offensive warfare, princi
pally directed against the Austrian forces in Italy, and so
combined as to afford to the French army not only the pos
sibility of securing itself, by the defeat of the Piedmontese
at the very commencement of the military operations,
against any enterprise on their part during the remainder
of the campaign ; but at the same time that of bringing the
court of Turin into a compulsory alliance with France ; and
lastly, the means of accelerating the conclusion of an advan
tageous peace for us by the total overthrow of the Austrians
in Italy.
The first military operations which this system commands

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 5
are comprised within a narrow circle, and require few de
velopments . The Directory must confine itself to the indi
cation of them ; the details of execution will belong to the
general-in-chief, in whom it places its confidence. They
will be submitted to the Directory, whenever circumstances
admit of that being done, and in extraordinary cases, when
its opinion will become absolutely necessary for determining
military movements of higher importance which have not
been foreseen. Everything commands us to strive by all
the means in our power to make the enemy cross the Po,
and to direct our most strenuous efforts towards the Mi
lanese. It appears that this essential operation cannot take
place until the French army has first gained possession of
Ceva. The Directory leaves the general-in-chief at liberty to
commence the operations by the attack of the enemy at that
point ; and, whether he gains a complete victory over them, /
or they retire towards Turin, the Directory authorizes him
to follow them, to fight them again, and even to bombard
that capital, if circumstances render it necessary.
After he has made himself master of Ceva, and drawn the
left of the army of Italy towards Coni, in order to threaten and
overawe the garrison of that place, the general-in-chief will
provide as speedily as possible for the wants of the army by
means of the resources which he will find in Piedmont ; he
will then direct his forces towards the Milanese, and princi
pally against the Austrians ; he will drive back the enemy
beyond the Po, turn his attention to the means of crossing
that river, and endeavour to secure the fortresses of Asti
and Valenza.
The general-in-chief must not lose sight of this, that it isf
the Austrians whom it is most important to cripple, and/
that one of the measures capable of bringing about peace in i
Italy is to intimidate them by advancing as far as possible'
on the right and towards Tortona, the wretched state of*
which induces the Directory to believe that it will be easily
taken. This essential movement of the troops towards our right
— which the general-in-chief will probably not be able to
make till he has reduced Ceva, and gained a signal victory
over the Piedmontese — will place us in a situation to awe
the Genoese republic, and to facilitate to the agent whom
the government keeps at Genoa negociations which may be

6 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
advantageous to us, and even a loan, which private persons
of that city might be able to make us.
More wealthy than their government, it must be expected
that they will not consent to supply us till the latter gives
them security for our punctuality in fulfilling the conditions
of this loan, which the favourable circumstances of the wai
may authorize us to demand. The entry of the republicai
army into Piedmont must be considered as merely a pre
liminary disposition, which enables us to attack the Austriar
forces with greater advantage ; it must pause there as Httle
as possible, and then push on briskly to fight the latter,
whom the defeat of the Piedmontese cannot but intimidate,
and render easier to conquer.
While the movements whicli the right of the French will
have to make towards Alexandria and Tortona are going
forward, it will be indispensable, in order to secure the fur
ther operations, that it should gain possession of Gavi, whe
ther the Genoese consent with a good grace to give it up tc
us during the war, or we are obliged to compel them to dc
so by threatening demonstrations of the force destined to be
employed for extorting their compliance.
The Directory, persuaded that the general-in-chief, in the
execution of this particular measure, will exercise all the
prudence which circumstances and our political situation ir
regard to the Genoese repubhc enjoin, leaves entirely to him
the conduct of this delicate affair, with the necessity, the dif
Acuities, and the advantage of which his presence on the
spot will make him acquainted.
By throwing the principal force of the republican army ir
Italy, on the right and in the direction of the Milanese, w(
shall gain several important advantages : we shall oblige
Piedmont, already shaken, to range herself on our side ; anc
the first victory that we shall obtain over the Austrian!
will be a certain pledge of the total ruin of their forces ir
that quarter. We shall intimidate all Italy, and dissolvi
the coalition of all those petty powers in favour of the Aus
trian cause.
The course which the Directory has pointed out to th<
general-in-chief must be considered as the principal, and, as
it were, the only one to be pursued ; it is a fixed basis t<
which all the secondary movements that circumstances anc
events may induce it to order must be referred. It is, ii
short, the object towards which everything must tend, an<

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 7
any operation that would positively deviate from it must be
absolutely rejected.
The Directory is quite aware that these great operations
cannot be attempted by the right or the centre of the army
of Italy, without being supported and prepared by the rest
of that brave army ; neither can they be, unless the general-
in-chief has first assured himself that one part of the army
will not be cut off and separated from the other, and thus
exposed to a total defeat. He will, therefore, pay scrupulous
attention to the left, and by his good dispositions put it out
of the power of the Piedmontese troops at Coni to injure or
to attempt anything against him.
The Directory, therefore, must here explain its intentions
relative to the sieges which the events of the campaign that
is about to open may render it expedient to undertake. Its
resolution is that no siege shall be undertaken, before the
enemy capable of disturbing it shall be totally routed and
unable to make any attempt ; and, at any rate, the general^
in-chief must beware of sending his heavy artillery to any
point whatever where it might be endangered by any slight
success of the enemy. The Directory insists particularly
on this essential precaution.
Though it is to the interest of France to direct her prin
cipal efforts against the Austrians, and to induce the Pied
montese, by our success against the former, to contract an
advantageous alliance for us, still the Piedmontese must
not be spared, so long as they shall be our enemies.
The general-in-chief will seek by all the means in his
power to inflame the discontents in Piedmont, and to make
them break forth against the court of Turin in a general or
a partial manner.
It would be superfluous to insist on the utility of a diver
sion of this kind,. and of wliich the enemy have been the
first to set us an example : it may facilitate to the army of the
Alps, acting in concert with the left of the army of Italy, the
rapid conquest of Piedmont, the possession of which during
the war would ensure us advantageous conditions at the peace.
Such are the principal bases of the plan of campaign
which the Directory has adopted. Before it closes the pre
sent instructions, it must insist on the necessity of subsisting
the army in and upon the hostile countries, and of supply
ing it with all that it needs by means of the resources which
the localities afford.

8 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The general-in-chief will make a point of maintaining
rigid discipline and sparing the inhabitants all the vexations
and disasters which the scourge of war so frequently brings
with it, and which order and well regulated administrations
are alone capable of repressing.
He will cause heavy contributions to be levied, half to be
placed in the chests destined for the service of the various
administrations, and the other half to furnish ready money
for the pay of the army.
As the Executive Directory reserves to itself the faculty
of making peace, the general-in-chief will not grant any
suspension of arms, or slacken in any manner his military
operations. He will receive all proposals tending to pacifi
cation, and transmit them immediately to the Directory.
The Directory relies on the zeal, activity, and talents of
the general-in-chief of the army of Italy, and recommends
to him with confidence the precise execution of the dispose
tions contained in the present instructions, to which the
Directory will add when the events of the war shall render-
it necessary.
Letourneur, Carnot, L. M. Lareveillere-
Lepaux, Rewbell.

Bonaparte, General-in-Chief, to the Executive Directory.
Head-quarter9, Nice, 8 Germinal, year 4 [March 28, 1796).
I have been several days in the bosom of the army, the
command of which I assumed yesterday.
I must give you an account of three essential things :—
1, of the departments of Vaucluse, Bouches du Rhone, the
Var, and the Lower Alps ; 2, of the state of the army, of
what I have done and what I hope to do ; 3, of our political
position in regard to Genoa.
The four departments of the arrondissement of the army
have not paid either forced loan or contributions in corn,
nor supplied the forage required by the law of the 7th Ven-
demiaire, nor begun to furnish the third horse. These ad
ministrations are extremely slow in their proceedings; I have
written to them, I have seen them, and I am led to hope for
more activity in matters so essential to the army.
The administrative situation of the army is deplorable,
but not desperate. The army will henceforth eat good

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 9
bread, and will have butcher's meat, and it has already re
ceived some advances on its arrears of pay.
The magazines on the road of the Rhone and the Var
are provisioned, and my cavalry, carriages, and artillery
began to move five days ago. I shall march very shortly.
One battalion has mutinied ; it refused to leave Nice, upon
pretext that it had neither shoes nor money. I directed all
the grenadiers to be arrested, made the battalion march off,
and, when it was in the heart of the town, I sent a counter-
order, and made it go to the rear. I intend to break up
that corps, and to incorporate the soldiers in the other bat
talions ; the officers not having shown sufficient zeal. This
battalion consists of no more than 200 men ; it is known for
its mutinous spirit.
I have been received by this army with confidence, and
particularly gratified by the welcome of General Scherer.
By his straightforward conduct, and bis readiness to give
me all the information that can be serviceable to me, he has
acquired a claim to my gratitude. His health really appears
to be somewhat impaired. With great fluency of speech he
unites an acquaintance with moral and military subjects
which might render him useful in some important post.
Our position fn regard to Genoa is extremely critical.
Things nave been ill managed ; we have done either too
much or not enough ; but fortunately no harm will result
from it.
The government of Genoa has more ability and energy
than is imagined : there are but two courses to be pursued
with it — either to take Genoa by a coup de main, but that is
contrary to your intentions and to the law of nations ; or to
live in close amity, and not strive to extract their money
from them, which is the only thing they care about.
Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.1
Head-quarters, Nice, 9 Germinal, year 4 [March 29, 1796].
The third battalion of the 29th demi-brigade has been
guilty of disobedience ; it has disgraced itself by its spirit
of mutiny, by refusing to march to the active divisions ; the
officers have behaved ill. The commandant, Captain Du-
verney, has shown bad intentions. You will cause him to
be arrested and sent before a council of war at Toulon, whi-
1 General Alexandre Berthier, afterwards Prince of Neufchatel.

10 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
ther you will address the charges, which will be preferred
by the commandant of the place.
You will cause the grenadiers accused of being the ring
leaders of the mutiny to be. tried by a council of war at Nice.
Let the other grenadiers be sent off and distributed by fives
among the battalions of the army.
The officers and subalterns, having remained in the ranks
without speaking, instead of setting an example to the men,
are all guilty : they must be immediately dismissed and sent
to their homes.
The soldiers of the battalion shall be incorporated at
Marseilles with the 83rd demi-brigade. This letter shall
be entered in the order of the day.
Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Nice, 9 Germinal, year 4 [March 29, 1796].
I wrote to you this morning relative to the third battalion
of the 29th demi-brigade. The officers of the grenadiers of
that corps have behaved well. I request you to make men
tion of this in the order of the day, to investigate the gene
ral conduct of all the officers and subalterns of that corps, to
communicate to me the result, and to let me know what
you think the best way to dispose of such of them as have
not taken any part in that mutiny.
Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Nice, 9 Germinal, year 4 [March 29, 1796].
You will order the general of the engineers to let the
company of miners, with the requisite equipments, proceed
to Finale. Let it start on the 13th.
You will order it to form a workshop of 110 workmen,
with directions for them to set out on the 13th for Finale.
Let there be an officer of engineers at the head of these
workmen ; let them be furnished with all requisite imple
ments ; and let the workmen in the different branches be
in proportion.
The commandant of the engineers, the director of the
park, and all the officers of the engineers at Nice, must re
pair to the head-quarters. There must be left, at Nice only

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 11
an officer as commandant of the place, and an officer charged
with the direction of the workshop at Nice.
Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Nice, 10 Germinal, year 4 [March 30, 1796].
Fresh meat shall be given out five times in a decade.
The battalions which have had salt meat to-day shall have
fresh to-morrow ; and those which have had fresh meat one
day shall have salt the next.
The administrations of the army and the workmen of the
shops shall take meat all together.
Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Nice, 11 Germinal, year 4 [March 31, 1796].
The general-in-chief is informed that several commissaries
of war and officers have in their chests sums arising from
various sales, from contributions, and from the revenues of
conquered countries. This being contrary to the good of
the service, to order, and to the constitution, he directs
that these different sums be remitted without delay to the
chest of the paymaster of the army or his superiors, in order
that they may be disposed of by the warrants of the pay
master-in-chief for the good of the service, and for supplying
the soldier with what is due to him.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.
Savona, 9 Germinal, year 4 [March 29, 1796].
I have received your letter of yesterday. I heartily con
gratulate you on the chief command of the army of Italy
which has been given to you. You know that I have long
done justice to your military talents. I shall act so as to
deserve your confidence, as I have obtained that of all the
generals who have hitherto commanded.
I am come from Voltri, whither I have been with Sali-
cetti, the commissioner, to inspect our new positions. Hopes
are given us of cash ; all means are set to work to obtain it.
To-morrow I shall give you an account of the positions of

12 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
the troops of the advanced guard, and of those of the enemy,
I shall not fail to inform you of everything that concerns
the service.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Oneglia, 10 Germinal, year 4 [March 30, 1796].
I have inspected all the points and the coast about
Oneglia, and have found that they are susceptible of a good
defence. The batteries of Oneglia are in good condition ; their
position is good ; they are serviceable but not sufficient. I
must first observe that there are two distinct roadsteads :
that of port Maurice, and that of Oneglia. The one affords
shelter against the east-north-east wind, the other against
the west and south-west.
As these winds blow alternately, it will be requisite to
occupy both roadsteads, and, of course, to make ourselves
masters of them.
The roadstead of Oneglia is defended firstly by the bat
teries of the fortress ; secondly, by those of Cape Oneglia,
and by that called the battery of the road.
That of port Maurice is defended by the battery of the road
and by the Genoese battery of port Maurice. The battery
of Cape Oneglia is important ; it affords a good appui, but
mounts only one 36-pounder. In my opinion, it ought to
have four pieces of that calibre.
The battery of the roadstead is not armed : the intention
is to mount two 13-pounders there ; but they will be insuf-
ficent — I even think it necessary that it should have four
36-pounders, because that battery answers two purposes ;
for, being situated between the two roadsteads, it defends
both. The Genoese battery of port Maurice is armed. It ap
pears to me indispensable that we should take possession of
it, and send artillerymen to work it : it is a good point d"appuij
the loss of which would entail that of the others, consequently
I think it would be dangerous to neglect it.
The guns of the present batteries are provided with five
rounds only : I think they ought to be increased to one
hundred. By means of the proposed increase of guns, amounting to

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 13
no more than seven 36-pounders, I think that a convoy of
200 sail would find protection and safety. I am just start
ing for Ormea, whence I shall give you a report of my
further observations.
Marmont.

To the General-in-Chief.
La Pietra, 10 Germinal, year 4 [March 30, 1796].
I have received your letter of the 8th instant, from which
I learn that you have just assumed the command of the
army. I congratulate myself on serving under you, know
ing your civism and your military talents. I will do my
utmost to fulfil your intentions in all the orders that you
shall give me : rely upon my zeal, my activity, and my
devotedness to the public welfare.
Your predecessor, General Scherer, ordered the 99th
demi-brigade, which ought to belong to my division, to be
transferred to General Massena for the expedition that is to
take place. As soon as that demi-brigade is of no further
service to the advanced guard, I request you to let it return
to my division.
AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, Germinal 10, year 4 [March 30, 1796].
The snow is melting fast ; our line needs; reinforcement.
The 99th demi-brigade, which belongs, according to the last
distribution made by General Scherer, to the division of
General Augereau, is become absolutely indispensable to
me. Obliged, by the re-organization of the demi-brigades,
to transfer many battalions and demi-brigades to the divi
sions of the line, my two advanced guard divisions have been
much weakened, forming in all but 13,000 men, and having
to guard from Melogno to Montelezino and Madona de la
Savona. General Augereau, with 10,000 men, is only
charged with the defence of the gorges of Bardinetto and
Spinardo. I hope, general, that you will comply with my request,
and permit me to keep that demi-brigade, which is at this
moment with the advanced guard, of which it has always
formed part. If, however, reasons that I cannot foresee

14 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
induce you to withdraw it from me, I will beg you to give
me another demi-brigade of nearly the same force. Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, 11 Germinal, year 4 [March 31, 1796].
I send you a copy of a letter which I have just received
from Salicetti, commissioner of the government. You see
that he will not explain himself in a positive manner re
specting the 3,000 men at Voltri.
I await your ulterior orders, and shall meanwhile secure
the communication with Savona.
The 84th demi-brigade sets out to-morrow on its return
to Finale. The troops of General Augereau's division, who
are there at this moment, will return to their first position.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, Germinal 12, year 4 [April 1, 1796].
Nothing new at the advanced guard. I have received
your letter of the 9th, and apprized them that they must
conform to your intentions, and that on no account what
ever is any one to meddle with the brigades of the artillery
carriages, which are on the road to Finale and Vado.
I have long been applying for the muskets and bayonets
of which the two divisions of the advanced guard are defi
cient. We want at least 2,000 muskets : have the good
ness to order thorn to be sent to us.
The snow is melting, and the communications with Pied
mont are beginning to be opened. The enemy is approach
ing our positions. I am reinforcing my line. General
Augereau asks me for the 99th demi-brigade ; I am in abso
lute need of it, as I have mentioned to you. That general
can dispense with this demi-brigade, having a few days since
received a corps of Allobroges. I hope it will be left with
me. Massena.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 15
To the General-in-Chief.
Loano, 12 Germinal, year 4 [April 1, 1796].
I saw General Serrurier yesterday. He has given me all
the particulars you desire, and I will transmit them to you.
The Col de Terme is an excellent post : it perfectly
covers Ormea, and there is no taking that town till we have
made ourselves masters of it.
It may be turned : 1, by the gorges of Viosena ; 2, by
the heights of TArbre ; 3, by the Col de Tlnferno.
The Col de Terme, though easy of defence, is of great
extent. General Serrurier thinks that it requires 2,400
men and six pieces of cannon. However, when it was
attacked last year, it was guarded by no more than 1,600
men. The gorges of Viosena are of great importance : if they
were to be forced, not only would the Col de Terme and
Ormea be turned, but the enemy would drop without diffi
culty into the valley of the Oneglia. They cannot be duly
guarded with fewer than 2,000 men.
General Serrurier thinks also that 200 men would be re
quired for the defence of the heights of TArbre ; 1,500 for
the Col de T Inferno ; and 1,200 for the gorge of Garessio.
Then his line of defence, extending from Viosena to Ga
ressio, would be occupied by 7500 men.
The Col de Terme is still impassable on account of the
snow : as soon as that obstacle is removed, General Serru
rier will cause it to be occupied. It is clearer on our side
than on that of the enemy ; so we may be quite easy^
I could not make observations on the different roads
which you charged me to inspect, because they are all occu
pied by the enemy ; our advanced posts extending no fur
ther than a league from Garessio ; but I have collected the
following particulars from the country-people and from offi
cers who have traversed some of them.
From the uniformity of their reports, they are no doubt
accurate. 1. From Ponte Nocetto to Ceva, there is an hour and a half
of good road practicable for carriages. There are two rises.
The descent of the second is within sight of the fort, in
reach of cannon, but somewhat covered by chestnut-trees.
2. From Nocetto. to Calisano, two leagues and a half of
mountain road, and scarcely passable for mules.

16 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
3. From Garessio to the Carthusian convent, an hour
and a half, and from the Carthusians to Mendovi, five hours
and a half. This is a good road, but for mules only.
4. From Bagnasco to Batifolo, one hour ; the road is
good and passable for field artillery.
I know not which is the Frabosa that you meant ; but, as
there are two, I have noticed both.
5. From Frabosa to Breuves, four hours ; roads for
mules ; and from Frabosa Fontana to Breuves, five hours ;
mule roads.
Such, general, is the information for wliich you have ap
plied to me. I am just starting for Finale and Savona.
I forgot, in my last letter, to tell you that it is not off
Oneglia that the enemy have taken some vessels, but off
Alassio. But Alassio was not then armed, and this acci
dent bespeaks nothing unfavourable for Oneglia, and they are
there taking the precautions which you have pointed out
Marmont.

To the General-in-Chief.
La Pietra, 30 Germinal, year 4 [April 2, 1796].
You must have seen by the report of General Rusca,
which I sent you the day before yesterday, that the enemy
was seeking to make himself master of the positions which
we occupy at Bardinetto.
You will see by that which I have just received, a copy
of which I send you, that the enemy was striving to gain
the positions : the troops which he is pushing on towards
that point, and the reconnaissances directed to that quarter,
bespeak some design on his part.
In order to prevent his attempts and to be provisioned,
we are at this moment on half rations and no fresh meat ;
it being better to reserve the little that we can procure for
the hospitals.
According to the statement of our situation yesterday,
we had here and at Garessio no more than 80 quintals of
corn and flour ; I have nevertheless been obliged to draw
together all the troops, as the enemy are making move
ments. Some days ago, we lost a piece of cannon, one and a half
pounder : it was probably sold by the artillerymen on guard :

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 1 7
this affair is in the hands of a council of war. I forgot to
report it to you.
General Rusca has just written to me from Galissano that
he is supporting my right. I am also writing to him, that
I may obtain an exact account of his positions and of his
communications with me. Serrurier.

To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, 13 Germinal, year 4 [April 2, 1796].
Nothing new at the advanced guard. An express has
just brought General Laharpe information that the enemy
has made some movements on the heights of Voltri : he is
even assured that some troops have arrived at San Pietro
d1 Arena, with a small detachment of cavalry.
I shall immediately reinforce Voltri with 500 men. I
shall act in consequence of further information that I may
receive of the movements of the enemy.
We have now 4000 men between this place and Voltri.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, 14 Germinal, year 4 [April 3, 1 796].
The movements of the enemy are not what they were at
first taken for. Yesterday 80 Austrians came on a recon
naissance to San Pietro d'Arena. Descending from Campo
di Marona, they spread alarm over the whole country, so
that it was believed that the whole Austro-Sardinian army
was at the gates of Genoa.
Having resolved, on account of the magazines of corn
and flour which we have at Voltri and Pegoli, to reinforce
the troops that are at Voltri, I sent off, last night, 500
men with General Laharpe, making in all 4500 that we
have from Savona to Voltri.
Reconnaissances have been made this morning along the
whole line of the two divisions of the advanced guard, but
only a few Barbets were met with. A most vigilant iook-
out is everywhere kept up.
Massena.

VOL. I.

18 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, 13 Germinal, year 4 [April 3, 1796
I arrived here yesterday, I have seen the port of Fim
and it appeared to me to be ill defended. The whole of
artillery consists of two 12-pounders and an 8 ; but tl
are of no consequence, and in the most inefficient state.
would be necessary to establish two good batteries of la
calibre. For the rest, the port of Finale is of little inter<
Seamen have assured me that it was impossible to lie th
if the sea was at all rough.
I took the road from Finale to St. Jaques ; it is sup
for mountain artillery ; but, I think, not passable for fie
pieces : in some places it is too narrow, in others too rugg
and all the turnings are too short. The road from ,
Jaques to Vado is better made, and, with slight repai
might be made passable for 12-pounder field-pieces.
The Austrian carriages which were at Finale are now
Loano : they can be employed only for the works of
arsenal and a great fort : twelve or fifteen, in particul
might serve for the forage of the horse artillery ; they ;
like those which are used for that purpose in the North.
The Austrians have made movements towards Gene
they have come to the number of 4000 men to the Bochet
and sent 100 men as far as San Pietro d1 Arena. I suppi
this movement to be the result of those which we have ma
in advance of Voltri, and that they meant to show the C
noese by it that they were there. Salicetti was apprehe
sive that they designed to carry off our magazines fr<
Voltri, and has determined to send a few battalions to si
port the 3000 men who are there: he has gone thitl
himself this morning with General Laharpe. Massena
very quiet : he thinks that nothing serious can occur the
Marmont.

To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, 15 Germinal, year 4 [April 4, 1796]
All is very quiet towards Voltri : our men are labourii
to-day at the evacuation of the magazines. When tl
operation is finished, I will send back the troops to th'
former positions, and repair to Albenga, to have the swe
pleasure (douw plaisir) of embracing you.
Massena.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 19
Order of the General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Oneglia, 15 Germinal, year 4 [April 4, 1796].
The general-in-chief orders a contribution of 400 sacks,
the assessment to be made in the valley of Oneglia, and a
contribution of 200 in the ci-devant marquisate of Dolce-
Aqua. He charges General Casalta with the levy of the
said contribution, orders such villages as shall not have
obeyed the requisition within twenty-four hours to be fined
100 francs in cash for each sack not furnished.
Bonaparte.

To the General Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Albenga, 16 Germinal, year 4 [April 5, 1796].
You will be pleased to assemble a military commission
for the purpose of trying Moulin, the emigrant, taken at
Ormea, and sent to Nice by order of General Serrurier.
Bonaparte.
To the General-in-Chief
Savona, 16 Germinal, year 4 [April 5, 1796].
I have returned fromVoltri. The flourish of the enemy in
coming to San Pietro d' Arena has ended in nothing : he
has even retired from Camporosso.
Between Novi, the Bochetta, Voltagio, and Ovado, there
are about 3000 men ; they have some pieces of cannon at the
Bochetta, and they are entrenching themselves there : they
have 50 men at Campofredo : this is, on the left, their most
advanced post towards Voltri.
There are 5000 men at Dego, 500 of whom they are de
taching to Ponzone : these are to send 200 to the camp of
Giana di Castagna, two leagues from Sacello, and 100 to the
mountain of Simaferro. According to all my reports, the
enemy is not in such force as the Genoese think fit to re
present ; and I have no doubt that, if we open the campaign
shortly, it will be in a very victorious manner.
I received yesterday your letter of the 1 1th instant ; your
promises are extremely consolatory, and I am impatient to
see the execution of them. The fortitude of the troops
under their sufferings can be compared only with their bra
very. We are in need of many articles of equipment. I
have myself made a strict scrutiny to ascertain the extent
c2

20 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
of our wants of that kind ; ' and it is very essential that you
should get supplies from Nice before we take the field. We
are likewise in want of arms, and especially of cartouch-
boxes and swords. The commissaire ordonnateur gives us
hopes of shoes, which we are in the utmost need of.
You will perhaps think, general, that I am asking for a
great deal ; but I am as solicitous to obtain for my brothers
in arms what is necessary for them, as I am to make them
clever at their business and to lead them to victory.
I have already told you, general, and I repeat that the
establishment at Voltri is extremely burdensome to us. It
is not military, and it obliges us to occupy a line far too
extensive, and which is liable to expose us to reverses. Sa
vona and Vado have mills which can make amends for
those of Voltri. The only objection in favour of the latter
place is that it ensures the arrival of cattle.
Laharpe.

To the General-in-Chief.
Ormea, 17 Germinal, year 4 [April 6, 1796].
I have received your letters of the 10th, 11th, and 15th
instant. I have made known to the soldiers of my division,
through the order of the day, the means which you are
about to employ to procure necessaries for them.
If the supplies of provisions for these divisions are to be
sent direct from Loano to Garessio, 200 mules would be
sufficient ; but if from Oneglia, they would fall short.
In order to be able to observe Batifolo, I must neces
sarily be master of the height of Preconda ; I have ordered
General Guyeux to set at work the peasants and the sappers
to open the necessary roads for us. If I were obliged to
proceed to Batifolo, I should not be in sufficient force ; I
should consequently be compromised, since my left would
have to guard Carlino and Visona, and precisely at that
time we must observe the Col de Terme, which, I think,
the enemy would be very glad to have ; but, if I can make
myself master of the Preconda and the Col de Casolto, that
will be all the same to me : I even believe that in this case
they will not risk the attempt.
Citizen Barthelemy, chief of the 10th demi-brigade, re
solved, without orders, to endeavour to dislodge the enemy
from a post which they have at St. Jaques- Viola. He had

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 21
probably made no disposition arid taken no military pre
caution. He was driven back to his cantonments, and
himself wounded and made prisoner. It has not yet been
ascertained how many men this foolish affair has cost us.
It took place in the afternoon of the 15th. Part of the
soldiers returned laden with booty. If an example is not
made, things will go on ill ; many soldiers would fain rob
only and not fight.
I shall not venture to the Carthusian convent at Casolto,
without having possession of the heights. Serrurier.

To General Augereau.
Souvelti, 18 Germinal, year 4 [April 7, 1796].
The enemy is seeking to make himself master of the
positions which we occupy : he expects 2000 men at Bag-
nasco, and, according to several reports, he has already
received a reinforcement.
I must inform yon that I shall be in the greatest danger
if my right is not guarded by the division of Finale ; for I
may be cut off from Galissano and taken in rear on the
Spinardo : I should then have no retreat but upon the troops
of General Serrurier.
I am obliged, for my own security, to leave two batta
lions at Galissano and one at Bardinetto : this force I shall
need to guard the positions of Solta, Rovigni, Souvelti, Ser-
boulera, and Maramasa, on account of the great extent of
the ground. The redoubt of Maramasa is not occupied by
us : the enemy came thither this morning on a reconnais
sance, but was driven out by the carabineers.
I have absolute need of my brigade for occupying the
four above mentioned positions ; so make haste, and order
the troops at Tuirano to come and occupy Bardinetto and
Galissano. 1 am under apprehension about to-night : those troops,
therefore, ought to be this evening at Bardinetto and Galis
sano, and to bring with them two days' provisions.
I have few cartridges at Bardinetto : some ought to be
sent, as well as brandy, the troops being in bivouac, without
covering and without shoes, and the cold very sharp.
We can have at Bardinetto 3000 rations of bread per
day, ovens and mills, including Galissano.

22 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
I have this instant learned that the enemy has many
troops at Berno. Rusca.

The General-in-Chief to the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Albenga, 17 Germinal, year 4 [April 6, 1796].
I have removed the head-quarters to Albenga. The
movement which I found commenced against Genoa has
drawn the enemy from his winter-quarters ; he has crossed
the Po and pushed forward advanced posts to Dego, follow
ing the Bormida and the Bochetta, leaving Gavi in his rear.
Beaulieu has published a manifesto, which I send you, and
which I will answer the day after the battle. I have been
extremely vexed and annoyed by this movement upon
Genoa, the more unseasonable as it has obliged that republic
to assume an hostile attitude, and awakened the enemy
whom I should have caught napping : our loss in men will
be so much the greater.
The King of Sardinia, on his part, is in the greatest
bustle : he has made a requisition of young men of the age of
15 years and upwards.
I have found at Oneglia marbles which are worth some
money. I have ordered them to be valued and put up for
sale in the Riviera of Genoa : these may produce the sum
of thirty or forty thousand livres.
The house of Flachat, which has the contract for corn,
and that of Collot for meat, behave well ; they supply uS
with very good corn, and the troops are beginning to have
fresh meat.
The army is in a state of frightful destitution. I have
still great obstacles to surmount, but they are surmountable.
Want has authorized indiscipline, and without discipline
there is no victory. I hope that this will speedily be set to
rights ; the aspect of things is already changing : in a few
days we shall be engaged with the enemy.
The day before yesterday I directed a reconnaissance to be
made towards Cairo : the advanced posts of the enemy were
driven back, and we took some prisoners.
The Piedmontese army is about 50,000 strong in infantry
and 5000 in cavalry : I have but about 45,000 disposable in
all. A great many troops have been kept back on my rear
and bevond the Rhone.

letters and despatches. 23
Chauvet, paymaster-in-chief, is dead at Genoa: this is a
real loss for the army ; he was active and enterprising. The
army has dropped a tear to his memory.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Albenga, 9 Germinal, year 4 [April 8, 1796].
You will find enclosed the letter written to me by General
Colli, who commands the army of the King of Sardinia, and
my answer to him : I hope that it will be conformable to
your intentions. The treasury frequently sends us bills of
exchange which are protested; as one for 162,800 livres on
Cadiz has just been ; and this increases our embarrass
ments. I have found this army not only destitute of everything,
but without discipline, and in a state of perpetual insubordi
nation. The discontent was such, that evil-disposed persons
took advantage of it : a company, called the Dauphin's, was
formed, and counter-revolutionary songs were sung. I have
directed two officers, charged with having shouted Vive le
roi ! to be tried by a council of war. I conjecture that the
mission of citizen Moulin, as a flag of truce, was connected
with plots of this kind, the clue to which I am assiduously
seeking. Be assured that peace and order will be re-esta
blished ; everything is in a fair way for it here. I have
just caused the important position of  to be occupied.
Before you read this letter we shall have had a battle.
The treasury has not kept its word ; instead of 500,000
livres, it has sent but 300,000 ; and we have heard nothing
of a sum of 600,000 which was promised us ; but in spite
of all this we are going on.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, 18 Germinal, year 4 [April 7, 1796].
The enemy yesterday attacked one of the posts of Voltri,
the mountain called Campo del Mello. Our troops, after
expending all their cartridges, fell back on a second post.
On the arrival of the reinforcement sent by General Cervoni,
the enemy retired, and. the post was retaken. The firing
lasted above two hours. We had only four men wounded.

24 letters and despatches.
Citizen Picot has reported to me, as he says he has also
done to you, the arrival of 3000 Austrians at Sacello.
General Laharpe starts at three to-morrow morning, to place
a post of 100 men at Stella and at Mozammaran, which is
on the road descending to ArbrisoUa : he will then inspect
the whole line as far as Voltri. If it is your intention,
general, to leave any longer the 4,500 men that there are
from Savona to Voltri, it will be necessary to send forward
to us some other troops, as well for that division as for the
division of Finale. The debouches of Piedmont are all
open : we must therefore take care of ourselves.
I went this morning to reconnoitre Montenotte very mi
nutely, and even pushed on three quarters of a league beyond
it. I convinced myself that we ought not to occupy that
post ; it would scatter our troops too much ; it is too wooded,
and offers no point of defence for its too great extent : to
clear it would require the labour of a hundred men at least
for above a month, in felling trees — an impracticable thing.
We shall confine ourselves then, if you approve it, to sup
porting our right at St. George, half musket-shot from
Montenotte, the centre in the plain of Revel and La Gallina,
and the left at St. Bartholomew ; and our second line will
be at Montelegino. The line is good, and the only one that
can be taken at the moment, with the number of troops that
we have.
Cadibona and.Baracon shall be reinforced to-morrow.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief
Savona, 18 Germinal, year 4 [April 7, 1796].
We are assured by advices from Genoa that the enemy
is preparing to attack us at St. Jacques. Though I do not
give absolute credit to them, still I must beg you to send
me troops to reinforce the second division, if it consists with
your operations to leave the troops at Voltri for some time
longer. You know as well as myself the importance of the
post of St. Jacques, and the necessity there is for reinforcing
it sufficiently to enable it to resist a superior force.
Massena.

letters and despatches. 25
To the General-in-Chief
Savona, 18 Germinal, year 4 [April 7, 1796].
General Cervoni wrote to me yesterday, at three in the
afternoon, that the enemy was attacking his posts on the
mountain. The affair could not have produced any result,
as I have no intelligence of it.
If it is your intention to retain Voltri, materials for en
camping are indispensable, that we may establish ourselves
in a more military manner, by occupying the heights, where
it is impossible to remain in bivouac : otherwise, we shall
be obliged to make troops ascend them every day, which
will fatigue them much.
I think it necessary that we should occupy Montenotte
as speedily as possible. This position has the advantage of
annoying the enemy by the facility which it affords of pro
ceeding either upon Dego or Batello. If the enemy were
to occupy it, our advanced posts of La Madona would be
continually disturbed, and we should be commanded.
The salt meat causes many disorders : it is time for this
unwholesome food to be discontinued. We are in urgent
need of shoes. We are in want of arms. Notwithstanding
all these wants, the troops are well disposed, and I doubt
not for a moment that you will make a brilliant campaign.
I will contribute to it with all my might.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief
Savona, 19 Germinal, year 4 [April 8, 1796].
I forward to you a letter which I have just received from
General Laharpe. I have desired him not to suffer himself
to be reduced to the last extremity before he makes his re
treat, and to abandon the positions occupied by his troops,
if he thinks that he cannot hold them without danger.
I shall immediately reinforce the post of Stella with 150
men, and I am giving orders to the commandant of La Ma
dona to make a movement upon Sassello, by Montenotte,
in order to alarm the force which the enemy appears to be
collecting towards Sassello.
I know not what are your intentions in regard to leaving
troops any longer at Voltri. I cannot help remarking to

26 letters and despatches.
you that our line is too extensive to be guarded by so few
men. Give me your orders, and in a positive manner.
I am forwarding the cartridges for which General Laharpe
applies.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Ormea, 19 Germinal, year 4 [April 8, 1796].
The general of brigade Guieux, commanding the advanced
guard of the division entrusted to me, informs me that the
enemy appear desirous to possess themselves of Casolto.
This point is of the utmost importance to cover my right ; I
have in consequence recommended to that general to protect
it with all his means, but without endangering himself. I
recommend to him to place a post at Casale in an advan
tageous position. In the allotment of the divisions, Casolto
was destined for the division of General Augereau. I have
not a force sufficiently strong to risk prolonging myself to
wards the right. I think that the plan of the enemy must
be to make the first cut at me, to oblige me to abandon the
environs of Preconda, which they must covet, in order to
delay or to suspend our operations : my plan, therefore, is
to reinforce my right as much as I can.
Corn arrives very slowly : I have difficulty to provision
Garessio, whither I must nevertheless march the greater
part of my troops : by the statement of to-day there are in
that place but seven quintals of flour ; this makes me un
easy. There is meat for a few days for the hospitals — that
is all. There are to-day but eight quintals of hay in the
magazine of Ormea ; so that horses as well as men are re
duced to half allowance.
Serrurier.

To General Massena.
Voltri, 19 Germinal, year 4 [April 8, 1796].
The firing has ceased ; the enemy is retiring ; the troops
are worn out ; we have no cartridges left. If the enemy
attacks this evening, or by daybreak to morrow, I shall be
obliged, in case none arrive, to retreat without resistance.
For the sake of the common weal 

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 27
Your letter for Giacomoni is gone by sea. Suchet is the
bearer of it.
It is impossible to delude one's self any longer. The
soldier ill-fed, and without shoes, cannot resist new fatigues
if he is attacked. All are under arms, and all will be so
for the night. Under this circumstance, I shall not return
to Savona, but I recommend to you the gorge which runs
down to Albisola : if not watched, we might all be culpable.
I think the troops at Stella too weak.
I learn this moment that the enemy is again making a
movement : he appears to be assembling for a fresh attack.
We are just out of cartridges : if an attack is made, our
resistance cannot be long.
Laharpe.

To General Massena.
Voltri, 20 Germinal, year 4 [April 9, 1796].
The night has been quiet. The enemy has not yet made
his appearance, which causes me to presume that he does
not design to disturb us to-day.
Last night, I received a communication from the minister ;
he promises me shoes : it will be the coming of the Messiah.
Most of the troops, absolutely barefoot, could no longer
ascend the mountain : they are all there, nevertheless, with
the exception of six companies which are here.
The troops murmur bitterly; I smoothed them down,
and I hope things will go on well. Though several fought
ill yesterday, saying that they would fight as they were
paid, be not uneasy. It anything new occurs, you shall
have immediate notice of it.
I have received 60,000 cartridges. It would not be amiss
to make them up 100,000.
Laharpe.

General Mesnard to Massena, General of Division.
Cadibona, 20 Germinal, year 4 [April 9, 1796].
I have just been informed, and you may take it as quite
certain, that the enemy has for these three days past been
despatching about 10,000 men towards Sacello ; and 1200
Pandours are leaving Dego to-day, to join those 10,000
men. General Roccavina commands this armed force. His

28 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
intention is to cut off the retreat of our troops to Voltri, or
to make them prisoners.
There has been a firing of small arms towards Melogno,
but I have not been able to learn the result.
It is the intention of the enemy to cut off the right and
the left of the army ; and the troops of Piedmont, with the
auxiliaries in her pay, are to make an effort towards the Col
de Tende : they reckon also upon forcing the two important
posts of Melogno and , St. Jacques, and upon leaving the en
virons of Cairo with few troops, in the hope of enticing us
into that valley. Mesnard.
The Minister of the French Republic at Venice to the General-
in-Chief.
Venice, 20 Germinal, year 4 [April 9, 1796].
With the letter which you were pleased to write to me
on the 7th instant, I received that of the minister for foreign
affairs, which accompanied it. Be assured that I will not
neglect any means in my power to procure the information
which you desire, and which must contribute to the success
of yoUr operations.
I have from time to time acquainted the minister of the
Republic at Genoa with all that was passing within my ob
servation. The result is that, since the defeat of General
Devins, there have entered Lombardy, by the Venetian ter
ritory, from 17,000 to 18,000 men, 2000 of which are light
cavalry, and 60 pieces of cannon of different calibres ; that
in this number are comprised two regiments of emigrants in
the pay of England, which crossed the States of the Pope
to embark at Civita Vecchia ; and that 900 men, Neapolitan
cavalry, which have likewise passed through the March of
Ancona, have just arrived at Milan. The general rendez
vous is at Pavia. We are assured also that there is, be
tween Inspruck and Trent, in the Tyrol, a reserve of 20,000
men, 6000 of them regular troops, and 14,000 militia.
The Austrian troops, according to the report of the
Milanese themselves, are in bad condition, excepting the
cavalry. They consist chiefly of elderly men, boys of fifteen
or sixteen, Polish recruits raised in Galicia, who march by
compulsion, and desert in platoons : those, whom I have
seen arriving here, have assured me that all their country
men will endeavour to do the same when they shall be

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 29
ordered against the French. They have even suggested to
me this stratagem, which had also occurred to myself, to
place at the head of our columns Poles dressed in the Polish
fashion, and who would be immediately recognized as such.
You have some at Savona, among others, Major Stratz-
kowski, whom you might employ in this manner with success.
As for the spirit of the inhabitants, especially of the
Milanese, they are tired of their archduke, whom they de
spise ; they are desirous of a change of government, and they
expect it from the arrival of the French among them ; but it is
not to be supposed that they will make the least movement in
their favour till the moment they feel certain that the latter
will be able to secure them for ever from the return of the
Austrian domination. It will, therefore, be necessary, on
coming among them, to inspire them with confidence by
rigid discipline, by scrupulous respect for private property
and for their religion and manners. They are afraid of us
now, because the priests and our enemies have always mis
represented us to them : they will learn by and by to esteem
us, and you will dictate to them such laws as you shall think
proper to ensure the triumph and the glory of the Republic.
Lallemant.

To the General-in-Chief.
Verachio, 22 Germinal, year 4 [April 11, 1796].
I arrived yesterday evening at Voltri ; but my stay there
was not long. The enemy, 4000 strong and with four pieces
of cannon, appeared along our front about three in the after
noon. The greater part of his troops came by Campo Vado,
and their artillery, with 200 horse, along the sea-coast.
Our troops have fought well ; but, scattered in many diffe
rent points and guarding an extensive and an easy country,
on account of its numerous gorges, they were forced at se
veral points ; and at night the enemy found himself master
of all the heights of Voltri. Very fortunately he had at
tacked late, for, had there been a few hours more daylight,
our situation might have been very disastrous. General
Cervonij therefore, wisely resolved to retreat.
Every thing has been evacuated — the magazines of all
sorts — and we have sustained, no loss.
We are at Verachio, where there are very good positions
to take ; among others that of the mountain of Lafourche.

30 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The left of the new line would be at Stella, where we have
one battalion.
I have not been able, as you perceive, to inspect the po
sitions which you specified. If you order the movement of
retreat, I shall return immediately to Savona : if you order
a new iine to be taken, I will visit it and then rejoin you.
Marmont.

To the General-in-Chief.
Between Cairo and Bochetta, 23 Germinal, year 4 [April 12, 1796]
I arrived at six o'clock upon the heights on the right,
between Cairo and Bochetta : my advanced guard covers this
village. I have not yet any intelligence of General Mesnard,
who has with him the 8th demi-brigade of light infantry. I
believe he occupies the bridge and heights of Carcaro.
The enemy occupies the heights facing us which cover
Cairo : he is said to have six battalions of grenadiers and
1200 Croats.
It is said that at Dego there are the battalions of Bel-
jioso and Caprara and two Piedmontese battalions.
I inform you that all the forces I have here amount to no
more than 1200 men.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Montenotte, 23 Germinal, year 4 [April 12, 1796].
We have just driven the enemy from the positions which
he occupied at Montenotte. His loss is very considerable ;
an officer, who is a prisoner, estimates it at 400 men ; ours
is but about a score wounded and five or six killed.
I am withdrawing my troops from the positions of Mon
tenotte. I have sent a superior officer with 100 men to
ascertain where General Laharpe is. If his operation is not
yet finished, I will march to his assistance, and we will
proceed together to Carcaro and Sacello, as you direct in
the letter which my aide-de-camp bas just brought me.
My troops have received no bread : I know not whether
any has been found at Vado.
I owe the warmest thanks to the brave fellows whom I
command.
Massena.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 31
The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief of the Army
of Italy.
Paris, 23 Germinal, year 4 [April 12, 1796].
The Executive Directory sends you, citizen-general, an
extract from a memorial which has just been presented to
it, and from which, it conceives, you may derive some ad
vantage. The Directory is far from intending to propose to you the
silly plan of exposing 10,000 men to a march of forty-five
leagues in an enemy's country, leaving behind them an
army and fortresses, and destitute of the means of carrying
with them necessaries for their subsistence ; but it has been
thought that it might be possible to attain the proposed end
by confiding the execution of the plan to a corps of partisans
commanded by a daring and enterprising leader. It begs
you to make the attempt, if you agree in its opinion, and if
you know a man in the army capable of executing it.
Letourneur.
Extract annexed to the preceding.
Genoa cannot be more than forty-five leagues distant from
Loretto : might it not be possible to seize the Casa Santa
and the immense treasures which superstition has been
amassing there for fifteen centuries 2 They are estimated
at ten millions sterling. Ten thousand men, secretly de
spatched, cleverly conducted, would accomplish such an
undertaking with the greatest facility. There is one diffi
culty — the road is not direet/or it will be necessary to cross
the Appenines.
Nevertheless, with daring, not in the execution, which
requires little or none, but in the plan, you will effect a
most admirable financial operation, and which would do no
harm but to a few monks.
Ten thousand men are sufficient for this enterprise.
Their unknown march will ensure their success. In case of
need, the army will second them. r

To the General in-Chief .
Millesimo, 25 Germinal, year 4 [April 14, 1796].
Agreeably to your orders, I sent off this morning the
brigade of General Victor. That of General Joubert is at

32 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
its destination. Thus I have only the 39th demi-brigade
left, and with that I must furnish a garrison for Cossaria,
and the force requisite for the service of Carcaro, so that I
have but 1000 or 1200 men disposable. With these, you
will admit, it is scarcely possible to occupy positions and to
form an attack. I am going, nevertheless, to make a di
version, to harass the enemy incessantly, and, in order to
do it effectively, to concert with General Joubert, who has
just informed me that the Piedmontese have retired to Mon-
tesemo.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief.
Millesimo, 25 Germinal, year 4 [April 14, 1796].
I inform you that I intend to attack Montesemo to
morrow morning. To this end I shall make General Be-
grand's brigade file along the heights of Rocavignano ;
General Joubert's shall start from Biestro, and proceed to
the same point ; and lastly, General Rusca's, master of St.
Giovanne de Murialto, will turn the enemy by his left and
cut off his retreat upon Ceva. I shall give you an account
of the result of this expedition. AUGEREAIT.

To the General-in-Chief.
Cossaria, 25 Germinal, year 4 [April 14, 1796].
The troops which defended the castle of Cossaria have at
length capitulated, at the moment when I was preparing to
cannonade them in the republican fashion. Adjutant-Ge
neral Verdier will deliver the capitulation to you.
It were to be wished that this capitulation had taken
place before the attack, and then we should not have to
regret the brave generals Banel and Quenin and many other
gallant officers and soldiers who have perished under the
walls of tljat castle.
I will march off the division for the attack which you
have just ordered.
Augereau. -

LETTERS and despatches; 33
To the General-in-Chief.
On the heights of the Castle of Cairo, 25 Germinal, year 4
[April 14, 1796].
The enemy, to the number of 1500 or 2000 men, is this
moment arriving on the heights facing the position which I
occupy. I shall be able to resist and to attack him as soon
as the battalion which I sent this morning for the second
time to General Augereau comes back.
I have this moment received two orders from General
Massena to march to La Bochetta with the two battalions
of the 84th demi-brigade. I am letting him know that,
having received contrary orders from you, and being on the
point of having the enemy upon my hands, I cannot abandon
my position.
Dommartin.

To the General-in-Chief
Cairo, 26 Germinal, year 4 [April 15, 1796].
Brilliant actions ought to be known. I have two to
mention to you which deserve your attention.
In the glorious fight of yesterday, I received orders" to
throw myself with my battalion on the front of the enemy :
this order I executed with impetuosity/ Adjutant-General
Palezzini and citizen Guiabega, captain in the first demi-
brigade of light infantry, which was with me, were the first
to dash into the enemy's entrenchments. The first was
aimed at by two Austrians who missed him : he disarmed
and took them prisoners. He advanced and disarmed four
officers, who defended themselves sword in hand.
This adjutant-general, dismissed at the time of the changes
made by Aubry, and provisionally placed in activity on the
application of General Scherer, has no letters of service ; he
deserves, by the trait which I have just related, and by the
intrepidity which he has displayed in the affair of Voltri,
in the attack of Montenotte, and on several other occasions,
that you, general, should solicit the grant of his commis
sion. The second, keeping ahead of the column, amidst a shower
of balls, threw himself into the redoubt, and engaged with
the sword two officers and a sergeant ; the latter he killed,
and disarmed and took prisoners the two others. This
VOL. I. D

34 letters and despatches.
officer, distinguished for his talents and his valour, who has
been a captain for three months, deserves to be promoted to
the rank of chief of battalion on the field of battle.
Cervoni.

To the General-in-Chief
Meridano, 26 Germinal, year 4 [April 15, 1796].
I learn, through the medium of the order of the day, that
shoes are to be delivered to the divisions of General Massena
and Laharpe. Nothing is said about mine, which is in ex
treme want of them. I beg you to send me the shoes I am
in need of as speedily as possible.
The convoys of provisions destined for my division reach
me with difficulty, because there is allowed an escort of two
men only, who are unacquainted with the roads and lose
their way.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief.
La Bochetta, 26 Germinal, year 4 [April 15, 1796].
Notwithstanding your promises, general, the troops are
without bread ; they are sinking under fatigue and inani
tion. Send us something — at least, some bread and a little
brandy ; for I am fearful of being a prophet of disaster ; but,
if we are attacked to-morrow, the troops will fight ill, for
want of physical strength.
Laharpe.

To the General-in-Chief.
Camp of Dego, 27 Germinal, year 4 [April 16, 1796].
The fight of yesterday was very hot, very fatiguing, but
very glorious for the arms of the Republic.
Before daylight, the enemy, who had received numerous
reinforcements, attacked all tho posts of Dego, of which we
had made ourselves masters the day before. The resistance
was most obstinate : our troops, notwithstanding their ex
treme valour, were obliged, after a combat of five hours, to
give way and to abandon all the positions which they oc
cupied : they made their retreat along the line which we
had taken on the first day.

letters and despatches. 35
I made dispositions for a new attack, and meanwhile oc
cupied the enemy by a great number of tirailleurs. The
reinforcement for which I applied to you having arrived,
the attack became general. The fire was terrible on both
sides : never was battle more obstinate. At length the
enemy, charged in all quarters, was obliged to yield to
republican valour, and to abandon, in his turn, all the re
doubts of which he had made himself master. His rout
was complete. In his flight he was charged with impetu
osity by the cavalry ; all who refused to surrender were cut
down. His loss is very considerable, in killed and wounded
as well as prisoners. The number of these last exceeds 3000.
Ours is small in comparison. We have to regret the death
of General Causse, Adjutant Poyre", and several other gal
lant officers. The chiefs of brigade Rondeau and Dupuis
are wounded, the first in the leg, the other in the arm.
The greatest praise is due to the troops : they have every
where displayed heroic courage. The general of brigade
Beaumont, commanding the cavalry, your aide-de-camp
Murat, and adjutant-general Vignolles, sub-chief of the
staff, particularly distinguished themselves by being the first
to attack the enemy and with vigour.
The success of this engagement is owing to the intrepi
dity of the troops and the reinforcement which you sent me.
I will communicate to you, general, the brilliant deeds
which do honour to that fight and to our republicans, and
immortalize those who are dead : their memory ought to be
recorded in the annals of history.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Heights of Ceva, 28 Germinal, year 4 [April 17, 1796]".
1 have this instant received your different orders, but
cannot put them in execution, being master of the enemy's
lines. I shall send immediately to occupy the Tete Noire
and other positions which overlook the fort : if, neverthe
less, you persist in the changes which you prescribe, I re
quest you to let me know it.
Augereau.

d2

36 letters and despatches.

To the General-in-Chief.
Bagnasco, 26 Germinal, year 4 [April 17, 1796].
There are no provisions in the magazines of Ormea and
Garessio : we are living from hand to mouth. It is the same
in regard to forage. I have been told that a small quantity
of oats has arrived, but with orders that none should be
delivered. My right column arrived at Nocetta too late to form the
attack of it, which took place this morning ; we carried at
once the redoubt of Terra Bianca. I am certain of these
facts, though I have not yet received the report of General
PeUetier, who directs that party.
I wrote to you yesterday, to give you an account of our
establishment at Batifolo, where we have taken prisoners
51 men and five officers, one of them a lieutenant-colonel,
Count d'Ison. I have to commend general of brigade Guieux,
as he does highly the chief of battalion Dallons.
I have just received intelligence from general of brigade
PeUetier, whose affair is as I have told you above : he has
taken five or six prisoners. I have sent General Miollis
with 1000 or 1200 men towards Pampara, as much to cover
me on that side as to annoy the enemy. The snow renders
the roads extremely toilsome.
Serrurier.

To the General-in-Chief
Mioglia, 28 Germinal, year 4 [April 17, 1796].
The boundless licentiousness to which the troops give
themselves up, and which cannot be remedied, because we
have not a right to order a scoundrel to be shot, is hurrying
us into ruin, dishonouring us, and preparing for us the most
cruel reverses. As my character for firmness will not per
mit me to witness such things, much less to tolerate them,
there is but one course for me to take, that of retiring. In
consequence, general, I beg you to accept my resignation,
and to send an officer to take the command entrusted to
me ; for I would rather dig the ground for a livelihood
than be at the head of men who are worse than were the
Vandals of old.
Laharpe.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 37
To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, 29 Germinal, year 4 [April 18, 179!)].
In consequence, general, of your order of the 28th, I have
halted at Savona. I have communicated your intentions
to the commandant of the artillery and to the commissaries
of war at Savona and Vado. You may depend upon your
orders being punctually executed, as well in regard to the
artillery as to the provisions. The field-artillery shall be
landed to-day, and to-morrow it shall be all sent off.
The commissaries of war have given orders that there
shall be nothing in their magazines but what is necessary
for daily consumption. To-morrow, a detachment of 100
horse shall go to Voltri, agreeably to the order of the chief
of the staff to the commandant of Savona. We are assured
that this country is entirely evacuated by the enemy.
The English squadron has been the whole day off Savona.
I have recommended the most active vigilance to the forts
of Vado and to the vessels in that harbour.
Cervoni.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castellino, 30 Germinal, year 4 [April 19, 1796].
I set out, agreeably to your orders, at the precise hour
this morning for Castellino, where I arrived without striking
a stroke, not having met with the enemy till I was beyond
the Tanaro, where he was encamped and awaiting me in
order of battle. As General Serrurier had not yet made
his appearance, I determined to make myself master of all
the heights which border the river by extending myself a
great deal on the right, in order to turn him by his left,
and to be enabled to cut off his retreat at the first move
ment that he should make.
General Serrurier having appeared and commenced his
attack, I have sent down a great number of tirailleurs to
occupy the enemy and to make a diversion. If a favour
able moment presents itself, I will cross the river, which it
is very difficult to do, since the enemy has broken down the
bridge, and the opposite bank is lined with artillery.
As soon as I appeared, the enemy broke up the camp
which is in the plain and that which is on the heights that
cover St. Michael. Augereau.

38 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief.
Ceva, 30 Germinal, year 4 [April 19, 1796],
We were masters of St. Michael, of the castle, and of
the heights. The enemy had blown up part of his ammu
nition ; his cannon, abandoned in the rout of the centre,
had been overturned by some of the chasseurs whom I had
with me, and who had crossed the Tanaro ; in short, we
were on the point of the most complete victory. Part of
Serrurier's division unfortunately fell to plundering in the
village of St. Michael, in spite of all the efforts of that
officer to restrain them. The enemy took advantage of
this stupidity to return to the charge, and in an instant the
conquerors lost everything. The general fell back upon
the heights in front of St. Michael, whither I went to re
join him, with some companies that I had taken from the
troops under the command of General Fiorella. He had a
mind to retire into his first positions ; I have strongly dis
suaded him from it, and he will await your orders. There
is nothing desperate. Let General Augereau closely press
the centre of the enemy ; let his attack commence even
before that of General Serrurier, that concert may be neces
sarily established between them, a concert indispensable for
success : let all our cavalry assemble, pour down into
the valley, and fall upon the enemy in his retreat, and I
think I may be answerable to you for certain success. The
enemy has but little artillery, and his countenance, through
the whole action, has been not so much that of an adversary
bent on maintaining his ground as of one who contemplates
retreat, merely taking the time necessary for the evacuation
of his magazines. It is essential above all things that you
should give speedy orders to General Serrurier, and invite
him to take his revenge.
Your brother will hand you this letter, written in haste.
I should have rejoined you, but my horse is knocked up,
and I am very little better myself. Return hither ; I think
your presence would be more useful here than at Salicetto.
DESPINOIS.

To the General-in-Chief.
Dego, 30 Germinal, year 4 [April 19, 1796].
According to the reports that reach me, the enemy has
evacuated the fortress of Voltri and the Bochetta, and is

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 39
collecting in the environs of Acqui. At Spigno, there is
only a piquet of fifty hussars. He appears disturbed this
morning : whether this arises from movements made on
your part, I caunot tell. It is two months since the troops
received any pay, as I am told by an officer with a flag of
truce that brought despatches.
We received last night bread and spirits, so that we have
been enabled to give out a whole ration for to-day.
In collecting the muskets and cartouch-boxes, we found
some more unfortunate wounded Austrians. More than
500 have been conveyed to Cairo, but they are all lost men,
mortification having already taken place in most of them.
Laharpe.

To the General-in-Chief.
Heights of St. Michael, 1 Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 1796].
1 am ready, for my part, general, to attack to-day, but
the circumstance exhibits no appearance of a probability
that would be favourable to us.
Several corps have been without bread for these three days :
the soldiers abused this pretext to abandon themselves to
the most horrible pillage. The corps have somewhat ral
lied, but there are still wanting a considerable number of
men, who have gone off to get provisions in all possible
ways. I am ill seconded by the officers, who pillage too :
they were drunk yesterday, like the others.
For the attack of the village, I should need at least two
8-pounders to answer the heavy pieces which the enemy
has placed for the defence of the bridge which he has cut
down. I should want an engineer of more ability than the
one I have, to rebuild that bridge under the fire of my
cannon. The means for the reconstruction of the bridge being pre
pared — for the river cannot be forded without great danger
— those means, I say, being prepared, it would be neces
sary to defer that attack till to-morrow, and not to com
mence it too early, because I have great movements to
make. To obtain success, it is necessary that General Augereau
should attack with a force sufficient to enable him to pene
trate ; should he not succeed, and I enter St. Michael, I
run the risk of being taken there with my troops, because

40 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
the enemy will correct the blunders which they committed
yesterday. If bread does not reach us, the soldiers will not march.
We are still in want of a great many muskets ; there were
nearly 2000 deficient before the affair. Serrurier.

To the General-in-Chief.
Savona, 1 Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 1796].
The detachment of 100 horse chasseurs sent on a recon-
noissance to Voltri has returned this morning. The com
manding officer informs me that this place is evacuated by
the enemy, who has effected his retreat by the Bochetta.
Nothing new. Cervoni.
To the General-in-Chief.
Castellino, 1 Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 179GJ.
I send you herewith two letters, one from general of
brigade Rusca, and the other from a Piedmontese, who in
forms him that a corps of enemy's troops has passed the
Tanaro in face of him. I have just inspected that ground,
and have remarked that this is really the place by which
we may be turned. If. I am attacked, I shall make a
proper resistance ; but, in case of necessity, I shall fall back
upon the entrenched camp, unless you give me contrary
orders. Numerous patroles, which I shall immediately send out,
will learn what truth there is in this statement ; and the
scouts whom I shall despatch early this morning will pre
vent any surprise in that quarter.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief. Cairo, 1 Floreal, year 1 [April 20, 1796].
I have come hither, general, to ascertain the state of our
provisions ; there is the same penury everywhere. Unless
we receive bread to-night, we shall be without an ounce
to-morrow, and, should it even arrive, there would not be
sufficient to give a quarter of a ration to the three brigades
and to the cavalry.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 41
All the agents, store-keepers, and others, in all the ad
ministrations, are making requisitions at random : the
peasants of these parts are absolutely ruined : the soldiers
are destitute and their leaders disconsolate : rogues only
are enriching themselves. There is not a moment to be
lost, general, if you would save the army, if you would not
have us be considered in Piedmont as men worse than the
Goths and Vandals. Punish the knaves severely ; reduce
the number of those public bloodsuckers ; whom one never
sees exerting themselves for the benefit of the army, but is
sure to find wherever they can profit by disorder.
Since the 23rd of last month, the 69th has received but
two rations and a half; and the others have suffered in
like manner. It is not possible to repress the men in this
miserable state : your army is about to be worn down by
disease, and, whenever we march, by the Barbets :' for it
cannot be doubted that the inhabitants, driven to despair,
will arm and slaughter every French straggler. Above all,
general, it is urgent that you should put a stop to that host
of illegal requisitions ; or, if they must continue, it would
be better to assemble the inhabitants, shoot them, and
then finish plundering, for it comes to the same point ; they
must be starved to death.
Bread ! bread ! and again bread !
Laharpe.

To the General-in-Chief.
Camp of Dego, ] Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 1796].
Indiscipline has reached the highest pitch. I am using
all possible means to maintain order, but they are of no
avail. There is no kind of excess which the soldiers do not
indulge in, and all that I can do is useless. I therefore
request you, general, to be pleased to accept my resigna
tion ; for I cannot serve with soldiers, who know neither
subordination, nor obedience, nor law, and who are every
moment threatening their officers and their commanders.
Chambarlhac,
Chief of the 70th demi-brigade.

1 Piedmontese guerillas.

42 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief. Dego, 1 Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 1796],
Indiscipline and insubordination are at their height : the
excesses perpetrated by the soldiers cannot be checked. For
several days past, I have been employing all the means in
my power to bring them back to obedience and subordi
nation ; all my efforts having proved unavailing, and find
ing myself wholly unable to reduce them to order, I request
you, general, to accept my resignation.
I observe to you, general, that two . chiefs of battalions
without appointments are with the demi-brigade, and one
of these citizens might readily supply my place, since their
military talents are superior to mine.
Maugras.

To the General-in-Chief.
Monte Barcaro, 3 Floreal, year 4 [April 22, 1796].
It is two o'clock and nothing has arrived ; the soldiers
are more busily engaged than ever in theft and plunder :
peasants have been murdered by our men, and soldiers have
been killed by the peasants. Words cannot adequately
describe the horrors that are committed. The camps are
almost deserted, the soldiers roaming over the country
more like ferocious beasts than men ; those who do not join
in the atrocities patrolling the while, with superior officers
at their head ; it is to no purpose to drive them from one
place ; they only run to murder at another. The officers
are in despair.
The soldiers are culpable, but those who reduce them to
the alternative of plundering or starving are much more
guilty. In the name of humanity, in the name of liberty,
which wretches are assassinating, rescue us from this situ
ation ! Send us wherewithal to prolong our miserable
existence without committing crimes. Who would ever
have thought that the brave fellows of the army of Italy,
after making so many sacrifices, would have no other re
ward but the cruel alternative of being famished to death
or turning robbers ! The contributions which, judiciously
levied, would have enabled us to live, are become imprac
ticable ; the soldier destroying in a moment what we could
have lived upon for a week, without ruining the inhabitant.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 43
Can there then exist a Providence, since its avenging bolts
do not crush all the villains who are at the head of the ad
ministration !
Laharpe.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castellino, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796].
This morning, at seven o'clock precisely, I received your
order to set off at that hour, which it was impossible for me
to do. I shall, however, make the utmost efforts to set
my columns in motion without delay.
The force of General Beyrand will proceed direct for
Dogliani, by way of Marsaglia. The column of General
Rusca will take the high road and escort the artillery.
I have just written to General Victor to set out imme
diately on receiving the orders of the staff, and to rejoin
me at Dogliani. As soon as I have arrived and taken
positions, I will report to you.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief.
Monte Barcaro, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796].
I have received your two letters, my dear general : your
promises are very cheering — may they be fulfilled !
General Mesnard has just sent back the company- of gre
nadiers of the second battalion of the 99th demi-brigade.
It was directed to protect property, and by its language
encouraged the plunder of it : it shall be broken and sent
to the rear of the division. One man is before a council of
war, and I hope that he will be shot to-day. The officers
have determined to second me to-day. Let us have bread,
and, by dint of exertions, I will answer for restoring dis
cipline.
Laharpe.

To the General-in-Chief.
Dogliani, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796].
It is seven o'clock, and I have just arrived here with the
39th demi-brigade : I am expecting the brigades of generals
Rusca and Victor, as well as the artillery. I entered

4i LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
amidst a concourse of people, who came to offer the scanty
resources which this little country affords. I accepted
nothing but wine.
The enemy passed through this place eight days ago, on
the 28th ult., in his retreat, to the number of 4000 men :
he came from Mutassano, and first marched to Marsoglio,
whence, after several movements, he proceeded to Mondovi.
When Mondovi was taken, he retired upon Cherasco, where
he is at present. He has cut off all the communications
on the Tanaro, which were nothing but bridges of boats.
To-morrow at daybreak I shall start myself, to make a
strict reconnoissance towards Novella, and I shall establish
myself there, if the country presents any advantageous
positions. I will report to you on the subject, and give
you all the information that I can pick up.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief.
Brealongo, 5 Floreal, year 4 [April 24, 1796]
I have been informed that the enemy were at Coni, to
the number of 4000 men, and that they had totally evacu
ated Fossano. I have sent a peasant to the -latter place
to make sure of the matter ; otherwise I could not gua
rantee the truth of these two statements. Supposing that
of Coni to be true, the position which I at present occupy
would not appear to me to be a very good one ; I should
actually be exposing my left flank to him.
I bivouacked last night With my troops on the position
which you pointed out in your last order of yesterday.
Not having received orders to march this morning as I
expected, I have placed myself personally in this village.
Serrurier.

To the General-in-Chief.
In advance of Brealongo, 5 Floreal, year 4 [April 24, 1796].
All night my patroles were unable to discover the ad
vanced posts of General Massena. It was not till near
daybreak that they discovered three posts, which were all
asleep. They report to me that they found nobody in
Carru, aud that they pushed on to your head-quarters,
which I do not know the name of.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 45
We have bivouacked, as your last order directs, on the
left bank of the Gezzio. The artillery is not yet arrived.
It appears certain that all is quiet, and that the enemy is at
a great distance from this place. I shall, nevertheless,
send out fresh patroles to Rocca and Morozzo. Serrurier.

To the General-in-Chief. Paris, 6 Floreal, year 4 [April 25, 1796].
Accept my congratulations on the brilliant actions of
Montenotte and Millesimo : at this moment, perhaps, you
have still more important ones to report to us. All France,
all Europe, have their eyes fixed on you. Your triumphs
are those of liberty ; and assuredly you will not only half
perform the glorious task which you have imposed upon
yourself. The Executive Directory will give orders for officers of
artillery and engineers to be sent as speedily as possible
to the army of Italy, and likewise one or two companies of
light artillery. It replies by the present courier to your
official letters. Carnot.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte, Commander-
in-Chief of the Army of Italy.
Paris, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796].
The Directory has received with the highest satisfaction,'
citizen-general, the news of the victory gained in Italy over
the Austrians. In appreciating advantages so brilliant at
the opening of a campaign which the aversion to peace on
the part of the enemies of the Republic has forced us to un
dertake, it is satisfactory to it to see the choice which it
has made of you to conduct the army of Italy to victory
justified by the laurels which you have just gathered.
Receive to-day, general, the tribute of the national gra
titude ; deserve it more and more ; and prove to Europe
that Beaulieu, in changing the field of battle, has not
changed enemies ; that, beaten in the north, he will be con
stantly beaten by the brave army of Italy ; and that, with
such defenders, liberty will triumph over the impotent
efforts of the enemies of the Republic.
Letourneur.

46 letters and despatches.
The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796]. ,
The Executive Directory has received, citizen-general,
your letter of the 1 7th Germinal, as well as a copy of that
written to you by General Colli, and of your answer, rela
tive to the apprehension of Moulin. The insult offered to
the national dignity by this hostile general, in sending to
you an emigrant with a flag of truce, justifies the resolution
which you have taken to detain him, and the Directory
approves it ; but you must only keep him in a place of
safety, and not bring him to trial, in consideration of the
character with which he is invested.
You know, citizen-general, the high importance attached
by the Directory to the campaign in Italy, and it is con
vinced that, on this theatre of war most especially, it is
essential to commence with important successes.
You have fulfilled its hopes in the brilliant victory of
Montenotte ; and it sees with an interest equal to its con
fidence in you those which you express respecting your
further operations.
Letourneur.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 6 Floreal, year 4 [April 25, 1796].
The Executive Directory has received, citizen-general, by
a second courier, the news of the victory of Millesimo.
The glorious testimonies of the national gratitude which
the legislative body has just given to the brave army of
Italy for this success and that of Montenotte, which
paved the way to it, dispense the Directory from expatia^
ting further in the praises which it has merited : it confines
itself to congratulating the general, to whose talents and
activity these victories are principally owing, on the dis
positions which he has made and the success which has
crowned them. It desires him to communicate to the
French generals who have so happily seconded him, and to
the brave men who have conquered under their command,
the testimony of its satisfaction and that of all the true
friends of liberty.
A republican government knows how to gratify those
who render important services to their country. It is its

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 47
duty to encourage the man whom patriotic sentiments and
the intrepidity inherent in the French soldier stimulate to
actions which reflect honour on their country.
The Directory informs you that it cheerfully complies
with the application which you have made for the rank of
general of brigade in behalf of citizen Rampon, chief of the
21st demi-brigade. It has sent him a letter expressing its
satisfaction, which you will find herewith inclosed, as well
as his commission, which the Directory begs you to deliver
to him.
The Directory has thought fit, in hke manner, to confirm
the nomination which you have made of citizen Lasnes to
the rank of chief of brigade of the 39th demi-brigade
instead of the officer who commanded it and fell on the field
of honour.
One more effort, citizen-general, and nothing will be able
to stop the triumphant march of the army which you com
mand. Ceva has no doubt been attacked at the moment
when the Directory is writing to you, and the valour of the
French troops will have carried the entrenched camp of
the Piedmontese near that fortress. A vast career is
opening before you ; the Directory has measured its full
extent : the instructions which it has given you, the deve
lopments which it adds to them by the present, and which
circumstances command it to address to you, your military
talents, as well as the valour of the troops that are under
you, will enable you to pass through it with glory and in
a manner worthy of the Republic for which you are
fighting. The instructions which the Directory transmitted to you,
at the moment when you apprised it that you had assumed
the command of the army of Italy, have already laid down the
bases to which the Directory refers. To-day it will give a
rapid sketch of the conduct which you have to pursue in the
different circumstances in which it is natural to suppose that
military events may place you.
The first hypothesis which it is fair to form is that which
is more closely connected with the hopes held out to the
Directory by the army of Italy and the talents and zeal of
the general who commands it. Everything induces a belief
that, after having obtained success at Ceva, after you have
gained possession of that fort, universal terror will be
diffused over all Piedmont ; that the court of Turin will

48 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
be obliged to abandon Coni, Mondovi, and its other for
tresses to their own strength ; to collect its troops to cover
Turin ; and to strive, by efforts which your activity and the
military dispositions made by you will find means to
thwart, further to oppose the march which part of the
French army will direct towards that capital. Perhaps
even the King of Sardinia, astounded at your success,
alarmed at the movements which may take place in Turin
itself, will at last renounce the coalition, into which he has
been drawn to his misfortune. And it is not improbable
that, in the present circumstance, he will seek with ardour
a peace which he has rejected with obstinacy, and to the
obtaining of which French generosity alone can permit him
to revert.
The Executive Directory has reserved to itself exclu
sively the faculty conferred on it by the constitution of
negotiating peace ; but it thinks that it may be useful to
communicate to you, citizen-general, some of the bases on
which it will insist for its establishment.
An alliance offensive and defensive with the King of
Sardinia is, without doubt, what would be most advantage
ous to the court of Turin. It would secure to the latter
not only Sardinia, where the disturbances appear to be fed
solely by the hope of being seconded by us : it would pro
cure for the Sardinian troops, by an attack combined with
the movements of the French troops towards Tortona,
Alexandria, and Valenza, the important invasion of. the
Milanese. This alliance, in short, would guarantee to us
the entire and for us advantageous expulsion of the house
of Austria out of Italy ; but the want of money in Pied
mont, the little confidence which the court of Turin enjoys,
and the exhaustion of the country after several campaigns,
forbid the idea of the possibility of an alliance so desirable,
and which would suddenly turn the forces of Piedmont
against our implacable enemies the Austrians. It would
perhaps, at most, be possible to require that part of the
troops of. the court of Turin should join the republican
troops, while the rest of the troops of the King of Sardinia
should be prudently reduced to a state that would give us
nothing to fear during the remainder of this war, in case
even of a reverse on our part, and if the advantages gained
by the Austrians should force the Piedmontese again to
join them. If, however, the court of Turin, induced by

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 49
the hope of being enabled to send its troops into the Mila
nese (the possession of which France would guarantee to
it) were suddenly to turn its forces against the soldiers of
Austria, it would then become necessary to have some im
portant fortresses as a pledge of its fidelity to us. Tor
tona or Alexandria, Coni, Suza, and the fort of Exiles,
might _ answer for the fidelity of the King of Sardinia in
observing the alliance which would be concluded with him
by the Executive Directory. The reasons deduced above,
citizen-general, leading us to think that the court of Turin,
at the moment when it is compelled to demand peace, will
find itself utterly incapable of continuing the war, have
arrested the attention of the Directory. Here are some of
the bases that it will adopt for the establishment of that
peace, if it is forced to renounce the hope of an alliance
offensive and defensive, advantageous to both States.
I. The general disarming of Piedmont;
2. The reduction of the Piedmontese troops to such a
state as would leave us nothmg to apprehend during the
course of the present war ;
3. The transport to the island of Sardinia of the greater
part and of the best corps which shall be retained ;
4. The occupation of the citadels and fortresses of Alex
andria or Tortona, those of Ceva and Coni, and lastly those
of Exiles and Suza, with a stipulation for the demolition
of the fortifications of the last three, either at the general
peace, or at a particular peace with the court of Turin ;
5. Lastly, the supply of all sorts of commodities in kind
which the troops of the Republic shall have need of during
the present war, and that of the means of transport, as
well as the establishment in Piedmont of military hospi
tals and workshops necessary for the army of Italy.
The second hypothesis entertained by the Directory is
that in which the King of Sardinia, either from obstinacy
or from continuing to reckon upon foreign subsidies, shall
persist in continuing the war. Your first instructions fur
nish you with a plan of conduct in this state of things ;
and then it will become essential to strive more especially
to excite insurrection in Piedmont, to second the desire
which is there manifesting itself for the establishment of a
republican government, and to draw from that country all
the resources which the army of Italy shall have need of;
but it would be imprudent to advance too far into Piedmont
VOL. I. E

50 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
and to direct attention to it exclusively : this would be
fiving the Austrians the means of repairing their losses and
opes of some success.
It will then be requisite — and you could, in a manner,
prepare beforehand for this movement, citizen-general — it
will be requisite to act upon your right, to drive the Aus
trians beyond the Po, and to turn your most strenuous
efforts in the direction of the Milanese. Genoa, after the
rout of the Austrian army, will cease to refuse the succours
that are indispensable to us. The firmness and energy- of
the French envoys to that republic, and their conduct,
prudent, circumspect, and worthy in everything of that
which employs them, will bring back the Genoese to the
sentiments from which they ought never to have swerved.
They will no longer refuse to let you occupy Gavi, in the
same manner and on the same conditions as at the time of
the taking of Vado ; and, if they should so misunderstand
their interests as to oppose our successes which ensure their
existence, force would soon make us masters of that for
tress. For the rest, the Directory relies Upon your
prudence, and it is convinced that your conduct in these
delicate transactions, which the distance prevents us from
determining in a more precise manner, will be in every
respect prudent and judicious.
Such are the developments which your successes have
determined the Directory to add to the instructions which
it had given you. It doubts not for a moment that you
will follow up the victories which the army has just won.
It knows that it is not you, citizen-general, whom it will
ever have to reproach with the disgraceful repose of Capua.
Letourneur.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte^
Paris, 6 Floreal, year 4 [April 25, 1796].
The Directory had signed the despatches which it ad
dresses to you to-day by the return of your first courier,
when your letter of the 27th Germinal arrived. Honour
to the army of Italy and to the chief who commands it !
You have had the skill to retrieve what a fatal security at
Dego had well nigh wrested from us. Honour to the brave
General Causse, who fell in the field of glory ! Honour
to all the French who defend and uphold the Republic !

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 51
Be particularly upon your guard against the movements
of the Austrians. May the successor of Devins soon go
back to Vienna, like him, to mourn over fresh losses ! No
repose till our enemies are totally dispersed.
The Directory will write to you very shortly, and will
be solicitous to reward the republicans who have distin
guished themselves. Send it the typographical plans of
the battles of Montenotte and Millesimo and the affair
of Dego, with an accurate description of the movements.
The Directory strongly insists on these plans, necessary
to the history of the triumphs of the Republic, being made
and sent to it punctually and without delay.
Annexed are some interesting papers. Orders shall
be given to the army of the Alps to second you ; but,
unfortunately, it is in a state of frightful destitution and
not strong. Letourneur.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 9 Floreal, year 4 [April 28, 1796],
By a courier who set out on the morning of the 7th, the
Directory acknowledged the receipt of the letters, informing
it of the success of the army of Italy at Dego. It has learned
with equal satisfaction the advantages gained near Coraglia
and Mondovi, and the news of the taking of that place.
These victories are owing, citizen-general, to your judi
cious dispositions and activity : they confirm the Directory
in the opinion which it entertains of your prudence and your
military talents. But, while praieing the valour and intrepi
dity of the army which you command, it bitterly regrets to see
the laurels which it has gathered stained by the disorders
and the pillage to which they have given themselves up.
This disastrous state of things, and the excesses which
tarnish the glory of the defenders of the Republic, have
probably been by this time repressed by the severe order
which you have given, and which is fully justified by the
imperious circumstances in which you have found yourself.
The Directory hopes that the ulterior conduct of the
army will soon allow you to recall it, and speedily to revoke
the extraordinary power which you have been obliged to
confer on the generals of division who second you. A
commencement of Vendee in La Lozere, the Ardeche, the
frontiers of the Gard, &c. has prevented the Directory
E 2

52 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
from ordering Chateauneuf-Randon to retain no longer the
two demi-brigades mentioned in your letter dated from
Cairo on the 27th of Germinal last, and which will be sent
to you by and by.
It is with extreme pain that the Directory, convinced of
the urgent necessity of the case, has authorized the retain
ing of those corps under the command of General Chateau
neuf-Randon. It will give orders for sending off imme
diately to the army of Italy a reinforcement of several
thousand men, which, unluckily, will not arrive so speedily
as the Directory wishes, but which will not on that account
be the less useful. Rely upon it, General, that the 'Direc
tory will not lose sight for a single moment of the brave
army which you command ; and the authority which the
Directory has conferred on citizens Salicetti and Garrpau
to require movements of troops upon the application of the
generals-in-chief, or of one of them, cannot fail to produce
harmony in the operations of the two armies.
The Directory sends you herewith a copy of the de
spatch which it addressed to General Kellermann on the
9th instant, in which you will remark that it has adopted
the principal bases of the plan presented by the general of
division Berthier, which had probably been communicated
to you, and which determines, for the right of the army of
the Alps, a close connexion with the left of that of Italy,
and movements absolutely dependent upon it. You will
see by the same letter how strongly the Directory has re
commended union between the two armies and the gene
rals who command them. The Directory considers it as
superfluous to enlarge with you on the necessity of that
concord : it knows that it needs not recommend to you to
pay your colleague the attentions which his long services
and military talents demand, and without which there
might arise such disharmony as would compromise the
success of our arms.
The courier who left on the 7th Floreal will have
brought you details respecting the officers of engineers and
artillery who have received orders to join the army of Italy.
The Directory does not lose sight of this interesting object.
The confidence which the Directory has in your energy
and prudence silences the fears which might be raised hy
the statement of the hostile forces opposed to you. Your
successes have brought about a highly interesting event,
and one to which the Directory attached the greatest im-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 53
portance — the separation of the Piedmontese and Austrian
armies ; but our advantages cannot be truly consolidated
without extreme promptitude in the operations which you
shall command. Act, therefore, with the rapidity of light
ning, and successively against the Austrian and the Pied
montese : beware, above all, of throwing yourself with too
much precipitation upon your left. How advantageous
soever might be an immediate junction with the right of
the army of the Alps, it is to be feared that Beaulieu would
suddenly take advantage of the removal of great part of
your forces towards Saluzzo. As you very justly observe,
the campaign is not yet decided. Beaulieu is the more to
be feared, as he is obstinate, daring, and enterprising ; his
attack at Dego after a defeat is a proof of this, and we
must take it as a warning : beat the Austrians again, and
you will thenceforward be master of the campaign ; and
you will have nothing more to fight but the heat and dis
ease, which must be kept off by the precautions which the
climate enjoins. Those scourges have always annihilated
our successes where you are : they must be provided against ;
and, unpleasant as may be the details which must be fol
lowed Up for this purpose, the. Directory deems it a duty to
call your attention beforehand to the necessity of keeping
an eye upon them.
Compliment, on the part of the Directory, the general of
division Augereau, and the generals of brigade Beyrand
and Joubert, on their conduct in the attack of the redoubts
defending the approach to the entrenched camp of Ceva ;
the general of division, Serrurier, on that which he dis
played at the attack of St. Michael and the passage of the
Corsaglia ; the general of division Massena, and the gene
rals of brigade Guieux, Fiorella, and Dammartin, on their
behaviour in the engagements of the 3rd and 4th Floreal ;
lastly, the chief of brigade, Murat, your aide-de-camp, who,
has, in like manner, distinguished himself.
As for yourself, hope every thing from the genius of the
Republic, from the valour of the soldiers, from the union
of the chiefs, and the confidence which is placed in you :
the Directory expects everything from the general who
commands the intrepid army of Italy, and from the holi
ness of the cause for which the French are fighting, and
which they will never abandon. Carnot.

54 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Bonaparte, General-in-Chief, to the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Cherasco, 9 Floreal, year 4 [April 28, 1796].
Enclosed you will find, citizens directors —
1 . Copy of the letter written to me by General Colli :
2. Copy of my answer ;
3. Copy of his second letter ;
4. The conditions of the suspension of arms concluded
last night between the Commandant-general Latour, com
manding the Piedmontese army, and myself.
Ceva, Coni, and Alexandria, are in the hands of your
army, as well as all the posts in Piedmont beyond the
Stura and the Tanaro.
If you will not come to an accommodation with the King
of Sardinia, I will keep those places and march upon
Turin ; my siege equipage is going off to Coni, and to pro
ceed thence to Cherasco.
Meanwhile, I shall Inarch to-morrow to meet Beaulieu ;
I shall oblige him to repass the Po ; I shall cross it imme
diately afterwards, make myself master of all Lombardy,
and in less than a month I hope to be on the mountains of
Tyrol, to find the army of the Rhine, and in concert with
it to carry the war into Bavaria. This plan is worthy of
you, of the army, and of the destinies of France.
if you will not grant peace to the King of Sardinia, let
me know beforehand, that, if I am still in Lombardy, I
may tall back and take measures.
As for the conditions of peace with Sardinia, you can
dictate what you please, since I have the principal fortresses
in my power.
Order 15,000 men of the army of the Alps to be placed
at my disposal and to join me : that will make me an army
of 45,000 men, part of which it might be possible to send
to Rome. If you continue to give me your confidence and
approve these projects, I am certain of success : Italy is
yours. You must not reckon upon a revolution in Piedmont ; it
will come, but it is requisite that the minds of those people
should be ripe for the purpose.
I have justified your confidence and the advantageous
opinion which you have conceived of me ; I shall constantly
strive to give you proofs of my zeal, and of the desire I feel
to deserve your esteem and that of the country.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 55
Send me, 1, twelve companies of light artillery — I have
but one ; 2, cavalry, and a commissary-general, able, dis
tinguished, and a man of genius. 1 have but pigmies, who
starve me amidst abundance, for I am in the richest country
in the world.
Bonaparte.

To the General Commanding in Chief the French Army
in Italy.
Head-quarters of the Piedmontese army,
April 26, 1796 [7 Floreal, year 4].
Having learned that His Majesty the King of Sardinia
is about to send plenipotentiaries to Genoa to treat there for
peace under the mediation of the court of Spain, I think,
general, that the interest of humanity would require that
hostilities be suspended on both sides during the time that
the negociations last.
I propose to you, therefore, an armistice, either unli
mited or for a fixed term, at your option, with a view to
spare the useless effusion of human blood.
Colli.

The General in Chief of the Army of Italy to General Colli,
Commanding in Chief the Army of the King of Sardinia.
Head-quarters, Carru, 5 Floreal, year 4 [April 24, 1796].
The Executive Directory, sir, has reserved to itself the
right of treating for peace. The plenipotentiaries of the
king, your master, must therefore repair to Paris, or wait
at Genoa for the plenipotentiaries whom the French govern
ment may send thither.
The military and moral position of the two armies ren
ders any pure and simple suspension impossible. Though
1 am particularly convinced that the government will grant
honourable conditions of peace to your king, yet I cannot
suspend my march upon mere presumptions : there is, how
ever, a way to attain your object, conformably with the
true interests of your court, and which would spare an effu
sion of blood useless, and thenceforth contrary to reason
and the laws of war ; that is, to place in my hands two of
the three fortresses < of Coni, Alexandria, and Tortona, at
your option : we might then wait without hostilities the

56 LETTERS and DESPATCHES.
end of the negociations that should be opened. This pro
posal is very moderate : the mutual interests which ought
to exist between Piedmont and the French Republic make
me anxiously desire to see the calamities of all kinds which
threaten your country averted from it.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief of the French Army in Italy.
Head-quarters of the Piedmontese army,
April 26, 1796 [7 Floreal, year 4].
I have communicated to the court of Sardinia, general,
the letter which you have written me, in answer to that
which I addressed to you, to notify the mission of a pleni
potentiary on the part of the king to Genoa, for the purpose
of making overtures of peace, and to invite you, while
awaiting their result, to spare the effusion of human blood
by a suspension of arms.
I am authorized by his majesty to tell you now that the
French minister at Genoa, to whom the plenipotentiary of
the king addressed himself for the said overtures of peace,
has declared to him that neither he, nor any person at
Genoa, has authority to enter into such negociations, but
that he must address himself to the Executive Directory in
Paris, which alone has the right to do so.
Whereupon the plenipotentiary said that he should
direct his further applications to that quarter for the object
in vi.ew. Till however we can, in this way, which is liable
to some delay, arrive at the hoped-for conclusion of the
salutary work of peace between the two States, the king,
wishing to spare both sides the calamities of all kinds in
cident to hostilities, has not hesitated to give his consent
that the proposed suspension of arms, which you have
shown yourself disposed to accept on certain conditions,
shall take place and be concluded without delay.
In consequence, his majesty orders me to declare to you
that he consents to put into your power two of his for
tresses, namely Coni and Tortona, as you have demanded,
during the continuance of the negociations about to be
opened, and according to the mode that shall be agreed
upon: in consequence of which all hostility shall cease
from the present time till the end of the said negociations ;
and ki case that, owing to the difficulties that might arise

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 57
from the then situation of the allied army, the fortress of
Tortona could not be given up, as above mentioned, his
Majesty is determined to offer instead of it the fortress of
Demont ; that, excepting the delivery of these two places,
things shall remain in statu quo as far as relates to the
country occupied by the respective armies, without their
having a right to pass the boundary line fixed for them
respectively ; and the whole in the manner that shall be
more specifically arranged between us. Colli.

To General Latour.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 7 Floreal, year 7 [April 26, 1796].
I have received, sir, the order of the king, addressed to
the commandant of Coni, which you have taken the trouble
to transmit to me. I shall be here to morrow to wait for
the order for one of the fortresses of Tortona and Alex
andria. You know, sir, that the distance between this and
either of those places renders it necessary that the order of
the king should be despatched to-morrow, if it is to arrive
by the 16th Floreal, [April 30th.] One division of my
army is already in this quarter. I am assured to-day that
Beaulieu is evacuating your territory. I am delighted, &c.
Bonaparte.

To General Latour.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 8 Floreal, year 4 [April 27, 1796].
This instant, sir, I have received, with your letter, the
two orders of the king for Ceva and Tortona.
At this moment there is but a small detachment at Fos-
sano, which shall withdraw immediately. On the day after
-to-morrow, there will not be an individual at Bra, and I
shall have the honour to apprize you of it.
Beyond the Stura, I shall keep only a corps de garde for
the bridge of Cherasco. I have applied to the general com
manding at Coni for an account of the state of the maga
zine of Notre Dame de i'Oulina. As soon as I get his
answer, I shall have the honour to write to you.
My aide-de-camp is setting out for Paris. You have had
the kindness to undertake to obtain him a passport, and to
elirect that he shall be furnished with post-horses.

58 LETTERS and despatches.
I shall want 1000 draught horses. I should like to buy
some in Piedmont. I shall be obliged to you to accept what
will be proposed on the subject by citizen Thevenin, agent
in chief of military transports.
Your aide-de-camp will deliver to you a note from the
officers prisoners of war. The moment you let me know
which you desire to have, I will order them to be sent either
to Coni or Cherasco ; you will do me a service by sending
ours to Tortona or Cherasco.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Carmagnola, April 28, 1796 [9 Floreal, year 4].
I hasten to address to you, my dear general, the order of
the king to the governor of Coni to deliver that place to
you. I hope that the celerity which I have used in this
affair will be a proof of my veracity in all the engagements
which I have contracted by the convention which we have
concluded. I have, moreover, to intimate to you that, in the course
of to-morrow at latest, the governor of Ceva will receive
the official order to deliver the fort to the officer whom you
shall appoint.
I eagerly seize this occasion of repeating to you, my dear
general, that I have every reason to flatter myself that our
convention is an approach to a speedy and advantageous
peace to both empires.
Be pleased to accept my homage and the assurance of the
highest consideration. T.
& Delatour.
PS. I have just informed myself of the present state of
the magazines of this town, and ascertained that there are
left about fifty sacks of wheat and other grain : as I pro
mised to send you them if you require it, I offer to fulfil
my promise immediately, and wait to learn your intentions.

To the General-in-Chief.
Carmagnola, April 29, 1796 [10 Floreal, year 4].
My anxiety, my dear general, in scrupulously fulfilling
all the articles of the convention which I have had the
honour to conclude with you, affording a new proof of my

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 59
veracity, 1 will cut short assurances, to submit to you a
highly interesting circumstance, and on which its execution
depends : the few moments that I had the pleasure of pass
ing with you did not permit me then to advert to it. It is
the article relative to the delivery of Coni, in which it is
stipulated that the stores of provisions for the garrison of
that place should be exclusively delivered to you, and that
the magazines of La Madona de l'Oulina, which, at the time
of the occupation of Mondovi by the French, had been re
moved to Coni, should remain at the disposal of the king.
As thoroughly convinced of your probity as of your
merits, I lay before you with confidence this fact, my dear
general, entreating you to attend to this just demand. — I
mean, to be pleased, either verbally or in writing, to apprize
the general commanding in Coni that, the said magazines of
provisions never having formed part of those judged neces
sary for that place, we shall be at liberty to remove them
with such precautions as you will please to agree upon with
my aide-de-camp, the Chevalier de Fabri, who will have
the honour to deliver to you this letter.
That annexed, for the Governor of Tortona, decides the
delivery that will be made to you of that plaee conformably
with the articles stipulated on that head, which determine
also the line of demarcation : I transmit to you, at the same
time, the orders of the king to the governor of Ceva.
With the assurance of all my confidence in a general who
inspires it so much as you do, be pleased to accept that of
the sentiments wliich accompany the esteem and the con
sideration with which I have the honour to be,
Delatour.

To the General-in-Chief.
Crevenzano, 10 Floreal, year 4 [April 29, 1796].
News of the enemy has this instant reached me : there are
none left either in Santo- Stephano di Belbo or Canelli ; all
have retired towards Valenza, with the exception of six or
seven thousand frightened men, who are incessantly inquiring
whether the French are coming. All are scattered by the
positions which they occupy to cover themselves : there are
no more assembled in a body than 2000 at Tezzo, with six
pieces of cannon and two howitzers, and from six to seven
thousand Austrian and Neapolitan cavalry between Tezzo
and Acqui, with four or six pieces of cannon. In Acqui

60 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
there are only some militia, who are working hard at eva
cuating the magazines : we must endeavour to make an
advantage by it.
The division is cleaning its arms. If the cartridges arrive
to-day, though without bread, I shall march without hesi
tation. The soldier asks for nothing better than to get out
of the state of misery in which he is.
I shall separate the division into two columns, The
69th and 70th, at the head of which I shall be, will pro
ceed by Santo-Stephano and Canelli, to take the enemy in
the rear ; the 99 th will march by Corteniglia, Bure, and
Monastero, to attack in front ; this attack will be but a feint
till I attack seriously : then it will be serious too. The
column of Cahelli will have three-pounders, and that of
Corteniglia fours, the roads being better.
I consider the taking of Acqui and the retreat or defeat
of the Austrians as highly essential to our campaign ; for
then our Piedmontese friends would take courage, seeing
themselves rid of the Austrians, and our Piedmontese ene
mies be cast down, seeing themselves abandoned by them.
Adieu, general : cartridges, if possible, shoes and bread,
and my first letter shall inform you that the first division is
behaving as well as the others ; I give you notice, however,
that, if cartridges do not arrive to-day, I shall be obliged to
wait twenty-four hours ; which would be a. great misfortune
and occasion us considerable loss.
Laharpe.

To the General-in-Chief.
Crevenzano, 10 Floreal, year 4 [April 29, 1796].
One ration of bread has arrived in the space of four days.
The bivouacs are hard. This position is good : it connects
me with Alba, and brings me nearer to it : but if it were
not so good as Nielle, I should be forced to come to it, for
the sake of having some slight succours for the support of
the soldiers. The smallness of the ovens and the distance
of the mills render it impossible for us to provide a suf
ficiency for our subsistence, let us be as industrious as we
will. Have pity on us, general — I ask for nothing but
biscuit, cartridges, and shoes. I am expecting news of the
Austrians every instant ; I tremble for fear they are eva
cuating. If that is the ease, I shall endeavour at least to

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 61
pursue them, were it only to prevent, if I can, the destruc
tion of their magazines.
I thank you, my dear general, for having recalled Genera
Charton. That general does not think as we do, and hai
scandalized my staff by the language which he has used
I could not have confidence in him, and the 10th intendec
to send you a memorial on the subject.
Laharpe.

To the General-i'n- Chief.
Boves, 9 Floreal, year 4 [April 28, 1796].
The detachment which I sent off yesterday, agreeably t<
your orders, having fallen in by the way with several Pied
montese posts, was not able to continue its route, being to>
inferior in number to hazard a battle. In consequence
the captain commanding that detachment, and bearer at th
same time of your letter, came to report that circumstanc
to me, which obliged me to place a sufficient number c
troops at his disposal. Your despatch must be delivered b
this time.
I have ordered the speedy formation at all the passes e
a company of national guards, for the apprehension of a
malefactors, as well French as Piedmontese. I think thi
measure will obtain your approbation.
The enemy has abandoned the suburb of Santo Dalmazze
and retired into Coni. I have but this moment learne
these particulars, and I shall set out in an hour on a recor
noissance towards the fort. If there is any thing new I wi
apprize you of it.
The Piedmontese, on retiring into Coni, authorized th
inhabitants of the suburb of Santo Dalmazzo to plunder th
magazines which could not be evacuated. Being instantl
informed of this fact, I sent orelers to the commune to tali
out of the hands of individuals whatever they might ha\
carried off. FlORELLA.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Cherasco, 10 Floreal, year 4 [April 29, 1796].
The city of Coni has just been occupied by our troops
there was in it a garrison of 5000 men.

62 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
I cannot doubt that you will approve my conduct, since
it is one wing of an army that agrees to a suspension of
arms to give me time to beat the other ; it is a king who
puts himself absolutely into my power by giving me three
of his strongest fortresses and the richest half of his do
minions. You may dictate, Hke a master, peace to the King of
Sardinia. I beg of you not to forget the little island of St.
Pierre, which will be more useful to us by and by than
Corsica and Sardinia put together.
If you grant him the portion of the Milanese which I am
about to conquer, it must be upon condition that he shall
send 15,000 men to second us, and to guard that country
after we have made ourselves masters of it. Meanwhile, I
shall cross the Adige with your army, and enter Germany
by the Tyrol. In this hypothesis, we must hold in deposit
till the general peace the places and country that we now
occupy ; to these it must be added that, on the day that
15,000 Piedmontese cross the Po, the city of Valenza shall
be delivered up to us.
My columns are in march ; Beaulieu in flight : I hope to
catch him. I will impose some millions of contributions on
the Duke of Parma ; he shall be forced to make propositions
of peace to you. Be not in a hurry, that I may be in time
to make him pay the costs of the campaign, provision our
magazines, and rehorse our carriages at his expense.
If you will not make peace with the King of Sardinia, if
your intention is to dethrone him, you must amuse him for
a few decades, and give me notice immediately ; I will get
possession of Valenza and march upon Turin.
I will send 12,000 men upon Rome, when I have beaten
Beaulieu and obliged him to recross the Adige ; when I
shall be sure that you grant peace to the King of Sardinia,
and you send me part of the army of the Alps.
As for Genoa, I think you ought to demand of it
15,000,000 as indemnities for frigates and vessels taken in its
ports, and insist that those who caused the Modeste to be
bumed and called in the Austrians, shall be tried as traitors
to the country. If you charge me with these matters,
which you will keep profoundly secret, I will find means to
do all that you can desire.
If I have any risks to run in Lombardy, it is on account
of the enemy's cavalry. I have been joined by forty horse

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 63
artillerymen, who have seen no service and are dismounted.
Send me then twelve companies, and do not entrust the exe
cution of this measure to the men of the offices Qiommes des
bureaux), for it takes them ten days to despatch an order,
and they may perhaps be silly enough to get them from
Holland, so as not to arrive 'before the month of October.
Our troops have just entered the citadel of Ceva, and I
have this moment received the King of Sardinia's order for
the delivery of the city and citadel of Tortona.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 10 Floreal, year 4 [April 29, 1796].
The suspension of arms concluded between the King of
Sardinia and us permits me to communicate by Turin, that
is to say, to save half the distance : T might then receive
your orders, and learn your intentions relative to the direc
tion to be given to the army. I am master of Coni, Ceva,
and Tortona. I am about to cross the Po, and to enter the
Milanese : on the way, I calculate upon fleecing the Duke
of Parma, and making him pay dearly for his infatuation.
My plan would be, to overtake the Austrians and to beat
them before the arrival of your answer ; that I may be ready
to march upon Turin, Naples, or Austria, by way of the
Tyrol. If the King of Sardinia were to suspect, before I knew it,
that you would not make peace, he might play me a sad
trick. If you will not make peace with Sardinia, let that
be communicated to him through me, that I may have it in
my power to take my own time, and that his plenipoten
tiaries in Paris may know nothing about the matter.
If you do make peace with the King of Sardinia, order
what you would have done in regard to Genoa, Parma, and
Rome. Beaulieu has still with him 26,000 men well equipped ;
he had 38,000 at the beginning of the campaign. I march
with 28,000. He has 5000 cavalry ; I have but 3600, and
in a bad state.
The court of Turin and that of Vienna reckoned with
certainty upon success in this campaign : the combined
armies amounted to 75,000 men : I have beaten them with
35,000. I have need of reinforcement : the army of the

64 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Alps might furnish me with 15,000 men. General Cha*
teaneuf-Randon ought to send me the 3000 destined for
this army, detained by him at Nimes. With these rein^
forcements, Italy is yours, and I could at one and the same
time march for Naples and Mantua, especially if I contrive
to beat the enemy'shortly.
An officer of engineers has just arrived ; pray send me
light artillery. I should like to have General Baraguay
d'Hilliers, to serve in his rank in the army : he has. pro-?
posed it to me himself.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Faipoult.
Head-quarters, Acqui, 12 Floreal, year 4 [May 1, 1796].
You will find annexed, my dear minister, a copy of the
suspension of arms which I have concluded with the King
of Sardinia. Our troops have entered Coni and Ceva ; to
morrow they will enter Tortona. We found at Coni,
besides the ammunition of the city, all the magazines of the
Sardinian army.
Beaulieu is crossing the Po, and seeking in the furthest
extremity, of Lombardy a refuge from the French army.
He told the King of Sardinia that he would not pull off his
boots till he was at Lyons, but he is not taking the road
for it.
There is not in Piedmont the first idea of a revolution,
and France, I should think, would not choose to effect one
at her own cost.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Faipoult.
Head-quarters, Acqui, 12 Floreal, year 4 [May 1, 1796].
We arrived yesterday at Acqui. Beaulieu's flight is so
swift that we cannot catch him. To-morrow, Laharpe will
be in Tortona, where I much desire to have a conference
with you on important matters.
Send me a note, geographical, historical, political, and
topographical, respecting the imperial fiefs bordering upon
Genoa, that I may derive from them all the advantage pos
sible. Send me a note concerning the dukes of Parma, Pla
centia, and Modena, the forces they have on foot, the for-

LETTERS and despatches. 65
tresses they possess, and wherein the riches of those coun
tries consist. Above all, send me a note of the pictures,
statues, cabinets, and curiosities, which are at Milan, Parma,
Placentia, Modena, and Bologna. When we made peace
with Spain, the Duke of Parma ought to have concurred in
it : why did he not ?
Send off immediately 6000 pair of shoes for Tortona.
As for citizen Giacomoni, let him go, covered with dis
grace and ignominy, where he likes. I have informed the
government of his conduct, that he may never again be ad
mitted to serve with Frenchmen.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief of the Piedmontese Army.
Head-quarters, Bosco, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].
I am informed, sir, that the Neapolitans have taken pos
session of Valenza. The interest of the king and that of
the Republic alike require that you should speedily drive
those troops out of Valenza.
The courage which animates your army, and which I
have had occasion to appreciate, leaves me no doubt that you
will speedily re-occupy Valenza : you know, besides, that
it is one of the clauses of the suspension which we have
concluded. If you are in need of any assistance, I offer you
that of a division of the army which I command.
The general chief of the staff will have the honour to
transmit to you to-morrow a statement of the Piedmontese
prisoners taken by us during the campaign. I shall have
great pleasure in sending to you as soon as possible such of
them as you would wish to have in preference.
Bonaparte.

To the Chevalier Solari, Governor of Alexandria.
Head-quarters, Bosco, 14 Floreal, year 4 [May, 3, 1796].
I have received, sir, the letter, which you have taken the
trouble to write to me ; and I am much obliged to you for
particulars which you have had the complaisance to give
me. I congratulate you on the evacuation of your territory
by the Austrian army. I sincerely wish to learn soon that
they have also evacuated the territory of his Majesty beyond
the Po.
VOL. I. F

66 letters and despatches.
A division of the army will very shortly arrive at
Valenza, for the purpose of crossing the Po there ; I beg of
you to let the boats necessary for them be procured. You
will feel that it is for the interest of the king that the
Austrians should make a short stay in your territory. I
shall have need also of some contractors, to procure for us
the means of transport. I beg of you to authorize the dif
ferent subjects of the king to make bargains with the army.
I am, sir, with esteem, &c.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief.
Acqui, 11 Floreal, year 4 [April 30, 1796].
The reports relative to the Austrian army state that, on
the 15th of April (0. S.), the day on which a great part of
that army was beaten for the second time at Dego, it fell
back in the greatest disorder upon Tezzo, one part passing
through the valley of Bormida, and the other through that
of Tero. On the 20th, one corps of these same troops, of
about 2000 men, was encamped at Acqui, in the environs
of the church of Madona Alta, where it united with a
reinforcement from Alexandria of 2000 infantry and three
or 4000 cavalry. On the 24th the whole corps of Acqui
moved to Nizza with Beaulieu.
On the 25th, that Austrian general remained at Nizza
with his troops, and marched on the 26th for Incisse,
whence, after refreshing his troops, he proceeded to Oviglio,
where he established his head-quarters. The day before
yesterday, the 29th, he sent to Alexandria a corps of 2000
men, with the intention, it is said, to make himself master
of the citadel ; but I am assured that the governor opposed
this design in the most energetic manner. Letters from_
Alexandria and the report of an inhabitant of that city,
who left it at six this morning, assert that there were still
about 2000 infantry there, and that the Neapolitan ca
vahy, about 1000 strong, had encamped beyond the Bor
mida, on the road leading to Tortona. The remainder of
Beaulieu's army was encamped at Solera, near Oviglio, with
the exception of his cavalry, which had been encamped
beyond the river Bormida with the Neapolita n cavalry.
One thousand hussars of this cavalry set out this morn
ing for Valenza, with some pieces of artillery ; the rest of the

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 67
artillery was left with the cavalry beyond the Bormida, in
the territory of Alexandria, on the road leading to Tortona :
that cavalry was expecting every moment orders for its
departure ; the artillery consisted of twenty -four pieces.
The rest of the troops which had remained encamped at
Tezzo, about 4,000 men, marched on the 28th to Acqui,
under the command of General Liptay, and set out yes
terday afternoon, the 29th, for Oviglio, where they joined
the corps of Beaulieu.
The strength of the Austrian army is 15,000 infantry
and from three to 4,000 cavalry, including 1,000 Neapo
litan cavalry. The Austrians have built a bridge over the
Po at Valenza.
On the loth of April, the day of the battle of Dego,
Beaulieu was.at Dego awaiting the result.
Vignolle.

To the General-in-Chief.
Bestagno, 12 Floreal, year 4 [May 1, 1796].
The general of division Augereau directs me to inform
you, general, that he set out this morning from Santo Ste
phano with the division which he commands, for Bestagno,
where he is at present awaiting your orders. He directs
me also to report that this morning, before leaving Santo
Stephano, a corporal of the carabineers and a carabineer of
the 6th light demi-brigade were executed agreeably to a
military sentence for committing robbery with violence.
VERDfER, adjutant-general.

To the General-in-Chief. Nizza, 12 Floreal, year 4 [May 1, 1796].
The troops which I command arrived last night very
late with rain. More than half of the division was left
behind, but nearly all are together again this morning :
there is only General Joubert's brigade which has not
arrived. He has sent me word that General Serrurier had.
neglected to cause his posts to be relieved, which has de
layed him.
The. march yesterday was very long and very laborious,
on account of the great ravines which it was necessary to
f2

68 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
cross. The troops are extremely fatigued, and entirely
barefoot. I advanced yesterday with the regiment of dragoons
under my command. As soon as I arrived, I sent out re
connaissances in all directions : they saw nothing but a few
hussars, who were put to flight.
According to the report of this morning, the Austrians
left Alexandria yesterday evening : they crossed the Po
over two bridges which they had got built, not venturing to
trust themselves on that of the Piedmontese. They di
rected their march towards the Lumellina and the Nova-
resa. The cavalry was left at Montbaresso Gannelero ; but
the greater part of it is at Frascaro.
I have a piquet of fifty dragoons out. I should like to
have another regiment of hussars, to be enabled to have
reconnaissances made in greater force.
I have this morning sent three natives of the country to
gain intelligence of the movement of the enemy, and shall
lose no time i%reporting it to you.
I must ask you for shoes : the troops are in great need
of them.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Carmagnola, May 2, 1796, [13 Floreal, year-4].
Fully assured, general, that you are solicitous to fulfil
the engagements contracted by the armistice, the conditions
of which we have jointly fixed and stipulated, I address
you, with all the confidence that I owe to your merits, to
observe that one Bonnafons, whose misconduct I had the
honour to lay before you in my letter of yesterday, has,
under the designation of mayor of Alba, enjoined different
communities on the banks of the Stura and the Tanaro,
(formerly belonging to the province of the Langhes, but
united to that of Turin on the day that the armistice was
signed) to sequestrate all the feudal and domainal property,
both moveable and immoveable, which you will find in the
list that my aide-de-camp will have the honour to deliver
to you.
Assured, I say, that, so far from authorizing upon any
pretext the proceedings of the said Bonnafons, your firm
intention is scrupulously to observe all the conditions of the

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 69
armistice, I shall merely, my dear general, apprise you of
the fact, and beg you to order speedy reparation.
I apprise you also that I have complied as far as possible
with your demand relative to the Sieur Thevenin. I leave
himself to inform you of the result of his researches.
I leave, in like manner, to the Chevalier Fabri the duty
of proposing to you all the arrangements which appear to
me as beneficial to both armies as adapted to circumstances,
and I authorize him to do everything to testify to you
more strongly our sincerity and to receive the testimonies
of yours.
I reserve to myself only the satisfaction of assuring
you, &c.
Delatour.

To the General-in-Chief.
Alexandria, May 2, 1796 [23 Floreal, year 4].
Though I am not the commander of the army of my
master, the King of Sardinia, but the oldest general-officer
of that department, I have thought that I should do an
agreeable and a useful thing for the interests of the king and
of the French Republic, in opening your letter, to see if I
could employ myself in any way that could do you plea
sure ; and, on perusing its contents, I am glad I did so,
since I have it in my power to inform you that not only
the Neapolitan troops, but the whole imperial army, with
the exception of a very small rear-guard which followed it,
have evacuated the city of Valenza and crossed the Po,
having commenced their march about midnight ; and that
the commandant himself saw them file off and cross the
Po at ten in the morning. Of this I can assure you, since
I have the information from the commissary-general of the
king, who was present there, and who never quitted the
commandant- general till the moment when he himself
crossed the Po.
I am gratified to be able to give you this information, in
consequence of which I shall merely present my thanks to
you, sir, for the expressions which you have been pleased
to use in speaking of the troops of the king, and for the
offer which you have made of French troops for carrying
into effect one of the clauses of the suspension of arms
which has just been concluded.

70 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
On receiving the list of the prisoners of war taken by
the French army from that of the king, I shall transmit it
direct to the war-office at Turin, that it may be communi
cated to the commander-in-chief of the said army, who
will inform the king of it, and he will assuredly be grati
fied by the solicitude which you manifest to send to us as
speedily as possible those whom they may desire to have in
preference. Solari, governor of Alexandria.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castellano, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].
It is two hours since I arrived here. The cavalry has
crossed the ferry ; but I am sadly afraid that I shall not
be able to get the infantry over before night : the utmost.
efforts are, nevertheless, making.
The enemy has totally evacuated Alexandria and retired
to Valenza: the Neapolitans are there too.
I send you a statement of the boats which there are on
both rivers, and if I had here one of the officers of engi
neers, I would get a bridge constructed in less than two
hours with the boats that are upon the river.
~ We found a Piedmontese cavalry officer here on our
arrival : I send him to you that you may extract informa
tion from him.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castellano, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].
The enemy has abandoned Alexandria, and retreated to
Valenza. The Austrians yesterday sold the magazines of
hay, oats, and maize, which they had in Alexandria, for
8000 francs : they are said to be considerable.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rivalto, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].
It is four in the morning, and I have not yet heard from
you. I am without cavalry, and one of my brigades has

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 71
not been able to cross the water : it is impossible that I can
set off yet, though the troops are assembled, at least such
of them as have crossed the river. A corps of the enemy's
hussars . is two leagues off, which may slacken our march.
We have had an ounce and three quarters of bread; I
shall direct my course to Castel Novo to try to get as much
there ; but there I decidedly expect your orders for the
march, being unwilling to risk the safety of the troops
entrusted to me.
We have still the river Orba to pass, and it seems to me
physically impossible that we can reach Tortona to-day.
Laharpe.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rivalto, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].
I have this moment, general, received your order to send
to Tortona a battalion, which is to remain there till fresh
orders. General Meynier has sent his flag of truce. The
moment the governor fixes the hour for entry, the battalion
will be ready.
Nothing is easier than to remain at Rivalto,- nothing
more difficult than to live there without bread. We are
in a country which cannot furnish us with any on account
of its smallness.
Laharpe.

To the General-in-Chief.
Carmagnola, May 3, 1796 [14 Floreal, year 4].
The king, my master, anxious that an answer should be
given to an application which I have made to him on your
behalf to be permitted to buy horses in Piedmont, has de
termined to send to you, my dear general, the Marquis de
St. Marsan, lieutenant-colonel of cavalry, an officer of his
staff, who will have the honour to hand you this letter, and
is charged to communicate to you the intentions of his
Majesty respecting the said purchase, as well as the various
precautions which he has thought it fit to take for the
safety of his dominions.
In consequence, I recommend to you the said Marquis
de St. Marsan, and inform you that he is authorized^ to
settle with you, my dear general, all the arrangements

72 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
which may be of reciprocal convenience, in case further in
formation should be necessary.
Be pleased to let the annexed letter be delivered to
Count 5e Massan, colonel of the regiment of guards ; and
be pleased also never to doubt all the sentiments, &c.
Delatour.

To the General-in-Chief.
Alexandria, May 3, 1796 [14 Floreal, year 4].
In reply, sir, to the letter which your aide-de-camp has
just delivered to me, I am sorry to be obliged to tell you
that it is absolutely impossible to furnish you with boats to
form a bridge across the Po, since General Baron Beaulieu,
as soon as his army had marched, caused the bridge to be
destroyed ; and all the boats which had been used in the
construction of the said bridge of Valenza, and for which
there had been employed all, the boats that had been taken
this way along the Tanaro, and those on the Po, which had
been brought from Casale, and even to the number of
twenty-five from Turin, to be carried off to Pavia. By his
orders, moreover, all the small boats in the environs of Va
lenza, there being absolutely no others, were sunk. It is
true that he promised an indemnification for the seizure of
the said boats and all the materials of construction ; reserv-,
ing to me to speak to you hereafter of the article relative
to the carriages which you have need of, and which will be
furnished you by some contractor, whom they are seeking
to provide for you. Permit me, general, to recommend to
yon the subjects of the king, and I beg you to exercise
more and more your good intentions, which are well known
to me, in order to prevent mischief being done by the
troops both in the fields and in the houses, especially those
in lonely situations ; several complaints having already
been preferred on this subject.
To return to the subject of carriages — not only have I
explained that I was authorizing the subjects of the king
to make contracts with the French army, but I have given
orders for seeking out such as I thought fit to be employed
in that way ; referring you on this subject to what your
aide-de-camp will tell you. Solari, governor of Alexandria.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 73
To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Carmagnola, May 5, 1796 [16 Floreal, year 4].
I must tell you, general, that, notwithstanding our de
sire to satisfy you in all that depends upon us, and to
facilitate to you the supply of your army, it is utterly im
possible for us to furnish you with the draught and cavalry
horses which you want : I must, nevertheless, observe that
those who are commissioned to make purchases for your
army would succeed in procuring them ; and His Majesty
has, moreover, approved of the permission which the
governor of Alexandria has granted to different contractors
to conclude bargains with you for the means of transport.
Besides, having every reason to believe that M. de
Beaulieu is preparing to evacuate the territories of the
king, and his Majesty even making a formal application to
him to that purpose, as he did for the evacuation of Va
lenza, I hope, in consequence, that there will be no occasion
for your demand, as you have yourself intimated in your
explanation with M. de St. Marsan. In case, however,
that the army should refuse entirely to evacuate the terri
tories of the king, I shall march my troops towards
Novara, Mortara, and Vigerano, to secure those towns.
Those troops will be conveyed to Valenza in all the boats
that can be picked up, since there now exist none belonging
to the king ; and these same boats will afterwards be at
your disposal.
The Marquis de St. Marsan, the bearer of this letter, is
authorized to take ulterior determinations with you rela
tive to the demarcation, and I have given him my orders.
The result is that the subjects of the king, evil-disposed
on the frontier of the demarcation, boasting of your pro
tection, redouble their efforts to excite internal revolutions.
This appears totally contrary to the law of nations, espe
cially in time of truce, and on this subject I renew the
remonstrances already made to you by the Marquis de St.
Marsan, in stedfast reliance on the civilities that are known
t0 me- Victor Emmanuel.1
! This was the Duke of Acosta and brother of the king, who resigned the
crown to him in 1802, and died a Jesuit at Rome. The internal disturbances
in 1821 induced Victor Emmanuel to abdicate in favour of his younger bro
ther, Charles Felix, the present King of Sardinia,

74 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief of the Army of Piedmont.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 15 Floreal, year 4 [May 4, 1795].
In a few days, sir, I shall be master of the territories' of
the king beyond the Po ; if the fortune of war continues to
be favourable to the army which I command, I shall oblige
M. Beaulieu to evacuate these countries, which will be con
quered from- the Austrian army, and belong by right to the
Republic. Still I feel how hard it is for the king to see
almost all his dominions overrun by our troops. I propose
to you, in consequence, to unite a division of 6000 infantry
and 1500 horse to the army which I command, to assist in
driving out the. Austrians. I will put them in garrison in
the States of the king beyond the Po.
This is so urgent, sir, that it is necessary for me to have
an answer as speedily as possible. The desire which I feel
to conciliate the interests of the king with those of the
Republic and the army, induces me, sir, to make you
these overtures, which, no doubt, you will consider very
reasonable. I am with consideration, &c.
Bonaparte.

To 'the General-in-Chief of the Army of the King of Sardinia.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 15 Floreal, year 4 [May 4, 1796].
The troops of the Republic have this morning occupied
the fort of Tortona : in consequence, dating from this day,
there is a suspension of arms between the two armies. I
shall place it in the order of the day ; and I hope you will
find the French officers disposed to give you proofs of the
esteem which they entertain for your army.
I am giving orders to the end that you should occupy
the town of Fossano and Bra. I will adapt to the line of
demarcation all the changes that you shall deem necessary,
adhering, however, to the spirit of the suspension which we
have concluded.
I have ordered 400 prisoners to be sent hither, in ex
change for the 400 which you have had the goodness to
despatch to Cherasco. The chief of the staff will transmit
to you the list of the officers of your army whom the for
tune of arms has made prisoners. I shall lose no time in
sending to you those about whom you interest yourself.
Bonaparte.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 75
To the General-in-Chief of the Army of Piedmont.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 16 Floreal, year 4 [May 5, 1796].
The Marquis de St. Marsan, whom I had the honour to
see yesterday, sir, will have delivered to you several letters,
by which you will see that all you desire relative to several
matters concerning the suspension of arms has been exe
cuted. 1 have ordered protections to be given to all those
who could have occasion for them.
I am authorizing the different generals to give passports
to the officers of your army who wish to go into the country
occupied by the army. I shall be too happy, in all cir
cumstances, to have it in my power to give you marks of
the distinguished esteem and consideration with which I
am, &c. Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of the King of Sardinia.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].
In consequence of the suspension of arms which the king
has concluded with the two armies of the Alps and Italy,
and the probability of peace, of which I have new assurances,
I am marching 17,000 men from the army of the Alpsto
the army of Italy. Nine thousand will pass by the Col
d'Argentieres and proceed to Coni, where they will cross
the Stura to come and join me. Eight thousand will pass
the St. Bernard by the valley of Aosta, and come and cross
the Tanaro at Alexandria. Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief. Sali, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].
I was informed yesterday that Piedmontese deserters, to
the number of 200, have armed, and are stopping indis
criminately all the French going and coming between
Alexandria and Tortona : they yesterday killed two of our
men at the gates of the former city, and a third on the
Tortona road, and wounded five or six. I immediately
sent off 200 cavalry, and nearly the same number of in
fantry, to give chase to them. These troops returned very
late last night, and brought about a score of peasants, some
of whom were found armed, and others with cartridges.
When I have examined them I will report to you.

76 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
I took a survey yesterday of the Tanaro and the Po,
and saw but two boats. An officer of artillery arrived yes
terday, with orders to construct flying bridges ; I know
not precisely what means he employs, but I will assist him
with all my power.
The enemy occupies the left bank of the Po ; but, I
think, not in any force. My advanced guard set out this
morning for Girola ; I have replaced it this morning by
other troops. MaSSENA.

To the General-in-Chief. Turin, May 7, 1796 [18 Floreal, year 4].
In reply to the letter which you have transmitted to me
through the medium of your aide-de-camp, I begin by
saying that, notwithstanding the burden which the passage
of so large a body of troops will throw upon the poor in
habitants of the districts through which they are to pass,
I nevertheless do myself the pleasure to consent, seconding
the intentions of the king, that you should march the
column which you propose by Argentieres and Coni, for
the purpose of joining your army : I will appoint an officer
to accompany it conformably with your desire. As for the
column which you wish to bring by the St. Bernard, I
must make some observations on that head : in the first
place, that it would appear not at all conformable with the
armistice, with the line of demarcation, and with the pacific
intentions which you have been pleased to profess, and of
which I am thoroughly persuaded, to demand a passage for
troops in so many different points ; which cannot but be
very burdensome to the States of the king. Besides, the
valley of Aosta, through which they would have to pass,
is a country destitute of every thing, which would have
great difficulty to furnish provisions for these troops ; the
Canavesar also is a district equally incapable of supplying
the wants of such a body of troops, especially as I too
should be obliged to send troops thither to escort yours,
because the inhabitants are very intolerant, and easily ex
cited to take up arms, which might occasion quarrels, and
even serious ones, with your troops ; secondly, because both
the Canavesar and the Versalois are intersected by a very
great number of rivers, which, when ever so little swollen,
are impassable, and' would be liable to place your troops in

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 77
the most awkward predicament, by enclosing them between
two, and reducing them to famine, which would oblige them
to have recourse to pillage, and raise the inhabitants of the
said countries. It behoves me to set before you all these
reflexions, and to observe moreover that, in making your
troops take the Argentieres road, this, according to the
natural order, would lengthen their march some days ; that,
nevertheless, they might run the risk of a still longer delay
in the valley of Aosta, owing to the accidents which may
be occasioned by the swelling of the waters. I am, besides,
fully persuaded that, if you desist from that passage, you
will do a thing highly agreeable to the king, and which he
will take very kindly.
On my arrival at Turin I was told that, on the way to
Tortona, persons in the train of your army seized chests
belonging to the king, and gave orders in that city as in a
conquered place. I must observe to you that, having been
placed in your hands by way of deposit, just like Coni,
where your troops have behaved like real friends, I flatter
myself, knowing your honour and your love of order, that
you will be pleased to issue orders for preventing all that is
likely to be injurious to his Majesty or to his people, and
that can possibly be avoided. The Marquis de St. Marsan
will have already delivered to you my first letter, and fur
nished a better explanation of some complaints of the dis
orders which soldiers, and more particularly Piedmontese,
have occasioned, by striving to excite revolutions in Pied
mont, with the intention, probably, of producing a rupture
of the suspension of arms which has been concluded, and
which, I hope, will be followed by a good and solid peace
between the French and us. I am, sir, &c.
Victor Emmanuel.

Extracts from different Notes of the Governor of Alexandria.
Note 1.
The governor of Alexandria demands —
1. That the sequestration ordered at Cherasco, on the
7th Floreal, of the property of persons employeel about the
King of Sardinia, be not carried into execution.
2. That a tete de pont be not constructed on the left of
the Stura, opposite to Cherasco.

78 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
3. He reclaims the royal moneys confiscated at Acqui,
Tortona, and Voghera. Note 2.
The governor of Alexandria demands —
1. That the King of Sardinia be permitted to remove a
magazine existing at Coni, which was destined for the
supply of the army. A commissary of his majesty was to
have had it transported to Notre Dame de I'Orme, but
General Maquart opposed it,
2. He reclaims the forage collected long ago at the hamlet
of St. Dalmas, that place not having been occupied by the
French army till posterior to the armistice.
3. He demands, on behalf of certain purveyors of the
army, the authorization to remove from the valley of Ver-
meguena forage which they have purchased there.
Note 3.
The governor of Alexandria demands that, conformably
with verbal conventions between the general-in-chief and
the Marquis de St. Marsan, from Alba to Nizza de la Paglia,
the limit of the demarcation be the boundary itself of the
provinces of Alba and Acqui ; so that all the lands and
villages dependent on the province of Asti, on the right of
the Tanaro, and, for a still stronger reason, those dependent
on the province of Alexandria which is on the left of the
Bormida, as far as Cassina exclusively, be not subject to
military contributions.
He intimates that, by means of piquets and by detach
ments posted on the left banks of the Tanaro and the Bor
mida, the straggling soldiers of the French army are pre
vented from deviating from the routes indicated and the
line of demarcation fixed by the armistice.
Note 4.
The governor of Alexandria begs the general-in-chief to
give the necessary orders for suppressing the movements
which are manifesting themselves at Coni and at the village
of St. Dalmas, where there has been a tumult against the
priests. His majesty has seen with satisfaction that tran
quillity, threatened by evil designing persons, has been
restored at Alba: he has the greatest confidence in the
good faith and integrity of the general-in-chief.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 79

PART II.
from the occupation of tortona to the investment
of mantua.
Bonaparte, General-in-Chief to the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].
The army of Italy yesterday took possession of Tortona,
where we have found a very fine fortress, which has cost
the King of Sardinia more than 1 5,000,000 livres.
I have informed you, through my aid-de-camp Murat,
that we have occupied Coni and Ceva, which we found in
a respectable state of defence, and provisioned with every
thing. The day after the signature of the suspension of
arms, General Laharpe marched with his division by way
of Bossogno to Acqui ; General Augerau by Stefano ; and
General Massena by Nizza de la Paglia. Beaulieu evacu
ated this country, and took refuge in Valenza, where he
crossed the Po with his whole army. General Massena
arrived with his whole division at Alexandria, in time to
secure the magazines which the Austrians, unable to carry
off, had sold to the city. On the 13th, the German army
recrossed the Po, cutting the boats, and burning those which
it found on the shore.
The Neapolitans, who in general are not enterprising,
have taken Valenza.1

To the Governor of the Duchy of Parma, at Placentia.
Head-quarters, San Giovanni, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].
Having to confer with you, sir, on matters of the highest
importance, jtou will be pleased to come immediately to
Castel- San-Giovanni .
It would be necessary that you should be here before two
in the morning, as I must be on horseback by that hour.
Bonaparte.
1 This letter was left unfinished.

80 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the Minister of Spain at Parma.
Head-quarters, Placentia, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].
I have received your letter, sir ; as it is not in my heart
nor in the intention of the French people to do harm with
out object, or to injure the people in any way, I consent to
suspend all hostility against the Duke of Parma and the
march of my troops for Parma ; but the duke must to
night send plenipotentiaries to conclude the suspension.
I am marching some regiments of cavalry with one bri
gade to within three leagues of Placentia : that need not
give any uneasiness to the Duke of Parma from the moment
that he accepts the conditions which we have agreed upon.
I am delighted that this occasion enables me to prove
to you the sentiments of esteem and consideration with
which, &c.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head- quarters, Placentia, 20 Floreal, year 4 [May 9, 1796].
We have at length crossed the Po. The second cam
paign is begun. Beaulieu is disconcerted. He calculates
very ill, and constantly falls into the snares that are laid
for him. Perhaps he meant to give battle : for that man
has the daring of madness and not that of genius : but the
6000 men who were forced yesterday to cross the Adda,
and who were defeated, will weaken him much : another
victory and we are masters of Italy.
I have granted a suspension of arms to the Duke of
Parma ; the Duke of Modena is sending me plenipoten
tiaries. If we had an able ordonnateur, we should be as
well off as it is possible to imagine. We are going to esta
blish considerable magazines of corn, with folds for 600
bullocks in the rear. The moment we cease our movements,
we shall new-clothe the army ; it is still in a frightful
state : but all are getting fat. The soldiers eat nothing
but Gonesse bread, good meat and in quantity, good wine,
&c. Discipline is becoming re-established from day to day ;
but it is often necessary to shoot, for there are intractable
men who cannot command themselves.
What we have taken from the enemy is incalculable.
We have the effects of hospitals for 15,000 sick, several

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 81
magazines of corn, flour, &c. The more men you send me,
the more easily I shall be able to feed them.
I am despatching to you twenty pictures by the first
masters, Correggio and Michael Angelo.
I owe you particular thanks for the attentions which you
are pleased to pay to my wife : I recommend her to you ;
she is a sincere patriot, and I love her to distraction.
I hope if things go on well to be able to send you a dozen
millions to Paris : that will not come amiss for the army
of the Rhine.
Send me 4000 dismounted cavalry ; I will endeavour to
remount them here.
I will not disguise from you that, since the death of
Stengel, I have no superior officer of cavalry who is a fight
ing man. I should be glad if you would send me two or
three adjutant-generals, who have been in the cavalry, who
have fire and a firm resolution never to make scientific
retreats.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Bruni, Floreal 18, year 4 [May 7, 1796].
I inform you of the arrival of the artillery at the division
which I command. It is in the worst condition : the num
ber of horses is daily diminishing from the mortality.
Beyrand.

To the General-in-Chief Maleo, 18 Floreal, year 4 [May 7, 1796],
Some enemies of the Republic have just reported to the
troops under my command that the quarters of General
Laharpe are cut off, and that he himself is killed. I have
directed my aide-de-camp to go and verify these reports.
If the facts are as represented, it is my intention to order
a charge by two battalions of grenadiers and by the cavalry
on anything capable of opposing a retreat, and so make a
vigorous resistance in the village which 1 occupy, while
awaiting your orders.
Dallemagne.
vol. I. G

82 letters and despatches.
To the General-in-Chief.
Codogno, 20 Floreal, year 4 [May 9, 1796].
Adjutant-general Boyer reported to you yesterday even
ing the death of General Laharpe.1 I lose no time in ap
prizing you of the events of the night and of the present
moment. The troops, terrified last night, were in the greatest dis
order in the village : unable to rally them, on account of
the darkness, I put good officers at the head of some picked
men, and sent them out to explore, while I proceeded my
self towards the point occupied by the enemy ; that was
Codogno. Night, which magnifies objects, had increased the dis
order, so that it was impossible to collect the troops and to
do anything with them. In this circumstance, I resolved
to keep in the village itself, and, after making useful mili
tary dispositions, to wait there till daylight. The rest of
the night passed off quietly.
Towards daybreak, my patroles discovered the enemy,
who was making dispositions apparently with the intention
of surrounding us. I then sent two battalions to cut them
off, but, perceiving that manoeuvre, they instantly -retreated
upon Casale, leaving behind them three pieces of cannon,
which they had taken from us. They were pursued as far
as possible.
At this present moment, I have collected the whole
corps, and am making the dispositions enjoined me by
General Laharpe, in establishing my forces on the Casale
road, whicli is the essential point to be guarded, where I
shall await your orders.
Nothing has happened at the advanced guard stationed
1 Laharpe was a native of the Swiss canton of Vaud, who had left his
country on account of the vassalage in which it was held by the aristocracy
of Berne. In the French service, he had eminently distinguished himself
by intelligence and intrepidity, and also, as we have seen, by his indignant
denunciations of the horrors which the soldiers of the French army gene
rally were urged by necessity and a spirit of plunder to commit. Those
men are described by their own officers as capable of any atrocity. Xiptai's di
vision of Beaulieu's army, after its defeat at Fombio, fell in at night with the
French advanced posts; and we are told that, in the meiee which ensued,
Laharpe was shot in the dark by his own soldiers. Is it uncharitable to
surmise that, in revenge for his pointed condemnation of their predatory
habits, their arms may have been wilfully turned against their gallant and
honourable leader ?

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 83
at Maleo : I heard of it by the chief of brigade Lannes,
who came to our assistance with two battalions.
I take the enemy who attacked us to be about 3000
strong : he must have been cut off from the army yester
day : for I cannot imagine that so small a force would have
the audacity to place itself wilfully between two bodies of
troops. I will have the guns which the enemy has thrown into
the ditches got out. I will likewise have that body of
isolated troops further pursued by infantry and cavalry, and,
if I learn that its number increases, I will give you advice
of it.
Mesnard.

To the General-in-Chief. Maleo, 20 Floreal, year 4 [May 9, 1 796].
The enemy still occupies the town of Pizzigitone. This
morning at daybreak, I reconnoitred my centre and my
right, and it did not appear to me that the enemy was
making any evacuation, from the fire which he opened upon
Us and the troops that he had on the ramparts.
The river Adda is broad and deep. I do not think that
it can be crossed without boats, and all those which might
be serviceable for that purpose are detained on the other
side. The chief of the staff having sent me word that General
Augereau occupies Casale, I shall send off a detachment of
cavalry to form my junction with him.
Up to this day, general, I have been making vain efforts
to check pillage. The guards which I have stationed are
of no use: the excesses committed cannot be surpassed.
Terrible examples are required ; but I know not whether
I have the power to make those examples. An honest and
humane man Suffers and feels himself dishonoured in march
ing at the head of a corps in which wretches are so nume
rous. Were I hot at the most advanced post, I would
beg you to send as my successor a man whose health and
talents 'might enable him to obtain greater success ; but I
must forget self, when the point is to' labour for the glory
of my country.
Dallemagne. g2

84 letters and despatches.
To the General-in-Chief.
Codogno, 20 Floreal, year 4 [May 9, 1796].
I am come this instant from visiting the positions of the
advanced guard, in which I have made some changes. I
have placed the 70th and the 99th demi-brigades between
the village of Maleo, occupied by the advanced guard, and
that of Codogno, where I have established my head
quarters. The horse-artillery is in advance of those two
brigades, for the purpose of marching to the advanced
guard, if it should be necessary. Your brother has given
orders, in your name, to General Dallemagne, to fire upon
the town of Pizzigitone, which he has set about executing.
Here are but two pieces of cannon and a howitzer. I have
ordered three large barks, which the enemy has quite close
to the town, and which he keeps, no doubt, for evacuating
by the Adda, if forced to it, to be sunk. The two four-
pounders are provided with only 40 rounds each, and the
howitzer with but thirty. Be pleased to send us imme
diately ammunition for those pieces, as well as cartridges
for the infantry. According to the report of some peasants,
the enemy has six pieces of artillery of different calibres,
and his number in the place amounts to 6000.
I hope, general, that, in confiding to me the right of
your army, you will leave me the division which I had
before : I am acquainted with the generals and the troops
which compose it, and this is a great advantage for me.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.Maleo, 21 Floreal, year 4 [May 10, 1796].
I shall immediately execute the orders which you com
municate to me, to send labourers and to cannonade Piz
zigitone. I keep about 900 men firing with small arms at
the town. There will be two 8-pounders and one howitzer ;
but I must observe to you that many shots cannot be fired
by the latter, because we have but thirty-five rounds : the
8-pounders are provided with only sixty rounds each. As
there is a causeway leading to Casale by way of Caneva, I
am sending troops thither to reconnoitre.
By my scouts this morning, I learned that the enemy
still had cannon at Pizzigitone : he continues to guard the

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 85
left bank of the Adda by a number of tirailleurs, and all
his movements are governed by those which he sees us
make.
Mesnard.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief of the Army
of Italy.
Paris, 18 Floreal, year 4 [May 7, 1796].
The Directory has received, citizen-general, your inter
esting communications of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Floreal,
and the duplicate of that of the 7th, apprizing it of the
taking of Mondovi, &c. What glorious successes ! The
general joy and hopes are immense : another victory over
the Austrians, and Italy is ours.
You have rendered signal services to the country : you
will find, citizen-general, the most gratifying reward for
them in the esteem of all the friends of the Republic and
in that of the Directory. Again it congratulates you, and
desires you to congratulate, in its name, the brave army,
which, by its daring and intrepidity, successfully executes
your happy plans. Glory to all the French who, by vic
tories and respectable conduct, contribute to seat the Repub
lic on bases that cannot be shaken !
The Directory approves the provisional armistice which
you have concluded with the plenipotentiaries of the King
of Sardinia : it is advantageous in all respects, and the
Directory cannot but praise the vigorous measures which
you have taken in granting it, and in having the most
essential conditions carried into immediate execution.
It has seen with pleasure that citizen Salicetti, its com
missioner with the army of Italy, was consulted before the
conclusion of the armistice. Negociations of this kind, in
urgent cases, and when the Directory itself cannot be con
sulted, fall particularly within the province of the commis
sioners of the government with the armies. The French
generals ought, nevertheless, to be the only direct agents
recognized by the enemy's generals : but it is proper that
the former should not have power to conclude any transac
tion or negociation, under the circumstances mentioned above,
unless according to the orders of the Directory, or the con
ditions which the commissioners of the government shall
transmit to them.

86 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
At the moment that the Directory is writing, you are,
no doubt, in the Milanese. May the lucky destinies of the
Republic have carried thither some French columns before
the Austrian has been able to recross the Po ! may they
place you in a situation to cut off his direct communication
with Milan and the court of Vienna ! Your letter of the
9th expresses the intention of marching on the 10th against
Beaulieu : you will have driven him before you. Do not
lose sight of him for a moment : your activity and the ut
most celerity in your marches can alone annihilate the
Austrian army, which must be destroyed. March ! no
fatal repose ! there are yet laurels left for you to gather ;
and it will be all over with the remnants of the perfidious
coalition, if you follow up, as you declare it to be your inten
tion to do, the advantages given to us by the splendid vic
tories of the Republican army which you command.
The plan of campaign which you have sketched in your
letter of the 9th is worthy of the French and of the army
which you command and lead to victory ; but it presents
formidable obstacles and difficulties that may be said
to be insurmountable. Believe, nevertheless, that the
Directory knows how to appreciate every thing grand and
profitable to the Republic that is submitted to it. Still,, it
must confine itself to a narrower circle than that which you
propose that it should traverse, and to which it is urged by
the imperative necessity for terminating the war with this
campaign : it cannot but dread the disasters that might
result from one miscarriage. It reckons upon the victories
of the army of Italy, but what might not be the consequences
of entering Bavaria by the mountains of the Tyrol, and
what hope could one conceive of an honourable retreat in
case of reverses ! How, moreover, curb, with the forces
which you command, and the few thousand men whom the
Directory might be able to add, so many countries sub
jected by our arms, and impatient to withdraw themselves
from the vicinity and the action of war ! And what would
be our means of resistance, if the court of Turin, which we
are forcing to make peace, should allow itself to be again
cozened, and resume arms to cut off your communications ?
The powers of Italy call us towards your right, citizen-
general, and this course must rid us of the perfidious
English, so long masters of the Mediterranean. It must
likewise enable us to recover Corsica, and to wrest those

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 87
French departments from the ambitious house of Bruns-
wick-Liineburg, which has so proudly established itself in
them : such are the sentiments of the Directory on this head.
First, effect the conquest of the Milanese, whether it be
destined to return to the house of Austria as a necessary
cession for securing our peace with it, whether it may be
expedient to give it in the sequel to the Piedmontese, either
as a reward for the efforts which we may have induced it to
make for assisting us in that conquest, or as an indemnity
for the departments of Mont Blanc and the Maritime
Alps, constitutionally incorporated with the French Repub
lic. Drive back the enemy to the mountains of the Tyrol,
and put him in dread of finding himself forced there.
Then divide the army of Italy into two : let the weaker
half remain in the Milanese and ensure the possession of it
by its presence ; it will be seconded there by the Piedmon
tese troops, if the King of Sardinia accepts the offensive and
defensive alliance, for which we shall immediately treat with
his agents ; and those troops will be specially charged with
keeping the gorges of the Tyrol and following up any ad
vantages which circumstances may afford them. Our
interest commands us to let them act, and even to lead them
to be daring ; but the Republican troops will remain in the
Milanese, levy contributions, and live in that fertile country,
the possession of which has been so valuable to the Aus
trians during this war. You will arrive there at the moment
of the harvest : manage so that the army of Italy shall have
no need of supplies from the interior. The Directory
destines for General Kellermann the command of the French
forces in the Milanese, when you have divided the army of
Italy, augmented by that of the Alps : and its intention is
to leave in force, in this new state of things, the decree
whieh it enacted on the 9th Floreal, conferring on the com
missioners Garreau and Salicetti a right to require move
ments of troops, &c. These dispositions would ensure union
between the two generals, if the love of the Republic and a
desire to render our arms triumphant did not bind them
still more closely.
The second column, made as strong as possible, will in
part proceed along the coast. After you have secured a
free passage through Gavi, if necessary, or even occupied
that place, it will first proceed to Leghorn, and then threaten
Rome and Naples.

88 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The conduct to be pursued towards Leghorn and Tuscany
is this : you must arrive there secondarily, and at a moment
when you will be least expected. The Republic is not at
war with the grand- duke, and it is important to keep up
our connexion with him : his minister at Paris has not
disguised the constraint in which the Enghsh held his
country, and the tyranny which they exercised in the port
of Leghorn. It is worthy of the Republic to deliver it
from that subjection ; and it is of particular consequence
that the national colours be respected in the ports of Tus
cany. Let the French troops arrive at Leghorn with that
order which commands confidence, and which is indispen
sable in neutral countries. Send to inform the grand-duke
of the necessity under which we find ourselves to enter his
territory and to put a garrison into Leghorn. Time the .
despatch of this courier and the arrival of the Republican
troops in that city so that the courier may enter Florence at
the moment, or very little before, the French troops enter
Leghorn: take possession of it with the same formalities
as were observed in occupying Vado ; make yourself master
of the English, Neapolitan, Portuguese, and other enemies'
ships that you find in the port ; seize, in short, all that
belongs to the different States which are at war with us, and
even sequester whatever belongs to individuals of those
States; let inventories be immediately taken, and beware,
above all, citizen-general, beware lest this wealth fall a prey
to rapacity and peculators. The grand-duke cannot refuse
his countenance to rigorous measures ; the Directory does
not presume that be will be disposed to throw in the way
obstacles which could be raised only by a perfidy that it is
to our interest to annihilate. You will declare to him,
citizen -general, in the name of the Executive Directory, that
he must immediately issue orders for every thing in his
dominions belonging to our enemies to be forthwith put into
our hands, and that he must guarantee the sequestration ;
otherwise the French Republic would be obliged to treat
Tuscany as an ally of England and Austria.
The grand-duke shall be responsible for the success and
the accomplishment of these measures. You will, more
over, require in that country the supplies necessary for the
army you command, and State bonds or bills payable after
the general peace shall be delivered in payment of provisions
and other commodities with which we shall have been fur-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 89
hished. The reports that you will have adroitly disseminated
respecting the number, which you will exaggerate, of the
French troops in Italy, will increase the terror of our ene
mies, and double in a manner your means of acting.
On entering the territory of the republic of Lucca, you
will declare to it, in the name of the Executive Directory,
that the French Republic has no hostile intention towards
it. It will be convenient to defer our discussions with Genoa
till after the expedition to Leghorn : let us at first be con
tent to draw from it, upon receipts given, the provisions
and means of transport which the French army has need of,
leaving the mode of reimbursement to be settled afterwards ;
but the directions given respecting Leghorn may apply to
. the republic of Genoa, though it is to our interest not to
drive it to despair, and to make sure that its neutrality will
become as beneficial to us as it has hitherto been to our
enemies. The conduct which it has recently pursued towards us is
not calculated to make us forget the act of treachery to
which the Modeste frigate fell a victim in times that were
less favourable to us. The time will come, when we shall
demand a formal reparation, and that those who caused the
Modeste to be burned and the Austrians to be called in
shall be tried as traitors to the country.
The Genoese, in fact, might be thus addressed : Either
you suffered that frigate to be taken and her crew murdered,
out of enmity to France, or you sacrificed it through weak
ness. In the first case, we claim a legitimate vengeance ;
in the second, we have a right to require of you to treat our
enemies as you have treated ourselves. The indemnity
granted must be sufficient : the relations of the Frenchmen
who perished on board the Modeste must participate in it ;
the reparation for so gross an injury must be signal, must
be solemn.
It is likewise after the expedition to Leghorn that we
shall endeavour to raise a loan in the city of Genoa, but we
must beware of harassing it : we will make it sensible that
we are more generous than our enemies, who proposed to de
liver it up to the King of Sardinia ; we will demand, in such
a manner as not to be refused, that every thing belonging to
our enemies, especially the English, as well in the port and
city of Genoa, as in the rest of the territories of that repub-

90 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
lie, shall be immediately put into our hands ; we will iiisist
on the sequestration of the property and funds of the mer
chants and the private persons of the country who inakei
war upon us, and the Genoese government shall answer for
the fidelity of the sequestration ; we will continue to- give,
in exchange for what Genoa shall supply us with, bonds of
redemption, to be treated of at the general peace ; lastly,
we shall require all emigrants, without exception, to be ex
pelled from the territories of Genoa and Tuscany, as you
have no doubt caused them to be expelled from the part of
Piedmont which you occupy, in case they have been bold
enough to remain there.
As for the course to be pursued in regard to the Duke of
Parma, it is just that he should pay for his infatuation in
not detaching himself from, the coalition ; his territories
must supply us with all that we have need of and with
money into the bargain ; but our connexion with Spain
enjoins us not to make any useless devastation there and to
spare his country much more than the other posses
sions of our enemies. It is the Milanese most especially
that we must not spare ; raise tliere contributions in specie
immediately, and during the first panic which the approach
of our arms will excite ; and let the eye of economy
superintend the application of them. The canals and the
great public establishments of this country, which we shall
not keep up, must feel somewhat of the effect of war : but
be prudent.
You will find in No. 1 an interesting note, and which
will enable you to take some wholesome measures : omit
nothing that can contribute to the health of the defenders of
the Republic.
Venice shall be treated as a neutral power, but it must
not expect to be treated as a friendly power : it has done
nothing to deserve our kindness.
If Rome makes advances, the first thing to be required
is that the Pope shall immediately order public prayers
for the success and prosperity of the French Republic.
Some of his beautiful monuments, his statues, his pictures,
his medals, his libraries, his bronzes, his Madonas of sil
ver, and even his bells, will indemnify us for the expense
occasioned by the visit that you will have paid him. In
case the court of Naples, alarmed at your approach, should
cause proposals to be made to France, it must be required

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 91
to deliver up to us immediately the ships and everything
belonging to the nations at war with us. It must answer
to us for the immediate execution of these measures ; it
must solemnly engage not to admit, during this war, any
vessels belonging to the English or to enemies of the Re
public into its ports, and, above all, not to allow any to enter
under a neutral flag.
The army of the Alps has orders to furnish you imme
diately with four demi-brigades, and you will see by the
annexed statement what dispositions have been made by
the minister at war for marching several companies of light
artillery to that of Italy by the shortest road. It was ne
cessary to take them where they were, and the Directory
perceives with Regret that some of them will be a long time
before they reach you.
The minister at war has likewise ordered a fourth com
missaire ordonnateur, citizen Foullet, who was with the army
of the Alps, to join that which you command ; you will
have, besides, the citizens Lambert, Sucy, and Gosselin.
In case one of these latter or citizen Foullet should be more
suitable for the appointment of commissary -general, the
Directory authorizes citizen Salicetti to nominate such one
of the three as you shall point out to that post.
If the army of the coasts of the Ocean can furnish you
with any cavalry, the Directory will order it to be sent off
for the army of Italy, and endeavour to procure you some.
It is going to treat for peace with Sardinia, and will make
you acquainted with the course of the negociations. The.
French Republic will be generous and strive to make an
ally, who, from interest and friendship, will always be
attached to it.
The Directory awaits with impatience the news of your
success against the Austrian army. Strike, and strike
hard.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 18 Floreal, year 4 [May 7, 1796].
The Executive Directory is persuaded, citizen-general,
that you consider the glory of the fine arts as attached to
that of the army which you command. To them Italy
Owes, in a great measure, its wealth and its fame ; but the

92 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
time is come when their reign must be transferred to
France, in order to establish and embellish that of liberty.
The National Museum must contain the most celebrated
productions of all the arts, and you will not neglect to en-i
nch it with those which await the present conquests of the
army of Italy, and the future ones which are yet reserved
for it. This glorious campaign, while placing the Republic
in a condition to give peace to its enemies, must also repair
the ravages of Vandalism in its own bosom, and combine
with the splendour of military trophies the charm of the
beneficent and cheering arts.
The Executive Directory, therefore, invites you, citizen-
general, to choose one or several artists, to select and trans
mit to Paris the most valuable objects of this kind, and to
give precise orders for the enlightened execution of these
dispositions, concerning which it wishes you to report.
Carnot.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 22 Floreal, year 4 [May 11, 1796].
The battle of Lodi, my dear Director, gives the Re
public all Lombardy. The enemy has left 2000 men in the
castle of Milan, which I shall immediately invest. You
may reckon, in your calculations, as if I were in Milan : I
shall not go thither to-morrow, because I wish to pursue
Beaulieu and to take advantage of his delirium to beat him
again. It will soon be possible for me to attack Mantua. If I
take that place, there is nothing more to prevent me from
entering Bavaria : in two decades I may be in the heart of
Germany. Could you not combine my movements with the
operations of those two armies ? I suppose that by this
time they are fighting on the Rhine ; were the armistice to
continue, the army of Italy would be crushed. If the two
armies of the Rhine take the field, I beg of you to let me know
their position and what you hope they will be able to do, that
this may serve me as a guide either for entering the Tyrol
or confining myself to the Adige. It would be worthy of
the Republic for the three united armies to go and sign the
treaty of peace in the heart of Bavaria or of astonished
Austria. As for me, if it is consistent with your plans for
the two armies of the Rhine to move forward, I will have

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 93
crossed Tyrol before the emperor has any serious suspicion
of the matter. If it were possible to find a good commis
sary, the one who is here might be fit as second, but he has
not spirit and brains enough for commissary general.
Bonaparte.

To M. Fernandi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Duke of Parma.
Head-quarters, Lodi, 24 Floreal, year 4 [May 13, 1796].
I have received, sir, the ratification of the suspension of
arms which you have accepted on the part of the Duke of
Parma. I send to you General Cervoni, that you may
settle with him all the details of the said suspension,
You will give directions for delivering to him, in the
course of to-morrow, the 500,000 francs, which, according to
the terms of the suspension, are to be paid within five
days : he will also receive the horses, and take the mea
sures necessary for the execution of the said suspension.
I rejoice, sir, that this circumstance affords me opportu
nity to express the consideration, &c.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Faipoult, Minister of the Republic at Genoa.
Head-quarters, Lodi, 24 Floreal, year 4 [May 13, 1796].
I am much obhged to you for the engravings which you
have sent me, and which will afford the greatest pleasure to
the army. I beg you to send from me twenty-five louis to the
young man who made them, and desire him to get the asto
nishing passage of the bridge of Lodi engraved.
As the fief of Montegio is not an imperial fief, it is not
comprised in the order which I gave for impositions on the
said fiefs. ,
We yesterday took Pizzigitone, with 300 prisoners and
three pieces of cannon. Beaulieu is running away as fast as
he can. Cremona belongs to the Republic.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Lodi, 25 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796].
After the battle of Fiombio, we pursued the enemy to Pizzi-

94 letters and despatches.
gitone, but could not cross the Adda. After the battle of Lodi,
Beaulieu retreated upon Pizzigitone ; we proceeded thither
on the 22nd, but he had already retired beyond Cremona.
We immediately invested and attacked the town of Pizzi
gitone, which, after a brisk cannonade, was obliged to open
its gates : in it we took 300 prisoners and five pieces of
brass cannon.
Our cavalry has set out in pursuit of the enemy. The
city of Cremona has opened its gates : all Lombardy be
longs to the Republic.
It is said that the suspension of arms on the Rhine still
continues. I should imagine that by this time you have
turned your attention to so essential a matter. It appears
even that the enemy have emphatically published in their
camp that this suspension is for three months, and that in
consequence they are about to receive large reinforcements.
- ~ Bonaparte.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 26 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796].
On the receipt of the Directory's letter of the 18th your
intentions were fulfilled, and the Milanese is ours. I shall
soon march to execute your plans respecting Leghorn and
Rome : that will all be done in a short time.
I am writing to the Directory relative to the idea of
dividing the army : I protest to you that in this I have
nothing in view but the : country. For the rest, you will
always find me in the straight line. I owe to the Republic
the sacrifice of all my ideas. If attempts are making to
lower me in your good opinion, my answer is in my heart
and in niy conscience.
As it is possible that this letter to the Directory may be
misconstrued, and that you have shown me friendship,'' I
have determined to ade&ess it to you, requesting you to
make such use of it as your prudence and your attachment
to me shall suggest. •
Kellermann will command the army as well as I, for no
body is more convinced than myself that the victories are
owing to the courage and daring of the army ; but I cannot
help thinking that to unite Kellermann with me in Italy
would ruin everything. I should not like to serve with a
man wbo deems himself the first general in Europe ; and I S

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 95
think, besides, that it is better to have one bad general than
two good ones. - War is like government — it is an affair
of tact.
I cannot be useful to you unless invested with the same
esteem that you testified for me in Paris. Whether I am
making war here or elsewhere is to me a matter of indiffer
ence : to serve the country, to deserve from posterity a page
in our history, to give the government proofs of my attach
ment and devotedness — that is all my ambition. But I
have it much at heart not to throw away in a week two
months' fatigues, toils, and dangers, and not to find myself
shackled. I have begun with some glory ; I desire to con
tinue to be worthy of you. Believe, besides, that nothing
shall weaken the esteem which you excite in those who
know you.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Lodi, 25 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796].
I have this moment received the courier who left Paris
on the 18th." Your hopes are realised, since, by this time,
all Lombardy belongs to the Republic. Yesterday I de
spatched a division to invest the castle of Milan. Beaulieu
is at Mantua with his army ; he has flooded the whole sur
rounding country : he will find death there, for it is the
most unwholesome place in Italy.
Beaulieu still has a numerous army : he began the cam
paign with a superior force ; the emperor is sending him a
reinforcement of 10,006 men, who are on their march. I
think it highly impolitic to split the army of Italy into
two ; it is equally contrary to the interests of the Republic
to put two different generals into it.
The expedition to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, is a very
trifling matter ; it ought to be performeslj>y divisions en
echelons, so that one mi^.t, by a retrograde march, find one's
self in force against the Austrians, and threaten to enclose
them on the slightest movement they should make. For
this there is required not only a single general, but it is
also necessary that there should be nothing to cramp him
in his march and his operations. I have made the cam
paign without consulting any one : I should have done no
good had I been obliged to reconcile my views with those of

96 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
another. I have gained some advantages over superior
forces, and in absolute want of everything, because, know
ing that your confidence reposed upon me, my progress was
rapid as my thought.
If you impose fetters of all kinds upon me ; if I must refer
at every step to the commissioners of the government ; if
they have a right to change my movements, to take, from
me or to send me troops, expect no more good. If you
weaken your means by dividing your forces ; if you break
the unity of military conception in Italy ; I tell you with
grief, you will have thrown away the fairest occasion for '
imposing laws upon Italy.
In the position of the affairs of the Republic in Italy, it is
indispensable that you should have a general who possesses
your entire confidence : if it were not to be myself, 1 should
not complain, but I would strive to redouble my zeal to
deserve your esteem in the post that you should confer
upon me. Every one has his own method of making war.
General Kellermann has more experience, and will do better
than I : but, both together there, we should do nothing
but mischief.
I cannot render essential services to the country, unless
invested entirely and absolutely with your confidence. I
am aware that it requires great courage to write you this
letter ; how easy it would be to accuse me of pride and
ambition ! — but I owe to you the expression of all my Sen
timents, to you, who have given me at all times testimonies
of esteem which I must not forget.
The different divisions of Italy are taking possession of
Lombardy. When you read this letter, we shall be upon
our march, and your answer will probably find us near
Leghorn. The course which you will take in this circum
stance is more decisive for the operations of the campaign
than 15,000 men sent by the emperor as a reinforcement to
Beaulieu.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
At theBivouac of Cadelano, 22 Floreal, year 4 [May 11, 1796].
I have returned with 500 men to the positions whicli I
occupied last night. General Beaumont, with the cavalry,
has remained at Crema : we have picked up from 100 to

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 97
150 stragglers, whom I will send to head-quarters. Ge-'
neral Beaumont had despatched 50 men upon the road
from Crema to Mantua, to endeavour to overtake the equi
pages of the enemy ; this detachment has returned without
having seen anything. A detachment of infantry, which
kept to the left of the former, fell in with 200 infantry,
retreating in good order.
The inhabitants of Crema told us that General Beaulieu
had marched troops upon Pizzigitone, and that the rest of
the army had taken the road to Mantua. The prisoners
and deserters all agree in saying that the enemy has no
corps rallied, and that the road from Lodi to Cremona was
covered with wounded from yesterday's fight.
Beyrand.

To the General-in-Chief.
Melegnano, 22 Floreal, year 4 [May 11, 1796].
I have just received orders to proceed to Cassano with
the cavalry that I have with me, to stop the troops or equi
pages of the enemy, which are seeking to pass that way.
I shall set out immediately, but I suspect that it will be
too late, as the whole passed in the course of yesterday. KlLMAINE.

To the General-in-Chief.
On the road, a league from Melegnano, 22 Floreal, year 4 [May 11, 1796].
At ten o'clock yesterday morning, the whole of the Aus
trian troops had already passed Santo Angelo : the last
division was composed of the regiment of Belgioso, and a
garrison battalion of another regiment of about 1000 horse.
It was into this division that a detachment of cavalry of
the advanced guard fell, and it appears to have suffered
severely, for want of caution and for want of infantry.
I could overtake only about forty stragglers, whom I
have sent to Borghetto. I heard in the night that, as usual,
you have beaten the Austrians, and that you were master
of Lodi.
The Austrians who were to defend the Upper Tesino, at
Buffarola, passed yesterday through Milan, directing their
march towards Cassano, for the purpose of crossing the
Adda there, and joining Beaulieu.
VOL. I. H

98 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The castle of Milan is provisioned for 4000 men for a
month, at least orders were given to that effect, and the
citadel of Mantua for 12,000 men for five months. The
flour in the magazines of Pavia was distributed among the
inhabitants. There is still hay left there. I await your
orders at Melegnano. KlLMAINE.

To the General-in-ChiefMilan, 25 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796].
I have not thought it right to invest the castle, not
having a sufficient force : I have, therefore, decided to make
the troops encamp outside the city, occupying the avenues
of the glacis. The cavalry is placed on the rampart, at a
little distance from the gate. I have frequent patroles sent
out. To-morrow, on the arrival of the rest of the troops of
my division, I will surround the castle, agreeably to your
orders ; the two pieces of light artillery are pointed at the
gate. I have been received in the city with the warmest accla
mations. On all sides were heard shouts of " The Republic
forever! Hatred to tyrants ! Liberty! liberty!"
All reports agree in saying that the number of the enemy
in the castle amounts to from 15 to 1800 men, and 2 to
300 cavalry.
Massena.

General Augereau to the Municipality of Pavia.
Pavia, 26 Floreal, year 4 [May 15, 1796].
The divisionary General Augereau orders the munici
pality of Pavia as follows : —
1. To proceed without delay to the general disarming of
all the inhabitants of the city of Pavia without exception. -¦
2. All these arms shall be deposited in a place of safety,
and, in the course of the day, placed at the disposal of the
commandant of the city.
3. All inhabitants having effects taken from the
magazines of the emperor are enjoined to give them up
forthwith, upon pain of military execution.
4. The municipality is required to collect all these effects
and to make a declaration of them to the commissary of war.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 99
5. All the workmen and sailors that are in the city are
put in requisition, and shall be immediately assembled to
go and build, under the direction of officers and engineers, a
bridge of boats over the Po, opposite to Cervesina.
6. All the workmen or sailors who, on the requisition of
the municipality, do not instantly obey shall be compelled
to do so by force.
7. All the cordage and other materials fit for the con
struction of the said bridge, which shall be found to exist
in Pavia, shall be immediately put in requisition and col
lected by the municipality, which shall render an account
to the general of what it shall have produced.
8. The municipality is charged with the execution of the
present in its fullest extent, and is responsible for the least
negligence which may be committed. It shall cause it to
be posted and published by sound of trumpet, and translated
into the language of the country.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Pavia, 27 Floreal, year 4 [May 16, 1796].
According to information received* both from officers of
the engineers and from inhabitants of the country, the esta
blishment of a bridge at Cervesina, as you have ordered,
cannot be carried into effect, since, in this part, the river
Po has the least depth of water, extends above a league
inland, and, besides, the roads leading to this bank are
wretched in the extreme. From all that I can learn, the
only place where a bridge could be constructed with con
fidence is at Mezzano de Corti, where the Austrians for
merly had one. I await your orders on this subject.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief.
Venice, 25 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796],
The minister of the Republic at Genoa, ought to have
forwarded to you several letters from me. I neglect no
¦means for procuring all the details that may contribute to
the success of the army which you command. I leave it
to your wisdom to separate them from such as shall appear
useless to you.
h2

100 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The government had an intention of marching consider
able reinforcements from Hungary for Trieste, where they
were to embark for the Po. An embargo was, in con
sequence, laid upon all vessels, but more were wanted than
there are. These troops are taking the route through the
Tyrol ; their number is said to amount to 20,000 men ;
the barks are to carry only provisions and ammunition for
Mantua ; they will have on board, divided among them,
400 men of the artillery and 1000 infantry. It would,
perhaps, be necessary to make some detachments advance
speedily to the frontiers of the Bolognese and the Fer-
rarese, to intercept them ; but, if this detachment is at a
distance from the column, it ought to be rather strong and
to have two to four pieces of light artillery : the station
ought to be on the bank of the Po, below the place where
that river divides into two branches, one running up to
Bologna, the other to Mantua.
Mantua is destitute of provisions and ammunition. Since
the battle which you have recently fought, and which has
forced Beaulieu to a precipitate retreat to Crema, the
wrecks of his army seem to be directing their course to
wards this last place in Lombardy, to wait there for rein
forcements : but this resolution, if it is executing, can only
hasten its utter ruin : all must perish by famine. For the
rest, general, I must beg you not to let our brave brethren
make any long stay there : the air is pestiferous, and for
that reason the emperor kept no garrison there. Would it
not be more advisable to follow the Roveredo road through
the territory of Venice, on which parties of the troops de
bouching from the Tyrol would be met with, that is to say,
if the intention of bringing them up is persisted in, which I
cannot believe ?
A merchant of Venice has been to offer me 150 barrels
of good powder, which is at this moment at Ancona : it
would be an affair of about 1000 louis ; and, if it suited
you, it might be carried to Ferrara in two days, and thence
by the Po to your first posts.
I ardently long for the communication between the
Venetian States and Milan to be free, that I may soon be
able to correspond directly with you, and to receive your
orders ; I charge an excellent French merchant to forward
this letter to the first advanced post, where the messenger
will await your answer.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 101
The Duke of Modena arrived here three days ago, with
considerable treasures ; he is avaricious. His only heir
is a daughter, married to the Archduke of Milan : the
more you extract from him, the more you will take from
the house of Austria. It is from him that you must extort,
and you will get so much the more out of his country. I
know indirectly that he expects it : give me your instruc
tions, and he will perhaps come down the more freely.
According to certain information which has this moment
reached me, terror pervades the city of Mantua. Most of
the wealthy inhabitants have fled, carrying off their money
and their most valuable effects ; it is computed that not
above one-third of its population is left.
The ammunition which was at Cremona and Pavia, the
flour, the military horses, as well as 600 bullocks, which
had been despatched on the 8th of May for Cremona, have
been removed thither. All the provisions that could be
found in other parts have likewise been collected. At
Pavia, the're are cannon and balls which the Austrians
were forced to leave behind, for want of the means of con
veyance. In consequence of these arrangements, it is computed
that the city contains corn, forage, wood, wine, and pro
visions for six months, and munitions of war for a very long
time. The number of soldiers in the place is said to amount
to 3000, but most of them are unfit for service. They
have fetched the orphans and bastards from Pavia and
Cremona and put them into uniform.
A camp composed of about 9,300 men, both infantry and
cavalry, had been formed at Goito, and thither were sent
the fugitives and a small number who reached Mantua. In
the evening of the 12th, a report was circulated in Mantua
itself that the French had dispersed that camp. Never
theless, in the night between the 12th and 13th, 3,200 men
were to proceed thither : orders were given to that effect.
The soldiers are very ill fed and ill paid.
On Monday the 9th, cannon were planted at the Pradela
gate leading to the camp. On the 12th, orders were issued
that the gates should remain closed, and that no person
should be allowed to go out, without permission of the com
mandant. The archives of Milan have been sent off for
Trieste.
Lallemant.

102 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 26 Floreal, year 4 [May 15, 1796].
Your despatch of the 17th Floreal, citizen -general, has
reached the Executive Directory. The possession of the
fortress of Tortona gives it a new degree of confidence in the
success of your dispositions for the passage of the Po : it
has enabled you to take in rear the line of defence of the
Austrians, after having concealed from them a daring and
ably-conceived movement, if they persist in guarding the
banks of the river toward Valenza.
The Directory appreciates, like yourself, the obstacles
wliich forbid the entry of the Milanese ; but the talents
and valour which gain battles are also capable of sur
mounting obstacles of all kinds ; and the triumphant army
which you command ought to consider the Milanese as a
certain conquest, and which is necessary to the glorious
political denouement that the Republic expects from its
victories. The conduct of Tuscany towards France is not deserving
of further forbearance ; and the Directory authorizes you,
as soon as circumstances shall appear favourable to you,
to direct upon Leghorn a corps, the force of which you will
determine, and by means of which you will carry into exe
cution the dispositions contained in the last despatches of
the Directory relative to the grand-duke. The reinforce
ments which you are to receive from the army of the Alps
will very soon enable you to arrange that operation ; but
at the same time you will be aware that your principal ob
ject in your present situation is to complete the overthrow
of Beaulieu.
The Directory reminds you, citizen- general, that the
maintenance of discipline can alone secure to an army the
conquests of its courage, and that its observance tends
always to relax in the intoxication of success. You are
deeply impressed with this truth, and will never cease to
make a rigorous application of it, which is at once required
by the interest of the Republic and that of your personal
glory.
Carnot.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 103
The Executive Directory to the General Commanding in
Chief the Army of Italy.
Paris, 27 Floreal, year 4 [May 16, 1796].
Goodnews from the army of the coasts of the Ocean, the
submission of the rebel Scepeaux and the Chouans who obeyed
him, and the certainty that the inhabitants of the theatre
of war in La Vendee are submitting in good earnest to the
laws of the Republic, had given great joy to the Directory,
when it was augmented by the information contained in your
letter of the 20th current, concerning the passage of the Po
and the successes at Fombio and Casale.
The Directory is not afraid to repeat the praises which it
has already given to the victorious army of Italy, and it
esteems itself happy to have to congratulate it anew,
through your medium, in the name of the French people,
on its intrepid and gallant conduct. It will not tarnish its
laurels by a conduct unworthy of the brilliant actions which
it has recently achieved, and pillage will be repressed with
that severity which respect for property and the welfare of
the army itself imperatively command and require. Let
all the efforts of the generals and officers be exerted to put
an end to this disorganizing scourge, and let Italy behold
in her conquerors none but Republicans, friends of order,
and worthy of the admiration of all nations !
It appears from the letters of the commissioner of the
government, Salicetti, that the army of Beaulieu is retiring
towards Mantua, and that you hope soon to be master of
Milan. The Directory reckons upon this success, and con
gratulates the army of Italy beforehand upon it. If the
Austrians are thrown into the Mantuan, delay not a mo
ment to pursue them. Beaulieu is concentrating himself:
the briskness of his retreat, the extent of ground which he
has traversed, oblige you to scatter your troops ; it is
necessary to annihilate as soon as possible this nucleus of
an Austrian army, which might take advantage of this dis
persion to return with the rapidity of lightning against the
army of Italy. Beaulieu is vanquished, but he has not,
perhaps, renounced the offensive ; and, as he cannot exercise
it with success but against separate divisions of your army,
it is requisite to prevent all his enterprises, to watch his
proceedings, and never to lose sight of him. Defer, if
necessary, citizen-general, till after the total rout and dis-

104 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
persion of the Austrian army all the particular petty enter
prises which would be liable to weaken the main body of
the army under your command. A vast career of glory is
yet open before you, but the first step taken in it ought to
be to destroy entirely the army commanded by the suc
cessor of Devins. Your successes will soon place you in a
situation to cut off all direct communication between it and
Vienna. This interesting object once accomplished, its
defeat is certain. In order to bring it about, it is necessary
above all things to harass the enemy incessantly, and to
reduce the Austrian soldiers to that state of fatigue which
disorganizes the most formidable armies, and which occasions
desertion, apathy, and frequently disobedience and rebellion.
Beaulieu once annihilated, the house of Austria will at
length think of peace, which the perfidious counsels of
England have induced it to reject. It will find itself forced
to accept such conditions as the Republic shall think fit to
impose. Venice, as the Directory observed to you in its despatch
of the 18th Floreal, ought to be treated as a neutral, not as
a friendly power. Seek, above all, without changing this
disposition, to prevent the wrecks of the Austrian, army
from finding a safe asylum in the territories of that repub
lic. If they penetrate into them without the consent of the
Venetian government, pursue them without hesitation.
The Directory refers you to its letter of the 18th cur
rent : it contains developments explanatory of our mode of
acting towards the different powers of Italy, to which it
deems it superfluous to add any thing under present circum
stances. All republicans will drop a tear for Generals Laharpe
and Stengel ; the Directory has felt as it ought for their
loss, and the laurels of their companions in arms ca*h alone
mingle some gratification with their sincere regrets. It
will not fail shortly to testify to the brave men who have
anew distinguished themselves at the passage of the Po
how highly satisfied it is with their devotedness, their intel
ligence, and that valour which makes them confront all
dangers. No pity for dishonest administrators, who devour the
subsistence and dilapidate the resources of the Republican
armies ! Point them out to the Directory, citizen-general ;
bring them to trial ; you are on the spot ; you are well

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 105
acquainted with their infamous conduct and scandalous
robberies ; make necessary examples of them, examples
capable of deterring those who may be tempted to imitate
them in future : it is the only way to extirpate that mania
for rapine, which impunity and connivance have so disas
trously spread over almost the whole surface of the Repub
lic. On these shameless vampires ought to fall the first
and the just punishment reserved for audacious guilt.
The army of the Alps is in need of funds : the Directory
addresses itself to you ; strive to procure it some, and to
revive the public credit by payments long due in the de
partments which it occupied : furnish it also with some
means of transport, and remount all its services, which are
in the greatest want of it. The Directory recommends to
you to concert on this subject with the general-in-chief
Kellermann. The Directory approves the armistice which you have
concluded with the Duke of Parma ; it accepts the present
which that prince is pleased to make us of some fine pic
tures to adorn the national Museum.
I recommend to you to visit and notice the eminent
men of science and artists in the countries where you are ;
and, when you are in possession of Milan, to honour and
protect particularly Oriani,1 the astronomer, so celebrated for
the services which he is incessantly rendering to the sciences.
The Directory will write to you forthwith, on the return
of your aide-de-camp, citizen Murat.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 27 Floreal, year 4 [May 16, 1796].
The Directory loses no time in transmitting to you,
citizen-general, a copy of the treaty of peace concluded
between the minister for foreign affairs, authorized by the
Directory and the plenipotentiaries sent by the court of
1 Barnab6 Oriani, a native of Garignano in the Milanese, early acquired
high reputation as an astronomer for the great accuracy of his observations.
In 1786, he was sent by the government to London, with a commission to
Ramsden for a mural quadrant and other instruments, for the Milan
Observatory. Here he contracted a friendship with Herschel, and con
tinued in correspondence with him while he lived. On the erection of the
Italian Institute, he was one of the first thirty members, and afterwards
made by Napoleon a count and senator of the kingdom of Italy. He died at
Milan in 1832, and left very considerable property for scientific purposes.

106 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Turin. There is every reason to believe that the legis
lative body, after examining, will ratify it, as Article 333
of the Republican constitution prescribes.
Thus the brave army of Italy, which you have so skil-r
fully led on to victory, will have reason to applaud itself
for having brought about this glorious peace, the fruit of its
valour, and which becomes the pledge of its future success
against the Austrians. Continue to direct it with that
rapidity and that perseverance which thwart and annihilate
all the combinations of hostile powers, and force them, in
spite of themselves, into that general peace, from which they
so obstinately kept aloof, and of the imperative and irresist
ible necessity of which our victorious armies will soon make
them sensible. Carnot.

To Citizen Lallemant, Minister at Venice.
Head-quarters, Milan', 28 Floreal, year 4 [May 17, 1796]. ,
I thank you infinitely, citizen minister, for the interest
ing particulars you give me respecting the position of the
enemy. I send you 6000 livres, to defray the expense of
spies at Trent, Mantua, and on the whole route of Tyrol,
and let me know the day on which the Trieste vessels left
for Mantua. Spare neither money nor pains ; the interest
of the country requires it. I will repay you punctually
all that you lay out. Send me an accurate- and very
detailed map of the Venetian States.
There is at Milan a strong disposition to create a revo
lution there. If citizens Jacob and Alliod are not indispen
sable at Venice, send them hither ; I will employ them in
the Milanese, for the administration of that country. You
must have received a letter from Lodi, from the commis
sioner of the government. Contrive to let your letters be
frequent and instructive : it is upon you I rely for news ;
fix a price for the couriers, so that when they arrive before
such an hour they shall have a gratuity.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of the King cf Sardinia.
Head-quarters, Milan, Floreal 29, year 4 [May 18, 1796],
I have just given orders, sir, for the two vessels with salt,
stopped at Placentia, to continue their route to Valenza.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 107
Perhaps you will think proper to send either a military
or civil officer to Placentia to take care that vessels and
other convoys belonging to the king are not intercepted by
the army. As soon as you have acquainted me with your
intentions on this subject, I shall be anxious to furnish that
officer with the necessary facilities to enable him to fulfil his
mission. He might also be directed to visit the different banks
of the Po, to obtain restitution of any effects belonging to
the king which we may have seized.
The chief of the staff is despatching orders to the troops
that will arrive at Casale to set out immediately for Milan.
I have directed my attention to the different remonstrances
relative to the province of Alba. I wish, sir, that you may
be convinced of the anxiety which I feel to do something
that would be agreeable to you.
I request you to send me a list of the officers whom you
desire that I should send you in exchange for those whom
you have had the complaisance to release on parole.
I am sending an officer of engineers to Valenza, to select
a spot for the construction of a bridge there ; but, as I leave
to the king the enjoyment of his territories on this side of
the Po, which M. Beaulieu evacuated only on my passage
of the Po at Placentia, I think it would be but fair that
you should yourself give orders for the construction of the
said bridge, which it would be useful to me to have before
the end of eight days.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 29 Floreal, year 4 [May 18, 1796].
The Duke of Parma is paying his contribution ; he has
already paid 500,000 livres, and is providing for the rest.
Faipoult would fain have had that prince excused from
paying any thing ; but the ambassador of Spain at Turin,
who has come to see me, admitted that we had been very
moderate. I dare say, however, that the Duke of Parma
complains ; but why did he not accept the mediation of
Spain ?
Bonaparte.

108 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief of the Army of the King of
Sardinia.
I have just been informed, sir, that the different military
agents in the conquered countries had sequestrated the pos
sessions of gentlemen belonging to the court. I have given
orders that the sequestrations be immediately taken off,
and that no difference be made between the subjects of the
king, whether resident in Turin or in the various towns
, subject to the Republic.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Barthelemy, Ambassador of the Republic
at Basle.
Head-quarters, Milan, 1 Prairial, year 4 [May 20, 1796].
We are masters of Lombardy. The troops of the Re
public, though in small number and destitute of every
thing, have surmounted all obstacles : the enemy has re
tired to Mantua ; to-morrow our corps of troops will be
here. I am in haste to be off, and beg you to acquaint me
with the movements of the imperial army in Bavaria and
Suabia. Can the emperor weaken his army on the Rhine to re
inforce that of Italy ? What troops could he still send
into the Tyrol I I request you, citizen minister, to com
municate to me all the information you possess on that
subject, and to send out agents on all sides, that you may
be able to let me know with precision what troops would be
marched to Italy.
I am extremely flattered that this circumstance has pro
cured me the pleasure of assuring you, &c.
Bonaparte.

To the Minister of the Finances.
Head-quarters, Milan, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].
The army of Italy is suffering severe want : it is in the
utmost penury and the most deplorable destitution of the
most essential necessaries : the number of its men is daily
increasing, and its wants are increasing in proportion.
The Executive Directory, which has appointed me to the
command of that army, has decided upon a plan of offensive

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 109
warfare, which requires prompt measures and extraordinary
resources. The allowance of two sous in specie for the private sol
dier, and eight livres for the officers, has not been received,
and this has discontented and discouraged the army. I
request you to inform yourself, and to let me know if I am
to reckon that the treasury alone will provide, so that the
pay may not fail. Of all expenses, this is the most sa
cred : the army of Italy is the only one which has gone
without it.
, The minister at war has given orders for the service of
Pluviose and part of that of Ventose at different times,
according to the annexed account, the sum of .... ; and
for the service of the artillery, on the 23rd of the month,
10,000 livres in specie, and 500,000 livres in assignats ; and
on the 19th Ventose, 30,000 livres in cash, and 1,500,000
livres in assignats.
They complain at the army of having received only a
very small portion of that sum. I beg you to cause an
account to be delivered to you of what remains to be sent
according to the above orders, and to let me know what you
hope to do for effecting the entire payment.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Bonslli, Chief of Battalion.
Head-quarters, Milan, 21 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].
You will go to Corsica, with eighteen men of your own
choice. Citizen Sapey is directed to procure you a passage,
and to deliver to you supplies of powder and arms. There
will be paid to you at your departure 24,000 livres in cash,
which you will lay out for encouraging the patriots. Citizen
Brassini will remain at Genoa, and transmit to you the
supplies that you have need of: he will deliver to you 100
muskets, 300 pair of pistols, 600 pounds of powder, and
10,000 pounds of lead. As soon as more precise informa
tion arrives, further supplies will be sent, and officers' com
missions for raising battalions on account of the French
Republic.
Bonaparte.

110 letters and despatches.
To Citizens Braccini and Paraviccini.
Head-quarters, Milan, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 179B].
You will remain at Genoa to correspond with the Cor
sican patriots, to inform me of all that is passing in that
department, and to forward supplies to him. Citizen Balbi,
banker of the Republic, will remit to you 15,000 livres.
With that sum you will buy 100 muskets, 300 pair of
pistols, 3000 gun-flints, 5000 to 6000 pounds of powder,
and 10,000 pounds of lead, which you will deliver to ci
tizen Bonelli. I am giving orders that there be sent to
you from Nice 600 fowling-pieces, which you will forward
successively. The minister of the Republic at Genoa is informed of
your mission. You will call upon him, that he may give
you whatever you are in need of. You will receive a salary
of 300 francs per month while your mission lasts.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Sapey.
Head-quarters, Milan, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].
I am sending off citizen Bonelli with 30 men and 100
muskets, 300 pair of pistols, 6000 pounds of powder, and
10,000 pounds of lead, to assist the patriots of Corsica.
I have directed citizens Braccini and Paraviccini to re
main at Genoa, and to carry on a correspondence with the
Corsican patriots. Your zeal being known to me, I desire
you to procure citizen Bonelli all the means necessary for
passing over to Corsica. I will reimburse the expense you
are at on this account.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Faipoult.
Head-quarters, Milan, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].
Herewith I send you an intercepted letter : you will see
that you have spies about you.
Peace is concluded with the King of Sardinia on very
advantageous terms ; it was signed on the 26th of this
month. All is quiet in Paris, and the revolutionists of
1 793 are still kept in order and thwarted.
You will find annexed a proclamation to the army. I

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. Ill
prefer that method to addressing the people. The armis
tice with the Duke of Parma has been approved. The
Directory has not thought it too ignominious for that duke.
We have laid an imposition of 20,000,000 francs on the
Milanese. I shall choose two fine horses for you out of
those which we shall require at Milan : they will help to
dispel the ennui and vexations of the country where you
are. I shall also make you a present of a sword.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 3 Prairial, year 4 [May 22, 1796].
I have just received, citizens directors, the courier who
left Paris on the 26th. He has brotight us the articles of
the glorious peace which you have concluded with the
King of Sardinia. I beg you to accept my congratulations
upon it.
The commissioner Salicetti will transmit to you a state
ment of the contributions that we have imposed. You may
at this moment reckon upon six to eight millions of money,
in gold or silver, in bullion or jewels, which are at your
disposal in Genoa at one of the principal bankers'. You
can dispose of that sum, it not being needed for the wants
of the army. If you wish it, I will remit a million to Basle
for the army of the Rhine.
I have sent General Kellermann 10,000 livres in cash,
and to-morrow I shall transmit 200,000 livres to him.
The troops are satisfied ; they receive half their pay in
money ; pillage is repressed, and discipline is reviving with
abundance in this glorious army. Nine thousand men of
the army of the Alps will arrive in ten days. I shall not
wait for them, for the troops are already in motion to march
for the gorges of the Tyrol.
The Austrian army is daily receiving reinforcements;
but I imagine that our army of the Rhine will not permit
the emperor to weaken himself too much in that quarter.
You will find annexed some letters of the highest im
portance, among the rest one which makes mention of con
versations between Louis XVIII. and several of our posts
at the army of the Rhine. The intelligence of these par
leys is repeated in all the letters of emigrants. I think it
important that this should be inquired into.

112 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
You will find annexed a statement of what we have taken
at Pavia : it is very considerable. We have magazines at
Tortona, Coni, Ceva, and Mondovi. The Duke of Parma
having neither muskets, nor cannon, nor fortresses, nothing
of this kind could be demanded of him.
You will find annexed an address to the army. You
will also find the suspension which I have concluded with
the Duke of Modena : there, you will see, are 10,000,000
more for the Republic. As he has neither fortresses nor
muskets, it was not possible to demand any of him.
Bonaparte.
PS. Among the letters of emigrants annexed, you will
find one from a priest, who writes from Paris to Cardinal
Zelada ; though not signed, it would be easy to discover
the writer, since he says that he supped with General
Dumuy the evening before his departure. When once the
minister of the police has found out this correspondent of
monseigneur the cardinal, it will be easy for him, by causing
him to be dogged for some days, to discover others. You
will also find the name of a merchant of Lyons, who trans
mits funds to emigrants.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Parma, 28 Floreal, year 4 [May 17, 1796].
You must have received, general, my despatch by the
extraordinary courier : I lose no time in sending back your
courier, and replying to your letter of the 27th.
The celebrated picture of St. Jerome, by Correggio, with
the four best that could be found here, will be packed to
morrow, and sent to Tortona. As for the others, I repeat
to you that it is indispensable, if you would make a good
selection, that you should send me some connoisseur from
Milan, for I might be deceived, knowing nothing of paint
ing, and having no one to consult.
1 am going to send an express to Mantua, and I shall
transmit to you the report he will bring me of the position
and number of the enemy. The general who commands
towards Cremona would, however, have been able to do
better service, being nearer to Mantua, and on the other
side of the Po : you would at any rate have received his
report more speedily.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 113
I am also sending a man to Reggio, though I am assured
by persons who have come from the town this morning that
all is quiet in that part.
Guastalla belongs to the Duke of Parma : that town is
neither fortified nor defended by any troops : there are but
a few old invalids of the duke's.
There is a stone bridge over the Secchia, two miles from
Reggio, on the Modena road; there are bridges over all
the rivers that are met with on the road to Bologna.
It is fifteen miles from this city to Reggio ; from Reggio
to the bridge over the Secchia, two miles. I await your
answer with impatience.
Cervoni.

To the General-in-Chief. Lodi, 29 Floreal, year 4 [May 18, 1796].
It has been determined that the division of General Mas
sena shall furnish the horse-artillery with three 8-pounders
and two six-inch howitzers. If you will order these five
pieces to be delivered to-morrow at Lodi, I can assure you
that, by the 3rd of next month, you shall have at your
disposal the horse-artillery with twelve pieces, provisioned
with 150 rounds each, 100 of them grape.
Dommartin.

To the General-in-Chief.
Parma, 30 Floreal, year 4 [May 19, 1796].
I have this instant received, general, the reports of the
trusty persons whom I sent to Mantua by different roads,
and neither knowing of the mission of the other. Both
agree in assuring me that three days ago reinforcements
of troops, coming from the Tyrol, entered Mantua : one
represents them as amounting to 5000, the other to
7000 men. They are labouring very hard to repair the
fortifications of Mantua, and to establish new batteries : in
these works, they employ not only the troops but the
people of the country and city : there is an incessant bustle,
and a mortal agitation prevails among the troops, as well as
the inhabitants. General Beaulieu declares unreservedly
that the emperor ought to make peace or to send him
60,000 men.
. VOL. I. I

114 LETTERS and despatches.
A line has been formed for defending the dikes of the
lakes Mincio and Garda, which supply the ditches of
Mantua with water ; it is in the defence of this line that
nearly all the wrecks of his army are employed : he is
constructing camps and entrenching himself everywhere
outside : he does not reside himself in Mantua, but is for
tifying himself at Marcheria, and has broken down the
bridge of the Oglio, twelve miles distant from Mantua.
My spies assert that the Austrians have not considerable
magazines : want is beginning to be felt, and discourage
ment is at its height among them. There is not an Aus
trian on this side of the Po.
In order to obtain these particulars the more speedily,
I made these expresses travel by post : I shall do the same
with those whom I shall send to the mouth of the Po, that
you may be promptly apprized of whatever there may be
new in that quarter.
It is sixty miles from Parma to Sarzana : there is a well-
beaten road, but not passable for carriages ; the rivers that
you meet with are all fprdable.
I told you in my last that it is impossible for the Duke
of Parma, notwithstanding his good will, to furnish us with
the oats that he has promised us. Instead of oats, I have
authorized the inspector of forage to receive beans and
Turkey corn, on the understanding of a just augmentation.
When all the resources of this kind in the duchy are ex
hausted, I shall have what has not been furnished in kind
levied in money.
I have likewise told you that there are no studs in the
territories of Parma : there is no good breed of horses in
the country, consequently there are but very few horses, and
those very bad. Yesterday, out of seven or eight hundred
that were brought to us, we were obliged to reject nearly
half, as being unfit for any kind of service in the army. I
see no possibility of extracting 500 good saddle-horses from
this duchy, and it will be very difficult for it to furnish us
with 200 for draught : you know that in these parts the
people use bullocks for transport. When I have despatched
all the horses that can be supplied, and am convinced of
the impossibility of levying more, I will render you an
account, that you may fix the sum which I ought to de
mand in lieu of those not furnished.
One hundred saddle-horses, the best of the bad, will start

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 115
to-morrow for Milan, under the conduct of Captain Fresnel,
whom I have ordered to leave ten with General Serrurier.
Among these hundred horses, there are sixteen out of the
duke's stables, eight of them saddle and eight coach-horses.
The captain has orders to deliver them to none but you :
they may serve for yourself, Salicetti, and the chief of the
staff. Besides these, Captain Fresnel has selected some
other good ones. The inspector of carriages will forward
those destined for the artillery to the Adda.
The famous St. Jerome, the Madona della Scudella, the
Taking down from the Cross, the Martyr, forming a com
panion to that picture, and St. John preaching in the
Wilderness — these five pictures are the best in the country,
are already packed, and will go off to-night. I will have
the others which you have pointed out to me secured, and
forward them to Tortona as speedily as possible. Cervoni.

To the General-in- Chief.
Pizzigitone, 1 Prairial, year 4 [May 20, 1796].
Annexed, I forward to you two reports, one by a spy
whom I had sent to Cremona, the other by a captain of the
10th regiment of horse chasseurs, whom I had sent with a
flag of truce. It is almost impossible to get well served by
the people of the country as spies : they dare not venture
upon ground occupied by an enemy's army, and what they
report is but vague.
According to the report of the spy, the enemy is entirely
on the other side of the Oglio ; he has his advanced posts on
the left bank of that river, and his cavalry in advance of
the infantry : the bulk of his army is encamped in the rear
of Mantua. He has few troops in that city, a considerable
camp at Basega, nobody on the banks of the Oglio, ascend
ing towards Rhina ; but there are troops atMarlaria: he
knows not the total force of the enemy, and that of his
different positions.
The report of Captain Allico is as follows : — " On the
28th I pushed on to Marlaria, passing through Bossolo ;
the enemy allowed me to approach to the bank of the
Oglio, where I had time to reconnoitre his position. I re
marked three pieces of cannon, one placed at the end of a
bridge, and sweeping that as well as the road leading to
I 2

116 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Bossolo : the other two are placed about fifty or sixty
fathoms to the right and left of the first : that on the right
plays upon a dike running diagonally towards the Oglio ;
that on the left is masked by some trees, and plays upon a
field of wheat on the left of the road leading from Marlaria
to Bossolo. I remarked, moreover, that the bridge had been
half burned ; but the piles and the framework were left.
I think it would be easy to repair it."
Dallemagne.

To the General-in-Chief.
Pizzigitone, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May21, 1796].
A countryman whom I despatched from Bina to ascer
tain the force and the position of the enemy, has returned
this morning. He reports that he descended the right
bank of the Oglio to Marlaria ; that the enemy has sunk
all the ferry-boats as far as that place ; that he saw nobody
on the left bank ; and that, from the information which he
obtained, the enemy has 6000 infantry at Marlaria and very
few cavalry.
Dallemagne.

To the General-in-Chief. Turin, May 21, 1796 [2 Prairial, year 4],
The boats necessary for the construction of the bridge
are all at the appointed place. I have already had advice
that the column coming by way of Argentieres has arrived
in the valley of the Stura ; that of the valley of Aosta will
likewise have entered it on the 1 9th ; but on this occasion
I must tell you that General Kellermann announces a
second passage through that valley, which we had not
agreed upon, and which would be extremely prejudicial to
the country through which this second, column would pass.
My brother, who commands at the valley of Aosta, has
written on this subject to General Kellermann, to apprize
him that this would not be conformable with the conven
tions ; so that I flatter myself there will still be time to
give orders that this second column shall pursue the route
of Argentieres instead of that of the St. Bernard.
I have thought to write you this, that you may bej in-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 117
formed of all our proceedings, having the greatest confidence
in your manner of acting towards me, and the strongest
desire to do everything that can be agreeable to you.
I have also resolved to address myself directly to you, to
beg of you to give orders that the peasants in the country
occupied by the French armies may be allowed the possi
bility of tilling their lands and sowing for a second crop ;
which, I think, will be as beneficial for the French army as
even for the country where produce is more abundant. As
it is just about the time when they ought to begin, 1 have
been anxious to press the subject upon you ; and with great
pleasure I seize this occasion to testify the distinguished
sentiments which I have for you, monsieur le general.
Victor Emmanuel.

Tke Executive Directory to General Bonaparte, Commander-
in-Chief of the Army of Italy.
Paris, 26 Floreal, year 4 [May 18, 1796].
The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letter
dated Lodi, the 22nd instant. You know how to follow up
victory, and this rapid and uninterrupted series of suc
cesses promises France the conquest of nearly all Italy, and
the immense resources possessed by that great and rich
peninsula. Immortal glory to the victors of Lodi ! Honour to the
general-inrchief, who prepared for the daring attack on the
bridge of that town, by going through the ranks of the
French warriors, and exposing himself to the most mur
derous fire of the enemy, and disposing everything for
victory- 1 Honour to the intrepid Berthier, who rushed on
at the head of that fierce and formidable republican column
which overturned and overthrew the enemy ! Honour to
generals Massena, Cervoni, Dallemagne, to the chiefs of
brigade Saluce, Dupas, and Sugni, to adjutant-major Toiret,
of the third battalion of the grenadiers ! Glory to the gal
lant second battalion of the carabineers, to those victorious
grenadiers who decided the issue of that battle ! Glory to
the brave division commanded by General Augereau and to
its leader ! Glory to the commissioner of the government
Salicetti !
Ye have conquered, French Republicans, ye have saved
your country, ye are consolidating the Republic, ye are an-

118 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
nihilating that monstrous coalition, which would have swal
lowed us up ; ye are making peace by inflicting redoubled
blows on those senseless Austrians, who, with an obstinacy
which is fatal to them, have hitherto refused to accept it.
The Directory becomes with pleasure the organ of all the
friends of the Republic, and it is never tired of giving you
the praises which are due to your courage and to the daring
intrepidity which characterizes you.
Yes, general, you know how to follow up victory : what
signifies it on what day you will be in Milan, since that city
belongs to the Republic, and you have caused the castle to
be invested ! Your plan is the only one to pursue : Beau
lieu must be followed up till he is annihilated, till you have
so dispersed him that he finds it utterly impossible to un
dertake anything, or even to show himself during this cam
paign. Continue then to pursue him, wherever he may be,
with that perseverance which you have hitherto displayed,
and desist not till the Austrian army is utterly destroyed, j
The despatches which the Directory has addressed to you
on the 18th, 26th, and 27th Floreal, contain the bases of
the movements which will be left for you to make, after the
entire overthrow of Beaulieu and the conquest of the
Milanese. As soon as that important operation is finished,
and the conditions of the peace concluded with Sardinia have
been ratified by the Legislative Body and the Court of
Turin, you will divide the troops under your command into
two parts. You will command those which are to
secure the whole of Italy, and General Kellermann,
required by the commissioner of the government Salicetti,
will command that of the Milanese by the name of the army
of the Alps, and will despatch, if the forces which you leave
him permit, some divisions and parties to the gorges of the
Tyrol, &c.
One part of the numerous troops at present composing
the army of the Alps, augmented by the reinforcements
which the situation of Lyons shall permit us to draw from
that city, will be able to advance into Piedmont, and contri
bute to the execution of the treaty of peace, by occupying
the places which are to be delivered up to us, in conformity
with Art. 12 ; and in Mont Blanc, the Upper and Lower
Alps, and Faussigni, there must be left only the forces in
dispensable for maintaining tranquillity, which evil disposed
persons might attempt to disturb.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 119
For these essential operations you will concert with the
commissioner of the government Salicetti and the general-
in-chief Kellermann, with whom you will fix the demarca
tions between the two armies and the arrondissements
assigned to the service of each of them.
The Directory has reserved for you the conduct of the
columns that are to go to Leghorn to chastise the English,
because it considers that operation as of superior import
ance ; because the fate of the island of Corsica depends upon
it, in some measure ; because it will make London tremble,
and give a mortal Wow to the English, the sole supporters
and conductors of the coalition, which seems at length
ready to crumble to pieces. It attaches to the immediate
execution of this plan a much greater interest than to the
dangerous expedition into the Tyrol ; in executing it, you
will make the tiara of the self-styled head of the universal
Church totter, and you will impose on the King of Naples
conditions of peace, as advantageous to France as they will
be disastrous to the perfidious English and their allies.
The march which you propose towards Tyrol is grand, no
doubt, but it is environed with obstacles difficult to surmount.
The Directory has partly developed the dangers of it in its
despatch of the 18th of Floreal, to which it refers ; be
sides, it considers that enterprise as absolutely dependent
on your future successes in Italy. The way in which it
might be advisable to prepare for it would be this : For
your march upon Leghorn and the States of the Church,
you will take with you no more troops than are indispen
sably necessary to ensure your success at Leghorn, Rome,
and Naples ; the rest, as we have observed, will be trans
ferred to the general-in-chief Kellermann, who will closely
pursue the wrecks of the Austrians into the mountains of
the Tyrol, and push strong parties into Germany as far as
he can, as well to levy contributions as to disturb the com
munications of the Austrian armies on the Rhine. If the
army which you will command needs reinforcements, they
shall be immediately drawn from that under General Kel
lermann, upon the requisition made for that purpose by the
commissioners of the government. You will leave, con
jointly with that general, in the Milanese, and to secure
your communications with France, no more troops than
are strictly indispensable for the fulfilment of that object ;
and General Kellermann will dispose militarily in the moun-

120 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
tains of the Tyrol the greater part of those under his
orders, so as to screen them from the heats of the plain,
and the diseases which they cannot fail to occasion.
Your marches towards the south of Italy ought to be
sharp and rapid : the immense resources which they will
afford you will be forwarded without delay to France.
Leave nothing in Italy that our political situation permits
us to carry off, and that may be useful to us. If this plan
is executed as the Directory hopes, it will then be the more
possible to resume towards autumn the enterprise of pene
trating into the heart of Germany, inasmuch as our armies
of the Rhine will by that time have been able to strike
vigorous blows. That of Italy has not only shown them
the way to victory ; it has facilitated it to them. The
Austrian, dismayed at your successes, has probably already
given orders for drawing from his armies on the Rhine nu
merous reinforcements to oppose your progress ; and hence
arises the necessity for giving to General Kellermann the
greatest possible force, that he may find himself at all
times in the situation of the offensive in the quarter of the
Tyrol. They are not yet fighting on the Rhine. The army of
the Sambre and Meuse is forming its magazines with diffi
culty. It has not, like the brave army of Italy, a fertile
plain before it, and it is obliged to secure for itself before
hand the means of subsistence in the sterile country of
Berg and in northern Wetteravia. That of the Rhine
and Moselle is in extreme destitution : its cavalry is an
absolute cipher for want of horses : it is also in want of
money for its services. It is, moreover, beset and under
mined by abuses and peculations of every kind. The foot
carabineers of the army of Italy have by their valour fur
nished the means for remounting the horse carabineers of
that of the Rhine and Moselle ; if you can send horses to
them and to the other cavalry troops of that army, hesitate
not to do so, and concert with the General-in-Chief Moreau
to arrange for their reception : and the same in regard] to
the means of transport and the distress for cash in which it
finds itself.
The moment when the enemy shall draw forces from his
armies on the Rhine to oppose them to ours in Italy, is that
which the Directory would choose for breaking the armistice
in the north : it is employing all its means to accomplish

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 121
this, but fears that the campaign cannot be opened before
the harvest, which will supply the French troops with the
means of subsistence that they are in want of.
If your general officers of cavalry fail to do their duty,
bring them to trial without mercy, turn them out, send
them to the rear, purge that arm and make it worthy of the
army of Italy. The Directory has just given orders for
general-officers of cavalry, of high reputation, general of
division Sahuguet and general of brigade Beaurevoir, to
start by post to join it. You will soon furnish the latter
with occasion to earn the rank of general of division, to
which his distinguished services already give him some
claim. If your commissaries of war are not good, get some
appointed by the commissioner of government Salicetti.
The Directory knows that you will not put into office any
but men of probity, intelligence, and activity.
The Republic of Venice will perhaps be able to furnish
us with money : you may even raise a loan at Verona,
where the pretended Louis XVIII. resided. The Directory
suggests this idea for your consideration, and commits the
execution of it to the commissioner of the government
Salicetti and yourself.
It is writing fresh letters of congratulation to the brave
men of the army of Italy : it is waiting for the plans of
your battles and of your marches ; you cannot be in want
of draughtsmen in Italy. What are your young officers
of engineers about, eh?
The Directory will immediately grant promotion to the
officers for whom you solicit it ; and it will give new
tokens of satisfaction to those who have distinguished
themselves. It applauds the perfect harmony which prevails between
you, General Kellermann, the commissioner of government
Salicetti, and the general of division chief of the staff Ber-
thier. It will sincerely rejoice to hear of the entire defeat
of the army of Beaulieu and the taking of Milan.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].
The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letter

122 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
of the 25th Floreal, apprising it of the taking of Pizzigi
tone and the possession of Cremona and all Lombardy : it,
congratulates afresh the army of Italy and him who com
mands it. It has made a glorious preparation for the
festival of victory which the entire Republic will celebrate
on the 10th of Prairial.
The Directory deems it superfluous to repeat to-day what
it has said to you in its last despatches, concerning the
necessity of watching all the movements of Beaulieu and
not losing sight of him for a single moment. If you are
apprehensive that he will receive reinforcements, attack
him before they join him, and neglect nothing to prevent
that junction. The enemy must not be allowed time to
recruit himself; we must not weaken ourselves in his pre
sence, and, above all, not furnish him, by a disastrous fritter
ing away of our force, with the means of beating us in
detail and. recovering the ground that he has lost.
The separation of the army of Italy into two parts must
not take place till Beaulieu is absolutely incapable of un
dertaking anything. Your first object therefore, general,
is to destroy his army and to disperse it entirely : it would
take advantage of the moments of rest which you should
grant it to recover from the terror which the arms of the
Republic have struck into it, and it would soon try to
become daring.
Defer the expedition to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, till
what you conceive to be a favourable moment ; but let it be
rapid, and let its complete success, especially against the
English, permit your speedy return to make head against
the troops which the court of Vienna might be able to
send. You appear desirous, citizen-general, to continue to
conduct the whole series of the military operations of the
present campaign in Italy. The Directory has maturely
considered of this proposition, and the confidence which it
has in your talents and your republican zeal have decided
this question in favour of the affirmative. The General-in-.
Chief Kellermann will remain at Chambery, and merely
attend to the occupation of the places that are to be given
up to us by the treaty of peace. The army of Italy will
continue to keep garrison in those which it entered in virtue
of the armistice, as well as in Valenza or Alexandria,
which that treaty grants us provisionally.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 123
The expedition to Leghorn is the first thing to be under
taken after the defeat of Beaulieu : the Directory has
explained the reasons in its late despatches ; it leaves to you
the choice of the time and of the means of execution, and
it will learn, with warm satisfaction, the news of this triumph
over the perfidious English.
The rest of the military operations towards Germany and
in the Mantuan are absolutely dependent on your success
against Beaulieu. The Directory is sensible how difficult it
would be to direct them from Paris ; on this point, there
fore, it leaves you the greatest latitude, recommending to
you extreme prudence. Its decided intention, however, is
that the army should not proceed beyond the Tyrol till
after the expedition to the south of Italy.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 3 Prairial, year 4 [May 22, 1796].
The Directory sends you, citizen-general, twelve swords
destined for the officers who have distinguished themselves
in the passage of the Po and the battle of Lodi, as well
as in the actions which took place previously. You will
find the names of the officers annexed. The Directory
requests you to deliver publicly these testimonies of the
satisfaction that it has felt at their conduct.
Carnot.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Crema, 5 Prairial, year 4 [May 24, 1796].
On my arrival at Crema, I set out immediately for Son-
cino, where I found the advanced guard. I then proceeded
to the Oglio, where there is no bridge, nor even a boat, the
little one which was there having been sunk. This river is
very inconsiderable at this season ; it is about twenty
fathoms wide at most, and is fordable in several places,
especially at the passage of Soncino, where the water reaches
no higher than a man's knees in the deepest parts. I
ordered General Kilrnaine to get a small bridge upon
trestles constructed in the night, that the infantry might
pass on the morrow dry-shod. I sent him twenty louis
for the construction of this bridge, not having received the

s

124 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
twenty-five which you had directed General Dallemagne to
give him : he told me that Augereau and Serrurier had
arrived in their new positions. I have given orders to
generals Massena, Augereau, Serrurier, and Kilmaine, to
execute the movement which you have directed, in order
that the divisions of the army may take a position at
Brescia. The scouts have been as far as two leagues in advance of
Soncino, and not met with the enemy. All accounts agree
in stating that he has his advanced posts between the
Mincio and the Chiesa, at Castiglione delle Stiviere, with
about 1200 horse. The body of the army is encamped,
it is said, behind the Mincio.
On my return, I met with an adjutant of the staff, who
brought me your orders in pencil to march off in the night
for Milan two regiments of horse, two battalions of the
21st, a battalion of grenadiers, and four pieces of light
artillery, which I hope will reach you before daylight.
I did think that on account of these movements the
march of the divisions for Brescia ought to be suspended :
but, having closely examined your pencil-notes, and found
nothing to that effect, I have made no change in your dispo
sitions, and the troops will execute the general movement
which you have ordered on Brescia. If this was an over
sight on your part, be pleased to send me a courier, and I
will stop the troops upon march. Till the receipt of your
orders, the troops, I apprize you, will execute the move
ment that you have directed.
I am much grieved at the disturbances which have taken
place at Pavia, but I hope that you will do strict justice,
and that the example will serve to prevent any other insur
rection, and to intimidate the nobles and the priests.
A. Berthier.1

To the General-in-Chief. Pavia, 5 Floreal, year 4 [April 24, 1796],
I, the undersigned, divisionary general of the armies of
the French Republic, certify that, being yesterday on my
way to Pavia and thence to head-quarters, whither I had
orders to repair, and having with me an aide-de-camp, citizen
1 General Alexandre Berthier, then chief of tho staff of the army, after
wards prince of Neufchatel.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 125
Dutaillis, aide-de-camp of General Berthier, a chief of
battalion, and another officer, we remarked the terrified
looks of the persons we met coming from Pavia : we heard
the alarm-bell ring, and several musket -shots fired, and a
peasant told us that the enemy was in the city ; that, not
believing this news, but not suspecting that there was any
disturbance, we continued to advance towards the city,
where we were persuaded that the division of General Au
gereau still was ; that, on reaching the gates, we were not a
little surprised not to find there either posts or sentinels,
and to see consternation upon every countenance ; that, on
arriving in the Place of the municipality, we there found a
great number of men armed with muskets, pistols, swords,
&c, and many country-people, with arms and tools of all
kinds ; that a considerable party of volunteers on the steps
of the Town-house called out to us, that the people had dis
armed all the posts and wanted to kill them ; that, thinking
to overawe this assemblage, I advanced on horseback ; that
those who had retired on our arrival again making their ap
pearance and aiming at us on all sides, with frightful
shouts, I thought it advisable to alight ; that, no sooner
had the other officers and myself set foot on the ground,
than the people seized all our horses ; that we found the
commandant of the place, who assured us that the concourse
was immense ; that I ordered him to go to the castle, to
send out strong patroles, and to try all means for restoring
order ; that, having endeavoured to execute this order, he
found it impossible ; that, meanwhile, the people, with loud
shouts, furiously demanded the disarming of the garrison,
promising to respect it and to disperse as soon as it had de
livered up its arms ; that for two hours I refused to accede
to this proposal ; that, at length, the furious populace
broke into the Town-house, entered the room where I was,
and dragged me from it ; that the municipal officers who
were about me covered me with their bodies ; that, unable
to prevent my being dragged to the Place, they kept by
me, and exerted all their efforts to restrain the people, some
of whom rushed upon me, while others took aim at me, and
at length, thanks to their interference, I came off with a
woiind from a bayonet between the shoulders, which, though
it well nigh prostrated me, did not enter far ; that, led by
the people from street to street, these municipal officers never
left me for a moment ; that, during this time, their col-

126 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
leagues placed in safety the guard which had been disarmed,
and the officers who had come with me, and provided for
their wants ; that others strove to pacify the people, and
had recourse for that purpose to persuasion, which was the
only means they had, since they had not a single armed
man at their disposal ; that, not having succeeded in making
the people listen to reason, they did contrive by great exer
tions to save us all from their fury ; that to their anxious
care we are indebted for our lives ; that in every respect
their conduct has been that of good magistrates, of virtuous
men, in whom crime excites abhorrence, and who, from the
impulse of their hearts, have done every thing in the world
to render us service, and exposed themselves to the danger
of perishing with us.
In faith of which, I have delivered to them these presents.
Haquin.

To the General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Crema, 6 Prairial, year 4 [May 25, 1796].
I have just received, general, your letter of the 6th
Prairial, and am glad to see that tranquillity is restored in
Milan. The example which you have made on the way to
Pavia will intimidate the evil-disposed. Pavia appears even
to deserve extremely rigorous measures. The army ex
pects from your energy and your wisdom the dispositions
necessary to make us respected, but it wishes for you with
impatience. I think, for my own part, that it is very necessary for
you to repair to the army,, which is near the enemy. All
that part between Cremona, and the position now occupied
by General Serrurier uncovers our right, but, as the enemy
is on the defensive, we ought not to presume that he is
seeking to attack us. I have, therefore, given General
Serrurier all the instructions necessary to keep him from
compromising himself.
Hereto I annex an extract of the dispositions that I have
ordered : you will there see that the army is collected into
a space of eight or nine miles, from left to right, but this
position can be but momentary, and your presence is abso
lutely necessary to determine our march upon the enemy.
I have found the head-quarters, remaining at Crema, too
far in the rear of Brescia ; I am moving them to Soncino*

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 127
where we expect you this evening. I shall go forward my
self, and take care to apprize you of all the news I receive
of the enemy.
I have left the paymaster and the park of artillery at
Crema till your arrival. Al. Berthier.

Extracts of the Orders given for the Execution of the Move
ment directed by the General-in-Chief
Crema, 6 Prairial, year 4 [May 25, 1796].
Orders were given yesterday to General Kilmaine to set
out very early this morning with all the troops of the ad
vanced guard from the position which he occupied at
Soncino, for the purpose of taking a new one at Brescia,
where he will arrive to-day; that general is informed of
the movements prescribed to generals Massena, Augereau,
and Serrurier.
General Massena received orders yesterday to set out
very early in the morning of to-day, the 6th Prairial, from
the position which he occupied at Ofelingo, with all the
troops under his command, for the purpose of taking to-day
a new one at Casale, about four miles in rear of Brescia, on
the road to Soncino : he is informed of the movements
which the advanced guard and generals Kilmaine, Augereau,
and Serrurier have orders to make ; he will cross the Oglio
at Soncino.
General Augereau received orders yesterday to set out
very early in the morning of to-day, with all the troops
under his command, from the position which he occupied at
Fontanella, and to proceed to Baitella, four miles in rear of
Brescia, on the road to Bergamo : it is believed that he can
pass through Castrenala. If he cannot cross the Oglio at
Fontanella, his orders direct him to come and cross at
Soncino : he is informed of the movements which the ad
vanced guard and the divisions of generals Massena and
Serrurier are to make.
Orders were yesterday despatched to General Serrurier
to set out very early this morning from the position which
he occupied at Butana, with all the troops under his com
mand, and to take a new position in rear of the Molla,
having Bagnolo in advance of him, and Cuisanella in rear
of his left. If he can cross the Oglio at Bordanula, he will

128 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
follow the road to Padernello and Della ; and, if he cannot
cross it at that place, he will come and cross at Soncino, and
thence proceed to the position specified above : he is in
formed of the movements prescribed to generals Kilmaine,
Massena, and Augereau.
Two battalions of the 21st demi-brigade set out yesterday
evening for Milan, as did also the 20th regiment of dragoons,
and the 24th regiment of horse-chasseurs.
The head-quarters break up this evening for Soncino.
Al. Berthier.

To the General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Soncino, 7 Prairial, year 4 [May 26, 1796],
Since the arrival of your aide-de-camp, Lemarois, I have
heard nothing whatever from you, and it is now twenty-four
hours since he left you. We are all extremely uneasy at
this silence, and the more so because your presence appears
to me indispensable here on all accounts, both military and
administrative. At ten o'clock last night, I had not received intelligence of
the arrival of the troops at the position which they are to occupy
on the Brescia. A letter has this moment reached me from
citizen Faultrier, who is staying at Crema till further orders,
who writes that a citizen from Lodi, an inhabitant of that
town, had informed him that there existed at Lodi an
assemblage of five or six thousand peasants against the
French, but that, this man not having given his name,
and he himself thinking that he had no right to order him
to be arrested in a neutral country, the report might be
considered as extremely vague, especially since no other
advice of it had reached Crema. But, sensible of the im
portance of ascertaining the truth, at eleven o'clock at
night, I despatched Adjutant-General Boyer, with his
assistants, with orders to repair first to Crema and then to
Lodi, to make the most minute inquiries into the state of
things ; and, in case the insurrection should prove true, to
acquaint me with it, and himself cross the Adda, either
above or below Lodi, to rejoin you and communicate to you
all he had learned.
At five this morning, I received a letter from Adjutant-
General Boyer, dated Crema, in which he informs me that
they have there no intelligence of any movement at Lodi ;

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 129
but that he is pursuing his course" to that town, to fulfil
completely the instructions which I have given him. It is
now nine in the morning, and I have no news as yet from
Lodi, which makes me presume that all is quiet.
At six this morning I received a letter from General
Kilmaine, who acquaints me that at eight yesterday evening
he reached Brescia, where his troops arrived extremely fa
tigued, as well by the heat as by the length of the march,
and owing to the new shoes which his men had received.
The only intelligence that he could obtain respecting the
enemy is, that there is a considerable corps of cavalry at
Castiglione : he informs me that he shall have a recon
naissance made this morning, and that he hopes to receive
more certain tidings. Generals Massena and Augereau
likewise send me word that they have arrived in the posi
tions specified to them, four miles in the rear of Brescia ;
the first on the road from that town to Soncino ; the second
on the road from that same town to Bergamo.
Respecting General Serrurier, who ought to be on the
right of Massena, I have no sort of intelligence. The latter
informs me that he thought yesterday evening that he
beard cannon on his right ; but I should imagine that if
General Serrurier had been aware that the enemy was so
near, he would have apprized us of it at head-quarters. I
sent off to him yesterday an adjutant, from whom I have
no tidings, and who was to return hither after he had seen
General Massena. I am going to despatch a second, to
endeavour to learn what is become of him. Being likely to
receive, from one moment to another, either orders from
you or news from the divisions, I have thought it right
not* to leave the head-quarters.
I repeat, general, that I think your presence here ex
tremely important. For the rest, citizen Lemarois, your
aide-de-camp, will supply all that is deficient in this letter.
Al. Berthier.
PS. I open my letter, general, to inform you, that the
adjutant whom I sent to ascertain the position of General
Serrurier has this moment arrived: he reports that this
general has taken a position at Guizanella, in rear of Mello,
four or five miles on the right of General Massena : he has
not received any direct news of the enemy. On leaving
Cremona, he received a flag of truce, bringing a packet for
me, relative to the exchange of prisoners.
VOL. i. K

130 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.'
The Oglio having risen a foot, which renders it less ford-'
able, I have ordered a bridge fit for the passage of infantry
to be immediately constructed. Your four divisions, in
cluding the advanced guard, form at present 27,700 men
under arms, infantry and cavalry, concentrated in rear of
Brescia, in a space of ten or twelve miles.
Al. Berthier.

To the General-in-Chief. Pavia, 9 Prairial, year 4 [May 28, 1796].
Order, tranquillity, and even confidence, begin to be
restored in Pavia and its environs.
Five hundred and fifty men of the garrison of Tortona
have arrived here. They had at their head Adjutant-
General Gillyvieux. As I was alone here, I have kept him
with me. These troops have not brought the two pieces of
cannon which you ordered to be sent hither from Tortona.
I have written to the commandant of artillery at Lodi,
requesting him to complete promptly what is deficient here
for the service of the two pieces of cannon which you have
left me, and also to send me immediately two caissons of
cartridges, the troops having none but what are in their
cartouche-boxes ; to send me, moreover, two 8-pounders
and their caissons ; and, lastly, all the supplies necessary
for the service of four pieces of cannon and a garrison of
2000 men, for a month. I beg you, general, to be pleased
to order this application to be complied with ; that is to say,
if you approve it. I have desired, in the most express
manner, the commissary of war to supply the fort, without
the slightest delay, with provisions and all other necessaries
for a garrison of 2000 men for a month.
Nothing has come hither but the third battalion of the
84th demi-brigade, which has gone again for Milan. I
have left me here the 14th demi-brigade, the 51st, the
46th, 210 horse, 30 artillerymen, and the old garrison of
Pavia, forming as yet but a small corps : the disarming of
the city has produced more fowling-pieces than muskets,
and then these are in great part Austrian. The people
have disarmed with a good grace, and I believe too with
good faith. A great number of villages have already laid
down their arms, and they are successively arriving. I
have circulated throughout the whole province a proclama-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 131
tion, which will no doubt produce the desired effect. French
arms must be expected to come in from the villages, for it
was their inhabitants who disarmed our troops. As soon
as those belonging to the old garrison are armed, I shall
send them, according to your orders, to their respective
corps. Citizen Ponge, commandant of engineers, is engaged in
constructing bridges over the Gravelonne and the Po : he
represented to me that he was alone here, that he had need
of some one to Assist him, and earnestly intreated me to
keep here citizen Bouchu, captain of artillery, attached to
the equipage of bridges, till the bridges are finished. I
have thought it right to accede to this request, and ordered
Captain Bouchu to remain temporarily with citizen Ponge
till your decision.
The new municipality, chosen by the commissioner of the
government, could not be installed till yesterday afternoon.
The course of affairs requiring the old one to be left in its
functions till this moment, it was not put under arrest
before to-day. Of the eleven members who composed it,
three left the city before the arrival of the French, the
eight others are arrested.
The commissioner of the government and myself have
thought it right to demand of the new municipality, com
posed of patriots, accurate and positive information con
cerning the members of the old, to submit this to you, and
to wait for a further order, in addition to that which you
have given me relative to the members of the old munici
pality. Be it what it will, it shall be executed on the re
ceipt of it : but, general, permit me to implore your cle
mency and kindness for men of whom such disadvantageous
accounts are presented to you ; for aged, feeble men, with
out energy, who, unaccustomed to popular commotions, lost
their presence of mind amidst the frightful disorder that
prevailed here ; for men whom I saw addressing the people,
using towards them the only means in their power, per
suasion; for men, in short, who saved the lives, and ren
dered all possible assistance to the officers I. had with me,
and to more than 150 disarmed volunteers, whom by their
prudent measures they rescued from the fury of the people,
as well as myself. The pillage has ruined them all. I can
assure you, general, that it is not death and terror that
require to be suspended over Pavia ; all within it is fright-
K2

132 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
ful consternation : the lesson which the inhabitants have
received is awful : all that we have left us to do is to con
ciliate them, to gain their confidence ; and by humanity and
mildness alone shall we succeed.
1 invoke with confidence those estimable qualities of your
heart : follow its impulse, general, and your name will still
be dear to a people which knows that it has deserved the
treatment you have inflicted on it. I await your orders
with inexpressible anxiety.
The commissioner of the government has transmitted to
me to-day a list of the persons to be seized as hostages;
they shall be apprehended to-day, and I shall await your
orders for sending them to Tortona : none have yet come
to me from Milan. The commissioner of the government
finding me violently attacked by fever, . and incapable of
attending to every thing, has required General Serviez to
remain here. Be pleased, general, to leave me that excel
lent officer : I cannot do without him while I am ill.
Haquin.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Loano, 10 Prairial, year 4 [May 29, 1796].
Last night, between twelve and one o'clock, two English
frigates and a brig appeared off the road of Vado, with the
intention of securing the flotilla lying in that road. They
despatched nine boats with troops, and were already within
half musket-shot, when they were discovered. The com
mandant of the troops in the place ordered the drums to
beat to arms, and in less than seven minutes the artillery
men and the infantry were at their posts. Meanwhile the
Infante brig kept up a brisk fire both of grape and chain-
shot upon the enemy. The English retired precipitately,
setting up loud cries, which causes us to presume that they
have lost a great number of men : three of their boats must
have been sunk, for we have seen but six this morning.1
All the troops deserve praise, and particularly the cap
tain and crew of the Infante.
Sauret.
1 The inferences of the French -general relative to our tars and their boats
may have appeared most conclusive to himself; but an English reader must
consider them as far more patriotic than logical.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 133
To the General-in-Chief Turin, May 29, 1796 [10 Prairial, year 4].
Having been required by General Kellermann to grant a
passage through the valley of Suza to a demi-brigade of
French troops, and not feeling myself authorized to give an
answer, it being our intention to allow troops to march only
through the valley of Aosta and that of Stura, I have
taken the commands of the king on the subject, who, con
sidering the distance which these troops have already tra
velled to come towards Lanslebourg, and from his desire
to satisfy you, has ordered me to prepare every thing for
their march through the valley of Suza, for this time only,
flattering himself that, out of reciprocity, you will be pleased
to inform General Kellermann that in future the ordinary
directions through the valley of Aosta and Stura will be
given to any troops proceeding through Piedmont to Lom
bardy. As to the artillery, however, the road of Mont
Genevre being the most commodious, there is no difficulty
to prevent you from continuing to prefer it. I doubt not;
knowing the consideration which you have always had for
me, that you will believe the accuracy of my representa
tion ; and I assure you that I shall never cease, on my
part, to do on other occasions whatever I can, without pre
judice to his Majesty, for your satisfaction.
Victor Emmanuel.

To the General-in-Chief.
Tortona, 10 Prairial, year 4 [May 29, 1796].
Your orders did not reach me till I was at Alba. I am
a day behind-hand in my march. I shall arrive at Placen
tia on the 13th. The route that we are pursuing is very
dangerous for stragglers : I have found several who had
been murdered ; but it is the convoys of ammunition that
run the greatest risk. Owing to the weakness of the gar
risons, these escorts are but small, so that this ammunition
is liable to fall into the hands of the gangs of banditti,
and to increase their means.
The rebels of Arquata having taken 123 volunteers, and
made prize of a sum of 100,000 francs, General Meinier,
agreeably to the advice of a council of war, desired me to
let him have 1600 men of the column under the command

1 34 LETTERS and despatches.
of General Vallette for a nocturnal expedition. I thought
it right to comply with this requisition of urgency, and am
proceeding to my destination with 3000 men, and the sur
plus of General Vallette's column. If you have to employ
us immediately, we will do our best to prevent your missing
the 1600 men, who are likely to be absent for a few days.
Vaubois.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castel Novo, 1 1 Prairial, year 4 [May 30, 1796].
The enemy has evacuated Castel Novo, and is in full
retreat. I am taking the cavalry of the advanced guard,
and four pieces of light artillery, to pursue him. The in
fantry of the advanced guard has orders to follow, with the
rest of the light artillery. This evening I shall have the
honour to give you an account of my luck. I cannot send
you a circumstantial detail of the affair of Borghetto, being
too much pressed ; but, meanwhile, I cannot refrain from
assuring you that the chief of brigade Leclerc, of the 10th
regiment of chasseurs, has particularly distinguished him
self. It was he who, at the head of some chasseurs, decided
the rout of the enemy by one of the most vigorous charges
that I have ever seen. General Gardanne was the first
who passed the river at the head of some grenadiers, up to
the shoulders in water. General Murat made a superb
charge at the head of the 10th regiment of hussars. It was
he vino decided the second rout of the enemy.
Kilmaine.

To the General-in-Chief. Turin, June 1, 1796 [13 Prairial, year 4].
I inform you that peasants of the province of Alba, irri
tated by the vexations of one Bonnafous and his adherents,
and by the violence which he has sought to do to their prin
ciple's, have ventured to seize him in the territory of' the
French demarcation, without having received the least order
or the least instigation on the part of the government ; and
they have brought him to Turin.
The king, my brother, considering his apprehension as
illegal, since Castion, the place where he was arrested, has
not yet reverted under his authority, has ordered him to be

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 135
taken back to the limits of the demarcation and set at
liberty. He doubts not that, in reciprocity for this proceeding,
and to avert also the disagreeable circumstances that may
arise from the vexations experienced by the peasants of
some provinces of the demarcation from the underhand
dealings of Bonnafous and adherents, you will be pleased to
issue strict orders for putting an end to them ; and the
king hopes at the same time that this affair will have no
unpleasant consequences for the inhabitants of the village
of Castion.
Victor Emmanuel.

To the General-in-Chief.
Pavia, 12 Prairial, year 4 [May 31, 1796].
Quiet and tranquillity are perfectly restored in Pavia ;
great harmony prevails here between the troops and the
inhabitants. The latter, most of whom are reduced to
poverty, attribute the cause of their misfortune to the
country people : the latter may have been instigated ; but
it is certain, and I can attest from having seen it, that it
was they in fact who occasioned the disorder and kept up
the insurrection in Pavia. Be this as it may, the inha
bitants of both city and country are so terrified at the con
sequences of their conduct, that it will be long before they
think of beginning again. The disarming of the city is
finished, and I have no doubt that it has been done in good
faith. That of the country must likewise have been effected.
The villages have made their submission ; the arms of a
great number of communes have already arrived here ; it is
only the most distant that have not yet been able to bring
them to Pavia ; but the business will be completed to-day
or to-morrow. I await your orders to declare that the just
severity which you have been obliged to exercise is about to
give place to pardon and clemency.
Yesterday, two 6-pounders, with artillerymen and the
ammunition necessary for their service, arrived here : they
are in battery in the fort. Infantry cartridges have not been
sent ; yet I am in want of them, and I have just written to
General Meinier, to beg him to send me some without delay.
As to the provisioning of the fort and the garrison with
ammunition, I request you to order the director of the

136 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
park of artillery of the army to supply it. There are two
6-pounders, anel a five inch and a half howitzer : the garrison
will consist of 2000 men. The provisioning with articles of
consumption will be completely finished to-day. The com
mandant of engineers has assured me that the bridge over
the Gravelonne will be finished to-day, and that over the
Po in a very few days.
Haquin.
To the General-in-Chief.
Castiglione di Mantouano, 14 Prairial, year 4 [June 2, 1796].
I have just made a reconnaissance to the very walls of
Mantua. I stopped there for a good quarter of an hour,
without perceiving any movement on the part of the enemy :
I met nothing by the way but a patrole of four horse, which
took to flight at sight of my tirailleurs. I think it urgent
to remove my advanced guard to Boucouli, where the road
branches off to Roverbello ; but I cannot make this move
ment without cavalry : I beg you to order some to be placed
at my disposal.
Augereau.

To M. le Due cTAoste.
Head-qnarters, Roverbello, 15 Prairial, year 4 [June 3, 1796].
I have received your courier, sir. The conduct of the
king, on occasion of M. Bonnafier,1 is worthy of him.
I shall take measures in order that, during the short time
the police of Alba will belong to the army, no disturbance
may be committed ; but I hope that we shall accelerate as
much as possible the moment of the execution of the treaty,
that we may witness the consolidation of that peace which
is henceforth to unite the two powers.
I have ordered the commandant of the fortress of Alba to
release several private individuals, subjects of the king, who
had been arrested, by what kind of reprisals I cannot ex
actly say.
I flatter myself you are persuaded that I shall not forget
anything that can be agreeable to you, earn me your esteem,
and convince you of the sentiments of consideration, &c.
Bonaparte.
1 Evidently the person called in preceding letters Bonnafons and Bonnafons.

letters and despatches. 137

To the General-in-Chief.Venice, 15 Prairial, year 4 [June 3, 1796].
Receive my congratulations on your glorious entry into
the Venetian territory. I calculate, if I am as well as at
present, to bring you them in person on Monday.
I learn this moment that the archduke, lately governor
of Lombardy, who, according to report, had fled from Venice,
not thinking himself in safety there, has just set out with
all his treasures. Part of his equipages are at Mestre, and
are about to proceed to Carinthia by way of Treviso. He
takes that road himself. The rest are put on board lighters
to be conveyed on the canals to the port of Caurlo : these
barks will ascend the Limene to the port of Gruaro, which
is the place of rendezvous. It will take four days at least
before this convoy can start for Gorrizia. From Bassano
to this rendezvous of Gruaro there is about twenty leagues
of very fine road through Castel Franco, Oberzo, and Molta :
you know, general, how to go from Verona to Castel Franco
and from Verona to Bassano, and you will make what use
you think proper of this information.
A Ragusan captain, who left Trieste three days ago, has
told me that, during his quarantine, he saw seven or eight
of the barks despatched for the Po return and land 700
men, to whom the Venetians had refused a passage upon the
Polesino, as they did to the first whom I mentioned to you,
and to whom the pope has just refused the same by the
Mesola. Others were expected.
This report, made to me very innocently, and without
any questions on my part, has all the character of truth.
This same captain told me that the departure of all vessels
from Trieste was suspended on the news that there were
French cruisers in the gulf. He saw the last French galley
at Ragusa, and believes it to be off Ancona.
Last week, I received orders from the government to
recognize as Frenchmen worthy of the protection of the
Republic such only as will constantly wear the national
cockade, and never appear before me without it. There are
only five or six here ; three of them have been settled
twenty years at Venice, but they are good Frenchmen and
determined to continue so. I notified the order to them,
and they immediately obeyed ; but this morning Messieurs

138 letters and despatches.
the Inquisitors of State sent their fante to citizens Barbette,
clockmaker, and Pinot, dentist, who demanded their cock
ades and brought them away. I am drawing up a remon
strance to the senate : it shall be energetic, and I shall, no
doubt, have an answer to-morrow. I dare say you will think
proper to speak to M. Foscarini about it, as an insult to
the nation, and for which we require satisfaction.
Lallemant.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte, Commander-
in- Chief of the Army of Italy.
Paris, 12 Prairial, year 4 [May 31, 1796].
Your despatches of the 28th and 29th Floreal and 3rd
Prairial have reached the Directory, citizen-general. It had
foreseen that the conquest of all Lombardy would be a glo
rious and necessary consequence of the skilful passage of the
Po at Placentia, and the heroic passage of the Adda at
Lodi ; and it sees with ever stedfast satisfaction that you
have gathered the fruits of victory by marching to fresh
successes. Its intention is conformable to the course which
you have adopted ; not to leave the enemy much breathing,
time in Mantua : to defer the entire defeat of a Vanquished
enemy is compromising the final issue. This principle
ought to be strictly observed,; for it is perfectly analogous to
the national character, and particularly applicable to the
theatre of the war in Italy. The reinforcements received by
Beaulieu will not relieve his troops from the sense of their
inferiority ; you will force them in their new positions, and
you will pursue the wrecks of them into the gorges of the
mountains, whence they must be deprived of all hope of
issuing, while part of your forces shall go to impose the
laws of the Republic in Southern Italy.
Herewith you will receive a copy of the letter which the
Directory is writing to Salicetti. You will there see that
its wish, conformable with the intention of the laws, is, that
all acts, such as armistices, war contributions, and the like,
which concern at once the civil and military authority, shall
be signed by the generals-in-chief and by the commissioners
of the government. You will see, moreover, that the mea
sures which you have taken in regard to the internal admi
nistration of the Milanese are approved.
As to the question which you ask respecting the political

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 139
state of that country, before the Directory can give a defi
nitive answer, it must wait till the accounts you give of the
dispositions of the inhabitants enable it to judge whether
those people are susceptible of independence. Meanwhile,
direct their opinion towards liberty, bearing in mind that
the fate of these States depends on the conditions of peace
with the emperor, on our successes on the Rhine, on the
essential conditions of our treaty with the Duke of Parma,
and on the part that Spain shall take in it.
Watch also over the proceedings of the authorities which
you have retained or created, and the secret intrigues of
those which you have suppressed.
The Directory approves the remittance which you pro
pose to make of a million to the armies on the Rhine : it
thinks that this trait of generous fraternity on the part
of the army of Italy will produce the happiest effects
among them. They open their campaign to-day, and
are going to commence a daring plan of offensive, which
will make the emperor repent his rupture of the armistice,
and slacken his impotent efforts to repair his losses in
Italy. Ten battalions of the army of the Coasts of the Ocean have
orders to join you. They will march by way of Chamberi.
We expect to receive in a few days the courier who will
bring us intelligence of new successes on the Mincio and
the fall of the citadel of Milan. Rely with confidence on
that which we owe you by so many honourable titles, and
maintain, citizen-general, the salutary harmony which pre
vails between citizen Salicetti and you, and in which we
feel strongly interested.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris; 16 Prairial, year 4 [June 4, 1796].
It appears, citizen-general, that, while the peace has been
negociating with the King of Sardinia, they have learned at
Turin that this peace would afford to the patriots of Pied
mont a guarantee for their future tranquillity : in revenge
for the efforts which some of them have made for liberty,
the government has hastened to deliver them up to the
executioners before the ratification of that peace. The terror
struck by the brave army of Italy into the courts of Rome

110 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
and Naples seems to produce the same horrors in the south
of Italy, and the prisons in which languish men whose only
crime is that they have thought of vindicating their rights
are emptied by similar executions.
The intention of the Directory is that you notify imme
diately to the petty princes of Italy that they must put a
stop to these atrocities, and that they shall answer for all-
the blood which they cause to be shed.
The prohibition to persecute the Italian patriots must be
introduced as a necessary clause in all armistices that shall
be concluded by the commissioners of the government with
the army of Italy and by you.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 18 Prairial, year 4 [June 6, 1796].
The minister at war, citizen-general, has made observa
tions on the small number of troops at present in garrison
at Toulon. The Directory begs you not to lose sight of
that important place, and to keep up constantly there the
force necessary for its defence.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief of the
Army of Italy.
Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].
The new successes which you report, citizen-general, to
the Executive Directory in your despatch of the 1 7th, seem
to crown the glory of the army of Italy, but it has still to
acquire that of preserving those conquests : it will not be
either less brilliant or less useful to the Republic, and it is
equally ' reserved for the genius which has directed such
astonishing operations and the courage which has executed
them. After you have expelled all the remnants of the Austrian
army from Lombardy, you will guard, no doubt, all the
outlets with the means of force and the precautions neces
sary for interdicting to Beaulieu all access to it, notwith
standing the reinforcements which he is receiving, or which
he is to receive in Tyrol. The armistices which are about
to be concluded with, the Prince of Rome and the King of

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 141
Naples, by leaving at your disposal the forces that were
destined to march against them, will give great latitude to
your dispositions for at once enabling the French to retain
quiet possession of the Milanese, and for preventing the
ravages of the dog-days. The Leghorn expedition must
not be neglected, but undertaken only when you shall think
the occasion favourable. The first of your considerations
is to keep a vigilant eye on the enterprises of an enemy,
who will set everything at work to repair his losses. The
glorious opening of the campaign on the Rhine will strike new
consternation into Austria and operate a powerful diversion
in your favour : the left of the army of the Sambre and Meuse
has beaten on the left bank of the Rhine the corps of the
Duke of Wirtemberg in two important actions at Ukerath
and Altenkirchen. A corps of more than 30,000 men,
under the command of the brave General Kleber, formed of
the left and part of the centre of General Jourdan's army,
is advancing at a rapid rate along the Lahn, and perhaps
the entire army commanded by the latter will soon march
for the Mayn ; that of the Rhine and Moselle is preparing
to act on its part by combined movements, the object of
which is to transfer immediately the theatre of the war to
the other side of the Rhine.
The minister of the finances is about to profit by the
notice which you have given of six millions at the disposal
of the government. It would be desirable to know with
precision where and in what hands that sum is, and if it
includes the four millions mentioned in your preceding
letters. The Directory has given orders for the escort on
this side of Lyons of the two millions that are on the
road. i '
The noble Quirini, envoy of Venice, has transmitted a
complaint of the licentiousness of the French troops in the
Bressan : you will find a copy of it annexed, and you will be
aware of the necessity of repressing these disorders, if they
have really taken place. As for the Senate of Venice, it
will not be amiss to act towards it with firmness.
The sharp and severe measures which you have taken
to quell the insurrection of the inhabitants of the Mila
nese were necessary : the laws of war and the safety of the
army will always render them legitimate under such cir
cumstances. You will see in our despatch to citizen Salicetti what

142 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
are our intentions relative to the proposals made to you on
the part of Rome and Naples j it would be superfluous to
repeat the contents of it here.
The situation of the southern departments has occa
sioned the recall of the order given to General Chateauneuf-
Randon to conduct to the army of Italy the two demi-r
brigades formerly destined for you. That general will
retain the command of the 9th military division till the
return of tranquillity there is insured. The Directory
thanks you for the attention which you have had to send
horses for its use. Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].
Congratulate, in the name of the Directory, citizen-
general, all the grenadiers and carabineers of the advanced
guard of the army of Italy, on their gallant conduct at the
passage of the Mincio. History will carefully preserve
the memory of the heroic acts which have shed lustre on
them during this campaign.
The general of brigade Murat has justified, by conduct
worthy of praise, the choice which the Directory made of
him to perform honourable functions. Assure him, in its
name, of the satisfaction which it feels in seeing him conti
nue to range himself among the most intrepid defenders of
the Republic.
Tell the chief of brigade Leclerc, of the 10th regiment
of chasseurs, that the Directory has seen him with pleasure
in the list . of the brave men who distinguished, themselves
at the battle of Borghetto.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].
The Executive Directory, in recommending to you by its
letter of the 27th Floreal to visit and pay attentions to the
eminent men of science and artists in the countries where
you are, made particular mention of the celebrated as
tronomer Oriani of Milan, as one who ought to be pro
tected and honoured by the republican troops. The
Directory will learn with satisfaction that you have fulfilled

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 143'
its intention in regard to this distinguished artist, and
requests you, in consequence, to give it an account of what
you have done to g'ive citizen Oriani tokens of the interest
and esteem which the French entertain for him, and to prove
to him that they know how to unite the love of glory and
liberty with that of the arts and talents.
Carnot.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].
The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letter
of the 13th, by which you inform it that two millions in-
gold, being part of the contributions levied in the lately
conquered countries, are on the way by post to Lyons,
whence they are to proceed to Paris, their destination.
The Directory has desired General Kellermann to make
all the dispositions necessary for the safety of these funds.
The Directory has already requested you to transmit one
million to the army of the Rhine and Moselle. As for
the 200,000 livres destined for General Kellermann and
the 10,000 which he has already received, that sum shall
remain at his disposal.
The minister of the finances is authorised to draw upon
Genoa to the amount of ten millions arising from contribu-,
tions in the enemy's country. In these ten millions are
included the sums which he has already expended, the two
millions forwarded by you to Lyons ; the funds sent to M.
Balbi at Genoa, under the superintendence of Faipoult, the
envoy ; and the produce of the jewels, diamonds, plate,
&c. sent to Tortona.
Carnot.

To the Minister of the Republic at Venice.
Head-quarters, Roverbello, 16 Prairial, year 4 [June 4, 1796].
The senate has sent to me two sages of the council : it
is necessary that you express to them the displeasure of the
Republic, because Peschiera has been delivered to the Aus
trians. French blood has been spilt in retaking it. We
must not, however, fall out with a Republic, whose alliance
is useful to us.
I spoke to the sages about the national cockade. I think

144 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
you ought strongly to insist that all the French should wear
it, and that reparation must be made for the injury that has
been done. Inform me regularly of the minutest particu
lars. I am just setting out for Milan. Let me hear from
you there. Do not leave me in the dark as to what Beau
lieu is about, and the movement of troops in Bavaria.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief.
Ceresa, 17 Prairial, year 4 [June 5, 1796].
I arrived here at seven in the morning : the advanced
posts of the enemy occupied the village ; they retired on
our approach. My infantry not having arrived, I was
obliged to wait before attacking. The Austrians were en
trenched behind two bridges, which they had broken down.
Three pieces of cannon defended the approaches : the gate was
closed, and the enemy, shut up in an embattled tower which is
above it, kept up a very brisk fire. As soon as my infantry
and artillery arrived, I gave orders for the attack, which was
made with the greatest bravery. The artillery, directed by
the chief of battalion Andreossi, rendered the greatest
service ; the briskness of our fire obliged the enemy to be
take himself to flight. Unluckily, the inundations on the
one hand, and the breaking down of the bridges on the
other, prevented our pursuit. We were obliged to bring
up cannon to break open the gates : meanwhile, he was
already in the place. I immediately had the bridges re
paired, and have just sent an eight-pounder with a strong
detachment to interrupt the breaking up of the road, which
the enemy is at work upon. At the same time, I have sent
out a reconnoissance towards the Stradella gate, which we
are within gun-shot of. The enemy is constructing a
redoubt there; but I will take care to prevent him from
finishing it. We have firm ground on both sides, and are
beyond the reach of the inundations.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief.
Verona, 17 Prairial, year 4 [June 5, 1796].
The proveditor has just sent me word that 2000 men
have arrived at Rocoara, and that more are expected : it is

LETTERS and despatches. 145
believed that others will descend by the Astico and the
Brenta, which causes some credit to be given to the last
news, namely that the enemy is seriously engaged in re
pairing the roads. The proveditor has sent me an assurance
that I should be informed of all the movements of the
Austrians.
Massena.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].
Annexed you will find a copy of the armistice concluded
between the two armies, French and Neapolitan.
1. We take 2,400 cavalry from the Austrian army,
and put them into a place where they will be at our
disposal ;
2. We take from the English five sail of the line and
several frigates ;
3. We continue to break up the coalitions ;
.If you make peace with Naples, the suspension will have
been useful, inasmuch as it will have weakened at once the
German army. If, on the contrary, you do not make peace
with Naples, the suspension will still have been useful, in
asmuch as it will enable me to take prisoners the 2,400
Neapolitan cavalry, and as the King of Naples will have
taken a step that must displease the coalition.
This leads me to consider the military question — Can we
and ought we to go to Naples ?
The siege of the castle of Milan, the guarding of the
Milanese, and the garrisons of conquered places, require
15,000 men ;
The guarding of the Adige and of the positions of the
Tyrol, 20,000.
There remain, including the succours coming from the
army of the Alps, but 6000 men.
But, if we had 20,000, it would not be advisable to make
a march of twenty-five days, in the months of July and
August, to seek disease and death. Meanwhile, Beaulieu
would be resting his army in the Tyrol, recruiting it, re
inforcing it with succours arriving every day, and would
retake in autumn what we took from him in spring. By
means of this armistice with Naples, we are enabled to dic
tate to Rome what conditions we please: already at this
VOL. I. L

146 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
moment the court of Rome is employed in preparing a bull
against those who preach up civil war in France upon pre
text of religion.
From a conversation which I had this morning with M.
Azara, minister of Spain, sent by the pope, it appeared
to me that he had orders to offer us contributions. I
shall soon be at Bologna. Is it your pleasure that I should
then accept from the pope, as the price of an armistice,
twenty-five millions of contributions in cash, five millions
in kind, 300 pictures, statues and manuscripts in proportion,
and that I insist on the release of all patriots confined for
revolutionary acts ? I shall have sufficient time to receive
your orders, since I shall not be at Bologna for these ten or
fifteen days. Then, if the 6000 men commanded by
General Chateauneuf-Randon arrive, it may not be amiss
to proceed from Bologna to Rome. At any rate, I beg
you to rest persuaded that, when once you have positively
acquainted me with your intentions, they must be
difficult indeed for me not to be able to execute them.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].
When M. Beaulieu learned that we were marching to
pass the Mincio, he possessed himself of the fortress of
Peschiera, which belonged to the Venetians. This fortress,
situated on the lake of Garda, at the head of the Mincio,
has a bastioned enclosure, in very good condition, and
eighty pieces of cannon, which, it is true, are not mounted.
M. the Proveditor-General, who was at Verona with
2000 men, might therefore have so managed that this place
should not be occupied by the Austrians, who entered with
out any kind of resistance, when I had arrived at Brescia,
that is to say, one day's march off.
As soon as I was apprized that the Austrians were at
Peschiera, I knew that not a moment was to be lost in in
vesting the place and depriving the enemy of the means of
provisioning it. A few days' delay would have entailed
upon me a siege of three months. The battle of Borghetto
and the passage of the Mincio put that place into our hands
two days afterwards. The proveditor came in great haste
to justify himself: I gave him a very ill reception. I de-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 147
dared that I should inarch to Venice, to complain in person
to the senate of such a manifest treachery. While we were
talking, Massena had orders to enter Verona at whatever
cost. The alarm at Venice was extreme. The Archduke
of Milan, who was there, immediately fled to Germany.
The senate of Venice has just sent to me two sages of the
council, to ascertain definitively how matters stand. I re
peated my complaints to them ; I also referred to the recep
tion given to Monsieur ; I told them that, for the rest, I
had given you an account of every thing, and that I knew
not how you would take the matter : that, when I left Paris,
you expected to find in the republic of Venice an ally faith
ful to principles; that it was not without regret. that their
conduct in regard to Peschiera had obliged me to think
otherwise ; that, at any rate, I believed that this would be
a storm which it would be possible for the envoy of the senate
to lay. Meanwhile, they agree with the best grace to supply
us with every thing necessary for the army.
If your plan is to extract five or six millions from Venice,
I have purposely provided this sort of rupture for you.
You might demand it by way of indemnity for the battle of
Borghetto, which I was obliged to fight in order to take that
place. If you have more decided intentions, I think you
ought to keep up this subject of quarrel, inform me of what
you design to do, and await the favourable moment,
which I will seize- according to circumstances : for we must
not have all the world upon our hands at once.
The truth of the affair of Peschiera is, that Beaulieu
basely deceived them : he demanded a passage for fifty
men, and made himself master of the town. I am at this
moment getting Peschiera put into a state of defence; and, in
less than a fortnight, it will require siege artillery and a
regular siege to take it.
Bonaparte.

To M. the Prince de Belmonte Pignatelli.
Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796],
The armistice which we concluded yesterday will be, I
hope, the preamble to peace. The negociations ought to
begin as soon as possible ; and then, though the troops are
long in arriving at their cantonments, I do not conceive that
this can be a reason for war, after the order of his majesty
l2

148 letters and despatches;'
the King of Naples is received, and the troops are on their
march for their destination.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Faipoult at Genoa.
Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796]. .
I do not write to you so often as I should wish. I have
sent you an account of the affair of Borghetto ; to-day I
inform you of the taking of the suburb of St. George at
Mantua and the investment of that place.
I came to Milan to put into execution the treaty of peace
with the King of Sardinia. I beg you to inform me about
the affairs of Corsica. I calculate upon transmitting to
Genoa 1500 fowling-pieces, to be sent thither for the pur
pose of keeping up the insurrection of the patriots. I am
told that the minister of the emperor at Genoa excites the
peasants to revolt, and sends them powder and money. If
this is so, my intention is to have him seized in Genoa
itself.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Lallemant at Venice.
Head-quarters,"Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].
I am glad to see that your discussions have terminated
in the way they ought to do.
Let me have regular accounts of the movements of Beau
lieu ; neglect nothing ; send out spies on all sides, to'
watch his operations and learn what reinforcements he
receives. Bonaparte.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head-quarters, Milan, 20 Prairial, year 4 [June 8, 1796].
I owe you my thanks for the obliging things you say to
me. The most gratifying reward for the fatigues, the
dangers, the risks, of this profession is to be found in the
esteem of the small number of persons whom one appreciates.
By my letter to the Directory, you will see our position.
If the battalions announced join us in time, it will be easy
for us to go as far as Rome. Still, as the operations in
Germany may change our position from one moment to ano-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 149
ther, I think it would be well if the faculty of concluding
the armistice with Rome were left to me, or to go thither :
in the first case, to prescribe to me the terms of the armi
stice ; in the second, to tell me what I am to do there, for
our troops could not maintain themselves there long. The
space is immense, the fanaticism excessive, and the great
disproportion of strength makes men bold.
As soon as the inundations are over, I shall be off to
Leghorn and Bologna. There I shall receive your orders,
and, if you accept the armistice with Rome, I will conclude it.
We shall soon be in July, when every march will put
200 on the sick list.
A commissioner of the Directory is come for the con
tributions. A million has been despatched to Basle for the
army of the Rhine. You have eight millions at Genoa ;
you can reckon upon that. Two millions more were going
off for Paris,; but the commissary assured me that it is
your intention that the whole should go to Genoa.
I will deserve your esteem ; I beg you to continue your
friendship to me, and to believe me for life, &c.
Bonaparte.

To General Clarke.

Head-quart er3, Milan, 20 Prairial, year 4 [June 8, 1796].
, Your young cousin arrived here yesterday ; he appears
to me active, though yet rather young. I will keep him
with me : he will soon learn to confront danger and to dis
tinguish himself. I hope that he will prove worthy of you,
and that I , shall have a good account to give you of him.
I am glad to do something that is agreeable to you.
Here all is going on tolerably well ; but the dog-days are
coming on at a gallop, and there is no remedy against their
pernicious influence. Miserable beings that we are, we can
only observe nature, not overcome it !
The campaign of Italy has begun two months too late :
we find ourselves obliged to remain in the most unwhole
some country in Italy. I see but one way of avoiding being
beaten in autumn : that is, to arrange in such a manner
as not to be obliged to advance into the south of Italy.
According all the accounts that are given us, the
emperor is seneniig a great many troops to his army of
Italy. We are waiting here with impatience for news from

150 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
the Rhine. If our army is successful, as I hope, we must
make the emperor pay for his infatuation : meanwhile, I
beg you to believe the sentiments of fraternity, &c.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief
Alexandria, June 8, 1796 [19 Prairial, year 4].
Having been informed that the manifesto issued by you
on the 9th Prairial last was to be published in all the vil
lages of the arrondissement of this city comprised within
the French line of demarcation, and that the intendant of
Alexandria was directed to publish it, I have thought it
my duty to send my aide-de-camp to Tortona, to confer
on the subject with General Meynier : the precise and abso
lute orders contained in the said manifesto have not per
mitted him to come to any conclusion upon it.
It appears to me that a law addressed to the Milanese
people, founded on the infraction of the order of the 6th
Prairial, unknown to the people of Tortona and Alexandria,
cannot be deemed binding for the inhabitants of the said
provinces. I observe also that several of the articles of the
manifesto, concerning solely what is practised in the Mila
nese, cannot apply to us.
However, the threatening punishments and all the mea
sures introduced by the rigour of war would strike alarm,
consternation, and despair into the bosom of a people that is
at peace with France, and whose countenance cannot have
displeased, having submitted to the contributions and
requisitions as cheerfully as it was possible to do.
When you prescribe disarming, is it not to be feared that
rogues will keep their arms, while honest men give them
up ? Thus, the latter will find themselves incapable of de
fending their hves or their properties, of resisting banditti,
and of contributing with the troops to the public safety.
The alarm-bell, rung at seasonable times at the order of
the person who has a right to give it, is also a means of
public safety. The French army experienced the good
effects of it at Oviglio and Castelluzzo, as General Meynier
will have informed you.
Solari.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 151
To the General-in-Chief.
Roverbello, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].
Yesterday, at noon, all the orders with which you charged
me were despatched. At two o'clock I set out for Gover-
nolo, where there is an old dike that served to force boats
to pass the toll-house. The Po is much swollen, and the
current of the Mincio flows back to Mantua, which precisely
fulfils the wishes of the Austrians, who are inundating them
selves as much as they can.
I found at this bridge a guard of General Augereau's,
and the country praising the discipline observed by his
troops. I continued my route to Ceresa, where the division
had arrived in the morning. A cannon-shot from this village,
I found a bridge over a branch of the upper lake, which
unites with the Mincio. The enemy occupies this bridge,
covered by an embattled tower, occupied by 300 men, well
entrenched and supported by a good battery of three pieces.
General Augereau was aware that he could not execute your
orders unless he carried the bridge and the entrenchments
of Ceresa ; in consequence, he disposed his troops and his
artillery for the attack : his cannon protected the movements
of the columns of infantry, which advanced with their usual
impetuosity upon the tower, where they found the bridge
broken down. Meanwhile, two battalions, which were de
ployed, kept up so brisk a fire that the enemy fled. Our
grenadiers repaired the bridge, while a little drummer went
up into the tower under the enemy's fire, and descended
again to open the gate to the grenadiers, who passed and
pursued the terrified enemy, who had retired into the ad
vanced works. I proceeded reconnoitring to within pistol-
shot of the cordon of the place, the side of which is the
weakest. This tower and bridge are in the same position as the
bridge of Santo Giorgio, excepting that it is a plain which
leads to the cordon of the place. This bridge is of the ut
most importance for us, especially as it was well entrenched,
and might ' stop the army, if the enemy defended himself
stoutly in it. I think, therefore, that we ought to take all
possible pains to preserve it. I slept at Ceresa ; to-day I
have followed the margin of the water, and, turning the
place, I arrived at the causeway of Pradella, defended by a
very good horn-work, constructed of earth, which has cannon

152 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
and is well palisaded. We approached to within hearing
distance ; and, after receiving the honours of a few musket-
shots, we pursued our route, following the upper lake of the
Mincio to Goito.
It results, general, that in that part of the fortress of
Mantua comprised between the upper Mincio and the lower
Mincio, on the Po, there are but two causeways, those of
Ceresa and Pradella, and that we are masters of the head of
the most important ; that the place is well encompassed, but
that it is indispensable to retain the positions occupied by
General Augereau.
I judge it, therefore, to be absolutely necessary that 3000
men should be employed in this part, independently of the
troops of General Serrurier.
All agree in reporting that the garrison is composed of
only seven battalions and two squadrons ; that there is but
a small stock of provisions and ammunition in the place ;
that the inhabitants refuse to sell any thing to the troops.
Many country -people come out to leave the town, but are
sent back ; it appears that, if we had means, it would be
easy to take the town.
General Augureau has killed some men of the enemy's.
General Serrurier took this morning twelve prisoners, who
agree in confirming what you know ; but they assert that,
in the attack of Borgo Santo Giorgio, the enemy had 72
wounded and about 50 killed.
I have ordered that not a moment be lost in constructing
the bridge over the Mincio below Mantua, in order to en
sure the communication between Augereau and Serrurier.
Citizen Barral has orders also to construct one over the
Po ; but that is an operation of consequence, owing to the
breadth of the river ; he will attend punctually to it. As I
foresee that the bridge cannot be ready for the passage of
the troops, I have ordered the necessary boats and pontoons
to be secured, to supply the want of it, and to serve for the
passage of the artillery.
The three battalions of grenadiers are collected here, as
well as the regiments, 1st hussars, 10th chasseurs, and 8th
dragoons. To-morrow I set out for Verona, and thence proceed to
reconnoitre between the lake of Garda and the Adige, then
to see how the works get on at Peschiera, and then I shall
rejoin you.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 153
I shall spend part of the night in giving such orders as
I judge necessary for whatever may be useful to the exe
cution of yours.
No news of the enemy from the quarter of the Tyrol : it
appears that he is at a distance.
Alexandre Berthier.

To General Kellermann.
Head-quarters, Milan, 21 Prairial, year 4 [June 9, 1796].
I have seen with pleasure the demi-brigades which you
have sent : they are in good condition and well disciplined.
I am not afraid of trespassing upon your kindness. I
am sending to you an artillery officer, with the necessary
funds, to provide for the transport of 5000 muskets, which
I earnestly entreat you to forward to us, together with
twelve six-inch and twelve eight-inch howitzers.
I anxiously await your answer respecting the 1800 men
whom I requested you to direct to be put into Coni, that I
may be able to withdraw the garrison.
You ought to have received 100,000 francs ; I shall give
orders for another 100,000 to be sent you.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief.
Verona, 22 Prairial, year 4 [June 10, 1796].
I am come from Peschiera : the works ordered go on very
slowly ; there is but a single captain of engineers to con
duct them. There is a want of tools ; I will have some
picked up to-morrow at Verona, as well as labourers.
I have not found a single field-piece at the park : I shall,
nevertheless, have need of eight — four at la Corona, and
four at Brentino ; we occupy those two posts since yester
day. One brigade is at Corona, from which a battalion is
detached to the heights of Monte Baldo.
Preabocco is also occupied by a demi-brigade ; it detaches
one battalion to Brentino : the two new positions have abso
lute need of mountain artillery ; there is not a single mule at
;the park, neither are there any artillerymen, so that I have
two howitzers at Rivoli, which I am obliged to send to the
park for want of men to work them. All my artillery of

154 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
the two divisions consists of two 4-pounders, under the
orders of General Rusca ; a howitzer, and one light artil
lery 8-pounder, with General Victor ; and two 8, and two
3-pounders, with General Rampon, at Verona : that is all I
have of the numerous artillery specified in my instruc
tions. The 18th and the 27th light infantry have arrived to-day
at Peschiera. The position of the troops of the two divi
sions will be as follows : —
One demi-brigade of light infantry at Corona ;
Another at Preabocco, under the command of General
Joubert ;
Two other demi-brigades of light infantry, in second
line, to support the first two ;
Two other brigades of light infantry at Salo, under
General Rusca ;
One demi-brigade of the line, between Peschiera and
Salo, one battalion of it detached to Pescheira ;
The 18th demi-brigade of light infantry and the 18th
of the line will form the grand camp between Rivoli and
Garda ;
At Verona I leave the 32nd of the line, and temporarily
the 17th light infantry, having had information that the
enemy is making some movements in that quarter.
Be pleased, general, to give the necessary orders, that all
that you destine for the two divisions under my command
may be punctually furnished me, and then rely upon my
punctuality and vigilance.
Massena.

To Citizen Comeiras.
Head-quarters, Milan, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].
I will direct the Grisons to be supplied with 3000 quin
tals of corn, on condition that they will give . us horses in
payment. I have at your desire caused the fort of .... to
be destroyed. I will send all you ask for. It is necessary
that you should exercise the greatest vigilance towards the
Valteline, to learn the movements that Beaulieu may make,
and to inform me of them in time.
It would be easy for me to send you a few thousand
fowling-pieces ; but would not these be well bestowed in the
hands of our friends ? and, if it be true that the heads of

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 155
the Leagues are sold to the House of Austria, would it not
be dangerous to increase their means of injuring us \
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796],
General Laharpe was of the canton of Berne : the autho
rities of that canton confiscated his property at the com
mencement of the Revolution. I beg you to use your
influence for obtaining its restitution to his children.
The Swiss have demanded of us the circulation of some
thousand weight of rice. We have granted that demand,
but on condition that the canton of Berne shall restore to
young Laharpe the possessions of his father. I hope that
you will approve this measure.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Barthelemy, Ambassador at Basle.
Head-quarters, Milan, 23 Prairial, year 4 {June 11, 1796].
The canton of Berne confiscated, at the commencement
of the Revolution, the property of the late General La
harpe ; I beg you to interest yourself, for the purpose of
causing it to be restored to his son.
Bonaparte.

To General Moreau.
Head-quarters, Milan, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].
I transmit to you 1,000,000, which you will draw from
the hands of citizen Barthelemy, ambassador of the Re
public at Genoa,1 to whom I have ordered it to be addressed.
The army of Italy has solicited permission from the Direc
tory to send you that money, proceeding from the war con
tributions, in order to relieve our brethren in arms of the
army of the Rhine. I am flattered that this occasion, &c.
Bonaparte.
4 It should be Basle — a mistake probably arising from haste

156 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Pavia, 24 Prairial, year 4 [June 12, 1796].
You will give orders for 2000 beds to be made up in the
castle of Pavia, with furniture complete. The commissary
of war will require for this purpose, from the city, the ne
cessary mattresses, sheets, and blankets.
Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 25 Prairial, year 4 [June 13, 1796].
The general-in-chief prefers a complaint, to the military
commission against M. Augustin Spinola, lord \seigneur\
of Arcquata, as being the chief of the rebellion which has
taken place at Arcquata, where several French soldiers have
been murdered, the tricoloured cockade torn, the effects of
the. Republic pillaged, and the imperial standard hoisted.
The seigneur of Arcquata and his wife have always given
way to their perfidious instigations.
I require that they be tried by the military commission,
conformably with the military laws.
Bonaparte.

To the Governor of Alexandria.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 25 Prairial, year 4 [June 13, I796J.
The officers and soldiers of the garrison of Serravalle
have taken part in the late rebellion of the imperial fiefs :
they have encouraged the peasants by furnishing them with
munitions of war.
This conduct is very far from being conformable with the
intentions of the king and M. the Duke of Aosta.
. I beg of you to punish severely the unworthy conduct of
these officers and soldiers.
Bonaparte.

To the Senate of the Republic of Genoa.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 26 Prairial, year 4 [June 14, 1 796].
The city of Genoa is the focus whence issue villains, who
infest the high roads, murdering the French, and intercept
ing our convoys, whenever they can. It is from Genoa
that the spirit of rebellion is instilled into the imperial fiefs.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 157
M. Girola, who resides in that city, has publicly sent them
munitions of war: he welcomes daily the leaders of the
assassins, yet dripping with French blood.
It is on the territory of the republic of Genoa that part
of these horrors are perpetrated, without any measures
being taken by the government: it appears, on the con
trary, by its silence and the asylum which it affords them,
to smile on the murderers. Woe to the communes which
behold with joy these crimes committed on their territory,
and French blood spilt by assassins I
It is indispensable that a stop be put to this evil, and
that the men who, by their conduct, patronize the banditti,
be very severely punished. The governor of Novi protects
them : I require the government to make a severe example'
of him. M. Girola, who has made Genoa a place d'armes
against the French, must be arrested, or at least expelled
from the city of Genoa. These preliminary satisfactions
are due to the manes of my brothers in arms, slaughtered
upon your territory.
Respecting the future, I demand of you a categorical ex
planation. Can you, or can you not, clear the territory of
the republic of the assassins who fill it ? If you do not
take measures, I will : I will have the towns and villages
burned in which the murder of a single Frenchman is com
mitted. I will have burned the houses that shall afford
refuge to the assassins. I will punish the negligent magis
trates who shall have transgressed the first principle of
neutrality, by granting an asylum to banditti. The murder
of a Frenchman shall bring woe upon the entire communes
that have not protected him.
The French Republic will be inviolably attached to the
principles of neutrality ; but the republic of Genoa shall not
be a refuge for all^the banditti.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Faipoult, Minister at Genoa.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].
I send you General Murat, my aide-de-camp. I desire
you to introduce him immediately to the senate, for the
purpose of delivering to it the note which he will commu
nicate to you. If you were to present it, it would take a
fortnight to get an answer ; and it is necessary to establish

158 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
a more speedy communication, that shall electrify those
gentlemen. The army of the Rhine has beaten the enemy. General
Berthier must have sent you the bulletin from Basle.
All is going on well ; I embrace you. The intelligence
from Paris is of the 19th: nothing new.
I have had above a score of chiefs of banditti who mur
dered our soldiers apprehended. They shall be shot with
out mercy. At this moment a division is doing justice on
Arcquata and the imperial fiefs.
Get a better governor appointed in Novi than the one
who is there. I do not intend that the senate should suffer
our soldiers to be slaughtered in detail. I will keep my
word to it. Bonaparte.
To Citizen Faipoult.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].
We have established a great many batteries on the
Riviera of Genoa : we ought now to sell the cannon and
ammunition to the Genoese, that we may not have to guard
them, but yet find them there in case we have need of
them again.
Bonaparte.

To the Governor of Novi.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 28 Prairial, year 4 [June 16, 1796].,
You give an asylum to the banditti ; the assassins are
protected in your territory ; there are some of them at this
moment in all the villages. I require you to cause all the
inhabitants of the imperial fiefs that are to be found this
day upon your territory to be apprehended. You will
answer to me for the execution of the present requisition : I
will burn the towns and houses that shall afforel refuge to
the murderers, or shall not arrest them.
Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Tortona, 28 Prairial, year 4 [June 16, 1796].
All the detachments of troops which are in the different
towns of the States of the King of Sardinia must rejoin

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 159
their corps, excepting the garrisons of Coni, Ceva, Cherasco,
Tortona, Alexandria, Oneglia, and Loano.
The troops and convoys of the army are forbidden to
take any other route than by Nice, Coni, Fossano, Asti,
Alexandria, Tortona, Pavia, Pizzigitone, Cremona, Casal-
Major, Borgoforte ; or by Genoa, Novi, Tortona ; or through
the valley of Aosta. The troops of the King of Sardinia
having undertaken to escort convoys, an escort of only one
or two men will be sent with them.
No further requisitions shall be made in the territories
of the King of Sardinia ; all the magazines that we have
in those countries shall be evacuated and transported to the
fortresses left in our possession.
The commissaries of war are expressly forbidden to grant
any route to soldiers separated from their battalions till
their number amounts to twenty-five. To this effect, the
soldiers who shall present themselves for the purpose of
rejoining their corps must be subsisted in the place till
they are of that number. The commissary of war will then
make out a bill of the route to the place where they will
have to separate, in order to rejoin their respective corps.
The commandants of fortresses will take care that the
soldiers be provided with arms, and give the command of
these detachments to a subaltern of the garrison, if there be
none among the men who are rejoining : this subaltern
shall accompany the detachment to the nearest garrison.
The general of division who commands at Nice shall have
under his orders the whole department of the Maritime
Alps ; he will appoint the commandants at all the stations
[/tapes] in order to superintend the passing soldiers and
those stationed at the Stapes.
The general of division who commands at Coni will have
under his superintendence the whole country comprehended
between the department of the Maritime Alps, the Stura,
and the Tanaro, as far as the territories of Genoa ; at the
same time, he will command at Ceva and Cherasco : he will
place at each station an officer to whom all soldiers having
bills of route will address themselves, and on whose visa the
Piedmontese commandants will deliver station-tickets to
our soldiers.
The general of division commanding at Tortona will
have under his superintendence all the countries comprised
between the Tanaro, the gulf of Genoa, the Po, and the

160 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
territories of the Duke of Parma : he will command also at
Alexandria : he will appoint officers to superintend the
passing soldiers at each station. It will be upon his visa
only that the agents of the King of Sardinia will deliver
station-tickets to our soldiers.
The general commandant of Lombardy will command :
officers will be appointed for each station to superintend
the men stationed there, and to maintain good discipline
among the passing soldiers.
The chief of the staff will send to these different gene
rals a list of the officers, wounded, supernumerary, or un
employed, who might be employed for this purpose.
The chief of the staff will appoint two superior officers to
superintend the routes from Cassano to Peschiera, and
from Pizzigitone to Goito : these two officers will quarter
themselves, the first at Chiaro, and the second at Oasale-
Major : they shall appoint the officers at each station to
superintend the soldiers and to take care that the agents
of Venice deliver punctually and of good quality the station
allowance to the soldiers and the horses.
Each of the superior officers shall have with him fifteen
men of horse gendarmerie anel 150 men who shall serve to
escort the prisoners, and to go wherever it may be neces
sary for the safety of the route.
The general commanding the Mantuan shall place officers
in all the stations of his arrondissement ; the generals of
division shall do the same each in his arrondissement, and
as far as the station that joins the high road.
The route of Placentia will join the great communication
of the army at St. Colombar. The superior officer com
manding the fortress of Placentia shall have the super
intendence of the whole route from St. Colombar to Parma.
It shall take nine days to go from Coni to Pavia, seven
from Pavia to Peschiera, and six from Pavia to Goito.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief.
Pavia, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].
I have this instant arrived from the bridge over the Po :
it is not yet bound together, though people pass over, and
even carriages : by to-morrow night it will be maele as
solid as possible. The roads to the bridge from both sides

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 161
bf the Po are superb : a corps de garde is established for
the guard of this bridge.
The repairs of the fortifications of the castle of Pavia are
proceeding with all possible activity. I have given orders
to the commissary of war to send off to Milan the horses
that were in the depot here. Lanusse.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castiglione, 29 Prairial, year 4 [June 17, 1796].
There is no fort at Chiusa, but merely two drawbridges,
which I have kept guarded since we have been in this
country by 100 men, supported by 300 others : there are,
besides, two pieces of cannon, so that there is nothing to fear.
The enemy has made no movement about Verona :
he. has approached our posts at La Corona : our scouts
have already given chase to him, and I have ordered him
to be attacked this morning by six companies of cara
bineers, supported by two battalions. I will give you an
account of the result.
General Guillaume, who commands at Peschiera, reports
to me that he has not a single grain of powder in the place ;
that the two bastions of the Verona gate are at length about
to be armed, but that he has neither balls nor bombs.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief Pavia, 29 Prairial, year 4 [June 17, 1796].
Thirty -two hostages have set out for Tortona ; these,
added to thirty-four previously sent off, form a total of
sixty-four. The bells of Pavia have been taken down : I shall have
thein all put together in a magazine. Tranquillity is per
fectly re-established here, and confidence begins to revive.
Lanusse.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castiglione, 30 Prairial, year 4 [June 18, 1796].
I informed you, in my letter of yesterday, that I had or
dered a chase of the enemy ; it has had all the success that
I expected from it : our carabineers killed forty men and
VOL. I. m

162 LETTERS and DESPATCHES.
made fifty prisoners, all of the regiment of Tuscany. I had
sent a flag of truce the evening before : I had selected an
intelligent officer, who had reconnoitred the advanced posts
of the enemy : three were carried by the bayonet. This
coup de main has so intimidated the Austrians, that the
rest of the camp took to flight, and several left their arms
behind them. It was in this flight that so many men were
killed. I shall make an excursion to Salo to-morrow ; it is said
that the enemy is within two leagues of the place : if there
is any possibility, he shall be attacked there.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Venice, 30 Prairial, year 4 [June 18, 1796}i
I have received the letter which you were pleased to
write me on the I Oth. I know not how it can have been
so long in coming.
Reinforcements are arriving successively in the Tyrol.
My man at Bolzano informs me that, since the first to the
30th of June,1 there have passed through that town 21,000
men for the confines, namely, 18,000 infantry, 14^000 of
them by the Adige, and 4,000 by land, 1000 artillery,
and 2,000 cavalry.
These troops, with the militia, occupy all the passes of
the Tyrol, and their advanced posts are on the Vicentine
hills, between RecOara and Astico. A piquet of twenty
Hulans and some engineers has advanced, to Bassano, but
no ulterior preparation announces their descent into the
plain. The Venetians are assembling their border militia
and their Dalmatians. They are sending their Italians into
their islands, and the direct conferences with the govern
ment seem to be taking a very favourable turn ; but it is hard
work to make the great number think of the future, and
they are always strongest in an assembly of 200 ignorant
and idle persons, where matters are decided by the plura
lity of votes.
Lallemant.
1 An evident mistake, perhaps for Prairial.

letters and despatches. 163
The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].
The Directory has had laid before it, citizen-general, the
letter by which you inform it that the republic of Venice
has permitted the Austrians to enter the fortress of Pes
chiera, and it has thought that this conduct authorized the
French Republic to require that the funds belonging to the
powers at war with us, especially those belonging per
sonally to the King of England, and which are at present
deposited at Venice, be delivered up immediately to us,
together with the ships of war, merchantmen, and all other
enemies' property whatever, that may.now be in the ports
of the republic of Venice. The Directory also thinks it
possible to borrow of that republic to the amount of
5,000,000 Dutch florins, for which it should accept assign
ments on the debt which the Batavian republic has con
tracted to us. It thinks also that you could, if necessary,
give bills on the deposit of money at Venice belonging to
the King of England, &c, in exchange for the contributions
in kind which circumstances might oblige you to levy in
the Venetian territory.
The Directory leaves this object for your consideration,
and recommends to you to concert for its accomplishment
with the commissioners of the government Salicetti and
Gareau. It observes to you that it is not its intention to
break with the republic of Venice, and your proceedings in
this delicate affair ought to be such as not to promote a
rupture. The Directory is thoroughly convinced that they
will be of a nature not to compromise the dignity of the
French nation, and conformable in every respect with the
instructions which it gives to you, as well as to the com
missioners of the government Salicetti and Gareau, by this
present letter.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].
The Directory has taken into consideration, citizen-gene
ral, the contents of your letter dated Roverbello, the 16th
instant. By its despatch of the 23rd, it has acquainted
you with its intentions relative to the republic of Venice.
m 2

164 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Your letter must necessarily produce some modifications
in them. The Directory thinks, in consequence, that it
would be possible to borrow at least 12,000,000 tournois of
that republic, and to induce it to accept as a guarantee
assignments on the debt which theBatavians have contracted
to us. The sum lent might be taken from the funds which the
king and the government of England have at present in the
treasury of Venice.
The Directory is highly satisfied with the conduct which
you have pursued, both towards the proveditor-general and
towards the two deputies whom the senate of that city sent
to you. „
The Directory likewise approves of the measure you
have taken for putting Peschiera in a state of defence.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].
You will no doubt have learned, citizen-general, the facts
stated in the report of the French minister at Genoa, a
copy of which the Directory has sent you annexed. The
perfidious conduct pursued towards us by the Genoese
government must be repressed : but, above all, it is impor
tant to withdraw from Genoa the funds which are there,
and the French minister must already have given orders
on that subject. As for the provisions and ammunition of
all kinds which may be there, the Directory trusts to you
to attend to their removal to a place where they will be
less exposed.
The Directory has thought that it might be imprudent
and prejudicial to the course of success of the army under
your command, to take measures immediately for com
pelling the Genoese to make suitable reparation for the in
jury that has been done us. It is not till after you have
concluded an armistice with Rome, till that agreed upon
with Naples has been executed, and, lastly, till you have
finished your excursion to Bologna and Leghorn, that it
will be proper to take up the affair of Genoa. Till then,
you will content yourself with causing the interests of the
French Republic in the city of Genoa to be watched with
the most vigilant attention ; and, when the favourable
moment has arrived, you will take the necessary measures

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 165
for obtaining a signal reparation for all those perfidious
proceedings in which the Genoese government has engaged
against the French Republic, and you will demand a very
large indemnity for the capture of the five vessels which
the English have recently taken from us by means of the
Genoese protection.
For the rest, the Directory refers to the previous instruc
tions which it has addressed to you, and which relate to
the city of Genoa.
If you think it advantageous to occupy in force the Gulf
of Spezzia at the time when you demand reparation of the
Genoese government, the Directory authorizes you to take
that measure, and relies in that matter on your prudence
and republican energy.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].
The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letters
dated Verona, the 15th Prairial, Roverbello, the J 6th, and
Milan, the 19th and 20th of the same month. Though it
could have wished that the King of Naples had contributed
some millions when the armistice was concluded, the Direc
tory approves it, referring to what was written to you pre
viously on the necessity of making the commissioners of the
government with the army under you take a part in trans
actions of that kind.
It were to be wished that the 2400 horse soldiers who are
to repair to Brescia, &c, on leaving the Austrian army,
had been bound by the terms of the armistice to return to
Naples on foot, and to relinquish their horses with the har
ness to us.
The Directory has read with pleasure the details of the
affairs of the advanced posts of Mantua : it continues to
applaud your conduct and that of General Dallemagne
and of the chief of brigade Lannes, and owes particular praise
to the general of division Augereau.
The Directory approves of the idea of deferring the final
arrangement of the armistice which is to be concluded with
the Prince of Rome till you are at Bologna or Leghorn.
The last despatches of the Directory fix the conditions of it ;
but if you think the contributions which that prince can

166 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
furnish ought to amount to 25,000,000 in specie and
5,000,000 in kind, the Directory agrees to adopt this ad
vantageous modification : it likewise approves the proposal
of other demands specified in your letter of 19th Prairial,
and hopes that the pope will assent to them.
Our aim must be to termiuate the war in the south of
Italy as speedily as possible, and to study only the means of
procuring peace by our situation in the north of that penin
sula. It is preferable to deposit either at Nice or at Grenoble,
instead of Genoa, the funds which your successes and the
armistice which you are going to conclude with the pope
shall permit you to place at the disposal of the minister of
the finances.
The Directory will write to you very soon concerning the
ulterior operations of the campaign.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].
It may happen, citizen-general, that the court of Naples,
satisfied with the armistice which has been concluded be
tween the French and Neapolitan armies, will neglect to
send immediately to Paris plenipotentiaries to treat for
peace, and seek to maintain itself in that sort of state of
neutrality, the prolongation of which would be very disad
vantageous to us.
The formal intention of the Directory is that you cause
it to be signified to the Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli, or to the
court of Naples itself, that, if the negociations for peace be
tween the French Republic and the King of the Two
Sicilies are not commenced in Paris before the expiration of
a month, reckoning from the date of these presents, the
armistice shall be considered as not having taken place.
It is essential, citizen-general, that you should strongly
stimulate the court of Naples, whose intention in not sending
to us promptly a minister plenipotentiary might be to amuse
us by delays justified upon false pretexts, in order to place
itself in a situation to regulate its ulterior conduct by the
events of the remainder of the present campaign.
Carnot.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 167

PART THIRD.
FROM THE TAKING OF BOLOGNA TO THE SECOND BLOCKADE
OF MANTUA.
To the Commissioners of the Government with the Army of
Italy.
Head-quarters, Bologna, 3 Messidor, year 4 [June 21, 1796].
The present movements of part of Wurmser's army on
the frontiers of the Grisons, the considerable reinforcements
which Wurmser is daily receiving, and those still more con
siderable on march ; the operation upon Leghorn which the
government has ordered me to undertake, and in which I
have seen no military inconvenience, calculating upon the
arrival of 6000 men whom General Chateauneuf-Randon
was to bring, but who received counter- orders and are still
at Nismes ; the garrison which I shall be obliged to leave
in the fortress of Leghorn — all render it necessary for us to
make two demi-brigades of the army of the Alps join us as
speedily as possible. It would be possible to withdraw one
of the two that are at Lyons, and one which is in the de
partment of the Drome. It will be easy for the general of
the army of the Alps to replace the two demi-brigades by
moveable columns, composed of sedentary national guards,
put in requisition, and to this end I am transmitting to him
150,000 livres in cash, to provide for their pay.
I require you therefore to take the most prompt and effi
cacious measures in order that these two demi-brigades may
proceed immediately to Milan ; the need we have of them
is so pressing, that I think we ought to take the nearest,
and to use all means to accelerate their march and their
arrival in Milan.
Bonaparte.
[Lower down is written :]
Having seen the above letter from General-in-Chief
Bonaparte, and for the considerations therein specified,
The Commissioners of the Government with the Army
of Italy and that of the Alps
Require General Kellermann, commander-in-chief of the

168 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
army of the Alps, to send without delay two demi-brigades
of his army to Milan, to place themselves under the orders
of the general-in-chief of the army of Italy.
Done at Bologna, 3 Messidor, year 4.
Salicetti, Garreau.

To Citizen Faipoult.
Head-quarters, Bologna, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].
I have just received your courier: I am too well ac
quainted with the spirit of the perfidious Genoese govern
ment not to have foreseen the answer that it would make.
I have just received, by an extraordinary courier from the
Directory, a copy of the note which you presented at the
time of the capture of the five vessels.
Here then are two grounds of complaint. I charge you
specially to take the most efficacious means that the money,
jewels, and other valuable effects belonging to the Republic,
which are at Genoa, be speedily removed from that place.
Send for citizen Suci, and let me have, by an extraordi
nary courier, an inventory of the effects, whatever they may
be, which are in Genoa.
I beg you to make me acquainted, from time to time, in
the minutest detail, with all that concerns our position with
the senate of Genoa.
Bonaparte.

To Adjutant-General Leclerc.
Head-quarters, Bologna, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].
You will repair to Coire, the capital of the country of the
Grisons : you will there see citizen Comeyras, minister of
the Republic ; you will traverse the country to the debouches
of Swabia ; you will send out spies, to pick up information
relative to the position and movements of the enemy on the
other side of the mountains. Inform me of all that may be
worth the trouble by an extraordinary courier, whom you
will address to General Despinois at Milan. You will mark
the positions which the enemy might take for descending
from the mountains into the Milanese, supposing that he
had a mind to attempt it. You will remain in the country

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 169
long enough to explore it, to make yourself acquainted with
it, and to acquire a notion of the spirit that animates the
inhabitants.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief of the Grison Leagues.
Bologna, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].
I address to you, citizen Leclerc, adjutant-general, to give
you a token of the friendship of the French Republic, and
of the desire which I feel to be useful to you, relying upon
a perfect reciprocity on your part.
Bonaparte.

To ilie Minister of the Republic at Venice.
Head-quarters, Bologna, 5 Messidor, year 4 [June 23, 1796].
I beg you, citizen minister, to infuse more activity into
your secret correspondence, and to send me every day a
bulletin of the forces and movements of the enemy. You
.must have spies at Trent, at Roveredo, at Inspruck, and
receive daily bulletins from those places ; that is what
citizen Barthelemy does at Basle, and thereby be renders
important services to the Republic. I am informed, through
an indirect channel, that Venice is arming, and you do not
tell me what is the nature and what the force of those ar
maments. You are aware how essential it is that I should
have timely information on all such points.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Miot, Minister at Florence. .
Head-quarters, Bologna, 5 Messidor, year 4 [June 23, 1796].
I send you citizen Marmont, my aide-de-camp, chief of
battalion, to deliver a letter to the Grand-duke of Florence :
it is under a flying seal, so that you can see its contents. I
should wish you to present it to his royal highness. If you
have any thing to say to me, address to this place till to
morrow morning.
Bonaparte.

170- letters and despatches.

To Citizen Miot.
Head-quarters, Bologna, 8 Messidor, year 4 [June 26, 1796].
I learn this moment that, in consequence of a general
order which has been issued not to permit any one going
from Bologna to Florence to pass, it is possible that M.
Manfredini may not have been allowed to pass, and may be
still at Bologna. If that were the case, I should be exces
sively vexed at this unlucky accident. I beg you to make
my excuses to the grand-duke, and to send off a courier im
mediately to Bologna with the annexed order.
Bonaparte.

To the General Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Leghorn, 9 Messidor, year 4 [June 27, 1796].
The general chief of the staff will immediately give the
most precise orders to the chief of battalion Hulin, com
mandant of the fortress of Leghorn, to cause the governor
of the city to be arrested as soon as he shall be informed
that the 75th demi-brigade is about to arrive ; that this go
vernor be put under good guard in a house near this camp,.
and thence sent off to Florence in a carriage which shall be
escorted, when the general-in-chief shall have determined
the hour for the departure of that officer, who, for the rest,
must be treated with all due respect.
Bonaparte.

To General Vaubois.
Head-quarters, Leghorn, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796].
General Vaubois will keep garrison at Leghorn with the
75th demi-brigade, a company of artillery, and a squadron
of the first regiment of hussars. He will get the batteries
which defend the entrance of the harbour put into a good
state of defence ; he will have them arranged in such a
manner that there shall be only pieces of one or at most
two calibres at each battery ; he will have furnaces mounted
for. red-hot balls, and take care that the guns be supphed
with a hundred rounds : he will choose a fort of the town,
that which is most capable of defending itself, and which
has communications with the interior; he will have this

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 171
fort put into a state of defence, make to this end such
changes in the disposition of the artillery as he shall think
proper, and establish a magazine, which shall contain suffi
cient to subsist 2000 men for forty days, with all the acces
sories for sustaining a siege.
He will spare no means for keeping Leghorn in perfect
tranquillity ; he will act in such a manner as to attach to
himself the troops of the grand-duke of Tuscany, on whom
he will keep a constant eye ; he will keep himself in good
harmony with the governor ; he will refer to him all matters
of detail, pay him great respect, especially in private, but
preserve a great superiority over him, especially in public.
Should there be plots at Leghorn, or anything else invol
ving the existence of the French troops, he will then take
all the measures necessary for restoring tranquillity and
punishing the evil-disposed. He will not spare, either
persons, or property, or houses.
In all the difficult affairs that may happen, he will consult
citizen Miot, minister of the French Republic at Florence,
who will be able to give him useful information.
He will protect the consul in the interesting operation
with which he is charged : being the first agent of the Re
public at Leghorn, he will attend to all the interests of the
Republic, and report to me on all the abuses which it may
not depend on him to repress.
He will live in suitable style. He will frequently have
at his table the officers of the grand-duke and the consuls
of the foreign powers : an allowance shall be granted to him
for extraordinary expenses.
He will appoint an officer to superintend the harbour :
he will appoint a commandant of each fort ; he will keep
privateers under a severe discipline, and see to it that they
respect the neutral flag, especially the Spanish. He will
have daily accounts rendered to him of the reports of the
sentries ; he will inform me regularly of all that passes in
the country where he is, and send me a report of all news
from Corsica that reaches him. He will write to the
imperial fiefs around the city to induce them to recognise
the Republic, and he will acquaint me with the number of
those fiefs, their population, their wealth, and the spirit
which animates them. He will keep up severe disci
pline among his troops ; he will make a point of having
all the soldiers in barracks, and not allowing any one,

172 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
from the general to the lowest employe, to lodge at any in-.
habitant's. He shall have with him an adjutant-general, a commis
sary of war, and an employe for each branch of the admi
nistration.
Bonaparte.

To the Consul of the Republic at Leghorn.
Leghorn, 12 Messidor, year 4 [June 30, 1796].
The consul of the Republic at Leghorn will cause the
seals to be taken off and inventories made of all the maga
zines belonging to England and to English merchants, to the
emperor, to the czarina of Russia, and in short to all princes
and private persons of States with which we are at war.
He will take all steps and use all means for discovering,
obtaining restitution of, and seizing all merchandize which
may have been deposited by different persons with Leghorn
merchants ; and for this purpose he will even pay whatever
he shall think necessary.
Bonaparte.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief of the
Army of Italy.
The Directory forwards to you the annexed copy of a.
letter which the minister of marine has just written to its
president, an acquaintance with which may be useful to you
for the diplomatic transactions that may take place in Italy.
It sends a duplicate of these copies to its commissioner
Salicetti.
Carnot.

The Minister of the Marine to the President of the Executive
Directory.
Paris, 2 Messidor, year 4 [June 20, 1796].
I think it my duty to beg you earnestly to write to
citizen commissioner of the Directory Salicetti, the condi
tions which it may be proper to impose on the governments
of Italy : by means of these impositions, perfectly legiti
mate on the part of, the conqueror, we can obtain the;

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 173
rapid means pf refitting our navy and reviving its
prosperity. In the Romagna, in the territories of Naples, we shall
find timber ready to be embarked in great quantity : in the
Modenese, in the Bolognese, in the Ferrarese, in the March
of Ancona, in Calabria, and the eastern part of Sicily, war
has caused hemp of the finest quality and sail-cloth to
accumulate. Is it not fitting that each of these several
States should furnish and transport to Toulon, with the
least possible delay, the quantities which they shall be able
to produce, and which they have already in magazine \
Make Italy proud of having contributed to the splendour
of our navy ; this, it appears to me, would be seconding the
views of the numerous patriots of those countries, who
take a noble pride in having assisted in the refit and the
success of the arms of the Republic.
I beseech you to submit these views to the Directory, and
to obtain its consent to this important measure. Truguet.
PS. I denounced, a few days since, to the minister
for foreign affairs, the oblique conduct of the govern
ment of Genoa : I subjoin here an extract from the letter
of the consul of the Republic at Leghorn, which will
make you acquainted with that of the Tuscan govern
ment.
Extract of a letter from Citizen Belleville, Consul-General
of the French Republic in Tuscany, to the Minister of the

I informed you, by my last letter of the 8th, that M.
Eliot and the heads of the English party had been
apprehended in Corsica : the intelligence is confirmed,
but the Corsicans have limited their demands to the
abolition of the taxes and the dissolution of the pretended
parliament of a few men whom they dislike. I am sorry
that the islanders, whom I fondly beheved to be specially
born for liberty, are, in so favourable a circumstance, more
intent on their present interest than on the honour of be
longing to the Republic. •-.
The English are removing from this place riches and im
mense stores for the purpose of transporting them to

1 74 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Corsica. Cattle, corn, horses, considerable sums, are all
carried off with assiduity and profusion : is it respecting neu
trality to allow one of the belligerent powers all sorts of
facilities for starving the other ?

Decree of the Executive Directory relative to Impositions on

3 Messidor, year 4 [June 21, 1796.]
The Executive Directory, considering that it is important
to determine by a particular regulation all that relates to
the form of the collection, paying in, produce, employment,
and order of accountability of the impositions levied in the
conquered countries, decrees :
Ordinary Impositions.
Art. 1. The ordinary impositions established in the con
quered countries shall continue to be collected for the profit
of the Republic.
2. The payment of what remains due upon these im
positions is demandable, and shall be effected without
delay. 3. The collectors and receivers at present existing shall
be charged with this collection, and be obliged to give all
the information that shall be demanded of them : in case
of the absence of any of them, the commissioners of the
government shall supply their place. .
4. The commissioners of the government shall cause a
statement of what remains due to be delivered to them :
to this effect they shall employ such means as appear to
them most expeditious.
5. They shall send the statement as speedily as possible
to the minister of the finances.
Extraordinary Impositions.
6. The general-in-chief shall have authority to lay on
any extraordinary imposition that he shall think proper :
he shall consult for this purpose with the commissioners
of the government, if there are any with the army.
7. When the amount of this extraordinary contribution
shall be determined, the commissioners of the government
shall be charged to make all the ulterior dispositions for
the execution.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 175
8. They will, in consequence, regulate the quantity to be
borne by each commune : they shall, if they think proper,
cause the amount that is to be paid to be advanced by the
persons assessed highest or the most wealthy, with the
understanding of an ulterior assessment to be made by the
constituted Authorities of the country, and, in short, take
all the most prompt and proper measures for getting it in.
9. They shall cause the collection to be made by the
receivers of the country, or by those whom they shall
appoint for that purpose, according to what they shall deem
to be most advantageous for the celerity of the getting
in, which they must most especially keep continually in
view. 10. They shall acquaint without delay the minister of
the finances with the sum to which the extraordinary impo
sition decreed will amount, and with all the arrangements
that have been made to ensure its payment.
Paying-in of the produce of the impositions, ordinary and
extraordinary; application of this produce; order of
accountability. 11. The produce of the impositions, both ordinary and
extraordinary, shall be paid with all diligence of the com
missioners of the government into a chest which they shall
establish for this purpose near them. The cashier shall
give receipts to the different collectors and receivers for
the sums paid in.
12. The cashier shall deliver all the sums that are indis
pensable for the subsistence and wants of the army to
the paymaster-general, who will account for them in the
usual manner.
13. The commissioners of the government shall give an
account every week to the minister of the finances of the
sums paid into the chest under their care, those remitted
by them to the paymaster-general of the army, and those
remaining in the chest. In regard to the latter, they
shall conform to the instructions which it will give them.
General Dispositions.
14. The general-in-chief and the commanders of the
armed force shall, on the requisition of the commissioners of
the government, or of any other person appointed by them,

176 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
furnish an armed force whenever it shall be necessary for
the levy of these ordinary and extraordinary impositions.
15. The general-in-chief and the commanders of the
armed force shall give the most precise and the most rigid
orders that none of the moneys arising from these impo
sitions be diverted and lost for the Republic.
16. The commissioners of the government will keep up the
most active correspondence with the minister of the finances
on everything relating to these same contributions ; they
will communicate to him, by courier after courier, the dispo
sitions whieh they shall have made, and the successive pro
gress of their operations.
17. When there shall be a special commissioner of the
Directory for the department of the finances and contribu
tions with the army, the articles of execution relating to
this object shall principally concern him ; still the other
commissioners shall have a right to take cognizance of all
the operations : in this case, he will deliberate with them,
and cause minutes to be kept of the dispositions that
shall be determined upon.
] 8. The minister of the finances is charged with the ex
ecution of the present decree. Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief ' Bonaparte.
Paris, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].
The column which you have sent towards the Lake of
Como has produced the effect which you expected from it,
and has somewhat alarmed the enemy for Swabia ; it may
have contributed several times to the departure of the
corps which have been detached from the army of Wurm
ser, in order to reinforce Beaulieu : some bulletins which
have reached the Directory represent their amount at
20,000 men. Your spies and the agents whom you will
have placed on the roads must have made you acquainted
with the truth. These circumstances must hasten the ter
mination of your affairs with the powers of Italy. At the
moment when the Directory is writing to you, you will
probably have concluded an armistice with the Pope : make
the plenipotentiaries of the prince of Rome repair with as
little delay as possible to Paris, to finish the peace, and,
above all, hasten the supplies in kind, with which, as it
shall be agreed, the French Republic is to be furnished.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 17?
It is equally urgent that the plenipotentiary of Naples
should arrive in Paris : one day lost for negociations in time
of war may occasion disasters. We strongly recommend
to you, in consequence, to accelerate the departure of these
ministers, that the Directory may have nothing to engage
its attention but the north of Italy, whither the reinforce
ments which Beaulieu is receiving, and the occupation of
the castle of Milan and Mantua by the enemy, summon you
back. By the time you receive this, you will no doubt have-
executed the important movements of Bologna and Leg
horn. May the tutelary genius which watches over the
high destinies of the Republic have brought you to that
port in time to secure some English ships and the maga
zines, &c. of those islanders !
You will, no doubt, have heard of the retrograde move
ment of the left wing of the army of the Sambre and
Meuse, from the Lahn to the Sieg. The Directory has
ordered it to resume the offensive. The army of the Rhine
and Moselle has had some success in advance of Manheim :
it is to pass the Rhine immediately in the environs of;
Strasburg, and to throw itself with impetuosity into Swabia
and Franconia. If that commanded by General Jourdan
seconds it boldly, as the Directory wishes it to do, it is to
be presumed that they will soon bring back part of the
troops that Wurmser appears to have detached against
the army of Italy.
This state of things would oblige the Directory to pre
scribe to you, as it does, to confine yourself to acting on
the defensive in the Tyrol, if the disposition of the inha
bitants of the conquered countries in Italy did not make it
an express law for you.
What you have done in the imperial fiefs near Tortona
and in the Milanese will inspire them, no doubt, with a
salutary fear, but it would be imprudent to trust to that :
it would be far more so if the army were to remove further
from Lombardy in penetrating too far into the Tyrol. This
operation could at most take place in case the republican
armies fighting in Germany should succeed in beating back
the enemy towards Bohemia or the Danube ; but, in pre
scribing to you this defensive, the Directory does not mean
to deny you the faculty of attacking the enemy whenever
you find a favourable occasion : it merely wishes that you
VOL. I. N

178 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
should not dash on too far into the Tyrol, because it be
lieves that this course would prove disastrous.
The Directory approves the articles agreed upon between
you and Lieutenant-Colonel de St. Marsan ; it will, as you
desire, welcome citizen Serbelloni and the other Milanese
patriots, deputies at Paris. It deems it superfluous to re
mind you that the fate of the Milanese depends on the
events that may happen, and principally on the success of
the armies of the Sambre and Meuse and of the Rhine and
Moselle in Germany.
The Directory has thought fit to defer for some time any
measure relative to the organization of one or several bat
talions composed of the Milanese youth.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].
It is asserted, citizen-general, that the marble bust of
Marcus Aurelius is at Pavia : it is for the interest of the
arts that it should be transmitted to France : the Directory
commands you to cause all necessary precautions to be
taken that it may arrive without damage.
Carnot.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Castiglione, 1 Messidor, year 4 [June 19, 1796].
I yesterday ordered a reconnaissance in force along the
Adige. Our troops have chased the enemy as far as Avis :
we have taken forty prisoners, and. killed many men. Our
loss is two killed and six wounded.
The position and force of the enemy are as follows.
General Colli, with 8000 men, is at Roveredo and Campara ;
General Hohenlohe, who has succeeded Beaulieu, is at Trent,
with 12,000.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castiglione, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].
I reconnoitred yesterday about Salo and the positions
occupied by our troops, and assuredly there is nothing to

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 1 79
fear in that quarter. I crossed the lake in the felucca which
has been equipped at Peschiera. This felucca has no sails
in it yet ; it were very necessary that it should have.
I am setting off for Chiusa : I have some changes to
make thereabouts. I am guarding the posts upon the
Adige, Bu3solenga, La Sega, and La Chiusa, by which the
enemy might attempt to cross : those three posts occupy a
demi-brigade.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Venice, 7 Messidor, year 4 [June 25, 1796],
The videttes which I keep at Bolzano and Trent inform
me that from the 15th to the 18th of June there have
passed by that route 3600 more infantry, 1600 of them
upon the Adige. They add that the Austrian general has
men at work on the road from Trent to Areo, whether he
purposes to break into the Brescian, or merely wishes to
draw your attention to that quarter, while he gets to
Mantua, through the Venetian territory.
Citizen Bartbelemi, in giving me the first good news from
the Rhine, adds that Wurmser has considerably weakened
his army by detaching from it 20,000 men for Italy. If
these reinforcements unite, there will be above 50,000 men
to put into Italy.
I learn this moment, by a letter from Trent, dated June
22nd, that 2400 more infantry arrived there on the 19th
and 20th ; bnt it appears that these troops and some others
comprehended in the preceding notes come from Inspruck,
and form part of the detachment from the Rhine. I am
applying for an explanation.
Lallemant.

To the General-in-Chief.
Pietati, 8 Messidor, year 4 [June 26, 1796].
All the works of the engineer department Would have
been finished this morning, had a certain general of brigade
been able to read, or taken the trouble to read, the order
given him by the staff of General Serrurier, to furnish us
with labourers in the night between the 6th and the 7th.
Owing to our not having had any that night, the siege has
n2

810 letters and despatches. ^
been retarded twenty-four hours. Last night, we partly
made amends for this neglect : but, to tell the truth, our
grand communication will not be practicable for cannon till
to-morrow. Do you not think that we have delayed the
artillery for want of communications ? In the first place, had
it been ready, it might have passed behind the dikes, at
night, as you have observed ; but, let what will be said,
three or four batteries have not the necessary strength, and
I am afraid that they will not long withstand the enemy's
fire. One of the two batteries of St. George is more ad-
vanced and more solid ; but that which ought to take the
advanced works in rear was not begun till the 6th, when I
passed that way.
If the artillery can, by its ricochets, weaken the enemy ;
if the battery of howitzers which I have applied for on my
right can beat down the enemy's works, I have nothing but
a trench of 120 toises to make, and I shall get within 50
toises of the palisades, that is to say, near enough to carry
them without difficulty, if the attack is well conducted. I
might succeed, were I to undertake this trench in the night
between the 9th and 10th; but I am fearful of unmasking
my designs, and had rather wait till our artillery has pro
duced some sort of effect : another thing that decides me to
this step is that the enemy is working more on our left than
on our right ; he seems to be on the wrong scent.
You should have had a plan of the trenches, if all my
people had not been either on duty or ill ; I have not even
a secretary. Chasseloup,
Chief of brigade of engineers.

To the General-in-Chief.
Milan, 8 Messidor, year 4 [June 26, 1796],
We had yesterday thirty-two pieces in battery against
the Castle. I ordered the attack to begin this morning
with the bridge and the prolongations both together till
noon : our batteries played perfectly till past that time.
The enemy kept up such a tremendous fire, that they have
suffered much. All the epaulements of the battery No. 1,
suburb of Venelina, have been broken up. The battery
No. 7, suburb of Camasina, is also damaged. In most of
them we have had pieces dismounted, bad carriages, and

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 181
coups d 'embrasure. Our mortar batteries of the centre and
the left of attack acted, however, extremely well ; they set
places on fire several times. To-night we shall work at re
pairing the batteries. The mortars will continue to play:
we shall determine upon the batteries dPattente for the pieces
from Alexandria. A combination of efforts and resources
is required here.
The enemy has particularly annoyed us by his bastioned
towers, from which he plays upon all our prolongations.
We had eighteen men killed or wounded.
I shall not yet bestow praises on our artillerymen : but
for a detachment of the army of the Alps, which has given
us a good lift, en passant, we could not have kept our ground.
Punishments and rewards — these are the two motives to
which I have recourse. I have been much pleased with
some of the bombardiers, and have signified this to them by
gratuities. I learn this moment that General Dugard has made a
bargain for the transport of artillery from Alexandria to
Pavia in a fortnight, and I recognize him in this trait.
Luckily, Captain Gastinel has set out with ] 60 horsed car
riages for Alexandria, where he will certainly put an end to
this grievous bargain. As for the siege of the Castle, you
desire speedy success, and nobody is more interested in that
than myself; but there is plenty of work here, and how
wretched are the means that ought to hasten it ! To
morrow you shall have particulars of our situation. The
day has been hot in all ways, and I am worn out with
fatigue. Despinois.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castiglione, 9 Messidor, year 4 [June 27, 1796].
The day before yesterday, four imperial barks appeared
at Torni, for the purpose of attacking the demi-galley which
we had there, armed. I had sent it that morning to Pes
chiera : the Austrian vessels, not finding ours as they ex
pected, fired about a hundred cannon or howitzer shot at
j;he troops charged with the defence of that port, and stood
up the lake. I was aware of the necessity of accelerating
the armament of our flotilla ; and, in consequence, I re-
. paired yesterday to Peschiera. I have ordered men to be

182 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
set to work on the ship gun-carriages, to enable the other
two demi-galleys to get out with one 8-pounder each :
these pieces were taken from the park, till those destined
for this object, of which we have notice, arrive. I hope,
from what the captain has told me, that the three demi-
galleys will be cruizing by the day after to-morrow : people
continue at work on the great barks, and it is said that they
will be ready to start in ten days. The demi-galleys will
certainly do us better service than the large barks ; infi%
nitely lighter, going in a superior manner with oars, they
afford advantageous means of boarding ; to this end I shall
man them with good troops.
I shall have a line formed upon the lake, to prevent the
passage of supplies for the Austrian troops. They have
long had nothing to live upon but porn brought them by the
Venetians ; as soon as our naval force is in a state to sail,
we will cut off that resource.
To-morrow, a battery will be established at Torni, to pro
tect the anchorage of our vessels there.
To-morrow morning, General Joubert will make a recon
naissance in force, in advance of the Col de Campiou.
Yesterday, the ordinary reconnaissance killed one and
wounded several of the enemy.
General Rusca will make a strong reconnaissance, and
push it as far as possible along the river Chiesa.
All reports agree in stating that the enemy is very far
from us, excepting at Corona, where there is every morning
a slight fire of small arms.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castiglione, 10 Messidor, year 4 [June 28, 1796.]
Informed that the enemy was reinforcing himself, and
constructing works to fortify himself in all his positions,
I ordered a general attack, to ascertain, by sure reconnois-
sances and in force, the truth of these reports.
Nine companies of carabineers and 600 men of the 4th demi-
brigade of light infantry had orders in consequence to pro
ceed under the command of General Joubert to the Bochetta
of Campiou : I went thither myself with my staff, and
accompanied by General of Brigade Valette, to satisfy my
self as to the force of the enemy's positions.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 183
By one o'clock in the morning, the chief of battalion
Marchand, with the nine companies of carabineers, had
invested and attacked the enemy in their formidable en
trenchments. General Joubert, with 600 men of the 4th
light infantry, followed him : the enemy, taken by surprise,
retired within the entrenchments, where our brave repub
licans attacked them, arms in hand, and using only their
bayonets and swords to storm the redoubts. The regi
ments of Lattermann, Shosoldo, and 400 Tyrolese defended
positions which would have been impregnable had they
been defended by Frenchmen ; but our brave fellows, re
gardless of the numbers, the positions, or the terrible fire
kept up by the enemy, drove them out of their little for
tresses, killed and wounded many, and made 200 prisoners j
they took four camps of about 400 tents, all the baggage of
the officers, cooking utensils, &c, and 25 mules, with about
15,000 cartridges. The commander of these troops was
killed in the entrenchments ; 200 of Lattermann's regiment
flung themselves from a reck to avoid the bayonets of our
intrepid warriors. I shall acquaint you, citizen-general,
with the deeds of valour that deserve to be known. General
Joubert and his staff behaved admirably, especially the
brother of that general who headed one of our columns. Since
the promotion of his brother to the rank of general of bri
gade, he has performed the duties of aide-de-camp, without
being an officer. I solicit of you, citizen -general, the rank
of sub-lieutenant for this young soldier.
You cannot imagine, general, the number and strength
of the entrenchments which the Austrians had thrown up in
this quarter. The officer of engineers, who was charged
with the direction of it, had orders to make it fit for the
reception of the whole present army of Beaulieu, and that
which he. expects from the Rhine : there would have been
room besides for the recruits of two years. The quantity
of works which those men have constructed in the space of
five or six days is incredible : rocks were suspended on the
top of all the heights to crush assailants, but all these terrible
means of defence could not stop our brave fellows for a
single moment.
The chief of battalion Rscco, commanding at Preabocco
and Brentino, had orders to march, with the 11th light
infantry, which he commands^ reinforced by two com
panies of carabineers and two of grenadiers, upon Belona, to

J 84 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
reconnoitre the positions and strength of the enemy. That
officer, known for his military talents and his valour, made.
his dispositions so ably, according to our instructions, that
his carabineers and grenadiers enveloped all the advanced
posts of the enemy, and not one of them escaped. Eight
hundred Austrians defended the excellent positions of Belona;
but our brave warriors, regardless of the number and the ex
cellent positions which the enemy defended, pushed on with
bayonets fixed, and overturned all before them. More than
100 Austrians were slain, 70 prisoners were left in our
hands, and, but for the battery of four pieces which the
enemy had on the left bank of the Adige and the impos
sibility of crossing that river, which is not fordable, the 800
Austrians would have been entirely cut off.
Our loss in these two affairs is but six killed and eight or
nine slightly wounded.
The report of general of brigade Victor, who was ordered
to proceed on the left of the lake, with a battalion of his bri
gade, to Malsesena, has not yet reached me. I have no
doubt that it is as advantageous to the arms of the Republic
as the two others.
Massena.

To the General-in-Chief.
Favorita, 10 Messidor, year 4 [June 28, 1796].
Agreeably to your order of the 28th ult., the command
ing officers of the artillery and the engineers and myself
met, the day before yesterday, the 8th ; we went and in-.
spected together all the points of the citadel, and slept at
Ceresa. On the morning of the 9th, we reconnoitred the
environs of the city, finishing with St. George, where it
was agreed that a mortar battery would be useful.
The commandant of engineers ascertained that the part
of the citadel easiest to attack is at the bastion of the
Trinity, and the part of the city, on the right of the dike
of Ceresa, independently of an incendiary battery, that is to
be placed at the casa Micheli, which is on the left of the
dike of Ceresa, nearly equidistant from the Pradella gate ;
and another of mortars near St. George, as I have before
mentioned. We have also fixed upon the site for the park of artillery,
which will be at an equal distance from the gate of Ceresa

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 185
and the casa Micheli, on a spot commodious enough and
sufficiently in rear: it will only be necessary to take some
precautious in regard to water.
On our return yesterday evening, we agreed that, with
the greatest possible economy, for the attack of the city,
no fewer than thirty pieces of cannon and sixteen mortars
could be employed ; for that of thej citadel, twenty-four
pieces and six mortars.
According to our calculations, there will be required
1084 artillerymen, and from 20,000 to 25,000 infantry
for the two attacks of the city and the citadel, and 1000
cavalry.• We have judged that the attack of the city could not be
made till all the posts in advance have been taken from the
enemy ; an operation which must be combined on account
of the difficulty of the approaches.
The commandant of the engineers has issued the neces
sary orders for setting about the preparatory works, such
as fascines, gabions, &c.
I have said nothing about a change of artillery ; I pre
sume that the commandant of that arm will communicate
with you about it. Serrurier.

To the General-in-Chief.
Castiglione, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796]
The long march which general of brigade Victor had to
make yesterday, in the reconnoissance which I had ordered
upon Malsesena, caused it to be very late when he reached
the enemy : so that his affair was attended with no other
results than driving back all the advanced posts, and a
brisk fire of small arms between the tirailleurs on both
sides. Five imperial barks fired a great deal upon the
troops : General Victor says that the artillery of those
vessels is ably worked ; he estimates the enemy in Mal
sesena and environs at 1000 or 1200 men : I hope to dis
lodge them one of these days.
To-morrow, those three galleys will come and cast anchor
at Torre, where I have ordered a battery of two pieces to
be placed for their protection.
Massena.

186 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief.
Milan, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796].
Our wishes are fulfilled : the commandant of the Castle
of Milan capitulated this morning at three o'clock, and the
troops of the Republic now occupy this fortress. Two
thousand eight hundred prisoners, one hundred and forty-
four pieces of cannon, two thousand weight of powder, five
hundred muskets, numerous siege implements — such are
the fruits of this capture.
I am this moment sending off the Austrian garrison for
Lodi, where it will await your orders.
To-morrow you shall receive an exact inventory of all the
things that we found in the Castle. I will likewise mention
to you the officers who have particularly distinguished
themselves. I perform to-day a very gratifying duty in commending
the conduct of all the besieging troops : artillery, infantry,
cavalry, have all concurred in the triumph of our arms.
The volunteers multiplied themselves ; they were at
once on guard, at work, and manning the batteries ; and,
during the excessive fatigues of twelve days' trenches,
their courage and devotedness never slackened for a single
moment. You will find annexed the capitulation which I proposed
to M. de Lamy, and which he was obliged to accept.
Despinois.
PS. I have this moment learned that there has been
found in the Austrian chests 72,000 livres. Out of these
funds, I solicit a gratuity for the besieging troops, who
have so richly deserved it.

The Commandant of the Castle of Milan to the General of
Division Despinois, commanding in Lombardy.
Castle of Milan, one a.m., June 29, 1796 [11 Messidor, year 4].
If you will suspend hostilities, I will capitulate with you
in the morning.
De Lamy.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 187
To M. de Lamy, Austrian Commandant of the Castle

Milan, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796] 3 a.m.
I cannot, sir, accede to a suspension of hostilities at the
point where we are, unless in virtue of the following capi
tulation which I propose to you, and on which you will
have to deliberate immediately.
Despinois.
To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Roverbello, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796].
We have made with General Serrurier and the com
mandant of the engineers minute reconnoissances of the
city and citadel of Mantua. Having afterwards met to
determine, agreeably to your orders, the points of attack,
and the site of the park, the result of our opinions is as
follows : —
To attack the citadel and the city at the same time ; to>
establish a battery for mortars to throw red-hot balls near
the casa Micheli ; to establish a mortar battery near the
casa Zampoli ; to place the park 200 toises in rear of the
casa Spolverini. The attack of the citadel to be made on
the bastion of the centre, called the Trinity, and there
would play six batteries : two of five pieces, two of four,
and two others of two, with three mortars each ; which
would make a total for that part of twenty-four pieces of
heavy calibre and six mortars.
The attack of the city to be made on the part to the
right of the dike of Ceresa ; and there would play three
batteries, one of six pieces, one of four, and another of
eight, with four mortars ; which makes in all, for this part,
eighteen pieces and four mortars.
The battery near the casa Micheli to be of twelve pieces,
six of them for red-hot balls, of six mortars. The battery
near the casa Zampoli to be of six mortars.
The total of the cannon necessary would be fifty-four
pieces and twenty-two mortars, those for change not in
cluded. To work this number of pieces, there will be required
1,100 artillerymen ; of troops, there must be from 20,000
to 25,000 infantry, and 1000 cavalry.
Sugny.

188 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief.
Bologna, 12 Messidor, year 4 [June 30, 1796],
I have just received, general, a letter from Cardinal Dug-
nani, legate of La Romagna, in which he informs me that
an armistice has been concluded between the French Re
public and his Holiness. As I am absolutely ignorant of
the existence of such a treaty, I beg you to let me have a
copy of it, and at the same time to send me your instruc
tions on the subject. You will find annexed a copy of the
cardinal's letter and of my answer.
1 evacuated La Romagna on the 8th, conformably with
your orders. I left there, as I have informed you, only a
detachment of fifty horse and a company of infantry to cover
the collection of the contributions and the removal of the
chests. A courier has just arrived, by whom Captain Albani, who
commands at Forli, informs me that an insurrection has
broken out at Cesena ; that the rebels have seized adjutant-
general Verdier, returning from the mission, on which, for
want of an officer of engineers, I had sent him to Ancona
jointly with adjunct d' Amour. That general officer has been
exposed. to the greatest dangers, and I know not yet whether
he has been able to extricate himself from them. I imme
diately despatched a courier to the magistrates of the town
where the rising had taken place. I summoned them on
their responsibility to set at liberty citizen Verdier, and to
send him to me under a good and safe guard. At the
same time, I ordered the general of brigade Beyrand to march
immediately, with what infantry I had left, a six-inch
howitzer, and a squadron of cavalry, for Cesena, and to
restore order there. I could not forbear giving counter-
orders to the battalion on march for Porto Legnago, that
the Bolognese might not be left without troops.
You see, general, how M. the cardinal and his infernal
clique have excited the minds of the inhabitants : certainly,
if the troops are withdrawn, we must give up the contri
butions, the collection of which would then be impracticable.
Those who might be left to attend to the collection would
run the risk of falling victims to the fury of the populace,
inflamed still more by the news of the armistice.
Augereau.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.' 189
To the General-in-Chief.
Genoa, 6 Messidor, year 4 [June 24, 1796]. '>
The Genoese government has given me no new answer
respecting M. Girola. I transmit to you, under No. 1, a copy
of a declaration made to me the day before yesterday, con
cerning the transmission of muskets and ammunition by
M. Girola to the rebels at Arcquata.
The senate, or, to speak more correctly, the secretary of
state, despatched, on the 30th of this month, an extraorr
dinary courier for Paris. I have no doubt that it was to
inform the minister of Genoa in France of your letter and
of Murat's arrival. As it was possible for me to give to
the same courier a despatch for the minister of the finances,*
I enclosed in that despatch a letter to the Directory, by
which I informed it of all that I sent him, even the copy
and translation of the insignificant answer that has been
made to you.
It is right, moreover, that you should know that the
Directory, having appointed one Marco Frederic to the
post of vice-consul of the French Republic at La Spezzia,
Genoa refuses to recognize him. On its refusal, I re
plied by a note, of which I annex a copy, No. 2 ; you
will see that I wished to bring this perverse government,'
once for all, to an explanation concerning the system of
repulsion and persecution which it pursues towards the
oldest friends that the Revolution has ever had in its ter
ritory. This note is yet unanswered.
The three points in litigation are these — Girola, the five
vessels taken at the Arneca, and the cessation of all the
animosity against those whom we may call the Genoese
patriots. I see clearly why you desire , me in your letter of the:
3rd to get everything belonging to the Republic removed
from this, place.
As to the operations that have taken place here under.
my superintendence relative to the consignments which
have been made to Balbi, the states of the case is this.:
The account of the cases of money arrived is made up :
there~has been found seven thousand and some hundred
livres less than, as it was announced, they ought to contain.
The whole, of the plate has been weighed, and yesterday the
melting was finished, with the knowledge of this city. To-

190 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
morrow, they will proceed to assay the ingots and weigh
them. Five copies are made of the minutes of all these
operations, which are extremely long.
Happen what will, I see nothmg to fear for the silver or
the ingots : for, 1. the money serves every day to pay the
bills of exchange drawn by the national treasury upon
M. Balbi, and by the 1st of July he will have paid them
to the amount of nearly 4,000,000 tournois ; 2. the value
of the sums which will then remain in the hands of
M. Balbi, and of the ingots, which will then be assayed
and weighed, being known, Genoa will be responsible to us
for it. Genoa is incapable of resisting. You may dictate
laws to Genoa whenever you please. Approach with 15,000
or 18,000 men, and, above all, with a train of mortars. Send
me, if you please, an engineer : he will make a tour out
side the fortifications ; he will discover how one may, by
scaling the great wall and then choosing two favourable
points between the great wall and the body of the place for
planting mortars and howitzers, keep Genoa in complete
dependence. Genoa must yield to you: you will always have it in
your power to force it to restore the sums in specie or bul
lion which may be taken at Balbi's. As for the jewels and
diamonds, to which I have not yet adverted, that is quite a
different affair. We have not yet had time to reglue the
case which contains them : to ascertain the value of the
diamonds and pearls, they must all be dismounted. One
can set but very few hands about this work, because they
must be watched to prevent embezzlement. I am going to
commence that operation the day after to-morrow ; it shall
be continued without interruption, and regular minutes
shall be taken. When you judge that they are ready, send
me an order, signed by you and the two commissioners,
Garau and Salicetti, by which, upon any pretext you please,
that can neither lead to any surmise of your intentions, nor
cause Balbi to suspect any diminution of confidence, you
will direct me to fetch away from citizen Balbi's the diamonds
and jewels that are there, for the purpose of being conveyed
to Tortona, or to any other place you may think proper.
For instance, you may make a handle of the fall of the
value of diamonds and pearls in Italy, and allege that in
consequence you prefer sending them to France.
You will only take care to keep at my disposal at San

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 191
Pietro de Arena a detachment of fifty horse, to escort the
convoy, which will not be bulky, but very valuable ; aud I
forewarn you that, without this escort, I will have nothing
to do with the business of removal.
I send you, under Nos. 2 and 3, translations of papers
from among those sent me by General Berthier,
I have sent off to the minister, Charles Lacroix, the
translation of that from Drake to Nelson. He will, per
haps, have in his office the means of deciphering the secret
article of that letter. It recommends to him at the same
time to warn our government to have an eye upon Toulon,
to which that article may possibly relate. The other letters
sent, German, Italian, and French, contain nothing worth
translating. Before I conclude my letter, general, I must communi
cate to you some general ideas concerning Genoa. You
will reconcile them with those which you may have con
ceived on the subject.
What had best be done with Genoa for the advantage of
our Republic, and, at the same time, I may say, for the
true interest of Genoa itself? That is the interesting ques
tion to be resolved.
Must we remind the Genoese of all the wrongs done by
their government to the French — the affair of the Modeste ;
the affair of the Imperieuse, another frigate taken at the
same time, and in the same manner, at La Spezzia ; the
affair in which, last year, the battery of La Lanterne fired
grape at Sibille, who was on board the little xebeck the
Leonidas ; the affair of the refusal of a loan to the French,
when they were destitute of every thing ; that of the recent
capture of five vessels at the Arneca ; lastly, the obstinacy
of the senate in persecuting and molesting all the old par
tisans of the French Revolution ? Yes.
Must we demand, insist on, the annihilation of all de
crees, and the cessation of all prosecutions commenced,
under specious pretexts, for political language and opir
nions ? Yes.
Must we demand of Genoa a loan of from six to eight
millions, and suitable indemnities for the prizes which they
have suffered to be taken from us on their territory, without
opposing the proceeding 2 Yes.
Must we require Genoa to admit no more English yessels
into its port or in its Riviera ? Yes.

192 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES."
Yes, general, most assuredly all this is necessary ; but,
in my opinion, all this will not be sufficient : without some
further measures, you will obtain only a few momentary
advantages ; while, the authority remaining in the hands of
our declared enemies, we shall have constantly to watch and
repress the underhand manoeuvres of the ill-affected sena
tors and the resentment of a populace whom they will
exasperate against us. You must, therefore, if you come
to Genoa, and wish to produce there an effect worthy of
your way of acting and of French dignity, command the
banishment of about fifty persons hostile to France, and the
reform of the mode of the deliberations, by insisting on
their being decided henceforward, in all cases, by a simple
majority. Do this, and, above all, on approaching Genoa,-
publish a manifesto, declaring that you are coming with no
other motives but to deliver the people, and even the nobi
lity, from the tyranny of the families which have engrossed-
all the powers : then your work will be durable ; France
will be able to rely on the good intentions of the Genoese,
and to consider that State as disposed to continue friends'
with her, both by inclination and by the consideration of
the respective interests of the two nations.
I know not whether it would not be better for us, under
certain circumstances, to correspond in cipher : I send you
one, No. 6, which is of no use but between us two.
Faipoult.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
. Paris, 10 Messidor, year 4 [June 28, 1796].
The Directory learns with surprise, citizen-general, that
a lighter and two merchantmen, with valuable cargoes, the
first of which had retired under the fire of the battery of
Portecros, near Toulon, and the other two under that of
St. Pierre, have been taken without resistance by the
English. It requests you not to suffer the approach of
these pirates to the coasts of the Mediterranean, to attend
to that service, which is said to be performed with the
utmost negligence, and to give it all the activity which
circumstances require.
Carnot.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 193
The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 12 Messidor, year 4 [June 30, 1796].
We have received your despatches, dated 3 Messidor :
that which treats of your military position has convinced us
that the Leghorn expedition has not made you lose sight of
a more essential object — that of preserving the conquests in
Italy, by preventing Beaulieu from re-entering the Mi
lanese. We participate in your just impatience for your
return to this side of the Po ; and we think that you will
soon be in a condition to collect your principal forces towards
the points threatened.
The_ Prince of Rome, terrified at the rapidity of your
march, will, no doubt, have demanded an armistice, and
your instructions on this head will have enabled you to
make conditions conformable with our wish, till circum
stances and the consolidation of the triumphs of the Re
public fix the manner in which it will be consistent with
the national dignity and our political system to treat defi
nitively with the Pope.
Your measures in regard to Genoa are approved, and the
Directory is desiring the minister of the Republic to that
power to insist on the expulsion of M. Girola: those which
have for their object the safety of your communications, the
tranquillity of the territory, and the avenging of perfidious
acts executed or attempted against whatever belongs to
the Republic, are likewise deserving of the assent of the
Directory. The observations which you make on the abuses of the
administrative service in the levy and application of the
contributions have fixed our attention. It has appeared to
us that unity of views and harmony among our agents
ought to be the basis of the good order to be established in
that department ; we have, in consequence, revoked the
powers of citizen Pinsot : our commissioners, Salicetti and
Garrau, will direct all the operations which belong to it.
A copy of our instructions to the commissioners of the
government with the armies is annexed, and the disposi
tions contained in our different letters fix the relations
which ought to exist between them and you. The entire
and legitimate confidence which you have acquired, citizen-
general, in every respect, and that which the Directory has
granted to its commissioners, Salicetti and Garrau, afford it
vol. i. o

194 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
the certainty that the same concert will continue to pre
vail between you. Let not any thing then that can add
to the fruit of the conquests of the Republic in Italy, and
to the judicious application of the resources which are
offered you, escape your vigilance. Point out with that
courageous integrity which is peculiar to you all rogues and
peculators, and the just severity of the Directory shall not
fail to overtake them.
General Kellermann has reported to us the requisition
made to him on your application for two demi-brigades, but
he has only five battalions left ; and this reinforcement will
necessarily meet with some delays before it reaches Milan.
The 2000 men furnished by the army of the Coasts of the
Ocean are on march. As soon as the first troops arrive at
Lyons, General Kellermann will despatch to you those that
you apply for : he has been directed to send you two batta
lions ; and one of the demi-brigades, commanded by General
Chateauneuf, is about to receive orders to proceed to the
army of Italy.
The junction of these reinforcements, of the troops which
you will bring back from Tuscany into the Milanese, and
of those which the fall of the castle of Milan will soon
render disposable, will form an imposing force, capable not-
only of resisting Beaulieu, but also of beating him in his
positions, till he is again overthrown. On the 6th, the
army of the Rhine and Moselle effected the passage of the
Rhine at Strasburg with brilliant success ; that of the Sam
bre and Meuse is necessarily about to resume a vigorous
defensive, under favour of this diversion and of a disposable
corps lent it by that of the North. Considerable forces are
acting at this moment on the right bank of that river, and
we hope that the whole theatre of the war will soon be trans
ferred to it.
We have been much pleased to learn that the troops are
free from those diseases which usually attack the French in
Italy. To satisfy the wants of the soldier, to keep him
from intemperance, and to maintain a vigilant discipline,
are the most efficient means of preserving armies from those
destructive calamities, the rock on which their triumphs are
wrecked. The exquisite productions of the fine arts, of the despatch
of which you give us notice, will add to the splendour of the
trophies of the army of Italy.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 195
We must at once embellish and enrich France with all
the valuable monuments and all the interesting productions
of those flourishing countries. It would be useful to in
troduce into our country mares of a good breed, to improve
that of our horses. The territory of several States, and
. especially that of Naples, affords particular resources of this
kind, which the Directory requests you not to neglect,
Carnot.

The General-in-Chief Bonaparte to the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Roverbello, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1 796].
I learn, this moment, citizens directors, that the garrison
of Mantua has made a sortie : it went back quicker than it
came out, leaving behind it fifty killed.
I shall make this evening a final reconnaissance for deter
mining upon the last operations of the siege : in four or five
days the trenches will be opened.
The divisions of the army which are on the mountains of
the Tyrol are in perfect health. The division of General
¦Serrurier, which is besieging Mantua and is 7000 strong,
begins to have fifty sick every day. It is impossible for me
to keep fewer troops about Mantua, where there is a gar
rison of at least 8 or 10,000 men. It is now a month that
I have kept the place blockaded in this manner. The
enemy, informed probably of the weakness of the be
siegers, has often attempted to make sorties and always been
beaten. But I am now obliged to reinforce this division, sinee the
opening of the trenches is about to commence. I hope that
we shall soon have the city, otherwise we shall have a great
many sick.
Wurmser is beginning to make movements for attempting
to raise the blockade of Mantua. I am waiting with some
impatienee for the ten battalions of the army of the Ocean,
which you have long promised me, and of which I have not
yet had any tidings.
I shall not turn my attention to the demands to be made
upon Venice, till the business of Genoa is settled, Mantua
reduced, and the matters about to be taken in hand termi
nated. It is computed that the reinforcements received by the
enemy amount to 31,000 men, 10,000 of whom are Tyrolese ;
o 2

196 LETTERS and despatches.
18,000, remnant of Beaulieu's army ; 8000, garrison' of
Mantua : total, 67,000 men.
The force of our army is as follows : Massena's division,
13,000 men; Sauret's, 8000; Augereau's, 8000 ; Serru-
rier's, 7000 ; Despinois', 5000 ; cavalry, 3000 : total, 40,000
men. You see the great superiority which the enemy has over
us. In the 40,000 men above mentioned, the garrisons of
Leghorn, Milan, Pavia, Tortona, &c, are not included.
I informed you in my last letter that I had demanded
6000 muskets of the republic of Lucca ; they were already
on their way, but, not being of calibre, I sent them back.
I have caused all the property at Leghorn belonging to
Neapolitans to be sequestrated, since, by the armistice, the
suspension of arms is not considered to have commenced till
the moment when the Neapolitan cavalry shall have arrived
at the positions indicated to it. I think, however, that you
might order restitution of the goods belonging to Neapolitans
by an article of the treaty of peace. I have ordered all the
inventories of the effects belonging to Neapolitans to be
made before their consul.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Roverbello, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].
I transmitted to you, citizens directors, by my last courier,
the requisition which I had made to the city of Genoa to.
expel the minister of the emperor, who never ceased foment
ing rebellion in the imperial fiefs and instigating the com
mission of murders. You will find annexed the note which
the secretary of state has addressed to citizen Faipoult,
and which he has sent to me. You will likewise find an
nexed a letter from the minister Faipoult relative to the
affairs of Genoa ; I beg you to take it into consideration, and
to give me your orders upon the subject. As for me, I
think, like the minister Faipoult, that there ought to be
turned out of the government of Genoa a score of families*
which, by the constitution of the country itself, have no
right to be in it, since they are feud&tories of the emperor
or of the King of Naples ; that the senate should be com
pelled to repeal the decree which banishes from Genoa eight

letters and despatches. 197
or ten noble families, namely, those wliich are attached to
France, and which, three years ago, prevented the republic
of Genoa from joining the coalition.' By these means, the
government of Genoa would find itself composed of our
friends, and we might rely the more upon it since the new
banished families would retire among the allies, and thence
forward the new governors of Genoa would fear them as we
fear the return of the emigrants. If you approve this plan,
you have only to give me your orders, and I will charge
myself with the means of ensuring its execution.
I shall expect your answer to this letter in the first
decade of Thermidor.
Bonaparte.

To General Bonaparte.
Venice, 15 Messidor, year 4 [July 3, 1796].
I learn this moment, citizen-general, that a courier who
has come to Drake, the English minister, brings him intel
ligence that General Wurmser is at Trent with a consider
able Austrian army and another Austrian general whose
name he has not given to me with sufficient accuracy.
I think it right to lose no time in acquainting General
Massena, as well as General Kilmaine, with this news ; and
for this purpose I ara. despatching a courier, whom I shall
address to General Rampon at Verona ; but it appeared to
me not less necessary to give you the information.
Lallemant.

To Citizen Faipoult, Minister of the Republic at Genoa.
Head-quarters, Roveredo, 17 Messidor, year 4 [July 5, 1796].
I had rather that the German deserters should take ser
vice in the Spanish army than in the Venetian ; I therefore
beg you to inform the Spanish recruiter that I authorise
him to go to Brescia,, whither I will send all the German
deserters to him.
I have been here since yesterday. General Massena has
been in quest of the enemy, killed 400 of his men, and taken
350 prisoners.
I shall approach youl" walls by and by.
Bonaparte.

198 letters and despatches.
To the Commissary of the Marine at Toulon.
Head-quarters, Roveredo, 17 Messidor, year 4 [July 5, 1796].
Eighty carriages loaded with hemp are about to start
from Bologna for Nice, where they will be at your disposal.
I have written to the minister of the marine, to inform
him that he might send commissioners to Rome, to receive
to the amount of 4,000,000, in cash.
I shall always have great pleasure in doing any thing
that can contribute to the restoration of our navy, though,
in reality, it requires an order of the government.
Bonaparte.
To Citizen Carnot, Member of the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Roverbello, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].
General Berthier is furious about the imaginary victory
which the German news-writers have made Beaulieu gain
over us. For my part, I think those gentlemen are right
to comfort themselves in the only way that is left them :
dreams have always been the consolation of the unfortunate.
All our diplomatic affairs in Italy, with the exception of
Genoa and Venice, are terminated.
For Venice, the moment is not favourable : we must first
take Mantua and give Wurmser a sound drubbing.
As for Genoa, the precise moment has arrived : I am of
the opinion of citizen Faipoult, who is for turning out of
the government a score families who have betrayed us in all
times, and to obtain, on the contrary, the recall of those in
banishment who have shown friendship for us. The moment
I know your intentions on the subject, I shall make it my
duty to execute them ; meanwhile, I shall begin with the
negociations for the 10,000,000.
All goes on well ; the enemy is reinforcing himself : we
shall not seek him unless he comes too near the Adige ; and
we are going to concentrate all our means to take Mantua.
Bonaparte.
The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 14 Messidor, year 4 [July 2, 1796],
The monastery of the Great St. Bernard has attracted,
citizen-general, the attention of the Directory : it has thought

letters and despatches. 199
that it ought to contribute to the maintenance of an esta-.
blishment directed in favour of humanity and the directors
of which afford hospitality to all nations. It recommends
to you to order the sum of 6000 livres in money to be re
mitted to the religious of that monastery, to make up for
the aid which has been so long withheld.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 17 Messidor, year 4 [July 5, 1796].
The Executive Directory reminds you, citizen-general, of
the urgent request that it made you to give precise orders,
to be vigilantly followed up, that plans of situations and
decadary historical bulletins should be regularly addressed
to it. It is sorry to see that, since the commencement of
the campaign, the army which you command has not sent
any of those different objects. It is important that this task
be henceforward punctually performed, and executed upon
the plan of the model.
When the occupations of the chief of the staff are too
numerous for him to attend personally to this point, he
can make an adjutant-general supply his place in drawing
up the historical bulletin, which requires a particular talent.
You will fulfil, citizen- general, the wish of the Directory,
by paying serious attention to the object of this letter.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].
We have received, citizen-general, your despatches of the
8th Messidor : we are satisfied with the armistice concluded
with the pope. The other advantages which you regret not
to have derived from that negociation will be found, we hope
with you, at the time of the definitive treaty, which we are
in no hurry to conclude, persuaded that the army of Italy,
in maintaining its glorious conquests, will give us all the
latitude necessary for imposing upon Italy the conditions of
peace most favourable to the Republic. In order to have
avoided the difficulties which you have met with in the dis
cussion of the armistice, it would have been desirable that
our commissioners should have conferred upon it in your

200 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
presence only with M. d'Azara ; but at this moment we see
nothing but the importance of that event, and the precious
faculty which it has given you of marching rapidly back to
this side of the Po, before Beaulieu has had time to attempt
any thing.
The retaining of the port of Ancona promises advantages
to our Levant trade ; but this measure appears to us to be
still uncertain for the future. We beg of you, however, till
something is settled in regard to this point, which is neces
sarily connected with ulterior circumstances, to make all the
dispositions that you shall deem useful.
It will be very interesting for us to know what opinion
we ought to attach to the overtures made to you by Prince
Pignatelli relative to Vienna ; and you have acted wisely
by directing him to repair without delay to Paris. In di
plomacy, as in war, moments are always precious.
The expedition to Leghorn must have been to Genoa a
signal of just alarm, which its perfidious neutrality cannot
but excite in it. Let the national vengeance follow the vic
torious army of Italy, and let us not neglect the indemnities
demanded by the losses and the sacrifices of the Republic.
The army of the Rhine and Moselle is continuing its vic
torious and rapid course on the right bank of the Rhine ; it
has overthrown part of Wurmser's troops near Offenburg,
and gained a battle on the 10th at Reinchen.
We learn this moment that the army of the Sambre and
Meuse has, conformably with our precise intentions, resumed
its offensive movement, and that the divisions which had
crossed the Rhine in falling back have recrossed the river
by main force. The Austrians cannot withstand the com
bined attack of these two powerful armies, which are impa
tient to follow the immortal traces of that which you com
mand. Carnot.

To M. the Proveditor-General.
Head-quaiters, Roveredo, 19 Messidor, year 4 [July 7, 1796].
I have received several reports of murders committed
upon Frenchmen by inhabitants of Pont Santo Marco. I
have no doubt that you will put a stop to this as speedily
as possible, otherwise the villages will be exposed to the
just resentment of the army, and I will make a terrible ex
ample of them.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 201
¦ I flatter myself that you will cause the guilty to be appre
hended, and place additional detachments in that town to
secure the communications.
Bonaparte.

To M. the Proveditor-General.
Head-quarters, Verona, 20 Messidor, year 4 [July 8, 1796].
There prevails between the French troops and the
Slavonians an animosity, which ill-affected persons, no
doubt, study to inflame. To prevent greater evils, not less
grievous than contrary to the interests of the two repub
lics, it is indispensable, sir, that you should send away
from Verona to-morrow, on the most plausible pretexts,
the battalions of Slavonians which you have in this city.
Bonaparte.

To M. the Proveditor-General.
Head- quarters, Verona, 21 Messidor, year 4 [July 9, 1796].
The present circumstances of the war and the necessity
for defending Verona, oblige me, sir, to place artillery on
the ramparts of this city. I have the honour to apprise
you that I have given instructions to this effect to the
general of artillery.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief
Bergamofl7 Messidor, year 4 [July 5, 1796].
The reports of my spies and of travellers agree in assur
ing me that the enemy is fortifying himself at the mountain
of Tonale, and that he is going to form a camp at Bal-
zente. To-morrow I shall have some more positive infor
mation, on the return of a trusty person ; and by an
adjunct [adjoint] whom I have sent into the Valteline, you
will have certain intelligence both respecting the adjutant-
general whom you have sent to the chief of the Leagues and
the dispositions of the Grisons : I am assured that they
are disposed and quite ready to take arms against any army
that should attempt to violate their territory.
From Bergamo there are four different routes to the
country of the Grisons : that of the Lake of Como and

202 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Chiavenna ; that of the valley of Brembo ; that of Serio
and Schalvo, and that of Val Camonica. All these routes
are very difficult : they are covered by extremely high and
steep mountains.
The debouches from the Tyrol to Bergamo are by the
Tonale, Ponte di Legno, Val Camonica, and the Grisons.
The first is as bad as the others. Cervoni.

To General Berthier, Chief of the Staff.
Bologna, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].
Your order of the 17th of this month, general, reached
me only just at the moment when I was setting out for
Lugo, where there is formed an apostolic army of 15 or
20,000 men. Those rebels have cavalry, leaders, and
generals ; they give passports, dated " Head-quarters,
Lugo :" they have killed two of my volunteers and a horse
chasseur. I have despatched a battalion, two pieces of
cannon, and a squadron, and am going at their head to re
duce those fanatics to order. I consider this measure as
indispensably necessary before leaving this country. I
have nevertheless sent off last night M. the Baron de Ca-
peletti, charge d' affaires of his Catholic Majesty, to try
the effect of remonstrance. I am waiting for his answer.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Leghorn, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].
I reported to you in my last, citizen-general, that the
military department was going on well at Leghorn : it is
the only one about which I am able to satisfy you. I have
been excluded from other matters, and am very glad of it,
for I am relieved from the responsibility of them.
From what the consul of the Republic tells me, the
English magazines will probably yield 5,000,000, if em
bezzlements, of which he is himself apprehensive, can be
prevented. I had slipped my Argus into the commission
charged with the sequestrations, inventories, and perhaps
the sale ; he was turned out by a resolution.
The consul of France has just left me : he has been to
complain of the cruelties practised upon the merchants of

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 203
the country. These merchants, on receiving intimation
that they were to pay to the Republic the amount of what
they owed to the English, insisted at first that there was
much more due to them from the English than they owed,
and that, at least, compensation ought to be made. They
were told that they might compound, and that, to excuse
them from producing their books, which should be verified,
the French would be content with 5 or 6,000,000. Yesterday,
as the consul told me, they offered 5,000,000 : it was re
fused. The consul appears to be extremely vexed at this :
he declares that this treatment is driving the merchants to
despair. •
The port is, by order, closely shut : of course it can no
longer be frequented, even by neutrals. Might not great
injury result from this to the country ? The Greeks and
other neutrals suffer; and if Provence were in need of
corn, are we not driving away those who procure it ?
Be it said, between ourselves, I believe that there is a
disposition to injure Leghorn for the benefit of Genoa.
The Genoese consul Lachese has been placed on the com
mission by the commissioners : many Genoese are arriving
here, and probably speculating on the goods of the English ;
this competition could not be otherwise than advantageous ;
but beware of connivances !
In shorty general, I am convinced that, with fair and
gentle means, this city would have fulfilled your expecta
tions, and produced, without crying out, 1 0,000,000 to the
Republic.
Vaubois.

To the General-in-Chief.
Formigosa, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].
I went yesterday, according to your orders, to the lake
of Mantua: after long and useless inquiry for the casa
Tasidiani, which nobody knew, guided by the localities, I
came to a house which I believe to be that marked in
the plan.
The road to it must be constantly above the water in the
highest inundations. It is almost entirely sheltered on the
side next to the enemy : at any rate, the columns may file
along at the rear, without the place having the slightest
suspicion of the matter.

204 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The house is situated on the margin of the lake, or, to
speak more correctly, of the inundation : one may embark at
once, or, if the water is low, by means of some small flying
bridges of little consequence. No muddy marsh to cross,
Consequently no hurdles, &c.
The lake is covered, in front of the house, for a regular
breadth of two hundred fathoms, with reeds ten or twelve
feet high. For this space, which we crossed with very
great difficulty on account of the reeds, the lake is of suffi
cient depth to carry large boats.
We also traversed it by following the canal marked in the
plan on the left of the house ; but this direction carried us
too far below the entrenchments, and we examined the first.
Beyond the reeds is the Mincio, the channel of which
may be from twenty-eight to thirty fathoms in width, which
we measured this morning a little lower down. Beyond the
Mincio is a flat shore covered with rushes.
No dispositions having been made yesterday evening for
measuring the breadth of the Mincio and the space covered
with reeds, the operation was deferred till to-night, espe
cially as, by. that time, we shall know in what direction we
must take these measures : which it is important to ascer
tain, as will be seen by and by.
The house called Tasidiani is found to. correspond by its
position nearly with the centre of that of the enemy, be
tween the canal of the cut and the place. In this interval
you perceive the entrenchment which defends the cut ; it is
very raking [rasant] ; a large camp parallel to the canal of
St. George, with posts in advance, one of which faces the
casa Tasidiani, with a stationary boat, that, I believe, does
not ply at night. We saw it retire yesterday evening and
arrive this morning at daybreak ; it has six oars and but
few hands. The great camp appears to support itself upon
an entrenchment which covers the side of the place towards
the canal of St. George ; this entrenchment, which is pali
saded, is extremely raking, appears in suitable, and might
be turned.
At the angle of the flank of the bastion on the right of
this entrenchment, is the termination bf a dike which runs
to a great distance in front of the enclosure that faces St.
George. The enemy is busily at work augmenting the re
lief. It covers a sallyport, placed in that part of the enclo
sure which is beyond the third flank.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 205
As to the arming of the part of the enclosure, there are
to be seen only six embrasures on the face to the right of
the tower, two embrasures on the face that comes next, and
one embrasure at the flanked angle, looking more to the right
face than to the left.
Now for the reflections suggested by these localities, and
what we propose in consequence of those reflections.
A landing upon the right bank of the Mincio appears to
us to be practicable, but, instead of making it in front of
the entrenchment, it is proposed to make it in rear, near
the dike, in order to turn that same entrenchment. The
means are these :
To make three cuts running to the same point in the
forest of reeds in front of the casa Tasidiani ; to make the
three great barks which are to carry the men for landing
keep moving to and fro in these three canals.
To establish on the remaining part of the Mincio, as
well over the canal as through the reeds, a bridge so con
structed that the boats be placed lengthwise instead of
breadthwise — a necessary precaution both for the facility
of the manoeuvre and the obstacle opposed by the reeds.
This bridge will be brought ready formed, or at least it
will be put together in a very short time in the middle cut,
and it will be propelled or hauled to the opposite bank.
For this operation expert and intrepid swimmers must be
employed. Supposing the Mincio to be thirty fathoms in width, and
the patch of reeds on the right bank likewise thirty
fathoms, there will be sixty fathoms to provide for,
and eighteen boats of three fathoms each will be
sufficient. This is not all. The bridges and the lighters can be
brought at night before the casa Tasidiani, without the
enemy perceiving this movement. I followed this morning
a canal, which runs along the left side of the Mincio behind
the reeds, that carried me to the Mincio, down which I
proceeded to Formigosa.
I was accompanied in the reconnaissance of yesterday
evening by citizens Samson, chief of battalion of en
gineers, and Duroc, captain of labourers, and in that of
this morning by Captain Duroc alone.
Andreossi.

206 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief.
Formigosa, 19 Messidor, year 4 [July 7, 1796].
The reconnaissance of last night has produced nothing.
According to the report of Captain Duroc, the cruizing
bark has prevented ours from debouching from the reeds. I
shall go thither myself this evening.
Citizen Duroc perceived distinctly at sunset the bastion
on the right of the entrenchment, which covers the enclo
sure armed with six pieces of cannon & barbette on the
side next to the Mincio.
The day before yesterday, we had heard the retreat
beaten at the camp, and the sentinels calling to each other
to be upon their guard. Yesterday, the retreat was not
beat ; the utmost silence prevailed, and not a bell in the
city sounded.
The water is rising, which will facilitate the landing : it
begins to be a little mooonlight.
Men are at work upon the bridge for the cut. I have
given orders for the construction of six gun-carriages a
coulisse, that is to say, three for eight-pounders and three
for howitzers. I shall have boats sufficient for landing from
300 to 600 men collected to-day ; I shall have, besides,
several small boats to move about with celerity to the
right and left: such were the orders you gave me
yesterday.
Andreossi.

To the General-in-Chief.
Verona, 19 Messidor, year 4 [July 7, 1796].
I am writing, citizen-general, from Vicenza, where the
enemy, who is very near, apprised of my coming, had formed
a plan to carry me off, or at least to lie in wait for me
as I left the town : I did my business all the same.
I sent off yesterday morning from Vicenza two trusty
men, one for Bassano and the other for Premolano. One
returned in the night, with rather circumstantial details,
which tally with those that have been given me by three
persons from Bassano. I wait here for the second emissary
and also two others whom I have despatched to Trent!
The details that I have received are these :

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 207
At Bassano, 5000 men, 2000 of them cavalry ; at Bressa-
via, 300 Hulans ; at Pazza, 100 horse.
On the left bank of the Brenta, at Citadella, 200 cavalry ;
at Dampo and Pietro, 150 cavalry ; they are said to be
Neapolitans. At Premolano, 6000 to 7000 men, expected to-day at
Bassano, of whom about 2000 cavalry. At Bassano and
Premolano there is only field artillery and no bridge
equipage. The inhabitants of Vicenza and the environs appear very
well disposed, and the extraordinary attentions paid by the
principal inhabitants and the podesta do not indicate that
they expect to see us driven out, as people said at Verona.
The Bishop of Vicenza, who arrived yesterday at Bassano,
observed that it would require something more than that to
drive out the French.
The Slavonians have all been sent away from Verona,
and are at Padova : it appears that they have been strongly
excited against us ; so I have been told by one of their
officers whom I saw at Vicenza. At Venice and Padova
there are about 10,000 Slavonians : it is their chaplains,
together with some silly jests of our soldiers, that have
occasioned their animosity.
The Venetians, with the exception of three or four thou
sand Slavonians from Venetian Italy, are arming only at
sea ; but they appear to be doing so with activity.
I expect here two men from Trent and one from Premo-
lana : they will arrive this evening ; they are trusty fellows.
Meanwhile, here is what I am informed from Trent.
The advanced posts of the enemy at Alia and Borghetto
amount to 2500 men. In Roveredo and the environs, there
are 15,000 men; at Bolzano, 12,000. It is said that they
expect 15 or 20,000 more. In what they have at present^
there are 10,000 cavalry, including the Neapolitans, who
have not yet left them. It appears that no troops of the
enemy have marched for Bergamo. Kilmaine.

Note presented to the Doge and Senate of Venice on the 20th
Messidor (July 8), by the Minister of the French
Republic.The minister of the French Republic, agreeably to the
orders which he has just received, has the honour to inform

208 letters and despatches.
your serenity and your excellencies that the French go
vernment cannot see with indifference the assemblage of
Slavonian soldiers and of national troops, which has been
going on for some time in Venice and in the islands of its
district. The Venetians took no defensive measure when the
Austrians marched considerable corps of troops into the
Venetian territory, and threatened to introduce them at
other points which in all ages had been respected. It seems
strange that, at the moment when the French, pursuing
their enemy upon the same territory which he is still vio
lating with impunity, are forced to occupy, though as
friends, posts indispensable for the success of their opera
tions, there should be collected extraordinary forces, the
object of which is not even apparent.
It is known to your serenity and your excellencies that
the ferment excited by this novelty has extended to the
whole Arenetian nation. It must necessarily have caused it
to believe that these dispositions were directed solely against
the French, and this opinion is so accredited through the
perfidious insinuations of the emigrants and the partizans of
Austria, that the coffee-houses and the public places still
ring with the most scandalous expressions, in spite of the
reiterated complaints wliich have been made and the
measures which the administration has taken to suppress
them. The general-in-chief of the French army considers these
dispositions as hostile, or dictated by a confidence injurious
to Venice, and contrary to the interests and the dignity of
the French Republic.
The minister of France has orders to demand of your
serenity and your excellencies a frank and honest expla
nation respecting the nature and the object of this move
ment. He ought to rely upon the positive assurances which
the Senate has given to the Executive Directory by its am
bassador in Paris, and which M. the Chevalier Pesaro is
daily repeating, of the firmest and the most constant friend
ship of the republic of Venice for the French Republic ;
but he further expects from its wisdom the immediate ces
sation of an arming, the continuance of which, in justifying
the founded suspicions that it excites in the general,
would decide him to steps, whicli must destroy in a moment
that good understanding which the respective ministers of

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES; 209
the two governments have thus far exerted themselves to
maintain. He thinks also that a prompt and satisfactory answer,
which should be sent immediately to the general-in-chief of
the army, would have the effect of destroying the disad
vantageous ideas that he must have conceived, and revive
his confidence.
Lallemant.

Proclamation of the General-in-Chief to the people of Mantua.
Head-quarters, Roverbello, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 9, 1796].
The general-in-chief is informed that abuses of all kinds
are committed, and that the good people of the duchy of
Mantua are crushed by abusive requisitions. In conse
quence, he orders,
1. That there shall be three assemblies in the duchy of
Mantua, composed of one deputy for each commune, who
shall meet on the 24th of the month.
The first meeting shall be held at Roverbello, and com
prehend the deputies of all the country between the Mincio,
the Po, and the States of Venice.
The second assembly shall be held at Gouraque, and
shall comprise the deputies of all the conquered countries
beyond the Po.
The third shall be held at Castiglione de Scrivia, and
comprehend the deputies of all the countries comprised
between the Mincio, the Po, the Brescian, and Lombardy.
2. Each deputy shall bring with him : 1, his act of depu
tation by the municipality ; 2, a paper of complaints which
the inhabitants have to make against different individuals
of the army ; 3, a statement of the contributions in money
which the country has furnished, and into whose hands ;
4, a statement of the contributions in kind that have been
furnished, and to whom delivered ; 5, a statement of the
amount found in the public chests ; 6, a statement of the
direct and indirect impositions, and what is due.
3. The oldest member of each assembly shall be the
president ; it shall assemble in a place that shall be speci
fied by the municipalities, where they will meet.
4. Each assembly shall nominate three deputies, to go
with all the papers of complaints and the statements above-
mentioned to the general-in-chief. Immediately afterwards
VOL. i. p

210 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
the assembly shall be dissolved : it must not last longer
than twelve hours.
5. The general-in-chief forbids, upon the severest penal
ties, agents of the services, commissaries of war, or officers,
to make any requisition unless it be signed by the ordon
nateur en chef.
Bonaparte.

To General Bonaparte.
Roverbello, 19 Messidor, year 4 [July 8, 1796].
I am come hither, general, to give you an account of
my reconnaissance of last night.
Between ten and eleven o'clock I approached, by favour
of the reeds, with two boats, as far as the canal of St.
George : from that place I detached two men with the
lightest of those boats : they proceeded, unperceived, to the
opposite bank, above the entrenchments, as you had pre
scribed : when the poles with which they propelled their
boat were not long enough to reach the bottom, they swam
with those same poles. No trees in this part-; very little
herbage ; and, in the shallowest parts, two fathoms water.
The opposite bank is a dike, the slopes of which afford an
easy access ; they brought me back specimens of that land
of promise, which will soon be ours, if the means are well,
combined, as I have no doubt they will be: order and
silence, and I will answer for the landing.
On attentively examining at sunset the bastion on the
right of the entrenchments which cover the enclosure, I did
not perceive the six pieces of cannon mentioned in my letter
of yesterday : with a good glass I clearly distinguished two
embrasures formed on the parapet with gabions full of
earth ; it did not appear to me that this battery was armed.
The stationary boat went up a little before the retreat ;
a second came down a little before ten ; so apparently a
boat does pass the night in this position.
The sentinels of the city cried a good deal till about
twelve o'clock, when I retired : those of the camps and the
posts depending on them maintain the most profound
silence. All that you have ordered me shall be ready to-morrow
evening. •
F. Andreossi.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 211
To General Bonaparte.
Bologna, 20 Messidor, year 4 [July 8, 1796].
The apostolic army and its head-quarters no longer exist.
The Chouans of the Romagna and the Ferrarese have been
chased, beaten, dispersed, at all points ; and, if I am
not mistaken, it will be a long time before they take a
fancy to fight us again.
Some priests, who conceived themselves still in the age
of the crusades, and five or six villains animated with the
spirit of revolt, contrived to collect, by means of terror, a
silly and misguided rabble, to which they ridiculously gave
the pompous name of army. Regulations, proclamations,
acts of atrthority of all kinds, had already issued from this
focus of insurrection ; workshops of all sorts were in full
activity : all trembled under the tyrannical yoke of these
rivals of Charette.
I ordered General Beyrand, who was then at Forli, to
seize, if possible, the printer, whose name was attached to
an incendiary .proclamation which I mentioned to you at the
time : that general sent a piquet of cavalry and a detach
ment of infantry to Lugo, for this operation. Those troops
were received with a fire of musketry, and obliged to retire,
after having had three men and a horse killed and four or
five men wounded.
Incensed at the audacity of these brigands, convinced of
the necessity of preventing the spreading of the insurrection,
and resolved to avenge French blood, I determined to begin
with a decisive blow.
I ordered General Beyrand to repair to lmola, where I
directed a battalion of the 4th demi-brigade, 200 horse, and
two pieces of artillery, to assemble; and I repaired thither
myself. The chief of brigade, Pourallier, had orders to set
put with half of the troops that were at Ferrara, and to
march to the rear of Lugo, to cut off the rebels, while I
should attack them in front.
On arriving at lmola, M. the Baron de Capaletti, charge?
des affaires of the King of Spain, proposed to me his medi
ation, and proceeded to Lugo to persuade that horde to lay
down their arms and to return to order: they were obsti
nate, and rejected these proposals. I marched against them
yesterday morning, with nearly 800 infantry, 200 horse,
and two pieces of artillery. About a league and a half from
p2

212 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. ,
the town, their advanced posts, concealed among the hemp
crops, began to fire : our advanced troops dislodged them,
and drove them faster than at a foot pace into the town,;
where they fancied themselves safe. I ordered a few can
non-shot to be sent after them, and several houses to be
fired. This demonstration, combined with a brisk fire of
musketry, made them shift their quarters precipitately ;
they fled in disorder into the country, where I caused them
to be closely pursued. About 300 were left on the spot.
The affair cost us four killed, and six or seven wounded.
The leaders of these rebels, certain of the treatment that I
should reserve for them, had prudently betaken themselves
to flight.
On entering Lugo, shots from windows killed two of my
men. I would have burned the town ; but women, old
men, and children only were left in it ; they were respected.
Augereau.

To General Bonaparte.
Leghorn, 21 Messidor, year 4 [July 9, 1796].
I avail myself of the first opportunity to give you an
account of the state of Leghorn.
I venture to assure you that the military service is going
on well, that the forts are respectable, that the conduct of
the troops is good, and that we are ready to receive the
enemy. I do not think that the commission created here to secure
to the Republic all that belongs to the English will give
you the same satisfaction. Dissension is breaking out in it.
The consul of France, Belleville, would have withdrawn ;
the minister and I prevailed upon him to remain : he gave
me to understand that he was afraid of peculation. A
Genoese colony has come to take- the lead in business.
Lachaise, consul of Genoa, associated with Belleville, has
taken a high tone : I might even complain of his corre
spondence. The commercial business has miscarried, in my opinion.
If, as the commissioner Garrau assured me, the merchants
offered 5,000,000 in specie, I think it was wrong not to
close with them. These merchants allege that the English
are prodigiously in their debt, and that they have advice
that the English will not pay them ; they proclaimed the

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 213
stoppage of their payments immediately. I think them in
a horrible crisis. I wish the Republic may be a gainer by
it ; but I doubt that. This business has been roughly
treated. A little more suavity and pliability would have
succeeded better.
The English magazines are very considerable, as I am
told ; but I am very often reminded too that the whole
will not be for the Repubhc. The commission is nume
rous, some of its members not of the best repute ; the prin
cipal of them have the pen always in their hands ; the
magazines are frequented only by the subordinates ; the in
ventories are made only by them : in short, they are at
liberty to, fish in troubled water.
I wash my hands of all these affairs, and confine myself
to the military department. Vaubois.

The Senate of Venice in answer to the Note of the
Minister Lallemant.
Venice, 9 July, 1796 [21 Messidor, year 4].
The memorial which you have this morning sent affords
the Senate occasion, which is always agreeable to it, to
renew, in a solemn manner, the assurance of the sincere
and constant friendship which it has avowed to the French
Republic, and of the firmness and punctuality with which it
will exert itself to keep in the principles of the strict neutra
lity which it has adopted in the course of the present war.
The sincerity and frankness of its public conduct, to which
the Senate is able to bear a noble testimony in face of
the government, will certainly never stoop to malicious in
terpretations, whieh could have been devised only by male
volence, and a desire to disturb the perfect harmony which
so happily subsists between the two republics.
And as for the arming which we are directing, and which
forms the subject of your memorial, though we have already
intimated the innocent use to which it was destined, we
make it a duty to give you the most precise information on
that head.
The entire confidence of the Senate in the friendship and
sincerity of the belligerent powers has always disinclined
it to take precautions for ensuring the external tranquillity
of its States, and has always caused it to confine itself to
the maintenance of order in the interior : it still, rests upon

214 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
the same basis : but, having reason to fear at this moment
that the environs of this capital may soon become the
theatre of violent military struggles, it cannot refrain from
taking the precautions necessary for securing it against
unforeseen descents of affrighted inhabitants, or of armed
men, dispersed or fugitives, who, coming thither in quest of
an asylum, might occasion confusion and terror.
Such is the sole motive of the measures which we have
taken, in drawing part of the naval forces nearer to these
parts, in directing a suitable number of armed barks for
their service to be prepared, and in summoning a sufficient
quantity of troops for the guard of the capital. We are
persuaded that the noble frankness of the Senate will en
tirely dispel the suspicions which may have been conceived
respecting the object of those same dispositions.
It flatters itself that, in this circumstance, you will give
it a new proof of the constant pains you take to strengthen
the good understanding between the two governments. We
assure you once more of the sentiments of our particular
consideration.

To General Bonaparte.
Venice, 23 Messidor, year 4 [July 11, 1796].
On my arrival in this city, to repair to my post, I have
met with some particulars which appear to me to be quite
certain respecting the state of the enemy's troops towards
, Bassano, and which, in consequence, I think it my duty to
transmit to you.
Persons who went from that city expressly to look at
the Austrian camp have reported that, on the 19th in
stant, there were below Bassano 600 Hulans, 600 hussars,
400 Neapolitan cavalry, 200 light cavalry, two battalions of
infantry, and five pieces of cannon. They added that the
cavalry was very fine, but that the infantry appeared to be
in a bad state. They said too, what I was told elsewhere,
that he has very advanced posts as far as Costavolo on the
Brenta, some miles on this side of Bassano : their principal
occupation was the transport of provisions, which they
bring from the Venetian States and convey to Bassano upon
the river. Lastly, they have confirmed the statement that
frequent patroles are sent towards Vicenza to make recon
naissances.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 215
Moreover, general, I am assured here that the Venetian
government is seriously engaged in the choice of a general
to command its troops. According to the laws of the
country, as you are no doubt aware, that general must be a
foreigner; in consequence, three persons, it is said, have
been thought of, not one of whom, certainly, is a friend to
our Republic. These are, 1, M. Salis, formerly colonel
of a. Swiss regiment in France ; 2, the Prince of Nassau;
3, the Polish general Komarzewski, an old favourite of
Stanislaus, the servant and protege of Russia. I shall, seek,
the moment I arrive in Venice, to verify this fact : if it is
true, it might give rise to still greater distrust on our part.
Jacob,
Secretary of the French Legation at Venice.

To General Bonaparte.
Florence, 23 Messidor, year 4 [July 11, 1796].
I have not been able to set out, general, so soon as I
wished, on my journey to Rome. I thought it right, be
fore my departure, to agree with M. Azara respecting the
course which I was to pursue, and it was agreed that I
ought not to arrive till after him in that city, for which he
will not start himself for these two or three days. I should
not, however, have heeded this motive of prudence and ex-
fediency, had I not been obliged to prolong my stay here.
have received news from Leghorn concerning the project
formed by the English for possessing themselves of Porto-
Ferrajo, which has required some explanations on my part
with the government of Tuscany.
I have desired, in order to relieve ourselves from all fear
of an invasion, which it is highly important to our interests
to prevent, that the governor of Porto Ferrajo, a man sold
to the English, should be changed ; that the grand-duke
should give orders for strengthening the garrison of that
place, too weak to resist any serious attack ; and that it
should even be agreed that we should add to it 200 men
drawn from Leghorn.
Of these proposals, one only, the change of the governor,
was adopted; the others were plumply rejected. The
government, founding itself on the principles of a neutrality,
which it considers as inherent in its system of administra-

216 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
tion, and supporting itself upon the plea that it is at peace
with all the powers, declares that.it has laid it down as a con
stant rule not to augment its means of defence in any place ;
and, setting out from this point, it refuses to send succours
to Porte Ferrajo.
It is therefore evident to my eyes that it is resolved to
make no resistance to the English, in case of attempts;
and that we must expect to see Porto Ferrajo in their
hands very shortly, if the thing is not already done.
I have not dissembled here any of my thoughts as to
the consequences of such a determination, and what bitter
but too late regrets it might some day cost Tuscany ; but,
in showing all the dissatisfaction that I feel, I can do no more
than I have done. In my opinion, it is proper to abstain
from illusory threats, and especially in Italy, where, when
people are afraid, they always represent the evil to them
selves as much greater than it is destined to happen ; but,
on the other hand, they soon pass from terror to insolence,
when they have not experienced all the ill they feared, be
cause it is in the vindictive character of the inhabitants of
this country to see always impotence in their enemies and
never generosity.
It will, therefore, be for you, citizen-general, to enlighten
me respecting the conduct that I am to pursue. It is, as
you perceive, delicate, and will perhaps be still more so' by
and by, especially at Rome. The examples of Pavia,
Binasco, Lugo, ought to be present to us, and impose upon
us the law of extreme prudence and extreme distrust. I
am far, however, from entertaining any alarm, or to think
that it is necessary to draw forces to the centre of Italy ; not
but that I believe they would be useful to ensure the execu
tion of the armistices which you have made, because, look
ing back incessantly to the real object of the war, I should
consider the dissemination of our forces as an obstacle to the
execution of the plan of campaign of Tyrol, to the impor
tance of wliich every other consideration must give way.
Miot.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Verona, 24 Messidor, year 4 [July 12, 1796].
General Sauret, with 3000 men, defends from Salo, situ
ated on the Lake of Garda, to the Lake of Iseo.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 217
General Massena, with 12,000 men, defends from Torre
to Rivalta on the Adige, and thence he defends the passage
of the Adige to San Giovani, three miles lower down than
Verona. The city of Verona has been put into a state of
defence by means of the artillery found in that place.
General Despinois defends, with 5000 men, from San
Giovani to Runco.
General Augereau, with 8000 men, defends from Runco
to Castaniara ; there are sluices, by means of which the
whole of the low country may be inundated.
General Kilmaine, with 2000 cavalry and 12 pieces of
hght artillery, is at Valeza, ready to start for any point at
which the enemy might be disposed to attempt a passage.
Porto Legnago, where there is a bridge over the Adige,
has been put into a state of defence, by using the Venetian
artillery found in the place.
Besides the bridges which we have at Porto Legnago
and Verona, I am getting a bridge of boats constructed
opposite to the Chiusa, defended by good batteries of posi
tion.
. By means of these three bridges, the army will pass
rapidly, on the first movement of the enemy, from the
defensive to the offensive.
The enemy has his advanced posts at Alta and Mal-
ses§ha, and he is now pushing very considerable columns
behind the Brenta. There are nearly 8000 men at Bas
sano. We have been for several days observing that posi
tion. Woe to him who shall calculate wrong ! . . .
As for us, we are solely occupied with the siege of Man
tua. I meditate a bold stroke : boats, Austrian uniforms,
incendiary batteries, shall all be ready by the 28th. The
ulterior operations will entirely depend on the success of
this coup de main, which, like those of that nature, de
pends absolutely on luck, on a dog or a goose.
This state of things makes me think that we ought to
defer the operation of Genoa for ten or twelve days, espe
cially as I shall not before then receive your answer to a
letter that I have sent you.
You will find annexed a copy of a letter which I have
written, in consequence, to the minister of the Republic
Faipoult. M. Catt&neo, whom the senate of Genoa has
sent to me, arrived this morning. He has, as you may

218 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
conceive, been extremely pleased with what I have told him.
The steps that Faipoult will take, and other accessory
operations, will enable us to attain our aim, which is to gain
about a fortnight, by which time our situation in Italy will
be so decided that I shall follow, without obstacle, point. by
point, the orders that you shall give me respecting Genoa
and Venice.
The latter republic is arming briskly. Citizen Lalle-
mant bas not apprized me, as he ought to, have done, of the
nature and activity of these armaments. You will find
annexed a copy of the note which he addressed to the senate,
and of the answer of the senate. At any rate, I am master
of all the strong places of the republic of Venice on the
Adige. Perhaps you may think proper to begin now to
pick, a little quarrel with: the minister of Venice in Paris,
in order that, after the taking of Mantua, and after I have
driven the Austrians from the Brenta, I may find the
greater facility for the demand which you intend me to
make of some millions.
We begin to have many sick before Mantua, but not one
death yet. The heat is excessive, and the air of Mantua
extremely unwholesome.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 26 Messidor, year 4 [July 14, 1796].
All the troops of the divisions employed in the expedi
tion to Leghorn and Bologna have recrossed the Po. I
have only ordered that 400 men should be left in the citadel
of Ferrara. By the treaty, the legation of Ferrara is to
remain united to the French Republic.
A monk, coming from Trent, brought intelligence into the
Romagna that the Austrians had passed the Adige, raised
the blockade of Mantua, and were making forced marches to
the Romagna. Seditious papers and fanatic preachers were
everywhere preaching insurrection : they organized in a
few days what they called the Catholic and Papal Army;
they established their head-quarters at Lugo, a large vil
lage of the legation of Ferrara, though surrounded by the
Romagna. General Augereau ordered the chief of brigade Pou-
rallier to go and reduce Lugo. That officer, at the head of

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 219
a battalion, arrived before Lugo, where the alarm-bell had
been ringing for several hours : he found there some thou
sands of peasants. An officer of grenadiers advanced, with
a flag of truce: they made signs to him to approach; and
a moment afterwards a shower of musket-balls was poured
upon him. These wretches, cowardly as perfidious, ran
away : some hundreds were left dead on the gronnd. Since
this event, which occurred on the 18th, order has been re
stored and all is perfectly quiet.
Bonaparte.

The Grand-Duke of Tuscany to General Bonaparte.
Florence, July 13, 1796 [25 Messidor, year 4].
By the copies of the three notes annexed from M. Miot,
minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic and the
answers that have been made to them, you may acquaint
yourself with his proposals tending to an augmentation of
the garrison of Porto Ferrajo, for the purpose of defending
that place against an attack of the enemy. Being at peace
with all the powers of Europe, and, in the course of the
present war, having never augmented by a single man the
small military forces of the grand-duchy, in the intention
of repelling foreign hostilities, I cannot lend myself to
such measures prejudicial to the neutrality, (the funda
mental law of Tuscany) assured by treaties and particularly
the last concluded with the French Republic, and recog
nised by all the belligerent powers.
To these grave and important motives is added that of an
absolute impossibility to send any reinforcement to Porto
Ferrajo, since, before the receipt of M. Miot's notes, the
sea was not free, and Leghorn was blockaded by English
ships, which permit nothing to approach, and prevent the
departure of every vessel ; which reduces that port to the
last extremity.
The question, general, relates to a matter in which the
glory of your name is concerned : you guaranteed to me the
observance of that same neutrality in your letter dated
June 24th last, and I earnestly solicit you to interpose your
authority that this demand may remain without effect. I
flatter myself to obtain this from your equity, and am with
particular esteem Ferdinand.

220 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To General Bonaparte.
Castiglione, 25 Messidor, year 4 [July 13, 1796].
The apprehension, which I expressed, citizen-general, in
my despatches of the 23d of this month, are realized : the
fortress of Porto Ferrajo was surrendered to the English
the day before yesterday ; they landed 800 men, who were
admitted without difficulty.
I have taken, as I have informed you, all the steps in my
power, to prevent an event so contrary to our interests and
especially to the tranquillity of Leghorn, where it might
in a moment develop the seeds of disturbance and revolt,
which pains are there taking to propagate in all quarters,
and now I think that I can do nothing more without positive
orders. -It is for the Directory to give them, or for you to
communicate to me your intentions, in case this circum
stance should have been provided against in the instructions
which you have. I wait with anxiety for letters from you,
to enlighten me in regard to the course which I am to pur
sue in this delicate circumstance, and especially respecting
the plans that you shall have formed.
Miot.

To General Bonaparte.
Venice, 26 Messidor, year 4 [July 14, 1796].
The last letters from Trent of July 9th give the enu
meration of the Austrian troops, which are at present in
position in General Massena's quarter : they are represented
as amounting to about 24,000 men, besides those which
are on the Lake of Garda and in the valley of Lidro ; viz.
Eight thousand at Bica, entrenched ; 4000 below, along
the Adige ; 8000 on the passes of Monte Baldo ; 4000 at
Valasso, Terraguolo, and Solgaria. These corps are com
manded by Colli and Mitrowski.
The corps of 5000 encamped from Valsugana to Bassano
is preparing to return to the mountains ; it is too weak to
withstand an attack with which it is threatened by the
French, and it is probable that it will join the others.
Mantua reduced, and I hope it will not be long first,
I think, general, it would be very important to detach
part of the disposable forces by Bassano. Pardon this
hint.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 221
The Venetians have decided to withdraw all their Sla
vonians from the terra fir ma, and to confine their defensive
to the sea and the lagoons. They will have at sea in a
few days in the Adriatic Gulf forty light vessels, besides
their galleys sent to Istria, and sixteen armed barks in the
lagoons, which Were occupied by the 6000 Slavonians whom
they had sent for.
All the letters from Germany say that the reinforcements
destined for Italy have had orders to halt.
Lallemant.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Milan, 27 Messidor, year 4 [July 15, 1796].
It cannot but be painful to me, general, to be of a differ
ent opinion from you on a subject of such importance as
that of the supplies to be furnished to the Grisons : the
habit of very just though very rapid apprehension, which
I know you to possess, causes me to mistrust my reason,
whenever it is in contradiction to yours. This sentiment
has led me to examine anew the motives of my conviction :
as it has not depended upon me to change it, I ought to
tell you the causes with that frankness due to each other
from two fellow-citizens, alike solicitous for the welfare of
their country, and differing only about the means which
may perhaps promote it.
You think that the conquest of the Milanese has de
stroyed all treaties concluded by its dukes with foreign
powers ; I think so too, and you will find this opinion put
forth as a principle in the memorial No. 1, which I have
transmitted to you ; but take notice that the Directory, to
conciliate the Grisons, and on my application, has consented
that the treaties which concern them, and which promise
them fifteen hundred loads of corn on their paying for it,
shall be executed, and that it has transmitted a warrant for
it to you. This admits of no application to the general
principle of the effect of a conquest, since the French
government has consented not to avail itself of that point.
Bear in mind, too, that I have notified this resolution to the
heads of the three Leagues ; that they have a right to cal
culate upon its being executed, and that it is, no doubt, to
this persuasion that I owe my almost unanimous recognition
as resident ; lastly, bear in mind that, before even the

222 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
resolution of the Directory existed, you had promised the
Grisons, at my solicitation, to take care that they should
be supplied with four thousand sacks of corn, and that you
made no condition that the chiefs of the Leagues should
demand of you the execution of the capitulations : so that
to insist on it now would be in a manner to retract your
promise, which you have certainly not yet done towards any
one, or to appear to be striving to overreach them, which
would be a part not worthy of you.
You ask me — " If you consent to grant purely and sim
ply the fifteen hundred loads of corn, where is my certainty,
if you have need of passages, that they will consent to
grant them, after having received beforehand, the means of
doing without you ?"
I answer, in the first place, that my certainty on this
point is founded on the experience of what I have already
obtained in this country, without having procured for it so
important a benefit as that of sustenance. Recollect that,
supported by your victories, I have crushed the Austrian
party there, caused the Republic to be unanimously recog
nised, and, what was more difficult than all the rest, that,
in place of the constitutional anarchy, I have brought about
the establishment there of a provisional government, in
vested with very extensive powers, in which the partisans
of our Republic have the exclusive sway.
I answer, in the second place, that, with the means with
which you supply me for paying the disbanded soldiers and
sergeants, I will make of them so many missionaries, who
will not only vote and induce others to vote for the pas
sage, when you or I shall demand it, but who, on the first
signal from us, would knock on the head those who should
dare attempt to oppose it.
I answer, moreover, that the possessor of the Milanese
holds the Grisons not merely by the corn, but that he holds
them also by an infinity of still stronger ties, for they can
procure corn in Suabia, but they cannot, make Suabia, like
the Milanese, a market for their cattle and for their other
produce, nor a place of passage and consumption, for the
commodities which traverse the Grison country, and the
transit of which, together with the tolls arising from them,
constitute their only public revenue : so that, in order to
unite the Grisons absolutely and overturn their government,
for want of funds, you need but, as conqueror and ruler of
the Milanese, close your passes against them.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 223
In the last place, I answer that if, notwithstanding all
these reasons, you wish to hold the Grisons by a still
stronger tie, instead of fifteen hundred loads of corn, sup
ply them provisionally with but a thousand, and assign, as
the motive of this diminution, the displeasure which you
have felt at the conduct of twelve communes out of the
sixty-three, where the Republic has been insulted and the
admission of its minister refused ; which causes you to
consider those communes, until their retractation and the ex
emplary punishment of their ringleaders, as enemies of the
Republic, and consequently deserving to be excluded from
its benefits.
In this manner, you will prevent the revolution, which is
commencing in favour of liberty and in favour of France
among the Grisons, from retrograding. You will prevent
Austria, which offered corn when she saw that we were
about to grant it, from enhancing that favour by your
refusal. I earnestly beg of you to reflect on these reasons, and
also to grant something to my word which would be com
promised ; and this might cost me- the popularity which I
have acquired with the Grisons, and which it is for the
interest of the Republic that I should retain.
Comeyras.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 23 Messidor, year 4 [July 11, 1796].
We have received, citizen-general, your interesting de
spatches of the 14th Messidor. The success of the Leg
horn expedition has given us great satisfaction, and we
approve everything that you have done and ordered in that
auspicious circumstance for the Republic. We must now
strive assiduously to reap all the advantages that it affords.
To sequestrate all effects belonging to the powers at war
with France, to impose heavy contributions on the indivi
duals belonging to them — such are the measures which we
must employ without deviating from them ; but it is the
English in particular against whom this right of war must
be most rigorously exercised : we have at once to avenge
upon them the right of nations, which the Machiavelian
government of England has incessantly violated, and the
independence of the neutral nations, which it has despised,

224 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
in order to injure us with the more security. The English
settled at Leghorn must be in our eyes like inhabitants, of
London ; let them be subjected to severe impositions : the
national generosity, however, dictates to us, while seeking
to indemnify ourselves for our losses, not to carry rigour to
the length of cruelty.
Though, citizen-general, we say nothing to you about
Genoa, and the measures which you have to pursue in
regard to it, according to our preceding instructions, we
think, nevertheless, that you will have made such disposi
tions as that important object requires : we shall be glad
to receive some account of them forthwith, and we have no
doubt that you are proceeding in this matter with the
same wisdom and firmness that you have shown in
Tuscany. M. Corsini, the minister of the latter, has made remon
strances on what concerns that power: it is admitted,
however, that the conduct of England rendered ours per
fectly legitimate : for the rest, he receives but vague
answers from us ; we shall make no alteration in the in
structions which you have, and it is for you and our com
missioners to act in consequence.
The taking of the Castle of Milan is a fortunate opera
tion : the troops employed in it deserve that we should
charge you to congratulate them in the name of the Repub
lic on this success.
We are of opinion, upon military and political considera
tions, that this castle ought to be demolished. You will
give the necessary orders : it is useful to cause this
demolition and that of the barracks at the parade to be
regarded as that of another Bastile, which Austrian despo
tism had hitherto employed to keep under its yoke those
flourishing countries, which seem peculiarly formed for
liberty. By favour of this idea, which you will accredit
among the people, excite a generous enthusiasm for the fall
of that citadel. It will no doubt be but a faint image of
that which presided at the destruction of the Bastile : but
it will awaken the ancient hatred of Lombardy against the
emperor, and make it dread the return of his domination.
All the artillery, all the effects in the magazines, found
in Milan, which will not be necessary for the army, shall
be sent to France. Keep with you only what is serviceable
to your movements, nothing that is liable to embarrass them.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 225
Your return to this side of the Po adds to our confidence
in regard to the position of the army which you command.
After negociating ably and gathering the fruit of those
victories, you are about to display again the military
talents which prepared them. Everything bespeaks that
the campaign of the Rhine will be equally brilliant and
decisive.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 23 Messidor, year 4 [July 11 , 1796].
The Executive Directory is informed, citizen-general, by
the resident of the Republic with that of the Grisons, that
you have promised those people to permit in their favour
the exportation of com from the Milanese, which had been
formerly granted to them. The Directory finds no fault
with this measure, so long as it is not prejudicial to the
supply of the army ; but thinks it useful to recommend to
you to inform yourself accurately whether, in return for the
exportation of corn from the Milanese into the country of
the Grisons, the latter were not obliged to grant a free pas
sage through their territory to the imperial troops. If such
a clause exists, you will feel the importance of getting it
renewed for our advantage.
.The Directory cannot, at this moment, settle any thing
relating to the Bolognese and Ferrarese ; but it is glad to
see that this interesting part of the State of the Church is
impatient to shake off the yoke of the pope. We ought to
study to keep up in that country dispositions favourable to
liberty, till its political fate is decided, according to the
desire which you express, or to ulterior circumstances.
The difficulty which has arisen in regard to the legation
of Ravenna cannot bear discussion ; it is evident that the
town of Faenza cannot be taken here for the entire legation,
of which it is the principal town ; and, whatever desire the
Directory may feel to accede to the observations of M.
d'Azara, out of regard for the court of Spain, it cannot in
this circumstance overthrow the sense of an article of the
armistice which has been sincerely assented to. Be pleased,
citizen-general, to make a suitable use of this decision, in
repeating to M . d'Azara the assurance of our consideration
for his court.
VOL. I. Q

226 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The safety of the valuable objects; of, art that Rome- is to
furnish ought not to be endangered ; they must be carried
by land, and any means of transport employed which the
country can afford, on payment of course of the necessary
remuneration. The thoughts of the government are naturally directed
by present circumstances to Corsica and the expulsion of
the English from that island. Promote the explosion of
the elements of insurrection which it contains against its
proud dominators.
The Directory authorizes the delivery of letters-of-
marque to the armed vessels of the Mediterranean ; but it
is important to require a legitimate surety from the captains
to whom they are delivered, and to prevent the abuse that
has been made of them : this has been so great that French
ships have been captured by pirates, which had taken these
letters of marque.
The Directory begs you to take all the precautions re
quired for the conveyance of the effects and money, which,
as you give notice, you will have to transmit.
The commissioners of the Directory, Salicetti and Garrau,
have sent us a report on the importance of occupying Porto
Ferrajo, which might be held with a garrison of a hundred
men. If you think this measure useful, we give the neces
sary authorization to that effect.
Carnot.

To Citizen Faipoult, Minister at Genoa.
Head-quarters, Milan, 25 Messidor, year 4 [July 13, 1796].
I have not yet seen M. Cataneo, citizen minister; when
I see .him he shall be satisfied with me, and I shall neglect
nothing to lull him and to give the senate a little more
confidence. The time of Genoa is not yet come, for two reasons :
1. Because the Austrians are reinforcing themselves, and
I shall soon have a battle. If conqueror, I shall have
Mantua, and then a mere estafette at Genoa will be as good
as a whole army ;
2. The ideas of the Directory relative to Genoa appear
to me not yet fixed.
It has ordered me to demand the contribution, but not
permitted me any political operation. I have despatched an

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 227
extraordinary courier with your letter, and asked for orders,
which I shall have in the first decade of next month. Be
tween this and then, forget all the subjects of complaint
that we have against Genoa.
Give them to understand that you and I have. ceased to
intermeddle in such matters, since they sent M. Spinola to
Paris. Give them to understand that we are both highly
satisfied with their choice, and that it is to us a guarantee
of their good intentions. Tell them positively that I have
been extremely pleased with the measures which they have
adopted relative to M. Girola ; in short, omit no circum
stance that can revive hope in the heart of the senate of
Genoa, and lull it to sleep till the moment for awaking.
I have received all your notes. Your correspondence is
becoming extremely interesting to me.
You will find annexed a letter addressed to me by M.
Vicente Spinola. It seems to me that there must be some
territory which is in discussion between Genoa and Pied
mont. Give me some explanations on this subject. Let
me know what interest they attach to it, and, on the demand
of the senate, tell them it is possible" that they might be im
mediately put into possession : in short, citizen minister,
manage so that we gain a fortnight, that hope revives, as
well as confidence between you and the Genoese government,
in order that, if we are beaten, we may find it friendly.
Transmit speedily to Tortona all that is at M. Balbi's.
It is the intention of the Directory to collect all at Paris
for the purpose of making a grand financial operation. I
shall send thither thirty millions.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Miot, Minister of the Republic at Florence.
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].
I have received, citizen minister, your different letters
relative to the occupation of Porto Ferrajo by the English.
So long as there was any hope of prevailing on the grand-
duke to put that place into a condition for resisting, you did
right to speak firmly to him ; now, I think with you, threats
would be impotent and useless. I think that we ought to
make no further mention of the matter, not to show any
mark of resentment, and wait till circumstances and the
orders of the government shall enable us to act, not talk.
Q2

228 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
I beg you to keep an eye on what is doing at Leghorn,
and to let me hear frequently from you.
If circumstances should oppose your proceeding imme
diately to Rome, let me know, that I may take other
measures.  Bonaparte.
To Citizen Sapey.
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].
All the Corsicans have orders to repair to Leghorn, to
embark there for the island.- General Gentili is going him
self. Prepare all possible means of embarkation and passage.
I am ordering General Vaubois to keep 8000 pounds of
powder, 4000 fowling-pieces, 1000 pair of shoes, and a cer
tain quantity of ball, at your disposal, in order to supply
the insurgents of that department.
I authorize you to take the measures which you propose
in your letter of the 19th Messidor. Spare no means to
transmit succours and to obtain news from the departments
of Corsica. Bonaparte.

To Citizen Bonelli.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1 796].
I have received your letter from Bocognano, dated the
23rd of June. I congratulate you on your arrival in Corsica.
I have given orders to all the refugees to prepare themselves
to set out, for the purpose of putting themselves at the
head of the brave patriots of Corsica, shaking off the English
yoke, and reconquering liberty, the perpetual object of the
-solicitude of our countrymen.
What glory for them, if they can single-handed drive
those proud English out of their country ! Glory and hap
piness to those who shall first declare themselves ! I re
commend to you not to give yourself up to any party-spirit ;
let all the past be forgotten, except for the small number of
perfidious men who have misled those brave people.
The armies of the Sambre and Meuse and of the Rhine
are in the heart of Germany : every thing smiles upojo. the
Republic. Manage to let us hear something about you soon.
Embrace our good friends, and assure them that before long
they shall be delivered from the tyranny which oppresses
them. Bonaparte.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 229

To the Ordonnateur -in- Chief.
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].
You will place 100,000 francs at the disposal of citizen
Sucy, commissary of war at Genoa, to supply the wants of
the hospitals, the transport of artillery and of the siege
equipage which is at Savona, and all the other expenses
relative to the troops that are still left in the Riviera of
Genoa.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Garrau, Commissioner of the Government.
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].
The requisition which you have made, citizen-commis
sioner, to General Vaubois, is contrary to the instructions
which the government has given me. I beg you for the
future to keep within the limits of the functions prescribed
you by the government of the Executive Directory : other
wise I shall be obliged to forbid, by an order of the day,
compliance with your requisitions. We are all only by the
law: he who would fain command and usurp functions not
granted to him by the law is no republican.
When you were representative of the people, you had
unlimited powers ; everybody made it a duty to obey you :
now, you are commissioner of the government, invested
with a very high character : positive instructions have regu
lated your functions : adhere to them. I am well aware
that you will repeat the remark which I shall make like
Dumouriez — It is clear that a general who has the pre
sumption to command the army which the government has
entrusted to him, and to issue orders without-a resolution
of the commissioners, cannot but be a conspirator.
Bonaparte.

To General Vaubois.
* Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].
I am not at all pleased, general, with your proclamation.
The commissioner of the government has no right to make
requisitions to you ; and, in the important place which you
command, a man is as culpable to obey those who have no

230 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
right to command as to disobey his legitimate superiors.
From the spirit of the instructions which T had given you,
and from all that I had said to you viva voce during my stay '
in Leghorn, it ought to have been easy for you to perceive
that that proclamation would not have my approbation.
Citizen Belleville has been solely charged with the opera
tions relative to the sequestration of the property in Leg
horn belonging to our enemies. I have learned with asto
nishment the waste and disorder existing in that business:
You ought to grant citizen Belleville ail the force that he
has need of, and to invest him with all the confidence neces
sary for him to denounce abuses, and to enable him to turn
to the profit of the Republic the goods which we have se
questrated from our enemies.
Hasten the arming and equipping of the 75th demi-
brigade, because, as soon as those brave fellows have rested,
my intention is to recall them to the army.
It is not the intention of the government that any injury
should be done to the Leghorn merchants or to the subjects
of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany. At the same time that we
study the interests of the nation, we ought to be generous
and just. I have been as much grieved as astonished at
the vexations committed against the commerce of Leghorn.
Be pleased to give me a detailed account of all that has
been done on this subject. You will take care, in particular,
to inform me by what authority citizen Lachaise has quitted
his consulship at Genoa to intrude into the affair of Leg
horn. A great quantity of Corsican refugees are proceeding
to Leghorn, to take shipping there for the island. Keep
4000 fowling-pieces, 1000 pair of pistols, 6000 pounds of
powder, and ball in proportion, at the disposal of citizen
Sapey, who will have instructions to transmit them to the
insurgent patriots of that department.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].
I have to speak to you, citizens directors, of our position,
military, administrative, and political, at Leghorn.
The batteries against the sea are in good condition : we
have repaired a citadel, in which the garrison can shelter
itself against an insurrection. We have there a garrison

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.^ 231
of 2800 men, very good troops, two companies of artillery,
and a good officer of engineers. If the French army were
obliged to abandon the north of Italy, that garrison would
retire by Massa and the Riviera of Genoa. General Vau
bois, who commahds it, is a prudent, firm, and excellent
officer. At the time of our entering Leghorn I directed citizen
Belleville, consul of the Republic in that place, to put seals
upon all the magazines belonging to the English, Portu
guese, Russians, and all other powers with which we are at
war, as well as to the merchants of those different nations.
I warned citizen Belleville that he should be personally re
sponsible for any dilapidations that might take place. This
man is universally esteemed for his integrity. After my
departure, a host of Genoese stock-jobbers came to get pos
session of all this wealth. All the measures that I had
taken were deranged; instead of one responsible person
were substituted commissions, each member of which plun
ders while amusing his neighbour. You will find annexed
extracts from two letters from General Vaubois. People
are conducting themselves in a harsher manner towards the
Leghorn merchants, and treating them with more rigour
than you wish them to treat the English merchants them
selves : this alarms the commerce of all Italy, makes us
pass in its eyes for Vandals, and utterly estranges the mer
chants of the city of Genoa ; and the mass of the people of
that city, which has always been favourable to us, is now
decidedly against us.
If our administrative conduct at Leghorn is detestable*
our political conduct towards Tuscany is no better. " I have
always refrained- from making any kind of proclamation,
and expressly ordered that no act, wearing the semblance
of an act of government, should be issued. You will see,
by the annexed proclamation, how little heed is paid to my
intentions, and to the orders which I have given. The
measure for driving emigrants from Leghorn, and from the
country for twenty leagues round it, by a proclamation, is
as useless as it is impolitic. There are very few emigrants
in Leghorn: the grand-duke himself has given orders for
their expulsion. It would have been much more simple to
have caused three or four to be apprehended by the native
authorities, and then the few others would have run off fast
enough. This proclamation, arrogating a jurisdiction over

232 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
twenty leagues of country, has a very bad effect, unless—1
which is totally contrary to your instructions — we were to
assume the tone and policy of ancient Rome.
The English have taken possession of Porto Ferrajo.
Masters of the sea, as they are, it would have been difficult
to oppose this enterprise. When we shall be masters of
Corsica, which cannot be long first, it will become possible
for us to drive them from this island. You will find an
nexed a copy bf the letter written to me by the Grand
Duke of Tuscany, of that of our minister at Florence, and
of the answer.
- In the present position of Italy we must not make our
selves any new enemy, and await the issue of the campaign,
in order to adopt a course conformable with the true in
terests of the Republic. No doubt you will then be sen
sible that it is not expedient for us to leave the duchy of
Tuscany to the brother of the emperor. I should wish
that till then no threat, no hostile language, should be used
at Leghorn against the court of Tuscany. My slightest
words, and those of your commissioners, are watched and
approached with the utmost respect ; but here people ima
gine themselves to be in the lobbies of the Convention.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].
Citizen Comeyras, minister of the Republic to the Gri
sons, has arrived in these last days at head-quarters. He
could have wished that, in consequence of capitulations
existing between the Archduke of Milan and the Grison
Leagues, I had ordered these latter to be supplied with
corn. We have even had a little discussion, because he
alleged that you had ordered this supply ; but, on referring
to the letter written to me by the minister, Lacroix, he
was convinced that it was a mere authorization to furnish
it, if I thought fit. I then observed to him that it was
impossible to furnish the quantity of corn that he desired,
unless the Leagues insisted on the execution of this article
of the capitulations, which would give us a right to demand
the passage that is granted to the Archduke of Milan, by
way of indemnity for the said supply.
We have agreed, in consequence, that, on his arrival at

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 233.
Coire; he shall write to the chiefs of the Leagues, that he
had met with some obstacles to the execution of the order
of the Directory for the supply of the corn, which cannot
take place till they have officially communicated the capi
tulations to me. The commissioner Comeyras asked me
for money to pay the peilsions of the Grisons : he thinks
that, with 60,000 francs, our party in that country would
be considerably increased.
• If the circumstances of the war were to carry us into
the country of the Grisons, or if we needed a force there to
oppose the incursions of the enemy, would it be amiss to
form a corps of all the Swiss who have been in the service
of France and are pensioned ? This would form a corps
d?elite of 800 men, perfectly acquainted with the roads, and
who might be of great service to us.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 22, 1796].
. The gentlemen of the senate of Venice would have liked
to serve us as they did Charles VIII. They calculated
that, like him, we should penetrate to the foot of Italy, and
were probably waiting for us on our return.
I immediately seized the citadel of Verona, which I have
armed with their cannon, and at the same time I sent a
courier to citizen Lallemant, our minister at Venice, to bid
him enjoin the senate to desist from its armaments. You
have seen the notes that I sent you on the subject by my
last courier : the arming is already discontinued.
The repubhc of Venice has already furnished us with
3,000,000 for the subsistence of the army : not that it fur
nishes this itself, but a contractor, whom it secretly pays.
So I agreed with the proveditor-general, promising, how
ever, that some day the French Republic should pay.
This contractor has called upon me several times to apply
for money. I have dismissed him with promises, and a
positive order to continue to supply : he has been to the
commissioners of the government, who have given him a bill
of exchange for 300,000 livres, to receive out of the contri
butions of the Pope. Of all measures this was the worst,
so now he Will supply no more. By this bill of exchange
for 300,000 livres, payable at a time when it is known that

234 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
there are 21,000,000 coming to us, they have taken away)
all hope of being paid, and at the same time led people!.
to conclude that by importunity and withholding : supplies-
they may extract money from us: so that now I am obliged
to storm against the proveditor, to- exaggerate the murders
committed on our troops, to complain bitterly of the arming,
which was not attempted while the Imperialists were the
stronger, and thereby I shall oblige him to supply all that
is required, in order to appease me. That is the way to
treat these folks; they will continue to supply me, half
willingly, half forcibly, till the taking of Mantua, and then-
I will tell them plumply that they must pay me the- contri
bution mentioned in your instructions, which will- easily be
done. I think it might be well for you to express to M.
Quirini your astonishment at the arming of the Venetians^
which was no doubt directed against us. There is not a
government more treacherous and more cowardly than that.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 4 Thermidor, year 4 [July 22, 1796].
I have informed you, citizens directors, that I have sent
over a score of refugees to Corsica. You will find' an
nexed a letter which I have received from him who com
mands them.
I have ordered general of division Gentili, and generals
Casalta and Cervoni, to proceed to Leghorn, whence they
will sail to put themselves at the head of the insurgents.
General Gentili, who is to have this command, is a clever,
prudent man, possessing the esteem of the country-people,
and the confidence of the mountaineers.
I am ordering the gendarmerie of the department of Cor
sica, of 180 men, all natives, to repair to Leghorn, whence
I will get them also sent over. These, together with 4000
fowling-pieces, and 6000 pounds of powder, will give' us the
whole interior of the country. The moment all this1 id
organized, I will send over a company of artillerymen, with
five or six mountain pieces, with which it will be easy to
take St. Florent, which has no permanent fortification.
This port taken, the English will have no interest to keep
the others; besides, the people of Ajaccio and Bastia are
very impatient of the English yoke.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 235
I beg you to be pleased to let me know if you think there
will be any inconvenience in granting a general amnesty to
the people of that department, excepting the principal
chiefs.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory,
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 4 Thermidor, year 4 [July 22, 1796].
The town of Reggio has risen against the Duke of Mo
dena ; deputies of that town have come to solicit ; protection
and assistance : as we have concluded an armistice with the
duke, I thought it advisable to exhort them to tranquillity.
I mention this merely that you may know that the subjects
of the dukes of Parma and Modena are very little attached
to their princes.
Bonaparte.

To his Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State of Rome.
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 3 Thermidor, year 4 [July 21, 1796].
I have the honour, monseigneur^ to send to his Holiness
citizen Cacault, agent of the French Republic in Italy, that
he may attend to the execution of the armistice which has
been concluded between the French Republic and his Holi
ness, under the mediation of the court of Spain. I beg you
to be pleased to recognize him in that quality.
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Cacault.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 3 Thermidor, year 4 [July 21, 1796].
You will find annexed a letter for M. d'Azara, and the
cardinal secretary of state for foreign affairs of his Holiness,
with a copy of the armistice concluded between the Re
public and the pope, as well as an additional article relative
to the legation of Faenza, with the decision of the Execu
tive Djrectory.
You will be pleased, in consequence, to demand an order
from the pope for the commandant of Ancona to receive
the garrison that I shall send thither.
You will despatch the 5,000,000 which are to form the
first payment, namely, 2,000,000 to the head-quarters, for

236 LETTERS and DESPATCHES.
which a receipt shall be given by the paymaster of the
army, and the rest to Tortona. The first convoy must
leave Rome twenty -four hours after your arrival.
The 5,000,000 that are to form the second payment.
must leave Rome a few days after the first ; for, according
to the armistice, it ought to be despatched by the 5th
Thermidor. The 5,500,000 livres which form the last payment ought
to. leave Rome by the 5th Vendemiaire.
The scientific men and artists, who are to select the
pictures, manuscripts, and statues, will address themselves
to you, and you will afford them the necessary protection,
by taking such steps as may be expedient. If it were ad
visable to give funds to the artists for defraying the expenses
of carriage, let them be taken from the funds arising from
the pope's contributions.
Four millions out of the 5,500,000, which the pope is to
furnish as the last payment, are destined for the navy.
The minister of the marine is to send commissioners for this
purpose. You will give notice, meanwhile, that the hemp, timber,
and other materials of that nature for ship-building, may
be got ready.
The remaining 1,500,000 livres are to be furnished in
horses and cloth for clothing the troops. You will de
mand, inconsequence, 400 horses, of the height for hussars.;
400 for dragoons ; and 600 for draught, which are to be
transferred to Milan, where they shall be appraised by
General Baurevoir, director of the depdts of the army, and
skilful persons sent by the pope : for the rest, blue and
white cloth for clothing the troops.
You will demand the liberation of all persons who have
been apprehended at Rome for their opinions, and especially
those named in the annexed list, as well as citizen La-
brousse of Bordeaux.
In consequence of the decision of the Directory, and of
the commission appointed in Florence by M. d'Azara, the
pope is bound to pay the contributions which had been im
posed upon the legation of Ravenna, amounting to 1,200,000
francs in goods, and 1,200,000 in money.
Bonaparte.

letters and despatches. 237
The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796].
According to the last despatches from the general-in-
chief of the army of the Alps, citizen-general, it appears
that he had not received the 200,000 francs in money which
you have been charged to send him. The state of things is
such, that the transmission of these funds cannot be longer
delayed without the most serious inconveniences. We
request you, therefore, to send off those 200,000 francs with
the least possible delay. Carnot.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796]. '
The Directory, citizen-general, has received the letter
which you addressed to it from Roverbello, on the 18th
instant : it has learned with pleasure that the troops block
ading Mantua, under the command of General Serrurier,
have repulsed with advantage the sorties attempted by the
garrison. If the Directory had before it a statement of the supplies
that are likely, to be in the place, it might be able to decide
whether it were preferable to open the trenches before it, or
to be content with a simple blockade, by means of which we
should make ourselves masters of it. The sickness which
has begun to appear in the division of General Serrurier
causes the Directory to think that the resolution which you
have taken to open the trenches is most suitable in the
present circumstances ; and it has learnt with satisfaction
that you have not neglected to employ in the works of the
siege the prisoners that you have taken from the Prince of
Rome, &c.
According to private letters from General Berthier, it
appears that the fevers which have manifested themselves in
the French division at Mantua, are but ephemeral ; perhaps
they will cease On the immediate removal of the sick to a
certain distance, and by enabling them to breathe a more
wholesome air: we found great benefit from this course in
Zealand. You must soon have accounts of the march of the rein
forcements which the army of the Coasts of the Ocean has
detached for the army of Italy. The Directory sends you

238 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
annexed a statement of the demi-brigades and the battalions
which compose it ; these troops form a total of 12,000 men.
The Directory thinks it right to observe, that the army of
the Alps is reduced, as it were, to nothing, and it is expe
dient that you should leave General Kellermann about 2000
men,, which are indispensably necessary, as well to attend
to the demolition of the fortresses of Piedmont, as to main
tain the police in the departments under his command.
The statement you have sent us of the enemy's force
which is opposed to you has appeared to us exaggerated.
The general-in-chief Moreau seems even to believe that
some of the Austrian reinforcements detached by the
army of Hohenlohe to strengthen that which you are
fighting have returned towards the Rhine, to oppose the
efforts of the army of the Rhine and Moselle. When
Mantua shall be in the power of the army of Italy, the
troops which have taken it, united to those which you have
towards the Tyrol, will give you a great superiority, of force
over, General Wurmser.
The fusils of the republic of Lucca might be made useful
for Corsica.
The Directory approves of the measures which you have
taken for the sequestration of the property belonging to
Neapolitans at Leghorn.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796].
Intelligence which has just reached the Executive Direc
tory, of the successes of the armies of Sambre and Meuse,
and Rhine and Moselle, leads it to presume, citizen-
general, that the Austrians, finding it absolutely impossible
to defend the right bank of the Rhine, any longer, have re
solved to abandon it : they appear to have an intention of
retiring into the heart of Germany. The orders which the
Directory has transmitted to the Republican generals, to
pursue them with vigour, give it hopes that they will be
driven back either upon Bohemia or the right bank of the
Danube. Annexed you will find a copy of the letter which we
wrote to General Moreau on the 5th Messidor : we have
thought that it might be useful to communicate it to you.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 239
In regard to what concerns Venice, the Directory thinks
as you do. The first operation to make sure of is to reduce
Mantua ; the second is to drive back Wurmser, in case he
should attempt to re-enter Italy ; and, above all, to keep
him in a state of harassing anxiety for the soldiers whom he
commands.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796].
It is with regret, citizen-general, that the Directory finds
itself compelled to abandon, in some measure, the principles
which it has laid down for itself, and which it has steadily
followed till this day, with the city of Genoa: but the
conduct of the Genoese government towards the French
Republic has forced it, against its will, to take the severe
measures contained in the annexed resolution.
You will be pleased, general, to carry it into execution
as soon as circumstances permit. The Directory trusts to
your prudence relative to the choice of the moment and
that of the means of execution ; in like manner, it leaves to
you both the proclamation which is to precede your demands,
and the precautions to be taken that the funds and other
valuable effects deposited at Genoa may not run the slightest
risks : it will be better, general, to place those objects in
safety than to be obliged to claim them.
Carnot.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796].
The Executive Directory, which has received, citizen-
general, your letter of the 18th Messidor, relative to the
means of driving the English out of Corsica, and restoring
those departments to the Republic without efforts, has
adopted all the views whichyou have there expressed.
It authorises you to get shipped for Corsica, either at
Leghorn or by any other way, all the Corsican patriots
whose courage and civism are known to you.
It authorises you to send over eight to ten thousand
fowling-pieces, and seven or eight thousand pounds of
powder.

240 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
It authorises you to promise, in the name of the govern
ment, proofs of the national gratitude to all the Corsicans*-
who are fighting for the liberty of their native country.
It authorises you to promise a^general and absolute pardon
to those who shall return to their ehity.
It authorises you, in short, to" Use all the means that.
you shall deem practicable, in the iteration with which
you are particularly charged.
The Directory, convinced that, to ensure the success of this
great operation, it is necessary to give it \ chief known for
his talents, his civism, his attachment to\the French Re
public, and who unites the confidence of me government
with that of the Corsican patriots, is writing by the same
courier to citizen Salicetti : it informs him mat it has cast
its eyes upon him for this purpose, and promises him all the
succours that will depend on itself and you. \To complete
your glory and render it more brilliant, you have nothing
to do, general, but to add to the title of conqueror of Italy
that of liberator of the country which gave you birth;
The Directory hopes it from your talents and your energy.
Carnot.

To Citizen Salicetti.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 4 Thermidor, year 4 [July 22, 1796.] ,•
Fortune has appeared for a moment contrary to us : so
many events have occurred during the last five or six days,:
and I am yet so much engaged, that it is impossible for me
to give you an accurate account of them ; but, at last, thanks
to the victory of Lonado and the rigorous measures which
I have adopted, things will take a satisfactory turn. I have
raised the siege of Mantua, and am here with nearly my
whole army.
I shall seize the first occasion to give battle to the enemy :
it will decide the fate of Italy. Beaten, I shall retire from the
Adda ; beating, I shall not stop at the marshes of Mantua.
Louis ' will give you a verbal account of our two victories
of Lonado and Salo. Louis will talk to you about my
present force and that of the enemy. Write to General-
Kellermann, to send me all the disposable troops by double
marches. Be assured that the castles of Milan, Tortona,
Alexandria, and Pavia, are provisioned. We are ex-
1 His brother, Louis Bonaparte.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 241
Iremely fatigued here; five of my horses have died of
fatigue. I cannot write to the Directory ; I beg of you to
inform it in a few words of what you see and what Louis
will tell you verbally. Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Rome, 22 July, 1796 [13 Prairial, year 4].
Monsieur le General, permit me to call myself to your
remembrance on an occasion so glorious for the arms of the
Republic and for you, who direct them with so much glory.
I suppose the conquest of Mantua to be accomplished, and
this triumph added to the others that you have so justly
won in Italy.
Citizen Miot will, no doubt, have informed you of the state
of the commission with which you have entrusted him, for the
execution of the treaty of armistice concluded at Bologna
between the Republic and the pope. Every thing is admirably
arranged, and the first five millions are already despatched
for lmola, where we agreed that thev should be put into the
hands of the deputies of. the Republic. As to all the rest,
the pope assents with all the sincerity in the world, and
citizen Miot has attended to the interests of the Republic
with such care and vigilance that every body renders him
the justice which is his due. He is about to return to
Florence ; citizen Cacault, whom you have sent to take his
place, having arrived. The scientific commissioners have
arrived, too, and I shall try to do my best in order that they
may fulfil their commission, and to render their stay at
Rome as agreeable as possible.
The Sieur Ratti, who will have the honour to deliver this
letter, will speak to you for me about la Messola and Santo
Martino, which the Ferrarese were desirous of compre
hending in their territory ; but it is so notorious throughout
all Italy that those two properties were purchased by the
popes, and have never been governed or administered by the
legates of Ferrara, that this has no need of proofs : never
theless, I have the honour to send you two authentic docu
ments of the contracts for the purchase of the lands in
question ; and, I hope, general, from your justice, that you
will be pleased to order that the pope be left in possession
of what legitimately belongs to him, according to the letter
and spirit of our treaty.
VOL, I. R

242 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
I hope, general, that your triumphs will soon give us
a peace useful and glorious to the Republic which you serve,
and necessarily to mankind. Meanwhile, I have the honour
to be, with the sentiments of admiration with which you
have inspired me, &c. The Chevalier d'Azara.
PS. M. Cacault has just delivered to me the two letters
with which you have honoured me, dated 3rd Thermidor, •
and I thank you for the care you have been pleased, to take
respecting the additional article relative to Romagna. For
the rest, the person of Citizen Cacault has long been known
to me, and I hope that he will complete the execution of
the treaty to your entire satisfaction. I presented him this
morning to the pope and to the secretary of state, by
whom he was received with all the distinction that he could'
desire, and citizen Miot took leave at the same time.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Venice, 5 Thermidor, year 4 [July 23, 1796].
All the letters from the Tyrol speak of nothing but the
perplexity of General Wurmser. He was anxious to
descend and to attempt the deliverance of Mantua; he
wished also for more force, that he might at once act and
guard the threatened Tyrol. You will take Mantua in a
few days ; you will attack the camp at Bassano ; and you
will force the passes of the Tyrol by the two routes.
It was reported here, the day before yesterday, that
2,400 men, who had come to Trieste by the Friule, above
Udine, had gone to reinforce the camp of Bassano ; but it
is added that all is quiet there.
It has also been reported that a corps of Austrians, like
wise come from Trieste, nobody knows how, had arrived at
Ferrara, to pass through the territory of Venice by the
Polesino. The senate does not believe a word of it ; but,
embarrassed as it is with its Slavonians, it has just given
orders for the departure of fourteen barks manned by 1500
or 2000 of these same Slavonians, which are to station
themselves at the conflux of the Adige and the Po, above
Brondolo ; they will never be dangerous there ; they are
commanded by Cleva.
¦ All that has passed before my eyes, and some expressions
dropped by M. Pesaro, lead me to believe it to be true,- as

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 243
it is reported, that the Venetians are really threatened by
Russia and England, as well as by the Austrians : accord
ingly, all their efforts of defence are directed towards the
sea, and I can assure you that they will soon have nothing
to fear in that quarter for their capital.
Lallemant.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 7 Thermidor, year4 [July 25, 1796].
We have received, citizen-general, your letters dated the
18th, 24th, and 26th Messidor.
We are very glad to learn that the divisions which you
conducted beyond the Po have recrossed that river, and
that you are vigorously pushing the siege of Mantua. The
insalubrity of the works of that siege and the preparations
going on in the Tyrol make tis earnestly desire to see that
place surrendered very soon to the troops which you com
mand. Stratagems and daring coups de main are in fact
an essential part of the art of attacking fortresses ; and those
which you meditate against this will, no doubt, accelerate
the surrender, by favour of the secrecy in which you will
contrive to envelop their profound combinations, and by the
rapidity of their execution.
Our last despatches will have informed you of our adhe
sion to the proposals which you made to us relative to
Genoa 5 and we think with you that that operation ought
to be deferred, as well as that concerning Venice, till the
moment when the taking of Mantua shall have consolidated
your position in such a manner as to deprive those two
States of all hope of escaping the justice of our demands
and the empire of the arms of the Republic.
It Is to be regretted that the interesting island of Elba is
in the hands of the English, who find in it a sort of com
pensation for the loss of Leghorn, and whence they may
molest your dispositions in favour of Corsica ; but that event
has the advantage for us of unveiling the secret intentions
which the grand-duke had hitherto coloured with the ap
parent desire to preserve his neutrality. In any other
circumstances, we should not have scrupled to propose war
to that perfidious power ; but, when the rapid course of our
triumphs is daily tending to dissolve the remnant of the
coalition and necessarily leading to a general peace', it has
r2

244 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES,
not appeared prudent to us to kindle fresh flames of war,
reserving to ourselves to remonstrate hereafter against this
violation of treaties, which we show that we are ourselves
tenacious of respecting.
Reports are in circulation that the emperor, according to
the probabilities of a health always precarious, is approach
ing his end. To take advantage of this event, it is neces
sary that you should be informed of it with the utmost
possible celerity, when it has taken place. Keep up for
this purpose secret correspondence with Vienna. The
grand-duke of Tuscany, heir to the imperial throne, will
not hesitate to repair to his capital immediately after the
death of his brother. The point will then be to prevent
him, to seize him as an enemy of the Republic, and to oc
cupy Tuscany militarily. This plan, though based upon
conjectures by no means certain, is not the less deserving
of all your attention.
The seditious movements, repeated on the part of the
Italians against the French troops, bespeak a profound
hatred in them of our successes, since the false report of a
reverse, how improbable soever, is sufficient alone to make
it break forth in so serious a manner. Combine, citizen-
general, with the activity of. your military labours that care
which is claimed by the constant and rigid repression of
those alarming germs of insurrection, which might perhaps
astonish the troops and cool their courage against the Aus
trians, to whom it must never cease to display itself with the
same brilliancy. One powerful expedient to be employed
against revolt is to carry off a great number of hostages and
the most considerable persons in the different countries.
The right of the army of the Rhine and Moselle nearly
touches upon the Lake of Constance, and will soon alarm
the rear of the Austrian army of Italy. Prince Charles,
reduced to half his force by his losses and the garrisons
which he has thrown into fortresses, is taking the route of
the Danube. Generals Moreau and Jourdan are briskly
pressing him on his two flanks.
The most decisive campaign appears to be already secure
from any reverse, and the news which the Directory ex
pects very shortly from you, citizen-general, will add still
more to the glorious and astonishing situation of the Re-?
public. Carnot,

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 245
To the General-in-Chief.
Venice, 8 Thermidor, year 4 [July 26, 1796].
According to a letter, dated July 23rd, which I received
yesterday, there had passed through Bolzano from the 20th
to the said 23rd, 9150 infantry, 1800 cavalry, and 34
artillerymen. This new number, added to all those of
which I previously had advice, appears to me rather ex
cessive ; but, on the other hand, I have some reason to
rely upon the writer : so that I suspend my judgment, and
nevertheless think it right to transmit, you this information.
My man adds that the infantry and the artillerymen come
from the Rhine.
It appears from other letters that the Austrians are re
tiring from Bassano, but that they are marching detach
ments of twelve to fifteen hundred men, in different parts of
their frontiers from the side of the Friule, to Goritz, Gra-
di'sca, and the Pontieba. It is difficult to guess what is
their design in this.
I am informed, besides, that 600 cavalry had no sooner
arrived at Roveredo than it received orders to fall back.
The minister of Prussia at Vienna writes, in a letter
which I have seen, that a courier had come to that cabinet
from the court of Naples, and that, from what transpired,
this courier had brought to the emperor the assurance that
the king of the Two Sicilies would not subscribe any dis
graceful peace.
Lallemant.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Venice, 8 Thermidor, year 4 [July 26, 1796],
I had yesterday a conversation with M. Pesaro, of which
I think it my duty to give you an account without delay.
We had to talk about some particular business ; but he was
anxious to speak to me upon a subject that appeared to him
much more important. It was the serious apprehension
which he felt, as well as the principal members of the col
lege, that the republic of Venice would soon be at war with
us. He told me that, according to the accounts which he
had just received from Verona, you had clearly manifested
the intention of declaring it ; that you had expressed to
him, who performs the functions of proveditor-general, ex-

246 letters and despatches.
treme dissatisfaction ; that you bad made demands, with
which it was impossible to comply at the moment; and
that you had, nevertheless, threatened to treat the Vene
tians as enemies if you did not immediately obtain what
you desired ; that, besides, great rigour had begun to be
shown in various places to individuals ; and, lastly, that you
had expressly declared that, unless Venice disarmed in a
very short time, you would actually declare war against it.
After he had thus explained to me the causes of his
alarm, he entered into very long justificatory details. He
represented to me that ever since the French army had en
tered the territories of Venice, its government had made it,
he said, a duty and a pleasure to promote your arrange-;
ments and to comply with your demands ; if it had not done
more, it was for want of means, or from the necessity in
which it found itself to avoid embroiling itself with the
other belligerent powers, from which, however, it was con
tinually receiving very severe reproaches : that, it is true,
we might have had reason to complain of the sentiments
and conduct of various individuals ; but that they had flat
tered themselves that, on directing our attention to the
proceedings of the government, we should not judge of its
principles and its intentions by the indiscreet conduct or
the imprudent language of individuals inflamed against us
by ancient prejudices, by a sense of the momentary evils
which they were necessarily suffering, and still more by the
intrigues of a great number of malevolent persons, who wish
for nothing better than to embroil Venice with France, and
thus to punish it for its refusal to join the coalition ; that,
on the other hand, this same government neglected nothing
that it could do without danger to change opinion in regard
to us ; that it curbed the licentiousness of our enemies ;,
that it had begun and should continue by degrees to remove
the most ardent, that is to say, the emigrants, and that
these precautions had already produced effects equally
happy and perceptible ; that, as for the arming, which ap
peared to excite your distrust, it had not had in its prin
ciple any other motives but those which have been stated
in the written answer given by the senate ; that, if any
others have arisen to induce them to continue those pre
parations for defence, which are such as ought to dispel all
our suspicions, since they are threats seriously addressed
to Venice, both by England and by Russia, the truth of

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES/ 247
these reasons is proved by the nature and the direction of
those same preparations ; that, besides, they are too incon
siderable to be regarded as the continuation of a design
formed against France ; that we ought not to draw any
unfavourable inference either from the extraordinary con
tributions and impositions which the government has de
manded, for, in this, its intention has been much less to
provide for its arming than to enable it to satisfy our re
quisitions ; lastly, that the senate conceived that it had
proved in every way the sincerity and constancy of its
friendly dispositions towards France, and that, in con
sequence, the contrary dispositions which you now mani
fested caused those to whom they were known equal surprise
and chagrin.
Such was in substance the address of M. Pesaro. As
I had ho instructions, touching the alleged facts on which
he founded his fears, I could not return any very precise
answer ; but I thought that I Ought, in one way or other,
to allay his apprehensions ; and for this purpose I employed
general reflections, which it would be superfluous to repeat
to you. I failed, no doubt, to cheer him completely, but
I made him a little easier ; and for the rest he seemed to
think that they ought to strive above all things to please
r.you, and to avoid all quarrel with France. He even ap
peared to think that such was the opinion of his principal
colleagues, and that such would also be the resolution of
the senate, to whom, he said, they should not fail to sub
mit, in the approaching sitting of Thursday, the accounts
received from Verona.
In addition, citizen-general, it seems to me absolutely
necessary, in the present circumstances, to tell you what I
know- of the dispositions of our own government, and
what I am able to judge of those of the government of
Venice. Permit me to enter into some details on this'
subject. In the first place, I see, by the letters which I receive
from the minister, that the Executive Directory appears to
calculate upon the neutrality of the Venetian republic, and
even to be satisfied with it, since it recommends to me to
keep it up : nay, more, it appears to think of forming a
much closer connexion between the two nations, and this
matter has already formed the subject of several despatches.
The latest that I have received, on Saturday last, insists

248 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
particularly on this point ; you may judge of it from the
paragraph which I transcribe.
" It is time that the republic of Venice should rouse itself
from the long sloth in which it has stagnated ever since the
peace of Passarowitz, and that it should resume among the
powers the rank which it held before 1718: France now
offers it the means to do so. Venice has an opportunity to
increase her territory, to acquire fortresses, which will con
solidate her power, and serve to form between the two
republics a federative compact, founded on their reciprocal
interests." I am ordered, besides, to persuade the Venetians to send
a negociator to Paris.
In the second place, as for this government; it is but too
true that it has shown an extreme aversion for our revo
lution ; it is but too true that it has violently decried and
calumniated it in its territories ; that several French indi
viduals have experienced rigorous treatment there ; that
hatred of us has there been industriously excited and fo
mented ; and that most heads, even those of several im
portant personages, have been heated and led astray by
religious fanaticism.
It is likewise but too true . that this same government,
long accustomed to tremble before that of Austria, has
yielded more than it ought to have done to her influence,
and that it paid the greater attention to her, and the less
to us, because its old prejudices promised it something very
different from our successes. But what appears to me not
less true at this moment is, that it is sincere in its protesta
tions of neutrality and good understanding with France ;
that, its prejudices giving way at last to its true interests,
it frankly wishes to see the Austrian yoke broken, under
which it bowed, like all Italy. 1 am not sanguine, it is
true, in expecting that we shall induce it to help itself with
its own hands : there are yet too many fears, too many
prejudices, in a great number of minds, and, besides, all are
stupified by the long habit of indolence. But we may pro
mise ourselves, I think, that so far from crossing those who
are labouring for its deliverance, it will at least make some,
secret efforts, and cherish some secret wishes in their favour.
As for the arming, some doubts may be entertained re
specting the nature of the motives which have determined
it ; but, be this as it may, it seems to me that, in the state

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 249
in" which it is, it ought not to excite any distrust. I have
given you an account of it in my preceding letters, and you
have, no doubt, judged that it was too feeble to excite any
alarm. I will add, that I see before my eyes the truth of
what M. Pesaro said to me. All the preparations which
are making have no other object but the guard of the la
goons and the defence of the sea-coast. This indicates no
hostile intentions against us.
Such, citizen-general, is what I have thought it right to
lay before you. Your wisdom and understanding will make
amends for all that I might further have told you, and will
not fail to suggest to you the resolutions most suitable to
the interests of the Republic. It belongs to you to com
bine the glory of a victorious general and of a prudent and
enlightened politician.
Lallemant.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 13 Thermidor, year 4 [July 31, 1796].
The Executive Directory, citizen-general, which cannot
but be well satisfied with the indefatigable activity with
which you combat the enemies of liberty — the Executive
Directory, which shares with all the good citizens, with all
the true friends of the country, with .the sincere republicans,
the admiration excited by the great military talents which
you display, and which give you just titles to the national
gratitude, sees with indignation the efforts that scribblers,
covered with different masks, are daily making to deceive
the public, and to second the enemies of our country by
reports, which cannot have any other object but to sow dis
sension among the friends of order and peace. The Direc
tory sees with indignation the perfidy with which these
coalition scribblers have dared to attack the loyalty, the
constant fidelity of your services, and it owes to itself the
formal contradiction which it gives to the absurd calumnies
which they are impelled to hazard by the necessity of feed
ing malignity with stories capable of sharpening it, and
gaining readers for their productions. Some, openly roy
alists, crudely circulate a falsehood ; others, calling them
selves patriots par excellence, but proceeding towards the
same point, comment upon it, embellish it in their way,
upon pretence of combating their so-called antagonists.

250 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Both are thus labouring to check the progress of order
which is establishing itself; both are seconding the ener
mies of the Revolution ; both are striving to sow discord
and to disorganize the armies ; both play in this manner
upon the credulity of their readers and of those from whom
they derive their subsistence, and they indecently give
them, as certain, tales which are the mere coinage of their
wild imaginations.
No, citizen-general, never have the friends of Austria
been able to prejudice the Directory against you, because
the Directory knows your principles and your inviolable
attachment to the Republic. No, never has there been a
question about your recall ; never has the Directory, never
has any of its members, thought of giving a successor to
him who so gloriously leads our republicans to victory. The
scribbler who, assuming the air of defending you, dared
assert that he was acquainted with the intrigue plotted
against you, and of which an affair of money was but the
pretext ; the other who, dressing himself in a false virtue,
dared to add that he had had the delicacy to keep silence
about events which would have made our enemies laugh,
are both impostors : both deceive the public, and are evi
dently unworthy of its confidence. If that man, so well
informed, if that man, who, like his brethren in calumny,
strives to give himself an air of importance, by pretending
to be acquainted with all the secrets of the State — if that
man is acquainted with one intrigue of the nature of that
which he mentions, let him disclose it, let him make it
known to the Directory : it is important enough assuredly ;
it too deeply interests the public welfare and the progress
of our armies, for him who can reveal it to be able to dis
pense himself from denouncing it to those whom its object
is to lead into error. But the silence of that man, his
silence wliich will be his condemnation, will enlighten the
public as to the confidence that it will henceforth owe to his
insinuations. You possess, citizen-general, the confidence of the Di
rectory : the services which you are daily rendering give
you a right to it ; the considerable sums which the Republic
owes to your victories prove that you attend at once to
glory and to the interests of your country : all the good
citizens are agreed on that point ; you will have no difficulty
to abandon- the boastings and the calumnies of the others to

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 251
the contempt which they deserve of themselves, and still
more for the spirit which directs them. Reveillere-Lepaux.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1 , 1796].
What you wrote to the Directory from Castiglione,
on the 4th Thermidor, citizen-general, relative to the demo
lition of the fortifications of the castles of Milan and of
Mantua, has its approbation. I think, however, that every
t;hing ought to be prepared for playing the mines and de
stroying the works, in case success on the part of the enemy
should render that measure necessary. As for Mantua,
the Directory adopts the proposal you make to demolish
that place immediately, and to send to France forthwith
the 300 pieces of artillery which are there. When that
city has been demolished, you can order the destruction of
the fortifications of the castle of Milan.
Reveillere-Lepaux.

The Executive Directory- to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 14 Thermidor,. year 4 [August 1, 1796].
The account you, gave us, citizen-general, of the siege of
Mantua persuades us that you use all the activity which
that operation demands, and the success of which we are
impatiently expecting. It is superfluous to recommend to
you to attend to the wants of the troops employed in it, in
order to mitigate the effects of the labours in which they
are engaged, and to check the progress of the diseases which
have broken out among the divisions.
We have approved in a particular despatch the proposals
relative to that place, when daring, perseverance, and talent
combined, shall have put it into our hands, as well as re
lative to the castle of Milan.
We cannot second too heartily the zeal which you ma
nifest for recovering Corsica from the English, and we
authorize you to grant an amnesty there in concert with
the commissioner Salicetti, specially charged with the exe
cution of the dispositions which you have made.
Lareveillere-Lepaux.

252 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].
The Directory is informed, citizen-general, that, agree
ably to its orders, the minister of war has directed the
general commanding in the 11th military division to retain
in that arrondissement a squadron of the 18th regiment of
dragoons, and to send the three squadrons of that corps to
the army of Italy without delay.
The disturbances which have broken out in the depart
ment of the Bouches du Rhone, and especially at Marseilles
and Aix, have induced us to send thither immediately Ge
neral Willot, who has our confidence. We beg him to
watch that department with particular vigilance, and to
prevent to the utmost of his power a civil war from bursting
forth. We have just ordered the minister of war to despatch for
Marseilles one of the three squadrons of the 18th regiment
of dragoons destined for Italy.
The horses which you have sent to the Directory are
arrived.
Reveillere-Lepaux.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].
We have received, citizen-general, the letter which you
have written to us from Castiglione the 4th of Thermidor,
in which you mention the insurrection of the inhabitants of
Reggio, and the dispositions of the people subject to the
dukes of Parma and Modena. Circumstances and the
friendship existing between the French Republic and the
court of Spain might require some concessions to be granted
at the general peace to the Duke of Parma, whose aggran
dizement in Italy would be advantageous to France in
several political respects.
Reveillere-Lepaux.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].
We have paid, citizen-general, particular attention to that
one of your last despatches which relates to Leghorn. We

letters and despatches. 253
persist in the determination which has hitherto governed
our conduct in regard to the grand-duchy of Tuscany, and
we have seen with pain, in the measures pursued by our
commissioners, a forgetfulness of our political principles in
regard to that power. Without ceasing to proceed towards
our goal — the crippling of the English in the Mediterra
nean, by closing the ports against them, and bringing back
Corsica under the laws of the Republic, by favour of the
occupation of Leghorn — we will not make any attack at
this moment on the independence of Tuscany, or perform
any acts of government in its territory. We defer, till
more favourable circumstances, the grievances which must
arise for us from the partiality of the grand- duke to the
English ; accordingly, we recommend to our commissioners
to employ the forms which neutrality requires, and to con
sult previously with you on the resolutions which appear
useful to them, abstaining, however, from every thing that
would tend to usurp the rights of the Tuscan government.
It is necessary, without giving umbrage to it, and without
affecting the exercise of authority, to husband the advan
tages of the Republic, whose interests this system will
favour. M. Corsini has transmitted to us a memorial containing
the grievances of his court : we have thought it right to
accede to his demand to revoke the resolution concerning
persons of Enghsh extraction, while rejecting his other
proposals. The administrative operations at Leghorn likewise engage
our solicitude ; and our formal intention is to establish the
rule of security, good order, and integrity there. We
earnestly call the attention of our commissioners to this im
portant object. Reveillere-Lepaux.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].
The observations contained, citizen-general, in your letter
concerning the State of Venice, have appeared to us ex
tremely judicious. The Directory authorises you to take
all the measures that you have proposed till the military
events, the happy issue of which we are awaiting, determine
in a positive manner our conduct in regard to that power.

254 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
As for the remonstrances of the Grison Leagues, the'
course which you have taken likewise deserves the approba
tion of the Directory, being conformable with its preceding-
instructions. It is useful to profit by the need they have of
the corn of the Milanese to ascertain their disposition.
The constitutional act forbids us to authorise the use you
propose to make of a corps of 800 Swiss pensioners.
Reveillere-Lepaux.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Poli, 11 Thermidor, year 4 [July 29, 1796].
I am just come from Rivoli : the fire has ceased ; we still
hold the position of Campo-Orongo — heights behind Rivoli.
Our troops are harassed ; they are absolutely knocked up ;
they have fought above fifty different actions. I never saw
the Austrians fight so furiously ; they were all drunk with
brandy. Our troops, though with empty bellies, fought
with surprising courage. If you send me a reinforcement
of 7 or 8000 men, I almost promise you to re-occupy la
Corona to-morrow ; but we want fresh troops. Let me
have news of you, general ; I have had none to-day : I am
impatient to hear from you.
I have just sent to ascertain whether the enemy is in the
environs of the Chiusa. I shall sleep at the bridge, Pigeon
and Victor at Rivoli. Joubert is ill.
Massena.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Pieverono, 11 Thermidor, year 4 [July 29, 1796].
I certainly expected to find the troops which arrived
yesterday from Vicenza diminished in number. You will
see, citizen-general, that, after all, it will be but a recon
naissance : that we shall know. To-day all precautions are
taken ; strong reconnaissances started in the night, to push
very forward on all the roads leading from the enemy, and
assuredly, if we are to be attacked, it will not be at Vicenza
only that the movement will take place, but along our whole
line. Health and friendship.
Massena.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 255
To General Bonaparte.
Venice, 12 Thermidor, year 4 [July 30, 1 796].
Citizen-general, according to a letter, which I have re
ceived from Bolzano, dated the 27th July, there have passed
through that part, since the preceding letter, 120 artillery
men, 5000 infantry, and 4000 cavalry, all these forces
coming from the Rhine. The same letter adds that, on the
25th, the Austrian troops put themselves in motion to the
number of 30,000, taking different directions, namely those
of Val Isella, Salto, Alia, Guiducasio, and Brescia. It also
gives me to understand that there are movements towards
Munich, for my man asks if it would be advisable for him
to go thither.
Other advices from Vicenza, dated July 18, assure me that
the number of the Austrian troops arrived in the environs
of that city does not exceed 3000, composed of Hulans,
hussars, and infantry. Those which are posted at the
Campo Marzo are provided with two pieces of cannon, one
placed on a hill on the other side of the river, and one on the
Verona road. Health and fraternity,
Lallemant.

To General Bonaparte.
Rome, 12 Thermidor, year 4 [July 31, 1796].
Citizen general-in-chief, I arrived here the day before
yesterday. I delivered your letters to M. Azara and to
cardinal Zelaila. M. Azara presented me this morning to
the pope, by whom I have been very well received. Citizen
Miot and his secretary of legation set out this evening for
Florence. The scientific men and artists arrived this
morning. Here I am installed with those who ought to
assist in the work ; we will endeavour to do it well.
Citizen Miot has spared nothing to inform you by couriers
of what is doing. Five millions are on the road to lmola :
I shall hasten the second remittance.
Agreeably to your instructions, I applied to the governor
of Ancona for an order to receive the garrison which you
are to send : I was told that this order was given, and that
commissioners from you had already come to Ancona, and
taken cognizance of the state of things.
An English frigate is blockading this port. This system

256 letters and despatches.
of blockade pursued by the English at Leghorn and other
places is designed to distress the people, by causing a want
of work, and exciting them by despair to revolt agamst us.
You know that there are fifty thousand pounds of powder
ready to be delivered here for the army. I am going to
have it tried by citizens Monge and Berthollet ; we ought
to know whether it is good : soon afterwards we will send
it off to you by Pistoia and Modena. I will give notice of
it to the French comandant at Bologna, who can send
national guards to escort and take it wherever you please.
I have requested citizen Miot to communicate to me
your answers, which may serve me here for ulterior in
structions. I have not yet said any thing about the article concerning
the contribution of Ravenna, because I have been engaged
with more urgent matters. I shall immediately have the
necessary interview upon that article with M. Azara.
They wish to wait here for the answer from lmola con
cerning the manner in which the delivery of the first five
millions will be effected, before forwarding the second in
stalment. It is found very difficult to collect this second
sum, which, besides, will be behind-hand : I shall be press
ing. People must be aware that the Directory will not turn
its attention to the definitive peace, till the conditions of the
armistice are fulfilled. They must, therefore, bestir them
selves here, notwithstanding their extreme disposition to
tardiness in every thing. We shall fall to work to-morrow
with the scientific men and artists to decide upon the ob
jects to be demanded in kind. I shall give you an account
of every thing, after I have learned from Miot what answer
you have given to all his propositions.
Cacault.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Roverbello, 13 Thermidor, year 4 [July 31, 1796].
My troops arrived here this morning, at three o'clock,
after marching two nights and a day. They are going to
Castellaro. 1 observe to you that I have but the 4th
demi-brigade and the 51st, forming part of General Kil-
maine's division. I have also a few cavalry and eleven
pieces of light artillery, far too many for so few infantry.
On the arrival of General Kilmaine, I went to see him,

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES." 257
in order to concert with him for the good of the service.
I have agreed with him that he should place a demi-brigade
between Roverbello and Castellaro, to cover Mantua, and to
be able to afford each other mutual assistance ; for it is
fourteen miles from Castellaro to Roverbello. You see that
I am lonely enough, and without hope of any succour ; but,
the greater the danger, the greater firmness we must show.
Rely upon my zeal and my activity.
I beg you to let me know upon what point I am to effect
my retreat, in case I am forced ; for I am not aware of your
intentions or of the position of the army. All your orders
have been executed. In those which you have given me on
the subject of the retreat, I have not been at all annoyed?"
Augereau.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Milan, 13 Thermidor, year 4 [July 31, 1796],
I am now persuaded that the enemy have taken Brescia.
I am setting off for Cassano, to make the necessary recon
naissances myself, and I will acquaint you with what I have
learned. So far, notwithstanding the usual exaggerations,
nothing leads me to believe that the corps of the enemy
which has come to Brescia is considerable. We have some
convoys on the road, that fell back to Cassano, which will be
the principal object of my examination.
They are working hard in execution of your orders con
cerning the castle of Milan. It will be supplied with pro-:
visions to-morrow, and I will endeavour to fulfil your inten
tions. As soon as the communication is re-established, or
as soon as you point me out another, I will send you the
detachments of cavalry which are daily equipping and the
other convoys destined for the head-quarters.
Sahuguet.

To General Bonaparte.
Lonado, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1 , 1796].
General Massena has not arrived here, as he sent me
word ; having no news of -Sauret, I could neither march upon'
Brescia nor follow up the victory. I learn this moment that
General Sauret, after taking Salo, has retired upon Desen-
sano, and know not what to make of it. General Massena
vol. I. s

258 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
is about to rejoin me. We shall act together, agreeably to
the instructions which I have received from you.
The battle of Lonado was terrible ; and I can assure you
the enemy has been so mauled that he will not forget it :
he has left above 1000 muskets, lost a great many men,
and gone off in the greatest confusion. We have taken 300
prisoners. Had we been stronger, or only fresher, we should
not have stopped there. Despinois.
PS. The enemy is guarding the bridge of St. Mark ; I
am told that he has 5000 men in Brescia, and nearly the
like number before the place ; nothing positive : if we may
believe the prisoners, we had to do yesterday with 8 or
9000 infantry and 800 horse.
M. Bataglia, proveditor of Brescia, lets you know that he
is here. He knows nothing about the positions and strength
of the enemy; or, at least, he says nothing precise or
positive. To General Bonaparte.
16 Thermidor, year 4 [August 3, 1796].
I have learned with pain that you are displeased because
I did not keep Salo after I had taken it. You will recol
lect, general, that you were for a moment undecided whether
we should go. You afterwards decided that, if it were only
to deliver General Guyeux and his demi-brigade, we ought
to go ; but you gave me no orders to remain there. General
Despinois took a different course, which greatly embarrassed
me, when I began my attack and saw that he did not come.
Had he apprized me of it, I would have detached a column,
which would have entered by the Brescia gate ; and, by
means of this manoeuvre, I should have made prisoners erf
the whole garrison and of the lieutenant-general command
ing there, and taken fifteen pieces of artillery parked at the
camp of Tormini.
General Despinois says that he corresponded with
me. I have received but one letter from him at four in the
afternoon, when I was falling back to reach the heights in
front of Desensano, having seen a great number of barks
full of troops upon the lake and the general with them.
I was afraid that they were coming to land near Desensano,
to cut off my retreat.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 259
On arriving at Lonado, Generals Massena, Despinois,
and I, consulted together in the presence of General St.
Hilaire. There was a question about returning to Salo.
The general asked how long it would take to get there ; I
replied that it would not take above four hours ; that,
according to calculations, I could have arrived there by five
o'clock in the evening ; that they had but to decide and I
would march immediately. General Massena was of opi
nion that it would be rather late. It was decided that the
three divisions should march in column to the bridge of
St. Mark, and that, if the enemy opposed our passage, the
cavalry should ford and each horseman take a volunteer
behind him. I marched, and had nearly reached Brescia,
when I received orders to fall back ; I then marched for
Salo. At the bridge of St. Mark, I allowed the troops to
rest for a moment. General Pigeon, who followed me, sent
me an orderly to let me know that he was making his
retreat upon Brescia, the enemy coming in force from
Gavardo. I drew up my division in order of battle ; I
immediately sent twenty horse chasseurs to reconnoitre the
Gavardo road, where I ordered two pieces of cannon to be
placed. I detached tirailleurs in front till the return of the
chasseurs. The officer commanding the reconnaissance
made me a report of his mission ; he had seen nothing, and
I resumed my march. General Massena sent me an
orderly, who told me from him that I ought to make all
the infantry advance upon Lonado. I was approaching it,
when I met General Massena, who expressed his astonish
ment to find me there : I replied that it was only in
consequence of his own advice, when he told me that the
orderly had made a mistake, and that this disposition related
only to the remainder of General Pigeon's troops. I then
fell back to regain the Salo road. You see, general, that,
but for these unlucky accidents, I should have arrived in
good time. I was then obliged to relinquish the command
to the general of brigade Guyeux, having had my leg
crushed : making a charge at the head of the 24th regi
ment of chasseurs, we passed along a very narrow road,
where I was pressed by the squadron, and my leg swelled
to such a prodigious size that I could neither walk nor
ride. I have transmitted to you the details of my expedi
tion, fearing that you had not received them.
I had about 1500 infantry and 90 horse chasseurs, and,
s2

260 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy, whose force
amounted to 3500 infantry and 400 hussars, or dragoons,
having cannon, I made 90 prisoners, among whom were
three captains and a sub-lieutenant. I took two pieces of
cannon and two pair of colours of the regiment of Pro
vence, and I delivered the 27th demi-brigade, General
Guyeux, General Rusca, and his aide-de-camp, who were
prisoners. The chief of brigade Desaix, commanding the Allobroges,
has distinguished himself. He entered the town twice at
the, head of the carabineers of the division, and received a
ball in the shoulder. Notwithstanding his wound, he has
never quitted the corps.
 Sauret.
To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Castiglione di Stiviere,
16 Thermidor, year 4 [August 3, 1796].
The enemy is completely beaten ; 3000 prisoners, cannon,
and ammunition, are the fruits of this victory. The three
arms fought well ; each has done its duty. We have to
regret the death of some brave men : General Beyrand was
killed on the field of battle, General Robert wounded ; the
chief of brigade Pourailler is likewise killed and several
brave chiefs of battalion.
The enemy received reinforcements several times ; the
fight was most bloody : I estimate the loss of the enemy at
7000 men. Your aide-de-camp Marmont conduoted him
self to admiration during the whole engagement : he has
displayed great military talents. I beg you to send me
General St. Hilaire to command the 4th demi-brigade, and
likewise the chief of brigade Lannes, who has the brevet
for taking the command of it ; otherwise those brave
troops are undone. You will endeavour also to send me a
general of brigade to command the 51st. We must strive
to profit by this victory. I will send you the circumstan
tial report relative to the affair of to-day, in which I shall
solicit of you promotion for the officers who have distin
guished themselves. .
6 Augereau.
PS. Not having officers enough, I have retained the
aide-de-camp of General St. Hilaire.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 261

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Castiglione di Stiviere,
16 Thermidor, year 4 [August 3, 1796].
I inform you, general, that the enemy has taken positions
by the side of us, that is to say, as far as we could pursue
him : the darkness put an end to our engagement. At
night-fall, precisely at the moment when I was making dis
positions, 200 hussars appeared upon our rear, and
approached to within pistol-shot of the town : at the same
moment the whole park of artillery was put to the rout,
and struck terror into the minds of the soldiers, who ran
away as fast as they could. Fortunately, we succeeded in
rallying some of them to serve to guard us.
The troops before us amount to 20,000 infantry. For
my part, I have computed them at 15,000, though all
reports agree in the first statement. You see, general, that
I shall be attacked to-morrow morning by fresh troops and
far superior in number. Our soldiers are harassed with
fatigue and destitute of provisions. If yeu do not send
me troops, it is impossible for me to resist, willing as the
troops may be to fight. The cavalry has suffered severely,
considering its small number. I have not an officer ; they
are all killed or wounded. We fought sixteen hours in a
parched plain, where there was not a drop of water. The
soldiers have suffered much.
I beg you to tell me what I have to do, in case I should
be obliged to retreat, and to what point I am to proceed
with my troops. An immediate answer.
Augereau.

To General Bonaparte.
Lonado, 16 Thermidor, year 4 [August 3, 1796].
I have this instant received a letter from General Rampon,
who tells me that General Guyeux is blocking up the enemy
in Salo, and that he has already taken so many prisoners that
he has not men sufficient to guard them . He declares that
the enemy is in complete rout, and desires me to march to
him with my division. General Rampon, having opened
the letter to me, set out immediately, to proceed to his
assistance. I am afraid that this precipitate, movement will cause me to

262 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
have some alerte in the night. Finding myself weakened by
four battalions, I am resolved to make my troops fall back to
Lonado and to leave no posts but on the heights of De
sensano. To-morrow morning by daybreak at Salo, if
there is nothing new.
There is still a firing of small arms towards Castillon.
Massena.

To General Guillaume [Commandant of Peschiera].
Head-quarters, Castiglione, 16 Thermidor, year 4 [Aug. 3, 1796].
You ought to have witnessed the battles fought yester
day and the preceding days : we have taken 20,000 men,
and killed a great number. The enemy's army is totally
broken up, and to-morrow we shall be within your walla.
Meanwhile, let what will happen, hold out to the last
extremity. -' The breach made, show the greatest firmness.
Health, esteem, and glory.
Bonaparte.

To General Guillaume.
Salo, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 4, 1796]. :
The most complete victory has crowned this day : the
enemy has at length given up to us all his positions, which
he made in vain the most desperate efforts to defend.
General Massena will give you an account of the attack
that we made this morning with such brilliant success.
The state of things has not permitted me, since my
coming to this division, to give you any account of the
operations concerted with General Despinois. This divi
sion has hitherto had too much to do to make itself master
of all the positions which could alone enable it to protect
the movements of General Despinois, of whom we have no
intelligence. Now that the communications are more free,
I have strongly urged General Guyeux, who had no
instructions nor any idea of your plans, to make a movement
to-morrow, for the purpose of putting into that operation
all the unity that it requires and seconding the attempts of
General Despinois upon the rock of Amfoux.
The enemy is so closely pressed in this quarter, where
we have cut him off' from all retreat towards the lake, that

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 263
he cannot escape a total loss ; for he is between this divi
sion, that of General Despinois, and Brescia.
I wrote to you yesterday, citizen-general, how grieved I
was on reaching the column of Salo, to find it in all
respects so unfit to concur on that same day in the object
which its march was designed to fulfil. General Guyeux
was ignorant of everything, even to the course that he had
to take. At length, all was repaired and placed on such a
footing that something may now be undertaken in that
quarter. I am only afraid that the delay has given a good deal of
uneasiness to' General Despinois, who has thus far been se
parated from us. Believe, citizen -general, in my entire
devotedness and in the triumph of the arms of the
Republic. St. Hilaire.
To General Bonaparte.
Brescia, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 4, 1796].
According to the instructions given me for the attack of
Gavardo, I marched with the first battalion of the 11th
demi-brigade to the heights of this village, passing by the
left of Picton. This position, occupied by the enemy, de
fended the village of Gavardo.
The impetuosity with which the enemy was charged by
the battalion obliged him to fall back into the village,
where, supported by several pieces of artillery, he was like
wise forced. One of their pieces and above 150 prisoners
were already in our power ; we were masters of the village
of Gavardo and the bridge, and the retreat of the troops
who were attacked by General Despinois was totally cut
off: to no purpose two squadrons, which escorted the
artillery and baggage, charged in the village ; our troops,
iu ambush on all sides, forced them to fall back upon Picton.
To decide the victory, nothing more was required but to
force him in this village ; but I soon judged that the troops
of General Despinois had been repulsed, on seeing two
enemy's columns advancing directly upon me. The fire of
these two brought back to the charge that which had
retreated upon Salo. In a moment, we were surrounded on
all sides. The first battalion of the 11th demi-brigade
here deserved the warmest praise. The only way I had
left to preserve these excellent troops for the Republic was

264 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
to charge the enemy's column with the bayonet ; I had no
great difficulty to persuade the brave fellows to second my
design, and well did they keep the oath which they made
me, to conquer or die. The charge beaten, a most vehement
fire soon opened us a passage, which afforded us the facility
to gain the mountains by which we effected our retreat.
It was not till we had marched more than thirty miles upon
horrible roads that we arrived at Rezato, where we learned
that General Despinois had retired to Brescia.
We were obliged to abandon the prisoners we had at first
made. In our different attacks the enemy has had an
infinite number killed and wounded, and among them
several officers of distinction. We have brought in fifty
prisoners taken during our retreat. Our loss in killed and
prisoners is about sixty men.
Ill health, added to a forced march, made on foot, obliges
me, to my great regret, to keep my bed. Health and respect.
Dallemagne.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 4, 1796].
I address to you annexed the extract of a letter from
my secretary, who, on the 15th of this month, saw Casal-
Maggior in full revolt. Murder, robbery, plunder, outrages
of all kinds, have been committed by a furious multitude.
I am in, according to all appearances, for five horses stolen,
all my baggage, consisting of linen, clothes, books, maps,
memorials, and military correspondence, carriage, waggon,
everything valuable and useful that I possessed ; and my
aides-de-camp are in nearly the same condition. I have no
doubt that you will signally avenge the outrage offered to
the Republic by these villains. In this assurance, I solicit of
you a particular reparation, proportioned, if it be possible,
to the loss that I have sustained ; I say, if it be possible,
for nobody can restore to me the fruit of several years'
researches. I rely, in this matter, on your severe equity.
Health and respect.
Despinois.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 265
To General Bonaparte.
Brescia, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 4, 1796].
Had nothing but daring been needed yesterday, we should
no . doubt have triumphed : I have sought the enemy and
attacked him without hesitation. What more could I do \
The arms that ought to have seconded the head failed me
when I wanted them ; and, on this point, I should betray
my duty, were I not to tell you the whole truth : there is
no good, no resource to be hoped from the eighth brigade ;
it is so infected with cowardice, that, on the firing of a
single musket by one of our sentinels, this morning, at an
Austrian prisoner who had appeared on the road, half the
corps was already in flight. We, General Bertin and I,
and all the brave, join to beseech you to put this corps in
its place, or at least to spare us the evident risk of being
dishonoured with it, and of being prevented from justifying
your confidence. At any rate, the division of which you
have given me the command cannot exist in the state of
disorganization in which it is at present. It is in want of
everything, and not a creature to furnish it with supplies,
no commissary of war, no agent, not even a medical officer
and an hospital for the wounded. It is always the case that,
when a prey to distresses, and suffering all sorts of priva
tions, the soldier is disheartened ; and it is this mischievous
impression too that we ought to hasten to destroy.
The Adjutant- General Herbin found nothing but rocks at
Santo-Osseto ; no provisions either behind or before, unless
indeed .you proceed a great distance further. This consi
deration and the loneliness of his position induced me to
¦recall him to Nave, where he remains posted till fresh
orders. I shall send this evening, unless contrary dispositions be
directed by you, the third battalion of the 11th to occupy
Rezato and the gorges of Irle and Massaro : by these means
I shall cover Brescia, and secure, as much as possible, all
the communications of your left. It is painful and grievous
to me to remain in some sort a spectator of your successes ;
but, when one does enterprise, there ought to be at least an
appearance of success, and here I have it not. The woful
experience that we had yesterday takes from me the very
hope of it.
Bend me, I beg of you, in all possible cases, infantry

266 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
cartridges and field-pieces with their ammunition. We are
reduced to ten cartridges per man, arid at Brescia there is
but a small stock, destined exclusively for the garrison of
the castle. Health and respect. Despinois.

To General Bonaparte.
Caliverge, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 14, 1796].
I have the honour to inform you that, last night, after
the return of my aide-de-camp, whom you had ordered to
proceed to Gavardo, and who was unable to reach that
place, because it is occupied by the enemy, I sent immedi
ately a confidential man, who has always served me well, to
ascertain the force of the enemy, both infantry, cavalry, and
artillery. He has reported to me that it is about 5 or 6000
men ; the infantry is in the town, the cavalry outside ; and
four small pieces of cannon are placed about a mile from
Gavardo, on the right. He was stopped at the first post,
which is of seven men, five infantry and two cavalry : at a
little distance from this first, there is another of about 200
infantry and 100 cavahy. He was conducted to the general,
and asked whence he came ; he said from Pont St. Mark^
and added that he came several times a week to Gavardo
anel its environs, to buy oats and other produce in which he
dealt. When questioned if there were many French to
wards Pont St. Mark and Lonado, he replied that he saw
some of them every day, but could not tell their number.
The road which he took to go thither runs before Pont
St. Mark, coming from Brescia : thus, I should think,
general, if you should march troops to that quarter, it
might be advisable to send one column by this road and one
by that running from Brescia by way of Rezato to Gavardo.
Artillery may be taken thither by both routes.
If General Guyeux is at Salo, he might come thither by
the Termini road, passing through Villa Nova, detaching a
column, and making it cross by the bridge of Termini or
that of Villa Nova : this column would pass through Supra
Ponte ; then the enemy would have no sort of retreat.
This man left Gavardo at ten this morning, and was con
ducted back by two Hulans to the first post, having a guide
with him. Health and consideration. Sauret.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 267
To General Bonaparte.
Salo, 18 Thermidor, year 4 [August 5, 1796],
The troops under my command are scouring the moun
tains in the environs of Salo, and bringing in Austrian
prisoners every moment : to-day the number is 200, one of
them a captain ; these, added- to 1510 whom we had taken
in the fights of the 16th and 17th, form a total of 1710,
including a general and several officers. We took also 26
caissons or carriages, most of them full of ammunition, one
twelve-pounder, one five, and one three. A twelve-pounder
has just been discovered on the road to the camp of La
Corona at Sabio ; I have ordered it to be taken to Salo : there
is a great quantity of muskets which the enemy threw away
upon the mountains when betaking himself to flight ; I have
had them collected and brought hither. His retreat is di
rected upon Anfo, which is occupied at this moment by his
wrecks. The inhabitants of Salo and also of the neighbouring
villages have expressed to us the greatest attachment for
the French Republic ; on returning into their territory,
everybody hailed our approach ; the doors of houses which
had before been closed on account of the misconduct of the
Austrians, who plundered them all the time they continued
there, were instantly thrown open with the greatest joy, and
the inhabitants themselves were anxious to afford all pos
sible accommodations to the troops that I command. Several
had concealed our sick officers, and paid them all the atten
tions that humanity requires. Health and respect.
Guyeux.
PS. One hundred more prisoners have just arrived. At
Villa Nova and Gavardo there are 150 wounded, whom I
shall have taken to the rear as soon as 1 can.
I am just informed that there have been found two four-
pounders, the carriages of which have been burned. These
pieces were hid in ditches on the heights of Villa Nova.

To General Bonaparte.
Cremona, 18 Thermidor, year 4 [August 5, 1796].
Having thoroughly ascertained, general, that it was im
possible for me to follow the movement of the division ordered

268 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
by your letter of the 17th, at eight in the morning, I had
myself set down at Cremona, and shall push on to Placentia,
where I shall try to recover my health and strength. Health
and respect. • Serrurier.

To General Bonaparte.
Monte Chiaro, 18 Thermidor^gear 4 [August 5, 1796].
, The total exhaustion of my strength prevents me, my
dear general, from joining you and sharing your glory.
Fever and pains have so reduced me that I cannot hold
myself upright, much less sit a horse. I am going to Brescia
in quest of relief. With rest and bark, I hope to rejoin
you shortly.
.lam told that I have lost my horses and my equipages.
I lent one to General St. Hilaire, who asked me for it in
your name, to make an excursion, and has not sent it back.
I have but two left. Health and friendship.
Kilmaine.

To General Bonaparte.
Cavriana, 18 Thermidor, year 4 [.August 5r 1796J.
We have pursued the enemy beyond Cavriana ; we are
collecting the stragglers, and the number of the prisoners is
increasing every moment. They abandon in their flight
arms, baggage, and ammunition of all kinds ; it is the most
complete rout, and I think there is occasion to profit by it. I
am going to march upon Peschiera with the 5th demi-
brigade. Send us, if possible, some bread, Or let us know,
at least, where to get it.
Part of the enemy are retiring upon Peschiera, part upon
Mantua.
Despinois.

To General Bonaparte.
Rome, 19 Thermidor. year 4 [August 6, 1796].
Since the evacuation of Verona and Ferrara, the most silly
and malicious reports are circulated against us. This weak
and timid government lends an ear to all sorts of lies. It
has despatched Monsignor Lagreca, vice^legate of Ferrara,

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 269
to be near that legation, as if the Austrians were about to
arrive there.
I have written to M. Azara a letter, of which I send you
a copy annexed. He has just delivered it to the Roman
government. It will make you acquainted with the way in
which I shall here follow up the affair which you have en
trusted to me.
The pope has conceived apprehensions for the safety of
the convoy of the 5,000,000 sent off for lmola : he is afraid
that the enemy may come and carry off that money. A very
polite communication informs me of the alarm he is in.
You will see by the annexed copy of my answer to M.
Azara what explanation I have thought it right to give on
this subject.
There is talk of a plan concerted between Vienna and
Naples, according to which the troops of the King of the
Two Sicilies are to advance to Ferrara, to give a hand to
the Austrians. It is said that the English are offering a
subsidy to set the army of Naples in motion. It is every
where asserted in Rome that the siege of Mantua is raised,
and that the besieging army, all sick, has retired to Cremona.
This is the land of fables. I shall occupy myself solely
in extracting from it the advantages which your victories
have ensured, and which they will maintain.
 Cacault.
To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Salo, 20 Thermidor, year 4 [August 7, 1796].
I have' the honour to inform you that the two colours
which I took from the enemy were carried on the 21st by
two chasseurs of the 24th regiment to Castiglione : the re-:
ceipt was even signed by an adjunct [adjoint] under the
route of the orderlies. I sent for the two chasseurs who
carried them, and who told me that they had delivered them,
at the staff, to a citizen of middling size, with a pale face,
and a coat embroidered at the pockets. Health and con
sideration. Sauret.
To General Bonaparte.
Brescia, 21 Thermidor, year 4 [August 8, 1796].
Take my life, general, or give me back my honour ; I do
not deserve to lose it. I am overwhelmed with grief. Re-

270 LETTERS and despatches.
ceiving no consolatory answer from you, I here subjoin the
motives which determined me to that retreat which I was
far from considering as dishonourable. View them, I beg of
you, as the strictest truth ; and, besides, it will be easy to
convince yourself on the subject by my demi-brigade.
If you wish to be informed of my military, moral, and
political conduct, during the four years that I have been
general, nothing will be so easy for me, not only by the
officers under whom I have served, bu% also by the troops
that have been under my command, and you have a great
many of them in your army. If you wish to go back still
further, even for the thirty-one years that I have been in
the service, I could do that too.
Deign to take into consideration my unhappy position. I
depend upon your justice. Health and fraternity.
Valette.

To General Bonaparte.
Salo, 21 Thermidor, year 4 [August 7, 1796].
I am afraid that you have not received my letter dated
the 18th Thermidor, since the orderly who carried it has
not returned : I told you in it that the enemy was rallying
his wrecks at Anfo. I have searched all the mountains
about Salo ; 200 prisoners have been picked up ; these,
added to the 1510, from the fights of the 16th and 17th,
furnish a total of 1710, including one general and several
officers. In those actions, 26 caissons or carriages, most of
them loaded with ammunition, fell into our hands. I have
had all the muskets collected which the enemy threw away
in his rout. Six hundred were brought to me yesterday,
and have been delivered to the commandant of the artillery.
Health and respect.
Guyeux.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Salo, 21 Thermidor, year 4 [August 8, 1796].
I have the honour to inform you that, General Massena
having withdrawn the third battalion of the 1 1th demi-
brigade of the division which I command, I have only three
demi-brigades left, forming at most 1800 men, and 80 horse
chasseurs of the 24th regiment. It is very difficult to

LETTERS and despatches. 271
fulfil your views with so small a force. I cannot put troops
into Gavardo, and your intentions were that I should oc
cupy Santo-Osseto and Nave, since it is the road through
the valley of Sabia to Brescia. Health and consideration.
Sauret.

To General Bonaparte.
Verona, 22 Thermidor, year 4 [August 9, 1796].
You will find annexed, general, copies of two letters, one
from General Beaumont, containing some particulars con
cerning the position of the enemy, which I think of suffi
cient interest to transmit to you ; and the other from the
general of brigade Robert, who, after being wounded in the
affair of Castiglione de Stiviere, learned that his baggage,
constituting all his resources, had been taken by the enemy.
The merit of that general and his unfortunate situation
must interest every man of feeling. I flatter myself, there
fore, that you will grant this brave officer the relief which
he has a right to expect from the public gratitude.
Augereau.

To General Bonaparte.
Verona, 22 Thermidor, year 4 [August 9, 1796].
If the troops marching for Mantua had arrived before
the place a little earlier, we should perhaps have still re
covered part of our means : so much is certain that the
trench nearest to the place was not entirely filled till three
days back, and that nothing had yet been done to destroy
the incendiary batteries. It appears that the garrison is
rather stronger than it was : I judge by the manner in
which it spreads itself over the country : the corps which
you have sent thither must act cautiously. I am just told
that it consists of no more than 2700 men, and that Ge
neral Fiorella had resigned his command on account of
illness. Unluckily, accidents delay our march upon the
place ; besides, I confess that 2700 might be sufficient for
one side of the place, but not for two ; and yet nothing can
be done, without a corps against the citadel and another
between Pradella and Ceresa.
If, instead of a simple blockade, it were thought fit to add
a bombardment, this operation would require only two addi-

272 letters and despatches."
tional battalions to be placed in the quarter of St. George^
and I think that it might cause the gates to be opened to
us much sooner than if we were to wait to starve them out
in the city. It remains then to be ascertained if the artil-i
lery can draw twelve or fifteen mortars well provisioned
from the fortresses of Milan, Tortona, and Alexandria, and
contrive to make the bombs explode ; for it is a fact that
most of them did not explode in Mantua.
If, instead of twelve or fifteen mortars, the artillery could
procure us thirty pieces of large calibre, we would then
make the attack by main force from the entrenchments, and
we should have the place in ten days : only it would be >
requisite to add a good demi-brigade to the blockading.
troops. If one considers of what importance Mantua is to
us, one cannot but regret that Murat did not attack that,
entrenched camp, as it had been planned. Mantua is neces
sary if one would remain peaceful possessor of Italy ; it is
more than that when one designs to march into the Tyrol
For the rest, I do not think that with reinforcements of
fewer than 15,000 men you could undertake to form your
junction with the armies of the Rhine. We must have, in
the present state, a force before Mantua, another disposable
one to extinguish the petty conflagrations to which your
absence may give rise, and, lastly, an army very prepon
derant in force to that of the enemy, because it will .be
weakened at every step, in traversing a barbarous country,
while theirs will recruit itself with all those people seasoned
to war, who will flee before you. The possession of all Italy
is too great an advantage to the French Republic to be
risked without important motives. To return to Mantua,
the whole reduces itself to these questions : 1, if we can-
have thirty pieces of large calibre, supplied with five or six.
hundred rounds ; 2, if, not having those, we can procure
twelve mortars, with five hundred bombs each ; but, in any
case, 2700 men are not sufficient to keep within bounds on
two points a garrison that has been renewed and is stronger:
than the former. ~,
Chasseloup.
PS. It is said, general, that Wurmser has not got
enough, and that he is disposed to have another taste :
General Augereau will finish him ; but perhaps there will
be need for abridge to communicate with Massena, or, better
still, to take the position which you have pointed out to:

LETTERS and despatches. 273
me behind the Adige. It seems to me that, if we were
masters of Trent, the enemy could be only on one of the
banks of the Adige ; and that to keep him in awe we should
have no need to scatter our forces : what I am advancing
is but an idea thrown out ; I am not sufficiently acquainted
with the country to affirm this.

To, ^General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Proverano, 23 Thermidor, year 4 [August 10, 1796].
Nothing new, general. According to the report which I
have had, the enemy has five battalions at La Corona : he
is establishing batteries there, and making a great many
entrenchments ; he has, besides, three battalions in the
gorge of Preaboco.
My duty requires me to report to you the officers who
have distinguished themselves in the different affairs that
have taken place between the 11th and the 20th. Generals
Victor, Joubert, Pigeon, and Rampon, have exhibited great
capacity and bravery. The adjutants-general Monnier and
Chabran marched at the head of the columns to Lonado, and
their example contributed not a little to the great advan
tages gained by my division. Citizens Somet, Degiovanni,
Ducos, and Reille, appeared at the head of their columns
with great intrepidity. I solicit promotion for these offi
cers ; they have many titles to it. The chief of battalion
Chariot, commanding the brave 32nd demi-brigade, deserves
also the rank of chief of brigade, which he filled tempo
rarily. This officer is full of intelligence and valour, and
deserves that one should take some pains for his promotion.
I shall transmit to you shortly the names of the other
brave officers who have distinguished themselves, persuaded
that you will study, as usual, to do them justice.
 Massena.
To General Bonaparte.
Rome, 23 Thermidor, year 4 [August 10, 1796],
Accept the congratulations which I address to you, in
the transport of my joy, upon the decisive victory which
you gained on the 16th instant. In rendering the greatest
and most important service to the Republic, you have saved
Italy from the disasters into which the disputed war which
VOL. I. T

274 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
the Germans wished to keep up would have plunged that
fine country.
The dawn of the first successes of the Germans had
heated to frenzy the lively imaginations of the Italians. It
was believed that we were ruined, because so the furious
agents of London and Naples gave out. . It had been con
certed between Vienna and Naples that the King of the Two
Sicilies should push forward his army, to give a hand to
the Imperialists. The pope was to be compelled to break
the armistice, and all the princes of Italy to furnish a con
tingent, to assist in driving us beyond the Alps.
The court of Rome, intimidated, and prompt to believe
absurdities that are to its taste, resolved, without speaking to
M. d'Azara, to send the vice-legate of Ferrara, Monsignor
della Greca, to resume his post and to re-establish the
papal authority, the moment the French have evacuated
that duchy. I am assured that the Cardinal Mattei,
Archbishop of Ferrara, made attempts to induce the muni
cipality of that city to renounce the oath of fidelity to the
Republic. ¦ The imbecility of the great, and the passion with which
they are inflamed against us, have inspired the emissaries
of our enemies scattered among the people with the teme
rity to insult grievously the two young Frenchmen, secre
taries of the commission of the arts, and even to put their.
lives in peril. I send you annexed a copy of the account
which they have drawn up of what they have had to endure,
and I send you also a copy of my official letter on this sub
ject, which I addressed to M. d'Azara, that he might give
it his support, as he has done, with the Roman government,
which is now, after your decisive victory, anxious. to satisfy
us. There is a million tournois in gold rods, out of what is
ready to be despatched from Rome, and they are striving to
increase that sum, to furnish the second contribution al
ready due ; but,. before forwarding this convoy, I wished
that the first 5,000,000 should have arrived and been re
ceived, as citizen Miot was to have concerted, that I might
be able to govern myself in the direction of the second con
voy with the greater certainty.
The pope has just appointed Cardinal Zelada, who was
doing nothing whatever, secretary of state. We are
weathering a sort of storm raised by extravagant ideas of

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 275
your defeats. The government is desirous to fulfil the
armistice : it is determined to do so faithfully ; but habi
tual incapacity and indolence, which keep aU here in a
state of torpor, will n6t stir without being goaded.
I inform the commissaire ordonnateur DennieS of what
concerns him.
I beg you, general, to accept the homage of my admi
ration and attachment.
Cacault.

To the General Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 24 Thermidor, year 4 [August 11, 1796].
You will be pleased to send off a patrol of fifteen men
on horseback to arrest the Abbe Zerbi at Poncino, and to
carry him to the prison of Milan.
Bonaparte.

To the' General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Salo, 24 Thermidor, year 4 [August 11, 1796].
According to your orders, I am not to leave Salo with
¦the division which I command, until replaced by two bat
talions of the 85th demi-brigade : they are not yet arrived.
It is utterly impossible that I can be at Salo by seven in
the morning, and it is now five. „
PS. I have the honour to inform you that I have at
most 3000 men in my division.

To M. the Chevalier d'Azara at Rome.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].
I have received several letters from you, sir, which cir
cumstances and my engagements have prevented me from
answering so promptly as I should have wished.
Cacault will deliver to you the two authentic papers
which you have sent me with a letter from the municipality
of Ferrara. You wiU there see that it is a settled affair.
I am assured that the court of Rome has insisted on
your proving that France has been erected into a republic.
<1 am told that at Rome no more benedictions are given to
-Ferrarese and Bolognese, but plenty to the people of Lugo.
T 2

276 LETTERS and despatches.
Add to this the legate sent to Ferrara, and the postpone
ment of the execution of the armistice, and the king, your
master, will be convinced of the bad faith of a government
whose imbecility equals its weakness.
, M. Capelletti is behaving very ill at Bologna : it is for
you, sir, to set him to rights ; I shall be sorry, to be obliged
.to drive him out of the city. It is as well that I should
not know what he is, what he is about, and what he pre
tends to do.
His Royal Highness the Duke of Parma has behaved to
wards the French army with the utmost frankness and the
most sincere sentiments of friendship.
I beg you, sir, to believe, &c,
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Cacault at Rome.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].
The pope has sent a cardinal legate to Ferrara, at the
time when he thought, no doubt, that the French were un
done — is this conformable with the treaty of armistice which
we have signed ? The citizens of Ferrara have refused to
receive him. I have just given orders to this cardinal to
.repair immediately to bead-quarters.
You will find annexed a letter from the municipality of
Ferrara, which appears to agree with M. d'Azara ; that
affair, therefore, is settled. I send you, in consequence,
the two authentic papers which the minister had transmitted
to me.
The first convoy of money is not yet arrived: every
thing goes on very slowly. It appears that there is great in
sincerity. Be vigilant and give me information. Send trusty
men to learn what is doing in Naples, and what was done
there during our military operations. You will find
annexed accounts and addresses, which will please you and
make you acquainted with what is passing.
Bonaparte.

To His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Tuscany.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].
I have received the letter dated the 13th of July, with
which your Royal Highness has honoured, me. .. It did not

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.' 277
reach me till very late, which, added to the numerous
events that have recently passed, has delayed my answer.
The government has learned with the greatest pain the
occupation of Porto Ferrajo by the English. It would have
been so easy for your Highness to defend that place ; it
would have been so advantageous to you to retain posses
sion of that important portion of your territories, that one
is obliged to think that the treachery of your governor, like
that of Spannochi, has caused an event as disagreeable to
France as to your own subjects.
' The Executive Directory would, no doubt, be authorized
to seize, by way of reprisal, territories of your Royal High
ness on the continent ; but, adhering to sentiments of mode
ration, the French government will not make change or
alteration of any kind in the neutrality and good harmony
which prevail between it and your Royal Highness.
I am with sentiments of esteem, &c,
Bonaparte.

To Citizen Miot,

Head-quarters, Brescia, 24 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1 796.]
I have received your different letters, my dear minister ;
you will find annexed several copies of the narrative you
desired. The emperor is said to be at the point of death.
Try to see some one who can inform you of the moment
when it is likely to happen.
You must be aware how important this is, and how-
essential it is that I should be apprized of the moment when
the grand-duke is to set out for Vienna.
Send by a courier the annexed papers to General Vaubois
and citizen Cacault. Let me hear from you with your
usual punctuality. It is to the interest of the government
that nothing should be done in Tuscany to indispose the
grand-duke ; so, maintain the neutrality.
Bonaparte.

To the Senate of Bologna.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].
I learn, gentlemen, that the ex- Jesuits, the priests, and
the monks, are disturbing the public tranquillity. Let
them know that, while the French Republic protects reli-

278 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
gion and its ministers, it is inexorable towards those who,
forgetting their profession, intermeddle in public or civil
affairs. Inform the heads of the different religions that, on
the first complaint brought to me against the monks, I will
make the whole convent responsible ; I will expel them from
the city, and confiscate their property for the benefit of the
poor. Bonaparte.
To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].
The enemy, after his retreat, occupied in force La Corona,
and Monte Baldo : it appeared to be his intention to main
tain himself there. Massena marched thither on the 24th
Thermidor, made himself master of Monte Baldo, La
Corona, and Preabolo, and took seven pieces of cannon
and 400 prisoners. He highly praises the 38th demi-brigade
of light infantry, his aide-de-camp Rey, and his adjutant-
general Chabran.
On the 25th, I ordered General Sauret and general of
brigade St. Hiiaire to proceed to the Rocca d'Anfo, where
the enemy showed a disposition to make a stand. This
operation was successful : we forced the Rocca d'Anfo, fell
in with the enemy at Lodrono : after a slight action, we
took the baggage, six pieces of cannon, and 1100 prisoners.
Augereau has passed the Adige, driven the enemy upon
Roveredo, and taken some hundred prisoners. The enemy
has 4000 sick in Mantua ; in this month the environs of
that city are pestilential, and all I do is to place there
camps of observation to keep the garrison within bounds.
If a division of the army of the Rhine can come and take
position at Inspruck, and throw the enemy upon the right, I
will march to Trieste, blow up its port, and sack the city.
If the army of the Sambre and Meuse reaches the
Danube, and that of the Rhine can be in force at Inspruck,
I will march for Vienna by the Trieste road, and then we
shall have time to carry off the immense resources which that'
place contains.
The first plan may be executed immediately; for the
second there would be required a good battle, to scatter
Prince Charles as I have scattered Wurmser, and then
all march to Vienna. The heat is excessive. I have
15,000 sick ; few, very few, deaths.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 279
I am waiting for the succours which you promise me :
there has yet arrived next to nothing. .
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].
I have received with gratitude, citizens directors, the
new testimony of esteem which you have given me by your
letter of the 13th Thermidor. I know not why the jour
nalists should bear. me a grudge. They have attacked me
at the same time as the Austrians. You have crushed
them by the publication of your letter.
I have completely beaten the Austrians ; thus, to this
hour, these double attempts of our enemies have proved
unsuccessful.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].
The jewels and diamonds which the army sent to Genoa,
which were since on the road for Paris, but directed to turn
back to Genoa, must be worth at least two or three million ;
yet no more than 400,000 francs was offered for them in
Genoa. I think that it would be advantageous to the Re
public that these valuable articles should be conveyed to
Paris. The great number of foreigners in that capital will
render the sale of those things more productive ; besides, I
am told that Flachatand Co. are to have them for 400,000
francs. This would be a ruinous business for the govern
ment. I had caused the property of the Neapolitans at Leghorn
to be sequestrated. The commissioner of the government,
as the consul writes to me, has had the sequestration taken
off : yet that would have been a good article of the treaty
of peace. That court of Naples behaves ill : the Neapoli
tans who are here behaved very ill during our military
events, and I think that it would be very dangerous to allow
them to remain here. Is M. Pignatelli in Paris? Are
the negociations for peace begun ? If not, I think that
we have a right to sequestrate this cavalry. There are 200
horses.

280 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
It is said that the King of Naples is advancing into the
territory of the pope. I have had it signified to him that,
if he advanced into the dominions of his Holiness, the
armistice should be null, and that I would march to cover
Rome. The court of Rome, believing that the army was undone,
had already sent a legate to Ferrara. The municipality
and the guard of that city have behaved well, and refused
to receive him. I have just ordered the cardinal to come
to my head -quarters.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796],
I think it useful, citizens directors, to give you my
opinion of the generals employed in this army. You will
see that there are very few who can be of service to me.
Berthier: talents, courage, character — every thing in
his favour.
Augereau : a great deal of character, courage, firmness,
activity, habit of war ; is beloved by the soldiers, lucky in
his operations.
Massena : active, indefatigable, daring ; has quickness
of apprehension and promptness in decision.
Serrurier: fights like a soldier, takes nothing upon
himself, firm, has not a very good opinion of his troops ; is ill.
Despinois : soft, without activity, without daring, has
not fighting habits, is not liked by the soldiers, does not
fight at their head ; has, for the rest, hauteur, intelligence,
and sound political principles : fit to command in the
interior. Sauret : good, very good soldier, but not enlightened
enough to be general ; not lucky.
Abatucci : not fit to command fifty men.
Garnier, Meunier, Casabianca : incapable, not fit to
command a battalion in so active and so serious a war as this.
Macquart : a brave man, no talents, fiery.
Gauthier : fit for an office [bureau] ; never was engaged
in war.
Vaubois and Sahuguet were employed in the fortresses ;
I have transferred' them to the army: I shall learn to
appreciate them ; they have both acquitted themselves

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 281
¦extremely well of the commissions that I have hitherto
given them ; but the example of General Despinois, who was
-all right at Milan, and all wrong at the head of his division,
orders me to judge of men by their actions.
Bonaparte.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].
Scarcely were we informed, citizen-general, of the events
which you report to us in your letter of the 15th, when
news arrived of the battle of Castiglione. The circum
stances which preceded that victory render it still more
memorable and dear to the Republic, and we consider it as
one of the most decisive of those which the brave army
under your command has gained in the course of the
campaign. In the interval that elapsed between the arrival of the two
couriers, we doubted not for a moment the return of
Fortune in favour of the Republican arms, and our con
fidence never ceased to rest upon the talent and valour
which conduct them.
We have seen with satisfaction the resolution which you
have rapidly taken to raise the siege of Mantua, in order
to collect your forces. The moments were precious, and
you have skilfully appreciated their importance. Let us
profit by experience, the result of which seemed likely to
prove disastrous to us, and which is itself a signal advan
tage. Let us relinquish the plan of reducing Mantua by a
regular siege, and leave its garrison to be extinguished by
diseases which must be making great ravages among them,
to judge from their effects on the besieging troops. You
are engaged in a new campaign, in which the Republican army
has taken as decisive an offensive as when it drove the enemy
from the Apennines into the Tyrol. He is increased by
some reinforcements, but those which you are successively
receiving, and the irreparable losses which he has just
sustained, afford you great means of fighting with the advan
tages of a vigorous offensive.
Our intention is, no doubt, conformable with your views.
Go, fulfil it ; carry the conquests of the Republic to Ins
pruck, reducing the army of Wurmser to fugitive wrecks,
which have Austria alone to rally in. To second this plan,

282 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
we have ordered General Moreau, who, according to the
last reports, has pushed Prince Charles nearly to Donau-
werth, to occupy by his right the line of Inspruck at Ingol-
stadt. This movement tends to cut off the communication
between the imperial armies of Italy and Germany, and to
facilitate your march upon the Inn. Meanwhile, General
Kleber, who commands ad interim the army of the Sambre
and Meuse, the general-in-chief of which is ill, is to direct his
course for Ratisbon, after he has dispersed the corps of
General Wartensleben, who is opposed to him, and inferior
in force.
The surprise which has taken place at Salo has, no doubt,
fixed your attention, for the purpose of preventing the dan
gers of negligence and indolence in the service. This event
was for a moment too serious not to demand a severe ex
ample of the faults to which it may be owing. We request
you to give us an account of it.
You will think, no doubt, that it is useful to profit by
the new impression of fear and admiration produced in
Italy by the recent successes of the Republic, to commence
the political operations concerning Genoa and Venice. We
have not yet fixed the moment for them, and we still leave
you to do so, persuaded that you will have the skill to seize
the most favourable.
The levy of the contributions also ought, if possible, to
acquire new activity, as also the remittance to France of
what is not necessary for the maintenance of the army.
We are informed that the military are yielding, with an
alarming facility, particularly at Milan, to the affected
kindness of the inhabitants, who seek to circumvent and
corrupt, in the bosom of pleasure, that purity of the repub
lican spirit which ought to animate them. General Despi
nois does not appear to be exempt from reproach on this
subject. Recall them, citizen-general, to the severity of
principles, and rigidly repress the forgetfulness of them.
We even authorize you to turn out of the army, at the
same time reporting to us, all the officers or military em
ployes who might tend to disorganize it by so dangerous a
conduct.
Reveillere-Lepaux.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 283
The Executive Directory to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army of Italy.
Paris, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].
You will find annexed, citizen-general, a report of the
commissioner of the Directory to the municipal adminis
tration of the canton of Mont Louis, concerning the out
rages perpetrated by several of the men of the 7th battalion
of Paris, on their passage through that commune to join
the army of Italy. You will there see that several volun
teers have committed acts of violence against the citizens,
and fired upon the national guard and the commissioner of
the Directory. The want of means for seizing the delin
quents on the spot where the offence was committed pre
vented their being brought to trial ; but the Directory re
quests you to let them be sought out, and undergo, by way
of military police, such punishment as you will think that
they have deserved.
.. ' Reveillere-Lepaux.

Resolution of the Directory respecting General Valette.
Paris, 28 Thermidor, year 4 [August 15, 1796].
The Executive Directory resolves that general of brigade
Valette, suspended provisionally from his functions in the
army of Italy by the General-in-Chief Bonaparte, and
charged with cowardice, and with having abandoned the
post of Castiglione, which was committed to him, shall be
tried without delay by a council of war.
The minister of war is charged with the present re
solution.
Reveillere-Lepaux.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 28 Thermidor, year 4 [August 15, 1796].
Your letter of the 19th, citizen-general, has crowned our
satisfaction. It seems that if Fortune for a moment placed
the brave army of Italy in a critical situation, it was only
to afford it a more signal occasion for developing all its
courage, and its leaders for employing the most brilliant
resources of their talents. In our last despatch we ex
pressed to you our opinion respecting the bold and skilful

284 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
course, which you had adopted, without hesitation, to raise
the siege of Mantua, though it was already advanced, and
to march against an enemy formidable for his strength and
his offensive position. This profound combination has led
to victory, and the celerity of your movements has ren
dered irreparable the wavering of Wurmser and the fault
which he committed of dividing his forces- on the Lake of
Garda. The plan which you have traced for us, and which is
connected with that which ought to direct the operations in
Germany, could not be conceived more seasonably, since it
is partly executed already by favour of the memorable
events which have opened to you the gorges of the Tyrol.
The wrecks of the Austrians will not be able to elefend the
course of the Inn ; you will descend it rapidly, while Ge
neral Moreau will close against them, by -the prolongation
of his right, the outlets of the defiles of the mountains
towards Germany. It would be highly important that you
should put yourself into direct correspondence with that
general. According to his last reports, he must have ar
rived by this time with his principal forces on the Danube,
near Donauwerth.
The army of the Sambre and Meuse is likewise marching
from success to success. The corps commanded by General
Wartensleben, which is opposed to it, is, as we had foreseen
in our last instructions, divided, to cover Bohemia and
Austria, and thereby favours the execution of our orders,
according to which General Jourdan ought to direct his
course upon Ratisbon. We prescribe, in particular, to the
generals-in-chief of the armies acting in Germany, to let the
numerous and brilliant actions which they have fought be
followed by more serious engagements, the results of which
shall be decisive. It is only by great battles won that they
will be able to dissolve the Austrian army completely ; and,
skilful as it may be to fall back from position to position,
we hope that, as they approach one another, they will force
it to a general engagement, the issue of which will oblige it
to go to a great distance to rally.
We request you to let us know if the 6000 men you
were to receive from the 9th and 10th military divisions
have arrived. We are already informed that the rein
forcements from the Coasts of the Ocean are successively
joining your

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 285
Exert the active vigilance and firmness which charac
terize you, in regard to the transmission into the interior of
the Republic of all the articles that are to be brought from
Italy. Oblige the employes of all classes to pay strict and
immediate attention to our orders on all the points that
concern them.
We have just received an account that the department
of the Maritime Alps is infested by Barbets : these ban
ditti, issuing from Piedmont and the Riviera of Genoa, in
creased by deserters, emigrants, and disbanded Sardinian
soldiers, are daily committing gross outrages on the public
tranquillity. Deliver, citizen-general, our southern pro
vinces from this scourge, which is a usual concomitant of
wars in Italy, and which it is now urgent to check.
The promotions which you have solicited of us are already
granted. The minister of war is charged with the execution
of the resolution which we have taken in consequence.
The army of the Alps is in extreme distress. We re
quest you to send it the first sums that shall be at your
disposal to the amount of 300,000 livres.
Reveillere-Lepaux.

The Executive Directory to the General in-Chief of the
Army of Italy.
Your despatch of the 21st Thermidor, citizen-general,
has reached us. It contained the happy news of the raising
of the siege of Peschiera, that of the relinquishment of the
line of the Mincio, and intelligence of the retreat of the
Austrian beyond the Adige.
To conquer enemies abroad is to crush those at home,
and the brilliant successes of the army which you command
give a worthy reply to envy and malignity, which would
fain have calumniated you, and which are daily striving in
vain to overturn the constitutional government.
Honour to the brave men of the army of Italy, who
fight with such ardour and devotedness, to ensure the inde
pendence and peace of the Republic ! Honour to the ge
neral who leads them with such talent and courage in the
career of glory !
We have ordered the general-in-chief of the army of the
Rhine and Moselle to despatch a corps of 15,000 men to
wards Inspruck, and even towards Brixen. It is for you,

286 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
citizen-general, to second this movement ; your last suc
cesses afford you the possibility to do so ; nay, it becomes
urgent that you should attack the enemy and drive him
before you. The army of the Archduke Charles, increased
by some reinforcements from Gallicia and the interior of
Austria, is become so imposing as to attack that com
manded by the general-in-chief Moreau, and to fight, be
tween Neresheim and Donauwerth, a battle, the success of
which, for a moment doubtful, was decided in our favour.
If General Wurmser were to obtain a moment's rest, he
might be able to detach some troops, which, joined to the
forces of the army of the Archduke Charles, would oppose
the enterprises of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, and
perhaps fight it with advantage. We think it right to
refer to our letters of the 25th and 28th Thermidor.
We have heard with great satisfaction of the proofs of
attachment to liberty given by the people of Milan, Bo
logna, and Ferrara. We recommend to you to cultivate
with care these happy dispositions.
We wait with impatience, citizen-general, for tidings of
your march, of the situation of the army, and of the steps
which circumstances shall have permitted you to take in
regard to the republic of Venice, in conformity with the
orders which we have transmitted to you on this head.
Again we recommend to you to send with as little delay
as possible the sum of 300,000 francs to the army of the
Alps. Reveillere-Lepaux.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rome, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].
You have saved our lives by your victories of the 16th
instant. The court of Vienna and the agents of London
and Naples made sure that thirty battalions, drafted from
the army of the Rhine, would put yours to the rout, and
every preparation was made for exterminating it. A sedi
tion had been got up against the French* even in the little
port of Civita Vecchia, and two of our seamen were very
ill used.
The Roman government, to which you are now giving
the ton, is doing what it ought to do — punishing the guilty.
I have complained grievously, as of a step that might be

[LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 287
called an infraction of the armistice, of the mission of the
vice-legate, Monsignor della Greca to Ferrara, as if to
take possession ; and still more of what Cardinal Mattej,
archbishop of Ferrara, has done to persuade the munici
pality to renounce the oath of fidelity to the Republic, and
of his temerity in causing the arms of the pope to be set
up in that conquered country.
The government is sensible that it was in the wrong.
The answer given me was plausible enough — that the
French; in evacuating Ferrara, had spiked their cannon,
and thrown water upon their powder ; they seemed to have
been afraid that the Austrians would make their appear
ance, and so the Roman government conceived that it
might show itself, without injury to our rights, and for the
preservation of the interests of the country.
I am prosecuting the accomplishment of the conditions
of the armistice which are likely to be of more pressing
necessity. I am waiting for accounts of the convoy of
5,000,000, which citizen Miot sent off by way of lmola,
before I despatch the second contribution and the other
objects in kind.
I beg you to accept my devoted attachment.
Cacault.

To the General-in-Chief.
Lavenone, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].
I have received your letter, citizen-general : it cannot
prescribe any thing that I have not the greatest desire
to do.
We wrote to you yesterday, in concert with General
Sauret, concerning the position which we are to attack.
On arriving at Lavenone, we procured more precise reports
relative to the environs of the position, which is susceptible
of being turned, in spite of great difficulties.
I am starting with my column to go round the Rocco
d'Anfo by the left, while General Sauret will attack in
front. We will inform you immediately of the result of
our attack. It is impossible to make a diversion on our
right for want of boats.
St. Hilaire.

288 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief.
Rome, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796],
Amidst your astonishing victories, permit the voice of a
good Spaniard to mingle its applause with that of so many
others, who proclaim you already the first general of our
tiaie. Your late actions of themselves have deserved and
ensured immortality, and I hope that my expressions will
not be suspected of flattery.
I thank you for the kindness which you have had to an
swer me so graciously respecting the affair of the Mesula
and the San Martina. If I had not been pretty sure of
the justice of my application, I would not have importuned
you. Baron de Capelletti does not behave perfectly well, I am
aware ; but it is not my fault. He is only silly, and I beg
you to pardon him, assuring you that the lesson which I
have read him to-day is such that henceforth he will not
give you the slightest cause of complaint. I have commu
nicated to citizen Cacault the letter that I am writing to
him, and he is quite satisfied with it. I have also agreed
with the same citizen for prescribing to the Spanish Jesuits
the condition which they are to keep, and for informing the
senate of Bologna that it must arrange with me all that
relates to the Spaniards through the medium of Cacault :
so every thing will go on smoothly. Capelletti was accre
dited to the legates of Bologna, but he cannot be to the new
senate. He is, however, an officer of the King of Spain,
to whom different commissions for his service are entrusted,
and, as such, he is under my orders.
I had no hand whatever in the conduct of the court of Rome
at Ferrara, and was one of the last to hear of it. Citizen
Cacault has written to you on this subject, at the same
time sending you a note from the minister of the pope ;
and I should not mention the matter to you if it were not
intimately connected with our armistice.
Believe me, general, there has been nothing but ignorance
in all this, and no malice whatever ; and the idea which
was current that the Austrians were coming to possess
themselves of Ferrara, upon which they have old claims^
occasioned the mission of the papal minister, who was sup
posed to be capable of preventing the Germans from seizing
a country abandoned by the French, when the English and

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 289
their emissaries were everywhere proclaiming that you were
ruined. If my intercession with you, general, has any in
fluence, I beg you to pardon the archbishop whom you have
ordered to be apprehended.
Citizen Cacault and I agree perfectly well about every
thing, particularly about the armistice, and I hope that we
shall complete the business in spite of the baneful influence
of our neighbours. Your last declaration to the court of
Naples will work miracles.
Accept the congratulations and homage of one who has
the honour to be, with the greatest consideration, monsieur
le general, your, &c.
The Chevalier d'Azara.

To the General-in-Chief.
Verona, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].
Having been prevented from accompanying citizen Chas-
seloup in the mission which you have given him, and being
prevented, moreover, from sending Miron, for the same
reason, I have sent the chief of battalion Labadie, citizen
Pernetti, and other officers who are acquainted with the
environs of Mantua. I have the honour to address to you
their report. The five 32-pounders of Goito were carried
off by the enemy : we have not been able to learn what be
came of those of the batteries of la Favorita, St. George,
and Ceresa, for the reasons mentioned in the report.
 Lespinasse.
To the General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Verona, 27 Thermidor, year 4 [August 14, 1796].
Here, general, are the dispositions which I propose to
make, if you adopt them and they accord with yours :
The corps of my division at Verona occupying the am
phitheatre of that place, both for the enemy's army and
for the garrison of Mantua, I think it would be essential, in
order to observe the enemy's movements on my right and
left, to detach a corps of 400 men to Porto-Legnago, 300
to Pesano, and 300 to Busolengo, which would form cross
patroles, and consequently guard the Adige. I request you
to let me know if this is conformable with your intentions,
and likewise to communicate to me any change that you
may think it right to make, and I will execute it forthwith.
VOL. I. u

290 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The force of my division is about 6000 men : if I send
away the 17th demi-brigade, as you desire, that will reduce
my strength.
I await your answer to all these observations. Rely
on my zeal and my activity. AUGEREAU.
PS. I send you annexed a plan of the line which, I be
lieve, the army occupies at this moment. You will per
ceive that, in taking these new positions, my left will find
itself appuyed on la Corona, and near enough to send forces
thither; and my left on Porto Legnago, where I shall
defend the passage of the bridge.

To the General-in-Chief.
Piovesano, 27 Thermidor, year 4 [August 14, 1796].
According to the order which I received, general, on the
25th, I proceeded to Rivoli, and returned the same day
to Piovesano, to see General Massena ; yesterday we ex
amined the banks of the Adige. From the Siega, where
you begin to enter the valley, to Rivoli and beyond, the
mountains of the left bank descend almost perpendicularly
to the river, which renders the establishment of any Ute
de pont impossible, because it could not be supported. With
the chiefs of battalion Maubert and Carriere, we examined
a position a little above the Siega, which was pointed out
to us by General Massena, but in combining the means of
defence, we have seen that they would be insufficient on
account of the nature of the ground.
Between the Siega and Polo, the right bank, either from
the difficulty of access, or because it is commanded by the
left bank, forbids any establishment of a bridge. There is
therefore no point but Polo, which presents a favourable
position, and it was there that the last bridge was con
structed. I have sent to Verona for the necessary boats and cor
dage, and to Dolce to order down four or five rafts, wliich
I am told the enemy has abandoned.
We have now at Peschiera three demi-galleys, two
armed on the forecastle with two Austrian 5 -pounders, one
with an 11 -pounder;

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 291
Two barks, having each a 13-pounder on the forecastle,
and two Austrian 5-pounders in the stern ;
Two other barks to be armed, one of which will carry
an 11 -pounder, the other a 13. I have directed the
carriages to be built at Peschiera.
The enemy had, during the late affairs, thirteen armed
barks ; those who have seen them assert that three only
carried each a piece of large calibre ; the ten others, which
were not so large, had small guns or musketoons. The
crews are Slavonians : the barks, it is said, are commanded
by an English officer. According to the reports made to
citizen Allemand, the enemy have a flotilla of about thirty
barks at Riva.
The extraordinary swellings of the river which take place
in the month of September, and particularly in that of
October, oblige me to send to Placentia and Pavia an officer
with a detachment of workmen and seamen, to attend to the
safety of the bridge and to direct the manoeuvres in times
of inundation.
The Italians who were charged with this business are
presenting without scruple accounts of 12,000 livres French
money, in which they set themselves down, with their
friends, for salaries of 500 livres per month. I have or
dered citizen Duroc to go to Placentia as soon as his health
permits, not only to verify the account of 12,000 livres, but
also to make out that of the expenses of the bridge, ever
since its construction, which expenses ought at least to be
defrayed out of the contributions.
I am in a very ill state of health, general ; the officers
and the principal workmen are ill : I shall nevertheless do
the impossible to hasten the construction of the bridge
which you have ordered. Andreossi.

To the General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Staro, 27 Thermidor, year 4 [August 14, 1796],
From all the reports or particulars that I have obtained
respecting the flight of the enemy, every thing indicates
that the army is retreating to Trent. I sent yesterday
one of my aides-de-camp as a flag of truce ; he went six
leagues without finding a single man of the enemy's, and
all the inhabitants assured him that the enemy were re-
u 2

292 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
treating to Trent : not liking to run after them, he turned
back, and by the way he fell in with four Austrian com
panies escaping from the mountains : he delivered the
packet to the officer in command of the troops, and, as it
was very late, he was obliged to pass the night with them.
During the night, the commandant of these troops received
orders to set out and to proceed to Trent.
I shall send to- morrow to make a reconnaissance for ex
ploring the localities of the country : I shall make it push
on further, especially on my left.
The position which I occupy at this moment is as
follows :
Head-quarters at Staro — Four companies of the 27th
demi-brigade at Ponte Tassaro — Four companies of the
39th demi-brigade at Thiarno, on the Riva road, where the
inhabitants reported to me that the enemy had evacuated
Riva — Four companies of the 25th at Lodrono and castle
St. Barbe — First battalion of the 25th at Condino — One
company of Allobroges at Rocca d'Anfo.
I have to lay before you, general, praises of the cavalry
for the manner in which it has behaved : it vigorously
charged the enemy's infantry ; it made in part all the pri
soners, and took six pieces of cannon. If my infantry had
not been so fatigued, I should have taken the 5000 men
who were at Lodrono or Staro. This force was commanded
by Prince Reuss.
The Rocca d'Anfo was stormed so expeditiously by our
brave carabineers, grenadiers, and volunteers, that, on
reaching Staro, where the action took place, the prisoners
inquired which way I had come, adding it was not possible
that it could be by the Rocca d'Anfo.
The country which we at present occupy affords us no
great resources : the inhabitants do tlieir utmost to furnish
bread, wine, and meat, for the subsistence of the division.
The valley of Ydro is entirely our own.
Sauret.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rome, Thermidor 28, year 4 [August 15, 1796].
There arrived here, yesterday evening, an express sent
by the governor of Frosinone to the cardinal secretary of
state, to inform him of the entry of Neapolitan troops into

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 293
that town of the Ecclesiastical State. The letter intimated
that only 2000 men had yet arrived, but that other troops
were to follow this advanced guard.
The Neapolitan commandant, on his entry, caused pro
clamations to be publicly read, ordering the troops, in the
name of his Sicilian Majesty, to observe good order, disci
pline, and respect towards the sovereign of the place and
his subjects. It is not known here what can be the real
object of such a surprise ; according to all appearances,
however, there is no question about an occupation of the
ecclesiastical territory, but only a passage of Neapolitan
troops, which have an ulterior destination.
The Roman government is preparing to make protests
and other customary formalities : it is incapable of any
opposition. The resident of Naples at Venice has despatched to
Naples a courier, who passed through this city a week ago,
reporting everywhere that our army was defeated and re
treating to Tortona. It may be that, in the first moment,
when the cabinet of Naples believed these false rumours to be
true, it may have immediately ordered its troops to advance,
agreeably to what I had told you of the promises of the King
of Naples to push forward 30,000 men to give a hand to the
Imperialists. The authentic intelligence of your victory
coming afterwards will perhaps produce a change of reso
lutions. Our enemies, and especially the English, who are
friends of the cabinet of Naples, wish to intimidate the
pope, to prevent him from fulfilling the conditions of the
armistice. They would have the Neapolitan army, which is numer
ous, as you may ascertain by the table of the military state
of Italy that I had the honour to send you at the com
mencement of the campaign, advance to retake Leghorn
and to occupy our conquered countries ; they would like at
least to produce a diversion. When they made sure that
the thirty battalions brought from the army of the Rhine
would beat your army, they had concerted a vast plan for
uniting all the means of Italy and even those of the King
of Sardinia.
The English, at least, would now be glad that Neapoli
tan troops should go and retake Leghorn, and that a Nea
politan army should march to Ferrara and support the
garrison of Mantua.

294 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Naples has threatened the pope, if he delivers to us the
30,000Tbs. of powder. Its emissaries are exciting the
rabble, by which the two secretaries of the commission of
arts have been insulted ; and I am told that the postillion,
whom the tribunals of Rome sentenced to death as the
most guilty in this affair, is now withdrawn, and has taken
refuge in the Farnese palace, belonging to the King of
Naples ; but I have no certain proofs of this last fact.
It seems difficult to believe that, after the news of your
victory of the 16th, the court of Naples should venture to
break the armistice which you have granted it ; but it
seems certain that it would not have failed to do so, if the
army of Italy had been beaten.
If the march of the Neapolitan troops, whose advanced
guard has entered the papal territory at Frosinone, con
tinues ; if the army advances, it will no doubt be to retake
Leghorn and then proceed for Mantua. I foresee that this
army will pass through Rome ; it has taken the road to
Frosinone, where there is not the same danger from un
wholesome air as by Terracina.
You may conceive how intimidated the court of Rome
must be under such circumstances, and that its operations
in fulfilment of the armistice cannot proceed at the rate I
wish. I hope that the 5,000,000 sent to lmola will have
been delivered, agreeably to the arrangements made and the
directions given by citizen Miot.
I have the honour to send you a copy of the note which
I have presented to solicit the pardon of two malefactors
who had insulted the two secretaries of the commission of
the arts. I send you also a copy of the sentence given
with a promptness unexampled, unless in very extraordinary
cases, and of the answer of the cardinal secretary of state,
informing me that the pope has granted the pardon which
I solicited. So long as things can be left in their natural
state, I shall find myself placed here upon a theatrical stage,
where it is not very difficult to support the highest charac
ters. If the Neapolitan army comes to make a disturbance
on the stage, I will support to the best of my ability,
and as far as it is possible, the truth of principles.
Nothing but a greater and unforeseen force can prevent
the pope from executing the conditions of the armistice. I
believe that he would be sincerely glad to be delivered from
other dangers at this rate. I endeavour to give the govern-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 295
ment to understand that, after paying this tribute, it may
rely on the protection of the army. Here is required a
protector more mighty than St. Peter and St. Paul. The
course of things is in alliance with Rome. It would be
laughable to see you at one and the same time general of
the Holy See and of the French Republic.
I shall be anxious to send you any further news. It
has appeared to me advisable to send an express to citizen
Miot with this despatch, and to request him to forward it
as speedily as possible, with the news and observations
which he can communicate to you himself.
Permit me, general, to request you to send the accom
panying despatch by one of your couriers to the minister
Delacroix. I beg you to accept my devoted attachment. Cacault.
PS. If the Neapolitan advanced guard were destined to
pass through the Romagna and not through Rome, it would
have taken the Aquila road. This army appears to have
marched without having given orders for preparing quar
ters, provisions, &c. : these considerations keep all minds in
suspense. You will find annexed the answer of Cardinal Zelada
to the letter by which you accredited me to this court.

To Monsieur le Marquis Gherardini.
Asti, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].
I have the honour to send to your Excellency, by a ser
geant of my regiment, a letter forwarded at the most earnest
solicitation of the Austrian officers prisoners, whom I saw
arrive in a most deplorable state at Asti, followed by 2000
soldiers of different regiments, especially that of Erbach.
They were conducted by an adjutant of General Bona
parte's, named Forestier, who dined with me, a man of
good family, young, full of fire, and possessed of a brilliant
understanding. This officer, who dined with me, appeared
to take the sufferings of the poor prisoners deeply to heart ;
and I have no doubt that he will leave nothing untried to
mitigate their condition till they reach the place of their
destination. He is most anxious to receive the answer of

296 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
your Excellency at Bra, and especially some relief for those
unfortunate men.
M. Forestier has assured me that the imperial army was
60,000 strong, when it came to attack that of the Repub
lic, which he estimates at no more than 80,000, including
everything. According to his account, a strong Austrian
column ran some risk in its retreat beyond the Mincio : he
admits the extraordinary bravery of the troops, but does
not bestow the like praise on the skill of your generals ; he
pointed out to me on the map the blunders committed.
Nevertheless, as the siege of Mantua is raised, and almost
all the cannon have been taken by your army, he thinks
that it will yet require a hard tug to turn it out of Italy :
" for," added he, " if despair had not forced us to fight with
surprising courage for the preservation of our lives, the
Republican army would have been destroyed without
resource." He believes that M. Wurmser has set out for
Vienna. Bonaparte killed seven horses in two days ; the
fatigues are excessive: all the French wounded in the
battle are dying of mortification. I put down all this in
haste : you know my respectful attachment for you.
ZlMMERMANN.

To General Zimmermann.
August 14, 1796 [27 Thermidor, year 4].
General, I am infinitely thankful for your kindness, and
touched by the sympathy which you show for our poor
prisoners. I have directed the sum of 500 francs to be put
into the hands of your Serjeant, which may be of some
service to the officers for the present. I beg Major Haug-
witz to send a receipt for it to you, and you will be pleased
to forward it to me here.
I beg your pardon for not writing to you myself, but I
am confined to my bed by indisposition. Gherardini.
PS. I give the packet containing the 500 francs to
your Serjeant Greilinger, and beg you to forward it to Bra,
keeping an account of the expenses which you will have to
pay on this occasion.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 297
To the General Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].
You will order general of brigade Murat to proceed to
Casal-Maggior, where he will command a moveable column
destined to carry into execution the different articles of the
requisition relative to Casal-Maggior.
You will appoint a military commission to accompany
him, for the purpose of trying those who have murdered
Frenchmen, and the authors and instigators of revolt.
He shall have with him a commissary of war and the
military agent to levy the contribution of a million.
He will effect the complete disarming : he will take care
to execute in three or four days the different dispositions of
the proclamation.
His moveable column shall be composed of one hundred
men of the 21st regiment of chasseurs, two pieces of light
artillery, and the 51st demi-brigade.
Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].
1. The chiefs of corps will transmit to the generals of divi
sion under whom they are a note of the absent officers, and
especially of those who are at Milan, Brescia, and Pla
centia. 2. Those who are at Brescia, Milan, and Placentia, with
out leave, and who have been absent more than forty-eight
hours, shall be immediately displaced by the general of
division, who will send the note for this purpose to the
chief of the staff.
3. The general of division will cause a list to be fur
nished him of those who are absent with permission, and
will revoke the permissions that are not indispensable for
the service. He will fix in this revocation the day when
the officer must rejoin his corps, upon pain of dissmissal.
4. The commandants of Milan, Brescia, and Placentia,
shall cause it to be published in those cities and posted at the
gates, that every officer, whoever he be, even though wounded,
must have his name entered at the staff of the place.
6. The municipality shall deliver every five days a list of
the officers lodging in the town, with the day of their arrival.

298 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The commandants of the places shall send a duplicate of
this statement to the general staff.
7. They shall cause all the officers who may be in their
town without ' a permission from the chiefs of their corps,
examined by the general of division, to be arrested.
8. Those who have substantial reasons of service to
authorize their stay in one of the places shall have from the
staff of the place a billet authorizing them to remain for
so many days.
9. Every officer who shall be found in one of these plaees
six hours after the expiration of his permission shall be
arrested, and the circumstance shall be reported to the
general of division under whom his corps is.
Bonaparte.

To General Kellermann.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].
We are in circumstances, my dear general, in which we
have the most urgent need of troops. Disease is daily
consigning the men to the hospitals. I beg you, therefore,
not to lose a single moment, and to hasten the march of the
troops as much as you can. The least delay may be
dangerous and produce the worst effect.
Wurmser is daily receiving new reinforcements. I reckon^
my dear general, upon your usual zeal, and I beg you to
accept my thanks for the trouble that you have never
ceased to take.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rome, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].
I have received the letter with which you honoured me on
the 21st Thermidor. I transmitted immediately to the
court of Naples and that of Rome the two despatches, copies
of which I send you annexed : nothing could have come
more opportunely to give a little tone to this country and
to stop and repress the court of Naples. M. Acton must
have received yesterday evening my letter, delivered, the
day before yesterday, to the charge d'affaires of his Sicilian
Majesty before the departure of the post. This charge"
d'affaires ought to have come and paid me a visit, as all

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 299
the diplomatic agents, and even the ambassador of Venice,
have done, according to the custom of Rome. I observe
further that I wrote a very polite note to this charge? d'affaires,
requesting him to transmit my letter to M. Acton, and that
he had the rudeness not to answer me. If these trifles are
of any signification, it is because they concur to indicate
that all those belonging to the court of Naples are fearful of
recognizing the armistice and foresee the rupture of it.
Four of our seamen are unworthily confined by the
government at Orbitello.
Passports to go to Palermo have been refused here to
Gamelin, a native of that city, son of the consul of France.
All the petty circumstances of this kind serve to strengthen
the great reasons we have for being persuaded that, if the
Austrians had beaten you, the Neapolitans would have re
peated the perfidy practised upon Latouche, after the con
vention signed four years ago in presence of the French
squadron. They write here concerning the German army that the
Neapolitan cavalry is to join the Austrians. I know how
little credit such private letters deserve ; but the concur
rence of indications and proofs ought not to escape us and
appears to me to demand your attention.
You will observe that, in my letter to M. Acton, I take
no notice of the entry of the Neapolitans into Ponte Corvo,
which belongs to the pope ; but it is enclosed in the Neapo
litan territory towards the frontier, and dependent on the
papal government of Frosinone.
The 2,000 Sicilian troops have only entered Ponte Corvo,
on the road to Rome through Frosinone : but they have
not arrived at Frosinone, as it was at first believed, and as
I wrote to you. The thing is the same at bottom. I will
send you a copy of the protests of the pope against this
entrance of the Neapolitans into Ponte Corvo ; they have
not been transmitted to me.
Apprehensions are felt here of the march of a Neapolitan
column for the Romagna, the troops having approached
extremely near to Tronto and Giulianova, confines of the
papal territory.
At the same time with my letter M. Acton must have
received my despatch, sent from this city by an express of
the resident of Naples at Venice, very different from his
first which I have mentioned to you, for he says to the person

300 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
to whom the packet was addressed in Rome : " The Aus-!
trians are driven into the Tyrol ; nothing can withstand
the French." ' This intelligence will frighten M. Acton,
who is naturally timid, and who is aware that these nu
merous troops must remain where they are placed as a bug
bear, so long as the Austrians shall not have beaten us.
Up to this moment, I have no tidings that the 2000
Neapolitan troops have advanced beyond Ponte Corvo, or
that orders have been given to make any preparation for
the passage of an army through the Ecclesiastical State. I
shall look sharp and inform you promptly of whatever may
happen. There is now every reason to believe that the
projects concerted against us are dissolved, and that the
Sicilian army, which has had plans taken of all the positions
in the ecclesiastical territory along the borders of Naples,
will not dare to pass the frontier.
I am circulating the news of the march of 18,000 men of
your army for Bologna.
The convoy of the 5,000,000 of the first contribution
must by this time have reached its destination. I have re
quested the commandant of the citadel of Bologna, who was
preparing to go and receive that money at lmola, to inform
you, as well as commissary-general Dennie, of the arrival of
the money at Bologna.
In three days, citizens Berthollet and Monge will make
the necessary experiments on the bars prepared for the pope's
second contribution : the amount of the bullion is not more
than 1,000,000 tournois. I am urging them to prepare
more expeditiously for the entire payment of the 5,000,000
already in arrear, but I see no speedy and decided term
with respect to the whole sum : this business I shall en
deavour to settle next week.
The commissioners are now busily engaged with the pope's
architect in getting the selected articles, of which they have
delivered a list, ready for packing.
I have already observed to you that there are few things
here directly useful to the army : the contribution must
therefore be received in kind, in things useful to the manu
factures of France, and which the government will be able
to turn into cash. You know that I have already had
delivered 50,000ibs. of alum, which will be conveyed to
Genoa in neutral ships ; the rest will be forwarded by land.
The new secretary of state, Cardinal Busca, appears to

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 301
have activity, and we are making more progress since his
appointment. The accomplishment of the business is se
verely felt by a country which has been accustomed only to
hold out its hand and receive. All will be accomplished, I
hope, notwithstanding the rage of our enemies, who have,
in this capital of Christendom, much more powerful means
of intrigue and influence than any where else.
You answer me, on the subject of the manuscripts, that
the armistice specifies five hundred volumes ; but the Che
valier d'Azara has declared to us here, upon his honour,
that he agreed with you and the commissioners Salicetti and
Garrau that three hundred manuscripts only should be
taken. The commissioner Salicetti has said the same thing
to the commissioners of the arts, Tinette and Barthelemy ;
it appears, therefore, to be true that it was verbally agreed
with M. d'Azara that only three hundred manuscripts should
be required.
They will not refuse to give five hundred if you insist
upon it ; but M. d'Azara will receive a mortification, which
you will probably not think it right to give him, if the thing
has been agreed upon without your recollecting it, though the
minister of Spain and the commissioners remember it well.
There are nearly twenty thousand manuscripts in the Va
tican library : if we take the three hundred best, we shall
have all that are really of any value. Good works are
printed ; the rest are of no worth but to bibliographers. I
submit these considerations to you, citizen-general : it is
necessary that the commissioners should know definitively
whether they are to take five hundred or three hundred
manuscripts. As the object of my instructions concerning the con
tribution of Ravenna would only divert attention from more
pressing matters, were I to insist on that object at present,
I defer the thorough discussion of it. When we have in
our hands a great part of the things promised, I shall have
the more force for determining the rest.
I have not failed to censure severely the orders relative
to Ferrara, and have informed you what answer was made
me. I have a direct correspondence with Bologna and Fer
rara, which enables me to keep an eye here upon what con
cerns those two provinces.
I have taken care to intimate to M. d'Azara that M. Ca
pelletti, charge d'affaires of Spain at Bologna, is a senseless

302 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
fanatic, whose sentiments are too conformable with those
that are attributed to the ex-Jesuits, which renders him in
capable of managing them well, and must lay you under the
necessity of sending all the ex-Jesuits out of Bologna.
M. d'Azara, who is an enlightened man, does not remon
strate on the subject of your orders for ensuring the tran
quillity of the people : he hopes that the two members of
the senate who have been sent to you will have obtained
permission for such of the ex-Jesuits as have been prudent
to remain : as for the others, they will be placed elsewhere.
Ever since your great victories, M. d'Azara is as much
transported with joy as ourselves : he is so mixed up in the
armistice of Rome, that his honour requires it to be fulfilled ;
and, in order that the government here may feel obliged to
him for it, we must keep up a superiority of force in Italy,
and the independence of Rome must be visibly owing to his
mediation. Of course, he is certainly for us, and goes hand
in hand with me in perfect and intimate harmony.
It is easy to have courage under the aegis of your valour
and of the prodigies achieved by all our armies. He who
animates me must always exhibit the appearance of impas
sibility. Thus it is that, without changing tone or language,
I transact the affairs with which I have been charged in
Italy ever since the beginning of the war. Be pleased to
consider that there are no means of proceeding fast without
breaking : we have to do with corpses.
Cacault.

To General Bonaparte.
Rome, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].
I have the honour to send you the note received by the
Chevalier d'Azara from the secretary to the cardinal secretary
of state. There are the Neapolitans marching again, it
seems, for the Romagna. Combine the whole with the
attack of the English on Leghorn and the entry of the Si
cilian troops into Ponte Corvo, and doubt, if you can, the
perfidy of the ministry of Naples. ~
PS. ft is known that there were brought from Naples
very considerable supplies for the army, which were to have
enabled it to march for some time in the country, where no
preparation had been made for it.

letters and despatches. 303
The Secretary of the Cardinal Secretary of State, annexed
to the preceding.
Rome, August 18, 1796 [1 Fructidor, year 4].
Your excellency learns to-day, by a letter from Ancona,
that, on Saturday last, the arms of the King of Naples were
set up over the door of the consul of his Sicilian majesty,
though he had been in that city above a year. This took
place after the arrival of a lieutenant and an ensign, officers
of his nation, who, after staying a single day, set out for
Sinigaglia. It is said, also, that intelligence had arrived at
Sinigaglia that 24,000 Neapolitan troops are on the point
of marching for the Romagna : the route which they are to
take is not specified.
Though his excellency conceives that this report is des
titute of the characters which might induce a belief in its
accuracy, still he deems it a duty to communicate it to you,
that you may point out to him what it would be advisable
to do, in case they should arrive in those parts.
He also begs you to give him further intelligence on the
subject to which the note that you have transmitted to him
refers, and concerning which he has already collected all
possible necessary particulars.
Having executed the orders of his Excellency, I make it
a duty to testify to your Excellency the respect and grati
tude with which I shall be eternally your most obedient
servant,
Joseph Evangelisti.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rome, 2 Fructidor, year 4 [August 19, 1796].
I have received the letter with which you have honoured
me, dated Brescia, 25 Thermidor, with copies of your report
sent to the Directory of the glorious actions of the 16th and
following days ; I have taken care to make good use of it.
The summons sent to M. the Cardinal Mattei, Archbishop
of Ferrara, and the severity exercised against the fanatics
of Bologna, will produce the best effect. I endeavour to
support these measures by all the humble means in my
power. M. d'Azara concurs in them with all his heart.
The first convoy of money must now have arrived. You

304 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
know that to-morrow we shall assay and pack a sixth mil
lion at the Mint. The rest is progressing.
People here would be glad if it were possible to slip out
of the conditions of the armistice ; but bad faith on the part
of the government cannot have place, since it has become
evident that it cannot save itself but by fulfilling the treaty.
I have the honour to send you annexed a copy of the
answer which I have received from the secretary of state to
the assurance which I gave on your part that, in case the
Ecclesiastical State were attacked, a division of the army
would come to defend it.
If M. Acton answers me, courier by courier, as he ought
to do, and as he will have time, I shall receive his letter oh
Monday next, in three days. *
I send you annexed a bulletin that has come to me from
Isola, on the frontier of the kingdom of Naples, on the road
to Rome.
I beg you to accept, &c. Cacault.
PS. At the moment of despatching my letter, citizen-
general, I have received the two notes annexed, from the.
cardinal secretary of state, who begs M. d'Azara and myself
to use the strongest solicitations to obtain your permission
for the speedy return of Cardinal Mattei to his see of Fer
rara. You see by these notes how warm an interest the
pope and the secretary of state take in this affair. The
summons has produced its complete effect. Clemency and
generosity, in terminating the affair, will produce a new one,
which cannot but be advantageous to your glory.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rome, 3 Fructidor, year 4 [August 20, 1796].
I lately intimated to you that Mr. Windham, minister
of England at Florence, had arrived here, spreading a report
that the English were bombarding Leghorn. It is now
alleged that letters have been received, announcing the
coming of another army of 30,000 men to Wurmser's assist
ance. There are no lies or intrigues which are not employed
to mislead the public mind, and to uphold the hope that we
shall be defeated.
Mr. Windham is only passing through Rome ; he is pro
ceeding to Naples. The false reports which he has circu-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 305
lated are not the real objects of his journey ; he has intimated
to a person whom M. Azara and I have known that he is
going to Naples, to make, in the name of England, the most
violent reproaches there, beeause the Sicilian troops have
not prevented the fulfilment of the armistice with the pope
by occupying Rome ; because the Neapolitan army has not
come to drive the French from Leghorn ; because that
army is not marching through the Romagna for Lombardy ¦
he declares that this is what the court of Naples had pro
mised. He adds that this court demanded of England, six
weeks ago, the same subsidy that was paid to the King of
Sardinia ; that this affair is on the point of being arranged,
and that an answer to it is expected from London.
The hope of Mr. Windham and the object of his un
expected journey to Naples are to decide that court to execute,
as far as it is concerned, the grand plan concerted upon the
supposition that the Germans would prove the stronger ;
in your quarter, I am persuaded, that it will not now
succeed. The intelligence received here from the direction of Naples
is not so threatening and alarming for the Ecclesiastical
State as it was. I send you annexed a little Italian bulletin,
which even alleges that the king has left Lora.
I have just been attending, with Monge and Berthollet,
the weighing and assaying of the first million, in bars, of
the second contribution. We have had it cased and sealed up
together with regular statements. They are at work here
melting down into bars plate which has arrived for a second
million. The operation will be finished on the 10th of this
month, and I calculate on despatching, by the 11th or 12th
instant, 2,000,000, by the same route to lmola which the
first convoy took.
Cacault.

To M. the Prince de Castelcicala, Director of the Foreign
Affairs of his Sicilian Majesty.
Rome, 4 Fructidor, year 4 [August 21, 1796.
Monsieur le Prince, I have received the letter which you
did me the honour to write me on the 20th of August. I
shall lose no time in sending it to the general-in-chief,
Bonaparte, and to the minister for foreign affairs, who will
lay it before the Directory.
VOL. I. X

306 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The enemies of France, everywhere vanquished, will soon
leave the agents of the Republic no other duty to perform
but to reconcile. I shall be too happy, Monsieur le Prince,
if my good offices can concur in the speedy establishment of
the definitive peace between France and your court.
The friendships which I contracted at Naples attach me
everlastingly to that fine country and to its welfare. I
think I cannot prove to you the sincerity with which I desire
good harmony between the two powers better than by point
ing out to you frankly some particulars which are likely to
give umbrage.
Report speaks of 30,000 Neapolitans, who had been pro
mised to be sent to give a hand to the Austrians, if the
French army had been beaten, and of a combined attack
upon the French garrison of Leghorn ; of a plan for carry
ing off our convoy of money on the road to the Romagna ; and
of a formal opposition of the King of the Two Sicilies to the
purchase of powder for our army in the Ecclesiastical State.
Report speaks of a treaty ready to be concluded, in virtue of
which the court of London is to pay to that of Naples the
same subsidy that it formerly gave to the King of Sar
dinia. After the vast plan combined on the false supposition
that our heroes were to be beaten has too generally crumbled
in pieces, I am grieved to see persons attached to the court
of Naples explain themselves openly in a manner that is not
accordant with the armistice. Your party in Rome ought
no longer to be our enemy. M. the Chevalier Binetti dis
penses himself from the customary attentions towards me,
and, on the other hand, I learn that Dr. Corona, a subject
of his Sicilian Majesty's, has been reprimanded as having
failed in duty to his sovereign, by visiting the French com
missioners who are in Rome.
A French officer and three seamen have been apprehended
at Orbitello and treated harshly. The Directory cannot
fail to be informed of these circumstances, which leads me
to observe to you that it might be proper to inform M. the
Prince Belmonte, and to enable him to furnish the requisite
explanations and particulars.
I beg you, Monsieur le Prince, to accept the assurance of
my sentiments of the highest consideration.
Cacault.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 307
To M. the General Acton, first minister of his Sicilian
Majesty.
Rome, 4 Fructidor, year 4 [August 21, 1796].
I have received the answer of your Excellency, dated the
20th of August, as well as that of M. the Prince Castelcicala.
I shall send those two letters to the General-in-chief Bona
parte, and also to the minister for foreign affairs. I am
answering M. the Prince of Castelcicala more at length : he
will no doubt communicate to you what I have the honour
to submit to him.
I seize this opportunity of renewing to your excellency
the assurance of my respect.
Cacault.

Note of the Commissioners Monge and Berihollet, respecting
the Powder of the Ecclesiastical State.
Rome, 5 Fructidor, year 4 [August 22, 1796].
Citizen Cacault having requested us to examine the
qualities of the powder manufactured in the States of the
pope, we applied for specimens of that powder to M. Salvi,
the contractor for it : he delivered to us two, one of very
fine grain, the other of a rather coarser grain, which alone
appeared to us to be suitable for the use of the musket.
Destitute of all the usual means for proving it, we were
obliged to have recourse to such as were at our disposal.
We first inquired the proportions employed : these are
lOOlbs. of refined saltpetre, 1201bs. of charcoal, and lOibs. of
sulphur. These proportions are good, and the paste is well
beaten, so that no fault is to be found with the manner in
which it is fabricated.
It was necessary to ascertain the state of the saltpetre
that enters into the composition. To this end, we dissolved
a certain quantity of Roman powder, and compared it with
a solution of French powder, by means of the solution of
silver. This produced a much more considerable precipitate
with the solution of the Roman powder than with that of
France ; which indicates that the saltpetre used here is im
perfectly purified, and contains a considerable proportion of
sea salt. We had the same result with a small quantity of
saltpetre which was given us.
The Roman powder, therefore, is prepared with a salt-
x2

308 LETTERS and despatches.
petre that contains much marine salt, which is not only
foreign to its effects, but diminishes the rapidity of the de
tonation, and renders the powder susceptible of contracting
damp from the air.
Having no instrument for proving the strength of the
powder, we could not determine to what degree the impurity
of the saltpetre deteriorates the Roman powder : we only
perceive that it has an imperfection which cannot but induce
an apprehension that it has not sufficient strength.
Berthollet and Monge,
Commissioners of the French Government
for the Arts and Sciences.

To the General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Milan, 3 Fructidor, year 4 [August 20, 1796].
You have no need of proofs, I dare say, to convince you
of the frequent correspondence which exists between the
courts of Vienna and Turin, and the intrigues of the arch
duke in this country ; but I think it my duty to commu
nicate to you some notes which I have collected, and which
seem to deserve your credit and perhaps your attention.
1. The couriers from Vienna to Turin, and vice versa,
succeed one another without interruption, and all of them
pass through Bellinzona and Canobio. Might it not be
possible to carry off one of them from the latter place or
the environs, to learn what our enemies are concerting ?
2. One Andriana, innkeeper at Bellinzona, is the con
fidant and diplomatic agent of the archduke, to whom he
takes frequent journeys.
3. On the 27th of Thermidor last, 300 armed Pied
montese passed through Canobio, and went on board six
barks on the lake, which steered for Ossola.
Baraguay-d'Hilliers.

To the General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Staro, 3 Fructidor, year 4 [August 20, 1 796].
It was not till yesterday noon, citizen-general, that I
received your letter of the 1st Fructidor.
I have to give you an account of the reconnaissance which
we have made of the roads leading to Riva.
The shortest of all, which leads to Riva in six hours, is

letters and despatches. 309
that which, traversing the valley of Ydro, leads to the
village of Ponale, on the Lake of Garda, where you embark
for Riva. This road, which has the advantage in point of
time, presents such great difficulties for cavalry and artil
lery, that it is passable for a corps of infantry only, and is
therefore unfit for us, being obliged to take both along
with us.
The other road, leading to Riva, after a march of eleven
hours, is that which, passing from Staro to Thion, and
thence through Balino and Cavrast, leads straight to Riva :
this is passable for all arms and for baggage ; only it has
the inconvenience of two marches, the distance being too
great for a single march.
In this case, my opinion is that advantage might be taken
of both roads, by marching a corps of infantry, which should
embark at Ponale, and make itself master of Riva, while the
division should be proceeding at the same time towards
Riva through Thion. This double direction would take
from the enemy all desire to prevent the corps of troops pro
ceeding by the longest road from reaching Riva, since it
would be already occupied by that which had come by way
of Ponale. I await your orders therefore.
You desire me, citizen-general, to keep here three three-
pounders of the cannon taken from the enemy ; I observe
to you that I have not been able to keep more than one
here, because, the horses which I applied for not having
arrived, I was obliged to send off the others with oxen for
Salo : I have given orders for them to come back, but
we want horses and artillerymen.
We are still in the greatest distress here for provisions :
we never receive more than the smaller part of what we
ought to have, and then nothing but bread. This part of
the army is totally neglected.
The execution of your order relative to cartridges causes
me to have need of 100,000 and 6000 flints, to supply the
place of those which have been delivered out to make up
fifty rounds per man. All the flints which were here in
reserve have turned out to be pistol-flints. Have the good
ness, citizen-general, to give orders that this mistake be not
again committed.
Sauret.

310 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief.
Polo, 4 Fructidor, year 4 [August 21, 1796].
I received, general, on the 25th of last month, the order
to proceed to Rivoli, and in the evening I was with General
Massena at Provezano. On the 26th, we visited the banks
of the Adige. I reported to you on the 27th that the site
of the old bridge was the only one that appeared suitable to
us. I cannot tell why my letter has not reached you.
The bridge will be finished this evening, and would have
been much sooner, but for the difficulty we have had to pro
cure boats ; and this moment I have just sent in search of
the last.
General Massena desired to have a flying bridge at
Rivoli for the communication with the Chiusa ; I have had
it established. During the time that the bridge was building, I had six
teen pontoons collected and refitted with their beams and
planks out of wood picked up here and there in the villages
and the country. The cordage and most of the iron work
necessary for the mechanism and speedy construction of the
bridge were not to be found. These boats, decked two and
two and drawn by horses, might serve to furnish a commu
nication at any point you should wish ; in short, they would
be a disposable bridge, which could be shifted at pleasure.
The navigation of the Adige being very difficult, on account
of the rapidity of the current, the sand-banks and the rocks
which are in its bed, and the hollows which are on its banks,
it would be necessary to have boatmen of the country: they
alone can manage boats upon it. I know not whether your
plans include such a bridge.
Andreossi.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rome, 5 Fructidor, year 4 [August 22, 1796].
Monsieur le General, I have many thanks to return you
for the letter which you did me the honour to write, dated
the ... Fructidor. It contains expressions which, coming
from a hero like you, are infinitely flattering to my self-love,
and I account it the most fortunate circumstance of my
whole life to have deserved your esteem.
You have good reason to say that everybody's head is

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 31 1
turning round in this part of Italy. I know that friend
Cacault gives you a regular account of all that is passing at
Naples, and you may rely on the accuracy of his reports.
The arming is just what you have been told, and, for some
months, we have seen the Neapolitan general make more
movements and choose more encampments than General
Bonaparte, who is fighting almost every day.
The object of these movements is in accordance with
those who are not fond of France : you are aware of that.
Meanwhile, the Neapolitan troops retain Ponto Corvo, and
for some days past they have been augmenting their
number. I am sure that your 10,000 men, led by you,
will accomplish your object; but, as you have something
more to do than to conquer, you will attend to everything.
In going or returning, you will of course visit the Capitol,
and in that case I hope you will do me the honour to take
up your quarters at my house. You will certainly be at a
friend's. I cannot give you any precise idea of the infernal intrigue
which has hitherto thwarted the accomplishment of our
armistice, and which proceeds from the very quarter to
which I have been alluding. We have fallen into another
embarrassment about the peace, which had been begun,
under bad auspices, to be negociated at Paris, and is to be
concluded somehow or other in Italy. Friend Cacault, to
whom I have communicated everything without reserve,
gives you a full account of the affair : I shall, therefore,
spare you the repetition.
I have long been acquainted with the ingratitude of the
Romans, but, if I do them a benefit in spite of their teeth,
it is not for their sakes that I do it ; I act from far nobler
principles. Still I have friends among them, who are wor
thy of being yours also.
If Devins succeeds Wurmser, you will have to do with
an old acquaintance of the army of Italy, and I have no
doubt that, polite as you are, you will accompany him to
Vienna. Accept, general, the homage of him who will be eternally
your very humble, &c,
The Chevalier d'Azara.

312 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Staro, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796J.
I have the honour to inform you that I have sent a recon
naissance to Thion, where, during the last days, an enemy's
patrole had made its appearance; I await the return of the
reconnaissance to inform you of the result.
I am informed this morning, by my confidential man, that
the enemy, to the number of 300, passed the night between
the 4th and 5th at Riva, and left that place again yesterday
morning. I report to you, general, that ever since the 25th, the
day of my arrival at Staro, the troops have not been able to
get more than a quarter of the ration of bread, in spite of all
the precautions that it has been in my power to take.
When the convoys are setting out for Salo, five, six thou
sand rations of bread are announced, but frequently only half
the quantity arrives.
Sauret.

To General Bonaparte.
Venice, 5 Fructidor, year 4 [August 22, 1796J.
I received, about six in the evening, the letter which you
wrote me yesterday. I immediately applied for a confer
ence with M. Pezaro, and the result of the conversation
which I have just had with him is as follows :
I was first asked whether you wish the articles which
you mention to me to be procured for you, even in case the
Sieur Vivanti should continue to supply you, or if you ask
this government for them only in case that merchant should
absolutely refuse that service. They propose to request him,
and flatter themselves that they shall prevail on him, to
supply you as before; but, be this as it may, even though
you should desire the articles, independently of the supplies
of the Sieur Vivanti, nothing shall be left undone to satisfy
you. They merely observe that there will be great diffi
culty in regard to hay, the crop of which failed this year,
and nearly an impossibility in regard to bullocks, because
the epidemic disease, which has prevailed and which still
prevails in the States of Venice, has destroyed such a
quantity of these animals, that there are scarcely any left.
Be pleased then, general, to give me as soon as possible

.LETTERS and despatches. 313
an answer to the question ; after that, I will take care that
you shall be promptly served ; I will even take care, in the
mean time, that they shall attend to the measures to be
taken in any case : and this, moreover, is what I am pro
mised by M. Pezaro, who desires also that I should assure
you anew of the anxiety of the Venetian government to do
.all that can be agreeable to you and to the French Republic.
Lallemant.

To the General-in-Chief. August 23, 1796 [6 Fructidor, year 4].
I transmit, annexed, to your excellency, the account sent
me by the officer commanding at Limon of the catastrophe
which happened on the 20th instant to M.the General Du-
jard, his suite, and his escort. I shall add what I have
since learned, and which consists in this, that the banditti
took the carts laden with the general's baggage for a
convoy of money. He was killed at the first discharge,
as were likewise Lieutenant-Colonel Bicistrat and a soldier,
and six wounded, one of whom died a few hours afterwards,
and another yesterday, here, on his passage. I have had
another taken to our military hospital, because he could
scarcely walk. The officers are going to Coni to recruit
themselves from bruises occasioned by their falls in escaping.
All the baggage and twenty-two horses have been carried
off; the prodigious rain that commenced when our detach
ment came to the rescue, prevented its going in quest of the
banditti. I send you also the minutes which the French
officers have drawn up concerning the circumstances conse
quent on the event, and the declaration made by them to
the officer commanding at Limon relative to his conduct on
this occasion.
I have just received a letter from General Macquart, which
is not perfectly clear. He supposes that the brigands take
refuge at Entraignes, Vaudier, Limon, and Levernant, and
alleges that those communes know and ought to apprehend
tham : he requests me to give strict orders on this subject.
He observes that the Piedmontese are not murdered, and,
what is still more particular, that the late general's guide
told him that the Piedmontese officer at Limon had not sent
to warn them till after they were slaughtered. Your excel
lency will see by the report made to me by this officer at

314 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Limon, that he could not inform them sooner, and that
from Limon to the Col de Tende the distance is great."
I shall, nevertheless, make all possible inquiries to dis
cover if there are any of these assassins, and to have them
secured. The French officers who turned back have assured
me that they were fired at from the barns above the Li-
monais, which are not in our territory. This event has pro
duced the greatest sensation in the minds of the French, who
reason upon it, each according to his dispositions towards us.
These banditti form a very considerable assemblage.
There are Frenchmen, Nisards, Corsicans, Genoese, and
deserters from us. Several of them come at night upon our
lands, go off to other villages, doing harm to nobody, and
paying everywhere for what they want. The communes,
fearing their vengeance, dare not pursue them : they are
seen in several villages in the same night, which, coming
to the ears of the general at Coni, leads him to suspect that
they live in those places, or have confederates there. I shall
send orders to the communes of the mountain, of the Limon
and the Limonais, to prevent fresh outrages, and a detach
ment to Entraignes to secure the brigands, who are suspected
of stopping there most frequently, and at the same time to
oppose the smuggling that is carried on there. This step
will attest to the general the reality of the precautions which
I am taking to second his views against these robbers, and
I will continue them till the communications are interrupted
by the snow.
After the plunder of the last convoy, one of the banditti
carried his parcel to Brois, and committed it to the care of
a working man, a native of Entraignes ; the depositary,
Renti, ran off with the deposit. In the night of the follow
ing day, seven other brigands seized Renti, and carried him
off with his trust, and he has not been heard of since. This
has struck terror into the villages of the mountain, and they
dare not make any disclosures.
De la Flechere,
Governor of the Province of Coni.

To the General-in-Chief.
Head-quarters, Verona, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796].
Nobody professes more sincerely than myself, general, the
justice that ought to be rendered to your indefatigable zeal

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 315
and your military talents. The esteem which I entertain
for you, and which all brave men who wish what is right
share with me, is a just tribute due to your care and your
solicitude for the success and glory of the Republic.
I am well aware that, if things do not go on as the chief,
you, some others, and myself, desire, it is a misfortune
which must be attributed to fatality, which puts into armies
creatures who impose shackles by incapacity, by negligence,
and whom custom has caused to be thought necessary.
The 29th demi-brigade has joined my division, which I
reviewed on the 3rd and 4th instant. Indeed, the con
dition of that 29th is pitiable : it has at most a hundred
bayonets ; it has no clothes, no shoes ; I found in it volun
teers under arms without any covering but a shirt and
linen trowsers. These troops must necessarily be armed,
equipped, and clothed, or left in the rear, for they cannot
be brought before the enemy in this state, occasioned by
the carelessness of the chief. They are, nevertheless,
soldiers, who, on some occasions, have exhibited proofs of
bravery and on whom one might rely; which ought to
stimulate our anxiety to put them in order and render them
fit to do good service. Make, I beg of you, all the efforts
you can to this end.
The rest of the division is going on very well, only that
some of those who have come back from the hospitals are in
want of arms, and excepting some bayonets lost, some coats
and pair of shoes which are deficient, and which it is urgent
to supply.
Discipline and order are observed in the best possible
manner. Adieu, my dear general : set everything to
rights, and let us prosecute our labours : that is what I
desire.
Augereau.

To the General-in-Chief.
Borgo-Forte, 7 Fructidor, year 4 [August 24, 1796].
As I dare say your aide-de-camp, citizen Lahoz, will
have returned to you before you have received the report of
the divisionary General Sahuguet, I cannot help intimating
that, up to this time, I have nothing but good news to tell
you. The enemy, after a vigorous resistance, has been completely

316 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES'.
beaten at Borgo-Forte. In order to force him at the bridge
of La Roque, it was necessary to exert republican bravery to
¦the utmost : in consequence, I owe the highest praise to the
6th battalion of grenadiers, and particularly to the 12th
demi-brigade of infantry of the line. I must not omit to
mention, citizen-general, the conduct displayed in this affair
by the officers of the 1 2th demi-brigade, and particularly by
the chief of the first battalion Beurnet. The adjutant-major
of the 6th battalion of grenadiers was one of the first to
force the barricades of the bridge of La Roque. Citizen
Lahoz ably seconded me.
I have, general, to repeat to you my solicitation for the
rank of chief of battalion for my aide-de-camp Marigny,
known for his courage and his activity, and who has given
fresh proofs of bravery in this little affair.
We have to regret several brave men. The loss of the
enemy has been considerable, particularly in slain, for our
troops gave no quarter.
I could not, without compromising myself, get into col
lision with the troops of the enemy in his line along the
causeway, where he is said to be in force. I await with
impatience the junction of the troops of General Sahuguet :
meanwhile, strong detachments are annoying the enemy on
the Ceresa road and on the dike.
Dallemagne.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].
You will be pleased to send orders for assembling in the
village of Tende a moveable column composed of 50 gen
darmes of the department of the Maritime Alps, 50 gen
darmes of the department of the Var, 3200 men from
the division of General Casabianca, 200 men from Antibes
and the Marguerite islands, 150 men of the national guard
of the Maritime Alps, 200 men of the national guard of the
district of Grasse, and two pieces of cannon.
This moveable column will be commanded by General
Casabianca. The military commission which I have ordered
for trying the Barbets shall meet at the village of Tende :
it shall be charged to collect all the information that can be
furnished it by the municipalities and the inhabitants for

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 317
destroying those assemblages and clearing the department
of the banditti who infest it.
The generals, superior officers, soldiers, and commis
sion, assembled at Tende, shall be paid half in money and
half in mandats, like the active army.
The paymaster of the army shall cause this moveable
column to be paid by the paymaster of Coni ; it shall be
furnished with provisions by the city of Coni, and have a
ration of meat, like the rest of the army.
The villages shall be responsible for the aid they give to
the villains.
General Macquart and the Piedmontese general shall be
apprized of the formation of this moveable column.
General Macquart shall have orders to concert with
General Casabianca for sending out on his part strong piquets,
in order to the rapid destruction of the banditti.
Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head -quarters, Milan, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].
You will be pleased, citizen-general, to order General
Gentili to organize in companies all the Corsican refugees
that are at Leghorn, officers, sub-officers, and soldiers. The
refugee Corsican generals, the chiefs of brigade or battalion,
shall each command one of these companies. Muskets
from those that are in the place shall be distributed among
them. These companies shall do no other service than what is
connected with the embarkation for Corsica. In case of
generale or alerte, General Gentili shall take the orders of the
general of division commanding the place respecting the
[»osts which the said companies are to occupy. The captains,
ieutenants, and sub-lieutenants of these companies shall be
armed with muskets.
I leave it to you to make a regulation for determining
whatever I may not have provided for, that all the Corsican
refugees forming part of the said companies may obtain the
rations due to their rank without confusion, and that they
may, in case of need, supply the place at Leghorn of the
battalion of the 75th demi-brigade, which I have withdrawn
from that place.

318 letters and despatches.
You will inform General Gentili that I shall send him
forthwith instructions concerning the expedition to Corsica.
The gendarmerie of the 28th division, being organized,

&

must concur in the duty of the place. You will authorize
its chiefs to recruit among the Corsican refugees in Leg-
nom' Bonaparte.
Give orders for 200 men of the battalion of the 12th
demi-brigade, which is at Milan, to set out early to-morrow
morning and proceed by the shortest road to Casal Maggior,
to be under the orders of General Murat, in lieu of the 51st
demi-brigade. Give orders to the 51st demi-brigade to set out, as soon
as these 200 men have arrived, and proceed to Leghorn by
the shortest route.
Give orders for establishing within thrice twenty-four
hours, in the castle of Pavia, an hospital for venereal cases.
There shall be kept in the magazine of the castle, five hun
dred muskets, with flints, cartridges, &c, for the purpose
of arming the venereal patients in case of need.
Give orders to the battalion of the 6th demi-brigade, the
first that arrives, to leave 200 men in the castle of Pavia.
As soon as these 200 men shall arrive at Pavia, give orders
to the 14th demi-brigade to set out for Leghorn by the
shortest way. Let the 51st demi-brigade and the 14th be
reviewed at the moment of their departure.
Order the establishment of an hospital for 500 patients in
the castle of Milan. My intention- is that the men who are
least ill be selected. Order that there be constantly kept
in the castle of Milan five hundred muskets, with all that is
necessary for arming the said patients in case of need.
Bonaparte.

To the General of Division Sauret.
Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].
The consideration of your health has alone induced toe to
give you the command of the reserve, and to supersede you
in that of the division at present under your orders : that
division is, moreover, destined for movements, the rapidity
of which is incompatible with your present state ; but you
will know how to make yourself useful in the post in which
I am placing you, and which is not less essential : the

letters and despatches, 319
service which it is to do is not so hard and more adapted to
your situation.
The reserve is intended to see the enemy, but it is destined
to come at him by less difficult roads. The services which
you have rendered must assure you that this change in
volves nothing that ought to affect you ; it is absolutely
foreign to any diminution in the confidence that I owe to
your bravery and your patriotism.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].
1. The division of General Sahuguet is blockading Mantua.
On the 7th, at three in the morning, we had at once
attacked the bridge of Governolo and Borgo-Forte, to oblige
the garrison to retire within its walls. After a brisk can
nonade, General Sahuguet in person took the bridge of Gover
nolo, at the same time that General Dallemagne made
himself master of Borgo-Forte. The enemy has lost 500
killed, wounded, and prisoners. The 12th demi-brigade
and citizen Lahoz distinguished themselves.
2. The division of General Augereau is at Verona.
3. That of General Massena is at Rivoli. That of
General Sauret, the command of which I have just given to
General Vaubois, General Sauret being ill, is at Staro.
It was indispensable to allow the troops a few days' rest,
to rally the scattered corps after so violent a shock, and to
reorganize the service of the administrations, absolutely
broken up. Some of those gentlemen ran all the way to
the Gulf of Spezzia without stopping.
The commissary of war Salva leaves the army ; panic-
struck, he beholds enemies everywhere ; he crosses the Po,
and communicates to all he meets the terrors that bewilder
him ; he fancies that the Hulans are at his heels. In vain
he scampers away for two days and two nights ; nothing
can raise his spirits ; writing to all quarters, Run for your
lives ! [Sauve qui peut] he arrives within two leagues of
Genoa, and — dies, in twenty-four hours, of a violent fever,
in the delirium of which he fancies himself wounded by a
hundred swords, and still those of the terrible Hulans. No
thing equals this cowardice but the bravery of the soldiers.
Many commissaries of war have not shown more bravery.

320 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Such, citizens directors, is the inconvenience of the law
which requires that the commissaries of war should be
civil agents, while they need courage and military habits
to a greater degree than the officers themselves : the cou
rage which is necessary for them is wholly moral ; it is
never the fruit of the habit of dangers. I have, therefore,
felt on this occasion how essential it is to appoint to the
office of commissaries of war none but men who have served
in the line for several campaigns and given proofs of courage.
Any man who values life higher than the national glory
and the esteem of his comrades ought not to form part of
the French army. It is revolting to hear every day the
persons of the different administrations confessing, and al
most boasting of it, that they were afraid.
We have in the army 1 5,000 sick ; the deaths are not
above fifteen or twenty a day : but the month of September
is said to be the time when diseases are most dangerous.
Up to this moment, there is nothing but slight fevers. I
have just been inspecting the hospitals of Milan : I am
highly pleased with them, which is partly owing to the zeal
and activity of citizen Burisse, principal agent of that
department. I have not yet received any troojos coming from the
Ocean : we have only tidings of 3000 men, composing the
sixth demi-brigade, who are to arrive at Milan on the 15th.
I hear nothing of any troops of the division of General
Chateauneuf-Randon : only the 10th demi-brigade of the
line, 600 strong, has arrived at Nice.
if the 6000 men of General Chateauneuf-Randon's whom
you have promised me, and the 13,000 announced long ago
from the army of the Ocean, had arrived, my army would
be almost doubled, and I should have swept the Austrian
army before me. If these reinforcements arrive in the
course of the month, we shall continue to find ourselves in a
respectable position, and capable even of putting an end to
the extravagance of Naples ; but I fear that your orders
relative to the movement of those troops are badly executed.
Our demi-galleys have run out of Peschiera, where they
have taken ten large barks and two pieces of cannon be
longing to the enemy.
Every thing here is in a satisfactory position. We are
waiting for the first tidings of General Moreau before we
advance into the Tyrol : but, if nothing arrives in a few days,

Letters and despatches. '¦ 321
we shall advance provisionally as far as Trent. I am as
sured that General Wurmser is recalled and succeeded by
General Devins.
The King of Sardinia having disbanded his provincial
regiments, the Barbets have increased. A cart conveying
money has been plundered. General Dugard, going to
Nice, has been killed. I have organized a moveable column
against the Barbets, with a tribunal to do justice upon them.
I cannot exercise any sort of influence on the departments
. of the Var and the Rhone. I am at such a distance that
letters reach me much later than the minister of war.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief
Rome, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].
I have the honour to send you a copy of what I am
writing to the commissary-general Dennie?, that you may
see how we stand in regard to the supplies. I will send by
the first courier a memorial concerning 1400 horses that
you demand, according to which you will be able to send--
hither or into Romagna the officer whom you may appoint
to superintend the operation.
Nothing new at Naples. I have taken measures to be
informed of what is passing in that quarter, in order to re
port to you.
I send you annexed a copy of the new lamentation of the
cardinal secretary of state on the subject of the new veniat
notified to Monsignor La Greca, lately vice-legate of Ferrara.
This Monsignor La Greca is the son of a merchant of Na
ples, and does not much interest this country. Cardinal
Mattei, archbishop of Ferrara, is a Roman prince, of an an
cient house, characterless, according to the taste of the Ro
mans, and generally liked and esteemed both by the pope
and the public. The justice of the orders that you have
given respecting those two prelates is acknowledged : they
have been exposed to deserved severities. Now that they
are walking tolerably straight here, I foresee that the em
barrassing prelates will be surrendered to the wishes of his
Holiness. The insurrections planned, to which we should all perhaps
have fallen victims but for your signal victories, could not
arise spontaneously from the Italian people, who have.
vol. i. Y

322 letters and despatches.
shrewdness, and who can see perfectly well, even at Rome,
the justice of our cause : all was the effect of the instigations
and manoeuvres of the English, Neapolitan, and Imperial
emissaries. Several cardinals have distinguished themselves by de
claiming and striving to act in that absolute Babel of Rome
against the French and your operations. M. the cardinal
Pignatelli-Monteleone, a Neapolitan, legate of Ferrara, who
is your prisoner, was one of the warmest in exciting the old
pope to despatch the vice-legate, La Greca, from this city.
M. the cardinal Caraffa, another Neapolitan, is one of the
greatest hatchers of lies against us. M. the cardinal Borgia,
a very learned and thought to be a discreet man, rose up
against us, and published a pamphlet, proving that the eccle
siastical canons forbade the pope to furnish powder for the
use of our army. The cardinal Albani, the eldest member
of the sacred college, whom the ambition of his family at
taches to the court of Vienna, is another of those possessed
zealots who have endeavoured to inflame peoples minds
against us. These gentlemen now appear to be somewhat
down in the mouth : fear alone can control them.
The pope, who now sees the consequences, is not pleased
with them, but this government knows not how to restrain
such personages. If you were to desire cardinal Mattei and
Monsignor La Greca to tell these gentlemen that you shall
hold them personally responsible for whatever happens in
Rome, and to tell the pope that if people here fail in obe
dience to the sovereign, in what relates to the maintenance
of good order and justice, you will send him an armed force,
I believe that it would produce a very good effect. We
must allay by fear the fire of the passions before we can
succeed in conciliating opinions.
Would you believe that Azara lives here forsaken, and
that the high company who owe everything to him treat
him as though he had done them a great disservice 1
I beg you to accept, &c,
Cacault.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief.
Paris, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796].
The last accounts that you have transmitted to us, citizen-
general, of your military operations prove to us that the

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 323
brave army which you command is daily gathering the fruits
of victory, by increasing the distress of its enemy. Ap
palled at his defeat, no doubt, he will not dare to venture
for a long time upon a pitched battle with the rest of his
forces : it is your business, therefore, to study to destroy
him in partial and frequent affairs, as you have done since
the memorable actions of the 16th and 18th. Pressed on
his rear by the rapid march of the right wing of the army
of the Rhine and Moselle, which is advancing upon the Inn,
it is to be presumed that he will make but a feeble and un
certain defence in the Tyrol, and thenceforward your pur
suit ought to acquire a new degree of celerity, either for the
purpose of overtaking the rear-guard and cutting it in pieces,
or to get to important passes before it, according to occasion
or the nature of the localities in which you have to deploy
all the variety of combinations and the resources of art as
you have already developed them by turns in mountain
operations and in those of the plain. We have praised the
boldness of your plan to pounce suddenly upon Trieste, but
to us the favourable moment does not seem to have yet
arrived. The reduction of the strength of the army by
disease, the more than equivocal dispositions of the different
powers of Italy, and the most pressing interest of all, that of
dissolving the forces of Austria, by inflicting on them
reiterated defeats, and thus dealing, as it were, the last blows
to our continental enemies — all these considerations decide
us to prescribe to you not to deviate, in the present circum
stances, from the plan which has for its object to connect
your left with the right of General Moreau, and to combine
your movements in such a manner as to crush Wurmser
and prince Charles, while General Jourdan will exert his
utmost efforts to drive Wartensleben into Bohemia, and so
to reduce his power that he shall be unable either to cover
that kingdom, or to protect the left bank of the Danube, if
he should fall 'back on that side.
After the three republican armies have executed these
dispositions in their totality, and the gates of Austria shall
be opened to them, we authorize you to throw a division
upon Trieste, in order to destroy its port and its public
establishments. Till then, prudence commands us to defer that enterprise.
We regret that we cannot give it our immediate assent ; but
the essential point is to confirm the conquest of Italy, and
Y2

324 .LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
to deprive the enemy, who has dared once more to dispute it
with the army under your command, of all hope and all
means of recovering it. It is, moreover, to be observed that
the corps which you would direct upon Trieste might be
compromised on its retreat into Italy in case of a reverse,
no very likely thing, it is true.
• We have received accounts that the 6,000 men, whom
General Chateauneuf-Randon had orders to despatch to Italy,
have long been in motion : inform us of their arrival, as well
as that of the reinforcements which have been drawn from
the Coasts of the Ocean. Our intention is to keep the army
of Italy in such a state of force as shall ensure to it a con
stant superiority in all the operations that concern it, either
by reinforcing it with troops from the interior, or by lending
it succours from the army of the Rhine and Moselle, to
which we shall send 6,000 men when the communication
between them shall be established : for we repeat to you, we
must retain, at any rate, our advantages in Italy ; it is
the object to which the thoughts of the government are
niost strongly attached, and which must have the greatest
influence on the continental peace.
When the emperor has been forced to accept the condi
tions of that peace necessary to Europe, we shall have to
decide upon that which it will suit the interests and the
splendour of the victories of the Republic to impose upon
the different States of Italy ; and then we shall be able,
with perfect security, to threaten Rome and Naples, to
niake them accede to our views.
The diseases which are attacking the garrison of Mantua
must soon reduce that place and relieve us from the neces
sity of observing it, unless at a distance. The health of
the troops strongly engages our attention, and claims no
doubt your most assiduous care, merited by the courage and
the republican fidelity of these brave defenders of the coun
try. The sick whose state . admits of their removal ought
to be conveyed, as far as it is practicable, to more wholesome
situations. Reveillere-Lepaux.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796].
The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letter
from Brescia of the 27th Thermidor, containing notes re-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES." 325
sp'ectihg some generals of the army of Italy. The Directory
has been pleased with it, and shall turn its attention to the
subject, when you have transmitted further notes, relative
to the generals of brigade and the adjutant-generals under
your command. You have forgotten several officers, espe-;
cially General Kilmaine. Reveillere-Lep aux .

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Paris, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796].
The Directory has received, citizen-general, the letter
which you have written to it from Brescia, on the 26th ult.
It gave orders immediately to the minister of the finances to,
have the jewels, valued at 400,000 livres, but which you
estimate at 2 or 3,000,000, brought to Paris. The Direc
tory is pleased with your vigilance on this essential occasion :
it feels every day how urgent it is that all the friends of the
Republic should denounce the numerous abuses which im-.
pede the march of its financial operations, and double the
inconveniences occasioned by a too complicated administra
tion in that important department. The supplies which
the army of Italy pours into the national treasury are the
more valuable the more violent the crisis : they have con
tributed to thwart the plots of our internal enemies.
We shall continue to recommend to you and to the com
missioners of the government to place at the disposal of the,
minister of the finances all the sums that are not indispen
sable for the different services of the army which you com
mand. The Directory has been grieved to hear of the removal of
the sequestration from the property of the Neapolitans at
Leghorn : it is a measure to which circumstances forbid us
to revert at present. The future conduct of the court of
Naples towards us will determine the ulterior steps that we
shall have to take. Before the effort of Wurmser on the
Adige and the Mincio, M. de Belmonte Pignatelli, who is in
Paris, strove, by all the means that foreign diplomacy is
skilled in employing, to avoid any occasion for treating
seriously for peace with the French Republic. Since the
army of Italy and the talents of its general have conquered
the. audacious Austrian, the conduct of the envoy of Naples
has totally changed, and he has become as eager for nego-

326 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
ciating peace as he appeared at first to be disinclined to do
so. It is easy to perceive that the King of the Two Sicilies
wishes to take advantage of your removal to a greater dis
tance, to conclude, on terms extremely advantageous to him,
a treaty against which his partiality for England and for
Austria revolts. It is for you, citizen-general, to inform us
respecting our real situation in Italy and our particular
position in regard to Naples. What you say on the subject
of the unfavourable dispositions of the Neapolitans at Brescia,
and of the danger which there would be in leaving them
there, has led us to consider the state of the army of Italy
with the most serious attention. We have asked ourselves
if the hottest season of the year, the moment when the
army has 15,000 sick, the moment, above all, when it is pre
paring not only to enter the Tyrol, but perhaps to throw
itself upon Trieste, is a favourable period for breaking the
armistice concluded with Naples. We have thought that
the hour for that rupture, if it must take place, has not
arrived, and that it would nevertheless be dangerous to go
to sleep upon Italian faith, by which we have been so often
deceived. In consequence, citizen-general, we think it right merely
to recommend to you to keep a vigilant eye upon the Nea
politans at Brescia, to scatter them in such a manner as to
render them less dangerous, to gain some of them, were it
only to learn all their proceedings, and to be in readiness to
seize their horses and their arms, in case of necessity. If
the court of Naples, unfaithful to the armistice, were to show
itself openly our enemy ; if it were to come forward to meet
you, or to declare itself anew absolutely in favour of Austria
and England — then, and in case of an absolutely imminent
danger, we authorize you, citizen-general, to make yourself
master of the 200 Neapolitan horse, who are in the rear of
the army of Italy.
The Directory approves what you have done in regard to
the legate sent by the court of Rome to Ferrara. We have
sent away the envoy of the Prince of Rome, who had been
despatched to us without any power to treat with the French
Republic. These steps, however, do not place us in a hos
tile situation in regard to the pope, but they warn us to lose
no time in extracting from Rome, by taking care to intimi
date it as you have done, the contributions of all kinds
granted to us by the armistice.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 327
It is right, citizen-general, that you should have an eye
upon what the court of Turin is doing. Its ambassador in
France, the Chevalier Revel, a French emigrant, has just
been sent away by us on account of that quality. We are
waiting for his successor. This measure makes no change
in the state of peace in which we are in regard to Piedmont,
but we know that they rejoiced in that country at the ephe
meral successes of Wurmser.
It is better to be on one's guard than to run the risk of
being deceived. Reveillere-Lepaux.

32SJ LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.'

PART FOURTH.
FROM THE BATTLE OF ROVEREDO TO THE RESUMPTION OF
HOSTILITIES BY A NEW AUSTRIAN ARMY.
To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 9 Fructidor, year 4 [August 26, 1796].
You will find annexed, citizens-directors, two letters which
I have received from Corsica. The English are embarking
all their munitions of war, to remove them to the isle of
Elba. What is become of the plan which they may have had
at the time when they believed us to be beaten, of making a
dash upon Leghorn, as the annexed proclamation would lead
one to believe ?
All the Corsican refugees are already arrived at Leghorn ;
the commissary Salicetti calculates on starting to-day.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 9 Fructidor, year 4 [August 26, 1796].
I have made a beginning of the negociations at Venice.
I have demanded of them provisions for the supply of the
army. You will find annexed a copy of the letter to citizen
Lallemant. As soon as I have swept the Tyrol, negocia
tions conformable to your orders shall be commenced; at
the present moment they would not succeed ; those people
have a powerful navy, and are sheltered from all insult in
their capital ; it may even prove extremely difficult to put
the property of the English and the emperor under seques
tration. I have sent for citizen Faypoult to Milan. We have
agreed upon the preparatory measures to be taken for the
execution of your instructions relative to Genoa.
At the same moment that we shall be at Trent, the army
of the Rhine will be at Inspruck, and that part of the corps
of troops coming to me from La Vendee reaches Tortona, I

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.* 329 '
shall proceed in person to Genoa, and your decree shall be
executed in its full tenour.
As for the Grand-duke of Tuscany, we must continue to
dissemble with him. I have made a change of troops in the
fortress of Leghorn, to put out calculators as to their num
ber, and to make a movement in the interior of Italy for
the purpose of accrediting the reports that I get circulated
with a view to overawe the populace of Rome and the Nea-.
politans.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 9 Fructidor, year 4 [August 26, 1796].
The King of Naples, at the head of 24,000 men, which
in reality may not exceed 15,000, has advanced into the:
territories of the pope, threatening to march to Rome and
thence come and join Wurmser, or proceed to Leghorn, in.
order to drive us, in concert with the English, from that:
place. Rome was in alarm, and the cabinet of his Holiness
in the greatest consternation. ;
I have written to citizen Cacault to soothe the court of
Rome, and to signify to that of Naples that, if the King of
the Two Sicilies advanced into the territories of Rome, I
should consider the armistice as null-, and march a division
of my army to cover Rome. Citizen Cacault assures me,
without being certain of it, that the King of Naples has de
sisted from his enterprise, and that he has himself returned
to Naples. That court is perfidious and stupid. I am of
opinion that, if M. Pignatelli has not yet arrived in Paris,'
it would be proper to sequestrate the 2000 cavalry that we
have in depot, to seize all the goods that are at Leghorn, to
draw up a strong manifesto, exposing the bad faith of the
court of Naples, particularly of Acton ; the moment it is
threatened it will become humble and submissive. I have
written to M. d'Azara at Rome ; I have told him that, if
the court of Naples, in contempt of the armistice, again offers
to enter the lists, I engage, before the face of Europe, to
march against the pretended 70,000 men, with 6000 grena
diers, 4000 cavalry, and 50 pieces of cannon. The fine
season is advancing : six weeks hence I hope the greatest
part of our sick will be cured. When the succours that you
announce to me arrive, I shall be able at once to carry on,

330 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
the siege of Mantua, and to overawe the Neapolitans and the
Austrians. The court of Rome, during our disasters, behaved no
better than the others : it had sent a legate to Ferrara ; I or
dered him to be seized and detain him an hostage at Brescia ;
it is cardinal Mattei. The vice-legate, named Greca, had
escaped, and was not more than two hours' distance from
Rome ; I sent him an oreler to come to Milan, and he came.
As he is less culpable, I shall dismiss him after keeping
him here for a few days.
Many reports are circulated respecting the King of Sar
dinia, but I think they are all unfounded. He has sold his
artillery equipage, disbanded his provincial regiments, and
is endeavouring to recruit, because he would rather have
foreign troops than native regiments, on which he cannot
much rely. It would be well if the journalists would be
pleased not to publish such absurdities as they are daily
circulating concerning him. There are petty paragraphs,
dashed off from sheer rumour, without any ill intention,
which do us more harm and make us more enemies than
a contribution, from which we should derive advantage.
Perhaps it might be useful if an official journal were to
insert an article contradicting these absurd and ridiculous
reports. Bonaparte.
To Citizen Miot, Minister of the Republic at Florence.
Head-quarters, Milan, 9 Fructidor, year 4 [August 26, 1796].
I have received all your letters. There are at Leghorn
2500 men of the 75th demi-brigade and 600 Corsican re
fugees, whom I am organizing into companies. I am send
ing the 1 5th and the 14th demi-brigades : make yourself
easy. Dissemble with the grand-duke ; if he behaves ill, he
shall pay all at once : people of that sort are not much to
be feared. Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Brescia, 13 Fructidor, year 4 [August 30, 1796].
It frequently happens that deficiency of the means of
conveyance prevents the soldier from receiving his ration of
bread of twenty-four ounces, and he gets no more than

letters and despatches. 331
twelve : it is but just, when this happens, to indemnify him
by giving him an equivalent in money. In consequence,
the general-in-chief orders that, in this case, there shall be
given him one sou and a half per twelve ounces. The in
spector of provisions of the division must give a certificate,
which shall be examined [vis&] by the commissary of war,
the chief of the staff of the division, and the general com
manding the camp. The commissaire ordonnateur, at the
end of the decade, shall present the certificate to the commis
sary-general,, who shall cause it to be paid.
Bonaparte.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rome, 12 Fructidor, year 4 [August 30, 1796].
I have received the two letters from Milan, of the 8th of
this month, with which you have honoured me.
I have the honour to send you the answer of the cardinal
secretary of state, to the demand of a supply of a thousand
bullocks for the army. Orders are given for them to be de
livered as fast as possible, and I have sent the commandant of
the citadel of Bologna a letter from myself, specifying the
persons who will be legitimately charged with the said bul
locks, and to give a receipt for them on account of the contri
bution in kind.
I had the honour to inform you before that orders had
been given by the pope for admitting the French garrison
into Ancona, on the terms of the armistice, and that you
could, therefore, send the garrison whenever you pleased. I
send you annexed the pope's order which you wish to have ;
it is signed by the cardinal secretary of state, in the usual
form, the most authentic and the only one customary here.
All that results from the note sent to Ancona, to the
secretary of state, in which you have observed that the
consul of his Sicilian majesty had placed the arms of his
master over his door, is that the court of Naples now thinks
fit to have at that port a regular consul, to whom it gives a
somewhat higher character to support, conceiving that at
the present time it has more need to be apprized of what is
passing in that quarter.
The Prince de Belmonte has found himself in Paris, like
M. Petracchi, without sufficient powers for signing the pre
liminaries which have been communicated to him. He has,

332 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.'
therefore sent off a courier to his court, which I believe to'
be now much frightened : it keeps up its stern and martial
countenance. M. the Prince of Castelcicala has not answered '.
my second, letter, and I hear that his charge d'affaires has.
orders not to receive any letters that I may send to him for-
his court.
All the solicitude, all the vigilance, all the efforts of M.
Acton are principally employed in preventing all communi
cation of Neapolitans with foreigners, so that it is very
difficult for me to obtain correct information relative to the--
state of his army. I shall send you the bulletins as fast as
I receive them.
Your letter to M. Azara will be read and shown about :
copies of it will probably reach Naples, and they will greatly
rejoice the public.
I have answered the municipality of Ferrara and the
senate of Bologna, on the subject of the alarm which they
felt, but which was unfounded, that the pope had given
orders for depriving them of the spiritual graces. I have:
also explained to the senate of Bologna how I had arranged
with M. Azara to prevent both M. Capelletti and the ex-
Jesuits from giving it the least annoyance.
The effect of the pardon solicited for two wretches has
been better than if we had left them in the galleys, where
they already were ; but I have made them sensible here that
you blamed me for it. If you did but know this beggarly
population, and how I am beset all day long by mendicants !;
There is nothing dangerous here but the emissaries of the
coalition, especially the English and the Neapolitans.
' We are now proceeding tolerably well towards the execu
tion of the armistice ; but here are new incidents arising,
of which you are apparently informed.
A fresh courier from M. Petracchi, minister of the pope
in Paris, arrived here yesterday, bringing me the decree of
the Directory, a copy of which you will find annexed.
I have acquainted you with the difficulty which has arisen
upon the first article of the treaty ; I send you annexed a
copy of that article. The congregation of the cardinals sum-1
moned by his Holiness to give him their opinions, both upon
the first article of the treaty and the new incident of the
decree of the Directory, has judged that, on the first point,
the article could not in conscience be admitted without some
reserves for the conservation of the faith. For the rest, it

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 333
has decided that the pope should send to the commissioners
of the Executive Directory, Salicetti and Garrau, a pleni
potentiary to obtain peace. M. Azara has been requested
to accompany this new minister, and consented. A courier
will set off immediately to seek out the commissioners and
to inquire to what place Monseigneur Caleppi is to repair
with M. Azara.
The pope weeps ; but neither he nor his council can yet
bring themselves to listen to the opinion of the divines
Whom I mentioned to you, or to the more solid reasons
which M. Azara and I have given to make them compre
hend that the article referred only to temporal matters.
- As for the armistice, there is no backwardness about its
fulfilment. The more important affair of the definitive treaty
is now under consideration : this leaves no opportunity to
negociate here for the purpose of inducing the pope to take
the measures which you suggest in regard to constitutional
priests. I imagine that the Directory means to send to the
commissioners a treaty ready to sign without rejoinder.
Cacault.

The Prince Castelcicala to Citizen Cacault.
I have received, sir, the letter which you have been
pleased to address to me on the 22nd instant, in answer to
that which, by command of bis Sicilian majesty, I had the
honour to write to you on the 20th of the same month.
The king, who has read the contents, has seen with sur
prise the reports circulated respecting the march of his
troops, since all these rumours were entirely overthrown and
demolished by the declaration which I made to you in my
preceding letter, that the troops of his majesty would not
pass the limits of this kingdom unless foreign troops entered
the territories of the pope and directed their march against
us. Precautions and measures of safety and foresight can
not be absolutely neglected by his majesty ; but the king
will scrupulously observe the armistice, sincerely desiring
the return of good harmony ; and in consequence of this
very sincere disposition on his part, he will always employ
such becoming and suitable means as can contribute to
manifest the truth of this assertion.
I have the honour to transmit to you a summary of the
facts concerning the detention of the officer and three French

334 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
seamen whom you mentioned in your letter, and you will
there observe the regularity of the conduct of the Neapolitan
commandant.
The Prince de Castelcicala.

Citizen Cacault to the Prince de Castelcicala.
Rome, 14 Fructidor, year 4 [August 31, 1796].
I have received the letter which you did me the honour
to write to me on the 29th of August. The general-in-
chief Bonaparte had been irritated by a concurrence of the
circumstances and reports which I specified to you ; but,
having received a copy of your letter and of General Acton's
dated the 20th of August, he now sends me word that he
has no further doubt of the observance of the armistice, the
execution of which he also will faithfully uphold.
I have referred the affair of the four Frenchmen detained
at Orbitello to the consul-general at Leghorn, Belleville,
that he may settle it with the consul of his Sicilian majesty.
I shall transmit to him to-day the summary which you have
been pleased to send me. I shall also address a copy of
that paper to the captain of La Dangereuse, who is at Civita
Vecchia, that both may be informed of the decision of the
king, who sets at liberty the officer and the three seamen.
As nobody desires more sincerely than myself the speedy
re-establishment of peace, you will always find me disposed
to promote a good understanding, and to give you proof,
monsieur le prince, of the sentiments of the highest con
sideration.
Cacault.

To General Bonaparte.
Verona, 14 Fructidor, year 4 [August 31, 1796].
I perceive, general, and I am even certain that the Vene
tians, so far from meaning to observe neutrality in regard to
us, are preparing and secretly fomenting — the nobles and the
{iriests in particular — acts of hostihty against us : I can no
onger doubt it, since hostilities are already commencing. One
of my patroles cannot go a league from its camp, without
being attacked and fired at by the peasants, who assemble
in arms at the sound of the alarm-bell. Several volunteers

letters and despatches. 335
have already been murdered, and I have not been able to
discover the culprits and to bring them to justice. The po-
desta of Verona, on my complaint, expressed great anxiety
to put a stop to these outrages, which will have mischievous
consequences, and affects to be taking a great deal of trouble ;
but, in fact, not a criminal has yet been apprehended. I
can hardly believe that the Venetian government suffers
itself to be deceived on this point, and is ignorant of the
source whence such outrages proceed.
Does it favour the Austrians in tacitly approving these
hostile insurrections ? I cannot help thinking so ; and this
must be cleared up as speedily as possible.
At two o'clock this morning, my advanced post of cavalry
was attacked by an advanced guard of enemy's hussars on
the Vicenza road : a few sword-cuts were exchanged, and
the arrival of a strong patrole of ours forced the enemy to
retreat ; he was about 100 strong — horse. According to
certain intelligence, these troops were directed to our ad
vanced posts by nobles of the country : some of these latter
have gone so far, to my knowledge, as to give money to our
grenadiers and volunteers for the purpose of enticing them
into insubordination and disorder ; which, I hope, will never
happen, for I make them observe the strictest discipline.
There is one noble in particular, whose name I have, that
promises to get rid of the generals by laying ambuscades
for them ; in short, the emperor and our French emigrants
have all this country in their favour : I am sure of it.
It is high time, general, to ascertain at once the inten
tions of the government of Venice : let it tell us whether
we are at war or at peace with it. Till we receive an an
swer to this question, I will do my best to protect this side
of the army, and to maintain safety and order among the
troops that I command.
Augereau.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Pinvenzano, 15 Fructidor, year 4 [September 1, 1796].
The bad weather which we have had for some days has
obliged General Pigeon to order down the posts from Monte
Baldo. If the weather changes, I shall direct him to send
them up again.
The soldiers suffer cruelly : two-thirds of my division, at

336 Letters and despatches.
least, are in want of coats, waistcoats, breeches, shirts, &c.',
and absolutely barefoot. This deficiency of clothing gives
us a great many sick, and will give us a great many more,
if people never do anything but promise without sending us
necessaries. I give you notice, general, that, if the movement of the
general-in-chief takes place, the soldiers whom I command
cannot march in any way whatever ; it is physically impos
sible, unless one would choose to leave half of them half
way. I have no hesitation to tell you that, if the same
attentions are not paid to my division as to the others, I
will give in my resignation and renounce the profession.
Let it not be supposed that I am swayed by ill-humour : it
is as a free man and fond of what is right that I thus ex
press myself.
I have long been applying at Verona for flour, for the
purpose of setting to work the ovens that are within reach
of my division. I know not from what diabolical specula
tion it is that they will never send anything but bread
ready baked at Verona, which, when it arrives here, is always
mouldy, at least two-thirds of it. When liquids are sent
to us, it is always in musty casks ; and, before they are
landed and delivered at the magazine, half the quantity is
always gone.
I have written to the commissary ; I have stationed an
officer of my staff at Verona ; but, for all that, things do
not go on as they ought to do. If you talk to the commis
saries and the agents, they tell you that a much greater
quantity of provisions is sent off than is wanted for the di
vision ; but they are well aware, from the letters which I
have written them, that half and more is not fit to be re
ceived. Let the general-in-chief give orders that this shall
be no longer the case. Health and fraternity.
Massena.
— £ 
The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.
Pariss 17 Fructidor, year 4 [September 3, 1796]
The Directory has received, citizen-general, your de
spatches of the 9th of this month. The statement of the
strength of the army which you command, rendered inactive
at this moment by sickness, and the account you give of the
<lelay experienced in their march by the reinforcements

letters and despatches. 337
destined for you, have deeply affected it. It is writing anew
and in the most imperative manner, on this latter subject,
to Generals Kellermann and Chateauneuf-Randon ; it never
theless observes that your preceding letters and those of its
commissioners mentioned that the troops despatched from
the Coasts of the Ocean were arriving successively at Milan.
Important as it may be to follow up the enemy after his
defeat, still we admit the necessity of the delay which you
have thought it right to interpose before you enter the
Tyrol. The nature of the ground, the particular- knowledge
of it possessed by the Austrians, who, though beaten and
considerably weakened, yet dared to resist in new positions,
and the internal situation of Italy, are, on this head, so
many motives Wjbich we can appreciate. But the time be
stowed on theses necessary precautions ought to ensure
greater activity; in the ulterior operations ; and we think
that you will be; forthwith at Trent, and very soon either at
Brixen or at Inspruck, according as circumstances shall
decide you.
The passage cjf the Lech by the army of the Rhine and Mo^
selle, the direction of its right upon the rear of the Austrian
army, and the rtetreat of Prince Charles upon the Iser, add
new confidence to the security which we share with you
respecting the sequel of your movements, and which arises
from your multiplied victories, the influence of which can
not fail to be decisive in favour of the Republic, since the
distress of the court of Vienna and the humiliation of its
defeats have not yet touched it sufficiently to make it sin
cerely desirous of putting an end to the war. The more
obstinate and the more haughty it is, the more terrible let
us be, and let us redouble our energy to close the campaign
with new successes, without compromising most especially
those which we have already won.
We approve the vigour of your threats in regard to
Naples, and we authorize you to carry them into effect, if
that court resumes a hostile attitude towards France. We
wish to be accurately informed of what has passed, and
what motive the King of Naples now alleges for his move
ment upon Rome.
We continue to reserve for the most favourable moment
the execution of our views respecting the powers of Italy
with which we have interests to discuss ; the most essential
point now is to ensure our triumphs.
VOL, I, %

338 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Though at a distance from the parts where the Barbets
carry on their pillage, do not lose sight of those obscure
and -dangerous enemies: orders, emanating from you will
have more effect than any that can be issued without your
participation, in repressing that evil, which is spreading in
several departments.
The laws relative to the organization of commissaries of
war, so far from authorizing pusillanimity, prescribe to them,
on the contrary, a courage equal to that of the defenders of
the country. One of our decrees orders, moreover, that
some of them shall always be attached to the troops, even in
presence of the enemy, and that such as should be cowardly
enough to quit the post of honour, of danger, shall be
brought to trial. We request you, citizen-general, to let
that decree be laid before you, and to provide for its rigid
execution. We request you also to inform us of everything relating
to the operation that is about to be commenced in Corsica,
and to second with all your means the zeal of citizen Salicetti,
and the daring of the refugees of that island.
L. M. Reveillere-Lepaux, President.

To the Executive Directory. .
Head-quarters, Trent, 20 Fructidor, year 4 [September 6, 1796],
We have nothing to do, citizens directors, if we would
profit by our present position, than to march upon Trieste.
We shall be at Botzen as soon as the army of the Rhine
shall have advanced upon Inspruck, but this plan which we
are adopting, and which would have been good in the month
of June, is good for nothing at the end of September : the
snow will soon re-establish the barriers of nature : the cold
is already becoming severe ; the enemy who has felt it has
thrown himself upon the Brenta to cover Trieste. I am
marching to-day along the Brenta to attack the enemy at
Bassano, or to cut off his rear, if he makes a movement upon
Verona. You are aware that it is impossible for me to en
tangle myself in the mountains of the Tyrol, when the whole
hostile army is at Bassano, and threatens my -flank and
my rear. Arrived at Bassano, I shall beat the enemy;
how then would you have me drive him before me and strive
to take Trieste from him ? On the day that I should beat
the enemy at Bassano, and the army of the Rhine be at

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 339
Inspruck, the 4000 men left of the division which guarded
Trent would retire by Brixen and Lintz upon the Friule ;
then the communication with the army of the Rhine will be
truly established, and I shall have flung back the enemy be
yond Trieste, an essential point, whence the enemy's army
derives its supplies. Then, according to the nature of cir
cumstances, I shall stay at Trieste, or return to the Adige.
After destroying that port, and according to the nature of
events, I will dictate to the Venetians the laws which you
have sent me in your ulterior instructions. Then again it
will be easy, if the reinforcements from General Chateau
neuf-Randon arrive, and if you take care that I am furnished
with 10,000 men of the army of the Alps, to send a good
army to Naples. Lastly, citizens-directors, do you not
choose this winter to have the war carried into the heart of
Italy \ Let us carry it into the Friule.
The army of the Rhine, occupying Inspruck, guards my
left flank: a month hence the snow and ice will do that for
it, and it will be able to return to the Danube. You are
better aware, no doubt, than I am what an effect the taking
of Trieste would produce upon Constantinople, Hungary,
and all Italy. At any rate, citizens-directors, on the 22nd
I shall be. at Bassano. If the enemy waits for me, there
will be a battle that will decide the fate of this whole coun
try ; if the enemy falls back again upon Trieste, I will do
what military circumstances shall cause me to judge most
suitable ; but I shall await your orders to know whether I
am or am not to dash upon Trieste.
I think that it might be necessary to form at Milan three
battalions of Milanese, which would serve to reinforce
the army blockading Mantua. If you adopt the plan of
going to Trieste, I beg you to let me know in what manner
you wish me to conduct myself towards that city, in case it
should be thought proper to evacuate it some time after
wards.
Bonaparte.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief.
Paris, 23 Fructidor, year 4 [September 9, 1796].
In Germany, citizen-general, there have occurred some
events, which, without compromising thus far the successes
which the Repubhc has obtained, require, nevertheless, a
z2

340 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
hew degree of energy for executing the new dispositions that we
have ordered. The army of the Sambre and Meuse, attacked
suddenly by Prince Charles, who has brought General War-
tensleben a reinforcement from Bavaria, has been obliged,
though without any serious battle, to fall back upon the
¦Rednitz and successively upon the Lahn.
This situation, which might be attended with disastrous
consequences, if we were not to thwart the design of the
enemy by a prompt and bold measure, has decided us to
direct General Moreau to march immediately with the
greatest part of his force, between the Rednitz and the
Upper Neckar to attack Prince Charles, who will be at
tacked in front at the same time by General Beurnonvillej
who is bringing from the army of the North to that of the
Sambre and Meuse a reinforcement of which he will take
the command. General Jourdan, having need of rest, passes
from that to the army of the North. General Moreau will esta
blish in Bavaria, before he leaves it, a defensive, sufficiently
strong to cover the Lech, and to curb such enemies as there
are in this part of the theatre of the war. But, to accom
plish this object which is essential, it is necessary that you
should briskly occupy the Austrians in the Tyrol, who might
carry succours into Bavaria, as they have already done,
according to the reports which have reached us, in order to
find themselves in force on the right of their line of opera
tions. We think, therefore, that you ought to act in such
a manner as to march with rapidity upon Inspruck, and
threaten to make an irruption into Bavaria. Avoid scatter
ing the troops as much as the nature of the ground will
permit, that nothing may be left to chance in that difficult
kind of operations which you will have to execute. You
will be deeply sensible that present circumstances are of the
highest importance, and that it is incumbent on us to deploy
all our means and especially to combine the employment of
them along the whole line occupied by our acting armies.
This concert alone can restore the offensive to us at all
points ; and we hope that the manoeuvre of Prince Charles,
fortunate for a moment, will draw upon his army terrible
strokes, by inducing him to try anew the fortune of battles.
We transmit to you a copy of the last report of General
Jourdan. In this despatch, citizen-general, we confine ourselves to
the subject of the movement which we prescribe to the brave

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 341
army of Italy and its able general, to operate immediately
in the Tyrol.
We refer to our preceding letters for all that relates to
the other affairs of the command that is entrusted to you.
L. M. Reveillere-Lepaux.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Marseilles,. 23 Fructidor, year 4 [September 9, 1796].
The eighth division is stripped of general officers. Till
the minister has supplied the places of those whom he has
taken from me, I have thought it right to keep temporarily
General of brigade Verne, whose health prevents him from
returning so soon to the army. I have given him the com
mand of the department of the Lower Alps : I shall inform
the minister of this arrangement. According to the state
ments of situation addressed to the staff, you will see that I
have not 6000 men for the four departments of the eighth
division. Agreeably to your orders, I have despatched fifty
gendarmes of the department of the Var, and I cannot sup
ply their place without great inconvenience. Marseilles
must be disgarnished, and I have not a hundred disposable
horses ; but Toulon and the department of the Var can no
longer furnish the service of the ordonnances for the escort
of the mails.
The Executive Directory had given me an order to keep
a complete squadron of the 1 8th regiment of dragoons on
its passage. In consequence of the state of that corps, which
left 150 horses at Liurbone, and 30 at Nimes, which Ge
neral Chateauneuf-Randon took it upon him to retain, I was
obliged to limit the number that I kept to 55 mounted dra
goons, 25 for the department of Vaucluse and 30 for Mar
seilles. The chief of brigade leaves me 17 ailing horses and
55 dismounted men, whom I hope to remount, as I have
received advice that some horses are coming from the inte
rior to the depot. The rest of this regiment, reduced to
nearly nothing, will set out on the 25th for Italy.
I have learned, general, that it is your intention to take
the grenadiers from me : in the state in which these depart
ments are, that measure might be attended with the most
disastrous consequences. The fire is smouldering under the
ashes ; agitators, enemies by interest and character to

342 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
every government that strives to establish the sway of the
laws, are daily hatching new plots. The removal of the
constituted authorities pronounced by the Legislative Body
cannot fail to occasion violent movements, if there is not at
hand a force sufficiently imposing to prevent them. In all
quarters, the dangerous party is armed ; it forms assem
blages and commits acts of violence ; deserters, men who
have taken the benefit of amnesties, who occupy civil posts,
enrol the persons liable to the requisition and the vagabonds
of all countries. I have presented to the government a
picture of my position, and I am soliciting from it succours
of all kinds. Till they arrive, I cannot strip myself of the
few troops I have, without perilling the public weal. This
is not all : all the military administrations are cramped by
the want of funds. Four days after my arrival, the troops;
would have been without bread, had not I overstepped my
powers, and insisted on emptying all the chests, taking upon
myself personal engagements.
The agents-in-chief of the victualling section, of military
transports, of forage, of hospitals, &c, are with the army,
and take no heed of this division, with the supply of which:
they are charged. The pay of the different corps was several
months in arrear. Such is the state of the division, the
command of which has, for my sins, been committed to me.
I dare say that this picture, equally true and alarming, has
been kept out of your sight. You are gaining victories'
over the foreign enemy ; I congratulate you upon them with
all my heart ; but this is not sufficient for the happiness of
the country : you must ensure order and tranquillity at
home, and you will then have all the kinds of glory to which
a republican hero ought to aspire. See what you can do
to assist us. Health and fraternity !
The General of Division,
WlLLOT.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Bassano, 23 Fructidor, year 4 [September 9, 1796].
You are aware, general, how brilliant the conduct of the
4th demi-brigade of infantry of the line has always been :
you witnessed its exploits in the actions of the 21st and 22nd
of this month. That intrepidity which characterizes it is

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 343
partly owing to the example of the brave officers who com
mand it ; among these the following have particularly dis
tinguished themselves, and I solicit for them well-merited
promotion. I solicit the rank of general of brigade for the chief of
brigade Lannes, who in this army as in that of the Eastern
Pyrenees has never ceased to exhibit the most signal proofs
of valour, and who in the last affair took two colours from
the enemy ; ,
That of chief of brigade, commanding the 4th demi-bri
gade, for the chief of battalion, brother of that officer : he
has rendered the most important services, and combines the
most useful talents with the greatest courage. He was
wounded in the battle of Ceva, and again yesterday : this
misfortune, which gives him a claim to the public gratitude,
will not prevent him from appearing again in a short time
at the head of his brave comrades.
Lastly, I desire that citizens Cassan and Gros, captains
of grenadiers, equally commendable for their bravery, their
zeal, and their morality, be promoted to the rank of chiefs
of battalion. I hope, general, that you will be pleased to transmit these
applications to the Executive Directory, on whose justice I
rely in this matter, as much as upon yours.
Augereau.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Guisenfeld, 23 Fructidor, year-4 [September 9, 1796].
I have received, citizen-general, your letter of the 14th of
this month. I was ready to attempt the attack of the gorges
of the Tyrol ; the Lech and the Iser were forced, which gave
us excellent debouches upon Inspruck ; but the army of the
Sambre and Meuse, having almost reached Ratisbon, has
been repulsed successively to Bamberg — it is even said to
Wurtzburg-: which obliges me to change my direction. The
enemy, who has not been able to withstand us at this point,
keeps the field only by strong parties of cavalry on our
flanks arid our rear, which sometimes annOy us.
I dare not commit to paper my present plan, apprehensive
lest this courier should fall into the hands of the enemy :
as soon as it is determined upon, I will communicate it to
you. ...

344 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Our advanced posts occupy Neuburg and Neustadt ; the
army is encamped at Guisenfeld ; Ferino's corps occupies
Mosburg, Franken, and Munich ; the right is at the sources
of the Lech towards Kempten and Schongau. I wish most
sincerely that more favourable circumstances may enable
me to second your operations.
The General-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine,
Moreau.
PS. General Reynier sends you, in a few words in cipher,
what we are going to do.
To General Bonaparte.
26 Fructidor, year 4 [September 12, 1796J.
We had proceeded, according to your instructions, to the
bridge of Castellara on the 25th Fructidor ; the length of
the march prevented our arrival before eight or nine in the
evening. We had found at Bigarello about 60 hussars of
the garrison of Mantua, whom we pursued, but in vain : we
had but one horse.
No sooner had we made our first establishments on the
Molinella, about three or four hundred fathoms in advance
of Castellara on the Porto-Legnago road, when the advanced
guard of Wurmser arrived from the opposite direction. A
few musket shots of our advanced sentinels and the tramp
of horses made us believe so ; the signal of the cannon fired
at Mantua on the return of the hussars into that place, and
several times repeated, left us no doubt. Joy at stopping
Wurmser gave new strength to our weary soldiers, and the
destruction of the brick bridge and the making of fortifi
cations to mask the avenues were accomplished with enthu
siasm by the army of Italy.
During our march, on arriving at Bigarello, we had left
General PeUetier with 600 men at the point where the road
which our column had followed joins the high road from
Mantua to Castellara : by abattis which were ordered about
a thousand toises farther on, towards Mantua, and by
breaking down two bridges, he was to cover us from all
possible efforts of the garrison : we had moreover left about
two miles in rear, at the Due Castelli, 200 men, who
were to break up the roads and to destroy the bridges in the
direction of Mantua.
All that we now had to do was to cover ourselves against

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 345
Wurmser : we sent to break down the bridge of Sorgate,
over the Tione, about 1500 toises from Castellara, which
bridge is situated on a high road, which comes from No-
gara and at the distance of about two miles leads to Cas
tellara. All our men were engaged in these occupations, which
were most urgent, when a patrole, sent off in the morning
of the 26th by this bridge of Sorgate, informed us that it
had been to a great distance, without finding any Austrian
post; and even ten chasseurs, who had been despatched
towards Villa Impenta, assured us that they had seen a
great number of Hulans. In their report, they confounded
the three rivers which are on that side ; we, nevertheless,
marched off 200 men whom we meant to send to the bridge
of Villa Impenta, in order to afford ourselves the means of
slipping to our right : the 200 men returned before they had
gone a quarter of a league. The movement of Wurmser
was then clear.
We had endeavoured to collect all possible information
respecting the road from Villa Impenta to Ronco-Ferraro,
and we still suspected there was a debouche" for an Austrian
army there : we resolved immediately to reconnoitre Ronco-
Ferraro; we had yet but glimpses of projects. Some chas
seurs started, and, to avoid the loss of time between the
report of the scouts and the orders to be given for turning
them to the best possible account, we pushed forward with
the utmost despatch 80 men of the advanced guard upon
that road. A quarter of an hour afterwards, when another
detachment of 100 men was about to push forward to sup
port or follow them, our chasseurs returned at a gallop upon
the road ; and our 80 men came back in haste and in dis
order through the fields and the lateral vineyards.
There is a second road, which parts from the Castellara
road at the bridge of La Molinella, about 250 toises from
the road of which I have been speaking, towards our left —
in the position which we were now obliged to take — and
which runs and branches off towards the right hand road,
about 2000 fathoms further. We soon learned that our
little post pushed forward on this road, fell back also in dis
order. Our enemies, masters of the angle of the two roads,
advanced upon us by both routes ; they had filled the inter
mediate ground with tirailleurs, and a fire of small arms
commenced on all sides.

346 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Our troops were scattered: several detachments were
occupied in covering the working parties at the different and
very distant bridges. The 200 men at the bridge of La
Molinella were not disposable ; 500 were still at Bigarello,
200 at the Due Castelli. If the enemy were to pass by
one of these roads, he would cut our line, but the confidence
and the courage of the troops did not allow us to be for a
moment uneasy respecting our position.
We collected the troops that we had left. St. Hilaire
pushed forward by the left hand road. Beaumont en
deavoured to make his way over the broken ground in the
centre, and Charton proceeded along the right hand road,
but with so few men that each of them had really nothing
but tirailleurs. I learned in a moment that Charton had been
killed by a discharge of grape. I ordered Beaumont, who
was proceeding to this right hand road to cheer the troops
whom the ravage of the grape-shot had daunted, to be called
back. One piece of light artillery was taken to each of the
roads, and a great number of horses of the enemy's cuirassiers
were killed. They fell back : our troops then advanced, but
presently it was their turn to fall back. There were several
such alternations from three in the afternoon, when the action
commenced, to seven in the evening. I sent successively
reinforcements of twenty-five or thirty men on either side,
in proportion as the return of detachments strengthened
my reserve.
Thus Wurmser appeared to be kept in check by our
advanced posts, which were supported : the enemy must
have supposed that we were in force in the village. General
Kilmaine's column, which arrived at ten o'clock the pre
ceding night and started in the morning according to fresh
orders, must have misled the enemy ; he imagined that we
were 10,000 men, as I was told; the truth is that the
troops opposed to him were under 1000.
But it was not without loss that our brave fellows thus
baffled Wurmser, reinforced by part of the garrison of
Mantua : we had at least 300 men killed or wounded, in
cluding those of the 12th demi-brigade of light infantry,
with the chief of brigade Dugoulot at their head. He was
ordered with 250 men to throw himself upon the right flank
of the enemy's cavalry ; this detachment ventured impru
dently into a plain, of which Dugoulot, wounded, was no
longer master: it would have charged the squadrons of the

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 347
cuirassiers which were there, but it was crushed by that
cavalry. All that were not killed are prisoners ; and I
hope Dugoulot is among the number.
On the other hand, the ground which the enemy occu
pied is strewed with carcases of men and horses. We have
taken but eight prisoners : forty chasseurs whom I had
could not pursue the enemy when he retreated.
General Kilmaine, who arrived at nine in the evening,
gave me fifty horse, who pushed on for three or four miles,
that is to say to Ronco-Ferraro, before which the enemy
bivouacked. I received at the same hour a letter from Murat, in
forming me of the arrival of the advanced guard of our army
at Nogaro ; and I immediately apprized him that I should
return to my post agreeably to your instructions. It was
agreed with General Kilmaine that he should endeavour to
retain for our army the passage by Castellaro, or the enemy
might come and occupy my position, for the purpose of
defending it against our army which was coming in pursuit
of him. I set out at ten in the evening, and arrived at
Goito, bringing all back in the best order.
It is not without reason that I have every where said we
instead of i". All the measures that I took were assented
to or dictated by Generals Beaumont and St. Hilaire, by
the brave Charton before his death, and by the brave and
honest Abbe, whom I charged from the commencement with
all the details of the division, who escaped twenty times the
grape of the right and of the left, and who is, as I am told,
a lieutenant in I know not what demi-brigade.
Motdier, chief of battalion of engineers ; N  , quarter
master of the 1st regiment of light artillery, who commanded
the howitzer on the left and had six horses killed by the
grape-shot ; N. . . ., chief of battalion of the 19th infantry ;
the thousand men who were in the fight, whose names I
should be glad to know, have all done wonders.
I beg your permission to keep with me Razout, Charton's
aide-de-camp, and Gardeur, formerly aide-de-camp of General
Causae, who have rendered the greatest services. I am
obliged also to name to you Croisier and Cabanes, both cap
tains in the 25th chasseurs, who have executed the recon
naissances with which I charged them with the utmost pos
sible intelligence. Sahuguet.

348 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Head -quarters, Porto Legnago,
27 Fructidor, year 4 [September 13, 1796].
During the ever active and uninterrupted campaigns of
four years, I have been struggling with the inconveniences
of a shattered constitution. I did hope that palliatives
would bring me to the moment when peace would permit me
to think of repose : the fatigues of the last march have
overthrown that hope, and I find myself assailed by so many
complaints at once that I am compelled to renounce for a
time the continuance of my service. The piles ebsolutely
forbid riding ; almost universal rheumatic pains, and my
chest, which has been long affected, have thrown me into a
state that is almost intolerable. It is painful for me thus
to leave the work of war incomplete at the moment when it
is terminating, but it is consolatory to my heart to have
worn out my faculties, ruined my health, destroyed my con
stitution, in serving my country. Nobody has served it
with greater zeal, or has with greater regret found himself
compelled to suspend his labours. I hope, general, that
you are convinced of all this.
I leave the command of the division to the general of
brigade Bon ; but I engage to send you an officer who will
have your confidence. That general of brigade who would
be qualified to command it is of the shortest standing, and
that would not do.
I am going to Brescia or Milan, whence, if I can recruit
myself, I will return and resume my functions as soon as
possible.
Augereau.

To General Bonaparte.
Trent, 1st complementary day, year 4 [September 17, 1796].
I have been at Trent, my dear general, for these two
hours, and shall return to my post immediately. We have
repulsed the enemy this morning, and taken a hundred and
odd prisoners. This little affair over, I am come to Trent
to make the council, heretofore aulic, take the oath authen
tically. By the 7th article of the order which you have left at
Trent, one Lingui Cheluzzi, a Tuscan, finds himself in the

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 349
predicament to be obliged to quit Trent in twenty-four
hours. He appears to be regretted by the municipality and
by the inhabitants ; but he calls the council, or part of the
council, rascals ; is he right ? I know nothing about it.
It has appeared to me that the best understanding does
not prevail between the council and the municipality. I
have ordered the commandant of the place to watch the
conduct of both narrowly, in order to discover in which
confidence may be put. I will acquaint you with all that
I discover. I cannot help following the 7th article of your
order ; but if Lingui Oheluzzi, whom you are acquainted
with, deserves an exception, you will be pleased to let me

know.

Vaubois.

To General Bonaparte.
Paris, 3rd complementary day, year 4 [September 19, 1796].
We awaited, my dear general, with an impatience which
you may easily imagine, the result of the action for which
you had prepared us by your preceding courier. We have
just received your last accounts, and, though accustomed to
the most extraordinary things on your part, our hopes have
been surpassed by the victory of Bassano. What glory
for you, immortal Bonaparte ! What a blow for proud
Austria ! She would not raise her head after it, if all our
armies were as successful as that of Italy ; but the mise
rable retreat of Jourdan disconcerts all our plans. The
army of the Rhine and Moselle, which was going to give
you the hand, has found itself compromised, nearly cut off,
obliged to fall back precipitately to defend its flank, and it
will require all the skill of Moreau to get it out of the
scrape. However, Beurnonville, who succeeds Jourdan, is
coming with a considerable reinforcement ; he is about to
resume the offensive, and I hope that the end of all this
will be the general discomfiture of Prince Charles's army.
From this nothing less will result than that we shall be
deprived of the resources of Bavaria, that your left is no
lono-er supported, that we shall have great difficulty to send
you succours equivalent to the column that should have
joined you by way of Inspruck. It is in your energy then
that we shall find new means. Push on to Trieste, if you
think that your right is safe, and are easy about your rear ;

350 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
raise heavy contributions in the Friule, and threaten the
emperor with the destruction of his only port if he does not
make haste to accept peace : but it must come to that if he
is obstinate. Recollect that, as soon as winter-quarters are
taken on the Rhine, he will have a great disposable force,
which he will not fail to employ against you, and that this
is one reason for not involving yourself, without being
certain of the gorges of the Tyrol.
Carnot.

To His Majesty the King of Sardinia.
Head-quarters, Milan,
5th complementary day, year 4 [September 21, 1796].
The officers appointed by your Majesty to command in
the part of your dominions that has been restored to you
view, if not with pleasure, at least with indifference, the
murders and robberies committed against the French.
By the treaty of peace concluded between your Majesty
and the French Republic, the Republic was to continue to
occupy that part of the territories which had been given up
to the army by the treaty of armistice. Conceiving that I
should do something agreeable to your Majesty, I restored
to you not only the civil government but also the military
government, with the special clause that the roads should
be guarded, and that even our convoys should be escorted
by your troops.
I therefore request that your Majesty will be pleased
to order a corps of respectable troops to be kept in the vil
lages of Limon and Limonais, which should send out
patroles as far as Lacas, escorting convoys, and taking all
necessary measures for making that road safe, as well as
Vadier, and generally in all the districts bordering on De-
mont, forming the communication between Coni and Bar-
celonetta. I likewise request of your Majesty that the five persons
who have been apprehended at Borgo-San-Dalmazzo by
the French, may be delivered into tho hands of the military
commandant at Coni.
I beg of you also to give orders to your different gover
nors to exert themselves heartily for the apprehension of
the banditti wherever they are found.
Independently of the interest of humanity and justice,

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 351
your Majesty will give, by this conduct, a proof of your
sincerity, and contribute to extinguish those germs of dis
cord, which would ultimately spread into the heart of your
Majesty's territories.
Bonaparte.

To the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the King of Sardinia.
Head-quarters, Milan,
5th complementary day, year 4 [September 21,1796].
I am no diplomatist, sir, I am a soldier : you will for
give my frankness. In different parts of his Majesty's
dominions, the French are murdered, robbed. By the
treaty of peace, the king, who is bound to grant us a pas
sage through his territories, ought to make it safe for us ;
and it is to this end alone that, contrary to the tenour of
the treaty of peace, I have taken it upon myself to restore
to his Majesty not only the civil government but likewise
the military government in that part of his dominions
which has been restored to him by the Republic. At Vine),
at Limon, before the face of the garrison of Demont, and
that of the corps of troops commanded by M. Fan char at
Borgo-San-Dalmazzo, outrages are daily committed which
appear to be not merely tolerated but even encouraged by
the government.
I shall therefore request of you a simple explanation.
1. Ought not the king to be expected to indemnify and
make good the losses sustained in consequence of crimes
committed in his, territories against the French, when those
crimes are committed in broad day, and by paid bodies of
two or three hundred persons ?
2. Is the king, with 25,000 men whom he has under
arms, strong enough to quell banditti in his dominions and
to enforce respect for the laws of justice, of humanity, and
of treaties ?
People judge of men, sir, by their actions alone : the in
tegrity of the king is universally known ; yet one is almost
forced to think that there are political reasons which cause
atrocities so revolting to be encouraged or at least tolerated.
I have written to his Majesty himself; 1 request you to
present my letter to him. The French government will
never do any thing openly or secretly tending to destroy or
to weaken the effect of the king's government upon his

352 letters and despatches.
subjects ; you are aware, nevertheless, that this would be not
less easy than successful. The very day that you sincerely
set about destroying the banditti who infest our communi
cation between Coni and Barcelonetta, they will cease to
exist. I beg you to believe me, &c. BONAPARTE.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Pavia,
5th complementary day, year 4 [September 21, 1796].
I am writing you to-day a military and a political letter.
I have made the council of Trent take the oath ; it has
done so with a good grace ; and received it from the other
subordinate authorities. There is a strongly marked and
malignant division between the inhabitants, and it cannot
but lead to public disturbances. Who is right ? who is
wrong ? This is what I cannot yet form any sound judg
ment upon. The podesta, concerning whom I wrote to
you, sides with the municipality ; but he is obliged to leave
Trent : I await your answer on that subject. He has a
great many partisans among the people ; that tells in his
favour. The council has for one of its members a certain count,
whom I somewhat mistrust : but there are other members,
and one in particular, who are reputed to have been fond
of our revolution ever since its birth : all these members
were, nevertheless, nominated by the prince-bishop, and the
municipality by the people.
One observation has been made to me by divers inhabitants,
whom I believe to be well disposed : they see with pain
that the council has no authority above it : they dread
tyranny, and are apprehensive that the spirit of party will
direct their determinations.
They would wish you to nominate three persons who
have your confidence, of whose way of thinking you are
sure, and who will attend to their business. I submit their
wishes to you. Vaubois.
To the General-in-Chief.
Rome, 1 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 22, 1796].
I have the honour to send you annexed a copy of the
letter which I transmitted yesterday to the secretary of state.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 353
Some persons doubt the authenticity of the letter of the
King of Naples to the pope, a copy of which I sent you ;
however, it is not formally contradicted. I am left here
without any person to write to me, or to give me any hint
about it. I should be glad to have a word from you.
It seems to me that the pope cannot get out of trouble
without sending a cardinal ambassador to Paris to sign
everything. He is very loth to come to this determina
tion. If the 2,000,000 which were despatched hence three
weeks ago have not arrived at lmola or Bologna, their pro
gress must have been delayed.
I beg you, citizen-general-in-chief, to accept my attach-
ment- Cacault.
PS. 1 have this moment received the accompanying
bulletin, which reports a movement of Neapolitan troops
that have already arrived at Ripatransone, in the ecclesias
tical territory, marching towards Ancona. I cannot think
that at this moment the government of Venice dare enter
into a league with the emperor, the pope, and the King of
Naples ; yet that is what people talk of. The fools call
this league " the last resource of Italy."
I have sent to ask the pope's secretary for foreign affairs
whether he had received any intelligence of this movement
of the Neapolitans, as he cannot fail to have done, if it is
true. The answer this moment is — Nothing new on that
subject. Perhaps accounts may be received by and by.

To General Bonaparte.
Verona, 1 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 22, 1796].
It is a long time, general, since I had the honour to
write to you concerning the very suspicious conduct of the
cabinet of Turin towards the French Republic. I dare say
that at this moment you are thoroughly informed of the
manoeuvres of that cabinet, and of the real aim proposed to
themselves by the ministers of Vienna and England re
siding at Turin.
The circumstances daily occurring are so many motives
for leading one to presume that this king will not keep the
peace any longer than the force which has compelled him
vol. I. A A

354 letters and despatches.
to make it shall exist. Here are some of them extracted
from the report dated the 30th Fructidor last.
The club of the aristocrats meeting at Turin in the house
of Sales is still conspiring against our patriots and the
invincible army of Italy. In Piedmont there has been or
ganized a Vendee of 1600 men, half in the valley of Aosta,
and half on the Col de Tende. Their principal object is to
slaughter our brave brothers in arms in detail. For some
days past, they have been murdering all who pass, and the
assassins have the temerity to come to Turin to sell the
arms and clothes of the unfortunate victims.
The chiefs of these banditti are the Marquis Caluso and
M. Genosio, a clerk in the great Tobacco office. The ban
ditti are paid by the king at the rate of 20 sous per day.
To arm these scoundrels, stores have been taken from the
royal arsenals, and in no small quantity.
Four companies of free chasseurs of the night patrol have
been dissolved for the purpose of being incorporated in this
band. Letters have been sent all over the country de
claring that all the French are infected with the plague and
ought to be put to death ; otherwise Piedmont will be
ruined. These letters were despatched by the club at the
time of the last affair which the French had with the Aus
trians. The Duke de Chablais said on this occasion : " If
the French have been successful this time, they will not be
so a second."
Not an emigrant has yet left Piedmont, and they inso
lently wear there all the devices of royalty. Giraud, Cheva
lier Rousset, Rotondo, and several others, imprisoned for
their political opinions, are still languishing in fetters.
The Austrian prisoners, whom the French send through
Piedmont on their way to France, are seduced by agents
paid by the government, who conceal them from the French
escort, and then send them to the Swiss regiments in the
pay of the tyrant. Pico.1
To the General-in-Chief.
Verona, 1 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 22, 1796].
Till now, nobody has been stirring to pick up information
towards the Friule : I have placed a man at Udine to give
us intelligence of the movements of the enemy.
1 A Piedmontese, employed as a secret agent.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 355
The man whom I sent to Mantua entered the place, and
reports to me that the whole of the enemy's troops in that
quarter amount to 15,000 infantry and 6500 cavalry, of
whom 6 or 7000 are sick. There are four military hos
pitals : one in the convent of Santa Barbara, near the gate
of St. George ; another at Santo Spirito, a convent of re
formed ; a third at Santa Catarina — last two near the Ceresa
gate ; the fourth and last at Santo Barnaba, near the Pus-
terla gate.
There are three hay-magazines : one in the palace of the
Marquis Lanzoni ; a second in the Domismondi palace —
both situated in the street of Santo Christophoro ; and the
third, which is the largest, at la Trinita, nearly in the
centre of the city. These magazines are almost empty ;
forage is expected to arrive by the Po, and they will en
deavour to introduce it by the Ceresa gate. At St. Gervais,
in the Gonzaga palace, near the Molina gate, there is a
magazine of oats tolerably well provided.
There are also two powder-magazines in the city : one is
in the church of Santo Sebastiano, near the Pusterla gate,
and the other in the church of Santo Nicolo, between the
Ceresa gate and the Catena gate. The latter is the more
considerable. It has been observed to me that the post of Rivalta, by
which the spies coming from the Tyrol introduce themselves
into Mantua, ought to be guarded. Pico.

To General Bonaparte.
Verona, 2 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 23, 1796].
I inform you, citizen-general, that, in the evening of the
day before yesterday, the 2000 men who were at Pordenone
arrived at Sacile. A corps of 200 infantry and 1 00 cavalry
has also arrived at Porto Buffole, and a third detachment
has proceeded to Molta. Pico.

To General Bonaparte.
Verona, 3 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 24, 1796].
The enemy have advanced from Sacile to Treviso : from
that place they sent two corps, one to Castel Franco,
A A 2

356 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
which has sent patroles to Citadella and to the environs of
Bassano ; the other to Novate, which has detached patroles
to Padua and the environs.
I am assured that the whole army of 23,000 men, which
is to keep on the defensive on the side towards Trieste, has
received orders to act in concert with that which is in the
environs of Bolzano, and which may be about 12,000 strong.
The first is commanded by General Colli, the second by
General Loudon.
One Nicolino, an innkeeper in Brescia, who has a brother
in the Berchini hussars, has written to me, applying for pay
ment, of, lstly, 490 francs in money, expended by your order
for secret correspondence in that quarter, a note of which
I sent you some time since; 2ndly, 12 sequins, which he
says he laid out at the time of the discovery, ten or twelve
days ago, of the pharmacie of the Austrians, which was
concealed in the custom-house of Brescia. Pico.

To General Bonaparte.
Rome, 3 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 24, 1796].
The reply of the commissioner Salicetti, who sends me
word that, all things considered, he thinks that the com
missioners of the arts had better return to Florence, deter
mined them to set out yesterday evening. I have written
to the cardinal secretary of state to apprise him that the
commissioners were going to make an excursion in Tuscany,
which would be no detriment whatever to the operations
agreed on for the armistice. I send you herewith the an
swer made me by Cardinal Busca in sending their passport,
and his reply to my preceding notes.
I called upon him this morning to have a fuller verbal
explanation with him. This Milanese cardinal, having his
fortune at Milan, is imbued, it is true, with the spirit that
animates the congregations and the pope, but he is aware
that he must keep terms with us : hence I have no reason
but to speak well of him at present. The result of our
conversation is, that the Roman and papal government,
which, in fact, is preserved as much as possible by the pro
posed treaty, seems to his holiness and to all the cardinals
to be destroyed and annihilated, if they accept such con
ditions. Accordingly, the court of Rome is determined,

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 357
without hope of return, to persist in the refusal to sign,
notified at Florence by M. Caleppi.
As it is asserted here that the Directory has notified to
M. Pieracchi that, if the pope did not sign the conditions,
every thing would be upon a war footing again, the govern
ment is directing its whole attention to defensive measures,
seeking to arm a great number of men and to make
alliances. It is alleged to be too clear and too manifest that France
must treat this country in a hostile manner, otherwise the
pope will, in spite of the armistice, refuse to deliver the pro
mised contributions. In consequence, the cardinal secre
tary of state has signified to me verbally that the execution
of the armistice, in so far as relates to the delivery of the
productions of art and of the contributions, was suspended ;
but that, for the rest, one may be sure that the pope will
not break the treaty by any hostility.
I have perceived clearly enough that he was ready to
notify to me in writing this suspension of the execution of
the armistice and its motives, hoping that in consequence I
should decide upon retiring to Florence, until the definitive
solution of the difficulties.
Notwithstanding the sternness of my behaviour, which,
in reality, cannot give rise to any suspicion of understand
ing with what is here called our party, and which I am not
acquainted with, our enemies, who can find nothing else to
allege against me, are alarmed at the danger of my stay at
Rome, as if I were a person to excite disturbances, like a
harebrained enthusiast. Hence, out of stupidity, and not
to be annoyed by the sight of any Frenchman here, the
pope and his ministers would be glad to see me set off.
The cattle, selected by the commissioners for improving
the breeds in France, yet remain to be sent off: they will
start to-morrow for Bologna.
Though I know full well and officially that the produc
tions of art will not be despatched, I shall let the commis
sioners, whose labours are not yet interrupted, proceed with
packing the statues in cases, and with the construction of
carriages for transporting them ; and, without contrary
orders, I shall remain as long as I can to observe Naples
and this country, but it cannot be for any long time. I see
no hope of inducing the pope to sign the proposed treaty,
or even to negociate with submission for the mitigation of

358 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
certain articles : he is so dragooned that he is really to be
pitied. The secretary of state assured me that he had no intel
ligence that the Neapolitan troops had advanced into the
Ecclesiastical State, that he was merely informed of the
army of Naples, which is on the frontier.
It is true that the court of Naples has ordered a decla
ration to be made here, that the negociation with the French
Republic forbade it to engage at the present moment against
it. That court is sending to Rome the Marquis del Vasto,
grand-master of the king's household, to make proposals for
treating. He is expected every moment.
The exasperation of minds in all the tyrannies and aris
tocracies of Italy against our power, dominant and extorting
in proportion, renders it necessary to have forces decisive
and to be relied on. More than 16,000,000 inhabitants
might rise at once against us ; it is this that is contem
plated — it is this that is hoped.
I delivered to the commissioners, on their departure for
Florence, all the very detailed maps of the kingdom of
Naples as yet engraved from Zanoni's surveys. This col
lection they will forward to you from Florence as soon as
possible. Cacault.
PS. They are raising a great outcry here on account of
the ransom demanded for Cardinal Mattei.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte,
commanding the Army of Italy.
Paris, 4th complementary day, year 4 [September 20, 1796].
The army which you command, citizen-general, has
completely justified our hopes in the course of this cam
paign ; but it seems to have surpassed them by the new
successes which you have reported to us. The result of the
actions of the 21st and the 22d Fructidor is as glorious as it
is unparalleled, and, if Wurmser should even contrive to
escape from your pursuit with his wretched wrecks, which
is not probable, we must consider the discomfiture of his
army as entire, and the conquest of Italy as irrevocable.
Let the republican army, citizen-general, enjoy the prize
that is justly reserved for it by the public gratitude and

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 359
esteem, after such signal triumphs : express to it our par
ticular satisfaction ; and accept yourself the distinguished
part of it which is your due.
Among the measures which we have adopted for the pur
pose of following up our advantages, and rendering them
decisive in favour of the Republic, whose interests all tend
to peace, the first is, to signify to the emperor, that, unless
he consents to send immediately to Paris an envoy fur
nished with powers to enter into negociation, you will de
stroy his port of Trieste and all his establishments on the
Adriatic Sea. As soon as the fate of Wurmser and his
last division is decided, you will send a despatch to Vienna
to make this notification, and you will march upon Trieste,
ready to execute a threat, justified by the laws of war and
the obstinacy of a haughty house, which dares attempt
every thing against the Republic, and sports with its
sincerity. During this movement you will continue to effect the
dispersion of the remnant of the Austrians scattered in the
Tyrol ; you will establish a safe communication between
the army of the Rhine and Moselle ; and you will impose
heavy contributions wherever the French arms penetrate.
It is to be presumed that, when you are at a distance
from the Milanese, such of the inhabitants of the interior
of Italy as are ill-affected towards us will seize the oppor
tunity to foment new revolts. Repress beforehand the ex
plosion of their perfidious designs, by giving the generals,
to whom you commit the safety of the troops and of the
countries which they occupy, precise orders, and by speci
fying to them the salutary measures which they will have
to take according to circumstances.
As to the political situation of Italy, one principal ob
servation fixes our attention, and ought to direct your con
duct in regard to the different States or towns which may
desire to give themselves a government, which is that peace,
our highest wish, may depend on the iot of the Milanese,
and that it behoves us to husband the means of exchange,
in order to consolidate the union of certain parts of the
territory of the Republic. It is, therefore, essential not to
favour indiscreetly political innovations detrimental to the
conclusion of peace and to the corroboration of our liberty.
The moment appears to have at length arrived for chas
tising Venice by the measures which we have already pre-

360 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
scribed to you, and the execution of which a prudent caution
has induced us to defer. Lay due stress on the legitimacy
of your pretensions ; use conciliatory forms as far as they
are capable of accomplishing your object ; and then, if it be
necessary, let the means of victory follow proceedings con
formable to the neutrality which we wish to maintain with
that State, after the just satisfaction that we have a right
to require of it.
L. M. Reveillere-Lepaux, President.

To the General-in- Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 4th complementary day, year 4 [September 20, 1796].
We approve, citizen-general, the proposal which you
make us to accede to the wishes of the Milanese, which is
desirous of forming battalions to be employed in the blockade
of Mantua, since you find in it no inconveniences in a
military point of view ; but, in adopting this measure, it is
essential to observe that our laws do not allow us to intro
duce foreign corps into our armies : so the battalions of the
Milanese shall be considered as distinct troops from those
of the Republic, and which have a common enemy to com
bat, though on this head nothing shall be stipulated with
the Milanese.
A consideration has been submitted to us, respecting
which we wish to havo your opinion. While you are pro
secuting the plan of operations, which we have chalked out
in our first despatch of this day, is it not dangerous to leave
the Piedmontese troops in superiority of force in Italy ;
and would it not be advisable to induce the King of Sar
dinia, by the concession of some advantages, to send 15,000
men to march in concert with the army which you com
mand? We do not presume that the King of Sardinia will readily
acquiesce in this proposal : whatever may be the acknow
ledged honour of the French nation, he will be afraid to
strip his territories of troops, and thereby deliver them
up defenceless to his allies, whom perhaps he still dreads.
Be this as it may, notwithstanding the inconveniences
which we imagine that we can perceive, we authorize you to
treat on this subject with the court of Turin, if you see any
advantage in it, and to give it all the guarantees necessary

LETTERS and despatches. 361
for its safety. If this negociation comes to nothing, it will
be very useful to make sure of the disarming of Piedmont,
as it has been stipulated in the treaty of peace, in order
that you may not leave behind you any subject of uneasiness
that might distract your movements.
The same attention ought to be paid to the court of
Naples : at the present moment we can only watch it and
control it at a distance. Our most important object is to
strike at the house of Austria, and to march upon Trieste.
Fix a short time for the answer of the court of Vienna to
your declaration, in order not to lose time, which the ap
proach of the bad season renders more valuable.
We have received from citizen Salicetti intelligence of
happy augury for the success of our designs respecting
Corsica.
L. M. Reveillere-Lepaux, President.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 4th complementary day, year 4 [September 20, 1796].
We have received, citizen-general, a remonstrance sent
from Mondovi, the value of which you are much more
capable of appreciating than we. The complaint is that, in
spite of the amnesty, the Piedmontese patriots, who have
declared in favour of France, are still persecuted by the
Sardinian government, and among others by one Moschetti.
It is alleged that the line of demarcation which determines
the Piedmontese possessions that our troops are to occupy
till the peace, is frequently broken, and that, ever since the
month of Messidor, there have been Sardinian troops at
Mondovi. Complaints are most especially made of the ex
treme licentiousness practised with impunity by our soldiers
and by some of their officers in those parts of the con
quered" countries in which they are distributed. It is
added, that an inevitable consequence of this relaxation of
discipline is, that the inhabitants, victims of the excesses
of their conquerors, are continually murdering those on
whom they cannot otherwise revenge themselves. Perhaps
there may be exaggeration in these complaints ; but several
particular facts have already proved that they are not
without foundation. The Directory, citizen-general, be
seeches you, therefore, to give all the orders necessary for

362 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
putting a stop to these horrible acts of vengeance, and above
all for preventing the cause of them. All the officers under
your command ought to be worthy of the signal successes
which you are continually obtaining over the enemy ; and
we know that you will not allow men who dishonour the
Republic to remain in the army, when its triumphs, owing
to your talents and its valour, so highly exalt its glory.
L. M. Reveillere-Lepaux, President.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 4 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 25, 1796].
We awaited with confidence, citizen-general, the tidings
which you had announced to us by the courier who pre
ceded him of the 30th Fructidor, and they were, in fact,
very satisfactory, though the success which you report to
us was not so complete as we had a right to hope from the
precision and the boldness of your dispositions. The defeat
of Wurmser under the walls of Mantua has avenged the
brave army of Italy for his escape from its pursuit at the
passage of the Adige and the Brenta, and all that it has left
to do to crown its glory is to bring that place under the
power of the Republic, with the wrecks of the Austrian army
shut up in it. To accomplish this object, not only is it
necessary not to leave any thing to chance, but the recent
events that have occurred in Germany command us to set
every thing at work to prevent the arrival of the troops
which the Austrians might send to the relief of Mantua.
How important soever may be the operation which we have
prescribed upon Trieste, it is still more essential to consoli
date the conquest of Italy by the reduction of the first of
those two places, and we recommend to you to employ all
your means to that end, with the boldness and activity
which direct all your enterprises. Certainly, it were to be
wished that your march upon Trieste could be effected at
the same time, and it is to be feared that the season will not
permit you to undertake it till Mantua has surrendered ; but
we repeat that we think that we ought to sacrifice this
advantage to the necessity of closing the door of Italy against
the Austrian reinforcements, and remaining masters of it at
the end of the campaign.
We are fully persuaded that you feel all the force of our

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 363
motives in not leaving any thing to the chances of fortune.
Tt is in Italy that we must indemnify ourselves for our re
verses in Germany, and force the emperor to peace : it is,
therefore, necessary to render our military position there
impregnable. Without analyzing here the causes of the checks in
Germany, we shall merely inform you that the army of the
Sambre and Meuse has successively abandoned the Rednitz,
the Mayn, and the Lahn, and that it has fallen back, part
upon Dusseldorf, part behind the Rhine. General Beurnon-
ville, who had assumed the command, and reinforced it
with a considerable corps from that of the North, announces
that he is about to move it forward, and we hope that he
will march with sufficient celerity to prevent the greater
part of the enemy's forces from falling upon the army of the
Rhine and Moselle, and obliging that to retreat too. In
the contrary supposition, it is to be concluded that the
enemy will afterwards march reinforcements into the Tyrol ;
and it is this consideration which induces us to desire you
to regard the reduction of Mantua as an object to which
you ought to sacrifice at this moment every other operation.
The dislike of the Germans to our troops, occasioned by
indiscipline, and the consequences that have resulted from
it, give us a new and a melancholy warning how fatal to the
glory of an army is laxity in the exercise of military au
thority, from rank to rank, and how important it is to gain
the inhabitants of the theatre of war by the maintenance of
good order.
But it is not enough for us to prevent their becoming our
enemies ; we must render them such towards their old
government, and sow the seeds of insurrection even in the
countries to which our armies have not yet penetrated.
This observation applies particularly to Hungary, where
political principles, deep-rooted among the higher and lower
nobility and the different classes of the people, render the
Austrian yoke more heavy. Circulate there, in the native
language, proclamations the energy of which shall awaken
the pride of the Hungarians and their ancient hatred of
their oppressors. The fame of your successes and of French
honour will beget a confidence in your promises, and per
haps excite in them a desire to reconquer their independence :
the court of Vienna, at least, will be alarmed, and tho re-

364 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
sources of all kinds which it derives from that kingdom
will diminish in proportion to its fears.
We are going to receive with lively satisfaction the
colours which aide-de-camp Marmont has brought, and we pro
pose to grant to the brave men who have lately distinguished
themselves the rewards which you have solicited for them.
We request you to express to the army, and particularly to
the general officers and others who have been wounded, the
satisfaction which we have received from their devotedness.
L. M. Reveillere-Lepaux, President.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 6 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 26, 1796].
We think it useful to transmit to you, citizen -general,
by an extraordinary courier, a letter which we have just
received from the general-in-chief, Moreau : it will make
you acquainted with the position in which the army of the
Rhine and Moselle is at this moment. We hope that
it will maintain itself on the banks of the Danube till that
of the Sambre and Meuse can resume "the offensive, and,
aided by the efforts which this latter will immediately make,
it shall again advance to the banks of the Lech, and even
to those of the Iser, for the purpose of taking its winter-
quarters there.
In this state of things we fear that the enemy, quitting
the army of the Sambre and Meuse, may for a moment
bring to bear some force against that of the Rhine and
Moselle, in order to mask with the greater certainty a
movement, the object of which would be to make a dash
upon you with all the disposable troops, to oblige you to
raise the siege of Mantua ; and we think it useful to recom
mend to you to guard with care the debouches of the Tyrol,
at the same time levying in that country all the contribu
tions you can, till the bad season intercepts them and forbids
any enterprise against you from that side. The attention
of Austria is almost exclusively turned to Mantua. That
city, which the court of Vienna considers as the last bulwark
of Italy, contains the wrecks of General Wurmser's army,
and it is to be presumed that the emperor will make every
effort to relieve it.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 365
Strive then, citizen-general, to finish this campaign in Italy
with the reduction of that place, to which the fate of this
peninsula is in some measure attached. Continue to cor
respond frequently with the general-in-chief Moreau, that
the harmony of your movements may awe the enemies of the
Republic, whom the conquest of Italy has astonished, and
who will find themselves compelled to think seriously of
peace, when they shall be certain that this country, de
fended by talent, courage, and strength, cannot be wrung
from us, and that the brave army of Italy and its chief,
who have conquered, leave them no hope of recovering it.
The last sums sent to the army of the Alps were
absorbed immediately, and part has been employed for
absolutely indispensable expenses incurred for the con
duct of numerous prisoners of war taken by the army of
Italy. It is with regret that we inform you, citizen -general, that
it is impossible for the national treasury to supply the
urgent wants of the army of the Alps ; which the slight
aid sent by you has not yet been able to place in a satisfac
tory situation. We recommend to you to consider this
army as forming in some measure part of that which is
under your orders, and we request you to provide for all its
necessities, concerting with the general-in-chief who com
mands it. Your zeal is known to us, and we know that it
is sufficient to point out to you the way to be useful to
your country, to be persuaded that you will be eager to
pursue it. L. M. Reveillere-Lepaux, President.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 8 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 29, 1796],
Our commissioners with the army of Italy have reported
to us, citizen-general, the refusal given on the part of the
pope to accept the conditions of peace that we have sub
mitted to him. Our intention is not to modify them ;
but, as it is important to finish the campaign with the re
duction of Mantua, in order to dictate with the greater
assurance laws in southern Italy, and it is useful meanwhile
not to break the armistice which you have concluded, we
are instructing our commissioners to prolong the negocia-

366 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
tion till such time as we shall be able imperatively to com
mand peace to Rome or to overthrow its power.
General Beurnonville has made a movement in advance
of the Sieg; Prince Charles is before him. The campaign
is recommencing in that part of the theatre of war with
hope of suceess, and General Moreau, who supports him
self upon Ulm and Bregentz, likewise gives us hopes that
he will maintain his ground in Suabia, till a decided offen
sive is re-established on the left of our line of operations.
Some corps from the Tyrol have attempted to annoy his
right flank and been repulsed.
We are hastening the marching of a reinforcement of
about 10,000 men, which we destine for you. Every day
the conquest of Italy appears likely to turn the balance of
political interests more and more in our favour ; its conso
lidation is involved in the taking of Mantua, and we give
you all the means in our power for finishing the campaign
with that decided advantage.
L. M. Reveillere-Lepaux.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.
Paris, 10 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 1, 1796].
You will find annexed, citizen-general, a decree relative
to Wurmser : that hostile general, whom you have beaten
so often, and who is very near his last defeat, in the place
which you are besieging, falls under the laws of the Re
public relative to emigrants. We leave you to judge
whether it is advisable to communicate to him this decree,
in order to induce him to surrender Mantua, by exciting in
him a dread of being sent to Paris and there tried as an
emigrant, if he holds out to the last extremity, and by
offering him an honourable capitulation if he consents to
deliver up that place to you. It appears to us that this
alternative must startle him ; and whatever confidence we
may have in the important operation in which you are
engaged, we ought not to neglect any of the legitimate
means which ean be useful against an obstinate army ; but
if you think, from a particular knowledge of the state of
things, that this communication would produce a contrary
effect and urge Wurmser to make a desperate defence,
instead of suffering himself to be overcome by personal

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 367
fear, you will not make any use of the decree, and we rely
upon the force of our arms and the talent which distin
guishes them to accelerate the taking of Mantua, to which
we attach the highest value. L. M. Reveillere-Lepaux.

To General Bonaparte.
Roverbello, 4 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 25, 1796].
I learn this moment, general, that the enemy yesterday
attacked Porto-Legnago : what is the result of that attack,
and what the force of the enemy, I know not ; neither do
Generals Massena and Kilmaine. I immediately despatched
fifty chasseurs of the 10th for Porto Legnago, by way of
Castellara, Nogara, and Sanguinetto. The officer com
manding this reconnaissance has orders to push on till he
falls in with the enemy, or can inform me of his force and
his position.
General Kilmaine sends word that General Bon has
marched upon Castellara with his division, and that he has
orders to break down all the bridges across the Tanaro.
I shall send out continual patroles upon Isola until I
have received some intelligence.
I see with pain, general, that prisoners continue to be
escorted with culpable indifference and almost without pre
cautions. Yesterday, from 7 to 800 prisoners were com
mitted to the charge of eight dragoons, from the Due Castelli
to Roverbello, and without one foot soldier. They were
conducted yesterday to Peschiera by thirty horse chasseurs
only, and without infantry : it is nevertheless high time to
take precautions. I know from good authority that a corps
is forming entirely of deserters in the Val Trompia, and
that every day, three or four boat-loads of these deserters
are sent across Lake Iseo to increase the nucleus collecting
in the Val Trompia.
The corps descending from Padua is estimated at 10,000
men. Some volunteers complained bitterly yesterday under
my windows that the prisoners of whom this new army was
partly composed were suffered to escape : they nevertheless
flatter themselves that they shall beat them and see them
better guarded in future.

368 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
I learn too from a letter written at Venice that a body
of Hungarians has already arrived at Trieste.
The inhabitants of Bergamo, out of gratitude for not
having had a French garrison, have given an entertainment
to the governor of the town, who has ordered a young man
of Brescia, named Lechi, to leave Bergamo immediately,
for having published in a coffee-house the news of your
triumphs far from agreeable to the country, and treated
there as a falsehood.
You are no doubt aware that the prisoners who desert
are favoured in the whole of the Bergamasco by the consti
tuted authorities. You are already informed of this ; but I
am too much attached to your glory and your person not to
communicate to you every particular that I can pick up
respecting the proceedings and the intentions of our

a
enemies.

Murat.

To the General-in-Chief.
Florence, 4 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 25, 1796].
Garrau must have informed you, general, of the pope's
answer. H e has refused to accept the conditions which the
Executive Directory offered him through us.
The successes which you have lately obtained are so
splendid, that to me it appears impossible for the emperor
to think of opposing an army to you in Italy : but Jourdan's
reverses in Germany, if as disastrous as they are reported
to be, must throw the Executive Directory into great em
barrassment. The tidings from Corsica are good. The interior of the
island cannot be more discontented than it is with the Eng
lish : it appears to be only waiting for the fit moment to
break forth. Canzo, with twelve men of his own choosing,
has landed on the island towards Ajaccio ; a score more,
from this side of the mountains, have landed on the beach
of Ravague. Rocca Serra, Subrini, and two deputies sent
to us from Sartenne, with thirty-six or forty refugees, were
to set sail yesterday evening, if the weather were favour
able. General Gentili and Casalta, with 300 men, are only
waiting for a fair wind to be off; and as soon as the
movement has assumed the character which I am striving
to give it, I will repair thither myself, unless you think

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 369
that my presence can be of any utility for the operations
which you are about to undertake iu Italy.
The Directory has just written to me to put in requisi
tion all the hemp I can in Ferrara and Bologna, and to
transmit it forthwith to Toulon. To this end four clerks
in the Navy Office have arrived with instructions to acce
lerate the transport of the hemp, which I shall place at
their disposal. I shall set out for Bologna to-morrow, and
avail myself of this opportunity to organize at Ferrara an
administration composed of natives of the country, capable
of managing affairs ad interim. If you have anything to
say to me meanwhile, I beg you to write to me at Bologna
or Ferrara.
While I am engaged in superintending the collection of
the hemp and giving a more regular march to the adminis
tration of this country, the embarkation of the Corsicans
will be actively continued at Leghorn. Every preparation
is already made there for their speedy departure. Every
thing leads me to believe that the expedition will be suc
cessful, especially as the English have embarked part of
their troops at St. Florent, to reinforce the garrison of
Gibraltar. At Leghorn there have been some movements during the
last days, on account of a miracle performed by a Christ in
a church. General Serrurier must have given you an
account of this affair : all is now quiet again. Salicetti.

To General Bonaparte.
Venice, 7 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 28, 1796].
The enemy have retired from Treviso : their last ad
vanced posts, since six p.m. on the 5th instant, are at
Corrigliano and Oderto on the river Montigan, and at
Molto, which is at the conflux of the Montigan and the
Livenza. In each of these villages there is a corps of 150
men, part cavalry.
Towards Trent, the enemy is advanced upon the right
of that city ; and I am assured some detachments have
appeared at Sabio in the valley of Sabio.
For these three or four days past, the city of Verona
has been crowded with French, who give out that they are
in the service of the Republic, though many of them do
VOL. I. B B

370 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
not wear the cockade. Their conversation is not republi
can, so that there is reason to suspect them to be royalists
come from the interior or emigrants. Pico.

To General Bonaparte.
Fachiani Farm, in the Sarraglio,
8 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 29, 1796].
I inform you, general, that our investment has been
made in the best order and without loss. Wurmser has
profited by the succours given him at St. George and at
Governolo. From the faint resistance he has made, we
may conclude that he has not precisely the garrison which
he needs for the place. According to my calculations, he
cannot have men enough, for I think he has 1200 fewer
than on his arrival.
Having traversed the Sarraglio in more than one direc
tion, I have perceived that it cannot be so unwholesome as
it is reputed ; the soil is every where dry, and there is no
water but on the banks of the lake towards Mantua ; what
proves that it is an agreeable spot to live in, is the great
number of handsome country-houses. I enter into these
particulars, merely to intimate to you that we might form
some establishments there. Nay, more, general : if you do
not get a bridge thrown over the Po, for the passage of
provisions from the other side, in a month the roads by the
dikes and by Formigosa will frequently expose your troops to
the want of subsistence. Another consideration might be
added, namely, that this would relieve the country about
Verona, which has been occupied by armies during the
whole campaign. The causeway from Ceresa to Borgo-
Forte is very good ; it would therefore be requisite that the
bridge should be within reach of that causeway.
I have this instant received your letter of the 7th Ven
demiaire, in which you order me to cut and break down the
dikes of Governolo. Those who suggested these ideas
meant, no doubt, to say — destroy the sluices of Governolo :
but it is thirty years since they were destroyed, and since
the Po, when swollen, ascends without impediment to
Mantua. As there are persons who think of making a Venice of
Mantua, they ought to have proposed to you a very consi-

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 371
derable undertaking, but great in its results, namely, to bar
the whole Mincio with a dike, having in its upper part the
form of a mill-dam, that the water may never rise above
the dikes, but always keep at that height. I shall revert
ti this subject when I have seen Governolo again ; on a
day of battle I cannot say more to you ; only be easy about
Mantua : they are labouring very hard, and I am going to
fortify all our positions by redoubts, which will take from
the enemy all inclination to come to seek us.
Chasseloup-Laubat.

To the General-in-Chief.
Rodiza, 8 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 28, 1796].
I shall now answer the different articles of your letter.
The cavalry, according to the arrangement which you
approved at Verona, is to be divided into three brigades ;
the first is that of General Beaumont, the second that of
General Murat, the third that of General Leclerc. You
will find annexed the statement of subdivision. Not a
single musket has yet arrived from Cremona ; but Lan-
drieux has found 300 new ones at Raggiolo in a forsaken
mansion, and sent me them. I am arming with them 300
of the 69th brigade, whom I am bringing from Cremona.
I shall establish at San Benedetto the depot for conva
lescents, the formation of which you order : I think with
you that this will be an excellent site.
As we have no brandy and Cremona cannot furnish
any more, I avail myself of that which is at Modena, and,
in consequence, am giving orders to the commissary of war
charged with the two divisions to get a quantity.
I have agreed upon everything with General Lespinasse ;
but, as we are in want of artillerymen and cannot supply
it, I am taking gunners' assistants from the battalions.
This measure is of the strictest necessity.
The enemy made a sortie yesterday morning, but with
out success : I send you a copy of General Chabot's report
on the subject.
Our flotilla makes no progress : at the rate this goes on,
we shall not have an armed boat on the lake in less than a
fortnight : the enemy is armed in force at Mantua.
Moreau's last victory is a brilliant one, no doubt ; but
BB2

372 letters and despatches.
the victory, of an army which nevertheless does not decamp
is of no great service to us, and my opinion is that we shall
be obliged to reckon upon ourselves alone. If it were
possible to fall upon the enemy before they have collected
tlieir troops, what think you of that, general ? You can
dispose of 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry : a little revo
lutionary march would astonish them. Whatever you do,
general, accept my most sincere wishes for your success and
y°ur Shry- Kilmaine.
PS. This moment, general, I have received your letter
by my aide-de-camp. I think that it would be possible to
make ourselves masters of the works of Pradella, and also
to make a lodgment there ; but I imagine that it would
cost us a great many men, and as for the blockade, the
enemy is so closely cooped-up on this side that not a creature
can either go in or out. If we had but wherewithal to
commence the siege, we should be sure to take it ; but
then this would be much easier, because, by throwing a few
bombs into the work, we should drive off those who are
defending it, and can batter the flank with siege pieces.
I think that it is possible to surprise it, but that we should
have difficulty to maintain ourselves in it. For the rest, if
a few days were of no consequence, I might hope that the
fever would grant me some respite and allow me to preside
on the occasion : I shall write to General Dallemagne and
to the engineers ; this is all that I can do at the moment,
for I am unable to ride and still less to walk. In two days,
I will write to you on the subject.
I will send and get the proclamations printed at Modena
and have them posted in all the environs of Mantua.
The preparations and the great number of boats which
the enemy is arming in Mantua indicate the intention of
an external sortie, and probably on the side of St. George,
where our forces are thinned in an alarming manner. That
division has lost 1500 men in the last fortnight, and the
posts can no longer be manned.
The 1st regiment of hussars will march in two days for
Legnago, as well as the remainder of the 20th dragoons,
because by that time our moveable columns will have re
turned. The first regiment of cavalry must come to
Roverbello, and, if the 5th cavalry has not arrived, I shall
keep a detachment of the 20th dragoons till it does.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 373
To General Bonaparte.
Rome, 8 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 29, 1796],
I send you herewith two edicts of the pope's : the first,
to show that his Holiness does not consider himself as being
at war, and orders only defensive measures ; the Second,
to institute a civic guard for the safety of the city of
Rome. I send you also a copy of the despatch of the King of
Naples to M. the Marquis del Vasto, authorizing him to
come and treat on his behalf with the pope. That envoy
had, the day before yesterday, a long audience of the pope,
in the presence of the secretary of state. The league
between those two courts is considered as concluded. His
Sicilian Majesty will march forward 30,000 men : the
English promise to give money ; the pope will furnish 8000
men and fanaticism for the whole people. Between two
extravagant courts, it is not easy to establish harmony : I
am assured that the treaty is not yet signed.
M. Acton would be obliged to relinquish his place if he
were to sign a treaty with France, proving how ill he has
thus far guided his master. He knows full well that the
Neapolitan troops will be worsted if they hazard a battle :
he wishes at least to gain time.
If these troops remain on the frontier, the French will
quickly force one of the points of tlieir line, and make a
rapid march to Naples, to settle the business. M. Acton
intends that the peace should have two acts : he has, indeed,
a very large company. That half which is to be pushed for
ward into the Ecclesiastical State will somewhat retard our
army. The beaten troops will retire to the frontier, where
there will be another battle to fight. After this second and
last defeat, the generalissimo Acton will embark in a fri
gate and sail to England, to enjoy his fortune and the
favour of Mr. Pitt. His masters will become whatever
they can : the Ecclesiastical State will be swallowed up.
M. Acton flatters himself that it will be time enough to
sign a very hard peace when the French shall be in Rome,
and that, after having utterly ruined the affairs of the pope,
he may contrive to get so much larger a share of the Eccle
siastical State.
This country'is consigned to foreign influence ; the family
of Albani, attached to Austria, bas a great ascendency.

374 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
The best posts at the court of Rome are occupied by Nea
politans ; the English have a great number of emissaries
and hired clamourers. The pope is a narrow-minded man,
but violent and proud, who has been excited and in whom
pains are taken to keep up the spirit of infatuation : nobody
here cares about the welfare of the country : the people
feast themselves upon absurd fables.
The agents of Austria, London, Naples, unite their in
fluence to make this country a victim : it is sufficient for
them to throw an additional obstacle in our way, by exas
perating the rabble against us. There are people who
would be glad to instigate the populace to murder me, in
order to animate it to defend itself against the French for
the purpose of escaping their vengeance. You cannot form
any idea of the misguided state of minds in Lower Italy.
The presence of the armies can alone rectify opinions, by
closing the mouths of furious declaimers, who are paid by
the courts.
_ I am of opinion that the proposed treaty will not be
signed either in Rome or Naples, without the presence of
armies. If our forces are needed elsewhere, there is no
hurry : leave those two States to ruin themselves still more ;
but we must not give up one step of the ground that we
have gained : this would diminish too much the idea of our
strength. When the emperor is pulled down and compelled
to sign a peace, provided that neither Rome nor Naples is
comprehended in it, those two States will be at the mercy
of the Directory.
This league between the emperor, Rome, and Naples,
would soon be strengthened by the adhesion of Venice,
Turin, and Tuscany, if they could flatter themselves with
the idea of driving us out of Italy. For this reason we
must not proceed a step further than we have done without
duly examining our strength, which we must not compro
mise by too much exposing so vast a fortune.
I beg you, citizen-general-in-chief, to take notice in what
tone M. the Cardinal Secretary of State has written to me
in the accompanying note on the subject of a French de
tachment arrived at Farnese. I have endeavoured to reply
in such a manner as to set him to rights, as you will see in
the annexed copy of my answer.
It seems to me that they have made a mistake at Leg
horn in sending a detachment to Farnese as if it were an

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 375
imperial fief: it is dependent on the pope alone. Prince
Chigi, the proprietor, has just assured me in writing, upon
his word of honour, that never did his family receive impe
rial investiture, or pay any contribution to the emperor. I
shall write to citizen Miot to desire him to investigate this
affair with the commandant of Leghorn. I should be sorry
if, in a moment of doubt and fermentation, the suspension
of arms with the pope were broken, before the Directory
or the general-in-chief had given orders for it.
I beg you, general, to accept, &c.
Cacault.

To General Bonaparte.
Rome, 9 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 30, 1796]
I find, upon investigation, that only three Frenchmen,
without arms, have been peaceably at Farnese : so there is
not the least fault to find with our troops. I send you
herewith copies of two new notes.
It is said that the Marquis del Vasto finds some diffi
culty in settling the treaty of alliance with the pope : it is
said that the principal of them arises from the refusal of the
pope to declare the war which you are waging in Lower
Italy a war of religion.
I have not the means of learning precisely what is
secretly negociating between Rome and Naples. To me
everything seems tending to overturn and engulph at once
the Ecclesiastical State, which is but the country of dreams :
I shall repair to you, general, after my departure from
Rome, if that does take place. I shall go to recover some
portion of mind in the society of a great man, after having
been so long among children.
Cacault.

To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Verona, 9 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 30, 1796].
The 18th of the line is still at St. George and at La
Favorita, agreeably to orders given by General Kilmaine,
without my having heard anything from him : it had re
mained at Roverbello in consequence of an oreler from
General Berthier.
A superior officer, whom I had sent to make a ciruuit,

376 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
for the purpose of ordering in the detached troops of my
division, could not return by Bassano. The enemy occu
pies Castel-Franco and Santa Lucia, and pushes reconnais
sances as far as Bassano.
I am writing to Murat for him to send me a regiment of
cavalry, for the purpose of making reconnaissances as far as
Vicenza. I have been obliged to give orders to General
Pigeon to rejoin his brigade, having none besides him : I
had left him at Roverbello. Victor is absent, and
Rampon very ill. Order the 18th demi-brigade to come
and join me.' Massena.
To General Bonaparte.
Head-quarters, Bassano, 10 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 1, 1796].
I should wish you to send me immediately the 75th
demi-brigade, which is to proceed to Montebello : with this
reinforcement, I should certainly hold out for a week at
Bassano, as you desire, and with still greater certainty,
when I have once received all the troops that you promise me.
I will do, as usual, all that lies in my power to second your
intentions in everything ; I will keep the enemy continually
in check by my frequent reconnaissances.
Have the goodness, general, to let me be apprised of the
departure of the two demi-brigades which Vaubois is to
send me down the Brenta, so that I may be able to take
advantage of that moment for placing the Tyrolose, who
are about Borgo, between two fires, in sending on my part
to meet them.
The Castle of Covolo would be destroyed by this time if
I had had an officer of engineers and a few sappers addi
tional : I have but nine in all, and I have only a lieutenant
of engineers, who is always ill and cannot be of any use
to me.
The number of the sick in the hospital of Bassano is de-
sreasing ; I shall send to-morrow to inspect the hospitals of
Vicenza and Montebello. Massena.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 11 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 2, 1796].
The people of Lombardy are speaking out more plainly
every day ; but there is a very considerable class that would

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 377
wish, before throwing down the gauntlet to the emperor, to
be invited to do so by a proclamation of the government,
which would be a sort of guarantee of the interest that
France will take in this country at the general peace.
This resolution of the government and a decree establish
ing a regulating government, and acknowledging the inde
pendence of Lombardy from that day, with some modifica
tions for the time that the war continues, would be worth
as much to the army as a corps of three or four thousand
auxiliaries. The knaveries that are committed are innumerable :
amid the bustle of war, it was not possible to keep a strict eye
upon them ; but now that, during my stay at Milan, cir
cumstances allow me to do so, I promise you to make fierce
war upon them : I shall soon have to apprize you that the
council has done justice upon a dozen of them.
Henceforward, the people of Lombardy, more fortunate,
will feel less the weight of the army and be less liable to
vexations. The same is not the case with the unfortunate
Mantuan ; Nature shudders in thinking of the host of
rogues who are desolating that country. I have made some
dispositions to diminish the evil.
Bologna and Ferrara, having no troops, are the luckiest
of all : superintendents have just been established there ;
if they behave like the former military agents of Lombardy,
most of whom ran away with their chests, they will carry
desolation into that fine country. I shall take care to have
accounts of them sent to me.
Reggio has made its revolution, and shaken off the
yoke of the Duke of Modena. There is not perhaps in
Italy a district more decided in favour of liberty.
Modena tried to do the same ; but the fifteen hundred
troops that the duke keeps in garrison there fire upon the
people and disperse the mob. I believe the shortest way
would be to declare the armistice broken, since five or six
hundred thousand livres are still due, and to place that city
on the same footing as Bologna and Reggio. We should
have so many enemies the fewer, for the regency makes no
secret of the fear with which we fill it, and the joy which it
feels at the successes of the enemy. I request you to give
me your orders on that point.
My opinion is that this State ought not to be left in the
commotion in which it is, but that it would be proper to

378 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
declare to the plenipotentiary whom you have in Paris that
the negociations are broken off. Instead of having a new
enemy, we should have, on the contrary, succours and
allies, the united populations of Modena and Reggio. How
ever, as the face of affairs is changing every fortnight in
this country, since that follows the military operations, and
as there is no need that your rupture with Modena should
occur at a moment when I could not spare fifteen hundred
men for a few days, to establish a new order of things in
that country, you could declare to the envoy of Modena
that you have acquainted me with your intentions, and com
mit to me the conclusion of peace with his prince. He
would then come to head-quarters, you taking care to inti
mate to him that he must be there before the expiration of
twelve days. I would then declare to him that all the ne
gociations were broken off ; at the same moment, our troops
shall enter Modena, make the garrison lay down its arms,
take the most furious aristocrats for hostages, and put
friends of the liberty of Modena into office in their stead.
You will then have Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and Fer
rara, where the mass of the people is daily training itself
for liberty, where the majority regard us as deliverers, and
our cause as theirs.
The territories of Modena extend to the Mantuan : you
must be aware how advantageous it would be to us to have
there, instead of an inimical government, a government
like that of Bologna, which would be entirely devoted to
us. We could, at the general peace, give the Mantuan to
the Duke of Parma, which would be politic in every re
spect ; but it would be useful for you to cause this to be
intimated to the ambassador of Spain, that it may get
round to the Duke of Parma, which would induce him to
render us many services. Since we are in alliance with
Spain, it would not be amiss if the Duke of Parma were to
join one of his regiments of seven or eight hundred men to
our army ; this would render disposable a like number of
our troops, and make all the inhabitants of the duchy
of Parma consider our cause as theirs ; and that is al
ways a great thing. I shall employ this corps before
Mantua or in escorting convoys or prisoners, which our men
do very negligently : out of 4000 prisoners, 1 000 generally
escape, which arises from the small number of men that I
can spare for escorts. I have tried four hundred Milanese

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 379
for escorts, and with complete success. The duke ought
also to be obliged to furnish us with a battalion of pioneers
of about eight hundred men, with the necessary imple
ments. Distant as we are from France, the alliance of this prince
will be a valuable assistance to us, since his territories are
upon the theatre of the war.
The Barbets cut up our communications. They are no
longer single-handed robbers ; they are organized bodies of
four or five hundred men. General Garnier, at the head of
a moveable column, which I have organized, occupies Tende
at this moment : he has taken a dozen of them and had
them shot.
The administration of the department of the Var has
refused to furnish two hundred men whom I put in requi
sition for the formation of this moveable column. General
Willot has not only refused to obey an order that I gave
him for the departure of the 10th battalion of the Ain, but
he has likewise kept back the 11th demi-brigade, which
General Chateauneuf-Randon was sending to the army, and
a squadron of the 18th regiment of dragoons. That general
has, nevertheless, eight thousand men in his division —
troops sufficient to conquer the South of France, if it were
in revolt.
I keep in awe and attend to the police of an enemy's
country more extensive than his whole division, with eight
or n'ne hundred men. That general has too exaggerated
opinions, and too readily embraces the different opinions of
the parties which are tearing France in pieces, to be able to
maintain order in the South without a strong army.
General Willot served at the beginning of the revolution
in the army of Italy : he has the character of being a brave
man and a good officer, but a furious royalist. As I do
not know him, and have not had time to weigh his opera
tions, I am far from confirming this opinion ; but what ap
pears clear enough to me is that he acts in the South
as in La Vendue, which is the very way to make it spring
up there.
When a man disregards all constituted authority, when
he declares all the inhabitants in mass of several depart
ments unworthy of the name of citizen, he either wishes to
form a considerable army or to give rise to civil war : I can
see no middle course. If you leave General Willot at Mar-

380 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
seilles, you must give him an army of twenty thousand
men, or expect the most afflicting scenes.
When a city is in a state of siege, a military man be
comes, to my thinking, a kind of magistrate, and ought to
conduct himself with the moderation and decorum required
by circumstances, and he ought not to be an instrument of
factions, an advanced guard officer. I submit to you all
these reflexions, specially on account of the need I have for
troops. I beg you therefore to take the 8th division from under
my command, because the principles and conduct of General
Willot are not such as they ought to be in his situation ;
and I should think myself dishonoured to see a leaven of
disturbance forming in a place where I command, and to
suffer a general under my orders to be but an instrument of
faction. By his disobedience and by his insubordination, he is the
cause of the horrors committing at this moment in the de
partment of the Maritime Alps. The convoy of pictures,
the masterpieces of Italy, has been obliged to return to
Coni ; it would have been taken by the Barbets. If Ge
neral Willot does not immediately obey the order that I
have given him to despatch the 83rd demi-brigade, my in
tention is to suspend him from his functions. Nice itself,
at the present moment, is not safe.
The Barbets draw their forces from the provincial regi
ment of Nice, which the King of Sardinia has disbanded :
perhaps it might be useful to form a particular corps from
all the inhabitants of the Maritime Alps who were serving
in the provincial regiment and the free corps, at the begin
ning of the war. In this case, one might declare that they
shall not resume their rights of citizens till they have served
two years under the colours of the Republic.
I have written very strong letters to the minister of foreign
affairs and to the King of Sardinia himself. I hope that the
number of these banditti will daily become less formidable.
I have sent citizen Poussielgue, secretary of legation at
Genoa, to Turin, to sound the disposition of that cabinet
for a treaty of alliance : we must have that prince or the
republic of Genoa. I even expressed a wish for an inter
view with the minister for foreign affairs of the King of Sar
dinia, but that could not be arranged. Bonaparte.

letters and despatches. 381
To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 10 Vendemiaire, year 4 [October 1, 1796].
After the battle of St. George, we endeavoured to draw
Wurmser into a second action, in order to weaken the gar
rison in an affair extra muros : we took good care, therefore,
to occupy the Sarraglio ; I hoped that he would proceed
thither. We continued only to occupy the bridge of Gover
nolo, with a view to facilitate our passage of the Mincio.
On the 4th complementary day, the enemy marched 1500
cavalry to Castellucio ; our grand'gardes fell back as they
had been ordered ; the enemy came no further. On the
3rd Vendemiaire, he marched upon Governolo, following
the right bank of the Mincio. After a very brisk can
nonade and several charges of our infantry, he was put to
the rout ; a hundred of his men were taken and five
caissons, with their teams.
General Kilmaine, to whom I have given the command
of the two divisions besieging Mantua, remained in his for
mer positions till the 8th, still hoping that the enemy, urged
by the desire to bring in forage, would attempt to come out ;
but the enemy had encamped at the Carthusian convent,
before the Pradella gate, and the chapel before the Ceresa
gate. General Kilmaine made his dispositions of attack,
and marched by several points upon these two camps, which
the enemy evacuated at his approach, after a slight fire of
musketry from the rear-guard. We occupy the Pradella
gate and that of Ceresa, and are blockading the citadel.
It is impossible at this moment to think of the siege of
Mantua on account of the rains : it will not be feasible be
fore January. By that time the emperor will have a power
ful army in the Tyrol and in the Friule ; he has already
collected a corps of 6000 men in the latter country, and sent
8000 men to Botzen. Nothing can equal the activity which
prevails in the empire for recruiting the army of Italy.
The force of our army is as follows : — I have 18,000 men
in the army of observation, 9000 men in the besieging
army. I leave you to conclude whether, if I receive no re
inforcements, it is possible for me to make head this winter
against the emperor, who will have 50,000 men in six weeks.
I have required the commissioner of the government to
direct the 40th demi-brigade, which is at Lyons, to be sent
to me ; I have ordered the 83rd, which is at Marseilles,

382 letters and despatches.
and the 10th battalion of the Ain, which is at Toulon, and
is to be incorporated in our cadres, to be despatched to me.
These two demi-brigades, if they arrive, form 4500 men.
General Willot has unseasonably detained the 1 1 th
demi-brigade, 400 strong, which General Chateauneuf-
Randon was sending hither. Add to this number the 10th
battalion of the Ain, 500 strong, which is at Nice ; this
makes 900 men of the 6000 whom that general ought to
send. Renew the orders to General Chateauneuf-Randon ; order
the departure of the 40th, which is at Lyons, and of the
87th, which is at Marseilles; let 15,000 men of those that
are within reach be despatched to us ; but calculate that,
out of 4000 men whom you send, not more than half will
arrive. Consider that, in order to maintain your ground in Italy
during the winter, you must have 35,000 infantry in the
army of observation and 18,000 infantry in the besieging
army, to make head against the emperor. These two
forces together make 53,000 men ; there are at this moment
27,000. Suppose that, the season being better, 3000 sick
come back to us, though the autumnal rains generally give
us a great number, there would remain 23,000 men to
send us.
If by extraordinary couriers you confirm my orders and
my requisitions, I hope to have in less than a month
8000 men drawn from the garrisons of the South. We
shall still want 15,000 men. If you despatch them from
Paris or the environs, they will be able to get hither in the
course of December ; but they must have their orders im
mediately. If you have depots, send them as well, to be
incorporated in our corps.
We should still want 1500 light cavalry or dragoons :
for example, the 14th regiment of chasseurs. We must
have 800 artillerymen for the siege of Mantua, 10 officers
of engineers, and some superior officers of artillery for this
siege. We must further have 1500 drivers [charretiers] organized
into brigades, having their officers — I have none but
Italians, who rob us — two battalions of sappers, and seven
companies of miners.
If the preservation of Italy is dear to you, citizens
elirectors, send me all these succours. I want also 20,000

LETTERS and despatches. 383
muskets : but these things must arrive, and not be like all
that is promised to this army but never comes. We have
a great quantity of muskets, but they are Austrian ; they
are too heavy, and our soldiers cannot use them. We have
here powder manufactories which we employ, and which can
supply us with thirty thousand [pounds] per month ; that
will probably be sufficient.
I recommend to you to give orders that the 8000 men
whom I expect at the end of October shall arrive : this
alone may enable me yet to give some hard blows to the
Imperialists. If 3000 men are to reach me from General
Chateauneuf-Randon, 6 or 7000 must be sent off.
1 am endeavouring to raise here a legion armed with
Austrian muskets, and clothed in the uniform of the na
tional guard of the country: the complement of this
legion is to be 3500 men ; it is possible that the plan
may succeed.
The advanced posts of General Vaubois have fallen in
with the Austrian division defending the Tyrol : it has
taken 110 prisoners from the enemy.
Whatever circumstances occur, I beg you not to doubt
for a moment the zeal and determination of the army of
Italy to support the honour of the arms of the Republic.
Bonaparte.

To the Chief of the Staff.
Head-quarters, Milan, 10 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 1, 1796].
You will give orders to General Kilmaine for the dis
arming of the Mantuan and for obtaining the restitution of
all the horses which have been bought of the soldiers. You
will direct that there be paid for each horse the sum that it
cost, but it must not exceed 120 francs apiece. You will
form three moveable columns commanded by intelligent and
upright men, which shall scour, the first, that part of the
Mantuan comprised between the Po, the Mincio, and the
Oglio ; the second, that part comprised between the Mincio,
the Po, and the Adige ; the third, all that is situated beyond
the Po. I should think that 150 infantry and half the
number of cavalry will be sufficient for each of these columns.
These columns will repair to the three chief towns, Cas
tiglione, Roverbello, and. Gonzaga, to proceed to the dis
arming, to the search after every thing that belongs to the

384 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
Austrians, to the apprehension of such turbulent men as
have excited the people to take arms against the army, and
to the recovery of the horses sold by the soldiers.
I recommend to you, in particular, to obtain information'
respecting the conduct of the monks of San Benedetto ; in
that village horrors have been perpetrated : I had ordered
an extraordinary imposition upon it, which must be levied
immediately. Apply to the commissaire ordonnateur for a
copy of my order.
I recommend to you also to put an end to those per
petual requisitions which desolate the conquered countries,
with scarcely any profit to the Republic.
Concert with the commissaire ordonnateur Aubernon, so
that a parcel of knaves, upon pretext of supplying the army,
may no longer despoil the villages for their own profit.
You are the first agent of the Republic in the Mantuan ;
you ought, therefore, to exercise your vigilance over every
thing that can interest public order. There is at Castig
lione an administrative commission charged with the levy
of impositions ; lend it the aid of the armed force and any
other assistance that is in your power.
Bonaparte.

To tke Executive Directory.
Head quarters, Milan, 11 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 2, 1796].
The republic of Venice is afraid ; it is plotting with the
King of Naples and the pope ; it is fortifying and entrench
ing itself in Venice. Of all the populations of Italy, the
Venetian is the one that hates us most cordially : they are
all armed, and there are districts the inhabitants of which
are brave. Their minister in Paris writes to them to arm,
or all will be lost. We shall do nothing with all these
people, if Mantua is not taken.
The King of Naples has on foot 60,000 men ; he cannot
be attacked and dethroned by fewer than 18,000 infantry
and 3000 cavalry. It is possible that, in concert with
Austria and Rome, he might push a corps upon Rome,
and afterwards upon Bologna and Leghorn : this corps
mio-ht be of about 15,000 men, and would considerably
annoy the French army. The grand-duke of Tuscany is
an absolute cipher in all respects. The Duke of Parma
behaves well enough : he is a cipher, too, in every respect.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 385
Rome is strong in its fanaticism ; if it shows itself against
us, it may considerably increase the strength of the King
of Naples, and oblige me to keep 3000 more men on my rear,
by the irritation which it may excite in the minds of these
people: singly, without Naples, it would require 10,000
infantry and 1500 cavalry to subdue it. If it arms, fana
ticism will give it some strength ; there would be bloodshed :
one cannot march to Rome united with Naples with fewer
than 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry ; and if one were to
go to Naples after having been at Rome, one would need an
army of 24,000 infantry and 3500 cavalry. I think that
6000 infantry and 500 cavalry would be sufficient to keep
the States of the pope in awe, if, when once master of
them, a man were to conduct himself with address and
firmness. The King of Sardinia foments the rebellion of the Bar
bets. If Naples and Rome act against us, 3000 more men
will be required in the fortresses of Piedmont.
Genoa — On the 16th of this month, the minister Fay-
poult will present a note to the senate, and we shall make
our operation, agreeably to your orders : if it succeeds, we
may rely upon the government.
If you persist in making war upon Rome and Naples,
there will be required a reinforcement of 25,000 men,
which, added to the 20,000 necessary for making head
against the emperor, form a reinforcement of 45,000 men
that will be needed. If you make peace with Naples, and
Rome only is left, it would be possible, with the mere force
destined to make head against the emperor, to take advan
tage of a favourable moment for crushing it : one must
reckon, nevertheless, on an increase of 3000 men.
In the present position of the Republic, I think that
you cannot make war at once upon Naples and the emperor.
Peace with Naples is of the utmost necessity: continue
in a state of negociation or armistice with Rome till the
moment for marching upon that proud city. Rome would
become very strong by its union with Naples. If we are
beaten on the Rhine, it will be advisable for us to make
peace with Rome and with Naples.
There is another negociation which becomes indispen
sable ; that is, a treaty of alliance with Piedmont and
Genoa. I should give Massa and Carrara and the im-
vol. I. c c

386 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
perial fiefs to Genoa, and make it declare against the
coalition. If you continue the war against Naples, it appears neces
sary to me to take Lucca and put a garrison into it : that
place is strong and well armed ; it covers the territories of
Genoa, and affords a retreat to the garrison of Leghorn.
This and the accompanying letters will make you tho
roughly acquainted with our position. I never calculated
that, after destroying two armies of the emperor's in one
campaign, there would be a more powerful one, and that
the two armies of the Republic would winter far from the
Danube : the project of Trieste and Naples was founded on
suppositions. I have written to Vienna, and this evening the courier
will set out at the same time that the army marches for
the Brenta.
I am fortifying the Adda, but it is a weak barrier.
Speedy succours, I repeat to you ; for the emperor is already
setting his troops in motion.
The negociation with Rome has been mismanaged :
before it was commenced, Rome ought to have fulfilled the
conditions of the armistice ; one might at least have waited
a few days, and one might easily have had the 5,000,000 of the
second payment, part of which had already arrived at
Rimini. The whole treaty was shown to the pope at once :
he ought, on the contrary, to have been obliged to decide
previously on the first article ; but, above all, one ought
not to have chosen the moment when the army was in the
Tyrol, and one ought to have had as a support a corps of
troops at Bologna, which fame would have increased.
This costs us 10,000,000, five in kind, and all the master
pieces of Italy, which a delay of a few days would have
given us.
All these countries are so populous, the situation of our
forces is so well known, all this is so hackneyed by the
emperor and by England, that the scene changes every
fortnight. If we do not succeed in all we undertake, I beg you to
believe that it will not be for want of zeal and assiduity.
Bonaparte.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 387
To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 17 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 8, 1796].
Mantua cannot be taken before the month of February,
as I must have already informed you : by this you perceive
that our position in Italy is uncertain, and our political
system very bad.
We commenced negociations with Rome, when the armi
stice was not fulfilled, when 10,000,000 worth in pictures,
and 5,000,000 in kind were on the point of being delivered
to us. Rome is arming, is kindling the fanaticism of the
people : they are coalescing on all sides against us ; they
are awaiting the moment for acting ; they will act with
success, if the emperor's army is at all reinforced.
Trieste is as near to Vienna as Lyons is to Paris : in
fifteen days troops arrive there. The emperor has already
an army in that quarter.
You will find herewith all the papers necessary to enable
you to judge of our position and of the state of people's
minds. I think peace with Naples most essential, and an alliance
with Genoa or the court of Turin necessary. Make peace
with Parma, and a declaration, taking under the protection of
France the people of Lombardy, Modena, Reggio, Bologna,
and Ferrara, and, above all things, send troops. It is abso
lutely necessary, at the conclusion of such a campaign as
this, to send 15,000 recruits. The emperor has sent them
thrice over in his campaign.
In Italy all is spoiled : the spell of our force is broken ;
they count our number. I think it time, and high time,
that you should take into consideration the state of your
army in Italy, that you adopt a system which can give you
friends as well among princes as among the people. Lessen
the number of your enemies. The influence of Rome is
incalculable. It was very impolitic to break with that
power ; all this turns to its advantage. Had I been con
sulted upon all this, I should have delayed the negociation
with Rome, like that with Genoa and Venice. Whenever
your general in Italy is not the centre of the whole, you will
run great risks. This language will not be attributed to
ambition ; I have but too much honour, and my health is
so impaired that I feel' myself obliged to apply to you for a
C c 2

388 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.
successor. I am unable to ride ; nothing but courage is left
me, but that is not sufficient in a post like this.
All was ready for the business of Genoa ; but citizen
Faypoult thought that it would be advisable to procrasti
nate. Surrounded by fermenting populations, prudence
commands us to conciliate that of Genoa till the new order
of things. I have sent citizen Poussielgue to sound the
court of Turin. I am continuing this negociation. Troops,
troops, if you would preserve Italy.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 17 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 8, 1796].
One hundred and fifty men of the garrison of Mantua,
leaving the place on the 8th at ten in the morning, crossed
the Po at Borgo-Forte in quest of forage. However, at five
in the afternoon, we completed the blockade of Mantua by
possessing ourselves of the Pradella gate and that of Ceresa,
as I had the honour to inform you by my last courier. This
detachment, finding itself thereby cut off from Mantua,
attempted to retire to Florence. On reaching Reggio, the
inhabitants, apprized of the circumstance, ran to arms, and
prevented them from passing, which obhged them to retire
to the castle of Monte Chiragolo, in the territories of the Duke
of Parma. The brave inhabitants of Reggio pursued them,
invested them, and made them prisoners by capitulation.
In the firing which took place, the national guards of
Reggio had two men killed. These are the first that have
shed their blood for the liberty of their country.
The brave inhabitants of Reggio have shaken off the
yoke of tyranny, from their own impulse, and without so
much as ascertaining whether they should be supported
by us.
Bonaparte.

To the Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 17 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 8, 1796].
You will find annexed, citizens directors, a proclamation
relative to Modena. These petty rulers take it into their
heads to conspire ; I have been beforehand with them.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES. 389
Why had I not a couple of brigades to do the same at
Rome ! But I have no disposable troops, and there is
Naples, which would oblige us to fall back. The affair of
Modena somewhat improves our position.
I am surrounded by thieves here ; I have already three
commissaries of war, two administrators, and officers, before
the council of war.
Bonaparte.

To tke Executive Directory.
Head-quarters, Milan, 20 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 11, 1796].
The Modena business, citizens directors, has been com
pletely successful : this country is content and happy to
find itself delivered from the yoke that oppressed it. The
patriots are numerous and in office. You will find here
with different printed papers which will enable you to
judge of the turn that I am giving to the public mind, in
order to oppose fanaticism by fanaticism, and to make friends
of people who otherwise would become our implacable
foes. You will there find the organization of the Lombard
legion. The national colours which they have adopted are
green, white, and red.
Among the officers, there are many French ; the others
are Italian officers, who have for several years been fighting
with us in the army of Italy. The chief of brigade, named
Lahoz, is a Milanese : he was aide-de-camp to General
Laharpe. I had taken him with me ; he is known to the
representatives, who have been with the army of Italy, and
particularly to citizen Ritter.
You will find annexed, in manuscript, the organization
which I intend to give to the first Italian legion. To this
end, I have written to the commissioners of the government,
in order that the governing persons of Bologna, Modena,
Reggio, and Ferrara may meet in congress : this will take
place on the 23rd. I shall neglect nothing that is capable
of imparting energy to this immense population and turning
minds in our favour. The Lombard legion will be paid,
clothed, and equipped by the Milanese. To defray this
expense, they must be authorized to take the plate of the
churches, which will produce nearly a million.
You will find different letters and different notes from
citizen Cacault. Every thing indicates that in less than a

390 LETTERS and despatches.
month great blows will be struck in Italy. Between this
and then, we must have concluded an alliance with Genoa
or with the King of Sardinia. Perhaps it would be highly
advisable to make peace with the King of Naples also.
I have sent back citizen Poussielgue to Turin, to con
tinue his negociation ; I have told him to inform you direct
from Turin of the issue of this second interview. Let me
know, above all, our present position in regard to Naples.
You are aware that I have 2400 Neapolitan cavalry, whom
I keep closely watched, and whom it would be necessary to
get the start of, if we had stronger reasons for mistrusting
Naples : if they were to act on their part at the same time
as the Austrians and the other powers, that could not fail
to increase our embarrassment. In the month of Thermi
dor, when I was falling back upon Brescia, I thought of
having them secured, but durst not venture.
General Serrurier writes to me from Leghorn that the
grand-duke is arming also.
Believe that, if my health will in any way permit, I will
spare no pains for the preservation of Italy.
You will find annexed a letter from citizen Faypoult. It
appears to me, according to this, that the Genoa business is
negociating in Paris, and that we have done quite right not
to intermeddle in it. This conduct excites distrust in the
Genoese government. I revert to my principle, exhorting
you to treat before a month's end with Genoa and Turin.
Bonaparte.

end of vol. i.

FREDERICK SHOBERL, JUNIOR,
PRINTER TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ALBERT,
51, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET, LONDO.N.

YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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