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BISMARCK.

BISMARCK

SKETCHES FOR A HISTORICAL PICTURE

BY
MORITZ BUSCH
translated from the German by
WILLIAM BEATTY- KINGSTON
« I., GERMAN EMPI
OF BERLIN," ETC.

VOLUME I.

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1891

PREFACE.

When a portrait painter intends to take the likeness of
any particular person, he endeavours to make that person's
acquaintance, to study his characteristic features at moments
and in situations calculated to reveal their true expression,
and to sketch them, more or less elaborately, on paper. I
may compare the following studies to an artist's observations
and drawings, executed as a preliminary to the painting of
his picture. From 1870 to the present time, I have enjoyed
many opportunities of contemplating their subject closely
and with observant eyes. What these latter have not
actually seen, has been derived from trustworthy sources.
I have also utilized a former work of my own, dealing with
a special episode in the Chancellor's life, the material of
which — extracted from a diary, and therefore published in
a fragmentary form — will be found here, combined with
cognate matter, in its proper place.
My studies and sketches have been made with all the
old affection I bear to him whom they attempt to portray
and render intelligible ; but also with the earnest endeavour
to reproduce the truth to the best of my ability. They

iv Preface.
have no collective pretension to be a portrait ; but are
intended to supply the materials for a characteristic pre
sentment of the Chancellor, with which, doubtless, the
Future will enrich us. I myself, am too little of an artist to
paint such a picture ; but perhaps a glance at these sketches
will suggest its execution to some of my readers.
The Author.

CONTENTS.

VOL. I.
CHAP. PACB
I. The Chancellor's Profession of Faith and
Moral Code of Statesmanship .... i
II. His Religious Views  103
III. The Junker-Legend  164
IV. Diplomatic Indiscretions  218
V. Bismarck and Austria  280

BISMARCK

CHAPTER I.
THE CHANCELLOR'S PROFESSION OF FAITH AND MORAL
CODE OF STATESMANSHIP.
The genius of statesmanship, like poetical, religious, and
artistic genius — indeed, like genius of every description — is
undefinable. We feel its power; we apprehend and admire
its propounded ideas and accomplished feats ; but we are
unable to analyse it with anything like completeness. In
our attempts to do so we find that something invariably
remains unachieved ; and if, from the utterances and actions
of a political genius, we deduce a set of principles and rules
which appear to represent collectively his views of the
world and methods of proceeding, within an hour events
may convince us that our judgment has been faulty. We
then discover that we have only realised to ourselves the
manner in which genius has comprehended circumstances,
relations and events of the Past, and has utilised or over
come them for the fulfilment of its tasks or for the carrying
out of its projects — inferring therefrom that it would deal
similarly with like circumstances, relations, and events of
the Future. Time and life, however, necessarily give birth
to new situations, new requirements, new tendencies to
satisfy these latter, and new obstacles, barely surmised by
VOL. I. B

2 Political Genius. [Chap.
a small minority of thinking men, and sometimes scarcely to
be foreseen by trie most ingenious statesman. The gifts
that enable a man to meet novel emergencies — the art of
encountering unhesitatingly every unexpected turn of affairs
with suitable measures, and of rendering it serviceable to
one's own ends — this inexhaustible strategy of a great states
man's genius is no less incomprehensible than the Divine
Agency, which, in its continuous work of creation, causes
those new objects of the political strategist's activity to
emerge from the boundless realm of possibilities into the
actual living world. Genius, in its unity, is as inconceiv
able as the elements, or as original force; it cannot be
resolved into its component parts, and cannot, therefore, be
described. No man — not even one himself inspired by
genius — can say with anything like certainty what the hero
of the day would have done had the situation at such or
such a moment assumed an aspect different to that which it
actually presented. But everyone feels that the great man
would have conquered under any circumstances, although
no one can conjecture how or by what means. It is, how
ever, natural to suppose that his method would have been a
very simple one, such as must have subsequently appeared
no less self-suggestive than the egg of Columbus. But a
great politician cannot be artificially produced, or educated
up to that potency which renders his very existence an
epoch in history, any more than the innermost germ of his
being can be defined ; like the poet, he must be born, not
made. No one can learn how to do as he does in all, or even
in many circumstances, by watching, however carefully, his
methods of action. Those who imitate him will only do so
with approximative exactitude in cases nearly reproducing
in the Present the constellations of the Past; and such
cases occur but rarely.

I.] His Intellectual Characteristics. 3
The above remarks apply to our Chancellor. Prince
Bismarck is — and will be, doubtless, in a much higher
degree to our descendants — one of those mighty historical
geniuses which make their appearance among us, now and
anon, to guide the world into new paths, and to transform
floating ideas and aspirations, theretofore inanimate, into
living realities by absolutely original procedures of their
own. What Bismarck has achieved had previously lean
imagined and desired unquestionably and demonstrably by
his contemporaries or predecessors ; but that was all. That
he hit upon the right way of carrying out such notions and
yearnings was the effect of genius. We essayed to under
stand him and his marvellous successes, and thought we had
discovered that the essence of his genius consisted in keen
political intelligence and heroic force of will. We saw
before us a perfectly correct calculation upon distinctly laid
down premisses, uninfluenced by party dogmas or preju
dices ; a sober process of addition and subtraction, by no
means, however, devoid of captivating warmth and poetical
lustre in the expression of its results and in the actions con
sequent thereupon. Moreover, amidst manifold changes of
method, as well as of subordinate and incidental aims, we
encountered a consistency which kept its main object in
view, firmly and sternly ; a comprehensive perception of the
means to that object's attainment ; a hand extremely light
and steady in the manipulation of the persons having
influence upon the enterprise undertaken ; the gift of
knowing exactly when to act and when to postpone action ;
an almost unexampled dexterity in luring an adversary into
such a situation that he is compelled to put himself in the
wrong before the whole world ; a prodigious energy of will,
recoiling at nothing, combined with a moderation and fair
ness which, having only demanded what was indispensable B 2

4 His Individuality. [Chap.
is sver ready to meet opponents half-way in coming to
terms with respect to matters of secondary importance. A
cool head controlling a warm heart — the maximum of in
genuity and audacity — Ulysses and Achilles in one ; such
will, to many besides ourselves, have appeared to be the
solution of the enigma of Prince Bismarck's unprecedented
successes. But all these attributes — this piercing insight, luxuriant
imaginative faculty, determination, persistence, circumspec
tion — are only symptoms of that which we designate as his
genius, and which (as an unknown something, an elementary
cause of actions invariably pressing onwards towards the
correct goal by the most practical means) constitutes the
basis of his every transaction. That it is, which conjoins
those attributes : that, from which they radiate — the white,
monochromatic light in him, which contains the seven
colours of the spectrum. His bright eye casts its glances
afar into the misty and shadowy realm of possibilities ; it is
manifest that he is guided by some general method; but
the deed, to the achievement of which he applies that
method, is apparent to his mind in outline, not in detail. His
letters may assume a variety of forms, to the construction of
which manifold means may suggest themselves. Forms and
means alike, however, depend upon the conjuncture of the
hour in which they must be invented or put in practice. It
is precisely his instinctive genius that prompts him to
recognise such conjunctures and to utilise them success
fully. In so doing he frequently appears as inconsistent
and changeful as Proteus ; but in reality he is acting under
the compulsion of expediency ; thus he must, and no other
wise ; he has no choice in view of the situation for the time
being, although his best ideas and achievements are inspira
tions and improvisations.

I.J His Fundamental Convictions. 5
Admitting the impossibility of demonstrating, more ac
curately than has been above attempted, the essence and
core of Bismarck's entity as a political phenomenon ; it is
to a certain degree otherwise with what may be designated
as the articles of his political creed and the statutes- of his
moral code of statesmanship. In these time an 1 experience
have wrought many modifications, and it may be that the
future will still further transform them. But the fundamental
ideas and convictions which he owns to at the present day,
and with regard to which he admits of no compromise, were
irradicably fixed in his mind, some of them at the very
commencement of his political career, others decades ago ;
and it is with these ideas and convictions that the present
chapter proposes to deal. Two, in particular, make them
selves conspicuously manifest in his speeches, writings, and
actions. In the United Diet, in the Lower House of 1849,
and in the Erfurt Parliament we observe him to have been
guided, as though by a predominant axiom, by faith in the
necessity and wholesomeness of Monarchy, as constituted in
Prussia, and, combined therewith, by a deep feeling that it
was his duty to defend that Monarchy against the attacks of
a democracy, which later on '(as the party of Progress)
pursued its old purpose — that of restricting and volatilizing
Royal authority — under the guise of unconstitutional parlia
mentary interference and control. On the other hand,
during the opening months of his active employment as
envoy to the German Confederation, he identified himself
with the idea that the welfare of the German nation was
only to be attained by the founding of a German Federal
State under the direction of Prussia. In promulgating
this idea he displayed surprising restlessness and unbounded
energy. The first-named article of faith, openly avowed by him in

6 Modifications in his Views. [Chap
many of his public speeches, has so far undergone modifica
tion since the Crown consented to grant a Constitution to
Prussia, that thereafter he declared the King to be restricted
in his independence and omnipotence to the extent ordained
and prescribed by the fundamental State-laws agreed upon
between him (the King) and the representatives of the
people. The second chief article of his political creed has
compulsorily suffered an even more thorough-going meta
morphosis through the force of circumstances. It first
expressed itself as the wish and effort to establish a Prussia,
which — in virtue of a policy at the Bund, at once firm and
confident of its advantageousness — should by degrees group
around herself the medium and smaller States of Germany,
connected with her by the ties of a Customs' Union as well
as by others of common interest ; it passed, later on,
through several phases of dualistic combination; and
finally, these latter having from first to last turned out
utterly impracticable, it found its full expression in the
German Empire, the strengthening and securing of which
ever since its foundation may be traced, running like a red
thread through all the Chancellor's projects of internal
reform, as well as through the totality of the leading actions
of his foreign policy. Both articles of faith — that of the
necessity of a free and animate Monarchy, and that of a
Germany federally united and gathered round Prussia —
stand immediately side by side, in about the same relation
to one another as the means to the end. Only such a
kingdom as Prussia could have undertaken to achieve
German unity, to render it fruitful and ensure its per
manence. Subjoined are a few authentic proofs of the statements
advanced in the foregoing paragraphs. On the ioth 01
April, 1849, Bismarck, at that time a Deputy, said in the

I.] Speeches. 7
Lower House of the Diet : "Iam unable to derive the con
viction from Article V. of the Prussian Constitution (dealing
with the rights of the Chamber) that it is our vocation to
govern this country by addresses and declarations of our
opinions and feelings — that we are called upon, whenever
the Government of His Majesty the King avails itself of
rights reserved to the Crown which do not happen to please
a certain section of this Assembly, to open an enduring fire
of addresses, votes of want of confidence, &c, upon the
Government, until the Ministry hauls down its colours.
Should the Ministry give way to such a method of proceed
ing on our part, it would thereby admit that the executive
power had been transferred to the Lower House. It would
acknowledge that Ministers are not servants of the King,
but of the Lower House, and that, as a matter of fact,
nothing whatever is left to the King except the outer
symbols of power. This may be considered constitutional
by a good many people ; for my part, I only regard that as
constitutional which is in conformity with the Constitution.
Anything you please may be constitutional in Belgium or
France, in Anhalt-Dessau or in that realm which is illumined
by the dawning splendour of the Mecklenburghian Constitu
tion : here, only that is constitutional which is laid down in
the Prussian Constitution." On the 24th of September he
replied to Deputy von Beckerath, who proposed that the
Diet should be invested with the right to refuse its sanction
to the imposition of taxes ; " According to our Constitution
there exists in this country an independent Monarchy,
which, indeed, has in the course of tirr^e (and particularly
of late years) transferred a considerable part of its rights to
the representatives of the people, but voluntarily, not for
lack of resisting force . . . The equality of rights of the
Crown, the Upper and the Lower Chamber in the matter of

8 On Constitutionalism. [CHAr.
legislation is the very basis ol our Constitution. If you
meddle with this equality of rights, to the prejudice of the
Crown — if you except from this common rule legislation
dealing with taxation, its collection and outlay, you destroy
the independence of the Crown in favour of parliamentary
majorities, whose value is dependent upon the bold pre
sumption that each and every Prussian Deputy of the future
will be in a position to form an independent and un
prejudiced judgment upon all possible questions of policy
and legislation."
During the debate on the address, which occupied the
Lower House from the 27th to the 29th January, 1863,
Minister-President von Bismarck, in reply to the complaint
of the majority that the Government had infringed Article
99 of the Constitution of January, 1850, observed: "That
would certainly be the case if the ordinance set forth in
that Article (estimating beforehand all the State revenues
and expenditure for each year, and inscribing them upon
the State Budget) had been followed by a sentence decree
ing that the Budget should be settled yearly by the Lower
House. But it is only stated in Article 99 that ' the Budget
shall be fixed by a law,' and, according to Article 62, such
a law can only be passed by accordance of the Crown and
both Chambers. Each of these three concurring rights,"
he continued, " is theoretically unlimited — one as much so
as another. If no agreement can be arrived at by these
three forces, the Constitution utterly fails to point out which
one of them must give way to the others. In previous
discussions it was assumed, by analogy with other countries
whose Constitutions and laws are not published or valid in
Prussia, that this difficulty might be surmounted by the
submission to the Lower House of the other two factors 
that, if an understanding could not be achieved, with respect

I.] On Constitutionalism. 9
to the Budget, by the Crown and Lower House, the Crown
should not only give way to the Lower House, dismissing
the Ministers lacking the confidence of the latter, but should,
by creating peers en masse, compel the Upper House (if at
odds with the Lower House) to harmonise with its legisla
tive fellow-factor. This arrangement would undoubtedly
establish the sole and sovereign sway of the Lower House ;
but that description of rule is not as yet constitutionally
correct in Prussia." * In conclusion he remarked that the
Constitution distinctly maintained the equilibrium of the
three legislative forces, and was incompetent to constrain
any one of them to yield to another. With respect to the
necessity of coming to an understanding by the aid of
compromises, he described the whole constitutional system
of government as " a series of compromises, which would
be transformed into conflicts if any one of the participating
forces should dogmatically insist upon the carrying out of
its own views ; " and wound up the exponence of his theory
in the following words : " He who is in a position to enforce
his opinions must go on doing so ; for the existence of a
State cannot remain stationary for a moment."
Similarly, during the so-called " Period of Conflict," in
the course of the debate upon Schleswig-Holstein that took
place on the 21st and 22nd January, 1864, in the Lower
House, Bismarck replied to the leader of the Opposition :
" Whether or not Ministers possess the King's confidence is
all the same to you. From your point of view the King
would be a personage possessing less influence upon
* Bismarck expressed himself in a similar sense, during the Address
Debate, which took place in the Upper House, on the 24th of January,
1865, and in the speech delivered by him on the ist of June, of that
year, upon the occasion of the discussion of the Navy Estimates, ia the
Lower House.

IO On Royal Prerogatives. [Chap.
Prussian affairs than any chief of a parliamentary fraction,
with whom, in order to gain his support, one is obliged to
make terms ; one would, indeed, be enabled to simply pass
over the King's rights to the ' order of the day.' And yet
the prescriptions of the Constitution are perfectly clear, viz.,
that it is the King's prerogative to make war or peace, and
to choose his Ministers. In behaving as you do, you
gainsay not only the Constitution, but the traditions, history,
and even the popular feeling of Prussia, which is, and will
remain, thoroughly monarchical. The rocher de bronze of
Frederick William the First still stands firm. It constitutes
the foundation of Prussian history, of Prussian renown, of
Prussia's rank as a great power, and of her constitutional
Monarchy. You will not succeed in shaking this brazen
rock by your National Association, your ' resolutions,' and
your liberum veto.''
On the 4th February, 1866, whilst contending in the
Lower House against Virchow's motion to the effect that
" the House would pronounce the union of the Duchy of
Lauenburg to the Prussian Crown illegal," Bismarck
remarked : " In this case also you are mixing up the Belgian
and Prussian Constitutions. The latter has copied the
former pretty faithfully, I admit ; but it has not adopted
Article 78. That Article (of the Belgian Constitution) is
worded as follows : ' The King possesses no other powers
but those which are accorded to him by this Constitution, or
by a law enacted on the basis of this Constitution.' This
Article is lacking to the Prussian Constitution ; and upon
that account His Majesty the King of this country is in
possession of all those ancient rights of the Crown which
have not been transferred to other factors by express
prescriptions of the Constitution, or of laws enacted upon
the basis of the Constitution."

I.] ' On Crown Rights. II
Finally, the Imperial Chancellor spoke his mind upon the
position of the Crown in Prussia, and the German Empire,
very vigorously and plainly in the oration delivered by him
(on the 24th January, 1882, in the Reichstag) upon the
significance of the Royal Decree dated January 4, 1882.
The decree in question had undoubtedly been drawn up by
the Chancellor himself, but took the form of a personal
manifesto of the Emperor-King, and was, in fact, a pendant
to the Imperial Message with which the Reichstag had been
opened some months previously. In the speech referred to
— one of the most important theretofore addressed by him
to the Imperial Parliament — we encounter the following
declarations bearing upon State rights : " The Decree is in
no way intended to create new rights, but to guard against
the undermining of established rights, and to combat the
Constitutional catchwords which attach themselves, like
usurious parasites, to the perfectly lucid text of the Constitu
tion — as if we recognised any other fountain of justice than
the Prussian statute laws ; as if traditions or Constitutions
haply obtaining in other countries could have the least
pretension to validity here in Prussia ! The outcome of
this collection of catchwords, carried out to its extreme
consequence, is that the King may rule in Prussia in the
sense of the French word regner, but not in that of the
French word gouverner ; that is to say, that the active
exercise of governmental power should lie in the hands of a
Ministry standing near the King and kept up (if quite correct
and orderly in its conduct) by the majority of one or both
Houses of the Prussian diet. What sort of a Government
this would be, from a French point of view, I find stated in
Taine's admirable work ' L'origine de la France contem-
poraine,' according to which the King of the Girondins
' serait une espece de president honoraire de la republique,

12 On Ministerial Government. [Chap.
anquel iis donneraient un conseil executif nomme' par
l'Assemble'e, c'est-a-dire par eux-me'mes.' Such is about the
constitutional ideal of a ministerial government, which might
be set up in contrast to the personal rule of a Prussian
King, and which then, to be sure, supported by a trust
worthy and well-trained majority, would be eminently
calculated to realise the ideal described by Deputy Momm-
sen in his electioneering speeches as ' a picture of horror
— that is to say, ministerial absolutism, by the side of which
our monarchy would dwindle down to playing the part of a
shadowy hereditary king who, whenever a new Minister
should be required, would be summoned from the side-scenes
to sign his name, and then vanish again, having in this wise
supplied the Opposition in the Diet with a new target to
shoot at, a new fortress to besiege — in other words; a new
Cabinet to contend against This constitutional majordomo-
ship, therefore, of which Deputy Mommsen — with a degree
of hostility quite unusual in that distinguished historian —
accuses me; this Chancellor-Dictatorship is precisely the
form of government which will become feasible if you
substitute the Ministerial regime for the royal regime. But
you will not succeed in doing so, for you have no ground to
stand upon ; the Prussian Constitutional Charter says nothing
about any such rigime. . . . But little mention is made of
Ministers in the Constitution, which only pronounces them
to be responsible, and indicates how they may be dealt with,
if they happen to incur the displeasure of parliamentary
majorities. In paragraph 3, Article 45, it is stated that
' The King's person is inviolable,' So, thank God ! it has
always been in Prussia ; and no one, with the exception of a
few miscreants who have been handed over to Justice, has
dared to touch or molest the person of the Monarch, or even
to disregard his inviolability, to the observance of which, in

L] On Royal Prerogatives. 1 3
my opinion, belongs verbal expression of respect for the
Royal credit, dignity and honour, whenever allusion is made
to the King. As I read it, this paragraph means : In all
discussions in which the King is concerned you shall speak
of him with reverence, not in such a disrespectful manner
as has been the case here this year. The King's Ministers
are responsible. Without doubt they are, and I do not in
the least shrink from this responsibility. My name is
subscribed to this Decree; and because it is so subscribed I
have put in an appearance here to-day, waiving a sick man's
privilege. I can make myself responsible for my own
actions, and I may have made myself responsible for those
of other people through having undertaken to guarantee
them ; I have certainly rendered myself responsible for all the
acts of my King, which I have countersigned, and I will also
joyfully incur responsibility to the last for those which I
have not countersigned. But all this makes no difference
whatsoever in Royal rights ; the governmental acts which
require counter-signature in order to obtain validity, remain
none the less governmental acts of the King. They are,
indeed, specially described as such in the Constitution, viz.,
'Governmental acts of the King, to be valid, must be
counter-signed.' When they are counter-signed, do they
thereby become Ministerial acts? Does the fulfilment of
that formality make the King a secondary, and Ministers a
primary agent ? That Ministerial signature, affixed low
down in a corner of the document: ! Well, gentlemen, I do
not understand how you reconcile that assumption with the
comprehensive reverence for the Royal position expressed by
the previous speaker; or how, in appraising the several
signatures subscribed to this Decree, you can attach the
greater importance to that of the Ministers. At all events,
this is the way to develop a Constitutional Majordomoship,

14 King and Parliament. [Chap.
even more powerful than that which. existed in tne time of
the shadowy Carlovingian kings. With us, however, it is
the King himself who reigns. Ministers set down upon
papers what the King has commanded; but they do not
govern. ' The power of consummating the laws,' says the
Constitution, ' is the King's alone ' — Ministers are not even
mentioned — 'the King fills up every post in all the branches
uf the State service ' — again no allusion to Ministers. ' The
legislative power is exercised ifl common by the King and
the two Chambers.' The King has yielded two-thirds of
legislative faculty to the Chamber — so prescribes our written
law. But if his last remaining third is to be handed over to
a Ministry, to be appointed by the King (much in the same
manner as, in former times I was able to appoint a justiciary,
and can, even now, nominate a parson under certain
circumstances — who, once appointed, can defy me to dismiss
him) which, according to Progressist doctrine and foreign
praxis, is irremovable — to a Minister, I say, who may
command a powerful majority in one Chamber or both, or
haply in the Reichstag itself, keeping such majority in a
good humour by feeding it with privileges and concessions
which he filches from the King — that, I contend, is equiva
lent to the setting up of the Majordomoship above alluded
to. The Constitution says : ' Unanimity of the Sovereign
and both Chambers is requisite for each and every law. The
right of proposing laws appertains equally to the King and to
either Chamber. Laws once rejected by the Sovereign
cannot be again put forward.' In the Constitution, there
fore, a Minister is a mere stop-gap, scarcely even mentioned.
Whether or not that fact be in harmony with the Constitu
tional theory is perfectly indifferent to me ; it stands thus in
the Prussian Constitution, and I know of no other funda
mental law by which Prussia is to be governed."

I.] Prussian Monarcfis. 15
" Moreover, Prussian traditions correspond accurately to
the prescriptions of the Constitution. The Kings of Prussia
have never regarded their position from the primary point
of view of their rights, but from that of their duties. Our
sovereigns — going back even to the Electors — never be
lieved that they were fruges comsumere nati, set up at the
head of the State for their amusement; on the contrary,
they were animated by a strictly subservient feeling of their
duties as regents, so aptly expressed in Frederick the Great's
declaration, that he considered himself the first servant of
the Prussian State. This tradition is still so quick in our
sovereigns that, here in Prussia, as a matter of fact, the King
commands in the Ministry itself, and Ministers obey as long
as they feel themselves equal to bearing responsibility.
When that ceases to be the case, there is no great difficulty
in changing a Ministry. The King, unless he should wish
to bring about something altogether eccentric, would readily
find other Ministers fully prepared to become responsible
for all the enactments which his actual ministers might
refuse to countersign. Nothing eccentric, however, is
sought to he imposed upon us ; on principle His Majesty
the King ordains steadfast adherence to the firm beaten
tracks which alone can conduct Prussian policy into the
German Empire. Ministers may possibly differ from him
in opinion, in which case a compromise may be effected ; for
a King who does not desire to dismiss his Minister per
emptorily, will probably yield something to him/ however
little he may wish to do so. But it happens much more
frequently that Ministers cannot obtain the Royal sanction
to a document which, in their opinion, is at once correct
and complete ; they are then compelled to ask themselves —
'Shall we let the whole matter fall, or make a Cabinet-
question of it, or resign ; or, finally, shall we make up our

1 6 Retrospective. [Chap.
minds that it will be more advantageous to our country
and the State-service if we make certain concessions to the
Royal will ? ' That Royal will, when all is said and done,
is the decisive one. The real, actual Minister-President
of Prussia is, and will continue to be, His Majesty the
King." "It is indeed lucky for Prussia that such is the case.
Just reflect that, were it not so, we should not be here at all
— I should not enjoy the advantage of talking to you in this
room — the German Parliament itself would not be in ex
istence. Just assume that, from the year i860 down to the
present time, His Majesty, our Constitutional King had seen
fit to interpret the Constitution by the light of Deputy
Haenel's principles, and had carried out the ministerial — let
us say the foreign — policy of my two predecessors, Schleinitz
and Bernstorff; that he had submitted his judgment to
theirs, or even chosen his Ministers in accordance with the
views then entertained by the majority of the Chambers
constituting the Diet ; that, in a word, His Majesty had
subordinated his policy to the policy of the majority, and
had put the Haenel legends in practice. Had he done all
this we should, first of all, not have had a reorganised army
— for the gentlemen in Parliament understood so little about
political possibilities in Europe as to be unable to make it
clear to themselves that, if they wanted to achieve German
unity, the first things requisite were a powerful Prussian
army, and the signature of the King of Prussia. That
monarch, however, was resisted to the utmost in his efforts
to make the army sufficiently strong, not only to achieve
German unity, but to sustain it in subsequent inevitable
wars; and, had Parliament had its way, we should have
kept up the army-organization which prompted its bravest
soldier— our Minister of War in the Olmuetz days — to tell

IJ Parliament v. King. 17
me, when I found myself called upon to wait upon him in
the characters of a Deputy and a Landwehr-officer : ' We can
not fight at all — it is impossible for us to prevent the
Austrians from occupying Berlin. I must therefore entreat
you, if you have any influence upon your colleagues, to
exert it to the utmost in quieting them down.' That is the
military condition in which we should have remained to the
present day, if the will of Parliament had been complied
with. If, again, the King had not been in a position to
carry out his own policy, but had been compelled to follow
1 the parliamentary, ministerial, legendary policy, the second
consequence of that course would have been that — in the
!year 1863, and under the guidance of Deputy Behrend from
Danzig, at that time Vice-President of the Lower House —
we should have encouraged the Polish insurrection, and
taken its part against Russia. Briefly stated, the Royal
policy was to exhibit forbearance to Russia, with a view to
future wars and great times coming; the Parliamentary
policy was, 'Great Heavens, here is a row, a rising, an
insurrection — a Government is being assailed — this arouses
our sympathy ! ' and without further reflection the Prussian
Parliament began to sing, ' Jeszcze Polska.' * That was
• With respect to the Polish outbreak, when the Prussian Govern
ment had concluded a treaty with Russia to check that movement, the
Progressist Deputy, von Carlowitz, accused the Ministry of shoit-
sightedness, complained that Prussia was rendering friendly services to
Russia gratis, and closed his oration by expressing the following highly
patriotic hope : "If the Prussian Government acts precipitately, mixes
itself up in foreign complications under unfavourable circumstances, and
practises an aggressive policy, I feel confident that this House — or at
least its great majority — in accordance with the country at large, will not
grant the present Ministry a single thaler wherewith to carry on such a
policy" (the aggressiveness of which, be it remarked, was aimed at
enemies of Russia, who were also Prussia's deadliest foes). Similarly,
and amidst the applause of the majority, Deputy von Unruh declared
VOL. I. C

1 8 Parliament v. King. (Chap.
the policy which the King would have been compelled to
adopt, had he not chosen to carry out his own instead.
Stili further, in the year 1864 (with respect to the Elbe
Duchies), Prussia, had she gone with the majority of her
Pailiament, would have placed herself at the disposal of the
Frankfurt majority. Such was at that time the popular
policy in the Lower House. At the instance of the Frank
furt majority we should therefore probably have levied a
Federal execution, with Prussian means, on the basis of
Federal Protocols. Read the negotiations of that period ;

that, should foreign complications accrue from the measures taken by
the Government to protect the frontiers and interests of Prussia, Parlia
ment would refuse to supply the king with the means of defending the
country. Waldeck compared the calling-out of the Prussian reserves —
one of the measures in question — to the sale of .Hessian troops to
England when that power was fighting the North-American insurgents.
Simson, in the same debate, drew a tasteful and opportune parallel
between the Ministry and Don Quixote, and used the expression " rope-
dancers." Sybel protested against a policy, " which burdened Prussia
with complicity in a colossal man-hunt, regarded by the whole of Europe
with moral indignation." The following sentences, with which this
orator played out all his trumps in his closing speech, are really
splendid. " If I could see," he exclaimed, " sitting opposite to me at
the Ministerial table, one man who had hitherto proved himself possessed
of far-seeing penetration, or of a heart susceptible of justice, I would ask
him whether this Convention of his reminds him of the 1815 treaty, of
the therein documented (recorded) right of the Poles to exist under their
own independent Constitution, of the therein recorded decision of
Prussia and Europe, viz. : that the King of Poland, not the Czar of
Russia, should reign in Warsaw? If our Ministry had itself taken this
Polish matter in hand, with the honest resolve to finally extract the
thorn from Europe's heel — at last to heal this old European wound —
what a position it might have risen to in its own country I But unfortu
nately the heart of our Ministry seems to delight only in ideas of
slavery and subjugation ; thus its statemanship and military capacity, as
well as it3 constitutional being, collapse in order that police machinations
may be glorified."

L] Follies of the Prussian Diet. 19
how was I abused because, in connection with the Federal
execution, I had contrived to induce Austria to act in
common with us 1 * We ought, therefore, to have renounced
• Upon that occasion Deputy Virchow, with the infallibility peculiar
to him, asserted that " The whole European situation would be a safer
one had the Government adopted the correct line of action, proposed to
the German Federation by a number of medium and small German
States. Only two powers, Austria and Russia, could possibly be dis
posed to take exception thereto. And why, gentlemen? Chiefly
because, by so doing, Austria and Russia would keep Prussia down and
make her look small ; because they would undermine our influence in
Northern Europe. But the Minister-President, for a long time past,
has enjoyed the reputation of at least steadily defending the Russian
Alliance, and of upholding the belief that our welfare lies in that
direction. If it be so materially the interest of Prussia to support the
Russian succession in the Duchies — to resign the only great harbout
possessed by Germany in the North, to the hands of Russia, and to drive
such a foreign wedge into our country just at the spot where it is least
protected and most vulnerable, then, gentlemen, we shall certainly not
be justified in expecting that he (Bismarck) will adopt any other course. "
The orator concluded with the following prophecy. "The people will
not fail to punish this treachery." When the war with Denmark was
breaking out, and Bismarck upon that account solicited the sanction of
the Lower House to a loan, his request was refused. Upon that
occasion the Progressist Deputy, Assmann, delivered a speech full of
pompous absurdities. With respect to the Austro-Prussian action across
the Eider, he assumed that "it would guard Schleswig against German
troops (the Saxon and Hanoverian ' execution ' soldiers in Holstein) and
against the claims of its legitimate ruler (the Hereditary Prince of
Augustenburg), so that the Duchies might be securely preserved to
Denmark." Further on, this clear-sighted politician remarked : " We
hold it to be an established fact, that Herr von Bismarck is endeavouring
to counteract the German-patriotic endeavour of the medium States "
(whose sole object was to utilise the situation for the creation of another
medium State, hostile to Prussia, and thereby to strengthen their own
position in the Federation) ; " and our estimate of his views, as Well as of
his capacities, does not encourage us to look forward with confidence to
the further development of a course of action, the ruinous character of
which we have been compelled to recognise in all the steps taken in it
up to the present time. If we are standing upon the threshold of events
teciring with everything of the saddest and most shameful that can
C 2

20 Retrospective Comparisons. [Chap.
our bargain with Austria, to have foregone the conjoint
campaign, and to have levied the Federal execution by our
selves, in order to obtain a certificate of good conduct from
the Presidency of the Federation, and to perpetuate the
Federation itself, after having done everything in our power
on its behalf. Without Austria, however, we should have
in all probability been put under restraint by an European
Coalition, and have had to submit in accordance with
Federal protocols ; in other words, we should have suffered
a second Olmuetz. Such would have been the results had
we then practised a parliamentary instead of a Royal policy.
We should probably to-day be still sitting in the Eschen-
heimer Gasse, and if I, perchance, were no longer Envoy to
the Federation, somebody else would be there in my stead,
and would, in conformity with my instructions, be decreeing
executions and concluding protocols ; and you, gentlemen,
would not be to the fore in this place at all. Therefore,
gentlemen, in my opinion we should not meddle with the
Royal action, with the animate interchangeable relations
between King and people, as these have always existed in
Prussia without ever having harmed the Monarchy. The

happen to a State or a nation ; if, through the policy of Bismarck, the
great German power, Prussia, can be converted into the foe of Germany
—if the valiant Prussian Army is to be used to fight against its German
brethren, who have taken the field to protect Germany's rights, then let
Germany know that, upon this question, we stand by her and not by our
Ministry. . . We have long been aware that, with every step it takes,
whether in home or foreign policy, this Ministry tramples upon a morsel
of Prussian territory ; that, in the hands of this Ministry, Prussia is fore
doomed to impotence or suicide. Penetrated by this conviction, our
choice cannot be doubtful ; we prefer impotence to self-destructicn."
At that time the entire Prussian House of Commons beamed with
wisdom of the above description. Of all the members barely a dozen
remained insensible to its brilliancy. '

IJ Retrospective Comparisons. 2r
better our Kings are known — the more prominently they put
themselves forward, and the more intimate their relations
with the people — the better they are liked, as was the case,
without any ministerial intermediation, when our King in
1847 — during the deliberations of the United Diet — directly
and without the assistance of responsible Ministers, but in a
constitutional sense, opposed Parliamentary discussion, then
sometimes characterised by parvenu rudeness. That did no
harm to Monarchy in this country; on the contrary, Kingship
acquired such strength and grandeur upon that basis of
interchangeable relations between the Sovereign and his
people, that you, gentlemen " (here the Chancellor turned
towards the benches of the Progressist party) " wish not
to come into immediate contact with it, but desire that the
Monarchy should be hidden behind a curtain. But when
we observe what the Monarchy has done for us, we should
make every effort to support, foster, and vivify it — not to
deal with it in such sort that it may to a certain extent
become obsolete through lack of utilisation. Whatever you
put away in a cupboard, and make no use of, loses in appli
cability and usefulness ; and thus it is with the monarchical
element — quite indispensable to Prussia — which predomi
nates over our people, whose predilections are eminently
monarchical. Take that away from us, and what will you
gentlemen put in its stead? If you resolve to disintegrate,
corrupt, or banish to an imaginary realm ( Wolkenkukuks-
heim) this vigorous King, so deeply rooted in our glorious
secular history, you will plunge us into chaos ; and I do not
believe that you are in possession of anything wherewith to
replace it, if you deprive Prussia of her ample, homely,
direct personal relation to the Monarchy. Because I know,
through my own personal experiences, through Prussian
history, and through the traditions of my ancestors and

22 Actual Monarchy in Prussia. [Chap.
kinsmen, that there is absolutely nothing capable of re
placing it, I combat and stand forward with my signature for
the living King, who is determined to vindicate his rights,
and who says : ' These rights are mine, and I will not
permit that they be filched from me by speeches and false
interpretations of the Constitution, or by legends that hang
on to the Constitution, but do not abide within it.' "
If we combine these declarations and apply them in
concert with other of the Chancellor's utterances, to the
German Empire, we shall arrive at the following truths : —
The King of Prussia, the German Emperor, does not only
reign — he governs as well. The irresponsibility and
inviolability of his person do not in any respect deprive
his utterances and actions as King and Emperor of their
character as independent acts of volition. Prussia and
the German Empire are governed constitutionally — not by
Parliament, as in England — by Ministers at the command of
the King, not of the majority for the time being in the
Assembly representing the people. According to the
Constitutions of those realms the supreme wielder of power
in the State is no mere abstract conception, no mere
representative of Monarchy, no mere sanctioning apparatus
set up for the purpose of consecrating laws that have been
carried by the votes of parliamentary majorities; but a
living personage with an opinion and will of his own, in the
exercise of which he holds a position, not subordinate to
but on a level with the National Representative body, and
in some very material respects — as exclusive possessor of
the prerogative to make war or peace, and of the collective
executive powers — above it. Parliament is a co-operative
factor in legislation, which cannot by means of the opinions
entertained by its majority (any more than it can compel
him to nominate Ministers emanating from that majority)

IJ TJie Prussian and German Constitutions. 23
hinder him from giving public and solemn expression to his
convictions at critical moments, and from thus casting
those convictions into the wavering scales. The Consti
tutions of Prussia and Germany have the effect, on the one
hand, of connecting a certain class of governmental actions
with laws which result, in Prussia, from agreements between
the Parliament and the Government, in the Empire from
the confirmation of such agreements by the German Govern
ments represented in the Federal Council; and, on the
other, of surrounding the Sovereign with responsible
Councillors, who are chosen by him and can only be
removed from their posts by him. If party spirit — which
agitates in favour of foreign parliamentarism, i.e. the rule of
the people's representatives, and still further, consciously or
unconsciously, for the realisation of popular sovereignty —
refuses to recognize this constitutional arrangement, which
has taken root in the spirit of the Prussian nation, and has
been repeatedly demonstrated by Prussian and German
history to be wholesome and necessary ; if liberalism
proposes to convert the Emperor-King into a mute principle,
or to regard him as politically dumb and merely ornamental,
it commits itself to an entirely erroneous standpoint, falsely
believing that its wishes have become facts, and sojourning,
not upon plainly legal or historical ground, but in the foggy
atmosphere of its own delusions. We, however, will thank
Heaven that the parliamentary system of the English,
Belgians, French and Italians does not reign over us ; that
our Constitutions do not from day to day hand over our
well-being and prosperity to the mercy of majorities ; for no
burden is heavier to bear than the rule of these latter ;
nothing (in constitutionally governed states) more effectually
protects the interests of the weak than a strong and solid
monarchical power controlling the people's representatives,

24 The Importance of Monarchy. [Chap.
with their fanaticism for doctrines & la mode; never is true
freedom so cruelly trampled upon as by the impatience,
injustice and tyranny of democrats, who inscribe freedom-
worship on their banner ; nothing, finally, is better adapted
to preserve and strengthen national unity than a vigorous
will in its very centre, whilst naught is more damaging to it,
and to the liberty of Germans, vis-d-vis of foreign countries,
than the debilitating, vacillating, disintegrating element of
democracy, represented more or less consciously and ener
getically in every Liberal camp, influencing its tactics and
strategy, and dictating its tone.
The projection into strong relief of Monarchy's importance
which is manifested in Bismarck's above-quoted utterances
might lead to erroneous interpretations of their meaning.
In spite of assurances to the contrary, it might be deemed
that in reality a reasonable, benevolent and unrestricted
sovereign stands higher in his estimation and liking than a
Monarch of the constitutional pattern. As a matter of fact,
this has been alleged, and the apprehension has been
entertained that he is even now bestirring himself towards
the achievement of the former desideratum. To demon
strate the fallacy of these assumptions, let us recall a
declaration pronounced by him (July 9, 1879) on the
occasion of a debate upon financial reform, in the course of
which he observed : " When we came back from the war
in 1866, it would have been easy enough for me, in the
position I then held — more influential, though within
narrower limits, than my present one — to say (indeed, I
had great trouble at the time to keep myself from doing so)
' Prussia is now grown bigger than she was ; her Constitution
is no longer suited to her ; let us rearrange it,' in short, to
have started under full sail with the boldest and most
incisive of conceivable reactionary policies, backed by the

IJ His Advocacy of Constitutionalism. 25
success which had stuck to us ever since Koeniggraetz.
You know, gentlemen, that I did just the contrary, thereby
incurring the aversion of a large section of my oldest
political friends. It cost me many a hard fight to carry
through the indemnity >and the maintenance of our Consti
tutional system. Do you think I did so out of sheer love for
Constitutional systems ? Gentlemen, I do not wish to make
myself out better than I am, and therefore I must distinctly
answer that question in the negative. I am no opponent
of the Constitutional system ; on the contrary, I regard it as
the only possible form of government If I had believed
that a dictatorship — that Absolutism in Prussia would have
been still more useful in advancing the work of German
Unity, I should most unquestionably have counselled the
adoption of Absolutism. But, after careful reflection — and
I had to contend against influences, not only powerful, but
near and dear to me — I came to the conclusion : No ; we
must continue in the path of Constitutional Law — a decision
which, moreover, corresponded with my inner sentiments
and with my convictions concerning the collective poten
tialities of our policy. I was then encountered by the
conflict respecting ecclesiastical matters, which really grew
out of the connection existing between the Church and
Polish questions. This struggle robbed me of my natural
supporter, the Conservative party, upon which I might
otherwise have reckoned ; and the methods I was compelled
to adopt, in order to build up and give reality to the
Constitution of the German Empire, and, by practically
vitalizing it, to invest it with some guarantee of durability,
would probably have been very different ones, had the
Conservative party not then left me in the lurch. . . 1
fought throughout that conflict with the vivacity which I
hope will continue to be my especial characteristic as long

26 His Political Creed. [Chap.
as I live in all questions that I believe concern the welfare
of my country and the rights of my King ; but I must say
(as I did once before, with respect to the conflict that took
place during the years of the budgetless regime) that I look
upon conflicts as episodes to be gallantly fought out under
certain circumstances, but not as an institution to be upheld
for any length of time; and when ways and means of
moderating the acrimony of antagonism accrue without
trending upon the principles of the contended question —
when adversaries learn to Jcnow one another and acquire
mutual respect through efforts made in common to attain a
high purpose — it does not manifestly lie within my province
as a Minister to close such ways or to reject such means."
Therefore, no Parliamentarism after the English or French
pattern, nor any Absolutism either ; but Constitutionalism ;
a strictly constitutional regime; an equally careful main
tenance of the Crown's rights and the Parliament's
competence ; a King who stands within the very heart of
political life, personally taking part therein ; and adminis
tration of the State by Royal officials, who hold their posts
with the concurrence of the people's mandatories in
Parliament and Diet, but not exclusively through the
influence of those bodies — such, briefly, are the contents of
the first article of the political creed avowed by our
Chancellor in connection with the internal affairs of the
Empire and of Prussia — the creed which, in the course of
his Ministerial career, he has been at great pains to
promulgate and to carry out. This article has regulated his
attitude towards every accruing question of our internal
policy. i
Bismarck is convinced that party-ministries are impossible
in Prussia. During the session of the Lower House held
on the 25th January, 1873, he remarked upon this subject:

IJ Objections to Party Government. 27
" The Ministry must be of a predominantly governmental —
allow me, in conformity with the innermost dictates of my
heart to use the expression — Royal character. Were we
to take to party-ministries, our antagonisms would at once
acquire a more acute character. The King alone, and the
inspiration emanating from himself and his political appre
hensions, are impartial and above party considerations. In
my opinion, therefore, the government in Prussia must stand
upon this high level— that of the Crown. It may be
necessary to go with one party or with another, according
to the governmental feeling of the Crown and the adminis
tration. In England, such a vicissitude is generally
characterised by a change of Ministry : if reactionary
measures have to be met, the Liberal party takes the helm,
under the reasonable presumption that it will not overstep
the requisite limits ; and vice versd in the case of Liberal
measures and the Conservative party. Our party antago
nisms are as yet too bitter, and public feeling — the feeling
that every individual, outside and independently of his own
party, is responsible for the government and good adminis
tration of the State — is not yet developed here in the same
degree as in England, although I do not deny that we have
made immense progress during the past few years. Every
one now is beginning to bear in mind the necessity of the
continuous existence of a well-ordered State Government —
except those who belong to a party which denies the State
itself on principle, because in their opinion it ought not to
exist at all." The views above expressed are still firmly
adhered to by Bismarck, as may be gathered from a passage
in his already quoted great speech of January 24th, 1882,
as follows : " A great State is not governed according to
party-views ; one must take into consideration the totality
of parties existing in the country, and from it deduce a line

28 Party Tendencies. [Chap.
of action which a government can pursue." In further
evidence we may quote some remarks from the Chancellor's
speech (June 14, 1882) in the Reichstag. Upon that
occasion he stated that a party government in Germany
is impossible, "because each party is continuously labouring
under the progressive development of its special party-
tendency. This progressive development necessarily takes
place in the direction of its extreme, and further advance
ment ensues according to the tendency animating the party
itself. A Conservative party is always exposed to the
danger of reaction, if it govern for any length of time ;
somebody will always be found belonging to it who will
put forward Conservative theories still more comprehensive
or far-going than those of his party, to which theories
(because of their extremeness) he will readily gain over the
mass of electors. The same is the case in the Liberal
party; in the matter of Liberalism one man is always
ready to outbid another; it has been so in France since
1789, and in England since the reforms of 1832. He who
is outbidden is always in the wrong, and the new elections
do not require to be worked by a Caucus, as here and in
England — they gravitate of themselves towards him who
abuses the government more than his predecessor ; thus
each party in turn is finally forced into the deplorable
position, through the intemperance of its more immoderate
members' doctrinal demands, of coercing the dynasty, in the
interest of its own sustention, into seeking the support of
other parties or elements. I would ask you, gentlemen, to
take to heart the example of the Herbst party in Austria,
and to observe the result of tactics prompting the leader of
to-morrow to outbid the leader of to-day, he of to-day
having already ruined him of yesterday. On this account,
I say, party government is quite impossible in this country ;

IJ Effects of Parliamentarism. 29
and if it has made a start here it will soon come to grief
through the doctrinal intemperance that is peculiar to the
German people, and through the suffocating effect of the
electoral vapours that will be artificially stirred up and
made to ascend from depths below." Finally, we may
quote the Chancellor's reply, in the autumn of 1881, to a
deputy who had taken exception to the assumption that the
Party of Progress, and other fractions pursuing that party's
slippery political path, must eventually arrive at the Republic.
Prince Bismarck called the Assembly's attention to history
— in particular, to that of the Girondists, who had wished
to bring about universal order in a Liberal and humane
sense of the word (as might be the visionary aspiration of
the Party of Progress) and who had in every respect shot
beyond their mark. " And so it went on," continued the
Chancellor, "in France. There had existed in that
country a hereditary, solidly constructed monarchy with
extremely intelligent constitutional institutions, with all
imaginable monarchical forms, with a Restoration and with
an Empire. All this has been swept, by Parliamentarism, into
the Republican orbit. These foregone conclusions have
not developed themselves in practice to the same extent in
other countries, because these latter have not held positions
as substantial as that of France. For instance, were
Holland and Belgium as great and independent as France,
it may be doubted (taking into consideration all their
political tendencies and agitations) that they would at the
present time still belong to the monarchical order of States.
Let us take Italy. There they have already had the
Republic, locally and transitorily. Even now it haunts
many Italian brains as the future government of all man
kind. In Italy they are a long way ahead of our German
' Progress.' Should God not preserve their dynasty, which

30 The Party of Progress. [Chap.
is dependent upon but few lives, nobody can answer for the
attainment of the goal aimed at by Italian development
throughout the last twenty years. Anyhow, the centre of
gravity of political life in Italy has shifted, under Govern
ment after Government, more and more Leftwards, so that
the country cannot lapse any further in that direction
without becoming Republican. Through the parliamentary
system contemplated by the Party of Progress, Spain, too,
has for a time possessed the Republic; aye, several
varieties thereof, which have fought one against another.
And in Germany — when things were left to themselves here,
before Prussian ' Militarism ' interfered with them, did not
Baden exhibit a similar readiness to heave Monarchy over
board and to introduce the Republic? The foregoing
prophecies concerning the end towards which the Party of
Progress, with its ' views and tendencies,' is gliding on,
are therefore by no means frivolous or indefensible.
History speaks for me," concluded the Chancellor in a
confident tone ; " scientific doctrinaires have delivered
themselves against me ; I stick to history. I am in a
position enabling me to observe ; and for twenty years past
— at least as far as our foreign policy has been concerned —
I have given proof that my eyes are not totally blind to
eventualities with which history may bring us into contact.
It is, therefore, with all the weight of my experience and
position that I bear witness to the fact that the policy of the
Party of Progress would conduct us, slowly but surely, to
the Republic. I can only say that the temper and attitude
which Monarchy requires in its Ministers are not those which
the Progressists fancy. I do not in the least doubt their
sincere desire to realise Constitutional Monarchy, to its
extremest limits ; but I believe they do not take to heart
the lessons taught by History ; they shut their eyes to

IJ Ministerial Responsibility. 31
them ; they are not capable of bringing the machine to a
standstill when it shall arrive at the point to which they
want to make it go. The road is too precipitous; they
cannot stay the avalanche of 45,000,000 Germans in its
fall ; it will overwhelm them."
The complement of this Article of Faith may be found in a
prediction of the Chancellor, founded upon the strength of
the Government, and his own firm will, which he gave
utterance to on December 2, 1881, in conversation with the
writer : " Should the Opposition long persist in its present
method and style of negation, allowing no reforms to come
to pass through us, and incapable of bringing any about
itself, it will attain the category of the Impossible — of that
which cannot be endured or put up with. Even the ' Luck
of Edenhall' — you know Uhland's poem — could be de
stroyed when, through an exaggerated belief in its solidity,
it was too roughly handled. So can the German Consti
tution." Article 44 of the Prussian Constitution states : " The
King's Ministers are responsible;" and Article 61: "In
virtue of a resolution passed by both Houses of the Diet,
Ministers may be prosecuted for the crimes of breach of
the Constitution, bribery, and treason." This, however, is
a theory that can only be put into practice whenever the
" Ministerial-Responsibility Bill " (hinted at in the conclud
ing sentence of Article 61, i.e., "Further disposition, anent
cases of responsibility, proceedings and penalties therein,
&c, are reserved for definition in a special law)," shall be
agreed upon between the three legislative factors, and shall
be put in force, which is not yet the case, as the Govern
ment appears to consider the objections still existent that
were raised against the draught measure brought forward
by the Party of Progress in 1863, when (April 22), Bismarck

32 Constitutional Shortcomings. [Chap.
declared in the Lower House that the Government did not
deem the moment suitable for the introduction of such a
measure, inasmuch as the Charter of the Constitution did
not offer any distinct and complete foundation for dealing
with it, and, moreover, important differences of opinion with
respect to the true significance of essential portions of the
Constitution had arisen between the Crown and the country,
as well as between both Houses of the Diet. " Those very
actions of the Government," he continued, " which are con
tested by you as unconstitutional, have conspicuously taken
place on the field of this question : ' What is legal when,
through lack of unanimity in the three legislative factors, a
law regulating the administration of the State household has
not been brought into existence ? ' The Constitution con
tains no answer to this question. ... If, in the present state
of affairs, a tribunal were constituted by a special law in
order to settle the question of Ministerial responsibility;
whether or not the Constitution were thereby violated, the
functions of a legislator would certainly be imparted to the
judge, who would be called upon either to interpret the
Constitution or to materially complete it. However highly
I may rank Prussian judges as juristic authorities, the
Government has not deemed it desirable to make the
political future of this country — the division of power between
the Crown and the Diet (as well as between the two Houses
of the Diet) — dependent upon the single sentence of a
tribunal, pronounced in conformity with the subjective
opinion of the majority of judges. The Government believes
that this question of State rights can only be settled by the
Legislature, through an understanding arrived at between
that Legislature's several factors; and therefore, under'
existing circumstances, cannot accord its sanction to the
draught measure you have brought forward."

IJ Tlie Collective Responsibility of Ministers. 33
The Chancellor does not approve of the collective Minis
terial arrangements existing in Prussia. At a session of the
Reichstag (16 April, 1869), he spoke of them as " a political
mistake, of which every State should rid itself as soon as
possible," and observed that "it would be an immense
improvement if Prussia, for the future, could have only one
responsible minister." " In what," he asked, " consists this
responsibility? It has been here stated that (for the
North German Confederation), it should come to pass by
means of solidarity; I say that it is incompatible with
solidarity. The individual may be invested with it, for he
may be made answerable for his errors ; but, as a member
of a corporation, he may ask, ' How do you know that I was
not outvoted ? that the difficulties and frictions I en
countered were not insurmountable — that laws did not
remain in abeyance for seven years, because seven honest
men could not agree together upon the interpretation of
their text ? ' In a corporation — when some matter has to
be definitely settled — it often becomes inevitable that a
desperate resolve should be adopted, so imperative is the
necessity that a decision should be arrived at — that some
body should be in a position to say, ' Thus it shall be, and
no otherwise!'" On the 25th of January, 1873, he further
remarked in the Lower House : " Strange to say, it is here
the case that the President of the Ministry of State, although
a greater weight of moral responsibility undoubtedly falls to
his share than to that of any other member of the Cabinet,
exercises no greater influence upon the collective direction
of affairs than any one of his colleagues, unless he can
achieve it by his own personal exertions. Our State laws
invest him with no such influence ; if he desire to obtain it,
he must do so by entreaties, arguments, correspondence,
expostulations, addressed to the assembled Cabinet — in a
VOL. 1. D

34 His View of the Premiership. [Chap.
word, by struggles which cannot but subject the capacities
of any individual to a heavy strain. The means are weak ;
the task is great ; and the weight that has to be lifted when
it becomes necessary to convince a colleague who differs in
opinion from you, is not amenable to entreaties and per
suasions." The moral deduced from the above is the
following : " Either collective responsibility must be estab
lished beyond dispute, without reference to the personality
of the Minister-President — to whom no greater responsibility
must therefore be ascribed than to any other Minister of
State — or the Premier must be provided with extra powers,
placing him, so to speak, in a higher position than that
occupied by departmental Ministers, if he is to be held in a
greater degree responsible than they; " that is, he must be
invested with the right of deciding questions, according to
his views and judgment, in cases where opinions differ. In
the Reichstag session of March 13, 1877, he expressed
himself upon this point much as he had done in 1869 : " I
look upon responsibility, imposed upon Ministers who out
vote one another by a majority of voices, as one altogether
incomprehensible. Who, then, bears the responsibility for
the decisions of the Reichstag, or of any other Parliamentary
assembly ? Can you hold the individual answerable for
those decisions ? Can you charge him with that responsi
bility, for instance, when the Reichstag's decisions do not
amount to anything for which he can be answerable ? He
will very possibly say, ' I was outvoted ; or, even if I was
not outvoted on any one particular question, I was com
pelled by the majority to adopt a general course which, had
I carried out my own personal views, I should not have
adhered to.' ... I do not understand how you can exact a
higher measure of responsibility from a Ministiy which
arrives at its decisions by vote, than from a Parliamentary

i. J His View of the Premiership. 35
Assembly, as long as this latter is in a position to invariably
hold the leading Minister (against whose will nothing can at
least come to pass), responsible for whatsoever takes place.
... It appears to me that political responsibility really
means whether or not a man, in the judgment of his fellow-
citizens, has made a fool of himself, politically speaking —
whether he has conducted the State affairs in such sort as
may be expected from a person fitted for the tenure of
ministerial office, or has managed them frivolously, inequi
tably, and at the dictates of party passions. Even this view
of the matter may frequently be unfair to the individual who
belongs to a Ministry in which he has been outvoted. Only
if he has been able to exercise an absolute veto in the
Cabinet can he be justly held answerable for what the
Cabinet has done."
Hence the Chancellor draws the conclusion that the
Prime Minister should be invested with decisive power in
the Empire as well as in Prussia. On March 5, 1878, he
observed in the Reichstag : " It has been previously
mentioned that certain departments stand in need of
financial comptrol. This comptrol cannot, however, be
carried so far as to make the Minister of Finance chief of
any one of these departments. At any moment may make
itself manifest the need of a decision which cannot be legally
pronounced upon any such dispute in Prussia by the
Ministry, but must either be the result of a compromise or
be settled by his Majesty the King. But to appeal to the
King in all trifling cases of divergence of opinion between
the Minister of Finance and a departmental chief would be
carrying such matters too far; and in this respect the
Imperial Constitution possesses an advantage over that of
Prussia, inasmuch as it vests the decisive power in one of
the Ministers — the Chancellor, or Premier. In Prussia this
d 2

36 His Attitude towards the Upper House. [Chap.
official must tell his colleague with whom he cannot agree,
' One of us must go ; ' and this is productive of tiresome
discussions often enduring throughout years at a stretch.
Not so in the Empire ; for there a Minister is to the fore
who has the right to command."
Bismarck chiefly indicated his attitude towards the Upper
House of the Prussian Diet by certain declarations which
he rnade to that Legislative body on the 15th and 24th of
January, 1865. On the former date he remarked : " The
Royal Government, from the standpoint of constitutional
eonvictions, will defend the existence and organic develop
ment of the Upper House against any and every attack ; it
looks upon those Constitutional Statesmen as extremely
shortsighted who believe they can assail any one factor of the
Constitution without calling into question the whole of our
constitutional system. A ruling force (executive power)
which should allow itself to be induced to wilfully suppress,
or even ignore, one factor of the legislature would scarcely
be prompted by constitutional scruples to hesitate at dealing
similarly with another." On the second occasion he ob
served : " I regard as illegal — because contradictory to the
spirit of the Constitution — the easy expedient for obviating
conflicts between the two Houses of the Diet, viz., that the
Government undertake to make the Upper House agree
with the Lower House, whenever it fails to do so, by a
creation of peers. This leads to the " one chamber system,"
which demands upon principle an Upper House absolutely
incapable of disagreeing with the Lower House, and entirely
undermines the institution known as a House of Lords
First Chamber, or Upper House — call it what you please 
which should in reality be the representative of a policy that
does not lightly yield to .popular opinion for the time being,
but serves at once to control and ballast the Diet. The

I J Utility of the House of Peers. 37
very same experiment that might be practised by a Liberal
Ministry in order to coerce a recalcitrant Upper House into
concord with a Liberal Lower House — by creating peers —
would necessarily be repeated, later on, by a Conservative
Ministry to oblige a Conservative Lower House (it is not an
utter impossibility that we may have a Conservative Lower
House some of these days) : and if we then had a Liberal
majority in the Upper House, it would be necessary to
recruit that body in a contrary direction, so that in time the
number of its members would become an extravagant one,
and the House of Peers would be a mere shadow of the
House of Commons — a condition of things which would
gainsay the spirit of the Constitution." In the Reichstag
later on (28th of March, 1867), he characterised the insti
tution of a First Chamber, Upper House, or Senate, more
exactly still — as follows : " It is a drag, fitted to the wheels
of the state-coach, in order to prevent the latter from run
ning too rapidly down precipitous intervals of the road ; it
is the influential participation in public affairs of those who
have something to lose thereby, and who are not disposed
to play too rashly, at the cost and risk of the State, because
their own stake is a high one ; it is the transfer to our con
ditions of being of one of the most material advantages of
English institutions — an advantage which I perceive in the
fact that so many almost Royal entities exist in England.
I will explain more clearly what I mean by this — absolutely
disinterested entities which have nothing to wish for in this
world of sufficient importance to tempt them to act other
wise than in accordance with their calm, conscientious
conviction of what is best for the welfare of the State. That
I consider to be an extraordinary advantage of English con
ditions of being. It is not so easy to make experiments in
that country, because those who are called upon to experi-

38 The Prussian Upper House. [Chap.
mentalise have by far too heavy a stake of property and
well-being to lose."
Finally (in February, 1881), the Chancellor expressed
himself in private with respect to the Prussian Legislative
Body above alluded to in something like the following
terms : " The practical participation of the Upper House in
our politics has been defective of late ; but we must not
regard it (the House of Peers) as the exclusive source of
that evil, although this latter may to a considerable extent
be attributed to a certain lack of interest in State affairs
which is manifest in a great number of our Peers. But the
chief blame, in my opinion, must be borne by the Govern
ment, and that because it submits, not only all its financial
propositions, but every other important motion and draught-
measure, to the Lower House in the first place. The
former course of action is prescribed by the Constitution ;
the latter is not. For example, the collective statutes of
organisation — as well those applying to the entire monarchy
as those concerning single provinces — were regularly and
exclusively laid, in the first place, before the Lower House,
which either left them lying about the committee-rooms, or,
at the most, sent them up to the House of Peers in the very
last week of the Session. This will probably suggest to a
good many people one of Schiller's lines, slightly varied so
as to run thus : " When vice shall have eaten its fill, virtue
may sit down to table." In other words : " Humble folk are
thrust back and ill-used because of their humility." To my
mind this policy is neither estimable nor practical. I
cannot help fearing that future Governments will have to
pay dearly for the mistake committed by the present one in
consenting to a practice which is nearly equivalent to the
nullification, of the Prussian Upper House. The lack of
interest, above alluded to, in public affairs which character-

IJ The Prussian Upper House. 39
ises the greater number of our Peers is unquestionably the
result of unsuitable arrangements, for which that body has to
thank its creation and development. It is owing to these
tnat most of our Peers have no animate connection, with
public life, the hot pulsation of which never reaches them.
There may still be some politicians amongst us who re
member the lively and efficient activity with which the
whilom " First Chamber," superseded by the Upper House,
made its mark in the existence of the State — and the corres
ponding interest exhibited by the public at that time in the
transactions of that Chamber, because they were in reality
fuller of matter and exhibited more intellectual capacity
than the debates of the Second Chamber. To any one able
to recall this to his mind, as I am, it will be impossible to
contemplate without regret the significance and utility of the
present House, as compared with those of the Chamber of
which it is the transmogrified successor. The error we here
encounter does not, however, lie exclusively at the- insuffi
ciency of the root which the Upper House, since its
development, has taken in this country ; for, even as
Prussia's Senate exists and is constituted, it would possess
more importance did the Government attach more impor
tance to it, instead of limiting its share in the labour of
legislation by assigning to it its present modicurc: of
participation in the business of the Diet, and by choosing
from a certain class the persons it nominates to peerages.
The manner in which our Upper House is constrained to
take part in legislation has for its result that preparatory
work in committee, and current business to boot, chiefly
falls into the hands of members who reside in the capital —
generally retired officials, more or less dissatisfied with the
loss of their posts . . . Ci-devant Ministers who, like
Bernuth, Count Lippe, Friedenthal, and Camphausen — have

40 Elements of the Prussian Senate. [Chap.
resigned office of their own free will, are either inclined to
continue, as members of Parliament, their old accustomed
Ministerial activity, or experience a feeling of resentment at
not having been again entrusted with a portfolio or with
any other sort of employment since their resignation. They
would indeed be endowed with uncommonly exalted dispos
itions of mind if — free from anything like ill-will — they
could contemplate or aid to bring about the successes of
those now holding the offices they formerly held ; and it is
only human— only natural and usual — that mere average
natures should be unable to oppose lofty patriotic considera
tions to the temptation, assailing them at every turn, to
suggest the impression that their retirement from office has
left a chasm in the State mechanism which cannot possibly
be filled up. I do not think I am beyond the mark in
stating that these Berlinese, supplemented by a few repre
sentatives of large towns, amount to sixty — the number of
members required by law to "make a House." The
remaining members of the House, i.e., the representatives of
great landed property in the provinces (who were originally
intended to exercise predominant influence in that Assembly)
only put in an appearance upon rare occasions, when the
voting apparatus is called upon to sanction the legislative
lesults of the whole Session within a few days ; and this is a
most decided disadvantage. With many of the persons who
arrive in Berlin for this purpose, the first question that
generally suggests itself is " When we shall be able to go
home again?" When the discussion upon the Field-and-
Forest Police Bill — a measure of the highest importance to
landed proprietors, threatening them, in fact, with intolerable
annoyances — took place, only about eighty members of the
Upper House, if I mistake not, came forward to vote ; and
of those barely twenty belonged to the class of provincial

ij His Appraisement of both Houses. 41
land-owners especially molested by the law in question . . .
If, therefore, the Government wishes to transact political
business in earnest, and not merely to administer individual
departments, it will have to recognise the necessity of trying
whether it be not possible, by treating the Upper House
somewhat better — by putting it more on an equal footing
with the Lower House — to induce its members to participate
more vivaciously and regularly in the transactions of the
Diet. Public business cannot any longer be carried on as
heretofore, if the regeneration of the Upper House, so
desirable in every respect, is to be effected. For who
could at present advance any pregnant and convincing
rejoinder to the questions with which the majority of the
133 Peers (present, out of 300, at the last division) might
reply to the reproach that they had only appeared in their
places in the House during the last fortnight of the Session,
i.e., ' What should we have done here, had we come sooner ?
Waited at the door of the Lower House till the Deputies
should condescend to send out to us the offal resulting from
their deliberations ? Or danced attendance on Ministers,
till they should find time to attend to us ? We could do as
much as that by stopping at home.' "
We have several of the Chancellor's utterances, besides
the above, to indicate to us his view of the real import of
the Lower House. In the Second Chamber (21 March,
1849) he said: "Do not let us yield to the illusion that
our majorities or minorities represent proportionate fractions
of popular will. Which of you gentlemen is exactly
acquainted with the sentiments and feelings of the people ;
who amongst us can adduce any credible proof that that
which he sets forth as such really is the collective will of the
Prussian people? We are elected by the majority of
secondary electors, themselves elected by the majority of

42 Parliament not Representative of tiie People. [Chap.
primary electors. We all, therefore, only represent the
majority of a majority, perhaps something over a quarter of
the primary electors who really registered their votes ; and
yet certain fractions of this Assembly come forward and
endeavour to foist upon us their views and their will as
the views and will of the great Prussian people ! " During
a session of the Lower House (14 February, 1850) he
further remarked : " The report of the Committee, with a
certain amount of complacency, applies the expression
' Representation of the People ' to both Prussian Chambers,
whose privileges It" does not wish to see curtailed. We do
not constitute a ' Representation of the People.' Let us
descend from that pedestal of self-created greatness. The
Prussian people, as it lives and has its being in its eight
provinces, with all its beliefs and hopes, its animate organ
isation and practical requirements, is by no means reflected
or reproduced in this Assembly. The Prussian Chamber is
still only an imperfect representative of the taxed elements
— that is, of about half the tax-paying primary electors in
each of the three assessed classes. I cannot call that a
' Representation of the People.' " (The President referred
Herr von Bismarck to article 83 of the Constitution ; which
says : " The members of both Chambers are representatives
of the whole people " ). " According to the Constitution,
just quoted to us, this Assembly is equipped with distinctly
defined attributes. . . Let us content ourselves with those
attributes and not go beyond them in order to advance
pretensions to the title of popular representatives, which is
officially accorded to us, truly, by the Constitution; but
titles in partibus are also official. Let us be satisfied with
what we have got; above all, let us not overstep our
constitutional competence." Finally (29 January, 1863) he
declared in the Lower House: "The Constitution makes

ij Denunciation of the Prussian Electoral System. 43
no difference between the two Houses of the Diet. The
circumstance that the Lower House is the outcome of
elections does not, according to the Constitution, invest it
with any rights superior to those of the Upper House."
Bismarck has often expressed his disapprobation of the
electoral system to which the Prussian Lower House owes
its being; he did so with unprecedented severity in the
Reichstag (28 March, 1867) when he designated the system
in question as incomparably senseless and pitiful, and charac
terised the statute embodying it as a measure calculated to
" rend asunder everything that should cohere, to muddle up
together people who have nothing whatever to do with one
another, and to measure each Commune with a different
scale. Had the inventor of this Electoral Law realised to
himself its practical effect, he would never have called it
into being. Capriciousness and oppression alike inspire
every census — oppression most palpable of all exactly where
the census breaks off and exclusion from it commences.
We can hardly explain to the persons excluded that they
are Helots, politically dead as far as State-existence is
concerned, because they do not pay exactly the same
amount of taxes as their next-door neighbours." Bismarck,
however, beyond this expression of his predilection for fair-
play, did not throw into the scale of argument any weights
borrowed from the practical working of other electoral laws ;
and, in the same sitting of the Reichstag, he remarked (after
agreeing with a previous speaker that, "on the whole all
Electoral Laws, enforced under similar conditions and
influences, produced identical results " ) : "I believe that if
to-day we were to conduct our elections on the basis of the
' United Diet and a ten-years' landed proprietorship,' we
should be represented much as we are actually at this time ;
since I began my parliamentary career in 1847 tne elements

44 Electoral Systems. [Chap.
of German legislative representation have not suffered any
change ; I have always seen the same faces opposite me,
some friendly, some combative." Further on in this speech
he availed himself of the arguments he had put forward
against indirect elections in 1849, i.e. : — " If it be assumed
that the majority in every electoral stage, only requires to
consist oi one over the moiety of votes, the secondary elector
only represents one primary elector more than half the total
of primary electors, and the Deputy only represents one
man more than half the secondary electors, whose totality
only represents the least thing more than the moiety of the
primary electors — therefore, the Deputy (unless large
majorities happen to have accrued in the electoral districts ;
I am however, taking the extreme case of a very small
majority) indirectly elected represents with mathematical
accuracy something minutely trifling over one fourth of the
primary electors ; and the majority of the House, therefore,
only represents one eighth of the whole electoral element.
Direct elections enable us to entirely omit one of these
stages of dimidiation." After his assumption, quoted above,
that all Electoral Laws yield nearly identical results, the
Chancellor's further remarks will probably appear to have
been dictated by courtesy, ever so slightly flavoured with
irony : " For I have ever found more intelligence in the
collective feeling of the people than in the meditations of
the elector; and I appeal to the impression — a pretty
general one — (I do not know whether or not you, gentlemen
share my perceptions in the matter, but I certainly do
experience the impression in question) that more remarkable
capacities are brought into this House by direct than
by indirect elections, because the weight of local cliques is
not so directly brought to bear upon the elector in the larger
districts in which the system of direct election obtain* I

IJ Officialism in Parliament. 45
hope the House will prove sensible to the indirect flattery
conveyed in these remarks."
Another of Bismarck's Articles of Faith concerning
Parliamentary elections exacts the exclusion therefrom of
Government officials, upon the ground (one of many) that,
with respect to the Reichstag, " such officials may be too
strongly disposed to give expression to the Particularist
impulses of the Federal Government which they may
happen to serve." His other reasons apply to the Prussian
Lower House ; and the most weighty of these is the laxity
of official discipline resulting from the participation of State
employes in Parliamentary proceedings. " In Prussia," he
observed, "we have at present, in a certain sense, two
Constitutions simultaneously in force; i.e. the ancient
Constitution of absolutism, guaranteed by the irremovability
of officials, and the modern Constitution with which, in
almost every other country, that irremovability is held to be
incompatible. . . The Government feels itself cramped in
every direction. It cannot dismiss an employe" who renders
formal obedience to its orders, but does not enter into their
spirit. This has its advantages. I would not upon any
account renounce the integrity of the Prussian official, his
prestige, his sense of dignity which'raises him above tempta
tion despite his slender and often insufficient remuneration,
and would rather henceforth put up with the inconveniences
of a cramped and embarrassed government than meddle
inconsiderately with these difficulties. But, just because
we cannot get rid of them at our pleasure we must avail
ourselves of every means at our disposal to maintain strict
discipline, and must shrink from everything calculated to
relax that discipline. I cannot say that it makes a good
impression throughout the country — I cannot doubt that it
suggests the feeling that there is something rotten in the

46 Officialism in Parliament. [Chap.
State — when we find a subordinate official opposing his
paramount chief in public and using language towards him
which, beyond doubt, that same official is far too well-bred
to use towards his own servants at home. . . As a Minister
I am quite prepared to put up with the strongest represen
tations submitted to me in a written form by any official, at
the promptings of a feeling of duty ; but I could hardly
bear to remain a Minister if I were compelled to con
tinuously employ in my department an official who refused
to pay me that respect in public to which, in my position,
I persistendy make claim."
Towards the close of this speech Bismarck declared it to
be at least desirable that ecclesiastical and judicial employe's
should be excluded from election to Parliament, pointing
out, with regard to judges in particular, that participation
in party-struggles reacted injuriously upon their impartiality.
" It has often happened to me," he said, " especially in the
earlier years of my official career, that sentences delivered
in cases of libel against the Prussian Prime Minister, quite
unknown to me and unprovoked by me, have been
submitted to my inspection with the enquiry 'whether I
would cause them to be published.' Upon the average I
found that insults such as, if addressed by one respectable
handicraftsman to another in public, would be punished by
a heavy fine or by imprisonment, cost about ten thalers
(thirty shillings) when aimed at the Prime Minister. At
that price any one was free to hurl the vilest abuse at
me in public, either by word of mouth or in print.
It was certainly not my impression that, in this particular
matter, the appraisement of the offence committed was
altogether emancipate from the influence of political feeling ;
the less so because I noticed, amongst the attenuating
circumstances recorded in some of these sentences that

IJ Politics and the Bench. 47
'as a matter of fact, the present Ministry is utterly
worthless.' "
In the same connection the Chancellor declared (3rd
March, 1881) in the Reichstag: "I believe that it is not
consistent with the dignity of judges that they should
directly take part in electioneering agitations. I am
extremely doubtful that, taking into consideration the
vivacity of our party-manoeuvres, it is possible for a judge
to display perfect impartiality towards his political oppo
nents.; and I should regard it as a blessing for the Prussian
Bench and for the reputation of our judges, if they were
legally excluded from participation in party-action. The
judge should be characterised by a higher degree of
impartiality than the administrative government official
called upon to serve one or another Cabinet. An official
of this latter class cannot be absolutely devoid of party-
feeling, and it always strikes me as a painful and undignified
spectacle, when I perceive some person, holding an exalted
post under Government, who is in diametrical opposition to
that Government's policy and yet continues to retain office.
A position in the Administration exacts from its occupant a
certain measure of partisanship for the Government ; but
the position of a judge prescribes absolute, intact and
spotless impartiality. I require from the judge that, as a
matter of honour, he should belong to no party ; whereas
the honour of a Government official does not suffer if,
under certain circumstances, he manifests party-spirit a
little more conspicuously than is consistent with good taste.
Through not taking a prominent part in elections the judge
is saved from making statements to the Electoral Com
mittee which, proved against him by witnesses, may render
him liable to attack ; though he may be called upon, as an
administrator of oaths, to accompany the candidate to the

48 Government Officials. [Chap.
poll." The Royal Decree of January 4, 1882, gave the
Chancellor occasion to deliver himself still further upon this
theme. The Decree set forth that " it is the sworn duty of
officials entrusted with the execution of the King's govern
mental acts to refrain from taking part in any electioneering
agitation hostile to the Government, and to protect the
Constitutional rights of the Crown by guarding them against
doubt and obscuration." The Chancellor briefly interpreted
this prescription as meaning " That an official should recall
to mind his oath with respect to his own election, is by no
means required of him ; in the exercise of his voting rights
he is perfectly free. . . The Decree is expressly addressed
to that class of officials whose habit it is to busy themselves
with elections other than their own, and thus draws a
distinction between two categories of officials— the political
and non-political." Only with respect to the former,
observed the Chancellor, did the Decree assume that their
oath binds them to support the policy of their Government,
" by which," as he expressed it, " I mean that a political
official, notwithstanding his indisputable right to elect whom
he pleases — let us, for instance, suppose his choice to have
fallen upon a Progressist candidate — is not thereby exempted
from his obligation to contest lies (which I have already
stigmatised as political well-poisoning) in accordance with
the dictates of his conscience ; if he be a man of honour, he
will surely do so, saying ' I do not belong to the Govern
ment party ; but this is untrue, and that is an exaggeration.'
He may — in his heart and with his secret voting-ticket as
well — vote for whom he will ; how he votes nobody will ask
him. and we cannot possibly find out; it will therefore
never be the cause of proceedings being instituted against
him, and I would never be instrumental in making it so.
But it is expected of these political officials that they should,

Ij Government Officials. 49
as far as in them lies, represent truth as against falsehood.
Is that too much ? Are they to become accomplices in
lying, by holding their tongues when they know better?
Are they to look on calmly in certain electoral districts,
whilst the inhabitants of the Royal Forests are told : The
King has made a compact with the Liberal Deputies to the
effect that you shall enjoy the right of hunting in the forest
if you vote for the Liberal candidate . . . From the non-
political officials His Majesty requires next to nothing. The
Decree expects that they will refrain from agitating against
the Government during the elections. That, gentlemen, I
venture to say, is a claim exercised upon them by common
decency. Nothing, I repeat, is expected of them but to
refrain from agitation — for instance, that they shall not
perform any official act under the influence of a third
person's vote or manner of voting, or which implies any
compulsion with respect to voting. Gentlemen, an official
acting thus would be punishable, and, in my opinion, not
only in a disciplinary sense of the word."
This view of a State employe's position, in relation to the
King and Government, is so natural and incontestable, that
even the Radical fraction of the Liberal party — at a time,
to be sure, when it hoped to assume the reins of office —
adhered to it quite unreservedly, and even went a good
deal farther. When the Party of Progress was formed in
1 86 1 it embodied the following declaration in its programme,
having regard to the circumstance that the Liberal Ministry
of that day tolerated many adversaries amongst its employe's ;
" For our internal institutions we require a firm Liberal
Government, which shall demonstrate its strength by
respecting the constitutional rights of all citizens, shall know
how to inexorably obtain currency for its principles throughout
all classes of its employes, and shall, by these means, obtain
vol. 1. E

50 His National Policy. [Chap
and maintain for us the respect of every other German race."
According to this manifesto — to which the party boasts of
still literally adhering — the Government has the indubitable
right to inexorably exact recognition of its political princi
ples from all its officials ; and one would suppose this right
to be equally vested in Liberal and Conservative Govern
ments, whichsoever might happen to be in power. Or do
the gentlemen of Progress, in this as in other questions,
recognise the distinction drawn by Squire Alexander between
the peasant's cow and his own ?
Our Chancellor's other chief Article of Faith — the other
mainspring of his political dealings in home as well as
foreign questions — the German Idea — the belief that the
Federal States of Germany must be transformed into one
Federal State under Prussian leadership, that the German
nation must, as far as is necessary and possible, be politically
unified, and that this achievement must be maintained and
perfected by all righteous means and measures, in order that
the forces and gifts of our nation may obtain full develop.
ment, that its true interests may be protected and advanced,
and that serious perils may be averted from it — has been
expounded in many of his writings, and in verbal avowals
made by him to the Legislative Bodies. Extracts from the
more ancient of the documents alluded to will be given in
the fifth chapter of this book. ... Of the avowals we
must, first and foremost, call attention to that pronounced
by Prince Bismarck (9 July, 1869), at the close of the
debate in the Reichstag upon Economic Reform. On that
occasion he said : "Since I first became a Minister I have
never belonged, nor could I ever belong, to any particular
fraction. I have been hated by all in turn, and liked by
only a few. When, in 1862, I accepted the Prussian
Premiership, you must all remember to what, I will venture

Ij His Patriotism. S1
to say, an unpatriotic height public hatred against me rose
I did not allow it to lead me astray, nor have I ever
attempted to take vengeance for it. From the very com
mencement of my career my sole guiding-star has been, how
to unify Germany, and, that being achieved, how to
strengthen, complete, and so constitute her unification that
it may be preserved enduringly, and with the good will of
all concerned in it." The Chancellor spoke in a similar
strain to the Reichstag during the sitting of February 24th,
1881. Reproached with having frequently and abruptly
changed his views with respect to different questions, he
replied : " Well, I am certainly not one of those who have
ever believed, or now believe, that they have nothing to
learn ; and if anybody says to me, ' Twenty years ago you
and I were of one mind ; to-day I hold the same opinions
as I did then, and you exactly the opposite,' I shall answer
him, ' Aye ; twenty years ago I was as wise as you are to
day ; now I am wiser, for I have learnt something in the
meantime.' But I will not attempt to excuse myself thus.
For me only one compass, one polar star, has ever existed,
by which I have steered my course; and that is, solus
publico. From the very beginning of my participation in
the conduct of State affairs I have often acted rashly and in
considerately ; but whenever I had time for reflection, I
always subordinated myself to the question, 'What is the
best thing for my native country — what (so long as I was
only a Prussian), is most useful to my dynasty — and, nowa
days, what is most suitable to the German nation. All my
life long I have never been a doctrinaire ; all systems by
which political parties feel themselves separated or bound
together are to me secondary considerations ; the first of all
is the nation, its standing abroad, its independence, our
organization, so contrived that we may be enabled to
e 2

52 His Indifference to Party Politics. [Chap.
breathe freely 'in the world as a great people. Everything
after that — Liberal, Reactionary, Conservative Constitutions
— gentlemen, I confess quite openly, that all these matters
are to me of secondary importance ; they constitute a luxury
in the furnishing line, which may be indulged in after the
building of the house shall have been solidly completed. In
these questions of party, I may tend towards one or another,
as the case may require in the interest of the country ; the
doctrines themselves I hold amazingly cheap. Let us first
bring to pass a durable edifice, outwardly secured, inwardly
supported, and held together by national ties ; and then you
may ask me my opinion how the house is to be fitted up,
with more or less Liberal-constitutional furniture ; perhaps
you will find that I shall answer, ' Well, I entertain no pre
conceived opinion upon the subject ; make your offers, and
if they prove acceptable to the Sovereign, whom I serve, you
will not encounter any very serious obstacles on my part.
Things may be managed this way or that ; many roads lead
to Rome. There are times in which it is necessary to
govern on Liberal principles, and times in which a dictatorial
Government is requisite ; everything changes ; here ther is
no eternity. But I demand that the edifice of the German
Empire, and the unity of the German nation, shall be estab
lished solidly and inexpugnably — not merely protected on
one side or another by flying field-works. To the creation
and consolidation of that edifice I have subordinated my
entire course of political action, from its very inception ; and
if you can indicate to me a single moment of my public life
during which I have not steered towards that point of the
compass, you will perhaps be able to show me that I have been
mistaken, but not that I have lost sight of the national goal."
Clear recognition of the situation's requirements, and the
"categorical imperative" of his sense of duty, prompted the

I.] His Foreign Policy. 53
Chancellor to do everything in his power to fortify the
Empire's position with relation to foreign countries, and on
the other hand to bring about the completion of its internal
arrangements with all possible swiftness. In the former
direction, he apprehended (until 1879), the possibility of a
Russo-Franco-Austrian Alliance, like that obtaining in the
days of Kaunitz ; and history will not count it a smaller
service to his country that he preserved New Germany from
that Alliance, than that he created the policy which enabled
him to construct the German Empire. His negotiations
with the Cabinet of Vienna, his efforts, indefatigably pro*
secuted and finally crowned with success, to effect a
rapprochement with Germany's mighty south-eastern neigh
bour, as well as his scientific diplomatic dealings with othei
Powers, were not the only means he employed to this end.
It was above all requisite, as an effective backing to these
diplomatic endeavours, to keep up the impression in those
Powers that the new Empire. was in itself united and solid.
With this object it was necessary to avoid exhibiting the
Government in a minority, constantly and upon important
issues, in Parliament. If the German Empire was to
maintain its prestige (the outcome of successful wars), in
foreign countries but imperfectly acquainted with its internal
conditions, the Powers in question must be enduringly
persuaded that the Federate Governments were at one
amongst themselves and with the majority of the Represen
tative Assembly ; and that both these elements were inspired
and governed by the national spirit Although this really
was the case during the earlier years of national exhilaration,
inasmuch as Liberals and Conservatives then combined to
form a national majority, things assumed a totally different
aspect from the moment at which the Central Party came
into existence, and the Conservative Party (from which the

54 His Internal Policy. [Chap.
Chancellor himself emanated), not only withdrew its support
from him, but attacked him with passionate personal
animosity under the leadership of the Kreuz Zeitung, at that
time belonging to Herr Nathusius. Thenceforth the
majority in the Reichstag unquestionably belonged to the
Liberal party ; the impression of our Unity could only be
kept up abroad by effecting compromises with that majority ;
and the completion of the Empire's internal organization
was bound to take place by means of the Liberal majority's
support and influence. By its aid the Empire's defensive
"forces were settled upon a firm foundation, and the dangers
arising from particularistic and anti-national agitations at
home were timely averted. The first steps were also suc
cessfully taken towards placing the Empire upon a self-
supporting footing in financial respects. On the other hand,
the Chancellor had to protect himself against the Liberal
majority's efforts to transfer the Imperial Government to a
number of Ministers independent of himself and of one
another, and thereby to get rid of homogeneous direction
and responsibility. He also subsequently found that he
received less support from Parliament than from the
Federate Governments in his further endeavours to bring
about the financial self-dependence of the Empire, to intro
duce into it a homogeneous Customs and commercial system,
to put the working classes upon an equal footing with the
other social classes with respect to life-insurance, and to
weaken the hold obtained upon them by Social-Democracy.
Indeed, the Federate Governments at the present time offer
much more substantial guarantees for the preservation and
development of German Unity than does the Reichstag,
split up as it is into parties and fractions.
The principles guiding the Chancellor with respect to the
Constitution of the Empire have been indicated, and to some

Ij The Imperial Constitution. 55
extent definitely propounded in several of his speeches. On
March n, 1867, in the Parliament convoked to construct
a Constitution for the North German Confederation, he said,
" It cannot have been our purpose to set up a theoretical
ideal of a Federal Constitution, in which German Unity is
to be eternally guaranteed on the one hand, and free elbow-
room is to be ensured to every sort of particularistic
movement on the other. We must leave it to the future to
discover such a talisman of wisdom, if any such exist; to
approach the squaring of the circle by a few decimals is not
our present mission. Prompted by memories of the past,
and by a just appraisement of actualities, we have made a
point of challenging as little as possible those resisting
forces which shattered our previous attempts (at Frankfurt
and Erfurt) to bring about German Unity. We have
deemed it our duty to be contented with a minimum of
those concessions which particular entities in Germany are
bound to make to the one common entity, if the latter is to
become really animate. We may bestow or not the name
of a Constitution upon the scheme that has resulted from
our labours ; that has nothing to do with the question. We
believe that if it be distinctly understood that we have
cleared the way for the German people, and have proved
our confidence in the genifls of that people, Germany will
be able to attain its ends by following the path we have
traced for it" Highly characteristic of Prince Bismarck
was the following statement, to which he gave utterance in
the Reichstag on March 10, 1877. " I believe our Consti
tution possesses a self-constructive faculty resembling that
to which the English Constitution owes its formation — not
through the setting-up of a theoretical ideal, the realisation
of which is sought to be effected regardless of obstacles, but
through the organic development of that which already

56 The Imperial Constitution. [Chap.
exists, always in the direction of progress, although by feasible
and inoffensive means, avoiding the incurrence of serious
risks. Although it is a speciality of our national character
to invariably aim at what is the very best, and thereby to
frequently miss that wliich is fairly good, I regard it as
disastrous that we cannot deliver ourselves from the occupa
tion of manufacturing Constitutions — that we do not give
our Constitution (which is and cannot be otherwise than
imperfect) time to breathe, and take a brief natural rest at
one of its stations, also necessarily incomplete."
Here speaks the genuine practical politician — the man of
piercing insight, who thoroughly understands the political
existence of peoples and states — who is aware that great
things are born, not made, and that, consequently, the best
Constitutions are to a great extent products of nature.
Expressing his astonishment at the criticisms to which
Opposition Deputies thought fit to subject the existing
Constitution, the Chancellor observed in a Parliamentary
speech (5 March, 1878) "Is the Constitution under which
we live really, then, so impracticable and unwarrantable?
From a theoretical point of view there is a good deal to be
said about it, in that sense: but practically it is the
expression of what actually existed and was possible at the
time of its formation, elaborated and regulated as well as it
then could be. At any rate, we have got on farther with it
than with all our theoretical experiments ; I refer you back
to the vast number of enactments passed, to the progressive
consolidation of this formerly very shaky Constitution, to
the prestige enjoyed throughout Europe by our new organ
ization, which it would certainly not have earned had
foreigners deemed it to be as ignominious and intolerable as
the public press says it is. What dreadful deeds have been
done to my countrymen, that they all of a sudden find

I.] The Imperial Constitution. 57
themselves so much worse off than they were a year ago ?
Is it, peradventure, our comparative tranquillity, or the
steadfast advancement that we exhibit, as contrasted with
other countries, or the fact that we are at peace, at home
and abroad ? That must certainly be the case ; for highly-
wrought spirits, forlorn of any occupation more exciting
and engrossing than that of " representing the people "
during the winter, inevitably fall a prey about summertide
to the restless feeling that ' something must be done ; ' their
craving for emotion becomes so vehement that it can only
be assuaged by foreign wars, or internal conflicts, or
criticism — employing the whole intellectual force of profound
thinkers — of the very undermost foundations of our institu
tions. I rejoice that the notion of giving practical expres
sion to this tendency (in the shape of Parliamentary motions)
has not found utterance in any part of this House. I do
not mean amendments, but motions having for their object
the revision of the Constitution. For it would indeed be
deplorable if so youthful a Constitution — one brought into
the world with such difficulty — should require revision in its
new-born state. The recollection of our fruitless attempts
in Frankfurt on Main a generation ago, to settle the matter
theoretically — the reflection 'How absolutely new these
institutions are ; how strange the events that preceded their
birth ; how violent, in a greater or less degree, the means by
which they have been brought about ' — should, in my opinion,
restrain every one from too often disturbing the basis upon
which they repose, and from arousing, at home or abroad,
the hope or the fear that this Constitution, which at present
confers upon the German Realm an amount of unity it has
not possessed for centuries past, may at any moment be
attacked in its very foundations, and suggest the inquiry :
'¦ Is any government under the same moral obligation, when

58 Bismarck's Federalism. [Chap.
subjected to the pressure of temptation and opportunity, to
adhere to a modified Constitution, forced upon its acceptance,
as that which bound it to uphold the Constitution originally
sanctioned by it f ' "
Another Article of Faith which guided Prince Bismarck
throughout his labours in building up the New Germany,
runs as follows : The autonomy of the German States
bound up in the Empire should only be restricted to the
extent absolutely exerted by national requirements — firstly,
because those States will only continue to participate
cheerfully and trustfully in the Federation as long as they
are equitably treated, and secondly, because a certain degree
of decentralisation is wholesome. The Chancellor, therefore,
is no Unitarian ; in proof of which a speech of his in the
Reichstag (ii March, 1867) may here be quoted. He
contested therein the demand for the nomination of a
constitutional, responsible Ministry for the North German
Confederation — a demand which, he observed, could only
be complied with if, at the same time, a chief of monarchical
character could be appointed to lead the Confederation.
This he considered impossible: "for," he continued, "it
would be necessary to mediatise those Sovereigns to whom
that supreme monarchical power could not be confided.
Such a mediatisation has neither been authorised by our
fellow-confederates nor demanded by ourselves. It has been
hinted here by some that this mediatisation could be
effected by force ; and by others that it would come to pass
spontaneously. . . We do not anticipate anything of the
sort, or that any considerable number of German Princes
will exhibit conspicuous readiness to exchange their present
position for that held by British Peers. We have never
expected this of them, nor do we propose to do so ; still less
can I regard it as our duty to appeal to brute force  to

Ij German Political Characteristics. 59
Prussia's predominant influence in the confederation — in
order to extort concessions that are not freely offered to us.
Least of all can we employ that force against allies, who
stood to us faithfully in the hour of danger, or against those
states with which we have just concluded an international
peace, as we hope, for all time to come. The basis of our
relations with them must not be violence, employed towards
princes or towards peoples; but confidence in Prussia's
fidelity to treaties — a confidence which shall not be
disturbed as long as others remain faithful to their part in
such compacts." Here we must also refer to a speech
(Reichstag, 16 April 1869) in which the Chancellor rejected
a motion brought forward by Deputy T*vesten and Count
Muenster for the creation of responsible Federal Ministries.
"Is Unitarism the best and most useful political config
uration? Is it so in Germany even? Is it historical in
Germany? That it is not, is clearly demonstrated by the
particularistic organisations that obtain amongst us in
every direction. We not only possess village-patriotism
and city-patriotism, developed to an extent unknown
to Romans and Slavs, but fraction-patriotism and depart
mental-patriotism, the latter of which regards everything
outside its own department as utterly alien to it and
susceptible of being justifiably damaged to any extent, as
long as " the department " derives some benefit from
injuring it. . . A Post-office official, whose intellectual
standing is not sufficiently elevated to enable him to form a
statesmanlike judgment, will look upon every measure that
does not exclusively serve the interests of the Postal
Administration as the act of an enemy, and carry away,
with conscientious satisfaction, any booty he may have
secured by fighting against it, to the prejudice of other
departments of the State. . . To this is attributable the fact

6o Particularism in Germany. [Chap.
that a German is only at his ease when confined within a
small space ; and it is by no means fair to deprive him of any
greater modicum of his homely comfort than is absolutely
requisite to keep the whole State fabric together and give it
authority abroad. This Particularism is the source of
Germany's weakness ; but also, in one direction at least, of
her prosperity. From small centres have radiated to all
parts of Germany common endowments of culture and
well-being, vainly to be looked for in great countries
organised upon the principle of centralisation. . . The faults
of Particularism — its external weaknesses, internal dissen
sions, restrictions upon commerce and communications —
have been attacked at their very roots by the Confederation,
whose mission it is to extirpate them altogether. Give it
time to do so. It is still young, but it will fulfil its purpose ;
and we, by backing it up, shall harmoniously cooperate
towards the attainment of a positive end, for which achieve
ment, when completed, the whole nation will be grateful to
us. If you contemplate the State-structures, which have
acquired a development that appears extensive, compared
with their physical resources, without incurring any loss of
internal freedom, you will find that those structures have
sprung from the evil of German history, and that they are
more or less, I will not say of a federalistic, but of a
decentralising character. As a conspicuous example let me
point to England, where Particularism is so carefully hidden
away in the shade of the village or the county, that it is
nowhere visible upon the geographical outlines of the map.
England is a decentralised country, which we Prussians are
eagerly endeavouring to imitate in that respect. Look at
that grand, wealthy and potent phenomenon, the Free States
of North America ; do its citizens regard an Unified State
as the Palladium of Liberty, or as the foundation of healthy

Ij Foreign Constitutional Systems. 61
development? Look at Switzerland, with her Cantonal-
Constitution. Look at a structure, which, unless I am much
mistaken, is most of all analogous to our own — the old
Constitution of the United Netherlands, the States-General,
in which the self-dependence of each Province was main
tained in a very high degree. It may, I fancy, be found
instructive, by any person here who takes an interest in
these matters, to carry out this comparison still further, and
to keep in mind, as well as the admirable political achieve
ments recorded in the history of the United Netherlands,
the bounteous measure of personal liberty that was dispensed
to all those who enjoyed the protection of that rSgime.
Centralisation is always more or less the result of violent
measures, and is not to be enforced without violating at
least the spirit of the Constitution. Every such violation
even if it appear excusable or justifiable in form, inflicts
wounds that bleed inwardly; and no man knows or can
predict how long they will continue to bleed. If you want
to make things comfortable for the populations of German
States, I believe that you must not ask them, ' What can we
all have in common ? How deep can the vast man of the
Commonwealth bite into the apple?' but, 'How much
must we absolutely and indispensably have in common ? '
and that you should leave everything else to the agency of
special development. In this manner you will do good
service to liberty and well being. ... I would remind you
of the endeavours to which we are now devoting ourselves
in Prussia. There we are trying to decentralise and to
create provincial and local self-reliance. Why should we
do exactly the contrary here; in the Confederation ? here,
where we already possess local, if not provincial self-reliance,
which has, moreover, been of the greatest utility to Germany ?
For instance, in the matter of administration we have learnt

62 The Federal Council. [Chap.
much from Saxony, and from Hanover to boot ; and therein
I rejoice at the progress achieved by Prussia, i.e., that the
curse of excessive self-appreciation, through which men
decaive themselves, has' been gradually removed from us
through the acquaintance we have made with the adminis
tration of the lesser States ; I hope that, in time, we shall be
freed from it altogether. These, however, are advantages
emanating from the self-sufficing existence of small States ;
they afford us no justification whatsoever for endeavouring
to curtail, in defiance of justice, and contrary to our own
interests, the influence of those independent States upon
Germany at large — an influence, too, that is constitutionally
secured to them." On the 19th April, 187 1, Prince
Bismarck spoke in a similar sense (though slightly ironically)
about the utility of small States and the significance of the
" Senate, State-House, and Upper House of the German
Empire " by them constituted in concord with Prussia. " I
believe," he observed, "that the Federal Council has a
great future before it, because it has for the first time made
an attempt to set a Federative Board at the head of the
State, there to exercise sovereignty over the whole Empire,
without robbing individual States of the benefits of mon
archical power, or of their own proper authorities; for
sovereignty does not lie with the Emperor, but with the
totality of the Confederate Governments. This institution
is the more useful, in that it imp.irts directly into these
deliberations the wisdom or stupidity of five-and-twenty
Governments— a plurality of views such as we have never
before been favoured with in any single realm. There are
five-and-twenty Ministries, or high authorities, in this Board,
each of which is in a position to absorb all the intelligence
and wisdom gushing up within the limits of its own par
ticular sphere, and is justified in imparting to the Federal

L] The Federal Council. 63
Council, upon its own account, the products of its absorp
tion ; whilst the single State is embarrassed by all sorts of
local obstacles, which plug up its springs at their very
sources. In a word, I may tell you from personal ex
perience, that I believe I have made considerable progress
in my political education, and have, generally speaking,
learnt a good deal through my participation in the sessions
of the Federal Council — through watching the vivifying
friction of five-and-twenty German centres. Therefore I
would beg of you not to meddle with the Federal Council.
In that very structure I recognise a sort of Palladium for our
future, and a powerful guarantee for the future of Germany."
A few days previously, on the ist of April, the Chancellor,
addressing the Reichstag, had thus characterised the
Federal Council :- " It is not in reality an Imperial Board ;
as a Board, it does not represent the Empire. The Empire
is externally represented by His Majesty the Emperor, the
people by the Reichstag. To our apprehension the
Federal Council is, so to speak, a corporation in which the
respective States of Germany obtain representation — a
corporation which I would not describe as a centrifugal
element, but as one entitled to represent special interests.''
With this extract may be compared the following passage in
Prince Bismarck's speech in Parliament (28 March, 1867),
pronounced in opposition to a motion in favour of creating
an Upper House upon the pattern of the British House of
Peers. " As far as the proposition to constitute an Upper
House is concerned, it can only be welcome (in itself and on
principle), to every Conservative. Nevertheless, we do not
deem it expedient to still further hamper the already com
plicated machinery of the Constitution by introducing into
it a third — or, if you will, a fourth factor. I cannot without
difficulty picture to myself a German Upper House thrust in

64 The Federal Council: [Chap.
between the Federal Council (which is indispensable as the
entity through which the sovereignty of individual States
finds its expression), and the Imperial Parliament; an
interloping factor which, from a social point of view, would
rank somewhat higher than the Reichstag and stand much
lower than the Federal Council, so as to justify its classifica
tion. In such an Assembly we should have peers — non-
reigning princes — strongly disposed to rivalise, socially
speaking, with the less-powerful sovereigns. To a certain
extent the Federal Council represents an Upper House, in
which His Majesty the King of Prussia is primus inter pares,
and in which, moreover, that remainder of the great German
nobility which has preserved its rights of sovereignty finds
its proper place. To complete this Upper House by adding
to it non-reigning members I consider too practically
difficult an enterprise to be attempted. But to degrade this
Sovereign Upper House in all its elements, except the
actual presidency, to such an extent that it shall resemble a
Chamber of Peers, recruitable from below, I deem impos
sible ; I should never dare to hint at it, for instance, to such
a personage as the King of Saxony. Our chief reason,
however, for not having recommended the division of the
Reichstag into two Houses is the inconvenience of ex
cessively complicated mechanism. As it is, the Confedera
tion's legislation may be brought to a stand-still at any
moment by a protracted difference between the Federal
Council and the Reichstag."
In connection with the Reichstag, Prince Bismarck's
views with respect to the question of " allowances " deserve
especial mention. On more than one occasion he contested
motions brought forward by Liberal members in favour of
making money-allowances to members of Parliament ;
during the debate of April 19, 1871, for example, in the

L] Parliamentary Allowances. 65
following terms : " If the Assemblies representing the people
are for the future to be regarded as epitomes, or living
images of our populations, it is indispensable that our
Parliamentary Sessions should be short ; otherwise all those
persons who have something to do in this world besides
law-making will fail to come forward, willingly and self-
sacrificingly, as candidates for election. Short Parliaments
alone render it possible that persons belonging to all sorts
of professions and callings — precisely the most intelligent
and honest class of citizens — should contrive to spare the
time which they devote to serving their country in this
place. Well, gentlemen, it results from experience that
unallowanced Sessions are invariably shorter than those to
which allowances are granted. This is quite unquestionable.
We may take the Prussian Diet as an example ; the Upper
House always exhibits a disposition to abbreviate the
Session, whilst the Lower House manifests a precisely con
trary tendency. I am far from recognising allowances as the
" one thing needful ; " it seems to me, indeed, that their
agency is exactly of the sort which I have already referred
to as objectionable. There are several Deputies in the
Prussian Lower House who have specially made it the
business of their lives to serve their country in this
particular direction, allowing their other occupations
to lapse into the background. There exists, moreover, a
certain nucleus of Deputies who — considering the activity
they display in fulfilling their mandate; the preliminary
studies they pursue in preparation for each sitting of the
House, and the thoroughgoingness with which they examine
everything they have to deal with — cannot possibly do
aught else of any real moment, be their capacity for work
never so great. I have the greatest respect for such
devotio n to Parliamentary activity, and should esteem it
vol. 1. F

66 Parliamentary Duties. [Chap.
highly regrettable were this element wanting to us ; but that
it should predominate in our Legislative Assemblies — that
the Deputy who makes representing the people his sole
business in life should prevail over us — I do not consider at
all desirable. Were that the case you would not have an .
Assembly really representing the people, but one of a
bureaucratic character, consisting of a special sort of officials,
useful enough for the mere labours of legislation, but not
always so in the sense or momentary temper of the people
— not always genuinely" representative of the various pro
fessional and working classes."
It is self-evident that anyone who allows himself to be
elected a Deputy of the Empire should appear in the
Reichstag as frequently as possible, in order to take part in
its labours. People entrust him with a mandate, not in
order to pay him a compliment, but to secure a representa
tive for their rights and interests. A good many Deputies
do not seem to understand this; they absent themselves
from the House more frequently than is justifiable, in
consequence of which that Assembly has often been com
pelled to declare itself incomplete and incapable of bringing
any business whatsoever to a conclusion. This unsatis
factory state of things prompted the Chancellor (June 13,
1873), to propose a reduction in the number of members
whose presence is requisite to the completion of any legis
lative act, with a view to coercing the Deputies into exer
cising their prerogatives somewhat more assiduously. He
referred to the example offered by England, " where valid
decisions may be arrived at by forty members, and where,
consequently, each individual member feels bound to put in
an appearance, lest forty of his colleagues, with whose
political tendencies he is unacquainted, should pass laws
behind his back, the legality of which laws would subse-

IJ Parliamentary Duties. 6j
quently be incontestable." Upon this subject he further
remarked (5 May, i88ij, in the Reichstag : "I believe that
Parliament would be a gainer if no limits were imposed upon
its numerical capacity to pass resolutions, so that those mem
bers who take pleasure in listening to speeches might attend
when they liked, without being counted out ; but that greater
scope should be given to that capacity when resolutions are
before the House, the adoption of which concerns the future
of the Empire. It is the Empire's right to insist that more
than half the total number of Deputies elected throughout
the realm shall be present whenever a decision is arrived at
which may exercise upon the destinies of the nation an
influence at once material, enduring, and not easily to be
set aside. Half the Reichstag is not Parliament, as recog
nised by the Constitution, nor does it rank as highly in
public consideration as the entirety of the Reichstag. . . .
How can you expect the population to take an eager interest
in the Reichstag's transactions, if its chosen representatives
set it such an example ? "
Germany came into the possession of Constitutional
institutions much later than other countries ; when she did so,
however, her long privation in that respect was succeeded
by excesses, the effect of which was to fatigue — well-nigh to
suffocate her. Her parliamentary apparatus was too
polypterous and complicated, whereby it used up a vast
amount of working power. The Deputy, by reason of the
over-exertion inflicted upon him in virtue of his mandate,
was bound to become a mere routinier; the Ministers were
overburdened with work to an intolerable degree ; the people,
in presence of the interminable length of parliamentary
debates in the provincial and particularist Diets as well as
in the Reichstag, subsided more and more profoundly into
a chronic condition of lethargic indifference — contributed f 2

63 Parliamentary Blemishes. [Char
to, doubtless, in great measure by the circumstance that it
is not vouchsafed to many to take dehght in Opposition, no
matter upon what question, in straw-splitting special pleading,
obtrusive and wearisome deliverances of sickly flavour, self-
sufficient rhetoric and false pathos, and such-like abomina
tions; at least, not to find all these as recreative as do
certain Deputies, who play the leading parts on our parlia
mentary stage, and take up by far the greater part of our
time. It was really found unbearable that a number of men
should be powerless to extricate themselves from the meshes
of law-making for from eight to nine months of the year at a
stretch. They exhausted their own strength and that of the
Ministers; they surfeited the public with the oratorical
pabulum cooked by themselves and incessantly served up by
the newspapers, until the said public ceased to pay any
attention to their speeches, unless these latter happened to
deal with questions of vital interest, or to be highly spiced
with offensive remarks and scandal. Finally, the Deputies,
during their long sojourn together in the different German
capitals, saw little or nothing of the districts they represented
or of actual life, listened only to the voice of party-sr hit,
and became ossified with doctrines and theories, like
professors in their studies and councillors at their green
tables. In order to remedy these evils it was necessary that
the representatives of the people should be enabled, during a
period of time far more protracted than theretofore, to rest
from their parliamentary labours, to breathe physically and
intellectually wholesome air in the outer world, and to
recover touch with the people of whose interests it was their
duty to be cognizant, so as to be en rapport with them when
again subjected to the influence of party-leadership. To
this end (in July, 1879) the Chancellor submitted to the
Federal Council a proposal involving the alteration of

IJ Proposed Parliamentary Reforms. 69
cerfain Articles of the Constitution, consisting in the substi
tution of a two years' Budget for the arrangement theretofore
obtaining (that of voting the Budget every year), in the
abolition of the obligation to convoke Parliament annually,
(the necessity of voting the Budget once a year being
revoked as above) and in quadrennial elections, instead of
triennial ones. The Federal Council approved of this
proposal ; the majority of the Reichstag, when it was brought
before them in 1880, abstained from dealing with it When,
however, the Chancellor put it forward again, a year later,
the Committee met him with a counter-proposal, in which
Prince Bismarck at once recognized " a lack of consideration
for the Ministerial class of human beings, and an attack
upon the Emperor's prerogatives." In his speech • of
May 5th, 1 88 1, he explained the immediate purpose of the
Federal Council's proposal in the following terms: "We
desire to modify the haste and excess of business, of which
the last speaker complained, by rendering it possible for you
to give more time to your sittings in Parliament, i.e., by
emancipating you from the restraint put upon you by the
simultaneous functioning every year of two bodies, the
Reichstag and Diet, which compels you to waste the time
that should be devoted to one of those assemblies, in favour
of the other. The work, moreover, would only be half
done, should you limit to the Empire the application of the
system recommended in this proposal. It must be enforced
in all the Diets; the Imperial Legislature must prohibit
Parliament and Diet from sitting at the same time; the
Diets must transact their business during one year, and
Parliament during the next. The chief business to be
transacted is the Budget, and the hurry complained of is
principally caused by time-pressure in the preparation of the
Budget, which has to be made up anew every year. We

70 Bismarck on Parliaments. [Chap.
(Deputies and Ministers alike) shall both have plenty of time
at our disposal, as soon as the Reichstag or Landtag, in the
year of its meeting, shall be enabled to indulge in the hope
that the prolongation of its session to the extent of three,
or even five months will be no great mishap ; and when the
working time of Ministers shall be allotted in such sort that
they will be able to prepare their measures beforehand."
Farther on the Chancellor pointed out another object of his
Draught Bill as follows : " In again bringing forward this
proposal I do so in the interest of those who exercise in
private life productive callings, which they are compelled to
renounce during the period of their participation in
parliamentary debates, and with the object of lightening that
participation by ceasing to compel them to function in two
Parliaments at one and the same time. If we do not do
this, we shall render it almost impossible for people holding
practical positions in life — I mean those who produce
something material, as handicraftsmen, tradesmen, lawyers
and practising physicians, farmers, manufacturers, industrials
of all kinds, persons whose practical experiences are most
valuable to us, who have every right to represent their
interests here, and who consequently are sent hither by the
electors — to take part in the proceedings of Parliament, for
any length of time to come. As matters stand, we are
exclusively provided with two categories of Deputies,
differing essentially from one another; the one composed
of those who cannot possibly await the end of the session to
resume the transaction of their own private affairs, with
relation to which they have been grievously missed ; the
other, of legislators who moan and sigh when compelled to
renounce the practice they love so well of public speaking
within these walls, and the habit of attending "fraction-
meetings " and Committees, because they have nothing else

I.] Bismarck on Parliaments. 71
to do in God's wide world — at least, nothing that they care
about. When I picture to myself an official, well or badly
off, who, at the close of a long and parliamentary debate on
a hot summer's day, is obliged to return to his dusty office,
there to perform his duties vigorously, and to pay anew some
slight deference to the very same official chief whom he has
all day long been looking down upon with a certain amount
of contempt from the heights of his Cutulian seat, I can well
conceive that a certain home-longing creeps over him as he
recalls the past delights of parliamentary life, and that he
should apply for a furlough on account of the fatigue
superinduced by his legislatorial labours. But in so doing,
a Deputy of this class, who has not kept up that contact
with his country which is maintained by working, striving,
and producing in common with his electors, runs the risk of
becoming utterly incapable of justly appraising the interests
and wishes of the district that has elected him. I look upon
it as highly perilous to the interests of the Empire that the
parliamentary majority should fall into the hands of those
Deputies whose sole occupation is politics, who are repre
sentatives of the people by profession, and who have
laboured at the questions on han'd for weeks and months
before they come to be discussed ; for they deal with them
in the public press as well, and endeavour to excite interest
in them. They have time enough to do this ; as a matter of
fact it is their only business. Of course they come to the
front very conspicuously, as far as dexterity and rhetorical
skill of fence are concerned ; they have so much practice in
that sort of exercise 1 If, by the exaggerated frequency and
length of Parliamentary Sessions, you make participation in
the Reichstag difficult for persons who are not fruges
consumere nati, and who do not derive their means of
existence exclusively from salaries, fees and capital, die

7 2 Bureaucratic Deputies. [Chap.
time will come when the Representative Assembly will
only be a branch of the bureaucracy — when we shall have
hereditary parliamentary families (as we now have hereditary
official families) which will make the legislative career their
exclusive study, saying to themselves : ' I will learn the
Deputy trade ; ' especially when they discover that this trade
not only keeps a man comfortably, but sometimes brings
him great advancement My own career is an exclusively
parliamentary One ; nobody would ever have heard anything
about me, living as I did in rural retirement, if I had not
by chance become a member of the United Diet in 1847,
and so I always count myself in, when I talk of Parliament
arians. But to extend our bureaucracy even into parlia
mentary life, and to let it become a branch of the Imperial
and national official administration, having few points of
contact and no interests or ideas in common with the
misera contribuens plebs, which digs and delves, toils and
sweats, earns, gains and loses, I deeta pernicious ; for the
best of employes, whose father and grandfather were employes
before him, and whose whole education has been directed
towards fitting him for office, certainly can know nothing
about the domestic life, the endeavours and the inner being
of his elector, who has himself never been an employe, or
had such a thing in his family."
The majority of the Reichstag, which at that time was
under the thraldom of the professional politicians above
described, remained unconvinced. It maintained a dis
trustful attitude; it regarded the Government proposal as
unnecessary and even dangerous, detecting in it a design to
circumscribe the rights of the Representative Assembly, and
treated it as a confirmation of the apprehension entertained
then as now by the Liberal party, that an era of reaction was
imminent. Contrasted with the weighty arguments of the

IJ Objections to his Proposals. 73
Chancellor, the rejoinders of his oppdhents (e.g. that all the
great Constitutional States, and even most of the smaller
ones, convoke their Parliaments annually) must be reckoned
as mere strings of sonorous but empty phrases — such as,
again, " It would be degrading Germany, in a measure, were
we to annul its equality of position with the States in
question — Were we to decree that the great German people,
raised to the highest rank amongst nations by the vigorous
policy of Emperor William and his great Chancellor, should
be mute for a whole year at a stretch, whilst other nations, in
the interim, would be making their voices heard ... To a
great, powerful and free people (and such is the German
people, since 187 1) the yearly convocation of its collective
representatives is as natural, self-suggestive and necessary
an action as regular breathing is to the individual human
being." These, as has been already observed, are idle
words and halting comparisons to boot. If, by the altera
tions of the Constitution suggested by Prince Bismarck,
our political life may become more healthy, genuine and
vigorous — if our Deputies can learn to think and vote more
practically and materially by spending more of their time
outside the limits Of party-doctrine or the atmosphere of
cliques, and inside the realm of popular interests — if,
consequently thereupon, the nation can be induced once
more to take interest in the performances and shortcomings
of the gentlemen in the Leipziger Strasse, we shall certainly
not be degraded, but promoted. Other people, like the
French, English, Belgians, Dutch and Italians, cannot be
compared with us in this matter, for they know ho duplex
Legislations, no small Parliament side by side with a great
one. There can really be no question of " shutting the
nation's mouth" by adopting Bismarck's notion; at the
most it may be said that political parties would be con-

74 Necessary Reforms. [Chap.
strained to hold their tongues for a year, and even that
would only be partially the case ; for meanwhile the freedom
of the press places journalism at their disposal. Finally,
supposing the Government stood in need of support on the
part of public opinion (to a certain extent concentrated in
the Reichstag) it could at any time have recourse to the
expedient of convoking the people's representatives in
session extraordinary. Therefore neither the nation's
honour nor its rights are prejudiced by the proposal in
question, whilst the objections by which it was encountered
emanate simply from the fears of conceited and restless
party-leaders, lest something natural should be introduced
into the unnatural conditions of party-life — lest reality should
gain ground against the theories cherished in political
" fractions " — lest the domineering influence of the Berlin
doctrinaires should suffer abatement — lest the greater num
ber of Deputies should move about, take observations,
become practically useful and form independent judgments
throughout sixteen or seventeen months (instead of four of
five, as heretofore) not in their own entourage of political
fogginess, but in the fresh air, amongst practical men — in a
word, in the sphere of the real people, not in that described
as such by tribune orators and by the press. But another
argument in favour of the contemplated reform deserves
attention. The ever-varying connection existing between
the Imperial Budget and the Budgets of the German States
belonging to the Federation render it urgently desirable
that this connection should be simplified and facilitated by
making the Imperial Budget biennial, instead of annual.
In days gone by the Diets of the respective States were
dependent upon the decision of the Reichstag, as far as the
matricular contributions were concerned ; and this is more
than ever the case now that the Customs' Tariff has

I J The Imperial Budget. 7$
materially altered the conditions of the Budget The
Empire has to allot incomes to its component States, and
to take back a portion of those incomes as contributions to
the Imperial Budget. It is therefore impossible to establish
the debit and credit of each individual State unless the
Imperial Budget be settled and brought out a good while
previously. In other words : since it has been determined
to divide the surplus of the Customs' Dues and Tobacco
Duty amongst the Federal German States, after deducting
130 millions of marks for the Empire, it is in the highest
degree desirable to settle the Imperial Budgets for a longer
period than one year, in order that the individual States
may be enabled to make a correct estimate of the sums
which are to be placed at their disposal out of the surplus.
It is in the interest of a well-managed financial adminis
tration that the individual States should not detain in their
Exchequers sums of money, confided to their keeping, but
which they are hindered from using because they do not
know what part of the funds in question may be claimed by
the Empire. Were the Imperial Budget fixed for two years,
it would be possible to keep the Imperial finances and
those of the individual States distinct, as they should be,
and, by means of these latter, to put the population of
Germany at large in possession of the benefits which should
have accrued to it from Financial Reform. The prolonga
tion of Parliament's legislative period bears close relation to
that of the Budget period. It will be pretty generally
admitted, in principle, that it is by no means agreeable to
be compelled to dance attendance upon the ballot-box
every three years ; and all those who wish for a vigorous
Parliament could scarcely fail to be delighted if the Deputies
of the Realm were elected for a longer period than they
are at present. As for the people, it is heartily weary of so

76 Freedom of Speech. [Chai*.
much electioneering, as is sufficiently demonstrated by its
slender participation in the elections, and would be thankful
were the sacrifices of time and money exacted from it by a
General Parliamentary Election inflicted upon it at longer
intervals. There is really only one point upon which it is
possible to differ. In England, a new parliament is only
elected in every seven years ; in Austria, the elective
element in the Reichsrath is renewed once in six years ; in
Germany, the Chancellor asked for fresh elections every
four years, instead of every three. Why not every six or
seven, whilst he was about it ?
From Bismarck's point of view, Parliamentary freedom Of
speech ought not to be unrestricted. On one occasion he
declared to the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, " You can
speak out your opinions as you please; but calumnies,
insults, and offences are acts, not opinions ; acts of the class
for which punishments are provided by the Penal Code ;
and, in my judgment, the Prussian law does not protect you
against the consequences of such acts. If your motion (in
favour of unlimited liberty of speech) had any legal
foundation, the members of both Houses of the Diet would
have the advantage over all their fellow-countrymen of
possessing such a prerogative as was never conceived in any
civilised realm by the most Quixotic fancy of an arrogant
patrician. Article 2 of the Constitution would have to be
written anew and in the following terms : ' All Prussians are
equal in the eyes of the law ; but the members of both
Houses of the Diet have the right to insult and caluminate
their fellow-cbuntrymen without being held responsible for
so doing by any authority other than that embodied in the
ordinary Rules of the House.'" In 1868 he still adhered
firmly to the conviction expressed above, but refrained from
giving utterance to " the theoretical sentiment of wounded

ij Parliamentary Licence. yf
consciousness of justice " which had previously inspired him,
in order to avoid troubling the understanding arrived at
between the Government and the Liberal majority of the
Lower House and Reichstag, as well as retarding the com
pletion of the North-German Federal Constitution. In
1879, however, he laid before the Reichstag a draught
measure according to that Assembly the power to inflict
punishment upon its members in addition to the disciplinary
privileges with which it had theretofore been invested. In
the preamble of this Bill it was observed that " the arrange
ments obtaining up to that time had resulted in a practical
guarantee of impunity— that the grossest excesses remained
unpunished in the House itself, and were disseminated out
side the House by the press without incurring penalty or
hindrance. The present Regulations of the House,'' con
tinues this preamble, " are inefficient to prevent the injurious
and even dangerous effects produced outside the walls of the
Chamber by the violent utterances of the Deputies. For
the publicity of our Parliamentary proceedings and the
constitutionally guaranteed irresponsibility of the speakers,
as well as of the published reports of their speeches, results
in the dissemination throughout all classes of society in
Germany of remarks and orations (pronounced by Members
of Parliament), which — were they not uttered under the
ffigis of the irresponsibility accorded to the oratorical tribune
and to the press, would expose orators and press alike to
criminal proceedings, in conformity with the prescriptions
of the Common Law. . . . The evil in question has become
more conspicuously apparent since the elections brought
into this House certain Deputies who deem themselves
justified in availing themselves of the freedom of speech,
guaranteed to them by the Constitution, to set forth theories
respecting the State and society at large, which are eminently

78 Characteristics of German Deputies. [Chap.
calculated to interfere with the stability of both." The
preamble concludes as follows : " The measure submitted to
you seeks to remedy a condition of the laws repugnant to
the dictates of justice, by investing the Reichstag itself with
disciplinary powers providing it with the means of vigor
ously repressing these excesses. But it must not be ignored
that .even this remedy appears by no means adequate to
deal with such serious violations of justice, which are only
expiable by the infliction of criminal punishments at the
hands of ordinary judges." The Reichstag did not acquiesce
in the above proposal, which, moreover, stirred the Liberal
newspapers up to fiery outbursts of moral indignation. And
yet it was justified by experience.
Our Deputies seem unable to forget the habits of their
student-days. Just as Parliamentary cliquedom — in which
absolute fidelity to party traditions and rules is an elemen
tary condition of being, and new members are subordinate
to their older colleagues as the " Fuchs " is to the " Altes
Haus" in the University — is to a certain extent a repro
duction of the goings-on practised by the students' corps and
associations, so the skill of fence, for the display of which
such ample opportunity is afforded by the Parliamentary
institution known as " personal observations," is a lingering
reminiscence of university life. In exercising this skill the
Deputies are too frequently " personal " in the worst sense
of the word, sometimes even malignant and spiteful — now
and then insolent, brutally insolent. Men assail their
adversaries (altogether forgetting that they are colleagues as
well) with cutting phrases, which are swiftly returned, like
sword-flashes in a duel; members speak on purpose to
demonstrate their combativeness, to prove that their wit is
at once brilliant and incisive, and, if possible, to enjoy the
satisfaction of having copiously bled their opponents. The

ij Parliamentary Amenities. 79
real matter at issue is only a slight and passing consideration.
Were these word-encounters always carried through with
harmless good-humour, in a graceful style, and with subtle
ingenuity, little could be said against them, although they
are generally the outcome of mere vanity ; indeed, they
might be welcome from time to time as a sort of relief to
the interminable, dry and vacuous juridical word-sifting into
which our debates not seldom degenerate. But what shall
be said of a Deputy who, when one of his fellow-legislators
does not happen to have caught his meaning, shouts out to
him, "I am sorry that your intelligence is so limited?"
Why not at once call him a " stupid fellow ? " One is as
bad as the other. And is it possible to blame any man
thus attacked if he reply to such a Parliamentary monster,
" You cannot insult me ? " Such episodes have frequently
occurred. But all this is in bad taste — these are manners
which may suit a House of Representatives or Senate, in
Washington or elsewhere, but not our Parliaments, which
should the more carefully refrain from them because called
upon to set shining examples of morality, polite behaviour,
and humane consideration for the feelings of others, to mani
fold institutions of public life — to Municipal Councils, popular
gatherings and the Press. But neither should it be permissible
to our Deputies to wound the feelings and hurt the honour of
persons who have no connection with the Legislative Bodies.
It is well known, however, that they have frequently done
so. Does this hold good in common justice? Should
those very men who make our laws, and who, precisely upon
that account, should be the first to observe them with con
scientious exactitude, retain the prerogative of behaving as
if they did not exist ? Shall he who finds the protection of
the law withheld from him when he is insulted and calumni
ated in Parliament, and sees his name befouled in news-

80 utiles of tne House. [Chap
paper reports of the debates, seek his remedy in the columns
of the press, and endeavour to pay out his calumniator in
kind ? Is he to adopt other means of obtaining satisfaction
— the pistol or the horsewhip ? Or, like the Deputy already
referred to, is he to say, " Herr X  cannot insult me in
Parliament or in the Diet, because — well, because I cannot
legally call him to account; because the principle of equality
before the law does not apply to him ; because, in a word,
he is an exempt ? " How if the offended person should not
think fit to put forward these reasonings? What, in any
case, becomes of the dignity of Parliamentary Assemblies,
which the Liberals talk so much about and are so anxious to
see preserved? If the oratorical style cultivated by
champions of the Progressist party and their neighbours on
the Social-Demopratic benches be further promulgated, shall
we not by-and-bye be compelled to interpret the expression
"Parliamentary" — hitherto synonymous with well-bred,
considerate or forbearing — as meaning the exact converse of
gentlemanly qualities ? But, it will be said, the question is
surrounded by grave difficulties. The representatives of
the people are constitutionally entitled to say what they
please ; Parliamentary debates are public, and the Press
has the right to put them in circulation as long as it repro
duces them with complete exactitude. No " Regulations of
the House " can alter or interfere with these privileges.
The only means afforded by those Regulations, either in the
Reichstag or Landtag, of checking oratorical misconduct,
are in the first place, a call to order, and secondly, pro
hibition of further speech upon the subject under discussion.
With respect to the latter measure the President, before
enforcing it, is obliged to consult the House ; whereas he
may be guided by his own judgment in enforcing the former.
It might be of some use were the President invested with

i.j Special Legislation. 81
power to reduce to silence (immediately after having pro
nounced the first " call to order '' and without asking per
mission of the House) any member who has been guilty of
insulting his colleagues or persons without the House, or has
committed any excess of speech which, had he not been
a Deputy, would have rendered him liable to prosecution.
Thus many disagreeable episodes might be averted : but the
remedy would not be a sufficient one. For the insult, the
objurgation that would be punishable by law, if pronounced
outside the Legislature, would have obtained world-wide
publicity, unhindered and exempt from penalty, through the
press. During subsequent discussions and debates upon
other subjects it might be repeated and travel anew through
the columns of the newspapers, thus doubling and tripling
its pernicious effect As, therefore, in 1879, and even up
to the present day, no other means within the internal
regulations of the House have been found available to
remedy this manifest evil, it becomes necessary to recur to
special legislation; and in that direction the Chancellor's
motion offered facilities for an arrangement which might
have been readily adopted, had Parliament displayed more
good will, less self-sufficiency and less aversion to self-
imposed but salutary restrictions.
Our Parliaments suffer from another shortcoming, strongly
condemned by the Chancellor's political creed, and against
which no inconsiderable measure of activity on his part has
been directly or indirectly exercised. German Legislative
Bodies appear to be governed, or at least powerfully in
fluenced, by the belief that all political questions — especially
those connected with the Constitution — may be solved by
applying formal rules to them. Not only the Progressists,
but leaders of less " advanced " groups as well, are guided
by a desire to incorporate the multiplicities of our national
vol. 1. G

82 The " Realm of Justice." [Chap.
life in a lifeless written code of laws. In other words, we
observe that jurisprudence occupies by far too prominent a
position in the ranks of our Liberal parties, and consequently
in the proceedings of our Parliament and Diets, making
itself felt throughout the debates in the shape of special-
pleading. The Rechtstaat, or Realm of Justice— more or
less clearly and irtelligently comprehended by those
Deputies, many in number, belonging to the attorney or
judge class — were it purely a juridical commonwealth
representing the exclusive rule of jurists, would be the exact
contrary of that which its advocates in Parliament and the
Press are bent upon bringing to pass. Its establishment
would entail the enthralment and paralyzation of those forces
and classes existing in the State side by side with the legal
profession, and having just as good a right as this latter to
insist upon the development and recognition of their
interests. This endeavour to constitute a Realm of Justice,
or rather a Realm of Law, is in no way more wholesome or
righteous than that of the theologian to establish a State the
Government of which shall be administered in conformity
with theological views — or than the efforts of Rome to invest
the Church with political sovereignty — or than any scheme
for the creation of a civil Commonwealth, in which the feudal
lord, the wholesale merchant, or the wealthy financier shall
exclusively decide what is or is not to be done.
Looking back at the last two decades, we perceive that
the views and action of the juridical element in our
Parliaments. has not only directed the course of legislation
too absolutely, but that it has exercised a cramping and
obstructive influence upon the conduct of State affairs
externally, through its habit of judging and dealing with
public questions and relations from a pettifogging point of
view. Let us recall to memory, for instance, the Schleswig-

Ij The Legal Parliamentary Element. 83
Holstein affair, in which (in the opinion of Ducal lawyers
then acting as Ministers) the Dueppel entrenchments were
not taken by Prussian troops, but by the Augustenburg
Charter of Rights — i.e. by a mouldy old parchment, not
respected even by the worms — and in which that Chartei
was held in higher esteem by the Prussian Party of Progress
than Germany's right to collect her forces and Prussia's duty
to exert them. Let us remember how, when it became
necessary to take measures for withstanding Rome, even
National-Liberal ^politicians — Deputy Bamberger, for in
stance, — protested against " shattering the foundations of the
German Realm of Justice with the second paragraph of the
Jesuit-Law." Let us not forget the pedantry that opposed
the prolongation of the provisional regime in the Imperial
Provinces (Elsass and Lothringen) merely because it desired
to subject them to the " legal form of compulsion." Think of
the last debates of the Committee appointed to consider the
Bill prepared by the Government with a view to checking
the misdeeds of Social-Democracy. It was unanimously
admitted by the members of that Committee that the
misdeeds in question constituted a real danger to the State,
and that it was imperatively necessary to furnish the Govern
ment — as the guardians of the nation's paramount interests
— with implements and weapons for the obviation of that
danger ; but the legal element in the Committee shook its
head, fumbled amongst the pages of its musty old law-books,
and finally fought with all its might against the Chancellor's
proposals and demands, on the ground that it could not
possibly approve of an " exceptional law " being set up over
the prescriptions of the "common law." And when the
speeches expounding this view came to an end, other grave
scruples arose. The whole world knew perfectly well,
thanks to history and to the utterances of the Revolutionists G 2

84 Parliamentary Pettifoggery. [Chap.
themselves, what Socialism and Communism meant. But
our jurisprudents could not find a place for them in their
herbarium of dried-up notions, until they should be " accu
rately defined." As if there were not thousands upon
thousands of things here below that are not-susceptible of
being as clearly and perfectly expressed by definitions and
formula as they are felt in the depths of human sentiment
and consciousness ; as if a Government which had identified
itself with freedom and order could not have been credited
beforehand with a high degree of penetration ; as if the
Parliamentary jurists would not be compelled to borrow all
that might really be worthy of attention in their definitions
and logical deductions from the feelings and convictions
resulting from practical experience ! It was when the right
of appeal against the action of the Repressive Statutes came
to be discussed that parliamentary pettifoggery most vehe
mently showed what it was made of. Federal Law,
Particular Law, Penal Law and Civil Law were marched
across the stage in long procession, and the Party of Progress
worked itself up to a state of excitement that prompted it to
skip over some of its fundamental principles in a highly
comic manner ; for instance, the Progressists, who thereto
fore had demanded that all political offences should be tried
by juries — that is to say, by persons forlorn of juridical
training — insisted that the Court of Appeal should be
exclusively composed of legal officials.
The correctness of the axiom " fustitia est fundamentum
regnorum " is beyond a doubt Justice is the basis of the
State. But that which is animate and creative in the
latter is quite another thing, and mere legal erudition has
no business to regard itself as the basis of a political
community. The creative element is the outcome of the
nation's collective entity; statesmanship shapes its products,

ij The Law-Making Rabies. 85
registers the result of its manipulation, and groups them in
orderly succession, conformable to law. The circumstance
that an exaggerated importance is attached in our Parlia
ments to legislative and judicial activity does not result alone
from the predominance of the juridical element amongst our
Deputies. It is, as Held remarks in his " Staat und
Gesellschaft," a characteristic of our age, having its point de
depart in France — in the French Revolution — and its
offspring are the theories of " the sovereignty of the law and
the judicial bench," the punctilious distinction drawn
between the administration of justice and governmental
administration, between the legislative and executive, the
accumulation of codes, the passion for making laws (against
which Bismarck took his stand in his above quoted speech
of March 10, 1877) and the extravagant weight attributed to
mere legal formalities. Plato himself pointed out that laws
did not constitute the entire existence of a State, and more
recent writers — among them doctrinaires of the purest water,
such as Constant — have given utterance, perhaps uncon
sciously, to the same conviction. If they were in the right,
it cannot be a necessary peculiarity of modern States that
they should pass their whole lives in devising and maintaining
laws. According to Held, the differences existing between
the laws and views of justice obtaining amongst all civilised
peoples are but slight ones. This may also be said of their
public rights; for, with the solitary exception of Russia,
every country in Europe is constitutionally governed. But
that fact does not annul the individuality of any one of the
States in question; wherefore "the peculiarities of race-
individualities must not be inferred from the expression of
their convictions with respect to justice, as put forth formally
in their laws, but rather from their inward comprehension of
the idea of justice, from the manner and measure of its

86 Morality v. Law. [Chap.
agency throughout the people's life, from each nation's
fundamental ideas, not to be juridically formulated, and
from all the many things which are likewise unsusceptible of
juridical formulation, but are closely connected with the
more deeply-seated national peculiarities generated by those
fundamental ideas and thereby invested with an inward
importance." A great number of important matters cannot
be completely or even partially settled by the law; for
freedom must prevail throughout the State. No virtue can
be legally prescribed or even enforced ; for each virtue is
the product of the respective individual's moral labour.
Which of them could be engendered by statutes, indepen
dently of moral family-ties and of home education in
religious feeling, uprightness, modesty, strength of character,
compassion and other jewels of the soul ? And how, at a
critical moment, would the State hold its own with mere
laws, were its subjects wanting in self-sacrificial patriotism ?
Of how little worth, after all, are those general principles
which are the outcome of legal compulsion 1 "Woe to the
State" exclaims Held, "in which there is no justice or
fulfilment of duty save that procurable through the medium
of tribunals, and in which judicial decisions are only
recognised as authoritative because their execution can be
enforced. Individual freedom constitutes not only neces
sarily a vast realm with which no law can meddle, but a still
more spacious field for fair-play considered in connection
with the enforcement of the law. This is especially the case
as far as those laws are concerned which are framed in
conformity with the real notion of a Constitutional State •
i.e. a State which relies deeply and weightily upon the
consciences of its subjects — which, in utilising its legislative
machinery, keeps in view the influence of the whole organic
popular life, and is thereby constrained to defer to the

Ij Theoretical State-Life. 87
principle of compromise ; " — a truth expressed by Bismarck
in the words " compromise is the basis of every constitutional
government," and by Odilon Barrot in the sentence, " Les
reformes ne sont que des transactions." In all States the
principle of compromise has been, and is, the support of its
organic component parts ; but where a constitutional regime
obtains, the spirit of compromise should inspire the totality
of the State's being. " The laws themselves,'' continues
Held, " would lack anything like higher life if they alone
constituted the entire existence of a State. For, instead of
leaving men free by according to them a sphere of action
uninvaded by law, they (the laws) would make them the
mere slaves of a number of positive statutes, because they
would have to dispense with the right of sanction, a dignified
human prerogative, and with the means of achieving an
organic and therefore sure development." Such, indeed
would be the Justice-Realm (Rechts staat) in its extreme
expression. It would be the crystallization, completed at a
particular moment and then definitely fixed, of a people's
inward higher life, and consequently (in its very topmost
stage of development) would entail utter annihilation of
individual freedom and of capacity, in men as well as States,
for progress. Even the more mildly-framed Justice-Realm
— which one hears lauded as the perfection of Constitution
alism, and which does not actually exclude from the State
those factors of social life that exist side by side with the
law-makers, but insists that social life itself shall concern
itself with nothing but the creation, fulfilment and main
tenance of laws — is a monstrosity. The object of it is, as
Held remarks, to exhibit the Constitutional State as a
diametrical contrast to the administrative Police-State, by
absolutely dissevering legislation and justice from adminis
tration, and enlarging the sphere of the former whilst

88 The Agency of Providetice. [Chap.
proportionately reducing that of the latter. This method is
a mixture of truth and falsehood. " For the satisfaction of
all State-needs does not lie in the manner of passing a law,
nor in the acceptance of a legal force equally applicable to
every circumstance with which a State may be called upon
to deal; but in this, that things appertaining by the very
conditions of their inner nature to legislation and the
administration of justice shall only be subordinated to these
latter, whilst those matters shall be handed over to govern
ment which, for identical reasons, cannot be left to legislation
and the administration of justice. The State would suffer
equally were one or the other sphere widened or narrowed
in discord with the nature of things." Finally, the agency
of Providence, in comparison with which all human legis
lation appears ineffective, is one of the factors by means of
which the development of States is achieved. To its sphere
of action unquestionably belongs the appearance upon the
world's stage of potent personages, alike distinguished by
intelligence and force of character — or the peculiar and
individual specialities of those who are legally or otherwise
called upon to occupy conspicuous and influential positions ;
and, indeed, the intervention of Providence does not consist
in the providential nature of certain men, but in the fact
that men equal to dealing with extraordinary circumstances
are always forthcoming. The importance of this fact is said
to have been diminished by Constitutionalism. Held justly
declares this view to be an erroneous one. It is so far
correct, that Constitutionalism has annulled or restricted
certain purely personal influences — not only evil, but good
ones. But, on the other hand, it is untrue that all such
influences have been or can be done away with by. Consti
tutional institutions; for no one can fail to perceive that
those institutions have developed and rendered unavoidable

I.] Bismarck as a Statesman. 89
a number of other personal influences that are actively
brought to bear upon the State.
We now come to the leading axioms of our Chancellor's
moral code of statesmanship, some of which have been
reflected in his above quoted utterances. To think and act
in a statesmanlike and politic manner is to know what you
want— to think and act in conformity with historical
teachings and the nature of things, that is to say, practically,
honestly and with foresight, only desiring what is needful,
striving to attain what is feasible, and not disdaining that
which is good because you cannot achieve what would be
the very best. This definition applies no less to the treat
ment of foreign than of home affairs. Policy takes no
cognizance of human feelings ; to speak more correctly, it
has none, but knows how to utilise those of others for its
own purposes. Still less does it give way to passion. It
adapts itself to circumstances, after the manner indicated by
Schiller : " Straight strikes the track
Of light'ning, or the dreadful cannon-ball.
. . . . The foot paths trod by men
With bliss to guide them, are by them pursued
Along the streamlet's course, the vale's spontaneous windings."
The statesman ignores revenge. He wages war in order
to secure peace ; avoids it as long as he can do so without
injury to his country, and urges it on, when it has become
inevitable, upon the principle that timely attack is the best
defence. Our Chancellor is a statesman of the very highest
rank; firstly, by reason of his indefinable genius and
political instinct for finding out means and measures appli
cable to new political situations ; and secondly, because he
always regulates his actions in accordance with the above
canons of statesmanship. In 1866, he was of opinion that,
of the territories then captured by our armies, only Hanover,

90 Bismarck's Political Sagacity Exemplified. [Chap.
Hesse and Nassau (with Frankfurt) should be annexed, in
order to fill up the gap existing between the eastern and
western moieties of Prussia, and because their populations
were upon the whole homogeneous with those of Prussia.
He spared Austria, in order not to preclude, by giving her
cause to regard Prussia with enduring rancour, the possibility
of coming to an understanding with her at some future time.
He hurried on the conclusion of peace in order to avert
France's participation in the prosecution of the war, because
a small French auxiliary force would have sufficed to impart
unity and enterprise to the South German troops, which had
meanwhile acquired great numerical strength; in making
peace he exhibited the utmost consideration for our
vanquished South-German foes, thereby ensuring valuable
alliances in the future. He did not annex Elsass and a
part of Lothringen because they had once been German —
" that is a Professor's notion " he observed to us during the
war with France — but because the commanding position of
Strassburg and the penetrating wedge of Weissenburg cut
South Germany off from North Germany in military respects,
and exposed the former to sudden inroads. He did not
convert those territories into a Prussian province, as many
well-meaning patriots desired, but made them Imperial,
thus awakening a common interest in those results of
conquest through the fact that they became the common
property of Southern and Northern Germany, and con
stituted a strong connecting link between the States situated
northward and southward of the Main. Throughout all the
negotiations that took place concerning these questions, and
others that subsequently cropped up, he displayed the self-
restraint, prudence and foresight of a true statesman, as
well as the fairness so closely allied to those qualities ; in
no single instance did he allow himself to be diverted by

Ij The North German Confederation. 9 1
sentiment from resolves which appeared to him practical
and expedient.
A few of the Prince's verbal utterances are appended in
proof of the foregoing assertions. He has often declared
that he invariably keeps life and its actual conditions in
view — perhaps most pregnantly in the statement that " he
had always acted upon grounds that were not discoverable
at the green table, but out in the green fields." On the
17th August, 1866, in the Lower House, he gave an account
of the policy observed by him at the conclusion of peace,
observing ; " The next thing we had to do was to lay down
firm foundations for the new Confederation. In my opinion,
the more extensive they were, the less solid they were likely
to turn out ; we could not possibly, for instance, exact from
such a State as Bavaria conditions we are compelled to
impose upon our Northern Confederates. We have estab
lished the most important of the foundations in question, in
the shape of a powerful Prussia — of, so to speak, a vigorous
home-power, vested in the leading State, to which end we
have considerably fortified the latter by adding to its
immediate possessions. The ties of close alliance, by which
we have further sought to unite North Germany, will
scarcely prove as strong as that of actual incorporation.
However, there were only two or three possible ways of
avoiding a repetition of the conditions which had led friendly
and kindred races, under the compulsion of their respective
Governments, to fall upon the rear of our armies. One of
these methods is incorporation and complete amalgamation
with Prussia, even against the will of the people — that is to
say, of the employe's and officers who feel themselves bound
by their oaths and fealty to former Governments. We
propose to surmount these difficulties in German wise — by
treating peculiarities with indulgence and gradually accus-

92 His Treatment of Saxony. [Chap.
toming the recalcitrant to our rule — not, as is the custom
with Latin people, at a single blow. Another method is the
partition of Sovereign rights, in such sort that there may be
a military ruler and a civil ruler, governing simultaneously ;
we shall be compelled by circumstances to make experiment
of this method in Saxony.* I formerly entertained a lively
* On the 20th of August Bismarck told the Saxon negotiators that he
would only treat with them for peace upon the conditions that the
military sovereignty of the King of Saxony should be transferred to the
King of Prussia, that the Saxon troops should take the oath of allegi
ance to the latter monarch, that they should be fully incorporated with
the Prussian army, and, finally, that they should be stationed in gar
risons without the Saxon frontier. Prussia could not tolerate the
further existence of a Saxon army, which — taking into consideration its
excellent condition and the valour displayed by it throughout the
campaign in Bohemia — would constitute a serious danger, if allied to a
first class military power, supposing that Prussia and Saxony should
once more fall out at some future time. The Saxons replied that the
Constitution of the contemplated North-German Confederation would
prevent matters from ever reaching that point, and that, in obedience to
their instructions, they were bound to insist upon the conservation of a
special Saxon army-corps, as well as of their King's military sovereignty ;
further, that they could only consent to the absolute subordination of
their army to the supreme command of Prussia in case of war and (but
under certain limitations) even in time of peace. It would, they added,
be a moral impossibility for the King of Saxony to authorise the anni
hilation, as an army, of troops which had achieved and suffered so
much in his cause. Bismarck rejoined, however, that he must abide by
his demands, which were not at all suggested by distrust of the Saxon
army, but were forced upon him by experience. The present Saxon
cabinet might be animated by the best intentions towards Prussia ; but
those intentions, as far as the future was concerned, were materially
valueless. Different views might arise with respect to the framing of
the Federal Constitution ; some foreign power — Austria, for instance 
might take part in the dispute ; and in such a case the Saxon army,
acting as the vanguard of the Imperial hosts, might prove a very serious
consideration. At that moment the Vienna cabinet was pleading on
behalf of Saxony, and so was the French Government ; all the diplo
matic machinery of Europe had been set in motion in her favour, a

I j Federative Expedients. 93
predilection for this system. But, judging by the im
pressions which I derived from the arrangement of the
February conditions with Schleswig-Holstein, I fear that
such a system will prove a lasting source of uneasiness — a
spring of disagreeables that may flow long after the dislike
of a new regime will have subsided in the absolutely annexed
territories . . . But, putting aside my feeling on the subject,
the system in question has this disadvantage, that one of the
two rulers — the military and foreign one — is bound to
appear invariably as a claimant of concession after con
cession; whereas all the beneficent influences of civil
administration remain attributes of the old-established local
Sovereign. I regret that we are compelled, as already
stated, to make this experiment in Saxony. The third
method is the dismemberment of hitherto existing State
entities — for instance, the reduction to very small dimen
sions of Saxony, Hanover, Elector Hesse, &c. This we
have disdained. It was with this system that we acquired
such dismal experiences in Saxony, in the year 181 5. True,
the districts then handed over to Prussia have become
integral portions of our realm ; but from that time forth a
circumstance which in itself sufficed to prove how dangerous it would
be to accede to her terms. This was a point utilised by foreign coun
tries as a lever wherewith to unsettle the consolidation of Germany and
to prepare all sorts of embarrassments for Prussia, in case of another war ;
therefore Saxony must be rendered innocuous. He seems to have
adhered to this view of the matter ; for when (21 October) Savigny and
Stosch concluded a Treaty of Peace with Saxony in which no mention
was made of the incorporation of the Saxon troops with the Prussian
army, Count Bismarck (who had meanwhile been lying ill at Putbus
and had not been kept informed with regard to the negotiations)
expressly disapproved of the result in that particular respect — with
which result, indeed, he only became reconciled after the establishment
of the Empire and of our present military relations with the South-
German States.

94 Consular Representation. [Chap.
steadfast dislike to Prussia has been kept up in the portion
of Saxony that retained its independence. Upon this
account we have now entirely done away with that system,
and have placed the interests of the persons to be ruled
above those of the dynasty. This may possibly se :m like
injustice ; but policy is not charged with the mission of a
Nemesis. We have nothing to do with revenge ; it is for
us to carry out that which is absolutely necessary to the
Prussian State, and we cannot allow ourselves to be guided
therein by any dynastic sympathies. Our endeavours have
already elicited acknowledgment from the countries they
chiefly concern. With regard to our Allies, they were few
in number and feeble ; but prudence, as well as duty,
ordains that we should keep our word, even to the least of
these. The more implacably Prussia demonstrates her
resolve to sweep her enemies off the map, the more
punctually must she fulfil her promises to her friends.
Faith in our political honesty will have great weight in our
favour, especially in South Germany."
On the 1 2th September, 1866, ia answer to Deputy
Schulze, who had found all manner of fault with the Federal
Treaty of that year, Bismarck said : " Amongst other
matters censured by the honourable member is this : that
there is no mention in the Federal Treaty of Consular
representation, handed over exclusively to Prussia, whereas
the right to be diplomatically represented abroad is retained
by the other Confederate Governments. Gentlemen, in
putting forward such a claim you exaggerate the importance
of diplomacy. I remember well how the most favourable
opportunity for negotiating with the German Princes upon
this subject was lost. Governments attach an altogether
disproportionate weight to this particular privilege and can
only with the greatest difficulty be induced to forego it I

Ij Elsass-Lothringen. 95
say an altogether disproportionate weight; for if the
standing of a realm be really so important that foreign
countries are bound to treat it with consideration, an
officer, a merchant or a private gentleman will suffice to
maintain all necessary relations, and may be received by
the Sovereign, if desirable, upon any insignificant pretext.
If, however, the position of the Sovereign in question be of
no great importance, he may send as many Ambassadors as
he pleases ; it will make no difference ; his own Parliament
will soon put a stop to his indulgence in such expensive
luxuries . . . The last speaker remarked that we have not
sufficiently profited by our victories from a political point
of view. Well, gentlemen, it is easy to make mistakes with
respect to the limits prescribed by conquest, and the future
will show whether or not we have been in error. We
believe that results of the war have put us in possession of
what we require — or at least of its groundwork — to make
arrangements that shall be at once durable, and in keeping
with the desire of the nation."
Relative to the conquest of Elsass-Lothringen, the
Chancellor (May 2, 1871), expressed himself in the
Reichstag as follows : " In the course of centuries our
wars with France had resulted in the establishment of
a geographico-military frontier-line which teemed with
temptation to France and with menace to Germany ;
and I cannot more aptly characterise the situation in which
we — particularly Southern Germany — found ourselves than
in the words of an extremely clever South-German Sovereign,
addressed to me by him at the time when Germany was
being urged to take the part of the Western Powers in the
Crimean War, although in the opinion of her several
Governments she had no substantial interest whatsoever
in the prosecution of that struggle. I can give you his

96 Tlie King of Wuertemberg. [Chap.
name ; it was the late King William of Wuertemberg who
said to me : ' I am quite of your opinion that we have no
interest in mixing ourselves up in this war. But should we
fall out with the Western Powers upon the subject — should
matters come to that pass — you may count upon my vote
in the Federal Council up to the date at which war shall
break out. Then, however, the affair will assume quite
another aspect. I am resolved to adhere as strictly as
anyone else to the engagements I have undertaken. But
beware of taking men for anything else than what they
really are. Give us Strassburg, and we will unite to en
counter any eventuality ; but as long as Strassburg remains
a sally-port for a permanently armed Power, I must continue
to entertain the apprehension that my country will be over
run by foreign troops before the German Confederation can
come to my aid. I shall not object for a moment to eat
the dry bread of exile in your camp ; but my subjects will
write to me, and you will be pestered with applications to
.bring about a change in my resolve. I do not know what I
shall do ; I do not know whether everybody will exhibit the
necessary firmness. But the main point is Strassburg ; for
until that city shall become German it will always stand in
the way of Southern Germany devoting herself unreservedly
to German Unity and to a German national policy.' The
question is, how to obtain hostages, wherewith to guard-
against invasion ; they must be of a territorial nature —
guarantees given by Foreign Powers can avail us but little,
for guarantees of this description are often, I regret to say,
supplemented by declarations that curiously impair their
value . . . Other arrangements were suggested ; we were
recommended, from several quarters, to content ourselves
with the war-expenses and the razing of the French fortresses
in Elsass and Lothringen. I steadfastly opposed this, as an

IJ The Reichs-Laenaer. 97
unpractical expedient ; I did so in the interest of the main
tenance of peace. It would be instituting servitude on
foreign soil, and inflicting an oppressive and distressing
burden upon those affected by it, as far as their feelings of
sovereignty and independence were concerned. The cession
of the fortresses will scarcely be more deeply resented than
would be a foreign prohibition to construct defensive works
within the boundaries of one's own territory . . . Another
expedient would have been to convert those provinces into
a neutral State, like Belgium or Switzerland. By that means
a chain of neutral States, reaching from the North Sea to
the Swiss Alps, would have been created, which would
certainly have rendered it impossible for us to attack France
by land, inasmuch as we are accustomed to respect treaties
and neutralities, and, moreover, should have been separated
from France by the intervening space in question. But
France would in no way have been hindered thereby from
carrying out the project entertained by her during the last
war, i.e., of sending her fleet with an expeditionary force to
our coasts, or of landing French troops on the coasts of her
allies, thence to invade our country. France would have
been endowed with a girdle protecting her from us ; whilst
we, as long as our fleet should not have become equal in
strength to that of the French, should have remained
vulnerable from the sea. This objection, however, came
second in order ; the first was, that neutrality is only main
tainable when a population is resolved to establish itself in
an independent neutral position, and, at need, to defend
that position by force of arms. It could not be expected
that this would proximately prove the case with a newly-
constituted neutral Elsass-Lothringen ; on the contrary, it
appeared more than probable thai, the strong French
element remaining in that country and likely to remain
vol. 1. H

98 Passionless Policy. _ [Chip.
there for a long time to come, would (in the case of another
Franco-German War) coerce the 'neutral State,' whoever its
sovereign might happen to be, into joining France again . . .
We therefore had no choice but to transfer those provinces,
together with their mighty fortresses, to German custody,
with the double object of utilising them as a powerful glacis
of defence against France, and of pushing back, to the
extent of a few days' march, the starting-point of French
attacks upon Germany."
In September, 1870, the National Zeitung complained of
the considerate treatment accorded to the captive Emperor
of the French. " Nemesis," it observed, " should have
been less polite to the man of the 2nd September, the
promulgator of the Loi de Surety, the author of the Mexican
tragedy, the instigator of this gruesome war." "Popular
feeling " considered that the victors had been by far too chiv
alric in their behaviour towards the vanquished. Bismarck
by no means shared this view. " Popular feeling, public
opinion," he said, " always take that line. People insist
that, in conflicts between States, the conqueror should sit
in judgment upon the conquered, moral code in hand, and
inflict punishment upon him for what he has done, not only
to the victor himself, but to third parties as well. This is
an altogether unreasonable demand. Punishment, reward
and revenge have nothing to do with policy. Policy
must not meddle with the calling of Nemesis, or aspire to
exercise the judge's office. That is Divine Providence's
business. It is not for policy to avenge what has been
done, but to take care that it be not done again — to simply
and solely, under no matter what circumstances, occupy
herself with the question ' What, in this matter, is to the
advantage of my country, and how can I realise that
advantage in the best and most productive manner ? ' In

IJ The Versailles Treaties. 99
such a case as the one referred to, the question would be,
' Which of the two will be most useful to us — a badly-used
Napoleon or a well-used Napoleon? It is by no means
impossible that he may one day rise to the surface again.' "
The Chancellor expressed himself in a similar sense at
Versailles with respect to a remark made by his cousin,
Count Bismarck-Bohlen, upon the arrest (October, 1870)
of Jacoby, to the effect that " he was glad they had shut up
that tiresome chatterbox." Our chief replied, " I am not at
all glad of it. A mere party-man may rejoice over such an
event, because it gratifies his vengeful instincts. A real
politician experiences no such feeling. All he asks himself
is, ' Is it of any use to ill-treat one's political opponents?'"
Highly characteristic are the Chancellor's pronounce
ments upon the reception which the treaties, concluded in
Versailles (anent the admission of the South-German States
into the Northern Confederation), had to expect from public
opinion in Germany, and upon the demonstrations that
might be looked for — demonstrations which actually came
off later on. On November 23, when the Treaty with
Bavaria was signed, he said : " The newspapers will not be
satisfied with the Convention, and whosoever shall one of
these days write the history of our transactions will pro
bably find fault with it. He may say, ' The stupid fellow
should have asked for more; he would have got it, they
would have been compelled to yield if he had pronounced
the words, ' You must ! ' " But to me it seemed more
important that the good people should be thoroughly con
tent with the transaction; what are treaties concluded
under compulsion ?-^nd I know that they went away from
me perfectly satisfied. I would not hear of putting pressure
upon them or of profiting by the situation. The treaty is
defective ; but it is all the more durable for being so. I
H 2

loo The Capitulation of Paris. [Chap.
count it amongst the most important of our achievements
this year." Whilst taking tea 01 the evening of Decem
ber i, he remarked : " The papers are dissatisfied with the
Bavarian treaty. I thought they would be. It displeases
them that certain officials should call themselves Bavarians,
although conforming to our laws in every respect. The
same with the army. Neither are they pleased with the
beer-tax ; just as if we had not had it for years past in the
Customs' Union ! They find plenty of other things to
grumble at besides, although everything of any real moment
has been effected and satisfactorily settled. They behave
as if we had been making war against Bavaria, as in 1866
against the Saxons ; whereas the Bavarians are acting with
us as our allies. Before approving of the treaty they want
to wait until they obtain Unity, in a form agreeable to
themselves. They will have a long while to wait Their
ways are the ways of postponement ; our business is to
act with promptitude. Should we hesitate, our enemies
will have time to sow tares in our field. The Treaty
ensures us a good deal; those who want everything are
frequently in the way of getting nothing . . . A Constituent
Assembly 1 And suppose the King of Bavaria should not
choose to be elected thereto. The Bavarian people cannot
compel him, nor can we."
On February 24, 187 1, at Versailles, the subject of con
versation being the dissatisfaction of several German journals
(amongst them the National Zeitung) with the capitulation
of Paris, on the ground that they looked forward to the
" Brilliant Entry" of our troops into that city as a " military
satisfaction " well earned by those valiant hosts, the Chan
cellor observed : "All that is based upon profound ignpr-
ance of the situation before and in Paris. I could have
carried it through with Favre ; but the populace ! They

I J The Church and State Struggle. 101
could dispose of powerful barricades and of three hundred
thousand men, one hundred thousand of whom would
certainly have showed fight. Enough blood — German
blood — has flowed in this war. Had we employed force,
the Parisians were in such an incensed temper that much
more blood must have been shed. The further humiliation
thus inflicted upon them would have been purchased too
dearly; we should have acted unpractically and im-
politically." When (December, 1881) Deputy Virchow reproached
the Chancellor with inconsistency in having withdrawn
from his contest with the Clericals after prosecuting it so
long and so vigorously, Bismarck replied : " In every
struggle there is a maximum point of violence ; but no
internal contest between parties and the Government — no
conflict of that kind — can be dealt with by me as a lasting
and useful institution. I must make war, but solely with
the object of obtaining peace. These combats of ours
sometimes wax very warm ; that they do so is not always
my fault alone ; but my aim throughout them all is invari
ably Peace. If I believe that a greater probability of
attaining a peaceful solution exists at the present moment
than existed when the struggle was at its height, it is clearly
my duty to turn my attention to peace — not, like a political
brawler, to go on fighting for the sake of fighting ... If
I can bring about peace by an acceptable modus vivendi, or
even only an armistice, like those heretofore established
between ourselves and Rome, and which have endured
throughout centuries, I should not be doing my duty did I
not close with such an arrangement."
To conclude this exposition of the Chancellor's political
creed — the Chancellor has been reproached with believing
that Might goes befo e Right, and with openly avowing that

102 Might and Right. [Chap.
belief. He denied this; but echo, unconvinced, still
repeats the accusation. As a matter of fact he never
uttered the sentence attributed to him ; but what if he
had ? Would it have been untrue ? Is not force — is not
the overthrow of obsolete or unnatural rights often far more
beneficial than right itself? and who, in certain cases, shall
say what really is right? One man's opinion will differ
from another's, and both will form their judgments accord
ing to their respective conceptions, circumstances and
interests ; nor does any tribunal exist above them that does
not do as they do.

IIJ ( 103 )

CHAPTER II.
His Religious Views.
It is intended that in this, as well as in the foregoing
chapter and those which are still to come, the Chancellor
shall characterise himself with respect to the subjects
indicated in their headings ; to which end we have arranged
in groups a number of his public and private utterances.
We shall for the future guard more carefully against the
fault of indulging in generalisation than has been the case
in the extracts by means of which we have endeavoured to
depict Bismarck in his character as a politician. The
copious material at our disposal, whereby we may be
enabled to appreciate the attitude assumed by the Prince
towards religion and the Church, must be sifted, and that
more carefully than other evidence, also in our possession,
bearing upon other traits of his spiritual physiognomy.
One may write a treatise upon Goethe, considered as a
politician, a patriot, or a cosmopolite, and only arrive at
semi-correct or wholly incorrect conclusions therein, if one
fail to regard his declarations of opinion (upon which such a
treatise must be founded) in immediate connection with the
time and place of their pronouncement, with their object,
origin, and relation to one another. They must be judged
by the period of development during which the poet and
thinker let them fall, by the state of his feelings at that

104 Goethe's Versatility. [Chap.
time ; by the influence which may have been exercised upon
him by the school of philosophy then prevailing, or the politi
cal conditions surrounding him, or the persons to whom he
addressed them. Thus only can they be appraised at their
just value; thus alone can that which is really weighty and
enduring in their totality be made known in its full histori
cal significance. The writer who deals otherwise with his
subject — and many have done so — who hunts up evidence
and patches it together with the light of preconceived
opinions, can just as easily come to the conclusion that
Goethe was " the lackey of Princes,'' a reactionary, an
unpatriotic spirit, as that he was exactly the converse of all
these. By dealing in such sort with him and quoting
certain chapters of his " Wanderjahre," it is easy to convert
him into a sort of Socialist of the Fourierist variety. This
applies in a still higher degree to his attitude towards
religion and the Church. Many passages may be extracted
from his poems and correspondence which seem to prove
him a heathen or a pantheist ; as many more, on the other
hand, clearly demonstrating that he was a Christian in
thought and feeling. If we recall the closing scene of Faust
(Part II.) or certain utterances in " Wahrheit und Dichtung,"
we may even bring ourselves to regard him as an inspired
apologist of Catholicism. The latter utterances (which
belong to the year 1 8 1 2) present an altogether too astound
ing glorification of the Papal Church's entity and institutions
— in particular, of the Seven Sacraments, and, above all, of
ordination. But, only a short time previously, Goethe, as a
Spinozist, had given expression to a passionate aversion
to Christianity, and a little later, as a Persian Dervish, he
scoffed at the mystery of the Holy Trinity. What he
thought of the priestly mission may be gathered from the
words of Eugenie (Die natuerliche Tochter) : —

ITJ Bismarck's Stages of Belief. 105
" Den Wunsch der Liebe, die zum All das Eine,
Zum Ewigen das Gegenwaertige,
Das Fluechtige zum Dauernden erhebt,
Den zu erfuellen ist sein goettlich Amt."
It would appear, however, that with respect to Bismarck's
religious belief the truth is not so hard to get at as in the
case of Goethe ; for we but seldom come across utterances
of his in that direction which are not readily reconcileable
with one another, and never meet with any of his reflections
upon heavenly matters in direct contradiction to other such,
previously by him enounced. Nevertheless, before utilising
the materials with which he has supplied us, in .the shape of
Ietteis, private conversations and public speeches, we must
not omit to answer as well as we can the questions above
indicated, and possibly to put forward a few others.
Imprimis, it may be confidently assumed that Bismarck
has not always entertained the same view of these matters,
and that he has never been quite able to make up his mind
about them. He himself acknowledges that, in religion as
well as in politics, he has successively arrived at different
stages of development. First of ali he passed through a
rationalistic phase ; then came a time during which he was
an unbeliever, or, at least, experienced no religious require
ments at all ; later on he gave expression to such decided
opinions that no doubt could be entertained as to his views.
obviously those of a man whose standpoint was Christian
and even Confessional ; and of late years he appears to
have retained only as much positive belief as entitles us to
consider him a profoundly religious spirit, believing firmly
in God, heavenly order and a personal existence continued
after death; doing his duty in conformity with this faith,
and deriving from it strength wherewith to fulfil his earthly
mission ; but making small account of creeds, absolutely

I©5 His Stormy Youth. [Chap.
condemning intolerance, and exhibiting no very conspicuous
yearning to fortify his soul with ecclesiastic observances or
by partaking freely of the Means of Grace.
The outward influences and inward circumstances and
conditions that led to these transitions are to some extent
easy of recognition. The Prince's youth was passed in a
time when rationalism still ruled throughout large circles of
society. His mother was a remarkably intelligent and
enlightened woman ; his father was a man of feeling, but
experienced no very deeply-seated craving for acquaintance
and consonance with the supernatural world. The schools
in which their son underwent his primary education were by
no means calculated to awaken or strengthen in him re
ligious sentiments or aspirations. Still less so was the im
mediately subsequent period of his life, during which he
attended the University and was surrounded by friends and
acquaintances. That was the time when, by all manner of
eccentricities, he earned the nickname of " the Mad Squire "
(Der tolle f unker) ; when his psychic condition was one of
fervent paroxysm and storm, full of arrogance and mischief.
And yet that very time was not totally devoid of efforts on
his part to attain higher and better things ; it ended, indeed,
in disgust with his own conduct and in an eager longing to
flee from the vexations that conduct had brought upon him.
Speaking of the gloominess that pervades the works of
English poets, Goethe says : " How many of them have led
dissolute and intemperate lives in their youth, and have
at an early age felt themselves justified in proclaiming the
vanity of all earthly things." This sentence applies to
Bismarck's nature, which, even during that tempestuous
time, was fundamentally a serious one. Possibly he was to
some extent under the influence of the very poems alluded
to above. In the mean time he had become acquainted

IIJ A Period of Reaction. 107
with Spinoza's works ; and although we do 'not know how
far he adopted that philosopher's views of things in general,
we may fairly assume that they produced some effect upon
him, and contributed to the pessimism which took possession
of him about that time and continued long afterwards to
darken his soul. His physical conditions also were such as
to superinduce a state of mind to which the world appeared
barren and mournful. In a letter addressed to his sister
(August 1846) he signed himself, half in jest, half in earnest :
" Thy consumptive brother." He also suffered from other
ailments that are generative of melancholy — for instance,
from stomachic neuralgia. Finally, throughout several years
of this particular period of his development, his pecuniary
affairs were of a nature to depress his spirits and suggest the
desire to seclude himself from society. It was in the temper
of mind produced by these untoward circumstances that he
expressed the wish to " emigrate to the Polish forests with
his last few thousand thalers in his pocket, in order there to
commence a new life as a simple farmer and hunter." Such
gloomy thoughts as those over wliich he then brooded might
have prompted any other man — particularly a Roman
Catholic — 4:o set up as a hermit with a hair-shirt, or to enter
a monastery in which the strictest discipline was enforced.
Thus Otto von Bismarck, then approaching his thirtieth
year, was more than sufficiently prepared to enter upon
another stage of his psychical existence ; and we shall not
be far wrong in assuming that his affection for the young
lady who subsequently became his wife conducted him
thitherwards, or caused the seed to sprout which had been
sown in him by others. Johanna von Puttkamer was the
daughter of pious parents, powerfully moved by the spirit of
Quakerdom. That the " Kneiphof Squire " — the young
man destined to develop into the "Iron Chancellor" —

108 Pietism in Prussia. [Chap.
should have been accessible to that spirit, will not surprise
anyone who has read the above paragraphs ; for his being
so was consistent with a tender trait that has not infrequently
made itself manifest in his character. We have no reason
to believe that he took delight in the sickly sweetnesses of
Quakerdom; but it is probable that he became deeply
interested in the more wholesome teachings of that particular'
form of pietism. Even Goethe the " Heathen " was greatly
attracted in his younger years by the system of fraternal
communities — " this Society gathered together under the
banner of Christ."
Meanwhile the number of pious, or at least of church-
going families had considerably increased within the circles
of the Prussian nobility. After the accession to the throne
of Frederick William the Fourth, it was regarded by many
as the result of irresistible inward impulse, and by others as
a mere fashionable movement, that the moral terrain
occupied by the higher social classes — -thitherto planted
with rationalistic theories or with the ideas of Rousseau
and Voltaire — should suddenly be flooded and drenched
by supranaturalistic, pietistic, and orthodox inundations.
Rationalism was much too flat, dry and sterile ; it was by
no means aesthetic, and had become rather vulgar ; it had
failed to move the heart or excite the fancy ; it was too near
akin to the Liberalism then endeavouring to do away with
the scanty remains of such feudal rights as had been spared
by the Stein-Hardenberg enactments. Hegel's doctrine was
not suitable to ladies, or to the men of sentiment associating
with them ; and it had put forth a shoot, in the shape of
Young-Hegelism, which threatened existing institutions more
imminently than did the teachings of Rationalism itself.
Revolution was looming like a thunder-cloud in the western
and southern horizon ; to many anxious spirits Christianity,

IIJ The Pessimistic Phase. 109
with its lessons of self-denial, humility and godliness, seemed
the only power capable of averting the menacing danger.
Along the whole line of defence, from Bunsen to Stahl and
Gerlach, it became the practice — imitated from the very
highest personages — to speak in unctuous phrases. The
ancient dogma of Original Sin, of the inborn sinfulness of
human nature, was once more dug up and thrust into the
foreground. Everything in the visible world from the time
of the Fall was pronounced to be evil. Whatever was not
in diametrical opposition to Nature was declared to be wicked
— self-satisfaction, the most heinous of crimes; salvation
could not be achieved by inward means — it could only
reach one from above.
Bismarck, shortly before his marriage, was introduced into
circles in which ideas of this class were prevalent, through
making the acquaintance at Zimmerhausen of his friend
Moritz von Blankenberg's wife, a daughter of Von Taddens
of Triglaff, described by Hesekiel as " a pious and clever
lady." Later on, he encountered the same views in the
Puttkamer family and elsewhere; such was the moral
atmosphere in which this young nobleman thenceforth chiefly
lived and breathed for several years. The Quaker view of
mankind and the world became closely blended with the
sad, discontented, yearning sentiments by which he had been
previously animated. We have reason to believe that
Bismarck felt himself exalted and inwardly deepened, as
well as emancipated from his retrospective sufferings, by the
positive opinions he derived from the view in question. He
had felt a huge void within him, which by this means was
beneficently filled up. He was blest in having become a
Christian ; and that joy was amalgamated with yet another—
his felicity in married life.
In a letter written to his wife from Frankfort in July 185 1

no He Reverts to Christianity. [Chap.
he said : " The day before yesterday I was at Wiesbaden,
and contemplated the scene of former follies with mingled
melancholy and precocious wisdom. If it would only please
God to fill with his bright strong wine this vessel, in which,
fourteen years ago, the champagne of youth frothed over so
uselessly, leaving only stale lees behind 1 Through how
many transformations have my views of worldly matters
passed during the interval, each of which, in turn, I deemed
conclusively correct ! how much seems paltry to me now
that then appeared grand — how many things worthy of
respect at which I was then wont to scoff ! How many a
leaf may sprout, wax green, give shade and wither away in
our inner-selves ere other fourteen years shall be past and
gone 1 ... I cannot understand how any man who thinks
about himself, and yet neither knows nor wishes to know
anything about God can, for very scorn and weariness,1
endure to live. I know not how I formerly managed to put
up with existence ; had I again to live, as then, without thee
and the children, I really am at a loss to say why I should
not put off this life as though it were a dirty shirt."
About that time he experienced the desire to aid others
to attain the standpoint at which he himself had arrived.
On a pleasure trip from Frankfort to Ruedesheim he took
his New Testament with him, and held " Christian talk " of
an evening on the balcony of the inn with Count Lynar, one
of his companions, in the course of which conversation he
long and unsuccessfully strove "with the Rousseau-like
virtuousness of his (Lynar's) soul."
We may assume that all the external influences which
brought about Bismarck's leaning towards Christian thought
and action would have proved ineffectual or, at least, would
have failed to govern him for any length of time, if the
pessimism of his manhood's earlier years had not clung to

II.] Christian Pessimism. 1 1 1
him throughout his later life, sometimes thrust down into
the depths of his soul, sometimes rising to his lips or pen's
point in loud complaint ; still further, if Christianity had not
appeared to him as the very basis of the State and a bulwark
against the assaults of the revolutionary spirit of the age — in
other words, a means of defence ; and lastly, to speak
theologically, had not the belief in a personal God and in the
eternal life of man, once adopted by him, served him as
compass and guiding-star for his actions, and as a source of
strength and comfort in the heavy perplexities and struggles
of his career as a statesman.
Christianity is the religion of contempt for mundane
things. To it — in contrast to antique Heathendom and to
the Renaissance, which regarded Nature as genuine and
holy, maintaining a cultus of joy in the world, and imparting
to virtue, by the aid alike of law and morality, a fully
developed and guaranteed force — this earth and the worldly
being of mankind is but a vanity of vanities, a vicious and
unreal delusion and snare. Real life is only in the other
world. But, as already pointed out, the pessimism which
has possessed the Prince even in his more advanced years
from time to time — probably oftener than we are aware —
and still creeps over him in his hours of weariness, is
closely akin to this contempt for mundane things. It may
be that this state of feeling has to do partly with the con
dition of his health, and partly with his many vexations,
disappointments, and melancholy forebodings. Goethe's
observation, in explanation of the mournful tone character
ising the majority of English poets, may well apply to
Bismarck ; viz. : — " How many of them have plunged into
worldly affairs, have played a part in Parliament, at Court,
in Ministries and Embassies, have distinguished themselves
in their country's internal struggles, in conspiracies against

112 He is subject to Melancholia. [Chap.
the State and in the overthrow of Governments, and have
experienced failure more frequently than success, if not
through their own fault, through that of their friends and
patrons . . . But even to have been only a spectator of such
great events makes men earnest ; and earnestness cannot but
prompt them seriously to consider the transitory and worth
less nature of worldly things." The development of these
views is reflected in the lines referred to by Goethe as
" terrible : "
" Then old age and experience, hand in hand,
Lead him to death and make him understand,
After" a search so painful and so long,
That all his life he has been in the wrong."
In a word, Bismarck has always suffered at intervals from
fits of melancholy ; pessimism, like an unresolved minor
discord, mars the harmony of his life. Within certain limits
we may assume that he is chiefly a Christian because his
deep and strong conviction of the finality and worthlessness
of mundane existence, in all its varied phenomena, predis
poses him in favour of the Christian dispensation.
His private correspondence and verbal utterances afford
numerous illustrations of the views entertained by him in the
above direction. In a letter to his wife, dated St. Peters-
burgh, July 2, 1859, we find expressed the weighty scruples
suggested to him by " Prussia's policy, ever lapsing more and
more into the wake of Austria." He writes as follows : —
" The will of God be done ! Everything here is only a
question of time — races and individuals, folly and wisdom,
war and peace, come and go like waves, but the sea remains
stilL" (This image, if not borrowed from a psalm, or from
one of the Scriptural prophets, is probably an echo of his
Spinozistical studies.) " There is nothing upon this earth
but hypocrisy and juggling ; and whether this mask' of flesh

IIJ His Reflections upon Life. 113
be torn from us by fever or grapeshot, fall it must, sooner
or later. When it does, a resemblance will make itself
manifest between a Prussian and an Austrian (if they happen
to be of the same height) which it will render it difficult to
distinguish the one from the other ; the skeletons of fools
and wise men present pretty much the same appearance."
(See Hamlet in the churchyard.) " From this point of view
it is easy to rid oneself of specific patriotism ; but it would
drive one to despair to believe that our salvation depended
thereupon." In a letter (August, 1861) to his brother-in-law, Oscar
von Arnim, whilst endeavouring to console the latter for the
loss of a son, he observes :— £^JVe must not attach ourselves
to this world or make ourselves at home in it ; twenty years
hence, or, at most, thirty, we shall be past the troubles of
this life, whilst our children will have reached our present
standpoint and will discover with astonishment that their
existence (but now so brightly commenced) has turned the
corner and is going down hill. Were that to be the end of
it all, life would not be worth the trouble of dressing and
undressing every day.'jT' (This is a recollection of a passage
in Goethe's ' Egmont ').
Since the above letter was written years of brilliant success
have passed over the Chancellor's head. He has covered
himself with imperishable glory, and raised the German
people to a rank amongst nations far surpassing that which
it had occupied during foregoing centuries. Many will be
of opinion that he should look back to the long list of his
deeds and works, as God the Father did, upon the seventh
day, to the world He had created. " And God saw all that
he had made, and behold, it was good." Perhaps, on the
whole, the Chancellor experiences this feeling ; but there
are moments, from time to time, when it is otherwise with
vol. 1. [

114 Intervals of Low Spirits. [Chap.
him — when he labours under depression of spirits, brought
about by discontent and dissatisfaction with his achieve
ments and his destiny. To these moments belongs an occur
rence that took place in the autumn of 1877. I have related
it elsewhere, but think it worth repeating here, as peculiarly
characteristic of Prince Bismarck.
It was twilight at Varzin, and he was sitting — as was his
wont after dinner — by the stove in the large back drawing-
room, where Rauch's statue of " Victory Casting Wreaths "
is set up. After having sat silent for a while, gazing straight
before him and feeding the fire, now and anon, with fir
cones, he suddenly began to complain that his political
activity had brought him but little satisfaction and few
friends. Nobody loved him for what he had done. He
had never made anybody happy thereby, he said; not
himself, nor his family, nor any one else. Some of those
present would not admit this, and suggested " that he had
made a great nation happy." " But," he continued, " how
many have I made unhappy ! But for me, three great wars
would not have been fought; eighty thousand men would
not have perished; parents, brothers, sisters, and widows
would not be bereaved and plunged into mourning . . .
That matter, however, I have settled with God. But I have
had little or no joy from all my achievements — nothing but
vexation, care, and trouble." He continued for some time
in the same strain. His guests kept silence; and those
amongst them who had never before heard him say anything
of the kind were somewhat astonished. It reminded one of
Achilles, speaking to King Priam in his tent before llion.
" Wir schaffen ja nichts mit unserer starrenden Schwermuth ;
Also bestimmten der Sterblichen Loos, der armen, die Goetter,
Truebe in Gram zu leben, allein sie selber sind sorglos."
This speech of the Chancellor — the " character of iron,"

II.] His Physical Sufferings. 1 1 5
the spirit one had accustomed oneself to think of as proudly
and sternly certain of itself— sounded (especially with
relation to the statue of Victory, stationed in the corner
opposite his seat, and making as though it would cast laurels
wreaths at his feet) like an echo of the feeling running
through the soliloquy, " To be or not to be," in the course
of which Hamlet exclaims : —
f" How weary, stale, flat and unprofitable
Seem to me all the uses of this world !
Fie on't ! O fie ! 'tis an unweeded garden
That grows to seed^^iings rank and gross in nature
Possess it merely 1" \
Still more keenly did all this pessimism of his remind one
of that passage in the Koheleth, the author of which makes
the Royal Preacher complain in the following terms : " But
when I looked at all my works which my hand had wrought,
and at the trouble that I had taken, behold, it was all vanity
and vexation, and nothing more under the sun." *
What was the cause of his melancholy? Possibly it
resulted from physical suffering, which conjures up painful
dreams even to the wakeful mind, from excessive irritability
caused by overmuch thinking and anxiety, by lassitude, by
discords in his nervous system, or perhaps — and this seems
to me most probable — by an unwitting outburst and over
flow of Christian feeling. One thing is certain — that of late
years he has repeatedly expressed himself in words almost
identical with those above quoted, and that, upon such
occasions, no arguments have availed to soothe him.
His public speeches bear witness that the Chancellor
long ago recognised in religion, and especially in Chris
tianity, one of the foundations and bulwarks of justice and
the State, a protection against the Revolution on the one
" Ecclesiastes ii. I 2

1 1 6 The State founded upon Christianity. [Chap.
hand, and against the sentimental humanitarianism that
would fain emasculate the penal laws on the other. His
frequent reference, in these discourses, to the Christian
basis of the Prussian and German State-systems, is a proof
of his religious propensities, and still more so of his acquain
tance with history. He is not a prophet ; his glance is
fixed upon the natural coherence of past events. Europe,
its culture and its political institutions, form a structure
founded upon Christianity, though they have frequently
striven with it ; and upon that foundation Bismarck takes
his stand. On the 15th June, 1847, ne said in the United
Diet : — " I am of opinion that the conception of a Christian
State is as old as the g.i-devant Holy Roman Empire, or as
all the States of Europe put together ; that it is precisely the
soil'in which those States have struck root ; and, that every
State, if it wish to ensure its durability and to prove its right
to existence, must rely upon a religious basis. For me, the
words " By the Grace of God," which Christian rulers
append to their names, are by no means an empty sound ;
I perceive in them the confession that Princes are called
upon to wield in conformity with the will of God those
earthly sceptres entrusted to them by the Deity. But I can
only recognise as God's will that which is revealed in the
Christian Gospel ... If we deprive the State of this
religious basis, we shall find that what remains is merely a
hap-hazard aggregation of laws — a sort of bulwark against
the warring of all men upon one another, erected by
antique philosophy. Its legislation will then no longer
derive self-regeneration from the springs of Eternal Truth,
but from the vague and changeful conceptions of humanity,
begotten in the brains of those who may happen to be at
its head. How it will be possible, in States of this class, to
contend against Communistic notions of the immorality of

II.] Duties of the Legislature. 117
property, the exalted moral merit of theft as an endeavour
to re-establish the inborn rights of man, if these notions
should become prevalent, I cannot surmise ; for the propa
gators of such ideas deem them essentially humane, and,
indeed, regard them as the very blossom of humanity."
In the great oration pronounced by Bismarck (15 Novem
ber, 1849) in the Prussian Lower House against civil
marriages and upon the subject of the people's Christian
consciousness, we meet with the following characteristic
passages : — " I do not believe it is the Legislature's duty to
ignore that which the people holds sacred. On the contrary,
I believe it to be the mission of the Legislature, as the
people's teacher and guide, to act in such sort that popular
existence, in .its every circumstance, shall lean upon the
staff of Faith — not to arbitrarily cast away that staff,
wherever it may be to hand, as an useless appendage, thus
undermining reverence for the Church and for religious
institutions wherever that reverence may have struck root
deeply in the life of the people ; and this during an epoch
which has taught us in letters of blood that wheresoever the
freethinkers have succeeded in imparting to the masses their
indifference to any and every positive profession of faith,
nothing has been left to the people of their Christianity but
such insipid dregs as consist in an ambiguous moral
philosophy — that there the bare bayonet alone interposes
between criminal passions and the peaceful citizen — that
there the war of class upon class is no fiction. Take away
from a man his belief in the revealed difference between
good and evil, and you may possibly succeed in convincing
him that robbery and murder will be severely punished by
laws which the well-to-do have framed for the protection of
their property and persons ; but you will nevermore be able
to prove to him that any action is in itself bad or good. I

Il8 Capital Punishment. [Chap.
have of late seen many an ' enlightened ' friend brought to
admit that a certain measure of positive Christianity is
necessary to the common man, in order to prevent him from
becoming dangerous to human society ... If we go further
in that direction ; if we make article 1 1 (the toleration of all
creeds) so far an actual reality that we compel our gen
darmes to protect the cultus of those democratic visionaries
who, during their recent meetings, placed their martyr,
Robert Blum, upon a footing of equality with the Redeemer
of the World, I still hope to see the day when the ship of the
age we live in, with its crew of fools, shall founder on the rock *
of the Christian Church ; for Faith in the revealed Word of
God is more firmly implanted in the people's heart than the
salvation-conferring force of an Article of the Constitution."
When (ist March, 1870, in the Reichstag of the North
German Confederation) the Chancellor replied to the
speeches of certain Deputies who had advocated the aboli
tion of the penalty of death, he observed : — " The impression
I have derived from this discussion, briefly summarised, is
that the opponents of the death-penalty exaggerate alike the
value of life in this world of ours, and the importance of
death. I can conceive that capital punishment may appear
harder to those who do not believe in the continuance of
individual life after physical decease than to those who
believe in the immortality of the souls granted to them by
God; but, looking more closely into the matter, I can
scarcely even accept that view of it. For him who does not
believe — as I do, from the bottom of my heart — that death
is a transition from one existence to another, and that we
• It is quite obvious that Prince Bismarck did not mean the "Rock
of Peter " at the Vatican ; and so he explicitly stated to the Ultra-
montanes on the 17th December, 1873, when Deputy von Gerlach
reminded him of the above utterance.

II.] Immortality of the Soul. 119
are justified in holding out to the worst of criminals in his
dying hour the comforting assurance, mors janua vita ; I
say that, for him who does not share that conviction, the joys
of this life must possess so high a value that I could almost
envy him the sensations they must procure to him. His
occupations must appear to him so teeming with promise of
reward that I cannot realise to myself what his state of
feeling must be, if, believing that his personal existence
terminates for ever with his bodily demise, he considers it
worth while to go on living at all. I will not in this place
refer you to Hamlet's tragical monologue, which sets forth
all the reasons capable of inducing him to put an end to
himself, but for the contingency of dreaming— perhaps of
suffering — after death ; who knows what ? He who has
made up his mind that no other existence succeeds this one,
can scarcely expect a criminal — who, in the words of the
poet, gazes steadfastly into the night from the Rabenstein,
and for whom death is the peace, the slumber yearned for
by Hamlet — to carry on the necessary phosphorisation of
his brain for any length of time within the narrow limits of a
prison-cell, forlorn of all that lends a charm to existence . . .
It strikes me, moreover, that the views of the Opposition in
this matter are guided by a certain sickly disposition to
protect and guard from wrong the criminal more carefully
than his victim ... I am quite prepared to admit that the
progressive perfection of human insight and education, all
the blessings of civilization which we hear so justly vaunted,
and the development of moral culture, have a bearing upon
the question at issue (the diminution of crime) ; but it is
that development of moral culture the basis of which can be
traced back to the Christianity of our forefathers ; which is
still quick in every class -of the people and keeps up morality
at this very time. Compared with that influence, the

120 Bismarck's Christianity. [Chap.
abolition of capital punishment has achieved but few and
brief experiences in extremely limited districts. For my
part, I do not feel justified in making this experiment at
the expense of the majority of peaceable citizens."
That the Chancellor, up to the very latest times, has
firmly upheld the Christian character of modern States is
proved by the speech which he pronounced in the Reichstag,
on the 2nd April, 1881, during the debate on the Accidental-
Insurance Bill. " I could wish," he observed, "that a State
which (however much you may object to the designation
'Christian State') consists in a large majority of Christians,
should allow itself to be guided to a certain extent by the
principles of the religion we profess, especially with respect
to the aid every man owes to his neighbour, and to the
sympathy due to the sad fate awaiting infirm old people."
We have no reason, whatsoever, to doubt the absolute
sincerity of Bismarck's belief in personal perpetuation after
death. But we may be permitted to ask what he — who
pronounces Life worthless without the positive conviction
mors esse januam vitce — would find to say, were some one to
open Goethe's ' Faust ' before him, and point to this
passage : —
" Thor, wer dorthin die Augen blinzend richtet I
Sich ueber Wolken seines Gleichen dichtet !
Er stehe fest und sehe hier sich um,
Dem Tuechtigen ist diese Welt nicht stumm.
Was braucht er in die Ewigkeit zu schweifen?
Was er erkennt, laesst sich ergreifen."
The following quotation, which partly belongs to the
evidence we are enabled to advance in support of our third
assumption respecting the causes and motives of Bismarck's
religious tendencies, furnishes fresh and convincing proof
that, in these respects, he has remained true, in the main

IIJ Bismarck's Christianity. 121
to his earlier views, although his eyes and ears are closed to
anything like indoctrination. In one of the Culturkampf-
Debates (10th February, 1872) in the Prussian Lower
House, the Chancellor replied to an Ultramontane ad
versary : " The previous speaker has reminded me of
speeches to which I gave utterance in 1849, three-and-
twenty years ago. I might dispose of this allusion by
simply remarking that I am accustomed to learn something
in three-and-twenty years, especially when they happen to
be the best years of my manhood ; and moreover that I,
at least, am not infallible. But I will go a little farther
than this. Whatever, in my former utterances, may have
applied to a lively profession — to a profession of the living
Christian Faith," (here observe the word 'living,' which
indicates the converse of dead . dogmas,) "I confess quite
openly to-day ; and I do not flinch from making this
profession, publicly or in my own house, at any and every
"time. But it is precisely my living, Evangelical, Christian
faith which imposes upon me the obligation to protect, in
every way, the high office confided to me in the country
of my birth, to serve which God created me. When the
foundations of the State were attacked from the Republican
party's barricades, I deemed it my duty to stand in the
breach ; and if they be attacked from quarters, formerly and
even still called upon to strengthen, instead of undermining,
the foundations of the State " (the speaker here referred to
the Centre, and, in connection with the Schools Inspection
Bill, to the Old Conservatives) " you will then also find me
stationed in the breach. That is the post assigned to me by
Christianity and by my belief."
That Bismarck never scrupled, in cases requiring the
sacrifice of his religious convictions to the welfare of the
State, to make that sacrifice, he demonstrated in 1873,

1 22 His Belief in an Eternal God. [Chap.
when the question of obligatory Civil Marriage was settled.
On January 17 of that year he declared in the Lower House
that " not readily, but most unwillingly and after a severe
mental struggle" he had resolved to recommend the sane
tioning of the measure in question to the King ; and
continued as follows : — " I am not here to propound
dogmas, but to transact politics. From the political point
of view I have convinced myself that the State — in the
situation to which it has been brought by the revolutionary
conduct of the Catholic Bishops — is constrained by the
dictates of self-defence to enact this law, in order to avert
from a portion of His Majesty's subjects the evils with
which they are menaced by the Bishops' rebellion against
the laws and the State ; in a word, that the State is forced
to do its duty as far as in it lies."
We now come to the third fundamental principle of Prince
Bismarck's religiosity. Beside his strong feeling with respect
to the vanity of everything earthly and human — beside the
melancholy tendency to a belief in finality that lurks within
his breast and from time to time finds loud and lively
utterance, exists (at least so we are entitled to conclude
from a number of his deliverances) the faith that something
Eternal, Enduring and alone truly Real lives and reigns over
or in this perishable world. This faith is to him — as pulpit
orators would say — a primitive fount of duty as well as of
justification; a Divine guiding-star, which never changes
its place or alters its light, and upon which he must
invariably keep his eyes fixed when called upon to choose
the right path among many ; a never-failing support, and a
treasure — ever attainable by the seeker — of invigoration for
the hard-working, struggling human soul. Certainty is the
breath of life to a hero. Outside the realm of the finite, vague
and indistinct, he must find some ground upon which he

II.] Duty his Guiding-Star. 123
can set both his feet firmly, if he desire to lift the world and
remove it to some other orbit. Creative activity is impos
sible if the convictions of him who would fain exercise it do
not repose upon an immovable basis. Luther's whole nature
finds expression in the first verse of his hymn " Our God is
a firm tower.'' Other heroes of history — Napoleon, for
instance — have looked for the primary cause of all their
endeavours within themselves alone — in their desire to
become conspicuous, in their yearning for fame and power
— and have subsequently imposed it, under other design
ations, upon their surroundings, their nation and their
epoch. Our political Reformer sought and found it where
religious men would have sought and found it ; it became
the source of his devotion to duty, of his strength and
comfort in need and danger, and he called it God, Faith or
Christianity. Others give it the name of Conscience. But
God dwells in the consciences of rising peoples — in theii
ethics, in that which prescribes to them their path, stimulates
and guides them in political life, and irresistibly moves them
to act thus, and not otherwise — and the hero is the concen
tration of this Divine Agent, which he consciously or
unconsciously absorbs into and amalgamates with himself,
becoming, as in Bismarck's case, absolutely identical with it.
Consciously and unconsciously, Bismarck has invariably
applied his genius to the service of German conscientiousness
and of Prussian sense of duty — has stedfastly laboured,
fought and conquered with Kant's categorical imperative.
He has often, as we shall shew, directly avowed this, partic
ularly of later years ; formerly he gave utterance to it for the
most part in theological forms.
Should the reader wish to have all this set forth in simpler,
more worldly and more sober terms, perhaps he may find
what he requires in the following judgment, pronounced

124 -^ Typical Prussian. [Chap.
upon Prince Bismarck's character by a friend of the author :
"He (Bismarck) is manifestly a dilettante in religious
matters ; he is no theologian and has not put together for
his own use any system of coherent convictions. His
religiousness is that of a practical person, who endeavours
to cover his rear as best he can. His capacity of achieve
ment is great ; but still he feels that he cannot do every
thing, and that things and circumstances innumerable escape
him. When this feeling possesses him, he seeks and
finds a supplement to his forces; that supplement which
Napoleon I. called I'ordre des clioses, and Bismarck calls
God. Both these great men have now and then felt uneasy,
despite all their power and foresight ; they have experienced
a sense of loneliness, and have plunged from time to time
into materialism and generalities, shaking off the fetters
of their individual entities. Bismarck owns a God besides
himself. Compare with him Goethe, in the ptbem under
the heading "Gott, Gemuet und Welt"
" Im Innern ist ein Universum auch
Daher dtr Voelker loeblicher Gebrauch
Dasz jeglicher das Beste, was er kennt,
Er Gott, ja seinen Gott, benennt,
Ihm Himmel und Erde uebergiebt,
Ihn fuerchtet und, wo moeglich, liebt."
Bismarck's sense of duty, however, is Old Prussian. Kant
and Fichte are also Prussians — prophets of the energy of
volition. Bismarck seems to me* a genial, marvellous
personification of Prussia, The real Prussians however are
found in the ranks of the lesser nobility, the army and the
bureaucracy, such as it has hitherto been. Bismarck is a
typical Prussian nobleman, soldier* and official. With all
* In the great speech against Richter and Bamberger, delivered by
the Chancellor in the Reichstag on the 14th June, 1882, the following

II.] His Family Motto. 125
this, and in requisite contrast to it, he is not wanting in a
slight dash of frivolity."
Let the reader combine With the above observations the
following evidence, adduced in support of the author's own
opinions with respect to Prince Bismarck's religious views.
One day, in the autumn of 1877, as he was showing me
his study at Varzin, we came to the gigantic green chimney-
piece, on the right of the door communicating with the
library. In the centre of this chimney-piece, under an
effigy of the German Imperial Eagle, is graven the motto
"In trinitate robur." When Bismarck held the post of
Envoy to the Confederation at Frankfurt, King Frederick of
Denmark conferred upon him the Grand Cross of the
Dannebrog Order. Now it is the custom that the name and
arms of any person in possession of this decoration shall be
set up in the Foundation-Church at Copenhagen, with a
motto which must be selected hy the person in question and
must have a double meaning. " So I hit upon this one,"
observed the Prince. " ' In trinitate robur ' — the trefoil,
clover, oakleaf, the old device of our family." " And my
strength in the threefold God ? " I asked. " Quite so ; that
was how I meant it," he gravely replied.
In a letter to his wife, dated 4 September, 1863, after the
dissolution of the Chambers, he wrote : — " God knows what
is the good of it. . . By God's help I am well enough; but

passage occurs : "The first thing said about me when I made my debut
as a Minister was something particularly flattering to my feelings, i.e. :
' Anybody can see at a glance that he is nothing but a Prussian officer
n plain clothes.' I gratefully accepted that definition of my appear
ance ; and my feelings as a Prussian officer, although I only wear the
outer insignia of that career, bear me forward higher on the wave of
national aspirat.'o.is and love of my country than any parliamentary
attribution I exercise in this place."

126 His Religiosity. [Chap.
humble faith is requisite in order not to despair of our
country's future." In another letter, dated 16 May, 1864,
and addressed to a Prussian Conservative (Gerlach, be it
observed) with regard to the condition of affairs in Schleswig-
Holstein (where he avowed, later on, that he had carried
out his most brilliant diplomatic campaign) crops up once
more his trust in Divine aid, ut sequitur: " The longer I am
engaged in politics, the less I place faith in human calcu
lations "; and, towards the end : — " You will gather here
from my view of the matter, as suggested by mere human
intelligence ; as for the rest, I am animated by an ever
increasing thankfulness to God for His support in the belief
that He knows how to tum even our mistakes to good
account. This I experience daily, to my most salutary
humiliation." When — early in the morning after the battle of Sedan —
the Chancellor was summoned by General Reille to meet
the Emperor of the French, there lay upon a table beside
the bed in which he had slept all night, the " Daily Solutions
and Instructive Texts of the Fraternal Congregation for
1870," and on the floor another manual of devotion instituted
" Daily Refreshment for Believing Christians." Both these
works had been forwarded to the Chancellor from Berlin by
some sympathetic soul with the object of keeping him well
supplied, whilst abroad, with spiritual nutriment. His man
servant stated that " Excellency was in the habit of reading
the books in question before he went to sleep."
In 1847 Bismarck concluded a speech in the United Diet
with these words : "Do not let us lower Christianity in
the estimation of the people by shewing them that their
legislators do not regard it as a necessity ; let us not rob
them of the belief that our legislation emanates from
Christian sources, and that the State aims at the realisation

IIJ Prof essions of Faith. 127
of Christianity, even if not always able to attain that object.
When I fancy myself in the position of having to obey a
Jew, as a representative of the King's Most Sacred Majesty,
I must confess that, were such the case, I should feel
downtrodden and crushed; the gladness and high-spirited
sense of honour with which I now endeavour to fulfil my
duties to the State would depart from me." Compare with
this a passage in the Prince's speech (9 October, 1878) in
the Reichstag, during the debate on the Socialist Bill, viz. :
" If I had come to entertain the belief attributed to these
men " (the Social Democrats) ; " well, I live a life of great
activity and occupy a lucrative post — but all this could offer
me no inducement to live one day longer did I not, as the
poet says, ' believe in God and a better future.' "
The religious feeling with which the Chancellor attributed
to God his own capacity for contention and endurance and his
faculty for exhibiting activity and patience alike, expressed
itself most vigorously and drastically in some after-dinner
remarks made by him in Rothschild's chateau at Ferrieres
(28 September, 1870), and which were published in the first
volume of "Bismarck during the Franco-German War,"
some of the strongest passages, however, being omitted
from that work. He said : — " If I were not a Christian, I
would not continue to serve the King another hour. Did I
not obey my God and count upon Him, I should certainly
take no account of earthly masters. I should have enough
to live upon, and occupy a sufficiently distinguished position.
Why should I incessantly worry myself and labour in this
world, exposing myself to embarrassments, annoyances, and
evil treatment, if I did not feel bound to do my duty on
behalf of God ? Did I not believe in a Divine ordinance,
which has destined this German nation to become good and
great, I had never taken to the diplomatic trade ; or,

128 The Duties of a Politician. [Chap.
having done so, I would long since have given it up. I
know not whence I should derive my sense of duty, if not
from God. Orders and titles have no charms for me ; I
firmly believe in a Life after Death, and that is why I am a
Royalist ; by nature I am disposed to be a Republican. To
my steadfast faith alone do I owe the power of resisting all
manner of absurdities, which I have displayed throughout
the past ten years. Deprive me of this faith, and you rob
me of my Fatherland. Were I not a staunch Christian, did
I not stand upon the miraculous basis of religion, you would
never have possessed a Federal Chancellor in my person.
Find me a successor animated by similar principles, and I
will resign on the spot . . . How gladly would I retire
from office ! I delight in country life, the woods and
Nature. Sever my connection with God, and I am the man
to pack up my trunks to-morrow and be off to Varzin to
reap my oats."
In Versailles, on the 30th of January, 1871, the Chancel
lor delivered a sort of lecture upon his conception of a
politician's duty and mission to the Frenchmen who had
been sent from Paris to negotiate with him. He observed
that consistency in politics frequently resulted in error,
obstinacy, and wilfulness. Consistency is apt to blind men
and prompt them to ignore the actuilities of Life, which
incessantly alter conditions and requirements (the Heavenly
force and ethical stimulus belonging to the people, desig
nated above — perhaps neither quite aptly nor exhaustively —
as the popular conscience). It is necessary that a politician
should mould himself in conformity with facts, the situation of
affairs, and probabilities ; that circumstances, not his opinions
(which too frequently are prejudices) should dictate to him
how he should serve his country. When he himself com
menced his political career, he entertained views and aimed

IIJ Bismarck and Cromwell. 129
at objects altogether different from his present ones. He
had, however, turned these matters over in his mind, and
had subsequently not flinched from sacrificing, partially or
entirely, his own wishes to the requirements of the day.
He concluded with the axiom " La patrie veut itre servie, et
pas dominie," which, chiefly, by reason of its pregnant form,
made a profound impression upon his Gallic guests and
hearers. One of these latter remarking that " the word
servie implied the subordination of the talented individual
to the opinions and will of the majority, and that majorities
were invariably characterised by a lack of understanding,
practical knowledge, and character," the Chancellor answered
him very happily, by laying stress upon his consciousness
of responsibility to God — which he described as " one of
his guiding stars " — and by contrasting le devoir (manifestly
Kant's categorical imperative) with the droit du genie so
highly appraised by the Frenchman, as the nobler motive
of the two, and that which had the greater weight with
himself. The matter as well as the tone of Bismarck's above
quoted utterances have reminded a good many people of
Cromwell. Any one who examines them closely, however,
will be unable to admit the similarity in question, except
under certain restrictions. The Bismarckian deliverances
rather resemble those of Carlyle than those of Cromwell.
But the founder of Germany's greatness bears a striking
likeness — in one respect about to be set forth — to the
mighty spirit who exalted England to the rank of an
Universal Power. Cromwell, although himself a strict,
ardent, and eager Puritan, observed towards Catholics,
Quakers, and Jews, a tolerance thitherto unknown in Eng
land. Similarly, Bismarck's religious feeling is in no way
mixed up with zeal for dogmas ; neither is it obtrusive
vol. 1. K

130 His Tolerance. [Chap.
and intolerant His sense of fairness — one of the most
conspicuous traits of his character — and his political acumen
are accountable for this fact. Let every one have his due,
as long as that arrangement is not detrimental to the in
terests of the State. He knows that he "lives amongst
heathens ; " but he does not choose to " make proselytes."
" Christianity — not the Creed of the Court Chaplains,"
he once observed to the author of this book, during the
winter of 1878-9. In the course of after-dinner conversa
tion (at St. Avoid, 12th of August, 1870) reference was
made to the Mormons and their plurality of wives, as well
as to the circumstance that the Government of the United
States tolerated such a sect; and upon that occasion the Chan
cellor propounded principles extremely favourable to liberty
in matters of belief, adding, however, that tolerance must not
be expected from one quarter alone. " Everybody has the
right to go to heaven his own way," he observed ; " but
Church property must remain in the possession of those who
stick to the old Church, that property's owner. Whosoever
chooses to quit the Church must make some sacrifice to his
convictions, or rather to his unbelief ... It is regarded as
but a trifling offence in Catholics that they should be
orthodox — in Jews, as none at all ; but in Lutherans, as a
very serious one, and the Church is persistently reproached
with exhibiting a spirit of persecution whenever it rejects
the non-orthodox. That the truly orthodox, however, should
be persecuted and scoffed at by the press and in private life
is regarded as quite natural and right.'' At a later period
of the war the subject was again brought upon the tapis one
evening at table, and once more Prince Bismarck advocated
leligious tolerance not less uncompromisingly than before.
"But," he reiterated, " the ' enlightened ' are by no means
tolerant They persecute believers, not with threats of the

IIJ Religious Persecution. 131
scaffold, truly— for that sort of persecution no longer obtains
— but with newspaper jeers and scoffs ; and as for the
people, so far as they are concerned with unbelief, they are
now pretty much what they formerly were. I should not
like to be a witness of the pleasure that would be manifested
by the crowd assembled to see Parson Knak* hanged." It
was mentioned that Protestantism of old had been exceed
ingly intolerant; and Bucher called attention to the fact
that, according to Buckle, the Huguenots had been zealous
reactionaries — as, indeed, were all the Reformers at that
period. " Not exactly reactionaries," replied the Chancellor,
" but petty tyrants. Every person was a miniature Pope.'
He spoke of Calvin's behaviour to Servet, and added,
" Luther was just the same." Another of his guests reminded
the Prince how Luther had treated Karlstadt and the
Muenster visionaries, recalling the deeds of the combative
theologists in Wittenberg, after Luther, and the execution
of the Chancellor Krell in Dresden, who atoned for his
crypto-Calvinisra with death. Bucher remarked that the
Scottish Presbyterians, towards the close of the last century,
condemned a person who had only lent Thomas Paine's
" Rights of Man " to a friend, to twenty-one years' transporta
tion, and loaded him with chains to bootf Another of the
Chancellor's guests made mention of the Puritans in the
New England States, who had formerly exercised — and to
some extent still continued to do so — the most intolerable
and oppressive compulsion upon society with their stiff-
• A preacher at the Bohemian Church in Berlin (now dead), dis
tinguished in his time for maintaining the assumption put forward in
the Old Testament to the effect that the sun goes round the earth, and
that Joshua made it stand still for several hours.
t The so-called " Scots Martyrs " of 1793, Muir, Palmer, etc., are
here referred to. K 2

132 His Sabbatarianism. [Chap.
nacked intolerance of opinions differing from their own, and
more especially with the Liquor-Law. "And the way they
keep the Sabbath holy in England and America," said
Bismarck ; " it is sheer tyranny of the most appalling
description. I remember that, the first time I went to
England and landed in Hull, I began to whistle in the
street. An Englishman whose acquaintance I had made on
board the packet begged me not to whistle. I asked
' Why not ? Is it forbidden to whistle here ? ' ' No,' he
replied; 'but 'this is the Sabbath-day.' I was so much
annoyed that I forthwith took a ticket for another steamer,
bound to Edinburgh ; I could not stand not being allowed
to whistle when I pleased . . . On the whole, however, I am
by no means against keeping the Sabbath holy," he con
tinued, after Bucher had observed that Sunday in England
is, after all, not altogether so abominable as people in
Germany generally imagine ; its quietude had always done
him good after the bustle and clamour of the London week
days. " On the contrary, as a landed proprietor, I do what
I can in that direction. Only I will not permit any com
pulsion to be exercised upon my people. Every man must
know how best he may prepare himself for the other world
. . No work ought to be done on Sundays, not particularly
because to labour on the Sabbath is a breach of God's
commandments, but because human beings require repose.
This rule does not, of course, apply to the service of the
State, especially in the diplomatic department, where
despatches and telegrams have to be attended to on Sunday
as well as upon any other day. Nor can the peasant be
blamed during harvest time, who, after a long spell of rain,
fine weather having set in on Saturday afternoon, carries his
hay or wheat on Sunday. I could never have the heart to
prohibit my farmers from doing that by a clause in their

IIJ His Sabbatarianism. 133
leases. For myself, I can afford to put up with the loss in
flicted upon me by a rainy Monday." Somebody present
remarking that pious people in New York allow no cooking
in their houses on Sunday, and that upon that account,
having been once invited to dine with a distinguished family
in New York, he had been compelled to eat a cold meal, the
Chancellor rejoined ; " Well, in Frankfort, when I was even
less particular than I am now, we always ate very plain food
on Sundays, and I never had the carriage out, on account
of the servants."
One day in the autumn of 1876 the Prince was out
riding at Varzin and came to a spot close to the confines of
his estate. There, to his surprise, he saw a number of
peasants working away with mattocks and spades in the
adjoining field, although it was Sunday. " What men are
those over there ? " he enquired of his bailiff. " Our
labourers, your highness," was the answer. "We cannot
spare them from our fields during the six week-days, and so
they are obliged to till their own plots of land on Sundays."
The Prince at once rode home, sat down to his desk and
wrote off instructions to all the bailiffs and land-stewards on
his different estates, to the effect that thenceforth the tillage
of his labourers' fields was to precede that of his own, and
that for the future no work whatsoever was to be done on
his estates of a Sunday. The consequence of this eminently
equitable arrangement has been that ever thereafter his labour
ing-men have got through the work required for the cultiva
tion of their own ground in two or three days, and have then
turned to with vigour and alacrity at whatever labour was
necessary on their master's estate, so that the Chief- Bailiff
has been in a position to report that the tillage, &c, of the
Prince's land had never thitherto been so rapidly executed
as it has since the new arrangement was instituted.

1 34 His views of Catholicism. [Chap.
It was pretty generally acknowledged at the time that the
measures with which the Chancellor met the pretensions
and encroachments of the Ultramontanes in 1872 were
aimed at the political, not the religious attributes of the
Catholic Church, and could not, therefore, be traced back
to any intolerance in his views. What could not be put up
with was interference in the State rights and public of
Prussia by the Roman Curia, invested with absolute power by
the proclamation of the Infallibility Dogma. Although now
adays all intelligent people are at one, as far as that matter
is concerned, it may be as well to revive some memories of
the struggle above alluded to ; for there are a great many
people in this country who are the reverse of intelligent,
and the proverb " Lies have short legs " has been proved by
experience to be a rule that has exceptions.
During the sojourn in Versailles of a mobilised depart
ment of the Prussian Foreign Office, the news reached us of
the Italian irruption into the Quirinal, and it was mentioned
that Pope Pius had announced his intention of transferring
his residence from Rome elsewhither — perhaps to some part
of Germany. After explaining to us at some length the
consequences that might accrue should the Holy Father
settle down in Cologne or Fulda (this portion of his remarks
upon the occasion was published in ' Prince Bismarck
during the Franco-German war,') the Chancellor remarked :
— "Well, supposing a few people in Germany were to
revert to Catholicism — I shall never do so — it would not
matter much, so long as they were believing Christians.
Faith is the main point — not one creed or another."
In his diplomatic as well as his parliamentary utterances,
however, the Prince has repeatedly and in the plainest
language made it known that nothing is farther from the
objects of his policy than any encroachment upon the

IIJ His Church and State Policy. 135
Catholic Church in its character as a saver of souls. When
Count Arnim, formerly Prussian Ambassador to the Curia,
proposed in a despatch written by him about the middle of
May, 1869, that Prussia (in common with the rest of
Germany) should — conformably to a custom observed by
her governments with respect to previous (Ecumenical
Councils — cause herself to be represented as a State at the
Vatican Council by special Plenipotentiaries (Oratores),
Bismarck, in rejecting the proposition in question, ex
pounded his reasons for so doing. One of them was the
following : " There is only one standpoint for Prussia,
constitutionally as well as politically ; that of the Church's
absolute liberty in matters ecclesiastical, and of determined
resistance to her every encroachment upon State-rights."
During the debate on the Budget of Public Worship
(Prussian Lower House, 30 January, 1872) the Chancellor
declared, towards the close of a lengthy speech : — " It is
the Government's serious resolve that every religious
denomination — and especially that of the great Catholic
Church, which, by reason of the great number of its
followers, is deserving of every consideration — should enjoy
all possible freedom within the limits of this realm ....
Every dogma, not excepting those in which we (the Govern
ment) do not believe, which is regarded as inviolable by
millions of human beings, must also be held sacred by
their fellow-countrymen and their Government. But we
cannot admit the ecclesiastical authorities' permanent claim
to exercise any part of the power affected to the State, and
we feel compelled in the interests of peace to impose
restrictions upon them, so far as they already possess that
power, in order that Church and State may have room to
exist side by side in mutual tranquillity." On May 14th,
[872, after having expressed to the Reichstag his regret

136 The Kultur-Kampf. [Chap
and astonishment that the Holy See should have rejected
Prussia's proposal to appoint Prince Hohenlohe as her
representative at the Vatican, Prince Bismarck remarked : —
" The Government owes it to our Catholic fellow-citizens
not to slacken its efforts towards finding a way to regulate
the frontier-line between spiritual and temporal power — of
which boundary, in the interest of our domestic peace, we
absolutely stand in need — in the most considerate and
least vexatious manner." In the course of the debate in
the Upper House (March 10th, 1873) upon certain changes
in the Constitution, the Chancellor said : — " There is no
question of a struggle between an evangelical dynasty and
the Catholic Church, as our Catholic fellow-citizens have
allowed themselves to be persuaded, or of a contest between
faith and infidelity, but of the primeval fight for supremacy
between Royalty and Priesthood, which dates much farther
back than the advent of our Saviour upon this earth. This
struggle is subject to the same conditions as any other
political encounter ; and the assertion that we have in view
the oppression of the Church is an evasion of the real
question at issue, only put forward to create a false im
pression in the minds of ignorant people. What we aim at
is the protection of the State, the establishment of a distinct
boundary-line between priestly dominion and Royal rule,
defined in such sort that the State may be enabled to abide
by it. For, in the kingdom of this world, the State is
entitled to power and precedence." During the discussion
of the motion for suspending the State-subventions to the
Catholic Church (March 16th, 1873) the Chancellor
exclaimed : — " I believe that I am serving my God by
serving my King for the protection of the community whose
ruler he is by the Grace of God ; it being the King's duty,
imposed upon him by God (and in whidh I serve him), to

iij Bismarck on Church and State. 137
defend the independence of his people against Roman oppres
sion, and to emancipate it from foreign spiritual influence."
How, from 1878 to the present day, the Prince has
repeatedly given effect to the love of peace and tolerance
expressed in the above quotations, despite the many
obstacles thrown in his way, is still fresh in everyone's
remembrance, and therefore does not need to be set forth
in detail and exemplified by illustrations. The Chan
cellor entertained a strong objection to becoming mixed
up in this ecclesiastical conflict about the Infallibility
Dogma, it being his opinion that any interference of the
temporal power on behalf of the more moderate prelates
would assuredly do the latter more harm than good.
Several times, and as lately as November 1883, Bis
marck has in private expressed himself to the effect that,
in all struggles between monarchy and priesthood, the
object of strife has really been the obtention of temporal
power, not the establishment of dogmas ; that the Roman
Curia struck him as being more of a political than a
Christian institution ; and that, in the contests above
referred to (between monarchies and priesthoods) the
latter combatant (not only nowadays and in Rome, bat in
the days of Agamemnon and Calchas, of the Egyptian
priests under the Pharaohs' rule, of the Persian sacerdotal
caste ; briefly, in Heathendom as well as Christendom) had
always found his handiest and most efficient weapon to be
the popular belief that priests are better acquainted with
the will of God than laymen, consequently, than the king
himself. "Against the priest's definition of God's will,"
he proceeded, " there is no appeal ; he interprets it
authentically, and temporal power, whenever it declines
to submit itself to him, puts itself in the position of being
at odds with the Divine decree, thereby exposing itself to

138 Bismarck on the Papacy. [Chap.
be stricken with bans and interdicts. The early Christians
had no priests — certainly no infallible ones; decisive
authority was originally vested in the Christian commune
and subsequently, even at the time of the first two or three
Oecumenical Councils, by no means exclusively in ecclesias
tics. A series of admirable Popes — admirable rather as
statesmen than as Christians — first succeeded in securing
to the priesthood the exclusive right to interpret Christian
doctrines, and the monopoly of dictation, with respect to
dogmas. They thus acquired a power over believing
Catholics which rendered the papal claim to supremacy
over all temporal monarchs an intelligible one, instead
of an absurd monstrosity — granting, of course, the implicit
belief of all the members of the community in priestly
infallibility, and the absolute submission of a sternly dis
ciplined priesthood to the personal rule of the Pope. "It
was easy enough for Catholic monarchies to reconcile
themselves to the theocratic pretensions of the Holy See.
On the principle that one hand washes the other, priests
inculcate obedience towards monarchs, as long as the latter
do not refuse it towards the Pope. For Protestant States
to achieve peaceful relations with the Church of Rome is —
under the most favourable circumstances — a problem like
that of squaring the circle, the solution of which one may
go very near, but never quite attain. Neither party can
get farther than some sort of a modus vivendi. This may
be said with equal truth of Catholic States and the Vatican ;
for the relations between monarchy and priesthood are
invariably regulated by actualities, not by principles, and
the two powers remain incommensurable — that is to say, as
long as the temporal declines to submit itself unconditionally
to the spiritual. They generally succeed, however, in
coming to terms, except with regard to mere fractional

II.] Bismarck on the Roman Church. 139
matters. But, from the Roman Catholic stand-point, a
predominantly Protestant government is always a malady to
be treated therapeutically or surgically with a view to its
cure. The leading idea of the last Oecumenical Council
was to effect a surgical cure of Prussia's 1866 victories and
the establishment of the North German Confederation,
regarded in Rome as symptoms of European disease.
France, the Pope's soldier, was " called in " to operate with
her bayonet, as a lancet wherewith to phlebotomize German
Protestantism. That the promulgation of the Infallibility
Dogma should have taken place in Rome simultaneously
with the French declaration of war against us was certainly
an extraordinary coincidence, especially as the latter event
was brought about, as every body knows nowadays, chiefly
by the exertions of the Ultramontane French Empress
Eugenie. That France would prove victorious was as
little doubted in Rome as in Paris ; and France, had she
conquered us, would certainly have exercised the pre
ponderance she would thereby have acquired (in concert with
the Pope and with the object of establishing the new
Dogma) in every direction, more particularly, however, in
that of Germany."
On one occasion the Chancellor publicly alluded to this
Roman-French intrigue, i.e., when he referred to the then
contemplated new " gesta Dei per Francos." At the time
of the CEcumenical Council he was perfectly alive to the
danger that, in the face of this foreign conspiracy, the
consideration due to Catholic Prussians by the Government
and Legislature might readily be lost sight of, and resisted,
long and steadfastly, every suggestion of temporal inter
ference in questions which (although he himself deemed
them eminently political) are regarded by the believing
masses as dogmatical or purely ecclesiastical. He never

140 The Kultur-Kampf. [Chap.
underestimated the difficulties presented to a temporal
government by a conflict of that description, and, at the
time above referred to, was wont in conversation with
intimate friends to recall his youthful memories of "the
inflexible resistance encountered by the powerful and
absolute government of Frederick William III. in the
loyal province of Nether Pomerania, during its struggle
with the Old Lutherans, a handful of people without any
especial leader, whom, however, the strong and resolute
executive of that period utterly failed to subdue to its will."
He sketched in words to his hearer's amusement, " the
stiff-kneed gendarme toiling on, with his clanking spurs and
long sabre dragging at his heels, after the light-heeled
caftdidate for holy orders whom his female co-religionaries
were ever ready to stow away in barns or pantries."
During the inception of the ecclesiastical conflict, he
rejected every proposition to participate in it, and wittingly
refrained from taking part in any of the skirmishes that
broke out sporadically in Braunsberg and other places.
Whilst blaming the Catholics for constituting a confessional
party on political grounds, he maintained friendly relations
with all the Catholic deputies and with Bishops von Ketteler
and von Ledochowski — so' thoroughly; indeed,, that the
former was enabled to apply frankly in person to the
Chancellor in order to lay before him the complaints of the
new Catholic "fraction" with respect to the Imperial
Constitution. Prince Bismarck was in uninterrupted friendly
communication with Ledochowski whilst the latter staid at
Versailles; and the Chancellor, when the bishopric of
Gnesen became vacant, had urgently solicited Bishop
Ketteler to accept it in order to disprove the false assertion
that the Prussian government was making war upon the
Catholic religion in Posen, when in reality it was only

II-] Herr von Savigny. 141
putting down the Polish revolutionary movement Ketteler
declined the appointment in question — which had been
approved of by His Majesty the King — on account of his
imperfect acquaintance with the Polish language; but had
thereafter kept up amiable relations with the Chancellor.
The subsequent estrangement between these two eminent
men, who entertained many views in common with respect
to purely national questions, was chiefly brought about by
Herr von Savigny. This gentleman, a schoolfellow and
boyhood's friend of Bismarck, had become his enemy at the
moment when he (Savigny) found it necessary to give up
all hope of ever obtaining the post of Federal Chancellor.
In the original Draught-Constitution this title had been
selected for the Prussian presiding-plenipotentiary, instead
of that of " President Envoy," thitherto obtaining by custom
in the Federal Assembly. This " Federal Chancellor " was
at first intended to be nothing more than a Prussian
presiding-plenipotentiary with a vote, whose instructions
should be imparted to him by the Prussian Minister of
Foreign Affairs. But the post acquired an altogether
different character — a ministerial one, indeed — through a
parliamentary amendment, adopted during the revision of
the Constitution, to the effect that the presidential decrees,
in order to become valid, would require to be counter
signed by the Federal Chancellor. As soon as this amend
ment had actually become law, Prince Bismarck informed
Herr von Savigny that the post of Federal Chancellor,
unless it were to be that of an independent Minister,
ranking above the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, must
be held by himself (Bismarck). Herr von Savigny probably
did not close his mind to the logical reasoning of this
intimation, but was of opinion that the Minister-President
should have opposed the amendment above alluded to in

142 Herr von Savigny. [Chap.
Parliament ; whereas Prince Bismarck, far from resisting it,
had in all likelihood been the cause of its suggestion and
adoption. It did not strike Herr von Savigny that a
national politician could hardly have acted otherwise in
this matter. All he saw was that a post specially designed
for him, and the official residence attached to which he had
already taken possession of, had slipped through his fingers.
The Minister-President's offer to appoint him chief of the
Federal chancery with the title of Vice Chancellor (a
position subsequently held by Delbrueck) remained un
acknowledged ab irato, and prompted Savigny to quit the
above-mentioned official residence without delay, as well as
to break off all intercourse with one who had thitherto been
his friend. Thenceforth Savigny became the Chancellor's
inveterate enemy, and set to work organising a hostile
faction. We find him shortly afterwards, in concert
with Ketteler, busy founding the Centre-Party. It lay
in his inborn disposition to bestir himself behind the
scenes rather than on the stage itself, and, whilst partici
pating in the arrangement of the Constitution, he carefully
abstained from making any oratorical display in Parliament
His share in the foundation of the Centre-Party is con
sequently not so well known to the world as that of other
persons. But, though by no means an effective public
speaker, he was an able diplomatist and took a leading part
in getting together this particular group of deputies and
determining their line of action ; which had not originally
been indicated by personal enmity to the Chancellor.
Prince Bismarck was drawn into this struggle by degrees,
as we have reason to believe, not by confessional but by
purely political motives. These latter had nothing what
ever to do with Italian affairs or the seizure of Rome. On
the contrary, the Chancellor was highly provoked with

II.] Poland and the Kultur-Kampf. 143
Italy during the Franco-German war on account of
Garibaldi's participation in the resistance offered to our
armies, and also of King Victor Emmanuel's unmistakable
inclination to take part with Napoleon against Germany.
When the Frankfort peace was concluded, German politicians
were altogether indisposed to oblige the Italians in any way —
least of all at the expense of the Pope, with whom Berlin at
that time kept much closer touch than it did with Italy.
It was not the Italian, but the Polish question which
decided the Chancellor — quite irrespective of the Vatican
or Infallibility — to take an active share in the conflict that
broke out between the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship
and the Roman Catholic clergy. The apprehension that,
under priestly leadership, a National-PoHsh propaganda
might be started in Upper Silesia, thitherto satisfactorily
Prussian and monarchical in feeling, gave rhe first impulse
to his action. Endeavours to Polonize Silesia were no
novelty; even later than 1848 we have seen the Rev, Mr.
Schaffranek declaiming in that sense from the tiibune of the
Diet. But nothing worth mentioning had been achieved
until the movement alluded to found vigorous and influential
advocates in the well-known " Catholic Department " of the
Ministry of Public Worship. That department had been
originally created to defend the rights of the Crown against
the Roman Church by means of Catholic State-Officialsr
but in the course of years it had degenerated into an organ
of the Catholic propaganda, which astutely sought and
promptly found support in this Government Board, so
influential in matters connected with education. The
Propaganda College has invariably fostered the Polish
tongue, as well as others — Flemish, for instance — which
have no pretensions to universality, because any tribe of
human beings isolated by the exclusivity of its idiom is

144 The Poles in West Prussia. \CnKt.
much more easily held in thrall by a masterful priesthood
than are other races differently situated. During the years
immediately preceding 1870, the Catholic Department of
the Ministry of Public Worship had purposely favoured the
Polish element in Prussia at the expense of the German
element. Certain members of an illustrious Polish family,
related to the Reigning House, succeeded in exercising a
direct influence upon that department and its head-official,
a Herr Kraetzig, as well as in furthering its objects at
Court And thus it came to pass that the process of
Germanising West Prussia and Posen was stopped to give
play to the Polonising of those provinces. From one
census to another the statistical reports demonstrated, in
West Prussia alone, an increment in the number of the
Polish population (as against the German) of about 30,000
souls. In the course of two generations entire villages
suffered transformation from German into Polish, and
German grandsires, who had all their lives long never
understood a word of Polish, left behind them Polish
grandchildren, unable to make themselves intelligible in
German.* This result of the Prussian official system of
* According to statements made by Minister von Gossler in the
Prussian Chamber (March 8th and 14th, 1883) German Catholics have,
in steadily increasing numbers, been transferred to the Polish national
camp year after year since 1849, in Posen as well as in West Prussia ;
and nowadays a large proportion of those persons who, a decade or two
ago, put themselves forward as representatives of conspicuous and
indisputable German nationality, must be reckoned — either themselves
or their children — as thorough-going Poles. Von Gossler alleges that
67,906 German Catholics belonged to the Government District of Posen
in the year 1861, and only 58,299 in 1872, whilst that section of the
province (exclusive of the parishes of Birnbaum, Fraustadt, Bormst and
Meseritz) contained 22,970 German Catholics in 1862, and only 10,320
ten years later. For the instrumentality of the Catholic clergy in
promoting this movement, see Von Gossler's speech in the Prussian
Diet of February 8th, 1882.

II.] The Kultur-Kampf. 145
education prompted the Minister-President to propose to
the Ministry of State that some attempt should be made to
remedy the evils in question, and — as soon as it became
manifest that this would not be possible under existing
institutions without the co-operation of the Catholic Depart
ment, which co-operation was refused — to demand the
suppression of the refractory department. Its abolition was
accordingly effected when Minister von Muehler was in
office, and signalised the active participation of the Minister-
President in the " Kultur-Kampf," thitherto confined to the
special Government offices connected with religious worship
and education.
This struggle was subsequently embittered by the circum
stance that the Conservative Party not only refused to support
Prince Bismarck in defending national education, but even
declared war against him with respect to certain disputes
that arose concerning the inspection of schools and pro
vincial constitutions. The party carried on hostilities with
a fierceness and personal malignity such as had never been
displayed during the conflicts between the Liberal Opposition
and the Chancellor ; and this desperate warfare reached its
apogee during the epoch of the Kreuz-Zeitung under
Nathusius, of Perrot's notorious libels, of the ' Reichs-
glocke' and the prosecutions for calumny in which the
names of noblemen belonging to both religions figured in
the list of defendants. Not even one of Richter's press-
organs, as far as we remember, ever published such insinua
tions — not against the policy, but against the personal
character of the Chancellor — as those wliich at that time
flowed from the pens of Messrs. von Loe, von Arnim, von
Diest and other of their titled confederates, whose private
friends contrived to bring about the circulation of the
" Reichsglocke " in all the German Courts. We have been
vol. 1. L

146 His Libellers. [Chap.
assured that eleven copies of that disgusting sheet were
smuggled into the Prussian Court alone by officials of the
Royal Ministry of the Household. The judicial proceedings
and other sources of information respecting the origin of
the calumnies propagated against the Chancellor lead us to
assume that Herr von Savigny was at the bottom of them
all. Manifestly it was he who set afloat the fable of Prince
Bismarck's improper participation in certain limited liability
undertakings in Berlin. He first communicated his inven
tion or error to a high official of the Foreign Office, who in
his turn imparted it to a near relative ; and thus the vile
fiction eventually reached the late Herr von Wedemeyer,
who shot himself as soon as he discovered that the story he
had believed in and repeated to others was in every respect
untrue. It was from papers left behind by this unfortunate
man that Herr von Diest subsequently compiled the allega
tions by publishing which he got himself into the prisoner's
dock. It is worthy of note that during and after this journalistic
onslaught of the Conservatives not a single Liberal paper
ever printed a single word in defence of the Chancellor ; not
less so that no organ of the Conservative party •emphatically
condemned and stigmatised the abominable accusations
brought against him, even after their groundlessness had
been conclusively demonstrated in the course of the
public proceedings instituted against his calumniators.
Another experience derived from those libel trials, in
which the first official of the State was called upon to
vindicate his honour, will be found instructive for the
future position of our tribunals as far as its connection with
party-life is concerned — namely, that the persons conducting
those proceedings appeared much more anxious to convict
the Chancellor of some reprehensible transaction or other

IL] The Kultur-Kampf. 147
than to bring down punishment on his calumniators. This
method of dealing with the cases in question was so far
advantageous to the calumniated person, that every suc
cessive piece of evidence elicited by the Bench exposed
more and more clearly the falsehood of the charges laid at
his door.
The bitterness of the impressions made upon Prince
Bismarck by the events above alluded to must have been
greatly enhanced by the knowledge that the results —
honourable to him in every respect — of these trials proved
alike unsatisfactory to his professed friends, to his enemies,
and to the tribunals themselves — all of whom would have
infinitely preferred that some of the dirt thrown at him
should have stuck. If the reader will endeavour to realise
to himself the feelings which must have been aroused in
the Chancellor by this particular episode of his life, he (the
reader) will be less likely than people in general have
hitherto been to reproach Prince Bismarck with lacking
affection and respect for the parties and persons with whom
he has had to deal in politics and Parliament. It is very
certain, with respect to his participation in the " Kultur-
Kampf" that the struggle between Church and State
would have been less violent and envenomed in character
if the Conservatives had refrained from breaking (on ac
count of the School-Inspection Bill) with a Minister who
was one of themselves, and in whose place they could
put forward, as their leader, no member of their party
possessing qualifications at all resembling his, far less
equalling them. If the Chancellor had experienced con
fidence instead of distrust at the hands of his former fellow
partisans — if he had been enabled to carry on the necessary
defence of State rights against the Papacy at the head
of the Conservative party — the split between Church and
L 2

148 The Kultur-Kampf. [Chap.
State would never have become as deep as it now is,
and confessional peace would have been in all probability
restored years ago to its normal condition, obtaining
in Prussia throughout two centuries prior to 1848 —
such a condition, in fact, as is attainable with relation
to Rome in States the populations of which profess various
creeds. In the course of the conflict with Rome, Prince Bismarck
stuck steadfastly to his political standpoint, never troubling
himself about differences of opinion concerning the dogma
itself, or indeed about any matters ecclesiastical whatsoever.
To this fact the foregoing quotations from his speeches bear
testimony. In legislation he took the initiative by bringing
about the abolishment of the Catholic Department, and by
introducing lay school-inspection — which, by the way, was
intended to be only facultative, as he wished to leave power
to the State to suffer its functions to be exercised by the
clergy, without being compelled to do so. Moreover, the
modifications of the Constitution were effected at his
instance; he is without doubt fully responsible for them,
inasmuch as he was only able to obtain his liberal colleagues'
consent to them, by making their acceptance or rejection
a Cabinet question. On the other hand it may be believed
that his participation in the May-Laws was a passive one, or
even that he took no part whatever in bringing them to pass.*
We have heard from trusted collaborators of the Chancellor
that as soon as he had read through these statutes, ex post
and for his personal information, he expressed strong doubts
as to the possibility of carrying out all their prescriptions,
and much astonishment at the high importance attached to
* Be it remembered that at the time these Laws were framed, Count
Roon was Prime Minister, and Prince Bismarck, as a rule, did not then
attend the meetings of the Cabinet Council.

II.] Bismarck on the Jews. 149
the Anzeigepflicht* which he regarded as an empty form.
We take leave to doubt the correctness of the latter view ;
but are entirely at one with another opinion of his, to the
effect that "School is the chief weapon of the State." But,
in connection with this subject, we must now endeavour to
render intelligible the attitude assumed by the Chancellor
towards the Jews and the Jewish question recently brought
upon the tapis anew ; to which end the best we can do is
to let him speak for himself.
In the first United Diet on June 15th, 1847, (portions of
the speech pronounced by him on that occasion have
already been quoted in this work) he declared himself*
opposed to the unrestricted emancipation of the Jews. " I
am no enemy of the Jews," he said ; " and should they be
foes of mine, I forgive them. I even like them — under
certain circumstances. I would also accord to them every
imaginable right, except that of holding authoritative office
in a Christian realm." The idea that a Jew might be
qualified to encounter him in the capacity of a representa
tive of His Majesty the King produced a depressing and
discouraging effect upon him. He must, however, have
found it necessary to become reconciled to this idea later
on, although I do not suppose he has ever quite liked it ;
for he offered no opposition to the measures granting
equality of rights to Jew and Christian, incorporated, firstly,
in the Constitution of the North German Confederation, and
secondly, in that of the German Empire ; indeed, he sup
ported them, although we can scarcely imagine that they
enlisted his sympathies to any great extent. Sitting at
table with us in Ferrieres, on September 25, 1870, he said
* In these matters repression is possible, not prevention ; the State
invariably knows too little about the new ecclesiastic to be able to form
any forecast as to his future behaviour.

1 50 Bismarck on the Jews. [Chap.
(speaking of the Jews) : — " As a matter of fact they have no
real home. So to speak, they are European in a general
sort of way ; cosmopolitans — in a word, nomads. Their
Fatherland is Zion, (here, he turned towards Abeken)
Jerusalem. Outside that, they belong, as it were, to the
whole world, and hang together all over the earth. The
petty Jew alone experiences anything like a feeling of local
patriotism. Amongst Hebrews of that class may be found
some decent, honest people. There was one such in my
part of the country (Pomerania) who dealt in skins and
such matters. His affairs could not have been very flourish
ing, for he became a bankrupt Upon that occasion he
came to me, begging me to let him off easy and not to take
out proceedings upon my claim against him, for he would
surely pay me what he owed, a little at a time, as soon as
he could. As had been my wont of old in such cases, I
agreed to his proposal ; and he really did pay up. Long
after, when I was Envoy to the Confederation at Frankfort
I was still receiving instalments from him at intervals ; and
I believe that I lost far less by him than did his other
creditors — if, indeed, I lost anything at all. Perhaps there
are not many Jews of that sort to be found nowadays.
Even Jews, however, have their good qualities; they are
renowned for respect to their parents, conjugal fidelity and
benevolence." On December 19th, 1870, after having been
for a drive about the environs of Versailles with Simson
(afterwards President of the Imperial Supreme Tribunal), he
observed to us: — "I thought he would have taken some
interest in the park and its pretty views ; but he manifested
none whatsoever. It seems that he has no sense of the
picturesque. That is the case with a vast number of Jews.
As far as I know there are no Jewish landscape-painters,
and but few Jewish painters of any description." Meyer-

Iij Bismarck on the Jeivs. 151
heim and Bendemann were mentioned. " Yes," he replied,
"I grant you Meyerheim; but it was only Bendemann's
grandfather and grandmother who were Jews. There have
been plenty of Jewish composers — Meyerbeer, Mendelssohn,
Halevy; but as for painters — well, a Jew will paint, but
only in case he is not compelled to get his living by his
brush." A few days later (December 23rd) we were all
talking at table about the arrests of Social-Democratic
demagogues which had taken place in Germany a short
while previously, and Count Lehndorff asked if anything
serious was to be apprehended from the imprisonment of
Bebel and Liebknecht — if it might be expected to arouse a
great deal of excitement ? " No," replied the Chancellor,
" there is nothing to be feared on that score." Lehndorff:
" But Jacoby's arrest gave rise to no end of noise and
clamour." The Chancellor : " He was a Jew and a
Koenigsberger. If you only catch hold of a Jew, forthwith
an outcry arises from every nook and corner." Shortly
afterwards (January 10th, 187 1) the conversation at table
turned upon the names Meier and Kohn, of common
occurrence amongst the Jews, and I offered an explanation
of that circumstance, winding up with the remark that the
patronymic Kohn (originally signifying a priest) had now
and then suffered transformation into Kuhn, Kahn and
Hahn. This brought the Chancellor to the subject of Jews
who had been converted to Christianity, and later on to
that of mixed marriages between Christians and Jews — of
which he seemed not to disapprove. "Indeed," he con
tinued, " I am of opinion that Jews must be improved by
crossing their breed. The results are really not so bad."
He mentioned a few noble families which had assimilated
Semitic blood by marrying some of their male members to
Jewesses, and added, " They are all quite intelligent, nice

152 Bismarck on tlie Jews. [Chap.
people." Then, after reflecting awhile — omitting to give
words to a passing thought anent the union of noble
Christian damsels, German Baronesses and Countesses, to
wealthy and talented Israelites — he added with a smile :
" On the whole it is better the other way — I mean, by the
conjunction of a Christian stallion of German breed with a
Jewish mare. The Jews' money is thus brought into
circulation again ; and the result of the cross is a very fair
breed. I really do not know what I shall advise my sons
to do, one of these days." This was a jocular utterance
inter pocula, but not altogether devoid of a serious substra
tum. It certainly did not justify the assumption that the
Chancellor entertains any prejudices against the Semitic
race. Of late years the Jewish question has been again and again
a Fordre dujour, and voices have been publicly heard to recom
mend the partial abrogation of the civil and political rights
conceded to the Israelites by the Constitution; but the
Chancellor has forborne from giving utterance in public to
his views with respect to the agitation in question, its causes
and aims. We have reason to believe, however, that the anti-
Semitic movement appeared to him by no means difficultto ac
count for, but somewhat untimely, and therefore inconvenient.
That was the opinion expressed in tolerably plain words by
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, which also observed
that the Jews were indebted to the Chancellor for his
assistance in obtaining their emancipation, but failed to
display any gratitude towards him — on the contrary, for the
most part they sustained and strengthened the Opposition
in its hostility to his policy. It is well known that this
assertion is correct. The Prince himself once repeated it
to me in the course of private conversation, with the
remark : " Men who own property of any kind pay their

Iij Bismarck on the Jews. i 5 3
taxes, abstain from writing democratical leading articles,
and do not frequent barricades. It is the other sort ol
people that does these things."
On the other hand I should doubt the entire authenticity
and freedom from embellishment of the observations he is
said to have let fall to a Jewish acquaintance two years ago
at Varzin. According to press reports, they were as fol
lows : " Nothing can be more incorrect than the notion
that I approve of the anti-Semitic agitation. On the
contrary, I most positively disapprove of this attack upon the
Jews, whether prompted by dislike to their religion 01
antipathy to their race. It would be just as unfair to
fall upon Germans of Polish or French extraction on
the pretext that they were not real Germans. That the
Jews preferentially devote themselves to business pursuits
is a matter of taste ; moreover, it may be the national
consequence of their former exclusion from other callings ;
but it is certainly no justification for raising an outcry
against their wealth, or reproaching them with being better
off than Christians — a proceeding which I consider repre
hensible, because it provokes envy and hatred amongst the
masses. I will never consent to any curtailment of the
constitutional rights accorded to the Jews. Their intellec
tual organisation disposes them to criticism, wherefore they
are for the most part to be found in the ranks of the
Opposition. But I make no difference between Christian
and Jewish adversaries of the economic policy which I
defend because, in my opinion, it is beneficial to the
Country." Whether or not certain of the above utterances are to be
accepted as absolutely authentic, the whole deliverance
probably represents the Prince's actual attitude towards the
matter in question with sufficient accuracy. In any case he

154 Bismarck on the Jews. [Chap.
has certainly not as yet contemplated any limitation of Jewish
civil and political rights. The anti-Semitic petition, in
which a desire was expressed that some such measure should
be adopted, remained unanswered ; and when Deputy
Haenal interrogated the Government with regard to its views
upon the Jewish question, Count Stolberg, at that time
Vice-President of the Prussian State Ministry, declared —
indubitably with the Chancellor's concurrence — that the
standing laws proclaimed the equality, as far as all civil and
political rights were concerned, of all religious denomi
nations, and that the Cabinet entertained no intention of
introducing any change in that condition of things. His
declaration sounded somewhat frigid and reserved ; it cer
tainly lacked the warmth of temperature characterizing the
Progressist interpellation which elicited it; but it was all
that was requisite. The Chancellor regards the Jewish
question with a statesman's eye, which has warned him
against interfering (unless under the pressure of urgent
necessity) with laws that have struck root, and against
reinforcing his old adversaries by new ones who, in virtue
of their wealth, influence upon the press and close cohesive-
ness constituted by no means a despicable force. He bears
himself in this question as a practical politician, who sub
ordinates his own personal feelings and wishes to the
collective requirements and demands of the State — as a
statesman capable of imposing silence and patience upon
his own sentiments in the interest of his country's tran
quillity and prosperity, when he finds it impossible to
reconcile that interest with the realisation of his own views.
The Chancellor, as we have already seen, justifies the
keeping holy of the Sabbath not so much upon the ground
of Scriptural Revelation, or of the Mosaic Commandments,
as upon that of mankind's need of a day of rest from the

II.] Outward Observances. 155
labour of tha week. Neither, it seems, does he attach much
importance to ecclesiastical observances and ceremonies.
For instance, he is not an assiduous church-goer ; at least
he has not been so, either in Berlin or Varzin, for many
years past, as far as the author of this work has been able
to ascertain by personal experience and enquiry. True,
Hesekiel says : " The Chancellor and the members of his
household attend the neighbouring Trinity Church, in which
he was once confirmed (by Schleiermacher, according to
the same authority). He receives the Holy Communion
from the hand of Consistorial-Councillor Souchon, who
confirmed all his children in turn. When Bismarck is pre
vented by indisposition from attending Divine Service in
public, he likes to have it privately performed for himself
and his family by a young clergyman." The author of this
work cannot say to what period reference is made in the
above statement.
One of the reasons why the Chancellor but seldom hears
a sermon or joins in the congregational singing of his
parish church (he takes the sacrament regularly twice a
year) may be most aptly expressed by the proverb " Serve
your master first, and God next" " In my life " he wrote
to his sister in July 1865 " there is so much that must be
done, that I am seldom able to do as I please." " I have
so much to do that I could wish every day was six or seven
hours longer than it is," he observed to me once at
Versailles ; and this remark applies to later times as well,
notably to the months he is accustomed to pass in Berlin
year after year. He has little leisure for church-going, and
none for theatres, concerts, art-exhibitions and court festi
vities. Perhaps too, he thinks that by serving his master
in matters of importance he serves God ; for, as we have
already seen, he regards his mundane mission as work

156 Outward 'Observances. [Chap.
imposed upon him by the will of God ; and by him per
formed in the name of God and for the realisation of
Divine inspirations. Another reason is due consideration
for his state of health. The cold temperature that prevails
in our churches invariably gives him a head-ache, as he once
hinted in a highly characteristic letter to his friend the
. Rev. Roman von Andre, e.g. " With respect to church-
going it is untrue that I never visit the House of God. I
readily admit that I might do so oftener ; that I do not is
not so much from lack of time as on account of my health,
especially during the winter ; and I am quite prepared to
explain why, to anybody who feels called upon to sit in
judgment over me in this matter. . . . Although I am
doubtless an item in the sum-total of sinners who are
regarded by the Deity as of but little account, I hope that
His mercy will not deprive me, amidst all the dangers and
doubts of my career, of the staff of humble faith with which
I endeavour to find my way about ; nor shall this hope of
mine render me hard of hearing to words of blame, when
pronounced by friends, or wrathful when made the subject
of unamiable and impertinent judgments."
How the Chancellor dealt with written communications
belonging to the latter of the above categories, the follow
ing example may illustrate. In 1873, when the Old Con
servatives turned their backs upon him and attacked him in
their press-organs on account of the attitude he had
assumed towards the School-Inspection Bill, an old
gentleman in Pomerania (Senfft-Pilsach) considered it his
right and duty to address an absurd sanctimonious letter to
him (Bismarck) exhorting him to return to the flock and
take to prayer The Prince in his answer (which he read
over to me in 1881) referred the writer to Psalm xii, v.
4 & 5 : " They shall cut off all flattering lips and the

HJ Outward Observances. 157
tongue that speaketh proud things; who have said, with
our tongue will we prevail ; our lips are our own : who is
Lord over us ? "
Bismarck has never allowed himself to be put down by
clergymen ; not even by Andre, when the latter disapproved
of his views of duelling, from the priestly standpoint, of
course. In the letter quoted above, he wrote to his reverend
friend : " As far as the Virchow affair is concerned "
(Bismarck had sent Herr von Puttkamer to the Progressist
Professor and Champion of the Diet with a challenge to fight
him with pistols on account of a gross insult addressed to
him by Virchow in the Lower House ; but the " tonguey "
hero had declined to meet him), " I am past the time of
life at which a man accepts advice in such matters from
mere flesh and blood. If I set my life upon a cast " (here,
indeed, speaks a spiritual kinsman of Cromwell), " I do so
in the belief which I have strengthened, throughout long
and heavy struggles, by honest and humble prayer to God,
and which no words uttered by mortal man, not even by a
friend in the Lord and servant of the Church will upset."
His relations to "servants of the Church" were un
doubtedly closer ones in former than of late years. The
change that has occurred in this respect is probably to be
attributed in part to the circumstance that several hundred
evangelical clergymen were amongst the " Deklaranten,"
who publicly took up the cudgels for the Kreuz-Zeitung,
when that paper was conducted by Nathusius. We know,
at least, that the Prince has remarked with much bitterness
that he had expected protection and support against the
blackguardism of the Kreuz-Zeitung and Reichsglocke from
the " servants of the Church," and found none. Not a
single Liberal journal defended him against the Conserva
tives' defamations ; nor did he ever hear that a clergyman

158 His Superstitiousness. [Chap.
took his part, with respect to all those lies and abominations.
Neither can his conflict with the Catholic Church have
induced him to regard the flesh and blood of his fellow-
men invested with priestly functions as the incorporation of
Christianity. During that contest he was wont to exclaim,
"What do these gentlemen mean by 'the Church?'
Doubtless, nothing more than a totality of priests, their
rights and their pretensions ! "
In the foregoing paragraphs, I have endeavoured to
propound my theme with lucidity, but, as I feel, insufficiently
so. In this man of genius and hero, whom we all honour,
there are mysterious depths which our understanding cannot
plumb, and for which perhaps even he may be at a loss to
account to himself, clearly and sufficiently. Talking to us
once at Versailles about his sleepless nights, he observed :
"J would sleep if I could; but something keeps me
thinking and speculating all the time." What that some
thing was that forced him to think, against his will, remains
unexplained. One may guess at it, but ever doubtfully.
Whatever one may discover, there always remains an
inexplicable residue; and the results of investigation
reveal themselves as mere glimpses of colour and form, seen
through a veil ; the truth, but not the whole truth. Those
persons with whom the Prince is in daily intercourse could
get nearer to the whole truth than we can, had they the
disposition or aptitude to do so. Possibly the residue
alluded to is something very simple, as plain as the answer
to many a riddle. It is otherwise with that which must be
mentioned ere this chapter come to a close.
Even the greatest intelligences are susceptible to some
thing besides religious belief that enlightened people are
accustomed to designate as "superstition," and which,
although only partially the offspring of Christianity, gene-

II.] His Superstitiousness. . 159
rally keeps up a certain connection with religion. It is not
infrequently encountered in extremely clever men, lacking
alike in imagination and religious instinct, in generals, like
Napoleon I., politicians, like Gambetta, and even in
diplomatists. Symptoms of superstitiousness — and not a
few — are apparently manifest in Prince Bismarck.
Somewhere in East Prussia there is an uninhabited
castle, which stands empty because its owner is convinced
that it is haunted by the ghost of a lady who, during her life
committed a crime within its precincts. The spectre in
question is said to be visible in broad daylight. This story
was told to Bismarck one day in the presence of some
friends, one of whom began to turn it into ridicule ; where
upon the Prince remarked, very gravely, that " it was better
not to scoff or jest at such matters ; there might very well
be something true in the tale, for he himself had undergone
a similar experience." He refrained, at the time, from
saying any more upon the subject; but what he referred to
was an occurrence at Schoenhausen, recorded by Hesekiel
as follows : —
" One night Herr Von Bismarck (then not yet Minister-
President) was lying abed in the very room* in which he had
been born ; a party of his friends was staying in the castle,
among them a Herr von Dewitz, and a shooting expedition
had been arranged for the morrow, on account of which
orders had been given to a servant to awaken the gentlemen
at an early hour. All of a sudden Bismarck started up from
his slumbers ; he heard in the next room a door open that
communicated with the library, and then footsteps. At first
he thought it must be the servant, come to call him ; but
immediately afterwards he heard Herr von Dewitz, three
* It should be observed that the windows of the bedroom referred to
look out upon a neighbouring churchyard.

160 His Superstitiousness. [Chap.
rooms off, exclaim ' Who's there ? ' He jumped out of bed,
the clock struck twelve ; nobody was there."
After the battle of Gravelotte, during dinner at Pont a
Mousson, we were talking about what would happen after
the French should have been completely vanquished ; and
the Chancellor concluded the exponence of his views with
the remark " Do not, however, let us talk about the skin of
the bear until we have shot him. I confess to being
superstitious in this regard." At Rheims, on another
occasion, Count Bismarck-Bohlen was counting the places at
table before dinner, and muttered to himself: — " We are
surely not thirteen ? No. So much the better ; for the
Minister does not like that at all." Another time we
really were thirteen at table, and when I mentioned it to
Bucher, who sat next to me, he begged me not to say it aloud,
as it would certainly annoy the Chief. On the 14th Oct.
1870, General Boyer came to Versailles, on a mission
from Bazaine ; but Bismarck transacted no serious business
with him that day. He asked in the office, " What is the
day of the month ? " " The fourteenth, your Excellency."
" Indeed ; so were the days of Hochkirch and Jena ; we
must not attempt to do anything important on the 14th."
Perhaps it also occurred to "him that the 14th in question
was also a Friday, which is a day of the week, in the
opinion of many people, unpropitious to the transaction of
business and in every respect unlucky. In 1852 he wrote
to his wife from Halle : " I have been seriously thinking
that yesterday — when I started on my journey — must have
been a Friday after all ; anyhow, it was a ' dies nefastus,' " in
proof of which he proceeds to recapitulate a whole string of
travelling annoyance, — a hotel " full of bugs and infamous
coffee, Jew pedlars and tiptop ladies of pleasure from a
notorious haunt of vice," and " an obtrusive Privy Councillor "

IIJ His Superstitiousness. 161
in his compartment of the train. In November of the same
year he wrote home from Blankenburg. " I had not such
good sport in Letzlingen this time as three years ago ; it was
Friday." During dinner on Oct. 26, 1870, at Versailles,
he observed : — " Yesterday I was p ecuted by a whole
series of mishaps, one after another. First of all a person
(Odo Russell) who had important business with me asked to
see me. I sent a message to him, asking him to wait two
minutes, as I was engaged upon a matter of urgent
importance. When I asked for him a quarter of an hour
later he was gone ; and the peace of Europe may possibly
depend upon my seeing him or not. Then I went off to the
King at midday — earlier than usual — and consequently fell
into the hands of  , who compelled me to listen whilst he
read me a letter, and thus caused me to lose a whole hour,
at the expiration of which I sent off several important
telegrams, which, through being delayed till then, perhaps
have not reached even to-day the persons to whom they
were addressed. In the mean time decisions may have
been arrived at and circumstances may have changed, the
results of all which may prove very serious and altogether
alter the political situation. And all of this comes of
Friday ! " he added ; " Friday negociations 1 Friday
measures 1 " In January 1871 he remarked to the Govern
mental-President, von Ernsthausen, " To day is the 13th
and Friday into the bargain. That won't do, Sunday will
be the 15th, — Wednesday, the 18th, on which the Ordensfest
is always held — that will be a good day on which to issue
the proclamation (one concerning the Emperor and Empire)
lo the German people."
During tea-time one evening at Versailles (Nov. 23, 1870)
he began to talk about his own death, and indicated the
exact age he was predestined to attain, and the year appointed
vol. 1. M

1 62 His Superstitiousness. [Chap.
for his decease. " I know it," he wound up, saying, after
some of those present had remonstrated against his asser
tions ; " it is a mystic number." Seven years later he
repeated this assurance to me at Varzin, adding, however,
" But God only knows ! "
Finally, it may be mentioned that the Chancellor is firmly
convinced of the moon's influence upon all growing things,
and especially upon hair and plants. " You are looking as
young again as usual, Privy Councillor," he observed
jestingly one day at dinner to Abeken, who had just had
his hair cut " Moreover, you chose exactly the right time
to be shorn, for the moon is waxing. And it is just the
same with trees as it is with hair. If you want beech-roots
to strike out and grow again, you must fell the tree during
the first quarter of the moon ; if they are to be uprooted, in
the last. There are plenty of learned people and school
masters who will not believe this ; but our foresters know it
well enough, and the Administration of Woods and Forests as
well. The clearest of thinkers, upon political questions more
profound and farseeing than any of his cotemporaries,
always hitting off the right conclusion, free from prejudice,
far above conventionalities ; and yet a ghost seer, a chooser
of days, a believer in mystic numbers !
Really ! But no ; with the exception of the Schoenhausen
episode, it is all pretence or jest. In the autumn of 1883
he expressed himself thus upon the subject. " All that
nonsense about my superstitiousness has no more solid
foundation than mere jokes or my consideration for other
people's feelings. I will make one of thirteen at dinner as
often as you please; and I transact the most important
and critical business on Fridays, if necessary." *
* The Berlin Congress, presided over by Prince Bismarck, was both
opened and closed on a 13th.

IIJ His Superstitiousness. 163
And the affair at Schoenhausen? Was that really
superstition ? Well, there are things between heaven and
earth that are not dreamt of in our philosophy.* This
sentence may be read in either of its two meanings. I
would rather accept it in that intended by Shakespeare. It
is open to powerful minds to interpret it otherwise. The
public, itself strong-minded, will probably do as they do.
* It may here be remarked (not superfluously, as far as our materialistic
physicists are concerned) that the word " philosophy," as Shakespeare
understood it and as it was used in the older English language, had a
much more comprehensive meaning than the one now attached to it.
It included all the natural sciences, and, indeed, specially dealt with
them. The above passage from Hamlet might, therefore, be also
rendered " Things not dreamt of in your physical science."

( 164 )

CHAPTER III.
THE JUNKER-LEGEND.
One of the chief Articles of Faith of vulgar Liberalism, as
well as one of the most effective means of attack and
persuasion which it is accustomed to avail itself of during
elections, etc., is the assertion that the German Chancellor
is a Junker — that he has always more or less clearly and
positively adhered to the views of Junkerdom, has practised
its outward behaviour and represented its' interests — and
that, particularly during the last four or five years, he has
(with respect to the internal affairs of Prussia and the
Empire) unmistakably carried out a policy which can only
be described as " Junkerish." The masses readily take
Liberalism's word for gospel. We, however, demand proofs
of its correctness ; and desire, moreover, to put a question
or two.
Are these allegations — which throughout such a long
succession of years have been handed down from genera
tion to generation of orators at district meetings and news
paper politicians, and which figure as incontestable in the
catechism of " staunch partisans " — founded on fact ? Can
any one of them be justified historically, by experience, or
by actualities ? Let us ask a counter-question. What is a
Junker, and what do the complainants in the Progressist
camp understand by the word Junkerdom ? By replying to
this question we shall answer the others as well ; and as the

Chap. III.] The Junker defined. 165
matter cannot be settled by the employment of empty
phrases and confused definitions (such as are commonly in
use in the camp above referred to) let us endeavour to
make it clear by means of thorough-going investigation.
According to Grimm, the German word Junker means
the son of a noble House as contrasted with his father, who
functions as the Senior or Elder of that House. It was
used in this sense in mediaeval German; still later, in
Goethe's ' Goetz von Berlichingen,' in ' The Death of
Wallenstein,' and ' William Tell ' ; and is still current in
certain parts of Germany amongst serving folk in attendance
upon the children of country nobles. It is, moreover, the
v custom to apply this epithet to cadets of patrician families
who are sent up to Court to take princely service, and to
nobly-born retainers or pages — whence the titles " Kammer-
junker," " Jagdjunker," &c. Further, as it was usual for
young men of this class to devote themselves temporarily or
permanently to the military profession, the lowest rank of
commissioned officers came to be designated by the title of
" Portepe'ejunker," or " Fahnenjunker " (ensign or cornet),
and was in some parts of Germany — in Bavaria, to wit —
until a few years ago only recorded in the Army List as
"Junker." In old-fashioned books the country noble is commonly
enough called a Junker, irrespective of his age, and modern
writers, such as are given to imitating those of times past,
also use the word in that manner. Thus Kleist, in
' Kohlhaas,' speaks of " Junker Wenzel von Tronka " ; and
Uhland begins one of his poems "Rechberger war ein
Junker keck."
The worse characteristics of the provincial nobility appear
to have been identified with the word Junker at a somewhat
early period. A proverb in Simrock's ' Collection ' says :

1 66 The traditional Junker. [Chap.
"Je kahler der Junker, je groesser der Prunker" (the
balder the squire, the bigger the fop), and another is to the
following effect : " The peasants do not ask much of God ;
only that the Junker's horses may not die, for then he would
ride bumpkins with his spurs on." In the duchy of Bremen
those ears of corn are styled junkers which contain no
grain, and therefore do not bend down like the others, but
carry their heads high and erect, just by reason of their
vacuity and worthlessness. Similarly, in Upper Hesse, a
field which only bears stalks and ears, but no grain, is
spoken of as " junkering." To these familiar expressions,
the outcome of observation, others have been added, chiefly
of an unfavourable character; as in the well-known story of
' Junker Alexander,' whose cow was endowed with privileges
denied to plebeian cows. Voss describes the Junker as one —
" Der die Maedchen des Doris missbraucht, und die Knaben wie
Lastvieh
Auferzoege, wenn nicht sich erbarmeten Pfarrer und Kuester,
Welche, gehasst vom Junker, Vernunft uns lehren und Rechtthum."
(who abuses the village-girls, and would bring up the youths
like beasts of burden, did not the parsons and beadles take
pity on the latter and (detested by the junker) teach us
common-sense and justice). During the last century such
expressions as " Junkerei," "junkeriren," and " Junker-
handwerk " came into use — one and all having a reproachful
or contemptuous signification — and, as early as 1840, Moritz
Arndt rhymed as follows : —
" Wie viel sie auch flittern und flunkern
Wie viel sie auch gaukeln und junkern,
Doch sieget das ewige Recht 1 "
Only the darker side of the Junker, or provincial noble,
is here indicated. He is shown as the petty village-tyrant
of foregone centuries, who plundered and ill-treated his

ill.] A Party Watchword. 167
vassals ; as empty, puffed-up, disposed to indulge in mad
freaks ; the adversary of reason and justice ; a creature of
limited intelligence, and quite in the dark as to his noble
extraction ; neither having learnt nor choosing to learn
anything. Other authors, however, added exalted passions
xnd a certain briisquerie of manner— taking, rather than
offensive — to these unpleasant characteristics of the Junker.
Full and final development was given to the definitions
above cited a short time before 1848, in the course of that
remarkable year and throughout the period of reaction
against the stormy surprises of the " March-Days." They
became at once a watchword and a weapon during the
struggle commenced by the middle class, which then rose to
the surface, against the nobility, or rather against that part
of it which desired to hark back to feudal conditions, or was
anxious at least to stick to what it had thitherto been able
to keep, in the way of privileges, &c. At that time people,
when they spoke of Junker-rule and Junkerdom, meant the
predominance and entity of the old nobility — more par
ticularly of the land-owning or provincial variety — which
was averse to all the modern notions, exactions, and en
deavours of Liberalism, and resolute in hammering away on
behalf of its prescriptive status. In his ' History of Rome '
(where, be it parenthetically remarked, such a sentence was
curiously out of place) Mommsen wrote : " Coldheartedness
and shortsightedness ; the special and inalienable privileges
of every genuine Junkerdom."
Since then the expression "Junker" has become familiar,
in the above sense, to the Parliamentary tribune, to the
press, and to electioneering manoeuvrers. He who still
cherishes Conservative views — who wishes to- see Constitu
tional Monarchy defended against Democratic pretensions
— who ventures to raise his voice against the parasitical

1 68 The Stigma of Junkerdom. [Chap.
growths and surprises of Liberal Legislation during the last
three or four decades, is at once thrust into one saucepan
with the real reactionaries — especially if he be unlucky
enough to wear a " von " in front of his name. That our
aristocracy has its bright as well as its dark side — that, in
many cases it is the benevolent adviser, support, and pro
tector of its poorer dependants ; that it renders highly note
worthy services to the State; that it has prevented the
bureaucracy from interfering unduly with public affairs ; that,
for centuries past, it has wholly and solely provided our armies
with officers, and still continues in great measure to do so,
although the pay is anything but a temptation — all this is
too generally overlooked. Hence the expression " Junker "
is become a term of reproach. In certain social circles it
plays the part of the red rag, a mere glimpse of which
causes the Progressist bull, the " respectable elector," and
the beer-sodden Philistine either to rear up infuriate or to
recoil in terror.
No one who is moderately well acquainted with latter-
day history and with the actual state of political relations
will dream of denying that, in Prussia as well as in other
parts of Germany, certain cliques exist in the Conservative
party to which the stigma of Junkerdom, as "defined by
Mommsen, applies in its worst sense. Under the rigime of
Stein there was no lack of eager advocates and champions
of a State-organisation on the feudal pattern, that " order
prescribed by God" — I need only recall the name of
Marwitz — and later on, at the time of the United Diet,
Hotspurs of this class took frequent occasion to bestir
themselves to action. When subsequently the National
Assembly in Berlin — an offspring of universal suffrage — set
about abolishing the nobility's privileges, a number of
patrician landowners, supported by their relatives and a few

HI.] Is Bismarck a Junker ? 169
plebeians who shared their opinions, formed a sort of league
for the purpose of more energetically defending the pre
rogatives they held so dear. Their Liberal opponents
christened this association — which was in favour of class-
representation, and therefore was by no means hostile to a
constitutional regime, and which struggled with might and
main against abuse of the concessions made by the Govern
ment in consequence of the 1848 "March-Days" — the
" Junker-Parliament ;'' and, as party-strife waxed hotter,
the expression " Junker," theretofore only possessing a
special social significance, acquired a political meaning and,
as already observed, began to sound offensively in the
public ear. Nor is this surprising, if we call to mind the
period of reaction; and even now, although the old-Con
servatives have learnt much and forgotten a good deal, there
are those among them who can well understand why they
are hated and regarded with apprehension.
Now let us enquire : Is Bismarck a Junker, or has he
ever been one ; and, if so, in what sense and within what
limits ?
He is descended from an ancient family of country nobles,
inhabiting the Marches, which has supplied to the Prussian
kings a goodly number of " Junkers," all of whom became
officers in the army, not a few dying the death on the
battlefield, under Frederick the Great and during the War
of Emancipation, for honour and their country. When he
had grown up to early manhood the " Junkerish " attributes
above alluded to — arrogance, high temper and brusquerie —
were strongly developed in him ; the least objectionable of
them, however, were the most salient. As a student he was
notorious for a saucy tongue and a ready sword ; the older
citizens of Goettingen still bear his wild tricks in mind.
When he subsequently entered the State service its pedantic

170 " Storm and Strain" [Chap.
routine proved so exceptionally repugnant to him that he
soon gave up that career, declaring that he experienced no
desire to become as leathery as his official superiors, and
retired to Pomerania, there to manage one of his father's
estates and to lead the sort of life recommended to him by
his impetuous disposition. This was the continuation of
his "Sturm und Drang" period — the transformation of a
collegian's frivolity into that of a provincial Junker. It was
then that the young ladies of neighbouring mansions, their
mammas and aunts, shuddered whilst their papas and
uncles, shaking their worthy heads and prophesying dread
calamities, told tales of furious carouses, during which
floods of champagne and porter were ingurgitated ; of
breakneck rides across country, worthy of the Wild Hunts
man ; of pistol-shots with which visitors at country houses
were aroused from their slumbers in the dead of night ; of
audacious defiances to all that was respectable and con
ventional, carried out with infinite mischievousness and
insolence. That much of this was true the old mansion-
house of Kniephof, long since replaced by a much more
elegant structure, could have testified, as well as that at
least half of it was founded upon neighbourly invention.
The prophesies of evil to which these excesses gave rise
have, at least, remained unfulfilled ; for the fermenting must,
after throwing up its exuberant scum, became clear at the
right moment ; what sort of liquor it ultimately turned out,
everybody knows.
At that time Bismarck was inclined to entertain Liberal
views. On the other hand his surroundings influenced him
to a certain extent ; and here it may be mentioned that
Thaddens' estate, Triglaff, was situate not far from Kniep
hof, and that its owner's son-in-law, Von Blankenburg, an
intimate friend of Bismarck during the hitter's boyhood, also

III.] His love of Country-life. 171
lived hard by. Pure and undefiled feudalism was wor
shipped in the clique to which these gentlemen belonged,
and which consisted of advocates of class institutions,
enthusiastic partisans of Legitimism, believers in the Holy-
Alliance policy, High Churchmen, etc. ; and it would have
been indeed surprising if some of the 'ideas current in such
society, and freely ventilated therein during every political
discussion, should not have taken root in the mind of a
young man still undergoing a process of intellectual develop
ment. The whole thing was in reality not nearly so bad as
it seemed to be ; and it is perhaps a pity that men like
Thaddens were not permitted, later on, to take their stand
upon the ground of Constitutionalism, for there was in
them not a little of the material for a parliamentary " Right "
which, by reason of its concentrated force and steady
integrity, might have played a very different part to the
agitatory rble now so highly in vogue in the Conservative
camp. Judging by the foregoing record of facts, Bismarck was
indisputably a Junker at one time, and in the fullest sense
of the word. We may add that, as far as that expression
may be held to denote a country squire, he still is so, and
wishes to be so considered during the tranquil days of his
annual furloughs at Varzin and Friedrichsruh. The remark
of a person very near and dear to him, " He likes a turnip
better than all your politics," must not be taken literally ;
but there is a grain of truth in that assertion. The
Chancellor is extremely fond of agriculture, and delights in
being upon his estate, far from town-life. We may go even
farther, and admit that Otto von Bismarck, in politics as well
as in private life, belonged for some years to the category
of persons described as Junkers by the 1848 Liberals; but
this admission can only be made under certain restrictions

172 An Avowed Junker. [Chap.
and but partly in the sense of the word adopted by his
adversaries. He was in the front rank of those who par
ticipated in founding the Kreuz-Zeitung and the " Junker-
Parliament ; " he represented certain phases of what the
Liberals of 1850 called Junkerdom in the Chamber — still
more keenly and eagerly as a writer in the above-mentioned
journal, and in private conversations — he even accepted
the designation of Junker, applied to him in the Prussian
Lower House, unhesitatingly and fully. On April 8, 185 1,
Von Vincke stated that he looked upon Bismarck as Junker
dom personified, and later on Simson remarked that
Junkerdom was a designation which no category of His
Majesty's subjects bestowed upon itself, and to which no
one could recognise himself as belonging. Upon this
Bismarck rose, in order — much to the astonishment and
annoyance of the Left — to give utterance to the following
declaration :
"The member for Koenigsberg (Simson) has expressed
the opinion that there is nobody in the Prussian kingdom
who claims to belong to the category of Junkerdom. As far as
I am personally concerned, I must contradict that assertion.
When Junkerdom is under discussion by the member for
Aachen (Von Vincke) or by Herr Peter Minus (the nom de
plume of Gustav Schiedtmann, who had about that time
published several pamphlets), I conceive that I have the
same right to appropriate this appellation to myself and my
political friends as a good and faithful officer has to feel
himself alluded to and honoured when democrats are talking
about mercenaries and the like. Whigs and Tories are also
expressions which originally signified something derogatory ;
and you may rest assured that we, for our part, shall know
how to convert the designation "Junkerdom " into a title of
honour and distinction."

in.] His Junkerdom. 173
How exuberantly Prince Bismarck — as Minister, Federal
Chancellor and Imperial Chancellor — has justified this
prediction needs demonstration as little as the fact that
little or nothing has ever been known of any fulfilment of
that assurance by his fellow partisans of that epoch.
Nevertheless he has most assuredly not carried out the
programme of the genuine and typical Junker latterly,
either in his foreign or internal policy. Even long before
the commencement of his splendid series of brilliant
achievements and creations, the more perspicuous of those
who assailed him with the epithet of " Junker " knew very
well that it was only partly applicable to him. It was, in
fact, a trump which they played against his self-conscious
abrupt behaviour and demeanour — a cue, to which the
masses, trained for that purpose, invariably responded
with applause for the conscientious Liberal orator who
pronounced it, and with prompt condemnation of the person
whom it denoted. The truth is that Bismarck, even when^
he was only a deputy, was much too keen an observer of I
life, and too practical a man, to deliver himself up absolutely
to any doctrine ; and as he mostly recognised what was
achievable by Liberal-Democrats, so, as a rule, did he
know the exact limits within which circumstances restrained
the Conservatives. Therefore in those days he only condi
tionally subscribed to the majority of the dogmas set forth in
the feudal and reactionary catechism, the contents of which
were designated in 'the Liberal dictionary by the epithet
" Junkerdom. " He was not then free from prejudices and
idiosyncracies ; it was not, however, so much these latter as
his downright way of speaking, self-consciousness and
contemptuous bearing towards the matadors of the demo
cratic party, that imparted to him the seeming of a Junker,
such as is defined in the lexicon above alluded to.

174 His view of the Constitution. [Chap.
Bismarck's speeches in the United Diet justify this
assertion. Looking back to them we find very little exactly
corresponding to the views of the Kreuz-Zeitung ; and even
they contain a good deal of truth. But, during that epoch of
development in his character, we observe in him, not only
remarkable combativeness and an extraordinary faculty for
tracing things back to their natural causes, for giving due
credit to experience and for opposing a practical policy of
German home-growth to Liberal doctrines imported from
abroad, but that sturdy adherence to old Prussian lealty, to
the absolute sovereignty of the king, to Christianity and its
results to the State; that proud regard for the national
honour; and that genuine patriotism which subsequently
enabled him to become the regenerator of his country.
He welcomed the Patent of 1847, and looked forward to
its organic development : but the exaggerated demands
put forward by the Rhenish and East- Prussian Liberals in
the sense of French Constitutionalism were repugnant to
him. Later on — after the 1848 "March-Days" — he was
dissatisfied with the King's adoption of the Constitutional
programme, not only because it was extorted from his
Majesty, and because the Crown's first concessions went too
far, but because, in his opinion, it involved departure from a
system which might without any risk have been made to
work well. During the debate on the address of the second
United Diet (April 2, 1848) he observed: "The past is
buried, and I regret more poignantly than many of you, that
no human power is capable of reviving it, inasmuch as the
Crown itself has sprinkled earth upon its coffin. But if,
constrained by the force of circumstances, I accept this
state of affairs, I cannot depart from the United Diet with
a lie on my lips — i.e. with the assurance that I rejoice in,
and am grateful for a measure which I regard as at least

HL] Prussian Democrats. 175
erroneous." Constitutional rights did not arouse his sus
picions and objections, but the 1848 concessions did, to
which he would have preferred a quieter and more gradual
process of Reform upon the basis of class-rights. Perhaps
he was not altogether wrong ; at any rate it was quite
comprehensible that he should have opposed an address
expressing joy and thanks to the King for granting a
Constitution which was bound to lead to the perpetuation of
the democratic abominations that then possessed Berlin and
other large Prussian cities. In this respect he was more
than justified by the attitude of the National Assembly,
which began to play the part of a tyrannical Convention,
although itself terrorised by club-orators of the most vulgar
description. Whosoever still remembers how matters stood in
the Prussian capital at that time — the parts played by Held,
Karbe, Lindenmueller, Ottensoser and other dirty rascals —
the performances of such a stupid and insolent crew as
Rehberger and his engine-smiths, " the brazen pillars of
democracy " — the speeches of the " later Left " — the ill-usage
and threatening of members of the Right by the mob —
Jacoby's impudent remark to the King, and the chaotic
hubbub attending the storming of the Arsenal, will be
inclined to regard Bismarck's antipathy to the new era as
prophetic. To such an one even the saying attributed to
him during that episode of frivolity, disgust and absurdity,
will scarcely appear unnatural, or even strongly " Junkerish,"
except in form. " If great cities, headquarters of revolution
as they are, continue to disturb the peace of the country,
they must be swept from the face of the earth."
When the Constitution was subsequently revised, Bismarck
spoke very forcibly against the right of the Diet to regulate
taxation, as transferring the centre of gravity of State-power
from the Crown to the majority of the Chamber, and leaving

176 Bismarck on " The People" [Chap.
little more to the former that the faculty of carrying out the
decrees of that majority. The Prussian Crown, he observed,
must not allow itself to be crushed down into the condition
of impotence characterising the English Crown, which latter
was scarcely more than an ornamental cupola surmounting
the State-edifice, whilst in that of Prussia he recognised the
central pillar supporting the whole building — an opinion
which, judging by his parliamentary utterances of 1882, he
still entertains. " The word Constitutional " he continued
" is one of those catch-words which have been privileged of
late years to pass current instead of facts. All these
references to England are harmful to us. Give us all the
English qualities that are lacking to us, and then I will be
the first to say, ' Govern us after the English pattern.' "
As a member of the Chamber, Bismarck has repeatedly
and valiantly attacked democracy, the sovereignty of the
people, and other doctrines or phrases of the period above
referred to ; but even in his speeches upon these subjects
scarcely anything of what is called Junkerdom can be
detected — least of all any trace of repugnance to correct Con
stitutional principles. With these he had meanwhile become
reconciled ; but he would not hear of Parliamentary domina
tion, or of what the gentlemen of the Left spoke of as " the
people's will." When these latter appealed to the people's
will on behalf of their pretensions, he said to them. " No
expression has been more commonly misused of late years
than the word People. Each individual has interpreted it
in such sort as to suit his own turn ; generally in the sense
of a mob of persons whom he has contrived to convert to
his own views." What intelligent man will nowadays call
this " Junkerish wisdom," and reject it as such ?
In the speech opposing the grant of an amnesty, he
said : " The strife of principles which has shaken Europe

UL] Bismarck and Temme. 177
to her foundations this year is one in which mediation is
impossible. The principles in question are so fundamentally
different as to be the respective negations of one another.
One derives the source of its justification from the people's
will — in other words from violence, as practised behind
barricades. The other is based upon an authority instituted
by the Almighty — an authority existing by the grace of God
— and seeks its development in an organic connection with
Constitutional institutions. According to one of these prin
ciples, rioters of all sorts are heroic champions of truth,
justice and freedom ; according to the other they are rebels.
No decision upon these principles can be arrived at by
Parliamentary debates, or by majorities ; but sooner or
later the God of battles will settle the matter with one cast
of his iron dice." Democratic journalists and orators will
say, Junkerdom spoke when those words were uttered.
But we recognise in them a simple truth and luminous
forecast, which has been fulfilled in Dresden, Baden, Vienna
and Hungary ; fortunately not as yet in Prussia,
Temme, in his ' Sketches,' relates an anecdote in
connection with that period which is in some essential
respects unfounded, and therefore needs rectification.
Temme sat by Bismarck in the so-called " dissolved
Chamber," and accident brought the two gentlemen together
in the " section " as well, where members of the higher and
lower nobility had to sit with five democrats (amongst
them d'Ester, George Jung and Schulze-Wanzleben) at
one and the same long table, at one end of which, accord
ing to Temme, the "aristocracy" took up its position,
whilst democracy was grouped at the other. The remaining
members of the " section " took their seats in the middle.
Naturally enough, Bismarck at first occupied a place
amongst the " noble, lords." But one day, during a sitting,
vol. 1. N

1 78 Bismarck and d' Ester. [Chap.
lie suddenly arose, pushed his chair back noisily, gathered
up his papers and blotting-pad, walked coolly down the
whole length of the table, took a chair, and sate down
amongst the five democrats. Temme writes : " He joined
us with the words, ' Those people are too stupid for me,'
pointing to the end of the table he had just quitted. He
was probably not far wrong. His manner towards us was
extremely polite, and we remained good neighbours,
although often politically at odds, and that sharply. It
was certainly curious to observe how, from our little group
at the democratic end of the table, the most vigorous
attacks conceivable were made upon reaction, aristocracy
and Junkerdom, varied every now and them by an onslaught
of ultra-Junkerish vehemence upon democracy. Thus, I
remember upon one occasion (I think it was during the
debate upon the proposed suspension of the state of siege
in Berlin) that Herr von Bismarck said to his neighbour
d'Ester : ' If I were in command, I would at once have
you shot;' to which d'Ester promptly replied, 'Well,
Herr von Bismarck, if ever we come to power, I will have
you hanged.' "
This is an outrageous perversion of facts. Bismarck could
not migrate from the Conservative to the Democratic region
of the table, because the Deputies were not sorted out ac
cording to their political opinions, but sat mixed altogether
quite haphazard ; and he could not have uttered the words
attributed to him by Temme, firstly, because he was a man
of good breeding, and secondly, because the Conservatives
present were anything but " stupid." (Amongst them, for
example, was Stiehl, an extremely clever bureaucrat). As
to the exchange of remarks with d'Ester, the following is
the truth of that matter. The diminutive gentleman in
question came to the committee-meeting one day in a very

III.] Bismarck and Von Unruh. 179
beery condition, and addressed these words to the member
for the West Havel District. " Herr Von Bismarck, of all
your party you are the one who has always been civil and
polite to us. We therefore propose to make a compact with
you ; if we get the upper hand, we will protect you ; if things
go the other way, do the same by us." This proposal
Bismarck, however, declined in a friendly way, replying ; —
" Should your party prove victorious, d'Esterchen, life will
not be worth having for me; if we get the upper hand,
hanging will be the order of the day, but with politeness,
even to the very last gallowsbird."
To the above category belongs a trifling anecdote re
counted by Von Unruh in his ' Reminiscences.' One day the
latter wound up a conversation with Bismarck, after remind
ing him of the incident with d'Ester, by saying: "Well,
should your party gain the day, take me under your wing,
and I will do as much for you if we get the best of it Are
you agreed?" " Willingly," replied Bismarck, although he
had no fear that his party would succumb. Eight years later,
Von Unruh found it advisable to remind Bismarck of this
jesting agreement and to claim his protection. Bismarck
kept his word.
Bismarck's convictions at that time were but little in
harmony with the decisions of the Frankfort Assembly, in
which well-meaning but unpractical professors and lawyers
took the lead, side by side with straight-horned and crump
led-horned democrats. He designated those decisions as
illegal and not binding upon Prussia, because they had only
been accepted by governments which, when combined,
only counted six millions of subjects, all told — governments
"whose Ministers were industriously occupied with the
endeavour to make sure of keeping, under the regime of
constituted anarchy obtaining in Frankfort, the offices they
N 2

180 His Prussianism. [Chap.
had contrived to appropriate during the 'March Days.'"
" Ere long," he continued, " we shall see the democrats
calling upon the new Emperor and asking him, ' Do you
believe this Eagle is a gift to you ? ' Every endeavour will
be made to compel Prussia to play in Germany the part
that Sardinia played in Italy, and to bring us to the same
point as that occupied by Carlo Alberto before the battle of
Novara. I think it would be utterly out of keeping with
our mission were we to confuse the German question still
further by lending our approval to the Frankfort cravings for
sovereignty just at the moment when Europe is beginning
to recover from the dizziness of revolution. I believe that if
we withhold our support from these projects it will be easier for
Prussia to bring about German Unity in the manner already
pointed out by the Government. If it come to the worst,
however, I would rather that Prussia should remain Prussia,
than see my King lower himself so far as to become the
vassal of Messrs. Simon and Schaffrath's political associates.
In her own character she will always be in a position to
give laws to Germany, instead of receiving them from
others." Speaking later on against the 1849 Project of Union, he
remarked : "What has hitherto kept us going has just been
our specific Prussianism, the remains of the heretical old-
fashioned Prussianism which has survived the Revolution, i.e.
the Prussian army and exchequer, fruits of intelligent Prus
sian administration, and the vigorous interchangeable activity
that connects King and People in Prussia. . . The people,
whose truest representative is that very army, does not
desire to see its Prussian kingdom melt away in the putrid
fermentation of South German insubordination. Its loyalty
is not attached to a paper Board of Directors of the
Empire or to the sixth part of a Council of Princes,

in.] The Prussian Nobility. 181
but to its living and free King of Prussia, the heir of his
ancestors. . . . We all wish that the Prussian Eagle should
spread his wings, alike protecting and ruling, from the
Memel to the Donnersberg ; but we want to see him free —
not fettered by a new Ratisbon Parliament, or supported
on the pinions of those levelling hedge-clippers at Frankfort.
Prussians we are, and Prussians we will remain ; and I
hope to God that we shall continue to do so long after this
scrap of paper will be forgotten as though it were a withered
autumn leaf."
Lives there a man endowed with a healthy intellect and
memory who can interpret tliese words as the vapourings of
a narrow-minded Prussian country squire ? Must not one
rather recognise in them the deep, farseeing discernment
and practical intelligence which subsequently surmounted all
the difficulties of the German Question ?
During the discussion upon the formation of the First
Chamber, Bismarck took occasion to say a word for the
nobility. "From the battle-field near Warsaw Bridge,"
he observed, " where the Great Elector laid the foundation-
stone of Prussia's independence, to the walls of Rastatt you
will find in all directions the roots of Prussian freedom
abundantly fed with the blood of our noble families. At the
commencement of this century the privileges of the nobility
--which long possession had induced it to look upon as
its rights — were abolished by the Legislature. But you
have not seen the nobility allowing itself to be forced, by
the exaction of this sacrifice, into assuming an attitude in any
way resembling that now taken up by the Democracy to
wards the Government. Their losses did not convert them
into grumbling plotters ; on the contrary, when the King
called his people to arms in 1813, the sons of the Prussian
nobility were found in the front rank of those who were

1 82 The Union Constitution. [Chap.
ready to spend their substance and shed their blood for
the preservation of the Royal House and the Fatherland,
whose Legislature had imposed so heavy a sacrifice upon
them." History, which records the above, says nothing about
Bismarck having ever come forward to demand the resto
ration of any one of the privileges in question, or having
expressed the wish that anything of the kind should be done.
Taking into consideration the practical impossibility of
effecting such a restoration, this is perhaps no great merit
on his part, but it must be expressly mentioned here, be
cause during the very last parliamentary elections the lying
agitators of the Party of Progress reproached him with his
endeavours in that direction. We shall soon adduce a
striking proof that he not only thought but acted in a manner
diametrically opposite to that attributed to him.
In the Erfurt Parliament, as well as in the Prussian Lower
Heuse, Bismarck opposed the Union Constitution, in virtue
of which sixteen millions of Prussians were to have been
domineered over by five millions of non-Prussians, and con
cluded his speech with the memorable dictum : " If you do
not make more concessions to the Old Prussian spirit than
are hitherto granted by this Constitution, and if you persist
in inflicting this Constitution upon Prussia, she will prove a
Bucephalus, always ready to carry its accustomed master
with mettlesome gladness, but equally ready to throw any
clumsy Sunday-equestrian and to shake off his black, red and
gold trappings to boot."
In another of his most brilliant speeches (Chamber of
Deputies, Dec. 3, 1850) whilst dilating upon the war that
was bound to break out should Prussia stick to the Union
and take up the Hessian question, as well as that of Schleswig-
Holstein, he said : " Why do great States make war nowa-

ill.] His State tfieory. 183
days ? The only sound basis of a great State is egotism, not
romance ; and it is unworthy of a great State to fight for any
question that does not concern its own interests. Show me
an object worth fighting for, and I will vote with you. I am
convinced that Prussian honour does not require Prussia to
play the part of Don Quixote all' over Germany on behalf of
fretful Parliamentary celebrities who fancy that their local
Constitutions are imperilled. To my mind it is indispens
able to the maintenance of Prussian honour that, above all,
Prussia should hold aloof from any disgraceful connection
with Democracy ; that, in the question before us as well as
in all others, she should not allow anything to take place in
Germany without her consent ; and that whatever Prussia
and Austria may consider sensible and politically correct,
after according it their impartial consideration in common,
should be carried out by the two Powers which function,
with equal rights, as Germany's Protectors."
Looking through these last-quoted utterances, the reader
will find it difficult to recognize in Deputy von Bismarck a re
presentative of narrow-minded and short-sighted Junkerdom ;
but easy enough, I imagine, to regard him as an enlightened
politician, keenly perceptive of the actual and necessary. If"
it appear from other of his speeches, delivered during the
period above referred to, that he, in unison with his party,
judged Austria more favourably than was justifiable, that
circumstance may be accounted for by the fact that he
regarded that Empire as avant tout a mighty ally against the
Hydra of Revolution, whose heads, although just then chop
ped off, might grow again. When (whilst Envoy to the
.Federal Diet at Frankfort) he became convinced that the
policy of Schwarzenberg and Schwarzenberg's successors
would not tolerate absolute parity between the two Great
German Powers, but aimed at the overruling of Prussia in

184 His Constitutional Views. [Chap.
the Federal Assembly by aid of a majority favourable to
Austria, he very soon changed his opinion, without troubling
himself about the doctrines of the real Junkers, i.e. the
Prussian Conservatives, and took prompt action in conse
quence thereof, advising the King to put forward the highly
justifiable egotism of Prussia against that of Austria and the
Smaller German States. When Prussia's interests were
threatened by the German Governments that sided with
Austria, he displayed no less energy in defending those
interests than he had manifested in warding off the dangers
with which the German Democratic movement had menaced
Prussia. With respect to Constitutional institutions likewise,
Bismarck, whilst at Frankfort — if not even earlier — adopted
views very different to those which animated his speeches
of previous years. He regarded those institutions as useful,
even necessary; the Prussian Diet appeared to him in
the light of a means towards increasing the prestige and
influence of Prussia in Germany ; and he had thoughts of
a Customs' Parliament. Towards the close of a private
letter written by him to Manteuffel on February 12th, 1853,
the passage occurs : " I may add, as a curious circumstance,
that Herr von Prokesch spoke of a total abolition of the
Constitution in Prussia as a purpose unquestionably enter
tained by the Royal Government, and my contradiction of
that assumption, as well as my remark that I myself did not
consider such an extreme result would be correct politically
speaking, quite surprised him." In another letter (dated
Reinfeld, in Pomerania, September nth, 1856) addressed
to a Prussian politician whose name is not given, he wrote :
"I believe that after 1865 we must borrow an institution
from the Union-projects of 1849, a Customs' Union to be
reorganised by Prussia for the exercise of class-rights in

ill.] Parliamentary Activity. 185
connection with the ZoUverein's affairs ; in other words, a
sort of Customs' Parliament . . . The governments will be
hard to move in that direction ; but if we are stern and
persistent, we can get our own way to a great extent.
The Chambers and the press ought to discuss the German
Customs' policy vigorously and unreservedly from the Prussian
point of view ; if they did, the attention of Germany might
once more be attracted to them, and our Prussian Diet
might become a power in Germany. I could wish to see
the Customs' Union and Confederation, as well as Prussia's
relations to both, subjected to the scalpel of the keenest
criticism in our Chambers ; nothing could be more advan
tageous to the King, his Ministers and their policy — if they
understand their business."
In March, 1858, Bismarck wrote to Minister von
Manteuffel : " In Prussia the Royal authority reposes upon
such a solid basis that the Government, without incurring
any risk, can exercise very effective influence upon German
affairs through a livelier activity on the part of the Legis
lative Bodies. Observe what an impression has been made
throughout Germany by the circumstance that the Saxon
Chambers have lately busied themselves with looking into
the policy of the Confederation as regards Saxony's
connection with the Bund. How much more forcible
would have been this impression if an analogous discussion
had taken place in the Prussian Chambers ? If Prussia
would only allow her German policy, her attitude towards the
Confederation, the difficulties she has had to surmount, and
the machinations of her opponents to be publicly discussed,
a few meetings of the Prussian Diet would probably suffice
to put an end to the pretensions of the domineering
majority in the Bund. That Federal policy which is
specifically needful to Prussia can only gain by publicity

1 86 A Customs' Union. [Chap.
and open discussion. As far as the press is concerned the
light of truth will not be able to penetrate the gloom
superinduced by the mendacity of subventioned journals
unless Prussian newspapers be empowered to deal fully and
freely with everything connected with the Confederation,
and be supplied with the materials for so doing."
Towards the close of another letter, written by Bismarck
from Stolpmuende to the Moderate Conservative Below-
Hohendorf on September 18, 1861, the passage occurs :
"We want a new and plastic institution in the Customs'
line, and a number of other arrangements in common, to
protect our material interests against the disadvantages
accruing from the unnatural configuration of the German
frontiers. We should leave no doubt as to our intention to
demand these things fairly and seriously. I do not, more
over, at all see why we should recoil so affectedly from the
notion of letting the people be represented either in the
Confederation or in a Customs' Union Parliament. We
cannot surely denounce as revolutionary an institution legally
established in every German State — one, too, which even
we Conservatives would rather not dispense with in Prussia."
Would a thoroughgoing Junker ever have entertained such
ideas or proposals ? Certainly not ; nay, it is mentioned in
one of Bismarck's Petersburg letters (August i860), that these
views of his at that time caused him to undergo the reproach
of heresy at the hands of his party. Referring to certain
calumnies (emanating from the Court of Coburg) asserting
that he had given his support to projects for giving up the
Riienish provinces in exchange for certain roundings-off of
the German frontier, he wrote : — " If I were an Austrian
statesman, or a German Prince and Austrian reactionary
like the Duke of Meiningen, our Kreuz Zeitung would have
taken me under its wing, as it has the latter. But as I am

ni.] Bismarck no Partisan. 187
only an old fellow-partisan, who is so unlucky as to have
views of his own upon a good many matters which he
understands, it allows me to be slandered ad libitum.
There is more injustice to be found amongst friends, who
have eaten out of the same pipkin for years, than amongst
enemies." At that time his connection with the out-and-out Junkers
had become very slack; and when Bismarck became a
Minister he never belonged to any party, but — invariably in
the true interests of Prussia and Germany — sometimes
supported the Liberals' demands, and sometimes the Con
servatives' objections. From the very first he assumed a
conciliatory attitude and — quite at variance with the wishes
and hope of the Hotspurs of genuine Junkerdom — endeav
oured to bring existing conflicts to a close by means of
compromises. But the Liberals did not trust him and, for
the most part, held him in small account. The democratic
press sang its old ditty about his vices and nefarious projects,
calling him a " flashy Junker," an " empty-headed braggart ; "
a " Napoleon-worshipper," &c. : and the burden of the song
was always, " Bismarck is equivalent to a coup d'etat." The
Berliner Allgemeine Zeitung, Vincke's paper, edited by
Julian Schmidt, and consequently preaching an infallible
two-headed doctrine of wisdom with relation to State
affairs, sketched his character as follows : — " He began his
career as a country noble of moderate political education,
whose intelligence and acquirements by no means surpassed
those which are the common property of all fairly well
informed men. He attained the apogee of h's parliamen
tary reputation in the Revising-Chamber of 1849 and in the
Union-Parliament of 1850. As a speaker he was rough
and reckless, furiously nonchalant, and sometimes coarsely
witty ; but when did he give utterance to a political idea ? "

1 88 His Ministerial Dibul. [Chap.
On the other hand the Feudalistic party rejoiced greatly
over him, hoping that the time for a good, hearty reaction
was come ; but was, as events proved, just as much deceived
in him as were the Liberals in at once fearing and under
valuing the new Minister.
When Bismarck made his appearance for the first time in
the House of Deputies at the Ministerial table, he made a
statement that was by no means to the taste of the Junkers
— to the effect that, as it was presumable that the House
would reject the estimates for Army Reorganisation included
in the Budget of 1863, as they had in. that of 1862, the
Government had resolved to withdraw the 1863 Budget " in
order not to aggravate the obstacles to an understanding."
At the same time he promised to lay the 1863 Budget before
the House at the commencement of the following session,
together with a Draught Measure for the regulation of
compulsory military service, maintaining the essential con
ditions of Army Reform. Justifying the outlay already
incurred for that reform, he continued : " If this crisis can
be honourably surmounted the Government will gladly meet
its opponents half way. Germany is not concerned with
Prussian Liberalism, but with Prussia's might. Prussia
must collect her forces for a favourable opportunity, such
as has already been let slip more than once. The frontiers,
as settled by the Vienna Treaties, are not suitable to a
healthy State. The great questions of the age are not
solved by speeches and the votes of majorities — that
was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 — but by Iron and
Blood!" Bismarck's conciliatory endeavours proved fruitless. The
House of Deputies wilfully rejected the hand he stretched
out towards it. It either did not or would not (out of sheer
dislike and distrust of the " Junker " who pronounced them)

ill.] The Crisis of 1863. 189
understand the very intelligible hints he threw out with
respect to the object of strengthening the army; it was
determined to shut its eyes and ears and run its head against
a wall ; and so the Diet had to be closed.
Moderate as ever, he said in the course of his concluding
speech : — " The Government finds itself compelled to carry
on the administration of State affairs without the support
presupposed by the Constitution, and is fully aware of the
responsibility it incurs through this regrettable circumstance;
but is also mindful of its duty to its country, which duty
authorises it to provide for the outlay requisite (until the
Budget shall be legally adjusted) for keeping up existing
State-institutions and promoting the welfare of the realm ;
feeling confident that, in due time, its action in this respect
will be fully sanctioned."
When the Diet re-opened, Bismarck left no stone un
turned to terminate the crisis without violating the Constitu
tion, which no Junker of the class to which he was assigned
by the Opposition could have brought himself to do.
During the debate on the Address (Jan. 29, 1863) he
remarked to the adversaries of the Government : " The
Constitution steadfastly maintains the equality of the three
legislatorial forces (Crown, Peers and Deputies) in the
Budget question as well as in all others. No one of these
forces can compel any other one to give way ; therefore the
Constitution recommends recourse to compromise. . . But
if compromise be frustrated because one of these forces is
resolved to carry out its own particular view with doctrinary
absolutism, the series of compromises must necessarily be
interrupted. In their place conflicts will then arise ; and,
as the existence of the State cannot be brought to a stand
still, conflicts will become questions of "which is the
stronger." He in whose hands actual power lies will then,

190 His Attitude towards Budgets. [Chap.
of course, act as he thinks fit. . . Whatever rights the
Constitution concedes to you, you shall exercise to their full
extent ; but when you ask for more, we shall refuse, and shall
persistently uphold the rights of the Crown against your
pretensions. . . Prussian Royalty has not yet completed its
mission; it is not yet fit to constitute an exclusively
ornamental decoration of your Constitutional Edifice, or to
be adjusted to the mechanism of a Parliamentary regime as
a passive bit of machinery."
This was realistic State-philosophy — not a manifestation
of Junkerish reactionary longings, adverse to the Constitu
tional rights of the country — which (as Bismarck denied, but
the Liberals directly and indirectly asserted) were by no
means exclusively the rights of the Chamber of Deputies ;
it was well-founded reliance upon established facts — real
fidelity to the Constitution — not, as Deputy Gneist was
pleased to style it " an open manifesto of absolutism." On
the contrary ; the Chamber desired to carry out its own will
absolutely and unrestrictedly with regard to Budget Legisla
tion, which was not only unconstitutional but — at that
particular time — fraught with peril to the State. As a
minister, Bismarck has always respected the special rights of
the people's representatives in financial matters. Quoting
from a conversation he had in 187 1 with Jules Favre, he
one day observed : " I told him we wanted money, and
Paris must get us some. He replied that we could effect a
loan. That, I rejoined, could not be done without the
Imperial Parliament or the Diet. ' Ah ! ' he exclaimed, ' you
can surely lay hold of 500,000,000 fr. somehow or other
without troubling the Chamber.' I replied : ' No, not five
francs.' He would not believe it But I told him that,
although I had been at war with the House of Re
presentatives for four years I had always stuck at effecting a

ill.] The Period of Conflict. 191
loan without the Diet's consent ; that was my limit, and I
had never dreamt of overstepping it."
We cannot here go further into the story of the " Period
of Conflict," and the author must content himself with
stating that what he has said above applies equally to all
Bismarck's utterances throughout that episode, so far as
they concerned the question of State-rights. When, in
1866, Vilbort expressed his astonishment that the Chan
cellor should have succeeded in inducing the King to
accept universal suffrage, he replied : " It is a victory that I
have won after four years' hard fighting. When the King
called me in, our position was an extremely difficult one.
His Majesty shewed me a list of Liberal concessions, and I
said : ' I accept it, and the more Liberal the Government
can be the better.' Throughout the conflict I followed the
King. It is an arbitrary assumption to say that I am, by
nature or system, an opponent of the nation's representa
tives." He did not at that time (like many of his previous
fellow-partisans) yearn for reaction any more than he does
now-a-days, when he is again accused of so doing. Had he
wished for it, he could probably have had it. If his defiant
attitude and sarcasms aimed at the doctrinaires of the
Liberal and Democratic Opposition may be qualified as
" Junkerish," they were at least not calculated to aggravate
the conflict — an offence of which he has been accused.
They were — as he himself lately remarked to me — practical
exemplifications of the jus talionis. He used offensive
words and expressions, by no means seldom ; but only upon
distinct provocation ; and never of such a virulent character
as those hurled at him by his angry and embittered adver
saries. These gentlemen, and the yelping press inspired by
them, hit much harder and more maliciously than did the
Minister-President They were profuse of abuse and threats ;

192 His Plain-Speaking. TChap.
talked about a " Kreuz-Zeitung Ministry," a " Cabinet of
Rope-dancers," the " Cain brand of Perjury " stamped upon
the forehead of Army Reform, and other cheerful matters
ejusdem generis. Bismarck was not the man to leave such
invectives unacknowledged ; when anybody slapped him on
the right cheek it was not his way to offer the left, but to
pull himself together and return cuff for cuff.
Besides, it was undesirable to persist in observing towards
the Chambers that more than oriental courtesy to which they
had been accustomed. No absolute monarch has been so
toadied to by sycophants as was the Lower House of those
days by Liberal Ministers, and the Chamber (as well as
public opinion) had sniffed up the incense of flattery until it
had come to believe that it was everything it was represented
to be by a Premier angling for a majority. It was
Bismarck's object to dispel this delusion by his shortcomings
in the matter of politeness.
He was, moreover, actuated by his contempt for the
doctrine of the People's Sovereignty, inferentially and
directly professed by the Opposition. To him, a Prussian
royalist by profound conviction, that doctrine was all the
more loathsome because the Democrats worshipped what he
regarded as the " miscarriage of a spurious philosophy "
with religious veneration — a circumstance that annoyed him
even more than the venomous, vulgar polemics of the
Liberal parliamentary praters and leading-article manufac
turers, and consequently stimulated him to appear more
scornful, trenchant and ironical than he would have been
but for this provocation. Finally, he was influenced by the
natural and intelligible disgust with which a truly great
mind cannot but regard political impotence and narrow-
mindedness — the pathetic obtuseness and stiff-necked
unteachableness of many of the doctrinaires with whom,

in.] Electoral Shortcomings. 193
then and subsequently, he had to deal and contend.
Scarcely one of the leaders of the Opposition (at the time
referred to) who clamoured so greedily for a share in, or
even monoply of government, possessed the least pretensions
to statesmanlike sagacity or real qualifications for taking
part in serious political business. Of this fact the Prussian
electors of 1866 were entirely unaware; consequently
they sent these pseudo-politicians up to the Diet thrice
consecutively. But somebody who was acquainted with
it (Lothar Bucher, I believe) explained the phenomena
in question very lucidly in the New York Tribune, as
follows :
" It is not every one who has either opportunity or
leisure to study the science of politics. But every one can
pick up something of that, as of any other science, if he
have occasion to observe, the eye of an observer, and a
certain adroitness of hand, fitting him for experimentalising.
In Prussia, opportunity and this happy aptitude to experi
mentalising on a small scale were altogether lacking. The
electors did not know how to test a politician. Whenever
they proceeded to exercise their electoral rights they lapsed
into an excusable but deplorable error ; they said to them
selves : ' This man is an admirable naturalist, lawyer,
"historian, schoolmaster — a first-class capacity in his pro
fession or science — he will make a splendid member of
Parliament' The consequences of this error may be set
forth by reversing a dictum of Aristotle, who says : ' A
Legislative Assembly, in its corporative capacity, displays a
higher intelligence than that of any one of its individual
members.' In 1861 and 1866 it was frequently remarked
that nearly every member of the Lower House, if you took
him aside and talked to him, was a sensible man enough ;
but that one and all were transformed into blockheads as
vol. 1. o

194 Parliamentary Wrongheadedness. [Chap.
soon as they got into that accursed, ill-ventilated room over
looking the Doenhofs-Platz."
It has been said of the French Academy : " If you gather
together too many clever people in one place, they become
muddle-headed;" and of the French Chamber of 1848:
" If an Assembly of this description remains in session for
any length of time it loses perception and judgment, as far
as the outside world is concerned." In great measure this
was then, and is still, the case with the Prussian House of
Deputies, as we have been reminded of late by many a
debate and vote in the Reichstag. " Idealists and old
bachelors'' — thus wrote "A National-Liberal Partizan,"
in a South-German journal (1879) — " who keep up no sort
of touch with the people have acquired an altogether too
pernicious influence in certain parties, whereby the actual
direction of affairs seriously affecting the people's welfare
has fallen into the hands of professional politicians, intri
guers, and coterie-heroes. . . Most of the speeches in our
Imperial Parliament sound like a second edition (with
addenda) of the Frankfort National Assembly ; many words,
little sense ; nearly always the same rhetorical carpet-
beaters, who deal with every subject according to cut and
dry theories or patterns, and invariably have the last word."
This criticism might be expressed in milder and politer
terms ; it teems, perhaps, with excessive reproach. But it
is in every respect applicable to the opposition of the so-
called " Conflict Period."
In the opinion of these wrong-headed spirits Bismarck
was a Junker, and remained so even after the grand dis
closure and realisation of his German plan came off in the
summer of 1866 — at least, in the opinion of the " consistent
ones, true to their principles and faithful to their party,"
who may be described as types of wrongheadedness. Others

III.] The Duchy of Lauenburg. 195
allowed themselves to be converted by facts, permanently or
temporarily, to more intelligent views, and thus gained the
honour and joy of sharing in his great work. Had a
genuine Junker, in Bismarck's place during the " Conflict
Period," been scarcely able to withstand the temptation of
advising the King to abolish, or, at least, materially modify
or suspend the Constitution, such a man would undoubtedly
have become arrogant after the victories in Bohemia, and
would have avenged himself upon his opponents ; for the
Junkers — I mean the out-and-out ones of the Kleist-Retzow
sort — are no politicians. The real politician is free from
arrogance and vengefulness, alike in thought and action.
He simply asks himself, " of what use will be this or that
proceeding towards the attainment of my object ? " That
was Bismarck's case in the autumn of 1866. From the
pinnacle of his triumph he stooped to ask for a vote of
indemnification. He appeared before the people's Repre
sentatives bearing, not a laurel-wreath, but the olive-branch
of reconciliation which he had plucked in Avignon four
years previously — too soon for the Opposition.
Not long before that time he had proved, with respect to
the Duchy of Lauenburg, that in another respect he did not
belong to the Junker brood, and was capable of bringing it
to its bearings (when requisite in the interest of the State)
as energetically and even as contemptuously as if it had
been composed of the stupid and insolent democrats of the
Berlin Diet.
In virtue of the Gastein treaty the Duchy had been
handed over to the Prussian Crown. This tiny realm was a
legal curiosity ; in comparison to its neighbour States (even
to Mecklenburg) a monstrosity. It was, so to speak, a
petrifaction of the state of the law in Germany during the
seventeenth century, and, had such an arrangement been

196 The Duchy of Lauenburg. [Chap.
practicable, ought to have occupied a distinguished position
amongst the antiquities of the German Museum. Nobody
within its precincts had ever thought of clearing out the
feudal rubbish which had accumulated there, as in a gigantic
lumber-room. An exalted official who had been charged
with putting it in order said to me, " In whichsoever direc
tion one looked throughout the duchy's institutions, nothing
was to be seen but mediaeval trash and robbery of the
majority by a small privileged minority. In a word, Lauen
burg was the Pompeii of German constitutional history, or —
which comes to the same thing — the Paradise of Junkerdom
and of a traditionally pampered bureaucracy."
Its former sovereigns in Copenhagen had, one after
another, confirmed the privileges of the " Staende " without
looking into them, and these privileges were set forth upon
a yellow worm-eaten parchment, called " The Recess."
The German Confederation, which occupied the Duchy in
the autumn of 1863, and the Austro-Prussian Commissioners
who administered it later on, had not been able to remedy
any of the existing abuses ; they had too little time at their
disposal, and circumstances prevailed which made it un
certain who would eventually become the owner of the
territory. Therefore, until Prussia took possession of it,
the order of the day (not to speak of such facts as the total
absence of a code of laws and the monopoly of common
rights by individuals) was the occupancy of numerous
lucrative official posts by a few " select families,'' which
made a practice of letting the enormous State domains (of
course, far under the value of their produce) to one another,
thus assimilating the fat of the land in large quantities.
" This class of person ruled almost unrestrictedly, wore the
Order of the Elephant upon its breast, and ate up all the
good things of the country. Those who belonged to it did

in.] The Lauenburg " Recess." 197
nothing, for they could do nothing ; and from that pursuit
they derived incomes amounting in some cases to ten
thousand thalers per annum. They allotted themselves
valuable perquisites and imposed heavy dues upon others ;
the people subjected to their sway were obliged to drink
detestable beer, brewed on their estates, and nobody
throughout the Duchy was able to purchase a few acres of
land, because they did not choose that more than two
thousand human beings should live upon a square mile of
ground." Now it happened that on the 25th of September, in the
year of Grace, 1865, King William entered the Duchy in
order to receive the homage and oath of fealty of his new
subjects in its capital, Ratzeburg. At Buechen, on the
frontier, he was greeted by a deputation of the " Staende "
with an address, in which the passage occurred : " We have
your Majesty's word that you will govern us justly and in
accordance with the customs and laws of the country," by
which, no doubt, was meant keeping up the abuses of
patrician and bureaucratic nepotism and of feudal equity,
rather than fair-dealing justice. In his reply, however, the
King made no reference to it.
During the afternoon of the 25th — the homaging cere
mony was appointed to come off on the following morning
in St. Peter's Church, Ratzeburg — Bismarck, who had
accompanied His Majesty thither, was enjoying the mild
autumnal air on the pretty lake close to the town, in the
company of a distinguished member of the Lauenburg
Assembly. As the latter had theretofore heard nothing of
any royal intention to confirm the local privileges, and was
suffering from the restlessness caused by uncertainty, he
plucked up courage, and asked —
"Apropos, Excellency, what about our 'Recess.?' I

198 The Lauenburg Homaging. [Chap.
hope His Majesty will sanction it before he exacts our
homage." " I fancy the King will not do so," replied Bismarck.
" Then," rejoined his companion, " we shall refuse to take
the oath in Church to-morrow."
" Very well," observed the minister. " In that case you
gentlemen will be informed to-morrow, also in church, that
you have been incorporated in the nearest Prussian pro
vince." After which the two gentlemen remained a little longer in
their boat upon the smooth surface of the lake, talking
about the beauties of the neighbourhood. •
As soon as he returned to his quarters, Bismarck sat
down and drew up a Royal Decree announcing the in
corporation of Lauenburg in the province of Brandenburg —
to be read aloud in case the " Staende " should really refuse
to take the oath and do the " correct hereditary homage "
— and ending with an exhortation to all present to swear
fealty en masse ; an exhortation which would undoubtedly
have been complied with by the people. He then made
sure of the King's sanction to the Decree, and went to
church next morning with this little torpedo in his coat-
pocket. A hymn was sung, followed by a sermon from
the superintendent. Then the vassals were summoned to
take the oath ; and behold ! they swore without a murmur.
So did the other " Staende." The " Recess " remained un
confirmed. Let us sum up the foregoing briefly and seek the lesson
contained in it. Feudal conditions of the " good old days "
are always put forward in electioneering speeches as the
Junkers' ideal. That ideal was realized most comprehensively
in the Duchy of Lauenburg. There, far longer than in any
other part of Germany, had been kept up patrimonial jurisdic-

III.] Bismarck and Lauenburg. 199
tion, local and family police, hereditary vassaldom, rights of
compulsion and ban, stringent game-laws, hunting monopo
lies, and absolute dependence of the peasants and labourers
upon the landowning authorities and officials. One would
think, , therefore, that a downright Junker, finding himself
the sole, uncontrolled and irresponsible Minister of the
country in question, would not take the initiative in putting
an end to this Junker-Idyll, but would wait at least until he
should be compelled to do so. This, however, was not the
case. Nobody exercised any pressure upon him. He
might have secured the whole "institution" under lock and
key if, on the occasion of the " hereditary homagings " he
had agreed to the demands of the " Staende " (amongst
whom, under the leading of their Syndic, Wittrock, strong
Guelphic tendencies prevailed) and had advised the king to
promise that the local Constitution should be maintained in
force. Instead of this we see that, being at the time a
Minister, he firmly withstood the pretensions of the
"Staende," and met their threat of refusing to do homage with
the counter-threat of exhorting all who should be present at
the ecclesiastical act of homaging to perform that rite by
acclamation. Subsequently we see that he took rapid
legislative steps to bring about the abolition of all the
prerogatives above recited, and to free the working-classes
of Lauenburg from the dependence in which they had
thitherto been kept by the four chief officials of the Duchy,
in virtue of plenary powers conferred upon them by " local
institutions " with respect to the preventive and punitive
police alike. Would a Junker have been disposed to pitch
all these antique prerogatives out of window ?
In that very same Lauenburg, where light was thus shed
upon feudal darkness in 1865, the apostles of Progressist
agitation had the audacity, during the autumn parliamentary

20O Bismarck no Partisan. [Chap.
elections of i88r to persuade the peasants that Bismarck
was Junkerdom incarnate, casting about him to revive the old
times, or worse ; and the silly people, oblivious of what had
happened, believed the senseless assertion and exercised
their electoral functions accordingly. Of course the agi
tators themselves and their wire-pullers in Berlin knew
their accusation to be untrue — a sort of spectre wherewith to
frighten fools — a bait wherewith to catch votes.
Within the last few years even the more honourable and
moderate Liberals have been heard to complain loudly that
Prince Bismarck, who had gone with them from 1866 to
1877, had quitted them in the latter year in order to steer
the ship of state into the waters of reaction. This is a dis
torted view of what really occurred. The Chancellor could
not abandon the National-Liberals, for he never belonged to
them ; and he could not revert to reaction (of the class pro
fessed by Kleist, Lippe, Count Bruehl, Rochow, and Tettau)
because he will not have anything to do with reaction, of
that or any other kind.
Whilst conversing (Jan. 1881) with the author of this work
about the complaints and reproaches uttered by Herr Bam
berger in the above sense, he observed: — "Ever since I
became a Minister I have not belonged to any party — neither
to the Liberal nor to the Conservative; the King has been
my sole political associate, and my only objects have been
to defend monarchical power against unconstitutional Parlia
mentarism, and to restore, strengthen and develope the
German Empire. The Conservatives have always been
against me — that is, whenever they wanted reaction, because
I would not have it. They remember the attitude assumed
towards me by the Kreuz-Zeitwig in 1872 and later at the
time of the great libels (published by Joachim Gehlsen in the
'tfeichsgJocke'). It was then that they forsook me and

HI.] The Bennigsen Incident. 201
began to attack me in every imaginable way because I could
not go with them. It was just the same with the National-
Liberals in 1877. When the Bennigsen Ministry failed to
come to pass, because Bennigsen asked for impossibilities and
the King would not have him, and expressly forbade any
further negotiations with him,* they left me in the lurch,
threw me over, and told all manner of lies about me.
Thenceforth they only supported me tepidly — or not at all —
in the Chamber, and endeavoured to get my Ministerial
colleagues to side with them."
* Unruh reports : " During the negotiations relating to the Tobacco
Duty Bill of 1878, when Bismarck declared his ideal to be a Monopoly,
Bennigsen told me that he had informed Bismarck of his inability to
pledge himself to that system, and consequently had given up his
intention of joining the Cabinet. This requires correction. According
to Bismarck's own account of the matter, what took place was as
follows. Count Eulenburg, the Home Minister, wished to retire in
1877. Bismarck offered the post in question to Herr von Bennigsen,
who required that Herren von Forckenbeck and von Stauffenberg
should also be appointed Ministers, no portfolios being at that moment
disposable. Meanwhile, Eulenburg had acquainted the King with the
Chancellor's intention to nominate Bennigsen his (Eulenburg's) suc
cessor, and had raised objections which resulted in the King sternly
forbidding the Minister-President to treat with Bennigsen any further.
This took place a few days after the conversation which Bismarck had
had upon the subject with Bennigsen at Varzin. Bennigsen sub
sequently went up to the Chancellor in the Reichstag, and asked him
about the Tobacco-Monopoly. Bismarck answered that he considered
it a good thing and should try for it ; whereupon Bennigsen rejoined
that he could not support it, and therefore must forego joining the
Cabinet. "This conversation, held two months after that of Varzin,
was in no way a pursuance of the negotiations, prohibited to Bismarck
by the King. The Chancellor, who continued (quite independently of
the Ministerial question) his endeavours to keep touch with Bennigsen
and the Natioaal-Liberal party, could not conveniently inform Herr
von Bennigsen that the possibility of negotiating with him as a
Ministerial candidate had been put an end to in the highest quarter two
months previously. Therefore, he allowed Bennigsen's version of the
matter — that the Tobacco-Monopoly had been the obstacle to further
negotiations — to pass uncontradicted.

202 Constitutional Majorities. [Chap.
Prince Bismarck, therefore, has not been a party-man for
many years past, which, with us Germans, is much the same as
saying he has not been an adherent to one or another doctrine.
Always sure of his own purpose, like all the great characters
of history, he looks for a Constitutional majority wherever
he thinks he can find it, when he wants it. Keeping his
above-mentioned two main objects steadfastly in view, he
has invariably endeavoured to manipulate the more impor
tant political parties in such sort that they might be available
for the attainment of those objects, making concessions from
time to time first to one and then to the other — concessions
which appeared to him insignificant compared with the
aims he sought to attain, and which might, if necessary, be
modified in some respects after those aims should be
attained. It having been remarked, during a recent debate
in the Reichstag, that he had approved of parliamentary
freedom of speech in 1870, he replied : —
"At that time, in order to foster the young and tender
plant of German Unity by every feasible means, I agreed to
many things that were greatly at variance with my political
convictions. It was not then my business to consider
economical questions, or to fret myself about trifles, but to
further the consolidation of the German Empire. Now we
can discuss such matters quietly. Had we not then made a
solid job of the Empire, discussion would not help us
now-a-days." When Bismarck looked about him amongst the representa
tives of the people for assistance to achieve his task, his
glance naturally fell upon the National-Liberal party. With
respect to national aims he was essentially at one with
it ; but it was also necessary that he should come to terms
with its Liberal elements.- This gave umbrage to the
Junker party, or Kreuz-Zeitung Association. As early as

UL] Constitutional Majorities. 203
1870 the editor of that paper, Beuthner, when I called at
his office one day with an unsympathetic mandate from the
Chancellor, said to me haughtily, " We will not do it.
Ministries vanish, not excepting the Bismarck Ministry;
but our party remains '' — a sentence which the worthy man
certainly did not derive from his own diminutive brain.
Prussian Junkerdom was out of temper with the Chancellor
" become a Liberal ; " first it sulked, then it waxed furious,
and early in the year 1872 it commenced active hostilities
against Prince Bismarck on the question of the Schools
Inspection Bill, allying itself to Herr Windhorst — for lack of
a sensible confederate — and inscribing upon its banner
"Vindication of the Monarchical Principle against Parlia
mentary Majorities" and " Defence of our State's Christian
Character." According to the Conservative organ, the
Prince, in his speech of Jan. 30, " had directly attacked or
renounced all that the Conservative Party in Prussia had
proclaimed and defended as its fundamental principles for
twenty years past." The passage of his speech in which all
this was discovered ran as follows : " But as matters
actually stand, this being a Constitutional State, we
Ministers stand in need of a majority which, on the whole,
supports our policy." This was designated " an uncom
promising recognition of that Constitutionalism which the
Kreuz-Zeitung had thitherto successfully withstood, because
it was not strictly Constitutional in Prussia."
To these remarks the following correct answer was re
turned in the Spener'sche Zeitung by the Chancellor's order :
"Not Constitutional? Are we, then, not living under a
Constitutional system of government? Have we an
Assembly representing the people ? Is its consent required
to make the laws valid, and is that consent obtained through
a majority ? If so, it follows inevitably that the advisers of

204 His view of Majorities. [Chap.
the Crown are compelled to obtain a majority for tie
passing of their laws — at least, to the extent of generally
supporting the Ministerial policy, even if it does not approve
of every measure proposed. The man criticized by the
Kreuz-Zeitung with such surpassing sagacity has proved, in
the storm and strain of eventful days, that he is not one to
sacrifice what he deems necessary to any majority. But
that same statesman has said, ' Conflicts ought not to be a
standing institution of the State.' Wherever a Parliament
exists majorities will always be obtainable. If the states
men of the Right withdraw their support from the Govern
ment it becomes a question whether or not the latter (which,
after all, has to keep the business of the State going) can
find representatives of the people on its Left who are fit to
govern, and on whose support it can reckon. The Minister-
President has already reminded the Right once that it has
transferred the centre of gravity to the other side of the
House by wilful opposition. That warning has lost none of
its significance. Majorities can only be matters of indiffer
ence in States governed absolutely, where the laws require
no confirmation on the part of the people's representatives."
Are these the words of a Junker, or the principles of that
caste commonly defined as Junkerdom? I stand in no
fear of contradiction when I assert that these deductions,
put forward by the Chancellor, are precisely the converse of
Junkerish notions and endeavours.
The words quoted above were aimed at the extreme
Right, or darkest shade of True Blue Conservatives. The
other members of the party were eulogised, e.g. : — "The Con
servative party sought and found its mainstay in the Govern
ment. This the Neue Preussische Zeitung designates ' the
source of evil.' We deem it more correct to recognize in
that fact the source o; this party's respectability and vigour.

HI.] The " Extreme Left'.' 205
It has risen from the insignificance of many a long year
under a powerful and enterprising Government. By loyally
adhering to the policy adopted by His Majesty, it not only
rendered the success of that policy possible but became
identified with it — thereby acquiring an indisputable right
to share its fame and honours. It cannot be said that,
during the last few years, the Government has to thank the
Conservative party exclusively for any parliamentary victory.
But it is to the party's credit that it attached itself to a
Government which was capable of carrying out what the
party could not per se bring to fulfilment."
Nearly the same that was thus said of the Conservatives —
more particularly of their right wing — applied to the
extreme Left of the National-Liberals, which separated from
that party some years ago, and still hovers in the air (like
Mahomet's fabulous coffin between two magnets), between
its old friends and the Progressists, who have much more in
common with it than the former. At the time of that
secession, when the said extreme Left was to a great extent
predominant, the words in question were, indeed, applicable
to the whole party ; for the National-Liberals only earned
their share of honour and glory in connection with the
rearrangement of German affairs by supporting and identi
fying themselves with the Chancellor's policy. At the
commencement of the internal construction of the new
edifice they, thanks to the more salient features of their
political character, were bound to strike the architect as
workmen peculiarly fitted for the execution of that task ;
and, in order that it should be rapidly completed, their
utilisation — as well as that of those Conservatives who com
prehended and were willing to further the Chancellor's plans
and endeavours — was indispensable. There were amongst
them some thorough-paced Liberals, scarcely amenable to

206 The Prussian Liberals. [Chap,
reason, who most reluctantly made up their minds to stand
by the Government ; such a course having been thitherto
by them regarded as out of keeping with true Liberalism,
accustomed to regard uncompromising opposition as the
correct thing under all circumstances. The Chancellor
won these Liberals over by making certain advances to
them, and showing consideration for their prejudices. He
gained friends amongst them by making formal concessions
to some of their favourite fads, which might, for the time
being, be regarded as harmless. But, although he
manifested every disposition to make himself agreeable to
them, he never permitted them to restrict the rights of the
Crown, or to infringe its Constitutional authority.
Thitherto Liberalism had professed the doctrine that the
Government must either submit to the will of the people's
representatives, or retire to make room for a Ministry
emanating from the majority of the Prussian Diet or the
German Parliament. Up to 1866 Bismarck had simply
declared this doctrine — -imported from England, where it is
little more than an old custom, by no means prescribed by
the Constitution — to be inapplicable to Prussia. There
after, however, he took pains upon several occasions to
convert the Liberals to views more cognate to monarchical
institutions. Furthermore, he sought to controvert and get
rid of an erroneous belief which (as above pointed out)
regarded antagonism between the Government and the
people's representatives as natural and in every wav
efficacious, and considered that the first duty of the latter
was to observe a steadfast and watchful mistrust of the
former's plans and proposals — its next, to redeem the
assumed rights of the people, and to emancipate the sub
jects of the State (now possessed of sufficient political
culture to qualify them for governing themselves) from

HI.] Bismarck and Liberalism. 207
official tutelage. At one time, as it seemed, Prince
Bismarck's endeavours to induce the National-Liberals to
reject these traditional paradoxes were not unsuccessful, so
that on the whole, relations of a very friendly description
were established between him and the most considerable
(in numbers and ability) fraction of the Liberals, resulting in
several concessions to these latter on the part of the
Government, e.g., with respect to economic interests,
administrative reform, the struggle with the Ultramontanists,
judicial reform and military organisation. Hereby the Chan
cellor always attained his object, as far as essentials were con
cerned, whilst yielding to Liberal demands of less moment
— in other words, by adopting a system of compromises.
Taking into consideration the rapidity with which the
internal construction of the German Empire was advanced
by the above means, it was inevitable that — when the time
came for closely and carefully inspecting the work achieved
— certain flaws should be detected, requiring immediate
elimination. One section of the National-Liberals recog
nised this fact — another failed to do so. All the members
of that party recalled to mind their doctrinaire past, to a
greater or less degree, and remembered their engagements
to their electors, erroneously assuming that the majority of
these latter regarded the old articles of the Liberal Creed as
Golden Rules or things holy and inviolable; hence the
support of the Chancellor by this party became more and
more questionable daily. It still figured in the Liberal
programme ; but, as an actuality, it left much to be desired.
The party lent him its aid most unwillingly when he
strengthened the Criminal Code, emasculated by humani
tarians a la mode, and the measure emerged from the
Parliamentary debates in a mutilated condition. On the
third reading of the Judicial Reform Bill the Liberals

208 "Never I n [Chap.
certainly made concessions of no inconsiderable importance;
but they had previously brought their doctrinaire Liberalism
heavily to bear upon the question, pruning and cobbling the
Bill in all directions.
The Parliamentary elections of 1877 showed pretty
plainly that the leaders of the party had deceived them
selves with regard to the feelings and wishes of the electors,
a large number of whom was favourable to the Prince's
policy. Consequently a good many National-Liberal
Deputies failed to reappear in the Berlin Parliament, whilst
the Conservative fractions were strongly reinforced.
At Eastertide, 1877, the Chancellor offered his resigna
tion to the Emperor, who replied to him with the famous
" Never ! " speaking for the vast majority of the German
people interested in political matters. The chief motives
prompting Bismarck's wish to retire from office were set
forth at the time in a series of articles published by the
Grenzboten, which it is unnecessary to reproduce in this
chapter. But there were others as well ; for instance,
vexation and weariness, superinduced by the waving opposi
tion of the strongest fraction of the Liberal party, which, in
view of the hostility displayed by the Ultramontanists to
the empire, should have vigorously sided with the latter,
but on the contrary — in order to keep up its reputation for
Liberal consistency — never lent its support to the Chan
cellor fully and freely, preferring to peddle with subtle
special-pleadings and Talmud-like straw-splittings, with
bargainings and reservations, in order to gain credit for at
least playing a special part in the political drama. The
Left Wing of the National-Liberal party felt that it was
their mission to criticise rather than to co-operate, and
harked back to their assumed " call " — namely, to act as
guardians of the people's menaced rights and liberties — so

III.] " Constitutional Guarantees." 209
that it became difficult, from time to time, to distinguish
them from the party of progress on the one hand, whilst on
the other they came to resemble very closely the Centre in
its opinions and style of oratory.
In the meantime the Chancellor's plans for remodelling
the economic institutions of the empire had ripened — plans
which aimed at augmenting the Imperial revenue by means
of Customs' duties and indirect taxation ; at giving aid to
national industry and agriculture in their struggle against
the forces of foreign competition ; at relieving the middle
classes of the population, overburdened with direct taxes,
and the communes, saddled with excessive obligations in
the nature of outlay for schools and paupers. To achieve
these objects Bismarck strove to secure the support of the
National-Liberals, and during the autumn of 1876 (as we
have already mentioned) opened negotiations in that sense
with Herr von Bennigsen, the leader of the party's right
wing; who, however, could not or would not take upon
himself to come to a decision, but simply took cognizance
of the Chancellor's proposals, in order to talk them over
with his fellow-partisans in Berlin. This he did ; and
behold 1 a few days later the watchword " Constitutional
Guarantees " was given out by the National-Liberal papers.
This pointed to a business transaction, manifestly suggested
by Herr Lasker, who, as early as 1873 (declaring that at
length the " People's Rights "must be exacted and con
ceded), had demanded a Press-Law after his own heart, but
had been disposed of by the Chancellor with the remark,
" We all belong to the people — not exclusively the party
which styles itself Liberal without invariably being so."
Now, however, that the party found itself in request —
necessary, and even, as it thought, indispensable — the time
was come, according to Herr Lasker's calculations, foi
vol. 1. P

210 " Constitutional Guarantees" [Chap,
taking advantage in a commercial spirit of so favourable a
conjuncture, and for putting pressure on the Government
to some purpose. Not that the party was at one about the
" Constitutional Guarantees " which it desired to obtain in
exchange for its pledge to support the Chancellor in carry
ing out his economic projects. But that it laid claim to
any such guarantees was the plainest conceivable expression
of the feeling (repeatedly given utterance to by the Extreme
Left) that the Liberals regarded the Chancellor as an
adversary, rather than as a friend and collaborateur — as a
person only to be approached with precaution, and whose
legislative schemes must be larded with all sorts of provisoes,
in order to render them harmless. The demand for
" guarantees " smacked of a tradesman's way of thinking,
crossed with that of a solicitor. The "people," in whose
name it was of course put forward, was in reality the
fraction of the Liberal party which yearned for the introduc
tion of English Parliamentarism into Germany, and me
chanically echoed the views and wishes of its leaders —
ambitious agitators, or doctrinaires utterly alienated from
the world of actualities. The real people — the great mass
of German citizens, by no means shared that yearning, nor
even understood what it was about, although the Liberal
press boasted of it daily as though it had been the fulfilment
of a sacred duty. The Chancellor, however, rejected it as
impracticable ; nor would he have been able to consent to
it, even had it been consonant with his political principles ;
for the Emperor would not have permitted him to do so.
Thereafter the National-Liberals constituted a party
which voted with the Opposition upon nearly every ques
tion brought before the Reichstag and Lower House of the
Diet, and refused Jo grant the Chancellor's simplest requests
with the object of putting pressure upon him. The separa-

Ill] The National-Liberals. 2\l
tion that took place of the Extreme Left from the rest of
the party made but little difference in this respect ; for the
National-Liberals had all more or less relapsed into their
old political groove, and, in so doing, had thrown the
Chancellor over, as we have already pointed out — not he
them. Their press organs assailed him in a tone every
whit as hostile as that adopted towards him by the Pro
gressist journals. Their representatives in the Diet rejected
every proposition made by the Government ; those belong
ing to the Reichstag did the same, overthrowing amongst
others the Socialist Bill, a measure urgently needed, and
only deigning to pass it after two attempts upon the
Emperor's life had been made by persons belonging to the
ranks of the revolutionary party, and the nation had been
put into a temper which threatened the parliamentary
future of those who, out of " fidelity to their principles,"
refused to apply any remedy to the Socialistic evil. By
accumulating obstacles in the Chancellor's path these
gentlemen above all wished to prove that they constituted a
damaging and impeding power, with which it would be
necessary to reckon and negotiate, in order to secure its
goodwill (of course, by means of concessions) whenever any
fresh question should crop up. But, ever since this policy
of the National-Liberals made itself clearly manifest, Prince
Bismarck has felt more strongly than ever theretofore that
they are untrustworthy friends. He has, moreover, carried
several important points of his programme of Reform by
the aid of others ; not so many as he could have brought to
pass had he been supported by both wings of the National-
Liberal party, but enough for the present.
Those others were the Conservatives and the Centre ; a
fact, however, which affords not the least pretext for assert
ing that the Chancellor is either become a Conservative — in
P 2

212 Parliamentary Government. [Chap.
the Junkerish sense of the word — or that he has gone over
to Ultramontanism. Both the parties in question showed
themselves willing to assist him in realising certain of his
purposes, and he accepted their co-operation. It is quite
open to the moderate Liberals to approach him anew, and
to get on with him again by means of compromises. When
he commenced his enterprise of economic reform he
observed : " I have in view positive and practical aims,
which I intend to attain ; an intention in fulfilling which I
have been sometimes aided by the Left, sometimes by the
Right. If I could have had my way, both parties would
have assisted me. Let him help me who will, whether those
aims be attained forthwith, or after years of common effort,
does not so much matter. I will work with anybody whose
object is that which, in my opinion, is calculated to further
the interests of the State and the country at large. It is all
the same to me what political fraction he belongs to."
Those interests — in Prussia and the German Empire alike
— cannot be advanced in any way by the policy advocated
of late years by Liberals of every nuance ; on the contrary,
we have nothing to hope and everything to fear from the
success of the purpose which regulates the attitude of the
Opposition in all home questions ; i.e. the introduction of
Parliamentary Government into Germany. England's expe
riences, up to the present time, of Parliamentarism — that is,
of alternating rule, exercised by majorities of the House of
Commons — by no means stultify this assertion ; for in that
country the institution in question reposes upon aristocratic
foundations. The English Constitution (admitting that there
is such a thing) is in a position to allow full play to its erratic
forces, being always susceptible of re-regulation by the habits
of the people amongst whom it sprung up (by the way, in a
quite common-place and unreasoning manner, like a product

Ill J Parliamentary Government. 213
of Nature) and by their conservative, monarchical and
national bent of mind. England, after all, is an island,
exhibiting developments peculiar to itself and requirements
that differ essentially from those of Continental States. In
spite of all this : we have yet to see what England's future,
as shaped by Gladstone's projects for the extension of the
suffrage, will bring forth ; already since the passing of the
first Reform BjU, Radicalism has struck root in several
broad strata of the population, and it is to be apprehended
that it will continue to gain ground and finally become the
ruling Power in the State. It is already numerously repre
sented in the House of Commons, and the present Premier
has found himself compelled to admit men of avowed demo
cratic — aye, of republican principles into his Cabinet.
The adoption of a Parliamentary system of government in
Austria-Hungary, France and Italy has failed to fulfil any one
of the expectations attached to it, and has justified all the
objections put forward against it. It has weakened those
States within and without. But there is even less prospect of
its proving useful in Germany, and more reason to apprehend
that it would result disastrously, our international situation
being a far more difficult one than that of any of the above-
named Great Powers. The predominant position at present
occupied by Germany in the " European Concert " is
regarded by the majority of the other performers as an'
anomaly, to be done away with as soon as may be. War
with France threatens our future in the West — with Russia,
in the East. A coalition of both these Powers against us
and our Ally on the Danube is improbable just now, but by
no means impossible in times to come ; and we can scarcely
hope for support of a steadfast and decisive nature from Italy
though it is through us that she has attained her full liberty
and independence. In reality we owe the maintenance of

214 Bismarck's funkerdom. [Chap.
peace to the respect with which our army and leading states
man have inspired our neighbours ; and to the assumption
that the foreign policy of the Empire will be carried on with
the firmness and consistency that have hitherto charac
terised it. Hence, the rudder of that policy must never be
entrusted to the hand of Proteus-like, ever-variable Parlia
mentarism ; but we must remain a Military power — one
that will not put up with any sort of. Parliamentary
government The German Army will always feel that it is
the army of its Emperor-King, and will never learn to obey
parliamentary commands or to produce Parliamentary
generals. Moreover, the solution of the social question — the Latter-
Day problem of problems — cannot be attempted with the
least prospect of success by any one of our existing political
parties. Were the Party of Progress to come to power it
would repeat its old errors and renew a hopeless struggle by
abolishing the Socialist-Law. That Bismarck is aware of
this, and has undertaken to solve the social question in a
practical manner, will one of these days be counted amongst
the greatest services he has rendered to his country. It must
however, be remarked of his resistance to Parliamentary
government that it was not inspired by the feelings of a
Royalist Junker, but by the foresight of a gifted statesman,
whose unerring glance takes in present and future, foreign
and home affairs, with equal clearness and accuracy.
Let us now look back and extract their gist from the
foregoing paragraphs.
The Chancellor was born a Junker ; he lived a Junker's
life for a considerable time, and to some extent represented
the views of his fellow-Junkers. As a Minister, however,
he only belonged to the party designated by the epithet
" Junkerdom " so far that, like itself, he was a Royalist in

ill.] His Militarism. 215
thought and feeling, and, above all, objected to Parlia
mentary government As was proved by his application to
the Diet for indemnification after Koeniggraetz (and by
many other utterances and transactions) he was at all times
faithful to the Constitution. That he was no patron of
aristocratic privileges was demonstrated by his attitude
towards the " Recess " of the Lauenburg Junkers, as well
as by various measures of his adoption — for example, his
frequent choice of commoners as Ministerial colleagues.
There are those amongst his contemporaries who do not
yet understand this, obvious though it be. But the stupid
phrase " Bismarck's Junker-Policy " will, we feel assured, be
undiscoverable in the pages of future history.
If he were styled " soldier " instead of " Junker " — if his
militarism were grumbled at instead of his Junkerdom,
there would be some sense in such a view of his character
although it would be no reproach to him. What is spoken
of as militarism is in reality that Prussian discipline by
virtue of which all the forces in the State, all the members
of the governmental organism in its various branches, work
together with one common object — that system, the first
principle of which for all connected with it (from the lowest
to the highest in rank, including the Sovereign) is obedience,
or rather the subordination of each individual's personal
inclinations and opinions to those of his immediate official
superior in particular, and to the interests of the State in
general. Every part of this system is an accurate fit,
dovetailing admirably with the part adjoining it ; all goes
on smoothly, as in the army, which is merely the most
distinct outcome of the spirit animating all our State
institutions and officials, besides being the chief and central
school in which that spirit is imparted to the population at
large. Such a system as this — of which Bismarck himself

216 The Drawbacks of Genius. [Chap.
once said, " I am ambitious to deserve one day the praise
bestowed by history upon Prussian discipline " — is quite
compatible with an abundant measure of political liberty, but
not with the Parliamentary form of government demanded
by our Liberals — a system that is bound to be always
unsteady, because unavoidably mutable as well as fettered
with respect to its action and constantly restricted to half-
measures ; whereas nothing in political life can approach
(for efficiency) the swift offensive power and steadfast
defensive force of a monarchy organised in the manner
above described.
Bismarck is the incorporate ideal of the Prussian officer
and official, not of the Prussian Junker. Nothing short of
stupidity or dishonesty can account for any man mistaking
him in this respect Future generations will not be guilty
of such folly or wickedness.
" It is easily to be understood," says Vischer (' Altes und
Neues,' vol. iii. 141), " that political atomists should reproach
the man whose life-purpose it is to create animate unity,
concord and community, and to overthrow the rule of the
many-headed, with an exclusive desire to set up his own
masterful individuality above all else. And the people has
allowed itself to be persuaded into believing that it is a
shame one man should do so much ; it (the people) has
come to regard a colossal Number One with apprehension.
Doubtless it is a misfortune for a man that he should he so
much cleverer and more capable than the generality of his
fellow-men. Mankind cannot endure the thought that the
intelligence and volition of so many should be concentrated
in one ; the masses detest that one, and sow hatred of him
everywhere. It is indeed a tragical lot to be a genius.
Nor, as a matter of fact, can a genius fulfil his mission
without using violence, towering so high above others as he

m.] Golden Words. 217
does, nor without feeling contempt, seeing what pigmies he
has to contend with."
These are golden words. The babble of narrow-minded
and envious Philistines will one day be recognised as what
it really is ; and already, in the rising generation, there are
those standing by the door, ready to carry away such'
rubbish and bury it out of sight for ever.

( 218 )

CHAPTER IV.
diplomatic indiscretions.
Diplomacy is the art of making good the justifiable
self-interest of a state by means of negotiations with other
states. In other words, its mission is, by observation,
written and spoken representations, and persuasions to
defend the commonwealth to which its practitioners (i.e.
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassadors, Envoys, Charge's
d'Affaires, &c.) belong against foreign adversaries ; to
prevent the conclusion of alliances hostile to that common
wealth ; to gain allies and keep them ; and to act with these
latter in such sort that the interests of the Monarch and
people represented by the diplomatist may be advanced —
their influence, power and well-being promoted and en
larged. Everything else considered appurtenant to the qualifi
cations and duties of a diplomatic agent is superficial,
supplementary and chiefly ornamental. That many, per
haps most of the gentlemen practising diplomacy, attach
more importance to these extraneous matters than to the
essential ones, is nothing to the purpose ; indeed it exhibits
their capacities in an unfavourable light, as do the opinions
and actions of certain philologists, who make a great fuss
about trifles. It may be assumed that such people know
but little about the science they profess, or lack vigour for
its furtherance.

IV.] Ecclesiastical Diplomatists. 219
Questions of outward show, etiquette and ceremonial
cannot but be invested with a certain importance, Court
circles being what they actually are; and an exact know
ledge (acquired by careful study) of the rules and precedents
obtaining in those spheres is indispensable to persons
called upon to move and act therein. But the first duty
and most exalted object of the occupant of a diplomatic
post is, and always must be, to obtain the advantage for his
employer in all political transactions. His mission is
closely akin to that of the soldier of high rank, and to that
confided to ecclesiastics by the Roman Catholic Church, in
its capacity of a political entity and temporal power.
This relationship has led to the circumstance that the
ranks of diplomacy have been largely recruited, at times, by
generals and prelates. In the Middle Ages the latter were
considered to be specially qualified for conducting. political
negotiations ; not alone because they were in those days
almost exclusively possessed of the requisite education, but
because the Church, as a combative force, ever striving to
obtain greater influence and the extension of its rule — a
power to which the use of the sword was not becoming or
(in cases where Fopes surmounted their scruples in that
regard) was not practicable on account of extraneous
reasons — had cultivated to a very high degree in its dignitaries
and, be it observed, not invariably to the detriment of man
kind, the art of attaining its ends by working upon human
passions and appealing to special interests by persuasion
and cunning manoeuvres of other descriptions, by wily
artifices and ingenious deceptions. Even nowadays the
Cardinals, Nuncios and Legates of Rome enjoy the reputa
tion of being uncommonly astute diplomatists, in the
practice of which profession it should be remembered that
they have the advantage of the Church's experience for at

220 Military Diplomatists. [Chap.
least a thousand years past, embodied in transmitted recipes
and maxims of approved value.
Hence it was by no means surprising that temporal
sovereigns in later times, and even down to the present
century, employed politicians belonging to the ecclesiastical
caste to serve their ends, not infrequently with excellent
results, seeing that the very able persons in question as a
rule served a King just as well as, in another official position,
they would have served the Pope. The names of Richelieu
and Mazarin will suggest themselves to the reader, as well
as that of Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun, who was the
model of a skilled diplomatist of the prae-Bismarckian era ;
and passing reference may also be made to the position in
which, some years ago, the Prussian Government had
intended to place Cardinal Hohenlohe.
The affinity of superior military officers with the diplo
matic world is too obvious to need demonstration at any
length. We talk about diplomatic tactics, strategy and
campaigns. In our own days we have seen French generals
functioning as ambassadors at foreign Courts, Pelissier in
London, Fleury and Chanzy in St. Petersburg, nor has
it been unusual to entrust Prussian and German officers of
high rank with diplomatic missions ; I may mention as
examples Lieutenant General von Mueffling, sent to Con
stantinople in 1829 to mediate in the arrangement of a
peace between Russia and the Porte ; Generals von
Manteuffel, von Rochow (Bismarck's predecessor as Prussia's
representative at the Federal Assembly), von Schweinitz
(first in Vienna, then in St. Petersburg) von Roeder (until
lately in Berne), and von Fabrice, who brought about the
intercourse that took place between Thiers and the
Versailles diplomatists during the "period of transition."
Moreover the circumstance that Bismarck (although only in

IV.] Female Diplomatists. 221
a titular sense) holds rank in the army, and calls attention
to that fact by almost invariably wearing uniform, may be
held to point to the intimate connection between military
and diplomatic duties.
Besides priests, soldiers and professional diplomatists, the
policy of monarchs has availed itself of other intelligent
persons, whose services must not be undervalued because
rendered by agents not occupying any official position; I
refer to ladies and Jews. The influence exercised by Frau
von Cruedener, the Princess Lieven and the Duchess of
Dino, is well known ; in the same category, at more recent
dates, may be classed the Queen and Princess of Prussia
during the Crimean War (see Lady Bloomfield's ' Remi
niscences of Court and Diplomatic Life,' vol. ii. pp. 34, 51),
the Archduchess Sophia, the late Queen of Holland, the late
Grand Duchess Helene and the Empress Eugenie. More
over, petticoat politicians have very frequently played a part
at Court, in Ministries and in diplomatic salons, sometimes
with salutary results, but more frequently with disastrous
ones — for the most part actuated by sentiment, and seldom,
indeed, by sensible reflection — always, however, so manifest
in their agency that, in all peculiarly complicated and per
plexing cases, we are driven to the enquiry, " Oh est la
femme ? " I only state facts, without enquiring into the
causes of these phenomena, as to do so would be to diverge
too widely from my subject, and would, moreover, necessitate
the exposure of circumstances and relations of an extremely
delicate nature. Suffice it to remark, that the influence
possessed by an Envoy at the Court to which he is accredited,
and the services he is enabled to render there to his Sovereign,
are not his own doing in every case. Were the Orders with
which he is decorated bestowed in reward of real merit, they
would now and then adorn the breast of his better half or

222 Hebrew Diplomatists. [Chap.
of one of his female friends amongst the ladies of the Court.
Niebuhr in his " Lebensnachrichten " observes : " It is a
good thing to be Ambassador at the Papal Court, for there,
at least, there are no maids of honour."
On the other hand, the wily, industrious and persevering
Children of Israel — citizens of the world as they are — have
frequently been employed upon diplomatic business as spies,
go-betweens and messengers ; to wit, Ephraim, the confi
dant of Haugwitz and agent of the Prussian Cabinet in 1805,
who kept up communications between Prussia and foreign
Cabinets, always working, however, in the interest of France.
Still oftener diplomacy has utilised them to influence public
opinion by means of the press. Sometimes they have become
more than mere subordinate agents, their advice and quiet
activity having been found of the highest efficiency in trans
actions of importance. But — except under the Third French
Republic, in which Jews, baptized and unbaptized, have
played an extraordinarily important part — they had only
risen to the position of ambassador or, in one case, to that
of Minister of Foreign Affairs when either they or their fathers
before them had renounced the faith of their race, as in the
cases of Disraeli- Beaconsfield, of the diplomatist Hamburger,
who accompanied Gortchakoff to the meeting of the three
Emperors at Berlin in 1872, and another of the Czar's
diplomatic officials, who was once a contractor, notorious
for the cleverness of his dealings in that line of business, and
whom the Czar subsequently employed to represent Mus
covite interests at one of the Western Courts.
A considerable number of capacities, seldom collectively
possessed by an individual, is essential to the efficient occu
pancy of an important diplomatic post. The chief re
quirements are, first of all, political intelligence ; secondly,
a practical turn of mind.; then, a thorough historical and geo-

IV.] Diplomatic Qualifications. 223
graphical education, familiarity with the traditions of the
Court to which one is accredited, freedom from prejudice,
knowledge of human nature, sang-froid, a sharp eye and a
quick ear for the development of affairs and for the differ
ences between seeming and reality, the essential and the un
important ; still further, tact, refinement of feeling, discretion,
and the gift of displaying firmness and resolution with the
greatest amiability of manner ; finally — and this is especially
requisite when a genius happens to be at the head of the
Foreign Office at home — an intellect capable of subordin
ating and adapting its own views, wishes and convictions to
the ideas and instructions of the leading spirit, above alluded
to. High birth is also a qualification ; and it is of consider
able advantage to employ members of princely families in
the diplomatic service, on condition, of course, that these
exalted personages are willing to observe discipline and
submit under all circumstances to the will of their chief, the
Minister. Whatever may be said to the contrary, the
education and training enjoyed by the well-to-do nobility
during youth fits them much better for those Court circles in
which an Envoy has to live and take action than does the
system upon which common hobbledehoys are brought up ;
and an ambassdor belonging to the most insignificant of
Reigning Houses will be regarded even by the Russian Czar
as to some extent his equal, will associate with him more
intimately, and experience greater facility in gaining him
over to the views he (the ambassador) is instructed to advo
cate, than a less august personage could possibly do. It may
be imagined, for instance, what the influence of a real live
Serene Highness would be who should represent a great
State at the court of parvenu sovereigns like Napoleon and
Eugenie. On the whole the persons least suitable for
employment in the diplomatic service are scientific men,

224 Herr von Bunsen. [Chap.
whose participation in practical politics, indeed, is in every
way undesirable, inasmuch as they are almost invariably
doctrinaires, and consequently liable to fall into gross errors
leading to serious misunderstandings. Josias von Bunsen
was a striking example of this assertion's correctness.
His ideal — a firm Anglo-Prussian alliance — was a fact
none the less absurd because Vincke and his following took
it up enthusiastically ; his notion that the restoration of
Poland would be not only feasible but useful, was a most
dangerous illusion.* Furthermore, an Envoy must keep his
private affairs in good order, make no debts, be dependent
upon no requirements compelling him to say to himself,
" As I can't take five from four, 1 must carry one over," and
experience no inclination to speculate on 'Change, or in land,
grain, &c. ; because in any of those cases he would run the
risk of being compelled to " oblige " Jewish financiers at the
expense of his country's interests or honour. Finally it is
desirable, for obvious reasons, that his wife should not
belong to any foreign nationality.
These exceptional qualifications, some twenty years ago,
appeared more abundant amongst the nobles of Latin and
* That he was not particular about telling the truth may be de
monstrated by the following anecdote, derived from a supremely
trustworthy source. During the Crimean War, he reported from
London to Berlin, that the English would ensure the possession of
Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, if the latter would take part in the
hostilities against Russia ; whilst at the same time, he told the Ministers
in London that Prussia would march against the Russians if the Elbe
Duchies should be guaranteed to her. Both these assurances were
absolutely unfounded ; when the whole affair came out, he was urged
to send in his resignation. His conduct was being discussed one day
at the King's, and His Majesty remarked : " For twenty years past we
have regarded him as a friend, and yet see what he has done now ! "
Old General von Rauch rejoined : " He has lied to and betrayed Your
Majesty for twenty years past 1"

IV. Noble Diplomatists. 225
Slavonic origin than amongst the illustrious families of Ger
many. Since then Bismarck made his appearance on the
scene, after having unobtrusively given abundant proofs of
his capacity as Envoy to the Federal Diet and as the adviser
of Manteuffel and Frederick William IV. At the Assembly of
Sovereigns in Frankfort and during the Schleswig-Holstein
business, the Austrian Kaunitz-policy was defeated by him ;
Benedetti and Gramont, in his hands, became the laughing-
stocks of Europe ; even Gortschakoff had to strike his top
sails to Bismarck's superior intelligence. But, after all, he
only constituted a remarkable exception to the general rule.
To many an one who has had opportunities to look over their
cards our other diplomatists' deficiencies cannot but be
plainly manifest ; these gentlemen, appraised by comparison
with the ideal of an Ambassador and Foreign Minister, will
inevitably appear even more insignificant than those of a still
earlier date. However, in common fairness towards them,
we must not omit to observe that, before 1866 and even up
to 187 1 the demand upon our nobility to supply the State
with diplomatists and courtiers, as we]l as with officers, was
much heavier than in any other European realm. The con
tingent required during the epoch of " Plurality of States "
was so numerous that picking and choosing were out of the
question. It was felt by many to be a disastrous state of
things, but one that could not be avoided. For, as a matter
of fact, it appertained traditionally to the dignity of petty
Sovereigns that they should own a couple of Envoys or
Charge's d' Affaires, or at least a share in them ; and on the
other hand the distinguished and influential families which had
theretofore been accustomed to see their scions occupying
posts of that description, were, as might have been expected,
strenuously opposed to any reduction of their number ; and,
in great measure actuated by similar feelings, the great noble
vdL. 1. Q

226 Bismarck's Reforms. [Chap.
families in other European countries fought against the unity
of Germany, because it would entail a considerable simpli
fication of the Fatherland's diplomatic machinery. What a
number of comfortable sinecures would be swept away by
such an achievement ! Whither, if the attache'-appointments
at the kindly, pleasant German duodecimo-Courts should be
abolished, should they send- their young people in order to
put them in the way of acquiring the elementary routine
i equisite to prepare them for the real diplomatic work await
ing them in their riper years at the first-class Courts. There
was, indeed, from this point of view, a great deal to be said
against the project of a German Federal State (alone to be
represented abroad), which shortsighted people, claiming to
be patriots, paid little or no attention to, but which weighed,
nevertheless, very heavily in the balance.
The Bismarckian Reformation made an end of this idyllic
state of affairs — that is, to a certain extent. Since the North-
German Confederation was founded we have kept up fewer
Legations and Missions than theretofore, and fewer still
since the creation of the German Empire ; but, if we take
into consideration the wishes of many amongst us, and the
capacity of our nobility to furnish us with meritorious
diplomatists, too many posts of that description are still in
existence. Moreover, not a few of our young noblemen,
after spending a couple of years in one of the Universities
" to study," pass into the school of diplomacy, instead of
beforehand acquiring practical knowledge and learning how
to work for a certain time as referendaries, farmers or any
thing else connected with real life outside the Court-sphere.
And yet all this is the more necessary that of late years
diplomatic posts have gained in importance ; not, of course
the purely ornamental ones which the smaller Courts
contrived to save from the flood. These, however, are of no

IV.] The French Language. 227
account. The Chancellor remarked to us at Rheims : " A
good many people worry themselves most unnecessarily
about the danger of keeping on representatives of the petty
States side by side with those of the Confederation. Even
were those States powerful they could keep up corres
pondence with foreign Courts without the aid of official
representatives, and intrigue byword of mouth against what
ever we may undertake. A tooth-drawer or some other
person of that class could manage it for them."
" If my aunt had wheels she would be an omnibus," says
the proverb. Bismarck, I may add, is of opinion that in these
matters it is well to look between one's fingers. Whilst we
were at Versailles Minister Delbrueck observed in the course
of an after-dinner chat, that during the negotiations respecting
Germany's reorganisation, Bavaria had put forward a claim
to a sort of co-representation of the new German Federal
State or Empire abroad (this was in the autumn of 1870) to
be arranged in such manner that the Bavarian Envoy should
carry on the business of the Embassy whenever the German
Ambassador should be absent. To this the Chancellor
replied : " No, no ; anything else — but that will really not do,
fpr the question at stake is not the Envoy but the instruc
tions he receives — and in that case we should be obliged to
have two Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Germany."
Amongst the young gentlemen who become attached to a
Legation or enter the Foreign Office immediately upon quit
ting the University, or soon after they have performed their
one year's service in the army, those who have been accus
tomed to speak French from their childhood upwards occupy
an exceptionally fortunate position. Unless a sucking
diplomatist possessed of this advantage should be absolutely-
devoid of every other capacity, it would be Uttle short of a
miracle did he not get on to a certain extent in time and at
Q 2

228 Diplomatic Training. [Chap.
the very least become chief of some small, unexacting and
unimportant Legation, to which, however the title of "Excel
lency " is appended and possibly the handsome Star, or even
Grand Cross Of an Order of Knighthood. The French
language is employed in verbal as well as epistolary inter
course with the majority of foreign countries as far as
official communications are concerned, and is also the one
indispensable vehicle of "Tart de causer" — i.e. the art of
talking agreeably without saying anything in particular. In
the examinations for the diplomatic career especial stress
is laid upon the French " style " in which the exercises set to
future Talleyrands or Bismarcks are to be couched. Less
importance is attached to the competitor's German, which,
until very lately, would appear to have been regarded as of
scarcely any moment whatsoever. Indeed, ambassadorial
reports have passed through my hands, the writers of which
manifestly lived upon very distant terms with ordinary
grammar, not to mention anything at all approaching a
logical sequence of ideas.
These short-comings, however, are mere superficialities ;
too often it is the matter enveloped in such unprepossessing
garments of diction that causes the reader of these produc
tions to shake his head and mutter with a mournful smile :
" What am I to do with this ? " Reports of the class alluded
to are amongst the consequences of the peculiar school
through which the Envoy has passed. Employed as a
galopin in the Foreign Office, or attached to some Legation
abroad, the apprentice to the diplomatic craft soon becomes
acquainted with the two lines of business — personal and
professional, the drawing-room and the office — in which he has
to employ and improve himself; and then, as a rule, it be
comes apparent that we human beings are but a feeble folk,
lacking in the force of character we ought to possess in the

VI.] Diplomatic Training, 229
presence of God, of important actualities and great truths.
Every old diplomatist was once a young one and remembers
which he liked the better when he commenced his career —
the examinations he had left behind him or the world that
was all before him. At that time of life it is necessary — and
gladly recognised to be so — to bestow all possible care and
attention upon producing favourable impressions with regard
to mere externals. A young diplomatist is asked to Court,
frequents illustrious and wealthy families — especially those
of financial magnates, who bask in the rays emanating from
the peerage — dines, sups, dances, plays at cards, haunts the
Jockey Club and other institutions of that class. All this he
does, not merely for his own pleasure, but, indeed, chiefly in
fulfilment of his duty, for every item of it is " de la plus
stricte necessity." He must look about him, make himself
favourably known to the elite of society, study the personnel
and state of affairs at Court, and above all make sure of not
being kept in the back-ground, but rather of being prized,
sought after and distinguished. This is the novice's first task,
and how can he possibly perform it otherwise than by
assiduously and conscientiously utilising the institutions and
opportunities specially to hand for that purpose ? So far
there is nothing to be said against existing arrangements.
But their natural consequence is that the majority of young
gentlemen adopting the career of diplomacy devote their
attention to the attractive side of their profession in prefer-
once to the other, and that the view and method of life
thereby imparted to them reacts upon their judgment and
actions when they are called upon to transact real business.
They accustom themselves in social intercourse (chiefly
with their acquaintances in the Corps Diplomatique) to make
use of empty and purely conventional phrases ; they learn to
take delight in witty but frivolous prattle, in tittle-tattle,

230 Diplomatic Training. [Chap.
highly spiced anecdotes, humorous slander and backbiting ;
in making themselves extremely agreeable to their present
enemies whilst making ill-natured remarks about their absent
friends ; in weaving intrigues, pumping and cross-questioning
their acquaintances about the merest trifles, and only
speaking the truth with modifications. Consequently, they
at length come to mistake semblance for reality, and to
attach greater moment to accessories than to essentials; by
degrees this habit of mind becomes so absolutely their
second nature that thenceforth, often throughout life, it
inspires their treatment of the affairs confided to them
and dictates the reports they address to their official
superiors. This is the sort of training that has been undergone by
nearly all our older diplomatists and still obtains amongst
their successors, with few exceptions. In order to ap
preciate its results, let us picture to ourselves the typical
Envoy provided by this system. Suppose him called upon,
for instance, to induce the Government to which he is
accredited to act in unison with his own Government in
some matter concerning a third power. The transaction
having been formally opened by means of a despatch or
verbal instructions, the diplomatist in question commences
action in the manner he has been taught to regard as the
only correct and efficacious one, namely, by intriguing and
endeavouring to get to the blind side of people, to deceive
them by misrepresentations and to lure them with illusory
temptations. In connection with this modus operandi an
accomplished chef de cuisine and a cellar full of choice wines
may prove eminently serviceable, although the days are
past in which ambassadors or envoys endowed with an
exceptional capacity for withstanding the effects of alcohol
were wont to carouse with less thoroughly seasoned dip-

IV.] Diplomatic Cookery. 231
lomatic agents, until the latter made concessions that were
contrary to their instructions.
Formerly it was by no means uncommon for diplomatists
themselves to invent dainties for the dinner-table, sauces,
puddings and made dishes, as, for instance, Nesselrode
pudding, pouding glace a la Metternich, pain dabricots a la
Richelieu, quenelles de volaille a la Talleyrand, saumon a la
Richelieu, filet de bosuf a la Westmoreland. A young
diplomatist, who had recognised the importance of the
cooking-art in his profession, carefully collected the menus
of the dinners and suppers given by the chief of his
Legation, had them handsomely bound and kept them in his
library, presumably in order to study worldly wisdom in
them from time to time, or to become thoroughly versed in
the leading chapter of the art of managing men : —
" Tout s'arrange en dinant dans le siecle oil nous sommes,
Et c'estpar les diners qu'on gouverne les hommes."
I do not share the opinion expressed in these verses of
Boileau, or believe that the attache' alluded to stored up a
particularly precious treasure of recipes for governing
mankind in his book of menus. In other words, I am
convinced that the great questions usually dealt with by
leading personages have never been settled in this way —
nor are they nowadays. Nevertheless, it is the plan of
action generally adopted by subordinate diplomatists.
Justice, the public good, the interests of the commonwealth,
&c, are alluded to, and advocated in their written com
munications ; but in their personal conversation upon the
question at issue these phrases seldom occur. Anybody
using them " in society," would be ridiculed as a person of
feeble intellect. They are only tolerated in the drawing-
room when it is deemed necessary to humbug some amiable
theorist who believes in " that sort of thing," and to whose

232 Diplomatic Triviality. [Chap.
prejudices circumstances render it expedient to defer for
the time being. The object is to encourage one's sup
porters and increase their number, as well as to gain over
or paralyse One's opponents ; and it is upon this field of
action that kitchen and cellar frequently play a remunera
tive part, combined with the gift of persuasion, employed
in opening up prospects of personal advintage, of decora
tion conferments, advancement of relatives, &c, or in
dropping ominous hints calculated to produce a terrorising
effect upon the person under treatment. The real matter
at stake is for the most part lost sight of, and the diplo
matist's whole attention is bestowed upon individuals, whom
he deems it his business to attract, utilise or damage, as
the case may be. Intriguing, which should be a secondary
consideration, thus becomes his primary object.
It was, and to a great extent still is, in this fact that lay
the most calamitous shortcoming in the training of our
young diplomatists, as well as the explanation of the cir
cumstance that many of the older ones (who had passed
through the school above described and lived exclusively in
the atmosphere of Courts, and the social circles immediately
connected therewith) have proved unequal to the manage
ment of serious and important transactions. Dazzled by
the glitter of mere accessories they have lost the power of
perceiving essentials, or at least weakened it ; by persis
tently laying traps for others they often incur the risk of
being trapped themselves ; they come, at last, to believe
that the only things worth trying for are those which they
fancy other people are anxious to obtain. They write
reports about all sorts of rubbish, in which nobody but
Court lackeys of the highest or lowest rank can take the
least interest, as : — " The pain in Her Royal Highness the
Princess So-and-so's leg" (a limb of no political moment

IV.] Diplomatic Gullibility. 233
whatsoever) "appears to have got worse," with an ela
borate explanation of the reasons for entertaining this
opinion; or, " Despatch, No. 101." "The health of His
Majesty" (needless to observe, a " Majesty " with whom we
are in no way concerned) " is improving ; " " Despatch, No.
102" (written the following day, obviously with breathless
eagerness). "His Majesty slept well last night;" " Des
patch, No. 103." '-His Majesty is getting better." When
they are on a journey they send their Minister long detailed
accounts of every reception accorded to them — say at
Pesth, Rustchuk and Varna, or by the Grand Vizier or
Sultan. Their judgment of circumstances and persons is
dependent upon the more or less courteous attention shown
to them personally, so that they are mere weathercocks,
pointing one way to-day, and another to-morrow, but very
seldom in the right direction. Utterly inexperienced in all
conditions and relations of men and things existing outside
Courts, and "high life," or, at the best, but superficially
acquainted therewith, they allow themselves to be stuffed
with the most ludicrous falsehoods, misstatements and
exaggerations, which they then incorporate (sometimes in
an absurdly high-flown style) in their communications to the
Home Government. To quote one example of many, I
have had before me certain reports written by a foreign
Envoy, in which were contained statements about the
Democrats and Socialists in Saxony and Bohemia of an
absolutely inconceivable impertinence and senselessness,
all of which His Excellency had taken for granted, and
transmitted to his Chancellor with the object, doubtless, of
adding to the latter's store of useful information. I am sorry
to be obliged to add that I have only too good reason to
believe that sins of this description are freely committed in
our own diplomatic service ; but then I have the comfort

234 Orders of Chivalry. [CiiAr.
of knowing that he to whom drivelling nonsense of the
kind above alluded to is submitted is perfectly aware of its
utter worthlessness.
An exact acquaintance with the firmament of Stars
(Orders of Knighthood) which hangs above Europe is
quite indispensable to a diplomatist, and cases have oc
curred in which all the talents and energies of a gentleman
in that line of business have been exclusively devoted to the
obtention of some particular decoration. With many
persons this yearning for Orders becomes a veritable passion,
quite as insusceptible of complete gratification as any one
of the three longings described as insatiable in a somewhat
equivocal Bible-text. If at any time the European Cabinets
manifest but little desire to, attain the solution of some
burning question by means of a Congress, their disinclina
tion in that direction must not be ascribed to the agency of
their diplomatists. On the contrary, whosoever of these
latter has the least chance of being sent to a gathering of
that class will, as a rule, do everything in his power to
ensure the realisation of that prospect, because an unusually
heavy shower of stars is sure to take place upon an occasion
of this kind — to the adornment of his dress coat in due
proportion to his official rank or to the class of such Orders
as he may already be possessed of. Perhaps even, it may
let fall upon his manly breast the broad Riband of some
exalted decoration !
Another variety of ambition has been developed of late
years amongst diplomatists. They are apt to assume airs
of undervaluing the press, which they accuse of doing
a great deal of harm and of being comparatively useless.
Strange to say, however, these gentlemen are practical
negations of their own assertions respecting journalistic
injuriousness and inutility whenever they happen to be

iv.] Diplomacy and the Press. 235
personally concerned in press utterances ; for they take the
utmost pains to make sure that this very same press shall
bring to light their services from time to time — aye', even
the smallest of their doings, scarcely perceptible by the aid
of the microscope, as well as those which have no existence
whatsoever, and recommend them to the attention of the
general public, to the end that this latter may recognise what
treasures King and Fatherland possess in these invaluable
diplomatists, and how deeply their fellow countrymen are
indebted to them. I could extract from my collections
of memoranda a goodly number of examples of ingenious
manoeuvres carried on between Envoys athirst for fame, and
newspaper editors or correspondents alacritously ready to
render services of this kind to their Excellencies, did the
space at my disposal permit me to point such anecdotes and
were it the object of this work to expose the faults and
follies of individuals, instead of to point out the necessity of
reforming existing conditions ; to which end the first thing
needful is that the office should take precedence of the
drawing-room in the estimation of professional diplomatists.
To the best of my knowledge Prince Bismarck, with his
intellectual earnestness, contempt for appearances and
trivialities, frankness and untiring industry, has served as a
pattern to but few diplomatists. These few, however, quiet
ly and unobtrusively share the burden of his labours. Like
him they only recognise one duty — that of serving the State
— and do not keep their eyes fixed upon their own personal
advantage, upon Court approbation and grace, or upon
journalistic praise. They do not seek to curry favour with
their chief, to establish relations likely to lead to their
advancement, or to gain external distinctions. Their work
ing capacities are utilised ; but they work in common with
others, not intent upon rendering themselves conspicuous.

236 Unobtrusive Diplomatists. [Chap.
They are, as a rule, alike unfit for " representation " and
intriguing ; they usually lack private means as well as
handles to their names ; their conscience alone sustains and
rewards them. It is towards these persons — teachable and
serviceable forces ; the working-bees in a hive well-stocked
with drones ; officials of high character and devoid of frivolity
— that Ambassadors and Chiefs of Missions should direct
more of their attention. Many grave difficulties, however,
stand in their way, and to them, indeed, the proverb may be
aptly applied, " Blessed are they who expect nothing, for
they shall not be disappointed." The author would in no
way be surprised were some young, or even old drawing-room
diplomatist, taking up this book by accident, to exclaim,
"Who the deuce has put together all this stuff? Doubtless
the Councillor of Legation N. N. ; that packhorse ;" I will
answer him beforehand : "Not so, your Excellency; not by
any manner of means. What is here written is the result of
personal study at the best possible sources, of personal
observation and personal experience; and you would do
better, instead of putting yourself in a passion, to be thank
ful that my sketches are not portraits recognisable by the
general public. Only think ; your own counterfeit present
ment might be amongst them !"
Formerly, life in Ministries of Foreign Affairs was tolerably
pleasant and easy-going, that is, during the ordinary course of
affairs, seldom interrupted for any length of time. It has
however been far otherwise since the commencement of the
Bismarckian era. A new spirit animates the world ; much
business of universal interest is transacted in Germany, and
a great deal of work has to be done. Still there are certain
people occupying exalted positions who know how to make
themselves comfortable by transferring their burdens to the
shoulders of others. By this means they contrive to find

IV. The Good Old Times. 237
plenty of time for the drawing-room and club, for their
favourite amusements, such as a cosy little bout of gambling,
&c, for private business and other occupations. An hour
per diem, or at most two, in the office suffices them to get
through the " troublesome business " that must be done,
and this sacrifice of course fully entitles its victim to spend
at least three months of the year in recovering from such
killing exertions at some delightful country-seat or en voyage.
Honi soil qui mat y pense 1
In times past, when things went more easily than now, a
Legation exacted even less labour from the diplomatist and
afforded him more leisure for amusement than the Foreign
Office itself. Such a post was comfort itself — a sort of idyll,
especially at the smaller Courts. Secretaries and attache's
of such Legations received, it is true, a more or less liberal
salary : but then they did next to nothing for it. A
youthful Baron or Count was then wont — during the hour
or so daily that he could not avoid deducting from the other
portion of his professional incumbencies — to sit at his ease
in front of his writing-table in the chancellerie, with a Manual,
Martin's Guide Diplomatique, and the indispensable
Almanach de Gotha before him on the desk, but in a half-
open drawer a thrilling new novel, in the enjoyment of which
he was only disturbed from time to time by his chief passing
through the room. -Shooting parties, visits of "artist"
friends and such-like, musical matinees, theatrical rehearsals
and other agreeable engagements left him but little superfluous
leisure in which to discharge his official duties. Now and
then there might be something to do ; but he soon disposed
of that. If he ever had a busy time, it was only on post-
day. Nowadays those quiet hours, consecrated to the secret
improvement of one's mind by aid of French novels, have
either been done away with altogetheror painfully abbreviated.

238 Diplomatic Duties. [Chap.
Railroads and the baneful telegraph-wire have dealt hardly
with them. The former bring along so many subjects of the
State which it is the attache's duty (as well as that of his
chief) to represent, that he can hardly grapple with them, and
is compelled to waste at least two hours a day in attending to
them; for, strange to say, these people get it into their
heads that the Legation exists for the purpose of being useful
to them, and every one of them has some affair or other on
hand, in which he expects " his Minister " to back him up
with word and deed. A good many, moreover, occupy a
position in the State or in society which renders it obligatory
upon the diplomatist to accord specially attentive consider
ation to their business, whatever it may be, although he has
nothing to hope from them in the way of a quid pro quo — such
people, for instance, as Members of the Diet or Parliament.
In a word, he is overwhelmed with work. In the good old
days a Legation's register of " important affairs " was a sort
of princely and aristocratic supplement to the ordinary
registration-lists concerning the common herd, and contained
little more than official notifications of births, deaths and
marriages in Royal, Ducal and other illustrious families.
At present there is scarcely a department of State business
with respect to which reports have not to be made by diplo
matic agents abroad. Railways, schools, manufactures,
tobacco, farmers' prospects, the prices of timber, the labour-
market, the attitude of the Catholic priesthood — the much-to-
be-pitied Legation is expected to understand all these things.
It ought, indeed, to be omniscient, but is only too well aware
how very Uttle it really knows. From time to time these
demands upon its intelligence result in occurrences of the de
scription recorded in the following delicious story, which I
took down in my note-book some years ago, and now reproduce
textually, only omitting the names of those who figured in it.

IV.] An Anecdote. 239
" Early this morning,  came to see me and read aloud
to me a passage from a letter in which the Secretary of
Legation, Count  (whose tutor he had formerly been)
informed him that his chief, Excellency  had instructed
him to prepare, within a term of two months, a report upon
the finances of  , and more particularly upon the
Tobacco-Monopoly. Of these matters he had not the
faintest notion. Could  not manage to scribble some
thing of the sort for him ? That is to say : — the Ambassa
dor in St  wishes to send our chief a report, pre
sumably of his own framing and composition. For this
report he gives an order to an ignorant young attache, who
in his turn implores a subordinate official of the Home
Ministry to help him out of his difficulty by supplying
him with the required information, which is then to be sent
back (as emanating from the Ambassador) to the locality
in which it was originally manufactured, and where, by
simply reading the newspapers a month ago, all the infor
mation could have been obtained which may possibly be
transmitted thither some ten weeks hence by carrying out
the plan above suggested."
Returning to generalities, and taking the opportunity to
observe that, in addition to the actual burdens of business
inflicted, as above described upon the suffering Legations,
telegrams reach them daily (whenever anything out of the
way is on the tapis) which must be answered without delay,
we may well sympathize with the diplomatists in question
when they murmur. "Nothing but trouble and worry
nowadays ! " Without looking more deeply into the matter
our readers will perceive that the personnel of diplomacy
now constitutes one of those classes of human beings which
is bound to learn and work more than it used to, in order to
get on in the world and supply useful members to society.

240 The Foreign Minister. [Chaf.
It follows, as a matter of course, that in the selection of
persons for that career more importance should be attached
now than heretofore, to capacity, knowledge and industry,
than to birth and family connections.
No matter how well informed, intelligent and industrious
may be the personnel of the Diplomatic Service, it can only
do its work properly if its chief be thoroughly competent to
direct its labours. It is his province to furnish the diplo
matic agents with their instructions ; and nothing is more
essential to the importance of missions representing a
Sovereign at foreign Courts and Cabinets than that the
persons composing such Missions should at all times be
accurately acquainted with the views and objects of their
own Government and should be supplied with clear
instructions as to how they are to conduct themselves in
relation to questions actually on hand. But, in order to be
able to direct its representatives abroad how they shall
speak or act in this or that circumstance, a Government
must itself know what it wants and how to get it, and
must, moreover, entertain an intelligible, unambiguous,
resolute policy. Although this was not the case with us
formerly — especially during the so-called " New Era '' of
Prussia's political existence, and although at that time
Berlin's foreign policy was characterised by poverty of ideas,
indecision and vacillation, nobody can complain of these
shortcomings at present. For more than two decades past
we have had all that we have required in Germany, as far as
foreign policy has been concerned. On the other hand,
another blemish has made itself manifest more than once
since Bismarck's accession to office, and precisely in
Embassies of importance — namely, the insubordination of
certain Diplomatic Agents, who fancied themselves cleverer
than their Minister, and attempted to take action in accor-

IV.] Insubordinate Diplomatists. 241
dance with that notion. This sentence naturally suggests
to its readers the name of Count Harry Arnim ; but
one of that ambassador's predecessors in the Paris post,
Von der Goltz; had (as will be seen) also indulged in dis
obedience to his chief, although not to so great an extent
as his immediate successor. The behaviour of these two
gentlemen reminds one of circumstances that obtained
during the reigns of Frederick William III. and Frederick
William IV., greatly to the injury of the country, and were
at that time regarded as perfectly natural by a great many
diplomatists. Upon this subject I was instructed to write
as follows in the Hanover Courier (May, 1874) when the
conflict between Bismarck and Arnim was raging, and
several journals were taking the latter's part : —
" Although it is a popular error that the title ' Minister
Plenipotentiary,' borne by our ambassadors, places them
upon a footing equal to that occupied by Ministers of
State, the fact is indisputable that Prussian envoys have
not unfrequently treated their chief as though they had
been his colleagues, and carried on disputes with him such
as might have occurred between two Councillors of a
Government Board, or two judges on the bench. In fact,
Prussian diplomacy was formerly notorious for its lack of
discipline. Amongst examples on record ¦ is that of an
Envoy who quitted his post without leave of absence and
travelled home to Berlin in order to obtain a hearing for
his views at Court and to vindicate them in the news
papers. It was not a domineering spirit that prompted the
Chancellor to shelve a number of ' Excellencies ' of the old
school, but the conviction that, although that sort of conduct
might have been tolerated at a time when Prussia was the
fifth wheel of the European political coach, it was totally
incompatible with the carrying out of the programme which
vol. 1. R

242 Count Harry Arnim. [Chap.
Herr von Bismarck brought into office with him in 1862,
and which he has fulfilled in such a manner that his name
is upon every tongue, whilst those of the recalcitrant
' Excellencies ' are only to be found in the pages of some
old encyclopaedia. Even Herr von Blankenburg, a military
author belonging to a Pomeranian family connected with
Count Arnim on the mother's side, alludes in the Schlesische
Zeitung to Bismarck's ' un-colleague-like behaviour.' Now,
ambassadors are not the Minister's colleagues, but his
agents. They have abundant opportunities of setting forth
their views in official reports ; but when once a decision has
been arrived at, all they have to do is to carry out their
instructions with a good grace. In a Council differences
are readily settled by putting questions to the vote. But
differences between a Minister and his subordinate who fails
to carry out his orders can scarcely be arranged otherwise
than by the retirement of one or the other, that is, in a
properly governed State. This is what has happened in
the case of Count Arnim ; and it is to be deplored, in
the interest of the State service, that it did not happen
sooner." Count Arnim was compelled to resign his post : he was
subsequently arraigned in a Court of Justice and found
guilty, a verdict which had been anticipated by public
opinion all but unanimously; and he would have been
speedily forgotten but for his audacity in reminding the
world of his existence by publishing the notorious pamphlet
" Pro Nihilo." His friends amongst the shelved diplomatists
ascribed that action on his part to " the courage of unap
preciated and persecuted innocence." Others, probably in
greater number, recognised in it the outcome of the ex-
Ambassador's three leading characteristics, — extraordinary
assurance, vanity, and ndiveti. It was this last which en-

iv.J Count Harry Arnim. 243
abled him to credit the public with the capacity for believing
that some anonymous worshipper of truth and justice had
taken up the cause of the wrongfully sentenced-one disinte
restedly, out of sheer compassion, and that it was not Count
Harry Arnim himself who was pleading that cause ; whereas
it could not but be unmistakably plain to any one who had
ever read the productions of his pen that he, and no other,
had written every line of the pamphlet from beginning to
end. His name alone was wanting to it ; but all the strained
humorousness and esprit, the tendency towards making use
of comparisons, quotations and superfine phrases void of
real meaning, and finally the would-be aristocratic trick
of depreciating mankind, which characterize the Arnim
style of composition, were conspicuously manifest in the
pamphlet. Though he hid his face, the rest of him was
perceptible enough throughout that compound of perver
sions, suppressions and self-laudations. In the last respect
he out-Heroded Herod ; " approved expertness," " know
ledge of business," " diplomatic tact," " collected demeanour,"
and " subtle intelligence " were by no means the largest or
shiniest laurel-leaves which Count Arnim wreathed about the
brows of Count Arnim. After he had, in the course of
his pamphlet, repeatedly expressed admiration of his own
lofty spirit, keen perception, and prophetic faculty of
appraising coming events, he concluded by remarking : —
" During his thirty years' service Count Arnim, by his con
scientious and intelligent fulfilment of duty, earned the
approbation of his Sovereign, Government and country, and
even — before his services became publicly renowned — -that
of the Chancellor himself. It has also been shewn in the
foregoing narrative that he has claims to the intellectual
origination of many political measures to which the Chan
cellor owes his great reputation ; and he has been for some
R 3

244 Count Harry Arnim. [Chap.
time past regarded as Prince Bismarck's probable successoi
in office."
Anybody capable of believing the above assertion, might
well exclaim : " Good heavens, what an enviable conscience !
what a man ! what a treasure 1 " It is a pity that Count
Arnim's " Hymn of Self-Praise " should itself undermine such
a pleasing faith, and demonstrate, clearly and irrefutably,
that which experts in his character knew only too well
all the time— namely, that the Chancellor, in his Ambas
sador to Thiers and McMahon, had to do with a conceited,
disobedient, artful intriguer, who strove to get his own way
in everything, who plotted against his chief at Court in
Berlin with confederates of his own kidney, and who put a
finishing touch of unexampled indiscretion to his unqualifi-
able conduct (in the hope of at once clearing and avenging
himself) by publishing documents which ought to have been
kept secret under any and every circumstance whatsoever.
On the other hand, it was easy to gather from the
pamphlet in question, despite all its misrepresentations of
facts with respect to the Chancellor, that Prince Bismarck
objected to Count Arnim's conduct, would not put up with
it, and was resolved to make an end of it swiftly and sternly,
regardless of the Paris Ambassador's exalted position and
still more exalted protectors. Heartfelt gratitude is due to
him for so doing; for his courage in breaking with the
antique traditions of Prussian diplomacy, which, like
many other abuses, had obtained currency even under his
immediate predecessor at the Foreign Office ; for vigorously
and resolutely vindicating his position as solely responsible
Minister, and therewith the Constitutional principle in the
German Empire's diplomatic affairs, as against Arnim's
endeavours to import the Absolutist principle into their
management As he himself expressed it in an official

IV.] Discipline. 24 5
decree dated July 19, 1873, he "recommended to his
Majesty measures such as were necessary for the conserv
ation of unity and discipline in the Foreign Department, in
order to guarantee the interests of the Empire from prejudice
unjustified by the Constitution."
Count Arnim was pleased to describe this proceeding
as " Ministerial Despotism.'' Intelligent people speak of it
as subordination, to be unconditionally exacted and strin
gently maintained. Count Arnim turned up his illustrious
nose because the Chancellor once remarked, " My ambas
sadors must wheel about at command like non-commissioned
officers, without knowing why."' Practical thinkers — even
if they be not Privy-Councillors, will not have to reflect
long before coming to the conclusion that the above axiom
accurately indicates the relation which should, always exist
between the leading spirit of our Foreign Office and his
agents at foreign Courts. For my part— with the kind
permission of the Excellencies and Grand-Crosses referred
to by Prince Bismarck — I see no reason why they should
not have been by him described as despatch-boxes, or as
secretaries to the Chancellor. The more absolutely (sup
pressing their own volition and self-consciousness) they
regard and conduct themselves as non-commissioned officers
or secretaries — in fact the more submissively they serve— the
better will they do their work ; and should they be clever
fellows as well, capable of manoeuvring with dexterity and
tact within the sphere assigned to them by their chief —
unprejudiced and clearsighted observers, and industrious
reporters to boot, they will pretty nearly fulfil every expect
ation that can reasonably be entertained on their behalf.
I may here observe that abominations of the class
practised by Goltz* Arnim and other Prussian diplomatists
have also occurred now and then in foreign Legation^

246 Count Montgelas. [Chap.
notably within the last five years. Some of my readers will
probably remember the scandal which agitated the Austrian
Embassy at the Court of St. James's, in March, 1878, and
subsequently came to light in the columns of the press.
Arnim had been the chief of an Embassy ; but in this case it
was a mere understrapper who took upon himself to transact
politics upon his own account, and behind his chiefs back,
in a direction altogether different to that prescribed to the
latter by his instructions. Count Montgelas, a secretary of
Legation stationed in London, succeeded for some time in
convincing the British Cabinet that he — not the ambassador
Count Beust — was really Andrassy's confidential agent.
By means of his family connections and by assuming an air
of importance .he contrived (with the aid of Montague Corry,
Disraeli's confidant) to impose himself upon the English
Premier as the only true interpreter of the views entertained
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, No matter
how plainly the latter gave the London Foreign Office to
understand, in official despatches, that England must not
count upon Austria's active cooperation against Russia,
Count Montgelas managed to keep up the belief in Downing
Street that those very despatches, communicated officially to
the Foreign Secretary by the Austrian Ambassador, by no
means expressed correctly the Imperial-Royal policy, but
that there was every prospect that Austria would enter into
an offensive alliance with Great Britain for the purpose of
making war upon Russia. At length matters went so far
that Disraeli deemed it his duty to point out this contra
diction in the utterances of Austria to the Emperor Francis
Joseph's official representative, a step attended by very
unpleasant consequences. Count Montgelas' conduct was
something so unheard-of that it was thought at the time that
he had not been intriguing on his own account, but as the

IV.] Diplomacy as it should be. 247
instrument of an exalted personage. Whether or not this
conjecture was well-founded is not for me to say ; but it was
certainly remarkable that Montgelas was at first only slightly
reprimanded and subsequently allowed to retire on a full
pension; that the negotiations between Austria-Hungary
and Great Britain were broken off shortly after the exposure
of the scandal ; and finally that rumours were spread abroad
from Vienna to the effect that Andrassy's position was
imperilled and even tottering to its fall.
The moral of what has been written above respecting the
necessity of personal discipline in the diplomatic service is
as follows : — Diplomacy, in many important respects, is
akin to the army ; above all in this — that it must have but
one leader, and must function organically ; in other words,
that branch of the public service which regulates communi
cations and relations with foreign States stands more in need
than any other of tense subordination of its members to its
head, and of unanimity in their utterances. All the diplo
matists of any State are bound to carry out the ideas of their
Minister — to turn and twist themselves about, in obedience to
his will and command, like the shuttles of a weaving-machine
when the steam-engine is at work. No exception to this
rule can be made in favour of first-class talents. Hesitations,
tergiversations, " knowing better " on the part of Ambas
sadors, divisions between the different organs of the staff
abroad, paralyse a government's action, undermine its pres
tige with other Cabinets, and, at certain critical moments,
endanger its very existence.
A disorganised diplomatic service can only be injurious to
the interests of Sovereign and people, like an army whose
subordinate generals should refuse to obey its commander-in-
chief when expressly ordered by him to march in this or
that direction, to attack or to retreat A certain measure of

248 Bismarck's Diplomacy. [Chap.
personal initiative is only permissible within the limits
prescribed by the ideas pervading instructions from Head
quarters. He who fails to understand this, or who objects
to conform to it because he deems himself better informed
or cleverer than his chief, had better send in his resignation,
and strive (outside the diplomatic organism to which he has
belonged) to become chief in his turn. He will probably
find it somewhat difficult to supersede Bismarck ; and the
Emperor William, who is a soldier avant tout, will not be
easily induced to sanction any such arrangement.
What has been our Chancellor's attitude towards the
" shady side '' of the diplomatic world described in this
chapter ? We observe in him an inveterate foe of all pre
tence, verbiage and attitudinising ; a truly practical politician,
a man of facts, averse to petty stratagem and frank to an
extraordinary degree, that is, whenever he finds it possible
to be so — no one knows better than he how to conceal his
projects and opinions when reserve is necessary. We know.
him to be of an equitable disposition, inclined to look at
matters from a lofty point of view, ever advancing towards
his goal with a firm step, and inspired by genial instincts,
aware of his own value, and consequently free from am
bition. Furthermore, he is a mighty worker, utterly in
considerate of himself whenever state requirements stand in
the way of his own need of rest and recreation. Finally, he
is a humourist of a decidedly satirical turn, who never
hoards up his arrows in their quiver when he catches sight
of aught that is either funny or despicable.
These being his leading characteristics, the feelings
aroused in Prince Bismarck's breast by some of his col
leagues when he first (as plain Herr von Bismarck) became
intimately acquainted with European diplomacy, were very
naturally far from agreeable, ones, and. there. is documentary

IV.] Bismarck on Diplomatists. 249
evidence to prove that he did not deem it necessary to keep
that circumstance to himself. He also gave free vent in
words to his opinions with respect to the disfigurements of
the craft that claims him for its Grand Master; and his
damaging criticisms were not always gratifying to their
subjects — for who is there that likes to hear the truth about
himself, especially when it is told in sarcastic language ? —
but, on the other hand, gave infinite pleasure to the public at
large, more particularly to all those who love justice and
appreciate humour. I now propose to subjoin a choice
selection of utterances and anecdotes, which may serve as
specimens of his opinions with respect to the average
members of this particular class of our own officials, as well as
a few foreign and " fancy " diplomatists, and as illustrations
of the treatment he accorded to such persons. I reserve all
exclusively bumouristic anecdotes of this description for
another chapter. As will be seen, his Frankfort colleagues
accredited to the defunct Federal Diet come off very badly
at his hands.
In May, 185 1, soon after Bismarck's first appearance at
Frankfort in an official capacity, the newly appointed
Councillor of Legation wrote to his wife :
" Frankfort is hideously tiresome ; I have been quite
spoilt by the affection shewn to me, and by having plenty to
do, and am just beginning to perceive how ungrateful I have
always been to many people in Berlin. Putting yourself
and our belongings quite out of the question, the more
temperate measure of goodwill accorded to me by my
compatriots and fellow-partisans may be described as
intimate regard in comparison with my intercourse here,
which really consists in nothing but mutual distrust and
espionnage. If we only had anything to find out, or to
conceal 1 The people here, worry themselves about the

250 Bismarck on Diplomatists. [Chai'.
merest rubbish, and these diplomatists with their pompous
peddling already appear to me a good deal more ridiculous
than a Member of the Second Chamber in all the pride of
his lofty station. Unless external accidents should accrue —
and we super-sagacious Federal creatures are incapable of
either bringing them about or dealing with them — I know
exactly how much we shall effect in one, two or five years
from the present time, and will engage to do it all myself
within four-and-twenty hours, if the others will only be
truthful and sensible throughout one single day. I never
doubted that, one and all, these gentlemen prepared
their dishes d feau, but such thin, mawkish water- soup as
this, devoid of the least symptom of richness, positively
astounds me. Send me your village schoolmaster or road-
inspector, clean washed and combed ; they will make just
as good diplomatists as these. I am making tearing pro
gress in the art of saying absolutely nothing in an infinite
number of words ; I write letters, many pages long, which
read as glib and smooth as leading-articles ; and if, after
reading them, Manteuffel can tell me what they are about,
he knows a good deal more than I do. Each one of us
behaves as if he believed that his neighbour was stuffed full
of ideas and projects, if he only chose to let some of them
out ; and in reality all of us put together know no more what
is going to become of Germany than a grocer's paper-bag
knows about next summer. No one — not even the most
malignant sceptic of a Democrat — could conceive what an
amount of quackery and humbug there is in this diplomacy ! "
Anything but flattering for most of his official colleagues
in Frankfort are the sketches of their Excellencies' characters
contained in Bismarck's despatches and private letters to
Manteuffel. But few obtain favourable mention ; least of all
Messieurs von Prokesch (Austria), von Nostitz (Saxony)

IV.] Baron von Prokesch-Osten. 251
and von Reinhard (Wuertemberg), whose portraits, however,
bear the stamp of faithful reproduction.
Of Prokesch he writes — I have put together extracts from
several of his letters, so as to present the reader with a sort of
mosaic likeness of the diplomatist in question — " The calm
and readiness with which he asserts falsehoods and denies
facts surpass my most extravagant expectations in that direc
tion, and are only equalled by the altogether astounding cold
bloodedness with which he lets a subject drop, or changes
front with respect to it, as soon as the lie with which he
started has been irretrievably found out. When in a corner,
he covers a retreat of the above class by an outburst of
moral indignation, or by an extremely personal attack, by
means of which he transfers the discussion to fresh and hetero
geneous ground. His principal weapons in the petty war I am
compelled to make upon him, when the interests we respec
tively represent happen to diverge, are : 1. Passive resist
ance ; that is to say, putting off the question, by doing which
he makes me appear a troublesome and pettifogging dun ;
2. Attack ; consisting of unimportant encroachments upon
the prerogatives of the presiding Envoy, prepared in such
sort as to impart to any remonstrance on my part the char
acter of quarrelsomeness or hyper-criticism. Thus it is almost
impossible for me — as far as he is concerned — to avoid
appearing in the light of an altogether insupportable person,
unless, indeed, I were to sacrifice the interests of Prussia to
an extent that would encourage him to aggravate his pre
tensions." A few weeks later he writes : " The unpleasant
impression produced upon me by this individual has been
recently deepened by the unexpected and unmeasured
personal irritability to which Herr von Prokesch not infre
quently gives way, and with respect to which it is somewhat
difficult- to hit off the exact moment when indignation,

252 Baron von Prokesch-Osten. [Chap.
assumed for diplomatic purposes, is transformed into real,
natural fury that breaks all bounds of decent behaviour. I
endured the first few of these outbursts in silence, in order
to avoid compromising our otherwise friendly relations;
and even went so far, in one or two ca,ses, as to try and find
out whether, after the expiration of a couple of days, Herr
von Prokesch might be inclined to take a calmer view of the
question at issue. As this, however, did not prove to be the
case ; as it struck me that my colleague seemed to anticipate
satisfactory results from conducting negotiations in this
manner ; and as the expressions of which he made use in
relation to Royal officials and to the actions performed by
them at the instance of our government, were constantly such
as my position did not permit me to listen to, I found myself
compelled to call Herr von Prokesch's attention to these
facts in a, very serious manner. Up to the present time this
appears to have had the effect of causing his irritability
— restrained upon one subject — to explode still less justifiably
in connection with other matters ; at least, during yester
day's sitting of the Military Committee, Herr von Prokesch
used such violent language to me, Apropos of an insignificant
detail, that I was obliged to tell him he had no right to speak
to me in such a manner, nor would I for a moment put up
with his doing so."
Amongst this Austrian diplomatist's unpleasant character
istics were a predilection for preaching and a tendency to
indulge in rhetorical pathos when nothing of the sort was
called for. In a report (May 7, 1853) addressed by
Bismarck to his Minister upon a conversation he (Bismarck)
had had with Prokesch, he observed : — " I have only given
you the sense of his utterances, without the colouring imparted
to them by my friend's high-flown oratory. Our conversa
tion took place during a stroll, and I had repeated occasion,

IV.] Baron von Prokesch- Osten. 253
by friendly interruptions, to bring down my companion's
style of delivery to the level of ordinary talk — especially
when he raised his voice to a pitch that attracted the atten
tion of the passers-by. Putting aside Herr von Prokesch's
specialities in the way of declamatory exaggerations, the sum-
total of what he had to say seemed to me to amount to this ;
that, in my colleague's opinion, interference in the internal
affairs of Austria by the Vladika of Montenegro could not be
less worthy of notice or consideration than Prussia's views
anent the question of the Federal fortresses. In order to
avoid becoming infected by his excitement, I had at last to
change the subject of our conversation; whereupon he
promptly got off his high horse and glided into a flow of
cordial confidential chat." Reverting to the Baron's chief
trait of character in another report, Bismarck writes ; " It is
undoubtedly every diplomatic agent's own business to settle
with himself what amount of frankness and attachment to
truth he will display in negotiating with foreign envoys.
Herr von Prokesch has reduced his stock of both these
commodities to such a minimum that — now that he has been
a member of the Federal Assembly for nearly a year — those
amongst his colleagues who most fully do justice to his
industry and to the lively interest he takes in business, would
with difficulty be induced to accept any assurance made by
him upon his word and faith ; on the contrary, whatever he
says or does, no matter how unimportant, in his quality of
President, the first question that everybody feels inclined to
ask is, ' What unacknowledged purpose is he aiming at ? ' "
Let me complete Prince Bismarck's sketch of his whilom
Austrian colleague at Frankfort by the following reminis
cences. Recalling his Bundestag experiences one day at
Versailles, the Chancellor said, " I could get on very well
with' Thun (his first Austrian fellow-Envoy at the Palace in

254 Baron von Prokesch- Osten. [Chap.
the Eschenheimergasse). He was a decent sort of fellow.
Rechberg (the third Austrian representative during Bismarck's
sojourn in the Federal capital) was also not so bad on the
whole — at least he was a man of high personal honour,
although extremely violent and tempestuous. As an Aus
trian diplomatist of the school of that day he was, of course,
unable to be quite exact in the matter of truthfulness. But
Prokesch was in no respect the man for me. He had
brought the vilest intrigues back with him from the East
(Prokesch had been Internuncio at Constantinople). The
truth was absolutely indifferent to him. I remember once,
at a large party, that reference was made to some Austrian
statement, which was not in accordance with facts. Raising
his voice, so that I might hear him, he exclaimed : ' Well,
if that is not true, I must have lied in the name of the
Imperial- Royal Government ! ' And then he looked at me.
I returned his gaze and said carelessly, ' Quite so, your
Excellency.' He was obviously startled ; looking around
him he became cognisant of downcast eyes and a dead
silence, proving that everybody present agreed with me ; he
then turned his back upon us and walked away to the supper-
room, where the table was laid. After supper he pulled
himself together and came over to me with a glass full of
wine in his hand — but for which I should have fancied he
was about to challenge me — saying, ' Come, let us make
peace.' ' Why not ? ' I replied ; ' but the protocol must
be altered, notwithstanding.' ' You are quite incorrigible ! '
he rejoined with a smile ; and there was an end of the matter.
The protocol, however, was altered — an acknowledgment
that it had contained a falsehood."
Bismarck thought well of his Bavarian colleague, Von
Schrenk, whom he wrote of as " one of the best elements in
the Assembly, with respect to capacity as well as to character.

IV.] Several Federal Envoys. 255
He is a thoroughgoing and industrious worker, practical in
his views and judgments, although his judicial training and
turn of mind dispose him to be disputatious and thereby
sometimes to hamper the prompt transaction of business.
In official intercourse he is frank and agreeable as long as
his over-wrought and supersensitive Bavarian national feel
ings are respected — a weakness I have made it my special
study to treat with consideration." Of Von Bothmer, the
representative of Hanover, Bismarck also spoke favourably.
" He is not only a man of upright and trustworthy character,
but the only one of my colleagues sufficiently independent
to lend me a more than passive support when I am com
pelled to put forward demands upon the Presidency." Those
amongst the remaining members of the Federal Assembly
with whom Bismarck was more or less satisfied, are character
ised as follows : " Herr von Scherff ( Luxemburg ) is our
faithful ally, personally quite devoted to the interests of
Prussia ; a man of business ; experienced and most anxiously
prudent. Of the gentleman who sits next to him, Baron
von Fritsch ( Weimar ) I only wish that his power to support
Prussian policy were equal to his will." " The Mecklenburg
Envoy, Herr von Oertzen, justifies in every respect his
reputation as a man of honour, by which he was known to
me before he occupied his present position. Immediately
after the reassembling of the Bundestag, a leaning towards
Austria became unmistakably manifest in him ; but it seems
to me beyond a doubt that his two years' experience of the
machinations practised here by the Austrian Government
through its organ, the President, has brought about a
reaction in Herr von Oertzen's honourable nature (although
he has a son in the Austrian army) which enables me to
count upon him, personally without reserve — and politicaUy
as far as his instructions will allow him to go." " Herr von
Buelow, the representative of Denmark for Holstein and

256 More Federal Envoys. [Chap.
Lauenburg, is one of the ablest members of the Assembly,
and I regret that the attitude of the State he represents
does not permit him to take a more important part in
current business." " The Baden Envoy, Herr von Mar-
schall, does not lack intelligence or business availability, but
takes infinite trouble to avoid becoming responsible for an
independent judgment and to find out in the most indis
putable question some medium stand-point from which it
may be possible to agree with both parties, or at least to dis
agree with neither. When he cannot help himself, however,
he inclines to take part with Austria rather than with us,
perhaps because his government is more afraid of Vienna
than of Berlin.
" The representative of Electoral Hesse, Herr von Trott,
is also moderately well-disposed towards Austria, but is not
a particularly important personage. He takes as little part
as possible in the proceedings, i.e. in drawing up reports and
attending committee-meetings, and is frequently absent on
leave, preferring country life and field-sports to the business
of the Bund. He appears to be more of a jolly, portly
provincial squire than an Envoy."
" Nassau and Brunswick are represented by Baron von
Dungern, an inoffensive character, exercising no influence
in the Federal Assembly either by personal capacity or
political prestige. The circumstances that he and his wife
are connected by ties of relationship with families pledged
to support Austria's interests, and that two of his sons are
serving in the Austrian army — which keeps him in greater
fear of Austrian than of Prussian resentment — are probably
accountable for the fact that whenever questions arise
upon which Nassau and Brunswick differ he adopts the
Nassau — that is, the Austrian — view of the matter at issue.
But it is a grave error that Brunswick should be represented
by a servant of the Duke of Nassau (Dungern had pro-

IV.] More Federal Envoys. 257
viously been a Nassau Minister) who is here situated in the
immediate vicinity of his own Court (one absolutely
dominated by the influence of Austria), and can only keep
up such exiguous relations with Brunswick as can scarcely
be considered an equivalent for the five thousand florins
which His Highness Duke William contributes annually to
Dungern's salary."
"The representative of the fifteenth Curia (Anhalt,
Schwarzburg and Oldenburg) is Herr von Eisendecher — a
man whose pleasant manners, combined with conversational
wit and vivacity, are very taking. He was formerly an
advanced Gotha-ist, and it would appear that his tendency
in that respect has become transformed into a lively
sympathy for the development of the federation into a
strong individual central power, in which, with the aid of
Austria, he hopes to find a substitute for the abortive efforts
to achieve German Unity undertaken by the advocates of
Prussian leadership in the Fatherland."
One of Bismarck's reports characterises the Saxon
Federal Envoy, von Nostitz, as follows : — " It seems to me
that he fundamentally entertains a traditional leaning to
wards Prussia and her political system, chiefly based upon
Protestantism of a nationalistic rather than orthodox sort,
and upon fear of Ultramontane encroachments. But I
also believe — and I should be glad to discover that, in so
believing, I have done him an injustice — that on the whole
he allows his personal interests to take precedence of the
political ones he represents, and that the malleability of his
character permits him to submit the latter to a light that is
always eminently favourable to the former. His pecuniary
affairs (apart from his official salary) stand in this relation
to his position in Frankfort ; he lives here in a house of his
own, for which he paid a large price before 1848, and which
vol. 1. S

15S Herr von Nostitz. [Chap.
he has unsuccessfully endeavoured to let for five years past
Through this circumstance his political attitude is inspired
by the wish to retain his official post here ; and, taking into
consideration the present tendencies of the Saxon Govern
ment, Austria has certainly just now more opportunities of
strengthening his position here than Prussia has. This fact
does not prevent Herr von Nostitz from careful avoidance,
as far as his instructions permit, of giving any conspicuous
offence to Prussia ; but, by reason of his great working
powers, intelligence and long experience, he is in reality
the most effective supporter of all Austria's machinations
in the Federal Assembly. He has a peculiarly happy knack
of drawing up reports and motions upon disputed questions
of a critical character, to which reports, &c, he imparts a
seemingly mediatory tone without ever yielding a point in
which Austrian interests are involved. It is only when his
said reports become subjects of serious negotiation that we
discover their real objects (to effect which he drew them
up) to be indicated in apparently purposeless and incidental
words. Should a change of front, favourable to Prussia,
take place in Dresden, the weighty personal support which
Herr von Nostitz — thanks to his intelligence and experience
and to his reputation for both — is able to afford would as
certainly be rendered to Prussia as it now is to Austria;
unless, indeed, the circumstance that one of his sons is
being brought up in the Austrian Naval College, whilst
another is already an officer in the Imperial Service,
should bind him irrefragably to the cause he at present
serves." The Hessian Envoy, Baron Von Muench-Bellinghausen,
figures in Bismarck's report as Prussia's principal opponent.
"Not only is he connected with Austrian interests by his
relationship to the former Presiding-Envoy, but his

IV.] Muench and Reinhard. 259
antagonism to Prussia is materially aggravated by his strong
and (I believe) sincere devotion to the Roman Catholic
Church. In private life he is a man of agreeable manners
and, as far as his official conduct is concerned, I cannot say
that I have detected in it any tendency towards intrigue or
duplicity exceeding the measure of reserve imposed upon him
by the anti-Prussian policy of his Government. Anyhow, it
is an anomaly that a Protestant Sovereign, actually engaged
in a conflict with Catholic prelates, should be represented in
the Confederation by Herr von Muench. Nor can the
Rhenish-Federative proclivities of Herr von Dalwigk and
Prince Emil of Hesse suit the political views of Herr von
Muench, which favour the so-called ' Grand-German '
scheme, advocated in Prussia by the Reichenspergers and
some others."
The first observation made with respect to the Wuertem
berg Envoy, von Reinhard, is that all his work " bears the
stamp of superficiality and bewilderment." Bismarck then
goes on to say : " I do not know whether or not his depar
ture from Berlin had to do with any circumstance which may
have inspired him with an enduring dislike to Prussia, or if
the muddled political theories, which he prefers as subjects
of conversation to practical business, cause him to believe in
the noxiousness of Prussia's influence in Germany. How
ever this may be, his antipathy to us certainly exceeds the
bounds of that which, considering Wuertemberg's political
situation, may be considered allowable in his Sovereign ; and
I have reason to believe that he actively exercises his
influence, as far as he can independently of his instructions,
altogether to the prejudice of Prussia. I may remark
en passant that he is invariably late in his attendance at the
sittings, in which he moreover constantly gives rise to repe
titions involving great waste of time, through inattention 8 2

260 Baron von Holzliausen. [Chap.
and consequent interference in the current discussion whilst
labouring under misapprehension."
Baron von Holzhausen, the Envoy of the 16th Curia
(Waldeck, the two Reuss Duchies, Lippe and Hesse-Hom-
burg), is described by Bismarck as an out-and-out Austrian of
a somewhat comic aspect. " It is said of him that for the
most part he makes out his own instructions, even when he
has plenty of time to obtain them in the regular way, and
encounters any remonstrances made by his co-employers
either by silence or by dexterous manipulation of them so
as to get a majority in his favour, which is not difficult, by
reason of the limited intercourse existing between them.
Besides, most of the petty Princes are disinclined to launch
into the expenses for their Federal diplomacy that would
be requisite to keep up a regular chancellerie established
on a proper footing; and were Herr von Holzhausen
(who got the post on Baron von Strombeck's retirement,
because he asked for less salary than anybody else did)
to resign they would have some difficulty in finding so
stately a representative as this well-to-do mem Der of tne
oldest patrician family in Frankfort, decorated with several
Grand- Crosses and an Actual Privy-Councillor to boot.
Herr von Holzhausen is unmarried and childless ; but his
nearest relatives are in the Austrian service. Moreover,
this gentleman's over-weening family pride and traditions
hark back perpetually to the connection of the Frankfort
noblesse with the splendours of the Holy Roman Empire, and
Prussia's whole attitude appears to him a revolutionary
usurpation, the chief object of which is the annihilation of
the Von Holzhausens' privileges. His large private fortune
justifies me in assuming that personal ambition is the tie
connecting him with Austria (perhaps the craving for some
Imperial Order or for an Austrian Count's title), not

IV.] Bismarck on his Colleagues. 261
pecuniary interest — unless, indeed, the fact that he owns a
great deal of Metalliques stock may influence his conduct. . .
It is scarcely probable that even those Governments which
follow the Austrian policy should have empowered Herr von
Holzhausen to display his Austrian tendencies with such
conspicuous ostentation, to dispense with asking for instruc
tions upon questions of the most vital importance, and to
exclusively regard Austrian interests as the one consideration
by which votes are to be determined."
In a private letter to Manteuffel (March 14, 1858) treat
ing of the Federal Envoys' terror of Austria, Bismarck
pronounced a truly crushing sentence upon several of his
Frankfort colleagues. " It is quite amazing what successes
Austria achieves with her system of incessantly and uncom
promisingly persecuting every diplomatist who dares to
vindicate the interests of his own country against the will
of the Vienna Cabinet, until, panic-stricken or weary of
resistance, he submits himself to her dictation. There are
but few diplomatists here who have not preferred capitulating
with their conscience and patriotism, and relaxing their
steadfastness as far as the defence of their own Sovereign's
and country's interests is concerned, to contending, at the
risk of their personal positions, against the difficulties
threatening them on the part of so mighty, unforgiving and
unscrupulous a foe as Austria. Austria never gives us any
choice but this : unconditional surrender to her will, or war
d outrance. I might, if I pleased, make my life as easy here
as my predecessors did theirs, and, like the majority of my
colleagues, manage all my business arrangements snugly
and comfortably, and acquire the reputation of a camarade
supportable, simply by committing high-treason to a moderate
and scarcely perceptible extent But so long as I refrain
from adopting that line of conduct I shall stand quite alone

262 Federal Diplomatists. [Chap.
to resist every attack ; for my colleagues do not dare to sup
port me, even if they felt called upon to do so."
The Federal Diplomatists, therefore, were in great part
insignificant, incapable, and far from disinterested persons —
petty, timorous and dependent — but nevertheless men
against whose past, as far as their private life was concerned,
there was little to be said. The year 1857, however, threat
ened to recruit the diplomatic corps in Frankfort with a
personage of exceedingly ambiguous antecedents, with
respect to whom Bismarck wrote a despatch to Manteuffel,
observing that the conferment of a diplomatic post upon
this individual by Prince Reuss (of the younger line) who
proposed to nominate him Minister-Resident in Frankfort,
had aroused general amazement The accounts of his
former career, &c, then current went back as far as the time
" when he, then a cobbler's apprentice, was taken into the
favour of an elderly unmarried lady, at whose expense he
subsequently received a high-class education and eventually
purchased the title of Baron ; upon which she married him."
Frequently sent by his Government on congratulatory mis
sions to Foreign Courts, " in order to obtain decorations for
him," he figures " in newspaper articles written by himself,
as ranking amongst the most eminent diplomatists of the
Great European Powers." It is observed that " the Govern
ment, which aims at compulsorily obtaining admission into
good society, hitherto sought by him in vain, for such an
individual as this, may be said to keep an open shop for
patents of nobility, in which anybody — no matter who —
may purchase the title he fancies by paying the price set
upon it in a fixed tariff." In all probability the same Govern
ment, " should its business in that line prove remunerative, '
will open another shop of the same class, for appointments
to the Diplomatic Body."

IV.] Jules Favre. 263
Pathetic expressions, would-be impressive oratory and en
deavours to be touching have nothing to do with diplomacy ;
and he who attempts to work with such tools as these
only proves himself to be a humbug. We have seen what
Bismarck thought of such artifices, in his reports concerning
Prokesch, and shall, in another portion of this book, be made
acquainted with a delightful story, having for its subject
Gagern, in his time a highly respected and much overrated
patriotic Pathotechnician — sit venia verbo, I mould it after
the model of pyrotechnician — and setting forth his comic
notions of diplomacy.
Two anecdotes of a similar character may not be out of
place here, as exemplifying the Chancellor's way of treating
such sentimental negotiators. The first relates to Jules Favre,
who transformed himself from a barrister into a diplomatist
after Sedan, and attempted experiments in foreign politics
by aid of the practices and tricks of his former trade; which
did not succeed with Bismarck. After the conferences at
Haute Maison and Ferrieres the Chancellor, speaking of
Favre, said : " It is quite true that he looked as if he had
been crying, and I made some endeavour to console him.
But, after inspecting him carefully, I came to the conclusion
that he had not squeezed out a single tear. Probably he
hoped to work upon me and move me by play-acting, as the
Paris lawyers are wont to do with their audiences. I am
firmly convinced that he was painted as well — white on his
cheeks and green round his eyes and nostrils — certainly he
was the second time, here in Rothschild's chateau, upon
which occasion he had 'made up' much more grey and
infirm, to play the part of one deeply afflicted and utterly
broken down. His object was to excite my compassion,
and thereby induce me to moderate my demands and make
concessions. But he ought to have known that feelings
have nothing to do with politics."

264 Adolphe Thiers. [Chap.
Thiers suited the Chancellor better than Favre, although
he once remarked of the former, " There is scarcely a trace
of the diplomatist about him ; he is far too sentimental for
that trade. He is not fit to be a negotiator — scarcely even
to be a horse-couper. He allows himself to be ' bluffed ' too
easily ; he betrays his feelings and lets himself be pumped."
On February 22, 187 1, Bismarck, whilst at dinner, gave us an
account of his second meeting with Thiers. " When I ex
acted a certain condition from him, he sprang to his feet
(although, as a rule, he could contain himself very well) and
exclaimed, ' Mais c'est une indignitk / ' I did not allow that
to disturb me : but forthwith spoke to him in German. He
hstened for a time, evidently not knowing what to make of
it ; then he whimpered out : ' Mais, Monsieur le Comte, vous
savez bien que je ne sais point l'allemand 1 ' I at once re
plied, in French : ' When you spoke just now of indignite
it struck me that I did not understand French well enough,
and so I thought it better to speak German, in which tongue
I know what I say and what I hear.' He caught my
meaning instantly, and at once agreed to the very condition
which he had characterised as an indignity. And only
yesterday," continued the Chancellor, "he began to talk
about Europe, which would certainly intervene unless we
moderated our demands. I replied, ' If you talk to me
about Europe I shall talk to you about Napoleon.' He
would not believe me, and insisted that France had nothing
to fear in that direction. I pointed out to him, however,
that he should think of the plebiscite, of the peasants, and of
the officers and soldiers. The Guard could only regain its
old position should the Emperor be restored, to whom it
could not be difficult, by judicious management, to gain
over a hundred thousand of the soldiers then prisoners-of-
war in Germany. All we should have to do would be to
send them well-armed across the frontier, and France would

IV.] Favre and Goulard. 265
be once more his (Napoleon's). ... If they would agree to
satisfactory conditions of peace, we would even go so far as
to put up with an Orleans, although we knew well enough
that under that regime war would infallibly break out again
in two or three years. Should they however prove obdurate,
we would interfere in their affairs, which thitherto we had
not done, and they would get another spell of Napoleon.
This must have produced some effect upon Thiers ; for this
morning he stopped himself just as he was beginning to talk
about Europe again, and said, ' Pray excuse me ! ' On the
whole I like him very well ; he has a clear head and good
manners, and narrates in capital style. Indeed, I am often
sorry for him, for he is in a painful position. But that can
not be helped."
Here is a delightful example of the diplomatic tact with
which (during the peace negotiations at Frankfort) the
Chancellor contrived to gain his ends with the Frenchmen.
The story was told to me by the late Count Wartensleben,
who had it from Bismarck himself. " One day — it was after
his firstpourparler-wiih Favre and Pouyer-Quertier — Bismarck
was looking very much worried and annoyed, and when I
asked him why, he replied that the Frenchmen had shewn
an uncommon degree of stubbornness, and added that he
had however, secured an ally in their own camp. ' I pro
posed to Favre,' he said, ' that he should bring M. Goulard,
a member of the National Assembly, with him to the
negotiations. He seemed very much surprised, and at first
would not hear of it. I then pointed out how useful it
would be to him. Goulard would feel highly flattered and
grateful, and would, as his co-negotiator, be compelled to
defend him in the National Assembly. So Favre consented.'
But Goulard was also of great use to the Chief; for the
portly little gentleman with the white tie and exuberant shirt-

266 TJie Due de Gramont. [Chap.
collar was extremely grateful to him for having suggested his
admission to the conferences, and invariably spoke in favour
of concessions when the two other Frenchmen were dis
inclined to make them, saying, ' Let it pass ; I wiU be
answerable at home for your doing so ; we may consent in
this case.' The best of it was that Favre finished by
formally thanking Bismarck for advising him to allow
Goulard to take part in the transactions."
In certain Bismarckian utterances pronounced shortly
before and during the war, Gramont repeatedly figured as a
combination of wrongheadedness and dullness. The Chan
cellor also spoke of Ollivier with undisguised scorn. Of these
persons he once remarked, " Gramont and Ollivier are pretty
fellows ! Were I in their place, having brought about such a
catastrophe, I would at least enlist in some regiment, or even
become a franc-tireur, if I had to be hanged for it. That
great strapping fellow, Gramont, would do well enough for a
soldier." (Upon another occasion he remarked that, had
the war in Bohemia proved a failure, he would have sought
a soldier's death, being perfectly sure that, unless he did so»
the old women in Berlin would flog him to death with their
wet pockethandkerchiefs.) Odo Russell mentioned that he
had once seen Gramont out shooting near Rome in a blue
velvet suit. " Yes," observed the Chancellor, " he is a good
sportsman, well-built and muscular enough. He would have
made a capital gamekeeper, or district-forester. But as a
Minister of Foreign Affairs — one can hardly conceive how
Napoleon could have employed him in that capacity ! "
Upon the same occasion he spoke in praise of Russell's
compatriot, Lord Napier, formerly British Envoy in Berlin,
as a man with whom it was very easy to get on ; also -of
Buchanan, whom he described as "dry, but trustworthy."
" And now we have got Loftus," he continued. " The posi-

IV.] Prince Gortchakoff 267
tion of an English Minister in Berlin is one of special responsi
bility and difficulty, on account of the family connections
existing between the English and Prussian Courts. It
exacts the greatest possible tact and attention from its
occupant." He then became silent ; but his silence spoke.
Subsequently, however (no Englishman being present), he
expressed, and in very forcible terms, his opinion that
Loftus in no way fulfilled the above-mentioned require
ments. Upon Gortchakoff the Chancellor pronounced judgment
to me as follows, in March 1879. " Without the least
reason, many people take him for a particularly clever and
skilful diplomatist. He never has any really great object
in view, and therefore cannot point to any remarkable
success. His policy is not that of Czar Alexander, nor is
it a Russian policy, but one dictated and guided in the first
place by considerations personal to himself, and in the
second by his predilection for France, which his master
does not share. His chief characteristic is a highly
developed egotism ; his chief aim the gratification of his
yearning to be esteemed a politician of the first class, which is
just what he is not. Hence his chronic disposition to invent
scenes in which he can play a part likely to elicit applause
from public opinion. The Russian Chancellor has only
exhibited any personal activity during the past four years ;
and no expert will venture to say that his operations have
revealed either adroitness or perspicuity. These four
years were devoted on his part to preparing the war with
Turkey and to making sure that the struggle in question
should result favourably and profitably to Russia. But his
manner of conducting this business has not altogether
signalised him as an intelligence capable of clearly dis
cerning its own aims and the means of attaining them. In

268 Prince Gortchakoff. [Chap.
preparing to fight the Turks the most important preliminary
was to ascertain beyond a doubt what position Austria-
Hungary and Germany would take up in relation to
Russia's projects, and to establish satisfactory relations
with those states. This was not effectually done, as every
body knows. Firm and distinct relations were not even
arranged and established with Roumania, although Gortcha
koff had ample opportunities for fulfilling that part of his
task during his six months' sojourn in Bucharest. But the
old gentleman spent too much of his time every day with
girls of a certain description to have any to spare for
business. " The results of his policy resembled the work he himself
did ; both were mediocre. But his yearning to be, or at
least to appear, more than he really was, remained as
vigorous and lively as ever theretofore. After 1874 it
seemed as if his greed for praise and renown would never
again leave him any peace or quiet. At the time of the
Reichstadt Convention he remarked. 'fe nepeux pas filer
comme une lampe qui s'iteint. Ilfaut queje me couche comme
un astre.' The Triple Alliance only satisfied him for a
very brief period. Already in 1874 threads of the Gortcha-
koff-Jomini policy (now set forth in the Golos) made
themselves manifest in the foreign press — more particularly
in that of France and Belgium. Even then the aim of that
policy was distinctly perceptible, namely, the revival of
intimate relations between Russia and vengefully-inclined
France, to the end of threatening and exercising pressure
upon Germany. France's rejection of this proposal (which
does not seem to have had Czar Alexander's approbation)
did not hinder further efforts in the direction indicated.
These endeavours culminated in the period between 1875
and 1877, when, entt} autres, a rumour obtained currency

IV.] Prince Gortchakoff. 269
ill over the world, to the effect that Russia had rescued the
French from a great and imminent peril. It was asserted
that in 1875, Gortchakoff had been apprised by Gontaut,
then Ambassador in St. Petersburg, that Germany was on
the point of forcing a war upon France ; Gortchakoff had
thereupon expressed his disapprobation of any such
undertaking ; the Czar had then travelled to Berlin, and
succeeded in persuading the Prussian military-party (then
urging on the enterprise in question) to abandon their
projects. Finally, the Russian Chancellor had taken
occasion to address a Circular Despatch to his Envoys
abroad, beginning with the words : 'Maintenant la paix est
assur'ee' "Of all the details contained in this report — which
emanated from St. Petersburg and was intended to display
Prince Gortchakoff to the world at large in the light of a
benevolent peace-maker and mighty dictator, as well as to
recommend him to the French as a friend and desirable ally
— only those touching the Czar's journey to Berlin and a
high-flown Circular Despatch of his Foreign Minister are
founded upon fact. On the other hand, with the solitary
exception of its remarks in a sense hostile to France and
relating to the Prussian military party's alleged warlike
projects, the statement published by the well-known
journalist, Oppert-Blowitz, anent a conversation held by him
with Prince Bismarck at the time of the Berlin Congress
upon the matter in question is absolutely correct. The
article appeared in the Times of Sept. 7, 1878, and its leading
points are as follows : —
" ' Bismarck, however, is jealous not only of his own, but
of his country's reputation, and denies such a plan (of attack
upon France) was ever conceived. On my remarking at
the end of my interview with him that Europe counted upon

270 Bismarck and Gortchakoff. [Chap.
peace as soon as it knew he wished for it, he eagerly caught
up the phrase for the purpose of reverting to the ' scare,'
of strongly disavowing any complicity with the authors of
the plan of settling his account with Prince Gortchakoff,
and of absolving Germany from the unwarrantable scheme
which terrified Europe. He exclaimed. 'I should not
have wished for peace if I had been the villain Gortchakoff
made me out to be in 1875. The whole story which then
startled Europe, and to which a letter in The Times gave
so great an echo, was nothing but a conspiracy devised by
Gortchakoff and Gontaut It was a plot between Gontaut
and Gortchakoff, who was eager to reap praises from the
French papers, and to be styled the saviour of France !
They had arranged this so that the thing should burst
forth the very day of the arrival of the Czar, who was to
appear as a Quos ego and by his mere appearance to give
security to France and peace to Europe. I never saw a
statesman act more heedlessly — from a sentiment of vanity
to compromise a friendship between two Governments ; to
expose himself to the most serious consequences in order to
attribute to himself the role of saviour, when there was
nothing in danger. I told the Emperor of Russia and
Gortchakoff, ' If you have such a mind for a French
apotheosis, we have still credit enough in Paris to be able to
make you appear on some theatrical stage in mythological
costume, with wings on your shoulders and surrounded by
Bengal lights. It really was not worth while to depict us as
villains for the sole purpose of issuing a Circular.' That
famous Circular, moreover, commenced with the words.
' Peace is now ensured ; ' and when I complained of that
phrase, which would have confirmed all the alarming
rumours, it was altered into the ' maintenance of peace is
now ensured ; ' wliich did not mean much less. I said to

IV.] Baron von der Goltz. 271
the Russian Chancellor: 'You certainly will not have
much room for congratulation on what you hive been
doing in risking our friendship for an empty satisfaction. I
frankly tell you that I am a good friend with friends and a
good enemy with enemies ! "
Returning to German diplomatic circles, we find that the
Chancellor values some 4»f their members very highly. But I
have only heard him speak with warm admiration of one of
them, with the single exception of Lothar Bucher. This was
the Secretary of State von Buelow (deceased, 1879), whom he
praised in his reports from Frankfort, and who was, as the
Prince has assured me in person, a collaborateur of his as
capable and well informed as he was indefatigably industrious.
Concerning other " Excellencies " the Chancellor expressed
himself with less warmth ; but I can only quote such of his
remarks as applied to persons who are no longer living.
Once I took the liberty of asking him whether or not
Von der Goltz, our former envoy in Paris, had been really
so clever and influential as many people assert him to have
been. " Clever, yes, in a certain sense of the word,"
replied the Chancellor ; " a quick worker and well informed,
but unsteady in his appreciations of persons and relations — ¦
to-day quite taken up with one man, or plan, to-morrow
with another — sometimes with the exact converse of the first.
And then he was always in love with the Royal ladies to
whose Court he was accredited; first, with Amalia of
Greece, then with Eugenie. He was of opinion that what
I had ' had the luck ' to bring about, he, with his superior
intelligence, could have done much better. Consequently
he was always intriguing against me, although we had
known each other as boys : he wrote letters to the King
complaining of me, and warning His Majesty against me.
That did not do him much good, for the King gave me the

272 Goltz, Arnim, Savigny. [Chap.
letters, and I answered them. But he was persevering in
this regard, and went on sending them, unvexed and
unwearied. His subordinates all disliked him ; in fact, they
absolutely hated him."
On another occasion, Privy-Councillor Abeken having
remarked how variously the Secretary of State, Cardinal
Antonelli had been appraised by the newspapers, some of
which had pronounced him to be a man of subtle intelli
gence, others a cunning intriguer, and others a drivelling
idiot, the Chancellor observed : " True, but such incon
sistencies occur, not only in the press, but in the judicial
capacities of a good many diplomatists — Goltz, for instance,
and ' our Harry.' Of Goltz I will say nothing ; he was
different. But the other one — he was one thing to-day,
and another to morrow ! When I was in Varzin, and had
time to read his reports one with another, I found that he
changed his opinions about people at least twice a week, in
exact proportion to the degrees of their civility towards
him. His views varied with each successive postal delivery
— sometimes even in one and the same despatch." " Our
Harry," I may remark, was Count Arnim, whose subsequent
opposition to the Chancellor has been already referred to,
and whose reports, whilst he was Ambassador in Paris,
certainly were Protean in character. Another time Bismarck
remarked of him : " I should like to know how he feels
just now ; probably in one way before breakfast, in another
after dinner, and quite otherwise to-morrow morning — like
his despatches ! "
Of Savigny the Chancellor said : " It is his fault that we
concluded a Treaty of Peace with Saxony in which the
military question was settled in an unsatisfactory manner.
He did it, not I, for I was on my back, very iU, at the time.
When the treaty first reached my hands, I thought of

IV.] Count Bernstorff. 273
congratulating him upon it, but when I looked more closely
into its condition, I changed my mind and forbore doing
so." It was, moreover, the Chancellor's opinion that
Savigny's Catholicism was partly accountable for his yielding
to the Saxon negotiators.
In January, 1871, Bismarck expressed himself as follows,
with respect to Count Bernstorff, formerly representing
Prussia and Germany at the British Court : " I have never
yet succeeded in filling up whole pages and sheets with
elaborate dissertations upon matters of no importance
whatsoever, as he did, and always teeming with back-
references — ' as I had the honour to report in my despatch
of January 3, 1863. No. so-and-so ; ' or 'as I respectfully
announced in my telegram, No. 1665.' I send these
things to the King, who naturally wants to know what it all
means, and writes on the margin in pencil : ' Don't know
anything about it'" Somebody observed that Goltz, too,
had scribbled a great deal of irrelevant rubbish, and Bismarck
added : " Yes, and, in addition to his despatches he often
sent me private letters of six to eight closely written sheets
in length. He must have had a frightful lot of spare time.
Fortunately, I got angry with him, and that nuisance
came to an end." Another of the persons at table re
marked : " What would Goltz say if he could know that the
Emperor is a prisoner, that Eugenie is in London, and
that we have been bombarding Paris ? " " Why," rejoined
the Chancellor, " he would not worry himself so much
about the Emperor as about his flame, Eugdnie. Never
theless, in spite of his amorousness, he would not have
made such a mess of it as others have done." By " others "
Bismarck meant Count Goltz's successor (Werther), whose
eyes had been closed to the French Government's war
projects throughout the summer of 1870 up to the very
vol. 1. T

274 Diplomatic Literature. [Chap
last moment, whilst his subordinates had clearly per
ceived what was going on and imparted it to the home
authorities. In speaking of the value of diplomatic reports — a not
unfrequent subject of comment on his part — the Chancellor
invariably referred to them in disparaging terms. On one
occasion he said, " Many of these productions are agreeable
reading enough ; but they contain nothing essential, and
are mere feuilletons, written for the sake of writing. Of
this class were the reports of our Consul in  . You
read them through, thinking all the time, ' Now it must be
coming.' But it never comes. The style is good and
fluent ; you read on and on. By and bye, coming to the
end, you find that there is really nothing in it — that it is all
deaf and empty." Another example was cited, that of the
military plenipotentiary B  , who came to the front as a
historian with some long treatises on Russia; and the
Chancellor observed : " When we appointed him we thought
we should get something out of him — and so we have, in
quantity as well as in style. He writes pleasantly, in the
feuilleton manner; but, reading through his sheets upon
sheets of close diminutive and elegant manuscript, I find
that, despite their amazing length, there is absolutely
nothing in them."
Of diplomatic literature in general he observed : " For
the most part it is nothing but paper and ink. The worst of
all is when the writers run to great length. One was
accustomed to Bernstorff, who always sent in a ream of
paper full of stale old newspaper-cuttings. But when
others take to exuberant writing — Arnim was wont to
distinguish himself in this respect — one is apt to get
annoyed ; for as a rule, there is nothing in it. If you
wanted to utilise it for historical purposes, you could not

IV.] Diplomatists on 'Change. 275
get anything worth having out of it. I believe it is the
rule to allow historians to consult the F. O. archives at the
expiration of thirty years (after date of despatches, &c).
They might be permitted to inspect them much sooner,
for the despatches and letters, when they contain any
information at all, are quite unintelligible to those unac
quainted with the persons and relations treated of in them.
Who knows, thirty years after date, what sort of a man the
writer himself was — how he looked at things and impressed
his individuality upon them. What one should know would
be what Gortchakoff, Gladstone, or Granville really thought
about the matter reported upon by the Ambassador. One
has a better chance of getting something trustworthy out of
the newspapers, of which Governments also avail them
selves frequently to say what they mean more distinctly
than by the mouths of diplomatists. Besides, accurate
knowledge of all sorts of circumstances is essential.
Finally, the most important information of all is communi
cated confidentially, by word of mouth or in private letters
which never reach the archives." He mentioned several
instances of such communications, and concluded by saying :
" All this one comes to know privately — not officially."
One day, at our dinner-table in Versailles, the conversation
turned upon diplomatists who had turned their positions to
account in the way of speculating on 'Change, and had made
a good thing of so doing. The Chancellor denied that there
was much to be done in that line with such necessarily
limited fore-knowledge of political events as can be attained
by the head of a Foreign Office. Events of that class do
not, as a rule, produce an immediate effect upon the money-
market, and it is impossible to say beforehand on what
particular day they will do so. " Of course," he added, " it
would be possible to complicate matters so as to bring about
t 2

276 Speculative Diplomatists. [Chap.
a fall ; but that would be dishonourable. The French Minister
G  did so, and doubled his fortune thereby, one might
almost say that he made war with that object. Moustier,
it seems, also transacted business of that description — not
with his own money, but with that of his kept-mistress — and
poisoned himself when threatened with exposure. ... If a
Minister wanted to make money out of his position by such
means, this is the way he would have to do it, i.e. get some
obliging official at each legation abroad to send him the
'Change telegrams together with the political ones. These
latter take precedence of all others at the Telegraph Offices,
so that he would gain an advance of from twenty to thirty
minutes, and would have to keep a swift-footed Jew by him
in order to utilise that time advantage. There have been,
it is said, people amongst us who have managed the thing in
this way." (Here he mentioned the names of some of these
gentlemen.) "Thus may a Minister make from 1500 to
15000 thalers a day, which, in the course of a few years,
would mount up to a very pretty sum. But my son shall
never have it to say of his father that he had made a rich
man of him by transactions of this kind."
Later on, another variety of diplomatic money-making
was discussed (Jan. 26, 1871). From the subject of
Strousberg's cleverness and indefatigable activity the con
versation turned to Gambetta, respecting whom somebody
asserted that " he had made five millions by the war " — an
assumption disputed (I believe justly) by others present.
Speaking of Napoleon III., Count Bismarck-Bohlen then
observed that he (Napoleon) must have saved at least fifty
millions of francs during his nineteen years' reign. " Some
people say eighty," interposed the Chancellor, " but I doubt
it. Louis Philippe spoilt the business. He got up kmeutes
and then sold on the Amsterdam exchange. At last the

IV.] The Due de Morny. 277
brokers, &c, found him out." Count Hatzfeldt (or
Baron Keudell) remarked that, every now and then, that
most illustrious, enterprising and wide-awake of all specula
tors used to fall ill, with a similar object. It was then
mentioned that, under the Second Empire, Morny especially
distinguished himself by the variety and ingenuity of his
expedients for making money. The Chancellor said :
" When Morny was appointed ambassador to Petersburg he
arrived there with a long string of fine elegant carriages, and
all his trunks were full of lace, silks and ladies' toilettes, on
which of course he had to pay no duty. Every one of his
servants had a carriage of his own, every attache or secre
tary at least two, and he himself five or six. A day or two
after his advent he sold off his impedimenta, carriages, lace
dresses and all. They say he made a clear profit of 800,000
roubles." " He was unprincipled but amiable, and could
really make himself extremely agreeable," added the narrator.
That diplomatists maybe classified as "purchasable,"
and " non-purchasable," may be gathered from the following
little story, told to me when I was on a visit at Varzin. It
concerns an attempt made by one Loewenstein to bribe
Bismarck when the latter was on the point of starting for
Petersburg as Ambassador to the Russian Court. " This
Loewenstein," said the Prince, " was a secret agent, acting
simultaneously on behalf of Buol and Manteuffel — spying,
executing commissions, and doing other things of that sort.
He came to me with a letter of recommendation from
Buol. When I asked him what I could do for him, he
replied that, ' he had come to tell me how I might do a
good stroke of business, with a profit of twenty thousand
thalers — perhaps more.' I answered, ' I do not speculate,
not having the wherewithal.' ' Oh, you do not require
any money ; you can manage it another way.' I said I did

278 Bribing Diplomatists. [Chap.
not understand that ; what, then, was I to do ? ' Only to
exert your influence in Petersburg, to bring about a good
understanding between Russia and Austria.' I made as
though I would think it over, but could not quite trust him.
Loewenstein then referred me to his letter of introduction.
I said that was not sufficient, and demanded a written
promise ; but the Jew was too cunning to give me anything
of the sort, and observed that his letter was legitimation
enough. Then I turned rusty, and as he was going away,
told him the plain truth, viz. :— that I should not think of
doing what he wanted, but felt greatly inclined to throw him
down the stairs, which were steep. So he went off, but not
before he had menaced me with Austria's wrath. On sub
sequently applying to  he found his proposals readily
understood and accepted, as was also the case with  ,
who receives ' subventions ' from Vienna to this very day."
Is there anybody fitted to become Bismarck's successor
in office — anybody equal to, or even, from an intellectual
point of view, approximatively akin to him ? Will he
leave a school of statesmen behind him? I believe I
must answer both these questions in the negative. The
present German diplomatists may, some of them, be persons
of respectable talent in their way ; but, one and all, they
are far inferior to their chief — and the Liberals, who hope to
inherit his authority, have still fewer capacities in their
ranks, and no routine whatsoever. Virchow, in some of his
public speeches, has mentioned that they (the Liberals)
expect to take the helm under the next king, and has
observed, in addition, that " then, the policy of Germany,
abroad as well as at home, will be altogether different from
what it is now. Bismarck is a gifted politician, but he
represents a school of diplomacy that has heretofore been
regarded as superseded." There will be nice doings,

IV.] No Bismarckian School. 279
doubtless ; they will not last long, however. But in the
meantime hideous follies will be committed, and great
d image done, some of it probably irreparable.
The Prince, despite all that has been said and written on
the subject, has not founded a school — at least, not one like
that which Moltke has formed round himself. Certain
diplomatists may have noted down, as generally useful, a
maxim or two contained in his instructions. Now and
again he himself has referred pointedly to such maxims.
He has no time to do more ; and, indeed, it would have
been labour in vain, since genius is born, not manufactured,
in the diplomatic career, as in every other, and new
situations, which are always cropping up, can only be
dominated by the intuition of genius, not by axioms
summarising past experiences. The thing chiefly needful
is not knowledge, but capability. " Ce jeune homme sail un
grand nombre de choses" said Nesselrode once of a German
attache, ' mais it ne saitpas faire une seule ; " and this remark
applies to a good many actual colleagues of the gentleman
who suggested it. It is a difficult matter enough to discover
a competent Secretary of State. What will it be to find a
new Chancellor who will not contrast ridiculously with the
old one ? These are unpleasant truths ; but truths they are,
and nothing can make them aught else.

( 280 )

CHAPTER V.
BISMARCK AND AUSTRIA.
Bismarck's line of policy has to no inconsiderable extent
been determined by the conduct of adversaries who were
persistently blind to their own interests ; and some of his
principal successes have their origin chiefly in the stiff-
necked obstinacy with which those persons have striven,
even to the eleventh hour, to maintain obsolete rights and
unreasonable pretensions in defiance of the reforming
genius, intelligence, and volition by which Germany's
demand for an historical entity was realised. Thus, in the
Schleswig-Holstein affair, imprimis, the calculating and dis
loyal policy of the Danish National Democrats compelled
King Christian to incorporate Schleswig in contravention of
an international arrangement, thus affording to the German
Great Powers the only valid pretext they could possibly
have advanced for declaring the London Protocol null and
void ; secondly, the question (in a subsequent phase of its
development) was treated by the Duke of Augustenburg as if
it had been an ordinary civil suit about a private gentle
man's estate, the title-deeds of which — in the shape of an
old, worm-eaten, olive-green parchment — he preserved and
worshipped like a miracle-working reUc. When the case
came forward, this good gentleman so stubbornly rejected the
demands (at first very moderate ones) put forward by Prussia
0.1 behalf of National interests, that he at last rendered

Chap. V.] The Schwarzenberg Policy. 281
annexation unavoidable. Again, in the Hanover business,
King George (doubly stricken with blindness) so utterly
failed before as well as after the 1866 catastrophe to
perceive his true interests, which he would have served
either by co-operating with Russia or by maintaining an
honourable neutrality, that he over and over again abruptly
declined the offers urged upon him from Berlin to enter into
an agreement upon the basis of Bismarck's plan for the
reform of Germany, thus bringing about the annihilation of
his own rights by the Power representing new and superior
rights, and the incorporation of his kingdom in that of his
conqueror. In this, as in the other question referred to
(Schleswig-Holstein), the Prussian Minister's keen perception
of his adversary's weak points and cleverness in putting the
latter in the wrong, as far as public opinion was concerned,
were singularly efficacious. Finally (not to mention other
examples), in the question of limiting the sphere of Austrian
influence as against that of North Germany, the old comedy
was played all over again — this time throughout a period of
more than a decade and a half, until the sword severed the
Gordian knot, did away with dualism, set up a fair and equit
able Prussian hegemony northward of the Main, and estab
lished parity of law throughout Germany — a political entity
which later on, obtained its completion — never lost sight of
by Bismarck — through an alliance that revived the good and
useful terms of the former Austro-Prussian league, and settled
satisfactorily once for all, relations between the whilom rivals.
But for the Schwarzenberg policy, practically a resuscita
tion of that of Kaunitz, and steadfastly pursued by Buol and
his successors, Germany's development into a Federal State
— which commenced with Bismarck's nomination as Envoy
to the Federal Assembly, and attained its first important
stage in 1866 — would have been next to an impossibility.

282 Prince Metternich. [Chap.
Possibly a similar conclusion might have been ultimately
arrived at, by other means, and at a much later period —
and even then only in case an energetic and talented states
man had arisen in Prussia to undertake the solution of the
problem. The departure of Prince Schwarzenberg and his
successors in the guidance of Austrian policy from the
considerate and conciliatory attitude maintained towards
Prussia by Metternich — their greedy aggressiveness, in fact,
hastened the march of events. We have to thank them for
swiftly and thoroughly reversing the opinions with regard to
Austria which prevailed in Berlin up to 1848, and which
Bismarck took with him to Frankfort. What the' King
thought of that transformation may be gathered from the
letter he wrote to Metternich on April 18, 1848, when the
latter had fled from Vienna on account of the Revolution.
The ¦ closing sentences of this document are highly
characteristic : " My personal relations to you remain' what
they were of old ; and yet they are rejuvenated, invigorated,
and fortified by our common misfortunes. I feel towards
Austria as I did in the year 1840. I will honestly do all I
can to obtain hereditary Roman Imperial rank for the
hereditary Emperor ; and the Roman Emperor must again
become the Honorary head of the German Nation. A
Caesar — as special elective chief of the special German
Realm — appears unavoidable. But I will not be that
Caesar. It is my ambition to become Arch-General
issimo of the Empire. God be with you, honoured Prince !
May he preserve you to this world until better times !"
A foregoing chapter has made us acquainted with the
attitude assumed towards Austria by Bismarck during the
years immediatly following the Berlin Revolution. When
the Chancellor of to-day was appointed (July 15, 1851)
Envoy to the Federal Assembly his experiences in various

f.] Bismarck at Frankfort. 283
directions had probably caused him to alter his former
opinion as to the policy of Austria; but he was certainly
not a thoroughgoing opponent of the Hapsburg Empire at
that time. Indeed, he regarded it as a valuable ally in the
struggle then maintained by Prussia with the still formidable
democratic Revolutionary Party, and fully agreed with the
nstructions imparted to his predecessor, General von
Rochow, i.e. to adhere (with relation to the resuscitated
Federal Diet) to the system of co-operation, on the part of
both great powers, which had generally obtained in the days
of Hardenberg, Ancillon and Metternich, and was carried
out thus : Austria and Prussia came to a clear mutual
understanding in every case, upon the measures to be recom
mended to the smaller Federal States, and then imposed their
will upon all the remaining members of the Confederation. In
a speech pronounced by him in 1850, Austria he referred to
as " the representative and heir of a German Power which
had often and gloriously wielded the sword of Germany."
At the commencement of his occupations in Frankfort
Bismarck took up an attitude with respect to the business
of the Bund, quite in keeping with the above view. He
made it a rule " to confer tete-a-tete with Count Thun, the
Austrian Envoy, upon any questions containing germs of
dissension between Prussia and Austria, before bringing
any such matter before the Federal Diet," and took great
pains to avoid any serious differences upon pending issues,
intimating the purport of his instructions from Berlin with
all possible suavity, and frequently subordinating his
personal wishes to those of the majority. But his concilia
tory and yielding dispositions were of course limited by the
interests and dignity of the State he represented, and
vexa tious experiences soon convinced him that placability
vvi<.s out of place in connection with Federal transactions.

284 Bismarck and the Bund. [Chap.
The authorities in Vienna were altogether in favour of the
unity wished for at Berlin — but only upon the condition
that Prussia should give way to the views entertained by
Imperial politicians just as readily as the medium and petty
states had theretofore yielded to decisions adopted by
Austria and Prussia in common. Should Prussia presume
to have a will of her own, Austria — in Schwarzenberg's
opinion — could dispose of machinery in the Federal Diet
wherewith to bend and break that will ; and this calculation
was so far correct that most of the petty states ascribed
projects of union or annexation to Prussia, and were
consequently always ready to outvote her in the Bund, to
keep her down to her own level, to narrow the sphere of
her independent action and enlarge the prerogatives of the
Federal Diet Bismarck's conviction that the Monarchy of
Frederic the Great was in no way bound to submit to the
voting majority of the petty States constituting Austria's
following, and that pliancy under such circumstances could
only lead Prussia to her ruin, was diametrically opposed to
all the endeavours of the smaller Confederates ; and on the
other hand he perceived clearly that the State he represented
could stand alone, without danger to itself, if those in charge
of it would only act firmly and consistently.
On September 23, 1851, after barely three months,
observation of the situation — a question in which Prussia's
power and independence were involved being then on the
tapis — he pointed out to his Minister that in his opinion it
was not only possible but desirable to break up relations
with the Bund, which had sensibly become more unsatisfac
tory than they had theretofore been. It was just after the
Berlin Cabinet (it having been agreed all round to fall back
upon the basis of the old Federal Law) had requested the
Bund to give up its control over the three eastern provinces

v.] Austria and the Bund. 285
of Prussia — incorporated in the Federal realm during 1848
— that course of action appearing necessary, in relation to
the political tendencies then prevailing at Frankfort, as
affording legal grounds upon which Prussia might found an
independent European policy. Austria voted in favour of
this proposal unwillingly and under compulsion. But when
the question was being haggled over in the Federal
Assembly Bismarck (writing to Manteuffel) declared that
" he should have been personally very glad had he been
in a position to make a categorical declaration upon the
subject, instead of being obliged to tout for the consent of
his coy colleagues to the proposal," and closed his report
with the remark that, "should the vote be postponed or be
given in the negative, he would declare that Prussia would
go her own way, even without the consent of those contra
dictory gentlemen."
Shortly afterwards (Nov. 12), he urged his chief in Berlin
(upon the occasion of the note upon the expenses of the
Federal " execution " in Electoral Hesse) to make an ex
periment in the direction of ascertaining how many notes oi
the Federal Diet would be given in favour of a certain Prussian
view, at the risk of bringing about a scission in that Assembly :
adding, " For my part, I should not object to letting it be
generally known that Prussia stands alone in this matter."
Austria continued to utilize the votes of the petty States
in the Bund for her own purposes, in a sense adverse tc
Prussia, whose representative could not help finding oul
that insurmountable difficulties stood in the way of anything
like harmonious co-operation between himself and his
Austrian colleague. In every direction he found himsel
circumscribed and molested, in a highly vexatious manner
by the great majority of the medium and petty Germai
States' representatives, obedient to the instructions wired t<

286 The North Sea Fleet. [Chap.
them from Vienna. For instance, when an Austrian motion
for the publication of the Federal Diet's sessional reports
came on for discussion, and, despite Prussia's remonstrance,
a committee was elected to make a selection of the proceed
ings suitable for publication ; the choice of matter made by
this committee at once demonstrated that Bismarck had
been justified in predicting that the committee would turn
out a contrivance favourable to Austria and adverse to
Prussia. He personally attacked this nuisance in the
columns of the press, and by a vigorous protest addressed
to the Bund itself, the result of which was that the whole
thing was knocked on the head.
The North Sea Fleet (created in 1848) and its main
tenance by the Bund constituted another cause of conflict,
during which resolutions were adopted that were distinctly
prejudicial to Prussia, and, as such, were declared unconsti
tutional, null and void by her representative. Another was
the project of a Customs' Union with Austria, which led to
nothing but a fruitless Conference in Frankfort, and only served
to bring out into strong relief the domineering character
of Schwarzenberg's policy and its ill-will towards Prussia.
In connection with these questions and occurrences
Bismarck spoke his mind clearly and unreservedly
(Dec. 22, 185 1), to his Chief in Berlin, upon the subject of
Austria's new anti-Prussian policy. " The attitude of the
Vienna Cabinet," he observed, " since Austria, having for the
moment arranged her domestic affairs, has been once more
enabled to meddle with German politics, shows that on the
whole Prince Schwarzenberg is not satisfied to reoccupy the
position accorded to the Empire by the Federal Constitution
up to 1848, but desires to utilize the revolution (that all but
ruined Austria) as a basis for the realisation of farseeing

v.] Austria and the Petty States. 287
plans — just as the phenomena attending the inception of the
Thirty Years' War made the Emperor master of Germany
after having been insecure in his own palace of the Hofburg.
It is natural that the struggle for the material and formal
strengthening of Austria's position in Germany should be
now commenced (if not fought out) upon ¦the field of
discussion in the Federal Diet, and that successfully ; for, in
any case of divergence between Austria and Prussia as
matters now stand, the majority of the Federal Assembly is
ensured to Austria. This state of affairs is attributable to a
mistrustful irritability maintained towards Prussia by most of
the medium German Courts ever since the epoch of the
March-Revolution. In those quarters an inclination obtains
to lend credence to insinuations that, by reason of her geo
graphical situation, Prussia cannot but be bent upon coercing,
in one way or another, the Princes whose realms abut upon
her frontiers into dependence upon her, appealing against
them (with this object) to popular sympathy with German
Unity. Austria, meanwhile, flatters the particularistic
Sovereigns with the prospect of being rendered independent
and autocratic, as far as their respective subjects are
concerned, pointing out to them as well that the geo
graphical position, with relation to herself, of the smaller
States incapacitates her from attempting to encroach upon
their independence. We should not, moreover, under
estimate the influence exercised upon most German
Sovereigns by their personal entourage. As a rule, the most
influential personages at German Courts belong to a social
class which has much more to hope for from an Austrian
than from a Prussian evolution of German affairs. Besides,
a great many persons appertaining to this category have sons
or other relatives in the Austrian service, whose advance
ment they consider to be bound up with their own further

288 Austria's "Method" [Chap.
ance of Austria's policy. . . . Furthermore, I regard the
following as an important consideration. The German
States are afraid of reprisals on the part of Austria, whereas
they feel sure of conciliatory and benevolent treatment on
that of Prussia, whatever may happen. . . . Our co-Con
federates are accustomed to Austria's system of strict
reciprocity, in friendship and in enmity, and of never
allowing herself to be restrained, either by moral or legal
principles, from fully paying out anybody who, being
expected to stand by her, fails to do so."
In an earlier letter, addressed to Manteuffel, Bismarck
sets forth the moral of Austria's method in the following
words : " I can only see my way to bringing about a change
in the voting conditions now unfavourably affecting us in the
Federal Assembly by steadfast persistence on the part of
Prussia in showing no consideration whatsoever to any
German government which does not take pains to deserve
it." We shall see that in his later reports, describing
Austria's transactions with the Bund and their success —
reports which are the outcome of long observation and
copious experience — he recommends this "method" in
very plain and urgent terms. It may be here observed that
he did not preach to deaf ears upon this subject. In him
we perceive the adviser of Manteuffel and King Frederick
William IV. in whom they reposed implicit trust, and whose
utterances, written and verbal, continuously inspired Prussia's
policy in relation to Austria and her journeymen in the
Bund. His Royal Master frequently summoned him to
Court in order to confer with him ; and the Chancellor himself
has told me that, in the course of one year, he had to make
thirteen journeys " by command " from Frankfort to Berlin.
Bismarck's opposition to the projected outvoting of
Prussia in the Federal Diet, soon gave offence to Austria.

VJ German Dualism. 289
Towards the end of December 1851, Count Thun informed
his Prussian colleague in the course of a private conversation
that " such resistance to the decisions of majorities could
not fail to break up the Confederation ; " and received the
reply that " If the Federal Assembly, by direct and reckless
enforcements of the system of majorities, attempted to
constitute a Board having for its functions the exercise of
compulsion upon Prussia, means would be found to suspend
to this last bond of German Unity a weight which it
would prove incompetent to bear. The Federal Assembly
had not been intended to confirm, under any and every
circumstance, decisions with respect to which either Austria
or Prussia might happen to find herself in a minority, hence,
up to the year 1848, the formal rights of majorities were
only utilised cum grano satis, for at that time the illusion
was not entertained that German Dualism, which had
existed for a thousand years, could be done away with by
the mechanism of majority votes."
In January 1852 differences of opinion about the fleet
developed into a conflict upon fundamental questions,
touching the Federal Constitution. The German North-Sea
fleet had been created in 1848 to serve the German Imperial
Power then expected to be called into existence. With that
" coming event " in view, Prussia had paid her just share of
the outlay ; whereas Austria had contributed nothing, and
some of the medium States little more. The " Imperial
Power," came to nothing; but these ships, etc., were to the
fore, and the resuscitated Confederation was bound to
provide for their maintenance. When Prussia, for this
purpose proposed that the matricular arrears for the year
1848 should be paid up, all the Governments refused their
assent, and the Federal Assembly, at their instigation,
decided (July 1851) upon a fresh pecuniary advance.
vol. 1. u

290 The North Sea Fleet. [Chap.
Against this measure Bismarck lodged a protest on behalf
of Prussia, pointing out that the fleet was not an organic
institution according to Federal law, and that conse
quently absolute unanimity was requisite in any financial
measure concerning it. This was repeated six months
later. After an animated debate in the Federal Diet
(January, 1852), it was resolved to issue a loan through
Rothschild wherewith to cover the arrear outlay for the
fleet, pledging monies belonging to the Bund to the
banking-house in question. Bismarck was absent, in
Berlin, and his representative for the time being pro
tested against this resolve. This brought matters to a
point ; and thereafter Bismarck acted in concert with
Manteuffel. On Jan. 10 he telegraphed to the Councillor
of Legation, Wentzel : " Prussia does not regard the
projected financial operation as a Federal Loan; no one
has the right to divert the monies deposited with Rothschild
from the purpose assigned to them by treaty. Lodge a
protest with Rothschild against the expenditure or pledging
of these monies ; we shall hold the house of Rothschild
answerable for any prejudice accruing to ourselves or the
Confederation through the payment in question. Mean
while, suspend every payment to the Federal exchequer,
including those already advised." Wentzel handed in the
protest personally, and then reported to Berlin that^Thun
was violently excited, declaring the step taken at Roths
child's was an insult to the whole Confederation and a
derision of the Federal Decrees. In reply Bismarck
telegraphed : " So long as the fleet is not recognised as
Federal property, we shall regard and treat any expenditure
thereupon of Federal funds, not sanctioned by ourselves, as
illegal. For damage thus unlawfully done to us we shall
impawn all payments due by us to the Federal exchequer.

v.] The Customs' Union. 291
Make this known to Count Thun and to the other Envoys.
No one here thinks of giving way."
The subsequent developments of the Fleet- Question and
its ultimate settlement by the auctioneer's hammer, have
nothing to do with the objects of this work, and must
therefore be passed over. Reference, too, can only be
made to the leading features of Austria's second onslaught
upon the Prusso-German Customs' Union, which began
in January 1852. Mindful of the intention previously
manifested by Austria to play into the hands of the Federal1
Diet — practically identical with the Cabinet of Vienna,
which commanded its majority — Prussia had taken the
precaution to conclude a special treaty (to take effect from
Jan. 1, 1854) with Hanover and the remaining members ot
the Duties Union, in case the Central and Southern German
States should withdraw from the Customs' Union. Tha
Berlin Cabinet had then (Nov. 1851) given notice respecting
the Customs' Union Treaties that would expire at the close
of 1853, and had invited its Confederates to a Conference
in Berlin, for April 1852, at which a new Customs' Union
should be organised on the basis of the treaty with
Hanover and her allies. The annoyance caused to the
other German States by this proceeding, which they
regarded as inconsiderate, was utilised by Austria, who, at
the commencement of 1852, invited all the German
Governments to Vienna, there to discuss a Customs' and
Commercial Treaty with the Empire, and — Prussia having
declined the invitation — about the same time opened
secret negotiations with Bavaria, Saxony, Wuertemberg,
Baden, both Hesses and Nassau, in that direction; i.e. to
conclude a commercial treaty favouring Austria above all
other countries, and subsequently to create the " Darmstadt
Coalition," a Customs' Union embracing Austria and the
u 2

292 The Customs' Union. [Chap.
above-mentioned seven States. A general understanding
was arrived at with respect to the former arrangement, and
it was agreed that the latter was desirable, but that was all,
for a Customs' Union without Prussia was tacitly admitted to
be an impossibility. The Darmstadt Leaguers were afraid
of a Prussian hegemony, but an Austrian hegemony was
equally objectionable to them ; a Customs' League with the
two Great Powers would have been welcome to them, but
Prussia would not hear of it ; a continuance of economic
relations with the latter was a vital necessity to German
manufacturers, who, on the other hand, apprehended great
danger to their interests from an intimate connection with
Austria. Standing securely upon the solid basis of material
interests, Prussia forthwith declared that she could only
negotiate with Austria about a commercial treaty after the
Customs' Union should have been reconstituted on the
principles of her Treaty with Hanover ; whilst Austria and
the above-named seven States demanded simultaneous
negotiations. This gave rise to a long series of diplomatic
manoeuvres, accompanied by popular agitation of a lively
character. Bismarck participated eagerly in both. In
numerous reports he strove to keep Manteuffel posted up
in current events and the feelings prevailing in Southern
Germany, as well as to make him stick to the Customs'
Union policy thitherto pursued ; he repeatedly came
forward to oppose the machinations of Austria and her
followers ; he endeavoured by means of newspaper articles
and pamphlets, to strengthen the South's existing sympathies
for the menaced commercial relations, to obtain the support
of influential personages, to instigate petitions to the Cham
bers and to make Frankfort the centre of the entire agitation.
During this period he was sent to Vienna, where he
represented the Prussian Envoy, von Arnim, from June 8 to

V.] Bismat ck and Buol. 293
July 7, 1852, and was instructed to come to an understanding
with Count Buol (the successor to Prince Schwarzenberg, who
died in the first week of April 1852) with respect to a more
conciliatory policy, of which, however — as he soon became
aware — there was no prospect whatsoever. On June 1 1 he
wrote to his wife : — " The people here either do not want to
come to terms or fancy that we do, a good deal more so than
is really the case. I fear that the opportunity for an arrange
ment will be let slip, which will lead to an evil reaction at
home, where they think that, in sending me hither, they have
taken a very conciliatory step. They will not be in a hurry
to send another man as well disposed to come to an under
standing as myself, or entrusted with such plenary powers."
On June 14, Bismarck had a long conversation with Buol,
and ten days later was received in special audience by the
Emperor, to whom he had brought an autographic letter
from King Frederick William. His interview with the
Austrian Premier confirmed his opinion that the Vienna
Government was resolved to rely upon the co-operation of
the Central German States rather than upon the friendly
disposition of Prussia. " Count Buol," he reported to Berlin,
" has obviously not abandoned the hope of attaining the
objects hitherto aimed at by the Darmstadt Coalition by
passively but unyieldingly maintaining Austria's present
attitude, in the presumption that the obstacles to the re
construction of the Customs' Union brought forward by the
Coalition, will compel us to withdraw our opposition to
Austria's wishes." At first Bismarck expressed to Count
Buol the desire that the differences between the two Cabinets
might be disposed of; amongst others, legislation touching
the press, reinforcement and organisation of the Federal
army, construction of new Federal fortresses, police arrange
ments and newspaper polemics on either side. Buol did

294 Bismarck and Buol. [Chap.
not manifest a conciliatory disposition with respect to any of
these matters. He observed that a preliminary understand
ing between the two Cabinets upon questions destined to be
discussed in Frankfort would be impracticable with relation
to the other Confederates — at least, with the completeness
desired by the Prussian Envoy. It would of course be
possible to come to an agreement with Prussia as regarded
general principles, but questions of detail must be left for
discussion in the Federal Diet. Bismarck replied that such
questions would necessarily remain unsolved should Vienna
decline to make arrangements about them beforehand, not
only in relation to principle, but to practice, i.e. in concrete
cases. Buol did not altogether reject this view, and
declared himself ready to discuss the questions alluded to,
one after the other, with Bismarck in subsequent conference.
His offer, however, came to nothing. They then touched
upon the commercial-political question, and Bismarck gave
Count Buol to understand that Prussia desired that question '
to be dealt with and solved in accordance with material
rather than political considerations. The history of the
past ten years, he observed, had proved that the Customs'
Union did not constitute a decisive basis of political in
fluence. Prussia was neither legally bound nor constrained
by necessity to fall in with the demands of Austria or the
conditions of the Darmstadt Coalition. She was simply
prompted by Federal good will and political considerations
to display an obliging disposition towards her Confederates,
and exacted from them no equivalent for her amicable
endeavours to please them. She wished- to conclude a
commercial treaty with Austria, such as might bring about
a still closer rapprochement and enable both contracting
parties to acquire experience by which they might appraise
the practical consequences of relations still more intimate.

V.] Bismarck and Buol. 295
" Prussia," he continued, " does not feel justified in making
experiments with the material well-being of her subjects
upon unknown ground. She therefore requires that the
question of a Customs' Union shall be treated as an open
one, not at present to be answered affirmatively or nega
tively. The right of imposing conditions in an issue which
is actually mera facultatis, as far as we are concerned,
belongs to us, not to the other party ; and if you reject
our request to comply with our demands in part and to
leave the decision, open with regard to the rest, preferring to
exact the whole of your own demand, we opine that the
fulfilment of Austria's wishes will not be advanced thereby."
Buol replied as follows : — " Austria cannot allow herself
to be regarded by Germany as a foreign power with which a
Commercial Treaty may be concluded as with an alien
country ; nor would such a treaty be of any value to the
Imperial Cabinet unless it recognised, expressly and
officially, the Customs' Union and amalgamation of all
Germany's interests as the aim of common policy. The
consequence of Prussia's refusal even to discuss the Austrian
proposals, will be Prussia's exclusion from the Customs' Union,
which will manage to exist without her. A large proportion
of the German States manifest a lively conviction of the
benefits to be derived from the Customs' Union, Austria
cannot call upon her Confederates to abstain from repre
senting their interests, identical with those of the Empire,
and will never depart from the basis thitherto agreed upon
between them without having previously come to an under
standing with them. It is not possible to regard this
question exclusively as a material one, for it has its political
side, inseparable though not predominant. Austria in this
matter, is contending on behalf of her legitimate influence
in Germany, and should Prussia stand alone at the head
of a Customs' Union embracing the whole of Germany,

296 Bismarck and Francis Joseph. [Chap.
many people will become apprehensive that the agitations
of late years in favour of German Unity may recommence."
Buol's chief arguments consisted of references to Prussia's
duty towards Germany, and complaints of the unfriendliness
displayed by her towards kindred States. Bismarck rejoined
that of late years Prussia had found doing her duty to Germany
a thankless business, and was resolved to regulate her own
financial and economic affairs in a practical manner, gladly
keeping a door open for such of her Confederates as might
be alive to their parity of interests with her, but by no means
touting for their entrance by concessions lying outside the
line she had laid down for herself.
With respect to his audience of Kaiser Francis Joseph,
Bismarck reported to the King that the Emperor had
observed, " It would always be his eager endeavour to
preserve and improve, in the sense indicated in the King's
letter, the close and friendly relations fortunately obtaining
between both countries. If, from time to time, both
Cabinets should differ in opinion upon individual questions
relating to material interests, that should not hinder
Prussia and Austria from going hand in hand upon the
remaining political terrain." With respect to the Customs
question, the Emperor deemed it his duty to. adhere to the
programme of Customs' Unity, " being convinced that
nothing but an amalgamation of material interests could
possibly achieve that measure of consolidation required by
Germany as a guarantee of her internal safety and of her
position as an European Power." So long as the King of
Prussia should continue not to share this view, the
Emperor would at least expect, "that the efforts made on
either side to invest the Federal Diet with greater power
and authority in Germany than it had theretofore possessed
would obtain complete success through the concordant
attitude of both the Great Powers." The Emperor further

V.] A Compromise. 297
remarke d fkat Count Buol would again confer with Prussia's
representative on questions of Federal Law ; and it might
be hoped that by this means an agreement in re the
Customs matter might be arrived at." Bismarck replied
that his Sovereign had commanded him to repeat verbally,
" that the consolidation and further development of a close
alliance between both Courts was not only recognised by the
King as a personal requirement but — now even more than
ever — as a political necessity ; and that His Prussian Majesty
was ready to do everything compatible with Prussia's
situation, to meet the Emperor's wishes." Bismarck then
touched upon the Customs' question, explained the Prussian
Government's views thereanent, and pointed out that " all
which is at present practically feasible in the way of fulfilling
the Imperial Government's desires consists in Prussia's
willingness to conclude — immediately after the renewed
recognition of the Zollverein — a commercial treaty with
Austria which should furnish both Powers with experiences
still lacking to them, by which they might be enabled to
come to a definite decision with respect to the possibility
of a Customs' Union." The Emperor listened attentively
to this statement, put some questions to Bismarck upon the
subject, spoke a few gracious words to him, and then
changed the topic of conversation.
Bismarck's mission was unsuccessful. Later on a sort of
compromise was arranged with respect to the Customs
question. On February 19th, 1853, Prussia and Austria
signed a Commercial and Customs' Treaty, to be valid for
twelve years ; and on April 4, at the Berlin Customs'
Conference, the Plenipotentaries of all the States thitherto
belonging to the Customs' Union, as well as those constitut
ing the Duties' Union, signed Treaties recording the renewal
of the former (Zollverein), the addition thereto of the latter

298 A ustria at the Federal Diet [Chap.
(Steuerverein) and the adhesion of both to the Treaty
concluded between Prussia and Austria. But the behaviour
in the Confederation of the Vienna politicians towards
Prussia remained unaltered. Buol carried on Schwarzen
berg's " method," of domineering over Prussia by means of
a philo- Austrian majority in the Federal Assembly — less
vigorously and intelligently, it is true, but with the same
instruments, and to the same ends. As before, Bismarck
found himself compelled to resist every contestable exten
sion of the Confederation's powers and jurisdiction, and, in
the Assembly of Envoys, to weaken and repel Austria's
influence by every means at his disposal. Discussions
respecting the competency of the presidential authority took
place almost without intermission.
There was no functional presidency. The representative
of Austria occupied by right the honorary position of Chair
man during the conferences, and formally conducted
business. As his post was a permanent one it had become
practically invested with a certain amount of influence.
This had been the case at a time when Prussia being on
good terms with Austria, was able to pass it over in silence ;
but when Austrian policy became distinctly anti-Prussian,
Bismarck was obliged to remonstrate with more or less
energy against certain encroachments perpetrated by his
presiding colleague. This was particularly the case in the
time of Thun's successor, the pathetic, insidious and untruthful
Prokesch-Osten, when Bismarck expressly protested against
the disgraceful circumstance that the Federal Chancery and
its officials regarded themselves as exclusively Austrian insti
tutions and were treated as such. He also severely criticised
the president's arbitrary manner of conducting business, and
ultimately proposed and carried through a fundamental
alteration of the regulations of the Federal Diet.

V.] The Federal Diet. 299
All this criticism and opposition at times looked like
petty cavilling; but serious considerations were in the back
ground. Bismarck's tactics consisted not so much in defend
ing the interests of Prussia against Austria as in vindicating
the rights of the entire Assembly against its Presidency.
Hereby he won the sympathies of many a colleague, even
amongst those who habitually favoured Austria. But al
though these gentlemen gratefully squeezed his hand in
private, glancing at him significantly the while, they seldom
ventured to lend him the support of their votes at a division ;
fur they were afraid of Austria's vengeance upon their
countries, and of prejudice to their own personal interests.
This being the case, Bismarck again and again repeated his
advice to the Prussian Government to pay the Austrians out
in kind, and to hinder the petty States from further acts of
molestation by returning them evil for evil.
When the Federal Diet was first resuscitated it turned its
attention to putting down all the surviving extravagances of
the 1848 revolutionary agitation. To this end a "Political
Committee '' was elected, which at once proposed to draw
up Federal decrees for the prevention of abuses of liberty of
the press, and even before promulgating such decrees, to
exhort the several Governments to enforce a strict police
supervision upon the press. This proposal was agreed to ;
but as soon as the text of the decrees themselves came under
discussion there was an end to the Assembly's unanimity.
Bismarck was the Revolution's inveterate foe, truly, but
even more important than its suppression appeared to him
the duty of saving Prussia from falling under Austrian tute
lage through the agency of the Federal Diet ; and so he
unremittingly opposed the draft of a detailed Federal Press-
Law which it was proposed to introduce into all the German
States. It was his desire that the Diet should only lay down

300 The Crimean War. [Chap.
such general principles in relation to the repression of press-
abuses, as might be acceptable to the Prussian Legislature.
He took up similar ground in 1853, when the supervision and
restriction of club-life came before the Diet, and energetically
defended the existing Prussian laws against the encroachments
proposed by the majority of the Diet under Austrian influence.
In view of her insecure relations with Austria and the
Central States and the former's steadfast endeavours to
stunt the independence of Prussian policy, Prussia found it
absolutely necessary, as far as was in her power, to prevent
the Bund from dealing with European questions, and also to
carefully avoid any collision between herself and the other
Great Powers. It was upon this account that Bismarck
opposed Baden's proposal to punish Switzerland for her
behaviour in the refugee question by occupying her eis
Rhenane territories with Federal troops. He also induced
Prokesch to omit from his speech to the Federal Assembly,
advocating an increase of the Confederation's armaments, a
passage in which France was pointed out in very offensive
terms as the only Power likely to disturb the peace of Europe.
Of exceptionally great moment was his view of the attitude
imposed upon Prussia and the rest of non- Austrian Germany
by the breaking out of the Crimean War, and by the action
of the Vienna Cabinet during the several phases of that
struggle between three Great Powers. So was his influence
upon Prussian policy throughout the crisis in question. That
he practically directed that policy — which was vehemently
contested by the Liberals at the time — may be gathered
from many of his private letters to Manteuffel, in which he
justifies it by exhaustive exponence of its motives and ends.
In 1853 Czar Nicholas believed himself capable of
making a great stride towards the solution of the Eastern
Question. With his aid the Revolution had been over-

v.] The Crimean War. 301
powered in Central Europe ; he looked upon Prussia and
Austria as his vassals ; he deemed England (under the
Aberdeen Ministry) indisposed, and France impotent, to
thwart his plans ; Turkey he regarded as a "sick man"
approaching dissolution. His notion was to sever the
Danubian Principalities as well as Bulgaria and Servia
from the Ottoman Empire, and to convert them into
States under a Russian hegemony. When England refused
her consent to a partition with Turkey (her share of which
would have been Egypt and Candia) the Czar sent Prince
Mentschikoff to Constantinople to demand the conclusion
of a treaty according to Russia the protectorate over all
orthodox Christians in Turkey. Upon the Porte rejecting
this demand a Russian army entered the Danubian Principali
ties in order to hold them in pawn for the satisfaction of the
Czar's claim. Upon this, in July 1853, the Envoys of the
four other Great powers assembled at Vienna in conference,
and made an unsuccessful attempt at mediation. The
Sultan then declared war upon Russia, and (March 12, 1854)
the Western Powers followed his example, Austria and
Prussia, however, restricting themselves for the time being
to summoning Russia (April 20, 1854) to evacuate the
Principalities and to declaring that they would regard as a
casus belli the incorporation of those provinces in the
Russian Empire. This proceeding was not to the taste of
the German Central States. They recommended a more
prudent attitude towards Russia, upon grounds set forth as
follows by Bismarck in a letter (April 26) to Manteuffel : — '¦
" They fear the expenses and calamities of war in general,
and in particular that they themselves, at its close, may
figure as objects to be dealt with by the Powers, instead of
sharers in the profits. Hence I believe myself justified in
assuming that, during each and every phase of the ap-

302 The German Petty States. [Chap.
proaching complications, they will timely range themselves
on the winning side, if the latter accord to them any kind of
guarantee for the maintenance of the petty German Princes'
formal independence. They would have found all they
wanted in an alliance of conservative tendencies between
Prussia, Austria and Russia. Not without inward reluctance
would they join a League of the four Western Powers
against Russia, because — although they would be on the
stronger side — such a League would offer them a weaker
guarantee of the status quo of their existence, in the ordinary
course of events. In such a case, however, they would
closely watch the action of France, and on the first symptom
of a rapprochement between France and Russia, would go
any length in order not to be excluded from a Franco-
Russian League. Simultaneously with a rupture between
Russia and the two German Great Powers, France would
find herself in a position to take possession of the hegemony
over all the other German States — that is, at the very
moment at which she could and would come to an under
standing with Russia." In a letter of April 27, he remarked
" The 20th of April has disappointed the expectations of the
German States, and discredited Prussia with them, for they
see that Austria is her master. The mouths of the Danube
are of little interest to Germany."
Partly in deference to the above views, Prussia subse
quently did her best to avoid a rupture with Russia. But
the Central States took measures to impress their objects
and aims in the matter upon the attention of both German
Great Powers. Under the leadership of Bavaria and Saxony
they assembled, in the persons of their plenipotentiaries, at
Bamberg, and addressed an " Identical Note " to the Courts
of Berlin and Vienna, claiming for the German Confedera
tion, as a first-class European power, a voice in the settle-

v.] The " April Treaty'' 303
ment of the Eastern Question. This step proved abortive,
however, and when Prussia and Austria laid their " April
Treaty " before the Federal Diet all the members of the
Bund, with the exception of Mecklenburg, agreed to the
policy therein set forth.
Prussia, at that time, had reason to fear that Austria
meant to go farther than the Berlin Government wished to
go. Her apprehensions are explained in Bismarck's report
of July 25, 1854. "The opportunity for acquisition is favour
able to Austria. The Alliance (' April Treaty ') affords a sort
of insurance against mishaps ; in addition, the conviction
prevails that Prussia and Germany will deem it necessary,
in their own interests, to safeguard Austria, however
objectionable her policy may be to them. Nothing
but the extinction of this unwarrantable conviction can
possibly hinder the Vienna Cabinet from wilfully picking
a quarrel with Russia. We cannot place much reliance
upon the Central States; but we can at least regain that
measure of their confidence which we possessed before
1848. Just now they are anti- French, with the exception,
perhaps, of Darmstadt. Nevertheless, steadfast pressure on
them, exercised by Prussia and Austria, may soon awaken
in them the desire to take France's part on their own account,
instead of doing so under the tutelage of the two German
Powers. It will come to that ultimately, unless their Govern
ments find Prussia ready to back them up and to representwith
vigour real German interests — not those so called by Austria.
Although I do not unconditionally rely upon a durable
good-feeling towards us on the part of the Bamberg
Leaguers, I fear that their sentiments for us must be
regarded as teeming with true devotion in comparison to
those which fill the hearts of Count Buol, Bach, and other
disciples of Schwarzenberg's political doctrines, leagued
with the Ultramontanists. The system of Germanising

304 Austria and Poland. [Chap.
centralisation now practised in Austria has need, for the
attainment of its objects, of a livelier organic connection
with a robuster hegemony in Germany. Ultramontane
efforts just now go hand in hand with those of the Vienna
Cabinet. Prussia's powerful position in Germany is the
hardest and heaviest stumbling-block to both; its im
portance diminishes in proportion to the increase of the
difference between Prussia's and Austria's respective physi
cal forces, as that difference comes to resemble the contrast
between the powers of Prussia and Bavaria . . . Therefore,
putting aside all other considerations connected with the
Eastern question, we can only consent to an Austrian
territorial increment if we obtain at least as considerable
an augmentation of territory as that accorded to the
Empire. Should Austria go to war with Russia she will
not be able for any length of time to refrain from participa
tion in the projects entertained by the Western Powers with
respect to a restoration of Poland. Hitherto those projects
have never been honourably scouted in London and Paris,
and will, sooner or later, be brought forward resolutely as
the only means of effecting a permanent curtailment of
Russia's power. Austria's interests are less adverse to the
restoration of Poland than those of Prussia or Russia ; they
are, indeed, scarcely of such moment as to induce Austria,
after having broken with Russia, to fall out with the
Western Powers. I am of opinion that, had Austria to
choose between Galicia and the Principalities, she would
select the latter, which are more accessible to the German
language and administration than are the Polish provinces ;
their population, moreover, is inoffensive; they are sus
ceptible of ample development, and, geographically as well
as commercially, suit Austria a great deal better than
Galicia, which is stuck on to the Empire outside the Car
pathians, and, with its open frontiers, is at the mercy alike

V.] Austria and Poland. 305
of Russia and of Polish revolutions. The dangers to which
Hungary's tranquillity would be exposed by the vicinity of
Poland would be counterbalanced by the plentiful recruit
ment of elements hostile to the Magyars — i.e. Serbs and Rou
manians. Furthermore, the restoration of Poland offers the
following advantages to the Austrian " system" : 1. Prussia
would be weakened and held in check. 2. The perils of
Panslavism would vanish as soon as there should exist two
powerful Slav States differing in religion and nationality. 3.
There would be another important Roman-Catholic State in
Europe. 4. Poland, restored by Austria's aid, would obviously
become the latter's steadfast ally. 5. The restoration of
Poland affords to Austria, probably, the only lasting guar
antee against Russia's vengeance whenever the Italian
question shall bring about a struggle between Austria and
France, or Austria shall get into trouble of any sort. If
the worst came to the worst the Vienna Cabinet could fall
back upon the expedient of re-allotting Poland, without
giving up the Danubian Principalities. I do not go so far
as to assert that Austria, of her own free will, will propose
the restoration of Poland. But if the Western Powers urge
it upon her seriously she will certainly not prove inflexible,
it being of course understood that the Principalities be
offered to her in compensation."
The policy of Prussia was mainly guided by these con
siderations, even in the subsequent development of affairs.
Austria, however, leant more and more towards the Western
Powers, strove to come to terms with them on her own
account, entertained the project of going to war with Russia
in real earnest, and left no stone unturned to obtain the aid
of Prussia and the other German States in that enterprise.
On June 14th she concluded a treaty with the Porte
authorising the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by
VOL. 1. x

306 . The Four Points. [Chap.
her troops, and the Austrians marched into those provinces
towards the end of July, as soon as the Russians had with
drawn from them. Before the Western Powers attacked
Russia upon her own soil, diplomacy had made consider
able efforts to stay the gigantic struggle and give matters a
peaceful turn. After many fruitless consultations and
propositions the Western Powers at last (July 22nd) pro
pounded four points, to serve as the basis of all further
negotiations : 1. Abolition of the Russian Protectorate in
Moldavia, Wallachia and Servia. 2. Absolute freedom of
navigation on the Danube. 3. Revision of the older
treaties concerning the Black Sea, and effacement there
from of Russian preponderance. 4. Rejection of any
special Protectorate over the Christians of the Ottoman
Empire, and establishment of a system of protection to be
practised in common by all the Great Powers. Austria and
Prussia supported these demands upon Russia. When
Russia rejected them, Austria reinforced her army in
Transylvania, and stationed another army upon the Russo-
Galician frontier. Prussia appeared practically satisfied by
the retreat of the Russians across the Pruth, and made no
warlike dispositions. The majority of the Federal States
followed her example. The Berlin Cabinet, however, did
not take Russia's part decisively, but continued to make
representations at Petersburg in the sense of the Four
Points. There, however, the custom had long prevailed of
assuming the right to " speak the last word " in questions
touching German politics, of giving advice to Berlin in the
Mentor style, of putting forward unjustifiable claims, and of
occasionally holding out threats ; so Count Nesselrode, the
Czar's Foreign Minister thought fit to maintain a haughty tone.
In a despatch (Nov. 6) addressed to the Russian Ambas
sador in Vienna and referring to " the split between the two

ivj Diplomacy as it should be. 247
instrument of an exalted personage. Whether or not this
conjecture was well-founded is not for me to say ; but it was
certainly remarkable that Montgelas was at first only slightly
reprimanded and subsequendy allowed to retire on a full
pension; that the negotiations between Austria-Hungary
and Great Britain were broken off shortly after the exposure
of the scandal ; and finally that rumours were spread abroad
from Vienna to the effect that Andrassy's position was
imperilled and even tottering to its fall.
The moral of what has been written above respecting the
necessity of personal discipline in the diplomatic service is
as follows : — Diplomacy, in many important respects, is
akin to the army ; above all in this — that it must have but
one leader, and must function organically ; in other words,
that branch of the public service which regulates communi
cations and relations with foreign States stands more in need
than any other of tense subordination of its members to its
head, and of unanimity in their utterances. All the diplo
matists of any State are bound to carry out the ideas of their
Minister — to turn and twist themselves about, in obedience to
his will and command, like the shuttles of a weaving-machine
when the steam-engine is at work. No exception to this
rule can be made in favour of first-class talents. Hesitations,
tergiversations, " knowing better " on the part of Ambas
sadors, divisions between the different organs of the staff
abroad, paralyse a government's action, undermine its pres
tige with other Cabinets, and, at certain critical moments,
endanger its very existence.
A disorganised diplomatic service can only be injurious to
the interests of Sovereign and people, like an army whose
subordinate generals should refuse to obey its commander-in-
chief when expressly ordered by him to march in this or
that direction, to attack or to retreat A certain measure of

308 Austria's Demands. [Chap.
with Belgium. It is very certain that the union of Prussia and
Austria (even if purchased by the former still more dearly than
au prix de quelques sacrifices d 'amour propre) constitutes one
of the most material elements of Belgium's security, par
ticularly since the relations of Belgium to Austria, prescribed
by history and confession, have been revivified by the
marriage of the Belgian Crown-prince to Archduchess Maria
Henrietta. If there is to be a war, Belgium can only desire
that it may be restricted to the Russo-German frontier, far
distant from Brussels, whilst she (Belgium), surrounded by
four Powers friendly to herself and to one another, shall be
preserved from any immediate contact with so serious a
complication. . . . Austria's demands have risen, by reason
of her trust in Prussia's help, step by step from the evacu
ation of the Danube Principalities to such a height that
hints at a possible cession of Bessarabia, published in the
Vienna press, no longer surprise anybody. Russia will only
consent to such terms at the close of a great and disastrous
war. The chances in favour of revolution which such a war
would present to the thrones of Europe, are more numerous
than the guarantees of Conservatism which lie in an
alliance with Austria— herself in need of aid against the
revolutionary movement — and the Western Powers, even if
Napoleon's life or reign were sure to last for a considerable
time to come. Therefore I am of opinion that an adhesion on
our part to the present Austrian policy can only be of use to us
so far as it may restrain Austria from attacking Russia.''
Upon the attitude of the petty German States towards
Austria's plans, and upon their view of the situation in
general, Bismarck reported to his chief (August 26) : " None
of my colleagues doubt that Austria even now — although
Russia has evacuated the Principalities — is bent upon
obtaining such a hold upon Germany's forces that they may

v.] The Central States. 309
be induced to engage in an Austrian war of conquest. The
Central States are by no means disposed to adopt a policy
so unfruitful and perilous, as far as they are concerned —
especially as long as it shall continue to be directed wilfully
by Count Buol, in whose capacity and prudence no one
places the least confidence. It were unjust to accuse the
Bamberg Leaguers of having from the first turned their eyes
towards France in this crisis ; what they really wanted was
an independent German policy, in connection with which
they would have as much as possible to say. When they
saw that the two Great Powers would not have this, they
hoped, by hanging on to Prussia, at least to keep themselves
out of a war in which there was no prospect of gain either to
us or to them, whilst its perils were quite incalculable. It
is not every one of my colleagues who has an opinion of his
own ; but the more independent of them talk to me con
fidentially upon the subject pretty much as follows : ' It is
Prussia's interest, as well as ours, to keep Austria out of a
war with Russia ; and if Prussia has the courage to forbid
Austria to attack Russia, she is certainly strong enough to
do so. But when we see Prussia allowing herself to be led
away by so narrow-minded and frivolous a person as Count
Buol, who does not even ask for her opinion upon decisive
issues, we are bound to look after our own safety. If both
the German Great Powers are to sail with Count Buol for
their steersman, it may be confidently predicted that Ger
many will suffer shipwreck ; for the certain consequence of
a Prusso-Austrian war with Russia will be a Franco-Russian
alliance — which, according to trustworthy rumours, is already
in course of preparation, and which Russia, in her need,
would purchase at any price. By reason of her internal
difficulties Austria is scarcely able to face such a danger ;
for it will be easy for the French to rouse Italy to revolt, and

310 Bismarck' s Remonstrances. [Chap.
for the Russians to stir up either the Grasco-Slav or Magyar
races. In such a conjuncture Prussia and England would
be unable to protect us. If, therefore, the former cannot
prevent Austria from going to war, we shall certainly cast in
our lot with Austria and France, as long as they stick
together, and with France, as soon as she shall separate from
Austria and enter into relations with Russia. The duty of
self-preservation will not permit us to act otherwise, should
Prussia not very soon and very resolutely put forth her
undoubted capacity to hinder Austria from making war.'"
Bismarck speaks of these views as " natural and reasonable ; "
and then (the inclination then prevailing at Berlin being
more favourable to Austria than he approved of) concluded
with the following words : " It is my official duty to
acquaint your Excellency with the appreciations thrust upon
me in the circle connected with my position here; and,
although it does not befit me to even wish to exercise
influence upon the decisions of exalted personages, I cannot
conceal the anxiety with which I am filled by the confidence
of the Austrian organs that Count Buol will succeed in
utilising for his own purposes His Majesty the King's friendly
disposition to the Bund, and in extorting fresh concessions
from Prussia which may inspire the Cabinet of Vienna with
the hope of success in its one-sided efforts to drag us after it
into an enterprise the eventualities of which will inflict a
multiplicity of heavy sacrifices and disasters upon Germany,
whilst, at the very best, they will only ensure to Austria
results of more than doubtful value."
Compare with the above the closing paragraph of the
report addressed by Bismarck to Manteuffel on Dec. 8 :
" I am not one of those who identify our interests with those
of Russia; on the contrary, Russia has done us much
wrong, and we can knock the Revolution on the head in

V.] Political Suggestions. 311
our own country, and in Germany, at least, without Russia's
assistance. Although a war with that empire would be a
serious matter for us, I should not attempt to say anything
against it if it held out the prospect of yielding us a prize
worthy of us. But the very notion appals me that we may
plunge into a sea of trouble and danger on behalf of Austria,
for whose sins the King displays as much tolerance as I
only hope God in Heaven will one day shew towards mine."
On Dec. 9 (after the conclusion of the Convention of the
2nd Dec. had been made known) Bismarck wrote privately
to Manteuffel : " The rapidity with which Austria's Conven
tion with the Western Powers has followed her agreement
with her German Fellow-Confederates, has not exactly served
to increase the confidence enjoyed here by Count Buol.
The impression is general that Austria is on more intimate
terms with the Western Powers — especially with France —
than with any German State. Even if Austria's political
situation be for the moment so fortunate an one as Herr von
Prokesch has depicted it in roseate tints, her policy on the
Danube will cause her a terrible headache when she shall
recover her sobriety. Let the Western Powers once be
convinced that fear (of an Italian onslaught supported by
France) is the magic wand with which Austria is to be ruled,
and she will soon be not only in their tow, but utterly and
immediately dependent upon them. If we should also
adopt this policy (which it may be desirable and necessary
to do under certain circumstances) I should recommend that
we do so by establishing a direct and independent connec
tion with the Western Powers, rather than by appearing in
the character of a reserve force, available ad nutum, of
Austria — herself hampered in her more important decisions.
With remarkable self-denial we have offered to Austria the
opportunity to take up a policy of her own, supported by

312 Austria and Russia. [Chap.
Germany ; Austria, however, would rather be dependent upon
France than incur any obligation to us ; she hopes, more
over, to get more by her dependence than by the other
method — she does not even know how much ; and finally,
she has not the courage, even when backed up by Prussia,
and all Germany, to defy French menaces of a rising, etc.,
in Italy. . . . Arrogance does not permit the Austrians to
confess honourably that they stand in need of us and to
deal with us accordingly ; they prefer trying to circumvent
us, in attempting which they commit the gross error of
treating political affairs as if they were notarial private busi
ness. Treaties between great States are only of value when
they ratify the expression of actual interests on either side ;
and all the clauses and provisions in the world are unavail
ing, when one of the parties feels itself bested and unfairly
treated, to make up for the lack of good will and free,
energetic action. ... If the Convention of the 2nd (which
I have not yet seen) be one in which we can join, perhaps a
manifestation in the Chamber might be utilized to render
our acceptance of that document less bitter to Russia.
Should peace be really achieved, it will in my opinion be a
great gain to us that thereafter we shall stand better with
Russia than before the war, whilst Austria and the Bamberg
League will be in bad odour with her. The day of reckon
ing never fails to arrive, though years may elapse before its
dawn." (It arrived in 1866, after Russia's debt to Austria
had been increased by the latter's behaviour throughout the
Polish insurrection.) " Austria has established herself upon
Russia's path as an at present insurmountable barrier ; natur
ally enough the sharpest weapons of Russia's policy will for
the future be brought to bear upon that barrier. We can
only gain in authority and freedom of action by this change ;
and it seems to be a very satisfactory result of our hesitant

v.] Fresh Conferences. 313
policy that in the meanwhile the antagonism of Vienna and
Petersburg has assumed an angrier and more durable
character." We find Bismarck consistently addressing Manteuffel in
this sense, and not without success : " It has rejoiced my
heart," he wrote on Dec. 19, " that your Excellency should
have answered the questions about our accession to the
Treaty (Austria and the Western Powers) and our so-called
isolation with cold dignity and without empressement. As
long as we shall continue to manifest unaffected fearlessness
people will respect us and be careful not to menace us. If
it were only possible to let Austria know that our patience
and brotherly love are not inexhaustible, and that we have
not forgotten the road to Moravia, I feel convinced that her
fear of us would do more to further the cause of peace than
her reliance upon our support actually does."
In view of the Convention above referred to, and of
Austria's manifestly warlike disposition, Russia appeared in
clined to give way, and Prince Gortchakoff, her Plenipoten
tiary Extraordinary in Vienna, announced that she would
accept, as bases of negotiation, the four points of the
Western Powers' declaration of July 22. The interrupted
Conference again assembled, but without result, as the
Russians did not really mean peace. Prussia drew nearer
to Russia, and the Bamberg League adhered to her policy of
neutrality, as a counterbalance to Austria's bellicose pro
jects. When Russia collected an army in Volhynia where
with to threaten Vienna, Austria applied (Dec. 24) to the
Federal Diet for the immediate mobilization of the Federal
Contingent, demanding that the troops of the 7th and 10th
Army Corps should be attached to similar corps of the two
Great Powers. But the Central States would only consent
to preparations which were far from being a real display oi

314 The Austrian Mobilisation. [Chap.
their fighting forces, and Prussia voted with them. Under
these circumstances Austria, whose finances were in a very
shaky condition, did not dare to commence hostilities, and
adhered to her semi-neutrality.
Concerning this Austrian mobilisation-proposal Bismarck
wrote (January i, 1855) to Manteuffel : — " I do not ven
ture to pronounce whether it be really the Vienna Cabinet's
object to drag Prussia into a war of aggression with Russia,
or whether Austria still flatters herself with the hope that
demonstrative war-preparations, made upon a large scale
and supported by Prussia with the same show of earnest
ness displayed by Austria herself, might suffice to obtain
everything she desires from Russia," (Here follow refer
ences in detail to former Conventions and Treaties, which
I have suppressed as, for the most part, unintelligible to the
English reader. — Translator's Note.) " I can only adhere
to my conviction, already reported to you, that the most
effective means for restoring peace and preserving our
influence in Europe, are to be found in the pressure we can
put upon Austria, if we choose to do so. Even now I do
not think it likely that the war-party will decide the
Emperor Francis Joseph's final resolves, if Austria be com
pelled to incur the risk of being forsaken by Prussia — still
less, if it be pointed out in Vienna that Prussia's action
might possibly take a hostile turn towards Austria. It is
believed, even in Paris and London, that Austria's active
co-operation is dependent upon Prussia's decision at the
crucial moment ; and in my opinion our only prospect of ex
ercising influence upon the resolves of the Western Powers
is to let it be clearly understood in Paris and London
that the key of Austrian co-operation lies in our hand, and
that we are determined, in case of need, to use it fearlessly .-
Until this shall be done I cannot doubt that our en

v.] Bismarckian Suggestions. 315
deavours, unaccompanied as they are by either proposals
or menaces, will be coldly received by the Western
Cabinets. Having made sure of Austria they will not
forego that advantage, and estrange Austria, by making
separate arrangements with us, unless we either make
offers to them surpassing those of Austria, or prove to
them that Austria's final decisions depend upon us — not
ours on hers. Hitherto the Western Powers have hoped to
obtain our co-operation without allowing us to influence
their own resolves. They reckon unduly upon the effect
of public opinion in Prussia " (where the Liberals were
perorating with incurable shortsightedness against Russia,
as the foe of Liberalism, and were raving about Britannia's
beautiful blue eyes), "and upon the influence of an in
definite anxiety with respect to so-called ' isolation ' and to
a war with the three contracting parties of December 2.
Beyond doubt, in my opinion, our endeavours can only prove
successful in influencing the action of those three Powers if
our agents in Vienna, Paris and London can awaken the
conviction that we are altogether free from anxieties of that
description and inexorably resolved to defend our inde
pendence and position as a Great Power against every one,
if need be, by the most desperate means and exertions.
Although it would be unreasonable and dangerous for us
to enter into closer relations with Russia than heretofore,
I believe that it would strengthen our influence upon the
course of events if we hinted to the Western Powers that
a rapprochement between ourselves and Russia is not
beyond the limits of possibility, and to Vienna that cir
cumstances might lead to our becoming more closely
connected with the Western Powers than Austria herself
is, in virtue of the Treaty of December 2."
In February 1855, it was said that France contemplated

3T6 An Abortive Project. [Chap.
assembling an army on the Upper Rhine, which force — •
having marched through Baden, Wuertemberg, and Bavaria
— should co-operate with the Austrians against Russia.
Writing on the subject to Manteuffel, Bismarck observed
that it would be better to " level bayonets " than to let the
French march through south-west Germany, where such a
proceeding would be certain to develope French military
rule. He took a cooler view of a French army that should
reach Austria by another road. In a letter of his dictation
he remarks (February 1 1) : "I should not regard as a
misfortune the stationing of French troops in Austria's
German provinces, if they were transported thither without
touching any other Federal State. The 80,000 Frenchmen
who would be in Bohemia could not be on the Rhine ; nor
would France be any the stronger for such a dispersion of
her armies. These troops would be easily got at by our
best forces (from the eastern provinces), to which moreover
they are in no way equal. Besides, such an arrangement
contains the germ of a rupture between France and Austria,
sure to accrue if from sixty to eighty thousand Frenchmen
— never particularly well-behaved allies — have to be pro
vided for in Austria. Austria's prestige in Germany would
suffer' a heavy blow, accompanied by the deepest distrust.
So long, therefore, as Federal rights shall be safeguarded
from a hazardous precedent by due notice being given to
the Bund by Austria of her intentions, I do not apprehend
that it is our business to oppose this step, which, in my
opinion, would be the greatest piece of folly committed by
Austria for a century past I do not think she wiU carry it
out until she shall be sure of our consent."
It was stated in June 1855 that Count Buol was once
more making up to the Russians ; and Bismarck wrote to
Manteuffel, on the 17th of that month: " I do not know

V.] A ustrian A mbition. 317
whether or not Count Buol has any distinct object in view,
as far as his policy is concerned ; I scarcely think so, unless
it be an instinctive feeling that Austria can make something
out of this crisis, and is resolved to profit by it as much or
as little as she can without running any great risk. To get
rid of the Russians from her southern frontier and to regu
late Danube navigation in conformity with Austrian interests
constitute a gratifying advantage, but one too inconsiderable
to content Austria. If she could have been satisfied with
that, she might have obtained it from the Russians with our
aid before December 2, without entangling herself in reck
less and costly engagements to the Western Powers. Last
year Austrian ambition probably aspired to the acquisition
of the entire Danube and of a part of the Black Sea coast,
and doubtless the Vienna Government has not yet quite
given up its hopes with respect to the Danubian Principali
ties. If it really contemplates secret negociations with
Petersburg in order to obtain Russia's recognition by
Treaty of the Austrian occupation of those provinces for an
indefinite period, we may take it for granted that Austria
entertains the definitive intention of building her nest
permanently in Moldo- Wallachia."
In the meantime the war upon Russia had been ener
getically prosecuted by the Western Powers, Turkey and,
more recently, Sardinia. After a siege of nearly a year's
duration, many severe struggles and enormous sacrifices of
human life, Sebastopol fell into the hands of the Allies on
September n, 1855. England was disposed to go on
fighting ; but the Emperor Napoleon had gathered laurels
enough, the new Czar was more peacefully disposed than
Nicholas had been, and Austria, as well as Prussia, was
extremely anxious to terminate a situation of affairs which
might at any moment compel both Powers to take part in

318 The Paris Congress. [Chap.
the war. Shortly after the fall of Kars had made it some
what easier for Czar Alexander to conclude a peace, the
Vienna Cabinet sent Prince Esterhazy to Petersburg, who
soon came to terms there with Nesselrode respecting a
Protocol intended to serve as a basis for peace-negocia-
tions. On January 26, 1856, the Sultan accepted twenty-
one Articles submitted to him by Austria and the Western
Powers (touching the equalisation before the law of Christians
and Moslems in the Ottoman Empire, improvements in tax
ation and legal administration, and other reforms) which
were framed with the object of depriving the Russians for
ever of any pretext for meddling in Turkey's home affairs.
These preliminary steps having been taken, a Congress for the
settlement of a definitive peace was convoked on Feb
ruary 25, and the Treaty was signed on March 30. As
Prussia had taken no part in the war, she at first (presumably
at the instance of Austria and England) received no invitation
to the Paris Congress. As, however, the Congress might be
called upon to alter the Vienna Conventions, guaranteed by
Prussia, the latter claimed to have also a voice in the
transactions, and her claim was very properly allowed.
We can gather from a private letter written by Bismarck
to Count Hatzfeldt, the Prussian Envoy in Paris (February 7)
what his opinion was upon these occurrences : " It is no
misfortune, either to the Bund or ourselves, that we do not
participate in the Conferences ; the only result thereof will
be that the stipulations agreed to (and which can only be
of secondary interest to non-participants in the proceedings)
will lack the guarantee of Prussia and the Confederation,
and that it will be doubtful, throughout the Conferences,
whenever differences of opinion accrue, in which scale the
weight of Germany would have been placed . . . We can,
therefore, very well put up with being excluded from the

V.] Bismarck on European Politics. 319
Conferences, but must accommodate to that eventuality our
attitude towards Austria's proposal to the Bund. Our
position would only become an awkward one were we to
take up a stand, here at the Bund, in the way of official
votes and declarations manifestly grounded upon the
assumption that we should be invited to the Congress, and
were then to find the door shut in our faces, after having
disclosed what concessions we were inclined to make.
Should we resolve to accept the preliminaries and co
operate in their maintenance, we must be certain before
hand that we shall not be denied the opportunity for so
doing. For it would be an indignity, to which we could
not expose ourselves, that our decisions would assume the
character of a memorandum ad acta, or by a futile expression
of opinion, pronounced by us, as it were, en qualite
d'amateur .... The totality of Confederate States
considers itself sufficiently represented if Prussia participates
in the Congress, but not by Austria alone, as the latter has
interests and obligations in the matter of a private nature,
having nothing in common with those of Germany. If,
therefore, Prussia's participation be ensured, it will be easy
to pass (in Frankfort) a resolution satisfactory to Austria ;
and half-a-dozen Notes respecting the contents of that
resolution will make no very great difference to our Most
Gracious Sovereign."
Perhaps the most interesting of all the documents of that
period is the private letter of Bismarck to Manteuffel,
dated April 26, 1856, treating of Prussia's political
situation, the prospects of a war in Italy, the probability of
a Franco-Russian Alliance, and the necessity of a proximate
struggle d entrance between the two great German
Powers. I select a few salient passages from this com
prehensive document.

320 Bismarck on European Politics. [Chap.
" Without committing myself to hazardous conjectures as
to the probable duration of the new peace, I may call
attention to the anxious uneasiness with which, although
peace is only just concluded, most of the European
Cabinets look forward into the future, as a symptom of the
slender confidence that is reposed in recent arrangements.
. . . Probably political groups will now be formed, the signifi
cance and influence of which will be based on the arriere
pens'ee of the possibility of war between certain combinations
of alliances. Closer connection between France and Russia
in this sense is at present too natural not to be expected.
Of all the Great Powers these are the two who, by reason
of their geographical position and political aims, exhibit the
fewest elements of discord, and whose respective interests
are such that they need not inevitably come into collision.
Until now the solidity of the Holy Alliance and Czar
Nicholas's dislike to the Orleans family have kept Russia
and France apart ; but the war just terminated was fought
without rancour, and served the internal rather than the
external requirements of France. Now that the Orleans have
been got rid of, that Czar Nicholas is dead, and that the Holy
Alliance is broken up, I do not see anything to hinder the
natural attraction of these two States to one another." . . .
" In the present state of Russian feeling towards Austria,
and seeing how France's pretensions to exercise influence
in Italy have increased, it is not probable that Austria will
be called upon to figure as the third party to this Alliance,
although she would doubtless be glad enough to do so.
She will have to take her share of the dangers that will
accrue to Europe through the Russo-French partnership,
and to avert them by timely sacrifices — perhaps by
bartering concessions in Italy for advantages in Germany
— or else to contract alliances with a view to self-defence.

V.] Bismarck on European Politics. 321
I believe she will adopt the former expedient, possibly
endeavouring to regain Russia's confidence by a change in
the personnel oi her Ministry. Only in her extremest need
will she allow herself to become dependent upon England's
support, or ours. . . . She will consider the German
party too weak for an ally, and I think she will be in the
right If it could be anticipated that in a future war
Prussia, Austria, the German Confederation, and England
would combine their forces honestly, concordantly and
trustfully, none but a coward could doubt that they would
prove victorious. Matters do not stand thus, however.
Let us admit that England would stick by us steadfastly,
and that — in spite of the French, Russian, American,
Danish and Dutch fleets — she would be able to prevent an
invasion, to 'keep the seas ' victoriously, to protect our
coasts on the North Sea and Baltic against hostile fleets
and, upon occasion, to harass the French coasts with
from 10,000 to 20,000 men. By so doing, she would
surpass my expectations. But the Continental war with
the land-forces of France and Russia would chiefly fall to
the share of Germany. The four last Army-Corps of the
Federal army do not possess the fighting efficiency that
characterises the troops of a Great Power, and only time
could show how many of them would be upon our side.
Based upon a Russo-Austro-Prussian Alliance the Con
federation would hold together tolerably well, because it
would have faith in the eventual success of that League,
with or without the Central States ; but in such a question
able case as war eastwards and westwards simultaneously
the Princes {aufur et d mesure as they happened not to be
under the control of our bayonets) would safeguard them
selves with neutrality conventions, or even possibly take
the field against us."
vol 1. Y

322 The Austrian Alliance. [Chap.
" Can we at need, defend ourselves against East and
West with Austria for our ally, if Sardinia, the Belgian
army and a portion of the German Bund should join our
Western foe ? Were everything as it should be, I should
entertain no doubt upon the subject. But the Emperor
Francis Joseph is not master of his realms and subjects in the
same measure as our most Gracious Sovereign is master of
Prussia and the Prussians. Austria is not to be despised
for offensive operations ; she can dispose of more than
200,000 good troops for service abroad and still retain a
sufficient number at home to keep close watch upon her
Italians, Magyars and Slavs. But for defensive purposes,
if attacked upon her own territory simultaneously from
East and West, I consider the Austria of to-day too weak ;
the first lucky blow struck by her enemies would probably
cause the whole artificial edifice of a centralized pen-ink-and
paper rigime built up by Bach and Buol to tumble down
like a house of cards. Apart from this danger, there is
one still greater; i.e. that the spirit of a Prusso-Austrian
Alliance, even at a moment of extreme common peril,
would be exactly the reverse of that which renders a
League firm and solid. Mutual political mistrust, military
and political jealousy, the suspicion of either that the other,
if things should go well, would endeavour to baulk his ally
of territorial increment by making separate treaties with the
enemy and, in the case of a reverse, would exclusively seek
to make good terms for himself — all this would prevail
between us (Prussia and Austria) now-a-days more violently
and detrimentally than it has ever obtained in the worst
assorted alliance of past history. . . . From the point of
view entertained by the policy of Vienna, Germany is not
big enough for us both. As long as a fair arrangement
respecting the influence in Germany of each of us shall not

v.] German Dualism. 323
be made and carried out, we shall both continue to plough
the same disputed field ; and so long will Austria remain
the only State in Europe by which we can enduringly lose
or gain. . . . For a thousand years, ever since the reign of
Charles V, German Dualism has regularly re-settled its
mutual relations once a century by a thorough-going internal
war; and in this century also that will prove to be the
only feasible expedient for arranging matters satisfactorily."
" It is not my intention to directly infer from the above
line of reasoning that we should just now frame our policy
with a view to bringing about a speedy settlement between
ourselves and Austria under conditions as favourable as
possible to Prussia. I only desire to express my conviction
that ere long we shall have to fight Austria for our very
existence; it is not in our power to avert that eventuality,
for the course of events in Germany can lead to no
other result. ... It is also out of the question that
Prussia should push self-denial so far as to risk her own
existence (as I believe in a hopeless struggle) to protect the
integrity of Austria. ... If we were to conquer a Franco-
Russian Coalition, for what should we have been fighting ?
For the maintenance of Austria's preponderance in Germany,
and for the contemptible Constitution of the German Con
federation. We cannot possibly exert our full strength
and risk our existence for such poor stakes as these. . . .
If it be true, as is stated here, that Austria has already
asked Bavaria for a Guarantee Treaty respecting Italy, that
she intends to make similar propositions to us, and that
Count Buol has visited Hanover and Dresden with the
same object in view, I do not believe that it is her funda
mental purpose to rally Germany round her and bid defiance
to a world in arms, but rather to utfiise our assurances and
those of others diplomatically in order to extort from
v 2

324 Guarantee Treaties. [Chap.
France and, if possible, from Russia, more favourable
conditions to an understanding, and at our expense. . . .
Should peace be maintained, Austria will display her
gratitude for our friendly Federal feeling by keeping us to
our word with respect to the solidarity of German interests
in order to juggle the Customs' Union out of our hands.
If war break out, all the Guarantee Treaties she keeps in
her pocket will not prevent her from ranging herself,
promptly and decidedly, on the side affording her the
likeliest prospect of maintaining that Supremacy in Germany
which she needs more than ever, now that she has taken to
Germanising-Centralisation. " As there is no danger in sight, Austria cannot possibly
imagine that Prussia would feel disposed to join in a
Guarantee-Treaty just now ... In the year 1851 the
perils of an influx of revolution from France and Italy were
imminent, and a combination of Sovereigns against that
danger came to pass which naturally resulted in our Secret
Defensive Alliance of May 16, 1851. That situation could
only be reproduced were the French Empire to be over
thrown. As long as that shall endure there will be no
question of keeping off the democrats, but only one of
Cabinet Politics, in which Austria's interests do not corre
spond to ours. A treaty for the defence of Austrian Italy,
concluded at the present moment, would only act as a
premature provocation to France and as a pretext for coolness
on the part of Russia towards us, which would be altogether
in Austria's interests ; and the Vienna Cabinet would take
care to make the fact known in Paris and Petersburg, trans
ferring the blame for any indiscretion to our shoulders.
But in everything which Austria has the desire or ability to
do without us she would not be restrained from action by a
Prussian or German Guarantee-Treaty, even were it the

v.] Austria and the Bund. 325
best of its kind. All she did with the 1854 April Treaty
was to make a fuss over it in her own interest, to treat us
badly and to pursue a policy as double-tongued as it was
unwise. But our Guarantee did not prevent her from
secretly concluding the December Treaty or from seeking
her own advantage in other directions ... In my opinion
our position, as an ally in demand, is a good one, as long
as political combinations do not assume an acute aspect,
displaying nothing more alarming than diplomatic activity,
and as a good understanding with one Power does not entail
a rupture with another. But were a Russo-French Alliance,
with warlike purposes, to be realised, I opine that we could
not join its adversaries ; for, if we did so, we should either
be beaten, or perhaps victoriously bleed to death pour les
beaux yeux de FAutiiche et de la Diete."
These ljst words are supplemented by a letter (May 10)
in which Bismarck advises Manteuffel to foster good
relations with Napoleon so as to keep open the prospect of
an alliance with France. We shall meet with the letter in
question in our next chapter.
The period of Oriental confusion during which the
majority of the German Central and petty States had
maintained a certain connection with Prussia, in opposition
to Austria, had been calculated to promulgate the error that
community of real German interests constituted a bond
between Prussia and the States in question. Various
experiences had convinced Bismarck that this bond was
but a loose one, and that Austria would assuredly revert to
her former policy in the Confederation. His views
received confirmation upon several occasions, between the
years 1856 and 1859. The efforts of the Presidency to
prejudice and embarrass, weaken and humiliate Prussia were
frequently renewed, and Austria's satelhtes in the Bund

326 The Confederation v. Prussia. [Chap.
reassumed the defensive and even offensive attitude towards
Prussian requirements and endeavours which they had
observed before the war; aye, the Central States carried
their disdain of the great North-German Power so far as to
refuse to make unimportant concessions to her.
The chief occasions upon which this reprehensible
conduct made itself manifest were the following: 1. The
Swiss question, which turned upon the liberation of the
Royalists who had been overpowered during the Neuenburg
outbreak and were kept prisoners by the Helvetian
authorities ; 2. The affair of the Holstein-Lauenburg Con
stitution ; 3. Beust's proposal to alter the Constitution of
the Bund ; 4. The construction and garrisoning of the
Federal fortresses, concerning which negotiations were
carried on in Frankfort with exasperating procrastination
and every imaginable sort of intrigue. In the Neuenburg
question Bismarck had to complain that Austria only lent a
lukewarm support to Prussia's plans, and for some time
raised difficulties in the south-western German Courts
against the contemplated transit of Prussian troops to
Switzerland ; which was accounted for to him by the fact
that Austria was jealous of Prussia, feeling herself relegated
to a secondary position whilst the latter was displaying her
strength and laying the foundation of closer relations to
Southern Germany and France. With regard to the
Holstein-Lauenburg affair he suggested to his Minister
(April 14, 1858) the expediency of closing the corre
spondence between Berlin and Vienna on that subject,
remarking : " It is precisely our many years' experience that
Austria utilizes every stage of this question to accuse us, to
foreign Powers, of being peace-disturbers, and to Germany,
of lukewarmness, which was one of the grounds rendering it
desirable that we should transfer the negotiations and their

V.] Bismarck 's Struggle with Austria. 327
responsibilities from the two Great Powers to the totality of
the Confederation." In the matter of the Rastatt garrison,
anent which Austria took great pains to induce German
States, generally at one with the Berlin Government, to
outvote Prussia in the Federal Assembly, Bismarck plainly
declared (June 1858) to Count Rechberg, Prokesch's
successor, that he would request Manteuffel to draw up a
Protocol in the name of Prussia, announcing that " he
regarded the Federal Treaties as violated," and that he
(Bismarck) " would be compelled until the receipt of
further instructions, to refrain from participating in the
proceedings of the Federal Assembly."
We cannot enter into the details of this unremitting
struggle of Bismarck against the pretensions of Austria and
her train-bearers in the Confederation, but will leave it to
himself to describe it to us in extracts from his official
reports, in a private letter dated March 14, 1858, and in his
" Memoir upon the necessity of inaugurating an indepen
dent Prusso-German policy," (known in the diplomatic
world as " The Little Book,") which is the most compre
hensive and valuable production transmitted by him to his
Government during his sojourn in Frankfort. It may be
regarded as Bismarck's political testament, upon the
occasion of his departure from the capital of the Con
federation — recapitulating his experiences, and written with
a view to informing his successor, Von Usedom, what views
the latter should take of Austria and her satellites, and how
he should deal with them. This memoir is a chapter of
German history, and contains great wealth of sterling State-
wisdom. Keenness of perception, logical sequence of
thought, profound and comprehensive intelligence, diplo
matic adroitness and sound common sense, as well as true
patriotism, are revealed in it, and stamp it as a political

328 " The Little Book." [Chap.
document of the highest class. We subjoin a few extracts
in extenso, chiefly from its second moiety, concluding with a
summary of the moral appended by its author to his
invaluable work.
" Up to the year 1848 Austria allowed Prussian policy to
obtain throughout Germany, exacting (as payment for this
concession) Prussia's support on all European questions.
In Germany, the Vienna Cabinet contented itself with
making sure, as far as it could, that Prussia should only
utilise within certain limits the influence accorded to her.
To this end the functional sphere of the Confederation was
restricted to few and relatively unimportant affairs, whilst
the independence and vetoing rights of the individual
governments were carefully fostered. Matters upon which
Austria and Prussia were not agreed did not come under
discussion ; a difference of opinion between the two Great
Powers was seldom to be found recorded in the Protocols ;
an open dispute between their representatives in session was
something unheard of and to be avoided under all con
ceivable circumstances as dangerous to the very existence of
the Confederation . . . The notion that serious differences
of opinion could be brought before the Bund for settlement
by voting-majorities was so remote from men's minds that
the Vienna Cabinet only sent its Presiding-Envoy to Frank
fort at long intervals, and left the representation of Austrian
interests in the hands of the Prussian Envoy for months at a
stretch . . . Prussia's tenure of the presidency, as well as
the long duration of the two governments' undisturbed
concord, contributed not a little to imparting a certain
predominance to the presidency in the Federal Assembly." ¦
" Since the resuscitation of the Bund in 185 1, the proceed
ings in the Federal Assembly have presented quite another
aspect Prince Schwarzenberg adopted the plan of ac-

v.] " The Little Book:' 329
quiring for Austria — by the means furnished to him by the
existing Federal Constitution — the hegemony over Germany
which Prussia had been unable to attain by aid of the
Constituantes and the attempts theretofore made to achieve
German unity. This notion suggested itself after Austria's
internal organisation had taken a direction in which lasting
success could only be obtained by strengthening the
relatively weak German element in the Empire. It would
be feasible to carry out this plan if Austria could contrive to
make sure of an enduring majority in the Confederation,
thereafter enlarging the competency of that body, and if
Prussia should lack the will or the power to offer an effective
resistance. The moment was an extremely favourable one
for putting this conception in practice. Through her
intimate relations to Russia, Austria could rely upon that
Power's support in her German policy, and had moreover
entered into connections with the newly-established French
Empire, which, towards the end of Prince Schwarzenberg's
life, aroused apprehensions of a close alliance of the three
Emperors in opposition to Prussia and England. A large
majority of the German Governments, appalled by the
revolution, and threatened by its consequences with being
compelled to part with a share of their sovereignty to
Prussia, inclined readily towards Austria, which was con
sequently in a position to nominate the Federal Envoys of
the Governments convoked in 1850, and of course selected
men who were bound to her interests by personal circum
stances, present or past. Austria could therefore make
certain, for a long time to come, of a majority in the Federal
Assembly. . . The jealousy inspired in the greater number
of the other German princes by the steady growth of the
Royal House of Prussia throughout two centuries influenced
them, in this conjuncture, almost as powerfully as their fears

330 " The Little Book." [Chap.
that Prussia would still further increase her might at their
cost " Austria has various means at her disposal for the
maintenance and furtherance of these arrangements. . . .
In compliance with long-established custom the nobility
of southern and central Germany enters the Austrian
service in considerable number, having but small prospect of
advancement in its native countries, whilst the efforts and
qualifications requisite for obtaining moderate promotion are
not so arduous or various in Austria as they are in the other
Federal States. Austria meets them half way in this par
ticular direction. As soon as the relatives of an influential
official, Minister or Envoy, attain the age at which a decision
may be arrived at respecting their career, they are beset with
brilliant offers emanating from Austrian sources ; and it has
occurred that lads of sixteen, who have never seen a
regiment in their lives, have received officers' commissions
without having even asked for them. Once berthed in
Austria they serve as hostages for their fathers' pliancy, and
also to keep up communications in Austria's interest with
their kinsmen in Germany holding positions at Court or in
the State service. Of the Envoys to the Federal Diet, for
instance, those of Saxony, Darmstadt, Nassau, Brunswick,
and another State cleave more closely to Austria than to
their own Governments, and serve her to the best of their
ability in all their official transactions. . . . The Bavarian is
a conscientious man, but his Austrian family connections and
Catholicism (which he imports into politics) make him an
J unwitting sympathiser with Austria. Many of the Ministers
and Court Officials in the petty States are similarly situated ;
and even in Prussia connections of this description exist,
which render it easy for Austria to keep herself well-informed
upon all ' intimate ' occurrences. The importance of such

V] " The Little Book!' 331
relations and their practical result make themselves con
spicuously manifest in Baden just now. The well-known
project of dividing that realm between Austria and Bavaria;
Austrian intrigues during its archiepiscopal contest; the
sympathies of the Briesgau population for Austria, and the
awkward position of the Evangelical dynasty in relation to
a preponderant Catholic population, are powerful causes of
distrust, as far as Austria is concerned, whilst the vigorous
assistance rendered to Baden by Prussia against the
revolutionists, and the near relationship of the Prussian and
Baden reigning families should justify a favourable dis
position towards Prussia on the part of Baden. None the
less for that, however, has it proved feasible for the Austrian
sympathisers who personally surround the Grand Duke,
combined with the influence exercised by the Austrian Herr
von Meysenbug upon his Baden brother, and with ultra
montane machinations, to make Baden's policy dependent
upon that of Austria.
" Whenever personal relations of this class are lacking,
Austria finds means to create them. She rewards her friends
with the same persistence as that which she displays in
injuring and getting rid of persons who oppose her. The
circumstance that an Envoy permits himself to address
reports to his Government without fear of or consideration
for Austria, suffices to ensure his persecution. Austria's
agents treat him discourteously, endeavour to irritate him,
and carefully rake up everything that they can urge against him
to his Government, in order to undermine his position. . . .
If an Envoy of this sort is not to be pitched off his saddle,
because his Minister protects him, the Vienna Cabinet
attacks the Minister himself, and strives to embitter his
independence of action and his desire to serve nobody but
his own Sovereign. All existing dissatisfactions, even those

332 " The Little Book? [Chap.
of the persecuted Minister's subordinates, are summoned to
the fray ; and the approved certainty that absolute discretion
and subtle ingenuity will characterise Austrian intrigues,
leads many a man to lend himself to transactions which are
closely akin to high treason."
" In all German States the Vienna Cabinet can count upon
every assistance of which the political leaders of the Catholic
Church can dispose. Even where the bulk of the Catholic
population has no grounds for dissatisfaction with its govern
ment, the intellectual leaders of Catholic policy are hostile
to the Protestant rkgime, and ready to promote the interests
of Austria by means of their influence upon the State and
people. In all Catholic Parliamentary Oppositions, a
leaning towards Austria manifests itself from time to time,
revealing her power of putting pressure upon Catholic
members, to the extent of inducing them to take action
against the government of their own country. The Ultra
montane press fights Austria's battles with reinvigorated
energy since the conclusion of the Concordat ; but still more
powerful is the press influence which Austria has purchased
with hard cash. Very soon after order had been restored
in the Empire, Prince Schwarzenberg set aside much larger
sums for the representatives of Austrian policy in the
European — and particularly in the German — press than had
thitherto been expended in that direction. It has been con
clusively proved by Herr von Prokesch's lost papers (they
were discovered in an old desk that he sold, and amongst
them were drafts of vehemently anti-monarchical newspaper
articles, in his handwriting, which had theretofore been
believed to have emanated from the Democratic camp) that
Austria ' waited upon ' the editors of German papers
vicariously, in the persons of Messrs. Hock, Lakenbacher
and other journalistic bagmen, and entered into agreements

v.] " The Little Book? 333
with them, in virtue of which some of them sold themselves out-
and-out to Austria, whilst others contracted to insert (in con
sideration of a yearly subvention, or of so much per article)
communications supplied to them by numerous and often
highly talented writers, paid by Austria, and gathered to
gether in a special official department called the Press
Bureau. The task which these journals are required to
perform is to represent Austria as the exclusive repre
sentative of "German unity and interests, and to point out
that Austria alone has the power and mission to realise the
better and more wholesome of the ideas that agitated the
people during the Revolution, utilising the Confederation, as
a Constitutional implement, for that purpose.
" Moreover, the sympathies of the majority of manu
facturers and financiers throughout Germany (especially in
the South and West) are Austrian, inasmuch as persons of
these classes make large profits out of Austria in various
ways, or expect to do so from her Customs system. It is
precisely one of the Empire's greatest weaknesses — her
finances — that constitutes her most fruitful source of political
influence. Capitalists hang on to Austria as a doctor does
to a patient who pays him well. The disproportionate
largeness of the Austrian National Debt renders the number
of Austrian stock-holders very great, for the high interest
yielded by Austrian State securities (averaging from six to
seven per cent, by reason of their low quotations) tempts
people to invest capital therein — the more so as Vienna
spares no pains to obtain and keep open a market for her
stock abroad. Every facility is conceded to foreign holders
for drawing their full interest ; whereas a foreign holder of
Prussian State securities is exposed, for lack of similar
arrangements, to all sorts of deductions, losses and bothera
tions, in order to encash his interest By her adaptability

334 "The Little Book? [Chap.
and high interest, Austria more than counterbalances the
insecurity of her National Debt as compared to that of
Prussia, greatly to her advantage ; for in the first place her
home deficiencies, in the matter of capital, are supplied from
abroad, and secondly (which is of far greater importance),
every holder of Austrian Government Stock becomes a
political supporter of Austria, in proportion to the measure
in which his property is dependent upon the well-being,
prosperity and (consequently) credit of the Empire. The
Frankfort financial houses entrusted with the payment of
Austrian interest are in a position to testify to the solidity of
this foundation for Austrian sympathies abroad, knowing as
they do that the administrators of so many Princes' private
fortunes have been moved to invest largely in Me"talliques
or in the National Loan by the high interest yielded by
those securities."
" Examples are by no means rare that Austria has pulled
all the wires of her influence in order to break down a
German Minister's resistance to her. With many gentle
men of this class the feeling of duty and independence is so
feeble that it readily makes way for a keen appreciation of
their own interests ; and a comprehensive glance at Austria's
means of attack suffices to convince them that the best
thing they can do is to comply with Vienna's wishes.
Others belong to the Austrian camp from the very first, and
are under no compulsion. Messrs. von der Pfordten and
von Beust, however, have made more than one attempt to
emancipate themselves, and have suffered, during the past
few years, so many insults and humiliations from Vienna
that they personally entertain the bitterest feelings towards
Count Buol. The Wuertemberg Minister, von Huegel, had
to bear with various unpleasantnesses in Vienna, shortly
before his nomination; Austria had demanded his recall

v.] « The Little Book." 335
thence, and during the early days of his tenure of office he
manifested violent irritation against Austria and her
Ministers. In spite of all this, not one of these three
Ministers ever dared to oppose the policy of Austria, even
when they personally condemned it, and spoke pretty openly
of Count Buol as an incapable but dangerous man who was
bound to destroy the Confederation and lead Germany to
her ruin."
" Every German State is more or less concerned with the
Bund, and not a few find themselves from time to time
dependent upon Federal Decrees with respect to their own
most important domestic questions. It is then that the
mighty influence of the Presidency, and that the majorities
packed by Austria become instruments of punishment or
reward, according to the previous behaviour towards Austria
of the State whose affairs happen to be under consideration.
Hanover, Wuertemberg, Electoral Hesse, Oldenburg and
Lippe, have undergone experiences of this sort within the
last few years ; and Austria has taken great pains to keep
their wounds open as long as possible."
" By the intelligent utilisation of all these various mechan
isms, Austrian influence upon the Governments of the
central and minor Federal States is steadfastly maintained.
A remarkably striking proof of its indestructibility is afforded
by the circumstance that it suffered no appreciable minish-
ment through the conduct of the Vienna Cabinet during the
Oriental crisis, or through the treatment then accorded to
the Federal Governments by Count Buol. At that time the
Imperial Minister behaved to the German States as if they
had been Austria's vassals, instead of her Confederates ; in
order to coerce them into joining her, he threatened them
(not only directly, but through foreign Powers) with the
occupation of their territories by French troops. . . . The

336 " The Little Book." Chap.
Minister von Huegel (who is now become a firm adherent
to Austria) related when he took office that Count Buol — in
answer to certain modest counter-representations advanced
by him — had told him ' the German Governments must get
accustomed to the fact that Austria alone had a right to
have a foreign policy ; it would be advisable for Wuertem
berg to keep that fact steadily in view ; the sooner Wuertem
berg did so, the better for her ! ' On the same occasion
Count Buol observed to the Saxon Envoy, von Koenneritz,
that Austria would squeeze the smaller States until Herr
von Beust should have no breath left for contradiction. In
her Secret Circular Despatch, Austria declared to all the
German Governments that she would not hesitate to break
up the Confederation in order to carry out her policy, and
invited them (each one separately) to contract an indepen
dent and special war-alliance with her, in controversion of
the Federal Decrees ; the result of which alliance was to be
that each State entering into it would obtain — in proportion
to the strength of the armed force it should place at the
Austrian Emperor's disposal — advantages which could only
be accorded to it at the cost of such members of the
German Confederation as should abstain from concluding
the alliance in question. If Prussia, in analogous circum
stances, had made the mildest attempt at treating the
German Confederates in this manner, the indignation of the
Central States at our unconstitutional, arbitrary, and violent
separatism would have endured to the present day ; whereas
Austria has long since regained her influence upon the
Governments and statesmen whom she insulted and mal
treated, and disposes of their votes in the Confederation."
" Having the power to secure majorities in the Federal
Assembly, Austria has of course endeavoured to widen the
sphere of action of so serviceable an implement, by bringing

v.] «' The Little Book? 337
within the scope of Federal legislation matters of greater
importance than those included therein before 1848, and by
doing away with the right of individual States and minori
ties to protest, in deciding upon such matters, so as to
impart increased competency to majority-voting."
" The aspirations of most of the Federal States, prompted
by their own respective interests, go hand-in-hand with this
endeavour of Austria. Each one of them in the Bund, speaks
as loudly and has as much right to vote as Prussia, and,
when they hold together, they practically decide the disputes
between Austria and Prussia which are so frequently brought
before their forum. It is not astonishing that they should
take an interest in the consolidation and development of an
institution by means of which — with very little trouble—
they obtain an increment of political importance. Should
the Confederation get into a mess and demand sacrifices at
their hands they would secede from it fast enough. As
soon as its enemies prove stronger than we, those Federal
States whose free will is not hampered by the proximity of
other overwhelmingly powerful States will by no means
feel called upon to sacrifice their existence to an ideal loyalty
to the Bund, but will deem it their duty avant tout to secure
the maintenance of their respective hereditary dynasties;
and their Governments, with fatherly patriotic sagacity, will
select the right moment at which their care for the welfare
of their subjects will make it their painful but inevitable
duty to pass over to the enemy. The prospect of this even
tuality does not prevent them, as long as they continue to
belong to the Confederation, from exercising all their rights
therein and endeavouring to attain, through their connection
with the Bund, a maximum of influence and moment. When
the territories of his own Sovereign do not afford sufficient
scope to the activity of a Southern or Central-German
vol. 1. z

338 " The Little Book? [Chap.
statesman, he gratifies his ambition by seeking to gain,
through the machinery of the Confederation, a considerable,
if self-exaggerated influence upon Prussia's seventeen
millions, the Bund's forty millions or the Central- European
Empire's seventy millions of people. Intelligences of a
higher order cannot find contentment within the narrow
circumstances of petty States ; and Herr von Beust, having
been Count Buol's leader during the Dresden Conferences,
considers himself capable of managing Germany in partner
ship with the Imperial Minister, if only the Bund — their tool
— had greater command over the individual German
Governments." Up to the above paragraph, the memorial of March, 1858,
described the situation into which the German States had
been conjured by Schwarzenberg's and Buol's policy. In
the following passages the author points out the conse
quences accruing to Prussia from this disastrous state of
affairs, as well as the duties incumbent upon her.
"Not only at Austria's instigation, but in accordance
with their own conviction, do the German Governments
strive to lessen their independence with relation to the
power of the Bund, by enlarging the latter's competency.
In this system, however, there is no place for Prussia, as
long as she does not choose to renounce the character of
an European Great Power. Such a Power, being resolved
to base its home and foreign policy upon the foundation of
its own strength, can only fall in with a stricter centralisa
tion of the Federal arrangements to the extent of itself
acquiring the leadership of the Confederate body, in order
to ensure the promulgation of decrees that suit its own
policy. It is therefore only natural that Austria, as well as
Prussia, should simultaneously endeavour to attain that
position in the Bund. But only one of them can have it.

v.] " The Little Book? 339
Austria is that one at present, and is well provided with
the means of remaining so. As the Confederation is now
organised, and so long as its decisions are exclusively
dependent upon the German Princes and their ministers,
it must be, humanly speaking, impossible for Prussia to
deprive Austria of her predominant influence. Austria is
quite aware of this, and therefore unhesitatingly rejects
every proposal on the part of Prussia to come to some
arrangement for the partition or exercise in common of that
influence. She knows that Prussia is predestined to be in
the minority in the actual Federal Assembly, and conse
quently believes that, supported by the majority of the other
States, she (Austria; can tow Germany along in the wake of
her own policy, without, and even in despite of Prussia. . . .
This state of things has been aggravated by the circumstance
that Austria has appointed to the Presidency of an Assembly
in which her own position (as Member and Presiding
Power) is a very delicate one, three men, one after another,
(Thun, Prokesch and Rechberg) of notorious irritability.
Neither the character of the persons entrusted by Austria
with the defence of her cause in the Bund against Prussia,
or her choice of weapons for the fray has contributed to
impart an amicable and conciliatory tone to the Federal
proceedings. There has been no lack of attempts at out
witting (such as are prescribed by the traditions of diplomacy
for centuries past), at the perversion of facts, at personal
calumniation ; even falsifications of documents containing
written agreements between the different Governments have
been officially brought home to Herr von Prokesch."
"These conflicts in the Confederation commenced
immediately after Prussia had rejoined it. Their first
pretext had to do with the confirmation of negotiations
undertaken without her sanction. Then a majority,
z 2

340 " The Little Book? [Chap.
consisting of nearly all the other Governments, was found
in readiness to support Austria's unjustifiable pretensions
with respect to the Fleet and Liquidation questions.
Austria claimed a right to the Fleet, without contributing
to its cost ; and declined to pay her share of the general
liquidation under the pretext that her Italian and Hungarian
wars were Federal wars, for which she had a right to be
indemnified. Then came the Customs' question, which
gave rise to an agitation got up with the obj'ect of proving
(as appeared in diplomatic documents and newspaper
articles) that the Bund alone was to be regarded as the
future promoter of public welfare, whilst every Prussian
effort in that direction must be stigmatised as particularism,
calculated to injure everybody except Prussia herself."
(The remainder of this paragraph has been suppressed, as
altogether forlorn of interest to English readers. — Translator's
Note). " In the matter of foreign policy the war in the East
proved highly instructive as to the Central States' views of
Federal conditions and responsibilities. There was scarcely
one of them that did not confidentially give the Berlin
Cabinet to understand that, should an Austria-French
Alliance really come to pass, it could not engage itself to
be bound by the prescriptions of Federal Law or by con
siderations of general Confederate interests, but would be
compelled to conform to the requirements of its own
individual safety." (During the Eastern crisis, the King of
Wuertemberg observed to Bismarck, " After all, my shirt is
nearer my skin than my coat is.") " This contrasted curiously
with the previous pretensions of the Central States not only
to settle Austro-Prussia differences, but to prescribe a
' Foreign Federal Policy,' to which every member of the
Confederation — Prussia in particular— -would have to give

V.] " The Little Book? 341
its adhesion and support." (A few lines are here omitted,
for the reason already given above. — Translator's Note.)
" With what unhesitating determination the Vienna
Cabinet pursues its purposes, is as distinctly manifest upon
the field of European politics, as in the proceedings of the
Bund. Even in questions not affecting its interests, or in
which these latter were identical with those of Prussia, it
has spared no exertions to diminish Prus'sia's prestige, and
hamper her policy. Prussia's participation in the Paris
Conference — a matter in which the mere point dhonneur
was the chief consideration for us — was opposed by Austria
more persistently than by any other Power, with the object of
lowering Prussia in the eyes of Germany by excluding her
from the conclave of Great Powers. In the Neuenburg ques
tion, Prussia's opponents were Austria's natural enemies ; but
the desire to prevent Prussia from displaying her military
strength in Southern Germany and from arriving at a satis
factory settlement of an issue of honour, proved stronger in
Vienna than Austria's dislike to the Swiss Democracy and her
apprehension of its possible effect upon Italy. The Vienna
Cabinet strove to invoke Federal Decrees against the transit
of Prussian troops through Southern Germany, and was aided
in this endeavour by Saxony. Austria would unquestionably
have obtained a majority in favour of her hostile demonstra
tion against Prussia, had not the influence of France been
brought to bear upon the Central States en behalf of Prussia.
The Danish question was utilised by Austria (as long as she
could do so) as a pretext for reproaching Prussia, in the
German press, with lukewarmness, and, to the Cabinets of
Europe, with violence.
" There is no prospect that Austria and her Confederates
will consent, of their own accord, to change their policy
towards Prussia; but, it may be asked, can Prussia, this

342 " The Little Book? [Chap.
being the case, maintain for any length of time, the
attitude she has hitherto observed? .... Austria can
manage to belong to such a Confederation as this, because
she disposes of its majority. Prussia does not possess that
advantage. That she has not heretofore taken her stand
openly against the hostile principles developed in gremio of
the Bund, but has kept up a seeming of deference to it, is
certainly attributable to her consciousness that, as a matter
of fact, it is not so easy after all for a corporation of
seventeen Federal Envoys to mediatise the monarchy of
Frederick the Great. A far more imminent danger is that
Prussia should come to a formal rupture with the forces of
the Confederation without suffering prejudice to her
independence. Federal pliability has its limits ; and, in
dealing with Austria, each successive concession is the
parent of a fresh demand. The moment cannot be far
distant, at which Prussia will accuse the Federal majority
of overstepping its jurisdiction, and- the Federal majority
will accuse Prussia of rebellion against valid Federal
Decrees. Each, therefore, will arraign the other of a
rupture of League. Whenever matters come to that pass,
the situation must become so unpleasant, that it would be
as well to adopt precautionary measures against it ;
especially as those measures cannot but strengthen
Prussia's independent prestige, as well as her influence
upon Germany. She would not, thereby, become untrue
to her German mission in any way ; she would only free
herself from the pressure exercised upon her by her
adversaries' fiction that "Federal Diet" and "Germany"
are convertible terms, and that Prussia's national (German)
feeling is to be appraised by the measure of her submissive-
ness to the majority of the Federal Assembly. No German
State has either the call or the opportunity to put its German

V.] " The Little Book? 343
sympathies in practice, independently of the Federal Assem
bly, to the same extent as Prussia ; and in this regard it is
readily demonstrable that Prussia is of greater moment to
the Central and petty States, than a majority of nine in the
Diet is to Prussia, Prussian interests chime in perfectly
with those of the Federal countries (except Austria) but not
with those of the Federal Governments ; and there is in
reality nothing more thoroughly German than the develop
ment of rightly understood Prussian particular interests. It
is just upon this account that these latter are opposed in the
Federal Assembly by the majority of the Governments ; for
the functional existence of thirty-three Governments (without
counting Prussia and Austria) is exactly the chief, though
legally justified, impediment to Germany's vigorous develop
ment. Prussia will only obtain free scope for the fulfilment
of her mission when she shall cease to attach any appreciable
value to the sympathies of the Central States' Governments.
All her efforts to gain them will ever prove fruitless, and
any consideration on her part for their wishes or suscepti
bilities is only so much wasted self-restraint. . . . Prussia's
position would perhaps be a better one if the Confederation
did not exist at all ; those intimate relations to her neighbours,
of which she stands in need, could have been formed under
her own superintendence. As the Bund, however, exists,
and an abuse of its institutions is practised to Prussia's
prejudice, it must clearly be Prussia's task, whilst faithfully
fulfilling all her indisputable engagements to the Confedera-
tion in war and peace-time, to nip in the bud every attempt
to augment the powers of the Bund at the expense of any
individual State's independence — every attempt, that is, which
exceeds the absolute letter of existing treaties. Those
who see in Prussia's friendly attitude towards the Bund *¦
nothing but utter and abject submission to the will of her

344 "The Little Book? [Chap.
fellow-Leaguers, expressed by their presidency and majority-
votes, will doubtless be seriously put out when they find
Prussia casting off her trammels, and regulating the measure
of her voluntary self-control by the textual contents of the
Federal Treaties. But peremptory interests — the only solid
foundation for maintainable relations even between German
States — will soon compel the malcontents to resign them
selves to the inevitable ; and those very Governments which
now do all they can to outvote Prussia will make up their
minds to seek her co-operation as soon as they shall have
convinced themselves that her attitude is not the expression of
momentary ill-temper, but the result of firm and definitive
resolves, based upon a carefully thought-out recognition of
her own interests."
" The practical consequences of such an attitude towards
the Bund would be that Prussia would thenceforth have
nothing to do with any agreements or decisions exacting abso
lute unanimity, and would frankly treat the first attempt at a
majority-vote (unless Constitutionally justified) as a violation
of the Federal Constitution, declaring herself to be only so
far bound by the latter as it shall be observed by other
members of the Bund."
" Opinions may differ as to whether or not a close alliance
with Austria be desirable. But experience permits no doubt
that pliancy and assurances of friendship are not the means
by which Prussia can succeed in living upon endurable, not
to mention secure, terms with Austria. Gratitude for
favours received, patriotic sympathies — in a word, feelings of
any description do not guide the policy of Austria. Her
interests constrain her to fight against and detract from
Prussia's prestige and influence in Germany to the best of
her ability, but in case of war or any of the multifarious
dangers by which Austria is surrounded becoming im-

v.] " The Little Book? 345
minent, she desires to be able to count upon the fullest
support on the part of Prussia's armed forces. In this twin
necessity lies Prussia's only possibility of coming to a clear
and satisfactory arrangement with the Southern German
Great Power ; she must give Vienna plainly to understand
that her support, at a moment of peril to the Empire, will be
languid and even doubtful, unless Austria shall observe
greater moderation in her German policy, and make terms
with Prussia. . . . Hitherto, Prussia's attempts to lead up
to better relations with Vienna have only resulted in her
being denounced to the Central States as aiming at Dualism.
As long as Prussia shall shrink from such denunciations and
lay the flattering unction to her soul that she is capable of
competing against Austria for the favour of the German
Central State Governments, so long will she lack a solid
basis whereupon to found an understanding with Austria. As
matters stand Prussia's only prospect is — as soon as her
eyes shall be fully opened to the inutility of her friendly
pliancy towards the Bund and to the fact that she is being
tricked and fooled in every direction — to make up her mind
to a rupture, perhaps at a moment extremely unfavourable
to her."
"Very different would be the mutual relations of the
German Great Powers should Prussia resolve to emancipate
them from the conventional formula of disingenuous
expressions of good-will and re-establish them upon the firm
basis of respective interests ; which would be done were
Prussia to inform Austria that for the future she would limit
her adhesion to the Bund (as long as its present Constitu
tion and actual political tendencies of its members should
endure) to a strict fulfilment of her incontestable duties ;
that she would decline to co-operate with the Bund beyond
that limit, and to make any concession to the presidency or

346 " The Little Book? [Chap.
majority : that she distinctly refused to enter into any
Customs' Union with Austria : that, so long as others should
also observe the treaties with equal exactitude, she would
march to Austria's assistance with the Federal contingent
whenever the German frontiers should be attacked ; but
that any further concession would depend upon Austria's
behaviour towards Prussia, and upon the degree of
community characterising their political aims. Only by
such language as this and by acting up to it can Prussia
secure honourable and tenable relations with Austria —
possibly even a firm alliance with her ; and in this manner
moreover, the German Confederation may be saved from
the danger of total dissolution with which it is at present
threatened by the extravagance of the anti-Prussian Federal
policy." " Proportionately to the decisiveness with which the
Prussian Government shall give Austria to understand that
Prussia does not regard the Federal Diet as the exclusive
organ of German interests, that she is resolved not to merge
herself in the majority of the Federal Assembly, and that
she will have nothing to do with the Bund beyond fulfilling
her treaty-obligations, her outlines will reveal themselves to
the eye of Germany in their natural grandeur and impor
tance." "The leading position occupied by Prussia before 1848
was not due to the favour of the Central States and Federal
Assembly, but to the fact that she had gone ahead in every
branch of State development— -that everything specifically
Prussian was recognised by the remaining Federal States as
a model, and imitated by them as such. The overthrow
of this state of affairs by the Revolution, and the mistrust
thereby awakened in the German Governments necessarily
resulted in a violent reaction against Prussian influence —

V.] " The Little Book? 347
which reaction, as well as the novelty of Austria's appearance
in the Federal field as her competitor, render it extremely
difficult just now for Prussia to recover her lost ground.
Nevertheless, that is the only way to achieve the position
which is requisite to her for the fulfilment of her mission as
a great State; and in this direction she possesses great
advantages over Austria and other German realms. . . . The
degree of political liberty held to be admissible without
hampering the authority of the Government is much greater
in Prussia than in the rest of Germany. Prussia is now able
to accord much more elbow-room than heretofore, even with
respect to purely political questions, to her Legislature and
press — and without risk. Before 1848, under an almost
despotic government, she succeeded in placing herself in
tellectually at the head of Germany, and can do so again,
independently of her internal Constitution. It is only
necessary that her home affairs should not be in such a con
dition as to disturb the impression prevailing abroad that
all Prussian organs and forces work harmoniously together.
If Prussia's actual Constitution be a definitive institution, the
steadfast self-reliance of her administration, in accordance
with the Legislature, must also be established in such sort
that her collective power cannot be broken up by internal
frictions ; otherwise she will be unable — at least, in time of
peace — to make that predominant impression upon Germany
which, with unimpaired forces, she is certain to produce.
The Royal power reposes upon such solid foundations in
Prussia, that the Government can without danger utilise the
Legislature's proceedings as a means of influencing German
affairs. ... If Prussia were to allow her German policy,
her relations to the Bund, the difficulties she has to contend
with in consequence of those relations, and the machina
tions of her adversaries to be openly discussed, in all proba-

348 " The Little Book? [Chap,
bility a very few sittings of the Prussian Diet would suffice
to make an end of the Bund's pretensions to rule by
majorities." " The Federal policy which is precisely and specifically
necessary to Prussia can only gain in strength by publicity
and frank discussion. In the press, truth will not come
to light through the mists conjured up by the menda
city of subsidised newspapers until the material where
with to expose all the mysteries of the Bund shall be
supplied to the Prussian press, with unrestricted liberty to
utilise it."
" If Prussia take up a position independent of the Con
federation, she will become, by virtue of her intrinsic force,
the natural centre of crystallisation for those connections of
which her neighbours stand in as urgent need as herself.
In such connections she will be backed up by the weight of
her greatness and speciality as a purely German State, as
well as by the similarity of her requirements and develop
ments to those of the German people at large. The neigh
bouring Federal States will endeavour to come to an under
standing with her for these reasons, as soon as they shall be
firmly convinced that Prussia will not agree to any of the
more favourable conditions they had theretofore expected to
obtain from her through the agency of the Confederation.
They will be all the more conciliatory and easy to manage
when they shall have recognised that Prussia is resolved to
bear, in every respect, with the inconveniences of an isolated
position, rather than allow them to dictate laws to her for
the regulation of her own behaviour and interests. Those
inconveniences, for most of them — particularly for Saxony,
Brunswick, both Hesses and Nassau, by reason of theii
smallness, land-bound situation and frontier conditions — are
much harder to endure d la tongue, than for Prussia, whether

v.] " The Little Book? 349
they concern Customs' uniformity, railway-projects, common
exchange and trade laws, postal arrangements, paper-
currency, banking business or any of the other subjects
which the Austrian presidency and the majority-States pro
pose to submit to the Federal Legislature. Hanover alone,
thanks to her sea-board and position between Prussia's
eastern and western provinces, may advance some claim to
consider herself independent of Prussia, compared with the
other German States. . . . Being in accord with Hanover,
Prussia may carry out any project she may entertain with
respect to the territories above mentioned, without any con
siderable inconvenience to herself; Hanover, therefore, is
the only German Central State upon which Prussia'sGerman
policy must be brought to bear, energetically and dexter
ously, unhindered by difficulties or partial failures, so as to
gain her good-will and allay her mistrust."
" But, even if Prussia should not succeed in this enter
prise, she has much more to hope from the independent
exertion of her own strength than from protracted tolerance
of her adversaries' Federal policy. In no part of Germany,
and in very few foreign States, is the popular feeling of con
tentment with the Government and of willingness to meet it
half way, trustfully and self-sacrificially, so dependent as in
Prussia upon the conviction that an independent and
dignified position is assured to the country at home and
abroad ; and the consciousness that Prussia is outweighed
in Germany by Austria — that Bavarian, Saxon, Hessian and
Wuertemberg majorities can claim to exercise any influence
whatsoever upon Prussia against her will — would, even in
this epoch of materialism, more certainly stimulate the
Prussian people to angry discontent than would the majority
of its real or alleged internal grievances ; whereas, on the
contrary, we know that any gratification of his amour proprt

350 The Years of Conflict. [Chap.
with regard to foreign nations renders the typical Prussian
readily oblivious of his home-grievances."
Thus closes this remarkable document, the concluding
sentences of which have only been convicted of error by
subsequent events in this respect : — that the years of con
flict (from 1861 to 1866)' afforded so many exceptions to the
rule therein propounded, viz., " that Prussians forget their
own home-grievances, when ruled by a Government whose
policy aims at increasing their country's prestige, and making
it respected abroad," that the exceptions would seem to have
constituted the rule. Prussia's prestige was to be augmented
by the reorganisation and strengthening of her army, the
object Of which measure was plainly perceptible to any
healthy vision ; it was indisputably heightened by our
successes against the Danes and the majority of Petty States
in 1864, when it became palpable that a still further and
mightier advance was in contemplation. What, however,
was at that time the attitude of the large majority of the
Lower House towards the Government which desired and
had commenced to carry out that project? Did it, in view
of gratifying Prussian amour propre with regard to foreign
nations, forget its home-grievances, and cleave with high
hearted patriotism to the Minister who was striving ener
getically to vindicate Prussia's rights and interests and to
save her from being hectored by Austria, or subjected to
the will of a few ill-conditioned petty States ? Did the
Deputies exhibit any self-sacrificial disposition? Not a bit
of it ; exactly the reverse in every direction. Parliamen
tarism, of a sort unknown to the Constitution, was to be
introduced ; the power of the Lower House was to be
augmented; the prerogatives of the Crown were to be
curtailed ; and, in their anger with the Government, because
it would not consent to all this, they hampered and weakened

V.] The Prussian Opposition. 351
its action to the utmost of their ability, shamelessly took
part against it, and for the Central States and the Duke of
Augustenburg — eventually, even for Austria — and broke out
into prophecies, of which it was difficult to say whether the
unpatriotic feeling or gigantic stupidity that inspired them
were the more amazing. Bitter hatred and utter blindness
prevailed, prompting abuse and calumniation of the man
who was engaged in promoting a genuine Prussian policy ;
animated by a spirit of pettifoggery and by faith in their
democratic Credo, men closed their ears to the demands of
patriotism; stuck in the mire of pseudo-progress, they
assumed a Conservative attitude towards real progress ; and
the end of it all was that instead of displaying the power
and dignity of a Representative Assembly to the spectators
of this drama, they only showed its moral and material
impotence, and, as far as history was concerned, rendered
themselves immortally ridiculous.
True, the gentlemen on the Opposition benches were not
genuine Prussians. It was with absolute correctness that
one day — after one of Schultz's speeches, as absurd as it was
pathetic — Bismarck exclaimed to these wrongheaded, petty
and conceited politicians, whose utterances sound nowadays
as though they had emanated from lunatics : — " You gainsay
Prussian popular spirit, you gainsay the glorious traditions of
our history by disavowing Prussia's position as a Great
Power, acquired by heavy sacrifices of her people's blood and
treasure ; you stultify our splendid past by siding with Demo
cracy and the petty States against the Prussian throne. By
thus striving to mediatise Prussia under a Federal majority,
you are doing the very thing you reproach us with toto die; you
are setting your party-standpoint above the country's in
terests ; you are saying ' Prussia may exist, after the fashion we
prescribe ; if not thus, why then she may go to pieces.' "

352 Summary of" Tfie Little Book? [Chap.
The quintessence of the " Little Book's " moral is as
follows : — Austria derives great advantages from her position
as the presidential Power in the Bund, from the fear of her
experienced by most of the Federal Governments, and from
the dislike of Prussia entertained by these latter. Hence she
enjoys a preponderance over Prussia in the Confederation,
which preponderance she cleverly and unscrupulously seeks
to increase. This state of things will not change of itself or
be altered by the most conciliatory behaviour on the part of
Prussia, who, therefore, must vary her tactics if she desire to
avert serious prejudice. She must forthwith adopt a policy
altogether independent of the Confederation — that is, of
Austria and her Central-German satellites. She must not
allow her actions to be guided by feeling, but by her own
well-weighed interests. The Confederation must be rendered
innocuous ; Prussia's engagements to it, as far as they are
legally justified, must be strictly fulfilled ; but everything re
quired of her outside the treaties must be refused, or only
granted in consideration of equivalent concessions on the
part of Austria and the other members of the Confederation.
Prussia must not renounce her right to absolute equality
with Austria ; she must not allow herself to be outvoted in
the Bund ; she must reject and denounce, as an unjustifiable
innovation, the system according validity to the decisions of
the majority of the Federal Assemby in all home and foreign
questions. Whenever it shall become desirable to establish
an understanding with neighbouring German States, Prussia
must endeavour to do so independently of the Con
federation. It is worthy of notice that the memorial recommends no
tortuous ways and artifices, such as Buol delighted in, but
straight roads and fair play. Its programme, however, re
quired completion, which its author supplied in a letter to

V.] Fire and Sivord. 353
Minister von Schleinitz, dated Petersburg, May 12, 1859,
ut sequitur : —
" The result of my eight years' experiences of official life
in Frankfort was the conviction that the Federal institutions
of that period fettered Prussia oppressively and, at critical
moments, so much so as to imperil her very existence, with
out affording us the equivalents that Austria derived from
them whilst suffering infinitely less restriction than ourselves.
. . . We always found the same claim to pliancy on the
part of Prussia, put forward by the same compact majority."
... (A few lines forlorn of actual interest are here omitted.
— Translator's Note).
" I am perhaps going too far in expressing the opinion
that we should seize every fair opportunity offered to us by
our Confederates, to achieve that revision of our relations
with the Bund which Prussia needs in order that she may be
enabled to get on permanently with the petty German States.
I think we ought to accept their challenge readily, and
regard it as a step forward towards improvement, not as a
misfortune, if the majority in Frankfort should vote some
measure in which we may recognise a transgression of its
competency, an arbitrary alteration of the Confederation's
purpose, or a breach of the Federal Treaties. The more
plainly any such violation is made manifest the better. We
shall not easily find the state of affairs in Austria, France
and Russia again so favourable as now to an amelioration of
our position in Germany ; besides, our Confederates are
doing their best to give us a .justifiable opportunity for
lettering ourselves without in the least stimulating their
arrogance. To my mind, Prussia's connection with the
Bund is an infirmity which we shall have to cure sooner or
later ferro et igni, if we do not apply timely remedies to it at
a favourable season of the year."
vol. 1. 2 A

354 The Teplitz Conference. [Chap.
Ferro et igni. Seven years later it came to pass, and the
cure was effected — the cure of Germany as well as of Prussia,
which did good to Austria too, indirectly at first, and subse
quently through the 1879 Alliance. In 1859 Schleinitz was
neither clever nor resolute enough to profit by auspicious
circumstances, and Bismarck, to use his own words, was " out
in the cold on the Neva." He saw from afar how, at a
certain moment, Prussia was on the point of lapsing into the
policy of sentiment towards Austria against which he had so
emphatically warned her, and how — forgetful of his reiterated
counsels — she all but committed a grave error, for which she
would have had to pay dearly.
When the Prince-Regent of Prussia had held a conference
at Teplitz with the Emperor Francis Joseph (July 25, i860),
and the news had reached Petersburg that Prussia had
verbally pledged herself to stand by Austria in case the
latter should again be attacked in Italy by France (but, on
the other hand, should Austria find herself compelled to take
the offensive, she would have to solicit Prussia's consent to her
so doing), Bismarck observed, in a letter dated August 2 2 : —
" This version of the agreement sounds more unsophisti
cated than it really is. Austria, being absolutely certain
that we shall strike in for Venice, will contrive to provoke a
French attack; it is already affirmed that, since the Teplitz
affair, she has assumed a bold and defiant attitude in Italy.
Since Garibaldi's expedition it has been the policy of Vienna
to make matters as unpleasant as possible in Italy, so that
when Napoleon shall find it necessary to guard himself
against the Italian revolutionists, people shall interfere from
every side, and the old state of affairs shall be approxima-
tively restored. This may prove a deceptive calculation, as
far as Napoleon is concerned ; and, as it seems, it has there
fore been abandoned since Teplitz, in the hope that the

V.] Prussia and Austria. 355
same object may be attained in spite of Napoleon. Either
way Austria's restless irritability endangers peace."
After Bismarck had been placed at the head of the Prussian
Government he took action upon several occasions in the
spirit expressed in the second part of the above-quoted
memorial. (Here follow several instances thereof, recounted
in elaborate detail, and of no essential importance to the
main object of the book. They have therefore been sup
pressed in the English version. — Translator's Note.)
Shortly before the definitive failure of a project for ex
tending the competency of the Bund, submitted by Austrian
and the Central States to the Federal Assembly, and rejected
on January 22, 1863, by nine votes to seven, Bismarck had
taken steps to come to an understanding with Austria on
behalf of Prussia alone, by means of conferences with Count
Karolyi, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin to whom (see
Circular Despatch of January 24, 1863) he made the follow
ing communications : —
" I am convinced that our relations to Austria must
unavoidably become better or worse. The Royal Govern
ment sincerely wishes that the former alternative may come
to pass; but if we continue to observe that Austria stead
fastly refrains from any attempt to meet us half-way we shall
be compelled to keep the latter alternative in view, and to
prepare ourselves for it. During decades prior to 1848 a
silent understanding obtained between the two Great
Powers, in virtue of which Austria was assured of Prussia's
support in European questions, Prussia, on the other hand,
exercising an influence throughout Germany that was in no
way interfered with by Austria, as the constitution of the
Customs Union demonstrated. Under those circum
stances the German Confederation rejoiced in a measure
of internal unity and external prestige which it has not
2 a 2

356 Bismarck and Karolyi. [Chap.
enjoyed since that epoch." Bismarck did not point out
whose fault it had been that analogous relations had not
been established after the revival of the Federal Diet, as his
object was to bring about a practical arrangement in time
present, not to indulge in recriminations anent time past.
So he only referred to the circumstance that Austria had
recently and with success exerted her influence in a sense
adverse to Prussia precisely in those States with which the
latter was specially called upon by her geographical posi
tion to cultivate friendly relations. He gave Count Karolyi
to understand that "perhaps Austria acquired the sym
pathies of the Governments of those States in this manner,
to the prejudice of the Bund's collective interests ; but she
certainly estranged from her the sympathies of Prussia.
The Imperial Ambassador, upon this, comforted himself
with the conviction that both Great Powers would revert to
their old alliance, whatever might occur, should Austria
find herself engaged in a perilous war."
In this assumption Bismarck recognised "a dangerous
error, which, it might be, would only be cleared up at a
critical moment and in a manner fraught with calamity to
both Cabinets." He therefore entreated the Count to
contend against this error in Vienna to the best of his
ability, observing that "during the last Italian War
Prussia's Alliance had not been so serviceable to Austria as
it might have been if, during the previous eight years, both
Powers had not been engaged in an energetic struggle upon
German territory and for the benefit of others, which
circumstance had undermined their mutual confidence.
Nevertheless, the effects of former intimacy had been
manifest, in that Prussia, instead of taking advantage of
Austria's perplexities, had made military preparations to
stand by her. But should the old friendly relations not be

V.] Bismarck and Karolyi. 357
renewed and revivified, it would be just as possible that
Prussia, in a similar case, would contract an alliance with
Austria's enemies, as that the two Great Powers should act
loyally and steadfastly together against a common foe. He,
Bismarck, at least, would never take it upon himself, under
such circumstances, to recommend neutrality to the King.
Austria could choose between prosecuting her present anti-
Prussian policy, backed up by a Central-State coalition, or
entering into an honourable connection with Prussia, as he
earnestly hoped she would do.
Count Karolyi replied that, " The Imperial House could
not possibly renounce its traditional influence upon the
German Governments." Bismarck denied the existence of
that influence, pointing out that "from the commencement
of the Seven Years' War, Hanover and Hesse had been
politically guided by Prussia, and that in Prince Metter-
nich's time those States had been admonished by Vienna,
in the interest of the Austro-Prussian understanding, to
follow the same leadership ; so that the alleged traditions of
the Austrian Imperial House only dated as far back as the
Schwarzenberg epoch, and the system to which they were
attached had not hitherto furthered the consolidation of
German alliances to any appreciable extent." He further
observed that in 1851, after having conferred repeatedly
with Prince Metternich upon this subject, he had hoped
" that Austria herself would perceive it to be the purpose of
a sagacious policy to obtain for Prussia a position in the
Confederation which might make it worth her while to
exert her whole strength for objects common to all the
German States ; instead of which Austria had successfully
striven to injure Prussia's position in the German Bund,
and to drive her to seek friends elsewhere. Her treatment
by the Vienna Cabinet seemed to be prompted by the

358 Bismark and Karolyi. [Chap.
assumption that Prussia was more exposed to foreign
attacks than any other State, and must consequently put up
with inconsiderate behaviour from those States to which she
had to look for support. It would therefore be the duty of
a Prussian Government, having at heart the interests of its
own country and Royal House, to prove the error of that
assumption by deeds, should no attention be paid to its
words and wishes." (An unimportant paragraph is here
omitted. — Translator's Note.)
Finally, the Prussian Minister requested the Austrian
Envoy to report the purport of this conversation as exactly
as possible to Count Rechberg, then directing the policy of
Austria, and expressed his conviction that unreserved frank
ness was indispensable to any attempt that might be made
to repair the damage that had accrued to Austro-Prussian
relations. With respect to the second Conference, which took place
on Dec. 13, the Circular Despatch reports : —
"I called upon Count Karolyi in order to direct his
attention to the gravity of the situation of affairs at the
Bund, and did not conceal from him that any further action
of the majority in what we regarded as an unconstitutional
direction would render our position untenable; that we
consequently foresaw a break-up of the Confederation ; that
Herr von Usedom had left no doubt as to our views in the
minds of Baron von Kuebeck and B.iron von der Pfordten,
but had received replies from them which excluded any
hope of a satisfactory settlement. Under these circum
stances, I remarked, a sense of our own dignity did not'
permit us any longer to avoid the conflict brought about by
our adversaries ; I pointed out that we should regard the
overstepping of the Confederation's competency involved in
a majority- vote as a breach of the Federal Treaties, and

v.] Bismarck and Thun. 359
should act accordingly ; viz. : we should recall the Royal
Federal Envoy without nominating a substitute; and I
indicated the consequences that must speedily accrue from
such a situation, inasmuch as we could no longer recognise
(he operativeness (in relation to Federal affairs) of an
Assembly in which we had ceased to play a part. We
should therefore be unable, thenceforth, to permit the
Prussian garrisons of Federal fortresses to obey any further
orders emanating from the Federal Assembly."
A few days after this conversation the Prussian Foreign
Office received the intimation that the Austrian Envoy in
Petersburg, Count Thun, would pass through Berlin and
talk over the pending difficulty with Bismarck. The follow
ing allusion to their interview is contained in the Circular
Dispatch :
" When Count Thun arrived here, I received the com
munications he made to me in the most conciliatory
manner, declaring myself ready to arrange the Frankfort
difficulties by expedients agreed upon between us . . .
Count Thun proposed to bring about a meeting between
Count Rechberg and myself for further discussion of the
matter." (The Despatch explains in detail why this
meeting did not come off, a fact with which the author
has already acquainted us in the foregoing chapter. —
Translator's Note.)
The answer returned by Vienna to the Circular Despatch
was couched in the language of calumniated innocence. It
observed that. " The Prussian Cabinet's exposk de faits
contains unmistakably plain-speaking testimony to the
political notions of its author, as well as an embellished
description of the occurrences so frequently discussed; a
description chiefly consisting of complaints against us and
reproaches anent what, in Berlin, is called our 'lack of

360 An Austrian Protest. [Chap.
consideration.' Our lack of consideration ! If our august
monarch declines to sacrifice a position which — the out
growth of centuries of history and hallowed by treaties —
belongs to his Crown by right, and corresponds to the
might and grandeur of his House, Austria is said to be
lacking in the consideration she owes to her Prussian Ally :
If the Imperial Court does not aid Prussia to gratify
pretensions that have no legal basis, but seek to trespass
upon the rights of other Confederate States, and which are
indicated in indistinct outlines instead of in a definite
form, Austria is accused of shutting her eyes to the con
sideration she owes to the other German Great Power 1 It
was reserved for the Prussian Government to stigmatise our
well-meant efforts to fulfil the German nation's wish for a
liberal development of the Federal Constitution as a lack of
consideration for Prussia ! What is meant by saying that
we ought not to prejudice Prussia's interests in Hanover
and Cassel by our interference ? Are we expected to keep
Envoys in those places for the purpose of acting on
Prussia's behalf instead of our own in questions with respect
to which the two German Powers take up different stand
points ? Do we complain of Prussia's influence at Karls
ruhe? ... If Berlin offers us the alternative of with
drawing from Germany, and transferring our Monarchy's
centre of gravity to Ofen, or of finding Prussia in the ranks
of our enemies during the next European conflict, public
opinion throughout Germany will pronounce judgment
upon such a proposition, and events will punish it, if
it be ever put in practice. It is for us to give its right
name to the pretext that has been thus got up at Berlin."
After Austria had again (in the spring and summer of
1863) distinctly manifested tendencies adverse to Prussian
policy by interfering, in common with France and England,

v.] Tlie Gastein Memorandum. 361
on behalf of the Polish insurgents, and by encouraging the
rebellion in Galicia to the best of her ability, whilst Bismarck
had concluded a treaty with Russia for the suppression of
that dangerous conflagration, the Vienna Cabinet reverted
to its plans for a Reform of the German Confederation.
Towards the end of July 1863 King William went to Gastein
to take the waters, accompanied by Bismarck, and was
visited there on August 3 by the Emperor Francis Joseph,
who wished to discuss German Federal Affairs with him. A
memorandum had been prepared for their Majesties' con
sideration, urgently recommending a modification of existing
conditions. It observed : — " The more uncertain the state
of Europe, the more imperatively does it become the duty of
German Princes — in view of the internal and external
dangers menacing the Fatherland — to secure to themselves
a tenable position. It is obvious that such a position can no
longer be simply based upon the actual Federal Constitution.
. . . The very foundations of the Federal Treaties shake
under the feet of him who stands upon them ; the edifice of
German order, as established by Conventions, exhibits gaps
and breaches in every direction. . . . Neither Austria nor
Prussia can rely with any degree of confidence upon the
Bund in its present condition. Recognising this fact, they
cannot but perceive how fully justified is the demand for such
reforms as shall impart fresh vitality into the principle of
Federation. . . . The Emperor has granted to his own
realms institutions in keeping with the age. He recognises
that the German nation in its entirety has a right to expect
that its political Constitution shall be reorganised; and, as
a Federal Prince, he deems it his duty to make his fellow-
Princes acquainted with what he considers feasible in this
direction, and what he, for his part, is ready to concede.
" Austria's plans of reorganisation repose exclusively upon

362 The Gastein Memorandum. [Chap
plain and positive adherence to the Federative principle.
. . . Monarchical States, amongst them two Great Powers
constitute the German League of States. Such institu
tions as an individual leader, or a Parliament resulting from
direct popular elections, are unsuitable to this League and at
variance with its nature. Whosoever demands them aims at
nothing more than a mere nominal Confederation ; or
rather, his real object is the gradual extinction of each
several State's vitality — a state of transition towards future
nullification — a split in Germany, without which this transi
tion connot be achieved."
The Austrian Government then set forth the fundamental
idea of its plan of reform as follows ; — "Austria will recom
mend the creation of a Federal Board of Direction, and the
periodical convocation of an Assembly of members of the
Diets of the different States. Well aware that a heavy
counterpoise will be required to guarantee the monarchical
principle against the latter institution and to protect the
legal independence of the individual States against possible
attack, she inclines to the belief that the best guarantee of this
kind and most efficient means of safeguarding princely rights
and the exalted station of German dynasties will be found
in periodical meetings of the Sovereigns of Germany.
"Without Prussia's amicable co-operation the task of
reorganising the Confederation cannot be definitively
carried out. Her will can practically and legally impede
the reform of Germany's collective Constitution. . . . But
things have gone so far in Germany that an absolute stand
still of reformatory agitation is no longer possible ; and the
Governments which recognise this fact will find themselves
at last compelled to take part in a work that is become
necessary. . . . Whatever experiences the future may have
in store for us, the Emperor will always have the satisfaction

V.J King William's Letter. 363
of knowing that he has plainly informed the King that, at
the present time, it depends upon Prussia's decision to
elevate the Confederation once more to the height of its
mission — a mission of such incalculable importance to the
nation, its Sovereigns, and the peace of Europe."
To this the Emperor added the verbal remark that the pro
ject had been mooted of a Congress of Princes, to assemble
in Frankfort on August 16 : that a Direction of five Princes
should be appointed to lead the Confederation ; that the Fe
deral Diet should continue to transact current business ; and
that it was proposed to constitute an Upper House of Federal
Sovereigns and a Lower House (endowed with consultative
attributes) of Deputies belonging to the Diets of the several
States. This conversation was succeeded by two others on
the same day, in the course of which the King did not
absolutely reject the Austrian project, but expressed several
scruples, which he repeated (August 4) in a letter to the
Chancellor, as follows : —
" In relation to a question so deeply concerning the
interests of my people and of the whole German nation, two
considerations present themselves, to which I subordinate
my own personal conclusions. It is firstly necessary to
avoid prejudicing such unity as actually exists by striving to
effect a closer connection. In this respect I gather from
Your Majesty's intention to maintain the essential founda
tions of the Federal Constitution a guarantee that whatever
may be good therein shall not be sacrificed to an endeavour
to attain something better, unless success shall be ensured to
that endeavour. My second consideration is, that the
achievement of our contemplated aim may be materially
retarded or furthered by our choice of the means to that
end. In my opinion our labours would not be lightened
by commencing them with a Meeting of Sovereigns. It

364 The Congress of Princes. [Chap.
seems to me imperative that so important a step (in order
that it may lead to the desired result) should be preceded
by exhaustive studies and conferences on the part of our
Ministers, upon the outcome of which the Sovereigns may
eventually pronounce their decision. On these grounds I
deem it my duty to decline Your Majesty's invitation for the
1 6th of this month, and to propose that we allow the
questions upon which the Sovereigns of all the Federal
States will ultimately have to decide, to be previously
discussed and formulated in Ministerial Conferences, to be
held by the representatives of the seventeen votes of the
Federal Assembly's Council."
When the two monarchs parted, the King remarked that
" a Congress of Princes, making allowance for the needful
business preliminaries, would not possibly be managed
before October 1." He was consequently much surprised
when, a few hours later, an Imperial aide-de-camp handed
to him the official invitation, dated July 31, to appear in
Frankfort on August 16th. This he answered in a letter
dated August 4 (already quoted) and by a telegram of the
same date, positively refusing the invitation for the 16th.
On the 7th however, he received another, proposing that
(in case his <4 cure " should not permit his attendance on the
1 6th) he would send a Prince of his House, duly provided
with plenary powers in his stead. This proposal was also
forthwith rejected. Austria's proceeding was especially
painful to the King, by reason of the hurry and informality
characterising its business portion in connection with the
personal part taken in it by his friend the Emperor in
paying him a visit. On the journey to Baden-Baden 
during which, as was then the rule, he was accompanied by
the Minister-President — he spent some days with the Queen
of Bavaria (whose husband was already at Frankfort) at

V.] King fohn of Saxony. 365
Munich and Nymphenburg, and 'subsequently staid at
Wildbad, where the widowed Queen Elizabeth was sojourn
ing. The whole of that period, as well as that of his stay at
Baden-Baden, was engrossed with negotiations, which
culminated in the arrival of the King of Saxony, accom
panied by his Minister, Herr von Beust, and bringing with
him a renewed invitation on the part of the assembled
Princes. Meanwhile, all the elements at our Court known
by the name of the "Austrian party,'' and whose most
industrious implement was Herr von Schleinitz, formerly
Minister of Foreign Affairs, had done their utmost to pave
the way for the King of Saxony's energetic endeavours to
persuade King William to go to Frankfort. The widowed
Queen, who had originally advocated the acceptance of the
invitation, pronounced herself in favour of its refusal,
having heard whilst passing through Wildbad, that, should
it be accepted, Herr von Bismarck would deem it necessary
to resign office. King John of Saxony — a gentleman of
great ability and much respected by King William — aided
by Herr von Beust, addressed himself to persuading His
Prussian Majesty to visit Frankfort so energetically and
with such vivacious arguments ad hominem that the
aggravated nervousness of the latter monarch — at that time
far from well — gave rise to considerable anxiety on the part
of his medical attendants. Herr von Bismarck addressed
vigorous reproaches to the Saxon Minister- President upon
this subject, leminding him of the circumstances under
which King Frederick William IV. returned from his last
visit to Dresden, bringing with him the germs of a deadly
malady; and very seriously required that consideration
should be shown for his Majesty's state of health. It is
even alleged that the Prussian Minister-President intimated
to his Saxon colleague that he would ask the Prussian

366 T/ie Congress of Princes. [Chap.
Commandant of Rastatt for an armed force wherewith to
protect his Sovereign against further annoyance, if it were
not put a stop to at his request
In a letter to the Emperor of Austria, dated August 20,
the King based his refusal of the collective invitation upon
the ground that he could enter into no binding engagements
with his Confederates before the matter under discussion at
Frankfort should have been thoroughly looked into by his
councillors ; wherefore his participation in the proceedings
was impracticable. This consideration, he added, would
not prevent him from examining, with the promptitude and
care he had also displayed relative to the development of
patriotic interests common to Germany at large, whatever
communications upon the subject his colleagues might
forward to him.
On August 21, Bismarck wrote to the Prussian Federal
Envoy concerning the Austrian projects of reform, then
before him in detail : — " In our opinion they do not har
monise with the proper position of the Prussian Monarchy,
or with the interests of the German people."
The Congress of Princes discussed Austria's proposals
and (at its final meeting on September 1) prepared a draft
of a reform-measure which was forwarded with a second
collective letter to the King of Prussia, but which, as its
clauses were not approved of in that high quarter, has
remained a draft to the present day.
(Here follows a lengthy report upon the Frankfort
Reform- Measure, addressed by Herr von Bismarck to the
King of Prussia on September 15, 1863, which, as it is
mainly a reiteration in detail of statements and arguments
already set forth more than once in this and the preceding
chapter, has been suppressed in the English version of
" Unser Reichskanzler." — Translator's Note.)

V.] Schleswig-Holstein. 3&
Bismarck's relations to Austria assumed quite ancthei
aspect when, in the autumn of 1863, the Schleswig-Holstein
question entered an acute phase. He said to us at Varzin
in 1877 : — "That is the diplomatic campaign of which I am
proudest." Baron von Holstein asked, " You wanted the
Duchies from the very beginning?" "Yes," replied the
Prince, " certainly I did, immediately after the King of
Denmark's death. But it was a difficult job. Everybody
was against me — several coteries at Court, Austria, the
petty German States, and the English, who grudged us the
harbour of Kiel. Crowds of the Liberals were opposed to it
who all of a sudden discovered that the rights of princes
were matters of importance — in reality, it was only their
hatred and envy of me — and even the Schleswig-Holsteiners
themselves did not want it. I had to contend with all these
and I know not whom besides. One day we had a meeting
of the State Council at which I delivered one of the longest
speeches I ever spouted, and said a good deal that must
have struck my hearers as inconceivable and impossible.
To judge by their astonished countenances, they must have
thought I had lunched too copiously. Costenoble acted as
reporter ; and when he shewed me his notes I found that
the passages in which I had spoken most plainly and
forcibly had been left out. I called his attention to this
and complained of it. ' Yes,' he replied, ' that is right
enough ; but I thought you would prefer that they should
be omitted.' I rejoined ; ' Not a bit of it. I insist that
the speech shall stand exactly as I spoke it' "
In order to attain his object the Prussian Minister was
compelled, firstly, to take his stand (over-against the great
non-German powers and Denmark) upon the London
Protocol of 1852, and, secondly, to make sure of Austria's
co-operation. Prussia and Austria, not the Confederation,

368 The Elbe Duchies. [Chap.
had signed the Protocol, which prescribed that Prince
Christian of Gluecksburg should succeed Frederick the
Seventh upon the thrones of Denmark and Schleswig-
Holstein, but also stipulated that Schleswig should never be
incorporated in the kingdom, and should preserve its
Provincial-Constitution. Two days after his accession,
however, the new King signed a Constitution for Denmark
and Schleswig, de facto incorporating the latter in the
former. Consequently, the German Great Powers could
not recognise him in the Duchies, unless, indeed, he should
revoke his signature. All that the Bund had to say in the
matter concerned Holstein and the rights possessed by that
Duchy in common with Schleswig. The interest of the
Central States, which influenced the Bund, prompted them
to support Duke Frederick of Augustenburg, who — despite
his father's formal renunciation of all his rights in the
Duchies — regarded himself as the heir to Schleswig-Holstein.
The idea was to create another Medium State, i.e. another
adversary to Prussia. This appeared to be Austria's
interest, too ; but other considerations outweighed it with
her. The London Protocol was binding upon Vienna as
well as upon Berlin ; Austria could not allow herself to be
outvoted in the Federal Assembly, any more than Prussia ;
by taking up the matter herself, she wrested it from the
hands of the resuscitated Democratic party ; she was bound
to go with Prussia, in view of the vehemently excited state
of German patriotism, if the latter power should stand forth as
the Champion of the populations of the Northern Marches ;
finally, by joining Prussia in the enterprise, Austria
thought she would be better enabled to watch, hamper,
and ultimately frustrate the projects of annexation attributed
to the policy of Berlin. Bismarck therefore succeeded in
separating Austria from the Central States and in conclud-

V.] The Elbe Duchies. 369
ing with her, for a short time, such an arrangement as had
obtained in the days of Metternich, and as he, whilst a
Federal Envoy, had often wished to see re-established. Speak
ing in the Upper House (January 24, 1865) upon this
subject, he observed : —
" Had we not chosen the path which we have actually
pursued, no alternative remained open to us but a Federal
War. . . . Now it is obvious that in a Federal War
Austria would have acted, not as a simple Confederate, but
as the presiding Power, and that, with her, but much more
decisively than she — the majority of the Federal Diet would
have interfered, not only with the military management of
the campaign, but with the ultimate organisation of the
Duchies. That we could have looked forward to a more
benevolent consideration of Prussian interests at the hands
of that majority than at those of Austria, our friend and
ally, I fancy even the gentlemen who disapprove of us will
scarcely assert."
We shall only indicate the principal events resulting from
the German Great Powers' common action. At first they
proceeded in accordance with the Confederation, proposing
in Frankfort (Dec. 7, 1863) that execution should be levied
upon Holstein by 6000 Saxon and as many Hanoverian
troops, and then exhorting the Bund to summon Denmark
to revoke the Constitution incorporating Schleswig — that
Duchy, in case of Denmark's refusal, to be occupied by
Federal troops. The Bund rejected this proposal ; where
upon Austria and Prussia took independent action in their
capacity of European Powers. The Emperor Napoleon
had been put into a good humour by the conclusion, a
short time previously, of the Franco-Prussian Commercial
Treaty ; he had come to the front in Italy as the vindicator
of nationality rights ; he had visions of a profitable compact
vol. 1. 2 B

370 The 1864 War. [Chap.
with Russia, in times to come. Russia was grateful for
Bismarck's conduct in relation to the Polish insurrection.
England's jealousy had not the courage to stay the Allies
on the path which rapidly led them to their goal.
On January 16, 1864, Prussia and Austria summoned
Denmark to withdraw the November Constitution. Their
summons was rejected ; the Allies entered Holstein, and,
soon afterwards, Schleswig ; the Dannewerk was evacuated ;
the Dueppel works were stormed ; all Schleswig and part of
Jutland were occupied. Then came a brief interruption of
operations by a Conference at London, in which Bismarck
caused it to be declared that Prussia repudiated the London
Protocol. Upon this followed the proposal, on the part of the
two Powers, that the Duchies should thenceforth only be
connected with Denmark by a personal union ; then (this
notion having been rejected by the Danes) the demand
that Schleswig-Holstein should be altogether disconnected
from Denmark, and amalgamated under the sovereignty of
the Hereditary Prince Frederick of Augustenburg. The
Conference broke up (June 25) having done nothing, and
war recommenced, soon to conclude by Denmark suing for
peace after the Island of Alsen and the whole of Jutland
had been occupied by the Allies. The King of Denmaik
ceded the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg
to the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria.
Thitherto the interests of Prussia and Austria had been
almost identical. Thereafter they diverged more and
more, in proportion as Austria harked back towards the
Confederation. Prussia could not suffer the creation on
Germany's northern frontier of a new medium State which
would infallibly reinforce the anti-Prussian majority in the
Federal Assembly. Its Duke, too (supposing he ever came
to reign) would have had to submit to precautionary

v.] Joint Occupation. 371
measures and limitations to his sovereignty, which would
not have suited him or the Central States or the traditional
policy of Austria. When Bismarck intimated to the Duke
of Augustenburg the conditions upon which Prussia would
recognise him as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, he encoun
tered a positive refusal ; after which it became Bismarck's
primary object to strip the Central States of whatever
influence they might hope to exercise upon a final settle
ment of the question. The first thing to be done in that
direction was to remove the Confederation's "execution"
troops from Holstein and Lauenburg. In this step
Austria stood by Prussia at the Bund. The Duchies were
now occupied in common by the troops of both Great
Powers and administered by Austro-Prussian Commissioners.
It soon became apparent that the Austrian Commissioner
was fomenting an agitation in favour of establishing the
Hereditary Prince as reigning Duke, whilst his Prussian
colleague was bestirring himself on behalf of annexation.
Soon these gentlemen began to protest against one
another's proceedings. When Count Mensdorff-Pouilly
proposed to hand the Duchies over to the Hereditary Prince,
Bismarck returned a negative answer, and instructed the
Prussian Crown-Syndics to draw up a memorial refusing the
Duke of Augustenburg's claims, and attributing to the
actual possessors of the three Duchies the right to administer
and legislate for them quite independently of the Federal
Assembly. Bismarck now (Dec 13) made confidential enquiries in
Vienna respecting annexation. Austria declared herself
content, if compensated in Germany — for instance by
cession to her of the county of Glatz. Of this Berlin, of
course, would not hear. Then (February 22, 1865)
Bismarck offered to recognise the Duke of Augustenburg 2 b 2

372 The Prusso- Austrian Quarrel, [Chap.
under conditions the more important of which were that the
King of Prussia should dispose of the armed forces, postal
arrangements and telegraph-lines of the Duchies ; that these
latter should enter the Customs' Union; and that they
should cede to Prussia some territories near Kiel and
abutting upon the projected canal between the North Sea
and the Baltic. This offer Court Mensdorff declined ; and
on April 6 Austria voted for a motion brought forward by
the South German Governments for the unconditional
establishment of the Hereditary Prince as ruler of Holstein,
and carried by a majority. It was not, however, recognised
by Prussia and therefore took no effect. When Bismarck
thereupon demanded that the class representatives in
Schleswig-Holstein should be heard upon the question in
dispute, Mensdorff would not consent ; and when subse
quently Vienna herself proposed that the class representatives
should be convoked, Bismarck exacted the expulsion before
hand of the " Pretender," whose presence in the country ren
dered a free expression of opinion on their part impossible.
During the summer of 1865, as Austria did not give way,
a settlement by arms appeared imminent. Whilst the
King and Bismarck were in Karlsbad, the latter once more
complained at Vienna of the Augustenburg agitation, and
threatened that Prussia would deal with it on her own
account. On his way to Gastein, the King held council
at Ratisbon with his Ministers and Envoy at the Court of
Vienna, and decided upon adhering to the February
Conditions. Two days later (July 23), Bismarck had a
conversation at Salzburg with the Bavarian Minister, Von
der Pfordten, to whom he expressed his conviction that
war between Austria and Prussia, had become inevitable,
observing that the interests of the Central States urgently
required that they should take their stand forthwith, in view

v.] The Gastein Convention. 373
of that eventuality. It would be a duel between the two
Great Powers, and fewer interests would have to suffer if
the rest of Germany would remain passive, which was all
the more feasible because Prussia had no thought of extending
her territory beyond the line of the Maine. Besides, the
affair would soon be settled. One great battle, and Prussia,
would be in a position to dictate terms to her enemy.
Bavaria should bear in mind that she was the natural heir
to Austria's position in Southern Germany.
Once more war was temporarily averted by negotiations
that took place in Gastein between Bismarck and Count
Blome, the Austrian Envoy in Munich. On August 14,
these diplomatists signed an agreement, according to which
the exercise of Austria's and Prussia's common rights
(assigned to them by the Treaty of Vienna) was alloted to
the King of Prussia in Schleswig and to the Emperor of
Austria in Holstein, without prejudice to the continuance
of both Powers' rights to the totality of the two Duchies ;
whilst Lauenburg was ceded to Prussia for a pecuniary
consideration. The Convention was carried out; General
Von Manteuffel was appointed Lord-Lieutenant of
Schleswig, Field-Marshal Lieutenant Von Gablenz of
Holstein ; and Lauenburg, at first by " personal union,"
was amalgamated with Prussia. This (as Bismarck wrote
to his wife on the very day upon which the agreement was
concluded) was only " pasting together the cracks in the
building." The partition of the Duchies' Administration
between Austria and Prussia did not improve matters, as
the former continued to promote the Augustenburg agitation
in Holstein. On October 16, the Hereditary Prince
actually made his appearance upon Schleswig ground, and
allowed himself to be received with royal honours at
Eckemfoerde ; whereupon the Staatsanzeiger stigmatised

374 The Duke of Augustenburg. [Chap
his conduct as " the usurpation of an unjustified authority,
and further remarked : — " Should the Prince, without per
mission from the King, again set foot upon Schleswig soil,
and give occasion to fresh demonstrations, his arrest may
be looked for." A mass-meetirig of Associations directed by
the Prince's councillors (at first prohibited by Gablenz, but
afterwards authorised by the express command of the
Vienna Cabinet) was held at Akona (January, 23, 1866),
vehemently demanded the convocation of the Schleswig-
Holstein Staende, and shouted "long live our lawful
Sovereign, Duke Frederick!" Moreover, the Holstein
press, with Austria's sanction, overflowed with abuse of
Prussia. In vain Bismarck remonstrated, through the Prussian
Envoy in Vienna. " The press," he observed, in a despatch
of January 20, 1866, "persists in treating the Prince of
Augustenburg as a lawful and even reigning monarch. The
Associations (still tolerated) get up demonstrations and
ovations for the Prince and his family, unmistakably
indicating him in the character of a Sovereign. All these
circumstances make his mere presence in Kiel a chronic
protest against the rights of both Sovereigns. The
Imperial Government seems to forget that this protest is as
much directed against the rights of the Emperor of Austria
as against those of the King of Prussia. . . . We were
prepared (in virtue of the Gastein Convention) that the
Imperial Government should exert its own rights to the
fullest extent, and have admitted those rights as an
indisputable factor in aU our plans and proposals touching
the future of the Duchies. But we were not prepared that
Austria should allow rights common to herself and us to be
violated with impunity ; and we protest against her doing
so. . . . His Majesty the King has a right to demand

v.] The Austrians in Holstein. 375
that this evil be remedied by the expulsion of the Prince,
if the Imperial Government really feels itself unequal to
putting a stop to the demonstrations in question. There
is another point to be considered. I have already mentioned
that we expected from the Austrian regime in Holstein a
consolidation of Conservative interests as against the too-
long tolerated disturbance of the country by a widely-spread
democratic agitation, which looks forward to realising its
plans under the shadowy reign of a powerless sovereign,
and' is already actively strengthening its influence upon the
population — especially upon the youth of the country — by
every means in its power. In this respect also, our expec
tations have unfortunately been disappointed. The
democratic agitation, animated by hatred of Conservative
Prussia, blossoms out luxuriantly in the Associations and
the press. The Imperial Austrian Government may
contemplate this demoralisation and corruption of the
populace with comparative indifference. Not so we.
Whatever may be the decision ultimately arrived at
respecting the Duchies, their condition will always be a
matter of importance to Prussia ; and should they become
a nucleus of democratic and revolutionary tendencies it
will become Prussia's business to put them in order. , , ,
Let the Cabinet of Vienna remember that the greater our
difficulties become (in Schleswig) the smaller will be the
admissible claims upon Prussia for compensation. For our
part, we have always clung to the hope of arriving at an
understanding by peaceful means, and have resolved, in the
mean time, to maintain the provisional arrangement in the
spirit of friendly concord. But the Imperial Cabinet must
not deceive itself to the extent of believing that its. manner
of working the Gastein Convention — one altogether too
hostile to Prussia — is calculated to revive that hope, or to

376 Mensdorffs Despatch. [Chap.
enable us to deal with the provisional arrangement as above
indicated." This despatch was followed by one even more forcible
and pressing, dated January 26. (As it is merely a re
capitulation of the grievances above recited, couched in
vigorous and menacing language, but containing no new
facts, it has been omitted from the English version of this
work. — Translator's Note.) But all these remonstrances
proved fruitless. On February 7, Count Mensdorff replied
to them in a despatch addressed to Karolyi, the leading idea
of which is thus expressed : —
"The two powers have not shared between them the
substance of the acquisitions resulting from the Treaty of
Vienna, but only their temporary possession. They have
reserved the definitive solution of the Sovereignty question
for a future understanding. . . . The Imperial Government
is not subject to any control in its temporary administration
of Holstein. In virtue of the Gastein Convention, Austria
is not only the sole proprietor of Holstein Sovereign-rights,
but the manner of exercising those rights is left entirely to.
her own discretion. . . . She regards each separate question
arising within the sphere of her administration in Holstein as
exclusively pendant between herself and her Lord-Lieutenant,
and exempt from interference from any other quarter.";
After having received this reply, Bismarck remarked to the.
Austrian Envoy that " Prussia's relations to Austria, despite!
the intimate character they had assumed during the past
year or two, had now been thrust back to the stand-point
they occupied before the Danish war — neither better nor
worse than those obtaining with any other Power." j
On February 28, a Council of Ministers was held at
Berlin, attended by the Governor of Schleswig, the Chief of
the General Staff, and the Prussian Envoy in Paris. It

v.] War Preparations. 377
came to the conclusion that any concession on the part of
Prussia in the question of the Elbe-Duchies would offend
popular feeling and affect the honour of the country ; where
fore the line thitherto taken up must be pursued, even at the
risk of war. Nevertheless, no military preparations were
commenced. On March 10, a Council of Marshals
assembled in Vienna, decided upon collecting troops in
Bohemia and Moravia. Six days later, in a despatch
addressed to Austria's representatives at the German Courts,
Count Mensdorff, declared it to be the Imperial Govern
ment's intention, in case Prussia should bring about an
open rupture, to invoke the interference of the Confedera
tion, and at the same time to make over to it all further
decisions concerning the regulation of the Schleswig-
Holstein affair. The Presiding Envoy was instructed to
inform the Federal Assembly that all Austria's efforts to
settle the question of the Duchies in concord with Prussia
had failed. Prussia was preparing for war, and Count
Karolyi, had been directed to demand a positive declaration
from the Prussian Minister Resident, whether or not the
Court of Berlin intended to violently tear up the Gastein
Convention. " Should the danger of a breach of the peace
become still more imminent, it would be necessary to take
measures, promptly and decisively, for self-defence. In
view of Prussia's threatened attack, these measures could
only consist of mobilising the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th
Federal Army-Corps, and placing them in the field, side by
side with the Austrian Army."
Bismarck "countered" this measure in a despatch (March
24) to Prussia's Envoys at the German Courts. He denied
that Prussia had armed ; pointed out that Austria was pre
paring for war and would soon have a powerful army
stationed close to the Prussian frontier ; and declared that

378 Bismarck on the Bund. [Chap.
it would be necessary to take defensive measures. He then
continued : —
" But this is not all exacted from us by the situation.
Our experiences of the trustworthiness of an Austrian
Alliance and of Vienna's real sentiments towards us compel
us to look to the future. Prussia — through her position,
German character and the German feeling of her Princes — is
avant tout obliged to look for guarantees in Germany itself.
. . . The Confederation, in its present form, is not equal to
carrying on the active policy exacted by great crises. Its
institutions were based upon the assumption that the two
Great Powers should be always agreed ; they could last as
long as that state of affairs was kept up by Prussian pliancy
towards Austria ; but they cannot survive serious antagonism
between the two Powers. . . . We have often pointed out
to our Confederates that the Federal military arrangements
were incompatible with the safety of Germany, and have in
vain endeavoured to improve it within the limits of the old
Federal organisation. As matters stand we cannot rely
upon any real help from the Bund, should we be attacked,
and shall consequently have to depend upon our own forces,
unless special good-will, on the part of individual German
Governments should place assistance at our disposal which
— dealt with in the ordinary Federal method — would only
become available far too late to be of any use to us. This
consideration, and the abnormal position in which Prussia is
placed by the hostile attitude of the other Great Power,
force us to propose a reform of the Confederation in keeping
with actualities. Through our geographical position the
interests of Prussia and Germany are identical. . . . Unless we
can be sure of Germany, our position, geographically speak
ing, is more hazardous than that of any other European
State ; but the fate of Prussia will carry with it the fate of

v.] Bismarck' on the Bund. $79
Germany ; and we doubt not that — once Prussia's strength
shattered — Germany would thereafter only participate pas
sively in the politics of European nations. AU the German
Governments should consider it their sacred duty to avert
such an eventuality; to which end they should act with
Prussia. If the German Confederation, in its present form,
should attempt to face the great European crisis which may
accrue at any moment, I much fear that it will succumb in
the endeavour, and will not be able to save Germany from
the fate of Poland." The despatch closed with a request
for an answer to the question, " Whether, and to what
extent, Prussia could count upon assistance from the
Government addressed, in case she should be attacked by
Austria or compelled to make war by unmistakable threats ?"
Most of the Governments replied by referring Prussia to
the Bund ; whereupon Bismarck proposed to the Federal
Assembly (April .9) that it should convoke a meeting of
delegates directly elected by national universal suffrage in
order to consider and discuss the several German Govern
ments' projects for reforming the Federal Constitution. . . .
Bismarck subsequently endeavoured to come to an under
standing with the different Governments respecting the funda
mental ideas of his own Reform Project ; and when a Com
mittee of the Bund had been appointed to look into it, the
Prussian Envoy submitted to that body the following sketch of
the project in question : — 1. The introduction of a National
Assembly to be periodically convoked, into the organism of
the Bund, for the purpose of replacing the voting-unanimity
at present exacted with respect to Federal Legislation.
2. Extension of this new Federal organ's competency to
matters referred to in Art 64 of the Vienna " Schluss-Akt "
as "Dispositions of general utility." 3. Regulation of
communications. 4. Free circulation and general German

380 Attitude of the Petty States. [Chap
rights of domicile. 5. General Customs' and Trade Legis
lation. 6. Organisation of the general protection of German
trade and navigation abroad, and regulation of United
Germany's Consular Representation. 7. Creation of a
German Fleet and of the harbours necessary thereto. 8.
Revision of the Federal Military Constitution.
The attitudes assumed by most of the Governments to
wards these proposals were respectively indifferent, mis
trustful or hostile. They feared that their particular
interests might be prejudiced by a National Assembly of the
above description; they felt themselves sufficiently pro
tected against external dangers by the two Great Powers ;
they believed that they could preserve their previous impor
tance without putting themselves to any additional trouble.
But the German people — or rather, those portions of it
influenced by more or less Democratic tendencies — in their
blindness and bitterness, were furious with the project of
reform. What good thing would come from Bismarck?
Rather 'let the detested Federal Diet endure than accept the
long yearned-for Parliament from the hand of a Minister who
refused to govern in accordance with the views and preten
sions of the Party of Progress 1
Meanwhile Berlin and Vienna were embarked in hot dis
putation about the alleged or real preparations for war;
advancing and retreating, arming and disarming again, and
even making another attempt to arrive at a peaceful solution
of the Schleswig-Holstein question. On April 26 Count
Mensdorff, in a despatch to Karolyi, proposed to the Prussian
Court " to give to the Bund what was the Bund's," and to
join Austria in making declaration at Frankfort that " Austria
and Prussia had resolved to transfer their rights to whichso
ever pretendant might be recognised by the German Con
federation as supremely entitled to the succession in

v.] War becomes imminent. 381
Holstein." In exchange for this certain concessions, pre
viously agreed to by the Cabinet of Vienna during the fore
going negotiations, should be made to Prussia. Bismarck's
answer (May 7) was essentially as follows : " We stand upon
the Treaties of Vienna and Gastein. The King of Denmark
had a perfect right to cede the Duchies, and the two Ger
man Powers acquired them unconditionally. Therefore, the
Confederation cannot decide upon the legal ownership of
Holstein. We should regard it as a breach of the above
Treaties were the Imperial Government, against our will, to
treat a Federal decision concerning our common rights to
the Duchies as valid. Just as little as we can leave the
settlement of this question to the actual majority of German
Governments do we intend to transfer our share of rights,
acquired in battle and by treaty, to a third party, who can
offer us no guarantee for an equivalent of the sacrifices with
which we were obliged to purchase the acquisition of those
rights. If, however, the Imperial Government wishes to
make fresh arrangements with respect to its rights in our
common conquest, we are ready to deal with her."
There was no question of any transaction of this kind in
Vienna ; and the possibility of war (Bismarck had mean
while secured Italy as our Ally) became more and more a
probability as week succeeded week. The Liberals in
Prussia and Germany did what they could to avert it with
highflown declarations and admonitions, denounced it as " a
the war undertaken solely with dynastic objects," threatened
Government with the nation's curse and with impeachment
foi high treason — in short, indulged in all sorts of pathetic
antics. What was of more importance was the fact that one
of our Ministers in Berlin was well-affected to Austria ; still
more so, that influence was brought to bear upon the King
in exalted quarters at Court, and that his Royal kinsfolk

382 The Gablenz Mission. [Chap.
outside Prussia were also busy in the endeavour to turn him
from his purpose. Most important of all was it, however,
that the King's own feelings did not allow him, for a long
time, to decide upon breaking with Austria and allying him
self to such a power as Italy ; and that his scruples only
vanished when Bismarck abundantly proved to him that he
must draw the sword to save Prussia's interests and honour
from prejudice. The army was mobilised. Before taking
the last step of all, however, Bismarck made another attempt
to come to an understanding with Austria — this time on an
entirely new basis. In 1869 he gave the Saxon Minister
von Friesen an account of this endeavour, whilst chatting
with him one day ; and I am in a position to tell exactly
what took place, having gathered the facts during a conversa
tion held on January 28, 1883. They are as follows : —
" About a fortnight before the commencement of active
hostilities, Bismarck sent the Austrian General von Gablenz's
brother, a Saxon then living at Berlin, to the Emperor in
Vienna with offers of peace on the basis of Dualism and
common action against France. Gablenz was to tell His
Majesty that we had six to seven hundred thousand men in
the field, whilst the Austrian forces were also very numerous ;
we had therefore better come to terms, execute a change of
front westwards (Prussia in the North, Austria in the South)
against France, reconquer Elsass, and make Strassburg a
Federal fortress. There was no just cause on hand for a
war with France : but our excuse would be that the French
had also done us a great wrong by seizing Elsass and
Strassburg in time of peace. If we offered Strassburg to
the Germans as a wedding-present they would put up with
our Dualism fast enough. The Austrians were to rule the
roast in the South, disposing of the 7th and 8th Army
Corps ; we in the North, with command of the gth and 10th.

v.] The Gablenz Mission. 383
Dualism is as old as the hills in Germany ; there have been
Ingaevons and Istsevons, Guelphs and Ghibellines, High-
Germans and Low-Germans. Well ; Gablenz went off with
his mission to the Emperor, who seemed not disinclined to
entertain the proposal, but replied that he must first hear
what his Foreign Minister, Mensdorff, had to say about it.
Mensdorff was not the man for such ideas ; he did not, how
ever directly oppose the project, and said he must confer
with the other Ministers. They proved to be, one and all,
for making war upon us. The Finance-Minister — who
thought we should be beaten — declared that he must have
five hundred millions out of us as a war-indemnity, or else a
good opportunity for declaring a State-bankruptcy. The
War-Minister was by no means displeased with Bismarck's
notion ; but, said he, " first we must have a brush together ;
then we can make it up and pitch into the French with our
united forces." So Gablenz came back unsuccessful ; and
a few days later the King and his Ministers started for the
scene of war in Bohemia. It- was a pity. The old union,
or rather disunion, of the Frankfort Confederation would
have been broken up, but there would have been no ex
ternal rupture. The Northern and Southern Confedera
tions would have entered into a close Alliance against
foreign countries, with a mutual guarantee of their respective
territories." Thenceforth matters progressed rapidly. On June 1
Austria declared at Frankfort that she would leave the
decision upon the Schleswig-Holstein affair to the Federal
Diet, and had instructed her Statthalter in Holstein to
convoke the local representative Assembly. Prussia
protested against both these proceedings. In a Circular
Despatch of June 4, Bismarck declared to the Foreign
Courts : — " Vienna has resolved upon war ; the next thing to

384 The Prussians enter Holstein. [Chap.
be done is to choose the most auspicious moment for
beginning it."
Prussia's protest was promptly followed by appropriate
action. On June 6 the Prussian Statthalter in Schleswig
informed the Austrian Statthalter in Hosltein that, in the
opinion of his Government, Austria had brought about a
rupture of the Gastein Convention. The conditions
obtaining previous to that Convention were therefore
revived. By command of the King he would march into
Holstein the next day; but (in order not to mar the
peaceful character of this step) would not occupy places in
which the Austrians were stationed. He hoped Baron
Gablenz would readily agree with him respecting the new
positions of affairs. Next day the Prussians entered
Holstein, and Manteuffel established his head quarters at
Rendsburg. Gablenz retired from Kiel to Altona under
protest, taking with him the Pretender. On June 12 the
Austrians gave up their positions in Holstein altogether, and
withdrew through Hanover to Hesse. Prussia took over
the administration of Holstein, and the meeting of the
Staende, called by Gablenz, was prohibited.
On the tenth of June Bismarck issued a Circular Despatch
addressed to Prussia's Confederates, submitting to them a
project of a Federal Constitution and asking them to
decide whether or not, if the actual Confederation should
be broken up, they would join a new one founded upon
his project, the chief dispositions of which were as follows: 
" The Federal Realm to consist of those States hitherto
belonging thereto, except the Austrian and the Netherland
territories. Legislative power to be exercised by the
Federal Diet in community with a National Assembly, the
latter to be convoked periodically. The Federal States to
constitute a Customs' and Commercial Union. . . . The

v.] The 1866 War. 385
Federal Government to have the right of declaring war, of
concluding peace, as well as alliances and treaties, and of
appointing and receiving diplomatic envoys, for purposes
connected with international representation. The Federal
fleet to be homogeneous and under the command of the
King of Prussia. The Federal land forces to consist of a
Northern army, commanded in chief by the King of
Prussia, a Southern army, commanded in chief by the
King of Bavaria. The relations of the Confederation to the
German provinces of the Austrian Empire to be regulated
by special treaties, after an agreement respecting them
shall have been duly arrived at between the Federal Diet
and the National Parliament."
Bismarck, therefore, did not then contemplate a complete
separation of Germany from Austria; and we shall see,
that as soon as that separation had really taken place he
addressed himself to the task of forming new relations to the
Empire with the same patience and perseverance he had
displayed in breaking up the old ones, so far as they were
disadvantageous to Germany.
On the nth of June Austria stigmatised Manteuffel's
march into Holstein as " violent self-help " in the Federal
Assembly, and moved for the mobilisation of the non-
Prussian army-corps. The motion was passed (June 14)
by nine votes against six, although the Prussian Envoy had
declared its very discussion to be anti-Federal He then,
in the name of his Sovereign, pronounced the Federal
treaty violated, null, and void. This was the final result
of Vienna's efforts, extending over twenty years, to induce
the Bund to take the field against Prussia.
Of the war which then broke out we will only say here
that it was short, and that the battle of Koeniggraetz
practically decided it in favour of Prussia. Thereafter no
VC\X T 2 C

386 Napoleonic Mediation. [Chap,
great military difficulties had to be overcome ; but other
troubles arose in the shape of French meddling, invoked by
the Emper of Austria. On July 4th Francis Joseph
telegraphed to Napoleon that he was prepared to cede
Venetia to France, and requested the latter's mediation with
Prussia and Italy. Napoleon lost no time in coming
forward as arbitrator. During the night of July 4-5 he
despatched a telegram to the Prussian headquarters at
Horitz, expressing the hope that so magnanimous a
monarch as King William would, after having achieved
such splendid successes, gladly welcome his endeavours to
restore peace, and proposing an armistice. The Prussian
answer was affirmative ; but our Ambassador in Paris was
instructed to inform the French Emperor than an armistice
could only be granted under certain express conditions, and
on the 17th Prince Reuss was sent off with a letter from
the King to Napoleon indicating those conditions. An
armistice was admissible if Austria would pledge herself,
when peace should be concluded, to withdraw from the
German Confederation, to consent to the creation of a
Federal realm on a national basis, and to a territorial
aggrandisement of Prussia that should connect the two
sections of her monarchy, hitherto separated. At a consul
tation (July 10) to which the representatives of Austria and
Prussia were invited, Napoleon made a counter-proposition
to the effect that the two German great Powers should
thenceforth stand alone, the remaining German States
forming a Confederation of their own. It was obvious that
he had in view a new Rhenish League ; wherefore both the
Prussian and Austrian Envoys refused his proposal, and
Napoleon found himself compelled to give way in the
direction of the Prussian conditions. In the hope of
rendering his intervention abortive, Bismarck made another

V ] The Herring Mission. 387
attempt to come to terms with the Cabinet of Vienna by
confidential means. He commissioned Biron Herring to
convey to the Austrian Government the following proposals,
whereupon peace negotiations might be founded : Austria
not to cede any territory, except Venetia, nor to pay any
war-indemnity ; Prussia to adopt the Main as the limit of her
hegemony ; Southern Germany to be left to itself, Austria
being allowed to enter into relations with it ; all this
however, upon condition that France was to have nothing
to do with the conclusion of peace. These proposals caused
agreeable surprise in high quarters at Vienna. But Prince
Maurice Esterhazy, who had great influence upon the
Foreign Minister, received their bearer very coldly, kept
him waiting thirty hours for an answer, and finally dismissed
him with a few evasive phrases, and the statement that
Austria could only send a negotiator to Prussian head
quarters on receipt of an official invitation. Herring
hurried off to Nikolsburg (where headquarters were by
that time established), but arrived there a little later than
Benedetti, Napoleon's agent, and was told : " If you had
made your appearance an hour earlier the negotiations
would have taken quite another turn. Having accepted
France's intervention, we can no longer dispense with it."
Napoleon now proposed an armistice on the following
terms ; preservation of Austria's territorial integrity, her
withdrawal from the League of German States, creation of a
North German Confederation under the military leadership
of Prussia, and permission to the Southern German States
to constitute an international independent Union. There
was no mention of any territorial aggrandisement to Prussia.
This, however, had become a condition of the first moment
to the King, since his victories ; indeed he and his generals
demanded more, in that direction, than Bismarck deemed
2 c 2

388 Annexation Projects. [Chap.
advisable. On the 9th of July he wrote to his wife from
Hohenmauth : — " If we are not extravagant in our preten
sions and do not fancy that we have conquered the whole
world, we shali obtain a peace worth all our trouble.
But we are as easily exhilarated as cast down, and it is my
thankless business* to pour water into effervescing wine,
and to point out that we do not live alone in Europe, but
have three neighbours to reckon with." Eager annexionists
at headquarters favoured the cession of Austrian Silesia.
Bismarck reminded them that that province was closely
and warmly attached to the House of Hapsburg. They
required that Austria's Central German allies should be
" punished " by loss of territory. He replied that we must
only take what we really were bound to have : that punish
ments should be left to God, and had nothing to do with
politics. They were of opinion that Bavaria ought to hand
over her ex-Hohenzollern territory as the prize of victory;
for Anspach and Bayreuth still remembered that they had
belonged to the Royal House of Prussia and were part of
its inheritance. Bismarck informed them that those
provinces had long since become reconciled to their
position under the Bavarian Crown. Then the annexionists
demanded the whole of Saxony, moderating their exaction
subsequently to Leipzig, with its entourage, and the
Lausitz, for strategical reasons. Bismarck replied that we
must either take all, which Austria could not consent to,
or nothing. Partitions gave rise to bad blood and caused a
great deal of trouble. For him the chief thing was Federal
Reform ; next came an increment of Prussia's might, to be
achieved by incorporating a few North German States.
Ultimately, the King consented to restrict his claims to
these limits ; but as late as the third week of July he
declared that " he would rather abdicate, than return home

V. Cessions of Territory. 389
without having obtained an important addition of territory
to Prussia."
During the negotiations that now commenced Bismarck
had to be guided by the King's above-mentioned resolve.
Later on he demanded large cessions of territory — a slice of
Bohemia, and all Bavaria northwards of the Main — but
only with the object of withdrawing these demands in
consideration of other advantages. The possibility of one
day making friends with Austria, by letting her off cheaply,
was worth a good deal more than so many square miles of
a Catholic and chiefly Czechish territory; and Bavaria's
tacit alliance, for the eventuality of a war with France, was
at least as valuable as the possession of Franconia. On the
1 8th of July Napoleon's new proposal received answer, by
telegraph, that it did not afford a sufficiently comprehensive
basis for definitive peace, as Prussia's territorial aggrandise
ment at the cost of hostile States in North Germany had
been rendered necessary by military events and the feeling
of the nation. If Austria and Italy accepted the French
programme, that would suffice to justify an armistice ; but
Austria and Prussia must negotiate their own peace together,
and the other belligerent States would have to make terms
with Prussia, each for itself. The King was ready to
observe a five days' truce ; if Austria did not accept the
Prussian conditions within that term, war would be
resumed. Benedetti had gone to Vienna to recommend the French
proposal. He returned to Prussian headquarters on the
19th, and informed Bismarck that Austria accepted it as the
basis of an armistice. Next day Bismarck intimated to
the Prussian Ambassador in Paris that the King had given
his consent to the armistice, but with great difficulty, and
only under the assurance, that greater cessions of territory

390 Bismarck at Nikolsburg. [Chap,
would be made to Prussia in North Germany when peace
should be concluded. " The French stipulations," he
continued (the despatch was communicated to Napoleon),
" would suffice us as preliminaries for a separate peace with
Austria, but not for one with our other adversaries,
especially in Southern Germany. With them we must
arrange special conditions; and the French Emperor's
mediation, which they have not invoked, applies ex
clusively to Austria. Though we are free, as far as Italy
is concerned, through the cession of Venetia, we cannot
set Italy free from her obligations to us before we obtain
our equivalent for Venetia, guaranteed to us by our treaty
with her."
On the evening of the 21st, Austrian plenipotentiaries
arrived at Prussian headquarters in Nikolsburg in order to
negotiate peace preliminaries with Bismarck. Count Barral,
the Italian Envoy, was on the spot, but without instructions
or powers ; so he took no part in the proceedings, but was
kept au courant of them. Italy, however, could not
refuse to agree to the terms of peace, the possession
of Venetia having been assured to her. Neither did
Napoleon's envoy participate in the Nikolsburg Conferences,
but he was also kept informed, and reported upon them
thus to his government on the day (July 23) of their
commencement. " With his practical views and customary determination,
Count Bismarck, during his first interview with the Austrian
negotiators, made a point that they should accept all his
conditions respecting the future organisation of Germany,
and that Austria should frankly renounce participation
therein. This agreed to, he made those questions which
were not defined or even dealt with in our preliminaries, the
chief subjects of the Conference. Finally he proposed to

v.] The Peace of Nikolsburg. 391
settle the terms of peace forthwith, instead of the armistice,
and induced the Austrians to treat respecting the war
expenses and Prussia's territorial acquisitions. Then he
informed the plenipotentiaries that the King insisted upon
an increment of Prussia in North Germany, as a primary
condition of peace. I hear that the Minister Resident, in
this matter, has announced his firm resolve to break off the
negotiations, unless assured of Austria's consent. He has
told me himself that the Austrians have confined themselves
to advocating the preservation of Saxony's territorial integrity.
I believe that this question will be settled by Prussia
agreeing to leave Saxony untouched, and Austria pledging
herself to offer no hindrance to the annexation of Hanover,
Electoral Hesse, and some other petty States."
And so it turned out. The preliminary peace with
Austria was signed on July 26, and speedily followed by the
definitive treaty. " A great object was attained," says the
Prussian General-Staff's work on the campaign of 1866.
" By this peace Germany's national development under
Prussian leadership was ensured. Projects of conquest
upon an extensive scale were not desired by the Govern
ment Monarch and people alike had fulfilled the duties
imposed by an exalted mission upon the State as well as
the individual, and were bound to admit that no further
urgent requirement for the safety and national development
of Prussia and Germany was forthcoming. What Prussia
had acquired in territory she might freely hope to see
speedily and completely amalgamated with the organism of
her theretofore existing realm. The conditions offered by
Austria did not exclude the possibility of a future revival of
friendly relations between the former confederates. No
wound was inflicted upon Austria's honour or might that
need necessarily result in irreparable enmity between both

392 Bismarck's new Proposals. [Chap.
States. Had more been exacted, a sting must have remained
that Time itself would have been unable to extract. It
could not be the interest of either Prussia or Germany to
perpetuate the breach between Austria and Prussia."
The latter sentences might have been written by Bismarck
himself; they breathe his spirit, and are reflected in his
behaviour to Austria when New Germany was founded.
Nevertheless as long as Count Beust was at the head
of Austria's Foreign Affairs, Bismarck encountered no
corresponding disposition at Vienna, but only scarcely
disguised ill-will.
When the treaties of alliance concluded with the South-
German States in 1866 were made public (in 1867, upon
the occasion of the Luxemburg imbroglio), the Austrian
Chancellor declared, through the Imperial Envoy in Berlin,
that they were in direct contradiction of the fourth Article
of the Treaty of Prague, which required " a South-German
States'-Union with international independence." Bismarck
did not repel Beust's remarks, but endeavoured to modify
the significance of the treaties by calling attention to their
purely defensive character.
Soon afterwards (early in April) the Bavarian diplomatist
Count Tauffkirchen called upon the Austrian Chancellor,
not only at the instance of his Government, but as the
bearer of important proposals on the part of Prussia. He
had been empowered by Bismarck to advocate an alliance
between the North-German Confederation and Austria, to be
joined by all the other German States. Beust reported as
follows (April 19) to Count Wimpffen, then Austrian Envoy
in Berlin \-^-" He spoke about a guarantee of our posses
sions, and gave me to understand that every desirable
security against attack could be secured to us, even
(temporarily) for our non-German provinces. He hinted at

V.] Beust and Bismarck. 393
Russia as the third party to the League, and observed that
our safety would be ensured by a renewal of the Triple
Alliance. Finally, he mentioned that a wmpact of friend
ship between Prussia and Austria would afford the South-
German States a greater measure of independence, and that
an international alliance of Austria with the North and
South German Confederations might eventually lead to
permanent and close relations, replacing the former Federal
connections with advantage to Austria as well as to the
German nation. A confidential despatch* communicated
to me by Baron Werther stated that Count Bismarck had
authorised the Bavarian Envoy to bring these propositions
to Vienna."
How Beust received those propositions we learn from his
despatch to Wimpffen. " I observed : — ' You foresee, in an
* Accordingto ' Alkotmanyos Titkok ' (a pamphlet published in 1883),
this despatch was dated April 14, and dealt as follows with the basis of
the proposed alliance : — "The North-German Confederation guarantees
Austria-Hungary's security against any attack from abroad. Should
this guarantee extend to the entire monarchy, the treaty of offensive
and defensive alliance is only to be valid for a fixed period of
time ; but with respect to the German provinces of the monarchy, a
permanent defensive Alliance, having of course an international
character, may be concluded. . . . The Prussian Envoy accompanied
his Chancellor's note with important declarations to the effect that, if
Austria should accept the above alliance, Germany would not only
guarantee her safety from without, in every direction, but would under
take to support her Oriental policy against Russia. By proposing to
guarantee to Austria the permanent possession of her German provinces.
Count Bismarck desired to dispel the groundless suspicion that Germany
aimed at their annexation. It was also aptly pointed out that Vienna
could never become the capital of Germany, because it lies close to the
limits of German-speaking territory, and because a different spirit
prevails throughout Austria to that predominating in Germany ; let
alone that many millions of Slavs inhabit Austria, who would in
cessantly protest against incorporation in Germany, and fight the battle
of their nationality far more passionately there than in Austria."

394 Beust's Views. [Chap.
Austro-Prussian alliance, the preseivation of peace, at
present endangered. But what would be Austria's position
(which is in no way menaced just now) at the commence
ment of the new peace-epoch ? She would have to face the
enmity of France, doubly perilous to her because it would
entail an almost unconditional dependence upon Prussia's
good-will in Germany. We do not doubt this good-will ;
but can you deny that circumstances are frequently more
powerful than the intentions of leading men, and that
Austria — in view of the Unity movement in Germany, and of
a still possible conflict with Italy — before incurring the
hatred of France would require more solid guarantees than
the promise that she shall not be mulcted of her
possesions— rat least, not too soon? But is not even
proved that the offered alliance wo.uld really entail the
preservation of peace. We have learnt not to appraise too
highly our powers, or the fear of them in others, and it is
probable — at least, just now — that the prospect of Austria's
participation in a war would not restrain France from
venturing upon such an enterprise, if she had once made up
her mind to put forth the moral and material forces that
would be required in undertaking a conflict with Prussia
and Germany.' " Count Beust continued in this strain,
according to his own account, for some time. Count
Tauffkirchen and Baron Werther both expressed their
regret that Austria should reject Prussia's friendly proposals.
Beust's despatch to Wimpffen empowered the latter to read
it to Bismarck.
(Here follows another lengthy anti-Prussian despatch from
the pen of Count Beust, addressed to the Austrian Envoy in
Munich for communication to Prince Hohenlohe, then
Bavarian Prime Minister. As it merely goes over ground
often traversed in this chapter, and is totally forlorn of

VJ Beust s Alliance Projects. 395
interest to Enghsh readers in general, it has been suppressed.
— Translator's Note.)
Under Baron Beust's rkgime, therefore, Bismarck's ad
vances to Austria encountered rejection, mental reservations
and veiled threats. The Saxon statesman, moreover, was
secretly on the look-out for an opportunity of taking ven
geance, in league with some other Power. Early in January,
1867, Beust commissioned the Austrian Ambassador in
Paris, Prince Metternich, to bring about a Triple Alliance
of France, Italy and Austria; and shortly afterwards
(January 22, 1867) he surprised the Petersburg Cabinet with
a Note in which he — an Austrian Prime Minister — did not
hesitate to assert that the 1856 Treaty of Paris had failed to
attain its object and must therefore undergo revision ; i.e.,
that the Sultan must be compelled to grant his Christian
subjects autonomous institutions, without distinction of
nationality or religion. This was a plain offer to help
Russia to shake off one of the heaviest fetters of the Paris
Treaty as an inducement to counter-services on her part,
which could only be intended to injure Germany. This
attempt failed; whereupon Beust began to coquette with
the Polish revolutionists. Another failure was the Austrian
Chancellor's endeavour to prevent the South German States
from drawing closer to the United North. These States, it
is true, did not yet join the Northern Confederation; but
they came into the newly organised Customs' Union ; and
the community of German defensive forces achieved by
Bismarck with the offensive and defensive treaty of 1869,
was thus completed by a Commercial Union. More success
appeared to attend Beust's intrigues in the direction of an
Austro-Franco-Italian alliance against Germany; indeed,
this combination was only postponed on account of France's
aversion to the annexation of the Papal States with Rome,

396 Proposals to Austria. [Chap.
and finally knocked on the head by the German successes
at Woerth and Spicheren ; moreover, that Austria did not
take arms against Germany during the later phases of the
Franco-German war was mainly owing to the well-founded
apprehension that Russia would seize the opportunity of
taking her revenge foi Buol's behaviour during the Crimean
war. and thus annihilate Austria's hopes in the East.
Despite the ambiguous and even hostile policy of the
Vienna Cabinet during the war of 1870-1, Bismarck en
deavoured once more — shortly after the fall of Napoleon —
to bring about a rapprochement towards Austria, and upon
an entirely new basis, connected with the proclamation of
the Republic in Paris.
On September, 12, 1870, Prince Luitpold of Bavaria
had a long conversation with the Chancellor at Reims, in
the course of which the latter (as he observed at tea-time the
same evening) " read him a historical and political lecture."
I have reason to believe that this conversation was the
preface or prologue to a series (frequently interrupted) of
negotiations between Bismarck and the Courts of Vienna
and Petersburg, which gradually led to an understanding,
and finally — in all probability under the influence of con
siderations other than those at first discussed — to the so-
called League of the Three Emperors. That " historical
and political lecture " had the object of prompting Prince
Luitpold to write a letter to his brother-in-law in Vienna,
Archduke Albrecht, whose connection with His Royal
Highness appeared ene of the few available means of
getting at the Emperor Francis Joseph direct, and of bringing
to his knowledge certain unadulterate facts, upon which he
might reflect What follows was imparted to His Majesty
in this manner.
" The tum which affairs have taken in Paris reveals, in

V.] Proposals to A ustria. 397
Germany's present war with France, the defence of the
monarchico-conservative principle against that of Republican
Socialism, which latter the present rulers of France have
inscribed upon their flag. The proclamation of the Republic
has been hailed with applause in Spain, and the same may
be expected in Italy. In this lies a great danger to the
monarchically-governed countries of Europe. As opposed
to the solidarity of Republican and Revolutionary interests,
the surest guarantee for the cause of order and civilisation
would consist in a solid coalition of the elements which — as
Germany, Austria, and Russia — still firmly sustain the
monarchical principle. Austria, however, can only be
classed in this category if she will recognise that the at
tempts she has hitherto made in Cis-Leithania, in the
way of Liberal institutions, have been as utter a mistake as
her national experiments in the direction of Poland. The
summons of the Polish writer Claczko (a Jew, formerly one
of the Emperor Napoleon's agents) to the immediate entour
age of the Austrian Chancellor, who is very well acquainted
with his position and tendencies, and the latest utterances
of the Pole in question, must be regarded as symptoms of
Beust's own views and intentions. This co-operation of
Beust with the Polish revolutionists, and the manifest
hostility to Russia involved therein, constitute a serious im
pediment, in the opinion of the German Chancellor, to the
establishment of good relations with Austria, as he cannot
but perceive in them a feeling and purpose hostile to
Prussia and Germany. Besides this, there is to be con
sidered the situation of the extra-Hungarian portions of the
Dual Realm, which can only be dealt with by a Conserva
tive policy. Only through a frank and confidential connec
tion with United Germany and Russia can Austria regain
the grip of the revolutionary and centrifugal elements in

398 Conciliatory Steps. [Chap.
her very midst, of which she stands in need, and which she
has lost through Count Beust's calamitous policy."
Prince Luitpold's letter, based upon these representa
tions, had no success in Vienna. The Archduke Albrecht
showed it to the Emperor, and to Count Beust as well, and
returned an answer inspired by the latter, to the effect that
Austria would experience no desire for a rapprochement as
long as her interests should not be favourably affected by an
offer, on the part of Prussia, of exceptional political advan
tages. If, as it would appear, Prussia wished to draw
nearer to Austria, the latter as yet failed to perceive what
Prussia had to offer as a " consideration " to her, although
her interests were multifarious. The Emperor would readily
give his best attention to whatever might reach him through
his government.
This attempt to achieve something in Vienna by means
of the Bavarian Prince was reported to Czar Alexander, to
whom at the same time was pointed out the manifest con
nection of the Paris regime -with the revolutionary propaganda
throughout Europe, as well as the desirability of a solid
coalition there-agalnst of the three Eastern Powers, and the
necessity for Germany to avoid (in concluding peace with
France) everything which, by neglecting the real require
ments of the nation for the protection and security of its
frontiers, might afford the revolutionary party in Germany
itself a pretext for poisoning public opinion. The Czar
expressed his concurrence in these statements, and his
urgent wish that a firm coalition of monarchical elements,
wherewith to contend against revolutionism, could be
effected. Again during the war Bismarck took a conciliatory step
at Vienna, by instructing the Prussian Envoy there (Dec. 5,
1870) to inform Count Beust that Germany, newly con-

V.] A proposed Coalition. 399
stituted by the Versailles treaties with the Southern States,
wished to contract relations of unreserved friendship with
Austria-Hungary. He repeated this on the 14th, with the
formal notification that Germany was constituted anew ;
and this time Beust could not avoid replying that, in the
unification of Germany under Prussian leading, he recog
nised an act of historical significance, an achievement of the
first rank in the modern development of Europe, and
politely expressing the hope that the two neighbour-States
might get on amicably together.
After the revolt of the Parisian Communists, that event
(as well as the apparition of the Internationale, to which
great importance was attached by the press) was utilised to
bring to pass a coalition of the Conservative Powers against
the uprising Republican-Socialistic forces, and this time
with some success ; for Beust declared his readiness to join
such a coalition within certain limits. Indeed, he sent in
an elaborate essay upon the means of contending against
the Socialist agitation, and a conference of Austrian and
Prussian plenipotentiaries was arranged for the purpose of
discussing the subject. But what Bismarck had chiefly in
view when he mooted this question, namely, an alliance of
Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary against the revolu
tionary party and other adversaries, was not achieved. It
came to pass, however, when Andrassy succeeded Beust, at
least during the Emperor Francis Joseph's visit to Berlin,
where he met the Czar ; and thenceforth the relations
between Austria and Germany improved gradually until
they assumed a friendly character, leading eventually (when
the connection of both Powers with Russia became troubled)
to the alliance at which Bismarck had aimed for many years
past. The improvement above alluded to manifested itself in the

400 Russian Displeasure. [Chap,
field of diplomacy during the Berlin Congress, at which
Bismarck recommended that the mandate of Europe should
be granted to Austria to occupy Bosnia and the Herzego
vina; and subsequently in the agreement of October n,
1878, by which the Cabinet of Vienna conceded the abro
gation of Article V. of the Treaty of Prague, stipulating that
certain northern districts of Schleswig should be restored to
Denmark at the wish of the population, expressed by free
and unbiassed suffrage.
Bismarck's impartial attitude at the Berlin Congress — in
particular, his advocacy of the Austrian occupancy of Bosnia
— gave great offence to an important political party in Russia.
Even the Russian official journals openly accused Germany
of ingratitude. Muscovite wrath waxed hot, and the press
prescribed a new war, its recipe running thus : " Constanti
nople must be captured at Berlin." The Russian Govern
ment itself gave vent to its displeasure in very forcible terms.
When the time came for carrying out the Berlin stipulations,
Russia addressed warnings to Berlin, to safeguard her
interests and support her claims, that were successively
urgent, imperative, and menacing; the claims in question
being, in more than one case, unrighteous and dangerous.
At last it seemed as if the influential circles of Petersburg
seriously contemplated a campaign in Germany. Russia
began to arm. Masses of Russian cavalry assembled near
the western frontier of Poland. Prince Gortchakoff sounded
France respecting her disposition towards an anti-German
alliance. " Matters standing thus " — in this strain will have run the
German Chancellor's thoughts in the presence of these
phenomena — " we must look out for an ally ; for, although
France appears quite peacefully disposed just at present, we
cannot be sure that she will not attack us should a favour-

v.] Bismarck's Reflections. 401
able opportunity present itself for so doing. England is of
but small account for a war on terra firma ; it therefore is
obvious whose alliance we must seek. Every intelligent and
unprejudiced person of the forty-two millions inhabiting the
German Empire would wish that we should be on good
terms with both Russia and Austria at the same time. If,
however, we are, as now, compelled to choose between our
two neighbours, there can be no hesitation about our choice.
Not alone national motives point unmistakably to Austria-
Hungary, amongst whose populations may be reckoned ten
millions of Germans ; for the Magyars are also on our side,
and have been so for years past, the Poles of Galicia have
not the least desire to be Russianised, nor have the Czechs, if
we except a dozen or so of Intransigeants, who make a
great deal of noise, signifying nothing. And even were
Austria altogether Slav, we should have to give her the pre
ference. Russia is strong enough to take care of herself, and
we cannot be of much use to her as Allies. On the other
hand it is essentially Austria's interest to have us for friends.
Per contra, she can materially aid us in carrying out a policy,
the main object of which is the maintenance of universal
peace. If Austria-Hungary and Germany unite with this
object in view, and stand back to back with their two
millions of soldiers, like a gigantic square in the centre of the
Continent, before the eyes of those who desire to break the
peace, the more exalted Nihilistic politicians in Muscovy
will scarcely venture to attempt the fulfilment of their
projects." These were the Chancellor's reflections when — in the
summer of 1879, during his sojourn in Kissingen — he
observed the Eastern horizon growing cloudier and cloudier.
They were also the views of the vast majority of intelligent
Germans. But few of those amongst the Teutonic Princes
VOL, I. 2 1)

402 Andrassy at Gastein. [Chap.
who were endowed with judgment thought otherwise.
Several of the most exalted personages at the Prussian
Court shared Prince Bismarck's appreciation of the
situation. There was only one thing which seemed incompatible
with his projects. Russia continued to threaten us ; and he
could only account for that circumstance by the assumption
that an understanding between Vienna and Petersburg had
either been effected, or was under weigh. The existence of
a Russian party at the Austrian Emperor's Court, a journey
made by Andrassy to Petersburg, and several other matters
justified this apprehension ; and it was not without painful
forebodings that Bismarck went from Kissingen to Gastein
in August For, should it come to an Austro-Russian
Alliance against Germany, France's adhesion to such a
League would, at the most, be only a question of time. In
that case it would be doubtful that England would stand by
Germany. Austria's interests in the East were directly
opposed to those of Russia; but it was nevertheless conceiv
able that Petersburg and Vienna should come to an understand
ing upon the following basis : Russia, within certain limits, to
have her own way in the Balkan Peninsula, and, in return
for this concession, to aid Austria in recovering, extending
and strengthening her influence in Germany. In a word,
Bismarck had good cause to regard the political look-out in
South-Eastern Europe as .a somewhat gloomy one.
Andrassy's arrival at Gastein entirely dispelled these
clouds. From what he had to say it was evident that none
of Bismarck's apprehensions anent Austria's possible rela
tions to Russia were founded on fact So the German
Chancellor took occasion to bring forward his old project of
an alliance between New Germany and her south-eastern
neighbour : and this time the long-desired understanding

V.] The Austro-German Alliance. 403
was achieved — the German statesman's cherished wish, the
positive purpose of his endeavours, as far as Austria had
been concerned, the completion of his work of 1866. To
recapitulate briefly, we find him entertaining that wish as
far back as the year 1852 and throughout a full quarter of a
century ; but, every time he attempted to realise it, being
frustrated by the opposition offered to him successively, with
more or less vigour, by the policy of Schwarzenberg, Buol,
Rechberg, Mensdorff, and finally Beust.
Bismarck's notion, as long as the German Confederation
existed, was that Austria should forego her pretension to be
the absolutely supreme power in Germany, and to govern that
country exclusively in her own interest — that she should
cease to restrict and snub Prussia, allowing her to take up a
position in the Confederation which would enable her to put
forth her whole strength abroad, if necessary, on behalf of
objects common to all the members of the Bund. Prussia,
thus placed in possession of her just rights and finding her
requirements taken into consideration, would cordially enter
into faithful and firm relations with both Powers (Austria
and the Bund) and pledge herself to rebut whatever
attacks Austria might be menaced with on the part of her
neighbours. The Viennese statesmen shrank from concluding so
equitable and natural an arrangement, and adhered to the
line adopted by Austria immediately after 1848, clinging to
the delusion that Prussia had most to fear from foreign
attack, and stood in greater need of friendship and aid
than any other European State — consequently, that she
must submit to be treated patronisingly, even insolently, by
Powers in a position to assist her. Therefore, in order to
obtain justice, to safeguard her own existence (with which
that of. Germany itself was bound up) Prussia found herself

404 Summary. [Chap.
compelled, in 1866, to furnish practical proof that the
assumptions of Austria's German policy were erroneous, and
that Prussia, too, was a Great Power by no means de
pendent upon extraneous assistance, but able to take by
force what was her due, if refused to her when she asked for
it civilly. Austria was expelled from the Confederation, and
Prussia came to terms with the other Confederates upon
principles of fair dealing, creating fresh relations, which time
has improved and completed. This success, however, did
not induce Prince Bismarck to give up his old idea, which
had to assume a new form, and to be prosecuted by other
means. The next combination that occurred to the
Chancellor was " an open and Constitutional Alliance
between Germany and Austria-Hungary, brought about by
the co-operation of all the Constitutional factors in both
countries, that is, in Germany, by the unanimous consent of
the Emperor, Federal Diet, and Imperial Parliament— in
Austria, by that of the Sovereign and the Delegates of Cis-
and-Trans-Leithania." The steps he took towards this
end led to nothing as long as Beust was in power.
Andrassy's succession to office gave rise to hopes which
were realised at Gastein and Vienna. On the whole he
entertained the Bismarckian project favourably ; but it was
his desire that the elements of publicity and Constitutionalism
should both be omitted from the contemplated Alliance.
The Austrians, indeed, had several objections to the latter
element, consisting chiefly in the nature of their Parliament,
the party relations existing in Vienna and Cis-Leithania,
and the dispositions of a good many of their Deputies to
fault-finding and bargaining without sufficient knowledge of
the subjects they are called upon to deal with.
On September 20, Bismarck quitted Gastein and arrived
in Vienna on the morrow. It was his fourth visit to Vienna ;

v.] Bismarck in Vienna. 405
and he met with an extremely friendly reception. From
the Emperor and his chief advisers down to the crowds that
lined the streets as he drove through them and thronged the
approaches to his hotel, one and all displayed the greatest
eagerness to honour and gladden their renowned guest
by demonstrations of sympathy. In order to receive
him in person, Francis Joseph had interrupted his shooting
arrangements in Styria. His Majesty sent a special aide-de
camp to meet and welcome him at the station ; he returned
his visit immediately ; and, at the diplomatic dinner which
he gave at his Castle of Schoenbrunn in honour of the
German Chancellor, he advanced -to the threshold of the
drawing-room, when Bismarck was announced, d tencontre
of his illustrious visitor — distinctions which constituted
striking exceptions to the rules of that strict Spanish
etiquette which regulates existence at the Court of Vienna.
On September 22 Bismarck's project was discussed
during a long audience accorded to him by the Emperor,
who emphatically approved of it. The two following days
were passed by Andrassy and Haymerle (destined to succeed
the former in office) in discussing and settling the details of
the treaty with Bismarck. Its text is not yet known to the
public ; but we are aware that it is a Defensive Alliance
between Germany and Austria-Hungary, stipulating that in
case one of those States shall be attacked by two or more
Powers the other contracting party shall come to its
assistance vi et armis.
Not so promptly as the Austrians — perhaps, even with
some reluctance — did the Emperor William give his sanction
to an arrangement that — although a necessary measure of
precaution against Russia's ill-will and manifestly hostile
projects — appeared to be inspired by mistrust of the personal
Triendship entertained by Czar Alexander towards his

406 The Austro-German Alliance. [Chap.
venerable uncle. The German Chancellor probably never
worked so hard in his life, before or since, as he did during
those days at Gastein and Vienna, whilst endeavouring to
overcome His Majesty's opposition to the Austro-German
Secret Treaty of Alliance.
This achievement cost him great labour and pains ; but it
was worth them all. Lord Salisbury, the British Minister
of Foreign Affairs, speaking of it at a public meeting, said :
— " To those who care for the peace of Europe and take an
interest in the independence of nations, I would exclaim :
A crowning mercy has been vouchsafed to the world ! " He
regarded the Alliance from the standpoint of the English
Conservative party ; but his exclamation found a hearty
echo in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The alliance was
a benefit and blessing to both these States — an event of the
first class — the triumphant result of a long series of medita
tions and endeavours on the part of that great genius who,
with a hand as sure as that of Providence, guides the
political destinies of the German race — the seal upon a
great and promising work of reconciliation, long yearned for
by all the leading intelligences of Germany — the concrete
expression of the identity of New-Germany's interests with
those of New Austria — the strongest cement that could
bind together, in amicable relations, two great States upon
the terrain of foreign policy.
Had this Alliance not been formally concluded, it would
be at the present moment an urgent requirement for both
these Powers, whose chief aim is the maintenance of peace,
and would therefore have to be effected without delay. In
the second place, should the allegation be true that it has
only been concluded for five years, nothing could be more
desirable, for obvious reasons, than that it should be pro
longed, and to a considerable extent. Thirdly (taking

v.] The Austro-German Alliance. 407
example by the completion of the military union between
the Northern Confederation and the South German States
by means of their economic community, brought about in
1867), it would only be natural that, whenever the Alliance
shall be renewed and elaborated, it shall also be strengthened
by the insertion of certain national-economical paragraphs ;
in other words, " the interests of both States would permit
them to fortify and consolidate their good political relatious
by Treaties establishing closer economic connections." The
circumstance that Cis-Leithania is a manufacturing country,
whilst Trans-Leithania is agricultural, would seem at least to
oppose no insurmountable barrier to the conclusion of
some such arrangement.

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