--w.wi.iiumiMitJWJkwiniiiuiuiii.uij  umiiMiMw^reaa
Gift Of .
,J?.d?&dJuJ^\ 190 J

OUTLINES OF
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

OUTLINES

OF

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

DESIGNED FOB THE USE OF
THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS

BY
AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG, D. D., LL. D.
PRESIDENT AND PBOFESSOB OF BIBLICAL THEOLOGY IN TUB
ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PHILADELPHIA
THE GRIFFITH & ROWLAND PRESS
1701 Chestnut Street

COPTBIOHT,
By AUGTJSTUS HOPKINS STRONG.
1908.

Cfcrteto Deo ^atimtori

" The eye sees only that which it brings with it the power
of seeing." — Cicero.
" Open thou mine eyes, that i may behold wondeous things
out of thy law." — Psalm 119 : 18.
" For with thee is the fountain of life : In thy light shall
we see light." — Psalm 86 : 9.
"Foe we know in part, and we prophesy in part; but when
that which is perfect is come, that which is in part
SHALL BE DONE AWAY." — 1 Cor. 18 : 9, 10.

INTKODTJCTOKY NOTE
The present work contains the substance of my "Systematic
Theology." It omits all bibliographical and illustrative material,
and confines itself to bare statements of doctrine. Those readers
who desire further explanation of the various points under discus
sion will find their needs supplied in the larger work, a description
of which immediately follows this Introductory Note. It is
thought that the present volume may have its special value as a
text-book and basis for class-recitation, supplemented, as such
recitation may be, by the oral expositions of the teacher. As this
volume, however, contains all the large print of the larger work; it
constitutes in itself a complete whole, and presents the author's
views in all essential particulars.
Rochester Theological Seminary,
Eochester, N. Y., May 1, 1908.

VTl

PEEFAOE
TO THE AUTHOR'S "SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY" IN THREE VOLUMES.

The present work is a revision and enlargement of my
" Systematic Theology," first published in 1886. Of the original
work there have been printed seven editions, each edition embody
ing successive corrections and supposed improvements. During
the twenty years which have intervened since its first publication
I have accumulated much new material, which I now offer to the
reader. My philosophical and critical point of view meantime has
also somewhat changed. While I still hold to the old doctrines, I
interpret them differently and expound them more clearly, because
I seem to myself to have reached a fundamental truth which
throws new light upon them all. This truth I have tried to set
forth in my book entitled " Christ in Creation," and to that book
I refer the reader for further information.
That Christ is the one and only Eevealer of God, in nature, in
humanity, in history, in science, in Scripture, is in my judgment
the key to theology. This view implies a monistic and idealistic
conceptipn of the world, together with an evolutionary idea as to
its origin and progress. But it is the very antidote to pantheism,
in that it recognizes evolution as only the method of the tran
scendent and personal Christ, who fills all in all, and who makes the
universe teleological and moral from its centre to its circumference
and from its beginning until now.
Neither evolution nor the higher criticism has any terrors to one
who regards them as parts of Christ's creating and educating pro
cess. The Christ in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and

IX

X PREFACE.
knowledge himself furnishes all the needed safeguards and limita
tions. It is only because Christ has been forgotten that nature and
law have been personified, that history has been regarded as unpur
posed development, that Judaism has been referred to a merely
human origin, that Paul has been thought to have switched the
church off from its proper track even before it had gotten fairly
started on its course, that superstition and illusion have come to
seem the only foundation for the sacrifices of the martyrs and the
triumphs of modern missions. I believe in no such irrational and
atheistic evolution as this. I believe rather in him in whom all
things consist, who is with his people even to the end of the world,
and who has promised to lead them into all the truth.
Philosophy and science are good servants of Christ, but they are
poor guides when they rule out the Son of God. As I reach my
seventieth year and write these words on my birthday, I am thank
ful for that personal experience of union with Christ which has
enabled me to see in science and philosophy the teaching of my
Lord. But this same personal experience has made me even more
alive to Christ's teaching in Scripture, has made me recognize in
Paul and John a truth profounder than that disclosed by any
secular writers, truth with regard to sin and atonement for sin,
that satisfies the deepest wants of my nature and that is self-
evidencing and divine.
I am distressed by some common theological tendencies of our
time, because I believe them to be false to both science and
religion. How men who have ever felt themselves to be lost sin
ners and who have once received pardon from their crucified Lord
and Savior can thereafter seek to pare down his attributes, deny
his deity and atonement, tear from his brow the crown of miracle
and sovereignty, relegate him to the place of a merely moral teacher
who influences us only as does Socrates by words spoken across a
stretch of ages, passes my comprehension. Here is my test of

PREFACE. xi
orthodoxy : Do we pray to Jesus ? Do we call upon the name of
Christ, as did Stephen and all the early church ? Is he our living
Lord, omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent ? Is he divine only
in the sense in which we are divine, or is he the only-begotten Son,
God manifest in the flesh, in whom is all the fulness of the
Godhead bodily ? What think ye of the Christ ? is still the critical
(question, and none are entitled to the name of Christian who, in the
[face of the evidence he has furnished us, cannot answer the ques
tion aright.
Under the influence of Eitschl and his Kantian relativism, many
of our teachers and preachers have swung off into a practical denial
of Christ's deity and of his atonement. We seem upon the verge
of a second Unitarian defection, that will break up churches and
compel secessions, in a worse manner than did that of Channing
and Ware a century ago. American Christianity recovered from
that disaster only by vigorously asserting the authority of Christ
and the inspiration of the Scriptures. We need a new vision of
the Savior like that which Paul saw on the way to Damascus and
John saw on the isle of Patmos, to convince us that Jesus is lifted
above space and time, that his existence antedated creation, that he
conducted the march of Hebrew history, that he was born of a
Virgin, suffered on the Cross, rose from the dead, and now lives
forevermore, the Lord of the universe, the only God with whom we
have to do, our Savior here and our Judge hereafter. Without a
revival of this faith our churches will become secularized, mission
enterprise will die out, and the candlestick will be removed out of
its place as it was with the seven churches of Asia, and as it has
been with the apostate churches of New England.
I print this revised and enlarged edition of my " Systematic
Theology," in the hope that its publication may do something to
stem this fast advancing tide, and to confirm the faith of God's
elect. I make no doubt that the vast majority of Christians still

Xll PREFACE.
hold the faith that was once for all delivered to the saints, and that
they will sooner or later separate themselves from those who deny
the Lord who bought them. When the enemy comes in like a
flood, the Spirit of the Lord will raise up a standard against him.
I would do my part in raising up such a standard. I would lead
others to avow anew, as I do now, in spite of the supercilious
assumptions of modern infidelity, my firm belief, only confirmed
by the experience and reflection of a half century, in the old
doctrines of holiness as the fundamental attribute of God, of an
original transgression and sin of the whole human race, jn a divine
preparation in Hebrew history for man's redemption, in the deity,
preexistence, virgin birth, vicarious atonement and bodily resur
rection of Jesus Christ our Lord, and in his future coming to judge
the quick and the dead. I believe that these are truths of science
as well as truths of revelation ; that the supernatural will yet be
seen to be most truly natural ; and that not the open minded theo
logian but the narrow minded scientist will be obliged to hide his
head at Christ's coming.
The present volume, in its treatment of Ethical Monism, Inspir
ation, the Attributes of God, and the Trinity, contains an antidote
to most of the false doctrine which now threatens the safety of the
church. I desire especially to call attention to the section on
Perfection, and the Attributes therein involved, because I believe
that the recent merging of Holiness in Love, and the practical
denial that Eighteousness is fundamental in God's nature, are
responsible for the utilitarian views of law and the superficial views
of sin which now prevail in some systems of theology. There can
be no proper doctrine of the atonement and no proper doctrine of
retribution, so long as Holiness is refused its preeminence. Love
must have a norm or standard, and this norm or standard can be
found only in Holiness. The old conviction of sin and the sense of
guilt that drove the convicted sinner to the Cross are inseparable

PREFACE. Xlll
from a firm belief in the self-affirming attribute of God as logically
prior to and as conditioning the self-communicating attribute. The
theology of our day needs a new view of the Eighteous One. Such
a view will make it plain that God must be reconciled before man
can be saved, and that the human conscience can be pacified only
upon condition that propitiation is made to the divine Eighteous-
ness. In this volume I propound what I regard as the true Doc
trine of God, because upon it will be based all that follows in the
volumes on the Doctrine of Man, and the Doctrine of Salvation.
The universal presence of Christ, the Light that lighteth every
man, in heathen as well as in Christian lands, to direct or overrule
all movements of the human mind, gives me confidence that the
recent attacks upon the Christian faith will fail of their purpose.
It becomes evident at last that not only the outworks are assaulted,
but the very citadel itself. We are asked to give up all belief in
special revelation. Jesus Christ, it is said, has come in the flesh
precisely as each one of us has come, and he was before Abraham
only in the same sense that we were. Christian experience knows
how to characterize such doctrine so soon as it is clearly stated.
And the new theology will be of use in enabling even ordinary
believers to recognize soul-destroying heresy even under the mask
of professed orthodoxy.
I make no apology for the homiletical element in my book. To
be either true or useful, theology must be a passion. Pectus est
quod theologum facit, and no disdainful cries of "Pectoral
Theology ! " shall prevent me from maintaining that the eyes of the
heart must be enlightened in order to perceive the truth of God,
and that to l.now the truth it is needful to do the truth. Theology
is a science which can be successfully cultivated only in connection
with its practical application. I would therefore, in every discus
sion of its principles, point out its relations to Christian experience,
and its power to awaken Christian emotions and lead to Christian

XIV PREFACE.
decisions. Abstract the ogy is not really scientiflc. Only that
theology is scientific whi .1 brings the student to the feet of Christ.
I would hasten the day when in the name of Jesus every knee shall
bow. I believe that, if any man serve Christ, him the Father will
honor, and that to serve Christ means to honor him as I honor the
Father. I would not pride myself that I believe so little, but
rather that I believe so much. Faith is God's measure of a man.
Why should I doubt that God spoke to the fathers through the
prophets ? Why should I think it incredible that God should raise
the dead ? The things that are impossible with men are possible
with God. When the Son of man comes, shall he find faith on the
earth ? Let him at least find faith in us who profess to be his
followers. In the conviction that the present darkness is but
temporary and that it will be banished by a glorious sunrising, I
give this new edition of my "Theology" to the public with the
prayer that whatever of good seed is in it may bring forth fruit,
and that whatever plant the heavenly Father has not planted may
be rooted up.
Eochester Theological Seminary,
Eochester, N. Y., August 3, 1906.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Intboduotobt Note  yxJ
Pbefaoe,  xi-xiv
Table of Contents,  xv-xxviii
PART I.— PROLEGOMENA,  1-17
Chapter I. — Idea op Theology,  1-8
I. — Definition of Theology,  1
IT. — Aim of Theology,  1
HI. — Possibility of Theology — grounded in,  1-5
1. The existence of a God,  1-2
2. Man's capacity for the knowledge of God,  2-3
3. God's revelation of himself to man,  , 3-5
IV. — Necessity of Theology,  5-6
V. — Relation of Theology to Religion,  7-8
Chapteb IT. — Material op Theology,  9-12
I. — Sources of Theology,  9-11
1. Scripture and Nature  9-10
2. Scripture and Rationalism,  10
3. Scripture and Mysticism,  10-11
4. Scripture and Romanism,  11
H. — Limitations of Theology,  11-12
ILT. — Relations of Material to Progress in Theology,  12
Chapter HI. — Method op Theology,  13-17
I. — Requisites to the Study of Theology,  13
II. — Divisions of Theology,  13-14
HI. — History of Systematic Theology,  14-15
IV.— Order of Treatment  15-16
V.— Text-books in Theology,  16-17
PART H.— THE EXISTENCE OF GOD,  18-32
Chapteb I. — Obigin op oub Idea op God's Existence,  18-23
I.— First Truths in General,  18-19
IL— The Existence of God a First Truth  19-20
1. Its universality,  19
2. Its necessity,  19-20
3. Its logical independence and priority,  20
TTT, — Other supposed Sources of the Idea,  21-22
IV.— Contents of this Intuition  22-23
xv

XVI table of contents
Chapteb II. — Corroborative Evidences of God's Existence, 24-28
L — The Cosmological Argument,  24-25
II.— The Teleogical Argument,  25-26
111. — The Anthropological Argument,  26-27
IV.— The Ontological Argument  27-28
Chapter in. — Erroneous Explanations, and Conclusion, . . . 29-32
I.— Materialism,  29-30
H. — Materialism Idealism,  30
III. — Idealistic Pantheism,  30-31
IV.— Ethical Monism,  31-32
PART HI.— THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM
GOD,  33-66
Chapter I. — Pbeldhinabx Considerations,  34-42
I. — Reasons a priori for expecting a Revelation from God, . . 33-34
II. — Marks of the Revelation man may expect,  34-35
HI. — Miracles as attesting a Divine Revelation,  35-39
1. Definition of Miracle  35-36
2. Possibility of Miracles,  36
3. Probability of Miracles,  36-37
4. Amount of Testimony necessary to prove a Miracle,  37-38
5. Evidential Force of Miracles,  38
6. Counterfeit Miracles,  39
IV. — Prophecy as attesting a Divine Revelation,  39-41
V. — Principles of Historical Evidence applicable to the Proof
of a Divine Revelation,  41-42
1. As to Documentary Evidence,  41
2. As to Testimony in General,  41-42
Chapter II. — Positive Proofs that the Soeiptubes are a
Divine Revelation,  43-55
L — Genuineness of the Christian Documents,  43-49
1. Genuineness of the Books of the New Testament,  43-48
1st. The Myth-theory of Strauss,  45-46
2d. The Tendency-theory of Baur,  46-47
3d. The Romance-theory of Renan,  47
4th. The Development-theory of Harnack,  47-43
2. Genuineness of the Books of the Old Testament,  48-49
IT. — Credibility of the Writers of the Scriptures,  49-50
ILL — Supernatural Character of the Scripture Teaching,  50-52
1. Scripture Teaching in General,  50-51
2. Moral System of the New Testament,  51
3. The Person and Character of Christ,  51-52
4. The Testimony of Christ to Himself,  52
IV. — Historical Results of the Propagation of Scripture,
Doctrine,  53-54
Chapter m. — Inspiration op the Soriptubes  55-56
1. — Definition of Inspiration  55

table of contents xvii
H. — Proof of Inspiration,  55-56
HI. — Theories of Inspiration,  56-58
1. The Intuition-theory,  ,...  56-57
2. The Illumination-theory,  57
3. The Dictation-theory,  57-58
4. The Dynamical-theory,  58
TV. — The Union of the Divine and Human Elements in
Inspiration,  58-61
V. — Objections to the Doctrine of Inspiration,  61-66
1. Errors in Matters of Science,  61-62
2. Errors in Matters of History,  62
3. Errors in Morality,  63
4. Errors of Reasoning,  63
5. Errors in Quoting or Interpreting the Old Testament, . . . 63-64
6. Errors in Prophecy,  64
7. Certain Books unworthy of a Place in Inspired Scripture, 64
8. Portions of the Scripture Books written by others than
the Persons to whom they are ascribed,  64-64
9. Sceptical or Fictitious Narratives,  65
10. Acknowledgment of the Non-inspiration of Scripture
Teachers and their Writings,  65-66
PART IV.— THE NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF
GOD,  67-123
Chapter L — The Attributes op God,  67-81
I. — Definition of the term Attributes,  67
II. — Relation of the Divine Attributes to the Divine Essence, . 67-68
TTT. — Methods of Determining the Divine Attributes,  68-69
IV.— Classification of the Attributes  69-70
V. — Absolute or Immanent Attributes,  70-75
First Division. — Spirituality, and Attributes therein
involved,  70-71
1. Life,  71
2. Personality,  71
Second Division. — Infinity, and Attributes therein
involved  72 73
1. Self -existence,  72
2. Immutability,  72-73
3. Unity  73
Third Division. — Perfection, and Attributes therein
involved,  73-75
1. Truth,  73-74
2. Love,  74-75
3. Holiness,  75
VL — Relative or Transitive Attributes,  76-79
First Division. — Attributes having relation to Time
and Space  76
1. Eternity,  76

XV111 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2. Immensity,  76
Second Division. — Attributes having relation to Cre
ation,  76-78
1. Omnipresence,  76-77
2. Omniscience,  77
3. Omnipotence,  77-78
Third Division. — Attributes having relation to Moral
Beings,  78-79
1. Veracity and Faithfulness, or Transitive Truth, 78
2. — Mercy and Goodness, or Transitive Love,  78
3. Justice and Righteousness, or Transitive
Holiness,  78-79
Vll. — Rank and Relations of the several Attributes,  79-81
1. Holiness the Fundamental Attribute in God,  79-80
2. The Holiness of God the Ground of Moral Obligation,. . . 80-81
Chapter H. — Doctrine of the Tbinity,  82-94
I. — In Scripture there are Three who are recognized as God,. 82-86
1. Proofs from New Testament,  82-85
A. The Father is recognized as God,  82
B. Jesus Christ is recognized as God,  82-85
0. The Holy Spirit is recognized as God,  85
2. Intimations of the Old Testament  85-86
A. Passages which seem to teach Plurality of some
sort in the Godhead,  85 86
B. Passages relating to the Angel of Jehovah,  86
C. Descriptions of the Divine Wisdom and Work,. . . 86
D. Descriptions of the Messiah,  86
II. — These Three are so described in Scripture, that we are
compelled to conceive them as distinct Persons,  87-88
1. The Father and the Son are Persons distinct from
each other,  87
2. The Father and the Son are Persons distinct from
the Spirit,  87
3. The Holy Spirit is a Person,  87-88
HI. — This Tripersonality of the Divine Nature is not merely
economic and temporal, but is immanent and eternal,. . 88-89
1. Scripture Proof that these distinctions of Per
sonality are eternal,  88
2. Errors refuted by the Scripture Passages,  88-89
A. The Sabellian,  88
B. The Arian,  88 89
IV. — While there are three Persons, there is but one Essence, . 89
V. — These three Persons are Equal,  89-92
1. These Titles belong to the Persons,  89-90
2. Qualified Sense of these Titles  90-91
3. Generation and Procession consistent with Equality, 91-92

TABLE OF CONTENTS xix
VL— The Doctrine of the Trinity inscrutable, yet not self-
contradictory, but the Key to all other Doctrines, . 92-94
1. The Mode of this Triune Existence is inscrutable, . . 92-93
2. The Doctrine of the Trinity is not self -contradictory, 93
3. The Doctrine of the Trinity has important relations
to other Doctrines,  93-94
Chapter HI. — The Decrees of God,  95-100
I. — Definition of Decrees,  95
LT. — Proof of the Doctrine of Decrees,  96-97
1. From Scripture,  96
2. From Reason,  96-67
A. From the Divine Foreknowledge,  96-97
B. From the Divine Wisdom,  97
C. From the Divine Immutability,  97
D. From the Divine Benevolence,  97
HI. — Objections to the Doctrine of Decrees,  97-100
1. That they are inconsistent with the Free Agency of
Man  97-99
2. That they take away all Motive for Human Exertion, 90-100
3. That they make God the Author of Sin, 
IV. — Concluding Remarks,  100
1. Practical Uses of the Doctrine of Decrees,  100
2. True Method of Preaching the Doctrine  100
Chauter IV. — The Works op God, ob the Execution op the
Decrees,  101-123
Section I. — Creation,  101-109
I. — Definition of Creation,  101
H— Proof of the Doctrine  101-103
1. Direct Scripture Statements,  102-103
2. Indirect Evidence from Scripture,  103
TTT, — Theories which oppose Creation,  103-106
1. Dualism,  103-104
2. Emanation,  104
3. Creation from Eternity  104-105
4. Spontaneous Generation,  105-106
IV. — The Mosaic Account of Creation,  106
1. Its Twofold Nature,  106
2. Its Proper Interpretation  106
V.— God's End in Creation,  106-107
1. The Testimony of Scripture,  106-107
2. The Testimony of Reason,  107-108
VL — Relation of the Doctrine of Creation to other Doctrines, . 108-109
1. To the Holiness and Benevolence of God,  108
2. To the Wisdom and Free Will of God,  108
3. To Christ as the Revealer of God  108
4. To Providence and Redemption,  109
5. To the Observance of the Sabbath,  109

XX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section H — Preservation,  109-112
I. — Definition of Preservation,  109-110
H. — Proof of the Doctrine of Preservation,  110
1. From Scripture,  110
2. From Reason,  110
HI. — Theories which virtually deny the Doctrine of Preserva
tion,  110-111
1. Deism,  110-111
2. Continuous Creation,  Ill
IV. — Remarks upon the Divine Concurrence,  111-112
Section HI. — Providence,  112-118
I. — Definition of Providence,  112
H. — Proof of the Doctrine of Providence,  112-113
1. Scriptural Proof,  112-113
2. Rational Proof,  113
HI. — Theories opposing the Doctrine of Providence,  114-115
1. Fatalism,  114
2, Casualism,  114
3. Theory of a merely General Providence  114^115
IV. — Relations of the Doctrine of Providence,  115-118
1. To Miracles and Works of Grace, ... ,  115-116
2. To Prayer and its Answer,  116-117
3. To Christian Activity,  117-118
4. To the Evil Acts of Free Agents,  118
Section IV. — Good and Entl Angels,  118-123
I. — Scripture Statements and Intimations,  119-121
1. As to the Nature and Attributes of Angels,  119
2. As to their Number and Organization,  119
3. As to their Moral Character,  119-120
4. As to their Employments,  120-121
A The Employments of Good Angels,  120
B. The Employments of Evil Angels,  120-121
II. — Objections to the Doctrine of Angels,  121-122
1. To the Doctrine of Angels in General,  121-122
2. To the Doctrine of Evil Angels in General,  122
HI. — Practical Uses of the Doctrine of Angels,  123
1. Uses of the Doctrine of Good Angels  123
2. Uses of the Doctrine of Evil Angels,  123
PART V.— ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN, 124-178
Chapteb I. — Pbeliminaby,  124-134
I.— Man a Creation of God and a Child of God,  124-125
H — Unity of the Race,  125-127
1. Argument from History,  125
2. Argument from Language,  j  126
3. Argument from Psychology,  126
4. Argument from Physiolpgy,  126-127

aa.±sijj!i ujt CONTENTS XXI
HI.— Essential Elements of Human Nature,  127-128
1. The Dichotomous Theory  127
2. The Trichotomous Theory  127-128
IV. — Origin of the Soul,  ,  128-130
1. The Theory of Preexistence,  128-129
2. The Croatian Theory,  129-130
3. The Traducian Theory,  130
V.— The Moral Nature of Man,  131-134
1. Conscience,  ,  131-132
2. Will,  132-134
Chapter H. — The Original State op Man,  135-140
I.— Essentials of Man's Original State,  135-137
1. Natural Likeness to God, or Personality,  135
2. Moral Likeness to God, or Holiness,  135-137
A. The Image of God as including only Person
ality,  '  136
B. The Image of God as consisting simply in
Man's Natural Capacity for Religion  136-137
TL— Incidents of Man's Original State,  137-138
1. Results of Man's Possession of the Divine Image, . . . 137-138
2. Concomitants of Man's Possession of the Divine
Image,  138
1st. The Theory of an Original Condition of
Savagery,  138-139
2d. The Theory of Comte as to the Stages of
Human Progress,  139-140
Chapter HL — Sin, ob Man's State of Apostasy,  141-178
Section I. — The Law of God,  141-145
I. — Lawin General,  141-142
H— The Law of God in Particular,  142-144
1. Elemental Law,  ,  142-144
2. Positive Enactment,  144
HI. — Relation of the Law to the Grace of God,  144-145
Section II. — Natube op Sin,  • 145-151
L— Definition of Sin  145-148
1. Proof,  ^  146-148
2. Inferences,  148
H.— The Essential Principle of Sin,  148-151
1. Sin as Sensuousness,  149
2. Sin as Finiteness,  149-150
3. Sin as Selfishness,  150-151
Section HE. — Universality op Sin,  152-153
I. — Every human being who has arrived at Moral Conscious
ness has committed acts, or cherished dispositions, con
trary to the Divine Law,  152
IL — Every member of the human race, without exception,

xxii TABLE OF CONTENTS
possesses a Corrupted Nature, which is a source of
actual sin, and is itself sin,  153
Section IV. — Origin op Sm m the Personal Aot of Adam, . . 154-156
I. — The Scriptural Account in Genesis  154-155
1. Its General Character not Mythical or Allegorical,
but Historical,  * 154
2. The Course of the Temptation, and the resulting
Fall,  154-155
II.— Difficulties connected with the Fall, considered as the
personal Act of Adam,  155-156
1. How could a holy being Fall ?  155
2. How could God justly permit Satanic Temptation?. 155
3. How could a Penalty so great be justly connected
with Disobedience to so slight a Command ?  155-156
m. — Consequences of the Fall — so far as respects Adam,  156-157
1. Death,  156
A. Physical Death, or the Separation of the Soul
from the Body,  156
B. Spiritual Death, or the Separation of the Soul
from God,  156
2. Positive and formal Exclusion from God's Presence, 156-157
Section V. — Imputation op Adam's Sin to his Posterity,  157-169
Scripture Teaching as to Race-sin and Race-responsi
bility,  157-158
I. — Theories of Imputation,  158-166
1. The Pelagian Theory, or Theory of Man's Natural
Innocence,  158-159
2. The Arminian Theory, or Theory of voluntarily
appropriated Depravity,  159-161
3. The New-School Theory, or Theory of Condem-
nable Vitiosity,  161-162
4. The Federal Theory, or Theory of Condemnation
by Covenant,  162-164
5. Theory of Mediate Imputation, or Theory of Con
demnation for Depravity,  164r-165
6. Augustinian Theory, or Theory of Adam's Natural
Headship  165-166
H. — Objections to the Augustinian Theory of Imputation,  167-169
Section VI. — Consequences op Sm to Adam's Posterity,  169-177
I.— Depravity,  170-172
1. Depravity Partial or Total?  170
2. Ability or Inability ?  170-172
H— Guilt,  172-174
1. Nature of Guilt,  172-173
2. Degrees of Guilt,  172-174
HL— Penalty,  174-177
1. Idea of Penalty,  174-175

TABLE OF CONTENTS Xxih
2. Actual Penalty of Sin  175-177
Section VH. — The Salvation of Infants,  177-178
PART VL— SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SAL
VATION THROUGH THE WORK OF CHRIST
AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT  179-233
Chapter L — Christology, or the Redemption Wrought by
Christ,  179-206
Section L — Historical Preparation for Redemption,  179-180
I. — Negative Preparation, in the History of the Heathen
World,  179
H. — Positive Preparation, in the History of Israel,  179-180
Section H. — The Person op Christ,  180-188
I. — Historical Survey of Views respecting the Person of
Christ,  180-181
1. The Ebionites  180
2. The Docetae  180
3. The Arians,  180
4. The Apollinarians, ...  180-181
5. The Nestorians,  181
6. The Eutychians,  181
7. The Orthodox Doctrine,  181
H — The two Natures of Christ, — their ReaJity and Integrity, 181-183
1. The Humanity of Christ,  181-182
A. Its Reality,  181-182
B. Its Integrity,  182
2. The Deity of Christ, . :  182-183
111. — The Union of the two Natures in one Person,  183-188
1. Proof of this Union,  183-184
2. Modern Misrepresentations of this Union  184-186
A. The Theory of Gess and Beecher, that the
Humanity of Christ is a Contracted and
Metamorphosed Deity,  184-185
B. The Theory of Dorner and Rothe, that the
Union between the Divine and the Human
Natures is not completed by the Incarnating
Act,  185-186
3. The Real Nature of this Union,  186-188
Section HI. — The Two States of Christ,  188-191
I.— The State of Humiliation,  188-190
1. The Nature of Christ's Humiliation,  188-190
A. The Theory of Thomasius, Delitzsch, and
Crosby, that the Humiliation consisted in the
Surrender of the Relative Attributes,  188-189
B. The Theory that the Humiliation consisted
in the Surrender of the Independent Exercise
of the Divine Attributes,  189-190

XXfV TABLE OR CONTENTS
2. The Stages of Christ's Humiliation,  190
H— The State of Exaltation,  190-191
1. The Nature of Christ's Exaltation,  190
2. The Stages of Christ's Exaltation,  190-191
Section IV. — The Officers of Christ,  191-206
I.— The Prophetic Office of Christ  191-192
1. The Nature of Christ's Prophetic Work,  191
2. The Stages of Christ's Prophetic Work,  191-192
H— The Priestly Office of Christ,  192-206
1. Christ's Sacrificial Work, or the Doctrine of the
Atonement,  192-205
General Statement of the Doctrine  192-193
A Scriptural Methods of Representing the Atone
ment,  193
B. The Institution of Sacrifice, especially as found
in the Mosaic System,  194-195
C. Theories of the Atonement,  195-203
1st. The Socinian, or Example Theory of the
Atonement,  195-196
2d. The Bushnellian, or Moral-Influence
Theory of the Atonement,  196-197
3d. The Grotian, or Governmental Theory
of the Atonement,  197-198
4th. The Irvingian Theory, or Theory of
gradually extirpated Depravity  198-199
5th. The Anselmic, or Commercial Theory
of the Atonement,  199-200
6th. The Ethical Theory of the Atonement, . . 200-203
First, The Atonement as related to Holi
ness in God,  200-201
Secondly, The Atonement as related to
Humanity in Christ,  201-203
D. Objections to the Ethical Theory of the Atone
ment,  203-205
E. The Extent of the Atonement,  205
2. Christ's Intercessory Work,  205 206
PH.— The Kingly Office of Christ  206
Chapter H. — The Reconciliation op Man to God, or the
Application of Redemption through the
Work of the Holy Spirit,  207-233
Section I. — The Application of Christ's Redemption, in
its Preparation,  207-211
L— Election,  208-210
1. Proof of the Doctrine of Election,  208-209
2. Objections to the Doctrine of Election,  209-210
H— Calling,  210-211
A. Is God's General Call Sincere ?  210-211

TABLE OF CONTENTS XXV
B. Is God's Special Call Irresistible ?  211
Section H. — The Application of Christ's Redemption, in
its Actual Beginning,  211-229
I.— Union with Christ,  211-214
1. Scripture Representations of this Union,  212
2. Nature of this Union  212-213
3. Consequences of this Union,  213-214
H.— Regeneration,  214-219
1. Scripture Representations,  214
2. Necessity of Regeneration,  215
3. The Efficient Cause of Regeneration,  215-216
4. The Instrumentality used in Regeneration,  216-217
5. The Nature of the Change wrought in Regeneration, 218-219
HI.— Conversion,  219-224
1. Repentance,  220-221
Elements of Repentance,  220-221
Explanations of the Scripture Representations, . . . 221
2. Faith,  221-224
Elements of Faith,  221-222
Explanations of the Scripture Representations,  222-224
IV.— Justification,  224-229
1. Definition of Justification,  224
2. Proof of the Doctrine of Justification,  224-225
3. Elements of Justification,  225-226
4. Relation of Justification to God's Law and Holiness, 226-227
5. Relation of Justification to Union with Christ and
the Work of the Spirit,  227-228
6. Relation of Justification to Faith,  228
7. Advice to Inquirers demanded by a Scriptural View
of Justification,  229
Section TTT. — The Application of Christ's Redemption, m
its Continuation,  229-233
I.— Sanctification,  229-232
1. Definition of Sanctification,  229
2. Explanations and Scripture Proof,  229-230
3. Erroneous Views refuted by the Scripture Passages, 230-232
A. The Antinomian,  230
B. The Perfectionist,  231-232
H — Perseverance,  232-233
1. Proof of the Doctrine of Perseverance,  232
2. Objections to the Doctrine of Perseverance,  232-233
PART VH.— ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF
THE CHURCH,  234-257
Chapter I. — The Constitution of the Church, or Church
Polity  234-243
I.— Definition of the Church,  234-235

XXVi TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. The Church, hke the Family and the State, is an
Institution of Divine Appointment,  235
2. The Church, unhke the Family and the State, is a
Voluntary Society,  235
H.— Organization of the Church,  235-238
1. The Fact of Organization,  235-236
2. The Nature of this Organization,  236-237
3. The Genesis of this Organization,  237-238
HI.— Government of the Church,  238-242
1. Nature of this Government in General,  238-240
A. Proof that the Government of the Church is
Democratic or Congregational,  238-239
B. Erroneous Views as to Church Government,
refuted by the Scripture Passages,  239-240
(a) The World-church Theory, or the
Romanist View,  239
(6) The National-church Theory, or the
Theory of Provincial or National
Churches,  239-240
2. Officers of the Church,  240-242
A. The Number of Offices in the Church is two, . . . 240
B. The Duties belonging to these Offices,  240-241
C. Ordination of Officers,  241-242
(a) What is Ordination?  241
(6) Who are to Ordain ?  241-242
3. Discipline of the Church,  242
A. Kinds of Discipline,  242
B. Relation of the Pastor to Discipline,  242
IV. — Relation of Local Churches to one another  242-243
1. The General Nature of this Relation is that of
Fellowship between Equals,  242
2. This Fellowship involves the Duty of Special Con
sultation with regard to Matters affecting the
common Interest,  243
3. This Fellowship may be broken by manifest Depart
ures from the Faith or Practice of the Scriptures
on the part of any Church,  243
Chapter H. — The Ordinances of the Church,  244-257
I.— Baptism,  244-251
1. Baptism an Ordinance of Christ,  244-245
2. The Mode of Baptism,  245-246
A. The Command to Baptize is a Command to
Immerse  245
B. No Church has the Right to Modify or Dispense
with this Command of Christ,  246
3. The Symbolism of Baptism,  246-247

TABLE OF CONTENTS XXvii
A. Expansion of the Statement as to the Symbolism
of Baptism  246
B. Inferences from the Passages referred to,  247
4. The Subjects of Baptism,  247-251
A. Proof that only Persons giving Evidence of
being Regenerated are proper Subjects of
Baptism,  247-248
B. Inferences from the Fact that only Persons giv
ing Evidence of being Regenerate are proper
Subjects of Baptism  248-249
C. Infant Baptism,  249-251
( a ) Infant Baptism without Warrant in the
Scripture,  249-250
( b ) Infant Baptism expressly Contradicted
by Scripture,  250
(c) Its Origin in Sacramental Conceptions
of Christianity,  250
( d ) The Reasoning by which it is supported
Unscriptural, Unsound, and Dangerous
in its Tendency,  250-251
( e ) The Lack of Agreement among Pedo-
baptists,  251
(/ ) The Evil Effects of Infant Baptism,  251
H— The Lord's Supper,  251-257
1. The Lord's Supper aa Ordinance instituted by
Christ,  251-252
2. The Mode of Administering the Lord's Supper,  252
3. The Symbolism of the Lord's Supper,  252-253
A Expansion of the Statement as to the Symbolism
of the Lord's Supper,  252
B. Inferences from this Statement, ,  253
4. Erroneous Views of the Lord's Supper,  253-254
A The Romanist View,  253-254
B. The Lutheran and High Church View,  254
5. Prerequisites to Participation in the Lord's Supper, 254-257
A There are Prerequisites,  254
B. Laid down by Christ and his Apostles,  254-255
C. The Prerequisites are Four,  255-257
First, — Regeneration,  255
Secondly, — Baptism,  255-256
Thirdly,— Church Membership,  256
Fourthly,— An Orderly Walk,  256
D. The Local Church is the Judge whether these
Prerequisites are fulfilled,  256-257
E. Special Objections to Open Communion,  257
PART VHI.— ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF
FINAL THINGS,  258-274

XXT111 TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.— Physical Death,  258-260
That this is not Annihilation, argued :
1. Upon Rational Grounds,  258-259
2, Upon Scriptural Grounds,  259-260
H.— The Intermediate State,  260-262
1. Of the Righteous  260-261
2. Of the Wicked,  261-262
Refutation of the two Errors :
(a) That the Soul sleeps, between Death
and the Resurrection,  261
( 6 ) That the Suffering of the Intermediate
State is Purgatorial,  261
Concluding Remark,  262
m.— The Second Coming of Christ,  262-264
1. The Nature of Christ's Coming,  262
2. The Time of Christ's Coming,  262-263
3. The Precursors of Christ's Coming,  263
4. Relation of Christ's Second Coming to the
Millennium,  263-264
IV.— The Resurrection,  264-266
1. The Exegetical Objection,  265
2. The Scientific Objection,  265-266
V.— The Last Judgment,  266-268
1. The Nature of the Final Judgment,  267
2. The Object of the Final Judgment,  267
3. The Judge in the Final Judgment,  268
4. The Subjects of the Final Judgment,  268
5. The Grounds of the Final Judgment,  268
VI.— The Final States of the Righteous and of the Wicked, .... 268-274
1. Of the Righteous,  268-269
A. Is Heaven a Place as well as a State ?  269
B. Is this Earth to be the Heaven of the Saints ? . . 269
2. Of the Wicked,  269-274
A. Future Punishment is not Annihilation,  270
B. Punishment after Death excludes new Proba
tion and ultimate Restoration  270-271
C. This future Punishment is Everlasting,  271-272
D. Everlasting Punishment is not inconsistent
with God's Justice,  272-273
E. Everlasting - Punishment is not inconsistent
with God's Benevolence,  273-274
F. Preaching of Everlasting Punishment is not a
hindrance to the success of the Gospel,  274

OUTLINES OF
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

PAET I.
PROLEGOMENA.

CHAPTEB I.

IDEA OF THEOLOGY.

I. Definition. — Theology is the science of God and of the relations
between God and the universe.
H. Atm. — The aim of theology is the ascertainment of the facts respect
ing God and the relations between God and the universe, and the exhibi
tion of these facts in their rational unity, as connected parts of a formulated
and organic system of truth.
HI. Possibility. — The possibility of theology has a threefold grounds
1. In the existence of a God who has relations to the universe ; 2. In the
capacity of the human mind for knowing God and certain of these relations ;
and 3. In the provision of means by which God is brought into actual con
tact with the mind, or in other words, in the provision of a revelation.
1. In the existence of a God who has relations to the universe. — It has
been objected, indeed, that since God and these relations are objects
apprehended only by faith, they are not proper objects of knowledge or
subjects for science. We reply :
A. Faith is knowledge, and a higher sort of knowledge. — Physical sci
ence also rests upon faith — faith in our own existence, in the existence of a
world objective and external to us, and in the existence of other persons
than ourselves ; faith in our primitive convictions, such as space, time,
cause, substance, design, right ; faith in the trustworthiness of our faculties
and in the testimony of our fellow men. But physical science is not thereby
invahdated, because this faith, though unlike sense-perception or logical
demonstration, is yet a cognitive act of the reason, and may be defined
as certitude with respect to matters in which verification is unattainable.
B. Faith is a knowledge conditioned by holy affection. — The faith which
apprehends God's being and working is not opinion or imagination. It is
certitude with regard to spiritual realities, upon the testimony of our
rational nature and upon the testimony of God. Its only peculiarity as a cog
nitive act of the reason is that it is conditioned by holy affection. As the
1

2 POSSIBILITY OF THEOLOGY.
science of aesthetics is a product of reason as including a power of recog
nizing beauty practically inseparable from a love for beauty, and as the
science of ethics is a product of reason as including a power of recognizing
the morally right practically inseparable from a love for the morally right, so
the science of theology is a product of reason, but of reason as including
a power of recognizing God which is practically inseparable from a love for
God. C. Faith, therefore, can furnish, and only faith can furnish, fit and
sufficient material for a scientific theology. — As an operation of man's
higher rational nature, though distinct from ocular vision or from reason
ing, faith is not only a kind, but the highest kind, of knowing. It gives
us understanding of realities which to sense alone are inaccessible, namely,
God's existence, and some at least of the relations between God and his
creation. 2. In the capacity of the human mind for knowing God and certain
of these relations. — But it has urged that such knowledge is impossible
for the following reasons :
A. Because we can know only phenomena. We reply : (a) We know
mental as well as physical phenomena. (6) In knowing phenomena,
whether mental or physical, we know substance as underlying the phe
nomena, as manifested through them, and as constituting their ground of
unity, (c) Our minds bring to the observation of phenomena not only
this knowledge of substance, but also knowledge of time, space, cause, and
right, realities which are in no sense phenomenal. Since these objects of
knowledge are not phenomenal, the fact that God is not phenomenal can
not prevent us from knowing him.
B. Because we can know only that which bears analogy to our own
nature or experience. We reply: (a) It is not essential to knowledge
that there be similarity of nature between the knower and the known.
We know by difference as well as by likeness. (&) Our past experience,
though greatly facilitating new acquisitions, is not the measure of our pos
sible knowledge. Else the first act of knowledge would be inexplicable,
and all revelation of higher characters to lower would be precluded, as well
as all progress to knowledge which surpasses our present attainments.
(e) Even if knowledge depended upon similarity of nature and experience,
we might still know God, since we are made in God's image, and there
are important analogies between the divine nature and our own.
C. Because we know only that of which we can conceive, in the sense
of forming an adequate mental image. We reply : (a) It is true that
we know only that of which we can conceive, if by the term "conceive"
we mean our distinguishing in thought the object known from all other
objects. But, (6) The objection confounds conception with that which is
merely its occasional accompaniment and help, namely, the picturing of
the object by the imagination. In this sense, conceivabihty is not a final
test of truth, (c) That the formation of a mental image is not essential
to conception or knowledge, is plain when we remember that, as a matter
of fact, we both conceive and know many things of which we cannot form

POSSIBILITY OF THEOLOGY. 3
a mental image of any sort that in the least corresponds to the reality ; for
example, force, cause, law, space, our own minds. So we may know God,
though we cannot form an adequate mental image of him.
D. Because we can know truly only that which we know in whole and
not in part. We reply : (a) The objection confounds partial knowledge
with the knowledge of a part. We know the mind in part, but we do
not know a part of the mind. (6) If the objection were valid, no real
knowledge of anything would be possible, since we know no single thing
in all its relations. We conclude that, although God is a being not com
posed of parts, we may yet have a partial knowledge of him, and this
knowledge, though not exhaustive, may yet be real, and adequate to the
purposes of science.
E. Because all predicates of God are negative, and therefore furnish
no real knowledge. We answer : (a) Predicates derived from our con
sciousness, such as spirit, love, and holiness, are positive. (6) The terms
"infinite" and "absolute," moreover, express not merely a negative but a
positive idea — the idea, in the former case, of the absence of all limit, the
idea that the object thus described goes on and on forever ; the idea, in
the latter ease, of entire self-sufficiency. Since predicates of God, there
fore, are not merely negative, the argument mentioned above furnishes no
valid reason why we may not know him.
F. Because to know is to limit or define. Hence the Absolute as
unlimited, and the Infinite as undefined, cannot be known. We answer :
(a) God is absolute, not as existing in no relation, but as existing in no
necessary relation; and (6) God is infinite, not as excluding all coexistence
of the finite with himself, but as being the ground of the finite, and so
unfettered by it. (c) God is actually limited by the unchangeablenessof his
own attributes and personal distinctions, as well as by his self-chosen
relations to the universe he has created and to humanity in the person of
Christ. God is therefore limited and defined in such a sense as to render
knowledge of him possible.
G. Because all knowledge is relative to the knowing agent; that is,
what we know, we know, not as it is objectively, but only as it is related
to our own senses and faculties. In reply : (a) We grant that we can
know only that which has relation to our faculties. But this is simply to
say that we know only that which we come into mental contact with, that
is, we know only what we know. But, (6) We deny that what we come
into mental contact with is known by us as other than it is. So far as it is
known at all, it is known as it is. In other words, the laws of pur knowing
are not merely arbitrary and regulative, but correspond to the nature of
things. We conclude that, in theology, we are equally warranted in
assuming that the laws of our thought are laws of God's thought, and that
the results of normaUy conducted thinking with regard to God correspond
to the objective reality.
3. In God's actual revelation of himself and certain of these rela
tions.  As we do not in this place attempt a positive proof of God's exist
ence or of man's capacity for the knowledge of God, so we do not now

4 PROLEGOMENA,
attempt to prove that God has brought himself into contact with man's
mind by revelation. We shall consider the grounds of this belief here
after. Our aim at present is simply to show that, granting the fact of
revelation, a scientific theology is possible. This has been denied upon
the f ollowing grounds :
A. That revelation, as a making known, is necessarily internal and
subjective — either a mode of intelligence, or a quickening of man's cog
nitive powers — and hence can furnish no objective facts such as constitute
the proper material for science.
In reply to this objection, urged mainly by idealists in philosophy,
(a) We grant that revelation, to be effective, must be the means of
inducing a new mode of intelligence, or in other words, must be under
stood. We grant that this understanding of divine things is impossible
without a quickening of man's cognitive powers. We grant, moreover,
that revelation, when originally imparted, was often internal and
subjective. (&) But we deny that external revelation is therefore useless or impos
sible. Even if religious ideas sprang wholly from within, an external rev
elation might stir up the dormant powers of the mind. Religious ideas,
however, do not spring wholly from within. External revelation can
impart them. Man can reveal himself to man by external communica
tions, and, if God has equal power with man, God can reveal himself to
man in hke manner.
(c) Hence God's revelation may be, and, as we shall hereafter see, it is,
in great part, an external revelation in works and words. The universe is
a revelation of God ; God's works in nature precede God's words in history.
We claim, moreover, that, in many cases where truth was originally com
municated internally, the same Spirit who communicated it has brought
about an external record of it, so that the internal revelation might be
handed down to others than those who first received it.
(d) With this external record we shall also see that there is given
under proper conditions a special influence of God's Spirit, so to quicken
our cognitive powers that the external record reproduces in our minds the
ideas with which the minds of the writers were at first divinely filled.
(e) Internal revelations thus recorded, and external revelations thus
interpreted, both furnish objective facts which may serve as proper mater
ial for science. Although revelation in its widest sense may include, and
as constituting the ground of the possibility of theology does include, both
insight and illumination, it may also be used to denote simply a pro
vision of the external means of knowledge, and theology has to do with
inward revelations only as they are expressed in, or as they agree with,
this objective standard.
B. That many of the truths thus revealed are too indefinite to consti
tute the material for science, because they belong to the region of the feel
ings, because they are beyond our full understanding, or because they are
destitute of orderly arrangement. We reply :

RELATION TO RELIGION. 5
(a) Theology has to do with subjective feelings only as they can be
defined, and shown to be effects of objective truth upon the mind. They
are not more obscure than are the facts of morals or of psychology, and the
same objection which would exclude such feelings from theology would
make these latter sciences impossible.
(6) Those facts of revelation which are beyond our full understanding may,
hke the nebular hypothesis in astronomy, the atomic theory in chemistry,
or the doctrine of evolution in biology, furnish a principle of union between
great classes of other facts otherwise irreconcilable. We may define our
concepts of God, and even of the Trinity, at least sufficiently to distinguish
them from all other concepts ; and whatever difficulty may encumber the
putting of them into language only shows the importance of attempting it
and the value of even an approximate success.
(c) Even though there were no orderly arrangement of these facts, either
in nature or in Scripture, an accurate systematizing of them by the human
mind would not therefore be proved impossible, unless a principle were
assumed which would show all physical science to be equally impossible.
Astronomy and geology are constructed by putting together multitudinous
facts which at first sight seem to have no order. So with theology. And
yet, although revelation does not present to us a dogmatic system ready-
made, a dogmatic system is not only implicitly contained therein, but parts
of the system are wrought out in the epistles of the New Testament, as for
example in Rom. 5 : 12-19 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 3, 4 ; 8 : 6 ; 1 Tim. 3 : 16 ; Heb. 6 :
1, 2.
IV. Necessity. — The necessity of theology has its grounds
(a) In the organizing instinct of the human mind. This organizing
principle is a part of our constitution. The mind cannot endure confusion
or apparent contradiction in known facts. The tendency to harmonize
and unify its knowledge appears as soon as the mind becomes reflective ;
just in proportion to its endowments and culture does the impulse to sys
tematize and formulate increase. This is true of all departments of human
inquiry, but it is peculiarly true of our knowledge of God. Since the truth
with regard to God is the most important of all, theology meets the deepest
want of man's rational nature. Theology is a rational necessity. If all
existing theological systems were destroyed to-day, new systems would rise
to-morrow. So inevitable is the operation of this law, that those who most
decry theology show nevertheless that they have made a theology for them
selves, and often one sufficiently meagre and blundering. Hostility to
theology, where it does not originate in mistaken fears for the corruption
of God's truth or in a naturally illogical structure of mind, often proceeds
from a license of speculation which cannot brook the restraints of a com
plete Scriptural system.
(b) In the relation of systematic truth to the development of charac
ter. Truth thoroughly digested is essential to the growth of Christian
character in the individual and in the church. All knowledge of God has
its influence upon character, but most of all the knowledge of spiritual
facts in their relations. Theology cannot, as has sometimes been objected,

6 PROLEGOMENA.
deaden the religious affections, since it only draws out from their sources
and puts into rational connection with each other the truths which are
best adapted to nourish the religious affections. On the other hand, the
strongest Christians are those who have the firmest grasp upon the great
doctrines of Christianity ; the heroic ages of the church are those which
have witnessed most consistently to them ; the piety that can be injured by
the systematic exhibition of them must be weak, or mystical, or mistaken.
(c) In the importance to the preacher of definite and just views of
Christian doctrine. His chief intellectual qualification must be the
power clearly and comprehensively to conceive, and accurately and power
fully to express, the truth. He can be the agent of the Holy Spirit in con
verting and sanctifying men, only as he can wield "the sword of the
Spirit, which is the word of God " ( Eph. 6 : 17 ), or, in other language,
only as he can impress truth upon the minds and consciences of his
hearers. Nothing more certainly nullifies his efforts than confusion and
inconsistency in his statements of doctrine. His object is to replace
obscure and erroneous conceptions among his hearers by those which are
correct and vivid. He cannot do this without knowing the facts with
regard to God in their relations — knowing them, in short, as parts of a
system. With this truth he is put in trust. To mutilate it or misrepresent
it, is not only sin against the Revealer of it, — it may prove the ruin of
men's souls. The best safeguard against such mutilation or misrepresen
tation, is the diligent study of the several doctrines of the faith in their
relations to one another, and especially to the central theme of theology,
the person and work of Jesus Christ.
(d) In the intimate connection between correct doctrine and the
safety and aggressive power of the church. Thejafety and progress of
the church is dependent upon her " holding the pattern of sound words "
(2 Tim. 1 : 13), and serving as "pillar and ground of the truth " (1 Tim. 3:
15). Defective understanding of the truth results ' sooner or later in
defects of organization, of operation, and of hfe. Thorough comprehen
sion of Christian truth as an organized system furnishes, on the other hand,
not only an invaluable defense against heresy and immorality, but also an
indispensable stimulus and instrument in aggressive labor for the world's
conversion. (e) In the direct and indirect injunctions of Scripture. The Scrip
ture urges upon us the thorough and comprehensive study of the truth
(John 5:39, marg., — "Search the Scriptures"), the comparing and
harmonizing of its different parts (1 Cor. 2: 13— "comparing spiritual
things with spiritual"), the gathering of all about the great central fact of.
revelation (Col. 1 : 27— "which is Christ in you, the hope of glory"), the
preaching of it in its wholeness as well as in its due proportions (2 Tim. 4 :
2 — " Preach the word"). The minister of the Gospel is called "a scribe
who hath been made a disciple to the kingdom of heaven" (Mat. 13 : 52);
the "pastors" of the churches are at the same time to be "teachers"
(Eph. 4 : 11); the bishop must be "apt to teach" (1 Tim. 3 : 2), " handling
aright the word of truth " ( 2 Tim. 2 : 15 ), "holding to the faithful word
which is according to the teaching, that he may be 'able both to exhort in
the sound doctrine and to convict the gainsayers " (Tit. 1 : 9).

NECESSITY OF THEOLOGY. *i
V. Relation to Religion. — Theology and religion are related to each
other as effects, in different spheres, of the same cause. As theology is an
effect produced in the sphere of systematic thought by the facts respecting
God and the universe, so religion is an effect which these same facts pro
duce in the sphere of individual and collective life. With regard to the
term ' religion', notice :
1. Derivation.
(a) The derivation from religdre, 'to bind back' (man to God), is
negatived by the authority of Cicero and of the best modern etymologists;
by the difficulty, on this hypothesis, of explaining such forms as religio,
religens; and by the necessity, in that case, of presupposing a fuller
knowledge of sin and redemption than was common to the ancient world.
(6) The more correct derivation is from relegere, "to go over again,"
"carefully to ponder." Its original meaning is therefore "reverent
observance " (of duties due to the gods).
2. False Conceptions.
(a) Religion is not, as Hegel declared, a kind of knowing ; for it
would then be only an incomplete form of philosophy, and the measure of
knowledge in each case would be the measure of piety.
(6) Religion is not, as Schleiermacher held, the mere feeling of depend
ence ; for such feeling of dependence is not religious, unless exercised
toward God and accompanied by moral effort.
(c) Religion is not, as Kant maintained, morality or moral action ; for
morality is conformity to an abstract law of right, while religion is essen
tially a relation to a person, from whom the soul receives blessing and to
whom it surrenders itself in love and obedience.
3. Essential Idea.
Religion in its essential idea is a life in God,_a life lived in recognition of
God, in communion with God, and under control of the indwelling Spirit of
God. Since it is a life, it cannot be described as consisting solely in the
exercise of any one of the powers of intellect, affection, or will. As physical
life involves the unity and cooperation of aU the organs of the body, so
religion, or spiritual life, involves the united working of aU the powers of
the soul. To feeling, however, we must assign the logical priority, since
holy affection toward God, imparted in regeneration, is the condition of
truly knowing God and of truly serving him.
4. Inferences.
From this definition of religion it f ollows :
(a) That in strictness there is but one religion. Man is a religious being,
indeed, as having the capacity for this divine life. He is actually religious,
whoever, only when he enters into this living relation to God. False
religions are the caricatures which men given to sin, or the imaginations
which men groping after light, form of this hfe of the soul in God.
(6) That the content of religion is greater than that of theology. The
facts of religion come within the range of theology only so far as they can
be definitely conceived, accurately expressed in language, and brought
into rational relation to each other.

8 PROLEGOMENA.
(c) That religion is to be distinguished from formal worship, which is
simply the outward expression of religion. As such expression, worship is
"formal communion between God and his people." In it God speaks to
man, and man to God. It therefore properly includes the reading of
Scripture and preaching on the side of God, and prayer and song on the
side of the people.

CHAPTBE II.
MATERIAL OF THEOLOGY.
L Sources op Theology.— God himself, in the last analysis, must be the
only source of knowledge with regard to his own being and relations.
Theology is therefore a summary and explanation of the content of God's
self -revelations. These are, first, the revelation of God in nature ; secondly
and supremely, the revelation of God in the Scriptures.
1. Scripture and Nature. By nature we here mean not only physical
facts, or facts with regard to the substances, properties, forces, and laws
of the material world, but also spiritual facts, or facts with regard to the
intellectual and moral constitution of man, and the orderly arrangement of
human society and history.
(a) Natural theology. — The universe is a source of theology. The
Scriptures assert that God has revealed himself in nature. There is not
only an outward witness to his existence and character in the constitution
and government of the universe (Ps. 19 ; Acts 14 :17; Rom. 1:20), but an
inward witness to his existence and character in the heart of every man
(Rom. 1 : 17, 18, 19, 20, 32 ; 2 : 15). The systematic exhibition of these
facts, whether derived from observation, history or science, constitutes
natural theology.
( b ) Natural theology supplemented. — The Christian revelation is the
chief source of theology. The Scriptures plainly declare that the revela
tion of God in nature does not supply all the knowledge which a sinner
needs (Acts 17 :23 ; Eph. 3:9). This revelation is therefore supplemented
by another, in which divine attributes and merciful provisions only dimly
shadowed forth in nature are made known to men. This latter revela
tion consists of a series of supernatural events and communications, the
record of which is presented in the Scriptures.
( c) The Scriptures the final standard of appeal. — Science and Scripture
throw hght upon each other. The same divine Spirit who gave both reve
lations is still present, enabling the believer to interpret the one by the
other and thus progressively to come to the knowledge of the truth.
Because of our finiteness and sin, the total record in Scripture of God's past
communications is a more trustworthy source of theology than are our
conclusions from nature or our private impressions of the teaching of the
Spirit. Theology therefore looks to the Scripture itself as its chief source
of material and its final standard of appeal.
(d) The theology of Scripture not unnatural. — Though we speak of
the systematized truths of nature as constituting natural theology, we are
not to infer that Scriptural theology is unnatural. Since the Scriptures

10 PROLEGOMENA.
have the same author as nature, the same principles are illustrated in the
one as in the other. All the doctrines of the Bible have their reason in
that same nature of God which constitutes the basis of ah material things.
Christianity is a supplementary dispensation, not as contradicting, or cor
recting errors in, natural theology, but as more perfectly revealing the
truth. Christianity is indeed the ground-plan upon which the whole
creation is built — the original and eternal truth of which natural theology
is but a partial expression. Hence the theology of nature and the theol
ogy of Scripture are mutually dependent. Natural theology not only pre
pares the way for, but it receives stimulus and aid from, Scriptural
theology. Natural theology may now be a source of truth, which, before
the Scriptures came, it could not furnish.
2. Scripture and Rationalism. Although the Scriptures make known
much that is beyond the power of man's unaided reason to discover or
fully to comprehend, their teachings, when taken together, in no way con
tradict a reason conditioned in its activity by a holy affection and enlight
ened by the Spirit of God. To reason in the large sense, as including the
mind's power of cognizing God and moral relations — not in the narrow
sense of mere reasoning, or the exercise of the purely logical faculty — the
Scriptures continually appeal.
A. The proper office of reason, in this large sense, is : (a) To furnish
us with those primary ideas of space, time, cause, substance, design, right,
and God, which are the conditions of all subsequent knowledge. (6) To
judge with regard to man's need of a special and supernatural revelation.
(c) To examine the credentials of communications professing to be, or of
documents professing to record, such a revelation, (d) To estimate and
reduce to system the facts of revelation, when these have been found pro
perly attested, (e) To deduce from these facts their natural and logical
conclusions. Thus reason itself prepares the way for a revelation above
reason, and warrants an implicit trust in such revelation when once given.
B. Rationalism, on the other hand, holds reason to be the ultimate
source of all religious truth, while Scripture is authoritative only so far as its
revelations agree with previous conclusions of reason, or can be rationally
demonstrated. Every form of rationalism, therefore, commits at least one
of the following errors : (a) That of confounding reason with mere rea
soning, or the exercise of the logical intelligence. (&) That of ignoring
the necessity of a holy aftection as the condition of all right reason in
religious things, (c) That of denying our dependence in our present state
of sin upon God's past revelations of himself, (d) That of regarding the
unaided reason, even its normal and unbiased state, as capable of dis
covering, comprehending, and demonstrating all religious truth.
3. Scripture and Mysticism. As rationalism recognizes too little as
coming from God, so mysticism recognizes too much.
A. True mysticism. — We have seen that there is an illumination of the
minds of all believers by the Holy Spirit. The Spirit, however, makes no
new revelation of truth, but uses for his instrument the truth already
revealed by Christ in nature and in the Scriptures. The illuminating

LIMITATIONS OF THEOLOGY. 11
work of the Spirit is therefore an opening of men's minds to understand
Christ's previous revelations. As one initiated into the mysteries of Chris
tianity, every true believer may be called a mystic. True mysticism is
that higher knowledge and fellowship which the Holy Spirit gives through
the use of nature and Scripture as subordinate and principal means.
B. False mysticism. — Mysticism, however, as the term is commonly
used, errs in holding to the attainment of religious knowledge by direct
communication from God, and by passive absorption of the human activi
ties into the divine. It either partially or wholly loses sight of (a) the out
ward organs of revelation, nature and the Scriptures ; (o) the activity of
the human powers in the reception of all religious knowledge ; (c) the
personality of man, and, by consequence, the personality of God.
4. Scripture and Romanism. While the history of doctrine, as show
ing the progressive apprehension and unfolding by the church of the truth
contained in nature and Scripture, is a subordinate source of theology,
Protestantism recognizes the Bible as under Christ the primary and final
authority. Romanism, on the other hand, commits the two-fold error (a) Of making
the church, and not the Scriptures, the immediate and sufficient source of
rehgious knowledge ; and (6) Of making the relation of the individual to
Christ depend upon his relation to the church, instead of making his rela
tion to the church depend upon, follow, and express his relation to Christ.
H. Limitations of Theology. — Although theology derives its mate
rial from God's two-fold revelation, it does not profess to give an exhaus
tive knowledge of God and of the relations between God and the universe.
After showing what material we have, we must show what material we have
not. We have indicated the sources of theology ; we now examine its limi
tations. Theology has its limitations :
(a) In the flniteness of the human understanding. This gives rise
to a class of necessary mysteries, or mysteries connected with the infinity
and incomprehensibleness of the divine nature (Job 11 : 7 ; Rom. 11 : 33).
(6) In the imperfect state of science, both natural and metaphysical.
This gives rise to a class of accidental mysteries, or mysteries which
consist in the apparently irreconcilable nature of truths, which, taken
separately, are perfectly comprehensible.
(c) In the inadequacy of language. Since language is the medium
through which truth is expressed and formulated, the invention of a pro
per terminology in theology, as in every other science, is a condition and
criterion of its progress. The Scriptures recognize a peculiar difficulty in
putting spiritual truths into earthly language ( 1 Cor. 2 : 13 ; 2 Cor. 3:6;
12 : 4 ).
(d) In the incompleteness of our knowledge of the Scriptures.
Since it is not the mere letter of the Scriptures that constitutes the truth,
the progress of theology is dependent upon hermeneutics, or the interpre
tation of the word of God.

12 PROLEGOMENA.
(e) In the silence of written revelation. For our discipline and pro
bation, much is probably hidden from us, which we might even with our
present powers comprehend.
(/) In the lack of spiritual discernment caused by sin. Since holy
affection is a condition of rehgious knowledge, all moral imperfection in
the individual Christian and in the church serves as a hindrance to the
working out of a complete theology.
HI. Relations op Matebial to Pbogress in Theology.
(a) A perfect system of theology is impossible. We do not expect to
construct such a system. All science but reflects the present attainment
of the human mind. No science is complete or finished. However it
may be with the sciences of nature and of man, the science of God will
never amount to an exhaustive knowledge. We must not expect to dem
onstrate all Scripture doctrines upon rational grounds, or even in every
case to see the principle of connection between them. Where we cannot
do this, we must, as in every other science, set the revealed facts in their
places and wait for further light, instead of ignoring or rejecting any of
them because we cannot understand them or their relation to other parts
of our system.
(6) Theology is nevertheless progressive. It is progressive in the
sense that our subjective understanding of the facts with regard to God,
and our consequent expositions of these facts, may and do become more
perfect. But theology is not progressive in the sense that its objective
facts change, either in their number or their nature. With Martineau we
may say : "Religion has been reproached with not being progressive ; it
makes amends by being imperishable." Though our knowledge may be
imperfect, it will have great value still. Our success in constructing a
theology will depend upon the proportion which clearly expressed facts of
Scripture bear to mere inferences, and upon the degree in which they all
cohere about Christ, the central person and theme.

CHAPTBE III.
METHOD OF THEOLOGY.
I. Requisites to the Study. — The requisites to the successful study
of theology have already in part been indicated in speaking of its limita
tions. In spite of some repetition, however, we mention the following :
(a) A disciplined mind. Only such a mind can patiently collect the
facts, hold in its grasp many facts at once, educe by continuous reflection
their connecting principles, suspend final judgment until its conclusions
are verified by Scripture and experience.
(6) An intuitional as distinguished from a merely logical habit oj
mind, — or, trust in the mind's primitive convictions, as well as in its
processes of reasoning. The theologian must have insight as well as under
standing. He must accustom himself to ponder spiritual facts as well as
those which are sensible and material ; to see things in their inner relations
as well as in their outward forms ; to cherish confidence in the reality and
the unity of truth.
(c) An acquaintance with physical, mental, and moral science.
The method of conceiving and expressing Scripture truth is so affected by
our elementary notions of these sciences, and the weapons with which
theology is attacked and defended are so commonly drawn from them as
arsenals, that the student cannot afford to be ignorant of them.
(d) A knowledge of the original languages of the Bible. This is
necessary to enable us not only to determine the meaning of the funda
mental terms of Scripture, such as holiness, sin, propitiation, justification,
but also to interpret statements of doctrine by their connections with the
context. (e) A holy affection toward God. Only the renewed heart can pro
perly feel its need of divine revelation, or understand that revelation when
given. (/) The enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit. As only the
Spirit fathoms the things of God, so only he can illuminate our minds to
apprehend them.
H. Divisions op Theology. — Theology is commonly divided into Bibli
cal, Historical, Systematic, and Practical
1. Biblical Theology aims to arrange and classify the facts of revelation,
confining itself to the Scriptures for its material, and treating of doctrine
only so far as it was developed at the close of the apostolic age.
13

14 PROLEGOMENA.
2. Historical Theology traces the development of the Biblical doctrines
from the time of the apostles to the present day, and gives account of the
results of this development in the life of the church.
3. Systematic Theology takes the material furnished by Biblical and
by Historical Theology, and with this material seeks to build up into an
organic and consistent whole all our knowledge of God and of the relations
between God and the universe, whether this knowledge be originally
derived from nature or from the Scriptures.
4. Practical Theology is the system of truth considered as a means of
renewing and sanctifying men, or, in other words, theology in its publica
tion and enforcement.
in. Histoby op Systematic Theology.
1. In the Eastern Church, Systematic Theology may be said to have
had its beginning and end in John of Damascus (700-760).
2. In the Western Church, we may (with Hagenbach) distinguish
three periods :
(a) The period of Scholasticism, — introduced by Peter Lombard
(1100-1160), and reaching its culmination in Thomas Aquinas (1221-1274)
and Duns Scotus (1265-1308).
(5) The period of Symbolism, — represented by the Lutheran theol
ogy of Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), and the Reformed theology of
John Calvin (1509-1564) ; the former connecting itself with the Analytic
theology of Calixtus (1585-1656), and the latter with the Federal theology
of Cocceius (1603-1669).
(c) The period of Criticism and Speculation, — in its three divisions :
the Rationalistic, represented by Semler (1725-1791) ; the Transitional, by
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) ; the Evangelical, by Nitzsch, Muller, Tholuck
and Dorner.
3. Among theologians of views diverse from the prevailing Protes
tant faith, may be mentioned :
[a) Bellarmine (1542-1621), the Roman Catholic.
(6) Arminius (1560-1609), the opponent of predestination.
(c) Laelius Socinus (1525-1562), and Faustus Socinus (1539-1604),
the leaders of the modern Unitarian movement.
4. British Theology, represented by :
(a) The Baptists, John Bunyan (1628-1688), John Gill (1697-1771),
and Andrew Fuller (1754-1815).
(6) The Puritans, John Owen (1616-1683), Richard Baxter (1615-1691),
John Howe (1530-1705), and Thomas Ridgeley (1666-1734).
(c) The Scotch Presbyterians, Thomas Boston (1676-1732), John Dick
(1764-1833), and Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847).
(d) The Methodists, John Wesley (1703-1791), and Richard Watson
(1781-1833).

ORDER OF TREATMENT IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 15
(e) The Quakers, George Fox (1624-1691), and Robert Barclay (1648-
1690). (/) The English Churchmen, Richard Hooker (1553-1600), Gilbert
Burnet (1643-1715), and John Pearson (1613-1686).
5. American theology, running in two lines:
(a) The Reformed system of Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), modified
successively by Joseph Bellamy (1719-1790), Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803),
Timothy Dwight (1752-1817), Nathanael Emmons (1745-1840), Leonard
Woods (1774-1854), Charles G. Finney (1792-1875), Nathaniel W. Taylor
(1786-1858), and Horace BushneU (1802-1876). Calvinism, as thus
modified, is often called the New England, or New School, theology.
(6) The older Calvinism, represented by Charles Hodge the father (1797-
1878) and A. A Hodge the son (1823-1886), together with Henry B.
Smith ( 1815-1877), Robert J. Breckinridge ( 1800-1871 ), Samuel J. Baird,
and William G. T. Shedd (1820-1894). All these, although with minor
differences, hold to views of human depravity and divine grace more nearly
conformed to the doctrine of Augustine and Calvin, and are for this reason
distinguished from the New England theologians and their followers by
the popular title of Old School.
IV. Order op Treatment in Systematic Theology.
1. Various methods of arranging the topics of a theological system.
(a) The Analytical method of Calixtus begins with the assumed end of
all tilings, blessedness, and thence passes to the means by which it is
secured. (6) The Trinitarian method of Leydecker and Martensen regards
Christian doctrine as a manifestation successively of the Father, Son and
Holy Spirit, (c) The Federal method of Cocceius, Witsius, and Boston
treats theology under the two covenants, [d) The Anthropological method
of Chalmers and Rothe ; the former beginning with the Disease of Man
and passing to the Remedy ; the latter dividing his Dogmatik into the
Consciousness of Sin and the Consciousness of Redemption, (e) The
Christological method of Hase, Thomasius and Andrew Fuller treats of
God, man, and sin, as presuppositions of the person and work of Christ.
Mention may also be made of (/) The Historical method, followed by
Ursinus, and adopted in Jonathan Edwards's History of Redemption ; and
[g) The Allegorical method of Dannhauer, in which man is described as a
wanderer, life as a road, the Holy Spirit as a light, the church as a candle
stick, God as the end, and heaven as the home ; so Bunyan's Holy War,
and Howe's Living Temple.
2. The Synthetic Method, which we adopt in this compendium, is both
the most common and the most logical method of arranging the topics
of theology. This method proceeds from causes to effects, or, in the
language of Hagenbach ( Hist. Doctrine, 2 : 152 ), "starts from the highest
principle, God, and proceeds to man, Christ, redemption, and finally to
the end of all things. " In such a treatment of theology we may best
arrange our topics in the following order :

16 PROLEGOMENA.
1st. The existence of God.
2d. The Scriptures a revelation from God.
3d. The nature, decrees and works of God.
4th. Man, in his original likeness to God and subsequent apostasy.
5th. Redemption, through the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit.
6th. The nature and laws of the Christian church.
7th. The end of the present system of things.
V. Text-books in Theology, valuable for reference :-
1. Confessions : Schaff, Creeds of Christendom.
2. Compendiums : H. B. Smith, System of Christian Theology ; A. A.
Hodge, Outlines of Theology ; E. H. Johnson, Outhne of Systematic
Theology ; Hovey, Manual of Theology and Ethics ; W. N. Clarke, Outhne
of Christian Theology ; Hase, Hutterus Redivivus ; Luthardt, Compendium
der Dogmatik ; Kurtz, Religionslehre.
3. Extended Treatises : Dorner, System of Christian Doctrine ; Shedd,
Dogmatic Theology ; Calvin, Institutes ; Charles Hodge, Systematic
Theology ; Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics ; Baird, Elohim Revealed ;
Luthardt, Fundamental, Saving, and Moral Truths ; PhiUippi, Glaubens-
lehre ; Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk.
4. Collected Works ; Jonathan Edwards ; Andrew Fuller.
5. Histories of Doctrine : Harnack ; Hagenbach ; Shedd ; Fisher ;
Sheldon ; Orr, Progress of Dogma.
6. Monographs : Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin ; Shedd, Discourses
and Essays ; Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity ; Dorner, History of the
Doctrine of the Person of Christ ; Dale, Atonement ; Strong, Christ
in Creation ; Upton, Hibbert Lectures.
7. Theism : Martineau, Study of Religion ; Harris, Philosophical
Basis of Theism ; Strong, Philosophy and Religion ; Bruce, Apologetics ;
Drummond, Ascent of Man; Griffith -Jones, Ascent through Christ.
8. Christian Evidences: Butler, Analogy of Natural and Revealed
Religion ; Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief ; Row, Bampton
Lectures for 1877;- Peabody, Evidences of Christianity; Mair, Christian
Evidences ; Fairbairn, Philosophy of the Christian Religion ; Matheson,
Spiritual Development of St. Paul.
9. Intellectual Philosophy : Stout, Handbook of Psychology ; Bowne,
Metaphysics ; Porter, Human Intellect ; HiU, Elements of Psychology ;
Dewey, Psychology.
10. Moral Philosophy: Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality ;
Smyth, Christian Ethics ; Porter, Elements of Moral Science ; Calderwood,
Moral Philosophy; Alexander, Moral Science; Robins, Ethics of the
Christian Life.
11. General Science : Todd, Astronomy ; Wentworth and Hill, Physics ;
Remsen, Chemistry ; Brigham, Geology ; Parker, Biology ; Martin,
Physiology; Ward, Fairbanks, or West, Sociology; Walker, Political
Economy.

TEXT-BOOKS IN THEOLOGY. 17
12. Theological Encyclopaedias: Schaff-Herzog ( Enghsh >; McClin-
tock and Strong ; Herzog (Second German Edition).
13. Bible Dictionaries: Hastings-; Davis; Cheyne ; Smith (edited by
Hackett ).
14. Commentaries: Meyer, on the New Testament; Philippi, Lange,
Shedd, Sanday, on the Epistle to the Romans ; Godet, on John's Gospel ;
Lightfoot, on Philippians and Colossians ; Expositor's Bible, on the Old
Testament books.
15. Bibles: American Revision (standard edition); Revised Greek-
English New Testament ( published by Harper & Brothers ) ; Annotated
Paragraph Ijible (published by the London Rehgious Tract Society)
Stier and TL-rile, Polyglotten-BibeL

PART IL
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD*

CHAPTEB I.
ORIGIN OF OUR IDEA OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.
God is the infinite and perfect Spirit in whom all things have their source,
support, and end.
The existence of God is a first truth ; in other words, the knowledge
of God's existence is a rational intuition. Logically, it precedes and con
ditions all observation and reasoning. Chronologically, only reflection
upon the phenomena of nature and of mind occasions its rise in con
sciousness. I. First truths in general.
1. Their nature.
A. Negatively. — A first truth is not (a) Truth written prior to conscious
ness upon the substance of the soul — for such passive knowledge implies a
materialistic view of the soul ; (&) Actual knowledge of which the soul
finds itself in possession at birth — for it cannot be proved that the soul
has such knowledge ; (c) An idea, undeveloped at birth, but which has
the power of self -development apart from observation and experience — for
this is contrary to all we know of the laws of mental growth.
B. Positively. — A first truth is a knowledge which, though developed
upon occasion of observation and reflection, is not derived from observa
tion and reflection, — a knowledge on the contrary which has such logical
priority that it must be assumed or supposed, in order to make any obser
vation or reflection possible. Such truths are not, therefore, recognized
first in order of time ; some of them are assented to somewhat late in the
mind's growth ; by the great majority of men they are never consciously
formulated at all. Yet they constitute the necessary assumptions upon
which all other knowledge rests, and the mind has not only the inborn
capacity to evolve them so soon as the proper occasions are presented, but
the recognition of them is inevitable so soon as the mind begins to give
account to itself of its own knowledge.
2. Their criteria. The criteria by which first truths are to be tested
are three : 18

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD A FIRST TRUTH. 19
A. Their universality. By this we mean, not that all men assent to
them or understand them when propounded in scientific form, but that all
men manifest a practical belief in them by their language, actions, and
expectations. B. Their necessity. By this we mean, not that it is impossible to deny
these truths, but that the mind is compelled by its very constitution to
recognize them upon the occurrence of the proper conditions, and to
employ them in its arguments to prove their non-existence.
C. Their logical independence and priority. By this we mean that
these truths can be resolved into no others, and proved by no others ; that
they are presupposed in the acquisition of all other knowledge, and can
therefore be derived from no other source than an original cognitive power
of the mind.
H. The Existence of God a pibst tbuth.
1. That the knowledge of God's existence answers the first criterion
of universality, is evident from the f ollowing considerations :
A. It is an acknowledged fact that the vast majority of men have actu
ally recognized the existence of a spiritual being or beings, upon whom
they conceived themselves to be dependent.
B. Those races and nations which have at first seemed destitute of such
knowledge have uniformly, upon further investigation, been found to pos
sess it, so that no tribe of men with which we have thorough acquaintance
can be said to be without an object of worship. We may presume that
further knowledge will show this to be true of all.
C. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that those individuals, in
heathen or in Christian lands, who profess themselves to be without any
knowledge of a spiritual power or powers above them, do yet indirectly
manifest the existence of such an idea in their minds and its positive influ
ence over them.
D. This agreement among individuals and nations so widely separated
in time and place can be most satisfactorily explained by supposing that it
has its ground, not in accidental circumstances, but in the nature of man as
man. The diverse and imperfectly developed ideas of the supreme Being
which prevail among men are best accounted for as misinterpretations and
perversions of an intuitive conviction common to all.
2. That the knowledge of God's existence answers the second criterion
of necessity, will be seen by considering :
A. That men, under circumstances fitted to call forth this knowledge,
cannot avoid recognizing the existence of God. In contemplating finite
existence, there is inevitably suggested the idea of an infinite Being as its
correlative. Upon occasion of the mind's perceiving its own finiteness,
dependence, responsibility, it immediately and necessarily perceives the
existence of an infinite and unconditioned Being upon whom it is depend
ent and to whom it is responsible.

20 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
B. That men, in virtue of their humanity, have a capacity for religion.
This recognized capacity for religion is proof that the idea of God is a neces
sary one. If the mind upon proper occasion did not evolve this idea, there
would be nothing in man to which religion could appeal.
C. That he who denies God's existence must tacitly assume that existence
in his very argument, by employing logical processes whose validity rests
upon the fact of God's existence. The full proof of this belongs under the
next head.
3. That the knowledge of God's existence answers the third criterion
of logical independence and priority, may be shown as follows :
A. It is presupposed in all other knowledge as its logical condition and
foundation. The validity of the simplest mental acts, such as sense-percep
tion, self-consciousness, and memory, depends upon the assumption that a
God exists who has so constituted our minds that they give us knowledge
of things as they are.
B. The more complex processes of the mind, such as induction and de
duction, can be relied on only by presupposing a thinking Deity who has
made the various parts of the universe and the various aspects of truth to
correspond to each other and to the investigating faculties of man.
C. Our primitive behef in final cause, or, in other words, our convic
tion that all things have their ends, that design pervades the universe,
involves a behef in God's existence. In assuming that there is a universe,
that the universe is a rational whole, a system of thought-relations, we
assume the existence of an absolute Thinker, of whose thought the
universe is an expression.
D. Our primitive behef in moral obligation, or, in other words, our
conviction that right has universal authority, involves the behef in God's
existence. In assuming that the universe is a moral whole, we assume the
existence of an absolute Will, of whose righteousness the universe is an
expression. To repeat these four points in another form — the intuition of an Abso
lute Reason is (a) the necessary presupposition of all other knowledge, so
that we cannot know anything else to exist except by assuming first of all
that God exists ; (&) the necessary basis of all logical thought, so that we
cannot put confidence in any one of our reasoning processes except by
taking for granted that a thinking Deity has constructed our minds with
reference to the universe and to truth ; (e) the necessary implication of our
primitive behef in design, so that we can assume all things to exist for a
purpose, only by making the prior assumption that a purposing God exists
— can regard the universe as a thought, only by postulating the existence
of an absolute Thinker ; and (d) the necessary foundation of our convic
tion of moral obligation, so that we can beheve in the universal authority
of right, only by assuming that there exists a God of righteousness who
reveals his will both in the individual conscience and in the moral universe
at large. We cannot prove that God is ; but we can show that, in order to
the existence of any knowledge, thought, reason, conscience, in man,
man must assume that God is.

OTHER SUPPOSED SOURCES. 21
HL Other Supposed Sources of our Idea of God's Existence.
Our proof that the idea of God's existence is a rational intuition will not
be complete, until we show that attempts to account in other ways for the
origin of the idea are insufficient, and require as their presupposition the
very intuition which they would supplant or reduce to a secondary place.
We claim that it cannot be derived from any other source than an original
cognitive power of the mind.
1. Not from external revelation, — whether communicated (a) through
the Scriptures, or (6) through tradition ; for, unless man had from another
source a previous knowledge of the existence of a God from whom such a
revelation might come, the revelation itself could have no authority for
him. 2. Not from experience, — whether this mean (a) the sense-perception
and reflection of the individual (Locke), (6) the accumulated results of the
sensations and associations of past generations of the race (Herbert Spen
cer), or (c) the actual contact of our sensitive nature with God, the super
sensible reality, through the rehgious feeling (Newman Smyth).
The first form of this theory is inconsistent with the fact that the idea
of God is not the idea of a sensible or material object, nor a combination
of such ideas. Since the spiritual and infinite are direct opposites of the
material and finite, no experience of the latter can account for our idea of
the former.
The second form of the theory is open to the objection that the very first
experience of the first man, equally with man's latest experience, presup
poses this intuition, as weU as the other intuitions, and therefore cannot be
the cause of it. Moreover, even though this theory of its origin were cor
rect, it would still be impossible to think of the object of the intuition as
not existing, and the intuition would still represent to us the highest meas
ure of certitude at present attainable by man. If the evolution of ideas is
toward truth instead of falsehood, it is the part of wisdom to act upon the
hypothesis that our primitive behef is veracious.
The third form of the theory seems to make God a sensuous object, to
reverse the proper order of knowing and feeling, to ignore the fact that in
all feeling there is at least some knowledge of an object, and to forget that
the validity of this very feeling can be maintained only by previously
assuming the existence of a rational Deity.
3. Not from reasoning, — because
(a) The actual rise of this knowledge in the great majority of minds is
not the result of any conscious process of reasoning. On the other hand,
upon occurrence of the proper conditions, it flashes upon the soul with the
quickness and force of an immediate revelation.
( b ) The strength of men's faith in God's existence is not proportioned to
the strength of the reasoning faculty. On the other hand, men of greatest
logical power are often inveterate sceptics, while men of unwavering faith
are found among those who cannot even understand the arguments for
God's existence.

22 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
(c) There is more in this knowledge than reasoning could ever have
furnished. Men do not hmit their behef in God to the just conclusions of
argument. The arguments for the divine existence, valuable as they are for
purposes to be shown hereafter, are not sufficient by themselves to warrant
our conviction that there exists an infinite and absolute Being. It will
appear upon examination that the a priori argument is capable of proving
only an abstract and ideal proposition, but can never conduct us to the
existence of a real Being. It will appear that the a posteriori arguments,
from merely finite existence, can never demonstrate the existence of the
infinite. In the words of Sir Wm. Hamilton (Discussions, 23) — "A dem
onstration of the absolute from the relative is logically absurd, as in such
a syllogism we must collect in the conclusion what is not distributed in
the premises" — in short, from finite premises we cannot draw an infinite
conclusion. ( d ) Neither do men arrive at the knowledge of God's existence by infer
ence; for inference is condensed syllogism, and, as a form of reasoning, is
equally open to the objection just mentioned. We have seen, moreover,
that all logical processes are based upon the assumption of God's existence.
Evidently that which is presupposed in all reasoning cannot itself be proved
by reasoning.
IV. Contents of this Intuition.
1. In this fundamental knowledge that God is, it is necessarily implied
that to some extent men know intuitively what God is, namely, ( a ) a
Reason in which their mental processes are grounded ; ( 6 ) a Power above
them upon which they are dependent ; ( c ) a Perfection which imposes law
upon their moral natures ; ( d) a Personahty which they may recognize in
prayer and worship.
In maintaining that we have a rational intuition of God, we by no means
imply that a presentative intuition of God is impossible. Such a presenta-
tive intuition was perhaps characteristic of unfallen man ; it does belong
at times to the Christian ; it will be the blessing of heaven ( Mat. 5:8 —
"the pure in heart. . . shaU see God" ; Rev. 22 : 4 — "they shall see his
face " ). Men's experiences of face-to-face apprehension of God, in danger
and guilt, give some reason to believe that a presentative knowledge of
God is the normal condition of humanity. But, as this presentative intui
tion of God is not in our present state universal, we here claim only that all
men have a rational intuition of God.
It is to be remembered, however, that the loss of love to God has greatly
obscured even this rational intuition, so that the revelation of nature and
the Scriptures is needed to awaken, confirm and enlarge it, and the special
work of the Spirit of Christ to make it the knowledge of friendship and
communion. Thus from knowing about God, we come to know God ( John
17 : 3_ "This is life eternal, that they should know thee" ; 2 Tim. 1 : 12
— "I know him whom I have believed " ).
2. The Scriptures, therefore, do not attempt to prove the existence of
God, but, on the other hand, both assume and declare that the knowledge

CONTENTS OF THIS INIUITION. 23
that God is, is universal (Rom. 1 : 19-21, 28, 32 ; 2 : 15). God has inlaid
the evidence of this fundamental truth in the very nature of man, so that
nowhere is he without a witness. The preacher may confidently follow the
example of Scripture by assuming it. But he must also exphcitly declare
it, as the Scripture does. "For the invisible things of him since the
creation of the world are clearly seen" (mdopaTat — spiritually viewed) ; the
organ given for this purpose is the vovc (voobpeva) ; but then — and this
forms the transition to our next division of the subject — they are "per
ceived through the things that are made " ( ™iq m^/iaaiv, Rom. 1 : 20 ),

CHAPTEE II.
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCES OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.
Although the knowledge of God's existence is intuitive, it may be expli
cated and confirmed by arguments drawn from the actual universe and
from the abstract ideas of the human mind.
Remark 1. These arguments are probable, not demonstrative. For this
reason they supplement each other, and constitute a series of evidences
which is cumulative in its nature. Though, taken singly, none of them can
be considered absolutely decisive, they together furnish a corroboration
of our primitive conviction of God's existence, which is of great practical
value, and is in itself sufficient to bind the moral action of men.
Remark 2. A consideration of these arguments may also serve to expli
cate the contents of an intuition which has remaided obscure and only half
conscious for lack of reflection. The arguments, indeed, are the efforts of
the mind that already has a conviction of God's existence to give to itself a
formal account of its behef. An exact estimate of their logical value and
of their relation to the intuition which they seek to express in syllogistic
form, is essential to any proper refutation of the prevalent atheistic and
pantheistic reasoning.
Remark 3. The arguments for the divine existence may be reduced to
four, namely : I. The Cosmological ; II. The Teleological ; IH. The
Anthropological ; and IV. The Ontological. We shall examine these in
order, seeking first to determine the precise conclusions to which they
respectively lead, and then to ascertain in what manner the four may be
combined. I. The Cosmological Argument, or Argument from Change in
Nature. This is not properly an argument from effect to cause ; for the proposi
tion that every effect must have a cause is simply identical, and means only
that every caused event must have a cause. It is rather an argument from
begun existence to a sufficient cause of that beginning, and may be accu
rately stated as follows :
Everything begun, whether substance or phenomenon, owes its existence
to some producing cause. The universe, at least so far as its present form
is concerned, is a thing begun, and owes its existence to a cause which is
equal to its production. This cause must be indefinitely great.
1. The defects of the Cosmological Argument.
A. It is impossible to show that the universe, so far as its substance is
concerned, has had a beginning. The law of causality declares, not that
24

THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 25
everything has a cause — for then God himself must have a cause — but
rather that everything begun has a cause, or in other words, that every
event or change has a cause.
B. Granting that the universe, so far as its phenomena are concerned,
has had a cause, it is impossible to show that any other cause is required
than a cause within itself, such as the pantheist supposes.
C. Granting that the universe must have had a cause outside of itself, it
is impossible to show that this cause has not itself been caused, i. e. , consists
of an infinite series of dependent causes. The principle of causality does
not require that everything begun should be traced back to an uncaused
cause ; it demands that we should assign a cause, but not that we should
assign a first cause.
D. Granting that the cause of the universe has not itself been caused,
it is impossible to show that this cause is not finite, like the universe
itself. The causal principle requires a cause no greater than just sufficient
to account for the effect.
2. The value of the Cosmological Argument, then, is simply this, — it
proves the existence of some cause of the universe indefinitely great.
When we go beyond this and ask whether this cause is a cause of being,
or merely a cause of change, to the universe ; whether it is a cause apart
from the universe, or one with it ; whether it is an eternal cause, or a cause
dependent upon some other cause ; whether it is intelligent or unintelli
gent, infinite or finite, one or many, — this argument cannot assure us.
H. The Teleological Argument, oe Argument from Order and
Useful Collocation in Nature.
This is not properly an argument from design to a designer ; for that
design implies a designer is simply an identical proposition. It may be
more correctly stated as follows : Order and useful collocation pervading a
system respectively imply intelligence and purpose as the cause of that order
and collocation. Since order and useful coUocation pervade the universe,
there must exist an intelligence adequate to the production of this order,
and a will adequate to direct this coUocation to useful ends.
1. Further explanations.
A. The major premise expresses a primitive conviction. It is not
invahdated by the objections : ( a ) that order and useful collocation may
exist without being purposed — for we are compelled by our very mental
constitution to deny this in all cases where the order and collocation
pervade a system : ( b ) that order and useful collocation may result from the
mere operation of physical forces and laws — for these very forces and laws
imply, instead of excluding, an originating and superintending intelligence
and will.
B. The minor premise expresses a working-principle of all science,
namely, that all things have their uses, that order pervades the universe, and
that the methods of nature are rational methods. Evidences of this appear
in the correlation of the chemical elements to each other ; in the fitness of

26 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
the inanimate world to be the basis and support of life ; in the typical forms
and unity of plan apparent in the organic creation ; in the existence and
cooperation of natural laws ; in cosmical order and compensations.
This minor premise is not invahdated by the objections : (a) That we
frequently misunderstand the end actuaUy subserved by natural events and
objects ; for the principle is, not that we necessarily know the actual end,
but that we necessarily believe that there is some end, in every case of
systematic order and coUocation. (6) That the order of the universe is
manifestly imperfect; for this, if granted, would argue, not absence of
contrivance, but some special reason for imperfection, either in the limita
tions of the contriving inteUigence itself, or in the nature of the end sought
(as, for example, correspondence with the moral state and probation of
sinners). 2. Defects of the Teleological Argument. These attach not to the
premises but to the conclusion sought to be drawn therefrom.
A. The argument cannot prove a personal God. The order and useful
coUocations of the universe may be only the changing phenomena of an
impersonal inteUigence and wiU, such as pantheism supposes. The finality
may be only immanent finality.
B. Even if this argument could prove personality in the inteUigence
and wiU that originated the order of the universe, it could not prove either
the unity, the eternity, or the infinity of God ; not the unity — for the use
ful coUocations of the universe might be the result of oneness of counsel,
instead of oneness of essence, in the contriving inteUigence ; not the eter
nity — for a created demiurge might conceivably have designed the universe ;
not the infinity — since aU marks of order and coUocation within our obser
vation are simply finite.
3. The value of the Teleological Argument is simply this, — it proves
from certain useful coUocations and instances of order which have clearly
had a beginning, or in other words, from the present harmony of the uni
verse, that there exists an inteUigence and wiU adequate to its contrivance.
But whether this inteUigence and wiU is personal or impersonal, creator or
only fashioner, one or many, finite or infinite, eternal or owing its being to
another, necessary or free, this argument cannot assure us.
In it, however, we take a step forward. The causative power which we
have proved by the Cosmological Argument has now become an intelligent
and voluntary power.
HI. The Anthropological Argument, or Argument from Man's
Mental and Mobal Nature.
This is an argument from the mental and moral condition of man to
the existence of an Author, Lawgiver, and End. It is sometimes called
the Moral Argument.
The argument is a complex one, and may be divided into three parts.
1. Man's intellectual and moral nature must have had for its author an
inteUectual and moral Being. The elements of the proof are as follows : —

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 27
(a) Man, as an inteUectual and moral being, has had a beginning upon
the planet. (6) Material and unconscious forces do not afford a sufficient
cause for man's reason, conscience, and free wiU. (c) Man, as an effect,
can be referred only to a cause possessing self-consciousness and a moral
nature, in other words, personality.
2. Man's moral nature proves the existence of a holy Lawgiver and
Judge. The elements of the proof are: — (a) Conscience recognizes the
existence of a moral law which has supreme authority. ( 6 ) Known viola
tions of this moral law are foUowed by feelings of Ul-desert and fears of
judgment, (e) This moral law, since it is not self-imposed, and these
threats of judgment, since they are not self-executing, respectively argue
the existence of a holy wiU that has imposed the law, and of a punitive
power that wUl execute the threats of the moral nature.
3. Man's emotional and voluntary nature proves the existence of a
Being who can furnish in himself a satisfying object of human affection
and an end which wiU call forth man's highest activities and ensure his
highest progress.
Only a Being of power, wisdom, hohness, and goodness, and aU these
indefinitely greater than any that we know upon the earth, can meet this
demand of the human souL Such a Being must exist. Otherwise man's
greatest need would be unsupplied, and behef in a lie be more productive
of virtue than behef in the truth.
A. The defects of the Anthropological Argument are : (a) It cannot
prove a creator of the material universe. ( 6 ) It cannot prove the infinity
of God, since man from whom we argue is finite. ( c ) It cannot prove the
mercy of God. But,
B. The value of the Argument is, that it assures us of the existence of
a personal Being, who rules us in righteousness, and who is the proper
object of supreme affection and service. But whether this Being is the
original creator of aU things, or merely the author of our own existence,
whether he is infinite or finite, whether he is a Being of simple righteous
ness or also of mercy, this argument cannot assure us.
Among the arguments for the existence of God, however, we assign to
this the chief place, since it adds to the ideas of causative power (which
we derived from the Cosmological Argument) and of contriving intelli
gence (which we derived from the Teleological Argument), the far wider
ideas of personality and righteous lordship.
IV. The Ontological Abgument, or Argument from oub Abstract
and Necessary Ideas.
This argument infers the existence of God from the abstract and neces
sary ideas of the human mind. It has three forms :
1. That of Samuel Clarke. Space and time are attributes of substance
or being. But space and time are respectively infinite and eternal. There
must therefore be an infinite and eternal substance or Being to whom these
attributes belong.

28 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
GiUespie states the argument somewhat differently. Space and time are
modes of existence. But space and time are respectively infinite and eter
nal. There must therefore be an infinite and eternal Being who subsists
in these modes. But we reply :
Space and time are neither attributes of substance nor modes of exist
ence. The argument, if valid, would prove that God is not mind but matter,
for that could not be mind, but only matter, of which space and time were
either attributes or modes.
2. That of Descartes. We have the idea of an infinite and perfect
Being. This idea cannot be derived from imperfect and finite things.
There must therefore be an infinite and perfect Being who is its cause.
But we reply that this argument confounds the idea of the infinite with
an infinite idea. Man's idea of the infinite is not infinite but finite, and
from a finite effect we cannot argue an infinite cause.
3. That of Anselm. We have the idea of an absolutely perfect Being.
But existence is an attribute of perfection. An absolutely perfect Being
must therefore exist.
But we reply that this argument confounds ideal existence witfe real
existence. Our ideas are not the measure of external reality.
Although this last must be considered the most perfect form of the Onto-
logical Argument, it is evident that it conducts us only to an ideal con
clusion, not to real existence. In common with the two preceding forms
of the argument, moreover, it tacitly assumes, as already existing in the
human mind, that very knowledge of God's existence which it would derive
from logical demonstration. It has value, therefore, simply as showing
what God must be, if he exists at all.
But the existence of a Being indefinitely great, a personal Cause, Con
triver and Lawgiver, has been proved by the preceding arguments ; for the
law of parsimony requires us to apply the conclusions of the first three
arguments to one Being, and not to many. To this one Being we may
now ascribe the infinity and perfection, the idea of which lies at the basis
of the Ontological Argument — ascribe them, not because they are demon
strably his, but because our mental constitution wiU not allow us to think
otherwise. Thus clothing him with all perfections which the human mind
can conceive, and these in illimitable fullness, we have one whom we may
justly caU God.
As a logical process this is indeed defective, since aU logic as weU as all
observation depends for its validity upon the presupposed existence of
God, and since this particular process, even granting the validity of logic
in general, does not warrant the conclusion that God exists, except upon a
second assumption that our abstract ideas of infinity and perfection are to
be applied to the Being to whom argument has actuaUy conducted us.
But although both ends of the logical bridge are confessedly wanting, the
process may serve and does serve a more useful purpose than that of mere
demonstration, namely, that of awakening, explicating, and confirming a
conviction which, though the most fundamental of all, may yet have been
partially slumbering for lack of thought.

CHAPTEE III.
ERRONEOUS EXPLANATIONS, AND CONCLUSION.
Any correct explanation of the universe must postulate an intuitive
knowledge of the existence of the external world, of self, and of God.
The desire for scientific unity, however, has occasioned attempts to reduce
these three factors to one, and according as one or another of the three has
been regarded as the aU-inclusive principle, the result has been Materialism,
Materialistic Idealism, or Idealistic Pantheism. This scientific impulse is
better satisfied by a system which we may designate as Ethical Monism.
I. Materialism.
Materialism is that method of thought which gives priority to matter,
rather than to mind, in its explanations of the universe. Upon this view,
material atoms constitute the ultimate and fundamental reality of which
aU things, rational and irrational, are but combinations and phenomena.
Force is regarded as a universal and inseparable property of matter.
The element of truth in materialism is the reality of the external world.
Its error is in regarding the external world as having original and inde
pendent existence, and in regarding mind as its product.
In addition to the general error indicated above, we object to this system
as f oUows :
1. In knowing matter, the mind necessarily judges itself to be different
in kind, and higher in rank, than the matter which it knows.
2. Since the mind's attributes of (a) continuous identity, (6) self -activity,
(e) unrelatedness to space, are different in kind and higher in rank than the
attributes of matter, it is rational to conclude that mind is itself different in
kind from matter and higher in rank then matter.
3. Mind rather than matter must therefore be regarded as the original
and independent entity, unless it can be scientificaUy demonstrated that
mind is material in its origin and nature. But aU attempts to explain the
psychical from the physical, or the organic from the inorganic, are acknowl
edged faUures. The most that can be claimed is, that psychical are always
accompanied by physical changes, and that the inorganic is the basis and
support of the organic. Although the precise connection between the mind
and the body is unknown, the fact that the continuity of physical changes
is unbroken in times of psychical activity renders it certain that mind is not
transformed physical force. If the facts of sensation indicate the depen
dence of mind upon body, the facts of volition equally indicate the depen
dence of body upon mind. 29

30 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
4. The materiahstic theory, denying as it does the priority of spirit,
can furnish no sufficient cause for the highest features of the existing
universe, namely, its personal intelligences, its intuitive ideas, its free-wiU,
its moral progress, its behef s in God and immortality.
II. Materialistic Idealism.
Idealism proper is that method of thought which regards all knowledge
as conversant only with affections of the percipient mind.
Its element of truth is the fact that these affections of the percipient
mind are the conditions of our knowledge. Its error is in denying that
through these and in these we know that which exists independently of our
consciousness. The idealism of the present day is mainly a materiahstic idealism. It
defines matter and mind alike in terms of sensation, and regards both as
opposite sides or successive manifestations of one underlying and unknow
able force.
To this view we make the foUowing objections :
1. Its definition of matter as a "permanent possibility of sensation "
contradicts our intuitive judgment that, in knowing the phenomena of
matter, we have direct knowledge of substance as underlying phenomena,
as distinct from our sensations, and as external to the mind which
experiences these sensations.
2. Its definition of mind as a "series of feelings aware of itself"
contradicts our intuitive judgment that, in knowing the phenomena of
mind, we have direct knowledge of a spiritual substance of which these
phenomena are manifestations, which retains its identity independently of
our consciousness, and which, in its knowing, instead of being the passive
recipient of impressions from without, always acts from within by a power
of its own.
3. In so far as this theory regards mind as the obverse side of matter,
or as a later and higher development from matter, the mere reference of
both mind and matter to an underlying force does not save the theory from
any of the difficulties of pure materialism already mentioned ; since in
this case, equally with that, force is regarded as purely physical, and the
priority of spirit is denied.
4. In so far as this theory holds the underlying force of which matter
and mind are manifestations to be in any sense inteUigent or voluntary, it
renders necessary the assumption that there is an intelhgent and voluntary
Being who exerts this force. Sensations and ideas, moreover, are expli
cable only as manifestations of Mind.
HI. Idealistic Pantheism.
Pantheism is that method of thought which conceives of the universe as
the development of one inteUigent and voluntary, yet impersonal, sub
stance, which reaches consciousness only in man. It therefore identifies
God, not with each individual object in the universe, but with the totality
of things. The current Pantheism of our day is idealistic.

ETHICAL MONISM. 31
The elements of truth in Pantheism are the inteUigence and voluntari
ness of God, and his immanence in the universe ; its error hes in denying
God's personality and transcendence.
We object to this system as f oUows
1. Its idea of God is self-contradictory, since it makes him infinite, yet
consisting only of the finite ; absolute, yet existing in necessary relation to
the universe ; supreme, yet shut up to a process of self-evolution and
dependent for self -consciousness on man ; without self-determination, yet
the cause of all that is.
2. Its assumed unity of substance is not only without proof, but it directly
contradicts our intuitive judgments. These testify that we are not parts and
particles of God, but distinct personal subsistences.
3. It assigns no sufficient cause for that fact of the universe which is
highest in rank, and therefore most needs explanation, namely, the exist
ence of personal intelligences. A substance which is itself unconscious, and
under the law of necessity, cannot produce beings who are self-conscious
and free.
4. It therefore contradicts the affirmations of our moral and religious
natures by denying man's freedom and responsibility ; by making God to
include in himself aU evil as weU as aU good ; and by precluding all prayer,
worship, and hope of immortality.
5. Our intuitive conviction of the existence of a God of absolute per
fection compels us to conceive of God as possessed of every highest quahty
and attribute of men, and therefore, ^speciaUy, of that which constitutes
the chief dignity of the human spirit, its personality.
6. Its objection to the divine personality, that over against the Infinite
there can be in eternity past no non-ego to caU forth self -consciousness, is
refuted by considering that even man's cognition of the non-ego logically
presupposes knowledge of the ego, from which the non-ego is distinguished ;
that, in an absolute mind, self -consciousness cannot be conditioned, as in
the case of finite mind, upon contact with a not-self ; and that, if the dis
tinguishing of self from a not-self were an essential condition of divine
self -consciousness, the eternal personal distinctions in the divine nature or
the eternal states of the divine mind might furnish such a condition.
TV. Ethical Monism.
Ethical Monism is that method of thought which holds to a single sub
stance, ground, or principle of being, namely, God, but which also holds
to the ethical facts of God's transcendence as weU as his immanence, and
of God's personality as distinct from, and as guaranteeing, the personality
of man.
1. WhUe Ethical Monism embraces the one element of truth contained
in Pantheism— the truth that God is in aU thingsand that all things are in
q0(j  it regards this scientific unity as entirely consistent with the facts of
ethics— man's freedom, responsibility, sin, and guilt; in other words,
Metaphysical Monism, or the doctrine of one substance, ground, or prin-

32 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
ciple of being, is qualified by Psychological Dualism, or the doctrine that
the soul is personally distinct from matter on the one hand, and from God
on the other.
2. In contrast then with the two errors of Pantheism — the denial of
God's transcendence and the denial of God's personality — Ethical Monism
holds that the universe, instead of being one with God and conterminous
with God, is but a finite, partial and progressive manifestation of the divine
Life : Matter being God's self -limitation under the law of Necessity ;
Humanity being God's self -limitation under the law of Freedom ; Incarna
tion and Atonement being God's self-hmitations under the law of Grace.
3. The immanence of God, as the one substance, ground and principle
of being, does not destroy, but rather guarantees, the individuality and
rights of each portion of the universe, so that there is variety of rank and
endowment. In the case of moral beings, worth is determined by the
degree of their voluntary recognition and appropriation of the divine.
WhUe God is all, he is also in all ; so making the universe a graded and pro
gressive manifestation of himself, both in his love for righteousness and
his opposition to moral evil.
4. Since Christ is the Logos of God, the immanent God, God revealed
in Nature, in Humanity, in Redemption, Ethical Monism recognizes the
universe as created, upheld, and governed by the same Being who in the
course of history was manifest in human form and who made atonement
for human sin by his death on Calvary. The secret of the universe and
the key to its mysteries are to be found in the Cross.

PAET III.
THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.

CHAPTEE I.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.
I. Reasons a priori fob expecting a Revelation fbom God.
1. Needs of man's nature. Man's inteUectual and moral nature requires,
in order to preserve it from constant deterioration, and to ensure its moral
growth and progress, an authoritative and helpful revelation of rehgious
truth, of a higher and completer sort than any to which, in its present state
of sin, it can attain by the use of its unaided powers. The proof of this
proposition is partly psychological, and partly historical.
A. Psychological proof. — (a) Neither reason nor intuition throws light
upon certain questions whose solution is of the utmost importance to us ; for
example, Trinity, atonement, pardon, method of worship, personal existence
after death. (6) Even the truth to which we arrive by our natural powers
needs divine confirmation and authority when it addresses minds and wills
perverted by sin. ( c ) To break this power of sin, and to furnish encourage
ment to moral effort, we need a special revelation of the merciful and help
ful aspect of the divine nature.
B. Historical proof. — (a) The knowledge of moral and religious truth
possessed by nations and ages in which special revelation is unknown is
grossly and increasingly imperfect. (6) Man's actual condition in ante-
Christian times, and in modern heathen lands, is that of extreme moral
depravity, (e) With this depravity is found a general conviction of help
lessness, and on the part of some nobler natures, a longing after, and hope
of, aid from above.
2. Presumption of supply. What we know of God, by nature, affords
ground for hope that these wants of our inteUectual and moral being wUl be
met by a corresponding supply, in the shape of a special divine revelation.
We argue this :
(a) From our necessary conviction of God's wisdom. Having made
man a spiritual being, for spiritual ends, it may be hoped that he wUl furnish
the means needed to secure these ends. (&) From the actual, though incom
plete, revelation already given in nature. Since God has actually under
taken to make himself known to men, we may hope that he wiU finish the
3 33

34 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
work he has begun. ( c ) From the general connection of want and supply.
The higher our needs, the more intricate and ingenious are, in general, the
contrivances for meeting them. We may therefore hope that the highest
want wiU be aU the more surely met. (d) From analogies of nature and
history. Signs of reparative goodness in nature and of forbearance in provi
dential deahngs lead us to hope that, whUe justice is executed, God may
stiU make known some way of restoration for sinners.
We conclude this section upon the reasons a priori for expecting a
revelation from God with the acknowledgment that the facts warrant that
degree of expectation which we caU hope, rather than that larger degree
of expectation which we caU assurance ; and this, for the reason that, while
conscience gives proof that God is a God of holiness, we have not, from the
light of nature, equal evidence that God is a God of love. Reason teaches
man that, as a sinner, he merits condemnation ; but he cannot, from reason
alone, know that God wfll have mercy upon him and provide salvation.
His doubts can be removed only by God's own voice, assuring him of
"redemption . . . the forgiveness of . . . trespasses" (Eph. 1:7) and
revealing to him the way in which that forgiveness has been rendered possible.
H. Marks op the Revelation man may expect.
1. As to its substance. We may expect this later revelation not to con
tradict, but to confirm and enlarge, the knowledge of God which we derive
from nature, while it remedies the defects of natural religion and throws
light upon its problems.
2. As to its method. We may expect it to follow God's methods of
procedure in other communications of truth.
(a) That of continuous historical development, — that it wiU be given
in germ to early ages, and wfll be more fuUy unfolded as the race is pre
pared to receive it.
( b ) That of original delivery to a single nation, and to single persons
in that nation, that it may through them be communicated to mankind.
(c) That of preservation in written and accessible documents, handed
down from those to whom the revelation is first communicated.
3. As to its attestation. We may expect that this revelation wUl be
accompanied by evidence that its author is the same being whom we have
previously recognized as God of nature. This evidence must constitute (a)
a manifestation of God himself; (6) in the outward as weU as the inward
world ; ( c ) such as only God's power or knowledge can make ; and ( d ) such
as cannot be counterfeited by the evil, or mistaken by the candid, soul.
In short, we may expect God to attest by miracles and by prophecy, the
divine mission and authority of those to whom he communicates a revelation.
Some such outward sign would seem to be necessary, not only to assure
the original recipient that the supposed revelation is not a vagary of his
own imagination, but also to render the revelation received by a single
individual authoritative to all ( compare Judges 6 : 17, 36-40 — Gideon
asks a sign, for himself ; 1 K. 18 : 36-38— Ehjah asks a sign, for others).

MIRACLES, AS ATTESTING REVELATION. 35
But in order that our positive proof of a divine revelation may not be
embarrassed by the suspicion that the miraculous and prophetic elements
in the Scripture history create a presumption against its credibnity, it wUl
be desirable to take up at this point the general subject of miracles and
prophecy. HI. Miracles, as attesting a Divine Revelation.
1. Definition of Miracle.
A. Preliminary Definition. — A miracle is an event palpable to the
senses, produced for a rehgious purpose by the immediate agency of God ;
an event therefore which, though not contravening any law of nature, the
laws of nature, if fully known, would not without this agency of God be
competent to explain.
This definition corrects several erroneous conceptions of the miracle : —
( a ) A miracle is not a suspension or violation of natural law ; since
natural law is in operation at the time of the miracle just as much as before.
(6) A miracle is not a sudden product of natural agencies — a product
merely foreseen, by him who appears to work it ; it is the effect of a wiU
outside of nature. ( c ) A miracle is not an event without a cause ; since
it has for its cause a direct volition of God. (d) A miracle is not an
irrational or capricious act of God; but an act of wisdom, performed in
accordance with the immutable laws of his being, so that in the same cir
cumstances the same course would be again pursued. ( e ) A miracle is not
contrary to experience ; since it is not contrary to experience for a new
cause to be foUowed by a new effect. (/) A miracle is not a matter of
internal experierce, Hke regeneration or illumination ; but is an event pal
pable to the senses, which may serve as an objective proof to aU that the
worker of it is divinely commissioned as a rehgious teacher.
B. Alternative and Preferable Definition. — A miracle is an event in
nature, so extraordinary in itself and so coinciding with the prophecy or
command of a rehgious teacher or leader, as fuUy to warrant the con
viction, on the part of those who witness it, that God has wrought it with
the design of certifying that this teacher or leader has been commissioned
by him.
This definition has certain marked advantages as compared with the pre
liminary definition given above : — ( a ) It recognizes the immanence of
God and his immediate agency in nature, instead of assuming an antithesis
between the laws of nature and the wUl of God. ( 6 ) It regards the mira
cle as simply an extraordinary act of that same God who is already present
in all natural operations and who in them is revealing his general plan.
( c ) It holds that natural law, as the method of God's regular activity, in
no way precludes unique exertions of his power when these wUl best secure
his purpose in creation. ( d ) It leaves it possible that all miracles may
have their natural explanations and may hereafter be traced to natural
causes, whfle both miracles and their natural causes may be only names
for the one and self -same wiU of God. (e) It reconcUes the claims of
both science and religion : of science, by permitting any possible or prob-

36 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
able physical antecedents of the miracle ; of religion, by maintaining that
these very antecedents together with the miracle itself are to be interpreted
as signs of God's special commission to him under whose teaching or
leadership the miracle is wrought.
2. Possibility of Miracle.
An event in nature may be caused by an agent in nature yet above
nature. This is evident from the following considerations :
( a ) Lower forces and laws in nature are frequently counteracted and
transcended by the higher ( as mechanical forces and laws by chemical, and
chemical by vital), while yet the lower forces and laws are not suspended
or annihilated, but are merged in the higher, and made to assist in accom
plishing purposes to which they are altogether unequal when left to them
selves. (6) The human wUl acts upon its physical organism, and so upon nature,
and produces results which nature left to herself never could accomplish,
whne yet no law of nature is suspended or violated. Gravitation stUl ope
rates upon the axe, even while man holds it at the surface of the water —
for the axe stiU has weight (c/. 2 K. 6 : 5-7).
( e ) In all free causation, there is an acting without means. Man acts
upon external nature through his physical organism, but, in moving his
physical organism, he acts directly upon matter. In other words, the
human wUl can use means, only because it has the power of acting initially
without means.
( d ) What the human will, considered as a supernatural force, and what
the chemical and vital forces of nature itself, are demonstrably able to
accomplish, cannot be regarded as beyond the power of God, so long as
God dweUs in and controls the universe. H man's wiU can act directly
upon matter in his own physical organism, God's will can work imme
diately upon the system which he has created and which he sustains. In
other words, if there be a God, and if he be a personal being, miracles are
possible. The impossibility of miracles can be maintained only upon prin
ciples of atheism or pantheism.
( e ) This possibility of miracles becomes doubly sure to those who see
in Christ none other than the immanent God manifested to creatures. The
Logos or divine Reason who is the principle of aU growth and evolution
can make God known only by means of successive new impartations of his
energy. Since all progress implies increment, and Christ is the only
source of life, the whole history of creation is a witness to the possibility
of miracle.
3. Probability of Miracles.
A. We acknowledge that, so long as we confine our attention to nature,
there is a presumption against miracles. Experience testifies to the uni
formity of natural law. A general uniformity is needful, in order to make
possible a rational calculation of the future, and a proper ordering of life.

MIRACLES, AS ATTESTING REVELATION. 37
B. But we deny that this uniformity of nature is absolute and univer
sal. ( a ) It is not a truth of reason that can have no exceptions, hke the
axiom that a whole is greater than its parts. ( 6 ) Experience could not
warrant a behef in absolute and universal uniformity, unless experience
were identical with absolute and universal knowledge. ( c ) We know, on
the contrary, from geology, that there have been breaks in this uniformity,
such as the introduction of vegetable, animal and human life, which can
not be accounted for, except by the manifestation in nature of a super
natural power.
C. Since the inworking of the moral law into the constitution and
course of nature shows that nature exists, not for itself, but for the con
templation and use of moral beings, it is probable that the God of nature
wiU produce effects aside from those of natural law, whenever there are
sufficiently important moral ends to be served thereby.
D. The existence of moral disorder consequent upon the free acts of
man's will, therefore, changes the presumption against miracles into a pre
sumption in their favor. The non-appearance of miracles, in this case,
would be the greatest of wonders.
E. As behef in the possibility of miracles rests upon our behef in the
existence of a personal God, so behef in the probability of miracles rests
upon our behef that God is a moral and benevolent being. He who has
no God but a God of physical order wUl regard miracles as an impertinent
intrusion upon that order. But he who yields to the testimony of con
science and regards God as a God of holiness, wiU see that man's unholi-
ness renders God's miraculous interposition most necessary to man and
most becoming to God. Our view of miracles wUl therefore be determined
by our behef in a moral, or in a non-moral, God.
F. From the point of view of ethical monism the probability of miracle
becomes even greater. Since God is not merely the intellectual but the
moral Reason of the world, the disturbances of the world-order which are
due to sin are the matters which most deeply affect him. Christ, the life of
the whole system and of humanity as weU, must suffer ; and, since we have
evidence that he is merciful as weU as just, it is probable that he wUl rec
tify the evU by extraordinary means, when merely ordinary means do not
avail. 4. The amount of testimony necessary to prove a miracle is no
greater than that which is requisite to prove the occurrence of any other
unusual but confessedly possible event.
Hume, indeed, argued that a miracle is so contradictory of all human
experience that it is more reasonable to believe any amount of testimony
false than to beheve a miracle to be true.
The argument is fallacious, because
( a ) It is chargeable with a petitio prineipii, in making our own per
sonal experience the measure of aU human experience. The same principle
would make the proof of any absolutely new fact impossible. Even though
God should work a miracle, he could never prove it.

38 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
( 6 ) It involves a self-contradiction, since it seeks to overthrow our faith
in human testimony by adducing to the contrary the general experience of
men, of which we know only from testimony. This general experience,
moreover, is merely negative, and cannot neutralize that which is positive,
except upon principles which would invalidate aU testimony whatever.
( c ) It requires belief in a greater wonder than those which it would
escape. That multitudes of inteUigent and honest men should against aU
their interests unite in dehberate and persistent falsehood, under the cir
cumstances narrated in the New Testament record, involves a change in the
sequences of nature far more incredible than the miracles of Christ and his
apostles. 5. Evidential force of Miracles.
(a) Miracles are the natural accompaniments and attestations of new
communications from God. The great epochs of miracles — represented by
Moses, the prophets, the first and second comings of Christ — are coinci
dent with the great epochs of revelation. Miracles serve to draw attention
to new truth, and cease when this truth has gained currency and foothold.
( 6 ) Miracles generally certify to the truth of doctrine, not directly, but
indirectly ; otherwise a new miracle must needs accompany each new
doctrine taught. Miracles primarily and directly certify to the divine com
mission and authority of a religious teacher, and therefore warrant accept
ance of his doctrines and obedience to his commands as the doctrines and
commands of God, whether these be communicated at intervals or all
together, oraUy or in written documents.
(c) Miracles, therefore, do not stand alone as evidences. Power alone
cannot prove a divine commission. Purity of hfe and doctrine must go
with the miracles to assure us that a rehgious teacher has come from God.
The miracles and the doctrine in this manner mutually support each other,
and form parts of one whole. The internal evidence for the Christian
system may have greater power over certain minds and over certain ages
than the external evidence.
( d ) Yet the Christian miracles do not lose their value as evidence in the
process of ages. The loftier the structure of Christian hfe and doctrine the
greater need that its foundation be secure. The authority of Christ as a
teacher of supernatural truth rests upon his miracles, and especially upon
the miracle of his resurrection. That one miracle to which the church
looks back as the source of her hfe carries with it irresistibly aU the other
miracles of the Scripture record ; upon it alone we may safely rest the
proof that the Scriptures are an authoritative revelation from God.
(e) The resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ — by which we mean
his coming forth from the sepulchre in body as weU as in spirit — is demon
strated by evidence as varied and as conclusive as that which proves to us
any single fact of ancient history. Without it Christianity itself is inexpli
cable, as is shown by the faUure of aU modern rationalistic theories to
account for its rise and progress.

PROPHECY, AS ATTESTING REVELATION. 39
6. Counterfeit Miracles.
Since only an act directly wrought by God can properly be caUed a
miracle, it follows that surprising events brought about by evU spirits or
by men, through the use of natural agencies beyond our knowledge, are
not entitled to this appeUation. The Scriptures recognize the existence of
such, but denominate them "lying wonders" (2 Thess. 2:9).
These counterfeit miracles in various ages argue that the belief in miracles
is natural to the race, and that somewhere there must exist the true. They
serve to show that not all supernatural occurrences are divine, and to impress
upon us the necessity of careful examination before we accept them as
divine. False miracles may commonly be distinguished from the true by ( a ) their
accompaniments of immoral conduct or of doctrine contradictory to truth
already revealed — as in modern spiritualism ; ( b ) their internal character
istics of inanity and extravagance — as in the hquef action of the blood of
St. Januarius, or the miracles of the Apocryphal New Testament ; ( e ) the
insufficiency of the object which they are designed to further — as in the
case of ApoUonius of Tyana, or of the miracles said to accompany the pub
lication of the doctrines of the immaculate conception and of the papal
infallibility; (d) their lack of substantiating evidence — as in mediaeval
miracles, so seldom attested by contemporary and disinterested witnesses ;
(e) their denial or undervaluing of God's previous revelation of himself in
nature — as shown by the neglect of ordinary means, in the cases of Faith-
cure and of so-caUed Christian Science.
IV. Prophecy as Attesting a Divine Revelation.
We here consider prophecy in its narrow sense of mere prediction,
reserving to a subsequent chapter the consideration of prophecy as inter
pretation of the divine wiU in general.
1. Definition. Prophecy is the foretelling of future events by virtue of
direct communication from God — a foreteUing, therefore, which, though
not contravening any laws of the human mind, those laws, if fully known,
would not, without this agency of God, be sufficient to explain.
2. Relation of Prophecy to Miracles. Miracles are attestations of
revelation proceeding from divine power ; prophecy is an attestation of rev
elation proceeding from divine knowledge. Only God can know the con
tingencies of the future. The possibility and probability of prophecy may
be argued upon the same grounds upon which we argue the possibility and
probability of miracles. As an evidence of divine revelation, however,
prophecy possesses two advantages over miracles, namely : ( a ) The proof,
in the case of prophecy, is not derived from ancient testimony, but is under
our eyes. ( b ) The evidence of miracles cannot become stronger, whereas
every new fulfilment adds to the argument from prophecy.
3. Requirements in Prophecy, considered as an Evidence of Revela
tion. ( a ) The utterance must be distant from the event. ( b ) Nothing
must exist to suggest the event to merely natural prescience, (e) The

40 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
utterance must be free from ambiguity. ( d ) Yet it must not be so pre
cise as to secure its own fulfilment. ( e ) It must be foUowed in due time
by the event predicted.
4. General Features of Prophecy in the Scriptures, (a) Its large
amount — occupying a great portion of the Bible, and extending over many
hundred years. ( 6 ) Its ethical and rehgious nature — the events of the
future being regarded as outgrowths and results of men's present attitude
toward God. (c) Its unity in diversity — finding its central point in
Christ the true servant of God and dehverer of his people. ( d) Its actual
fulfilment as regards many of its predictions — while seeming non-fulfil
ments are explicable from its figurative and conditional nature.
5. Messianic Prophecy in general. ( a ) Direct predictions of events
— as in Old Testament prophecies of Christ's birth, suffering and subse
quent glory. ( 6 ) General prophecy of the Kingdom in the Old Testa
ment, and of its gradual triumph. ( e ) Historical types in a nation and
in individuals — as Jonah and David, (d) Prefigurations of the future
in rites and ordinances — as in sacrifice, circumcision, and the passover.
6. Special Prophecies uttered by Christ, (a) As to his own death
and resurrection. ( b ) As to events occurring between his death and the
destruction of Jerusalem ( multitudes of impostors ; wars and rumors of
wars; famine and pestilence), (e) As to the destruction of Jerusalem
and the Jewish pohty (Jerusalem compassed with armies; abomination of
desolation in the holy place ; flight of Christians ; misery ; massacre ; dis
persion), (d) As to the world-wide diffusion of his gospel (the Bible
already the most widely circulated book in the world ).
7. On the double sense of Prophecy.
( a ) Certain prophecies apparently contain a fulness of meaning which
is not exhausted by the event to which they most obviously and literahy
refer. A prophecy which had a partial fulfilment at a time not remote
from its utterance, may find its chief fulfilment in an event far distant.
Since the principles of God's administration find ever recurring and ever
enlarging illustration in history, prophecies which have already had a
partial fulfilment may have whole cycles of fulfilment yet before them.
( 6 ) The prophet was not always aware of the meaning of his own proph
ecies ( 1 Pet. 1:11). It is enough to constitute his prophecies a proof of
divine revelation, if it can be shown that the correspondences between
them and the actual events are such as to indicate divine wisdom and pur
pose in the giving of them — in other words, it is enough if the inspiring
Spirit knew their meaning, even though the inspired prophet did not.
8. Purpose of Prophecy — so far as it is yet unfulfilled, (a) Not to
enable us to map out the detaUs of the future ; but rather ( b ) To give gen
eral assurance of God's power and foreseeing wisdom, and of the certainty
of his triumph ; and ( c ) To furnish, after fulfilment, the proof that God
saw the end from the beginning.

PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE. 41
9. Evidential force of Prophecy — so far as it is fulfilled. Prophecy,
like miracles, does not stand alone as evidence of the divine commission of
the Scripture writers and teachers. It is simply a corroborative attesta
tion, which unites with miracles to prove that a rehgious teacher has come
from God and speaks with divine authority. We cannot, however, dispense
with this portion of the evidences, — for unless the death and resurrection
of Christ are events foreknown and foretold by himself, as well as by the
ancient prophets, we lose one main proof of his authority as a teacher sent
from God.
Having thus removed the presumption originaUy existing against mir
acles and prophecy, we may now consider the ordinary laws of evidence
and determine the rules to be foUowed in estimating the weight of the
Scripture testimony.
V. Principles of Histoeical Evidence applicable to the Peoop of
a Divine Revelation ( mainly derived from Greenleaf, Testimony of the
Evangelists, and from Starkie on Evidence).
1. As to documentary evidence.
(a) Documents apparently ancient, not bearing upon their face the
marks of forgery, and found in proper custody, are presumed to be genuine
until sufficient evidence is brought to the contrary. The New Testament
documents, since they are found in the custody of the church, their natural
and legitimate depository, must by this rule be presumed to be genuine.
( o) Copies of ancient documents, made by those most interested in their
faithfulness, are presumed to correspond with the originals, even although
those originals no longer exist. Since it was the church's interest to have
faithful copies, the burden of proof rests upon the objector to the Christian
documents. ( c ) In determining matters of fact, after the lapse of considerable time,
documentary evidence is to be aUowed greater weight than oral testimony.
Neither memory nor tradition can long be trusted to give absolutely correct
accounts of particular facts. The New Testament documents, therefore,
are of greater weight in evidence than tradition would be, even if only
thirty years had elapsed since the death of the actors in the scenes they
relate. 2. As to testimony in general.
( a ) In questions as to matters of fact, the proper inquiry is not whether
it is possible that the testimony may be false, but whether there is sufficient
probability that it is true. It is unfair, therefore, to aUow our examination
of the Scripture witnesses to be prejudiced by suspicion, merely because
their story is a sacred one.
( & ) A proposition of fact is proved when its truth is established by com
petent and satisfactory evidence. By competent evidence is meant such
evidence as the nature of the thing to be proved admits. By satisfactory
evidence is meant that amount of proof which ordinarily satisfies an

42 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
unprejudiced mind beyond a reasonable doubt. Scripture facts are there
fore proved when they are established by that kind and degree of evidence
which would in the affairs of ordinary life satisfy the mind and conscience
of a common man. When we have this kind and degree of evidence it is
unreasonable to require more.
(c) In the absence of circumstances which generate suspicion, every
witness is to be presumed credible, until the contrary is shown ; the burden
of impeaching his testimony lying upon the objector. The principle which
leads men to give true witness to facts is stronger than that which leads
them to give false witness. It is therefore unjust to compel the Christian
to establish the credibility of his witnesses before proceeding to adduce
their testimony, and it is equaUy unjust to aUow the uncorroborated testi
mony of a profane writer to outweigh that of a Christian writer. Christian
witnesses should not be considered interested, and therefore untrustworthy ;
for they became Christians against their worldly interests, and because they
could not resist the force of testimony. Varying accounts among them
should be estimated as we estimate the varying accounts of profane writers.
(<#) A slight amount of positive testimony, so long as it is uncontradicted,
outweighs a very great amount of testimony that is merely negative. The
sUence of a second witness, or his testimony that he did not see a certain
aUeged occurrence, cannot counterbalance the positive testimony of a first
witness that he did see it. We should therefore estimate the silence of pro
fane writers with regard to facts narrated in Scripture precisely as we should
estimate it if the facts about which they are sUent were narrated by other
profane writers, instead of being narrated by the writers of Scripture.
( e ) " The credit due to the testimony of witnesses depends upon : first,
their ability ; secondly, their honesty ; thirdly, their number and the con
sistency of their testimony; fourthly, the conformity of their testimony with
experience ; and fifthly, the coincidence of their testimony with coUateral
circumstances. " We confidently submit the New Testament witnesses to
each and all of these tests.

CHAPTEE II.
POSITIVE PROOFS THAT THE SCRIPTURES ARE A DIVINE
REVELATION.
I. The Genuineness op the Christian Documents, or proof that the
books of the Old and New Testaments were written at the age to which they
are assigned and by the men or class of men to whom they are ascribed.
1. Genuineness of the Books of the New Testament.
We do not need to adduce proof of the existence of the books of the New
Testament as far back as the third century, for we possess manuscripts of
them which are at least fourteen hundred years old, and, since the third
century, references to them have been inwoven into all history and litera
ture. We begin our proof, therefore, by showing that these documents not
only existed, but were generaUy accepted as genuine, before the close of
the second century.
A. AU the books of the New Testament, with the single exception of
2 Peter, were not only received as genuine, but were used in more or less
coUected form, in the latter half of the second century. These coUections
of writings, so slowly transcribed and distributed, imply the long continued
previous existence of the separate books, and forbid us to fix their origin
later than the first half of the second century.
(a) Tertullian (160-230) appeals to the ' New Testament ' as made up of
the ' Gospels ' and 'Apostles. ' He vouches for the genuineness of the four
gospels, the Acts, 1 Peter, 1 John, thirteen epistles of Paul, and the Apoca
lypse ; in short, to twenty-one of the twenty-seven books of our Canon.
( b ) The Muratorian Canon in the West and the Peshito Version in the
East (having a common date of about 160) in their catalogues of the New
Testament writings mutuaUy complement each other's slight deficiencies,
and together witness to the fact that at that time every book of our present
New Testament, with the exception of 2 Peter, was received as genuine.
( c ) The Canon of Marcion (140), though rejecting aU the gospels but
that of Luke, and aU the epistles but ten of Paul's, shows, nevertheless,
that at that early day "apostolic writings were regarded as a complete
original rule of doctrine." Even Marcion, moreover, does not deny the
genuineness of those writings which for doctrinal reasons he rejects.
B. The Christian and Apostolic Fathers who lived in the first half of
the second century not only quote from these books andaUude to them,
but testify that they were written by the apostles themselves. We are
therefore compeUed to refer their origin still further back, namely, to the
first century, when the apostles lived. 43

44 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
( a ) Irenseus ( 120-200) mentions and quotes the four gospels by name,
and among them the gospel according to John : ' ' Afterwards John, the
disciple of the Lord, who also leaned upon his breast, he likewise published
a gospel, whUe he dwelt in Ephesus in Asia. " And Irenaeus was the dis
ciple and friend of Polycarp ( 80-166 ), who was himself a personal acquain
tance of the Apostle John. The testimony of Irenseus is virtuaUy the
evidence of Polycarp, the contemporary and friend of the Apostle, that each
of the gospels was written by the person whose name it bears.
(6) Justin Martyr (died 148) speaks of 'memoirs (awofivij/ioveii/iaTa) of
Jesus Christ,' and his quotations, though sometimes made from memory,
are evidently cited from our gospels.
(c) Papias ( 80-164 ), whom Irenseus calls a 'hearer of John,' testifies
that Matthew " wrote in the Hebrew dialect the sacred oracles (ra Myia),"
and that " Mark, the interpreter of Peter, wrote after Peter, (yarepov ILiTpy )
[ or under Peter's direction ], an unsystematic account ( oi rd^ei ) " of the
same events and discourses.
( d ) The Apostolic Fathers, — Clement of Rome ( died 101 ), Ignatius of
Antioch (martyred 115), and Polycarp (80-166), — companions and friends
of the apostles, have left us in their writings over one hundred quotations
from or aUusions to the New Testament writings, and among these every
book, except four minor epistles (2 Peter, Jude, 2 and 3 John) is repre
sented. ( e ) In the synoptic gospels, the omission of aU mention of the fulfil
ment of Christ's prophecies with regard to the destruction of Jerusalem is
evidence that these gospels were written before the occurrence of that
event. In the Acts of the Apostles, universaUy attributed to Luke, we have
an allusion to 'the former treatise', or the gospel by the same author, which
must, therefore, have been written before the end of Paul's first imprison
ment at Rome, and probably with the help and sanction of that apostle.
C. It is to be presumed that this acceptance of the New Testament doc
uments as genuine, on the part of the Fathers of the churches, was for
good and sufficient reasons, both internal and external, and this presump
tion is corroborated by the foUowing considerations :
( a ) There is evidence that the early churches took every care to assure
themselves of the genuineness of these writings before they accepted them.
(6 ) The style of the New Testament writings, and their complete cor
respondence with all we know of the lands and times in which they profess
to have been written, affords convincing proof that they belong to the
apostolic age.
( c ) The genuineness of the fourth gospel is confirmed by the fact that
Tatian ( 155-170 ), the Assyrian, a disciple of Justin, repeatedly quoted it
without naming the author, and composed a Harmony of our four gospels
which he named the Diatessaron ; whUe BasUides (130) and Valentinus
( 150 ), the Gnostics, both quote from it.

THE GENUINENESS OF THE SCRIPTURE DOCUMENTS. 45
(d) The epistle to the Hebrews appears to have been accepted during
the first century after it was written ( so Clement of Rome, Justin Martyr,
and the Peshito Version witness). Then for two centuries, especiaUy in
the Roman and North African churches, and probably because its internal
characteristics were inconsistent with the tradition of a Pauline authorship,
its genuineness was doubted (so Tertullian, Cyprian, Irenseus, Muratorian
Canon). At the end of the fourth century, Jerome examined the evidence
and decided in its favor; Augustine did the same; the third Council of
Carthage formaUy recognized it (397) ; from that time the Latin churches
united with the East in receiving it, and thus the doubt was finally and
forever removed.
( e ) As to 2 Peter, Jude, and 2 and 3 John, the epistles most frequently
held to be spurious, we may say that, although we have no conclusive
external evidence earlier than A. D. 160, and in the case of 2 Peter none
earlier than A. D. 230-250, we may fairly urge in favor of their genuine
ness not only their internal characteristics of hterary style and moral value,
but also the general acceptance of them aU since the third century as the
actual productions of the men or class of men whose names they bear.
(/) Upon no other hypothesis than that of their genuineness can the
general acceptance of these four minor epistles since the third century, and
of all the other books of the New Testament since the middle of the second
century, be satisfactorily accounted for. If they had been mere coUections
of floating legends, they could not have secured wide circulation as sacred
books for which Christians must answer with their blood. If they had been
forgeries, the churches at large could neither have been deceived as to
their previous non-existence, nor have been induced unanimously to pre
tend that they were ancient and genuine. Inasmuch, however, as other
accounts of their origin, inconsistent with their genuineness, are now cur
rent, we proceed to examine more at length the most important of these
opposing views.
D. Rationalistic Theories as to the origin of the gospels. These are
attempts to eliminate the miraculous element from the New Testament
records, and to reconstruct the sacred history upon principles of naturalism.
Against them we urge the general objection that they are unscientific in
their principle and method. To set out in an examination of the New Tes
tament documents with the assumption that aU history is a mere natural
development, and that miracles are therefore impossible, is to make history
a matter, not of testimony, but of a priori speculation. It indeed renders
any history of Christ and his apostles impossible, since the witnesses whose
testimony with regard to miracles is discredited can no longer be con
sidered worthy of credence in their account of Christ's life or doctrine.
1st. The Myth-theory of Strauss ( 1808-1874).
According to this view, the gospels are crystallizations into story of Mes
sianic ideas which had for several generations filled the minds of imagina
tive men in Palestine. The myth is a narrative in which such ideas are
unconsciously clothed, and from which the element of intentional and
deliberate deception is absent.

46 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
We object to the Myth-theory of Strauss, that
(a) The time between the death of Christ and the pubhcation of the
gospels was far too short for the growth and consohdation of such mythi
cal histories. Myths, on the contrary, as the Indian, Greek, Roman and
Scandinavian instances bear witness, are the slow growth of centuries.
( b ) The first century was not a century when such formation of myths
was possible. Instead of being a credulous and imaginative age, it was an
age of historical inquiry and of Sadduceeism in matters of religion.
( c ) The gospels cannot be a mythical outgrowth of Jewish ideas and
expectations, because, in their main features, they run directly counter to
these ideas and expectations. The sullen and exclusive nationahsm of the
Jews could not have given rise to a gospel for all nations, nor could their
expectations of a temporal monarch have led to the story of a suffering
Messiah. ( d ) The behef and propagation of such myths are inconsistent with
what we know of the sober characters and self-sacrificing lives of the
apostles. (e) The mythical theory cannot account for the acceptance of the
gospels among the GentUes, who had none of the Jewish ideas and expec
tations. (/) It cannot explain Christianity itself, with its behef in Christ's cruci
fixion and resurrection, and the ordinances which commemorate these facts.
2nd. The Tendency-theory of Baur (1792-1860).
This maintains that the gospels originated in the middle of the second
century, and were written under assumed names as a means of reconciling
opposing Jewish and GentUe tendencies in the church. "These great
national tendencies find their satisfaction, not in events corresponding to
them, but in the elaboration of conscious fictions."
We object to the Tendency-theory of Baur, that
( a ) The destructive criticism to which it subjects the gospels, if apphed
to secular documents, would deprive us of any certain knowledge of the
past, and render aU history impossible.
(6) The antagonistic doctrinal tendencies which it professes to find in
the several gospels are more satisfactorily explained as varied but consistent
aspects of the one system of truth held by aU the apostles.
( c ) It is incredible that productions of such literary power and lofty
rehgious teaching as the gospels should have sprung up in the middle of
the second century, or that, so springing up, they should have been pub
lished under assumed names and for covert ends.
( d ) The theory requires us to believe in a moral anomaly, namely, that
a faithful disciple of Christ in the second century could be guilty of fabri
cating a life of his master, and of claiming authority for it on the ground
that the author had been a companion of Christ or his apostles.

THE GENUINENESS OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCUMENTS. 47
( e ) This theory cannot account for the universal acceptance of the gos
pels at the end of the second century, among widely separated communi
ties where reverence for writings of the apostles was a mark of orthodoxy,
and where the Gnostic heresies would have made new documents instantly
liable to suspicion and searching examination.
(/) The acknowledgment by Baur that the epistles to the Romans, Gala
tians and Corinthians were written by Paul in the first century is fatal to
his theory, since these epistles testify not only to miracles at the period
at which they were written, but to the main events of Jesus' life and to the
miracle of his resurrection, as facts already long acknowledged in the
Christian church.
3d. The Romance- theory of Renan ( 1823-1892 ).
This theory admits a basis of truth in the gospels and holds that they
all belong to the century foUowing Jesus' death. "According to" Mat
thew, Mark, etc., however, means only that Matthew, Mark, etc., wrote
these gospels in substance. Renan claims that the facts of Jesus' life were
so sublimated by enthusiasm, and so overlaid with pious fraud, that the gos
pels in their present form cannot be accepted as genuine, — in short, the
gospels are to be regarded as historical romances which have only a foun
dation in fact.
To this Romance-theory of Renan, we object that
( a ) It involves an arbitrary and partial treatment of the Christian doc
uments. The claim that one writer not only borrowed from others, but
interpolated ad libitum, is contradicted by the essential agreement of the
manuscripts as quoted by the Fathers, and as now extant.
( b ) It attributes to Christ and to the apostles an alternate fervor of
romantic enthusiasm and a false pretense of miraculous power which are
utterly irreconcilable with the manifest sobriety and holiness of their lives
and teachings. If Jesus did not work miracles, he was an impostor.
( e ) It f aUs to account for the power and progress of the gospel, as a
system directly opposed to men's natural tastes and prepossessions — a
system which substitutes truth for romance and law for impulse.
4th. The Development-theory of Harnack ( born 1851).
This holds Christianity to be a historical development from germs which
were devoid of both dogma and miracle. Jesus was a teacher of ethics,
and the original gospel is most clearly represented by the Sermon on the
Mount. Greek influence, and especiaUy that of the Alexandrian philoso
phy, added to this gospel a theological and supernatural element, and so
changed Christianity from a life into a doctrine.
We object to the Development-theory of Harnack, that
( a ) The Sermon on the Mount is not the sum of the gospel, nor its
original form. Mark is the most original of the gospels, yet Mark omits
the Sermon on the Mount, and Mark is preeminently the gospel of the
miracle- worker.

48 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
( 6 ) AU four gospels lay the emphasis, not on Jesus' life and ethical
teaching, but on his death and resurrection. Matthew implies Christ's
deity when it asserts his absolute knowledge of the Father (11 : 27), his
universal judgeship (25 : 32), his supreme authority (28 : 18), and his
omnipresence (28 : 20), whUe the phrase "Son of man" implies that he is
also "Son of God."
( c ) The preexistence and atonement of Christ cannot be regarded as
accretions upon the original gospel, since these find expression in Paul
who wrote before any of our evangehsts, and in his epistles anticipated the
Logos-doctrine of John.
( d) We may grant that Greek influence, through the Alexandrian phi
losophy, helped the New Testament writers to discern what was already
present in the hfe and work and teaching of Jesus ; but, hke the microscope
which discovers but does not create, it added nothing to the substance of
the faith.
(e) Though Mark says nothing of the virgin-birth because bis story is
limited to what the apostles had witnessed of Jesus' deeds, Matthew appar
ently gives us Joseph's story and Luke gives Mary's story — both stories
naturaUy published only after Jesus' resurrection.
(/) The larger understanding of doctrine after Jesus' death was itself
predicted by our Lord (John 16 : 12). The Holy Spirit was to bring his
teachings to remembrance, and to guide into all the truth (16 : 13), and
the apostles were to continue the work of teaching which he had begun
(Acts 1 : 1).
2. Genuineness of the Books of the Old Testament.
Since nearly one half of the Old Testament is of anonymous authorship
and certain of its books may be attributed to definite historic characters
only by way of convenient classification or of literary personification, we
here mean by genuineness honesty of purpose and freedom from any
thing counterfeit or intentionaUy deceptive so far as respects the age or
the authorship of the documents.
We show the genuineness of the Old Testament books :
(a) From the witness of the New Testament, in which aU but six books
of the Old Testament are either quoted or aUuded to as genuine.
( b ) From the testimony of Jewish authorities, ancient and modern,
who declare the same books to be sacred, and only the same books, that
are now comprised in our Old Testament Scriptures.
( c ) From the testimony of the Septuagint translation, dating from the
first half of the third century, or from 280 to 180 B. C.
( d ) From indications that soon after the exile, and so early as the
times of Ezra and Nehemiah ( 500-450 B. C. ), the Pentateuch together with
the book of Joshua was not only in existence but was regarded as authori
tative. ( e ) From the testimony of the Samaritan Pentateuch, dating from the
time of Ezra and Nehemiah (500-450 B. C. ).

CREDIBILITY OF THE WRITERS OF THE SCRIPTURES. 49
(/) From the finding of "the book of the law" in the temple, in the
eighteenth year of King Josiah, or in 621 B. C.
(g) From references in the prophets Hosea (B. C. 743-737) and Amos
( 759-745 ) to a course of divine teaching and revelation extending far back
of their day.
(h) From the repeated assertions of Scripture that Moses himself wrote
a law for his people, confirmed as these are by evidence of literary and
legislative activity in other nations far antedating his time.
H. Credibility of the Weitebs of the Scriptures.
We shaU attempt to prove this only of the writers of the gospels ; for if
they are credible witnesses, the credibility of the Old Testament, to which
they bore testimony, foUows as a matter of course.
1. They are capable or competent witnesses, — that is, they possessed
actual knowledge with regard to the facts they professed to relate, (a)
They had opportunities of observation and inquiry. ( 6 ) They were men
of sobriety and discernment, and could not have been themselves deceived.
(c) Their circumstances were such as to impress deeply upon their minds
the events of which they were witnesses.
2. They are honest witnesses. This is evident when we consider that :
(a) Their testimony imperiled aU their worldly interests. (6) The moral
elevation of their writings, and their manifest reverence for truth and con
stant inculcation of it, show that they were not wilful deceivers, but good
men. (c) There are minor indications of the honesty of these writers in
the circumstantiality of their story, in the absence of any expectation that
their narratives would be questioned, in their freedom from all disposition
to screen themselves or the apostles from censure.
3. The writings of the evangelists mutually support each other. We
argue their credibility upon the ground of their number and of the con
sistency of their testimony. While there is enough of discrepancy to
show that there has been no coUusion between them, there is concurrence
enough to make the falsehood of them aU infinitely improbable. Four
points under this head deserve mention : (a) The evangelists are indepen
dent witnesses. This is sufficiently shown by the futility of the attempts to
prove that any one of them has abridged or transcribed another. ( b ) The
discrepancies between them are -none of them irreconcilable with the
truth of the recorded facts, but only present those facts in new lights or
with additional detaU. (c) That these witnesses were friends of Christ
does not lessen the value of their united testimony, since they foUowed
Christ only because they were convinced that these facts were true. ( d )
WhUe one witness to the facts of Christianity might establish its truth, the
combined evidence of four witnesses gives us a warrant for faith in the facts
of the gospel such as we possess for no other facts in ancient history what
soever. The same rule which would refuse belief in the events recorded
in the gospels "would throw doubt on any event in history."

50 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
4. The conformity of the gospel testimony with experience. We have
already shown that, granting the fact of sin and the need of an attested
revelation from God, miracles can furnish no presumption against the tes
timony of those who record such a revelation, but, as essentiaUy belonging
to such a revelation, miracles may be proved by the same kind and degree
of evidence as is required in proof of any other extraordinary facts. We
may assert, then, that in the New Testament histories there is no record
of facts contrary to experience, but only a record of facts not witnessed in
ordinary experience — of facts, therefore, in which we may beheve, if the
evidence in other respects is sufficient.
5. Coincidence of this testimony with collateral facts and circum
stances. Under this head we may refer to ( a ) the numberless correspon
dences between the narratives of the evangehsts and contemporary history;
( 6) the failure of every attempt thus far to show that the sacred history is
contradicted by any single fact derived from other trustworthy sources ;
(c) the infinite improbabUity that this minute and complete harmony
should ever have been secured in fictitious narratives.
6. Conclusion from the argument for the credibility of the writers of
the gospels. These writers having been proved to be credible witnesses,
their narratives, including the accounts of the miracles and prophecies of
Christ and his apostles, must be accepted as true. But God would not
work miracles or reveal the future to attest the claims of false teachers.
Christ and his apostles must, therefore, have been what they claimed to be,
teachers sent from God, and their doctrine must be what they claimed it
to be, a revelation from God to men.
III. The Supernatural Character op the Scripture Teaching.
1. Scripture teaching in general.
A. The Bible is the work of one mind.
( a ) In spite of its variety of authorship and the vast separation of its
writers from one another in point of time, there is a unity of subject, spirit,
and aim throughout the whole.
( b ) Not one moral or religious utterance of aU these writers has been
contradicted or superseded by the utterances of those who have come later,
but aU together constitute a consistent system.
( c ) Each of these writings, whether early or late, has represented moral
and rehgious ideas greatly in advance of the age in which it has appeared,
and these ideas still lead the world.
( d ) It is impossible to account for this unity without supposing such a
supernatural suggestion and control that the Bible, whUe in its various
parts written by human agents, is yet equaUy the work of a superhuman
inteUigence. B. This one mind that made the Bible is the same mind that made the
soul, for the Bible is divinely adapted to the soul.
( a ) It shows complete acquaintance with the souL

SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF SCRIPTURE TEACHING. 51
(6) It judges the soul — contradicting its passions, revealing its guilt,
and humbhng its pride.
(.0 ) It meets the deepest needs of the soul — by solutions of its problems,
disclosures of God's character, presentations of the way of pardon, conso
lations and promises for hfe and death.
( d ) Yet it is sUent upon many questions for which writings of merely
human origin seek first to provide solutions.
(e) There are infinite depths and inexhaustible reaches of meaning in
Scripture, which difference it from aU other books, and which compel us to
believe that its author must be divine.
2. Moral System of the New Testament.
The perfection of this system is generaUy conceded. AU will admit that
it greatly surpasses any other system known among men. Among its dis
tinguishing characteristics may be mentioned :
(a) Its comprehensiveness, — including all human duties in its code,
even the most generaUy misunderstood and neglected, whUe it permits no
vice whatsoever.
(6) Its spirituality, — accepting no merely external conformity to right
precepts, but judging aU action by the thoughts and motives from which it
springs. (c) Its simplicity, — inculcating principles rather than imposing rules;
reducing these principles to an organic system ; and connecting this system
with religion by summing up all human duty in the one command of love
to God and man.
(d) Its practicality, — exemplifying its precepts in the hfe of Jesus
Christ; and, while it declares man's depravity and inability in his own
strength to keep the law, furnishing motives to obedience, and the divine
aid of the Holy Spirit to make this obedience possible.
We may justly argue that a moral system so pure and perfect, since it
surpasses aU human powers of invention and runs counter to men's natural
tastes and passions, must have had a supernatural, and if a supernatural,
then a divine, origin.
In contrast with the Christian system of morality the defects of heathen
systems are so marked and fundamental, that they constitute a strong
corroborative evidence of the divine origin of the Scripture revelation.
3. The person and character of Christ.
A. The conception of Christ's person as presenting deity and humanity
indissolubly united, and the conception of Christ's character, with its fault
less and all-comprehending excellence, cannot be accounted for upon any
other hypothesis than that they were historical realities.
( a ) No source can be assigned from which the evangelists could have
derived such a conception. The Hindu avatars were only temporary
unions of deity with humanity. The Greeks had men half-deified, but no

52 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
unions of God and man. The monotheism of the Jews found the person
of Christ a perpetual stumbhng-block. The Essenes were in principle more
opposed to Christianity than the Rabbinists.
( b ) No mere human genius, and much less the genius of Jewish fisher
men, coiUd have originated this conception. Bad men invent only such
characters as they sympathize with. But Christ's character condemns bad
ness. Such a portrait could not have been drawn without supernatural
aid. But such aid would not have been given to fabrication. The concep
tion can be explained only by granting that Christ's person and character
were historical realities.
B. The acceptance and behef in the New Testament descriptions of
Jesus Christ cannot be accounted for except upon the ground that the
person and character described had an actual existence.
( a ) If these descriptions were false, there were witnesses still living who
had known Christ and who would have contradicted them. ( 6 ) There was
no motive to induce acceptance of such false accounts, but every motive to
the contrary. ( c ) The success of such falsehoods could be explained only
by supernatural aid, but God would never have thus aided falsehood. This
person and character, therefore, must have been not fictitious but real; and
if real, then Christ's words are true, and the system of which his person
and character are a part is a revelation from God.
4. The testimony of Christ to himself — as being a messenger from
God and as being one with God.
Only one personage in history has claimed to teach absolute truth, to be
one with God, and to attest his divine mission by works such as only God
could perform.
A. This testimony cannot be accounted for upon the hypothesis that
Jesus was an intentional deceiver : for (a) the perfectly consistent holiness
of his hfe ; ( 6 ) the unwavering confidence with which he challenged
investigation of his claims and staked aU upon the result ; (c) the vast
improbability of a lifelong lie in the avowed interests of truth; and (d)
the impossibility that deception should have wrought such blessing to the
world, — aU show that Jesus was no conscious impostor.
B. Nor can Jesus' testimony to himself be explained upon the hypoth
esis that he was self -deceived : for this would argue (a) a weakness and
foUy amounting to positive insanity. But his whole character and hfe
exhibit a calmness, dignity, equipoise, insight, self-mastery, utterly incon
sistent with such a theory. Or it would argue ( b ) a self -ignorance and self-
exaggeration which could spring only from the deepest moral perversion.
But the absolute purity of his conscience, the hunhlity of his spirit, the
self-denying beneficence of his life, show this hypothesis to be incredible.
If Jesus, then, cannot be charged with either mental or moral unsound
ness, his testimony must be true, and he himself must be one with God and
the revealer of God to men.

HISTORICAL RESULTS OF SCRIPTURE TEACHING. 53
IV. The Historical Results of the Propagation of Scripture
Doctrine.
1. The rapid progress of the gospel in the first centuries of our era
shows its divine origin.
A. That Paganism should have been in three centuries supplanted by
Christianity, is an acknowledged wonder of history.
B. The wonder is the greater when we consider the obstacles to the
progress of Christianity :
( a ) The scepticism of the cultivated classes ; ( b ) the prejudice and
hatred of the common people ; and ( c ) the persecutions set on foot by
government. C. The wonder becomes yet greater when we consider the natural insuffi
ciency of the means used to secure this progress.
(a) The proclaimers of the gospel were in general unlearned men, belong
ing to a despised nation. ( b ) The gospel which they proclaimed was a
gospel of salvation through faith in a Jew who had been put to an ignomi
nious death. ( c ) This gospel was one which excited natural repugnance,
by humbling men's pride, striking at the root of their sins, and demanding
a hfe of labor and self-sacrifice. ( d ) The gospel, moreover, was an exclu
sive one, suffering no rival and declaring itself to be the universal and only
religion. The progress of a religion so unprepossessing and uncompromising to
outward acceptance and dominion, within the space of three hundred years,
cannot be explained without supposing that divine power attended its pro
mulgation, and therefore that the gospel is a revelation from God.
2. The beneficent influence of the Scripture doctrines and precepts,
wherever they have had sway, shows their divine origin. Notice :
A. Their influence on civilization in general, securing a recognition of
principles which heathenism ignored, such as Garbetfc mentions: (a) the
importance of the individual ; ( 6 ) the law of mutual love ; ( c ) the sacred-
ness of human life ; ( d) the doctrine of internal holiness ; ( e ) the sanctity
of home ; (/) monogamy, and the rehgious equality of the sexes ; (g ) iden
tification of behef and practice.
The continued corruption of heathen lands shows that this change is not
due to any laws of merely natural progress. The confessions of ancient
writers show that it is not due to philosophy. Its only explanation is that
the gospel is the power of God.
B. Their influence upon individual character and happiness, wherever
they have been tested in practice. This influence is seen ( a ) in the moral
transformations they have wrought — as in the case of Paul the apostle, and
of persons in every Christian community ; ( 6 ) in the self-denying labors
for human welfare to which they have led — as in the case of WUberf orce and
Judson ; ( c ) in the hopes they have inspired in times of sorrow and death.
These beneficent fruits cannot have their source in merely natural causes,
apart from the truth and divinity of the Scriptures ; for in that case the

54 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
contrary behefs would be accompanied by the same blessings. But since
we find these blessings only in connection with Christian teaching, we may
justly consider this as their cause. This teaching, then, must be true, and
the Scriptures must be a divine revelation. Else God has made a he to be
the greatest blessing to the race.

CHAPTEE 111.
INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.
I. Definition of Inspiration.
Inspiration is that influence of the Spirit of God upon the minds of the
Scripture writers which made their writings the record of a progressive
divine revelation, sufficient, when taken together and interpreted by the
same Spirit who inspired them, to lead every honest inquirer to Christ and
to salvation.
( a ) Inspiration is therefore to be defined, not by its method, but by its
result. It is a general term including aU those kinds and degrees of the
Holy Spirit's influence which were brought to bear upon the minds of the
Scripture writers, in order to secure the putting into permanent and written
form of the truth best adapted to man's moral and religious needs.
( 6 ) Inspiration may often include revelation, or the direct communi
cation from God of truth to which man could not attain by his unaided
powers. It may include iUumination, or the quickening of man's cogni
tive powers to understand truth already revealed. Inspiration, however,
does not necessarUy and always include either revelation or Ulumination.
It is simply the divine influence which secures a transmission of needed
truth to the future, and, according to the nature of the truth to be trans
mitted, it may be only an inspiration of superintendence, or it may be also
and at the same time an inspiration of Ulumination or revelation.
( c ) It is not denied, but affirmed, that inspiration may quahfy for oral
utterance of truth, or for wise leadership and daring deeds. Men may be
inspired to render external service to God's kingdom, as in the cases of
Bezalel and Samson ; even though this service is rendered unwillingly or
unconsciously, as in the cases of Balaam and Cyrus. All human inteUi
gence, indeed, is due to the inbreathing of that same Spirit who created
man at the beginning. We are now concerned with inspiration, however,
only as it pertains to the authorship of Scripture.
H. Proof of Inspiration.
1. Since we have shown that God has made a revelation of himself to
man, we may reasonably presume that he wUl not trust this revelation
whoUy to human tradition and misrepresentation, but wUl also provide a
record of it essentially trustworthy and sufficient ; in other words, that the
same Spirit who originaUy communicated the truth will preside over its
publication, so far as is needed to accomphsh its rehgious purpose.
2. Jesus, who has been proved to be not only a credible witness, but a
messenger from God, vouches for the inspiration of the Old Testament, by
55

56 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
quoting it with the formula: "It is written" ; by declaring that "one jot
or one tittle" of it "shall in no wise pass away," and that "the Scripture
cannot be broken. "
3. Jesus commissioned his apostles as teachers and gave them promises
of a supernatural aid of the Holy Spirit in their teaching, like the promises
made to the Old Testament prophets.
4. The apostles claim to have received this promised Spirit, and under
his influence to speak with divine authority, putting their writings upon a
level with the Old Testament Scriptures. We have not only direct state
ments that both the matter and the form of their teaching were supervised
by the Holy Spirit, but we have indirect evidence that this was the case in
the tone of authority which pervades their addresses and epistles.
5. The apostohc writers of the New Testament, unlike professedly
inspired heathen sages and poets, gave attestation by miracles or prophecy
that they were inspired by God, and there is reason to believe that the
productions of those who were not apostles, such as Mark, Luke, Hebrews,
James, and Jude, were recommended to the churches as inspired, by apos
tolic sanction and authority.
6. The chief proof of inspiration, however, must always be found in the
internal characteristics of the Scriptures themselves, as these are disclosed
to the sincere inquirer by the Holy Spirit. The testimony of the Holy
Spirit combines with the teaching of the Bible to convince the earnest
reader that this teaching is as a whole and in all essentials beyond the power
of man to communicate, and that it must therefore have been put into per
manent and written form by special inspiration of God.
HI. Theories of Inspiration.
1. The Intuition-theory.
This holds that inspiration is but a higher development of that natural
insight into truth which all men possess to some degree; a mode of intelli
gence in matters of morals and religion which gives rise to sacred books, as
a corresponding mode of intelligence in matters of secular truth gives rise
to great works of philosophy or art. This mode of inteUigence is regarded
as the product of man's own powers, either without special divine influence
or with only the inworking of an impersonal God.
With regard to this theory we remark :
( a ) Man has, indeed, a certain natural insight into truth, and we grant
that inspiration uses this, so far as it will go, and makes it an instrument in
discovering and recording facts of nature or history.
( 6 ) In all matters of morals and religion, however, man's insight into
truth is vitiated by wrong affections, and, unless a supernatural wisdom can
guide him, he is certain to err himself, and to lead others into error.
( c ) The theory in question, holding as it does that natural insight is
the only source of rehgious truth, involves a self-contradiction; — if the
theory be true, then one man is inspired to utter what a second is inspired

THEORIES OF INSPIRATION. 57
to pronounce false. The Vedas, the Koran and the Bible cannot be inspired
to contradict each other.
( d ) It makes moral and rehgious truth to be a purely subjective thing
— a matter of private opinion — having no objeotive reality independently
of men's opinions regarding it.
( e ) It logically involves the denial of a personal God who is truth and
reveals truth, and so makes man to be the highest inteUigence in the uni
verse. This is to explain inspiration by denying its existence ; since, if
there be no personal God, inspiration is but a figure of speech for a
purely natural fact.
2. The Illumination Theory.
This regards inspiration as merely an intensifying and elevating of the
rehgious perceptions of the Christian, the same in kind, though greater in
degree, with the Ulumination of every behever by the Holy Spirit. It
holds, not that the Bible is, but that it contains, the word of God, and that
not the writings, but only the writers, were inspired. The Ulumination
given by the Holy Spirit, however, puts the inspired writer only in full
possession of his normal powers, but does not communicate objective truth
beyond,his ability to discover or understand.
With regard to this theory we remark :
( a ) There is unquestionably an Ulumination of the mind of every behever
by the Holy Spirit, and we grant that there may have been instances in
which the influence of the Spirit, in inspiration, amounted only to
Ulumination. (6) But we deny that this was the constant method of inspiration, or
that such an influence can account for the revelation of new truth to the
prophets and apostles. The iUumination of the Holy Spirit gives no new
truth, but only a vivid apprehension of the truth already revealed. Any
original communication of truth must have required a work of the Spirit
different, not in degree, but in kind.
( c ) Mere Ulumination could not secure the Scripture writers from
frequent and grievous error. The spiritual perception of the Christian
is always rendered to some extent imperfect and deceptive by remaining
depravity. The subjective element so predominates in this theory, that no
certainty remains even with regard to the trustworthiness of the Scriptures
as a whole.
(d) The theory is logicaUy indefensible, as intimating that Ulumina
tion with regard to truth can be imparted without imparting truth itself,
whereas God must first furnish objective truth to be perceived before he
can Uluminate the mind to perceive the meaning of that truth.
3. The Dictation-theory.
This theory holds that inspiration consisted in such a possession of the
minds and bodies of the Scripture writers by the Holy Spirit, that they
became passive instruments or amanuenses — pens, not penmen, of God.

58 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
Of this view we may remark :
( a ) We grant that there are instances when God's communications were
uttered in an audible voice and took a definite form of words, and that this
was sometimes accompanied with the command to commit the words to
writing. ( & ) The theory in question, however, rests upon a partial induction of
Scripture facts, —unwarrantably assuming that such occasional instances
of direct dictation reveal the invariable method of God's communications of
truth to the writers of the Bible.
(c) It cannot account for the manifestly human element in the Script
ures. There are peculiarities of style which distinguish the productions of
each writer from those of every other, and there are variations in accounts
of the same transaction which are inconsistent with the theory of a solely
divine authorship.
[d) It is inconsistent with a wise economy of means, to suppose that
the Scripture writers should have had dictated to them what they knew
already, or what they could inform themselves of by the use of their nat
ural powers.
( e ) It contradicts what we know of the law of God's working in the soul.
The higher and nobler God's communications, the more fuUy is man in
possession and use of his own faculties. We cannot suppose that this high
est work of man under the influence of the Spirit was purely mechanical.
4. The Dynamical Theory.
The true view holds, in opposition to the first of these theories, that
inspiration is not simply a natural but also a supernatural fact, and that it
is the immediate work of a personal God in the soul of man.
It holds, in opposition to the second, that inspiration belongs, not only
to the men who wrote the Scriptures, but to the Scriptures which they
wrote, so that these Scriptures, when taken together, constitute a trust
worthy and sufficient record of divine revelation.
It holds, in opposition to the third theory, that the Scriptures contain a
human as weU as a divine element, so that while they present a body of
divinely revealed truth, this truth is shaped in human moulds and adapted
to ordinary human inteUigence.
In short, inspiration is characteristicaUy neither natural, partial, nor
mechanical, but supernatural, plenary, and dynamical. Further explan
ations wUl be grouped under the head of The Union of the Divine and
Human Elements in Inspiration, in the section which immediately f oUows.
IV. The Union of the Divine and Human Elements in Inspiration.
1. The Scriptures are the production equaUy of God and of man, and
are therefore never to be regarded as merely human or merely divine.
The mystery of inspiration consists in neither of these terms separately,
but in the union of the two. Of this, however, there are analogies in the
interpenetration of human powers by the divine efficiency in regeneration

DIVINE AND HUMAN ELEMENTS IN INSPIRATION. 59
and sanctification, and in the union of the divine and human natures in the
person of Jesus Christ.
2. This union of the divine and human agencies in inspiration is not to
be conceived of as one of external impartation and reception.
On the other hand, those whom God raised up and providentiaUy qualified
to do this work, spoke and wrote the words of God, when inspired, not as
from without, but as from within, and that not passively, but in the most
conscious possession and the most exalted exercise of their own powers of
intellect, emotion, and wUl.
3. Inspiration, therefore, did not remove, but rather pressed into its
own service, aU the personal peculiarities of the writers, together with their
defects of culture and literary style.
Every imperfection not inconsistent with truth in a human composition
may exist in inspired Scripture. The Bible is God's word, in the sense
that it presents to us divine truth in human forms, and is a revelation not
for a select class but for the common mind. Rightly understood, this very
humanity of the Bible is a proof of its divinity.
4. In inspiration God may use aU right and normal methods of literary
composition. As we recognize in literature the proper function of history, poetry, and
fiction ; of prophecy, parable, and drama ; of personification and proverb ;
of aUegory and dogmatic instruction ; and even of myth and legend ; we
cannot deny the possibility that God may use any one of these methods of
communicating truth, leaving it to us to determine in any single case which
of these methods he has adopted.
5. The inspiring Spirit has given the Scriptures to the world by a pro
cess of gradual evolution.
As in communicating the truths of natural science, God has communi
cated the truths of religion by successive steps, germinaUy at first, more
fuUy as men have been able to comprehend them. The education of the
race is analogous to the education of the chUd. First come pictures,
object-lessons, external rites, predictions ; then the key to these in Christ,
and their didactic exposition in the Epistles.
6. Inspiration did not guarantee inerrancy in things not essential to the
main purpose of Scripture.
Inspiration went no further than to secure a trustworthy transmission
by the sacred writers of the truth they were commissioned to deliver. It
was not omniscience. It was a bestowal of various kinds and degrees of
knowledge and aid, according to need ; sometimes suggesting new truth,
sometimes presiding over the coUection of preexisting material and guard
ing from essential error in the final elaboration. As inspiration was not
omniscience, so it was not complete sanctification. It involved neither
personal infallibility, nor entire freedom from sin.
7. Inspiration did not always, or even generaUy, involve a direct com
munication to the Scripture writers of the words they wrote.

60 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
Thought is possible without words, and in the order of nature precedes
words. The Scripture writers appear to have been so influenced by the
Holy Spirit that they perceived and felt even the new truths they were to
pubhsh, as discoveries of their own minds, and were left to the action of
their own minds in the expression of these truths, with the single exception
that they were supernaturaUy held back from the selection of wrong words,
and when needful were provided with right ones. Inspiration is therefore
not verbal, whUe yet we claim that no form of words which taken in its
connections would teach essential error has been admitted into Scripture.
8. Yet, notwithstanding the ever-present human element, the aU-per-
vading inspiration of the Scriptures constitutes these various writings an
organic whole.
Since the Bible is in aU its parts the work of God, each part is to be
judged, not by itself alone, but in its connection with»every other part.
The Scriptures are not to be interpreted as so many merely human produc
tions by different authors, but as also the work of one divine mind. Seem
ingly trivial things are to be explained from their connection with the whole.
One history is to be built up from the several accounts of the hfe of Christ.
One doctrine must supplement another. The Old Testament is part of a
progressive system, whose culmination and key are to.be found in the New.
The central subject and thought which binds aU parts of the Bible together,
and in the hght of which they are to be interpreted, is the person and work
of Jesus Christ.
9. When the unity of the Scripture is fuUy recognized, the Bible, in
spite of imperfections in matters non-essential to its religious purpose, fur
nishes a safe and sufficient guide to truth and to salvation.
The recognition of the Holy Spirit's agency makes it rational and natural
to believe in the organic unity of Scripture. When the earlier parts are
taken in connection with the later, and when each part is interpreted by
the whole, most of the difficulties connected with inspiration disappear.
Taken together, with Christ as its culmination and explanation, the Bible
furnishes the Christian rule of faith and practice.
10. WhUe inspiration constitutes Scripture an authority more trust
worthy than are individual reason or the creeds of the church, the only
ultimate authority is Christ himself.
Christ has not so constructed Scripture as to dispense with his personal
presence and teaching by his Spirit. The Scripture is the imperf eot mirror
of Christ. It is defective, yet it reflects him and leads to him. Authority
resides not in it, but in him, and his Spirit enables the individual Christian
and the coUective church progressively to distinguish the essential from
the non-essential, and so to perceive the truth as it is in Jesus. In thus
judging Scripture and interpreting Scripture, we are not rationalists, but
are rather believers in him who promised to be with us alway even unto
the end of the world and to lead us by his Spirit into all the truth.
11. The preceding discussion enables us at least to lay down three car
dinal principles and to answer three common questions with regard to
inspiration.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION. 61
Principles : ( a ) The human mind can be inhabited and energized by God
whUe yet attaining and retaining its own'highest inteUigence and freedom.
(6) The Scriptures being the work of the one God, as well as of the men
in whom God moved and dwelt, constitute an articulated and organic unity.
(c) The unity and authority of Scripture as a whole are entirely consis
tent with its gradual evolution and with great imperfection in its non-essen
tial parts.
Questions : (a) Is any part of Scripture uninspired? Answer": Every
part of Scripture is inspired in its connection and relation with every
other part. ( b ) Are there degrees of insphation ? Answer : There are
degrees of value, but not of inspiration. Each part in its connection with
the rest is made completely true, and completeness has no degrees. ( c )
How may we know what parts are of most value and what is the teaching
of the whole ? Answer : The same Spirit of Christ who inspired the
Bible is promised to take of the things of Christ, and, by showing them to
us, to lead us progressively into aU the truth.
V. Objections to the Doctrine of Inspiration.
In connection with a divine-human work like the Bible, insoluble diffi
culties may be expected to present themselves. So long, however, as its
inspiration is sustained by competent and sufficient evidence, these difficul
ties cannot justly prevent our fuU acceptance of the doctrine, any more than
disorder and mystery in nature warrant us in setting aside the proofs of its
divine authorship. These difficulties are lessened with time ; some have
already disappeared ; many may be due to ignorance, and may be removed
hereafter ; those which are permanent may be intended to stimulate inquiry
and to discipline faith.
It is noticeable that the common objections to insphation are urged, not
so much against the religious teaching of the Scriptures, as against certain
errors in secular matters which are supposed to be interwoven with it. But
if these are proved to be errors indeed, it will not necessarUy overthrow
the doctrine of inspiration ; it will only compel us to give a larger place
to the human element in the composition of the Scriptures, and to regard
them more exclusively as a text-book of rehgion. As a rule of rehgious
faith and practice, they wUl still be the infallible word of God. The Bible
is to be judged as a book whose one aim is man's rescue from sin and
reconciliation to God, and in these respects it wUl still be found a record
of substantial truth. This wUl appear more fully as we examine the objec
tions one by one.
1. Errors in matters of Science.
Upon this objection we remark :
( a ) We do not admit the existence of scientific error in the Scripture.
What is charged as such is simply truth presented in popular and impres
sive forms.
The common mind receives a more correct idea of unfamiliar facts when
these are narrated in phenomenal language and in summary form than

62 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
when they are described in the abstract terms and in the exact detail of
science. ( b ) It is not necessary to a proper view of inspiration to suppose that
the human authors of Scripture had in mind the proper scientific interpre
tation of the natural events they recorded.
It is enough that this was in the mind of the inspiring Spirit. Through
the comparatively narrow conceptions and inadequate language of the
Scripture writers, the Spirit of inspiration may have secured the expres
sion of the truth in such germinal form as to be inteUigible to the times
in which it was |first published, and yet capable of indefinite expansion as
science should advance. In the miniature picture of creation in the first
chapter of Genesis, and in its power of adjusting itself to every advance of
scientific investigation, we have a strong proof of inspiration.
(c) It may be safely said that science has not yet shown any fairly
interpreted passage of Scripture to be untrue.
With regard to the antiquity of the race, we may say that owing to the
differences of reading between the Septuagint and the Hebrew there is room
for doubt whether either of the received chronologies has the sanction of
inspiration. Although science has made probable the existence of man
upon the earth at a period preceding the dates assigned in these chronol
ogies, no statement of inspired Scripture is thereby proved false.
( d) Even if error in matters of science were found in Scripture, it would
not disprove inspiration, since inspiration concerns itself with science only
so far as correct scientific views are necessary to morals and religion.
2. Errors in matters of History.
To this objection we reply :
(a) What are charged as such are often mere mistakes in transcription,
and have no force as arguments against inspiration, unless it can first be
shown that inspired documents are by the very fact of their inspiration
exempt from the operation of those laws which affect the transmission of
other ancient documents.
( b ) Other so-caUed errors are to be explained as a permissible use of
round numbers, which cannot be denied to the sacred writers except upon
the principle that mathematical accuracy was more important than the
general impression to be secured by the narrative.
( c ) Diversities of statement in accounts of the same event, so long as
they touch no substantial truth, may be due to the meagreness of the
narrative, and might be fully explained if some single fact, now unrecorded,
were only known. To explain these apparent discrepancies would not only
be beside the purpose of the record, but would destroy one valuable
evidence of the independence of the several writers or witnesses.
(d) WhUe historical and archaeological discovery in many important
particulars goes to sustain the general correctness of the Scripture narra
tives, and no statement essential to the moral and rehgious teaching of
Scripture has been invahdated, inspiration is stiU consistent with much
imperfection in historical detaU and its narratives "do not seem to be
exempted from possibilities of error. "

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION. 63
3. Errors in Morality.
(ff ) What are charged as such are sometimes evil acts and words of good
men — words and acts not sanctioned by God. These are narrated by the
inspired writers as simple matter of history, and subsequent results, or the
story itself, is left to point the moral of the tale.
( b ) Where evU acts appear at first sight to be sanctioned, it is frequently
some right intent or accompanying virtue, rather than the act itself, upon
which commendation is bestowed.
( c ) Certain commands and deeds are sanctioned as relatively just —
expressions of justice such as the age could comprehend, and are to be
judged as parts of a progressively unfolding system of morahty whose key
and culmination we have in Jesus Christ.
( d ) God's righteous sovereignty affords the key to other events. He has
the right to do what he wUl with his own, and to punish the transgressor
when and where he wUl ; and he may justly make men the foretellers or
executors of his purposes.
( e ) Other apparent immoralities are due to unwarranted interpretations.
Symbol is sometimes taken for hteral fact ; the language of irony is under
stood as sober affirmation ; the glow and freedom of Oriental description
are judged by the unimpassioned style of Western hterature ; appeal to
lower motives is taken to exclude, instead of preparing for, the higher.
4. Errors of Reasoning.
(a) What are charged as such are generally to be explained as valid
argument expressed in highly condensed form. The appearance of error
may be due to the suppression of one or more hnks in the reasoning.
( b ) Where we cannot see the propriety of the conclusions drawn from
given premises, there is greater reason to attribute our faUure to ignorance
of divine logic on our part, than to accommodation or ad hominem argu
ments on the part of the Scripture writers.
(c) The adoption of Jewish methods of reasoning, where it could be
proved, would not indicate error on the part of the Scripture writers, but
rather an inspired sanction of the method as apphed to that particular case.
(d) If it should appear however upon further investigation that Rab
binical methods have been wrongly employed by the apostles in their argu
mentation, we might still distinguish between the truth they are seeking
to convey and the arguments by which they support it. Inspiration may
conceivably make known the truth, yet leave the expression of the truth to
human dialectic as weU as to human rhetoric.
5. Errors in quoting or interpreting the Old Testament.
(a) What are charged as such are commonly interpretations of the
meaning of the original Scripture by the same Spirit who first inspired it.
( 6 ) Where an apparently false translation is quoted from the Septuagint,
the sanction of inspiration is given to it, as expressing a part at least of the

64 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
fulness of meaning contained in the divine original — a fulness of meaning
which two varying translations do not in some cases exhaust.
( e ) The freedom of these inspired interpretations, however, does not
warrant us in like freedom of interpretation in the case of other passages
whose meaning has not been authoritatively made known.
(d) WhUe we do not grant that the New Testament writers in any
proper sense misquoted or misinterpreted the Old Testament, we do not
regard absolute correctness in these respects as essential to their inspira
tion. The insphing Spirit may have communicated truth, and may have
secured in the Scriptures as a whole a record of that truth sufficient for
men's moral and rehgious needs, without imparting perfect gifts of scholar
ship or exegesis.
6. Errors in Prophecy.
( a) What are charged as such may frequently be explained by remem
bering that much of prophecy is yet unfulfilled.
( b ) The personal surmises of the prophets as to the meaning of the
prophecies they recorded may have been incorrect, while yet the prophe
cies themselves are inspired.
(c) The prophet's earlier utterances are not to be severed from the later
utterances which elucidate them, nor from the whole revelation of which
they form a part. It is unjust to forbid the prophet to explain his own
meaning. ( d) The character of prophecy as a rough general sketch of the future,
in highly figurative language, and without historical perspective, renders
it peculiarly probable that what at first sight seem to be errors are due
to a misinterpretation on our part, which confounds the drapery with the
substance, or apphes its language to events to which it had no reference.
7. Certain books unworthy of a place in inspired Scripture.
( a ) This charge may be shown, in each single case, to rest upon a mis
apprehension of the aim and method of the book, and its connection with
the remainder of the Bible, together with a narrowness of nature or of
doctrinal view, which prevents the critic from appreciating the wants of the
peculiar class of men to which the book is especially serviceable.
( 6 ) The testimony of church history and general Christian experience
to the profitableness and divinity of the disputed books is of greater weight
than the personal impressions of the few who criticize them.
(c) Such testimony can be adduced in favor of the value of each one of
the books to which exception is taken, such as Esther, Job, Song of Solo
mon, Ecclesiastes, Jonah, James, Revelation.
8. Portions of the Scripture books written by others than the persons
to whom they are ascribed.
The objection rests upon a misunderstanding of the nature and object of
inspiration. It may be removed by considering that

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION. 65
(a) In the case of books made up from preexisting documents, inspira
tion simply preserved the compUers of them from selecting inadequate or
improper material. The fact of such compilation does not impugn their
value as records of a divine revelation, since these books supplement each
other's deficiencies and together are sufficient for man's rehgious needs.
( b ) In the case of additions to Scripture books by later writers, it is
reasonable to suppose that the additions, as well as the originals, were made
by inspiration, and no essential truth is sacrificed by aUowing the whole to
go under the name of the chief author.
(c) It is unjust to deny to inspired Scripture the right exercised by
all historians of introducing certain documents and sayings as simply his
torical, whUe their complete truthfulness is neither vouched for nor denied.
9. Sceptical or fictitious Narratives.
( a ) Descriptions of human experience may be embraced in Scripture,
not as models for imitation, butasiUustrationsof the doubts, struggles, and
needs of the soul. In these cases inspiration may vouch, not for the cor
rectness of the views expressed by those who thus describe their mental
history, but only for the correspondence of the description with actual fact,
and for its usefulness as indirectly teaching important moral lessons.
( 6 ) Moral truth may be put by Scripture writers into parabohc or dra
matic form, and the sayings of Satan and of perverse men may form parts
of such a production. In such cases, inspiration may vouch, not for the
historical truth, much less for the moral truth of each separate statement,
but only for the correspondence of the whole with ideal fact ; in other
words, inspiration may guarantee that the story is true to nature, and is
valuable as conveying divine instruction.
(c) In none of these cases ought the difficulty of distinguishing man's
words from God's words, or ideal truth from actual truth, to prevent our
acceptance of the fact of insphation ; for in this very variety of the Bible,
combined with the stimulus it gives to inquiry and the general plainness of
its lessons, we have the very characteristics we should expect in a book
whose authorship was divine.
10. Acknowledgment of the non-inspiration of Scripture teachers
and their writings.
This charge rests mainly upon the misinterpretation of two particular

( a ) Acts 23 : 5 ( " I wist not, brethren, that he was the high priest ' ' )
may be explained either as the language of indignant irony : " I would not
recognize such a man as high priest" ; or, more naturaUy, an actual con
fession of personal ignorance and f aUibUity, which does not affect the inspi
ration of any of Paul's final teachings or writings.
( 6 ) 1 Cor. 7 : 12, 10 ("I, notthe Lord" ; "not I, butthe Lord"). Here
the contrast is not between the apostle inspired and the apostle uninspired,
but between the apostle's words and an actual saying of our Lord, as in
5

66 THE SCRIPTURES A REVELATION FROM GOD.
Mat. 5 : 32 ; 19 : 3-10 ; Mark 10 : 11 ; Luke 16 : 18 ( Stanley on Corinthians),
The expressions may be paraphrased : — " With regard to this matter no
express command was given by Christ before his ascension. As one inspired
by Christ, however, I give you my command."

PAET IV.
THE NATURE, DECREES AND WORKS OF GOD.

CHAPTEE I.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

In contemplating the words and acts of God, as in contemplating the
words and acts of individual men, we are compelled to assign uniform and
permanent effects to uniform and permanent causes. Holy acts and words,
we argue, must have their source in a principle of holiness ; truthful acts
and words, in a settled proclivity to truth ; benevolent acts and words, in a
benevolent disposition.
Moreover, these permanent and uniform sources of expression and action
to which we have apphed the terms principle, proclivity, disposition, since
they exist harmoniously in the same person, must themselves inhere, and
find their unity, in an underlying spiritual substance or reahty of which
they are the inseparable characteristics and partial manifestations.
Thus we are led naturaUy from the works to the attributes, and from the
attributes to the essence, of God.
I. Definition of the term Attributes.
The attributes of God are those distinguisning characteristics of the
divine nature which are inseparable from the idea of God and which con
stitute the basis and ground for his various manifestations to his creatures.
We call them attributes, because we are compeUed to attribute them to
God as fundamental qualities or powers of his being, in order to give
rational account of certain constant facts in God's self-revelations.
H. Relation of the divine Attributes to the divine Essence.
1. The attributes have an objective existence. They are not mere
names for human conceptions of God — conceptions which have their only
ground in the imperfection of the finite mind. They are qualities objec
tively distinguishable from the divine essence and from each other.
The nominalistic notion that God is a being of absolute simplicity, and
that in his nature there is no internal distinction of qualities or powers,
tends directly to pantheism ; denies aU reahty of the divine perfections ;
or, if these in any sense still exist, precludes aU knowledge of them on the
part of finite beings. To say that knowledge and power, eternity and holi
ness, are identical with the essence of God and with each other, is to deny
that we know God at all. 67

68 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
The Scripture declarations of the possibihty of knowing God, together
with the manifestation of the distinct attributes of his nature, are conclu
sive against this false notion of the divine simplicity,
2. The attributes inhere in the divine essence. They are not separate
existences. They are attributes of God.
WhUe we oppose the nominalistic view which holds them to be mere
names with which, by the necessity of our thinking, we clothe the one sim
ple divine essence, we need equally to avoid the opposite reahstic extreme
of making them separate parts of a composite God.
We cannot conceive of attributes except as belonging to an underlying
essence which furnishes their ground of unity. In representing God as a
compound of attributes, reahsm endangers the living unity of the Godhead.
3. The attributes belong to the divine essence as such. They are to be
distinguished from those other powers or relations which do not appertain
to the divine essence universally.
The personal distinctions (proprietates ) in the nature of the one God
are not to be denominated attributes ; for each of these personal distinctions
belongs not to the divine essence as such and universally, but only to the
particular person of the Trinity who bears its name, whUe on the contrary
all of the attributes belong to each of the persons.
The relations which God sustains to the world {predicata), moreover,
such as- creation, preservation, government, are not to be denominated
attributes ; for these are accidental, not necessary or inseparable from the
idea of God. God would be God, if he had never created.
4. The attributes manifest the divine essence. The essence is revealed
only through the attributes. Apart from its attributes it is unknown and
unknowable. But though we can know God only as he reveals to us his attributes, we
do, notwithstanding, in knowing these attributes, know the being to whom
these attributes belong. That this knowledge is partial does not prevent
its corresponding, so far as it goes, to objective reahty in the nature of God.
AU God's revelations are, therefore, revelations of himself in and through
his attributes. Our aim must be to determine from God's works and words
what qualities, dispositions, determinations, powers of his otherwise unseen
and unsearchable essence he has actually made known to us ; or in other
words, what are the revealed attributes of God.
HI. Methods of determining the divine Attributes.
We have seen that the existence of God is a first truth. It is presup
posed in all human thinking, and is more or less consciously recognized by
all men. This intuitive knowledge of God we have seen to be corroborated
and exphcated by arguments drawn from nature and from mind. Reason
leads us to a causative and personal Intelligence upon whom we depend.
This Being of indefinite greatness we clothe, by a necessity of our thinking,
with all the attibutes of perfection. The two great methods of determining
what these attributes are, are the Rational and the Biblical.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE ATTRIBUTES. 69
1. The Rational method. This is threefold : — ( a ) the via negationis,
or the way of negation, which consists in denying to God all imperfections
observed in created beings ; ( b ) the via eminentice, or the way of climax,
which consists in attributing to God in infinite degree all the perfections
found in creatures ; and ( c ) the via causalitatis, or the way of causality,
which consists in predicating of God those attributes which are required in
him to explain the world of nature and of mind.
This rational method explains God's nature from that of his creation,
whereas the creation itself can be fuUy explained only from the nature of
Qod. Though the method is valuable, it has insuperable limitations, and
its place is a subordinate one. While we use it continuaUy to confirm and
Supplement results otherwise obtained, our chief means of determining the
divine attributes must be
2. The Biblical method. This is simply the inductive method, apphed
to the facts with regard to God revealed in the Scriptures. Now that we
have proved the Scriptures to be a revelation from God, inspired in every
part, we may properly look to them as decisive authority with regard to
God's attributes.
IV. Classification of the Attributes.
The attributes may be divided into two great classes : Absolute or Imma
nent, and Relative or Transitive.
By Absolute or Immanent Attributes, we mean attributes which respect
the inner being of God, which are involved in God's relations to himself,
and which belong to his nature independently of his connection with the
universe. By Relative or Transitive Attributes, we mean attributes w,hich respect
the outward revelation of God's being, which are involved in God's relations
to the creation, and which are exercised in consequence of the existence of
the universe and its dependence upon him.
Under the head of Absolute or Immanent Attributes, we make a three-fold
division into Spirituality, with the attributes therein,involved, namely, Life
and Personality; Infinity, with 'the attributes therein involved, namely,
Self -existence, Immutability, and Unity ; and Perfection, with the attri
butes therein involved, namely, Truth, Love, aud Hohness.
Under the head of Relative or Transitive Attributes, we make a three
fold division, according to the order of their revelation, into Attributes
having relation to Time and Space, as Eternity and Immensity ; Attributes
having relation to Creation, as Omnipresence, Omniscience, and Omnipo
tence ; and Attributes having relation to Moral Beings, as Veracity and
Faithfulness, or Transitive Truth ; Mercy and Goodness, or Transitive
Love and Justice and Righteousness, or Transitive Holiness.

70 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
This classification may be better understood from the foUowing schedule :
1. Absolute or Immanent Attributes :

A. Spirituality, involving

(a) Life,
( b ) Personality.

1-

B. Infinity, involving

(a) Self -existence,
(6) Immutability,
(c) Unity.

C. Perfection, involving

(a) Truth,
( 6 ) Love,
(c) Hohness.

2. Relative or Transitive Attributes :
~ . , . ™. -. r, ((«) Eternity,
A. Related to Time and Space- ] ( ^ Tnim(Wv

B. Related to Creation -

(a) Omnipresence,
( 6 ) Omniscience,
(c) Omnipotence.

C. Related to Moral Beings -

I [a) Veracity and Faithfulness,
or Transitive Truth.
( 6 ) Mercy and Goodness,
or Transitive Love.
( c ) Justice and Righteousness,
or Transitive Holiness.

<ra

V. Absolute ob Immanent Attributes.
First division. — Spirituality, and attributes therein involved.
In calhng spirituality an attribute of God, we mean, not that we are jus
tified in applying to the divine nature the adjective "spiritual," but that
the substantive " Spirit " describes that nature ( John 4 : 24, marg. — "God
is spirit"; Rom. 1 :20 — "the invisible things of him"; 1 Tim. 1 :17 —
"incorruptible, invisible"; Col. 1:15 — "the invisible God"). This
implies, negatively, that ( a ) God is not matter. Spirit is not a refined
form of matter but an immaterial substance, invisible, uncompounded,
indestructible. (6) God is not dependent upon matter. It cannot be
shown that the human mind, in any other state than the present, is depen
dent for consciousness upon its connection with a physical organism
Much less is it true that God is dependent upon the material universe as
his sensorium. God is not only spirit, but he is pure spirit. He is not
only not matter, but he has no necessary connection with matter ( Luke
24:39 — "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having").
Those passages of Scripture which seem to ascribe to God the posses
sion of bodily parts and organs, as eyes and hands, are to be regarded as

ABSOLUTE OR IMMANENT ATTRIBUTES. 71
anthropomorphic and symbolic. When God is spoken of as appearing to
the patriarchs and walking with them, the passages are to be explained as
referring to God's temporary manifestations of himself in human form —
manifestations which prefigured the final tabernacling of the Son of God
in human flesh. Side by side with these anthropomorphic expressions
and manifestations, moreover, are specific declarations which repress any
materializing conceptions of God ; as, for example, that heaven is his throne
and the earth his footstool (Is. 66 : 1), and that the heaven of heavens can
not contain him (IK. 8 : 27).
We come now to consider the positive import of the term Spirit. The
spirituality of God involves the two attributes of Life and Personahty.
1. Life.
The Scriptures represent God as the living God.
Life is a simple idea, and is incapable of real definition. We know it,
however, in ourselves, and we can perceive the insufficiency or inconsist
ency of certain current definitions of it. We cannot regard life in God as
(a) Mere process, without a subject; for we cannot conceive of a
divine life without a God to hve it.
Nor can we regard life as
( 6 ) Mere correspondence with outward condition and environment ;
for this would render impossible a hfe of God before the existence of the
universe. ( c ) Life is rather mental energy, or energy of inteUect, affection, and
wUl. God is the living God, as having in his own being a source of being
and activity, both for himself aud others.
2. Personahty.
The Scriptures represent God as a personal being. By personahty we
mean the power of self-consciousness and of self-determination. By way
of further explanation we remark :
( a ) Self -consciousness is more than consciousness. This last the brute
may be supposed to possess, since the brute is not an automaton. Man is
distinguished from the brute by his power to objectify self. Man is not
only conscious of his own acts and states, but by abstraction and reflection
he recognizes the self which is the subject of these acts and states. ( b )
Self-determination is more than determination. The brute shows determi
nation, but his determination is the result of influences from without; there
is no inner spontaneity. Man, by virtue of his free-will, determines his
action from within. He determines self in view of motives, but his deter
mination is not caused by motives ; he himself is the cause.
God, as personal, is in the highest degree self-conscious and self-deter
mining. The rise in our own minds of the idea of God, as personal,
depends largely upon our recognition of personahty in ourselves. Those
who deny spirit in man place a bar in the way of the recognition of this
attribute of God.

72 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
Second Division. — Infinity, and attributes therein involved.
By infinity we mean, not that the divine nature has no known limits
or bounds, but that it has no limits or bounds. That which has simply no
known hmits is the indefinite. The infinity of God implies that he is in
no way limited by the universe or confined to the universe ; he is tran
scendent as well as immanent. Transcendence, however, -must not be con
ceived as freedom from merely spatial restrictions, but rather as unhmited
resource, of which God's glory is the expression.
In explanation of the term infinity, we may notice :
( a ) That infinity can belong to but one Being, and therefore cannot be
shared with the universe. Infinity is not a negative but a positive idea.
It does not take its rise from an impotence of thought, but is an intuitive
conviction which constitutes the basis of all other knowledge.
( 6 ) That the infinity of God does not. involve his identity with 'the all,
or the sum of existence, nor prevent the coexistence of derived and finite
beings to which he bears relation. Infinity imphes simply that God exists
in no necessary relation to finite things or beings, and that whatever limita
tion of the divine nature results from their existence is, on the part of God,
a self-limitation. ( c ) That the infinity of Qoi is to be conceived of as intensive, rather
than as extensive. We do not attribute to God infinite extension, but
rather infinite energy of spiritual hfe. That which acts up to the measure
of its power is simply natural and physical force. Man rises above nature
by virtue of his reserves of power. But in God the reserve is infinite.
There is a transcendent element in him, which no self -revelation exhausts,
whether creation or redemption, whether law or promise.
Of the attributes involved in Infinity, we mention :
I. Self-existence.
By self -existence we mean
( a) That God is "causa sui," having the ground of his existence in him
self. Every being must have the ground of its existence either in or out
of itself. We have the ground of our existence outside of us. God is not
thus dependent. He is a se ; hence we speak of the aseity of God.
But lest this should be be misconstrued, we add
( 6 ) That God exists by the necessity of his own being. It is his nature
to be. Hence the existence of God is not a contingent but a necessary
existence. It is grounded, not in his volitions, but in his nature.
2. Immutability.
By this we mean that the nature, attributes, and wiU of God are exempt
from all change. Reason teaches us that no change is possible in God,
whether of increase or decrease, progress or deterioration, contraction or
development. AU change must be to better* or to worse. But God is
absolute perfection, and no change to better is possible. Change to worse
would be equally inconsistent with perfection. No'cause for such change
exists, either outside of God or in God' himself.

ABSOLUTE OR IMMANENT ATTRIBUTES. 73
The passages of Scripture which seem at first sight to ascribe change to
God are to be explained in one of three ways :
( a ) As illustrations of the varied methods in which God manifests his
immutable truth and wisdom in creation.
( 6 ) As anthropomorphic representations of the revelation of God's
unchanging attributes in the changing circumstances and varying moral
conditions of creatures.
( c ) As describing executions, in time, of purposes eternaUy existing in
the mind of God. Immutability must not be confounded with immobUity.
This would deny aU those imperative vohtions of God by which he enters
into history, The Scriptures assure us that creation, miracles, incarnation,
regeneration, are immediate acts of God. ImmutabUity is consistent with
constant activity and perfect freedom.
3. Unity.
By this we mean (a) that the divine nature is undivided and indivisible
( unus ) ; and ( b ) that there is but one infinite and perfect Spirit (unicus ).
Against polytheism, tritheism, or dualism, we may urge that the notion
of two or more Gods is self -contradictory ; since each limits the other and
destroys his godhood. In the nature of things, infinity and absolute per
fection are possible only to one. It is unphUosophical, moreover, to
assume the existence of two or more Gods, when one wUl explain aU the
facts. The unity of God is, however, in no way inconsistent with the doc
trine of the Trinity ; for, while this doctrine holds to the existence of
hypostatical, or personal, distinctions in the divine nature, it also holds
that this divine nature is numeriijaUy and eternally one.
Third Division. — Perfection, and attributes therein involved.
By perfection we mean, not mere quantitative completeness, but qualita
tive exceUence. The attributes involved in perfection are moral attributes.
Right action among men presupposes a perfect moral organization, a nor
mal state of inteUect, affection and wUl. So God's activity presupposes a
principle of inteUigence, of affection, of volition, in his inmost being, and
the existence of a worthy object for each of these powers of his nature.
But in eternity past there is nothing existing outside or apart from God.
He must find, and he does find, the sufficient object of inteUect, affection,
and will, in himself. There is a self-knowing, a self -loving, a self -willing,
which constitute his absolute perfection. The consideration of the imma
nent attributes is, therefore, properly concluded with an account of that
truth, love, and holiness, which render God entirely sufficient to himself.
1. Truth.
By truth we mean that attribute of the divine nature in virtue of which
God's being and God's knowledge eternally conform to each other.
In further explanation we remark :
A. Negatively :
(a) The immanent truth of God is not to be confounded with that
veracity and faithfulness which partially manifest it to creatures. These

74 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
are transitive truth, and they presuppose the absolute and immanent
attribute. ( b ) Truth in God is not a merely active attribute of the divine nature.
God is truth, not only in the sense that he is the being who truly knows,
but also in the sense that he is the truth that is known. The passive pre
cedes the active ; truth of being precedes truth of knowing.
B. Positively :
(a) AU truth among men, whether mathematical, logical, moral, or
rehgious, is to be regarded as having its foundation in this immanent truth
of the divine nature and as disclosing facts in the being of God.
( b ) This attribute therefore constitutes the principle and guarantee of
aU revelation, whUe it shows the possibUity of an eternal divine self-
contemplation apart from and before aU creation. It is to be understood
only in the hght of the doctrine of the Trinity.
2. Love.
By love we mean that attribute of the divine nature in virtue of which
God is eternaUy moved to self-communication.
In further explanation we remark :
A. Negatively :
( a ) The immanent love of God is not to be confounded with mercy and
goodness toward creatures. These are its manifestations, and are to be
denominated transitive love.
( b ) Love is not the aU-inclusive ethical attribute of God. It does not
include truth, nor does it include hohness.
( c ) Nor is God's love a mere regard for being in general, irrespective
of its moral quality.
{d) God's love is not a merely emotional affection, proceeding from
sense or impulse, nor is it prompted by utilitarian considerations.
B. Positively :
( a ) The immanent love of God is a rational and voluntary affection,
grounded in perfect reason and deliberate choice.
( 6 ) Since God's love is rational, it involves a subordination of the
emotional element to a higher law than itself, namely, that of truth and
hohness. ( c ) The immanent love of God therefore requires and finds a perfect
standard in his own holiness, and a personal object in the image of his own
infinite perfections. It is to be understood only in the hght of the doc
trine of the Trinity.
(d) The immanent love of God constitutes a ground of the divine bless
edness. Since there is an infinite and perfect object of love, as well as of
knowledge and wiU, in God's own nature, the existence of the universe is
not necessary to his serenity and joy.

ABSOLUTE OR IMMANENT ATTRIBUTES. 75
( e ) The love of God involves also the possibility of divine suffering,
and the suffering on account of sin which hohness necessitates on the part
of God is itself the atonement.
3. Holiness.
Holiness is self -affirming purity. In virtue of this attribute of his nature,
God eternaUy wills and maintains his own moral excellence. In this defi
nition are contained three elements : first, purity ; secondly, purity will
ing ; thirdly, purity willing itself.
In further explanation we remark :
A. Negatively, that holiness is not
( a ) Justice, or purity demanding purity from creatures. Justice, the
relative or transitive attribute, is indeed the manifestation and expression
of the immanent attribute of holiness, but it is not to be confounded
with it.
(6) Holiness is not a complex term designating the aggregate of the
divine perfections. On the other hand, the notion of holiness is, both in
Scripture and in Christian experience, perfectly simple, and perfectly dis
tinct from that of other attributes.
( c ) Holiness is not God's self-love, in the sense of supreme regard for
his own interest and happiness. There is no utilitarian element in holiness.
( d ) Holiness is not identical with, or a manifestation of, love. Since
self-maintenance must precede self-impartation, and since benevolence has
its object, motive, standard and hmit in righteousness, holiness the self-
affirming attribute can in no way be resolved into love the self -communi
cating. B. Positively, that holiness is
(a) Purity of substance. — In God's moral nature, as necessarily acting,
there are indeed the two elements of willing and being. But the passive
logicaUy precedes the active ; being comes before willing ; God is pure
before he wills purity. Since purity, however, in ordinary usage is a
negative term and means only freedom from stain or wrong, we must
include in it also the positive idea of moral rightness. God is holy in that
he is the source and standard of the right.
(6) Energy of wUl. — This purity is not simply a passive and dead qual
ity jjtjsjhe attribute of a personal being ; it is penetrated and pervaded
by wiU. Holiness is the free moral movement of the Godhead.
( c ) Self-affirmation. — Holiness is God's self -willing. His own purity is
the supreme object of his regard and maintenance. God is holy, in that
his infinite moral exceUence affirms and asserts itself as the highest possi
ble motive and end. Like truth and love, this attribute can be under
stood only in the hght of the doctrine of the Trinity.

76 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
VI. Relative oe Transitive Attributes.
First Division. — Attributes having relation to Time and Space.
1. Eternity.
By this we mean that God's nature ( a ) is without beginning or end ; ( 6 )
is free from aU succession of time ; and ( c ) contains in itself the cause of
time. Eternity is infinity in its relation to time. It imphes that God's nature
is not subject to the law of time. God is not in time. It is more correct
to say that time is in God. Although there is logical succession in God's
thoughts, there is no chronological succession.
Yet we are far from saying that time, now that it exists, has no objective
reahty to God. To him, past, present, and future are "one eternal now,"
not in the sense that there is no distinction between them, but only in the
sense that he sees past and future as vividly as he sees the present. With
creation time began, and since the successions of history are veritable suc
cessions, he who sees according to truth must recognize them.
2. Immensity.
By this we mean that God's nature ( a ) is without extension ; ( 6 ) is sub
ject to no limitations of space ; and ( c ) contains in itself the cause of space.
Immensity is infinity in its relation to space. God's nature is not subject
to the law of space. God is not in space. It is more correct to say that
space is in God. Yet space has an objective reahty to God. With creation
space began to be, and since God sees according to truth, he recognizes
relations of space in his creation.
Second Division. — Attributes having relation lo Creation.
1. Omnipresence.
By this we mean that God, in the totality of his essence, without diffu
sion or expansion, multiplication or division, penetrates and fiUs the
universe in all its parts.
In explanation of this attribute we may say :
(a) God's omnipresence is not potential but essential. — We reject the
Socinian representation that God's essence is in heaven, only his power on
earth. When God is said to " dweU in the heavens," we are to understand
the language either as a symbolic expression of exaltation above earthly
things, or as a declaration that his most special and glorious self -manifesta
tions are to the spirits of heaven.
( 6 ) God's omnipresence is not the presence of a part but of the whole of
God in every place.— This follows from the conception of God as incor
poreal. We reject the materialistic representation that God is composed of
material elements which can be divided or sundered. There is no multi
plication or diffusion of his substance to correspond with the parts of his
dominions. The one essence of God is present at the same moment in aU.
(c ) God's omnipresence is not necessary but free.— We reject the pan
theistic notion that God is bound to the universe as the universe is bound

RELATIVE OR TRANSITIVE ATTRIBUTES. 77
to God. God is immanent in the universe, not by compulsion, but by
the free act of his own wiU, and this immanence is qualified by his tran
scendence. 2. Omniscience.
By this we mean God's perfect and eternal knowledge of aU things which
are objects of knowledge, whether they be actual or possible, past, present,
or future.
( a ) The omniscience of God may be argued from his omnipresence, as
well as from his truth or self-knowledge, in which the plan of creation has
its eternal ground, and from prophecy, which expresses God's omniscience.
( b ) Since it is free from all imperfection, God's knowledge is immediate,
as distinguished from the knowledge that comes through sense or imagina
tion ; simultaneous, as not acquired by successive observations, or buUt
up by processes of reasoning ; distinct, as free from aU vagueness or con
fusion ; true, as perfectly corresponding to the reality of things ; eternal,
as comprehended in one timeless act of the divine mind.
( c ) Since God knows things as they are, he knows the necessary
sequences of his creation as necessary, the free acts of his creatures as free,
the ideally possible as ideaUy possible.
(d~) The fact that there is nothing in the present condition of things
from which the future actions of free creatures necessarily foUow by nat
ural law does not prevent God from foreseeing such actions, since his
knowledge is not mediate, but immediate. He not only foreknows the
motives which wUl occasion men's acts, but he directly foreknows the acts
themselves. The possibility of such direct knowledge without assignable
grounds of knowledge is apparent if we admit that time is a form of finite
thought to which the divine mind is not subject.
( e ) Prescience is not itself causative. It is not to be confounded with
the predetermining wiU of God. Free actions do not take place because
they are foreseen, but they are foreseen because they are to take place.
(/) Omniscience embraces the actual and the possible, but it does not
embrace the self-contradictory and the impossible, because these are not
objects of knowledge.
( g ) Omniscience, as qualified by holy wUl, is in Scripture denominated
"wisdom." In virtue of his wisdom God chooses the highest ends and
uses the fittest means to accomplish them.
3. Omnipotence.
By this we mean the power of God to do all things which are objects of
power, whether with or without the use of means.
( a ) Omnipotence does not imply power to do that which is not an object
of power ; as, for example, that which is self -contradictory or contradictory
to the nature of God.
( b ) Omnipotence does not imply the exercise of all his power on the
part of God. He has power over his power ; in other words, his power is

78 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
under the control of wise and holy wiU. God can do all he wiU, but he
wiU not do all he can. Else his power is mere force acting necessarUy,
and God is the slave of his own omnipotence.
( e) Omnipotence in God does not exclude, but implies, the power of self
limitation. Since aU such self-limitation is free, proceeding from neither
external nor internal compulsion, it is the act and manifestation of God's
power. Human freedom is not rendered impossible by the divine omnipo
tence, but exists by virtue of it. It is an act of omnipotence when God
humbles himself to the taking of human flesh in the person of Jesus Christ.
Third Division. — Attributes having relation to Moral Beings.
1. Veracity and Faithfulness, or Transitive Truth.
By veracity and faithfulness we mean the transitive truth of God, in its
twofold relation to his creatures in general and to his redeemed people in
particular. (a) In virtue of his veracity, all his revelations to creatures consist with
his essential being and with each other.
(6) In virtue of his faithfulness, he fulfiUs all his promises to his people,
whether expressed in words or imphed in the constitution he has given
them. 2. Mercy and Goodness, or Transitive Love.
By mercy and goodness we mean the transitive love of God in its two
fold relation to the disobedient and to the obedient portions of his
creatures. ( a ) Mercy is that eternal principle of God's nature which leads him to
seek the temporal good and eternal salvation of those who have opposed
themselves to his wUl, even at the cost of infinite self-sacrifice.
( b ) Goodness is the eternal principle of God's nature which leads him to
communicate of his own hfe and blessedness to those who are like him in
moral character. Goodness, therefore, is nearly identical with the love of
complacency ; mercy, with the love of benevolence.
3. Justice and Righteousness, or Transitive Holiness.
By justice and righteousness we mean the transitive hohness of God, in
virtue of which his treatment of his creatures conforms to the purity of his
nature,— righteousness demanding from aU moral beings conformity to the
moral perfection of God, and justice visiting non-conformity to that perfec
tion with penal loss or suffering.
(a) Since justice and righteousness are simply transitive holiness —
righteousness designating this holiness chiefly in its mandatory, justice
chiefly in its punitive, aspect,— they are not mere manifestations of benev
olence, or of God's disposition to secure the highest happiness of his
creatures, nor are they grounded in the nature of things as something
apart from or above God.
( 6 ) Transitive hohness, as righteousness, imposes law in conscience and
Scripture, and may be caUed legislative hohness. As justice, it executes

RANK AND RELATIONS OF THE ATTRIBUTES. 79
the penalties of law, and may be caUed distributive or judicial holiness.
In righteousness God reveals chiefly his love of holiness ; injustice, chiefly
his hatred of sin.
( c) Neither justice nor righteousness, therefore, is a matter of arbitrary
wUl. They are revelations of the inmost nature of God, the one in the
form of moral requirement, the other in the form of judicial sanction. As
God cannot but demand of his creatures that they be like him in moral
character, so he cannot but enforce the law which he imposes upon them.
Justice just as much binds God to punish as it binds the sinner to be
punished. ( d ) Neither justice nor righteousness bestows rewards. This f oUows
from the fact that obedience is due to God, instead of being optional or a
gratuity. No creature can claim anything for his obedience. If God
rewards, he rewards in virtue of his goodness and faithfulness, not in virtue
of his justice or his righteousness. What the creature cannot claim, how
ever, Christ can claim, and the rewards which are goodness to the creature
are righteousness to Christ. God rewards Christ's work for us and in us.
( e ) Justice in God, as the revelation of his holiness, is devoid of all pas
sion or caprice. There is in God no selfish anger. The penalties he
inflicts upon transgression are not vindictive but vindicative. They express
the revulsion of God's nature from moral evU, the judicial indignation of
purity against impurity, the self-assertion of infinite holiness against its
antagonist and would-be destroyer. But because its decisions are calm,
they are irreversible.
VH. Rank and Relations of the several Attributes.
The attributes have relations to each other. Like inteUect, affection and
wUl in man, no one of them is to be conceived of as exercised separately
from the rest. Each of the attributes is qualified by aU the others. God's
love is immutable, wise, holy. Infinity belongs to God's knowledge, power,
justice. Yet this is not to say that one attribute is of as high rank as
another. The moral attributes of truth, love, holiness, are worthy of
higher reverence from men, and they are more jealously guarded by God,
than the natural attributes of omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipo
tence. And yet even among the moral attributes one stands as supreme.
Of this and of its supremacy we now proceed to speak.
1. Holiness the fundamental attribute in God.
That hohness is the fundamental attribute in God, is evident:
(a) From Scripture, — in which God's holiness is not only most con
stantly and powerfully impressed upon the attention of man, but is declared
to be the chief subject of rejoicing and adoration in heaven.
( 6 ) From our own moral constitution, — in which conscience asserts its
supremacy over every other impulse and affection of our nature. As we
may be kind, but must be righteous, so God, in whose image we are made,
may be merciful, but must be holy.

80 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
(c) From the actual dealings of God, — in which hohness conditions
and limits the exercise of other attributes. Thus, for example, in Christ's
redeeming work, though love makes the atonement, it is violated hohness
that requires it ; and in the eternal punishment of the wicked, the demand
of holiness for self -vindication overbears the pleading of love for the suf
ferers. (d) From God's eternal purpose of salvation, — in which justice and
mercy are reconcUed only through the foreseen and predetermined sacri
fice of Christ. The declaration that Christ is " the Lamb . . . slain from
the foundation of the world " implies the existence of a principle in the
divine nature which requires satisfaction, before God can enter upon the
work of redemption. That principle can be none other than hohness.
2. The holiness of God the ground of moral obligation.
A. Erroneous Views. The ground of moral obhgation is not
( a ) In power, — whether of civil law ( Hobbes, Gassendi ), or of divine
wiU (Occam, Descartes). We are not bound to obey either of these,
except upon the ground that they are right. This theory assumes that
nothing is good or right in itself, and that morality is mere prudence.
( b ) Nor in utihty, — whether our own happiness or advantage present
or eternal (Paley), for supreme regard for our own interest is not virtu
ous ; or the greatest happiness or advantage to being in general ( Edwards ),
for we judge conduct to be useful because it is right, not right because it is
useful. This theory would compel us to believe that in eternity past God
was holy only because of the good he got from it, — that is, there was no
such thing as holiness in itself, and no such thing as moral character in God.
(c) Nor in the nature of things (Price), — whether by this we mean their
fitness (Clarke), truth ( WoUaston), order ( Jouffroy), relations ( Wayland),
worthiness (Hickok), sympathy (Adam Smith), or abstract right (Haven
and Alexander ) ; for this nature of things is not ultimate, but has its ground
in the nature of God. We are bound to worship the highest ; if anything
exists beyond and above God, we are bound to worship that, — that indeed
is God.
B. The Scriptural View. — According to the Scriptures, the ground of
moral obhgation is the hohness of God, or the moral perfection of the
divine nature, conformity to which is the law of our moral being (Robin
son, Chalmers, Calderwood, Gregory, Wuttke). We show this :
(a) From the commands: "Ye shaU be holy," where the ground of
obligation assigned is simply and only : "for I am holy" (1 Pet. 1 : 16) ;
and "Ye therefore shaU be perfect," where the standard laid down is : "as
your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mat. 5 : 48). Here we have an ultimate
reason and ground for being and doing right, namely, that God is right, or,
in other words, that hohness is his nature.
( b ) From the nature of the love in which the whole law is summed up
(Mat. 22:37— "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God"; Rom. 13 : 10 — "love
therefore is the fulfilment of the law"). This love is not regard for

RANK AND RELATIONS OF THE ATTRIBUTES. 81
abstract right or for the happiness of being, much less for one's own
interest, but it is regard for God as the fountain and standard of moral
excellence, or in other words, love for God as holy. Hence this love is
the principle and source of holiness in man.
( e ) From the example of Christ, whose life was essentiaUy an exhibi
tion of supreme regard for God, and of supreme devotion to his .holy wUl.
As Christ saw nothing good but what was in God (Mark 10 :18 — "none
is good save one, even God " ), and did only what he saw the Father do
( John 5 : 19 ; see also 30 — "I seek not mine own wiU, but the wfll of him
that sent me " ), so for us, to be like God is the sum of aU duty, and God's
infinite moral excellence is the supreme reason why we should be like him.

CHAPTEE II.
DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.
In the nature of the one God there are three eternal distinctions which
are represented to us under the figure of persons, and these three are
equal. This tripersonality of the Godhead is exclusively a truth of revela
tion. It is clearly, though not f ormaUy, made known in the New Testa
ment, and intimations of it may be found in the Old.
The doctrine of the Trinity may be expressed in the six foUowing
statements : 1. In Scripture there are three who are recognized as God.
2. These three are so described in Scripture that we are compeUed to con
ceive of them as distinct persons. 3. This tripersonality of the divine
nature is not merely economic and temporal, but is immanent and eternal.
4. This tripersonality is not tritheism ; for whUe there are three persons,
there is but one essence. 5. The three persons, Father, Son and Holy
Spirit, are equal. 6. Inscrutable yet not self -contradictory, this doctrine
furnishes the key to all other doctrines. — These statements we proceed now
to prove and to elucidate.
I. In Scripture there abe Three who are recognized as God.
1. Proofs from the New Testament.
A. The Father is recognized as God, — and that in so great a number of
passages ( such as John 6 : 27 — " him the Father, even God, hath sealed,"
and 1 Pet. 1 : 2 — " foreknowledge of God the Father ") that we need not
delay to adduce extended proof.
B. Jesus Christ is recognized as God.
( a ) He is expressly caUed God.
In John 1:1 — Qm %v 6 Uyos — the absence of the article shows Beds to be
the predicate ( c/. 4 : 24 — wvcv/ia 6 6£<5? ). This predicate precedes the verb
by way of emphasis, to indicate progress in the thought = ' the Logos was
not only with God, but was God ' ( see Meyer and Luthardt, Coram, in loco).
" Only b Uyoc can be the subject, for in the whole Introduction the ques
tion is, not who God is, but who the Logos is" (Godet).
In John 1 : 18, /wvoyevift Bed; — ' the only begotten God ' — must be regarded
as the correct reading, and as a plain ascription of absolute Deity to Christ.
He is not simply the only revealer of God, but he is himself God revealed.
In John 20 : 28, the address of Thomas '0 avptdg /xov nal 6 de6c; /jxw,  ' My
Lord and my God ' — since it was unrebuked by Christ, is equivalent to an
assertion on his own part of his claim to Deity.
In Rom. 9 : 5, the clause <5 £>v enl tt&vtu/v Bebg Evloyqrdc cannot be translated
'blessed be the God over ah,' for £n> is superfluous if the clause is a dox
ology ; " Mo-pirds precedes the name of God in a doxology, but foUows it,
82

scripture recognizes three AS GOD. 83
as here, in a description" (Hovey). The clause can therefore justly be
interpreted only as a description of the higher nature of the Christ who
had just been said, to Kara aapm, or according to his lower nature, to have
had his origin from Israel (see Tholuck, Com. in loco).
In Titus 2 : 13, eirif&veiav riji <5dfj?f tov psyalov Beoi Kal aorijpog fiftov 'Itjoov
Xpiorov we regard ( with Elhcott ) as "a dhect, deflnite, and even studied
declaration of Christ's divinity " = "the . . . appearing of the glory of
our great God and Savior Jesus Christ " ( so Enghsh Revised Version ).
'En-up&veta. is a term apphed speciaUy to the Son and never to the Father,
and fieyd?iov is uncaUed for if used of the Father, but peculiarly appropriate
if used of Christ. Upon the same principles we must interpret the simUar
text 2 Pet. 1:1 (see Huther, in Meyer's Com. : "The close juxtaposition
indicates the author's certainty of the oneness of God and Jesus Christ ").
In Heb. 1 : 8, Tcpb( <5s tov vlbv • b -d-povo( aov, 6 Bebq, sig rbv aiava is quoted as
an address to Christ, and verse 10 which foUows — "Thou, Lord, in the
beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth " — by applying to Christ
an Old Testament ascription to Jehovah, shows that 6 Bebg, in verse 8, is
used in the sense of absolute Godhead.
In 1 John 5 : 20 — kap.lv ev tu alri-d-ivu, iv t€> vl<^ avrov 'Iqaov Xpt.0T$. ovt6(
koTiv b aXrf&wbQ Be6q — " it would be a flat repetition, after the Father had
been twice caUed 6 al7i#iv6q, to say now again : 'this is b alq-frivbc 6s6g.' Our
being in God has its basis in Christ his Son, and this also makes it more
natural that oiro? should be referred to vie. But ought not b aXriOwdg then
to be without the article ( as in John 1:1 — Bebg fjv b Uyoc; ) ? No, for it is
John's purpose in 1 John 5 : 20 to say, not what Christ is, but who he
is. In declaring what one is, the predicate must have no article ; in
declaring who one is, the predicate must have the article. St. John here
says that this Son, on whom our being in the true God rests, is this true
God himself " ( see Ebrard, Com. in loco ).
( & ) Old Testament descriptions of God are applied to him.
This application to Christ of titles and names exclusively appropriated
to God is inexphcable, if Christ was not regarded as being himself God.
The peculiar awe with which the term ' Jehovah ' was set apart by a nation
of strenuous monotheists, as the sacred and incommunicable name of the
one self-existent and covenant-keeping God, forbids the belief that the
Scripture writers could have used it as the designation of a subordinate
and created being.
( c ) He possesses the attributes of God.
Among these are life, self-existence, immutability, truth, love, holiness,
eternity, omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence. All these attributes are
ascribed to Christ in connections which show that the terms are used in no
secondary sense, nor in any sense predicable of a creature.
(d ) The works of God are ascribed to him.
We do not here speak of miracles, which may be wrought by communi
cated power, but of such works as the creation of the world, the upholding
of aU things, the final raising of the dead, and the judging of all men.

84 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
Power to perform these works cannot be delegated, for they are character
istic of omnipotence.
( e ) He receives honor and worship due only to God.
In addition to the address of Thomas, in John 20 : 28, which we have
already cited among the proofs that Jesus is expressly called God, and in
which divine honor is paid to him, we may refer to the prayer and worship
offered by the apostolic and post-apostolic church.
(/) His name is associated with that of God upon a footing of equality.
We do not here aUude to 1 John 5 : 7 ( the three heavenly witnesses ), for
the latter part of this verse is unquestionably spurious ; but to the formula
of baptism, to the apostolic benedictions, and to those passages in which
eternal life is said to be dependent equaUy upon Christ and upon God, or
in which spiritual gifts are attributed to Christ equaUy with the Father.
( g ) Equality with God is expressly claimed.
Here we may refer to Jesus' testimony to himself, already treated of
among the proofs of the supernatural character of the Scripture teaching
( see pages 50, 51 ). Equality with God is not only claimed for himself by
Jesus, but it is claimed for him by his apostles.
( h ) Further proof of Christ's deity may be found in the application to
him of the phrases : ' Son of God, ' ' Image of God ' ; in the declarations
of his oneness with God ; in the attribution to him of the fulness of the
Godhead. ( i ) These proofs of Christ's deity from the New Testament are corrobo
rated by Christian experience.
Christian experience recognizes Christ as an absolutely perfect Savior,
perfectly revealing the Godhead and worthy of unlimited worship and
adoration ; that is, it practicaUy recognizes him as Deity. But Christian
experience also recognizes that through Christ it has introduction and
reconeUiation to God as one distinct from Jesus Christ, as one who was
alienated from the soul by its sin, but who is now reconcUed through
Jesns's death. In other words, whUe recognizing Jesus as God, we are
also compeUed to recognize a distinction between the Father and the Son
through whom we come to the Father.
Although this experience cannot be regarded as an independent witness
to Jesus' claims, since it only tests the truth already made known in the
Bible, stiU the irresistible impulse of every person whom Christ has saved
to lift his Redeemer to the highest place, and bo w before him in the lowliest
worship, is strong evidence that only that interpretation of Scripture can
be true which recognizes Christ's absolute Godhead. It is the church's
consciousness of her Lord's divinity, indeed, and not mere speculation
upon the relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that has compeUed the
formulation of the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity.
In contemplating passages apparently inconsistent with those now cited,
in that they impute to Christ weakness and ignorance, limitation and sub
jection, we are to remember, first, that our Lord was truly man, as well as

scripture recognizes three as GOD. 85
truly God, and that this ignorance and weakness may be predicated of him
as the God-man in whom deity and humanity are united ; secondly, that
the divine nature itself was in some way limited and humbled during our
Savior's earthly life, and that these passages may describe him as he was
in his estate of humiliation, rather than in his original and present glory ;
and, thirdly, that there is an order of office and operation which is consist
ent with essential oneness and equahty, but which permits the Father to be
spoken of as first and the Son as second. These statements will be further
elucidated in the treatment of the present doctrine and in subsequent
examination of the doctrine of the Person of Christ.
C. The Holy Spirit is recognized as God.
( a ) He is spoken of as God ; ( 6 ) the attributes of God are ascribed to
him, such as life, truth, love, hohness, eternity, omnipresence, omniscience,
omnipotence ; ( c ) he does the works of God, such as creation, regenera
tion, resurrection ; ( d ) he receives honor due only to God ; ( e ) he is asso
ciated with God on a footing of equahty, both in the formula of baptism
and in the apostolic benedictions.
As spirit is nothing less than the inmost principle of life, and the spirit
of man is man himself, so the spirit of God must be God (see 1 Cor. 2 : 11
— Meyer). Christian experience, moreover, expressed as it is in the
prayers and hymns of the church, furnishes an argument for the deity of
the Holy Spirit similar to that for the deity of Jesus Christ. When our
eyes are opened to see Christ as a Savior, we are compelled to recognize
the work in us of a divine Spirit who has taken of the things of Christ and
has shown them to us ; and this divine Spirit we necessarUy distinguish
both from the Father and from the Son. Christian experience, however,
is not an original and independent witness to the deity of the Holy Spirit :
it simply shows what the church has held to be the natural and unforced
interpretation of the Scriptures, and so confirms the Scripture argument
already adduced.
This proof of the deity of the Holy Spirit is not invahdated by the limita
tions of his work under the Old Testament dispensation. John 7 : 39 —
"for the Holy Spirit was not yet" — means simply that the Holy Spirit
could not fulfill his peculiar office as Revealer of Christ until the atoning
work of Christ should be accomplished.
2. Intimations of the Old Testament.
The passages which seem to show that even in the Old Testament there
are three who are implicitly recognized as God may be classed under four
heads :
A. Passages which seem to teach plurality of some sort in the Godhead.
( a ) The plural noun DTI^K is employed, and that with a plural verb — a
use remarkable, when we consider that the singular 7X was also in exist
ence ; ( 6 ) God uses plural pronouns in speaking of himself ; ( c ) Jehovah
distinguishes himself from Jehovah ; ( d ) a Son is ascribed to Jehovah ;
( e ) the Spirit of God is distinguished from God ; (/) there are a three
fold ascription and a threefold benediction.

86 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
The fact that D'ifttt is sometimes used in a narrower sense, as applicable
to the Son ( Ps. 45 : 6 ; cf. Heb. 1:8), need not prevent us from beheving
that the term was originaUy chosen as containing an aUusion to a certain
plurahty in the divine nature. Nor is it sufficient to caU this plural a
simple pluralis majestaticus; since it is easier to derive this common
figure from divine usage than to derive the divine usage from this common
figure — especiaUy when we consider the constant tendency of Israel to
polytheism. B. Passages relating to the Angel of Jehovah.
( a ) The angel of Jehovah identifies himself with Jehovah ; ( 5 ) he is
identified with Jehovah by others; (c) he accepts worship due only to
God. Though the phrase « angel of Jehovah ' is sometimes used in the
later Scriptures to denote a merely human messenger or created angel, it
seems in the Old Testament, with hardly more than a single exception, to
designate the pre-incarnate Logos, whose manifestations in angelic or
human form foreshadowed his final coming in the flesh.
C. Descriptions of the divine Wisdom and Word.
( a ) Wisdom is represented as distinct from God, and as eternaUy exist
ing with God ; (6) the Word of God is distinguished from God, as execu
tor of his wUl from everlasting.
It must be acknowledged that in none of these descriptions is the idea of
personahty clearly developed. StiU less is it true that John the apostle
derived his doctrine of the Logos from the interpretations of these descrip
tions in PhUo Judseus. John's doctrine (John 1 : 1-18 ) is radicaUy differ
ent from the Alexandrian Logos-idea of PhUo. This last is a Platonizing
speculation upon the mediating principle between God and the world.
PhUo seems at times to verge towards a recognition of personality in the
Logos, though his monotheistic scruples lead him at other times to take
back what he has given, and to describe the Logos either as the thought of
God or as its expression in the world. But John is the first to present
to us a consistent view of this personality, to identify the Logos with the
Messiah, and to distinguish the Word from the Spirit of God.
D. Descriptions of the Messiah.
(a) He is one with Jehovah ; ( 6 ) yet he is in some sense distinct from
Jehovah. It is to be remembered, in considering this, as weU as other classes of
passages previously cited, that no Jewish writer before Christ's coming had
succeeded in constructing from them a doctrine of the Trinity. Only to
those who bring to them the hght of New Testament revelation do they
show their real meaning.
Our general conclusion with regard to the Old Testament intimations
must therefore be that, while they do not by themselves furnish a sufficient
basis for the doctrine of the Trinity, they contain the germ of it, and may
be used in confirmation of it when its truth is substantiaUy proved from
the New Testament.

SCRIPTURE DESCRIBES THE THREE AS PERSONS. 87
H. These Three are so described in Scripture that we are com
pelled to conceive of them as distinct Persons.
1. The Father and the Son are persons distinct from each other.
( a ) Christ distinguishes the Father from himself as ' another ' ; ( 6 ) the
Father and the Son are distinguished as the begetter and the begotten ;
( c ) the Father and the Son are distinguished as the sender and the sent.
2. The Father and the Son are persons distinct from the Spirit.
( a ) Jesus distinguishes the Spirit from himself and from the Father ;
( b ) the Spirit proceeds from the Father ; ( c ) the Spirit is sent by the
Father and by the Son.
3. The Holy Spirit is a person.
A. Designations proper to personahty are given him.
( a ) The masculine pronoun titetvos, though irvevpa. is neuter ; ( 6 ) the
name n-apd/cA^i-of, which cannot be translated by 'comfort', or be taken as
the name of any abstract influence. The Comforter, Instructor, Patron,
Guide, Advocate, whom this term brings before us, must be a person. This
is evident from its apphcation to Christ in 1 John 2 : 1 — "we have an
Advocate — TzapaiOiijTov — with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous."
B. His name is mentioned in immediate connection with other per
sons, and in such a way as to imply his own personality.
( a ) In connection with Christians ; ( b ) in connection with Christ ; ( c )
in connection with the Father and the Son. If the Father and the Son are
persons, the Spirit must be a person also.
C. He performs acts proper to personahty.
That which searches, knows, speaks, testifies, reveals, convinces, com
mands, strives, moves, helps, guides, creates, recreates, sanctifies, inspires,
makes intercession, orders the affairs of the church, performs miracles,
raises the dead — cannot be a mere power, influence, efflux, or attribute of
God, but must be a person.
D. He is affected as a person by the acts of others.
That which can be resisted, grieved, vexed, blasphemed, must be a per
son ; for only a person can perceive insult and be offended. The blas
phemy against the Holy Ghost cannot be merely blasphemy against a
power or attribute of God, since in that case blasphemy against God would
be a less crime than blasphemy against his power. That against which
the unpardonable sin can be committed must be a person.
E. He manifests himself in visible form as distinct from the Father and
the Son, yet in direct connection with personal acts performed by them.
F. This ascription to the Spirit of a personal subsistence distinct from
that of the Father and of the Son cannot be explained as personification ;
for :
( a ) This would be to interpret sober prose by the canons of poetry.
Such sustained personification is contrary to the genius of even Hebrew
poetry, in which Wisdom itself is most naturaUy interpreted as designating

88 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
a personal existence. ( b ) Such an interpretation would render a multitude
of passages either tautological, meaningless, or absurd, — as can be easUy
seen by substituting for the name Holy Spirit the terms which are wrongly
held to be its equivalents ; such as the power, or influence, or efflux, or
attribute of God. ( c ) It is contradicted, moreover, by all those passages
in which the Holy Spirit is distinguished from his own gifts.
HI. This Tripersonality op the Divine Nature is not merely
ECONOMIC AND TEMPORAL, BUT IS IMMANENT AND ETEENAL.
1. Scripture proof that these distinctions of personality are eternal.
We prove this ( a ) from those passages which speak of the existence of
the Word from eternity with the Father ; ( 6 ) from passages asserting or
implying Christ's preexistence ; ( c ) from passages implying intercourse
between the Father and the Son before the foundation of the world;
( d) from passages asserting the creation of the world by Christ ; ( e ) from
passages asserting or implying the eternity of the Holy Spirit.
2. Errors refuted by the foregoing passages.
A. The Sabellian.
SabeUius ( of Ptolemais in Pentapohs, 250 ) held that Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit are mere developments or revelations to creatures, in time,
of the otherwise concealed Godhead — developments which, since creatures
will always exist, are not transitory, but which at the same time are not
eternal a parte ante. God as united to the creation is Father ; God as united
to Jesus Christ is Son ; God as united to the church is Holy Spirit. The
Trinity of SabeUius is therefore an economic and not an immanent Trinity
— a Trinity of forms or manifestations, but not a necessary and eternal
Trinity in the divine nature.
Some have interpreted SabeUius as denying that the Trinity is eternal a
parte post, as weU as a parte ante, and as holding that, when the purpose
of these temporary manifestations is accomplished, the Triad is resolved
into the Monad. This view easUy merges in another, which makes the
persons of the Trinity mere names for the ever shifting phases of the
divine activity.
It is evident that this theory, in whatever form it may be held, is far
from satisfying the demands of Scripture. Scripture speaks of the second
person of the Trinity as existing and acting before the birth of Jesus
Christ, and of the Holy Spirit as existing and acting before the formation
of the church. Both have a personal existence, eternal in the past as weU
as in the future — which this theory expressly denies.
B. The Arian.
Arius ( of Alexandria ; condemned by CouncU of Nice, 325 ) held that
the Father is the only divine being absolutely without beginning ; the Son
and the Holy Spirit, through whom God creates and recreates, having been
themselves created out of nothing before the world was ; and Christ being
caUed God, because he is next in rank to God, and is endowed by God
with divine power to create.

THE THREE PERSONS ARE EQUAL. 89
The foUowers of Arius have differed as to the precise rank and claims of
Christ. WhUe Socinus held with Arius that worship of Christ was obliga
tory, the later Unitarians have perceived the impropriety of worshiping
even the highest of created beings, and have constantly tended to a view of
the Redeemer which regards him as a mere man, standing in a peculiarly
intimate relation to God.
It is evident that the theory of Arius does not satisfy the demands of
Scripture. A created God, a God whose existence had a beginning and
therefore may come to an end, a God made of a substance which once was
not, and therefore a substance different from that of the Father, is not God,
but a finite creature. But the Scripture speaks of Christ as being in the
beginning God, with God, and equal with God.
rV. This Tripersonality is not Tbitheism ; fob, while there are
three Persons, there is but one Essence.
(a) The term 'person' only approximately represents the truth.
Although this word, more nearly than any other single word, expresses
the conception which the Scriptures give us of the relation between the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, it is not itself used in this connection
in Scripture, and we employ it in a qualified sense, not in the ordinary
sense in which we apply the word ' person ' to Peter, Paul, and John.
( 6 ) The necessary qualification is that, whUe three persons among men
have only a specific unity of nature or essence — that is, have the same
species of nature or essence, — the persons of the Godhead have a numeri
cal unity of nature or essence — that is, have the same nature or essence.
The undivided essence of the Godhead belongs equaUy to each of the per
sons ; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each possesses aU the substance and
aU the attributes of Deity. The plurahty of the Godhead is therefore not
a plurahty of essence, but a plurahty of hypostatical, or personal, distinc
tions. God is not three and one, but three in one. The one indivisible
essence has three modes of subsistence.
( c ) This oneness of essence explains the fact that, whUe Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit, as respects their personahty, are distinct subsistences, there is
an intercommunion of persons and an immanence of one divine person in
another which permits the peculiar work of one to be ascribed, with a sin
gle limitation, to either of the others, and the manifestation of one to be
recognized in the manifestation of another. The limitation is simply this,
that although the Son was sent by the Father, and the Sphitby the Father
and the Son, it cannot be said vice versa-thai, the Father is sent either by
the Son, or by the Spirit. The Scripture representations of this intercom
munion prevent us from conceiving of the distinctions called Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit as involving separation between them.
V. The Three Pebsons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are equal.
In explanation, notice that :
1. These titles belong to the Persons.
( a ) The Father is not God as such ; for God is not only Father, but
also Son and Holy Spirit. The term ' Father' designates that hypostat-

90 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
ical distinction in the divine nature in virtue of which God is related to the
Son, and through the Son and the Spirit to the church and the world. As
author of the behever's spiritual as weU as natural hfe, God is doubly his
Father ; but this relation which God sustains to creatures is not the ground
of the title. God is Father primarily in virtue of the relation which he
sustains to the eternal Son ; only as we are spiritually united to Jesus
Christ do we become children of God.
( 6 ) The Son is not God as such ; for God is not only Son, but also
Father and Holy Spirit. ' The Son ' designates that distinction in virtue
of which God is Belated to the Father, is sent by the Father to redeem the
world, and with the Father sends the Holy Spirit.
( e ) The Holy Spirit is not God as such ; for- God is not only Holy Spirit,
but also Father and Son. * The Holy Spirit ' designates that distinction in
virtue of which God is related to the Father and the Son, and is sent by
them to accomplish the work of renewing the ungodly and of sanctifying
the church.
2. Qualified sense of these titles.
Like the word ' person ', the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not
to be confined within the precise limitations of meaning which would be
required if they were applied to men.
( a ) The Scriptures enlarge our conceptions of Christ's Sonship by
giving to him in his preexistent state the names of the Logos, the Image,
and the Effulgence of God. — The term 'Logos ' combines in itself the two
ideas of thought and word, of reason and expression. WhUe the Logos as
divine thought or reason is one with God, the Logos as divine word or
expression is distinguishable from God. Words are the means by which
personal beings express or reveal themselves. Since Jesus Christ was " the
Word " before there were any creatures to whom revelations could be made,
it would seem to be only a necessary inference from this title that in Christ
God must be from eternity expressed or revealed to himself ; in other
words, that the Logos is the principle of truth, or self -consciousness, in
God. — The term ' Image ' suggests the ideas of copy or counterpart. Man
is the image of God only relatively and derivatively. Christ is the Image
of God absolutely and archetypaUy. As the perfect representation of the
Father's perfections, the Son would seem to be the object and principle of
love in the Godhead. — The term ' Effulgence,' finaUy, is an aUusion to the
sun and its radiance. As the effulgence of the sun manifests the sun's
nature, which otherwise would be unrevealed, yet is inseparable from
the sun and ever one with it, so Christ reveals God, but is eternaUy one
with God. Here is a principle of movement, of wUl, which seems to con
nect itself with the holiness, or self-asserting purity, of the divine nature.
( 6 ) The names thus given to the second person of the Trinity, if they
have any significance, bring him before our minds in the general aspect
of Revealer, and suggest a relation of the doctrine of the Trinity to God's
immanent attributes of truth, love, and hohness. The prepositions used to
describe the internal relations of the second person to the first are not pre-

THE THREE PERSONS HAVE ONE ESSENCE. 91
positions of rest, but prepositions of direction and movement. The Trinity,
as the organism of Deity, secures a life-movement of the Godhead, a pro
cess in which God evermore objectifies himself and in the Son gives forth
of his fulness. Christ represents the centrifugal action of the deity. But
there must be centripetal action also. In the Holy Spirit the movement is
completed, and the divine activity and thought returns into itself. True
rehgion, in reuniting us to God, reproduces in us, in our limited measure,
this eternal process of the divine mind. Christian experience witnesses that
God in himself is unknown ; Christ is the organ of external revelation ; the
Holy Spirit is the organ of internal revelation — only he can give us an
inward apprehension or realization of the truth. It is " through the eter
nal Spirit " that Christ " offered himself without blemish unto God," and
it is only through the Holy Spirit that the church has access to the Father,
or faUen creatures can return to God.
( c ) In the hght of what has been said, we may understand somewhat
more fully the characteristic differences between the work of Christ and
that of the Holy Spirit. We may sum them up in the four statements that,
first, aU outgoing seems to be the work of Christ, aU return to God the
work of the Spirit ; secondly, Christ is the organ of external revelation,
the Holy Spirit the organ of internal revelation ; thirdly, Christ is our
advocate in heaven, the Holy Spirit is our advocate in the soul ; fourthly, in
the work of Christ we are passive, in the work of the Spirit we are active.
Of the work of Christ we shall treat more fully hereafter, in speaking of
his Offices as Prophet, Priest, and King. The work of the Holy Spirit
wUl be treated when we come to speak of the Apphcation of Redemption in
Regeneration and Sanctification. Here it is sufficient to say that the Holy
Spirit is represented in the Scriptures as the author of hfe — in creation,
in the conception of Christ, in regeneration, in resurrection ; and as the
giver of hght — in the insphation of Scripture writers, in the conviction of
sinners, in the Ulumination and sanctification of Christians.
3. Generation and procession consistent with equality.
That the Sonship of Christ is eternal, is intimated in Psalm 2:7. " This
day have I begotten thee " is most naturally interpreted as the declar
ation of an eternal fact" in the divine nature. Neither the incarnation, the
baptism, the transfiguration, nor the resurrection marks the beginning of
Christ's Sonship, or constitutes him Son of God. These are but recogni
tions or manifestations of a preexisting Sonship, inseparable from his God-
hood. He is "born before every creature" (while yet no created thing
existed — see Meyer on Col. 1 : 15) and "by the resurrection of the dead"
is not made to be, but only "declared to be," " according to the Spirit of
holiness" (= according to his divine nature) "the Son of God with
power " ( see PhUippi and Alf ord on Rom. 1 : 3, 4). This Sonship is unique
 not predicable of, or shared with, any creature. The Scriptures inti
mate, not only an eternal generation of the Son, but an eternal procession
of the Spirit.
The Scripture terms 'generation' and 'procession,' as applied to the
Son and to the Holy Spirit, are but approximate expressions of the truth,

92 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
and we are to correct by other declarations of Scripture any imperfect
impressions which we might derive solely from them. We use these terms
in a special sense, which we explicitly state and define as excluding aU
notion of inequality between the persons of the Trinity. The eternal gen
eration of the Son to which we hold is
( a ) Not creation, but the Father's communication of himself to the
Son. Since the names, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not applicable to
the divine essence, but are only apphcable to its hypostatical distinctions,
they imply no derivation of the essence of the Son from the essence of
the Father.
( 6 ) Not a commencement of existence, but an eternal relation to the
Father, — there never having been a time when the Son began to be, or
when the Son did not exist as God with the Father.
( c ) Not an act of the Father's wiU, but an internal necessity of the
divine nature, — so that the Son is no more dependent upon the Father than
the Father is dependent upon the Son, and so that, if it be consistent with
deity to be Father, it is equally consistent with deity to be Son.
( d ) Not a relation in any way analogous to physical derivation, but a lif e-
movement of the divine nature, in virtue of which Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit, whUe equal in essence and dignity, stand to each other in an order
of personahty, office, and operation, and in virtue of which the Father
works through the Son, and the Father and the Son through the Spirit.
The same principles upon which we interpret the declaration of Christ's
eternal Sonship apply to the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father
through the Son, and show this to be not inconsistent with the Spirit's
equal dignity and glory.
We therefore only formulate truth which is concretely expressed in
Scripture, and which is recognized by all ages of the church in hymns and
prayers addressed to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, when we assert that in
the nature of the one God there are three eternal distinctions, which are
best described as persons, and each of which is the proper and equal object
of Christian worship.
We are also warranted in declaring that, in virtue of these personal
distinctions or modes of subsistence, God exists in the relations, respect
ively, first, of Source, Origin, Authority, and in this relation is the Father ;
secondly, of Expression, Medium, Revelation, and in this relation is the
Son ; thirdly, of Apprehension, Accomplishment, Realization, and in this
relation is the Holy Spirit.
VI. Inscrutable, yet not self-contradictory, this Doctrine fur
nishes the Key to all other Doctrines.
1. The mode of this triune existence is inscrutable.
It is inscrutable because there are no analogies to it in our finite experi
ence. For this reason aU attempts are vain adequately to represent it :
( a ) From inanimate things — as the fountain, the stream, and the rivulet
trickling from it ( Athanasius ) ; the cloud, the rain, and the rising mist

INSCRUTABLE, YET NOT SELF-CONTRADICTORY. 93
( Boardman ) ; color, shape, and size ( F. W. Robertson ) ; the actinic, lumi-
nif erous, and calorific principles in the ray of hght ( Solar Hieroglyphics,
34). ( 6 ) From the constitution or processes of our own minds — as the
psychological unity of intellect, affection, and wUl ( substantiaUy held by
Augustine ) ; the logical unity of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis ( Hegel) ;
the metaphysical unity of subject, object, and subject-object ( Melanchthon,
Olshausen, Shedd).
No one of these furnishes any proper analogue of the Trinity, since in
no one of them is there found the essential element of tripersonality. Such
illustrations may sometimes be used to disarm objection, but they furnish
no positive explanation of the mystery of the Trinity, and, unless carefully
guarded, may lead to grievous error.
2. The doctrine of the Trinity is not self-contradictory.
This it would be, only if it declared God to be three in the same numerical
sense in which he is said to be one. This we do not assert. We assert
simply that the same God who is one with respect to his essence is three
with respect to the internal distinctions of that essence, or with respect to
the modes of his being. The possibility of this cannot be denied, except
by assuming that the human mind is in aU respects the measure of the
divine. The fact that the ascending scale of life is marked by increasing differen
tiation of faculty and function should rather lead us to expect in the highest
of aU beings a nature more complex than our own. In man many faculties
are united in one intelhgent being, and the more inteUigent man is, the
more distinct from each other these faculties become ; untU intellect and
affection, conscience and wUl assume a relative independence, and there
arises even the possibUity of conflict between them. There is nothing irra
tional or self -contradictory in the doctrine that in God the leading functions
are yet more markedly differentiated, so that they become personal, while
at the same time these personahties are united by the fact that they each
and equaUy manifest the one indivisible essence.
3. The doctrine of the Trinity has important relations to other doc
trines. A. It is essential to any proper theism.
Neither God's independence nor God's blessedness can be maintained
upon grounds of absolute unity. Anti-trinitarianism almost necessarUy
makes creation indispensable to God's perfection, tends to a behef in the
eternity of matter, and ultimately leads, as in Mohammedanism, and in
modern Judaism and Unitarianism, to Pantheism. " Love is an impossible
exercise to a sohtary being." Without Trinity we cannot hold to ahving
Unity in the Godhead.
B. It is essential to any proper revelation.
If there be no Trinity, Christ is not God, and cannot perfectly know or
reveal God. Christianity is no longer the one, aU-inclusive, and final reve-

94 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
lation, but only one of many conflicting and competing systems, each of
which has its portion of truth, but also its portion of error. So too with
the Holy Spirit. " As God can be revealed only through God, so also can
he be appropriated only through God. If the Holy Spirit be not God,
then the love and self -communication of God to the human soul are not a
reahty." In other words, without the doctrine of the Trinity we go back
to mere natural religion and the far-off God of deism, — and this is ulti
mately exchanged for pantheism in the way already mentioned.
C. It is essential to any proper redemption.
If God be absolutely and simply one, there can be no mediation or atone
ment, since between God and the most exalted creature the gulf is infinite.
Christ cannot bring us nearer to God than he is himself. Only one who is
God can reconcUe us to God. So, too, only one who is God can purify our
souls. A God who is only unity, but in whom is no plurality, may be our
Judge, but, so far as we can see, cannot be our Savior or our Sanctifier.
D. It is essential to any proper model for human life.
If there be no Trinity immanent in the divine nature, then Fatherhood
in God has had a beginning and it may have an end ; Sonship, moreover,
is no longer a perfection, but an imperfection, ordained for a temporary
purpose. But if fatherly giving and filial receiving are eternal in God,
then the law of love requires of us conformity to God in both these respects
as the highest dignity of our being.

CHAPTEE III.
THE DECREES OF GOD.
L Definition of Decrees.
By the decrees of God we mean that eternal plan by which God has
rendered certain aU the events of the universe, past, present, and future.
Notice in explanation that :
( a ) The decrees are many only to our finite comprehension ; in their
own nature they are but one plan, which embraces not only effects but also
causes, not only the ends to be secured but also the means needful to
secure them.
( 6 ) The decrees, as the eternal act of an infinitely perfect wUl, though
they have logical relations to each other, have no chronological relation.
They are not therefore the result of deliberation, in any sense that implies
short-sightedness or hesitancy.
( c ) Since the wiU in which the decrees have their origin is a free wUl,
the decrees are not a merely instinctive or necessary exercise of the divine
inteUigence or vohtion, such as pantheism supposes.
( d) The decrees have reference to things outside of God. God does not
decree to be holy, nor to exist as three persons in one essence.
( e ) The decrees primarily respect the acts of God himself, in Creation,
Providence, and Grace ; secondarily, the acts of free creatures, which he
foresees wUl result therefrom.
(/) The decree to act is not the act. The decrees are an internal exer
cise and manifestation of the divine attributes, and are not to be confounded
with Creation, Providence, and Redemption, which are the execution of the
decrees. ( g ) The decrees are therefore not addressed to creatures ; are not of the
nature of statute law ; and lay neither compulsion nor obligation upon the
wills of men.
( h ) AU human acts, whether evil or good, enter into the divine plan and
so are objects of God's decrees, although God's actual agency with regard
to the evU is only a permissive agency.
( i ) WhUe God's total plan with regard to creatures is caUed predesti
nation, or f oreordination, his purpose so to act that certain wiU beheve and
be saved is called election, and his purpose so to act that certain will refuse
to beheve and be lost is caUed reprobation. We discuss election and repro
bation, in a later chapter, as a part of the Apphcation of Redemption.
95

96 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
H. Proof op the dootbine of Decrees,
1. From Scripture.
A. The Scriptures declare that all things are included in the divine
decrees. B. They declare that special things and events are decreed ; as,
for example, ( a ) the stability of the physical universe ; ( b ) the outward
chcumstances of nations ; ( c ) the length of human life ; ( d ) the mode of
our death ; ( e ) the free acts of men, both good acts and evil acts. C.
They declare that God has decreed (a ) the salvation of believers ; ( b ) the
establishment of Christ's kingdom ; ( c ) the work of Christ and of his
people in establishing it.
2. From Reason.
( a ) From the divine foreknowledge.
Foreknowledge implies fixity, and fixity implies decree. — From eternity
God foresaw all the events of the universe as fixed and certain. This fixity
and certainty could not have had its ground either in bhnd fate or in the
variable wills of men, since neither of these had an existence. It could
have had its ground in nothing outside the divine mind, for in eternity
nothing existed besides the divine mind. But for this fixity there must
have been a cause ; if anything in the future was fixed, something must
have fixed it. This fixity could have had its ground only in the plan and
purpose of God. In fine, if God foresaw the future as certain, it must have
been because there was something in himself which made it certain ; or, in
other words, because he had decreed it.
Decreeing creation implies decreeing the foreseen results of creation. —
To meet the objection that God might have foreseen the events of the uni
verse, not because he had decreed each one, but only because he had
decreed to create the universe and institute its laws, we may put the argu
ment in another form. In eternity there could have been no cause of the
future existence of the universe, outside of God himself, since no being
existed but God himself. In eternity God foresaw that the creation of the
world and the institution of its laws would make certain its actual history
even to the most insignificant details. But God decreed to create and to
institute these laws. In so decreeing he necessarUy decreed all that was
to come. In fine, God foresaw the future events of the universe as certain,
because he had decreed to create ; but this determination to create involved
also a determination of aU the actual results of that creation ; or, in other
words, God decreed those results.
No undecreed event can be foreseen. — We grant that God decrees pri
marily and directly his own acts of creation, providence, and grace ; but
we claim that this involves also a secondary and indirect decreeing of the
acts of free creatures which he foresees wUl result therefrom. There is
therefore no such thing in God as scientia media, or knowledge of an
event that is to be, though it does not enter into the divine plan ; for to say
that God foresees an undecreed event, is to say that he views as future an
event that is merely possible ; or, in other words, that he views an event
not as it is.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF DECREES. 97
Only knowledge of that which is decreed is foreknowledge. — Knowledge
of a plan as ideal or possible may precede decree ; but knowledge of a plan
as actual or fixed must foUow decree. Only the latter knowledge is
properly /oreknowledge. God therefore foresees creation, causes, laws,
events, consequences, because he has decreed creation, causes, laws, events,
consequences ; that is, because he has embraced aU these in his plan. The
denial of decrees logicaUy involves the denial of God's foreknowledge of
free human actions ; and to this Socinians, and some Arminians, are
actuaUy led.
( 6 ) From the divine wisdom.
It is the part of wisdom to proceed in every undertaking according to a
plan. The greater the undertaking, the more needful a plan. Wisdom,
moreover, shows itself in a careful provision for all possible circumstances
and emergencies that can arise in the execution of its plan. That many
such circumstances and emergencies are uncontemplated and unprovided
for in the plans of men, is due only to the hmitations of human wisdom.
It belongs to infinite wisdom, therefore, not only to have a plan, but to
embrace aU, even the minutest detaUs, in the plan of the universe.
( c ) From the divine immutabUity.
What God does, he always purposed to do. Since with him there is no
increase of knowledge or power, such as characterizes finite beings, it fol
lows that what under any given circumstances he permits or does, he must
have eternaUy decreed to permit or do. To suppose that God has a multi
tude of plans, and that he changes his plan with the exigencies of the situ
ation, is to make him infinitely dependent upon the varying wills of his
creatures, and to deny to him one necessary element of perfection, namely,
immutabUity. ( d ) From the divine benevolence.
The events of the universe, if not determined by the divine decrees, must
be determined either by chance or by the wills of creatures. It is contrary
to any proper conception of the divine benevolence to suppose that God
permits the course of nature and of history, and the ends to which both
these are moving, to be determined for myriads of sentient beings by any
other force or wiU than his own. Both reason and revelation, therefore,
compel us to accept the doctrine of the Westminster Confession, that " God
did from all eternity, by the most just and holy counsel of his own wiU,
freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass."
TTT, Objections to the doctrine of Decrees.
1. That they are inconsistent with the free agency of man.
To this we reply that :
A. The objection confounds the decrees with the execution of the
decrees. The decrees are, hke foreknowledge, an act eternal to the divine
nature, and are no more inconsistent with free agency than foreknowledge
is. Even foreknowledge of events implies that those events are fixed. If
this absolute fixity and foreknowledge is not inconsistent with free agency,
7

98 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
much less can that which is more remote from man's action, namely, the
hidden cause of this fixity and foreknowledge — God's decrees — be incon
sistent with free agency. If anything be inconsistent with man's free
agency, it must be, not the decrees themselves, but the execution of the
decrees in creation and providence.
B. The objection rests upon a false theory of free agency — namely, that
free agency imphes indeterminateness or uncertainty ; in other words, that
free agency cannot coexist with certainty as to the results of its exercise.
But it is necessity, not certainty, with which free agency is inconsistent.
Free agency is the power of self-determination in view of motives, or man's
power (a) to chose between motives, and (6) to direct his subsequent
activity according to the motive thus chosen. Motives are never a cause,
but only an occasion ; they influence, but never compel ; the man is the
cause, aud herein is his freedom. But it is also true that man is never in a
state of indeterminateness ; never acts without motive, or contrary to aU
motives ; there is always a reason why he acts, and herein is his rationality.
Now, so far as man acts according to previously dominant motive — see (6)
above — we may by knowing his motive predict his action, and our certainty
what that action wUl be in no way affects his freedom. We may even bring
motives to bear upon others, the influence of which we foresee, yet those
who act upon them may act in perfect freedom. But if man, influenced by
man, may stiU be free, then man, influenced by divinely foreseen motives,
may stUl be free, and the divine decrees, which simply render certain
man's actions, may also be perfectly consistent with man's freedom.
There is, however, a smaller class of human actions by which character
is changed, rather than expressed, and in which the man acts according to
a motive different from that which has previously been dominant — see ( a )
above. These actions also are foreknown by God, although they cannot
be predicted by man. Man's freedom in them would be inconsistent with
God's decrees, if the previous certainty of their occurrence were, not cer
tainty, but necessity ; or, in other words, if God's decrees were in all cases
decrees efficiently to produce the acts of his creatures. But this is not the
case. God's decrees may be executed by man's free causation, as easUy as
by God's ; and God's decreeing this free causation, in decreeing to create a
universe of which he foresees that this causation wiU be a part, in no way
interferes with the freedom of such causation, but rather secures and estab
lishes it. Both consciousness and conscience witness that God's decrees
are not executed by laying compulsion upon the free wills of men.
It may aid us, in estimating the force of this objection, to note the four
senses in which the term 'freedom' may be used. It may be used as
equivalent to (1 ) physical freedom, or absence of outward constraint ; (2)
formal freedom, or a state of moral indeterminateness ; ( 3 ) moral free
dom, or self-determinateness in view of motives ; (4) real freedom, or abil
ity to conform to the divine standard. With the first of these we are not now
concerned, since aU agree that the decrees lay no outward constraint upon
men. Freedom in the second sense has no existence, since aU men have
character. Free agency, or freedom in the third sense, has just been shown
to be consistent with the decrees. Freedom in the fourth sense, or real

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF DECREES. 99
freedom, is the special gift of God, and is not to be confounded with free
agency. The objection mentioned above rests whoUy upon the second of
these definitions of free agency. This we have shown to be false, and with
this the objection itself faUs to the ground.
2. That they take away all motive for human exertion.
To this we reply that :
( a ) They cannot thus influence men, since they are not addressed to
men, are not the rule of human action, and become known only after the
event. This objection is therefore the mere excuse of indolence and
disobedience. ( b ) The objection confounds the decrees of God with fate. But it is to
be observed that fate is uninteUigent, whUe the decrees are framed by a
personal God in infinite wisdom ; fate is indistinguishable from material
causation and leaves no room for human freedom, while the decrees exclude
aU notion of physical necessity ; fate embraces no moral ideas or ends,
whUe the decrees make these controlling in the universe.
(c) The objection ignores the logical relation between the decree of
the end and the decree of the means to secure it. The decrees of God not
only ensure the end to be obtained, but they ensure free human action
as logicaUy prior thereto. All conflict between the decrees and human
exertion must therefore be apparent and not real. Since consciousness
and Scripture assure us that free agency exists, it must exist by divine
decree ; and though we may be ignorant of the method in which the
decrees are executed, we have no right to doubt either the decrees or the
freedom. They must be held to be consistent, until one of them is proved
to be a delusion.
( d ) Since the decrees connect means and ends together, and ends are
decreed only as the result of means, they encourage effort instead of dis
couraging it. Behef in God's plan that success shaU reward toU, incites
to courageous and persevering effort. Upon the very ground of God's
decree, the Scripture urges us to the diligent use of means.
3. That they make God the author of sin.
To this we reply :
( a ) They make God, not the author of sin, but the author of free beings
who are themselves the authors of sin. God does not decree efficiently to
work evil desires or choices in men. He decrees sin only in the sense of
decreeing to create and preserve those who will sin ; in other words, he
decrees to create and preserve human wills which, in their own self -chosen
courses, wUl be and do evil. In all this, man attributes sin to himself and
not to God, and God hates, denounces, and punishes sin.
( b ) The decree to permit sin is therefore not an efficient but a permis
sive decree, or a decree to permit, in distinction from a decree to produce
by his own efficiency. No difficulty attaches to such a decree to permit sin,
which does not attach to the actual permission of it. But God does actuaUy
permit sin, and it must be right for him to permit it. It must therefore

100 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
be right for him to decree to permit it. If God's hohness and wisdom and
power are not impugned by the actual existence of moral evU, they are not
impugned by the original decree that it should exist.
( c ) The difficulty is therefore one which in substance clings to aU theis-
tic systems ahke — the question why moral evil is permitted under the
government of a God infinitely holy, wise, powerful, and good. This
problem is, to our finite powers, incapable of full solution, and must remain
to a great degree shrouded in mystery. With regard to it we can only say :
Negatively, — - that God does not permit moral evil because he is not unal
terably opposed to sin ; nor because moral evil was unforeseen and inde
pendent of his wUl ; nor because he could not have prevented it in a moral
system. Both observation and experience, which testify to multiplied
instances of dehverance from sin without violation of the laws of man's
being, forbid us to limit the power of God.
Positively, — we seem constrained to say that God permits moral evil
because moral evU, though in itself abhorrent to his nature, is yet the inci
dent of a system adapted to his purpose of seh-revelation ; and further,
because it is his wise and sovereign will to institute and maintain this sys
tem of which moral evU is an incident, rather than to withhold his seU-
revelation or to reveal himself through another system in which moral evU
hould be continuaUy prevented by the exercise of divine power.
TV. Concluding Remarks.
1. Practical uses of the doctrine of decrees.
(a) It inspires humility by its representation of God's unsearchable
counsels and absolute sovereignty. ( b ) It teaches confidence in him who
has wisely ordered our birth, our death, and our surroundings, even to the
minutest particulars, and has made aU things work together for the triumph
of his kingdom and the good of those who love him; ( c ) It shows the
enemies of God that, as their sins have been foreseen and provided for in
God's plan, so they can never, whUe remaining in theh sins, hope to escape
theh decreed and threatened penalty. ( d ) It urges the sinner to avail
himself of the appointed means of grace, if he would be counted among the
number of those for whom God has decreed salvation.
2. True method of preaching the doctrine.
{a) We should most caref uUy avoid exaggeration or unnecessarily obnox
ious statement. ( 6 ) We should emphasize the fact that the decrees are not
grounded in arbitrary wUl, but in infinite wisdom. ( c ) We should make
it plain that whatever God does or wiU do, he must from eternity have pur
posed to do. ( d ) We should illustrate the doctrine so far as possible by
instances of completeness and far-sightedness in human plans of great
enterprises. ( e ) We may then make extended apphcation of the truth to
the encouragement of the Christian and the admonition of the unbeliever.

CHAPTEE IV.
THE WORKS OF GOD ; OR THE EXECUTION OF THE DECREES.

SECTION I. — CREATION.
I. Definition of Creation.
By creation we mean that free act of the triune God by which in the
beginning for his own glory he made, without the use of preexisting mate
rials, the whole visible and invisible universe.
Creation is designed origination, by a transcendent and personal God,
of that which itself is not God. The universe is related to God as our own
volitions are related to ourselves. They are not ourselves, and we are
greater than they. Creation is not simply the idea of God, or even the
plan of God, but it is the idea externalized, the plan executed ; in other
words, it imphes an exercise, not only of inteUect, but also of wUl, and this
wUl is not an instinctive and unconscious wUl, but a wiU that is personal
and free. Such exercise of wiU seems to involve, not self-development, but
self -limitation, on the part of God ; the transformation of energy into
force, and so a beginning of time, with its finite successions. But, what
ever the relation of creation to time, creation makes the universe whoUy
dependent upon God, as its originator.
In further explanation of our definition we remark that
( a ) Creation is not "production out of nothing," as if " nothing " were
a substance out of which "something " could be formed.
( b ) Creation is not a fashioning of preexisting materials, nor an emana
tion from the substance of Deity, but is a making of that to exist which
once did not exist, either in form or substance.
(c) Creation is not a distinctive or necessary process of the divine
nature, but is the free act of a rational wiU, put forth for a definite and
sufficient end.
( d ) Creation is the act of the triune God, in the sense that aU the persons
of the Trinity, themselves uncreated, have a part in it — the Father as the
originating, the Son as the mediating, the Spirit as the realizing cause.
H. Proof op the Doctrine of Creation.
Creation is a truth of which mere science or reason cannot fuUy assure
us. Physical science can observe and record changes, but it knows nothing
of origins. Reason cannot absolutely disprove the eternity of matter.
101

102' NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
For proof of the doctrine of Creation, therefore, we rely whoUy upon
Scripture. Scripture supplements science, and renders its explanation of
the universe complete.
1. Direct Scripture Statements.
A. Genesis 1 :1 — " In the beginning God created the heaven and the
earth. " To this it has been objected that the verb NTS does not necessarily
denote production without the use of preexisting ma terials ( see Gen. 1 : 27
— " God created man in his own image " ; cf. 2:7 — " th e Lord God formed
man of the dust of the ground " ; also Ps. 51 : 10 — " Create in me a clean
heart"). We grant, in reply, that the argument for absolute creation derived from
the mere word NTS is not entirely conclusive. Other considerations in
connection with the use of this word , however, seem to render this inter
pretation of Gen. 1 : 1 the most plausible. Some of these considerations
we proceed to mention.
(a) WhUe we acknowledge that the verb NTS " do es not necessarily or
invariably denote production without the use of preexisting materials, we
still maintain that it signifies the production of an effect for which no nat
ural antecedent existed before, and which can be only the result of divine
agency." For this reason, in the Kal species it is used only of God, and is
never accompanied by any accusative denoting material.
( b) In the account of the creation, NT3 seems to be distinguished from
nty.1?, ' ' to make " either with or without the use of already existing material
(nwpb NT 3, "created in making" or "made by creation," in 2 ; 3 ; and
^.J?.!) of the firmament, in 1 : 7), and from TV', " to form " out of such mate
rial. ( See NT3;i, of man regarded as a spiritual being, in 1 : 27 ; but T5f ;t
of man regarded as a physical being, in 2 : 7.)
( c) The context shows that the meaning here is a making without the
use of preexisting materials. Since the earth in its rude, unformed, chaotic
condition is still called "the earth" in verse 2, the word NT 3 in verse 1
cannot refer to any shaping or fashioning of the elements, but must signify
the calling of them into being.
(d) The fact that NTS may have had an original signification of "cutting,"
"forming," and that it retains this meaning in the Piel conjugation, need
not prejudice the conclusion thus reached, since terms expressive of the
most spiritual processes are derived from sensuous roots. If NTS does not
signify absolute creation, no word exists in the Hebrew language that can
express this idea.
( e ) But this idea of production without the use of preexisting materials
unquestionably existed among the Hebrews. The later Scriptures show
that it had become natural to the Hebrew mind. The possession of this
idea by the Hebrews, whUe it is either not found at aU or is very dimly
and ambiguously expressed in the sacred books of the heathen, can be
best explained by supposing that it was derived from this early revelation
in Genesis.

THEORIES WHICH OPPOSE CREATION. 103
B. Hebrews 11:3 — "By faith we understand that the worlds have been
framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out
of things which appear " = the world was not made out of sensible and
preexisting material, but by the direct fiat of omnipotence ( see All' ord, and
Liinemann, Meyer's Com. in loco).
2. Indirect evidence from Scripture.
(a) The past duration of the world is limited ; ( b ) before the world
began to be, each of the persons of the Godhead already existed ; ( c ) the
origin of the universe is ascribed to God, and to each of the persons of the
Godhead. These representations of Scripture are not only most consistent
with the view that the universe was created by God without use of preex
isting material, but they are inexplicable upon any other hypothesis.
HI. Theories which oppose Creation.
1. Dualism.
Of dualism there are two forms :
A. That which holds to two self -existent principles, God and matter.
These are distinct from and coeternal with each other. Matter, however,
is an unconscious, negative, and imperfect substance, which is subordinate
to God and is made the instrument of his will. This was the underlying
principle of the Alexandrian Gnostics. It was essentiaUy an attempt to
combine with Christianity the Platonic or Aristotelian conception of the
vfai. In this way it was thought to account for the existence of evU, and
to escape the difficulty of imagining a production without use of preexist
ing material. BasUides ( flourished 125 ) and Valentinus ( died 160 ), the
representatives of this view, were influenced also by Hindu philosophy,
and their dualism is almost indistinguishable from pantheism. A similar
view has been held in modern times by John Stuart MiU and apparently by
Frederick W. Robertson.
With regard to this view we remark :
( a ) The maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, upon which it rests, is true only in
so far as it asserts that no event takes place without a cause. It is false, if
it mean that nothing can ever be made except out of material previously
existing. The maxim is therefore apphcable only to the realm of second
causes, and does not bar the creative power of the great first Cause. The
doctrine of creation does not dispense with a cause ; on the other hand,
it assigns to the universe a sufficient cause in God.
( b ) Although creation without the use of preexisting material is incon
ceivable, in the sense of being unpicturable to the imagination, yet the
eternity of matter is equaUy inconceivable. For creation without pre
existing material, moreover, we find remote analogies in our own creation
of ideas and volitions, a fact as inexplicable as God's bringing of new sub
stances into being.
( c ) It is unphUosophical to postulate two eternal substances, when one
self-existent Cause of aU things wiU account for the facts. ( d ) It contra-

104 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
diets our fundamental notion of God as absolute sovereign to suppose the
existence of any other substance to be independent of his will. ( e ) This
second substance with which God must of necessity work, since it is, accord
ing to the theory, inherently evU and the source of evU, not only limits
God's power, but destroys his blessedness. (/) This theory does not
answer its purpose of accounting for moral evU, unless it be also assumed
that spirit is material, — in which case dualism gives place to materialism.
The other form of dualism is :
B. That which holds to the eternal existence of two antagonistic spirits,
one evU and the other good. In this view, matter is not a negative and
imperfect substance which nevertheless has self -existence, but is either the
work or the instrument of a personal and positively malignant inteUigence,
who wages war against all good. This was the view of the Manichasans.
Manichseanism is a compound of Christianity and the Persian doctrine of
two eternal and opposite intelligences. Zoroaster, however, held matter to
be pure, and to be the creation of the good Being. Mani apparently
regarded matter as captive to the evil spirit, if not absolutely his creation.
Of this view we need only say that it is refuted ( a ) by aU the arguments
for the unity, omnipotence, sovereignty, and blessedness of God ; ( 6 ) by
the Scripture representations of the prince of evU as the creature of God
and as subject to God's control.
2. Emanation.
This theory holds that the universe is of the same substance with God,
and is the product of successive evolutions from his being. This was the
view of the Syrian Gnostics. Their system was an attempt to interpret
Christianity in the forms of Oriental theosophy. A similar doctrine was
taught, in the last century, by Swedenborg.
We object to it on the foUowing grounds : ( a ) It virtuaUy denies the
infinity and transcendence of God, — by applying to him a principle of
evolution, growth, and progress which belongs only to the finite and imper
fect. ( b ) It contradicts the divine holiness, — since man, who by the
theory is of the substance of God, is nevertheless moraUy evil. ( c ) It
leads logicaUy to pantheism, — since the claim that human personahty is
illusory cannot be maintained without also surrendering behef in the per
sonahty of God.
3. Creation from eternity.
This theory regards creation as an act of God in eternity past. It was
propounded by Origen, and has been held in recent times by Martensen,
Martineau, John Caird, Knight, and Pfleiderer. The necessity of suppos
ing such creation from eternity has been argued from God's omnipotence,
God's timelessness, God's immutabUity, and God's love. We consider
each of these arguments in their order.
( a ) Creation from eternity is not necessitated by God's omnipotence.
Omnipotence does not necessarily imply actual creation ; it implies only

THEORIES WHICH OPPOSE CREATION. 105
power to create. Creation, moreover, is in the nature of the case a thing
begun. Creation from eternity is a contradiction in terms, and that which
is self -contradictory is not an object of power.
(6) Creation from eternity is not necessitated by God's timelessness.
Because God is free from the law of time it does not f oUow that creation is
free from that law. Rather is it true that no eternal creation is conceiv
able, since this involves an infinite number. Time must have had a begin
ning, and since the universe and time are coexistent, creation could not
have been from eternity.
(c) Creation from eternity is not necessitated by God's immutabUity.
His immutabUity requires, not an eternal creation, but only an eternal plan
of creation. The opposite principle would compel us to deny the possibility
of miracles, incarnation, and regeneration. Like creation, these too would
need to be eternal
( d ) Creation from eternity is not necessitated by God's love. Creation
is finite and cannot furnish perfect satisfaction to the infinite love of God.
God has moreover from eternity an object of love infinitely superior to any
possible creation, in the person of his Son.
(e) Creation from eternity, moreover, is inconsistent with the divine
independence and personality. Since God's power and love are infinite, a
creation that satisfied them must be infinite in extent as weU as eternal in
past duration — in other words, a creation equal to God. But a God thus
dependent upon external creation is neither free nor sovereign. A God
existing in necessary relations to the universe, if different in substance from
the universe, must be the God of dualism ; if of the same substance with the
universe, must be the God of pantheism.
4. Spontaneous generation.
This theory holds that creation is but the name for a natural process still
going on, — matter itself having in it the power, under proper conditions,
of taking on new functions, and of developing into organic forms. This
view is held by Owen and Bastian. We object that
(a) It is a pure hypothesis, not only unverified, but contrary to aU known
facts. No credible instance of the production of living forms from inor
ganic material has yet been adduced. So far as science can at present teach
us, the law of nature is " omne vivum e vivo," or " ex ovo."
( b ) H such instances could be authenticated, they would prove nothing
as against a proper doctrine of creation, — for there would stUl exist an
impossibility of accounting for these vivific properties of matter, except
upon the Scriptural view of an inteUigent Contriver and Originator of
matter and its laws. In short, evolution imphes previous involution, — if
anything comes out of matter, it must first have been put in.
(c) This theory, therefore, if true, only supplements the doctrine of
original, absolute, immediate creation, with another doctrine of mediate
and derivative creation, or the development of the materials and forces
originated at the beginning. This development, however, cannot proceed to

106 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
any valuable end without guidance of the same inteUigence which initiated
it. The Scriptures, although they do not sanction the doctrine of sponta
neous generation, do recognize processes of development as supplementing
the divine fiat which first called the elements into being.
IV. The Mosaic Account op Creation.
1. Its twofold nature, — as uniting the ideas of creation and of develop
ment. ( a ) Creation is asserted. — The Mosaic narrative avoids the error of mak
ing the universe eternal or the result of an eternal process. The cosmogony
of Genesis, unlike the cosmogonies of the heathen, is prefaced by the
originating act of God, and is supplemented by successive manifestations
of creative power in the introduction of brute and of human hfe.
( b ) Development is recognized. — The Mosaic account represents the
presenv order of things as the result, not simply of original creation, but
also of subsequent arrangement and development. A fashioning of inor
ganic materials is described, and also a use of these materials in providing
the conditions of organized existence. Life is described as reproducing
itseh, after its first introduction, according to its own laws and by virtue of
its own inner energy.
2. Its proper interpretation.
We adopt neither ( a ) the aUegorical, or mythical, ( 6 ) the hyperliteral,
nor (c) the hyperscientific interpretation of the Mosaic narrative ; but
rather (d) the pictorial-summary interpretation, — which holds that the
account is a rough sketch of the history of creation, true in aU its essential
features, but presented in a graphic form suited to the common mind and
to earlier as weU as to later ages. WhUe conveying to primitive man as
accurate an idea of God's work as man was able to comprehend, the revela
tion was yet given in pregnant language, so that it could expand to all the
ascertained results of subsequent physical research. This general corres
pondence of the narrative with the teachings of science, and its power to
adapt itself to every advance in human knowledge, differences it from every
other cosmogony current among men.
V. God's End in Creation.
Infinite wisdom must, in creating, propose to itseh the most comprehen
sive and the most valuable of ends, — the end most worthy of God, and the
end most fruitful in good. Only in the hght of the end proposed can we
properly judge of God's work, or of God's character as revealed therein.
In determining this end, we turn first to :
1. The testimony of Scripture.
This may be summed up in four statements. God finds his end ( a ) in
himself ; ( b ) in his own wUl and pleasure ; ( c ) in his own glory ; ( d ) in
the making known of his power, his wisdom, his holy name. AU these
statements may be combined in the following, namely, that God's supreme
end in creation is nothing outside of himself, but is his own glory — in the

god's end in creation. 107
revelation, in and through creatures, of the infinite perfection of his own
being. Since holiness is the fundamental attribute in God, to make himself, his
own pleasure, his own glory, his own manifestation, to be his end in crea
tion, is to find his chief end in his own holiness, its maintenance, expres
sion, and communication. To make this his chief end, however, is not to
exclude certain subordinate ends, such as the revelation of his wisdom,
power, and love, and the consequent happiness of innumerable creatures to
whom this revelation is made.
2. The testimony of reason.
That his own glory, in the sense just mentioned, is God's supreme end
in creation, is evident from the f oUowing considerations :
(a) God's own glory is the only end actuaUy and perfectly attained in
the universe. Wisdom and omnipotence cannot choose an end which is
destined to be forever unattained ; for "what his soul desireth, even that
he doeth" (Job 23 :13). God's supreme end cannot be the happiness of
creatures, since many are miserable here and wiU be miserable forever.
God's supreme end cannot be the holiness of creatures, for many are
unholy here and wUl be unholy forever. But whUe neither the hohness
nor the happiness of creatures is actually and perfectly attained, God's
glory is made known and will be made known in both the saved and the
lost. This then must be God's supreme end in creation.
(6) God's glory is the end intrinsically most valuable. The good of
creatures is of insignificant importance compared with this. Wisdom dic
tates that the greater interest should have precedence of the less. Because
God can choose no greater end, he must choose for his end himself. But
this is to choose his holiness, and his glory in the manifestation of that
holiness. ( c ) His own glory is the only end which consists with God's independ
ence and sovereignty. Every being is dependent upon whomsoever or
whatsoever he makes his ultimate end. If anything in the creature is the
last end of God, God is dependent upon the creature. But since God is
dependent only on himself, he must find in himself his end.
( d ) His own glory is an end which comprehends and secures, as a sub
ordinate end, every interest of the universe. The interests of the universe
are bound up in the interests of God. There is no holiness or happiness
for creatures except as God is absolute sovereign, and is recognized as
such. It is therefore not selfishness, but benevolence, for God to make
his own glory the supreme object of creation. Glory is not vain-glory, and
in expressing his ideal, that is, in expressing himself, in his creation, he
communicates to his creatures the utmost possible good.
( e ) God's glory is the end which in a right moral system is proposed to
creatures. This must therefore be the end which he in whose image they
are made proposes to himself. He who constitutes the centre and end of

108 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
all his creatures must find his centre and end in himself. This principle
of moral philosophy, and the conclusion drawn from it, are both explicitly
and implicitly taught in Scripture.
VI. Relation op the Doctrine of Creation to other Doctrines.
1. To the holiness and benevolence of God.
Creation, as the work of God, manifests of necessity God's moral attri
butes. But the existence of physical and moral evU in the universe appears,
at first sight, to impugn these attributes, and to contradict the Scripture
declaration that the work of God's hand was "very good" (Gen. 1 :31).
This difficulty may be in great part removed by considering that :
( a ) At its first creation, the world was good in two senses : first, as free
from moral evU, — sin being a later addition, the work, not of God, but of
created spirits ; secondly, as adapted to beneficent ends, — for example,
the revelation of God's perfection, and the probation and happiness of
intelligent and obedient creatures.
( b ) Physical pain and imperfection, so far as they existed before the
introduction of moral evil, are to be regarded : first, as congruous parts of
a system of which sin was foreseen to be an incident ; and secondly, as
constituting, in part, the means of future disciphne and redemption for the
faUen. 2. To the wisdom and free-will of God.
No plan whatever of a finite creation can fully express the infinite per
fection of God. Since God, however, is immutable, he must always have
had a plan of the universe ; since he is perfect, he must have had the best
possible plan. As wise, God cannot choose a plan less good, instead of one
more good. As rational, he cannot between plans equaUy good make a
merely arbitrary choice. Here is no necessity, but only the certainty that
infinite wisdom wUl act wisely. As no compulsion from without, so no
necessity from within, moves God to create the actual universe. Creation
is both wise and free.
3. To Christ as the Revealer of God.
Since Christ is the Revealer of God in creation as weU as in redemption,
the remedy for pessimism is ( 1 ) the recognition of God's transcendence —
the universe at -present not fully expressing his power, his holiness or his
love, and nature being a scheme of progressive evolution which we imper
fectly comprehend and in which there is much to follow ; ( 2 ) the recog
nition of sin as the free act of the creature, by which aU sorrow and pain
have been caused, so that God is in no proper sense its author ; ( 3 ) the
recognition of Christ for us on the Cross and Christ in us by his Spirit, as
revealing the age-long sorrow and suffering of God's heart on account of
human transgression, and as manifested, in self-sacrificing love, to dehver
men from the manifold evUs in which their sins have involved them ; and
( 4 ) the recognition of present probation and future judgment, so that pro
vision is made for removing the scandal now resting upon the divine
government and for justifying the ways of God to men.

DEFINITION OF PRESERVATION. 109
4. To Providence and Redemption.
Christianity is essentially a scheme of supernatural love and power. It
conceives of God as above the world, as weU as in it, — able to manifest
himself, and actuaUy manifesting himself, in ways unknown to mere nature.
But this absolute sovereignty and transcendence, which are manifested
in providence and redemption, are inseparable from creatorship. If the
world be eternal, hke God, it must be an efflux from the substance of God
and must be absolutely equal with God. Only a proper doctrine of creation
can secure God's absolute distinctness from the world and his sovereignty
over it.
The logical alternative of creation is therefore a system of pantheism, in
which God is an impersonal and necessary force. Hence the pantheistic
dicta of Fichte : " The assumption of a creation is the fundamental error
of aU false metaphysics and false theology " ; of Hegel : " God evolves the
world out of himself, in order to take it back into himself again in the
Spirit " ; and of Strauss : " Trinity and creation, speculatively viewed, are
one and the same, — only the one is viewed absolutely, the other
empiricaUy." 5. To the Observance of the Sabbath.
We perceive from this point of view, moreover, the importance and value
of the Sabbath, as commemorating God's act of creation, and thus God's
personahty, sovereignty and transcendence.
( a ) The Sabbath is of perpetual obhgation as God's appointed memorial
of his creating activity. The Sabbath requisition antedates the decalogue
and forms a part of the moral law. Made at the creation, it applies to man
as man, everywhere and always, in his present state of being.
( b ) Neither our Lord nor his apostles abrogated the Sabbath of the deca
logue. The new dispensation does away with the Mosaic prescriptions as
to the method of keeping the Sabbath, but at the same time declares its
observance to be of divine origin and to be a necessity of human nature.
( c ) The Sabbath law binds us to set apart a seventh portion of our time
for rest and worship. It does not enjoin the simultaneous observance by
aU the world of a fixed portion of absolute time, nor is such observance
possible. Christ's example and apostohc sanction have transferred the
Sabbath from the seventh day to the first, for the reason that this last is
the day of Christ's resurrection, and so the day when God's spiritual cre
ation became in Christ complete.

section ii. — preservation.
1. Definition op Preservation.
Preservation is that continuous agency of God by which he maintains
in existence the things he has created, together with the properties and
powers with which he has endowed them. As the doctrine of Creation is

110 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
our attempt to explain the existence of the universe, so the doctrine of
Preservation is our attempt to explain its continuance.
In explanation we remark :
( a) Preservation is not creation, for preservation presupposes creation.
That which is preserved must already exist, and must have come into exist
ence by the creative act of God.
( 6 ) Preservation is not a mere negation of action, or a refraining to
destroy, on the part of God. It is a positive agency by which, at every
moment, he sustains the persons and the forces of the universe.
( c ) Preservation imphes a natural concurrence of God in aU operations
of matter and of mind. Though personal beings exist and God's wUl is not
the sole force, it is stUl true that, without his concurrence, no person or
force can continue to exist or to act.
II. Proof of the Doctrine of Pbeservation.
1. From Scripture.
In a number of Scripture passages, preservation is expressly distin
guished from creation. Though God rested from his work of creation
and established an order of natural forces, a special and continuous divine
activity is declared to be put forth in the upholding of the universe and its
powers. This divine activity, moreover, is declared to be the activity of
Christ ; as he is the mediating agent in creation, so he is the mediating
agent in preservation.
2. From Reason.
We may argue the preserving agency of God from the foUowing
considerations :
(a) Matter and mind are not self-existent. Since they have not the
cause of theh being in themselves, their continuance as weU as theh origin
must be due to a superior power.
( b ) Force imphes a wUl of which it is the direct or indirect expression.
We know of force only through the exercise of our own wiUs. Since wiU
is the only cause of which we have direct knowledge, second causes in
nature may be regarded as only secondary, regular, and automatic workings
of the great first Cause.
( e ) God's sovereignty requires a behef in his special preserving agency ;
since this sovereignty would not be absolute, if anything occurred or
existed independent of his will.
HI. Theoeies which virtually deny the doctrine of Preservation.
1. Deism.
This view represents the universe as a self -sustained mechanism, from
which God withdrew as soon as he had created it, and which he left to a
process of self-development. It was held in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries by the Enghsh Herbert, Collins, Tindal, and Bolingbroke.

REMARKS UPON THE DIVINE CONCURRENCE. Ill
We object to this view that :
( a ) It rests upon a false analogy. — Man is able to construct a self-mov
ing watch only because he employs preexisting forces, such as gravity,
elasticity, cohesion. But in a theory which hkens the universe to a machine,
these forces are the very things to be accounted for.
( 6 ) It is a system of anthropomorphism, whUe it professes to exclude
anthropomorphism. — Because the upholding of all things would involve a
multiplicity of minute cares if man were the agent, it conceives of the
upholding of the universe as involving such burdens in the case of God.
Thus it saves the dignity of God by virtuaUy denying his omnipresence,
omniscience, and omnipotence.
( c ) It cannot be maintained without denying aU providential interfer
ence, in the history of creation and the subsequent history of the world. —
But the introduction of life, the creation of man, incarnation, regeneration,
the communion of inteUigent creatures with a present God, and interposi
tions of God in secular history, are matters of fact.
2. Continuous Creation.
This view regards the universe as from moment to moment the result of
a new creation. It was held by the New England theologians Edwards,
Hopkins, and Emmons, and more recently in Germany by Rothe.
To this we object, upon the foUowing grounds :
( a ) It contradicts the testimony of consciousness that regular and
executive activity is not the mere repetition of an initial decision, but is an
exercise of the wiU entirely different in kind.
( b ) It exaggerates God's power only by sacrificing his truth, love, and
holiness ; — for if finite personahties are not what they seem — namely,
objective existences — God's veracity is impugned ; if the human soul have
no real freedom and hfe, God's love has made no self-communication to
creatures ; if God's wUl is the only force in the universe, God's holiness
can no longer be asserted, for the divine wUl must in that case be regarded
as the author of human sin.
( c ) As deism tends to atheism, so the doctrine of continuous creation
tends to pantheism. — Arguing that, because we get our notion of force
from the action of our own wills, therefore aU force must be will, and divine
will, it is compeUed to merge the human wUl in this aU-comprehending
wUl of God. Mind and matter ahke become phenomena of one force,
which has the attributes of both ; and, with the distinct existence and per
sonality of the human soul, we lose the distinct existence and personahty
of God, as weU as the freedom and accountability of man.
IV. Remarks upon the Divine Concurrence.
( a ) The divine efficiency interpenetrates that of man without destroying
or absorbing it. The influx of God's sustaining energy is such that men
retain their natural faculties and powers. God does not work aU, but all
inaU.

112 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
( b ) Though God preserves mind and body in their working, we are
ever to remember that God concurs with the evU acts of his creatures only
as they are natural acts, and not as they are evil.

SECTION III. — PROVIDENCE.
I. Definition op Providence.
Providence is that continuous agency of God by which he makes aU the
events of the physical and moral universe fulfill the original design with
which he created it.
As Creation explains the existence of the universe, and as Preservation
explains its continuance, so Providence explains its evolution and progress.
In explanation notice :
( a ) Providence is not to be taken merely in its etymological sense of
foreseeing. It is /orseeing also, or a positive agency in connection with
aU the events of history.
( b ) Providence is to be distinguished from preservation. WhUe preser
vation is a maintenance of the existence and powers of created things,
providence is an actual care and control of them.
( c ) Since the original plan of God is aU-comprehending, the providence
which executes the plan is all-comprehending also, embracing within its
scope things smaU and great, and exercising care over individuals as well
as over classes.
( d ) In respect to the good acts of men, providence embraces aU those
natural influences of birth and surroundings which prepare men for the
operation of God's word and Spirit, and which constitute motives to obe
dience. ( e ) In respect to the evil acts of men, providence is never the efficient
cause of sin, but is by turns preventive, permissive, directive, and deter
minative. (/) Since Christ is the only revealer of God, and he is the medium of
every divine activity, providence is to be regarded as the work of Christ ;
see 1 Cor. 8:6 — " one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are aU things " ;
c/. John 5 : 17 — " My Father worketh even until now, and I work."
H. Proof of the Doctrine of Providence.
1. Scriptural Proof.
The Scripture witnesses to
A. A general providential government and control ( a ) over the uni
verse at large ; ( b ) over the physical world ; ( c ) over the brute creation ;
( d ) over the affairs of nations ; ( e ) over man's birth and lot in hfe ;
(/) over the outward successes andfaUures of men's lives ; (g) over things

PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. 113
seemingly accidental or insignificant ; ( h ) in the protection of the
righteous ; ( i ) in the supply of the wants of God's people ; {j ) in the
arrangement of answers to prayer ; ( k ) in the exposure and punishment
of the wicked.
B. A government and control extending to the free actions of men —
( a) to men's free acts in general ; ( b ) to the sinful acts of men also.
God's providence with respect to men's evU acts is described in Scripture
as of four sorts :
(a) Preventive, — God by his providence prevents sin which would
otherwise be committed. That he thus prevents sin is to be regarded as
matter, not of obhgation, but of grace.
( b ) Permissive, — God permits men to cherish and to manifest the evil
dispositions of their hearts. God's permissive providence is simply the
negative act of withholding impediments from the path of the sinner,
instead of preventing his sin by the exercise of divine power. It implies
no ignorance, passivity, or indulgence, but consists with hatred of the sin
and determination to punish it.
( c) Directive, — God directs the evU aats of men to ends unforeseen and
unintended by the agents. When evU is in the heart and wUl certainly
come out, God orders its flow in one direction rather than in another, so
that its course can be best controUed and least harm may result. This is
sometimes caUed overruling providence.
(d) Determinative, — God determines the bounds reached by the evil
passions of his creatures, and the measure of their effects. Since moral
evU is a germ capable of indefinite expansion, God's determining the
measure of its growth does not alter its character or involve God's com
plicity with the perverse wills which cherish it.
2. Rational proof.
A. Arguments a priori from the divine attributes. ( a ) From the
immutabUity of God. This makes it certain that he wUl execute his eter
nal plan of the universe and its history. But the execution of this plan
involves not only creation and preservation, but also providence. ( b ) From
the benevolence of God. This renders it certain that he wUl care for the
inteUigent universe he has created. What it was worth his whUe to create,
it is worth his whUe to care for. But this care is providence. ( e ) From
the justice of God. As the source of moral law, God must assure the vin
dication of law by administering justice in the universe and punishing
the rebellious. But this administration of justice is providence.
B. Arguments a posteriori from the facts of nature and of history.
( a ) The outward lot of individuals and nations is not whoUy in their own
hands, but is in many acknowledged respects subject to the disposal of a
higher power. ( b ) The observed moral order of the world, although
imperfect, cannot be accounted for without recognition of a divine provi
dence. Vice is discouraged and virtue rewarded, in ways which are beyond
the power of mere nature. There must be a governing mind and wUl, and
this mind and will must be the mind and wUl of God.
8

114 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
HI. Theories opposing the Doctrine op Providence.
1. Fatalism.
Fatalism maintains the certainty, but denies the freedom, of human self-
determination, — thus substituting fate for providence.
To this view we object that ( a ) it contradicts consciousness, which testi
fies that we are free ; ( 6 ) it exalts the divine power at the expense of
God's truth, wisdom, hohness, love ; ( c ) it destroys aU evidence of the
personahty and freedom of God ; ( d ) it practicaUy makes necessity the
only God, and leaves the imperatives of our moral nature without present
validity or future vindication.
2. Casualism.
Casualism transfers the freedom of mind to nature, as fatalism transfers
the fixity of nature to mind. It thus exchanges providence for chance.
Upon this view we remark :
( a ) If chance be only another name for human ignorance, a name for
the fact that there are trivial occurrences in life which have no meaning or
relation to us, — we may acknowledge this, and stiU hold that providence
arranges every so-caUed chance, for purposes beyond our knowledge.
Chance, in this sense, is providential coincidence which we cannot under
stand, and do not need to trouble ourselves about.
( b ) If chance be taken in the sense of utter absence of aU causal con
nections in the phenomena of matter and mind, — we oppose to this notion
the fact that the causal judgment is formed in accordance with a funda
mental and necessary law of human thought, and that no science or knowl
edge is possible without the assumption of its validity.
( c ) If chance be used in the sense of undesigning cause, — it is evi
dently insufficient to explain the regular and uniform sequences of nature,
or the moral progress of the human race. These things argue a superin
tending and designing mind — in other words, a providence. Since reason
demands not only a cause, but a sufficient cause, for the order of the phys
ical and moral world, casualism must be ruled out.
3. Theory of a merely general providence.
Many who acknowledge God's control over the movements of planets
and the destinies of nations deny any divine arrangement of particular
events. Most of the arguments against deism are equaUy valid against the
theory of a merely general providence. This view is indeed only a form of
deism, which holds that God has not whoUy withdrawn himself from the
universe, but that his activity within it is limited to the maintenance of
general laws.
In addition to the arguments above alluded to, we may urge against this
theory that :
( a ) General control over the course of nature and of history is impossi
ble without control over the smaUest particulars which affect the course of
nature and of history. Incidents so slight as weU-nigh to escape observa-

RELATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. 115
tion at the time of their occurrence are frequently found to determine the
whole future of a human life, and through that life the fortunes of a whole
empire and of a whole age.
( 6 ) The love of God which prompts a general care for the universe must
also prompt a particular care for the smaUest events which affect the happi
ness of his creatures. It belongs to love to regard nothing as trifling or
beneath its notice which has to do with the interests of the object of its
affection. Infinite love may therefore be expected to provide for aU, even
the minutest things in the creation. Without belief in this particular care,
men cannot long beheve in God's general care. Faith in a particular provi
dence is indispensable to the very existence of practical religion ; for men
wiU not worship or recognize a God who has no dhect relation to them.
( c ) In times of personal danger, and in remarkable conjunctures of pub
lic affairs, men instinctively attribute to God a control of the events which
take place around them. The prayers which such startling emergencies
force from men's lips are proof that God is present and active in human
affairs. This testimony of our mental constitution must be regarded as
virtuaUy the testimony of him who framed this constitution.
(d) Christian experience confirms the declarations of Scripture that
particular events are brought about by God with special reference to the
good or Ul of the individual. Such events occur at times in such dhect
connection with the Christian's prayers that no doubt remains with regard
to the providential arrangement of them. The possibility of such divine
agency in natural events cannot be questioned by one who, hke the Chris
tian, has had experience of the greater wonders of regeneration and daily
intercourse with God, and who beheves in the reahty of creation, incarna
tion, and miracles.
IV. Relations of the Doctrine op Providence.
1. To miracles and works of grace.
Particular providence is the agency of God in what seem to us the minor
affairs of nature and human life. Special providence is only an instance
of God's particular providence which has special relation to us or makes
peculiar impression upon us. It is special, not as respects the means
which God makes use of, but as respects the effect produced upon us. In
special providence we have only a more impressive manifestation of God's
universal control.
Miracles and works of grace hke regeneration are not to be regarded as
belonging to a different order of things from God's special providences.
They too, hke special providences, may have theh natural connections and
antecedents, although they more readUy suggest theh divine authorship.
Nature and God are not mutuaUy exclusive, — nature is rather God's
method of working. Since nature is only the manifestation of God, special
providence, miracle, and regeneration are simply different degrees of
extraordinary nature. Certain of the wonders of Scripture, such as the
destruction of Sennacherib's army and the dividing of the Red Sea, the

116 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
plagues of Egypt, the flight of quaUs, and the draught of fishes, can be
counted as exaggerations of natural forces, while at the same time they are
operations of the wonder-working God.
2. To prayer and its answer.
What has been said with regard to God's connection with nature suggests
the question, how God can answer prayer consistently with the fixity of
natural law.
A. Negatively, we remark that the true solution is not to be reached:
( a ) By making the sole effect of prayer to be its reflex influence upon
the petitioner. — Prayer presupposes a God who hears and answers. It
wUl not be offered, unless it is beheved to accomphsh objective as weU as
subjective results.
( 6 ) Nor by holding that God answers prayer simply by spiritual means,
such as the action of the Holy Spirit upon the spirit of man. — The realm
of spirit is no less subject to law than the realm of matter. Scripture and
experience, moreover, ahke testify that in answer to prayer events take
place in the outward world which would not have taken place if prayer had
not gone before.
( c ) Nor by maintaining that God suspends or breaks in upon the order
of nature, in answering every prayer that is offered. — This view does not
take account of natural laws as having objective existence, and as reveahng
the order of God's being. Omnipotence might thus suspend natural law,
but wisdom, so far as we can see, would not.
( d ) Nor by considering prayer as a physical force, linked in each case to
its answer, as physical cause is linked to physical effect. — Prayer is not a
force acting directly upon nature ; else there would be no discretion as to
its answer. It can accomplish results in nature, only as it influences God.
It seems more in accordance with both Scripture and reason to say that:
B. God may answer prayer, even when that answer involves changes in
the sequences of nature,—
(a) By new combinations of natural forces, in regions withdrawn from
our observation, so that effects are produced which these same forces left
to themselves would never have accomplished. As man combines the laws
of chemical attraction and of combustion, to fire the gunpowder and split
the rock asunder, so God may combine the laws of nature to bring about
answers to prayer. In aU this there may be no suspension or violation of
law, but a use of law unknown to us.
Since prayer is nothing more nor less than appeal to a personal and
present God, whose granting or withholding of the requested blessing is
believed to be determined by the prayer itself, we must conclude that
prayer moves God, or, in other words, induces the putting forth on his
part of an imperative volition.
( b ) God may have so prearranged the laws of the material universe and
the events of history that, whUe the answer to prayer is an expression of

RELATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. 117
his wiU, it is granted through the working of natural agencies, and in per
fect accordance with the general principle that results, both temporal and
spiritual, are to be attained by inteUigent creatures through the use of the
appropriate and appointed means.
Since God is immanent in nature, an answer to prayer, coming about
through the intervention of natural law, may be as real a revelation of
God's personal care as if the laws of nature were suspended, and God inter
posed by an exercise of his creative power. Prayer and its answer, though
having God's immediate vohtion as theh connecting bond, may yet be
provided for in the original plan of the universe.
C. If asked whether this relation between prayer and its providential
answer can be scientifically tested, we reply that it may be tested just as a
father's love may be tested by a dutiful son.
( a ) There is a general proof of it in the past experience of the Chris
tian and in the past history of the church.
( 6 ) In condescension to human blindness, God may sometimes submit
to a formal test of his faithfulness and power, — as in the case of Ehjah
and the priests of Baal.
(c) When proof sufficient to convince the candid inquirer has been
already given, it may not consist with the divine majesty to abide a test
imposed by mere curiosity or scepticism, — as in the case of the Jews who
sought a sign from heaven.
( d) Since God's wUl is the link between prayer and its answer, there
can be no such thing as a physical demonstration of its efficacy in any pro
posed case. Physical tests have no application to things into which free
wUl enters as a constitutive element. But there are moral tests, and moral
tests are as scientific as physical tests can be.
3. To Christian activity.
Here the truth lies between the two extremes of quietism and naturalism.
( a) In opposition to the false abnegation of human reason and will which
quietism demands, we hold that God guides us, not by continual miracle,
but by his natural providence and the energizing of our faculties by his
Spirit, so that we rationaUy and freely do our own work, and work out
our own salvation.
( b ) In opposition to naturalism, we hold that God is continuaUy near
the human spirit by his providential working, and that this providential
working is so adjusted to the Christian's nature and necessities as to fur
nish instruction with regard to duty, discipline of rehgious character, and
needed help and comfort in trial. •
In interpreting God's providences, as in interpreting Scripture, we are
dependent upon the Holy Spirit. The work of the Spirit is, indeed, in
great part an apphcation of Scripture truth to present chcumstances.
While we never aUow ourselves to act blindly and irrationaUy, but accus
tom ourselves to weigh evidence with regard to duty, we are to expect, as
the gift of the Spirit, an understanding of circumstances — a fine sense of

118 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
God's providential purposes with regard to us, which wiU make our true
course plain to ourselves, although we may not always be able to explain it
to others.
4. To the evil acts of free agents.
(a) Here we must distinguish between the natural agency and the
moral agency of God, or between acts of permissive providence and acts
of efficient causation. We are ever to remember that God neither works
evU, nor causes his creatures to work evil. All sin is chargeable to the self-
wUl and perversity of the creature ; to declare God the author of it is
the greatest of blasphemies.
( b ) But while man makes up his evil decision independently of God,
God does, by his natural agency, order the method in which this inward
evU shaU express itself, by limiting it in time, place, and measure, or by
guiding it to the end which his wisdom and love, and not man's intent, has
set. In aU this, however, God only aUows sin to develop itself after its
own nature, so that it may be known, abhorred, and if possible overcome
and forsaken.
( c ) In cases of persistent iniquity, God's providence stUl compels the
sinner to accomphsh the design with which he and all things have been
created, namely, the manifestation of God's holiness. Even though he
struggle against God's plan, yet he must by his very resistance serve it.
His sin is made its own detector, judge, and tormentor. His character and
doom are made a warning to others. Refusing to glorify God in his salva
tion, he is made to glorify God in his destruction.

SECTION IV. — GOOD AND EVIL ANGELS.
As ministers of divine providence there is a class of finite beings, greater
in inteUigence and power than man in his present state, some of whom
positively serve God's purpose by hohness and voluntary execution of his
wUl, some negatively, by giving examples to the universe of defeated and
punished rebellion, and by illustrating God's distinguishing grace in man's
salvation. The scholastic subtleties which encumbered this doctrine in the Middle
Ages, and the exaggerated representations of the power of evU spirits
which then prevailed, have led, by a natural reaction, to an undue depre
ciation of it in more recent times.
But there is certainly a possibility that the ascending scale of created
intelligences does not reach its topmost point in man.' As the distance
between man and the lowest forms of life is filled in with numberless gra
dations of being, so it is possible that between man and God there exist
creatures of higher than human inteUigence. This possibility is turned to
certainty by the express declarations of Scripture. The doctrine is inter
woven with the later as weU as with the earher books of revelation.

SCRIPTURE STATEMENTS AND INTIMATIONS. 119
I. Scripture Statements and Intimations.
1. As to the nature and attributes of angels.
( a) They are created beings.
(6) They are incorporeal beings.
( c ) They are personal — that is, inteUigent and voluntary — agents.
(d) They are possessed of superhuman inteUigence and power, yet an
inteUigence and power that has its fixed limits.
( e ) They are an order of intelligences distinct from man and older
than man.
The constant representation of angels as personal beings in Scripture
cannot be explained as a personification of abstract good and evU, in accom
modation to Jewish superstitions, without wresting many narrative passages
from theh obvious sense ; implying on the part of Christ either dissimu
lation or ignorance as to an important point of doctrine ; and surrendering
behef in the inspiration of the Old Testament from which these Jewish
views of angelic beings were derived.
The same remark apphes to the view which regards Satan as but a col
lective term for aU evU beings, human or superhuman. The Scripture
representations of the progressive rage of the great adversary, from his first
assault on human virtue in Genesis to his final overthrow in Revelation,
join with the testimony of Christ just mentioned, to forbid any other con
clusion than this, that there is a personal being of great power, who carries
on organized opposition to the divine government.
2. As to their number and organization.
(a) They are of great multitude.
( 6 ) They constitute a company, as distinguished from a race.
( c ) They are of various ranks and endowments.
(d) They have an organization.
With regard to the 'cherubim' of Genesis, Exodus, and Ezekiel, — with
which the 'seraphim' of Isaiah and the 'living creatures' of the book of
Revelation are to be identified, — the most probable interpretation is that
which regards them, not as actual beings of higher rank than man, but as
symbolic appearances, intended to represent redeemed humanity, endowed
with all the creature perfections lost by the FaU, and made to be the
dwelling -piace of God.
3. As to their moral character.
( a ) They were aU created holy.
( b ) They had a probation.
( c ) Some preserved theh integrity.
(d) Some feU from theh state of innocence.
( e ) The good are confirmed in good.

120 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
(/) The evU are confirmed in evil.
4. As to their employments.
A. The employments of good angels.
(a) They stand in the presence of God and worship him.
(6) They rejoice in God's works.
( e ) They execute God's wUl, — by working in nature ;
( d ) by guiding the affairs of nations ;
( e ) by watching over the interests of particular churches ;
(/) by assisting and protecting individual behevers ;
(g) by punishing God's enemies.
A general survey of this Scripture testimony as to the employments of
good angels leads us to the foUowing conclusions :
First, — that good angels are not to be considered as the mediating
agents of God's regular and common providence, but as the ministers of
his special providence in the affairs of his church. He ' maketh his angels
winds' and 'a flaming fire,' not in his ordinary procedure, but in connec
tion with special displays of his power for moral ends ( Deut. 33 : 2 ; Acts
7 : 53 ; Gal. 3 : 19 ; Heb. 2:2). Theh intervention is apparently occasional
and exceptional — not at their own option, but only as it is permitted or
commanded by God. Hence we are not to conceive of angels as coming
between us and God, nor are we, without special revelation of the fact, to
attribute to them in any particular case the effects which the Scriptures
generally ascribe to divine providence. Like miracles, therefore, angelic
appearances generaUy mark God's entrance upon new epochs in the unfold
ing of his plans. Hence we read of angels at the completion of creation
(Job 38 : 7 ) ; at the giving of the law ( Gal. 3 : 19) ; at the birth of Christ
( Luke 2 : 13) ; at the two temptations in the wilderness and in Gethsemane
( Mat. 4:11, Luke 22 : 43 ) ; at the resurrection ( Mat. 28 : 2 ) ; at the ascen
sion ( Acts 1 :10) ; at the final judgment ( Mat. 25 :31 ).
Secondly, — that theh power, as being in its nature dependent and derived,
is exercised in accordance with the laws of the spiritual and natural world.
They cannot, like God, create, perform miracles, act without means, search
the heart. Unhke the Holy Spirit, who can influence the human mind
directly, they can influence men only in ways analogous to those by which
men influence each other. As evil angels may tempt men to sin, so it is
probable that good angels may attract men to holiness.
B. The employments of evU angels.
(a) They oppose God and strive to defeat his wiU. This is indicated
in the names apphed to their chief. The word "Satan" means "adver
sary " — primarUy to God, secondarily to men ; the term " devU " signifies
' ' slanderer " — of God to men, and of men to God. It is indicated also in
the description of the "man of sin" as "he that opposeth and exalteth
himself against all that is caUed God."

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF ANGELS. 121
(6) They hinder man's temporal and eternal welfare, — sometimes by
exercising a certain control over natural phenomena, but more commonly
by subjecting man's soul to temptation. Possession of man's being, either
physical or spiritual, by demons, is also recognized in Scripture.
Satan's temptations are represented as both negative and positive, — he
takes away the seed sown, and he sows tares. He controls many subordi
nate evU spirits ; there is only one devU, but there are many angels or
demons, and through theh agency Satan may accomphsh his purposes.
Possession is distinguished from bodUy or mental disease, though such
disease often accompanies possession or results from it. — The demons
speak in their own persons, with supernatural knowledge, and they are
directly addressed by Christ. Jesus recognizes Satanic agency in these
cases of possession, and he rejoices in the casting out of demons, as a sign
of Satan's downfaU. These facts render it impossible to interpret the
narratives of demoniac possession as popiflar descriptions of abnormal
physical or mental conditions.
( c ) Yet, in spite of themselves, they execute God's plans of punishing
the ungodly, of chastening the good, and of illustrating the nature and
fate of moral evU.
A survey of the Scripture testimony with regard to the employments of
evU spirits leads to the foUowing general conclusions :
First, — the power of evil spirits over men is not independent of the
human wUl. This power cannot be exercised without at least the original
consent of the human wiU, and may be resisted and shaken off through
prayer and faith in God.
Secondly, — theh power is limited, both in time and in extent, by the
permissive wUl of God. EvU spirits are neither omnipotent, omniscient,
nor omnipresent. We are to attribute disease and natural calamity to theh
agency, only when this is matter of special revelation. Opposed to God as
evU spirits are, God compels them to serve his purposes. Theh power for
harm lasts but for a season, and ultimate judgment and punishment wiU
vindicate God's permission of theh evU agency.
H. Objections to the Doctrine of Angels.
1. To the doctrine of angels in general. It is objected :
(a) That it is opposed to the modern scientific view of the world, as a
system of definite forces and laws. — We reply that, whatever truth there
may be in this modern view, it does not exclude the play of divine or
human free agency. It does not, therefore, exclude the possibility of angelic
agency. ( b ) That it is opposed to the modern doctrine of infinite space above
and beneath us — a space peopled with worlds. With the surrender of the
old conception of the firmament, as a boundary separating this world from
the regions beyond, it is claimed that we must give up aU belief in a heaven
of the angels. — We reply that the notions of an infinite universe, of heaven
as a definite place, and of spirits as confined to fixed locahty, are without

122 NATURE, DECREES, AND WORKS OF GOD.
certain warrant either in reason or in Scripture. We know nothing of the
modes of existence of pure spirits.
2. To the doctrine of evil angels in particular. It is objected that :
(a) The idea of the fall of angels is self -contradictory, since a faU deter.
mined by pride presupposes pride — that is, a faU before the faU. — We
reply that the objection confounds the occasion of sin with the sin itseU.
The outward motive to disobedience is not disobedience. The faU took
place only when that outward motive was chosen by free wUl. When the
motive of independence was selfishly adopted, only then did the innocent
desire for knowledge and power become pride and sin. How an evU voli
tion could originate in spirits created pure is an insoluble problem. Our
faith in God's hohness, however, compels us to attribute the origin of this
evU volition, not to the Creator, but to the creature.
( b ) It is irrational to suppose that Satan should have been able to
change his whole nature by a single act, so that he thenceforth willed only
evil. — But we reply that the circumstances of that decision are unknown
to us ; while the power of single acts permanently to change character is
matter of observation among men.
( c ) It is impossible that so wise a being should enter upon a hopeless
rebellion. — We answer that no amount of mere knowledge ensures right
moral action. If men gratify present passion, in spite of theh knowledge
that the sin involves present misery and future perdition, it is not impossi
ble that Satan may have done the same.
( d) It is inconsistent with the benevolence of God to create and uphold
spirits, who he knows wUl be and do evil. — We reply that this is no more
inconsistent with God's benevolence than the creation and preservation of
men, whose action God overrules for the furtherance of his purposes, and
whose iniquity he finally brings to hght and punishes.
(e) The notion of organization among evil spirits is self-contradictory,
since the nature of evil is to sunder and divide. — We reply that such
organization of evU spirits is no more impossible than the organization of
wicked men, for the purpose of furthering theh selfish ends. Common
hatred to God may constitute a principle of union among them, as among
men. (/) The doctrine is moraUy pernicious, as transferring the blame of
human sin to the being or beings who tempt men thereto. — We reply that
neither conscience nor Scripture aUows temptation to be an excuse for sin,
or regards Satan as having power to compel the human wUl. The obj ection,
moreover, contradicts our observation, — for only where the personal exist
ence of Satan is recognized, do we find sin recognized in its true nature.
(g) The doctrine degrades man, by representing him as the tool and
slave of Satan. — We reply that it does indeed show his actual state to be
degraded, but only with the result of exalting our idea of his original
dignity, and of his possible glory in Christ. The fact that man's sin was
suggested from without, and not from within, may be the one mitigating
circumstance which renders possible his redemption.

PRACTICAL USES OF THE DOCTRINE OF ANGELS. 123
HI. Practical uses of the Doctrine of Angels.
A. Uses of the doctrine of good angels.
(a) It gives us a new sense of the greatness of the divine resources, and
of God's grace in our creation, to think of the multitude of unfaUen intel
ligences who executed the divine purposes before man appeared.
( 6 ) It strengthens our faith in God's providential care, to know that
spirits of so high rank are deputed to minister to creatures who are
environed with temptations and are conscious of sin.
( c ) It teaches us humility, that beings of so much greater knowledge
and power than ours should gladly perform these unnoticed services, in
behalf of those whose only claim upon them is that they are children of
the same common Father.
( d) It helps us in the struggle against sin, to learn that these messen
gers of God are near, to mark our wrong doing if we faU, and to sustain us
if we resist temptation.
( e ) It enlarges our conceptions of the dignity of our own being, and of
the boundless possibilities of our future existence, to remember these
forms of typical innocence and love, that praise and serve God unceasingly
in heaven.
B. Uses of the doctrine of evil angels.
(a) It Ulustrates the real nature of sin, and the depth of the ruin to
which it may bring the soul, to reflect upon the present moral condition
and eternal wretchedness to which these spirits, so highly endowed, have
brought themselves by theh rebellion against God.
( b ) It inspires a salutary fear and hatred of the first subtle approaches
of evil from within or from without, to remember that these may be the
covert advances of a personal and mahgnant being, who seeks to overcome
our virtue and to involve us in his own apostasy and destruction.
( c ) It shuts us up to Christ, as the only Being who is able to deliver
us or others from the enemy of aU good.
( d ) It teaches us that our salvation is whoUy of grace, since for such
multitudes of rebellious spirits no atonement and no renewal were provided
— simple justice having its way, with no mercy to interpose or save.

PAET V.
ANTHROPOLOGX, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

CHAPTEE I.
PRELIMINARY.
1. Man a Cbeation of God and a Child of God.
The fact of man's creation is declared in Gen. 1 : 27 — "And God created
man in his own image, in the image of God created he him " ; 2:7 — " And
Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into
his nostrils the breath of hfe ; and man became a living soul. "
(a) The Scriptures, on the one hand, negative the idea that man is the
mere product of unreasoning natural forces. They refer his existence to a
cause different from mere nature, namely, the creative act of God.
(6) But, on the other hand, the Scriptures do not disclose the method
of man's creation. Whether man's physical system is or is not derived,
by natural descent, from the lower animals, the record of creation does not
inform us. As the command "Let the earth bring forth living creatures "
( Gen. 1 : 24 ) does not exclude the idea of mediate creation, through
natural generation, so the forming of man "of the dust of the ground"
( Gen. 2:7) does not in itself determine whether the creation of man's body
was mediate or immediate.
(c) Psychology, however, comes in to help our interpretation of Script
ure. The radical differences between man's soul and the principle of
intelligence in the lower animals, especiaUy man's possession of self-con
sciousness, general ideas, the moral sense, and the power of self-determin
ation, show that that which chiefly constitutes him man could not have been
derived, by any natural process of development, from the inferior creatures.
We are compeUed, then, to beheve that God's "breathing into man's nos
trils the breath of hfe " (Gen. 2 : 7), though it was a mediate creation as
presupposing existing material in the shape of animal forms, was yet an
immediate creation in the sense that only a divine reinforcement of the
process of hfe turned the animal into man. In other words, man came
not from the brute, but through the brute, and the same immanent God
who had previously created the brute created also the man.
(d) Comparative physiology, moreover, has, up to the present time,
done nothing to forbid the extension of this doctrine to man's body. No
single instance has yet been adduced of the transformation of one animal
species into another, either by natural or artificial selection ; much less has
it been demonstrated that the body of the brute has ever been developed
134

UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 125
into that of man. AU evolution imphes progress and reinforcement of hfe,
and is unintelligible except as the immanent God gives new impulses to the
process. Apart from the direct agency of God, the view that man's
physical system is descended by natural generation from some ancestral
simian form can be regarded only as an irrational hypothesis. Since the
soul, then, is an immediate creation of God, and the forming of man's body
is mentioned by the Scripture writer in dhect connection with this creation
of the spirit, man's body was in this sense an immediate creation also.
(e) WhUe we concede, then, that man has a brute ancestry, we make
two claims by way of qualification and explanation : first, that the laws
of organic development which have been followed in man's origin are only
the methods of God and proofs of his creatorship ; secondly, that man,
when he appears upon the scene, is no longer brute, but a self-conscious
and self-determining being, made in the image of his Creator and capable
of free moral decision between good and evil.
(./) The truth that man is the offspring of God imphes the correlative
truth of a common divine Fatherhood. God is Father of aU men, in that
he originates and sustains them as personal beings hke in nature to him
self. Even toward sinners God holds this natural relation of Father. It
is his fatherly love, indeed, which provides the atonement. Thus the
demands of hohness are met and the prodigal is restored to the privileges
of sonship which have been forfeited by transgression. This natural
Fatherhood, therefore, does not exclude, but prepares the way for, God's
special Fatherhood toward those who have been regenerated by his Spirit
and who have believed on his Son ; indeed, since all God's creations take
place in and through Christ, there is a natural and physical sonship of all
men, by virtue of their relation to Christ, the eternal Son, which antedates
and prepares the way for the spiritual sonship of those who join themselves
to him by faith. Man's natural sonship underlies the history of the faU,
and qualifies the doctrine of Sin.
H. Unity of the Human Raoe.
( a ) The Scriptures teach that the whole human race is descended from
a single pah.
( b ) This truth lies at the foundation of Paul's doctrine of the organic
unity of mankind in the first transgression, and of the provision of salva
tion for the race in Christ.
(c) This descent of humanity from a single pair also constitutes the
ground of man's obhgation of natural brotherhood to every member of
the race.
The Scripture statements are corroborated by considerations drawn from
history and science. Four arguments may be briefly mentioned :
1. The argument from history.
So far as the history of nations and tribes in both hemispheres can be
traced, the evidence points to a common origin and ancestry in central Asia.

126 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
2. The argument from language.
Comparative phUology points to a common origin of aU the more impor
tant languages, and furnishes no evidence that the less important are not
also so derived.
3. The argument from psychology.
The existence, among aU families of mankind, of common mental and
moral characteristics, as evinced in common maxims, tendencies and capaci
ties, in the prevalence of simUar traditions, and in the universal applicability
of one philosophy and religion, is most easily explained upon the theory
of a common origin.
4. The argument from physiology.
A. It is the common judgment of comparative physiologists that man
constitutes but a single species. The differences which exist between the
various families of mankind are to be regarded as varieties of this species.
In proof of these statements we urge : ( a ) The numberless intermediate
gradations which connect the so-caUed races with each other. (6) The
essential identity of aU races in cranial, osteological, and dental character
istics. ( c ) The fertility of unions between individuals of the most diverse
types, and the continuous f ertihty of the offspring of such unions.
B. Unity of species is presumptive evidence of unity of origin. One
ness of origin furnishes the simplest explanation of specific uniformity, if
indeed the very conception of species does not imply the repetition and
reproduction of a primordial type-idea impressed at its creation upon an
individual empowered to transmit this type-idea to its successors.
(a) To this view is opposed the theory, propounded by Agassiz, of
different centres of creation, and of different types of humanity correspond
ing to the varying fauna and flora of each. But this theory makes the
plural origin of man an exception in creation. Science points rather to
a single origin of each species, whether vegetable or animal. If man be,
as this theory grants, a single species, he should be, by the same rule,
restricted to one continent in his origin. This theory, moreover, applies an
unproved hypothesis with regard to the distribution of organized beings in
general to the very being whose whole nature and history show conclusively
that he is an exception to such a general rule, if one exists. Since man can
adapt himself to aU climes and conditions, the theory of separate centres of
creation is, in his case, gratuitous and unnecessary.
( b ) It is objected, moreover, that the diversities of size, color, and
physical conformation, among the various families of mankind, are incon
sistent with the theory of a common origin. But we reply that these
diversities are of a superficial character, and can be accounted for by cor
responding diversities of condition and environment. Changes which have
been observed and recorded within historic times show that the differences
alluded to may be the result of slowly accumulated divergences from one
and the same original and ancestral type. The difficulty in the case, more
over, is greatly reheved when we remember ( 1 ) that the period during ,

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN NATURE. 127
which these divergences have arisen is by no means limited to six thousand
years (see note on the antiquity of the race, page 62) ; and (2) that, since
species in general exhibit their greatest power of divergence into varieties
immediately after theh first introduction, aU the varieties of the human
species may have presented themselves in man's earliest history.
HI. Essential Elements of Human Nature.
I. The Dichotomous Theory.
Man has a two-fold nature, — on the one hand material, on the other hand
immaterial. He consists of body, and of spirit, or soul. That there are
two, and only two, elements in man's being, is a fact to which consciousness
testifies. This testimony is confirmed by Scripture, in which the prevaihng
representation of man's constitution is that of dichotomy.
(a) The record of man's creation ( Gen. 2:7), in which, as a result of
the inbreathing of the divine Spirit, the body becomes possessed and
vitalized by a single principle — the living soul.
( b ) Passages in which the human soul, or spirit, is distinguished, both
from the divine Spirit from whom it proceeded, and from the body which
it inhabits. ( c ) The interchangeable use of the terms ' soul ' and 'spirit.'
( d ) The mention of body .and sold ( or spirit ) as together constituting
the whole man.
2. The Trichotomous Theory.
Side by side with this common representation of human nature as con
sisting of two parts, are found passages which at first sight appear to favor
trichotomy. It must be acknowledged that nveiipa (spirit) and f«xi (soul),
although often used interchangeably, and always designating the same
indivisible substance, are sometimes employed as contrasted terms.
In this more accurate use, tvxfi denotes man's immaterial part in its infe
rior powers and activities ; — as fux^i, man is a conscious individual, and, in
common with the brute creation, has an animal hfe, together with appetite,
imagination, memory, understanding. Hvevpa, on the other hand, denotes
man's immaterial part in its higher capacities and faculties; — as nvevpa,
man is a being related to God, and possessing powers of reason, conscience,
and free wUl, which difference him from the brute creation and constitute
him responsible and immortal.
The element of truth in trichotomy is simply this, that man has a triplic-
ity of endowment, in virtue of which the single soul has relations to matter,
to self, and to God. The trichotomous theory, however, as it is ordinarily
defined, endangers the unity and immateriality of our higher nature, by
holding that man consists of three substances, or three component parts —
body, soul, and spirit — and that soul and spirit are as distinct from each
other as are soul and body.
We regard the trichotomous theory as untenable, not only for the reasons
already urged in proof of the dichotomous theory, but from the f oUowing
additional considerations :

128 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
(a) Tlvevfia, as weU as tyvxfi, is used of the brute creation.
( 6 ) Vvx-fi is ascribed to Jehovah.
(e ) The disembodied dead are caUed faxvl.
(<?) The highest exercises of religion are attributed to the tyvxfi-
( e ) To lose this ty^x*! is to lose all.
(/) The passages chiefly relied upon as supporting trichotomy may
be better explained upon the view already indicated, that soul and spirit
are not two distinct substances or parts, but that they designate the
immaterial principle from different points of view.
We conclude that the immaterial part of man, viewed as an individual
and conscious hfe, capable of possessing and animating a physical organism,
is caUed tyvxv ', viewed as a rational and moral agent, susceptible of divine
influence and indwelling, this same immaterial part is caUed nvevpa. The
wveipa, then, is man's nature looking Godward, and capable of receiving
and manifesting the ILvevpa dyiov ; the tyoxh is man's nature looking earth
ward, and touching the world of sense. The irvevpa is man's higher part,
as related to spiritual realities or as capable of such relation ; the ¦^>xvh is
man's higher part, as related to the body, or as capable of such relation.
Man's being is therefore not trichotomous but dichotomous, and his
immaterial part, while possessing duality of powers, has unity of substance.
This view of the soul and spirit as different aspects of the same spiritual
principle furnishes a refutation of six important errors :
(a) That of the Gnostics, who held that the irvevp.a is part of the divine
essence, and therefore incapable of sin.
(b) That of the Apollinarians, who taught that Christ's humanity
embraced only aap.a and tyvxfi, whUe his divine nature furnished the vnevpa.
( c ) That of the Semi-Pelagians, who excepted the human irvevfia from
the dominion of original sin.
( d ) That of Placeus, who held that only the nvev/m was directly created
by God ( see our section on Theories of Imputation ).
( e ) That of Julius MuUer, who held that the tyvxfi comes to us from
Adam, but that our wvevpa was corrupted in a previous state of being
( see page 490 ).
(/) That of the Annihnationists, who hold that man at his creation had
a divine element breathed into him, which he lost by sin, and which he
recovers only in regeneration ; so that only when he has this irvevfia restored
by virtue of his union with Christ does man become immortal, death being
to the sinner a complete extinction of being.
IV. Origin of the Soul.
Three theories with regard to this subject have divided opinion :
1. The Theory of Preixistence.
This view was held by Plato, PhUo, and Origen ; by the first, in order

ORIGIN OF THE SOUL. 129
to explain the soul's possession of ideas not derived from sense ; by the
second, to account for its imprisonment in the body ; by the third, to jus
tify the disparity of conditions in which men enter the world. We concern
ourselves, however, only with the forms which the view has assumed in
modern times. Kant and Juhus MuUer in Germany, and Edward Beecher
in America, have advocated it, upon the ground that the inborn depravity
of the human wUl can be explained only by supposing a personal act of
seU-determination in a previous, or timeless, state of being.
To the theory of preexistence we urge the foUowing objections :
( a ) It is not only whoUy without support from Scripture, but it directly
contradicts the Mosaic account of man's creation in the image of God, and
Paul's description of aU evU and death in the human race as the result of
Adam's sin.
( b ) If the soul in this preexistent state was conscious and personal, it is
inexplicable that we should have no remembrance of such preexistence, and
of so important a decision in that previous condition of being ; — if the soul
was yet unconscious and impersonal, the theory faUs to show how a moral
act involving consequences so vast could have been performed at aU.
( c ) The view sheds no light either upon the origin of sin, or upon God's
justice in dealing with it, since it throws back the first transgression to a
state of being in which there was no flesh to tempt, and then represents
God as putting the fallen into sensuous conditions in the highest degree
unfavorable to theh restoration.
( d ) WhUe this theory accounts for inborn spiritual sin, such as pride
and enmity to God, it gives no explanation of inherited sensual sin, which
it holds to have come from Adam, and the guilt of which must logically be
denied. 2. The Creatian Theory.
This view was held by Aristotle, Jerome, and Pelagius, and in modern
times has been advocated by most of the Roman Cathohc and Reformed
theologians. It regards the soul of each human being as immediately
created by God and joined to the body either at conception, at birth, or at
some time between these two. The advocates of the theory urge in its
favor certain texts of Scripture, referring to God as the Creator of the
human spirit, together with the fact that there is a marked individuahty
in the chUd, which cannot be explained as a mere reproduction of the
qualities existing in the parents.
Creatianism is untenable for the foUowing reasons :
( a ) The passages adduced in its support may with equal propriety be
regarded as expressing God's mediate agency in the origination of human
souls ; whUe the general tenor of Scripture, as weU as its representations
of God as the author of man's body, favor this latter interpretation.
( 6 ) Creatianism regards the earthly father as begetting only the body
of his chUd— certainly as not the father of the chUd's highest part. This
9

130 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
makes the beast to possess nobler powers of propagation than man ; for the
beast multiplies himself after his own image.
( c ) The individuality of the child, even in the most extreme cases, as in
the sudden rise from obscure f amilies and surroundings of marked men hke
Luther, may be better explained by supposing a law of variation impressed
upon the species at its beginning — a law whose operation is foreseen and
supervised by God.
(d) This theory, if it aUows that the soul is originaUy possessed of
depraved tendencies, makes God the direct author of moral evil ; if it holds
the soul to have been created pure, it makes God indirectly the author of
moral evU, by teaching that he puts this pure soul into a body which
wUl inevitably corrupt it.
3. The Traducian Theory.
This view was propounded by Tertullian, and was implicitly held by
Augustine. In modern times it has been the prevaUing opinion of the
Lutheran Church. It holds that the human race was immediately created
in Adam, and, as respects both body and soul, was propagated from him
by natural generation — aU souls since Adam being only mediately created
by God, as the upholder of the laws of propagation which were originaUy
estabhshed by him.
With regard to this view we remrka :
(a) It seems best to accord with Scripture, which represents God as
creating the species in Adam ( Gen. 1 : 27 ), and as increasing and perpetu
ating it through secondary agencies (1 : 28 ; ef. 22 ). Only once is breathed
into man's nostrUs the breath of hfe (2:7, cf. 22 ; 1 Cor. 11:8. Gen. 4:1;
5 : 3 ; 46 : 26 ; c/. Acts 17 : 21-26 ; Heb. 7:10), and after man's formation
God ceases from his work of creation ( Gen. 2:2).
( 6 ) It is favored by the analogy of vegetable and animal hfe, in which
increase of numbers is secured, not by a multiplicity of immediate creations,
but by the natural derivation of new individuals from a parent stock. A
derivation of the human soul from its parents no more imphes a materiahs
tic view of the soul and its endless division and subdivision, than the simi
lar derivation of the brute proves the principle of inteUigence in the lower
animals to be whoUy material.
(c) The observed transmission not merely of physical, but of mental and
spiritual, characteristics in families and races, and especially the uniformly
evil moral tendencies and dispositions which aU men possess from their
birth, are proof that in soul, as weU as in body, we derive our being from
our human ancestry.
( d) The traducian doctrine embraces and acknowledges the element of
truth which gives plausibihty to the creatian view. Traducianism, properly
defined, admits a divine concurrence throughout the whole development of
the human species, and aUows, under the guidance of a superintending
Providence, special improvements in type at the birth of marked men,
similar k those which we may suppose to have occurred in the introduction
of new varieties in the animal creation.

THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN. 131
V. The Moeal Nature of Man.
By the moral nature of man we mean those powers which fit him for
right or wrong action. These powers are inteUect, sensibility, and wUl,
together with that peculiar power of discrimination and impulsion, which
we caU conscience. In order to moral action, man has inteUect or reason,
to discern the difference between right and wrong ; sensibility, to be moved
by each of these ; free wiU, to do the one or the other. Intellect, sensibU-
ity, and will, are man's three faculties. But in connection with these facul
ties there is a sort of activity which involves them aU, and without which
there can be no moral action, namely, the activity of conscience. Con
science applies the moral law to particular cases in our personal experience,
and proclaims that law as binding upon us. Only a rational and sentient
being can be truly moral ; yet it does not come within our province to treat
of man's inteUect or sensibility in general. We speak here only of Con
science and of WUl.
1. Conscience.
A. Conscience an accompanying knowledge. — As already intimated,
conscience is not a separate faculty, hke inteUect, sensibility, and will, but
rather a mode in which these faculties act. Like consciousness, conscience
is an accompanying knowledge. Conscience is a knowing of self ( includ
ing our acts and states ) in connection with a moral standard, or law. Add
ing now the element of feehng, we may say that conscience is man's
consciousness of his own moral relations, together with a peculiar feeling in
view of them. It thus involves the combined action of the intellect and
of the sensibility, and that in view of a certain class of objects, viz. : right
and wrong.
B. Conscience discriminative and impulsive. — But we need to define
more narrowly both the inteUectual and the emotional elements in con
science. As respects the inteUectual element, we may say that conscience
is a power of judgment, — it declares our acts or states to conform, or not to
conform, to law ; it declares the acts or states which conform to be obliga
tory, — those which do not conform, to be forbidden. In other words,
conscience judges : ( 1 ) This is right ( or, wrong ) ; ( 2 ) I ought ( or, I
ought not ). In connection with this latter judgment, there comes into view
the emotional element of conscience, — we feel the claim of duty ; there
is an inner sense that the wrong must not be done. Thus conscience is ( 1 )
discriminative, and ( 2 ) impulsive.
¦C. Conscience distinguished from other mental processes. — The nature
and office of conscience wiU be stiU more clearly perceived if we distinguish
it from other processes and operations with which it is too often confounded.
The term conscience has been used by various writers to designate either
one or aU of the foUowing : 1. Moral intuition — the intuitive perception
of the difference between right and wrong, as opposite moral categories.
2. Accepted law — the application of the intuitive idea to general classes
of actions, and the declaration that these classes of actions are right or
wrong, apart from our individual relation to them. This accepted law is
the complex product of ( a) the intuitive idea, ( 6 ) the logical inteUigence,

132 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
(c) experiences of utility, (d) influences of society and education, and (e)
positive divine revelation. 3. Judgment — applying this accepted law to
individual and concrete cases in our own experience, and pronouncing our
own acts or states either past, present, or prospective, to be right or wrong.
4. Command — authoritative declaration of obligation to do the right, or
forbear the wrong, together with an impulse of the sensibihty away from
the one, and toward the other. 5. Remorse or approval — moral senti
ments either of approbation or disapprobation, in view of past acts or states,
regarded as wrong or right. 6. Fear or hope — instinctive disposition of
disobedience to expect punishment, and of obedience to expect reward.
D. Conscience the moral judiciary of the soul. — From what has been
previously said, it is evident that only 3. and 4. are properly included
under the term conscience. Conscience is the moral judiciary of the soul
— the power within of judgment and command. Conscience must judge
according to the law given to it, and therefore, since the moral standard
accepted by the reason may be imperfect, its decisions, while relatively
just, may be absolutely unjust. — 1. and 2. belong to the moral reason,
but not to conscience proper. Hence the duty of enlightening and culti
vating the moral reason, so that conscience may have a proper standard of
judgment. — 5. and 6. belong to the sphere of moral sentiment, and not to
conscience proper. The office of conscience is to " bear witness " ( Rom.
2 : 15).
E. Conscience in its relation to God as law-giver. — Since conscience, in
the proper sense, gives uniform and infallible judgment that the right is
supremely obhgatory, and that the wrong must be forborne at every cost,
it can be caUed an echo of God's voice, and an indication in man of that
which his own true being requires.
F. Conscience in its relation to God as holy. — Conscience is not an
original authority. It points to something higher than itself. The
"authority of conscience " is simply the authority of the moral law, or
rather, the authority of the personal God, of whose nature the law is but a
transcript. Conscience, therefore, with its continual and supreme demand
that the right should be done, furnishes the best witness to man of the
existence of a personal God, and of the supremacy of holiness in him in
whose image we are made.
2. Will.
A. WUl defined. — WiU is the soul's power to choose between motives
and to dhect its subsequent activity according to the motive thus chosen, 
in other words, the soul's power to choose both an end and the means to
attain it. The choice of an ultimate end we caU immanent preference ; the
choice of means we caU executive volition.
B. WUl and other faculties.— ( a ) We accept the threefold division of
human faculties into inteUect, sensibility, and will ( 6 ) InteUect is the
soul knowing ; sensibihty is the soul feeling ( desires, affections) ; will is
the soul choosing ( end or means). ( c ) lu every act of the soul, all the
faculties act. Knowing involves feeling and willing ; feeling involves
knowing and willing ; willing involves knowing and feehng. ( d ) Logi-

THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN. 133
oaUy, each latter faculty involves the preceding action of the former ; the
the soul must know before feeling ; must know and feel before willing.
(e) Yet since knowing and feeling are activities, neither of these is
possible without vriUing.
C. WUl and permanent states. — (a) Though every act of the soul
involves the action of all the faculties, yet in any particular action one
faculty may be more prominent than the others. So we speak of acts of
inteUect, of affection, of wUl. ( 6 ) This predominant action of any single
faculty produces effects upon the other faculties associated with it. The
action of wUl gives a direction to the inteUect and to the affections, as well
as a permanent bent to the wUl itself, (c ) Each faculty, therefore, has its
permanent states as weU as its transient acts, and the wUl may originate
these states. Hence we speak of voluntary affections, and may with equal
propriety speak of voluntary opinions. These permanent voluntary states
we denominate character.
D. WUl and motives. — (a) The permanent states just mentioned, when
they have been once determined, also influence the wiU. Internal views and
dispositions, and not simply external presentations, constitute the strength
of motives. ( 6 ) These motives often conflict, and though the soul never
acts without motive, it does notwithstanding choose between motives, and
so determines the end toward which it will dhect its activities. ( e )
Motives are not causes, which compel the wUl, but influences, which per
suade it. The power of these motives, however, is proportioned to the
strength of wUl which has entered into them and has made them what
they are.
E. WUl and contrary choice. — ( a ) Though no act of pure wUl is pos
sible, the soul may put forth single vohtions in a direction opposed to its
previous ruling purpose, and thus far man has the power of a contrary
choice (Rom. 7:18 — "to wUl is present with me " ) . ( b ) But in so far as
wUl has entered into and revealed itself in permanent states of intellect
and sensibility and in a settled bent of the wUl itself, man cannot by a
single act reverse his moral state, and in this respect has not the power of
a contrary choice. ( c ) In this latter case he can change his character only
indirectly, by turning his attention to considerations fitted to awaken
opposite dispositions, and by thus summoning up motives to an opposite
course. F. WUl and responsibility. — (a) By repeated acts of wUl put forth in
a given moral direction, the affections may become so confirmed in evU or
in good as to make previously certain, though not necessary, the future
good or evU action of the man. Thus, whUe the wUl is free, the man may
be the "bondservant of sin" (John 8 : 31-36) or the "servant of right
eousness" (Rom. 6:15-23; cf. Heb. 12-23 — "spirits of just men made
perfect "). ( 5 ) Man is responsible for aU effects of wUl, as weU as for will
itself ; for voluntary affections, as weU as for voluntary acts ; for the
inteUectual views into which wUl has entered, as weU as for the acts of wUl
by which these views have been formed in the past or are maintained in
the present ( 2 Pet. 3 : 5 — " wilfuUy forget ").

134 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
G. Inferences from this view of the win. — ( a ) We can be responsible
for the voluntary evU affections with which we are born, and for the will's
inherited preference of selfishness, only upon the hypothesis that we
originated these states of the affections and wUl, or had a part in originat
ing them. Scripture furnishes this explanation, in its doctrine of Original
Sin, or the doctrine of a common apostasy of the race in its first father,
and our derivation of a corrupted nature by natural generation from him.
( 6 ) WhUe there remains to man, even in his present condition, a natural
power of wUl by which he may put forth transient volitions externaUy
conformed to the divine law and so may to a hmited extent modify his
character, it still remains true that the sinful bent of his affections is not
directly under his control ; and this bent constitutes a motive to evU so
constant, inveterate, and powerful, that it actuaUy influences every member
of the race to reaffirm his evU choice, and renders necessary a special
working of God's Spirit upon his heart to ensure his salvation. Hence the
Scripture doctrine of Regeneration.
H. Special objections to the deterministic theory of the will. — Deter
minism holds that man's actions are uniformly determined by motives
acting upon his character, and that he has no power to change these
motives or to act contrary to them. This denial that the wUl is free has
serious and pernicious consequences in theology. On the one hand, it
weakens even if it does not destroy man's conviction with regard to respon
sibility, sin, guUt and retribution, and so obscures the need of atonement ;
on the other hand, it weakens if it does not destroy man's faith in his own
power as weU as in God's power of initiating action, and so obscures the
possibility of atonement.

CHAPTEB II.
THE ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.
In determining man's original state, we are whoUy dependent upon
Scripture. This represents human nature as coming from God's hand,
and therefore " very good " ( Gen. 1 : 31 ). It moreover draws a paraUel
between man's first state and that of his restoration ( Col. 3:10; Eph. 4 :
24). In interpreting these passages, however, we are to remember the
twofold danger, on the one hand of putting man so high that no progress
is conceivable, on the other hand of putting him so low that he could not
faU. We shaU the more easUy avoid these dangers by distinguishing
between the essentials and the incidents of man's original state.
L Essentials of Man's Original State.
These are summed up in the phrase "the image of God." In God's
image man is said to have been created ( Gen. 1 : 26, 27 ). In what did
this image of God consist ? We reply that it consisted in 1. Natural like
ness to God, or personahty ; 2. Moral likeness to God, or holiness.
1. Natural likeness to God, or personality.
Man was created a personal being, and was by this personality distin
guished from the brute. By personahty we mean the twofold power to
know self as related to the world and to God, and to determine self in
view of moral ends. By virtue of this personahty, man could at his crea
tion choose which of the objects of his knowledge — self, the world, or God
— should be the norm and centre of his development. This natural like
ness to God is inalienable, and as constituting a capacity for redemption
gives value to the life even of the unregenerate ( Gen. 9 : 6 ; 1 Cor. 11:7;
James 3:9).
2. Moral likeness to God, or holiness.
In addition to the powers of self-consciousness and self-determination
just mentioned, man was created with such a direction of the affections and
the will, as constituted God the supreme end of man's being, and consti
tuted man a finite reflection of God's moral attributes. Since holiness is
the fundamental attribute of God, this must of necessity be the chief attri
bute of his image in the moral beings whom he creates. That original
righteousness was essential to this image, is also distinctly taught in Script
ure ( Eccl. 7 :29 ; Eph. 4 : 24 ; CoL 3 : 10).
This original righteousness, in which the image of God chiefly consisted,
is to be viewed :
( a ) Not as constituting the substance or essence of human nature, — for
in this case human nature would have ceased to exist as soon as man sinned.
(6) Nor as a gift from without, foreign to human nature, and added to
135

136 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
it after man's creation, — for man is said to have possessed the divine image
by the fact of creation, and not by subsequent bestowal.
( c ) But rather, as an original direction or tendency of man's affections
and wiU, stUl accompanied by the power of evU choice, and so, differing
from the perfected hohness of the saints, as instinctive affection and child
like innocence differ from the holiness that has been developed and con
firmed by experience of temptation.
( d ) As a moral disposition, moreover, which was propagable to Adam's
descendants, if it continued, and which, though lost to him and to them,
if Adam sinned, would still leave man possessed of a natural hkeness to
God which made him susceptible of God's redeeming grace.
In the hght of the preceding investigation, we may properly estimate
two theories of man's original state which claim to be more Scriptural and
reasonable :
A The image of God as including only personahty.
This theory denies that any positive determination to virtue inhered
originaUy in man's nature, and regards man at the beginning as simply
possessed of spiritual powers, perfectly adjusted to each other. This is the
view of Schleiermacher, who is foUowed by Nitzsch, Juhus Miiller, and
Hofmann. In addition to what has already been said in support of the opposite
view, we may urge against this theory the foUowing objections :
(a) It is contrary to analogy, in making man the author of his own
holiness ; our sinful condition is not the product of our individual wills,
nor is our subsequent condition of holiness the product of anything but
God's regenerating power.
( 6 ) The knowledge of God in which man was originally created logicaUy
presupposes a direction toward God of man's affections and wUl, since only
the holy heart can have any proper understanding of the God of hohness.
( c ) A likeness to God in mere personality, such as Satan also possesses,
comes far short of answering the demands of the Scripture, in which the
ethical conception of the divine nature so overshadows the merely natural.
The image of God must be, not simply ability to be like God, but actual
hkeness. B. The image of God as consisting simply in man's natural capacity for
religion. This view, first elaborated by the scholastics, is the doctrine of the Roman
Catholic Church. It distinguishes between the image and the likeness of
God. The former ( D7S — Gen. 1 : 26 ) alone belonged to man's nature at
its creation. The latter (fHOT) was the product of his own acts of obedi
ence. In order that this obedience might be made easier and the conse
quent likeness to God more sure, a third element was added — an element
not belonging to man's nature — namely, a supernatural gift of special
grace, which acted as a curb upon the sensuous impulses, and brought
them under the control of reason. Original righteousness was therefore

INCIDENTS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE. 137
not a natural endowment, but a joint product of man's obedience and of
God's supernatural grace.
Many of the considerations already adduced apply equaUy as arguments
against this view. We may say, however, with reference to certain features
peculiar to the theory :
(a) No such distinction can justly be drawn between the words D73? and
rwoi. The addition of the synonym simply strengthens the expression,
and both together signify "the very image."
( 6 ) Whatever is denoted by either or both of these words was bestowed
upon man in and by the fact of creation, and the additional hypothesis of
a supernatural gift not originaUy belonging to man's nature, but subse
quently conferred, has no foundation either here or elsewhere in Scripture.
Man is said to have been created in the image and likeness of God, not to
have been afterwards endowed with either of them.
(c) The concreated opposition between sense and reason which this
theory supposes is inconsistent with the Scripture declaration that the
work of God's hands "was very good" (Gen. 1:31), and transfers the
blame of temptation and sin from man to God. To hold to a merely nega
tive innocence, in which evU desire was only slumbering, is to make God
author of sin by making him author of the constitution which rendered sin
inevitable. ( d ) This theory directly contradicts Scripture by making the effect of
the first sin to have been a weakening but not a perversion of human
nature, and the work of regeneration to be not a renewal of the affections
but merely a strengthening of the natural powers. The theory regards
that first sin as simply despoiling man of a special gift of grace and as
putting Tn'm where he was when first created — still able to obey God and
to cooperate with God for his own salvation, — whereas the Scripture
represents man since the faU as " dead through . . . trespasses and sins "
(Eph. 2 : 1), as incapable of true obedience (Rom. 8 : 7 — "not subject to
the law of God, neither indeed can it be " ), and as needing to be "created
in Christ Jesus for good works " ( Eph. 2 : 10 ).
E. Incidents of Man's Original State.
1. Results of man's possession of the divine image.
(a) Reflection of this divine image in man's physical form. — Even in
man's body were typified those higher attributes which chiefly constituted
his hkeness to God. A gross perversion of this truth, however, is the view
which holds, upon the ground of Gen. 2 : 7, and 3 : 8, that the image of God
consists in bodUy resemblance to the Creator. In the first of these passages,
it is not the divine image, but the body, that is formed of dust, and into
this body the soul that possesses the divine image is breathed. The second
of these passages is to be interpreted by those other portions of the Pen
tateuch in which God is represented as free from aU limitations of matter
(Gen. 11 :5; 18:15).
( 6 ) Subjection of the sensuous impulses to the control of the spirit. —
Here we are to hold a middle ground between two extremes. On the one

138 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
hand, the first man possessed a body and a spirit so fitted to each other that
no conflict was felt between theh several claims. On the other hand, this
physical perfection was not final and absolute, but relative and provisional.
There was stUl room for progress to a higher state of being ( Gen. 3 : 22 ).
( c ) Dominion over the lower creation. — Adam possessed an insight into
nature analogous to that of susceptible childhood, and therefore was able
to name and to rule the brute creation ( Gen. 2 : 19 ). Yet this native
insight was capable of development into the higher knowledge of culture
and science. From Gen. 1 : 26 ( cf. Ps. 8 : 5-8 ), it has been erroneously
inferred that the image of God in man consists in dominion over the brute
creation and the natural world. But, in this verse, the words "let them
have dominion " do not define the image of God, but indicate the result
of possessing that image. To make the image of God consist in this
dominion, would imply that only the divine omnipotence was shadowed
forth in man.
( d ) Communion with God. — Our first parents enjoyed the divine pres
ence and teaching (Gen. 2:16 ). It would seem that God manifested him
self to them in visible form ( Gen. 3:8). This companionship was both
in kind and degree suited to theh spiritual capacity, and by no means
necessarUy involved that perfected vision of God which is possible to
beings of confirmed and unchangeable holiness ( Mat. 5 : 8 ; 1 John 3:2).
2. Concomitants of man's possession of the divine image.
( a ) Surroundings and society fitted to yield happiness and to assist a
holy development of human nature ( Eden and Eve ). We append some
recent theories with regard to the creation of Eve and the nature of Eden.
(6) Provisions for the trying of man's virtue. — Since man was not yet
in a state of confirmed holiness, but rather of simple childlike innocence,
he could be made perfect only through temptation. Hence the "tree of
the knowledge of good and evU " ( Gen. 2:9). The one slight command
best tested the spirit of obedience. Temptation did not necessitate a f all.
If resisted, it would strengthen virtue. In that case, the posse non peccare
would have become the non posse peccare.
(c) Opportunity of securing physical immortality. — The body of the
first man was in itself mortal ( 1 Cor. 15 : 45 ). Science shows that physical
hfe involves decay and loss. But means were apparently provided for
checking this decay and preserving the body's youth. This means was the
"tree of hfe" (Gen. 2:9). If Adam had maintained his integrity, the
body might have been developed and transfigured, without intervention of
death. In other words, the posse non mori might have become a non
posse mori.
The conclusions we have thus reached with regard to the incidents of
man's original state are combated upon two distinct grounds :
1st. The facts bearing upon man's prehistoric condition point to a
development from primitive savagery to civilization. Among these facts
may be mentioned the succession of implements and weapons from stone
to bronze and iron ; the polyandry and communal marriage systems of the

INCIDENTS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE. 139
lowest tribes ; the relics of barbarous customs stiU prevailing among the
most civilized.
With regard to this view we remark :
(a) It is based upon an insufficient induction of facts. — History shows a
law of degeneration supplementing and often counteracting the tendency
to development. In the earliest times of which we have any record, we
find nations in a high state of civilization ; but in the case of every nation
whose history runs back of the Christian era — as for example, the Romans,
the Greeks, the Egyptians— the subsequent progress has been downward,
and no nation is known to have recovered from barbarism except as the
result of influence from without.
(6) Later investigations have rendered it probable that the stone age
of some localities was contemporaneous with the bronze and iron ages of
others, whUe certain tribes and nations, instead of making progress from
one to the other, were never, so far back as we can trace them, without
the knowledge and use of the metals. It is to be observed, moreover, that
even without such knowledge and use man is not necessarUy a barbarian,
though he may be a chUd.
( c ) The barbarous customs to which this view looks for support may
better be explained as marks of broken-down civilization than as relics of
a primitive and universal savagery. Even if they indicated a former state
of barbarism, that state might have been itself preceded by a condition of
comparative culture.
(d) The weU-nigh universal tradition of a golden age of virtue and
happiness may be most easUy explained upon the Scripture view of an
actual creation of the race in holiness and its subsequent apostasy.
2nd. That the rehgious history of mankind warrants us in inferring a
necessary and universal law of progress, in accordance with which man
passes from fetichism to polytheism and monotheism, — this first theologi
cal stage, of which fetichism, polytheism, and monotheism are parts, being
succeeded by the metaphysical stage, and that in turn by the positive.
This assumed law of progress, however, is contradicted by the foUowing
facts :
(a) Not only did the monotheism of the Hebrews precede the great
polytheistic systems of antiquity, but even these heathen religions are
purer from polytheistic elements, the further back we trace them ; so that
the facts point to an original monotheistic basis for them all.
(&) "There is no proof that the Indo-Germanic or Semitic stocks ever
practiced fetich worship, or were ever enslaved by the lowest types of myth
ological rehgion, or ascended from them to somewhat higher " ( Fisher ).
( c ) Some of the earhest remains of man yet found show, by the burial
of food and weapons with the dead, that there already existed the idea of
spiritual beings and of a future state, and therefore a rehgion of a higher
sort than fetichism.

140 INCIDENTS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE.
( d) The theory in question, in making theological thought a merely
transient stage of mental evolution, ignores the fact that rehgion has its root
in the intuitions and yearnings of the human soul, and that therefore no
philosophical or scientific progress can ever abohsh it. WhUe the terms
theological, metaphysical, and positive may properly mark the order in
which the ideas of the individual and the race are acquired, positivism errs
in holding that these three phases of thought are mutually exclusive, and
that upon the rise of the later the earlier must of necessity become extinct.

CHAPTEE III.
SIN, OR MAN'S STATE OF APOSTASY.

SECTION I. — THE LAW OF GOD.
As preliminary to a treatment of man's state of apostasy, it becomes
necessary to consider the nature of that law of God, the transgression of
which is sin. We may best approach the subject by inquiring what is the
true conception of
I. Law in General.
1. Law an expression of will.
The essential idea of law is that of a general expression of wiU enforced
by power. It imphes : ( a ) A lawgiver, or authoritative wfll. ( b ) Sub
jects, or beings upon whom this wUl terminates. ( c ) A general command,
or expression of this wiU. ( d ) A power, enforcing the command.
These elements are found even in what we caU natural law. The phrase
' law of nature ' involves a seh-contradiction, when used to denote a mode
of action or an order of sequence behind which there is conceived to be no
inteUigent and ordaining wUl. Physics derives the term ' law ' from juris
prudence, instead of jurisprudence deriving it from physics. It is first
used of the relations of voluntary agents. Causation in our own wills
enables us to see something besides mere antecedence and consequence in
the world about us. Physical science, in her very use of the word 'law,'
implicitly confesses that a supreme WUl has set general rules which control
the processes of the universe.
2. Law a general expression of will
The characteristic of law is generality. It is addressed to substances or
persons in classes. Special legislation is contrary to the true theory of
law. 3. Law imphes power to enforce.
It is essential to the existence of law, that there be power to enforce.
Otherwise law becomes the expression of mere wish or advice. Since
physical substances and forces have no inteUigence and no power to resist,
the four elements already mentioned exhaust the implications of the term
' law ' as applied to nature. In the case of rational and free agents, how
ever, law imphes in addition : (e) Duty or obhgation to obey; and (/)
Sanctions, or pains and penalties for disobedience.
4. Law expresses and demands nature.
The wiU which thus binds its subjects by commands and penalties is an
expression of the nature of the governing power, and reveals the normal
141

142 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
relations of the subjects to that power. FinaUy, therefore, law (g) Is an
expression of the nature of the lawgiver ; and ( h ) Sets forth the condition
or conduct in the subjects which is requisite for harmony with that nature.
Any so-caUed law which faUs to represent the nature of the governing
power soon becomes obsolete. All law that is permanent is a transcript of
the facts of being, a discovery of what is and must be, in order to harmony
between the governing and the governed ; in short, positive law is just and
lasting only as it is an expression and republication of the law of nature.
II. The Law of God in Particular.
The law of God is a general expression of the divine will enforced by
power. It has two forms : Elemental Law and Positive Enactment.
1. Elemental Law, or law inwrought into the elements, substances,
and forces of the rational and irrational creation. This is twofold :
A. The expression of the divine wUl in the constitution of the material
universe ; — this we caU physical, or natural law. Physical law is not
necessary. Another order of things is conceivable. Physical order is not
an end in itself ; it exists for the sake of moral order. Physical order has
therefore only a relative constancy, and God supplements it at times by
miracle. B. The expression of the divine will in the constitution of rational and
free agents ; — this we caU moral law. This elemental law of our moral
nature, with which only we are now concerned, has all the characteristics
mentioned as belonging to law in general. It imphes : (a ) A divine Law
giver, or ordaining WiU. ( b ) Subjects, or moral beings upon whom the
law terminates. ( c ) General command, or expression of this wUl in the
moral constitution of the subjects. ( d ) Power, enforcing the command.
( e ) Duty, or obhgation to obey. (/) Sanctions, or pains and penalties
for disobedience.
AU these are of a loftier sort than are found in human law. But we need
especially to emphasize the fact that this law (g) Is an expression of the
moral nature of God, and therefore of God's hohness, the fundamental
attribute of that nature ; and that it ( h ) Sets forth absolute conformity to
that hohness, as the normal condition of man. This law is inwrought into
man's rational and moral being. Man fulfills it, only when in his moral as
weU as his rational being he is the image of God.
The law of God, then, is simply an expression of the nature of God in the
form of moral requirement, and a necessary expression of that nature in
view of the existence of moral beings ( Ps. 19 : 7 ; c/. 1 ). To the existence
of this law aU men bear witness. The consciences even of the heathen tes
tify to it ( Rom. 2 : 14, 15 ). Those who have the written law recognize this
elemental law as of greater compass and penetration ( Rom. 7 : 14 ; 8 : 4 ).
The perfect embodiment and fulfillment of this law is seen only in Christ
(Rom. 10 :4; PhU. 3 : 8, 9).
Each of the two last-mentioned characteristics of God's law is important
in its implications. We treat of these in theh order.
First, the law of God as a transcript of the divine nature.— If this be the

THE LAW OF GOD IN PARTICULAR. 143
nature of the law, then certain common misconceptions of it are excluded.
The law of God is
( a ) Not arbitrary, or the product of arbitrary wUl. Since the wUl from
which the law springs is a revelation of God's nature, there can be no
rashness or unwisdom in the law itself.
( 6 ) Not temporary, or ordained simply to meet an exigency. The law
is a manifestation, not of temporary moods or desires, but of the essential
nature of God.
( c ) Not merely negative, or a law of mere prohibition, — since positive
conformity to God is the inmost requisition of law.
(d) Not partial, or addressed to one part only of man's being, — since
likeness to God requires purity of substance in man's soul and body, as
weU as purity in aU the thoughts and acts that proceed therefrom. As law
proceeds from the nature of God, so it requires conformity to that nature
in the nature of man.
( e ) Not outwardly pubhshed, — since all positive enactment is only the
imperfect expression of this underlying and unwritten law of being.
(/) Not inwardly conscious, or limited in its scope by men's conscious
ness of it. Like the laws of our physical being, the moral law exists
whether we recognize it or not.
(g ) Not local, or confined to place, — since no moral creature can escape
from God, from his own being, or from the natural necessity that unlike-
ness to God should involve misery and ruin.
( h ) Not changeable, or capable of modification. Since law represents
the unchangeable nature of God, it is not a shding scale of requirements
which adapts itself to the ability of the subjects. God himself cannot
change it without ceasing to be God.
Secondly, the law of God as the ideal of human nature. — A law thus
identical with the eternal and necessary relations of the creature to the
Creator, and demanding of the creature nothing less than perfect holiness,
as the condition of harmony with the infinite holiness of God, is adapted
to man's finite nature, as needing law ; to man's free nature, as needing
moral law ; and to man's progressive nature, as needing ideal law.
The law of God is therefore characterized by :
(a) AU-comprehensiveness. — It is over us at aU times; it respects our
past, our present, our future. It forbids every conceivable sin ; it requires
every conceivable virtue ; omissions as well as commissions are condemned
by it.
(6) Spirituality. — It demands not only right acts and words, but also
right dispositions and states. Perfect obedience requhes not only the
intense and unremitting reign of love toward God and man, but conformity
of the whole inward and outward nature of man to the holiness of God.
(c) Solidarity. — It exhibits in all its parts the nature of the one

144 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
Law-giver, and it expresses, in its least command, the one requirement of
harmony with him.
Only to the first man, then, was the law proposed as a method of salva
tion. With the first sin, aU hope of obtaining the divine favor by perfect
obedience is lost. To sinners the law remains as a means of discovering
and developing sin in its true nature, and of compelling a recourse to the
mercy provided in Jesus Christ.
2. Positive Enactment, or the expression of the wUl of God in pub
lished ordinances. This is also two-fold :
A. General moral precepts. — These are written summaries of the ele
mental law ( Mat. 5 : 48 ; 22 : 37-40 ), or authorized applications of it to
special human conditions ( Ex. 20 : 1-17 ; Mat. chap. 5-8).
B. Ceremonial or special injunctions. — These are Ulustrations of the
elemental law, or approximate revelations of it, suited to lower degrees of
capacity and to earlier stages of spiritual training ( Ez. 20 : 25 ; Mat. 19 : 8 ;
Mark 10 : 5 ). Though temporary, only God can say when they cease to
be binding upon us in theh outward form.
AU positive enactments, therefore, whether they be moral or ceremonial,
are repubhcations of elemental law. Theh forms may change, but the sub
stance is eternal. Certain modes of expression, hke the Mosaic system,
may be abolished, but the essential demands are unchanging ( Mat. 5 : 17,
18 ; cf. Eph. 2 : 15 ). From the imperfection of human language, no posi
tive enactments are able to express in themselves the whole content and
meaning of the elemental law. "It is not the purpose of revelation to
disclose the whole of our duties. " Scripture is not a complete code of rules
for practical action, but an enunciation of principles, with occasional pre
cepts by way of Ulustration. Hence we must, supplement the positive
enactment by the law of being — the moral ideal found in the nature of God.
HL Relation of the Law to the Grace of God.
In human government, whUe law is an expression of the wiU of the
governing power, and so of the nature lying behind ~the wiU, it is by no
means an exhaustive expression of that wUl and nature, since it consists
only of general ordinances, and leaves room for particular acts of command
through the executive, as well as for " the institution of equity, the faculty
of discretionary punishment, and the prerogative of pardon. "
Applying now to the divine law this Ulustration drawn from human law,
we remark :
( a ) The law of God is a general expression of God'B wUl, applicable to
aU moral beings. It therefore does not exclude the possibility of special
injunctions to individuals, and special acts of wisdom and power in creation
and providence. The very specialty of these latter expressions of wUl
prevents us from classing them under the category of law.
(6) The law of God, accordingly, is a partial, not an exhaustive,
expression of God's nature. It constitutes, indeed, a manifestation of that
attribute of holiness which is fundamental in God, and which man must

DEFINITION OF SIN. 145
possess in order to be in harmony with God. But it does not fully express
God's nature in its aspects of personahty, sovereignty, helpfulness, mercy.
(c) Mere law, therefore, leaves God's nature in these aspects of person
ahty, sovereignty, helpfulness, mercy, to be expressed toward sinners in
another way, namely, through the atoning, regenerating, pardoning, sancti
fying work of the gospel of Christ. As creation does not exclude miracles,
so law does not exclude grace (Rom. 8 : 3 — " what the law could not do
 God" did).
(d) Grace is to be regarded, however, not as abrogating law, but as
republishing and enforcing it (Rom. 3 :31 — "we estabhsh the law"). By
removing obstacles to pardon in the mind of God, and by enabling man to
obey, grace secures the perfect fulfilment of law (Rom. 8 : 4 — "that the
ordinance of the law might be fulfiUed in us " ). Even grace has its law
(Rom. 8 :2 — "the law of the Spirit of life") ; another higher law of
grace, the operation of individualizing mercy, overbears the "law of sin
and of death, " — this last, as in the case of the miracle, not being sus
pended, annulled, or violated, but being merged in, whUe it is transcended
by, the exertion of personal divine wUl.
(e) Thus the revelation of grace, whUe it takes up and includes in itself
the revelation of law, adds something different in kind, namely, the mani
festation of the personal love of the Lawgiver. Without grace, law has
only a demanding aspect. Only in connection with grace does it become
" the perfect law, the law of liberty" (James 1 :25). In fine, grace is
that larger and completer manifestation of the divine nature, of which law
constitutes the necessary but preparatory stage.

SECTION II. — NATURE OF SIN.
I. Definition op Sin.
Sin is lack of conformity to the moral law of God, either in act, disposi
tion, or state.
In explanation, we remark that ( a ) This definition regards sin as pred
icable only of rational and voluntary agents. ( b ) It assumes, however,
that man has a rational nature below consciousness, and a voluntary nature
apart from actual volition. ( c ) It holds that the divine law requhes moral
hkeness to God in the affections and tendencies of the nature, as weU as in
its outward activities. ( d ) It therefore considers lack of conformity to the
divine holiness in disposition or state as a violation of law, equally with the
outward act of transgression.
Our treatment of Holiness, as belonging to the nature of God ( pages 75, 79,
80) ; of WUl, as not only the faculty of vohtions, but also a permanent state
of the soul (pages 132-134) ; and of Law as requiring the conformity of
man's nature to God's holiness (pages 142-144) ; has prepared us for the
definition of sin as a state. The chief psychological defect of New School
theology, next to its making holiness to be a mere form of love, is its ignor-

146 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
ing of the unconscious and subconscious elements in human character. To
help our understanding of sin as an underlying and permanent state of the
soul, we subjoin references to recent writers of note upon psychology and
its relations to theology.
In adducing our Scriptural and rational proof of the definition of sin as
a state, we desire to obviate the objection that this view leaves the soul
whoUy given over to the power of evU. WhUe we maintain that this is
true of man apart from God, we also insist that side by side with the evil
bent of the human wiU there is always an immanent divine power which
greatly counteracts the force of evU, and if not resisted leads the individ
ual soul — even when resisted leads the race at large — toward truth and
salvation. This immanent divine power is none other than Christ, the
eternal Word, the Light which hghteth every man ; see John 1 : 4, 9.
1. Proof.
As it is readUy admitted that the outward act of transgression is properly
denominated sin, we here attempt to show only that lack of conformity to
the law of God in disposition or state is also and equaUy to be so denomi
nated. A. From Scripture.
(a) The words ordinarily translated 'sin,' or used as synonyms for it,
are as applicable to dispositions and states as to acts ( HXDn and dfiapria =
a missing, faUure, coming short [ so. of God's wUl ] ).
( 6 ) The New Testament descriptions of sin bring more distinctly to
view the states and dispositions than the outward acts of the soul ( 1 John
3 :4: — qdp.apTia hrlv % hvofi'm, where dvojiia = , not "transgression of the
law," but, as both context and etymology show, " lack of conformity to
law" or "lawlessness" — Rev. Vers.).
( c ) Moral evU is ascribed not only to the thoughts and affections, but
to the heart from which they spring ( we read of the " evU thoughts " and
of the " evil heart "— Mat. 15 : 19 and Heb. 3 : 12 ).
( d ) The state or condition of the soul which gives rise to wrong desires
and acts is expressly caUed sin ( Rom. 7 : 8 — "Sin . . . wrought in me . . .
all manner of coveting " ).
(e) Sin is represented as existing in the soul, prior to the conscious
ness of it, and as only discovered and awakened by the law (Rom. 7:9, 10
— "when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died"— if sin
"revived, "it must have had previous existence and hfe, even though it
did not manifest itself in acts of conscious transgression ).
(/) The allusions to sin as a permanent power or reigning principle, not
only in the individual but in humanity at large, forbid us to define it as a
momentary act, and compel us to regard it as being primarily a settled
depravity of nature, of which individual sins or acts of transgression are
the workings and fruits ( Rom. 5 : 21 — " sin reigned in death " ; 6 : 12 —
" let not therefore sin reign in your mortal body " ).

DEFINITION OF SIN. 147
(_g) The Mosaic sacrifices for sins of ignorance and of omission, and
especiaUy for general sinfulness, are evidence that sin is not to be hmited
to mere act, but that it includes something deeper and more permanent in
the heart and the life (Lev. 1 : 3 ; 5 : 11 ; 12 : 8 ; cf. Luke 2 : 24).
B. From the common judgment of mankind.
( a ) Men universaUy attribute vice as weU as virtue not only to con
scious and dehberate acts, but also to dispositions and states. Behef in
something more permanently evil than acts of transgression is indicated in
the common phrases, "hateful temper," "wicked pride," "bad character."
( 6 ) Outward acts, indeed, are condemned only when they are regarded
as originating in, and as symptomatic of, evil dispositions. CivU law pro
ceeds upon this principle in holding crime to consist, not alone in the
external act, but also in the evU motive or intent with which it is per
formed. ( c ) The stronger an evil disposition, or in other words, the more it
connects itself with, or resolves itself into, a settled state or condition of
the soul, the more blameworthy is it felt to be. This is shown by the
distinction drawn between crimes of passion and crimes of dehberation.
(d) This condemning sentence remains the same, even although the
origin of the evU disposition or state cannot be traced back to any conscious
act of the individual. Neither the general sense of mankind, nor the civil
law in which this general sense is expressed, goes behind the fact of an
existing evU wUL Whether this evU wUl is the result of personal trans
gression or is a hereditary bias derived from generations passed, this evil
wUl is the man himself, and upon him terminates the blame. We do not
excuse arrogance or sensuality upon the ground that they are family traits.
( e ) When any evil disposition has such strength in itself, or is so com
bined with others, as to indicate a settled moral corruption in which no
power to do good remains, this state is regarded with the deepest disappro
bation of aU. Sin weakens man's power of obedience, but the can-not is a
will-not, and is therefore condemnable. The opposite principle would
lead to the conclusion that, the more a man weakened his powers by trans
gression, the less guilty he would be, untU absolute depravity became
absolute innocence.
C. From the experience of the Christian.
Christian experience is a testing of Scripture truth, and therefore is not
an independent source of knowledge. It may, however, corroborate con
clusions drawn from the word of God. Since the judgment of the Christian
is formed under the influence of the Holy Spirit, we may trust this more
implicitly than the general sense of the world. We affirm, then, that just
in proportion to his spiritual enlightenment and self-knowledge, the Chris
tian ( a ) Regards his outward deviations from God's law, and his evU incli
nations and deshes, as outgrowths and revelations of a depravity of nature
which hes below his consciousness ; and

148 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
( b ) Repents more deeply for this depravity of nature, which constitutes
his inmost character and is inseparable from himself, than for what he
merely feels or does.
In proof of these statements we appeal to the biographies and writings
of those in all ages who have been by general consent regarded as most
advanced in spiritual culture and discernment.
2. Inferences.
In the light of the preceding discussion, we may properly estimate the
elements of truth and of error in the common definition of sin as ' the
voluntary transgression of known law. '
(a) Not aU sin is voluntary as being a distinct and conscious volition ;
for evU disposition and state often precede and occasion evil volition, and
evU disposition and state are themselves sin. All sin, however, is voluntary
as springing either directly from wUl, or indirectly from those perverse
affections and desires which have themselves originated in wUl. ' Volun
tary ' is a term broader than ' volitional,' and includes aU those permanent
states of intellect and affection which the wUl has made what they are. WUl,
moreover, is not to be regarded as simply the faculty of vohtions, but as
primarUy the underlying determination of the being to a supreme end.
( b ) Deliberate intention to sin is an aggravation of transgression, but it
is not essential to constitute any given act or feeling a sin. Those evU
inclinations and impulses which rise unbidden and master the soul before
it is weU aware of theh nature, are themselves violations of the divine law,
and indications of an inward depravity which in the case of each descen
dant of Adam is the chief and f ontal transgression.
( c ) Knowledge of the sinfulness of an act or feehng is also an aggrava
tion of transgression, but it is not essential to constitute it a sin. Moral
blindness is the effect of transgression, and, as inseparable from corrupt
affections and deshes, is itself condemned by the divine law.
( d ) Ability to fulfill the law is not essential to constitute the non-fulfil
ment sin. Inability to fulfiU the law is a result of transgression, and, as
consisting not in an original deficiency of faculty but in a settled state of
the affections and wiU, it is itself condemnable. Since the law presents
the holiness of God as the only standard for the creature, ability to obey
can never be the measure of obhgation or the test of sin.
H. The Essential Principle of Sin.
The definition of sin as lack of conformity to the divine law does not
exclude, but rather necessitates, an inquiry into the characterizing motive
or impeUing power which explains its existence and constitutes its guUt.
Only three views requhe extended examination. Of these the first two
constitute the most common excuses for sin, although not propounded for
this purpose by their authors : Sin is due ( 1 ) to the human body, or ( 2 )
to finite weakness. The third, which we regard as the Scriptural view,
considers sin as ( 3 ) the supreme choice of self, or selfishness.
In the preceding section on the Definition of Sin, we showed mat sin is

THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF SIN. 149
a state, and a state of the will. We now ask : What is the nature of this
state ? and we expect to show that it is essentiaUy a selfish state of the wUL
1. Sin as Sensuousness.
This view regards sin as the necessary product of man's sensuous nature
— a result of the soul's connection with a physical organism. This is the
view of Schleiermacher and of Rothe. More recent writers, with John
Fiske, regard moral evil as man's inheritance from a brute ancestry.
In refutation of this view, it wUl be sufficient to urge the following con
siderations :
( a ) It involves an assumption of the inherent evil of matter, at least so
far as regards the substance of man's body. But this is either a form of
dualism, and may be met with the objections already brought against that
system, or it imphes that God, in being the author of man's physical
organism, is also the responsible originator of human sin.
(6) In explaining sin as an inheritance from the brute, this theory
ignores the fact that man, even though derived from a brute ancestry, is no
longer brute, but man, with power to recognize and to realize moral ideals,
and under no necessity to violate the law of his being.
( c) It rests upon an incomplete induction of facts, taking account of sin
solely in its aspect of self -degradation, but ignoring the worst aspect of it as
self-exaltation. Avarice, envy, pride, ambition, malice, cruelty, revenge,
self -righteousness, unbelief, enmity to God, are none of them fleshly sins,
and upon this principle are incapable of explanation.
{d) It leads to absurd conclusions, — as, for example, that asceticism, by
weakening the power of sense, must weaken the power of sin ; that man
becomes less sinful as his senses faU with age ; that disembodied spirits are
necessarily holy ; that death is the only Redeemer.
(e) It interprets Scripture erroneously. In passages hke Rom. 7 : 18 —
ovk oiKei kv e/ioi, tovt' Ibtiv kv 1-5 aapai pov, dyafidv — adpl-, or flesh, signifies, not
man's body, but man's whole being when destitute of the Spirit of God.
The Scriptures distinctly recognize the seat of sin as being in the soul
itself, not in its physical organism. God does not tempt man, nor has he
made man's nature to tempt him ( James 1 : 13, 14).
(/) Instead of explaining sin, this theory virtually denies its existence,
— for if sin arises from the original constitution of our being, reason may
recognize it as misfortune, but conscience cannot attribute to it guUt.
2. Sin as Finiteness.
This view explains sin as a necessary result of the limitations of man's
finite being. As an incident of imperfect development, the fruit of igno
rance and impotence, sin is not absolutely but only relatively evil — an
element in human education and a means of progress. This is the view of
Leibnitz and of Spinoza. Modern writers, as Schurman and Royce, have
maintained that moral evU is the necessary background and condition of
moral good.

150 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
We object to this theory that
(a) It rests upon a pantheistic basis, as the sense-theory rests upon
duahsm. The moral is confounded with the physical ; might is identified
with right. Since sin is a necessary incident of finiteness, and creatures
can never be infinite, it foUows that sin must be everlasting, not only in
the universe, but in each individual soul.
( 6 ) So far as this theory regards moral evU as a necessary presupposition
and condition of moral good, it commits the serious error of confounding
the possible with the actual. What is necessary to goodness is not the
actuality of evil, but only the possibility of evil.
(c) It is inconsistent with known facts, — as for example, the foUow
ing : Not aU sins are negative sins of ignorance and infirmity ; there are acts
of positive mahgnity, conscious transgressions, wilful and presumptuous
choices of evU. Increased knowledge of the nature of sin does not of itself
give strength to overcome it ; but, on the contrary, repeated acts of con
scious transgression harden the heart in evU. Men of greatest mental
powers are not of necessity the greatest saints, nor are the greatest sinners
men of least strength of wUl and understanding.
(d) Like the sense-theory of sin, it contradicts both conscience and
Scripture by denying human responsibility and by transferring the blame
of sin from the creature to the Creator. This is to explain sin, again, by
denying its existence.
3. Sin as Selfishness.
We hold the essential principle of sin to be selfishness. By selfishness
we mean not simply the exaggerated self-love which constitutes the antith
esis of benevolence, but that choice of self as the supreme end which
constitutes the antithesis of supreme love to God. That selfishness is the
essence of sin may be shown as foUows :
A. Love to God is the essence of aU virtue. The opposite to this, the
choice of self as the supreme end, must therefore be the essence of sin.
We are to remember, however, that the love to God in which virtue con
sists is love for that which is most characteristic and fundamental in God,
namely, his holiness. It is not to be confounded with supreme regard for
God's interests or for the good of being in general. Not mere benevolence,
but love for God as holy, is the principle and source of holiness in man.
Since the love of God required by the law is of this sort, it not only does
not imply that love, in the sense of benevolence, is the essence of holiness
in God, — it implies rather that hohness, or self -loving and self -affirming
purity, is fundamental in the divine nature. From this self-loving and
self-affirming purity, love properly so-caUed, or the self-communicating
attribute, is to be carefuUy distinguished ( see pages 74, 75 ).
B. AU the different forms of sin can be shown to have their root in
selfishness, whUe selfishness itself, considered as the choice of self as a
supreme end, cannot be resolved into any simpler elements.
( a ) Selfishness may reveal itself in the elevation to supreme dominion

THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF SIN. 151
of any one of man's natural appetites, deshes, or affections. Sensuality is
selfishness in the form of inordinate appetite. Selfish desire takes the forms
respectively of avarice, ambition, vanity, pride, according as it is set upon
property, power, esteem, independence. Selfish affection is falsehood or
mahce, according as it hopes to make others its voluntary servants, or
regards them as standing in its way ; it is unbehef or enmity to God, accord
ing as it simply turns away from the truth and love of God, or conceives
of God's holiness as positively resisting and punishing it.
( 6 ) Even in the nobler forms of unregenerate hfe, the principle of self
ishness is to be regarded as manifesting itself in the preference of lower
ends to that of God's proposing. Others are loved with idolatrous affection
because these others are regarded as a part of self. That the selfish ele
ment is present even here, is evident upon considering that such affection
does not seek the highest interest of its object, that it often ceases when
unreturned, and that it sacrifices to its own gratification the claims of God
and his law.
( c ) It must be remembered, however, that side by side with the selfish
wUl, and striving against it, is the power of Christ, the immanent God,
imparting aspirations and impulses foreign to unregenerate humanity, and
preparing the way for the soul's surrender to truth and righteousness.
C. This view accords best with Scripture.
( a ) The law requhes love to God as its aU-embracing requirement. ( 6 )
The hohness of Christ consisted in this, that he sought not his own wiU or
glory, but made God his supreme end. ( c ) The Christian is one who has
ceased to hve for self. ( d) The tempter's promise is a promise of selfish
independence, (e) The prodigal separates himself from his father, and
seeks his own interest and pleasure. (/) The "man of sin" illustrates
the nature of sin, in "opposing and exalting himself against aU that is
caUedGod." Sin, therefore, is not merely a negative thing, or an absence of love to
God. It is a fundamental and positive choice or preference of seU instead
of God, as the object of affection and the supreme end of being. Instead
of making God the centre of his life, surrendering himself unconditionaUy
to God and possessing himself only in subordination to God's wiU, the sin
ner makes self the centre of his life, sets himself directly against God, and
constitutes his own interest the supreme motive and his own wUl the
supreme rule.
We may follow Dr. E. G. Robinson in saying that, whUe sin as a state
is unlikeness to God, as a principle is opposition to God, and as an act is
transgression of God's law, the essence of it always and everywhere is
selfishness. It is therefore not something external, or the result of compul
sion from without ; it is a depravity of the affections and a perversion of the
wUl, which constitutes man's inmost character.

152 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
SECTION III. — UNIVERSALITY OF SIN.
We have shown that sin is a state, a state of the will, a selfish state of
the wiU. We now proceed to show that this selfish state of the wUl is
universal. We divide our proof into two parts. In the first, we regard
sin in its aspect as conscious violation of law ; in the second, in its aspect
as a bias of the nature to evil, prior to or underlying consciousness.
I. Evert human being who has arrived at moral consciousness
has committed acts, or cherished dispositions, contrary to the
divine law.
1. Proof from Scripture.
The universality of transgression is :
(a) Set forth in dhect statements of Scripture.
( 6 ) Implied in declarations of the universal need of atonement, regen
eration, and repentance.
(c) Shown from the condemnation resting upon aU who do not accept
Christ. (d) Consistent with those passages which at first sight seem to ascribe
to certain men a goodness which renders them acceptable to God, where a
closer examination wUl show that in each case the goodness supposed is a
merely imperfect and fancied goodness, a goodness of mere aspiration and
impulse due to preliminary workings of God's Spirit, or a goodness result
ing from the trust of a conscious sinner in God's method of salvation.
2. Proof from history, observation, and the common judgment of
mankind. (a) History witnesses to the universality of sin, in its accounts of the
universal prevalence of priesthood and sacrifice.
( b ) Every man knows himself to have come short of moral perfection,
and, in proportion to his experience of the world, recognizes the fact that
every other man has come short of it also.
( c) The common judgment of mankind declares that there is an element
of selfishness in every human heart, and that every man is prone to some
form of sin. This common judgment is expressed in the maxims: "No
man is perfect" ; "Every man has his weak side", or "his price" ; and
every great name in literature has attested its truth.
3. Proof from Christian experience.
( a ) In proportion to his spiritual progress does the Christian recognize
evil dispositions within him, which but for divine grace might germinate
and bring forth the most various forms of outward transgression.
(6) Since those most enlightened by the Holy Spirit recognize them
selves as guUty of unnumbered violations of the divine law, the absence
of any consciousness of sin on the part of unregenerate men must be
regarded as proof that they are blinded by persistent transgression,

THE UNIVERSALITY OF SIN. 153
H. Every member of the human baoe, without exception, posses
ses A COBRUPTED NATURE, WHICH IS A SOURCE OP ACTUAL SIN, AND IS ITSELF
SIN. 1. Proof from Scripture.
A. The sinful acts and dispositions of men are referred to, and explained
by, a corrupt nature.
This corrupt nature ( a ) belongs to man from the first moment of his
being ; ( b ) underlies man's consciousness ; ( e ) cannot be changed by
man's own power ; ( d) first constitutes him a sinner before God ; ( e ) is
the common heritage of the race.
B. AU men are declared to be by nature ehUdren of wrath ( Eph. 2:3).
Here ' nature ' signifies something inborn and original, as distinguished
from that which is subsequently acquired. The text implies that : ( a ) Sin
is a nature, in the sense of a congenital depravity of the wUl. ( b ) This
nature is guilty and condemnable, — since God's wrath rests only upon that
which deserves it. ( c ) AU men participate in this nature and in this con
sequent guilt and condemnation.
C. Death, the penalty of sin, is visited even upon those who have never
exercised a personal and conscious choice ( Rom. 5 : 12-14 ). This text
imphes that ( a ) Sin exists in the case of infants prior to moral conscious
ness, and therefore in the nature, as distinguished from the personal
activity. ( b ) Since infants die, this visitation of the penalty of sin upon
them marks the Ul-desert of that nature which contains in itself, though
undeveloped, the germs of actual transgression. ( c ) It is therefore certain
that a sinful, guUty, and condemnable nature belongs to aU mankind.
2. Proof from Reason.
Three facts demand explanation : ( a ) The universal existence of sinful
dispositions in every mind, and of sinful acts in every hfe. ( b ) The pre
ponderating tendencies to evU, which necessitate the constant education of
good impulses, while the bad grow of themselves. ( c ) The yielding of the
wUl to temptation, and the actual violation of the divine law, in the case of
every human being so soon as he reaches moral consciousness.
Reason seeks an underlying principle which will reduce these multitudi
nous phenomena to unity. As we are compeUed to refer common physical
and inteUectual phenomena to a common physical and inteUectual nature,
so we are compeUed to refer these common moral phenomena to a common
moral nature, and to find in it the cause of this universal, spontaneous, and
aU-controUing opposition to God and his law. The only possible solution
of the problem is this, that the common nature of mankind is corrupt, or,
in other words, that the human wfll, prior to the single vohtions of the
individual, is turned away from God and supremely set upon self-gratifi
cation. This unconscious and fundamental direction of the wiU, as the
source of actual sin, must itself be sin 5 and of this sin all mankind are
partakers.

154 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
SECTION IV.— ORIGIN OF SIN IN THE PERSONAL ACT OF ADAM.
With regard to the origin of this sinful nature which is common to the
race, and which is the occasion of aU actual trangressions, reason affords
no hght. The Scriptures, however, refer the origin of this nature to that
free act of our first parents by which they turned away from God, cor
rupted themselves, and brought themselves under the penalties of the law.
I. The Sordptueal Account of the Temptation and Fall in Gen
esis 3 : 1-7.
1. Its general character not mythical or allegorical, but historical.
We adopt this view for the foUowing reasons : — ( a ) There is no inti
mation in the account itself that it is not historical. ( b ) As a part of a
historical book, the presumption is that it is itself historical. ( c ) The
later Scripture writers refer to it as a veritable history even in its detaUs.
( d ) Particular features of the narrative, such as the placing of our first
parents in a garden and the speaking of the tempter through a serpent-
form, are incidents suitable to man's condition of innocent but untried
childhood. ( e ) This view that the narrative is historical does not forbid
our assuming that the trees of hfe and of knowledge were symbols of
sphitual truths, while at the same time they were outward realities.
2. The course of the temptation, and the resulting fall.
The stages of the temptation appear to have been as foUows :
( a ) An appeal on the part of Satan to innocent appetites, together with
an implied suggestion that God was arbitrarily withholding the means of
their gratification ( Gen. 3:1). The first sin was in Eve's isolating herself
and choosing to seek her own pleasure without regard to God's wiU. This
initial selfishness it was, which led her to listen to the tempter instead of
rebuking him or flying from him, and to exaggerate the divine command
in her response ( Gen. 3:3).
( 6 ) A denial of the veracity of God, on the part of the tempter, with a
charge against the Almighty of jealousy and fraud in keeping his creatures
in a position of ignorance and dependence ( Gen. 3 : 4, 5 ). This was fol
lowed, on the part of the woman, by positive unbelief, and by a conscious
and presumptuous cherishing of desire for the forbidden fruit, as a means
of independence and knowledge. Thus unbehef, pride, and lust aU sprang
from the self-isolating, self-seeking spirit, and fastened upon the means
of gratifying it ( Gen. 3:6).
( c ) The tempter needed no longer to urge his suit. Having poisoned
the fountain, the stream would naturaUy be evil. Since the heart and its
deshes had become corrupt, the inward dispositition manifested itself in act
( Gen. 3:6 — 'did eat ; and she gave also unto her husband with her " = who
had been with her, and had shared her choice and longing ). Thus man
fell inwardly, before the outward act of eating the forbidden fruit, — fell in
that one fundamental determination whereby he made supreme choice of
self instead of God. This sin of the inmost nature gave rise to sins of the

DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH THE FALL. 155
deshes, and sins of the deshes led to the outward act of transgression
( James 1 : 15 ).
H DrFFIOULTTES CONNECTED WITH THE FALL CONSIDERED AS THE PER
SONAL Act of Adam.
1. How could a holy being fall f
Here we must acknowledge that we cannot understand how the first
unholy emotion could have found lodgment in a mind that was set
supremely upon God, nor how temptation could have overcome a soul in
which there were no unholy propensities to which it could appeal. The
mere power of choice does not explain the fact of an unholy choice. The
fact of natural desire for sensuous and inteUectual gratification does not
explain how this deshe came to be inordinate. Nor does it throw hght
upon the matter, to resolve this faU into a deception of our first parents by
Satan. Theh yielding to such deception presupposes distrust of God and
alienation from him. Satan's faU, moreover, since it must have been
uncaused by temptation from without, is more difficult to explain than
Adam's falL
But sin is an existing fact. God cannot be its author, either by creating
man's nature so that sin was a necessary incident of its development, or by
withdrawing a supernatural grace which was necessary to keep man holy.
Reason, therefore, has no other recourse than to accept the Scripture doc
trine that sin originated in man's free act of revolt from God — the act of
a wUl which, though inclined toward God, was not yet confirmed in virtue
and was stiU capable of a contrary choice. The original possession of such
power to the contrary seems to be the necessary condition of probation
and moral development. Yet the exercise of this power in a sinful direction
can never be explained upon grounds of reason, since sin is essentiaUy
unreason. It is an act of wicked arbitrariness, the only motive of which
is the deshe to depart from God and to render self supreme.
2. How could God justly permit Satanic temptation ?
We see in this permission not justice but benevolence.
(a) Since Satan feU without external temptation, it is probable tha
man's trial would have been substantiaUy the same, even though there had
been no Satan to tempt him.
( 6 ) Lu this case, however, man's fall would perhaps have been without
what now constitutes its single mitigating circumstance. Self-originated
sin would have made man himself a Satan.
( c ) As, in the conflict with temptation, it is an advantage to objectify
evil under the image of corruptible flesh, so it is an advantage to meet it
as embodied in a personal and seducing spirit.
( b ) Such temptation has in itself no tendency to lead the soul astray. If
the soul be holy, temptation may only confirm it in virtue. Only the evil will,
self-determined against God, can turn temptation into an occasion of ruin.
3. How could a penalty so great be justly connected with disobedi
ence to so slight a command f

156 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
To this question we may reply :
(a) So slight a command presented the best test of the spirit of
obedience. ( 6 ) The external command was not arbitrary or insignificant in its sub
stance. It was a concrete presentation to the human wiU of God's claim
to eminent domain or absolute ownership.
( c ) The sanction attached to the command shows that man was not left
ignorant of its meaning or importance.
( d) The act of disobedience was therefore the revelation of a wUl thor
oughly corrupted and alienated from God — a wUl given over to ingratitude,
unbelief , ambition, and rebellion.
TTT, Consequences of the Fall, so far as respects Adam.
1. Death. — This death was twofold. It was partly :
A. Physical death, or the separation of the soul from the body. — The
seeds of death, naturaUy implanted in man's constitution, began to develop
themselves the moment that access to the tree of life was denied him. Man
from that moment was a dying creature.
But this death was also, and chiefly,
B. Spiritual death, or the separation of the soul from God. — In this
are included : ( a ) Negatively, the loss of man's moral likeness to God, or
that underlying tendency of his whole nature toward God which constituted
his original righteousness. (6) Positively, the depraving of aU those
powers which, in theh united action with reference to moral and rehgious
truth, we caU man's moral and religious nature ; or, in other words, the
blinding of his inteUect, the corruption of his affections, and the enslave
ment of his wiU.
In fine, man no longer made God the end of his life, but chose self
instead. WhUe he retained the power of self-determination in subordinate
things, he lost that freedom which consisted in the power of choosing God
as his ultimate aim, and became fettered by a fundamental inclination of
his wiU toward evil. The intuitions of the reason were abnormally
obscured, since these intuitions, so far as they are concerned with moral and
religious truth, are conditioned upon a right state of the affections ; and —
as a necessary result of this obscuring of reason — conscience, which, as
the normal judiciary of the soul, decides upon the basis of the law given to
it by reason, became perverse in its dehverances. Yet this inability to judge
or act aright, since it was a moral inability springing ultimately from wUl,
was itself hateful and condemnable.
2. Positive and formal exclusion from God's presence. — Thisincluded:
( a ) The cessation of man's former familiar intercourse with God, and
the setting up of outward barriers between man and his Maker ( cherubim
and sacrifice ).
( 6 ) Banishment from the garden, where God had speciaUy manifested
his presence. — Eden was perhaps a spot reserved, as Adam's body had

IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY. 157
been, to show what a sinless world would be. This positive exclusion from
God's presence, with the sorrow and pain which it involved, may have been
intended to illustrate to man the nature of that eternal death from which
he now needed to seek dehverance.

SECTION V. — IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY.
We have seen that all mankind are sinners ; that all men are by nature
depraved, guUty, and condemnable ; and that the transgression of our first
parents, so far as respects the human race, was the first sin. We have stUl
to consider the connection between Adam's sin and the depravity, guUt,
and condemnation of the race.
(a) The Scriptures teach that the transgression of our first parents con
stituted theh posterity sinners (Rom. 5:19 — "through the one man's
disobedience the many were made sinners "), so that Adam's sin is imputed,
reckoned, or charged to every member of the race of which he was the germ
and head ( Rom. 5 : 16 — " the judgment came of one [ offence ] unto con
demnation " ). It is because of Adam's sin that we are born depraved and
subject to God's penal inflictions (Rom. 5 :12 — "through one man sin
entered into the world, and death through sin " ; Eph. 2:3 — "by nature
children of wrath " ). Two questions demand answer, — first, how we can
be responsible for a depraved nature which we did not personally and con
sciously originate ; and, secondly, how God can justly charge to our
account the sin of the first father of the race. These questions are sub
stantiaUy the same, and the Scriptures intimate the true answer to the
problem when they declare that "in Adam all die" (1 Cor. 15:22) and
" that death passed unto aU men, for that aU sinned " when "through one
man sin entered into the world " ( Rom. 5 : 12 ). In other words, Adam's
sin is the cause and ground of the depravity, guUt, and condemnation
of all his posterity, simply because Adam and his posterity are one, and, by
virtue of their organic unity, the sin of Adam is the sin of the race.
( 6 ) According as we regard this twofold problem from the point of view
of the abnormal human condition, or of the divine treatment of it, we may
caU it the problem of original sin, or the problem of imputation. Neither
of these terms is objectionable when its meaning is defined. By imputa
tion of sin we mean, not the arbitrary and mechanical charging to a man
of that for which he is not naturally responsible, but the reckoning to a
man of a guilt which is properly his own, whether by virtue of his individ
ual acts, or by virtue of his connection with the race. By original sin we
mean that participation in the common sin of the race with which God
charges us, in virtue of our descent from Adam, its first father and head.
( c ) There are two fundamental principles which the Scriptures already
cited seem clearly to substantiate, and which other Scriptures corroborate.
The first is that man's relations to moral law extend beyond the sphere of
conscious and actual transgression, and embrace those moral tendencies
and quahties of his being which he has in common with every other member

158 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
of the race. The second is, that God's moral government is a government
which not only takes account of persons and personal acts, but also recog
nizes race responsibilities and inflicts race-penalties ; or, in other words,
judges mankind, not simply as a collection of separate individuals, but also
as an organic whole, which can coUectively revolt from God and incur the
curse of the violated law.
( d) In recognizing the guilt of race-sin, we are to bear in mind : ( 1 ) that
actual sin, in which the personal agent reaffirms the underlying determina
tion of his wUl, is more guUty than original sin alone ; ( 2 ) that no human
being is finaUy condemned solely on account of original sin ; but that all
who, like infants, do not commit personal transgressions, are saved through
the application of Christ's atonement ; ( 3 ) that our responsibility for
inborn evil dispositions, or for the depravity common to the race, can be
maintained only upon the ground that this depravity was caused by an
original and conscious act of free wUl, when the race revolted from God in
Adam ; ( 4 ) that the doctrine of original sin is only the ethical interpreta
tion of biological facts — the facts of heredity and of universal congenital
Uls, which demand an ethical ground and explanation ; and ( 5 ) that the
idea of original sin has for its correlate the idea of original grace, or the
abiding presence and operation of Christ, the immanent God, in every
member of the race, in spite of his sin, to counteract the evil and to prepare
the way, so far as man wiU permit, for individual and collective salvation.
(e) There is a race-sin, therefore, as weU as a personal sin; and that
race-sin was committed by the first father of the race, when he comprised
the whole race in himself. AU mankind since that time have been born in
the state into which he feU — a state of depravity, guUt, and condemnation.
To vindicate God's justice in imputing to us the sin of our first father,
many theories have been devised, a part of which must be regarded as only
attempts to evade the problem by denying the facts set before us in the
Scriptures. Among these attempted explanations of the Scripture state
ments, we proceed to examine the six theories which seem most worthy of
attention. I. Theories op Imputation.
1. The Pelagian Theory, or Theory of Man's natural Innocence.
Pelagius, a British monk, propounded his doctrines at Rome, 409. They
were condemned by the CouncU of Carthage, 418. Pelagianism, however,
as opposed to Augustinianism, designates a complete scheme of doctrine
with regard to sin, of which Pelagius was the most thorough representative,
although every feature of it cannot be ascribed to his authorship. Socinians
and Unitarians are the more modern advocates of this general scheme.
According to this theory, every human soul is immediately created by
God, and created as innocent, as free from depraved tendencies, and as
perfectly able to obey God, as Adam was at his creation. The only effect
of Adam's sin upon his posterity is the effect of evU example ; it has in no
way corrupted human nature ; the only corruption of human nature is that
habit of sinning which each individual contracts by persistent transgression
of known law.

ARMINIAN THEORY OF IMPUTATION. 159
Adam's sin therefore injured only himself ; the sin of Adam is imputed
only to Adam,— it is imputed in no sense to his descendants ; God imputes
to each of Adam's descendants only those acts of sin which he has person
ally and consciously committed. Men can be saved by the law as weU as
by the gospel ; and some have actuaUy obeyed God perfectly, and have
thus been saved. Physical death is therefore not the penalty of sin, but
an original law of nature ; Adam would have died whether he had sinned
or not ; in Rom. 5 : 12, " death passed unto aU men, for that aU sinned,"
signifies: "aU incurred eternal death by sinning after Adam's example."
Of the Pelagian theory of sin, we may say :
A. It has never been recognized as Scriptural, nor has it been formu
lated in confessions, by any branch of the Christian church. Held only
sporadically and by individuals, it has ever been regarded by the church at
large as heresy. This constitutes at least a presumption against its truth.
B. It contradicts Scripture in denying : ( a ) that evil disposition and
state, as weU as evU acts, are sin ; ( 6 ) that such evil disposition and state
are inborn in aU mankind ; ( c ) that men universaUy are guUty of overt
transgression so soon as they come to moral consciousness ; ( d ) that no
man is able without divine help to fulfil the law ; ( e ) that aU men, with
out exception, are dependent for salvation upon God's atoning, regenerat
ing, sanctifying grace ; (/) that man's present state of corruption,
condemnation, and death, is the dhect effect of Adam's transgression.
C. It rests upon false phUosophical principles ; as, for example : ( a )
that the human wiU is simply the faculty of vohtions ; whereas it is also,
and chiefly, the faculty of self-determination to an ultimate end ; ( b ) that
the power of a contrary choice is essential to the existence of wiU ; whereas
the wiU fundamentaUy determined to self -gratification has this power only
with respect to subordinate choices, and cannot by a single volition reverse
its moral state ; (e) that ability is the measure of obligation, — a principle
which would diminish the sinner's responsibility, just in proportion to his
progress in sin ; ( d ) that law consists only in positive enactment ; whereas it
is the demand of perfect harmony with God, inwrought into man's moral
nature ; ( e ) that each human soul is immediately created by God, and
holds no other relations to moral law than those which are individual ;
whereas all human souls are organicaUy connected with each other, and
together have a corporate relation to God's law, by virtue of theh deriva
tion from one common stock.
2. The Arminian Theory, or Theory of voluntarily appropriated
Depravity. Arminius (1560-1609), professor in the University of Leyden, in South
Holland, while formaUy accepting the doctrine of the Adamic unity of the
race propounded both by Luther and Calvin, gave a very different inter
pretation to it — an interpretation which verged toward Semi-Pelagianism
and the anthropology of the Greek Church. The Methodist body is the
modern representative of this view.

160 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
According to this theory, all men, as a divinely appointed sequence of
Adam's transgression, are naturally destitute of original righteousness, and
are exposed to misery and death. By virtue of the infirmity propagated
from Adam to aU his descendants, mankind are whoUy unable without
divine help perfectly to obey God or to attain eternal life. This inability,
however, is physical and inteUectual, but not voluntary. As matter of jus
tice, therefore, God bestows upon each individual from the first dawn of
consciousness a special influence of the Holy Spirit, which is sufficient to
counteract the effect of the inherited depravity and to make obedience
possible, provided the human wiU cooperates, which it stiU has power to do.
The evU tendency and state may be caUed sin ; but they do not in them
selves involve guUt or punishment ; stUl less are mankind accounted guilty
of Adam's sin. God imputes to each man his inborn tendencies to evil,
only when he consciously and voluntarily appropriates and ratifies these in
spite of the power to the contrary, which, in justice to man, God has
speciaUy communicated. In Rom. 5 : 12, "death passed unto aU men, for
that all sinned," signifies that physical and spiritual death is inflicted upon
aU men, not as the penalty of a common sin in Adam, but because, by
divine decree, aU suffer the consequences of that sin, and because aU
personaUy consent to theh inborn sinfulness by acts of transgression.
With regard to the Arminian theory we remark :
A. We grant that there is a universal gift of the Holy Spirit, if by the
Holy Spirit is meant the natural hght of reason and conscience, and the
manifold impulses to good which struggle against the evU of man's nature.
But we regard as wholly unscriptural the assumptions : [a) that this gift
of the Holy Spirit of itself removes the depravity or condemnation derived
from Adam's faU ; ( 6 ) that without this gift man would not be responsible
for being morally imperfect ; and ( c ) that at the beginning of moral life
men consciously appropriate theh inborn tendencies to evU.
B. It contradicts Scripture in maintaining : ( a) that inherited moral
evU does not involve guilt ; ( b ) that the gift of the Spirit, and the regen
eration of infants, are matters of justice ; (e) that the effect of grace is
simply to restore man's natural ability, instead of disposing him to use that
ability aright ; ( d ) that election is God's choice of certain men to be saved
upon the ground of their foreseen faith, instead of being God's choice to
make certain men believers ; ( e ) that physical death is not the just pen
alty of sin, but is a matter of arbitrary decree.
C. It rests upon false phUosophical principles, as for example : ( a) That
the wUl is simply the faculty of vohtions. ( 6 ) That the power of contrary
choice, in the sense of power by a single act to reverse one's moral state, is
essential to win. (c) That previous certainty of any given moral act is
incompatible with its freedom. ( d) That ability is the measure of obh
gation. ( e ) That law condemns only volitional transgression. (/) That
man has no organic moral connection with the race.
D. It renders uncertain either the universality of sin or man's responsi
bility for it. If man has full power to refuse consent to inborn depravity,
then the universality of sin and the universal need of a Savior are merely

NEW SCHOOL THEORY OF IMPUTATION. 161
hypothetical. If sin, however, be universal, there must have been an absence
of free consent ; and the objective certainty of man's sinning, according to
the theory, destroys his responsibility.
3. The New School Theory, or Theory of uncondemnable Vitiosity.
This theory is called New School, because of its recession from the old
Puritan anthropology of which Edwards and BeUamy in the last century
were the expounders. The New School theory is a general scheme built
up by the successive labors of Hopkins, Emmons, Dwight, Taylor, and
Finney. It is held at present by New School Presbyterians, and by the
larger part of the Congregational body.
According to this theory, aU men are born with a physical and moral con
stitution which predisposes them to sin, and ah men do actuaUy sin so soon
as they come to moral consciousness. This vitiosity of nature may be
caUed sinful, because it uniformly leads to sin ; but it is not itself sin, since
nothing is to be properly denominated sin but the voluntary act of trans
gressing known law.
God imputes to men only their own acts of personal transgression ; he
does not impute to them Adam's sin ; neither original vitiosity nor physi
cal death are penal inflictions ; they are simply consequences which God
has in his sovereignty ordained to mark his displeasure at Adam's trans
gression, and subject to which evils God immediately creates each human
soul. In Rom. 5 : 12, "death passed unto aU men, for that aU sinned,"
signifies : " spiritual death passed on aU men, because all men have actu
aUy and personaUy sinned."
To the New School theory we object as foUows :
A. It contradicts Scripture in maintaining or implying: (a) That sin
consists solely in acts, and in the dispositions caused in each case by man's
individual acts, and that the state which predisposes to acts of sin is not
itself sin. ( 6 ) That the vitiosity which predisposes to sin is apart of each
man's nature as it proceeds from the creative hand of God. ( c ) That
physical death in the human race is not a penal consequence of Adam's
transgression. ( d ) That infants, before moral consciousness, do not need
Christ's sacrifice to save them. Since they are innocent, no penalty rests
upon them, and none needs to be removed, (e) That we are neither
condemned upon the ground of actual inbeing in Adam, nor justified upon
the ground of actual inbeing in Christ.
B. It rests upon false philosophical principles, as for example : ( a ) That
the soul is immediately created by God. (6 ) That the law of God consists
whoUy in outward command. ( c ) That present natural ability to obey the
law is the measure of obligation. ( d ) That man's relations to moral law
are exclusively individual. ( e ) That the will is merely the faculty of indi
vidual and personal choices. (/) That the wUl, at man's birth, has no
moral state or character.
C. It impugns the justice of God .
( a ) By regarding him as the dhect creator of a vicious nature which
infaUibly leads every human being into actual transgression. To maintain
11

162 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
that, in consequence of Adam's act, God brings it about that all men
become sinners, and this, not by virtue of inherent laws of propagation,
but by the direct creation in each case of a vicious nature, is to make God
indirectly the author of sin.
( 6 ) By representing him as the inflicter of suffering and death upon
millions of human beings who in the present hfe do not come to moral
consciousness, and who are therefore, according to the theory, perfectly
innocent. This is to make him visit Adam's sin on his posterity, while at
the same time it denies that moral connection between Adam and his pos
terity which alone could make such visitation just.
( c ) By holding that the probation which God appoints to men is a sepa
rate probation of each soul, when it first comes to moral consciousness and
is least qualified to decide aright. It is much more consonant with our
ideas of the divine justice, that the decision should have been made by the
whole race, in one whose nature was pure and who perfectly understood
God's law, than that heaven and heU should have been determined for each
of us by a decision made in our own inexperienced childhood, under the
influence of a vitiated nature.
D. Its limitation of responsibility to the evU choices of the individual
and the dispositions caused thereby is inconsistent with the foUowing facts :
(a) The first moral choice of each individual is so undeliberate as not
to be remembered. Put forth at birth, as the chief advocates of the New
School theory maintain, it does not answer to their definition of sin as a
voluntary transgression of known law. Responsibility for such choice does
not differ from responsibility for the inborn evU state of the wUl which
manifests itself in that choice.
( 6 ) The uniformity of sinful action among men cannot be explained
by the existence of a mere faculty of choices. That men should uniformly
choose may be thus explained ; but that men should uniformly choose evil
requhes us to postulate an evU tendency or state of the wUl itself, prior to
these separate acts of choice. This evil tendency or inborn determination
to evU, since it is the real cause of actual sins, must itself be sin, and as
such must be guilty and condemnable.
( c ) Power in the wUl to prevent the inborn vitiosity from developing
itself is upon this theory a necessary condition of responsibility for actual
sins. But the absolute uniformity of actual transgression is evidence that the
wUl is practicaUy impotent. If responsibUity diminishes as the difficulties
in the way of free decision increase, the fact that these difficulties are insu
perable shows that there can be no responsibUity at aU. To deny the guUt
of inborn sin is therefore virtuahy to deny the guUt of the actual sin which
springs therefrom.
4. The Federal Theory, or Theory of Condemnation by Covenant.
The Federal theory, or theory of the Covenants, had its origin with
Cocceius (1603-1669), professor at Leyden, but was more fuUy elaborated
by Turretin (1623-1687). It has become a tenet of the Reformed as
distinguished from the Lutheran church, and in this country it has its main

FEDERAL THEORY OF IMPUTATION. 163
advocates in the Princeton school of theologians, of whom Dr. Charles
Hodge was the representative.
According to this view, Adam was constituted by God's sovereign appoint
ment the representative of the whole human race. With Adam as their
representative, God entered into covenant, agreeing to bestow upon them
eternal life on condition of his obedience, but making the penalty of his
disobedience to be the corruption and death of aU his posterity. In accord
ance with the terms of this covenant, since Adam sinned, God accounts aU
his descendants as sinners, and condemns them because of Adam's trans
gression. In execution of this sentence of condemnation, God immediately creates
each soul of Adam's posterity with a corrupt and depraved nature, which
infaUibly leads to sin, and which is itself sin. The theory is therefore a
theory of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, theh
corruption of nature not being the cause of that imputation, but the effect
of it. In Rom. 5 : 12, " death passed unto aU men, for that aU sinned,"
signifies : "physical, spiritual, and eternal death came to aU, because aU
were regarded and treated as sinners."
To the Federal theory we object :
A. It is extra-Scriptural, there being no mention of such a covenant
with Adam in the account of man's trial. The assumed allusion to Adam's
apostasy in Hosea 6 : 7, where the word " covenant " is used, is too preca
rious and too obviously metaphorical to afford the basis for a scheme of
imputation (see Henderson, Com. on Minor Prophets, in loco). In Heb.
8:8 — "new covenant" — -there is suggested a contrast, not with an
Adamic, but with the Mosaic, covenant (c/. verse 9 ).
B. It contradicts Scripture, in making the first result of Adam's sin to
be God's regarding and treating the race as sinners. The Scripture, on
the contrary, declares that Adam's offense constituted us sinners ( Rom. 5 :
19). We are not sinners simply because God regards and treats us as
such, but God regards us as sinners because we are sinners. Death is said
to have " passed unto all men," not because all were regarded and treated
as sinners, but "because aU sinned " ( Rom. 5 : 12 ).
C. It impugns the justice of God by implying :
( a ) That God holds men responsible for the violation of a covenant
which they had no part in establishing. The assumed covenant is only a
sovereign decree ; the assumed justice, only arbitrary wiU.
( 6 ) That upon the basis of this covenant God accounts men as sinners
who are not sinners. But God judges according to truth. His condemna
tions do not proceed upon a basis of legal fiction. He can regard as
responsible for Adam's transgression only those who in some real sense
have been concerned, and have had part, in that transgression.
( c) That, after accounting men to be sinners who are not sinners, God
makes them sinners by immediately creating each human soul with a cor
rupt nature such as wUl correspond to his decree. This is not only to
assume a false view of the origin of the soul, but also to make God directly

164 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
the author of sin. Imputation of sin cannot precede and account for cor
ruption ; on the contrary, corruption must precede and account for impu
tation. 5. Theory of Mediate Imputation, or Theory of Condemnation for
Depravity. This theory was first maintained by Placeus (1606-1655), professor of
Theology at Saumur in France. Placeus originaUy denied that Adam's sin
was in any sense imputed to his posterity, but after his doctrine was con
demned by the Synod of the French Reformed Church at Charenton in
1644, he published the view which now bears his name.
According to this view, aU men are born physicaUy and moraUy depraved ;
this native depravity is the source of aU actual sin, and is itself sin ; in
strictness of speech, it is this native depravity, and this only, which God
imputes to men. So far as man's physical nature is concerned, this inborn
sinfulness has descended by natural laws of propagation from Adam to aU
his posterity. The soul is immediately created by God, but it becomes
actively corrupt so soon as it is united to the body. Inborn sinfulness is
the consequence, though not the penalty, of Adam's transgression.
There is a sense, therefore, in which Adam's sin may be said to be im
puted to his descendants, — it is imputed, not immediately, as if they had
been in Adam or were so represented in him that it could be charged
directly to them, corruption not intervening, — but it is imputed mediately,
through and on account of the intervening corruption which resulted from
Adam's sin. As on the Federal theory imputation in the cause of depravity,
so on this theory depravity is the cause of imputation. In Rom. 5 : 12,
" death passed unto aU men, for that aU sinned," signifies : "death physi
cal, spiritual, and eternal passed upon aU men, because aU sinned by pos
sessing a depraved nature."
The theory of Mediate Imputation is exposed to the following objections :
A. It gives no explanation of man's responsibility for his inborn
depravity. No explanation of this is possible, which does not regard man's
depravity as having had its origin in a free personal act, either of the
individual, or of coUective human nature in its first father and head. But
this participation of aU men in Adam's sin the theory expressly denies.
B. Since the origination of this corrupt nature cannot be charged to the
account of man, man's inheritance of it must be regarded in the light of an
arbitrary divine infliction — a conclusion which reflects upon the justice of
God. Man is not only condemned for a sinfulness of which God is the
author, but is condemned without any real probation, either individual or
coUective. C. It contradicts those passages of Scripture which refer the origin of
human condemnation, as weU as of human depravity, to the sin of our first
parents, and which represent universal death, not as a matter of divine
sovereignty, but as a judicial infliction of penalty upon aU men for the sin
of the race in Adam ( Rom. 5 : 16, 18 ). It moreover does violence to the
Scripture in its unnatural interpretation of "aU sinned," in Rom. 5 : 12 

AUGUSTINIAN THEORY OF IMPUTATION. 165
words which imply the oneness of the race with Adam, and the causative
relation of Adam's sin to our guUt.
6. The Augustinian Theory, or Theory of Adam's Natural Headship.
This theory was first elaborated by Augustine (354-430), the great
opponent of Pelagius ; although its central feature appears in the writings
of Tertullian (died about 220), Hilary (350), and Ambrose (374). It is
frequently designated as the Augustinian view of sin. It was the view held
by the Reformers, Zwingle excepted. Its principal advocates in this
country are Dr. Shedd and Dr. Baird.
It holds that God imputes the sin of Adam immediately to aU his poster
ity, in virtue of that organic unity of mankind by which the whole race at
the time of Adam's transgression existed, not individuaUy, but seminally,
in him as its head. The total life of humanity was then in Adam ; the race
as yet had its being only in him. Its essence was not yet individualized ;
its forces were not yet distributed ; the powers which now exist in sepa
rate men were then unified and localized in Adam ; Adam's wUl was yet the
wUl of the species. In Adam's free act, the wUl of the race revolted from
God and the nature of the race corrupted itself. The nature which we now
possess is the same nature that corrupted itself in Adam — "not the same
in kind merely, but the same as flowing to us continuously from him."
Adam's sin is imputed to us immediately, therefore, not as something
foreign to us, but because it is ours — we and aU other men having existed
as one moral person or one moral whole, in him, and, as the result of that
transgression, possessing a nature destitute of love to God and prone to
evU. In Rom. 5 : 12 — " death passed unto all men, for that aU sinned,"
signifies: "death physical, spiritual, and eternal passed unto aU men,
because aU sinned in Adam theh natural head."
We regard this theory of the Natural Headship of Adam as the most sat
isfactory of the theories mentioned, and as furnishing the most important
help towards the understanding of the great problem of original sin. In
its favor may be urged the following considerations :
A. It puts the most natural interpretation upon Rom. 5 : 12-21. In
verse 12 of this passage — " death passed untoaUmen, for that aU sinned"
— the great majority of commentators regard the word ' ' sinned " as describ
ing a common transgression of the race in Adam. The death spoken of
is, as the whole context shows, mainly though not exclusively physical.
It has passed upon aU — even upon those who have committed no conscious
and personal transgression whereby to explain its infliction ( verse 14 ).
The legal phraseology of the passage shows that this infliction is not a
matter of sovereign decree, but of judicial penalty (verses 13, 14, 15, 16,
18 — "law," "transgression," "trespass," "judgment .... of one unto
condemnation," "act of righteousness," "justification"). As the expla
nation of this universal subjection to penalty, we are referred to Adam's
sin. By that one act ( "so," verse 12) — the "trespass of the one " man
(v. 15, 17), the " one trespass " (v. 18) — death came to aUmen, because
aU [ not ' have sinned ', but ] sinned ( ndvres rjpaprov — aorist of instantaneous

166 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
past action ) — that is, all sinned in " the one trespass " of "the one " man.
Compare 1 Cor. 15 : 22 — "As in Adam aU die " — where the contrast with
physical resurrection shows that physical death is meant ; 2 Cor. 5 : 14 —
"one died for all, therefore aU died." See Commentaries of Meyer,
Bengel, Olshausen, PhUippi, Wordsworth, Lange, Godet, Shedd. This is
also recognized as the correct interpretation of Paul's words by Beyschlag,
Ritschl, and Pfleiderer, although no one of these three accepts Paul's doc
trine as authoritative.
B. It permits whatever of truth there may be in the Federal theory and
in the theory of Mediate Imputation to be combined with it, while neither
of these latter theories can be justified to reason unless they are regarded
as coroUaries or accessories of the truth of Adam's Natural Headship. Only
on this supposition of Natural Headship could God justly constitute Adam
our representative, or hold us responsible for the depraved nature we have
received from him. It moreover justifies God's ways, in postulating a real
and a fair probation of our common nature as preliminary to imputation of
sin — a truth which the theories just mentioned, in common with that of
the New School, virtually deny, — whUe it rests upon correct phUosophical
principles with regard to wUl, ability, law, and accepts the Scriptural
representations of the nature of sin, the penal character of death, the
origin of the soul, and the oneness of the race in the transgression.
C. WhUe its fundamental presupposition — a determination of the wiU
of each member of the race prior to his individual consciousness — is an
hypothesis difficult in itself, it is an hypothesis which furnishes the key to
many more difficulties than it suggests. Once aUow that the race was one
in its first ancestor and feU in him, and hght is thrown on a problem
otherwise insoluble — the problem of our accountability for a sinful nature
which we have not personaUy and consciously originated. Since we can
not, with the three theories first mentioned, deny either of the terms of
this problem — inborn depravity or accountability for it, — we accept this
solution as the best attainable.
D. This theory finds support in the conclusions of modern science :
with regard to the moral law, as requiring right states as weU as right acts ;
with regard to the human will, as including subconscious and unconscious
bent and determination ; with regard to heredity, and the transmission of
evil character ; with regard to the unity and solidarity of the human race.
The Augustinian theory may therefore be called an ethical or theological
interpretation of certain incontestable and acknowledged biological facts.
E. We are to remember, however, that whUe this theory of the method
of our union with Adam is merely a valuable hypothesis, the problem
which it seeks to explain is, in both its terms, presented to us both by
conscience and by Scripture. In connection with this problem a central
fact is announced in Scripture, which we feel compeUed to beheve upon
divine testimony, even though every attempted explanation should prove
unsatisfactory. That central fact, which constitutes the substance of the
Scripture doctrine of original sin, is simply this : that the sin of Adam is
the immediate cause and ground of inborn depravity, guUt and condemna
tion to the whole human race.

OBJECTIONS TO THE AUGUSTINIAN THEORY. 167
H — Objections to the Augustinian Doctrine op Imputation.
The doctrine of Imputation, to which we have thus arrived, is met by its
opponents with the foUowing objections. In discussing them, we are to
remember that a truth revealed in Scripture may have claims to our belief,
in spite of difficulties to us insoluble. Yet it is hoped that examination
will show the objections in question to rest either upon false philosophical
principles or upon misconceptions of the doctrine assailed.
A. That there can be no sin apart from and prior to consciousness.
This we deny. The larger part of men's evU dispositions and acts are
imperfectly conscious, and of many such dispositions and acts the evil qual
ity is not discerned at aU. The objection rests upon the assumption that
law is confined to published statutes or to standards formally recognized
by its subjects. A profounder view of law as identical with the constitu
ent principles of being, as binding the nature to conformity with the nature
of God, as demanding right vohtions only because these are manifestations
of a right state, as having claims upon men in their corporate capacity,
deprives this objection of all its force.
B. That man cannot be responsible for a sinful nature which he did not
personaUy originate.
We reply that the objection ignores the testimony of conscience and of
Scripture. These assert that we are responsible for what we are. The sin
ful nature is not something external to us, but is our inmost selves. If
man's original righteousness and the new affection implanted in regener
ation have moral character, then the inborn tendency to evU has moral
character ; as the former are commendable, so the latter is condemnable.
C. That Adam's sin cannot be imputed to us, since we cannot repent
of it.
The objection has plausibUity only so long as we faU to distinguish
between Adam's sin as the inward apostasy of the nature from God, and
Adam's sin as the outward act of transgression which foUowed and mani
fested that apostasy. We cannot indeed repent of Adam's sin as our per
sonal act or as Adam's personal act, but regarding his sin as the apostasy
of our common nature — an apostasy which manifests itself in our personal
transgressions as it did in his, we can repent of it and do repent of it. In
truth it is this nature, as self -corrupted and averse to God, for which the
Christian most deeply repents.
D. That, if we be responsible for Adam's first sin, we must also be
responsible not only for every other sin of Adam, but for the sins of our
immediate ancestors.
We reply that the apostasy of human nature could occur but once. It
occurred in Adam before the eating of the forbidden fruit, and revealed
itself in that eating. The subsequent sins of Adam and of our immediate
ancestors are no longer acts which determine or change the nature, — they
only show what the nature is. Here is the truth and the limitation of the
Scripture declaration that " the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father ' '
(Ez. 18 : 20 ; cf. Luke 13 : 2, 3 ; John 9 : 2, 3 ). Man is not responsible

168 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
for the specificaUy evU tendencies communicated to him from his immedi
ate ancestors, as distinct from the nature he possesses ; nor is he respons
ible for the sins of those ancestors which originated these tendencies. But
he is responsible for that original apostasy which constituted the one and
final revolt of the race from God, and for the personal depravity and dis
obedience which in his own case has resulted therefrom.
E. That if Adam's sin and condemnation can be ours by propagation,
the righteousness and faith of the behever should be propagable also.
We reply that no merely personal qualities, whether of sin or righteous
ness, are communicated by propagation. Ordinary generation does not
transmit personal guUt, but only that guilt which belongs to the whole
species. So personal faith and righteousness are not propagable. " Origi
nal sin is the consequent of man's nature, whereas the parents' grace is a
personal exceUenee, and cannot be transmitted " ( Burgesse ).
F. That, if aU moral consequences are properly penalties, sin, considered
as a sinful nature, must be the punishment of sin, considered as the act of
our first parents.
But we reply that the impropriety of punishing sin with sin vanishes
when we consider that the sin which is punished is our own, equaUy with
the sin with which we are punished. The objection is valid as against the
Federal theory or the theory of Mediate Imputation, but not as against the
theory of Adam's Natural Headship. To deny that God, through the opera
tion of second causes, may punish the act of transgression by the habit and
tendency which result from it, is to ignore the facts of every-dayhfe, as weU
as the statements of Scripture in which sin is represented as ever repro
ducing itself, and with each reproduction increasing its guUt and punish
ment (Rom. 6 : 19 ; James 1 : 15. )
G. That the doctrine excludes aU separate probation of individuals since
Adam, by making theh moral hfe a mere manifestation of tendencies
received from him.
We reply that the objection takes into view only our connection with the
race, and ignores the complementary and equaUy important fact of each
man's personal wUL That personal will does more than simply express the
nature ; it may to a certain extent curb the nature, or it may, on the other
hand, add a sinful character and influence of its own. There is, in other
words, a remainder of freedom, which leaves room for personal probation,
in addition to the race-probation in Adam.
H. That the organic unity of the race in the transgression is a thing so
remote from common experience that the preaching of it neutrahzes aU
appeals to the conscience.
But whatever of truth there is in this objection is due to the self-isolating
nature of sin. Men feel the unity of the famUy, the profession, the nation
to which they belong, and, just in proportion to the breadth of theh sym
pathies and theh experience of divine grace, do they enter into Christ's
feeling of unity with the race ( c/. Is. 6 : 5 ; Lam. 3 : 39-45 ; Ezra 9:6;
Neh. 1:6). The fact that the self-contained and self-seeking recognize

CONSEQUENCES OF SIN TO ADAM'S POSTERITY. 169
themselves as responsible only for theh personal acts should not prevent
our pressing upon men's attention the more searching standards of the
Scriptures. Only thus can the Christian find a solution for the dark prob
lem of a corruption which is inborn yet condemnable ; only thus can the
unregenerate man be led to a full knowledge of the depth of his ruin and
of bis absolute dependence upon God for salvation.
I. That a constitution by which the sin of one individual involves in
guUt and condemnation the nature of aU men who descend from him is
contrary to God's justice.
We acknowledge that no human theory can fuUy solve the mystery of
imputation. But we prefer to attribute God's dealings to justice rather
than to sovereignty. The foUowing considerations, though partly hypo
thetical, may throw hght upon the subject : (a ) A probation of our com
mon nature in Adam, sinless as he was and with full knowledge of God's
law, is more consistent with divine justice than a separate probation of each
individual, with inexperience, inborn depravity, and evU example, aU favor
ing a decision against God. ( 6 ) A constitution which made a common
faU possible may have been indispensable to any provision of a common sal
vation. ( e ) Our chance for salvation as sinners under grace may be better
than it would have been as sinless Adams under law. ( d ) A constitution
which permitted oneness with the first Adam in the transgression cannot
be unjust, since a like principle of oneness with Christ, the second Adam,
secures our salvation. ( e ) There is also a physical and natural union
with Christ which antedates the f aU and which is incident to man's creation.
The immanence of Christ in humanity guarantees a continuous divine
effort to remedy the disaster caused by man's free wUl, and to restore the
moral union with God which the race has lost by the faU.
Thus our ruin and our redemption were ahke wrought out without per
sonal act of ours. As all the natural life of humanity was in Adam, so all
the spiritual life of humanity was in Christ. As our old nature was cor
rupted in Adam and propagated to us by physical generation, so our new
nature was restored in Christ and communicated to us by the regenerating
work of the Holy Spirit. If then we are justified upon the ground of our
inbeing in Christ, we may in hke manner be condemned on the ground of
our inbeing in Adam.

SECTION VI. —CONSEQUENCES OF SIN TO ADAM'S POSTERITY.
As the result of Adam's transgression, aU his posterity are born in the
same state into which he f eU. But since law is the all-comprehending
demand of harmony with God, aU moral consequences flowing from trans
gression are to be regarded as sanctions of law, or expressions of the divine
displeasure through the constitution of things which he has established.
Certain of these consequences, however, are earlier recognized than others
and are of minor scope ; it wUl therefore be useful to consider them under
the three aspects of depravity, guUt, and penalty.

170 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
I. Depravity.
By this we mean, on the one hand, the lack of original righteousness or
of holy affection toward God, and, on the other hand, the corruption of the
moral nature, or bias toward evil. That such depravity exists has been
abundantly shown, both from Scripture and from reason, in our considera
tion of the universality of sin.
1. Depravity partial or total?
The Scriptures represent human nature aB totaUy depraved. The phrase
"total depravity, ".however, is liable to misinterpretation, and should not
be used without explanation. By the total depravity of universal humanity
we mean :
A. Negatively, — not that every sinner is : ( a ) Destitute of conscience,
— for the existence of strong impulses to right, and of remorse for wrong
doing, show that conscience is often keen; (6) devoid of aU quahties
pleasing to men, and useful when judged by a human standard, — for the
existence of such quahties is recognized by Christ; (c) prone to every
form of sin, — for certain forms of sin exclude certain others ; ( d) intense
as he can be in his selfishness and opposition to God, — for he becomes
worse every day.
B. Positively, — that every sinner is : ( a ) totaUy destitute of that love
to God which constitutes the fundamental and aU-inclusive demand of the
law ; ( 6 ) chargeable with elevating some lower affection or desire above
regard for God and his law ; ( c ) supremely determined, in his whole
inward and outward hfe, by a preference of self to God ; ( d ) possessed of
an aversion to God which, though sometimes latent, becomes active enmity,
so soon as God's wUl comes into manifest conflict with his own ; ( e ) dis
ordered and corrupted in every faculty, through this substitution of self
ishness for supreme affection toward God ; (/) credited with no thought,
emotion, or act of which divine holiness can fully approve ; ( g ) subject
to a law of constant progress in depravity, which he has no recuperative
energy to enable him successfully to resist.
2. Ability or inability f
In opposition to the plenary ability taught bythe Pelagians, the gracious
ability of the Arminians, and the natural ability of the New School theolo
gians, the Scriptures declare the total inabihty of the sinner to turn him
self to God or to do that which is truly good in God's sight ( see Scripture
proof below). A proper conception also of the law, as reflecting the hoh
ness of God and as expressing the ideal of human nature, leads us to the
conclusion that no man whose powers are weakened by either original or
actual sin can of himself come up to that perfect standard. Yet there is a
certain remnant of freedom left to man. The sinner can ( a ) avoid the sin
against the Holy Ghost ; ( 6 ) choose the less sin rather than the greater ;
( c ) refuse altogether to yield to certain temptations ; ( d ) do outwardly
good acts, though with imperfect motives ; ( e ) seek God from motives of
self-interest. But on the other hand the sinner cannot (a) by a single volition bring
his character and life into complete conformity to God's law ; ( 6 ) change

CONSEQUENCES OF SIN TO ADAM'S POSTERITY. 171
his fundamental preference for self and sin to supreme love for God ; nor
( e) do any act, however insignificant, which shah meet with God's approval
or answer fuUy to the demands of law.
To the use of the term "natural ability " to designate merely the sinner's
possession of aU the constituent faculties of human nature, we object upon
the foUowing grounds :
A. Quantitative lack. — The phrase "natural ability" is misleading,
since it seems to imply that the existence of the mere powers of inteUect,
affection, and wUl is a sufficient quantitative qualification for obedience to
God's law, whereas these powers have been weakened by sin, and are nat
urally unable, instead of naturaUy able, to render back to God with interest
the talent first bestowed. Even if the moral direction of man's faculties
were a normal one, the effect of hereditary and of personal sin would
render naturaUy impossible that large likeness to God which the law of
absolute perfection demands. Man has not therefore the natural ability
perfectly to obey God. He had it once, but he lost it with the first sin.
B. Qualitative lack. — Since the law of God requhes of men not so much
right single vohtions as conformity to God in the whole inward state of the
affections and wiU, the power of contrary choice in single vohtions does
not constitute a natural ability to obey God, unless man can by those single
vohtions change the underlying state of the affections and wiU. But this
power man does not possess. Since God judges aU moral action in connec
tion with the general state of the heart and life, natural abUity to good
involves not only a full complement of faculties but also a bias of the affec
tions and will toward God. Without this bias there is no possibhity of right
moral action, and where there is no such possibility, there can be no abihty
either natural or moral.
C. No such abUity known. — In addition to the psychological argu
ment just mentioned, we may urge another from experience and observa
tion. These testify that man is cognizant of no such abihty. Since no
man has ever yet, by the exercise of his natural powers, turned himself to
God or done an act truly good in God's sight, the existence of a natural
abihty to do good is a pure assumption. There is no scientific warrant
for inferring the existence of an abUity which has never manifested itself
in a single instance since history began.
D. Practical evU of the behef. — The practical evU attending the preach
ing of natural abUity furnishes a strong argument against it. The Script
ures, in their declarations of the sinner's inability and helplessness, aim to
shut him up to sole dependence upon God for salvation. The doctrine of
natural abUity, assuring him that he is able at once to repent and turn to
God, encourages delay by putting salvation at aU times within his reach.
H a single vohtion wiU secure it, he may be saved as easUy to-morrow as
to-day. The doctrine of inabUity presses men to immediate acceptance of
God's offers, lest the day of grace for them pass by.
Let us repeat, however, that the denial to man of aU abUity, whether
natural or moral, to turn himself to God or to do that which is truly good
in God's sight, does not imply a denial of man's power to order his

172 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
external hfe in many particulars conformably to moral rules, or even to
attain the praise of men for virtue. Man has stUl a range of freedom in
acting out his nature, and he may to a certain limited extent act down upon
that nature, and modify it, by isolated vohtions externaUy conformed to
God's law. He may choose higher or lower forms of selfish action, and
may pursue these chosen courses with various degrees of selfish energy.
Freedom of choice, within this hmit, is by no means incompatible with
complete bondage of the wUl in spiritual things.
IL Guilt.
L Nature of guilt.
By guUt we mean desert of punishment, or obhgation to render satis
faction to God's justice for self-determined violation of law. There is a
reaction of hohness against sin, which the Scripture denominates "the
wrath of God" (Rom. 1 : 18). Sin is in us, either as act or state ; God's
punitive righteousness is over against the sinner, as something to be feared;
guilt is a relation of the sinner to that righteousness, namely, the sinner's
desert of punishment.
The foUowing remarks may serve both for proof and for explanation :
A. GuUt is incurred only through self-determined transgression either
on the part of man's nature or person. We are guUty only of that sin
which we have originated or have had part in originating. GuUt is not,
therefore, mere liability to punishment, without participation in the trans
gression for which the punishment is inflicted, — in other words, there is
no such thing as constructive guUt under the divine government. We are
accounted guilty only for what we have done, either personaUy or in our
first parents, and for what we are, in consequence of such doing.
B. GuUt is an objective result of sin, and is not to be confounded with
subjective pollution, or depravity. Every sin, whether of nature or per
son, is an offense against God (Ps. 51 : 4-6), an act or state of opposition
to his wUl, which has for its effect God's personal wrath ( Ps. 7 : 11 ; John
3 : 18, 36 ), and which must be expiated either by punishment or by atone
ment ( Heb. 9 : 22 ). Not only does sin, as unlikeness to the divine purity,
involve pollution, — it also, as antagonism to God's holy wiU, involves guilt.
This guilt, or obhgation to satisfy the outraged hohness of God, is explained
in the New Testament by the terms "debtor" and " debt " ( Mat. 6 : 12 ;
Luke 13 : 4 ; Mat. 5 : 21 ; Rom. 3 : 19 ; 6 : 23 ; Eph. 2:3). Since guilt,
the objective result of sin, is entirely distinct from depravity, the subjective
result, human nature may, as in Christ, have the guUt without the deprav
ity ( 2 Cor. 5 : 21 ), or may, as in the Christian, have the depravity without
theguUt(l Johnl : 7, 8).
C. GuUt, moreover, as an objective result of sin, is not to be confounded
with the subjective consciousness of guUt ( Lev. 5:17). In the condem
nation of conscience, God's condemnation partially and propheticaUy mani
fests itself ( 1 John 3 : 20 ). But guUt is primarUy a relation to God, and
only secondarUy a relation to conscience. Progress in sin is marked by
diminished sensitiveness of moral insight and feeling. As " the greatest of
sins is to be conscious of none," so guUt may be great, just in proportion

CONSEQUENCES OF SIN TO ADAM'S POSTERITY. 173
to the absence of consciousness of it ( Ps. 19 : 12 ; 51 : 6 ; Eph. 4 : 18, 19
— dirriXyriiidTes ). There is no evidence, however, that the voice of conscience
can be completely or finaUy sUenced. The time for repentance may pass,
but not the time for remorse. Progress in holiness on the other hand, is
marked by increasing apprehension of the depth and extent of our sinful
ness, while with this apprehension is combined, in a normal Christian expe
rience, the assurance that the guUt of our sin has been taken, and taken
away, by Christ (John 1 : 29 ).
2. Degrees of guilt.
The Scriptures recognize different degrees of guUt as attaching to differ
ent kinds of sin. The variety of sacrifices under the Mosaic law, and the
variety of awards in the judgment, are to be explained upon this principle.
Casuistry, however, has drawn many distinctions which lack Scriptural
foundation. Such is the distinction between venial sins and mortal sins in
the Roman Cathohc Church, — every sin unpardoned being mortal, and all
sins being venial, since Christ has died for aU. Nor is the common distinc
tion between sins of omission and sins of commission more valid, since the
very omission is an act of commission.
The foUowing distinctions are indicated in Scripture as involving differ
ent degrees of guUt :
A. Sin of nature, and personal transgression.
Sin of nature involves guilt, yet there is greater guUt when this sin of
nature reasserts itself in personal transgression 5 for, whUe this latter
includes in itself the former, it also adds to the former a new element,
namely, the conscious exercise of the individual and personal wUl, by virtue
of which a new decision is made against God, special evil habit is induced,
and the total condition of the soul is made more depraved. Although we
have emphasized the guilt of inborn sin, because this truth is most con
tested, it is to be remembered that men reach a conviction of theh native
depravity only through a conviction of theh personal transgressions. For
this reason, by far the larger part of our preaching upon sin should con
sist in applications of the law of God to the acts and dispositions of men's
lives. B. Sins of ignorance, and sins of knowledge.
Here guilt is measured by the degree of hght possessed, or in other words,
by the opportunities of knowledge men have enjoyed, and the powers with
which they have been naturally endowed. Genius and privilege increase
responsibUity. The heathen are guUty, but those to whom the oracles of
God have been committed are more guUty than they.
0. Sins of infirmity, and sins of presumption.
Here the guilt is measured by the energy of the evil wUl, Sin may be
known to be sin, yet may be committed in haste or weakness. Though
haste and weakness constitute a palhation of the offence which springs
therefrom, yet they are themselves sins, as revealing an unbelieving and
disordered heart. But of far greater guilt are those presumptuous choices
of evil in which not weakness, but strength of wUl, is manifest.

174 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
D. Sin of incomplete, and sin of final, obduracy.
Here the guUt is measured, not by the objective sufficiency or insuf
ficiency of divine grace, but by the degree of unreceptiveness into which
sin has brought the soul. As the only sin unto death which is described
in Scripture is the sin against the Holy Sphit, we here consider the nature
of that sin.
The sin against the Holy Spirit is not to be regarded simply as an isolated
act, but also as the external symptom of a heart so radicaUy and finaUy set
against God that no power which God can consistently use wiU ever save
it. This sin, therefore, can be only the culmination of a long course of
self-hardening and self-depraving. He who has committed it must be
either profoundly indifferent to his own condition, or actively and bitterly
hostile to God ; so that anxiety or fear on account of one's condition is
evidence that it has not been committed. The sin against the Holy Sphit
cannot be forgiven, simply because the soul that has committed it has
ceased to be receptive of divine influences, even when those influences are
exerted in the utmost strength which God has seen fit to employ in his
spiritual administration.
ELL Penalty.
1. Idea of penalty.
By penalty, we mean that pain or loss which is directly or indirectly
inflicted by the Lawgiver, in vindication of his justice outraged by the
violation of law.
In this definition it is implied that :
A. The natural consequences of transgression, although they constitute
a part of the penalty of sin, do not exhaust that penalty. In aU penalty
there is a personal element — the holy wrath of the Lawgiver, — which nat
ural consequences but partiaUy express.
B. The object of penalty is not the reformation of the offender or the
ensuring of social or governmental safety. These ends may be incidentaUy
secured through its infliction, but the great end of penalty is the vindica
tion of the character of the Lawgiver. Penalty is essentiaUy a necessary
reaction of the divine holiness against sin. Inasmuch, however, as wrong
views of the object of penalty have so important a bearing upon our future
studies of doctrine, we make fuUer mention of the two erroneous theories
which have greatest currency.
( a ) Penalty is not essentiaUy reformatory. — By this we mean that the
reformation of the offender is not its primary design, — as penalty, it is not
intended to reform. Penalty, in itself, proceeds not from the love and
mercy of the Lawgiver, but from his justice. Whatever reforming influ
ences may in any given instance be connected with it are not parts of the
penalty, but are mitigations of it, and they are added not in justice but in
grace. If reformation foUows the infliction of penalty, it is not the effect
of the penalty, but the effect of certain benevolent agencies which have
been provided to turn into a means of good what naturaUy would be to the
offender only a source of harm.

CONSEQUENCES OF SIN TO ADAM'S POSTERITY. 175
That the object of penalty is not reformation appears from Scripture,
where punishment is often referred to God's justice, but never to God's
love ; from the intrinsic Ul-desert of sin, to which penalty is correlative ;
from the fact that punishment must be vindicative, in order to be disciplin
ary, and just, in order to be reformatory ; from the fact that upon this
theory punishment would not be just when the sinner was already reformed
or could not be reformed, so that the greater the sin the less the punish
ment must be.
(6) Penalty is not essentially deterrent and preventive. — By this we
mean that its primary design is not to protect society, by deterring men
from the commission of like offences. We grant that this end is often
secured in connection with punishment, both in f amUy and civU govern
ment and under the government of God. But we claim that this is a
merely incidental result, which God's wisdom and goodness have connected
with the infliction of penalty, — it cannot be the reason and ground for
penalty itself. Some of the objections to the preceding theory apply also
to this. But in addition to what has been said, we urge :
Penalty cannot be primarily designed to secure social and governmental
safety, for the reason that it is never right to punish the individual simply
for the good of society. No punishment, moreover, wiU or can do good to
others that is not just and right in itself. Punishment does good, only
when the person punished deserves punishment ; and that desert of pun
ishment, and not the good effects that wUl follow it, must be the ground
and reason why it is inflicted. The contrary theory would imply that the
criminal might go free but for the effect of his punishment on others, and
that man might rightly commit crime if only he were willing to bear the
penalty. 2. The actual penalty of sin.
The one word in Scripture which designates the total penalty of sin is
" death." Death, however, is twofold :
A Physical death, — or the separation of the soul from the body,
including aU those temporal evils and sufferings which result from dis
turbance of the original harmony between body and soul, and which are
the working of death in us. That physical death is a part of the penalty
of sin, appears :
(a) From Scripture.
This is the most obvious import of the threatening in Gen. 2:17 — " thou
shalt surely die " ; c/. 3 : 19 — " unto dust shalt thou return." Allusions to
this threatin theO. T. confirm this interpretation : Num. 16 :29 — "visited
after the visitation of aU men," where 1p_3 = judicial visitation, or punish
ment ; 27 : 3 ( lxx. — <V dpaprlav avrov ). The prayer of Moses in Ps. 90 :
7-9, 11, and the prayer of Hezekiah in Is. 38 : 17, 18, recognize plainly the
penal nature of death. The same doctrine is taught in the N. T., as for
example, John 8 : 44 ; Rom. 5 : 12, 14, 16, 17, where the judicial phrase
ology is to be noted ( cf. 1 : 32 ) ; see 6 : 23 also. In 1 Pet. 4 : 6, physical
death is spoken of as God's judgment against sin. In 1 Cor. 15 : 21, 22,
the bodily resurrection of aU behevers, in Christ, is contrasted with the

176 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
bodily death of aU men, in Adam. Rom. 4 : 24, 25 ; 6 : 9, 10 ; 8 : 3, 10,
11 ; Gal. 3 : 13, show that Christ submitted to physical death as the pen
alty of sin, and by his resurrection from the grave gave proof that the
penalty of sin was exhausted and that humanity in him was justified. "As
the resurrection of the body is a part of the redemption, so the death of
the body is a part of the penalty. "
( 6 ) From reason.
The- universal prevalence of suffering and death among rational creatures
cannot be reconcUed with the divine justice, except upon the supposition
that it is a judicial infliction on account of a common sinfulness of nature
belonging even to those who have not reached moral consciousness.
The objection that death existed in the animal creation before the Fall
may be answered by saying that, but for the fact of man's sin, it would not
have existed. We may believe that God arranged even the geologic his
tory to correspond with the foreseen fact of human apostasy ( cf. Rom. 8 :
20-23 — where the creation is said to have been made subject to vanity by
reason of man's sin ).
The translation of Enoch and Elijah, and of the saints that remain at
Christ's second coming, seems intended to teach us that death is not a
necessary law of organized being, and to show what would have happened
to Adam if he had been obedient. He was created a "natural," " earthly "
body, but might have attained a higher being, the "spiritual," "heavenly"
body, without the intervention of death. Sin, however, has turned the
normal condition of things into the rare exception ( cf. 1 Cor. 15 : 42-50 ).
Since Christ endured death as the penalty of sin, death to the Christian
becomes the gateway through which he enters into f uU communion with his
Lord. B. Spiritual death, — or the separation of the soul from God, including
ah that pain of conscience, loss of peace, and sorrow of spirit, which result
from disturbance of the normal relation between the soul and God.
( a ) Although physical death is a part of the penalty of sin, it is by no
means the chief part. The term ' death ' is frequently used in Scripture
in a moral and spiritual sense, as denoting the absence of that which con
stitutes the true hfe of the soul, namely, the presence and favor of God.
( 6 ) It cannot be doubted that the penalty denounced in the garden and
faUen upon the race is primarUy and mainly that death of the soul which
consists in its separation from God. In this sense only, death was fuUy
visited upon Adam in the day on which he ate the forbidden fruit ( Gen. 2 :
17 ). In this sense only, death is escaped by the Christian ( John 11 : 26 ).
For this reason, in the paraUel between Adam and Christ (Rom. 5 : 12-21),
the apostle passes from the thought of mere physical death in the early
part of the passage to that of both physical and spiritual death at its close
(verse 21 — "as sin reigned in death, even so might grace reign through
righteousness unto eternal hfe through Jesus Christ our Lord " — where
" eternal life " is more than endless physical existence, and " death " is
more than death of the body ).

THE SALVATION OF INFANTS. 177
( c ) Eternal death may be regarded as the culmination and completion of
spiritual death, and as essentiaUy consisting in the con-espondence of the
outward condition with the inward state of the evU soul ( Acts 1 : 25 ). It
would seem to be inaugurated by some peculiar repellent energy of the
divine holiness (Mat. 25 : 41 ; 2 Thess. 1:9), and to involve positive retri
bution visited by a personal God upon both the body and the soul of the
evU-doer (Mat. 10 :28 ; Heb. 10 : 31 ; Rev. 14 :.ll).

SECTION VII. — THE SALVATION OF INFANTS.
The views which have been presented with regard to inborn depravity
and the reaction of divine hohness against it suggest the question whether
infants dying before arriving at moral consciousness are saved, and if so,
in what way. To this question we reply as foUows :
( a ) Infants are in a state of sin, need to be regenerated, and can be
saved only through Christ.
( 6 ) Yet as compared with those who have personaUy transgressed, they
are recognized as possessed of a relative innocence, and of a submissiveness
and trustfulness, which may serve to illustrate the graces of Christian char
acter. ( c ) For this reason, they are the objects of special divine compassion
and care, and through the grace of Christ are certain of salvation.
( d ) The descriptions of God's merciful provision as coextensive with
the ruin of the FaU also lead us to believe that those who die in infancy
receive salvation through Christ as certainly as they inherit sin from Adam.
(e) The condition of salvation for adults is personal faith. Infants are
incapable of fulfilling this condition. Since Christ has died for all, we
have reason to beheve that provision is made for theh reception of Christ
in some other way.
(/) At the final judgment, personal conduct is made the test of charac
ter. But infants are incapable of personal transgression. We have reason,
therefore, to beheve that they wUl be among the saved, since this rule of
decision wUl not apply to them.
(g) Since there is no evidence that children dying in infancy are regen
erated prior to death, either with or without the use of external means, it
seems most probable that the work of regeneration may be performed by
the Spirit in connection with the infant soul's first view of Christ in the
other world. As the remains of natural depravity in the Christian are
eradicated, not by death, but at death, through the sight of Christ and
union with him, so the first moment of consciousness for the infant may be
coincident with a view of Christ the Savior which accomplishes the entire
sanctification of its nature.
WhUe, in the nature of things and by the express declarations of Script
ure, we are precluded from extending this doctrine of regeneration at death
12

178 ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.
to any who have committed personal sins, we are nevertheless warranted in
the conclusion that, certain and great as is the guilt of original sin, no
human soul is eternally condemned solely for this sin of nature, but that,
on the other hand, aU who have not consciously and wUfuUy transgressed
are made partakers of Christ's salvation.

PAET VL
SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION THROUGH
THE WORK OF CHRIST AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

CHAPTER I.
OHRISTOLOGY, OR THE REDEMPTION WROUGHT BY CHRIST.

SECTION I.— HISTORICAL PREPARATION FOR REDEMPTION.
Since God had from eternity determined to redeem mankind, the history
of the race from the time of the FaU to the coming of Christ was providen-
tiaUy arranged to prepare the way for this redemption. The preparation
was two-fold :
L Negative Preparation, — in the history of the heathen world.
This showed ( 1 ) the true nature of sin, and the depth of spiritual igno
rance and of moral depravity to which the race, left to itself, must fall ; and
( 2 ) the powerlessness of human nature to preserve or regain an adequate
knowledge of God, or to deliver itself from sin by philosophy or art.
H. Positive Preparation, — in the history of Israel
A single people was separated from aU others, from the time of Abraham,
and was educated in three great truths : ( 1 ) the majesty of God, in his
unity, omnipotence, and hohness ; ( 2 ) the sinfulness of man, and his moral
helplessness ; ( 3 ) the certainty of a coming salvation. This education
from the time of Moses was conducted by the use of three principal
agencies :
A Law. — The Mosaic legislation, (a) by its theophanies and miracles,
cultivated faith in a personal and almighty God and Judge ; ( b ) by its
commands and threatenings, wakened the sense of sin ; ( c ) by its priestly
and sacrificial system, inspired hope of some way of pardon and access to
God. B. Prophecy. — This was of two kinds : ( a ) verbal, — beginning with
the protevangeh'um in the garden, and extending to within four hundred
years of the coming of Christ ; ( b ) typical, — in persons, as Adam, Mel-
chisedek, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, David, Solomon, Jonah ; and in acts, as
Isaac's sacrifice, and Moses' lifting up the serpent in the wilderness.
179

180 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
C. Judgment. — Repeated divine chastisements for idolatry culminated
in the overthrow of the kingdom, and the captivity of the Jews. The exile
had two principal effects : (a) rehgious, — in giving monotheism firm root
in the heart of the people, and in leading to the establishment of the syna
gogue-system, by which monotheism was thereafter preserved and propa
gated ; (6) civU, — in converting the Jews from an agricultural to a trading
people, scattering them among aU nations, and finally imbuing them with
the spirit of Roman law and organization.
Thus a people was made ready to receive the gospel and to propagate
it throughout the world, at the very time when the world had become
conscious of its needs, and, through its greatest philosophers and poets,
was expressing its longings for deliverance.

SECTION II.— THE PERSON OF CHRIST.
The redemption of mankind from sin was to be effected through a Medi
ator who should unite in himself both the human nature and the divine, in
order that he might reconcUe God to man and man to God. To facilitate
an understanding of the Scriptural doctrine under consideration, it will be
desirable at the outset to present a brief historical survey of views respect
ing the Person of Christ.
I. Historical Survey of Views respecting the Person of Christ.
1. The Ebionites ( pxa; = ' poor ' ; A. D. 107 ? ) denied the reahty of
Christ's divine nature, and held him to be merely man, whether naturaUy
or supernaturaUy conceived. This man, however, held a peculiar relation
to God, in that, from the time of his baptism, an unmeasured fulness of the
div'ne Spirit rested upon him. Ebionism was simply Judaism within the
pale of the Christian church, and its denial of Christ's godhood was occa
sioned by the apparent ^compatibility of this doctrine with monotheism.
2. The Docetm (So/tea — 'to seem,' 'to appear'; A. D. 70-170 ), hke
most of the Gnostics in the second century and the Manichees in the third,
denied the reality of Christ's human body. This view was the logical
sequence of their assumption of the inherent evU of matter. If matter is
evU and Christ was pure, then Christ's human body must have been merely
phantasmal. Docetism was simply pagan phUosophy introduced into the
church. 3. The Arians (Arius, condemned at Nice, 325) denied the integrity
of the divine nature in Christ. They regarded the Logos who united him
self to humanity in Jesus Christ, not as possessed of absolute godhood, but
as the first and highest of created beings. This view originated in a mis
interpretation of the Scriptural accounts of Christ's state of humiliation,
and in mistaking temporary subordination for original and permanent
inequality. 4. The Apollinarians ( Apollinaris, condemned at Constantinople, 381)
denied the integrity of Christ's human nature. According to this view,

THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST. 181
Christ had no human vovc or irvevpa, other than that which was furnished by
the divine nature. Christ had only the human aapa and tyoxfi ; the place
of the human vove or nvevrla was filled by the divine Logos. ApoUinarism
is an attempt to construe the doctrine of Christ's person in the forms of the
Platonic trichotomy.
5. The Nestorians ( Nestorius, removed from the Patriarchate of Con
stantinople, 431 ) denied the real union between the divine and the human
natures in Christ, making it rather a moral than an organic one. They
refused therefore to attribute to the resultant unity the attributes of each
nature, and regarded Christ as a man in very near relation to God. Thus
they virtuaUy held to two natures and two persons, instead of two natures
in one person.
6. The Eutychians ( condemned at Chalcedon, 451 ) denied the dis
tinction and coexistence of the two natures, and held to a mingling of both
into one, which constituted a tertium quid, or third nature. Since in this
case the divine must overpower the human, it foUows that the human was
reaUy absorbed into or transmuted into the divine, although the divine was
not in aU respects the same, after the union, that it was before. Hence the
Eutychians were often caUed Monophysites, because they virtuaUy reduced
the two natures to one.
The foregoing survey would seem to show that history had exhausted the
possibilities of heresy, and that the future denials of the doctrine of Christ's
person must be, in essence, forms of the views already mentioned. AU
controversies with regard to the person of Christ must, of necessity, hinge
upon one of three points : first, the reality of the two natures ; secondly,
the integrity of the two natures ; thirdly, the union of the two natures in
one person. Of these points, Ebionism and Docetism deny the reahty of
the natures; Arianism and ApoUinarianism deny theh integrity; while
Nestorianism and Eutychianism deny theh proper union. In opposition
to aU these errors, the orthodox doctrine held its ground and maintains it
to this day.
7. The Orthodox doctrine ( promulgated at Chalcedon, 451 ) holds that
in the one person Jesus Christ there are two natures, a human nature and
a divine nature, each in its completeness and integrity, and that these two
natures are organicaUy and indissolubly united, yet so that no thhd nature
is formed thereby. In brief, to use the antiquated dictum, orthodox doc
trine forbids us either to divide the person or to confound the natures.
That this doctrine is Scriptural and rational, we have yet to show. We
may most easUy arrange our proofs by reducing the three points mentioned
to two, namely : first, the reahty and integrity of the two natures ; sec
ondly, the union of the two natures in one person.
H The two Natures of Christ, — theib Reality, and Integrity.
1. The Humanity of Christ.
A. Its Reahty. — This may be shown as foUows :
( a ) He expressly caUed himself, and was caUed, " man."

182 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
( 6 ) He possessed the essential elements of human nature as at present
constituted — a material body and a rational soul.
( c ) He was moved by the instinctive principles, and he exercised the
active powers, which belong to a normal and developed humanity (hunger,
thirst, weariness, sleep, love, compassion, anger, anxiety, fear, groaning,
weeping, prayer).
(d) He was subject to the ordinary laws of human development, both in
body and soul ( grew and waxed strong in sphit ; asked questions ; grew in
wisdom and stature ; learned obedience ; suffered being tempted ; was
made perfect through sufferings ).
( e ) He suffered and died ( bloody sweat ; gave up his sphit ; his side
pierced, and straightway there came out blood and water).
B. Its Integrity. We here use the term 'integrity ' to signify, not
merely completeness, but perfection. That which is perfect is, a fortiori,
complete in aU its parts. Christ's human nature was :
( a ) SupernaturaUy conceived ; since the denial of his supernatural con
ception involves either a denial of the purity of Mary, his mother, or a denial
of the truthfulness of Matthew's and Luke's narratives.
(6) Free, both from hereditary depravity, and from actual sin; as is
shown by his never offering sacrifice, never praying for forgiveness, teach
ing that aU but he needed the new birth, chaUenging all to convict hi™ of
a single sin.
( c ) Ideal human nature, — furnishing the moral pattern which man is
progressively to realize, although within limitations of knowledge and of
activity required by his vocation as the world's Redeemer.
{d) A human nature that found its personahty only in union with the
divine nature, — in other words, a human nature impersonal, in the sense
that it had no personahty separate from the divine nature, and prior to its
union therewith.
(e) A human nature germinal, and capable of self-communication, 
so constituting him the spiritual head and beginning of a new race, the
second Adam from whom faUen man individuaUy and collectively derives
new and holy life.
The passages here aUuded to abundantly confute the Docetic denial of
Christ's veritable human body, and the ApoUinarian denial of Christ's ver
itable human soul. More than this, they establish the reahty and integrity
of Christ's human nature, as possessed of aU the elements, faculties, and
powers essential to humanity.
2. The Deity of Christ.
The reahty and integrity of Christ's divine nature have been sufficiently
proved in a former chapter ( see pages 82-89 ). We need only refer to the
evidence there given, that, during his earthly ministry, Christ :
( a ) Possessed a knowledge of his own deity.

THE TWO NATURES IN ONE PERSON. 183
(5) Exercised divine powers and prerogatives.
But this is to say, in other words, that there were, in Christ, a knowl
edge and a power such as belong only to God. The passages cited furnish
a refutation of both the Ebionite denial of the reality, and the Arian denial
of the integrity, of the divine nature in Christ.
HL The Union of the two Natures in one Person.
Distinctly as the Scriptures represent Jesus Christ to have been possessed
of a divine nature and of a human nature, each unaltered in essence and
undivested of its normal attributes and powers, they with equal distinctness
represent Jesus Christ as a single undivided personahty in whom these two
natures are vitaUy and inseparably united, so that he is properly, not God
and man, but the God-man. The two natures are bound together, not by
the moral tie of friendship, nor by the spiritual tie which links the behever
to his Lord, but by a bond unique and inscrutable, which constitutes them
one person with a single consciousness and wfll, — this consciousness and
wiU including within their possible range both the human nature and the
divine. 1. Proof of this Union.
(a) Christ uniformly speaks of himself, and is spoken of, as a single
person. There is no interchange of 'I' and 'thou' between the human
and the divine natures, such as we find between the persons of the Trinity
( John 17 : 23 ). Christ never uses the plural number in referring to him
self, unless it be in John 3 : 1 1 — " we speak that we do know, " — and even
here "we" is more probably used as inclusive of the disciples. 1 John
4:2 — "is come in the flesh" — is supplemented by John 1 : 14 — " became
flesh"; and these texts together assure us that Christ so came in human
nature as to make that nature an element in his single personahty.
( 6 ) The attributes and powers of both natures are ascribed to the one
Christ, and conversely the works and dignities of the one Christ are
ascribed to either of the natures, in a way inexphcable, except upon the
principle that these two natures are organically and indissolubly united in
a single person ( examples of the former usage are Rom. 1 : 3 and 1 Pet.
3 : 18 ; of the latter, 1 Tim. 2 : 5 and Heb. 1 : 2, 3 ). Hence we can say,
on the one hand, that the God-man existed before Abraham, yet was born
in the reign of Augustus Caesar, and that Jesus Christ wept, was weary,
suffered, died, yet is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever ; on the other
hand, that a divine Savior redeemed us upon the cross, and that the human
Christ is present with his people even to the end of the world ( Eph. 1 : 23 ;
4:10; Mat. 28:20).
(c) The constant Scriptural representations of the infinite value of
Christ's atonement and of the union of the human race with God which
has been secured in him are inteUigible only when Christ is regarded, not
as a man of God, but as the God-man, in whom the two natures are so
united that what each does has the value of both.
(d) It corroborates this view to remember that the universal Christian

184 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
consciousness recognizes in Christ a single and undivided personality, and
expresses this recognition in its services of song and prayer.
The foregoing proof of the union of a perfect human nature and of a
perfect divine nature in the single person of Jesus Christ suffices to refute
both the Nestorian separation of the natures andthe Eutychian confound
ing of them. Certain modern forms of stating the doctrine of this union,
however — forms of statement into which there enter some of the miscon
ceptions already noticed — need a brief examination, before we proceed to
our own attempt at elucidation.
2. Modem misrepresentations of this Union.
A. Theory of an incomplete humanity. — Gess and Beecher hold that
the immaterial part in Christ's humanity is only contracted and meta
morphosed deity.
The advocates of this view maintain that the divine Logos reduced him
self to the condition and hmits of human nature, and thus hteraUy became
a human soul. The theory differs from Apollinarianism, in that it does not
necessarily presuppose a trichotomous view of man's nature. WhUe
Apollinarianism, however, denied the human origin only of Christ's imevpa,
this theory extends the denial to his entire immaterial being, — his body
alone being derived from the Virgin. It is held, in slightly varying forms,
by the Germans, Hofmann and Ebrard, as weU as by Gess ; and Henry
Ward Beecher was its chief representative in America.
Against this theory we urge the foUowing objections :
(a) It rests upon a false interpretation of the passage John 1 : 14 —
o A<5yor adp!j iyhero. The word odptj here has its common New Testament
meaning. It designates neither soul nor body alone, but human nature in
its totality (c/. John 3 : 6 — to yeyevvrjpivov en Tin oapKOQ aapi; eariv • Rom. 7 :
18 — ovk olnel kv ipoi, tovt' lartv kv Ty oapiti pov, aya-&6v ). That eyhero does not
imply a transmutation of the teyoe into human nature, or into a human
soul, is evident from eanrpxyiaev which foUows — an allusion to the Shechinah
of the Mosaic tabernacle ; and from the paraUel passage 1 John 4 : 2 — ev
aapid ifa/MAra — where we are taught not only the oneness of Christ's
person, but the distinctness of the constituent natures.
(&) It contradicts the two great classes of Scripture passages already
referred to, which assert on the one hand the divine knowledge and power
of Christ and his consciousness of oneness with the Father, and on the
other hand the completeness of his human nature and its derivation from
the stock of Israel and the seed of Abraham (Mat. 1 : 1-16 ; Heb. 2 : 16).
Thus it denies both the true humanity, and the true deity, of Christ.
( c) It is inconsistent with the Scriptural representations of God's immu
tabUity, in maintaining that the Logos gives up the attributes of Godhead,
and his place and office as second person of the Trinity, in order to contract
himself into the limits of humanity. Since attributes and substance are
correlative terms, it is impossible to hold that the substance of God is in
Christ, so long as he does not possess divine attributes. As we shaU see
hereafter, however, the possession of divine attributes by Christ does not

THE TWO NATURES IN ONE PERSON. 185
necessarily imply his constant exercise of them. His humiliation indeed
consisted in his giving up their independent exercise.
( d) It is destructive of the whole Scriptural scheme of salvation, in that
it renders impossible any experience of human nature on the part of the
divine, — for when God becomes man he ceases to be God ; in that it renders
impossible any sufficient atonement on the part of human nature, — for
mere humanity, even though its essence be a contracted and dormant deity,
is not capable of a suffering which shaU have infinite value ; in that it
renders impossible any proper union of the human race with God in the
person of Jesus Christ, — for where true deity and true humanity are both
absent, there can be no union between the two.
B. Theory of a gradual incarnation — Dorner and Rothe hold that the
union between the divine and the human natures is not completed by the
incarnating act.
The advocates of this view maintain that the union between the two
natures is accomplished by a gradual communication of the fulness of the
divine Logos to the man Christ Jesus. This communication is mediated
by the human consciousness of Jesus. Before the human consciousness
begins, the personahty of the Logos is not yet divine-human. The per
sonal union completes itself only gradually, as the human consciousness is
sufficiently developed to appropriate the divine.
It is objectionable for the foUowing reasons :
(a) The Scripture plainly teaches that that which was born of Mary
was as completely Son of God as Son of man ( Luke 1 : 35 ) ; and that in
the incarnating act, and not at his resurrection, Jesus Christ became the
God-man (PhU. 2:7). But this theory virtuaUy teaches the birth of a
man who subsequently and gradually became the God-man, by consciously
appropriating the Logos to whom he sustained ethical relations — relations
with regard to which the Scripture is entirely sUent. Its radical error is that
of mistaking an incomplete consciousness of the union for an incomplete
union. ( b ) Since consciousness and will belong to personahty, as distinguished
from nature, the hypothesis of a mutual, conscious, and voluntary appro
priation of divinity by humanity and of humanity by divinity, during the
earthly life of Christ, is but a more subtle form of the Nestorian doctrine
of a double personahty. It foUows, moreover, that as these two personal
ities do not become absolutely one untU the resurrection, the death of the
man Jesus Christ, to whom the Logos has not yet fully united himself,
cannot possess an infinite atoning efficacy.
( c ) WhUe this theory asserts a final complete union of God and man in
Jesus Christ, it renders this union far more difficult to reason, by involving
the merging of two persons in one, rather than the union of two natures
in one person. We have seen, moreover, that the Scripture gives no coun
tenance to the doctrine of a double personality during the earthly hfe of
Christ. The God-man never says : "I and the Logos are one " ; "he that
hath seen me hath seen the Logos " ; " the Logos is greater than I " ; "I

186 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
go to the Logos. " In the absence of aU Scripture evidence in favor of this
theory, we must regard the rational and dogmatic arguments against it as
conclusive. 3. The real nature of this Union.
(a) Its great importance.— While the Scriptures represent the person
of Christ as the crowning mystery of the Christian scheme ( Matt. 11 : 27 ;
Col. 1 : 27 ; 2 : 2 ; 1 Tim. 3 : 16 ), they also incite us to its study ( John
17 : 3 ; 20 : 27 ; Luke 24 : 39 ; Phil. 3 : 8, 10 ). This is the more needful,
since Christ is not only the central point of Christianity, but is Christianity
itself — the embodied reconciliation and union between man and God.
The foUowing remarks are offered, not as fuUy explaining, but only as in
some respects relieving, the difficulties of the subject.
( 6 ) The chief problems. — These problems are the foUowing : 1. one
personahty and two natures ; 2. human nature without personahty ; 3.
relation of the Logos to the humanity during the earthly life of Christ ; 4.
relation of the humanity to the Logos during the heavenly life of Christ.
We may throw hght on 1, by the figure of two concentric circles ; on 2,
by remembering that two earthly parents unite in producing a single child ;
on 3, by the Ulustration of latent memory, which contains so much more
than present recoUection ; on 4, by the thought that body is the manifes
tation of sphit, and that Christ in his heavenly state is not confined to
place. ( c ) Reason for mystery. — The union of the two natures in Christ's person
is necessarily inscrutable, because there are no analogies to it in our experi
ence. Attempts to Ulustrate it on the one hand from the union and yet
the distinctness of soul and body, of iron and heat, and on the other hand
from the union and yet the distinctness of Christ and the behever, of the
divine Son and the Father, are one-sided and become utterly misleading, if
they are regarded as furnishing a rationale of the union and not simply a
means of repelling objection. The first two Ulustrations mentioned above
lack the essential element of two natures to make them complete : soul and
body are not two natures, but one, nor are iron and heat two substances.
The last two Ulustrations mentioned above lack the element of single per
sonahty : Christ and the behever are two persons, not one, even as the Son
and the Father are not one person, but two.
(d) Ground of possibUity. — The possibility of the union of deity and
humanity in one person is grounded in the original creation of man in
the divine image. Man's kinship to God, in other words, his possession of
a rational and spiritual nature, is the condition of incarnation. Brute-life
is incapable of union with God. But human nature is capable of the divine,
in the sense not only that it lives, moves, and has its being in God, but that
God may unite himself indissolubly to it and endue it with divine powers,
whUe yet it remains aU the more truly human. Since the moral image of
God in human nature has been lost by sin, Christ, the perfect image of
God after which man was originaUy made, restores that lost image by
uniting himself to humanity and filling it with his divine Life and love.
(e) No double personality. — This possession of two natures does not

THE TWO NATURES IN ONE PERSON. 187
involve a double personality in the God-man, for the reason that the Logos
takes into union with himself, not an individual man with already devel
oped personahty, but human nature which has had no separate existence
before its union with the divine. Christ's human nature is impersonal, in
the sense that it attains self -consciousness and self-determination only in
the personahty of the God-man. Here it is important to mark the dis
tinction between nature and person. Nature is substance possessed in
common ; the persons of the Trinity have one nature ; there is a common
nature of mankind. Person is nature separately subsisting, with powers
of consciousness and wUl. Since the human nature of Christ has not and
never had a separate subsistence, it is impersonal, and in the God-man
the Logos furnishes the principle of personahty. It is equally important
to observe that self-consciousness and self-determination do not belong to
nature as such, but only to personahty. For this reason, Christ has not
two consciousnesses and two wUls, but a single consciousness and a single
wUl. This consciousness and wUl, moreover, is never simply human, but
is always theanthropic — an activity of the one personahty which unites in
itself the human and the divine ( Mark 13 : 32 ; Luke 22 : 42 ).
(/) Effect upon the human. — The union of the divine and the human
natures makes the latter possessed of the powers belonging to the former ;
in other words, the attributes of the divine nature are imparted to the
human without passing over into its essence, — so that the human Christ
even on earth had power to be, to know, and to do, as God. That this
power was latent, or was only rarely manifested, was the result of the self-
chosen state of humiliation upon which the God-man had entered. In
this state of humiliation, the communication of the contents of his divine
nature to the human was mediated by the Holy Sphit. The God-man, in
his servant-form, knew and taught and performed only what the Spirit
permitted and directed (Mat. 3 : 16 ; John 3 : 34 ; Acts 1:2; 10 : 38 ; Heb.
9 : 14). But when thus permitted, he knew, taught, and performed, not,
like the prophets, by power communicated from without, but by virtue of
his own inner divine energy (Mat. 17 : 2 ; Mark 5 : 41 ; Luke 5 : 20, 21 ;
6:19; John 2 : 11, 24, 25 ; 3:13; 20:19).
(g) Effect upon the divine. — This communion of the natures was such
that, although the divine nature in itself is incapable of ignorance, weak
ness, temptation, suffering, or death, the one person Jesus Christ was
capable of these by virtue of the union of the divine nature with a human
nature in him. As the human Savior can exercise divine attributes, not in
virtue of his humanity alone, but derivatively, by virtue of his possession
of a divine nature, so the divine Savior can suffer and be ignorant as man,
not in his divine nature, but derivatively, by virtue of his possession of a
human nature. We may iUustrate this from the connection between body
and soul The soul suffers pain from its union with the body, of which
apart from the body it would be incapable. So the God-man, although in
his divine nature impassible, was capable, through his union with human
ity, of absolutely infinite suffering.
( h ) Necessity of the union. — The union of two natures in one person
is necessary to constitute Jesus Christ a proper mediator between man and

188 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
God. His two-fold nature gives him feUowship with both parties, since it
involves an equal dignity with God, and at the same time a perfect sympathy
with man (Heb. 2 : 17, 18 ; 4 : 15, 16). This two-fold nature, moreover,
enables him to present to both God and man proper terms of reconcilia
tion : being man, he can make atonement for man ; being God, his atone
ment has infinite value ; whUe both his divinity and his humanity combine
to move the hearts of offenders and constrain them to submission and love
(ITim. 2 :5; Heb. 7:25).
( i ) The union eternal. — The union of humanity with deity in the person
of Christ is indissoluble and eternal. Unlike the avatars of the East, the
incarnation was a permanent assumption of human nature by the second
person of the Trinity. In the ascension of Christ, glorified humanity has
attained the throne of the universe. By his Sphit, this same divine-human
Savior is omnipresent to secure the progress of his kingdom. The final
subjection of the Son to the Father, aUuded to in 1 Cor. 15 : 28, cannot be
other than the complete return of the Son to his original relation to the
Father ; since, according to John 17 : 5, Christ is again to possess the
glory which he had with the Father before the world was (cf. Heb. 1:8;
7:24,25). (,;') Infinite and finite in Christ. — Our investigation of the Scripture
teaching with regard to the Person of Christ leads us to three important
conclusions : 1. that deity and humanity, the infinite and the finite, in him
are not mutuaUy exclusive ; 2. that the humanity in Christ differs from his
deity not merely in degree but also in kind ; and 3. that this difference
in kind is the difference between the infinite original and the finite deriva
tive, so that Christ is the source of life, both physical and spiritual, for aU
men.

SECTION III. — THE TWO STATES OF CHRIST.
I. The State of Humiliation.
1. The nature of this humiliation.
We may dismiss, as unworthy of serious notice, the views that it consisted
essentiaUy either in the union of the Logos with human nature, — for this
union with human nature continues in the state of exaltation ; or in the
outward trials and privations of Christ's human life, — for this view casts
reproach upon poverty, and ignores the power of the soul to rise superior
to its outward chcumstances.
We may devote more attention to the
A. Theory of Thomasius, Delitzsch, and Crosby, that the humUiation
consisted in the surrender of the relative divine attributes.
This theory holds that the Logos, although retaining his divine self-
consciousness and his immanent attributes of holiness, love, and truth,
surrendered his relative attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omni-

THE STATE OF HUMILIATION. 189
presence, in order to take to himself veritable human nature. According
to this view, there are, indeed, two natures in Christ, but neither of these
natures is infinite. Thomasius and Dehtzsoh are the chief advocates of
this theory in Germany. Dr. Howard Crosby has maintained a simUar
view in America.
We object to this view that :
(a) It contradicts the Scriptures already referred to, in which Christ
asserts his divine knowledge and power. Divinity, it is said, can give up
its world-functions, for it existed without these before creation. But to
give up divine attributes is to give up the substance of Godhead. Nor is
it a sufficient reply to say that only the relative attributes are given up,
whUe the immanent attributes, which chiefly characterize the Godhead, are
retained ; for the immanent necessarily involve the relative, as the greater
involve the less.
( 6 ) Since the Logos, in uniting himself to a human soul, reduces him
self to the condition and limitations of a human soul, the theory is virtuaUy
a theory of the coexistence of two human souls in Christ. But the union
of two finite souls is more difficult to explain than the union of a finite and
an infinite, — since there can be in the former case no intelligent guidance
and control of the human element by the divine.
( c) This theory faUs to secure its end, that of making comprehensible
the human development of Jesus, — for even though divested of the relative
attributes of Godhood, the Logos still retains his divine self -consciousness,
together with his immanent attributes of hohness, love, and truth. This
is as difficult to reconcUe with a purely natural human development as the
possession of the relative divine attributes would be. The theory logicaUy
leads to a further denial of the possession of any divine attributes, or of
any divine consciousness at all, on the part of Christ, and merges itself in
the view of Gess and Beecher, that the Godhead of the Logos is actuaUy
transformed into a human souk
B. Theory that the humUiation consisted in the surrender of the inde
pendent exercise of the divine attributes.
This theory, which we regard as the most satisfactory of all, may be more
fuUy set forth as foUows. The humiliation, as the Scriptures seem to
show, consisted :
( a ) In that act of the preexistent Logos by which he gave up his divine
glory with the Father, in order to take a servant-form. In this act, he
resigned not the possession, nor yet entirely the use, but rather the inde
pendent exercise, of the divine attributes.
( b ) In the submission of the Logos to the control of the Holy Spirit and
the ^limitations of his Messianic mission, in his communication of the
divine fulness of the human nature which he had taken into union with
himself. (e ) In the continuous surrender, on the part of the God-man, so far as
his human nature was concerned, of the exercise of those divine powers
with which it was endowed by virtue of its union with the divine, and in

190 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
the voluntary acceptance, which foUowed upon this, of temptation, suffer
ing, and death.
Each of these elements of the doctrine has its own Scriptural support.
We must therefore regard the humihation of Christ, not as consisting in a
single act, but as involving a continuous self-renunciation, which began
with the Kenosis of the Logos in becoming man, and which culminated in
the self-subjection of the God-man to the death of the cross.
2. The stages of Christ's humiliation.
We may distinguish : ( a ) That act of the preiincarnate Logos by which,
in becoming man, he gave up the independent exercise of the divine attri
butes. ( b ) His submission to the common laws which regulate the origin
of souls from a preexisting sinful stock, in taking his human nature from
the Virgin, — a human nature which only the miraculous conception ren
dered pure. ( e ) His subjection to the limitations involved in a human
growth and development, — reaching the consciousness of his sonship at his
twelfth year, and working no miracles tUl after the baptism. (_d) The
subordination of himself, in state, knowledge, teaching, and acts, to the
control of the Holy Sphit, — so living, not independently, but as a servant.
( e ) His subjection, as connected with a sinful race, to temptation and suf
fering, and finaUy to the death which constituted the penalty of the law.
H. The State op Exaltation.
1. The nature of this exaltation.
It consisted essentiaUy in : ( a ) A resumption, on the part of the Logos,
of his independent exercise of divine attributes. ( 6 ) The withdrawal, on
the part of the Logos, of aU limitations in his communication of the divine
fulness to the human nature of Christ. ( c ) The corresponding exercise,
on the part of the human nature, of those powers which belonged to it by
virtue of its union with the divine.
2. The stages of Christ's exaltation.
(a) The quickening and resurrection.
Both Lutherans and Romanists distinguish between these two, making
the former precede, and the latter foUow, Christ's "preaching to the spir
its in prison." These views rest upon a misinterpretation of 1 Pet. 3 : 18-
20. Lutherans teach that Christ descended into heU, to proclaim his
triumph to evil spirits. But this is to give erfpvt-ev the unusual sense of
proclaiming his triumph, instead of his gospel. Romanists teach that
Christ entered the underworld to preach to Old Testament saints, that they
might be saved. But the passage speaks only of the disobedient ; it can
not be pressed into the support of a sacramental theory of the salvation of
Old Testament believers. The passage does not assert the descent of Christ
into the world of spirits, but only a work of the pre'incarnate Logos in
offering salvation, through Noah, to the world then about to perish.
( 6 ) The ascension and sitting at the right hand of God.
As the resurrection proclaimed Christ to men as the perfected and glori
fied man, the conqueror of sin and lord of death, the ascension proclaimed

THE PROPHETIC OFFICE OF CHRIST. 191
him to the universe as the reinstated God, the possessor of universal
dominion, the omnipresent object of worship and hearer of prayer. Dex-
tra Dei ubique est.

SECTION IV. — THE OFFICES OF CHRIST.
The Scriptures represent Christ's offices as three in number, — prophetic,
priestly, and kingly. Although these terms are derived from concrete
human relations, they express perfectly distinct ideas. The prophet, the
priest, and the king, of the Old Testament, were detached but designed
prefigurations of him who should combine all these various activities in
himself, and should furnish the ideal reality, of which they were the
imperfect symbols.
I. The Prophetic Office op Christ.
1. The nature of Christ's prophetic work.
(a) Here we must avoid the narrow interpretation which would make
the prophet a mere foreteUer of future events. He was rather an inspired
interpreter or revealer of the divine wfll, a medium of communication
between God and men ( npo<pfiTiK = not foreteUer, but f orteUer, or f orth-
teUer. Cf. Gen. 20 : 7, — of Abraham ; Ps. 105 : 15, — of the patriarchs ;
Mat. 11 : 9,— of John the Baptist ; 1 Cor. 12 : 28, Eph. 2 : 20, and 3 : 5,—
of N. T. expounders of Scripture).
( & ) The prophet commonly united three methods of fulfilling his office,
— those of teaching, predicting, and miracle-working. In aU these respects ,
Jesus Christ did the work of a prophet ( Deut. 18 : 15 ; cf. Acts 3 : 22 ;
Mat. 13 : 57; Luke 13 : 33 ; John 6 : 14). He taught (Mat. 5-7), he
uttered predictions (Mat. 24 and 25 ), he wrought miracles ( Mat. 8 and 9 ),
whUe in his person, his life, his work, and his death, he revealed the Father
(John 8 :26; 14:9; 17 : 8).
2. The stages of Chris fs prophetic work.
These are four, namely:
( a ) The preparatory work of the Logos, in enlightening mankind before
the time of Christ's advent in the flesh. — AU preliminary religious knowl
edge, whether within or without the bounds of the chosen people, is from
Christ, the revealer of God.
( 5 ) The earthly ministry of Christ incarnate. — In his earthly ministry,
Christ showed himself the prophet par excellence. WhUe he submitted,
hke the Old Testament prophets, to the direction of the Holy Spirit, unhke
them, he found the sources of aU knowledge and power within himself.
The word of God did not come to him, — he was himself the Word.
( c ) The guidance and teaching of his church on earth, since his ascen
sion. — Christ's prophetic activity is continued through the preaching of
his apostles and ministers, and by the enhghtening influences of his Holy

192 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
Spirit ( John 16 : 12-14 ; Acts 1:1). The apostles unfolded the germs of
doctrine put into their hands by Christ. The church is, in a derivative
sense, a prophetic institution, estabhshed to teach the world by its preach
ing and its ordinances. But Christians are prophets, only as being pro-
claimers of Christ's teaching ( Num. 11 : 29 ; Joel 2 : 28 ).
( d) Christ's final revelation of the Father to his saints in glory (John
16 : 25 ; 17 : 24, 26 ; cf. Is. 64 : 4 ; 1 Cor. 13 : 12 ).— Thus Christ's prophetic
work wiU be an endless one, as the Father whom he reveals is infinite.
II. The Priestly Office of Christ.
The priest was a person divinely appointed to transact with God on
man's behalf. He fulfilled his office, first by offering sacrifice, and secondly
by making intercession. In both these respects Christ is priest.
1. Christ's Sacrificial Work, or the Doctrine of the Atonement.
The Scriptures teach that Christ obeyed and suffered in our stead, to
satisfy an immanent demand of the divine hohness, and thus remove an
obstacle in the divine mind to the pardon and restoration of the guUty.
This statement may be expanded and explained in a preliminary way as
foUows : —
( a ) The fundamental attribute of God is holiness, and holiness is not
self-communicating love, but self -affirming righteousness. Holiness limits
and conditions love, for love can wUl happiness only as happiness results
from or consists with righteousness, that is, with conformity to God.
( b ) The universe is a reflection of God, and Christ the Logos is its hfe.
God has constituted the universe, and humanity as a part of it, so as to
express his. hohness, positively by connecting happiness with righteous
ness, negatively by attaching unhappiness or suffering to sin.
(c) Christ the Logos, as the Revealer of God in the universe and in
humanity, must condemn sin by visiting upon it the suffering which is its
penalty ; whUe at the same time, as the Life of humanity, he must endure
the reaction of God's holiness against sin which constitutes that penalty.
( d ) Our personahty is not self-contained. We live, move, and have our
being naturaUy in Christ the Logos. Our reason, affection, conscience,
and wUl are complete only in him. He is generic humanity, of which we
are the offshoots. When his righteousness condemns sin, and his love vol
untarily endures the suffering which is sin's penalty, humanity ratifies the
judgment of God, makes fuU propitiation for sin, and satisfies the demands
of holiness.
( e ) WhUe Christ's love explains his willingness to endure suffering for
us, only his holiness furnishes the reason for that constitution of the uni
verse and of human nature which makes this suffering necessary. As
respects us, his sufferings are substitutionary, since his divinity and his
sinlessness enable him to do for us what we could never do for ourselves.
Yet this substitution is also a sharing — not the work of one external to us,
but of one who is the life of humanity, the soul of our soul and the life of
our life, and so responsible with us for the sins of the race.

THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST. 193
(/) The historical work of the incarnate Christ is not itself the atone
ment, — it is rather the revelation of the atonement. The suffering of the
incarnate Christ is the manifestation in space and time of the eternal suf
fering of God on account of human sin. Yet without the historical
work which was finished on Calvary, the age-long suffering of God could
never have been made comprehensible to men.
{g ) The historical sacrifice of our Lord is not only the final revelation
of the heart of God, but also the manifestation of the law of universal life
— the law that sin brings suffering to aU connected with it, and that we
can overcome sin in ourselves and in the world only by entering into the
feUowship of Christ's sufferings and Christ's victory, or, in other words,
only by union with him through faith.
A Scripture Methods of Representing the Atonement.
We may classify the Scripture representations according as they conform
to moral, commercial, legal or sacrificial analogies.
( a ) Moral. — The atonement is described as
A provision originating in God's love, and manifesting this love to the
universe ; but also as an example of disinterested love, to secure our
dehverance from selfishness. — In these latter passages, Christ's death is
referred to as a source of moral stimulus to men.
( 6 ) Commercial. — The atonement is described as
A ransom, paid to free us from the bondage of sin ( note in these pas
sages the use of dvTi, the preposition of price, bargain, exchange). — In
these passages, Christ's death is represented as the price of our dehverance
from sin and death.
( c ) Legal. — The atonement is described as
An act of obedience to the law which sinners had violated ; a penalty,
borne in order to rescue the guilty ; and an exhibition of God's righteous
ness, necessary to the vindication of his procedure in the pardon and resto
ration of sinners. — In these passages the death of Christ is represented
as demanded by God's law and government.
( d ) Sacrificial. — The atonement is described as
A work of priestly mediation, which reeoncUes God tomen, — notice
here that tjie term ' reconcihation ' has its usual sense of removing enmity,
not from the offending, but from the offended party ; — a, sin-offering, pre
sented on behalf of transgressors ; — a propitiation, which satisfies the
demands of violated hohness ; — and a substitution, of Christ's obedience
and sufferings for ours. — These passages, taken together, show that
Christ's death is demanded by God's attribute of justice, or holiness, if sin
ners are to be saved.
An examination of the passages referred to shows that, while the forms
in which the atoning work of Christ is described are in part derived from
moral, commercial, and legal relations, the prevailing language is that of
sacrifice. A correct view of the atonement must therefore be grounded
upon a proper interpretation of the institution of sacrifice, especiaUy as
found in the Mosaic system.

194 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
B. The Institution of Sacrifice, more especiaUy as found in the Mosaic
system. ( a ) We may dismiss as untenable, on the one hand, the theory that
sacrifice is essentiaUy the presentation of a gift ( Hofmann, Baring-Gould )
or a feast ( Spencer ) to the Deity ; and on the other hand the theory that
sacrifice is a symbol of renewed feUowship ( Keil ), or of the grateful offer
ing to God of the whole hfe and being of the worshiper ( Bahr ). Neither
of these theories can explain the fact that the sacrifice is a bloody offering,
involving the suffering and death of the victim, and brought, not by the
simply grateful, but by the conscience-stricken soul.
( 6 ) The true import of the sacrifice, as is abundantly evident from both
heathen and Jewish sources, embraced three elements, — first, that of satis
faction to offended Deity, or propitiation offered to violated holiness ; sec
ondly, that of substitution of suffering and death on the part of the innocent,
for the deserved punishment of the guUty ; and, thirdly, community of life
between the offerer and the victim. Combining these three ideas, we have
as the total import of the sacrifice : Satisfaction by substitution, and
substitution by incorporation. The bloody sacrifice among the heathen
expressed the consciousness that sin involves guUt ; that guUt exposes man
to the righteous wrath of God ; that without expiation of that guilt there
is no forgiveness ; and that through the suffering of another who shares his
life the sinner may expiate his sin.
( c ) In considering the exact purport and efficacy of the Mosaic sacri
fices, we must distinguish between theh theocratical, and theh spiritual,
offices. They were, on the one hand, the appointed means whereby the
offender could be restored to the outward place and privUeges, as member
of the theocracy, which he had forfeited by neglect or transgression ; and
they accomplished this purpose irrespectively of the temper and sphit
with which they were offered. On the other hand, they were symbolic of
the vicarious sufferings and death of Christ, and obtained forgiveness and
acceptance with God only as they were offered in true penitence, and
with faith in God's method of salvation.
( d ) Thus the Old Testament sacrifices, when rightly offered, involved a
consciousness of sin on the part of the worshiper, the bringing of a victim
to atone for the sin, the laying of the hand of the offerer upon the victim's
head, the confession of sin by the offerer, the slaying of the beast, the
sprinkling or pouring-out of the blood upon the altar, and the consequent
forgiveness of the sin and acceptance of the worshiper. The sin-offering
and the scape-goat of the great day of atonement symbolized yet more dis
tinctly the two elementary ideas of sacrifice, namely, satisfaction and sub
stitution, together with the consequent removal of guUt from those on
whose behah the sacrifice was offered.
( e ) It is not essential to this view to maintain that a formal divine insti
tution of the rite of sacrifice, at man's expulsion from Eden, can be proved
from Scripture. Like the family and the state, sacrifice may, without such
formal inculcation, possess divine sanction, and be ordained of God. The
weU-nigh universal prevalence of sacrifice, however, together with the fact

SOCINIAN THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT. 195
that its nature, as a bloody offering, seems to preclude man's own invention
of it, combines with certain Scripture intimations to favor the view that it
was a primitive divine appointment. From the time of Moses, there can
be no question as to its divine authority.
(/) The New Testament assumes and presupposes the Old Testament
doctrine of sacrifice. The sacrificial language in which its descriptions of
Christ's work are clothed cannot be explained as an accommodation to
Jewish methods of thought, since this terminology was in large part in
common use among the heathen, and Paul used it more than any other of
the apostles in dealing with the GentUes. To deny to it its Old Testament
meaning, when used by New Testament writers to describe the work of
Christ, is to deny any proper insphation both in the Mosaic appointment
of sacrifices and in the apostohc interpretations of them. We must there
fore maintain, as the result of a simple induction of Scripture facts, that
the death of Christ is a vicarious offering, provided by God's love for the
purpose of satisfying an internal demand of the divine holiness, and of
removing an obstacle in the divine mind to the renewal and pardon of
sinners. C. Theories of the Atonement.
1st. The Socinian, or Example Theory of the Atonement.
This theory holds that subjective sinfulness is the sole barrier between
man and God. Not God, but only man, needs to be reconcUed. The only
method of reconciliation is to better man's moral condition. This can bo
effected by man's own wfll, through repentance and reformation. The
death of Christ is but the death of a noble martyr. He redeems us, only
as his human example of faithfulness to truth and duty has a powerful
influence upon our moral improvement. This fact the apostles, either
consciously or unconsciously, clothed in the language of the Greek and
Jewish sacrifices. This theory was f uUy elaborated by Laelius Socinus and
Faustus Socinus of Poland, in the 16th century. Its modern advocates
are found in the Unitarian body.
To this theory we make the foUowing objections :
( a ) It is based upon false phUosophical principles, — as, for example, that
wUl is merely the faculty of vohtions ; that the foundation of virtue is in
utility ; that law is an expression of arbitrary wUl ; that penalty is a means
of reforming the offender ; that righteousness, in either God or man, is
only a manifestation of benevolence.
(6) It is a natural outgrowth from the Pelagian view of sin, and logi-
caUy necessitates a curtailment or surrender of every other characteristic
doctrine of Christianity — insphation, sin, the deity of Christ, justification,
regeneration, and eternal retribution.
( c ) It contradicts the Scripture teachings, that sin involves objective
guilt as weU as subjective defilement ; that the hohness of God must punish
sin ; that the atonement was a bearing of the punishment of sin for men ;
and that this vicarious bearing of punishment was necessary, on the part of
God, to make possible the showing of favor to the guUty.

196 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
(d) It furnishes no proper explanation of the sufferings and death of
Christ. The unmartyrlike anguish cannot be accounted for, and the for
saking by the Father cannot be justified, upon the hypothesis that Christ
died as a mere witness to truth. If Christ's sufferings were not propitia
tory, they neither furnish us with a perfect example, nor constitute a mani
festation of the love of God.
( e ) The influence of Christ's example is neither declared in Scripture,
nor found in Christian experience, to be the chief result secured by his
death. Mere example is but a new preaching of the law, which repels and
condemns. The cross has power to lead men to holiness, only as it first
shows a satisfaction made for theh sins. Accordingly, most of the passages
which represent Christ as an example also contain references to his propi
tiatory work.
(/) This theory contradicts the whole tenor of the New Testament, in
making the hfe, and not the death, of Christ the most significant and
important feature of his work. The constant aUusions to the death of
Christ as the source of our salvation, as weU as the symbohsm of the ordi
nances, cannot be explained upon a theory which regards Christ as a mere
example, and considers his sufferings as incidents, rather than essentials,
of his work.
2nd. The Bushnelhan, or Moral Influence Theory of the Atonement.
This holds, like the Socinian, that there is no principle of the divine
nature which is propitiated by Christ's death; but that this death is a mani
festation of the love of God, suffering in and with the sins of his creatures.
Christ's atonement, therefore, is the merely natural consequence of his
taking human nature upon him ; and is a suffering, not of penalty in man's
stead, but of the combined woes and griefs which the living of a human
life involves. This atonement has effect, not to satisfy divine justice, but
so to reveal divine love as to soften human hearts and to lead them to
repentance ; in other words, Christ's sufferings were necessary, not in order
to remove an obstacle to the pardon of sinners which exists in the mind of
God, but in order to convince sinners that there exists no such obsta
cle. This theory, for substance, has been advocated by BushneU, in
America ; by Robertson, Maurice, CampbeU, and Young, in Great Britain ;
by Schleiermacher and Ritschl, in Germany.
To this theory we object as foUows :
(a) WhUe it embraces a valuable element of truth, namely, the moral
influence upon men of the sufferings of the God-man, it is false by defect,
in that it substitutes a subordinate effect of the atonement for its chief aim,
and yet unfairly appropriates the name * vicarious,' which belongs only to
the latter. Suffering with the sinner is by no means suffering in his stead.
(6) It rests upon false philosophical principles, — as, that righteousness
is identical with benevolence, instead of conditioning it ; that God is sub
ject to an eternal law of love, instead of being himself the source of all law;
that the aim of penalty is the reformation of the offender.
(c) The theory furnishes no proper reason for Christ's suffering. WhUe
it shows that the Savior necessarUy suffers from his contact with human

GROTIAN THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT. 197
sin and sorrow, it gives no explanation of that constitution of the universe
which makes suffering the consequence of sin, not only to the sinner, but
also to the innocent being who comes into connection with sin. The hoh
ness of God, which is manifested in this constitution of things and which
requhes this atonement, is entirely ignored.
( d ) It contradicts the plain teachings of Scripture, that the atonement
is necessary, not simply to reveal God's love, but to satisfy his justice ;
that Christ's sufferings are propitiatory and penal ; and that the human
conscience needs to be propitiated by Christ's sacrifice, before it can feel
the moral influence of his sufferings.
( e ) It can be maintained, only by wresting from theh obvious meaning
those passages of Scripture which speak of Christ as suffering for our sins ;
which represent his blood as accomplishing something for us in heaven,
when presented there by our intercessor ; which declare forgiveness to be a
remitting of past offences upon the ground of Christ's death ; and which
describe justification as a pronouncing, not a making, just.
(/) This theory confounds God's method of saving men with men's
experience of being saved. It makes the atonement itself consist of its
effects in the behever's union with Christ and the purifying influence of
that union upon the character and hfe.
( g ) This theory would confine the influence of the atonement to those
who have heard of it, — thus excluding patriarchs and heathen. But the
Scriptures represent Christ as being the Savior of all men, in the sense of
securing them grace, which, but for his atoning work, could never have
been bestowed consistently with the divine hohness.
3d. The Grotian, or Governmental Theory of the Atonement.
This theory holds that the atonement is a satisfaction, not to any inter
nal principle of the divine nature, but to the necessities of government.
God's government of the universe cannot be maintained, nor can the
divine law preserve its authority over its subjects, unless the pardon of
offenders is accompanied by some exhibition of the high estimate which
God sets upon his law, and the heinous guilt of violating it. Such an
exhibition of divine regard for the law is furnished in the sufferings and
death of Christ. Christ does not suffer the precise penalty of the law, but
God graciously accepts his suffering as a substitute for the penalty. This
bearing of substituted suffering on the part of Christ gives the divine law
such hold upon the consciences and hearts of men, that God can pardon
the guilty upon theh repentance, without detriment to the interests of his
government. The author of this theory was Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jur
ist and theologian ( 1583-1645 ). The theory is characteristic of the New
England theology, and is generaUy held by those who accept the New
School view of sin.
To this theory we urge the foUowing objections :
( a ) WhUe it contains a valuable element of truth, namely, that the suf
ferings and death of Christ secure the interests of God's government, it is
false by defect, in substituting for the chief aim of the atonement one
which is only subordinate and incidental.

198 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
( b ) It rests upon false phUosophical principles, — as, that utUity is the
ground of moral obligation ; that law is an expression of the wUl, rather
than of the nature, of God ; that the aim of penalty is to deter from the com
mission of offences ; and that righteousness is resolvable into benevolence.
( c ) It ignores and virtually denies that immanent hohness of God of
which the law with its threatened penalties, and the human conscience
with its demand for punishment, are only finite reflections. There is some
thing back of government ; if the atonement satisfies government, it must
be by satisfying that justice of God of which government is an expression.
(e) The intensity of Christ's sufferings in the garden and on the cross
is inexphcable upon the theory that the atonement was a histrionic exhibi
tion of God's regard for his government, and can be explained only upon
the view that Christ actuaUy endured the wrath of God against human sin.
( d ) It makes that to be an exhibition of justice which is not an exercise
of justice ; the atonement being, according to this theory, not an execution
of law, but an exhibition of regard for law, which wiU make it safe to par
don the violators of law. Such a merely scenic representation can inspire
respect for law, only so long as the essential unreality of it is unsuspected.
(/) The actual power of the atonement over the human conscience and
heart is due, not to its exhibiting God's regard for law, but to its exhibit
ing an actual execution of law, and an actual satisfaction of violated
holiness made by Christ in the sinner's stead.
(g) The theory contradicts aU those passages of Scripture which repre
sent the atonement as necessary ; as propitiating God himself ; as being a
revelation of God's righteousness ; as being an execution of the penalty of
the law ; as making salvation a matter of debt to the behever, on the ground
of what Christ has done ; as actuaUy purging our sins, instead of making
that purging possible ; as not simply assuring the sinner that God may
now pardon him on account of what Christ has done, but that Christ has
actuaUy wrought out a complete salvation, and wfll bestow it upon aU who
come to him.
4th. The Irvingian Theory, or Theory of GraduaUy Extirpated De
pravity. This holds that, in his incarnation, Christ took human nature as it was
in Adam, not before the Fall, but after the FaU, — human nature, therefore,
with its inborn corruption and predisposition to moral evil ; that, notwith
standing the possession of this tainted and depraved nature, Christ, through
the power of the Holy Sphit, or of his divine nature, not only kept his
human nature from manifesting itself in any actual or personal sin, but
graduaUy purified it, through struggle and sufferiug, untU in his death he
completely extirpated its original depravity, and reunited it to God. This
subjective purification of human nature in the person of Jesus Christ con
stitutes his atonement, and men are saved, not by any objective propitiation,
but only by becoming through faith partakers of Christ's new humanity.
This theory was elaborated by Edward Irving, of London ( 1792-1834 ), and
it has been held, in substance, by Menken and Dippel in Germany.

ANSELMIC THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT. 199
To this theory we offer the foUowing objections :
( a ) WhUe it embraces an important element of truth, namely, the fact
of a new humanity in Christ of which all believers become partakers, it is
chargeable with serious error in denying the objective atonement which
makes the subjective application possible.
( b ) It rests upon false fundamental principles, — as, that law is identical
with the natural order of the universe, and as such, is an exhaustive expres
sion of the wfll and nature of God ; that sin is merely a power of moral evil
within the soul, instead of also involving an objective guilt and desert of
punishment ; that penalty is the mere reaction of law against the trans
gressor, instead of being also the revelation of a personal wrath against
sin ; that the evU taint of human nature can be extirpated by suffering its
natural consequences, — penalty in this way reforming the transgressor.
( c ) It contradicts the express and implicit representations of Scripture,
with regard to Christ's freedom from aU taint of hereditary depravity ; mis
represents his life as a growing consciousness of the underlying corruption
of his human nature, which culminated at Gethsemane and Calvary ; and
denies the truth of his own statements, when it declares that he must have
died on account of his own depravity, even though none were to be saved
thereby. (d) It makes the active obedience of Christ, and the subjective purifi
cation of his human nature, to be the chief features of his work, while the
Scriptures make his death and passive bearing of penalty the centre of
aU, and ever regard him as one who is personaUy pure and who vicariously
bears the punishment of the guflty.
(e) It necessitates the surrender of the doctrine of justification as a
merely declaratory act of God ; and requhes such a view of the divine hoh
ness, expressed only through the order of nature, as can be maintained
only upon principles of pantheism.
5th. The Anselmic, or Commercial Theory of the Atonement.
This theory holds that sin is a violation of the divine honor or majesty,
and, as committed against an infinite being, deserves an infinite punish
ment ; that the majesty of God requhes him to execute punishment, while
the love of God pleads for the sparing of the guilty ; that this conflict of
divine attributes is eternally reconcUed by the voluntary sacrifice of the
God-man, who bears in virtue of the dignity of his person the intensively
infinite punishment of sin, which must otherwise have been suffered exten
sively and eternaUy by sinners ; that this suffering of the God-man presents
to the divine majesty an exact equivalent for the deserved sufferings of the
elect ; and that, as the result of this satisfaction of the divine claims, the
elect sinners are pardoned and regenerated. This view was first broached
by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) as a substitute for the earher patris
tic view that Christ's death was a ransom paid to Satan, to deliver sinners
from his power. It is held by many Scotch theologians, and, in this
country, by the Princeton School.

200 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
To this theory we make the foUowing objections :
( a ) WhUe it contains a valuable element of truth, in its representation
of the atonement as satisfying a principle of the divine nature, it conceives
of this principle in too formal and external a manner, — making the idea of
the divine honor or majesty more prominent than that of the divine hoh
ness, in which the divine honor and majesty are grounded.
( b ) In its eagerness to maintain the atoning efficacy of Christ's passive
obedience, the active obedience, quite as clearly expressed in Scripture, is
insufficiently emphasized and weU nigh lost sight of.
( c ) It aUows disproportionate weight to those passages of Scripture
which represent the atonement under commercial analogies, as the pay
ment of a debt or ransom, to the exclusion of those which describe it
as an ethical fact, whose value is to be estimated not quantitatively, but
qualitatively. ( d ) It represents the atonement as having reference only to the elect,
and ignores the Scripture declarations that Christ died for aU.
( e ) It is defective in holding to a merely external transfer of the merit
of Christ's work, whUe it does not clearly state the internal ground of that
transfer, in the union of the behever with Christ.
6th. The Ethical Theory of the Atonement.
In propounding what we conceive to be the true theory of the atone
ment, it seems desirable to divide our treatment into two parts. No theory
can be satisfactory which does not furnish a solution of the two problems :
1. What did the atonement accomphsh ? or, in other words, what was the
object of Christ's death ? The answer to this question must be a descrip
tion of the atonement in its relation to hohness in God. 2. What were the
means used? or, in other words, how could Christ justly die ? The answer
to this question must be a description of the atonement as arising from
Christ's relation to humanity. We take up these two parts of the subject
in order.
First, — the Atonement as related to Holiness in God.
The Ethical theory holds that the necessity of the atonement is grounded
in the holiness of God, of which conscience in man is a finite reflection.
There is an ethical principle in the divine nature, which demands that sin
shall be punished. Aside from its results, sin is essentially Ul- deserving.
As we who are made in God's image mark our growth in purity by the
increasing quickness with which we detect impurity, and the increasing
hatred which we feel toward it, so infinite purity is a consuming fire to all
iniquity. As there is an ethical demand in our natures that not only
others' wickedness, but our own wickedness, be visited with punishment,
and a keen conscience cannot rest tiU it has made satisfaction to justice
for its misdeeds, so there is an ethical demand of God's nature that penalty
f oUow sin.
Punishment is the constitutional reaction of God's being against moral
evU — the self-assertion of infinite holiness against its antagonist and

ETHICAL THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT. 201
would-be destroyer. In God this demand is devoid of aU passion, and is
consistent with infinite benevolence. It is a demand that cannot be
evaded, since the holiness from which it springs is unchanging. The
atonement is therefore a satisfaction of the ethical demand of the divine
nature, by the substitution of Christ's penal sufferings for the punishment
of the guilty.
This substitution is unknown to mere law, and above and beyond the
powers of law. It is an operation of grace. Grace, however, does not
violate or suspend law, but takes it up into itself and fulfils it. The right
eousness of law is maintained, in that the source of all law, the judge and
punisher, himself voluntarily submits to bear the penalty, and bears it in
the human nature that has sinned.
Thus the atonement answers the ethical demand of the divine nature
that sin be punished if the offender is to go free. The interests of the
divine government are secured as a first subordinate result of this satisfac
tion to God himself, of whose nature the government is an expression ;
whUe, as a second subordinate result, provision is made for the needs of
human nature, — on the one hand the need of an objective satisfaction to
its ethical demand of punishment for sin, and on the other the need of a
manifestation of divine love and mercy that wiU affect the heart and move
it to repentance.
Secondly, — the Atonement as related to Humanity in Christ.
The Ethical Theory of the atonement holds that Christ stands in such
relation to humanity, that what God's holiness demands Christ is under
obhgation to pay, longs to pay, inevitably does pay, and pays so fully, in
virtue of his two-fold nature, that every claim of justice is satisfied, and
the sinner who accepts what Christ has done in his behalf is saved.
We have seen how God can justly demand satisfaction ; we now show
how Christ can justly make it ; or, in other words, how the innocent can
justly suffer for the guUty. The solution of the problem lies in Christ's
union with humanity. The first result of that union is obhgation to suffer
for men ; since, being one with the race, Christ had a share in the respon
sibUity of the race to the law and the justice of God. In him humanity
was created ; at every stage of its existence humanity was upheld by his
power ; as the immanent God he was the hfe of the race and of every
member of it. Christ's sharing of man's hfe justly and inevitably sub
jected him to man's exposures and liabilities, and especiaUy to God's
condemnation on account of sin.
Christ's share in the responsibUity of the race to the law and justice of
God was not destroyed by his incarnation, nor by his purification in the
womb of the virgin. In virtue of the organic unity of the race, each mem
ber of the race since Adam has been born into the same state into which
Adam feU. The consequences of Adam's sin, both to himself and to his
posterity, are : ( 1 ) depravity, or the corruption of human nature ; ( 2 )
guUt, or obhgation to make satisfaction for sin to the divine holiness ;
( 3 ) penalty, or actual endurance of loss or suffering visited by that hoh
ness upon the guUty.

202 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
If Christ had been born into the world by ordinary generation, he too
would have had depravity, guUt, penalty. But he was not so born. In the
womb of the Vhgin, the human nature which he took was purged from its
depravity. But this purging away of depravity did not take away guUt, or
penalty. There was stUl left the just exposure to the penalty of violated
law. Although Christ's nature was purified, his obligation to suffer yet
remained. He might have declined to join himself to humanity, and then
he need not have suffered. He might have sundered his connection with
the race, and then he need not have suffered. But once born of the Vhgin,
once possessed of the human nature that was under the curse, he was bound
to suffer. The whole mass and weight of God's displeasure against the race
feU on him, when once he became a member of the race.
Notice, however, that this guUt which Christ took upon himself by his
union with humanity was : ( 1 ) not the guUt of personal sin — such guUt
as belongs to every adult member of the race ; ( 2 ) not even the guUt of
inherited depravity — such guUt as belongs to infants, and to those who
have not come to moral consciousness ; but ( 3 ) solely the guUt of Adam's
sin, which belongs, prior to personal transgression, and apart from inherited
depravity, to every member of the race who has derived his life from Adam.
This original sin and inherited guUt, but without the depravity that ordina
rily accompanies them, Christ takes, and so takes away. He can justly
bear penalty, because he inherits guUt. And since this guilt is not his per
sonal guUt, but the guilt of that one sin in which "all sinned " — the guUt
of the common transgression of the race in Adam, the guilt of the root-sin
from which aU other sins have sprung — he who is personaUy pure can
vicariously bear the penalty due to the sin of all
If it be asked whether this is not simply a suffering for his own sin, or
rather for his own share of the sin of the race, we reply that his own share
in the sin of the race is not the sole reason why he suffers ; it furnishes
only the subjective reason and ground for the proper laying upon him of
the sin of aU. Christ's union with the race in his incarnation is only the
outward and visible expression of a prior union with the race which began
when he created the race. As "in him were aU things created," and as
"in him aU things consist," or hold together (Col, 1 : 16, 17), it foUows
that he who is the hfe of humanity must, though personaUy pure, be
involved in responsibility for aU human sin, and "it was necessary that the
Christ should suffer " ( Acts 17 : 3 ). This suffering was an enduring of the
reaction of the divine holiness against sin and so was a bearing of penalty
( Is. 53 : 6 ; Gal. 3 : 13 ), but it was also the voluntary execution of a plan
that antedated creation ( PhU. 2 : 6, 7 ), and Christ's sacrifice in time showed
what had been in the heart of God from eternity ( Heb. 9 : 14 ; Rev. 13 : 8 ).
The Atonement, then, on the part of God, has its ground (1) in the
hohness of God, which must visit sin with condemnation, even though this
condemnation brings death to his Son ; and (2 ) in the love of God, which
itself provides the sacrifice, by suffering in and with his Son for the sins of
men, but through that suffering opening a way and means of salvation.
The Atonement, on the part of man, is accomphshed through ( 1 ) the
solidarity of the race ; of which ( 2 ) Christ is the life, and so its repre-

ETHICAL THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT. 203
sentative and surety; (3) justly yet voluntarUy bearing its guilt and
shame and condemnation as his own.
Christ therefore, as incarnate, rather revealed the atonement than made
it. The historical work of atonement was finished upon the Cross, but
that historical work only revealed to men the atonement made both before
and since by the extra-mundane Logos. The eternal Love of God suffer
ing the necessary reaction of his own Holiness against the sin of his
creatures and with a view to their salvation — this is the essence of the
Atonement. In favor of the Substitutionary or Ethical view of the atonement we may
urge the foUowing considerations :
(a) It rests upon correct philosophical principles with regard to the
nature of wiU, law, sin, penalty, righteousness.
( 6 ) It combines in itself all the valuable elements in the theories before
mentioned, while it avoids theh inconsistencies, by showing the deeper
principle upon which each of these elements is based.
( c ) It most fully meets the requirements of Scripture, by holding that
the necessity of the atonement is absolute, since it rests upon the demands
of immanent holiness, the fundamental attribute of God.
( d) It shows most satisfactorfly how the demands of hohness are met ;
namely, by the propitiatory offering of one who is personally pure, but
who by union with the human race has inherited its guilt and penalty.
( e ) It furnishes the only proper explanation of the sacrificial language
of the New Testament, and of the sacrificial rites of the Old, considered as
prophetic of Christ's atoning work
(/) It alone gives proper place to the death of Christ as the central
feature of his work, — set forth in the ordinances, and of chief power in
Christian experience.
(g) It gives us the only means of understanding the sufferings of Christ
in the garden and on the cross, or of reconciling them with the divine
justice. ( h ) As no other theory does, this view satisfies the ethical demand of
human nature ; pacifies the convicted conscience ; assures the sinner that
he may find instant salvation in Christ ; and so makes possible a new hfe
of holiness, whUe at the same time it furnishes the highest incentives to
such a life.
D. Objections to the Ethical Theory of the Atonement.
( a ) That a God who does not pardon sin without atonement must lack
either omnipotence or love. — We answer, on the one hand, that God's
omnipotence is the revelation of his nature, and not a matter of arbitrary
wUl ; and, on the other hand, that God's love is ever exercised consistently
with his fundamental attribute of hohness, so that while hohness demands
the sacrifice, love provides it. Mercy is shown, not by tramphng upon
the claims of justice, but by vicariously satisfying them.

204 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
(6) That satisfaction and forgiveness are mutuaUy exclusive. — We
answer that, since it is not a thhd party, but the Judge himself, who makes
satisfaction to his own violated hohness, forgiveness is stiU optional, and
may be offered upon terms agreeable to himself. Christ's sacrifice is not
a pecuniary, but a penal, satisfaction. The objection is valid against the
merely commercial view of the atonement, not against the ethical view of it.
(c ) That there can be no real propitiation, since the judge and the sacri
fice are one. — We answer that this objection ignores the existence of per
sonal relations within the divine nature, and the fact that the God-man is
distinguishable from God. The satisfaction is grounded in the distinction
of persons in the Godhead ; while the love in which it originates belongs
to the unity of the divine essence.
( d ) That the suffering of the innocent for the guilty is not an execution
of justice, but an act of manifest injustice. — We answer, that this is true
only upon the supposition that the Son bears the penalty of our sins, not
voluntarUy, but compulsorUy ; or upon the supposition that one who is
personaUy innocent can in no way become involved in the guilt and penalty
of others, — both of them hypotheses contrary to Scripture and to fact.
( e ) That there can be no transfer of punishment or merit, since these
are personal. — We answer that the idea of representation and suretyship
is common in human society and government ; and that such representa
tion and suretyship are inevitable, wherever there is community of life
between the innocent and the guilty. When Christ took our nature, he
could not do otherwise than take our responsibilities also.
(/) That remorse, as a part of the penalty of sin, could not have been
suffered by Christ. — We answer, on the one hand, that it may not be essen
tial to the idea of penalty that Christ should have borne the identical
pangs which the lost would have endured ; and, on the other hand, that
we do not know how completely a perfectly holy being, possessed of super
human knowledge and love, might have felt even the pangs of remorse for
the condition of that humanity of which he was the central conscience and
heart. (g) That the sufferings of Christ, as finite in time, do not constitute a
satisfaction to the infinite demands of the law. — We answer that the infi
nite dignity of the sufferer constitutes his sufferings a full equivalent, in
the eye of infinite justice. Substitution excludes identity of suffering ; it
does not exclude equivalence. Since justice aims its penalties not so much
at the person as at the sin, it may admit equivalent suffering, when this is
endured in the very nature that has sinned.
(A) That if Christ's passive obedience made satisfaction to the divine
justice, then his active obedience was superfluous. — We answer that the
active obedience and the passive obedience are inseparable. The latter is
essential to the former ; and both are needed to secure for the sinner, on
the one hand, pardon, and, on the other hand, that which goes beyond
pardon, namely, restoration to the divine favor. The objection holds only
against a superficial and external view of the atonement.

EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT. 205
(i) That the doctrine is immoral in its practical tendencies, since
Christ's obedience takes the place of ours, and renders ours unnecessary. —
We answer that the objection ignores not only the method by which the
benefits of the atonement are appropriated, namely, repentance and faith,
but also the regenerating and sanctifying power bestowed upon aU who
beheve. Faith in the atonement does not induce license, but "works by
love " ( Gal. 5:6) and " cleanses the heart" (Acts 15 : 9).
(j ) That if the atonement requhes faith as its complement, then it does
not in itself furnish a complete satisfaction to God's justice. — We answer
that faith is not the ground of our acceptance with God, as the atonement
is, and so is not a work at all ; faith is only the medium of appropriation.
We are saved not by faith, or on account of faith, but only through faith.
It is not faith, but the atonement which faith accepts, that satisfies the
justice of God.
E. The Extent of the Atonement.
The Scriptures represent the atonement as having been made for aU men,
and as sufficient for the salvation of aU. Not the atonement therefore is
hmited, but the application of the atonement through the work of the
Holy Sphit.
Upon this principle of a universal atonement, but a special apphcation
of it to the elect, we must interpret such passages as Eph. 1 : 4, 7 ; 2 Tim.
1 : 9, 10 ; John 17 : 9, 20, 24 — asserting a special efficacy of the atone
ment in the case of the elect ; and also such passages as 2 Pet. 2 : 1 ; 1 John
2:2; Tim. 2 : 6 ; 4 : 10 ; Tit. 2 : 11— asserting that the death of Christ
is for all.
If it be asked in what sense Christ is the Savior of aU men, we reply :
( a ) That the atonement of Christ secures for aU men a delay in the
execution of the sentence against sin, and a space for repentance, together
with a continuance of the common blessings of hfe which have been for
feited by transgression.
( b ) That the atonement of Christ has made objective provision for the
salvation of all, by removing from the divine mind every obstacle to the
pardon and restoration of sinners, except theh wilful opposition to God
and refusal to turn to him.
< c ) That the atonement of Christ has procured for aU men the powerful
incentives to repentance presented in the Cross, and the combined agency
of the Christian church and of the Holy Spirit, by which these incentives
are brought to bear upon them.
Christ is specially the Savior of those who believe, in that he exerts a
special power of his Spirit to procure their acceptance of his salvation.
This is not, however, a part of his work of atonement ; it is the apphcation
of the atonement, and as such is hereafter to be considered.
2. Christ's Intercessory Work.
The Priesthood of Christ does not cease with his work of atonement, but
continues forever. In the presence of God he fulfils the second office of
the priest, namely that of intercession.

206 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
A. Nature of Christ's Intercession. — This is not to be conceived of
either as an external and vocal petitioning, nor as a mere figure of speech
for the natural and continuous influence of his sacrifice ; but rather as a
special activity of Christ in securing, upon the ground of that sacrifice,
whatever of blessing comes to men, whether that blessing be temporal or
spiritual. B. Objects of Christ's Intercession. — We may distinguish (a) that
general intercession which secures to aU men certain temporal benefits of
his atoning work, and ( b ) that special intercession which secures the
divine acceptance of the persons of behevers and the divine bestowment
of aU gifts needful for their salvation.
C. Relation of Christ's Intercession to that of the Holy Sphit. — The
Holy Sphit is an advocate within us, teaching us how to pray as we ought;
Christ is an advocate in heaven, securing from the Father the answer of
our prayers. Thus the work of Christ and of the Holy Sphit are com
plements to each other, and parts of one whole.
D. Relation of Christ's Intercession to that of saints. — AU true inter
cession is either directly or indirectly the intercession of Christ. Chris
tians are organs of Christ's Spirit. To suppose Christ in us to offer prayer
to one of his saints, instead of directly to the Father, is to blaspheme
Christ, and utterly misconceive the nature of prayer.
HI. The Kingly Office of Christ.
This is to be distinguished from the sovereignty which Christ originaUy
possessed in virtue of his divine nature. Christ's kingship is the sover
eignty of the divine-human Redeemer, which belonged to him of right
from the moment of his birth, but which was f uUy exercised only from the
time of his entrance upon the state of exaltation. By virtue of this kingly
office, Christ rules all things in heaven and earth, for the glory of God and
the execution of God's purpose of salvation.
(a) With respect to the universe at large, Christ's kingdom is a king
dom of power ; he upholds, governs, and judges the world.
( b ) With respect to his militant church, it is a kingdom of grace ; he
founds, legislates for, administers, defends, and augments his church on
earth. ( c ) With respect to his church triumphant, it is a kingdom of glory ;
he rewards his redeemed people with the full revelation of himself, upon
the completion of his kingdom in the resurrection and the judgment.

CHAPTER II.

THE RECONCILIATION OF MAN TO GOD, OR THE
APPLICATION OF REDEMPTION THROUGH
THE WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

SECTION I.— THE APPLICATION OF CHRIST'S REDEMPTION
IN ITS PREPARATION.
( a ) In this Section we treat of Election and Calling ; Section Second
being devoted to the Apphcation of Christ's Redemption in its Actual
Beginning, — namely, in Union with Christ, Regeneration, Conversion, and
Justification ; while Section Third has for its subject the Application of
Christ's Redemption in its Continuation, — namely, in Sanctification and
Perseverance. ( 6 ) In treating Election and Calling as applications of Christ's redemp
tion, we imply that they are, in God's decree, logicaUy subsequent to that
redemption. In this we hold the Sublapsarian view, as distinguished from
the Supralapsarianism of Beza and other hyper-Calvinists, which regarded
the decree of individual salvation as preceding, in the order of thought, the
decree to permit the FaU. In this latter scheme, the order of decrees is
as foUows : 1. the decree to save certain, and to reprobate others ; 2. the
decree to create both those who are to be saved and those who are to be
reprobated ; 3. the decree to permit both the former and the latter to fall ;
4. the decree to provide salvation only for the former, that is, for the elect.
( c ) But the Scriptures teach that men as sinners, and not men irrespec
tive of theh sins, are the objects of God's saving grace in Christ ( John 15 :
9 ; Rom. 11 : 5, 7 ; Eph. 1 : 4-6 ; 1 Pet. 1:2). Condemnation, moreover,
is an act, not of sovereignty, but of justice, and is grounded in the guUt of
the condemned ( Rom. 2 : 6-11 ; 2 Thess. 1 : 5-10 ). The true order of the
decrees is therefore as foUows : 1. the decree to create ; 2. the decree to
permit the FaU ; 3. the decree to provide a salvation in Christ sufficient for
the needs of aU ; 4. the decree to secure the actual acceptance of this sal
vation on the part of some, — or, in other words, the decree of Election.
( d ) Those Sublapsarians who hold to the Anselmic view of a limited
Atonement, make the decrees 3. and 4., just mentioned, exchange places, —
the decree of election thus preceding the decree to provide redemption.
The Scriptural reasons for preferring the order here given have been
aheady indicated in our treatment of the extent of the Atonement (page
205). ' 807

208 CHRISTOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION.
I. Election.
Election is that eternal act of God, by which in his sovereign pleasure,
and on account of no foreseen merit in them, he chooses certain out of the
number of sinful men to be the recipients of the special grace of his Spirit,
and so to be made voluntary partakers of Christ's salvation.
1. Proof of the Doctrine of Election.
A. From Scripture.
We here adopt the words of Dr. Hovey : "The Scriptures forbid us to
find the reasons for election in the moral action of man before the new
birth, and refer us merely to the sovereign wUl and mercy of God ; that is,
they teach the doctrine of personal election." Before advancing to the
proof of the doctrine itself, we may claim Scriptural warrant for three pre
liminary statements (which we also quote from Dr. Hovey), namely :
First, that "God has a sovereign right to bestow more grace upon one
subject than upon another, — grace being unmerited favor to sinners."
Secondly, that " God has been pleased to exercise this right in dealing
with men."
Thirdly, that "God has some other reason than that of saving as many as
possible for the way in which he distributes his grace. "
The Scripture passages which directly or indirectly support the doctrine
of a particular election of individual men to salvation may be arranged as
foUows :
( a ) Dhect statements of God's purpose to save certain individuals :
( 6 ) In connection with the declaration of God's foreknowledge of these
persons, or choice to make them objects of his special attention and care ;
( c ) With assertions that this choice is matter of grace, or unmerited
favor, bestowed in eternity past :
( d) That the Father has given certain persons to the Son, to be his
peculiar possession :
( e ) That the fact of believers being united thus to Christ is due whoUy
to God :
(/) That those who are written in the Lamb's book of life, and they
only, shaU be saved :
{g) That these are aUotted, as disciples, to certain of God's servants :
( h ) Are made the recipients of a special caU of God :
( i ) Are born into God's kingdom, not by virtue of man's will, but of
God's wUl:
(j) Receiving repentance, as the gift of God :
( k ) Faith, as the gift of God :
( I ) Holiness and good works, as the gift of God.
These passages furnish an abundant and conclusive refutation, on the
one hand, of the Lutheran view that election is simply God's determina-

ELECTION. 209
tion from eternity to provide an objective salvation for universal humanity;
and, on the other hand, of the Arminian view that election is God's deter
mination from eternity to save certain individuals upon the ground of
their foreseen faith.
B. From Reason.
( a ) What God -does, he has eternaUy purposed to do. Since he bestows
special regenerating grace on some, he must have eternaUy purposed to
bestow it, — in other words, must have chosen them to eternal hfe. Thus
the doctrine of election is only a special apphcation of the doctrine of
decrees. ( 6 ) This purpose cannot be conditioned upon any merit or faith of
those who are chosen, since there is no .such merit, — faith itself being
God's gift and foreordained by him. Since man's faith is foreseen only
as the result of God's work of grace, election proceeds rather upon fore
seen unbelief. Faith, as the effect of election, cannot at the same time be
the cause of election.
( c ) The depravity of the human wfll is such that, without this decree to
bestow special divine influences upon some, aU, without exception, would
have rejected Christ's salvation after it was offered to them ; and so aU,
without exception, must have perished. Election, therefore, may be
viewed as a necessary consequence of God's decree to provide an objective
redemption, if that redemption is to have any subjective result in human
salvation. (d) The doctrine of election becomes more acceptable to reason when
we remember : first, that God's decree is eternal, and in a certain sense is
contemporaneous with man's belief in Christ ; secondly, that God's decree
to create involves the decree of aU that in the exercise of man's freedom
wiU f oUow ; thirdly, that God's decree is the decree of him who is aU in
aU, so that our willing and doing is at the same time the working of him
who decrees our willing and doing. The whole question turns upon the
initiative in human salvation : if this belongs to God, then in spite of dif
ficulties we must accept the doctrine of election.
2. Objections to the Doctrine of Election.
(a) It is unjust to those who are not included in this purpose of salva
tion. — Answer : Election deals, not simply with creatures, but with sinful,
guilty, and condemned creatures. That any should be saved, is matter of
pure grace, and those who are not included in this purpose of salvation
suffer only the due reward of theh deeds. There is, therefore, no injustice
in God's election. We may better praise God that he saves any, than charge
him with injustice because he saves so few.
( b ) It represents God as partial in his deahngs aud a respecter of per
sons. — Answer : Since there is nothing in men that determines God's choice
of one rather than another, the objection is invalid. It would equaUy apply
to God's selection of certain nations, as Israel, and certain individuals, as
Cyrus, to be recipients of special temporal gifts. If God is not to be

210 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
regarded as partial in not providing a salvation for faUen angels, he cannot
be regarded as partial in not providing regenerating influences of his Sphit
for the whole race of faUen men.
(c) It represents God as arbitrary. — Answer: It represents God, not
as arbitrary, but as exercising the free choice of a wise and sovereign will, in
ways and for reasons which are inscrutable to us. To deny the possibility
of such a choice is to deny God's personahty. To deny that God has
reasons for his choice is to deny his wisdom. The doctrine of election finds
these reasons, not in men, but in God.
( d ) It tends to immorality, by representing men's salvation as inde
pendent of theh own obedience. — Answer : The objection ignores the fact
that the salvation of behevers is ordained only in connection with theh
regeneration and sanctification, as means ; and that the certainty of final
triumph is the strongest incentive to strenuous conflict with sin.
(e) It inspires pride in those who think themselves elect. — Answer:
This is possible only in the case of those who pervert the doctrine. On
the contrary, its proper influence is to humble men. Those who exalt
themselves above others, upon the ground that they are special favorites of
God, have reason to question theh election.
(/) It discourages effort for the salvation of the impenitent, whether on
their own part or on the part of others. — Answer : Since it is a secret
decree, it cannot hinder or discourage such effort. On the other hand, it
is a ground of encouragement, and so a stimulus to effort ; for, without
election, it is certain that all would be lost ( cf. Acts 18 : 10 ). While it
humbles the sinner, so that he is willing to cry for mercy, it encourages
him also by showing him that some wfll be saved, and ( since election and
faith are inseparably connected) that he wUl be saved, if he wfll only
beheve. While it makes the Christian feel entirely dependent on God's
power, in his efforts for the impenitent, it leads him to say with Paul that
he "endures aU things for the elects' sake, that they also may attain the
salvation that is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory " ( 2 Tim. 2 : 10 ).
( g ) The decree of election implies a decree of reprobation. — Answer :
The decree of reprobation is not a positive decree, hke that of election,
but a permissive decree to leave the sinner to his self-chosen rebellion and
its natural consequences of punishment.
H. Calling.
Calling is that act of God by which men are invited to accept, by faith,
the salvation provided by Christ. — The Scriptures distinguish between :
( a ) The general, or external, call to aU men through God's providence,
word, and Sphit.
(6) The special, efficacious call of the Holy Sphit to the elect.
Two questions only need special consideration :
A. Is God's general caU sincere ?
This is denied, upon the ground that such sincerity is incompatible,
first, with the inability of the sinner to obey ; and secondly, with the

UNION WITH CHRIST. 211
design of God to bestow only upon the elect the special grace without
which they wfll not obey.
(a) To the first objection we reply that, since this inabUity is not a
physical but a moral inabUity, consisting Bimply in the settled perversity
of an evU wUl, there can be no insincerity in offering salvation to aU, espe
ciaUy when the offer is in itself a proper motive to obedience.
( 6 ) To the second, we reply that the objection, if true, would equaUy
hold against God's foreknowledge. The sincerity of God's general caU is
no more inconsistent with his determination that some shall be permitted
to reject it, than it is with foreknowledge that some wfll reject it.
B. Is God's special call irresistible ?
We prefer to say that this special call is efficacious, — that is, that it infal
libly accomplishes its purpose of leading the sinner to the acceptance of
salvation. This imphes two things :
( a ) That the operation of God is not an outward constraint upon the
human wUl, but that it accords with the laws of our mental constitution.
We reject the term 'irresistible,' as implying a coercion and compulsion
which is foreign to the nature of God's working in the soul.
( 6 ) That the operation of God is the originating cause of that new dis
position of the affections, and that new activity of the wiU, by which the
sinner accepts Christ. The cause is not in the response of the wfll to the
presentation of motives by God, nor in any mere cooperation of the will of
man with the will of God, but is an almighty act of God in the wfll of man,
by which its freedom to choose God as its end is restored and rightly exer
cised ( John 1 : 12, 13). For further discussion of the subject, see, in the
next section, the remarks on Regeneration, with which this efficacious call
is identical.

SECTION II. — THE APPLICATION OF CHRIST'S REDEMPTION
IN ITS ACTUAL BEGINNING
Under this head we treat of Union with Christ, Regeneration, Conversion
(embracing Repentance and Faith), and Justification. Much confusion
and error have arisen from conceiving these as occurring in chronological
order. The order is logical, not chronological. As it is only " in Christ "
that man is " a new creature " (2 Cor. 5 : 17) oris "justified" (Acts 13 :39),
union with Christ logically precedes both regeneration and justification ;
and yet, chronologicaUy, the moment of our union with Christ is also the
moment when we are regenerated and justified. So, too, regeneration and
conversion are but the divine and human sides or aspects of the same fact,
although regeneration has logical precedence, and man turns only as God
turns him.
I. Union with Christ.
The Scriptures declare that, through the operation of God, there is con
stituted a union of the soul with Christ different in kind from God's natural

212 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
and providential concursus with aU sphits, as weU as from all unions of
mere association or sympathy, moral likeness, or moral influence, — a union
of hfe, in which the human spirit, while then most truly possessing its own
individuality and personal distinctness, is interpenetrated and energized by
the Spirit of Christ, is made inscrutably but indissolubly one with him,
and so becomes a member and partaker of that regenerated, beheving, and
justified humanity of which he is the head.
1. Scripture Representations of this Union.
A. Figurative teaching. It is Ulustrated :
( a ) From the union of a buUding and its foundation.
( 6 ) From the union between husband and wife.
( c ) From the union between the vine and its branches.
( d ) From the union between the members and the head of the body.
( e ) From the union of the race with the source of its hfe in Adam.
B. Dhect statements.
( a ) The behever is said to be in Christ.
( 6 ) Christ is said to be in the behever.
( c ) The Father and the Son dweU in the behever.
( d ) The behever has life by partaking of Christ, as Christ has life by
partaking of the Father.
( e ) AU believers are one in Christ.
(/) The believer is made partaker of the divine nature.
(g ) The behever is made one spirit with the Lord.
2. Nature of this Union.
We have here to do not only with a fact of life, but with a unique rela
tion between the finite and the infinite. Our descriptions must therefore
be inadequate. Yet in many respects we know what this union is not ; in
certain respects we can positively characterize it.
A. Negatively. — It is not :
( a ) A merely natural union, hke that of God with aU human spirits, —
as held by rationahsts.
( 6 ) A merely moral union, or union of love and sympathy, hke that
between teacher and scholar, friend and friend, — as held by Socinians
and Arminians.
( c ) A union of essence, which destroys the distinct personahty and sub
sistence of either Christ or the human spirit, — as held by many of the
mystics. ( d ) A union mediated and conditioned by participation of the sacra
ments of the church, — as held by Romanists, Lutherans, and High-Church
Episcopalians.

UNION WITH CHRIST. 213
B. Positively. — It is :
(a) An organic union, — in which we become members of Christ and
partakers of his humanity.
( b ) A vital union, — in which Christ's hfe becomes the dominating prin
ciple within us.
( c ) A spiritual union, — that is, a union whose source and author is the
Holy Sphit.
( d ) An indissoluble union, — that is, a union which, consistently with
Christ's promise and grace, can never be dissolved.
( e ) An inscrutable union, — mystical, however, only in the sense of sin-
passing in its intimacy and value any other union of souls which we know.
3. Consequences of this Union as respects the Believer.
We have seen that Christ's union with humanity, at the incarnation,
involved him in aU the legal liabilities of the race to which he united him
self, and enabled him so to assume the penalty of its sin as to make for all
men a full satisfaction to the divine justice, and to remove aU external
obstacles to man's return to God. An internal obstacle, however, still
remains — the evU affections and wfll, and the consequent guUt, of the
individual soul This last obstacle also Christ removes, in the case of all
his people, by uniting himself to them in a closer and more perfect manner
than that in which he is united to humanity at large. As Christ's union
with the race secures the objective reconciliation- of the race to God, so
Christ's union with behevers secures the subjective reconciliation of
behevers to God.
The consequences of union with Christ may be summarily stated as
follows :
( a ) Union with Christ involves a change in the dominant affection of
the soul. Christ's entrance into the soul makes it a new creature, in the
sense that the ruling disposition, which before was sinful, now becomes
holy. This change we call Regeneration.
( 6 ) Union with Christ involves a new exercise of the soul's powers in
repentance and faith ; faith, indeed, is the act of the soul by which, under
the operation of God, Christ is-received. This new exercise of the soul's
powers we call Conversion (Repentance and Faith). It is the obverse or
human side of Regeneration.
( c ) Union with Christ gives to the behever the legal standing and rights
of Christ. As Christ's union with the race involves atonement, so the
believer's union with Christ involves Justification. The behever is enti
tled to take for his own aU that Christ is, and all that Christ has done ; and
this because he has within him that new life of humanity which suffered in
Christ's death and rose from the grave in Christ's resurrection, — in other
words, because he is virtually one person with the Redeemer. In Christ
the behever is prophet, priest, and king.

214 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
(d) Union with Christ secures to the behever the continuously trans
forming, assimUating power of Christ's life, — first, for the soul ; secondly,
for the body, — consecrating it in the present, and in the future raising it
up in the hkeness of Christ's glorified body. This continuous influence,
so far as it is exerted in the present hfe, we caU Sanctification, the human
side or aspect of which is Perseverance.
(e) Union with Christ brings about a feUowship of Christ with the
behever, — Christ takes part in aU the labors, temptations, and sufferings
of his people ; a feUowship of the behever with Christ, — so that Christ's
whole experience on earth is in some measure reproduced in him ; a feUow
ship of all believers with one another, — furnishing a basis for the spiritual
unity of Christ's people on earth, and for the eternal communion of heaven.
The doctrine of Union with Christ is therefore the indispensable prepara
tion for Ecclesiology, and for Eschatology.
H. Regeneration.
Regeneration is that act of God by which the governing disposition of
the soul is made holy, and by which, through the truth as a means, the first
holy exercise of this disposition is secured.
Regeneration, or the new birth, is the divine side of that change of heart
which, viewed from the human side, we caU conversion. It is God's turn
ing the soul to himself,. — conversion being the soul's turning itself to God,
of which God's turning it is both the accompaniment and cause. It wfll be
observed from the above definition, that there are two aspects of regener
ation, in the first of which the soul is passive, in the second of which the
soul is active. God changes the governing disposition, — in this change the
soul is simply acted upon. God secures the initial exercise of this disposi
tion in view of the truth, — in this change the soul itself acts. Yet these
two parts of God's operation are simultaneous. At the same moment that
he makes the soul sensitive, he pours in the hght of his truth and induces
the exercise of the holy disposition he has imparted.
1. Scripture Representations.
(a) Regeneration is a change indispensable to the salvation of the sinner.
( 6 ) It is a change in the inmost principle of hfe.
(c ) It is a change in the heart, or governing disposition.
( d ) It is a change in the moral relations of the soul.
( e ) It is a change wrought in connection with the use of truth as a
means. (/) It is a change instantaneous, secretly wrought, and known only in
its results.
(g ) It is a change wrought by God.
( h ) It is a change accomphshed through the union of the soul with
Christ.

REGENERATION. 215
2. Necessity of Regeneration.
That all men without exception need to be changed in moral character, is
manifest, not only from Scripture passages aheady cited, but from the fol
lowing rational considerations :
( a ) Holiness, or conformity to the fundamental moral attribute of God,
is the indispensable condition of securing the divine favor, of attaining
peace of conscience, and of preparing the soul for the associations and
employments of the blest.
( 6 ) The condition of universal humanity as by nature depraved, and,
when arrived at moral consciousness, as guilty of actual transgression, is
precisely the opposite of that hohness without which the soul cannot exist
in normal relation to God, to self, or to holy beings.
( c ) A radical internal change is therefore requisite in every human soul
— a change in that which constitutes its character. Holiness cannot be
attained, as the pantheist claims, by a merely natural growth or develop
ment, since man's natural tendencies are wholly in the direction of selfish
ness. There must be a reversal of his inmost dispositions and principles
of action, if he is to see the kingdom of God.
3. The Efficient Cause of Regeneration.
Three views only need be considered, — aU others are modifications of
these. The first view puts the efficient cause of regeneration in the human
wiU ; the second, in the truth considered as a system of motives ; the thhd,
in the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit.
A. The human wfll, as the efficient cause of regeneration.
This view takes two forms, according as the wiU is regarded as acting
apart from, or in conjunction with, special influences of the truth apphed
by God. Pelagians hold the former ; Arminians the latter.
( a ) To the Pelagian view, that regeneration is solely the act of man, and
is identical with self-reformation, we object that the sinner's depravity,
since it consists in a fixed state of the affections which determines the
settled character of the vohtions, amounts to a moral inability. Without
a renewal of the affections from which aU moral action springs, man wfll
not choose holiness nor accept salvation.
( 6 ) To the Arminian view, that regeneration is the act of man, cooper
ating with divine influences apphed through the truth (synergistic the
ory ), we object that no beginning of hohness is in this way conceivable.
For, so long as man's selfish and perverse affections are unchanged, no
choosing God is possible but such as proceeds from supreme desire for
one's own interest and happiness. But the man thus supremely bent on
self -gratification cannot see in God, or his service, anything productive of
happiness ; or, if he could see in them anything of advantage, his choice
of God and his service from such a motive would not be a holy choice, and
therefore could not be a beginning of holiness.

216 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
B. The truth, as the efficient cause of regeneration.
According to this view, the truth as a system of motives is the direct and
immediate cause of the change from unhohness to holiness. This view is
objectionable for two reasons :
( a ) It erroneously regards motives as whoUy external to the mind that
is influenced by them. This is to conceive of them as mechanically con
straining the wUl, and is indistinguishable from necessitarianism. On the
contrary, motives are compounded of external presentations and internal
dispositions. It is the soul's affections which render certain suggestions
attractive and others repugnant to us. In brief, the heart makes the motive.
( b ) Only as truth is loved, therefore, can it be a motive to holiness.
But we have seen that the aversion of the sinner to God is such that the
truth is hated instead of loved, and a thing that is hated, is hated more
intensely, the more distinctly it is seen. Hence no mere power of the
truth can be regarded as the efficient cause of regeneration. The contrary
view imphes that it is not the truth which the sinner hates, but rather some
element of error which is mingled with it.
C. The immediate agency of the Holy Sphit, as the efficient cause of
regeneration. In ascribing to the Holy Spirit the authorship of regeneration, we do
not affirm that the divine Sphit accomplishes his work without any accom
panying instrumentality. We simply assert that the power which regen
erates is the power of God, and that although conjoined with the use of
means, there is a direct operation of this power upon the sinner's heart
which changes its moral character. We add two remarks by way of further
explanation :
( a ) The Scriptural assertions of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and
of his mighty power in the soul forbid us to regard the divine Spirit in
regeneration as coming in contact, not with the soul, but only with the
truth. The phrases, "to energize the truth," "to intensify the truth,"
" to illuminate the truth," have no proper meaning ; since even God cannot
make the truth more true. If any change is wrought, it must be wrought,
not in the truth, but in the soul.
( 6 ) Even if truth could be energized, intensified, Uluminated, there
would stiU be needed a change in the moral disposition, before the soul
could recognize its beauty or be affected by it. No mere increase of hght
can enable a blind man to see ; the disease of the eye must first be cured
before external objects are visible. So God's work in regeneration must
be performed within the soul itself. Over and above all influence of the
truth, there must be a dhect influence of the Holy Sphit upon the heart.
Although wrought in conjunction with the presentation of truth to the
intellect, regeneration differs from moral suasion in being an immediate
act of God.
4. The Instrumentality used in Regeneration.
A. The Roman, Enghsh and Lutheran churches hold that regeneration
is accomplished through the instrumentality of baptism. The Disciples,
or f oUowers of Alexander CampbeU, make regeneration include baptism,

REGENERATION. 217
as well as repentance and faith. To the view that baptism is a means of
regeneration we urge the foUowing objections :
( a ) The Scriptures represent baptism to be not the means but only the
sign of regeneration, and therefore to presuppose and foUow regeneration.
For this reason only behevers — that is, persons giving credible evidence
of being regenerated — were baptized (Acts 8 : 12). Not external baptism,
but the conscientious turning of the soul to God which baptism symbolizes,
saves US (1 Pet. 3:21 — aweidi/aeuc dyadijc knep6T7ipa). Texts hke John
3 : 5, Acts 2 : 38, Col. 2 : 12, Tit. 3 : 5, are to be explained upon the princi
ple that regeneration, the inward change, and baptism, the outward sign
of that change, were regarded as only different sides or aspects of the same
fact, and either side or aspect might therefore be described in terms
derived from the other.
( 6 ) Upon this view, there is a striking incongruity between the nature
of the change to be wrought and the means employed to produce it. The
change is a spiritual one, but the means are physical. It is far more
rational to suppose that, in changing the character of intelligent beings,
God uses means which have relation to theh intelligence. The view we
are considering is part and parcel of a general scheme of mechanical rather
than moral salvation, and is more consistent with a materiahstic than with
a spiritual phUosophy.
B. The Scriptural view is that regeneration, so far as it secures an
activity of man, is accomplished through the instrumentality of the truth.
Although the Holy Sphit does not in any way Uluminate the truth, he
does Uluminate the mind, so that it can perceive the truth. In conjunc
tion with the change of man's inner disposition, there is an appeal to man's
rational nature through the truth. Two inferences may be drawn :
( a ) Man is not wholly passive at the time of his regeneration. He is
passive only with respect to the change of his ruling disposition. With
respect to the exercise of this disposition, he is active. Although the effi
cient power which secures this exercise of the new disposition is the power
of God, yet man is not therefore unconscious, nor is he a mere machine
worked by God's fingers. On the other hand, his whole moral nature
under God's working is alive and active. We reject the "exercise-system,"
which regards God as the direct author of aU man's thoughts, feelings,
and vohtions, not only in its general tenor, but in its special apphcation to
regeneration. ( 6 ) The activity of man's mind in regeneration is activity in view of
the truth. God secures the initial exercise of the new disposition which
he has wrought in man's heart in connection with the use of truth as a
means. Here we perceive the hnk between the efficiency of God and the
activity of man. Only as the sinner's mind is brought into contact with
the truth, does God complete his regenerating work. And as the change
of inward disposition and the initial exercise of it are never, so far as we
know, separated by any interval of time, we can say, in general, that
Christian work is successful only as it commends the truth to every man's
conscience in the sight of God ( 2 Cor. 4:2).

218 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
5. The Nature of the Change wrought in Regeneration.
A. It is a change in which the governing disposition is made holy.
This imphes that :
( a ) It is not a change in the substance of either body or soul. Regen
eration is not a physical change. There is no physical seed or germ
implanted in man's nature. Regeneration does not add to, or subtract
from, the number of man's inteUectual, emotional or voluntary faculties.
But regeneration is the giving of a new direction or tendency to powers
of affection which man possessed before. Man had the faculty of love
before, but his love was supremely set on self. In regeneration the direc
tion of that faculty is changed, and his love is now set supremely upon
God. ( b ) Regeneration involves an enhghtenment of the understanding and
a rectification of the volitions. But it seems most consonant with Scripture
and with a correct psychology to regard these changes as immediate and
necessary consequences of the change of disposition already mentioned,
rather than as the primary and central facts in regeneration. The'taste for
truth logically precedes perception of the truth, and love for God logicaUy
precedes obedience to God; indeed, without love no obedience is possible.
Reverse the lever of affection, and this moral locomotive, without further
change, wiU move away from sin, and toward truth and God.
(c) It is objected, indeed, that we know only of mental substance and of
mental acts, and that the new disposition or state just mentioned, since it
is not an act, must be regarded as a new substance, and so lack aU moral
quahty. But we reply that, besides substance and acts, there are habits,
tendencies, proclivities, some of them native and some of them acquired.
They are voluntary, and have moral character. If we can by repeated
acts originate sinful tendencies, God can surely originate in us holy ten
dencies. Such holy tendencies formed a part of the nature of Adam, as
he came from the hand of God. As the result of the FaU, we are born
with tendencies toward evU for which we are responsible. Regeneration
is a restoration of the original tendencies toward God which were lost by
the FaU. Such holy tendencies ( tastes, dispositions, affections ) are not
only not unmoral — they are the only possible springs of right moral action.
Only in the restoration of them does man become truly free.
B. It is an instantaneous change, in a region of the soul below con
sciousness, and is therefore known only in its results.
( a ) It is an instantaneous change. — Regeneration is not a gradual
work. Although there may be a gradual work of God's providence and
Sphit, preparing the change, and a gradual recognition of it after it has
taken place, there must be an instant of time when, under the influence of
God's Sphit, the disposition of the soul, just before hostile to God, is
changed to love. Any other view assumes an intermediate state of indeci
sion which has no moral character at aU, and confounds regeneration either
with conviction or with sanctification.
( 6 ) This change takes place in the region of the soul below conscious
ness. — It is by no means true that God's work in regeneration is always

CONVERSION. 219
recognized by the subject of it. On the other hand, it is never dhectly
perceived at aU. The working of God in the human soul, since it contra
venes no law of man's being, but rather puts him in the f uU and normal
possession of his own powers, is secret and inscrutable. Although man is
conscious, he is not conscious of God's regenerating agency.
(c) This change, however, is recognized indirectly in its results. — At
the moment of regeneration, the soul is conscious only of the truth and of
its own exercises with reference to it. That God is the author of its new
affection is an inference from the new character of the exercises which it
prompts. The human side or aspect of regeneration is Conversion. This,
and the Sanctification which foUows it ( including the special gifts of the
Holy Spirit ), are the sole evidences in any particular case that regenera
tion is an accomplished fact.
HI. Conversion.
Conversion is that voluntary change in the mind of the sinner, in which
he turns, on the one hand, from sin, and on the other hand, to Christ.
The former or negative element in conversion, namely, the turning from
sin, we denominate repentance. The latter or positive element in conver
sion, namely, the turning to Christ, we denominate faith.
( a ) Conversion is the human side or aspect of that fundamental spirit
ual change which, as viewed from the divine side, we caU regeneration.
It is simply man's turning. The Scriptures recognize the voluntary activ
ity of the human soul in this change as distinctly as they recognize the
causative agency of God. WhUe God turns men to himself ( Ps. 85 : 4 ;
Song 1:4; Jer. 31 : 18 ; Lam. 5 : 21 ), men are exhorted to turn themselves
to God ( Prov. 1 : 23 ; Is. 31 : 6 ; 59 : 20 ; Ez. 14 : 6 ; 18 : 32 ; 33 : 9, 11 ;
Joel 2 : 12-14 ). WhUe God is represented as the author of the new heart
and the new spirit ( Ps. 51 : 10 ; Ez. 11 : 19 ; 36 : 26 ), men are commanded
to make for themselves a new heart and a new spirit ( Ez. 18 : 31 ; 2 Cor.
7 : 1 ; ef. PhiL 2 : 12, 13 ; Eph. 5 : 14).
(6) This twofold method of representation can be explained only when
we remember that man's powers may be interpenetrated and quickened by
the divine, not only without destroying man's freedom, but with the result
of making man for the first time truly free. Since the relation between
the divine and the human activity is not one of chronological succession,
man is never to wait for God's working. If he is ever regenerated, it must
be in and through a movement of his own wiU, in which he turns to God
as unconstrainedly and with as little consciousness of God's operation upon
him, as if no such operation of God were involved in the change. And in
preaching, we are to press upon men the claims of God and theh duty of
immediate submission to Christ, with the certainty that they who do so
submit will subsequently recognize this new and holy activity of their own
wiUs as due to a working within them of divine power.
( c ) From the fact that the word * conversion ' means simply ' a turning,'
every turning of the Christian from sin, subsequent to the first, may, in a
subordinate sense, be denominated a conversion ( Luke 22 : 32 ). Since

220 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
regeneration is not complete sanctification, and the change of governing
disposition is not identical with complete purification of the nature, such
subsequent turnings from sin are necessary consequences and evidences of
the first ( cf. John 13 : 10). But they do not, like the first, imply a change
in the governing disposition, — they are rather new manifestations of a
disposition aheady changed. For this reason, conversion proper, hke the
regeneration of which it is the obverse side, can occur but once. The
phrase ' second conversion, ' even if it does not imply radical misconception
of the nature of conversion, is misleading. We prefer, therefore, to
describe these subsequent experiences, not by the term 'conversion,' but
by such phrases as 'breaking off, forsaking, returning from, neglects or
transgressions,' and 'coming back to Christ, trusting anew in him.' It is
with repentance and faith, as elements in that first and radical change by
which the soul enters upon a state of salvation, that we have now to do.
1. Repentance.
Repentance is that voluntary change in the mind of the sinner ia which
he turns from sin. Being essentiaUy a change of mind, it inv>lves a
change of view, a change of feeling, and a change of purpose. We may
therefore analyze repentance into three constituents, each succeeding term
of which includes and imphes the one preceding :
A. An inteUectual element, — change of view — recognition of sin as
involving personal guUt, defilement, and helplessness (Ps. 51 : 3, 7, 11).
If unaccompanied by the foUowing elements, this recognition may mani
fest itself in fear of punishment, although as yet there is no hatred of sin.
This element is indicated in the Scripture phrase iniyvumg dpapria; (Rom.
3:20; cf. 1:32).
B. An emotional element, — change of feeling — sorrow for sin as com
mitted against goodness and justice, and therefore hateful to God, and
hateful in itself ( Ps. 51 : 1, 2, 10, 14 ). This element of repentance is indi
cated in the Scripture word peraptTiopai. If accompanied by the foUowing
element, it is a TAmn nard Bc6v. If not so accompanied, it is a Mmy tov adapov
= remorse and despair ( Mat. 27 : 3 ; Luke 18 : 23 ; 2 Cor. 7 : 9, 10 ).
C. A voluntary element, — change of purpose — inward turning from
sin and disposition to seek pardon and cleansing ( Ps. 51 : 5, 7, 10 ; Jer.
25 : 5 ). This includes and imphes the two preceding elements, and is
therefore the most important aspect of repentance. It is indicated in the
Scripture term perdvoia (Acts 2 : 38 ; Rom. 2:4).
In broad distinction from the Scriptural doctrine, we find the Romanist
view, which regards the three elements of repentance as the following:
( 1 ) contrition ; ( 2 ) confession ; ( 3 ) satisfaction. Of these, contrition is
the only element properly belonging to repentance ; yet from this contri
tion the Romanist excludes aU sorrow for sin of nature. Confession is con
fession to the priest ; and satisfaction is the sinner's own doing of outward
penance, as a temporal and symbolic submission and reparation to violated
law. This view is false and pernicious, in that it confounds repentance
with its outward fruits, conceives of it as exercised rather toward the church

CONVERSION. 221
than toward God, and regards it as a meritorious ground, instead of a mere
condition, of pardon.
In further explanation of the Scripture representations, we remark :
(a) That repentance, in each and all of its aspects, is whoUy an inward
act, not to be confounded with the change of hfe which proceeds from it.
True repentance is indeed manifested and evidenced by confession of sin
before God ( Luke 18 : 13 ), and by reparation for wrongs done to men
(Luke 19 : 8). But these do not constitute repentance ; they are rather
fruits of repentance. Between ' repentance ' and ' fruit worthy of repent
ance,' Scripture plainly distinguishes (Mat. 3:8).
(6) That repentance is only a negative condition, and not a positive
means of salvation.
This is evident from the fact that repentance is no more than the sinner's
present duty, and can furnish no offset to the claims of the law on account
of past transgression. The truly penitent man feels that his repentance has
no merit. Apart from the positive element of conversion, namely, faith in
Christ, it would be only sorrow for guilt unremoved. This very sorrow,
moreover, is not the mere product of human will, but is the gift of God.
( c ) That true repentance, however, never exists except in conjunction
with faith.
Sorrow for sin, not simply on account of its evil consequences to the
transgressor, but on account of its intrinsic hatefulness as opposed to divine
hohness and love, is practically impossible without some confidence in
God's mercy. It is the Cross which first makes us truly penitent ( cf. John
12 : 32, 33 ). Hence all true preaching of repentance is implicitly a preach
ing of faith (Mat. 3 : 1-12 ; cf. Acts 19 : 4), and repentance toward God
involves faith in the Lord Jesus Christ (Acts 20 : 21 ; Luke 15 : 10, 24;
19:8,9; cf. GaL 3:7).
(d) That, conversely, wherever there is true faith, there is true repent
ance also.
Since repentance and faith are but different sides or aspects of the same
act of turning, faith is as inseparable from repentance as repentance is from
faith. That must be an unreal faith where there is no repentance, just as
that must be an unreal repentance where there is no faith. Yet because
the one aspect of his change is more prominent in the mind of the convert
than the other, we are not hastUy to conclude that the other is absent.
Only that degree of conviction of sin is essential to salvation, which carries
with it a forsaking of sin and a trustful surrender to Christ.
2. Faith.
Faith is that voluntary change in the mind of the sinner in which he
turns to Christ. Being essentially a change of mind, it involves a change
of view, a change of feehng, and a change of purpose. We may therefore
analyze faitb also into three constituents, each succeeding term of which
includes and imphes the preceding :
A. An inteUectual element (notitia, credere Deum),— recognition of
the truth of God's revelation, or of the objective reahty of the salvation

222 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
provided by Christ. This includes not only a historical behef in the facts
of the Scripture, but an inteUectual behef in the doctrine taught therein
as to man's sinfulness and dependence upon Christ.
B. An emotional element ( assensus, credere Deo ), — assent to the
revelation of God's power and grace in Jesus Christ, as applicable to the
present needs of the soul. Those in whom this awakening of the sensibili
ties is unaccompanied by the fundamental decision of the wUl, which con
stitutes the next element of faith, may seem to themselves,' and for a time
may appear to others, to have accepted Christ.
Saving faith, however, includes also :
C. A voluntary element (fiducia, credere in Deum ), — trust in Christ
as Lord and Savior ; or, in other words — to distinguish its two aspects :
(a) Surrender of the soul, as guUty and defiled, to Christ's governance.
( b ) Reception and appropriation of Christ, as the source of pardon and
spiritual life.
The passages already referred to refute the view of the Romanist, that
saving faith is simply implicit assent to the doctrines of the church ; and
the view of the Disciple or Campbellite, that faith is merely inteUectual
behef in the truth, on the presentation of evidence.
In further explanation of the Scripture representations, we remark :
( a ) That faith is an act of the affections and will, as truly as it is an act
of the inteUect.
It has been claimed that faith and unbelief are purely intellectual states,
which are necessarily determined by the facts at any given time presented
to the mind ; and that they are, for this reason, as destitute of moral quality
and as far from being matters of obligation, as are our instinctive feelings
of pleasure and pain. But this view unwarrantably isolates the intellect,
and ignores the fact that, in all moral subjects, the state of the affections
and wiU affects the judgment of the mind with regard to truth. In the
intellectual act the whole moral nature expresses itself. Since the tastes
determine the opinions, faith is a moral act, and men are responsible for
not beheving.
( 6 ) That the object of saving faith is, in general, the whole truth of God,
so far as it is objectively revealed or made known to the soul ; but, in par
ticular, the person and work of Jesus Christ, which constitutes the centre
and substance of God's revelation (Acts 17 : 18 ; 1 Cor. 1 : 23 ; CoL 1 : 27 ;
Rev. 19:10).
The patriarchs, though they had no knowledge of a personal Christ, were
saved by beheving in God so far as God had revealed himself to them ; and
whoever among the heathen are saved, must in like manner be saved by
casting themselves as helpless sinners upon God's plan of mercy, dimly
shadowed forth in nature and providence. But such faith, even among the
patriarchs and heathen, is implicitly a faith in Christ, and would become
explicit and conscious trust and submission, whenever Christ were made
known to them ( Mat. 8 : 11, 12 ; John 10 : 16 ; Acts 4 : 12 ; 10 : 31, 34, 35,
44; 16:31).

CONVERSION. 223
(c) That the ground of faith is the external word of promise. The
ground of assurance, on the other hand, is the inward witness of the Spirit
that we fulfil the conditions of the promise ( Rom. 4 : 20, 21 ; 8 : 16 ; Eph.
1 : 13 ; 1 John 4 : 13 ; 5 : 10 ). This witness of the Sphit is not a new reve
lation from God, but a strengthening of faith so that it becomes conscious
and indubitable.
True faith is possible without assurance of salvation. But if Alexander's
view were correct, that the object of saving faith is the proposition : "God,
for Christ's sake, now looks with reconciling love on me, a sinner," no one
could beheve, without being at the same time assured that he was a saved
person. Upon the true view, that the object of saving faith is not a propo
sition, but a person, we can perceive not only the simplicity of faith, but
the possibihty of faith even where the soul is destitute of assurance or of
joy. Hence those who already believe are urged to seek for assurance
(Heb. 6:11; 2 Peter 1:10).
(d) That faith necessarUy leads to good works, since it embraces the
whole truth of God so far as made known, and appropriates Christ, not only
as an external Savior, but as an internal sanctifying power (Heb. 7 : 15, 16 ;
Gal. 5:6).
Good works are the proper evidence of faith. The faith which does not
lead men to act upon the commands and promises of Christ, or, in other
words, does not lead to obedience, is caUed in Scripture a "dead," that is,
an unreal, faith. Such faith is not saving, since it lacks the voluntary ele
ment — actual appropriation of Christ (James 2 : 14-26).
(e) That faith, as characteristicaUy the inward act of reception, is not to
be confounded with love or obedience, its fruit.
Faith is, in the Scriptures, caUed a work, only in the sense that man's
active powers are engaged in it. It is a work which God requires, yet
which God enables man to perform ( John 6 : 29 — Ipyov tov Beov. Cf. Rom.
1 : 17 — iimioavvn Btdv ). As the gift of God and as the mere taking of unde
served mercy, it is expressly excluded from the category of works upon the
basis of which man may claim salvation ( Rom. 3 : 28 ; 4 : 4, 5, 16 ). It is
not the act of the fuU soul bestowing, but the act of an empty soul receiv
ing. Although this reception is prompted by a drawing of heart toward
God inwrought by the Holy Spirit, this drawing of heart is not yet a con
scious and developed love : such love is the result of faith ( Gal. 5:6)
What precedes faith is an unconscious and undeveloped tendency or dispo-.
sition toward God. Conscious and developed affection toward God, or love
proper, must always follow faith and be the product of faith. So, too,
obedience can be rendered only after faith has laid hold of Christ, and with
him has obtained the spirit of obedience (Rom. 1 :5 — viraitoi)v wiaTeag =
' ' obedience resulting from faith " ). Hence faith is not the procuring cause
of salvation, but is only the instrumental cause. The procuring cause is
the Christ, whom faith embraces.
(/) That faith is susceptible of increase.
This is evident, whether we consider it from the human or from the divine
side. As an act of man, it has an inteUectual, an emotional, and a voluntary

224 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
element, each of which is eapable of growth. As a work of God in the soul
of man, it can receive, through the presentation of the truth and the quick
ening agency of the Holy Spirit, continuaUy new accessions of knowledge,
sensibility, and active energy. Such increase of faith, therefore, we are to
seek, both by resolute exercise of our own powers, and above all, by direct
apphcation to the source of faith in God ( Luke 17:5).
IV. Justification.
1. Definition of Justification.
By justification we mean that judicial act of God by which, on account of
Christ, to whom the sinner is united by faith, he declares that sinner to be
no longer exposed to the penalty of the law, but to be restored to his favor.
Or, to give an. alternative definition from which aU metaphor is excluded :
Justification is the reversal of God's attitude toward the sinner, because of
the sinner's new relation to Christ. God did condemn ; he now acquits.
He did repel ; he now admits to favor.
Justification, as thus defined, is therefore a declarative act, as distin
guished from an efficient act ; an act of God external to the sinner, as dis
tinguished from an act within the sinner's nature and changing that nature ;
a judicial act, as distinguished from a sovereign act ; an act based upon and
logicaUy presupposing the sinner's union with Christ, as distinguished from
an act which causes and is foUowed by that union with Christ.
2. Proof of the Doctrine of Justification.
A. Scripture proofs of the doctrine as a whole are the foUowing :
B. Scripture use of the special words translated "justify " and "justifi
cation" in the Septuagint and in the New Testament.
(a) Sinaida — uniformly, or with only a single exception, signifies, not to
make righteous, but to declare just, or free from guilt and exposure to pun
ishment. The only O. T. passage where this meaning is questionable is
Dan. 12 : 3. But even here the proper translation is, in all probability, not
'they that turn many to righteousness,' but 'they that justify many,' i. e.,
cause many to be justified. For the HiphU force of the verb, see Girdle-
stone, O. T. Syn., 257, 258, and Delitzsch on Is. 53 : 11 ; cf. James 5 : 19, 20.
In Rom. 6:7 — b yap dnofiavuv SctiataiuTai anb rfj( dpapTiaf = ' he that once
died with Christ was acquitted from the service of sin considered as a pen
ality. ' In 1 Cor. 4 : 4 — ovdkv yap kpavrip avvoida. dW ovukv tovti, dtdmaiwpa
= ' I am conscious of no fault, but that does not in itself make certain God's
acquittal as respects this particular charge.' The usage of the epistle of
James does not contradict this ; the doctrine of James is that we are justi
fied only by such faith as makes us faithful and brings forth good works.
" He uses the word exclusively in a judicial sense ; he combats a mistaken
view of nioTig, not a mistaken view of fiinaibu"; see James 2 : 21, 23, 24, and
Cremer, N. T. Lexicon, Eng. trans., 182, 183. The only N. T. passage
where this meaning is questionable is Rev. 22 : 11 ; but here Alf ord, with
N, A and B, reads 6iKatoavvrjV irotr/aaTa.
(b) oMaiaots — is the act, in process, of declaring a man just, — that is,
acquitted from guUt and restored to the divine favor ( Rom. 4 : 25 ; 5 : 18 .

justification. 225
(c) ducaio/ta— is the act, as already accomplished, of declaring a man
just,— that is, no longer exposed to penalty, but restored to God's favor
(Rom. 5 : 16, 18; cf. 1 Tim. 3 : 16). Hence, in other connections, Simiapa
has the meaning of statute, legal decision, act of justice ( Luke 1:6; Rom.
2:26; Heb. 9:1).
(d) iinatoovvri — is the state of one justified, or declared just ( Rom. 8:
10 ; 1 Cor. 1 : 30). In Rom. 10 : 3,^ J?aul inveighs against r#v X&iav Suaaoovviiv
as insufficient and false, and in its place would put rrjv tov Beov bacatoovvriv, —
that is, a Sinaioavvn which God not only requhes, but provides ; which is not
only acceptable to God, but proceeds from God, and is appropriated by
faith, — hence caUed SmaLoaiivri -KioTtuc, or en. iriarea^. "The primary significa
tion of the word, in Paul's writings, is therefore that state of the behever
which is caUed forth by God's act of acquittal, — the state of the behever as
justified," that is, freed from punishment and restored to the divine favor.
Since this state of acquittal is accompanied by changes in the character
and conduct, diKatoavvti comes to mean, secondarUy, the moral condition of
the believer as resulting from this acquittal and inseparably connected with
it ( Rom. 14 : 17 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 21 ). This righteousness arising from justifica
tion becomes a principle of action ( Mat. 3 :15 ; Acts 10 :35 ; Rom. 6 :13,
18). The term, however, never loses its implication of a justifying act
upon which this principle of action is based.
It is worthy of special observation that, in the passages cited above, the
terms "justify" and "justification" are contrasted, not with the process of
depraving or corrupting, but with the outward act of condemning ; and that
the expressions used to explain and iUustrate them are all derived, not from .
the inward operation of purifying the soul or infusing into it righteousness,
but from the procedure of courts in their judgments, or of offended persons
in their forgiveness of offenders. We conclude that these terms, wherever
they have relet ence to the sinner's relation to God, signify a declarative and
judicial act of God, external to the sinner, and not an efficient and sovereign
act of God changing the sinner's nature and making him subjectively
righteous. 3. Elements of Justification.
These are two :
A. Remission of punishment.
( a ) God acquits the ungodly who beheve in Christ, and declares them
just. This is not to declare them innocent,— - that would be a judgment
contrary to truth. It declares that the demands of the law have been satis
fied with regard to them, and that they are now free from its condemnation.
( b ) This acquital, in so far as it is the act of God as judge or executive,
administering law, may be denominated pardon. In so far as it is the act
oi God as a father personaUy injured and grieved by sin, yet showing grace
to the sinner, it is denominated forgiveness.
( c ) In an earthly tribunal, there is no acquittal for those who are proved
to be transgessors, — for such there is only conviction and punishment.
But in God's government there is remission of punishment for believers,
even though they are confessedly offenders ; and, in justification, God
declares this remission.

226 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
( d) The declaration that the sinner is no longer exposed to the penalty
of law, has its ground, not in any satisfaction of the law's demand on the
part of the sinner himself, but solely in the bearing of the penalty by
Christ, to whom the sinner is united by faith. Justification, in its first
element, is therefore that act by which God, for the sake of Christ, acquits
the transgressor and suffers him to go free.
B. Restoration to favor.
(a) Justification is more than remission or acquittal. These would
leave the sinner simply in the position of a discharged criminal, — law
requhes a positive righteousness also. Besides dehverance from punish
ment, justification implies God's treatment of the sinner as if he were, and
had been, personaUy righteous. The justified person receives not only
remission of penalty, but the rewards promised to obedience.
( 6 ) This restoration to favor, viewed in its aspect as the renewal of a
broken friendship, is denominated reconciliation ; viewed in its aspect as a
renewal of the soul's true relation to God as a father, it is denominated
adoption. ( c ) In an earthly pardon there are no special helps bestowed upon the
pardoned. There are no penalties, but there are also no rewards ; law can
not claim anything of the discharged, but then they also can claim nothing
of the law. But what, though greatly needed, is left unprovided by human
government, God does provide. In justification, there is not only acquittal,
but approval ; not only pardon, but promotion. Remission is never sepa
rated from restoration.
( d ) The declaration that the sinner is restored to God's favor, has its
ground, not in the sinner's personal character or conduct, but solely in the
obedience and righteousness of Christ, to whom the sinner is united by
faith. Thus Christ's work is the procuring cause of our justification, in
both its elements. As we are acquitted on account of Christ's suffering of
the penalty of the law, so on account of Christ's obedience we receive the
rewards of law.
4. Relation of Justification to God's law and Holiness.
A. Justification has been shown to be a forensic term. A man may,
indeed, be conceived of as just, in either of two senses : (a) as just in
moral character, — that is, absolutely holy in nature, disposition, and con
duct ; (6) as Justin relation to law, — or as free from aU obhgation to suffer
penalty, and as entitled to the rewards of obedience.
So, too, a man may be conceived of as justified, in either of two senses :
( a) made just in moral character ; or, ( 6 ) made just in his relation to law.
But the Scriptures declare that there does not exist on earth a just man, in
the first of these senses ( Eccl. 7 : 20). Even in those who are renewed in
moral character and united to Christ, there is a remnant of moral depravity.
If, therefore, there be any such thing as a just man, he must be just, not
in the sense of possessing an unspotted hohness, but in the sense of being
dehvered from the penalty of law, and made partaker of its rewards. If
there be any such thing as justification, it must be, not an act of God

JUSTIFICATION. 227
which renders the sinner absolutely holy, but an act of God which declares
the sinner to be free from legal penalties and entitled to legal rewards.
B. The difficult feature of justification is the declaration, on the part of
God, that a sinner whose remaining sinfulness seems to necessitate the vin
dicative reaction of God's holiness against him, is yet free from such reaction
of holiness as is expressed in the penalties of the law.
The fact is to be accepted on the testimony of Scripture. If this testimony
be not accepted, there is no dehverance from the condemnation of law. But
the difficulty of conceiving of God's declaring the sinner no longer exposed
to legal penalty is relieved, if not removed, by the three-fold consideration :
(a) That Christ has endured the penalty of the law in the sinner's stead.
(6) That the sinner is so united to Christ, that Christ's life aheady con
stitutes the dominating principle within him.
(c) That this life of Christ is a power in the soul which wfll graduaUy,
but infallibly, extirpate aU remaining depravity, until the whole physical
and moral nature is perfectly conformed to the divine holiness.
5. Relation of Justification to Union with Christ and the Work of
the Spirit.
A. Since the sinner, at the moment of justification, is not yet com
pletely transformed in character, we have seen that God can declare him
just, not on account of what he is in himself, but only on account of what
Christ is. The ground of justification is therefore not, ( a ) as the Romanists
hold, a new righteousness and love infused into us, and now constituting
our moral character ; nor, ( b ) as Osiander taught, the essential righteous
ness of Christ's divine nature, which has become ours by faith ; but ( c ) the
satisfaction and obedience of Christ, as the head of a new humanity, and
as embracing in himself all behevers as his members.
As Adam's sin is imputed to us, not because Adam is in us, but because
we were in Adam ; so Christ's righteousness is imputed to us, not because
Christ is in us, but because we are in Christ, — that is, joined by faith to
one whose righteousness and hfe are infinitely greater than our power to
appropriate or contain. In this sense, we may say that we are justified
through a Christ outside of us, as we are sanctified through a Christ within
us. Edwards : " The justification of the believer is no other than his being
admitted to communion in, or participation of, this head and surety of aU
behevers." B. The relation of justification to regeneration and sanctification, more
over, delivers it from the charges of externahty and immorality. God does
not justify ungodly men in their ungodliness. He pronounces them just
only as they are united to Christ, who is absolutely just, and who, by his
Spirit, can make them just, not only in the eye of the law, but in moral
character. The very faith by which the sinner receives Christ is an act in
which he ratifies all that Christ has done, and accepts God's judgment
against sin as his own (John 16 : 11 ).
Justification is possible, therefore, because it is always accompanied by
regeneration and union with Christ, and is foUowed by sanctification. But

228 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
this is a very different thing from the Romanist confounding of justification
and sanctification, as different stages of the same process of making the
sinner actually holy. It holds fast to the Scripture distinction between
justification as a declarative act of God, and regeneration and sanctification
as those efficient acts of God by which justification is accompanied and fol
lowed. 6. Relation of Justification to Faith.
A We are justified by faith, rather than by love or by any other grace :
(a) not because faith is itself a work of obedience by which we merit
justification, — for this would be a doctrine of justification by works ; ( b )
nor because faith is accepted as an equivalent of obedience, — for there is
no equivalent except the perfect obedience of Christ ; ( e ) nor because
faith is the germ from which obedience may spring hereafter, — for it is
not the faith which accepts, but the Christ who is accepted, that renders
such obedience possible ; but ( d ) because faith, and not repentance, or
love, or hope, is the medium or instrument by which we receive Christ and
are united to him. Hence we are never said to be justified Sid moriv, = on
account of faith, but only <5(d wio-Teas, = through faith, or kit wio-reus, =
by faith. Or, to express the same truth in other words, whUe the grace
of God is the efficient cause of justification, and the obedience and suffer
ings of Christ are the meritorious or procuring cause, faith is the mediate
or instrumental cause.
B. Since the ground of justification is only Christ, to whom we are
united by faith, the justified person has peace. If it were anything in
ourselves, our peace must needs be proportioned to our holiness. The
practical effect of the Romanist mingling of works with faith, as a joint
ground of justification, is to render all assurance of salvation impossible.
( CouncU of Trent, 9th chap.: "Every man, by reason of his own weak
ness and defects, must be in fear and anxiety about his state of grace.
Nor can any one know, with infallible certainty of faith, that he has
received forgiveness of God. " ). But since justification is an instantaneous
act of God, complete at the moment of the sinner's first believing, it has
no degrees. Weak faith justifies as perfectly as strong faith ; although,
since justification is a secret act of God, weak faith does not give so strong
assurance of salvation.
C. Justification is instantaneous, complete, and final : instantaneous,
since otherwise there would be an interval during which the soul was
neither approved nor condemned by God ( Mat. 6 : 24 ) ; complete, since
the soul, united to Christ by faith, becomes partaker of his complete satis
faction to the demands of law ( Col. 2 : 9, 10 ) ; and final, since the union
with Christ is indissoluble ( John 10 : 28, 29). As there are many acts of
sin in the life of the Christian, so there are many acts of pardon foUowing
them. But aU these acts of pardon are virtually imphed in that first act
by which he was finaUy and forever justified ; as also successive acts of
repentance and faith, after such sins, are virtually implied in that first
repentance and faith which logicaUy preceded justification.

SANCTIFICATION. 229
7. Advice tp Inquirers demanded by a Scriptural View of Justification.
(a) Where conviction of sin is yet lacking, our aim should be to show
the sinner that he is under God's condemnation for his past sins, and that
no future obedience can ever secure his justification, since this obedience,
even though perfect, could not atone for the past, and even if it could, he
is unable, without God's help, to render it.
(6) Where conviction of sin already exists, our aim should be, not, in
the first instance, to secure the performance of external religious duties
such as prayer, or Scripture-reading, or uniting with the church, but to
induce the sinner, as his first and aU-inclusive duty, to accept Christ as his
only and sufficient sacrifice and Savior, and, committing himself and the
matter of his salvation enthely to the hands of Christ, to manifest this trust
and submission by entering at once upon a hfe of obedience to Christ's
commands.

SECTION III. — THE APPLICATION OF CHRIST'S REDEMPTION
IN ITS CONTINUATION.
Under this head we treat of Sanctification and of Perseverance. These
two are but the divine and the human sides of the same fact, and they bear
to each other a relation similar to that which exists between Regeneration
and Conversion.
I. Sanctification.
1. Definition of Sanctification.
Sanctification is that continuous operation of the Holy Spirit, by which
the holy disposition imparted in regeneration is maintained and strength
ened. This definition imphes:
(a) That, although in regeneration the governing disposition of the soul
is made holy, there stiU remain tendencies to evil which are unsubdued.
( b ) That the existence in the behever of these two opposing principles
gives rise to a conflict which lasts through life.
( c ) That in this conflict the Holy Spirit enables the Christian, through
increasing faith, more fully and consciously to appropriate Christ, and thus,
progressively to make conquest of the remaining sinfulness of his nature.
2. Explanations and Scripture Proof.
(a) Sanctification is the work of God.
( 6 ) It is a continuous process.
( c ) It is distinguished from regeneration as growth from birth, or as the
strengthening of a holy disposition from the original impartation of it.
(d) The operation of God reveals itself in, and is accompanied by, intel
ligent and voluntary activity of the behever in the discovery and mortifica
tion of sinful desires, and in the bringing of the whole being into obedience
to Christ and conformity to the standards of his word.

230 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
(e) The agency through which God effects the sanctification of the
believer is the indweUing Spirit of Christ.
(/) The mediate or instrumental cause of sanctification, as of justifica
tion, is faith.
(g) The object of this faith is Christ himself, as the head of a new
humanity and the source of truth and hfe to those united to him.
(h) Though the weakest faith perfectly justifies, the degree of sanctifica
tion is measured by the strength of the Christian's faith, and the persist
ence with which he apprehends Christ in the various relations which the
Scriptures declare him to sustain to us.
(i) From the lack of persistence in using the means appointed for
Christian growth — such as the word of God, prayer, association with other
behevers, and personal effort for the conversion of the ungodly — sanctifi
cation does not always proceed in regular and unbroken course, and it is
never completed in this hfe.
(j ) Sanctification, both of the soul and of the body of the believer, is
completed in the life to come, — that of the former at death, that of the
latter at the resurrection.
3. Erroneous Views refuted by these Scripture Passages.
A. The Antinomian, — which holds that, since Christ's obedience and
sufferings have satisfied the demands of the law, the believer is free from
obhgation to observe it.
To this view we urge the foUowing objections :
( a ) That since the law is a transcript of the holiness of God, its demands
as a moral rule are unchanging. Only as a system of penalty and a method
of salvation is the law abohshed in Christ's death.
( 6 ) That the union between Christ and the behever secures not only
the bearing of the penalty of the law by Christ, but also the impartation
of Christ's spirit of obedience to the behever, — in other words, brings
him into communion with Christ's work, and leads him to ratify it in his
own experience.
( c ) That the freedom from the law of which the Scriptures speak, is
therefore simply that freedom from the constraint and bondage of the law,
which characterizes those who have become one with Christ by faith.
To sum up the doctrine of Christian freedom as opposed to Antinomian-
ism, we may say that Christ does not free us, as the Antinomian beheves,
from the law as a rule of life. But he does free us ( 1 ) from the law as a
system of curse and penalty ; this he does by bearing the curse and penalty
himself. Christ frees us ( 2 ) from the law with its claims as a method of
salvation ; this he does by making his obedience and merits ours. Christ
frees us ( 3 ) from the law as an outward and foreign compulsion ; this he
does by giving to us the spirit of obedience and sonship, by which the
law is progressively realized within.

SANCTIFICATION. 231
B. The Perfectionist, — which holds that the Christian may, in this
life, become perfectly free from sin. This view was held by John Wesley
in England, and by Mahan and Finney in America.
In reply, it wiU be sufficient to observe :
(a) That the theory rests upon false conceptions : first, of the law, — as
a sliding-scale of requirement graduated to the moral condition of creatures,
instead of being the unchangeable reflection of God's holiness ; secondly,
of sin, — as consisting only in voluntary acts instead of embracing also those
dispositions and states of the soul which are not conformed to the divine
holiness ; thhdly, of the human will, — as able to choose God supremely
and persistently at every moment of hfe, and to fulfil at every moment the
obligations resting upon it, instead of being corrupted and enslaved by the
FaU. (o) That the theory finds no support in, but rather is distinctly contra
dicted by, Scripture.
First, the Scriptures never assert or imply that the Christian may in this
life hve without sin ; passages hke 1 John 3 : 6, 9, if interpreted consist
ently with the context, set forth either the ideal standard of Corinthians
living or the actual state of the behever so far as respects his new nature.
Secondly, the apostohc admonitions to the Corinthians and Hebrews show
that no such state of complete sanctification had been generally attained by
the Christians of the first century.
Thhdly, there is express record of sin committed by the most perfect
characters of Scripture— as Noah, Abraham, Job, David, Peter.
Fourthly, the word reAcioc, as apphed to spiritual conditions aheady
attained, can f airly be held to signify only a relative perfection, equivalent
to sincere piety or maturity of Christian judgment.
Fifthly, the Scriptures distinctly deny that any man on earth lives with
out sin.
Sixthly, the declaration : "ye were sanctified " ( 1 Cor. 6 : 11 ), and the
designation : " saints " ( 1 Cor. 1:2), applied to early behevers, are, as the
whole epistle shows, expressive of a hohness existing in germ and anticipa
tion ; the expressions deriving theh meaning not so much from what these
early behevers were, as from what Christ was, to whom they were united
by faith.
( c ) That the theory is disapproved by the testimony of Christian expe
rience.  In exact proportion to the soul's advance in holiness does it shrink
from claiming that holiness has been already attained, and humble itself
before God for its remaining apathy, ingratitude, and unbelief .
Perfectionism is best met by proper statements of the nature of the law
and of sin ( Ps. 119 : 96 ). WhUe we thus rebuke spiritual pride, however,
we shoifld be equally careful to point out the inseparable connection between
justification and sanctification, and theh equal importance as together mak-

232 SOTERIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.
ing up -the Bibhcal idea of salvation. WhUe we show no favor to those who
would make sanctification a sudden and paroxysmal act of the human will,
we should hold forth the hohness of God as the standard of attainment, and
the faith in a Christ of infinite fulness as the medium through which that
standard is to be graduaUy but certainly realized in us ( 2 Cor. 3 : 18).
H. Perseverance.
The Scriptures declare that, in virtue of the original purpose and contin
uous operation of God, all who are united to Christ by faith will infaUibly
continue in a state of grace and will finally attain to everlasting hfe. This
voluntary continuance, on the part of the Christian, in faith and weU-doing
we caU perseverance. Perseverance is, therefore, the human side or aspect
of that spiritual process which, as viewed from the divine side, we caU sanc
tification. It is not a mere natural consequence of conversion, but involves
a constant activity of the human wUl from the moment of conversion to the
end of life.
1. Proof of the Doctrine of Perseverance.
A. From Scripture,— as John 10 : 28, 29 ; Rom. 11 : 29 ; PhiL 1:6;
2 Thess. 3 :3 ; 2 Tim. 1 : 12 ; 1 Pet. 1:5; Rev. 3 : 10.
B. From Reason.
(a) It is a necessary inference from other doctrines, — such as election,
union with Christ, regeneration, justification, sanctification,
( 6) It accords with analogy, — God's preserving care being needed by,
and being granted to, his spiritual, as well as his natural, creation.
( c ) It is imphed in aU assurance of salvation, — since this assurance is
given by the Holy Spirit, and is based not upon the known strength of
human resolution, but upon the purpose and operation of God.
2. Objections to the Doctrine of Perseverance.
These objections are urged chiefly by Arminians and by Romanists.
A. That it is inconsistent with human freedom. — Answer : It is no
more so than is the doctrine of Election or the doctrine of Decrees.
B. That it tends to immorality. — Answer : This cannot be, since the
doctrine declares that God wfll save men by securing theh perseverance in
holiness. 0. That it leads to indolence. — Answer : This is a perversion of the
doctrine, continuously possible only to the unregenerate ; since, to the
regenerate, certainty of success is the strongest incentive to activity in the
conflict with sin.
D. That the Scripture commands to persevere and warnings against
apostasy show that certain, even of the regenerate, wUl fall away. —
Answer :
(a) They show that some, who are apparently regenerate, wUl fall away.
( b ) They show that the truly regenerate, and those who are only appar
ently so, are not certainly distinguishable in this hfe.

PERSEVERANCE. 233
( c ) They show the fearful consequences of rejecting Christ, to those
who have enjoyed special divine influences, but who are only apparently
regenerate. ( d) They show what the fate of the truly regenerate would be, in case
they should not persevere.
(e) They show that the perseverance of the truly regenerate may be
secured by these very commands and warnings.
(/) They do not show that it is certain, or possible, that any truly
regenerate person wfll faU away.
E. That we have actual examples of such apostasy. — We answer :
(a) Such are either men once outwardly reformed, hke Judas and
Ananias, but never renewed in heart ;
( b ) Or they are regenerate men, who, like David and Peter, have fallen
into temporary sin, from which they wiU, before death, be reclaimed by
God's discipline.

PAET YIL
ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

CHAPTER I.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH, OR CHURCH POLITY.
I. Definition op the Church.
( a ) The church of Christ, in its largest signification, is the whole com
pany of regenerate persons in all times and ages, in heaven and on earth
(Mat. 16:18 ; Eph. 1 :22, 23 ; 3 :10 ; 5 :24, 25 ; Col. 1 :18 ; Heb. 12 :23).
In this sense, the church is identical with the spiritual ingdom of God ;
both signify that redeemed humanity in which God in Christ exercises
actual spiritual dominion ( John 3:3, 5 ).
( 6 ) The church, in this large sense, is nothing less than the body of
Christ — the organism to which he gives spiritual life, and through which
he manifests the fulness of his power and grace. The church therefore
cannot be defined in merely human terms, as an aggregate of individuals
associated for social, benevolent, or even spiritual purposes. There is. a
transcendent element in the church. It is the great company of persons
whom Christ has saved, in whom he dweUs, to whom and through whom
he reveals God (Eph. 1 : 22, 23 ).
( c ) The Scriptures, however, distinguish between this invisible or uni
versal church, and the individual church, in which the universal church
takes local and temporal form, and in which the idea of the church as a
whole is concretely exhibited.
( d ) The individual church may be defined as that smaller company of
regenerate persons, who, in any given community, unite themselves volun
tarily together, in accordance with Christ's laws, for the purpose of secur
ing the complete establishment of his kingdom in themselves and in the
world. (e) Besides these two significations of the term 'church,' there are
properly in the New Testament no others. The word hnikriaia is indeed
used in Acts 7 : 38 ; 19 : 32, 39 ; Heb. 2 : 12, to designate a popular assem
bly ; but since this is a secular use of the term, it does not here concern us.
In certain passages, as for example Acts 9 : 31 (kv&rio-ia, sing., N abo),

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH. 235
1 Cor. 12 : 28, PhU. 3 : 6, and 1 Tim. 3 : 15, i/ocXr/ola appears to be used either
as a generic or as a coUective term, to denote simply the body of indepen
dent local churches existing in a given region or at a given epoch. But
since there is no evidence that these churches were bound together in any
outward organization, this use of the term kni&noia cannot be regarded as
adding any new sense to those of ' the universal church ' and ' the local
church ' already mentioned.
The prevailing usage of the N. T. gives to the term iiuifaiaia the second
of these two significations. It is this local church only which has definite
and temporal existence, and of this alone we henceforth treat. Our defini
tion of the individual church imphes the two foUowing particulars :
A. The church, like the family and the state, is an institution of
divine appointment. This is plain : (a) from its relation to the church
universal, as its concrete embodiment ; ( 6 ) from the fact that its necessity
is grounded in the social and rehgious nature of man ; ( c ) from the Script
ure, — as for example, Christ's command in Mat. 18 : 17, and the designa
tion ' church of God,' apphed to individual churches ( 1 Cor. 1:2).
B. The church, unlike the family and the state, is a voluntary society.
(a) This results from the fact that the local church is the outward expres
sion of that rational and free hfe in Christ which characterizes the church
as a whole. In this it differs from those other organizations of divine
appointment, entrance into which is not optional. Membership in the
church is not hereditary or compulsory. ( b ) The doctrine of the church,
as thus defined, is a necessary outgrowth of the doctrine of regeneration.
As this fundamental spiritual change is mediated not by outward appli
ances, but by inward and conscious reception of Christ and his Cruth, union
with the church logicaUy foUows, not precedes, the soul's spiritual union
with Christ.
H. Organization of the Church.
1. The fact of organization.
Organization may exist without knowledge of writing, without written
records, lists of members, or formal choice of officers. These last are the
proofs, reminders, and helps of organization, but they are not essential to
it. It is however not merely informal, but formal, organization in the
church, to which the New Testament bears witness.
That there was such organization is abundantly shown from ( a ) its stated
meetings, ( b ) elections, and ( e ) officers ; ( d ) from the designations of its
ministers, together with ( e ) the recognized authority of the minister and
of the church; (/) from its discipline, (g) contributions, (A) letters of
commendation, (i) registers of widows, (j) uniform customs, and (k)
ordinances ; ( I) from the order enjoined and observed, ( m ) the qualifi
cations for membership, and ( n ) the common work of the whole body.
As indicative of a developed organization in the N. T. church, of which
only the germ existed before Christ's death, it is important to notice the
progress in names from the Gospels to the Epistles. In the Gospels, the
word " disciples " is the common designation of Christ's foUowers, but it is

236 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
not once found in the Epistles. In the Epistles, there are only " saints,"
"brethren," "churches." A consideration of the facts here referred to is
sufficient to evince the unscriptural nature of two modern theories of the
church :
A. The theory that the church is an exclusively spiritual body, destitute
of aU formal organization, and bound together only by the mutual relation
of each behever to his indwelling Lord.
The church, upon this view, so far as outward bonds are concerned, is
only an aggregation of isolated units. Those behevers who chance to
gather at a particular place, or to Uve at a particular time, constitute the
church of that place or time. This view is held by the Friends and by the
Plymouth Brethren. It ignores the tendencies to organization inherent in
human nature ; confounds the visible with the invisible church ; and is
dhectly opposed to the Scripture representations of the visible church as
comprehending some who are not true behevers.
B. The theory that the form of church organization is not definitely
prescribed in the New Testament, but is a matter of expediency, each body
of behevers being permitted to adopt that method of organization which
best suits its chcumstances and condition.
The view under consideration seems in some respects to be favored by
Neander, and is often regarded as incidental to his larger conception of
church history as a progressive development. But a proper theory of
development does not exclude the idea of a church organization aheady
complete in all essential particulars before the close of the inspired canon,
so that the record of it may constitute a providential example of binding
authority upon aU subsequent ages. The view mentioned exaggerates the
differences of practice among the N. T. churches ; underestimates the need
of divine direction as to methods of church union ; and admits a principle
of 'church powers,' which may be historically shown to be subversive of
the very existence of the church as a spiritual body.
2. The nature of this organization.
The nature of any organization may be determined by asking, first : who
constitute its members ? secondly : for what object has it been formed ?
and, thhdly : what are the laws which regulate its operations ?
A. They only can properly be members of the local church, who have
previously become members of the church universal, — or, in other words,
have become regenerate persons.
From this limitation of membership to regenerate persons, certain
results f oUow :
(a) Since each member bears supreme aUegiance to Christ, the church
as a body must recognize Christ as the only lawgiver. The relation of the
individual Christian to the church does not supersede, but furthers and
expresses, his relation to Christ.
(6) Since each regenerate man recognizes in every other a brother in
Christ, the several members are upon a footing of absolute equahty ( Mat
23 : 8-10).

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH. 237
(c) Since each local church is directly subject to Christ, there is no
jurisdiction of one church over another, but all are on an equal footing,
and aU are independent of interference or control by the civU power.
B. The sole object of the local church is the glory of God, in the com
plete establishment of his kingdom, both in the hearts of behevers and in
the world. This object is to be promoted :
(a) By united worship, — including prayer and rehgious instruction;
(6) by mutual watchcare and exhortation ; ( c) by common labors for the
reclamation of the impenitent world.
C. The law of the church is simply the wfll of Christ, as expressed in
the Scriptures and interpreted by the Holy Sphit. This law respects :
(a) The qualifications for membership. — These are regeneration and
baptism, i. e., spiritual new birth and ritual new birth ; the surrender of
the inward and of the outward life to Christ ; the spiritual entrance into
communion with Christ's death and resurrection, and the formal profession
of this to the world by being buried with Christ and rising with him in
baptism. (b) The duties imposed on members. — In discovering the wfll of Christ
from the Scriptures, each member has the right of private judgment, being
dhectly responsible to Christ for his use of the means of knowledge, and
for his obedience to Christ's commands when these are known.
3. The genesis of this organization.
(a) The church existed in germ before the day of Pentecost, — otherwise
there would have been nothing to which those converted upon that day
could have been "added" (Acts 2 : 47). Among the apostles, regenerate
as they were, united to Christ by faith and in that faith baptized (Acts 19 :
4 ), under Christ's instruction and engaged in common work for him, there
were already the beginnings of organization. There was a treasurer of the
body (John 13 : 29), and as a body they celebrated for the first time the
Lord's Supper (Mat. 26 : 26-29 ). To all intents and purposes they consti
tuted a church, although the church was not yet fuUy equipped for its work
by the outpouring of the Spirit (Acts 2 ), and by the appointment of pastors
and deacons. The church existed without officers, as in the first days suc
ceeding Pentecost.
( b ) That provision for these offices was made graduaUy as exigencies
arose, is natural when we consider that the church immediately after Christ's
ascension was under the tutelage of inspired apostles, and was to be pre
pared, by a process of education, for independence and self-government.
As doctrine was communicated graduaUy yet infallibly, through the oral
and written teaching of the apostles, so we are warranted in believing that
the church was gradually but infallibly guided to the adoption of Christ's
own plan of church organization and of Christian work. The same promise
of the Sphit which renders the New Testament an unerring and sufficient
rule of faith, renders it also an unerring and sufficient rule of practice, for
the church in all places and times.

238 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
( c ) Any number of behevers, therefore, may constitute themselves into
a Christian church, by adopting for theh rule of faith and practice Christ's
law as laid down in the New Testament, and by associating themselves
together, in accordance with it, for his worship and service. It is impor
tant, where practicable, that a council of churches be previously called, to
advise the brethren proposing this union as to the desirableness of consti
tuting a new and distinct local body ; and, if it be found desirable, to
recognize them, after its formation, as being a church of Christ. But such
action of a council, however valuable as affording ground for the feUowship
of other churches, is not constitutive, but is simply declaratory ; and,
without such action, the body of believers aUuded to, if formed after the
N. T. example, may notwithstanding be a true church of Christ. StiU
further, a band of converts, among the heathen or providentiaUy precluded
from access to existing churches, might rightfuUy appoint one of their
number to baptize the rest, and then might organize, de novo, a New
Testament church.
HI. Government of the Church.
1. Nature of this government in general.
It is evident from the dhect relation of each member of the church, and
so of the church as a whole, to Christ as sovereign and lawgiver, that the
government of the church, so far as regards the source of authority, is an
absolute monarchy.
In ascertaining the wfll of Christ, however, and in applying his com
mands to providential exigencies, the Holy Sphit enlightens one member
through the counsel of another, and as the result of combined dehberation,
guides the whole body to right conclusions. This work of the Spirit is
the foundation of the Scripture injunctions to unity. This unity, since it
is a unity of the Spirit, is not an enforced, but an inteUigent and willing-
sunity. WhUe Christ is sole king, therefore, the government of the church
so far as regards the interpretation and execution of his will by the body,
is an absolute democracy, in which the whole body of members is intrusted
with the duty and responsibUity of carrying out the laws of Christ a,
expressed in his word.
A. Proof that the government of the church is democratic or congre
gational. (a) From the duty of the whole church to preserve unity in its action.
( b ) From the responsibUity of the whole church for maintaining pure
doctrine and practice.
( c ) From the committing of the ordinances to the charge of the whole
church to observe and guard. As the church expresses truth in her teach
ing, so she is to express it in symbol through the ordinances.
( d ) From the election by the whole church, of its own officers and dele
gates. In Acts 14 : 23, the literal interpretation of x^poTovriaavreq is not to
be pressed. In Titus 1:5, " when Paul empowers Titus to set presiding
officers over the communities, this circumstance decides nothing as to the

GOVERNMENT OF THE CHURCH. 239
mode of choice, nor is a choice by the community itself thereby necessarUy
excluded." (e) From the power of the whole church to exercise disciphne. Pas
sages which show the right of the whole body to exclude, show also the
right of the whole body to admit, members.
B. Erroneous views as to church government refuted by the foregoing
passages. (a) The world-church theory, or the Romanist view. — This holds that
all local churches are subject to the supreme authority of the bishop of
Rome, as the successor of Peter and the infallible vicegerent of Christ,
and, as thus united, constitute the one and only church of Christ on earth.
We reply :
First, — Christ gave no such supreme authority to Peter. Mat. 16 : 18, 19,
simply refers to the personal position of Peter as first confessor of Christ
and preacher of his name to Jews and GentUes. Hence other apostles
also constituted the foundation ( Eph. 2 : 20 ; Rev. 21 : 14 ). On one occa
sion, the counsel of James was regarded as of equal weight with that of
Peter (Acts 15 : 7-30), whUe on another occasion Peter was rebuked by Paul
( Gal. 2 : 11 ), and Peter caUs himself only a fellow-elder (1 Pet. 5:1).
Secondly, — If Peter had such authority given him, there is no evidence
that he had power to transmit it to others.
Thirdly, — There is no conclusive evidence that Peter ever was at Rome,
much less that he was bishop of Rome.
Fourthly, — There is no evidence that he reaUy did so appoint the bishops
of Rome as his successors.
Fifthly, — If Peter did so appoint the bishops of Rome, the evidence of
continuous succession since that time is lacking.
Sixthly, — There is abundant evidence that a hierarchical form of church
government is corrupting to the church and dishonoring to Christ.
( 6 ) The national-church theory, or the theory of provincial or national
churches. — This holds that aU members of the church in any province or
nation are bound together in provincial or national organization, and that
this organization has jurisdiction over the local churches. We reply :
First, — the theory has no support in the Scriptures. There is no evi
dence that the word kKKknaia in the New Testament ever means a national
church organization. 1 Cor. 12 : 28, PhU. 3 : 6, and 1 Tim. 3 : 15, may be
more naturaUy interpreted as referring to the generic church. In Acts 9 :
31, enKX-riaia is a mere generalization for the local churches then and there
existing, and imphes no sort of organization among them.
Secondly, — It is contradicted by the intercourse which the New Testa
ment churches held with each other as independent bodies, — for example
at the CouncU of Jerusalem (Acts. 15 : 1-35)
Thhdly, — It has no practical advantages over the Congregational pohty,
but rather tends to formahty, division, and the extinction of the principles
of self-government and dhect responsibUity to Christ.

240 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
Fourthly, — It is inconsistent with itself, in binding a professedly spiritual
church by formal and geographical lines.
Fifthly, — It logicaUy leads to the theory of Romanism. If two churches
need a superior authority to control them and settle theh differences, then
two countries and two hemispheres need a common ecclesiastical govern
ment, — and a world-church, under one visible head, is Romanism.
2. Officers of the Church.
A The number of offices in the church is two : — first, the office of
bishop, presbyter, or pastor ; and, secondly, the office of deacon.
(a) That the appeUations 'bishop,' 'presbyter,' and * pastor ' designate
the same office and order of persons, may be shown from Acts 20 : 28 —
k-iondirovc woipalveiv ( cf. 17 — irpeo/3vTepovg ) ; PhU. 1:1; 1 Tim. 3 : 1, 8 ; Titus
1 : 5, 7 ; 1 Pet. 5 : 1, 2 — ¦Kpeafivripovq .... wapaiiaMJ b avpirpeo/Uvrepoc ....
noipdvare noipviov .... k-imo-ovvTe<:. Conybeare and Howson : "The terms
'bishop' and ' elder' are used in the New Testament as equivalent, — the
former denoting (as its meaning of overseer imphes) the duties, the latter
the rank, of the office. " See passages quoted in Gieseler, Church History,
1 : 90, note 1 — as, for example, Jerome : " Apud veteres iidem episcopi et
presbyteri, quia Ulud nomen dignitatis est, hoc setatis. Idem est ergo
presbyter qui episcopus."
( 6 ) The only plausible objection to the identity of the presbyter and the
bishop is that first suggested by Calvin, on the ground of 1 Tim. 5 : 17.
But this text only shows that the one office of presbyter or bishop involved
two kinds of labor, and that certain presbyters or bishops were more suc
cessful in one kind than in the other. That gifts of teaching and ruling
belonged to the same individual, is clear from Acts 20 : 28-31 ; Eph. 4 : 11 ;
Heb. 13 : 7; 1 Tim. 3 : 2 — Mokoitov 6idanTiK6v.
( c ) In certain of the N. T. churches there appears to have been a plu
rahty of elders ( Acts 20 : 17 ; PhU. 1 : 1 ; Tit. 1:5). There is, however,
no evidence that the number of elders was uniform, or that the plurahty
which frequently existed was due to any other cause than the size of the
churches for which these elders cared. The N. T. example, while it per
mits the multiplication of assistant pastors according to need, does not
require a plural eldership in every case ; nor does it render this eldership,
where it exists, of coordinate authority with the church. There are indica
tions, moreover, that, at least in certain churches, the pastor was one, whUe
the deacons were more than one, in number.
B. The duties belonging to these offices.
(a) The pastor, bishop, or elder is :
First, — a spiritual teacher, in public and private ;
Secondly, — administrator of the ordinances ;
Thhdly, —superintendent of the discipline, as weU as presiding officer at
the meetings, of the church.

GOVERNMENT OF THE CHURCH. 241
( 6 ) The deacon is helper to the pastor and the church, in both spiritual
and temporal things.
First, — relieving the pastor of external labors, informing him of the
condition and wants of the church, and forming a bond of union between
pastor and people.
Secondly, — helping the church, by relieving the poor and sick and
ministering in an informal way to the church's spiritual needs, and by
performing certain external duties connected with the service of the
sanctuary. 0. Ordination of officers.
(a) What is ordination ?
Ordination is the setting apart of a person divinely called to a work of
special ministration in the church. It does not involve the communication
of power, — it is simply a recognition of powers previously conferred by
God, and a consequent formal authorization, on the part of the church, to
exercise the gifts already bestowed. This recognition and authorization
should not only be expressed by the vote in which the candidate is
approved by the church or the council which represents it, but should also
be accompanied by a special service of admonition, prayer, and the laying-
on of hands (Acts 6: 5, 6; 13:2, 3; 14:23; ITim. 4:14; 5:22).
Licensure simply commends a man to the churches as fitted to preach.
Ordination recognizes him as set apart to the work of preaching and
administering ordinances, in some particular church or in some designated
field of labor, as representative of the church.
Of his call to the ministry, the candidate himself is to be first persuaded
( 1 Cor. 9:16; 1 Tim. 1 : 12 ) ; but, secondly, the church must be per
suaded also, before he can have authority to minister among them ( 1 Tim.
3:2-7; 4:14; Titus 1 : 6-9.
( b ) Who are to ordain ?
Ordination is the act of the church, not the act of a privileged class in
the church, as the eldership has sometimes wrongly been regarded, nor yet
the act of other churches, assembled by theh representatives in council.
No ecclesiastical authority higher than that of the local church is recognized
in the New Testament. This authority, however, has its limits ; and since
the church has no authority outside of its own body, the candidate for
ordination should be a member of the ordaining church.
Since each church is bound to recognize the presence of the Sphit in
other rightly constituted churches, and its own decisions, in like manner,
are to be recognized by others, it is desirable in ordination, as in all
important steps affecting other churches, that advice be taken before the
candidate is inducted into office, and that other churches be caUed to sit
with it in councU, and if thought best, assist in setting the candidate apart
for the ministry.
It is always to be remembered, however, that the power to ordain rests
with the church, and that the church may proceed without a CouncU, or

242 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
even against the decision of the CouncU. Such ordination, of course, would
give authority only within the bounds of the individual church. Where no
immediate exception is taken to the decision of the CouncU, that decision is
to be regarded as virtually the decision of the church by which it was
called. The same rule applies to a Council's decision to depose from the
ministry. In the absence of immediate protest from the church, the decis
ion of the Council is rightly taken as virtually the decision of the church.
In so far as ordination is an act performed by the local church with the
advice and assistance of other rightly constituted churches, it is justly
regarded as giving formal permission to exercise gifts and administer ordi
nances within the bounds of such churches. Ordination is not, therefore,
to be repeated upon the transfer of the minister's pastoral relation from
one church to another. In every case, however, where a minister from a
body of Christians not Scripturally constituted assumes the pastoral rela
tion in a rightly organized church, there is peculiar propriety, not only in
the examination, by a CouncU, of his Christian experience, caU to the
ministry, and views of doctrine, but also in that act of formal recognition
and authorization which is caUed ordination.
3. Discipline of the Church.
A. Kinds of discipline. — Discipline is of two sorts, according as offences
are private or public, (a) Private offences are to be dealt with according
to the rule in Mat. 5 : 23, 24 ; 18 : 15-17.
(6) Public offences are to be dealt with according to the rule in 1 Cor.
5 : 3-5, 13, and 2 Thess. 3 : 6.
B. Relation of the pastor to discipline. — ( a) He has no original author
ity ; ( b ) but is the organ of the church, and ( e ) superintendent of its
labors for its own purification and for the reclamation of offenders ; and
therefore (d ) may best do the work of discipline, not dhectly, by consti
tuting himself a special policeman or detective, but indirectly, by securing
proper labor on the part of the deacons or brethren of the church.
IV. Relation of Local Churches to one another.
1. The general nature of this relation is that of fellowship between
equals. — Notice here :
(a) The absolute equality of the churches. — No church or councU of
churches, no association or convention or society, can reheve any single
church of its direct responsibUity to Christ, or assume control of its action.
(6) The fraternal feUowship and cooperation of the churches. — No
church can properly ignore, or disregard, the existence or work of other
churches around it. Every other church is presumptively possessed of the
Sphit, in equal measure with itself. There must therefore be sympathy
and mutual furtherance of each other's welfare among churches, as among
individual Christians. Upon this principle are based letters of dismission,
recognition of the pastors of other churches, and aU associational unions,
or unions for common Christian work.

RELATION OF LOCAL CHURCHES TO ONE ANOTHER. 243
2. This felloioship involves the duty of special consultation with
regard to matters affecting the common interest.
(a) The duty of seeking advice. — Since the order and good repute of
each is valuable to all the others, cases of grave importance and difficulty in
internal discipline, as weU as the question of ordaining members to the min
istry, should be submitted to a councU of churches called for the purpose.
(6) The duty of taking advice. — For the same reason, each church
should show readiness to receive admonition from others. So long as this
is in the nature of friendly reminder that the church is guUty of defects
from the doctrine or practice enjoined by Christ, the mutual acceptance of
whose commands is the basis of aU church feUowship, no church can justly
refuse to have such defects pointed out, or to consider the Scripturalness of
its own proceeding. Such admonition or advice, however, whether coming
from a single church or from a councU of churches, is not itself of bind
ing authority. It is simply in the nature of moral suasion. The church
receiving it has stiU to compare it with Christ's laws. The ultimate decis
ion rests enthely with the church so advised or asking advice.
3. This fellowship may be broken by manifest departures from the
faith or practice of the Scriptures, on the part of any church.
In such case, duty to Christ requhes the churches, whose labors to reclaim
a sister church from error have proved unavailing, to withdraw theh feUow
ship from it, untU such time as the erring church shaU return to the path
of duty. In this regard, the law which apphes to individuals applies to
churches, and the polity of the New Testament is congregational rather
than independent.

CHAPTER II.
THE ORDINANCES OF THE CHURCH.
By the ordinances, we mean those outward rites which Christ has
appointed to be administered in his church as visible signs of the saving
truth of the gospel. They are signs, in that they vividly express this truth
and confirm it to the believer.
In contrast with this characteristicaUy Protestant view, the Romanist
regards the ordinances as actuaUy conferring grace and producing holiness.
Instead of being the external manifestation of a preceding union with
Christ, they are the physical means of constituting and maintaining this
union. With the Romanist, in this particular, sacramentahsts of every
name substantially agree. The Papal Church holds to seven sacraments or
ordinances: — ordination, confirmation, matrimony, extreme unction, pen
ance, baptism, and the eucharist. The ordinances prescribed in the N. T.,
however, are two and only two, viz. : — Baptism and the Lord's Supper.
I. Baptism.
Christian Baptism is the immersion of a believer in water, in token of his
previous entrance into the communion of Christ's death and resurrection, —
or, in other words, in token of his regeneration through union with Christ.
1. Baptism an Ordinance of Christ.
A Proof that Christ instituted an external rite caUed baptism.
(a) From the words of the great commission ; ( 6 ) from the injunctions
of the apostles ; ( c ) from the fact that the members of the New Testament
churches were baptized behevers ; (d) from the universal practice of such
a rite in Christian churches of subsequent times.
B. This external rite intended by Christ to be of universal and per
petual obhgation.
(a) Christ recognized John the Baptist's commission to baptize as
derived immediately from heaven.
( b ) In his own submission to John's baptism, Christ gave testimony to
the binding obligation of the ordinance (Mat. 3 : 13-17). John's baptism
was essentially Christian baptism (Acts 19 : 4), although the fuU signifi
cance of it was not understood until after Jesus' death and resurrection
(Mat. 20 : 17-23; Luke 12 : 60; Rom. 6 : 3-6).
(c) In continuing the practice of baptism through his disciples (John
4 : 1, 2 ), and in enjoining it upon them as part of a work which was to last
244

BAPTISM. 245
to the end of the world (Mat. 28 : 19, 20), Christ manifestly adopted and
appointed baptism as the invariable law of his church.
(d) The analogy of the ordinance of the Lord's Supper also leads to the
conclusion that baptism is to be observed as an authoritative memorial of
Christ and his truth, until his second coming.
(e) There is no intimation whatever that the command of baptism is
limited, or to be limited, in its apphcation, — that it has been or ever is to
be repealed ; and, untfl some evidence of such limitation or repeal is pro
duced, the statute must be regarded as universaUy binding.
2. The Mode of Baptism.
This is immersion, and immersion only. This appears from the foUow
ing considerations :
A The command to baptize is a command to immerse. — We show this :
(a) From the meaning of the original word J3a-T%u. That this is to
immerse, appears:
First, — from the usage of Greek writers — including the church Fathers,
when they do not speak of the Christian rite, and the authors of the Greek
version of the Old Testament.
Secondly, — every passage where the word occurs in the New Testament
either requires or aUows the meaning 'immerse.'
Thhdly, — the absence of any use of the word in the passive voice with
•water' as its subject confirms our conclusion that its meaning is "to
immerse." Water is never said to be baptized upon a man.
(6 ) From the use of the verb /Jajrrifw with prepositions :
First, — with eig ( Mark 1:9 — where 'lopSdvriv is the element into which
the person passes in the act of being baptized ).
Secondly, — with kv ( Mark 1 : 5, 8 ; cf. Mat. 3:11. John 1 : 26, 31, 33 ;
cf. Acts 2 :2, 4). In these texts, kv is to be taken, not instrumentaUy, but
as indicating the element in which the immersion takes place.
( c ) From circumstances attending the administration of the ordinance
( Mark 1 : 10 — dva/laivuv en tov iidarog ; John 3 : 23 — iidara iroXld ; Acts 8 : 38,
39 — Karef3?iaav el( to iidup .... dvefSqaav i/c tov vdaroc ).
( d ) From figurative aUusions to the ordinance.
( e ) From the testimony of church history as to the practice of the early
church. (/) From the doctrine and practice of the Greek church.
The prevailing usage of any word determines the sense it bears, when
found in a command of Christ. We have seen, not only that the prevail
ing usage of the Greek language determines the meaning of the word
' baptize ' to be ' immerse,' but that this is its fundamental, constant, and
only meaning. The original command to baptize is therefore a command
to immerse.

246 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
B. No church has the right to modify or dispense with this command
of Christ. This is jflain :
(a) From the nature of the church. Notice :
First, — that, besides the local church, no other visible church of Christ
is known to the New Testament. Secondly, — that the local church is not
a legislative, but is simply an executive, body. Only the authority which
originaUy imposed its laws can amend or abrogate them. Thhdly, — that
the local church cannot delegate to any organization or council of churches
any power which it does not itself rightfuUy possess. Fourthly, — that the
opposite principle puts the church above the Scriptures and above Christ,
and would sanction aU the usurpations of Rome.
( 6 ) From the nature of God's command :
First, — as forming a part, not only of the law, but of the fundamental
law, of the church of Christ. The power claimed for a church to change
it is not only legislative but constitutional. Secondly, — as expressing the
wisdom of the Lawgiver. Power to change the command can be claimed
for the church, only on the ground that Christ has failed to adapt the
ordinance to changing chcumstances, and has made obedience to it unneces
sarily difficult and humiliating. Thhdly, — as providing in immersion the
only adequate symbol of those saving truths of the gospel which both of
the ordinances have it for theh office to set forth, and without which they
become empty ceremonies and forms. In other words, the church has no
right to change the method of administering the ordinance, because such a
change vacates the ordinance of its essential meaning. As this argument,
however, is of such vital importance, we present it more fully in a special
discussion of the Symbolism of Baptism.
3. The Symbolism of Baptism.
Baptism symbolizes the previous entrance of the believer into the com
munion of Christ's death and resurrection, — or, in other words, regenera
tion through union with Christ.
A. Expansion of this statement as to the symbolism of baptism. Bap
tism, more particularly, is a symbol :
(a) Of the death and resurrection of Christ.
(6) Of the purpose of that death and resurrection, — namely, to atone
for sin, and to deliver sinners from its penalty and power.
(c) Of the accomplishment of that purpose in the person baptized, —
who thus professes his death to sin and resurrection to spiritual life.
(d) Of the method in which that purpose is accomphshed, — by union
with Christ, receiving him and giving one's self to him by faith.
(e) Of the consequent union of all believers in Christ.
(/) Of the death and resurrection of the body, — which wiU complete
the work of Christ in us, and which Christ's death and resurrection assure
to all his members.

BAPTISM. 247
B. Inferences from the passages referred to :
(a) The central truth set forth by baptism is the death and resurrection
of Christ, — and our own death and resurrection only as connected with that.
(6) The correlative truth of the behever's death and resurrection, set
forth in baptism, imphes, first,— confession of sin and humUiation on
account of it, as deserving of death; secondly, — declaration of Christ's
death for sin, and of the behever's acceptance of Christ's substitutionary
work; thhdly,— acknowledgment that the soul has become partaker of
Christ's life, and now lives only in and for him.
(c) Baptism symbolizes purification, but purification in a peculiar and
divine way, — namely, through the death of Christ and the entrance of the
soul into communion with that death. The radical defect of sprinkling or
pouring as a mode of administering the ordinance, is that it does not point
to Christ's death as the procuring cause of our purification.
( d) In baptism we show forth the Lord's death as the original sour oecf
holiness and life in our souls, just as in the Lord's Supper we show forth
the Lord's death as the source of aU nourishment and strength after this
life of holiness has been once begun. As the Lord's Supper symbolizes
the sanctifying power of Jesus' death, so baptism symbolizes its regener
ating power.
( e ) There are two reasons, therefore, why nothing but immersion wfll
satisfy the design of the ordinance : first, — because nothing else can sym
bolize the radical nature of the change effepted in regeneration — a change
from spiritual death to spiritual hfe ; secondly, — because nothing else can
set forth the fact that this change is due to the entrance of the soul into
communion with the death and resurrection of Christ.
(/) To substitute for baptism anything which excludes aU symbolic
reference to the death of Christ, is to destroy the ordinance, just as substi
tuting for the broken bread and poured out wine of the communion some
form of administration which leaves out all reference to the death of Christ
would be to destroy the Lord's Supper, and to celebrate an ordinance of
human invention.
4. The Subjects of Baptism.
The proper subjects of baptism are those only who give credible evidence
that they have been regenerated by the Holy Spirit, — or, in other words,
have entered by faith into the communion of Christ's death and resurrection.
A. Proof that only persons giving evidence of being regenerated are
proper subjects of baptism :
( a ) From the command and example of Christ and his apostles, which
show :
First, that those only are to be baptized who have previously been made
disciples. Secondly, that those only are to be baptized who have previously
repented and believed.

248 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
( b ) From the nature of the church — as a company of regenerate persons.
(c) From the symbolism of the ordinance, — as declaring a previous
spiritual change in him who submits to it.
B. Inferences from the fact that only persons giving evidence of being
regenerate are proper subjects of baptism :
(a) Since only those who give credible evidence of regeneration are
proper subjects of baptism, baptism cannot be the means of regeneration.
It is the appointed sign, but is never the condition, of the forgiveness of
sins. Passages like Mat. 3:11; Markl:4; 16:16; John3:5; Acts2:38; 22:
16 ; Eph. 5 : 26 ; Titus 3:5; and Heb. 10 : 22, are to be explained as par
ticular instances "of the general fact that, in Scripture language, a single
part of a complex action, and even that part of it which is most obvious
to the senses, is often mentioned for the whole of it, and thus, in this case,
the whole of the solemn transaction is designated by the external symbol. "
In other words, the entire change, internal and external, spiritual and
ritual, is referred to in language belonging strictly only to the outward
aspect of it. So the other ordinance is referred to by simply naming the
visible "breaking of bread," and the whole transaction of the ordination
of ministers is termed the ' ' imposition of hands " ( cf. Acts 2 : 42 ; 1 Tim.
4 : 14).
( 6 ) As the profession of a spiritual change already wrought, baptism is
primarily the act, not of the administrator, but of the person baptized.
Upon the person newly regenerate the command of Christ first ter
minates ; only upon his giving evidence of the change within him does it
become the duty of the church to see that he has opportunity to foUow
Christ in baptism. Since baptism is primarUy the act of the convert, no
lack of qualification on the part of the administrator invalidates the bap
tism, so long as the proper outward act is performed, with intent on the
part of the person baptized to express the fact of a preceding spiritual
renewal (Acts 2: 37, 38).
( c ) As intrusted with the administration of the ordinances, however, the
church is, on its part, to require of all candidates for baptism credible evi
dence of regeneration.
This foUows from the nature of the church and its duty to maintain its
own existence as an institution of Christ. The church which cannot restrict
admission into its membership to such as are hke itself in character and
aims must soon cease to be a church by becoming indistinguishable from
the world. The duty of the church to gain credible evidence of regenera
tion in the case of every person admitted into the body involves its right to
require of candidates, in addition to a profession of faith with the lips,
some satisfactory proof that this profession is accompanied by change in
the conduct. The kind and amount of evidence which would have justified
the reception of a candidate in times of persecution may not now constitute
a sufficient proof of change of heart.

BAPTISM. 249
(d) As the outward expression of the inward change by which the
behever enters into the kingdom of God, baptism is the first, in point of
time, of all outward duties.
Regeneration and baptism, although not holding to each other the rela
tion of effect and cause, are both regarded in the New Testament as essen
tial to the restoration of man's right relations to God and to his people.
They properly constitute parts of one whole, and are not to be unnecessarUy
separated. Baptism should foUow regeneration with the least possible
delay, after the candidate and the church have gained evidence that a
spiritual change has been accomplished within him. No other duty and no
other ordinance can properly precede it.
(e) Since regeneration is a work accomplished once for aU, the baptism
which symbolizes this regeneration is not to be repeated.
Even where the persuasion exists, on the part of the candidate, that at
the time of baptism he was mistaken in thinking himself regenerated, the
ordinance is not to be administered again, so long as it has once been sub
mitted to, with honest intent, as a profession of faith in Christ. We argue
this from the absence of any reference to second baptisms in the New Tes
tament, and from the grave practical difficulties attending the opposite
view. In Acts 19 : 1-5, we have an instance, not of rebaptism, but of the
baptism for the first time of certain persons who had been wrongly taught
with regard to the nature of John the Baptist's doctrine, and so had igno-
rantly submitted to an outward rite which had in it no reference to Jesus
Christ and expressed no faith in him as a Savior. This was not John's
baptism, nor was it in any sense true baptism. For this reason Paul com
manded them to be "baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus."
(/) So long as the mode and the subjects are such as Christ has enjoined,
mere accessories are matters of individual judgment.
The use of natural rather than of artificial baptisteries is not to be elevated
into an essential. The formula of baptism prescribed by Christ is " into
the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Sphit."
C. Infant Baptism.
This we reject and reprehend, for the foUowing reasons :
(a) Infant baptism is without warrant, either express or implied, in the
Scripture. First, — there is no express command that infants should be baptized.
Secondly, — there is no clear example of the baptism of infants. Thirdly, —
the passages held to imply infant baptism contain, when fairly interpreted,
no reference to such a practice. In Mat. 19 : 14, none would have ' forbid
den,' if Jesus and his disciples had been in the habit of baptizing infants.
From Acts 16 : 15, cf. 40, and Acts 16 : 33, cf. 34, Neander says that we
cannot infer infant baptism. For 1 Cor. 16 : 15 shows that the whole
famUyof Stephanas, baptized by Paul, were adults (1 Cor. 1 : 16). It is
impossible to suppose a whole heathen household baptized upon the faith
of its head. As to 1 Cor. 7 : 14, Jacobi caUs this text "a sure testimony
against infant baptism, since Paul would certainly have referred to the

250 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
baptism of children as a proof of theh hohness, if infant baptism had been
practised. " Moreover, this passage would in that case equaUy teach the
baptism of the unconverted husband of a beheving wife. It plainly proves
that the children of Christian parents were no more baptized and had no
closer connection with the Christian church, than the unbelieving partners
of Christians.
(6) Infant baptism is expressly contradicted :
First, — by the Scriptural prerequisites of faith and repentance, as signs
of regeneration. In the great commission, Matthew speaks of baptizing
disciples, and Mark of baptizing behevers ; but infants are neither of these.
Secondly, — by the Scriptural symbolism of the ordinance. As we should
not bury a person before his death, so we should not symbolicaUy bury a
person by baptism until he has in spirit died to sin. Thirdly, — by the
Scriptural constitution of the church. The church is a company of persons
whose union with one another presupposes and expresses a previous con
scious and voluntary union of each with Jesus Christ. But of this conscious
and voluntary union with Christ infants are not capable. Fourthly, — by
the Scriptural prerequisites for participation in the Lord's Supper. Parti
cipation in the Lord's Supper is the right only of those who can discern
the Lord's body ( 1 Cor. 11 : 29). No reason can be assigned for restrict
ing to inteUigent communicants the ordinance of the Supper, which would
not equaUy restrict to inteUigent behevers the ordinance of Baptism.
( e ) The rise of infant baptism in the history of the church is due to
sacramental conceptions of Christianity, so that aU arguments in its favor
from the writings of the first three centuries are equaUy arguments for
baptismal regeneration.
(d) The reasoning by which it is supported is unscriptural, unsound,
and dangerous in its tendency :
First, — in assuming the power of the church to modify or abrogate a
command of Christ. This has been sufficiently answered above. Secondly,
— in maintaining that infant baptism takes the place of circumcision under
the Abrahamic covenant. To this we reply that the view contradicts the
New Testament idea of the church, by making it a hereditary body, in
which fleshly birth, and not the new birth, qualifies for membership. "As
the national Israel typified the spiritual Israel, so the circumcision which
immediately foUowed, not preceded, natural birth, bids us baptize chUdren,
not before, but after spiritual birth." Thirdly, — in declaring that baptism
belongs to the infant because of an organic connection of the child with
the parent, which permits the latter to stand for the former and to make
profession of faith for it, — faith aheady existing germinaUy in the chUd by
virtue of this organic union, and certain for the same reason to be developed
as the chUd grows to maturity. "A law of organic connection as regards
character subsisting between the parent and the chUd, — such a connection
as induces the conviction that the character of the one is actually included
in the character of the other, as the seed is formed in the capsule." We
object to this view that it unwarrantably confounds the personality of the
child with that of the parent ; practioaUy ignores the necessity of the Holy

THE LORD'S SUPPER. 251
Spirit's regenerating influences in the case of chUdren of Christian parents ;
and presumes in such chUdren a gracious state which facts conclusively
show not to exist.
(e) The lack of agreement among pedobaptists as to the warrant for
infant baptism and as to the relation of baptized infants to the church,
together with the manifest decline of the practice itself, are arguments
against it.
The propriety of infant baptism is variously argued, says Dr. BushneU,
upon the ground of "natural innocence, inherited depravity, and federal
holiness ; because of the infant's own character, the parent's piety, and the
church's faith ; for the reason that the child is an heir of salvation aheady,
and in order to make it such  No settled opinion on infant baptism
and on Christian nurture has ever been attained to."
(/) The evU effects of infant baptism are a strong argument against it :
First, — in forestalling the voluntary act of the child baptized, and thus
practioaUy preventing his personal obedience to Christ's commands.
Secondly, — in inducing superstitious confidence in an outward rite as
possessed of regenerating efficacy.
Thhdly, — in obscuring and corrupting Christian truth with regard to
the sufficiency of Scripture, the connection of the ordinances, and the
inconsistency of an impenitent hfe with church-membership.
Fourthly, — in destroying the church as a spiritual body, by merging it
in the nation and the world.
Fifthly, — in putting into the place of Christ's command a commandment
of men, and so admitting the essential principle of all heresy, schism, and
false religion.
H. The Lord's Supper.
The Lord's Supper is that outward rite in which the assembled church
eats bread broken and drinks wine poured forth by its appointed represen
tative, in token of its constant dependence on the once crucified, now risen
Savior, as source of its spiritual hfe ; or, in other words, in token of that
abiding communion of Christ's death and resurrection through which the
hfe begun in regeneration is sustained and perfected.
1. The Lord's Supper an ordinance instituted by Christ.
(a) Christ appointed an outward rite to be observed by his disciples in
remembrance of his death. It was to be observed after his death ; only
after his death could it completely fulfil its purpose as a feast of commem
oration. ( b ) From the apostohc injunction with regard to its celebration in the
church until Christ's second coming, we infer that it was the original inten
tion of our Lord to institute a rite of perpetual and universal obhgation.
(c) The uniform practice of the N. T. churches, and the celebration of
such a rite in subsequent ages by almost aU churches professing to be

252 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
Christian, is best explained upon the supposition that the Lord's Supper is
an ordinance established by Christ himself.
2. The Mode of administering the Lord's Supper.
(a) The elements are bread and wine.
(6) The communion is of both kinds, — that is, communicants are to
partake both of the bread and of the wine.
( c) The partaking of these elements is of a festal nature.
( d) The communion is a festival of commemoration, — not simply bring
ing Christ to our remembrance, but making proclamation of his death to
the world.
( e ) It is to be celebrated by the assembled church. It is not a sohtary
observance on the part of individuals. No "showing forth" is possible
except in company.
(/) The responsibUity of seeing that the ordinance is properly adminis
tered rests with the church as a body ; and the pastor is, in this matter, the
proper representative and organ of the church. In cases of extreme
exigency, however, as where the church has no pastor and no ordained
minister can be secured, it is competent for the church to appoint one from
its own number to administer the ordinance.
(g) The frequency with which the Lord's Supper is to be administered
is not indicated either by the N. T. precept or by uniform N. T. example.
We have instances both of its daily and of its weekly observance. With
respect to this, as well as with respect to the accessories of the ordinance,
the church is to exercise a sound discretion.
3. The Symbolism of the Lord's Supper.
The Lord's Supper sets forth, in general, the death of Christ as the
sustaining power of the behever's life.
A. Expansion of this statement.
(a) It symbolizes the death of Christ for our sins.
( 6 ) It symbolizes our personal appropriation of the benefits of that death.
( c ) It symbolizes the method of this appropriation, through union with
Christ himself.
(d) It symbolizes the continuous dependence of the behever for all
spiritual life upon the once crucified, now hving, Savior, to whom he is
thus united.
(e) It symbolizes the sanctification of the Christian through a spiritual
reproduction in him of the death and resurrection of the Lord.
(/) It symbolizes the consequent union of Christians in Christ, theh
head. ( g ) It symbolizes the coming joy and perfection of the kingdom of God.

THE lord's supper. 253
B. Inferences from this statement.
( a ) The connection between the Lord's Supper and Baptism consists in
this, that they both and equaUy are symbols of the death of Christ. In
Baptism, we show forth the death of Christ as the procuring cause of our
new birth into the kingdom of God. In the Lord's Supper, we show forth
the death of Christ as the sustaining power of our spiritual life after it has
once begun. In the one, we honor the sanctifying power of the death of
Christ, as in the other we honor its regenerating power. Thus both are
parts of one whole, — setting before us Christ's death for men in its two
great purposes and results.
( 6 ) The Lord's Supper is to be often repeated, — as symbolizing Christ's
constant nourishment of the soul, whose new birth was signified in Baptism.
( c ) The Lord's Supper, hke Baptism, is the symbol of a previous state
of grace. It has in itself no regenerating and no sanctifying power, but is
the symbol by which the relation of the behever to Christ, his sanctifier, is
vividly expressed and strongly confirmed.
(d) The blessing received from participation is therefore dependent
upon, and proportioned to, the faith of the communicant.
( e ) The Lord's Supper expresses primarUy the fellowship of the behever,
not with his brethren, but with Christ, his Lord.
4. Erroneous views of the Lord's Supper.
A The Romanist view, — that the bread and wine are changed by
priestly consecration into the very body and blood of Christ ; that this con
secration is a new offering of Christ's sacrifice ; and that, by a physical
partaking of the elements, the communicant receives saving grace from
God. To this doctrine of " transubstantiation'' we reply :
( a ) It rests upon a false interpretation of Scripture. In Mat. 26 : 26,
" this is my body " means : ' ' this is a symbol of my body. " Since Christ
was with the disciples in visible form at the institution of the Supper, he
could not have intended them to recognize the bread as being his literal
body. " The body of Christ is present in the bread, just as it had been in
the passover lamb, of which the bread took the place " (John 6 : 53 contains
no reference to the Lord's Supper, although it describes that sphitual union
with Christ which the Supper symbolizes; cf. 63. In 1 Cor. 10 : 16, 17,
noivulav tov o&paToe tov Xpiarov is a figurative expression for the spiritual
partaking of Christ. In Mark 8 : 33, we are not to infer that Peter was
actuaUy " Satan," nor does 1 Cor. 12 : 12 prove that we are all Christs. Cf.
Gen. 41:26; 1 Cor. 10:4).
(5) It contradicts the evidence of the senses, as well as of aU scientific
tests that can be applied. If we cannot trust our senses as to the unchanged
material quahties of bread and wine, we cannot trust them when they
report to us the words of Christ.
( c ) It involves the denial of the completeness of Christ's past sacrifice,
and the assumption that a human priest can repeat or add to the atonement

254 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
made by Christ once for aU (Heb. 9 : 28 — a.ira% npooevex&ek). The Lord's
Supper is never called a sacrifice, nor are altars, priests, or consecrations
ever spoken of, in the New Testament. The priests of the old dispensation
are expressly contrasted with the ministers of the new. The former
"ministered about sacred things," i. e., performed sacred rites and waited
at the altar; but the latter "preach the gospel" (1 Cor. 9 : 13, 14).
(d) It destroys Christianity by externalizing it. Romanists make aU
other service a mere appendage to the communion. Physical and magical
salvation is not Christianity, but is essential paganism.
B. The Lutheran and High Church view, — that the communicant, in
partaking of the consecrated elements, eats the veritable body and drinks
the veritable blood of Christ in and with the bread and wine, although the
elements themselves do not cease to be material. To this doctrine of
" consubstantiation " we object :
(a) That the view is not required by Scripture. — AU the passages cited
in its support may be better interpreted as referring to a partaking of the
elements as symbols. If Christ's body be ubiquitous, as this theory holds,
we partake of it at every meal, as really as at the Lord's Supper.
( 6 ) That the view is inseparable from the general sacramental system of
which it forms a part. — In imposing physical and material conditions of
receiving Christ, it contradicts the doctrine of justification only by faith ;
changes the ordinance from a sign, into a means, of salvation ; involves the
necessity of a sacerdotal order for the sake of properly consecrating the
elements ; and logicaUy tends to the Romanist conclusions of ritualism and
idolatry. ( e ) That it holds each communicant to be a partaker of Christ's veritable
body and blood, whether he be a believer or not, — the result, in the absence
of faith, being condemnation instead of salvation. Thus the whole char
acter of the ordinance is changed from a festival occasion to one of mystery
and fear, and the whole gospel method of salvation is obscured.
5. Prerequisites to Participation in the Lord's Supper.
A. There are prerequisites. This we argue from the fact :
(a) That Christ enjoined the celebration of the Supper, not upon the
world at large, but only upon his disciples ; ( 6 ) that the apostohc injunc
tions to Christians, to separate themselves from certain of their number,
imply a limitation of the Lord's Supper to a narrower body, even among
professed believers ; ( c ) that the analogy of Baptism, as belonging only to
a specified class of persons, leads us to beheve that the same is true of the
Lord's Supper.
B. The prerequisites are those only which are expressly or implicitly
laid down by Christ and his apostles.
(a) The church, as possessing executive but not legislative power, is
charged with the duty, not of framing rules for the administering and
guarding of the ordinance, but of discovering and applying the rules given

THE lord's supper. 255
it in the New Testament. No church has a right to establish any terms of
communion ; it is responsible only for making known the terms established
by Christ and his apostles. (6) These terms, however, are to be ascer
tained not only from the injunctions, but also from the precedents, of the
New Testament. Since the apostles were inspired, New Testament prece
dent is the "common law " of the church.
C. On examining the New Testament, we find that the prerequisites to
participation in the Lord's Supper are four, namely :
First, — Regeneration.
The Lord's Supper is the outward expression of a life in the behever,
nourished and sustained by the life of Christ. It cannot therefore be par
taken of by one who is "dead through .... trespasses and sins." We
give no food to a corpse. The Lord's Supper was never offered by the
apostles to unbelievers. On the contrary, the injunction that each com
municant "examine himself " implies that faith which wUl enable the com
municant to "discern the Lord's body" is a prerequisite to participation.
Secondly, — Baptism.
In proof that baptism is a prerequisite to the Lord's Supper, we urge
the foUowing considerations :
(a) The ordinance of baptism was instituted and administered long
before the Supper.
(6) The apostles who first celebrated it had, in aU probability, been
baptized. (c) The command of Christ fixes the place of baptism as first in order
after discipleship.
( d ) All the recorded cases show this to have been the order observed by
the first Christians and sanctioned by the apostles.
( e ) The symbolism of the ordinances requhes that baptism should pre
cede the Lord's Supper. The order of the facts signified must be expressed
in the order of the ordinances which signify them ; else the world is
taught that sanctification may take place without regeneration. Birth must
come before sustenance — 'nascimur, pascimur.' To enjoy ceremonial
privileges, there must be ceremonial qualifications. As none but the
circumcised could eat the passover, so before eating with the Christian
family must come adoption into the Christian family.
(/) The standards of aU evangelical denominations, with unimportant
exceptions, confirm the view that this is the natural interpretation of the
Scripture requirements respecting the order of the ordinances.
( g ) The practical results of the opposite view are convincing proof
that the order here insisted on is the order of nature as weU as of Scripture.
The admission of unbaptized persons to the communion tends always to,
and has frequently resulted in, the disuse of baptism itself, the obscuring
of the truth which it symbolizes, the transformation of Scripturally consti-

256 ECOLESIOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
tuted churches into bodies organized after methods of human invention,
and the complete destruction of both church and ordinances as Christ
originaUy constituted them.
Thirdly, — Church membership.
( a ) The Lord's Supper is a church ordinance, observed by churches of
Christ as such. For this reason, membership in the church naturaUy pre
cedes communion. Since communion is a famUy rite, the participant
should first be a member of the famUy.
( b ) The Lord's Supper is a symbol of church feUowship. Excommu
nication implies nothing, if it does not imply exclusion from the commun
ion. If the Supper is simply communion of the individual with Christ,
then the church has no right to exclude any from it.
Fourthly, — An orderly walk.
Disorderly walking designates a course of hfe in a church member whbh
is contrary to the precepts of the gospel. It is a bar to participation in the
Lord's Supper, the sign of church fellowship. With Arnold, we may class
disorderly walking under four heads : —
( a ) Immoral conduct.
( b ) Disobedience to the commands of Christ.
( c ) Heresy, or the holding and teaching of false doctrine.
(d ) Schism, or the promotion of division and dissension in the church.
— This also requhes exclusion from church fellowship, and from the Lord's
Supper which is its appointed sign.
D. The local church is the judge whether these prerequisites are ful
filled in the case of persons desiring to partake of the Lord's Supper. —
This is evident from the following considerations :
(a) The command to observe the ordinance was given, not to individu
als, but to a company.
( b ) Obedience to this command is not an individual act, but is the joint
act of many.
(c) The regular observance of the Lord's Supper cannot be secured,
nor the qualifications of persons desiring to participate in it be scrutinized,
unless some distinct organized body is charged with this responsibUity.
( d ) The only organized body known to the New Testament is the local
church, and this is the only body, of any sort, competent to have charge of
the ordinances. The invisible church has no officers.
( e ) The New Testament accounts indicate that the Lord's Supper was
observed only at regular appointed meetings of local churches, and was
observed by these churches as regularly organized bodies.
(/) Since the duty of examining the qualifications of candidates for
baptism and for membership is vested in the local church and is essential
to its distinct existence, the analogy of the ordinances would lead us to

THE lord's supper. 257
beheve that the scrutiny of quaUfications for participation in the Lord's
Supper rests with the same body.
( g ) This care that only proper persons are admitted to the ordinances
should be shown, not by open or forcible debarring of the unworthy at the
time of the celebration, but by previous pubhc instruction of the congre
gation, and, if needful in the case of persistent offenders, by subsequent
private and friendly admonition.
E. Special objections to open communion.
The advocates of this view claim that baptism, as not being an indispen
sable term of salvation, cannot properly be made an indispensable term of
communion. In addition to what has already been said, we reply :
( a ) This view is contrary to the belief and practice of aU but an insig
nificant fragment of organized Christendom.
( 6 ) It assumes an unscriptural inequality between the two ordinances.
The Lord's Supper holds no higher rank in Scripture than does Baptism.
The obhgation to commune is no more binding than the obhgation to pro
fess faith by being baptized. Open communion, however, treats baptism
as if it were optional, whUe it insists upon communion as indispensable.
( c ) It tends to do away with baptism altogether. If the highest privi
lege of church membership may be enjoyed without baptism, baptism loses
its place and importance as the initiatory ordinance of the church.
( d ) It tends to do away with aU discipline. When Christians offend,
the church must withdraw its feUowship from them. But upon the prin
ciple of open communion, such withdrawal is impossible, since the Lord's
Supper, the highest expression of church feUowship, is open to every
person who regards himself as a Christian.
( e ) It tends to do away with the visible church altogether. For no
visible church is possible, unless some sign of membership be required, in
addition to the signs of membership in the invisible church. Open com
munion logicaUy leads to open church membership, and a church member
ship open to all, without reference to the qualifications required in
Scripture, or without examination on the part of the church as to the
existence of these qualifications in those who unite with it, is virtuaUy
an identification of the church with the world, and, without protest from
ScripturaUy constituted bodies, would finaUy result in its actual extinction.

PAET VIII.
ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FLNAL THINGS.
Neither the individual Christian character, nor the Christian church as a
whole, attains its destined perfection in this life ( Rom. 8 : 24 ). This per
fection is reached in the world to come ( 1 Cor. 13 : 10 ). As preparing the
way for the kingdom of God in its completeness, certain events are to take
place, such as death, Christ's second coming, the resurrection of the body,
the general judgment. As stages in the future condition of men, there is
to be an intermediate and an ultimate state, both for the righteous and for
the wicked. We discuss these events and states in what appears from
Scripture to be the order of theh occurrence.
I. Physical Death.
Physical death is the separation of the soul from the body. We distin
guish it from spiritual death, or the separation of the soul from God ; and
from the second death, or the banishment from God and final misery of the
reunited soul and body of the wicked.
Although physical death falls upon the unbeliever as the original penalty
of sin, to all who are united in Christ it loses its aspect of penalty, and
becomes a means of discipline and of entrance into eternal life.
To neither saint nor sinner is death a cessation of being. This we main
tain, against the advocates of annihilation :
1. Upon rational grounds.
(a) The metaphysical argument. — The soul is simple, not compounded.
Death, in matter, is the separation of parts. But in the soul there are no
parts to be separated. The dissolution of the body, therefore, does not
necessarUy work a dissolution of the soul. But, since there is an immate
rial principle in the brute, and this argument taken by itself might seem to
prove the immortahty of the animal creation equally with that of man, we
pass to consider the next argument.
( b ) The teleological argument. — Man, as an inteUectual, moral, and
reUgious being, does not attain the end of his existence on earth. His
development is imperfect here. Divine wisdom wiU not leave its work
incomplete. There must be a hereafter for the full growth of man's powers,
and for the satisfaction of his aspirations. Created, unlike the brute, with
infinite capacities for moral progress, there must be an immortal existence
in which those capacities shaU be brought into exercise. Though the
wicked forfeit ah claim to this future, we have here an argument from
God's love and wisdom to the immortahty of the righteous.
258

PHYSICAL DEATH. 259
( c) The ethical argument. —Man is not, in this world, adequately pun
ished for his evU deeds. Our sense of justice leads us to believe that God's
moral administration wiU be vindicated in a hfe to come. Mere extinction
of being would not be a sufficient penalty, nor would it permit degrees of
punishment corresponding to degrees of guUt. This is therefore an argu
ment from God's justice to the immortality of the wicked. The guUty con
science demands a state after death for punishment.
(d) The historical argument. — The popular belief of all nations and
ages shows that the idea of immortality is natural to the human mind. It
is not sufficient to say that this indicates only such desire for continued
earthly existence as is necessary to self-preservation ; for multitudes expect
a hfe beyond death without desiring it, and multitudes deshe a heavenly
i f e without caring for the earthly. This testimony of man's nature to
immortahty may be regarded as the testimony of the God who made the
nature. We conclude our statement of these rational proofs with the acknowledg
ment that they rest upon the presupposition that there exists a God of truth,
wisdom, justice, and love, who has made man in his image, and who desires
to commune with his creatures. We acknowledge, moreover, that these
proofs give us, not an absolute demonstration, but only a balance of proba
bility, in favor of man's immortality. We turn therefore to Scripture for
the clear revelation of a fact of which reason furnishes us httle more than
a presumption. 2. Upon scriptural grounds.
( a ) The account of man's creation, and the subsequent aUusions to it
in Scripture, show that, while the body was made corruptible and subject
to death, the soul was made in the image of God, incorruptible and
immortal. ( b ) The account of the curse in Genesis, and the subsequent aUusions to
it in Scripture, show that, whUe the death then incurred includes the dis
solution of the body, it does not include cessation of being on the part of
the soul, but only designates that state of the soul which is the opposite
of true life, viz., a state of banishment from God, of unholiness, and of
misery. ( e ) The Scriptural expressions, held by annihUationists to imply cessa
tion of being on the part of the wicked, are used not only in connections
where they cannot bear this meaning (Esther 4:16), but in connections
where they imply the opposite.
( d ) The passages held to prove the annihilation of the wicked at death
cannot have this meaning, since the Scriptures f oreteU a resurrection of the
unjust as weU as of the just ; and a second death, or a misery of the reunited
soul and body, in the case of the wicked.
( e ) The words used in Scripture to denote the place of departed sphits
have in them no implication of annihilation, and the allusions to the condi
tion of the departed show that death, to the writers of the Old and the New

260 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS.
Testaments, although it was the termination of man's earthly existencej
was not an extinction of his being or his consciousness.
(/) The terms and phrases which have been held to declare absolute
cessation of existence at death are frequently metaphorical, and an exami
nation of them in connection with the context and with other Scriptures is
sufficient to show the untenableness of the Uteral interpretation put upon
them by the annihUationists, and to prove that the language is merely the
language of appearance.
(g ) The Jewish belief in a conscious existence after death is proof that
the theory of annihilation rests upon a misinterpretation of Scripture.
That such a behef in the immortahty of the soul existed among the Jews is
abundantly evident : from the knowledge of a future state possessed by the
Egyptians ( Acts 7 : 22 ) ; from the accounts of the translation of Enoch and
of Ehjah ( Gen. 5 : 24 ; cf. Heb. 11 : 5. 2 K 2 : 11) ; from the invocation
of the dead which was practised, although forbidden by the law ( 1 Sam.
28 : 7-14 ; cf. Lev. 20 : 28 ; Deut. 18 : 10, 11 ) ; from aUusions in the O. T.
to resurrection, future retribution, and life beyond the grave ( Job
19 : 25-27 ; Ps. 16 : 9-11 ; Is. 26 : 19 ; Ez. 37 : 1-14 ; Dan. 12 : 2, 3, 13 ) ;
and from distinct declarations of such faith by Philo and Josephus, as weU
as by the writers of the N. T. (Mat. 22 :31, 32 ; Acts 23 : 6 ; 26 : 6-8 ;
Heb. 11:13-16).
( h ) The most impressive and conclusive of all proofs of immortality,
however, is afforded in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, — a work accom
plished by his own power, and demonstrating that the sphit lived after its
separation from the body ( John 2 : 19, 21 ; 10 : 17, 18 ). By coming back
from the tomb, he proves that death is not annihilation ( 2 Tim. 1 : 10 ).
II. The Intermediate State.
The Scriptures affirm the conscious existence of both the righteous and
the wicked, after death, and prior to the resurrection. In the intermediate
state the soul is without a body, yet this state is for the righteous a state
of conscious joy, and for the wicked a state of conscious suffering.
That the righteous do not receive the spiritual body at death, is plain
from 1 Thess. 4 : 16, 17 and 1 Cor. 15 :52, where an interval is intimated
between Paul's time and the rising of those who slept. The rising was to
occur in the future, "at the last trump." So the resurrection of the
wicked had not yet occurred in any single case (2 Tim. 2 : 18— it was an
error to say that the resurrection was "past aheady") ; it was yet future
(John 5:28-30— "the hour cometh :: — Ipxerat apa,not Kal vvv kariv—
" now is, " as in verse 25 ; Acts 24 : 15 — " there shaU be a resurrection " —
avdaraaiv piXkeiv iaeadai ) . Christ was the firstfruits ( 1 Cor. 15 : 20, 23 ). If
the saints had received the spiritual body at death, the patriarchs would
have been raised before Christ.
1. Of the righteous, it is declared :
(a) That the soul of the behever, at its separation from the body,
enters the presence of Christ.
( b ) That the sphits of departed believers are with God.

THE INTERMEDIATE STATE. 261
( c ) That believers at death enter paradise.
( d ) That theh state, immediately after death, is greatly to be preferred
to that of faithful and successful laborers for Christ here.
( e ) That departed saints are truly ahve and conscious.
(/) That they are at rest and blessed.
2. Of the wicked, it is declared :
(a) That they are in prison,— that is, are under constraint and guard
( 1 Peter 3 : 19 — fuXmc^ ).
(6) That they are in torment, or conscious suffering (Luke 16:23 —
iv f3aodvoi$ ) .
( c ) That they are under punishment ( 2 Pet. 2:9 — KoXafrptvovQ ).
The passages cited enable us properly to estimate two opposite errors.
A They refute, on the one hand, the view that the souls of both right
eous and wicked sleep between death and the resurrection.
This view is based upon the assumption that the possession of a physical
organism is indispensable to activity and consciousness — an assumption
which the existence of a God who is pure spirit ( John 4 : 24 ), and the
existence of angels who are probably pure spirits (Heb. 1 : 14 ), show to be
erroneous. Although the departed are characterized as ' spirits ' ( Eccl. 12 :
7 ; Acts 7 : 59 ; Heb. 12 : 23 ; 1 Pet. 3 : 19 ), there is nothing in this ' absence
from the body ' ( 2 Cor. 5:8) inconsistent with the activity and conscious
ness ascribed to them in the Scriptures above referred to. When the dead
are spoken of as ' sleeping ' ( Dan. 12 :2 ; Mat. 9 : 24 ; John 11 : 11 ; 1 Cor.
11 : 30 ; 15 : 51 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 14 ; 5 : 10 ), we are to regard this as simply the
language of appearance, and as hteraUy applicable only to the body.
B. The passages first cited refute, on the other hand, the view that the
suffering of the intermediate state is purgatorial.
According to the doctrine of the Roman Catholic church, "all who die
at peace with the church, but are not perfect, pass into purgatory." Here
they make satisfaction for the sins committed after baptism by suffering a
longer or shorter time, according to the degree of theh guilt. The church
on earth, however, has power, by prayers and the sacrifice of the Mass, to
shorten these sufferings or to remit them altogether. But we urge, in
reply, that the passages referring to suffering in the intermediate state give
no indication that any true behever is subject to this suffering, or that the
church has any power to reheve from the consequences of sin, either in this
world or in the world to come. Only God can forgive, and the church is
simply empowered to declare that, upon the fulfilment of the appointed
conditions of repentance and faith, he does actuaUy forgive. This theory,
moreover, is inconsistent with any proper view of the completeness of
Christ's satisfaction ( Gal. 2 : 21 ; Heb. 9 : 28 ) ; of justification through faith
alone (Rom. 3 :28) ; and of the condition after death, of both righteous
and wicked, as determined in this hfe ( Eccl. 11 : 3 ; Mat. 25 : 10 ; Luke 16 :
26; Heb. 9:27; Rev. 22:11).

262 ESCHATOLOG Y, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS.
We close our discussion of this subject with a single, but an important,
remark, — this, namely, that while the Scriptures represent the intermediate
state to be one of conscious joy to the righteous, and of conscious pain to
the wicked, they also represent this state to be one of incompleteness. The
perfect joy of the saints, and the utter misery of the wicked, begin only
with the resurrection and general judgment.
HI. The Second Coming of Christ.
WhUe the Scriptures represent great events in the history of the individ
ual Christian, hke death, and great events in the history of the church, like
the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost and the destruction of Jerusalem,
as comings of Christ for deliverance or judgment, they also declare that
these partial and typical comings shall be concluded by a final, triumphant
return of Christ, to punish the wicked and to complete the salvation of his
people. 1. The nature of this corning.
Although without doubt accompanied, in the case of the regenerate, by
inward and invisible influences of the Holy Sphit, the second advent is to
be outward and visible. This we argue :
(a) From the objects to be secured by Christ's return. These are partly
external ( Rom. 8 : 21, 23 ). Nature and the body are both to be glorified.
These external changes may weU be accompanied by a visible manifestation
of him who * makes aU things new ' ( Rev. 21 : 5 ).
( b ) From the Scriptural comparison of the manner of Christ's return
with the manner of his departure (Acts 1:11) — see Commentary of
Hackett, in loco : — " hv Tp6nov= visibly, and in the ah. The expression is
never employed to affirm merely the certainty of one event as compared
with another. The assertion that the meaning is simply that, as Christ had
departed, so also he would return, is contradicted by every passage in
which the phrase occurs."
( c ) From the analogy of Christ's first coming. If this was a literal and
visible coming, we may expect the second coming to be Uteral and visible

2. The time of Christ's coming.
( a ) Although Christ's prophecy of this event, in the twenty-fourth chap
ter of Matthew, so connects it with the destruction of Jerusalem that the
apostles and the early Christians seem to have hoped for its occurrence
during their life-time, yet neither Christ nor the apostles definitely taught
when the end should be, but rather declared the knowledge of it to be
reserved in the counsels of God, that men might ever recognize it as
possibly at hand, and so might live in the attitude of constant expectation.
( 6 ) Hence we find, in immediate connection with many of these predic
tions of the end, a reference to intervening events and to the eternity of
God, which shows that the prophecies themselves are expressed in a large
way which befits the greatness of the divine plans.

THE SECOND COMING OF CHRIST. 263
(c) In this, we discern a striking parallel between the predictions of
Christ's first, and the predictions of his second, advent. In both cases the
event was more distant and more grand than those imagined to whom the
prophecies first came. Under both dispensations, patient waiting for Christ
was intended to discipline the faith, and to enlarge the conceptions, of God's
true servants. The fact that every age since Christ ascended has had its
Chfliasts and Second Adventists should turn our thoughts away from
curious and fruitless prying into the time of Christ's coming, and set us at
immediate and constant endeavor to be ready, at whatsoever hour he may
appear. 3. The precursors of Christ's coming.
( a ) Through the preaching of the gospel in all the world, the kingdom
of Christ is steadUy to enlarge its boundaries, until Jews and GentUes alike
become possessed of its blessings, and a millennial period is introduced in
which Christianity generaUy prevaUs throughout the earth.
( 6 ) There will be a corresponding development of evil, either extensive
or intensive, whose true character shaU be manifest not only in deceiving
many professed f oUowers of Christ and in persecuting true believers, but in
constituting a personal Antichrist as its representative and object of worship.
This rapid growth shaU continue until the millennium, during which evil,
in the person of its chief, shaU be temporarily restrained.
( c ) At the close of this mUlennial period, evU wUl again be permitted
to exert its utmost power in a final conflict with righteousness. This spir
itual struggle, moreover, will be accompanied and symbolized by political
convulsions, and by fearful indications of desolation in the natural world.
4. Relation of Christ's second coming to the millennium.
The Scripture foreteUs a period, caUed in the language of prophecy " a
thousand years," when Satan shaU be restrained and the saints shaU reign
with Christ on the earth. A comparison of the passages bearing on this
subject leads us to the conclusion that this millennial blessedness and
dominion is prior to the second advent. One passage only seems at first
sight to teach the contrary, viz. : Rev. 20 : 4-10. But this supports the
theory of a premiUennial advent only when the passage is interpreted with
the barest hteralness. A better view of its meaning wiU be gained by
considering :
(a) That it constitutes a part, and confessedly an obscure part, of one
of the most figurative books of Scripture, and therefore ought to be inter
preted by the plainer statements of the other Scriptures.
( b ) That the other Scriptures contain nothing with regard to a resurrec
tion of the righteous which is widely separated in time from that of the
wicked, but rather declare distinctly that the second coming of Christ is
immediately connected both with the resurrection of the just and the
unjust and with the general judgment.
(c) That the hteral interpretation of the passage — holding, as it does,
to a resurrection of bodies of flesh and blood, and to a reign of the risen

264 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS.
saints in the flesh, and in the world as at present constituted — is inconsist
ent with other Scriptural declarations with regard to the spiritual nature
of the resurrection-body and,of the coming reign of Christ.
( d ) That the Uteral interpretation is generaUy and naturaUy connected
with the expectation of a gradual and necessary decline of Christ's kingdom
upon earth, untU Christ comes to bind Satan and to introduce the millen
nium. This view not only contradicts such passages as Dan. 2 : 34, 35, and.
Mat. 13 : 31, 32, but it begets a passive and hopeless endurance of evil, .
whereas the Scriptures enjoin a constant and aggressive warfare against it,
upon the very ground that God's power shall assure to the church a
gradual but constant progress in the face of it, even to the time of the end.
( e) We may therefore best interpret Rev. 20 : 4-10 as teaching in highly
figurative language, not a preliminary resurrection of the body, in the case
of departed saints, but a period in the later days of the church militant
when, under special influence of the Holy Ghost, the spirit of the martyrs
shaU appear again, true rehgion be greatly quickened and revived, and the
members of Christ's churches become so conscious of theh strength in
Christ that they shall, to an extent unknown before, triumph over the
powers of evil both within and without. So the spirit of Elijah appeared
again in John the Baptist ( Mal. 4:5; cf. Mat. 11 : 13, 14 ). The fact that
only the spirit of sacrifice and faith is to be revived is figuratively indicated
in the phrase: "The rest of the dead Uved not again until the thousand
years should be finished " = the sphit of persecution and unbelief shall be,
as it were, laid to sleep. Since resurrection, like the coming of Christ
and the judgment, is twofold, first, spiritual (the raising of the soul to
spiritual hfe ), and secondly, physical ( the raising of the body from the
grave), the words in Rev. 20 : 5 — "this is the first resurrection " — seem
intended distinctly to preclude the literal interpretation we are combating.
In short, we hold that Rev. 20 : 4-10 does not describe the events commonly
caUed the second advent and resurrection, but rather describes great spirit
ual changes in the later history of the church, which are typical of, and
preliminary to, the second advent and resurrection, and therefore, after
the prophetic method, are foretold in language literaUy appUcable only to
those final events themselves (cf. Ez. 37 : 1-14 ; Luke 15 : 32 ).
IV. The Resurrection.
WhUe the Scriptures describe the impartation of new hfe to the soul in
regeneration as a spiritual resurrection, they also declare that, at the second
coming of Christ, there shaU be a resurrection of the body, and a reunion
of the body to the soul from which, during the intermediate state, it has
been separated. Both the just and the unjust shaU have part in the resur
rection. To the just, it shah be a resurrection unto hfe ; and the body shah
be a body like Christ's— a body fitted for the uses of the sanctified sphit.
To the unjust, it shaU be a resurrection unto condemnation ; and analogy
would seem to indicate that, here also, the outward form wUl fitly represent
the inward state of the soul — being corrupt and deformed as is the soul
which inhabits it. Those who are living at Christ's coming shall receive
spiritual bodies without passing through death. As the body after corrup-

THE RESURRECTION. 265
tion and dissolution, so the outward world after destruction by fire, shaU be
rehabUitated and fitted for the abode of the saints.
Upon the subject of the resurrection, our positive information is derived
whoUy from the word of God. Further discussion of it may be most
naturally arranged in a series of answers to objections. The objections
commonly urged against the doctrine, as above propounded, may be
reduced to two :
1. The exegetical objection, — that it rests upon a literalizing of meta
phorical language, and has no sufficient support in Scripture. To this we
answer :
( a) That, though the phrase "resurrection of the body " does not occur
in the New Testament, the passages which describe the event indicate a
physical, as distinguished from a spiritual, change ( John 5 : 28, 29 ; P^hil.
3 : 21 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 13-17 ). The phrase " spiritual body " ( 1 Cor. 15 : 44 )
is a contradiction in terms, if it be understood as signifying 'a body which
is simple spirit.' It can only be interpreted as meaning a material
organism, perfectly adapted to be the outward expression and vehicle of the
purified soul. The purely spiritual interpretation is, moreover, expressly
excluded by the apostohc denial that " the resurrection is past aheady "
( 2 Tim. 2 : 18 ), and by the fact that there is a resurrection of the unjust, as
weU as of the just (Acts 24 : 15 ).
( 6 ) That the redemption of Christ is declared to include the body as
weU as the soul (Rom. 8:23; 1 Cor. 6:13-20). The indwelling of the
Holy Spirit has put such honor upon the fraU mortal tenement which he
has made his temple, that God would not permit even this whoUy to perish
( Rom. 8 : 11 — did rb evomovv avrov irvevpa kv vpiv, i. e., because of his indweU-
ing Spirit, God wUl raise up the mortal body ). It is this behef which
forms the basis of Christian care for the dead (Phil. 3 :21 ; cf. Mat. 22 :32).
( c ) That the nature of Christ's resurrection, as Uteral and physical,
determines the nature of the resurrection in the case of believers ( Luke
24 : 36 ; John 20 : 27 ). As, in the case of Christ, the same body that was
laid in the tomb was raised again, although possessed of new and surpris
ing powers, so the Scriptures intimate, not simply that the saints shall
have bodies, but that these bodies shaU be in some proper sense an out
growth or transformation of the very bodies that slept in the dust (Dan.
12 : 2 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 53, 54). The denial of the resurrection of the body, in
the case of behevers, leads naturaUy to a denial of the reahty of Christ's
resurrection ( 1 Cor. 15 : 13 ).
( d ) That the accompanying events, as the second coming and the judg
ment, since they are themselves Uteral, imply that the resurrection is also
literal. 2. The scientific objection. — This is threefold :
( a ) That a resurrection of the particles which compose the body at
death is impossible, since they enter into new combinations, and not unfre
quently become parts of other bodies which the doctrine holds to be raised
at the same time.

266 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS.
We reply that the Scripture not only does not compel us to hold, but it
distinctly denies, that aU the particles which exist in the body at death are
present in the resurrection-body ( 1 Cor. 15 :37 — ov rb aapa to yevqobpevov •
50 ). The Scripture seems only to indicate a certain physical connection
between the new and the old, although the nature of this connection is not
revealed. So long as the physical connection is maintained, it is not neces
sary to suppose that even a germ or particle that belonged to the old body
exists in the new.
( b ) That a resurrection-body, having such a remote physical connection
with the present body, cannot be recognized by the inhabiting soul or by
other witnessing spirits as the same with that which was laid in the grave.
To this we reply that bodUy identity does not consist in absolute same
ness of particles during the whole history of the body, but in the organizing
force, which, even in the flux and displacement of physical particles, makes
the old the basis of the new, and binds both together in the unity of a
single consciousness. In our recognition of friends, moreover, we are not
whoUy dependent, even in this world, upon our perception of bodUy form ;
and we have reason to believe that in the future state there may be methods
of communication far more direct and intuitive than those with which we
are f amUiar here.
( c ) That a material organism can only be regarded as a hindrance to the
free activity of the spirit, and that the assumption of such an organism by
the soul, which, during the intermediate state, had been separated from the
body, would indicate a decline in dignity and power rather than a progress.
We reply that we cannot estimate the powers and capacities of matter,
when brought by God into complete subjection to the sphit. The bodies
of the saints may be more ethereal than the air, and capable of swifter
motion than the light, and yet be material in their substance. That the
soul, clothed with its spiritual body, wiU have more exalted powers and
enjoy a more complete f elicity than would be possible whUe it maintained
a purely spiritual existence, is evident from the fact that Paid represents
the culmination of the soul's blessedness as occurring, not at death, but at
the resurrection of the body.
We may sum up our answers to objections, and may at the same time
throw hght upon the doctrine of the resurrection, by suggesting four prin
ciples which should govern our thinking with regard to the subject, — these
namely: 1. Body is in continual flux; 2. Since matter is but the manifesta
tion of God's mind and wiU, body is plastic in God's hands ; 3. The soul in
complete union with God may be endowed with the power of God ; 4. Soul
determines body, and not body soul, as the materialist imagines.
V. The Last Judgment.
WhUe the Scriptures represent all punishment of individual transgressors
and aU manifestations of God's vindicatory justice in the history of nations
as acts or processes of judgment, they also intimate that these temporal
judgments are only partial and imperfect, and that they are therefore to be
concluded with a final and complete vindication of God's righteousness.

THE LAST JUDGMENT. 267
This wUl be accomplished by making known to the universe the characters
of aU men, and by awarding to them corresponding destinies.
1. The nature of the final judgment.
The final judgment is not a spiritual, invisible, endless process, identical
with God's providence in history, but is an outward and visible event,
occurring at a definite period in the future. This we argue from the fol
lowing considerations :
(a) The judgment is something for which the evU are "reserved" (2
Peter 2 : 4, 9 ) ; something to be expected in the future (Acts 24 : 25 ; Heb.
10 : 27 ) ; something after death ( Heb. 9:27); something for which the
resurrection is a preparation ( John 5 : 29 ).
( 6 ) The accompaniments of the judgment, such as the second coming of
Christ, the resurrection, and the outward changes of the earth, are events
which have an outward and visible, as weU as an inward and spiritual,
aspect. We are compeUed to interpret the predictions of the last judgment
upon the same principle.
(c) God's justice, in the historical and imperfect work of judgment,
needs a final outward judgment as its vindication. " A perfect justice must
judge, not only moral units, but moral aggregates ; not only the particulars
of hfe, but the life as a whole." The crime that is hidden and triumphant
here, and the goodness that is here maligned and oppressed, must be
brought to light and fitly recompensed. "Otherwise man is a Tantalus —
longing but never satisfied " ; and God's justice, of which his outward
administration is the expression, can only be regarded as approximate.
2. The object of the final judgment.
The object of the final judgment is not the ascertainment, but the mani
festation, of character, and the assignment of outward condition corre
sponding to it.
(a) To the omniscient Judge, the condition of aU moral creatures is
already and fuUy known. The last day wfll be only "the revelation of
the righteous judgment of God. "
( 6 ) In the nature of man, there are evidences'and preparations for this
final disclosure. Among these may be mentioned the law of memory, by
which the soul preserves the records of its acts, both good and evil ( Luke
16 : 25 ) ; the law of conscience, by which men involuntarily anticipate
punishment for theh own sins ( Rom. 2 : 15, 16 ; Heb. 10 : 27 ) ; the law of
charaeter, by which every thought and deed makes indehble impress upon
the moral nature ( Heb. 3:8, 15 ).
( c ) Single acts and words, therefore, are to be brought into the judg
ment only as indications of the moral condition of the soul. This manifes
tation of aU hearts wfll vindicate not only God's past dealings, but his
determination of future destinies.

268 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS.
3. The Judge in the final judgment.
God, in the person of Jesus Christ, is to be the judge. Though God is
the judge of all ( Heb. 12 : 23 ), yet this judicial activity is exercised through
Christ, at the last day, as weU as in the present state ( John 5 : 22, 27 ).
This, for three reasons :
(a) Christ's human nature enables men to understand both the law and
the love of God, and so makes inteUigible the grounds on which judgment-
is passed.(6) The perfect human nature of Christ, united as it is to the divine,
ensures aU that is needful in true judgment, viz. : that it be both merciful
and just.
(c ) Human nature, sitting upon the throne of judgment, wUl afford con
vincing proof that Christ has received the reward of his sufferings, and
that humanity has been perfectly redeemed. The saints shaU "judge the
world " only as they are one with Christ.
4. The subjects of the final judgment.
The persons upon whose characters and conduct this judgment shah be
passed are of two great classes :
(a) All men — each possessed of body as weU as soul, — the dead having
been raised, and the hving having been changed.
(6) AU evil angels, — good angels appearing only as attendants and
ministers of the Judge.
5. The grounds of the final judgment.
These wUl be two in number :
(a) The law of God, — as made known in conscience and in Scripture.
( b ) The grace of Christ (Rev. 20 : 12 ), — those whose names are found
" written in the book of life " being approved, simply because of theh union
with Christ and participation in his righteousness. Theh good works shall
be brought into judgment only as proofs of this relation to the Redeemer.
Those not found " written in the book of hfe " wUl be judged by the law of
God, as God has made it known to each individual.
VL The Final States of the Righteous and of the Wicked.
1. Of the righteous.
The final state of the righteous is described as eternal hfe (Mat. 25 : 46 ),
glory ( 2 Cor. 4 : 17 ), rest ( Heb. 4:9), knowledge ( 1 Cor. 13 :8-10 ), hoh
ness (Rev. 21 : 27), service (Rev. 22:3), worship (Rev. 19:1), society
(Heb. 12 : 23 ), communion with God ( Rev. 21 : 3 ).
Summing up aU these, we may say that it is the fulness and perfection of
holy hfe, in communion with God and with sanctified spirits. Although
there wUl be degrees of blessedness and honor, proportioned to the capacity

PINAL STATES OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND OF THE WICKED. 269
and fidelity of each soul (Luke 19 : 17, 19 ; 1 Cor. 3 :14, 15), each wiU
receive as great a measure of reward as it can contain ( 1 Cor. 2:9), and
this final state, once entered upon, wUl be unchanging in kind and endless
in duration ( Rev. 3 : 12 ; 22 : 15 ).
With regard to heaven, two questions present themselves, namely :
( a ) Is heaven a place, as weU as a state ?
We answer that this is probable, for the reason that the presence of
Christ's human body is essential to heaven, and that this body must be
confined to place. Since deity and humanity are indissolubly united in
Christ's single person, we cannot regard Christ's human soul as limited to
place without vacating his person of its divinity. But we cannot conceive
of his human body as thus omnipresent. As the new bodies of the saints
are confined to place, so, it would seem, must be the body of theh Lord.
But, though heaven be the place where Christ manifests his glory through
the human body which he assumed in the incarnation, our ruling concep
tion of heaven must be something higher even than this, namely, that of a
state of holy communion with God.
( b ) Is this earth to be the heaven of the saints ? We answer :
First, — that the earth is to be purified by fire, and perhaps prepared to
be the abode of the saints, — although this last is not rendered certain by
the Scriptures.
Secondly, — that this fitting-up of the earth for man's abode, even if it
were declared in Scripture, would not render it certain that the saints are
to be confined to these narrow limits (John 14 : 2 ). It seems rather to be
intimated that the effect of Christ's work wfll be to bring the redeemed into
union and intercourse with other orders of inteUigence, from communion
with whom they are now shut out by sin ( Eph. 1 : 20 ; Col. 1 : 20 ).
2. Of the wicked.
The final state of the wicked is described under the figures of eternal fire
( Mat. 25 : 41 ) ; the pit of the abyss ( Rev. 9:2, 1 1 ) ; outer darkness ( Mat.
8 : 12 ) ; torment (Rev. 14 : 10, 11 ) ; eternal punishment ( Mat. 25 : 46) ;
wrath of God ( Rom. 2:5); second death ( Rev. 21 : 8 ) ; eternal destruc
tion from the face of the Lord ( 2 Thess. 1:9); eternal sin ( Mark 3 : 29 ).
Summing up aU, we may say that it is the loss of all good, whether
physical or spiritual, and the misery of an evU conscience banished from
God and from the society of the holy, and dwelling under God's positive
curse forever. Here we are to remember, as in the case of the final state of
the righteous, that the decisive and controlling element is not the outward,
but the inward. If heU be a place, it is only that the outward may corres
pond to the inward. If there be outward torments, it is only because these
wUl be fit, though subordinate, accompaniments of the inward state of the
soul. In our treatment of the subject of eternal punishment we must remember
that false doctrine is often a reaction from the unscriptural and repulsive
over-statements of Christian apologists. We freely concede : 1. that future

270 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS.
punishment does not necessarUy consist of physical torments, — it may be
whoUy internal and sphitual ; 2. that the pain and suffering of the future
are not necessarily due to positive inflictions of God, — they may result
enthely from the soul's sense of loss, and from the accusations of con
science ; and 3. that eternal punishment does not necessarUy involve end
less successions of suffering, — as God's eternity is not mere endlessness, so
we may not be forever subject to the law of time.
In order, however, to meet opposing views, and to forestaU the common
objections, we proceed to state the doctrine of future punishment in greater
detail :
A. The future punishment of the wicked is not annihilation. — In our
discussion of Physical Death, we have shown that, by virtue of its original
creation in the image of God, the human soul is naturally immortal ; that
neither for the righteous nor the wicked is death a cessation of being ; that
on the contrary, the wicked enter at death upon a state of conscious suffer
ing which the resurrection and the judgment only augment and render
permanent. It is plain, moreover, that if annilnlation took place at death,
there could be no degrees in future punishment, — a conclusion itself at
variance with express statements of Scripture.
There are two forms of the annihUation theory which are more plausible,
and which in recent times find a larger number of advocates, namely :
(a) That the powers of the wicked are graduaUy weakened, as the
natural result of sin, so that they finally cease to be. — We reply, first, that
moral evU does not, in this present life, seem to be incompatible with a
constant growth of the inteUectual powers, at least in certain directions, and
we have no reason to beheve the fact to be different in the world to come ;
secondly, that if this theory were true, the greater the sin, the speedier
would be the rehef from punishment.
(6) That there is for the wicked, certainly after death, and possibly
between death and the judgment, a positive punishment proportioned to
theh deeds, but that this punishment issues in, or is foUowed by, annihila
tion. — We reply first, that upon this view, as upon any theory of annihUa
tion, future punishment is a matter of grace as weU as of justice — a notion
for which Scripture affords no warrant; secondly, that Scripture not only
gives no hint of the cessation of this punishment, but declares in the
strongest terms its endlessness.
Since neither one of these two forms of the annilnlation theory is
Scriptural or rational, we avaU ourselves of the evolutionary hypothesis as
throwing hght upon the problem. Death is not degeneracy ending in
extinction, norpunishment ending in extinction, — it is atavism that returns,
or tends to return, to the animal type. As moral development is from the
brute to man, so abnormal development is from man to the brute.
B. Punishment after death excludes new probation and ultimate restora
tion of the wicked.— Some have maintained the ultimate restoration of all
human beings, by appeal to such passages as the foUowing : Mat 19 • 28 •
Acts 3 : 21 ; Eph. 1 : 9, 10.

FINAL STATES OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND OF THE WICKED. 271
( a ) These passages, as obscure, are to be interpreted in the light of
those plainer ones which we have aheady cited. Thus interpreted, they
foreteU only the absolute triumph of the divine kingdom, and the subjec
tion of all evU to God.
( b ) A second probation is not needed to vindicate the justice or the love
of God, since Christ, the immanent God, is aheady in this world present
with every human soul, quickening the conscience, giving to each man his
opportunity, and making every decision between right and wrong a true
probation. In choosing evU against theh better judgment even the heathen
unconsciously reject Christ. Infants and idiots, as they have not consciously
sinned, are, as we may beheve, saved at death by having Christ revealed to
them and by the regenerating influence of his Spirit.
( c ) The advocates of universal restoration are commonly the most stren
uous defenders of the inalienable freedom of the human wfll to make choices
contrary to its past character and to aU the motives which are or can be
brought to bear upon it. As a matter of fact, we find in this world that
men choose sin in spite of infinite motives to the contrary. Upon the
theory of human freedom just mentioned, no motives which God can use
wiU certainly accompUsh the salvation of aU moral creatures. The soul
which resists Christ here may resist him forever.
( d ) Upon the more correct view of the will which we have advocated,
the case is more hopeless stiU. Upon this view, the sinful soul, in its very
sinning, gives to itself a sinful bent of inteUect, affection, and wUl ; in other
words, makes for itself a character, which, though it does not render neces
sary, yet does render certain, apart from divine grace, the continuance of
sinful action. In itself it finds a self-formed motive to evU strong enough
to prevaU over aU inducements to hohness which God sees it wise to bring
to bear. It is in the next world, indeed, subjected to suffering. But suffer
ing has in itself no reforming power. Unless accompanied by special
renewing influences of the Holy Sphit, it only hardens and embitters the
soul. We have no Scripture evidence that such influences of the Sphit are
exerted, after death, upon the stfll impenitent ; but abundant evidence, on
the contrary, that the moral condition in which death finds men is theh
condition forever.
( e ) The declaration as to Judas, in Mat. 26 : 24, could not be true upon
the hypothesis of a final restoration. If at anytime, even after the lapse of
ages, Judas be redeemed, his subsequent infinite duration of blessedness
must outweigh all the finite suffering through which he has passed. The
Scripture statement that "good were it for that man if he had not been
born " must be regarded as a refutation of the theory of universal restora
tion. C. Scripture declares this future punishment of the wicked to be eternal.
It does this by its use of the terms aityw, aliiviog. — Some, however, maintain
that these terms do not necessarUy imply eternal duration. We reply :
(a) It must be conceded that these words do not etymologically neces
sitate the idea of eternity ; and that, as expressing the idea of " age-long,"
they are sometimes used in a limited or rhetorical sense.

272 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS.
( 6 ) They do, however, express the longest possible duration of which
the subject to which they are attributed is capable ; so that, if the soul is
immortal, its punishment must be without end.
( e ) If, when used to describe the future punishment of the wicked, they
do not declare the endlessness of that punishment, there are no words in
the Greek language which could express that meaning.
( d) In the great majority of Scripture passages where they occur, they
have unmistakably the signification "everlasting." They are used to
express the eternal duration of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit
( Rom. 16 : 26 ; 1 Tim. 1:17; Heb. 9 : 14 ; Rev. 1 : 18 ) ; the abiding pres
ence of the Holy Spirit with aU true behevers ( John 14 : 17 ) ; and the
endlessness of the future happiness of the saints ( Mat. 19 : 29 ; John 6 : 54,
58; 2 Cor. 9:9).
( e ) The fact that the same word is used in Mat. 25 : 46 to describe both
the sufferings of the wicked and the happiness of the righteous shows that
the misery of the lost is eternal, in the same sense as the life of God or the
blessedness of the saved.
(/) Other descriptions of the condemnation and suffering of the lost,
excluding, as they do, aU hope of repentance or forgiveness, render it cer
tain that al&v and alimoq, in the passages referred to, describe a punish
ment that is without end.
(g) While, therefore, we grant that we do not know the nature of
eternity, or its relation to time, we maintain that the Scripture representa
tions of future punishment forbid both the hypothesis of annihUation, and
the hypothesis that suffering will end in restoration. Whatever eternity
may be, Scripture renders it certain that after death there is no forgive
ness. D. This everlasting punishment of the wicked is not inconsistent with
God's justice, but is rather a revelation of that justice.
( a ) We have seen in our discussion of Penalty ( pages 652-656 ) that its
object is neither reformatory nor deterrent, but simply vindicatory ; in
other words, that it primarily aims, not at the good of the offender, nor at
the welfare of society, but at the vindication of law. We have also seen
( pages 269, 291 ) that justice is not a form of benevolence, but is the expres
sion and manifestation of God's hohness. Punishment, therefore, as the
inevitable and constant reaction of that holiness against its moral opposite,
cannot come to an end until guilt and sin come to an end.
( 6 ) But guUt, or Ul-desert, is endless. However long the sinner may
be punished, he never ceases to be Ul-deserving. Justice, therefore, which
gives to aU according to theh deserts, cannot cease to punish. Since the
reason for punishment is endless, the punishment itself must be endless.
Even past sins involve an endless guUt, to which endless punishment is
simply the inevitable correlate.
(c) Not only eternal guilt, but eternal sin, demands eternal punish
ment. So long as moral creatures are opposed to God, they deserve pun-

FINAL STATES OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND OF THE WICKED. 273
ishment. Since we cannot measure the power of the depraved will to resist
God, we cannot deny the possibility of endless sinning. Sin tends ever
more to reproduce itself. The Scriptures speak of an " eternal sin " ( Mark
3 : 29 ). But it is just in God to visit endless sinning with endless punish
ment. Sin, moreover, is not only an act, but also a condition or state, of
the soul ; this state is impure and abnormal, involves misery ; this misery,
as appointed by God to vindicate law and holiness, is punishment ; this
punishment is the necessary manifestation of God's justice. Not the
punishing, but the not-punishing, would impugn his justice ; for if it is just
to punish sin at all, it is just to punish it as long as it exists.
( d ) The actual facts of human life and the tendencies of modern science
show that this principle of retributive justice is inwrought into the elements
and forces of the physical and moral universe. On the one hand, habit
begets fixity of character, and in the spiritual world sinful acts, often
repeated, produce a permanent state of sin, which the soul, unaided, cannot
change. On the other hand, organism and environment are correlated to
each other ; and in the sphitual world, the selfish and impure find sur
roundings corresponding to their nature, whUe the surroundings react
upon them and confirm their evU character. These principles, if they act
in the next life as they do in this, wUl ensure increasing and unending pun
ishment. (e) As there are degrees of human guilt, so future punishment may
admit of degrees, and yet in aU those degrees be infinite in duration. The
doctrine of everlasting punishment does not imply that, at each instant of
the future existence of the lost, there is infinite pain. A line is infinite in
length, but it is far from being infinite in breadth or thickness. "An
infinite series may make only a finite sum ; and infinite series may differ
infinitely in theh total amount." The Scriptures recognize such degrees
in future punishment, while at the same time they declare it to be endless
( Luke 12 :47, 48 ; Rev. 20 : 12, 13 ).
(/) We know the enormity of sin only by God's own declarations with
regard to it, and by the sacrifice which he has made to redeem us from it.
As committed against an infinite God, and as having in itself infinite possi
bilities of evU, it may itself be infinite, and may deserve infinite punish
ment. HeU, as weU as the Cross, indicates God's estimate of sin.
E. This everlasting punishment of the wicked is not inconsistent with
God's benevolence. — It is maintained, however, by many who object to
eternal retribution, that benevolence requires God not to inflict punish
ment upon his creatures except as a means of attaining some higher good.
We reply :
(a) God is not only benevolent but holy, and holiness is his ruling
attribute. The vindication of God's hohness is the primary and sufficient
object of punishment. This constitutes a good which fully -justifies the
infliction. ( 6 ) In this lif e, God's justice does involve certain of his creatures in
sufferings which are of no advantage to the individuals who suffer ; as in

274 ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF FINAL THINGS.
the case of penalties which do not reform, and of afflictions which only
harden and embitter. If this be a fact here, it may be a fact hereafter.
(c) The benevolence of God, as concerned for the general good of the
universe, requhes the execution of the f uU penalty of the law upon aU who
reject Christ's salvation. The Scriptures intimate that God's treatment of
human sin is matter of instruction to aU moral beings. The self-chosen
ruin of the few may be the salvation of the many.
(d ) The present existence of sin and punishment is commonly admitted
to be in some way consistent with God's benevolence, in that it is made the
means of revealing God's justice and mercy. If the temporary existence of
sin and punishment lead to good, it is entirely possible that their eternal
existence may lead to yet'greater good.
( e ) As benevolence in God seems in the beginning to have permitted
moral evfl, not because sin was desirable in itself, but only because it was
incident to a system which provided for the highest possible freedom and
hohness in the creature ; so benevolence in God may to the end permit the
existence of sin and may continue to punish the sinner, undesirable as these
things are in themselves, because they are incidents of a system which pro
vides for the highest possible freedom and hohness in the creature through
eternity. F. The proper preaching of the doctrine of everlasting punishment is
not a hindrance to the success of the gospel, but is one of its chief and
indispensable auxiliaries. — It is maintained by some, however, that, because
men are naturaUy repeUed by it, it cannot be a part of the preacher's
message. We reply :
( a ) If the doctrine be true, and clearly taught in Scripture, no fear of
consequences to ourselves or to others can absolve us from the duty of
preaching it. The minister of Christ is under obhgation to preach the
whole truth of God ; if he does this, God wUl care for the results.
( b ) AU preaching which ignores the doctrine of eternal punishment just
so far lowers the holiness of God, of which eternal punishment is an expres
sion, and degrades the work of Christ, which was needful to save us from
it. The success of such preaching can be but temporary, and must be fol
lowed by a disastrous reaction toward rationalism and immorality.
( c ) The fear of future punishment, though not the highest motive, is
yet a proper motive, for the renunciation of sin and the turning to Christ.
It must therefore be appealed to, in the hope that the seeking of salvation
which begins in fear of God's anger may end in the service of faith and love.
( d ) In preaching this doctrine, while we grant that the material images
used in Scripture to set forth the sufferings of the lost are to be spirituaUy
and not hteraUy interpreted, we should still insist that the misery of the
soul which eternaUy hates God is greater than the physical pains which are
used to symbolize it. Although a hard and mechanical statement of the
truth may only awaken opposition, a solemn and feehng presentation of it
upon proper occasions, and in its due relation to the work of Christ and the
offers of the gospel, cannot f aU to accomplish God's purpose in preaching,
and to be the means of saving some who hear.

8393