YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

A

LETTER

T O

My. DO DWELL*,

Wherein ali the Arguments in his|Epi(lolary\Dif-
courfe againft the Immortality ot the SOUL
are particularly anfwered,Tjand the Judgment
of the Fathers concerning that Matter truly
reprefented. Together with
A Defence of ah Argument made ufe of in the
above-mentioned Letter to Mr. Dodwell, So prove
the Immateriality arid Natural Immortality of the
Soul. In Four Letters to the Author
of Some Remarks, &c_^
To which is added,
Some Reflexions on (that Part ofV Book called
Amy ntor 4Cwhich relates to the Writings of the
Primitive Fathers s arid the Canon: of the New
Teftament. j - >¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
By SAMUEL CLARKE, D. D. late Re&of
of St; James's JVeJiminfter.
The Sixth Edition.
lit this Edition are injerted Tbe Remarks on Dn
Clarke** Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the feveral
Replies to the DoiJor's Defences thereof.
LONDON:
Printed for J a m e s and John K # A P 1 0 n, at the
Cro-wn in St. Part* CbufchprA. M DCC XXXI..

A

LETTER

T O

Mr.DODWELL;

WHEREIN

AH the A R g u m e n t s in his Eplftolary
Difcourfe againfl the Immortality of the
SOUL are particularly anfwered,

AND

fhe Judgment c£the F a t h e r s concern
ing that "^Matter truly reprefented.

By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D.late
Re<ftor of St. James's Wejlminjler.

LONDON:
Printed in the Year MDCCXXXI.

LETTER

T O

Mr. Dodwell, &c.

SIR,

allow

T lis a Thing of very ill Con-
fequence, when Men of great
Reputation in the World for
Learning, in their Difcourfes
upon the moft important
Do&rines of Religion, rafhly
and upon very little Grounds,
themfelves to advance new and crude

Notions, and extravagant Hypothefes ; which
the Profane will not, and the Weak are not
able to feparate, from the principal and funda
mental and moft neceflary Do&rines them
felves. For, as in Natural Philofophy and in the
fearch after Phyfical Truth, the Syftems and
Hypothefes which ingenious Men invent for ex
plaining the appearances of Nature, and which
for fome time are received with Applaufe, but
B after-

^Letter^* Mr. Dodwell.
afterwards are confuted by Reafon and Expe
rience -, are apt to make Men think the Natu
ral Caufes of things abfolutely impofiible to be
difcovered at all ; and have really fuch an effect
upon very Many, as to make them reject for
their fake, or at leaft to call in queftion, even
t he certaineft Truths which have been difcove
red by plain Experiments, or clear Mathema
tical Demonftration it felf: So in Matters of
Religion likewife, the inconfiderate and ground-
lefs Notions, which Men of great Learning
and much Reading, have with too little Judge
ment fometimes joined and intermixed with
their Explications of fome of the greateft and
moft important Doctrines of Religion ; when
upon due Examination, the abfurdicy and in-
confiftency of fiich Schemes plainly appears j
have been apt to raife Doubts in many Mens
Minds concerning the Truth even of the cer
taineft Doctrines themfelves, which are either
the moft plainly difcovered by right Reafon,
or are moft clearly delivered in Scripture.
You teach that the Soul of Man is naturally
mortal, and will of it felf perifh and come to
nothing, if not upheld by the extraordinary
Power of God, in a pr-Eternauiral way. Many,
who fee the imprudent Title of your Difcourfe,
and will not take the pains to read the Book it
felf, will conclude that you fuppofe the Soul
to perifh at the diflblution of the Body ; And
all Libertines, when they have read and confix
dered all that you offer, will ftill conclude,
that if fas you grant to them) the Soul muft of
it felf naturally perifh fometime or other, there
is no time fo probable when it fhould perifh,
as at the diflblution of the Body ; and they
will eafily perfuade themfelves to rely upon this,

A Letter to Mr. Dodwell.
this, that God will not work a perpetual Mi
racle to preferve them prasternaturally by his
omnipotent Power, on purpofe to inflict upon
them an eternal Punifhment, which by Nature
they were not capable of undergoing.
Thefe Mens Conclufion indeed is by no means
right; But it is fuch a one, as is very natural
for Men of loofe Principles and vicious Lives
to draw from your Doctrine ; and therefore
you ought to have been very careful not to
give them fuch an Occafion of deceiving them
felves, unlefs you had firft been very fure that
your Notion was either very plainly contained
in Scripture, or very clearly demonftrable by
right Reafon : Which that it is not, I prefume
will appear from the following Obfervations.
You begin with a Diftinction ( Prcemon. Sect.
3.) that the Souls of fome Men are made im
mortal by the Spirit of God, to Happinefs -,
and the Souls of fome others, by the Will of
God, to Punifhment. Now what can be more
precarious and groundlefs than this Diftinction ?
For what real Difference is there in the thing it
felf, between being immortalized by the Spirit,
and by the Will of God ? Eternal Life and Hap
pinefs is indeed conftantly attributed to the Spirit
of God, that is, thofe only who have the Spirit of
God, and are guided by it, who obey the Will
of God, and live in conformity to his holy
Laws, fhall be partakers of Eternal Happinefs :
And thus the Spirit of God is indeed neceflary
to qualify Men for, and to make them capa
ble of, the Happinefs of Heaven. But if, to
make good Men capable of an Eternal Dura
tion in order to that Happinefs, it be neceflary
that the Spirit of God give them a new Princu
fie. af Subfiftence, or fuperadd a new Subjlance to
B ' 2 their

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
their Souls i ( *u your obfcure Expreffions
concerning the- Acceffion of dn adfcititious Spirit,
Sec. frequently feem to fignify ; and without
which, there is no other difference than only in
Words, between being immortalized by the
Spirit and by the Will of God ; ) then nothing
can be more contrary to reafon, than to fuppofe
any Men made immortal without the addition
of that new Principle ; nor can any reprefenta-
tion of God's Proceedings, be more hat fh and
incredible, than to fuppofe him by his Omnipo
tent Will and Power, eternally and miraculbufly
preferving fuch Creatures unto endlefs Punifh
ment, who never had in them, either originally
or additionally, any Principle of Immortality at
all. How plainly and how very much more a-
greeable to Reafon and to our natural Notions
of God is it, to fay that all Creatures who fhall
ever undergo eternal Punifhment, are fuch as
having been created naturally immortal, and by
wilful continuance in Sin, having fo far depra
ved themfelves as to become uncapable of eter
nal Happinefs, muft confequently by the juft
Judgement of God fall into fuch Mifery, as
their immortal Nature fo corrupted neceflarily
makes them liable to. When we fpeak of the
Soul as created naturally immortal, We mean
that it is by the Divine Pleafure created fuch a
Subftance, as not having in it felf any Com-
pofition, or any Principles of Corruption, will
naturally, or of it felf continue for ever; that
is, will not by any natural decay, or by any
Power of Nature, be diflblved or deftroyed ;
But yet neverthelefs depends continually upon:
God, who has power to deftroy or annihilate
ir, if he fhould fo think fit. When therefore
you fay that the Original of the Immortality of
fuch

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
fuch Souls as fhall be eternally punifhed, may be
more agreeably derived from the Divine Pleafure,
than from the Nature of the Soul ; if thereby you
mean that the Soul was made immortal by the
mere pleafure of God, in oppofition to its being
immortal by the neceffity of its own Nature, in
the fenfe that God is immortal ; then indeed
not Plato only, but all others alfo that ever
held the Immortality of the Soul, have been
and are of the fame Opinion : But if by thofe
Words you mean, as through the whole of
your Difcourfe you exprefsly declare, that the
Soul was created mortal, but by the Divine
Omnipotence is upheld eternally ; then it is, on
the contrary, evidently far more agreeable to
right Reafon and to our Notions ofGod, to de
rive the Immortality of the Soul, and efpecially
of a miferable one, from its own Nature, than
from the Divine Pleafure j that ;s, to fuppofe
the Soul to have been at firft creaced fuch a
Subftance, as by the ordinary concourfe of Di
vine Providence would continue forever; than
that it was created of a mortal and periftiable
Nature, but by the extraordinary and miracu
lous Power of God, is continually fuppprted,
only to endure Torment and Punifhment, be
yond the capacity of its own l^atyre, tp aU
Eternity. There cannot eafily be made a worfe repre
sentation of God's dealings with Mankind, than
what you affirm ( Prcsmon. Sect. 4. ) that if the
Devils had not fallen, there had been no Hell at all ;
and that Mankind is no otherwife concerned in it,
than as, hy joining themfelves to tbe Devil's Party,
they intitle themfelvei alfo to his Punifhment. It is
true, ".he Fire pf Hell was firft and originally
B 3 prepared

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
prepared for the Devils, becaufe they were the
firft: and original Offenders. But to fay that,
without their Fall, there never would have been
Any Hell at all ; and that the fame or equal Pu
nifhment fhould not then have been inflicted
upon Wicked Men for the fame Crimes, as there
now fhall ; is reprefenting God like an Arbi
trary Tyrant, who without caring to make an
exact, equal , and particular diftribution of
Juftice, deals with all Offenders of all ranks
and degrees alike, becaufe they have all inter-
pre'tatively joined in Oppofing his Authority.
You affirm exprefsly (ibid. ) that the Soul does
not depend on our grofs Organical Body, nor pe~
rifhes upon its diffolution from thofe Bodies. I be-
feech you, if the Soul be fuch a Subftance as is
incapable of being hurt by fo great a change
and diffolution, as is caufed in us by a violent
Death, fuppofe by Fire ; upon what Principle
can it be imagined to be naturally mortal ; or
what Revolutions in Nature will it not be able
to refift and fupervive ? You explain this fur
ther, by faying, that Mens Souls do not fo depend
on any other created Being, but that they mny ftill
continue in their duration, whaifoever other crea
ted Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be
pleafed ftill to continue that ordinary Providence,
which is effentially neceffary for their continuance.
And is not this the very definition of Immortali
ty ? or did ever any Man mean more than this,
when he affirmed the Soul to he naturally Im-,
mortal ? You diftinguifh it indeed from the Na
tural Immortality of Angels ; but by fuch a di~
ftinilian, as includes not in it any the leaft diffe
rence. For what difference is there between af
firming concerning Angels, that if is in the Power et»d

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
and Pleafure of God to annihilate them when he
thinks fit ; and concerning Humane Souk, that
they do not fo depend on any other created Beings,
but that they may ftill continue in their Duration,
whatfoever other created Influences be withdrawn
from them, if God be pleafed ftill to continue that
ordinary Providence, which is effentially neceflary
for their Prefervation ? And yet in the very
next Words, you very inconfiftently imagine
the Soul, as being a mere Flatus, to have a
more immediate Dependence on God than other
Creatures, than even the meaneft Particles of
lifelefs Matter have ; which muft make it ceafe to
be, whenever he is pleafed to ceafe to breath it ;
as being unable to continue its Duration, by the Pow
ers given it at its firft Production, and the conti
nuance of thofe general Influences which are requi-
ftte for the fupport of Created Beings in general.
According to thefe laft Words, the Soul not
being fo much as a Subftance of any kind at
all, is likely to be more effectually deftroyed by
Death, than even the Body it felf. Whereas
according to the Words juft preceeding, your
Scheme ought to have been on the contrary, that
the Soul is by Nature Immortal, and muft be
mortalized by the Omnipotence of God, if ever
it perifh ; and not, that it is by Nature Mor
tal, and muft be immortalized by a new Act of
Omnipotence, to enable it to fubfift for ever.
So that here, you feem to have framed no con-
fiftent Notion even of your own Scheme.
What you advance ( Pramon. Seel. 5. ) con
cerning its not having been culpable to hold
communication and join with the Devil, before
the Publication of the Gofpel ; and that the
Devil was not to be looked upon as a publick
Enemy, before his being declared fo by the
B 4 Gofpel j

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
Gofpel ; is fo extravagant, that it needs no
Confutation. Was not the Devil an Enemy
when he tempted pur firft Parent I And was
he not publitkly declared to be fo, in the
Curfe pronounced to him thereupon ? Is not the
Devil defcribed as a publick Enemy to God
and good Men, in the Hiftory of J obi And as
an Enemy to Ifrael, i Chron xxi. i ? Or was he
known to be an Enemy in Temporal Affairs
only, ( Prcemon. pag. 41, ) and could not be
known to be fo in things relating to the Life to
come ? Or had the Patriarchs, no expectation
at all of a better City to come, after- the pre-
fent Tabernacle was diffolved ? Is not Idolatry in
the Old Teftament conftantly branded with
as fevere a character of Rebellion againft God,
as in the New ? And in the Heathen World,
before the Gofpel was begun tp be preached,
( though the times of tbat Ignorance God did in
deed wink at, that is, would not be fo fevere in
punifhing them, as thofe who fhould afterwards
fin againft greater Light;) yet was it no Crime,
to worfhip "the Creature more than the Creator I
was it no Fault that the World did ».tX*% ci t*. a-wff,
lie under entire fubjectiort to the Evil One,
1 Joh. v. 19? and in the Power of Satan,
Acts xxvi. 18 ? Were not the abominable Rites
of the Heathen, plainly afacrificing to Devils?
And do not all the Ancient Fathers^ for whofe
Judgement you exprefs fo great anefteem, fup
pofe in all their Writings againft the Pagans,
that before the propofing of the Gofpel to them,
they ought to have known from the Light 0f
Nature and Right Reafon, that thofe impure
Spirits whofe Wo."fliip was attended with all
manner of beftiality and wickednefs, were pro-
feffed Enemies to God and Goodnefs? Nay, does

rA Letter to Mr. Dodweli. o
does not St. Paul himfelf exprefsly affirm, that
That which may be known of God, was manifeft
enough to them, to have preferved them from
Idolatry ? and that, becaufe they did not like to
retain God in their knowledge, but changed the
Truth of God into a Lie, for that Reafon God
gave them up unto vile affetlions, &c.
Nor is it lefs abfurd, to found ( as you do in
the fame place ) the Heinoufnefs of Sin, and the
Reafonablenefs of the Severity pf its Punifh
ment, principally upon its being interpreted as
a joining with the Devil. Idolatry indeed, and
Witchcraft, and Profane Scoffing at God and all
Religion, may juftly enough come directly un
der this Charge ; and all other Sins alfo may
in effect and in event, not improperly be look
ed upon as promoting the Intereft of the De
vil, and an oppofing the eftablifhment of the
Kingdom of God. But to make the formal
Reafon, the heinoufnefs and demerit, not only
pf Idolatry, Witchcraft, and Profane open Op-
pofition of Religion, but alfo of all other Sins
whatfoever, to confift not fo much in the ori
ginal depravity of the Actions themfelves, in
their contrariety to Right Reafon, and to the
Light of Nature and Confcience, in their op-
pofition to the Nature, and Will, and Law,
and Authority of God, as in their being in-
ierpretatively a joining and communication with
the Devil ; To fuppofe God inflicting upon
Men fuch a Punifhment, not as their Sins de-
ferve in their Own Nature, and fuch as the Na
ture of their own Souls makes them capable of
falling into by wilful and obftinate corruption
and depravation of themfelves, but fuch as * is * *T**»°»°
difproportionable to their Nature, and f exceed- P*7J£*
ing the natural Powers of their degree of Being ; 28.
' and

io A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
and to account for this only by faying, that
Chrift will fo interpret their not joyning with
Him, as if they had joyned themfelves to the
Devil ; Is not all this, to make God, in the
**-««». hardeft Senfe, act * arbitrarily? ^
P- 27- Your Interpretation of Rom. ii. 12. and of
Job. iii. 19. ( Prcsmon. SetJ. 6. ) is fo loofe and
Groundlefs, that any Text may in the fame man
ner be brought to prove any thing, or rather no
Text can really prove any thing at all. For if
when St. Paul fays, Rom. ii. 12. tbat as many
as have finned without Law, fhall alfo perifh with
out Law ; and as many as have finned in tbe Law,
foall be judged by the Law ; the Word perifh be
not evidently Synonymous to being judged or
condemned, and fignifies that every Siriner's Con
demnation or Punifhment fhall be proportiona
ble to the heinoufnefs of his Sin with refpedt to
the Light he finned againft ; but on the con
trary from the Word [ >™>tS$ ] fhall perifh, it
can be concluded that the Perfons fpoken of
fhall only barely ceafe to be, in oppofuion to
the Word [ ^.""Wr*. ] fhall be judged or condem
ned; It will follow equally from the ufe of the
fame Word in other places of Scripture, that
neither Rejecters of the Gofpel, nor wicked
Chriftians, nor even the Devils themfelves,
fhall be condemned to any other Punifhment,
than bare ceafing to be : For of all thefe it is
faid in feveral Pla-ces of Scripture, that [^^t*.]
they fhall perifh, or be deftroyed: And thus you
unwarily overthrow all the Threatnings of the
Gofpel. Again , if when our Saviour fays,
John iii. 19. that This is the condemnation, that
Light is come into the World, and Men love Dark'
tiefs rather than Light; his plain Meaning be
not this, That the clear Revelation of the Will of

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. n
ofGod made to Mankind in the Gofpel, and the
exprefs denunciation of his Wrath againft Sin,
is the great Aggravation of impenitence, and
that which makes Men obftinately continuing
in their Sins utterly inexcuf able, and their con
demnation evidently moft juft, becaufe they
cannot now pretend ignorance of their Duty ;
but the Words [ "Aw* i xp.<r<s ] This is the Con
demnation, muft fignify a particular kind of Pu
nifhment to be inflicted upon Men for Affociating
with the Devil as being the Prince of Darknefs ;
I cannot fee but by the fame Liberty, any Af-
ferter of any new Opinion may interpret any
part of Scripture fo as to countenance any the
moft groundlefs Fancy or Imagination whatfo-
ever. Is it not a very weak Hypothefis, to imagine
that the Souls of Men muft needs be naturally
Mortal, becaufe otherwife God would not know
how to difpofe of the Souls of the Heathen ;
fince there cannot be any third Eternal State, fui-
table to the Nature of a Rational Soul ; neither
happy, nor miferable ; as there muft be, if thofe
Souls be naturally Immortal ? ( Prcemon. p. 43 .)
Is not the Univerfe large enough, for God to
difpofe of all his Creatures into States fuitable
to their Natures ? Are there not in God's Houfe
many Manfions ? Or will Heaven and Hell be
two fuch Places, in which there will be no Dif
ferences of States, no Space for Order and Va
riety of degrees ? Does not our Saviour him-.
felf exprefsly tell us, that they who knew not
their Mafter's will, and yet did things worthy of
ftripes, fhall be beaten with few ftripes ? And
does not St. Paul, in the whole 2d Chapter to
the Romany plainly declare that Gentiles as
well.

iz A Let ter to Mr. Dodweli.
well as Jews fhall be judged according to their
Works ?
The reft of your Prgemonition, being upon
a different Subject, I forbear to confider at this
time.

IN the Difconrfe it felf ( SeSl. 2. ) you pro-
pofe a moft dark and unintelligible Notion,
concerning [4^ and 3m*7*«] Soul and Spirit ;
not only diftinguifhing the rational Soul from
the fenfttive ; which was the Philofophy of ma:
ny of the Antients ; but moreover making the
Spirit different from both, and wholly praster-
natural to Man. The whole natural Soul
f -WO including both the fenfttive and RationaJ
part, ( which you elfewhere call the two Souls,
fag. 220,} you fuppofe to be qf irfelf mortal,
but to be made immortal in good Chriftians by
fhe addition of the Spirit, ( by the Acceffion of
an Adfcititious Spirit, as you fometimes exprefs,
it ) and in the Rejecters of the Gofpel to be
made immortal without it. If by the Spirit
you mean only an Operation pf the Spirit of
God upon our Souls, then ( as I obferved be
fore ) there is no real difference between being
immortalized by the Spirit and by the Will of
God. But if by the Spirit you mean the addi
tion of a new Subftance or Principle of Sub-
fiftence to the Souls of good Chriftians in order
to immortalize them, which yet in them thau
reject fhe Gofpel are immortalized without that
addition ; is not this juft fuch another fuppofi-
tion, as if you fhould fupppofe the Vnderftand-
tng to be one Subftance in a Man, and the Will
another, and the Habit of Virtue a third ; not-
yithftanding that at the fame time it be confef-
fd

^Letter to Mr. Dodweli. i j
fed that all thefe things may be Faculties or
Powers of one and the fame Subftance? And
your perverting the Words of St. Paul to ferve
your obfcure Hypothefis is very grofs. Does
St Paul when he diftinguifhes the natural Body
[ -tyvxiM <rZfha ] from the Spiritual Body [ mtVftM-
rutay trap* ] and calls the one corruptible, the o-
ther incorruptible ; mean that the natural Body
[•^ixW*-!**] is therefore corruptible or mortal,
Becaufe the Soul [ -fax* ] or Principle of Life
•Which is in it, is itfelf a * mortal Principle ? or * ?*g- £
that the Spiritual Body [ pnmO/jMriMv e-ZftM, ] is made
incorruptible by the fuperaddition of a Spirit to
the Soul that animates it ? The plain meaning
of St Paul is only this, that the Body which in
this prefent ftate is difiblvable and corruptible^
fhall after the Refurrection, by the Power of
God, be made incorruptible ; without having
any refpect at all to the Soul, or the Nature of
it, in his whole Difcourfe. Again, when St
Paul derives our Title to the Refurreclion of the
Body, wholly from Chrift ; does he thereby
mean to affirm, that, without the Refurrection
of Chrilt, the Souls of Men muft alfo have
ceafed to exift ? On the contrary, for that very
reafon, becaufe the Souls of Men would not
have ceafed to exift ; therefore Chrift thought
them of value to redeem them from Mifery,
by the Purchafe of his Blood, by his Death
and Refurrection. And it is the worft repre-
fentation of Chriftianity, that can be ; fome-
thing that might indeed -f be thought hard deal- 1 ?a£S-
ing ; to fuppofe (as you do ) that the Gofpel
of Chriftj which is every where in Scripture'
reprefented as the greateft Inftance of God's
tender Mercy and Compaflion towards Men,
fliould upon the whole fo very difproportionably increafe

14 r^ Letter to Mr. Dodweli;
increafe the Mifery of finful Men, as that who
ever difbelieved or neglected that new Offer of
Grace and Favour, fhould from thenceforth be
condemned to everlafting Torments ; notwith
standing that otherwife Sin, in its own Nature,
againft the Light of Reafon and Confcience,
and the natural Law of God, was fo little
heinous, that had it not been for the Offer of
this new extraordinary Grace and Favour, they
that had lived in the utmoft contempt of God
and of his natural and eternal Law written in
their Hearts, and in the moft unreftrained prac
tice of all poffible wickednefs, might have been
fafe from the fear of any other danger, than
that of perifhing finally by a natural Morta
lity. Your Conclufion from our Saviour's defcrip-
tion of the laft Judgment, Matt. xxv. is very
extraordinary ; [SetJ.fi ;] that becaufe the re-
wardablenefs of the good Works of the Righ
teous, is there afcribed to their having been
done for Chrift's fake ; therefore no other Per
fons fhall be concerned in that Judgment but
thofe to whom the Gofpel had been made
known. You might exactly as well have con
cluded, that becaufe Charity and Uncharitable-
nefs art the only particular Actions there men
tioned, for which Men fhall be adjudged to
Reward or Punifhment; therefore no regard
fli all be had to any other Virtues or Crimes in
that final Judgment. It is evident by com
paring other places of Scripture, that all kinds
of ASiions fhall then be examined ; and it is as
evident, that all forts of Perfons fhall be fotoo.
Thofe who never heard of the Gofpel, it is true,
cannot be judged by the fame Rule or Form, as
4 thofe

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. i $
thofe who did hear of it ; But is it not very
wonderful, to conclude from thence, that be
caufe * fuch perfons muft be judged by another form * P#g- 7
not fully and exprefsly ( fuppofe ) mentioned in
Scripture, therefore that form cannot at all be
known, what it is ; and if that form could not be
known, yet that therefore it ought not to be be
lieved that there is any fuch form at all ? Does
not the fame Light of Reafon, which makes
"Men & Law to themfelves, neceffarily difcover al
fo to them at the fame time what Rule they
fhall be judged by ? Neither is it true therefore,
that no fuch Form can be proved from the
Scriptures: For does not St Paul, in the whole
2d Chapter to the Romans, largely declare that
there is fuch a Form, and alfo what that Form
is ? And does not the Scripture every where
plainly fuppofe, that the Judgment fhall be uni-
verfal ? The Phrafe of judging the World, Acts
xvii. 31, manifeftly implies it; and the oppo
sition between Death and Judgment, Heb. ix.
27, though the ftrefs of the Apoftle's Argu
ment does not indeed lie upon it, and the u-
niverfal particle [All] is not added, yet very
evidently fuppofes the Judgment to extend to
the very fame Perfons as Death doth. And
what difference is there, between faying that it
is appointed for Men once to , die, or that it is
appointed for All Men once to die ? It is not a
juft anfwer here, to fay that Univerfal AfTerri-
ons are frequently in Scripture to be under-
ftood in a limited Senfe. That can only be fo,
when either the common acceptation of the
words, evidently limits their fignification ; as
in that place you mention, Job. xii. 19 ; or when
fome other parallel places of Scripture, exprefsly
add a Limitation. Where this is not the cafe,
, as

r^ Letter to Mr. Dodwefl.1
as it is not in the phrafe of God's judging the
World, Aclsxvii. 31 ; the fame Expreffion be
ing in all other places of Scripture likewife uni-
verfal ; if limitations may be added arbitrarily
and at pleafure, there will then be no way left
to difti^guifh at all, when any declaration is to
be looked upon as univerfal, and when as only
particuldr. You your felf are forced to allow
the Jews, who lived before our Saviour's Com
ing* to be concerned in the Judgment ; and
not them only, but alfo others who lived be
fore the Law, in the Times of Noah and the
Patriarchs; becaufe {pag. 11,) as tbey were in-
titled to the Spirit, in Reverfion ; fo tbey might
be intitled to tbe Confequences of the Spirit, one of
which is Immortality. I fuppofe you will eafily >
grant, that the Knowledge many of thefe Men
had of Chrift, was but implicit and very 6b-
fcure : And if that was fufficient to intitle
them to Immortality, why is it not as eafy to
fuppofe that the Pfomife God made to Adam. '; '
might intitle all Mankind to have fome benefit
of the Redemption purchafed by Chrift, ac
cording to their different proportions and ca
pacities, though they never heard of him ex
plicitly ?
It may here be obferved alfo by the By, that,
according to your obfcure and indeed confufed
manner of exprefling your felf, you in this
Section ( pag. 8, ) fuppofe the Holy Spirit to im
mortalize Men to Punifhment ; and again (pagfi 1 ,)
that Men are qualified for tbe higher degree of
Punifhment, by the Acceffion of the adfcititious Spi
rit, which makes them fouyytxa : Not very con-
fiftently with your firft diftinction, ( Prcemon.
Seel. 3,) thatthe actually immortalizing Souls
to Punifhment, may better be afcribed to the
4 Pleafure

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 17
Pleafure of God, than to the Divine Spirit. Un-
lefs you will fay, that bad Men within the Co
venant, are immortalized to Punifhment by one
Principle ; and bad Men without the Covenant,
or Rejecters of it, immortalized to Punifhment
by another Principle. And fo there is no end
of vain and groundlefs Imaginations.
That there fhall be, as you fay, ( Set?. 4, ) a
very great difference in the Punifhment of thofe who
refift and rejetl the Gofpel, from what it would have
been if they had never heard of the Gofpel ; is un
doubtedly very true. But does it from thence
follow, that God did not* oblige Men at all to * pug u;
werjhip himfelf, before any revealed Religion was and\%.
instituted ? Becaufe the -f Scripture does indeed f*"'"'I*i
every where fuppofe the Condition of thofe who refift
the Gofpel difpenfation worfe than that of the worft
fort of Criminal wbo never beard cf the Gofpel %
does it from thence follow, that they that never
heard of the Gofpel, had therefore no concern at
all in the final judgment? Becaufe our Saviour
declares that it fhall be more tolerable for Sodom
and Gomorrha in the Day of Judgment, than
for thofe who rejected the Gofpel when offered
them ; does it from thence follow, that thofe
wicked People fhall not be caft into || outer dark- \pag- I4\
nefs at all ? When our Saviour threatens that
Capernaum, which was exalted to Heaven, fliould
be brought down to Hell ; is it not a very extraor
dinary Interpretation of the meaning of thofe
Words, and as wonderful an Inference from
them, to conclude that thofe People, if our Sa
viour had not preached to them, would Jiave
* had no reafon to fear the Punifhment of Hell * ibid.
at all? An unprejudiced Perfon would rather
conclude on the contrary, that for that very
C Reafon,

18 ^Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
Reafon, becaufe they were in danger of it, there
fore our Saviour preached to them, and ex
horted them to repent and flee from the wrath to
come. Laftly, if they that never heard of the
Gofpel, fhall not indeed for their Unbelief be
' pag. 18. fentenced to * that Hell, which was prepared
for the Devil and his Angels; that is, to the
fame Degree of Punifhment with thofe who reject
or difobey the Gofpel; yet does it at all from
thence follow, that they fhall have no concern in
the general Judgment, upon account of their ha
ving obeyed or difobeyed the Law of Nature ?
The Cafe (Seel. 6.) of that Text in St John,
John v. 28 and 29 ; The Hour is coming, in the
which all that are in tbe Graves fhall hear his Voice,
and fhall come forth, they that have done good, unto
tbe RefurretJion of Life, and they that have done
evil, unto the RefurretJion of Damnation, is exactly
the fame with that before-mentioned, AtJs xvii.
31. The Words are univerfal; and the In fian
ces you bring of other univerfal Affirmations,
which muft be underftood in a limited Senfe,
have not the leaft fimilitude with the Text you
are confidering. If the Gibeonites univerfal De
claration to David, that for themhefhould not
kill any Man in Ifrael, muft needs indeed be
underftood in a limited Senfe, becaufe they them
felves exprefsly limited it by demanding feven of
Saul's Pofterity to be delivered to them to be
put to death : If Abab's fending to all Nations
and Kingdoms to fearch for Elijah, muft indeed
of neceffity, in the Nature of the thing it felf,
be underftood only of thofe that bordered upon
him : If St Paul's univerfal Declaration, that he
baptized none of the Corinthians, muft indeed
be underftood with an exception j becaufe he
himfelf

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.' 19
himfelf in the very next Words adds an excep
tion exprefsly : Is it juft to infer from thefe In-
ftances, that our Saviour's univerfal Affirmation
in this place, concerning the Refurre&ion, may
likewife be underftood in a limited Senfe, though
neither in the Nature of the thing itfelf, nor
from the Context, there be any the leaft Ground
for fuch Limitation ? Nay though on the con
trary, all the parallel Texts, which are very
many, be likewife univerfal ? It is a wonder
ful thing, to fee in what manner Learned Men
can argue, when Prejudices prevail over their
Judgment. Your 7th Section, to ordinary Underftand-
ings, feems to be mere Confufion. Tou fuppofe
Man to confift of three diftinct parts, Body,
Soul, and Spirit : But they who made this diftinc
tion, fuppofed thefe three parts to be in all Men
by Nature ; which will not ferve your purpofe.
Tou bring in Plato diftinguifhing Mind [nS5]
from f 4^] &"#/, and making the one mortal,
the other immortal : But this likewife, being
fpoken concerning the natural Formation of all
Men, is nothing to your purpofe ; For in your
Hypothefis, you make the whole Man by na
ture Mortal. Tou mention Plato here ( pag. 22
and 24, and again pag. gg and 96, and Prcsmon.
pag. 21,) as avowing your own Notions: And
yet in other places, {as pag. 33, 60, and 66, )
you inconfiftently fpeak of him as juftly blamed
for holding the contrary Opinion, for afferting
Our DotJrine of the Souls natural Immortality,
pag. 33. Tou affirm {pag. 23, ) that there is
no real difference between the Platonical No-,
tions and thofe of the New Teftament, only
that That which the Platonifts call Mind [ n*5 ]
C 2 and

zo /f Letter f* Mr. Dodweli.
and make it Immortal, the Sacred Writers call
[<*nZm~\ Spirit, as being the Divine Breathing,
Gen. ii. 7: Here you openly contradict your
felf, making the immortal [ a-wi*/** ] Spirit com
mon to all Men by their original Formation,
and confounding it with what you ejfewhere
*Vrs.mm. fo * often, in allufion to that very Text, di-
ptg. 11 ftinguifh by the Name [ mm ] Breath, and make
anj2i*' it mortal. Tou bring in Philo diftinguifhing
Dijcourfh ^e Immortal Soul from the fenftble formed Man,
it felf, as you darkly exprefs it ; But even this alfo is
pag 160 directly againft you : For Philo oppofing the
and ll6, immortal Mind of Man, that is, the. rational
Soul, both to the Body and to the fenfitive
Soul, ftill fpeaks of them all as original and na
tural Parts of the Man ; and therefore when
you apply to your Hypothefis of an adfcititious
Spirit, what he fays concerning this [imfy*«.*h.«]
Divine Spirit or Soul infufed into Man by God's
breathing, Gen. ii. 7 ; you again directly con
tradict your felf, by confounding the Spirit
[mt-Zfwc] which you fuppofe immortal, with
the -[ Tvoi) ] Breath or Soul which you make to be
mortal. Tou cite {pag 26.) the Words of
Aratus , TS ^ ^ ya,©- itrpi* as approved by St
Paul, Ads xvii. 28: But'tf thofe Words prove
any thing, they prove direftly againft you :
For Ylv@~ $£, jf it fignifies any thing, fignifies
Off-fpdng of God in that Senfe which you op-
pofe, {pag 66. ) And though you are pleafed
to underftand them {pag. 66,) only of thofe
that are immortalized by receiving or rejecting
the Gofpel, yet St Paul on the contrary as
plainly applies them to all that dwell on the Face
of tbe Earth, as it could be expreffed in Words. In

rA Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 21
In the fame Section, (pag. 22, ) you call it a
precarious Fancy, to make every caufe of Motion
diftintl from Matter, to be properly what we call
a Spirit, Independent on Matter, and Immortal :
Here you feem to fuppofe the Soul of Man, to
be fomething diftintl from Matter ; yet not a
Spirit, nor Independent on Matter, leaft from
thence it fhould follow that it was naturally
immortal. In your Premonition, p. 25, you
make the Soul, as being a mere Flatus, to have
a more precarious fubfiftence, even than mere
Matter it felf , faying that it is unable to continue
its own Duration by the Powers given it at its firft
Produtlion, and the continuance of tho ft general
Influences which are requifite for the fupport of
Created Beings in general : Yet in the fame page
( as I obferved before ) you fay that Souls do
not fo depend on any other Created Being, but that
they may ftill continue in their Duration, wbatfo-
ever other created Influences be withdrawn from
them, if God be pleafed ftill to continue that ordi
nary Providence which is effentiatty neceflary for
their continuance : This is making them properly
Immortal. In the Difcourfe it felf, pag. 5 f , you
fuppofe again that the Soul may depend on Mat
ter, as to its Being and Prefervation, though it
be not a Modification of Matter, but diftintl
from it: Here you exprefs your felf, as if you
thought it a Subftantial Form, a contradictory
Chimasra, which arofe merely from the mif-
conftruction of a Greek Word in Ariftotle, fig- •%
nifying indifferently either Subftantial or Efifen-
tiali And again, pag. 91, you fuppofe in like
manner, thatthe Soul is Jomething diftintl both
from Spirit, and alfo/"-0-» Matter and Motion ;
that is to fay, a Material Form ; an atlive Sub
ftantial Principle, diftintl from Matter, yet de-
C 3 pending

22 ^Letter?* Mr. Dodweli.
pending on Matter, in effe, in fieri, in operafi,
and which muft accordingly be diffolved on the dif
folution of that Matter on which it depends. In
pag. 220, you fuppofe, on the other hand, the
Two Souls (fas you call them ) to be not only di
ftintl, but alio feparable : And pag. 218, you
feem to incline to the Notion of thofe Philofo-
phers, who owned the w,on to be material like the
Steams of odoriferous Bodies ; Which Confideration
alone, you fay, is fiifficient to cut it off from any
pretenfionsto any proper natural Immortality. Is
not all this, the greateft Extravagancy and Con-
fufion that, can be ? Did not the World know
you to be a ferious Perfon, thefe things would
look much more like the Raillery of an Unbe
liever, than the Reafonings of one that in ear-
neft intended to eftablifh any confiftent Notion.
In reality, That the Soul cannot poflibly be
Material, is evident not only from the confide
ration of its noble Faculties, Capacities and Im
provements, its large Comprehenfion and Me
mory ; iu Judgment, Power of Reafoning, and
Moral Faculties ; which Arguments have been
urged with unanfwerable Strength by the wifeft
and moft confiderate Men in all Ages from the
times of Socrates and Plato to this very Day ;
but the fame thing is moreover demonftrable
from the fingle confideration, even of bare
Senfe or Confcioufnefs it felf. For Matter be-
ing a divifible Subftance, confifting always of
-/feparable, nay of actually feparate and diftinct
parts, 'tis plain, that unlefs it were effentially
Confcious, in which cafe every particle of Mat
ter muft confift of innumerable feparate and
diftinft Confcioufnefles, no Syftem of it in any
poffible Compofition or Divifion, can be an
individual Confcious Being: For, fuppofe three

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 25
three or three hundred Particles of Matter, at a
Mile or any given diftance one from another ;
is it poflible that all thofe feparate parts mould
in that State be one individual Confcious Be
ing ? Suppofe then all thefe particles brought
together into one Syftem, fo as to touch one
another ; will they thereby, or by any Motion
or Compofition whatfoever, become any whit
lefs truly diftinct Beings, than they were when
at the greateft diftance? How then can their
being difpofed in any poflible Syftem, make
them one individual confcious Being ? If you
will fuppofe God by his infinite Power fuperad-
ding Confcioufnefs to the united Particles, yet
ftill thofe Particles, being really and neceflarily
as diftinct Beings as ever, cannot be themfelves
the Subject in which that individual Confciouf
nefs inheres, but the Confcioufnefs can only be
fuperadded by the addition of Something,
which in all the Particles muft ftill itfelf be but
one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whofe
Power of Thinking is undeniably one Individu
al Confcioufnefs, cannot poffibly be a Material
Subftance. And if it be neither Matter nor
any Modification of Matter, then ( though you
are pleafed to * affirm fomewhat rafhly, and • pug. ji.
without offeringany reafon for your affirmation,
that fuch Reafoning is far from being Self-evident,
yet ) it is really as notorioufly Self-evident as
any thing in Nature, that it cannot poffibly de
pend upon Matter, as to its Being and Prefervation,
For if even one particle of Matter cannot poffibly
depend upon another, as to its Being and Preferva-
tion, { which I believe you will confefs to be
Self-evident, ) becaufe they are each of them
diftinct Beings ; muft it not be even yet lefs
poflible, for a Being which is neither Matter
C 4 iE

'24 ^Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
it felf, nor a Modification of Matter, but in-
tirely diftintl from Matter, {pag. 51 •, ) to de
pend on Matter as to its Being and Prefervation ?
• It is not indeed of any great Moment in the
prefent difpute ; but it feems to fhow in general
fomething ofhafleand inconfiftency in your No
tions ; what you affirm concerning the Giants,
( Set!. 8.) who you fay, defcended from theSons
ef Seth and the Daughters of Cain ; and yet in the
very fame Paragraph you call them the Off- ¦
fpring of the fallen Angels ; and, upon their ac
count, make two defetlions of Angels, one before
the Fall of Adam, the other before the Flood.
You proceed ( Setl. 9,) to the Authority of
the Fathers. Juftin Martyr, whom you begin
with, fays indeed exprefsly, that the Soul ought
not properly to be called Immortal: But this he
fays, not as you reprefent him, in oppofition to
cur Doclrine, nor yet in oppofition to Plato,
but in oppofition to the extravagant Notions of
fome * pretended Platonifts, who
¦* *L*¥Tx u''ty°" "- taught fuch an Immortality as
*> aSkm-rk h> xfrlc. t.Wj Af- imphed necejjity of exift ence.
¦ye/tyns zrxuTcmx&i. z>'mi»g. For the reafon he gives why
tum.Tryph. Souls ought not to be cal-
..« ' \ x t \ led Immortal , is becaufe +
yttvivM-  , cat &(* uS-m*™. tloey ha® a beginning, and de*
ibid. pend continually upon God for
the Prefervation of their Being.
In which Senfe, neither aw Angels Immortal;
|| Mi©- $ «y«©- * )ut WG°dc onh- AH that he
«<pfatT& i ©«* ibid. lays therefore, does not m the
leaft imply, but that the Soul
may be fuch a fubftance, as is able to continue
its own Duration for ever, by the Powers given it

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 2 5
it at its firft Production, and the continuance
Of thofe general Influences which are requifite
for the fupport of Created Beings in general :
Which is all that we mean by natural Immor
tality. Nay, that he did actually think the Soul
to be in this fenfe Immortal, may juftly be ga
thered from thofe very words which you your
felf cite from him : "Oti kvr\ ,4" >g q$x.p\, &c.
What Plato thought concerning the World, that it
muft needs indeed be in its Nature capable of being
deftroyed and brought lo an End, becaufe it had
a Beginning ; yet that God would never atlually
deftroy it : The fame may be thought concerning the
Soul, and concerning all things that are or can be,
excepting only God himfelf ( luen l%a,<pavt£iYiwi ) that
they are capable of being deftroyed : Which laft
words feem clearly to explain what he means by
the word [ q>^ra> ] corruptible, which he ap
plies not only to the Soul of Man, but alfo to
all Created Beings whatfoever ; namely, not to
fignify any Tendency to Corruption in the Na
ture of the thing it felf, but only a Depen
dence upon the Will of God, in oppofition to
Self-exiftence. He does .indeed fay, that the
Souls of the Damned fhall continue to exift as
long as God thinks fit ; and implies as if he
thought they fhould finally be deftroyed, after
very long Punifhment : But this, not by a na
tural Mortality, but by the Will of God, who
is as able to deftroy if he thinks fit, as to create:
Which Opinion, if there was any ground for it,
Would yet fignify nothing at all to your purpofe.
Tatian's Opinion, if it was of any Authority,
would prove too much for you. For he fancied
that the.Soul was diffolved with the Body, and
rofe again with it at the Refurreclion. This part

26 !^ Letter ^ Mr. Dodweli.
part you pleafantly call his Humane Reckoning
{ SetJ. i o ; ) as if you thought all the reft of
what he fays in the very fame Sentence, was im
mediately Divine. Yet even He alfo is exprefsly
againft you. For as he makes all .Souls to die
with the Body, fo he makes them all to rife
again with it alfo ; leaving none of them in
their natural Mortality ; but raifing them all
either to eternal Happinefs, or [S-«Wev aj^ t.-
ju-svf.'ajs ci ciB-mmcrii* *.v,fi,Gavistr» ] to immortal Punifh
ment. Irenaus is fo very full and exprefs againft you,
and your perverting of his words fo very grofs,
that with the fame liberty any perfon might
eafily make any Author feem to countenance
any Herefy or abfurd Opinion whatfoever, even
from the very Words themfelves, wherein he
with all poflible clearnefs expreffes himfelf a-
gainft it. The Paffages which you your felf
cite, are as clear and plain as can be defired.
He in exprefs words (as you your felf cite them,)
declares the Soul to * be immor-
* Quae funt natura immor- tal in its own Nature, and af-
talia; quibus a fua natura adeft £,.,„„ ,.,,„,. :,. j „ j.  , j-„
nvere. hib. 5. ,.4. 0 hrms tnat ȣ. does T not die.
f ibid. c. 7. To evade this, you fuppofe
he means only, that the Soul
does not die in the fame Manner that the Body
does, namely by ceafengto breathe ; A more fur-
prizing Evafion could not poffibly have been
invented; His Words, which the Reader would
expett you fhould have tranfcribed at length,
are thefe ; that 4. it is the
4- Hxc [ euro J enim eft, quae Body only that dies, not the Soul:
TZZ n^f^itus^Cri F°/\ ^ V ''^^
enim, eft vitalem amittere ha- °J ^F ' breath , benfe and
Muatem, & fine Sfiramine in Motion •% and to be feparated into* its

A Letter, to Mr. Dodweli. 27
its firft Principles of Compofi- pofterum, & inanimalem &
Hon •, which tbe Soul, the Fla- !***mob'!e*** fieri, & deperire
tusvitz, andthe Spirit which is fi^^ g0~
a fimple and UnCOmpOUnded and heq; Animas evenit; flatus eft
indiffolvable fubftance, cannot be: en,m vita*-' neq; Spin'tui ; in-
is not the word [Spiramen] Suf "' f r!nrt.,8c fimpIex
t> _,,.,.„ u r J *pintus qui refolvi non po-
Breath, in this Sentence an ex- teft, lib. j. s*a. 7.
cellent ground for your di
ftinction; that Irenceus by denying that the
Soul dies, does not mean to deny that it dies,
but only to deny that it dies in the fame Man
ner the Body does, viz. by ceafing to breathe ?
Again, He exprefsly affirms
that * the Soul and Spirit is ,, * "pvn $ i ^Ii s->htIv,
not mortal : By this you fay ™ ™,"*fS/** ,ib.- j\ J3- a*
l 1 ..¦ A. c 1 the Words are cited by you:
he means only, that the Soul & /,-,. f_ 7> ^ ,/A
does not ailually die w^w the Words again.
Body dies ; but, being afhamed
of this Interpretation, you add immediately,
that he means alfo further, that the Soul in
its own Nature,, does not confift of contrary Prin
ciples, tending to a Diffolution by its own Nature,
as the Body does: This is exprefsly giving up
the whole Queftion ; and direftly contrary to
what you add prefently after, that Death is na
tural to the Soul on account of its natural Conftitu-
tion. It is here further to be obferved alfo,
that thefe laft words which you your felf cite out
of Irenaus, that the Soul and Spirit is not Mor
tal, [xnti-tyvM *ts to mivfiux, ] are directly con
tradictory to the Notion you advance, pag. 3,
concerning [ o-a"*** 4vw*°" ] tbe natural Body's be
ing therefore oppofed to [ smty**™*},- ] 1 Cor. xv.
44, becaufe it has only a Mortal Principle [ +%]
in it ; and alfo directly contradictory to what
you infinuate, pag. 41, concerning Ireneus'%
understanding [•rm^} the Breath of Life, Gen,

28 '^ Letter /ff Mr. Dodweli.
Gen. ii. 7, to be, what Tou all along diftin
guifh it to be, a Mortal Principle: Which he
is indeed fo far from doing, that, on the con
trary, he, in that very Chapter from whence
you have taken moft of your Citations, de
clares [ Mw ] the Soul, not to be mortal,
* Qus funt ergo mortalia for * that very reafon becaufe
corpora? numquidnam Ani- it IS [sroi £»")«] the Breath of
xnx? Sed incorruptibiles Ani- fife, Gen. ii. J. Notwith-
mx quan/rm1™umain" ftanding that he does indeed,
nem mortaliumcorporum. in- 0
fufflavit enim in faciem homi- at the fame time, contra
ry Deus /<*/»»» viu ("Gen. ii. diftinguifh it, as St Paul does,
7. ) & facto te& in animam vi- f » , ^ Th -
ventem ; Flatus autem viu, *lvl" •"". "» • .1 •
incorporalis eft. Sed ne mor- {pactum being plainly With him,
talem quidem poffunt dicere as it js with St Paul, that di-
hominem ipfum flatum vitse vine power wnich Spiritualizes
exiftentem. Et propter hoc , T .. * ,
David ait; & anima mea illi and Immortalizes, not the
vivet; tariquam immortalifub- Soul, but the Body, at the Re-
ftantiauna ejus existence, lib. 5. furrection.

c.-}.

lrenzus does indeed, with other Antient Wri
ters, allow, that whatever is ymnrm or had a be
ginning, muft be tpSwjrov, that is, as Juftin Mar
tyr expreffes it, 'o»v « l|«p«v.a-*H"i>«., capable of being
deftroyed. But this is only meant fas the Anti-
thefis of the Words [ytn*™ ] and [ tps-x^n ] evi
dently fhowsj of the Nature of the Soul as op-
pofed, together with that of Angels and of all
other the higheft Created Beings whatfoever, to
That Immortality which arifes from Neceffity of
Exiftence, which muft needs be peculiar to God
alone ; Which is nothing to your purpofe.
I cannot fee how you collect any thing at all
from Athenagoras, {Sett. 12,) He does indeed
diftinguifh nS« from ^i according to the old
Philofophy ; but he does not found any thing upon

^Letter to Mr. Dodweli. zgi
tapon that diftinction, which is in the leaft to
your purpofe. He neither affirms the Soul to
be mortal, nor makes any doubt but the Bodies
of all Men fhall rife again unto Judgment. All
you pretend to gather from him, is, that the
Soul is not it felf fufficient to immortalize the
Body : But to this you have your felf given a
full anfwer, that No Body ever thought it was.
The Words you cite from Iheophilus Antio-
chenus, { Setl. 13,) relate wholly to the Queftion
concerning the State of Adam in Paradife, whe
ther he was created Mortal or Immortal in that
State : Nothing therefore can be gathered from
thence, concerning the Natu re of a feparate Soul.
Theopbilus determines, that He
was neither Mortal nor Immor- * Note; your Emendation*
tal * originally by his Creati- •y'"/*** for iyS p>\>, in this
on ; that is (as you your felf Paffage ofTheophiius, is wi-h-
... v i- . ^ , • oiitground. For the Senfe is
explain it, pag. 46.) God nei- nor, r^ Tsro jy^a,,] notfa.
ther defigned for him Corporal J fuppofe ¦, but [ ih touto IyS
Death, nor Corporal Immor ta- /**>>) l ' dare not "Jfett Thlie
,.. l 1 ui c neither, for my tart; anfwerin?
lity ; but he was capable of t0 rV«B»» *«A»J in thf
being either, according as he preceeding line; Asanyonethat
fhould behave himfelf : But pleafes to compare your Book»
whether Adam before his Fall ^ obfervc'
was in that Senfe naturally
immortal, or naturally mortal ; what is this to
the Soul? Which, fuppofing Adam never fo mor
tal, you your felf acknowledge does not perifh
by that Mortality which denominates a Man
Mortal, that is, the Diffolution of the Body.
His faying that from that Text, Gen. ii. 7,
moft Men [ a-sW^s ] ftiled the Soul immortal ;
does not imply (as you imagine) that Theopbilus
himfelf thought it Mortal; but it implies
fpme doubt concerning the proper ufc of the,
Word

30 r^ Letter W Mr. Dodweli:
Word &9<U)t9". which fas has been before
noted ) feemed to many of the Antients to im
ply as much as iyW®- Neceffarily exifting, ( in
the Senfe that St Paul fays of God, i Tim. vi.
1 6, i Mo,©- '&*.» £&«««*» that #<? o»/y Aa/A Immor
tality ; ) or at leaft to fignify an indefetlible State
of Virtue and Happinefs : And therefore it is,
that he fays concerning Adam, '£« iS-imrm kwrnkw
lw$c, i7r17comx.ii, s-ioti u» hci7com,u : If Adam had been
made originally immortal, he bad been made a God.
It is alfo further to be obferved from this paf-
fage of Theopbilus, that the Text you fo fre
quently allude to, Gen. ii. 7, was sj%-' *-«*s tr-mw
by moft of tbe Antients, underftood in a Senfe di
rectly contrary to your Notion of the m*\ figni-
fying in that place a Mortal Principle. And it
is with very extraordinary difficulty, that you
here labour to fuppofe, that [s-ai«»£«] thofe
moft Men whom theopbilus affirms to have col
lected the Immortality of the Soul from this Text
of Scripture, were not Chriftians, but either
Jewifh Pharifees, or Heathen Philofophers : which
Suppofition of Heathen Philofophers proving
the Immortality of the Soul from a Text of
Scripture ; and that a Chriftian Writer fpeak-
ing of moft Mens Senfe concerning a Text of
Scripture, fhould thereby mean the Senfe of
Heathen Philofophers ; This, I fay, with all
that follows in that Section, is fo extremely ab-
furd, as to need no Confutation.
Tertullian does indeed fuppofe the Soul to be
Material ; from whence it muft alfo neceffarily
be confeffed to follow that it would be naturally
Mortal; and no one can ( as you fay, Setl. 14,)
believe fuch a Soul as he fuppofes, to be inde
pendent on Matter in its own Nature. All this
4 is

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
is very true ; and yet even This feems to be no
thing to your purpofe. For though the natu
ral Mortality of the Soul is indeed a neceflary
Confequence of Tertullian's Doctrine ; yet, fince
Tertullian did not fee nor own that Confequence ;
and, if he had feen the Confequence, would
have difowned the Doctrine ; his Authority
{ which is what you would make ufe of) is not
for you, though the Confequence of his Dotlrine
be ; And therefore you are guilty of a very ma-
nifeft Fallacy, when you fay, {pag. S5-> ) that
the Church had not declared againft this Dotlrine
of Tertullian, which fuppofed the Soul's natural
Mortality : For his Doctrine did not then fup
pofe it, though our Philofophy fhows it to be
indeed a Confequence. He fays exprefsly in
many places of his Book de Anima, that- the
Soul is immortal: He reckons this among thofe
Opinions of the Philofophers which gave oc-
cafion to Herefies that * fome
of them denied the Immortality
of tbe Soul: He denied -f- that
the Soul grew or increafed in
fubftance, notwithstanding he
thought it Material ; leaft it
fhould follow from thence, that
it was capable likewife of perifh-
ing: He ftrongly .}¦ oppofes the
Opinion of thofe who thought
the Soul received Nourifhment ;
leaft from thence likewife it fhould
follow that it was liable to pe
rifh: He exprefsly affirms, 0
that all Mankind, without ex
ception, fhall rife again to eter
nal Happinefs or Punifhment:
And many other fuch Paffages

31

* Alii immortalem
Animam, cap. f.

negaat

f Caeterum animam fubfhn-
tia crefcere negandum eft, ne
etiam decrefcere fubftantia di-
catur, atq; ita & defedtura cre-
datur, cup. 37.
4- Auferenda eft Argumenta-
toris -occafio, qui, quod anima
defiderare videatur alimenta,
hinc quoq; morralem earn in-
telligi cupit, quae cibis fuftine-
atur, deniq; derogatis eis evi-
gefcat, poftrerao fubtraftis in-
tercidat, cap 38.
|| Reflitueturtfrarce humamim
genus ¦ exinde ia fmmen-
fam asternitatis perpetuitateni.
Id. in Apologetico.

are

3*

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
are to be found in his Works. You feem to
be aware of this, when you fay, that Tertullian
does indeed own the atlual Immortality of the Soul:
But then, what you infinuate in your next
Words, [ Efpecially of all who were, upon that
account, obliged to come over as Profelytes upon the
Publication -of the Gofpel,] is extremely unfair;
fince Tertullian's Words, being every where
as univerfal as can be, are directly contrary to
what you would infinuate by the Word Efpe
cially. And here upon occafion of the Paffages you
cite out of Tertullian, concerning the Propaga
tion of the Soul ex traduce, and its having a Hu
mane Shape and Difference of Sex ; I cannot
forbear propofing it to your more calm and
ferious confideration, whether your manner of
citing the Fathers, by picking out chiefly fuch
Sentences, wherein for want of Philofophy
they were evidently miftaken, and which can
only be of differvice to Religion, and tend to
confirm profane Men in their Mockery and
Contempt; is not a very ill reprefentation of
thofe Writers, and a very ill manner of fhow-
ing your regard to them. I believe, fhould
any other Perfon do the like upon any other
Philosophical Subject, you would immediately
look upon him as doing it with an ill defign,
and deferving a very fevere Cenfure.
What you fay ( Seel. 16, ) concerning Ter
tullian's deriving the Humane Soul from the
Flatus Vila mentioned Gen. ii. 7 ; proves, not
that he thought the Soul Mortal, becaufe you
groundlefsly interpret that Text fo ; but that
he underftood that Text contrary to what you
have done, becaufe he clearly declares the Soul
derived

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 33
¦derived thdhce to be immortal : As I have be
fore fhown particularly concerning Irenceus.
And what you offer in the reft of that Para
graph, concerning proper Immortality belonging
only to God, is all entirely againft your felf,
and not in the leaft againft our Notion, as has
likewife been proved before.
The Word's you cite out of St Cyprian, {Seel.
j 8, ) are evidently nothing to your purpofe ;
being fpoken only concerning regeneration or
the new birth in the moral Senfe, without any
the leaft hint of any natural mortality of the
Souls of thofe who are not regenerated. Arnobius,
you your felf acknowledge to have his Para
doxes on this Subjetl ; that he was but a Catechu
men, when he wrote his Book ; and was not
truly inftrutled in the Chriftian Dotlrine. But,
you fay, he is more to be regarded, when he
f peaks conformably to the Senfe of other Catbolick
Doffors of that early Age, that is, when you
think he fays any thing agreeable to that Notion
which you not truly attribute to the Fathers.
And yet even He, does not fay any thing really
agreeable to that Notion. For though he does
indeed' blame the boldnefs of certain Platonifts
for fuppofing, the Soul to be * neceffarily Immor- * Animus,
tal, to have come from Heaven, and to return <]u'im:
thither again of courfe at the diffolution of fhe vor,isa&
Body ; running out with much oratorical Li- Deus effe
berty upon the weaknefs of thofe Mens Argu- narramr,
ments for the Immortality of the Soul -, and
does himfelf contend that the
Soul is of 1 + middle Nature + Medletas er£° qusedam, &
00m is or a t miaaieiNai-ure-, animarum anc€ps ambigua(li
neither mortal, nor immortal, natura, &c. lib. 1.
but capable of either conditi
on according to its behaviour ; yet all this he
D does

34 ^Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
does purely upon That Argument, that what
ever had a beginning muft alfo neceffarily be
capable of being deftroyed ; and that whatever
is Paffble, muft needs in its Nature be liable
to perifh; and accordingly therefore applies it
to Angels * and all other
* omnes omnino, Dii, An- Created Beings whatfoever ,
&2F£?£1SS j the very fame. Senfe as he
& ipfi funt media:, & ambi- does to Men : which is not the
guse fortis conditione mutabi- Notion of Mortality Tou are
les- lib- *¦ contending for. And when he
fuppofes the Souls of the Wicked to perifh fi
nally, ( which you imagine to be for your pur
pofe ; ) he underftands it of all the damned, as
well thofe that bad heard the Gofpel, as thofe
that had not; and thofe that had received the
Spirit, as thofe that had not ; conceiving them
all to be deftroyed by the Power of God inflict
ing fuch Punifhment upon them, and not that
any die by a natural mortality.
Latlantius is throughout his whole Work as
full and exprefs againft you, as any Author that
ever wrote either before or fince. So that your
perverting his Words to favour your Notion, is
really, what upon fecond Thoughts you your
felf will hardly excufe. I fhall firft fhow briefly,
how clearly he afferts the natural Immortality of
the Soul, and then confider in how very extra
ordinary a manner you mifreprefent him.
He approves that + Noti-
+ Licet verum de arumx _„ c nS1. , • i . /¦
immomlirate fentiret , &c. °" of Pla0 » whlch You 4" ,f°
lib. 7. §. 8. often condemn, concerning the
4 p»g. 33. 66, &c. natural Immortality of the
II Apparet animam non in- .*. g j R declares that || the
terires neq; diffolvi, fed mane- r> . > ./, ¦ i-r
re in Stmpiternum. lib. 7. <>oal does not perifh nor IS dlf-
§-o- " folved, but endures for ever:
He

A Letter to Mr, Dodweli
He is very large and particu
lar * in confuting all Lucreti-
us's Arguments againft the
natural Immortality of the
Soul: He affirms, that -f* at
Death the Body returns to the
Earth ; but That part of our-
felves, which God breathed into us, endures and
lives for ever ; And again ,
that 4- the Soul is not corrupti
ble, but endures for ever ; be
caufe it proceeded from an eter
nal Original : And concludes ;
H I think, faith he, I have fuf-
ficiently proved the Soul is not
diffolvable. He expreffes him
felf in the very fame manner concerning the
natural duration of wicked Souls, as of good
ones. The Effetl of that Death,
faith * he, which wicked Souls
are fubjetl to, is not the extin
guishing of them, but the punifh-
ing them eternally : This Punifh
ment we call the fecond Death ;
which is itfelf alfo perpetual, as
eternal Happinefs is ; The fecond
Death is the fuffering eternal
Torment ; tbe damnation of Souls
to eternal Punifhment , accord
ing to their Defer ts. Again:
As tbe Life of the Soul, faith f
he, is eternal, in which it en
joys divine and unfpeakable Hap
pinefs ; fo its Death alfo muft
needs be eternal, in which it in
jures everlafting Punifhment and
endlefs Torments for its Sins.
D 2 And

35

* Lib. y, §. n, Sec.
f Quod ex terra fuit, in
Terram refolvitur; quod ex
cselefti Spiriru, id conftat ac
viget Semper, quoniam divinus
Spi.-itus'empitefiiUseft. lib. j.
§. ii.

+ Ergo anima, qua: fragilis
non eft, in internum manet ;
quoniam Origo ejus seterna
eft. Ibid.
|j Declaravi, ut opinor, ani
mam non efle folubilem. M. 7.
§••3-

* Cujus [mortis] non ea
vis eft, ut injuftas animas ex-
tinguat omn.no, fed ut puniat
in sternum. Earn pcenam, fe-
cundam mortem nominamus,
quae eft gc ipfa perpetua, ficut
& immortalitas ,  Mors Se-
cunda, eft seterni doloris per-
pefiio; Mors eft animarumpro
mentis ad jeterna fupplicia
damnatio. lib. 1. §.12.

f Sicut Vita Animas fempi-
terna eft, in qua divinos & in-
eloquibiles immortalitatis fuse
fructus capit; ita & mors ejus
perpetua fit neceffe eft, in qua
perennes]pcenas & infinita tor-
menta pro peccatis fuis pendet,
lib. 7. §. 11.

3-6

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
And again: Death, faith * he,
* Morsautem non funditus ^oes y0p deftroy and' extinguifh
perimit ac cfelel, , fed ^terois thg. Sml hul fubjetls it to tier-
Sfflcucruc.attbu,W.7.§-- ^ . To^UHt/m "W that all
this might not pofli.bly be underftood either of
your immortalizing Spirit, or of the wri- Will'.
and Pleafure of God, fuftaining the Soul, and
ca-ufing it- to endure beyond the original capa
city of its own Nature ; he adds exprefsly in
the very next Words, ( as if he had forefeeii.and
•defigned to prevent your Hypothecs, ) that the
reafon why the Soul is fubject to fuch endlefs
Punifhment--, is becaufe it was created origi
nally immortal, and therefore cannot die : For
the Soul, f fays he, cannot ut
terly perifh and be extinguifhed%
becaufe it has its Original from
the Spirit' of God [ he means
that which you call the «*«i'
Gen, ii. 7, ] which is eternal. And again ; in
Anfwer to that Objection,
."_ how that which is immortal,
can be capable of fuffering ; he
has thefe remarkable Words :
Mens Souls, faith || he, though
they are not capable of being ut
terly extinguijhed, becaufe they.
are of Divine Original ; yet by
being immerfed in Senfe, and de-r
praved by Sin, they become liable t
to' Mifery and Torment. And
again: * What wonder is. it,
faith he, if Souls, notwithftand-
ing that tbey are immortal, are
yet capable of having Punijbment inflitled upon.
them by God ?

¦\ Nam interire prorfus ani-
ffia non poteft-;; quoniam ex
Dei Spiritu, qui,eft'aeternu,s o-.
riginem cepit, ibid.

4. Si eft-imniortalis Anima,
quomodo patibilis inducitur 8c
pcense fentiens? lib. 7,20.
|| Ejus naturx reddi animas
ut, fi non extinguibiles in to-
tum, quoniam ex Deo funt,
tamen cruciabiles. fiant per
corporis maculam , qua: pec-
catis inufta fenfum doloris at-
tribuit. ibid.
* Quid ergo mirum, ficum
fint immortales anima;, tamen
patibiles fint Deo ? ibid,

Moft

A Letter to Mr. Dodwefl. .37
Moft of thefe Paffeges, which are as remark
ably full and clear againft you, a? if the Au
thor had written on purpofe to oppofe your
Hypothefis, you inexcufably pafs over without
notice. And from thefe Pa'ffagesany one may
eafily obferve, how very grofsly, I had almoft
¦laid beyond Example, you mifreprefent thofe
other places which you do cite from him. The
Pafikges Which you cite, pag. 70, wherein Lac-
tanfius affirms Immortality, not to be the necef-
fary Condition of our Nature, but the Reward
of our Virtue ; are all plainly meant, not of
Perpetuity of Duration, (which he every
where affirms to belong neceffarily to our Na
ture ) but of the eternal indefectible Happi
nefs of Heaven ; which this Author always
means by the word Immortality, as alone de-
ferving that glorious Title ; notwithstanding
that at the fame time he exprefsly and conftant
ly affirms the oppofite ft^e to be of equal du
ration and perpetuity. Thus when, fpeaking
ofthat fecond Death, which, 1
he fays, * does not extinguifh * cujus non ea vis eft, ut
wicked Souls, but fubjetls them injuftas animas extinguat om-
to endleft Mifery-, he fay's, that j&^&^S
That likewife is of perpetual nomiHafeus; qua eft & ipfa
Duration, as Immortality alfo is ;. perpetua, fieut & immortalitoSr
it is evident that by Immortality w- *• "•
he means to exprefs, hot Du
ration, but Happinefs : Andin the place which
you cite to prove that he did not think Im
mortality natural to Men, he in exprefs words
declares that by Immortality he
means + the unfpeakable and t £fe wmtrinUutm ddior-
, r7 . r r tt „ te aiTequerentur ac molliter,
eternal Happinefs ef Heaven . ftdad ^md.iFer^tiuimloqui-
And when he fays || there would bile prttn'm-A fumma cumdif-
be no difference betwixt juft and fieultate,- &c.tib. 7. §•-"•.
* a r I tut*,*. L 7?* || Nam nihil interelTet later
mmft , no fuch thing as Ke- "
jD 3 ward

5 8 ^f Letter W Mr. Dodweli.
juftum & injuftum ;¦ fiquidem ward and Punifhment , if all
omnis homo natus, immortdis Men were born Immortal; It
fieret. ibid. js verv tv\c\txVi from the
Thread of his Difcourfe, that he means, if
Men were born originally, and without under
going any Tryal, into fuch a
* Cum poffet femper Spirt- gtate as * thf. Qood Angels
tibus fuis immortahbus mnu- . , , 0 ! P ^
merabiles animas procreare fi- are now in , and the SaintS
cut Angelos gtxixM, quibus im- fhall be in after the Refur-
mortditas fine ullo malorum. reftion) namely a State of In-
^riculoacrnetuconftat„&c. d?feaib,e yirtue and Happj.
nefs; then the Nature of Re
wards and Punifhments, would be taken away.
Again ; Thofe Paffages which you cite, pag. 71,
wherein you fuppofe that Latlantius by that
immortal Spirit which God put or infpired into an
Earthly Body, means, not the natural Soul ,of
Man, but the Divine Spirit received in our Sa*
viour^s regenerating Bapiifm, as a new Principle
of Immortality: Thefe Paffages, I fay, if to
any one that pleafes to compare the places,
f lib. j, u. they do not appear to be f all and every one
rt 1*'*'L of them clearly fpoken on the Contrary, con-
,', '7'4 cerning that natural Soul, which God is faid
to have breathed into Man, Gen. ii. 7 ; it will
not be eafy to conceive how any Man can pof
fibly exprefs his meaning in Words : And when
from this Paffage, [ FitJo cor pore, 'fpiravit ei
animam de vitali fonte Spiritus fui, qui eft peren-
nis ; ut fi Anima fuperaverit, qua ex Deo oritur,
fit Immortalis & in perpetua luce verfetur j you
infer that the Soul is Immortal, only conditio*
nally, if it be victorious ; your mifreprefentation
of the Paffage, is very extraordinary: Forthe'
Words are not one entire Sentence, as anyone
would imagine them to be by your manner
"of citing them ; but two Paffages, at a Page
diftance

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 30
diftance from each other ; and not Anima { as
you feem to underftand it ) but Homo is the
Nominative Cafe to fit immortalis 6? in per
petua Luce verfetur ; And fo far is the Author
from making the Soul's Immortality conditional,
by thefe Words ; that directly on the contrary
he in this very Sentence means to fay, that the
Soul muft of Neceflity be Immortal in all cif-
cumftances ; only with this
difference, that * \f a Man * Ex rebus diverfisacrepug-
lives after the Spirit, his Im- nantibus Homo faauseft; 
mortality fhall be a Happy ut> £ Anim* ^Pfrayerit, qu*
z. . •/• 7 7- ct tii ex Deo otitur, fit immortalis
one; but if he Itve after the & in perpetua luce verfetur; fi
Flefh, his Immortality muft be autem Corpus vicerit,  fit
a Miferable one. When there- »*, tenebr's fempitemis & in
fore you fay th^at the way, ac- ^XlKS™
cording to LactS'^-ius, taken by tinguat omnino, fed ut puniat
Providence, for making Man's in K"*nuin- l'6- *> '*•
atlual Mortality or Immortality
the Reward or Punifhment of his Free-will was
to join his Soul to his Body immediately, which
being it felf Frail and Mortal, could not fecure
the Soul from atlual Mortality ; and That this
he fuppofes would make the Complex of the Soul
and Body atlually Mortal ; you might with the
fame Truth ; and with as much appearance of
Reafon, have faid, that Latlantius wrote his
Book with a defign to difprove the whole
Chriftian Religion, or any other particular Ar
ticle of it whatfoever. Again, when Latlantius
fays, that + fince tbis Temporal
Life is fucceeded by Temporal , t Q<*«* temporalem vitam
^yl. « ^*i,tnw» j r temporalis mors fequitur, con-
Deatb, It follows tbat the SOUl fequens eft ut refargant anima:
muft rife again to eternal Life, ad vitam perennem, quia finem
becaufe temporal Death has an f°rs temporalis accepit. lib,-,.
End; It is a very great and
P 4 palpable

4 a A Letter tr Mr. Dodweli.
palpable mifreprefentation, to infer from thefe
words, ( as you do, pag, 73 , ) th^t Latlantius-
was fo far from owning the Immortality of tbe
Soul, as natural to it, that he feems to own its
atlual Death, for the fpace between tbe Death of
the Body and the Refurrection ; and therefore aft
er ibes the Refurretlion to the Soul as well as the
Body : For what can be a groffer mifreprefen
tation of any Author, than from one fingle Paf
fage ( even fuppofing that Paffage not recon-
cileable with the reft, ) to affirm that his Opi
nion was juft contrary to what he largely and
exprefsly almoft in every Page of his Book
declares it to be ? But after all, this Paffage
is not difficult to be reconciled : For when he
who fays a hundred times in his Book, that the
Soul has no dependance on the $ody, but fub-
fifts as well and better after it is Separated from
it, fays in one fingle Paffage that Mens Souls
do [ refurgere ] rift again to eternal Life ; can
any thing be more evident than that his mean-
k . w ., . , 'ng is 5 that the Souls fhall
indueatur. ibid. 21. dies at the Rejurreclion before
the Judgment ? It is an eafy
Figure, and very ufual in the belt Authors,
and in the Scripture it felf, to fignify by the
Word [Soul] the fame as [Perfon] in general :
Thus Gen. xlvi. 26, All the Souls that came
with Jacob into Egypt, &c. And Lev. v. 2,
If a Soul touch any unclean thing, &c. In which
places nothing can be more abfurd than to un-
derftand Soul in the ftridt and proper Senfe of
the Word : And yet there is juft as much Rea
fon fo to do, as, from the Paffage now cited,
to conclude that Latlantius, contrary to what
he exprefsly declares in almoft every Page of
his

rA Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 41
his Book, was of Opinion that the Soul died
•with tbe Body. Had not the World defervedly
an Opinion of your great Learning, there
would be no need to take notice of fuch extra
ordinary mifconftructions : Which really, Sir,
in your reprefentation of this Author, appear
to have proceeded from greater Prejudice, or
greater Want of Care, than Men of your
known Abilities are ordinarily guilty of. At
laft you come off, pag. 75, with faying that
Latlantius's Reafonings either prove or are con-
fiftent with a precarious Immortality ; at leaft even
by our modern Reafonings, do not imply any Ne-
cefftty of an Immortality by Nature : And who,
Ibefeechyou, ever taught any other Immorta
lity of the Soul, than a precarious one ; that is,
depending on the pleafure of- God Almighty ?
Or who ever imagined, that any thing which
was yaw™ and had a beginning, "was not alfo
capable of Being deftroyed and having an end,
if God fhould fo pleafe ?
You begin with St Athanafius {Seel. 21, ) ve
ry ominoufly ; Acknowledging that&<? does in
deed own the Dotlrine of the Soul's Immortality,
as a Dotlrine of the Church: Which he does,
not only in * the Words you
cite from him, but alfo largely * "°T\h *j «%«*«¦¦*&- v'v-
and fully in many other places £ '« ***. * •f'^^T ""
of his Oratio contra Gentes ; ^^ 0r;tm com. Gent.'
ftiling the Soul f rational and f «S»« «» tS«w«a», «
immortal ; affirming that || when "fax* *»v-*» >$ ^^ht®-, Md.
it is feparated from the Body, H,nS* ?» p"**** $ ™f*"
¦ .¦7,1 71 7 zr>tiot , hm^vS-ittrx, th <rau,ct*-
%t will have a much clearer know- r@J >  <p^^ -£.%•,,
ledge of its own Immortality ; rfc *9-cmun'*s yvSru. ibid,
and proving its Immortality
distinctly from feveral Topicks and Argu^
ments :

42 A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
ments: If the Soul, faith* he,
* 'E. yisj ttifut koT0 i xiy'i be diftintl from tbe Body ; as
&ciht%i wngk to a-Z^a, _ *V« 3 we have before Jhown ; and the
ro ~ <**u W w«yw , ' , It follows ne-
Tttii -tyvx,w uS-u.voi.tov Mat, TO) /*» wiiy *J f«I/r- *M> 'J. ,.
fjvxi m».T* to rZp*. ibid. ceffanly, that the Soul, being di-
f Am tSto $ «*¦ «.9-»W« x" ftintl from the Body , muft
itimut xoytZiw <£ <p?om, f™- yg jmmgrtal : And again; The
t~i^lb^oZZ Soul, faith ^fhe therefore me-
.W« «? »l t8t« Srtt>fowrw hur- dilates and thinks upon things
bltrin, grtui *&*>>«*¦* $iafwr«i> immortal and eternal, becaufe it
*^&*™l»xfy,i**v-^ • it felf Immortal; For as the
^f.ibid. Body, being it felf Mortal, has
all its Senfes employed about
mortal things ; fo the Soul, whofe Faculties are
employed about immortal things, muft it felf of ne?
ceffity be immortal and live for ever : Thefe Ar
guments are plainly drawn from the Nature of
the Soul it felf, and are directly contrary ro
your Notion of an Immortalizing Spirit or Will
of God : And accordingly, fpeaking of the
Heathens, he expreffes himfelf in the very
fame manner concerning Their Souls in partigu-
lar ; If tbey pretend to believe,
!| 'E. 5 if^^w i|.5irj» [«Z. «ti- faith || he,' tbat they have a
XoiwylXw . $ y) TtS^oyirJ Sour md value themfelves upon
.;,i*5- 3W i; pi W-s 'h- iheir Rattoml Faculties, as they
%w, srapit Aoyjw T-oXp.Strt , x.a.1 juftly may ; why, as if they
dx. & h? <P r if (fioatS™ , *mm had no Soul, do they atl contrary
KOSITTOVaj £«UT«« iC. TOtl ©£(« 5TOI- . T> r J s s 7 • 7. .1
«L.. ,,,.,,/, / ?q.' >/ /e Reafon, andnot think as tbey
eutrt ; -yvxw y«j a.ita.v«.Tov ttfov- 7 7
te? x" //,', pxacoifytvp mvtoTs, tm ought to do, but make God a
?-£«» ci to~5 ^aesto^wms ^ 3-ju- _g^ '^ meaner than themfelves ?
«r? «™k«->™. ^. For ^ -^ tbemj-ehes an im.
mortal «"-d invisible Soul, yet
they make God like to things vifible and mortal.
When therefore to Athana/ius's general Afferti-
on concerning the Immortality of the Soul, yot*
anfwer, that That does not concern your Caufe,
hecaufe

_ ^Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 41
becaufe your Queftion is not whether the Soul
be Immortal, but whether it be Immortal in its
own Nature; you are guilty ofa very great
Fallacy : For if by the Soul's being Immortal in
its own Nature, you intend to exprefs what we
mean, that the Soul by the powers given it
at its firft Creation is naturally able to continue
for ever j then Athanafius's Affertion does con-,
cern your Caufe ; becaufe, in all the places now
cited, he exprefsly maintains the natural Im
mortality of the Soul in that Senfe : But if by
Immortal in its own Nature, you mean neceffarily
Immortal, as God is ; then neither Athanafius,
nor we, nor perhaps any Body elfe, ever
meant that the Soul was Immortal in its own
Nature. From the Paffages therefore now cited, where
in Athanafius fo exprefsly and very largely afferts
the natural Immortality oi the Soul, it is very
reafonable to conclude, that all thofe Paffages
in His Book de Incarnatione verbi Dei, which
you underftand to imply a natural Mortality of
the Soul, ought ( that they may not be incon-
fiftent with what he fo fully and exprefsly af
ferts elfewhere ) to be underftood concerning
that natural Mortality which is the Diffolution
of the Body and Separation of the Soul, with
out determining what becomes ofthe Soul after
that Separation. And thofe Paffages may the
better be underftood in that Senfe, becaufe they
are all fpoken concerning that Mortality Adam
incurred by his Sin in Paradice ; the Confe
quence of which Mortality, with refpect to
the State of the Soul feparated thereby from
the Body, antecedent to the Promife of Chrift,
was not a Queftion neceflary to be entered in
to, And this is ftill the more confirmed by
This,

44 ^ Letter ^ Mr. Dodw*el?.'
This, that even thofe Phrafes, 3w««* voavw-xfi®^.
4>.^oj«5 vrxpif3tui-ti--r, ui t>j roil s-avtiiTis <ps-o%& f&feiv and the
like ; which feems at firft fight to make ther
moft for your purpofe ; it is plain need not to
be underftood to exprefs the total ExtintJionor
titter Annihilation of Adam, if Chrift had never
been promifed ; but either his having no
ground to expect any Reftoration to his fof-
raer ftate by a RefurretJion of tbe Body ; which
feems to be the meaning ofthem in fome places j
or t\ie ( which is evidently their Signification
in fome other places, ) Death's continuing to pre*
vail and extend it felf over his Pofterity : Thus,
When Adam had finned, faith *
• Tot/Vow 5 yivopbis, ot "« «v- he, Death entred into tbe Worlds
eooimi KTckv/fncov, i 0 s<po(a. >.- and jfcs Beftrutlion prevailed
kov^t-uv™^™,^^ d the whole
cv tis xscTet (putriv i^untra xair "
ixs tS ylvisr $ yx.o *? d t»~5 R&ce of Mankind. For Men
^MiJj^nxiujxa-iii oi av/rp/OTo. ont. increaftd and multiplied their
S^.- r», rr^r a'-™'' Sins btyond meafure: And there*
uXXa xmt oXtyei s«-ixTU»of0^ot, .. J J ..
Mmov **} Hi^iM-rpv 1WS-*- Pre Death prevaung more and.
«-..¦  A.* h toSt*, tojXov i? more, and this DeftrutHon con*
^.-liiwT^.^i*^!- tinuin* to have Dominion ever
toss -aafcctiLna-nq Kara, tm av- , , ° r . , „
•firm,, to $ t«v b^pS™ y'- Meflt We Whole RaCC ef MM*
y@- IQS-iiftvo. De lucamat. kind Was loft,
VerbL The fame thing ( namely,
that the Phrafes before-men
tioned do not fignify the total Extinction of
Adam both Soul and Body, if Chrift had ne
ver been promifed ; but only That Mortality
which is the Diffolution of the Body, and fe-
paration of the Soul ; ) may alfo, be gathered
from thofe other Exprefiions of the fame Au
thor in his Book de Incamatione Chrifti, from
fome of which you very unreafonably endea
vour {pag. 85, ; to conclude the direct con
trary. For when he fpeaks of the Soul's being
3 held

* AioS toJto j£. ojtS SitdiSan
\ i- sa/'' ~ T.5_
to tocJ avjp&wii* truu,a, axu
TSooi'tTcu ' lytriss to t'S'uv a-Zu.0.'
Kelt 07CIS XittpcCTTlTO ij 'vf'tJ^sJ it OS.V-
Qcumvn av S-a.va.Toi, isit Iss-ioV*-
vvtou it fylfot; tv,v a,vB-fa7riviiv $v-
%viv toh'av itrmv, &c. De In-
cam. Chrilli tontrm. Aiollinnr.
lib. i.

^Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
held [ c* ha-po* ] in Bonds, and [ <» &07*>"*i :SWts}
bt the Bonds of Death ; it is plain this does not
fignify the Extintlion of the Soul, but its con
finement to [Wds] the feparate State. And
therefore, fpeaking of Chrift's delivering Men
from that Mortality which was the Confe
quence of Adam*s Sin, he
faith * ; To that, place where
the Body of Man was corrupt
ed, thither did the Body of
Chrift go ; and to that Place,
where the Soul of Man was de
tained in Death, thither did'
Chrift go with his Humane
Soul, &c In which Paffage
it is evident, that by the Words [ ki^thto ' 4^».
i 'AtfyaTcivti c* 3-«.vccT.t» ] the Soul of Man was de
tained in Death, is not meant the Extintlion of
the Soul, but its Confinement to ["a^J that
feparate State, to which the Soul of Chrift de-
fcended. And in that very Paffage, where
from the Souls being concerned in the Sentence
'[SavosTa «sro9-swS] tbou fhalt furely die, you would
infer the Extintlion of the Soul ; if you had
cited the Words at length, it would have ap
peared that juft the contrary was intended : Tjie
Words are thefe ; God, faith*
he, paffed upon Man a double
Sentence of Punifhment ; faying
.to his earthly Body, Duft thou
art, and unto Duft fhalt thou
return- ; and fo the Body turned
into, Corruption ; And to his
Soul, Thou fhalt furely die ;
and fo the Man was feparated,
and condemned- to depart into two
different places : From the laft of which Words it

<rS

* AcTAl"? Tift; Tlf*l0JflO4 T-lj) St-no-
<patrtv trfjtvxs. rd [&& y^tvat uqti-
*»S , r» il, xj ei'c; yiv aTCitetiry.
}£ tfCTsVt; VTCe&ifcSTOll (p&opa ro tr&-
(ba., o\a-7coris i&zQsivaftyjis- Ttj
5 "$">%% SavaTU ^7?3-«vS C? sstsv
ol%a. ^.tfiirai o avSfafC®^ , <£
an twri Tosrou; Sifiit&ui x«t««ixs«-
£et«i. ibid.

4.6 A L E VT TER « Mr. DOdwen;
is very evident, that by, applying that Threat*
ning [Savara kirt&ati ] tbou fhalt furely die, tothe
Soul ; he did not mean its Extintlion, but its
Separation and Confinement to ["a^ ] the fepa
rate State.
Your .aft Citation out of this Author ,
(pag. $6,) is very remarkable. Againft cer
tain Hereticks who taught that the Soul was
corporealy he argues from thofe Words of our
Saviour, Fear not them that kill the Body, but
cannot kill the Soul. If, faith
* nft «' r™ ¦ •&»,***• * he tbe Soui be as you Applm
^0-v^hioiTo.i-, vrik *> e? o n.'- Imarifts contend, corporeal; why
Tp©- t«? c« "At*y K*T'XPiiiLvus cannot it be killed and perm
Info. ™ii**T«.ovoi/l^,&c. witjj the 20dy ? And why doth
De adventu Cm till contra Apol- r> -n rJ i • r f J
Our. lib. i. r St Peter, f peaking of feparate
Souls, call them Spirits ? Here
you fay, the [trcc^.i^4"'Xi] flefhly or corporeal
Soul, is plainly oppofed to the [ srv£u/*«T.xl. ] Spi
ritual Soul, and for that reafon is fuppofed as ca
pable of being killed by Men, as the Body it felf.
Is not this very extraordinary ? when the plain
and exprefs Meaning of Athanafius, is to fhow
that there can be no fuch thing at all as
[ <r«f*ixi if/t^s, j a flefhly or corporeal Soul ; be
caufe, if there was, it would be capable of be
ing killed, which our Saviour fays cannot be.
All that you fay, Seel. 23, feems to be ut
terly Unintelligible : And thofe words in par
ticular, pag. 91, ( which I have before had an
occafion to take notice of, ) where you fuppofe
the Soul to be Something diftintl both from
Spirit, and alfo from Matter and Motion ; that
is to fay, a Material Form:, an atlive Subftan
tial Principle, diftintl from Matter, yet depend
ing on Matter in effe, in fieri, in operari, and
4 which

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 47
*whicb muft accordingly be diffolved on the diffolution
of that Matter on which it depends : Thefe words,
I fay, appear fo very abfurd and contradictory
in themfelves, that no Confutation of them
can be ftronger than the bare tranfcribing
them. You feem very certain, Setl. 24, that your
Doctrine can have no ill Influence upon Mens
prefent PratJice ; becaufe, though you affert
indeed the natural Mortality of the Soul, yet
you teach at the fame time, that the Souls of
all thofe, who hear of the Gofpel, whether
they imbrace it or no, fhall be atJually immor
talized ; and fo bad Men can take no advantage
of the Doctrine concerning the Natural Mor
tality of the Soul, to encourage themfelves in
their Wickednefs with the Hopes of Impunity.
But can you really think, Sir, that it is a
thing of no ill confequence in Practice, to raife
newdifputes, to fill the Minds of weak and un
liable Men with endlefs Doubts and Scruples,
and the Mouths of the Profane with new To-
picks of Scepticifm and Raillery, againft the
moft important and fundamental Doctrines of
all Religion ? Or can you be indeed perfwaded,
that fuch Men as are pleafed with fome of your
Notions, will as readily admit all the reft alfo ?
You are forced to make a new and diftinct
Hypothefis upon every particular occafion :
You firft fuppofe the Soul of Man naturally
Mortal ; and then, to ftfcure to good Men the
Unchangeable State of Heaven, you are forced
to fuppofe their Souls prseternaturally immor
talized to Happinefs by the Divine Spirit : Yet,
becaufe all who receive that Divine Spirit, do
not fo behave themfelves as to be capable of
the Happinefs of Heaven, you are forced
(though

48 A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
* vre.m<m.{ though * Unwillingly ) to fuppofe fome of
P- "• them immortalized by the fame Divine Spirit
wTCur to Punifhment; And after this, leaft thofe who
vifcolfe reject the Gofpel, and never receive the Di-
?«r.8& vine immortalizing Spirit at all, fhould take
3'- advantage of the Soul's natural Mortality to en
courage themfelves with hopes of Impunity in
their Wickednefs, you are forced to fuppofe
Their Souls made immortal without any im
mortalizing Principle at all, by the mere Om
nipotence and Arbitrary Pleafure of God'.
Now, all thefe Hypothefes appearing very
precarious and independent on each other ; is
it not very obvious to perceive that profane
Men will very gladly and with great advan
tage make ufe of all your Arguments for the
Natural Mortality of the Soul ; and drop the
following parts of your Hypothefis ? And in-
d'eedl cannot fee, but you muft in fome mea-
fure be anfwerable for this ill Confequence.
For it is not enough to prevent the natural and
obvious ill Confequences of an Hypothefis, that
a learned and ingenious Man is able to invent
fuch further Suppofitions, and to find out fuch
Shifts and Diftinctions, by which he fhall think
he can evade the force of thofe Confequences.
There is hardly any Opinion fo extravagant or
of fo mifchievous confequence, but an ingeni
ous Man may maintain it in fuch manner, as
that upon his whole Hypothefis it fhall not
be eafy to charge him with any ill confequence,
for which he will not be able to find fome eva-
fion : And yet he that maintains it, muft ne-
verthelefs be anfwerable for fuch ill Confequen
ces, as are naturally apt to follow- from the Opi
nion it felf, without' the additional Hypothefes
which are made ufe of to falve it. The Epi
cureans, whotaught that Pleafure was the Chief Good

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 49
GrtW, when they were charged with the obvi
ous ill Cbnfequences of that Doctrine, were
provided to make fuch ingenious Explications
of it, that they thought themfelves abundantly
able to evade all thofe ill Confequences that
could be drawn from it : Yetthat Doctrine Was
evidently a very pernicious Doctrine ; and they
who maintained it, could not be excufed (as
Cicero has largely fhoWn) from being anfwera
ble for thofe Confequences , * QUau- eg0 jd curem qu]d
which were but * too natural- iHeami iatnegat: illud quaero,
ly drawn from it by the gene- ^^"fg**™1" flt dicere'
rality of Men, who would q ' lteff '
not attend to the Subtilties and Diftindtiorts of
thofe Philofophers. He that will fuppofe
Men to have no Soul at allt, but that their Life
is entirely eXtinguifhed at the Diffolution of the
Body ; and at the fame time fuppofes that at
the Refurrection their Life fhall be reftored
again, and continue for ever ; will be fure to
pretend that no ill Confequence can be drawn
from his Doctrine, becaufe he fuppofes Men
actually and in event as much Immortal, as if
they had Souls really diftintl from their Bodies :
And yet I believe you your felf make no doubt
but That Opinion is a very pernicious one.
He that will affirm that there is no other Sub
ftance in the World but Matter ; and at the
fame time fuppofes Matter capable of all the
fame Powers and Attributes, which we afcribe
to Spirit ; may likewife with the fame Reafon
pretend, that no ill Confequence can be drawn
from his Opinion : And yet no Body can
doubt but fuch an Opinion leads directly to
Atheifm. It is not therefore fo very clear, as
you feem to fuppofe it to be, that none of
thofe Confequences are to be charged upon
E you,

5o

'^Letter/* Mr. Dodweli.
you, which ( if your whole Hypothefis be grant
ed ) you can find indeed a way of evading.
You attempt to prove ( Sell. 25, ) that the
Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no
Ingredient in the Nature of the Humane Soul a-
mong the Heathens themfelves ; by faying, that
the popular Heathens believed only their firft An-
ceftors to have been Gods ; their next to have been
Heroes or Demi-Gods, and the later Generations
to have been pure Men ; Unlefs the Supreme Being
were pleafed { even in the degenerous Ages ) to
confer the nobler Principle on fome choice Favou
rites. Here you feem to forget, that the popu
lar Heathens ( as you call them ) had all a No
tion of Elyftan Fields and of a Tartarus, that is,
of a Place of future Happinefs or Mifery,
where the Souls of thofe which you call pure
or mere Men were to be difpofed of, either to
continue there for ever, or to come out upon
new revolutions, but not to be extinguifhed.
Yet prefently after, {pag. 96,) you fay that
by the ofdeft Tradition, all Souls were fuppofed
to have the Divine Principle connatural to them;
And the reft of the Section is wholly fpent in
explaining the Notions of thofe whom you call
{pag. 100,) the Traditional travelling Philofo
phers, who believed that Human Souls un
derwent many Purgations and different Revo
lutions, but that no part of the divine Seed might
perifh finally ; and that all Humane Souls were
thus far at leaft of a divine extratlion, not as tbe
Notion of Divine might intitle them to infinite
Perfection, but as it ?night at leaft intitle them
to Immortality. All which is fo far from being
any thing to your purpofe, of proving that
the Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 5 i
no ingredient, in the Nature of tbe Humane Soul
among tbe Heathens themfelves \ that on the
contrary it feems to me to prove rather directly
againft you.
Setl. 26, You all along confound either necef-
fary Immortality, or elfe the Notion of Prce-ex-
iftence and Revolutions of Souls, with natural
Immortality. That which any of the Primitive
Chriftian blamed Plato and Origen for, was not
their afferting the Immortality of the Soul, but
its Prce-exiftence and everlafting Revolutions.
Their Maxim, that whatever had a Beginning,
muft therefore be capable likewife of having an End,
does not at all prove againft natural, but only
againft neceffary Immortality, that is, neceffary
and independent Exift ence : As is evident from
what you your felf obferve, that upon this
Principle they owned none Immortal but God him
felf; No, not the Angels ; And that the Apoflle
affirms of God, [ "O /am©- t%av aB-avatnav, 1 Tim. vi.
16, ] that He only has Immortality, as being the
atiTo aStwaa-Ca. from whom All that will pretend to
Immortality, muft derive it, and not from their
own Nature ; that is, not from the Neceffity of
their own Nature, but from the Will of God :
who was pleafed to create them Immortal, and
upon whom (nocwithftanding their Immorta
lity, that is, nocwithftanding their natural Pow
er of continuing for ever, without being liable
to be deftroyed by any created Force, ) they
neverthelefs continually depend for their Pre
fervation. '
Ariftotle by affirming the immortal Soul to be
[ -ruf-49-siF ] from without, means plainly that it is
Something diftintl from the Body, and not ( as
you interpret him, pag. 101, ) that it is not
E 2 ingre-

5z ^ Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
ingredient in the Conftitution of Mankind ingene-
*Pnmo». ral, or ( as you * elfewhere exprefs your felf)
fast. 14- & that it is a prceiernatural Principle ; as if, natu-
ffc0Ur{eo rally, Men had no rational Souls at all.
f»g- 3°° The o(;her jy[axjm vou mention, That nothing
that is paffible can be Immortal, proves likewife
only againft neceffary, not againft natural Im*
mortality. For a Thing's being capable to
be acted upon, does not at all prove that itis
capable of being deftroyed by any natural
Power. Every perfectly folid Particle of Mat
ter it felf, is incapable of being deftroyed or
even divided by any Power of Nature, though
it is as capable of being moved and agitated and
acted upon, as any compound Body. The Soul
may in like manner be very capable of fuffering
and of being acted upon ; and yet it will not at
all follow, that it is capable of being deftroy
ed by any .natural Power. Thofe of the An
tients, who proved that the Soul of tbe rich Man
in the Parable, muft have been Corruptible becaufe
it fuffered Torment ; you acknowledge, prove
at the fame time that it muft likewife have been
Corporeal: But the Corporality of the Soul, you
know, was taught only by one or two Men.
The reft were all of a different Opinion. And
Latlantius is very particular and exprefs in an-
fwering that Objection ; * If
* Si eft immortaiis anima s tbe Soul bh immortal, how then
quomodo pitibilis inducitur, js it paffible and capable of en-
ac pce.ije ent.ens. . .7.5,10. during Punifhment? and if it be
capable of pain, how is it not ca
pable of Diffolution ? The Anfwer he gives, is;
f Ejus naturae reddi animas, firft, ~f that (according tO
ut fi non extinguibiles in to- the Notjon 0f the Stoicks )
turn, quoniam ex Deo funt, .7 p . c , , , , f
tamen cruciabiles riant per corr tl3e botils °J Men, though by
poris maculam, ike. ibid, reafon of their Divine Original they

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 5*
they cannot indeed be extinguifhed, ''yet by being im
merfed in Senfe and depraved by Sin, they may
become liable to Mifery and Punifhment. Se
condly, * that though we indeed
do not know how Immaterial * Tantam eiTc Dei poteita-
_., . 7 , tem.utetiam lncorporahacom-
lhings can be atled Upon, yet p.ehendar, & quemadmodum
God has as much Power over volu-rir, afficiat. Nam & An-
tbem, as over corporeal Things : £eli Deum m«"unt- &c- Q""*
A j 1 Ai j. ..7 s ¦ j , er8° mirum, fi cum unt im-
And lattly, f that in order to mort,|es anima:, tamen pati.
endure Punifhment, the Souls bles fint Deo? ibid.§. zi.
fhall again be united to their Bo- r t Sed tamen docent nos
j- Aii v- . r> re iindta: litera;. quemadmodum
dies._ All which Paffages un- pcenas impii fin7 laturii Nam
deniably fhow that Latlantius quia peccata in corporibus con-
did not think the Soul natU- traxerunt, rurfus carne indu-
rally corruptible, and pre- ^1^.?*^ '^
ferved prseternaturally by the
Power of God ; but on the contrary, that the
Soul was naturally Immortal, but by the Pow
er of God made capable of enduring Punifh
ment. If there was any ftrength in the Argument
you make ufe of Setl. 27 ; that becaufe the actu
al Immortality of the Soul is a Revelation of the
Gofpel, therefore it is not capable of being proved
by Reafon from the Nature of the Soul it felf; It
would follow by the fame Argument, that Mo*
ral Obligations, becaufe they are Revelations of
the Will of God in the Gofpel, therefore are
not capable of being proved by Reafon, frotn
the Nature of God, of Men, and of Things.
Some things revealed in the Gofpel, are indeed
of fuch a Nature that they could not have
been known at all without Revelation : But
others f of which the Immortality of the Soul
Js one, ) are fuch as were capable of being in
great meafure difcovered by the Light of Na-
E 3 ture

54 A Le t t e r to Mr. Dodweli..
ture and right Reafon ; but yet by the Reve
lation of the Gofpel, are made known with
much, greater Certainty, greater Cledmefs, great
er Authority, and in a Manner much better
fitted to all Capacities. This feems to be the
proper Meaning of the Word [ (jw.troa-T'^
2 Tim. i. io, ] has brought to Light, has clearly
difcovered, has univerfally and evidently made
known, that which before was but obfcurely and
difficultly, and imperfetlly underftood.- The Al-
lufion you fuppOfe to be between the Words
[ has brought Life and Immortality to Light through
the Gofpel, ] and thofe other words of the Apo-
ftle, [an Inheritance incorruptible, that fadeth not
away, of the Saints in Light, ] is indeed fome
little Similitude of Words ; the word Light
being ufed in both places ; But not the leaft
Allufion or Similitude in Senfe. And indeed
you feem your felf to be confcious of the
weaknefs of your Argument in this whole
Matter ; by your faying that the Immortality
*pg. io<5. of the Soul, at leaft * in Heaven, is plainly
fuppofed not to be known without divine Re-
+ ?tig 104. vela tion ; and again, At leaft -j- as to tbe giving
us tbat immortal Life in. Heaven ; and, That the
Immortality of the Soul could not have been
4p.tg. 106. otherwife known with 4. that Certatetythat might
fupport the Pratlice which Religion expetls in con
fequence of it ; and again, That it could not have
I jug. 104. been known, at leaft || with that Affurance which
was requifite for the. Pratlice which Religion re
quires purfuant to the .Belief of it.
That the Sadducees, { Sect. 28, ) denied the Im
mortality cf the Soul, is very, true ; But then it
is worth obferving, that the fame Men afferted
alfo that there was no Refurretlion, neither An gel

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 55
gel nor Spirit, Acts xxiii. 6. Your Interpre
tation of which words, is very extraordinary.
What is the meaning of Spirit here, as it is joined
with Angel, you fay is manifeft : It is that Im
mortalizing Spirit which makes us ''<r«yy//,a5, that
is, Immortal and entitled to Heaven, as well as
the Angels are : That fame Spirit indeed by which
the Angels themfelves are entitled to Immortality. —
This therefore obliged them ' [ the Sadducees ] to
deny the allual Immortalizing of either Angels or
Humane Souls, when they denied them Both that
Spirit which could alone immortalize them. Thefe
Words, I think, need no Reflexion to be made
upon them.
Your Interpretation {Se£l. 31, ) of that
Text, 1 Cor. xv. 22, As in Adam all die, even
fo in Chrift fhall all be made alive ; feems very
forced and unnatural. You underftand it to
fignify, that as All who defcended from Adam,
muft die ; fo All who are in Chrift, that is, all
Chriftians, fhall be made alive. But this In
terpretation, if it was true, would prove too
much for you ; namely, that thofe only who
embraced, not thofe who rejected the Gofpel,
fhould be raifed again : And the general tenour
of Scripture, which every where declares that
Unbelievers, who never were in Chrift, fhall
be raifed to Condemnation ; fhows plainly that
your Interpretation of this Text is wrong.
And how the falfe Notion certain Hereticks had
of a metaphorical Refurrection, 2 Tim. ii. 18,
tends to prove that St Paul's true account of
the literal Refurrection, is to be underftood in
a particular and limited Senfe ; is not eafy to
conceive.
E 4 Your

5<5 A Let t zk to Mr. Dodweli.
Your Inference in the fame place, againft
the Univerfality of the Refurrection, from what
the Apoftle fays concerning Baptifm ; feems
likewife wholly precarious. For the Apoftle
does not in this Chapter fay any thing, by which
he might feem to ground the Refurrection up
on Baptifm: But only, arguing againft thofe
who pretended to be Chriftians, and yet did
not believe the Refurredtion of the Dead, he
fhows how abfurd it was for fuch Perfons to
be baptized, and thereby to expofe themfelves
to fuch hazards as they muft unavoidably do.
by their profefling Chriftianity, if they had
no expectation of a Refurrection from the,
Dead. Whatever be the Meaning of that dif
ficult Phrafe, of being baptized for the Dead;
the Strefs of the Argument plainly lies upon
thefe Words : And why ftand we in Jeopardy
every Hour ? That Baptifm, whatever it was,
expofed them to fome hazard, and gave occa-
fion to their being perfecuted ; and the Apo-
ftle's Argument is, that it was foolifhfor them
to expofe themfelves to fuch danger needlefsly
and to no purpofe, if there was to be no fuch
thing as a Refurrection from the Dead. The
Apoftle grounds the Reafonablenefs of being
baptized, and of embracing Chriftianity, which
was a perfecuted Religion ; purely upon the
Hopes of a Refurrection from the Dead ; But
he does not at all ground the Refurredtion up
on Baptifm, nor fays any thing which does in
the leaft infinuate that ^he Refurrection fliould
not be univerfal,
The Concjufion you draw ( Setl. 32, ) from
what St Paul teaches, Rom. v. is very obfcure.
The Sum of the Apqftle's Doctrine, there, is
that

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. $7
that That Condemnation which was brought
upon Men by Adam, they are delivered from
by Chrift. How you can infer any thing from
thence, againft the univerfal Immortality of
the Soul, I do not perceive. You fuppofe
that thofe over whom Death reigned between
the times of Adam and Mofes, were extinguifhed
by a total Mortality both of Soul and Body ;
But the Death there fpoken of, is plainly the
fame Death to which all other Men likewife are
fubject : For it is not faid, that Death reigned
over Them only ; but that Death reigned even
over them alfo, as well as over the reft of
Mankind ; notwithftanding that they had not
finned againft any pofitive Law, as Adam be
fore, and thofe who lived under the Law did
after; but were fubject to Death, only as it
was a natural Confequence of Adam's Tranf-
greffion : To infer from hence, that their Souls
as well as Bodies, were fubject to that Morta
lity, is begging the Queftion which was under
taken to be proved. Thofe who are fubject to
Death in confequence of Adam's Tranfgreflion,
are indeed (filed Many, ver 15 and 19 ; as thofe
to whom the Benefit of Chrift's Death redounds,
are alfo in the fame place ftiled Many: But
thofe Many who die through the Offence of
One, are", ver. 12 and iS, exprefsly called All
Men ; and there is no good reafon to fuppofe,
but that fhe Death of Chrift, who was promifed
immediately upon the Fall of Adam, may con
ditionally extend its Virtue, and Benefit under
different Difpenfations, to all Men likewife.
To fay that the Dominion of Death, fignifies
in this place fomething peculiar, under which
all Men are not included ; becaufe the Apoftle
affirms that D^th reigned from Adam to Mofes, even

58 A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
even over them that had not finned after the fimi-
litude of Adam'; Tranfgreffion ; is very Angular
and groundlefs : For the Dominion of Death
is not there confined { as you fuppofe it ) to the
fpace between Adam and Mofes ; fo as to fignify
a particular kind of Death prevailing at that
Time, an Extinction of Soul as well as Diffolu
tion of the Body ; But the Apoftle's Affertion
is plainly This, that -in Confequence of Adam's
Tranfgreffion, Death (in the common accep
tation of Mortality ) reigned in that fpace of
time alfo, even over them that had not tranf-
greffed any pofitive Law after the fimilitude of
Adam's Tranfgreffion, as well as over thofe who
had in their own Perfons difobeyed pofitive
Laws. From whence how any thing can be
collected to your purpofe, is very difficult to

imagine,

Whether that Text, Job. i. 9, That was the
true Light, which lighteth every Man that cometh
into tbe World; was ever alledged by Any, to
prove that an Immortalizing Spirit is given to
every Particular by Chrift himfelf; I cannot tell,
But I think your Interpretation of it, ( Setl.
33, ) is utterly unintelligible. The -^vo\, you
%. 136. * fay, is That which our Apoftle here makes in all
Men, [ in every Man that cometh into the' World, ]
inlightned by tbe vifitation cf the A«y©-, as an ex
ternal Principle : Yet fo as not to make any change
in the Nature, in the Perfonfo inlightned, without
peculiar divine Favour, and difpofitions in the Re
cipient, for fuch an Union with the Aoy©-, as may
qualify it for the divine Favour of raifing it above
its own Nature: Till then, they are feparable
again, and this external Vifitation of the Aoy*^.
leaves the vifited 4V", as Mortal as it found it,
where

A Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 59
where there is no particular defign of God for Im
mortalizing it to Punifhment. What the mean
ing of this, and all that follows in that Section
is ; and how you collect it from the fore-cited
Text of St John; is not, I believe, poflible to
be underftood.
When St Paul fays, 1 Theff. iv. 16, that the
dead in Chrift fhall rife firft ; Thefe words do
not indeed prove that there muft afterwards be
a Refurrection of them that never heard of
Chrift : becaufe the dead in Chrift, which are here
faid to rife firft, are not, it is true, oppofed in
this place to the dead out of Chrift, but to
them that fhall be found alive in Chrift at the
time of the Judgment : ( Where note by the
by, that you * mifinterpret this Text, by op-* ^141.
pofing the dead in Chrift, and which are faid to
rife firft, not, as the Apoftle does, to them
that fhall be found alive in Chrift, but to thofe
who had been formerly in Chrift and did not die
in him, or to thofe who might have been in him if
they had pleafed, but never were in him atlually. )
But other places of Scripture, as has been be
fore fhown, do fufficiently prove the Univer
fality of the Refurrection : And particularly
that parallel Text, 1 Cor. xv. 23 ; where the
fame Apoftle fays, that every Man fhall be raif
ed in his own Order ; Chrift the Firft-fruits, af
terwards they that are Chrifts at his coming ; And
then cometh the end, &c. Which words being im
mediately fubjoined to that univerfal declarati
on, As in Adam all die, evenfo in Chrift fhall all
be made alive ; cannot, without great force, be
interpreted to any other Senfe, but that the
End muft fignify the general Refurrection of all
the Dead. See Rev. xx. ver. 5, 12 and 13.
Your

60 A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.
Your Interpretation {Setl.35,) of that Text,
Rom. ii. 12, As many as have finned without
Law, fhall alfo periflo without Law, and as many
as have finned in the Law, fhall be judged by the
Law ; . is not only groundlefs ; the word
[ turaxSvTcu, [hall perifh ] which you underftand to
fignify Annihilation, or bare ceafing to be, being
evidently Synonymous to [ ^i.%Vo>t«i fhall be
judged;] But alfo ("as I before obferved upon
your Premonition, Seel. 6, ) you thereby over^
throw all the Threatnings of the Gofpel, which
frequently exprefs the Punifhment even of the
worft of Sinners by that fame word [ iuraxSmu,
ftj all perifh ] which you here interpret to fignify
only a bare ceafing to be. You are your felf
fenfible of this difficulty, pag. 143; where you
confefs, that though the word, Perifh, may bear
tbat milder Senfe of only ceafing to be, yet it is alfo
ufed in. ihe Scriptures, concerning them whom all
muft believe liable to the fevere ft pofitive Infiitlions,
You feem indeed fenfible, I fay, of this diffi
culty upon your Interpretation : But yet you
give no anfwer to it: Only you fay, pag. 144,
that though the word will indeed bear a larger-
Signification, yet in tbis place Annihilation may
perhaps be more natural. Is not this a very fin-
* See prA- gular manner of arguing ? To * collect from
laX' the fignification of the word ZihxSvtou, that thofe
of whom it is here fpoken, fhall only ceafe to
bej and yet at the fame time to confefs that in
other places of Scripture That word has no
fuch Signification ; only in this place, Annihi
lation may, perhaps, be more natural.
Your Interpretation of thofe other words of
the Apoftle, that wben the Gentiles which have
not the Law, do by nature the things contained in
the Law, thefe having not the Law, are a Law. untf

15

^Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 61
unto themfelves; is no lefs extraordinary ; Name
ly, that the Gentiles being a Law unto them
felves; does not fignify their Obligation to obey
the Law of nature, with refpect to future Re
wards and Punifhments; but only there * own-* pag. 144.
ing the Reafonablenefs of the things impofed as a
Law by God on the Jews, but not on themfelves ;
which would no further oblige Them to the Obferva-
tion of them, than as their own Interefts might
prevail with them to obferve them, as they would
avoid the Punifhments, and obtain the Rewards of
Providence in This Life. Is not this very won
derful ; that the Gentiles fhould be able to
judge ofthe Reafonablenefs of God's moral Law
to the Jews, and yet not be fenfible that the
Reafonablenefs of the Thing laid a ftrong Oblio-a-
tion upon themfelves alfo? Orthat they fhould
be fenfible of an Obligation laid upon them to
live virtuoufly ( which it would fometimes 1 hap
pen they could not do without expofing even
their Life it felf, ) and yet not have any
ground to expect a future Judgment, nor any
other Rewards and Punifhments than in the
prefent Life ? Is not this, deftroying the very
Nature of Virtue and Vice ; and contrary to
fome of your own Arguments, Seel. 47, and
elfe-where ?
Is it not a very confident Notion, to fuppofe
as you do, {Seel. 35, 36, and elfewhere,) that
the Souls of Men, though naturally mortal,
yet are neither diffolved with their Bodies, nor
yet perifh afterwards by any natural Decay ;
but furvive, and continue to fubfift in a fepa
rate State ; and none of them ever perifh actu
ally by that Decay and Mortality which you
fuppofe natural to Them ; but that thofe who
fhall

62 A Letter to Mr. Dodweli.1
fhall neither be immortalized to Happinefs
nor to Punifhment, fhall yet fubfift till the ge
neral Judgment, and then be diffolved by that
exquifite lire which is to prevail in the loft Confla
gration, at leaft fo far as to deprive them of any
fenfibility of Pain ? Is not this Notion more
properly a fuppofing them to be naturally Im
mortal, that is, capable of fubfifting for ever
by the Powers given them at their original
Production ; but that God, by the interposition
of his Almighty Power, prseternaturally de-
ftroys at the laft day, fuch of them as are nei
ther capable of eternal Happinefs, nor yet de-
ferve eternal Punifhment? This certainly would
have been rather the more confiftent Scheme of
the two, and fomewhat a more defenfible Ex
plication of your Notion, (with refpect to
the bare Reafon of the Thing, ) than to affirm
that all Souls are naturally mortal, and yet that
none of them ever die by a natural Decay and
Mortality. But your Hypothefis however va
ried, would not yet have been truly confiftent.
For why, I befeech you, muft it needs be fup-
pofed, that God cannot difpofe of all his ratio
nal Creatures into States fuitable to their feveral
Natures, and proportionable to their feveral
Capacities and Deferts, without deftroying and
taking away their Being? And what can be
more forced and difagreeable to Reafon, than to
fuppofe that the Sodomites and Ninevites, and
other Heathens of all Sorts, muft indeed all
appear at the Day of Judgment, but yet that
* pug. 148. their appearance there will be * with no Defign
of concerning them in the Judgment of the Day,
but only in the retrofpeclive part of the day, for
vindicating the Divine Providence, in relation to
wbat had been tranfatJed by it formerly ? You
imagine
4

A Letter to Mr, Dodweli. 6$
imagine indeed, * that the Sodomites and Egypti- */"».?• 3 5>
ans and other wicked Men to whom the Gofpel
was never preached, may endure the Sufferings of
the future eternal State, during the time of their
Duration ; that is, from the time of their Death
tothe Day of Judgment ; And that -f" tbe Infe-\$»g'l*\-
lici ties good Heathens may have fuffered in this Life,
may be fufficiently rewarded by the Happinefs ofthe
intermediate fpace between their Death and the
Judgment, though they have no [hare in thofe Eter
nal Rewards which are to follow after the Day of
Judgment : But, upon your Scheme, how can this
be applied to thofe who fhall live at the End
of the World, when there may be as good and
as bad Men among the Heathens, as ever were
in any other Age, and yet thefe, according to
your Notion, muft All perifh together at the
Conflagration ? And befides, becaufe I prefume
you will not be lefs moved by Authority than
by Reafon ; is not this extremely like one of
thofe very Notions, which Tertullian, whofe
Authority you are otherwife fo very defirous
to make ufe of, blames
the* Stoicks for, and ridicules • Qui anima aliqnod tem-
. ¦ , , , , pus indulgent, abexcefiuulq; in
them as vainly and f need- ^pgratiomm univerfitatis, ut
lefsly imagining , that the Stoid, &c. Tertull. de Anima.
Souls of their Difciples fhould ?»\ ® ivw> y*"">™ rJ $
continue capable of Inftruc- ^ iwwi«v«™ ^aS*.
tion and Improvement in the 'aaa' i%t^tvm t»«s ^'js? x«*'
feparate State, when at the "=•"">" T»" $ ™" <r^^i(a, .
fame time they believed they ^' r\ ik *\">^™* ™
j } xoaTm. gjc. Uumemits apud
were all to perifh in the ap- tujeb.
proaching Conflagration? t Quis autem ill's pofthuma
Eruditionis ufus ac fru£tus ,
ttti , • „_.,_ jamjam conflwrationevmiuxis'i
What you advance in your ^J^ d/J>ima, F
417? and following Setlions, con
cerning the State and Condition of feparate Souls,

6*4 /f Letter ^ Mr. Dodweli.
Souls, is in every refpect too uncertain to have
any thing built upon it. Whether they who
never heard of the Gofpel in This Life, fhall
hereafter have any new Offef made to them,
and undergo any new Trial ; or whether all
Mankind , even thofe who never heard of
Chrift at all, fhall however, by virtue of the-
Original Promife of the Meffiah made to Adam,
have fo much Benefit of the Redemption pur-
chafed by the Blood of Chrift, as that at the
general Judgment they fhall all in fome Pro
portions, and according to their feveral Capa
cities, have relief from the Equity and Mercy
of the Gofpel-covenant ; ( which feems, ofthe
two, to be much the more probable Opinion :
For how fhall they who are found alive at the
end of the World, undergo any new Trial ? )
Which foever, I fay, of thefe ways be true, it
makes little difference as to the main Queftioii.
That, upon the whole, God is no Refpecter of
Perlons; and that our Saviour could not confine
his defign, as a Saviour of Souls, to any particu-1
3ar People, fas you prove largely and well in
your 47th Seclion,) but will certainly in fome
manner or other extend the Offer of his gracious
Covenant, or at leaft the Benefit and Equity of
it in fome Proportions, to Men of all Ages
and Nations in the World -, muft undoubtedly
be allowed hy all confidering Perfons: And
this very confideration alone, if you had not
at other times reafoned inconfiftently with your
felf, might eafily have laved you the whole
trouble of inventing your wonderful Hypothe
fis concerning the natural Mortality of the Soul,
in order to difpofe of thofe Gentiles who never
heard of Chrift : But then as to the particular
Manner, how the Equity and Mercy of the
4 Gofpel

rA Letter: to Mr. Dodweli: 6f
Gofpel fhall be extended to thofe to whom it
never was preached ; this, there is no Neceffity
of determining ; And certainly your Notion*
( Seel. 4.2,) concerning feparate Souls being of
Neceffity to be baptized with Water, even in
the literal Senfe, in order to be made capable of
any Favour of this kind ; might very well
have been fpared.
As to what you teach in th 42^ ana4 following
Setlions, concerning two diftintl Souls in Men ;
Many ancient Writers do indeed fo exprefs
themfelves^ as if they fuppofed the fenfttive,
Soul to be one Subftance, and the rational Soul
another : But both That Philofophy itfelf, and
your Explication of it particularly, is very un
intelligible : And your Interpretation of that
Text, where the Formation of Man is defcribed.,
is really ridiculous : The Words are thefe ; And
the Lord God formed Man of the Duft of the
Ground, and breathed into his Noftrils the Breath
of Life, and Man became a living Soul, Gen. ii<
7. Upon this Text, you* fay: Here is a Man * fdg.iiO,
fuppofed before the Divine Breathing ; Certainly
not a dead Man, which is indeed no Man, but a
Man animated with that lower Soul, which is
common to him and Beafts, and therefore cannot be
imputed to a Divine Breathing. Can any thing
be more abfurd than this Interpretation ? Or
can any thing be more plain, than that the
meaning of thefe Words is, that God firft
formed the Body of Man outof the Duft, and
then infpired into it a living Soul ? But which
way foeyer the Philofophy of this Queftion be
determined, it will ftill be nothing to your
purpofe : For fuppofe, if you pleafe, that the
Senfitive and Rational Soul be really two diftinct
, * F Subftances;

66 /Letter to Mr. Dodweli."
Subftances; yet how does this tend to prove
that the Rational Soul is ever the more Natural
ly Mortal ? Did not thofe antient Philofophers,
who thought Man compofed of three diftind
parts, a Body, a fenfttive Soul, and a rational
Spirit ; teach that the rational Spirit was natu-
* tMf, ii rally Immortal? As you your felf confefs * con-
& Z3- cerning Plato and Philo ; and you bring no
Authority nor Reafoning, in thefe Sections, to
the contrary.
In like manner your long Excurfion, in the
g$th Setlion, concerning the Separate State, does
not at all prove, nor indeed fo much as fuppofe,
that the Soul is naturally Mortal : On the con
trary, the Authorities you there cite, do all fup
pofe it Immortal. Wherefore the particular
groundlefs, not to fay abfurd Notions, which
you there advance, concerning the Habitations
of feparate Souls, and the Extent ofthe Power of
Evil Spirits over them, Sec. not being of any
importance with refpect to the main Queftion ;
need not here be examined.
The Argument you propofe, ( Self. 60, ) that
a naturally mortal Soul is more fuitable and agreea
ble to be joined with a naturally mortal Body, as
a conftituent of Human Nature, than a Soul that
is naturally Immortal. This Argument, if it
proved any thing, would prove that the Soul
ought to be of the fame Nature and Duration
with the Body, and that it ought to die at the
fame time with the Body, that is, that there
ought to be no Soul at all. For it is juft as
much difagreeable and unfuitable to the Body,
to have fuch a Subftance united to it, as is ca-.
pable of fubfifting at all after the Diffolution of
the

rA Letter to Mr. Dodweli.' 67
the Body ; as to have fuch a Subftance united
to it, as is capable qf continuing to fubfiftffor
ever. Since therefore you your felf acknow
ledge that the Soul is naturally able to fubfift
feparate for many Ages after the Diffolution of
the Body ; this Argument, if it had any ftrength
in it, would prove a great deal too much for
you ; and be of the fame force againft your own
Notion of the Soul, as againft ours ; Unlefs
you could perfuade the World to believe, that
not only the Immortalizing Spirit, but even the
rational' Soul, that Soul which you fuppofe to
be naturally Mortal, is it felf alfo a prceternatu-
ral Principle, { as you * once or twice very ab- * Fr*m°n-
furdly affert, ) and not originally a conftituent^-^"J£"d
Part of Humane Nature. ^.300/
Neither has the Argument you draw from
the Doftrine of Original Sin, any greater
ftrength in it. For there is no neceiTi'ty of
fuppofing, upon any Scheme, that fuch Perfons
as have no actual Sin of their own, fhall ever
be condemned to eternal Torments merely for
the Sin of our firft Parent. It. is true we can
not peremptorily affirm in particular, how God
will difpofe of fuch Souls, as having no actu
al Sins of their own to anfwer for, yet have no
exprefs Title, by the ordinary Means, to the
Rewards of the Gofpel : But certainly it is a
very weak and poor Argument, to conclude
that numberlefs Souls muft therefore neceffari
ly be annihilated, merely becaufe we do not
know in particular, what State and Condition
it will pleafe God to aflign them.
The fame may be faid of your Argument
drawn from the Doctrine of Reprobation. You
anfwer it your felf, by fuppofing that the Do
ctrine of abfolute Reprobation is not the Doctrine
F 2 of

6*s A L e t t e r to Mr. Dodweli.
of Scripture. And as to that Pretention, which
is barely the not affording all Men the fame
Means of Knowledge; it is anfwered in your
own Scheme, by what you fay ( Seel. 45, 46,
and 47, ) concerning the new Trial fome Per
fons may undergo in another State ; and it is
anfwered better by fuppofing that all Men may
however be judged in proportion, according to
the Equity of the Gofpel, though they never
had any explicit Knowledge of it.
Laftly, As to your Argument drawn from the
Difficulty of reconciling eternal Punifhments
with the Goodnefs of God ; That Difficulty
does not arife chiefly from the difference of the
Perfons, who may be concerned in thofe Punifh
ments proportionably in different Degrees ; but
the real Difficulty of the Queftion lies in this,
how it is reconcileable with the Goodnefs of
God, to put any Perfons at all upon a neceffity
of making fuch an Option, wherein if they
chufe amifs, the Mifery they incur muft be ir
recoverable. And this Difficulty is evidently
much better anfwered, by fuppofing the Souls
of Men to be naturally immortal ; fo that they
who render themfelves uncapable of Happi
nefs, muft confequently fall into f emedilefs Mi
fery ; than it can be anfwered in ypur Scheme,
where none can be liable to endlefs Punifhment,
without being miraculoufly immortalized on pur
pofe, by the Arbitrary Will and Power of God,
beyond the original Capacity of their Nature.
And now, Sir, I cannot but earneftly recom
mend it again to your moft ferious confideration;
whether the new and inconfiderate Notions you
have advanced, and (the Arguments I will not
fay,

rA Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 69
fay, becaufe I think you have not offered any
that are of any real force, but ) the Pretences
of Reafon and Authority, which you have put
into the hands of fceptical and profane Men,
to confirm them in their Prejudices againft the
Belief of the Immortality of the Soul ; are not
likely to be of great differvice to Religion ; And
whether you ought not ( as all good Men are
of Opinion you ought ) to think of fome
means of making fatisfaction to the Church,
to whom you have given fo great Offence ; and
of preventing the effe<Lt of that Incouragement,
which your Notions in this matter ( though no
Body doubts but it is contrary to your inten
tion ) have given to Immorality and con
tempt of Religion.
If Zeal for the Defence of a Doctrine of fuch
importance, has in any part of this Letter cau
fed me to drop any Expreffions, which may
be thought too fharp, and to carry in them too
little of that Refpect, which all the World ac
knowledges to be juftly due to you upon ac
count of your very great Learning-; I know
you will pardon it upon fuch an occafion as this ;
and I cannot doubt but upon fecond Thoughts,
you will be fomewhat diffatisfied with your felf,
for having publifhed a Book, at which all good
Men are fprry^nd all prqfane Men rejoice.

F 3 AD?

70 A L e t t K R. to Mr. Dodweli,
ADVERTISEMENT.
WHEREAS the Author of certain Re
marks upon the Sermons preached at
Mr Boyle's Lecture in the Year 1704, has
publifhed a Vindication of thofe Remarks,
with more Mifreprefentation of the Doctrine
contained in thofe Sermons, and in thofe
preached in the Year 1.705 : The Author of the
faid Sermons, humbly conceiving that there is
po Objection either in the Remarks or in the
Vindication of the Remarks, which has not
been either prevented in the Sermons them
felves, or fully anfwered in the Preface to the
fecond Volume : And not thinking it fit to
trouble the World with any further Reply to
mere Calumny and ill Language ; defires to re
fer this Matter wholly to the impartial Reader,
who by comparing the Books themfelves, with
the Remarks, will judge on which fide Truth,
and Reafon Hands.

A LET-

LETTER To the Learned
Mr. Henry Dodweli;

CONTAINING

Some Remarks on a (pretended)
Demonftration of the Immateria
lity and Natural Immortality of
the Soul, I N
Mr. Clarke s Answer to his late
Epijlolary Difcourfe^, &a
LONDON,'
Printed in the Year MDCCXXXI.

[73]

LETTER

To the L E A R N E D

Mr. Henry Dodweli, <3cc.

SIR,
HERE is nothing more unreaso
nable than to imagine there is any
dangerous Confequence in allowing
Men fairly to examine the Grounds
of received Opinions, or to fufpect
the good Intentions of thofe who do examine :
For till Men have fomething befides Reafon
for their Direction, it is their duty to follow
tbat Light wherever it leads them ; and how
they can ufe their Reafon, when there is a Re-
ftraint laid on their Tongues and Pens, is as
unconceivable to me, as how People fhould be
Chriftians in Japan, or Proteftants in Spain,
* Ever7

^4 R E MA R K S on
Every Man has the Faculty of Reafoning, butf
without the ufe and exercife of that Faculty,
will make little or no progrefs in any Science.
And what makes fuch Sufpicions, if poflible,
ftill more unaccountable, is, That Examina
tion is really a mark of Sincerity ; fince the
hazard of Suffering lies more on the fide of Ex
amination, than on that of fubmitting to pre
vailing Opinions. And to be fure it is a Difpo-
fition of Mind much more favourable to Truth
than the contrary one ; becaufe Reafon being
the fame in all Men, we fhould more of us
light upon Truth, did we rely on the Ufe of
the fame common Faculty, than we poffibly
can, by following the contradictory Ortho
doxies of the feveral Countries in the World.
But fince through the Artifices of defigning
Men, they who fincerely fearch after Truth
meet with fuch difcouragement, efpecially if
there be any Blot in their Characters, or any
thing done in the whole courfe of their Lives
that is capable of having an invidious Turn
given to it, I publickly return You my Thanks
for your late. Epiftolary Difcourfe, wherein you
have fhowed a noble Example of Freedom
and Liberty in attacking the received Opinion
of the Natural Immortality ef the Soul. Your
Character of Piety towards God, Charity ta
the Neceffitous, and Patience under Afflictions,
occafioned by adhering to your Principles
( which were once thought Doctrines of the
Church of England ) is too well eftablifhed in
the World by the Applaufes of thofe Men,
who now endeavour to make you as little in the
Judgment of others, as you were great in theirs.
before, not to derive fome Credit on thofe wha»

Mr. Clarke'^ 'Demonftration, Sec. ff
•who purfue your Steps, or at leaft to abate the
Edge of Satyr and Invective againft them :
For the World has now a great Inftance not
only of the Confiftency of Zeal for Religion
with Liberty of Thinking, but that it is evi
dently your Zeal for Religion winch has occa-
fioned the Liberty you have taken.
Under the Protection therefore of your Aur
thority, I fhall propofe fome of my Thoughts
to the World onJthe great Subject of the Na
tural Immortality oftbe Soul, with all the Bre\ icy
that Perfpicujty will allow, and in fome re-
fpect promote the Defign of your late Dif-
courfe : For though I do not pretend to prove
the Natural Mortality of the Soul by Reafon,
yet if I can fhow the Inconclufivenefs of the
moft cogent Argument for its Natural Immor
tality, they who lay a ftrefs on that Argument
will be better prepared to receive thofe Proofs
from the Scriptures and the firft Fathers, urged
in your Epiftolary Difcourfe, to fhow, That
the Soul is a Principle naturally Mortal.
The principal Argument for the Natural Im
mortality of the Soul is founded on the Suppofi-?
tion of its Immateriality ; and therefore great
Endeavours have been made ufe of to prove
the Soul an Immaterial Being, and particularly
by the Reverend and Learned Mr. Samuel
Clarke, who in his Letter * to you propofes to * Fag.zj.
demonftrate, that the Soul cannot pof/ible be Ma
terial. And what he has there faid being ur
ged with very great Acutenefs and Dexterity,
I fhall impartially confider it.
By Soul, I fuppofe, Mr. Clarke means a Sub
ftance with a Power of Thinking, or, as he
expreffes himfelf, with an Individual Confci
oufnefs.
BY

76 R E MA R K S on
By faying the Soul cannot poffibly be Material,
I conceive is meant, that the Subftance which
hath Solidity added to it, cannot have a Power
of Thinking added to it ; or, that the fame
Subftance cannot be both Solid and have the
Power of Thinking.
To demonftrate the Impoflibility of this, it
fhould be declared what is to be underftood by
the word Subftance ; and then, in what the
Identity of the fame Subftance doth confift.
But thefe things being omitted, I fhall obferve,
that after an Enumeration of Arguments which,
IP.12,23 he fays, have been urged by the wifeft and moft
confederate Men in all Ages { fo it is faid, and fo
let it pafs ) we are told, The fame thing is de-
monftraUe from the fingle Confideration of bare
Senfe or Confcioufnefs. por, fays he, Matter be
ing a diviftble Subftance, confifting always of ftp a-
rable, nay of atlually feparate and diftintl Parts ;
if is plain, unlefs it were effentially confcious, itt
which cafe every Particle of Matter muft confift
of innumerable feparate and diftintl Conftioufneffes,
Tfo Syftem of it in any poffible Compofition or Di-
yifion can be an Individual confcious Being : For
fuppofe Three or Three Hundred Particles of Mat
ter at a mile, or any given diftance, one from ano
ther ; is it poffible that all thofe feparate Parts
fhould in that ftate be one individual confcious Be
ing ? Suppofe then all theft Particles brought to
gether into one Syftem, fo as to touch one another ;
will they thereby, or by any Motion or Compofi
tion whatfoever, become any whit left truly diftintl
Beings than they were at the greateft diftance ?
How then can their being difpofed in any poffible
Syftem, make them one individual confcious Being ?
If you fuppofe God. by his infinite Power fuperad-
aing^ Confcioufnefs to the united Particles, yet ftill
thofe Particles being really and neceffarily as di-

Mr. Clarke'* <Detno%ftrAtion, Sec". 77
ftintl Beings as ever, cannot be themfelves the Sub-
jetl in which that individual Confcioufnefs inheres j
but the Confcioufnefs can only be fuperadded by the
addition of fome thing, which in all the Particles
muft ftill it felf be but one individual Being. The
Soul therefore, whofe Power of Thinking is pide-
niably one individual Confcioufnefs, cannot be pof
fibly a Material Subftance.
I have fet down Mr. Clarke's Argument at
length, and in the full force of his own Ex-
preflions, that a Judgment may be made more
eafily of the Pertinency or Impertinency of the
following Obfervations.
1. Since it is only required that a thing be
an Individual Being, in order to its being a
proper Subject of a Power of Thinking, or at
leaft that it may be poffible for God to fuper-
add to it a Power of Thinking; it is evident,
by Mr. Clarke's own account of Matter, which
he makes to confift of actually feparate and di
ftintl Parts { though I wonder that at the fame
time he fhould make it divifible, when by its
conlifting of feparate apd diftinct Parts it is
actually divided. ) That thofe feparate and
diftintl Parts are capable of having a Power of
Thinking, or an Individual Confcioufnefs fuper
added to each ofthem ; becaufe the want of In
dividuality or Diftinctnefs is the fole Reafon
urged, why a Syftem of Matter cannot have a
Power of Thinking, or an Individual Confci
oufnefs : And confequently, according to Mr.
Clarke's own Reafoning, Matter may have a Pow
er of Thinking, or an Individual Confcioufnefs.
2. Since an Individual Being, according to
Mr. Clarke, can only be the fubject of a Power
of Thinking -, Why may not feveral Particles
of Matter, when united in one Syftem, become an

REMARKS on
an Individual Being, and be by the Power of
God rendered incapable of any Divifion or Se
paration by Natural Caufes, and confequently
be a fubject capable of Thinking ? If feveraj
Particles of Matter can be fo united as to touch
one another, or clofely to adhere; wherein
does the Diftindtnefs or Individuality of the fe
veral Particles confift ? The Diftindtnefs or In
dividuality is as much loft to me by this fup
pofed Union, as the Diftindtnefs of the Parts
if if I may fo fpeak ) of an Immaterial Being, .
upon fuppofition that Extenfion is not excluded
out of the Idea of Immateriality, as it is not
by Mr. Clarke, if I rightly apprehend him- For
if the Union of Material Particles be compleat
and intire, I can as well conceive an Immaterial
Being capable of Divifion , as conceive thofe
Particles fo united capable of Divifion from
one another. All the Difference perceivable by
us, between fuch a Material Subftance and an
Immaterial Subftance, befides Solidity in one
and want of Solidity in the other, lies in this..
That one perhaps continues as it was created,
and the other becomes by the Power of God,
what the other was by Creation. Arid what
difference that will make as to one's being ca
pable of the Power of Thinking, and the o-
ther's not being capable of that Power, does
not appear to me, and never will, till Thinking
and Solidity are proved to be incompatible in
the fame Subject.
3. But let us fuppofe with Mr. Clarke, that
a Material Subftance in any manner difpofed,
is not an Individual Being ; yet I cannot fee
but that an Individual Power may refide in a
Material Syftem, which confifts of adtually fe
parate and diftinct Parts ; and confequently, that,

Mr. Clarke'.* demonftration, Seel 7p
that an Individual Being is not indifpenfably
neceffary to be the fubject of an Individual
Power. Now if an Individual Power can be
lodged by God in, or fuperadded to that which
is not an Individual Being, or follows from the
Compofition or Modification of a Material
Syftem, confifting of actually feparate and di
ftinct Particles ; the very Soul and Strength of
Mr. Clarke's Demonftration is gone. And Mat
ter of Fact is fo plain and obvious, that a Man
cannot turn his Eye but he will meet with Ma
terial Syftems, wherein there are Individual
Powers, which are not in every one, nor in any
one of the Particles that compofe them when
taken apart, and confidered fingly. Let us
ihftance for example in a Rofe. That confifts of
feveral Particles, which feparately and fingly
want a Power to produce that agreeable Senfa-
tion we experience in them when united. And
therefore either each of the Particles in that
Union contributes to the Individual Power,
which is the external Caufe of our Senfation ;
or elfe God Almighty fuperadds the Power of
producing that Senfation in us upon the Union
of the Particles. And this, for ought I can
fee, may be the cafe of Matter's Thinking.
Thofe Particles which compofe the Brain, may
under that Modification either have the Power
of Thinking neceffarily flowing from them,
or elfe may have the Power of Thinking fu
peradded tothem by the Power ofGod, though
fingly and feparately they may not have the
Power of Thinking. The Fallacy of Mr.
Clarke's Argument, by which, as I take it, he
deceives himfelf, lies in this, That by an In
dividual Power he underftands a Power that
can only proceed from, or refide in, an Indi
vidual

fo REMARKS on
vidual Being ; which is a plain Begging of
the Queftion, or fuppofing the thing in dif-
pute, that Thinking is fuch an Individual Pow
er: To prove which, he has not, though all
he fays depends on it, offered fo much as one
word, and I conceive cannot till he is perfectly
acquainted with the Nature of Thinking. I
readily acknowledge that we can diftinguifh the
various Modes of Thinking from one another ;
but whether Thinking is fuch a kind of Ope
ration as proceeds from an Individual Being, or
whether it proceeds from a Being which con-
lifts of actually feparate and diftinct Parts, I
muft be content to be ignorant, till fome bet
ter proof is produced to place it in an Indivi
dual Being, than by calling it an Individual
Power. 4. But after all, fuppofing Mr. Clarke had
proved that Confcioufnefs could only refide
in an Individual Being, and that That Indi
vidual Being muft be an Immaterial Being,
the Soul would not then be proved to be na
turally Immortal ; and confequently all the
pains taken to prove the Soul Immaterial, fig
nify nothing. Nothing is proved naturally
Immortal by the fuppofition of the Soul's
Immateriality, but the Subftance of the Soul.
Now the Soul is fuppofed to be a Thinking
Immaterial Being ; and unlefs a Thinking; Im
material Being can be proved naturally Im
mortal, the Soul cannot be proved naturally
Immortal. But how this can be done, I know
not, but by fhowing the infeparable Connection
between Immaterial Being and Thinking j and
till then we have as much reafon to believe,
that Thinking is an Action which may com
mence after the exiftence of its Subject, and
may

Mr. Clarke'.? 'Demonftration', &c. 8 1
may perifh Or ceafe to exift, its Subject ftill
remaining. And thus there is no more pro-
grefs made in the proof of the Natural Immor
tality of the Soul by proving its Immateriality,
than there would be in proving the natural Im
mortality of Mens Bodies, which are laid in
the Grave, by fhowing that Matter can only
perifh by Annihilation : For as in the laft Cafe
no Proof is made of the neceflary continuance
together of the feveral Particles that compofe
our Bodies ; fo in the other Cafe we have no
proof, that Thinking is an infeparable Property
of Immaterial Being. Of what ufe then is
this Argument to the Ends and Purpofes of
Religion ? For if we have no fecurity that we
muft hereafter exift in a State of Perception, as
by only proving, the Natural Immortality of
the Subftance ©f the Soul, we have not ; it can
be of no ufe to influence our Lives and Actions.
5. But let us fuppofe, that from the Power
Of Thinking, or Individual Confcioufnefs, we
can prove the Immateriality of the Soul, and
from its Immateriality prove its natural Im
mortality, and then fee what will be the con
fequence. All the numerous fenfible Creatures
in the Univerfe are put in the fame condition
with Man, and made capable of eternal Hap
pinefs as well as he. Now, to avoid this Con
fequence , there are two Things principally
urged. 1. That all thofe Creatures ( which I call
Senfible ) are only mere Machines : Or,
2. That their Souls fhall be annihilated upon
the Diffolution of their Bodies,
G To

82 RE MA R K S on
Tothe Firft I anfwer, That Experience as
much convinces us, that they perceive, think,
13c. as that Men do. They avoid pain, and
feek pleafure, and give as good marks of Un-
eafinefs under the one, and Satisfaction under
the other, as Men do. They avoid pain, and
feek pleafure, by the fame Motives that Men
do, viz. by reflecting on their paft Actions,
and the Adtionsof their fellows, with the Con
fequences of them ; which is apparent from
their acting more to their own advantage, the
more experience they have had. But if after
all, Brutes are only mere Machines, the Diffi
culty of proving the Soul Immaterial will be
increafed. For if the Operations of Brutes are
not fufficient to diftinguifh them from Clocks
and Watches, the Operations of Men will not
prove them to be fuperiour to Machines.
To the Second Objection I anfwer: That if
the Souls of Brutes are annihilated upon the
diffolution of their Bodies, then the Proof of
the Natural Immortality of Mens Souls from
their Immateriality, tends not to prove that
their Souls fhall really be Immortal ; becaufe
mere Natural Immortality is not a Security
from Annihilation, as is fuppofed in the Ob
jection. I fhall now only add. That under the Un
certainty in point of Reafon, both of the Soul's
Immateriality and Natural Immortality, I am
not the lefs certain of Man's Immortality from
the Gofpel of Chrift ; and therefore for the
fake of thofe who may be offended with me for
my freedom, I fhall obferve, That the fame
Zeal which engages one Man to maintain, that
a certain Argument has a great deal of force in
it to prove the Immortality of the Soul, may

engage

Mr. Clarke'.*- 'Demonftration, Sec.
engage another Man to maintain, that it is
weak and dangerous. They both aim at the
fame End ; they differ only in judging of the
Nature of an Argument. They ought both
to abftain from all fufpicious Expreffions ; to
abftain, I fay, not in faying they will abftain,
for that makes an ill Impreffion, but by a perfect
Silence. I am,

SIR,

Your humble Servant.

G 3

AD&

A
DEFENCE O F A N
ARGUMENT Made ufe of in a
LETTER T O
Mr. DODWELL,
To prove the Immateriality and Na
tural Immortality of the SOUL*

By S A MUE L CLARKE,D.D. late
Rector of St. James's Wejlminfter.
LONDON:
Printed in the Year MDCCXXXL

[87]

A

DEFENCE

O F A N

Argument, &c.

N a Letter to Mr. Dodweli, upon
occafion of his late Difcourfe con
cerning the Nature of the Soul,
the following Argument was a-
mong others particularly made
ufe of to prove the Immateriality
and Natural Immortality of the Soul.
" The fame thing, viz. that the Soul cannot Letter n>
poffibly be Material, is moreover demonftra- Mr.. Dod"
ble from the fingle confideration even of ^ j1]23.
bare Senfe and Confcioufnefs it felf. For,
Matter being a divifible Subftance, confiding
always of feparable, nay of actually Sepa
rate and Diftinct Parts ; it is plain, unlefs
it were effentially confcious, in which cafe
G 4 " every

tt ct
tcft<t
M

8 8 A "De fence of the Immateriality
" every Particle of Matter muft confift ofjn-
" numerable feparate and diftindt Confcipuf-
" neffes, no Syftem of it in any poffible Com-
" pofition or Divifion can be an Individual
" confcious Being. For fuppofe three, or
'¦< three Hundred Particles of Matter, at a
" Mile, or any given diftance, one from ano-
" ther; is it poffible that all thofe feparate
*' Parts fhould in that State be one Individual
" confcious Being ? Suppofe then all thefe Par-
" tides brought together into one Syftem, fo
" as to touch one another ; will they thereby,
" or by any Motion or Compofition whatfoe-
" ver, become any whit lefs truly diftinct Be-
" ings, than they were at the greateft diftance?
" How then can their being difpofed in any
" poflible Syftem, make them one Individual
" Confcious Being ? If you fuppofe God by
" his Infinite Power fuperadding Confcioufnefs
" to the united Particles, yet ftill thofe, Parti-
" cles, being really and neceffarily as diftinct
" Beings as ever, cannot be themfelves the
" Subject in which that Individual Confciouf-
" nefs inheres ; but the Confcioufnefs can only
" be fuperadded by the addition of Something,
" whiclrin all the Particles muft ftill it felf be
" but one Individual Being. The Soul there-
" fore, whofe Power of Thinking is undenia-
" bly one Individual Confcioufnefs, cannot
" poffibly be a Material Subftance".
To invalidate the force of this Argument,
* a Litter the following Objections have been offered to
eonUmng lne publick.
Jome Re- *¦
marks en a
frttended " I. That * an Individual Power may refide
Demm- « jn a Material Syftem which confifts of adtu-
i^c. pv. ally
78. 7S-

and natural Immortality ofthe Soul. 89
*' ally feparate and diftindt Parts ; That an
*' Individual Power can be lodged by God in,
'' or fuperadded to That which is not an Indi-
*' vidual Being •> or zV -way follow from the
" Compofition or Modification of a Material
" Syftem confifting of actually feparate and
*' diftindt Particles; and if fo, then the very
*' Soul and Strength of the foregoing Demon-
" ftration is gone. That as to this, Matter of
" Fact is fo plain and obvious, that a Man
*' cannot turn his Eye, but he will meet with
** Material Syftems, wherein there are Indivi-
'* dual Powers, which are not in every one,
" nor in any one of the Particles that compofe
" them, when taken apart and confidered
** fingly. That a Rofe, for Example, confifts
" of feveral Particles which feparately and
** fingly want a Power to produce that agreea-
*' ble Senfation we experience in them when
" united ; And therefore either each of the
i% Particles in that Union contributes to the In-
** dividual Power which is the external Caufe
" of our Senfation ; or elfe God fuperadds the
" Power of producing that Senfation in us,
.*' upon the Union of the Particles. That this
'*' may be the Cafe of Matter's Thinking.
" Thofe Particles which compofe the Brain
" may under that Modification, either have
" the Power of Thinking neceflarily flowing
" from them, or elfe may have the Power of
" Thinking fuperadded to them by the Power
" of God, though fingly and feparately they
*« may not have the Power of Thinking. And
" That the Fallacy of the fore-mentioned Argument
*' lies in this, that by an Individual Power is there
" meant a Power that can only proceed from, " or

90 A ^Defence of the Immateriality
" or refide in an Individual Being : Which isa
" plain begging of the Queftion.
II. That though a Syftem of Matter were al-
* fg- 77- lowed not to be capable of Thinking, yet * " it is
" evident, that, according to the foregoing Ar-
" gumtnt, the feparate and diftinct Parts of
" Matter are capable of having a Power of
" Thinking, or an Individual Confcioufnefs
<c fuperadded to each of them ; becaufe the
" want of Individuality or Diftindtnefs, is the
" fole Reafon urged, why a Syftem of Mat-
** ter cannot have a Power of Thinking or an
" Individual Confcioufnefs ; and it is only re-
'« quired that a Thing be an Individual Being,
" in order to its being a proper Subject of a
*' Power of Thinking, or at leaft?'-- order to
" its being a Subjetl to which it may be pOffible
" for God to fuperadd a Power of Thinking.
i pag. So. " III. That though it were allowed f, that
" Confcioufnefs could refide only in an Indivi-
" dual Being ; and alfo that That Individual
" Being muft be an Immaterial Being ; yet even
" then the Soul would not be proved to be
" naturally Immortal ; that is, the Thinking
" Immaterial Being would not be proved to be
"' Immortal, but only tbe bare Immaterial Sub-
" ject or Subftance it felf -, Becaufe Thinking is
" an Adlion which may commence after the
'' Exiftenceof its -Subject, and may perifh or
" ceafe to exift, its Subject ftill remaining.
li taS-7%- " 1^- ^at tf\\ an Individual Being can only
" be the Subject of a Power of Thinking,
" then, according to the foregoing Argument, either
" it will be proved that Material Subftance is ca-
" fable of thinking, or elfe that neither is Imma-
" terial Subftance capable of it : Becaufe either
" feveral Particles of Matter, when united in
4 one

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 9 1
one Syftem, may become an Individual Be
ing, and be by the Power of God rendred
incapable of any Divifion or Separation by
Natural Caufes, and confequently be a Sub
ject capable of Thinking, or elfe Immaterial
Subftance alfo may as well be conceived capa
ble of Divifion, upon Suppofition that Ex-
tenfion is not excluded out of the Idea of
Immateriality.
" V. That if* from the Power of Thinking, *p«g.8i.
or Individual Confcioufnefs, we can prove the
Immateriality of the Soul, and from its Im
materiality prove its natural Immortality ;
then the Confequence will be, that all the nu
merous fenfible Creatures in the Univerfe are
putxin the fame Condition with Man, and
made capable of eternal Happinefs as well as
he ; or elfe to avoid this Confequence, it muft
be fuppofed, either that all thofe Creatures are
only mere Machines, or elfe that their Souls
fhall be annihilated upon the Diffolution of
their Bodies ; And if fo, then the proof of
the natural Immortality of Men's Souls from
their Immateriality, tends not to prove that
their Souls fhall really be Immortal".
The Queftion being of great Importance, and
the Objections very ingenious, as containing in
brief all that can be faid in Favour of Mat
ter's being capable of Thinking ; It is pre-
furned it may be acceptable to the impartial
Reader, to fee a clear Anfwer given to each
of them as they are here reprefented in their
full Strength, though ( for Methods fake j in
fomewhat a different Oi-der than they were at
firft publifhed.
I. To

92 A 'Defence <*/ \the Immateriality
I. To the Firft, viz. That an Individual
Power may refide in a Material Syftem ; as Sweef-
nefs, in a Rofe ; And that Thinking may be fupr
pofed to do fo, as well as any other Individual
Power ; It is anfwered, that it is fo far from
being true, as is alledged, that Matter of FaSi
is fa plain and obvious, tbat a Man cannot turn
his Eye, but he will meet with Material Syftems,
wherein there are Individual Powers, which aft
not in every one, nor in any one, of tbe Particles
tbat compofe tbem, wben taken apart and conftde-
red fingly ; This, I fay, is fo far from being
True, that on the contrary, it is both abfolute-
ly falfe in Fact, and impoffible and a direct
Contradiction in the Nature of the Thing it felf,
that any Power whatfoever fhould inhere or refide
in, any Syftem or Compofition of Matter,
different from the Powers refiding in the fingle
Parts. For the clearer and more diftinct Ex
plication and Proof of which Doctrine, it is to
be obferved that all Powers or Qualities may be
diftinguifhed into three forts. i/?,Some Qualities
there are, which do ftritlly and properly fpeak-
ing, inhere in the Subftance to which they are
afcribed. And concerning thefe, it is evident
at firft fight, that every Power or Quality,
that is or can be inherent in any Syftem of
Matter, is nothing elfe than the Sum or Ag
gregate of fo many Powers or Qualities of the
fame kind, inherent in all its Parts. The Mag
nitude of any Body is nothing but the Sum of
the Magnitudes of all its Parts. Its Motion, is
nothing but the Sum of the Motions of all its
Parts. And if Cogitation in like manner could
poffibly be a Quality really inherent in a Syftem
of Matter, it muft likewife neceffarily be the
Sum and Refult of the Cogitations ofthe feveral
4 Parts :

and natural Immortality of the Soul 93
Parts-- : And fo thiere would be as many diftindt
Confciaufneffesi, as there are Particles of Mat
ter, of which the Syftem confifts ; Which I
fuppofe will be granted to be very abfurd. Com
positions or Divifionja of Magnitude, varied in
infinite manners to Eternity, can produce no
thing in the whole Syftem, no Quality or Pow
er whatfoever, but tnere Magnitude ; Competi
tions and Variations of Motion, nothing but
mere Motion. And Sound may as well be added
tQ a Colour, or Colour to a Smell ; or any Qua-
lii%he made to fubfift, without any Subjeft at all ;
as that any, Power whatfoever fhould be fuper
added to, and really made to refide in, any
Compofitum or Syftem of Matter, without be
ing made to inhere proportionably in the Parts of
that Whole, taken fingly as well as together.
This, I fay, is evidently at firft fight True, of
all real Qualities, which truly and properly
inhere in the. Subject to which they belong ;
fuch as are Magnitude and Motion in Matter.
2.dlyr Other Qualities there are, which are vul
garly 'looked upon as Individual Powers, refult-
Lrjg from and refiding in the whole Syftem,
without refiding particularly iii each or any of
its fingle and original Parts ; fuch as are the
Sweetnefs of certain Bodies, their Colours, &c.
But,this is only, a vulgar and very grofs Errour.
For, neither do thefe Qualities refide in, or at all
refult from, the whole Syftem, in any proper
Senfe : Neither in any Senfe at all, in which they
can be afcribed to that Body or Syftem of Mat
ter to which they are vulgarly fuppofed to be
long, are they truly Individual Powers. In the
firft place they are not really Qualities of the
Syftem* and evidently do not at all in any pro-
$f* Senfe belong to it, but are only Effects oc-
cafionally

94 A Defence of the Immateriality
cafionally produced by it in fome other Sub
ftance, and truly Qualities or Modes of thai-
other Subftance in which they are produced ;
Thus the Sweetnefs of a Rofe, is well known not
to be a Quality really inhering in the Rofe ; but
a Senfation, which is merely in him that fmells
it, and a Mode of the Thinking Subftance that
is in the Man. In the next place, thefe Quali
ties, in no Senfe wherein they can be afcribed
to the Syftem of Matter, are Individual Pow
ers. They are Individuals* only as they are
Modes of the Thinking Subftance that perceives
them ; but in the Bodies themfelves, they are
onlyfpecifically, not individually, fingle Powers ;
that is, they are only a Number of fimilar Mo
tions or Figures of the Parts of the Body. Nay,
they are not always fo much as fpecifically fingle
Powers. Thus Compound Colours, as certain
Greens , for Example, which are Individual-
Modes in the Thinking Subftance that perceives
them, may in the Objects be nothing but a num
ber of Figures or Motions even fpecifically dif
ferent, namely fuch as ufually reprefent both
Blue and Yellow. And the fame may be faid of
Heat, Eight, Tafte, Sound, and all thofe others
which we call Senfible Qualities. %dly, Other
Powers, fuch as Magnetifm, and Eletlrical -At
tractions, are not real Qualities at all, refiding
in any Subject, but merdy abftratl Names to ex
prefs the Effects of fome determinate Motions of
certain Streams of Matter: And Gravitation it
felf, is not a Quality inhering in Matter, or that
can poffibly refult from any Texture or Com
pofi tion of it ; but only an Effetl of the conti
nual and regular Operation ot fome other Be
ing upon it ; by which the Parts are all made
to tend one towards another. Under thefe tbra

and natural Immortality of the Soul. 95
three Heads muft neceffarily be contained all
poflible Qualities, Modes or Powers whatfoe
ver : They muft either be Qualities really in
hering in the Subjeti to which they are ufually af
cribed ; or Modes produced by it in fome other
Subjeti ; or elfe mere abftratJ Names, fignifying
certain Powers or Effetls that do not properly re
fide in any Subjeti at all. And now the Queftion
is, among which of thefe Three forts of Powers
muft Confcioufnefs or Thinking be reckoned. I
fuppofe it will neither be faid to be a mere ab
ftratl Name, nor yet an Effetl produced in or
upon a Foreign Subftance, ( as the Sweetnefs or
Colour of a Rofe, is not any individual Power
in the Rofe it felf, but merely a Senfation ex
cited in him that fmells or fees it ; ) but that it
is certainly a Power or Quality truly and really
inhering in the Thinking Subftance it felf. And
therefore, if that Thinking Subftance be a
Syftem of Matter, the former Reafoning holds'
ftrictly and demonftratively true, that the Con
fcioufnefs, muft inhere in all and every one of
the Particles of that Syftem, taken fingly, as
well as together. To fuppofe any Power or
Quality of this kind, arifing from, or belong
ing to any whole Syftem of Mattel', wichout be
longing to the feveral Parts of which that
Whole confifts, is a direct and exprefs Contra
diction : Ic is fuppofing either an Univerfal to
exift, without Particulars ; or an Effetl to be
produced without a Caufe, or to have more in
it than was in the Caufe ; or that a Quality is
by the Power of God made fo to arife out of
Nothing, as to be fuperadded to a Subjeti, and
to fubfift without inhering in that Subject, to
which it is at the fame time fuppofed to be
long. By this I prefume it fufficiently appears
with what poffibility of Truth it is alledged, that

96 A ^Defence of the Immateriality
that the Particles of Matter which compofe the
Brain, may under that Modification either have-
the Power of Thinking neceffarily flowing: from-
them, or elfe may have the Power of Thinking fu
peradded to them by the Power of God, thottgh
fingly and feparately they may- not have the Powef
of Thinking. And it will eafily be judged*,
whether it be indeed a Fallacy and a plain beg--
ging of the Queftion, to affirm that an Individu~
al Power, properly and ftridtly fpeaking, fuch
as Confcioufnefs or Thinking muft needs be ac
knowledged to be, can only proceed from, or re
fide in, an Individual Being ; or whether the
contrary be not rather demonftrated to be a
plain Contradiction.
II. To the Second, viz. That according to
the Argument now under Confideration, if not
a. Syftem of Matter, yet at leaft the feparate and-
diftintl Parts of Matter, are capable of having a'
Power of Thinking, or an Individual Confcioufnefs*
fuperadded to each of them ; feeing it is only re
quired tbat a thing be an Individual Being,, in or
der to its being a proper Subjeti of a Power of:
Thinking : It is anfwered, Firft, That fuppofing
any Particle of Matter could be truly an Indi
vidual, that is, an Indivifible or Indifcerpible5
Being ; yet it would not therefore follow,' that
it could be capable of thinking. For though-
Divi Ability or Difcerpibility in any Subject, is
a fufficient Proof that That Subject is not ca
pable of fuch an Individual Power of Thinking;
yet it does not from thence prefen fly follow on
the contrary, that whatever is Indifcerpible; is
therefore capable of Thinking. Though the
prefent Argument proves - indeed- only, ,thac
whatever is Difcerpible, cannot Think ; that
is, that Individuality is a- fine oua> non, or
ane*

find Natural Immortality of the Soul. 97
a neceflary (Qualification without which no
Subject can be capable of Thinking -, yet
it does -by no means exclude other Confi-
derations, or at all imply that whatever has
this Property of Individuality , .muft there
fore neceffarily be capable of Thinking, and
^cannot by any other Property be rendred,
or by any other Argument proved to be, in
capable of it. Though the want of Individu
ality or DiftincJneftj, is indeed tbe file Reafon ur
ged in the prefent Argument, why a Syftem of
Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking or an
Individual Confcioufnefs ; yet it ought not there
fore to be faid, that it is Only required that a-
Tbing be an Individual Being, in order to its be
ing a proper Subjeti of a Power of Thinking. Be
sides ; Suppofing any Particle of Matter could
be truly an Individual Being, and alfo that up
on that account ( which yet is by no means ne
ceffary ) it could be capable of Thinking ?
yet ftill the principal part of the Queftion
would be certain and unavoidable , that ar
Thinking Being muft be, if not immaterial,
,yet however naturally Immortal: For whate-
'ver is Indifcerpible, though it were fuppofed
Material, could not by any Power of Time, or
any Force in Nature, ^receive any fuch Altera
tion, but that not only its Subftance, h;ut even
all its ..Qualities alfo, muft naturally remain for
ever unchanged. But then, Secondly , it is
gnfwered. further, That the .Supposition it felf
of this Objection, i« utterly irnpoffible, viz:
that any Particle of Matter .can be truly' an
Individual or Indifcerpible Being. For it is
.neceffarily included in the Nature of Solid Sub-
Stance, how ¦ fmall foever it be conceived to be,
to confsft ftill of Parts not effentially connedted,
and not at all depending upon each other for
H their

9* A 'Defence of the Immateriality
their Exiftence. So that it is absolutely impof
fible and contradictory, to fuppofe any Parti
cle of Matter fo truly an Individual, but that
by the Power of God ( for the Powers of Na
ture here are nothing to the purpofe ) it may be
divided into two or more Particles, which fhall
each of them feparately be as Perfect and Com-
pleat Matter, and continue to have all the very
fame Properties, as the whole Particle had be
fore it was divided. Suppofe then the fmaUeft
imaginable Particle of Matter, indued with
Confcioufnefs or Thought : Yet by the Power
of God, this Particle may be divided into two
diftindt Parts ; and then what will naturally and
confequently become of its Power of Thinking?
If That Power will continue in it unchanged ;
then there muft either be two diftinct Confci-
oufneffes, in the two feparate Parts ; or elfe the
Power continuing in the intermediate Space, as
well as in the parts themfelves, muft there fub-
fift without a Subject ; or elfe, not the Mate
rial Subftance, but fome other Thing, is the
Subject of the Confcioufnefs. If the Power of
Thinking will remain only in One of the fepa
rated Parts ; then either That One Part only,
had at firft the Power refiding in it ; and then
the fame Queftion will return, upon the fuppo-
fition of Its being likewife divided ; or elfe it
will follow that one and the fame Individual
Quality maybe transferred from one Sub/'edt to
another ; which all Philofophers of all Sects in
the World, have always confeffed to be irn
poffible. If, in the laft place, it be faid, that
upon the Divifion of the Particle, the Power
of Thinking, which was in it, will wholly
ceafe ; then it will follow, that That Power
was never at all a real Quality inhering or re
fiding in the Subftance, ( in which mere fepa-
ration

And Natural Immortality of the Soul. 99
.ration of Parts, makes no Alteration ; ) but
that it was merely an external Denomination, fuch
as is Roundnefs in a Globe, which perifhes at its
being divided : And this, I fuppofe, will be
granted to be fufficiehtly abfurd. There is no
way to evade this Argument, but by affirming
cither that a Particle of Matter may be fo fmall,
as that it fhall not be in the Power of God to
divide it; or that if it be divided, it will con
fequently and neceffarily be annihilated ; ( nei
ther of which, I fuppofe, will be affirmed ;)
or elfe that the fame may be argued concerning
Immaterial Subftance alfo ; which is the Fourth
Objection, and will be confidered prefently in
its proper place.
III. To the Third, viz. That though Con
fcioufnefs were allowed neceffarily to infer Indi-
vifibility, and Indivifibility to infer Immateriali
ty : yet even then not the Soul, the Thinking im
material Being, but only the bare Immaterial Sub
jeti or Subftance itfelf, would be proved to be na
turally Immortal ; fince Thinking is an Atlion ( a
' Power it fhould rather have been called ) which
may commence after the Exiftence of its Subjeti, and
may ceafe, its Subjeti ftill remaining : It is an
fwered, that the contrary is evidently True j
namely, that not only the bare Immaterial Sub
jeti, but the Subjeti and the Power together, the
Thinking immaterial Being it felf, is hereby
proved to be naturally Immortal: Becaufe, what
ever Subftance is wholly indifcerpible, is plainly,
by Virtue of that Property, not only it felf
incapable of being deftroyed by any Natural
Power, ( for fo alfo is the moft difcerpible Sub
ftance likewife ; ; but all its Qualities and
Modes alfo, are utterly incapable of being af-
H 2 fected

ioo A ^Defence of the Immateriality
fected in any meafure, or changed in any de
gree, by any Power of Nature ; For all real
and inherent Qualities of any Subftance, are
either Modifications of the Subftance it felf,
or elfe Powers fuperadded and connected to the
Subftance, by the immediate Power ^of Gods
And in either of thefe cafes, it is manifeft no
Quality can be altered by any natural Power,
which is not able to affect and make fome Al
teration ( in the Difpofition of the Parts at
leaft ) of the Subftance it felf; which in an in
difcerpible Subftance it is evident cannot be done.
The Soul therefore, the whole Confcious Being 5
the Power of Thinking that re fides in it, as well
as the bare Immaterial Subjeti or Subftance it felf;
( whatever may be faid concerning the Power
cf God in this Queftion ; ) will clearly, notwith
standing what any Finite Power can do, of ne
ceffity be naturally Immortal. The Truth of
this Reafoning is evident from what we cannot
but obferve even in the Material World ; namely,
that all the Changes which are caufed therein
by any Powers of Nature, are Nothing but
Changes of the Order and Difpofition of the
Parts of compound Bodies. The original and
perfectly folid Particles of Matter, which are,
(not indeed abfolutely in themfelves, but,) to
any Power of Nature, indifcerpible ; are ut
terly incapable of having not only their Sub
ftance, but even any of their Qualities or Pro
perties altered in any meafure by any Power .of
Nature : As is evident from the Form or Spe
cies of thofe we vulgarly call fimple or elemen
tary Bodies, remaining always unalterably the
lame, and indued continually with the fame
Powers and Qualities.
IV. To

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. i o i
JV. To the Fourth, viz. That according to
fhe Argument we are now confidering, either
a Syftem of Matter, being by a ftridt Union of
Parts made an Individual Being, may become
capable of Thinking ; or elfe Immaterial Subftance
alfo may as well be conceived capable of Divifion,
and confequently incapable of Thought; fup
pofing Extenfton not excluded out of tbe Idea of
Immateriality : It is anfwered, that the Cafe is
Very different : Becaufe fome of the firft and
moft obvious Properties which we certainly know
of Matter, as its having partes extra partes,
ftrictly and properly fpeaking, that is, itscon-
fifting of fuch Parts as are atlually unconnetled,
and are truly diftintl Beings, and can ( as we fee
by Experience ) exift feparately, and have no
dependance one upon another ; do neceffarily and
confeffedly imply Difterpibility : But in Imma
terial Beings we do not know of any fuch Pro
perties, as any wife imply Difeerpibility. It
cannot be collected from any Property we know
of Them, but that they may be fuch Beings as
can no more be divided than annihilated, that
is, whofe whole Effence may be neceffarily
One, and their Subftance effentially indivifible,
upon the fame Ground as their Exiftence conti
nues: Nay, the only Properties -we certainly and
indifputably know of them, namely Confcioufnefs
and its Modes, do prove (as has been before
ftiown ) that they muft neceffarily be fuch In
difcerpible Beings. As evidently as the known
Properties of Matter prove it to be certainly
a Difcerpible Subftance, whatever other unknown
Properties it may be endued with ; fo evidently
the known and confeffed Properties of Immaterial
Beings prove them to be Indifcerpible, whatever
H 3 other

ioz A "Defence of the Immateriality
other unknown Properties They likewife may
be endued with. How far fuch Indifcerpibility
can be reconciled and be confiftent with fome
kind of Expanfion ; that is, what unknown Pro
perties are joined together with thefe known
ones of Confcioufnefs and Indifcerpibility; is
another Queftion of confiderable Difficulty,
but of no Neceffity to be refolved in the pre
fent Argument. Only This : As the Parts of
Space or Expanfion it felf, can demonftrably
be proved to be abfolutely Indifcerpible ; fo it
ought not to be reckoned an infuperable Dif
ficulty, to imagine that all Immaterial Thinking
Subftances ( upon Suppofition that Expanfion is
not excluded out of their Idea, ) may be fo
likewife, V. To the Fifth, viz. That by the fore-
mentioned Argument, all the fenfible Creatures
in the Univerfe are put in the fame Condition with
Man, and made capable of eternal Happinefs as
well as he ; or elfe that, to avoid this Confe
quence, all thofe Creatures muft either be fuppofed
to be only mere Machines, or elfe that their Souls
fhall be annihilated upon the diffolution of their
Bodies ; And if fo, then the Proof of the natu
ral Immortality of Men'; Souls from their Im
materiality, tends not to prove that their Souls fhall
really be Immortal .- It is anfwered, that, Though
all Senfible Creatures have certainly in them
fomething that is Immaterial, yet it does not
at all follow, either that they muft needs be
annihilated upon the Diffolution of their Bo
dies, or elfe that they muft be capable of eter
nal Happinefs as well as Man. This is juft
fuch an Argument, as if a Man fhould con
clude, that whatfoever is not exactly like him=
4 m,

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. ioj
felf, can therefore have no Being at all : Or
that all the Stars of Heaven, if they be not ex
actly like our Globe of Earth, cannot poffibly
be any Globes at all. Certainly the Omnipo
tent and infinitely Wife God may, without
any very great difficulty, be fuppofed to have
more ways of difpofing of his Creatures, than
we are at prefent let into the fecret of. He may
indeed, if he pleafe, annihilate them at the Dif
folution of their Bodies ; (And fo he might,
if he thought fit, annihilate the Souls of Men ;
and yet it would be never the lefs true, that*
they are in their own Nature Immortal ; ) or he
may, if he pleafes, without either annihilating
them or fuflering them to fall into a State of
entire Inactivity, difpofe of them into num-
berlefs States, concerning the particular Nature
of which, we are not now able to make the
leaft conjecture. I fuppofe, That Man does
not do any great Honour either to God, or
to the Chriftian Religion, who will needs con
tend, that through a boundlefs Eternity there
fhall never exift any thing in the immenfe Uni-
verfe, but what muft needs partake either of
the Happinefs or Mifery of Mankind.

H 4 ARE-

REPLY T O
Mr. Clarke 's Defence
Of his LETTER to t
Mr. D 0 D WE L L:
WITH
A POSTSCRIPT relating to Mr.
Milles's Anfwer to Mr. Dodw ell's
Epiftolary Difcourfe.

 Jefus Chrift, who hath abolifhed Death, and
hath brought Life and Immortality to Light
through the Gofpel, z Tim. i. io.

M. Evolve igitur librum Platonis qui eft de animo :
atnplius quod defideres, nihil erit.
A. Feci mehercule & quidem. fsepius : fed nefcio
quomodo dum lego, aflentior,- cum pofui librum, &me-
cum ipfe, de immortalicate animorum, ccepicogitare, af-
fenfio omnis ilia elabitur.
M. T. Cueronis Tufculanarum Gpuafiionum lib. i.

LONDON:
Printed in the Year MDCCXXXI.

[ I07 ]

REPLY

T O

Mr. Clarke's Defence, &€.

SIR,

H E Importance of the Queftion
concerning the Pofpbility of Mat

ter's Thinking, and the Ability of
Mr. Clarke to urge to the beft
Advantage, whatever can be faid
on that fide of it which he ef-
poufes, make me prefume it will not be unac
ceptable to the impartial Reader, to fee what
Anfwer can be given to his Defence of an Argu
ment, made ufe of in a Letter to Mr. Dodweli,
to prove the Immateriality and Natural Immorta
lity of the Soul, by the Author of the Objec
tions to that Argument ; who ftill thinks it incon-
clufive, and propofes to fhow its Inconclufive-
nefs in the following Papers, and thereby to
contribute towards the Eftablifhment of the
immortality of Man on that Evidence only that
God

108 rA Reply to Mr. ClarkeV 'Defence?
God has thought fit to afford us of it ; and by
a new Inftance affert the Freedom and Liberty,
fo peculiar to the Country wherein we live, of
examining the Grounds and Reafons of prevail
ing Opinions. But if he happenisto fail in "the
Execution of his Defign, either through the
Weaknefs of his Caufe, err his own Inability to-
deal with fo learned an Adverfary ; yet he is
very fure not to err in any thing but a matter
of Speculation. He is not difpofed to ufe any
foreign or unmannerly Mixture in any Debate,-
much lefs when engaged with a Gentleman.)
who by confining himfelf folely to the Argu
ment, let fo unufual an Example of fair dealing
in Controverfy.
The Argument made ufe of by Mr. Clarke,
to'prove the Immateriality and Natural Immor-
Lctterto tality of the Soul, was, That the Soul cannot
Mr.iW- poffibly be material, is demonftr able from the fingle
w ,p-22. confideration even of bare Senfe and Confcioufnefs
it felf : for Matter being a divifible Subftance^
eonfifting always of feparable, nay, of atJuallyfer
parate and diftintl Parts ; it . is plain, unlefs ii
were effentially confcious, in which cafe every Par
ticle of Matter muft confift of innumerable Con-
fcioufneffes, no Syftem of it, in any poffible Compo-
Jition or Divifion, can be an Individual Confcious
Being. For fuppofe three or three hundred Parti'
des ef Matter at a Mile or any given diftance
one from another, is it poffible that all thofe fepa
rate Parts fhould in that State be one Individual
Confcious Being ? Suppofe then all thefe Particlei
le brought together into one Syftem, fo as to touch
one another : Will they thereby, or by Any Motion
*r Compofi tion whatfoever, becomi any whit left
truly diftintl Beings, than tbey were at tbe great-eft
diftance? How then can their being difpofed in anf
pofftbli
$

cf his L e t t e r to Mr. Dodweli. ro**
poffible Syftem, make them one Individual Confci
ous Being ? If you fuppofe God by his Infinite
Power fuperadding Confcioufnefs to the united
Particles ; yet ftill thofe Particles being really and
neceffarily as diftintJ Beings as ever, cannot be
themfelves tbe Subjeti in which that individual
Confcioufnefs inheres ; but tbe Confcioufnefs can only
be fuperadded by the addition of fomething, which
in all the Particles muft ftill it felf be but one indi
vidual Being. The Soul therefore, whofe Power
of Thinking is undeniably one individual Confci
oufnefs, cannot poffibly be a material Subftance.
Againft this Argument I offered feveral Ob
jections, .which I fhall repeat and defend, in the
fame Order that Mr. Clarke has thought fit to
confider them. The firft is as follows:
" i. Let us fuppofe, with Mr. Clarke, that
" a material Subftance in any manner difpofed,
•" is not an individual Being ; yet I cannot fee,
" but that an individual Power may refide in a
«¦** material Syftem, which confifts of actually
" feparate and diftinct Parts ; and confe-
" quently that an individual Being is not indif-
" penlabiy neceffary to be the Subject of an
" individual Power. Now if an individual'
*' Power can be lodged by God in, or fuper-
" added to that which is not an individual Be-
" ing, or follows from the Compofition or
" Modification of a material Syftem, confift-
" ing of actually feparate and diftinct Parti-
" cles ; the very Soul and Strength of Mr.
" Clarke's Demonftration is gone. And Mat-
" ter of Fact is fo plain and obvious, that a
" Man cannot turn his Eye, but he will meet
" with material Syftems, wherein there are in-
*' dividual Powers, which are not in everyone, " nor

t io A R i p t Y to Mr. Clarke'j 'Defenci
'* nor in any one of the Particles that cOmpofii
*' them, when taken apart and confidered fing-
«« ly. Let us inftance, for example, in a Rofet
*' that confifts of feveral Particles, which fe-
" parately and fingly want a Power to pro-
" duce that agreeable Senfation we experience
" in them when united. And therefore either
*' each of the Particles in that Union contii-
" butes to the individual Power, which is the
" external Caufe of our Senfation ; or elfe
*' God Almighty fuperadds the Power of pro-
" ducing that Senfation in us, upon the Union
" of the Particles : and this, for ought I can
" fee, may be the cafe of Matter's Thinking.
*' Thofe Particles which compofe the Brain,
*' may under that Modification either have the
*' Power of Thinking neceffarily flowing from
*' them, or elfe may have the Power of Think-
** ing fuperadded to them by the Power of
" God, though fingly and feparately they may
" not have the Power of Thinking. The Fal-
*' lacy of Mr. Clarke's Argument, by which as
*' I take it he deceives himfelf, lies in this, that
" by an individual Power he underftands a
" Power which can only proceed from or re-
" fide in an individual Being ; which is a plain
*' Begging of the Queftion, or fuppofing the
" thing in difpute, that Thinking is fuch an in*
" dividual Power : to prove which he has not,
*' though all he fays depend on it, offered fo
" much as one word, and I conceive cannot,
*' till he is perfectly acquainted with the na-
*' nature of Thinking. I readily acknowledge,
" that we can diftinguifh the various Modes of
" Thinking from one another ; but whether
" Thinking is fuch a kind of Operation as
" proceeds from an Individual Being, or whe-
" ther

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 1 1 1
*' ther it proceeds from a Being which confifts
" of actually feparate and diftinct Parts, I
" muft be content to be ignorant till fome bet-
" ter proof is produced to place it in an Indi-
" vidual Being, than by calling it an Indivi-
" dual Power "'.
To anfwer this Objection Mr. Clarke fays, patT. gi.
That all Powers and Qualities may be diflingmfhed
into three forts. \. Some Qualities there are
which do, ftricJly und properly fpeaking, inhere in
the Subftance to which they are afcribed. And
concerning thefe it is evident, that every Power or
Quality that is or can be inherent in any Syflem of
Matter, is nothing elfe than the Sum or Aggregate
of fo many Powers or Qualities of the fame kind in
herent in all the Parts. The Magnitude of any
Body is nothing elfe but the Sum of tbe Magnitudes
of all its Parts : Its Motion is nothing elfe but the
Sum of the Motions of all its Parts. And if Co
gitation in like manner could poffibly be a Quality,
really inherent in a Syftem of Matter, it muft like-
wife neceffarily be the Sum and Refult of the Cogi
tations of tbe feveral Parts,, and fo there would be
as many diftintl Confcioufneffes as there are Parti
cles of Matter. 2. Other Powers, which are
vulgarly looked on as Individual Powers, refulting
from and refiding in the whole Syftem, without re
fiding particularly in each or 'any of its fingle and
original Parts ; fuch as the Sweetnefs of certain
Bodies, their Colours, &c. but this is only a grofis
and vulgar Err our. 3. Other Powers, fuch as
Magnetifm and Electrical Attratlions, are not real
Qualities at all refiding in any Subjeti, but merely
abftratl Names, to exprefs the Effetls of feme de
terminate Motions of certain Streams of Matter :
And Gravitation it felf is not a Quality inhering
in Matter, or tbat can poffibly refult from any
Texture

ii2 A Rep l y to Mr. Clarke'.** 'Defencg
Texture or Compofition, but only an Effetl of the
continual and regular Operation of fome other Be
ing upon it, by which the. Parts are all made to
tend one towards another. Under thefe three
Heads muft neceffarily be contained all poffible Qua*
lities, Modes or Powers whatfoever : And now the
Queftion is among which of thefe three Sorts of
Powers muft Confcioufnefs or Thinking be reckoned.
I fuppofe it will neither be faid to be a mere abftraW
Name, nor yet an EfstJ produced in or upon a
foreign Subftance {as tbe Sweetnefs and Colour of 9
Rofe is not any Individual Power in the Rofe it
felf, but merely a Senfation excited in him that
fmells or fees it ) but tbat it is a Quality or Pomp
truly and really inhering in the thinking Subftance
it felf . And therefore if that thinking Subftance be-
a Syftem of Matter, the former Reafoning holds
flritlly > and demonstratively true, that the Confci
oufnefs muft inhere in all and every one of the Par
ticles of that Syftem taken fingly as well as together.
To fuppofe any Power or Quality oft bis kind arifing
from or belonging to the feveral Parts, of which the
Whole confifts, is a diretl and exprefs Contradiction :
It is fuppofing either an Univerfal to exift without
Particulars, or an Effetl to be produced without a
Caufe ; or that a Quality is, by the Power ofGod,
ma.de fa to arife out of nothing, as lo be fuperadded
to a Subjeti, and to fubfifl without inhering in that
Subjeti to which, it is at the fame time fuppofed (a
belong. 1. Before i make any Return to this Anfwer
of Mr. Clarke, it will not be improper to fix
and determine the precife Significations of feme
Words on which the Queftion turns. The
.Queftion being, Whether a Syftem of Matter
can have a Power of Thinking, or an indivi
dual Confcioufnefs fuperadded to it, or flow
from

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 1 1 3
from any Modification of that Syftem ; it is
evident, that by a Power of Thinking is under
ftood, not a Capacity to think, but atJual Think
ing, for elfe Confcioufnefs could not be properly
employed, by Mr. Clarke, to fignify the fame
thing with a Power of Thinking.
2. The Term Individual, when applied to
Power, muft likewife fignify barely One Power
without any Determination ; whether that Pow
er proceed from an individual or an actually di
vided or divifible Being : for if an individual
Power fignifies a Power which proceeds from
or inheres in an individual Being, and Confci
oufnefs be fuppofed fuch an individual Power,
and the Queftion is, Whether Confcioufnefs or
any individual Power can refide in a Syftem of
Matter , or a Being that is not individual ;
Shere is no ground to difpute, whether a Syftem
of Matter can have Confcioufnefs, or any other
individual Power, on fuch Suppofitions. It is
evident, that on thofe Suppofitions a Syftem of
Matter cannot poffibly think ; for a Syftem of
Matter being fuppofed to confift of Parts and
Thinking, or Confcioufnefs being fuppofed to
be a Power incapable of refiding in a Being
that confifts of Parts, the Queftion of Matter's
thinking will amount to this, Whether tbat
which cannot think, can think. I do not, by
what I have faid, exclude Mr. Clarke from con
tending for Confcioufnefs or Thinking's being
a Power that can only refide in an individual
Being. He is at his liberty to make that a
Queftion whenever he thinks fit, and I fhall be
very glad to fee whatfo able a Gentleman can
fay to give me light into the Nature of Think
ing. But all that I contend for is, that Think
ing be not fuppofed an individual Power, in a
I Senfe

1 14 4 Reply to Mr. Clarke'.; 'Defence
Senfe that begs the Queftion between us, till it
be proved individual in that fenfe ; and then I
will allow, that there is no ground to djfpute
whether a Syftem can think. Thefe things be
ing cleared, I anfwer to Mr. Clarke's Argu
ment :
1 . That it is nothing elfe but Argumentum ad
Ignorantiam. For by enumerating his three
forts of Powers or Qualities of Matter, and
fhowing that the two laft of the forts are im
properly called Powers or Qualities, he does
fuppofe that a Syftem of Matter has, and can
have only Powers of one fort or kind, fuch as
Magnitude and Motion, which are only the
Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the fame
kind ; which, what is it elfe but to argue,
That becaufe we know of no other Powers of
a different kind in Matter from Magnitude and
Motion, therefore it has andean have no other
Powers of a different kind from Magnitude
and Motion ? Whereas he ought to have de
monftrated, if he would have proved the Point
he undertook to prove, that there can be no
other Power in any Syftem of Matter, but what
is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the
fame kind ; and then there might have been
fonie ground to conclude, That if Confcioufnefs
be really inherent, in a Syftem of Matter, it muft
be tbe Sum or Refult of tbe Confeioufneffes of the
feveral Parts : for till it is demonftrated, that
there can be no other Power in any Syftem of
Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of
Powers of the fame kind ; it may as well be
fuppofed, that there- are Powers of different
kinds in different Particles of Mater, or that
God can fuperadd different kinds of Powers to
the different P,arts of a material Syftem ; and
then

vf hit Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 1 1 §
then the .Action or Power eKerted,refulting from
them when united, will be of a different fort or
fpecies from ally Power inhering in the Parti
cles itjngly considered., and fo far from beirijjj
the Sum or Aggregate of Ppwers of the fame
Jcind, that, the new Power will be the Sum of
Aggregate of Powers ot a different kind. And
if fo, then Mr. Clarke muft prove, that Con
fcioufnefs is not an Action or actual Power re
fulting from an Union of different kinds of
Powers, or elfe he will not be able to prove
ihe Impoftibility of Matter's thinking from
its Divisibility, or its being actually divided in
ir&nitum; for on fuppofition that there are
Powers of different kinds in different parts of
the fame material Syftem, and that Confciouf
nefs cannot be proved to, be, properly fpeak-
ing, an Individual Power, or a Power which
can only refide in an Individual Beirig, there
will he no reafon to conclude, That if ConfcU
oufnefs be really inherent in a Syftem of Matter, it
muft he the Sum or Refult of the Confcioufneffes of
the feveral Parts : but on the contrary, That
if Confcioufnefs does inhere in a Syftem of
Matter, it muft not be the Sum or Refult of
.the Confcioufneffes of the feveral Parts ; and
all Mr. Clarke's Difficulties founded on Mat
ters confifting of actually feparateand diftinct
Parts, will be removed ; for it will then be no
Qontradiclion to fuppofe a Power arifingfrom Mat
ter, without belonging to the Parts of which the
Whole confifts, no more than it will be to con
ceive that a Whole is not the fame with a
Piece of a Clock : for the Power refulting from
the different contributing Powers in the Syftem,
neither belongs ro any part of the Syftem when
confidered by it felf, nor is it of , the fame fort
I 2 or

1 1 <s . -_ A Revly to Mr. Clarkeli 'Defence
or kind with any Power in any part of the
Syftem, nor will there be any ground to fup
pofe an Univerfal to exift without Particulars, but
a particular Power exifting to which feveral
particular Powers contribute, as every Manis
. -a particular Man, though various Powers are
neceffary to conftitute him of the Species :
nor, laftly, to fuppofe an Effetl produced without
a Caufe ; for the different Powers in the fingle
and feparate Parts of a Syftem of Matter,' by
uniting in one Operation or Power to operate,
are the Caufe of the Exiftence of that Power
which did not exift in the Particles fingly con-
fidered. : And thus it may be conceived, that
there may be a Power in all thofe Particles
which compofe the Brain, to contribute to the
Act of Thinking, before they are united un
der that Form ; though while they are difunited,
they have no more of Confcioufnefs than any
Being which produces Sweetnefs in us ( that is
made up of Parts wherein different Powers in
here) when under a particular Form, has a
Power to produce Sweetnefs in us, when its
Parts are difunited and feparated.
2. Though I have fuppofed different Parts of
Matter, in the fame Syftem, to have actual
Powers effentially different ; yet I will allow
that Matter is every where under the fame Cir-
cumftances, endowed with the fame Powers ;
and that, taking the whole Material World
together, every Particle thereof is capable of
contributing to all the actual Powers of Matter
equally with any other Particle whatever. But
then if thefe actual Powers exift but only under
fuch and fuch Regulations, and that a Difpofi
tion of Parts by Motion be neceffary to the
Exertion of every Power, it will equally fol
low,

. of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 117
. lovi, that the Power of every Syftem will not
be the Sum of Powers of the fame kind, but
.be the Sum of Powers of different kinds; be
caufe by the differcnc Situation of Parts in a
Syftem, a different Power is exerted in every
Particle, though each of them would exert the
fame Power under the fame Circumftance or
Pofition. . And I much, rather take this to be
the Cafe, than to fuppofe really different Pow
ers founded on different Capacities in the diffe
rent Parts of Matter ; for by Experience we
fee that every thing by change of Form be
comes every thing. The fame Parts of Mat
ter become Parts of Dung , Earth, Grafs,
Corn, Sheep, Horfes, Men, &c. and act their
parts under thefe Mutations : and I would
add, as what feems equally matter" _of fact to
me ; That the Matter of which art Egg con
fifts., doth intirely conftitute the young one,
and that the Action of Senfation began under a
particular Difpofition of the Parts by Motion,
without the Addition of an ImmateriaFand Im
mortal Soul, as the Powers of Vegetation ,
Gravitation , of producing the "Senfation- -of
Heat, Cold, Red, Blue, Yellow, are perform
ed without the Addition of an Immaterial- and
Immortal Soul, had not the Syftem makers of
Europe thought fit to deny it, in order to etch
out their Hypothefes.
3. Mr. Clarke has not rightly enumerated the-
known Powers of Matter. In Order to make
that appear, let us confider what we meartlny
Power. By Power I underftand, iiithe Queftion
between us, An atlual Ability to make- or re
ceive any Change, to atl or be atled -on. The
Queftbn then will be, whether there J£ in any
Syftem of Matter a Power to make or -receive
I 3 - a -Change,

Ut A i%EfLY to Mr. ClarkeV defence
a Change, to adt 6r be acted oh, that is not
the Suin or Aggregate of Powers of. the fanje
kind ? Nc(w that th^re are Powers in Syftertis
pf Matter, that are not the Sum Or Aggregate
of Powers of the fame kind, is apparent from
this' Confideration, That not only mere Mag
nitude and Motion1 is neceffary td the making
or receiving fome fort of Change, but the par
ticular Texture of a Being. Now the Texture,
let it be of th,e Eye, Ear, or ahy other part of
Man, is effentially different from the Texture
of other Bejngs, arid the Texture of the Parts
of the Being it felf ; and it is from its Texture,
as well as from its Magnitude and MotJorj,
that the Matter of which the Eye confifts, has
a Power to make or receive a Change, to act or
ibe acted on : which Power depends fo intirely
on the particular Texture, that upon the leajt
Alteration of fome Parts of the Eye, it eeafes
to have a Power of being operated 017 by ex
ternal Objects, or of contributing to the Adt of
Vifion. And if the Powers of a Syftem of
Matter may iiitirely ceafe upon the leaft Alte
ration of a part <x that Syftem,, it is evident
that the Powers of the Syftem inhere not in its
Parts in the fame fenfe with Magnitude and
Motion : for divide and vary the Parts of Mat
ter as much as you will, there will be Mag->
nitude, and may be Motion ; but divide or
vary the leaft Part of the Eye, and the Power
of contributing towards the Act of Vifion is
intirely at an end.
4. I had faid, " That the Fallacy of Mr,
** Clark's Argument, by which as I took it he
" deceived himfelf, lies in this, That by an
" Individual Power he underftands a Power
'•' which can only proceed from or refide in an
individual

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 1 1 •
*' Individual Being, which is a plain begging
" of the Queftion, or fuppofing the thing in
«' difpute, that Thinking is fuch an Individual
'* Power. To prove which he has not, though
" all he fays depends on it, offered fo much
" as one word, and I conceive cannot till he is
*' perfectly acquainted with the Nature of
*' Thinking. I readily acknowledge that we
*' can diftinguifh the various Modes of Think -
*¦' ing from one another ; but whether Think-
" ing is fuch a kind of Operation as proceeds
" from an Individual Being, or whether it
" proceeds from a Being that confifts of Parts,
" I muft be content to be ignorant, till fome
" better proof is produced to place it in an
*' Individual Being, than by calling it an Indi-
*' vidual Power ".
To manifeft this, and fhow yet farther the
Weaknefs of Mr, Clarke's Argument, I ob
ferve that Mr. Clarke propofed to demonftrate
that a Power of Thinking or Confcioufnefs can
not inhere in a Syftem of Matter, from the fin~
gle Confederation of bare Senfe or Confcioufnefs it
felf. His Argument is in fhort as follows :
Matter is a Subftance confifting always ef aStuaUy
feparate and diftintl Parts; Confciottfttefs is an
Individual Power. An Individual Power cannot
bt added to a Subftance, confifting of atJually fe
parate and diftintl Parts, but by being added to
ell thofe Parts of which that Subftance doth con
fift ; whereby inftead of one Confcioufnefs, there
will be as many diftintl Confcioufneffes as there bt
diftintl Parts of that Subftance. l This, if I
miftake not, comprehends the entire Strength.
of his Argument, with relation to which I fhall
3ay down the following Particulars.
I 4 (i.) That

120 A R e p l y to Mr. ClarkeV 'Defence
(i.) That our Idea, fignified by the Term
Matter in this Difpute, is, of a folid Being,
¦which doth confift of actually feparate arid di
ftindt Parts.
(2.) Saying, Tbat Confeioufneft is an Individual
Power ( be they ever fo -many that fay fo ) is
but calling Confcioufnefs by another Name. It
is not giving an account of what Confcioufnefs
is, wherein it doth confift, which is requifite
to demonftrate from Confcioufnefs, that Con
fcioufnefs cannot be added to a Being that con
fifts of actually feparate and diftinct Parts. If
a Man fhould fay, that Confcioufnefs is a Qua
lity that makes the Being to which it is added
not to confift of diftindt Parts,; he would (al
lowing the Truth of his Affertion ) prove that
it cannot inhere in a Being that confifts of
Parts, becaufe of the obvious Repugnancy
there is between the Co-exjftence of thefe two
Properties, Affections, Qualities ( or call them
as you pleafe) in the fame Being. But it is
not enough to demonftrate that Confcioufnefs
cannot be fuperadded to a Being that confifts
of Parts, to call Confcioufnefs by another
name. If one fhould undertake to demon
ftrate to me, that Confcioufnefs can only inhere
in a Syftem of Matter, and for this purpofe
fhould tell me, that Confcioufnefs is an Orga
nical Operation, I fhould defire him to tell me,
wherein Thinking or Confcioufnefs doth con
fift ? For if he would do that, . X fhould be
able to know whether it is an Organical Ope
ration or not: whereas his telling me that itis
an Organical Operation, leaves me as ignorant
what Thinking is, in what it does confift,^as I
-was before thofe Sounds reached in my Ear ;
and does as much fuppofe the Thing in difr
putes

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 121
pute, That Matter can only think, as Mr. Clarke's
calling Confcioufnefs an Individual Power, in
hisfenfe of Individual Power, is fuppofing that
Matter cannot think.
(3.) Therefore before it can be demonftrated
from Confcioufnefs, that Confcioufnefs cannot
refide in a Being that confifts of actually fepa
rate and diftinct Parts , it muft be demon
ftrated , that Confcioufnefs is an Individual
Power in Mr. Clarke's Senfe of thofe words, of
that it is a Power which can only refide in an
Individual Being : But Mr. Clarke has not faid
any thing to this Queftion, but barely by
calling Confcioufnefs an Individual Power. His
Argument therefore , ftript of all doubtful
Expreffions, and refting on the Proofs by
which he fupports it, is this: Matter is' a Sub
ftance confifting always of atJually feparate and
diftintl Parts, Confcioufnefs cannot refide in a Be
ing 'which confifts of atJually feparate and diftintl
Parts ; therefore Matter cannot think, or be
confcious. To fupport which Connexion he has
no intermediate ideas, but by faying, Confci
oufnefs is an Individual Power, and an Individual
Power cannot refide in a Being that confifts :of
Parts ; therefore Confcioufnefs cannot refide in a
Being which confifts of Parts : which carries the
Mattter not one jot further than merely fup
pofing Confcioufnefs to be a Power, which can
only refide in an IndividualBeing.
(4.) Having made good my Charge againft
Mr. Clarke's Argument, as it ftands in his Let-'
ter to Mr. Dodweli, which only could lie before'
me when I made my Objections, and fronv
whence Mr. Clarke has urged nothing in his*
Defence, to fhow that he did not beg the
Queftion, I fhall corifider what I ; can find in
his Defence^ to fhow that Thinking is a Power which

i2i A Reply to Mr. Clarke".- 'Defence
which muft refide in an Individual Being. He
P. 91. fays, That every Power or Quality that is or can
be inherent . in any Syftem of Matter, is nothing
elfe but the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of tht
fame kind, inherent in all its Parts ; and if Co
gitation could be a Quality really inherent in Mat
ter, it muft be the Sum and Refult of the Confci
oufneffes of the feveral Parts, which is apparently
abfurd. Now though this does not fuppofe
Thinking to be a Power which can only refide
in an Individual Being, as Mr. Clarke's Argu
ment did, yet it fuppofes another Propofidon,
That athtbe Powers of any Syftem of Matter are
nothing elfe but the Sums or Aggregates of Powers
of the f amis' kind. From whence he infers, that
Confcioufnefs cannot refide in a Syftem of Mat
ter, or, which is all one, that it is an Indivi
dual Power in his fenfe ; and therefore it lies
upon him to prove that there can be no Power
in a Syftem of Matter, but what is the Sum
and Refult of Powers of the fame kind.
(5.) Having fully examined the main Ar
gument of the firft Article of Mr. Clarke's De
fence, I proceed to take notice of two or three
particular Incidents in it. As,
P. $>2, 1. Mr. Clarke charges me with faying,
Sweetnefs is in a Rofe ; whereas I fay quite the
contrary in thefe words, " That a Rofe con-
" lifts of Particles, which fingly and fepa-
'* rately want a Power to produce that agreea-
«' ble Senfation we experience in them when
*' united ". And therefore Mr. Clarke had ho
p. 93. reafon to fhow the Vulgarnefs and Groffnefs of
believing that Sweetnefs exifts in Bodies, to me
who agreed with him, as appears by my own
words. I know no one more capable of inftruc-
ting others than Mr. Clarke, and therefore I
wiih

of bis Letter to Mr. Dodweli. iaj
tvifli he had chofen feme Topick wherein we
differed; and then how well and clofely fcever
he had argued, Lfhould hav^ had the Satlf-
fadtion either of feeing my felf ingenioufly op-
pofed, or elfe h4ve been convinced by him :
Whereas now I appear ignorarit where I am
not fo, and Mr. Clarke byi no means advahta-
gioufly, when he giv-es himfelf the Trouble to
difpute with a Mart in Prinr- that he makes ig
norant of the firft Rudiments of Natural Phi
lofophy. i
2. Mr, Clarke fays, That the Powers in a
"Rofe are nothing elfe but a number of fimilar Mo
tions or Figures ; wherein there are two things
to be proved: (i.) That the mere Figure and
Motion of the Parts of a Rofe do produce, or
are the fole external Caufe of the Senfation
caufed by them (2.) That thofe Motions and
Figures are perfectly ftmilar.
3. Mr. Clarke fays, Tbat Gravitation is the p. 94,
Effete of the continued and regular Operation of
feme other Being on Matter: Whereas it does
not appear but that Matter gravitates by vir
tue or Powers originally placed in it by God,
and is now left to it felf to act by thofe Origi
nal Powers. And it is as conceivable that
Matter fhould act by virtue of thofe Powers,
as that an Immaterial Being fhould originally
put it into Motion, or continue it in Motion.
Sect. z. It was objected, " Since it is only
" required that a thing be an Individual Be-
*' ing, in order to its being a proper Subject
" of a Power of Thinking, or at leaft that it
" may be poflible for God to fuperadd to it
" a Power of Thinking ; it is evident by Mr.
" Clarke's own account of Matter, which he
*' makes to confift of atlually feparate and di-
«' ftintl

1 24 A R e p l y to Mr. ClarkeV 'Defence
«* ftintl Parts ("though I wonder at the fame
.-«*. time he fhould make it divifible, when, by
' • «' its confifting of feparate and diftinct Parts
*'.it is actually divided) that thofe feparate
-*.' and diftintl Parts are capable of having, a
f*. Power of Thinking, or an Individual Con-
" fcioufnefs fuperadded to each of them j be-
*.*¦ caufe the Want of Individuality .-or Diftinct-
".nefs is the fole Reafon urged why a Syftem
" of Matter cannot have a Power Of Think-
'*' ing, or an Individual Confcioufnefs : and
*' confequently , according to Mr. Clarke's
-". own Reafoning,, Matter may have a Power
** of Thinking, !or an Individual Confcipuf-
" nefs ". '. To this Mr. Clarke anfwers, That
fuppofing any Particle of Matter could be truly an
Individual, that 'is, an fndiviftble or indifcerpible
Being; yet. it .would not therefore follow, that it
could be ca oable of .Thinking •* for- though Divifihi-
lity or Difcerpib'ility in any Subjeti is afiujficient
proof tbat. tbat Subjeti is not capable of fuch, an
Individual Power as Thinking; yet it does not
from thence, follow on the contrary, that whatever
is indifcerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking. .
. ift, But if Indifcerpibility be ;what is only
required in Mr. Clarke's Argument for a Sub
ject of a Power of Thinking, then it muft
follow, not only that what is difcerpible can
not think, but that whatever is indifcerpible is
capable of Thinking, till Mr. Clarke thinks
fit to add fuch Confideratipns to his Argument,
whereby an individual material Being is ex
cluded from a Capacity of Thinking, and an
individual immaterial Being is not: For if In
difcerpibility is all that is mentioned as requifite
in a Subject for a Power of Thinking, then
wherever there is Indifcerpibifity, there is al
tha t
3

of his Letters Mr. Dodweli. 125
J 1
that is required by that Argument. And fo
though it does riot, from Difcerpibility in any
Subjeti' s' being a fuffieient Proof that tbat Subjeti
is not capable of Thinking, univerfally follow,
that whatever is indifcerpible, is tberefore^mpable
of Thinking ;yet it may and doesfoHow from
Mr. Clarke's Argument, as it ftands atprefent,
arid rdefire him to fhfew me any one Principle,
in the prefent Argument, from whence it can
not be as well inferred, that an individual Ma
terial Being is a proper Subject of a Power of
Thinking, as an Immaterial Being.* '
But Mr. Clarke fays, Though tbe want of In
dividuality or Diftintlnefs is the file Reafon urged
in the 'prefent Argument, why a Syftem of Matter
cannot think; yet it ought not therefore to be faid,
that it is only required that a thing be an Indivi
dual Being, in order to its being a proper Subjeti
of a Power of Thinking. Upon which I ob
ferve, that Mr. Clarke Owns the Truth of my
Reafoning upon the Suppofition, that Indivi
duality is only required by him in a Subjedt of
a Power of Thinking ; but denies that -I have
any reafon to infer that individuality is only
required/mfc the want of Individuality's being
tbe file Reafon urged why a Syftem of Matter
cannot have a Power of Thinking: which I can
not help thinking to be all one, till there is a
Difference affigned between only required' In the
prefent Argument, and the file Reafon urged in
the prefent Argument.
(2.; Had I affirmed, from the Confideration
of Mr. Clarke's Argument^ That whatever is in
difcerpible, is' therefore capable of Thinking; I
cannot fee how Mr. Clarke, confidently with
the Principles on which his Argument proceeds,
can urge any Confiderations, whereby an In
dividual

126 A Reply to Mr. Clark eV 'Defence
dividual Material Being is excluded from a Ca+
parity of Thinking: and if he cannot, then it
follows univerfally from his Argument, that
whatever is indifcerpible, is therefore capable
of Thinking. This I would fhow, but that
P'97* Mr. Clarke does deny the Suppofition on which
this Objetlion is grounded, viz. that any Particle
of Matter can be truly an Indifcerpible Being :
and therefore I fhall fpare the Reader, by not
arguihg longer on a Suppofition denied on
fcoth fides ; though when I urged it, I took
it to be Mr. Clarke's Opinion, becaufe he faidi
Matter confifted of atlually feparate and diftintl
Parts : by which words fince he underftands
improper Parts, or Parts that feem fo to us
( for according to him Matter has no Parts ) X
Own the Ground of my Objection, as founded
on his Words, is intirely taken away.
Seel. 3. It was objected, " Suppofing Mr.
*' Clarke had proved, that Confcioufnefs could
¦** only refide in an Individual Being, and
" that an Individual Being muft be an Imma-
" terial Bring, the Soul would not then be
" proved naturally Immortal, and confequent-
*' ly all the Pains taken to prove the Soul Im»
" material fignify nothing. Nothing is proved
" naturally Immortal by the Suppofition of
" the Soul's Immateriality, but the Subftance
" of the Soul Now the Soul is fuppofed to
" be a Thinking Immaterial Being; and un-
" lefs a Thinking Immaterial Being can be
*' proved naturally Immortal, the Soul cannot
" be proved naturally Immortal. But how
" this can be done, I know not, but by fhow*
" ing the infeparable Connexion between Im-
" material Being and Thinking ; and till then
'* we have as much reafon to believe that
*' I,
4

of his Letter to $fr. Dodweli. 127
«* Thinking is an Action which may com-
*' mence after the Exiftence of its Subject, and
«' may perifh or ceafe to exift, its Subjedt ftill
«' remaining. And thus there is no more pro-
" grefs made in the Proof of the natural InV
*' mortality of the Soul, by proving its Im*
*' materiality, than there would be in proving
" the natural Immortality of Men's Bodies
*' which are laid in the Graves, by fhowing
** that Matter can only perifh by Annihilati-
*' on : for, as in the laft Cafe, no proof is
" made of the neceffary Continuance together
*' of the feveral Particles that compofe our
*' Bodies ; fo, in the other Cafe, we have no
*'. proof that Thinking is an infeparable Pro-
" perty of Immaterial Being. Of what ufe
** then is this Argument to the Ends and
" Purpofes of Religion ? For if we have no
'* fecurity that we muft exift hereafter in a
" ftate of Perception, as by only proving the
*' -natural Immortality of the Soul we have
"* not, it can be of no ufe to influence our
** Lives and Actions".
To this Mr. Clarke anfwer j, That all tbe p. op>iC0.
Qualities and Modes of an Indifcerpible Being are
utterly incapable of being affetled in any degree by
any Power in Nature ; for all real and inherent
Qualities, of any Subftance, are either Modifica
tions of the Subftance it felf, or elfe Powers fu
peradded and connetJed to the Subftance by the im
mediate Power of God: And, in either of thefe
Cafes, it is manifeft no Quality can be altered by
any natural Power, which is not able to affetl
and make fome Alteration in the Subftance {in the
Difpofition of the Parts at leaft) it felf, which
in an IndifterpMe Subftance cannot be done.
i. Upon

12s ^Reply?* Mr. Clarke'^ Defence
i . Upon this Anfwer I obferve, That it i*
inconfiftent with Matter of Fact, or elfe fup
pofes the Soul a Material Being : For we know
by experience, that the Soul or Thinking Be
ing undergoes feveral Changes or Alterations.
It has not only different Paffions, as Anger,
Love, fcfc. at different times, which are Modi
fications of the Soul, that begin and have their
Period, but has Qualities Or Powers, fuch as
Seeing and Hearing, which by the Defect of
our Organs plainly ceafe for a time. Now
when Mr. Clarke reconciles our having diffe
rent Paffions at different times, and our en
joying of Powers, and then lofing of them,
with his Notion , That all tbe Qualities arid
Modes of an Indifcerpible Being are utterly inca
pable of being affetied in any meafure, or changed
in any degree by any Power of Nature •> I pro-
mife him tO account for the Poffibility of
Thinking's ceafing in an Immaterial Being by
the Powers of Nature. But if he cannot ,
what remains, but from the Actions of our
Souls which muft then, according to him, be
inconfiftent with their Exiftence in an Indif
cerpible Being, to conclude the Soul uo be ma
terial ?
2. The Powers of Nature fignify material and
finite immaterial Beings , and their feveral
Powers and Operations one on another. Now
till Mr. Clarke has a compleat Idea of both
forts of Beings, their Powers and Operations
one on another, it is impoffible for him in
many refpects to tell how far they can affect
one another's Operations : For inftance, there
aire Beings in the World that think, of whofe
Subftance I have no other Idea but that it is
indifcerpible by the Powers of Nature ; but yet
I un-

of hts Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 1 29
I underftand not the manner how thefe indif
cerpible Beings think, nor how they are ca
pable of other Qualities, nor what other Qua
lities and Powers they have. Nor do I under
ftand all the Powers .of material or other imma
terial Beings, and the manner of their Opera
tions ; how then can I poffibly tell how that,
of which! have no Idea, may affect an Action
or Power of another Being, of which I have no
Idea,, how it is performed, bow it inheres in its
Subject, .or wherein the Nature of that Power
confifts ?
3. But Mr. Clarke fays, No Quality or Mode
can be altered by any natural Power, which is not
able to affetl and make fome alteration of the Sub
ftance it felf ; which in' an Indifcerpible Subftance
cannot be done. In anfwer to which I ask Mr.
Clarke; whether God can deftroy a Mode or
Quality in an Immaterial Being, without ma
king fome alteration in the Subftance it felf?
If Mr. Clarke replies, That God can deftroy a
Mode or Quality, without making fome altera
tion in the Subftance it felf ; then there is no
repugnancy in the Nature of the thing, that a
Mode or Quality may be deftroyed, without
any alteration of the Parts of that Subftance
which was the Subject of that Mode or Quality.
If he' fays, That God can deftroy a Mode or
Quality in an immaterial Subftance, without
making any alteration in the Subftance, but
that a created Being by any Powers that it is
capable of receiving from the Hand of God
cannot ; I defire him to give me any Argument
Upon his Principles to prove created Beings
Cannot, that will not equally conclude againft
God's deftroying fuch a Power, unjefs at the
fame time he-' annihilates the Subject of that
K Power.

130 A Reply to Mr. Clarke'* 'Defence
Power. He cannot make it impoffible for the
Powers of an Immaterial Being to ceafe, by the
Operations of created Beings on it, from its
Indifcerpibility, without excluding God from
putting an end merely to thofe Powers ; for, ac
cording to Mr. Clarke, God himfelf can no more
make any alteration in the Parts of an immate
rial Subftance, than a created Being can. If
Mr. Clarke replies, That God cannot deftroy a
Mode or Quality of an immaterial Being,
without making an alteration in the Parts of
the Subftance : I anfwer, "That if God does
make any alteration in the Parts of the Sub
ftance, upon deftroying the Power or Quality
that he has fuperadded ; then an immaterial
Subftance is plainly as difcerpible by the Power
of God as a material Subftance : and all Mr.
Clarke's Arguments againft the Poffibility of
Matter's Thinking, turn upon him ; for alte
ration of Parts in a finite Being is as much an
Evidence of Difcerpibility, as Solidity is. But,
laftly, if Mr. Clarke replies, That no Power
ror Quality can be deftroyed, without the An
nihilation of the Subject of that Power,, I de-
fire a Reafon may be given why God can fuper*
p. 100. add a Power to an immaterial Being, as Mr.
" Clarke acknowledges he can, and not caufe it to
ceafe, its Subject remaining as it was before the
Power was fuperadded.
4. But to give him all the Satisfaction I can,
I fhall inftance in a Quality of immaterial Be
ing, that may owe its continuance to the Ac
tions of created Beings, and may ceafe without
making any alteration in the Subftance it felf.
Extension not being excluded out of Mr.
Clarke's Idea of Immaterial Being, it is plain,
whenever our Bodies are carried from one place to

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 1 3 1
to another, our Souls muft likewife move along
with them ; though Motion is no doubt in
compatible with Immaterial Being, in cafe Im
material Being has no Extenfion. Now this
fuppofed Motion of our Souls Is intirely owing
to external and material Caufes, not only as
to the Degree of Motion, but as to the Deter
mination of the Motion ; for both the Degree
of Motion, and the particular Determination
thereof will ceafe upon withdrawing the exter
nal material Caufes : and if any particular Mo
tion of an Immaterial Being be owing to ex
ternal material Caufes, then all its Motions,
for all we know to the contrary, may be fo
too ; and if fo, there can be no repugnancy,
in fuppofing it poffible for an Immaterial Be
ing to be deftitute of the Quality of actual
Motion. And if there is no repugnancy in fup
pofing, that Motion may be continued in an
Immaterial Being by the Powers of Nature,
and may ceafe by withdrawing of thofe Pow
ers ; then Mr. Clarke's Affirmation, That no
Quality of an Immaterial Being can be altered
by any. natural Power, which is not able to make
an Alteration ( in the Difpofition of the Parts at
leaft ) of the Subftance it felf, is very precarious.
5. Laftly, Suppofing Mr. Clarke had proved
in this Article, what I conceive he has not,
That the whole Soul, the Thinking Immateri
al Being, is indivifible by the Powers of Na
ture, or naturally Immortal in that fenfe, yet
this Indivifibility, this Natural Immortality,
is no more than he allows to fome Particles
of Matter ; for he fays, That there are original, P. ioo.
and perfectly folid Particles, which are to any
Power of Nature indifcerpible: and he corrects
me for calling any Particle of Matter an Indu-
K 2 vidual

132 A R e p l y t o Mr. Clarke'.? Deface
P- 98. vidual Being, becaufe it cannot be divided by
natura] Caufes, or the Powers of Nature : and
therefore if a Particle of Matter, notwith
standing its Indifcerpibility by natural Caufes, is
not naturally immortal, or indivifible in that
Senfe, in which Mr. Clarke requires the Sub
ftance of the Soul to be, viz. to be indifcerpi
ble by the Power of God, neither can the whole
thinking Being be proved naturally Immortal
in that fenfe, unlefs it can be fhowed, that the
whole thinking Being is indifcerpible by the
Power of God. But to that Queftion he has
not faid any thing, and therefore I may con
clude, that fuppofing Thinking rriuft refide in an
individual Being, or a Being that is indifcerpi
ble by the Power of God, yet it does not fol
low, that the thinking immaterial Being is in
difcerpible by the Power of God, or naturally
Immortal. It was objected, 4. " Since an individual
"' Being can only be the Subject of a Power
" of Thinking, Why may not feveral Particles
" of Matter, when united in one Syftem, be-
" come an individual Being, and be by the
" Power of God rendered incapable of any
" Divifion or Separation by natural Caufes,
" and confequently be a Subjedt capable of
" Thinking? If feveral Particles of Matter
" can be fo united as to touch one another,
" or clofely adhere ; wherein does the Diftinct-
" nefs or Individuality of the feveral Parti-
" cles confift ? The Diftindtnefs or Individua-
*' lity is as much loft to me by this fuppofed
" Union, as the Diftindtnefs of the Parts of
" an immaterial Being, upon Suppofition that
" Extenfion is not excluded out of the Idea
" of Immateriality, as it is not by Mr. Clarke, *« if

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 1 3 3
*' if I rightly apprehend him : For if the
" Union of material Particles be compleat and
*' intire, I can as well conceive an immaterial
" Being capable of Divifion, as conceive thofe
*' Particles fo united, capable of Divifion from
'' one another. All the Difference perceiva-
'' ble by us, between fuch a material Sub-
" ftance, befides Solidity in one and want of
*' Solidity in the other, lies in this, That one
*' perhaps continues as k was created, and the
" other becomes by the Power ofGod what the
,e Other was by Creation. And what difference
** that will make as to one's being capable of
*' the Power of Thinking, and the other's not
*¦* being capable of that Power, does not ap-
'-' pear to me, and never will till Thinking
*' and Solidity are proved to be incompatible
"' in the fame Subject".
To this Mr. Clarke anfwers, That the Cafe is p, ,0I,
very different, between fuch a Material Being
and an Immaterial Being, though it be fup
pofed to be extended, becaufe feme of the firft
and moft obvious Properties, which we certainly
know of Matter, as its, having partes extra
partes, ftritJly and properly fpeaking, and its con
fifting of fuch Parts as can exift feparately, and
have no Dependance on one another, do neceffarily
and confeffedly imply D'ifcerpibility : But in Im
material Beings we do not know of any fuch Pro
perties as any wife imply Difeerpibility.
The Cafe is not different between fuch a Ma
terial Being as I have defcribed, and a finite
extended Immaterial Being : for though ail
Matter does confift of Parts, that have no de
pendance on one another for their Exiftence ;
yet by the Suppofition in the Objection, it is
as indifcerpible by natural Caufes as an Im-
K 3 material:

134- A R e p l y to Mr. Clarke's*' Defence
material Being. Now this Suppofition Mr.
Clarke is fo far from denying to be poffible,
P. ieo. that he grants it to be true in fact, That there
are Particles of Matter which are to any Powers
in Nature indifcerpible. And if there are or
may be Syftems of Matter, which imply In
difcerpibility by natural Caufes, though they
are allowed difcerpible by the Power of God,
there can be no difference between thofe
Syftems of Matter, and any other finite ex
tended Beings, as to their Divifibility by the
Powers of Nature. Nor can there be any
difference as to their Divifibility by the Power
of God, for all finite extended Beings muft fo
far confift of Parts, that the Part of one fide
is not the Part of the other fide. They can
only confift in a Continuity of the fame Sub
ftance: and why fuch a Subftance fhould not be
as divifible as a perfectly continued folid Sub
ftance, I can fee no reafon. Let Mr. Clarke
Ihow that a continued folid Subftance is difcer
pible by the Power of God, and the fame Ar
gument will equally fhow the Difcerpibility of
any other finite continued Subftance. Suppofe
the Subftance of the Soul to be four Inches
fquare ( for when once Extenfion is allowed to
the Soul, fuch a Suppofition becomes reafo-
nable ) i ask Mr. Clarke, If that Subftance at
its Creation did not depend entirely on the
Will of God as to the Degree of its Exten
fion, as much as any of thofe perfectly folid
Particles of Matter did, which are allowed to
be indifcerpible by the Powers of Nature ?
And whether God could not have made it two
Inches fquare, had he pleafed, as well as any
of thofe Particles fmaller ? Both which, I fup
pofe, Mr. Clarke will allow. Then I ask him,
2 If

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 1 3 5
If God can make Immaterial Beings of diffe
rent Dimenfions, what can hinder him from
making an Immaterial Being lefs than when he
firft created it, that will not hinder him from
making a continued folid Being lefs than when
he firft created that? It does not appear ro
me, that an Inch on one fide of an Immaterial
Being is more dependent on an Inch on the
other fide, as to each other's Exittence, than
two fides of a perfectly folid Particle of Mat
ter are. So that I think we have as clear Evi
dence, we do as much know of a Property in
Immaterial Subftance, which implies Difcerpi
bility, as we do in fome Particles of Matter;
continued Extenfion in a Being as much im
plying Difcerpibility , as continued Solidity.
But Mr. Clarke fays, As the known Parts of
Space can demonftrably be proved to be abfolutely
indifcerpible ; fo it ought not to be reckoned an in-
fuperable Difficulty, to imagine extended Immate
rial Subftance may be fo likewife. Though the
known Parts of Space can be demonftrated to
be abfolutely indifcerpible ; yet it may be, and
is an infuperable pifficulty to imagine ^n Im
material Subftance may be fo likewife, becaufe
Space is infinitely extended, and becaufe it is
nothing but the mere Abfence or Place of Bo
dies ; whereas Immaterial Being is fomething
extended and finite. Now if all finite extend
ed Beings are divifible by the Power of God,
then all Mr. Clarke fays againft Matter's Think
ing has equal Force ( if it has any at all ) a-
gainft an Immaterial Being's Thinking, as will
appear by his own Words, if we put immate
rial or extended Being in the Place of the Term
Matter or material Being. Suppofe, fays he, an p. 5s
Extended Being asfmall as youpleafe, indued with
K 4 Confei-

136 iREPLY?(? Mr. Clarke'.* Defence
Confcioufnefs or Thought -, yet if by tbe Power of
God this Extended Being may be divided into two
parts, what will naturally and confequently be
come of its Power of Thinking ? If thai Power
continue in it unchanged ; then there muft be two
diftintl: Confcioufneffes in the two feparate Parts ;
or elfe the Power continuing in the intermediate
Diftance or Space, as well as in the Parts them
felves, muft there fubfift without a Subjeti ; or
elfe not the material Subftance , but fome other
thing is the Subjeti of tbe Confcioufnefs. If the
Power of Thinking will remain only in one of the.
feparated Parts -, then either that one Part only
'had at firft the Power refiding in it, and then the
fame Quefiion will return upon the Suppofition of
its being likewife divided ; or elfe it will follow
that one and tbe fame Individual Quality may be
transferred from one Subjeti to another, which all
philofophers of all Setls in the World have always
confift to be impofiible. If in the laft Place it be
fa-id, that upon the Divifion of an Extended Be
ing, the Power of Thinking which was in it will
wholly ceafe ; then it will follow, that that was.
never or at alia real Quality inhering and refiding
in the Subftance ( in which mere Separation of
farts makes no Alteration ) but that it was a mere,
external Denomination, as the Roundnefs of a Be
ing which perifibes at its being divided : And tbis
he fuppofes will be granted to be fufficiently ab-
furd. It was objected, in the fifth and laft Place.
*' But let us fuppofe, that from the Power of
*' Thinking or Individual Confcioufnefs, we
" can prove the Immateriality of the Soul,
" and from its Immateriality prove its natural
*' Immortality, and then fee what will be the
«' Confequence. All the numerous fenfible
'*. Creatures

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 1 3 7
"¦' Creatures in the Univerfe are put in the fame
*' Condition with Man, and made capable of
*' Eternal Happinefs as well as he. Now to
** avoid this Confequence there are two things
«' principally urged.
" 1. That all thofe Creatures (which I call
'* fenfible ) are only mere Machines : Or,
" 2. That their Souls fhall be annihilated
" with their Bodies.
" To the firft I anfwer, That Experience as
" much convinces us , that they perceive,
" think, &c. as that Men do : They avoid
" Pain and feek Pleafure, and give as good
** Marks of Uneafinefs under the one, and Sa-
*' tisfadtion under the other, as Men do ; they
* ' avoid Pain, and feek Pleafure by the fame
" Motives that Men do, viz. by reflecting on
*' their paft Actions, and the Actions of their
" Fellows, with the Confequences of them ;
" which is evident from their acting more to
"' their own Advantage, the more Experience
" they have had. But if after all Brutes are
" only mere Machines, the Difficulty of prov-
*¦' ing the Soul Immaterial will be increafed :
" for if the Operations of Brutes are not fuf-
*' ficient to diftinguifh them from Clocks and
" Watches, the Operations of Men will not
*' prove them to befuperiour to Machines.
" To the fecond Objection I anfwer, That
'' if the Souls of Brutes are annihilated on the
" Diffolution of their Bodies, then the proof
'* of the natural Immortality of Mens Souls
" from their Immateriality, tends not to prove
''* that their Souls really be Immortal, be-
'< caufe raere natural Immortality is not a Se-
" curity

1 3 8 A Reply to Mr. Clarke'j Defence
" curity from Annihilation, as is fuppofed in
" the Objection ".
P. 102. To which Mr. Clarke anfwers, That though
fenfible Creatures have certainly fiomething in them
that is Immaterial, yet it does not at all follow,.
either that they muft needs be annihilated upon the
Diffolution of their Bodies, or elfe be capable of
Eternal Happinefs as well as Man. This is juft
finch an Argument as if a Man fliould conclude,
that whatfoever is not exatlly like himfelf, can
therefore have no Being at all. The Strength of
this Anfwer lies in my fuppofing either a Ne
ceffity of Annihilation ofthe Souls of Brutes on
the Diffolution of their Bodies, or elfe that
they become capable of Eternal Happinefs as
well as Man ; which fhould I allow to be what
I intended, yet it would not be juft fuch an Ar
gument as if a Man fhould conclude, that what
foever is not exactly like himjelf can therefore have
no Being at all; becaufe it does not place an
Oppofition between a Capacity of the Soul's
Eternal Happinefs, and not exifting at all, but
between a Capacity of Eternal Happinefs, and
not exifting after the Diffolution of their Bo
dies. And therefore though it may follow from
the Argument, that whatever Immaterial Being
has not a Capacity of Eternal Happinefs can
not exift after the Diffolution of the Body to
which it was joined ; yet it by no means follows,
That no Immaterial Being or Soul can exift at
all, unlefs it has a Capacity of Eternal Hap*-
pinefs as well as Man ; or, in Mr. Clarke's
words, is not exatlly like himfelf as to that Ca -
parity. But it was very far from my Intention
to argue, that there was either a Neceffity of
the Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes on the
Diffolution of their Bodies, or elfe that they
would

of his L e t t e r to Mr. Dodweli. r 3-9
would be capable of Eternal Happinefs as well
as Man ; but only to argue either the Neceffity
of Annihilation fome time or other, or elfe that
Brutes would be capable of Eternal Happinefs
as well as Man. For when I objected to my
felf, That the Souls of Brutes fhall be annihilated
with the Diffolution of their Bodies, I confidered,
that thofe who would fuppofe an Annihilation
of the Souls of Brutes, would be moft likely
to pitch on the Diffolution of the Body as the
prope? Term or Period for the Exiftence of
their Souls, as I could fhow from the feveral
Anfwerers of Mr. Dodweli ; who only from his
fuppofing the Soul to be naturally mortal,
though capable of Immortality, conclude the
time of the Diffolution of the Body the proper
time for the actual Mortality of the Soul. And
therefore I crave leave to underftand Mr. Clarke's
Argument after this manner, That though all
fenfible Creatures have certainly in them fomething
that is Immaterial; yet it does not at all follow
either that they muft needs be annihilated, or elfe
that they muft be capable of Eternal Happinefs as
well as Man. To which I reply, That fince Mr.
Clarke does allow, that all the fenfible Creatures
in the Univerfe are not mere Machines, by ac
knowledging that they have all fomething in them
that is Immaterial, I defire him to tell me, con-
fiftently with the Principles of his foregoing
Argument for the natural Immortality ofthe
thinking Immaterial Being in us, what elfe re
mains reafonable, but that they be fuppofed
fometime or other to be annihilated, or elfe be
fuppofed capable of Eternal Happinefs as well
as Man : for they having fomething Immaterial
in them, muft, according to Mr. Clarke, for
ever, without Annihilation, enjoy the Power of

Ho A Reply to Mr. Clarke's Defence
of Perception ; and if they muft have for ever
a Power of Perception, they muft have either
agreeable or difagreeable Perceptions ; and if
they muft have either agreeable or difagreeable
Perceptions, they muft be fuppofed capable of
eternal agreeable Perceptions, unlefs Mr. Clarke.
will fay, that they are only capable of an eter-;
nal Mixture of agreeable and difagreeable Per
ceptions, or only capable of eternal difagreea
ble Perceptions : which, fince they are unrea
sonable Suppofitions , and would deftroy all
proof of Man's Capacity for a happy Immorta
lity from the Argument now in queftion, I dare
fay he will not affirm.
My laft Objection therefore cleared from all
doubtfulnefs arifing from Expreflion, and to
which I fhould be glad to receive a good An
fwer, ftands thus, That if from the Power of
Thinking we can prove the immateriality of
the Soul of Man, and from its Immateriality
prove its natural Immortality, and confequently
its Capacity of Eternal Happinefs ; the Power
of Thinking muft prove the Immateriality of
the Souls of Brutes, the Immateriality of their
Souls muft prove their natural Immortality,
and confequently their Capacity of Eternal
Happinefs. If it be fuppofed that the Souls of
Brutes may be fometime or other annihilated,
then this Argument is not ufeful to the End
for which it is intended ; becaufe natural Im
mortality will then be no proof of the real
Immortality of the Soul of Man.

POST*

of his Lett e r to Mr. Dodweli. 14I

POSTSCRIPT.
SINCE the finifhing this Reply to Mr.
Clarke, I have met with Mr. Milles's Anfwer
to Mr. Dodwell's Epiftolary Difiourfe ; in the
Preface whereof he has endeavoured to defend
Mr. Clarke's Argument for the Immateriality and
Natural Immortality of the Soul againft my Ob
jections, but upon Principles which intirely
overthrow it, and by putting fuch a Senfe on
Mr. Clarke's Words as is inconfiftent with what
Mr. Clarke underftands by them in his Defence.
As for inftance, Mr. Milles fays, If that which Preface,
thinks within us be extended, it muft confift ofiP-6-
Parts ; and that by Individual Being, in Mr. P. 7.
Clarke'.- Reafoning, we are to underftand an un-
txtended Being : And again, That I did not rightly p. 10.
apprehend Mr. Clarke, when I faid Extenfton
was not excluded by him out of his Idea of Imma
teriality. Whereas Mr. Clarke is fo far from
objecting any fuch miftake to me, and from
fuppofing, That if that which thinks in us be ex
tended, it muft confift of Parts, that in the fourth
Article of his Defence he argues with me as
not miftaking his Meaning, by allowing Ex
tenfton not to be excluded out of his Idea of Imma
teriality, and gives up his Argument, in cafe I
prove that whatever is finitely extended muft
confift of Parts ; that is, prove what Mr. Milles
grants to be true, and infifts on in Defence of
Mr. Clarke. Therefore inftead of returning any
particular Anfwer to Mr, Milles's Obfervations,
1 refer him for Satisfaction to Mr. Clarke's De
fence, where he may not only fee that he has
miftaken Mr. Clarke's Meaning, but that Mr.
2 Clarke's

142 A R e p L y to Mr. Clarke's Defence
Clarke's Argument cannot be defended by him
till he retracts his Preface: For if an Immate
rial Being or Soul be, according to Mr. Clarke,
an extended Being, and yet indifcerpible both
by the Powers of Nature and the Power of
God, then Mr. Milles's Affertions, That if that
which thinks in us be extended, it muft confift of
Parts, and that it is impojfible tbat what has
Parts fhould be the Subjeti of Thought, do over
throw Mr. Clarke's Demonftration of the Im
materiality of the Soul ; for if whatever is ex
tended muft confift of Parts, and if that which
confifts of Parts cannot think, thenMrC/tfr>Vs
Immaterial Being cannot think, and confe
quently the Immateriality of the Soul, in Mr.
Clarke's Senfe, is deftroyed by Mr. Milles's De
fence : and therefore if Mr. Milles undertakes
again Mr. Clarke's Defence, he muft firft re
tract this Principle in his Preface, That if that
which thinks in us be extended, it muft confift of
Parts, before he can demonftrate the Indifcer
pibility of an extended Being ; that is, before
he can prove the Immateriality and Natural
Immortality of the Soul , in Mr. Clarke's
Senfe. Though Mr. Milles has thus "egregioufly mif-
taken Mr. Clarke, yet it is but juft to let the
Reader fee the Reafon he afligns why Mr. Clarke
muft underftand by Immaterial Being, Unex-
".10. tended Being. The Remarker, fays he, has done
Mr. Clarke a great deal of wrong in faying he
does not exclude Extenfton out of the Idea of Im
materiality ; fince it is plain our Argument would
have no force, but upon fuppofition that the imma~
terial thinking Subftance within us is proved not
to be extended. For which Argument I fhall
not return him the Civility he beftows on me, in

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli: 145;
in fuppofing that I defpife Logick, but take the P. 16.
Liberty to attribute it to a more indifputable
Caufe, notwithftanding he has the Modefty to
fay, He has taken the Liberty to imitate the great P. aa,*
Mr. Chillingworth throughout his Treatife.
As.Mr. Milles does not fufficiently agree with
Mr. Clarke in Principles, in order to defend
him ; fo Mr. Milles and I are not fufficiently
agreed in common Principles to difpute with
one another. In a Matter of Speculation it is
not the Authority of Tully himfelf, could his
Opinions be known (I fay could they be known,
becaufe he does not always tell us on what fide
he is in his Philofophical Dialogues ) nor all the
Philofophers that ever lived, much lefs the
Fathers of the Church, that has any weight
with me. It is Reafon alone, from what hand
foever it comes, to which I am ready to pay
my Submiffion, and it is by that alone that
Mr. Clarke and I propofe to be determined :
and therefore when Mr. Milles urges no other
Argument to prove the Power of Thinking in-
feparable from Immaterial Being, but by fay
ing, The Power of Thinking has been always p. 16, 17.
looked upon, and is now by every one acknowledged
to be a neceffary Property of Immateriality ; \
think it fruitless to contend with a Man who
knows not that the Queftion between Mr. Clarke
and me is not a Queftion that depends on the
Opinion Of any Man, nor that Mr. Clarke pro-
pofed only by the Argument I have examined to
demonftrate the Immateriality and Natural Im
mortality of the Soul by Reafon. In fhort, his
arguing from Fact is as foreign to the Matter,
as if I fhould ufe fome topical Arguments to
prove the Fathers profound Philofophers, when that

144- A Reply, &c.
that Queftion can only be determined by an
Induction of particular Paffages out of their
Works, to which end Mr. Milles's- and Mr.
Dodwell's Writings may perhaps be allowed
very ufeful.

A Se-

A Second
DEFENCE O F A N
ARGUMENT Made ufe of in a
LETTER

T O

Mr. DO DWELL,
To prove the Immateriality and Na
tural Immortality of the SOUL.

In a Letter to the Author of A Reply to
Mr. Clarke'* Defence, &c

By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D.late
Rector of St. James's Wejlminfier.
LONDON:
Printed iji the Year MDCCXXXI.
h

1 147]

A Second

DEFENCE

O F A N

Argument, &c.

SIR, N abftract and Metaphyseal Specu
lations, it is hardly poflible that
any thing fhould ever be fo clearly
expreffed, or fo ftrongly proved ;
but Thofe who are not very much
verfed in fuqh Enquiries, will per
petually be apt to mif-apprehend what is faid ;
and Men of Wit and Parts will always be able
to raife new Difficulties, and perplex their Read
ers with intricate and endlefs Difputations.
Since you have not thought fit in your Reply,
to offer any new Arguments, but only to urge
again the fame Objections which you had before
advanced, againft what I perfuade my felf 1
have already explained with as much Clearnefs
L 2 ®®

148 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
as can reafonably be expected in Queftions of
this Nature ; I think I might very well, with
out entering into any further Debate, have now
left it wholly to the judicious and impartial
Reader, to confider and determine with himfelf
on which fide the greateft Strength of Reafon
and Argument lies. Neverthelefs, the Can
dour and Ingenuity with which you have writ*
ten, have once more engaged me to endeavour
to give you Satisfaction in this matter ; by
pointing out to you fome of the principal In-
ftances/ wherein you feem either to have mif-
taken the Queftion it felf, or tohavemifunder-
ftood my Argument upon it. But hereafter,
unlefs any new Objections fhall be propofed,
and not merely Repetitions and ingenious Re-
prefentations of the former Difficulties, you
muft excufe me if I thipk not my felf obliged
to do fo any more.
In repeating my Anfwer to your firft Objec-
*' %*$h tion, you cite- my Words thus ; * To fuppofe
}«£¦''*¦' any Power or Quality of this kind, arifingfrom,
or belonging to the feveral Parts of which, the
Whole confifts., is a dir eft and exprefs Contradiction :
Whereas " my Words were ; To fuppofe any
Power or Quality of.tfyis kind arifing from or be
longing to [ any whole Syftem of Matter, witfaut
belonging to ] tbe feveral Parts of which the Whole
f defence, confifts, is a dir eel and exprefs ContraditJionf. J
f*ge 95- makg no queftion but this is only a Fault of the
Prefs in your Reply. Yet it was piqper to take
notice of it, becaufe perhaps every Reader wil}
not be at the Pains to compare the Books ; and
it happens, as the Paffage ftands in your Cita?
tion to give a very difadvantagious Reprefen,?
ration of my Senfe,

itnd Nattifal Immortality of the Soul. 1 4.-7
In your preliminary defining the Signification
of the Terms*, I cannot fee any Reafon, * RiP!y>
( unlefs it be to perplex the Reader with a new \age l '**
Queftion, Whether the Soul always AtJually thinks
or not, which is wholly foreign to the Matter
at prefent in Difpute; J 1 cannot fee any Rea
fon, I fay, why you fhould affirm that Confci
oufnefs cannot be properly imployed to fignify the
fame thing with a Power of Thinking, unlefs by a
Power ef Thinking, be underftood, not a Capacity
to Think, but Aclual Thinking. For, the thing
to be proved, being This, that a Divifible
Subftance is not Capable of a Power of Think
ing ; what difference can it make, whether by a
Power of Thinking you underftand actual Think'
ing, or a Capacity to think ? For I prefume
you will not deny, but whatever is proved in
capable of aclual Thinking, is alfo proved inca*
pable ( pardon the Expreffion ) of a Capacity of
Thinking; and whatfoever is proved incapable
of a Capacity of Thinking, is alfo proved inca
pable of atlual Thinking. Wherefore there was
no need of indeavouring at this time to per
plex and multiply the Queftion by any fuch
difputable Diftinction ; Which kind of Diffi
culties, foreign to the thing at prefent under
Confideration, they who are defirous to come
at Truth, and to come at it the neareft Way,
ought always very carefully to avoid.
Confcioufnefs fax the moft ftridt and exadt Senfe
of the Word, fignifies neither a Capacity of
Thinking, nor yet AtJual Thinking, but the Re
flex Ati by which I know that I think, and tbat
my Thoughts and Atlions are my own and not Ano
ther's. But in the prefent Queftion, the Rea»
der needs not trouble himfelf with this Nicety
©f Diftinction 1 but may underftand it indiffe-
L 3 ren tly

150 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
rently in all or any of thefe Significations ; be
caufe the Argument proves univerfally, that
Matter is neither capable of this Reflex Atl,
nor of the firft DiretJ AU, nor of the Capacity
of Thinking at aU.
By an Individual Power I mean ( in the Sepfe
that Logicians commonly ufe the Word Indivi
dual when they oppofe it to Specifick, ) fuch a
Power as is really and truly in the Nature of
the Thing it felf One Power, in oppofition to
its being fuch merely in our abftratl Complex
Notion. For Inftance: When I fpeak of my
own Confcioufnefs, and call it an Individual
Power; I mean thereby to exprefs that it is
really and truly one undivided Confcioufnefs,
and not a Multitude of diftinct Confcioufneffes
added together: But when I fpeak of the Blue-
nefs, ( fuppofe ) or Rednefs, or Sweetnefs of a
Body, as of a fingle Power belonging to that
Body ; it is evident I can mean only, that it is
fuch merely in the abftratl Complex Notion or
Idea I frame in my Mind ; that is, in the fame
Senfe as we fay an Army or a City is One ; But
that really and indeed it is a vaft Multitude of
Blueneffes, Redneffes, or Sweetneffes ; or ra
ther (to fpeak ftrictly and properly) a vaft
Multitude of fuch Parts as excite in us theSen-
fations of Bluenefs, Rednefs, or Sweetnefs. Now
the thing to be proved, was that fuch an In
dividual Power as Confcioufnefs, cannot pof
fibly inhere in or refult from a divifible Sub
ftance. And this I did prove ; not by defining
or fuppofing an Individual Power to be a Power
tbat cannot poffibly inhere in, or refult from a di
vifible Subftance; ( which would indeed have
been a Begging of the Queftion ; ) but by de-
monftrating, that it would neceffarily imply a
plain

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. i 5 1
plain and direct Contradiction, for any Power
which is really One and not Many, ( fuch as
your felf acknowledged Confcioufnefs to be, by
confeffing it does not refide * in the fingle and *Ps- 1,<5>
feparate Parts of the Brain, ) to inhere in or
refult from a divifible Subftance. Wherefore it
is altogether without Reafon, that you endea
vour to perplex your Reader by telling him
that -f- a Syftem of Matter beingfuppofed to confift fpag. 1 iji
of Parts , and Thinking being fuppofed to be a
Power incapable of refiding in a Being that con
fifts of Parts, the Queftion of Matter's Thinking
will amount to this, Whether that which cannot
think, can think ; When you well know that I
made ufe of no fuch Suppofition, but endea
voured to prove, ( and, I hope, have proved
with fome Strength and Clearnefs ) what you
feem to infinuate as if I only fuppofed.
I. You reply to my Anfwer to your firft Ob-
jedlion ; that || it is nothing elfe but Argumen- [j^j. 114.
turn ad Ignorantiam : that in enumerating the forts
of Powers or Qualities of Matter, I fuppofe that
a Syftem of Matter has and can have only Powers
of one fort or kind, fuch as Magnitude and Mo
tion, which are only the Sum or Aggregate of
Powers of tbe fame kind; Which, what is it elfe
but to argue, That becaufe we know of no other
Powers of a different kind in Matter from Mag
nitude and Motion, therefore it Has and Can have
no other Powers? Now I cannot think, Sir, but
a Man of your Underftanding, if you pleafe to
confider the Matter a fecond time, will find it
is by no means Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.
For if a Disjunction be complete, ( as that in
which I enumerate the feveral forts of Powers
of which Matter is capable, either is ; or elfe
L 4 you

be

1 5 z A Second Defence of the Immateriality
roU ought i6 have proved that another Mem-
oer could be added to it, to fhow that it was
hot ; ) it contains in it all the poflible Particu
lars, as well the unknown, .4s thofe that are ever
fo well known. , For how many Particulars foe-
ver be fuppofed to be unknown, and how im-
poflible foeyer it be fuppofed to come at the
Knowledge of thofe Particulars; yet if the
iHeads or Kinds be rightly diftributed, they
muft of Neceffity contain under them all the
unknown Particulars as certainly as thofe that
are the moft known. All the poffible Qualities,
I faid, or Powers of Matter, ( whether known
br unknown, ) muft of Neceffity be either Qua
lities really inhering in the Subjeti it felf to which
they are afcribed ; or Modes produced by it in fome
other Subjeti ; or elfe mere abftratl Names figni
fying certain Powers or EffeSts that do not pro
perly refide in any Subject at all. Now if this
Disjunction be true ; and Thinking be at all a
Quality or Power of Matter ; and be confeffed
hot to belong to either of the two latter forts ;
it liiiift of neceffity ( how unknown foever the
Nature of it be otherwife fuppofed to be, ) be
included in the former. And then the Argu
ment holds unanfwerably good ; that Thinking,
( or, if you pleafe to imagine any other even
yet more abftrufe Qualities or Powers of Mat
ter, even thefe alfo ) as well as Magnitude
and Motion, which I inftanced in ; and what
ever elfe may be reducible to this Kind ; by
truly and really inhering in the Subject it felf;
muft of neceffity inhere in all and every one of
the Particles of the Syftem, taken fingly as
Well as together. Becaufe, as I faid before, to
fuppofe any Power or Quality of this kind,
arifing from) or belonging to any whole Syftem of

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 1 5 i
of Matter, without belonging to the feveral
Parts, of which that whole confifts, is a direct
and exprefs Contradiction : It is fuppofing
either an Univerfal to exift, without Particu
lars ; or an Effetl to be produced without a
Caufe, or to have more in it than was in the
Caufe ; or that a Quality is by the Power of
God made fo to arife out of Nothing, as to
be fuperadded to a Subjeti, and to fubfift with
out inhering in that Subject to which it is at
the fame time fuppofed to belong.
To this you reply, * that to fuppofe a Power *f*g.*i&,
arifing from Matter, without belonging to the Parts
of which the Whole confifts ; is not to fuppofe an
Univerfal to exift without Particulars, but a Par
ticular Power exifting, to which feveral Particu
lar Powers contribute ; as every Man is a Parti
cular Man though various Powers are neceffary
to conftitute him of that Species. But, Sir, if
the Whole or Refult, which you call a Parti
cular Power, be entirely and Specifically diffe
rent from all and every one of the particular
Powers contributing to it; as Thinking mani-
feftly is, from all the Powers of Particles not
indued with Thought -, you will find, if you pleafe
to confider it carefully, that it is as certain artd
evident as any Arithmetical Demonftration, that
fuch a Particular Power is a Whole bigger than
¦all its Parts ; a Whole, that contains fomething
in it befides All and every one of its Parts %
that is, I think, an Univerfal without Particu
lars. It is exactly as if you fhould affert, that
a Smell and a Colour could be joined together
to make up a Sound ; or as if Hardnefs and Fi
gure could be the Particulars contributing to
conftitute a Motion. A Man, if you mean the
whole Man, the Thinking Perfon; fas the
Reader may be apt to think you do ; ) and fup
pofe

JS4- A Second Defence of the Immateriality
pofe him to be conftituted of mere Matter,
whofe fingle Particles are none of them induecl
with Thought ; is fuch a contradictory Whole:
But if you mean, ( as you feem to do,) the
Body only, with its Mechanical Powers ; then
there is nothing in it, differing from the Pow
ers of the fingle Parts ; except only the bare
Name, the Abftract Notion of its being a
Whole ; which is a complex Idea in our Mind ;
but in the Thing it felf it is nothing at all,
but its being the Sum of the Magnitudes, Fi
gures, and Motions of all the feveral Parts ;
from which conftituent Parts no Whole can
( without an evident Contradiction ) differ any
otherwife, than as in Numbers a Thoufand dif
fers from Ten Hundred, or as in Weights a
Pound differs from Sixteen Ounces, or as an Ar
my differs from all the Men that compofe it ;
that is, in nothing but the bare Name.
You add : Neither is it a fuppofing an Effetl
produced without a Caufe : For the different
Powers in the fingle and feparate Parts of a
Syftem of Matter, by uniting in one Operation or
Power to operate, are tbe Caufe of the Exiftence
of that Power which did not exift in the Particles
fingly confidered. And thus in thofe Particles which
compofe the Brain, &c. Nowhere, Sir, I really
cannot but wonder how a Gentleman fo well
skilled in Philofophy, as you are, can fuffer
himfelf to be impofed upon by fo very grofs
and palpable a Fallacy. For though the diffe
rent Powers in the fingle and feparate Parts of a
Syftem of Matter, ( as, for inftance, their Mag
nitude, Situation, Figure and Motion, ) may
by uniting in one Operation or Power to ope
rate, be the Caufe of the Exiftence of another
Power of the fame Species, which did not exift in
the

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 15%
the Particles fingly confidered ; that is, may
conftitute another Magnitude, another Figure,
another Motion, than was in the fingle Par
ticles ; juft as twenty different Numbers added
together, conftitute a new Nuinber different
from any of the Partipulars: Yet thofe Powers
cannot, without an evident Contradiction, be
the Caufe of the Exiftence of any other Power
of a different Species ; ( as Thinking is confeffedly
of a different Species from Magnitude, Figure,
Motion, or whatever other Properties may be
long to Unthinking Particles of Matter ; ) for
the fame Reafon as the Addition of different
Numbers in Arithmetick, cannot without a ma-
nifeft Contradiction, be the Caufe of the Exi
ftence of a Line or a Figure ; or the Mixture
of Taftes, conftitute a Colour ; Namely, be
caufe thus the Effetl would contain more in it
than was in the Caufe ; that is, fomething would
without any Efficient, be produced out of
Nothing. In like manner ; though the diffe
rent Powers in the fingle and feparate Parts ofa
Syftem of Matter, ( their Magnitude fuppofe,
Situation, Figure and Motion, ) may, by u-
niting in one Operation or Power to operate,
be the Caufe of the Exiftence of a Power to
affetJ fome foreign Subftance, which Power did
not exift in the Particles fingly confidered ;
that is, certain Particles united, may prick the
Skin and caufe Pain, which the fingle ones
could not do ; or may ftrike the Eye fo as to
excite the Senfation of Blue or Red, which the
fingle ones could not do ; Juft as a Wedge may
force it felf a Paffage, where a Body of fome
other fhape could not : Yet thofe Powers can
not, without an evident Contradiction, be the
Caufe of the Exiftence of any new Quality realh

'i$6 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
really inhering in the Subjeti it felf ; ( as Thinking
cohfeffedly is a Quality really inhering in the
Thinking Being it felf, and not barely ah dbftratl
Notion, or Power of affetling feme foreign Sub
ftance ; ) for the fame Reafon as the fharpning
of the Point of a Needle cannot poffibly be the
Caufe thatthe Needle it felf fhould feel Pain.
From hence it eafily appears how defective
»^,, your Similitude is *, when you fay it is no Con-
' fraditlion to fuppofe a Power arifingfrom Matter,
without belonging to the Parts of which the
Whole confifts ; no more than to conceive tbat a
Whole is not the fame with a Piece of a Clock ;
Wherein the Power refulting from the different
contributing Powers in the Syftem, neither belongs
to any Part of the Syftem when confidered by it felf,
ttor is it of the fame fort or kind with any Power
in any- part of the Syftem. For that which you
call the Power of a Clock, to fhow the Time
cf the Day, is evidently nothing in the Clock
it felf, but the Figure and Motion of its Parts;
and confequently not any thing of a different
fort or kind from the Powers inherent in the
Parts : Whereas Thinking, if it was the Refult
of the Powers of the different Parts of the
Machine of the Body, or of the Brain in par
ticular, would be fomething really inhering in
the Machine it felf , fpecifically different from
all and every one of the Powers of the feveral
Parts out of which it refulted : Which is an
exprefs Contradiction, a fuppofing the Effetl to
have more in it than the Caufe. And therefore,
though you are pleafed to make ufe of it as a
Similitude ; yet in reality this Power of Think
ing, which truly and properly inheres in its
Subject, has not in any refpect the leaft Ap
pearance of likenefs to the Power ofa Clock to Ihow
4 the

and Natural Immortality of the S ul. 157
the Time of the Day, which is merely an ab
ftratl Complex Notion in the Man that beholds
it, and nothing at all really in the Clock itfelf.
In like manner, when you fay * it may be * }ng. %i6".
conceived that there may be a Power in all thofe
Particles which compofe tbe Brain, to contribute
to tbe Acl of Thinking, before they are united un
der that Form ; though, while they are difunited,
they have no more of Confcioufnefs, .than any Being
which produces Sweetnefs in us ( that is made up
of Parts wherein different Powers inhere ) when
Under a particular Form, has a Power to pro
duce Sweetnefs in us, when its Parts are difunited
and feparated ; you fall again into the fame
Fallacy. For the Power of a Body to excite in
us the Idea of Sweetnefs, is nothing elfe but a
certain Figure and Motion refulting from dif
ferent Figures and Motions, of its original
conftituent Parts ; juft as the Power of a Pin
to caufe Pain in us, is nothing but its Motion
and the fharp Figure of its Point, refulting
from different Motions, Figures and Situations
of its conftituent Parts. And if the Effect of
the Powers, by which the feveral Particles that
compofe the Brain, contribute ( as your Phrafe
is ) to the Adt of Thinking, was likewife only
-the exciting of certain Thoughts in fomething
which was before a Thinking Subftance, your Si
militude would have fomething of likenefs in
it. But that Particles which in themfelves have
no Thought, fhould ever contribute any thing
towards making the Subftance, which they
conftitute, a Thinking Being; this I am fure
you can no more be able to clear from being
an exprefs Contradiction ; ( though I doubt
not but you can argue upon it as acutely as any
Pne ; ) than if you fhould undertake to prove, that;

158 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
that a Solid Mafs of Marble is made up of
Particles, which without having any Solidity
themfelves , contribute by other unknown
Powers to conftitute a Solid Mafs ; or that a
Foot-fquare of an-}" Matter, is made up of
Particles, which withbut hiving any Extenfion
themfelves, contribute by other different and
unknown Powers, to conftitute stn extended
Solid Quantity.
And here I cannot but take notice, that be-
fides the Contradictions beforfe-mentibriedj you
have, by choofing to annex ConfciOufnefsto f6
flux a Subftance as the Brain or the Spirits in it,
fallen into another very great Abfurdity. For
if the Brain Or Spirits be the Subject o'f Con
fcioufnefs ; and the Parts of the Brain or Spi
rits be ( as they certainly are, whatever Queftioii
may be made concerning any original Solid
Stamina of the -Body, ) in perpetual flbx Sfld
change ; it will follow that That Cdnfeibuf-
riefs, by which I not orlly Remember that certain
Things were done mafny Years fince, biit alfo
am Confcious that tbey were dohe by Me, by fh~e
very fame Individual Confcious Being who how re
members them ; it will follow, I fay, that That
Confcioufnefs is transferred from one Subject
to another ; that is to fay, that it is ia real
(Quality which fubfifts withbut inhering iii any
Subject at all.
But to return to the Argument before us.
You fuppofe that the Particles which compofe
the Brain, though themfelves void of Conftiouf-
'hefs When taken fingly, may yet by other dif
ferent Powers contribute towards the making
up Ohe Confcious Whole. Th?s I affirm to tit,
land f think I have proved to be, an exprefs
Contradiction -, an affigning more to the Ef
fetl,

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 159
fetJ than was in the Caufe ; a making the Whole
Bigger than all its Parts, and Specifically diffe
rent from All and every One of them. The
Occafion, the common Ground and Founda
tion of Mens Erring in this whole Matter, I
have * elfewhere largely difcovered ; and fhall * Demon.
here repeat what I think may be fufficient to °f the Be-
fatisfy an inquifitive and unprejudiced Perfon. jf/"/.
" Whatever can arife from, or be compounded 0f God. '
*' of any Things; is ftill only thofe very Prop. 8.
" Things, of which itwas compounded: And Sca' *•
" if infinite Compofitions or Divifions be made
" eternally, the Things will ftill be but eter-
" nally the fame : And all their poflible Ef-
" fects, can never be any thing but Repetitions
" of the fame. For Inftance : All poffible
" Changes of Pigure, are ftill nothing but Fi-
" gure: [AH poflible Variations, Compofi
tions and Divifions of Magnitude, are ftill no
thing but Magnitude:'] " All poffible Com-
" pofitions or Effects of Motion, are ftill no-
" thing but mere Motion" : All Compofitions
of Magnitude, Figure and Motion together, are
ftill nothing but Magnitude, Figure and Mo
tion : And how many other Qualities foeyer,
'known or unknown, the Particles of Matter be
fuppofed to be indued with ; thofe Qualities
can never in any Compofi tibn or Divifion pro
duce any new Power fpecifically different from
themfelves, unlefs a Caufe could give more to
the Effetl than is in it felf. And confequently,
if the Matter of the Brain be the Subject in
which Confcioufnefs inheres, That Confciouf
nefs cannot poffibly be the Refult of any other
lcnown Or unknown Powers of the feveral con
ftituent Particlesy. but what muft themfelves
have been originally of the fame Species, that is

160 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
is to fay, fo many feveral Confcioufneffes.
" That which has been apt to deceive Men in
" this Matter, is this ; that they imagine Com-
" pounds to be fomewhat really [ fpecifically ]
«' different from the Things of which they
" are compounded. Which is a very great
*' Miftake. For all the Things, of which
«' Men fo judge ; either, if they be really dif-
«' ferent, are not Compounds nor Effects of
** what Men judge them to be, but are fome-
*' thing totally diftindt; as when the Vulgar
*' thinks Colours and Sounds to be Properties
" inherent in Bodies, when indeed they are
*' purely Thoughts of the Mind : Or elfe, if
" they be really Compounds and Effects, then
*' they are not different, but exactly the fame
" that ever they were ; As when two Triangles
" put together make a Square, that Square is
** ftill nothing but two Triangles ; or when a
" Square cut in halves makes two Triangles,
" thofe two Triangles are ftill only the two
" halves of a Square ; or when the Mixture of
" Blue and Yellow Powder makes a Green,
«' that Green is ftill nothing but Blew and Yel-
" low intermixt, as is plainly vifible by the
'« Help of Microfcopes : And in fhort, every
" thing by Compofition, Divifion or Motion ;
«" is nothing elfe but the very fame it was be-
" fore, taken either in whole or by Parts, or in
'' different Place or Order, [fo as to excite
in our Minds different complex Notions, and oc-
cafion new abftratl Names of .Things ; but by
no means to produce any new real Quality in
the Things themfelves, fuch as Confcioufnefs is
agreed to be, inhering truly and properly in
\.he Subject k is afcribed to. ] ' "
The

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. i6t
The true State of this Cafe, feems in brief to
be This. Sometimes we confider one and the
fame Quality of a Thing, in different Circum-
ftances and Refpedts, and with relation to other
different Things ; which relation may be changed
by the Alteration or Removal of thofe other
things, and a new Effect be produced, without
any alteration at all of the Thing it felf or any
of its Qualities ; and yet then we give it a new
Name, and are apt to think that new Name a
new Quality. Sometimes we confider feveral
diftinct Qualities of different parcels of Matter,
together ; and, becaufe fome new Effect is
thereby occafioned in fome other Being, we
give the imaginary Whole a new Name, and think
that new Denomination a new Quality. But with
how little Reafon this is done, will abundantly
appear by the following Inftances. The fame
Particle of Matter, which makes a Point in
the Siirace of a Globe, may, by other Parts
being fhaved off, become the Point of the
Angle of a Cube, without undergoing any alte
ration it felf; and produce an effect, which it
could, not produce before : But is this truly a
new Quality or Power in the Point it felf? Blue
and Yellow Powder mingled together, occafion
a new Effect, and are called by a new Name,
Green : But is this really a new Quality or Pow
er ? Is it not plainly the fame two Qualities,
which, they had when feparate, acting ftill
diftindfjy, as appears in a Microfcope ? That
particular and determinate Degree of Velocity in a
Wheel, whereby it turns once round precifely
in Twelve Hours, is that which you" call the
Power of a Clock to fhow the Time ofthe Day :
And becaufe fuch a determinate Velocity of
Motion is made ufe of by Us for the Meafure
M of

162 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
of Time, and has an abftratl: Name given it to
exprefs that ufe ; is it therefore really a new
Quality or Power diftindt from the Motion it
felf? And, to mention no more ; When a
Weight in one Scale of a Balance, does, by
taking out part of the Weight that was in the
other Scale, begin to preponderate, which it
did not before ; is this any new Quality or real
Power in the Weight that is not altered, dif
ferent from what it had before ?
I fliall obferve but one Thing more upon this
Head ; and that is, that Whereas I affirmed
every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent
in any Syftem of Matter, to be nothing elfe than
the Sum or Aggregate of fo many Powers or Qua
lities of the fame kind inhering in all the Parts ;
meaning that the Powers inhering in the feve
ral Parts, muft be of the fame Kind, or Species
of that Power, which is the Refult of the Whole ;
you feem all along to underftand it as if I had
afferted, that the Powers or Qualities inhering
in the feveral Parts, muft needs be all of tbe
fame Kind or Species one with another ; Thereby
diverting your Reader from the true Strength
of the Argument, and perplexing him with
that which has no relation to the Queftion :
For whether the Powers of the feveral Parts
be all of the fame kind one with another, or of
ever fo different kinds one from another ; that
which I affirmed, is ftill equally certain and
neceffary ; that the Power of the Whole, be
ing but the. Sum or Mixture of the Powers of
the Parts, cannot poffibly be ofa different Kind
or Species from all the feveral Powers of the
Parts, as Thinking is of neceffity fpecifically
different from all and every one of the Powers,
known or unknown, of 'Particles which are
r confeffed

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. \6*
confeffed to be void of Thought. Wherefore
when you fay, * be ought to have demonftrated, 'fag. 114."
if he would have proved the Point he undertook
to prove, that there can be no other Power in any
Syftem of Matter, but what is the Sum or Ag
gregate of Powers of the fame kind ; And that
¦f till it is demonftrated, that there can be no other j.^
Power in any Syftem of Matter, but what is the
Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the fame kind, it
may as well be fuppofed that there are Powers of
different kinds in different Particles of Matter ;
And that it is 4. fo far from being the Sum or Ag- ±pa£ , ,, ¦
gregate of Powers of the fame kind, that the new
Power will be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of
a different kind; And that || the Power ffuag.iii.
every Syftem will not be the Sum of Powers of the
fame kind, but the Sum of Powers of different
kinds: AD this is entirely befides the Purpofe.
Your Suppofition, * that the Matter of which * ,-£,/
an Egg confifts, doth entirely conftitute the young
one; and that the Atlion of Senfation began under
a particular Difpofition of the Parts by Motion,
without the Addition of an Immaterial and Im
mortal Soul ; is in every part contrary to all the
Difcoveries in Anatomy, and to all true Phi
lofophy : For fo far is it from being true, that
the Matter of the Egg, by any particular Dif
pofition of its Parts by Motion, is formed
into or entirely conftitutes the young one, that it
does not conftitute it at all, not fo much as the
Body of it ; but only ferves it for nourifhment
and growth : It being as impoffible that the
Organized Body of a Chicken fhould by the
Power of any Mechanical Motions be formed
out of the unorganized Matter of an Egg ; as.
that the Sun, Moon and Stars, fhould by mere
Mechanifm arife out of a Chaos. And that
M 2 Sen-

1 64 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
Senfation fhould be added to it by arifing from
a particular Difpofition of the Parts by Motion,
is ftill more impoffible; becaufe it is fuppofing
fomething to come out of that, in which it ne
ver was : Than which, nothing in the World
can be a more exprefs Contradiction. You
think it ridiculous to recur to the Addition of
an Immaterial and Immortal Soul: Let it be fo:
I can as eafily fuppofe, if you muft needs have
an Hypothefis, that the immaterial Subftance
was not Added afterwards, but was in it from
the Beginning, from the Time that the Semi
nal Principle it felf of the Organised Body
was framed : And who fhall tell us when That
was ? The deeper Difcoveries every Age makes
in Anatomy by Microfcopial Obfervations, the
further all thefe things are found to be removed
backwards from the Search and common No
tions even of the moft inquifitive Men. Sup
pofe therefore we could not frame any probable
Hypothefis at all, when and how the immate
rial Principle of Senfation came in ; yet why
ought this to incline any Man to doubt the
Truth of a certain Proof which fhows him that
there Is fuch a Principle ; any more than the
Difficulty ( which is altogether as great an one)
of framing an Hypothefis how and whence the
Organized Body came, make him disbelieve his
Senfes which difcover it to him ?
'pzg.iij. You tell me again, * that I have not rightly
enumerated the known Powers of Matter. To
prove which Charge, you repeat what you had
before faid, concerning Aggregates of Powers of
the fame kind ; wherein I have already fhown
that you lay ftrefs upon that which is wholly
foreign to the Queftion.. And what you add
concerning the particular Texture of a Body, as
being

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 1 6 $
being fomething that is different from the
Magnitude and Motion of its Parts, and on
which depend certain Powers, as the Power of
the Eye, for inftance, to be operated upon by ex
ternal Objecls, and to contribute to the Acl of
Vifion ; which Power, becaufe it ceafes wholly
upon the leaft Alteration of the Texture of any
part of the Eye, it is evident does not inhere
in the Parts of the Syftem, in the fame Senfe
with Magnitude and Motion : This alfo is alto
gether foreign to the Queftion. For the Eye's
Power of Seeing, is not, as your Argument
fuppofes, one of thofe Powers which I ranked
under the firft Head, that is, a Power which
really inheres in the Syftem, and confequently
in all the Parts of it ; But it is one of thofe
Powers which I called the third fort, viz. which
are mere abftratl Names fignifying certain Powers
or Effetl- s which do not at all refide in the Subjeti.
For the -Ej^does not See, in the fame Senfe as
the Thinking Subftance Thinks ; "Rut Seeing in the
Eye, is what Magnetifm- is in the Load-ficne ;
not a real inherent Quality, but merely a Situa
tion of Parts and Pores, fo as to be the Occa-
fion of an Effect wholly extrinfical to it felf, an
Effect produced in fome other Subftance by
Rays tranfmitted through the Pores of the
Eye, juft as the Magnetick Effluvia are through
a Loadftone, or Corn through a Sieve. So
that you might exactly as well have compared
the Power by which the Soul Thinks, to the
Power by which a Sieve tranfmits Corn, as to
the Power by which the Eye fees.
* You obferve, * that Saying Confcioufnefs is an* fzg.ua.
individual Power, is but calling Confcioufnefs by
another Name, and not giving an account of what
Confcioufnefs is, or wherein it confifts ; which is
M 3 requifite

1 66 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
requifite to demonftrate from Confcioufnefs, that
Confcioufnefs cannot be added to a Being that con
fifts of atJually feparate and diftintl Parts. It is
true, my affirming Confcioufnefs to be an in
dividual Power, is not giving an account of
what Confcioufnefs is •> neither was it intended
to be fo. Every Man feels and knows by expe
rience what Confcioufnefs is, better than any
Man can explain it : Which is the Cafe of all
fimple Ideas : And it is not at all neceffary to
define more particularly what it is •> but abun
dantly fufficient that we know and agree what it
is not, viz. that it is not a Multitude of diftinct
and feparate Confcioufneffes ; in order to prove
that it does not and cannot inhere in a Being,
that confifts of a Multitude of feparate and di
ftinct Parts. You your felf acknowledge that
the Parts which conftitute the Brain, are not
feparately and diftinctly confcious ; that is, that
the Confcioufnefs of a Man, is not a Multitude
of Confcioufneffes, but One. This is all that I
fuppofe, when I call Confcioufnefs an Individual
Power ; and from hence I think it is proved
ftrongly, that Confcioufnefs cannot refide in a
Being that confifts of a Multitude of feparate
and diftinct Parts : Becaufe if it could, it muft
neceffarily follow, either that it would become
a Multitude of diftinct Confcioufneffes, con
trary to the Suppofition which you your felf al
low ; or elfe that an Individual Quality of each
fingle Particle, would become the Individual
Quality of every one of the reft likewife, which
is a Contradiction in Terms ; or elfe, that the
Confcioufnefs would be one Power refulting
from the contributing Powers of all the feveral
feparate and diftinct Particles ; in which cafe, it
would be, as I have before proved in enume rating

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 1H7
rating the feveral kinds of Powers, a mere ab
ftratl Name or complex Notion,and not a real Qua
lity refiding in any Subject at all. It is there
fore wholly without reafon, that you fay * Mr, *t*g.izi.
Clarke'.? calling Confcioufnefs an Individual Power,
in his Senfe of an Individual Power, is fuppofing
that Matter cannot think ; and that you infinuate
to your Reader, "f that Confcioufnefs beingan In-f ibii.
dividual Power, in Mr. Clarke'.* Senfe of thofe
Words, is fuppofing that it is a Power which can
only refide in an Individual Being ; to prove which
he has not faid any thing, but barely by calling
Confcioufnefs an Individual Power. For an Indi
vidual Power, in my Senfe of the Word, does
not mean in the Definition a Power which can
only refide in an Individual Being ; but it figni
fies One Power, in oppofition to a Multitude ;
and I have proved that fuch a Power can only
refide in an Individual Being, (not by Sup-
pofing it, but,) by reducing the contrary Sup
pofition to an exprefs Contradiction.
What you fay again 4, , concerning Sums j-pag.u*.
and Aggregates of Powers of the fame kind ; is
repeating the fame Miftake, which I have before
fhown you to have fallen into, in underftanding
Powers of the fame kind with one another, in
ftead of Powers of the fame kind [ or Species ]
with the Whole that refults from them.
You are pleafed to entertain your felf and
your Reader || , upon my accufing you with y au,
fuppofing Sweetnefs to be in a Rofe. But I hope
this will appear very pardonable, fince it feem-
ed neceffary to me to underftand you as I did,
becaufe I could not otherwife apprehend what
you faid concerning it, to be pertinent to
your purpofe. For you compared the Power
which refults from the feveral Particles of a
Rofe3 without being in the Particles themfelves
M 4 feparately

168 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
feparately and fingly ; to the Power which re
fults from the feveral Particles of the Brain,
without being in the Particles themfelves fepa
rately and fingly : Now the Power which you
fay refults from the Difpofition of the feveral1
Particles of the Brain, is Confcioufnefs refiding in
the Brain it felf ': Either therefore by the Power
refulting from the Difpofition of the feveral
Particles of the Rofe, you muft mean Something^
refiding likewife in the Rofe it felf ; or elfe your'
Similitude is not at all parallel. Now that
Power which refides in the Rofe it felf, as
Confcioufnefs does in the Brain, and yet belongs'
not to the feveral conftituent Particles of the
Rofe, can neither be Magnitude, nor Figure, nor
Motion, (for thefe belong to the feveral Parts
fingly ;) nor Texture, (for That, fo far as it
differs from the former, is nothing but a mere
abftratl Notion, and nothing really in the thing
it felf) but muft be either Sweetnefs it felf, or
fomething elfe equally unintelligible and inex<
plicable. If you will fay you mean a Power
not refiding in the Rofe at all, but refulting
fromit, theri, (befides that, as I faid before, it
is not pertinent to your purpofe, ) what is this,
but fuppofing a Power fubfifting without any
Subject .'at all ? a mere Name ?
In my Affertion, that the Powers in a Rofe
are nothing elfe but a Number of fimilar Mo-
*fxg.ixy tidfts Or Figures, you * tell me there are two
things to be proved, ift, That the mere Figure
and Motion of the Parts of a Rofe, do produce, or
are the fole external Caufe of the -Senfation caufed
by them.1 2dl~y, That thofe Motions and Figures
are perfetJly fimilar. By Similar, I meant that
they were fo far fimilar, as the Smell or Colour
of the Rofe was fimilar or homogeneous : But
whether

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 169
whether they be fimilar, or no, is of no con
cern at all in the prefent Queftion, unlefs you
ftill continue in your former Miftake about
Powers of the fame kind with one another, inftead
of with tbe Whole. And as to the other thing
which you fay wants proof; I think I may ap
peal to your felf, whether you can find or con
ceive any thing elfe in the Rofe, which can be
the Caufe of our Senfation, befides the mere
Magnitude, Figure, Situation, and perhaps Mo
tion of its Parts.
You find fault with me * for afferting, that #*«». Iz,;
Gravitation is the Effect of the continued and
regular Operation of fome other Being on Mat
ter' ; whereas, you think, it does not appear but
that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers origi
nally placed in it hy God, and is now left to it felf
to at! by thofe Original Powers. This Opinion
of yours, I cannot but think, Sir, to be a great
Miftake in your Philofophy. For when a
Stone that was at Reft, does of it felf, upon its
Support being removed, begin to fall down
ward ; what is it that caufes the Stone to begin
to move ? Is it poffible to be an Effect produced
without a Caufe? Is it impelled without any Im
peller ? Or can a Law ox Power, that is to fay,
a mere abftratl Name or complex Notion, and not
any real Being, impel a Stone and caufe it to
begin to move ? In any other Cafe you would
not doubt but this implied an abfolute Contra
diction. II. When in my Anfwer to your fecond Ob
jection, I faid that though the Want of Indivi
duality is indeed the fole Reafon urged in the
prefent Argument, why a Syftem of Matter canr
not think ; yet that it ought not therefore to be
faid

170 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
faid that Inviduality is the only thing required,
to render a Being a proper Subject of a Power
of Thinking ; ( Becaufe I would not exclude
any other Argument, by which other inquifitive
Perfons might prove other Conditions alfo, as
well as Individuality, to be neceflary Requi-
fites in order to a Subject's being capable of
Thinking : ) You hereupon make the following
*pag. 1 2r. Remark; * Upon this I obferve that Mr. Clarke
owns the Truth of my Reafoning, upon the Suppo
fition, that Individuality is only required by him in
a Subjeti of a Power of Thinking ; ( you fhould
have added ; and upon Suppofition alfo, that
a Particle of Matter, could be truly an Indi
vidual ; ) but denies that I have any reafon to infer
/^/Individuality is only required, from the Want
of Individuality'* being the file Reafon urged why
a Syftem of Matter cannot have a Power of Think
ing ; Which I cannot help thinking to be all one,
'till there is a Difference afftgned between only re
quired in the prefent Argument, and the fole
Reafon urged in the prefent Argument. Now
This is a very unfair Observation : Becaufe the
Difference to be affigned, and which I did af-
fign exprefsly, was between the fole Reafon ur
ged in the prefent Argument, and what was only
required ( not in the prefent but) in any new Ar
gument which Others might make ufe of.
ffȣ.!i8. HI. The Queftion concerning the -f- Alterati
ons of the Modes or Qualities of Immaterial Be
ings, feem indeed to have fome Difficulties in it,
but not fuch as any way affect our prefent Ar
gument. The Thing you objected was, that
though the Subftance of the Soul were proved
to be both Immaterial and Immortal, yet it>
would not follow that it muft be an Immortal Thinking

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 171
Thinking Subftance, becaufe its Thinking might
perifh, though its Subftance did not. To this I
replied ; that the Power of Thinking could no
more be deftroyed by any Natural Power, than
the Subftance it felf; becaufe the Qualities or
Modes of any Subftance not being alterable
otherwife, than by fome alteration in the Sub
ftance it felf; it is manifeft that an Indifcerpible
Subftance not being it felf alterable by any na
tural Power, it muft follow that neither can
any of its Qualities be altered by any natural
Power. When therefore I faid, that all its Qua
lities and Modes are utterly incapable of being
affected in any meafure, or changed in any de
gree, by any Power of Nature ; you had no
reafon to underftand this, as if I had afferted,
that an Indifcerpible Subftance could not be
atled upon at all by any Power of Nature ; But
my Meaning was, that it could not be fo acted
upon, as to deftroy, change or alter any of its in
herent Qualities or Powers; which was all that
the Thing in Queftion required me to prove.
And that this was my Meaning, you might have
underftood from the Comparifon I ufed, ofthe
original and perfectly folid Particles of Mat
ter. For as thofe Particles, being, ( not abfo
lutely in themfelves, but ) to any Power of
Nature, indifcerpible; are evidently incapable
©f having any of their Qualities or Properties
altered in any meafure by any Power of Na
ture ; that is, their Figure, their Magnitude,
their Hardnefs, and all the refpedtive Effects or
Powers depending upon thefe, can by no natu
ral means be changed ; and yet you could not
imagine me to mean, but thefe Particles might
be atled upon, might beftruck by each other,
plight be removed this way or that way, up*
s. wards

i 7% A Second Defence ofthe Immateriality
wards or downwards ; all which makes no real
alteration in them : So an indifcerpible imma
terial thinking Subftance, though it may be
transferred from one part of the Univerfe to
another, though it may be atled upon by a
Multitude of things, though it may have dif
ferent Idea's reprefented to it, though the Or
gans of the Senfes may at times tranfmit diffe
rent Species, or hinder them from being tranf-
mitted to it ; yet all this makes no real Altera
tion either in the Subftance or its inherent
Powers ; nor can its Power of Thinking ("which
was the Thing in Queftion ) be deftroyed or
altered by thefe or any other natural Powers ;
any more than the Mobility ov Hardnefis of the
original perfectly folid Particles of Matter can
be deftroyed by any of their Actings one upon
another. There is ftill lefs weight in what you add ;
fpag. i»8. * Now till Mr. Clarke has a compleat Idea of both
forts of Beings, [ Material or Immaterial, ] and
of their Powers and Operations one on another ; it
is impoffible for him, in Many Refpetls, to tell how
far they can affetl one another's Operations. This
is true indeed ; but what follows from it ? Be
caufe, in Many Refpetls, I cannot tell how far
they can affect one another's Operations ; does
it therefore follow, that I cannot in any refpetJ
tell wherein they cannot affedt one another's
Operations ? All that I pretend to, is to deny
the Poffibility of fuch Effects, as plainly im
ply a Contradiction ; and this, I prefume, I
may be allowed to do, though I were in moft
refpetls ignorant how far Material and Immate
rial Beings can affect one another.
As to the Power of God to deftroy any Mode
or Quality in an immaterial indifcerpible Sub
ftance,

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 173
ftance, I faid nothing concerning it, neither is
our Queftion at all concerned in it. But fince
you have thought fit to put the Queftion whe
ther, according to my Principles, God can de«
ftroy a Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Be
ing, without making fome alteration in the
Subftance it felf ; I cannot but take notice,
that all the Anfwers you have made for me to
this Queftion, are fuch as I cannot approve, and
that therefore I am not concerned in any of
their Confequences. The Anfwer I would make
for my felf, is, that fuppofing God to deftroy
any Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being,
it is refonable to imagine that he muft do it by
m aking fome fuch Alterations in that Subftance,
as may be analogous or equivalent to altering
the Difpofition of the Parts in a Material Sub
ftance. But you ought not to have jumbled * *f*g-i2§l
thefe two things together, ( which I carefully 'I0'
diftinguifhed ) by fuppofing me to anfwer, that
God muft do it by making an Alteration in the
Parts of die Immaterial Subftance ( to which it is
not proper to afcribe any Parts, ) and thence
concluding that an Immaterial Subftance is as
difcerpible by the Power of God, as a Material
Subftance. Laftly, you tell me f that after all I make the \pg 1 ji.
Immaterial Thinking Subftance to be in no other
Senfe Immortal, than I make the original folid
Particles of Matter to be indifcerpible ; that is
to fay, that the one is immortal and the other
indifcerpible, only with refpect to the Powers of
Nature ; but that in refpedt to the Power of
God, neither is the one indifcerpible, nor the o-
ther immortal. Your Expreffions in this whole
Section lie under fo much Obfcurity, that I can
hardly be. fere. whether I underftand you right or

'i74 d Second Defence of the Immateriality
or not. But if this be your Senfe ; I confefs I
do indeed make it fo ; and I fuppofe no confi-
derate Man ever made the Soul immortal in any
Other Senfe. For though I believe it is not dif
fer pible, even by the Power of God ; yet he is
undoubtedly able to deftroy it, either by anni
hilating it, or perhaps by otherwife depriving it
of all its Faculties, in ways which we can
know nothing of.
IV. To the Difficulties arifing from the Sup
pofition of Immateriality not excluding Exten
sion ; I anfwer,
i. That all thefe Difficulties are wide of the
main Queftion. For if the foregoing Proof,
that Matter is incapable of Thinking, cannot
be fhown to be defective ; it follows neceffari
ly that the Soul muft be an Immaterial indifcer
pible Subfiance. But the Difficulties that arife
from any following Hypothefis concerning o-
ther Properties of that Immaterial Indifcerpible
Subftance, as whether it be Extended or Unex-
tended, whether it ever acts wholly feparate, or
always in fome ?naterial Vehicle, finer or groffer,
and the like ; the Difficulties, I fay, that arife
from any of thefe particular Hypothefes, affect
only the particular Hypothefis, from which
they arife, and not at all the foregoing general
Proof. I take it to be demonftrated, thatthe
Soul is an Immaterial Indifcerpible Subftance : He
that thinks the Difficulties arifing from the
Suppofition of that Immaterial Indifcerpible
Subftance being Extended, to be unfurmounta-
ble ; may try if he can find fewer Difficulties in
fuppofing it Unextended ; And he that thinks
the Difficulties that arife from fupofing it Unex
tended, are not to be got over ; may try to
folve

mid Natural Immortality of the Soul. 17 J
folve the Difficulties that arife from fuppofing
it Extended: But the main Argument remains
firm either way ; and no difficulty arifing from
following Hypothefes can be fo great, as to
leffen the Force ofthe foregoing pofitive Proof.
2. But conceiving Immateriality not to ex
clude Extenfion, and fuppofing the Difficulties
arifing from that Hypothefis to be fuch as could
not be clearly anfwered ; yet this would not
weaken the foregoing Proof, unlefs that Ar
gument could otherwife be fhown to be in it
felf defective. For there are many Demon-
ftrations even in abftradt Mathematicks them
felves, which no Man who underftands them
can in the leaft doubt of the Certainty of,
which yet are attended with difficult Confe-
quencej that cannot perfectly be cleared. The
infinite Divifibility of Quantity, is an inftance of
this kind. Alfo the Eternity ofGod, than which
nothing is more felf-evident ; and yet the Dif
ficulties confequent upon it, are fuch as have re
duced moft of the Schoolmen to entertain that
unintelligible Notion ofa Nunc Stans. And his
Immenfity, attended with much the like Diffi
culties. 3. But neither is this the true State of the
Cafe. For the Difficulties arifing from the Sup
pofition of Immaterial indifcerpible Extenfion,
are by no means like thofe before-mentioned.
Space, (which you unpbilofophically call the
mere Abfence of Bodies, and yet confefs it to
be pofitively infinite,) is without difficulty con
feffed by you to be an Inftance of fuch an Ex
tenfion ; An Extenfion whofe Parts ( impro
perly fo called ) depend on each other for their
Exiftence, not only becaufe of its Infinity, but
becaufe of the Contradiction which a Separation of

17<S A Second Defence of the Immateriality
of them manifeftly would imply. And the
only Thing required in the prefent Cafe, is, to
conceive that God can create a finite Subftance,
which fhall not, like the folid, rigid, determi
ned Extenfion of Matter, confift of Parts which
are actually fomany diftindt Beings independent
on each other for their Exiftence ; but be a
Subftance perfectly and effentially One, fo that
to fuppofe any Divifion of it, fhall neceffarily
infer a Deftruction of the Effence of that Sub
ftance. This muft indeed be confeffed to be a
confiderable Difficulty : But if the Difficulties
arifing upon any other Hypothefis, be fas they
certainly are ) at leaft as great ; nothing can
thence be inferred to the weakening of the fore
going Proof.
Your applying the Argument, by which I
proved that Matter could not Think, in the
fame Words, to prove that neither could Im
material Subftance be capable of Thinking ; is
fallacious in the firft Sentence. For the Sup
pofition of the Subftance being by the Power
of God divided into two Parts, which concerning
Matter is confeffed to be always poffible, may
concerning Immaterial Subftance ( even though
Extenfion be not excluded) be denied to be
poffible, as being a Suppofition which deftroys
the very Effence of the Subftance it felf.
V. As to your laft Difficulty concerning
Brutes, I anfwer, that your Disjunction is ftill
*pag. 138. imperfect, when you fay * they muft either nc-
andagam ceffarily be annihilated fome time or other, or
*' 4 ' elfe be capable of Eternal Happinefs as well as
Man. For though they fhould never be annihi
lated, yet why muft they needs be capable of
Eternal Happinefs as well as Man ; any more than

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 177.
than their prefent Subfifting, implies that they
muft needs be capable of the ExpetJations and
Conditions of Eternal Happinefs, as well as Man ?
But what is all this, to our purpofe? Cannot
God, if he pleafes, caufe them to perifh at the
Diffolution of their Bodies ? Or cannot he, if
he pleafes, annihilate them at any other time,
when he fhall fo think fit ? Or cannot he, if he
pleafes, without ever annihilating them at all,
difpofe of them into States fuitable to their
particular Natures ; which yet may in no Pro
priety of Speech be ftiled a Capacity of Eter
nal Happinefs, as that of Man is ?
Having thus at large endeavoured, to give
you particular Satisfaction, in every one of the
Difficulties you propoied ; I fhall conclude
with briefly repeating the Strength of the Ar
gument, in a few pdain and eafy Prcvofitions ;
and fo leave it to the Judgment of the inquifi
tive and impartial Reader.

NOTE; by Confcioufnefs in tbe following Proportions,
the Reader may underftand indifferently either the
Reflex A&, by which a Man knows his Thoughts to be his
own Thoughts; (which is the ftriti and proferefi Senpe of
the Word ; ) or the Direct Atft of Thinking ; or the Power
or Capacity of Thinking; or (which is of the Pame Import,)
limple Senfation; or the Power of Self-y-otion, or of be
ginning Motion by the Will : the Argument holding equally
in all or any of thefe Senfes ; as has been before faid.
I.
Every Syflem of Matter confifts of a
Multitude of diftinct Tarts.
This, I think, is granted by all.
N H. Every

1 7 I A Second Defence of the
II.
Every real Quality inheres iri fome Sub
ject.
This alfo, I think, is granted by All, For
whatever is called a Quality, and yet inheres
riot in any Subjeti, muft either fubfift of it felf;
and then it is a Subftance, not a Quality ; or
elfe it is nothing but a mere Name.
III.
No Individual 'or fingle Quality of one
Particle of Matter, can be the Iridividu'dl
ot fingle Quality of another Particle.
The Heat of one Particle, is not the Heat
of another. The Gravity, the Colour, the
Figure, of one Particle, is not the fame indi
vidual Gravity, Colour, or Figure of another
Particle- The Confcioufnefs or Senfation of one
Particle, ( fuppofing it to be a Quality of
Matter, ) is not the Confcioufnefs or Senfation oi
another. If it was-; it would follow, that the
fame Thing could be Two, in the fame Senfe,
and at the fame Time, that it is but One.
Note, From hence may be drawn an evi
dent Confutation ofthat abfurd Notion which
Mr. Hobbes fuggeffs in his Phyficks, (Chap.
25. Setl. 5.) that All Matter is effentially
endued with an obfeure atlual Senfe and Percep
tion, but that there is required a Number and
apt Compofition of Parts to make up a clear
and diftintl Senfation or Confcioufnefs. For
from this Notion it would follow, that the
refulting Senfation or 'Confcioufpefe at laft,.
being but One diftinct Senfation or Confcioufnefs (as

nnd Natural Immortality of the Soul. 179
{ as is that of a Man ; ) the Senfation or
Confcioufnefs of every One of the conftituent
Particles, would be the individual Senfation or
Confcioufnefs of All and Each of the reft.
IV.
Every real Simple Quality, that refides
in any whole material Syftem, refides in
All the Tarts of that Syftem.
The Magnitude of every Body, is the Sum
of the Magnitudes of its feveral Parts. The
Motion of every Body, is the Sum of the Mo
tions, of its feveral Parts. The Weight of every
Body, is the Sum of the Weights of its feve
ral Parts. The* Heat of. every Body, is the * Note by
Heat of its feveral Parts. The Colour of every Heat here, |
Body is the Colour of its feveral Parts. And Jn^e^,-.<
the fame is univerfally true of every Simple 0„ which'
Quality refiding in any Syftem. For refiding caufes in
in the Whole, and not refiding in the Parts, Us the Sen-
is refiding in a Thing, and not refiding in it, Heat" By
at the fame time. co.w.that
V Magnitude
• and Figure,
Every real compound Quality, that refides ^^ par.
i# any whole material Syftem, is a Number ticuiar
of fimple Qualities refiding in all the y*rfj £^°t_bc
of that Syftem; fome* in one part, fome in ted to us;
another. &Ci
Thus in the Inftance of mixt Colours ;
When the Simples, Blue, fuppofe, and Yellow,
make the Whole appear Green ; In this Cafe,
That Portion of the Syftem, in which any one
of the particular Simple Qualities refides, isa
' Whole Syftem with refpect to, that Quality,
. and the Quality refiding in it, refides in the
N 2 feveral

,i 80 A Second Defence of the Immateriality
feveral Particles of which That Portion of the
Syftem is conftituted : And fo of the reft.
VI.
Every real Quality, Simple or Compound,
that refults from any whole material Syftem,
but does not refide in it, that is, neither in
All its diftindt Parts, nor in All the Parts of
fome Portion of it, according to the Expli
cation of the two foregoing Propofitions ;
is the Mode or Quality of fome Other Sub-
fiance, and not of That.
All fenfible fecondary Qualities, Heat,
Colour, Smell, Tafte, Sound, and the like, are
of this kind ; being in reality not Qualities
of the Bodies they are afcribed to, but Modes
of the Mind that perceives them.
VII.
Every Tower, Simple or Compound, that
refults from any whole material Syflem,
but does not refide in it, that is, in all its
Parts, in the manner before explained ; nor
yet refides in any Other Subftance, as its
Subject ; is no real Quality at all ; but muft
either be it felf a real Subftance, ( which
feems unintelligible;") or elfe it is nothing
but merely an ab/iracJ Name or Notion, as
ail Univerfals are.
Thus the Power refulting from the Texture
of a Rofe, to excite in us the Senfation of
Sweetnefs, is nothing but an abftratl Name,
fignifying a particular Motion and Figure of
certain Parts emitted. The Power of a Clock to

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. ** 8 1
to fhow the Hour of the Day, is nothing but
one new Complex Name, to exprefs at once the
feveral Motions of the Parts, and particularly
the determinate Velocity of the laft Wheel to
turn round once in twelve Hours : Upon the
flopping which Motion by the Touch of a Fin
ger or any other Impediment, without making
any alteration at all in the Number, Figure,
or Difpofition of the Parts of the Clock, the
Power wholly ceafes : and upon removing the
Impediment, by which nothing is reftored but
mere Motion, the Power returns again, which
is therefore no new real Quality of the Whole,
but only the mere Motion of the Parts, The
Power of a Pin to prick, is nothing diftinct
from its mere Figure permitting it to enter
the Skin. The Power of a Weight in one Scale
of a Balance, to afcend or defcend, upon
increafing or diminishing the Counterpoife in
the other Scale ; is not a new real Quality, di
ftindt from its abfolute Gravity, though it oc-
cafions a new Eft eel ; there being no Altera
tion at all made in the Weight it felf . The
Power of the Eye to fee, is not a real Quality
of the Whole Eye, but merely an abftratl Name
fignifying a Tranfmitting and Refracting of
the Rays of Light in a certain manner
through its feveral Parts ; Which Effect, by
the Interpofition or Removal of an Opake
Body, is deftroyed or renewed, without any
Alteration at all in the Eye it felf. A Key,
by having many new Locks made fit to it,
acquires a new Power of producing Effects,
which it could not before ; and yet no new
real Quality is produced, nor any alteration
at all made, in the Key it felf. And fo uni
verfally of all Powers of this kind. If thefe •
N 3 Powers

iZz rA SecondDefenee of the. Immateriality
Powers were any thing elfe, but mere ab
ftratl Names ; they would fignify Qualities
fubfifting without any Subjedt at all ; that is,
fuch as muft themfelves be diftinct Subftan
ces. Which is unintelligible, VIII.
Confcioufnefs is neither a mere abftratl
Name, ( fuch as are the Towers mentioned
in Trop. Vll ; nor <z Tower of exciting or
occafioning different Modes in a foreign Sub-
fiance, ( fuch as are all the fenfible Qualities
of Bodies, Prop. VI ; ) but a real Quality,
truly and properly inherent in the Subfecl
it felf, the Thinking Subftance.
If it was a mere abftratl Name ; it would be
nothing at all in the Perfon that Thinks, or
in the Thinking Subftance it felf ; but only
a Notion framed by the Imagination of fome
Other Being. For all thofe Powers which
are only abftratl Names, are not at all in the
Things whofe Powers they are called: but are
only Notions framed in Imagination, by the
Mind that obferves, compares and reafons
, about different Objetls without itfelfi.
If it was a Power of exciting or occafioning
different Modes in a foreign Subftance; Then
the Power of Thinking muft be before in that
foreign Subftance ; and that foreign Sub
ftance alone would in reality be Confcious,
and not This which excites the different
Modes in That foreign Subftance. For the
Power that is in one Subftance, of exciting
different Modes in another Subftance ; pre-
fuppofes neceffarily in that other Subftance
the Foundation of thofe Modes, Thus in the
Cafe

m*d Natural Immortality of the Soul. 1 8 i
Cafe of all the fenfible Qualities of Bodies 5
the Power of Thinking is beforehand in that
Being, wherein thofe Qualities excite or oc-
cafion different Modes of Thinking,
It remains therefore that it muft of necef
fity be a real Quality, truly and properly in
hering in the Subjeti. it felf , the Thinking Sub
ftance ; there being no other Species of Pow
ers or Qualities left, to which it can poffibly
be referred. And this indeed is of it felf as
evident by every Man's Experience, as it can
be rendred by any Explication or Proof
whatfoever.
IX.
No real Quality can refult from the
Compofition of different Qualities, fo as to
be a new Quality in the fame Subject, of
a different Kind or Species from all and
every one of the Component Qualities.
If it could, it would be a Creation of 'Some
thing out of Nothing : From compound Mo
tions, can arife nothing but Motion : From
Magnitudes, nothing but Magnitude: From
Figures, nothing hut Figure : From Compo
fitions of Magnitude, Figure, and Motion toge
ther ; nothing but Magnitude, Figure, and
Motion: From Mechanical Powers, nothing
but Mechanical Powers: From a Compofition
oi Colours, nothing but Colour, which it felf
( as appears by Microfeopes ) is ftill the fim
ple Colours of which it was compounded.
From Mixtures of Chymical Liquors, nothing
but Ferments ; which are only mere Motions
of the Particles in mixing, fuch Motions as
arife from the placing of Iron and a Load-
Stone near each other. Gravity, is not a Qua-
N 4 lity

18+ A Second Defence of the Immateriality
lity of Matter, arifing from its Texture or
any other Powers in it ; but merely an En
deavour to Motion, excited by fome foreign
Force ir Power. Magnetifm and EletJricity,
are not new Qualities, refulting from diffe
rent and unknown Powers; but merely E-
miffions of certain Streams of Matter, which
produce certain determinate Motions. Com
pofitions of Colours, can never contribute to
produce a Sound ; nor Compofitions of Mag
nitude and Figure, to produce a \Motion ; nor
neceffary and determined Motions, to produce a
free and indetermined Power of Self Motion ;
nor any Mechanical Powers whatfoever, to
produce a Power not Mechanical. And the fame
muft of neceffity hold univerfally true, of all
Qualities and Powers whatfoever, whether
known or unknown : Becaufe otherwife, as
hath been before faid, there would in the Com
pound be fomething created out of Nothing.

Confcioufnefs therefore being a real Qua
lity, ifJrop. Viii. ) and of a Kind fpecifi-
ca'iy different ffom all other Qualities
whci-lnr' known or unknown, which are
themuiv s acknowledged to be void of
Confcioufnefs i can never poffibly refult
from any » o,- pofition of fuch Qualities.
This is as c ident rrom the foregoing Pro-
pofitions as that a Sound cannot be the Re
fult of a Mixture of Colours and Smells ; nor
Extenfion the Kcfult of a Compofition of
Parts unextended, ..or Solidity the Refult of
P- fs not folid; whatever other different Qua-
2 lities3

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. i%$
lities, known or unknown, thofe conftituent
Parts may be fuppofed to be endued with.

XI.
No Individual Quality can be transferred
from one SubjeSl to another.
This is granted by All.
XII.
The Spirits and T articles of the Brain,
being loofe and in perpetual Flux, cannot
therefore be the Seat of that Confcioufnefs,
by which a Man not only remembers things
done many Years fince ; but alfo is Confci
ous that He himfelf the fame Individual
Confcious Being, was the Doer of them.
This follows evidently from the foregoing.
XIII.
The Confcioufnefs that a Man has at one
and the fame time, is One Confcioufnefs;
and not a Multitude of Confcioufneffes ; as
the Solidity, Motion, or Colour of any
piece of Matter is a Multitude of diftinct
Solidities, Motions, or Colours.
This is granted by All, who deny that the
Particles of the Brain, which they fuppofe
to conftitute a Confcious Subftance, are
themfelves each of them Confcious.
XIV.
Confcioufnefs therefore cannot at all re
fide in the Subftance of the Brain, or Spi
rits, or in any other material Syflem as its
Subjeti 3

rj$6 A Second Defence, ike.
Subject ; but muft be a Quality of fome
Immaterial Subftance.
This follows neceffarily from the forego
ing Propofitions compared together. For
fince every poffible Power of Matter, whe
ther known or unknown, muft needs be either,
i ft, a real Quality of the Matter to which it
is aftribed ; and then it muft inhere in the fe
veral diftinct Parts ; Or, 2dly, a Power of
exciting or occafioning certain Modes in fome
other Subjeti ; and then it is truly the Quality,
not of the Matter, but of that other Subjeti :
Or, 3_dly, a mere abftratl Name or Notion of
what is, properly fpeaking, no real Quality
at all, and inheres in no real Subject at all ;
And Confcioufnefs is acknowledged to be none
of thefe : It follows unavoidably, that it
muft of neceffity be a Quality qf fome Im^
material Subftance. XV.
Difficulties that arife afterwards, con
cerning Other Qualities of that Immateri
al Subftance, as whether it be Extended
or Unext ended} do not at all affect the
prefent Argument.
For thus even abftradt Mathematical De-
monftrations ; as thofe concerning the Infi
nite Divifibility of Quantity, the Eternity of
God, and his Immenfity ; have almoft infu-
perable Difficulties on the other Side : And
yet no Man, who underftands thofe Matters,
thinks that thofe Difficulties do at all weaken
the Force, or diminifh the Certainty of the
Demonftrations.
RE-*

REFLECTIONS O N
Mr. Clarke s Second Defence
O F H I S
L ET T E R
T O
Mr. DO DWELL.
-Vimq; omnem earn, qua vel agamus quid, vel

fentiamus, in omnibus Corporibus vivis cequaliter
effe fufam, nee feparabilem effe a Corpore, quippe
quce nulla fit, nee quicquam, nifi corpus unum
£3 f implex, itafiguratum ut temperatione natura;
vigeat & fenliat : affirmat Dicasarchus apud
Cicer. Tufc. Quaeft.
Nos autem animam corporalem & hie profitemur, &
in fiuo volumine probamus, habentem proprium
genus fubftantim, feliditatis, per quam quid di?
fenfire & pati poffit. Tertullian. de Refur-
redtione Carnis,

LONDON*
Printed in, the Year MDCCXXXt

1 189]

RE F LECTIONS O N
Mr. Clarke s Second Defence, &c.
F the Reader is not already tired
with the Continuance of this Dif
pute, concerning the Poffibility of
Matter's Thinking, I will prefume
fo far on his Underftanding and
Candour, as ( without endeavouring to lead
him into my Side of the Queftion by making
a previous Judgment of Mr. Clarke's Second
Defence of his Argument, made ufe of in a Let
ter to Mr. Dodweli, to prove the Immateria
lity and Natural Immortality of the Soul) to pro
ceed directly to the Queftion it felf, after I have
performed a Piece of Juftice to Mr. Clarke and.
the Reader, by acknowledging, that in my
Reply to Mr. Clarke's former Defence, I did
omit a Line in citing his Anfwer to my firft
Objection ; which, whether it was owing to a
Fault in the Prefis, or to my Negligence in
tranfcribing, I cannot fay : but I can affure the
Reader, it was out of no Defign to give a difi-
advantagious Reprefentation of his Senfe, and I
hope he will be induced to believe fo, when he
confiders that I made no manner of ufe of that
Re pre-

i 90 Refietlions on Mr: Clarke's 2d Defence
Reprefentation to the Difadvantage of his Argu-
s.JDefence, ment, and to excufe me in the fame ingenuous"
p. 148. Manner that Mr. Clarke has done.
The Queftion is, Whether a Syftem of Mat
ter can have a Power of Thinking, or an Indi
vidual Confcioufnefs fuperadded to it, or flow
from any Modification of fhat^Syftem.
aJDe/. By the Term Individual, when applied to
p. 1/0,15 1. Confcioufnefs, both Mr. Clarke and I underftand
one Confcioufnefs, in oppofition to a Multitude of
diftindt Confcioufneffes.
By a Powersoft* Thinking, T-;did underftand on
this Occafion Aclual Thinking, and not a Capa-
Reply, city of Thinking ; " for elfe, as I /aid, .Co&fci-
p. 113. •''t''-ioufnefs'cbuIclInt-t be properly employed; by
" Mr. Clarke to fignify the fame thing with a
" Power of 'Thinking *\ But to this State
of the Qu6ftionnMr. Clarke excepts; by faying,
id t>ef, ' That he can fee no' reafon' for 'fuch a Nicety of Di-
P- '49- ftintlion: For, 'fays1 he, the thing to be proved '-be-
Aing this, that a' divifible Subftance' ii not capable of
a Power of ' Thinking ; 'What difference can it
"make, whether by a Power of 'Thinking I under
ftand atJual T'hirikrng, or a Capacity of Think
ing? 'For he prt fumes, I will nor deny, but what
ever ii proved intapable of '-dtfuhPTbinking, is alfo
proved incapable of a Capacity of 'Thinking. ; aiid
whatever is proved incapable, of 'a Capacity of
'¦Thinking, ' iralfoproved incapable -of aclual Tbihk-
zdvef. 'ing. 'Arid further to fhew the Ncedleffnefs'M
p.i49.'J° diftinguifhing between atJual Thinking, and.' a
v Capacity of ¦ Thinking; he fays, "The "Reader ¦ niay
'Underftand- the Term Confcioufnefs 'mdiffereifly
for either ei Capacity of Thinking, or atJual ThMk-
•ihg, or- the rtfiex Ac! of Thinking ; becaufe his
Argument- p-oves univerfally, that Matter is nei
ther

of his L e t f e r to Mr. Dodweli.1 191
ther capable of the reflex AtJ, nor of the diretl
Atl, nor of the Capacity of Thinking.
1. Now allowing this to be as Mr. Clarke
reprefents it, what occafion was there for con
tending with me about the Senfe I fixed to the
Terms, Power of Thinking and Confcioufnefs ?
All that could be hoped for by him in this Dif
pute, is, by his own Account of the Matter,
as well attained by my underftanding a Power
of Thinking or Confcioufnefs, in that Senfe where
in I underftood thofe Terms, as if either of them
ftoOd for three Significations at once. For if his
Argument proves univerfally, that Matter can nei- *¦* r>f.
ther have the diretl Atl, nor the reflex4 Atl, nor p' I49'
tbe Capacity of Thinking ; And that whatever is P- Hi*
proved incapable of aclual Thinking, is proved in
capable of a Capacity of Thinking : And I may
add likewife, and that whatever is proved in
capable of atlual Thinking, is proved incapable
of the reflex Act of Thinking : Have I not
then Underftood him, in a Senfe that anfwered
•all the Ends and Purpofes of his Argument ?
2. But there is ftill the lefs Reafon, if poffible,
to difpute with me about this Matter ; becaufe
he exprefsly fays, The Reader may -underftand
the Term Confcioufnefs indifferently in all or any
>of the before-mentioned Significations. So that
I have taken but the 'fame -Liberty he allows to
every Other Reader ; and till I am fhown a Dif
ference between an Anfwerer and a Reader m
this refpect, I fhall think my felf juftified by
"What Mr. Clarke allows to his Reader. But
that the Reader may fee the Ground of his
Complaint againft me, and that I may do Mr.
-Clarke Juftice, I will cite the whole Sentence
thathe u'fes on this occafion, becaufe it feems
to me to contain one of the niceft Diftinciions that

j 9 % Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* rd Defence1
tdDtf. that ever I met with. Says he, The Reader need
*>M9M°-n0t trouble himfelf with the Nicety of DiftintJion,
between a Capacity of Thinking, aclual Thinking,
and the reflex Atl of Thinking, but may under
ftand Confcioufnefs indifferently in all or any of thefe
Significations. Which is as much as to fay, that
the Reader need not underftand Confcioufnefs
indifferently in any of the before- mentioned
Significations, and yet may underftand it indif
ferently in any of thefe Signification : for I
cannot fee, but that whoever underftands Con
fcioufnefs in any one of thofe Significations, muft
ufe that Nicety of DiftintJion he complains of
whether he will or no : For by reftraining
Confcioufnefs to any one of thofe Significations,
he neceffarily diftinguifhes that one from the
other two. And therefore I muft own, I can
not fee the leaft Reafon Mr. Clarke had to blame
me for a needlefs Nicety of DiftintJion, when he
allows me to underftand Confcioufnefs indiffe
rently in three Significations ; one of which I
did affign as my Meaning or Idea of that
Word. 3. Since then it is evident that I have under
ftood him in a Senfe that anfwered all the Ends
and Purpofes of his Argument, and in a Senfe
wherein he allows his Reader to underftand
him ; he ought not to have fuppofed fuch a
Reafon as he is pleafed to affign for me, why I
diftinguifh between actual Thinking, and a Ca
pacity of Thinking, as he does, when he fays,
a</r>ff. That he cannot fee any Reafon {unlefs it were to
p. 149. perplex tbe Reader with a new Queftion, Whe
ther the Soul always atJually thinks or not; which
is wholly foreign to tbe Matter at prefent in Dif
pute ) why IJhould affirm, " That Confciouf-
" nefs could not be properly employed by Mr.
'" Clarke

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 195
" Clarke to fignify the fame Thing with a
" Power of Thinking, unlefs by a Power of
*' Thinking be underftood not Capacity to
" think, but actual Thinking". I fay, he
ought not to have affigned fuch a Reafon for
me ; for if I have underftood him in one of
thofe Senfes that he allows his Reader to un
derftand him in, and by confequence acknow
ledges that I do not perplex the Reader with a
new Queftion, by underftanding a Power of
Thinking to ftand for atlual Thinking, but that I
keep my felf to the old Queftion by under
ftanding him in that manner ; What ground
could he have to imagine, that I had any defign
to perplex the Reader with a new Queftion, but
by either making the fame Queftion to be both
new and old, or two different Queftions, one
and the fame Queftion ? I fhall not prefume to
enter fo far into his Thoughts, as to fay, That
though he acknowledge his Argument to be di
rected againft the Senfe in which I underftand
Power of Thinking and Confcioufnefs, and that all
that he requires from his Argument, equally
follows from Matter's being proved incapable
of actual Thinking, as if I underftood him in
any Other Senfe that he can contend for \ I
fay, I fhall not prefume to enter fo far into his
Thoughts as to tell the Reader, that I can fee
no reafon for his imagining that I had any
defign to perplex him with a Queftion foreign to the
Matter, ('unlefs it be to perplex this Difpute in
that part where it is moftneceffary to be clear)
but chufe rather to demand a Reafon of his
Conduct, when I cannot affign a good one for
him. And that is what I think I had reafon to
expect from him, if he means any thing by at
tributing Candour and Ingenuity to wbat % have it r>f.
O written P- '48-

194 Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
written befides mere Compliment, whether I
could have given a good Reafon or no for un
derftanding Confcioufnefs to fignify in this
Difpute aclual Thinking, and confequently for'
distinguishing between actual Thinking and a
Capacity of Thinking.
4. But to give Mr. Clarke and the Reader full
Satisfaction on this Head, I will fhow that the
whole Difpute turns upon that Diftinction,
That my Objections were entirely founded on
that Distinction, and that Mr. Clarke's not at
tending to it has rendered all his Anfwers fo-
Letttr to reign to the Matter of my Objections, Mr.
Air. D. Clarke had faid, It is plain, unlefs Matter were
P- "' effentially Confcious — ho Syftem of it in any pof
fible Compofition or Divifion can be an individual
Confcious Being. Now upon my Principles, and
I fuppofe the Principles of all thofe who fay a
divifible Being may have a Power of Think
ing, it is impoffible to give any Anfwer at all
to this Propofuion, but by reflraining the Senfe
of the Term Confcioufnefs : becaufe on Suppofi
tion, that Confcioufnefs ftands' at one and the
fame time for the direct Act, for the reflex Act,
and for the Capacity of Thinking, what is meant
by thofe Words cited out of Mr. Clarke's Let
ter to Mr. Dodweli, will be allowed by me to be
partly true and partly falfe. I grant the Rea
soning to be good thus far, That if Matter be
not made by God capable of Thinking, or
effentialiy confcious in that Senfe, That no
Syftem of it in any poffible Compofition or Divifion
can be an individual confcious Being ; that is, No-
Motion whatever can give Matter a Capacity
of Thinking : and only deny them to be true,.
underftood after this manner, That unlefs all
Matter did actually think, or was effentially confcious

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 19*
confcious in that Senfe, no Syftem of it in any
poffible Compofition or Divifion can actually
think. So that what I maintain is in fhort this,
That either Matter was made originally capa
ble of Thinking, or may be made by God ca
pable of Thinking after its beginning to exift ;
and notwithstanding that no Part of it may
really, or actually think, yet by virtue of that
Capacity fome Syftems may by Compofition
ahd Divifion become Subjedts of Thinking.
All that I fuppofe arifes new from Compofition
and Divifion is nothing elfe but a new Opera
tion, or actual Thinking ; and therefore my
Principles led me to underftand by a Power of
Thinking, actual Thinking, and confequently
to diftinguifh between actual Thinking, and a
Capacity of Thinking. And had any end of
Truth been to be ferved by further diftinguifh-
ing, I had taken the fame Liberty to have
fpoken of Confcioufnefs in the moft ftritl and 2 Df
exatl Senfe of the Word, as it ftands for the re- P- "4S*-
ftex AH of Thinking, by which Iknow that I think
as I have now done in ufing it for atlual Think
ing. 5. As I could not make any Objections to
Mr. Clarke's Argument but by diftinguifhing
Between atlual Thinking and a Capacity of Think
ing ; fo in fact my firft Objedtion is grounded
on that Diftindtion. I fpeak direftly of Think
ing as an Operation: And when I fay, " That Reply,
" Matter of Fact is fo plain that a Man can- p -109,1 ie.
" not turn his Eye but he will meet with ma-
" terial Syftems, wherein there are Individual
«' Pov/ers which are not in every one, nor in
" any one of the Particles that compofe them
u when taken apart and confidered fingly, and
"inftance in a Rofe that produces in us the
;- ¦¦- O 2 Sen-

ria6 Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* id Defence
" Senfation of Sweetnefs ; 1 plainly fuppofed
ie the Matter of which thofe material Syftems
'* confifted, effentially capable of thofe Indi-
*' vidual Powers which are obfervable upon the
«' different Difpofition of their Parts, and like-
" wife the Matter of which a Rofe confifted
" effentially capable of producing that Senfa-
11 tion in us ; and that it was from the Com-
" pofition of that Matter, of which it did con-
<¦' fift, into the Form of a Rofe, whence the
*' particular Operation that caufes our Senfa-
*• tionarifes".
Sect. i. In order to prove that Confcioufnefs
could not inhere in, or refult from a divifible
Subftance, Mr. Clarke enumerated all the pof
fible Powers of Matter under three Heads.
•fi Dff. i • Powers really inhering in the Subjeti to which
p- 9*-« 93- they are ufually afcribed, fuch as Magnitude and
&c- Motion, which are Sums or Aggregates of Powers
of the fame Kind.
2. Modes produced in fome other Subjeti, as for
inftance, the Sweetnefs and Colour of a Rofe, which
are vulgarly looked upon as Individual Powers.
But this, fays he, is only a vulgar andgrofs Errour.
3. Certain Effetls or Powers that do not pro
perly refide in any Subjeti at all, fuch as Magne-
tifin, and Eletlrical Attratlions.
From whence it follows, that according, to.
Mr. Clarke no Powers can inhere in Matter, but
fuch Powers as Magnitude and Motion, which
are only Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the
ijl Def. fame kind : And therefore if Confcioufnefs can in-
P- r-9l- here in a Syftem of Matter, it muft neceffarily be
ihe Sum and Refult of the Confcioufneffes of the
feveral Parts, aud fo there would be as many di
ftintl Confcioufneffes as there are Particles of Mat ter

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 197
ter of which the Syftem confifts, which he fuppofes
will he granted to bs very abfiurd. Now in an
fwer to this Argument I faid, " That it was Reply,
*' nothing elfe but Argumentum ad Ignorantiam ; P- ' *4*
*' for by enumerating his three forts of Powers
"' or Qualities of Matter, and fhowing that the
" two laft are improperly called Powers or
c* Qualities, he does fuppofe that a Syftem of
'* Matter has and can have only Powers of one
'* fort or kind, fuch as Magnitude and Mb-
" tion, which are only the Sums and Aggre-
" gates of Powers of the fame kind : which
" what is it el(e but to argue, That becaufe
" we know of no other Powers in Matter of
** a different Kind from Magnitude and Mo-
** tion, therefore it has and can have no other
." Powers of a different Kind " ?
But Mr. Clarke fays, If a Disjuntlion he com- zd Def.
plete (as that in which he enumerates the feveral ?¦*?*>' ft*
forts of Powers of which Matter is capable, either
is ; or elfe I ought to have proved that another
Member could be added to it, to fhow that it was
not ) it contains in it all the poffible Particulars,
as well the unknown as thofe tbat are everfe well
known. 1. It is very true, If a Disjunction be com
plete, it muft contain in it all poffible Particu
lars both known and unknown ; but this a-
mounts to no more than to fay, that if a Dif-
junction be complete it is complete, and does
by no means reach the Queftion, which is,
how he can know that his Disjunction is com
plete ( if ranking all the true and proper Pow
ers of Matter under one Head, can be called
a Disjunction) when he produces no Proof that
his Heads are rightly diftributed, and do con
tain under them all the poffible Powers of
O 3 Mat-

I98 Reflections on Mr, Clarke'* zd Defence
Matter both known and unknown ; and till he
can prove that, he can never clear his Argu:
ment from being Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.
He therefore miftakes the Objection of Argu
mentum ad Ignorantiam, when he fays, That his
Disjuntlion either is complete, or elfe I ought to
have proved that another Member could be added to
it to fhow that' it was not : For the Nature of
that Objection does not oblige me to add ano
ther Member to his Disjunction, but obliges
him to prove that another Member cannot be
added to his Disjunction ; for unlefs Mr, Clarke
can prove it impoffible for another Member to
be added to his Disjunction, he can never
know that another Member cannot be added to
it, and confequently an Argument drawn from
a Disjunction which is not demonftrated to be
complete, is purely an Argumentum ad Ignoran
tiam ; and to put me upon adding another
Member to it, is to put me upon more than
my Objedlion obliged me to, nay is inconfiftent
with the Nature of fuch an Objection, and mix
ing things that are foreign together.
2. But I did not only tell him that his Ar
gument was an Argumentum ad Ignorantiam,
which was fufficient to overthrow a precarious
Disjunction, but did inftance in feveral Powera
of Matter that did not fall in with his pisjunc-
&epfy, tion. I inftanced particularly in the Power of
p. u8. the Eye to contribute to the Act of Seeing,
( for though I certainly think the Eye to be
the Organ of Seeing, as I do the Nofe of*
Smelling, or the Lungs of Breathing, and I may
add the Brain of Thinking, yet I attribute in
my Argument in this place no more to that
Syftem of Matter called the Eye, that I might
not beg the Queftion between us, than fuch un-
doubted

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 199
doubted Matter of Fact as I think no one will
deny, viz. that by the Difpofition of its Parts
it is operated on in a peculiar Manner by ex
ternal Objects, and that it does contribute by
its own Operation towards the Act of feeing)
as an Operation of a Syftem of Matter, that
did not inhere in its Parts in the fame Senfe
with Magnitude and Motion in Body : *' For
" divide and vary the Parts of Matter as
" much as you will, there will be Magnitude
" and may be Motion ; but divide or vary
" the leaft Part of the Eye, andthe Power of
" contributing towards the Act of Vifion is
" entirely at an end ".
But that I may explain my felf more fully
on this Head, I fhall obferve, that not only
the Power of the Eye to contribute towards
the Act of Seeing, is a Proof that there are
Powers in Syftems of Matter that inhere not in
the Parts of thofe Syftems fingly confidered,
but almoft every thing we fee, feel, hear, tafte
or fmell, may convince us of the Exiftence of
fuch Powers. Does not a mufical Inftrument,
by being operated on in a peculiar Manner, o-
perate on us again, and produce in us feveral
agreeable Senfations ? And is not that Power or
Ability to be atJed on by us, and to atl on us, pe
culiar to the Modification of that Body, and
not the Refult of Powers of the fame kind,
fince there are parts of that Syftem of Matter
abfolutely neceffary to the Continuance of that
Power in them which produces our Senfations?
For as the Strings of a Violin are not fufficient
of themfelves, fo neither are the remaining
Parts of that Inftrument to produce in us thofe
harmonious Sounds that are caufed by the
O 4 whole

200 Reflections on Mr. Clarke* zd Defence
whole Syftem of that Matter, being modified
into that peculiar Form.
What are particular Figures in Bodies, fuch
as Roundnefs or Squarenefs, but Qualities or
Powers in Bodies that are not the Sum of Pow
ers of the fame kind ? For divide a round Body
into what Number of Parts you pleafe, and it
will never be found to confift only of round
Parts, no more than a fquare or cubical Body
will be found to confift only of fquare or cu
bical Parts ; fince a round Body may by the
Motion or Alteration of its Parts become cubi
cal, and a cubical Body by the Motion or Al
teration of its Parts become round.
zdvef. But Mr. Clarke fays, That Seeing in the Eye
is not a real inherent Quality, but merely Situati
on cf Parts and Pores, fo as to be the Occafion
of an Effetl wholly extrinftcal to it felf, an Effetl
produced in feme other Subftance by Rays tranfenit-
ted through the Pores of the Eye ; and is one of
thoj'e Powers, &c. ranked under his third Head of
Powers, viz. an Effetl that does not refide in any
Subjeti at all.
In this Paragraph Mr. Clarke feems to con
found his fecond and third Heads together, by
making the Power of the Eye to fee to be both
an Effetl produced in fome other Subjeti, and an
Effetl refiding in no Subjeti at all at the fame
time. But I will fhow Mr. Clarke, that it is
neither the one nor the other ; for what is the
Tranfmiffton of Rays in a peculiar Manner, but
an Operation particular to the Parts of the Eye
under fuch a Modification ? And is there not
then a peculiar Motion of the Eye whereby
the Soul is made capable of feeing Objects
tranfmitted, which Operation or Mode of Mo
tion entirely ceafes upon the leaft Alteration
2 of

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 201
©f the Parts ? Is not the whole Being affected,
and does it not adt in a different Manner from
each of ks Parts fingly confidered, and from
the whole Syftem under another Modification ?
Now it is that manner of acting peculiar to the
Structure of the Eye, that I call the Power of
the Eye ( which does not inhere in the Parts of
the Eye in the fame Senfe that it inheres in that
whole Eye ) in the Idea whereof is not only
contained an Effect wrought in another Sub
ject, viz. Atlual Seeing in the Soul, but an O-
peration on the Subject of Seeing : As I fup
pofe Thinking not to be merely an effect
¦wrought on another Subjedt, viz. Ideas and the
Images of things, but is likewife the Adtion of
the Brain, or Spirits of the Brain on thofe
Ideas and Images of things. And therefore if
the Power of the Eye to contribute towards
feeing be a Mode of Motion peculiar to that
Syftem of Matter, and Motion be allowed
truly and properly to inhere in the Subjedt that
moves ; then the Power of the Eye to contri
bute towards feeing, is neither a Mode pro
duced in another Subject, nor an Effect refiding
in no Subject at all. But to this Inftance, and
all other Inftances that I have mentioned before,
it may be anfwered, That the Power to con
tribute towards feeing, and the Power of a
mufical Inftrument to produce an harmonious
Sound, being really nothing elfe but an Impref
fion of a particular Kind or Mode of Motion
which thofe Syftems are capable of receiving
from the particular Difpofitions of their Parts,
and the Actions of other Beings on them ; and
Roundnefs or Squarenefs being nothing elfe but
Modes of Figures, the Power of the Eye, ofa
mufical Inftrument, and the Qualities of Round nefs

202 Reflections! on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
nefs and Squarenefs are only the "Sums of the;
Motions and Figures of the Parts, or Sums of
Powers of the fame Kind, and confequently fall
in with the Powers of Matter that Mr. Clarka
ranked under the firft Head of Diftribution of
the Powers of Matter, and are defective Simi
litudes to prove the real Exiftence of fuch
Powers as inhere in a Syftem of Matter, with
out i hering in the Parts of the Syftem fingly
con (id <- red.
This, if I miftake not, comprehends the in-
trre Strength of all that can be faid againft my
Inftances ; and an Anfwer to it will fet this Dif
pute in a clearer Light than poffibly it has hi
therto been, and perhaps give Mr. Clarke par
ticular Satisfaction with relation to the Incon-
ciufivenefs of his Argument, by detecting whafi
I conceive has particularly impofed upon him.;
In anfwer therefore to this Objection, I own,
fince I undertook to give a Proof drawn from
Matterof Fadl, that there are Individual Pow
ers peculiar to Syftems of Matter, without be
longing to each of their Parts fingly confidered,
I am obliged either to clear thofe Inftances I
have given, or affign other Inftances, or elfe.
own that there are no known Powers in Mat
ter, but what are the Sums of Powers of the
fame kind. And therefore to fhow that my In
ftances are pertinent, I diftinguifh between Nu
merical Powers and Generical Powers. By Nu-.
merical Powers I underftand fuch Powers as Mo
tions and Figures of the fame Species. The
Power of the Eye to contribute towards feeing,
is a Species of Motion, and the Roundnefs of
a Body is a Species of Figure. By Generical
Powers I underftand all the feveral Species of
Numerical Powers ; as Motion fignifies all the
various

of his Le tter to Mr. Dodweli, 205
various Species of Motion, and Figure all the
various Species of Figure. Now if the Rea
der will be pleafed to apply the foregoing Di
ftinction, he may fee that the whole of the
Objection is founded on an Equivoque of the
Terms, Powers of the fame kind : for if Powers
of the fame kind be underftood generically, then
I do agree that the known Powers of Matter
are nothing elfe but the Sums or Powers of the
fame kind; that is, the Figure and Motion of
a Body confift of the Figures and Motions of
the Parts. But if the Terms Powers of tbe
fame kind be taken numerically, ( that is, as
Powers really exift ) then there are Powers in-
hering in Syftems pf Matter that are not the
Sums of Powers of the fame kind : As the
Roundnefs of a Body is not the Sum of the
Roundnefies of the Parts ; nor the Power of a
mufical Inftrument to caufe an harmonious
Sound, the Sum of Powers of the fame kind
in the Parts fingly confidered. I fhall now ap
ply what I have faid to Confcioufnefs, or a
Power of Thinking; and to make my felf
the more intelligible, will fuppofe Confciouf
nefs ( of whofe Nature I may be fuppofed igno
rant ) to be a Mode of Motion, and not a
Mode of fome unknown Power ; and the ra
ther, becaufe I have to do with a Gentleman
that underftands the Rules of arguing too well,
to impute that to me as my Opinion, which I
only take the Liberty to fuppofe. If Confci
oufnefs then be confidered as a Mode of Mo
tion, as Roundnefs is a Mode of Figure, it will
be fo far from being true,, that if Confciouf
nefs inheres in a Syftem of Matter, it muft be
the Sum of the Confcioufneffes of the Parts,
that it will be a Contradiction to make it the
Sum

204- Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
Sum of the Confcioufneffes of the Parts, as It
is a Contradiction to make Roundnefs to con
fift in the Roundneffes of the Parts : though I
would readily grant, that was Confcioufnefs a
generical Power like Figure and Motion, it
would be likewife the Sum and Refult of the
Confcioufneffes of the feveral Parts ; and fo
there would be as many diftinct Confciouf
neffes, as there are Particles of Matter, of
which the Syftem confifts ; which I do allow
to be very abfurd. What I have now faid I
think fufficient to fhow, that my Inftances to
prove that there are Powers in Matter that are
not the Sums of Powers of the fame kind,
were rightly chofen, and confequently to fhow
that Confcioufnefs, of whofe Nature we are
ignorant, may inhere in a Syftem of Matter,
without being the Sum of the Confcioufneffes
of the Parts. Wherefore I take the Liberty
to conclude, that befides fuch generical Pow
ers, as Motion, Figure, tic. that Mr. Clarke
only confiders under his firft Head ( which ac
cording to him contains all the true and pro
per Powers of Matter ) there are Numerical
( or if Mr. Clarke pleafes, Individual) Powers,
fuch as particular Modes of Motion, and par
ticular Modes of Figure in certain Syftems of
Matter, which he has omitted the Confiderati
on of: for had he confidered Confcioufnefs as a
Mode of fome Power in Matter, he could ne-
ifi Def. ver haye fa-id, If Confcioufnefs could poffibly be a
P- 9*. 93- Quality inherent in a Syftem of Matter, if muft
likewife neceffarily be tbe Sum of tbe Confciouf
neffes of the feveral parts ; but the contrary, If
human Confcioufnefs be a Mode of fome gene
rical Power in Matter, it muft not be the Sum
of the Confcioufneffes of the Parts. T©

of toLETTERft* Mr. Dodweli.' 205
To make this Matter ftill clearer, and an
fwer all that I think can be alledged, I take the
Liberty to examine a Paffage relating to the
Argument that I am now upon, in the Hiftori-
cal and Critical Dictionary of that learned and
acute Philofopher Mr. Bayle, a zealous Afferter
of the Immateriality of the Soul, who denied
Thinking could be a Mode of Matter : * Be
caufe, fays he, all Modes of which we have any
knowledge, are of fuch a Nature that they never
perifh, but to make room for another Mode of the
fame kind. There is no Figure that is deftroyed
but by another Figure, and no Colour but what
makes room for another Colour. Therefore if we
would reafon from wbat we obferve in Matter, we
ought to fay, that no Thought ceafies in Matter, but
to make room for fome other Thought by which it is
fucceeded, divide and confound this Matter how
you will. I am very far from denying what is
felf-evident, that no Mode ever ceafes but to
give place to another Mode : and though it
fhould be always to a Mode of the fame gene
rical Kind, as one Colour or Figure is con
ftantly fucceeded by another, fince all Matter"
muft neceffarily exift under fome Figure, and
appear under fome Colour to the Eyes of Ani
mals ; yet it is no good Confequence, that
every Mode muft unavoidably be fucceeded by
a Mode of the fame numerical Species, as that

* Car toutes les modalitez dont on a quelque connoiiTance
font d'une telle nature, qu'elles necelTcnt que pour faire place
a une autre modalire de meme genre. II n'y point de figure
qui foit detruite que par une autre Figure, ni point de cou
leur qui foit chafle que par une autre couleur. sAinfi pour
bien raifonner Ton doit dire qu'il n'y a point de fentiment
qui foit chafle de fa Subfiance que par l'lntroduftion de
quelque autre Sentiment, P. 104,4.
Round

206 Reflections on Mr. Clarke* zd Defence
Round or Blue muft ftill be fucceeded by Round
or Blue; which would entirely deftroy all
Change or Succeffion ' of Modes whatever, and
fo deprive the Univerfe of all Motion or Di-
verfity. Now if Thought be fuppofed a Spe
cies of Motion, then it never ceafes indeed, but
to make room for feme other Motion ( the Par
ticles of all Bodies being in perpetual Action,
as well as under fo the Figure or Colour ) but
it follows not that the fiicceeding Motion muft
always be a Thought for the Reafons and Ex
amples already alledged, no more than that the
Motion of a going Clock exifted in the feveral'
Parts of it before,* or continues after they are
feparated. Now that human Confcioufnefs or
Thinking is a Mode of fome generical Power
in Matter, will, in my Opinion, feem evident
to every Man that confults his own Experi
ence, and fuffers it rtot to be contradicted or
Confounded by unintelligible Diftindtions or So-
'phiftry.' Thinking or Human Confcioufnefs
begins, continues and ends, or has Generation,;
Sdcceffion and Corruption, like all other Modes
of Matter ; as like them it is divided and deter
mined, fimple or compounded, and fo on. But
if the Soul or Principle of Thinking be undi
vided, how can it think fucceffively, divide, ab
stract, combine or ampliate, retain or revive
Impreffions in the Memory ? And how can it
be capable, partly or. wholly, to forget any.
thing ? All which Phenomena are naturally
conceived, and may be commodioufly explained
by the Springs and Movements, and Recepta^
cles ; by the Vigour, Perfection, Diforder of
Decay of a bodily Organ, but not by any
thing indivifible. 4 Does

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 207
Does not Experience further convince us,
that our ordinary Habits, no lefs than all our
Actions, are corporeal -, thofe of contemplating
and meditating, as well as thofe of fingingand
dancing ? Are we not frequently as much tired
by the One, as by tlie other ? Which c^juld ne
ver be, if Contemplation and Meditation were
Immaterial. The Reaction of our Thoughts
and Words on one another does manifeftly prove
the Corporeity of both ; the Word being no
fooner fpoken than the Idea is excited, and the
revived Idea bringing its Name immediately
into our Remembrance : If we forget the one
or the other, it betokens fome Defect in the
Organ, as it isvifible in Children and old Peo
ple ; the Fibres of whofe Nerves, and the
Confiftence of whofe Brains are ordinarily too
moift and remifs in the one, as they are, too dry
and rigid in the other. Nor does Want of Me
mory, or Slownefs of Conception appear in
Perfons of a middle Age, but from fome af-
fignable Caufe that difcompofes the Organ.
Human Thinking being therefore a Mode of
Matter, all Parts of Matter may be fuppofed
capable of producing it, not neceffarily indeed,
and at all times, no more than any other Modes,
but only under a convenient Structure and
Difpofition.— Upon the Principles I have now more fully
explained, I think I might leave it to the intel
ligent Reader, or to Mr. Clarke himfelf, tofolve
the remaining Difficulties that he urges : but to
fhow my Willingnefs to give Satisfaction to
thofe who are of opinion I fhould not other-
wife pay refpect enough to a Man of his Abili- t
ty, I proceed to confider whatever I conceive
affects the Bottom of the Caufe between us.
I had

208 Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
Reply, I had faid, " That to, fuppofe a Power ari-
p.ntf. «c fmg from Matter, withbut belonging tothe
«* Parts of which the whole confifts, is not to
" fuppofe an Univerfal to exift, but a particu-
«' lar Power exifting, to which feveral parti-
«' cular -Powers contribute ; as every Man
" is a particular Man, though various Powers
" are neceffary to conftitute him of that
" Species".
zdDef. To this Mr. Clarke anfwers, That if that
p- »f3- Whole or Refult, which I call a particular Power,
le entirely and fpecifically different from all and
every one of the particular Powers contributing to
it, as Thinking is from all the Particles not endued
with Thought ; I fhall find if I confider it care
fully, that it is as certain as any Arithmetical De
monftration, that fuch a particular Power is a
whole bigger than all its Parts. To fhow the
Want of Force in this Anfwer, let us apply it
to Roundnefs ; for ifit concludes againft Think
ing's arifing out of Particles not fingly endued
with Thinking, it will equally conclude againft
the Poffibility of the Exiftence of Roundnefs
in Body, which no more confifts of feveral
Roundneffes, ( fince in a round Body of an
Inch diameter, it is as impoffible that any one
Particle of the Surface fhould be round, as it
is needlefs that any other fhould be fo ; and
therefore probable in many cafes, that not one
Particle of a round Body is round in particu*
la-r ) no more, I fay, than Thinking or Con
fcioufnefs does of feveral Confcioufneffes, and is
as fpecifically different from other Figures, as
Confcioufnefs is from a circular Motion. If
the Whole or Refult, which I call a particular
Power, be fpecifically different from all and every
one of the particular Powers contributing to it, as
Round-

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli, 209
Roundnefs is from allibeParficl.es not endued with
Roundnefs, I fhall find if I confider it carefully,
that it is as .certain as-.any Arithmetical Denwn-
.flration, that fuch a particular Power is a whole
bigger than' all its Parts. But in .behalf of
Roundnefs as well as Thinking, I anfwer, That
it is fo far from being as certain as an Arithme
tical Demonftration , that fuch a particular
Power is a Whole bigger than all its Parts,
that it is an Arithmetical Demonftration that
fuch a particular Power as Roundnefs is, is
tout juft equal to ail the Parts of which that
Roundnefs confifts : For -what more goes to
the Compofition^of Roundnefs, than the Con
junction of feverasl Particles not fingly endued
with Roundnefs ? And agreeably to the Suppo
fition I lately made, what more goes to the
Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of
feveral Particles, not each endued .wich-j that
Species of Motion called Thinking ?
— - 2. But t:o proceed a Step further, fuppofing
we could hot account for the Beginning of
¦Confcioufnefs. or Roundnefs from. the various
Compofition of Matter, yet I cannot fee what
Reafon there is to exclude even created Beings
from fuperadding Powers to Matter, that, are
not always exifting in Matter. If Matter is
not effentially active, as I prefume Mr. Clarke
contends it is not, I would ask, upon the Sup
pofition of fome Parts of it being at abfolute
reft, whether finite material Beings in Motion
were not fufficient of themfelves to put them
into Motion, though they had no Motion be
fore ? Was not Matter's Capacity .of Motion
fufficient to make it move, as foon as it was
impelled by another Being ?. In like manner, a
Capacity to think may.be fufficient to caufe ys
P to

zio Reflections on Mr. Clarice'* za 'uejence
to think, though we are fometime without
thinking ; as a Capacity to think of a Trian
gle is ground enough to make us think upon
it whenever that Figure is placed before our
Eyes, though we never have as yet thought
upon it at all. And this I take to be the Cafe
of Operations of all kinds in finite Beings,
viz. That it is fo far from being a Repugnancy,
to fuppofe them to have a Beginning of their
Exiftence, that if we don't fuppofe a Begin
ning of Operations , we muft deftroy all
Change or Succeffion whatever, and fo entirely
deprive the Univerfe of all Diverfity.
id Def. It is urged by Mr. Clarke, That to annex Con-
p. 1 58. feioufnefs tot fo flux a Subftance as the Brain, or
the Spirits in it, is a very great Abfurdity : For if
the Parts of tbe Brain or Spirits be ( as they cer
tainly are ) in perpetual flux and change ; it will
follow, that Confcioufnefs, by which I not only
remember that certain things were done many Tears
fence, but alfo am confcious that they were done by
the very fame individual confcious Being wbo now
remembers them ; it will follow, he fays, that
Confcioufnefs is transferred from one Subject to ano
ther ; that is to fay, that it is a real Quality which
fubfifis without inhering in any SubjecJ at ally in
the Examination of this Argument I think
fomething will appear quite contrary to what
Mr. Clarke imagines, That it is fo far from
being abfurd to annex human Confcioufnefs to
fo flux a Subftance as the Brain, that it will
rather be abfurd to annex it to any other Sub
ftance but fo flux a one as the Brain : For if
we utterly forget, or ceafe to be confcious of
having done many things in the former Parts'
.of our Lives which we certainly did, as much
as any of thofe things which we are confcious that

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 2 1 r
- that we have done ; and if in fact we do by
degrees forget every thing which we do not re
vive by frequent Recollection, and by again
and again imprinting our decaying Ideas ; and
if there be in a determinate Time a partial or
total flux of Particles in our Brains : What can
better account for our total Forgetfulnefs of
fome things, our partial Forgetfulnefi. of o-
thers, than to fuppofe the Subftance of the Brain
in a conftant Flux ? And what can better fhow
that Confcioufnefs is not transferred from one
Subject to another, than our forgetting totally
or partially, according to the Brain's being
more or lefs in a Flux ? But I will fuppofe that
I am confcious to have done fome things, with
out having one Particle of the Brain the fame
that I had when I did thofe things ; how then
can I be confcious that I did them, without al
lowing Confcioufnefs to be transferred from
one Subjedt to another ? This I think contains
the Strength of Mr. Clarke's Objection. In
anfwer to which, I will fuppofe my felf con
fcious at Forty of having been carried to a
Market or Fair at five Years old, without any
Particle of Matter about me, the fame which
I had at that Age : Now in order to retain the
Confcioufnefs of that Action, it is neceffary to
revive the Idea of it before any confiderable
flux of Particles, ( otherwife I muft totally
lofe the Memory of it, as I do of feveral things
done in my Childhood ) and by reviving the
Idea of that Adtion, I imprint afrefh the
Confcioufnefs of having done that Action, by
which the Brain has as lively an Impreffion of
Confcioufnefs ( though it be not entirely com-
pofed of the fame Particles ) as it had the
Day after it did the Action, or as it has of a
P 2 Triangle,

2 1 i Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* zd 'faeftnce.
Triangle, or ahy other new Idea not before
imprinted on it. Cbhfcioufnefs of having done
that Actldn is an idea imprinted on the Brain,
by recollecting or bringing into view otir
Ideas before they are quite worn out ; which
Idea continues in me, not Only the Memory
ofthe Action it felf, but that I did its And
if there is every how artji then a Recollection
*of \ paft Action, Mr.. Clarke may, by what I
have faid, -conceive a Man may be confcious
pf thihgs done by him-, though he has not one
Pa'rtfcredf Matter the fame that he had at tlje
doing of tHofe 'thirfgs, without Confcioufnefs' s
being transferred from 'one Subjeti to another in
any abfurd SehTedf thofe words.
Ididinciderttally, in my Reply to Mr. Clarke's
firft Defence, whither. I refer the Reader for
\epiy, the Occafibn, make this Suppofition, *\As
p. 117. " What feeihed Matter of pact to me: That
" the Matter of which an Egg confifts, doth
" entifelyxoriftitute the ybung one ; and that
•*' the Action 'of -Senfation began under a.par-
" ticular Difpofition of the Parts by Motion,
** without the Addition Of an immaterial and
zdDef. " immortal SOul": Which Mr. Clarke fays
p. 163. is in every ipar t contrary to all 'the Difcoveries in
'Anatomy, and to alilrue 'Philofophy ; forfofaris
it from being hue, thatthe Matter of the Eggy
by any* particular -Difpofition of its Parts by-Mb-
tidn, is formed into or1 conftitMes the young Ohe,
tbat it dobs not conftitute it -at 'all, -not fo much "as
the Body of it, (bnV only ferves it for NourifhmZnt
and Gromb: Tt bang as impoffible that the'ttn-
-organized Body 'of ^Chicken fliould, by the Power
of ' any mecMnic.al Motions, be, formed outijof the
unorganized Matterof an E%g ; as that the-Sum, Moon

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 1 3
Moon and Stars fhould', by mere Mechanifim, rife
out of a Chaos.
In anfwer to which I aver, that my Suppo
fition is fo far from being contrary to all the
Difcoveries in Anatomy, and to all true Philo
fophy, that if Mr. Clarke has given a juft Ac
count of all thofe Difcoveries in Anatomy and
Philofophy in this Paragraph, it is agreeable to
them all, except his faying, That the organized
Body of the Animal is no part of the Matter of the
'Egg. And as for that Difcovery made in. Ana
tomy by Microfcopical Obfervations, I take it to
be not only removed backwardsfrom the. Search and
qommon Notions even of the moft inquifitive Men,
but contrary to fuch undoubted Matter of Fact,
that I will venture to infift on it in opppfition to
all the Difcoveries in Anatomy Mr. Clarke is
acquainted with ; for if by our Eyes we can
perceive the organized Body of the Animal to
be part of the Matter of the Egg, no Mi
crofcopical Obfervation can deftroy *fuch Matter
of Fact. Mierofcopica] Obfervations may help
us to difepver the Exiftence of fome things,
the Beauty and Contrivance of others, which
by our mere Organs we are unable to do ; but
can never make us fee nothing where we do fee
fomething. I no where deny the organized Body of the
Animal to have been formed long before it is
comprehended in the Shell: All that I affirm
is, that when the organized Body is compre
hended within the Shell, it then becomes part
ef the Matter of the Egg ; and I continue to,
fuppofe that Senfation "doth not begin in, the
Animal till fome of the other Parts of the Egg
become Parts of the Animal by Motion, oxby
ferving it for Nfourifhment and Growth ; though
" " P 3. * *•&>

ai+ Reflections oh Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
I muft at the fame time confefs, that I fee ho
Abfurdity in fuppofing the organized Body of
the Animal to be formed by Mechanical Mo
tions out of fuch Matter, as the unorganized
Parts of an Egg, if they may be called unor
ganized: Thofe Parts are not indeed Legs,
Wings, Eyes, csV. and fo are not organized in
that fenfe ; but yet they are fo d.ifpofed or or
ganized as to contribute by their Motion to
wards fomething orderly and regular, and to
become Parts of the Leg or the Eye of an Ani
mal. I conceive, no Matter, in the prefent
State of the Univerfe, can be compared to a
Chaos; from whence I grant no regular Work
can be produced by mere Mechanifm, but all
is difpofed by the Power of God in a State of
Regularity : and as there was no Contradiction
for the organized Body of the Animal to be
firft formed by Matter regularly moved, nor
no Contradiction for other Parts of Matter to
be joined to that Body by a regular Motion ;
io it is no more a Contradiction to fuppofe fuch
an Union of Parts to begin in an Egg, where
by the 'Body of an Animal may be formed,
than it was for fuch an Union of Parts to be
gin a Thoufand Years before, or than it is that
thofe Parts fhould grow in the Manner they do
by the Addition of other Particles to them.
Mr. Clake adds, And tbat Senfation fliould begin
tinder a particular Difpofition of tbe Parts, is ftill
more impoffible ; becaufe it is fuppofing fomething to
come out of that in which it never was. Senfa
tion is by me fuppofed to be in the Parts of
the Animal, as Roundnefs is in the Parts which
compofe a round Body ; each Part has as much
of Senfation, fingly confidered, as each Part of
a round Body has of Roundnefs : and when the

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 215
the Parts are duly difpofed, whole Thinking is
performed, as whole Roundnefs exifts by the.
Conjunction of Parts.
2. But fuppofing Senfation did not exift in
the Parts antecedent to their Union, as Motion
does not in thofe Parts of Matter that are at ab-
folute reft ; why may not the one have actual
Senfation by virtue of an antecedent Capacity
to have Senfation, without having always* ac
tual Senfation, as well as Matter at abfolute
reft may have actual Motion by virtue of an
antecedent Capacity to have Motion, without
being always in actual Motion ?
I did indeed think k abfurd to recur to the R'pb><
Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul, tof' II7*
folve the Phenomenon of Senfation in Animals ;
becaufe I cannot conceive it poflible for all the
numerous fenfible Creatures which Microfcopi-.
cai Obfervations do difcover to us to exift in
all Parts of the Univerfe, even in our own Bo
dies, and the Liquors that we drink, to be
proper Subjects of eternal Rewards and Pu
nifhments. Mr. Clarke goes on : Let it be fo, xi Dej.
( ttyat is, let it be abfurd to have recourfe to the p. 16+
Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul
to account for Senfation in Animals ) he can as
enfily fuppofe, if I muft needs have an Hypothefis,
thai the Immaterial and Immortal Soul was not
added afterwards, but was in it from the Time
that the feminal Principle it felf of the organized
Body was framed. I am againft all mere Hypo
thefes, and was, particularly in that Place Mr.
Clarke refers to, contending againft an Opinion
that I take to be a mere Hypothefis : and though
I did not exprefsly mention that Hypothefis
which Mr. Clarke is pleafed to fuppofe for me,
yet I conceive that that Hypothefis is as much
P 4 excluded

si 6" Reflections on Mr. Clarke** id Defame
excluded by my fuppofing that an Animal con^
fi'fts only of mere Matter, as" if I. had directly
mentioned it; and therefore I wonder that Mr.
Clarke could imagine that one of thofe Hypo
thefes' fhould content me arty more than the o-
ther, or that I have any fondnefs at all for any
Hypothefes. I fatisfy my felf with obferving.
Matter of Fact, and believe what I fee, till
fubfcquent Matter of Fact convinces me of
the firlt falfe Appearances, of Things, and then
I correct my fifft Opinion from the fecond Ap-s
pearance. Micrography and Aftronomy do
help us to fettle feveral important Facts, which
without their Affiftance we fhould be apt to.
miftake ; but as for any Suppofitions, to ac
count for any Matters of Fact or Effects that
we obferve, I deny them all, unlefs it involves.
a Contradiction not to make fuch Suppofitions;
and I will allow Mr. Clarke W affign One or
Twenty unknown Beings in every Animal,
when it is a Contradiction not to fuppofe One
or Twenry : But till that time I think it not pro
per to go beyond my Eye-fight, nor, as I fee
nothing but Matter in Animals, to believe there
is any thing but Matter in them.
One thing more under this Head I think my
felf obliged to take notice of : Mr. Clarke had
if! Def. fa"d' Tbat Gravitation is the EffetJ of the con-
p. 04. tinned and regular Operation of fonii other Being
imply, on Matter. Upon which I faid, " That it does
p. -23. " not appear but that Matter gravitates by
" virtue of Powers originally placed in it by
" God, and is now left to it felf to act by
" thofe original Powers. And it is as coh-
" ceivablethat Matter fhould act by virtue of
" thofe Powers, as that an Immaterial Being/
?.' fliould put ir. into Motion, pr continue it in
*-.'. Mo-

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. % 17
«', Motion". ThisOpj»M>» of mine Mr. Clarke *¦& *>?/.
thinks is a great Miftake in my Philofophy- ; for?' l69t
when a Stone that was at reft, does of it felf, up- •<
on its Support being removed, begin to fall d^m*t-
wards, tffbat is it thai caufed the Stone to begin. to>,
move ? Is it poffible, to be an Effeft withput a.
Caufe ? Is it impelled without an Impeller .? Or
can a Law. or a Power, that is to fay,, q rn^ret
a-bftratJ Name, or a complex Notion, and not a^yt
real Being, impel a Stone, anfL caufe it to begin £#
jnove ?
1. The Queftion is not, whether any real
Being moves a Stone that was at reft, when it
begins to fall downwards, upon its Support be
ing removed ; but whether another Being, or a
Being diftinct from Matter, does continually
impel it, either immediately or mediately, ( for
I deny not the Neceffity of a Being impelling
another, in order to caufe that Mode of Mo
tion called Gravitation) .and therefore Mr.
Clarke changes the Queftion, when he intro
duces fome real Being as neceffary to impel a
Stone, or caufe it to begin to move upon its
Support being removed, inftead of what he firft
affirmed, That Gravitation is the Effetl. of the itlDef.
continued and regular Operation of fame other Be- p- °4-
ing on Matter: and confequently his Queftions,
What is it caufes tbe Stone to move ? Is it poffible
to be an Effetl without a Caufe ? Is it impelled
without an Impeller ? Or can a Law or. Power,
that is to fay, an ahftraU Name, or complex No
tion, and not any real Being, impel a Stone, or
caufe it to move ? reach not the Queftion of the
Neceffity of the regular and continued Opera
tion of an immaterial Being, on Matter, in or
der to caufe that Mode of Motion called Gra
vitation. 2. As

si 8 Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
2. As I did not, exclude the Impulfe of other
Bodies contiguous to the Body gravitating, but
only the continued and regular Operation of an
immaterial Being on it, from being a conftant .
Caufe of Gravitation ; fo I do not think the
mere Impulfe of the furrounding Bodies to be
the fole Caufe of that Motion: And to fpeak
my own Opinion, it feems Matter of Fact to
, me, that the external Figure and internal Con
figuration of the Parts of Matter, are thofe
Powers in Matter by which it receives that
peculiar Mode of Motion called Gravi
tation , from the circumambient impelling
Bodies. For drop a Pound of Lead, in the
Form of a Bullet, from the Top of a Tower,
and it defcends in a very quick Space to the
Ground : Vary the external Figure of the Bul
let, by beating it out broad with a Hammer,
and its Tendency downwards decreafes ; vary
the Configuration of its Parts by Fire, and it
will afcend inftead of defcending ; the fame
Adtion of the circumambient Bodies producing
thefe three different Effects by this three-fold
Difpofition of the felf-fame Quantity of Lead :
So that Matter's Determination feems purely
owing to the Caufes and Powers 1 have affigned.
And I have often admired that Gravitation
fhould be efteemed a Matter of fuch Difficulty
among Philofophers ; for when once Motion is
fuppofed, and that all Matter is in conftant
Motion, and perpetually ftriking one part a-
gainft another, as I think no body doubts,
one part of Matter muft be determined one
way, and another part another way ; and Gra
vitation being one Mode of Motion, viz. a
Tendency towards a Centre, ( whether it be of
the whole Vortex, or only of our Earth, or
the

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli.' 215?
the particular Center of that peculiar Motion
which depends upon the Sphere of its Activity)
fome Parts of Matter muft as neceffarily gravi
tate, as others have different Motions. Nay,
properly fpeaking, there is no Motion whate
ver but is Gravitation refpectively ; for what
ever afcends with refpect to us, defcends with
refpect to other Bodies ; and whatever defcends
with refpect to us, afcends with refpect to o-
thers : fo that if there is any Motion in the
Univerfe, there muft be Gravitation.
3. When therefore I faid, " It does not ap- Reply,
" pear but that Matter gravitates by virtue P« lzi'
" of Powers originally placed in it by God,
t{ and that it is as conceivable that Matter
" fhould act by virtue of thofe Powers, as
'* that an immaterial Being fhould put Matter
" into Motion, or continue it in Motion^" ; I
did not lay it down as my Opinion, that Mat
ter did act without a direct Impulfe from Mat
ter, but fuppofed it as intelligible, that Mat
ter might act without Impulfe by Powers placed
in it by God, as that -an immaterial Being
fhould move Matter without being able to im
pel it by Contact. And whenever Mr. Clprke
gives me an Idea how an immaterial Being can
move Matter, or in what place God can be con
ceived beginning a Motion of Gravity or Le
vity in the Univerfe, when in the Univerfe there
is no up or down in reality, Cfor to fay that
God acts refpectively, fhows but the Perti
nency of my Queftion the more, fince he muft
then be neceffarily placed with refpect to an af-
fignable Center j then I promife to give him
an Idea how Matter fhould move by Powers
placed in it- by God, without the Impulfe of
other

iiT, D,
p. 22

-520 Reflections on Mr. C.I,a*-ke'* zd Dffimfe-
Other Bodies, or even by, what Mr. Clarke calls
an abftratl Name, or a complex Notion.
4. But was, it; my Opinion that Matter did ad^
by virtue of Powers placed in it by God, with
out the' Impulfe of Matter, I think I have
tetterjo j\gK Clarke of my Opinion, when he fays, AS
Matter confifts of a.tJually feparate and diftintt
Parts: For if it is actually divided in infinitum,
it cap never act by Impulfe, but muft act by
other Powers ; unlefs Mr. Clarke will fay, that
it is an immaterial Being, that conftantly ancl
immediately mftves every Particle of Matter.
!$qt whether I take. Mr. Clarke right or no, the
Incomparable Sir Ifaac Newton is of Opipion,
* That feveral Phenomena of Nature may depend
on certain Forces, w-berefiy from Caufes ( or Pow
ers ) yet ukdifl.Q.v,evedi tb% Particles of Bodies^ are
mutu'aJJ,y impelled agoivft each other, and cohere
according to. regular Figures, er whereby they re
cede or are driven from, one another ; which Forces
or Powers being yet, unknown, the Philofophers, hi
ther to have attempted Natyre. in v^in.
Sect. 2. Befides anfwering dhedtly tos Mf-
Clarke's pretended Demonftration, I did endea-,
vour to fhow, tha, t if it proved the Impoffibjlity
of Matter's Thinking, it would equally prpye
the Impoffibiljty of an immaterial Bejjig's.
Thinking, fince Mr- Clarke did not exclude

* Ss-ip'cor <;a opwii> ( viz. Pljjenomena Natura:) ex *irj-
bDsperidfrepq'lp, quibus Corpprumpartjcuja; per caufas nop-
duni rogpiras vel in fe murup impelluntur, 8c fecundum figii-
jras regulares cohscrent, vel ab invicerp fugantur & reGedurit :
quibus viribus ignptis Phjlpfpphi /ia£*enus paturam frufjra
tentarpnt. Nemtem Prtfatjt ad ?&%$/<*, Nnwxal'n fWffy*
Extenfioa

of "his Letter to Mr. DodWeH irf
Extenfion out of his Idea of immaterial Be
ing. For his Argument being founded on the
^Proof of this Propofition, that Divifibility ahd
Thinking cannot cohere or exift together in the
fame Subjedt ; and Mr. Clarke allowing, That *fi ^4-
there are Particles of Matter which are to any **' I0°'
Powers in Nature indifcerpible ; I obferved,
44 That If there may be Matter which implies *"<-ffc
" Indivifibility by natural Caufes, no Argu- P* ,30,
*« mentcan be brought to prove the Indivifibi-
" lity of fuch Particles of Matter, but what
'*' will equally prove the Divifibility of arty
" finite extended Being " : "and confequently,
either all Matter is not divifible, and fo, by
'Mr. Clarke's Principles, is not excluded from'a
Poffibility of Thinking.; or elfe an immaterial
Being is no more capable of Thinking than a
material one.
But Mr. Clarke anfwers, That fuch a Difficulty zdDefiuce,
is wide of the main Queftion ; for if the foregoing P- '74-
Proof, That Matter is incapable of Thinking cannot
be fhown to be defetlive, it neceffarily follows, that
the Soul muft be an indifcerpible Subftance, though
extended, i. Though Mr. Clarke's Argument
could not be fhown to be defective, it does not
follow that an extended Being muft be indifcer
pible ; for if I have as clear Evidence of the
Divifibility of an immaterial Being by the
Power of God, as of a material one, fas I
contend we have, and have fhown in my Reply, P. 134.
whither I refer the Reader ) and if I have like-
wife clear Evidence that a divifible Being can- -
not think, as I am likewife fuppofed to have,
what remains for us but Darknefs, and Confufi-
c*n, and- Scepticifm, under fuch a Ballance of
Evidence ; A View of Mr,. Clarke's Way of ar
guing againft the Poffibility of Matter's Thfiik-
3 ing,

zzz Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
ing, urged againft the Poffibility of an imma
terial Being's Thinking, will make it evident
to the Reader, that there is no more ground
from that Argument to conclude againft Mat
ter's Thinking, than againft an immaterial Be
ing's Thinking. And therefore as Mr. Clarke
endeavours to fhow that Matter cannot think,
"becaufe by the Power of God it is divifible ; fo
I who- fee no manner of Difference between
any other finite extended Being and Matter in
that refpect, urge Mr. Clarke's Argument, to
prove that an immaterial Being cannot think,
thus: Whatever is divifible by the Power of
God, cannot, according to him, have a Power
of Thinking: An immaterial Being is extended,
and confequently muft be divifible by the Pow
er of God, ( if it be true that all Matter is di
vifible, becaufe no Argument can be brought
to prove all Matter divifible that will not prove
all finite extended Beings divifible) therefore an
immaterial Being cannot think. And if it be
proved that an immaterial Being cannot think,
then it follows, that the Being which thinks in
us muft be material. If it is further objected,
to weaken the Force of the foregoing Proof,
That all material Subftance is likewife divifible,
Mr. Clarke's Anfwer in behalf of immaterial
Subftance will ferve the Cafe of material Sub
ftance ; and it may be faid, That this Diffi
culty is wide of the main Queftion ; for if tbe
foregoing Proof, that immaterial Being is incapa
ble of Thinking, cannot be fhown to be defetlive,
it follows neceffarily, that the Soul muft be an in
difcerpible material Subftance.
xi Df. 2. But Mr. Clarke fays, There are many De-
P- lis- .motift rations, even in abftratl Malhematicks them--
felves, which no Ma;: wbo underftands them can in

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. zij
in the leaft Doubt of tbe Certainty of, which yet
are attended with difficult Confequences, that can
not be perfetJly cleared. The infinite Divifibility
of Matter is an Inftance of this kind ; alfo tbe
Eternity of God and his Immenfity are attended
with the like Difficulties. In anfwer to this, I
fay, That if there are any fuch Demonftrations,
from whence any Contradictions or Abfurdities
follow in our way of conceiving things, thofe
Abfurdities and Contradictions fhould affect a
Demonftration fo far that I ought to fufpend
my Affent. In our Affent or Diffent to Pro-
pofitions, we have no other ground of either,
than the Perception ofthe Agreement or Difa-
greement of the Ideas, for which the Terms in
Propofitions ftand. And if things make fuch
an appearance to our Underftandings, that we
do a priori perceive, or imagine we perceive
demonftrative Proof of the Truth of a Propo
fition, and perceive or imagine that we per
ceive Abfurdities and Contradictions follow
from that Propofition which we imagined we
perceived to be demonftrative ; what have we
but tworepugnantDemonftrations,which ought
to leave the Mind inballance or fufpence ? For
on which fide can I fufpect that my Under
ftanding fails me? There is no more reafon to
fufpect that my Underftanding fails me, when
I think that I perceive an Abfurdity, Contra
diction, or Difagreement of Ideas, than when I
think I perceive the Agreement of Ideas.
3. But I deny that there are any Inftances of
this kind in Nature, and particularly that the
Infinite Divifibility of Matter, the Eternity and
Immenfity of God, are fuch Inftances. And I
defire Mr. Clarke to define thofe foregoing
Terms, and tell me, what they ftand for in his
Mind :

224- Reflections on Mr. Clarice* zu 'Uefence
Mind : and if his Meaittng of thofe Terms a-
gfeetothe Reality erf ThingSj inftead of mar
king real Beings of ahftract Notions, I require
him to prove that -any Abfurdity or Contra
diction follows either from the infinite Divifi-
%UHy of Matter, tbe Eternity or Immenfity of
God, in our way of conceiving ; and if he
cannot, he has no ground from thofe Inftances
to put human Nature in fuch a State of Scep-
iieiftn and Abfurdity.
td Def. 4. Asto h'is'urging again his Inftance of Space,
p- *7t- Which t readily own to be indifcerprble, to fhow
the. Poffibility of immaterial Subftance's being
indifcerpible, thbughextended, I tell him again,
that Space ( which Mr. Clarke fays is only an
dbftrdil Idea of Immenfity ) will by no means
teach 'his purpofe : for Space is infinite, atri
hot Only infinite, but being incapable of being
corilldered, "either as ailing :or 'being abJ-ed 'on, is
no'.Being or .Subfta-nce at all, and therefore its
Indivifibility cannot prove the Poffibility ofa
finite extended Subftances being indivifible,
Dut fhe contrary : for Space is only indivifible
by having thofe two before-mentioned Qualities
that make it differ from the immaterial Beirig
in queftion. 5. Tolhew the Difference between an imma
terial and material Subftance as to their Divifi-
zdrmf. bility, Mr. 'Clarke. fays, The Suppofition of an'im-
P- *76- -material 'Subftance' s being by the Power of G6d' di
vided into Parts, f which concerning Matter is
allowed to be poffible ) may be denied 'to be poffible,
as being -a Suppofition which deftroys the Effence
of thefiupftance it felf.
What fignifies the Confeffion of fome or all
Men, that all Matter' is divifible, or Mr. Clark's
-Denial that immaterial Subftance is divifible, to
fhow

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 22 $
Ihow a Difference between an immaterial and
material Subftance as to Divifibility ? Material
Subftance is not upon that account proved divi
fible, nor immaterial Subftance indivifible. The
Divifibility or Indivifibility of either Subftance
depends not upon fuch Confeffion or Denial;
if it did, I might retort his Argument upon
him thus: That immaterial Subftance is by me
confeffed to be divifible, but may concerning
material Thinking Subftance be denied to be
poffible, as being a Suppofition which deftroys the
Subftance it felf ; for I have juft as much reafon
to make that Suppofition concerning a mate
rial Being, that cannot by natural Caufes be
made fmaller, as he has concerning an immate
rial Being ; that is, both Suppofitions are e-
qually precarious.
But he had no Reafon at all to fay, That all
Matter was confeffed to be divifible ; becaufe I
was fo far from making any fuch general Con
feffion, that I did in my Reply deny all Matter
could be proved divifible by any Argument
that would not equally conclude for the Di
vifibility of an immaterial Being ; and confe
quently, if thofe Arguments were not fuffici
ent to prove the Divifibility of immaterial
Subftance, neither would they, according to
me, prove the Divifibility of all material Sub
ftance. And therefore I fhall be fo far from
allowing all Matter to be divifible, that when
ever Mr. Clarke proves to me the neceffary In
divifibility of any finite extended Subftance, I
will then deny that all Matter can be proved tO
be divifible.
' Sect. 3. I offered two Arguments to fhow
that the Suppofition of the Immateriality of
Q_ the

226 Reftetttons on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
the Soul, was of no uk to the Ends and Pur
pofes of Religion, were it capable of Demon-
lettcr to ftration: For I faid, " Unlefs a Thinking im-
Air„D\ " material Subftance can be proved naturally
p' " Immortal, the Soul cannot be proved natu-
" rally Immortal ; and I asked, Of what ufe
" then is this Argument to the Ends and Pur-
*' pofes of Religion ? For if we have no Se-
'' cunty that we muft exift hereafter in a State
" of Perception, as by only proving the na-
c* tural Immortality of the Subftance of the
" Soul, we have not ; it can be of no ufe to
«' influence our Lives and Actions ". From
which Paffages it is plain, that the Queftion of
this Article was, whether an immaterial Being,
or the Subftance of the Soul could be proved
to be in a perpetual State of Thinking ; or
elfe fuppofing that though it could not by this
Argument be proved to be always in a State of
Perception, whether it was ftill of ufe to the
Ends and Purpofes of Religion.
To prove the Poffibility of Thinking as an
Action's ceafing in an immaterial Being, I did
p. 128. in my Reply obferve, " That the Soul has
" not only different Paffions at different times,
" fuch as Anger, Love, &c. which are Mo-
'c difications that begin and have their Period,
" but has Qualities and Powers, fuch as feeing
" and hearing, ( which by the Defect of our
p.130,131. " Organs plainly ceafe for a time. ) I likewife
" inftanced in the Motion of the Soul from
" one place to another, which might be en-
" tirely owing to external and material Cau-
" fes".
And what Anfwer has Mr. Clarke given to
fliow the Ufefulnefs of his Argument to the
Ends and Purpofes of Religion, but by chan ging
3

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 227
ging the Terms of the Queftion, and not only
the Terms themfelves, but the Meaning of
thofe Terms? For inftead of confidering
Thinking as an Atlion, he ufes the Terms
Power of Thinking, ( by which I now find that 'fi Def-
he meant Capacity of Thinking ; ) and in his Se- p' "
cond Defence changes the Term Motion into Mo- p* iyz'
bility, and the Powers of feeing and hearing
urged on him to prove the Poffibility of
Thinking's ceafing in an immaterial Being, into
a Capacity of hearing and feeing ; whereby
my Argument is turned to quite another pur
pofe than it was intended by me, and the Rea
der is diverted from the true State of the
Queftion ; and Mr. Clarke himfelf, inconfiftently
with his Cenfure of me for nice Diftinguifhing,
does diftinguifh between actual Thinking and a
Capacity of Thinking, actual Motion and a
Capacity of Motion, &c. But yet I fhould
not have cenfured him for this, had he not
really perplexed the Reader with a new Queftion,
as I aver this Queftion, Whether the Soul mufl
for ever be capable of Thinking, to be, and to
have no relation to the Queftion in difpute : For
allowing the Soul can never exift without a Ca
pacity to think -, of what ufe is a Proof that
the Soul muft always have that Capacity, in
order to influence Mens Actions, when not-
withftanding that, the Soul may no more exift
in a State of Perception, or Rewards and Pu
nifhments, than a Man born blind fees Colours,
or a deaf Man hears Sounds ?
What follows being founded on this Change
of the Queftion, needs no other anfwer than
what I have already given. Q_2 , Se.t. 4.

228 Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
*<#, Sect. 4. My laft Objection was, " That if
p. 140. « from tne power 0f Thinking we can prove
«' the Immortality of the Soul of Man, and
" from its Immateriality prove its natural Im-
" mortality, and confequently its Capacity of
" eternal Happinefs, the Power of Thinking
" muft prove the Immateriality of the Souls
" of Brutes, the Immateriality of their Souls
" muft prove their natural Immortality, and
" confequently their Capacity of eternal Hap-
" pinefs".
2 Def. To which Mr. Clarke anfwers, Cannot God,
V- '77- if he pleafes, caufe them to perifh at tbe Dffolution
of their Bodies, or elfe annihilate them at any other
time? Now by all the Rules of anfwering,
Mr. Clarke ought to have taken notice of the
Reply I made in the Clofe of the Objection it
felf to the Anfwer he here gives me, and
ought either to have confeffed its Force, or
elfe fhowed the Inconclufivenefs thereof ; but
fince he has thought fit to do otherwife, I take
the Liberty to repeat that part of my Objection
again, that I efteem perfectly fatisfactory to his
Anfwer, and which is as follows : " That if it
" be fuppofed that the Souls of Brutes may
" be fometime or other annihilated, then Mr.
*' Clarke's Argument is not ufeful to the End
" for which it was intended, becaufe mere na-
*< ttiral Immortality will then be no Proof of
" the real Immortality of the Soul of Man".
But Mr. Clarke has a fecond Anfwer : Cannot
God, fays he, difpofe of them into States fuit able
to their particular Natures, which yet may in no
Propriety be ftiled a Capacity of eternal Happinefs,
as that of Man is ? Mr. Clarke lays the Strefs in
a wrong Place. I meant no more by fuppofing
Brutes capable of eternal Happinefs as well as
1 Man,

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 29
Man, but only a State wherein they might en
joy conftant agreeable Perceptions, as Mr.
Clarke may fee if he confiders the 144th Page
of my Reply ; and had no defign to compare
the feveral Degrees of Happinefs among
created Beings in the next World. But fince
Mr. Clarke acknowledges all the numerous fen
fible Creatures to be Subjects of eternal Re
wards, I ask him whether Mites, Fleas, Lice,
Oyfters, Rats and Mice, may be punifhed e-
ternally, as well as enjoy eternal Rewards ? If
he anfwers, that they muft only enjoy eternal
Rewards, then he elevates Brutes above Men,
and places them in a much more eligible Con
dition. If he anfwers, that they are Subjects
both of eternal Rewards and Punifhments ; I
ask, for what it is that eternal Rewards are be
llowed on fome Animals, and eternal Punifh
ments beftowed on others ? If they are to have
eternal Rewards or Punifhments, they muft
have them either according as they act agreea
bly or difagreeably to fome Rules of Action ;
and then they muft be allowed to be moral
Agents, and confequently to have all the Pow
ers in them which Men have that are neceffary
to make their Actions efteemed Moral ; or elfe
they muft be punifhed or rewarded, that thofe
who have received Injuries in this Life may be
compenfated in the next, and thofe who have
been profperous in the Rapine and Slaughter
of their fellow Animals may be punifhed,
.whereby there may be a perfect Equality in
God's Dealing with them ; agreeably to what
Mr. Arnaud relates in Reflexions fur le Syfteme Liv. 1.
du P. Mallebrancbe : Quand on leur. demandoit P- H6'
( that is , fome Jews that maintained Brutes
were proper Subjects of eternal Rewards and
Q 3 Punifh-

230 Reflections on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
Punifhments ) quelle juftice il y avoit dans let
mort des betes, quelle peche elles avoient commis, fcf
pourquoi Dieu vouloit, puis que fa providence
s'etendoit a tout, qu'un Rat Innocent fut decbire
par un Chat, Pis repondoient, Que Dieu I'avoit
ainfi ordonne, mais qu'il recompenfieroit ce Rat
dans lefiecle a venir.
From thefe and feme other Confequences
flowing from the foregoing Argument, we
have fo ftrange a View of the State of Man,
that I conceive there can be no greater Service
to Religion, than to fhow the Ufelefnefs of
that Argument to the Ends and Purpofes of
Religion ; efpecially fince there are fuch folid
Arguments for a future States from Topicks
that can neither be anfwered by Infidels, nor
loaded with any abfurd Confequences.
Mr. Clarke, in the Conclufion of his Defence,
has fummed up his Argument in Fifteen Pro
positions, which I now propofe to confider,
that my Anfwer to him may be compleat,
though all that he advances in them is over
thrown in the foregoing Reflections.
His Propofitions are :
i . -Every Syftem of Matter confifts of a Mul
titude of diftintl Parts.
This Propofition, which he thinks is granted
by all, is, I am fure, denied by a great many.
However, I fhall not at prefent enter into any
Debate with him concerning it, but continue
to fuppofe it as I have hitherto done.
2. Every real Quality inheres in fome Subjeti.
3. No individual or fingle Quality of one Pari
tide cf Matter can be the individual or fingle Qua*
lity of another Particle -of Matter.
Thefe two I grant. 4, Every

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 2 3 1
4. Every real fimple Quality that refides in any
whole material Syftem, refides in all the Parts of
tbat Syftem.
5. Every real compound Quality that refides in
any whole material Syftem, is a Number of fim
ple Qualities refiding in all the Parts of that Syf
tem, fome in one part, fome in another.
Thefe two Propofitions I fhall not contend
with him about, though he feems to me to con
found fimple and compound Qualities together;
for in his Explication fubjoined to his Fourth
Propofition, as an Example of what he means
by a fimple Quality, he inftances in the Motion
of a Body ; which, fays he, confifts in the Sum
of the Motions of its feveral Parts. And in his
Explication fubjoined to his Fifth Propofition,
as an Example of what he means by compound
Qualities, he fays, The Simples Blue and Yellow
make the compound Colour called Green. Now
the Motion of a Clock is to me as much a
compound Quality as the Colour Green is a com
pound Quality ; for the various Motions of a
Clock, its circular, perpendicular, and other
Motions, are as fpecifically different from one
another, as Blue and Yellow are from one
another : ^nd therefore I confefs that I have no
clear Ideas from Mr. Clarke's Explications to
the Terms Simple and Compound.
6. Every real Quality, fimple or compound, that
refults from any whole material Syftem, but does
not refide in it, that is, neither in all its diftintl
Parts, nor in all the Parts of feme Portion of it,
according to the Explication of the two foregoing
Q^4 Propo*

232 Reflections on Mr. Choc's zd Defence
Propofitions, is the Mode of fome other Subfiance,
and not of that.
This Propofition I grant, on Condition that
inftead of other Subftance be fubftituted the
Words other Subjeti : for I grant Sweetnefs does
not refide in a Sugar-Loaf ; that is, neither in
all the diftintl Parts, nor in all tbe Parts of fome
Portion of a Sugar-Loaf \ but is produced in ano
ther Subjedt ( and not in another Subftance ) as
all other Senfations or Modes of Thinking
are ; which Subject I contend is material.
j. Every Power, fimple or compound, that re
fults from any whole material Syftem, but does
not refide in it, that is in all its Parts, in tbe
Manner before explained, nor yet refides in any
other Subftance as its Subjeti, is no real Quality at
all ; but muft be either it felf a real Subftance
( which feems unintelligible ) or elfe it is nothing
elfe but merely an abftratl Name, as all Univer-
fals are.
8. Confcioufnefs is neither a mere abftratl Namey
(fucb as the Powers mentioned in Prop. 7. ) nor a
Power of exciting or occafioning different Modes
in a foreign Subftance, ( fuch as are the fenfible
Qualities of Bodies, Prop. 6,-) but a real Quality,
truly and properly inhering in the Subjeti it felf%
the Thinking Subftance.
Before I anfwer to this Propofition, it is ne
ceffary to be very precife in unraveling what
feems to be very much perplexed in it. Mr.
Clarke confounds two things that ought to be
feparated, viz. The Power of exciting Modes in
a foreign Subjeti, and the Modes that are ex
cited, /when he fays, fenfible Qualities in Bodies are

of his Letter to Mr'. Dodweli. 2 3 j
are Powers of exciting Modes in another Subjeti ;
whereas Sweetnefs , Sounds, &c. which are
vulgarly termed fenfible Qualities in Bodies, aie
only Ideas, Senfations, or Modes of Thinking
in us, and exift not at all in thofe Bodies of
which they are faid to be fenfible Qualities ;
and therefore the Powers in Bodies muft be
fomething very different from thofe Qualities,
as different as a Caufe is from an Effect ; and
( that I may proceed with the greater Clearnefs)
I will fuppofe thofe Powers to excite Modes in
another Subjedt to be peculiar Modes of Mo
tion in certain Syftems of Matter.
Having thus diftinguifhed, I fhall anfwer to
this Propofition in each of the foregoing Sen-
fes. 1. I do agree that Confcioufnefs is neither a
mere abftradt Name ( fuch as are the Powers
mentioned in Prop. 7. ) nor does it exift in the
Brain, as Sweetnefs is vulgarly fuppofed to do
in a Rofe, and as all fenfible Qualities in Bodies
are fuppofed to do ; but is a real Quality, truly
and properly inhering in the Subjedt it felf,,
the Brain, as Modes of Motion do in fome
Bodies, and Roundnefs does in others.
2. I do agree again that Confcioufnefs is not
a mere abftradt Name, but is a Power of the
Brain anfwering to the Powers in Matter that
produce Senfations in us. For as thofe Powers
or Modes of Motion are peculiar to certain
Syftems of Matter, and are not the Sums of
Powers ofthe fame numerical Kind; fo neither
is Confcioufnefs the Sum of Powers of the fame
numerical Kind : And as thofe Syftems of Mat
ter do by peculiar Modes of Motion produce
Ideas in us ; fo we by the Power of Thinking
can enlarge or abftradt Ideas, that is, modify them:,

:$4 ' RefleBions on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
them, or caufe Changes in them, as well as ex
ternal fenfible things can caufe Modes or
Changes in us. And therefore Confcioufnefs
anfwers, or may be likened to thofe Powers in'
fome Syftems of Matter that are Occafions of
Modes in another Subject ; and is at the fame
time a Quality as much inhering in Matter as
the Motion of a Clock does in the Parts of a
Clock, or as Roundnefs, or any other particu
lar or individual Figure in a Body.
g. No real Quality can refult from the Compofi
tion of different Qualities, fo as to be a new Qua-
lily in tbe fame SubjetJ, of a different Kind or
Species from all and every one of the component
Qualities. According to Mr. Clarke's Explication of this
Propofition, I allow this likewife to be true ;
for from Motion nothing but Motion can arife, and
from Figure nothingbut Figure: But this reaches
not the Cafe of Numerical Powers, and par
ticularly reaches not the Cafe of Confcioufnefs.
A real Numerical Power, as I fuppofe Con
fcioufnefs to be, and fuch as Roundnefs is,
may refult from the Compofition of different
Qualities, as Roundnefs does from different
Species of Figures ; and is confequently a new
Quality in the fame Subject, of a different
Kind or Species from all the component Qua
lities confidered together: but Motion being
a generical Power, does, I agree, confift of
the Morions of the Parts, as Figure does of
the Figures of the Parts ; and did Confciouf
nefs anfwer to Figure and Motion, that would
likewife confift of the Confcioufneffes of the
Parts.
10, Con-'

if his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 2jy
10. Confcioufnefs therefore being a real Quality
( Prop. 8. ) and of a Kind fpecifically different
from all other Qualities, whether known or un
known, which are themfelves acknowledged to be
void of Confcioufnefs, can never poffibly refult from
any Compofition of fuch Qualities.
\ Though Confcioufnefs be a real Quality, and
different from all other Qualities, whether
known or unknown, which are themfelves ac
knowledged to be void of Confcioufnefs, it can
or may refult from fuch Qualities as fingly con
fidered are void of Confcioufnefs. Roundnefs
is a real Quality fpecifically different from o-
ther Qualities void of Roundnefs, and yet may
be the Refult or Compofition of fuch Qualities.
But in Mr. Clarke's Senfe of real Qualities, I
allow this Propofition to be true: but then it
reaches not the Cafe of Confcioufnefs, which I
deny to be a generical Power, but affirm to be
only a Mode of a generical Power.
11. No individual Quality can be transferred
from one Subjeti to another.
This Propofition I allow to be true : The
Quality of a Subjedt can only be the Quality
of that Subjedt wherein it exifts, and not of an
other Subject. The Motion of a Syftem of
Matter can only be the Motion of that Syftem.
The Confcioufnefs of any Being can only be
the Confcioufnefs of that particular Being.
And I further obferve, that the Morion of a
Syftem of Matter one Day can never be the
Motion of the fame numerical Syftem the ,
next Day, nor the Confcioufnefs of Yefterday
be the fame numerical Confcioufnefs that I have
to Day, let the Being that is confcious in me
i be

23 6 RefleBions on Mr. Clarke'* zd Defence
be divifible or indivifible. The fame indivi
dual Quality can no more be transferred to the
fame individual Subjeti that was formerly the
Subjedt ofit, than it can be transferred to ano
ther Subject.
12. The Spirits and Particles of tbe Brain, be
ing loofie and in a perpetual flux, cannot therefore be
the Seat of that Confcioufnefs, by which a Man
not only remembers things done many Tears fince,
but alfo is confcious that he himfelf, the fame indivi
dual Being, was the Doer of them.
Though the Spirits or Particles of the Brain
cannot by being in a perpetual Flux be the
Seat of that Confcioufnefs, by which I know
my felf to Day to be the fame individual con
fcious Being that I was a Year ago ( for I deny
that we have any Confcioufnefs at all that we
continue the fame individual Being at different
times ) yet if it be not abfurd for Matter to
think, Matter muft at the fame time know that
it thinks, or be confcious of its thinking : and
if it can know at this inftant that it thinks, I
can fee no reafon why it may not remember To
morrow what it thinks of To-day, though fome
Particles will be then wanting which it has at
prefent. And if it can remember at all, then
the Memory of Things may be continued even
after we have loft all the Particles of Matter
that we had at the Time of the doing them, by
continual intermediate repeating, or imprint
ing afrefh our Ideas before they are quite loft
or worn out. And it is thus as intelligible to
me that the Memory of Things fhould be pre-
ferved by a Being in a Flux, as by a Being
that is not fo. For the individual Confciouf
nefs To-day, can neither in an individual or
divifible

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 237
divifible Being be the individual Confcioufnefs
To-morrow : that Confcioufnefs is a perfectly
diftindt Adtion in both Beings from the pre
ceeding Confcioufnefs the Day before. And
whenever Mr. Clarke accounts for an indivifi
ble Being's remembrance of an Action or
Thought, I promife to account for Memory in
a divifible Being.
13. The Confcioufnefs that a Man has at one and
the fame time is one Confcioufnefs, and not a Mul
titude of diftintl Confcioufneffes ; as Solidity, Mo
tion, or Colour of any Piece of Matter, is a
Multitude of diftintl Solidities, Motions, or Co
lours. 1 4. Confcioufnefs therefore cannot at all refide in
the Subftance of the Brain or Spirits, or in any
other material Syftem as its Subjeti, but muft be
a Quality of fome immaterial Subftance.
Taking Confcioufnefs for a numerical Pow
er, either as anfwering to Roundnefs in a Bo
dy, or to a Motion peculiar to a Syftem of Mat
ter, and this Propofition by no means follows
from thofe foregoing : For if Confcioufnefs be
a numerical Power, then it anfwers to never a
one of the Heads under which he ranks the
Powers of Matter ; for it neither anfwers to
an Effect refiding in no Subject at all, ( if there
is any fuch Thing in Nature, which I utterly
deny there is ) nor does it anfwer to Sweetnefs,
or any other fenfible Qualities exifting in Bo
dies external to us ( for they are only Modes of
Thinking or Perceptions in us, and exift not
at all in thofe external Bodies.) Nor, laftly,
is it a Power which anfwers to Figure and Mo
tion, which I agree confift only in the Fi
gures

238 RefleBions on Mr. Clarke* zd Defence
gures and Motions of the Parts, but agrees or
anfwers to Modes of Figure and Motion. From
all which it is plain, that all Mr. Clarke's
Propofitions are founded on his confidering
Confcioufnefs to be fomething elfe than what
I contend it is ; and fo though he may demon-
ilrate the' Impoffibility of Matter's being con
fcious in his Senfe of the Term Confcioufnefs,
yet I deny that he has faid one word to prove
the Impoffibility of Matter's Thinking in the
-Senfe for which the Term Confcioufnefs ftands
with me, and I fuppofe with all thofe that
contend for the Poffibility of Matter's Think
ing or being confcious. So that his Demon
ftration may be granted by me, without affect
ing the Queftion between us, fince it relates to
a Chimera or Idea of his own framing ; and
thus endlefs Demonftrations may be made,
without underftanding Things as they really
exift, or any Truth befides the Relations of
chimerical Ideas : For I grant his Demonftra
tion to be good, if Confcioufnefs be confidered
either as a generical Power like Motion and
Figure, or as anfwering to the Sweetnefs of a
Rofe, ( which is a Senfation or Mode of think
ing in us ) or as an Effect refiding in no Sub
ftance at all ; then Confcioufnefs cannot in
here in a Syftem of Matter, and his Demon
ftration reaches no farther. But Confciouf
nefs anfwering to never a one of thefe Powers,
in demonftrating that Confcioufnefs in his
Senfe cannot inhere in a Syftem of Matter, he
has no more reached the Queftion, than if he
had talked of any thing elfe in the World : for
his Uiage of the Term Confcioufnefs does not
make him one jot neater the Queftion, than if
he had ufed a different Term, or a Term that no

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli.' 23^
no one would fufpect flood for the thing really
fignified by the Term Confcioufnefs.
15. Difficulties that arife afterwards concerning
other Qualities of that immaterial Subftance, as
whether it be extended or unextended, do not at all
affetl the prefent Argument.
How far the Difficulty of making immate
rial Being extended, affects Mr. Clarke's Ar«-
gument, I refer the Reader to Page 220, &c.
of my Refletlions. And as for the Difficulty
of making it unextended, I will fpeak to that
whenever Mr. Clarke defines the Terms Unex
tended and Being, that I may fee what they
ftand for when joined together ; and then I
will fhow how far confidering immaterial Be
ing to be an unextended Being affects his Ar
gument, as I have fhown how far confidering
immaterial Being to be an extended Being af
fects it.
Thus I have gone through Mr. Clarke's
Propofitions, and fhown wherein they fail to
clear the Point that he ought to have aimed
at : And I conclude with this further Obfer-
vation, that he has not drawn up one Propofi
tion to fhow that his Argument is of any ufe
to the Ends and Purpofes of Religion, allow
ing it to be ever fo true and juft ; and there
fore for Proof that it is of no ufe to that end,
I refer the Reader to the 225th and the fubfc
quent Pages of the foregoing Refletlions.

A Third

D E F EN C E
O F A N
ARGUMENT Made ufe of in a
Letter to Mr. D ODIVEL,
lo prove the Immateriality and Na
tural Immortality of the SOUL.

In a Letter to the Author of the Reflexions
on Mr. Clarke'* Second Defence, &c
By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D.late
Rector of St. James's Weftminjier.
Arguments feldom work • n Men of Wit and Learning, when
they have once engaged themfelves in a contrary Opinion.
Mr. Hobbes.
We have as much Reafon ro be fatisfied with our Notion of
Immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body; and die
Exiftence of the One, as well as the Other For itbeingno
more a Contradiction that Thinking fhould exift feparate and
independent from Solidity, than it is a Contradiction that
Solidity (Iwuld exift feparate and independent from Thinking-,
they being Both but Simple Ideas, independent one from a-
nother; And having as clear and di Ainft Ideas in us, ot
Thinking, as of Solidity; Iknow not why we may not as
well allow a Thinking Thing without Solidity, that is, Imma
terial, to exift; as a Solid Thing -without thinking, that, is,
Matter, to exift. Mr. Lock's EiTay, Book II. Ch. 13. §32
L.O N D O N:
Printed in the Year M DCC XXXI,
R

[ 243 ]

A Third
DEFENCE O F A N
Argument, &c.

SIR,
N my Laft Reply I perfuaded my
felf I had fet the Queftion between
us in fo clear a Light, that there
would have been no need of any
new Debate, or of giving our
Readers any further trouble in
this Matter. But feeing you have found out a
feemingly new DiftintJion, by which you ftill
endeavour to evade the Force of the Argu
ment ; And, though your Evafion feems to
Me indeed extreamly flight, yet feeing you
have thought fit to infift upoii it in fuch a Man
ner, as if you your felf really believed there
was fome Strengeh and "Weight in it ; I fhall
endeavour to gratify thefincere Defire youpro-
R z fefs

'£ 44 'A Third Defence of the Immateriality
fefsto have of difcovering the Truth, by fhow
ing briefly the Weaknefs and Inconclufivenefs
of what you have advanced in your Refletlions.
In order to prove that Thinking cannot poffi
bly be a Quality or Power of Matter ; I faid
that all the Qualities or Powers, which either
Are in Matter, whether they be known or un
known ; or are vulgarly Afcribed to it ; muft
of neceffity be either,
ift, Real Qualities, truly and properly in
hering in the Subjedt to which they are af
cribed : Such as are Magnitude, and Motion in
Matter. Thefe are always the Sums, or Aggro-
gates of Powers or Qualities of tbe fame Kind,
inhering diftindtly in the feveral Parts of the
Material Subjedt. Which not being true of
Thinking, it is manifeft that Thinking cannot, be
a Po^ejf or Quality of this Sort, inhering in a
Syftem of Matter.
Or idly, Qualities, not really inhering in
the Subjedt to which they are ufually afcribed,
but being indeed Modes excited and refiding in
fome'other Subjedt : Such as are Colours, Sounds,
and; all thofe which are conxnonly called the,
Senfible Qualities of Matter. Thefe db not
exift at all: in That Subject to which th«y are
ufually afqr.ibed ; but. in. fome Other Subjedt.
And this alfo not being, applicable to Thinking,
it is manifeft therefore that Thinking, cannot be a
Power or Quality of this Kind,- in a Material:
Subject. Or %dly, Qualities, not really inhering inany*
Subjedt- at all, but being mere Abftradt Names;
or external Denominations, to exprefs certain
complex Ideas framed in our Imaginations; or
certain-general extrinfick, and relative Effects,
produced upon particular Syftems of Matter by

and Natural Immortality of the So&l. 245
by foreign Agents ; or certain Difpofirions of
the particular Syftems of Matter, requifite to
ward* the producing of thofe Effects. Such
as are Magnetifm, EletJHcity, Attratlion, Re-
fiexibililyi Refrangibility, and the like. Thefe
have fto real Exiftence by way of proper in
hering in any Subject. Which likfwife firtce it
cannot be faid of Thinking, it is manifeft that
Thinking cannot be a Power or Quality in a Ma
terial SyfteiW, of this Kind neither.
You gtttnt that Thinking, for the Reafons I
Orged, cannot be a Power or Quality of any
Of Thefe Knids : But you Diftinguifh' upon" the
Firft Sort ; and a-lledjge,-
That there are fome Real Qualities, truly and
properly inhering1 in the Subject to Which they
are aferibed ; which yet are not, like Magni
tude and Motion , Sums- or Aggregates Of
Powers or Qualities' of the fame Kind, inhering
diftinctly in the feveral Parts of the Subject :
And that therefore [Thinking, though it be not
an; Aggregate of Pbwers!6f the fame Kind, may
yet never'thelefs be a real Quality inhering- in
Matter. That' Numerical Power's^ or particular and In- R'epaidns,
dividual Modes, are fiich real inherent Qualities, /,-*-o3>104-
refldirlg in a Syfteiti of Matter, without in
hering' diftinctly in its feveral Farts : in con-
ttadiftindtion to^generical Powers, fuch as Mag
nitude' and- Motion,- which you acknowledge' to
be the Sums of the Magnitudes and Motions of
the feveral- Parts'.
That, for Inftance, the Power of the Eye, to pag. 198.
contribute to tbe Atl of Seeing ; the Power of a
Clock, to fhow the Hour of the Day,; the pag. 109.
Power of a Mufical Inftrument, to produce in
R 3 m

246 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
*"*?• i°9> us harmonious Sounds; the particular Figures
*°°* in Bodies, fuch as Roundnefs or Squarenefs ; and
pag. 200. particular or individual Modes of Motion, are
fuch Numerical Powers, not at all refulting
from any Powers of the fame Kind inhering in
the Parts of the Syftem : And that Thinking
therefore in like manner, not being an Aggre
gate of Powers of the fame 'Kind, may yet in
here in a Syflem of Matter, as one of thefe
p*g- 103' Numerical or Individual Modes of fome Gene-
20+' rical Power.
Tbat, upon this Suppbfition, of Thinking be
ing a Numerical Mode of fome Generical Power
pag. 203. of Matter ; it may be conceived, that as the
Roundnefs of a Body, is not the Sum of the Round-
neffes of the Parts ; nor the Squarenefs of a Bo
dy, the Sum of the Squareneffes of the Parts;
pag. io; nor the Power of a Mufical Inftrument to caufe
an harmonious Sound, the Sum of Powers of the
fame Kind in the Parts fingly confidered ; nor any
particular Mode of Motion, the Sum of the
fame Modes of Motion in all the feveral Parts;
pag. 20+. So the Confcioufnefs that inheres in a Syftem of
Matter, may yet not be the Sum of the Confciouf
neffes of the Parts.
pag. 208. That the Argument therefore drawn from
Confcioufnefs not being made up of feveral Con
fcioufneffes; concludes no more againft the Pof
fibility of its refiding in a Syftem of Matter ;
pag. 208. than the like Argument would conclude againft
tbe Poffibility of the Exiftence of Roundnefs, or
any other Numerical Mode, in a Body.
pag. 208. " For Roundnefs 110 more confifts of feveral Round-
neffes, than Thinking or Confcioufnefs does of fe
veral Confcioufneffes.

And

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 247
And Roundnefs is as fpecifically different from M- "*°8-
other Figures of which it may be compofed, as
Confcioufnefs is from a Circular Motion.
So that Senfation may be conceived to be in p*g. 114,
the Parts of an Animal's Body, juft as Round- 2I5-
nefs is in the Parts that compofe a Round Body :
Each Part has as much of Senfation, fingly confi
dered ; as each Part of a Round Body, has of
Roundnefs : And wben tbe Parts are duly difpofed,
whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundnefs
exifts by the Conjunclion of Parts.
For Confcioufnefs, being fuppofed to be a real
Numerical Power, fuch as Roundnefs is ; may
refult from the Compofition of different Qualities,
as Roundnefs does from different Species of Figure :
And is confequently a new Quality in the fame Sub
jeti, of a different Kind or Species from all the
component Qualities confidered together.
Wherefore, though Confcioufnefs be a real Qua
lity, and different from all other Qualities, whe
ther known or unknown, which are themfelves ac
knowledged to be void of Confcioufnefs ; yet it may
refult from fuch Qualities as fingly confidered are
void of Confcioufnefs ; In like manner as Roundnefs
is a real Quality fpecifically different from other
Qualities void of Roundnefs, and yet may be the
Refult or Compofition of fuch Qualities,
That Confcioufnefs may be confidered parti- pag. 2033
cularly, as an individual Mode or Species of
Motion. For, as nothing more goes to the Compofition M>- x09%
of Roundnefs, than the Conjunclion of feveral
Particles not fingly endued with Roundnefs ; fo
upon Tbis Suppofition, nothing more needs go
to tbe Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of
feveral Particles not each endued with That Specie^
of Motion called Thinking.
R 4 This,

2 + % A Third Defence of £#f Imm/tteriafity
This, -if I und^rfta-icf ypu aright, is. the
Sum and fulj Streng^of ^Jfiac ypu have urged
in your RefieMqns. - v ) >• >• ' v. i\rr V***^''-
Apd to This, I anfwer as follows,. ",,r;, .
/-. IR • i .-. A >' r I Ov
It ij§ gbfolutely impqffible and an evident
Contradiction, that any RcaJ Quah'ty fl/io^d,
trply and p/operly iruhere in a Sy^qrp pf lyiat-
ter, without being the Sum or i\ggregai;e of a
Number of Powers or Qualities, reading di
ftinctly in the feveral Pajts of the Syftem, and
being always of the; fa^e .Kind with the v^hole
that refults, from thetp. For, as^ tlae Subftaj^^
it felf of a Syftem' of lV(a.tter. is nothing but
the Sum of its Parts, exifting diftinctly and. in
dependently from eachother •, andthe Who,!";
cannot but be of the' fame Kind with the Pai;ts
that conftitute it : So no Power or Quality, of
the Subftance can be any thjng elfe, but the Sum
or Aggregate of the Powers of the feveral
Parts ; and That Sum or Aggregate, without
a Creation of fomething out of Nothing, can
not but be of the fame , Kind with the. Powers
that conftitute it. If the Parts of die Svul?fi;ance
be fimilar, then the Syftem it felf is an uniform,
or homogeneous Subftance : If the Parts be differ
milar, then the Subftance is difform or Hetero
geneous : But ftill always of the fame Kind or
Kinds with the Parts that compofe it. In like
manner, if the Powers of the feveral Parts of
the' Syftem, be fimilar, the F*awerof the Whole
will be a fimple and uniform Power : If the Pow
ers of the fevera,l Parts be diffimijnr, , the Power
of the whole will be a compound difform Power :
But ftill always neceffarily of the fame Kind or
Kinds with the Powers of which it is cornpounclr
ed. Since therefore you acknowledge Thinking to

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 249
tp be a Po^yer not com pofed of a Multitude
pf Thinkings ; and it is evident ( as fhall iti the
Sequel be made fully appear ) that no Powers
y.p,id of Thinking, can be of the fame Kind
with the Power of Thinking, fo as to be Parts
of it, apd that frorn a Compofition of Them
the Po^er of Thinking may arife ; it follows
that Thinking is not a Power made up at all of
Parts, and confequently that it cannot refide
in a Subjtapce that confifts of diftindt and in^
dependent Parts, fuch as. all Matter is con-
fej^4 *° he.
From tfie clear Explication of which whole
Argument, and, to vindicate the Notion from
all the Objections and pretended Inftances you
have brought to the contrary ; it is to be ob
ferved, that the : Terms, Kind, and. Species, and
of . tbe fame Kind or Species, are very ambigu
ous Terms, and ufed in great Variety of Sig
nifications^ Though arnong Men who feek
Truth, and endeavour to exprefs themfelves
w^ith the greateft, Clearnefs they can, and a,re
willing to underftand each others meaning •,
they do not often caufe any considerable Mif-
takes. For Example : It is an evident Truth, that
All 'Circles of four Foot Diameter, are of., one and
the fame Kind or Species ; and this, is, what the
Logicians call Species fpecialifiima. It is true
in, another Senfe, that" All Circles whatever, are
of the fame Species: In another Senfe, that All
curvilinear Figures, are. of the fame Species: In
another, that All plain Figures both ftreight-lined
and curvilinear, as oppofed to Solids, are of
the, fame. Speeies : And in another, that All Fi-
gur.es fvft>a}foey£r, whether plain, or folid, are of
th\fame Kind ox Species ; as contradiftinguifhed from

2jo A Third Defence of the Immateriality
from Motion or Thinking, or from any Thing
elfe of a totally different Kind. This is what
they call the Genus generalius. And beyond
This, it is neither True nor good Senfe, nor can
it in any manner be faid, that Figure and Mo
tion , or Figure and Colour , or Figure and
Thought, are of the fame Kind ; Becaufe there is
nothing Common in their Idea's, by which they
can be ranked or compared together ; fave only
as they are all comprehended perhaps under the
mere Abftradt Name of Quality in general.
In like manner ; All Squares of two Foot Dia
meter are fpecifically different from All Squares
of one Foot Diameter ; but not in the fame Senfe,
norfo much, as Both are from Parallelograms :
And All Parallelograms differ fpecifically from
All Squares; but not fo, as Both do from
Triangles : And All Triangles differ fpecifically
from All quadrilateral Figures ; but not fo, as
Both do from Spheres or Cylinders : And Spheres
or Cylinders differ fpecifically from all Streight-
lined Figures ; but not fo, as They and All
Other Figures differ from Motion, or from a
Tafte or a Sound ; or as Figure or Motion does
from a Thought. Which makes it appear by the
Bye, with what Truth and Senfe you affirm,
pag. 20S. jthat Roundnefs is as fpecifically different from all
other Figures, as Confcioufnefs is from a Circular
Motion; That is, that a Circle differs from an
Ellipfis ( fuppofe ) or from a Parabola, not only
as much as it differs from a Cube, but even as
much as it differs from the Reafon of a Man :
Or, as Logicians would exprefs it, that the
Species fpeciaHor differs as much from the Species
next arid immediately fuperiour to it, as it does
from the Genus gensraliffimum \ and not only fo,

and Natural Immot tality of the Soul. 2 j 1
but as it does alfo from any thing that is not
fo much as included even in That Genus.
Again : All light Blue Colours differ fpecifi
cally from All dark Blues -, but not fo as Both
do from Tellow or Scarlet : And Scarlet differs
fpecifically from Blue ; but not fo, as Both do
from the Sound of a Trumpet.
Now to apply This to our prefent Queftion.
When I affirm that every real Power or Qua
lity inhering in a Syftem of Matter, muft of
neceffity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers
of the fame Kind refiding diftindtly in the feve
ral Parts of that Syftem ; it is manifeft that
by this Term, of tbe fame Kind, is not to be
underftood the Species fpecialiffima, but fome of
the Species generaliores. For Example : When
I fay the Magnitude of a Cubic Foot of Gold, is
the Sum or Aggregate of the Magnitudes of its
Parts ; I do not mean to fay, that it is an Ag
gregate of Cubic Feet, but of other Magnitudes
which conftitute a Cubic Foot, and which are
of thefiame Kind with it, in the Senfe that All
Magnitudes are of the fame Kind, and may be
Parts one of another: But Magnitude and Mo
tion, or Magnitude and Figure, are not in any
Senfe of thefiame Kind, and cannot be Parts one
of another ; Neither can Eigure or Motion be
a Piece of a Thought.
In like manner: When I fay the Number
Twenty is made up of Parts of the fame Kind
with the Whole ; it is evident 1 do not mean
that it is made up of twenties, but of Other
Numbers, which are of thefiame Kind with it, in
the Senfe that All Numbers, are of the fame
Kind, and may be Parts one of another : But
Number and Sound, or Number and Colour, are
not in any Senfe of thefiame Kind, and cannot
2 be

3 $ 2 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
be Parts one of another ; Neither can Number
or Figure, Motion or Magnitude, be a Piece oia
Thought. Again ; When I fay Roundnefs or Globofity or
any other Figure of a Body, muft needs, be the
Sum of Qualities of the fame Kind. inhering in
the feveral Parts ; it is plain. I do not mean to
affirm, that G-hbofity is made up of .Globofeties,
any mme than the Number Twenty is made up
of fwentiex, or the Motion of a Cubic Foot of
Matter made; up of the Motions of Cubic Feet ;
but that z,.wholx: Round Figure muft necefiarily
be made up of Pieces of Roundnefs, which are
all of ibsfame Kind with it ; juft as the Num
bers, which are Parts of Twenty, are of the
fame Kind with the Whole, and the Motions of
the Particles ofa Cubic Foot of Matter, which
are Parts of the Motion, of the Whole, are of
the- fame- Kind' with the Whole Motion. But
Figure, and. whatever is not Figure, are not in
any Senfe a/ the- fame Kind; Neither can any
thing that is void of Figure, be. part of any Fi
gure whatfoever ; nor any thing: that is void of
Curvity in particular, be part of a round Cir
cumference.; nor any thing. that is void of that
particular- Degree of Cur-v.it. y which makes, a
Circle of a. certain determinate. Diameter, be
part of the Circumference . of That Circle ;-. nor
any thing that is, void of Thinking ; be. a Part or
Conftituent of a Thought.
From hence it clearly appears, that your Di
ftinction of Generical and. Numerical Powers, is
of no Service to your Caufe. For thofe^PoWr
ers which. you. call Numerical, muft as necefti>
rily be Aggregates of Powers of thefiame Kind,
as thofe which you call Generical. It is- as evi
dent,, that the. Rounds, Figure of: a Globe, [ its
fuperficial

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 255
fuperficial figure, ] is the Sum of the Convex
Surfaces of its outward Parts : and its Solid Fi
gure, the Sum of all its Solid Parts taken toge
ther, confidered like fo many concentrick Shells
or any other Figures which can be conftituent
Parts of the folid Content of a Globe ; as it is
that the Motion of a Globe, is the Sum of the
Motions of its Parts. And the Convex Outfides
of its outward Parts, and the Concentrick Round-
aeffei of -its inwards Parts, are as much of the
fame Kind with the Whole Roundnefs or the
Whole Globofity, of which they are pieces ; as
the feveral diftindt Motions or Magnitudes of its
Parts, are of thefiame Kind with the Whole Mo
tion or Magnitude which they conftitute. For
why is. not a Semicircle or the Arch of a Qua
drant, of the fame Kind with the Chen inference
of a Cirele ;. and concentrick round Fignres, or
any other Figures which can be conftituent Parts
of the folid Content of a Globe, of the* fame
Kind with the Figure ofthe Globe ; as much as
the Mb tion or Magnitude- of half a Foot' Cube of
Matter, is of the fame Kind with the Motion or
Magnitude, of the .Whole Foot Cube ?
In reality, no other Powers but Numerical
Powers, cao> properly in the prefent Queftion
come under Confideration at all. For G'eneri-
cal Powers, confidered as fuch, are' nothing but
Univerfals, having no being but in the Imagi
nation confidering and comparing feveral Par
ticulars. In the Individuals themfelvesj wherein
alone Powers really exift, they are not Gene
ral; They' are only made General by the con
fidering and comparing together of Particulars ;
Which Companion has no Exiftence but in the
Idea; And confequently General or Generical
Powers, having no real Exiftence in things
without

254 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
without us, have really neither Parts nor Whole,
nor can properly come at all under Confidera
tion in the prefent Queftion. It is not Motion
or Figure in general, that is made up of Mo
tions and Figures ; but it is the Individual Nu
merical Motion or Figure of a Body, that is
made up of the Motions or Figures pf its
Parts. The Numerical Mode of Motion of the.
Whole ; is always the Sum of the Numerical
Modes of Motion ofthe Parts : The Numerical
Mode of Superficial Figure of the Whole, is the
Sum of the Numerical Modes of Figure of the
Outfides of its Superficial Parts: And the Nu
merical Modes of Solid Figure of the Whole ; is
the Sum of the Numerical Modes of Solid Fi
gure of all the Parts taken together. In like
manner, if Thinking could inhere in a Syftem
of Matter, it would not be Thinking in. general,
but always fome particular Numerical Thought,
that would be the Refult of the Thinkings of the
feveraj Parts.
If you will reply, that by Generical Powers
you do not mean General Powers, or Univer-
fals, which have no real Exiftence ; (though
when you reckon Figure among your Generical
Powers, in Oppofition to any particular Figure,
as Roundnefs ; your words cannot eafily bear
any other than this abfurd Senfe ; ) If, I fay,
you will reply, that by Generical Powers you
do not mean General Powers, but only fuch
Sorts of particular Powers, as Are Sums or Ag
gregates of Powers of the fame Kind, in Op
pofition to fuch other particular Powers or
Qualities, as Are not Sums or Aggregates of
Powers of thefiame Kind: I anfwer, that there
is no fuch Diftinction in Nature ; But all Pow
ers or Qualities whatever that inhere in Syftems of

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. i 5 .
of Matter, whether they be fuch as you inftance
in for Generical, or fuch as you inftance in for
Numerical Powers -, are equally and alike Sums
or Aggregates of Powers of thefiame Kind. For
if by this Term, of the fame Kind or Species,
you underftand the Species fpecialiffima ; in that
Senfe neither the One Sort of Qualities, nor
the Other, nor any Wholes in the World, are
Aggregates of Parts of the fame Kind. It be
ing no more true, that the Magnitude or Mo
tion ( which you call the Generical Qualities )
of a Foot Cube of Matter, are made up of
Cubic Feet Magnitudes, or Cubic Feet Motions %
than it is true that the Roundnefs ( v/hich you
""Call the Numerical Quality ) of a Globe, is made
up of the Like Roundneffes. But if by the
Term, of the fame Kind, be underftood ( as
common Senfe requires, and as I before ex
plained, ) the Species generalior ; then both the
One Sort of Qualities and the Other, and AU
Wholes in the World, are Aggregates of Parts
of tbe fame Kind: It being equally true and evi
dent, that the Round Figure of a Globe, ( the
Numerical Quality, ) is, as to its Surface, made
up of Pieces of Surfaces fpherically and concentri
cally Convex ; and, as to its Solid Content, made
up of concentrick round Figures, or of Shells
fpherically and concentrically Convex ; which,
"being Pieces of the whole Spherical Surface,
or of the whole Spherical folid Content, are
refpectively of the fame Kind with it : as that
the Magnitude of a Foot Cube of Matter, ( the
Generical Quality, ) is made up of Inches Cube,
or of any other Magnitudes, which, being Pieces
of a Foot Cube, are of the fame Kind with it.
Whea

256 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
pag. 103. When therefore you, fay ; if Pb-foers of the
fame Kind be underftood Generically, then you Do
agree that the known Powers of Matter are no
thing elfe but the Sums of Powers ofihefanie Kind ;
that is, the Figure and Motion of a Body, [ the
Magnitude and Motion you fhould more pro
perly have inftanced in, ] confift of the Figures
and Motions [the Magnitudes .arid Motions^ of
the Parts : But if the Terms, Powers of the fame
Kind, be taken Numerically, ( that is, as Pow
ers really exift, ) then there are Powers inhering
in Syftems of Matter that are not tbe Sums, of
Powers of the fame Kind ; As, the Roundnefs of
a Body, is not the Sum of the Roundneffes of the
Parts: Your Diftinction is evidently very
groundlefs. Becaufe in the fame Senfe that we
Roundnefs of a Body is not the Sum of the Like
Roundneffes of the Parts, ( for of Other Round
neffes, as of innumerable concentrick Round
neffes, and of the convex Ouifides of its minute
externa) Particles, it may be and always is tlie
Sum : ) In the fame Senfe (I fay, J that tbe
Roundnefs of a Body is not the Sum of the [Like]
Roundnefs of ihe Parts; in that fame Senfe it is
true alfo, that neither does the Magnitude nor
Motion of a Body confift of the [Like] Magni
tudes nor Motions of the Parts. And oh the
contrary : In the fame Senfe that it is true, that
the Magnitude and Motion of a Body does confift
of [not thefiame, but the Different], Magnitudes
and Motions of the Parts ; in- that fame Senfe it
is true likewife, that the Numerical Round Fi
gure of a Body, that is, the Round Figure of its
Surface, is the Sum of the Roundneffes, that Is,
of the round or convesi Outfides, of its fuperfi
cial Parts ; and its Solid Figure, is the Sum of
all its folid Parts taken together, which ( as I
before
4

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 257
before faid ) may be confidered as fo many
concentrick Shells or any other Figures that can
be conftituent Parts of the folid Content of a
Globe. ,;
And when you fay ; Itis a Contradiction top°g--°i-
make Confcioufnefs the Sum of the Confcioufneffes z°4'
of the Parts, as it is a Contraditlion to make Round
nefs tcr confift in the Roundneffes of the Parts ;
Though you would readily grant, that was Con- -
feioufnefs a generical Power like Figure and Mo
tion, it would- be likewife the' Sum and Refult of
the Confcioufneffes of the feveral Parts ; and fo there
would be as many diftintl Confcioufneffes, as there
are Particles of Matter, of which the Syftem con
fifts; which. you do allow to be very abfurd : And
again ; If humane Confcioufnefs be a Mode ofifs- z°4-
fome generical Power in Matter, it muft not be the
Sum of the Confcioufneffes of tbe Parts : And ;
Did Confcioufnefs anfwer to Figure and Motion, pag. 234-
[ the generical Powers •, J Tbat would likewife
confift of the Confcioufneffes of the Parts : And
ag^in ; ' Confcioufnefs may refult from fuch Qua- pag. ijr.
lities,^ as fingly confidered are void of Confeidufnefs ;
In like manner as Roundnefs is a real Quality
fpecifically different from other Qualities void of
Roundnefs, and yet maybe the' Refult or Compo
fition of ' fuch Qualities: And ; Nor is Confci- pag. 237,
oufnefe a Power which anfwers to Figure and Mo^ 23S.
tion [ the generical Powers,] which you agree
confift only in the Figures and Motions ofthe Parts ;
}>ut it agrees or anfwers to [ Numerical ] Modes
of Figure and Motion : All this, is only amufing
your Reader with infignificant Words. For
1 ft Confcioufnefs, ( as I fhall hereafter have occa
fion more particularly to obferve J is truly a
more generical Power, than either Figure or
Motion, For Figure contains under it, nothing
S hut

258 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
but the Modes of Figure ; and Motion, nothing
but the Modes of Motion : But Confcioufnefs
comprehending under it all the Modes of
Thinking, contains in it felf the Ideas of all the
Modes of Figure, and the Ideas of all the
Modes of Motion, and infinite Other Ideas be
fides. Confcioufnefs therefore being a generical
Power, not like, but infinitely more fo, than
Figure and Motion; muft be (according to
your own Confeffion ) the Sum and Refult of the
pag. 204. Confcioufneffes of the feveral Parts ; and fo there
would be as many diftintl Confcioufneffes, as there
are Particles of Matter, of which the Syftem con
fifts ; which you do allow to be very abfurd. But
2dly, Let us endeavour to imagine Confcioufnefs
to be, not a Generical, but a Numerical Power
or Quality, fuch as Roundnefs is ; and fee what
will follow from thence. It cannot be con
ceived that Confcioufnefs in general is a Numeri
cal Power, any more than Figure in general, or
Roundnefs in general. But, as the individual
Roundnefs of a Globe, is a Numerical Quality
of that individual Globe ; fo you can only fay
that the individual Confcioufnefs, which I find
in my felf at any particular Moment of Time,
is a Numerical Mode of fome Power inhering
in that Syftem of Matter which conftitutes my
Brain. Now as the individual Roundnefs of a
Globe, is not indeed made up of a Number of
the Like whole Roundneffes ; ( even as the Num
ber a Hundred, is not made up of Hundreds,
nor the Magnitude of a Foot Cube, made up of
Feet Cube; nor any Whole whatever, made up
of a Number of the like Wholes ; ) but yet
muft needs be made up of fuch Figures, as are
Parts of Roundnefs, nay Parts endued with that
particular numerical Degree of Curvity or Round-
1 nefs ;

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. % j 9
nefs ; and cannot bq -nade up offtraigbt Lines,
Jnor of any Figures which are not Pieces of
Roundnefs, or not Pieces endued with that par
ticular determinate Degree of Curvity or Round
nefs : s!>o the individual Confcioufnefs that I find
in my felf at any particular Moment of Time,
( fuppofing it to be a Quality inhering in a
Syftem of Matter, ) muft be made up, though
not indeed of a Number of the very fame Con
fcioufneffes, yet of fuch Powers as are as piuch
pf thefiame Kind with that Numerical Confeiouf-
ttefs, as \ Arches of Circles are of the fame Kind
with the whole circular Circumference ; or Pieces
of Surfaces fpherically and concentrically Convex,
are of the fame Kind with the whole Spherical
Surface compofed of them ail : That is, it muft
be made up of Different Confcioufneffes indeed,
but ftill Confcioufneffes only, and not Motions or
Figures, or any thing elfe ; any more than the
Roundnefs of a Circle can be made up offtraigbt
Lines, or of Colours, or Sounds, or any thing
elfe befides Pieces of circular Roundnefs ; or than
the Surface of a Sphere, can be made up of any
thing elfe than little Surfaces having every one of
them tbe very fame fipherical and concentrick Con
vexity ; or than an Extended or Solid Subftance,
can be made up of any other Ingredients, than
fuch as are Themfelves Pieces of Extended or
Solid Subftance. It is by no means true, which
you affirm, that Roundnefs is a new Quality, of pag. 234.
a different Kind or Speaes from all the component
Qualities confidered together ; or that it may be pag. 2?f.
the Refult or Compofition of Qualities void of
Roundnefs ; Since it cannot be affirmed of any
part of the Arch pf a Circle, that it is wholly
Void pf Circularity ; as a ftraigbt Line is : And
in like manner, it is by no means poffible,
S 2 that

260 A Third Defence of the tettidteridlitf
t"g. *¦*.$¦ that Confcioufnefs mkyfefult from fuch Qualities,
as fingly confidered are void of \_ all kind of]
Confcioufnefs ; as Motion or Figure is. Nay fur
ther -..Every Part. of. the Circumference , of a
Circle, is not only riot wholly void 'of Round
nefs, but has really; as much Roundnefs or Cur-
¦vity ( as much iii Degree, though not fo much
of it in Quantity ? ),' as the whole Circle it felf
has ; For the fame 'Reafon as one Circle has as
much'- Roundnefs, as Twenty; Or one Inch Cube
of boiling Water," as ¦much, Heat [ in Degree]
as Twenty ; or one 'Foot Square oi a white Sur
face, as much Whitehefs as Twenty : And' there
fore Confcioufnefs in' like manner, ifit was a
Quality anfwering to, or that could be com
pared with, the Roundnefs of a Circle ; muft
confift: of Parts, every one of which would
have as much Confeioufinefs [ in Degree ] as the
Whole. From the fame Principles may eafily be fhown
the Abfurdity of all the reft that you have
advanced, upon your favourite Inftance of
ROUNDNESS.
You fay that the Argument drawn from Con-
fcioufnefs's not being made up of- feveral Con
fcioufneffes, concludes no more againft the Pof
fibility of Its refiding in a Syftem of Matter;
pag. 208. than ihe like Argument would conclude againft
tbe Poffibility of the Exiftence of Roundnefs in
Body ; which no more confifts of feveral Round-
nf/fes, than Thinking or Confcioufnefs does of feve
ral Confcioufneffes ; and is as fpecifically different
from other Figures, as Confcioufnefs is from a
circular Motion. But I think I have fhown,
that the Inftances are not alike ; and that
Roundnefs does not confift of Qualities fo dif
ferent from Roundnefs, as you fuppofe Confci oufnefs

and Natural Immortality of the SouL 2 6 1
mfnefs to be made up of , Qualities different
from Confcioufnefs ; that is, that the Roundnefs
of the whole Circumference of a Circle, is not fo
fpecifically different from the Convexity of the
little Arches , of which it confifts ; or the
Roundnefs of a whole Globe, from the little
fpherically and concentrically Convex Pieces of
Surfaces, of which it is compofed ; as Confci
oufnefs is from a circular Motion, or from Mo
tion in a Square, or any Motion at all, or any
other thing whatever that is wholly void of Con
fcioufnefs. For Roundnefs can confift of no
thing but Pieces of Roundnefs, that differ from
it fpecifically only in the very loweft Senfe of
the Word fpecifically ; or rather they do not
differ from it at all fpecifically, but in Magni
tude only, as the Part from the Whole ; it be
ing hardly good Senfe, to fay that the Number
Twenty differs fpecifically from the Number Ten ;
or that 360 Degrees, or 60 Degrees, differ
fpecifically from 20 Degrees, or from 20 Seconds,
or from any other Part of One and the fame
Arch ; Every part of which, has neceffarily
(* as I before faid ) juft as much Roundnefs or
Curvity [ in Degree, ] as the whole Arch or
whole Circle it felf has : But Thinking, if it be
made up of Qualities utterly void of Thought,
as Motions, Figures, and the like ; muft confift
of Qualities generically^ different from it felf,
in the higheft Senfe of the Word generically ;
they being under no common genus, and having
no fimilitude, nothing common one with ano
ther in their Ideas ; and confequently cannot
with any Senfe be compared at all one with ano
ther, or be compounded one of another ; any
more than Circles and ftraight Lines, or Colours
and Sounds, Numbers and Taflest Figures and
S 3 Motions,

262 A ThirdDefehce of the Immateriality
Motions, or any things whofe Ideas have no
thing common or alike betwixt thetn.
pag. 209. Again : You alledge in behalf of Roiiftdnefs
as well as Thinking, that it is fo fair from being as
certain as an Arithmetical Demonftrdfton, that
fuch a particular Power is a Whole bigger than all
its Paris ; tbat it is an Arithmetical Demonftra
tion, that fuch a particular Power as Roundnefs
is, is but juft equal to all the Parts of which that
Roundnefs confifts. For what more goes to the
Compofition of Roundnefs, than the Conjunclion of
feveral Particles not fingly endued with Roundnefs?
And  what 'more goes to the Power of Think
ing, than the Conjunclion of feveral Particles not
each endued with  Thinking? But here alfo
your Comparifon is nothing to the Purpofe.
For, when you ask, what more goes to the
Compofition of Roundnefs, than the Conjunclion of
feveral Particles not fingly endued with Round
nefs ? If by not fingly endued with Roundnefs,
you mean not fingly endued with [the farrie
whole] Roundnefs ; then your Affertion is no
more than this, that the Parts of Roundnefs
are not a Number of the fame Wholes ; or that
the feveral Pieces of the Circumference of a Cir
cle, are not fo many Whole [Same] Circum^
ferences : And then I anfwer, neither would the
Parts of Thinking ( if it inhered in a Syftem of
Matter ) be fo many Whole [the Sable]
Thoughts. But if you riiean, that a Round
Figure is a Compofition of Particles notfingh
endued with [any Part of] Roundnefs, any
[ Curvity ] at all *, then your Affertion is di
rectly falfe : And fuch a Roundnefs, would be
a Whole bigger than all its Parts ; juft as I faid
Confcioufnefs Would be, if it was made up of
Motions or any other Qualities void of Confer
oufnefs*

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 265
oufnefs. If you imagined Thinking to be made
up of innumerable different Confcioufneffes, as
the Roundnefs of the Circumference of a Circle is
made up of innumerable convex Arches, which
are Pieces of Roundnefs ; then indeed, and then
only, your Comparison would be good : But
to fuppofe Thinking made up of Powers utterly
void of Confcioufnefs, is like fuppofing the Cir
cumference of a Circle to be made up of ftraight
Lines utterly void of Convexity ; ( or rather like
fuppofing it to be made up of Sounds or Co
lours, or whatever elfe can be imagined even
ftill more remote from the Idea of Roundnefs: )
And This is evidently making a Whole bigger
than All its Parts, that is, containing fomething
different from , fomething over and above,
fomething more than All its Parts taken toge
ther ; nay, fuch a Whole, the Sum of whofe
Parts neither make up the Whole it felf, nor
any Part of it : Which is a plain Contradicti
on. It is evident, that no Whole can poffibly
differ from All its Parts in any thing elfe, but
only in the Abftradt Name, the mere external
Denomination of its being a Whole ; which is
nothing at all in the Thing itfelf, but merely a
manner of Conception, a Conjunction of Ideas
in the Imagination of the Perfon that beholds
or thinks upon it. Thinking, if it was the Qua
lity of a Syftem of Matter, that is, the Sum
or Whole of the Powers of its Parts ; muft dif
fer from the diftinct Powers of thofe Parts, no
otherwife than as the Idea of the Roundnefs
of a Circle differs from the Idea of the Round
nefs of two Semicircles ( or of four Quadrants )
joined together ; or as the Idea of Twice Six,
differs from the Idea of the Number Twelve.
If therefore Thinking was, as you fuppofe, a
S 4 Com-

264 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
Compofition or Refulr of feveral Powers ; and
thofe Powers fuch,, as were Themfelves utterly
void of Confcioufnefs ; Thinking would be either
a mere outward Denomination, and nothing at
all really in the Thinking Subftance it felf ;
juft as a Dozen is only a mere Name, and no
thing at all differing really in the thing it felf
from TwelveUnits; Which is what you will not
affirm : Or elfe it muft unavoidably be a Whole
bigger than All its Parts ; that is, containing
All its Parts, and Thinking befides : Juft as the
Curve Circumference of a Circle would contain
more of Curvjty in it than All its Parts taken
together, if it could be compofed of Lines that
had none of them fingly any Curvity at all ;
ox a Cube would be bigger than AH its Parts, if
it were made up of Parts that had none of
them fingly any Magnitude at all.
[If upon this you will forfake your firft In
ftance, and, feeking ftill for new Similitudes,
alledge that a Square Figure ( fuppofe ) may
confift of Parts, that are none of them fingly
endued with any thing like Squarenefs : I an
fwer, that the Squarenefs of the Figure of a
Body, is a mere external Denomination, a mere
relative comparing together in the Imagination
the Bounds of a Surface, the Situation of four
ftraigbt Lines with refpetl one to another ; and has
not properly any real Exiftence in Things
themfelves, fo as Confcioufnefs is acknowledged
to have in the Thinking Subftance, The like
may be faid concerning all other Qualities,
whofe Effence confifts merely in the relative
comparing the Situation or other Refpetls of the
Parts of a Body one towards another : Such kind
of Qualities having really no proper Numerical
Exiftence, faVe only in the Idea. And Round nefs.

and Natural Immortality of the Soul, 2 65
nefs it felf, being confidered in the fame. man
ner, might this way likewife afford a juft An
fwer to your Argument drawn, from thence.]
Laftly, You affirm that Senfation is in the fag. 214,
Parts of an Animal, as Roundnefs is in the Parts us-
which compofe a round Body : Each Part has as
much of Senfation, fingly confidered, as each Part
of a round Body has of Roundnefs ; And wben the
Parts are duly difpofed, whole Thinking is per
formed, as whole Roundnefs exifts, by the. Con
junclion of Parts. But from what has been al
ready faid, I prefume it is evident enough, that
Senfelefs Figure or Motion cannot be fo a Part of
Senfation or a piece of a Thought, as a Semicircle.
or Quadrant is a Piece of a Circle. To affirm.
that it can ; viz. that Figure or Motion wholly
void of Senfe, can be fo a Part of Senfation ; is
plainly ( as I have before fhown ) the very
fame Thing, as if you fhould affirm that a
Line wholly void of Curvity, could be fo a
Piece of tbe Circumference of a Circle, as the
Arch of a Quadrant is; or that fomething that
has no Solidity and no Extenfion, might yet be
a Conftituent Part of an Extended and of a So
lid Subftance.
I have fhown that no part of the Circumfe
rence of a Circle, is wholly void of Round
nefs. If therefore Senfation is ("according to
your Affertion ) in the Parts of an Animal, as
Roundnefs is in the Parts that compofe a round
Body ; and each part has as much of Senfation,
fingly confidered, as each part ofa round Body has
of Roundnefs ; It will follow, not ( as you in
tended ) that Senfation can arife from a Con
junction of Particles utterly void of Senfe ; ( for
the Circumference of a Circle cannot be made by
a Conjunction of Linest or the Superficies of a
Spberg

i6<5 rA Third Defence of the Immateriality
Sphere by a Conjunction of Surfaces, utterly
void of Curvity : ) but, on the contrary, it will
follow that fome Degree of Senfation is really in
every part of the Animal, fingly confidered ;
as fome Degree of Curvity is neceffarily in
every part of the Circumference of a Circle, or of
the Surface of a Sphere. And fo you run una
voidably into that confeffedly abfurd Notion,
fug. 2*»4- that there are as many diftintl Confcioufneffes, as
there are Particles of Matter, of which the Think
ing Syftem confifts.
I am afraid our Readers are fufficiently tired
with ROUND NE S S. The other Inftances
you alledge, to prove that a Quality or Power
inhering in a Syftem of Matter, needs not be
the Refult of Powers or Qualities of the fame
Kind, refiding in the Parts of the Syftem ; are
ftill lefs to your purpofe. For it is very evi
dent concerning Thofe and all other poffible
Inftances, that they never are nor can be any
thing elfe, but the Sums of Powers or Quali
ties of the fame particular uniform Kind with the
Whole, when that Whole is Simple and Homo
geneous ; or of the fame General Kind with it,
when it is Complex and Heterogeneous. Which
fince you acknowledge cannot be the Cafe of
Thinking, it will follow that Thinking cannot be
a Power or Quality refiding in a Syftem of
Matter. The Power of a Clock to fhow the Hour of
the Day, is not indeed a Refult from the like
individual Powers refiding in the feveral Parts ;
any more than the Number a Thoufand, is the
Refult of a Compofition of Thoufiands ; or Any
Whole, a Compofition of a Multitude of the
fame Wholes : But, as the Number a Thoufetni
is the Sum of a great many Numbers, but can not

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. '26%
not with any Senfe be imagined to be a Com
pofition of Sounds or Colours ; fo the Numeri
cal Power of a Clock, being it felf nothing but
Motion and Figure, cannot be the Refult of
arty other Powers in the Parts, but fuch as are
themfelves fingly of the fame Kind, in the man
ner before explained; namely, Motions and
Figures. And in like manner my prefent Nu
merical Confcioufnefs, if it were at all a Quality
inhering in a Syftem of Matter ; though it
need not indeed be the Sum of a Multitude of
the like individual Thoughts, inhering in the fe
veral diftindt Parts of the Syftem ; yet it muft
be the Sum of Such Powers in the Parts, as
would themfelves fingly be of the fame Kind,
namely Confcioufneffes or Thoughts: It being
equally, and for the very fartie Reafon, im
poffible that my Confcioufnefs fhould be the Re
fult of fuch Powers in the Parts of my Brain,
as are toto genere different from Thinking, and
hive nothing in their Ideas common with it
Or alike to it ; ( fuch as are Figure and Mo
tion, and all other Powers which are void of
Confcioufnefs ; ) as that the fore-mentioned
Number a Thoufiand, fhould be a Compofition
of Sounds or Colours, or of any thing elfe but
Numbers. The Power of a Mufical Inftrument to pro- pg- *99\
duce Harmonious Sounds, is not indeed a Refult
from the like individual Powers refiding in the
feveral Parts of the Inftrument 5 any more
than the Circumference of a Circle is made up of
a Number of the like whole Circ umferences: But,
as the Circumference of a Circle is the Sum of a
Multitude of convex Arches cf like Curvity, but
cannot be an Aggregate of Straight Lines, or
of Cubic Bddies, or bf Arches of unlike Curvity j
So the Harmony produced by a Mufical In
ftrument,

'i&s. A Third Defence of the Immaterially.
ftrument, . being it felf, in <the Mind that pep-..
ceives it, .nothing but Sound ; and, in the Inr
ftrument, and, in the Air, and in the Organs
of Senfatipn, nothing but a .Motion of Parts %
cannot be the Refult or, Compofition. of any
other Powers, but what are themfelves fingly
of the fame Kind in the feveral Subjects refpec
tively ; namely, in the Mind that perceives
them, Sounds likewife ; and, in the Inftrument
it felf, and' in the Air, and inithe Organs, of
Sepfation, Motion of the Parts. < And in like
manner Confcioufnefs , if it were a Power in
hering in a. Syftem of Matter, could not be
the Refult. of any other Powers in the- Parts,
but fome fieri is. of Confcioufnefs ; for the very fame
Reafon as the Circumference of a Circle cannot
(as was before faid ) be an Aggregate of
ftraight. Lines*, or of Cubic Bodies ; nor an Har- .
monious Sound, a Compofition of Colours, or of
any thing elfe befide Sounds.
f*t- *.A The Power cf the Eye to fee, is nothing elfe
*&' but fuch a. Power, as is in the Objetl Glaffes
of Telefcopes, ,; of Tranfmitting and Ref ratling
Rays of Light, fo as to paint the Image of
tjie Objeft in .the Bottom of the Eye. And
This is evidently nothing but the Sum of Pow
ers of thefame Kind, namely, Powers of Tranf
mitting and Refratling of Rays, . refiding di-'
ftinctly in the feveral Parts of the Eye or of
the Glafis. Every Part of the Eye, Tranfenits
and RefraQs .Rays ; and thofe Rays paint feve
ral Parts of the Image : And the Whole, Image,
differs no otherwife from all its Parts; nor
That which you call the Numerical Power. of
the Whole Eye, from the fingle Powers of all its
Parts ; than the Idea of a Dozen differs from
the Idea of Twelve Units : Which, if it be as
• ¦. great

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. -2 6$
great a Difference, as is between the Idea of
Cdhfeioufnefs and 'the Idea of a Circular or' any t*&< IoS-
other Motion, I will confefs I have loft my Un
derftanding. ',
But there is ftill a further peculiar Unhapi
pinefs in your choofing to inftance in the Pow'-
er of the Eye to contribute to the Atl of feeing, as
a Numerical' Pow'er of a .Syftem of Matter, that
does not inhere iii tbe Parts ofthat Syftem ; and
in your affirming, that upon dividing or varj- p"g. *99-
'ing the leaft Part of the Eye, the Power of
contributing towards the All of Vifion is entirely
at an End. Fo^ fo. far is this from being true,
( excepting only accidentally upon Account of
the Softnefs and Fluidity of the Matter of the
"Eye, ) that on the contraty,^ not only ever'y
Part of the Eye (as I now faid )' Tranfmits, 'arid
Refratls Rays, in order to paint at the Bottdih
the feveral Parts of the Image Of the Object ;
( and the Power of the Whole. Eye, is nothing
more than the Sum of thofe Trdnfmiffwns and
Refratlions : ) but moreover even every Part
of the Eye has the fame Power as the Whole,
( differing only in Degree, ) of painting at .the
Bottom the Whole Image, of the Object. For,
as each Half of a broken Object" Glafs of a
Telefcope, or any Piece of it that retains the
Polifh on both Surfaces, will reprefent diftinctly
the Whole Object, only with lefs Brightnefs
and Luminoufnefs than the whole Glafs would
do ; fo each part of the Eye, paints every
part of the whole Object : And, it half of the '
Eye, or almoft the Whole Eye be covered, fo
that you look only through a Pinhole placed
on the right fide, or on the left fide, or upon
the middle ofthe Pupil; ftill the whole Ob
ject is feen diftinctly, even by that very finall Pare

gfo rA Third Defence of the Immateriality
Part of the Eye ; And confequently the Power
of the Eye is the fame both in the Whole, and.
in every. Part.
And the fame that has been faid concerning
thefe feveral Inftances you chofe to infift upon,
may with very little Variation be faid likewife
concerning all other Powers whatfoever that
do or can refide in any Syftem of Matter ; The
right Explication of the Nature of which Pow
ers, fliows even your own Inftances to be fo
many unanfwerable Arguments againft the Af
fertion you brought them to fupport.
This, I prefume, may be fufficient to prove.
jagainft ypu in the general, that Every Power or
Quality refiding in any Syftem of Matter,
muft of Neceffity be the Sum or Aggregate
of Powers of thefiame Kind, refiding diftindlly
in the feveral Parts of the Syftem : And con
fequently, that Whatever Power is not an Ag
gregate of fuch Powers j as you confefs Con
fcioufnefs or Thinking is not j cannot be at all a
Power or Quality of Matter.
Not without fome Unwillingnefs ypu feem
at laft to determine in particular what Sort of
Generical Power in Matter, you imagine Th'ink-
f»g. zo-j. ing to be a Numerical Mode of. You fuppofe
Confcioufnefs to be a Mode of Motion : You fpeak
pag. 206. of Thought as a Species of Motion : And you
conceive it a proper Expreflion, to mention a
pag. 209. certain Species of Motion, called Thinking.
pag. 203. You defire indeed it may not be imputed to
you as your Opinion, fince you only take the Li
berty to Suppofe it. But This will not ferye ypu
for an Evafion, when the Abfurdity of theNp-
tion is proved upon ypu. Fpr you declare it
as

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 271
ias your pofitive Opinion, that Human Confci- pag. ao6'
oufnefs or Thinking is a Mode of Some Generical
Power in Matter. What that Generical Power
is, you will not pofitively determine j But you
Suppofe it to be Motion. Now I prefume you
Suppofe That which you judge the moft pro
bable, and which you think will beft ferve
your purpofe in explaining the Nature of
Thinking. 1 fhall prove prefently, that Nothing
can be more abfurd, than to Suppofe Thinking
to be a Mode of Motion. The fame Argu
ments will prove no lefs ftrongly , that it is
not poffible for Thinking to be a Mode of Fi
gure, or of any other known Property of Mat
ter ; And alfo that it is not poflible for it to be
a Mode of any unknown Power of Matter,
which in the general is void of Thinking; Becaufe
every unknown Power which is void of Thinking,
is as different from Thinking, as Motion it felf is,
or Figure, or any other known Power ; for the
fame Reafon that a Smell or a Tafte, or any o-
ther known or unknown Quality which is not a
Colour, muft of Neceffity be as different from
Blue or Scarlet, as the Sound of a Trumpet is.
When therefore I have fhown the Abfurdity of
your Suppofition, that Thinking is a Mode of fag. aoj'
'Motion ; I fhall likewife have fhown the Ab
furdity of your declared Opinion, that Human pag\ 2 0$
Confeioufnefs or Thinking is a Mode of Some Ge
nerical Power in Matter.
Now to prove the Abfurdity of Suppofing
Confcioufnefs to be a Mode of Motion, I offer the
following Arguments.
1 . Every Mode of any Power or Quality, is
nothing elfe but That Power or Quality of which
it is a Mode, underftood with fome particular
Limitation ; that is to fay, it is nothing but a
particular Inftance of that general Power or
Quality ;

272 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
Quality; nothing but the general Power or
Quality,, confidered under this or that particular
Modification: '. Blue and Red, and all other
Modes of/Colour, are nothing but feveral par
ticular Coldurs; and can contain nothing in
their Ideal, beyond the Genus of Colour. Acute
arid Grave, ^nd all other 'Modes of Sound, are
nothing but feveral particular Sounds ; and can,
contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the Ge
nus of Soutfd; Circular' and Triangular, and all
other Modes of Figure,, are nothing but feveral .
particular Figures; and can Contain nothing in
their Idea, beyond the Genus1 of Figure-. In
like mahnerAir Modes of: Motion, are nothing
elfe but merely particular Motions; and cannot
Contain any thing in their Idea; beyond the
Genus Of Motion! Now if Simple Ideas be the
"Foundation of all our Knowledge ; and clear
and difiiritl Perception of the Agreement or Dif-
agreement of thofe Ideas, be' the beft and great-
eft Criterio'n , of Truth, that our Faculties ina-
ble us to attain to ; then it is as evident as^ any
Truth in; the World, that Confcioufnefs cannot
"poffibly be. a Mode cf Motion. For I have as
clear and diftintl a Perception, thatthe Idea of
Confcioufnefs contains fomething in it befides and
beyond the Genus of Motion, as I have that it
contains forriething in it beyond the Genus of
Figure. The Idea of Confcioufnefs is as totally
and generically different from the Idea of a
Circular Motion, or an Elliptical Motion, or
any other Mode of Motion whatfoever, as it is
from the Idea of a Circle or a Cube, or any
other Mode of Figure whatfoever. I have there
fore exactly the fame intuitive Certainty, that
Confcioufnefs cannot be a Mode of Motion, as I
have that a Circle or a Cube is not a Thought, or

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 273
Or that an Acute Sound is not a Purple Colour,
or that any one thing in the World is not ano
ther, whofe Idea is the remoteft and moft
different from it, that can be imagined. To
fuppofe Confcioufnefs to be a Mode of Motion, is
really a greater Abfurdity, ( if poffible ) than
it would be to fuppofe Roundnefs to be a Pro
perty of a Square ; Becaufe the Idea of Local
Motion and the Idea of Thinking, having no
common Genus, nothing wherein they agree or
can be compared together ; are evidently more
different one from another, than the Ideas of
any two plain Figures can be, which have a com
mon Genus. And your Queftion, What more pag. 209.
goes to the Power of Thinking, than the Con
junclion of feveral Particles not each endued with
That Species of Motion called Thinking ? Is truly
more ridiculous, than if a Man fhould ask,
What more goes to the making up of a Scarlet
Colour, than the Conjunclion of feveral Particles
not each endued with That Species of. Sound, cal
led Scarlet ? Becaufe no two fenfible Qualities
are in their Ideas fo different one from another,
as the Idea of Confcioufnefs, is from the Idea of
Local Motion.
Local Motion can have no other effect upon
any Syftem of Matter, than only producing in
it a different juxta pofition of Parts. To which
to afcribe Thinking, Mr. Lock himfelf, who
had no Prejudice againft the Poffibility' of Mat
ter's Thinking, acknowledges it is very Ab
furd. To fuppofe, faith he, the Eternal thinking Book Iv.
Being [or any finite thinking Being] to bec^f°-
nothing elfe but a Compofition of Particles of Mat- »' '
ter, each whereof is incogitative ; is to afcribe all
the Wifdom and Knowledge of that Eternal Being
I or the Wifdom and Knowledge, and all the
T Powers

274 rd Third Defence of the Immateriality
Powers of the Finite thinking Being ] only to
the juxta -pofition of Parts. Than which nothing
can be more abfurd. For unthinking Particles of
Matter, however put together, can have nothing
thereby added to tbem, but a new Relation of Po
fition, which it is impoffible fhould give Thought
and Knowledge to them.
2. If Thinking was any Mode or Species of Mo
tion, it would follow that All Motion would be
fome degree or kind of Thinking. For Motion,
in the Thing Moved, excepting only the
Difference of Degrees of its Swiftnefs or Slow-
nefs, is a Similar Quality, and has no Variety
in it : All its different Determinations, or thofe
v/hich you call its Modes and Species, being
nothing really in the Body it felf that is moved ;
but mere Abftratl Notions or external Denomina
tions, conceived only in our Imagination. For,
moving with one Determination, or with ano
ther ; from North to South, or from South to
North ; is merely relative, and not really a
different thing in the Body moved ; that one
of thofe Motions fhould be Confcioufnefs, the
other not. In like manner Circular Motion,
or Motion in any other Figure, is not any thing
really and truly inhering in the Body it felf,
different from Motion in a ftraight Line. For
the Determination of any Body that moves in, a.
Circle, is nothing elfe, at any given Point of
Time, but a Determination to move in a cer
tain ftreight Line ; and, at another given Point
of Time, to move in another ftreight Line ; and
fo on : fo that there is no fuch thing as a circu
lar Motion of any Particle of Matter, coexiftent
at once ; but all Motion is, ftridtly and pro
perly fpeaking, a fimilar and uniform Quality,
viz, a Body's Going on according to its Deter
mination ;

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 27$
mination ; Which Determination is always in a
ftraight Line ; and caufes the Body to go on
actually in a ftraight Line, where it meets with
no Refiftance ; and where it meets with Re-
fiftance by Intervals, there to go on into new
ftraight Lines fucceflively, into which it is di
verted by fuch Refiftance ; and, where it meets
with continual Refiftance, there to go on in a
Curve Line, into which it is continually di
verted : And every fuch curvilinear Motion,
whether circular or of any other Species whatfo
ever, is but the Idea of a Number of Suc-
ceffive Motions of a Body, never exiftent to
gether ; a pure Ens Rationis, or Operation of
the Mind ; which confidering Paft Motion and
Future, and recollecting the Whole by the
Memory and Fancy, calls * That Whole fome- * Set B*«
times by one Denomination and fometimes by fll0P ?f
another. How then can any of thofe Modes *jf sermon on
Motion be the Efficient of Thought, or ( ac- Immorta-
cording to your Suppofition ) be themfelves li*y of tlie
Thought; when they are evidently nothing but^'p-.9'
the Effetl and Produtl of it, viz. Ideas framed Bentle/s
merely by the Imagination and Memory ? Sermon II
And the fame that has been faid concerning "^'"'s
the Modes of Motion of a fingle Body, may *"..!'
eafily be applied to the Modes of Motion of any
Number of Bodies, in any Syftem or Compofition
whatfoever. It being very evident, that if the
Progrejfion of One Particle of Matter diretJly in
a ftraight Line, be not Confcioufnefs or Thought ;
the like Progrejfion of Twenty Particles at the
fame time in ftraight Lines, cannot be Confcioufi
nefis neither : The Pofition of thofe Lines with
refpect one to another, which determines the
particular Mode of Motion of the whole Syftem,
being merely imaginary, relative, and compa-
T 2 rative ;

¦ 7 6 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
rative ; a figment only in the Mind or Imagi
nation, and not any thing really exifting in the
Bodies themfelves, at any one and the fame
Moment of Time.
In like manner the Impulfe alfo, or Beating of
one Particle of Matter againft another, is a thing
fimilar and in all Cafes alike ; differing in no
thing but in the Degrees or Quantity of the
Force : And therefore muft always and in all
Cafes, if ever in Any Cafe at all, be fome De
gree of Thought. From whence it would fol
low, that there muft be as many feveral in
coherent Confcioufneffes, as there are Particles of
the Brain or Spirits, or of any other Matter
in any Syftem, that ever dafti one againft ano
ther : Which is what you are not willing to
affirm. 3. If Confcioufnefs were a Mode or Species of
Motion ; then Motion would be the more generi
cal Power ; containing Thinking under it, as
( in the Language of Logicians ) the Genus
does the Species. But on the contrary it is
evident ( as I before obferved ) that Thinking
( though fimple and not compounded of Parts,)
is, in the Senfe we are now fpeaking of, a
Power infinitely more generical than either Mo-
< tion or Figure, or any other Power of Matter ;
and confequently cannot be a Mode or Species
of any of them. There are as many Ideas of
Figure, as there are Figures ; and as many Ideas of
Motion, as there are Modes of Motion ; and as
many Ideas of other things, as there are other
things in the World, that can be thought upon :
And all thefe Ideas, are Modes and Sorts, or
Kinds of Thinking. Now if Thinking is a Pow
er more various, more extenfive, more gene
rical, than Motion ; it is manifeft it cannot be
a Mode or Species of Motion, as Roundnefs is a
3 Mode

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 277
Mode or Species of Figure. If Thinking is a
Power more generical, than Figure, or Motion,
or ariy other Power of Matter ; if it is a Power
as univerfal, as all things taken together, that
can be thought upon ; it is certainly a generical
Power in the higheft Degree ; And confequently,
( if it be at all a Power of Matter, ) it will
oblige you to run into the Abfurdity you de
clare you would avoid. For, by your own
Confeffion, you would grant readily, that, was fug. 204.
Confcioufnefs a generical Power like Figure and
Motion ( like Figure and Motion it is not, but
infinitely more generical than either of them, )
it would be likewife the Sum and Refult of the
Confcioufneffes of the feveral Parts ; and fo there
would be as many diftintl Confcioufneffes, as there
are Particles of Matter, of which the Syftem
confifts ; Which you do allow to be very Abfurd.
As Figure is the Genus of all the Species pf
Figure, fo the Idea of Figure is the Genus of
all the Ideas of all the Species of Figures : And fo
the Idea of Motion, is the Genus of all the Ideas of
all the Species of Motions ; and the Idea of Colour,
is the Genus of the Ideas of all the Species of Co
lours ; and the Idea of Sound, is the Genus of
tbe Ideas of all the Species of Sounds ; and the
Idea of an Animal, is the Genus of the Ideas of
all the Species of Animals. The General Ideas of
p-igure, Motion, Colour, Sound, Animal, &c. are
generical Powers of the Mind ; And Thinking is
the Genus gener alius of all thofe Powers. With
what Senfe then can it be faid to be one of the
lower Species, or a Numerical Made of One of
thofe Powers ?
4. If it was the Motion of the- Parts of a
Corporeal Syftem, on which its Thinking depends-,
all the Thoughts There, muft be unavoidably acci-
T 3 dental

278 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
dental and limited ; becaufe each one of the
Particles, tbat by Motion caufe Thought, being in
it felf without any Thought, cannot regulate its
own Motions ; much lefs be regulated by the
Ihought of the Whole ; fince that Thought of the
Whole, is not the Caufe of Motion, (for then it
muft be antecedent to it, and fo without it, ) but
the Confequence of it : Whereby Freedom, Power,
Choice, and all rational and wife thinking or ailing,
will be quite taken away : So that fuch a thinking
Being, would be no better nor wifier, than pure
blind Matter ; fince to refiolve all into the acciden
tal unguided Motions of blind Matter, or into
Thought depending on unguided Motions of blind
Matter, is the fame thing: Not to mention the
Narrownefs of fuch Thoughts and Knowledge, that
muft depend on the Motion of fuch Parts. But
there needs no Enumeration of any more Abfurdities
and Impoffibilities in this Hypothefis, (however
full of them it be, ) than That before-mentioned ;
fence, let this thinking Syflem be All or a Part of
the Matter of the Univerfe, it is impoffible that
any one Particle fhould either know its own, or
the Motion of any other Particle ; or the Whole
know the Motion of every particular ; and fo re
gulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have
any Thought refulting from fuch Motion. This
Argument, is Mr. Lock's own Words, ( Book
IV. ch. 10. Seel. iy. ) to which I cannot but
fuppofe you will give fome Deference.
5. If Thinking was a Mode or Species of
Motion ; then in like manner as it is a proper
Expreflion to fay, that Circularity is one Species
of Figure, and Squarenefs a fecond, and Cubi-
calnefs a third, and Elliptical nefs a fourth ; fo it
would be proper alfo to fay, that Circular Mo
tion is one Species of Motion, and Motion in a

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 27*?
Square a fecond, and Motion in an Ellipfis a
third, and Thinking or Confcioufnefs a fourth ;
and, I appeal to the common Senfe of all
Mankind, whether I may not add with exactly
the fame Reafon, that a Tree is a fifth, and a
Syllogifm a fixth, and Perfionality a feventh, &c.
[If to this you will reply, that you do not
mean as you fay, that any particular Motion is
it felf Thought, but that Thought may be the
Refult of fome particular Motion ; I anfwer in
the Words of Mr. Hobbes, that * no Refult of *. Mtttu
Motion can ever be any thing elfe but mere *"'*''.?*"*'*'
Motion ftill : ( With a different Juxta-pofition Motum.
of Parts perhaps ; of which before, pag. 273.) Leviat.
And confequently all the foregoing Arguments c' '• /
hold equally good, againft one Notion as a-
gainft the other.]
Some of thefe Abfurdities are fo very grofs,
and yet fuch obvious Confequences of your
Notion, that it can hardly be imagined ypu
fhould have over-looked them. And indeed
you do at laft endeavour to obviate them in a
very effetlual manner ; In fuch a manner, by
which you may, whenever you pleafe, anfwer
all the Arguments upon any Queftion in the
World ; and remove out of your way, not
only any Demonftration, but even Intuitive
Knowledge it felf. You tell me, that I imagine pag. ijfc
Confcioufnefs to be Something elfe than wbat you
contend it is ; That the Term of Confcioufnefs pag. 23s.
ftands with You, in another Senfe than with
Me: That with You, it fignifies a Numerical pag. as?,
Power, anfwering to Roundnefs in a Body, or to
a Motion peculiar to a Syftem of Matter ; but pag. S3g.
that with Me, it relates to a Chimera or Idea of
my own framing,
T 4 Now

280 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
Now to This I reply in the Words of Mr.
Lock ; ( Book IV. ch. i . Self. 4. ) A Man in
fallibly knows, affoon as ever he has them in his
Mind, tbat the Ideas he calls White and Round,
are the very Ideas they are ; and that they are not
other Ideas, which he calls Red or Square.
I think I know infallibly, affoon as ever I
have it in my Mind, that the Idea I call Con
fcioufnefs, Perception or Thinking, is the very
Idea it is ; and that it is not another Idea ,
which I call circular Motion, or Elliptical Mo
tion, or Motion in a Square, or the Motion of a
Watch or of any other Machine. And 1 appeal
to what every Man finds in his own Mind ;
whether my Account of Confcioufnefs, or yours
which makes it to be merely a Mode of Motion,
be the more Chimerical Idea.
Simple Ideas cannot be defined nor defcribed.
When any Difpute is carrried fo far, as to ter
minate in queftioning the Idea it felf ; there is
nothing then left but to appeal to the Idea
which every Man has in his own Mind. If I
affirm that this Paper is White, and you will
contend that it is Red; we cannot confute one
another by Arguments, but muft appeal to the
Judgment of the World. If a Man will tell
rne, that by Scarlet-Colour he does not mean
That Chimerical Idea which I frame in my
own Mind and call by that Name ; but that He
means thereby, only a certain Numerical Mode.
of Sound, I know not how he can be confuted,
but by appealing to every Man's own Ideas.
The Idea of Confcioufnefs which I have in . my
Mind, appears to Me an Idea, which I think \
clearly and diftinctly perceive to be altogether
as different from the Idea of any poffible Nume
rical Mode of Figure or Motion, as my Idea of
' Scarlet-

and Natural Immortality of the Saul. 2 s r
Scarlet-Colour is different from my Idea of the
Sound ofa Trumpet. If any other Perfon thinks
his Idea of Confcioufnefs, to be the fame with his
Idea of a circular Motion or of any other nume
rical Mode of Motion ; I conceive there is no
thing more to be done, but to permit him to
have the Pleafure of continuing to think fo,
as long as he pleafes.
The Sum is This. I affirm that Thinking,
cannot poffibly be a mere Mode of Motion ;
becaufe the Idea of Thinking and the Idea qf
Motion or any of its Modes, have not the leaft
Likenefs or Affinity between them. This, you
fay, proves nothing ; becaufe My Idea of
Thinking, is a mere Chimera ; but Your Idea
of it, is the fame as your Idea of fome Nu
merical Mode of Motion. I reply ; If this proves
nothing, then neither can any Argument in the
World ever prove any thing. For, Suppofe
the Thing in difpute be, whether a Square is a
Circle, or whether Bluenefs is a Tafte: I con
tend this cannot poffibly be, becaufe my Idea
pf a Square includes in it nothing of that
Roundnefs which is my Idea of a Circle ; and
my Idea of Bluenefs includes in it nothing like
That Senfation, which is my Idea of a Tafte.
May not another Perfon anfwer, that This
proves nothing ? Becaufe my Idea of a Square,
br of Bluenefs, is a mere Chimera ; but His
Idea of a Square, is the fame as his Idea of a
round Figure; and his Idea of Bluenefs, the fame
as his Idea of fome certain Tafte.
To conclude. In reviewing this whole Mat-
ter^ I can hardly perfuade my felf, but that
you have miftaken your own Argument. Some
ingenious Perfons in the prefent Age have in
deed undertaken to maintain,, that God, by
the

2 82 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
the immediate Exercife of his Omnipotence^
may make Matter Think ; notwithftanding it
be impoffible that Thinking fhould refult natu
rally, from any Compofition or Divifion of
the original Properties of Matter. I fuppofe
they meant, that to Matter difpofed in a cer
tain Manner, and put into fome particular
Modes of Motion, Omnipotence could Super
add the Power of Thinking. I think the Argu
ment drawn ' from the Divifibility of Matter,
proves that Matter is not a Subjedt capable
of fuch a Superaddition : And if it be not ;
then recurring to the Divine Omnipotence for
the making out an Impoffibility, is not magni
fying but deftroying the Power of God ; as indeed
all contradictory Apprehenfions concerning any
of his Perfections, are really and in event de-
ftructive of our whole Notion of God ; and
have no other Effect, than to give profane
Men an occafion offcoffing at Religion. How-.
ever, that Affertion had the Appearance
( though a very falfe one) of being founded in
a certain modeft Apprehenfion concerning the
Inconceivable Extent of the Divine Power.
But that any Mode of Motion fhould be ( not a
previous Difpofition or Qualification, towards
capacitating Matter for the Addition of fuch a
Power ; but that it fhould be ) Thinking it felf ;
when all the Matter fuppofed to be in that Mo
tion, is acknowledged otherwife to be void of
Thought : This is fuch an extravagant Abfurdi
ty, as may juftly caufe Wonder how it fhould
ever enter into the Heart of any rational Man s
efpecially in an Age, wherein Philofophical
Knowledge has received fo confiderable Im
provements. Having

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. zsj
Having thus particularly anfwered the Ar
gument wherein you placed your main Strength;
It remains that I take notice of fome Incidents
in your Refletlions, wherein I think you have
either greatly mifreprefented Me, or give very
difadvantagious Reprefen tation s of your own
Philofophy. In the Queftion, Whether a Syftem of Matter
can have a Power of Thinking, or an Indivi
dual Confcioufnefs fuperadded to it, or flowing
from any Modification of that Syftem ; you faid,
you underftood by a Power of Thinking, only
Atlual Thinking, and not a Capacity of Think
ing. I replied, there was no need of making any
fuch Diftinction ; becaufe my Argument was of
equal force, in whatever Senfe the Term Con
fcioufnefs was underftood ; whether to fignify
the Capacity of Thinking, or Atlual Thinking,
or the Reflex Adt of being Confcious that I
Think. Upon this, you mate a long Expoftulation,
wbat occafion I had for contending with you about p*g- 191.
the Senfe you fixed to the Terms. I did not con
tend much about it : But the Occafion of faying
what I did,, was, becaufe in all Queftions, the
greater Latitude of Signification the Terms
may be allowed to be underftood in, without
making any Alteration in the Strength of the
Proof, the clearer and ftronger fuch Proof al
ways is ; and the lefs Perplexity, or room for
quibbling, remains in the Queftion it felf.
You ask ; Have you not underftood me in a pag. ipi
Senfe that anfwered all the Ends and Purpofes of
my Argument? My Argument was indeed con -
clufive in the Senfe you underftood me in :
But

2 §4 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
But I had no reafon to approve of your con
fining me to that Senfe only, when the Argu
ment was equally conclufive in any other Senfe
the Reader might happen to underftand the
Terms in.
pug. 191. You fay, you have taken but the fame Liberty
1 allow to every other Reader. But, if I miftake
not, there is fome Difference between allowing
the Reader to take the Term Confcioufnefs in
which of the Three fore-mentioned Senfes he
pleafes ; and allowing You to confine it to One
of thofe Senfes, exclufive of the others.
I affirmed that the Reader needs not trouble
himfelf with the Ninety of Diftintlion between a
Capacity of Thinkings atlual Thinking, and tbe
Reflex Atl of Thinking ; but may underftand
Confcioufnefs indifferently in all or any of thefe
Significations.
?«?. iot, This Sentence, you think, contains one of the
192. niceft Diftintlions that ever you met with ; being
as much as to fay, that the Reader need not under
ftand Confcioufnefs indifferently in any of the be
fore-mentioned Significations, and yet may under
ftand it indifferently in any of thefe Significations,
But Where is the Nicenefis ( the Ridiculoufinefis I
fuppofe you mean) of faying that the Reader
may take a Word in a Senfe, which yet he is
not under a Neceffity of taking it in, but may
likewife take it in fome Other Senfe if he
pleafes ?
p»g. 152. You add : For you cannot See, but that who
ever underfiands Confcioufnefs in any one of thofe
Significations, muft ufe that Nicety of Diftintlion
I complain of, whether he will or no ; For by
Reftraining Confcioufnefs to any One of thofe Sig
nifications, he neceffarily diftinguifhes That One
from the other Two : And that therefore you muft
needs

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 285
needs own, you cannot See the leaft Reafon I had
to blame you for a needlefs DiftintJion, when I
allow you to underftand Confcioufnefs indifferently
in three Significations, one of which you did affign
as your Meaning or Idea of that Word. But, if
you pleafe to look once again, I fuppofe you
will be able to See, that there is no abfolute Ne
ceffity for bim that underftands Confcioufnefs in
any One of thofe fore-mentioned Significations, to
Reftrain it to That One Signification ; as you de-
fired to do.
Laftly, You alledge that the whole Difpute pag. 194;
turns upon the prefent Diftintlion of the Signifi
cations of the Word Confcioufnefs ; And to
prove that it does fo, you cite a Sentence out
of my Letter to Mr. Dodweli, wherein the
Word Confcious cannot be underftood in any
other Senfe, than to fignify atJual Thinking.
It is true; in that Sentence the Word was fo
ufed ; And in the very fame Sentence it was
alfo ufed Otherwife. Now, becaufe iri that
Paffage which you made the Occafion of our
prefent Debate, I once ufed the Word in fuch a
Manner, as that the Nature of the Thing ac
cidentally confined it to that Signification ;
though in the more emphatical Part of the
very fame Sentence, it was ufed in a larger
Senfe ; Does this prove that the whole Difpute
now turns upon any Diftinction of the Significa
tion of that Word ? You might as well have
faid, it proves the remoteft Thing in the World
from our prefent Queftion. The Sentence it
felf was This : It is plain, unlefs Matter were
effentially Confcious,  no Syftem of it in any
poffible Compofition or Divifion can be an Indivi
dual Confcious Being. My Meaning was, that
unlefs Matter were effentially Confcious, that is,
unlefs

2 8 6 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
unlefs it were effentially indued with atlual
Thinking ; it might be proved from its Divifi
bility, that no Syftem of it in any poffible
Compofition or Divifion, could ever be an in
dividual Confcious Being, that is, could ever
either atJually Think or attain a Capacity of
Thinking. How does it follow now from hence,
that becaufe in the former Part of this Sentence,
the Word Confcious happens to fignify only ac
tual Thinking ; therefore in the Queftion ,
[ Whether Confcioufnefs can inhere in a Syftem of
Matter, ] the Word Confcioufnefs may not be
underftood at large, to fignify either atJual
Thinking, or a Capacity of Thinking ? Between
which, after all, there is no great Difference
at the Bottom.
Upon the whole ; why you fhould be dif-
pleafed with me for allowing the Terms of the
Queftion to be underftood in the greateft La
titude, and for endeavouring to prove more
than you expected, • viz. that no Syftem of
Matter could either have atlual Thinking, or fo
much as any Capacity of Thinking ; I could
not imagine. And why you made fuch a Stir
about a Diftinction, which did and ftill does
appear to me to be very needlefs ; I could
conceive no other Caufe, but only that you
might perplex the Queftion.
fag. 193. Thus I have given you the Reafon, you De
manded, of my Condutl in this Matter : I dd
not Demand of Tou, but leave it to your Dif-
cretion, to choofe whether you will give any
Reafon of yours, or no: For, (if you will
faS. i9i, give me leave to ufe your own Expreffion / 1
cannot affign a good one for you. Yoi*

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 287
YoU ask ; If the Soul or" Principle of Thinking pug. 206.
be Undivided, how can it think fucceffively, divide,
abftratl, combine or ampliate, retain or revive Im-
preftions in the Memory ? And how can it be ca
pable, partly or wholly to forget any thing ? And
the Corporeity of the Soul, you think, is fur
ther proved experimentally, from our being
tired with contemplating, as much as withyJ«gi»g
and dancing ; from the ReatJion of our Thoughts
or of our Ideas and Words, mutually exciting
each other ; and from the Forgetfulnefs of Chil
dren and Old People, upon any caufe that dificom-
pofes the Organ.
To this I anfwer. The Reafon why the Soul
or Principle of Thinking, though it felf Un
divided, yet thinks fucceffively, divides., ab-
ftracts, combines or ampliates, retains or re
vives Impreffions in the Memory, or partly gr
wholly forgets Things ; is becaufe The Whole
Soul thinks fucceffively, divides, abftracts, com
bines or ampliates, retains or revives Impref
fions in the Memory, or partly or wholly for
gets things : And none of thefe Phenomena
can be explained by the various Acts of the
various Parts of a Bodily Organ alone.
Our being tired with Contemplation ; the mu
tual ReatJion of our Ideas and Words ; our For
getfulnefs that follows upon certain DefetJs or Difi-
compofures of the Brain; csV ; do not prove
that the Soul it felf is a Bodily Organ ; but only
that it AtJs upon, and is Atled upon by Bodily
Organs ; and is affifted by them, as Inftru»
ments in its Operations. Experience fhows us,
that the Sight is bettered by good Telefcopes,
and the Hearing by Inftruments of conveying
Sounds ; but not that thofe Inftruments there
fore Hear or See : That all Senfation is bettered by

ass A Third Defence of the Immateriality
by good Organs of Senfe,; but not that the Or
gans themfelves are Senfible : That Imagination
and Memory depend on the Brain ; But not that
the Brain imagines or remembers. The Organs of
the Senfes are entirely diftindt from one ano
ther ; But the Thing which perceives by thofe
different Organs, is One and the Same Thing ;
one Thinking Being, which every Man calls
Himfelf. And this One Thinking Being, has
not fome Powers in fome Parts, and other
Powers in other Parts ; fome Actions in fome
Parts, and other Actions in other Parts ; But
all its Powers, are the Powers of the Whole ;
and All its Actions, are the Actions of the
Whole. The Whole Thinking Subftance, Sees
both the Whole Object, and every Part of it ;
The fame Whole Subftance Hears every Sound,
Smells every Odour, Taftes every Sapour,
and Feels every thing that Touches any Part
of the Body; Every Imagination, every Vo
lition, and every Thought is the Imagination,
Will, and Thought, of that Whole Thinking
Subftance, which I call I my felf. And if this
One Subftance ( which we ufually ftile the Soul
or Mind ) has no Parts, that can Atl feparate
ly ; it may as well be conceived to have none,
that can Exift feparately ; and fo, to be abfo
lutely Indivifible.
I alledged that it is Abfurd to annex Confciouf
nefs to fo flux a. Subftance as the Brain or Spirits ;
becaufe if fuch a Subfiance could be the Seat of that
Confcioufnefs, by which a Man not only remembers
things done many Tears fince, but alfo is Confcious
that He himfelf, the fame individual Being, was
the Doer of them ; it would follow that Confci
oufnefs could be transferred from one Subjeti to
another; that is, that a Quality could fubfift with out

mid Natural Immortality of the Soul. 289
•out inhering in any Subjeti. at all ; which all ra
tional Men allow to be impoffible. To this you
reply ; that in order to retain the Confeioiifnefis ofiPas> *n>
an Atlion, it is neceffary to revive the Idea of it, 2l2"
before any confiderabfe Flux of Particles ; and by
reviving the Idea of that Atlion, I imprint afrefh
tbe Confcioufnefs of having done that Atlion, by
which the Brain has as lively an Impreffion of Con
fcioufnefs, ( though it be not entirely compofed of the
fame Particles, ) as it had the Day after it did the
Atlion, or as it has of a Triangle or any other new
Idea not before imprinted on it. Confcioufnefs of
having done that Atlion, is an Idea imprinted on
the Brain, by recolletling or bringing into View our
Ideas, before they are quite worn out ; which Idea
continues in me not only the Memory of the AtJion
it felf, but tbat I did it. And if there is every
now and then, a RecolletJion of a paft Atlion ;
it may hereby be conceived, that a Man may be
confcious of things done by him, though he has not one
Particle of Matter the fame that he had at the
doing of thofe things ; without Confcioufnefs' s being
transferred from one Subject to another, in any ab
furd Senfe of thofe Words. And again : If Mat
ter can know at this Inftant, that it Thinks ; you pag. 236.
can fee no reafon why it may not remember to Mor
row what it thinks of to Day, though fome Parti
cles wi]l be then wanting which it has at prefent .*
And if it can remember at all ; then the Memory
pf things may be continued even after we have loft
-all the Particles of Matter that we had at the
doing ihem, hy continual intermediate repeating or
imprinting afrefh our Ideas before they are quite loft
ortupornaut. But the Fallacy of this Reply, is
very evident. For to affirm that new Matter
perpetually added to a fleeting Syftem, may
rby repeated impreffions add Recollections of
U Ideas,

290 A Third ^Defence of the Immateriality
Ideas, participate and have communicated to
it a Memory of what was formerly done by the
Whole Syftem ; is not explaining or proving,
but begging the Queftion, by afluming an im-
pojfible Hypothefis. But fuppofing it were pof
fible, that the Memory in general of fuch or
fuch an Action's having been done, might be
preferved in the Manner you fuppofe ; yet it
is a manifeft Contradiction, that the Confciouf
nefs of its being done by Me, by my own Indi
vidual Self 'in particular, fhould continue in me
after my whole Subftance is changed ; unlefs
Confcioufnefs could be transferred from one Sub
ject to another, in the abfurdeft Senfe of thofe
Words. For to fuppofe that One Subftance
fhould be Confcious of an Action's having been
done by it felf, which really was not done by
It, but by another Subftance ; is as plainly
fuppofing an Individual Quality to be transfer
red from One Subjedt to another, in the. moft
abfurd Senfe ; as it is plain that Confcioufnefs is
a real individual Quality, and different from bare
general Memory.
If therefore you will anfwer, ( which is the
only poffible feeming Evafion in this Cafe, ) that
That which we call Confeioufinefis, is not a fixt
individual numerical Quality, like the numerical
Figure or Motion of a folid Body ; buta fleet
ing transferable Mode or Power, like the Round
nefs or the Mode of Motion of Circles upon
the Face of a running Stream ; And that the
Perfon may ftill be the fame, by a continual Su-
peraddition of the like Confcioufnefs ; notwith-
ftanding the Whole Subfiance be changed :
Then I fay, you make Individual Perfionality to
be a mere external imaginary Denomination, and
nothing at all in reality : Juft as a Ship is called
2 the

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 291
the fame Ship, after the Whole Subftance is
changed by frequent Repairs ; or a River is
called the fame River, though the Water of it
be every Day new. The Name of the Ship, is
the fame ; but the Ship it felf, is not at all the
fame ; And the continued Name of the River
fignifies Water running in the fame Channel,
but not at all the fame Water. So if a Man at
Forty Years of Age, has nothing of the fame
Subftance in him, neither material nor imma
terial, that he had at Twenty ; he may be
Called the fame Perfon, by a mere external ima
ginary Denomination ; in fuch a Senfe as a Statue
may be called the fame Statue, after its whole
Subftance has been changed by piecemeal : But
he cannot be really and truly the fame Perfon,
unlefs the fame individual numerical Confcioufnefs
can be transferred from one Subject to another.
For, the continued Addition or Exciting of a
like Confcioufnefs in the new acquired Parts, after
the Manner you fuppofe ; is nothing but a De
ception and Delufion, under the Form of Me
mory; a making the Man to feem to himfelf to
be Confcious of having done That, which really
was riot done by Him, but by Another. And
fuch a Confcioufnefs in a Man, whofe Subftance
is wholly changed, can no more make it Juft
and Equitable for fuch a Man to be punifhed for
an Adtion done by another Subftance ; than the
Addition of the like Confcioufnefs ( by the
Power of God,) to two or more new Created
Men ; or to any Number of Men now living,
by giving a like Modification to the Motion of
the Spirits in the Brain of each of them re
fpectively ; could make them All to be One
and the fame individual Perfon, at the fame
time that they remain feveral and diftinct Per-
U 2 fonsj

292 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
fons ; or make it juft and reafonable for all and
every one of them to be punifhed for one and
the fame individual Action, done by One only,
or perhaps by None of them at all.
Mr. Lock himfelf, in the very Place where he
contends that Confcioufnefs makes the fame indi
vidual Perfon, notwithftanding that the Whole
Subftance be fuppofed to be changed ; acknow
ledges exprefsly, ( Book II. ch. 27. Setl. 13. J that
fuch a Continuation of thefiame Confcioufnefs in
a fleeting Subftance, would be a reprefenting
That to the Mind to have been, which really ne
ver was ; a reprefenting to One intelletlual Sub
ftance as done by it felf, what if never did, and
was perhaps done by fome other Agent ; a Repre
fentation without Reality of Matter of Fail, as
feveral Reprefientations in Dreams are ; a Transfer
ring by a fatal Errour from One to Another, Thai
. Confcioufnefs which draws Reward or Punifhment
•with it; a making Two [or Two Hundred]
Thinking Subftances, to be but One [Individual]
Perfon; And leaves it to be confidered, how far
this may be an Argument againft thofe who would
place Thinking in a Syftem of fleeting Animal
Spirits. To fay here, that God's Juftice and Good*
nefs will not permit him to put any fuch ine
vitable Deceit upon Men ; is nothing to the
Purpofe. For if it be but naturally poffible for
him to do That, which, upon Suppofition of
the Truth of your Notion, will be a plain
Contraditlion -, this is a certain Demonftration
that your Notion is Falfe. And I think it is
a Contraditlion plain enough, to fay that God's
imprefling permanently upon a Thoufand
Mens Minds, after the Manner of the Repre
fentation of a Dream, the like Confcioufnefs with

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 293'
with that which I find in my own Mind ; would
make every One of them, to be, not Perfons
like me, but the fame Individual Perfon with
my felf. According to fuch Reafoning as
•this, Accidents need not have any neceffary
Dependence on their Subftance : And the fame
individual Subftance may as well be conceived
to exift in a Thoufand Places at once, under
like Accidents ; as the fame Individuating Ac
cidents or Qualities can inhere in a Thoufand
different Subftances at once. By which fame
Subtilty, ( as Believing too much and too little,
have commonly the Luck to meet together,
like things moving two contrary ways in the
fame Circle, ) all the Abfurdities in the Doc
trine of Trjinfiubfiantiation may eafily be recon
ciled. You deny that we have any Confcioufnefs at all, pag. 2?6.
that we continue the fame Individual Being at .
different times. If fo ; it can be to no great
purpofe for us to difpute about any Thing :
For, before you receive my Reply, you may
happen poffibly to be entirely changed into
another Subftance ; and, the next time you
write, may deny that you have any Confci
oufnefs at all, that you continue the fame In
dividual Being who wrote this Remarkable
Sentence. But to the Affertion , I anfwer :
Either Confcioufnefs proves a Man to be the
fame Individual Being at different times ; Or
elfe it is a mere Deceit and Delufion ; and by
being added in like manner to other Subftan
ces, might (as I faid ) make an Hundred o-
ther Men with equal Juftice liable to the. fame
Punifhment with himfelf for any One Indivi
dual Action done by Him. But of this more,
when I come to fpeak of the Ufefulnefs and
U 3 Importance

'294 A ThirdDefence of the Immateriality
Importance of the prefent Argument to the
Ends and Purpofes of Religion.
pag. 212; You affirmed, that The Matter, of which an
Egg confifts, doth entirely conftitute the young
One ; and that the Atlion of Senfation began un
der a particular Difpofition of the Parts by Mo
tion :' To this I anfwered ; that fo far is it from
heing true, that the Matter of tbe Egg, by any
particular DifipofitioiTof its Parts by Motion,
is formed into or entirely conftitutes the young
One ; that ( according to the. befi Difcoveries by
Microficopes and in Anatomy ) it does not confti
tute it at all, not fib much as the Body of it ; but
only fierves it for Nourifhment and Growth. You
p»g. 213. reply : If by our Eyes we can perceive the or
ganized Body of the Animal to be Part of the
Matter of the Egg ; no Microfeo pical Obfervation
can deftroy fuch Matter of Fail, and—  make
us See Nothing , where we do See Something.
Now I am very forry, Sir, tp find you in a
ferious and important Queftion defcenia to fo
extremely mean and trifling a Quibble. For,
This is exactly the fame Thing, as if you
fhould fay, that by your Eyes you can perceive
an inclofed Worm to be Part of the Matter of
the Nut it feeds on ; or that by your Eyes you
can perceive a Man to be Part of the Matter
of the Houfe he dwells in.
I called Gravitation the Effetl of the conti
nued and regular Operation of fome Other Being
tag. 216. on Matter. You replied ; that it does not ap
pear, but that Matter gravitates^ by virtue of
Powers originally placed in it by God^ and is now
left to it felf to atJ by thofe original Powers. To
this I anfwered : That a Law or Power, that is
to

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 295
to fay, a mere abftratl Name, or complex Notion,
which is no real Being ; cannot impel a Stone, and
caufe it to begin to Move. You reply again ;
that you deny not the Neceffity of a Bing impel- pag. 217.
ling another, in order to caufe that Mode of Mo
tion called Gravitation : That you fuppofe it to
be caufed by the Impulfe of Other Bodies : And, M- ll8*
to fpeak your own Opinion, it feems Matter of
Fail to You, that the external Figure and inter
nal Configuration of the Parts of Matter, are
thofe Powers in Matter, by which it receives that
peculiar Mode of Motion called Gravitation, from
the circumambient impelling Bodies. I did ima
gine, Sir, when I expreffed my felf with fuch
brevity in my firft Anfwer, you had been fo
well acquainted with Natural Philofophy, as
not to be ignorant that it has been demonftra
ted even Mathematically, that Gravitation can
not arife from the Configuration and Texture of Seethe in-
tbe Parts of Matter, and from the circumam- P?m£ara'
bient impelling Bodies; becaufe, if it did, it ;/L "New.
would not be proportionable to the Quantity ton'sVr'm-
of Matter, or the Solid Content of all Bodies, cP'a
without any regard to their Superficial Pro- out^and
portion ; as we find by Experience it is ; fee- the 'f$u&-
ing all Bodies, of all Textures, and all Con-*""*'31 the
figurations of Parts, and all Varieties of fo- \^,f^\.
perficial Proportion ; [a Bullet, or a Feather, tion of his
or a Piece of Leaf-Gold, or a Sheet of Pa- opticb.
per ; J defcend in Vacuo with equal Swiftnefs.
And if Material Impulfe, be not the Caufe of
Gravity ; then fome Being that is not Material,
( for Laws or Powers are nothing but mere
empty Words, ) muft of neceffity be allowed
to be the Caufe of it. But it feems you are,
notwithftanding the Force even of Demonftra
tion it felf, ftill of Opinion that Gravitation
U 4 is

296 A Third Defence \ of the Immateriality
pag. 218. is ¦purely owing to the outward Figure and in
ward Configuration of the Parts of Matter,
and the Impulfe of circumambient Bodies.
f*£i2i8. For, drop a Pound of Lead, in the Form of a
Bullet, from the Top of a Tower ; and it defcends
in a very quick Space to the Ground :' Vary the
external Figure of the Bullet, by beating, it broad
with a hammer ; and its Tendency downward
decreafes : Vary tbe Configuration of its Parts by
Fire ; and it will aficend, inftead of defc'eHding.
Certainly the Reader cannot but be greatly
furprized, to meet with fuch Philofophy as
This, in our prefent Age. For, what has All
This to do with Gravitation ? Or with the
Caufe of Bodies Tending downwards ? Has a
Pound of Lead in the Form of a Bullet, a
greater Tendency downward, than under any o-
ther Form ; becaufe the Air making lefs Re
fiftance to it when in that Form, fuffers it to
fall more fwiftly ? Or when it is beaten out
into a thin Plate, which is ftill of a Pound
Weight ; does its Tendency downward- decreafe,
becaufe the Air making greater Refiftance to
it when under that new Form its Superficies is
enlarged, fuffers it now to fall but flowly ?
You might by the fame Philofophy, and ex
actly with the fame Truth , affirm that a
Hundred-pound-weight, fo long as you fupport
it with your Hands, has loft its Tendency down
ward, becaufe it does not defcend ; But, I
prefume, Experience will eafily convince you
of the contrary. In like manner ; when Lead
being evaporated by Fire, afcends in the Ait
inftead of defending, becaufe it is carried up
ward by the Motion of the Air, which afcends
being rarefied with Heat ; is therefore its Ten
dency downwards decreafed ? You might exactly with

aid Natural Immortality of ihe Soul. t§**
with the fame Reafon hat^e affirmed that a Pound
of Lead m one Scale of a Balance, lofes its
Tendency downwards, whenever a greater Weight
in the oppofite Scale, forces it to dfcend inftead
of defending. The Truth is plainly This : As
a Pound of Wood, duting the time of its af-
cending from the Bottom of a Pail of Water
towards the Top, is as much a Pound-weight
added to the Weight of the Whole Water*
as a Pound of Lead is, that lies ftill at the
Bottom ; and confequently the Tendency ofthe
Wood downwards, is always the very fame,
whether it be afcending in Water, or deficend-
ing in the Air ; So your Bullet, whether it falls
fwiftly in the Form of a Bullet, or flowly in
the Form of a thin Plate, or falls not at all
while it is fupported in your Hand, or on the
contrary afcends in the Form of Fume, ( in
which cafe, It is in the Air, exactly what
Wood is in the Water ; ) ftill its Tendency down
ward, that is, its Gravitation, continues al
ways the fame, without any the leaft Decreafie
or Increafe: Which is the direct Contradictory
to your Affertion. As in Vacuo all Bodies, of
all Figures, and all Textures whatfoever, ac
tually defcend with equal Swiftnefs ; fo in the
open- Air, and every Where elfe, their Ten
dency downwards, that is, their Gravitation,
whether vhey afcend or defcend, whether they
fall fwiftly or flowly, or nOt at all, continues
always invariably the fame ; and cannot be in
creafed or decreafed by any change whatfoever,
of their external Figure, dr of the internal Con
figuration of their Parts, or of the circumambient
impelling Bodies. Gravitation therefore cannot
poffibly arife from the external Figure, nor in
ternal Configuration of the Parts of Matter, nor
i from

298 A Third D>efence of the Immateriality
from the circumambient impelling Bodies ; fince
by no alteration of Any or All of thefe things,
can the Gravitation of any Body be in the
leaft increafed or diminifhed ; And confequent
ly Gravitation is quite another thing, than
you feem to have at all thought of, when you
fag. 218. fpoke your Opinion about what fieemed Matter of
Fail to you, and talked of the Decreafie of a Bul
let's Tendency downward, upon the Variation of
its Figure.
f_ Whoever will explain Gravity, which by
Experience is always proportionable to the So
lid Content of Bodies ; muft affign fuch a Caufe,
as can act upon Bodies in proportion to their
Solid Content, without any regard to their Su
perficial Proportion ; that is to fay, fuch a
Caufe, as can reach and penetrate to the very
Center of every folid Particle of Matter ; .
Which I fuppofe you will hardly affirm your
circumambient Bodies, how fubtle foever, are ca
pable of doing. ]
And not content to have erred fo very grofs-
ly in the firft Foundation of all Natural Phi
lofophy ; you could not forbear profeffing
pag. 218. further, that you have often Admired that Gra
vitation fhould be efeeemed a Matter of fuch
Difficulty among Philofophers ; and that you think
it to be fo evident and neceffary an Effect of
Matter in conftant Motion perpetually ftriking
one part againft another, that you wonder every
Body fhould not fee it. I fuppofe the reft of
the World will no lefs Admire at Tou, for ima
gining that by fo flight an Admiration you
could at once fet afide all the Propofitions in
that moft excellent Book before-mentioned ;
'- wherein it is made appear by ftrictly Mathe
matical Demonftrations, drawn from the Laws of

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 299
of Motion now agreed on by Mathematicians
and eftablifhed by Experiments, and from the
Phjenomena of the Heavenly Bodies ; that the
prefent Operations of Nature, depending up
on Gravitation, cannot poffibly be Mechanical
Effects of Matter in conftant Motion perpetually
ftriking one part againft another.
Not much unlike to This, was Mr. Hobbes's
fancying that he had confuted all the Pro
pofitions in Euclid, by Admiring at Euclid's
Definitions of Lines and Surfaces : And all
Men ever fince, that underftand the firft Ele
ments of Geometry, have Admired at Him for
fancying fo.
But that which follows, is ftill the moft
wonderful of~all. You fay : Whether you take pag] 220.
Mf. Clarke "right or no, the incomparable Sir
Ifaac Newton ("in the Preface to his Principia,)
is of Opinion, " That feveral Phenomena of Na- ¦
" ture may depend on certain Forces or Powers,
* ' whereby from Caufes yet Undifcovered, the Par-
" tides of Bodies are mutually impelled againft;
" each other,  or receed and are driven fron$
**¦ one another: Which Forces or Powers being
'" yet unknown, the Philofophers hitherto have
" attempted Nature in vain ". Now to infinu
ate to your Reader by fuch a Citation, that
This Great Man is of your Opinion in the pre
fent Queftion ; when on the contrary, the
very Sentence you cite, was fpoken by him
( as appears from the Words immediately pre
ceeding thofe you have cited, ) not concerning
Gravitation, but concerning Other more parti
cular Phasnomena of Nature, in exprefs Con-
tradiftintlion to thofe of Gravitation ; and when
in that whole Book, from one End to the o-
ther, he is profeffedly confuting and fhowing the

300 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
the abfolute Impoffibility of your Notion of
* optic Gravitation ; and when he has * elfewhere in
fag. 322. ex£refs worc*s declared, that by the Terms,
Forces and Powers, he does not mean ( as You
did by Powers originally placed in Matter by
God) to fignify the Efficient Caufe of certain
determinate Motions of Matter, but only to
exprefs the Atlion it felf by which the Effect
is regularly produced, without determining the
immediate Agent or Caufe of that Adtion : Af
ter all this, I fay, to infinuate to your Reader
by the Citation of a Piece of a fingle Sentence,
that That Great Man is of yotir Opinion ; is
C to ufe your own Expreffions once more, )
fag. 193. fuch a Condutl, as the World may juftly de
mand a Reafon of from your felf ; for I cannot
affign a good one for you.
Laftly : As you declare it to be your Opi
nion, that Gravitation is caufed by Material
Impulfe ; fo you think it ittipoffiUe, that it
ihould be owing to any fmmaterial Caufe ¦:
And you believe it to be as intelligible, that
Matter might atl without Impulfe, by Powers
placed in it by God ; as that ah Immaterial Be
ing fhould move Matter without being able to im
pel! it by Contatl.
This Belief of yours is founded wholly upon
the Suppofition, that there is nothing in the
World but Tangible Subftance ; Which Opinion
you give no Reafon for ; and therefore it is a
mere Prejudice. But further : I prefume you
will hardly deny, but God himfelf is an Imma
terial Being; and that He can move Matter,
though he does not impel it by Contatl. O-
ther Immaterial Beings therefore, though they
do not impel Matter by Contatl, yet it does not
from thence follow that they cannot move it
at

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 301
at all ; Becaufe from God's moving it, itis ma
nifeft that there are other ways of moving it,
befides that of impelling by Contatl. But Pow
ers or Laws, are not real Beings ; They are
nothing but mere Words or Notions ; and can
neither act in any Senfe, nor move Matter ei
ther with Contact or without it. I conceive
an ordinary Reader may be able to difcern the
Difference, between affirming that an Immate
rial Subfiance, a real Being, though not hard
and folid, may move Matter ; and affirming
that a Law or Power, a mere Word or Term
of Art, which is really No Thing, and has
not truly any Being or Exiftence, fave only
in the Imagination , can caufe Matter . to

move.

Upon the Whole ; All that you have ad
vanced in thefe Sections about Gravitation, is
fuch marvellous Reafoning, to be made ufe
of in the prefent Age, after fo many great
Difcoveries, founded upon Experience, and
even Mathematical Demonftration ; that though
I have no caufe at all to be difpleafed with
you for arguing in fuch a Manner ; yet I be
lieve your Readers cannot but think you
might very well have forborn going out of
your Way ; to give fo very difadvantagious
a Reprefentation of your own Philofophy.
I have been the longer upon this Head, be
caufe the true Theory of Gravitation, as it
has been made out by that excellent Perfon.
whom you juft now fo unfortunately cited,
does in its obvious and neceflary Confequen
ces, more entirely fubvert the very Founda
tions of all poffible Hypothefes, wherewith
Materialifts would undertake to explain the
Phsenomena of Nature Mechanically by the
mere

302 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
mere Powers of Matter and Motion ; than any
Difcovery in natural and experimental Philo
fophy, that has ever yet been made in Any
Age : Showing the Matter of the Univerfe to
take up almoft an infinitely fmall and incon-
fiderable Part of that Space, which you fup
pofe to be filled with it ; bearing in truth far
lefs Proportion to it, than a Tennis Ball does
to the Body.of the Earth : And confequentlyi
that the great Phaenomena of Nature cannot
poffibly depend upon any Mechanical Powers
of Matter and Motion , but muft be pro
duced by the Force and Action of fome high-
See Sir €r Principle: And fo leading us. even with
'f'f'Nj"""*- Mathematical Certainty, to Immaterial Pow-
W«.S *""•" '¦> a°d finally to the Author of all Power,
fage 3 14 the Great Creator and Governour of the World.
& 346-
I affirmed, that there are many Demonftra-
tions, even in abftratl Mathematicks themfelves,
which no Man who underftands them, can in tbe
leaft doubt of the Certainty of; which yet are
attended with difficult Confequences, that cannot
be perfeUly . cleared : As, for inftance, thofe
fag. 223. concerning the infinite Divifibility .ofi Quan
tity, and the Eternity and Immenfity of^God. In
anfwer to this, you fay that if there are any
fuch Demonftrations, from whence any Con-
traditJions or Abfurdities follow in our way of
pag. 12.3: conceiving things, &V. And again : Abfiur-
pag. 223. dities and Contraditlions, &c. And again : Ab
furdity, Contraditlion, or Difiagreement of Ideas,
pag. 224. csV. And again : You require me to prove
that any Abfurdity or Contraditlion follows ei
ther from the infinite Divifibility of Matter,
or from the Eternity or Immenfity of God, in
our way of conceiving ; and if I cannot, I
have

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 3 o j
have no ground, you fay, from thofe Inftances,
to put Human Nature in fuch a State of Scep-
ticifin and Abfurdity. Now, by all the Rules of pag. 228.
jlnfwering, ( to ufe your own Expreffion ; ) you
ought not to have changed my WordsrZ)*/-
ficult Confequences that cannot be perfietJly cleared ;
into Abfurdities, ContraditJions, and Difagree-
ments of Ideas : Becaufe Abfurdities, Contradic
tions, and Difagreements of Ideas, are things juft
as different from Difficult Confequences of De
monftrated Truths, which cannot be perfietJly
cleared ; as Light is from Darknefs. Abfurdities,
ContraditJions, and Difagreements of fdeas, are
things already perfetlly cleared ; that is, things
proved with perfetl Clearnefs, to be Falfe and
Impoffible : But Difficulties that cannot be per
fetlly cleared, may attend things either poffibly
or certainly True.} Abfurdities, Contradictions,
and Difagreements of Ideas, do with as perfetl
Clearnefs prove a thing to be Falfe ; as a po
fitive Demonftration proves a thing to be True :
And therefore it is abfolutely impoffible, that
they can Both be applied to the fame thing ;
even juft as impoffiole, as that the fame thing
fhould at the fame time be both true and falfe.
But Difficult Confequences that cannot perfietJly be
cleared, may be, and very often are, found to
attend Things which are Demonftrated to be
True. The Reafon is ; becaufe Difficulties that
cannot petfietlly be cleared, do not ( like Abfur
dities and ContraditJions ) arife from a Percep
tion of the Difagreement of Ideas , but barely
from the Defietl or Imperfetlnefs of the Ideas
themfelves. Our Reafon is able to apprehend
clearly the Demonftration of the Certainty
of the Exiftence of fome Things, where the
Imagination is not able to comprehend the Ideas of

304 A Third Defence of the Immateriality
of the Things themfelves. This is plainly the
Cafe of the' infinite DivifiYiity of Quantity, of"
Infinity and Eternity in general, of the Atlions
eft Immaterial Subftances 'upon "Matter, and of
many other Things. Here therefore I have
juft Caufe ("if I may ufe your own Expreffion
fag- 193. once again ) to demand a Reafon of your Con-
dutl ; and to complain . that you have greatly
departed from that Fairnefs, for which your
former Papers were juftly commended.
And you can ftill the more hardly be ex-
cufed in this Matter ; becaufe you knew Ihad
before expreffed my felf very particularly and
fully concerning the fame Thing, in a Book
which you your felf cite upon another occafi
on in the very next Page to That wherein you
accufe me fo wrongfully. My Words were
Thefe : ( Dtmonftrdt. of the .Being and Attri
butes of God, p. n.) " Since in all Queftions
¦*" concerning -the Nature and Perfections of
'* God, or concerning any Thing to which the
*' Idea of Eternity or Infinity is joined ;
¦«' though we can indeed demonftrate certain
*' Propofitions to be true ; yet it is impoffible -
" for us to comprehend or frame any adae-
" quate or complete Ideas of the Manner How
" the things fo demonftrated, can Be : There-
" fore when once any Propofition is clearly
*' demonftrated to be True ; it ought not to
" difturb us, that there be perhaps perplexing
*6 Objections on the other fide, which for want
*' of adequate Ideas of the Manner of the
" Exiftence of the Things demonftrated, are
*" not eafy to be anfwered. Indeed, were it
*' poffible there fliould be any Propofition,
*' v/hich could equally be Demonftrated on both
•' fides of the Queftion, or which could on
«' both

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. %o$
** both fides be reduced to imply a Contradict
•' tion, [ as Some have too tnconfi'derately affert-
""* ed ; ] This it muft be confeffed, would al-
«« ter the Cafe ; Upon this abfurd Suppofition,
'•' all Difference of True and Falfe, all Think-
«' ing and Reafoning, and the Ufe of all our
** Faculties, would be entirely at an End.
** But when to Demonftration on the one
** fide, there are oppofed on the other, only
" Objections raifed from our Want of having
" adajquate Ideas of the Things themfelves;
*' this ought not to be efteemed a Real Diffi-
" culty. It is pofitively and clearly Demon-
*' ftrable, that Something has been from Eter-
«' -nvty: All the Objections therefore raifed
«' againft the Eternity of any thing, grounded
" merely on our Want of having an adae-
** quate Idea of Eternity ; ought to be Iookt
€C upon as of no real Solidity. Thus in other
«' the like Inftances : It is Demonftrable, for
** Example, that Something muft be adtually
" Infinite: All the Metaphyfical Difficulties
*' therefore, which arife ufually from apply-
*' ing the Meafures and Relations of Things
*' Finite to what is Infinite ; and from fup-
" pofing Finites to be [ Aliquot J Parts of
,e Infinite, when indeed they are not properly
" fo, but only as Mathematical Points to
" Quantity, which have no Proportion at all ;
[ and from imagining all Infinites to be Equal,
when in things difparate they manifeftly are
not fo ; an infinite Line, being not only not
equal to, but infinitely lefs than an infinite Sur
face ; and an infinite Surface, than Space infinite
in all Dimenfions ; ] " ought to be efteemed
" vain and of no Force. Again ; It is in like
«' manner Demonftrable, that Quantity, is in-
X *' finitely

306 IA Third Defence of the immateriality
'" finitely Divifible : All the Objections there-
" fore raifed [ by fuppofing the Sums Total of
¦all Infinites to be equal, when in difparate Parts
they manifeftly are not fo; and] " by com-
" paring the imaginary Equality or Inequality
•«' ofi the Number of the Parts of Unequal
.«' Quantities, whofe Parts have really noNum-
« ' ber at all, they all having Parts without Num-
«' ber ; ought to be looked upon as weak
;<* and altogether Inconclufive, &c ".
. Concerning the Quefiions, Whether Immate
rial Subftances be extended or not ; and Whe
ther, upon Suppofition of their being extended,
they may not neverthelefs be of fuch a Na
ture, as not to confift of Parts which (like the
Parts of Matter) are themfelves every one of
them 'complete diftindt Beings, feparable, and
wholly independent of each other : Alfo, Whe
ther from the Immateriality of the Souls of
Brutes, it follows that they muft of neceffity be
put into an eternal' State of Rewards and Pu-
' nifhments : Concerning thefe Queftions, I fay,
I have nothing further to add ; but only that
I think All you have advanced upon thefe Heads
in your Refletlions, hath been already clearly
obviated in my former Papers ; To which
therefore I refer the Reader, who, I fear, is
already too much tired with Repetitions.
In the laft Place, you challenge me to fhow
fag- 226, that my Argument is of any Ufe to the Ends and
& ^39- Purpofes of Religion. That it is of the Greateft
Ufe, will I fuppofe eafily be granted ; if it be
evident that the Notion I am arguing againft, is
utterly deftrudtive of Religion. And in what
refpedts

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 307
refpedts it is fo, I fhall give you an Inftance or
two to confider of -, and fo conclude.
ift then ; If the Mind of Man, were no
thing but a certain Syftem of Matter ; and Think
ing, nothing but a certain Mode of Motion in
that Syftem : It would follow , that, fince
every Determination of Motion depends necef
farily upon the Impulfe that caufes it, there
fore every Thought in a Man's Mind muft
likewife be* neceffary, and depending wholly * See a^
upon external Caufes ; And there could be no bove' t*s>
fuch thing in Us, as Liberty, or a Power of277'17*5'
Self-determination. Now what Ends and Pur
pofes of Religion mere Clocks and Watches are
capable of ferving, needs no long and nice
Confideration. idly, If Thinking, in a Man, be nothing but
a Mode of Motion, or of any other Quality of
Matter ; it will be but too natural a Confe
quence, to conceive that it may be only the
fame thing in all Other Rational Beings likewife ;
and even in God himfelf. And what a Notion
of God This would give us, is not difficult to
imagine. A Friend of yours has given us a
very broad Hint, whither This tends ; when
he tells us that -f the greateft Freedom or Li-^zjfajcau
berty we can conceive to belong to ANT B E- cem'mgthe
ING, is fuch as he there largely explains to^"^""^
be No Liberty at all, but abfolute Neceffity, pofiZml"
fuch as the Motion of a Watch or Clock is de- the Evi-
termined by. tb"?0f
^dly, If the Soul, be nothing but a SyjlemJ^^
of Matter ; and Thinking, nothing but a Mode H,m hu. <
of Motion, or of fome other Power of Matter ; manTefiu
the Doctrine of the RefurretJion, (as I beforew^
obferved, pag. 291, &c. ) will be inconceivable
and incredible ; and the Juftice of future Re-
X 2 wards

^ol A Third Defence of ihe Immateriality
wards and Punifhments, impoffible to be made
out. The Notion of the Soul's Immateriality,
evidently facilitates the Belief of a Refurreclion
and of a future Retribution, by fecuring a
Principle of Perfimal Individuality, upon which
the Juftice of all Reward or Punifhment is en
tirely grounded : But if Thinking be in reality
nothing but a Power or Mode,r which inhering
in a loofe and fleeting Syftem of Matter, pe-
rifhes utterly at the Diffolution of the Body ;
then the reftoring the Power of Thinking to the
fame Body at the Refurreclion, will not be a
Raffing again of the fame fndividual Perfon ;
but it will be as truly a Creation of a new
Perfon, as the Addition of the like Power of
Thinking to a new Body Now, would be the
Creation of a new Man. For, as God's fu-
peradding Now to a new Parcel of Matter, the
like Confcioufnefs with what I at this time find in
my felf, would not make that new Parcel of
Matter to be thefiame individual Perfon with me,
but only another Perfon Like me ; fo his fyper-
adding That Confcioufnefs at the Refurreclion,
to the fame Particles of Duft, of which my
Body was formerly compofed ; will not be a
Refioration of the fame Perfon, but a Creation
of a new one like me. For, the Samenefs of
the fenfelefs Particles of Duft, it is evident
from the flux Nature of the Subftance of our
Bodies, is not that which Now makes me to
be the fame Perfon ; and therefore cannot be
that, which will Then make me to be fo. If
my prefent Confcioufnefs , be nothing but a
Mode of Motion in the fleeting Particles of my
Brain or Spirits ; this Confcioufnefs will be as
utterly deftroyed at the Diffolution of my Bo
dy, as if the very Subftance of my Body was
annihilated :
i

and Natural Immortality of the Soul: ^m
annihilated : And it would be juft as poffible
for the fame Individual Perfon to be created a-
gain, after an abfolute Annihilation ; as to be
reftored again, after foch a Diffolution. But
now, if the fame Perfon, after Annihilation*
could, by reftoring of the fame Confcioufnefs,
be created again ; he might as poffibly be
created again, by addition of the fame Confci- s
oufnefs to new Matter, even before Annihilation
of the firft : From whence it would follow,
that Two, or Two Hundred, feveral Perfons,
might All, by a Superaddition of the like
Confcioufnefs, be one andthe fame individual Per
fon, at the fame time that they remain feveral
and diftintl Perfons : It being as eafy for God
to add my Confcioufnefs to the new formed Mat
ter of One or of one Hundred Bodies at this
prefent Time, as to the Duft of my prefent Body
at the Time of '/&<? Refurrection. And no Rea
fon can be given, why it would not be as juft.
at any time, to punifh for my Faults a new
created Man, to whom my Confcioufnefs is by
the Power of God fuperadded ; as to punifh.
That Perfon, who at the Refurreclion fhall by
the fame Power be new made out ofthe Duft of
my Body, with the fame Confcioufnefs fuperad
ded : It being allowed that Then, as well as
Now, it is not the Samenefs of the Particles of
Duft, that makes the fame Perfon. But if it
was ; yet That would make no difference in
this Matter : For, the Particles of Duft, which
in the Courfe of Twenty Years have fucceffive
ly been part of the Subftance of my Body, are
enough in Quantity to form feveral Bodies :
And if the Addition of a like Confcioufnefs
with what I now find in my felf, to One of
thofe Bodfes at the Refurrection, will make It
X 3 to

V-i'a A ThirdDefence of the Immateriality
to be the fame Individual Perfon with Me ; the
Addition of the like Confcioufnefs to Twenty
of them, would confequently make every one
of them to be ( not Perfons like Me, but) the
fame Individual Perfon with Me, and with each
other likewife. Which is the greateft Abfurdity
in the World: An Abfurdity equal (as I be
fore faid ) to that of Tranfubftantiation. This
inexplicable Confufion,wherewith your Doctrine
perplexes the Notion of Perfonal Identity, upon
which Identity the Juftice ofall Reward or Pu
nifhment manifeftly depends ; makes the Refur
reclion, in Your way of arguing, to be incon
ceivable and impoffible : And confequently your
Doctrine, ( which fuppofes the Body to be the
Whole Man, ) isdeftructive of Religion ; leav
ing no room for Reward or Punifhment, but
in the prefent Life only ; and confequently gi
ving Men liberty to do every thing for their
prefent Pleafure or Advantage, that can be
done with a good Colour, and without being
obnoxious to human Laws : Which is the great
eft Mifchief that can poffibly befal Mankind.
But if the Soul be, as We believe, a permanent
indivifible Immaterial Subftance, then all thefe
Difficulties vanifh of Themfelves.
It is here to be obferved, that all the Ab
furd Confequences which I have now fin confi
dering of what Ufe my Argument is to Reli
gion) frown to follow from your Doctrine,
with refpect to the RefurretJion ; do equally fol
low from it ( as has been before proved ) even
without refpetl to the Refurreclion. For as it is
Abfurd to fuppofe, ( which you muft do in
your Scheme, ) that at the Refurreclion thefiame
individual Perfon can be reftored ', merely by
the Addition of a like Confcioufnefs with that
which

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 3 1 1
which utterly periihed at the Diffolution of the
Body, to the Duft of the fame Body when re
collected again : As this, I fay, is plainly Ab
furd, becaufe in the fame manner Twenty other
Men formed out of the fame Duft, ( of which
there is quantity enough belonging to every
Perfon that has lived any Number of Years, )
may alfo by an Addition of the like Confciouf
nefs become every one of them That One Same
Individual Perfon, at the fame Time that they
remain fo many feveral and diftindt Perfons : So,
without regard to any future Refurrection, there
is the very fame Abfurdity in fuppofing (as
you do, ) that a Man at this prefent Time,
though he has none of the fame Subftance be
longing to him, may yet, merely by a like Mo
dification of the Motion of his Spirits, continue
to be the fame Individual Perfon he was Twenty
Years fince ; There is, I fay, the very fame Ab
furdity in this Suppofition, as in the former ; be
caufe there is no difference between fuppofing
that any Number of new Bodies at the Refur
rection co-<exiftently, or any Number of different
Men now living contemporarily, or any Number
of different Bodies fiucceeding one another in one
continued Form by a perpetual uninterrupted
Flux of Particles, ( which is the thing you con
tend for;) can be One and the fame Individual
Perfon, merely by a like Modification of the Fi
gures and Motions of their Parts refpectively,
without having anything at all the fiamein them.
To the Propofitions I laid down at the Con-
clufion of my former Reply, you have objected
nothing, but what ( I think ) is already clearly
anfwered in the foregoing Pages.
X 4 AN

A N
ANSWER T O
Mr. Clarke's Third Defence
O F HI S
LETTER T O
Mr. DO DWELL.

•-Neque decipitur ratio neque decipit unguami
Manilius.

LONDON:
Printed in the Year MDCCXXXI.

[3i5l

A N

ANSWER T O
Mr. Clarke's 3d Defence, &c.
HENI confider that the Queftion
between Mr. Clarke and me is
concerning the Force of an Ar
gument made ufe of in his Letter
to Mr. Dodweli, to prove the Im
materiality and Natural Immorta
lity of the Soul; and that out of Four Objec
tions infifted on in my Refletlions againft that
Argument, he has dropt the Confideration of
Three ; and in anfwer to the Fourth, is fo far
from fhowing, That if Confcioufnefs did inhere in
a Syftem of Matter, it muft confift of the Confci
oufneffes of the Parts,, (which was the Abfurdi
ty, that by his Argument he laboured to fix
on thofe who judged it poffible for Confciouf
nefs to inhere in a Syftem of Matter ) that on
the contrary, he has only endeavoured to prove,
againft my parallel Inftance of Roundnefs, That
it muft confift of feveral Pieces of Roundnefs,
Or Tendencies towards Roundnefs ; and confe
quently

3 1 6 An Anfwer to Mr, Clarke\r id Defence
quently can only infer, That if Confcioufnefs did,
in like manner with Roundnefs, inhere in a Syftem
of Matter, it muft confift of feveral Tendencies
towards Confcioufnefs: I freely acknowledge,
that I cannot tell how to juftify my felf to any
Reader ( exeept Mr. Clarke himfelf) in not ap
pealing to him, or in prefuming, that he had
any need of my Affiftance to find out Mr.
Clarke's apparent Defertion of his Argument.
But fome incidental Points to that in hand, of
great Importance to be cleared, having crept
into our Difpute ; I hope the further Continu
ance of this Debate will not be unacceptable to
Lovers of Truth ; and that upon that account
they will pardon a Review of the Controverfy
between us.
There are few Difputes of any Confequence,
but the Rule by which they ought to be deter
mined, is both appealed to and called in quef
tion. When Reafon is on our fide, we chear-
fully fubmit to its Dictates, and expect that
others fhould do fo too ; but when we are not
able to anfwer Difficulties alledged againft our
Schemes, then we contend that Reafon is weak,
and from its fuppofed Weaknefs infer, That;
our Inability to clear up Difficulties and an
fwer Objedlions, ought not to hinder our Affent
to them.
Mr. Clarke has thought fit to purfue this
Method of proceeding with me ; and therefore
I cannot but efteem it a neceffary Preliminary
to this Debate, to examine what he fays on this
Head, and thereby endeavour to fix a Standard
or Meafure, by which all that we fay muft be
tryed. For to what purpofe is difputing and
reafoning about the Truth and Falfehood of
Propofitions, when by any Doubt or Scruple
concerning

of his L e * t e r to Mr. Dodweli.' 31 jjf
concerning the Meafure whereby we judge of
Truth and Falfehood, Truth and Falfehood ei
ther become Names without any Signification at
all, or elfe fignify different things in different
Mens Minds ?
It is demonftrable, according to Mr. Clarke,
That Matter is incapable of Thinking, becaufe
it is divifible by the Power of God. From whence ifl Def.
he concludes, That Thinking muft refide in an ?• 98.
immaterial Being; in the Idea whereof Exten
fion is contained : which is in effect to fay,
That Thinking can and cannot refide in a di
vifible Being. For what other Argument can
be made ufe of to prove all Matter divifible by
the Power of God, but what is drawn from the
Confideration of its Extenfion ? And if Matter
as an extended Being is divifible, all extend
ed Beings muft be divifible, and confequently
muft be incapable of Thinking: unlefs Mr.
Clarke will fay, That a divifible Being is both
capable and incapable of Thinking.
To clear his Argument from this manifeft
Contradiction, he has recourfe to the following
Diftinction, ( by which a Man may be enabled
to believe every thing, and reafon about no
thing ) That it is abfurd to fuppofe Matter in
divifible by the Power of God ; but to fuppofe
an extended 'unfolid Subftance indivifible by
the Power ofGod, is only a difficult Confequence xdDef.
that cannot be perfetlly cleared: and to make this t- '7S-
Diftinction intelligible, he urges, That difficult yl Def.
Confequences that cannot be perfetlly cleared, do ?".°3'"°4'
not ( like Abfurdities and Contraditlions ) arife
from the Perception of the Difagreement of Ideas,
but barely from the Def eel and ImperfetJnefs ofi the
Ideas themfelves. Which is as much as to fay,
That Difficulties which cannot be perfectly
cleared, do not arife from the Perception of
the

3 1 8 An Anpwer, to mr. -fiance s ia 'juejence
the Difagreement of Ideas, but from thePer-
ception of the Difagreement of Ideas. For
what is a Difficulty which cannot be cleared ( or
perfetlly cleared, for I know no Difference ) by
reafon of defective Ideas ; but a Difficulty which
arifes from the Perception ofthe Difagreement
of thofe Ideas ? If he means that there is a
Difference between a Difficulty which arifes
from the Perception of the Difagreement of
perfect or adequate Ideas ; and a Difficulty that
arifes from the Perception of the Difagreement
of imperfect or inadequate Ideas : I anfwer,
That there is no manner of ground for fuch a
Diftinction ; or if there was any ground for
that Diftintlion, it is not to his purpofe, as will
evidently appear, if we do but confider what
we mean by adequate and inadequate Ideas.
By an adequate or perfect Idea, I underftand,
Mr hock's A" idea which perfetlly reprefents the Archetype
Mffky of the Mind fuppofes is taken from ; as for Inftance,
human a\l complex Ideas of Modes, fuch as Fear, Cou-
Yfi^f rage, &c. which beinz voluntary ColletJions of
/landing. r i t i 7 1 • 1 7 • ?
B-2. c.-}i-femple ideas, tbat the Mind puts together, with
out reference to any real Archetypes exifting any
where, are adequate Ideas ; becaufe they not being
intended for Copies of things really exifting, but for
Archetypes made by the Mind, cannot but repre-
fent themfelves.
By an inadequate Idea, I underftand an Idea
which does not perfectly reprefent that Arche
type the Mind fuppofes it taken from : as for
Inftance, If I put into my Idea of Gold only
its Colour and Weight, it is evident they repre^
fent not the Archetype my Idea is taken from,
but only imperfectly or inadequately. And
thus, for ought we know to the contrary, all
the Ideas we have that we refer to real Exigen ces,

of his letter to Mr. Dodweli: $ ii
ces, may be inadequate ; for we can never be
certain that we contain in our Idea all the
Whole Plenitude of Effence, Properties and
Affections, that refide in any Being whatever.
What I have faid, if I miftake not, com
prehends the entire Senfe of the Diftinction of
adequate and inadequate Ideas. I know Mr.
Locke accounts fimple Ideas adequate ; but I
cannot fee on what ground, but what deftroys
the Diftinction of adequate and inadequate
Ideas, and does in reality make all Ideas ade
quate. For if, as he fays, fimple Ideas are
adequate, becaufe being nothing but the Effetls of
certain Powers in things ordained by God to pro
duce fuch Senfation in us, they cannot but be cor-
refipondent and adequate to thofe Powers ; • then
every Idea whatever may be adequate in that
fenfe, that is formed with Care : for we ought
not to ufe a Word to fignify any Idea whate
ver, but fo far as the Idea goes it ought to
correfpond to the Archetype it is referred to.
As for Inftance, If I fhould put into my Idea
of Man, folid Subftance, Life, Senfe, fpontaneous
Motion, and a Faculty of Reafoning ; it is plain,
all this agrees to Man, how inadequate foever
a Reprefentation it is of him, and is as much
correfpondent and adequate to the Subjedt it is
taken from, as any fimple Idea is to the Power
that occafions it. For fimple Ideas, by means of
Organs of different Perfection, cannot be pre-
cifely alike in different Men ; and confequently
muft in any Men, if not in all, be imperfect
and inadequate, if confidered with relation to
the whole Power that occafions them, though
they are adequate and correfpondent to a Power
in Nature, fo far as they go and were defigned
to be. Now, if all Ideas, as referred to things
exifting, are really imperfect and inadequate ;
and

J26 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'j %d Defence
and if with relation to things exifting, there is
no other Teft of Truth but the Perception of
the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas ; then,
if Mr. Clarke denies not all Knowledge, that
relates to things exifting, he cannot diftinguifh
between Difficulties that arife from the Percep
tion of the Difagreement of inadequate Ideas,
and Difficulties that arife from the Perception
of the Difagreement of adequate ideas. And
if he allows that Difficulties which arife from
the Perception of the Difagreement of inade
quate Ideas are Abfurdities and Contradictions,
he gives up his Diftinction. So that he muft
either deftroy all Knowledge or Science relating
to things exifting, or elfe own that there is no
difference between Difficulties that arife from
the Perception of the Difagreement of ade
quate Ideas, and Difficulties that arife from the
Perception of the Difagreement of inadequate
Ideas. 2. But to vindicate human Knowledge, and
mow further the Groundleffnefs of Mr. Clarke's
Diftinction ; I obferve, That though we can
never be fore that we have adequate Ideas of
any thing that exifts, yet we have as much
reafon to think that our inadequate Ideas agree
to the Reality of things, as adequate Ideas do
to the Archetypes they are referred to ; and
confequently have no reafon but to conclude,
that inadequate Ideas can be as well compared
together, and as right Judgments formed from
their Comparifon, as from the Comparifon of
adequate Ideas. For fuppofe I fee fomething
in a Mift, near the Size and Shape of an ordi
nary Man ; which though I fee not diftinctly
enough to know, whether it be a Statue or a
Man ; yet I may certainly know it not to be a
Steeple,

If his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 321
Steeple, by perceiving the Difagreement between
the idea of a Steeple, and the Figure I fee, as
I can know a hibral or abftradt Mathematical
Propofition to be falfe , by perceiving the
Difagreement of the Ideas of which it is made
up. Wherefore, fince we Can as well know or
be certain, by the Perception of the Agreement
or Difagreement of inadequate Ideas as of ade
quate ideas ; the Difficulties that arife from the
Perception of the Difagreement Of both ade
quate and inadequate Ideas, muft be equally
Contradictions, ahd confequently there is no
ground for Mr. Clarke's Diftinction.
3. Was hot a Difficulty that arifes from the
Perception of the Difagreement of inadequate
Ideas, as much an Abfurdity as a Difficulty
that arifes from the Perception of the Difagree
ment of adequate Ideas ; we could not difeourfe
at all with Certainty of the principal Objects of
Religion, God and his Attributes. The Ideas we
fix to the Terms, God and his Attributes, are
no doubt inadequate Ideas, if any of our Ideas
are inadequate ; and yet in religious Difcourfes
we argue from the Juftice, Veracity, Goodnefsj
Hdlinefs and Wifdom of God ; and fay, that
fuch and fuch things muft be, becaufe they foi.*
low from the Suppofition of thofe Attributes ;
and that fuch and fuch things cannot be, be
caufe they are inconfiftent with them ; that is,
fuch and fuch things agree or difagree to our
Ideas of the Juftice, Veracity, Holinefs, Good
nefs and Wifdom of God. As for inftancej
we fay.. It is inconfiftent with his Juftice, to
punifh eternally a Man who obeys his Laws,
and to reward a Man who difobeys them : and
on the other fide, that it is agreeable to his
Juftice.) to reward a Man that obeys his Laws,
Y and

322 rAn Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'^ id '¦Defence
and to punifh a Man that difobeys them. Mr.
Tenures, Clarke himfelf argues, That moral and im-
Vol. II. moral Actions muft be attended with Rewards
'* ,-'*r" and Punifhments : becaufe the fame Reafons that
¦prove God himfelf to be neceffarily juft and good j
and the Rules of Juftice, Equity and Goodnefs, to
be his unalterable Will, Law and Command to all
created Beings ; prove alfo, tbat he cannot but be
pleafed with and approve fuch Creatures as imitate
and obey him, by obferving thofe Rules ; and be
difipleafed with fuch as atl contrary thereto ; and
confequently cannot but feme way or other make a
fuitable Difference in his Dealings with them.
Hl^ But fence the Condition of Men in this prefent State
p. 161. is fuch, that the natural Order of things in this
World is in event manifeftly perverted, and Vir
tue and Goodnefs are vifibly prevented, in great
meafure, from obtaining their proper and due Ef-
fetls, in eftablifhing Mens Happinefs proportiona
ble, to their Behaviour and PratJice  There
fore, It is certain that there muft be a future Slate
of Exiftence for Men, as that by an exatJ Dif
tribution of Rewards and Punifhments therein,
all the prefent Diforders and Inequalities will be
fit right, and the whole Scheme of Providence,
which, to us who judge of it by only one fimall
Portion of it, feems now fo inexplicable and con-

Now on what is this Argument founded, but
on Mr. Clarke's inadequate Idea of the Juftice
of God ? And wherein does its Strength lie
( if it has any ) but in his Perception of the
Difagreement of the vifible Diforders and Ine
qualities in this World, with his inadequate
Idea of the Juftice of God, without the ne
ceffary Suppofition of a future State,' to fet
right thofe Diforders and Inequalities ? Where fore

ef his Letter to Mr. Dodweli: 325
fore fince Mr. Clarke thinks he argues with
Certainty for a future State, and fince he ar
gues only from a defective or inadequate Idea;
and fince there can be no arguing in the Cafe,
but from the Agreement or Difagreement of
fuch Ideas as we have ; it follows, That Mr.
Clarke muft allow that Certainty can be attained
as well where our Ideas are inadequate or im
perfect, as where they are adequate or perfect :
that is, the Perception of the Agreement or
Difagreement of fuch Ideas as we have, whe
ther perfect or imperfect, adequate or inade
quate, is the true and only Criterion of Truth;
unlefs Mr. Clarke will deny the Force of his
own Argument for a future State, or fay, that
we have an adequate Idea of the Attributes of
God. 4. But fuppofing there was a juft Ground to
diftinguifh between our Knowledge that relates
to things exifting, and our Knowledge that
relates to Ideas of the Mind which have no
Archetypes beyond their own Exiftence ; fo
that in one Cafe there is not the fame Degree of
Certainty as in the other ; yet Mr. Clarke has
no reafon here to oppofe them to one another,
becaufe his Argument for the Immateriality of
the Soul is and can be only founded on the fole
Comparifon of the inadequate Ideas of Matter,
Spirit, and Thinking. And therefore an Ob
jection or Difficulty founded on the Difagree
ment of thofe imperfect or inadequate Ideas, is
as much a Demonftration of the Falfehood ofa
Propofition that involves fuch a Difficulty, as
the Agreement of inadequate Ideas is a De
monftration of the Truth of a Propofition
made up of fuch Ideas. And confequently ,
whether there is or is not any juft Ground for
Y 2 Mr.

1 z'4 An Anfwer to Mr. Clwkcti id Defence
Mr. Clarke's Diftinction, it ferves not his pur
pofe in the leaft.
5. But perhaps the Reader may, from the
Writings of the Papifts for Tranfubftantiation,
and from the Writings of fome Proteftants a-
gainft the Socinian Herefy, ask, Whether there
are not in fome Queftions Demonftrations on
both Sides, and confequently that the Percep
tion of the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas
is not the Criterion or Teft of Truth. In an
fwer to which I freely declare it to be my Opi
nion, That whatever can be demonftrated, can
be perfetlly cleared from all Objections and Diffi
culties ; and that any Perfon that underftands
a Demonftration and the Objections made a-
gainft it, is capable of folving them ; and that
all the Difficulties that may be urged againft
the Immenfity and Eternity of God, &c. which
ri Def. Mr. Clarke fays, cannot be clearly anfwered, are
t- '75- to be clearly anfwered. And in order to an
fwer them clearly, I would only require thefe
equitable Conditions ofhim, that he would de
fine the Terms Immenfity, Eternity, Immaterial
Being, &c. and fhow that his Definitions agree
to the things exifting, that they refer to.
3<j De£ He proceeds : Our Reafon, fays he, is able to
ji. ^304. apprehend clearly the Demonftration of the Cer
tainty of fome things, where the Imagination is not
ablest 0 comprehend the Ideas of the things them
felves. That is, if I underftand him right, we
can apprehend clearly, fuppofe, that an imma
terial Being exifts, or that fomething exifts
correfpondent to the Idea we fix to the Terms
Immaterial Being, without being able to compre
hend entirely all that exifts in the Being our
Idea refers to. And what then ? How does it
follow from hence that there is any Difference between

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli.' 52 %
between Difficulties that arife from the Per
ception of the Difagreement of adequate Ideas,
and Difficulties that arife from the Perception
tion of the Difagreement of inadequate Ideas ?
Cannot I , though I know but in part the
Archetype to which my Idea of Immaterial
Being refers, have a juft Idea of Immaterial
Being as far as my Idea goes ? And if it be fo,
why fhould I not be able to anfwer all Objections
againft the Exiftence of that which I clearly
apprehend does exift ? Nay, What other Me
thod can there be taken in the Ufe of fuch Words
as Immaterial Being, Infinity, Immenfity, &c.
but to make them ftand for intelligible and
confiftent Ideas, which have a Conformity to
things that really exift ? And why intelligible
and confiftent Ideas fhould not be capable of
being cleared from all Difficulty, I fhall then
be able to conceive, when I can fee no Diffe
rence between intelligible and unintelligible, con
fiftent and inconfiftent.
By what has been faid, the intelligent Reader
may be fatisfied, that when I underftood Dif- $d. Dif.
ficulties that cannot be perfetlly cleared, to fignify t- 3°3«
Contraditlions and Abfurdities, I did not depart zd Def.
from tbat Fairnefs for which, Mr. Clarke fays, t' 3°'"
my former Papers were juftly commended. And I
am not without fome hopes that Mr. Clarke
may contradict himfelf once more in my fa
vour, fince in his Third Defence he is pleafed to
contradidt what he faid in his Second Defence, 2JDf,
for he there accufed me of Unfairnefis, and now A »73-
acquits me of it.
I proceed now to the Queftion concerning
the Poffibility of Matter's being confcious :
and as I have fhowed that finite Extenfion in an Reft.
immaterial Being implies Divifibility as well as rd Edit-
Y3 in*"*"*

I26 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'.-" id Defence
in a material Being, and which confequently,
according to Mr. Clarke, muft be a Subject e-
qually incapable of Thinking with material
Being ; fo I fhall endeavour to reconcile Mr.
Clarke to himfelf, by fhowing, that his Argu
ment drawn from the Divifibility ( or, which
is all one, the Extenfion) of Matter, is incon-
-d Def. clufive. His Argument is as follows ; That all
the Qualities or Powers which either are in Mat
ter, whether they be known or unknown, or are
vulgarly afcribed to it, muft of neceffity be either,

p. 2441

1. Real Qualities truly and properly inhering
in the Subjeti to which they are afcribed ; fuch as
Magnitude and Motion in Matter. Thefe, fays
he, are always the Sums or Aggregates of Powers
of the fame Kind, inhering difiintlly in the feveral
hfl Def. Parts of the material Subjeti. And could Con-
p. 91-93- feioufinefs in like manner be a Quality really inhe
rent in a Syftem of Matter ; it muft likewife be
the Sum and Refult of the Confcioufneffes of the fe
veral Parts : and fo there would be as many di
ftintl Confcioufneffes as there are Particles of Mat
ter of wbich the Syflem confifts.
3 d Def. Or, 1. Qualities not really inhering in the Sub-
p. 244. jggf f0 wbich they are ufually afcribed, but being
indeed Modes excited and refiding in fome other
Subjeti : fuch as are Colours, Sounds, and all thofe
wbich are commonly fenfible Qualities of Matter.
Thefe do not exift at all in that Subjeti to which
they are ufually afcribed, but in fome other Sub
jeti. And this alfo not being applicable to Think
ing, it is manifeft therefore, that Thinking cannot
le a Power or Quality of tbis kind in a material
Subjeti.
Or,

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli: %ifA
Or, 3. Such Qualities as Magnetifim, EletJri-
city, AttratJion, Reflexibility, Refrangibility, and
the like. Thefe have no real Exiftence by way of
proper inhering in any Subjeti ; which likewife
fince it cannot be faid of Confcioufnefs, it is mani
feft, that Confcioufnefs cannot be a Power or Qua
lity in a material Syftem of this kind neither.
In anfwer to which Argument, the Subftance
of one Objection that I urged was, That his
Enumeration was imperfect, becaufe he omit
ted the Confideration of the Modes of thofe
Kinds of Powers mentioned in the firft Branch
of his Divifion ; and that Confcioufnefs being,
according to me, a Mode of one of thofe kinds
of Powers , it is impoffible his Argument
fhould conclude againft Confcioufnefs's inhering
in a Syftem of Matter, when that Quality that
agrees with Confcioufnefs is not named in his
Enumeration. As for inftance, Confcioufnefs
being with me a Power or Quality in Matter
anfwering to a Mode of Motion or Figure,
fuch as the peculiar Motion of a Clock, or
Roundnefs ; the Confideratiou of Confciouf
nefs, as fuch a Quality or Power, fhows, that
his Argument is perfectly foreign to the Que
ftion. For if Confcioufnefs be confidered like
Roundnefs or any other Mode of Figure, or
like a Mode of Motion in an Animal or
Clock, it is manifeft, ift, That it has a real
and proper Inherence, and is not an Effect re
fiding in no Subftance at all, and confequently
v anfwers not to Magnetifim , Eletlricity , Sec.
idly, That it has a real Inherence in the Sub
jedt of which it is faid to be a Quality, and
eonfequently anfwers not to Colour and Sound,
which exift not in the Subftance to which they
Y 4 are

32$ An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'* id Defense
are afcribed. And, %dly, That as it inheres
truly and properly in Matter, fo it is not of
the fame Extent, nor does it anfwer to Figure,
Magnitude, and Motion. For Roundnefs in
heres in a Syftem of Matter, without being
the Sum of the Roundneffes of the Parts. And
the like may be faid of the peculiar and indivi
dual Modes of Motion in a Clock, or an Ani
mal, that they inhere not diftinctly in each of
the diftinct Parts. I did not take upon me to
determine of what kind of Power Thinking or
Confcioufnefs was a Mode ; but for greater
Clearnefs in arguing, I did take the Liberty to
fpeak of it as a Mode of Motion. Now, if it
be confidered as a Mode of Mqtion, that is, if
it confifts of Ten Thoufand diftinct Motions,
it is as impoffible that whole Confcioufnefs
fhould exift in each of the diftinct Parts of a
Syftem of Matter, as that whole Roundnefs
fhould exift in each Part of a Circle, or that
the individual Motion of an Animal or Clock
fhould exift in each of their diftinct Parts,
Wherefore it is evident, that the Strength of
his Argument lies in confidering Confcioufnefs
as ftanding for an Idea inconfiftent with its be
ing a Power of Matter, that foi lows/row* the
Divifion or Co'm'P0fitlon °f Matter, as he pro-
» 2 %, %x. pofed to confider it in his Letter to Mr. Dodweli:
ar(d therefore his Demonftration was granted by
me, as not affecting the Queftion he propofed tq
prove, fince it related folely to a Chimera * pr

* If the Header could doubt of my Meaning in p. 47. of
m% Refletftiqns, he may confider what I fay here as the Ex
plication of it ; and then he will fee, that what Mr. Clarke
advances inf. 50. Edit- 1. and fome following Pages, needs
90 particular Anfwer. Idea,

j/foLETTER to Mr. Dodweli. 3 291
Idea, that he was pleafed to fuppofe, without
any ground, I was obliged to rank Confcioufr
nefs under.
Mr. Clarke, to fhow that his Argument is
cdnclufive againft the Poffibility of Matter's
Thinking, lays down this Propofition, as what
he propofes to explain and vindicate ; That it is id Def.
abfolutely impoffible, and an evident Contraditlion, P- H8,
that any real Quality fhould truly and properly
inhere in a Syftem of Matter, without being the
Sum or Aggregate of a Number of Powers and
Qualities refiding diftintlly in the feveral Parts of
the Syftem, and being always of the fame Kind
with the Whole that refults from them.
In anfwer to this, I humbly conceive that Mr,
Clarke ought to have laid down a Conclufion
clearly contradictory to me, and not have ex-
preffed himfelf in fuch a Manner, that I can
agree to what he fays, confiftently with mainr
taining the Force of my Objection. As for
inftance, I do allow, that no Quality can rer
fide in a Syftem of Matter, but what muft be al
ways in a certain Senfe ofi the fame Kind with
the Whole that refults from the Parts. For when
Roundnefs or any other individual Figure in
heres in a Syftem of Matter, the Parts muft be
fo far cf the fame Kind, as to have a Tendency
to that individual Figure of which they are a
part. And in that Senfe I have always allowed Letter to
Confcioufnefs to "confift of Powers of the fame Mr. D.
Kind; for if Confcioufnefs inheres in a Syftem ?- 7S'
of Matter, it muft neceffarily be allowed, that
the diftinct Beings in that Syftem contribute
towards Thinking, as the Pieces of a Circle
do towards a Circle, or as all the Parts of a
Syftem of Matter contribute towards the Syf
tem : unlefs a Man will fay, that Confciouf- Refs

¦530 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'* id Defence
nefs inheres in a divifible Subftance, and does
not inhere in it at the fame time. Wherefore
his Propofition to be vindicated is obfcure ;
and I defire the Reader to obferve, that no
Propofition can be truly contradictory to what
I affirm, unlefs it affirms that every Quality
that inheres in a Syftem of Matter, muft in
here wholly in each part of it ; that is, that in
a round Figure every Particle muft be round :
for unlefs he affirms and proves that which is
fo manifeftly againft Experience, he will ne
ver contradict me, or be able to fhow, that
Confcioufnefs muft neceffarily, ( if it inheres
in a Syftem of Matter ) confift of feveral di
ftindt Confcioufneffes.
3d Def. To vindicate his Conclufion, Mr. Clarke -ore-
p 248, &c. mifes a Difcourfe of the various Ufe of the
Terms Powers of the fame Kind ; to which, that
I may not difoblige him by taking no notice of
it, I anfwer, That when Terms are defined,
and Inftances agreeing to thofe Definitions gi
ven, whereby all Doubtfulnefs about one ano
ther's Meaning is in the moft effectual Manner
excluded, I cannot fee of what ufe it is to
enumerate the various Senfes that Logicians
give to the fame Terms, efpecially fince I have
id Def. the Authority of the Schools ( as Mr. Clarke
p. 249,&c reprefents them ) for my ufe of thofe Terms :
Though had I underftood them in a Senfe
not to be juftified from their Authority, my
miftake had only been in the Meaning of two
or three Englifh Words, which was a Matter
of no great Confequence when the Words
were defined. Wherefore I proceed to the
Defence of his Argument.

o

He

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 3 1
He fays, When he affirms, that Roundnefs or
Globofity muft needs be the Sum of Qualities of the
fame Kind ; he does not mean that Globofity is made p. jj2.
up ofi Globofeties, but that a whole round Figure
muft neceffarily be made up of Pieces of Round
nefs, which are all of the fame Kind with Round
nefs. For nothing that is void of Figure can be
part of any Figure whatfoever ; nor any thing
that is void of Curvity in particular, be part of
a round Circumference ; nor any thing that is void
of that particular Degree of Curvity which makes
a Circle of a certain determinate Diameter, be
part of the Circumference of that Circle. And
to prove that Roundnefs confifts of Pieces of
Roundnefs, or Powers of the fame Kind, in that
Senfe with Roundnefs, he fpends near Twenty
Pages. All which, for ought I know, may
be a Vindication of the Conclufion he laid down,
and that I cited, but concerns not his Argu
ment in the leaft. For what Mr. Clarke endea
voured to prove againft thofe who judged it
poffible for Matter to think, was, that no
Power could inhere in a Syftem of Matter
without being the Sum of Powers of the fame
Kind ; and confequently that if Thinking or
Confcioufnefs did inhere in a Syftem of Mat
ter, there muft be as many diftinct Confciouf
neffes as there are Parts in that Syftem. And
to fhow how inconclufive that was, I pro
duced Roundnefs ( and I might have produced
almoft all the Modes of Motion and Figure
that can exift ) as an inftance that a Power
might inhere in a Syftem of Matter, without
being the Sum of Powers of the fame Kind ;
that is, that Roundnefs might inhere in a Syf
tem of Matter, without making as many di
ftinct Roundneffes as there are Parts in that
Syftem ;

3 3 2 ^» Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'.** id Defence
Syftem ; and confequently, that Confcioufnefs,
if it inhered in a Syftem of Matter in like
manner with Roundnefs, could not confift of the
Confcioufneffes of the Parts. Now, how does
it follow, That if Confcioufnefs inheres in a Syftem
of Matter, it muft confift of the Confcioufneffes of
the Tarts, or in that Senfe of Powers of the
fame Kind; becaufe in another Senfe, Round
nefs, which I made parallel to Confcioufnefs,
confifts of Powers of the fame Kind, viz. of
Figures and Curvities? For it is readily allowed
by me, that Roundnefs confifts of Pieces of
Roundnefs, which by being all Figures are of
the fame Kind with Roundnefs, confidered as
a Figure ; and by being little Curves or Arches,
are likewife of the fame Kind with Roundnefs,
confidered as a Curve ; and in that Senfe I al
low Confcioufnefs to confift of Powers of the
fame Kind ; for that, Recording to me, con
fifts of Parts which have a Tendency to Think
ing or Confcioufnefs, as Roundnefs does of
Parts that have a Tendency to Roundnefs. And
yet for all that, neither Roundnefs nor Con
fcioufnefs confift of Powers of the fame Kind in
the Senfe of Mr. Clarke's Argument : For un
lefs in a round Figure each part muft be wholly
round, and in a confcious Syftem of Matter,
each part muft be wholly confcious, and in
that fenfe confift of Powers of the fame Kind ;
not one Step can be taken in Defence of Mr.
Clarke's Argument . Nay, what he has advan
ced is fo far from defending it, that it evidently
demonftrates the Falfehood of it. For if
Roundnefs does confift of Parts, none of which
can poffibly be round, (as Mr. Clarke evidently
fhows it muft, by proving that Roundnefs muft
confift only of Pieces of Roundnefs ) and that are

of his L E t T I r to Mr. Dodweli.1 33 3
are only Powers of the fame Kind with Round
nefs, by being all Figures, and by confifting of
Parts that have a nearer Affinity to Roundnefs
than ftraight Lines ; itis a Demonftration that
there may be Powers in Matter which are not
the Sums of Powers of the fame Kind, in that
fenfe which fhows the Inconclufiveneis of his
Argument. For when it is proved, that Round
nefs confifts of Parts, none of which can pof
fibly be round, there is a full and perfect In
ftance to fhow, that Confcioufnefs may inhere
in a Syftefh of Matter, without each of the
Parts being diftinctly confcious. S© that as
far as I can fee, the Force of Mr. Clarke's De
fence lies in underftanding the Terms Powers
of the fame Kind, in a different Senfe from what
he did at firft, and in a Senfe that evidently
fhows his Argument has no force. However,
he is capable of making the fame Conclufion
in words that he did at firft, viz. That no Pow
er can inhere in a Syftem of Matter, without be
ing the Sum ofi Powers of the fame Kind ; and
that, I will allow him, is artful enough to
impofe on Readers that are willing to be fa
tisfied on his fide of the Queftion.
But let us fee how he applies all that he fays,
for Twenty Pages together, to prove Round
nefs muft confift of Powers of the fame Kind (in
the Senfe he now contends for, and that I allow
to be true ) to the Queftion, That if Confciouf
nefs does inhere in a Syftem ofi Matter, it muft
confift of the diftintl Confcioufneffes of the Parts.
I can find nothing to that Queftion, but in
thefe words ; That the individual Roundnefs of 3</ Def.
a Globe is not made up of a Number of the like p. 258.
whole Roundneffes, ( and I add, nor is it made
up of any Number of Roundneffes or any
round

j 34 An Anfwer to Mr. ClarkeV *d Defence
round Parts at all ) but yet muft needs be made
up of fuch Figures as are Parts of Roundnefs, nay
Parts indued with that particular numerical De
gree of Roundnefs; and cannot, be made up of
firaight Lines, nor of any Figures which are not
Pieces endued with that particular Degree of
Roundnefs. So that an individual Confcioufnefs
{fuppofing it to inhere in a Syftem of Matter )
muft be made up, though not of the very fame
Confcioufneffes, yet of fuch Powers as are of the
very fame Kind with that numerical Confcioufnefs,
as the Arches of a Circle are of the fame Kind
with the whole Circumference  That is, It
muft be made up of different Confcioufneffes indeed,
but ftill Confcioufneffes only. All which, I hum
bly conceive, amounts to thus much, That
though Roundnefs confifts of Parts or Pieces
of Roundnefs ( none of which can poffibly be
round ) yet, if Confcioufnefs inheres in a Syftem
of Matter, in like manner with Roundnefs
( that is, confifts of Parts, none of which can
poffibly be confcious ) there muft be as many
diftinct Confcioufneffes as there are Parts ;
which is in effect to fay, If Confcioufnefs in
heres in like manner in a Syftem of Matter
with Roundnefs, it inheres in a different Man
ner from Roundnefs': Or in other words; if
Confcioufnefs by inhering in a Syftem of Mat
ter does not confift of the Confcioufneffes ofthe
Parts, it does confift of the Confcioufneffes of
the Parts.
This is the Strefs of his Demonftration, which
I think I may fubmit to the intelligent Reader,
without any Reply : ifl, Becaufe it vifibly
confutes it felf; and, idly, Becaufe on this oc
cafion, I have a mind to fhow my Complai-
fitice to Mr. Clarke, in letting him have the
Satisfaction

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 3 5
Satisfaction to fee his Demonftration ftand in its
full force, without any attack from me: for
when I confider, that it can deceive no Reader
but himfelf, and that by a Citation from Mr.
Hobbes in his Title- Page, he is of Opinion,
That Arguments feldom work on Men of Wit and
Learning, when they have once engaged themfelves
in a contrary Opinion ; I think it would be a
Piece of ill Nature to difturb his particular Sa
tisfaction in the Force of his Argument.
But there is one thing more of which I think
it neceffary to inform the Reader, with relation
to my Inftance of Roundnefs, and that is, That
I made ufe of it to no other purpofe, than to
give the Reader an Idea, how Confcioufnefs
might inhere in a Syftem of Matter, without
confifting of the Confcioufneffes of the Parts;
and that purpofe I think it fully anfwers. But
whether in other refpects Confcioufnefs anfwers
to Roundnefs, concerns not me : Nay, I pro-
fefs that I think it differs from Roundnefs,
and all other Modes of Figure, in many re
fpects ; and therefore I am not anfwerable for
any Difagreement between Roundnefs and Con
fcioufnefs, provided they agree in confifting of
Parts, none of which are diftinctly round or
diftinctly confcious.
I did urge feveral other Inftances of Modes
to .my purpofe, ( for indeed almoft every Mode
in Matter is to my purpofe ) but I chufe rather
to remit their Defence to the Confideration of
the Reader, who may, from the Principles al
ready advanced, eafily folve Mr. Clarke's Ob
jections, than fpend more words to fhow the
Inconclufivenefs of his Argument, when I
think enough has been faid already. Wherefore

33 o" An Anfwer t& Mr. Clarke'.? 3 d DefeHci
Wherefore I proceed to the Confideration of
the remaining Parts of Mr. Clarke's Defence.
That I might let the Reader more clearly in
to the Force of my Objection to Mr. Clarke's
Argument, and make my felf more intelligi-
Refl.pioi. ble> I did fuppofe Conficioufnefi ( ofi whofe Nature
I was ignorant ) to be a Mode of Motion, and not
a Mode of fome unknown Power ; and the rather
becaufe, I thought, / had lo do with a Gentleman
that underftood the Rules ofi arguing too we'll, to
impute that to me as my Opinion, which I only
-dvef. took the Liberty to fuppofe. But Mr. Clarke not
{. 270. taking, to himfelf my Character of an ingenu
ous Adverfary, will make me accountable for
the Abfurdity of tbe Notion of Thinking's being
really a Mode of Motion ; though he might as
well have made me accountable for the Ab
furdity- of the Notion of Thinking's being really
a Mode of Figure, becaufe I likened Thinking
to Roundnefs, as much as I did to a Mode of
Motion : but without any defign by either, to
affert it as my Opinion, that Thinking was ei
ther a Mode of Motion, or a Mode of Figure 5
having no defign then to enquire into the Na
ture of Thinking. Wherefore I am concerned
to vindicate my Suppofition no farther than the
Nature of my Objection required, which was
only to affign fuch an Inftance of a Power in
Matter, that did not confift of Powers of the
fame Kind, in fuch a Senfe as deftroyed the
Force of Mr. Clarke's Argument. And there
fore fhould the Abfurdity of the Notion of
Thinking's being really a Mode of Motion be
proved ; yet the Abfurdity of my Suppofition
would not in the leaft be proved. I ufe the
Suppofition of Thinking's being a Mode of
Motion to no other End, but to exprefs my
4 Meaning

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 37
Meaning intelligibly, how Thinking may in
here in a Syftem of Matter, without being the
Sum of the diftindt Thinkings of the Parts ;
and if my Suppofition ferves that purpofe, it
is nothing to me, let the Abfurdity of fup
pofing Thinking to be really a Mode of Mo
tion, be as great as he pleafes. Therefore
when Mr. Clarke propofes to prove againft me,
by the Arguments contained between page 270,
and page 279, the Abfurdity of fuppofing Con- p. 270..
fcioufnefis to be a Mode of Motion ( meaning the
Suppofition that Confcioufnefs is really a Mode
of Motion ) he changes the Queftion in dif
pute, under an Appearance in Words of con
futing my Suppofition ; whereas my Suppofition
is no more touched on, in. thofe Arguments,
than the moft foreign Q>ueftion in the World.
However, that Mr. Clarke may be kept a little
more in Countenance for his Labours here,
than for the Pains he has taken about Round
nefs, I will fo far tranfgrefs the Rules of Dif
pute, as to confider, whether he proves a Pro
pofition that was not in Debate between us :
And I hope the Reader will be pleafed to ex
cufe me, for the Breach of the Rules of Dif-
putation, for the Sake of my Complaifance to
Mr. Clarke. The Method I fhall take, fhall
be briefly to enquire into the Nature of Think
ing, and then into the Force of Mr. Clarke's
Arguments, to prove Thinking cannot be a
Mode of Motion.
1. As to the Nature of Thinking, I obferve,
that Thinking is an Adtion that begins not in
us, till we are operated on by external materi
al Objects, that adt on us by Motion and Con
tact ; no more than a Windmill begins to go
till the Air or fome other Body ftrikes againft
Z the

3 3 8 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke's*- %d Defence
the Sails,. For we having no Objedts or Ideas
to think upon, but what are ultimately found
ed .on. and refolved into the fimple Jdeas of
Senfation and Reflection ( by the firft of which
we have all our Ideas of fenfible Qualities in
Bodies external to us, and by the latter all our
Ideas of Thinking, and its Modes, viz. doubt
ing, willing, knowing, csV. ) cannot think firft
on the Ideas of Refledion, becaufe we muft
think upon fomething before we can reflect or
think/upon Thinking and its Modes ; and fince
that fomething cannot be Thinking or any of its
Modes, it remains that we muft firft think
on the fimple Ideas of Senfation. And if we
think on .the fimple Ideas of Senfation, it
is matter of Fadt, that we do not begin to
think upon them till Bodies operate upon us.
And this is an evident Agreement of Human
Thinking ;wkh a Power or Affection of Mat
ter, which ever ows its Exiftence to the Motion
or Operation of fome other Body. What is
Fire.bnt a Power or Affection of Matter, be
ginning . in Matter, perfectly free from that pe
culiar Mode of Motion, till by the Application
of Matter in Motion it is produced ? And what
are other Powers or Affections of Matter, fuch
as bitter, fweet, four, foft, hard, cold, all
Smells, Taftes, Sounds, csV. but peculiar
Modes of Motion or Figure, that begin in par
ticular Syftems of Matter, upon the Action
of other Matter upon them ?
Did we perceive Ideas antecedent to the O-
peration of Matter on our Senfes, there might
be fome Colour to fuppofe Human Thinking
not a Power or Affedtion of Matter, ( fince
Matter cannot be conceived from no Action,
or Reft, to begin an Action; ) but Thinking
% following

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 3 ;
following the Motion of Matter on our Senfes,
we have juft as much reafon to conclude, that
it is a Power or Affedtion of Matter occafioned
by the Action of Matter, as we have to fay,
that Fire is a Power Or Affection of Matter,
when it is produced by the rubbing of a
"Wheel and its Axle-Tree. And T fee not
why itis hot as neceffary to introduce the Hy
pothefis of an Immaterial Being into every
material Subject, to account for its wonderful
Operations, as for the Operations of Man or
Beaft. I doubt not, but that it is very poffible
to be part of the Religion of the moft learned
Country in Europe ( if we can form any Judg
ment what they may believe from what they do
believe) to believe, that Repetitions of Words
in Eccho's are performed by an intelligent or
immaterial Being that mocks us, according to
Ovid's Defcription of her, as a real Being :
 Quce nee reticere loquenti,
Nee prior ipfa loqui didicit, refonabilis Echo.
Corpus adhuc Echo, non vox erat : ci? tamen
ufium
Garrula non alium, quam nunc habet, oris ha-
bebat ;
Reddere de multis ut verba noviffima poffet.
.  .  -— — in fine loquendi
Ingeminat voces ; audilaq; verba reportat.
And then we fhould fee as many learned
Treatifes, to fhow the Inconfiftency of fuch a
regular Repetition of articulate Sounds in any
Being but ah Immaterial Being ( which is fup-
pofedc-nly to have Memory and Reflection ) as
Tertuilian's, and fome other antient Fathers
Are to prove the Soul material 1 and as any
Z 2 of

340 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'* id Defence
of the Moderns are to prove the Soul imma
terial. 2. Human Thinking has Succeffion and
Parts, as all material Actions have ; for all our
Thoughts fucceed one another, can be fufpend-
ed in a Point, or continued in like manner
with a Mode of Motion, and fo are as much
diftinguifhable into Parts.
3. Thinking has its Modes, fuch as Doubt
ing, Willing, Knowing, Pleafure, Pain, ISc,
juft as particular Powers of Matter have their
Modes. Sound ( which in the Body to which
it is attributed, is nothing but a Mode of Mo
tion ) has Modes of acute, grave,, csV. which
with their feveral Degrees, are capable of be
ing varied in infinitum. And as Sounds are
fwift or flow, regular or irregular, according
to the different Action of Matter ; fo the Soul
thinks fwiftly or flowly, regularly or irregu
larly, is drunk or fober, has Pleafure or
Pain, according to the different Motions pro
duced in our Bodies.
4. It is evident to me that God muft be an
Immaterial Being, that is, a proper Immateri
al Being, a Being without any of the Pro
perties of Matter, without Solidity, Extenfion,
or Motion, and that exifts in no Place ; and
not a Being that has Extenfion ( and confe
quently exifts in Place and has Parts ; accord
ing to Mr. Clarke's Idea of Immaterial Being.
Now Thinking in God cannot be founded on
any Objects acting upon him, nor is Thinking
in him fuppofed to be focceffive, or to confift
of Parts, or to have any Modes, becaufe
Modes of Thinking are diftinft Acts of Think
ing. But as his Effence is eternal and immuta
ble, without any the leaft Variation or Alte
ration,

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 341
ration, fo his Thinking is fuppofed to be one
numerical individual Adt, comprehending all
things and all the Poflibilities of things at one
View ; and is as fixt, and permanent, and un-
variable, and as much without Succeffion and
Parts, as his Effence. So that if we can form
any Judgment of the Nature ot Thinking in
Man, from its perfect Conformity with the
Powers of Matter, and its entire and total Dif
agreement with Thinking, in that only Imma
terial Being which, we are fatisfied, exifts ;
we may reafonably conclude Human Thinking
a Power or Affedtion of Matter.
If it be asked, Of what kind of Power in
Matter, Thinking is a Mode ? Is it a Mode
of Motion, or a Mode of fome unknown Pow
er ? To that I anfwer, That I pretend not to
know that Secret, and therefore will only make
thefe two Obfervations.
1. That Mr. Clarke allows Matter, or the yl Def.
Bodily Organs, to atl upon the Soul. Now Mat-?' z87-
ter cannot adt upon an Immaterial Being by
Motion, becaufe there can be no Contact be
tween a material and immaterial Being : Where
fore by Mr. Clarke's own Principles, there muft
be a Power in Matter unknown to us, and of
which we have no Idea ; and if there is a Pow
er in Matter, of which we have no Idea, that
Power in Matter may comprehend under it
Thinking and its Modes, as Figure does Round
nefs, csV. and Motion the feveral Modes of
Motion, and their Modes.
2. It is by many thought a Difficulty to con
ceive, how by a mere Preference of the Mind,
we can caufe our left Hand, which was in mo
tion, to be at reft ; and our right Hand, which
was at reft to be in motion ; and by a new
Z 2 Will,

b *72

342 Art Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'j \d Defence
Will, Choice or Preference ( call it as you
pleafe ) to put the left Hand in motion, and
the right Hand at reft, and fo on, let our Wills
vary and change ever fo often. But that Diffi
culty is entirely at an end, if Thinking in
Man be nothing but a Mode of Motion, or
Matter in motion : and it is then as conceiva
ble, that Thinking fhould produce thofe Mo
tions, as that a Spring or Weight in a Clock
fhould make a Clock ftrike or point to the
Hour of the Day.
But let us proceed to Mr. Clarke's Arguments,
to prove, that Thinking cannot be a Mode of
Motion in Matter.
T.ftf>jf- His firft Argument is, That Modes of Mo
tion are nothing elfe but particular Motions, and
cannot contain any thing in their Idea, beyond the
Genus of Motion,  And he has as clear and
diftintl a Perception, that the Idea of Confciouf
nefs contains fomething in it-, befides and beyond th?
Genus of Motion ; as he has, that it contains in
it fomething beyond the Genus of Figure.  '¦ 
He has therefore exatlly the fame intuitive Cer
tainty that Confcioufnefs cannot be a Mode of Mo
tion ; as he has that any one thing in the World is
not another, whofe Idea is the rtmoteft and moft
different from it that can be imagined.
To which I anfwer, That though we have an
abftradt Idea of Motion, which as it ought, fo
I doubt not but it does, comprehend under it all
the Modes of Motion, that ever did or can
exift , yet I deny, that we have an Idea of all
the really exifting, much lefs of all the poffi
bly exifting Modes of Motion. We have Ideas
of the more fimple Modes of Motion ; fuch as
a circular Motion, or Motion in a ftraight
Line. But when the Motions are very com
plex.

of his Letter to. Mr. Dodweli. 343
plex, fuch as the Mode of Motion in a Tree,
by which Vegetation is performed ; and the
Mode of Motion in a Man or Animal, by which
Life and Senfation is continued : we have not a
diftindt Conception of them in our Minds.
The only diftinct Conception that we have of
fuch Modes is, that they have in them the Ge
nus of Motion ; and that they have Succeffion
and Parts , and can be varioufly modified.
Now as far as we know any thing of the Na- •
ture of Thinking, by what we find and feel in
our felves ; That has likewife the Genus of
Motion, by arifing from Motion, by being
varied by Motion, and by its producing other
Motions diftinct from it felf; and has likewife
Succeffion and Parts, and withal innumerable
Modifications. Wherefore fince no particular
Idea of Human Confcioufnefs can be produced,
beyond the Genus of Motion ; and that we
have no particular Ideas of the more complex
Modes of Motion that exift : It is impoffible
for him to prove or know, that one is net the
other. For till he has a further Idea of the
Nature of Human Thinking, than what I have
defcribed ; and a particular diftinct Idea of
that complex Mode of Motion, that exifts in
our Animal Spirits ; he can no more know,
that one is not the other, than he can know,
whether two things agree or differ from one
another, that he has no Idea of at all. Indeed
a Man may fay, That a Wheel in Motion does
not think, or that a circular Motion is not
Thinking ; becaufe we fee not any of the Ef
fects of Thinking follow from a circular Mo
tion : though I douot'not, but (if the Effects
of Thinking followed from a circular Motion,
as much as they do whenever that complex
Z 4 Motion

344 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'-** id Defence
Motion peculiar to the Body of a Man, exifts)
that Mr. Clarke would have recourfe to the Hy
pothefis of Immaterial Being, and fay, That Im
material Beings were added to all Wheels on
the production of every circular Motion. But
it is not poffible for us to fay, that Thinking
does not confift in the peculiar Motion of the
Spirits in the Brain, till we have a particular
Idea of the Motion of thofe Spirits, and an
Idea of Thinking, as fomething diftinct from
a Mode of Motion, or as diftinct from a Power
or Affection of Matter ; of none of which has
Mr. Clarke given us any Ideas.
2. I have been the longer on this Argument
than was neceffary, becaufe what I have offered,
will in a great meafure ferve to fet this Queftion
in a true Light ; otherwife there needed nothing
to be faid to an Argument which does only
affirm the Queftion in debate, and which can
fignify nothing to any body that wants Con
viction : for as he only affirms, That he has an
intuitive Certainty that Confcioufnefs - cannot, be a
Mode of Motion ; fo a Man may affirm againft
him, that by a Survey of the Nature of Hu
man Thinking, and the different Effedls of
Motion, he knows or perceives that Human
Thinking is a Mode of Motion ; and another
may affirm with me, that he is fo far ignorant
of the Nature of Human Thinking, as not to
know, whether it be a Mode of Motion or no.
All three prove alike, and have nothing elfe to
do, but to fubmit their feveral Affirmations to
the Reader, but can never convince one ano
ther. Mr. Clarke has indeed affirmed the
Queftion that he has brought into difpute, in
ftronger Words than I have produced from
¦id Def. n*m' ^ That it is. a greater Abfurdity, and more
p. 173. ridiculous

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 345
ridiculous than fome evidently falfe and ridicu
lous Propofitions, which he is pleafed to pro
duce as Parallels to what he would make me af
firm. But I humbly conceive, there is no more
proof in fuch Affertions, than in the moft
modeft and civil Affirmations. However, I
thought my felf obliged to do him the Juftice,
to produce what he fays, that it may have its
Weight with the Reader ; becaufe I ought to
fuppofe he intended it for Argument.
His fecond Argument to prove, that Think- *d Def-
ing cannot be a Mode of Motion^ is, If Thinking^' 147"
was a Mode or Specks of Motion, it would fol
low, that all Motion would be a Degree of Think
ing. To which, as well as to all that follows
under this Head, I think it fufficient to reply :
That Matter is every where the fame, and all
alike ; but becomes Fire, or Water, or pro
duces Smells, Taftes, and Sounds, &c. accord
ing as it is diverfified by Motion : and as it is
fuppofed, that Motion can produce nothing
but Motion, fo thefe Differences in Matter are
nothing but peculiar Modes of Motion. Where
fore if it be proper to fay, That every Mo
tion is a Degree of Fire, a Degree of Water,
a Degree of all the Modes of Smell, a Degree
of all the Modes of Sound, a Degree of Bit
ter, and a Degree of Sweet, a DegEee of Ve
getation, and a Degree of Corruption ; I do
in that fenfe allow, that every Motion is a
Degree of Thought ; if it be true , that
Thinking isa Mode of Motion, as Mr. Clarke
fuppofes it to be in this Argument.
His third Argument to prove, Thinking can- P. 276.
not be a Mode of Motion, is, That if Thinking
was a Mode- of Motion, them Motion would be a
more generical Power than Thinking. Whereas, On

3 4<5 An Anfwer to Mr. ClarkeV id Defence
On the contrary, fays he, it is evident, that
Thinking is a Power infinitely, more generical,
than either Figure or Motion, or any other Pow
er of Matter. There are as many Ideas of Fi
gure, as 'there are Figures ; and there are as many
Ideas of Motion, as there are Modes of Motion ;
and as many Ideas of other Things, as there are
other things in the World, that can be thought up
on : And all thefe Ideas are Modes, and Sorts, or
Kinds of Thinking.
i. When Motion is faid to be more generical
than any particular Species or Mode of Mo
tion •, and when Figure is faid to be more ge
nerical than any particular Mode of Figure :
I take the Meaning of it to be, that Figure
and Motion are abftradt Ideas, which compre
hend under them all the particular Modes of
Figure and Motion that can poffibly exift ; fo
that whetever any particular Figure or Motion
exifts, it has a Conformity to our abftradt Ideas
of Figure and Motion : whereas a circular Mo
tion and Squarenefs are abftradt Ideas, to which
only a particular Mode of Motion and Figure
has a Conformity. So that Motion and Figure
are called more generical than any particular
Motion or Figure, becaufe their Ideas are con
tained under them.
But when Mr. Clarke calls Thinking in Man
a more generical Power than Motion and Figure,
I am perfectly at a Lofs what he means. Does
he mean, that Thinking is a Power which does
confift both of Motions and Figures ? If he
does mean fo, ( and I know not what other
fenfe, according to the Meaning of the Terms
more generical in this place, to underftand him
in ) then if it be proper Language to call that
an individual Power which confifts of all pof.
. fible

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 347
irble Motions, and all poffible Figures -, what
does Mr Clarke do in affirming Thinking to be
more generical than Motion, but make Thinking
a perfedtly material Adtion? For unlefs k
comprehends under it all poffible Modes both
of Figure and Motion, as Motion and Figure
does all poffible Modes of Motion and Figure,
(which thereby become more generical than any
particular Mode of Figure and Motion ) he
ufes the Term generical in one fenfe in one place,
and in another fenfe in another place. Where
fore it follows from this Argument, that either
Thinking is, by confifting of Figures and Mo
tions, a material Actjon ; or elfe that he ufes
the Term generical fallaciously.
If he ufes the Term generical in one and the
fame Senfe in both places, and pretends it fol
lows from his Argument, that thinking muft,
by being more generical than Figure and Mo
tion, confift both of Figures and Motions, and
fo cannot confift of Motion alone; and would
thereby deftroy the Suppofition, that Thinking
is a Mode of Motion. I anfwer, That when
Thinking is fuppofed to be a Mode of Motion
in the Animal Spirits, the Figure and Structure
of them, as well as the principal Parts of a
Man, are included, as neceffary to conftitute
an Adt of Thinking ; for otherwife, neither
the Motion of Thinking, nor the various Mo
tions in the Body of a Man could be perform
ed ; no more than the Mode of Motion called
Vegetation could be performed in an Oak, with
out fuch an organical Difpofition of Parts as is
peculiar to that kind of Tree called an Oak.
If he ufes the Term generical fallacioufly,
and not in the fame Senfe that it is ufed when
Figure is faid to be pore generical than Round- \
nefs ;

348 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'.* id Defence
nefs; but for Thinking's containing in it Ideas,
cifV. that is, for being more generical than Mo
tion and Figure, becaufe we have Ideas of Mo
tion and Figure : His Difcourfe is not to the
Point, and he might as well have ufed any
other Term in the World as the Term generi
cal. For if he means , that the Objects of
Thinking are more generical than Motion and
3</ Def. Figure, ( as by affirming, That Thinking con-
p. 258. tains in it felf the Ideas of all the Modes of Fi
gure, and the Ideas of all the Modes of Motion,
and infinite other Ideas befides ; and by what he
fays in this Article, I am apt to think he does )
then what he fays is not to the Queftion in dif
pute, which has no relation to the Genericalnefis
of the Objedts on which we think, but to the
Genericalnefis of Thinking it felf.
Indeed Mr. Clarke does help himfelf out as
well as he can, by faying, That Ideas of Figure,
&c. are Modes, and Sorts or' Kinds of Thinking.
But that, I conceive, isa clear Miftake, and a
confounding together the Faculty and the Ob
ject. I allow there can be no Thinking without
an Idea or Object, nor can there be an Idea or
Object without Thinking : for they are as re
lative Ideas as Father and Son, and muft there
fore fubfift together ; but yet Thinking, when
Roundnefs is the Object, is no more the ma
terial Idea we think on, nor that material Idea,
Thinking, than the Idea of Father is the Idea
of Son, or the Idea of Son the Idea of Father.
2. But let Thinking in Man be whatever
Mr. Clarke pleafes ; let it be a Power in an ex
tended Subftance that, according to him, con
fifts but of one Figure and one Motion,' and
not of the Figures and Motions of the Parts,
and that is indivifible by the Power of God ;
1 though

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 49
though one fide cannot but be diftinct from
the other fide. Does not that extended Being
of Mr. Clarke's, with one only Figure and one
Motion, by means of that fuppofed Power,
perceive the Ideas of Figures and Motions ?
And if one Power can perceive or have the
Idea of another Power, as by Mr. Clarke's own
Suppofition he muft allow, I fee no more rea-
. fon againft making Figures, &c. the Objects
of a Mode of Motion, than againft making them
the Objects of any other Power, that exifts in
a Subject which has neither Modes of Motion,
nor Modes of Figure contained in it.
3. It muft be allowed, that every diftindt
Thought is a particular Mode of Thinking ;
and fo Thinking muft in us have a great
Number of Modes ; but yet for all that our
Thoughts are finite and limited. And not-
withftanding Mr. Clarke affirms, That Thinking *¦* Def.
in Man contains in it the Ideas of all the Modes t ' 2s8,
of Figure, and the Ideas of all the Modes of Mo
tion ; yet I take it to be matter of Fact, that
we comprehend only the more fimple Modes
of Motion and Figure. And fince our Thoughts
are all limited, in point of Number, I fee no
reafon from their Variety neceffarily to con
clude, that human Thinking cannot be a
Mode of Motion. For if we confider but the
prodigious Variety of .Sounds which are called
diftinct Modes of Sound, it is as eafy to con
ceive, that upon the Suppofition of Thinking
being a Mode of Motion, it fhould have the
feveral Modes that we are confcious it. has, as
that Sound fhould have all the diftinct innume
rable Modes which that has. His

350 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke's*" id ^Defence
%d Def. His fourth Argument to prove Thinking cam-
p. 277.278. not .fa a Mode of Motion, is a Citation from
Mr. Locked Effay of Human Underftanding,
which he cannot .but fuppofe I will give fome De
ference to. ¦ But why he fhould expect any De
ference from me to any Man's words, any fur
ther than they, carry Evidence along with
them, except thofe of the infpired Writers, is
as furprizing to me, as that Mr. Locke fhould
be made choice of as a proper Authority to
fubmit to. However, fince Mi". Clarke is fo
far miftaken in me as to think I would pay any
more Deference to Mr. Locke than I do to him,
I will on this occafion freely declare it to be
my Opinion, that I look on it to be contrary
to the Duty of a rational Agent to pay any
manner of Deference in matters of Opinion or
Speculation to any Man, or Number of Men
whatfoever ; and that could I fo far proftitute
my Confcience, as to fubmit to any mere hu
man Authority, Mr. Locke's would in all likeli-*
hood be thetaft for my Purpofe ; becaufe it
would be much more for my Eafe, if not my
Profit, to fubmit to the Decifionsand Determi
nations of thofe Men that in every Country
have worldly Preferments to beftow, than act
the fame low Part out of fo poor a Profpedt
as I muft fee would follow from believing in fo
rational an Author as Mr. Locke.
R .4.. e. 10. As to the Paffage it felf, I refer the Reader
*• I7- to it, who will fee, that it is fo far from having
any relation to the Queftion that Mr. Clarke
has been pleafed to ftart, whether human Think
ing be a Mode of Motion, that its whole defign
is to prove, that Thinking in the Deity cannot
depend on the Motion of the Parts of a Corpo
real Syftem, againft fuch Theifts as affirm, that

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 5.1
that God is a certain Syftem of Matter, and that
Thinking is a certain Motion of the Parts of
that Syftem. And as the Queftion is not the
fame, fo fome of the Confequences that Mr.
Locke draws from thofe Principles, affect only
that really abfurd Suppofition of Thinking's
being a Mode of Motion in God. For if it
be a juft Inference, that all Thoughts muft be un
avoidably accidental and limited that depend on
Motion, as I think it is ; it fufficiently proves
the Abfurdity of thofe Theifts that Mr. Locke
argues againft, but is no manner of Objec
tion againft thofe imaginary People that
maintain Thinking in Man to be a Mode of
Motion. His Fifth Argument; as far as I can under- '<t£>ef.
ftand it, is, That it is not proper to diftinguifh /'•"¦7S>*'79-
Motions and Figures into Modes or Species of
Motion and Figure ; and that a Man may as
well call a Syllogifm a Mode or Species of Mo
tion, as call any particular Motion a Mode or
Species of Motion. And for this he appeals
to the common Senfe of Mankind. This Argu
ment has relation only to Propriety of Lan
guage, and therefore I can only fay this to it :
That I have diftindt Ideas of feveral Motions,
and diftinct Ideas of feveral Figures, whereby
I diftinguifh thofe Motions and Figures from
one another, as well as I can Figure from Mo
tion : That fome of thefe peculiar Motions and
Figures have diftindt Names given to them, and
confequently thofe Motions and Figures are as
much ranked into Kinds and Sorts ( though
they may be never called Kinds or Sorts ),as
any things elfe in the World. For what do we
mean by a Kind or Sort, but feveral Particulars
having a Conformity to an abftradt Idea ? So
that if our abftradt Idea of Roundnefs agrees to
the

352 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke's*1 id Defence
the Figure of any Number of Beings, we do as
neceffarily call them all round, and reckon
their Figure a fort of Figures, as we do a Ne
gro of the Sort or Species of Men, by his an
fwering or having a Conformity to our abftradt
Idea of Man, though the Term Species or Sort
may not perhaps be made ufe of in one cafe as it
is in the other. But after all, I cannot fee what
ground Mr. Clarke has to conteft this Language
li Def. with me, who fays fo much about Figures difi-
p. 250. feringfipecifically from one another.
Thus I have gone through his Arguments to
prove, that Thinking cannot be a Mode ofi Mo
tion, and will conclude what I have to fay on
this Head, with confidering the Apology he
makes for my maintaining fo abfurd an Opinion,
though it be only an Opinion he puts upon me,
See Reply, as he did, that I maintained S-weetnefs exifted in
p izz. a Rofe, in direct Defiance of my Words that
were before him. He fays, that in reviewing
the Matter, he can hardly perfuade himfelf, but
that I have miftaken my own Argument. And his
w xjtf. reafon is, becaufe fome ingenious Perfons have
7.281,281. undertaken to maintain, that God can make Mat
ter think ; which it feems, though a falfe and
impoffible Affertion, is notfo extravagant an Ab
furdity as mine : and therefore I prefume he
thinks I intended to follow^ or fhould have
followed thofe ingenious Perfons ; which is as
much as to fay, I am more extravagantly ab
furd than others, therefore I have miftaken my
own Argument. I may as well fey, that Mr.
Clarke has miftaken his own Argument, becaufe
I think him more miftaken than Defoartes, and
fome other ingenious Perfons, in making the Soul
an extended Being, and yet indivifible by the
Power of God. Have not Mr. Clarke, and I,
and

of his Letter io Mr. Dodweli. 3 5 3
and every Man elfe, a Liberty to judge and
argue for our felves ? And though it be very
poffible for us all to argue in fuch a manner as -
will feem extravagantly abfurd to fome Men or
other, yet I humbly conceive that we ought not
from thence to be charged with miftaking our
Own Arguments. When a Papift argues for
Tranfitbftantiation, I cannot fee how he can be
charged with miftaking his own Argument, be
caufe fome ingenious Divines of the Church of
England contend only for a real Prefence. If
we look into the World, is there not evident
Proof, that Men profe fling Learning are capa
ble of believing and defending any Abfurdity
in Nature ? Nay, are not almoft all the extra
vagant Opinions that abound in the World,
chiefly confined to thofe that profefs Philofo
phy and Learning ? For as no living Creature is
fubjetl to the Privilege of Abfurdity, but Man only ;
fo the common People, by their Incapacity for
Speculation, can enter no farther into the par
ticular Speculations of their Country, than like
the common Soldiers of an Army, by fhowing
their Courage and Warmth for they know not
what. Indeed we have had the Happinefs in
England to have fuch rational Parliaments and
Convocations that have eftabliflied nothing but
Truth : yet an Englijhman is thereby no more
priviledged from maintaining and believing any,
the moft extravagant Abfurdity, than a Man
born in Turkey, France, or Spain ; and that
with the fame Degree of Honefty and Sincerity.
Had I contradicted my felf, I might be faid to
have miftaken my own Argument ; as Mr. Clarke
may juftly be faid to have done, in making an
extended Being, as fuch, divifible and indivifi-
fcle. at the fame time. But to fay I have mif.
A a taken

354 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke's*1 id Defence
taken my own Argument, becaufe I exceed
another in Abfurdity, is fuch a Miftake, and
argues fo little infight into the Nature of Man
( fo prone to Errour and Abfurdity ) that I
know not under what Kind or Species of Miftakes
to put it.
To prove the Impoffibility of Matter's
Thinking, Mr. Clarke urged another Argu-
jY)ef ment, viz. That it is abfurd to annex Conficioufi-
p. 158'. nefs to fo flux a Subftance, as the Brain or Spirits:
ad Def. becaufe if fuch a Subftance could be the Seat of that
p.zSti.ify. Confcioufnefs, by which a Man not only remembers
things done many Tears fence ; but alfo is confcious
that he himfelf, the fame individual Being, was
the Doer of them ; it would follow, that Confciouf
nefs could be transferred from one Subjeti to ano
ther ; that is, that a Quality could fubfift without
inhering in any Subjeti at all. .
Xtji. To which Argument I anfwered. That no
p.23<5,*37, Man has the fame numerical Confcioufnefs to
o, &c. jjay that he had Yefterday : the Confcioufnefs
he has to Day, is a diftindt numerical Adt from
all pait Confcioufneffes ; and can be no more
the fame numerical individual Confcioufnefs
with, any of thofe paft Confcioufneffes, than the
Motion of a Syftem of Matter to Day, can
be the numerical individual Motion it had
Yefterday. That we are not confcious, that we continue
a Moment the fame individual numerical Be
ing. That we utterly forget or ceafe to re
member a great many things, done in the for
mer Part of our lives, which yet we as certainly
did, as ever we did any of thofe things that
we are confcious we did. That we do by de
grees forget things partially, which we do not
revive by frequent Recollection : And that in
order

1

of his Letters Mr. Dodweli. 3 5 5
brder to retain the Memory or Confcioufnefs of
a paft Action, it is neceffary to revive the Idea
of it, before any confiderable Flux of Parti
cles : and by reviving the Idea, we have as
perfect a Memory or Confcioufnefs of having
done that Adtion (though the Brain or Spirits
be not compofed of the fame numerical Parti ¦
cles ) as we had the Day after we did the Ae^
tion ; or as we have of a Triangle, or any o-
ther new Idea not before imprinted on the
Brain. And if there is every now and then
a Recollection of a paft Adtion, a Man may
be confcious of things done by him, though
he has not one Particle of Matter, the fame
that he had at the doing of thofe things, with
out Confcioufnefs' s being transferred from one Sub
jeti to another, in any abfurd Senfe of thofe
words. And nothing can better account for a
total Forgetfulnefs of fome things, and partial
Forgetfulnefs of others, than the Suppofition
of Confcioufnefs's inhering in a Subftance,
whofe Particles are in a conftant Flux.
But, Mr. Clarke fays, the Fallacy of this Re- ,j ^et
ply is very evident. For to affirm, that netv p 289,290.
Matter, perpetually added to a fleeting Syftem,
may, by repeated Impreffions and Recolletiions of
Ideas, participate and have communicated to it a
Memory of what was formerly done by the whole
Syflem, is not explaining or proving, but begging
the Queftion, by affuming an impoffible Hypothefis.
Now as far as I underftand any thing of
the Nature of Arguing ; it was not my bufinefs,
as a Refpondent, to prove, but affign an Hy
pothefis. For affigning an Hypothefis, pro
vided that Hypothefis be poffible, is a full
Anfwer to an Argument, whereby the contrary
is propofed to be demonftrated ; becaufe what
A a 2 is

356 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'* id Defence
is poffible, cannot be reduced to an Abfurdity.
And this I have done in the Words I have cited ;
but whether that Hypothefis be poffible dr
impoffible, I leave to be determined by every
Man's Reafon ; and whether it be not the real
Truth Of the Matter, by every MarfS Expe
rience. This I am fufe of, that Mr. Clarke's
calling it an impoffible Hypothefis, and inftead of
faying a' word to prove it impoffible, imme
diately arguing dn the Suppofition of its Pof
fibility, is begging the Queftidh, and fuppdfin^
that which he was to prove: whereiis I was"
not to prove, but a'ffign a Suppofition or Hy
pothefis. The Subftance of $hat he adds,
while he argfies on the Suppofition of ihe Pof
fibility of my Hypothefis; relating to th6
Queftion of Perfonal Idefitity, and the Juftice
of fdtbfe Rewards and Punifhments, fhall be
confidered under another Head.
Letter to I had urged, That though from the Imma-
Mr- D- teriality of the Soul, it did follow., that the
^* °' '* Subftance of the Soul was naturally immortal
or indivifible ; yet it would by no means follow,
that the Soul, confidered as an actually think-
Reflect. jng Being, was naturally immortal : arid un-
f22r,22 . jej-g ^ gouj^ as an immaterial Being, did per
petually think or perceive, or as a thinking Be
ing, was naturally immortal, a future State of
Rewards and Punifhments could not be proved
from Mr. Clarke's Argument ; and therefore,
it was of no ufe to the Ends and Purpofes of Re
ligion, that is, it was of no ufe to prove what
it was defighed for, via. a future Stale of Re
wards and Punifhme'rits .
3d Def. To this Mr. Clarke fays; That he fuppofes it
7.306,307. will be granted to be of the gWhteft Ufe; if it be
evident

pf his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 357
evident that the Notion he is arguing againft, is ut
terly deftrutlive of Religion.
Let the Notion he is . arguing againft be utter
ly deftrutlive ofi Religion, it will not therefore
follow, that a Proof of the Immateriality of
the Soul, is any Proof of a future State of Re
wards and Punifhments : and if a future State
of Rewards and Punifhments does not follow
from the Suppofition of the Soul's Immateria
lity, his Argument is not of any ufe to that
end, for which it was intended ; and no more
proves a future State of Rewards and Punifh
ments than any Opinion or Principle, whofe
Suppofition is utterly deftrutlive of a future State.
For whatever Medium does not prove a Pro
pofition, when tp.e pretended Ufe of that Me
dium is to prove that Propofition ; that Me
dium no more ferves that End and Purpofe,
than the moft abfurd Propofition in the World.
Wherefore it is plain, that his fubfequent Arr
guments, fhould they prove my Notion defiruc-
tive of Religion, do not prove the Ufefulnefs of
his own Argument ; and are no more to the
Queftiou in difpute^ than hjs Endeavours to
prove Roundnefs confifts of Powers of the fame
3ff\nd, and that Thinking is not a Mode of Mo^
fion. But to purfue the Complaifance with
which I have treated him, I will confider what
he fays to prove my Notion deftrutlive of Reli
gion. His fir.ft Argument to prove my Notion de- p. 307
ftrudtive of Religion, is, That if the Mind of
Man were nothing but a certain Syftem of Mat
ter, .and Thinking nothing .but a certain Mode of
Motion in that Syftem ; it would follow, that fince
every Determination of Motion depends neceffarily
Upon the Impulfe that caufes it ; therefore every
A a 3 Thought

358 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke' j id Defence
Thought in a Man's Mind muft be ne-ceffdry, ' and
depending wholly upon external Caufes ; and there
could be no fuch thing in us, as Liberty, or a Pow
er of Self-Deterntinalion. Now what Ends and
Purpofes of Religion, mere Clocks and: Watches
are capable of fierving, needs no long and nice Con
fideration. To which I anfwer :
i . I no where affirm, Thinking to be a Mode
of Motion in any Syftem of Matter ; and there
fore let his Argument be ever fo juft and con-
clufive, it cannot prove my Notion deftrutlive
of Religion.
2-. But fuppofing I had affirmed, the Mind of
Man to be nothing but a certain Syftem of Matter,
and that Thinking is a Mode of Motion in that
Syftem ; and that therefore, there can be no fuch
thing in us, as a Power of Self -Determination, no
more than there is in Clocks or Watches : How
does it follow, that my Notion is deftrutlive of
Religion ?¦
Men and Clocks agree in being neceffarily
determined in all their Actions ; therefore, fays
he, they are alike incapable of Religion. I
might as well argue, thac becaufe an' immaterial
Subftance and a Clock agree, according to Mr.
Clarke, in being extended, therefore an imma
terial Subftance is no more capable of Religion
than a Clock. For what is it makes a Man a
.proper Subjedt of Religion but his Under
ftanding ? And what excludes a Clock from
being a proper- Subject of Religion, but the
Want of a human Underftanding ? Both are
neceffarily determined in their Actions: The
one by the Appearances of Good and Evil,
and the other by a Weight or a Spring. But
how does this Agreement deftroy Man's Capa
city for Religion .? How does it appear, thataa intelli-

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 35$,
intelligent Agent that acts neceffarily is not d
proper Subjedt of Religion, becaufe an unin
telligent Agent that acts neceffarily is not ?
When Mr. Clarke proves, that fuch an intelli
gent Agent cannot be a proper Subject of Re
ligion, Twill allow him, that Man is no more
a Subject of Religion than a Clock ; nay, I
will go farther and allow, that there can be no
fuch thing as Religion. For among all the Spe
culations relating to the human Mind, or any
other intelligent Beings, there feems to me
nothing more evident than that there cannot
exift in any intelligent Being, nor do we enjoy
any other Liberty than a Power to do as we will,
and forbear as we will: that is to fay, ifl have
the Will to flay in my Chamber, I have a
Power to flay there ; and if I have the Will to
go out of my Chamber, I have a Power to go
out. Let my Mind determine either way, I
have ftill the Power to act as I will, unlefs
fomething happens to hinder me from acting
as I will. If I am locked up faft, I have no
longer my Liberty in that refpect, I have not
then a Power to do as I will ; and ifl am thruft
but by Violence, I am not at Liberty in that
refpect,- becaufe I cannot forbear going out,
though I fhould will not going out. Whenever
therefore the doing or forbearing any Action,
according to the Determination of my Will,
is in my Power, I am then always free and at
liberty, that is, from any Agent's hindering
me from acting as I will, but not free from Ne
ceffity, For when I will, or prefer going a-
broad to (laying at home, that Adt of Volition
or Preference as much determines me to act ac
cording to that Preference, if it is in my Power
to go abroad, as Locks and Bars will hinder me
A a 4 fro™*

3 do An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'-r id Defence
from acting according to that Preference. The
only Difference is, that in one Cafe I am ne-
ceffitated to act as I will, and in the other Cafe
to act contrary to my Will.
This feemsto me to contain the whole Idea
of human Liberty. Now, if Mr. Clarke can
not affign another Idea of Liberty, that is intel
ligible and confiftent with it felf, and that wc
can know to be true, by comparing it with the
Actions of our Minds ; Then if he fhows, that
a neceffary Agent cannot be a Subject of Rer
ligion, it will follow from his Principles that
Man is not a Subjedt of Religion. And that
he can have no confiftent, intelligible Idea of
Liberty, befides what I have affigned, i think
will be evident to any Man, that carefully
confiders the Actions of intelligent Beings, or
endeavours to frame an Idea of Liberty, that
is diftinct from Neceffity. Upon the beft In
formation I can get, I can put no other intel
ligible Meaning on the Terms Liberty or Self-
Determination for Mr. Clarke's Purpofe, than a
Power to will or chufie differently under thefiame
Circumfiances : that is, though I will or prefer
Haying in my Chamber to leaping out at the
Window, yet I could under thofe very Circum
fiances, wherein I preferred flaying in my
Chamber, have preferred leaping out at Win
dow ; which is as much as to fay, I could have
preferred what I did not prefer, though all the
Caufes of Preference continued. Now this to
me is perfectly inconfiftent ; for whenever I
prefer one thing to another, it is always on
fome Motives or Caufes ; and I find, that I
cannot but prefer what I do prefer, till different
Motives or Caufes produce another Preference,
Choice, or Will : and particularly in ihe Cafe
before

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 6 1
before us, the Confideration of the Duty J owe
to God and my Country, the Satisfaction I
take in living, &c. are fome of thofe Caufes
that produce that Will or Preference; and
therefore to fay I can prefer or will differently*
under the fame Circumftances, is to fay, I can
prefer what difpleafes me, -than which nothing'
can be more inconfiftent. I know the Doctrine
of Neceffity is too generally fuppofed to be ir
religious and atheiftical ; and I muft confefs, I
cannot but wonder at it, confidering that the
Predeftinarians are fo numerous in all the Sedts
of Chriftians, and that it is eftablifhed in fo
many Confeffions of Faith. Among the Refor
med I think it cannot be doubted, but there
are more Calvinifts than Arminians : and If the
Janfenifts in the Church of Rome are not equal
in number to their Oppofers, their Writings
fhow them to be the moft acute and ingenious
* Perfons of that Communion. And if, in the » Mr. At-
Church of England, its Members incline to Ar- nauld' W
minianifm, yet it is affirmed by many, that our ^j.^-.
Articles are Calvimfiical, and acknowledged by cho"le, <?«•
all, that they were not defigned to exclude a
Calviniftical Meaning: which is a fufficient
Ground to prefume, that the Compilers were
Calvinifts, or at leaft, that they did not think
Calvinifen led to Irreligion. I could produce
many Divines of our Church that in Terms
teach the Dotlrine of Neceffity ( for indeed it
would be ftrange, if fome Divines did not
maintain what feems fo evidently the Dodtrine
of the Church ) but I think it fufficient to name
only Dr. South, whofe Penetration, to know
What is Orthodox, can no more be called in
queftion by any Man that has looked into his
Writings, than his Zeal to be Orthodox can
' be

'$6~£ An Anfwer to Mr. Chrke's id Defence
be fufpected ; when it is confidered, that after
Animad- declaring what he takes to be the commonly re-
•verfionsoa -ceived Dotlrine ofi the Church concerning the Bleffed
lock's Trinity, he humbly fubmits it to the Church ofi
Vindication England. And I look upon his Authority a-
of the lone to befufficient to convince every impartial
v.'Tio. Reader, that a poor Layman may hold the O-
pinion of the Neceffity of all Events, as inno
cently as fo Reverend a Doctor of the Church,
and take off from the Force of Mr. Clarke's
Imputation of Irreligion' oft that Principle,
fince the Doctor has never met with any Cen-
¦g. 381. fure for afferting it. In his firft Volume of
Sermons, he fays, Providence never Jboots at Ro-.
vers. There is an Arrow that flies by Night as
well as by Day ; and God is the Perfon that fhoots
it, who can take aim then as well as in the Day.
Things are not left in an equilibrium, to hover un
der an Indifference, whether they fhall come to pafs
or mi come to pafs ; but the whole Train of E-
vents is laid before-hand, and all proceed by the
f g Si. Rule and Limit of an antecedent Decree. Nay,
and finful Atlions too are overruled to a certain
Iffue : even that horrid Villany of the Crucifixion
cf our Saviour was not a thing left to the Difpo
fition of Chance and lncertainty ; but in Adts ii.
23 ; it is faid of him, That he was delivered
to the wicked Hands of his Murderers by the
determinate Counfel and Foreknowledge of
God. For furely the Son of God could not die
by Chance, nor tbe greateft Thing that ever came
to pafs in Nature, to be left to an undeterminate
p. 38?) Event. Thofe that fufpend the Purpofes of God,
38+, 38;. an& the Refolves of an eternal Mind, upon tbe
Atlions of the Creature, and make God firft wait
and expetJ what the Creature will do ( and then
frame his Decrees and Counfels accordingly ) forget thai

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli." -|6|
that he is the firft Caufe of all things, and. difcourfe
moft unpbilofophically, abfurdly, and unfuitably to
tbe Nature of an infinite Being ; whofe Influence
in every Motion muft fie t the firft Wheel agoing.
He muft ftill be the firft Agent ; and what he does
he muft will and intend to do, before be does it ;
and what he wills and intends once, he willed and
intended from all Eternity : it being grofsly contrary
to the very firft Notions we have of the infinite
Perfetlion of the divine Nature, to ftate or fuppofe
any new immanent Atl in God. The Stoicks indeed
held a Fatality, and a fixed unalterable Courfe of
Events ; but then they held alfo, that they fell out
by a Neceffity emergent from and inherent in the
things themfelves, which God himfelf could not. af
ter: fo that they fubjetled God to the fatal Chain
of Caufes, whereas they fhould have refolved the
Neceffity of all infer iour Events into the free De
termination of God, who executes neceffarily that
which he pur pofed freely.
In the foregoing Words the learned Doctor,
in Terms, afferts the Neceffity of all inferioun
Events ; and though he diftinguifhes between
the Chriftian and Stoical Neceffity, yet that is
only with relation to the Caufe of that Necef
fity. A Neceffity founded on the Will of God,
muft as much deftroy the Power of Self-deter
mination in Man, as if that Neceffity was found
ed on a Chain of Caufes.
But let us fuppofe, that the Neceffity of all
Actions was deftructive of all Religion, by de
ftroying the Power of Self determination ; I de^ BoyfcV
fire Mr. Clarke, who maintains the Certainty Le3ures^
of all Events, to fhow what different Influence °a" *"
that fuppofed Neceffity of our Actions canjicj',,;
have on the Power of Self-determination, that
the Suppofition pf the Certainty of our Atlions has

364 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke' j id Defence
has not. If every Action, and the leaft Cir-
cumftance of it, be certain to exift before they
dp exift ; can I poffibly have a Power to act
contrary to fuch an Action, or any Gircum-
ftance of it, any more than I can contrary to
an Adtion that will neceffarily exift ? Now un
lefs he can fhow fuch a Difference between the
Certainty and Neceffity of all Actions, where
by it may appear that the Neceffity of all Ac
tions deftroy s all Power of S elf-deter jfninaiion,
and the Certainty of all Actions does not ; he
muft give up Religion on his Principles : or
if he quits them, he muft own with me, that
Religion is confiftent with maintaining the Ne
ceffity of all Events.
Befides, Mr. Clarke muft fuppofe, that God
himfelf can have no other Liberty, but a Li
berty to do or forbear according as he wills, when
tenures, he fays, That the neceffary and eternal different
Vol.W. Relations, which different things bear to one anj)-
t *f5> another, always and neceffarily do determine the
p. 128- Will. of God; and that God is unalterably deter
mined to do always what is heft in the whole. For
if the Will of God is always neceffarily and un
alterably determined, how can he have a Power
of Self-determination, as before explained ; that
is, How can he will differently under the
fame Circumftances ? And if his Will be ne
ceffarily determined, what other Liberty can be
attributed to the Deity but a Power tp do all
that he wills, and to forbear what he wills
the Forbearance of? The Force of Truth has
produced thefe Expreffions from Mr. Clarke,
and he is de fired to reconcile them with his
«d<Def. Cenfure of the Author ,of the Effay of, &c.
->- 3"7* for afferting only the fame Opinion; a.nd not
only fo, but to reconcile the Power. pf Self-de
termination

of his Letter to Mt. Dodweli. 36"$
termination' in Man, with his Principle of God's
Will being neceffarily determined. For if he con
siders the matter, he will find, that as God's
Will is neceffarily determined by what is really
beft, fo the Human Will muft always be deter
mined by what feems beft ; and that it is im
poffible to conceive, but that every intelligent
Being, that has a Power of Adtion, muft be
thus determined ; nay that the Perfection of
intelligent Beings, as diftinguifhed from unin
telligent Beings, lies in being determined by ap
pearing Good and Evil, and a Power of acting
purfuant to thofe Appearances. What would
Man have, or can he wifh for more than to
have a Will, Election and Choice, and a Pow
er to do as he wills or chufes ? Would he be
able tO chufe or will Pain, When he wills or
chufes Pleafure ? Or would he, when he wills
or chufes Pleafure, be capable of acting con
trary to his Will ? That is, would he be fo
miferable a Being, as to be able to will Pain
under the Notion of Pain, or by acting contra
ry to his Will or Choice have all his Actions
involuntary ? Both which muft follow from
a fuppofed Power in Man, to will or chufe dif
ferently under the fame Circumftances, and from
a Power to adt contrary to what he wills. But
God be thanked we are in a much better State ;
we are forrounded with Objects, which fo far
as they feem preferable one to another, we do,
and cannot help willing or preferring ; and
while we will or prefer them, we cannot help
acting agreeable to that Will or Preference:
and nothing but Violence offered to us can
hinder us from acting agreeable to our Wills ;
which Compu.fion or Violence fure no one
.can defire. Indeed we are a little restrained ia
our

3<W An AnfweT to Mr. Clark eV id Defend
Our Liberty. If we will going into the Moon$
or no further than the Atmofphere, we are not
at liberty to act as we will ; for had we a Li
berty in all cafes to act as we will, we fhould
be omnipotent.
%d Def. His next Argument to prove my Notion de-
t-$9l>l<&-ftrutlive of Religion, is,- That the Dotlrine of the
Refurreclion will be inconceivable, and incredible^
and.Juflice of Rewards and Punifhments impoffible
to be made out.
What he fays to make out this point, being
founded on the Queftion of Identity, it will
not be amifs to ftate briefly my Opinion, be
fore I confider his Exceptions.
i. A particular Subftance, I call the fame
Subftance that it was formerly, from its per
fect Agreement to that Idea which I then fup
pofed it correfpondent to. As for inftance,
the Identity of a material Subftance, at diffe
rent times, lies in confifting of exactly the fame
numerical Particles, to which no Addition of
Subftradtion has been 'made.
2. A particular Mode ( as fuppofe any
particular Mode of Motion) not being capa
ble of a Continuation of Exiftence, like Being
andSubftan.ee, but perifhing the Moment it be
gins -, its Identity cannot confift in being the
lams numerical Mode of Motion at different
times, but only in being that Mode of Motion
that it was when it exifted, and not another
Mode of Motion. In like manner, any parti
cular Act of Confcioufnefs is incapable of the
Continuation of its Exiftence ; wherefore its
Identity can only confift in being that very nu
merical Act of Confcioufnefs that it is. 3- The

of his L e t t e r to Mr. Dodweli. 56?
3. The Identity of an Oak, Animal, or Man,
confifts in a Participation of a continued Life,
under a particular Organization of Parts. An
Oak that contains feveral Loads of Timber, is
called the fame Oak with an Oak that was an
Inch long an Hundred Years ago, by partaking
thence-forward of a continued vegetable Life.,
•in a like continued Organization of Parts : and
an Animal or Man is called the fame Animal
or Man at Twenty Years old, that it was at a
Quarter old, by partaking of a continued A-
nimal Life, under a like continued Organizati
on of Parts ; let this Vegetable and Animal
Life in the Oak, Animal or Man, be united at
different times, to ever fo different Particles of
Matter. 4. Befides thefe forts of Identity, there is
a fourth very different from thefe, which we
fignify by the Word Self, and fometimes call
Perfio nal Identity. Now to underftand what it is
that conftitutes .Self or Perfonal Identity, let
us confider to what Ideas we apply the Term.
Self. If a Man charges me with a Murder done
by fome body laft Night, of which I am not
confcious ; I deny that I did the Action, and
cannot poffibly attribute it to my Self, becaufe
I am not confcious that I did it. Again, fup
pofe me to be feized with a fhort Frenzy of
an Hour, and during that time to kill a Man.,
and then to return to my Self without the leaft
Confcioufnefs of what I have done ; I can no
more attribute that Adtion to my Self, than I
could the former, which I fuppofed done by
another. The mad Man and the fober Man\
are really two as diftinct Perfons as any two
other Men in the World, and will be fo con
fidered in a Court of Judicature, where want of

363 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'.* id Defence
of Confcioufnefs can be proved : and it will be
thought as unjuft to punifh the fober Man for
what the mad Man did, as to punifh one Man
for another's Fault, though the Man both fo
ber and mad is the fame Man.
And laftly, fhould there be fo ftrong a Re
prefentation to my Underftanding of a Mur
der done by me ( which was really never done
at all ) fo that I could not diftinguifh it in my
Mind from fomething really done by me ; I
can no more help attributing this to my Self,
than I can any other Action which I really
did, and was confcious of. So that it is evi
dent, that Self or Perfonal Identity confifts
folely in Confcioufnefs ; fince when I diftinguifh
my Self from others, and when I attribute any
paft Actions to my Self, it is only by extending
my Confcioufnefs to them. And further, to
give the Reader an Idea of the Nature of Per
fonal Identity , let him confider, That our
Limbs or Flefh, while vitally united to Think
ing confcious Self, are part of our felves ; but
when feparated from us, are no part of Self,
but that Flefh which fucceeds in the room
of the Flefh feparated, becomes as much a
part of Self as the feparated Piece of Flefh Was
before. The Queftion then between Mr. Clarke and
me is, whether upon Suppofition that Perfonal
Identity confifts in Confcioufnefs, and that Con
fcioufnefs is only a Mode in a fleeting Syftem of
Matter, the Doctrine of the RefurretJion will
be incredible, and the Juftice of future Rewards
find Punifhments impoffible to be made out.
id. Def. Mr. Clarke fays, If Thinking be in reality no-
?• 3°8. thing but a Mode, which inhering in a loofe and
fleeting Syftem of Matter, ptrifhes utterly at the
Diffolution

of his Letter to Mr. DodwelL 369
Diffolution of the Body ; then the refioring the
Power of Thinking to the fame Body at the Refiur-
retlion, will not be a raifing again of the fame in
dividual Perfon ; but it will be as truly a Creation
of a new Perfon, as the Addition of the like
Power of Thinking to a new Body now would be
the Creation of a new Man.
To which I anfwer, that if Perfonal Identity
confifts in Confcioufnefs, as before explained j
and if Confcioufnefs be a Mode in a fleeting
Syftem of Matter, Confcioufnefs can perifh
no more at the Diffolution of the Body, than
it does every Moment we ceafe to think, or be
confcious. Suppofe we were taken to pieces
every Night after we are afleep, and our Parts
put into the fame Form and Order which they
would have been in in the Morning had we
continued fleeping ; I think it is not to be
doubted but we fhould have the fame Confci
oufnefs or Memory that we fhould have had
in our natural State. Confcioufnefs is no more
created anew in one cafe than in the other ;
there is only a Sufpenfion of the Operation of
Thinking : Therefore the refioring the Power
of Thinking to the fame ( or if you pleafe a
different ) Body at the Refurrection, with a
Memory or Confcioufnefs extending to paft
Actions, will be a raifing the fame Perfon, and
not a Creation of a new Perfon, as adding the
like Power ofi Thinking to a new Body now would
be the Creation ofi a new Man ; becaufe the
Identity of Man, confifting in a Participation
of a continued Life, under a particular Orga
nization of Parts, muft be new created when
ever fuch a Life begins ; whereas, if perfonal
Identity confifts in Confcioufnefs, or a Memo
ry extending to paft Actions, that will make
B b any

370 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'j id Defence
any one as much the fame Perfon that he was
in this World, as any one is the fame Perfon
here two Days together. That Memory or
Confcioufnefs preferves him from being a new
Perfon ( the Effence whereof ex hypothefi, con
fifts in having a Power of Thinking that can
not be extended backwards. )
2. But if Mr. Clarke means by the fame in
dividual Perfon in the Paragraph I cited, the
fame numerical Being with thefiame individual nu
merical Confcioufnefs at different times, as I fup
pofe he does, fince therein confifts his Notion
%dDef. of perfonal Identity, (as the Reader may fee,
p. 188— jf he wjjj reacj tne pjaces referred to in the
p9v:>y. to Margin) I do allow, that fuch an individual
the End. Perfon cannot be raifed at the Refurredtion.
Nay, I think it is demonftrable, that there
can be no Refurrection at all of the fame Per
fon on that Suppofition. And thus I demon
ftrate it.
1. Being as Being cannot be rewarded or
fuffer. 2. Being only as Confcious or Thinking can
be rewarded or fuffer.
3. Human Thinking or Confcioufnefs con
fifts of a Number of particular Acts of Think
ing or Confcioufnefs, which whether they re
fide in a fleeting or indivifible Subftance, can
each of them have but one Exiftence, and can
not poffibly exift at different times as Sub
ftances do, but perifn the Moment they be
gin. 4. Since it is not poffible for thofe individual
numerical Acts of Thinking or Confcioufnefs
that are paft to exift again ; the fame numeri
cal Being, with the fame numerical individual
Confcioufnefs, cannot exift at two different times,

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli.1 i**i
times, and confequently cannot poffibly be re
warded or punifhed for an Action done.
5. Therefore if perfonal Identity confifts in
the fame numerical Being, with the fame indi
vidual numerical Confcioufnefs, there can be
no Refurredtion of thefiame Perfon ; nay, there
can be no fuch thing as the fame Perfon at two
different times.
So that upon the whole, my Notion of per
fonal Identity is fo far from contradidting the
Doctrine of the Refurredtion, or making it
impoffible or incredible, that there can only be a
Refurredtion of thefiame Perfon, on thefe Prin
ciples, That prefent Confcioufnefs or Memory is
nothing but a prefent Reprefentation of a paft
Atlion, and that perfonal Identity confifts only
in having fuch a Confcioufnefs or Memory. For
on thefe Suppofitions, a particular Confciouf
nefs or Memory of paft Actions can begin at
the Refurrection as well as after a Night's fleep ;
whereas, if the fame numerical individual Con
fcioufnefs, that exifted in this World, is to exift
at the Refurredtion, as Mr. Clarke maintains,
he requires a Condition in order to a Refur
redtion that implies a Contradiction.
There feems to me but one Objection more
to my Notion of perfonal Identity that requires
a Solution, and that is as follows : That if the 3<? ">/¦
Addition of a like Confcioufnefs with what MrJl°9'llo>
Clarke now finds in himfelf to any Syftem of thofe
Particles ofi Duft, which in the Courfe of Twenty
Tears have fucceffively be^n part of the Subfiance
of his Body, and are enough to form fieveral Bo
dies at th? Refurreclion, will conftitute the fame
Perfon with himfelf; the Addition of the like
Confcioufnefs to all thofe Syftems, would confequent
ly make every one of them to be, not Perfons like
B b 2 him,

372. An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke's** id Defence
him, but the fame individual Perfon with him,
and with each other\likewifie, which is the greateft
Abfurdity in the World, an Abfurdity equal to
Tranfiubftantiation. It is making them all to be
P- 3°9- une and the fame individual Perfon at thefiame time
that they remain feveral and diftintl Perfons.
i. To which Objection I anfwer, by asking
him, If thefe thinking Beings can know them
felves to be the fame or different Perfons any o-
ther way, but purely by Confcioufnefs ? And
lask him, whether each of them muft not una
voidably think himfelf the fame Perfon with Mr*
Clarke? If each confcious Being cannot help
thinking himfelf to be the fame Perfon with
Mr. Clarke, it is paft doubt, that nothing can
be meant by the Term Self, but purely a pre
fent Reprefentation of paft Actions, or a Con
fcioufnefs extending it felf to paft Actionsi
without regard to Samenefs or change of Sub
ftance. Wherefore I do allow that each of
thofe Beings would be thefiame Perfon with Mr.
Clarke, that is, each of them would have a pre
fent Reprefentation of the paft Actions of Mr.
Clarke ( for that is what I underftand, and what
I think every Man muft unavoidably fignify by
the Term Self, or by Samenefs of Perfon. ) And
if each thinking Being is in that Senfe thefiame
Perfon with Mr. Clarke -, and if Samenefs of
Perfon or Self confifts in having a prefent Re
prefentation of a paft Action, and applying
that Adtion to a Man's Self, let there be ever
fo many thinking Beings that have a prefent
Reprefentation of a paft Action, they can all
conftitute but one and the fame Perfon, becaufe
they all agree in, or have a prefent Reprefen
tation of the fame paft Action, wherein Self or
perfonal Identity confifts 5 as my confifting of
evet
4

'of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli.' 373
ever fo great a Bulk of Master, or ever fo many
diftinct Beings, does not conftitute different
Perfons, but conftitutes what we call Self, by
the Sympathy and Concern I have for each
part united to me, though I have a diftindt
Adt of Senfation for each part that is at any
time affedted. I fuppofe Mr. Clarke, when he $dDef.
expects any Deference- fhould be given to an Au>- p, 278.
thority he cites againft me, will pay the fame
Deference to the fame Authority that he ex
pedts I fhould ; and therefore on this occafion
I fhall give him Mr. Locke's own Words, who
fays, It muft be allowed, that if the fame Confci- B. 2. e. if]
oufnefs can be transferred from one thinking Sub- §• I2-
fiance to another, f as in a certain Senfe he evi
dently fhows that it may ) it will be poffible that
two thinking Subftances may make but one Perfon.
2. It is an Article of Chriftian Faith, that
the fame numerical Particles that are laid in the
Grave, fhall be raifed at the Refurrection. And
fince God Almighty has made that neceffary by
the Declaration of his Will ; the fame Perfon
will at the Refurrection only exift in thofe very
numerical Particles that were laid in the Grave ;
by virtue of which, perfonal Identity or Self
will begin in the fame manner at the Refur
rection, as it does in the Morning when we
awake from Sleep. Befides, if God fhould
caufe to exift Twenty prefent Reprefentations
of the fame paft finful Actions in fo many di
ftindt Beings, the confequent Punifhment would
be Twenty times as much as the finful Action
deferved, and his Juftice required. Wherefore
if God will not punifh for Punifhment-fake,
as to be fure he will not, there cannot be two
diftindt thinking Beings, with each of them, a
B b 3 Confci-

37+ An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'* id Defence
Confcioufnefs extending to the fame paft Ac
tions, and attributing them to themfelves.
3. But fuppofing that each of thefe Twenty
diftinct Beings is thefiame Perfon with Mr. Clarke,
( which ex hypotheft is true ) and fuppofing fur
ther, that they can be confidered as diftinct
Perfons from one another, ( which yet is not
the Cafe, as the Reader may fee by what I have
faid before ) yet I humbly conceive Mr. Clarke
will not upon Recollection fay, this is an Ab
furdity equal to Tranfubft'antiation,but will rather
chufe to call it, a Difficulty that cannot be perfetlly
cleared, when he confiders that it is one Of the
Articles of our Chriftian Faith, to believe that
two complete Perfons, fingly confidered, viz.
the fecond Perfon in the Trinity, and a hu
man Perfon, do conftitute, by an hypoftatical
Union, but ohe Perfon.
4. But as to his own Scheme, befides the
Abfurdity of making the fame individual nu
merical Confcioufnefs neceffary to conftitute the
fame Perfon, I think there follows another Ab
furdity from his making the fame numerical
Being neceffary to conftitute Self, or the fame
Perfon. For how can he account for the Re
furrection on the following Cafe ? Suppofe a
Man lives and believes as a good Chriftian
ought to do for forty Years, and then has a
Diftemper in his Body which obliterates all
the Ideas lodged in the numerical individual
immaterial Subftance ; fo that on his Recovery
there remains no Memory, no Confcioufneft
of any Idea that he perceived for forty Years
paft. And further, fuppofe this numerical,
individual, immaterial Subftance, to get Ideas
again as a young Child does, and till its Sepa
ration from the Body, leads a diffolute and
debauched

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 375
debauched Life. Here on my Principles is the
fame Being at different times, as much two Per
fons as any two Men in the World are two
Perfons, or as the fame Man mad and fober is
two Perfons. Now I ask him, whether or no
they are two diftindt Perfons ? If he anfwers,
they are two diftinct Perfons : I ask him, how
one of them can be punifhed eternally, and
the other eternally rewarded, on Suppofition
that the fame numerical individual Subftance is
neceffary to conftitute the fame Perfon ? And
if they are two Perfons , whether perfo
nal Identity muft not confift in Confcioufnefs
alone, without any regard to its exifting in the
fame or different Subftances ? If he anfwers,
that they are not two Perfons, but one Perfon ;
I ask him, whether he can fuppofe this Being
rewardable or punishable ? And what kind of
Confcioufnefs it will have when it is either re
warded or punifhed ? When he has anfwered
thefe Queftions to himfelf, and will give him
felf, the trouble to confider Mr. Locke's Chap
ter of Identity arid Diverfity, he will fee, that
let him frame what imaginary Schemes of per
fonal Identity he pleafes, if there lie not un-
anfwerable Objections againft them all, except
that of perfonal Identity confifting in Confcioufnefs,
yet at leaft that Experience perfedtly contra
dicts his Notion of perfonal Identity, which
confifts in an individual numerical Being, with
the fame numerical Confeioufinefis. And when he
fees the Impoffibility of the fame numerical Con
feioufinefis continuing a Moment in a finite Be
ing, but that every Moment's Confcioufnefs is
a new Adtion, and nothing but bringing the
Idea of a paft Adtion into view ; he may per
haps fee the Needlefnefs of cont'efting whether
B b 4 Self

17 6 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'.* id Defence
Self or perfonal Identity muft inhere in the fame
or different Beings at different times : becaufe.
he may then as eafilyconceive that the fame
Confcioufnefs may exift in different Beings at dif
ferent times, as in the fame numerical Being at
different times ; and may have as clear an Idea
of perfonal Identity continuing under the greateft
Change of Subftance, as he may have an Idea
of Animal or Human Identity, which confifting
in a continued Life, under a like continued Or
ganization of Parts, cannot be deftroyed by
the greateft Change or Flux of Particles ima
ginable. Though after all, was a Flux of Par
ticles abfolutely inconfiftent with perfonal Iden
tity, God Almighty could as eafily preferve the
moft loofe Particles from a Separation, as he
can an immaterial or unextended Being from
Annihilation. As to what Mr. Clarke fays about the Injuf-
tice of Punifhment, on Suppofition that perfo
nal Identity confifts in Confcioufnefs, and that
Confcioufnefs is a Mode of Motion in a Syftem
of Matter; it is to no purpofe to enter into
that Queftion till we are agreed on the Ends and
Reafons of both Temporal and Eternal Punifh
ment, which he has not as yet afiigned. And
when he affigns what 1 take to be the true Ends
of Punifhment, both in this World and the
next, it will be then time enough to fhow, that
they may all take Place on my Principles, as
they can on any Principles whatfoever.
Being come to a Conclufion of what I think
fit to reply to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence on the
Head of the Poffibility of Matter's Thinking,
I will, out of a Defire to have this Argument
put on its true Foot, obferve in this place,
That Mr, Clarke and I have only fpoken of
Matter

of his Lutthk to Mr? Dodweli.1 375?
Matter fo far forth as is knowabley viz. as So
lid; and the Queftion between us has been in
effect, whether Thinking can be an Affedtion
of Solidity ? And therefore fhould he have de-
monftrated with the greateft Clearnefs the Im
poffibility of all I have faid, ("as I humbly con
ceive it is quite the contrary ) yet for all that,
he cannot upon his Principles prove that there
are different Kinds of Subftances in the World.'
For fince he fuppofes, That we are utterly ig- tenures,
norant of the Subftance or Effence of all Things, Vol. I.
and, That there is no Subftance in the -World of*' 7& 77»
which we know any thing further than only a cer-
tain Number of its Properties or Attributes ; it
is abfolutely impoffible for him to prove that
there are two different Subftances in the World,
becaufe having no Idea of the Subftance of Mat
ter, nor of the Subftance of a Being diftintl from
Matter, it is impoffible for him to know that
the Subftance of one is not the Subftance of
the other, or that there exifts any other Sub
ftance but the Subftance of Matter.
He can only know a thing to be true, either
by Intuition, or by perceiving the Agreement
or Difagreement of Ideas by the Help of in
termediate Ideas.
He cannot know that the Subftance of Mat*
ter and the Subftance of Spirit, or Being di
ftindt from Matter, are nor the fame by Intui
tion, when he has no Idea of either ; for thr:t
would be to fay, that he perceived a Diffe- ice
when he perceived no Difference at all.
Nor can he perceive- or know, rb at there- "is
a Difference between them by the Help of" an.
intermediate Idea, becaufe no-intermedia '.c >-fe-J
can difcover any Agreement' of fJ.:Wr<zcv.-.n-z
•of ideas, but by being 'pkredo-rwe^ -•¦-
iuM-i.;

^78 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'.* id Defence
Ideas. Now no intermediate Idea can be placed
between two Ideas of things, when there is no
Idea of either, no Subject of Comparifon.
Suppofe a Brafs Farthing put into one Box,
and a Ring into another Box ; how is it pof
fible for a Man that has no Idea of either by
any intermediate Idea, to know whether they
differ from one another or no ? And fuppofe
one Man fhould affirm to another, who has no
Ideas to the Terms Three Angles of a Triangle
and two Right Angles, that Three Angles of a
Triangle are equal to two right ones ; how is
it poffible for him to know their Equality, by
the Help of any intermediate Ideas, under
that Ignorance ? Other Angles can never fhow
him the Agreement of he knows what with he
knows not what, no more than if he was fhowed
the Sun or the Moon.
All that I can find faid againft this moft
evident Demonftration by Mr. Clarke, to whom
Preface to it has been objedted, is, That from the demon-
ht> second jj;rafrie Attributes of God, and from the known
Le8ures°. Properties of Matter, we have unanfiwerable Rea-
fions to convince us, that their Effences are intirely
different, though we know not difiintlly what thofe
Effences are. The Attributes of God, fays he,
are, that he is Self-exifient, Eternal, Infinite, In
telligent, Free, Wife, &c. The known Properties
of Matter are, adds he, that it is not Self-exiftent,
but Dependent, Finite, Divifible, Paffive, Unin
telligent, &c. But by what intermediate Idea
does it appear that the Subftance of Matter is
not Self-exifient, but Dependent, Finite, Paffive,
Divifible, Unintelligent, &c? Nay, is it not fup
pofed by our having no Idea of the Subftance
of Matter, that we cannot poffibly know whe
ther it be Self-exifient, Dependent, Finite, Paffive,
* Divifible,

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 79
Divifible, Unintelligent, or no ? How then can
Mr. Clarke on his own Principles know, that
the Subftance of Matter is not Self-exifient, &c ?
There is nothing in Matter that appears to be
Dependent, Paffive, not Self-exifient, Finite, &c.
but Solidity and the Affections thereof. The
Subftance in which Solidity inheres we have no
Idea of, and confequently cannot affirm of it,
that it is Finite, Divifible, or Unintelligent, or
not Self-exifient. So that it is evident that Mr.
Clarke and all thofe Gentlemen who fay, we
are entirely ignorant of the Subftances and Ef
fences of things, or have no Idea at all of
them, cannot take a Step to prove, that there
are different Subftances in the World, without
contradicting themfelves, and fuppofing, that
they are not utterly ignorant, but that they have
an Idea of the Subftances and Effences of
things, when at the fame time they confefs, that
they are utterly ignorant, or have no Idea at all
of the Subftances and Effences of Things.
Mr. Locke, who always fpeaks of a Subftance
as fomething unknown, and of which we have
no Idea, whether it be applied to material or
immaterial Subftances, but a mere relative Idea
of a Support, might very juftly argue, That Ejpiy of
from our not having any Notion of the Subftance of h it.
Spirit, we can no more conclude its Non-exifience,®-\-c'1Z*
than we can for the fame Reafon deny the Exiftence *
of Body. It being as rational, fays he, to affirm,
there is no Body becaufe we cannot know its Effence,
as it is called, or have no Idea of the Subfiance of
Matter; as to fay, there is no Spirit, becaufe we
know not its Effence, or have no Idea of a Spiri
tual Subftance. For on the Suppofition of our
having no Idea of Subftance, and that Subftance
is fomething diftinct from what are ufually
1 called

'380 An Anfwer to Mr. ClarkeV id Defence
called Properties, it will be impoffible for any
Spinozift or Materialift to prove that there is
no other Subftance in the Univerfe but mate
rial Subftance. But then on the other Side,
it will be as impoffible for fuch an Immateria-
lift to prove that there muft neceffarily be two
kinds of Subftances, becaufe by having no Idea
either of the Subftance of Matter, or the Sub
ftance of Spirit, he cannot know but that the
Subftance of Matter is the Subftance of Spirit.
From what I have faid it is evident, that Mr.
Clarke, and thofe that are of his mind, cannot
poffibly, upon their own Principles, prove the
Neceffity of Thinking's inhering in an imma
terial Being. For though they fhould prove,
that Thinking cannot inhere in Matter, becaufe
it is folid, and confequently divifible ; yet that
is no more than to fay, That thinking cannot be
an AffecJ'wn of Solidity: for that is what they
muft mean when they fay, Thinking cannot in
here in Matter, becaufe having no Idea of the
Subftance of Matter, they can only fay, Think
ing cannot inhere in that part of Matter of
which we have an Idea. Wherefore, fuppofing
Mr. Clarke to argue right, that Thinking cannot
inhere in Matter, that is, cannot be an Affec
tion of Solidity, it would by no means follow,
that it may not be made an Affedtion of, or be
annexed to that Subftance which is vefted with
Solidity. For ofthat Subfiance we are fuppofed
to have no Idea, and confequently cannot ex
clude it from a Poffibility of Thinking, any
more than from a Poffibility of being Solid.
Mr. Locke, to juftify the Confideration of
Subftance as an unknown Support, in which Pro-
Letterto perties inhere, fays, A Philofopher that fays,
the Bp. of Subftance ( or that which fupports Accidents ) is
w- ?-,<J- fomething

of his Lett e r to Mr. Dodweli. 381
fomething he knows not what, and a Countryman
that fays the Foundation of the great Church at
Harlem is fupported by fomething he knows- not
what, and a Child that ftands in the Dark on his
Mother's Muff, and fays, he ftands upon fomething
he knows not what ; in this refpetl talk exatlly
alike. Now I humbly conceive, that they may
not all talk exactly alike in this refpect, for the
Countryman and Child may have a clear ab
ftradt Idea of folid Being or Matter, a Species
whereof the Countryman may imagine the
Church at Harlem, and the Child himfelf fup
ported by ; whereas the Philofopher has no
Idea at all : For let the Philofopher ftrip any
part or piece of Matter of Solidity, and nothing
conceivable remains, nothing in which Solidity
can inhere ; for as to that Portion of Space, in
which it exifted, that could not be the Sub
ftance in which it inhered, becaufe that Portion
of Space in which it exifted, was really diftinct
from the material Subftance, and accidental to
it : for that Portion of Space exifts immutably
and perpetually in the fame Place ( if I may fo
fpeak ) though ever fo many particular mate
rial Subftances are coextended to it, and then
removed from it.
But as far as I can judge, all this talk of the
Effences of Things being unknown, is a per
fect Miftake : and nothing feems clearer to me,
than that the Effence or Subftance of Matter
confifts in Solidity, and that the Effence or
Subftance of a Being, diftinct from Matter,
muft confift in want of Extenfion, and is truly
defined an unextended Being/ For nothing can
be conceived to be coextended with the Parts of
Space (if I may fo fpeak) but what is folid.
And therefore to make immaterial Being ex
tended

382 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'/ id Defence
tended ( as Mr. Clarke does ) is to make im
material Being material, which indeed is but of
a Piece with his making an extended Being in
divifible, though he has no other Reafon to
make all Matter divifible, but becaufe it is ex
tended.
From As to what he has faid againft material Im-
p. 295, to pU]fe being the Caufe of Gravitation, the whole
is founded on this, That becaufe a Bullet, a
Feather, and a Piece of Leaf -Gold defcend with
equal Swiftnefs in vacuo (that is, in a Veffel out
New v.x- of which the Air is exhaufted, according to
priments jyjn Boyle's Definition of the Term Vacuum, in
tctlc-wg tne jjjjg cafe Dy which he under [lands not a
the Atr, 7 ¦ 7 • n7 777 r t
•>to,p. io- Space wherein there is no Body at all, but fuch as
is either altogether, or almoft totally devoid of Air)
therefore material Impulfe cannot be thp Caufe
of Gravitation. I ufe the Term vacuum in the
aforefaid Senfe, becaufe it is fo far from being
evident that all Matter is exhaufted ( though
it fhould be granted, that there is no perfect
Plenum there ) that there are Experiments which
prove, that Body remains there after the Air
is exhaufted, and that does receive actual Mo
difications by Motion from Bodies without the
Veffel. And if fo, a Bullet, a Feather, and a
Piece of Leaf-gold may defcend in vacuo, as
Mr. Clarke calls it, with equal Swiftnefs, by
virtue of the Impulfe of thofe Parts of Matter
that are contiguous tothem, as that Lead under
different Forms afcends or defcends according
to the Preffure of the circumambient Air.
And as to that external Motion, which is the
Caufe of that Mode of Motion called Gravita
tion, I think the Experiment of feveral Pieces
of Thread, tyed to thelnfide Parts of a Hoop,
all tending to a Center, upon a Globe's be ing

of his Letter to Mr. DodwellJ 3 % i
ing whirled round its Axis in the Middle of the
Hoop, and this further Experiment of Bodies
not defcending in vacuo, as Mr. Clarke calls it,
with the fame Velocity at a greater Diftance,
as they do near the Earth, evidently fhow, that
the Motion of the Earth is a proximate Caufe
of the Gravitation of Bodies in our Neighbour
hood, and do difcover the Caufe of Gravitation
throughout the material Univerfe. But how
ever this be, unlefs Mr. Clarke proves, that
there is a real vacuum in Nature, that is, that
there are fome Portions of Space without Bo
dy ; and unlefs he proves withal, that there can
be an entire Portion of Space in a Veffel with
out any the leaft Particle of Matter, fo that
he may try whether Bodies weigh or defcend
without the leaft Contact from other Bodies ;
he will not be able to prove, that material Im
pulfe is not the Caufe of Gravitation : and I
may in the mean while fay what I think, that
could any Body be at firft fo fituated as to be
furrounded with nothing but pure Space, there
would be no Beginning of Motion, no Weight,
no Gravitation in that Body. This I humbly
conceive is fufficient to obviate all he has ad
vanced without Proof under this Article : for
as to his x Treatment of me I pafs it all by,
except one particular and extraordinary Liberty
he has taken, viz. his faying that I infinuate to ^ Def
my Reader, that Sir Ifaac Newton is ofi my 0- p. 299.
pinion in the prefent Queftion ; and to that will
fay no more than affure the Reader, that it is a
pure Fiction.
He fays, That the great Phcenomena of Nature p- 302i
( and particularly that of Gravitation J cannot
poffibly depend upon any mechanical Powers of
Matter and Motion, but muft be produced ( that is,

£ 84 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'/ 3 d Defence
is, conftantly) by the Force- and Atlion ofi fome ¦
higher Principle : And fo leading us even with ma-*<
thematicab Certainty to immaterial Powers ; and
finally to the Creator ofi the World.
Boyle'* But tne Honourable Robert Boyle was of Opi-
inquiryin- nion, That it feems manifeft enough, that whatfo-
tothe ¦vul- ever is £om in tfo Worlds at leafi -where the ra-
^f Nature ^i°na^ &oul intervenes not, is really effetled by Cor-
p. 66. poreal Caufes and Agents aHing in a World fo
framed as ours is, according to the Laws fettled by
P_ --. the omnifiient Author of things. And, that as it
more recommends the Skill, of an Engineer to con
trive an elaborate Engine, fo as that there need
nothing to reach his ends in it, but the Contrivance
of Parts devoid of Underftanding ; than if it
were neceffary that ever and anon a dificreet Ser
vant fhould be employed to concur notably to the
Operations 'of this or that part, or to hinder the
Engine from being out of Order : So it more fets
off the Wifdom af God in the Fabrick of the Uni
verfe, that he. can make fo vaft a Machine per
form all thofe many things, which he defigned it
fhould, by the mere Contrivance of Brute Matter
managed by certain Laws of Motion, and upheld
by bis ordinary and general Concourfe, than if he
employed from time to time an intelligent Overfeer
to regulate and controule the Motion of the Parts.
And therefore could it be proved, that the
grand Phcenomena of Nature depended on the
conftant Force and Atlion of immaterial Beings,
it would, according to Mr. Boyle, argue a lefs
Degree of Wifdom, than if they depended on
the mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion,
and confequently overturn the Exiftence of an
infinitely perfect Being, by not attributing to
him the higheft Wifdom we can poffibly con
ceive. 2. But

if his Letter to Mir. DodwelL' 385
2. But let this matter be as it will, I con- LeBuresi
teive this Argument of Mr. Clarke's for the^i*
Exiftehce of God, or the Creator of all things, *'
is as obficure and defective, as he thinks Defoartes's
Argument from the Idea of God, is. For the
true Queftion being, whether there has exifted
from all Eternity one immaterial Being of infinite
Perfetlions, that created Matter and every thing
elfe ex nihilo ; how does it follow, that fuch a
Being exifts, from the mere Suppofition of the
Exiftence of two Beings of different kinds I
For it does not neceffarily follow from that
Suppofition, that one muft have created the
other ex nihilo ; and therefore Other Mediums
are neceffary to prove that Point.
To infer a Creator of one Being or Subftance
from the mere Exiftence Of two kinds Of Beings
or Subftances, is a Reafoning no where extant
in the old profane Authors, who had notfio much Burnetii
as a word to fignify the ProdutJion of things ex **<&•
nihilo, and therein agreed with the Jews, who* . V,*-
( as the fame Author obferves ) every where
apply the Hebrew Word , which we render
Creation, to exprefs other Atlions and Effetls than
a Production of Matter ex nihilo. The Quef
tion therefore of a Creator ex nihilo is a modern
Queftion ; and confequently out of Reverence
to facred and profane Antiquity, it became
Mr. Clarke not barely to fuppofe the mere Ex
iftence of two Beings of different kinds fuffici
ent to demonftrate the Creation of one of them
ex nihilo.
3. Since, on occafion of the Soyledn Lecture,
the Exiftence of God is often made a Queftion
( which otherwife would be with few any
Queftion at all ) and fince the Gentlemen that
preach that Lecture propofe to prove the Ex-
C c iftence

386 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'/ i d Defenie
Clarke'/ iftence of God by the Rules ofi demonftrative
ua. Foi. i. Argumentation ( and thereby give Men a right
*' ls' to expect Demonftration ) I fhall, out of the
Inclination I have to fee the Foundation of all
Religion eftablifhed on Demonftration, and to
ibid p 6 gratify tnat L>fftre which even Atheifis ( as Mr.
' Clarke obferves ) muft ofi Neceffity own they
have to fee a Truth eftablifhed, that is fo much
p. 9. for the Benefit and Happinefs of Men ; for, fays
he, on whatever Hypothefis they proceed1, No
thing is fo certain, as that Man, confidered with
out the Protetlion and Condutl ofi a fiuperiour
Being, is in afar worfie Cafe, than upon the Sup
pofition ofi the Being and Government of God, and
of Mens being under his peculiar Condutl, Pro
tetlion and Favour ( from whence it feems to
follow, That Atheifis, according to Mr. Clarke,
even while they continue fo, have no reafon to
fear any thing for their Disbelief ) I fay, I fhall
couclude this Debate with an Effay, fhowing a
way how to demonftrate the Exiftence of God,
fince Demonftration is thought fo neceffary in
the Cafe, though I fhould think Probability e-
nough to determine any Man. As far as I can
judge of the Opinions of Straio, Xenophanes,
and fome other antient Atheifis, from a few
Sentences of theirs which yet remain, and of
the Opinions of that Seel called the Literati in
China, from the Accounts we have in the feve
ral Voyages thither, and more particularly
from Father Gobienh Preface before his Hiftoire
de I'edit de I' Empereur de la Chine en fiaveur de la
Religion Chretienne, Svo, Par. 1698, they feem
all to me to agree with Spinoza ( who in his
Opera Pofthuma has endeavoured to reduce
Atheifm into a Syftem ) that there is no other
Subftance in the Univerfe but Matter, which
Spinoza

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 37
Spinoza calls God, and Strata, Nature. A fid
this Syftem is thus defcribed by Manilius,
Lib. 1.
Omnia mortali mutantur lege creatd.
Nee fie c'ognofeant term verteniibus annis
Exutas. Variant faciem per fiecula gentes.
At manet incolumis mundus fiuaq; omnia fierv at,
Qua nee longa dies auget, minuitq; fienetJus.
Nee motus punclo currit, curfiufq; fatigat :
Idem fiemper erit, quoniam fiemper fuit Idem,
Non alium vidire Patres, aliumve Nepotes
Afipicient. Dens eft qui non mutatur in cevum.
Now to anfwer thefe Atheifis demonftrative-
ly, and on Principles which will ftand the Teft,
lam fo far of Mr. Clarke's Mind, as to think
that we ought to prove the Creation of Mat
ter ex nihilo ; or which is all one, that Matter
is not a felf-exiftent Being. For if once Mat
ter be allowed to be a felf-exiftent Being, we
Chriftians who believe but in one felf-exifting
Being, are obliged by our own Reafoning to
allow Matter all poffible Perfections, and to
exclude every thing elfe from being Self-exiftent:
Becaufe it is from the Idea of Self- exiftence,
that we infer the Perfections of God. Befides,
fhould we admit two Self-exifting Beings, Spi
rit and Matter, we could not then be able to
prove, but that there may be Self-exifting Be
ings in Infinitum, and a Plurality of Gods j
Which is as inconfiftent with the Being of God,
or a Creator, as the Self-exiftence of Matter.
Wherefore it is evident, that to avoid the two
dangerous Extreams of believing, either that
nothing exifts but the material Univerfe, or
that Beings of different kinds neceffarily exift,
C c 2 we

3 8 8 An Anfwer to Mr. Clarke'/ 3 et Defence
we muft not only know that Beings of different
kinds exift ( which Mr. Clarke thinks fufficient
to prove a Creator ) but we muft have an Idea
how it is poffible for Matter not always to have
exifted : And then it will evidently follow,
that what we can conceive poffible not always
to have exifted, cannot be a Self-exifting Be
ing, and confequently that there muft be a God
or a Creator of Matter.
Now the way to prove, That Matter is not
Self-exifient, or, which is all one, the Creation ofi
Matter ex nihilo, is to form to our felves an
Idea of the Creation of Matter ex nihilo, as we
have an Idea of the feveral Powers of Matter
beginning to exift without any preceeding Ex
iftence ; for unlefs we have an Idea of the
Creation of Matter ex nihilo, we muft inevita
bly conclude Matter a Self-exiftent Being. For
what is a Self-exifting Being, but a Being
which we cannot but conceive exifting ? And
what is the Idea of Creation ex nihilo, but an
Idea of the Poffibility of the Exiftence of Mat
ter, or an Idea how Matter may begin to exift ?
As our Idea of the Creation of the Powers of
Matter, is an Idea of the Poffibility of thofe
Powers beginning to exift ; of which we have
as clear a Conception, as we have that any
Powers of Matter do really exift. Now to
get an Idea of Creation, or a Conception how
Tjpiy ef Matter might begin to exift, we muft ( as the
ja.'u. incomparable Mr. Locke with great Modefty
B.4.. c. 10. expreffes himfelf" emancipate our felves from
vulgar Notions, and raifie our Thoughts as far as
they can reach to a clofer Contemplation of Things ;
and then we may be able to aim at fome dim and
feeming Conception, how Matter might at firft be
made, and begin to exift by the Power of the E-
ternal

.8.

of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli. 3 89
ternal Firft Being. But as he thought that this
would lead him too far from the Notions, on which
the Philofophy now in the World is built, and that
it would not be pardonable to deviate fo far from
'them ; fo the fmall Compafs of this Treatife,
and the great Labour of fhewing the Falfehood
of fo many received Prejudices and Opinions,
as is neceffary to give an Idea of Creation ex
nihilo, muft make it more pardonable in me
( who own my felf to be infinitely below him
in Abilities ) if I omit for the prefent fo ufeful
a Defign, or fhould leave it entirely to fome
of thofe Gentlemen that are appointed annually
to preach at the Lecture founded by the Ho
nourable Robert Boyle.
Before I conclude, it may be expected that
I fhould take fome notice of the Expreffions of
Contempt ufed towards me in Mr. Clarke's
Third Defence. But to every thing of that
kind, I think it fufficient to fay, ift, to Mr.
Clarke, That I heartily forgive all fuch Ufage
from whomfoever I receive it, and that I think
my felf in a particular Manner obliged to for
give him : Becaufe I fincerely believe he en
deavoured to be civil, and that he was as civil
as he could be. And, %dly, as to my other
Readers, I will take the Liberty to believe them
fo much Philofophers/ as that upon fecond
Thoughts they witfthink Civility the beft An
fwer and Reproof: Notwithftanding that we Edwards',
are lately told, by a Reverend Author, That ^"^
Good Nature and Good Humour make Men 0j r*it'^
Atheifis and Seep ticks. &c. p. iy
But there is one thing which I am very much
furprized to find in Mr. Clarke, and of which
I did not think him capable, and that is an In-
C c 3 finuation

m$

3po An Anfwer, See.
%i Def. finuation that I believe too little. For I did
i*-1??- imagine that the Ufage he had had of the like
marks ol' kind, would have given him an opportunity to
hhser- confider, that fuch Reflections are capable of
mons, and being made by any body, and fo derive no
^fttMe C^dit on their Author, and that they can
Remarks, pleafe no Man of Candour and Ingenuity. How
ever, I fhall not make that Return which fuch
an Infinuation does fuggeft and would juftify,
but inftead thereof will give him on this oe?
cafion a Teftimony in his favour, before I fi
nally take my leave of him ; That I verily
think he neither believes too little, nor too much ;
but that he is perfedtly and exactly Orthodox,
and in all likelihood will continue fo.

A Fourt H

A Fourth
DEFENCE O Fo.A N
ARGUMENT Made ufe of in a
LettcrtoUr.DODWELL,
7*o prove the Immateriality and Na
tural Immortality of the SOUL.
In a Letter to the Author of the Anfwer
to Mr. Clarke'.- Third Defence, &c.
With a POSTSCRIPT, relating to a
Book, entitled, A Vindication of Mr.
Dodweli'.* Epifiolary Difcourfe, &c.
By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D.late
Rector of St. James's Wejlminjler.
If we look into the World, is there not evident
Proof, that Men prof effing Learning, are capable
of believing and defending any Abfurdity in Na
ture? Anfwer to Mr. Clarke's 3d Def. p. 353.
LONDON:
Printed in the Year M DCC XXXI.
C c 4

t 393 I

A Fourth
D E F E N C E
O F A N
Argument, &c.

SIR,

the fame Things over
there is no End.

F repeating
and over again, tnere is no
The Thing I propofed to prove,
is, I think, fo fully made out in my
foregoing Defences ; that I might
fafely leave the whole Matter to the intelligent
and impartial Reader, without any further En
largement. Your laft Anfwer is little more,
than a renewing of your former Affertions,
fometimes in the fame, and fometimes in dif
ferent Words ; as if you thought all that I had
advanced to the contrary, was entirely wide of
the Queftion. Whether that be really the Cafe
or no, I am very willing the World Jhould
judge : And therefore in Reply to your perpe
tual Repetitions, I fhall not tranfcribe my for-,
mer Papers 5 but only refer to them, as occa-* fioq.

3 94 A Fourth Defence of the immateriality
fion fhall offer ; and defire they may fairly be
compared together : And, as I go along, fhall
endeavour to point out to you fome ""of the
chief Mifreprefentations and Fallacies you ap
pear to be guilty of : Anywhere youjo|Ej-.i£. at
any Argument that feems new in any part of
it, fhall confider it in its pjace.
Anfwer, You begin with charging me, that out of Four
fag- 3 'f- ObjetJions infified on in your Refletlions, I have
dropt the Confideration of Three,.'
Whether this be true, or no ; they who
pleafe to compare the Papers, may find. I
am not fenfible, that , I have paffed over any
of your Objections, or any part of any of
them, unanfwered : Only, where you pave
repeated the fame Things. again, (as, for In
ftance, in that poor Objection drawn from our
Ignorance of the Manner how God will difpofe of
the Souls of Brutes ; ) inftead of repeating my
Anfwers, I have only referred to them as they
flood in my former Defences ; which "isT ulti
mately appealing to the Judgment pf the in
telligent Reader : And for this Complaint, I
fhall give you more frequent Occafions here-;
after.
pag. 515. And in anfwer to your Fourth Objetlion, you
& 3|6' fay I atn fo far from fhowing ( as I ought to haye
done, ) that ^"Confcioufnefs did inhere; in a
Syftem of Matter, it muft confift of the. Com-
fiioufnefs of the. Parts ; that on ihe contrary I
have only endeavoured to prove, that, as Roftjid-
nefis muft confift ofi feveral Pieces <of Roundnefs, er
Tendencies 'towards Roundnefs ; fo, if Confciouf
nefs did, in like manner with Roundnefs, inhere
in a Syftem of Matter, it muft confift of .feve
ral Tendencies towards Confcioufnefs. And, this
you call an apparent Defieriion of my Argument.
NoW

'and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 395
Now to this, I reply ; that, confifting ofi the
Confcioufnefs of the Parts, and confifting of feve
ral Tendencies towards Confcioufnefs, is the very
fame thing. For, as nothing that is not Curve,
can have any Tendency towards Curvity ; as no
thing that is not Colour, can have any Tendency
towards Colour ; as nothing that is not Sound,
can have any Tendency towards Sound : So no
thing that is not Confcioufnefs, can have any
Tendency towards Confcioufnefs. Differences in
deed and Degrees there may be, of the Di
ftindtnefs of Confcioufnefs and vigour of Think
ing ; as there are different Degrees of the Cur
vity of a Line, different Degrees of the Bright-
nefis ofi a Colour, and different Degrees of the
Clearnefs ofa Sound: But as it is plainly im
poffible that any Colour fhould have any Ten
dency towards being any Sound, or that any Fi
gure fhould have any Tendency towards being
any Motion ; fo it is likewife ridiculous to ima
gine that any Motion, or any other Quality of
Matter void of Confcioufnefs, fhould have
any Tendency towards being Confcioufnefs.
Befides : The Curvities of the feveral little
Arches that conftitute the Circumference of a
Circle, are not properly Tendencies towards
Roundnefs ; ( for a Part has no more Tendency to
the Whole by Compofition, than the Whole has a
Tendency to its Part by Divifion; ) but they
are themfelves, being taken together, the whole
Circle, or the Roundnefs it felf: So that Round
nefs is not a new real Quality, refulting from the
Curvities of the feveral Parts ; but only a Name see Third
of the Whole, a mere external Denomination : Defence,
Even in the fame Manner as the Twelve U- ***' 36*'
nits that conftitute the Number a Dozen, are
not properly fo many Tendencies towards a
Dozen.

396* A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
Dozen (as towards any real new Thing or Qua
lity ; ) but are Themfelves, being taken to
gether, the Number a Dozen ; which Name
is nothing but a mere Term, an external Denomi
nation of the Whole, and nothing at all really
in the Things numbered. Confcioufnefs there
fore in like manner, if it was nothing but the
Sum of thofe Motions or Modes of Motion,
which you call Tendencies towards Confciouf
nefs ; would not be a diftindt Quality really in
hering in the Thinking Subftance, (as every
Man feels by Experience, and you your felf
grant that it is ; j but it would be a mere Word
or Term of Art, nothing but a Name or exter
nal Denomination, fuch as are thofe Qualities
which I ranked under the Third Sort
jfofveru Wherefore when you confefs, that the Parts,
•id Def. (of Roundnefs, fuppofe) muft be fo far of the
%*&<¦ V-9' fame Kind, as to have a Tendency to that Indi
vidual Figure of which they are a Part : And that
in that Senfe you have always allowed Confciouf
nefs to confift of Powers of the fame Kind ; be
caufe if Confcioufnefs inheres in a Syftem of Mat
ter, it muft neceffarily be allowed that 'the diftintl
Beings in that Syftem contribute towards Thinking,
as the Pieces of a Circle do towards a Circle, or as
all the Parts of a Syftem of Matter contribute to-
$mS. j3i. wards the Syftem: And again ; that What is
faid in the Third Defence, may, for ought you
know, be a Vindication of the Conclufion before-
recited, ( viz. that if Confcioufnefs did inhere in a
Syflem of Matter, it muft confift of feveral Ten-
f*£- 332> dencies towards Confcioufnefs :) And again; You
do, in that Senfe, allow Confcioufnefs to confift of
Powers of thefiame Kind ; For, according io You,
it confifts of Parts which have a Tendency to
Thinking or Confcioufnefs, as Roundnefs does of
Paris

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 397
Parts that have a Tendency to Roundnefs : In all
thefe Paffages you directly give up the Que
ftion. For, thofe Modes of Motion (or of
any other Quality of Matter ) which you call
Tendencies to Confcioufnefs, either are themfelves
Confcioufneffes and Thoughts, or not. If they
le; then, as the whole Curvity of a Circle is
made up of the Curvities of the feveral little
Parts or Arches of which it is compofed, fo
whole Confcioufnefs or Thinking will likewife be
made up of feveral partial Confcioufneffes or
Thoughts ; which is giving up the Queftion
with one Hand : Or if they be not ; then, as
the Roundnefs of a Circle, fo far as it differs
from the Curvities of the little Arches of
which it is compofed, is nothing but a bare
Name of a Whole, a mere external Denomina
tion ; fo Confcioufnefs, as far as it differs from
thofe conftituent Modes that are no Confciouf
neffes, will be only a Name of a Whole, a mere
External Denomination, and nothing at all
really in the Thinking Subftance it felf;
Which is giving up the Queftion with the
other Hand.
V O U reprefent me all along fpeaking, as if
my whole Argument was founded upon
the Suppofition, that in the Idea of an Immate-pag. 317,
rial Being Extenfion is contained. That Extend- pag. 349.
ed Being of Mr. Clarke' j. You think him mifi- pug. 35-2.
taken in making the Soul an Extended Being. In pag- is*.
making an Extended Being, as fuch, &c. An Im- P"g- Im
material Subfiance and a Clock agree, according to
Mr. Clarke, in being Extended: And, to make P-i*f'ZSz-
Immaterial Being Extended, as Mr. Clarke
does. This

398 A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
This is neither doing Me nor your Readers
Juftice. For my Argument is not at all found
ed upon any Suppofition either of Immaterial
Subftance being Extended or Unextended.
That which I undertook to prove, was, that
Matter, ( all whofe folid Parts are fo many
diftinct, feparable, independent, unconnected
Beings ; ) could not be a Subject capable of
Individual Confcioufnefs ; And that therefore
Confcioufnefs muft have fome other Subject to
refide in. Whether That other Subject be
Extended or Unextended, ( whatever you may
fuppofe my Opinion to be , upon other
Grounds, ) the prefent Argument determines
not ; but leaves every Reader at Liberty to
judge as he fhall find Reafon. Only I affirmed
by tbe Bye, for Argument's fake, that I thought
the Difficulties arifing from the Suppofition of
Immaterial Subftance being Extended, were
not greater, but rather lefs, than thofe which
arife from the Suppofition of its being Unex
tended. See Second Defence, pag. 174, 175.
It is here alfo further to be obferved inciden-
Anfwr to tally ; that, when you ask, What other Argu-
¦xJ D?f. ment can fo ma(pe uj-e 0j- t0 prove an Matter divi-
}<*£• 3 '/ • jine iy tfog power of God, but what is drawn from
the Confideration of its Extenfion ? And affirm,
that if Matter, as an extended Being, is divifi
ble ; all extended Beings muft be divifible : and,
that I have no other Reafon to make all Matter
**g- 3 *" divifible, but becaufie it is Extended: and, when
you mention the Divifibility, add by way of
pag. 326. Explication, or {which is all one ) the Exten-
Reply to fion, of Matter : You feem to forget, that you
1/2 Def. y0Ur felf exprefsly allowed Space, though ex-
tv- '35- tended, to be abfolutely Indifcerpible ; And,
therefore

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 390
therefore you your felf make Matter divifible, and r^a
not barely as an Extended Being, but as finitely onldLef-
Extended ; And, that I gave ftill another Rea- {J^b*"'
fon for (tiling Matter divifible; viz. God's ha- pag. 101.
ving by his own Will and good Pleafure created andi^oe/
it fuch a Subftance, all whofe folid Parts we p,I7S,I7<S'
find by Experience to be fo many diftinct Be
ings, loofe, independent one from another,
and unconnected ; that is, having no effential
Connexion one with another, nor any Depen
dence one upon another for their Exiftence ; as
the Parts of Space evidently have, even fepa
rate from the Confideration of its being abfo
lutely Infinite; and as the Parts of Time have,
( forafmuch as every Moment, co-exifting with
all the Parts of Space, is yet both indivifible in
it felf, and infieparable from the other Parts of
Duration;') and as the Parts, improperly fo
called, of Immaterial Subftances may have,
for any thing that can ever be proved to the
contrary, on Suppofition of their being Ex
tended. But all this is befide the main Argu
ment, which ( as I have faid ) does not necef
farily imply any fuch Suppofition.
TN like manner; when you make a long -dnfwr u
and pompous Difcourfe about Adequate *d Def'„
and Inadequate Ideas, and about Difficulties that —*X.
cannot be perfietJly cleared ; ( that is, which can
not be' cleared wholly, but yet may in great part,
and enough to fatisfy any reafonable Perfon ;
though, it feems, you knownofuch Difference :) pig. 318,
When, I fay, you talk about thefe things as
of great Neceffity to be premifed, and as if
you would have the Reader think the Whole
Argument depended upon the right flaring of
them ; whereas in reality they have no relation at

g.oo A Fourth Defence of the immateriality
at all to the Argument, but were ftarted only
upon occafion of that foreign and incidental
Queftion concerning the Extenfion of Immateri
al Subfiance ; In all this Matter, you have by
no Means made at right Reprefentation of
things. However, as to the Diftinction it felf, be
tween Abfurdities or ContraditJions, and Diffi
culties that cannot perfietJly be cleared ; I defire
only, that what / have faid upon this Head,
( 3 J Defence, page 302, 303.) may be com
pared with what you have faid upon it, ( Anfwer,
pag. 318 — 325 : ) And whether then I had not
reafon, ( notwithftanding the Amufement of
Anrwer, 7 or 8 Pages about Difficulties arifing from the
p.iyA.&c percgption of the Difagreement of perfetl or ade
quate Ideas, and Difficulties arifing from the Per*
ception of the Difagreement ofi imperfetJ or inade
quate Ideas 5 when on the contrary I had ex
prefsly faid, that the Difficulties I meant, did
not arife from the Perception of any Difagree
ment of Ideas at all, but merely from our ha
ving in our Imagination either no Ideas, or
fuch very imperfect ones as cannot well be
compared together, of Things whofe Exi
ftence or Certainty we can neverthelefs de-
monftrably prove by Reafon, and apprehend
many of their Properties by the Underftand
ing ; Which every one, that underftands the
firft Elements of Mathematicks, knows to be
the Cafe of All Sorts of Infinites and of Some
Finites : Whether I fay, I had not good rea
fon ) for the Diftinction I made, I am willing
any one, who pleafes to compare the Books,
fhould judge.

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 40 r
Y"OU .askj What is a Difficulty which cannot pug. 31 8.
be perfetlly cleared by reafon of defetlive
Ideas, but a Difficulty which arifes from the Per
ception of the Difagreement of thofe Ideas ? I an
fwer ; It is a Difficulty arifing, not from the
Perception of any Difiagreement of Ideas, but
from the Want or Defetlivenefis of Ideas in the
Imagination ; which therefore we cannot com
pare fo as to Imagin diftindtly how they agree,
though we can by our Reafon and Underftand
ing demonftrate it is impoffible they fhould difia-
gree. This is plainly the Cafe in moft Queftions,
concerning Eternity, Immenfity, &c.
Tou declare your felf of another Opinion ;
And, that you think, whatever can be demon- pg, 31^
firated, can be perfectly cleared from all Objec
tions and Difficulties ; And, that all the Difficul
ties that may be urged againft the Immenfity and
Eternity of God, &c. which Mr. Clarke fays
tannot be clearly anfwered, are to be clearly an
fwered ; And, in order to anfwer them clearly,
you would only require thefe equitable Conditions
of him, tbat he would define the Terms, Immenfity ,
Eternity, Immaterial Being, &c. It is a plea-
fant Inftance of an Equitable Condition, that
you defire me to give a Definition, that is, to
exprefs the Idea, of things whereof I contend
we have no Ideas or very imperfect ones, ( fee
ing we can only give Negative Defcriptions of
them ; ) though we have certain Demonftrations
of their Exiftence. And it is no lefs remarka
ble, that notwithftanding all this ftir about the
Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of
Ideas, yet you your felf, when you come to
difcourfe more particularly concerning the Na
ture of Thinking, talk of a Power in Matter ^ 34,.
D d unknown

402 A. Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
unknown to us, and of which we have no Idea ;
of which neverthelefs you venture to affirm,
that it may comprehend under it Thinking and its
Modes, as Figure does Roundnefs. But, to pafs
this over : Since it is your declared Opinion,
that all the Sorts of Difficulties now-mentio
ned, may be clearly anfwered ; I cannot but
think you would very much oblige the World,
in anfwering them clearly. And I will offer
you a fair Opportunity of doing it ; by recon
ciling, if you pleafe, the two following Ac
counts together ; or elfe by maintaining either
of them, and anfwering clearly the Objections
and Difficulties contained in the other.

It is evident to me, that
God muft be an Immaterial
Being, that is, a proper Im
material Being, a Being with
out any of 'the Properties of
Matter *, without Solidity ,
Extenfion, or Motion ; and
that exifts in No Place ; and
not a Being that has Exten
fion^ and confequently exifts
in Place and has Parts. —
Thinking in God, cannot be
founded on any Objetls atJing
upon him ; nor can Thinking
in him be SUCCESSIVE or
confift of Parts ; nor can his
Thinking have any MODES,
becaufie Modes of Thinking are
DISTINCT ACTS
of Thinking. But as his Ef
fence is eternal and immuta
ble, without any the leaft Va
riation or Alteration ; fo his

The next Abfurdity charged
on the Attribute of Eternity,
is, How God fhould co-exift
with all the Differences of
Time, and yet there be no
SUCCESSION inhis
Being. This I own to be as
abfurd, as  ; and that
there is a manifeft. Contrar
ditlion in this Notion or Con
ception. For if by Succef
fion in God's Being, is un
derftood, (and I know not
what other Senfe to put up
on it, ) co-exifting with all
tbe Differences ofi Time ; then
the Difficulty is, how to con
ceive God to co-exift with all
the Parts of Time, and yet
not to co-exift with all ihe
Differences of Time. Noia
I acknowledge I cannot do
This. But in behalf of God's
Eternity

' immortality of the Soul. 403
jinking is one Numerical Eternity I beg leave to plead,
INDIVIDUALS, that if God does * co-exi/i
(comprehending all Things, ani with the Differences of Time*
all the Poffibilihes ofi Things then he does co -exift with the
atone View; and is as fixt Differences of Time ; and it
and permanent and unvaria- by no means can be faid, that
ble, and as much without he does not co-exift witb all
S U C C E S S I O N a nd the Differences of Time,, if it
Parts, as his Effence. An- be true, that he does co-exift
fwer to Mr. Clarke's Third with all tbe Differences of
Defence, page 340, 341. Time  To fay, God ex*
ifts all at once, is to fay
that he atlually exifts in time paft, prefent, and to
come ; that is, that Time paft is not paft, and that
Time to come is come, and was always come. But to
give feme Salisfatlion to thofe who think it an Im-
perfetlionfor God to co-exifi with the federal Parts
of Time, I defire it may be confidered, that if
God Operates at different Times, and takes up the
Space of Six Days in the Creation of the World,
redeems Mankind 4000 Tears after , and will
judge Men in a Time not yet come ; then he Ope
rates not all at once : And if he Operates not all at
once, then he exifts not all at once ' For if he ex
ifted all at once, there .could be no DiftintJion of
Time in His Operations. Paft, prefent, and to
tome, muft be attributed to the Being that Ope
rates, as well as to its Operations, becaufe Ope
rations at different Times, fuppofe Succeffion in
the Nature of Things, and Exifting all at once,
fuppofes no Succeffion : And confequently, if there

* Note: All that is here argued concerning God's co- ex
ifting with the Differences of Time, may in the very fame
Manner be applied to his co-exifting with the different:
Parts of Place et Extenfion.
D d 2 is

404

Anfwer,
fag. 315.
2,d Def.
pag. 264-1
z6S- Anfwer,
fag. 327.

pag. 32.8.

See ^il
Def. pag.
l6i, &c.

A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
is a Succeffion in the Nature ofi Things, there is
no fuch Thing in Nature as Exifting all at once.
Now if there is no Imperfetlion in fuppofing that
God Atls at different Times ; as there is not : What
Imperfetlion can there be in fuppofing that he
does not exift now at the time of the general Judg
ment, any more than that he is not now judging tbe
World ? Effay concerning the Ufe of Reafon,
&fr- Pag- 53, 54-
This Difficulty you muft by no means pafs
over unfatisfied ; becaufe the Author of the
Effay here cited, is believed to be a Perfon,
whofe Reafoning you cannot flight.
But to proceed now ( as you fey ) to the
Queftion it felf, My Argument, you pretend, is
inconclufive ; becaufe, in my Enumeration of
the poffible Qualities of Matter ; individual
Modes of Figure, Motion, and other Qualities;
( fuch as are the Roundnefs of a Circle, the in
dividual Mode of Motion of a Clock, and, in
your Opinion, Confcioufnefs or Thinking ; ) are
omitted : not being reducible to any of the
Three Heads there mentioned.
I anfwer : Whole Roundnefs ( as you call it, )
that is, the Name of the Sum of the Curvities
of the little Arches that conftitute a Circle ;
And, the whole Mode of Motion of a Clock, that
is, the Name of the Sum of a certain Num
ber of Motions ; And, Confcioufnefs or Thinking,
that is, as you fuppofe, the Name of the Sum
of Ten Thoufand diftintl Motions, or of a Num
ber of any other Qualities void of Confciouf
nefs ; do all plainly belong to the Third fort
of Qualities I mentioned ; That is, they are
all plainly nothing but bare Names of Wholes,
mere external Denominations, fo far as their Idea

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 405
is different from that of their conftituent Parts ;
and are nothing at all really in the Things
themfelves. Which whether it can poffibly be
the true Notion of Confcioufnefs ; making it
nothing at all really in the Thinking Subftance
it felf, but a mere emp' ty and foreign Name ;
I leave every Man to judge from his own Ex
perience. For my contending that Thinking was not fuch
a bare external Name of a Number of Qualities,
but it felf a real diftintl Quality in the Think
ing Subftance ; you before called my Idea ofReflc£i- m
Thinking a mere Chimera ofi my own framing, * e -g .
( though I believe no Man can help being con
fcious of the like Chimera in himfelf;) And Anfwer te
now you repeat it again. In anfwer to which, 3d Def-
I refer you to what has been already faid, t*s' 3i8"
(3d Defence, pag. 307, 308. j and to what
you will prefently give me Occafion to add
further upon this Head.
You allow that no Quality can refide in a Syf- Anfwer,
tern of Matter, but what muft be always in a P*£- 3*-»-
certain Senfe of the fame Kind with the Whole
that refults from the Parts ; ( that is to fay, of
the fame Kind with It felf; But I fuppofe you
mean, of thefiame Kind with its conftituent Parts ;)
Namely, that the Parts muft be fib far of the
fame Kind, as to have a Tendency, &c And
that in That Senfe, you have always allowed Con- p.*i9,*-3*-
fcioufnefis to confift ofi Powers of the fame Kind.
But I have proved at large in my Third De- |^Pcf-
fence, that Motions (or any other Qualities faJJ,m'
void of Confcioufnefs ) can be in no Senfe of
the fame Kind with Confcioufnefs. And I See above,
have fhown juft now, that they canpot pof- t»S- 39S-
fibly in any Senfe have any Tendency towards
D d 3 it,

406 A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
it, any more than Colours or Modes of Colour^
can have any Tendency to Sound or Smell.
Anfwer, The diftintl Beings in a Syftem of Matter, con-
pag. 319. trft,ute^ you jfaV) towards Thinking ; as the Pieces
ef a Circle do towards a Circle.
That they cannot do fo ; and that there is
no Analogy, no Similitude in the leaft, be
tween the Things you compare together ; I
have fhown at large in my Third Defence ; and
particularly page 24$, &c, to which I refer
you and the Reader.
t*i- 33°' ^ou aHe%e' that in order to eontraditl you,
it muft be affirmed, that every Quality that in
heres in a Syftem of Matter, ntuft inhere Wholly
fag. 331. in each Part of it: That Roundnefs is an In
ftance, that a Power may inhere in a Syftem of
Matter, without being the Sum of Powers of the
fame Kind, that is, of Whole Roundneffes s
¦pag. 318. That it is as impoffible that Whole Confcioufnefs
Jhould exift in each of the diftintl Parts of a Syft
tern of Matter, as that Whole Roundnefs ftoould
fag. 332. exift in each Part of a Circle : And that, unlefi
in a round Figure each part muft be Wholly round;
and in a confcious Syftem of Matter, each part
muft be Wholly confcious ; and in that Senfe
confift of Powers of the fame Kind : not one ftep
can be taken in Defence of Mr. Clarke'.- Argu
ment. To all this, I think I have already given a
clear and diftinct Anfwer. Third Defence,
pag. 248, &c.
}*£¦ 334 *n reprefenting Part of which Anfwer, you
make it amount to this ridiculous Propofition ;
that though Roundnefs confifts of Parts, none of
which canpoffibly be Round; yet, if Confcioufnefs
inheres in a Syflem of Matter in like manner with
Roundnefs $

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. \o?
Roundnefs ; that is, if it confifts of Parts, none
cf which can poffibly be Confcious ; there muft be
as many diftintl Confcioufneffes, as there are Parts :
Whereas the plain Strength and Sum of the
Argument, was this ; that as Roundnefs confifts
of Parts, none of which can indeed be the Whole
Roundnefs, but yet every one of them muft of ne
ceffity be Pieces of Roundnefs ; fo Confiioufinefis, if
it inhered in Matter in like manner with Round
nefs, muft likewife confift of Parts, none of which-
could indeed be the Whole Confcioufnefs, but yet
every one of them muft of neceffity bear the fame
Analogy to the Whole Confcioufnefs, as the Cur
vity of a Semicircle bears to the Curvity of two Se
micircles, or the Curvity of one Quadrant to the
Curvity of four Quadrants. And whether fuch
Parts can be wholly void of Confcioufnefs, be
caufe they have not in them fingly the Whole
Confcioufnefs ; any more than the Arches of a
Circle can be wholly void of Curvity or
Roundnefs, becaufe they have not in them
fingly the Whole Curvity or Roundnefs ; I
leave to your felf to judge. Herein therefore
you are guilty of a very great Mifreprefentati
on ; in charging me v/ith a Contradidtion ,
which arifes only from your own ludicrous Inter
pretation of my Words. For if you abfurdly,
and in defiance of the moft perfpicuous-Ex-
preflions , put your contrary Senfe upon my
Words ; what wonder then is it, if they be
come contradictory to my own evident Mean
ing ?
What you repeat ( Anfwer to Third Defence,
page 236, 237, csV. ) concerning your ufing
it as a Suppofition only, and not declaring it
your Opinion, that Thinking may be a Mode
' D d 4 of

4<33 A Fourth "Defence of the Immateriality
of Motion ; I only defire the Reader would be
pleafed to compare, with what I offered,
(Third Defence, pag. iyi.) And, if in your
Suppofition you pitched upon the likelieft Qua
lity of Matter you could find, to make Think
ing a Mode of; and I proved the Abfurdity
and Impoffibility of Thinking's being a Mode
of That Quality ; and, at the fame time, made,
it evident that the fame Arguments proved e-
qually the Abfurdity and Impoffibility of
3</ Def. Thinking's being a Mode of any Other Quality
t<*£- *¦!'• 0r Power of Matter whatfoever ; and yet you
declared it pofitively to be your Opinion, that
Refietl. on Thinking was a Mode of Some Power in Mat-
ia Def. ter . j prefume, your denying your felf to be
{eg. 10 i. accountable for the Abfurdity I charged you
with, and complaining of my Difingenuity in
charging it upon you, ( or, as you are pleafed
to exprefs your felf, in putting it upon you ; )
will not be looked upon as of any Weight,
till you can Anfwer the Argument by which I
proved it to be juftly chargeable upon you ;
which Argument you have not taken the leaft
Notice of, as I might reafonably have expected
Ibid, an Ingenuous Adverfiary would have done.
You proceed to offer fome Cpnfiderations,
Anfwer, concerning the Nature ofi Thinking; from whence
?".?• 337- to deduce Arguments, to prove that it is
merely an Affetlion ofi Matter.
The Sum of your Firft Argument, is this.
The Mind is operated upon by Matter,
and Senfations are excited in it by the
Operation of Matter, and all our Sen-1
fes depepd on Material Organs. Matter

md Natural Immortality of the Souf. 409
Matter likewife is operated upon by Mat
ter, and Motions are excited in it by
the Contact and Impulfe of Matter.
Therefore the Mind is Matter, and Think
ing a mere Affection of Matter,
This Argument, I think, deferves no An
fwer. Yet the Reader may, if he pleafes, con-
fult upon this Head the ThirdDefence, pag. 273,
I fhall only obferve here, by the Bye ; that pag. 339:
whereas you fay, feeing Thinking follows the Mo
tion of Matter in our Senfes, we have juft as much
Reafon to conclude that It is a Power or Affec
tion of Matter occafioned by the Atlion of Mat
ter, as we have to fay that Fire is a Power or
Affetlion of Matter, when it is produced by the
Rubbing of a Wheel and its Axle-tree : It is evi
dent on the contrary, that we have all the
Reafon in the World to conclude there is no
Similitude between thefe two Things : Becaufe
Fire, as it exifts in the Matter it felf, ( feparate
from the Senfations it excites in our Minds, ) is
confeffedly nothing but mere Motion : But
Thinking cannot poffibly be mere Motion ; as
I have abundantly proved in my Third Defence ; ?(/ Def.
and will ftill further appear, when I come to p<*g. 27 1>
confider in their proper Place the Exceptions 8cc'
you have made to the Proofs there urged.
Your Second Argument, is this. P*Z- 34°-
Human Thinking has Succeffion and Parts.
Material Actions likewife have Succeffion
and Parts.
Therefore Human Thinking is a Material
Action.
This Argument alfo, I think, deferves no
Anfwer. Your

4io A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
pag. 340. Your Third Argument, is,
Thinking has its Modes.
Qualities of Matter have likewife their
Modes.
Therefore thinking is a Quality of Matter.
This is juft as if I fhould argue.
Sound has its Modes.
Colour has likewife its Modes.
Therefore Sound is a Colour,
Or thus:
Spirit has Exiftence.
Matter alfo has Exiftence.
Therefore Spirit is Matter.
That I have not in the leaft mifreprefented
your Senfe in thefe Arguments, I appeal to
whoever pleafes to compare our Papers to

gether.

ibid. Your Fourth Argument, is, this.
Thinking, in God, who is an Imrnaterir
al Being, is without any Succeffion,
Modes, and diftinct Acts.
Thinking in Man, has, on the contrary
Succeffion, Modes, and diftindt Adts ;
as the Powers of Matter have.
Therefore Thinking, in Man, is a Power
or Quality of Matter.
In this alfo there is no Confequence, though
the Premifes were true. But, that Thinking, in
God, is without Succeffion, I know not whether
see above, you will continue to affirm, or not ; when you
pag. 402, have confidered and compared together the two
4°3- different Accounts of this Matter, which I juft
now tranfcribed ; and fhall have refolved which
Of them you will adhere to, by anfwering
clearly the Objections contained in the other. In

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. I41 i>
In the mean time I cannot but take notice,
that you ufe a very ftrange Expreffion, when
you fay it is evident to you, that God muft be an Anfwer.
Immaterial Being, that is, a proper Immaterial P"£' 3 4**'
Being, a Being without Any of the Properties of
Matter, without Solidity, Extenfion or Motion,
and that exifts in No Place ; that is, in other
words, wbich exifts not at all : For, if he exifts
at all, it is certain he exifts in every Place. I
fhould not have made this Remark, but that I
am fure you are no Friend to Unintelligible
Diftindtions, and Words that have no Significa
tion ; and that you will be afhamed to give
me the School-mens Anfwer, that God exifts in
every Ubi, but not in any Place ; that is, that
in Latin he exifts every where, but in Englifh no
where. And yet, unlefs you give either this
Anfwer or a better, ( for it is a thing of too
great Importance to be paffed over without
any Anfwer at all ; ) it cannot be helped, but
your Words will fignify, what it is not poffible
to^ fuppofe you could mean.
Nor is it a lefs wonderful Expreffion, when
you affirm that Thinking, in God, cannot be fiuc- ^,340,341.
ceffive, nor have any Modes or diftintl Atls of
Thinking ; but that it is one numerical individual
Atl, fixt, and permanent, and unvariable, and
without Succeffion, &c. That is to fay ; that
God cannot vary his Will, nor diverfify his
Works, nor adt fucceffively, nor govern the
World, nor indeed have any Power to will or
do 'any thing at all. I do not charge you
with Confequences ; but I affirm they are too
plain Confequences of what you profefs.
You obferve that I allow Matter to atl uponfagt ^
the Soul; Which fince it cannot do by Contatl, it

4 1 2, A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
it muft be by a Power whereof we have no Idea ;
and if there be in Matter any fuch Power
whereof we have no Idea, why may it not as
well be capable of Thinking ?
I anfwer : The Power by which Matter acts
upon the. Soul, is not a real Quality, inhering
in Matter , as Motion inheres in it, and as
Thinking inheres in the thinking Subftance ; but
it is only a Power or Occafion of exciting cer-r
tain Modes or Senfations in another Subftance ;
Which Power, is one of thofe Qualities I rank^
iJVef. ed under the SecondSort ; And there is no Ana^
pag. 244. j0gy at ai]5 between a Subject's being it felf
capable of Senfation, and its being the Occa-r.
fion of certain Senfations being excited in ai
nother Subject,
However, as to the thing it felf, there is no
more difficulty iu conceiving how Matter may
adt upon Immaterial Subftance, than in conceiving
how it acts upon Material Subftance. When a.
Globe, fuppofe, of a Foot Diameter, in Mo
tion ; flrikes upon a Globe of a Foot Diame
ter, at Reft : Tell me how Matter acts upon
Matter, by ContatJ ; why the Quiefcent Globe
makes a certain determinate Degree of Refift
ance ; why it does not paake an infinitely great
Refiftance ; or why it does make any Refiftance
at all. And when Light is reflected and re-
fradted by Bodies, which it never touches ; nay,
at a diftance from them evident tp Senfe ;
and, in fome Circumftances, the nearer the
Medium, whofe Surface it reflects from, ap
proaches to a Vacuum, the greater and ftronger
the Reflection is ; ( of which there are gon-
victive Experiments published to the World: )
Or when Matter acts, by the Caufe of Gravi
tation, upon other Matter, in proportion, not to

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 4 1 3
to the Bignefs of the Superficies, but to the
Quantity of the folid Matter it felf ; that is,
acts upon the very Centers of the original folid
Parts of Matter ; ( of which, Mathematicians
know there are Demonftrations extant ; ) Tell
me how, in thefe Cafes, Matter acts upon Mat
ter, without Contatl; and I will undertake to
tell you, how Matter acts upon Immaterial
Subftance. It is worthy of Remark, that, both here and Anfwer,
elfewhere, you feem willing to allow, that^- 34".
That Power in Matter, whereof you contend
Thinking to be a Mode, is a Power you pre
tend not to know ; a Power unknown to us, and
of which we have no Idea, no diftintl Conception
in our Minds , and which you know not whe
ther it be Motion or no. Whatever it be, I See above,
have fhown that the fame Arguments hold e-?'*-0™08'
qually againft Thinking's being a Mode of that
unknown Power, as againft its being a Mode
of Motion. But that which I would here re
mark, is this. If it is abfolutely impoffible ( as Anfwer.
you elfewhere affirm) to prove that there are^'^77"
two different Subftances in the World, becaufie we
have not Ideas cf them ; how can we know there
is any fuch unknown Power in Matter, without
having an Idea of it ? And if it can be known
that there is a Quality in Matter, of which we
have no Idea ; why can it not as well be known
that there is a Subftance in the World, of which
we have no Idea ? If there be (as you fay) nof»g. 3*-°.
other Teft of Truth, but the Perception of the
Agreement or Difiagreement of Ideas ; how can
we affirm any thing concerning a Quality, of
which we have no Idea ? If Difficulties which P*£- 31*-
cannot be perfetlly cleared, are* ( according to
you ) ContraditJions and Abfurdities ; why is this
important

4t4 rA Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
important Difficulty left uncleared? Again -
^ag. 388. If it be true ( as you affirm in another Place, )
that unlefs we have an Idea of the Creation of
Matter out ofi Nothing, we muft inevitably con
clude Matter a felf-exiftent Being ; how comes it
not to be as evident, that* unlefs we have
an Idea of the Formation ofa Thought out
of fuch Qualities of Matter as we have no Idea
of, we muft inevitably conclude that Matter
cannot think ? And, that, unlefs we have Ideas
of thofe Qualities Which we have no Ideas of,
there can be no fuch Qualities in Matter ? But
all this, is only upon your own Suppofitions :
t*£. 34»- Forthe unknown Quality you make Me to af
cribe to Matter, in order to enable it to act
See above, upon immaterial Subftance; is not fas I juft
pag, 412. nowfhewed) a real inherent Quality, but only a
Power or Occafion of exciting Modes in another
Subjeti.
Anfwer, You obferve further, that if the Soul be art
^.341,341. Immaterial Subftance, it is a great Difficulty to
conceive how by a mere Preference of the Mind
we can move our Hand, and caufe it to reft
again, when we will : Whereas, if Thinking be
¦nothing but a Mode of Motion, or Matter in Mo
tion, That Difficulty is entirely at an End ; there
being then nothing in it harder to be under
ftood, than how the Hand of a Clock is moved
by the Weights or Spring.
It is very true : If there be no Liberty of Will
at all, then all the Difficulties concerning the
Manner of it, are entirely at an End. Thus
Des-Cartes put an End to all the Difficulties con
cerning the Knowledge and Perception of Brutes*
by denying that they have any fuch thing as
Senfe, Knowledge, or Perception at all : And if
you
4

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 41s
you had deprived your human Machines, as he
did his Brutal ones, of all Senfe and Perception,
all Knowledge and Underftanding, as well as all
Liberty of Will ; fome further Difficulties ftill,
concerning the Nature of Thinking and Per
ception in general, would have been alfo en
tirely at an End. And thus, if I fhould fay I
could entirely put an End to all the Difficulties
about Opticks, by fuppofing that Men have
no Eyes at all, I fhould likewife fay very true ;
But who would thank me for the notable Dis
covery, I cannot tell.
And yet there is a Difficulty even upon your
own Suppofition } greater than you feem to be
aware of. For by what Impulfe, by what See B^kA
Preference, by what Power, That Matter firft jjff£fj"
and originally began to move, which you fup- 1704, /*£.
pofe impells both the Weights of a Clock, and 9*>- &c.
the Thinking Materials in a Man ; is jufttf- dif- 1</E</'*'- ,
ficult to conceive, as how, by a mere Preference oftff. \\Z'
the Mind, without any external Impulfe, we £<#**.
can caufe our Hands to move. >
,A7" O U go on in the next Place to confider my
Arguments againft the Poffibility of
Thinking's being a Mode of Motion.
To my firft, viz. that Modes of Motion are
nothing but particular Motions, and cannot con
tain any thing in their Idea beyond the Genus of
Motion ; and that therefore we have thefiame in
tuitive Certainty that Conficioufinefis cannot be a
Mode of Motion, as we have that any one thing
is not another, whofe idea is the moft remote from
it that is poffible : You reply ; That we have no Anfwer,
Idea of all the poffible Modes of Motion; That pag. 34*.
though we have indeed Ideas of the more fimple itf> 344'
Modes of Motion^ yet of the very complex ones
1 we

4i <S A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
nae have no diftintl Conception in our Minds;
That therefore we can no more prove or know
that Thinking is not one of thefe more complex
Modes of Motion, than we can know whether
two things agree or differ from one another, that
we have no Idea of at all ; That it is not poffible
for us to fay that Thinking does not confift in the
peculiar Motion of the Spirits in the Brain, till
we . have a particular Idea of the Motion of thofe
Spirits, and an Idea of Thinking as fomething dif
tintl from a Mode of Motion ; Th<it Thinking has
the Genus of Motion, by arifing from Motion, by
being varied by Motion, by producing other Mo
tions, by having Succeffion and Parts, and innu
merable Modifications ; That no Idea ofi human
Confcioufnefs can be produced beyond the Genus of
Motion ; That faying we have an intuitive Cer
tainty that Confcioufnefs cannot be a Mode of Mo
tion, is only affirming the Queftion in debate, wbich
can fignify nothing to any Body that wants Con-
vitlion, &c.
Now in all this, you have at laft plainly de
clared the fl-pwrov -btvSos of your whole Hy>>
2d Def. pothefis ; namely, that you intend to make
pag. 244. T'hinking not a real Quality, but a mere empty
Name or external Denomination, fuch as I at
firft ranked under the Third Head. For the
moft complex Modes of Motion poffible, what
ever Name we call them by, are ftill nothing
but Motions ; and the Name we give them, is
nothing but a mere external Denomination. Think
ing therefore, according to you, being only a
very complex Mode of Motion [ or of any other
Quality of Matter ] is likewife nothing but a
mere external Name or Denomination of that
SeeA»fa>. Mode. Which Notion of yours concerning
to 3<*Def. Thinking,
pag 328.

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 4 1 -r
Thinking, is certainly a mere Chimera ; and a
very abfurd one.
Every Man has within himfelf the Idea, ( or, See above,
in your Language, the Chimera ) of Confcioufi- ^fL4°5/
nefs ; which, though he cannot produce ( as you ^d Def.
abfurdly require, ) that is, cannot define, nor p*g- 343-
defcribe, any more than you can defcribe your
Idea of any Colour or Sound ; yet he as cer
tainly knows it not to be any complex Mode
of Motion, as you know your Idea of Colour
not to be any complex Mode'of Sound : Which
intuitive Certainty, if it be only a bare affirm-
ing the Queftion in Debate in one cafe, and can
fignify nothing to any Body that wants Convitlion ;
it is fo in the other likewife : And then there is
an end of all human Knowledge, and no Man
can pretend to know any one thing not to be
any other.
Thinking has indeed Succeffion and Modes, and Ibid.
many other things in common with Motion ;
and fo has every thing, with every thing : The
thing I affirmed, was not that Thinking has no
Property that Motion has ; but that it has
fomething in its Idea, which Motion has not ;
that it has fomething beyond, and totally diffe
rent from, the Genus of Motion : And this, I
ftill affirm, every Man has an intuitive Cer
tainty of : Which Intuition you your felf allow See rW
to be one Way, (Anfwer, pag. 377,) and, I Defence,
add, it is of all others the moft infallible Way, P**' 27Z-
of knowing a thing to be true.
We cannot indeed frame in our Minds dif- Anfwer,
tindt Images of the more complex Modes of ?"¦?• 343-
Motion, as we can of the more fimple Ones :
But are we not, neverthelefs, equally certain
that they are all alike Imaginable, though our
narrow Imaginations cannot comprehend ihem ?
E e And

41 8 A Fourth Deftnee of the Immateriality
And that, if we could reprefent them to our
Imaginations, they would all appear as remote
from the Idea of Thinking, as any One of them
does ? Becaufe we cannot comprehend in our
Imagination a diftinct Conception of a vaft
Number in Arithmetiek, as we can of a fenall
one ; do we not therefore know, but that a
vaft Number may poffibly proVe fo different
from a Small one, as to turn into a Plant or
an Animal ? Becaufe we cannot form in our
Minds an Image of a Space Ten Thoufand Mil
lions of Miles Square, as we can of Ten Feet
Square ; are we not therefore fure, but that
the great Space may poffibly. be fomething,
whofe true Idea fhall have no Similitude, no
Relation to Extenfion ? If I fhould plead in
Favour of Motion's being -a Mode of Figure,
( as you do for Thinking's being a Mode of
/>. 5^,343. Motion, ) that, though we have indeed Idea's of
the more fimple Modes ofi Figure, yet of the very
complex ones we have no diftintl Conception in our
Minds ; and that therefore, though we are fure
indeed that a Triangle or a Square is not a Mo-
**£• 343- tion, yet we can no more prove or know that Mo
tion is not one of the more complex Modes of Fi
gure, than we can know whether tzvo things agree
or differ from one another, that we have no Idea
of at all: If I fhould argue thus, I fay, I know
well what Mathematicians would argue con
cerning Me : And I can guefs what Anfwer I
fhould deferve, if I fhould tell the World
P*Z- 343- further, that it is not poffible for us to'fiay that
Colour does not confift in a peculiar Mixture of
Ten Thoufand various Sounds, till we have a
particular diftintl Idea ofi the Refult of the
Mixture of thofe Ten Thoufand Sounds. /
may call Scarlet- colour, if I pleafe, a very com plex

&nd Natural Immortality of the Soul. 410
plex Mode of Sound; and who fhall confute
me, by producing tht particular diftintl Idea &fpag. 3^
the Refult of a peculiar Mixture of Ten Thou
fand Sounds ? And you may call Tbinking, if
you pleafe, a very complex Mode of Motion :
Yet neither of them will, by either of our
Confidence in giving things Names, be ever the
nearer becoming fuch in reality. This I think*
clearly fhows your Notion to be fomething
more than a Difficulty that cannot be perfietJly
cleared ; that is* ( according to you, ) fomething
more than an Abfurdity and ConlraditJion ; But
I will be content to look upon it, as being but
barely contradictory and abfurd.
m
To my fecond Arguriient, viz. that, if Think
ing was a Mode or Species of Motion^ it would
follow that all Motion would be a Degree of Think
ing : You reply, that you do allow, that every p%g. j^..
Motion is a Degree of Thought, in that Senfe
Wherein it is proper to fay that every Motion is a
Degree of Fire, &c. That is ; you allow every
Motion, to be as much a Degree of the Sen
fation it felf; of Heat, for inftance, or of any
other Senfation or Thought arifing in the Mind.;
as it is a Degree ofthat Mode of Motion in Mat
ter, which excites in us fuch or fuch a particular
.Senfation i You allow every the floweft Mo
tion of a Needle to be as much and as properly
a Degree of Pain, as it is a Degree of that
Motion which caufes it to prick the Skin: You
allow every Motion of a Particle of Air, to
be as truly a. Degree of the Thought and Rea
fon of a Man ; as it is a Degree of that Mode
of Motion, which, ftriking the Ear, excites in
us the Senfation of Sound: You muft by the
fame Reafon have allowed, if it-had been, de-
E- e % fired-

420 A Fourth Defence of tht Immateriality
fired of you ; that a Straight Line is as much
a Piece of a Motion, as it is a Piece of the Fi
gure of a Triangle. But I accept contentedly
what you do allow ; and I do not defire to be
allowed any more.
To my third Argument, viz. that if Think
ing was a Mode of Motion, then Motion would
'be a more generical Power than Thinking ; where-
p, 145-— 'as on the contrary, &c. Your Reply is fo un-
349, &c. certain and obfcure, that it is hard to know
what to make of it. The Strength of the Ar
gument, which you pretend you cannot under
ftand, was plainly this : That no particular Mode
of any Power, can contain under it fib" great a
¦Variety of Modes, as the Superiour Power it felf
does ; for the fame Reafon that Quadrilateral Fi-
gure^ which is a Mode of Figure, cannot contain
under it fo great a Variety of Modes, as Figure
in general does : And that therefore, if Thinking
was a particular Mode of Motion, there could
not poffibly be fo many Modes of Thinking, as there
are of Motion. But now, on the contrary, it is
evident there are more Modes of Thinking, than
there are of Motion ; becaufe every Mode of Mo
tion has a Mode of Thinking [ an Idea ] anfwering
'to it, and there are innumerable other Modes of
Thinking befides : Thinking therefore cannot poffibly
be a Mode of Motion. [ And the fame Argu
ment holds againft the Poffibility of its being a
Mode of any other Power of Matter whatfoever. J
This is in fhort the Sum of that Argument,
which, you fay, you are perfetlly at a Lofis to
know what it means. To know what it means, I
believe every Man, except your felf, is very
able ; But to know what to anfwer to it, you
might well be perfietJly at a Loft. Inftead of
anfwering

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. \z i
anfwering it therefore, you were refolved to
be even with me for offering you an Argument
you could not underftand ; and would needs
fay fomething in oppofition to it, which you
were fure neither / nor any Body elfe could un
derftand ; namely, that Ideas are not Modes, P"£- 34s*
but Objetls of Tbinking. However, this being
manifeftly abfurd, you contradict your felf
again in the next Page, and fay it muft be al- pag. 349.
lowed that every diftintl Thought, [ that is, every
Idea~\ is a particular Mode of Thinking ; "and fo
Thinking muft in us hope a great Number of
Modes. But yet, for all that, you fay, our
Thoughts are finite and limited ; and we com
prehend only the more fimple . Modes of Motion
and Figure ; and, fince ¦ our Thoughts are all li
mited in point of Number, you fee no .reafon frotn pag. 349.
their Variety neceffarily to conclude, that human
Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion. You
-feem refolved indeed not to fee the Reafon :
But the Reafon is vifible enough, and will force
any Man to fee it, that does not fhut his Eyes 5
viz. that, there being more Variety of Modes
of Thinking, than there is of Modes of Motion;
and all the Modes of Motion ( though we cannot
atJually attend to them, becaufe their Number
is infinite, ) anfwering only to one Species of
the Modes of Thinking, ( which Modes of
Thinking under that one Species, are likewife in
finite in Number;) itis plainly, and forthe
very fame Reafon, as impoffible that Think
ing fhould be any one of the infinite Number
of the Modes of Motion, as that Figure in ge
neral fhould be any one of the infinite Num
ber of the Modes of Quadrilateral Figure,.
E e 3 You

422 A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
f£- 349- You add : If we confider but the prodigious
Variety of Sounds, which are called diftintl Modes
of Sound ; it is as eafy to conceive, that upon Sup
pofition of Thinking being a Mode of Motion, it
fhould have the feveral Modes that we are confci
ous it has ; as that Sound fhould have all the
diftintl innumerable Modes which That has. But
from what has been faid, it is evident, That as
all the Modes of Sound, though infinite in
Number, yet bear no Proportion to the in
finite Variety of the Modes of infinite other
things put all together; fo the infinite Modes
of Motion, and their correfpondent Ideas, bear
no proportion to the infinite Variety of infi
nite other Modes of Thinking : And that
therefore Thinking with its infinite Variety of
Modes, can no more poffibly be a Mode of
Motion, though the Modes of Motion be allowed
to be capable of infinite Variation ; than Co
lours, or Smells, or any other thing that has
no fimilitude to thefe, can be any of the infi
nite Number of the Modes of Sound.
My fourth Argument, was drawn from the
Authority, and from the Reafoning of Mr. Locke.
'\? 3;°- The Authority, you profefs to defpife.
/,-35o..:ri. To the Reafoning, you anfwer; that Mr.
Locke's whole Defign in the Paffage I cited, was
not to prove that Human Thinking cannot be
a Mode of Motion, but that Thinking in the Deity
cannot depend on the Motion of the Parts of a
Corporeal Ssftem ; and that, as the Queftion is
not tbe fame, fo fome of the Confequences that Mr.
Locke draws from thofe Principles, affetJ only
that really abfurd Suppofition of Thinking's being a
Mod.- ff Motion b: God, I reply :

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 425
I reply : It is very true, that Mr. Locke in
deed is not there proving that Thinking in Man,
but that Thinking in God cannot be a Mode of
Motion ; and that Some of the Confequences he
there draws, do indeed affect only the latter
Queftion, and not the former. But, if the
Reafoning he ufes, be as ftrong in one Cafe, as
in the other ; and the Confequences I made ufe
of from him, were only fuch as affect both
Queftions alike ; ( for which I appeal to every See Third
Reader ; ) It was by no means confiftent with defence.
Ingenuity and Candour, foryou to endeavour^'2'77'
to impofe upon your Readers with fo weak an J
Anfwer. To my laft Argument, ( which alfo you Anfwtr,
feem unwilling to underftand, ) viz. that, iff**' 3*1*
Thinking was a Mode or Species of Motion ; then,
in like manner as it is a proper Expreffion to fay,
that Circularity is one Species of Figure, and
Squarenefs a fecond, and Cubicalnefis a third, and
Ellipticalnefs a fourth ; fo it would be proper alfo
to fay, that Circular Motion is one Species of Mo
tion, and Motion in a Square a fecond, and Mo
tion in an Ellipfis a third, and Thinking or Con
fcioufnefs a fourth ; ( which Confequence, I
think, is abundantly abfurd : ) You reply, by f.3^1.
quibbling upon the Word proper, that the Ar
gument has relation only to Propriety of Lan
guage, and that you fee not what Ground I
have to contefi this Language with you : Whereas
the Queftion was not Whether it was proper
with refpect to the Language, but with refpect
\o One Senfe; that is, whether it was True ac
cording to your Hypothefis, and a juft and
neceffary Confequence from it, to fay that Think
ing differs no otherwife from Circular Motion,
E e 4 than

424 A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
than Circular Motion does from Elliptical Mo
tion or from Motion in a Square : And this, it
feems, (as you are indeed this time very libe
ral in your Conceffions, ) you are willing to
grant ; And I am well contented with the Con-
ceflion.
Anfwer, TJPON the Queftion, whether individual
P-sS^sSS' Perfonality can be preferved by a continual
transferring of Confcioufnefs from one parcel of
Matter to another, in fo flux a Subftance as the
Brain or Spirits ; you repeat what you had be
fore advanced in your Refletlions. In anfwer to
whicy, I fhall not repeat, but only defire the
Reader to compare what I offered in my Third
Defence, pag. 288 — 289, and 302 — 303. And
I fhall here make only fome brief incidental
Obfervations on what feems new in your Re
ply.
See id Def. In the firft Place you difown none of the ab-
pȣ 28?, furc} Confequences I charged on your Hypo-
&£' ^°z' thefis. You deny not, but One Subftance may
be Confcious of an Anion's having been done by it
felf, which really was not done by It, but by Ano-
Anfwer, ther Subfiance ; you make Individual Perfionall-
P"£_ i'>7> iy to be a mere external imaginary Denomination,
' i 9' and all Self-Conficioufinefis a mere Dream and De-
compsre lufion ; you own that One Man may poffibly be
id Def. two Perfons, and Two or Two Hundred Men one
292 and' Perfon> that is, not Perfons exatJly Like one
Ani-mer, another, but all really a?id truly one and thefiame
pag. 369 individual Perfon, at the fame time that they
continue fo many diftintl , intelligent, rational
Men. Thefe Abfurdities, I fay , you have
not denied to be unavoidable Confequences of
your Hypothefis; nor have you done any thing
towards clearing them from being Abfurdities ;
but

and Natural Immortality oj the Soul. 425
but inftead thereof, have only offered fome
loofe Objections againft what I propofed un
der this Head.
You fay you are fure, that my calling your Anfwer,
Hypothefis an impoffible one, and inftead of faying^g- 353-
a Word to prove it impoffible, immediately arguing
on the Suppofition of its Poffibility ; is begging the
Queftion, and fuppofing what I was to prove. The
particular Hypothefis here referred to ( viz,
that Memory may be preferved in a fleeting Sub
ftance, by continually repeating the Idea's, and
imprinting them afrefh upon new Particles of Mat
ter perpetually fucceeding in the Room of thofe that
pafs away, ) was, I faid, an impoffible Hypo
thefis ; And an impoffible Hypothefis it will
always appear to be, till you can find out fome
new Hypothefis, by which to make it intelli
gible, how it is poffible that new Ideas printed
upon new Particles, fhould be a Memory of
old Ideas printed upon old Particles. But I
did not enlarge upon this ; becaufe, fuppofing
the PoffibiHty of it, yet it would avail nothing
towards your main Purpofe ; the Queftion be
ing, not whether the Memory in general of fuch
or fuch an Action's having been done, might
poffibly be preferved in the manner you fup
pofe ; but whether the Confcioufnefs of its being
done by Me, by my own Individual Self in par
ticular, could in this manner be continued. .
Now how it was in me a begging of the Queftion,
to argue, that, even on Suppofition of the
Poffibility of the Hypothefis now mentioned,
yet it would neverthelefs be impoffible foryou
from thence to make out the Conclufion you
were to prove ; I confefs, I underftand not :
Neither do I underftand how you can prevail
upon your felf to difpute in fuch a Manner.
r J A Man,

426 A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
pag. 367. A Man, you fay, who, during a fhort Fren
zy, kills another, and then returns to himfelf,
without the leaft Confcioufnefs of what he has done ;
cannot attribute that Atlion to Himfelf; and there
fore the mad Man and the fober Man are really
two as diftintl Perfon as any two other Men in
the World, and will be fo confidered in a Court ofi
Judicature. Extraordinary Reafoning indeed!
Becaufe in a figurative Senfe a Man, when he
is mad, is faid not to be Himfelf; and in aforen-
fick Senfe, is looked upon as not anfwerable
for his own Atlions ; therefore in the Natural
and Philofophical Senfe alfo, his Atlions are not
his own Atlions ; but another Perfon' s ; and the
fame Man is really two diftintl Perfons !
pag- 368. You add : Should there be fo filrong a Repre
fentation to my Underftanding, of a Murder done by
me, which was really never done at all ; fo that
I could not diftinguifh it in my Mind from fome
thing really done by me; I can no more help attri
buting this to my felf, &c. It is true, I could
not help it indeed ; But it would be ( as Mr.
See ^d Def. Locke well expreffes it, ) a fatal Errour; and
pH- 39s' • not ( as you would have it ) a making me to
p»gWi68. be reaI,y the Perfon i arn not- So that 'lt ^
evident (you go on,j that Self or Perfonal Identity
confifts folely in Confcioufnefs, though a falfe one ;
that is, it confifts in a Falfe Reprefentation, in
. a Dream, as Mr. Locke well expreffes it again.
And fo all Mankind, it feems, are nothing
but a Dream : Unlefs rather your Opinion it
felf be a Dream ; as, I prefume, it will be
found to be, by every Man whofe Reafon is
awake.
pag. 3159 The refioring, you fay, tbe Power of Thinking
to the fame or to a different Body at the Refur
reclion, with a Memory or Confcioufnefs extending te

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 427
to paft Ailions, will be a raifing the fame Perfon
and not a Creation of a new one. If fo ; then
the reftoring the like Power of Thinking to
Twenty different Bodies with a falfe Memory
( a Dream, ) or a Confcioufnefs extending to
imaginary paft Actions, will be a making
them all ( as I faid, and as you exprefsly al- pag . 369.
low, ) to be, not Perfons like one another,
but one and the fame individual Perfon, at the
fame time that they continue different, intelli
gent, rational Men. That is to fay, if twenty
of your Clocks happen to go exactly alike,
they are no more twenty Clocks, but one and
the fame individual Clock,
Your Diftinction between raifing thefiame Per* Ibid.
fon and creating a new One, is a Diftinction
without any the leaft Difference. For the
Memory or Conficioufhefis extending to paft Atlions,,
which you fuppofe makes the fame Perfon in
the one Cafe; does exactly as well make the
fame Perfon in the other Cafe : It being evir
dently as eafy for God to add an imaginary
Conficioufhefis extending to pafi Atlions that never See Anf-
were, to a new created Body now ; as to add f' 3<S8
an imaginary \ Conficioufhefis extending to paft Act
tions that were done by one Body, to another Body
at the RefurretJion. So that from your Opini
on it unavoidably follows, that I may now at
this prefent Time as poffibly be created anew,
and have another Self, exifting at the fame time
with me, by God's adding to the Underftanding see AnC,
of a new-made Body fo ftrong a Reprefentation PfS- 367
of my paft Adtions, that That Other My-felf & 36S*
could not diftinguifh them in his Mind from things
really done by him ; ( as you exprefs your felf in
z like Cafe * ) This, I fay, is exactly as pof-
' ' fibks

428. A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
fible, in your Hypothefis ; as it. is for me to
be raifed again at the Refurredtion.
£.370,371, Your Argument, by which you endeavour
& 3 75- to retort upon me, that, according to my
Notion of Individual Perfonality, there can
be no Refurredtion, nor any fuch thing as per
fonal Identity at all ; is founded upon a falla
cious Reprefentation, as if, by the fame indivi
dual numerical Confcioufnefs, I underftood the
fame individual numerical Atl of Thinking:
Whereas the individual numerical Confcioufnefs,
which Identifies the Perfon, .is that Perception,
by which the Perfon is fenfible, thas his Paft
Alls of Tbinking were his own Thoughts and" not
another's ; Which Perception, in the fame con
tinued Being, is a true Memory, and can be
true in that one numerical Being only ; But in
your fleeting Being, it would be a falfe Me- .
mory, a mere Delufion, and might be impreffed,
on any number of Beings at one and the fame
time: All which, diftindt, intelligent,, ratio
nal Beings, becaufe they happened to be in the
pig- 37^- fame Dream, you would affirm to be one and
the fame individual Perfon ; And, for the
fame Reafon, if twenty Pieces of Money hap
pen to be ftampt with fo like an Impreffion, o
that they could not be diftinguifhed one from.
another ; you muft affirm them all to be one
and the fame Individual Shilling, notwithftand
ing their being different Pieces of Silver.
/> 371,373. Having granted, that if ever fo many Think
ing Beings have ( not one and the Same numerical
Confcioufnefs, as by your Comparifon of a vaft
Mlk of fenfelefs Matter being added to a Man's
Body, you would very artfully infiauace, in
contradiction to the whole Courfe of your
Argument and moft exprefs Conceffions ; but)
having

and Natural Immdr tality of the Soul. %z$
having granted, I fay, and contended, that if
¦ ever fo many diftintl Thinking Beings have within
themfelves a Like Confiioufinefis, or a Like pre
fent Reprefentation of paft Atlions, they can all
conftitute but one and the fame Perfon ; You ask
me, Whether each of thefe diftinct Thinking
Beings muft not unavoidably think himfelf the
fame Perfon that did the Action, and the fame
Perfon that every one of the reft will likewife
diftinctly think himfelf to be ? I anfwer, as be
fore ; They muft indeed unavoidably think fo ; See above,
But in fo doing, they muft alfo unavoidably beP"£- 42<5-
miftaken : And fo, according to your Notion,
we are all vnavoidably we know not who, and do
but fancy and dream our felves to be the Per
fons we think we are, and write and read about
we know not Whom nor What.
To your taking Refuge in the Juftice of God, sd Def-
I have already anfwered; thatthe Queftion is ^' 29*"
not, whether God will do an abfurd thing, but
whether in the Nature of Things it be poffible
-to be done. And whereas you alledge that ifMmr,
God Jhould caufe to exift twenty prefent RepreA*g' ^73*
fentations of the fame paft finful Anions info many
diftintt Beings, the confequent Punifhment would b°
twenty times as much as the finful Atlions deferved •
and his Juftice required; and that therefore God
will not do any fuch thing : I reply ; The Dif
ficulty does not lie there ; Becaufe the Punifh
ment due to the fingle Perfon's finful Actions,
might be divided proportionably among the
¦ twenty diftinct intelligent Beings , which in
your way are One and the Same Individual Per
fon ; and fo according toyou, there would be no
Injuftice done, becaufe the Punifhment would
not be more than the Offences deferved : And
yet it is manifeft, that in reality, Nineteen at
leaft

430 A Fourth ^Defence of the immateriality
leaft of thefe Twenty diftinct intelligent Be
ings would be punifhed unjuftly, how fmall i.
proportion foever they bear of the Punifh
ment ; becaufe they would be punifhed for
what they had never been guilty of at all,
however by a falfe Conficioufhefis they might
imagine themfelves to have done what they ne
ver did.
f-374-37*- The Cafe you put, of a Perfon living well
for fome Years, and afterwards forgetting that
he had done fo, and then living for the future
in all manner of Debauchery ; is fo far from
being an Abfurdity, as you call it, upon my
Notion of Perfonal Identity ; that, on the con
trary, there is no manner of Difficulty in its.
The Man is not two Perfons, as much as any
two Men in the World are two Perfons ; ( which
you declare he muft be, in Confequence of
your Principles ; A Confequence fufficient to
have convinced almoft any Man, of the Fal-
fity of the Principles from which he fees and
owns fuch an Abfurdity to follow ; ) But he is,
I confefs, ( as you add in the next Words, ) as
much two Perfons, as thefiame Man Mad and So
ber is two Perfons ; that is, he is not at all two
• Perfons, but plainly one and the fame Perfon ;
and fhall juftly be punifhed as his Iniquities de-
ferve.
*,wj,,7. You urSe- that my Argument is no more
P-35 >3f /• ufefu- to tne j?nds 0f Religion, than yours ; be
caufe, unlefs the Soul, as an Immaterial Being,
did perpetually Think ; a Proof of the Immate
riality of the Soul, would not neceffarily prove
a future State of Rewards and Punifhments : And
upon this you are pleafed to make your felf
merry, in a very needlefs Manner. Now what
4 Con-

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. \ifk
Connexion there is between the Soul's Imma
teriality, and its Perpetual Thinking ; has been
confidered elfewhwe. In this place it may be
fufficient to add, that whether the Immateriality
and Immortality of the Soul neceffarily infers
its perpetual actual Thinking, or not, yet my
Argument is evidently ufeful to Religion, by
proving at leaft the Poffibility. and great Probar
bility of a future State of Rewards and Punifh
ments ; And yours is evidently deftrutlive of
Religion, by making a Future State of Rer
wards and Punifhments not only Improbable^
but Impoffible ; feeing it infers ( as I have at
large fhown ) an abfolute Impoffibility of a Re
furreclion ofi the fame Perfon ; And if a Refur
rection were poffible, yet, by introducing fuch
an abfolute and fatal Neceffity of all human
Actions, as Mr. Hobbes and Spinoza formerly
attempted to eftablifh by the fame numerical
Argument, ( though from your Thinking in the
fame way, I would not conclude you All to
be the fame Individual Perfon ; ) it manifeftly
makes all future Reward unreafionable, and all
Punifhment unjufi : Of which more immediately.
My firft Argument to prove your Notion
deftrudtive of Religion, was, that by inferring
tbe Neceffity of all Human Actions, it makes Men
to be Subjetls no more capable of Religion, than
Clocks and Watches are.
To this you reply, Firft, that Thinking's be- Anfwer U
ing a Mode of Motion in any Syflem of Matter, Zd Def-
(which is the Suppofition I refer to, that de-?^' 3S *
ftroys all Liberty of Will,) is no where af
firmed by you. But this is a mere Quibble ; as
I have fhown at large, ThirdDefence, pag. 270,
271, And above, pag. 407, 408, In

432 A Fourth Defence of the immateriality
p. *?%• In the next place therefore, you anfwer feri-
oufly ; that Men and Clocks Agreeing in being
neceffarily determined in all their AtJions, does no
more prove them to be alike incapable of Religion ;
than an Immaterial Subfiance and a Clock's agree-
* See a- ing in being * extended, proves them to be alike in-
bove, capable of Religion. Had I not feen it, I could
f*S- 397- not have believed that either you or any rea
sonable Man could have given fuch an Anfwer.
Neceffity, if Men and Clocks agree in it, muft
make them both alike incapable of Religion ;
becaufe Neceffity is the very thing, that makes
any Being incapable of Religion : But Exten
fion, fuppofing Immaterial Subftance and Clocks
to agree in That, would not make Them
both alike incapable of Religion ; becaufe Ex
tenfion is not the thing, that makes any Being
incapable of Religion.
Neceffity, you muft reply, is not the thing
that ma'kes any Being incapable of Religion ;
What is it then, that incapacitates for Religi-
Anfwer, on ? Want ofi Underftanding, you, fay: For
fag. 358. Jf hat excludes a Clock from being a proper Subjeti
of Religion, but the Want of a human Under
ftanding ? and What is it that makes a Man a
proper Subjeti of Religion, but his Underftanding ?
I anfwer: It is notUnderftanding, but Will, that
makes a Man capable of Religion ; and it is
not Want of Underftanding, but Want of Will
and of a Power of ailing freely, that makes a
Clock incapable of Religion. For, fuppofing
a Clock to have the Underftanding ofa Man;
yet if, for all that Underftanding, it continued
to be moved by the Weights as neceffarily as it
is Now, it is manifeft it would Then have no
more Power of doing either good or evil, than
it has Now ; And the only Difference would be,

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 4 3 3
be, that it would then Know and underftand
it felf to be incapable of Religion, whereas
now it is incapable of Religion without under
ftanding or being fenfible that it is fo.
And to make it appear, that Neceffity in an
Intelligent, as well as in an Unintelligent Be
ing, incapacitates for Religion ; and that there
can be no Religion without Freedom ofi Will $
I offer only the following Argument. Religu
on fuppofes a future State of Rewards and Pu
nifhments ; and a future State of Rewards and
Punifhments, fuppofes that God is pleafed and
difipleafed with the different Actions of Men ;
and God's manifefting his difipleafure towards
certain Perfons by punifihing them finally, fup
pofes that fuch Punifhment is juft and that the
Perfons deferved it : For God cannot err. Now,
if Men, with all their Underftandings, were un
der the fame Neceffity in all their Actions, as a
Clock is in its Motions ; then, though you
would unreafonably imagin perhaps it might
ferve fome Defigns of human Government, to
pull and draw, to drive and pufh fuch neceffary
Agents with the Screws and Springs of Rewards
and Punifhments, as Men govern their Clocks
by the Addition and Subftraction of Weights ;
yet neither from the Hands of God or Men
could the good or evil Actions of fuch intel
ligent Machines Deferve either Reward or Pu
nifhment ; nor could there poffibly be any
Juftice in God's final Diftribution of Rewards
and Punifhments ; nor is there any Reafon
why any Man fhould reproach himfelf, or be
blamed by others, ( even by thofe who would
be fo unreafonable as to punifh the Machine, j
for any Profanenefs, Impiety or Wickednefs
whatfoever, for murdering a Man ( for inftance)
F f with

434 A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
with his Sword, when his Hand was moved ne
ceffarily to do it, by the Action of Subtle Matter
upon his Brain and Spirits ; any more than if
he had done it by another Man's forcibly ufing
his Hand and Sword: Neither is it poffible
that God fhould be pleafed or angry with any
Man, for doing what he could not avoid do
ing ; any more than a Man can be angry with
his Clock for going wrong, even fuppofing the
Machine indued with Underftanding enough,
to feel and be fenfible that its Weights necef-
fitated it to do fo. The Notion therefore you
maintain, of Mens Actions being all Neceffary,
is totally deftrudtive of Religion.
Till you can give a clear Anfwer to this Ar-
gument, you ftand obliged by Promife to al-
7 low that Man is no more a SubjetJ of Religion,
than a Clock ; nay, to go further, and allow that
there can be no fiucb thing as Religion. Though,
I hope, you will be better than your Word j
and own rather, that there is no fuch thing as
Neceffity.
pag. 363. Before we difmifs this Argument, you will
expect I fhould anfwer the two Queftions you
put to me ad hominem. Though indeed you
have no reafon to expect it ; becaufe you knew,
( but, for Reafons beft known to your Self,
took not the leaft Notice of it, ) that they
were Both of them diretJly and clearly anfwered
in the Places from whence you had them.
Firft, you defire Mr. Clarke, who maintains
( you fay ) the Certainty of all Events, to
fhow what different Influence the fuppofed Necef
fity of our Atlions can have on the Power of Self-
determination, that the Suppofition of the Cer
tainty of our Actions has not. I anfwer :
Your fuppofed Neceffity is directly contradictory
1 to

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 435
to the Power of Self-determination, and there
fore manifeftly inconfiftent with it ; But the Boom's
Certainty I fpeak of in the Place you cite, has Le<a- Vo1-
no Inconfiftency at all with the Power of Self-1' ,ftEd*
determination, becaufe it means (as is thereat."'9
largely explained ) only that mere Futurity, id Edit.
which you your felf muft confefs all Actions ***' ,69-
had while they were yet future, even upon Sup- ,7&*
pofition of the Power of Self-determination. For
you can fuppofe, what you will not grant, a
Power of Self-determination. And, I prefume,
you cannot deny but every paft Action had,
and every future Adtion has a Futurity, ( which
is all that was meant by Certainty of Event in
the Place now referred to, ) notwithftanding
that fuppofed Power of Self-determination.
Secondly; You ask, if ( as Mr. Clarke af- %^'s
firms ) the neceffary and eternal different Rela- 'i.e,ftEd
tions, which different things bear to one ano- pag. 276,
ther, always and neceffarily do determine the *»d *"-8-
Will of God ; and God is unalterably determi- ^Edir"
ned to do always what is beft in the whole ; ^ lQU
then how can he have a Power of Self-determina
tion ? I anfwer ; The Neceffity there fpoken of,
is only a Moral Neceffity ; which, as to the
Effetls, may be depended upon with infallible
Certainty, (viz. that a Wife Being will not adt
foolifihly, and a Good Being will not do Evil ; ) Ihitl lft
but, as to the thing it felf, it is in the natural Edit. pag.
and philofophical Senfe, ( of which we are now "4°. *37»
treating, ) no Neceffity at all, but mere Self-de- *+'* §£*
termination: As is at large explained in the id Edit.
Book you refer to. Which, if you would p^- 'IO'
have * taken to your felf the Charatler of an In- J^* j£»
genuous Adverfary, certainly you ought to haveIpI' &e.
taken fome notice of. For f when Terms are * A»f*>er
defined, and Inftances agreeing to thofe Definitions' °fft>f
F f 2 ' given, f f bid.
m- 33°»

436 A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
given',, whereby all Doubtfiulnefe about on f another's
Meaning is in the mofi effetlual manner excluded ;
To cite an Author's Words, notwithftanding
this, and apply them to a Senfe dire&ly con
trary to what the Author largely and exprefsly
explains he intends .they fhould be taken in, is
no fair way of managing a Controverfy.
My fecond Argument to prove your Notion
deftrutlive of Religion , was drawn from the
Confideration of the Nature of Perfonal Iden
tity, and of the Refurreclion of thefiame Perfon. s
^d Def. To which all the Reply you have made, has
pag, 288, been confidered already.
a8j>, &c. '
Anfwer, To your Argument, that, if we have no Idea
p»g. ill- of the Subftance of Matter and of the Subfiance of
Spirit, it is impoffible to prove that one is not the
ether ; It might be fufficient to Anfwer, that
an unprejudiced Perfon would be apt to think
it as eafy to prove, that there is a Subftance in
the World, of which we have no Idea, totally
different from the Subftance of Matter ; as that
there fhould be a Quality in Matter, of which
we have no Idea, totally different from all the
pag. 341. known Qualities of Matter. But to pafs this
over: I affirm, that from our Knowledge of
any Being's having certain Properties incom
patible with the Effential Properties of Matter,
we may certainly infer that the Subftance of
that Being and the Subftance of Matter are not
the fame, though we have no Ideas ofthe Sub
ftances themfelves. We have no Idea of In
finite ; and yet every Mathematician can de
monftrate concerning Many Infinites, that One
is not another ; and in fome, the exact Pro
portion between One and Another ; without having

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 4 3 7
having an Idea of either. And to your felf,
you fay, it is evident that God muft be an Imma- pag. 340.
terial Being, becaufe he is without Any of the
Properties of Matter : ( I hope you mean the
peculiar Properties of Matter ; Otherwife Ex
iftence will be one of its Properties, as much as
any of thofe you mention. ) The moft Effiential
Properties of Matter we know, are, I think,
Impenetrability , Divifibility, and that which
Mathematicians call its Vis Inertia:. If you
will fay, that though thefe Properties belong
indeed univerfally to all the Matter we have
any knowledge of, yet, for ought we know,
there may be other Matter which wants thefe
Properties ; and fo thefe Properties may pof
fibly not be Efifential, but only Accidental to
Matter ; Then, I fay, you either mean nothing
at all by the Word Matter, or elfe you mean
by it the fame as you do by the Word Sub
ftance; and then your affirming God to be
Immaterial, will be as much as affirming him pug. 34©.
to have no Exiftence. And, as to the Thinking
Subftance in Man ; When you fhall declare, that
by the Thinking Syftem of Matter in the Brain,
you mean a Syftem of fuch Matter, as has no
Impenetrability, no Divifibility, and no Vis
Iuertice; we fhall then difpute upon a new
Foot. In the mean time, nothing fieems clearer to you p«£. 381:
at prefent, than that the Effence or Subftance of
Matter confifts in Solidity ; and that, to be So
lid, is to be co-extended with the Parts of Space.
If fo ; Then the Omniprefent God cannot co-
exift with all the Parts of Space, without be
ing Material: And I defire you would be
pleafed in your next ; to Anfwer the Difficul
ties objected againft your Notion of God's Im-
F f 3 materiality%

438 A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
tnateriality as they are expreffed in the Paffage
Seeabove, \ before-cited out of the Effay concerning the Ufe
pug. 402. cy Humdne Reafim . fubftituting only the Words
[ co-exift with all the different Parts of Space ]
all along inftead of the Words [ co-exift with
all the Differences of Time, ] and [ Immenfity ]
inftead of [ Eternity.'] And this I infill on the
rather, and defire it the more earneftly ; becaufe
( as I before obferved,) it is. generally believed
that That Effay was written by a Perfon, with
whofe Reafoning ( for we are not to give any
deference to Authority), you are thoroughly
acquainted. As to what I faid againft material Impulfe be
ing the Caufe of Gravitation ; the Whole,
Anfwer, you fay, is founded on this, tbat becaufie a Bullet*
pag. 7$*.- a Feather, and a Piece of Leaf Gold defcend with
equal Swiftnefs in Vacuo, therefore material Im
pulfe cannot be the Caufe of Gravitation. Where
as, on the contrary, this was only an inciden
tal Inftance, to fhow by a grofs and vulgar
Experiment , ( what Mathematicians know
there are Proofs enough of in Nature, ) that
Gravity is exactly proportionable to the Quan
tity of Solid Matter contained in Bodies, and
not at all to the Quantity of their Superficies.
This Proportion it is, that evidently fhows
Gravitation not to be caufed by Material Im
pulfe. And unlefs you could have found an
Hypothefis, whereby either the Quantity of
Solid Matter in Bodies, and the Quantity of
their Superficies, could be made one and the
fame ; or, upon Mechanical Principles, Bodies
could, by Superficial Contact, receive Impulfes
proportional to the Quantity of Solid Matter
contained in them j you would much more ad-
vantagioufly

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 4 3 o
vantagioufly to your felf, have acknowledged
the firft palpable Errour ; than by a heap of
things befide the Purpofe, have endeavoured
to amufe only fuch Readers, as want Skill in
Mathematicks. My faying, that you endeavoured to infi
nuate to your Reader, that That excellent Per
fon, Sir Ifaac Newton, was of your Opinion in
the prefent Queftion.; you affiure the Reader, isP*£- 383.
a pure Fitlion. But I hope you will take it in
good part, that I was fo complaifant to you
as to imagine, that you were not your felf fo
fenfible of the Needlefnefis of your Citation out
of his Book, as you now acknowledge that
you were.
VOU tell us ; If we have not an Idea of tbe pag. 388.
Creation of Matter out of Nothing, we
tnuft inevitably conclude Matter a Self-exifient
Being : I anfwer ; By the fame Argument it
follows on the contrary, that if we have not
an Idea of the Self-exiftence of Matter, [ that is,
that every diftinct Particle of Matter in the
Univerfe, is a Neceffary, Independent, Self-
exifient Being, ] we muft inevitably conclude
Matter to be a Created Being : And by a better
Argument it follows ; if we have an Idea of
ihe Poffibility of the Non-exifience of Matter,
that is, if we have an Idea that Space can ( with
out a Contraditlion ) exift without Matter in it ;
we muft inevitably conclude Matter not to be a ne
ceffarily exifting, but a created Being. In like
manner : By the fame Argument with yours, it
follows, that, if we have not an Idea ( as * you * fag-i*,*-
own we have not ) of the Inherence of Thinking
in Matter, we muft inevitably conclude it to in
here in fomething Immaterial : And by a better
Argument it follows ; if we fee a Difiagreement
F f 4 °f

440 A Fourth Defence of the Immateriality
of Ideas in fuppofing Thinking to inhere in Mat
ter, we muft inevitably conclude it to inhere in
Immaterial Subfiance.
pxg. 385, What the reft of your loofe and uncertain
&c- Difcourfe about Creation and Self-ex'iftence tends
to, I do not well underftand : Only, I am
fure, it is foreign to our prefent Queftion. Yet
two things there are in it, which, I think, de-
ferve to be remarked incidentally. 1
The firft is ; that from thefe Words of mine,
[ On whatever Hypothefis they ( that is, Atheifis)
proceed, Nothing is fo certain, as that Man, con
fidered without the Protetlion and Condutl of a
fiuperiour Being, is in afar worfie Cafe, than upon
tbe Suppofition ofi the Being and Government of
God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Con
dutl, Protetlion and Favour ; J you moft uncan-
<g(S didly infer, that Alheifls,accordingto Mr. Clarke,
t**' even while they continue fo, have, no reafon to fear
any thing for their Disbelief.
pag, 386. The fecond, is this ; that, to gratify that
Defire which even Atheifis have to fee a Truth
eftablifhed, fo much for the Benefit ofi Men ; you
pag. 386- fhall conclude this Debate (you fay) with an
Effay, fhowing a way how to demonftrate the
pug. 387. Exiftence of God ; viz. by proving the Creation
of Matter out of Nothing: And this you do
mf sSo. ^ omitti»gfor ihe prefent fio ufefiul a Defign, and
f £' *» y leaving it entirely to feme pf thofe Gentlemen that
are appointed annually to preach at the Leclure
founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle.
Inftead of concluding therefore, as you
promifed, with an Effay flowing a way how to
demonftrate the Exiftence of God, you almoft in
the fame Breath repent of fo noble an Under
taking, and end your Difcourfe with a pre
tended

and Natural Immortality of the Soul. 44 f
tended Compliment to Me ; that you will give
me upon this Occafion a Tefiimony in my Favour ;
viz. that you verily think I neither believe too
litik nor too much ; but am perfetlly and exatlly
Orthodox, and in all likelihood will continue fo.
And confidering we have had ( you fay ) the pag. 353^
Happinefs in England , to have fuch rational
Parliaments and Convocations, that have eftablifhed
nothing but Truth ; I fhould have taken this as a
Teftimony very much in my Favour indeed %
had you not elfewhere dropt fome Expreffions
concerning proftituting Confiiencefo far as to fiub- pag. 350J
mit to any mere human Authority, and to the ibii^
Decifions and Determinations of thofe Men, that
in every Country have worldly Preferments ta
leftow : Which yet fince you make no Appli
cation of, neither fhall I. Only, in return
for your Favour, I fhall, inftead of giving any
Teftimony concerning Tou, conclude with moft
hearty Wifhes, that you would be very care
ful, while you are difputing ahoutMetaphyficksr
not to oppofe the Intereft of true Religion and
Virtue, without which nothing is truly valua
ble or praife- worthy among Men.

POST-

t 44* 1
POSTSCRIPT.
WHEREAS there has lately been pub-
lifhed a rude and fcurrilous Book, en
titled, The Holy Spirit the Author of Immorta
lity, Or, A Vindication of Mr. Dodweli'." Epifi-
tolary Difcourfe.
Which Vindication the Learned Mr. Dod
weli has been fo far from difapproving, ( as
there was Reafon to expect he fhould have
done, ) that on the contrary he has referred to
ThI^aI- jt in the followinS Wol"ds. The Defence of
count of w^at I have formerly produced from the Fathers,
the eternal I left to the Abler Advocate for my Caufe, raifed
Rewards or upfor me fry Divine Providence. And again : /
menu 'fa.fhould now have proceeded to have Vindicated my
pag. i. & Interpretation of, &c. if God himfelf had not
pag. 191. partly fiupeffieded that part of my Work, by raifing
me up a more Able Patron  that fib Excel
lent a Perfon, fo utterly unknown to me, fhould
prevent me with a Defence fo much Better than
I could have made for my felf ,~  Heave fo much
of  my Task, to him who is fo much Fitter/or
it  It looks to me, like a Divine Interpofition,
pag. 193. &c. And again : How much I am indebted to
Providence that has appeared on this Occafion, and,
to the Worthy Inftrument who has fo readily an
fwered the Call of Providence, &c.
It cannot therefore be improper nor unfea-
fonable, to give the World a few Inftances of
the Great Abilities That Author has difcovered
in his fo highly commended Performance. In

X

POSTSCRIPT. 44J*
In that Part which relates to
the Fathers.

THEY (faith he) [the Philofophers ] vkjiM.
maintained it [the Immortality of t:e<" Ms-
Soul ] by way of Anticipation, by the Ihftindt of D^""e11'*
tj ¦, c •'• ' ' £ ' J Ep'ftoliry
Evil Spirits. 4^/ Preiace,
To what purpofe, the pretended natural Im- P*s' *7i
mortality ? To exift vitally for ever, for nothing !
The Original Belief of a Natural Immortality, p»g- 43-
fuggefted by the Devil, was a Lie.
* 'Ov $ <*y ioTi.5 "«¦* « £*;>', a<« t5 ©«S. [ Thus ren* Vitidicat.
dred, very learnedly. ] It is notfio of it felf to P- 6- 7-
live, as it is of God.
* i. e. ihe Soul hath not Life from It felf, as Cod has
from Himfelf.
'Atue-ctTii ifi t« #iirT6»toT<&' trugxlis, smsS/ahs yi & xattu. pag, 8, io.'
The Refurreclion is of the Flefh that fell; for
the Spirit doth not fall  What then? Ifit
doth fomething * analogous ta falling, it is as
much to our Purpofe.
* That is, if it dies, though without falling to the Ground,
as the Body does. A very learned Diftinftion.
The Soul in its natural Separation  ,?*£• u>
though Alive, is no more to the Man, than the
Dead Carkafs. '"No

444. POSTSCRIPT.
pag. ij. No created Beings can be naturally immortal,
becaufe by being fuch they would be * Equal unto
God, not inferiour or fubject to him, but inde
pendent on him.
* Contrary to common Senpe, and to tht exprefs Dedal
rations of All that defend the Soul's Natura I Immortality.
£*£• *-7~' Quemadmodum igitur Apofiolus, &c.  Sic
«y Deus, &c. [ Thus rendred, without any
Senfe. ] Whereas the Apoftle, &c.  So God,
&c.
f»g. 4<*> * In eo quod dicunt, &c. [ Thus tranflated,
with no Senfe.] At the fame time they affirm, &c.
* i. e. In or by their affirming.
pag. 47* If [ the Soul be] a God in one refpedt, or as
(andzd t0 * Qne Attribute ; why not as to all the reft ?
jart, * y-Zi a Q.eate(j immortality, owing wholly to the
tV- **J Good Pleafure of God.
tag. 6t. Though he [ Athenagoras] fays indeed, that
Men have Perduration without any Interruption,
with refpect to the Soul ; yet this is not to be
taken in a proper, but in a * figurative Senfe.
* What is living for ever, in a figurative Senje ?

fag. i zo^

Then from this Opinion [of the Soul's natu
ral Immortality, ] it will follow that its Life
is * neceffary, or its Exiftence ; and why not
its Propenfeons and Inclinations ? If fo ; then
the Man is in Confequence Incapable of Sin, and
no way Obnoxious to Judgment or Penalties on
that account. — — Then hence it will follow,
that to be Virtuous or Vigioust is an Indifferent
thing, &V.
* Nothing lefs. * E^

POSTSCRIPT. 445
* Ex rebus igitur diverfis ac repugnantibus pag. u&
HOMO fadtus eft ; ut, fi-fcfc, -Ll flt im. ' *
mortalis. Si autem, &c.  fit in tenebris
fempiternis & in morte. [Thus rendred] f The
SOUL is made of different and repugnant
Principles : So that, if fcrV ; IT fhould be
Immortal : But and if, cxrV ; SHE fhould be
in everlafting Darknefs and Death.
* i. e. MAN is made up of two different and contrary
Tarts, ( viz. Soul and Body .• ) That if, &c ; then H E (hould
be immortal, and enjoy perpetual Light: But if, &c ; then
HE (hould be in everlafting Darknefs and Death. The
Effect of which Death is not to Kill wicked Souls, but to
punilli them eternally; eye. And much more follows to
the fame Purpofe.
f Note, In the Errata he has put [Man] for [the Soul.-}
But even That Corre&ion does not make the whole Senfe
right. lam fenfible this Paraphrafe of mine, will -^ .-,
be looked upon as Forced, by the * Prejudiced *
and Ignorant : But I matter not That.
* That is, by all but Himfelf.
Tunc cum Anima focietate Corporis libera- ta ,,
ta, in folo Spiritu vivit: When the Soul beings 131.
delivered from the Society of this Earthly Body,
lives or exifts in the Spirit alone. That is, ( fup
pofing Latlantius to fpeak in a Chriftian Senfe; )
when the Soul and Body Both fhall be Spiritua ¦
lized, Immortalized, &c.
* i. e. In Mr. Dodwell's Senfe.
Homo configuratus eft ex  Animo, 8zpag] 146.
Corpore ;  iEterno, ac Temporali : Man
isfa/hioned, of,  Soul and Body,  Eter
nal and Temporal, &c. There may be fome
Advantage taken from this Place, I forefee :
But I think it is eafily anfwered by this Dif
tinction :

446 POSTSCRIPT.
tindtion : Either Latlantius here argues from
Principles allowed by the Philofophers ; Or
elfe * owns an Actual Eternal Principle in Man,
refulting from the Spirit of God, the t» &>~a>,
the quid divinum, fuperadded by Baptifm.
* i e. Suppofing him, again, to fpeak in Mr. PodwellV
Senfe; it uilf then follow indeed, that he does fpeak in
Mr. Dodwell'j Senfe.
7.141,144. Cum poffet femper fpiritibus fuis immorta-
libus innumerabiles animas procreare, fieut An-
gelos genuit : Whereas he might always have pro
created innumerable Souls with their Immortal
Spirits, as he generated the Angels. I cannot
queftion, whilft he * mentions Spirits in Con
junction with Souls as caufes of their Perdura-
iion, and immortalizing them ; but he means
their being united with the Eternal Divine Spi
rit ; And becaufe He is collated on every Indi
vidual in Baptifm •, fpeaks of him improperly,
as if He was a particular Spirit to every Soul
that is Immortalized.
* Ihe Author evidently means no fuch thing.
pug. 73. 'H "5 tiXoyuv [tyvzii ]  faiyuoc ifsu.

awttiroGvytTiiei T£*i ffu/jcuTt ' — t5 ">' 4v6pftwg »") "tu^ij,
«£.'?«-? v%dp%Ei nut xreXevrviToc. [ Thus inter
preted. ] The * irrational Soul ,

earthly as to its Orgination, — — dieth together
with the Body : But the Soul of ( The "Avflpawoc
or ) Man, ( under fuch Limitations as are here
f fuppofed of  being united with and under
the Guidance pf the Spirit, )  exifts for ever,
and fhall have no End of its Exiftence.
* The Soul of irrational Creatures, he fhould have ren
dered it.
f Suppofed by his own Imagination. Evi/flfiTOC

POSTSCRIPT. 447
EevteTos 6 uvfyuvos, **«' sx <".,t*\Ss, sTe'S c>of <&*& K?« l17-
t<xS i' to* f'(x\J/u^8 : [Thus explained.] Man is
a compounded, not a fimple Being, not confifting of
fimilar Parts, but of an incorporeal Mind ( or
Spirit,) [he doth not fay, ^atf, Soul,] and of
a Concupifcible Body or animated by -py^tj,
Soul ( Excellently difiinguifhed! )
I am well aware that fome maybe ready to carp pag. 179;
at this my Paraphrafiical Verfeon ; viz. that it is
Forced and Extorted. All I fhall fay by way of
Anticipation, is only this ; that either the Senfe I
have given, is genuine ; or that it is impoffible to
reconcile it to a* Chriftian Senfe.
* That is, to Mr- Dodwell's Senfe. And fo every Au
thor muft needs fpeak Mr. Dodweli*^ Senfe ; or elfe the fame
great Abfurdity will certainly follow, \YL. that he does not
fpeak. Mr. Dodweli j Senfe.
Granting any Being to be actually Immortal, — pag. 234:
there is no need of fuppofing it any further de
pendent on its Creator for Exiftence ; but is now
as Self-fufficient and Independent ; as That Be
ing that produced it.
Had he been fo created, Man would have been a pag. 235.
God. The natural Immortality of any created Being, pag. i3(jQ
will imply * neceflary Exiftence to all Eternity
a parte poft, as much as of God himfelf.
* Nothing lefs.
To fay that the Soul is naturally Immortal, pug. 237s
and can in its own Nature, in Confequence of the
Defign of God in its Creation, perfevere in vi
tal Exiftence for ever, and fhall never die ; is to
make

448 POSTSCRIPT.
make it in aftritl and proper Senfe neceffarily-
exiftent, independent, and its Death it felf or
Annihilation impoffible even to* -Omnipotence
itfielf. * Though it exifts only in Confequence of God's Defign
and Will in creating it ; as is exprejfed in the very fame
Sentence.

In the Other Part.
P*2' 37* O ^ ^ a Cr'lttctfer (he fays ) as Mr. Clarke,
J3 Iforefee may take fome Advantage of my *
feeming Mifapplication of this Text : But, &c.
* Nay, very real.
Might not this very Notion [ the Heathens
Notion ] of The One God, terminate even in the
Devil himfelf, the very Source of Errour and Ido
latry ?
t*Z' 74. ^*s Preieflded univerfal Confent of the Hea
thens, of owning One God, -the Creator of all
things ; in them is plainly a Lie, though in Us
the grandeft Truth : Becaufe by this One God *,
they meant the Devil.  The aclual Knowledge
of God, mufi be from Revelation, either by God
or the Devil ; nay, by Both ; and cannot be ob
tained by mere Natural Light. And that this
two-fold Revelation, csV.
* God forbid.
pag. 135- Hath Mr. Clarke* proved  that Men are
any way I N T ER E S S E D in the Vital Ex
iftence of the Soul after Death, any more than in
their dead Bodies ? Or

POSTSCRIPT. 440
Or can he * prove — ,  that the "Avfya*®* pag. 135-
[ the Man ] is Concerned in the happy or mife
rable Exiftence of one Effential Fart, fuppofe the
Soul ; whilft the other [ the Body ] is in a
State of Infenjibility ? Or [ that the Man is con
cerned ] in the happy or miferable State o/Both
the effential Parts, whilft atJually feparated from
each other ?
* One would think, thefe needed no proof.
So then we have gained One Soul ; The other pug, 135.
[ the Rational] he muft yield us ; Then here are
Two Souls, &c.
Is it poffible for a Compofi turn to confift of con- p. 146, 14.7
trary conftituent Parts ? Would it not be mon-
ftrousfor Man to confift of two effential conftituent
Parts, whereof one is dead, the other alive ; or
one Subjedt to Diffolution, the other not ? Or, is
it not certain thatthe Soul is naturally mortal *,
BECAUSE the Body is ? Or, is it not cer
tain, that  Both his conftituent effential Parts,
as animal and reafonable, mufi partake of the fame
Nature as to Mortality and Immortality ? Is
not this SELF-EVIDENT as to both States,
This and the future ?
* A moft clear and felf evident Confequence indeed !
What fignifies the feparate* VITAL exiftence p*g- -49.
ef ihe Soul, to the Man ? If the *a,$?„v& [ the
Man ] be dead, the Soul is dead to him as atJu
ally as the Body, &c.
* That is ; there is, no difference between Alive and Dead.
When he [Adam] was punifhed for \\\%t*g- *57-
Tranfgreffion,  The Breath of Life, that
is, the Spirit of him who faith lam the Life,
G g with^

450 POSTSCRIPT.
withdrew from this Flefh of an earthly Original,
and the Animal dropt into Death -, the Immor
tality of the Soul being preferved, becaufe it
was only faid to the Flefh., Duft thou art, &c.
Cyril. Alex. ] Here I can confefs, St Cyril dif
fers fomewhat ; but agrees, in tbe main  that
the Immortality of the Soul was preferved., becaufe
he fuppofes the Spirit * did not recede from It.
* That is to fay, The Soul at Death did not recede
from the Soul, as it did from the Body.
pag. ig6. Neither did thefe Antient Philofophers, as our
Immaterialifts, opine, that the Spirituality or
Immateriality of any Being argued its Rationali
ty, or on the other Hand its Rationality argued
its Immateriality in the Senfe of our Neotericks,
or that its Spirituality inferred its Immortality.
At this rate, the very HTHER.MJWINDS
would be Rational and Immortal.

Thefe are fome few of the innumerable In
ftances of the Singular Abilities ofthat Author,
whom the Learned Mr. Dodweli fo highly com
mends. Whoever cafts his Eye upon this Spe
cimen, it is prefumed will not expedt that any
One fhould think it worth his while, to fol
low more particularly fo firangely ftupid a
Writer, through twice Two Hundred Pages
of thick Darknefs, even Darknefs that may be
felt.

SOME

SOME
REFLECTIONS On that Part of a Book called
AMYNTOR, O R T H E
Defence of M i l t o n*s Life,
Which relates tothe Writings of the
PRIMITIVE FATHERS
AND
The Canon of the New Teftament,
In a Letter to a Friend.
LONDON:
Printed in the Year M DCC XXXI.

[ 45*3 ]

SOME
REFLECTIONS
On that Part of a Book called
AMYNTOR, &c.

SIR,
H E Defign which the Author of
the Defence of Milton'.? Life pro-
feffes that he had, in writing that
part of his Book which relates
to the Writings of the Primitive
Fathers, and the Canon of the
New Teflament, was only to vindicate him
felf from the Charge of denying the Scripture
and declaring his Doubt tbat feveral Pieces un
der the Name of Chrifi and his Apoftles, received
now by the whole Chriftian Church, are fuppofe ti-
tious ; by fhewing that what he had faid in the
Life of Milton, concerning the Spurioufnefs of
feveral Pieces under the Name of Chrifi and his
Apoftles, was meant not of thofe Writings
which are now received by the whole Chriftian
Church, but of thofe Apocryphal Pieces, which
were in many places received and approved in the
Primitive Times. This is what the Author
G g 3 profeffes

454 Some RefleBions on that Tart
profeffes to be the only Defign of this part of
his Book : And though for his own fake I
cannot but heartily wifh it were really no o-
ther ; yet becaufe there are feveral Paffages,
wherein he either fo expreffes the very flight
Efteem that he has for the Primitive Fathers,
as feems to refledt upon our Religion it felf ;
or raifes fuch Doubts about the Authority of
the Canon of the New Teftament, as Here*-
ticks (to ufe his own words) may draw mifi-
chievous Inferences from, and by which Scruples
may be put into the Minds of Sincere Chriftians ;
I have therefore fent you fuch fhort Remarks
as upon reading the Book have occurred to me,
and as I hope may be of fome ufe to others on
this Occafion.
The Principal Propofitions which our Au
thor maintains, and which I thought moft to
deferve Confideration, are thefe three.
Pag. 38. Firft, That the Books afcribed to the Difciples
39- and Companions of the Apoftles, which are ftill
extant, and at this time thought genuine, and ofi
great Authority ; fuch as the Epifile ofi Clemens
to the Corinthians, the Epiftles of Ignatius, the
Epiftle of Polycarp to the Philippians, the Rafter
of Hennas, and the Epiftle of' Barnabas ; ( for
about the reft which he mentions, there is no
great Controverfy ; ) are all very eafily proved
to be fipurious, and fraudulently impofed upon the
Credulous.
pag. 38. Secondly, That it is the eafiefi Task in the
World, te fhew the Ignorance and Superftition of
pag. 45-. the Writers of thefe Booh: That Barnabas has
many ridiculous Paffages ; and by faying that the
Apoftles before their Converfion were the greateft
Sinners in Nature^ robs us of, an Argument we
draw

of a Book called Amyntor, &c. 455
draw from their Integrity and Simplicity againft In
fidels : That the Paftor of Hermas is the fillie/l
Book in the World: And that Ignatius fays, the pag. 46.
Virginity of Mary was a Seeret to the Devil ;
which, I fuppofe, he cites as a ridiculous
Saying. Thirdly, That they who think thefe Books ge
nuine, ought to receive them into the Canon of
Scripture, fince the reputed Authors of them
were the Companions and Fellow-labourers of the
Apoftles, as well as St. Mark, or St. Luke,
which is the only reafon he ever heard of, why pag. 4s.
thefe two Evangelifts are thought Infipired, For
to fay that thefe Books ought not to be received now
into the Canon, becaufe the Ancients did not think
fit to approve them, is but a mere Evafion ; fince
many Books now received as Canonical, were not
approved by the Ancients ; and feme received by the pag. 571
Ancients, are now rejetled by the Moderns ; and
Mr. Dodweli owns, that antiently no difference pig. 73.
was put by the Church between the Apocryphal and
Canonical Books of the New Tefiament : and be
fides, no ftrefs can be laid on the Teftimony of the
Fathers ; fince they not only contraditl one ano- pag. 80.
ther,- but are often inconfiftent with themfelves in
their relations of the very fame Fails ; were di- pag 56.
vided into various Seels, who in thofe early Days
did, like us, condemn one another for damnable
Hereticks; ufed to reafon precarioufly, (as Ire- p. 50, p.
nseus the famous Succeffor of the Apoftles, argues
from the four Regions of the World, and the four
Winds, that there cannot be more nor fewer tha,n
four Gofpels ) and give hard Names to thofe who
contemn fuch precarious Reafoning.
Thefe are the principal Aflertions of our
Author, which becaufe they feem to me not
G g 4 only

4 j 6 Some RefleBions on that Tart
only to be falfe, but alfo to be propofed with
too bold a Liberty of paffing Cenfures upon
the Judgment both of the ancient and modern
Church; I fhall therefore in anfwer to them,
and for a Vindication ofthe Primitive Fathers
and Modern Doctors of the Chriftian Church,
with Submiffion advance thefe three Propo
fitions. Firft, That though we are not infallibly cer
tain that the Epiflles of Clemens, Ignatius, Po-
lycarp, and Barnabas, with the Paltor of Her-
mas, are Genuine ; yet that they are generally
believed to be fo, upon very great Authority,
and with very good Reafon.
Secondly, That therefore, though they are
not received as of the fame Authority with
the Canonical Books of the New Teftamenr,
yet they ought to have a proportionable Vene
ration paid to them, both with refpect to the
Authors, and to the Writings themfelves.
Thirdly, That neither the Belief of the Ge-
nuinenefs of thefe Books, nor the Refpect paid
to them as fuch, docs in the leaft dminifh from
the Authority of the Nciv leflament, or tend to
make the Number of ihe Canonical Books Uncer
tain or Precarious.
I. Firft, That though we are not infalli
bly certain that the Epiftle of Clemens, fgna-
tius, Polycarp, and Barnacis, with the Paftor
of Hernias, are Genuine ; yet that they are
generally believed to be fo, upon very great
Authority, and with very good Reafon.
t. The

of a Book called Amyntor, &c.
I. The Epiftle of Clemens * great

4J7

o/AcXcyufS^ii p'm sxifoyu <pLi-
tcu, ptykM n £ S-»ou.eurm.
Eufeb. Hift. 1. 3. c. 16.
Id- 1. 3. c. 38.
lyMmrant vp«s^»). Id. J. e.
c 6. ex Irensro, I. 3. 3. c. 3,
f Jkvtw ¦-) y^ <i „te,'rtUi gj,.
&p£W srkiMnt xai wsS-' (Ju^
.Wi,? 'yi^/ty. Id- I.3. 1. I(J.

to the Corinthians, a
and wonderful Epiftle, faith
Eufebius, was unanimoufiy and
without any Controverfy re
ceived by the antient Church ;
and . f read publickly in moft
Churches, both antiently, and
in his time. And that the
Epiftle now extant is the
fame with that which was fo
commended by the Antients,
has not been queflioned by any Learned Man
thefe many Years, and has been lately proved
at laVge by the Learned DotJor Wake in his Ge
nuine Epiftles of the Apoftolical Fathers, and by
Grabius in his Spicilegium, p. 261. whom I fhall
not now tranfcribe.
2. That Ignatius wrote fe
veral Epiftles, || one to the
Ephefians , one to the Magne-
fians, one to the Trallians, one
to the Romans, one to the
Philadelphians, one to the Smyr-
nceans, and one to Polycarp ;
Eufebius exprefsly teflifies ;
quoting a large Paffage out of
his Epiftle to the Romans,
which Paffage is now extant
word for word in that Epiftle, being publifhed
with the reft above-mentioned. And that all the
Epiftles now extant under thefe Titles, are the
fame with thofe mentioned by the Antients ;
is fufficiently proved by the very Learned
Bifhop Pierfon in his Vindicice, Cotelerius, and
others. -?. The

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c 35-, 36.

3 5 8 Some RefleBions on that Tart
3. The Epiftle of Polycarp to the Philippi-
ans, is mentioned by * IrenGus
* tib. 3. c. 3. that knew him living, and by
t H'fi- '¦ 3- '• 3<S- + Eufebius, J. iftmwj and o-
+ la CataUgo, &c. ^ whofe+Teftimonies fet
down at large by Cotelbrius I need not trans
cribe: And that the Epiftle now extant under
his Name, at leaft the greateft Part of it, is
the Genuine one, is acknow-
'*] See Dr. Wake's Genuine ledged by || all Writers e-
Epiflles, and Cotelenus, n,ot?i ^ f ju<jgment ftnd
l.inEpiftolas Ignatu. T . J &
* ° qqo Learning.
4. The Paftor of Hermas is inconteftably a
moft antient Work, being cited by almoft all
the Primitive Fathers extant, that lived in or
near the fecond Century ;
* L. 2. a- 4- & 6. viz. by * Irenaus, by f Ter-
jDeO>at.cti vrdePutlic. tullian, by 4, Origen, by Clem.
+ mm.S. num. lib. 1, 1. j/«flffj, &c. whofe Teftimo-
t7"3 de Prracip Comment. . .
in Mat. mm. 37. i» Uc. nies are fet down at large by
multtff, aliis in lotis. Nicol. de Nourry at the End
of his Apparatus ad Bibliothe-
cam maximam vetentm Patrum, and prefixed to
the Oxford Edition of Hermas, and to that of
Cetelerius. Whether the Author of this Book
be the fame Hermas that is mentioned by St.
Paul, though it is affirmed by many of the beft
and moft judicious Writers, yet is it not fo
certain, nor of luch confequence, tbat we fhould
be obliged to defend it.
5. The Epiftle of Barnabas is alfo without
Controverfy antient, a Work of the Apofto-
lick Age, being quoted by
J) r\m. Me*. Strom. 2 <? ^ ft all ^ „ primkiw F
Strom < Onzen contra Celf. . " - -.
lib. 6, &t. wers *' as y°» raa7 fee hy the
Teftimonies fet down at large, in

of a Book called Amyntor, &c. 450
in all the fame Authors with the Teftimonies
concerning Hermas.
Upon thefe great Authorities then, though
we cannot be abfoJutely fure that thefe Writ
ings are Genuine, yet we mayJwell conclude
and believe them to be fo, notwfthftanding the
Sufpicions which fome have raifed tp the con
trary. There are alfo fundry other Argu^
ments, which may be drawn from the Sim
plicity of the Stile and Way of arguing ufed
in thefe Writings, agreeable to the Cuftom of
the Age in which they are fuppofed to be
written ; from the Conformity of the Matters
contained in them, to the Doctrine and Dis
cipline of thofe times ; and from the exact
Agreement of all the Quotations of the moft
antient Authors, to the Copies extant at this
Day : All which taken together, afford fo
good Reafon to believe thefe Books to be ge
nuine, that whofoever confiders them, may
very well wonder at the Confidence of Mr. Ta-A
who is pleafed to affirm that it is the eafieft Task
in the World to prove all thefe Writings fpurious,
and fraudulently impofed upon the credulous.
II. Secondly, Though thefe Writings are not
received as of the fame Authority with the Ca
nonical Books of the New Teftament, yet
ought they to have a proportionable Veneration
paid to them, both with refpect to the Authors
and to the Writings themfelves.
Clemens was a Companion of the Apoftles,
and Ignatius and Polycarp their immediate
Succeffors ; and if the Authors of the Epiftle
of Barnabas and of the Paftor of Hermas were
not the fame with the Fellow-Labourers and
Contemporaries of the Apoftles, known by
thofe

jp

4<5o Some RefleBions on that Tart
thofe Names, yet are they fo undeniably anti
ent, C being certainly of the firft Age, ) as to
challenge all the refpedt that can poffibly he
due to any Writers upon the Account of An
tiquity. And\as to the Writings themfelves,
though Mr. T. will not be perfuaded to grant
with the Learned Dr. * Wake,
* In his Difcourfe of the tjlat t^ey contain the true and
vrnTZV^. ^^ E" P^re Faith ofi Chrift, without
v ' r the leaft Errour intermixt with
it ; yet thisv-f .'¦ may be bold to affirm, that
in general they are fo far from betraying either
the Ignorance or Superftition of their Authors,
which Mr. T. fo confidently charges them
with, that they contain a very good Account
of that Dotlrine and Difcipline ofthe pureft
Ages of the Church, which all learned and
good Chriftians heartily wifh could be reftored
at this Day.
i. The Epiftle of Clemens is filled by Eufe
bius, C as I have already obferved ) a great and
admirable Epiftle ; and was publickly read in
the Chriftian Churches both before and in his
time : " And indeed it does not at all come
" fhort of the higheft Praifes which the An-
" tients have given to it ; being a Piece com-
" pofed with fuch an admirable Spirit of Love
«' and Charity ; of Zeal towards God, and of
" Concern for the Church ; of the moft ex-
" cellent Exhortations delivered with the
" greateft Plainnefs and Simplicity of Speech,
" and yet preffed many times v/ith fuch mo-
** ving Eloquence too ; that I cannot imagine
" what could have been defired in fuch an
" Epiftle, more proper for the End for which
" it was compofed ; what could have been
" written more becoming an Apoftolical Age,
" and

of a Book called Am'yntor, &c ". \6i
" and the Pen of one of the moft eminent
" Bifhops of it ". Thus the Learned Dr.
Wake.
His making the Scarlet Thread hung out by
.Rabab to the Spies, a Type of the Blood of
Chrift ; however it may poffibly feem ftrange
to fuch as Mr. T. was yet in the Opinion of
the Antients very agreeable to the Tenour of
.the Scripture, and particularly to that Type
of the Scarlet Wool, wherewith the Blood of
the Sacrifice was fprinkled on tftFPeople under
the Law, Heb. ix. 19. v"**1'
The Hiftory of the Phanix, mentioned in
this Epiftle, is confefledly a Fable. But he
that confiders that it was a Story at that time
generally told and believed, as Tacitus largely
relates ; and that the beft of Men never had
any Affurance of being preferved from vul
gar and innocent Errours ; will not be hafty in
<enfuring an excellent Man, and an excellent
Book, for making fuch a vulgar Errour the
Topick ot a popular Argument.
2. The Epiftles of Ignatius are written in
deed in a plain, fimple, and unaffected Stile ;
as are moft of the Books of the Holy Scrip
ture it felf : but, whatever Mr. T. fays, there
is nothing in them either of "Ignorance or Su-
perftition ; unlefs a Firm Relief of Divine Re
velation muft be efteemed Ignorance, and a
firitl Obfervance of the Laws of Chrift is to be
called Superftition.
One Paffage indeed there is in his Epiftle to
the Ephefians, which Mr. T. cannot but fmile
at : viz. that the Virginity of Mary and her De
livery, was kept infecret from the Prince of tbis
World.

* Sane Diabolum nrajus a-
liquid homine in CtaUb ag-
novilTe hoc quidem tempore,
conftanter, nee fine. magnimr-
gumentis, negant Scriptores
antiqui. Grot, in Mat. 4,3.

462 Some RefleBions on that Tart
World. But he that confiders the manner of
•our Saviour's Temptation, and how the An
tients conftantly, and ( in thejudgment ofthe
very Learned * Grotius ) not
without good Grounds, de
nied the Devil to have known
any thing at firft of the great
Myftery of the Incarnation,
will not for this Paffage con
demn Ignatius of Ignorance.
3. The Epiftle of Poly carp to the Philippi-
ans is a very valuable Monument of Anti
quity, containing nothing in it unworthy the
Character of fo great a Fa
ther, -j- Irenteifs ca'lls it a moft
compleat Epift'k ; out of which
they that are careful of their
own Salvarthn , may learn
what was the Belief of that
Apoftolica'l Man, and what
tfhe Form -of found Dotlrine.
which he delivered m his Preaching.
4. The Paftor of Hermas is a Book full of
very excellent Moral Inftriictions, delivered for
the inoft Part in eafy and natural Similitudes,
and thefe alfo explained at large to the Appre-
henfion of fhe .meaneft Capacities : For which
reafon, though it wa-s not received into the
Canon of Scripture, yet (as
Eufebius teftifies ) it || was
fudged by the Antients a moft
neceffary Book, efpecially for thofe
who were io be inftrutled in the
firft Principles ofi Religion ; and
was therefore accordingly read in
Churches : And Origen ( who "was far from
* in Rom. being an ignorant Man ) judges it to * be a moft
ttfeful

stss srpos >J>.Ai5fir>)a;«Ss yv/fUfAi-
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tfVTtq Tii{ iaoTati'S.a.THfiMi'oma.v-
rtti lAxh-Etii. Eufeb. Hift- ...4.
c. 14. ex Irenxo.

I Xlpoc tap Tt»m *s>TtXvXiic.TM
it Vi Ctm. a.11 c* ojJi/oXcynftlficii; rt-
S'tiD ii<p' Iticuv t £.KiyxMtCTt&Tt>v ,
ok uidXt^a on rct%iii>Hria<z tvra-
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ytjyiMS. Kixpti&t .t&sp noil tfy cv
tutaikvleui i<rpfp,avTo ^io\jA,ca-m-
(fip'w. F.ufeb. '.Hift. 1. 4. c. 3.

xvi. 14.

of a Book called Amyntor, &c. \6%
ufeful Books But Mr. T. faith it is the fillieft
Book in the World. Why he fhould think fo, I
cannot apprehend, unlefs it be becaufe there
are here and there fome few odd Paffages fcat-
tered in it, very different from our modern
way of Writing, which perhaps he can fingle
out and expofe ; And fo there is hardly any
Book extant in the World, which a witty
Man may not turn into ridicule.
All the Objections which I think have been
hitherto made to this Book,
are thefe : That * it contains * Libri fabuloft funt, ia
fabulous Vifions : That it makes quibrusr com" Apoftolicum
\ , Jr 7-. -77 «,, confenfum adttruiur uberum
too much for Free-will : That Arbitnum%una P(E,it„nila ,_
it<,affigns to every Man two An- UtudoMonafiica, &. quod me
et-^: That it favours the Nova- moratu dignum purga onum
tians in allowing but one Rep en- % ^m^T £
tance : That it favours Monkifh script. Apoch.
Solitude : and, that it fipeaksof
Purgatory. The three firft of thefe Objections
we fhall confider immediately ; But the three
latter are fo diretlly falfe, that one would won
der how Prejudice could poffibly be fo ftrong
as to make Men fee in any Author thofe things,
of which there is not the leaft Syllable or Hint
in the whole Book.
That the Vifions contained in it are fabulous,
we ought not to fay, unlefs we be fure, either
that God never afforded any Vifions to the firft
Chriftians ; or that thefe Vifions have fome
particular Circumftances, which prove that
they could not come from God. But if it
were fo, yet taking that which is ufed in this
Book to be no other than a Parabolical way of
Writing, wherein the Church is introduced as
reprefenting its own Doctrine and Difcipline to
a Perfon. in a Vifion, it ought not to be ftiled
j fabulous,

46> 'Some Reflections on that Tart
fabulous, any more than *
• Parable of the Pilgrim of other Books of that kind
the Prodigal, arc. which are written in our
Age.
That maintaining the Freedom of Mans Will,
in the Senfe that Hermas afferts it, is a' good
Objection againft a Book, I fuppofe neither
Mr. T. .nor any Man elfe, at this time of Day,
will contend.
That Hermas afligns to every particular Man
two Angels, if the Titles of the Chapters were
of any Authority, could not indeed be quef-
tioned. But in the Book it felf there is no fuch
thing exprefsly affirmed : AU that the Author
there fays, is only in general,
fDuo funt nuntii cum That t there are two Angels
homine ; unus aequitatis, 8c with Man ; one of Righteouf-
unus iniquitatis. Mandat. 6. K^ the other of Iniquity ; and
that when good Thoughts arife
in a Man's Heart, -then the Angel of Righteoufi-
nefis ( that is, fome good Spirit ) is with him ;
and when evil Thoughts arife in his Heart, then
the Angel of Iniquity, ( that is, fome evil Spirit)
tempts him : Which perhaps is no more than.
what all Chriftians believe. So that Cotelerius
in his Notes upon the Place, might have fpared
the Pains of proving other Fathers to have been
of the fame Opinian with Hermas, till he had
fhown that thefe words do neceffarily fignify
that Hermas himfelf was of that Opinion.
That Hermas by allowing but One Repentance
for great and fcandalous Crimes, favours the
Novatians, whofe Herefy confifted in allowing
no other Repentance at all, than that of Bap
tifm, is fo far from being true, that he in ex
prefs words oppofes his One Repentance to Bap
tifm, and fays more for the Validity and Effi cacy

of a Booh called Amyntor, &c. 46 s
cacy of that after-Repentance for Crimes com
mitted by Baptized Chriftians, in this one little
Book, than perhaps is to be found in all the
other Writers of the three firft Centuries put
together ; infomuch that Tertullian, after he
turned Montanifi, and had embraced the Opi
nion of the Novatians, * ex
claims with all imaginable bit- * Cederem tibi. fi faiptu-
ternefs againft this Book for ra Paftoris, quae fola mcechos
that very Reafon, becaufe it *mV*- non al? omni coni"i,'°
was more favourable than any t^Z^Z .Iffift
Other _ Book then extant, in ipfa,8cindepatronafociorum.
allowing Repentance to Adul- £>" PudUiti*.
terers after Baptifm, which the
Novatians denied.
That this Book favours Monkifh Solitude, is
alfo fo far from being true, that on the con
trary it even exprefsly allows -f- Second Mar- f Man-
riages, which was more than moft Writers of^-4-
that Age were willing to do,
Laftly, So far is this Writer from eftablifh-
ing the Doctrine of Purgatory, that there is
not one Syllable about it in the whole Book *
All the Places where he fpeaks of Mens Un
dertaking many Hardships, and fo purging
themfelves from their Sins, being as plainly
meant of the Penances to be gone through, ac
cording to the then eftablifhed Difeipline of
the Church, as it is poffible for any thing to
be expreffed by words.
5. The Epiftle of Barnabas was very much
efteemed among the Antients: And though,
it muft indeed be confeffed, that it contains
fome very ftrange and allegorical Interpreta
tions of Scripture ; yet he that confiders how
much that manner of Interpretation was anti-
«tly in ufe among the Jews in their Targums,
7 H h and

466 Some Reflections on that Tart
and how many important Truths were that
way conveyed, fo that the Apoftles themfelves
in their arguing with the Jews did often make
ufe of it, as we fee in their uncon trover ted
Writings; I fay whofoever confiders thefe things,
will rather chufe modeftly to fufpend his Judg
ment, than rafhly to upbraid this Author with
the Terms of foolifh and ridiculous.
And as to his faying that the Apoftles before
their Converfion were the greateft Sinners in Na
ture ; this does not at all rob us of the Argu
ment we ufe to draw from their Integrity and Sim
plicity againft Infidels. For fuppofing them to
have been never fo wicked, were they the lefs
Simple and Illiterate for that ? Or is their Wick
ed nefs before their Converfion any way incon
fiftent with their Integrity after it ? But be
fides, thefe Words might be fpoken with rela
tion to fuch Sins, as though very great in them
felves, yet fincere and well-meaning Men
might be guilty of in their Ignorance ; as St.
Paul fays of himfelf, that before his Conver
fion he was the chief of Sinners, in refpect of
his blafpheming Chrift and perfecuting Chrifti
ans even to Death, for Chrift's fake.
In fhort, though it muft after all be confeft,
that the Authors of thefe Writings ufed a
plain, popular, and unpolite Stile ; that they
were guilty of fome Miftakes, in things where
in the whole World at that time erred with
them ; ( for which Mr. T. is pleafed to ftile
them Ignorant ; ) and that they delivered divers
things, which though very agreeable to the
Stridtnefs of their Difcipline in the Primitive
Church, yet the prefent Times will notfo well
bear ; (for which Mr. T. calls them Superflu
ous;) Though I fay, all this muft be grafted j
yet

of a Book called A my n tor, &c'. 4.67
yet fince in general the Matter of thefe Wri
tings is fuch, that not only the Antients thought
-fit to cite them in their Books and read them
in their Churches, but alfo the Learnedeft and
moft Judicious Criticks of our own times, as
well Laicks as thofe of the Clergy, have re
ceived them as genuine, and recommended
them as containing the true and pure Faith of
Chrift ; I cannot but think that the very great
Scorn and Contempt, wherewith Mr. T. hath
thought fit to treat them, is a very bold af*
fuming to himfelf, and undervaluing the Judg
ment of the greateft Men both of the Antient
and Modern Church, and confequently a Re
flexion upon our Religion its felf ; and that
after all, we have very good Reafon, as well a*j
very great Authority, though not to receiv J
thefe Writings as of the fame Authority with
the Canonical Books of the New Teftament,
yet to pay them a proportionable Veneration,
both with refpedt to the Authors, and to the
Writings themfelves.
III. Thirdly, Neither the Belief of the Ge
nuinenefs of thefe Writings, nor the Refpedt
paid to them as fuch, does in the leaft dimi-
nifh from the Authority of the New Teftament,
or tend to make the Number of the Canonical
Books uncertain or precarious.
This is the Difficulty, on which Mr. T.
feems particularly to infill, as ifit were impof
fible for thofe who believe the Genuinenefs of
thefe Writings to give any tolerable Reafon
why they do not admit them into the Canon of
the New Teftament, as well as feveral others,
which are now received i And therefore I
H h 2 foall

468 Some Reflections on that Tart
fhall endeavour to be fomewhat more exact and
particular in giving an Anfwer to it.
i. Firft then, Though we have great Reafon
to believe thefe Books to be Genuine, yet have
we_ not the fame Certainty of it, as we have
of the Genuinenefs of the Books received into
the Canon of the New Teftament. The Books
of the New Teftament, as it might be proved
of every one of them particularly, were re
ceived at their firft coming forth as being
written by Divine Infpiration, and were quoted
as fuch by Irenceus and others of the Antienteft
Fathers : And though upon occafion of fome
Difputes that arofe afterwards among Chriftians,
fte Authority of fome few of thofe Books
came to be called in Queftion ; ( not to fpeak
at prefent of thofe Hereticks, the Cerinthians,
Marcionites, Manichees, and others, who re
jected whatfoever made againft their abfurd
Opinions-,) yet thofe few Questioned Books
were fo far from being (as Mr. T. falfely af
ferts) rejetled a long time by all Chriftians almoft
•with univerfal Confent, that even thofe Books
were not only kept entire from the Beginning,
but ( as Eufebius exprefsly tef-
* rtuoi'iA,** f 4' gv «/*«« Tai tif-es ^ were * owned by moft
*"*%—'"'"« i *"t* ***¦ Doctors of the Church, and
,4,'*;. Hift. 1. 3. c. 2 5-. were all along read together
nir^^T^M, em hiijh- with the other Scriptures ; and
¦r p:'tM *TaS"'*fl TUi at laft, upon the full and ex-
piS* rS> 'LxxJy^k^n vf«- adfc Examination of all Cir-
'+£>. lib. 3 c- 3. cumftances, the Matter being
put out of Queftion , they
were unanimoufly received, as well by thofe
Churches where they were doubted before, as
by all other Chriftian Churches, into the Canon of

of a Book called Amyntor, &c. 4651
©f Scripture ; and fo have been continued ever
fince by univerfal Confent, and by the uninter
rupted- Succeffion of Chriftians in all Ages.
Whereas of thofe Writings which we are now
fpeaking of, that which is the leaft controverted,
viz. the Epiftle of Clemens, was for many Ages
thought to be utterly loft : and though upon
its appearing again, the beft Criticks in the
World thought they had good Reafon to pro
nounce it Genuine ; yet they could not be fo
fure that it was free from Corruption and In
terpolation, as we are of thofe Writings which
were never loft. And now this Argument is
of peculiar Force againft Mr. T. For if he
thinks, as he fays, that he can with all the eafe
in the World prove thefe Writings fpurious ;
( which notwithftanding his vain boaft, he will
never be able to perform ; ) he may at leaft al
low thofe, who do not doubt but they are Ge
nuine, yet not to advance them above their
own Rank, and place them among thofe which
by the Univerfal Church have been received into
the Canon of the New Teftament.
2. Secondly, Though the Matter of thefe
Writings be fuch, as that they do therefore de-
ferve very great Veneration and Refpect ; yet
is there plainly fomething humane, fomething
of infirmity, fomething of fallibility in them,
for which they are with all Reafon thought in-
feriour to the Writings of the Apoftles. And
this Argument is alfo peculiarly ftrong againft
Mr. T. For if he thinks, as he fays, that he
can with all the eafe in the World fhew the
Ignorance and Superftition of the Authors of
thefe Writings ; well may he allow thofe, who
fo far differ from him in this, as to think they
deferve

47 o *ome Refletlions on that Tart
deferve the high Character of Primitive, Holy,
and Apoftolical Men, yet not to prefume to
equal them with the Apoftles themfelves.
3. Thirdly, When we have made the beft
Judgment of things, that we can poffibly at
this diftance of Time, we cannot after all but
pay fome Deference to the Judgment of the
Antients, efpecially when aflembled in a Coun
cil ; and allow them to judge fomewhat better
in the Ages next after our Saviour, what
Writings were of Authority to be made the
Standard and Rule of Faith, than we can after
Seventeen Hundred Years: Efpecially fince of
the doubted Books, which were fometime read
promifcuoufly with the uncontroverted, it is
plain they received fuch only into the Canon,
whofe Stile, and Matter, and Agreement with
the reft of the Apoftolical Writings, do fuf
ficiently prove them to have judged wifely and
upon good Grounds. But this Argument is of
no force with Mr. T.
4. Fourthly, Therefore, and which is a direct
Decifion of this Queftion, I add, that the true
Reafon why fuch a certain and determinate
Number of Writings are received as the Canon
of Scripture, that is, as an Authoritative Rule
of Faith and Manners, is becaufe they were
written by the Apoftles themfelves ( who are ac
knowledged to have been guided by airinfalli-
ble Spirit, ) or which is all one, were ditlated9
reviewed and approved by them or fome of them.
All the Books of the New Teftament, except
the Gofpels of St. Mark, and St. Luke, and
the Atfs of the Apoftles, are therefore received
as Canonical, becaufe the Church upon un
doubted

of a Book called Amyntor, &c. 471
doubted Grounds believes them to be written
immediately by the Apoftles themfelves ; and thefe
three Books are therefore received as Canoni
cal likewife, becaufe we believe them to have
been ditJated, reviewed and approved by fome
of the Apoftles. And this is a plain and direct
Reafon, though Mr. T. is fo modeft to fay be P"g- 48«
never heard of it, why the Writings of St.
Mark and Luke, who were only Companions
of the Apoftles, are received among the Ca
nonical Writings of the Apoftles ; and yet the
Epiftles of Clemens and Barnabas, who were
Fellow-Labourers with the Apoftles, are not.
And that this is indeed the true Reafon, why
fome Books are received as of infallible Au
thority, and others not; may be fufficiently
proved to any unprejudiced Perfon, from what
we find in the Antients concerning this Matter.
That all Books acknowledged to be written by the
Apofiles, were always received as of unquefiionable
Authority, is evident. The Queftion concerning
any doubted Book, being not whether the
Writing of an Apoftle fhould be received as
of good Authority or not, but whether that
Writing faid to be an Apoftle's, was indeed
the Writing of him whofe Name it bore. That
the Reafon why the Writings of St. Mark and
St. Luke were always received as of certain Au
thority, was not becaufe they were Contempo
raries with the Apoftles, ( for fo were Clemens,
and Hermas, and Barnabas, ) but becaufie their
Writings were particularly approved and au
thorized by the Apoftles, is plain from Eufe
bius ; who tells us exprefsly that St. Peter received
and approved the Gofpel of „ , , , , „
St. Mark, and that * it was Ttgj^ \^ e**,W«.s. 1
tbis Approbation that authorized c. 1 $. it

2.

472

* ''H^u S Maex-X id, Axxm tZ>
• • •¦ • * ,/ ' >' >
»«r ctuTXi tvctyyiXiuv tvh e««o-
<ri» srssroi/jjK/BsW. IftwOToa - ' ¦
^5W^£|«l3'«s ^!/£» (pCHTlt , s*Alj3'E<-
IW oluTeit, ITClfHiXftV^vrOSITCH. 1. 3,
c. 44.
f Marcus difcipulus & lti-
tetpres Pf/ri, quae a Petro an-
nunciata erant, edidit. 3. e^.
1. || Lucas fedtator Pauli quod
ab illo pras.iicabatur, Evahge-
lium in Libro condidit. Ibid.

Some Reflexions on that Tart
it to be received by the Churches •
In like manner, * That St-
John reviewed all the Gofpels,
and confirmed the Truth of thein :
Irenceus likewife tells us, + that
what St. Mark wrote, was dic
tated by St. Peter ; and that
|| the Gofpel of St. Luke was
only a Tranfcript ofi St. Paul'."
Preaching: St. Paul himfelf
plainly refers to it, 1 Cor xv«
5, where declaring unto the
Gofpel which he had before
puts them in mind how that

Corinthians the
Preached, he
Chrifi rofe from the Dead according to the Scrip
tures, and that he was fieen of Cephas, &c. which
appearance of our Saviour to Peter, is no where
mentioned but in St. Luke's Gofpel, Luke xxiv.
34- And in the firft Epiftle to Timothy v. *8. he
quotes it with the exprefs Title of Scripture ;
The Scripture faith, The Labourer is worthy ef
his Hire ; which words are no where found in.
Scripture, but in St. Luke's Gofpel, Luke x. 7.
So that it is not without great Reafon, that
Learned Men have judged it to be St. Luke's
Gofpel, which the Apoftle calls his own Gof
pel , 2 Tim. ii. 8. and elfewhere. And then
for the Atls of the Apoftles, it is plain they are
* Baron, an Account of St. Paul's Travels, * written
adann> 61. before his Death ; fo that they are with all rea
fon believed to have been approved by hirn ;
and if they were not, yet j
being antiently the fame Book
with the Gofpel of St. Luket
they were undoubtedly re
viewed by St. Jobnt together with

•f Sunt enim Aifta Stiry©*
ejus operis Aoy^cujus n^Urm
xiym ipfe fuum agnofcit E-
vangelium. Afta poftea ab
Evangelic, divulferunt, quibus

of a Book called Amymor, &c. 473
with it, and their Authority commodius vifum, ob loco-
was hardly ever, that I know rum fadliorem expedm'orem-
'r „„ii^j : n- 1 que invicem compararionem.
Of, called m queftion by any, JUngelirtas fep-mo codicc
but * Marcion the Heretick. compledi, & ab Atfis fecer-
Laftly, That no other' Books, """re. Dodweli. DiSemt. ..
however written by the Contem- * f^"' T,rtM adverrus
poraries of the Apoftles, were Marcion. lib. S- f'-'-> initio.
received by the Antients as of
infallible and detifive Authority in Matters of
Difpute is evident. Eufebius tells us exprefsly
that the Authority ofthe Epiftle to the He
brews was queftioned by fome, riot becaufe
they doubted whether it was written in the
Age of the Apoftles, ( for that they could
not , ) but -f becaufe the
Church of Rome thought it t T""s$ «fe*""»'' ^" *?»« "E-
not to be written by St. eff''"6. *&¦ ™ v?ftar ™*T
Paul. The Paftor of hermas ^Tix£yi&*.> 4*™^. lib. 9.
alfo ( as 4 the fame Author cap. j.
tells us ) was efteemed fo 4. idem ibidem.
much as to be read publickly
in Churches,, and yet never received as of in
fallible Authority : Nay Origen goes farther,
and thinks it to be not only a
ufeful Book , but written * * Qux fcriptura valde mi,
even with fome Degree of In- Iii "tilis vWetur, &, ut puto,
r„:,„f',^„ „„j .,<„. 4. ;^.„^r^.o divinitus infpirata. Origen in
fpiration; and yet t impofes Rom.xvi. ^ i
it not upon any one to be re- + Si cui tamen scriptura
Ceived as Scripture, ilia reeipienda videtur. Ori-
• In like manner the Epiftle gen. Horn. 8. in mm.
of Clemens, though the moft
Tunqueftioned Piece in all Antiquity, and (as
^Eufebius ftiles it) || kvapoxwtpir* ff^ft- *¦*«, yet ic II L>'- 3-
is by the fame Author * elfewhere reckoned » ^ d>
Up among the Apocryphal' Pieces: that is, as c. ,3,
Cotelerius well obferves, not that any one doubt
ed of its Genuinenefs or Excellency, but only
I i that

474 Some Reflections on that Tart
that they would not reckon it among the Books
tS; SiL$ y(«.<pm, to which Eufebius there oppofes if#
The Truth is, the unqueftioned Works of
the Apoftles were not antiently ( as Mr. Dod
weli confeffes ) kept in a diftinct Book from the
Apocryphal, but read and cited promifcuoufly
with the Works of their immediate Succeflbrs :
But then it is alfo certain, that as the unquef
tioned Works of the Apoftles, whenever they
were cited, were looked upon by all as infal
lible and decifive ; fo the other Pieces, whilft
they were quoted and urged by fome, might as
freely be denied or not yielded to by others.
Vainly therefore doth Mr. T. object, That
they who beleeve the Epiftle ofi Clemens and the
reft to be genuine, cannot give any reafon why they
do not admit it into the Canon of Scripture. And
as falfely does he infinuate, that the Eftablifh
ment of that Canon is uncertain and precari
ous. Could it be proved, That the Epiftles of
James, and of Peter, and of Jude, or any of
them, were not written by thofe whofe Names
they bear ; we lhould indeed be obliged to re
ject them : And could the Preaching and Re
velation of Peter be proved to be genuine, we
fhould be obliged to receive them into the
Canon of the New Teftament. But fo far is
it from being true, That the Preaching and
Revelation of Peter were fo received by the
Antients, as by more than a Parity of Reafon,
to claim Admiffion into the Canon with his fe
cond Epiftle, and the reft of the fome time
queflioned Books, that on the contrary thefe
Pieces ( befides the Arguments t nat may be
drawn from the Writings thenuelves ) were
received by fo few of the Antients, as to
4 make

of a Hook called Amyiitor, &cl 475
make * Eufebius think, ( tho*
in that indeed he was mif- * Tv0< „ A£y^£W iotS 4.
taken, ) that they were never guy«,«, $ fkv Kctx^m ~&nx.k-
quoted by any of the Antients *vv"> '"^ J**, <<"* *$&****«*
j. 1 1 fir pit &eifaotd'ofAii)ii*. On ju*j-
¦XXTt. A* cf L • -j- Tikfxetlat, ^ts raf >ut6' ip,ai
What Mr. i. has invidi- T,5 e*,e.w.*r.KV -^V""'?'*''5.
oufly urged about the Divifi- *-*~« *% *m™ 0rw.7e-.1Wo f^
ons among the Fathers, and «r«-- Hift.1.3. o 3.
their want of Exactnefs in
their Reafonings, I fuppofe will not move thofe,
who know that Truth is neverthelefs fuch for
being furrounded with a Multitude of Errors ;
and. that Men did not then write in a Nice
and Scholaftick Way, but in a plain and un->
polite Stile, mixing Arguments, Similitudes, and
Illuftrations promifcuoufly, which is the way
of reprefenting things popularly, and to mean
Capacities. Thus I have endeavoured to give a fhort Anfwer
to the Difficulties which Mr. T. has with great
Freedom propofied: Hoping that what I have here
very briefly and with Submiffion hinted, may give
occafion to fome abler and more learned Pen, to
treat of this Matter with that Largenefs and
Clearnefs, with which fib great a Point well de
ferves to be handled.

I am SI R,
tours.

FINIS.

BOO K S written by Samuel Clarke,
. D. D. late Retlor of St. James's Weftminfter %
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,. The Scripture Doftrine. of the Trirjity, in three Parts.*
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Homeri Ilias Grace & Latine, Annotationes in Ufum
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