I ¦ . THE WARS OF RELIGION ! IN FRANCE . JAMES WESTFALL. THOMPSON YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY The Wars of Religion in France 1559-1576 VIEW OF PARIS From a sketch by Jacques Callot (1592-1635). The Wars of Religion in France 15S9^S7^ The Huguenots Catherine de Medici and Philip II BY James Westfall Thompson, Ph.D. Associate Professor of European History in the University of Chicago (ARMS OK LA ROCIIEI.LK) CHICAGO : THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS LONDON: T. FISHER UNWIN, i ADELPHI TERRACE I909 Copyright 1909 By The University of Chicago Published May 1909 io 37*3i Composed and Printed By The University of CMcaffO Press Chicago, MhnuivU. S.a. TO MARY HAWES WILMARTH THE LARGESS OF WHOSE SPIRIT HAS MADE THE WORLD RICHER AND LIFE NOBLER PREFACE No one acquainted with the history of historical writing can have failed to observe how transitory are its achievements. Mark Pattison's aphorism that "history is one of the most ephemeral forms of literature" has much of truth in it. The reasons of this are not far to seek. In the first place, the most laborious historian is doomed to be superseded in course of time by the accumulation of new material. In the second place, the point of view and the interpretation of one generation varies from that which preceded it, so that each generation requires a rewriting of history in terms of its own interest. These reasons must be my excuse for venturing to write a new book upon an old subject. It is now nearly thirty years since the appearance of the late Professor Henry M. Baird's excellent work, The Rise of the Huguenots (New York, 1879), and little that is comprehensive has since been written upon the subject in English, with the exception of Mr. A. W. Whitehead's admirable Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France (London," 1904). But the limita tions imposed by biographical history compel an author inevitably to ignore movements or events not germane to his immediate subject, which, nevertheless, may be of great importance for gen eral history. Moreover, a biography is limited by the term of life of the hero, and his death may not by any means terminate the issue in which he was a factor — as indeed was the case with Coligny. An enumeration of the notable works — sources and authori ties — which have been published since the appearance of Professor Baird's work may serve to justify the present volume. First and foremost must be mentioned the notable Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, the lack of which Ranke deplored, edited by the late Count Hector de.la Ferriere and M. Baguenault de la Puchesse (9 vols.), the initial volume of which appeared in 1880. Of diplomatic correspondence we have the Ambassade en Espagne de JeanEbrard, vin PREFACE seigneur de St. Sulpice de 1562 a 1565 (Paris, 1902), edited by M. Edmond Cabie, and the Depeches de M. Fourquevaux, ambas- sadeur du roi Charles IX en Espagne, 1565-72, in three volumes, edited by the Abbe Douais (Paris, 1896). Other sources which have seen the light within the last three decades are M. Delaborde's Vie de Coligny (3 vols., 1877-), the title of which is somewhat mis leading, for it is really a collection of Coligny' s letters strung upon the thread of his career; the Baron Alphonse de Ruble's Antoine de Bourbon et leanne dAlbret (4 vols., 1881); M. Ludovic La- lanne's new annotated edition of D'Aubigne (1886), and the new edition of Beza's Histoire ecclesiastique (ed. of Baum, 1883). Finally, among sources should be included many volumes in the " Calendar of State Papers." Professor Baird has rightly said that "Too much weight can scarcely be given to this source of information and illustration." His praise would probably have been even greater if he could have used the correspondence of Dale and Smith as freely as he did that of Throckmorton and Norris. When we pass from sources to authorities the list of notable works is even longer. La Ferriere's Le XV P Steele et les Valois — the fruit of researches in the Record Office in London — appeared in 1879; M. Forneron's Histoire de Philippe II (4 vols.) was published in 1887, and is even more valuable than his earlier Histoire des dues de Guise (1877). Besides these, in the decade of the 8o's, are Durier's Les Huguenots en Bigorre (1884); Com- munay's Les Huguenots dans le Beam et la Navarre (1886) ; Let- tenhove's Les Huguenots et les Gueux (1885) ; the baron de Ruble's Le traite de Cateau-Cambresis (1889), and the abbe Marchand's Charles de Cosse, Comte de Brissac (1889). M. de Crue's notable Anne, due de Montmorency appeared in the same year and his no less scholarly Le parti des politiques au lendemain de Saint Bar- thelemy three years later. M. Marlet's Le comte de Montgomery was published in 1890; M. Georges Weill's Les theories sur le pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de religion, in 1891; M. Henri Hauser's Francois de La None in 1892; M. Bernard de Lacombe's Catherine de Medicis entre Guise et Conde in 1899, and most recently of all, M. Courteault's Blaise de Montluc (1908). PREFACE ix Many contributions in the Revue historique, the Revue des questions historiques, the English Historical Review, the Revue d histoire diplomatique, the Revue des deux mondes, and one article in the American Historical Review, January, 1903, by M. Hauser, "The Reformation and the Popular Classes in the Sixteenth Century," are equally valuable, as the notes will show. I have also consulted many articles in the proceedings of various local or provincial historical societies, as the Societe de Paris et de l'lle de France; the Societe de l'histoire de Normandie, the Societe d'histoire et d'archeologie de Geneve, etc., and the admirable series known as the Bulletin de la Societe d protestantisme frangais, which is a mine of historical lore. While the present work falls in the epoch of the French Refor mation, no attempt has been made to treat that subject in so far as the Reformation is assumed primarily to have been a religious manifestation. Doctrine, save when it involved polity, has been ignored. But into the political, diplomatic, and economic activities of the period I have tried to go at some length. As to the last feature, it is not too much to say that our interpretation of the sixteenth century has been profoundly changed within the last twenty years by the progress made in economic history. Such works as Weiss's La chambre ardente and Hauser's Ouvriers du temps passe have revolutionized the treatment of this subject. Such an interpretation is merely a reflection of our own present- day interest in economic and social problems. In this particular it is the writer's belief that he is the first to present some of the results of recent research into the economic history of sixteenth- century France to English readers. My indebtedness to M. Hauser is especially great for the help and suggestion he has given me in the matter of industrial history. But I have tried to widen the subject and attempted to show the bearing of changes in the agricultural regime, the influence of the failure of crops owing to adverse weather conditions, and the disintegration of society as the result of incessant war and the plague, upon the progress of the Huguenot movement. In an agricultural country like France in the sixteenth century, the distress of the provinces through the x PREFACE failure of the harvests was sometimes nearly universal, and the retroactive effect of such conditions in promoting popular dis^ content had a marked influence upon the religious and political issues. It has been pointed out that "the religious wars of France furnish the most complete instance of the constant intersection of native and foreign influences."1 The bearing of the Huguenot movement upon Spanish and Dutch history was intimate and marked, and this I have also attempted to set forth. In so doing the fact that has impressed me most of all is the development and activity of the provincial Catholic leagues and their close connection with Spain's great Catholic machine in France, the Holy League. The history of the Holy League in France is usually represented as having extended from 1576 to 1594. This time was the period of its greatest activity and of its greatest power. But institutions do not spring to life full armed in a moment, like Athene from the head of Zeus. "The roots of the present lie deep in the past," as Bishop Stubbs observed. Institutions are a growth, a develop ment. The Holy League was a movement of slow growth and development, although it has not been thus represented, and re sulted from the combination of various acts and forces — political, diplomatic, religious, economic, social, even psychological — work ing simultaneously both within and without France during the civil wars. I have tried to set forth the nature and extent of these forces; to show how they originated; how they dperated; and how they ultimately were combined to form the Holy League Certain individual features of the history here covered have been treated in an isolated way by some writers. The late baron de Ruble and M. Forneron have disclosed the treasonable negotia tions of Montluc with Philip II. M. Bouille and more recently M. Forneron have followed the tortuous thread of the cardinal of Lorraine's secret negotiations with Spain. Various historians chiefly in provincial histories or biographies like Pingaud's Les Saulx-Tavannes, have noticed the local work of some of th provincial Catholic associations. But the relation of all the T The Wars oj Religion ("The Cambridge Modern History, " Preface) PREFACE xi various movements, one to the other, and their ultimate fusion into a single united movement has not yet been fully brought out. What was the number and form of organization of these local Catholic leagues? What influenced their combination? What bearing did they have upon the course of Montluc and the cardinal of Lorraine ? Or upon Philip IPs policy ? How did the great feud between the Guises and the Montmorencys influence the formation of the Holy League and its hostile counterpart — the Association of the Huguenots and the Politiques ? These ques tions I have tried to answer and in so doing two or three new facts have been brought to light. For example, an undiscovered link in the history of the Guises' early secret intercourse with Philip II has been found in the conduct of L'Aubespine, the French ambassador in Spain in 1561; the treasonable course of the car dinal of Lorraine, it is shown, began in 1565 instead of 1566, a fact which makes the petty conflict known as the "Cardinal's War" of new importance; the history of the Catholic associations in the provinces, hitherto isolated in many separate volumes, has been woven into the whole and some new information established regarding them.1 The notes, it is hoped, will sufficiently indicate the sources used and enable the reader to test the treatment of the subject, or guide him to sources by which he may form his own judgment if desired. In the matter of maps, the very complete apparatus of maps in Mr. Whitehead's Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France, has greatly lightened my task, and I express my cordial thanks to Mr. Whitehead and Messrs. Methuen & Co., his publishers, for permission to reproduce those in that work. My thanks are also due to M. Ch. de Coynart and MM. Firmin Didot et Cie for permission to reproduce the map illustrating the battle of Dreux from the late Commandant de Coynart's work entitled L'Annee 1562 et la bataille de Dreux; and to M. Steph. C. Gigon, author of La bataille de larnac et la campagne de i56g en Angoumois, for T In the appendix I have published the constitution of two of these provincial leagues hitherto unknown. XH PREFACE permission to use his two charts of the battle of Jarnac. Those illustrating the Tour of the Provinces in 1564-66, the march of the duke of Alva and Montgomery's great raid in Gascony are my own. Some lesser maps and illustrations are from old prints which I have gathered together, in the course of years, except that illus trating the siege of Ha vre-de- Grace and the large picture of the battle of St. Denis, which have been photographed from the originals in the Record Office. During the preparation of this volume, which has entailed two prolonged visits to Paris and other parts of France, and to London, I have become the debtor to many persons. Among those of whose courtesy and assistance I would make special acknowledgment are the following: His Excellency, M. Jean- Jules Jusserand, French ambassador at Washington; M. Henri Vignaud, charge d'affaires of the American legation in Paris; MM. Charles de la Ronciere and Viennot of the Bibliotheque Nationale; MM. Le Grand and Viard of the Archives Nationales, where I chiefly worked in the K. Collection. At the Record Office, Mr. Hubert Hall and his assistant, Miss Mary Trice Martin, were unfailing in the aid given me. For the transcript of the " Discorso sopra gli humori del Regno di Francia," from the Barberini Library in Rome, I am indebted to P. Franz Ehrle, prefect of the Vatican archives. I also hold in grateful memory the friendship and assistance of the late Woodbury Lowery, author of The Spanish Settlements within the Present Limits of the United States: Florida (1562-74), New York, 1905, with whom I was a fellow worker at the Archives Nationales in the spring and early summer of 1903. Finally, I owe much to the suggestive criticism of my friend and colleague, Professor Ferdinand Schevill, and my friends, Professor Herbert Darling Foster, of Dartmouth College, and Professor Roger B. Merriman, of Harvard University, each of whom has read much of the manuscript. James Westfall Thompson The University or Chicago January 1909 CONTENTS PACE XV List of Maps and Plates CHAPTER I. The Beginning of the Huguenot Revolt. The Con spiracy of Amboise .... i II. Catherine de Medici between Guise and Conde. Pro ject of a National Council . 40 III. The States-General of Orleans . . 69 IV. The Formation of the Triumvirate ... 91 V. The Colloquy of Poissy. The Estates of Pontoise. The Edict of January, 1562 . . 106 VI. The First Civil War. The Massacre of Vassy (March 1, 1562). The Siege of Rouen . . 131 VII. The First Civil War (Continued). The Battle of Dreux (December 19, 1562). The Peace of Amboise (March 19, 1563) ... 172 VIII. The War with England. The Peace of Troyes (1563-64) . . . . . . 198 IX. Early Local and Provincial Catholic Leagues . 206 X. The Tour of the Provinces. The Bayonne Episode 232 XI. The Tour of the Provinces (Continued). The Influence of the Revolt of the Netherlands upon France. The Affair of Meaux . . 283 XII. The Second Civil War (1567-68) . 326 XIII. The Third Civil War (1568). New Catholic Leagues. The Battle of Jarnac . . .... 349 XIV. The Third Civil War (Continued). The Peace of St. Germain ... . 378 XV. The Massacre of St. Bartholomew 422 XVI. The Fourth Civil War . 454 XVII. The Last Days of Charles IX. The Conspiracy of the Politiques ¦ • 469 XVIII. Henry III and the Politiques. The Peace of Monsieur (1576) 486 Genealogical Tables . . • 525 Appendices . • 529 Index ... • • LIST OF MAPS AND PLATES View of Paris . . . Frontispiece FACING PAGE Huguenot March to Orleans, March 29-ApRiL 2, 1562 . 139* Campaign of Dreux, -November to December, 1562 180 Battle of Dreux, according to Commandant de Coynart . 181 Sketch Map of the Fortifications of Havre -de -Grace . 202 The Tour of the Provinces, 1564-66 . 232 March of the Duke of Alva through Savoy, Franche Comte, and Lorraine 308 Execution of Egmont and Hoorne in the Market Square at Brussels 314 Paris and Its Faubourgs in the Sixteenth Century 327 Blockade of Paris by the Huguenots, October-November, 1567 328 Huguenot March to Pont-a-Mousson after the Battle of St. Denis 329 The Battle of St. Denis between pp. 332, 333 Autumn Campaign of 1568 . . 368 Croquis du Theatre de la Guerre pour la Periode du 24 F^vrier au 13 Mars 1569, according to M. S. C Gigon 376 Bataille de Jarnac, according to M. S. C Gigon 377 Campaign of the Summer and Autumn of 1569 380 Poitiers in the Sixteenth Century . 386 Plan of the Fortress of Navarrens Made by Juan Martinez Descurra, a Spanish Spy . . 398 Voyage of the Princes after the Battle of Moncontour; Mont gomery's Itinerary in Bigorre and Gascony; Union of Coligny and Montgomery in December, 1569, at Port Ste. Marie .... 402 The Massacre of St. Bartholomew ¦ 422 Plan de la Rochelle en 1572 . 458 Letter of Henry III of France to the Duke of Savoy 484 Letter of Henry III to the Swiss Cantons 485 Map of France Showing Provinces 602 CHAPTER I THE BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT. THE CON SPIRACY OF AMBOISE The last day of June, 1559, was a gala day in Paris. The marriages of Philip II of Spain with Elizabeth of France, daughter of King Henry II and Catherine de Medici, and that of the French King's sister, Marguerite with Emanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, were to be celebrated. But "the torches of joy became funeral tapers"1 before nightfall, for Henry II was mortally wounded in the tournament given in honor of the occasion.2 It was the rule that challengers, in this case the King, should run three courses and their opponents one. The third contestant of the King had been Gabriel, sieur de Lorges, better known as the count of Montgomery, captain of the Scotch Guard,3 a young man, "grand et roidde," whom Henry rechallenged because his pride was hurt that he had not better kept his seat in the saddle in the first running. Montgomery tried to refuse, but the King silenced his objections 1 Mem. de Tavannes, 239. 2 The constable Montmorency, in a letter to Queen Elizabeth dated June 30, 1559, says that the accident happened "yesterday," i. e., June 29. — C. S . P. Eng. For., No. 698. Almost all the sources, however, give June 30. Cf. Castelnau, Book I, chap. i. Throckmorton gives June 30. See p. 3, note 1. J The origin of the Scotch Guard goes back to the Hundred Years' War. In 1420, five years after the battle of Agincourt, when Henry V was in possession of all of northern France, the dauphin, Charles VII, sent the count of Vendome to Scotland to ask for assistance in virtue of the ancient league between the two nations. In 1421 a body of 1,000 Scots arrived in France under the earl of Buchan. They fought at Bauge' in Anjou in that year, but were almost all destroyed in 1424 in the furious battle of Verneuil. The remnant, in honor of their services, became the king's own guard. See Skene, The Booh of Pluscarden, II, xix-xxi, xxvi-xxix; Houston, L'Escosse francois (Discours des alliances commencees depuis l'an sept cents septante, et continuees jusques a present, entre les couronnes de France et d'Escosse), Paris, 1608; Forbes Leith, The Scots Men-at-Arms and Life Guards in France, from Their Formation until Their Final Dissolution, 2 vols., 1882. The Guard consisted of the principal captain, the lieutenant, and the ensign, the marechal-de-Ioges, three commis, eighty archers of the guard, twenty-four archers of the corps; the pay of whom amounted annually to 51,800 francs, or 6,475 pounds sterling.— C. S. P. For., No. 544, December, 1559. 2 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE with a command and reluctantly1 Montgomery resumed his place. But this time the Scotch guardsman failed to cast away the trunk of the splintered lance as he should have done at the moment of MONTGOMERY IN TOURNAMENT COSTUME (Bib. Nat., Estampes, Hist, de France, reg. Q. b. 19) the shock, and the fatal accident followed. The jagged point crashed through the King's visor into the right eye.2 For a minute 1 Claude]Haton, whose Catholic prejudice was strong, believed this reluctance to be feigned (M.&moires, I, 107). - D'Aubigne', Book II, chap, xiv, says the blow raised the King's visor, and that the end of the lance, which was bound with a morne, or ring, to dull the point, crashed through the helmet like a bludgeon. Tavannes, chap, xiv, says that the King had failed to take the precaution to fasten his visor down. BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 3 Henry reeled in his saddle, but by throwing his arms around the neck of his horse, managed to keep his seat. The King's armor was stripped from him at once and "a splint taken out of good bigness."1 He moved neither hand nor foot, and lay as if be numbed or paralyzed,2 and so was carried to his chamber in the Tournelles,3 entrance being denied to all save physicians, apothe caries, and those valets-de-chambre who were on duty. None were permitted for a great distance to come near until late in the day, when the duke of Alva, who was to be proxy for his sovereign at the marriage, the duke of Savoy, the prince 6f Orange, the car dinal of Lorraine, and the constable were admitted.4 After the first moment of consternation was past, it was thought that the King would recover, though losing the sight of his eyej5 since on the fourth day Henry recovered his senses and his fever was abated. Meanwhile five or six of the ablest physicians in France had been diligently experimenting upon the heads of four criminals who were decapitated for the purpose in the Conciergerie and the prisons of the Chatelet. On the eighth day Vesalius, Philip IPs physician, who had long been with the emperor Charles V, and who enjoyed a European reputation, arrived and took special charge of the royal patient.6 In the interval of conscious ness Henry commanded that the interrupted marriages be solem nized. Before they were celebrated the King had lost the use of ' Throckmorton to the Lords in Council, C. S. P. For., June 30, 1559. ' D'Aubigne, loc. cit. La Place, 20, says that the King spoke to the cardinal of Lorraine. De Thou, Book II, 674, on the authority of Brantome, doubts it. 3 The Palais des Tournelles stood in the present Place Royale. It was torn down in 1575. * Throckmorton, loc. cit. s The constable Montmorency to Queen Elizabeth, C. S. P. For., No. 898, June 30, 1559. Throckmorton, ibid., No. 928, July 4, "doubted the King would lose his eye." 6 C. S. P. For., No. 950, July 8, 1559. De Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret I, 432, has published Vesalius' official report. Henry II had a body-physician who also enjoyed a European reputation. This was Fernal. He was the author of a Latin work upon pathology which was translated into French in 1660 under the title: La pathologie de Jean Fernal, pemier medicin de Henry II, roy de France, ouvrage tres-utile ii tous ceux qui s'appliquent a la connoissance du corps humain. 4 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE speech and lapsed into unconsciousness, and on the morrow of the marriages he died (July 10, 1559)- On August 13 the corpse was interred at St. Denis.1 When the ceremony was ended the king of arms stood up, and after twice pronouncing the words "Le roi est mort," he turned around toward the assembly, and the third time cried out: "Vive le roi, tres-chretien Francois le deathbed of henry II A. Catherine de Medici B. Cardinal of Lorraine C. Constable Montmorency D. Couriers E. Courtiers F. Physicians deuzieme de ce nom, par la grace de Dieu, roi de France." There upon the trumpets sounded and the interment was ended.2 A month later, on September 18, Francis II was crowned at Rheims. Already Montgomery had been deprived of the captaincy of the Scotch Guard and his post given to "a mere Frenchman," much to the indignation of the members of the Guard.3 1 There is an account of the funeral in Arch, cur., Ill, 309-48. The MS account of the funeral expenses is in the Phillipps Collection, 2,995. Compare Galembert, Funerailles du roy Henri II, Roole des parties et somme de deniers pour le faict des dits obseques et pompes jun'ebres. Publie avec une introduction. Paris, Fontaine, 1869. 2 See the description of Throckmorton, written to Queen Elizabeth, C. 5. P. For., No. 1,190, August 15, 1559. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 1,242, August 25, 1559. BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 5 The reign of Henry II had not been a popular one. He had neither the mind nor the application necessary in public affairs.1 On the very day of the accident the English ambassador wrote to Cecil: " It is a marvel to see how the noblemen, gentlemen, and ladies do lament this misfortune, and contrary-wise, how the townsmen and people do rejoice."2 The wars of Henry II in Italy and in the Low Countries had drained France of blood and treasure, so that the purses of the people were depleted by an infinity of exactions and confiscations; offices and benefices had been bartered, even those of justice, and to make the feeling of the people worse, Henry II was prodigal to his favorites.3 Finally the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (1559) was regarded as not less disadvantageous than dishonorable.4 Meanwhile much politics had been in progress.3 The new king was not yet sixteen years of age.6 He was of frail health and insignificant intellect, being quite unlike his wife, the beautiful and brilliant Mary Stuart, who was a niece of the Guises, Francis, duke of Guise, and his brother Charles, cardinal of Lorraine, who had been in no small favor under Henry II. Even in the king's lifetime the ambition of the Guises had been a thing of wonderment ' Rel. ven., I, 195. "De fort petit sens," says La Planche, 202. 2 Throckmorton to Cecil, June 30, 1559, C. S. P. For., 899. j And yet the evil nature of Henry II's reign may be exaggerated. An ex tended and critical history of his reign is still to be written. Claude Haton, no mean observer of economic conditions says: "En ce temps et par tout le regne du dit feu roy, faisoit bon vivre en France, et estoient toutes denrees et marchandises a. bon marche, excepte le grain et le vin, qui encherissoient certaines annees plus que d'aultres, selon la sterilite, et toutesfois esdittes treize annees de son regne n'ont este que trois ans de cherte de grain et de vin, et n'a valu le ble froment, en la plus chere des dittes trois annees, que 14 et 15. s. t. le bichet (a la mesure de Provins), et les aultres grains au prix le prix, et ne duroit telle cherte que trois moys pour le plus." A valuable table of prices of food stuffs follows. — Claude Haton, I, 112, 113. 4 See De Ruble, "Le traite de Cateau-CambYesis," Revue d'hist. diplomatique (1887), 385, and the more extensive work (1889) with the same title by this author. 5 On the general situation between the wounding and the death of Henry II see Neg. Tosc., Ill, 400. 6 Castelnau, Book I, chap. i. He was sixteen on January 19, 1560. Cf. Castan, "La naissance des enfans du roi Henri de Valois," Revue des savants, 6™e se>., III. 6 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE and his unexpected death opened before them the prospect of new and prolonged power. Henry II had scarcely closed his eyes when the duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine took posses sion of the person of Francis II and conducted him to the Louvre, in company with the queen-mother, ignoring the princes of the blood, the marshals, the admiral of France, and "many Knights of the Order, or grand seigneurs who were not of their retinue." There they deliberated without permitting anyone to approach, still less to speak to the King except in the presence of one of them. Francis II gave out that his uncles were to manage his affairs.1 In order to give color to this assumption of authority, as 'if their intention was to restore everything to good estate again, the Guises recalled the chancellor Olivier, who had been driven from office by Diane de Poitiers, Henry IPs mistress.2 Even before these events the Guises had shown their hand, for on the day of Henry IPs decease the constable, the cardinal Cha- tillon and his brother, the admiral Coligny, had been appointed to attend upon the royal corse at the Tournelles, by which maneu ver they were excluded from all active work and the way was cleared for the unhampered rule of the King's uncles. Rumor prevailed that D'Andelot, the third of the famous Chatillon brothers, was to be dismissed from the command of the footmen and the place be given to the count de Rochefoucauld.3 Before the end of the month the duke of Guise was given charge of the war office and the cardinal of Lorraine that of finance and matters 1 Throckmorton to the queen, July 18, 1559, C. 5. P. For., No. 1,009. This information was given to the council and a deputation of the Parlement, but no official proclamation was made. — D'Aubigne, I, 243, n. 1. 2 Claude Haton, I, 106; Tavannes, 245. The deposed beauty surrendered the keys of the royal cabinets and some bags of precious jewels to the new queen, La Planche, 204; Baschet, 494, dispatch of the Venetian ambassador, July 12, 1559. Cf. Guiffrey, Lettres inedites de Diane de Poitiers, 1866; Imbart de St. Amand, Revue des deux mondes, August 15, 1866, p. 984. For light upon her extravagance see Chevalier, Archives royales de Chenonceau: Comptes des recettes et despences faites en la Chastellenie de Chenonceau, par Diane de Poitiers, duchesse de Valen- tinois, dame de Chenonceau et aulres lieux (Techener, 1864). Hay, Diane de Poitiers la grande seneschale de Normandie, duchesse de Valentinois, is a sumptuously illustrated history. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 1,024, July 19, 1559. BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 7 of state.1 At the same time, on various pretexts, the princes of the blood were sent away,2 the prince of Conde" to Flanders, osten sibly to confer with Philip II regarding the peace of Cateau-Cam- bre"sis,3 the prince of La Roche-sur-Yon and the cardinal Bour bon to conduct Elizabeth of France into Spain, so that by Novem ber "there remained no more princes with the King save those of Guise,"4 who had influential agents in the two marshals, St. Andre5 and Brissac.6 1 Castelnau, Book I, chap, ii; C. S. P. For., No. 972, July n, 1559; No. 1,080, July 27, 1559. 2 La Planche, 208; Claude Haton, I, 108; Paulin Paris, Negociations, 108, note. 3 Tavannes, 245; Paris, Negociations relatives au regne de Francois II, 61, 76, 80, 83, 86; La Planche, 207; C. S. P. For., No. 1,121, August 4, 1559; ibid., August 1, 1559, No. 1,101, Throckmorton to the Queen: "The French .... are in fear because of the king of Spain, who has not as yet restored S. Quentin's, Ham nor Chastelet, the Spanish garrisons of which daily make courses into the country as far as Noyon, about which the governor of Compegny has written to the King, adding that it were as good to have war as such a peace." C. S. P. For., July 13, 1559, No. 985, Throckmorton to the Queen: "It is thought that the treaty al ready made is void by the French King's death; .... that the king of Spain, seeing his advantage and knowing the state of France better than he did when he made that peace, will either make new demands, or constrain France to do as he will have them, who would be loath to break with him again." 4 Tavannes, op. cit. s Jacques d'Alban de St. Andre, born in the Lyonnais, marshal 1547, favorite of Henry II. He was taken prisoner at the battle of St. Quentin. After the death of Henry II, fearing prosecution for his enormous stealings in office, he became the tool of the Guises. See La Planche, 205, 206; Livre des marchands, 438, 439; and especially Boyvin du Villars, 904 ff., on his administration in Provence. 6 Brissac was governor of Piedmont under Henry II, where he sustained the interests of France so energetically that Philip hated him. The Guises made great efforts to attach him to their party, with the hope of playing hini against the Bourbons and Montmorencys (Paris, Negociations, 73, note). After the peace of Cateau-Cambresis, the fortresses of the duke of Savoy were dismantled, to the intense anger of the latter. Cf. Fillon Collection, 2,654: Letter of July 16, 1560, to the duchess of Mantua, complaining that the people of Caluz have revolted against the authority of the marshal Brissac. This hard feeling probably explains Brissac's transfer to the government of Picardy, in January, 1560, to the chagrin of the prince of Cond 65> 94"i°2, 136, 154, 166, 169, 177, 182- 98, 225, 421, 264, 345-S2, 358, 36l» 377-8i, 394, 415, 43°, 434-37, 446, 452> 46i, 468, 482, 489, 5i°, 514, 522, 538, 540-43, 549-52, 556-58, 562-64, 5^7, 568, 581- 89, 602-9, 615, 625, 628, 654, 668, 671; Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, II, 27, 48, 89, 108, 121, 163, 171-74; Poulet, Correspondance du cardinal de Gran velle, I, 565, note; R. Q. H., January, 1879, 10-12. Some of his letters which were intercepted by the Huguenots are published in the Mimoires de Condi. M. Paillard has printed a portion of those relating to the conspiracy of Amboise in the Rev. hist., XIV; at pp. 64, 65 is a brief sketch of the ambassador's life. See also Weiss's introduction to edition of Papiers d'ital du cardinal de Granvelle, I. 26 * THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANC The spirit of unrest in France, both political and religious, was so great that only a head was wanting, not members, in order to bring things to a focus. The whole of Aquitaine and Normandy was reported, in December, 1559, to be in such "good heart" as to be easily excited to action if they perceived any movement elsewhere;1 in February, 1560, the turbulence in Paris was so great that Coligny was appointed to go thither in advance of the King's entrance "for the appeasing of the garboil there."2 In order to repress this spirit of rebellion the government diligently prosecuted the Huguenots.3 The Guises hoped that the severity exercised during the last few months in Paris and many other cities against persons condemned for their religion, of whom very great numbers were burnt alive,4 would terrify the Calvinists and 1 C. S. P. For., No. 543. 2 Ibid., No. 508, December 27. Throckmorton wrote to the council on February 4, 1560: "At present the French have to bestir themselves for the good and quiet of their own country, as factions in religion are springing up every where." — Ibid., No. 685. Indeed, the chancellor at this time for three days refused to sign an order necessary for the prosecution of the war in Scotland, on the ground of the dangers at home and the necessity of harboring the govern ment's resources (ibid., No. 292, November 18, 1559: Killigrew and Jones to Cecil). Among the financial expedients resorted to at this time was an order in December, 1559, that all posts and postmasters should henceforth be deprived of the fees which they enjoyed which amounted to 100,000 crowns yearly, and for compensation to them the price of letters was increased a fourth part (ibid., No. 508, December, 1559). On May 29, 1560, a royal ordinance abolished the King's support of the post entirely and some new ordinances of Parlement were calculated to increase the revenue by 2,000,000 francs (ibid., No. 550, January 6, 1560). In February the King raised a loan of 7,000 francs at 8 per cent, from the Parisians (ibid., No. 750, February 20, 1560: Throckmorton to the Queen). 3 "Six score commissions are sent forth for the persecution for relioion.'' — Ibid., No. 451: Killigrew and Jones to the Queen, December 18, 1559. This was just after the murder of the president Minard. "The Cardinsl of Lorraine lately sent .... a bag full of commissions for persecution to be done about Poitiers and certain letters which he carried apart in his bosom; the messenger was met and the letters taken from him."— Ibid., No. 590, January 18, 1560. One of these— "Lettre de roi a tous les eveques de son royaume" — is preserved in K. 1,494, fol. 4. It is dated January 28, 1560. 4 Nig. Tosc, III, 408, January 22, 1560. On January 29 a poor man, a binder of books, was condemned to be burned for heresy at Rouen. While riding in a cart between two friars to be burned, a quarrel was made with a sergeant who BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 27 the political Huguenots into obedience. But on the contrary, local rebellion increased. At Rouen, at Bordeaux, and between Blois and Orleans, Huguenots arrested by the King's officers were rescued by armed bands, in some cases the officers being killed. Indeed, so common did these practices become that they were at last heard of without surprise.1 Imagine a young king [wrote the Venetian ambassador] without experience and without authority; a council rent by discord; the royal authority in the hands of a woman alternately wise, timid, and irresolute, and always a woman ; the people divided into factions and the prey of insolent agitators who under pretense of religious zeal trouble the public repose, corrupt manners, disparage the law, check the administration of justice, and imperil" the royal authority.2 The interests of the religious Huguenots and the political Hugue not's continued to approach during the autumn and winter of 1559-60. In order to make head against the usurpation of the Guises,3 which they represented as a foreign domination, the latter contended that it was necessary to call the estates of France in order to interpret the laws, just as the Calvinists contended for an inter- convoyed him and he was unhorsed, the poor man was taken out of the cart, his hands were loosed, and a cloak was thrown over him, and he was conveyed out of the hands of his enemies. The justices and the governors, having knowledge of this, commanded the gates to be shut, and, making a search that night, found him again and burned him next day. And at his burning were three hundred men- at-arms, for fear of the people (C. S. P. For., No. 708, February 8, 1560). 1 C. S. P. For., No. 256, November 14, 1559; ibid., Ven.. No. 132, March 6, 1560. 2 Baschet, I, 559; cf. Nig. Tosc, III, 310, January, 1560. 3 The fear of attempts being made to assassinate them or the King haunted the cardinal and his brother. In November the French King, while out hunting near Blois, became so terrified, that he returned to court, and orders were given to the Scotch Guard to wear jack and mail and pistols (C. S. P. For., No. 166, Nov ember 15, 1559); in December rumors reached the cardinal's ears that his own death and that of tie duke of Guise was sworn (ibid., No. 528); in January the use of tdbourins and masks in court pleasures was forbidden on account of the fear which the cardinal of Lorraine had of being assassinated (ibid., No. 658, January 28, 1559). De Thou says the cardinal was "natura timidus." — Book XXV. The wearing of pistols and firearms was prohibited by two edicts, the one of July 3, 1559, the other of December 17, 1559. The law also forbade the wearing of long sleeves or cloaks or even top boots, in which a pistol or a poignard might be concealed. Both measures were attributed with good reason to the timidity of the cardinal of Lorraine. 28 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE pretation of the Scriptures. The contentions of the Huguenots, the tyrannical conduct of the Guises, the menaces which they did not hesitate to utter against the high nobles of the realm, the retirement into which they had driven the constable, the removal of the princes of the blood which they had brought about upon one pretext or another, the contempt they expressed for the States- General, the corruption of justice, their exorbitant financial policy, the disposal of offices and benefices which they practiced — all these causes, united with religious persecutions, constituted a body of grievances for which redress inevitably would be demanded. The question was, How ? The leaders of the Huguenots — and the term is used even more in a political sense than in a religious one — were not ignorant of the history of the Reformation in Germany, nor una ware of the fact that politics had been commingled with religion there.1 The question of ways and means being laid before the legists of the Reformation and other men of renown in both France and Germany, it was answered that the government of the Guises could be legally opposed and recourse made to force of arms, pro vided that the princes of the blood, who, in such case had legitimate right to bear rule in virtue of their birth, or any one of their number, could be persuaded to endeavor to do so.2 But the attempt neces sarily would have to be of the nature of a coup de main, for the reason that the King was in the hands of the Guises and the council .composed of them and their partisans. After long deliberation it was planned, under pretext of presenting a petition to the King, to seize the cardinal of Lorraine and the duke of Guise, then to assemble the States- General for the purpose of inquiring into their administration, and before them to prosecute the ministers for high treason.3 Three classes of men found themselves consorting together in this movement: those actuated by a sentiment of 1 "Les protestans de France se mettans devant les yeux l'example de leurs voisins." — Castelnau, Book I, chap. vii. 2 La Planche, 237. 3 Ibid.; Castelnau, Book I, chap. viii. The Huguenots did not intend to take up arms against the person of the King or to force Francis II to change the religion of the state. The assertion that these were their purposes was an adroit stroke of the Guises (Rev. hist., XIV, 85, 101). BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 29 patriotism, conceiving this to be the right way to serve their prince and their country; second, those moved by ambition and fond of change; finally, zealots who were filled with religious enthusiasm . and a wish to avenge the intolerance and persecution which they and theirs had suffered.1 For such an enterprise Louis of Bourbon, the prince of Conde, was the logical leader, both because of his position as a prince of the blood and on account of his resentment toward the Guises for having been excluded from the government of Picardy. But the prince, when besought to attempt the over throw of the Guises for the deliverance of the King and the state, in view of the dubious conduct of his brother, concluded that it would be too perilous to the cause for him to be overtly compromised, in event of failure.2 Montmorency was not possible as a leader, for his religious leanings were in no sense Calvinistic; he was not a prince of the blood, and therefore his contentions could not politically have the weight of Conde's; and finally, his grievance was more a personal than a party one.3 1 Rel. vin., I, 525. 2 Volrad of Mansfeldt and Grumbach, counselor of the elector palatine, but personal enemies of the cardinal of Lorraine, had been drawn by sympathy into the plan, and on March 4, through their influence, Hotman was received by the elector at Heidelberg, who gave Hotman a letter of credit to the king of Navarre and the prince of Conde. See Dareste, "Extraits de la correspondance inedite de Francois Hotman," Mim. de I'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, CIV (1897), 649. 3 After the failure of the conspiracy, during the course of the investigation set on foot by the government, the constable was accused of complicity in the affair but vigorously denied it in a remonstrance laid before the Parlement (La Place, 37, gives a part of the text; Castelnau, Book II, chap, xi), and while condemning the conspiracy artfully contrived to imply that the Guises were to be blamed for much (La Planche, 269). De Thou, II, 778, perhaps reproduces the actual language of the constable before the Parlement, his father having been president of the body at this time. But in the early winter Montmorency had visited his lands in Poitou and Angoumois, and his daughter, Madame de la Tremouille, having quitted his usual place of residence at Chantilly, and traveled in those quarters of France which, it will be observed, are identical with those wherein the conspiracy of Amboise was hatched (La Place, 32). Is it reasonable to believe that a man of his political acumen and state of feeling at the time toward the Guises could have been unaware of at least something of what was in preparation ? The strongest evidence in favor of the innocence of the constable is the fact that his two nephews, the cardinal de Chatillon and the admiral Coligny were undoubtedly without knowledge of the plot. See the 3° THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The conspirators found a leader in the person of a gentleman of Limousin or Perigord, one Godfrey de Barry, sieur de la Renaudie,1 who had been imprisoned at Dijon, escaped and found refuge in Switzerland;2 he had a special grievance against the Guises, who. had lately (September 4, 1558) put his brother-in-law, Gaspard de Heu, sieur de Buy, to death.3 The active participants were, in the main, recruited from the Breton border, Anjou, Saintonge, and Poitou, with individual captains from Picardy, Normandy, Guyenne, Provence, and Lan guedoc.4 Their rendezvous was at Nantes, in a house owned, it is said, by D'Andelot.5 But the author of the whole daring project was the famous Francois Hotman, a French refugee at Geneva, and the real inspiration of the movement came from Switzerland, for the unexpected death of Henry II seemed to the French exiles in Switzerland to open the door of the mother country again to them.6 proofs in Delaborde, Vie de Coligny, I, 391-414; D'Aubigne, ed. De Ruble, I, 263, n. 6; Paillard, "Additions critiques a. l'histoire de la conjuration d' Amboise," Rev. hist, XIV (1880), 70. 71. It is hard, however, to believe that the constable had no information at all of what was on foot, considering his politics and his move ments during the winter. 1 La Place, 33; Le Laboureur, I, 386, says his first name was Jean. 2 C. S. P. Ven., No. 137. He had been imprisoned for devising false evidence in a process of law (D'Aubigne, ed. De Ruble, I, 258, n. 3). La Renaudie is said even to have gone to England to see Queen Elizabeth (Haag, La France protestante, I, 259). No reference is given, but from Hotman's correspondence (Acad, des sc. moral, et polit., CIV [1877], 645) it is evident some one was so sent. The further fact that Mundt was approached in Strasburg and French proclamations printed in England were circulated in Normandy (C. 5. P. For., 954, April 6, 1560) seems to sustain this view. 3 La Place, 41; Castelnau, Book I, chap. viii. 4 D'Aubigne, Book II, chap, xvii; I, 259-61 gives the names of the provincial captains. s La Planche, 239. 6 Mundt, Elizabeth's agent in Strasburg (he was also agent of the landgrave Philip of Hesse), was applied to and "thought that the Queen would not be wanting in kind offices. Already it is whispered," he wrote, "that there is a great agree ment among the nobility and others throughout France, who will no longer endure the haughty and adulterous rule of the Guises, and that some of the first rank in France are cognizant of the conspiracy who remain quiet; the rest will rise in arms BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 31 The whole plot was concerted in a meeting held at Nantes on February 1, 1560,1 which was chosen partly because of its remote ness, partly because the Parlement of Brittany being in session, the conspirators could conceal their purpose by pretending to be there on legal business. A marriage festival also helped to dis guise their true purpose; and for the sake of greater caution, the principals were careful not to recognize one another in public.2 It was determined to muster two hundred cavalry from each town in the provinces of Guyenne, Gascony, Perigord, Limousin, and Agenois. For the maintenance of this force they intended to avail themselves of the revenues and effects of the abbeys and monas teries of each province, taxing them arbitrarily and using force if unable to obtain payment in any other way.3 The initiative was to have been taken on March 6,4 under the form of presenting a against the Guises." — C. S. P. For., No. 779, February 27, 1560. Cf. Nig. Tosc, III, 409. An added element of adventure was the participation of a certain nobleman of wealth who seems to have financially supported the conspiracy for self -advantage. This man imagined that the movement might be converted into a movement for the recovery of Metz from the French (letter of Hotman to Calvin, September 19, 1559). In Hotman's eyes, to restore Metz to Germany was to restore it to Protestantism, but Calvin was cautious, for his sound policy distinguished between rebellion and constitutional restriction of tyranny. He sent Beza to Strasburg to attempt to prevent such an action. But the Senate of Strasburg seized upon the project, demanded liberty for the Protestants of Metz and Treves, abolished the Interim, interdicted the Catholic religion, and even expelled the Anabaptists from the city, to the jubilation of radical Protestants, who looked upon it as just reprisal for the repressive policy of the Guises in France. 1 La Planche, 238. 2 La Place, 23; La Planche, 238. Some thirty captains were party to it. who were to be put in command of some companies of German lansquenets (La Place, 33). "Upward of sixty men, part foreigners and part native Frenchmen" came to aid the plot (C. 5. P. Ven., No. 134, March 15, 1560). 3 C. S. P. Ven., No. 125, March 16, 1560. The correspondence of the Spanish ambassador testifies to the fact that the Protestant soldiery was well paid, the money having been procured by spoliation of the churches. They gave to each footman 14 francs per month and to each horseman 16 sous per day. — Rev. hist., XIV, 104. The Venetian ambassador says the horsemen got 18 soldi, the footmen 10 daily (C. 5. P. Ven., March 17, 1560). 4 The Spanish Ambassador puts it upon the 6th. La Planche, Beza, Castelnau, De Thou, D'Aubigne, La Popeliniere, Le Laboureur make March 10 the day. The 32 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE petition to the King against the usurpation of the Guises.1 Unfor tunately for the success of the enterprise, it was too long in prepara tion and too widely spread to keep secret.2 The magnitude of the plot alarmed the Guises, in spite of the full warning they had received.3 Aside from outside sources of information, the con spiracy was revealed by one of those in it, an advocate of the discrepancy perhaps is to be accounted for by the circumstance that Avenelles had said that March 6 was the day designated, but the unexpected removal of the court from Blois to Amboise (La Place, 33; La Planche, 346) postponed the date of action. Cf. Rev. h.st., XIV, 66, 85. » Castelnau, ibid.; La Planche, 239, 246. The statement is confirmed by La Place, 33, 34, and La Planche, 255 who say that the petition was written in invisible ink and intrusted to one Bigne, a servant of La Renaudie, who having been captured after the death of his master, in order to save his life, revealed the secret of the document. The first article was couched in these terms: "Protesta tion faicte par le chef et tous les ceux du conseil de n'attenter aucune autre chose contre la Majestie du roy et les princes de son sang. Et estoit le but aussi de la dicte entreprise de faire observer d'ancienne coustume de la France par une legitime assembled des estats." — Tavannes, 247. Tavannes says Bigne directly said that Conde and Coligny were implicated. Other incriminating papers were found in the boots of the baron Castelnau (Rev. hist., XIV, 99, 100; La Planche, 254, 255). 2 Castelnau, Book I, chap. xi. De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II, I, 60-70 (2 vols., Paris, 1866), shows admirably that there is no doubt of the formidable nature of the conspiracy of Amboise. 3 It is said that the cardinal and his brother received intimations of danger from Spain, Italy, Savoy, Germany, and Flanders (La Place 32; Castelnau, Book I, chap, viii) and it is certain that the cardinal Granvella, Philip's representative in the Netherlands, warned them. De Thou says that warnings came from Ger many, Spain, Italy, and France. Paillard in Rev. hist., XIV, 81, is dubious about an Italian source, but it is confirmed by C. S. P. Ven., 137, March 6, 1560. He thinks that any Spanish source of information was impossible, for the reason that Philip II learned everything from Chantonnay. Granvella's warning is acknowl edged by Chantonnay in a letter of March 3, 1560, to his brother. He was ex pressly told that the aim of the conspiracy was to make away with the cardinal of Lorraine and all those of the house of Guise (Rev. hist., XIV, 80, 81). This is supported by the testimony of the constable and the Venetian ambassador (D'Au bigne, I, 263, n. 3). It seems certain that this information was conveyed to the Guises by February 12 (Rev. hist., XIV, 83; Mem. de Condi, I, 387; D'Aubigne, Book II, chap. xvii). Dareste, "Francois Hotman et la conspiration d'Amboise," Bibliotheque de VEcole des Charles, ser. Ill, V, 361, thinks that Hotman's own indiscreet boasting at Strasburg was responsible, at least in part, for the discovery of the plot. The duke of Guise and his brother were in such fear that they wore shirts of chain mail underneath their vestments, and at night were guarded by pistoleers and men-at-arms. On the night of March 6, while at Blois, the alarm was so great that the duke, the cardinal, the grand-prior, and all the knights of the order there, watched all night long in the courtyard (C. 5. P. For., No. 837, March 7, 1560). BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 33 Parlement named Avenelles, whose courage failed him at the critical moment.1 Thereupon, for precaution's sake, the court moved from Blois to the castle of Amboise, which the duke, having the King's authority to support him, immediately set about for tifying. He likewise secured the garrison and townspeople, and found a plausible pretext to watch the prince of Conde, by giving CONSPIRACY OF AMBOISE SURRENDER OF THE CHATEAU DE NOIZAY (Tortorel and Perissin) him one of the gates to defend, but, at the same time, sent his brother, the grand prior along with a company of men-at-arms of assured fidelity. In view of alarming rumors a posse was sent on March n under command of the count of Sancerre to Tours, where some ten or twelve of those in the plot, notably the baron 1 Castelnau, Book I, chap, viii; La Planche, 246, 247. He received one hundred ecus and a judicial post in Lorraine (De Thou, II, 774, ed. 174°)- 34 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE de Castelnau, the captain Mazeres, and a gentleman named Renay were already awaiting the money which was to be distributed among companies of theirs secretly stationed in the neighboring villages.1 Twenty-five of the conspirators were arrested without opposition, whilst incautiously walking outside the Chateau de Noizay, between three and four leagues from Amboise, which belonged to the wife of Renay, and the whole number of them, with five others arrested at Tours by the count de Sancerre, were taken to Amboise. Im mediate examination, though, showed that some of them had risen in arms, partly from friendship for certain captains under whom they had served, while others had been tempted by a trifle of earnest money in lieu of pay, as usual when soldiers were raised for companies, without knowing the place of their service, or its purpose. They were all dismissed, with the exception of one or two who remained prisoners, the chancellor Olivier having admonished them and told them that though they deserved to die the king of his clemency, for this once granted them their lives.2 To enable them to return home, the King had a crown (teston = 10 to 1 1 sous) given to each man. But the alarm was not yet ended. That night (March 14) several couriers arrived at the court bring ing new advices. The next morning at daybreak there was greater commotion than ever before the castle, for two hundred cavalry made their appearance in the town. They thought them selves almost sure of not finding any sort of resistance and that 1 "Among the prisoners was a Gascon gentleman, one baron de Castelnau, who considering himself ill-used by the cardinal and the duke of Guise, with many other captains and soldiers, dissatisfied on account of non-payment of their arrears and because they had been dismissed from the Court, finding themselves without salary or any other means, and being half desperate, joined the other insurgents about religion and conspired against the cardinal and the duke of Guise." — C. S. P. Ven., No. 135, March 16, 1560. Sancerre had known Castelnau during the late war, and when he sought to arrest him and his companions, they resisted. Although the city of Tours took up arms in the king's name against them, they made their escape into the chateau de Noizay (Indre-et-Loire), between three and four leagues from Amboise, which belonged to the wife of Renay (La Place, 33. She had been maid of honor to Jeanne d'Albret, C. S. P. Ven., No. 135, March 16, 1560). Cf. C. S. P. For., March 21, 1560, and note, on p. 462 — the account of Throck morton. The two versions substantially agree. 2 C. S. P. Ven. For., March 16, 1560. BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 35 they consequently would be able to effect their purpose, as all the princes and lords, like all the rest of the court, had no sort of defen sive armour except some coats of mail, and very few even of those, while their offensive weapons were merely swords and daggers, with a few pistols, whereas, on the contrary, the insurgents were well armed with both kinds of weapons and were for the most part well horsed. Some boatmen saw the insurgents following the course of the Loire, and their shouts aroused the castle. One or two were killed, whereupon the rest took to flight toward the THE EXECUTION OF AMBOISE, DEATH OF CASTELNAU (Tortorel and Perissin) country. But several were captured and two of them having been recognized as among the company who had been pardoned on the evening before, they were instantly hanged, with two others taken on the preceding day, on the battlements over the castle gate. As a result of the new alarm there was a general scattering of bands of arrest on the next day (March 15). The marshal St. Andre was dispatched to Tours with nearly two hundred horse, with orders to take five companies of men-at-arms from the garrison in the immediate neighborhood. He was followed by Claude of Guise, the duke d'Aumale, the duke de Nemours and the prince 36 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of Conde.1 Marshal Termes was sent to Blois; the marshal Vieilleville to Orleans; the duke of Montpensier to Angers; La Rochefoucault to Bourges; Burie to Poitiers.2 During the day some forty others were taken. Fifteen of those pursued retreated into a house and defended themselves most obstinately, wounding many of their assailants who surrounded it, so that the house was set on fire: one of them, rather than surrender, burned himself alive by throwing himself into the flames. Toward nightfall six or seven more of them were hanged. The duke of Guise, whom the King in the exigency of the moment, made lieutenant-general on March 17,3 did not fail to take every precaution; he appointed two princes and two knights of St. Michael for each quarter of Amboise, keeping sentries there and sending out scouts as if the town were besieged.' The most exposed parts of the castle were repaired and supplied with food, and above all with money, weap ons, and artillery. The most useful remedy, however, was the publication and transmission for publication to all the towns and places in France of a general pardon for all the insurgents who within twenty-four hours after its notification should return to their homes, or otherwise they would be proclaimed rebels and traitors, and license would be given to all persons to slay them and inherit their property; but assuring the insurgents, nevertheless, that if they wished to say anything, or to present any request to the King they would be heard willingly, without hurt, provided they made their appearance as loyal subjects.4 The prisoners confessed that in all the neighboring towns, viz., Blois, Orleans, Chartres, Chateaudun, and others, a great 1 C. S. P. For., No. 859, March 15, 1560; ibid., Ven., No. 135, March 16. 2 Rev. hist., XIV, 102; La Planche, 247; Arch, de la Gironde, XXIX, 8. Vieille ville was sent to pacify the Beauce and M. de Vassey, another knight of the order, to Maune, near Angers, to subdue a commotion there (C. 5. P. For., 902, March 26, 1560). 3 His orders at this hour are printed in the Mim.-journ. du due de Guise, 457; Mem. de Condi, I, 342; La Popeliniere, I, 166; cf. La Planche, 225, who gives the gist of them. 4 Lettres-patentes du Roi Francois II au seneschal de Lyon "concernans la revelacion de grace que sa Mate veult faire a ceulx qui avaient conspire contre I'estat de la religion et son royaume," March 17, 1560. BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 37 supply of arms had been made in secret, most especially of arque buses, one of the men who were hanged having revealed that in one single house at Blois there were six large chests full of these. During the next three days nothing was attended to but fortifying the castle, repairing the weakest places around it, and making a trench in front of the principal gate, which opened on the country, in which some arquebuses and three or four small pieces of artil- DEATH OF LA RENAUDIE (Tortorel and Perissin) lery found accidentally and brought there from neighboring places, were fixed. Round the town, besides cutting the bridges which were at its gates, except the principal bridge over the Loire, the moats were cleansed and restored, leaving but one gate open.1 Scouting parties were daily sent out, and on March 19 a company of five fell in with an equal number of insurgents; after a long and stout fight the posse at length killed their commander and two of ¦ See the extended account in C. S. P. Ven., March 20, 1560; Nig. Tosc, III 412-15. 38 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE his men and made the other two prisoners. One of those killed proved to be La Renaudie. J But the Guises did not stop with these acts of punishment near by. Besides sending letters of authority to all bailiffs and seneschals ordering the arrest of all men, whether on foot or on horseback, to be found in the country surrounding Amboise,2 Tavannes, on April 12, 1560, was ordered to do the like in Dauphine, being actually armed with lettres de cachet issued in blank.3 Few other disturbances developed except at Lyons, and in Pro vence and Dauphin 64 but the government was anxious with regard to Gascony and Normandy, "their populations being much more daring."5 " The whole of Normandy is filled with Huguenotism," wrote the Venetian ambassador, "the people by thousands sing every night until ten o'clock the Psalms of David and the 1 His corpse was hanged March 20, 1560, upon a gibbet before the court gate, and left there for two whole days, with an inscription at his feet running: "C'est La Renaudie diet la Forest, capitaine des rebelles, chef et autheur de la sedition" (La Place, 35; D'Aubigne, I, 268, Book II, chap, xvii; C. S. P. For., 463, note, March 23, 1560). 2 The sentencing to death of prisoners continued daily, several being sent for execution to Blois, Tours, Orleans, and other places, "that these acts of justice might be witnessed universally and be better known." 3 The instructions of the King are a curious witness of the fury of the Guises: "Je vous prye, y estant arrive, faire si bonne dilligence que vous les puissiez chastier comme ils meritent, sans avoir aucune pitie ny compassion d'eux. . . . Aussy je vous envoye des lettres dont le nom est en blanc et lesquelles vous ferez remplir a votre fantaisie, que j'escrips aux principaux seigneurs et gentilshommes dudit pais a ce qu'ils ayent a assembler leur voysins et vous accompaigner en qeste entre- prinse." — Nigociations relatives au regne de Francois II, 342, 343. 4 Throckmorton wrote on February 27, 1560: "It is reported that the idols . have been cast out of the churches throughout Aquitaine and that the same would speedily be done in Provence." — C. S. P. For., No. 779. Later, on April 14, the Venetian ambassador reports that the insurgents in Provence "have stripped the churches, and mutilated the images." — Ibid., Ven., No. 146. In Dauphine1 the achievements of Montbrun made him famous; see De Thou, Book XXV, 548 ff. 5 Chantonnay to the duke of Sessa, March 24, 1560, K. 1,493, No. 45. At St. Malo the insurgents killed certain public officials and prevented an execution. On March 25 the cardinal of Bourbon went to Rouen; and on the same day there was a sermon in a wood without the town to above two thousand people. A priest and a clerk called them Lutherans and cast stones at them, and a riot ensued. Two days after the preacher was taken and burned (C. 5. P. For., 930, March 30, 1560). BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT 39 men-at-arms dare not touch them. The people of Dieppe every night in the market-place sing psalms and some days have sermons preached to them in the fields; in most towns in Normandy and many other places they do the same thing."1 In consequence of this state of things, the marshal de Termes was appointed with royal authority and full and absolute powers throughout the province summarily to confiscate, imprison, con demn and put to death whomsoever he pleased.2 In the end the government sent 1,200 of those implicated in the con spiracy of Amboise or under suspicion to execution. A morbid desire to witness the shedding of blood seized upon society, and it became a customary thing for the ladies and gentlemen of the court to witness the torture of those condemned after the manner of the auto da fe in Spain. 3 D'Aubigne'4 the eminent historian of the French Reformation, was an eye-witness of such in cidents, and though but ten years of age, swore like young Hannibal before his father, to devote his life to vengeance of such atrocities.5 1 C. S. P. Ven., No. 142, March 26, 1560. 2 Ibid., No. 146, April 4, 1560; ibid., For., 952, April 6. The cardinal of Lor raine justified the drastic policy of the government, saying: "It will be more than necessary to apply violent remedies and proceed to fire and sword, as otherwise, unless provision be made, the alienation of this kingdom, coupled with that of Germany and England and Scotland, would by force draw Spain and Italy and the rest of Christendom to the same result." — Ibid., Ven., No. 142, March 28, 1560. 3 The court attended the spectacle of these executions "comme s'il eut ete question de voir jouer quelque momerie." — La Planche, 263. 4 Monod, "La jeunesse d'Agrippa d'Aubigne," Mim. de I' Acad. ... de Caen, 1884. s C. S. P. For., 1560, Introd. Hotman vented his disappointment at the failure of the conspiracy and his wrath because of the cruel policy of the Guises in a famous pamphlet directed against the cardinal of Lorraine. It bore the significant title "LeTigre." See De Thou, Book XXV, 512; Weill, 40, 98, Asse, "Un pamphlet en 1560," Revue de France, January 1876, and Dareste, Mim. de I' Acad, des sc. moral. et polit., CIV (1877), 605. Hotman's authorship of it remained undiscovered for years. A counselor named Du Lyon, believed to be the author of it, a printer named Martin, and a merchant of Rouen, who had sponsored it, were hanged in the Place Maubert (Castelnau, Book I, chap, xi; La Planche, 312, 313; La Place, 76, 77)- In 1875 M. Charles Read published this famous pamphlet in facsimile from the only existing copy which was rescued from the burning of the H6tel-de-Ville in 1871. The text is accompanied with historical, literary, and bibliographical notes. CHAPTER II CATHERINE DE MEDICI BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE. PROJECT OF A NATIONAL COUNCIL The insurrection of Amboise was not wholly displeasing to many even in the court. Huguenot dissidence and the discontent of many persons with the government gave the cardinal and the duke of Guise many troubled thoughts even after every external sign of disquiet had ceased. Strong suspicion rested upon the prince of Conde1 who was forbidden to leave the court and so closely watched that he was afraid to speak to any of his friends. The Guises were in a dilemma, not having the courage to shed the blood royal,2 yet, on the other hand, they feared lest, by let ting their suspicion pass in silence, the prince might be rendered more daring and confident for the future. So pointed did the accusation become that Conde finally de manded a hearing before the Council, where he cast down the gauntlet to the Guises, declaring that "whoever should say that he had any hand in conspiring against the King's person or gov ernment was a liar and would lie as often as he said so;" he then offered to waive his privilege as a prince of the blood in order to have personal satisfaction and withdrew. But the cardinal of Lorraine, instead of accepting the challenge, made a sign to the King to break up the session.3 Antoine of Navarre had been in the south of France during these events but, nevertheless, he also did not escape suspicion; 1 The baggage of the prince of Conde was opened, it being expected to find therein letters or other writings relating to the conspiracy, and although excuses were made after the search, attributing it to thieves, yet as none of the contents were missing, the belief greatly prevailed of the search having been made for that purpose (C. S. P. Ven., No. 178, 1560). On March 22 the prince of Conde was confronted with one of the condemned conspirators, but to the discomfiture of his enemies, no evidence against the prince could be elicited (C. S. P. For., No. 919, March 29 1560). » La Planche, 267. 3 Castelnau, Book I, chap. xi. 40 CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 41 a secretary of his who was staying in Paris to look after his affairs was searched and all the furniture of his house ransacked to dis cover incriminating papers, if possible. * The Bourbon prince was doubly alarmed at the suspicion of guilt because his name was associated with that of the English queen.2 The king of Navarre may have had imperfect knowledge that something was in the wind when he left the court to visit his dominions in the south, but he was no party to the conspiracy.3 Of Queen Elizabeth's indirect participation there is no doubt at all. The belief prevailed in Paris that great offers had been made to the earl of Arran by Gas- cony, Poitou, Brittany, and Normandy, if he would lead an English descent into those parts,4 and in the two last-named provinces English merchants and sailors animated the people to rebellion against the house of Guise by means of proclamations in the French language printed in England. 5 But if the Guises shrank from shedding the blood of the princes, they struck as near to them as they dared, by urging the pursuit of Visieres, a former lieutenant of Montgomery, for whose apprehension, dead or alive, a reward of 2,000 crowns was offered,6 and Maligny, a lieutenant of the prince of Conde. 1 La Planche, 268. ' May 6, 1560, Navarre to Throckmorton: "Has received a letter enclosing a proclamation of the Queen in which he sees it intimated that the princes and estates of France are to call her to their aid. As first prince of the blood he repudiates this, and . . hopes she will not mention him or the others in her proclamations again, as it will only injure them with the King" (written from Pau).— C. S. P. For., No. 40. 3 Mim. de Condi, I, 398; La Popeliniere, I, 170. 4 C. S. P. For., No. 992, April 12, 1560. s Ibid., No. 954, April 6, 1560; Chantonnay wrote to the duchess of -Parma that Elizabeth was privy to the conspiracy (Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, II, 142). 6 C. S. P. For., No. 992, April 12, 1560. The unfortunate baron Castelnau, in view of the fact that he was a knight of the order, was at first sentenced to the galleys for three years, but later, at the instance of the Guises, was condemned to die and was beheaded on March 29, along with the captain Mazeres, the duke of Nemours, the baron's captor, being absolved from keeping his promise to spare his life (C. S. P. For., N0.952, April 6, 1560; La Planche, 264, 265; La Place, 34; D'Aubigne, 268-70, Book II, chap. xvii). One of the most prominent of those arrested was the Scotchman, Robert Stuart, who had already been suspected of the 42 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Although the initial purpose of the conspiracy had failed, namely to take the King and drive out the Guises,1 Conde and his followers did not fail to perceive that things were not entirely unfavorable.2 Catherine de Medici, who while jealous of the position of the Guises in a place which naturally, and by tradition, if the regencies of Blanche of Castille and Anne of Beaujeu counted as precedents, belonged to her, had nevertheless sustained the drastic policy fol lowed out after the execution of Du Bourg, in spite of the arguments of the admiral.3 Now, however, she saw her opportunity to make head against the cardinal and his brother and played into the hands of Coligny and Conde.4 She prevailed upon the King to send the murder of President Minard, and who claimed to be a relative of Mary Stuart. He was imprisoned in the Conciergerie and put to torture, but would admit nothing. It was he who shot the constable Montmorency on the battlefield of St. Denis. Stuart had the reputation of being able to make bullets, called Stuardes, which would pierce a cuirass. He himself was killed in turn at the battle of Jarnac by the marquis of Villars, count of Tende, who stabbed him with a dagger (Rev. hist., XIV, 93; Forneron, Histoire des dues de Guise, II, 92). 1 "A conspiracy to kill them both and then to take the King and give him masters and governors to bring him up in this wretched doctrine," is the way the cardinal of Lorraine and his brother described it to the dowager queen of Scotland in a letter of March 20, 1560 (C. S. P. For., No. 870). The King's circular letter to the Parlements, bailiffs, and seneschals of the kingdom on March 30 declared that the conspirators "s'estoyent aides de certains predicans venus de Geneve." — Mem. de Condi, I, 398. 2 "It had been well if the Guises had not been so particularly named as the ' occasion of these unquietnesses, but that it had run in general terms," wrote Throck morton to Cecil (C. 5. P. For., No. 954, April 6, 1560). Chantonnay advised the queen mother that, in order to avoid further difficulty, it was expedient for the Guises to retire from court for a season (La Place, 38). 3 La Planche, 219, 20. 4 Tavannes actually says she was privy to the conspiracy of Amboise, p. 247. During the reign of Henry II, Catherine de Medici had had no political influence. She was hated as an Italian (Rel. vin., I, 105). On one occasion only did she assert herself; "En 1557, a la nouvelle du desastre de Saint-Quentin, qui ouvrait a l'Espagne les portes de la France, il y eut un moment d'indicible panique. Hommes d'e'tat, hommes de guerre, tous avaient perdu la tete. Par un hasard heureux, Catherine se trouvait a. Paris; seule elle conserva son sang-froid, et, de sa propre initiative, courant en l'h6tel-de-ville et au parlement, et s'y montrant si eloquente et energetique, elle arracha aux echevins et aux membres du parlement un large subside et rendit du cceur a la grande ville." — La Ferriere "L'entrevue de Bayonne," R. Q. H., XXXIV, 457. CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 43 admiral upon a special mission to Normandy late in July, where he was expected to take the edge off the Marshal Termes' conduct, and secretly abetted the faction of the constable.1 The oppor tunity was the better to do these things owing to the death of the chancellor Olivier on March 27," who had been an instrument of the Guises, and the queen mother was quick to seize it. The famous Michel de l'H6pital3 was immediately appointed to the vacancy. He was a man of great knowledge in the law and of great culture; at the moment he was president of the chambre des comptes and had been chancellor to Madame Marguerite of France, the duchess of Savoy (who had Protestant leanings, and had inter ceded for Du Bourg), and was a member of the conseil prive of the King. L'H6pital's accession was followed by the proclamation of letters of pardon to all recent offenders, provided they lived as good Catholics, the King declaring that he was unwilling to have the first year of his reign made notorious to posterity for its bloody atrocities and the sufferings of his people.4 This was followed in May, 1560, by the royal edict of Romorantin, whereby the jurisdiction of legal processes relating to religion was completely taken away from the courts of parlement and from lay judges who had power to pass summary judgments, and was remitted to the ecclesiastical judges; which was interpreted as an assurance to 1 "Ut exorientes tumultus reprimeret," Raynaldus, XXXIV, 72, col. 1; Chantonnay to Philip II, August 31, 1560, K. 1,493, No. 76; D'Aubigne, I, 27; La Planche, 269. Shortly before the death of Henry II, Coligny had sought to resign his government, wishing to retain only his office of admiral but Henry refused to accept the resignation (Delaborde, I, 362). Coligny then endeavored to have his government of Picardy given to his nephew, the prince of Conde (Rev . hist., XIV, 74). Meanwhile he continued to hold the office of governor to prevent the Guises getting control of it (La Planche, 216). Finally in January, 1560, the admiral again went to court to present his resignation, and at the same time to urge the appointment of his nephew. This time it was accepted, and the prince of Conde was appointed to the post (La Planche, 217; Rev. hist., XIV, 74, 75). = La Place, 36; C. S. P. For.i No. 952. 3 La Place, 38. On L'Hopital see Dupre-Lasale, Michel de I'Hopital avant son elevation au poste de chancellier de France, 2 vols., 1875; Amphoux, Michel de I'HSpital et la liberti de conscience au XVIe siecle; Guer, Die Kirchenpolitik d. Kanzlers Michel de I'Hopital, 1877; Shaw, Michel de I'Hopital and His Policy. 4 La Place, 37. 44 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE accused persons that they needed no longer fear the penalty of death, owing to the opportunity of delaying sentences by means of appeals from the acts and sentences of bishops to archbishops and from thence to Rome.1 In August a supplementary decree ordered the bishops and all curates to reside at their churches, the bishops being prohibited in the future from proceeding against anyone in the matter of religion except the Calvinist preachers or persons in whose houses Huguenot meetings were held, the gov ernment thus tacitly permitting others to live in their own way, which was interpreted as a virtual "interim."2 The spirit of this legislation, as well as the skilful use of the law made therein, is certainly due to the heart and brain of the chancellor L'Hopital, although Coligny is not without credit for his influence.3 These changes had the double effect, first, of persuading the queen to take the management of affairs upon herself and endeavor to remove the house of Guise from court; and second, in giving the Huguenots and their partisans the opportunity of strengthening themselves. The leniency of the government drew back into France numbers of those who had withdrawn, among them preach ers from Geneva and England who gave new life to the party by exhorting them to continue their assemblies and the exercise of 1 Castelnau, Book I, chap, xi; C. 5. P. Ven., No. 174, 1560; Raynaldus, XXXIV, 66, col. 2; D'Aubigne, I, 274, n. 3; La Planche, 305; La Place, 468, gives the text. The edict was not published, though, until July 17 (K. 1,494, folio 6). 2 C. S. P. Ven., No. 193, August 30, 1560. The term "interim" was tech nically applied to a resolution of the sovereign, with or without the approbation of the diet or the estates of the country. By such an edict religious affairs were regu lated provisionally, pending a final settlement by a general council of the church. The practice first obtained in Germany, where Charles V issued such a decree in favor of the Lutherans in 1548. See Rev. hist., XIV, 76, 77. "In modo che, restando ciascuno d'allora in dietro assicurato dalla paura che avea per innanzi, di poter esser inquisito, questo si puo dir che fosse uno tacito interim." — Rel. vin., I, 414. 3 "La reyne mere du roy, monstrant une bonne affection a. l'admiral, le pria de la conseiller et l'advertir par lettres, souvent, de tous les moyens qu'il scauvoit et pourroit apprendre d'appaiser les troubles et seditions du royaume." — Castelnau, Book I, chap. xi. Thos.e of the Council who were unwilling to consent to such changes absented themselves. The marshals Brissac and St. Andre did so, the one alleging ill health as his excuse, the other hatred of the king of Navarre (Rel. ven., I, 549). CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 45 their religion.1 There was fear that the "interim" would be used by the Huguenots like the edge of a wedge to open the way to pos sess churches of their own, and such a demand was shortly to be made openly in the King's council at Fontainebleau in August, 1560. It was apparent that there was not a province which was not affected, and there were many in which the new religion was even spreading into the country, as in Normandy, Brittany, almost all Touraine, Poitou, Guyenne, Gascony, the great part of Langue doc, Dauphine, Provence, and Champagne.2 The "religion of Geneva" extended to all classes, even to the clergy — priests, monks, nuns, whole convents almost, bishops, and many of the chief prel ates. The movement seemed to be widest among the common people, who had little to lose, now that life seemed safe. Those who feared to lose their property were less moved. But neverthe less all classes of society seemed deeply pervaded. While the "interim" lasted only those were punished who were actually preaching and holding public assemblies. The prisons of Paris and other towns were emptied, and in consequence there was a great number of persons throughout the kingdom who went around glorying in the victory over the "papists," the name which they give their adversaries. To add to the discomfiture of the Guises, the breach between them and Montmorency was widened.3 The duke of Guise had purchased the right of the sieur de Rambures to the county of Dammartin, not far from Paris, and adjacent to that of Nanteuil,4 which the duke had shortly before acquired, the lower court of which was held in relief of Dammartin. In order to do so the duke of Guise had persuaded Philippe de Bou- 1 Castelnau, Book I, chap, xi; Rel. vin. I, 415 and n. 2. 2 Davila, I, 295; Rel. ven., I, 413. "In the rural portions of Normandy, for unknown reasons, 'Lutheranism' had spread so much that to one district of that province was given the name of 'Little Germany.'" — Hauser, American Hist. Rev., January, 1899, 225. 3 The Tuscan ambassador, as early as April, 1560, advised his government of the likelihood of this feud (Nig. dip. de la France avec la Toscane, III, 415-17 Rev. hist., XIV, 74). 4 Nanteuil, near La Fere (Aisne). 46 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE lainvilliers, who had lately sold the property to the constable, to rescind the contract which had been made, and sell it to him.1 But the duke met with a straight rebuff, for when he sent word of the transaction, the constable answered by Damville, his son, that "as he had bought it, so would he keep it."2 The feud between the Guises and Montmorency naturally threw the "connesta- blistes" more than ever to the side of Conde. Damville was sent to the King and the queen mother, who were staying at Chateaudun, to inform them that the Guises were his declared adversaries, and then went to confer with the prince of Conde, whom he met, "environ le jour appele" la feste de Dieu au mois de Mai,"3 between Etampes and Chartres, near Montlhery, when on his way to Guy- enne, to see his brother of Navarre. The Guises, who had infor mation of the interview, enlarged upon the dangerous conduct of Conde and pushed the suit for the lands of Dammartin in the courts.4 Catholic zealots made much of the events of Amboise to enlarge the reputation of the Guises. " During the whole of this Passion week," wrote the Venetian ambassador, "nothing has been attended to but the sermons of the cardinal of Lorraine, which gathered very great congregations, not only to his praise, but to the universal astonishment and admiration, both on account of his doctrines and by reason of his very fine gesticulation, and incom parable eloquence and mode of utterance."5 On the other hand, those who abhorred him on account of reli gion and for other causes did not fail to defame him by libels and writings placarded publicly in several places in Paris, where they were seen and read by everyone who wished.6 Scarcely a day passed without finding in the chambers and halls of the King's own palace notes and writings of a defamatory nature abusing " La Place, 38. 2 C. 5. P. For., No. 232, June 24, 1560; D'Aubigne, I, 276; Mim. de Condi, I, 151- 3 La'Tjlace, 41; D'Aubigne, I, 277. 4 La Place, 41. s C. S. P. Ven., No. 149, 1,560. « Rel. vin., II, 139; Nig. Tosc. Ill 417. La Planche, 217, gives a sample ampoon. CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 47 the cardinal of Lorraine. In Paris the Palais de Cluny, belonging to the Guise family, full of furniture of great value, was nearly burnt by a mob.1 In several places the cardinal's painted effigy, in his cardinal's robes, was to be seen, at one time hanging by the feet, at another with the head severed and the body divided into four quarters, as was done to those who were condemned. In the Place Maubert he was hanged in effigy and burnt with squibs.2 But worse disturbances than violent manifestoes disquieted the government. On June i, 1560, the day of the Corpus Domini at Rouen, when the procession passed through the city with the customary solemnities, it was remarked that in front of a certain house before which the procession passed no tapestry or any other decoration had been placed. Villebonne, the King's officer, "who on account of these disturbances about religion remained there," perceived the omission and being suspicious of some clandestine meeting of the Huguenots, chose to verify the fact instantly. He attempted to enter the house by force, but met with such stout resistance on the part of its inmates that the procession was inter rupted, and a great tumult arose, both sides having recourse to arms. After much fighting, each party having several wounded, at length with the death of some defenders of the house and after very great effort, the authorities quieted the uproar as well as they could. Next morning upward of 2,000 persons appeared before the royal magistrates, not only very vehemently to demand justice and satisfaction for the death of those persons who had been killed, but to present also the "Confession" of what they believed and the mode in which they intended it should be allowed them to live, demanding that the " Confession" should be sent to the King that it might be granted, and protesting that if on that account his J C. S. P. Ven., No. 151. 2 Ibid., For., No. 992, April 12, 1560. On one occasion the police of Paris, when pursuing a murderer, entered a house at a venture, into which they thought the culprit had made his escape, where they found and arrested the man who printed and placarded over the walls of Paris the writings against the Guise family and against the cardinal (ibid., Ven., No. 178, 1560; Nig. Tosc, III, 417, 418). The offending printer was hanged and then quartered (C. 5. P. Ven., No. 186, July, 1560). 48 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE ministers proceeded against any of them by arrest or capital punish ment or other penalty, they would put to death an equal number of Catholic officials of the government. The president and four councilors of the Parlement of Rouen journeyed to Paris to present the " Confession." They assured the King that the whole of Nor mandy was of the same opinion as those who declared themselves. In its quandary the government blamed Villebonne, accusing him of too much zeal and inquisitiveness. Moreover, fresh commotions were heard of daily, and the government plainly feared some sudden attack like that of Amboise.1 The Guises plucked courage, however, from the fact that under the pretext of still preparing for the war in Scotland in support of Mary Stuart,2 they could fill France with soldiery.3 Months before the outbreak of the conspiracy of Amboise their agents had been at work in Germany, using French gold for the purchase of arms, ammunition, and above all, men, for Germany was filled with small nobles of broken fortune, vagabond soldiers,4 and lansquenets ready to serve wherever the pay was sure and the chance for excitement and plunder good.5 1 C. S. P. Ven., No. 174; 'ibid., For., No. 232, June, 1560; No. 234, June 24, 1560; La Planche, 261. Francis II, during the course of this investigation, stayed at Maillebois, a house of D'O, the captain of the Scotch Guard, on the edge of Normandy (C. S. P. For., No. 233, June 24, 1560). 2 D'Andelot and Coligny refused to make war upon the Scotch Calvinists (C. S. P. For., No. 168, June 7, 1560). 3 " Rapport indiquant les preparatifs faits pour l'enterprise sur l'Ecosse, a Rouen, au Havre et a. Dieppe," K. 1,495, No. 2, n juillet 1560. "The embarkment for Scotland hastens. Soldiers arrive daily from Dieppe and New Haven At Caudebec, Harfleur, and New Haven there is exceed ing great store of provision and munitions, sufficient for 25,000 men for six months." — C. S. P. For., No. 233, June 24, 1560. 4 Mundt to Cecil, from Strasburg, ibid., No. 52, May 7, 1560. s Gresham to Cecil, ibid., No. 617, January 22, 1560: "The French king brings at least 20,000 footmen in Germany and he has taken up at Lyons as much money at interest as he can get." The count of Mansfeldt to the Queen, ibid., No. ^, May 5, 1560: "The French continue to raise troops and to buy horses and ammunition. . . . Possibly these preparations are being made against the insurgents of France, but it is doubt ful whether under pretense of invading Scotland. . . . " After the conspiracy of Amboise the duke of Ferrara sent 1,000 harquebusiers and the Pope 4,000 Italians (ibid., No. 952, April 6, 1560). CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 49 On March 30, 1560, Guido Giannetti, Elizabeth's secret agent at Venice, wrote to Cecil, " France will have enough to do in her religious wars that have just sprung up, which will be worse than the civil war of the League of the Public Weal, in 1465 under Louis XL"1 The prophecy soon became true. In spite of the formidable preparations made to continue the war in Scotland,2 the more necessary since the death of the queen dowager of Scot land, news of which reached France on June 18,3 France — or rather the French party in Scotland — on July 6, 1560, signed the treaty of Edinburgh, which, so far as the Guises were concerned, was the renunciation on their part of aggression abroad.4 Nothing but the grave state of home politics could have induced the Guises so to yield the cause of their niece in Scotland.5 The Huguenot issue promised to come to a climax during the "summer of 1560. 6 From all over France came reports of sedition and insurrection. The Protestants were masters of Provence.7 1 C. S. P. Eng., No. 931. The clever Italian, in this case, had more discern ment than Cecil, who thought that the French would rather "yield in some part than to lose their outward things by inward contentions." — Cecil to Elizabeth, June 21, 1560; ibid., 1560-61, No. 152, n.; Keith, 414; Wright, I, 30. 2 See letter of the cardinal of Lorraine and duke of Guise, Appendix I. 3 C. 5. P. For., No. 255, June 30, 1560. The news was concealed from Mary Stuart for ten days. 4 Pricis d' articles arreties conclus entre le commissionaire d'Angleterre et de la France: Affaires d'Ecosse (summary), K. 1493, No. 59, 6 juillet 1560. Montluc, the bishop of Valence, the bishop of Amiens, and MM. de la Brose, d'Oysel, and Randau were the French ambassadors who accepted the terms offered by Cecil. Their commission was issued from Chenonceaux May 2, 1560. Montluc and Randau signed the instrument, an abstract of which is in C. S. P. For., No. 281, July 6, 1560. Castelnau, Book II, chaps, i-vi, gives an account of the Anglo- Scotch war. See the memoir of Montluc upon his mission, in Paulin Paris, Nigociations, etc., 392; and Schickler, Hist, de .France dans les archives privies de la Grande Bretagne, 6. The treaty may be found in Rymer, XV, 593; Keith, I, 291; Lesley, Hist, of Scotland (1828), 291. s "The late peace was forced upon the French rather by necessity occasioned by their internal discord than from their desire for concord. " — Mundt to Cecil from Strasburg, August, 13, 1560, C. S. P. For., No. 416. 6 Chantonnay to Philip II, June 27, 1560, K. 1493, 68c. ? Nig. Tosc, III, 419, 420, May, 1560. Biragues, king's lieutenant in Saluzzo, to the duke of Anjou, March 1, 1560, Collection Montigny, No. 298. 5° THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The cardinal Tournon, returning from Rome, dared not bring with him the cross of the legation, for fear of its meeting with dis respect by the people of the places through which he would have to pass.1 From another source came the report that "very free sermons have been delivered in the churches of Bayonne."2 The bishop of Agen wrote the council that all the inhabitants of that city were in a state of furious insurrection ; that they went to the churches, destroyed all the images, and maltreated certain priests. The queen mother was mysteriously warned that unless she re leased certain preachers imprisoned at Troyes she would become the most unhappy princess living.3 The Pope's legate left Avignon in disgust at the license of the " Lutherans,"4 and when the pontiff proposed to send thither the cardinal Farnese, who was willing to go provided a suitable escort of Italian and Swiss infantry was furnished, France refused to consent, being un willing to allow a foreign prince to enter the kingdom on such a warlike footing.5 At the same time the personal attack upon the Guises be came more venomous.6 The enmity between the Guises and the house of Montmorency had become so open and proceeded so far, owing to the dispute about Dammartin, that it was ex pected they would take up arms. To crown all, the govern ment received information through several channels of a design against the King and his ministers of worse quality than the recent Amboise conspiracy.7 The information that came to light caused the greatest anxiety because this time the evidence seemed 1 C. 5. P. For., No. 386, August 3, 1560. Throckmorton was told that "all in this country (Picardy) seem marvellously bent to the new religion." — Ibid., No. 405, August 7, 1560. 2 Ibid., No. 416, August 13, 1560. 3 Ibid., Ven., No. 188, July 30, 1560. » Ibid., For., No. 416, August 13, 1560. s Ibid., No. 494, September 7, 1560. 6 A pamphlet, issued in the nature of a petition and addressed to the king of Navarre and the princes of the blood, abounded in invective against them. — Cas telnau, Book II, chap, vii; C. 5. P. For., No. 168, June 7, 1560. 7 C. S. P. Ven., No. 188, July 30, 1560. CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 51 strongly to compromise the vidame de Chartres,1 and the prince of Conde".2 Although the war in Scotland was practically at an end, the 1 A vidame is a baron holding of a bishop. The vidame of Chartres was cousin-german of Maligny, suspected in the Amboise conspiracy. The vidame not having any children, Maligny and his brother were his sole heirs. The comte de Bastard has written a biography of him, Vie de Jean de Ferrieres, vidame de Chartres, Auxerre, 1885. 2 C. S. P. Ven., No. 193, August 30, 1560. The prince of Conde, during this summer, had repaired to Guyenne to see his brother, the king of Navarre, at Bordeaux where he protested against the Catholic policy of Antoine (La Planche, 276; La Place, 35). The brothers met on June 25 (Rochambeau, Lettres d' Antoine de Bourbon et de Jeanne d'Albret, 202). In his journey he inveighed against the usurpation of the Guises, and found a hearing from the noblesse and gentlemen of the south, who urged him and his brother to assume the place to which their rank entitled them. The Guises were kept informed of this journey of the prince by the marshal St. Andre, who, under pretense of visiting his brothers, kept watch of Conde (La Planche, 314, 315; La Place, 53). The discovery of the plot was owing to the suspicious vigilance of the duke of Guise, who marked a Basque gentleman who appeared in Paris as a stranger bent on important business, and surmised that he had been sent by the king of Navarre. It was noticed that he had conferred with the vidame of Chartres, and so, "as he was returning . . to . . . Navarre, the duke of Guise had him and his valises, with (his) letters and writings, seized at Etampes. ... In the valise many letters were found, said to have been addressed both to the king of Navarre and to his brother, the prince of Conde. Among them were letters of the constable and his son, Montmorency, though they were merely letters of ceremony; but those of importance were what the vidame wrote to the prince, part in cipher and part without." — C. S. P. Ven., No. 193, Aug. 30, 1560. Cf. La Planche, 355-58; De Thou, III, 357; Nigociations relatives au regne de Francois II, 367; De Crue, 277, 278. The vidame of Chartres was arrested on August 29, 1560, by the provost-marshal and the lieutenant-criminal, at his lodgings in Paris, and carried through the streets upon a mule, "with a great rout of armed men to the Bastille." — C. S. P. For., No. 483, September 3, 1560. Castelnau, Book II, chap, vii, says that the letters promised to assist the prince of Conde against all persons whatsoever except the King and the royal family. The Venetian ambassador says that there was enough in them "clearly to indicate that for many months there had been an intrigue." — Ibid., Ven., No. 193, August 30, 1560. On the other hand, Throckmorton asserts that " the substance of the letter sent by .the vidame to the king of Navarre is said to be so wisely written that it is thought that nothing can be laid to his charge." — Ibid., For., No. 502, September 8, 1560. He was examined by the archbishop of Vienne and the president De Thou. Upon his arrest the vidame said "he was glad of it, for now the King would know of his innocence." — Ibid., No. 502; La Place, 70. 52 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Guises had not relaxed their efforts to raise men and money-.1 Philip II, knowing what was in progress, seems to have made a partial offer of assistance. In July fifteen German captains were dispatched beyond the Rhine, each commissioned to bring back three hundred pistoleers for the King's service;2 letters were sent to the Rhinegrave and Duke John William of Saxony, urging them to form a league of the German princes and procure forces in case there should be need of them.3 La Mothe Gondrin was sent into Provence and Dauphine, and another agent into Cham pagne, on similar errands.4 Fifteen hundred men with armor and munitions were sent to the castle of Guise.5 The Guises even endeavored to effect a reconciliation with the constable through the mediation of the marshal Brissac.6 The prevailing alarm was not allayed by the admiral, Gaspard de Coligny, who at a full council meeting held at Fontainebleau, on August 20, 1560, presented two petitions,7 one for the King, the other for his mother, asking the King, in the matter of religion, to concede the petitioners two places of worship in two parts of the kingdom for greater convenience, that they might there exercise their rites and ceremonies as private congregations, without being 1 The treaty of Edinburgh between Scotland and England was signed on July 6, 1560 (C. S. P. Scot., IV, 42). On July 28, 1560, Francis II, writing to the bishop of Limoges, says it is unne cessary to do more than inform the king of Spain that he has made peace with Scotland, which will leave him leisure to attend to the internal affairs of the realm and to thank him for his good offices (Teulet, I, 606); cf. C. S. P. For., July 28, 1560, 194, u. 2 C. S. P. For., No. 345, July 19, 1560. 3 Castelnau, Book II, chap, vii; C. S. P. For., No. 416, August 13, 1560, from Strasburg. 4 C. S. P. For., No. 502, September 8, 1560. 5 Ibid., No. 354, July 19, 1560. 6Ibid., No. 317, July 8, 1560; Nig. Tosc, III, 421-23, June, 1560. 7 At the assembly at Fontainebleau the King proposed four points for delibera tion: (1) religion; (2) justice; (3) the debts of the crown; (4) means to relieve the people (Nig. Tosc, III, 424, August 25, 1560). C. S. P. For., No. 442, August 20, 1560; La Place 53; La Planche, 35 1 ; Castelnau, Book II, chap, viii, give the names ¦of those present. The petitions are printed in Mim. de Condi, II, 645. Picot, Hist des itats giniraux, II, 14, erroneously gives the date as August 23. CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 53 molested by anyone, arguing that meetings in private residences would thus be obviated.1 Coligny claimed to speak with authority, having been officially sent into Normandy by the queen mother to inquire into the cause of the disturbances there. A hot alterca tion ensued between the admiral and the cardinal of Lorraine. Coligny had prudently omitted signatures to the petition, but declared that he "could get 50,000 persons in Normandy to sign it," to which the cardinal retorted that "the King could get a mil lion of his own religion to sign the contrary."2 L'Hdpital, the chancellor, however, deftly diverted the discussion into a political channel by a long discourse3 upon the condition of the realm, comparing it to a sick man, asserting that the estates were troubled and corrupt, that religious dissidence existed, that the nobility were dissatisfied, and concluded by saying that if the source and root of all the calamities visiting France could be discovered, the remedy would be easy.4 In reply the cardinal of Lorraine offered to answer publicly for the administration of the finances and showed by an abstract of the government accounts that the ordinary ex penses exceeded the revenue by 2,500,000 livres (over seven and one- half million dollars) ; his brother, the duke of Guise, as lieutenant- general, laid papers upon the table with reference to the army and forces of the kingdom.5 An adjournment was then taken until August 23, when, upon reassembling, each member of the Council was provided with a memorandum containing a list of the topics which the crown wished to have debated.6 Montluc, the bishop of Valence,7 as the youngest privy-coun- 1 C. S. P. Ven., No. 195, August 30, 1560; Castelnau, Book II, chap, viii, gives an abstract of the speech, in the third person. Cf. La Place, 54, 55. 2 Castelnau, loc. cit. 3" En termes prolixes."— De Thou, Book XXV, 525. It is printed in CEuvres completes de L'HSpital, ed. Dufey, I, 335. 4 "They might see all states troubled and corrupted, religion, justice, and the nobility, every one of them ill-content, the people impoverished and greatly waxed cold in the zeal and good will they were wont to bear to their prince and his minis ters."— C. S. P. For., No. 442. 5 La Planche, 352; Castelnau, Book II, chap, viii; the statement of the debt given by La Planche agrees exactly with C. S. P. For., 442. 6 Castelnau, loc. cit.; La Planche, 352. 7 See Reynaud, Jean de Montluc, eveque de Valence, 1893. 54 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE cilor, began the discussion when the Council reconvened.1 But /the speech of the occasion was that of Marillac, the liberal arch bishop of Vienne, who, taking his cue from the chancellor, in a long discourse2 enlarged upon the religious, political, and economic distress of France. His address is a complete statement of the Huguenot programme in church and state. He began by saying that the true "ancient and customary" remedy was a general council, but failing that, recourse must be had to a national council, and then proceeded to enumerate the things to be considered there in; first, the intrusion of foreign prelates— chiefly Italians— into French ecclesiastical offices,3 "who fill a third portion of the benefices of the kingdom, who have an infinite number of pensions, who suck our blood like leeches, and who in their hearts, laugh at us for being so stupid as not to see that we are being abused;" secondly, he demanded that the clergy of France show by some notable act that they were sincerely bent upon reform and not merely seeking to fortify their prerogatives and privileges under the pretension of reform; and to this end the illicit use of money — "that great Babylonian beast, which is avarice, in whose path follow so many superstitions and abominations" — must be guarded against; thirdly, the wicked must make sincere repentance; fourthly, for the adjustment of the political and economic questions vexing the people the States- General must be convened. Then followed a statement of conditions: that the king must live upon the income of the royal domains, the spoliation of which should cease; that his wars be supported by the old feudal aids and not by recourse to extraordinary taxes. \ This speech highly pleased the admiral, who added three points, \ 1 "Les derniers et plus jeunes conseillers opinent les premiers, afin que la liberte des advis ne soit diminuee ou retranchee par 1'authorite des princes ou premiers conseillers et seigneurs." — Castelnau, Book II, chap. viii. He made a typically episcopal, not to say unctuous, address. Cf. La Place, 54; La Planche, 352; printed in Mim. de Condi, I, 555; La Popeliniere, I, 192. 2 La Planche, 352-61; La Place, 53-65. 3 Reform in the collation of benefices was one of the important deliberations of the Council of Trent (Baguenault de la Puchesse, " Le Concile de Trente," R. Q. H. October, 1869, 339). CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 55 namely, that, a religious "interim" be officially granted until the findings of the Council of Trent, which the Pope was to be asked to reconvene; that in event of refusal to do so, a national council of the clergy of France be called in which the Huguenots should have a representation;1 and that the number of guards around the court, "which were very expensive and only served to infuse fears and jealousies into the people's minds" be reduced.2 The upshot of the conference was the resolution to call a meeting of the States- General for December 10 at Meaux (later changed to Orleans), and in default of the convening of a general church council, to convene a national body of the clergy at Paris on Janu ary 10, 1 56 1, the long interval being allowed in order to permit the Pope to act.3 In the meantime the status quo was maintained with reference to the worship of the Protestants, but for the sake of precaution, an edict was issued by which all subjects of the realm, whether princes or no, were prohibited from making any levy of men, arms, armor, horses, or moneys, on pain of being declared rebels against his majesty.4 There is no doubt that the resolution of the Council of Fon tainebleau conformed to the conviction of a large element in France, the religious troubles having stirred up a strong demand for another general council of the church (the second session of the Council of Trent having been interrupted by the defeat of the emperor Charles V in the Smalkald war) , or a national council, if the con vocation of the former proved impossible.5 Even the cardinal 1 Nig. Tosc, III, 424, August 29, 1560. 2 Castelnau, Book II, chap, viii; La Planche, 361. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 193, August 30, 1560; Paris, Nigociations relatives au regne de Francois II, 481; Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 149, n.; La Place, 68; La Planche, 363. "The government seems determined not to await the meeting of a council general, the decision of which will be tardy, but to con vene a national one, assembling in a synod all bishops and other leading and intel ligent churchmen of the kingdom, to consult and provide for the urgent need of France in matters of religion which admit of no delay." — C. S. P. Ven., No. 142, 1560. 4 La Place, 70. 5 In Tours as early as April, 1560, a letter was published to all the governors and ministerial officials of the cities and provinces of the kingdom concerning the reformation of the church by means of a congregation of the prelates of the Gallican church to be assembled for a national council (C. S. P. Ven., No. 151, 1560). 56 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of Lorraine, desirous of acquiring fame by reforming the church of France, urged the course, though it was hostile to the interest of the Holy See, until the development of events at home per suaded him to change his tactics.1 The project of a national council was not pleasing to the Pope, who cherished the hope of reconvoking the Council of Trent,2 either in France, Spain, or Germany.3 When the cardinal of Lorraine urged it, the Pope's rejoinder was that he would not divide Christ's garment.4 The Holy Father was in a quandary, being unable with safety to grant a free council, or to refuse the general one. He wanted to regard the prospective council as a continua tion of the Council of Trent, and not as a new council.5 But there were political difficulties in the way of so doing, for not all the Ger man princes were in favor of the decrees of Trent, and the Emperor was bound by his oath not to attempt execution of the decrees lest the princes of the Confession of Augsburg become alarmed for fear that the Emperor, His Catholic Majesty and the Most Chris tian King had formed a Catholic concert.6 The Kings of Spain 1 The ultra-Catholic party at Trent accused the cardinal of wanting to create an independent patriarchate out of the Gallican church. Desjardins. Neg. de la France dans le Levant, II, 728. As a matter of fact, at this season, the cardinal was disposed to favor the pro ject of a national council, as he hoped thereby to enlarge the power and dignity of his office as primate of France. His ambition was to become a sort of French pope, so that "he would not have thought it wrong had all obedience to the pontiff ceased." — Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), September 23, 1560. 2 Maynier, Etude historique sur le concile de Trente (1545-62), 1874; Journal du concile de Trente, redigi par un secritaire vinitien prisent aux sessions de 1562 a 1563, et publie par Armand Baschet, avec d'aulres documents diplomatiques relatifs a la mission des Ambassadeurs de France au concile; Desjardins, Le pouvoir civil au concile de Trente, Paris, 1869; Baguenault de la Puchesse, "Le concile de Trente," R. Q. H., October, 1869. 3 C. 5. P. Ven., No. 161, 1560. 4 Ibid., For., No. 232, June 24, 1560. When the Pope showed anger at the determination of France, the cardinal of Lorraine actually apologized for himself by saying that it was neither by his orders nor with his consent, but that the printers took the liberty to give the name of National Council to the "Congregation" which the King intended to convoke! (ibid., No. 174, 1560). s Ibid., No. 569, September 8, 1560. 6 Ibid., No. 615, October 8, 1560. The demands of the Protestants were as follows: (1) That the Council be convened in a free city of Germany; (2) that summons be not by a papal bull, but by the Emperor, who should provide them with safe-conducts; (3) that the Pope be subordinated to the Council; (4) that those CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 57 and France, moreover, although in favor of the general council, had reservations of their own regarding the application of the Tri- dentine decrees.1 The matter of the council was of much importance to every ruler in Europe. France, although resolved to convene the national clergy if the Pope protracted things, nevertheless urged the latter to hasten to grant a free and general council, not only by means of the bishop of Angouleme, the French ambassador in Rome, and the cardinals, but also through Bochetel, the bishop of Rennes, ambassador to the Emperor, and Sebastian de l'Aube- spine, the bishop of Limoges, ambassador to Philip II. The Vene tian senate, too, was importuned to use its influence. But the Pope hesitated for a long time, because the secular governments and himself were divided upon the question as to whether such a council should be regarded as a continuation of the Council of Trent (as the Pope wished), or as a council de novo. The Pope was fearful of compromising the papal authority by admitting the French contention of an authority superior to himself, for this he could never grant, taking the ground that, whether present or absent, he was always the head of and superior to all councils. Finally, Pius IV, alarmed by the resolution of the French govern ment to assemble a national council if the general council should not be held, both because it would diminish his authority and because, even though nothing should be resolved on in opposition to the see of Rome, yet the assembling of a council by France with out its consent would be prejudicial, and might be made a precedent by other states, came to the conclusion that further delay was dangerous, and convoked the general council for Easter, 1561, of the Confession of Augsburg have a vote equally with the Catholics; (5) that the judgment be according to the Holy Scriptures, .and not according to the decrees of the Pope; (6) that the prelates of the Council be absolved from the oath by which they are bound to the Pope and the Church of Rome; (7) that the acts of the Council of Trent be annulled (cf. C. 5. P. For., No. 782, sec. 14). i"A general council is necessary for abolishing these heresies; but. . . . espe cial care must be taken with the Emperor and the kings of France and Spain to decide what shall be settled therein."— C. 5. P. For., No. 416, August 13, 1560, from Strasburg. 58 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE at Trent, "to extirpate heresy and schism and to correct manners,"1 declaring that the canons' of the church could permit of no other course. The resolution of the French government had forced the hand of the Pontiff, who, however, consoled himself by the thought that either the national council would not now take place, or that the Guises would prevail in the States- General, so that the national council could be silenced, if held.2 The Pope figured that he would force the Catholic princes to side with him, lest by hazarding a ' The Vatican understanding was that the former Council of Trent was to be continued; although in the bull the word continuation was not made use of, as in that of the jubilee, a show of deference thereby being made to the Emperor and the French King, who had demanded a new council. But the French government although it allowed the place, did not allow the continuation of the former Council of Trent convened by Paul III. For if it accepted the council as it was published by the bull, it would have had to accept all the articles which had been concluded in the former council. When it was argued that Philip II was satisfied with the continuation, Francis II replied that although continuation might suffice for the needs of his dominions, it would not do for France, the more so because Henry II of France having caused protest to be made in Trent of the nullity of that council, from its not having been free, his son could not think well of the continuation. (The reply of Francis II to Philip II, October, 1560, is in Paris, Negociations, 615-22. Cf. also the luminous accounts of Elizabeth's agent in Venice, Guido Gianetti, C. S. P. For., No. 782, December 7, 1560; No. 815, December 21, 1560; and the dispatch of Throckmorton to the queen, of December 31, 1560, giving an account of a conversation with the king of Navarre, No. 832, §7.) In the reply made to Philip in October, 1560, the French King declared that, by the advice of his council, he had resolved upon an assembly of his prelates, from which nothing was to be feared for the apostolic see, it being intended only to provide the necessary remedies, and that it would not be a hindrance but rather an aid to the General Council, for when it came to open, the French prelates would be already assembled and "well informed as well of the evil as of the remedy," and that when the Council at Trent should have once begun, it would put an end to the lesser assembly. As to the place of the council, the French at first preferred to have it meet in one of the Rhenish towns between Constance and Cologne, or at Besancon in Burgundy, which be longed to Philip II; later, in the answer to Don Antonio and in his letters to Rome, Francis II agreed to accept whatever place the Emperor and the Pope decided upon. The new session of the Council of Trent was to be preceded by a general jubilee, giving power to confessors to absolve from all sins, even from that of having read prohibited books. The bull warmly exhorted the extirpation of heresy. This jubilee was first celebrated at Rome, on Sunday, November 24, 1560, by a proces sion, with the Pope walking at its head (C. S. P. For., No. 782, §§15, 16). - La Place, 114; C. 5. P. For., No. 630, October 12, 1560, from Venice. CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 59 change of religion in a national council they would also endanger their kingdoms. Philip II concurred in this belief. A king so orthodox as he had not failed to watch the course of the movement in France upon the ground of religious interests. But the Spanish King had also a political interest in France. His own Flemish and Dutch provinces were turbulent with revolt, and Granvella wrote truly when he said that it was a miracle that with the bad example of France, things were no worse in the Low Countries.1 Accord ingly, Philip II sent Don Antonio de Toledo into France to divert the French King from the idea of a national council.2 The means of persuasion were readily at hand, for the French King was already far too compromised with Philip II to refuse his request. After | the arrest of the vidame of Chartres, Francis II, in a long ciphered letter of August 31, 1560, to his ambassador in Spain, had besought | the Spanish king to be prepared to assist him, in case it should be j necessary.3 To forefend the proposed national council, Philip II ! now offered at his own expense to give the French aid in sup pressing all rebellion and schism.4 1 Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, I, 191, Granvella to Antonio Perez from Brussels, August 9, 1560. - Paris, Nigociations, etc., 615-22; Papiers d'etat du cardinal de Granvelle, VI, 137, 149. Don Antonio arrived at the French court on September 23, and departed four days later (C. S. P. For., 619, Oct. 10, 1560). Philip II took the ground that any discussion looking toward the reformation of religion would not only imperil the faith, but prejudice his policy in Spain and the Netherlands; for if France should alter anything, he feared it would cause a schism universally (ibid., No. 619, Oct. 10, 1560). The growth of the reformation in Spain alone was already quite great enough to alarm him. In the early autumn of 1559, Miranda, the archbishop of Toledo, the archbishop of Seville, and twelve of "the most famous and best- learned religious men" in Spain had been arrested for heresy (ibid., No. 133, October 25, 1559), and at this time the inquisitors had just laid their hands on the brother of the admiral of Spain (ibid., No. 619, October 10, 1560). On this whole subject see Weiss, The Spanish Reformers, and Wiffen, Life and Writings of Juan de Valdis, 1865. Montluc accused Jeanne d'Albret of printing Calvinist catechisms and the New Testament in Spanish, in Basque, and in Bearnais, and of secretly distributing them in Spain by colporteurs (La Ferriere, Blaise de Montluc, 61). 3 Paris, Nigociations, 495; Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, I, 225. The Venetian ambassador learned the news within less than a month (C. S. P. Ven., No. 199, September 28, 1560). 4 This important offer was Philip's answer to Francis II's letter of August 31 and was made to L'Aubespine, the French ambassador in Spain, on September 60 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Warlike preparations accordingly went forward under cover of a proposed intervention in Scotland,1 which the uncertainty regarding Cond^ and Antoine of Bourbon facilitated, for it was currently believed that both the king of Navarre and the prince absented themselves from court on purpose.2 At the court the rumor prevailed that both were plotting recourse to arms, so much so that on September 2 the cardinal Bourbon was sent to them, desiring them in the name of the King to repair to the court, which, on the next day, was moved from Fontainebleau to St. Germain.3 The marshal Brissac was transferred from the government of Picardy to that of Normandy, and Du Bois, master of the foot men, was instructed to conduct all the footmen he could levy with great secrecy into Normandy, while all the men in the ordinary garrison of Picardy and other frontier points were drawn in toward Orleans.4 At the same time the Rhinegrave was notified to come, but met unexpected opposition.5 13, 1560, as appears from the minutes of the Spanish chancellery in K. 1,493, No. 84. After the departure of Don Antonio, Catherine wrote a letter to Philip II, thanking him for the offer (Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 149). The Venetian ambassador is particular and says he offered to put 3,500 troops in Flanders at the disposal of France, to place 2,000 infantry near Narbonne, and another 4,000 near Bayonne, besides "a large body of Spanish cavalry." — C. S. P. Ven., No. 199, September 28, 1560. Throckmorton's figures are 3,000 Spaniards from the Low Countries; 500 men-at-arms and 2,000 footmen, who would enter by way of Narbonne; and 3,000 through Navarre with 500 horses of that country (ibid., For., No. 619, §13, October 10, 1560). C. S. P. Eng., No. 620, October 10, 1560. 2 Ibid., For., No. 411, August 9, 1560. 3 Ibid., No. 502, September 8, 1560; Chantonnay of Philip II, same date, K. i,493, No- 83- 4 Ibid., No. 619, §§13, 15, October 10, 1560. The gendarmerie is appointed to remain in divers countries according to an edict. Has been informed that there is a, league in hand between him (the king of France) and the king of Spain. On the 16th there departed out of Paris ten cartloads of munitions and artillery, but whither it is to be conveyed and how it is to be employed he cannot s "From Strasburg: Frequent negotiations between the French King and the German princes. The Rhinegrave has departed into Hesse . . with Count John of Salm, who is also a French pensioner; where, by the landgrave's permission and the dissimulation of the Saxon duke of Weimar, they have levied 2,000 cavalry to take into France, which they have partly collected in the territories of the abbot CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 61 Parallel with these military preparations new financial meas ures were taken. On October n, 1560, the King demanded 100,000 crowns (testons — a silver coin valued at ten or eleven sous; the amount was between $750,000 and $775,000) from the mem bers of the Parlement, the provost, the chief merchants of Paris,1 and "certain learned men of the Sorbonne."2 The Parisians mur mured because they thought the military display was meant to intimidate them. In November the crown imposed 10,000 francs (approximately $7,500) upon Orleans and demanded 100,000 more to pay the troops.3 Lyons furnished a loan4 and money was also secured by confiscations from the Huguenots on the part of the local authorities in many places.5 1 In the provinces disturbances continued to take place.6 In Amboise and Tours the people stormed the prisons and released all those who had been confined as agitators on account of religion.7 learn (C. S. P. For., No. 655, October 22, 1560). On the 30th Du Bois passed bringing with him out of the places and forts in Picardy 1,000 footmen, who marched between this town and Rouen toward Anjou; but where they shall go is only known to himself and the duke of Guise. They keep together strong, as if they were in an enemy's country. After them come 500 more (ibid., No. 692, Oct. 31, 1360). The Tuscan ambassador notices the ardor of Paris to contribute blood and treasure (Nig. Tosc, III, 436). of Fulda on the boundaries of Hesse. The prefect of the Rhenish Circle, the count of Salm, being informed of this preparation of cavalry, assembled his captains at Worms, where it was decided that they would not be permitted to transport their cavalry into France. For a warning had been given in the Imperial Diet that no assembling or travelling of soldiers would be allowed unless by the express permission of the Emperor; for wherever they went they did great damage to the inhabitants." — Ibid., No. 736, November 26, 1560. ' For the organization of Paris at this time see Livre des marchands, 423, 440-43. 2 C. 5. P. For., No. 665, October 22, 1560. The Venetian ambassador says 400,000 francs — twice the amount given by Throckmorton (C. S. P. Ven., 220, October 15, 1560). 3 Ibid., No. 726, November 18, 1560. 4 Ibid., No. 619, October 10, 1560. s "The goods of divers Protestants have been seized and divers men dispatched by night and sent by water in sacks to seek heaven." — Ibid., No. 726, November 18, 1560. Cf. La Planche, 226, 227, 233. 6 D'Aubigne, Book II, chap, xx; Nig. Tosc, III, 424; for details see La Planche, 366-73. 7 C. S. P. Ven., No. 200, October 15, 1560. 62 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE >The valley of the Loire seems to have been the storm center of these provincial uprisings, and in the middle of October1 the king came hastily to Orleans with three companies of veteran infantry from the garrisons of Picardy.2 It was now decided to convene the States- General at Orleans instead of Meaux.3 On October s30 the prince of Conde, who all along had borne himself as if inno cent and who came with his brother to Orleans, was arrested,4 and the vidame of Chartres, who had been incarcerated in the Bastille, was sent for from Paris that he might be examined face to face with Conde.5 Besides being accused of implication in the con spiracy of Amboise, he was accused of being the author of the recent insurrection at Lyons.6 A significant change was made in the provincial administration at this time. The Guises, having observed the dissatisfaction that prevailed because so many offices, dignities, and commissions had been distributed among them, in order to fling a sop to the princes of the blood and their faction, advised the King to create 1 On October 18 (La Planche, 378). 2 "Very well armed and numbering more than 300 men in each company and several pieces of cannon." — C. S. P. For., No. 665, October 25, 1560. The people of Orleans were completely disarmed, even to knives, by an edict which required all arms to be deposited in the H6tel-de-Ville (Despatches of Suriano [Huguenot Society], November 1, 1560). 3 Paris, Nigociations, etc., 486. Castelnau, Book II, chap, x, says the change was made because the Huguenots were numerous around Meaux (but so were they also around Orleans), and fear lest another conspiracy might be formed by having the place known so long in advance. A rumor was current that the Huguenots were planning to surprise it. I believe the real reason to be the more central location of Orleans. 4 " On his arrival with his brethren, the cardinal of Bourbon and the prince of Conde, the prince was taken before the Council who committed him prisoner to MM. de Bressey and Chauverey, two captains, with 200 archers. . . The king of Navarre goes at liberty but is as it were a prisoner." — C. 5. P. For., No. 716, §18, November 17, 1560; La Place, 73; Castelnau, Book II, chap, x; Nig. Tosc, III, 425. La Planche, 381, describes the method of his imprisonment. s La Planche, 380; C. S. P. For., No. 725, November 18, 1560; Nig. Tosc, III, 425, 426. 6"Qu'il avoit faict et faisoit plusieurs entreprises contre luy (le roi) et l'estat de bon royaume."— La Planche, 380; Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), November 10, 1560. CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 63 two new governments in the middle of the kingdom in favor of the duke of Montpensier and his brother, the prince de la Roche- sur-Yon. In compliance with this suggestion the government of Touraine, to which province was added the duchies of Anjou and Vend6me and the counties of Maine, Blois, and Dunois, was created in favor of the former, and the government of Orleans, to which was added the duchies of Berry, the pays Chartrain, the Beauce, Montargis, and adjacent places, in favor of the latter. But the new office was reduced to a shadowy power by the revolu tionary step of appointing provincial lieutenants over the gover nors, who were responsible to the duke of Guise as lieutenant-gen eral of the realm, in this case the sieur de Sipierre being lieutenant in the Orleannais and Savigny in Touraine, each of whom was a servitor of the Guises.1 There is little reason to doubt that the Huguenots would have made a formidable revolt at this early day if they had been certain of effective leadership. But the cowardice of Antoine of Navarre, the logical leader of the party, prevented them from so doing. The great influence he might have exerted as first prince of the blood was in singular contrast with his weak character.2 His policy, which he flattered himself to be a skilful one of temporization, was looked upon with contempt by the Huguenots, who despised him for weakly suffering his brother to be so treated and then added to his pusillanimity by foregoing his governorship of Guyenne, which was given to the marshal Termes.3 In vain the Huguenot leaders urged upon him their supplications and their remon strances;4 in vain they laid before him the details of their organiza 1 La Place, 38; La Planche, 378; Castelnau, Book II, chap, x; Rel. vin., I, 557; Brantome, III, 278. 2 Yet he was so carefully watched that he was practically a prisoner — "tanquam captivus," says Throckmorton to Lord Robert Dudley (C. S. P. For., No. 721, 1560). Damville was also regarded with suspicion. 3 Ibid., No. 716, §18, November 17, 1560. 4 Castelnau, Book II, chap, ix; La Planche, 318-38, gives the text of one, which is significant because it is almost wholly a political indictment of the Guises; next to nothing is said touching religion, conclusive evidence that the Huguenot party was much more political than religious. \ 64 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE tion; that six or seven thousand footmen throughout Gascony and Poitou were already enrolled under captains; that between three and four thousand, both foot and horse, would come from Provence and Languedoc; that from Normandy would come as many or even more, with a great number of cavalry; that with the aid of all these *he would be able to seize Orleans (thus controlling the States- General), and Bourges, with Orleans the two most impor tant towns in central France. They assured him that thousands were merely waiting for a successful stroke to declare themselves and that money was to be had in plenty; for every cavalryman and every footman was supplied with enough money for two months and that much more would be forthcoming, provided only the king of Navarre would declare himself the protector of the King and the realm and oppose the tyranny of the Guises.1 "^This^was the moment chosen by Catherine de Medici to assert herself. Hitherto, there had been no room for her between the two parties, each of which aspired to absolute control of the King. The queen mother had no mind to see herself reduced to a simple guardian of the persons of her children, utterly dependent upon the action of the council, without political authority nor "control of a single denier,"2 and perceived that she might now fish to advantage in the troubled waters; to change the figure, she deter mined to play each party against the other3 in the hope of herself being able to hold the balance of power between them. This explains her double-dealing after the conspiracy of Amboise, when she represented to Coligny that she wished to be instructed in the Huguenot teachings in order, if possible, that she might be able to discover the "true source and origin of the troubles," and conferred with Chaudien, the Protestant pastor in Paris, and* Duplessis, the Huguenot minister at Tours, at the same time also inquiring into the political claims of the Huguenots, having the cardinal of Lorraine concealed, like Polonius, behind the arras;4 ! La Planche, 375, 376. 2 Ibid., 318. 3"Qu'il seroit meilleur pour elle d'entretenir les choses en l'estat qu'elles estoyent, sans rien innover." — Ibid., 313. "Ibid., 316, 317. CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 65 why, too, she used fair words at the conference at Fontainebleau and simultaneously saw Francis II write to Philip II asking for Spanish aid in the event of civil war. The Venetian ambassador said truly that the famous Roman temporizer, Fabius Cunctator, would have recognized his daughter in this astute woman of Etruria.1 For fear of being sent back to Italy or of staying in France without influence, she aimed to play the two parties against one another. She did not hesitate to hazard the crown in order to keep the government in her hands, although, as the Venetian ambassador said, "to wish to maintain peace by division is to wish to make white out of black."2 The time was a peculiarly propitious one. With the prince of Conde out of the way3 she counted upon the vacillation and hesitancy of the king of Navarre to keep the Huguenots from overt action, while the prospect of the coming States-General, which had grown out of the assembly at Fontainebleau, as the bishop of Valence had predicted,4 filled the Guises with dismay, so much so that when the demand for the summons of that body began to grow, they had endeavored to persuade the King to ordain that whoever spoke of their convocation should be declared guilty of lese-majeste.s The reason of their alarm is not far to seek. The demand for the States- General was the voice of France, speaking through the noblesse and the bourgeoisie, crying out for a thor ough inquiry into the administration of the Guises and reformation of the governmental system of both state and church; as such it was a menace to the cardinal and his brother and in alignment with the demands of the political Huguenots. The costly wars \pi Henry II, the extravagance of the court; the burdensome taxa- \ 1 Baschet, La diplomatic vinitienne, 499. \ 2 Rel. vin., II, 65. 3 The more one considers the arrest of the prince of Conde, the more certain it seems that Catherine de Medici inspired it. The Venetian ambassador believed Catherine was at the bottom of his arrest; see Baschet, 500, 501. 4" The bishop of Valence says .... that the meeting of Fontainebleau would turn into a general assembly of the three estates of France." — C. S. P. For., No. 445, August 22, 1560. s La Planche, 218. 66 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE tion; the venality of justice; the lawlessness and disorder prevail ing everywhere; the impoverishment of many noble families, and the rise of new nobles out of the violence of the wars in Picardy and Italy, more prone to license and less softened by the social graces that characterized the old families;1 the dilapidation of ancestral fortunes and the displacements of wealth; the religious unrest; the corruption of the church — all these grievances, none of which was wholly new, were piling up with a cumulative force, whose impending attack the Guises regarded with great apprehen sion.2 The administration of the cardinal of Lorraine and his ducal brother had not mended matters, but in justice to them it should be said that their ministry was quite as much the occasion as the cause of the popular outcry for reform. The evils of the former reign were reaching a climax which their haughtiness and ambition served to accentuate.3 Misappropriation of public moneys, exor bitant taxation, denial of justice, spoliation of the crown lands, especially the forests, the dilapidation of church property, and the corruption of manners, were undoubtedly the deepest popular grievances. In the demand for redress of these grievances all honest men were united. In 1560 the cry of the Huguenots for freedom of worship was the voice of a minority of them only. Most Huguenots at this time were political and not religious Hugue nots, who simply used the demand of the new religionists as a 1 See the scathing comparison of the house of Guise with that of Montmorency: "La plus ancienne yssue du premier chrestien du premier du royaume de la chrestiente." — Livre des marchands, 428-30. 2 "Messieurs de Guyse vouloyent venir aux armes pour effacer ceste poursuite des estats et reformation de l'eglise . la poursuitte que nous avions si juste- ment commencee de leur faire rendre compte de leurs dons excessifs, c'est-a-dire de leurs larcins, et de leur mainement des finances, ou plustost de leurs finesses." — Ibid., 456. The petition of the estates of Touraine, assembled at Tours on October 26, 1560, to the King, is a good example of this popular demand. The articles reflect the state of the times (C. S. P. For., No. 681). In connection with this authentic petition compare the imaginary "discours du drapier" in a fancied meeting of the estates-general, as given in Livre des marchands, 427-40, the satirical forerunner of the greatest political satire of the sixteenth century, the Satyre Menippie. 3 La Planche, 260. CATHERINE BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDE 67 vehicle of expression ; this sentiment also accounts for local risings to rescue arrested Calvinists, the participants in many cases being actuated more by the desire to make a demonstration against the government than by sympathy with the Calvinist doctrines.1 The debts of the crown at the accession of Francis II aggregated forty-three millions of livres,2 upon which interest had to be paid, without including pensions and salaries due to officers and servants of the royal household, and the gendarmerie, which were from two to five years in arrears,3 a sum so great that if the entire revenue of the crown for a decade could have been devoted to its discharge, it would not have been possible to liquidate it. The result was the provinces abounded with poor men driven to live by violence and crime, while even the nobility, because of their reduced incomes, and the soldiery on account of arrears of wages, were driven to plunder the people.4 Even members of the judiciary and the clergy had recourse to illicit practices.5 The regular provincial administration was powerless to suppress evils so prevalent, whose roots were found in the condition of society. It was in vain that the crown announced that it was illegal to have recourse to arms for redress of injuries and commanded the governors in the prov inces, the bailiffs, seneschals, and other similar officers to stay within their jurisdictions and vigilantly to sustain the provost- 1 Cf. La Place, 47-49, 1 10-13; La Planche, 342; and especially the indictment in Livre des marchands, 436-58. 2 To be exact, 43,700,000 lives (Isambert, XIV, 63). Part of it was held by the Swiss cantons: "The French King is conferring with the Swiss about paying his debts, and offers two-thirds with a quarter for interest, and to pay the whole within three years; which conditions they refuse, and desire him either to stand to his written promises or that the matter shall be discussed in some place appointed in Switzerland." — C. S. P. For., No. 763, December 3, 1560, from Strasburg. 3 "In so much as it was necessary for him to find the wherewithal to satisfy some of these obligations, the late king had abolished certain of them and reduced others; he had let 50,000 footmen be billeted upon the cities of the kingdom and caused money to be raised by the imposition of subsidies, so much so that he had found it necessary in some places to diminish the taille, the people having abandoned the county of Normandy."— C. S. P. For., No. 658, January 28, 1560; cf. La Place, 47; Livre des marchands, 447, 448; Nig. Tosc, III, 405 and 455. 4 "The soldiers through necessity have begun to rob." — C. S. P. For., ibid. 5 La Place, 48. 68 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN PRANCE marshals in suppressing sedition or illegal assemblies. Some men thought the remedy lay in more drastic penalties and advo cated the abolishment of appeal in criminal causes, as in Italy and Flanders.1 But history in many epochs shows that the social maladies of a complex society cannot be so cured. Obviously the true remedy lay in searching out the causes of the trouble and destroying them, and this was the intent of the demand for the States- General. The summons of the States- General of Orleans and the further act of the government in announcing that it would summon a na tional council of the French clergy to meet in Paris on January 10, 1 56 1, unless the Council General was called in the meantime, were equivalent to promises that reform would be undertaken in both state and church. The double announcement was the simultaneous recognition of one necessity — reformation. 1 La Place, 49. CHAPTER III THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS The prosecution of the prince of Conde and the vidame of Chartres was pushed during the month of November in order to overcome any Huguenot activity in the coming States- General.1 The Guises assured both the Pope and Spain that their intention was, after the execution of the prince, to send soldiery into the provinces under the command of the marshals St. Andre", Termes, Brissac, and Sipierre, whose Catholicism was of a notoriously militant type, and thus either to crush the Huguenots, or drive them out of the country.2 Conde" claimed, upon the advice of his counsel, the advocates Claudius Robert and Francis Marillac, that as a prince of the blood he had to give account to the King alcne and to judges suitable to his condition, as peers of France, denying the jurisdiction of the ordinary judges.3 This the latter refused to allow, on the ground that there was no appeal from the King in council (which at least had been the practice of the crown since Francis I) because the judgment so given was an absolute declaration of the king's pleasure; whereupon Conde, after the example of Marchetas, when condemned by Philip of 1 "Interrogatoire d'un des agens du prince de CondiS," Arch, cur., ser. I, IV, 35. Madame de Roye, Coligny's sister and mother-in-law of Louis of Conde, was also seized in the expectation of finding papers in her possession which would incriminate Conde, Lattoy, the advocate, and Bouchart, the king of Navarre's chancellor (Castelnau, Book II, chap, ix; La Planche, 381; Frederick, count palatine of the Rhine, to Elizabeth, from Heidelberg, C. S. P. For., No. 721, November 17, 1560; No. 737, §8, November 28, 1560; No. 781, December 7, 1560; De Crue, Anne de Montmorency, 282 ff.). 2 "MM. de Guise avoient asseure le pape et le roi d'Espagne de chasser du royaume les huguenots; desseignent (apres le proces du prince de Conde et luy execute) d'envoyer de la gendarmerie et de gens de pied sous la charge des sieurs de Sainct Andre, Termes, Brissac et Sipierre, leurs amis, pour chasser les heretiques et faire obeyr le roy." — Tavannes, 257 (1560). 3 Mim. de Condi, II, 379; Chantonnay to Philip II, November 28, K. 1,493, No. 108; Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), November 22; Claude Haton, I, 130, 131. 69 70 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Macedon, appealed from the King in bad council to the King in good council. The prince, however, adhered to his claim, until by a subterfuge he was made, in a way, to commit himself; for at last he signed an answer to his counsel, Robert, whereby the prosecution gained a point prejudicial to him, although good lawyers affirmed that a defendant's counsel could not be made his judge. Thereupon the government organized a court in which there was a sprinkling of peers, in order to seem to comply with the law.1 Under such practices the judgment was a foregone conclusion, although even after being declared guilty, the general opinion was that the prince would not be put to death, but that the worst that could befall him would be imprisonment in the dungeons of Loches, where Ludovic Sforza died in the reign of Louis XII; or that he would be kept in confinement elsewhere pending greater age on the part of the king and new develop ments.2 What Conde's fate would have been still remains a problemati cal question, for Francis II died at Orleans on December 5, 1560, and his death put an end to all proceedings against the prince.3 The prince of Conde was released on December 24, and imme- 1 This action was a legal subterfuge, as Castelnau, Book II, chap, xii, no friend of Conde, is honest enough to admit, citing several precedents in favor of Conde. Cf. La Place, 73-75; La Planche, 400-2; D'Aubigne, I, 294, 295. 2 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), November 25, 1560. 3 Francis II, always had been of a frail constitution, and in his passion for hunting seems to have over-exerted himself. "The constitution of his body is such as the physicians do say he cannot be long lived, and thereunto he hath by this too timely and inordinate exercise now in his youth added an evil accident." — Throck morton to Elizabeth, C. S. P. For., No. 738, November 28, 1560; Chantonnay to Philip II, same date, K. 1,493, No. 108. He fell ill about November 20, seem ingly with a catarrh (Suriano, November 20, 25), accompanied by headache and pain in the ear of which he died on the night of December 5 at the eleventh hour, although the physicians, on December 1, "mistrusted no danger of his life" (C. S. P. For., No. 758). Throckmorton elsewhere calls the King's disease "an impostume in the head." — Ibid., No. 771, December 6, 1560; cf. La Planche, 413, 418; D'Aubigne', I, 299. Very probably the disease was mastoiditis — an affection of the mastoid bone back of the ear, induced by chronic catarrh which finally affected the brain. Suriano says: "II corpo del morto Re e stato aperto et hanno trovato guasto tutto il cervello, in modo che per diligentia delli medici non si haveria potuto risanarlo" (December 8, 1560.) THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 71 diately went to La Fere in Picardy.1 The crown descended to the dead king's younger brother, Charles IX, a boy ten years of age. His accession was not an auspicious one. Well might the Venetian ambassador exclaim: "Vae tibi terra cujus rex puer est."2 The execution of two Calvinists in Rouen on December 3 occasioned a riot during which the gates of the city were shut,3 and at Bordeaux a serious insurrection of 1,200 persons had taken place in conse quence of the arrest of Conde, so that the general pardon of reli gious offenders issued on January 3, 1561, was a wise step.4 All the plans designed and prepared for execution at Orleans were broken by the death of the King. The Guises were furious.5 It was hoped that the new reign might be established tranquilly, without an appeal to arms, but there was much misgiving owing to "the bad spirit among the people on account of the religious question, and of their dislike of the existing government."6 Many had thought that in the event of the death_of Jhe_.kin&-a_genexal . jtrpj^ng^rrngTrt^e^ir^LHro^^out^ the realm, for religious and 1 D'Aubigne, I, 300, and n. 2. The vidame of Chartres, who had been confined in the Bastille, "though allowed to take the air" (C. S: P. For., No. 764, December 3, 1560), was released also, but died almost immediately (La Place, 78-79, gives a eulogy of him). See Lemoisne, "Francois de Vendome, vidame de Chartes," Positions de theses de I'Ecole des Chartes, 1901, 89. His death enriched the house of Montmorency, for he left the lordship of Milly-en- Gatinois, worth 3,000 crowns yearly, to Damville, the constable's second son (C. S. P. For., No. 832, §10, December 31, 1560). The will is printed in Bib. de I'Ec. d. Chartes, 1849, 342; it is dated December 23. 2 Rel. vin., I, 543. On the situation after death of Francis II see Weill, chap. ii. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 764, December 3, r56o, Edwards to Cecil from Rouen. 4 " Lettres-patentes du roi Charles IX; pardon-general au sujet des affaires de religion." The Spanish ambassador had been summoned to the court that he might write to Philip II to stand ready to offer assistance in case of need. — Despatches of Suriano [Huguenot Society], December 3, 1560; K. 1,493, No. 113, December 3, 1560. Chantonnay's correspondence shows that the Spanish King was fully informed of the progress of events in France, which is confirmed by Throckmorton. "The King of Spain has given order to stay the five thousand Spaniards in the Low Countries who were to go to Sicily .... the posts run apace and often between the kings of France and Spain." — C. S. P. For., No. 737, November 28, 1560. : La Place, 76; Claude Haton, I, 116. 6 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), December 3, 1560. 7 2 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE administrative reform, since Charles JX, being a minor, would be placed under the guidance of the king of Navarre, the oldest and nearest prince of the blood, who by consenting to the demands of TEe Huguenots, eLther frqnijndinarion or from inability to repress them, would open the door to such a course. Others believed that the Guises would not be put down, but that with the military resources concentrated around Orleans, at their disposal, they would seek to overawe the opposition and retain their power, find ing means, through papal dispensation, to marry Mary Stuart to the new king.1 There was a third class who rightly surmised that the queen mother, if not able to establish the regency in her favor, would play the parties against each other in such a way as to be able to exercise large control herself. In pursuance of this double course, Catherine secretly incited the king of Navarre and the prince of Conde, giving out that the action lately taken against the latter had been by the advice of the Guises. At the same time she gave the Guises to understand that the hard feeling which the Bourbon princes felt for them was contrary to her wish and pleasure and that it was they who had sought to compel the Guises to render account of their administration.2 As the constable seemed to command the balance of power, both the queen mother and the Guises began to compete for his favor,3 Catherine C. 5. P. For., No. 773, December 6, 1560. "They have not only already good forces in this town at their devotion, but have sent for more men-at-arms to be here with all diligence .... so that if they cannot get it by good means, they see none other surety for themselves but to get it by such means as they can best devise .... if the Guise forces and party be best, they will not fail to betrap them all and to stand for it whatever it costs them." — C. S. P. For., No. 771, December 6, 1560. Catherine de Medici detested Mary Stuart. She called her "notre petite reinette ecossaise." 2 Claude Haton, I, 118, 119. The Guises wanted, above all, to prevent the undivided regency of Catherine de Medici and even cited the Salic law as a bar to such result (Chantonnay to Philip II, December 28, 1560; K. 1,494, No. 12). They favored the regency of the pliable Antoine of Bourbon, or a combination of the king of Navarre and the queen mother. In either event a galaxy of the Guises was to surround the throne, i. e., the cardinals of Tournon and Lorraine, the duke of Guise, the chancellor and the two marshals Brissac and St. Andre'; cf. Nig. Tosc, III, 434, and De Crue, Anne de Montmorency, 288-90, a good brief statement. 3 Catherine sent the sieur de Lansac at once to the constable at Etampes (cf. D'Aubign^, I, 299, and n. 2) who in turn went to consult with his son, Dam ville, at Chantilly, where he was kept by his wife's illness, those two in turn con ferring with the princess of Conde (La Place, 76). THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 73 overcoming her old enmity on account of her fear of the Guises.1 Between the Guises and Montmorency the enmity was too great for any rapprochement, so that the Guises endeavored to counter the coalition of Catherine de Medici and the constable by over tures to Antoine of Navarre, whose own pliant nature readily yielded to their blandishments, telling him that Philip II probably would be inclined to restore his lost kingdom of Navarre or give him an equivalent in Sardinia, in the event of the adoption of a strong Catholic policy on his part.2 Catherine de Medici, however, by the promptness of her action, and perhaps not a little owing to the unpopularity of the cardinal of Lorraine,3 got the better of the Guises, the government being organized around the queen mother and the three Bourbon princes, the king of Navarre, the cardinal of Bourbon, the prince of Conde the constable, the three Chatillons — the admiral Coligny, the car dinal Odet, and D'Andelot — the duke de Montpensier and the prince de la Roche-sur-Yon.4 The duke of Aumale, the marquis of Elbceuf, the grand prior of France, and the cardinals of Lor raine and Guise, all brothers of the duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine left the court at the same time,5 but if the pride of the Guises was wounded, they did not show it. They were followed 1 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), December 18, 1560. 2 How much Antoine yielded to the, temptation the following report of an interview between Throckmorton and the king of Navarre shows: "Throck morton said that there was a bruit that the Spaniards had passage given them by Bayonne and other forts of the French King. The king of Navarre said that it was true, and that he was about to verify the letters that are yet denied." — C. S. P. For., No. 732, December 31, 1560, § 7. On Sardinia see Rel. vin., I, 555. Even the prospect of becoming emperor was held out to him (ibid., I, 559; II, 76). 3 "Although the duke of Guise is popular, above all with the nobility, yet everybody so detests the cardinal of Lorraine that if the matter depended upon universal suffrage, not only could he have no part in the government, but perhaps not in the world ! It is cynically reported that his Right Reverend and Lordship took the precaution to send his favorite and precious effects early into Lorraine." — C. S. P. Ven., No. 221, December 16, 1560. 4 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), December 18, 1560; Rel. vin., I, 433. "I found the court very much altered .... not one of the house of Guise." — C. S. P. For., No. 832, December 31, 1560. s Claude Haton, I, n. 74 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE by all the companies of ordinance, both cavalry and infantry, which had been sent to Orleans. But Catherine de Medici looked farther than the present order of things and schemed to have the coronation effected as soon as possible, thinking that it would remove many difficulties alleged of the King's minority1 and make him of sufficient authority to ap point such governors as he pleased.2 She found means to have it arranged in the Privy Council (March 27, 1561) that she and the king of Navarre, in the capacity of lieutenant-general, should rule jointly, the King's seal being in the custody of both and kept in a coffer to which each should carry a different key. This astute move gave Catherine exclusive guardianship of the person of Charles IX, and assured her at least an equal power in the regency.3 At the same time orders were given for the ambassadors and others who wished for audience to ask it of the queen mother through the secretaries.4 By this new arrangement it became unnecessary to give account of one's business first of all either to the cardinal of Lorraine or the constable, or to anyone else, as was usually done before; but at once to address the queen, who, should the matter need to be referred to the council, could propose jt_and give reply according to their decision. As not one of these 1 The law of France, by ordinance of Charles V, had for generations provided that the king's majority was attained when he was fourteen years of age; but the King's uncles claimed that the meaning of the law was that the King's majority was not reached until the end of his fourteenth year, i. e., upon his fifteenth birthday, which, in the case of Charles IX, would not be until June 27, 1564. This ingenious argument was sustained by various authors subsidized by the Guises, who went farther and argued away the regency of the queen mother also, in spite of the pre cedents of Blanche of Castille and Anne of Beaujeu, on the ground of the Salic law (Chantonnay to Philip II, December 28, 1560; K. 1,494, No. 12). 2 D'Aubigne, I, 302; Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 176; Des patches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), March 29, 1561; C. S. P. For., No. 77, §3, March 31, 1560; La Place, 120, 121; De Crue, Anne de Montmorency, 299. 3 Cf. Viollet, Inst, polit. de la France, II, 95. 4 The arrangement of executive offices at this time was very different from that of a modern government. Instead of there being a single secretary for foreign affairs, there were individual secretaries for each country — one for Italy, one for Spain, one for Flanders, one for Germany, etc., and each one attended to his own business. This eliminated one more power in the government, exactly as Cath erine wanted. THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 75 councilors was superior to another, the power was all in Catherine's hands. She had played her cards well and had won. The duke of Guise ceased to be of influence at court and the constable " was satisfied to lose his authority in order to damage his enemies."1 France began to awaken to the fact that the queen who had led a life of retirement during her husband's reign, in that of her son was evincing that capacity for public affairs which was an heredi tary possession in her family. In her quality as queen mother, she kept the King well in hand. She would not permit anyone but herself to sleep in his bed-chamber; she never left him alone. She governed as if she were king. She appointed to offices and to benefices; she granted pardon; she kept the seal; she had the last word to say in council; she opened the letters of the ambassa dors and other ministers. Those who used to think she was a timid woman discovered that her courage was great ; and that, like Leo X and all his house, she possessed the art of dissimulation.2 The Huguenots had hoped for much politically from the sudden revolution, and looked forward to organizing the States-General, while the Catholics hoped that the precautions taken during the elections had insured the election of men opposed to any novelty/ in the matter of religion.3 The first session took place on Decem ber 13.4 L'Hopital, the chancellor, made an eloquent and earnest plea in favor of harmony among the members, endeavoring to draw them away from religious animosities by pointing out the great necessity of administrative and political reform, urging that the root of the present evils was to be found in the miscarriage of justice, the burdensome taxes, the corruption of office, etc.5 1 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), March 29, 1561. "The King is young and the constable has now a great authority in the realm But if they recover their authority, it is to be feared that they will use more extremity than they did before, and that therefore the queen cannot but fear his danger in this case." — C. S. P. For., No. 1,030, February 26, 1561, § 6. 2 See the remarkable character-sketch of the Venetian ambassador in Rel. ven., I, 425-27- 3 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), December 8, r56o. On the efforts of the Guises to control the States-General of 1560 see Weill, 40. 4 D'Aubigne, I, 304; Paris, Nigociations, 789. s La Place, 85, 87. 76 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE He ascribed the religious inquietude to the degeneracy of the church and advocated thorough reform of it, saying that the clergy gave occasion for the introducing of a new religion, though he avoided entering into the matter of merit of its doctrines.1 He pointed out the needs of France and the necessity for civil and religious concord, and, in the peroration pleaded for earnest, patriotic support of the boy-King, "for there never was a father, no matter of what estate or condition, who ever left a little orphan more involved, more in debt, more hampered than our young prince is by the death of the kings, his father and his brother. All the cost and expenses of twelve or thirteen years of long and con tinuous war have fallen upon him; three grand marriages are to to be paid for, and other things too long to tell of now; the domain, the aids, the salt storehouses, and part of the taille have been alien ated."2 In spite of the efforts of the chancellor, however, to smooth the way, the ship of state encountered rough water at the very beginning. It was doubtful whether anything would come of the session, as the difficulties between the delegates were endless, partly from the diversity of their commissions and of the requests they had to make, partly from individual caprice. The commons and the clergy readily agreed to meet together, but many of the nobility made difficulty. Some of those of Guyenne and of some parts of Brittany, Normandy, and Champagne would not consent to treat with the government without a fresh commission, saying that their commission was to the late king, Francis II — an inven tion of those who were not satisfied with the present government 1 Castelnau, Book III, chap. ii. In this connection the following observation is of interest: "A disputation has lately been at Rome among the cardinals, and the Pope has had the hearing of what is the cause that France is thus rebelled from them. The Romans would conclude that the dissolute living of the French car dinals, bishops and clergy, was the cause; but the French party and the bishop, who is ambassador there, say that nothing has wrought so much in France as of late the practice in Rome of divers of the nobility of France where they have seen such dissolute living of the clergymen as returning into France they have persuaded the rest that the clergy of Rome is of no religion." — C. 5. P. For., No. 822, Decem ber 28, 1560. 2 The address is printed in extenso in (Euvres computes de I'HSpital, I, 375 ff. THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 77 and disliked the queen's supremacy.1 Perceiving this obstacle, the queen sent for the president of La Rochelle and told him to have an autograph list made of all those who dissented and to bring it to her. But no one dared to be the first to sign this list. This was admirable adroitness on Catherine's part. She was playing for a large stake, because if the estates treated with the new government, they would in a certain way approve its legiti macy by general consent. Finally, after a week's delay, during which the cahiers of the delegates were handed in and classified, deliberations were resumed. _Thg_three chief questions before the estates of Orleans were reli gion, the finances, and the regulation of Jhe_cqurts of judicature. The three estates in order, beginning with the commons, presented each its cause. The orator of the third estate, an avocat du roi at Bordeaux, demanded a general council for the settlement of religious controversy; the discipline of the clergy, whom he de nounced in scathing terms; their reformation in manners and morals; revision of justice, and alleviation of taxes. '' As a whole, the commons seemed to wish for a general pardon for all the insurgents, and that everybody should be restored to favor; that the election of prelates should be regulated, so as to insure the nomination of fitting persons to reform the life and customs of the clergy; and that the revenues of the churches should be limited to persons appointed for that purpose.3 The spokesman of the noblesse, one Jacques de Silly, sieur de Rochefort, invoked biblical authority, besides Assyrian and classi cal history, to prove that the nobility had been ordained of God and recognized by men of all times as the pillar of the state. The harangue was a carefully worded assertion of the political interests and claims of the nobility. Even religion was subordinated to their political ends, a written memorial being presented by some 1 Suriano, December 20; D'Aubigne, I, 303, 304; La Place, 88, 109. "The estates assembled on December 13, but have done little or nothing; divers of them will not put forth such things as they were instructed in, now the king is dead." — C. 5. P. For., No. 832, December 31, 1560. 2 La Planche, 389-96; D'Aubigne, I, 305, 306. 3 Cf. C. S. P. Ven., No. 237, February 17, 1561. 78 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of the nobles asking for leave for each great feudal proprietor to ordain what worship he might choose within his lands, after the manner of the settlement at Augsburg in 1555 (cujus regio, ejus religio).1 The clergy naturally were in conformity with the canons and the Catholic ritual. They were declared to be "the organ and mouth" of France, much history and doctrinal writing being cited to prove their supremacy. Liberty of election in the matter of STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS (Tortorel and Perissin) church offices, abolition of the abuse of the dime, which, it was complained, had been extorted from the church, not once, but four, five, six, and even nine times in a year, and prelates put in prison for failure to pay, to the destruction of worship in the churches; suppression of heresy (thus early stigmatized as la pritendue reformation) , and royal support of the authority of the priest-class, were the four demands of the clerical order.2 The sittings were rendered less tedious by a bold attack made upon the persecution of religion by a deputy who demanded that the La Place, 93. Ibid., 93-109. THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 79 Huguenots be permitted to have their own church edifices — a plea which was reinforced by a hot protest of the admiral Coligny against an utterance of Quintin, the clerical orator.1 As to religion, grave questions arose. Would the toleration of religion occasion civil war ? Would it cause an ultimate altera tion of the faith of France? Would it, finally, alter the state, too? The States- General refused to enter deeply into these problems. The petition of the Protestants was not mentioned.2 In the end it was determined to grant a general pardon to all throughout the kingdom, without obliging anyone to retract, or to make any other canonical recantation — a proposal which was quite at variance with the constitution of the church and was regarded by Rome as exceeding the bounds of the authority of the King and his Council, cognizance of matters of this nature appertaining to ecclesiastics and not to laymen.3 The pressure of the third estate as well as the influence of Coligny, L'Hopital, and others, is discernible in this measure. For it had been deter mined in the Privy Council that should the Council- General not be held before June, the National Council would assemble in France. This could not be denied to the estates who demanded it; and this concession apparently at first caused all the three estates to agree not to renounce the old religion. To this must be added another reason, viz., that although the greater part of the clergy, more especially the bishops, approved the old religion, yet many of the nobility approved the new one.4 T La Place, 109; La Planche, 397; D'Aubigne, I, 307. 2 Castelnau, Book III, chap. ii. 3 C. S. P. Ven., No. 237, February 17, 1561. The action practically flouted a papal bull of November 20, 1560, convening the Council at Trent, which was intended to anticipate and prevent any such action as this at Orleans (La Planche, 403). 4 There was also a technical argument based on the fact that in the bull of the Council the words "sublata suspensione" were interpreted to mean that the Pope intended to continue the Council already commenced, and that the decrees already made were to be valid; which offended France. The cardinal of Lorraine was the one who raised these difficulties, though he tried to give the opposite im pression; from him came the opposition to the words of the bull (C. S. P. Ven., No. 229, January 7, 1561; Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), January 14, 1561). 80 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Even more favorable action toward the Huguenots might have been taken if Catherine's caution and her fear of antagonizing the Guises too much had not acted as a restraint. The pardon of the government was theoretically not understood to be granted to those who preached the Calvinistic doctrine, nor to the King's judges who had authority in the cities and provinces of France who espoused it. But it was tacitly admitted that no one was to be prosecuted for heresy on this account. In Orleans the people worshiped in Huguenot form and in Paris — wonder of wonders — Catholic preachers were admonished to cease inveighing against "Lutherans" and Huguenots, and not to speak against their sects or their opinions — an order generally interpreted as consent from the Privy Council for all to follow such opinions about faith as most pleased their ideas.1 A corollary to the question of religion was that touching the government of the church. Several excellent ordinances were passed for reforming the abuses of the church, particularly for preventing the sale of benefices. The election of the bishops was taken out of the King's direct jurisdiction and remitted to the clergy, and to satisfy the people it was added that twelve noble men and twelve commoners together with the governor and judges of the city in which a bishop was to be elected were to unite with the clergy in election, giving laymen the same authority as ecclesi astics. Another matter also was determined which was sure to displease the Pope, viz., that moneys should no longer be sent to Rome for the annates or for other compositions on account of benefices, on the ground that these charges drew large sums of money from the kingdom and were the cause of its poverty. Even the payment of the Peter's Pence was resented by some. The bishop of Vienne publicly asserted that it was with astonishment and sorrow that he observed the patience with which the French people endured these taxes "as if," said he, "the wax and lead of the King was not worth as much as the lead and the wax of Rome which cost so much."2 As it would have seemed strange were 1 C. S. P. Ven., No. 237, January 23, 1561; La Place, 124-26, practically paraphrases the edicts. 2 Rel. vin., I, 443. THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 81 the Pope not first informed of it, the estates elected one of the presidents of the Parlement to go to Rome to give an account to the Pope of the matter, not so much to ask it as a favor from the Pope as merely to state the causes which moved the government thus to decide. The strongjnclination of manyJa_Fr_aiice whosg_ ^catholicity could not beJmgugDed^to. ..dimiriiskJJie .papal^irthor.- ity and assert the old Gallican liberties, is noticeable. Pontifical "authority would have been quite at an end if the .estates had determined to lay hands on the church property, as was desired by many persons. The two other questions before the estates were those of justice and finance. In the matter of the former nothing was done. For although there was universal dissatisfaction, the issue was too complicated, as all judicial offices were sold, and in order to dis place those who had bought them it would have been necessary to reimburse the holders, which could not have been done then. The chances, accordingly, were that the administration of justice was likely to go from bad to worse.1 The main work of the estates of Orleans had to do with the reorganization of the finances of the kingdom, the administration of which was intimately connected with the future government. The crown was over forty million francs (exceeding eighteen mil lion crowns) in debt.2 It may be well at this point to give a short survey of the finan cial policy of the French crown during the sixteenth century. Under Louis XII the taille, which was the principal tax, and which fell upon the peasant, was reduced to about six hundred thousand e"cus, a sum little superior to the amount originally fixed under Charles VII. It was raised by Francis I to two millions. In the time of Louis XII the total revenue amounted to barely two mil- 1 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), February 17, 1561. 2 Castelnau, Book III, chap, ii, says 42,000,000; Throckmorton put the figures at 43,000,000: C. 5. P. For., No. 1,032, February 26, 1561; cf. No. 988, February 12, 1561; Suriano, the Venetian ambassador, also gives the amount as eighteen million crowns (ibid., Ven., No. 237, February 17, 1561). This would approximate $75,000,000. The debt of the King to the Genoese, Germans, Milanese, Florentines, and Lucca amounted to 644,287 ducats (ibid., For., No. 1,432, October 5, 1560). 82 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE lions; his successor brought it up to five, the dimes of the clergy being included.1 When the expenses of the government came to exceed the receipts, Francis I had recourse to extraordinary measures, that is to say, to augmentation of the taxes, to new loans, or to new forms of taxation. In 1539 he introduced the lottery from Italy. These extraordinary practices were not submitted to any process of approval, not even in the pays d'etat. Foreigners were astonished at the ease with which the king of France procured money at his pleasure. Francis I quadrupled the taille upon land, and even had the effrontery to raise it to the fifth power. In general the people paid without murmuring, although in 1535 an insurrection broke out at Lyons on account of an alteration in the aides demanded by the crown; and in 1542 there was a serious outbreak at La Rochelle owing to burdensome imposition of the gabelle. The author of the new financial measures of 1539 was the chan cellor Poyet, a man of ability, who owed his advancement to the favor of Montmorency. Several very excellent measures are due to him, pre-eminently numerous ordinances relating to the inalien ability of the royal domain, which he promulgated as a fundamen tal law of the monarchy, a law which the weak successors of Henry II repudiated. He also endeavored to suppress dishonest admin istration in the provinces. Thus he called to account both the marshal Montjean, whose exactions in the Lyonnais produced wide complaint, and Galiot de Genoullac, the sire d'Acir, whose stealings were enormous. These measures would have had a salu tary effect if the administration of justice had been independent and honest in France. Unfortunately Poyet's reputation for integ rity was not as great as it should have been in a minister, and his policy made him many enemies. The incomes of Francis I, great as they were, did not suffice for Henry II, the renewal of the war continuing to increase his necessities. Under him the increase of the gabelle and the tithes and other special taxes brought the total of the revenues up to six and a half million ecus, which did not yet save the King from 1 Dareste, Histoire de France, III, 456, 457. THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 83 being reduced to the necessity of making alienations and loans, which reached on the day of his death fourteen millions of ecus, about thirty-six millions of francs.1 The practice of the French government of making loans, a practice which has today become familiar to us on a colossal scale, both in Europe and America, antedates the Hundred Years' War. St. Louis contracted various loans with the Templars and Italian merchants for his crusades.2 Philip the Fair borrowed from Italian merchants, from the Templars, and from his subjects.3 His war with Edward I of England and his enterprises in Italy increased the amount, so that his sons inherited a considerable public debt. The Hundred Years' War enormously increased it. We have few means of knowing what rates of interest obtained upon most of the public loans of the fourteenth and fifteenth cen turies, but they were probably high in most cases. Charles VIII in 1487 fixed the rate of interest upon a loan made in Normandy at twelve deniers tournois for each livre, which would not be over 5 per cent. Seven years later, when he was preparing for the Itahan campaign, a rate of two sous per livre obtained, which would be approximately equivalent to 10 per cent. In the time of the direct Valois kings, most of the. government's loans were arranged in the provinces, as in Normandy and Lan guedoc. But, beginning with Francis I, the city of Paris became increasingly the place where the crown obtained financial aid, so much so indeed that the supervision of the rentes of the Hotel- de-Ville became a separate administrative bureau of the royal treasury, although it must not be understood that the government's operations were henceforth exclusively confined to Paris; for loans continued to be made wherever possible with towns, corporations, T Lorenzo Contarini in 1550 speaks with satisfaction of the even balance of the finances; Soranzo in 1556 speaks of their disorder (cf. Ranke, Franzbsische Geschichte, Book VII, chap, iv, 11. 2). 2 An ordinance of 1270 authorized a loan of 100,000 livres tournois for the crusade that culminated in disaster before Tunis. Cf. G. Servois, "Emprunts de St. Louis en Palestine et en Afrique, Bibliotheque de I'Ecole des Chartes, ser. IV, IV, 117. Philip III borrowed of his great vassals and from the Flemish towns (Langlois, Le regne de Philippe le Hardi, chap. v). 3Boutaric, La France sous Philippe le Bel, 297. 84 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE the clergy, and private loan brokers and bankers. These rentes of the capital, it should be understood, were technically a sub stitution of the credit of the city of Paris for the somewhat dubious credit of the crown.1 From that date (1522) forward in France, government loans took the form of perpetual annuities, payable at the H6tel-de-Ville in Paris. But other cities, such as Orleans, Troyes, Toulouse, and Rouen, also furnished the King with money in the forni, of annuities. Aside from Paris, the church of France was the grand pillar of the government's finances, and as the initiation of the rentes is due to Francis I, so to this king also is the second expedient to be ascribed. In 1516, on the occasion of the concordat, Leo X allowed Francis I to exact a new tenth, theoretically to be distin guished from the dime of the clergy of France, the pretext being a war projected against the Turks. The new tithe was levied by the King's officers alone, on the basis of a grand survey of the property of the clergy (Description generate du bien d'eglise) made in this year. In this financial survey the tax or quota of each benefice and the total of the tithe in every diocese were indicated. Thenceforth it was easy for numerous tithes to be levied by the will of the King alone. However, in order to conceal the arbi trariness of this conduct, the crown sometimes indicated its pur pose to Rome which issued the necessary validation, but more often the King addressed the clergy itself united in assemblies of the bishops at Paris and in provincial or diocesan assemblies. The consent of the clergy was nothing but a formality, for the royal authority fixed in advance the sum to be paid. The diocesan assembly had nothing to do but distribute the impost. This con cession of the Pope was successively renewed, under different pre texts, for a number of years, under the name of a don caratif, and was equivalent to another tithe, the practice, prolonged year * The preamble of the letters-patent of Francis I, bearing date of September 2, 1522, makes this fact clear; for in that document alienation is made by the government of the "aids, gabelles and impositions" of Paris, the fees of the "grand butchery of Beauvais," the rates upon the sale of wine, both wholesale and retail, and of fish, as security for the loan made. Cf. Viihrer, Histoire de la dette publique en France, I, 15-26; Lavisse, Histoire de France, V, Part I, 241, 242. THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 85 after year, at last hardening into a permanent form of taxation required of the clergy, so much so that under Henry II receivers of the "gift" were established in every diocese.1 Wastefulness and bad management characterized the reign of Henry II from the very first. The treasury was soon completely exhausted. A reserve of four hundred thousand ecus d'or, which Francis I had amassed to carry the war into Germany, with little owing save to the Swiss, ^payments to whom Francis I had con tinued in order to prolong his alliance with them, was dissipated within a few months, and the government had resort to increased taxation and the creation of new taxes. The gabelle upon salt, from which Poitou, Saintonge, and Guyenne had hitherto been exempt, and which was now introduced into those provinces, raised a terrible revolt which was not crushed until much violence had been done and much blood shed. The renewal of the war against Charles V and the invasion of Lorraine, added to the insa tiable demands of the court, required new financial expedients. Not less than eighteen times during the twelve years of the reign of Henry II were the echevins of Paris called upon to supply the King with sums of money. Four millions and a half were thus demanded of the capital. In order to obtain these sums, which the people refused to advance gratuitously, the King was forced to humiliate himself exceedingly. Thus in 1550, in a general assembly of the sovereign courts of the clergy and of the bourgeois it was reported that "the King, being obliged to give money to the English, and not having any money in his treasury except muti lated and debased currency which could not be recoined, is under the necessity of offering this debased and mutilated coin as security for a public loan." As might be expected, this not very tempting offer did not entice the provost of the merchants, much to the chagrin of the King, who, however, consented to a short delay. But three years later Henry II was even less shameless. Although there was still just as much unwillingness on the part of the mer chants of the city to take the King's notes, this little difficulty was easily overcome by the King's agents. If the money were not - Esmein, Histoire du droit frangais, 631-34. 86 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE forthcoming, the sideboards of the wealthy bourgeois of Paris contained enough gold and silver plate to answer the purpose, and an edict of February 19, 1553, ordered certain specified persons to bring to the mint their vessels of gold and of silver, for which the government issued its notes. But Paris was not the only city which was almost incessantly called upon to supply the King's needs. Each year, and even each month, was characterized by a new demand, and numbers of the cities of France were from time to time taxed for sums which were not secured, however, without resistance to the royal treas urers. Lyons, which was at this epoch the seat of a commerce greater even than that of Paris, was more often mulcted than any other in this way. Conduct so high-handed naturally resulted not only in creating bitterness against the government, but demoral ized trade as well. The credit of the government depreciated to such an extent that the rate of interest rose as high as 14 per cent.1 During the twelve years of Henry II's reign a greater amount in taxes had been imposed upon the people of France than in the fourscore years preceding, besides which many of the crown lands had been dissipated. Naturally "hard times" prevailed.2 1 Vuhrer, Histoire de la dette publique en France, I, 22-25. 2 Gold was at a premium, the payments for gold crowns and pistolets being above their valuation. All foreign coins were rated high: English "rose" nobles = 6 francs, 12 sous; "angels" = 4 francs, 6 sous; imperials and Phillipes were current at the same rate as "angels" (C. S. P. For., No. 1,076, February 20, 1561), The gold crown was passable at 51 francs tournois; the pistolet gold and weight, 49 francs (ibid., No. 886, January 17, 1561). Prices of commodities were also high. The duke of Bedford, who came over in February I56r as a special envoy of Eliza beth, reports, February 26: "France is the dearest country I ever came in." — Ibid., No. 1,031. Cf. the confession of Richard Sweete, an English fugitive in France, who was forced to return home on account of "hard times." "Within one month they came back from Paris, partly upon the death of the French king and partly for that victuals were there so dear that they could not live." — Ibid., II, No. 36, October 5, 1559. Without attempting to go at length into the intricate subject of the various kinds of money current in France in the sixteenth century, something yet is to be said upon the subject in order to make clear the working of these and other economic sources. In the sixteenth century, as during the Middle Ages, the standard of value was the livre tournois, divided into sous and deniers (1 livre = 20 sous; 1 sou = 12 deniers). The livre tournois was really a hypothetical coin and was merely THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 87 Some members of the States- General were for bringing the officers of finance to account and obliging them to submit the list of all the grants which had been made in favor of the great and influential at the court of Henry II. But the cooler element thought that this policy could not be followed out on account of the powerful position of those involved and that occasion for new used as a unit of calculation. The French gold coin was the ecu d'or which varied in value between 1 livre, 16 sous, and 2 livres, 5 sous. In 1561 it was equivalent to 2 livres in round numbers. The teston was a silver coin of a value of 10 or n sous and was sometimes called a crown or a franc by the English. The sou ori ginally was made of an amalgam of silver and copper and the denier or penny of red copper. The English during their long occupation of Normandy in the fifteenth century, and owing to their commercial communication with Flanders, introduced the pound sterling or "estrelin" (easterling) (Du Cange, Glossarium, j. v. "Esterlingus;" Ruding, Annals of the Coinage, I, 7; Le Blanc, Traiti historique des monnaies de France, 82). Though much more stable than other coinage — except the Vene tian ducat and the florin — it nevertheless slowly depreciated. Elizabeth in 1561 rechristened it the gold "sovereign." It was worth about 8 livres tournois in 1561 (Avenel, "La fortune mobiliere dans l'histoire,'' Revue des deux mondes, July 15, 1892, 784, 785). The French peasantry still in certain parts of France estimate in terms of ancient coinage. The pistole, by origin a Spanish coin current in Flanders and the Milanais, was forbidden circulation as far back as Louis XIV. Yet the peasants of Lower Normandy at the cattle fairs today will estimate the price of their animals in ancient terms. Similarly the Breton peasantry talk of riaux (real), the last vestige of Brittany's commercial relations with Spain (Avenel, op. cit., 783). The actual value of these coins in modern terms has been much debated. M. de Wailly estimated the value of the livre tournois in 1561 at 3 francs, 78 cen times. The vicomte d' Avenel thinks these figures too high and has adopted 3 francs, n centimes as a mean value for the years between 1561 and 1572. M. Lavasseur prefers the round number of 3 francs. On the basis of the last estimate one sou would be equivalent to 15 centimes and 1 denier to 1.2 centimes in terms of modern French money. But these figures mean nothing until the purchasing power of money at this time is established. In this particular, estimates have varied all the way from 3 to 12 and even to 17 and 20. M. Lemmonier inclines to the ratio of 5 for the middle of the sixteenth century. For an admirably clear and succinct account of the value of French money in the sixteenth century, see Lavisse, Histoire de France, Vol. V, Part I, pp. 266-69. Larger references will be found in the bibliography appended to the chapter. But whatever the ratio may have been, the decline in the purchasing power of money was great. Between 1492 and 1544 Europe imported 279 millions worth (in francs) of gold and silver. In the single year 1545, when the famous mines of Potosi were opened, 492,000,000 francs' worth were brought into Europe. The 88 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE commotions only would ensue.1 Instead, retrenchment was resolved upon. The stipends of the gentlemen of the King's household and of the gens de finance were reduced one-half and all pensions were abridged one-third,2 except in the case of foreign ers in the King's service, who were supposed to have no other source of income. This last provision created an outcry, on the ground that foreigners could only be so employed in time of war, save in the case of the Scotch Guard.3 Even this was cut down, one hundred men-at-arms and one hundred archers being dis missed. The royal stables and mews were also broken up and the horses and falcons sold.4 Something more constructive than mere economy, however, was necessary, and the burden of paying the King's debts fell heaviest upon the clergy. This was partly owing to the great wealth of the church; partly to the fact that the clergy had rushed in where others feared to tread, and, officiously asserting their superiority in matters of state as well as of church, had proceeded purchasing power of money is estimated to have fallen one-quarter between 1520 and 1540 and one-half by the year 1600. After the peace of Cateau-Cambresis when peaceful relations were renewed between France and Spain, France particu larly felt the disturbing effect of the new conditions. According to the vicomte d' Avenel (op. cit.), from 1541-61 the livre tournois was valued at 3 francs, 34 centimes; from 1561-72 at 3 francs, n centimes; from 1575-79 at 2 francs, 88 centimes. "Un capital de 1,000 livres qui valait 22,000 francs en 1200, n'en valait plus intrinsequement que 16,000 en 1300; 7,530 en 1400; 6,460 en 1500, et etait tombe en 1600 a 2,570 francs." — Revue des deux mondes, July 15, 1892, 800. One is astonished not to find greater complaints about the "hard times" in the chronicles and other sources of the period. To be sure, the misery did not reach its acutest stage until the time of the League, when the difference between the price of food stuffs and daily wages was outrageous. For example, since 1500 the wage of the laboring man had increased but 30 per cent., whereas the price of grain had increased 400 per cent. At the accession of Louis XII, wheat had cost four francs per hectolitre and the peasant earned sixteen centimes a day; at the accession of Henry IV (in 1590), wheat sold for twenty francs per hectolitre and the daily wage of the peasant was but seventy-eight centimes (Avenel, "Le pouvoirde l'argent," Revue des deux mondes, April 15, 1892, 838). 1 Castelnau, Book III, chap. ii. 2 La Planche, 112; C. 5. P. For., No. 990, February 12, 1561. 3 La Planche, 113. * C. S. P. For., No. 889, January 16, 1561 ; No. 890, February 12, 1561. THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 89 to examine the royal accounts, which the nobles and the commons were too wary to inspect.1 The nobles took the ground that they were not concerned in the matter of paying the King's debts, claiming that they paid their dues to the crown by personal service in war time.2 As far back as the assembly at Fontainebleau far-sighted coun cilors of the king had pointed out that the revenues of the church would have to be made to do duty for the government, and inter course with Rome had been under way looking to such an arrange ment.3 The Pope was not as bitterly opposed to such a policy as one might at first be led to think, for he was thoroughly fright ened at the prospect of a national council of the French clergy being convened in France and was disposed to be accommodat ing. But of course a roundabout method had to be resorted to, for the church would not have suffered a barefaced taxation of ecclesiastical revenues by the political authority. The resulting arrangement was in the nature of a political "deal." Upon the understanding that no French council should be convened, the French crown was permitted to appropriate three hundred and sixty thousand ducats per annum for five years from the incomes of the church,4 the condition of the subsidy, theoretically, being that France was to maintain a fleet to serve against the Turks.5 When these things had been done and the King had received in writing the doleances and requests of the three orders, the States- General were prorogued6 until the first of May, to meet at Pontoise 1 C. S. P. Ven., No. 237, February 17, 1561. 2 La Place, 121. 3 "They mean to levy the greatest subsidy that was ever granted in France. The chief burden rests with the clergy, who give eight-tenths; the lawyers, mer chants, and common people are highly rated also. They reckon to levy 18,000,000 francs."— C. S. P. For., No. 483, September 3, 1560. 4 "The Pope has given faculty to the King to sell of the revenues of the church by the year, and has granted the like to the French King, meaning to serve them to execute . ... the order now to be taken at the General Council." — Ibid., No. 777, December 7, 1560, from Toledo. A similar arrangement was made in Spain with Philip II, in order to restore his depleted finances. s Ibid., No. 850, January 1, 1561. 6 The ordonnance of the King proroguing the estates did not appear until a month later, March 25, is6r. 9° THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE in order to complete the settlement of affairs,1 for time was neces sary to make the arrangements with the church, since the prelates present had not been commissioned to enter into such a compact. 1 La Place, in; C. S. P. For., No. 938, February 12, 1561. In a letter dated January 22, 1561, to Peter Martyr, Hotman gives an admirable account of the session of the States-General at Orleans. See Dareste, "Francois Hotman," Mim. de I' Acad, des sc. moral, et polit., CIV, 654-56. CHAPTER IV THE FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE The factional rivalry which had been engendered during the course of the session of the States-General at Orleans was so great that this discord, combined with the agitation prevailing on account of religion, seemed ominous of civil war, and " every accident was interpreted according to the passions of the persons concerned."1 The affair of the custody of the seal created bitter feeling for a time between the duke of Guise and the king of Navarre, until the former out of policy and the latter either from policy or lack of courage, affected to become reconciled. The Guises realized that they had suffered a serious blow politically through the death of Francis II and Catherine was shrewd enough to know that while she controlled the seal, she was the keeper of the King's authority. The prince of Conde was a double source of friction. In the first place, his trial for treason was still pending before the Parlement of Paris.2 The queen mother was anxious to have the cause settled out of court, for if condemned (which was unlikely) the whole Bourbon family would be disgraced as formerly through the treason of the constable Bourbon in 1527, and if acquitted, the prince would not rest until he had been avenged of his enemies. Accordingly, she caused a letter to be written in the King's name instructing the Parlement to dismiss the case. But the mettle some spirit of the prince resented this process, and his discontent was increased to furious anger when the duke of Guise recom mended that all the evidence be burned and prosecution be dropped, although his opinion was that legally Conde could not be acquitted as the trial so far had proved him to have been implicated in the revolt of Lyons.3 To both parties Catherine de Medici steadily replied that she had written the letter in order to adjust the affairs of the prince of Conde to his honor and to the satisfaction of all, 1 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), March i, 1561. * C. S. P. For., No. 49, March 18, 1561. 3 Ibid., Ven., No. 242, March 3, 1561. 9i 92 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE and that the seal was in her hands. On March 15 the prince was readmitted to the Privy Council; but the Parlement was not dis posed to drop the case so easily and deliberated at length upon the matter, finally on June 13, going on record, in a delicately balanced pronouncement which was intended to please all parties concerned and satisfied none.1 A new source of friction was the vacant government of Cham pagne which the queen gave to the duke of Nemours. This offended Antoine of Navarre, because he wanted to have it conferred upon the prince of Conde.2 To these dissensions, finally, must be added a recent ruling of the Privy Council, in compliance with one of the resolutions of the States-General, that all bishops, including the cardinals, were to return to their sees.3 This regu lation eliminated some of the leaders of both parties, the cardinal 1 La Place, 129; La Popeliniere, I, 244; De Thou, IV, 66, 67. The king of Navarre, most of the princes of the blood, cardinals, and nobles being present, chief among whom were the duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine. The prince was declared innocent, all the information brought against him was pro nounced false and the letters, forgeries. This rehabilitation was also extended to the vidame of Chartres and Madame de Roye, Coligny's sister and mother of the princess of Conde, and the parlementary arret was ordered to be proclaimed in all the courts of parlement of the realm (C. S. P. For., No. 265, § 8, June 23, 1561). 2 Nig. Tosc, III, 467, and note. 3 Ordonnance generale . . des etats assembles a Orleans, p. 5; Isambert, XIV, 65. In pursuance of this legislation the cardinal of Lorraine resigned a few of his pluralities. He gave the bishopric of Metz to his brother, the cardinal of Guise, and retained for himself the archbishopric of Rheims, with the Abbeys of St. Remy and St. Denis (Claude Haton, I, 234). On April ±, 1561, the action of the States-General was affirmed in a royal edict which commanded the bishops to return to their dioceses and there reside under pain of seizure of their temporalities, and in every bailiwick in France inventories were to be made of the whole revenues of the priest (Isambert, XIV, 101). It was followed by an edict dealing with the administration of the hospitals and support of the poor (ibid., 105), designed to put an end to corrupt practice on the part of unprincipled and avaricious priests who did not wish to reside at home and so sold their cures to presbyters. Those who had numerous benefices found means to excuse themselves from residence in their cures, in virtue of an article of the edict, which provided that ecclesiastics who had numerous cures, which they held par dispense, or other benefices or charges requiring actual residence in some other church, and who could not by this means reside in their parishes, by residing in one of the parishes or other churches in which they had a benefice or office requiring residence, were exempt from residing in their other cures, provided that they committed them to the care of capable vicars. In FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE 93 of Lorraine on the one hand and the cardinal de Chatillon on the other, to the discomfiture of both parties. Only the cardinal Tournon, whose great age made him harmless and who really wanted to pass the rest of his life in retirement, and the cardinal of Bourbon whose easy disposition also made him harmless, were permitted to stay with the court. Philip II of Spain had been an attentive follower of all that had happened in France since the early autumn of 1560 and had been kept thoroughly informed by his indefatigable ambassador. His disquietude over the death of Francis II and the new direction of affairs in France was so great1 that in January Philip sent Don Juan de Manrique, his grand master of artillery, to Orleans, osten sibly to perform the office of condolence and congratulation,2 but in reality to win over the constable, to harden the policy of the French government toward the Huguenots, to persuade it against the project of a national council,3 and to promote Philip's pur- virtue of this article they were permitted the enjoyment of their revenues after having satisfied the king's officers in each bailiwick. Cf. Claude Haton, I, 221, 222. The revenues of hospitals were assumed control of by the government, and the administration thereof was committed to the care of special administrators. Local judicial officers instead of the clergy, as formerly, were to supervise the distribution of money, wood, wine, and provisions, to priors, monks, nuns, and the poor. The hospitals of various towns of France and in particular the hotels-dieu at Paris and Troyes, had already, even before this, been governed by lay com missioners. For a complaint of bad administration of the H6tel-Dieu at Provins by the lay officers, who enriched themselves at the expense of the poor, and let the house run down, for which reason the King was requested to restore the adminis tration to the clergy, see Claude Haton, I, 223. 1 The letter which the bishop of Limoges, the French ambassador in Madrid, wrote "apres la mort de Francois II," detailing the Spanish monarch's fear, is almost prophetic (Paris, Nigociations relatives au regne de Francois II, 782-85). 2 Philip II, to Charles IX, January 4, 1561, K. 1,495, No. 13; to Mary Stuart, January 7, K. 1,495, No. 17; C. 5. P. For., No. 870, January 10, 1561. He arrived on the evening of January 23. Cf. Don Juan de Manrique and Chantonnay to Philip II, January 28, 1561, K. 1,494, No. 55, giving an account of his reception at the French court. He left about February 10, 1561 (C. S. P. For., Nos. 933, January 23, 1561, and 984, February n, 1561). 3 C. S. P. For., No. n, March 4, 1561; Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), February 19, 1651. A letter of December 26, 1560, to the King, pub lished in the Revue d'hist. diplomatique, XIII, No. 4 (1899), 604, "Depeches de Sebastien de l'Aubespine,'' states the real mission of Don Juan de Manrique. 94 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE poses regarding the marriage of Mary Queen of Scots, to Don Carlos, Philip's son. Catherine de Medici soon divined both the purpose and the danger, and her alarm was correspondingly great, because the increasing confusion in the realm on account of religion every day made Spanish intervention more possible/ One of two results seemed certain to happen: either that things would end with the Huguenots having churches in which they could preach, read, and perform their rites according to their doctrine without hindrance, as they had temporarily obtained churches by the declaration of Fontainebleau, at the end of August, in compliance with the reso lution presented by the admiral ; or else that obedience to the Pope and to the Catholic rites would be enforced at the point of the sword, and a manifest and certain division in the kingdom would result, with civil war as the consequence. When Francis II died, a great number who had fled to Geneva and Germany after the conspiracy of Amboise came back to France. For the government of Charles IX had inaugurated the new reign by a declaration of toleration (January 7, 1561) which, although Calvin disapproved it,2 may yet with reason be regarded as a liberal edict. The Prot-' estants were not slow to profit by the change, and flocked back from Switzerland and Germany and resumed their propaganda, one phase of which was a vilification of Rome and the Guises to such an extent that the King protested to the Senate of Geneva regarding their abuse.3 Paris soon abounded with Huguenot preachers from Geneva, who relied upon the division in the coun cil or the protection of persons in power for the maintenance of the new edict.4 1 The queen mother to the bishop of Rennes, April 11, 1561, Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 186. The latter's reply is in Paris, Nigociations, etc., 871, May 26, 1561. Cf. Castelnau, I, 555. 2 Lacombe, Catherine de Midicis entre Guise et Condi, 108. The edict was actually a confirmation of the edict of Romorantin. See Mim. de Condi, II, 266; text of the Edict of Romorantin in Isambert, XIV, 31. 3 Letter of Charles IX, January 23, 1561, Opera Calvini, XVIII, 337. The reply of the senate under date of January 28 is at 343-45. 4 C. S. P. Ven., Nos. 250, 272, April, 1561. Coligny's house was a favorite rendezvous. He never went to mass, and when his wife gave birth to a child in the spring of 1561 he had it baptized openly in the popular tongue, according to the Calvinist form (C. S. P. For., Nos. 933, 984, 1561). FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE 95 In some provinces, such as Normandy,1 Touraine, Poitou, Gascony,2 and the greater part of Languedoc, Dauphine, and Provence, congregations and meetings were openly held. Guyenne save Bordeaux, was badly infected with heresy.3 The new religion penetrated so deeply that it affected every class of persons, even the ecclesiastical body itself, not only priests, friars, and nuns, but even bishops and many of the principal prelates. Among all classes there were Huguenot sympathizers, the nobility perhaps more manifestly than any other class.4 The congregations of Rouen and Dieppe sent to the King for license to preach the word of God openly. In Dieppe the Calvinists once a day met in a great house, "of men, women and children above 2,000 in company."5 There were Huguenot outbursts at Angers, Mans, Beauvais, and Pontoise, in April, and at Toulouse in June.6 At Beauvais when the cardinal -of Chatillon, who was bishop there, caused the Calvinist service to be conducted and communion administered in his chapel, "after the manner of Geneva," the canons and many of the people "assembled to good numbers to have wrought their wicked wills upon the cardinal." Some were hurt and killed in the trouble, and one poor wretch was brought before the cardinal's gate and burned.7 A similar riot took place in Paris, on April 28, in the evening, near the Pre-aux-Clercs. As a result of these excesses things took a sterner turn. A new measure interdicted Huguenot meetings, even in private houses; and all persons of every condition in Paris were required 1 For the rise of Protestantism in Normandy see Le Hardy, Histoire du pro- testantisme en Normandie depuis son origine jusqu' a la publication de I'Edit de Nantes, Caen, 1869; Lessens, Naissance et progres de Vhirisie de Dieppe, I557~ 1609: Publication faite pour la I^re fois d'apres le MS de la biblioth. publ. av. une introd. et des notes, Rouen, 1877; Hauser, "The French Reformation and the Popular Classes," American Historical Review, January, 1899. 2 Archives de la Gironde, XIII, 132; XVII, 256. 3 "There is not one single province uncontaminated," wrote Suriano, the Venetian ambassador on April 17, 1561 (C. S. P Ven., 272). 4 See a long letter of Hotman published by Dareste in Rev. hist., XCVII, March-April, 1908, p. 299. 5 C. S. P. For., 857, January 1, 1561. 6 Nig. Tosc, III, 456. 7 C. S. P. For., No. 124, April 20, 1561. 96 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE to observe the Catholic religion.1 The attitude of Paris was omi nous for the future. The populace was wholly Catholic and hostile to religious change,2 and was strongly supported by the Sorbonne and the Parlement.3 The Sorbonne freely let it be under stood that it would never obey any order issued to the injury of the Catholic religion, asserting that whenever the crown changed faith and religion, the people were absolved from the oath of fealty and were not bound to obey.4 The words "civil war" were on the lips of all who were attentively observing events. "Between the two parties, justice is so little feared," wrote the duke of Bed ford, "and policy has so little place that greater things are to be dreaded."5 The responsibility for the government's vacillation at this season is not to be imputed wholly to Catherine de Medici.6 It is to be remembered that France was under a double regency, and that the weakness of the king of Navarre materially embarrassed affairs. At this moment he seemed to be inclined toward the faith of Rome in the hope of conciliating Philip II of Spain, in order to recover- the kingdom of Navarre. The Spanish ambas sador and the Guises naturally made the most of his aspiration, the former telling Antoine that although it was impossible to obtain what he claimed from His Catholic Majesty by mere force, he might make a fair agreement with Philip by maintaining France in the true faith.7 During these months of tension and tumult, the ambassador 1 C. S. P. For., No. 155, April 30; C. S. P. Ven., No. 255, May 2, and No. 258, May 14, 1561. 2 Suriano says this hostility of Paris toward Protestantism was greater, per haps, because it was favored by the nobles, who were naturally hated — "la plebe di questa Citta che per professione e nemica delle nove sette, forse perche sono favorite dalli nobili, li quali sono odiati per natura." — Op. cit., May 2, 1561. Cf. May 16, ab init. (Huguenot Society of London). 3 "Requete de la Sorbonne au roi," K. 1,495, No. 74, without date but seem ingly of this time. 4 C. S. P. Ven., No. 259, May 16, 1561. s Ibid,t For., No. 158, April, 1561; cf. No. 124, April 20, 1561. 6 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 188, and n. 1. 7 C. 5. P. Ven., No. 259, May 16, 1561. FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE 97 worked out a scheme, which in principle was that of Philip II, but the details were of Chantonnay's own arrangement. The aim was to form a group of influential persons at the court, who should begin by complaints of the government's policy and then proceed to threats and dark hints of the displeasure of Spain, finally presenting a bold front to Catherine, and compelling her to abandon her policy of temporizing and moderation. The constable Montmorency was the objective leader of this cabal, and his persuasion to the enterprise was one of the secret purposes of the mission of Don Juan de Manrique. While this envoy bore letters expressing Philip's esteem to all the most notable Catholics at the French court, there was a distinction between them. The king of Spain wrote in common to the duke of Guise, the constable, the duke of Montpensier, the chancellor, and the marshals St. Andre and Brissac,1 and a joint note to the cardinals of Lorraine and Tournon.2 But Montmorency and St. Andre each also received a separate letter. The discrimination shows the won derfully keen penetration of Philip's ambassador, for these two were destined to be two of the three pillars of the famous Trium virate.3 In reply the cardinal of Lorraine hastened to inform Philip II of his deep interest in maintaining the welfare of Cathol icism.4 But it required time and adroitness to overcome the constable's prejudice against Spain, and his attachment to his nephews.3 In the meantime, before the constable was persuaded, the cabal made formidable headway by winning Claude de l'Aubespine to its cause. This paved the way for an action which, if Catherine de Medici could have known it, would have thrown her into con sternation indeed. For Claude de l'Aubespine's brother Sebastian, the bishop of Limoges, was Charles IX's ambassador in Spain. On April 4, 1561, the latter addressed a secret letter to Philip II 'January 4, 1561; K. 1,495, No. 15. 2 Ibid., No. 16. 3 On the whole see De Crue, Anne de Montmorency, 294, 295. 4 January 31, 1561; K. 1,494, No. 21. 5 For an example of Chantonnay's way of working see De Crue, 296, 297, and the letters in K. 1,494, No. 54, January 15, 1561, and No. 56, February 1, 1561. 98 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of Spain describing the turmoil in France and thanking him, in the queen's name, for the "bons et roiddes offices" of Chantonnay.1 Coincident with this event, things in France had come to a head precisely as Philip and his ambassador had planned to have them. At this ' juncture Montmorency took a decisive stand. When the constable saw that meat was being freely eaten during these Lenten days; that Protestant service was held in the cham bers of the admiral and the prince of Conde"; that Catherine de Medici invited Jean de Montluc, the heretic bishop of Valence, to preach at court on Easter Sunday, the old warrior's spirit rose in revolt. In vain his eldest son, the marshal Montmorency, pleaded that his father's fears were exaggerated and his prejudices too deep-seated. The old man was firm in his convictions, in which he was sustained by his wife, Madeleine of Savoy, a bitter adversary of Calvinism.2 Moreover, the political as well as reli gious demands of the Huguenot party, especially the demands of certain of the local estates, which advocated drastic reform, alarmed him. The whole power of the political Huguenots was directed against the constable, the duke of Guise, the cardinal of Lorraine, and the marshals Brissac and St. Andre", the leaders of the party being determined to call them to account for their peculations during the reign of Henry II and his successor, and to force them to surrender the excessive grants which had been given them.3 On the evening of April 6, 1561, Montmorency, after having expostulated with the queen, invited the duke of Guise, the duke de Montpensier, the prince of Joinville, the marshal St. Andre, and the cardinal Tournon to dine with him. In his apartments 1 This important document which has not been published by M. Louis Paris, or elsewhere that I can find, is in K. 1,494, No. 70 (printed in Appendix II). 2 La Place, 122, 123. 3 This is the judgment of both Catholic and Huguenot historians; e. g., Castel nau, Book III, chap, v, and Benoist, Historie de I'idit de Nantes, Book I, 29, who says that the chief motive of St. Andre and the constable in forming the Trium virate was fear of being compelled to pay back the immense sums which they had embezzled. Yet the constable in 1561 was a poor man as the result of the heavy sums of ransom he and his house had been obliged to pay during the late war. See De Crue, Anne de Montmorency, 236. FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE 99 that famous association named by the Huguenots the Triumvirate, in which the constable, Guise, and St. Andre were principals, was formed.1 The preparations of the Guises during the former year enabled the Triumvirate rapidly to lay its plans. Spanish, Italian, Ger man, and Swiss forces could be counted upon and procured within a very short time. These forces were to be divided under the command of the duke of Aumale and the three marshals, Brissac, Termes, and St. Andre. In order to support these troops, the Catholic clergy were to be assessed according to the incomes they enjoyed; cardinals 4,000 to 5,000 livres per annum; bishops 1,000 to 1,200; abbots 300 to 400, priors 100 to 120; and so on down to chaplains, whose annual stipend was but 30 livres, and who were only assessed a few sous. But as some immediate means were necessary, the gold and the silver of some of the churches, and the treasure of certain monasteries was to be appropriated at once, receipts being given for the value of the gold taken, and promise being made that reimbursement would be made shortly out of the confiscations made from the heretics.2 Catherine de Medici's plan to govern through the constable Montmorency and the admiral,3 leaving Antoine of Navarre only nominal authority, received an abrupt shock when the Trium virate was established. Her policy partook of both doubt and fear, and vacillated more than ever.4 But more formidable than the project to organize insurrection at home, thus promoted by the Triumvirate, was the foreign policy it adopted. The Triumvirate formally appealed to Philip II for » La Place, 123; Ruble, III, 71; De Crue, 303; Chantonnay to Philip II, April 7, K. 1,494, B. 12, 73; April 9, B. 12, 75. Cf. Mimoires de Condi, III, 210 ff.: "Sommaire des choses premierement accordees entre les dues de Mont morency, Connestable et De Guyse, . . . . et le Mareschal Sainct Andre, pour la Conspiration du Triumvirate, et depuis mises en deliberation a l'entree du Sacre et Sainct Concile de Trente, et arrestee entre les Parties en leur prive Conseil faict contre les Hereticques et contre le Roy de Navarre en tant qu'il gouverne et conduit mal les affaires de Charles IX." » La Planche, 454. 3 Nig. Tosc, III, 448. *Rel. vin., I, 534. ioo THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE aid.1 The response was not slow in forthcoming, though the royal word was prudently couched in vague terms.2 To make matters worse, Antoine of Navarre inclined more than ever toward the faith of Rome in the hope of conciliating Philip II of Spain.3 To a man less vain and gullible than Antoine of Bourbon such a proposition, upon its very face, as the restoration of Navarre, would have appeared to have been preposterous. Aside from the blow to its prestige which any loss of territory entails upon a nation, it is only necessary to look at the position of Spanish Navarre to perceive that Spain could better afford to lose a war abroad than to part with this key to the passes of the western Pyrenees. There is no need to relate at length the story of Antoine's alternate hopes and fears, of his great expectations, and of the empty promises made him.4 The office Antoine held, not the man, made him important to France and Spain. For this reason, he was alternately wheedled and cajoled, mocked and threatened, for more than a year; and all the time the pitiable weakling shifted and vacillated in his policy.5 It is amazing to see how successfully Antoine was led along by the dexterous suggestions of Chantonnay, and the evasive answers of Philip II. It was a delicate game to play, for there was con tinual fear lest he would discover that he was being made the dupe of Spain, and prevail upon the queen mother and the prince of Conde to join him in avenging his wrongs, a not impossible devel- 1 The original letter is preserved in the Musee des Archives Nationales, No. 665. See the Mimoires de Condi, III, 395. - Philip II to the constable, the cardinal of Lorraine, and Antoine of Navarre, April 14 and June 12, 1561, Archives nat., K. 1,495, B- 13, 33, 44- Admission of this step thus early is made in the Mimoires du due de Guise, ed. Michaud et Pou- joulal, ser. I, V, 464, The Huguenots were early apprised of it by the intercep tion of a messenger of the Triumvirate near Orleans. Cf. Bref discours et veritable des principalis conjurations de la maison de Guyse, Paris, 1565, 5, 6. 3 C. S. P. Ven., No. 259, May 16, 1561. 4 Cf. De Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, III, 251 ff. s On Palm Sunday (1561) Antoine went to mass, for which Pius IV hastened to congratulate him and the church (K. 1,494, No. 74, April 8, 1561), and for some time after Easter he continued to go to mass, and refrained from eating flesh on the days prohibited by the church (C. S. P. For., No. 24S, May 18, 1561). ' But within a month, he is discovered having public preaching in his house by a Protestant minis ter, and "daily service in the vulgar tongue" (ibid., No. 265, §13, June 23, 1561). FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE 101 opment, as Granvella observed, "considering that prudence does not always preside over the actions of men."1 The game was the more difficult because Antoine wanted the restoration of his kingly title more than anything else. If he had been willing to become vassal to Spain, as Chantonnay said to St. Andre, there were a thousand ways to satisfy him. But Spain could not think of alienating any of her provinces, least of all any frontier possession like Navarre or Roussillon.2 Time and again the prince of Conde told his brother he was a fool to be so wheedled, and Jeanne d'Albret sarcastically said that she would let her son go to mass when his father's inheritance was restored.3 When the game was likely to be played out, and Antoine, discovering that fine words did not butter parsnips, began to complain or boldly to bluster,4 a possible substitute for the kingdom of Navarre which Antoine did not want to hold as a Spanish dependency3 was sug gested. At one moment it was Sienna; at another the county of Avignon ; at a third the crown of Denmark — to be gotten through the influence of the Guises. The most alluring offer in Antoine's eyes, however, was Sardinia.6 In return for the crown of Sardinia, 1 "Como todas actiones no se goviernan siempre con la razon." — Granvella to Philip II, May 13, 1561, Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VI, 541. 2 Chantonnay's letter of April 18, 1562, is almost entirely given up to a report of a conversation between him and the marshal St. Andre upon this question. It is very interesting (K. 1,497, No. 24). 3 K. 1,497, No. 33. 4 See Vargas to Philip II, from Rome, September 30, 1561, in Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VI, 357, where he tells the king of one of Antoine's speeches. One of the minor duties of Don Juan de Manrique's mission to France in January, 1561, had been to give Antoine hope in that quarter, in which policy Spain's grand master of artillery, and the papal nuncio worked together. The nuncio was Hippolyte d'Este, the cardinal of Ferrara. His correspondence is published in Nigociations ou lettres d'affaires ecclisiastiques et politiques escrites au Pape Pie IV et au Cardinal Borromie, par Hippolyte d'Est, cardinal de Ferrare, legat en France au commencement des guerres civiles, Paris, 1658. s K. 1,497, No. 28. 6 " Sa principal esperance de ce coste-la [Sardinia], se f onde sur les bons et yigoureux offices qu'il se promet de nostre Saint-Pere." — Letter II, from St. Ger main, Januarv 10, 1561. Nigociations . . . . du cardinal de Ferrare, Lettre XXXIV, June 26, 1562. Don Juan de Manrique suggested to Antoine — "Que s'il vouloit repudir la reine sa femme, comme heretique qu'elle estoit, les Seigneurs de Guise luy feroient espouser leur Niece, veuve de Francis II." 102 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Antoine was willing to leave all the fortresses of the island in Spain's possession; and to put his children in Philip's hands as hostages.1 This digression has somewhat anticipated the progress of events. Charles IX had been crowned at Rheims on May 15 (Ascension Day).2 The declared majority and the coronation of her son seems to have given Catherine new courage, for in spite of the menace implied in the formation of the Triumvirate, she still labored in the interest of the Huguenot cause. On June 13, as we have seen, the definite exoneration of the prince of Conde was pronounced by the Parlement of Paris,3 and in the following 1 Apparently the Sardinians were prepared to say something for themselves in the matter. For St. Sulpice, the French ambassador n Spain, who succeeded L'Aubespine, on October 8, 1562, writes to Antoine to this effect: "On lui a rapporte 'comme les galeres d'Espagne, venant dTtalie a Barcelone, et passant pres de la Saidaigne, les habitans du pays, s'etaient mis en armes avec contenance de vouloir defendre l'abordee de leurs portes ausd. galeres, de quoi s'etant depuis venus justifier par deca; ils avaient remontre qu'ils avaient entendu que ce roi les voulait bailler a. un autre prince et qu'ils craignaient que lesd. galeres y vinssent pour les contraindrc de la recevoir a sgr., ce qu'ils ne voulaient permettre, le sup- pleant de ne les aliener de sa courrone,'" etc. — L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 83. His correspondence abounds with allusions to Sardinia, e. g., 17, 25, 35, 37, 79, 83, 84, 90, etc. 2 In the presence of the king of Navarre, the constable, the dukes of Guise, Nevers, Montpensier, and Aumale, and of spiritual lords, the cardinal of Lorraine, who was archbishop of Rheims, and the bishops of Laon, Langres, Chalons, Noyon, and Beauvais, the last being the cardinal Chatillon, the only prominent Huguenot, who attended the coronation. The prince of Conde, the admiral, the duke de Longueville, the marshal Montmorency, and his brother Damville, were not present, because they would not assist at mass ("M. Damville is the con stable's best-beloved son, a Knight of the Order, one of the paragons of the court and a favourer of the reformed faith."' — C. S. P. For., No. 395, §3, August 11, 1561). For a detailed account of the particulars and party issues manifested at the cere mony see De Crue, 309, 310. Catherine de Medici apparently took her time to advrse Philip II of the coronation, for her letter (without date) was not received by the King until June 17, K. 1,494, No. 44. 3 This mightily offended the Triumvirate, and the duke of Guise, the con stable, and the marshal St. Andre forthwith left the court in high dudgeon. Rochambeau, Lettres d' Antoine de Bourbon et de Jeanne d'Albret, Inventaire Sommaire, No. CXLIII, 27 juin 1561— " Attestation de Catherine de Medicis et Antoine de Bourbon, pour affirmer que la retraite du due du Guyse, de cone- stable de Montmorency, et du mareschal de St. Andre n'est due qu'au seul respect et affection qu'ils portent au service du roi et au repos de ses sujets." — Bib. Nat., F. Fr., 3,194, fol. 5. FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE 103 August an outward reconciliation, at least, was effected between the prince and the duke of Guise.1 Encouraged by the positive attitude of the queen mother and the vacillation of the king of Navarre, the Huguenots urged the cause of toleration and presented a request to the King on June tt, 1 56 1, through the deputies of the churches dispersed through out the realm of France.* They declared that the reports of their refusing to pay the taxes and being seditious were false and ca lumnious; they begged the King to cause all persecutions against them to cease; that he would liberate those of them who were in prison, and that he would permit them to build churches as their numbers were so great that private houses would no longer suffice ; finally offering to give pledges that there would be no sedition in their assemblies, and promising all lawful obedience. The queen mother referred this petition to the Privy Council, but as it involved so important a matter the council was of opinion that it ought to be laid before the Parlement as well as to be con^ sidered by the princes of the blood and all the peers and councilors of the Court of Parlement.3 The Catholic party was quite willing to have this course followed, feeling confident that the Parlement in its official capacity would refuse to register an edict for such purpose. But L'H6pital4 and Coligny had hopes that the interest and authority of the princes of the blood and other persons of influence might carry it through the Parlement after all.5 How ever, in the end nothing positive was concluded, final resolution being deferred until a colloquy of the bishops and other clergy, who were convoked at Poissy, near St. Germain, for the end 1 "Proces-verbal de la reconcilation entre le prince de Conde et le due de Guise en presence du roi Charles IX," in K. 1,494, No. 92; Nig. Tosc, III, 460; C. S. P. For., Nos. 449, August 24, 1561, 461, August 30, 1561; La Place, 139, 146^ 2 "Requeste presente au roi par les Deputez des Eglises esparses parmi le royaume de France." A printed copy is to be found in K. 1,495, No. 42. It is a really eloquent petition. 3 Castelnau, Book III, chap, iii; C. S. P. For., No. 304, §3, July 13, 1561. 4 Suriano definitely says the edict of July was the work of the chancellor. He gives a summary of the edict in a despatch of July 27, 1561 (Huguenot Society). 5 Cf. C. S. P. For., 1561, No. 237; Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society)) June 25, 1561. 104 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of the month, took place.1 Meanwhile a tentative ordinance— the Edict of July, similar to the Edict of Romorantin— was to obtain. This gave the church, as before, entire cognizance of the crime of heresy and deprived the Parlement, the bailiffs, sene schals, and other judges of any jurisdiction. In every case local ecclesiastical courts had to act first; banishment was to be the severest punishment for heresy; false accusers were to be punished in the same way that the accused would have been if really guilty; amnesty was granted for past offenses; and firearms were forbidden to be carried in towns or elsewhere, with certain exceptions, under a penalty of 50 gold crowns.2 Within a short time, accordingly, the Protestant assemblies appeared as frequently as before, although the Calvinist clergy seemed to have become more discreet in their utterances.3 This cleverly designed edict, while seeming to pronounce judg ment, really avoided the question at issue. There was sufficient leeway still for the holding of Protestant assemblies, and moreover, even though ecclesiastical affairs were to be referred to the spiritual courts, the Huguenots were protected by a saving clause (except for offenses cognizable by the secular power).4 Such qualified 1 Chantonnay to Philip II, July 24, 1561, K. 1,495, No. 52; C. S. P. For., No. 321, §2, Paris, July 16, 1561. 2 Isambert, Anc. lois franc., XIV, 109 (Edit sur la religion, sur le moyen de tenir le peuple en paix, et sur la repression des seditieux) . 3 Suriano, August 25; Nig. Tosc, III, 453-58; Castelnau, Book III; C. S. P. For., No. 357; Beza, Hist, ecclis., I, 294 (ed. 1841); La Place, 130; D'Aubigne, I, 309. 4 Castelnau, Book III, chap, iii; he admirably depicts the divided state of mind of the Parlement which resulted in the edict taking this neutral form. Suriano pithily observes: "Con questi dispareri le cose del Regno patiscono assai, et non si pu6 far niuna deliberatione d'importanza che sia ferma et rissoluta, et di qua hanno havuto origine tanti editti nel fatto di Religione che sono stati publicati li mesi passati, Ii quali non solamente sono ambigui, ma diversi l'uno dall' altro, et spesse volte contrarii, donde li heretici hanno preso tanto fomento che sono fatti piu indurati et piti ostinati che mai" (June 26, 1561). Charles IX sent the Sieur d'Ozances to Spain to soften Philip's anger as much as possible. In a letter of July 18, from St. Germain to his ambassador in Spain, after stating the motives which have led him to dispatch D'Ozances, he adds: "Au demeurant, je ne doubte point qu'on seme de beaulx bruictz par dela, tou- chant le faict de la Religion, et qu'on ne nous face beaucoup plus malades que nous ne sommes; et, pour ceste occasion il m'a sembie qu'il serait fort a propos que le FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE 105 toleration, so guardedly given, was probably all that might with safety have been granted to the Huguenots at this early date. But they were far from seeing things in this light. The hotheads among them, in their meetings and in public places, used the most violent language in detraction of the Catholic church and its sacra ments.1 In some places popular feeling against priests was so strong that they were compelled, for the safety of their lives, to disguise their, costumes and not to wear the clerical habit abroad, nor long hair, nor have the beard shaved, nor exhibit any other mark which would indicate that they were priests or monks.2 Sr. d'Auzances feist entendre au Roy, mon bon frere, les termes en quoy nous en sommes." Then follow details upon the edict of pacification. This letter was sold at auction in 1877. It is catalogued in the Inventaire des autographes et des documents historiques composant la collection de M. Benjamin Fillon, Paris, Charavay, 1877 (Series I, 34, No. 132 — "Lettre de Charles IX contre-sig. Robertet, a. l'eveque de limoges, ambassadeur en espagne; St. Germain, 18 juillet, 1561"). 1 Claude Haton, I, 122. 2 Ibid., I, 129. In consequence of this state of things we find numerous ordinances passed in the summer of 1561 in restraint of violence; cf. "Edit sur la religion, sur le moyen de tenir le peuple en paix et sur la repression des seditieux, July 1561," Isambert, XIV, 109; "Edit pour remedier aux troubles, et sur la re pression des seditieux,'' October 20, 1561, ibid., XIV, 122; "Edit sur le port d'armes a feu, lavente de ces armes et les formalites a suivre par les fabricants," October 21, 1561, ibid., XIV, 123. CHAPTER V THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY. THE ESTATES OF PONTOISE. THE EDICT OF JANUARY, 1562 In the summer of 1561, France saw two separate assemblies convene : the adjourned session of the States- General at Pontoise and the conference of the leaders of the two religions at Poissy. In a sense the cause of the political Huguenots was represented in the former, that of the religious Huguenots in the latter, although the deliberations of the two assemblies were finally combined in an instrument known as the Act of Poissy. The elections in the prov inces, each of which sent up two1 representatives from each baili wick of the kingdom, had enabled the opposition to go on record,2 so that the crown had early intimation of the sort of legislation that was likely to be demanded. The business of the estates was 1 C. S. P. Ven., No. 237, February 17, 1561, says: "one representative with absolute authority to treat and conclude what might be approved by the majority of votes." But La Place, III, 121, says two representatives were chosen from each bailiwick. Cf. De Crue, Anne de Mvntmorency, 300. 2 The estates of the Ile-de-France demanded that the council and government of the King should be formed according to the ancient constitution of the realm; that the accounts of the previous administration should be examined; that the queen mother should be removed from the government and be content with being guardian of the King's person; that no stranger be admitted to be of the council; that no cardinal, bishop, or other ecclesiastical person having made suit to the Pope, should have any place in the Privy Council, not even the cardinal Bourbon, though he was a prince of the blood, unless he resigned his hat; that the king of Navarre be regent of the realm with the title of lieutenant-general, and that with him be joined a council of the princes of the blood and others; that the admiral and M. de Roche foucault should have charge of the education of the King. On these conditions the Estates offered to discharge the King's debts in six years; but in the event of refusal, they declared that the King must live upon the incomes of the royal domain, much of which was mortgaged (C. 5. P. For., No. 77, sec. 3, March 31). Cf. Despatches of Michele Suriano (Huguenot Society), June 10, 1561; De Crue, Anne de Montmorency, 300, 301; letter of Hotman to Bullinger, April 2, 1561 in Mim. de I'Acad. des sc moral, et polit., CIV (1877), 656; Nig. Tosc, III, 455-58. For other information, see " Remonstrances du tiers-etat du baillage de Provins," in Claude Haton, II, 1137; "Remonstrance . . des villes . . . de Cham pagne," ibid., Ill, 1 140, which shows the economic distress. 106 THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 107 to find a way out of the financial difficulties which overwhelmed the King.1 The spokesman of the third estate, one Jean Bretaigne, mayor of Autun, after a tedious prologue copiously laden with biblical and classic lore, at last came to the pith of things : he summed up in a paragraph of portentous dimensions the burden imposed upon the people by war and the extravagance of the court during the past twenty years, declaring that the people were so penniless that they had nothing to give the King, "save a good and loyal will." Things had come to such a pass that mere economy and retrench ment, nor even an honest and effective administration, although that was demanded and was promised by the King, could tave the future.2 The immense resources of the clergy must be made to restore the dilapidated finances of the monarchy; the church must come to the material rescue of the state, as in the days of Charles Martel. The entire revenue he argued, must be taken of all offices, benefices, and ecclesiastical dignities not actually officiated either in person or in a titular capacity, the Knights of Rhodes and the Hospitalers of St. James included ; all the fruits, also, of benefices in litigation which the collators were accustomed to take during the time of litigation should be appropriated by the state, as well as the moneys of deceased bishops and monks. Moreover, one-quarter of the income should be taken of all bene ficiaries actually resident in their benefices, in cases where the revenue was from 500 to 1,000 livres; of those having a revenue of 1,000 to 3,000 livres, one-third; of those with incomes running from 3,000 to 6,000 livres, one-half; of those ranging from 6,000 to 12,000 livres, two-thirds. Those of the clergy whose incomes exceeded 12,000 livres and above were to be permitted to retain 4,000 livres, the surplus being applied to liquidate the King's debts, 1 La Place, 158 ff.; La Popeliniere, I, 271 ff.; D'Aubigne, Book II, chap, xvi; Beza, Hist, ecclis., ed. 1840, I, 320 ff.; L'Hopital, CEuvres completes, I, 485 ff. De Thou, Book XXVIII, 74-77; Claude Haton, I, 155. A test vote, however, on religion was taken, resulting in 62 votes for liberty of worship in the case of the Huguenots, and 80 against it (letter of Hotman in Rev. hist., XCVII, March- April, 1908, 300. 2 C. S. P. For., No. 396, August 11, 1561; La Place, 146, 147, 150. io8 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE save in cases where the beneficiaries were bishops, archbishops, primates, and cardinals, to whom 6,000 livres revenue was to be allowed. As to the monastic orders, their whole treasury and revenues were to be appropriated, save enough for their support, for the maintenance of their buildings, and for charity. And this was not all: all houses, gardens, and real property within either cities or faubourgs not actually employed for ecclesiastical uses, were to be confiscated by the government; the clergy were to be made to pay taxes upon the rich furniture and works of art or adornment given them to enjoy either for a length of years or in perpetuity. Finally, all lands providing revenues, either in money or in kind, as oil, wine, and grain, in case of being let to contract or change of control, were to be declared redeemable. If these measures should prove insufficient, then recourse must be had to more drastic means, namely the direct sale of the property of the church. Twenty-six million livres' worth of this could be readily sold, the speaker argued, which would be no more than one- third of the church's possession; the remainder should be administered by a trustworthy commission, which, after paying the stipends of the clergy in the amounts above indicated, should devote the balance to the payment of the debts of the crown.1 This formidable programme, which suggests the policy actually followed by France in 1789, in spite of the hot declaration of the constable that the speaker presenting it ought to be hanged,2 proved so reasonable that the government, without going to the extreme proposed, saw that the moment was a favorable one to secure important aid from the clergy. The clergy, on the other hand, were sharp enough to see that in order to save their property, they would have to make sacrifice of a portion of it. At first they offered the crown a bonus of ten million livres, which it refused as being too small a sum, and demanded a greater subsidy.3 A temporary settlement at last was made on the basis of 1,600,000 1 La Place, 150-52; De Thou, IV, 74, 75. The full text, unpublished, of this discourse is in F. Fr., 3970, a volume which contains much unused material for the history of the estates of Pontoise. L'Hopital's address is one of the documents. 2 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), August 24, 1561. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 538, §5, September 26, 1561. THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 109 livres annual revenue to be levied upon the vineyards of the clergy, in order to relieve the King's present needs.1 But something more fundamental than this had to be done, for these measures only supplied the King with funds for current expenses, and did not admit of redemption of the debt or resumption of the crown lands, which had been mortgaged for about thirty millions of francs. This matter was the subject of investigation and debate through the ensuing November and December. Finally, a scheme was worked out whereby the royal domain was all to be redeemed by the clergy within six years, and the remainder of the debt to be discharged within another six.2 The contract of Poissy-Pontoise presents two important stipu lations: one, a gift of money to the King; second, the repurchase by the clergy of the domains of the crown and the redemption of the debt. If this contract had been observed, it would have rend ered the other assemblies of the clergy useless, but the failure to execute it made necessary the subsequent assemblies of 1563 and 1567, which established a rule of periodicity, as it were, and fixed the next session at 1573. By 1567, the clergy had fulfilled its first obligation and declared itself ready to resume the second by giving to the provost of the merchants and to the echevins of Paris the guarantees desired for the redemption of the rentes. But the King at the same time insisted upon the continuation of the sub sidy of 1,600,000 livres. The clergy protested, demanding his adherence to the contract of Poissy. The crown enforced continu ation, but as "an easement" waived claim to the "secular tithe" heretofore exacted, and granted to the clergy, for the first time, the right to collect taxes by its own agents, and the right to judge in a sovereign capacity all cases which might arise from these financial matters. The government observed this convention no better T De Crue, 312, 313; De Thou, IV, 74; Nig. Tosc, III, 461; Ruble, Antoine ie Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, III, 160; Rel. vin., II, 21; K. 1,494, fol. 94. Not withstanding this relief, the King demanded a further subsidy amounting to three million gold crowns from the local Estates to be paid in the following January (C. S. P. For., No. 682, §10, November 26, 1561). 2 Ibid.; cf. No. 750, §7, December 28, 1561. Most of this debt was held by Paris. It amounted to 7,560,056 livres. no THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE than the first, and in addition to extraordinary subventions — two million livres in 1572, nearly half of which was squandered by the duke of Anjou in Poland — resorted to compulsory alienations of church property, as in 1563, 1568, 1574, which were made upon order of the King, without recourse to papal affirmation. Pur chasers were not wanting for the new credit. The rate of interest fell to 5 per cent, in the autumn of 156 1 as a result of these expedi ents, and, provided civil war could be averted, it seemed probable that the dilapidated finances might be rehabilitated.1 Simultaneous with the sitting of the estates at Pontoise to settle the financial issue, the religious issue was being debated by the doctrinal leaders of Catholicism and Calvinism, at Poissy.2 This solemn assembly had been summoned in June to meet on the second of the following month,3 in spite of the opposition of the clergy ahd Spain, who warned Catherine that such a concession would lead to disaster.4 But delay ensued, and the assembly did not actually convene until September, for the members were slow in coming.3 The conditions governing the meeting at Poissy were published in council on August 8, namely, that the clergy should not be umpires; that the princes of the blood should pre side at the disputation, and that the different proceedings should be faithfully recorded by trustworthy persons.6 With respect to the other matters the Calvinists were required to make some con"- ' Rel. vin., I, 409-11. Upon the whole question, see De Crue, Anne de Montmorency, chap, xiv; Esmein, Histoire du droit jrangais, 632-33. 2 De Ruble, Le colloque de Poissy (1889); Klipfel, Le colloque de Poissy (1867). 3 C. 5. P. For., No. 265, §9, June 23, 1561; La Place, 131. 4 Paris, Nigociations relatives au r.egne de Frangois II, 550, 615-22; Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VI, 137; Klipfel, Quis fueril in Gallia factionum status, Paris 1863, 23. s Theodore Beza, "the Huguenot pope," did not reach the court until August 23, where he was cordially received by the prince of Conde, before whom he preached "in open audience, whereat was a great press" (C. S. P. For., No. 461, August 30, 1561). For the active agency of Beza at court before the assembly at Poissy met, see La Place, 155-57. 6 The Sorbonne protested against the whole proceeding, but its request was not granted (La Place, 154; cf. C. 5. P. For., No. 458, August 28, 1561, No. 485, September 8, 1561). THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY in cessions in order to avoid the reproach of seeming to evade the colloquy. While awaiting the formal opening of the conference at Poissy, Beza was invited by the court to speak before the King, the queen mother, the king of Navarre, and the Council. He was listened to with great attention by all until he began to deny the Real Presence, when the Catholic party tried to stop his address, exclaiming that it was blasphemy, and Beza and his partisans would certainly have been ejected if their opponents had not been restrained by the royal authority and compelled to listen to the end. At its conclusion the cardinal Tournon exhorted the King to continue firm in the faith of his ancestors,1 and not to permit France to be reduced to the Swiss cantonal system.2 Many of the clergy said that it was not pertinent for the colloquy to determine these points, but that it was for the General Council to decide; moreover, it was argued that as the delegates of the Spanish clergy would shortly be coming through France on their way to Trent, why should not they assist as well as the others ?3 Catherine, it is said, had intended that there should be no dispu tation about dogma. But there is some reason to believe that she confounded dogma with the rites and observances of the church,4 and it is certain that the Huguenots were determined to push their privilege of free speech to the very limit. Indeed, the conditions predicated by Beza formed the substance of a petition presented by the Reformed leaders to Charles IX.5 When the conference met a great attempt to maintain secrecy 1 C. S. P. For., No. 492, September 10, 1561. 2 "Far diventar questo Regno cantoni di Svizzeri" .... (Despatches of Suri ano [Huguenot Society], Aug. 15, 1561; cf. English Hist. Review, VIII, 135). Elsewhere the Venetian ambassador says: "E cosi si va alia via di redurre quella provincia a stato populare, come Svizzeri; e distruggere la monarchia e il regno." — Rel. vin., I, 538. De Thou, Book XXV, observes: "Qui primam, quam Deo debebant, fidem irritam fecissent; qua semel violate, minime dubitaverint regem ipsum petere quo regnum everterent, et confusis ordinibus, in rei publicae formam, Helvetiorum exemplo, redigerent." 3 C. S. P. For., No. 421, August 19, 1561; ibid., Ven., No. 280, September 8, 1561. 4 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), September 18, 1561. s "Demandes des ministres protestantes au roi," K. 1,494, No. 95. 112 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE was made. No one was permitted to enter except those who had been formally appointed;1 the duke of Guise carried the keys to the conference hall, and careful search was made at the beginning of each sitting to find any who might be hid.2 The principal points in dispute turned upon the use of images; the administration of the sacrament of baptism; the communion; 4fcQ>. i r> J p-^a^ THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY (Tortorel and Perissin) the mass; the laying-on of hands and the vocation of ministers, and finally the consideration of a possible accord in doctrine, in which points the usages of the primitive church and the reasons of separation were involved.3 On the second day of the conference (September 16) the cardinal of Lorraine spoke, dwelling upon these principal poin'ts: first, "- Upon the personnel of the assembly, see the references in D'Aubigne, I, 3I5i n- 4- 2 C. S. P. For., No. 516, §7, September 20, 1561. 3 "Paroles prononcees par Theodore de Beza touchant le sacrement." — K. 1,495, No. 77. 1, "Profession de foi . concerte par les prelats de France;" 2, "Premiere proposition des Catholiques; premiere proposition des heretiques."— Latin, K. 1,495, No. 78; cf. Rel. ven., II, 75. THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 113 that the King, being a member of the church and not its head, could not set himself up as a judge in matters of religion and faith, but was subject to the church like every other Christian; second, the definition of the authority of the church was extended even over princes.1 Before long, however, it became evident, both that the attempt to reconcile the Catholic and the Calvinist parties was an impossi bility, and that the government's policy of accommodation was exciting discontent.2 The demands of the Huguenots, based on Beza's arguments, were as follows: 1. That bishops, abbots, and other ecclesiastics should not be constituted in any way judges of the Huguenots, in view of the fact that they were their opponents. 2. That all points of difference be judged and decided accord ing to the simple word of God, as contained in the New and Old Testaments, since the Reformed faith was founded on this alone, and that where any difficulties arose concerning the interpretation of words, reference should be made to the original Hebrew and Greek text.3 This second article was a rock of contention from the very beginning. The whole Catholic doctrine of tradition having equal weight with Scripture was denied in this article. It was manifest, indeed, from the first that three things would not be suffered to ¦ be considered : (1) a change of religion ; (2) the authority of the Pope; (3) the possible alienation of church property.4 This state 1 The cardinal's definition of the church was, "the company of Christians in which is comprised both reprobates and heretics, and which has been recognized always, everywhere, and by all, and which alone had the right of interpreting Scripture." — C. S. P. For., No. 507, September 17, 1561; cf. Suriano (Huguenot Society), September 22. His address is given at length in La Place, 179 ff. It was published at the time. Suriano, August 23, 1561, says all the delegates "made very long speeches." Upon the doctrinal tactics of the cardinal of Lorraine at the colloquy of Poissy, see the letters of Languet, Epist. seer., II, 139, September 20, 1561; 159, November 26, 1561. 2 The first president of the Parlement of Paris was committed to keeping his house because of offensive agitation (C. S. P. For., No. 461, August 30, 1561). 3 Proposition de Theodore de Beze, K. 1,494, No. 96. 4C. 5. P. Ven., No. 280, September 8, 1561. H4 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of things, together with the fact that the prolongation of the session entailed great expense,1 brought about a change of plan. Five per sons, the bishop of Valence, the archbishop of Sens, and MM. Salignac, d'Espence, and Boutellier, were appointed by the queen and agreed to by the clergy, to confer with five representatives of the Calvinists, viz., Peter Martyr,2 Beza, De Gallars, Marborat, and D'Espine.3 Within ten days more the prelates and ministers had ceased to confer and were taking their departure.4 The assembly of Poissy dissolved of itself on October 18, having accomplished nothing,5 except doctrinally still further to disunite the Protestant world, which otherwise might possibly have had a council of its own, composed of French, Scotch, English, Germans, Danes, Swiss and Swedes, to face the Council of Trent.6 Two days later the cardinal and the duke of Guise departed from the court, in spite of the urgency of the queen mother to have them remain, accompanied by the dukes of Nemours and Longue- ville and other great personages and mustering six or seven hun dred horse. Outwardly there was no sign of disaffection. Im mediately afterward the constable also left, expressing dissatis faction with the tolerant policy of the government. It was plain 1 C. S. P. For., No. 511, September 19, 1561. - Not being a Frenchman, but an Italian — his name was Pietro Martire Ver- migli — he received a separate safe-conduct (Suriano [Huguenot Society], August 23; Rev. hist., XCVIT, March-April, 1908, p. 302). 3 La Place, 199. 4 C. S. P. For., No. 602, October 1,2 1561. For a description of the last days of the Colloquy, see Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), October 16, 1561. s C. S. P. For., No. 624, October 18, 1561. In K. 1,495, No. 66, is a resume by the Spanish chancellery of Chantonnay's dispatches dealing with the colloquy. 6 C. 5. P. For., No. 753, from Strasburg, December 30, 1561. Waiting just a week earlier, on December 23, to his sovereign, Chantonnay strongly condemned the course of Catherine at Poissy because it had militated against the authority of Trent, and had given courage to the heretics to continue their synods. — K. 1,494, No. 104. Other references to the Colloquy of Poissy are De Thou, IV, 84 ff.; De Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, 76 ff.; Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, I, Introd., ci, 239. Chantonnay's correspondence, covering both the colloquy and the meeting of the estates at Pontoise, is in K. 1,494, No. 89, August 5; No. 90, August 20; No. ior, September 12 (especially valuable for the financial settlement); No. 102, September 15. THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 115 throughout the proceedings at Pontoise (and at Poissy) that the chancellor of France, L'H6pital, and the admiral, had the chief direction of affairs in their hands, although the queen mother and the king of Navarre had the greater show of authority.1 The Vatican had been an anxious observer of affairs in France, and early in June, 1561, the Pope had resolved to send the cardinal of Ferrara, Hippolyte d'Este, to France as legate.2 The principal points of his mission to the French court, where he arrived on September 14, were to entreat the French crown that the annates might still remain as the Pope's revenue; that there might be no change of religion and observance in the church; to solicit the King to recognize the Council of Trent and to break off the colloquy at Poissy.3 But when the legate presented his credentials, at the instance of the chancellor, who impugned his powers, the estates protested against the entry of any of the Pope's bulls or letters without the King's consent and seal.4 The Parlement of Paris 1 C. S. P. For., No. 659, §10, November 14, 1561. Of these the chancellor was the more agrressive, opposing the efforts of the clerical party to delay and ob struct action (D'Aubigne, I, 311). 2 Coirespondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 248; C. S. P. For., Nos. 225 and 245, June 6-13, 1561; No. 273, June 23, 1561. The choice was a tactless one on the part of the Pope and one certain to antagonize Catherine de Medici as well as the political Huguenots, for the cardinal was a relative of the Guises by marriage. Don Luigo d'Este, the duke of Ferrara's brother, was the son of Alphonso d'Este and Lucretia Borgia^ He resigned his place in the church and married the duchess of Estouteville, a marriage indicating the Guise policy of aggrandisement (C. S. P. For., No. 904, March 27, 1560). The marriage made bitter feeling between the House of Ferrara and the Guises. "There is a breach between the Dukes of Ferrara and Guise touching the former's mother, who, being very rich, and lately fallen out with her son, had secretly sent to the Duke of Guise, a gentleman with a message that she would come to France and end her life there and be as his mother. Word was sent her that she would be welcome; and if her son would not permit her to come with her substance, he would take into his hands the assignation made by the late king upon certain lands for the payment of 100,000 crowns yearly to the Duke till such time as 600,000 crowns, borrowed from him at the Duke of Guise's last voyage to Rome, were paid off. The Duke keeps his mother with good watch for fear of her escaping to France." — C. 5. P. For., No. 446, August 22, 1561. The cardinal traveled with great pomp, having no less than four hundred horses in his train. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 538, §1, September 26, 1561. 4 D'Aubigne, I, 311; Rel. vin., II, 87; C. S. P. For., No. 602, October 12, 1561. 116 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE went even farther, and refused to confirm the King's letters-patent. But the King's council overrode this resolution, and recognized the legate's credentials, although L'H6pital steadfastly refused to affix the seal of state to the council's action. The cardinal began his negotiations by offering on the part of the Pope to resign the tenths and subsidies exacted by the church, and promising all the help His Holiness could give with honor, on condition that the resolution of the estates of Orleans, prohibit ing payment of the annates, which the estates of Pontoise had reasserted, should not be executed. The nuncio argued that this action was a violation of the concordat of 1516, and that the prin ciple in the case had been decided by the council of Basel, and accepted by Charles VII in the Pragmatic Sanction. Accordingly, the nuncio asked for a revocation of the actions taken touching the property of the church, and that things be restored to the state in which they originally were.1 But the cardinal's arguments were of no effect. The execution of the new law went forward. The first province where it was applied was Guyenne — within the government of the king of Navarre, then Touraine, and the Orleannais.2 / An even more interested observer, perhaps, of French affairs than the Pope, was Philip of Spain. The progress of heresy in France, the seizure of the property of the church there, the attitude of the French crown toward the Council of Trent, the uncertainty of Antoine of Bourbon's conduct — these were all disquieting facts to the Spanish ruler. Philip curtly told Catherine and her son that her government must abandon its policy of weakness and dissimulation, that too many souls were being imperiled by her course, and that coercive measures must be used.3 The duke of 1 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), September 23, 1561. 2 Ibid., October 22, 1561. For further details of the negotiations, see ibid., November 3, 1561; C. S. P. For., No. 682, §9, November 26; Baschet, Journal du Concile de Trente, 89. ' 3 Philip II to Catherine, September 29, 1561; to Charles, ibid., K. 1,495, No- 72. To Chantonnay he wrote three days later: "Tambien hazed entender a la Reyna como por este camino perdera su hijo, esse reyno y la obediencia de sus vassalos." — K. 1,495, No. 80. The words were not merely urgent advice — they implied a threat. THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 117 Alva had the boldness to declare that unless the government of France revived the rigorous suppressive measures of Henry II, and punished every heretic, His Catholic Majesty was resolved to sacrifice the welfare of Spain and even his own life in order to stamp out a pest which he regarded as menacing to both France and Spain.1 Singly and together the bishop of the Limoges (who was still at the Spanish court) and D'Ozances, while deploring the malice of the times and " the disasters of which everyone knew," tried to justify their government on the ground that Calvinism had become a necessary evil in France and that it was better to give it qualified toleration than to plunge the country into fire and war. They pointed to the deliberations of the assembly of Fontainebleau, to the States- General of Orleans, to the arrets of the Parlement, and the findings of Pontoise and Poissy in proof; they asserted that' the queen mother and the king of Navarre — they were cau tious not to style him thus in Philip's presence, however — were "of perfect and sincere intention" not to let heresy increase in France; "the scandal and outrage" of heretical preaching never would be permitted in Paris or at the court, although it was neces sary to permit the Protestants to have their own worship outside of some of the towns; that the purpose of the crown was fixed never to change or alter the true religion; that France was not hostile to the Council of Trent, but in her distress was naturally impatient ; and finally they importuned the king of Spain not to show his anger, but to give "advice and comfort" for the sake of the friendship which existed between their country and his, and for the repose of Christendom.2 v 1 Weiss, L'Espagne sous Phillippe II, I, 114, 115; cf. Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, I, 253, n. 3. See also the remarkable " Rapport sur une conference entre l'ambassadeur de France et le due d'Albe, au sujet des affaires du roi de Navarre et des troubles pour cause de la religion (French transcript, apparently of a report of the Spanish chancellery), in K. 1,496, No. 136, December 20, 1561'. The Pope indorsed the proposition of Spanish intervention in France (Vargas to Philippe II, November 7, 1561, in Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VI, 398, 404). 2 "Aux villes et pays ou ils sont la declaires leur bailler quelques lieux pro- chaine hors des dictes villes" — Resume des points principaux traites par l'ambas sadeur de France aupres du roi Philippe II (Communications du due d'Alba),' n 8 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The appeal fell upon deaf ears. Philip coldly replied that it was useless for France to expect the advice or assistance of Spain so long as her government tolerated heresy in any degree whatso ever; that those at the court who were Huguenots, like the admiral and the prince of Conde", should be sent away forthwith, and all others should be coerced; that from the point of view of religion it was blasphemy to permit the Huguenots to have any places of worship, and from the political point of view it was suicide to tolerate them, for "there could never be new things in religion without loss of obedience to the temporal power," in proof of which the King pointed out that in certain of the provinces of France the people were refusing to pay tithes and taxes, at the same time triumphantly asserting that he was better informed of things hap pening in France than in Spain ; that as to the Council of Trent, the Germans would have nothing to do with it and Spain had no need of it, while France was torn by heretical controversy, so that it might well be said that the council sat for the benefit of France alone.1 One of the points upon which Philip II dwelt with earnestness in the interviews he granted the two ambassadors of France was the vicious education under which Charles IX's brother Henry, November 9, 1561, K. 1,495, No. 58; "Propositions faites par M. d'Ozance et 1'ambassadeur ordinaire en Espagne, l'evdque de Limoges, dans deux audiences a eux donnees par le roi Philippe II" (Resume avec annotations), M-'nute, Notes de chancellerie, K. 1,495, No. 69, Madrid, September 17, 1561; "Points principaux d'une negociation speriale de M. d'Ozance, envoye de Catherine de Medici avec reponses notees a la marge, point par point: Communications au due d'Albe apres une deliberation du Conseil d'etat, prise lui absent," November 12, 1561, K. 1,495 No. 89; "Precis des points traites par M. d'Ozance et de l'Aubespine, ambassadeur de France," K. 1,495, No. 94, December 10, 1561; " Reponses a faire par ordre de Philippe II a M. d'Ozance, sur les nouvelles propositions de cet ambassadeur," K. 1,495, No. 98, December 15, 1561; "Memento addresse par 1'eveque de Limoges au due d'Albe" (Note a communiquer au roi Philippe II), K. 1,495 No. 100, December 20, 1561; Philip II to Chantonnay: "Avis de ce qu'on a repondu & M. d'Ozance," December 21, 1561, K. 1,495, No. 102; "Rapport sur une con ference entre 1'ambassadeur du France et le due d'Albe, au sujet des affaires du roi de Navarre et des troubles pour cause de la religion" (copie en Francais), K. 1,496, folio 136, Madrid, December 20, 1561. 1 Summary of Philip II's letter to Chantonnay of January 18, 1562, in K. 1,496, No. 34. THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 119 duke of Orleans, was being brought up. He emphatically con demned the Huguenot environment of the young prince. It did not seem a coincidence therefore, when a plot was discovered in November to seize the duke of Orleans — afterward Henry III — who was to have been made capo di parti by the Catholics. It was even said the conspirators aimed also to remove the king and queen of Navarre, Conde", and the admiral, by poison. The duke of Nemours was charged with being the principal author of it, and was to have carried the young duke off to Lorraine or Savoy.1 This supposition was given greater probability when the whole company of the Guises suddenly left the court and departed for Lorraine. But Catherine was not yet intimidated, though she prudently dropped the investigation which she had set on foot when she discovered clues that led to the Escurial and the Vatican.2 In spite of the omens, she still adhered to a middle course. The government resolved to send twenty-five bishops and two arch bishops to Trent, although they went "very unwillingly."3 At the same time permission was granted to the ministers of the Re- 1 Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), November 4, 1561. The Journal du Concile de Trente (ed. Baschet), 89, says the intention was to carry him into Lorraine, to prevent his becoming tainted with heresy. Lignerolles, an intimate of the duke of Nemours, later confessed the latter's complicity in the plot to kidnap the young prince and spirit him away to Savoy, but the affair was hushed up and Lignerolles was shortly afterward released. The prince de Joinville, Guise's son, seems to have been more actively interested than his father. The correspondence between Chantonnay and Philip leaves no room for doubt of the fact that Nemours was acting as the agent of Spain (K. 1,494, No. 106, October 31, from St. Cloud; No. 114, November 28, 1561), although Philip repudiated complicity in a letter to Catherine (K. 1,495, No. 90, November 27, 1561), and Chantonnay declared the whole story was a trick of the Huguenots. 2 D'Aubigne, 321. Chantonnay seems to have been apprehensive lest the circumstances might precipitate the civil war which every one feared (Letter to Philip II, November 28, 1561, K. 1,494, No. 114), and seized the opportunity afforded by it to read the queen mother a lecture. The ambassador "used great threatenings toward the queen mother and the king of Navarre for their proceedings in religion." — C. S. P. For., No. 659, §§1, 2. Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, III, 245-50; De Crue, Anne de Montmorency, 315, 316. The official inquiry entitled, "Enquete sur 1'enleve- ment du due d'Orleans," is in F. Fr. 6,608. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 715, §1, December 12, 1561. 120 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE formed churches to preach in private houses or in gardens environed with houses (the erection of churches being prohibited), if it was done without tumult.1 At court the ministers of the Reformed churches preached one day, when the queen of Navarre, the prince of Conde, and the admiral would be present. The next day either some Cordelier, Jesuit, Jacobin, Minim, or other of the cloistered sects, preached, on which occasion, the King, the queen mother, the king of Navarre, the cardinal of Ferrara, accompanied by those who leaned toward the see of Rome, would be present. But moderation was exacted of both sects. On one occasion a famous preacher of the Minims, who had won some credit with the Catho lics for his railings, was in the night secretly taken from his lodgings and carried to the court to answer for his rabid utterances.2 But- it was increasingly manifest that events, both within and without France, were passing beyond the grasp of the government. The Huguenots, sometimes from fear no doubt, but not infrequently for effrontery, went to their services with pistols and matchlocks, in spite of the laws against the bearing of arms; and they even were bold enough to march through the streets singing their psalms, to the anger and scandal of Catholic Christians.3 An outbreak was imminent at any time. In Paris, on October 12, the Protestants assembled together to the number of 7,000 or 8,oco to hear one of their ministers preach, half a mile from the town. The Catholics thereupon shut the gates to prevent their re-entry. Finding the gates closed, the Protestants forced them, and many were wounded and some slain on both sides.4 From the provinces word had come in July that the duke of Montpensier, going to his house in Touraine for the burial of his mother, and finding numbers in many towns who made open profession of Calvinism, by virtue of his governorship of that country, imprisoned about one hundred and forty in Chinon. 1 Despatches of Michele Suriano (Huguenot Society), November 3, 1561; C. S. P. For., No. 659, §5, November 14, 1561. 2 C. S. P. For., No. 717, §7, December 13, 1561. For some of the famous Catholic preachers of Paris in 1561, see Claude Haton, I, 213, 214, and notes. 3 Claude Haton, I, 177, 178. 4 C. S. P. For., No. 617, October 15, 1561. THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 121 Whereupon the people, not forgetting his conduct toward them in the previous reign, when he razed the houses of several who were reported to him to be Huguenots, assembled in great numbers — about 12,000 or 15,000, we are told — surely a great exaggeration, and marched so fast upon him that he was besieged in his house and forced to release all the prisoners in order to appease the multitude.1 The organized nature of the Huguenot agitations in various localities, especially in southern France, did not escape the keen observation of Philip's ambassador.2 At Montpellier in Langue doc the Protestant organizations, by September, had taken the form of a definite league, with the sweeping motto: "No mass, no more than at Geneva," whose operations were so thorough that many Catholics were on the point of emigrating to Catalonia.3 Quite as formidable as armed and insurrectionary religion at home was the drift of the negotiations of both parties abroad. The formation of the Triumvirate had been taken as a sign by both parties that the issue between them was, as in Germany before the Smalkald war, likely soon to pass from religious difference and political rivalry into military combat; and both sides accord^ ingly prepared against this fatal day. Naturally, the Protestant German princes who had followed the proceedings at Poissy with intense interest4 were the ones looked to for assistance by the ¦ C. S. P. For., No. 304, §4, July 23, 1561. 2 K. 1,495, No. 47, June 19, 1561. Cf. Despatches of Suriano (Huguenot Society), October 1. Upon these insurrections in the south, see D'Aubigne, I, 322-26; De Thou, II, 235 ff. (ed. 1740); Mem. de Condi, III, 636; Long, La riforme et les guerres de religion en Dauphine; Pierre Gilles, Hist, ecclis. des iglises r if armies vaudoises, chap, xxii; Hist, du Languedoc, V, 211. 3 "Aulx petites villes, elles se sont ralliez les unes avec les autres en ung faict, ung monopole et une ligue ensemble." — Mimoires-journaux du due de Guise (M. & P., ser. I, VI, 467, col. 2); Letter of Joyeuse to the constable; duplicate to the duke of Guise (September 16, 1561). For the work of this league see pp. 468-71. Guillaume, vicomte de Joyeuse, was lieutenant to the governor of Languedoc and later a marshal of France. 4 These princes were Wolfgang William, duke of Deuxponts; William, land grave of Hesse; Frederick the Pious, count palatine of the Rhine (D'Aubigne, I, 333, 334; Le Laboureur, I, 673). The leading Protestant princes of Germany were Augustus, elector of Saxony; Joachim II, margrave of Brandenburg, John 122 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Huguenots. In May, 1561, the prince of Conde had sent Hotman to the chief German princes, begging them not to desert the cause of the true religion in France and saying that Philip II was endeav oring to terrify the queen from making any concessions to the Huguenots.1 The fact that some of these, as the count palatine of the Rhine, and the landgrave of Thuringia were Calvinists, while others were Lutherans, was not an insuperable barrier to co-operation, although the Lutherans wished that the confession of Augsburg might first be recognized in France. But the pre vailing opinion was that the adherents of both of the Protestant faiths should first unite in endeavoring to secure freedom of wor ship and liberty of conscience in France, and then they might proceed to establish uniformity of religion, if possible.2 Two propositions were made to the German princes. The first was that if the Guises, or any of their confederates, tried to enlist soldiers in Germany, measures should be taken to stop the effort; secondly, that if the Guises or their accomplices resorted to the use of arms against Conde and Coligny and were supported by Spain, then assistance should be given them. Some of the German princes agreed at once to this latter proposition, provided the expenses of such military support were defrayed by the Huguenots; but others thought that the matter could only be settled in a general assembly of the princes. The circle of Huguenot negotiations at this moment was a wide one and their prospects were bright. For Frederick duke of Saxony; Christopher, duke of Wiirttemberg; Wolfgang William, duke of Deuxponts (Zweibriicken) ; John Albert, duke of Mecklenberg; John the Elder, duke of Holstein; Joachim Ernest, prince of Anhalt, and Charles, margrave of Baden. These are enumerated in a letter of Hotman, December 31, 1560. See Mim. de I' Acad, des sc moral, et polit., CIV, 653, and Bulletin de la soe. prot. frang., i860. 1 Mim. de I'Acad. des sc. moral, et polit., CIV (1877), 66; C. 5. P. For., No. 399, August 12, 1 561. 2 C. 5. P. For., No. 319, July 15, 1561, from Strasburg. Hotman visited the elector palatine at Germersheim; the landgrave of Hesse at Cassel; the elector of Saxony at Leipsic, whence he went to Stuttgart. He did not see the duke of Wiirttemberg in person, and was compelled to write to him instead. (See his letter, September 27, 1561, in Mim. de I'Acad des sc moral, et polit., CIV, 660.) Thence he went to Heidelberg, from which point he wrote a second letter to the duke of Wiirttemberg, and one to the duke of Deuxponts. THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 123 at this time Denmark, too, was suing for French favor. Among the ambassadors who came to offer the condolences of their sov- . ereigns for the death of Francis II and to congratulate young Charles, had come an envoy of the Danish king proposing the mar riage of his sister to a French prince and himself to marry Mary Stuart. This proposed Franco-Danish alliance could have pro duced no other effect than to facilitate the Protestant cause in France.1 On the other hand, the prospect of Swiss support of the Catholic cause in France was not good. Aside from the great expense this alliance had always entailed, the number of the Catholic cantons had been diminished by the secession of Glaris, which had lately gone over to Protestantism, in consequence of which the rest, seeing themselves weakened, had asked aid from the duke of Savoy and the Pope.2 The Catholics adroitly emphasized the difference between the two Protestant faiths, with the hope not only of preventing Lutheran support of the Huguenots, but even of securing their aid against the French Calvinists. The duke of Guise went in person to con fer with the duke of Wiirttemberg at Saverne (February 15, 1562),3 while Philip II redoubled his efforts to alienate the king of Na varre.4 The support of the Spanish monarch was the vital factor in French politics. The French Calvinists had no single most powerful ally to support them, such as the Catholic party enjoyed in the assistance of Spain. England was the only Protestant power capable of being a rival to Spain, and England was too cautious or too much occupied with home politics to risk embroil ment abroad. Both Rome and Spain at this moment took a resolute attitude. Shortly after the conference of Poissy came to an end, a consistory 1 La Place, 121, 122; C. S. P. Ven., No. 249; Arch, nat., K. 1,495, f°h° 47, Chantonnay to Philip II, June 19, 1561. 2 C. S .P. For., No. 736, November 26, 1561. 3 Chantonnay's correspondence shows that agents of the duke of Guise were busy in Germany as early as October, 1561, K. 1,494, No. 105, October 28, 1561. Cf. Hubert Languet, Epist. seer., II, 142, 159, 202; Archives de la maison d'Orange- Nassau, I, 216-18, 226-52; Bulletin de la soe de I'histoire du prot. frangais, XXIV. 4 C. 5. P. For., No. 724, §2, December 14, 1561. 124 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of the curia, on October 10, 1561, had resolved to resist the Prot estants in France.1 The counter-reformation programme delib erated at Trent recognized Philip II as the secular head of the movement ("a ceste fin d'un commun consentement le tout chef et conducteur de toute l'enterprise ") who was to wheedle or com pel the king of Navarre to commit himself in favor of the Catholic cause in France, of which the duke of Guise was to be formally recognized as leader. The Spanish monarch was also to bring pressure to bear upon the Emperor to compel the Catholic princes of Germany to prevent the Lutherans and Rhenish Calvinists from supporting the Protestants of France. France must be saved from self-ruin for the sake both of religion and the preserva tion of other Catholic nations. Time and circumstances would show the hour of such intervention, but everything must be pre pared in advance.2 Aside from his inflexible religious convictions, in Philip's eyes, policy also pointed toward Spanish intervention in France. Spain, Spanish Burgundy, and Flanders were, as Montluc of Valence declared, "les trois plus belles fleurs de chapeau du roy Philippe;" each of them bordered France, and France lay between Spain and them, splitting the Spanish empire like a wedge. Under these circumstances the prevention of heresy in France was not merely an act of religious duty but an act dictated by political expediency. Moreover, Spain might territorially profit by such a policy. The son of Charles V dreamed of acquiring ducal Burgundy, which his father had failed to secure; the Three Bishoprics might be wrested away from Charles IX, either violently or as the price of Spanish aid, and joined to Franche Comte they would materially strengthen Spain's midcontinental road from Lombardy to the mouths of the Rhine.3 1 C. S. P. For., No. 602, October n, 1561, from Rome. 2 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VI, 432-43: "Rapport secret du secretaire Courtville," December, 1561. 3 Cf. Montluc, bishop of Valence, "Discours sur le bruit qui court que nous aurons la guerre a cause de la religion," Mim. de Condi, ed. London, III, 73-82. A note adds: "Ce discours se trouve aussi au fol. 61 recto du MS R et il est a la suite d'une lettre de M. de Chantonnay, du 24 mars 1561. II dit a la fin de cette THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 125 Fear of Spain and of the Guises gave Catherine de Medici more anxiety than the insurrections of the Huguenots.1 The government was justly apprehensive of Philip II's movements and warned Joyeuse to be on his guard against any effort to throw Spanish troops across the frontier.2 Reinforcements were sent to Calais.3 At the same time more captains and companies were sent to Metz, where Vieilleville, the governor, was ordered not to admit anyone known to be a Guisard into the city, as the Guises were suspected of wishing to hand it over to Philip.4 Pre cautionary changes were also made in the military posts, in the case of those known to be well-affected to the Guises, the changes lettre, que Ton disoit communement que ce Discours etoit de l'eveque de Valence (Montluc). Ce Discours a ete copie dans ce MS sur I'edition qui en fut faite dans le terns." 1 On November 23, 1561, Charles IX wrote to the bishop of Limoges in regard to Philip II : " Dites-Iui que je le prie si Ton luy a donne quelques doubtes et soupcons de mes deportements, qu'il vous en dye quelcun et ce qu'il la mys en doubte, affin que s'il veult prendre tant de paynes d'envoyer ung homme fidelle ez lieux oil il aura oppinion qu'on fera quelques preparatifs, je luy face cognoistre que c'est une pure menterie." — Catalogue . . . . de lettres autographes de feu M. de Lajarielle, Charavay, Paris, i860, No. 667. Five days later, on November 28, 1561, Catherine de Medici wrote to the same ambassador: "Je me defie tent de seux qui sont mal contens .... car je ne veos ni ne suys conselliee de venir aus armes." — Collection de lettres autographes ayant appartenu a M. Fosse-Darcosse, Paris, Techener, 1861, No. 193. 2 Hist, du Languedoc, V, 211. Philip II was reputed to have spent 350,000 crowns of his wife's dowry in Germany (C. S P. For., No. 659, §18, November 14, 1561). Catherine sent a special agent, Rambouillet, into Germany to assist Hot- man in discovering information about Spain's intrigues there (C. S. P. For., No. 713, December, 1561; Mim. de I'Acad. des sc. moral, et polit., CIV [1877], 661). D'Ozances in Spain received special instructions to decipher Philip II's conduct if possible. 3 C. 5. P. For., No. 265, §n, June 23, 1561. This was in consequence of the apprehension aroused early in May by the appearance of a large body of Spanish infantry and cavalry to survey Abbeville whence they returned toward Guisnes (ibid., No. 248, from Paris, May 18, 1561). 4 Ibid., No. 712, December 9, 1561, from Strasburg; No. 717, §6, December 13, 1561, from Paris. There had been some anxiety lest the Emperor might avail himself of the distraction in France to seize the Three Bishoprics. But at this moment, on account of the activity of both the Turk and the Muscovite, and because he was angry with the Pope over the Council of Trent, Ferdinand, was friendly to France and cordially received Marillac, the bishop of Vienne (D'Aubigne, I, 332, 333). 126. THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE all being in favor of the Huguenot party.1 De Gourdan was removed from Calais and the command given to the sieur de Gram- mont, who had married a sister of the vidame de Chartres; the prince de la Roche-sur-Yon was made king's lieutenant in Paris; the admiral made governor of Normandy in place of the duke of Bouillon; Conde was sent to Picardy, where the marshal Brissac had lately resigned on account of illness.2 "Here is new fire, new green wood reeking, new smoke and much contrary wind blowing," wrote Shakerley to Elizabeth's ambassador, Throckmorton, on December 15, 1561.3 The words were wisely as well as quaintly used. From the capital to every edge of France unrest, suspicion, conspiracy, insurrection pre vailed. The Catholic orders began to fortify the abbeys. Every day Catherine's determination to maintain an even balance of the two religions was producing greater tension and more heat. Vio lence was ominously on the increase.4 Robbery was common •¦ "Le conseil du roi, voyant que les mouvements les plus divers agitaient le royaume, decide que chaque gouverneur, lieutenant, seneschal et autres ministres, se rendissent a. leurs gouvernements." — Baschet, Journal du Concile de Trente, 89. 2 C. S. P. For., No. 595, October 9, 1561; No. 602, October 12, 1561; No. 624, October 18, 1561; No. 659, §20, November 14, 1561. The appointments of Coligny and Conde never became operative, owing to the outbreak of civil war early in the next year. They are important only as they reflect Catherine's policy of caution and craft. 3 Ibid., No. 729. Thomas Shakerley was an Englishman by birth, who had once been a page to Edward VI, while the latter was prince. He had left England nine years before and had spent most of his time in Rome, where, becoming an organist, he "obtained the estimation of a cunning player for the substance and solemnity of music." He came to France in the suite of the cardinal of Ferrara. The Spanish ambassador approached him with an offer to enter the secret service of Spain, which Shakerley patriotically communicated to Throckmorton (ipid., No. 730, §5, December 18; No. 750, §10, December 28, 1561). 4 On December 27, the Protestants congregated in the Faubourg St. Marceau, whereupon the priests and Papists assembled at St. Medard and determined to attack them. One of the Protestant soldiers going to remonstrate was run through. The Protestants who were appointed to guard the assembly, seeing this, ran to his succor, but were driven back by the numbers. Other Protestants coming up put their attackers to rout and forced their way into the church, .when the prince de la Roche-sur-Yon, the King's lieutenant, arrived with a strong force of horse and foot and carried off several to the Chatelet (ibid., No. 783, January 4, 1561; Mim. de Condi, IT, 541 ff.; Claude Haton, 179, and note; Arch, cur., IV, 63 ff.; and an article in Mim. de la soe de I' hist, de Paris, 1886). THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 127 under pretense of searching for heretics.1 In the hope of bettering things, the crown relieved the prince de la Roche-sur-Yon of the lieutenancy and committed it to the marshal Montmorency, from whose religious moderation and popularity much was expected.2 The capital of France at this season presented a strange and ter rible appearance. Armed bands roamed the streets. The city more resembled a frontier city in a state of siege than a mercantile or university town. The students of the Sorbonne paraded the streets and went armed to mass, the authorities being powerless to control them.3 The condition in the provinces was as bad; only here the odds seem to have been in favor of the Protestants. In Guyenne a Huguenot mob sacked a town, committed many outrages, and finally besieged the governor, Burie, in his house.4 A worse occurrence was the murder of Fumel, an eminent lawyer in Lan guedoc, as an "enemy of the religion."3 There were riots in Troyes, Orleans, Auxerre, Rouen, Meaux, Vend6me, Bourges, Lyons, Tours, Angers,6 Bazas.7 The Huguenots of Sens erected 1 C. S. P. For., No. 758, §13, December 31, 1561. 2 Ibid., No. 789, §2, January 8, 1562. The prince de la Roche-sur-Yon passed for a Calvinist, while the marshal Montmorency was a liberal Catholic. The queen mother hoped the change would be acceptable to both parties. An other reason for this change was that the constable and the prince de la Roche- sur-Yon were the principals in a law-suit involving 10,000 ducats income. It was possible for the lieutenant of Paris to use influence with the Parlement of Paris before which the case was to be tried, and this more obviously favored the con stable's side of the suit. Cf. details in Chantonnay's letter to Philip II, January 5, 1562, K. 1,497, B, 15. 3 C 5. P. For., No. 925; cf. Castelnau's description of the bandits in the Faubourg St. Marcel, Book III, chap. v. 4 C. S. P. For., No. 789, §2, January 6, 1562. s Archives de la Gironde, VIII, 207. The King sent a special officer to put the offenders to death and destroy the village, but it is significant that this commission was not intrusted to Villars, who was sublieutenant in Languedoc and notorious for his treatment of the Huguenots (C. S. P. For., No. 750, §10, December 28, 1561). 6 Claude Haton, I, 195-98, 236, 237. His spleen is evidenced, though, in saying that: "a cause de la grande liberte a mal faire et dire qui leur estoit permise sans aulcune punition de justice .... si le plus grand larron et voleur du pays eust este prins prisonnier. il eust eschappe a tout danger voire a la mort, moyennant qu'il se feust declare Huguenot et de la nouvelle pretendue religion." — Ibid., I 124. This is one of the earliest characterizations of the Huguenot faith. It was afterward currently referred to as the "R. P. R." ^ Archives de la Gironde, XV, 57. 128 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE a church outside the town. Then finding that they outnumbered the Catholics they pillaged the treasury of the cathedral and robbed the monasteries.1 Still the queen mother persevered, taking her counsel from the chancellor L'Hdpital, the admiral Coligny, the prince of Conde, and his brother, D'Andelot, and adhered to her resolution to per mit the Huguenots to enjoy freedom of worship. On January 3, 1562, the chancellor made an earnest plea for religious toleration before the Court of Parlement,2 which was followed by the most decisive action the government had yet taken, namely the issuance of the famous edict of toleration of January 17, known as the Edict of January, which was the first that granted exercise of the Reformed religion in public.3 1 Claude Haton, I, 194, 195, and note. 2 Chantonnay to Philip II, January 5, 1562, K. 1,497, B. 15. The Spanish ambassador violently expostulated with Catherine de Medici, Antoine of Bourbon, and others after this address was over (K. 1,497, January n, 1562), for which Philip II commended him (K. 1,496, No. 34, 3 verso). 3 Isambert, XIV, 124-29; Raynaldus, XXXIV, 292, 293. The original docu ment is on exhibition in the Musee des Archives at Paris. It is catalogued K. 674, No. 4. Although authorized on January 17, the edict was not printed until March 13, 1562 (C. S. P. For., No. 930, §11; 934, §1). The Edict of July had been only negative in its character, simply forbidding judges and the magistrates from pursuing the Huguenots, but not in any sense recognizing their religion. Castelnau, Book I, chap, ii, makes this very clear. The Edict en countered strong opposition in the Parlement, which twice rejected it by a plurality vote (C. S. P. For., No. 849, January 28, 1562; Claude Haton, I, 185, 186). Benoist, Histoire de I'Edil de Nantes, I, Appendix, gives the text together with the first and second mandamus of the King, February 14 and March 11, 1562, ex pressly enjoining the Parlement "to proceed to the reading, publishing, and regis tering of the said ordinance, laying aside all delays and difficulties." The first mandamus, "Declaration et interpretation du roy sur certains mots et articles contenus dans l'edict du XVII de Janvier 1561," declared that magistrates were not officers within the meaning of the edict (Isambert, XIV, 129, n. 2). Klipfel, Le colloque de Poissy, chap, iii, makes the point that the Parlement of Paris was criminally wrong in arraigning itself upon the side of violence and encouraging the intolerance of the populace. The Parlement of Rouen was more complacent, and seems promptly to have registered it (C. S. P. For., No. 891, §10, February 16, 1562). The Edict of January is sometimes wrongly dated January 17, 1561. The error arises from the confusion of the calendar in the sixteenth century. In 1561 the year in France legally began at Easter, which, of course threw January 17, into the year 1561. But in 1564 a royal ordonnance abolished this usage jind estab- THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY 129 This edict was expressly declared to be provisional in its nature, pending the decisions of the Council of Trent, which, by a coin cidence, was opened on the day following, January 18, 1562, the first formal session being set for the second Thursday in Lent.1 The preamble recited that the government's action was taken in consideration of the state of affairs prevailing in the kingdom; that it was not to be construed as approving the new religion; and that it was to remain in force no longer than the King should order; it deprecated the "disobedience, obstinacy, and evil inten tions of the people" which made even provisional recognition of Calvinism necessary. Specifically, the edict provided for the restoration by the Huguenots of all property unlawfully possessed by them; it forbade them to erect any churches, either within or without the cities and towns (Art. 1) or to assemble for worship within the walls thereof either by day or night, or under arms (Arts. 2, 5). Protestant worship was required to be in the day time, outside the town gates, in the open, or, if under cover, in buildings occasionally used, and not formally consecrated as churches. For this reason the Reformed ministers preached, some in the fields, others in gardens, old houses, and barns, accord ing to their particular inclinations or convenience. For they were expressly forbidden to build any chapels, or meddle with the churches, upon any account. Access to their meetings was always to be permitted to the King's officers, i. e., bailiffs, seneschals, provosts, or their lieutenants, but not to officers of judicature (Arts. 3, 6 ; and supplementary declaration of interpretation, Feb ruary 14, 1562). Furthermore, the raising of money among the Huguenots was to be wholly voluntary and not in the form of assessment or imposition. They were to keep the political laws of the Roman church, as to holidays and marriage, in order to lished January 1 as the beginning of the year, which brought forward January 17 into its proper year, 1562. The reform of the calendar by Gregory XIII would alter the date of the month also, according to modern reckoning. But it is simpler to let established dates stand. Henry III authorized the use of the Gregorian calendar in France in 1582. For a lucid account of these changes see Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, Introd., x-xi by the baron de Ruble. 1 Baschet, Journal du Concile de Trente, 71. 130 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE avoid litigation and confusion of property rights; and to refrain from harboring any person who might be accused, prosecuted, or condemned by the government, under penalty of a fine of 1,000 crowns, to be devoted to charity, together with whipping and banishment (Arts. 8, 9, 12) . The use of reproachful or vituperative language touching the faith or practice of the Catholic church was made a misdemeanor (Art. 10). Finally, all Protestant synods or consistories were required to be held by permission of or in presence of the lieutenant-general of the province concerned, or his representative, and the statutes of the churches were to be communicated to him (Art. 7, and supplementary declaration and interpretation of February 14, 1562). In order to prevent seditions, an edict was sent to the judges of the towns, in the name of the King, by which the authorities were ordered to disarm all Catholics in their towns of every species of weapon and to make them deposit their arms in the local city hall or other common point, where they were to be kept under the guard of the procureur and the echevins.1 It is a question worthy of consideration, whether the preachings of the Reformed might not have been peaceably maintained after the Edict of January, the provisional form gradually being modi fied until complete religious toleration would have been secured, if Spain had not continued to tamper with French politics, and if the persistence of the political Huguenots had not continued to push things to such a point that at last the two causes, originally separate, became the obverse and reverse sides of the same issue and had to stand or fall together. On the other hand, had not these concessions of the crown been too long delayed ? Was the edict "dead from birth," as Pasquier wrote?2 1 Claude Haton, I, 177, and n. 1. For other details see Castelnau, Book III, chap, i; Rel. vin., II, 71. 2 Lettres de Pasquier, II, 96. Mignet characterizes the provisions of the Edict of Jauuary as "genereuses, simples, et sages." Mignet, "Les lettres de Calvin" (Journal des savants, 1859, p. 762), and Haag, La France protestante, Introd., xix, as "le plus liberal edit qui ait ete obtenu par les reformes jusqu'a celui de Nantes." CHAPTER VI THE FIRST CIVIL WAR. THE MASSACRE OF VASSY (MARCH i, 1562). THE SIEGE OF ROUEN The progress of events had developed so rapidly as to bely the Edict of January almost as soon as it was passed. The continued absence of the Guises from the court made them open to suspicion, particularly as messengers were passing frequently between Join- ville and St. Germain.1 The nets of conspiracy woven by the Triumvirate were daily being drawn tighter around France. Directed by Chantonnay and the cardinal of Ferrara (who gen erally spoke in Spanish when together in public, that those near by might not understand),2 the plans of the Triumvirate were concerted, the Spanish ambassador looking ahead to the day when force would supplant diplomacy.3 Ever since its formation, as we have seen, the Triumvirate had sought to win over the king of Navarre. As he was, therefore, sought by both parties, he was much inflated with a sense of his own importance. Antoine still lived in hope of compounding with Philip for the kingdom of Navarre, and to that end still nego tiated both with the Vatican and with Spain.4 But he was getting very tired of the procrastination of the Spanish king, so that there was danger of the thread of his patience being snapped.5 If war 1 C. 5. P. For., No. 789, §1, January 8, 1562, and cf. No. 750, §3, December 28, 1561. The importation of money from Germany into Lorraine was no secret. 2 Ibid., No. 729, §3, December 16, 1561. Catherine de Medici, however, could speak the language (ibid., No. 2,155, December 3, 1571). 3 Ibid., No. 729, §3, December 16, 1561. Chantonnay was morally the leader of the Triumvirate, beyond a doubt, and guided its policy. "The king of Navarre, the duke of Guise, the constable, the cardinal of Ferrara, the marshals St. Andre, Brissac, and Termes, the cardinal Tournon, have joined together to overthrow the Protestant religion and exterminate the favorers thereof — which enterprise is pushed forward by the Spanish ambassador here and Spanish threaten ings." — C. S. P. For., No. 934, §1, March 14, 1562. '¦Ibid., No. 758, §12, December 1; No. 531, §4, September 23, 1561. s Antoine de Bourbon to Philip II December 7, 1561, K. 1,494, No. 116 (not in Rochambeau). 131 13 2 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE broke out in France and found him in such a mood, an attempt might possibly be made to overrun Navarre.1 In consequence, it became necessary to make a more tangible proposition to the Bourbon prince. It took the form of a demand and a promise. The demand was that every Huguenot should be banished from court and the Protestant clergy expelled from the country together with the prince of Conde, the Chatillon brothers, the chancellor, and Montluc, the bishop of Valence. In return Antoine was to receive the "kingdom of Tunis" as a reward. This was the new prize used by Spain to bait the hook, and gradually Antoine was drawn over to the side of Spain and the Triumvirate. The amus ing feature of this proffer was not so manifest to the men of that day as to us. Geographical knowledge, even of the Mediterranean coast, was hazy. The constable, for example, thought that Tunis was an island! But Antoine knew more history and geography than Montmorency; he knew that Tunis was a Turkish possession which Charles V had vainly tried to seize, and had to be beguiled with visions of oriental splendor and large plans for its conquest before he became passive. Pending its acquisition, Philip II renewed the offer of Sardinia. Meanwhile Antoine received instruction in the Catholic faith from a teacher recommended to him by the general of the Jesuits,2 and quarreled with Jeanne d'Al- 1 Despatches of Michele Suriano (Huguenot Society), October 18, 1561. The whole letter is exceedingly interesting. 2 The Jesuits had long tried to get a legal status in France. Henry II, was favorable to them, but the Parlement of Paris, the secular clergy, and the Sorbonne were bitterly opposed. The Act of Poissy recognized the Jesuits as a college but not as a religious order, to the anger of the Sorbonne. See Douarche, V Universiti de Paris et les Jesuites, Paris, 1888, chap. iv. At the time of the expulsion of the Jesuits from France in 1761, in reply to the question of the crown as to their legal status, the cardinal de Choiseul made the following answer: "Lorsqu'ils ont ete recus en France l'an 1561, par le concours des deux puissances, ils se sont soumis et ont ete astreints par la loi publique de leur etablissement a toute superinten- dance, jurisdiction et correction de l'eveque diocesain et a se conformer entierement a la disposition du droit commun, avec la renonciation la plus formelle aux pri vileges contraires portes dans les quatre bulles par eux presentees ou autres qu'ils pourraient obtenir a l'avenir." .... " Le viritable etat des Jisuites en Ftance parS.it done Ure, suivant les lois canoniques regues dans le royaume, I'itat des riguliers soumis & la juridiction des ordinaires conformement au droit com- THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 133 bret because she would not let the future Henry IV be taken to mass, or permit him to be present at the christening of the infant son of the Spanish ambassador.1 By March (1562) it was evident that the king of Navarre was "never so earnest on the Protestant side as he was now furious on the other."2 But if the Spanish ambassador used smooth words to the king of Navarre, his language was quite otherwise toward Catherine de Medici. In the name of his sovereign he demanded the banish ment of Jeanne d'Albret from court, the compulsory education of Henry of Navarre in the Catholic religion, and so soundly rated her for harboring Coligny and D'Andelot at court that the outraged queen mother demanded his retirement,3 ordered the marshal St. Andre" back to his government,4 and the constable to retire to Chantilly, and contemplated doing the same with the old cardi nal Tournon. This procedure offended Antoine who imputed her conduct to Coligny and his brother, and in consequence he inclined more than ever toward the Triumvirate.5 Finally on Palm Sunday (March 22) Antoine cast the die and went to mass, coming from the service with the emblem of the celebration in his hand.6 A superficial aspect of peace still prevailed at court, but in the provinces a state of war already prevailed. Sens,7 Abbeville,8 Tours, Toulouse, Marseilles, Toul in Lorraine,9 and most of all mun." Cf. Eugene Sol, Les rapports de la France avec I'ltalie, d'apres la sirie K. des Arch. Nat., Paris, 1905, 119,120. The original document is in the Archives nationales, K. 1,361, N. 1, C. 1 C. 5. P. For., No. 934, §2, March 14, 1562. 2 Ibid., No. 931, March 9, 1562. 3 Ibid., No. 924, §8, March 6, 1562; cf. ibid., No. 715, §4, December 12, 1561: "The Spanish ambassador was wondrous hot with the queen." 4 Lettres du cardinal de Ferrare, No. 14, March 3, 1562. 5 C. S. P. For., No. 891, February 16, 1562. 6 Corresp. de Chantonnay, K. 1,497, No. 17, March 25, 1562. This circum stance is noticed by almost all the chroniclers: D'Aubigne, Book V, chap, iii, 1; Mim. de Condi, I, 76, 77; Arch, cur., VI, 59. ' Claude Haton, I, 189. 8 Beza, Histoire ecclis., I, 416. 9 Collection Godefroy (Bibliotheque de l'lnstitut), Vol. XCVII, folio 19, March 6, 1562. 134 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Cahors and Agen,1 where the terrible Montluc figured, were all scenes of riot and bloodshed during the winter months, in which the Huguenots were generally worsted.2 In Agen it was so bad that the government had to take more than ordinary notice of the situation. Charles IX called upon the governor of Guyenne to repress "les exces, forces, violences, sacagements d'eglises, sedi tions et escandalles advenus en n6tre pays d'Agenais," and ordered the consuls of the city to send him the names of those who disturbed the peace. In this condition of things only a spark was needed to throw the whole country into flames. Force alone could settle the irre concilable conflict, and it was soon to be invoked. War was certainly anticipated by both parties. But contrary to expectation it was not precipitated by Spanish intervention, but by outbreak within France. It was the massacre of Vassy on March i, 1562, that threw the country into civil war. The duke of Guise had spent the winter, as we have seen, working in the interest of the Triumvirate. On February 15, 1562, he had a conference at Saverne with the duke of Wiirttemberg, whom he adroitly persuaded into the belief that the Calvinists were aiming to involve the German Protestants in their own quar rel, thereby securing his neutrality in event of civil war. Shortly after his return to France the duke left Joinville with the inten tion of rejoining the court. As he was passing through Vassy,3 his retinue encountered a Huguenot congregation worshiping in a barn outside of the town. Though the service was strictly in con formity with the Edict of January, the sight angered the duke, whose followers fell upon the company, and the famous massacre ensued. It was March 1, 1562. How much provocation was made by the Protestants for this attack is a matter of dispute. The duke himself and Catholic partisans ever since have asserted 1 Inventaire des archives communales d' Agen, BB., "Inventaire sommaire," XXX, 28 (April 17, 1562). 2 D'Aubigne, II, 7, gives a long list of cities where disturbances occurred. 3 Vassy was a little town in the diocese of Chalons-sur-Marne, in a dependency of Joinville belonging to the Guises. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 135 that stones were first thrown at him. Probably the absolute truth will never be known. Ranke, perhaps, sums up the verdict of history best in the statement that "whether the duke intended the massacre or not, it is enough that he did not prevent it."1 THE MASSACRE OF VASSY, MARCH 1, *Sys / > k ^ (Bib. Nat., Estampes. Histoire de France, Q. b.) Two weeks later, on March 16, the duke of Guise, accompanied by the chief members of his house, save the cardinal of Lorraine and the duke of Elbceuf, arrived in Paris. The capital, which long since had learned the news of Vassy, received him joyfully.2 At 1 In the Mimoires de Condi, III, 124, there is an elaborate Protestant version of the massacre, preceded by a letter of the duke of Guise. The Guise account is in the Mimoires du due de Guise, 471-88. Cf. D'Aubigne, 131; Arch, cur., IV, 103. The Spanish ambassador's long letter of March 16 is in K. 1,497, No. 14. The quotation from Ranke is in his Civil Wars and Monarchy in France, 211. 2 Correspondance de Chantonnay, March 20, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 16. Ac counts of this event abound. See La Popeliniere, I, 287; Claude Haton, I, 208; D'Aubigne, II, 10; a letter of Santa Croce in Arch, cur., VI, 55; La Noue, Mim. 136 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE the St. Denis gate he was met by the constable and his four stalwart sons, the eldest of whom was governor of the city, the four marshals of France, and twenty-one knights of the Order. Having arrived at his hotel, the provost of the merchants, who was syndic of Paris, accompanied by many of the chief merchants, visited him, "testi fying his joyful welcome," which was further attested by the proffer of two millions of gold in favor of the Catholic cause. The duke made an adroit reply, assuring them that the queen mother and the king of Navarre, with the aid and advice of the King's council, would pacify the realm; that he, as a faithful and loyal subject, must abide where the King commanded, and that he hourly ex pected a summons to court. On the same day the prince of Conde, returning from the court to Paris with the intention of going to Picardy, finding the duke of Guise in the capital, changed his plans and tarried in Paris, though offering to leave the town by one gate if the duke, the constable, and the marshal St. Andre would leave' by the other.1 When the Guises perceived that the Huguenots were undismayed by the events, they began to increase their adherents in the city, so that in a short time, it was thronged with nearly ten thousand horsemen. It was impossible, on the other hand, for the Huguenots to concert measures of defense in Paris, and accordingly the prince of Conde soon quitted the capital (March 23) "like another Pompey,"2 going to Meaux, where Coligny and D'Andelot soon joined him.3 Meanwhile Catherine de Medici, fearful lest the person of the King would be forcibly seized by the Guises, and recognizing that milit., ed. Petitot, 128 — very interesting; and a letter of an eye-witness in Bull. de la Soe. de I'hist. du prot. frang., XIII, 5. On March 16, 1562, an ordinance of the king of Navarre enjoined the captains and lieutenants of each quarter of Paris who were elected by the bourgeoisie to appoint ensigns, corporals, and sergeants, and to enlist all the men capable of bearing arms in their divisions, both masters and servants (Capefigue, 234, 235). 1 L'Aubespine to his brother, the bishop of Limoges, French ambassador at Madrid (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 22; C. 5. P. Eng. For., No. 987, §7; manifesto of the prince of Conde to Elizabeth, April 7, 1562). 2 This is D'Aubigne's comparison, II, 14, and n. 2. 3 Delaborde, II, 48; Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 285, n.; C. S. P. For., No. 987, §12, March 31, 1562. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 137 the king of Navarre had surrendered completely to the Trium virate, endeavored to remove the King to Blois. But Antoine hotly protested against so overt a move in favor of the Huguenots and Spain's ambassador fulminated so strongly against "the evil reputation" of L'Hdpital,1 that the court was compelled to go to Fontainebleau instead.2 Even this place met with small favor on the part of the Guises, who would have preferred keeping the court in Paris. But when they urged the necessity of the queen's presence in the council in consideration of the grave state of affairs, Catherine caustically rejoined that she thought "it more meet to have regard to the health of the King than to inform so many wise men what was necessary to be done." This speech of the queen mother, however, was not said altogether in sarcasm. For instead of following the advice of the constable, who showed signs of resenting the Guise ascendency, that the crown repudiate and condemn the massacre of Vassy and announce its determination to maintain the Edict of January,3 Catherine in her alarm lest the rising of the Huguenots sweep the Valois dynasty from the throne began to incline toward Spain.4 For the time being the Trium virate professed itself satisfied, intending after Easter to compel the court to repair to Bois de Vincennes, in order to have the King in their midst and thus strengthen with his name the authority of their actions.5 Great was the alarm, therefore, when the prince of Conde, accompanied by the admiral Coligny and D'Andelot, appeared before the gates of Paris on March 29 with three thousand 1 " La mala reputacion que el chancellerio ne quanto k la fe." — Correspondance de Chantonnay, K. 1,497, No. 16, March 20, 1562. 2 Tavannes, 271; C. S. P. For., No. 943, March 20, 1652. 3 Paris, Nigociations relatives au regne de Frangois II, 880. 4 "Monsieur le conestable ayst d'opinion que Ton (fasse) une letre patente par laquelle le roy mon fils dedere qu'i ne voult poynt ronpre l'edist dernier Ne distes rien deset que je vous dis de 1'ambassadeur (Chantonnay) qui ayst yci, mes au confrere distes qu'i comense a. se governer mieulx et plus dousement qu'i ne solet en mon endroyt." — Catherine de Medici to St. Sulpice, circa April 11, 1562, in V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 15, 16. This is a characteristic example of the queen's eccentric spelling. s D'Aubigne, II, 15. 138 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE horse.1 Immediately all the bridges were drawn up and prepara tions made to meet an attack.2 Already extraordinary arrange ments had been made for the defense of Paris. Strangers were compelled to leave the city; no persons except gentlemen were permitted to wear arms and these were limited to sword and dagger; only six gates were open and these were under double guard.3 Failing to enter the city, the prince quartered his troops at St. Cloud and took possession of the highroad from Paris to Orleans at Longjumeau, while in Paris the duke of Guise, the king of Navarre, and the constable hastened forward the prepara tions for war.4 But the prince of Conde refrained from the use of force. He gave out that he had as much right to enter the city under arms as had Guise, and complained of the fact that Guise and his following, on March 27, which was Good Friday, had visited the King and Queen at Fontainebleau, where the latter "made them strange countenance because the train came in arms to the court."5 The apparent purpose of the prince of Conde" was to cut Fontainebleau off from Paris, for the admiral lay at Montreuil, but four leagues distant, and thus force a reasonable settlement, or push matters to an extremity by making himself master of the Loire, thus cutting France in twain and having all Guyenne and Poitou and much of Languedoc at his back. Color was lent to this belief by the fact that so many men from the north ern and eastern provinces were passing southward that a special body of troops was set to guard the line of the Seine.6 1 V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 22; C. S. P. For., No. 967, March 31, 1562. Elizabeth wrote to Conde to "remember that in all affairs second attempts be even more dangerous than the first." — C. 5. P. For., No. 965, March 31, 1562. On the political theory of the Huguenots that the King was a captive and that they were struggling for his relief, see Weill, 66. 2 C. S. P. For., No. 969, March 31, 1562. 3 Correspondance de Chantonnay, March 25, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 17. He reports also that a boat was captured coming down the Seine loaded with 4,000 arquebuses and other ammunition, all of which was taken to the H6tel-de-Ville. 4 Correspondance de Chantonnay, K. 1,497, No. 17, March 25, 1562. s C. S. P. For., No. 967, §12, March 31, 1562. 6 Correspondance de Chantonnay, April 2-4, K. 1,497, No. 18; April 11, ibid., No. 22. %5> \J\£, St ClOudr Longjumaau] Montlhery Etampes ngerville \Toury Artenay Clcu/e HUGUENOT MARCH TO OR LEANS March 29- April 2.1562 Scale of Miles 20 S3 Melhu&n &.Co. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 139 But the Catholic leaders guessed Conde"'s purpose and by a coup de main seized the King and his mother and carried them off from Fontainebleau to Melun, a town strong enough to be withheld against any sudden enterprise. Thereupon the prince, perceiving that he had been outreached, marched toward Orleans1 in spite of an order sent from the King, and undoubtedly inspired by Guise, that he should lay down his arms. An attempt to pre vent him from reaching Orleans was blocked by a rapid advance of D'Andelot. Meanwhile the constable had assumed the direction of affairs in Paris, where on April 5 the Huguenot house of worship near the Port St. Antoine was torn down, the pulpit, forms, and choir burned, and fragments carried away as souvenirs by the mob. Troops patrolled the streets, arresting suspects, and a house to house visitation was made in search of Calvinist preachers. The same day the court came to Bois de Vincennes. During the next few days vain overtures were made to the prince. Coligny and D'Andelot offered to meet the queen mother at such a place as she would appoint, provided the prince of Navarre, the future Henry IV, Damville, the constable's second son, and one of the Guises, were given into Orleans as hostages for them. Catherine was willing to accept the offer, but was overruled by Antoine of Bourbon, the duke of Guise, and Montmorency.2 Those who were least alarmed still looked for settlement at the hands of the General Council. But there were serious political difficulties, as well as those religious, in the way of this, the three principal ones being: (1) the summons of the council, which many Catholics even wished to be convoked by the Emperor, and not by the Pope; (2) the place of the council; (3) the authority of the council, which many Catholics wished to be above the Pope.3 On April 12, 1562, at Orleans, the prince of Conde formally 1 La Noue, Mimoires, chap, ii, has described this march. 2 Correspondance de Chantonnay, April 8 and 11, 1562, K. 1,497, Nos. 21, 22. 3 C. S. P. Ven., No. 283. 14° THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE assumed command of the Huguenot forces,1 his chief lieutenants being the admiral Coligny and D'Andelot.2 The first civil war was a reality. The city on the Loire for some years to come was destined to be the capital of the Protestants, dominating all the surrounding country. Blois and its chateau, Tours and its castle, Amboise, Saumur, Angers, and many other towns on the Loire and in Maine, were occupied by the Protestants. Orleans was reputed to have bread and wine enough in store to withstand a two years' siege,3 and the Huguenots seemed to have plenty of money for immediate necessities, thanks to their despoilment of the churches of the region, especially the rich abbey of Marmou- tier.4 Although the purposes of the Huguenots were clandestinely more political than religious, it was expedient to cloak them under a mantle of faith.5 The political organization of the Huguenots was effected through the medium of an association, a form of organization of which there are many examples, both Protestant and Catholic, during this troubled period. The preamble of the instrument of government disclaimed any private motives or considerations on the part of those who were parties to the asso ciation, and asserted that their sole purpose was to liberate the King from "captivity" and punish the insolence and tyranny of the disloyal and the enemies of the church. Idolatry, blasphemy, violence, and robbery, were forbidden within the territory of the 1 According to Hotman who had left Orleans on May 29, the Huguenot forces consisted of 15,000 foot and 5,000 horse' — Letter to the landgrave, June 7, 1562, in Rev. hist., XCVII March-April, 1908, p. 304. 2 Conde had entered Orleans on April 2. On the 7th he wrote to the Reformed churches of France, requiring men and money in the interest of the deliverance of the King and the queen mother and the freedom of the Christian religion (Mi moires de Condi, II, 212). 3 Correspondance de Chantonnay, April 11, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 22. 4 Ibid., No. 21, April 8, 1562; De Ruble's edition of D'Aubigne, II, 18-20; C. 5. P. For., No. 997, April 10, 1562; No. 1,043, §2, April 24, 1562. Cf. Boulan- ger, "La reforme dans la province du Maine," Revue des Soe savant, des dipart., 2e ser., VII (1862), 548. s "Leurs desseins caches ont autre racine que celle de la religion, encores qu'ils le veuillant couvrir de ce manteau." — Catherine de Medici to St. Sulpice, V Am bassade de St. Sulpice, 59, August 9, 1562. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 141 association, in order that all might know that it had "the fear of God before it." The association was to expire after the King had attained his majority.1 The essential difficulties in the situation as it obtained at this time are manifest. The Huguenots declared the King to be a cap tive in the hands of the Guises and themselves claimed to be loyal subjects in rebellion against tyranny.2 The Guises, on the other hand, branded the Huguenots as rebels and schismatics, although Catherine de Medici still had a lingering hope of restoring peace, and in official utterances carefully refrained from alluding to the prince of Conde as a rebel.3 Neither side would agree to lay down its arms without the other doing likewise, and neither dared take the initiative in this matter. The situation, therefore, was an irreconcilable one, which nothing but war could settle. The political determinations of the Huguenots were quite as fixed as their religious convictions, for part of their platform was the article agreed upon by the estates at Orleans to the effect that the cardinal of Lorraine, the duke of Guise, the constable, and the marshals Brissac and St. Andre", should render an account of their stewardship.4 How far politics governed the situation is evidenced by the fact that late in April the king of Navarre and Montmorency began to weaken in their attitude when it was known that Conde dominated the middle Loire country, Touraine, Maine, Anjou, 1 "Declaration faicte par monsieur le prince de Conde, pour monstrer les raisons qui l'ont contrainct d'entreprendre la defense de l'authorite du roy, du gouvernement de la royne, et du repos de ce royaume" (Orleans, 1562); cf. C. S. P. For., No. 1,003, Orleans, April 1, 1562. The prince of Conde is said to have issued a coinage of his own at this time with the superscription, "Louis XIII." Chantonnay, however, says that they were medals (K. 1,497, No. 27, May 2, 1562). See the memoir of Secousse: "Dis sertation oh l'on examine s'il est vrai qu'il ait ete frappe, pendant la vie de Louis I", prince de Conde, une monnie sur laquelle on Iui ait donne le titre de roi de France," Mim. de I'Acad. roy. des inscrip. et bell, lettres, XVII (1751); Poulet, Correspondance du cardinal de Granvelle, III, 85. Whitehead, Gaspard de Coligny, 303, is convinced the story is a fabrication. ' Correspondance de Chantonnay, April 11, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 22. 3 K. 1,497, No. 21, April 8, 1562. 4 C. S. P. For., .No. 1,013, §I2> April 17, 1562. 142 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE and much of Normandy; when it was learned that the cities of Lyons,1 Toulouse, Caen, Rouen,2 Dieppe, Troyes, Bourges,3 and the provinces of Dauphine, Provence, and Poitou, had declared for the Huguenot cause; and when troops were pouring into Orleans by thousands.4 If the Guises and the marshals Brissac and St. Andre could have acquitted themselves with so little discredit as Antoine of Bourbon or the constable, it is possible that a compromise might have been made even yet.5 But such an issue was impossible under the circumstances. The guilt of Vassy still hung over the duke, for he had not yet been absolved either by the Court of Parlement or by the peers of France. Having appealed to force, force fe- 1 Archives curieuses, sex. I, IV, 175. 2 Rouen was taken in the night pf April 15. Floquet, Histoire du parlement de Normandie, II, 380. 3 Raynal, Histoire du Berry, IV, 35. 4 The stopping of the couriers in the service of Spain by the Huguenots was a source of great anxiety to Chantonnay. April 8 he wrote to Philip advising that the couriers be sent via Perpignan and Lyons in order to avoid being intercepted, as the Huguenots commanded the whole line of the Loire. Cf. Letters to Philip II, April 24, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 25; K. 1,497, No. 21; K. 1,497, No. 28. His letter of May 5 (K. 1,497, No. 28) describes the adventure of a courier bearing a dispatch of the bishop of Limoges. He was given twenty blows with a knife, but managed to escape. St. Sulpice reports a similar experience of ^'le chevaucher de Bayonne" in a letter to Catherine, June 30, 1562. D'Andelot intercepted a letter from the duke of Alva (K. 1,497, No. 26, April 28, 1562) and the prince of Conde one from the bishop of Limoges to Catherine de Medici (K. 1,497, No. 33). The activity of the Huguenots in Gascony gave the French and Spanish governments special disquietude because they continually overhauled the couriers bearing official dispatches between Paris and Madrid. The letters of St. Sulpice contain many complaints because of the rifling of his correspondence (see pp. 30, 35, 37, 38, 41, 59). But the Huguenots were not the only ones who scrutinized letters unduly. Philip II frequently asked to be shown the letters of Charles IX and his mother to his wife, so that St. Sulpice advised Catherine always to send two letters, one of which was to be a "dummy" to be shown to the King (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 136). The Spanish ambassador told Philip he would have to come out into the open and declare war to protect his own interests (K. 1,497, No. 26, April 25, 1562). He anticipated as early as this the probable com bination of the French Huguenots and the Dutch rebels, and warned Margaret of Parma to be on her guard (Correspondance de Chantonnay, K. 1,497, Nos. 30, 33, to Philip II). 5 C. S. P. For., No. 1,043, §2> April 24, 1562. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 143 mained the only method of settling the great dispute that divided France, and Guise daily assembled horse and foot in Paris in expec tation of battle.1 The formidable nature of the Huguenot rising by this time had so increased the fear of Catherine de Medici that she completely surrendered to the Triumvirate and resolved to appeal to Spain for help. On April 19 she sent for Antoine of Navarre, the duke of Guise, the constable, and the two marshals, Brissac and St. Andre", to whom she declared that she had been badly advised hitherto, and that she now trusted to their support. Montmorency at once proposed to ask the nuncio to petition His Holiness to send money and troops to the help of Catholic France. But Spain, not Rome, was the political cornerstone of the Catholic world, and it was now that the momentous resolution was taken to invite Philip II to lend assistance. Catherine de Medici, who shortly before this time had looked upon the prospect of Spanish inter vention with apprehension, was now in favor of it. At Catherine's instance the Triumvirate formally invited Spain's support in a joint letter which was accompanied by Antoine of Navarre's written profession of the Catholic faith.2 Two weeks later, May 8, Charles IX himself formally solicited military assistance of Philip II.3 1 On April 24 the cardinal of Lorraine came to Paris with 1,000 horse (C. S. P. For., No. 1,043, §rli April 24, 1562; Corresp. de Chantonnay, April 28, K. 1,497, No. 2). 2 This famous document, which is dated April 21, 1562, is in K. 1,496, B, 14, No. 61, and is on exhibition in the Musee des Archives. Chantonnay's letter to Philip II on April 24 sheds an interesting light on the situation. In it the ambas sador advises the King to write personally to the queen mother, but not to write individually to the others, but rather a single letter, because if Antoine of Navarre were not addressed as King of Navarre he would refuse to receive it, whereas if the letter were written to all in common, this complication might be avoided (K. i,497, No. 25). 3 The Spanish King acceded to this request on June 8, 1562 (Philip II to Margaret of Parma; Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, II, 218-23. He promised to send 10,000 foot and 3,000 cavalry, chiefly Italians and Ger mans; cf. De Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, IV, 214. At about the same time the constable appealed to Rome through Santa Croce, for a loan of 200,000 ecus and a body of soldiers (Arch, cur., VI, 86). 144 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Catholic Switzerland1 Catholic Germany,2 Savoy, the Pope,3 and other princes of Italy were also looked to.4 The queen mother 1 The Swiss Diet, which met at Soleure on May 22, offered 6,000 infantry to be commanded by the captain Froelich (Letter of Hotman in Revue hist., XCVII, March-April, 1908, 305). 2 C. S. P. For., No. 6, §1, May 2, 1562. The Spanish ambassador was deeply incensed at Catherine for making this new overture. The intermediary was the Rhinegrave, but Chantonnay persuaded the leaders not to recognize him (Cor- resp. de Chantonnay, April 28, 1562; K. 1,497, No. 26). The duke of Savoy offered to furnish 10,000 footmen and 600 horse, 3,000 of the former and 200 of the latter to be at his expense. This was the fruit of Chantonnay's interview with Moreta, the Savoyard ambassador, early in April, when he discussed with him a possible restoration of the fortresses in Piedmont (K. 1,497, No. 21, April 8, 1562). 3 The Pope offered to give 50,000 crowns per month. 4 "Suisses, lansquenetz et reystres, seront en ce pays devant la fin de ce moys, sans vostre secours d'Espagne." — L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 24, June 12, 1562. It must be understood that in many European states, especially those of Germany, the maintenance of regular troops did not yet obtain as a. practice. Instead, the princes depended upon mercenary forces recruited by some distinguished captain. These troops, which answered to the condottieri of Italy were called Lanzhnechts or Reiters. Languet stigmatizes this practice in Epist. ad Camerariam, 28; cf. Arch. d' Orange-Nassau, I, 104. In Protestant Germany there was a feeling that the policy of France threatened to extinguish the gospel in other regions besides France and therefore should be opposed by common consent. The elector palatine, the landgrave, and Charles, margrave of Baden, planned to send an embassy into France in the name of the Protestant princes to allay the dissensions there, and to ask that the same liberty of religion might be granted as was allowed by the edict of January 17. Many advocated an open league between all the Protestant states for mutual protection, in the hope that the mere knowledge of such a league would restrain their adversaries (C. 5. P. For., No. n, May 2, 1562). Opinion was divided in Germany as to whether Conde also should make foreign enrolments, or whether the territories of those who had suffered these levies to be made should be invaded by the Lutherans. Agents of the Guises circulated a printed apology for the massacre at Vassy (D'Aubigne, II, 16, and n. 2; La Popeliniere, I, 327). Rambouillet and D'Oysel, the agents of France in these countries (St. Sulpice, 77; Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, I, 364) made much of the King of Spain's aid and carried credentials from Chantonnay. The duke of Guise even sent an agent, the count of Roussy, to England, to discover Elizabeth's intentions, and to ascertain the military state" of her kingdom (cf. Beza, Hist, des iglises riformies, ed. of Toulouse, I, 373; De Ruble, IV, 103 ff.; L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 13; C. S. P. For., No. 1,037, April 21, 1562). The argument of the Catholics with the German Protestant princes and imperial cities was that the Huguenots were political dissidents and rebels, and that religion was a pretext with them (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 65). In order to counteract this teaching the Huguenots circulated a pamphlet written by Hot- THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 145 did not know that already the Triumvirate had anticipated her re quest by asking the Spanish King to instruct the regent of Flanders man throughout the Rhine provinces which attempted to neutralize the differences between Calvinism and Lutheranism. (This curious pamphlet is printed in Mim. de Condi, II, 524; La Popeliniere, I, 325. In this capacity Hotman was invaluable. Some of his letters at this time are in Mim. de I'Acad.. CIV, 662-65.) The German princes as a whole tried to prevent soldiers from going out of Germany. The landgrave Philip of Hesse arrested an officer of cavalry who was secretly enlisting horsemen in Hesse and who said he was doing so for Roggendorf, tore up the officer's commission before his face, and made him swear to leave his castle without a passport. The duke of Wiirttemberg also took care that no volunteers should march through Montbeiiard into France, and Strasburg forbade anyone to enlist under severe penalties. The bishops of the Rhine kept quiet; only in Lorraine and the Three Bishoprics was Catholic enlisting unimpeded. The recruiting-sergeant of the Guises in Germany was the famous Roggendorf, a Frisian by birth who had been driven out of his native land in 1548 and since then had lived the life of an adventurer, part of the time in Turkey. (See an interesting note in.Poulet, I, 542, with references.) Pn April 8 the king of Navarre in the name of Charles IX, signed a convention with him engaging the services of 1,200 German mounted pistoleers and four cornettes of footmen of 300 men each (D'Aubigne, II, 33, n.). These forces entered France late in July and reached the camp at Blois on August 7 (D'Aubigne, II, 76, n. 3). One reason why the Protestant princes of Germany were unable immediately to make strong protest to the French crown was that the envoys of the elector palatine, the dukes of Deuxponts and Wiirttemberg, the landgrave of Hesse and the margrave of Baden, were unprovided for a month with letters of safe conduct, by the precaution of the Guises, with the result that Roggendorf led 1,200 cavalry in the first week in May across the Rhine and through Treves into France for the Guises, though the Protestant princes did all they could to hinder the passage and expostulated with the bishops of Treves and Cologne for allowing them to be levied in their territories. Failing greater things, the Protestant princes of Germany, in July, 1562, put Roggendorf under the ban in their respective states (cf. C. S. P. For., Nos. 244 and 269, June 13 and July, 1562). In the end, despite the enterprise of the Guises, the French Catholics may be said to have been unsuccessful beyond the Rhine, that is in Germany proper, but not in Switzerland or the episcopal states. D'Oysel, who was sent by Charles IX in July to Heidelberg (D'Aubigne, II, 97, and n. 1; Le Laboureur, I, 430) received a short and definite answer "which showed him how groundless were his hopes of aid from that quarter, a document to which so much importance was attributed that it was forthwith printed for wider circula tion" (C. S. P. For., No. 414, August 3, 1562, and the Introduction, xi). The king of Spain's captains had money and were ordered that as soon as soldiers were taken from Germany into France they should enlist men for the de fense of his territories (C. S. P. For., No. 11, May 2, 1562). In the bishopric of Treves soldiers were enrolled easily, as the passage from thence to France was short (ibid., No. 74, May 19, 1562). In Switzerland the Huguenots endeavored to prevail upon the Protestant 146 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE to hold the troops there in readiness "because Madame de Parma would not let a single horse go out of Flanders without orders."1 By the end of June these troops were ready. They were almost all Spaniards and Italians, then universally regarded as the best soldiers in the world.2 Philip II, though, was actuated by other motives besides zeal for Catholicism.3 He feared lest the south of France might attack Navarre, owing to the identification of Jeanne d'Albret with the Huguenot cause, and so sent reinforce ments to Fontarabia and Pampeluna; a movement which weak ened the prince of Conde" by preventing Grammont's Gascon troops from going to Orleans.4 The war went forward in spite of lack of funds on both sides. In order to pay the expenses of the war in Brittany Catherine authorized the seizure of the plate in the churches. But the duke of Etampes, who was governor of Brittany, was cautious about carrying out this order. "The people are so religious and scrupu- cantons to prevent the Catholic cantons from lending support to Guise (C. 5. P. Ven., No. 285, April 29, 1562). The Guises asked for a levy of foot from the papist cantons of Switzerland in the King's name (Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, I, 289, April 8, 1562). The cantons promised to send 15 ensigns; but the Protestant cantons especially Bern, told the prince of Conde that they would not suffer any soldiers to be levied against him in their territory, on pain of confiscation of goods. Nevertheless the Catholic Swiss managed to make some enrolments, the men quitting home on July 8. On August 7 these mercenaries arrived at Blois, having come by way of Franche Comte (De Thou, Book XXX). They were commanded by Captain Froelich (see D'Aubigne, II, 148; Zurlauben, Hist, milit. des Suisses, IV, 287 ff.; Letter of Hotman in Rev. hist., XCVII, March- April, 1908, 307). 1 Correspondance de Chantonnay, K. 1,497, No. 22. 2 "La fleur du monde." — L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 41. For details see ibid., 24, 26-29, 36-38, 41, 50-54; Correspondance du cardinal de Ferrare, Letter 40, July 3, 1562; D'Aubigne, II, 91, and n. 2; Ruble, Antoine de Bour bon et Jeanne d'Albret, 220. 3 St. Sulpice was dubious of Philip II's purpose and suspected political de signs "sous le titre de notre secours" (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 39). Neverthe less he believed in Philip's methods of repression — even the Inquisition. See his letter to the French ambassador at Trent on p. 28. 4 C. 5. P. For., No. 46, §3, May 11; No. 86, §1, May 23, 1562. Cf. No. 248— Challoner to Elizabeth from Bilboa, June 24, 1562. Spain established a naval base at La Reole to help Noailles, lieutenant of the King in Guyenne (L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 61). THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 147 lous in these things," he wrote, "that if they found out that we wanted to take it, they would not readily endure it, especially in Lower Brittany. ' ' Instead he advised that the plate of the churches be deposited in some principal town in each bishopric, "under color of retaining and guarding it there, and that a tax of from 15 to 20 livres be imposed upon each person for this purpose, figuring that this expedient would produce from 15 to 20,000 livres.1 The Huguenots let no money pass from the provinces under their control, even going so far as to destroy the government registers in the towns they took.2 Every day increased the interest of the populace in the struggle.3 "If the prince of Conde" should come to Paris," wrote an English man in Paris, "they could not tarry there, on account of the fury of his soldiers and the populace."4 In Dauphine, De la Mothe Gondrin, lieutenant of the duke of Guise, was slain at Valence by the Protestants. It is just to say, however, that he was the aggressor. Accompanied by sixty or eighty gentlemen he went out into the country and came upon a worshiping company of Calvinists "and left not one of them alive." A Huguenot noble man, Des Adresse who styled himself "lieutenant of the King in Dauphine," acquired a reputation in the region as sinister as that of Montluc in Gascony. The whole southeast of France seemed up in arms.5 Grenoble, Macon in Burgundy, Chalons in Cham- 1 Correspondance de Chantonnay, K. 1,497, No. 21, April 8, 1562; C. S. P. Eng. For., No. 1,058, April 27, 1562; ibid., No. 6, §2, May 2, 1562. 2 Correspondance de Chantonnay, K. 1,497, No. 33, May 2, 1562. Philip has commented on the margin to the effect that if the Catholics were as active as the Huguenots they would be better off. 3 Chantonnay particularly notices this in a dispatch of April 18, 1562, K. i,497- So also does the Tuscan ambassador (Nig. Tosc, III, 481, June, 1562). Travel ing in France was dangerous (Windebank to Cecil, C. S. P. Dom., XXII, 53, April 8, 1562). «C. 5. P. Dom., XXII, 60, April 17, 1562. Paris wore red and yellow ribbons — the Guise colors. "Ceux de Paris disent publiquement qu'on doit renvoyer la reine en Italie et qu'ils ne veulent plus avoir de roi qui ne soit catholique. lis en ont d'ailleurs un que Dieu leur a donne, c'est le grand 'roi de Guise.' " Letter of Hotman in Rev. hist., XCVII, March-April, 1908, 305. s D'Aubigne, Book II, chap. iv. 148 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE pagne, Moulins in Bourbonnais, where they destroyed the tombs of Antoine's ancestors,1 were taken by the Huguenots. Lyons, by reason of its proximity to Geneva, was radically Huguenot, and this sentiment was stimulated still more by the great discontent that prevailed among the lower classes, engaged in silk manufac turing and other industries.2 In Normandy it was even worse. At Rouen the Huguenots routed the Catholics and seized the government.3 On May 14 Maligny took Havre-de- Grace, which astonished and affrighted the Catholics because it stood at the mouth of the Seine and made open communication between the Huguenots and the English easy. At Caen,4 Bayeux, and most places in Lower Normandy, the inhabitants defaced the images in the monasteries and parish churches, and arrested the King's revenues coming to Paris.5 Caudebec, which revolted on May 15, was besieged by the Guisards, but had placed men in it pre viously and so saved itself. In Dieppe, where the revolt followed hard upon news of Vassy, a conflict between Protestants and Catholics resulted in the death of 150 persons.6 Terrible cruelties were committed at Angers7 by the Protestants. Amid this almost spontaneous insurrection involving provinces widely separated from one another, the Ile-de-France and Bur gundy adhered to the crown and the Catholic cause, the former wholly from inclination, the latter in part because of the adroitness 1 Correspondance de Chantonnay, K. 1,497, No. 36, May 28, 1562. 2 The importance of Lyons so near the cantons of Switzerland and Geneva is emphasized in Nig. Tosc, III, 488, July 6, 1562. 3 Correspondance de Chantonnay, April 24, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 25. On the situation in Rouen, see Mim. de Condi, III, 302 ff.; and the diary of a citizen in Revue retrospective, V, 97. Montgomery who was in western Normandy about Vire sent the King's letter back to him after polluting it with filth, at least so says Chantonnay, K. 1,497, No. 27, May 2, 1562. 4 See Carel, Histoire de la ville de Caen sous Charles IX, Henri III et Henri IV, Caen, 1886. s The duke of Bouillon, commandant of Caen Castle, made an attempt to restrain the populace (C. S. P. For., No. 303, §7, July 12, 1562). He posed as a neutral, but ultimately became a Huguenot. 6 C. S. P. For., No. 101, May 27, 1562. 7 Ibid., No. 68, May 18, 1562; cf. No. 69, §10. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 149 of Tavannes, the brilliant captain, who foiled the Huguenot assault upon Dijon,1 and saved Chalons-sur-Sa6ne.2 In spite of these occurrences, however, abortive negotiations for peace filled the ten days between the 18th and the 28th of May.3 In Paris it was expected that Conde" would attack the city. The government's force was not sufficient to take the field, and twenty- five pieces of artillery were paraded through the streets to make an impression and to induce the clergy and Parisians to contribute money for this religious war-making.4 Popular opinion in Paris was bitterly hostile to the Huguenots, but the bourgeois were not inclined to go down into their pockets and so, when the cowardly king of Navarre published a proclamation on May 26s expelling all Protestants from Paris and leaving their goods at the mercy of their adversaries, it was hailed with delight by the capital. Mobs of Catholics forcibly expelled Huguenots from the city and destroyed their goods. The city was so full of men-at-arms, high waymen, and robbers at this time that every householder was required to keep a light in his street window until daybreak.6 1 C. 5. P. For., No. 69, §16, May 18, 1562. 2 Forbes, II, 8; cf. Planche, Histoire de Bourgogne, IV, 556. 3 Upon these negotiations see Mim. de Condi, III, 384, 388, 392, 393, 395. 4 C. 5. P. For., No. 106, §2, May 28, 1562. The King's army had but twenty- two pieces of artillery at the beginning of the first civil war (Rel. vin., II, 101). s C. 5. P. For., No. 107, May 28, 1562; No. 174, June 9; Mim. de Condi, III, 462. Another edict of the King put the military government of Paris in the hands of the provost of the merchants and the ichevins of the city ("Declaration portant permission au Prevost des Marchands et aux Echevins de la Ville de Paris, d'eta- blir es Quartiers d'icelle, des Capitaines, Caporaux, Sergents des Bandes, et autres Officiers Catholiques. A Monceaux, le 17 May 1562;" also in Ordonnances de Charles IX, par Robert Estienne, fol. 187; Mim. de Condi, III, 447I), in com pliance with a popular request made a week earlier; " Ordonnance du Roy, donnee en consiquence de la Requite des Habitans de Paris, par laquelle il leur est permis de faire armes ceux que dans cette Ville sont en etat de portes les armes, et d'en former des Compagnies, sous des Capitaines qui seront pas eux choises," May 10, 1562 (Mim. de Condi, III, 422, 423). The Venetian ambassador wisely ob served "Percioche dar liberamente I'armi in mano ad un populo cosi grande e cosi furiosi, benche fosse cattolico, non era farse cosa molto prudente." — Rel. vin., II, 98; cf. Nig. Tosc, III, 280. 6 See Chantonnay's letter to Philip II of May 28, inclosing the edict and giving these and other details, K. 1,497, No. 36. ISO THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Risings in many parts of the country continued to be heard of;1 Vendome, La Charite, Auxerre, Montargis, Poitiers, together with most of the towns of Saintonge and Angoumois,2 either declared for the prince of Conde or were taken by him. But at Toulouse the Huguenots suffered heavily.3 In Normandy, there was great fear of English intervention.4 Overtures for peace came to nothing because the Huguenots made the withdrawal of the Triumvirate a condition precedent to their laying down of arms.3 The prince contended that he could not be secure unless the duke of Guise, the constable, and the marshal St. Andre retired from the court. The queen mother in reply represented that it was not right, during the King's minority, to remove from him such important personages; that the Catholics 1 "Cependant tout se ruyne et se font tous les jours infiniz meurdres et saccage- mens de part et d'autre .... vous verrez par les chemyn's une partye de la pitie qui y est, et ce royaume au plus callamiteux estat qu'il est possible." — L'Au- bespine a l'Ev^que de Limoges, June 10, 1562; L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 22. 2 Chaumet, " Proces-verbal des titres et ornements bruies par les protestants," Les protestants et le Cathidrale d'Angouleme en 1562, in Bull de la Soe arch., etc. 4e ser., VI, 1868-69 (Angouleme, 1870), 497. Gellibert des Seguins, Aubeterre en 1562; "Enquete sur le passage des pro testants en cette ville, le pillage de l'eglise Saint-Jacques et la destruction des titres et papiers du chapitre," Bull, de la Soe arch., etc., 1862, 3e ser., IV (Angouleme, 1864). 3 The strife in Toulouse was occasioned by an edict of the parlement of Tou louse (May 2) forbidding Calvinist worship and the wearing of arms by the Hugue nots (K. 1,495, No. 35; a printed copy of the edict). Both parties fought for three days for possession of the H6tel-de-Ville where arms were stored. Nearly 5,000 Protestants, it is said, were killed (Corresp. de Chantonnay, 1497, No. 36, May 28, 1562; Commentaires de Montluc, Book V, 234-37, La Popeliniere (who saw it), I, 311 ff.; D'Aubigne, Book II, chap, iv; Lettres du cardinal de Ferrare, No. 30, June 23, 1562; cf. Histoire viritable de la mutinerie, tumulte et sedition faite par les prestres de St. Medard contre les Fideles, le Samedy XXVII juin de 1562; Bosquet, Histoire sur les troubles advenus en la ville de Tolose, Van 1562, le dix-septiesme may, Nouv. edition, avec notes, Paris, 1862; Histoire de la dilivrance de la ville de Toulouse, 1862. 4 Stanclift, Queen Elizabeth and the French Protestants (1559-60), Leipzig, 1892. s Coll. des lettres autographes, Hotel Drouot, March 18, 1899, No. 19; Cardinal Chatillon to the queen mother, May 28, 1562, protesting that peace is impossible without the banishment of the Guises from court. Cf. R. Q. H., January 1879, 14, 15- THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 151 in Paris had taken up arms to oppose the Edict of January, and that if the Huguenot soldiery would retire to their homes they might live there as they liked, while a council (of which he should be a member) considered some better means of settlement.1 Gradu ally the hostile armies — the prince of Conde" at the head of the Huguenots and the duke of Guise, the constable, the marshal St. Andre and the recreant king of Navarre with the Catholic host — drew near to each other.2 An attempt was made to take Jargeau, eight miles from Orleans; but fearing lest its capture would cut supplies off from Orleans, Coligny and D'Andelot destroyed the bridge there. This forced the Catholic captains to change their intention, and they traversed the Beauce so as to surprise Beau- gency, fourteen miles from Orleans, midway between Orleans and Blois, where there was a bridge across the river. On June 15 the two forces arrived near the bridge at almost the same time and a fight seemed imminent. The two armies were about five miles apart, and about the same distance from Orleans. Both being south of the Loire, there was no river to hinder an engagement. There were many vineyards between them, which was an advantage to the prince, who had more infantry than cavalry, while Guise 1 "Tous jours sur le point que messieurs de Guise, conestable et mareschal de St. Andre se retirent de la cour." — L'Aubespine, secretaire d'etat a son frere M. de Limoges, ambassadeur en Espagne, June 10, 1562; L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 22; cf. the same to the same, June 12, p 24. On these unsuccessful negotiations, see D'Aubigne, II, 33-35; La Popeliniere, I, 323; Mim. de. Condi, 489; La Noue, Mim., Book I, chap, ii; Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, IV, chap, xix; Conde further justified the revolt of the Huguenots on the ground that the King and his mother were "prisoners" in the hands of the Triumvirate, but the statement was too transparent to be believed. Catherine herself, in order to dis prove it, took the King to Monceaux with her (Corresp. de Chantonnay, May 28, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 36), whence she wrote to the Parlement of Paris explaining the reason of her action. The Parlement promptly approved her course. Mim.- journaux du due de Guise, 495, col. 2: "Acte par lequel la Reinemere et le Roy de Navarre declarent que la retraite voluntaire que font de la cour du due de Guise, le Connestable et le mareschal de St. Andre, ne pourra porter prejudice a leur honneur" (May 28, 1562). 2 "Nostre camps et a douse lyeu d'Orleans et byentot nous voyront set que en sera." — Catherine de Medici to Elizabeth of Spain, June 13 or 14, 1562, in V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 31. 152 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE had 7,000 horse, D'Aumale having come from Normandy with his force. The Catholic forces were divided: Guise lay north of the river, beyond Beaugency, Paris-ward; D'Aumale's detach ment was on the other side of the river at Clerie, midway between Orleans and Beaugency, having the town and the bridge in his hands; while Navarre was established at Vernon, a league from Beaugency.1 The condition of the country around Orleans at this time, con sidering that a state of war existed, was not bad. Conde" had plenty of money for the moment, having secured the riches of the churches of Bourges. Food was good and plentiful in Orleans and bread was cheap. Everything the Huguenots took they paid for, as a matter of policy,2 although large funds were not in sight and they looked anxiously to England for 100,000 crowns, offering the notes of the leaders as security or else the bonds of some of the most notable Reformed churches, as Rouen and Lyons. The Huguenot army made a brave display. Many of the gentlemen were rich and wore long white coats (casaque blanche) of serge, kersey, or stramell, after the old manner, with long sleeves over their armour.3 The truce expired on June 21 (Sunday), but only 1 A parley was held with the usual lack of success on June 21 between the prince of Conde and his brother at Beaugency, which was neutralized for the purpose (D'Aubigne, II, 37, and n. 4). The baron de Ruble discovered the correspondence of the principals in the interview. The king of Navarre exhorted his brother to accept the conditions offered by the King, i. c., to let the Huguenots dwell peaceably in their houses until a council settled the matters in dispute. He promised in any event that the Protestants should have liberty of conscience. But when the prince insisted on having the edict enforced in Paris even, Antoine replied that the crown would never consent to such terms (C. 5. P. For., No. 329, §§1, 2, July 17, 1562). Even while the truce existed straggling prisoners were taken daily by either side. (For other military details, see Mim. de La Noue [ed. Pantheon litt.], 284; D'Aubigne, II, 39, 40; Beza, Histoire des iglises riformies, I, 540, 541; and the "Discours ou recit des operations des deux armees catholique et protestante dans les premiers jours de juillet," in De Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, IV, 414). 2 Not so the royal troops, which were quartered upon the towns of the region and nearly consumed the people by their exactions (Claude Haton, I, 279). 3 The Catholics, in derision, called the Huguenot gentry "millers." During the interview on June 9 between the prince and the queen mother, the latter said: "Vos gens sont meusniers, mon cousin," a fling which the prince of Conde more than matched by the rejoinder: "C'est pour toucher vous asnes, madame!" This anecdote is related by D'Aubigne, II, 35. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 153 light skirmishing was indulged in while specious negotiations were continued by Montmorency.1 But the Catholic leaders offered such hard conditions that Conde would not accept them. Among others it was demanded that all preachers should be banished from France, together with the prince himself, the brothers Chatillon, and the other Huguenot leaders, until the King was of age. During this delay the prince lost the advantage he had possessed. For the duke of Guise, the constable and Marshal St. Andre returned from Chartres to the camp again, which was between Beaugency and Blois, which lends color to the theory that it was they who overruled Antoine of Navarre and Catherine. After the rupture of the truce, the Catholic army marched to Blois, which they battered for a day and a night, assaulted and entered, although the inhabitants offered to let them in at the gates. When the magistrates of the city offered the keys to the duke of Guise, he pointed to the cannon with him, saying they were the keys he would enter by. At the same time St. Andre took Poitiers and Angouleme and drove La Rochefoucauld into Saintonge with the aid of Spanish troops.2 When informed of the duke's proceedings at Blois, Conde marched to Beaugency, which, after bombardment, was entered on July 3, the most part of those who were left to guard it being killed.3 Then seeing his own fortunes diminishing daily, he retired to Orleans, with scarcely 3,000 horse and 6,000 footmen. The prince was in doubt what next to do ; whether to retire to Lyons and join with the baron des Adresse,4 who had 1 Cf. Guise's letter to the cardinal of Lorraine, Appendix III; C. S. P. For., No. 238; No. 264, §3, June 29. 2 Ibid., No. 425, August 5, 1562; Archives de la Gironde, XVII, 270. The constable seized Tours and Villars Chatellerault (D'Aubigne, II, 41-44). For the operations of Burie in Perigord, see Archives de la Gironde, XVII, 271. At Bazas a local judge, with the aid of Spanish troops actually crucified some Calvinists (ibid., XV, 57). 3 La Noue admits that the boasted discipline of the Huguenots was disgraced by their atrocities here (Mim. milit., chap, xvi; cf. C. S. P. Ven., No. 288, July 16, 1562). 4 On the war in Lyonnais, Dauphine, Provence, and Languedoc, see D'Au bigne, Book III, chap. vii. The notes are valuable. Des Adresse proclaimed all Catholics in Lyonnais, Burgundy, Dauphine, and Limousin rebels to the King 154 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE acquired Grenoble, Valence, and Chalons in Burgundy, despite Tavannes who kept the field with his forces,1 and was reputed to have 8,000 foot and 1,500 horse besides 6,000 Swiss sent from Bern and Lucerne, or to retire to Gascony where the queen of Navarre was, or thirdly to go to Rouen and thereby keep Normandy. In the end, however, he and Coligny stayed in Orleans. The remainder of his force was either dispersed in the various towns or dismissed. The Protestants stood in dire need of outside aid during this summer.2 A few days after Conde had retired within Orleans, D'Aumale took Honfleur (July 21). In Paris mobs killed almost hourly men, women, and children, notwithstanding an edict to the contrary under pain of death. Arms were in the people's hands, not only in Paris but in the villages. Neither the King nor the queen mother had the means to rule them, for the king of Navarre and the duke of Guise were then at Blois, with the result that Paris did much as it pleased. The leaders contemplated the recovery of Touraine, Anjou, and Maine, and all the towns upon the Loire, and then proposed to go into Normandy and recover Havre-de- Grace, Dieppe, and Rouen. In pursuance of this pro ject the duke of Guise took Loudon and Chinon in Touraine. In the same month Mondidier was entered by the Catholics upon assurance that all the Protestants therein should live safely; but notwithstanding the promises they were all cut to pieces, robbed, or driven forth. Numbers of men, women, and children were drowned in the night with stones about their necks, at Blois, Tours, and Amboise, and those towns which surrendered to the king of Navarre. While these events were taking place in the Loire country, the (C. S. P. For., 340). He was not a Huguenot in the proper sense, but rebelled against the King, and sided with the Huguenots because he was jealous of La Mothe Gondrin, who was made lieutenant du roi instead of himself in Dauphine (see D'Aubigne, II, 49, n. 5). 1 D'Aubigne, II, 48. He recovered Chalons-sur-Marne in June and Macon in August (Tavannes, 339, 343). 2 It was at this moment that D'Andelot was sent to Germany for succor (C. 5. P. For., No. 374, §7, July 27, 1562). 1 i THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 155 duke of Aumale again approached Rouen on the 29th of June, and planted his batteries before St. Catherine's Mount, but succeeded in doing little in spite of his long battery. He hoped to recover Havre-de- Grace after Guise had seized the towns upon the Loire. The great fear of the French was lest Havre-de- Grace should be given by the Huguenots into the hands of the English, and the atrocious practice of D'Aumale was likely to further such conduct on the part of the Huguenots,1 for he promised the peasantry not only the privilege of sacking the chateaux of the nobles, but also to relieve them of all taxes. As a result of this vicious policy, trade was dead and whole families of the nobility retired to Dieppe, abandoning their homes.2 Violence increased both in the cities and in the provinces. In the southeast Somarive committed great cruelties in Orange, killing men, women, and children wherever he went.3 But the achieve ments of Montluc, "the true creator of the French infantry"4 were the conspicuous feature of the war in the south. By his own confession this famous soldier "rather inclined to violence than to peace, and was more prone to fighting and cutting of throats 1 At Pont Audemer the duke caused » preacher to be hanged, and afterward some of the best citizens and even boys (C. S. P. Ven., 355, Jjily 23, 1562). There was also fear lest the English would land troops in Guyenne (Archives de la Gironde, XVII, 284). 2 C. 5. P. Ven., No. 354, July 23, 1562; Claude Haton, I, 301; C. S. P. For., 185, June 13, 1562; cf. 246, §24; but see the duke of Aumale's disclaimer to the queen mother, of July 9, asserting that those of Rouen, Dieppe, and Havre were plundering indiscriminately (Appendix IV). 3 D'Aubigne, II, 52-73. The prince of Orange found himself in a very difficult position. His principality was continually exposed to the attacks of the king of France and those of the Pope from Avignon. Moreover, the conduct of the Huguenots compromised him on account of their violence toward the priests in the sanctuaries (Archives de la maison d' Orange-Nassau, I, 71, 72; Raumer, II, 211 [1561]). 4 Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, I, 294. Montluc is unequaled in the keenness of his political penetration. The baron de Ruble says with truth that the old soldier rivals Hotman and Bodin in this respect. Witness the paragraph written in December, 1563, to be found in the memoir he sent to Damville justifying his resignation of the lieutenancy of Guyenne (Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 297, 298 and note). 156 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE than to making of speeches."1 The war in the southern provinces, it is plain, was one of both politics and religion. The practices of the Huguenots penetrated the whole administrative machinery. The sieur de Burie, king's lieutenant in Guyenne, was old and overcautious, and not without suspicion of Calvinism,2 while Duras, the Huguenot leader was so active that the crown had sent the veteran of the siege of Sienna into Guyenne in January, 1560, with a special commission.3 The Huguenots tried to buy Montluc off through one of their captains formerly with him before Sienna, who came to him saying that the church at Nerac had made him their captain. Montluc's reply nearly took the captain off his feet. "What the devil churches are those that make captains ?" was his fierce question.4 He speedily began to make his name formidable by hanging six Huguenots without process of law "which shook great fear into the whole party." Montluc's arrival was in the nick of time for the Catholics of the south. He thought that if the Huguenots had been more led by soldiers and not so "guided by ministers, they had not failed of carrying Bordeaux and Toulouse. But God preserved those two forts, the bulwarks of Guyenne, to save all the rest." Montluc was everywhere at once, never resting long in any place, holding his foes in suspense everywhere, and not only was himself in con tinual motion, but also with letters and messages perpetually solicited and employed all the friends he had.5 His troops were few in numbers and so ill-paid that he sometimes was reluctantly compelled to ransom his prisoners. "We were so few that we were 1 There are few more interesting annals in the history of war than the racy, egotistical, garrulous, yet sometimes pithy narrative of this veteran leader. The fifth book of Montluc's Commentaires is wholly taken up with the war in Guyenne in 1562-63. His correspondence during the same period is in IV, 111-225; add Beza, Histoire des iglises riformies, which is remarkably accurate and impartial. 2 Coll. Tremont, No. 51. — Antoine de Bourbon to M. de Jarnac, from the camp at Gien, September 12, 1562, relative to sending forces into the south to join those of Burie and Montluc. 3 Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, II, 345, and note. His title was "con- servateur de la Guyenne" (O'Reilly, Histoire de Bordeaux, 221). 4 Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, II, 357. 5 Ibid., 416, 421. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 157 not enough to kill them all," he comments. "Had the King paid his companies I should not have suffered ransom to have been in use in this quarrel. It is not in this case as in a foreign war where men fight for love and honor. In a civil war we must either be master or man, being we live as it were, all under a roof." He was as good as his word and "shook a great terror into the country everywhere." When he appeared before Agen he "wondered that the people should be so damnably timorous and did not better defend their religion." Instead "they no sooner heard my name but they fancied the rope already about their necks." Yet terrible as the old war-dog was, he still waged war according to the rules of the game. He is outspoken in condemnation of the conduct of the Spanish companies sent by Philip II which joined him before Agen.1 The importance of Montluc's services in the south was great. He helped save Toulouse and Bordeaux to the govern ment and the subsequent capture of Lectoure, and the notable battle of Vergt in Pengord (October 9, 1562) prevented the Hugue nots south of the Loire from joining the forces of the prince of Conde, who thus narrowly lost the battle of Dreux.2 As the Catholic cause mended, the situation of the Huguenots darkened. Four thousand Swiss in June had joined Tavannes in Burgundy and thereby Dijon, Macon, and Chalons-sur-Sa6ne were made safe. Late in July 6,000 lansquenets passed through Paris toward the camp at Blois. Pope Pius IV sent his own nephew to the aid of Joyeuse with 2,500 footmen, one thousand 1 "The French spared the women there, but the Spaniards killed them, saying they were Lutherans disguised. These ruffians slew some 300 prisoners in cold blood — not a man escaped saving two that I saved." — Montluc, II, 457, 458. When these Spaniards later mutinied and deserted in the summer of 1563, not even the Catholics regretted their departure (L! Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 144, 152). For the terms on which they came, see Montluc, IV, 452, 453; D'Aubigne, II, 91, n. 2; 94, n. 4. 2 See Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, III, 37 ff.; De Thou, Book XXXIII; D'Aubigne, II, 95; Bull, de la Soe de I'hist., du prot. frang., II (1854), 230; C. S. P. For., 837 and 415, §12 (1562). I have purposely built this account upon Mont luc's narration in Book V of his Commentaires. An additional source for Lectoure and the battle of Vergt is his long letter to Philip II, published in L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 84-86; add also De Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, 244-56. 158 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of whom were ' ' Hispainolz. ' ' J The Huguenots impatiently awaited the coming of German pistoleers and footmen, to be brought by Casimir, the second son of the count palatine, accompanied by D'Andelot who had been sent into Germany for assistance. But the German princes were slow in responding, especially to the demand for money,2 so that the prince of Conde" actually promised to give them the pillage of Paris!3 D'Andelot passed the Rhine on September 22, 1562 — three weeks too late to relieve Bourges — with 2,000 German horse and 2,000 musketeers, who figured in the battle of Dreux in the next December.4 France had seen nothing like these reiters in days heretofore. Their coming created both consternation3 and curiosity. Claude Haton in vain sought the meaning of the word. The word reiter had never had vogue in France within the life of the oldest of men, and one had never used the word until the present, although the kings of France had been served in all their wars by Germans, Swiss, and lansquenets, who are included under this word and name of Germany or Allemaigne. I have taken pains to inquire of numerous persons, who are deemed to know much what was the signification of this word "reiter," but I have not found a man who has been wise enough to tell me what I wished to know.6 1 Mim. de Condi, III, 756: "Fragment d'une lettre de 1'ambassadeur du due de Savoye, a la Cour de France. De Paris du dernier de juillet, 1562;" cf. Nig. Tosc, III, 492, 493. 2 See an article by De Crue, "Un emprunt des Huguenots francais en Alle- magne et en Suisse (1562). 'Pleins pouvoirs donnees a M. d'Andelot par le prince de Conde — Orleans, 7 juillet, 1562," Rev. d'hist. dip., 1889, 195. 3 L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 77; C. S. P. For., 884, October 9, 1562. His instructions are in Mim. de Condi, III, 630. See a letter of Hotman, July 27, T562, to the elector palatine, Mem. de I'Acad. des inscrip. et belles-lettres, CIV, 668. The original is in the archives at Stuttgart. This letter was communicated to the duke of Wiirttemberg by the count palatine and was sufficient temptation to lead the first of the famous hordes of German reiters across the border into France. 4 Claude Haton, 267. See in the Mim. de Condi, III, some letters relating to the coming of the reiters in this year. s "Ceux-ci [reiters] sont tou jours prets a se battre, mais en tout le reste, ils n'obeissent a. personne et montrent la plus grande cruaute. Ils pillent tout, et cela ne leur suffit pas. Ils devastent tout et detruisent les vins et les recoltes. "—Letter of Hotman in Rev. hist., XCVII, March-April, 1908, 311. 6 Claude Haton, I, 294. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 159 In order to pay the reiters and to find money, a taille was im posed upon the Huguenots of all classes, in all towns and villages under their control, upon nobles, priests, merchants, bourgeois, and artisans. But as this means was very tedious, the prince had recourse to the gold and silver vessels, chalices, and crosses of the churches which the Huguenots had pillaged. He also seized upon the government receipts from the gabelle and other taxes of the King in all the villages and elections controlled by the Huguenots, even the moneys of the royal domain, and the revenues of the churches.1 Meanwhile on August 19 the siege of Bourges had begun. The city was defended by about 3,500 soldiers, but the circuit of its walls was very great. It was well provisioned for a time, and had considerable munitions and artillery of an inferior sort, but neither cannon nor culverin. Half the town was protected by a great marsh near by; the other half was fortified. It was the plan of D'Andelot, who had entered Lorraine with 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot, commanded by the duke of Deuxponts, feeling he could do nothing in time for Bourges, to cut off Paris by securing the passages of the river at St. Cloud and Charenton.2 Accord ingly the constable and the duke of Guise, learning of the approach 1 Ibid. From an account in the Record Office, indorsed by Cecil, we know what the wages of these hireling troops were: "The pay of every reiter is 15 florins the month. The entertainment of the ritmeisters is a florin for every horse, and each cornet contains 300 men. The lieutenants have, besides the pay of one reiter, 80 florins. The ensign, besides the pay of one reiter, has 60 florins, eight officers having, besides a reiter's pay, 15 florins apiece. The wage and ap pointment of 4,000 reiters with their officers per mensem equals 122,048 livres tournois, equals 81,532 florins. The colonel 3,000 florins; 15 officers equals 300 florins. To every ten reiters there must be allowed a carriage with four horses, at 30 florins per month. Total (not counting the money rebated) 127,448 livres tournois, or 84,966 florins. Total expense for four months, counting the levy, 569,792 livres tournois equals 379,861 florins. "For levying 6,000 lansknechts: for their levying, a crown per month. The pay of every ensign of 300 men per month, 3,500 livres tournois. The whole expense for four months 395,000 livres tournois equals 263,337 florins. Sum total with other expenses, 1,759,792 livres tournois equals 211,174,175, 2d." = D'Andelot passed the Rhine on September 22, too late to relieve Bourges. 160 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of the reiters, dispatched D'Aumale with a commission to levy all men of war in Champagne, Brie, and Burgundy, both foot and horse, and to sound the tocsin for the purpose of raising new levies for the King if those which he first raised should not suffice, and to make a great camp of all these men for the purpose of combating the reiters.1 But D'Aumale dallied so long,2 to the intense chagrin of his army, which clamored to "f rapper dessus les lif -lof.de reis- tres,"3 that the German troopers were able to cross the river Seine at Chanceaux, whence they took the road above Auxerre, crossed the Yonne, and so joined the prince of Conde at Orleans. It would have been much better for France, and especially for the provinces of Champagne, Brie, and Burgundy, if D'Aumale had attempted to repulse the reiters, for his soldiers were the ruin of the villages where they lodged, and any action, even defeat, would have been better than license and idleness. When it was known that the reiters had evaded the force sent against them, the King, seeing new villages of France taken every day, sent orders to all those who still adhered to the crown to the effect that they should be on their guard night and day, for fear of being taken by surprise. For greater security commissions were dispatched 1 See Claude Haton's vivid description of this recruiting. The new levies did great damage to the country of Brie and Champagne, for they were kept in villages for more than five weeks before going to camp, and all this time the reiters were approaching closely (I, 295). 2 Claude Haton, I, 295. He adds that Catherine de Medici sent him secret orders to do so. But there is no evidence of this in her correspondence, and D'Aumale's subsequent blunder in 1569 by which the Huguenots were able to get possession of La Charite justifies the inference that his action was due to incapacity as a general. 3 The long presence of the reiters in France during the civil wars introduced many German words into the French language, for example biere (Bier); blocus (Blockhaus); boulevard (Bollwerh); bourgmestre (Burgmeisler); canapsa (Knap sack) ; carousser (Garaus machen) ; castine (Kalkstein) ; halle (halt) ; trinquer (trinhen and of course reitre (Reiter) and lansquenet (Lanzknecht) . See Nyrop, Grammaire historique de la langue jrangaise, I, 51. Rabelais abounds with such words, c. g., "Je ne suis de cas importuns lifrelofres qui, par force, poultraige et violence, contraignent les lans et compaignons trinquer, voire carous et alluz qui pis est." Rabelais, Book IV, prologue. So also in Book IV, prol.: "Je n'y ay entendu que le hault allemant." THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 161 authorizing the election of a gentleman of honor and credit to be town-captain in every town.1 The Catholic and Huguenot position with reference to each other between Paris and the Loire was now somewhat as follows: the former held Chartres, Bonneval, Chateaudun, Blois; the latter St. Marthurin, Montargis, and Gien. On August 31, 1562, the surrender of Bourges took place. The crown guaranteed life, property, and liberty of conscience to the commandant and soldiers and inhabiants of the town, in consideration of an indemnity of 50,000 livres "pour avoir ete si gracieusement traites."2 But the Catholic leaders were in doubt what next to do, for all the Hugue nots were within the towns, neither occupying the open country nor having a camp outside the walls. The king of Navarre urged the siege of Orleans, but the council was not in agreement with him for two reasons: first, on account of the plague which was there; secondly because they had hopes that Navarre might pre vail upon his brother to desert the Huguenot cause, and so spare them the exercise of force. For these reasons it was resolved not to push the siege of Orleans and to attack Rouen instead, where the duke of Aumale was already.3 1 In Provins, on their own initiative, the townspeople taxed their town, baili wick,, and rissort (sinischausie) to the amount of 7,000 livres tournois, the sum being imposed upon persons of every class, those who had gone to the war in the King's service alone being exempted. This levy created great discontent, especially among the clergy, who appealed against the bailiff and the gens du roi to the Court of Aids, alleging that the levy was made without royal commission and without the consent of those interested. The bailiff compromised by promising the clergy to restore the money paid by them and not to demand more of them, and so the process was dropped (Claude Haton, I, 296, 297). 2 On the siege of Bourges see D'Aubigne, II, 77 ff.; Raynal, Hist, du Berry, IV; Mim. des antiq. de France, sir. Ill (1855), II, 191 ff.; Nig. Tosc, III, 494, 495; Boyer, Doc. relat. au regime de I'artillerie de la ville de Bourges dans le XVIe siecle, 641; in Bidl. du Comiti de la langue, de Vhist. et des arts de la France, III, 1855-56. The capitulation of Bourges is in Mim. de Condi, III, 634. See also the "Journal of Jean Glaumeau," edited by M. Bourquelot in Mim. de la Soe des antiq. de France, XXII. Philip II expressed his displeasure at the terms to St. Sulpice, saying, "que aulcunes des conditions semblaient du tout assez con- venables des sujetz a leur roi" (V ambassade de St. Sulpice, 70, 75. Alva's opinion is given at p. 78). 3 Claude Haton, I, 285. Philip II told St. Sulpice "quant un voyage de Nor mandie, bien qu'il I'estimait etre bien entrepris, qu'il semblait qu'il eut ete meilleur de s'adresser a. Orleans, ou etaient les chefs, afin qu'ils ne se grossissent d'avantage." ¦ — L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 75. 162 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The Guises were now fully aware of the formidable nature of the revolt of Normandy, there being danger of their also losing western Normandy, where the duke de Bouillon held Caen castle, but was disposed to be neutral. They planned, therefore, to send the greater portion of their new forces, Germans and Swiss, to the aid of D'Aumale, who had advanced against Rouen after D'Andelot gave him the slip, for they were little needed in the Loire country. Roggendorf, Guise's chief German agent, at this time arrived in Paris with 1,200 German pistoleers, well armed and mounted; the Swiss captain, Froelich had brought fifteen ensigns of Swiss, and the Rhinegrave was in Champagne with two regi ments of foot and three hundred pistoleers. r The constable and the duke of Guise in fear of English support, resolved to concentrate the greatest part of their force against Rouen and Havre-de- Grace. Another motive lay in the fact that Paris was in want; for the Huguenots recognized that if Rouen, Havre-de- Grace and Dieppe were well held, coercion of Paris was not impossible. The condition at Dieppe and Havre-de-Grace was the source of more anxiety to the government than any other matter. These towns, owing to their situation, were the chief keys to France, without which neither Paris nor Rouen could be free. Havre-de- Grace was of more use to France than Calais as a port of supply, and daily all those who escaped from Pont Audemer, Honfleur, Harfleur, and the Protestants between Dieppe2 and Rouen were flocking thither. The chief hope of the French Protestants was based upon the expected aid of England. Early in April, 1562, the prince of Conde and the admiral had solicited her support.3 But the anxiety 1 C. 5. P. For., No. 374, §7, July 27, 1562; No. 510, §i, August 10, 1562. For the operations of the reiters around Paris in the summer of 1562 see D'Aubigne, Book III, chap, xii; De Ruble's notes are valuable. - Daval, Histoire de la riformation a Dieppe, 1557-1657. Publ. pour la Ire fois avec introd. et notes par E. Lesens (Societe rouennaise de bibliophiles. 2 vols., 1879). 3 C. 5. P. For., Nos. 975, 976, 1,002. This solicitation was in the nature of an acknowledgment of an expression of interest in them made by the English queen. For as far back as March she had sent assurances of her interest to Conde and the admiral (ibid.. No. 965, March 3, 1562). THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 163 of Elizabeth in the welfare of Protestantism beyond sea was not disinterested, any more than Philip II's Catholicism. The legality of her position as queen required her adherence to everything anti-Catholic, to which may be added the influence of the political aims of Philip II with reference to England, especially his interest in the doings of Mary Stuart and Spanish tyranny in the Low Countries, both of which jeopardized England. Her ambassador in France observed truly when he wrote her: "It standeth Your Majesty, for the conservation of your realm in the good terms it is in, to countenance the Protestants as much as you may."1 Another practical end to be gained by English support of the Huguenots was the possibility of recovering Calais.2 Yet in spite of their deep religious animosity and their political hostility to one another, England and Spain were in so peculiarly complicated a relation that neither state wished to go to war. Philip II assured Charles IX that although Elizabeth would squirm at sight of Spanish assistance given to France, she dared not strike back in aid of the Huguenots, and would have to compel herself to view things from afar.3 The key to this extraordinary situation is to be found in the commerce of the Low Countries. The duke of Alva flatly said that his master could not afford to break with the English because of the commercial injury he would sustain in the Netherlands.4 The same proposition, reversed, was in like stead true of England; her commercial interests in Holland and Flanders were too great to be risked. ¦ But the good prospect of regaining Calais coupled with the fear lest the reduction of France to Spanish suzerainty would entail greater danger to England in the long run than the loss of 1 C. S. P. For., No. 973, April 1, 1562. 2 Ibid., No. 1,013, §J3, April 17, 1562. Elizabeth considered the suggestion of her ambassador so favorable that she sent Sir Henry Sidney to France in the spring to aid Throckmorton. See the instructions in C. S. P. For., Nos. 1,063, 1,064, April 28, 1562. 3 "Et il assure que bien qu'elle prenne a depit de voir que les catholiques soient secourus de deca, elle est persuadee que son meilleur est de se contenir et regarder de loin ce qui adviendra." — V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 55, July, 1562. 4 "Reponses du due d'Albe a. St. Sulpice, October 8, 1562." L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 79; cf. 92, 93, 103. 164 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE her commerce beyond sea, at last persuaded Elizabeth to support the Huguenots, upon certain conditions, the ultimate one being restoration of Calais to England.1 Accordingly, in September, 1562, the queen offered to land 6,000 men to guard the towns in Normandy, to take Havre and Dieppe under her protection, and receive into them the refugees of the Reformed church, and prom ised not to abandon Havre without the prince's consent, nor receive Calais from the opposite party. The vidame of Chartres agreed to deliver the custody of Havre-de- Grace to the queen's lieutenant on condition that the latter would recompense him and 1 Throckmorton, English ambassador in France, urgently pressed such a policy, "even though it cost a million crowns" (C. 5. P. For., No. 418, August 4, 1562). It was in the form of alternative offers to the Huguenots. Upon receipt of Havre-de-Grace, England was to deliver three hostages in guaranty of the compact, to the count palatine of the Rhine, and to pay in Strasburg 70,000 crowns; also to deliver at Dieppe 40,000 crowns within twenty days after the receipt of Havre-de- Grace, and 30,000 crowns within twenty days following, to be employed by Conde upon the defenses of Rouen and Dieppe and in the rest of Normandy, with the understanding that Havre-de-Grace was to be delivered to France upon the res toration of Calais, and the repayment of the 140,000 crowns advanced. The second offer was to this effect: Upon receipt of Havre-de-Grace, England was to deliver three hostages and deposit 70,000 crowns in Germany, and to send 6,000 men into Normandy to serve at Rouen and Dieppe (C. S. P. For., No. 268, July, 1562; cf. Nos. 662, 663). After prolonged negotiations which were conducted by the vidame of Chartres, the treaty of Hampton Court was framed on these lines, on September 10, 1562 (Mim. de-Condi, III, 689; Mim. du due de Nevers, I, 131; D'Aubigne, II, 79, 80). Elizabeth's proclamation and justification of her action is at p. 693 of Mim. de Condi. The alliance between the prince of Conde and the English, with the implied loss of Calais to France, more than any other fact, reconciled Catherine de Medici to Spanish assistance. After August she personally urged this aid (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 58, 59). Still Philip emphatically gave her to understand that "si 1'ambassadeur de Espagne avait fait esperer que son maitre declarerait la guerre aux Anglais . . . . il avait depasse ses instructions, car les Espagnols etaient depuis si longtemps lies avec ces peuples qu'il etait impossible de rompre cette alliance." — St. Sulpice to Charles IX, November 12, 1562 (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 93). The constable was at Yvetot in October, 1562, at the time of the descent of the English upon Havre and wrote to Charles IX that he was unable to take the field. At a later season he complains to Catherine of the calumnies heaped upon him, and bluntly says "that he is not in the humor to endure such things." — Coll. de St. Pitersbourg, CIII, letters pertaining to the house of Montmorency; La Ferriere, Rapport, 46. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 165 Conde" by annual pensions or assigned lands, because of the loss of their estates and goods in France. In pursuance of this com pact, on September 24, 1562, the English proclamation for the expedition into Normandy was published. It was time, if success were to crown the enterprise, for in Havre troubles and enemies multiplied and patience with the English was on the point of breaking. " No prey happens to a sleeping fox," wrote the vidame impatiently to the English admiral. On October 1, 1562, the English sailed from Portsmouth for Havre, and on Sunday, Octo ber 4, entered the roadstead of Havre at three in the afternoon, and immediately landed as many men as they could with the tide. The English occupation of Havre-de- Grace startled the gov ernment into new activity before Rouen, and the King determined to take it before English assistance could be afforded.1 The town was well supplied with provisions and had plenty of small arms, but was short of artillery and gunpowder. The garrison numbered about 4,000, under command of Montgomery, the guardsman who had accidentally killed Henry II in tournament, for Morvilliers, the former chief in command in Rouen, had hesitated about the introduction of English soldiers and had been replaced. In the first week of October the attack of the royal forces upon Rouen was renewed with fury and the fortress on St. Catherine's Mount was taken by them. Desperation soon prevailed in the beleaguered city and there was talk of conditional surrender if that could be effected, until the arrival of a few companies of English revived the courage of the Rouennais and the fight was renewed. But the procrastinating caution of the English by this time over- 1 Archambault to St. Sulpice, L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 71; Charles IX to St. Sulpice, September 15, ibid., 74. The camps on the Loire were broken up on September 14, only sufficient forces being left to invest Orleans. The soldiers were sent to Normandy via Montargis, Angerville-la-Riviere, and Etampes, leaving posts at Gien, Beaugency, and Pithiviers to keep the lines open between north and south and to prevent D'Andelot from getting to Orleans. On the siege of Rouen, see Claude Haton, I, 286-89. "^ne c'ty was taken October 26 (Floquet, Hist, du Parlement de Normandie, II, 435). On Huguenot excesses in Rouen, see an arret of the Parlement of Rouen, August 26, 1562, in Mim. de Condi, III, 613, and another ordering prayers for the capture of Fort St. Catherine, October 7 (ibid., IV, 41). 1 66 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE reached itself. In spite of the importunities of Throckmorton,1 the English government was reluctant to venture its arms beyond the seaboard,2 although Throckmorton's arguments were rein forced by every other English agent in France, Rouen being repre sented as "such a jewel for them that by no means is it sufferable to become an enemy."3 All urgency was in vain. The instruc tions to the earl of Warwick, the English commander in Havre- de- Grace, were to the effect that if requested to send aid to Rouen or other places he should make some "reasonable delay," without offending them.4 It is easy to see from such instructions and the policy pursued by the English government in France that its inter est was purely practical and in no sense sentimental or religious. England wanted to hold Havre-de- Grace in pawn for Calais, under cover of pretending to support the Huguenots. By mid-October, however, it had become plain that this narrow policy could not be so rigidly adhered to. The success of the Catholic armies in Normandy was even endangering Havre-de- Grace, and Havre-de- Grace was not nearly so favorable a point of vantage for the English as Calais had been, for there the pale protected the city proper; in the city at the Seine's mouth the fortifications were weak and, worst of all, the location was a poor one for defense.5 With the coming of winter, it would be possible for the French with slight effort to prevent much intercourse by sea between Havre and the English ports, while already the coun try roundabout was being devastated by the German reiters. D'Aumale was reported to have said — and there was justification of the statement — that the English garrison might make merry as it pleased, the winter and famine would cause them to pack homeward faster than they had come. Too late the English at 1 See his singular letter to Cecil of July 29, 1562, in C. 5. P. For., No. 389. 2 Cf. articles for the English agent Vaughan, of August 30, in Cecil's hand writing (ibid., No. 550). 3 Ibid., No. 763, Vaughan to Cecil, October 4, 1562; Forbes, II, 89. 4C. 5. P. For., No. 790, October 7, 1562; Forbes, II, 93. s Cf. C. S. P. For., No. 803, October 8, 1562; Forbes, II, 101; report of a military expert to Cecil. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 167 last determined to succor Rouen after the fall of St. Catherine's Mount,1 and relief troops were sent forward to Rouen from Havre- de-Grace and Dieppe. An intrepid English captain named Leighton (he was afterward made governor of Guernsey), with a handful of men, made his way into the city, but substantial assist ance did not come until the middle of October. Even then mis fortune overtook the English. The approach was made by the river in six small ships, but one of them struck on a sand bar near Caudebec and was intercepted by Damville, so that only 600 English got into the town.2 Oh the morning of the 16th, Montgomery and two of the chief men of the city came out of Rouen, under a flag of truce, and spoke with the queen, returning a second time with fresh proposals, but nothing resulted. The Huguenots demanded, first of all, liberty of preaching, and of living according to their religion. Besides this, they insisted that the King should not put a garrison in Rouen, and as security for the observance of these conditions they required hostages from the King, to be kept by them at Havre-de-Grace. In the second interview they enlarged the conditions; namely, that the Edict of January might be observed and that they might preach freely in the cities, although by the edict preaching was permitted only outside of cities.3 Moreover, they insisted on this agreement being extended to all towns of France; and in order to give this convention a general effect, the prince of Conde was to confirm it. For the observance of all these conditions they de manded as hostages the prince de Joinville, eldest son of the duke 1 It was taken by assault by the duke of Guise (Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, I, 414, note; Claude Haton, I, 285; Mim. de Condi, IV, 41). 2 The English aid had been divided into three bodies, that portion which entered Rouen being only the vanguard. It was the middle portion which fol lowed in ships up the river and was captured by Damville. The third body was of the rear guard and returned to Havre-de-Grace (C. S. P. Ven., No. 302, October 14, 1562). In the fight off Caudebec 200 English were killed, and 80 made prison ers, all of whom were hanged by the French — a more rigorous punishment than even sixteenth-century war nominally allowed (ibid., For., Nos. 870, 872, October 17, 18, 1562). 3 Ibid., No. 901, October 23, 1562. 168 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE of Guise, and brother of the marshal Brissac,1 superintendent of the King's revenues. Although Montgomery was unaware of it, the government already, alarmed by the English intervention, had made overtures to the prince of Conde" in Orleans. But in each case, a condition required would not be yielded. The demand of the Rouennais that the Edict of January be revised so as to permit Protestant worship in all towns broke off negotiations with them. In the overtures made to Conde and Coligny, restitution of all in rebellion to their estates and offices was promised, as also the assurance to the Huguenots that they might enjoy their religion peaceably in their houses, but public worship, even without the towns, was not to be permitted. The Protestant leaders seem to have been inclined to yield to these terms, although they implied a reduction of their religious privileges, but insisted that the crown should assume the payments due to Conde's German auxiliaries. The government balked at this proposal, and the prince and the admiral themselves balked when the king of Navarre declared that D'Ande- lot's German troopers and the Huguenots should unite to expel the English from France, so that in the end neither set of negotia tions was successful.2 During the successful assault upon Fort St. Catherine which followed the rupture of these negotiations both Antoine of Navarre and the duke of Guise were wounded, the former by an arquebus- shot in the joint of the shoulder, as it proved, mortally, because mortification of the wound could not be stayed.3 Montgomery fought furiously in the assault, which lasted seven hours, and threatened to use his sword upon any who might seek to yield. It was a desperate and vain battle, however.4 The King's forces ' C. 5. P. Ven., October 27, 1562. 2 Ibid., For., 932, §4, October 30, 1562. 3 For details see Corresp. de Catherine de Med., I, 420, note; Claude Haton, I, 287-91; and a relation in Arch, cur., IV, ser. 1, 67. Also in Mim. de Condi, IV, 116. The same volume has some letters addressed to the queen of Navarre upon his death. Cf. Le Laboureur, III, 887. Claude Haton, I, 292, 293, has an interesting eulogy of him. 4 Charles IX and his mother were eye-witnesses of this struggle, viewing it from a window of the convent of St. Catherine "from which they could see all that took place within and without the city." — C. 5. P. Ven., October 18, 1562. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 169 mined clear to the walls of the town, and the havoc of their explo sions could not be remedied. The breach in the walls made by both mine and shot was so wide that some of the royal force rode through on horseback.1 On Monday, October 26, the besiegers fought their way through and over the walls. In this supreme movement the English and the Catholic Germans came sharply together. No quarter was given the English in the town, the command being given "that they should all pass the sword." Many of them were stripped naked by the victors. The wounded English who were found had their throats cut ; the rest were sent to the galleys. The King entered Rouen the day after its capture, making his way over dead bodies which had been spoiled by the soldiers.2 The royal forces now had unlimited control of the Seine below Rouen; at Caudebec they staked half the river, so that ships and boats were compelled to pass close under their guns. 1 It had been the queen's hope that Rouen might be saved from sack, and with this object she had offered 70,000 francs to the French troops if they would refrain from pillage. But such a hope was slight, for Rouen was the second city of the realm and one of great wealth (C. S. P. Ven., October 17, 1562). More over, " Guise proclaimed before the assault that none should fall to any spoil before execution of man, woman, and child" (ibid., For., No. 920, Vaughan to Cecil, October 28, 1562). Catherine de Medici also throws the responsibility upon the duke of Guise (Corresp., I, 430). For other details of the sack, see Castelnau, Book III, chap. xii. "Le ravage de ceste ville fut a la mesure de sa grandeur et a sa richesse," is D'Aubigne's laconic statement (II, 88). Fortunately, for the sake of humanity, the sack was stayed after the first day. The German troopers committed the worst outrages. The marshal Montmorency is to be given credit for mitigating the horrors. Montgomery, though at first reported captured, escaped to Havre, having disguised himself by shaving off his beard (C. 5. P. For., No. 939, October 30, 1562), and abandoned his wife and children, to the indigna tion of Vaughan, who vented his outraged sentiments to Cecil: "A man of that courage to steal away, leaving his wife and children behind him" (ibid., No. 920, October 28, 1562). Among those in Rouen who were officially executed were a Huguenot pastor by the name of Marlorat, with two elders of the church, a merchant and burgess of the city, named Jean Bigot, and one Coton; Montreville, chief president of Rouen, De Cros, some time governor of Havre-de-Grace, eight Scotchmen who had pass ports of Mary Stuart to serve under Guise, and some French priests (D'Aubigne, II, 88; C. S. P. For., No. 950, §14, October 31, 1562; No. 984, §2, November 4, 1562). 2 C. S. P. Ven., No. 307, October 31, 1562; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 91; "Montgomery qui les faisait tenir s'est sauve, laissant le peuple livre a la boucherie." — Letter of Catherine de Medici to St. Sulpice. 17° THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The Guises now anticipated a swift collapse of the Huguenot cause. All the chief towns in France save Orleans1 and Lyons were either by inclination or compulsion obedient to the crown, which found powerful support from the property-owning and lawyer class. Politically and financially the government was stronger, although the court was in want of money at this time. The duke of Guise, the most notable captain and soldier in France, the constable and veteran marshals like Brissac and St. Andre, had made a combination too strong to be overcome. In this strait, the Huguenot leaders grasped at the last straw — the hope that the prince of Conde might succeed the king of Navarre as lieutenant of the realm by winning the support of liberal Catholics and the anti-Guisard element.2 There was ground for this hope if the Calvinists- could be persuaded to be a little less radical, and if the Catholic religion would be suffered without criticism to be and remain the religion of France, and the Huguenots would make no further alteration in their form of worship than the English Reformation had done.3 Antoine of Bourbon, since sustaining the wound received at Rouen, had been gradually sinking, and died on board a boat on his way to Paris, October 26, after prolonged suffering.4 Conde" 1 Orleans had 1,200 horsemen and 5,000 footmen in it, besides the inhabitants, with provisions to last six months. Almost all the weak places had been fortified with platforms, ravelins, and parapets. The counterscarp was roughly finished. There were nine or ten cannon and culverins with a good store of powder. The greatest menace was the plague which daily diminished the number of the Prot estants (C. S. P. Eng., 596, §6, September 9, 1562 — report of Throckmorton who was on the ground). 2 C. 5. P. Ven., October 17, 1562. The Spanish ambassador had foreseen the possibility of such a contingency and early in April had cautioned Philip II not to play upon Antoine's expectations to the point of exasperation (K. 1,497, No. 17). 3 C. S. P. Eng., 1,050, November 14, 1562. 4 "His arm is rotten and they have mangled him in the breast and other parts so pitifully" — in the endeavor to cut out the mortified flesh. — C. S. P. For., 1,040, Smith to Cecil, November 12, 1562. Cf. No. 932, October 30; for other details see C. S. P. Ven., November 8, 9, 10, 13, 1562; Mim. de Condi, IV, 116; D'Aubigne, II, 85. The knowledge of his death was kept a secret for two days (C. S. P. For., 1,079, November 20, 1562). The Spanish court wore mourning for four days in honor of his memory (L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 103). He was a "trimmer" THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 171 now, by virtue of the arrangement made at the meeting of the States- General at Orleans, legally succeeded to his brother's office as lieutenant of the realm, and proceeded forthwith to send out commissions to the constable, marshals, and to all the governors of provinces and places, to repair to him as the King's lieutenant- general and governor of France. But in spite of the regulation of the estates, the court and Catholic party, by the advice of the cardinals of Ferrara, Lorraine, and Guise, the duke of Guise, the constable, and marshal St. Andre, with the special solicitation of the Spanish ambassador who voiced his master's wishes with "a lusty swelling tongue," resolved to establish the cardinal of Bour bon in the authority the king of Navarre had held. ' to the last, on his deathbed professing the confession of Augsburg, as a doctrine intermediate between Catholicism and Calvinism (Despatch of Barbaro [Huguenot Society], November 25, 1562). 1 "Le roi catholique est content que la reine mere ait l'entier gouvernement des affaires, tout en ayant pres d'elle le cardinal de Bourbon." — V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 109, January 19, 1562 (1563). CHAPTER VII THE FIRST CIVIL WAR (Continued). THE BATTLE OF DREUX (DECEMBER 19, 1562). THE PEACE OF AMBOISE (MARCH 19, 1563) After the fall of Rouen, the chief military design of the Guises seems to have been to protract the war, without giving battle, until the Germans with D'Andelot and Conde either deserted for lack of pay or were corrupted by them. Catherine's wish, on the other hand, was to end the war by composition and not by the sword, fearing to have either party become flushed with success. In pursuance of this policy numbers of the soldiers were permitted to go home, the war being considered to be practically at an end until the spring, except that garrisons of horse and foot were kept in the towns round about Orleans after the manner of a flying siege (siege volanle). But the rapid advance of the prince toward Paris from Orleans, where he had been waiting for D'Andelot, who mustered his German horse in Lorraine in the middle of September, after he learned of his brother's death, required the duke of Guise to change his plans. Passing by Etampes, which the Guises aban doned at his approach,1 the prince of Conde marched toward Cor- beil in order to win the passage of the Seine, where 4,000 footmen and 2,000 horse of the enemy lay in order to keep the Marne and the Seine open above Paris for provisioning the capital. The Huguenot army numbered about 6,000 footmen; 4,000 of them Germans, and nearly 3,000 horsemen. Most of the Germans were well armed and mounted, and all "very Almain soldiers, who spoil all things wh^re they go."2 The duke of Guise, having received word of the approach of the Huguenots upon Paris, abandoned his purpose of going to Havre, 1 "11 y eut toujours dans la ville quatre corps de garde, Charles IX ordonna d'etablir a Etampes un magasin de vivre bour fournir son armee." — Annates du Gdtinais, XIX, 105. 2 C. S. P. Eng., No. 1,070, November 20, 1562. 172 THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 173 in order to return to the succor of the city. Great difficulty was experienced in accomplishing the return of the army, because it was the depth of winter and the days were short and the roads heavy. "Nevertheless everyone in camp took courage, because he was returning to the good French wines and no more needed to drink the cider of Normandy."1 To combat the Protestant force, Guise and the constable had not over 6,000 footmen and 1,000 horsemen at Paris, though this force could be somewhat enlarged by drawing in the troops around Rouen and before Havre-de- Grace. It was fully expected that the prince of Conde would march upon the capital or else take the straight road to Normandy in order to unite with the English and with their help attempt to regain possession of Rouen and Dieppe. Paris was in the greatest alarm. All the people living in the fau bourgs were compelled to abandon their houses. The state of the royal army was bad; the soldiers were scattered and disor ganized, for the spoil of Rouen had induced every kind of license and debauchery. Moreover, the plague was raging everywhere. In this exigency the duke of Guise abandoned the country round about, within two or three leagues of Paris, to the pillage of the Protestants, withdrew his scattered forces within the walls, and feverishly employed every available person in the erection of for tifications, principally' upon the side toward Orleans, for which certain unfinished erections of Francis I were utilized. The city was so crowded with people even before the appearance of the troops of the prince that it seemed to be in a state of siege. If Conde at this time could have seized the river above and below the capital by which provisions were received into Paris, the city could have been speedily reduced to famine, as there was even at this time a scarcity of food.2 But Louis of Conde was not a man of good judgment and, while 1 Claude Haton, I, 305. 2 C. S. P. For., 193, December 5, 1562; ibid., Ven., December 3; Forbes II, 27, La Noue gives a motive which led Conde to besiege Paris: "Non en intention de forcer la ville, mais pour faire les Parisiens, qu'il estimoit les soufflets de la guerre et la cuisine dont elle se nourissoit." — Mim. milit. de la Noue, chap. ix. 174 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE personally brave, he lacked political daring. To gain time for the arrival of reinforcements, Catherine and the Guises wheedled him with empty overtures for peace and sent the marshal Brissac's bro ther to the Protestant camp near Etampes to propose a plausible settlement, saying that the Huguenots might have what they desired if they would aid in expelling the Germans, and especially the Eng lish. The last possibility was what the English agents in France had most feared, the more because of the undeniable strength of the Catholic crown party, which had won to itself a great number of the nobility, and because of the approaching winter, the lack of money among the Huguenots, the scarcity of food, and the weariness of the country. Such abandonment of the English by the prince of Conde could hardly have been construed as a breach of faith, seeing the apathy of the English participation after the seizure of Havre-de- Grace and Elizabeth's slowness in sending him financial assistance. But the prince refused to treat with an agent and continued his march toward Paris. On November 25 his cavalry appeared in sight of the city and the queen mother and the constable went out to parley further. The prince of Conde demanded the post of lieu tenant-general of the realm; for the Huguenots the right to have churches in all towns except Paris and its banlieue and frontier towns ; the right of all gentlemen to have private worship in their own houses, and the retirement of the foreign troops. To these demands, the queen replied that no one should have her authority, adding that the government was already well made up of gentle men, officers, and ministers, among whom the responsibilities of state had been divided, so that the government was capable of being well conducted until the King had attained his majority. As to toleration, she declared that to grant it would only be to encourage civil war.1 Too late Conde" found that he had been trifled with2 in order 1 Charles IX to St. Sulpice December 11, 1562; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 98; Despatch of Barbaro (Huguenot Society), December 7, 1562. 2 Yet although the negotiations of the prince of Conde at this time were ten tative and the statements of the crown not intended by it to obtain, nevertheless the claims advanced are to be observed, because the lines along which religious toleration was to develop in France and the outlines of subsequent edicts of tolera- THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 175 to give the government time to bring up reinforcements1 and that the terms he offered had not even been considered. The blame for this unfortunate turn in the war must rest, not upon the queen mother, but upon the Guises. For the duke of Guise and his brother, with the constable, could not but fear, that in the event of peace they would be ruined, and the duke used his own popularity with the masses and the enmity felt by the Parisians toward the queen to gain his ends. When tion, like those of Amboise, Longjumeau, and Bergerac, are foreshadowed in the articles proposed now. Conde first proposed the following three articles: (1) liberty of conscience with free exercise of religion where demanded; (2) security of life and property unto all; (3) the summons of a free council within six months, or, if that were im possible, then a general assembly of the realm. To these proposals the govern ment replied that Calvinist preaching would not be permitted under any circum stances in Lyons and other frontier towns, which were defined, nor near those with a governor and garrison, nor in those towns which were seats of the parlements. Conde then modified the Huguenot demands, as follows: (1) That Calvinist preaching be permitted in the suburbs of frontier towns, or in certain ones so appointed; (2) that it should obtain only in those other places where it was practiced before the war began; (3) except that it should be lawful for all gentlemen and all nobles to have private service in their own houses; (4) all persons residing in places where preaching was not permitted should be suffered to go to the nearest towns or other places for the exercise of their religion, without molestation. In reply, the government excepted Paris and the banlieue from these stipulations. All these conditions the government and Conde accepted on December 3, 1562, Lyons being declared not to be a frontier city within the construction of the articles. Certain minor stipulations followed as to amnesty, recovery of property, etc. Cf. C. S. P. For., No. 1,219, December 9, 1562; Beza, Hist, des iglises riformies, II, 121 ff., ed. 1841. 1 "M. de Nevers has already here from 800 to 1,000 horse. They look for 600 foot and horsemen, Spaniards and Gascons and Piedmontese, to arrive shortly. All this while they had driven the prince off with talk." — C. S. P. For., 1,168, December 1, 1562 — Smith to Throckmorton. These reinforcements reached Paris on the night of December 7, 1562; there were 10 ensigns of Gascons (40 or 50 in an ensign), in all about 500 or 600 men; of the Spaniards, 14 ensigns, "better filled," about 2,500-3,000, all footmen, and few armed. Their weapons were arquebuses and pikes, and some bills and halberds. "With them a marvellous number of rascals, women and baggage" (Smith to Cecil, C. S. P. For., No. 1,205, December 7, 1562; cf. Barbaro [Huguenot Society], December 7, 1562. The Venetian ambassador went out to view them). These reinforcements are much exaggerated in the Mim. de Condi (V, 103, 104, ed. London), which rates the Gascons as 3,000 and the Spaniards as 4,000. 176 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE duplicity failed, then Catherine's adversaries used intimidation, and the Spanish ambassador at their instigation was sent to her, "either threatening or protesting, or promising and offering aid, and thus upsetting everything."1 When Paris was full of soldiers negotiations were broken off, the prince of Conde declaring defiantly that the Huguenots would sharpen their swords as they would have need of them. The only advantage the prince had gained was that he had been able to draw his force close in toward Paris, so that in the last week in November he was camped near the Pont de Charenton. On the 26th he planted his camp on the left bank, a mile from the faubourgs. If the prince of Conde had attacked Paris at once, instead of wasting time at Corbeil in vain pourparlers, the whole Huguenot cause might have triumphed, for the government would have been forced to yield almost everything. He might have won the suburbs with little loss, although in want of heavy artillery, and the city could not then have held out long. But now the case was such that he either had to fight — with small hope of winning, let alone of taking Paris — or else come to an accord upon his enemy's terms.2 The prevailing opinion was that the prince would not be able to keep his army together for want of provisions and money, especially in mid-winter.3 This proved to be true. On Decem- 1 C. S. P. Ven., December 3 and 14, 1562. For an extreme example of Chan tonnay's overbearing policy, see Barbara's account of a conversation with the Spanish ambassador in the letter of January 25, 1563. 2 Ibid., For., 1,183, December 3, 1562; No. 1,238, §7, December 13, 1562. It is fair to say, though, that Conde was almost without artillery, having but eight guns, so that there was no possibility of breaking the wall. The only way to take the city would have been by an assault with scaling-ladders (letter of Hotman in Rev. hist., XCVII, March-April, 1908, 311). 3 Claude Haton, I, 307; C. 5. P. Ven., No. 314, December 11, 1562. See Throckmorton's earnest plea in C. S. P. For., 1,195, December 6, 1562, for sending financial assistance to him. The English intervention in Normandy was demon strated to be a safe and profitable venture; besides other advantages which they might draw from Rouen, Havre, and Dieppe (which could safely be recovered) the archbishopric of Rouen was worth 50,000 francs; the two abbeys inside the town 10,000; the abbey of Fecamp 40,000 francs; the benefices within the town valuable; the gabelle in salt and other royal rights in Rouen and Dieppe worth 50,000 THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 177 ber 9 he broke camp and marched off crestfallen, toward Nor mandy, after burning the camp, to effect a juncture with the Eng lish.1 By this time he had barely 7,000 men, the time of the year telling hard upon the army, for it was compelled to live in the open, while his adversaries had 15,000 or 16,000 men of all nations, one-quarter of whom were mounted. The difficulty of his position was the greater because he was on the left bank of the Seine, with no prospect of passing the river, for the duke of Guise lay at Poissy,2 while the Rhinegrave and Villebonne were guarding Pont de l'Arche lower down. Warwick was unwilling to venture forth from Havre to the prince's assistance, but hoped, by stopping the ship ment of salt and other merchandise up the Seine, to be able to compel the towns of Normandy, as Honfleur, Harfleur, Caudebec, and Rouen, for necessity's sake to come to terms.3 Being unable to pass the Seine, Conde" drew off toward Chartres, followed at the distance of about five leagues by the duke of Guise and the constable, and came to a halt near Montfort not far from Evreux, while Guise lay at a point about ten leagues west of St. Denis, from whence, including Paris, he drew his supplies.4 All around the two armies the country was destroyed. crowns, which would double when the English merchants came, so that the military occupation of Normandy would cost less than the profits therefrom. But arguments were in vain to persuade Elizabeth's double policy of caution and parsimony. Sir Nicholas drove Smith's warning of December 7 home by another one to Elizabeth, urging her " to deal substantially " with Conde, ' ' for wanting the queen's force of men it is not likely he will be strong enough to accomplish his intents." > Too late the English government was alive to the danger of its losing all, owing to the narrow policy hitherto pursued, and Cecil hurried Richard Worseley , captain of the Isle of Wight, off to Portsmouth on December 7 to secure 5,000 pounds, as earnest of more money to be sent into France in aid of the Huguenots, whence he was to hasten to Havre, warn the earl of Warwick not to give credit to any reports of peace unless so informed by Throckmorton or Smith, and see that the town was speedily fortified and guarded (C. S. P. For., No. 1,033, December 7, 1562; Forbes, II, 124, 125). 2 Claude Haton, I, 307; C. 5. P. For., No. 1,240, December 13, 1562. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 1,238, December 13, 1562. On December 14, 1562, Conde wrote anxiously from his camp at St. Arneuil asking for succor, especially that Montgomery, who had gone to England for assistance, might be sent to him. (See Appendix V.) Montgomery was in Portsmouth with Sir Hugh Poulet, who was commissioned to bring over the balance of 15,000 pounds to Havre (C. S. P. For., No. 1,270, December 16, 1562). 4 Ibid., No. 1,276, December 18, 1562; No. 1,278, December 19, 1562. i78 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The prince's inability to secure provisions, combined with the failure of English support, finally compelled him to give battle to the duke of Guise near Dreux on December 19, the engagement being precipitated by his attempt to force the passage of the Eure, although the odds were against him in every particular, for the duke of Guise was posted at a point so chosen that he could fall back on Dreux if compelled to do so; his flank was protected by a stream and a wood ; and his artillery was more numerous than BATTLE OF DREUX, DECEMBER 19, 1562 (Bib. Nat., Estampes, Histoire de France, Q. b) that of Conde.1 The advance guard of the Huguenots was com manded by the admiral; the "battle," in which were the German reiters, by D'Andelot; the rear guard by the prince of Conde himself. The Huguenot ministers and preachers, armed and mounted, moved about among the men, who sang their psalms in such a loud voice that the camp of the King could easily hear them. On the Catholic side the marshal St. Andre was pitted 1 Guise had 22 cannon; Conde's artillery consisted of 4 field-pieces, 2 cannon, and a culverin, which "never shot a shot" (Throckmorton to the Queen, C. S. P. For., January 3, 1563. He was an eye-witness of the battle. Forbes, II, 251). THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 179 against D'Andelot; the constable Montmorency commanded the rear guard, with instructions to hold off until the Huguenot rear guard entered the fight; while the duke of Guise himself com manded the advance guard against the admiral.1 The battle was begun about noon by a victorious charge of the Huguenot horse, headed by Conde and Coligny, which drove back the Catholic Swiss and resulted in the capture of six pieces of cannon and the constable Montmorency who was slightly wounded in the mouth. His captors "sent him to Orleans with such speed, that he drank but once by the way and that on horseback."2 The second charge was less effective owing chiefly to the slowness of the prince's German reiters who had to have their orders inter preted to them, and partly to the effective artillery fire of the enemy, and culminated in the capture of Conde, whose horse was shot under him. Too late to save the prince of Conde the admiral made a partial rally of the French and German cavalry, in the course of whose attack the marshal St. Andre was killed.3 Even then the issue might have been different if the Huguenot footmen had not behaved like cowards.4 The Protestant loss included about 800 of the noblesse, and nearly 6,000 footmen and reiters according to those who buried the dead.5 The Catholic loss was about 2,000, the most conspicuous among the fallen being the marshal St. Andre and Montbrun, the youngest son of the con stable Montmorency.6 1 Claude Haton, I, 308, 309. Cf. note for other references. 2 C. S. P. Eng., No. 228, 229, January 3, 1562; the admiral to Montgomery (Delaborde, Gaspard de Coligny, II, 180), December 28, 1562, from the camp at Avarot; cf. C. S. P. Eng., No. 181, January 2, 1563 — the admiral to Queen Elizabeth; Forbes, II, 247. 3 De Thou, Book XXXIV, and Le Laboureur's additions to Castelnau, II, 81. ? "They did not strike a stroke" and "were defeated in running away." — C. S. P. For., January 3, 1563; Forbes, II, 251. 5 Claude Haton, I, 311. 6 For contemporary accounts of the battle of Dreux, see: "Discours de la bataille," in Mim. du due de Guise, ed. Michaud, 497 ff.; Beza, Histoire des iglises riformies, I, 605 ff.; D'Aubigne, Book III, chaps, xiii, xiv; Tavannes, 392 ff.; La Noue, Mim. milit., chap, x; De Thou, Book XXXIV; C. S. P. Eng., No. 1,282, abstract of a printed pamphlet; No. 1,316, December 21; No. 1,323, December 180 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The battle of Dreux was fought on the day of the feast of St. Thomas— almost the shortest day of the year— and the Huguenots had to thank the oncoming of darkness for saving them from pursuit. Under its cover Coligny drew off toward Auneau where he pitched camp, but some of the Huguenot horse galloped all night toward Orleans. Fortunate was the Calvinist who could find a cross to put upon his clothing on the morrow.1 Twenty- two standards of the prince of Conde were found upon the ground, which were sent to the King and hung in the cathedral of Notre Dame. Almost all Conde's German footmen were taken prisoners, about 2,000, three-quarters of whom were sent back to Germany on parole, without weapons, and bearing white rods in witness of their abdication; the rest entered the service of the King and were joined with the Rhinegrave's forces under command of Bas- sompierre, an Alsatian in the service of Charles IX.2 The battle of Dreux, while not a complete rout of the Hugue nots, was no less a disaster, because it foiled the efforts of Coligny to effect a junction with the English in Havre and compelled him 22, 1562 — letter of the admral to the earl of Warwick; to Queen Elizabeth, Dela- borde, II, 178, 179. For details as to the number of prisoners, etc., see C. S. P. For., Nos. 1,286-88, 1,316, 1,317, 1,335, §§4-6; 1,334, i,3S3, §6J I>563, Nos. 12, 22, 28, narrative of Spanish troops. Excellent accounts of the battle are to be consulted in De Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, II, 366 ff.; Whitehead, Gaspard de Coligny, 140-45; and the duke of Aumale's History of the Princes of Condi (Eng. trans.), I, 150-68. The standard treatment of the sub ject is Coynart, L' Annie 1562 et la bataille de Dreux: itude historique et mili- taire; extraits divers, correspondance officielles du temps (1894). Montaigne has an interesting essay upon some peculiar incidents of the battle. Two curious occurrences happened. The duke of Guise was the first to alight from his horse and courteously receive the prince of Conde (C. S. P. For., No. 1,326, December 26, 1562); the two slept in the same bed that night (ibid., Ven., December 21, 1,562). The duke of Aumale was unhorsed and nearly the whole army rode and trampled over him, yet he was unhurt, owing to the heavy suit of armor he wore (ibid., For., No. 375, §3, 1563; cf. No. 400, §2). 1 The Parlement ordered the bishops of France to declare that in all parishes those who knew who were Huguenots should denounce them within nine days to their priests under pain of excommunication. This practice led to a large exodus of the Huguenots in many of the towns (Claude Haton, I, 312, 316, 317, and note, 318). 2 The German form of the name was Bessenstein. CAMPAIGN of DREUX NOV.- DEC. 1562 Scale of Miles ^e March of Huguenots % — — — — March of Catholics to the baWe of Drcu> Dreux Neauphle ¦ le-vieux o ^ ,* Houdan Versailles PortaMng/o<5 / Treono 14. _»- Ormqy Neu ville ~*-~ " Padajseaij- iLimours &. SVilleneuve PSt Georges £ssonnes i S£orbejl <** CaJiaj-don^s^^JAblis Auneau !fLaFert£-AI(Lis aChartres Etampes i ILePuiset Pithivicrs\ Chateaudun Epieds Freteval o 6ucquesa *Vend3me Patay ORLEANS 4S». «.. yB eaxjgency TAvaray MeUiuen & Co. BATTLE ofDREUX according to COMMANDANT da COYNART > Chateau Methuen & Co. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 181 to fall back on Orleans. Even Spain breathed easier, for anxiety lest the English get Calais was dispelled.1 Moreover, the French Protestants were in need of money, both Coligny's and D'Andelot's troops being in arrears of pay, the latter's reiters having gone three months without wages.2 On the other hand the government was in better financial condition through the efforts of the cardinal of Lorraine, who collected some money at the Council of Trent3 in order to continue the war, and the active efficiency of the Spanish ambassador and the papal legate, who were excellent coworkers.4 Yet, in spite of defeat, Coligny was resolved to continue the fight, though uncertain what policy to follow. At first he was inclined to go into Dauphine and join forces with Des Adresse against the duke of Nemours,3 but the prospect of Catholic relief from Ger many in the early spring made it advisable to abandon this plan. The military situation was much as follows in mid- January, 1563: the Huguenot center was at Orleans, where D'Andelot lay, in control of the middle line of the Loire above Blois and as far northward as Chateaudun and the vicinity of Chartres;6 Coligny lay at Villefranche (January 12) ; Montgomery was in Dieppe and the English in Havre. But communication between the Protes tant coreligionists was prevented by the way in which the Catholic troops were disposed. Etampes, which the duke of Guise recov ered in January, restored the necessary connecting link between Blois and Paris, and the whole line of the Seine was in the hands of the Catholics; Warwick was being besieged in Havre by Vieilleville (he had succeeded the Marshal St. Andre and was also governor of Normandy), who lay at Caudebec.7 The marshal 1 C. S. P. For., No. 14, §2, January 3, 1563. 2 Ibid., No. 16, §2, January 3, 1563, and No. 32 — D'Andelot to Elizabeth from Orleans, January 5, 1563; cf. Forbes, II, 263. 3 Sarpi, Histoire du Concile de Trent, Book VII, chap, xlviii. ? C. 5. P. For., No. 15, §1, January 3, 1563. 5 Ibid., Eng. For., No. 35, January 6, 1563; Forbes, II, 270; No. 54, §2, January 7; No. 69, §1, January n, 1563. 6 La Mothe Fenelon to St. Sulpice, December 17, 1562; L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 103, 104. i C. S. P. Ven., December 27, 1562. 1 82 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Brissac was at Rouen with seventeen ensigns. The marshal Bourdillon who had been given the baton of the late marshal Termes was in Piedmont. Paris of course was in the government's hands. In Berry where the upper waters of the Loire and the Seine flow close together the lines of the two hostile parties came in contact. The admiral in the second week in January, 1563, passed the Loire at Beaugency and distributed his men at St. Aignan, Celles, and Montrichard, which lay on the right bank of the stream.1 At the same time Guise had been minded to cross the river the other way and attack Orleans. This move on the part of each commander brought about a collision of forces near Clery, in which Guise was repulsed. The condition of the coun try at the time was terrible, especially for the duke, whose troopers were so pressed that they had to forage twelve leagues from camp.2 Everywhere the reiters were held in terror, for these raiders fre quently made long and rapid marches and fell suddenly upon places, carrying death and destruction with them. In the meanwhile, the constable had been kept in light captivity at Orleans,3 a treatment in contrast with that experienced by Conde, who was first kept under strong guard by Damville in the little abbey of St. Pierre at Chartres, both the windows and the street being barred, and later, on January 24, 1563, brought to Paris.4 Ever since Dreux, the queen mother and the constable had been constantly employed in the endeavor to make a settle- 1 Randolph wrote to Cecil on January 5, 1563: "We thought ourselves happy till we heard of the prince's taking, but despair not as longe as the admiral kepethe the feeldes." — C. S. P. Scot., I, 1,160. 2 Ibid., For., No. 83, January 13, 1563; No. 84, §3, same date; No. 109, §6, January 17; No 137, §5, January 23, 1563. 3 Ibid., No. 83, §3, January 13, 1563. 4 "Coll. d'un ancien amateur," Hotel Drouot, February 10, 1877, No. 34: Eleanor de Roye to Catherine de Medici from Orleans, December 22, 1562, asking that pity be taken upon the prince of Conde; C. S. P. For., No. 35, January 6, 1563; Forbes, II, 270; No. 146, §3: "This night (January 24) Conde was brought into this town with a strong guard. He came on horseback, and was brought through the town in a coach covered with black velvet, by torch-light, and the windows of the coach open; but the torch was so carried that none could see him.'' The gov ernment had good reason to fear an attempt would be made to rescue him while he was at Chartres. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 183 ment.1 In the case of the constable, self-interest was the chief motive : he chafed under confinement and was envious of the duke of Guise.2 On the other hand, Catherine's anxiety was of a poli tical nature. She was fearful lest England permanently acquire Havre-de- Grace. Her purpose was to make peace with the Hugue nots and then unite the parties in a war for the recovery of Havre.3 But the mistrust of the Huguenots that the overtures of peace were meant to be an accord in appearance only ; the ambition of the Guises who saw their power thrive in the struggle; the oppo sition of Paris, and perhaps above all, the opposition of Spain, were difficulties in the way.4 Philip II's joy over Dreux was tempered by his anxiety, and he secretly aimed to thwart any terms of peace at all favorable to the Protestants.5 Catherine probably would have preferred to abide by anything rather than have the Guises gain greater profit.6 The queen mother urged 1 "A ce soir bien tard j'ay receu la lettre qu'il vous a pleu m'escripre par la poste et vous puis asseurer Madame qu'il y a deux jours que Madame la Princesse et mon nepveu Dandelot veullent vous envoyer la response et advis de mon nepveu monsieur l'admiral et de toute leur compaigne. Mais je les en ay engarder sur la tente qu'auyons au retour du Plessis qui devoit estre samedy au matin pour estre rendu certain de vostre volonte, a quoy les voys tous fort affectionnes pour faire une bonne paix," etc., etc. — Montmorency to Catherine de Medicis, Orleans, 12 Janvier 1563 (Fillon Collection, No. 2652). 2 C. S. P. For., No. 35, §2, January 6, 1563; Forbes, II, 270. 3 Catherine expressed this determination as far back as October 20 in a letter to St. Sulpice (L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 87; C. S. P. For., No. 37, January 6, 1563)- * C. S.. P. Ven., February 2, 1563. 5 Cf. L' Ambassade St. Sulpice, 93, 108, 114, 116, and Corresp. de Cath. de Mid., I, 508, 548. This was the real mission of Don Fernando de Toledo, a bastard son of the duke of Alva and grand prior of the order of St. John in Castile, who was sent to France to congratulate Charles IX on the victory of Dreux (cf. C. S. P. For., No. 187, January 29, 1563, from Madrid; No. 190, January 30, from Madrid; No. 234, February 3, from Madrid). St. Sulpice this early surmised that Alva, at any rate, though he did not yet so suspect the political designs of Philip II, desired the continuation of civil war in France in order that Spain might profit by her distress, and so wrote to Catherine de Medicis. — L' ambassade de St. Sulpice, 93, November 12, 1562. In consequence of this attitude, religious and political, the arguments of France fell upon deaf ears (see ibid., 122, and note). 6 Cf. C. S. P. For., No. 35, §2, January 6, 1563; No. 109, § 4, January 17; No. 182, §9, January 28; Forbes, II, 270, 287. 184 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE the necessity of peace on account of lack of funds to carry on the war.1 But her arguments were cast to the winds by the triumphant Guises when money began to pour into France from Spain, Venice, the duke of Tuscany, and from some of the Catholic German princes.2 On the other hand, the penury of the Protestants increased from day to day. Coligny was in daily fear lest the reiters would desert him on account of the delay in paying them.3 In vain he wrote to Elizabeth, urging the speedy remittance of money. The cautious procrastination and niggardly policy of Elizabeth in the end was fatal to his purpose. In vain her ambassador in France, the faithful Throckmorton, urged immediate and liberal action. Warwick also added his plea, informing the home government and the queen that the admiral would be "ruined and unable to hold up his head without her aid in men and money."4 Eliza beth's notorious parsimony led her to deceive the French Protes- • C. S. P. Ven., February 6, 1563. 2 Ibid., For., No. 234, February 3, 1563, from Madrid. No. 194, January 30, 1563. The money was used to purchase the services of 3,000 reiters and some new levies of Swiss. Pending their arrival, Charles IX called out the arriere-ban — cavalry of the nobility obliged to serve upon call — to prosecute the war (C. S. P. Ven., February 17, 1563). See the interesting account of the interception of 13,000 ecus d'or probably by the Huguenots, though it may have been by robbers, sent from Flanders in February, 1563 (Paillard, "De tournement au profit des Hugue nots d'un subside envoye par Philippe II a Catherine de Medicis," Rev. hist., II, 490). 3 C. S. P. For., No. 145, January 24, 1563; Forbes, II, 300. 4 Ibid., Eng. For., No. 289, February 12, 1562. "If the admiral," wrote the earl, "should, for want of present aid, be discomfited and driven to make composi tion, they may reckon not only upon the whole power of France being bent against this place (Harfleur), but that the same will, with the assistance of Spain and Scot land and their confederates, be also undoubtedly extended against England. But if he be now aided with 10,000 men and 200,000 crowns, further inconvenience will be stayed and may serve a better purpose than the employment at another time of a far greater number at larger charges. It would be better for the queen to convert a good part of her plate into coin than slack her aid." — Ibid., Eng., No. 290, February 12, 1563; add Nos. 285, 287. Warwick in seconding Coligny's appeal (ibid., For., No. 294, February 12, 1563) urged haste in the matter of the money, as "if it is not sent in time it will be the ruin of the cause through mutiny of the reiters, who may even kill the admiral;" moreover, as the admiral's forces were all cavalry, English infantry was wanted. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 185 tants with vague promises, a policy so short-sighted that it ulti mately lost England the support of the Huguenots and compelled the evacuation of Havre-de- Grace, which otherwise they might have made another Calais. By February the admiral's patience was well-nigh exhausted, and his troops in mutiny, the reiters raid ing the country to such an extent that the court and the foreign ambassadors were compelled to retire from Chartres to Blois, not daring to try to go to Paris. As his position became more des perate from want of funds, Coligny determined to strike northward, if possible to effect a juncture with the English on the coast of Normandy, and so while his agents parleyed for peace in order to gain time and deceive the enemy, the admiral, leaving his wagons and baggage behind him in order that his reiters might ride unim peded, stole away from Jargau on the night of February 1 with 2,000 reiters, 1,000 mounted arquebusiers, and 500 gentry. His purpose was to join Warwick, but when he reached Dreux, where the battle had been fought six weeks earlier, he discovered that it was impossible for him to cross the Seine, and hence, after send ing word to the earl that he was in hard straits for money to pay his men and had "much ado to keep them together," he drew off toward Caen.1 While Coligny lay at Dives, Throckmorton — it must have been against his own convictions — was sent to confer with him, inform ing him that if the admiral counted that the payment of his army and the support of the war depended upon Elizabeth alone, he was to understand that the people of England would not willingly con tribute to such an expense, since the war was of little profit to them. Therefore Elizabeth advised the Huguenots not to refuse reason able conditions of peace, the English queen including in the sphere of "reasonable conditions" Huguenot insistence that Calais be restored to England.2 In the meantime, while Coligny's position was growing worse 1 C. 5. P. For., Nos. 265, 276, 280, 282, 289, February, 1563. 2 Ibid., Eng., No. 291. Throckmorton's report of his conference with Admiral Coligny, February 12, 1563. It is astonishing, after this display of selfishness and greed, that Coligny should still have retained patience with, and faith in, Elizabeth. 186 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE and worse, the position of D'Andelot in Orleans had also become serious. The duke of Guise invested the city on February 4, and got possession of Portereau (February 6), a faubourg of Orleans across the river, which had been fortified during the previous summer. But the Huguenots still held the town at their end of the bridge and broke several of the arches down. A tiny island lay in the stream and this the duke planned to reach by filling thousands of sacks with sand and gravel and throwing them into the river between the banks at Portereau and the island from whence he would be more able to attack Orleans with cannon.1 But it being winter time, the river was too deep and the current too strong. Failing this, he planned to cut the river above Orleans in order to let the water into the meadow lands.2 The spirited siege lasted many days. Every kind of metal was impressed into service by those of Orleans, including shells made of brass, "which was a new device and very terrible," and their ammunition seemed likely to outlast that of their enemy. The Catholic position around Orleans was by no means an enviable one. Food, money, and ammunition were lacking. All Guise's men-at-arms and light horsemen lived at discretion — that is, they quartered themselves on the surrounding villages and forced the poor people of the country to feed them and their horses. The court was doing the same at Blois to the "marvellous destruction" of the country. The lack of powder bade fair to be fatal to the duke's success, for the government's powder factories at Chartres, Chateaudun, and Paris were all blown up, accidentally or otherwise, about this time, that of Paris having occurred on January 28, 1563, with great destruction of property and some lives.3 In consequence of these 1 The duke was short of heavy guns and had to send to Paris for them to come to Corbeil by water, from thence to Montargis, and so after by land to the river. The defenders had improvised a mill on the island into a fortress but after the ar rival of the heavy guns, so hot a fire was poured upon them that they were compelled to retire across the bridge, "leaving many to the mercy of the fish" (Claude Haton, I. 3i9)- 2 C. S. P. For., No. 323, February 17, 1653. Both D'Aubigne^ Book III, chap, xvi, and La Noue, Mim. milit., chap, x, have vivid accounts of this siege; cf. also De Thou, Book XXXIV. 3 Barbaro gives details of the havoc wrought by this explosion (C. S. P. Ven., January 28, 1563); cf. C. 5. P. For., No. 239, §3, No. 323, § 18, February 17, 1563. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 187 disasters, the Catholic artillery had to send all the way to Flanders for gunpowder. Although some breaches were made in the wall by the CathoHcs, the duke of Guise delayed final assault, for two reasons: first, because the queen mother hoped to take the city by composition, secondly, because Catholic reinforcements were looked for late in March out of Germany, Switzerland, and Gas cony, to the number of ten thousand. No such silver lining lightened the cloud on the Huguenot hori zon. D'Andelot from Orleans, the princess of Conde, Eleanor de Roye, from Strasburg, her imprisoned husband, and Coligny all implored the English queen in vain for speedy relief. The admiral's position by the end of February was desperate. He had been compelled to move into the western part of Normandy, for his 5,000 reiters were "in such rage for their money that he could scarce keep them together," and were being so corrupted by the enemy that he might otherwise have lost them utterly.1 Powder also was wanting.2 The condition of Montgomery3 in Dieppe and of Warwick in Havre was quite as bad. In Havre food was so scarce that rations were reduced to a two-penny loaf to four persons; wood was unprocurable; the water was bad.4 The spoiling of Normandy from the devastation of Coligny's reiters who were levying upon the country without law or order, and burning and destroying villages without regard to religion, was 'Throckmorton wrote to Cecil on February 21: "He is to be pitied, for every hour he is in danger of his life and of being betrayed by his reiters." — C. S. P. For., No. 333, §§1, 5, 9, February 20, 1563; No. 339, February 21, 1562. 2 Ibid., No. 374, March ±, 1563; Forbes, II, 332. 3 Montgomery to the Rhinegrave, Dieppe, 8 fevrier, 1563: "Les habitans du plat pays m'ont faict entendre qu'ils seroient prestz de se joindre a moy si je me vouloys metre en campagne pour les deffendre des oppressions, pilleries et saca- gementz qu'ilz disent estre exerces par ceux qui vous suivent Monsieur l'admiral [Coligny] n'est [pas] au pays [l'Orleannais] que me mandez. ou a tout le moings qu'il a faict une extreme diligence et est plus pres de nous qu'on ne cuyde, en delliberation de metre bientost une fin a. ces troubles, pour nous faire tous jouyr du rang que nous debrons tenir prez la personne du Roi comme ses vrays subjets et loyaulx serviteurs." — Fillon Collection. 4C. 5. P. For., No. 352, Warwick to the council, February 25, 1563; cf. Forbes, II, 336; C. 5. P. Eng. For., No. 327, §3, February 18, 1563; Forbes, II, 334, 38°, March 1, 1563; cf. Nos. 333, 344. 1 88 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE terrible. "If the reiters understand that another messenger has arrived here (Caen) from the queen and the money not come," wrote the admiral, "it will be impossibble to save our throats from being cut." Fortunately the very next day the English ambassa dor arrived in Caen with word for Coligny to the effect that eight thousand pounds in English sovereigns, French crowns, angels, and pistolets were on the way from Portsmouth to Caen.1 Fire opened on Caen castle on March i, and the next day the marquis D'Elbceuf surrendered it. Bayeux also capitulated.2 The fall of these two places and the fearful state of the country,3 might have broken the resolution of the crown to continue the war.4 But another fate intervened. Henry of Guise was mortally wounded on the night of February 18, 1563, by a Huguenot assassin named Poltrot5 and died on 1 The money reached Havre on February 25 and was brought by Beau voir, Briquemault, and Throckmorton under guard of eight pieces of artillery to Caen at once (Delaborde, II, 226, 227). The reiters received their pay at once. For some curious information about the avarice of the reiters and the pay given them, see Papiers d'etat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 129, note; VII, 407. 2 C. S. P. For., 391; Forbes, II, 346. 3 Catherine wrote with truth: "Ce royaume est reduit en telle extremite que la necessite veut que l'on ne perde l'occasion de faire pacifier, principalement pour jeter hors les etrangers, m6mement les Anglais." — L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 101. 4 "La guerre," said Catherine with words of simple dignity, which were re peated in the instructions of the special envoys sent to notify the court of Vienna and Madrid, the Vatican and the Council of Trent, "a tellement appauvri le roy aume qu'il est reduit a. un etat digne de commiseration. La voie des armes etait impossible; le remede propre a un tel mal; l'experience a demontre, c'est un libre et general concile." — Corresp. de Cath. de Mid., II, Introd., v. Philip II, reproached the regent of Parma for not lending assistance to France. See her letter justifying her conduct in Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 266, August 12, 1563. s The marshal Brissac succeeded to the command (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 120). For the influence of the death of the duke of Guise in France, see For neron, Hist, des dues de Guise, II, 80; upon Flanders, Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 52, 61, 65; Gachard, Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 245. For interesting details see D'Aubigne", Book III, chap, xx; Mim. de Condi, IV, 243; C. 5. P. For., No. 332, February 20, 1563; No. 354, §§2-5, February 26, 1562, both from Smith to Queen Elizabeth, written from Blois. Cf. Forbes, II, 159; 36J1 §§1-8, 17, February 26, 424, §10 March 8, 1563; C. 5. P. Ven., letters of February THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 189 Ash Wednesday following, February 24. The death of the duke of Guise was a heavy blow to the Catholics. His following, because of his personal magnetism, was greater than that of any other Catholic leader, for many noblemen and gentlemen adhered to the Catholic cause more for love of him than for loyalty to the established religion. Moreover, he was an able general uniting quickness of intelligence, determination, experience, popularity, and physical endurance in his talented person. Immediately after ASSASSINATION OF THE DUKE OF GUISE, FEBRUARY 18, 1563 (Tortorel and Perissin) Guise was hurt, the queen mother went to the camp with the desire to see the constable. The prince of Conde and the con- 23, 27, and March 2, 23, 1563. It is said the duke received warning from Montluc and Madame de St. Andre, but that the word arrived too late. The news of his death was kept from Mary Stuart for some time. See C. S. P. Scotland, VI, No. 1,173, March 10, 1563; VIII, No. 17, March 18, 1563; No. 30, April i, 1563; No. 31, April 10, 1563. On the political theory of assassination, see Weill, 69. Poltrot was put to death on March 18; for the trial, see Mim.-journ. de Frangois, de Lorraine (Michaud Coll.), 506, 537 ff.; Paulin Paris, Cabinet hist., I&re part., Ill, 49 ff. A conspicuous instance of the high-mindedness of Jeanne d'Albret is the letter of consolation she wrote to the duchess of Guise after the assassination of the duke (La Ferriere, Rapport, 39). 190 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE stable were obviously the men of the hour, and as they could not conduct negotiations while they were prisoners, they were both liberated on March 8, and held a conference together on that day.1 On March 19 the King, with the assent of his council, formally decreed religious toleration and appointed the prince of Conde" Heutenant-general of the realm with exemption for seizure of any of the royal revenues by him during the troubles.2 It was high time for peace to be made, for the revolt of the provinces was INTERVIEW ON THE ILE-AUX-BCEUFS (Bib. Nat., Estampes, Histoire de France, Q. b) increasing. In La Rochelle, Poitou, Guyenne, and Picardy the " Howegenosys " had again rebelled in February, and the lieuten ants of these provinces sent to Blois for aid.3 1 C. S. P. For., No. 422, March 8, 1562; Forbes, II, 350, 354, 356; C. 5. P. For., No. 437, March 12, 1563; ibid., No. 424, §§25-27; No. 435, March 11, 1562, Conde" to Smith. 2 Ibid., No. 473; 481, March 20, the Rhinegrave to Warwick on the basis of a letter of the queen mother (Beza, II, 17, ed. 1841). 3 C. 5. P. For., Nos. 395, §2, March 3, 1563; 419, §5, March 7; 424, §§3, 4i Forbes, II. "La retarder d'un jour," said De Losses in one of the sessions of the King's council, "c'e'tait exposer la ville de Paris au sac et au pillage, laisser le roi THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 1 91 The terms of Amboise are interesting because they mark the triumph of the aristocratic element in the Huguenot party, whose interests were identified with their political purposes and their feudal position, over the " Geneva party," who were austere Cal vinists, and who had an eye single to religion only.1 D'Andelot, and to a less degree the admiral, were representatives of this latter group.2 The terms of peace provided that the prince of Conde" was to succeed to the place of the late king of Navarre; that the Huguenot army was to be paid by the government; that in all towns where the Reformed religion prevailed, save Paris, it was to be protected; that in every bailiwick the King was to appoint one town where the gospel might be preached; that all gentlemen holding fiefs in low or mean justice might have preaching in their houses for the benefit of their families; that all nobles enjoying high justice might have preaching on their estates; that property confiscated from either church was to be restored.3 Paris firmly refused at first to tolerate any terms of peace,4 its Catholic pre judices being aggravated by desire to revenge the murder of the duke of Guise; but the King replied to the demur of the Parlement et la reine a la merci des protestants encore aux armes." M. Gonnor, later the mar shal Matignon, dwelt upon the miserable state of the country and concluded: "Je parle sans passion. Je ne suis pas huguenot et je supplie la cour de ne pas differer P enregistrement de l'e'dit." — Corresp. de Cath de Mid., II, Introd., iii. 1 "Traite politique par lequel en quelque sorte la gentilhommerie provinciale s'isolait du puritanisme de Geneve." — Capefigue, 260. 2 "C'est trop grand pitie que de limiter ainssy certains lieux pour servir a Dieu, comme s'il ne vouloit estre en tous endroicts." — Fillon Collection, 2,657, the admiral to the landgrave from Caen, March 16, 1563. 3 " Edict et declaration faite par le roy Charles IX sur la pacification des troubles de ce Royaume: le 19 mars 1563," Par., Rob. Esiienne, 1563; Isambert, XIV, 135. The various pieces showing the evolution of the edict are to be found in Mim. de Condi, IV, 305, 333, 356, 498, 504. Cf. C. S. P. For., Nos. 428, 430, 431 (March 10, 1563). Biron was sent into Provence in 1563 with instructions to give ah account to the King of the manner in which justice was administered there and how the edict was executed. He was also to find the count of Tendes and Sommerive and express the King's displeasure of their conduct. The royal instructions are evidence of the sincerity with which the government started to execute the edict (La Ferriere, Rapport, 46; cf. Collection Trimont, ser. 3, p. 124). 4 C. 5. P. For., No. 424, §16; No. 590, April 8, 1563; Forbes, II, 379. 192 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE that the city must make up its mind to accept the conditions.1 On the other hand, Lyons as obstinately refused to receive the mass, so that the country round about it remained turbulent well into the autumn.2 Rouen, Dijon, Toulouse, encouraged by the opposition of the Parlement, refused to recognize the edict.3 The roads were filled with robbers, and the continued presence of the reiters, to whom an enormous sum in wages was due, was a per petual menace. The Germans who had been in the service of the King and those of the prince of Conde fraternized on the road home. They made a great troop to the number of 10,000 or 12,000, taking the road from Orleans by way of Pluvieres and Etampes to Paris, and arrived there in Easter week, where they staid for five weeks at least. When they left they were an entire day crossing the bridge over the Seine, because of the enormous amount of baggage which they had. After having crossed the Seine, the reiters divided into two bands for better living, one of them skirting the right bank of the Seine, the other crossing Brie to the Marne, in order to find better provisions for themselves and their horses. These latter traversed Champagne to the River Aube and encamped at Mon- tier-en-Der near Vassy for six entire weeks, marauding the country 1 C. S. P. Ven., March 23, 1563. "Response faicte par le Roy (Charles IX) et son Conseil, aux Presidens et Conseillers de sa Cour de Parlement de Paris: Sur la remonstrance faicte a. sa dicte maieste, concernant la declaration de sa Maiorite, et ordonnance faicte pour le bien, et repos publique de son Royaume " (Lyons, Rigaud, 1563). In the first week of May the King summoned the members of the Parlement of Paris and the authorities of the city to St. Germain, commanding them before the week was out to obey the Edict of Toleration, to release those imprisoned for religion, and to lay down their arms (C. S. P. For., No. 703, §3, May 4, 1563). Paris finally published the edict, but observed it slightly, the Parlement admitting the "graces" of the edict, but saying it could not in its conscience allow two religions (ibid., No. 1190, 835, June 2, 1563). For an example of the violence of the capital see No. 895, June 15, 1562. The public criers and the very horses which they used in the crying of the edict in the city of Paris were in danger of being killed by the populace, which poured out of the mouths of the streets (Claude Haton, I, 328). 2 "Le peuple y est fort sedicieux." — Fourquevaux to St. Sulpice, October 13, 1563, L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 165. 3 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., iv. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 193 for five or six leagues about. Their depredations drove the peas antry to such despair that protective associations composed of the peasantry and nobles were formed to resist their aggressions, and these fell upon stragglers whenever they found a little group of them, and cut their throats. Gradually, however, these despoil- ers were drawn off out of the land, being accompanied to the fron tier by the French infantry under the command of the prince de Porcien, who was then at Metz, where he had been stationed to foil any effort the Emperor might make for its recovery.1 The priest-historian of Provins has graphically depicted the depreda tions of the reiters : At the beginning of this war [he says] the people of the villages were so rich and well provided for, so well furnished in their houses with all kinds of furniture, so well provided with poultry and animals, that it was noble to see. . . But the soldiers destroyed their beautiful tables, their shining brass-bound chests, and killed a great quantity of poultry without paying for it, or else offering a paltry sum in proportion to the number of soldiers who were lodged in the house. It was all one whether one man or many were so lodged, because the soldier who had a house to himself seized everything to his own profit. The wives and daughters of the peasantry were compelled to defend their honor. Property was seized and every sort of villainy was done by the soldiers, within the space of the three or four days that they might remain at a place.2 Not since the Hundred Year's War had France beheld a people more fearful and formidable than were these reiters. They plund ered the wretched people of all their goods, loading their horses and wagons therewith. Amid their equipment they carried win nowing fans to winnow the grain, flails to beat it in the granges, and sacks to bind it up in. They had with them mills to grind the grain and little ovens to bake bread in. Wherever they lodged they tore up floors, broke into closets, and ransacked gardens, C. S. P. Ven., March 29, April 10 and 20, 1563. On the prince de Porcien, see Le Laboureur, I, 389; also an article by Delaborde in Bulletin de la Soe prot. /rang., XVIII, 2. Claude Haton gives some vivid details about this retirement of the reiters (Vol. I, p. 355). Cf. Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 15, 16, 42. On the case of the Three Bishoprics see St. Sulpice, ibid.; C. S. P. Ven., March 29, April 10, 1563; C. S. P. For., Nos. 323, §8, and 419, §5, 420, 455; Nig. Tosc, III, 403. 2 Claude Haton, I, 279, 280. 194 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE courts, and chimneys, in order to find booty. They even fell upon the houses and chateaux of the nobles, where they passed, if they saw they were not strong or well defended.1 For this reason those living in poorly fortified houses vacated them and fled to the towns. Those who owned strong and well-fortified houses levied soldiers for their defense. What happened at Provins happened, doubtless, in many other places, too. In the carrefours of Provins, it was proclaimed that no inhabi tant of the town, under pain of a fine of one hundred livres tournois and imprisonment, should leave it, and that every man at the hour of ten in the morning must report with his arms before the house of his sergeant (dizainier) for the purpose of mounting guard upon the walls, each in his own part of the city. Everybody in the surrounding country began to vacate their houses and to drive their cattle into the town. On the evening before Easter mes sengers of Provins reported that the reiters were near. At this news watchers were set upon the wall of the town, and a corps de garde posted by the town authorities. On the morning of the morrow, which was Easter Sunday, the gates of the town were not opened until eight o'clock, upon which there poured into the town an infinite number of wagons and pack-animals laden with the possessions of the villagers round about. There was hardly room to bestow so many people and so many animals. Divine service was celebrated in the parish churches, for it was expected that the reiters would take their course toward the town, and the people were resolved not to let them enter, but to resist to the very last drop of blood. In order to ascertain what was the equipment and the arms of each in habitant of the town, a general meeting was called at midday for a view of arms, but it was not possible to hold the meeting because all the streets and squares were packed with the refugees and their animals. In consequence of this, local meetings were held in each of the quarters of the city. Thus the day wore on and consternation abated only when it was learned that the reiters had gone off toward the Marne, which they crossed above Coulumiers. On the morrow, Easter Monday, there was no procession in the streets as 1 See the interesting account of an unsuccessful attempt by the reiters to storm a chateau (Claude Haton, I, 347-49). THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 195 usual, for fear of a surprise, and it was not until evening that the people who had found refuge within the town, began to depart.1 But the undisguised hostility of Spain to the Edict of Amboise was a greater source of danger to France than protests of the Par lement or popular violence. " If the heretics obtain their demands with the aid of the English queen," Chantonnay had threatened on March 6, "the Catholics in their turn will rise, and they will be sustained by the King my master and by all the Catholic princes."2 But Catherine was in no mood to be intimidated. She openly told him that he treated her as if he governed the country, and charged him with wilful fabrication, sarcastically adding that she could excuse him for so doing in some degree because she knew from whom he derived his opinions, meaning the constable and the two deceased members of the Triumvirate.3 Philip II's reli gious convictions were outraged by the toleration of Calvinism al lowed in the Edict of Amboise, the more so because the queen mother, in justification of the course of the government, com promised the church at large by declaring that the sole practical solution of the difficulty could be accomplished by a true general council of the church, and not by the one sitting at Trent, in defi ance of whose conclusions she asserted the legality and inviolability of the edict.4 Catherine de Medici was deeply concerned over the conduct of the Council of Trent. For the programme of zealous advo- 1 Claude Haton, I, 354. 2 Quoted by Forneron, I, 277, note 1. 3 C. 5. P. Ven., April 21, 1563. 4 Correspund. de Cath. de Mid. Introd., cxlv-vi; cf. R. Q. H., October 1869, 349-51. Charles IX was firmly resolved to enforce the national traditions of the French monarchy with reference to the papacy. The fearless speech of Du Ferrier occasioned a sensation in the council. France was accused of wishing, like England, to secede from Rome and found a national church and it was even proposed to hand the ambassador over to the Inquisition (Fremy, Un ambassa deur liberal sous Charles IX et Henri III, 1880, p. 49). So energetic were the remonstrances of Lansac that he was derisively called the "ambassador of the Huguenots" (Fremy, 21). On April 15, 1563, the King wrote to the cardinal of Lorraine to inform him that, having grown impatient at the slowness of the Council of Trent, he was send ing the president Biragues to Trent and then to the Emperor with a mission to have 196 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE cates of the counter-Reformation there aimed at church consolida tion and the enlargement of papal authority to such an extent that the immemorial liberties of the Gallican church, confirmed by the great concordat of 15 16, and the rights of the crown over the tem poralities of the church in France were seriously threatened. The complication of the Huguenots with England and the murder of the duke of Guise had brought this issue to a head. In the month in which the duke was assassinated there was a significant meeting of the ambassadors of the ultra-Catholic powers resident at the French court, in which it was resolved to support the Council in matters of religion; to prevent future appropriation of church revenues by the state under pain of excommunication; to stamp out heresy; and to avenge the murder of the duke of Guise.1 The cardinal of Lorraine was the chief representative of France at Trent and perhaps the most conspicuous prelate there. He was bitter against the policy of Charles IX, advocating utter suppression of the Huguenots. His continuance at Trent, therefore, became a danger to France and Catherine de Medici dexterously found means to remove him by sending him on special errands to Vienna and Venice, leaving the case of France at Trent in the hands of the sieur de Lansac, whose loyalty to the Catholic faith did not subvert his patriotism.2 the council transferred to a freer place if possible. The King declared that if the reforms demanded by Christianity were not accorded and confirmed by the coun cil, France would not hesitate to convoke a national council. (See the instruction to D'Oysel in Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, II, 1—3, note.) 1 "Articles de l'alegation de messieurs les ambassadeurs, estant de present a la cour; envoyez, l'un par nostre saint pere le Pape, l'autre par l'Empereur, Roy des Romains, l'autre par le Roy d'Espaigne, et le Prince de Piedmont. Au Roy de France et princes de son sang, au mois de Fevrier, 1563," Mim. de Condi, V, 406-8; cf. U Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 135 and 167. 2 Lansac and Du Ferrier were the ambassadors of France at Trent. Lansac's instructions, which outline the policy of France, are in Baschet, Journal du Con cile de Trente, etc., 251-65; add D'Aubigne, Book III, chap, xxi; St. Sulpice, 28, 64, 102, 114, 130, 141, 160-63. On Lansac, see Correspondance de Cath erine de Midicis, Index; upon Du Ferrier, consult Fremy, Un ambassadeur libiral sous Charles IX et Henri III, 1880. The cardinal of Lorraine, while agreeing with Philip II, as to religion and heresy, looked with resentment upon the King's attempt to appropriate the political THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 197 Aside from his religious antagonism, Philip II regarded his own political interests as also jeopardized by the French situation. He was alarmed at the possible recovery of Calais by England,1 and the progress of heresy and rebellion in the Netherlands, especially at Valenciennes and Tournay, was cer tain to be encouraged by the example of France, while a com-* mon effort of the Huguenots of Picardy and those of the religion across the Flemish border was seriously feared.2 destiny of Mary Stuart to his own ends (St. Sulpice to Lansac, December 15, 1562, p. 103). The whole council was filled with disaffection; 150 out of the 230 members present were Italians, most of these pensioners of Rome, so that the others re sented their preponderance (Lansac to St. Sulpice, February 10, 1563, L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 115). There were conflicts as to precedence; some of the ambassadors like Lansac and Du Ferrier believed in qualified toleration of Protestants (St. Sulpice, 115); many of the members, while believing in the enlargement of the Pope's prerogatives in religious affairs, were opposed to a reduction of governmental rights of control over ecclesiastical temporalities. Philip II's attitude in this respect was identical with that of Charles IX — each wanted to exercise political control over the church within his kingdom (St. Sulpice, 198). Even the cardinal of Lorraine was an advocate of temporal independence (St. Sulpice, 161). See Baschet, Journal du Concile de Trente; the Appendix has a valuable bibliography of the history of the Council of Trent. M. Baguenault de la Puchesse' article in R. Q. H., 1869, may be added. The cardinal of Lorraine left Trent on March 23. M. Baschet questions (p. 214): "Que sont devenues toutes les depeches qu'il a du ecrire a la Reine mere, tant sur sa negociation avec l'Empereur, que sur sa visite a la Republique de Venise et son voyage en Cour de Rome, pour l'accomplissement desquels il s'etait deplace de sa residence au Concile ?" He was not aware of the fact, when he wrote in 1870, that Count Hector de la Ferriere had shortly before discovered them in the archives at St. Petersburg (La Ferriere, Deux annies de mission d Saint Petersbourg, 51). For the cardinal's mission to Venice see R. Q. H., October 1869, 349, 350, and 385, note. 1 Forbes, II, 271; C.S. P. For., No. 1,193, §5> December 5, 1562. Granvella to the King, March 10, 1563; Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 239; cf. Philip to Margaret of Parma, May 16, ibid., I, 249. 2 The fear was amply justified. Granvella wrote to his sovereign on December 22, 1563: "Le situation actuelle de la France est plus facheuse qui j'aie vue depuis la mort du roi Francois." — Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 284. Ga chard, Rapport sur les archives de Lille, 218, cites a remark made in 1562: "Messieurs, acoustez bien ce qui adviendra en France entre les catholicques et les Huguenots; cas, au son flageolet de Franche il vous faudra danser par decha." CHAPTER VIII THE WAR WITH ENGLAND— THE PEACE OF TROYES1 (1563-64) The closure of the civil war was a necessary condition precedent "to the war France now planned to wage with her "adversary of England" for the recovery of Havre-de-Grace. Catherine de Medici had paid Coligny's reiters in order to close the chasm as soon as possible. The keen-witted representatives of Queen Elizabeth in France — -Throckmorton and Smith — had done all in their power to diussade the Protestants from making peace, "ji Too late Elizabeth perceived the result of her procrastination. War between England and France over Havre was inevitable,3 though in March the French government dissembled its real intention, giving the English to understand that the last portion of the fourth article of the peace, which referred to putting strangers out of the realm, applied to the German reiters.4 The English declared that if the French would restore Calais to the queen, Elizabeth would surrender Havre-de- Grace and Dieppe, with all that was held by the English in Normandy.5 ( But I the French contended that the English, having occupied Havre- de- Grace, were deprived of all right to Calais,6 and declined to (entertain such a proffer, hoping to recover Havre-de- Grace by force7 and also to remain masters of Calais by virtue of the treaty 1 On this subject see La Ferriere, La Normandie a I'itranger, and his article entitled, "La paix de Troyes avec l'Angleterre," R. Q. H., XXXIII, 36s. Much of the article is reprinted from the introduction to Correspondance de Ca therine de Midicis, II. 2 C. S. P. For., No. 443, March 13, 1563, Smith to D'Andelot; cf. 511, the Privy Council to Warwick, March 23, 1563; Forbes, II, 363. 3 The prince of Eboli and the duke of Alva proposed that Havre-de-Grace be put temporarily into the hands of Philip II, he to mediate between England and France! (St. Sulpice to Charles IX, July 11, 1563, and to Catherine, August 27; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 137, 151.) 4 C. 5. P. For., No. 498, March 22, 1563, Elizabeth to Smith. s Ibid., Ven., No. 319, January 24, 1563. 6 Charles IX to St. Sulpice, June 20, 1563; L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 122, 123. - 1 Ibid., 136. THE WAR WITH ENGLAND 199 of 1559, which provided that if, during the term of the treaty, which was to endure for the space of eight years, the English ac quired other possessions in France, they would immediately lose their right to Calais. To this England replied that France had been the first offender, when French troops were sent into Scotland in aid of Queen Mary; and that thereby the treaty was broken and Calais was due her. Elizabeth refused to see that her own selfish conduct had compelled the Huguenots to make terms, and / bitterly upbraided the Huguenot leaders for their "desertion."1! The determination to push the war proceeded entirely from the queen, the chief members of the government having opposed it both because of the strength of the fortress, which they thought difficult to take, and also because of the confusion which still pre vailed in the kingdom. On April 7 the prince of Conde was established in the lieutenantship. Marshal Brissac, who was chief military commander, a week later quitted Paris for Normandy in company with the Swiss, and the whole artillery lately used before Orleans was sent forward.2 Artillery and ammunition were sent by the river, and provisions also were forwarded. The campaign was delayed until this time for two reasons: first, to ascertain whether the internal disturbances could be quelled and the reiters gotten out of the kingdom, as otherwise it would have been peril ous to make any movement in the direction of the coast ; secondly, all the territory of Normandy had been so devasted by the war that 1 Neither Coligny nor D'Andelot could be prevailed upon to serve in the war against England, although believing they had been shabbily treated by Elizabeth. The admiral openly refused; D'Andelot feigned illness; Conde alone, of the Hugue not leaders, bore arms against his former ally — "l'honneur de la France couvrait son ingratitude." — Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., xii, xiii, xvii; cf. C. 5. P. For., Nos. 498, 511, 541, and especially 548, March, 1563. Elizabeth had replied to the envoy sent to her by the prince of Conde to notify her of the peace made by the prince with the King and to treat for the restitution of Havre-de-Grace, that as the envoy had neither power nor commission from the King, she would not negotiate with him, and that nothing must be said about Havre- de-Grace unless the affairs of Calais were first adjusted (C. S. P. Ven., May 18, 1563)- 2 Ibid., For., No. 936, April 17, 1563. Warwick in a letter to Lord Robert Dudley and Cecil of April 23, 1563, estimates the French force around Havre at 10,000 French and 6,000 Swiss (ibid., No. 659; Forbes, II, 398). 200 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE the army could not be maintained except at very great cost and inconvenience. Fortunately for the French government anxiety with reference to the Emperor's designs regarding Metz was now removed, the cardinal of Lorraine having persuaded Ferdinand that if the Three Bishoprics were restored they would become a refuge for the heretics from Lower Germany and Luxembourg.1 The queen mother appealed to Paris to obtain 200,000 crowns, and a royal edict commanded the clergy to contribute 100,000 ecus de rentes annual revenue.2 At the same time a government octroi upon wines was laid for six years, to the dismay of many towns, which opposed the execution of the edict, claiming that the vine and wine were their sole means of livelihood.3 The King also went to Parlement to obtain pecuniary supplies there against England, saying that the 200,000 crowns from the city was to be used to pay the reiters of the Rhinegrave, who had mutinied for their pay in Champagne, to quit the kingdom.4 Paris readily responded, "the Parisians caring not what they gave to recover Newhaven;" it had been "a scourge and loss to them of many millions of francs" during that year.5 Meanwhile the position of Warwick in Havre had grown so 1 C. S. P. For., No. 652, Mundt to Cecil, April 20, 1563, from Strasburg; cf. No. 659, Warwick to the Privy Council on the authority of the Rhinegrave, April 23", 1563; Forbes, II, 398. Nevertheless, the French continued to fortify Metz against the future (C. S. P. For., No. 705, May 4, 1563). 2 The church complied by mortgaging its possessions to this amount (Claude Haton, I, 330). They were redeemed in the March following (Catherine de Medici to St. Sulpice, December 22, 1563; L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 203; Journal de Bruslart, 141. The transaction cost the church 3,230,000 livres. Some of the clergy claimed that the King had no right to do this without papal authorization (Claude Haton, loc. cit.). 3 The rate was fixed at five livres for each measure of wine, and at 6 sous, 8 deniers, for each queue (Claude Haton, I, 330, 331). The farm of this gabelle was sold at Provins for the sum of 600 livres. 4 " Led. prince dit avoir moyen de faire sortir . . les Allemans qu'il a en grand nombre." — L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 101; C. S. P. For., Nos. 688; 748, §§13, 20; 753, §§5, 10; No. 764 (anno 1563); C. 5. P. Ven., No. 326, May 18, 1563. s C. 5. P. Eng. For., No. 750, §§6, 7, May 16, 1563; No. 753, §5, May 17; No. 770, May 20, 1563. THE WAR WITH ENGLAND 201 bad that he had expelled all strangers from the town.1 Anticipat ing a siege, a new fosse 30 feet wide, 10 feet broad, and 8 feet deep had been constructed outside of the old ditch around the town. The delay of the English government, however, was fatal to the success of Warwick. All his labors went for naught.2 ( On May 22 ] the French assault upon Havre began in earnest.3 In the midst of the tedium and the anxiety Catherine de Medici dominated all, having no regard for her own convenience, but being in vigor ous action at all hours, and under great mental strain most of the time. ^ Yet her patience, her address, and her assiduous atten tion during the time of the siege to the councils of the govern ment, and to her continual audiences, were remarkable. "Her Majesty," wrote the Venetian ambassador, "exceeds all that could be expected from her sex, and even from an experienced man of valor, or from a powerful king and military captain." ( She insisted on being present at all the assaults, and even in the trenches, where cannon-balls and arquebus-bullets were flying.4) The character of Catherine de Medici from this time forth, throughout her long and varied career, continued to fill her sub jects with astonishment.5 Not even the most consummate courtier 1 C. S. P. For., 584, April 5, 1563; Forbes, II, 573. 2 Warwick had barely 5,000 men of all sorts to defend the town (C. S. P. For., No. 680, Muster of April 29-30, 1563). There was much sickness. Food was scarce. "The estate of victuals here," wrote the earl to the Privy Council on April 30, "rests now upon a scarce proportion of one month in bread and corn (of beer we can make no further account than as long as we are masters of water, to brew), having neither flesh, fish, butter, nor cheese, nor any meat of the queen's store but bacon for two days. The clerk of the store here is as bare in money as victuals. .... The enemy's chief hope for taking this town rests upon famine." — C. S. P. For., No. 676; Forbes, II, 402. Warwick pointed out, however, that if the queen "would put forth a power upon the sea" and keep the mouth of the Seine open, as well as prevent relief from being brought from Flanders and Brittany, Havre might be saved. "Their whole relief must come to them by Picardy side, which will not suffice long; neither can they be victualled by land any way, if the com modities of the seas be by this means taken away." — C. S. P. Dom., XXVII, 15, January 12, 1563. Cf. XXVIII, 48, May 8, 1563. 3 C. 5. P. For.. No. 786; Forbes, II, 427. 4 C. 5. P. Ven., No. 328, May 28, 1563. s Rel. vin., II, 155; cf. II, 45. "Non si puo gia. negare che non sia donna di gran valore e di gran spirito." — Ibid., I, 548. "Tres-sage et tres-universelle en tout." — Brantdme, III, 249. 202 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE could have praised her beauty. ( She had big eyes and thick lips, like Leo X, her great-uncle.1 She possessed, too, the character istics of her family. She loved to erect public edifices; to collect books.) She made a profession of satisfying everybody, at least in words, of which she was not saving. Her industry in public business was the subject of astonishment. Nothing was too small for her notice. She could neither eat nor drink without talking politics. She followed the army without regard to her health or even her life. Her physical characteristics, if not the admira^ tion, were certainly the wonder of all. She was fond of good-living, eating much and irregularly, and was addicted to physical exercise, especially hunting, which she also followed for the purpose of reducing her weight. With this design, incredible as it may seem, she often rode clad in heavy furs.2 When fifty years of age she could walk so fast that no one in the court was willing to follow her. The difficulties of the French in the siege of Havre-de- Grace were very great. The locality was surrounded for the distance of a mile by marsh and by the waters of the sea, which were cut by inaccessible canals. There was a strand of sand on the seaside only about thirty yards distant from the wall at low tide. The besiegers passed along the shore, somewhat concealed by the sand and gravel cast up by the sea, and wedged themselves and their artillery between this strand and the sea, and opened fire. By the end of July the French had approached so near the walls of Havre-de- Grace that they were almost able to batter them point-blank, and the besieged went out to parley and demanded four days' time to communicate with England.3 The garrison was reduced to a sorry plight, for the French were about to storm the place, as they had already battered effectually and dismantled a bulwark and several towers of the fort and filled up the whole moat, so that with but a little more work they would have opened a road for themselves securely with a spade. They had, moreover, a battery of forty cannon, so that while only twenty 1 Rel. vin., I, 375. 2 Ibid., I, 429. 3 C. 5. P. Ven., No. 338, July 27, 1563; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 141, 142. 0 SKETCH MAP OF THE FORTIFICATIONS OF HAVRE-DE-GRACE Dated July 15, 1563. Original in Public Record Office,*State Papers, Foreign, Elizabeth, Vol. XL, No. 919. THE WAR WITH ENGLAND (203^ or thirty shots each day formed the usual feature of a siege at this time, the French now fired more than a hundred and twenty shots.1 (At last on July 28 Warwick agreed to surrender Havre-de- Grace, f and to ernbark in four days. Two days later the English admiral Clinton appeared in sight, with thirty ships and five galliots. The I French artillery was then directed toward the sea, so the admiral • set sail the next evening with the fleet, and the French army '; entered on Sunday, August 1, 1563. ^ I, The capture of Havre was of immense immediate advantage to France, especially to Normandy, Havre being the door through which all the traffic and commerce entered, not only to Rouen, but also to Normandy, and to a great part of France. Without this commerce Normandy-of-the-Seine suffered greatly.3 But Elizabeth was reluctant to believe that she had been beaten, and the autumn of the year witnessed tedious negotiations.4 The chief difficulty between the two crowns turned on the restitution of Calais. The French insisted that they were absolved from the terms of Cateau-Cambre"sis through the action taken by England in the matter of Havre-de- Grace; that thereby forfeiture of the 1 I have come upon an interesting item in the history of the art of war in con nection with this siege of Havre. In January, 1563, a Corsican, resident in Spain, by the name of Pietro Paolo del Delfino offered his services to St. Sulpice. "II va dans l'eau," wrote the ambassador to Catherine, "et m'a assure qu'avec certains engins il empechera que nul navire venant d'Angleterre puisse aborder aud. Havre sans grand danger." In June Delfino arrived at Bois de Vincennes, where he was well received, according to his own statement (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 112, and n. 4). But I do not find any further mention of him. Was this invention a sort of torpedo ? We know that shells were first used in the siege of Orleans in this year. 2 C. S. P. Ven., No. 341, August 6, 1563; on the progress of the siege and the condition of Havre cf. ibid., For., 1563, Nos. 754, §6; 762, 806, §§ 4, 5; 828, 835, 852. §4J 853, §4; 857, §8; 871, 881, 894, 907, §2; 941, 967, 973, §2; 977, §4; 982. §9; 998, 1007, 1021, 1024, 1026, §7; 1044, §4; 1049, 1081, 1086, 1100, 1208, 1296. In Appendix VI is a letter of Admiral Clinton to Lord Burghley, July 31, 1563, in which he says that the plague, not the arms of France, has conquered them. 3 C. 5. P. Ven., No. 343, August 14, 1563. 4 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., xxvi-xxviii; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 177, 194, 193. (204} THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE English right to Calais was made.' Elizabeth, on the other hand, would not make peace unless her pretensions were recognized.2 In the meanwhile, in the seas of Flanders, France, and England thousands of acts of piracy were committed, and trade in the Channel was quite interrupted.3 A partial agreement at last was patched up. On April n, 1564, the treaty of peace was signed at Troyes,4 the articles yielding Havre-de- Grace to France, in return for 120,000 gold crowns, a sum which the English grud gingly took, though they had demanded a half million, the terms also providing for property indemnifications and freedom of com merce between the two nations. Nothing was specified as to Calais. After three years of nego tiations the question still remained unsettled. In June, 1567, Sir Thomas Smith, Elizabeth's ambassador, demanded the restitu tion of Calais. Charles was evasive, saying that the messenger must be content to wait till the King had obtained the consent of his council, before whom the King told Smith openly that he would not restore Calais, but would hold it as the possession of his ancestors, to which the queen of England had no just right. When the ambassador replied, citing the word of the treaty, the chancellor answered that the promise had been given under the express conditions that the English queen should not in any way molest the subjects or territory of France or Scotland, but from what had taken place at Havre-de- Grace it appeared manifest that she had forfeited all claims which she might have had to Calais. \ The King's rejoinder was notable in that it is so excellent an ex- ,' ample of the French doctrine of "natural frontiers," Charles IX 1 "Adieu le droit de Calais," wrote Robertet, Charles IX's secretary, on July 4, 1561, to St. Sulpice (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 142). 2 C. S. P. Ven., 347, November 11, 1563; ibid., For., No. 6, January 4, 1564; No. 47, January 15. 3 Ibid., Ven., No. 348, November 18, 1563; Archives de la Gironde, XVII, 293- 4 The text of the treaty is in Rymer's Foedera, XV, 640. La Ferriere has an extended account of the negotiations in Correspondance de Catherine de Medicis, II, Introd., xxxiv-xliv. For other details see C. S. P. For., 1564, Nos. 6, 47, 250- 53> 297> 3°7_I°. 3r4> 347> 3(>3< 364. On the great commercial importance of the treaty of Troyes, see De Ruble, Le traiti de Cateau-Cambrisis, 193, 194. THE WAR WITH ENGLAND 295 replying to the effect thaf the queen ought not to regret the loss I of Calais, knowing that of old it was the possession of the crown of France, and that(God had willed it to return to its first master, and that the two realms ought to remain content with the frontiers created for them by nature and with a boundary so clearly defined as the sea.1 ' C. S. P. Ven., 1564, No. 388. CHAPTER IX EARLY LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES Thanks to her own enterprise in pushing the war which had culminated with so much honor to France, and partly also to her skilful handling of the factions at court, Catherine de Medici was now in enjoyment of supreme power. The entire weight of the government rested on her shoulders, there being no longer any other person who controlled public affairs. The Guises and Chatillon factions were full of animosity toward one another, for Madame de Guise refused to recognize the admiral's acquittal for the murder of her husband ;T Montmorency was deeply offended because the young duke of Guise received the grand-mastership and the gift of the duchy of Chatellerault, and so feigned to have the gout in order to avoid service before Havre ; Conde was doubly angry at the queen, both because she withheld the promised lieu tenant's commission and because the daughter of Marshal St. Andre, who left a great fortune, was not permitted to marry his son. The parties were, therefore, in a triangular relation toward one another and Catherine's art was bent upon maintaining the balance in order to hold her own.2 The population of the wittiest city in Europe was quick to perceive the animosities and paradoxes that existed. "The Parisians have three things to wonder at," the saying went, "the constable's beads, the chancellor's mass, and the cardinal Chatil- lon's red cap. One is ever mumbling over his beads and his head 1 "A Paris arriva toute la maison de Lorraine vestue de deuil, pour faire une solemnelle demande de justice exemplaire sur la mort du due de Guise." — D'Au bigne, II, 204; the request bearing date September 26, 1563, is in Mim. de Condi, IV, 667. Coligny was so fearful of suffering violence in Paris from the bigotry of the populace or at the instigation of the Guises, that he would not enter the city. 3 On these feuds see C. S. P. For., anno 1563, No. 748, §§1-6, 15; No. 753, §1; No. 770; No. 896, §3; No. 912, §4; No. 1,003, §3; N°- I,2i2; No. 1,233, §4; No. 1,249; No. 1,287; No- 1.337. §3; No- 1. 43i; No. 1,445, §8; Proceedings of the Huguenot Society, letters of April 20, 30, May 1, 21, 27, 31. 206 LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 207 is ever occupied with other affairs; the other hears mass daily and is the chief Huguenot in France ; the third wears a cardinal's cap and defies the Pope."1 (The queen mother had hoped that*! reHgious animosities would be forgotten in the course of the war with England. But she was disappointed. The peace of Am-i boise could not be enforced.) Even in Paris armed troops and armed guards had to patrol the streets to prevent outbreaks of violence.2 It was impossible to disarm the Catholics, who made house-to-house searches to ferret out Huguenots.3 Under the terms of pacification the Protestants were permitted to return to Paris, but who dared avail himself of so precarious a liberty? Instead, they were compelled to sacrifice their property.4 In the provinces the same condition of things prevailed — in Languedoc, in the Orleannais, in the Lyonnais.5 In Languedoc the association of the Huguenots maintained its organization, raised money, levied troops.6 Yet in spite of its failure to enforce pacification, the government required the demolition of the walls of towns known to be Huguenot strongholds, as Orleans, Montauban, and St. L6, a procedure which the Protestants strongly resisted; so that a condition of petty civil war existed throughout much of France, the Edict of Amboise notwithstanding.' Summarized, the troubles of France at this time may be said to have been the feud between the house of Guise and that of Chatillon — a feud which compro- 1 C. S. P. For., No. 1,558, December 29, 1563. "Le connetable lui meme, tout en etant homme de bien catholique, etait cependant carnale, et voulait avoir appui des deux cotes." — Baschet, Journal du Concile de Trente, 240. ' For examples see C. S. P. For., No. 982, §§1, 2, an episode of the last week of June, 1563; ibid., Ven., No. 333; Correspondance de Catherine de Medicis, II, Introd., xxix. 3 A law was made in August forbidding the wearing of any weapon but sword and dagger; concealment of firearms was an offense punishable by confiscation of lands and goods (Edict of Caen, August 24, V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 147; C. 5. P. For., No. 1,394, October 1563; ibid., No. 912). 4 C. 5. P. For., No. 1,003, July I4. 1563; ibid., Ven., No. 330, June 10. s Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., xxxii, xxxiii (many examples). 6 C. S. P. For., Nos. 896, §§3, 17; 912, §4. 7 Ibid., Nos. 1,155, 4,387, 1,394, 1,431, i,445, ann° I5^3- 208 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE mised the crown and most of the other great families of the king dom; the queen's ambition to govern, which led her to nourish the quarrel; religious intolerance; the poverty of the crown; the uncertainty of its foreign relations; and finally the detriment to its commerce on account of the war with England, which deprived France of four or five milHons of gold.1 Even before peace was made between France and England it had been decided that the King should make a tour of the prov inces for the better pacification of the country.2 A programme of administrative and financial reform was developed at the same time. The army was to be reduced; in place of the royal garrisons there was to be a "belle milice" of forty ensigns of footmen, ten each in Picardy, Normandy, Languedoc, and Dauphine. These troops were to be supported partly by the crown, partly by the provinces. The Scotch Guard was to be cut down. Through the church's aid twelve millions of the public debt, including the unpaid balance of the dowries of EHzabeth of Spain and the duch ess of Savoy, were to be paid off within six years and the aHenated domains of the crown redeemed.3 Already Charles IX's majority had been declared at Rouen, during the course of the siege of Havre4 — a dexterous stroke of the queen mother to thwart the ambitions of the factions.5 1 The fisheries of France, however, were profitable. "They quietly make their herring fishery . . without impeachment. . . . Their fish-markets were never better furnished." — C. S. P. For., No. 1,356, Throckmorton to the queen November 1, 1563. 2 Castelnau, Book V, chaps, vii-ix. 3"Instructions pour le Sieur de Lansac, envoye en Espagne, Janvier 1564," V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 223. 4 August 18, 1563. The official promulgation is in Mim. de Condi, IV, 574. Diclaration faicte par le Roy en sa majoriti tenant son lict de justice en sa cour de Parlement de Rouen, Robert Estienne, Paris, 1563. s L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 101, 102; R. Q. H., XXIV, 459; Claude Haton, I, 363, and n. 2; Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., xxiii; C. 5. P. For., No. 1,190, September, 1563. The declaration, by a technicality, contravened the testament of Charles V (1374), which for centuries had been the law regulating the King's majority. Charles IX was born on June 17, 1550, so that he was in his fourteenth year, though not yet fourteen years old. The Parlement of Paris for more than a month refused to LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 209 In the early spring of 1 564 the court set out from Fontainebleau, and thence went to Sens and Troyes, where the peace was signed; from Troyes the way led to Bar-le-Duc and Nancy. But the journey of the King, instead of allaying the disquietude of the Huguenots, alarmed them still more. For the strongest overtures were made to the King to break the peace of Amboise, not only by provincial authorities1 but also through the ambassadors of certain of the CathoHc powers. The Council of Trent had finished its labors with somewhat unseemly haste on December 4, 1563, on account of the antici pated decease of Pius IV,2 and strong pressure was brought upon the French and Spanish governments to accept its findings.3 The Pope, in consistory, accepted them in their integrity, on January 26, 1 564/ But various European governments, especially France, strongly objected to the findings as prejudicial to the interests of monarchy.5 On the first Monday in Lent the cardinal of Lorraine register the edict, not on political, but on religious grounds. It objected to "la mention de l'edit de pacification d' Amboise, introduite sans motif dans la declara tion de l'e'dit de la majorite, ce que semblait reconnaitre deux religions." — Corre spondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., xxiv. The Venetian ambassador gives an interesting character-sketch of Charles IX at this time (Rel. vin., I, 419). 1 The estates of Burgundy declared in a memorial that it was impossible to maintain double worship in France and petitioned that Protestant worship might be abolished in that province, May 18, 1563 (D'Aubigne", II, 205; Mim. de Condi, IV, 413; Castelnau, Book V, chap. vi. 2 "S'etaeint tous departis avec une hate extreme causee sur la disposition du pape." — Testu to Catherine de Medici, L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 207. "Les eVSques francais se declarent obliges de partir, se voyant prives de ressources." — Baschet, Journal du Concile de Trente, 239. 3 The Pope sent the bishop of Vintimilla to Spain to persuade Philip II to enforce the Tridentine decrees in favor of the counter-Reformation (V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 174, 200, 217, 218). See also a letter of Luna, Philip II's am bassador at Trent, of November 17, 1563, in Correspondencia de los principes de Alemania con Felipe II, y de los Embajadores de Esle en la Corti di Vienna (1556- q8) in "Documentos ine'ditos," CI, 24. 4 Annates Raynaldi, 1564, No. 1; Labb6, XIV, 939; cf. R. Q. H., October, (1869), 402. s For the grounds of objection see R. Q. H. (October, 1869), 365, 366, and 401-8; Fremy, Diplomates du temps de la Ligue, 45. In Vol. LXXXVI, Coll. de St. Pitersbourg, is a collection of letters, many of them from Lansac and the cardinal of Lorraine while at the Council of Trent. These are the letters whose disappearance Baschet wondered at and deplored (La Ferriere, Rapport, 58). 210 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE presented the decrees of Trent to the King in council and others of the Parlement, urging that their adoption was necessary for the repose of the kingdom. The debate which followed, in a certain sense was a test of strength between the moderate CathoHc party, led by the chancellor L'H6pital and the Guises. Much objection was made to the findings, especially by the chancellor, who asserted that they were contrary to the privileges of the Gal lican church, and that the cardinal's party was now trying to com pass by craft what they had failed to do by force of arms. The cardinal rejoined with words to the effect that L'Hopital was unmindful of the benefits he had received of them (the Guises), using the word ' ' ingrate ' ' (ingrat) . To this the chancellor haughti ly returned that he had never received any benefits from the car dinal or his family, that he had only filled the post of maitre de requites, which was not a high office, and that he did not desire to pay his debts at the expense of the King's sovereignty by voting in favor of the decrees. In the end, France refused to accept all of the findings.1 With the closing of the Council of Trent, the representatives of the ultra-Catholic powers, notably Spain and Savoy, intimated to Charles IX that their sovereigns would assist him in the extir pation of heresy in France. The offer was both a promise and a menace, the implication being that the Catholic world at large would not tolerate the recognition of Protestantism accorded by France and that a joint action of the powers most concerned might compel the king of France to live up to his title of Most Christian King. The cardinal of Lorraine had carried the idea of the Trium virate to Trent with him,2 and on the floor of the Council had proposed the formation of an association to be called "The Broth- 1 Charles IX to St. Sulpice, February 26, 1564, V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 229; D'Aubigne. II, 223; L'Estoile, I, 19; Bulletin de la Soe prot. frang., XXIV, 412. Catherine makes no allusion to this scene in her letter to Elizabeth of Spain at this season (L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 237). But on a subsequent occasion, when the cardinal of Lorraine dropped the remark that the Council of Trent ought to be called Spanish, the queen mother replied "qu'il avait raison, et que aussi lui meme s'e'tait montre1 tel et plus de ce parti que de tout autre." — Ibid., 383. 2 R. Q. H., XXXIV, 462; Fremy, Diplomates de la ligue, chap. i. LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 211 erhood of CathoHcs in France." He offered to secure the co-oper ation of his nephews, relatives, and friends, and returned to France with the consent of the Pope for that purpose.1 The Triumvirate, as we have seen, had already made overtures to Spain, to which Philip II had responded with cordial, if no very definite sentiments, and from the time of the promulgation of the Edict of January and the formation of the Triumvirate, the idea of a Catholic league in which the Pope and the king of Spain were to be the chief pil lars, begins to take shape.2 The mission of Louis de St. Gelais, sieur de Lansac, to Trent and Rome in this month, was partly to prevent the formation of such a league, and partly to persuade the Pope to approve the French government's appropriation of the property of the church. Granvella was not unfavorable to the idea, though in his eyes such a league should be formed, not for the purpose of intervening in France, but as a defensive measure, lest Catherine endeavor to profit by the critical situation prevailing in the Spanish Netherlands and interfere there in order to divert the discontent of the French from home affairs, and to prevent the Protestants of the Netherlands from assisting their coreligionists in France.3 The outbreak of civil war after the massacre of Vassy and the seizure of Havre-de- Grace by the EngHsh had convinced Philip II that the time to act had come in France, and Spanish troops and Spanish money were put at the disposal of the Guises, although PhiHp denied to England that he was giving succor to Catholic France.4 In May, and again in August of 1562, the Triumvirate appealed to Philip II,5 and on June 6 the Spanish King wrote to the regent in the Netherlands to send the Triumvirate assistance. But 1 Tavannes, 291. 2 Vargas, Spanish ambassador in Rome, to the cardinal Granvella, February 22, 1561 (Papiers d'itat du card, de Granvelle, VI, 512, 513; if. Q. H., XXXIV, 460). 3 On January 16, 1562, Granvella wrote to Perez from Brussels that it was already impossible to prevent this (Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 198). 4 Philip II to Quadra, Spanish ambassador in England, August 4, 1562 (Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VI, 606). s La Popeliniere, Book VIII, 591, 634, gives the text of these appeals. 212 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE the order was easier to give than to execute, and exactly a month later (July 6) both Margaret and Granvella replied, asserting the imprac- tibility of carrying out Philip's wishes on the ground that no money could be procured from the estates for such a purpose.1 In the meantime, the cardinal-legate in France, convinced that "in order to lay the ax at the root of the evil, there was no shorter way and no better expedient than recourse to arms,"2 and impatient of Spain's slow reply to the petition of the Triumvirate,3 stirred up both the Vatican and the court of Madrid to livelier action.4 As a result, although it was against their better judgment, Margaret and Granvella prevailed upon the Council of State in August to appropriate 50,000 ecus for the war in France, and in September 3,000 Italians were sent from Franche Comte to the aid of Ta vannes in Burgundy.5 The elements of the future Holy League are here manifest as early as 1561-62. But apart from the course being followed out in high political circles, at the same time, popular associations for the maintenance of the Catholic religion were being formed within France. The years 1562-63 witnessed the formation of 1 "Les etats ne payeraient un maravedis aux bandes d'ordonnance si on voulait envoyer celles-ci en France." — Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 206. 2 "Pour coupper la racine du mal, il ny puisse avoir de plus courtevoye, ny de meilleur expedient que alluy d'armes." — Lettres du cardinal de Ferrare, Letter xxx, 1563. 3 "Apres la declaration que seigneurs ont envoyee en Espagne des deniers qu'ils y ont demandez, ils ne voyant pas qu'on se haste beaucoup de leur re- spondre." — Ibid. 4 Nig. Tosc, III, 492. s Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VI, 620, September 13, 1563. It is interesting to observe the objections of Margaret of Parma and Granvella. Ac cording to the former, "l'impossibilite' de donner secours au roi de France etait notoire, a moins qu'on ne voulut la perte et la ruine totale des Pays-Bas." — Gachard, Philippe II et les Pays-Bas, I, 211; Margaret to Philip, August 6, from Brussels. The latter deplores the reduction of the forces of the country because "les ligues et confederations (c'est ainsi qu'on les appelle) formees contre lui, con- tinuent." — Ibid., August 6, 1562. Three future patriots of the Netherlands were in this session of the Council of State — William of Orange, Egmont and Hoorne. Cf. Gachard's note. LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 213 several provincial leagues and town associations, which were the real roots of the Holy League. The people of the capital had begun to manifest their preju dices in an organized military form as early as 1562, and the government, instead of suppressing this tendency, encouraged it. On May 2, 1562, the Parlement of Paris passed an ordinance ordering the Schevins and all loyal Catholics in each quarter of the city to organize under arms, with captains, corporals, and sergeants. ! But the preponderance of Paris in the formation of the Holy League has been exaggerated. When it became a national affair, Paris, as the capital and most Catholic city of France, seized hold of it and made it her own. But it is inverting things to say that Paris gave the League to the provinces. Rather Paris identified herself with their interests, and reflected their passions and their character, "fierce in Languedoc, sullenly obstinate in Brittany, everywhere modified in its nature and its devotion by the politics of the towns."2 The south of France was far more aggressive than the north in this particular, and anti-Protestant associations were formed in many provinces to the disquietude of the government, which knew not how to control them.3 The earliest of such local associations formed by the CathoHcs seems to have been one of Bordeaux, where the people were organized after the Protestant attempt to gain possession of the Chateau Trompette in Francis II's reign.4 'La Popeliniere, Book viii, 499); Rel. vin. II, 99. 2 "Cependant la ligue ne s'est pas renfermee dans l'enceinte de Paris. Paris, qui l'avait incertaine et hesitante encore, la renvoya aux provinces, toute brulante et toute armee. Elle s'associa a leur interets, r^fleta leur passions et leur caractere, feroce en Languedoc, durement obstinee en Bretagne, partout modifiee dans sa nature et sa duree par la politique locale des municipalites." — Ouvre', Essai sur I'histoire de la ligue d Poitiers (1855), 6. 3 Ranke, Civil Wars and Monarchy in France, 226, notices this contrast between the north and the south. 4 This local organization did not seem strong enough for Montluc, whose activity against the Protestants in 1562 was already notable and who was sus picious lest some Huguenots might creep into the body and betray it; so the power was taken out of the hands of the jurats of the city at his suggestion and vested in the hands of Tilladet, governor of Bordeaux, who also had possession of the keys 214 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE This association formed in Bordeaux is the germ of the Catholic League which later expanded over the Bordelais and Gascony. Other portions of France followed suit. In November, 1562, the Association of Provence was formed at Aix and terrorized the Huguenots.1 Toulouse was notoriously Catholic, and street wars between Catholics and Protestants were of common occurrence. A more than usually violent outburst of popular fury here culmi nated on March 2, 1563, in the formation of a CathoHc League, of which the cardinals Armagnac and Strozzi, lieutenants of the King in the seneschaussees of Toulouse and Albi, the president of the Parlement, Du Faur, who was advocate-general of the crown, certain eminent knights of the Order, and the famous Montluc, were sponsors. The immediate occasion of this out break at Toulouse seems to have been the combination of fury and fear of a plot which the Catholics felt when they learned of the duke of Guise's assassination. When the outbreak began, the president of the Parlement of Toulouse hastily dispatched a messenger to Montluc entreating him to come to their assistance. Upon Montluc's arrival at Toulouse the leaders prayed him to put himself at the head of the troops in the province against the Huguenots. Montluc at first made some difficulty about consenting to this request, because he had no permission from Damville, the governor of Languedoc, in which province Toulouse was located, and who, moreover, was not one of his friends.2 Finally, however, he of the city. This proceeding was destined to be revolutionary in the development of the municipality. The jurats pleaded their ancient privileges, which were as old as the English domination, which Louis XI had confirmed after the wars of the English in France were over. But the parlement of Bordeaux approved the change and thus the form of government of the greatest city of the Gironde was altered by stress of circumstances (O'Reilly, Hist, de Bordeaux, II, 241—44; Montluc, Lettres et commentaires, IV, 214, note). Cf. Gaullieur, Histoire de la riformation a Bordeaux et dans le ressort du parlement de Guyenne. Tome I, "Les origines et la premiere guerre de religion jusqu'a. la paix d' Amboise" (1523-63), Paris, 1848. 1 "Tellement que les pauvres fideles trembloyent dans Aix et plusieurs firent constraints de s'enfuyr." — Mim. de. Condi, IV, 240. At p. 278 is an account of the formation of this league. Cf. Discours viritable des guerre et troubles odvenus au Pays de Provence en Van 1562. 2 This was Henri Damville, the second son of the constable Montmorency. LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 215 yielded to their request, and measures were taken to put an army on foot in thirty days. Those who composed this assembly drew up the compact of a league or association on March 2, 1563, which was to be observed by the* clergy, the nobility, and the third estate in the towns and dioceses within the jurisdiction of the parlement of Toulouse, both in Languedoc and Guyenne. According to the articles of this association the members engaged to bear arms, and to make oath between the hands of those commissioned by the Parlement, or by the King's lieutenant in the country, to march whenever required for the defense of the Catholic religion. The parlement of Toulouse approved and authorized this association on March 20, provisionally and without charges, "subject to the good pleasure of the King." In the name of this league taxes were laid, men were levied, and an inventory of arms made in every generalite and diocese.1 Montluc had come to Toulouse, fresh from the formation of another and eariier league for the preservation of the Catholic faith, in Agen, which had been organized on February 4, 1563. This league was a direct consequence of the siege of Lectoure and the battle of Vergt. Montluc had received orders to report, with the marshal Termes, to the King in the camp before Orleans. But the Agenois was not quite pacified and the gentry of the country were so filled with alarm, that they concluded, so Montluc naively says, "that in case I should resolve to go away to the King, as his Majesty commanded, and offer to leave them without a head, they must be fain to detain me in the nature of a prisoner."2 The upshot of things was that the "Confederation and Association of the town and city of Agen and other towns and jurisdictions of 1 This association, in the words of D'Aubigne, was the "prototype et premier example de toutes les ligues qui ont despuis paru en France." — Vol. II, 137. Ex tended accounts of its origin may be found in the Annates de Toulouse, II, 62 ff.; De Thou, IV, Book XXXIV, 496, 497; La Popeliniere, Book VIII, 602, gives the text of the compact, which shows the financial measures adopted in the support of the league; Lettres et commentaires de Montluc, ed. De Ruble, II, 398; Hist, du Languedoc, V, 249 ff. Protestant accounts are in Beza, Book X; D'Aubigne, HI, chap, xviii. 2 Commentaires (Eng. trans.), Book V, 232. 216 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Agen" was formed and organized on February 4, 1563, with a captain, Heutenant, sergeants, corporals, and other necessary officers, in order to extirpate the Huguenots from the region. It was an oath-bound covenant.1 The examples of Agen and Toulouse were contagious, and the popular hatred of the Huguenots, on account of the assassina tion of the duke of Guise, induced the spread of these local leagues. On March 13, 1563, the Catholic lords of Guyenne also entered into a league at Cadillac on the same plan and for the same object as that of the Catholics of Agen and Languedoc.2 Like the earHer ones, the league of Guyenne was organized by parishes, districts, seneschaussees and provinces, under the direction of one supreme chief assisted by a council chosen from the third estate. In the north of France, as has been observed, the tendency of the Catho Hcs to associate was not so strong as in the south. There is evi dence of a weak association of the CathoHcs in the towns of the Rouennais and the lower part of the Ile-de- France in 1 563,3 and of a town league in Anjou and Maine.4 But no formidable Catho lic association was formed north of the Loire, until the appear ance of the Confrerie du St. Esprit in 1568, under the marshal Tavannes. The nucleus of many of these Catholic associations, before they expanded into provincial leagues, in most cases seems to have been a local guild or confraternity5 of some nature. These were 1 "Ordonnance de Blaise de Montluc, chevalier de l'ordre et lieutenant du roi en Guyenne, sur l'opinion qui devoit estres les sujets fideles a sa Majeste en la senechaussee d'Agenois, et sur l'ordre qu'ils devoient tenir pour resister aux entreprises des sujets rebelles." — Ruble, Comment, et Lettres de Montluc, IV, 190; La Faille, Annates de Toulouse, II, 62. The preamble is a recital of Catholic grievances and Huguenot violence. 2 D'Aubigne', II, 213, and n. 6; Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 214. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 1,000, anno 1563. 4 Mourin, La riforme et la ligue en Anjou, 21, 22. 5 It is interesting to observe how history is repeating itself in the formation of these local associations or confraternities against the Huguenots. In 1212 ii^ the course of the war against the Albigenses the " Conf raternitas ad ecclesiae defen- sionem Massiliae instituta" was formed at Marseilles by Arnaud, the papal legate^ See Martene, Thesaurus anecdotorum, sub anno. LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 217 closely connected with the body of tradesmen, each trade having its patron saint, its sacred banner, and devoted bands; but some of the more aristocratic people were joined with the artisans. The members had fixed places of meeting and certain days on which to assemble, common exercises, and often a common meal. They swore to use their wealth and their life, if need be, for the defense of their faith.1 (The new r61e now begun to be played by these ancient guilds is an interesting phase of the religious wars. If France in the sixteenth century was laboring in the throes of a reHgious revolu-^ tion, she was also in a state of industrial transformation./ In origin the economic revolution was independent of the Reforma tion, yet so influential were its social and economic effects upon the Reformation that in a very, true sense the religious movement may be said to have been the subordinate one.2 The identity and fulness of this change in the old order of things coincides with the Reformation, which in large part became the vehicle of its expression. The crisis coincides with the reign of Charles IX and Henry III, although the beginnings of it are very mani fest in the time of Louis XI (cf. the ordinances of 1467, 1474-76, 1479). The change particularly involved the guilds, whose traditional practices had now reached the point of an industrial tyranny. More and more, from the middle of the fifteenth century, control of the guilds had tended to fall into the hands of a few. This growth of a social hierarchy within the guilds had serious political and economic results. For inasmuch as city government was so largely an out-growth of guild life, this exclusiveness threw poHtical control of the cities into the hands of a "ring" composed of the upper bourgeoisie, who formed an 1 Martin, Histoire de France, IX, 201 ; Anquetil, I, 213. 2"Si la Reforme acquit une si grande importance, au point que les esprits superficiels y virent l'origine des libertes actuelles, c'est qu'auparavant avait eclats une revolution sociale et economique, dont les luttes religeuses ne furent que les arriere-maux. Tant que les historiens, dans leurs etudes sur la Reforme, ne tiendront pas compte de ce dernier point de vue, ils n'ecriront a son sujet que les romans ou des pamphlets." — Funck-Brentano, Introd. to new ed. of Mont- chretien's L'CEconomie politique, LXXI. V 21$ THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE oligarchy and gradually squeezed the lower classes out of all par ticipation in the government. The general body of the common alty everywhere, in France, in Germany, in England, tended to disappear or to be replaced by a select group from the inner circle of the guild. The lower bourgeoisie was shut out of the council at Nevers in 1512, at Sens in 1530, at Rheims in 1595. But the economic revolution implied in this change was of far greater importance than the political. The gens de metier became a monopolist, a capitalist class, controlling the "hoards" of the guilds as well at being the ruling class in local politics. The old guild was transformed into a mercantile association, operated in favor of a few rich families who were possessed of capital and regulated wages and fixed the term of apprenticeship to their own advantage. In order to secure cheap labor the masters increased the number of apprentices, lengthened the time of service, raised the requirements of the chef-d'ceuvre, made membership in the guild increasingly difficult, and reduced wages by employing raw, underpaid workmen in competition with skilled labor. The result was that the distance widened continually between the j upper and lower working classes.1 f The social democracy and honorable estate of guild life, as it had been in the thirteenth and I fourteenth centuries, passed away and was replaced by a strife between labor and capital, between organized labor and free labor, which brings the sixteenth century, remote as it is in time, very near to us in certain of its economic conditions. To be sure there were some things which partially neutralized this antagonism, such as better facihty in communication, the increase of production, the activity of exchange, the invention of new industrial processes, and the opening of new industries, notably printing and silk manufacture.2 But nothing compen- I sated the workman for the rise in the price of necessities of life due to the influx of gold and silver from America, for his wages T Hauser, "The Reformation and the Popular Classes in France in the Six teenth Century," American Historical Review, January, 1899, 220. 2 See Hauser, Quvriets du temps passi; Pariset, Histoire de la fabrique lyonnaise, 1901* .Rbussel, ''tin livre de main au XVIe siecle," Revue Internationale de socio- logie, XIII (1905), 102, 521, 825. LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES <^) om I <,ized\ did not rise in proportion. In consequence the cleavage grew more and more sharp. {The result of this tendency was that poor workmen, despairing of getting economic justice from the guilds, took to working in their own quarters. So common was this prac- 1 tice in the sixteenth century that a new word was coined to define this unapprenticed class — chambrelons. These plied their trades in their own houses and sold the product of their handicraft any where. As early as 1457, and again in 1467, the masters complain of this practice.1 J It is easy to understand the disastrous influence of this new form of industry upon guild labor, since the new class of workmen was not subject either to the same money charges or to the same restrictive regulations. It was "unfair" competition for the old order of things which reposed upon the maintenance of an economic equilibrium between demand and supply, between labor and capital, was upset by the new tendencies. |To the toiling masses trodden down by the masters and econom ically tyrannized over, the Reformation, came as the first organi movement of discontent, and hosts of dissatisfied workmen through- j out Germany and France hastened to identify themselves with ] Protestantism, not for reHgious reasons, but because the Reforma tion constituted exactly that for which they were seeking — a pro test. The situation was further aggravated by the influx of foreign workmen, chiefly from Germany, where this economic revolution was earlier and more fully developed than elsewhere in Europe, in great industrial centers like Niirnberg, and where i small German workmen were more completely shut out than I was the case in France or England. These men!— such as cob- > biers, shoemakers, carpenters, wool-carders, and other simple artisans-}-wandered over the country from one province to another,] 1 Eberstadt, "Der franzosische Gewerberecht und die Schaffung staatlicher Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung in Frankreich vom dreizehnten Jahrhundert bis 1581," Schmoller's Forschungen, XVII, Pt. II, 270. This is a pioneer work in the economic subject here briefly outlined. The reader will find Unwin's Industrial Development in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, London, 1905, an admirable survey of the same subject, dealing chiefly with England, but with frequent reference to the continent, where the conditions were much the same. There is a copious bibliography prefixed to the work. The article by M. Hauser referred to in the American Historical Review, January, 1899, should also be examined. {^22oJ THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE carrying the economic gospel of free labor and the reHgion of Lutheranism with them.) Naturally they imbued their French fellow-workmen with their sentiments — and to such an extent that for years, during the early course of the civil wars, the Huguenots were commonly called "Lutherans." Before 1560, the greater portion of the Protestant party was made up of wool- combers, fullers, drapers, weavers, shoemakers, hosiers, dyers, tailors, hatters, joiners, glaziers, bookbinders, locksmiths, cutlers, pewterers, coopers, etc.1 ( Even as late as 1572, when the Hugue not movement had for twelve years been led by noblemen Hke the Chatillons and the Rohans, the Venetian ambassador still characterized the Huguenots as " a sect which consists for the most | part of craftsmen, as cobblers, tailors, and such ignorant people."2] Coupled with this religious and economic revolution, went also a change in the manners of society, which pervaded all classes — a change which began in the reign of Francis I and was continued under Henry II. The newrinternationalism of France, due to the Italian wars, was probably the initial cause of this. Returned soldiers, laden with the pay of booty of warfare, brought back into 1 Weiss, La chambre ardente, cxlv. The early identification of the French nobility with Calvinism has been exaggerated. One must be cautious in the use of the term "nobility,'' for it is to be remembered that the eldest son received the largest share of the inheritance and that younger sons and small nobles, in many instances, had much in common with the small farmers in the provinces. As Mr. Armstrong aptly says: "All that separated them from their neighbors was 'privilege,' and to this they clung all the more desperately." — Armstrong, The French Wars of Religion, 4. In the decade between 1550 and 1560 there is an increase in the number of aristocratic names identified with French Protestantism, but it was not till 1557 that the first great noble espoused its cause and that covertly. This was Antoine of Bourbon. In the same year Coligny and D'Ande lot also inclined to it (Whitehead, Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France, 63-66). On the whole matter, see Lavisse, Histoire de France, V, Pt. II, 238-42. = Relazione IV, 242. The great store-house of information on this head is M. Noel Weiss, La chambre ardente, 1889 — the trials for heresy during the years 1547-49 of the reign of Henry II — a book which has revolutionized the point of view of the history of the French Reformation (see a review of this work in English Hist. Review, VI, 770). In the town of Provins there were but a few Huguenots. Among them were 1 doctor; 2 lawyers; a notary; 1 barber and surgeon; 1 dyer; 3 apothecaries; 1 draper; 1 fuller; 1 salt dealer. — Claude Haton, I, 124, 125. LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 221 France the manners and customs of Italy, which commingled with the manners and customs introduced by wandering work men from Germany and Switzerland.1 The revision of the statutes of the guilds was one of the minor features of the reform programme of the political Huguenots in the States- General of Orleans and the Cahier-general of the third estate which was compiled from the local cahiers presented by the deputies shows traces of the interest of France at large in the issue. Unfortunately these fuller local records are lost.2 But this revision only looked to a modernizing of the mediaeval language of the ordonnances, which chiefly dated from the fourteenth cen tury, and did not contemplate an entire recasting of them, so as to make them harmonize with the new industrial conditions. Only one man in the assembly seems to have appreciated the real con dition of things. This was the chancellor L'Hdpital. Not con tent with the mild reorganization of the guilds recommended by the third estate, on the last day of the session, January 31, 1561, the chancellor drew up the famous ordinance of Orleans.3 The intent of this statute was indirectly to restrain the enlarged eco nomic tyranny of the guilds, to lessen the burden of apprenticeship, and to establish freer laboring conditions. This purpose the gov- 1 It would be a narrow view of the history of France at this time to infer that religious and economic changes were the only sort. The truth is, the reigns of Francis I and of Henry II, were an age of transition in religion, in institutions, even in manners. " La corruption des bonnes mceurs a continue en tous estatz, tant ecclesiastique que aultres, depuis les cardinaux jusques aux simples prebstres, et depuis le roy jusques aux simples villagloix. Chascun a voulu suyvre son plaisir; on a delaisse mesne l'ancienne coustume de s'habiller. De temps immemorial, nul homme de France n'avoit est£ tondu ni porte longue barbe avant le regne dudit feu roy; ains tous les hommes, garcons et campagnons portoient longs cheveux et la barbe rasee au menton Les prebstres et evesques se sont faict tondre des derniers; et ont porte longue barbe, ce qui a este trouve fort estranger depuis le commence ment du regne dudit feu roy, ont commence' les nouvelles facons aux habillemens toutes contraires a l'antiquit^, et a sembl£ la France estre ung nouveau peuple ou ung monde renouvele."— Claude Haton, I, 112. 2 The cahier of the estates of Orleans was published at the eve of the French Revolution (Recueil des cahiers giniraux des trois ordres, chap. i). 3 Isambert, XIV, 63 ff. \ ,222) THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE ernment aimed to attain by dissolving the confraternities, for by striking at these it really struck the guilds, since many of these associations were one and the same. No distinction was made between associations whose character was religious or charitable, and those composed of patrons and workingmen; all the confra ternities were grouped together and governmental supervision was provided for. They were not legislated out of existence by the new action, but reduced to a partial dissolution. Their accu mulated hoards of capital were ordered to be expended for the support of schools and hospitals and similar institutions in the towns and villages where these various guilds were, and only a limited amount of money was left in their hands. The municipal officers, in co-operation with those of the crown were made per sonally responsible for the execution of this measure in every bailiwick. It is important to notice the significance of this course. The government, in fact, was pursuing a policy of partial seculari zation of the property of these confraternities for the benefit of the people at large, and compelling distribution of the great sums locked up in the hands of the guilds in much the same way that the church had come to possess enormous sums in mortmain. This legislation, if it had really been effective, would have destroyed the guilds. / The guilds thus put upon the defensive, owing to the reforming (policy of the crown and the poHtical Huguenots, sought to save j themselves by pleading that they were reHgious associations; By f this adroit movement they gained the support of the Catholic ' party.^ But the crown refused to yield, and we find the Confreries de metiers directly supervised in letters-patent of February 5, 1562, and December 14, 1565. Coupled with these measures, we find others forbidding banquets, festivals, and Hke celebrations (edicts of December n, 1566, and of February 4, 1567) which by this time had become centers of reHgious agitation among the Catholics. But the government could not maintain its course. The identi fication of the guilds and confraternities with the CathoHc party gave them great and unexpected support. Under the new order of things they became the nuclei of local and provincial Catholic LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 223 leagues.1 In other words, the labor party became identified with the Huguenots, while the upper bourgeoisie, cbntrolHng the guilds, adhered to the CathoHc cause — at Rouen in 1560 the merchants actually declared a lock-out against workmen who attended preachings2 — and became the nuclei of the provincial leagues, exactly as in France in 1793 every Jacobin club became an arm of the Terror government. It was said at the time, and has often been asserted since, that these local Catholic leagues were but protective associations in the beginning and formed to repel Huguenot violence.3 The Hugue nots practiced as violent methods as their reHgious opponents and their offenses were as numerous; but with the exception of the Huguenot association in Dauphine, there is no early example of a Protestant association similar to the leagues of the Catholics 1 1 am indebted for much of this information to M. Henri Hauser, "Les questions industrielles et commercielles aux Etats de 1560," Revue des cours, XIII, No. 6, December 15, 1904. Cf. Funck-Brentano, Introd. to Montchretien, Traicti de I'ceconomie politique, LXXIV-VI. 2 Hauser, "The Reformation and the Popular Classes in France in the Six teenth Century," American Historical Review, January 1899, p. 223. "The trade- unions fell under the sway of the religious brotherhoods, which excluded the non- Catholics and were soon to lead the revolutionary movement of the League." — Ibid., 227. 3"L'origine des ligues en ce royaume vient des Huguenots." — Tavannes, 222; Martin, Histoire de France, IX, 125. "En face des Protestants, qui s'associaient et s'organisaient contre les catho- liques, ceux-ci avaient de bonne heure forme des unions locales pour resister aux entreprises des heretiques. Ces premieres ligues ont seulement un but religieux. Elles sont generalement composes de bourgeois devoue a la royaut£ et sincerement emus des dangers auxquels est expose1 la catholicisme." — La grande encyc, XXII, 234, s. v. "Ligue," article by M. de Vaissiere. "La jalousie entre les deux Religions ne se borna pas l'emulation d'une plus grande regularity; elles chercherent s'appuyer l'une contre l'autre de la force des confederations et des serments. Depuis long-temps la Romaine entretenoit dans son sein des associations connues sous le nom de confreries. Elles avoient des lieux et des jours d'assemblee fixes, une police, des repas, des exercices, des deniers communs. II ne fut question que d'ajouter a ce la un serment d'employer ses biens et sa vie pour la defense de la Foi attaquee. Avec cette formule, les con freries devinrent comme d'elles-memes, dans chaque ville, des corps de troupes pretes a agir au gre des chefs, et leur bannieres, des etendarts militaires." — An- quetil, I, 213. 224 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE in the provinces. The Protestant local organizations were not so highly developed, in a military sense, as early as this, nor were they of the same form as those of the CathoHcs. Montluc himself, than whom there is no better judge, testifies that in the war in Guy enne in 1562 "they showed themselves to be novices, and indeed they were guided by their ministers." The Protestants had a sort of triumvirate, it is true, in the two Chatillon brothers, and the prince of Conde, but their work only remotely partakes of the poHcy of the real Triumvirate; even their appeal to EHzabeth did not contemplate such radical conduct as the Triumvirate displayed.1 / No Huguenot leader ever thought of subordinating the govern ment of France to a foreign ruler for the maintenance of the faith he believed in,2 as the Guises, Montmorency, and St. Andre" did. Conde's declaration that the civil war was caused by the Trium virate's action had much truth in it. The rules of the association which the Huguenots formed at Orleans, on April n, 1562, were as much a body of miHtary regulations for the discipHne of the army as they were a political compact, as a reading of the articles will prove.3 There was Httle of the poHtico-miHtary character of 1 Coligny expressly denied having made any promise to return Calais to England, and as to the occupation of Havre, he said: "J'en ignorais les termes jusqu'a. la venue de Throckmorton en Normandie, et lorsque j'en ai signe la con firmation, je n'ai jamais pu croire qu'il y eut autre clause que l'assurance donnee a la reine du remboursement des sommes qu'elle nous avancait." — Correspondance ie Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., xiii. See the extended discussion of this con troverted subject in Whitehead, Gaspard de Coligny, Appendix I, where he shows that the admiral is to be exonerated from the odium of having sought to betray Havre-de-Grace into the hands of the English and puts the blame for this article of the treaty of Hampton Court upon the vidame de Chartres. 2 The conduct of La Rochelle in the fourth civil war is the most pronounced instance of Huguenot willingness to subordinate French territory to a foreign domination and this action was of the municipality, not of a single Huguenot leader, nor did it, of course, imply the subjection of the government of France to English rule as the Triumvirate contemplated in the case of Spain. 3 Mim. de Condi, IV, 93: "Traicte d' Association faicte par Monseigneur le Prince de Conde avec les Princes, Chevaliers de l'Ordre, Seigneurs, Capitaines, Gentilhommes et autres de tous estats, qui sont entrez, ou entreront cy-apres, en la dicte association, pour maintenir l'honneur de Dieu, le repos de ce royaume, et 1'estat et liberte du Roy sous le gouvernement de la Roy sa mere." The third article provides for implicit obedience to the prince of Conde, "chef LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 225 the Catholic leagues about it. It is not until after the Bayonne episode that we find a solid federation of the Reformed churches beginning to form, and the first test of the Protestant organization was made at the beginning of the second civil war.1 This is not the place, however, to dwell upon its development. In due time the subject will be taken up. The edict confirming the act of pacification (March 19, 1563) in its sixth article forbade the formation of any leagues in the future, and ordered the dissolution of those already in existence.2 This prohibition was a dead letter from the beginning. The government not only was unable to prevent the formation of new leagues; it was even unable to suppress those already in existence.3 When the first civil war ended, there were three well-organized Catholic leagues in southern France, namely those of Provence, of Toulouse, and of Agen. Catherine de Medici, who, for some months to come, continued to give substantial manifestation of her desire for peace,4 in announcing the act of Amboise to Montluc, et conducteur de toute la Compagnie," i. e., the army; there was no league. Minute regulations follow for the government of the camp, for services of prayer both morning and evening, etc. The fourth article, which has to do with the ways and means of raising revenue, is the nearest approach to political organization: "- . . nous jurons and promettons devant Dieu et ses Anges nous tenir prests de tout ce qui fait en nostre pouvoir, comme d'argent; d'armes, chevaux de service, et toutes les autres choses requises, pour nous trouver au premier Mandement du diet Seigneur Prince." — Mim. de Condi, III, 210-15. Cf. La Popeliniere, Book VIII, 582 ff., upon the same subject. 1 In 1567 when the Huguenot chiefs tried to seize Charles IX by surprise at Meaux, thus precipitating the second civil war, the Venetian ambassador, Correro, expressed astonishment at the perfection of the Huguenot organization (Rel. vin., II, 115)- 2 Edit de confirmation de l'edit de pacification du 19 Mars 1562, sec. 6: "Nous .... prohibons et deiendons, sur peine de crime de leze-majeste a tous nos dits sujets, quels qu'ils soient, qu'ils n'ayent a faire practique, avoir intelligence, en- voyer ne recevoir lettres ne messages, escrire en chiffre n'autre escriture feincte, ne desguisee, a princes estrangers, ne aucuns de leur subjects et serviteurs, pour chose concernant nostre estat sans nostre sceu et expres conge et permission." — Isambert, Recueil des lois, XIV, 145; the "Ordonnance explicative" of April 7 is on p. 333; cf. Mim. de Condi, IV, 311; La Popeliniere, Book X, 724. 3 We find repeated orders for their dissolution, e. g., F. Fr. 15,876, fol. 201. 4 Lettres-patentes of Charles IX extended the right of Protestant worship to Condom, St. Severe, and Dax, towns which did not figure in the edict of March 19 226 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE demanded the dissolution of these associations. Instead of so doing, however, Candalle, Montluc's chief agent in Guyenne, continued his activities. On March 13, 1563, as has been noticed, in defiance of the impending edict of pacification (which was completed and only awaited promulgation) the Catholic seig neurs of Guyenne, at Cadillac (near Bordeaux) entered into a league identical in purpose and in form with those of Agen and Languedoc.1 This league, which is the germ of that which spread over Gascony, seems to have been denounced to the government by Lagebaston, the president of the par lement of Bordeaux, between whom and Montluc there was friction, partly because of Montluc's preference for Agen as a working capital for the region, partly because of his notorious dis like of the lawyer class, whose disposition to regard forms of law and vested right interfered with Montluc's high-handed and arbitrary management of affairs.2 This new league in such glaring violation of the edict, called forth a sharp letter of rebuke from the queen mother to Montluc on March 31. After alluding in a general way to "les maulx" due to the existence of "les par- tiaKtez et les associations, qui se sont faictes" she says: J'ay este' advertye qu'il s'en est faicte une autre en la Guyenne dont est chef Monsieur de Candalle, laquelle encores qu'elle ayt est6 faicte a bonne intention durant la guerre, si n'est-ce que, cessant la dicte guerre et se faisant la paix, elle n'est plus necessaire et ne la peult ung roy trouver bonne, ny que ceulx qui veullent estre estimez obeyssans ne peuvent soustenir sans encourir le mesme cryme de rebellion dorit ilz ont accuse" leurs adversaires. Et pour ceste cause, et que le Roy monsieur mon filz n'est pas de'libe're' d'en souffrir plus aucun, de quelque coste' qu'elle procedde ny permectre plus a. ses sub- jectz, de quelque religion qu'ilz soient, d'avoir autre association qu'avec luy (Ruble, Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 257, 272, and notes). A royal ordinance was later issued giving a list of those towns where Calvinist worship was permitted, specifying that it must be conducted in the faubourgs, however (Mim. de Condi, IV, 338). 1 Within a month the government received anonymous information of Can-"- dalle's activity (Archives de la Gironde, XXI, 14 [April 16, 1563]). Cf. "Lettre de Candajlg a la reine, du mai 20, 1563 (F. Fr. 15,875, fol. 495). In the same volume, fol. 491, is a joint declaration of the gentlemen of Guyenne upon the pur poses of this association. 2 Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 214. LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 227 et selon son obeyssance, il fault, Monsieur de Monluc, que, pour le bien de son service, comme il le vous commande expressement par ses lettres, que vous, qui estes son lieutenant-general par dela, faciez rompre celle qui s'est faicte sans permectre qu'ilz ayent aucune force, puissance ou authority que celle que vous leur baillerez, ny aucune volunte" que d'obeyr a ce que par vous, pour le bien du service du Roy monsieur mon filz, leur sera commande'; pour lequel effect j'en scriptz, comme faict le Roy monsieur mon filz, une lectre audit sr de Candalle et a tous ceulx qui y sont comprins, comme nous en avons este bien amplement advertiz.1 Until the ambition of the Guises created an opposition to them ' among the old-line nobility, and so identified the Huguenot move ment with the interests of the aristocracy,2 the French Reformation found its chief support among the lower bourgeois class in the towns. The proportion naturally varied from place to place. Lyons, partly from its proximity to Geneva, but more because of its strong commercial position and its great manufacturing inter ests, among which the silk industry was of most importance, was the greatest Huguenot city in France.3 Where we find Protes tantism prevailing in feudal districts, it is largely to be ascribed to 1 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 552, col. 2. At the same time Catherine wrote to certain members of the Parlement of Bordeaux. Montluc's reply, both the personal letter he wrote to the queen mother (April 11), and the more official remonstrance he, forwarded to the King, is a palpable lie. He wrote to the queen "Je vous puis asseurer .... que despuis la nouvelle de la paix, il n'y a eu traicte d'association aucune; que, au moindre mot que j'en ay diet, tout ne soit cesse comme s'il n'en avoit jamais este parle." — Commentaires et lettres, IV, 206. Cf. his similar declaration to Charles IX, on p. 214. The clergy of Bordeaux sustained Montluc in this deception, and when the queen's suspicion continued, justified the association on the ground of religion. Corresp. de Catherine de Mid., I, 552, note. Candalle in a letter of May 20, 1563, still evaded the truth in writing to the queen (F. Fr., 15,876, fol. 495), and Catherine, upon more suspicious informa tion from d'Escars, determined to satisfy herself of certain facts, and sent two commissioners to Guyenne to secure better information (Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 270, note). Unfortunately for the government, the Parlement of Bordeaux resented their coming as an invasion of their jurisdiction, and the inquiry degenerated into a quarrel between the Parlement and the commissioners (ibid., IV, 292, n. 1; Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, II, 114, 115). 2 Claude Haton, I, 266. 3 "A Lyon, les catholiques y sont pour le jour d'huy en plus grand nombre des troiz partz pour une que les huguenotz; mais les dits huguenotz sont les prin- cipaulx et ceulx qui ont les forces en mains." — Granvella to the emperor Ferdinand I, April 12, 1564, Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 467. 228 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE the influence of Protestant gentleman-farmers, often retired bour geois, who purchased the county estates of the older nobility who had been bankrupted by the wars in Italy and Flanders, or else preferred to live at court. The strongholds of French Protestantism were the river towns, on the highways of trade, or sea-ports like Rouen and La Rochelle. Dauphine, which fattened on the commerce out of Italy through the Alpine passes, and Provence which bordered the Mediterranean, both of which "cleared" through Lyons; Lower Poitou, whereLa Rochelle was, andNormandy on the Channel were the chief Protestant provinces of France. Normandy was probably the most Protestant province of all, for here Calvinism not only obtained in the ports and "good" towns, but in the coun try areas as well.1 But there are evidences of the penetration of Protestantism into the country districts elsewhere as well — in Orleannais, Niver- nais, Blesois, the diocese of Nimes and even in isolated parts of j Champagne and Gascony.2 \ In general, however, the French peasantry were strongly Catholic. The reason for this is, first, a social one: while the revolution of the fif teenth and sixteenth centuries was ruinous for the artisan, it was profitable to the peasant. The rent paid to the landlord, immutably fixed in the twelfth pr thirteenth century, represented under the new values of money a very light purden, while the fall in the price of silver considerably raised the nominal worth of the products of the soil, when the villein sold them. The price of [land was falling rapidly at the very time when the French gentry, ceasing to be 1 The coast trade with England and Holland probably explains the prevalence of Protestantism in Lower Normandy, at least in part. But the reasons of the prevalence of rural Huguenotism on an extensive scale in Normandy are quite obscure. On this subject see La Ferriere, Normandie a Vitranger, 2-5, 82; Hauser, "The French Reformation and the French People in the Sixteenth Century," American Historical Review, January 1899, 225, 226. - Hauser, op. cit., 226, 227. I find in Montluc an interesting allusion to the prevalence of the Reformed belief among the peasantry of Guyenne, which M. Hauser has not noticed. It occurs in a letter of "Instruction au cappitaine Monluc [Pierre-Bertrand, called captain Peyrot] de ce qu'il dira a la royne et au roy de , Navarre, de la part du sieur de Monluc, touchant l'e'tat de Guyenne," March 25, 1561, and is as follows: "Et ce, a cause des insollences, scandalles et contemne- ments que les paisans dudit pais leur ont faict depuis ung an en ca," etc. — Com mentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 115. LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES (229) an aristocracy of gentlemen -farmers and becoming a court-nobility, were com- \ pelled to sell their estates to meet their expenses jand, as was said, to put their] mills and meadows on their shoulders. When a lord wished to sell at any price a part of his estates, there was always, in the parish, a countryman who had been, as one may say, saving money for centuries, and who, realizing at last the dream of bygone generations, bought land. Thus did the French villein become a landowner. (The reign of Louis XII and the beginning of that of Francis I was for the French peasants an epoch of real prosperity; his situation presented a striking contrast with that of the German peasant who, at the same date, was in danger of relapsing into bondage. We may easily understand why there was not in France, as in Germany, a peasants' revolu tion both social and religious.1 But there are other reasons for the reHgious growth of the Huguenot cause among the people not so hard to find. Their ministers preached in the French language and avoided the use of Latin, which tended to mystery and obscurity; after sermons the service was continued with prayer and the singing of psalms in French rhyme, with vocal and instrumental music in which the congregation joined. In their church poHty, the Huguenots had carried changes farther than had the Reformation elsewhere in Europe. In Germany and England the Reformation still adhered to many of the institutions of the mediaeval church, retaining the episcopate and inferior clergy, as deacons, archdea cons, canons, curates, together with vestures, canonical habits, and the use of ornaments.2 No reliable estimate can be made of the proportion between Catholics and Huguenots in the sixteenth century. A remon strance of r562, to the Pope declared that one-fourth of France was separate from the communion of Rome.3 The Venetian 1 Hauser, "The French Reformation and the French People in the Sixteenth Century," American Hist. Review, January 1899, 224. For further information upon this change in the condition of the lower and middle classes in France in the sixteenth century see Avenel, "La fortune mobiliere dans 1'histoire," Revue des deux mondes, August 1, 1892, pp. 605, 606; idem, " La propriete fonciere de Philippe- Auguste a Napoleon," Revue des deux mondes, February 1, 1893, pp. 128, 129; April 15, 1893, pp. 796, 797, 801-3, 812, 813; August 15, 1893, pp. 853-55; Lavisse, Histoire de France, V, Pt. I, 262-65. 2 Remonstrance sent to the Pope out of France, C. S. P. For., No. "1453 (x562)- 3 Ibid. 230 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE ambassador thought "hardly a third part of the people heretical" in 1567.1 The echevins of Amiens declared three-quarters of the inhabitants of Amiens were Protestant in the same year.2 Charles IX in a remonstrance to Pius IV asserted that a fourth part of France was Protestant.3 Montluc, no mean observer, estimated that one-tenth of the population of Guyenne was Prot estant.4 If this proportion be applied to France at large, the Huguenots would have numbered something Hke 1,600,000. Beza, who presided over the synod of La Rochelle in 1571, claimed that the Huguenots had 2,150 congregations, some of them very large, as in the case of the church of Orleans, which was said to have 7,000 members. At the time of the Colloquy of Poissy, Normandy was said to have 305 pastors, Provence 60.5 But the number' of Huguenots in Normandy, Provence, or the Orleannais was excep tionally large. The average congregation must have been small. If we assume that the population of France was sixteen millions6 and that one-tenth of the people were Calvinist, we would have a total of 1,600,000 Protestants for all France, which would give an average of about 750 members to each congregation on the ba sis of Beza's statement as to the number of the Huguenot churches. This is certainly much too high a figure. Personally I beHeve the average was less than half of this. If the congregation averaged 400 members each, on Beza's calculation there would have been 1 Rel. vin., II, 121. 2 Du Bois, La ligue: documents relatifs a la Picardie d'apres les registres de I'ichevinage d' Amiens (1859), 5. 3 Mim. de Condi, II, 812. 4 Montluc, Letter 48, March 25, 1561, Comment, et lettres, IV, 115. "Cette appreciation de Montluc est digne d'etre signalee a. cause de sa conformite absolue avec les conclusions de l'erudition actuelle. On admit generalement que le parti protestant, a l'epoque meme de sa plus grande force, n'a jamais compte plus de dixieme de la population en France." — Note appended by M. de Ruble. 5 Synodicon in Gallia, I, lix. 6 A Venetian syndicate interested in France in 1566 estimated the population to be between fifteen and sixteen millions (Rel. vin., Ill," 149). I assume this estimate to be more reliable than most. According to Levasseur, economically France could support a population of 20,000,000 in the sixteenth century (Foville, "La population francaise," Revue des deux mondes, November 15, 1891, 3.o6). LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 231 860,000 Huguenots in France. A Venetian source of the year 1562 sets the number at 600,000. r This may be too low, but all things considered, I believe it not far from the truth. The total Protestant population of France I do not believe to have exceeded three-quarters of a million before 1572, and after that date it is often difficult to distinguish between Huguenots and Politiques. Such was the state of things when the first civil war came to an end. 1 C. S, P. For., No. 935, §4, March 14, 1562. CHAPTER X THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES.1 THE BAYONNE EPISODE "I am always en voyage," wrote the Venetian ambassador to the senate. "Since the beginning of my embassy the King has not staid more than fifteen days in any one place. He goes from Lorraine to Poitou, and then to Normandy and the edge of Belgium, back again to Normandy, then to Paris, Picardy, Champagne, Burgundy."2 Dr. Dale wrote in the same strain to Lord Burgh- ley: "The Spanish ambassador has a saying that ambassadors in France are eaten up by their horses, since they are constrained to keep so many because of the habit of the court of moving from place to place continually."3 But there was point to Charles IX's famous tour of the prov inces in 1564-66. The unsettled condition of the country, if no other reason, accounts for Catherine's great design of completing - the pacification of the kingdom by having the King tour the realm. The route lay through Sens4 (March 15) to Troyes (March 23)' where the peace with England was signed on April 13; thence to Chalons-sur-Marne, Bar-le-Duc, Dijon (May 15), Macon (June 8), and thence to Lyons, where the court arrived on June 13. The King traveled with his ordinary train, that is, with his mother, his brother, the duke of Anjou, the constable, and the archers of the guard, in order to spare the people the burden of 1 Upon the details of this famous tour see Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., xlvff.; D'Aubigne, Book IV, chap iv; Jouan, Voyage du roi Charles IX, new ed.; L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 243, 254, 255, 270, 272, 274-76, 287, 300, 319. ' Rel. vin., I, 108. 3 C. S. P. For., No. 43, March 7, 1574. 4 "Entree du roy Charles IX et de la reyne-mere Catherine de Medicis en la ville de Sens, le 15 mars 1563," Relation extraite du MSS d'Eracle Cartault, cha- noine, et des deliberations de l'Hotel-de-Ville. Preface de M. H. Monceaux, 1882. s Coutant, "Depenses du roi Charles IX a Troyes le mercredi 5 avril 1564 apres Paques," Annuaire admin., etc., pour i860 (Troyes); "Depenses du roi Charles IX a Troyes le samedi 8 avril 1564," Annuaire admin., etc., pour 1859 (Troyes). 232 THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 233 great entertainment, and those princes and nobles who wished to follow were accompamed only by their ordinary servants.1 If the Huguenots viewed the King's sojourn at Bar-le-Duc with apprehension,2 it was not without anxiety that his Catholic sub jects saw Charles IX visit the great city located at the junction of the Rhone and the Saone rivers.3 Lyons seems to have imbibed something of Calvinism from the very waters of the arrowy river whose source was the lake of the citadel of Calvinism.4 The rumor was current that a greater conspiracy than that of Amboise was on foot; that the King and queen were to be deposed and slain, and that Lyons would unite with Geneva to form a greater Calvinistic republic.5 But Lyons welcomed the King graciously, and gave him sumptu ous accommodation.6 Charles was charmed with the reception given him and amazed at the wealth and commercial prosperity of the city.7 Situated at the confluence of the Rhone and the 1 Claude Haton, I, 364. 2 The visit of the King to Bar-le-Duc (to attend the baptism of the child-prince Henry of Lorraine) profoundly stirred the Calvinists of France and Switzerland. Charles IX in person, Ernest of Mansfeldt, governor of Luxembourg, repre senting Philip II, and the dowager-duchess of Lorraine, Christine of Denmark, acted as god-parents. 3 Fourquevaux to St. Sulpice, May 19, 1564, L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 266. 4 Armstrong, French Wars of Religion, 22, admirably observes: "Geneva was practically a French republic, constantly recruited by raw refugee material, and circulating in return trained ministers and money, giving unity to measures which local separation was likely to dissolve. Hence came the propagandism, the organization for victory, the reorganization after defeat, the esprit de corps, the religious zeal which whipped up flagging political or military energies." s See a letter of Alva in K. 1,502. Montluc later informed Philip II of it (Commentaires et lettres, V, 25, letter of June, 1565). The rumor seems not to have passed unheeded, for the marshal Vieilleville cautioned the King and his mother to be moderate in their course, saying that the Huguenots were many and the soldiers few (Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 632). On the state of Geneva at this time see Roget, L'iglise et I'itat d Geneve du vivant de Calvin; etude d'histoire politico-ecclisiastique, 1867. 6 The constable to St. Sulpice, June 21, 1564, in L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 273- 7 V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 275, 276; Nig. Tosc, III, 515, 516; Nyd (l'abbe) "Notes ecrites en 1566, a la fin d'un missel de l'abbaye de Malgrivier (evenements 234 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Sadne rivers, the wines and grain of Burgundy came to Lyons for market, while it was the natural entrepdt of the commerce out of Italy, besides much that came from Spain and Flanders. There were four fairs there each year. The great industry of the city was silk manufacturing. In 1450 Charles VII had granted it the monopoly in this. Francis I in 1536 reHeved the silk opera tives of all taxes and miHtary service. The bulk of the commerce was in the hands of ItaHans, of whom there were said to be above twelve thousand in the city — chiefly Florentines, Genoese, and Milanese.1 There were also many Germans and Swiss, whose presence gave the governor, the duke of Nemours,2 great anxiety, because large quantities of arms were smuggled into the city in the guise of merchandise.3 / - The court had not been long upon its tour through the provinces before Catherine de Medici discovered that the petition of the estates of Burgundy for the aboHtion of Protestant worship was not merely a local prejudice, but the sense of the provinces.4 The elements of this public opinion were various : The clergy — not all, however — wanted the findings of the Council of Trent accepted in toto; all of them were dissatisfied with the recognition of the rights of the Protestants; the alienation of their lands was a griev ance to the clergy, the more so because speculators had bought them at a low price because of the doubt as to the validity rel. a. Lyon, 1562-66)," Bull, du Com. de la langue, de I'hisl. et des arts de la France, IV, 300 (1857). The copper and lead mines of the Lyonnais had been profitable in the Middle Ages, but the wars of the English in France and the Black Death ruined the industry. See Jars, "Notice historique des mines du Lyonnais, Forez et Beaujolais," MS, Bibliotheque de Lyons, No. 1,470. 1 Rel. vin., I, 35-37. 2 A letter of his published by La Ferriere, Deux annies de mission a, St. Piters- bourg, Paris (1867), 56, 57, casts an interesting light upon the state of the city at this time. 3 V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 266. 4 La Cuisine, Histoire du parlement de Bourgogne, I, 60; Castelnau, Book V, chap, vi, says the petition was printed. The bishop of Orleans, Jean de Morvil- liers, in a letter dated August 21, 1563, called the queen mother's attention to this growing prejudice (Fremy, Les diplomates de la Ligue, 30-32). THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 235 of the title.1 The Guises were angry that the prosecution of Coligny for the murder of the duke had been abandoned.2 Among high and low aHke there were unprincipled folk who had hopes of profiting by confiscations and forfeitures imposed upon the Huguenots.3 The queen mother was too good a poHtician not to pay heed to these signs of popular feeling, more especially as the voice of the provinces chimed with those in high authority, who not only urged that the war be renewed against the Protestants but also hinted broadly of foreign support in aid of the crown. At first Catherine answered graciously, yet guardedly, to the effect that a peace which had been so solemnly made, by the advice of the princes of the blood and the council, could not be too lightly cast aside. The miserable effects of the war were everywhere evident. Agriculture had almost ceased in a country famous for its fertility, and the whole country had been so plundered and harassed by both parties that the poor people, being stripped of all their sub stance, often preferred to fly to the forests rather than to remain continually exposed to the mercy of their enemies. Wandering soldiers and dissolute women, with stolen goods in their possession, infested the roads.4 As to trade and manufacturing, the mechanic arts still were pHed only in the largest and strongest towns ; even here merchants and tradesmen had shut up shop and gone off to war, not always out of religious zeal, but in the hope of enriching themselves by spoHation. The nobility were divided; the clergy incensed. The civil war had been accompanied by the attendant aids of violence, robbery, murder, rape, and justice had not been 1 L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 129-31. Philip II, as has been observed, ex pressed his disapproval of this practice (ibid., 152), and when the French government endeavored to make it apply to the property of the French church in the Low Countries, he set his foot down hard (ibid., 188). An endeavor was made to restrain speculation in church property by law. 2 For details see ibid., 152, 156, 165, 185, 186, 226. 3 Castelnau, Book V, chaps, vi and x is very clear in the statement of various motives. 4 Claude Haton, I, 368. 236 > THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE f administered in the courts for months. J The very methods resorted \ to for the preservation of religion rendered it hateful in the eyes 4 of many men of both parties. Both parties were bigoted in belief and / in practice. The iconoclasm of the Protestants, who tore down church edifices hoary with age and sanctified by tradition, expelHng \ the inmates, both male and female, if doing them no worse in- j jury, familiarized society with changes wrought by violence and \ made the people callous to one of the most precious possessions I of a nation — a reverence for tradition.1 r To all these difficulties the prevalence of the plague must be |added. Since the century of the Black Death Europe had not 4so suffered from this scourge as in the sixteenthi It recurred intermittently, being especially violent in the years 1531, 1533, | 1544, 1546, 1548, 1553, 1562-64, 1568, i577-8o.2 I No part of j Europe was spared. | France, England, Spain, the Low Countries, Germany, and Italy, all suffered. But certain portions of France suffered more than others, as Bas-Languedoc, Provence, the Lyon nais, Burgundy, Champagne, the Ile-de-France, and Normandy. The west and especially the southwest were relatively exempt. Apparently the disease followed the trades-routes along the river valleys, for Toulouse, Lyons, Chalons-sur-Saone, Macon, Chalons- sur-Marne, Langres, Bourges, La Charite, Orleans, Tours, Mou lins, Sens, Melun, Dijon, Troyes, Chateau- Thierry, Soissons, Beauvais, Pontoise, Paris, Rouen, and the Norman ports suffered 1 most.3 J As always, Italy was the immediate source of the epidemic, i which was communicated from place to place by the movements 1 See the wonderful word-picture drawn by Castelnau at the beginning of Book V, and Montluc, Books V, VI, passim. For the brigandage that prevailed see Montluc, IV, 343 (letter to the King from Agen, March 26, 1564). 2 Franklin, "La vie d'autrefois," Hygiene, chap, ii, especially pp. 67-75. For the plague of 1563-64 in Languedoc see Hist, de Languedoc, XI, 447 (Toulouse), 464 (Montpellier, Ntmes, Castres, etc.). It was at its height in July, 1564. It seems to have come into Languedoc from Spain. See also Papiers d'itat iv, card, de Granvelle (March 11, 1564), VII, 387, 401; VIII, 36, 382, 470; C. S. P. For. (1564), Introd., xi-xii, and Nos. 544-53, §2; No. 592; Claude Haton I, 332. Those exposed to the infection were required to carry white wands as a sign (C. S. P. Ven., No. 824, November 20, 1580). 3 Claude Haton, I, 332. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 237 of trade. Lyons paid dearly for its commercial pre-eminence, | for the ravages of the plague were terrible there.1 It was at its j height when the court was there in July, 1564. The English! ambassador, Smith, gives a fearful picture of the state of the city J Men died in the street before his lodgings. His servant who went daily for his provisions sometimes saw ten and twelve corpses, some naked, lying in the streets where they lay till "men clothed in yellow" removed them. A great many bodies were cast into the river, "because they will not be at the cost to make graves. This day," he writes on July 12, "from break of day till ten o'clock there laid a man naked in the street, groaning and drawing his last breath, not yet dead. Round the town there are tents of the pestiferous, besides those which are shut up in their houses."2 Almost every third house was closed because of the plague. The city authorities vainly tried to combat the disease by providing that visits were to be made twice a day by those appointed; but as there were but five "master surgeons" in the whole city, medical attention must have been slight. Persons affected with the plague were to be removed to the hospital — the oldest and one of the best in Europe at that time. Corpses were to be buried at night and the clothes of the dead burned.3 "About the Rhone men dare eat no fish nor fishers lay their engines and nets, because instead of fish they take up the pestiferous carcasses which are thrown in." New sanitary regulations were made. All filth was to be cast into the river and not allowed to pollute the streets or the river banks. Fires of scented wood were kept burning between every ten houses in the street. Pigs and other animals were not allowed at large. Meat, fish, and vegetable stalls were to be inspected and all decayed provisions destroyed.4 It is interesting to observe the efforts made by local authorities to prevent the spread of the disease and the relief measures that 1 Vingtrinier, La peste a Lyon, 1901. 2 C. 5. P. For., No. 553 (1564). 3 On the state of medical science at this time see Franklin, " La vie d'autrefois," Hygiene, chap, ii; cf. C. S. P. For., No. 544, July 1, 1564 (summary of a pamphlet printed by the city authorities). 4 Claude Haton, I, 224-28. 238 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE were taken. As soon as the plague was discovered, the town authorities usually set guards to watch the houses of those stricken and appointed barbers and gravediggers to treat ill and to inter the dead. These attendants were supported and paid by a tax laid upon the town. Those who were ill were sent to a house of isolation appointed to be a hospital, which was often upon the walls of the town, remote from the people. In Provins the church and cemetery were immediately adjacent to the hospital! The mortaHty was great. In Provins in 1562 there were eighty persons stricken, of whom sixty died, among them four of the attendants. Two of the barber-surgeons refused to serve and were proceeded against by the town baiHff and were hanged in effigy because the principals in the case had made their escape. Diseased houses were sprinkled with perfumes and aromatic herbs were burned in them in order to purify them.1 As always, the dislocation of society and the depravation of morals worked havoc in the com munity. Crimes of violence were common.2 Little by little, however, this picture of misery faded into the background of the queen's mind and the question of poHtical expediency, which was always the lodestar of her poHcy, became her primary consideration.3 The Catholics plucked up courage as the court progressed4 and Huguenot suspicion of the queen's course was early aroused. Shortly after the tour of the provinces had begun, and while the court was till at Troyes pending the signa ture of the treaty of peace, there was a jar between D'Andelot and the queen mother, who would not permit him to choose his own captains and other officers as was customarily permitted to colonels. 1 Claude Haton, I, 332. 2 " Non-seulement la France fut agitee en ceste annee de guerres, diminution des biens de la terre et de peste, mais aussi fut remplie et fort tormentee des voleurs, larrons et sacrileges, qui de nuict et de jour tenoient les champs et forcoient les eglises et maisons, pour voller et piller les biens d'icelles pour vivre et s'entretenir." — Mimoires de Claude Haton, I, 332 (1562). Smith declared that Lyons was the "most fearful and inhuman town he had ever seen. Men show themselves more fearful and inhuman than pagans."— C. S. P. For., No. 553, July 12, 1564. 3 Castelnau, Book V, chap. x. 4 Claude Haton, I, 378. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 239 Partially in consequence of this affront, and partially to avoid being compromised more with Qeen EHzabeth, D'Andelot, the prince of Conde, and the cardinal Chatillon all remained away from the sessions of the council while the terms of peace were under con sideration, and when the court resumed its migration, no one of these attended it.1 Indeed, after the court left Chalons-sur-Marne, so wide was the breach between the prince of Conde, the admiral and all of that faction, and the court, that the chancellor L'H6pital was the only official who continued to treat them with deference.2 The consideration shown Jeanne d'Albret only par tially relieved the suspicions of the Protestants.3 We find the anxiety of the Protestants over the situation reflected in the proceedings of the provincial synod of the Reformed churches of the region through which the court had been traveHng during this season, namely the churches of Champagne, Brie, Picardy, the Ile-de- France, and the French Vexin.4 This synod assembled on April 27, 1564, at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and was composed of forty-five ministers. Letters were read from many parts of France and abroad, among which was one from Beza bidding the Hugue nots to be on their guard as the priests were contributing money for the purpose of rooting out the truth. It was agreed by the- body to reply that the Protestants were suspicious of the intentions of the queen mother.5 In its resolutions the synod condemned the poHcy of the magistrates who cloaked their religious animosity under the guise of the law,6 and complained that the CathoHcs were 1 C. S. P. For., No. 327, §11, April 14, 1564; No. 389, §12, May 12, 1564. 2 Ibid., No. 755, October 21, 1565. 3 Jeanne d'Albret had an interview with Catherine after the court left Macon; she demanded possession of Henry of Beam, and leave to return to her estates. But the queen mother, feeling that to grant either of these requests might injure her cause with Philip II, sought to satisfy her with the gift of 150,000 livres and the assignment of Vendome as the place of her residence (Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, Introd., II, 1). 4C. 5. P. For., No. 384, § 7; Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 529. His opinion of the synod is expressed in Vol. VIII, 17; Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 179, note; Claude Haton, I, 384. s C. S. P. For., No. 358. 6 Castelnau, Book V, chap, x, p. 284, attests this miscarriage of justice. 240 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE carrying the King about the country in order to show him the ruin of their churches.1 The moderate La Roche even went so far as to declare that the Reformed church never could have peace while the queen mother governed. /^ Justice and historical accuracy, however, require that it be said 'that the Huguenots' own conduct was sometimes in violation of the privileges granted them by the Edict of Amboise. Their iconoclasm toward the images and the pictures which the CathoHcs considered sacred was outrageous; they failed to confine their worship to authorized places, so that the magistrates were acting within their rights in so far repressing Protestant worship; their provincial synods not infrequently were inflammatory poHtical "assemblies.2 On the other hand, the CathoHcs wilfully molested the Huguenots, interfering in their congregations, and compelHng them to pay tithes and other dues for the support of the CathoHc poor and even — Castelnau says — -to support their provincial leagues.3 But the Huguenots went too far in their suspicion of the gov ernment. Beza, at the synod of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre had been apprehensive of a joint attack of France and Savoy upon Geneva, not knowing that the French aim was to renew the affiance with the Catholic cantons in order to prevent Spanish ascendency there.4 Bern and Zurich were the pillars of French ascendency in the Alpine country. France counted upon them more than upon all else to prevent Spanish recruiting, and to close the Alpine passes to Spain's army. To this end Bellievre, the marshal Vieille- 1 C. S. P. For., 755, October 21, 1564. 2 No one can read the Huguenot historian, La Popeliniere, Vol. II, Book XI, without prejudice, and not be convinced of the fact that the French Protestants infringed both the letter and the spirit of the Edict of Amboise. The fact that Damville, who had succeeded his father the constable as governor of Languedoc in 1562, and who was a moderate Catholic, was required to be so drastic in his measures of repression that the Protestants complained of him to Charles IX, supports this view. Cf . Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., 1 and li. 3 Castelnau, Book V, chap, x; La Popeliniere, loc cit. iL' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 328; Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 398. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 241 ville, and the bishop of Limoges, who had returned from Madrid, where he was succeeded by St. Sulpice, were sent into Switzerland in the early spring of 1564 to penetrate the designs of Spain, and to promise an early payment of the French debts due to the can tons in return for their miHtary support in the wars of Henry II.1 BelHevre's particular mission was to the Grisons. The position of the Grisons was a precarious one, for Spain could attack them from the Valteline, or starve them by prohibiting the exportation of grain into the country from Lombardy. By using such threats the Spanish governor of Milan hoped to compel the adherence of the Grisons to a treaty which would open to Spanish and imperial arms the great Alpine routes of the Spliigen, the Bernina, and the Stelvio, thus connecting the territories of the two branches of the Hapsburg house and shutting France out from eastern Switzerland. BelHevre fraternized with the popular element, and by May, 1564, had almost completely neutraHzed the success of his Spanish rival in spite of Spanish gold. Fortunately for France the Ten Jurisdic tions declared in her favor and the Grisons, though very Spaniard- ized, luckily had a French pensioner as its chief magistrate, the Swiss captain Florin. Meanwhile the negotiations of the bishop of Limoges and the marshal Vieilleville had progressed so far that the treaty of alliance was all but signed. Late in October BelHevre received from Freiburg the text of the articles of alliance which the bishop of Limoges and the marshal VieiUeville proposed to submit to the Swiss diet. Encouraged by this success, he went to Glarus in order to overcome the influence of the Zurich preachers who were out spoken enemies of the French affiance, and if possible to settle the difference between that state and Schwytz. By great dexterity he prevailed upon the two cantons to accept a uniform treaty. But he could not push negotiations to a conclusion until hearing from his colleagues. Spain made a supreme effort to secure the opening of the 1 It was rumored also that the queen mother was ready to sacrifice the Italian protege's of France to curry favor with Spain (Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Gran velle, VIII, 395-400, note; L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 300, 335). 242 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE passages between the Tyrol and the Milanais, but failed because the Grisons promised France that they would accept the principle of a renewed affiance, leaving the settlement of details pending, so that although the supremacy of France in Switzerland was not absolutely assured, at least the adherence of the three leagues to her seemed assured. But the Escurial and the Vatican were leagued to destroy French influence in Switzerland. Spain gave up hope of compelling the cantons to make a direct alliance with her, but by means of commercial threats and commercial inducements counted on still keeping the Alpine passes open to her arms. Her maxim was, where the grain of Lombardy goes, there Spain's armies may go, too. To neutralize this danger the French energetically opposed any renewal of an alliance between the Vatican and the Swiss cantons. The Grey League, later won by the commercial prom ises of Spain, separated from the other two in the end, but its defection was not so serious as it might have been, since according to the joint constitution the vote of two leagues in matters of foreign policy compelled the adherence of the third. But in order further to strengthen the hold of France, the French ambassadors had recourse to a sort of referendum in order to secure an approval of the majority of all the Swiss towns in favor of the French affiance, in addition to the official action of the three leagues. The success of this stroke was complete and the general diet of the three leagues gave its adherence to the treaty of Freiburg concluded by the bishop of Limoges and the marshal Vieilleville on December 7, 1564.1 The poverty of France, however, seriously endangered the continuance of this alliance. When it was concluded, France tried to stave off payment of her debts, which amounted to more than 600,000 livres, yet demanded the execution of the articles of Freiburg. Glarus, Lucerne, Schwytz, Appenzell, Valais, the Grisons, Schaffhausen, and Basel bitterly complained, the last also because of the burdens laid upon the importations of her commerce into France through Lyons. 1 " Traite" et renouvellement d'alliance entre Charles IX, roi de France, et Messieurs les Ligues de Suisse, faite et conclu£ en la ville de Fribourg, le 7 jour de D&., 1564" (Dumont, Corps dip., V, Pt. I, 129). THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 243 In this conflict which France carried on against Spain and the Holy See in Switzerland, Charles IX was supported- by the German Protestants, who of course were hostile to both houses of Hapsburg, and France may be credited with considerable address in smoothing the ruffled feeHngs of Basel and Schaffhausen, and softening the Protestant prejudices of Zurich. This is simply another way of saying that the foreign policy of France in Switzer land was a Protestant poHcy. Even Bern yielded and joined the general treaty of affiance instead of insisting upon a particular treaty, as she had at first done.1 The Huguenots, however, suspicious of the impending reaction at home and misreading the diplomacy of France in Switzerland, grew more and more fearful and began to turn their eyes again toward the prince of Conde as a leader. But fortune and the craft of Catherine had lured the prince away from his own ; he had become a broken reed, dangerous to lean upon. In July, 1564, Eleanor de Roye, the brave princess of Conde, died.2 The Guises and the queen mother, who were now in co-operation,3 at once began to practice to lure Conde away forever from his party, and the former at the same time, in order to make the alliance between France and Scotland more firm, conceived the idea of marrying the prince of Conde to Mary Queen of Scots.4 As another possibility 1 Abridged from Rott, " Les missions diplomatiques de Pomponne de Bellievre en Suisse et aux Grisons (1560-74)," Rev. d'histoire diplomatique, XIV, 26-41 (1900); cf. Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 630, 631; D'Aubigne, II, 210. M. Rott admirably observes (p. 42): "Ainsi done, cinquante ans et plus avant Richelieu, la politique confessionnelle de la France s'inspirait deja. dans les rapports avec l'etranger, de principes fort differents de ceux qui dirigeaient son action a l'interieur du royaume." 2 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 72. The prince of Conde had secured leave to leave the court in order to visit her at Vitry in May, where she then lay ill. Her mother was Madeleine de Mailly, sister of the admiral and grand daughter of Louise de Montmorency, sister of the old constable (ibid., VII, 630, and note; cf. C. S. P. For., 592, August 4, 1564). 3 "All go and come by the cardinal of Lorraine, for without him nothing is done." — Smith to Cecil, November 13, 1564, C. S. P. For., 793, §2. 4 Granvella to Mary Stuart, November, 1564, Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 570; cf. 550, 591, 599. Randolph to the earl of Leicester: "The prince of Conde is become a suitor 244 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE the Guises cherished the hope of marrying their niece to Charles IX and thus recovering the ascendency they had enjoyed under Fran cis II.1 The corollary of such a plan was the reduction of the Prot estants of France. To these ideas PhiHp II, was stoutly opposed, though he concealed his opposition thereto; Mary was too valuable for his projects to be suffered to become a tool of the Guises. Their purposes were limited to France; his purposes embraced Christendom.2 In 1575 the Venetian ambassador wrote, a propos of one of the courtships of Queen Elizabeth: "Princes are wont to avail themselves of matrimonial negotiations in many ways."3 These words sagely summarize the efforts of much of the diplomacy of the sixteenth century. By a singular combination of events and Hne- ages, Mary Stuart was necessarily almost the cornerstone of the uni versal monarchy Philip II dreamed of forming in Europe; her possession of the Scottish crown,, her claims to England, her here, supported by the cardinal." — C. S. P. Scotland, IX, 67, November 7, 1564. Mary Stuart expressed her repugnance at such a prospect by saying: "Trewlye I am beholding to my uncle : so that yt be well with hym, he careth not what be- commethe of me." — Randolph to Cecil, C. S. P. Scot., II, 117, November 9, 1564. Another match, proposed simply for the purpose of leading Conde along, was be tween the young duke of Guise and the prince's daughter, Margaret, who was a little child. — C. S. P. For., No. 642, §3; Smith to Cecil from Valence, September i, 1564; No. 650, ibid., September 3, 1564; No. 784, November 7, 1564. Smith to Cecil: "News is that the prince of Conde and the cardinal of Lorraine have inter- visited each other." Cf. Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 127. Bol- willer who disapproved of these plans in the interest of Philip II (ibid., VIII, 381, note) evidently believed the prince won over to Catholicism (ibid., VIII, 156). A propos of Conde's relapse he sarcastically wrote to Granvella on July 8, 1564: "Ce que Ton est en oppinion que L'Admiral et D'Andelot se doibvent renger et hanger leur robbe, si le font, lors me semblera — il veoir une vraye farce, et pour- ront les femmes dire lors estre dadvantaige constante que les hommes, mesme madame de Vandosme et duchesse de Ferrare demeurans en l'oppinion ou l'on les void." — Ibid., VIII, 129. 1 Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, II, 106, note; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 164; C. S. P. Scot., II, 153, Randolph to Cecil, March 1-3, 1565. Mary Stuart in 1564 was twenty-two years of age, Charles IX barely fourteen (Papiers d'etat du card, de Granvelle, VIII, 347, note). 2 Cf. the luminous letter of Philip to Granvella, August 6, 1564, in Papiers d'itat du card, de Granvelle, VIII, 215, 216. 3 C. 5. P. Ven., November 6, 1575. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 245 relationship with the Guises, united with the religion she professed, made the furtherance of her power the most practicable means to that end. Whether Mary's future husband were Don Carlos or the Austrian archduke was a matter of detail in Philip's plan — the end remained constant. Mary Stuart was of too much value to PhiHp II's poHtical designs to risk such a marriage as the Guises contemplated.1 Her hand might be disposed elsewhere with greater advantage. Those intense reHgious convictions of the Spanish King which made him beHeve he was the divinely ordained instrument of the counter-Reformation, united with his poHtical purposes and ambitions, required him to keep a watchful eye upon France.2 The Netherlands, France, Italy, England, Scotland were like so many squares of a vast political chessboard upon which he aimed so to move the pieces he was in command of as ultimately to seize possession of those countries, and redeem them from heresy. Mary Stuart was an important personage in PhiHp's purposes. He wanted to put her on the throne of Elizabeth and thus unite 1 Fortunately for Philip, a whim of passion helped the Spanish King's purposes, and Catherine and the Guises failing to carry the match between Mary Stuart and the prince were content to keep the prince alienated from his party. The prince of Conde had become enamored of one of the queen mother's maids-of -honor, Isabel Limeuil, while the court was a. Roussillon, and had seduced her. On this liaison see Corresp. de Cath. de Mid., II, 189, note; Louis Paris, Nigociations, Introd. XXVI, XXVII; Nig. Tosc, III, 572, and especially La Ferriere, "Isabel de Limeuil," Revue des deux mondes, December 1, 1883, 636 and the due d'Aumale, Histoire des princes de Condi, I, Appendix, xix. A sug gestion of the manners prevailing at court is found in the following information: " Orders are taken in the court that no gentleman shall talk with the queen's maids, except it is in the queen's presence, or in that of Madame la Princesse de la Roche-sur-Yon, except he be married; and if they sit upon a form or stool, he may sit by her, and if she sits in the form, he may kneel by her, but not lie long, as the fashion was in this court." — C. S. P. For., 1091, April 11, 1565. 2 Unknown to Charles IX, the Spanish ambassador Chantonnay, whose recall Catherine had insisted upon for months past and who was finally replaced late in 1564 by Alava. traversed the provinces of France in disguise, in the interest of his master, journeying through Auvergne, Rouergue, Toulouse, Agen and Bordeaux, before he reported at Madrid for new duty. St. Sulpice to Catherine de Medici, June 12, 1564; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 7ri; Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 592. For some correspondence between Philip II and Granvella, and Granvella and Antonio Perez regarding 246 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Scotland and England under a common Catholic rule. For a time he dreamed of marrying her to his own son, Don Carlos, until Catherine interfered and offered her daughter Marguerite as a less dangerous alternative to France. The death of Don Carlos,1 the eternal irresolution of the Spanish King, the development of new events, continually altered the details of PhiHp's purposes, but his essential aim never varied an iota.2 The subjugation of France, not in the exact terms 'of loss of \ sovereignty, perhaps, but no less in loss of true national inde- pendence was a necessary condition of Philip's purposes. The kingdom of France was situated in the very center of those 1 dominions whose consolidation was to be the Spanish King's reaH- zation of universal rule. Spain bordered her on the south; the Netherlands on the north; in the east lay Franche Comte. Besides these territories which were directly Spanish, the CathoHc cantons of Switzerland and Savoy were morally in vassalage to Spain. Beyond Franche Comte" lay the CathoHc Rhinelands, Chantonnay's recall see Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 251-53. Upon Chantonnay's successor, Alava, see L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 227, 228, 236; Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 393; Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 359, 534; Poulet, I, 570, n. 1; Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, II, 256. On the secret service of Philip II, see Forneron, I, 218, 290, 334; II, 304, 305^ Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 498, 499; VIII, 128, 182. Alava exceeded his instructions in threatening France with war. Philip II, far from wishing war with France, repudiated his ambassador's statements (R. Q. H., January, 1879, p. 23). ' Upon one of the fits of madness of Don Carlos see letter of the Bishop of Limoges to Catherine de Medici in La Ferriere, Rapport, 48, 49. The Raumer Letters from Paris, Vol. I, chap, xv, contain an interesting account of Don Carlos, with long extracts from the sources. The editor rightly says that Ranke in his treatise on the affair of Don Carlos, as acute as it is circumstantial, has adopted the only right conclusion for the solution of this mysterious episode of history. See also Wiener Jahrbucher, XL VI; Forneron, Hist, de Philippe II, II, 103 ff.; Louis Paris, Nigociations, etc., 888; Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 317, note; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 17, 29, 101, 597; Lea, in Amer. Hist. Rev., January, 1905; English Hist. Rev., XIV, 335. 2 Cf. Papiers d'itat du card, de Granvelle, VIII, 334 and note; cf. 215, 343, 344, 595, 596. Philip found a new prospective husband for Mary Stuart in the person of the archduke Charles. He had abandoned the idea of marrying Mary Stuart to his son even before the death of Don Carlos. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 247 bound to the other branch of the house of Hapsburg. Beyond Switzerland and Savoy lay Italy, save Venice entirely, and Rome in part, a group of Spanish dominions. Catherine de Medici combated Philip II both at Madrid and Vienna. But by the side of the negative purpose to thwart PhiHp's proposed alliances, Catherine de Medici had purposes of her own of the same sort. The daughter of a house made rich by banking and which never lived down the bourgeois tradition of its ancestry in spite of all its wealth and power, even though popes had come from its house, Catherine was fascinated by the thought of marrying Charles IX to the eldest daughter of the Haps- burgs, and her favorite son, the future Henry III, then known as the duke of Orleans- Anjou, to the Spanish princess Juana, sister of PhiHp, hoping to see some of Spain's numerous dominions pass to France as part of Juana's dowry. In the pursuance of this double marriage project, the queen early began to beset Philip II for a personal interview, and urged her daughter to persuade the king to the same end, using Pius IV's cherished idea of a concert of the great CathoHc powers to consider the condition and needs of Christendom with some adroitness as a screen to her own personal purposes.1 Much of her correspondence with St. Sulpice relates to an interview with PhiHp II for the purpose of arranging these matters, • upon which she had set her heart, and the time of both the ambas sador and the Spanish King was consumed with repeated interviews none of which was ever satisfactory, and all of which were tedious.2 The natural reluctance of PhiHp II to commit himself to any posi tive course, united with the great aversion he felt toward the queen mother because of her wavering religious policy — for rigid adher ence to CathoHcism was PhiHp's one inflexible feature — led the King to follow a course of procrastination and duplicity for months, during which, however, he never evinced any outward sign of 1 See R. Q. H., XXXIV, 461. 2 Catherine turned to her own advantage an almost forgotten wish of Philip II that he might see her, expressed in July, 1560, when his anxiety was great because of her lenient policy toward the French Protestants (R. Q. H., ' XXXIV, 458). 248 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE impatience; his countenance remained as imperturbable as that of a Hindu idol, and never by any expression reflected his thought.1 Foolish pride and undue affection led Catherine even to use the Turk as a means of pressure upon Spain in order to accompHsh this double marriage project. In the year 1562 an ambassador of the Sultan passed through France, having come by way of Venice to Lyons, and going thence via Dijon and Troyes to Paris.2 Turkey, after crushing the revolt of Bajazet,3 was seeking to avenge the accumulated grievances which she had suffered from Austria and Spain, especially the latter, for PhiHp II's expedition to Oran and his capture of its fortress, which was regarded as impregnable, had been a bitter blow to the Porte.4 Exasperated by Spain, Turkey whose war poHcy was guided by the able grand vizier, Mohammed SokolH, prepared a vast expedition to expel her from all points which she occupied in Africa. But such a campaign was not possible until Malta, lying midway in the straits of the Mediterranean, was overcome.5 Europe, which still preserved an acute memory of the protracted siege of Rhodes, looked forward with dismay to the prospective attack upon Malta, so that Catherine de Medici's cordial reception at Dax of another Turkish ambassador — he was a Christian Pole in the employ of the Sultan — in the course of the tour of the provinces was a political act that was daring to rashness.6 In order to force PhiHp II's hand Catherine even intimated that 1 Challoner, English ambassador to Spain, to the queen: "Hardly shall a stranger by his countenance or words gather at any great alteration of mind, either to anger, or rejoicement, but after the fashion of a certain still flood;" quoted by Forneron, I, 319, n. 2, from Record Office MSS No. 466. 2 See the extremely interesting account of the passing of the Turkish embassy through Provins, in Claude Haton, I, 342-44. 3 On the conspiracy of Bajazet and his flight to Persia see D'Aubigne, Book III, chap, xxviii. 4 Nigociations dans le Levant, II, 729. s Ibid., 730. 6 Spain suspected the Sultan was desirous of securing a French roadstead for his fleet during the siege of Malta. See Commentaires et lettres de Monikc, V, 38, note; D'Aubigne1, 221, and n. 1; Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 162; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 398; R. Q. H., XXXIV, 473-78. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 249 Charles IX might marry Queen Elizabeth, although this proposi tion was too great a strain upon the credulity of Europe to be given any consideration.1 Soon after St. Sulpice reached Spain, we find Toulouse suggested as the place for the desired interview,2 and thereafter for thirty-eight months this conference was one of the dominant thoughts in Catherine's mind.3 The queen mother's original plan had been to avoid the heat of the south by passing the winter at Moulins, and visiting Langue doc and Guyenne in the next spring.4 But the influence of im pending change impelled her forward in the maze of tournaments, balls, and masques.5 Although she was in "a country full of mountains and brigands,"6 so that she feared "que cette canaille sacageassent quelques uns de sa cour," and strengthened Strozzi's band as a precaution, nevertheless Catherine's resolution seems to have increased in degree as she moved southward. Probably the fact that the prince of Conde was in the toils encouraged her; certainly the necessity of exhibiting something positive that would please Spain, in view of the approaching interview, actuated her. But apart from her own motives, outside pressure had been brought to bear upon her to this end, when at Bar-le-Duc, where the King went to attend the baptism of the infant child of Charles III, duke of Lorraine, who had married Charles IX's sister, Claudine, in 1 Corresp. de Cath. de Mid., II, Introd., lxxxvi, lxxxvii; R. Q. H., XXXIV, 470. 2 U Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 14, Letter of March 27, 1562. 3 Perez writes to Granvella on November 15, 1563: "La reine mere de France tourmente sa majeste catholique pour la determiner a. une entrevue." — Papiers d'itat du card, de Granvelle, VII, 256; and two weeks later (December 4, 1563) we find Philip II writing to Alva, saying that " L'ambassadeur de St. Sulpice lui a propose une entrevue avec la reine de France," and desiring the duke's opinion in the matter (Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 277). The actual text is in Philip's correspondence, No. XXVI. 4 V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 226. s "Ne se passoit jour sans nouvelle sorte de combatz, passe-temps et plaizirs. .... L'on drecoit joustes, tournoy, commedies et tragoedies." — Fourquevaux to St. Sulpice, L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 266; cf. Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 466. For an account of one of these entertainments, see Castelnau, Book V, chap. vi. 6 "Le pays est tel que vous avez entendu, pleins de montagnes et bandoliers." — Catherine to St. Sulpice, January 9, 1564, V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 331. 250 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE March.1 Later "when the court came to Lyons information was brought to it that if the King and his advisers should continue to resist the general rising against the Huguenots, it would be turned ^-against itself."2 In this instance, however, the pressure came, not /jrom Spain, but from Pope Pius IV whose agent, the Florentine Ludovico Antinori, was sent to France to urge the extirpation of Calvinism and to plead the cause of the findings of the Council of Trent.3 Catherine obeyed the signs. But as a sudden rupture of the peace of Amboise would have been attended with dangerous consequences she proceeded cautiously.4 The first5 definite intimation of the reaction was an edict issued i on July 24, prohibiting Calvinist worship within ten leagues of the court, notwithstanding the fact that authorized places of Prot estant worship were affected by it. A fortnight later, on August 4, came a more sweeping edict — the so-called Edict of RoussiUon6 which forbade all persons of whatever reHgion, quaHty, or con dition to molest one another, or to violate or maltreat images, 1 Charles III had been educated in France and was a French pensioner to the amount of 250,000 francs annually (Rel. vin., I, 451). On this Spanish pressure to revoke the Edict of Amboise see Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 461, 468; Poulet, I, 576, note; Castelnau, Book V, chap, ix; R. Q. H., XXXIV, 462, 463. The Huguenots quickly divined it (Languet, Epist. seer., II, 268, November 18, 1563; Arch, d' Orange-Nassau, I, 136). The anxiety of the French Protestants over the King's visit of Lorraine is well expressed in the letter of Lazarus Schwendi to the Prince of Orange, August 22, 1564, in Arch, d 'Orange-Nassau, I, 191. 2 Ranke, Civil Wars and Monarchy in France, 226. 3 Davila, Guerre civile di Francia, III, 144. On September 27, 1564, the prevot Morillon wrote to the cardinal Granvella: "L'edit de France contre les apostatz me faict esperer que la royne mere passera plus avant, puisque la saison est a propos; et si elle ne le faict, je crains qu'elle et les siens le paieront." — Papiers d'itat du card, de Granvelle, VIII, 361. 4 Castelnau Book V, chap. a. Granvella expressed impatience at Catherine's slowness in repressing the Huguenots. See his letters to vice-chancellor Seld and Philip II at this time in Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 598, 599, 632, 633. s Unless the order forbidding Renee of Ferrara to hold Protestant service even in private while at the court, be taken as the first; see R. Q. H., XXXIV, 467. 6 Near Lyons, where on account of the plague the court was stopping July 17 to August 15; it belonged to the cardinal Tournon, who held it in apanage. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 251 or to lay hands upon any sacred objects upon pain of death; magistrates were likewise enjoined to prevent the Huguenots from performing their devotions in any suspected j places, but to confine them to such places as had been specified; finally, the Huguenots were forbidden to hold any synods or other assembHes except in the presence of certain of the King's officers, who were appointed to be present at them.1 The pretext of both of these edicts was the trespass upon the terms of Amboise by the Protestants, and fear of a Protestant conspiracy. But in reality the action of the government constituted a partial yielding to that CathoHc pressure which already had made itself manifest at Nancy. The Edict of Roussillon completely ignored a petition of the Huguenots presented to the King while at Roussillon, which shows the pernicious activity of the local Catholic leagues already. The complaint specified that infractions of the Edict of Amboise had been committed by the CathoHcs, especially in Burgundy; that Catholic associations everywhere were being formed against them ; that the priests openly lauded the King of Spain from their pulpits ; that their synods were broken up by the enemies of their reHgion.2 After a sojourn of a month at Roussillon, the pilgrimage of the court was again resumed. At Valence (August 22) Catherine received word that Elizabeth of Spain had given birth to still-born twin babes. On September 24 Avignon was reached, where a stay of two weeks was made during which Catherine con sulted the famous astrologer Nostradamus. Hyeres and Aix were stages on the road to Marseilles3 (November 3-10), whence 1 Isambert, XIV, 166; Castelnau, Book V, chap, x; La Popeliniere, II, Book XI, 5, 6; Cheruel, Histoire de V administration monarchique de la France, I, 196. 2 D'Aubigne, II, 211. On the last complaint see Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 195, 203, and notes. These Catholic associations generally at this time went by the name of "Confreries du St. Esprit," as D'Aubigne's allusion shows. 3 For an episode showing at once the manners of some in the court, and the Catholic intensity of the people of Marseilles, see Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 475. 252 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE it led to Nimes1 (December 12), and MontpelHer2 (Decem ber 17), and thence to Agde and Beziers,3 where progress for some time was blocked by heavy snow-falls. The snows irritated Catherine and to placate her impatience she was shown historical evidence that both Blanche of Castile and the queen of Charles VII had once been snowed-in in these parts for three months.4 Unlike his mother, Charles IX enjoyed it, building a snow fort in which he and his pages withstood a siege by some of the gentle men of the household.5 During this enforced sojourn Catherine de Medici received word of the famous conflict between the marshal Montmorency, who had been made governor of Paris,6 when the court started en tour, and the cardinal of Lorraine. On January 8, 1565, the cardinal of Lorraine sought to enter Paris with a great rout of armed retainers. The marshal demanded the disarming of the company, in compliance with a royal ordonnance of 1564 forbid ding the carrying of arquebuses, pistols, or other firearms,7 .not knowing that the cardinal had a warrant from the queen mother : Lamathe, "Deliberation des consuls de Nismes au sujet de l'entree de Charles IX dans ladite ville (1564)," Rev. des Soe savant des dipart., 5e serie, III (1872), 781. 2 While here, Catherine dispatched the marshal Bourdillon into Guyenne for the purpose of dissolving the league formed at Cadillac on March 13, 1563 (D'Aubigne', II, 213). As we shall see, the mission was fruitless. 3 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., lviii. The editor adds: "De toutes les villes du Midi, c'etait [Beziers] celle qui comptait le plus de Protes tants." On account of the alarm evinced by the Huguenots of the south — 300 gentlemen of Beziers visited the King in a body — Charles IX, when at Marseilles on November 4, "confirmed" the Edict of Amboise. Yet so apprehensive was the court that whenever it stopped an effort was made to disarm the local populace (C. S. P. For., No. 788 [1564]). 4 On the incident of Catherine reading a MS chronicle about Blanche of Castile, see the extract of the Venetian ambassador in Baschet (La diplomatic vinelienne, 521, 522). s Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., lix. 6 Claude Haton, I, 378. 7 The order of the King of December 13, 1564, prohibiting any nobles whoever they might be, unless princes of the house of France, from entering the government of the Ile-de-France is still unpublished. It is preserved in a report of the Spanish ambassador, Arch, nat., K. 1,505, No. 31. It is to be distinguished from the THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 253 authorizing his men to wear arms if so desired. The cardinal haughtily refused to obey, and a fight took place in the street near the corner of St. Innocents, in which one man was killed.1 The reactionary poHcy of the government stimulated the locaL CathoHc leagues in Languedoc during this winter of 1 5 64-6 5. 2 The reHgious prejudice which these associations manifested was influ enced by the bitter jealousy existing between the Guises and the Montmorencys. From the hour of the clash between the cardinal and the marshal, the Guises plotted to compass the ruin of the house of Montmorency, and sought to find support in the Catholic leagues of the southern provinces. The tolerant ^policy of the general ordonnance of the year before — "Lettres du roy contenans defenses a. toutes personnes de ne porter harquebuzes, pistoles, ni pistolets, ni autres bastons a feu, sur peine de confiscation de leurs armes et chevaulx," Paris, 1564. Cf. Isambert, XIV, 142. 1 All the historians notice this episode. See D'Aubigne, Book IV, chap, v; Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., lix, lx, and 253-56 where the letters of the marshal and the queen mother on the subject are given. The editor, in a long note, sifts the evidence. Other accounts are in Claude Haton, I, 381-83 (other references in note); C.S.P.For., No. 942, January 24, 1564; Mim. du due de Nevers, V, 12, 13; Castelnau, Book VI, chap. ii. In Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 600-2, is an account from the pen of Don Louis del Rio, an attache of the Spanish embassy at Paris; and on pp. 655, 656 is the "Harangue de l'admiral de France a MM. de la court du parlement de Paris du 27 Janvier 1565 avec la reponse." The baron de Ruble has written the history of this incident in Mim. de la Soe de I' hist, de Paris de l'Ile-de-France, Vol. VI. According to a letter of Mary Stuart to Queen Elizabeth, February 12, 1565, the resentment due to the old lawsuit over Dammartin flashed out at this time. But it must have been a conjecture on her part, for she adds: "I have heard no word of the duke of Guise or monsieur d'Aumale." — C. S. P. Scot., II, 146. The prince of Conde's Catholic leanings at this critical moment are manifested in a letter to his sister, the abbess of Chelles, in which he states that he is annoyed at the outrage committed on the cardinal of Lorraine by the marshal Montmorency; that the union of these two houses is more than necessary; that if he had been with the cardinal, he would have given proof of his good-will bv deeds. See Appendix VII. 2 "Les confraires du Sainct-Esprit et autres reprenoient plus de viguer, et les provinces ne pouvoient plus souffrir les ministres ny les presches publics et parti culars, et se se paroient entierement des huguenots; qui estoient argumens certains qu'en peu de temps il se verroit quelque grand changement." — Castelnau, Book VI, chap. ii. 254 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE marshal Montmorency and his brother Damville was seized upon by the Guises to make them odious.1 The secular clergy and still more the Jesuits and Capuchins were very active in this work, going from town to town and village to village, urging CathoHcs vigorously to defend their faith, and their fiery preaching materi ally advanced the tendency to union among the provincial leagues.2 Under the effective leadership of the sieur de Candalle, the league of Agen had had an astonishing spread over Guyenne, exhibiting a strength of organization and an audacity which fore shadows that of the Holy League of 1576, in whose genesis, indeed, it represents an evolutionary stage. What made the league of Guyenne so pecuHarly formidable, however, was not so much its perfection of organization and its wide expansion, as the fact that it was organized and had existence without the knowledge or consent of the crown, and in transgression of the royal authority, which forbade such associations. This highly developed stage of existence was arrived at by the league of Agen in August, 1564, from which date it may properly be called the league of Guyenne.3 Naturally the Guises approached Montluc with their plan. While the court was sojourning at Mont-de-Marsan (March 9-24, ^65), waiting the arrival of the Spanish queen and the duke of Alva at Bayonne, an intimation was given to Montluc that a league was in process of formation in France "wherein were several great persons, princes and others," and an agent of the Guises at this 1 Ardent Catholics, like Cardinal Granvella, believed both the marshal Mont morency and Damville to be Protestants at heart (Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 278). 2 "Des catholiques formerent des 'unions' pour derendre l'honneur de Dieu et de la Sainte Eglise, et ces unions, en se rapprochant constituenent la Ligue." — Beulier, "Pourquoi la France este-elle restee catholique au XVIe siecle," Revue anglo-romaine, January 11, 1896, 257. The Jesuits worked hard in France for Philip II. Forneron, II, 304, quotes an interesting letter to this effect from a Jesuit working in France. 3 The proces-verbal of this league is in Mimoires de Condi, ed. London, VI, 290-306. For the court's sojourn at Agen see Barrere (l'abbe), "Entree et sejour de Charles IX a Agen (1565)," Bull, du Com. de la langue, de I'hist. et des arts de la France I (1854), 472. For the King's sojourn at Condom (1565) see Barrere (l'abbe'), ibid., 476. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 255 time endeavored to persuade Montluc to join the association.1 But Montluc was cautious; he had no great affection for the Guises and, moreover, leagues and such associations were against the law, which he, as a crown officer, was pledged to support. Grammont who was opposed to Montluc had already complained of his con duct to the queen mother.2 Besides, there were private reasons, whose nature will be soon developed, which made him hesitate. Montluc carried his information to Catherine de Medici, who, not yet perceiving that the ambition of the Guises was the chief motive, was not at once seriously alarmed, since the anti-Protestant policy of the government made it indifferent now to such associations. Accordingly, when the court reached Bordeaux (it arrived there on April 9) and the Huguenots renewed their complaints against Candalle and his associates, the King ignored the petition, recog nizing that many of the nobles were members of the league of Guyenne. Instead, he gave the league a quasi-legal status by proclaiming that the crown would not listen to any more complaints against Candalle and his associates.3 But the queen mother was genuinely alarmed a few weeks later when the real purpose and scope of the proposed league were re vealed to her through an intercepted letter which the duke of Aumale had written on February 27, 1565, to the marquis d'Elbceuf. The duke of Montpensier, the vicomte de Martigues, Chavigny, who was a Guise protege, D'Angennes, and the bishop of Mans, were named in this letter as the chiefs of an association, which had for its avowed end the abasement of the house of Montmorency.4 1 Commentaires et lettres de Monttuc, III, 80, 81; De Thou, V, Book XXXVII, 32; Anquetil, I, 213. 2 Collection Godefroy, CCLVII, No. 7, July 18, 1564. 3 De Thou, IV, Book XXXVII, 32. 4 A printed copy of this important dispatch, entitled "Coppie d'une lettre du sieur d'Aumale au sieur marquis d'Elbceuf son frere, -sur l'association qu'ils deliberent faire contre la maison de Montmorency" (February 27, 1565), is to be found in the Bib. Nat., L b. 33: 172. It evidently was circulated as a political pamphlet by the Huguenots. But where is the original ? Portions of it are as follows: "Mon frere . . . j'ay receu de vostre homme la lettre que m'avez escripte J'en ay par plusieurs fois cy devant escript a Messieurs de Montpensier, d'Estampes, Cehavigny: par ou ils auroyent bien 256 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Catherine, apprehending the consequences certain to result from such an extension of the feud of the two houses, implored the -^King, at a large meeting of the council held on May 18, 1565, to divulge what had been ascertained — that a secret association had been discovered in defiance of the law, having political aims detri mental to the monarchy, and a system of government for the levy ing of men and money without the King's authority. The coun selors, with one accord, denied their knowledge or implication, and protested their devotion to the cause and the law. Catherine was thoroughly alarmed, and appealed to Montluc for advice. What followed may be told in his own words : I heard then some whisper of a league that was forming in France, wherein were several very great persons, both Princes and others, whom nevertheless I have nothing to do to name, being engaged by promise to the contrary. I cannot certainly say to what end this League was contrived; but a certain gentleman named them to me every one, endeavoring at the same time to persuade me to make one in the Association, assuring me it was to a good end; but he perceived by my countenance that it was not a dish for my palate. I presently gave the Queen private intimation of it; for I could not endure such kind of doings, who seemed to be very much astonished at it, telling me it was the first syllable she had ever heard of any such thing; and commanding me to enquire further into the business, which I did, but could get nothing more out of my gentleman; for he now lay upon his guard. Her Majesty then was pleased to ask my advice, how she should behave herself in this business, whereupon I gave her counsel to order it so that the peu juger la volonte que j'ay tousjours lue de nous venger, et combien je desirerois l'association que vous dites (verso) prevoyant assez combien elle estoit necessaire non seulement pour nous, mais aussi pour tous les gens de bien a qui l'on en veult plus que jamais. "Et pour ceste cause, mon frere, je trouverois merveilleusement bon que les diets Sieurs y voulsissent entendre, laissant les villes, d'autant qu'il n'y a nulle asseurance en peuple, comme je l'ay dernierement encore cogneut. Mais avec la Noblesse, de ma part je suis tout resolu et prest, et n'y veux espargner aucune chose, et le plustost sera le meilleur. Qui me fait vous prier, de regarder et en bien adviser tous parensemble, et mesmes avec le seigneur de Montpensier, et de m'en mander ce que vous aurez deliber£, a fin que par la je resolue avec les Seigneurs et Noblesse qui sont de deca et mes Gouverneurs, qui feront tout ce que je vouldray. "Au demeurant, vous avez bien entendu le nombre de Chevaliers de l'Ordre qui ont estS faicts, qui sont bien pres de trente ou plus, dont monsieur de Brion en est des premiers. Aussi des preparatifs que Ion fuit a la Court pour aller a Bayonne recevoir festoyer la Roine d'Espaigne." THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 257 King himself should say in public that he had heard of a League that was forming in his Kingdom, which no one could do without giving him some jealousy and offence; and that therefore he must require everyone without exception to break off this League, and that he would make an Association in his Kingdom, of which he himself would be the Head; for so for some time it was called, though they afterwards changed the name, and called it the Con federation of the King. The Queen at the time that I gave her this advice did by no means approve of it, objecting, that should the King make one, it was to be feared that others would make another; but I made answer and said that the King must engage in his own all such as were in any capacity of doing the contrary, which, however, was a thing that could not be concealed, and might well enough be provided against. Two days after, her Majesty being at supper, called me to her and told me that she had considered better of the affair I had spoke to her about, and found my counsel to be very good, and that the next day, without further delay, she would make the King propound the business to his Council; which she accordingly did, and sent to enquire for me at my lodging, but I was not within. In the evening she asked me why I did not come to her, and commanded me not to fail to come the next day, because there were several great difficulties in the Council, of which they had not been able to determine. I came according to her command, and there were several disputes. Monsieur de Nemours made a very elegant speech, remonstrating "That it would be very convenient to make a League and Association for the good of the King and his Kingdom, to the end, that if affairs should so require, every one with the one and the same will might repair to his Majesty's person, to stake their lives and fortunes for his service, and also in case any one of what religion soever, should offer to invade or assault them, or raise any commotion in the state, that they might with one accord unite, and expose their lives in their common defence." The Duke of Montpensier was of the same opinion, and several others saying that they could not choose but so much the more secure the peace of the Kingdom, when it should be known that all the Nobility were thus united for the defence of the Crown. The Queen then did me the honor to command me to speak ; whereupon I began, and said, "That the League proposed could be no ways prejudicial to the King, being that it tended to a good end for his Majesty's service, the good of his Kingdom, and the peace and security of his People; but that one which should be formed in private could produce nothing but disorder and mischief; for the good could not answer for the evil disposed; and should the cards once be shuffled betwixt League and League, it would be a hard matter to make of it a good game; that being the most infallible way to open a door to let strangers into the kingdom, and to expose all things to spoil and ruin; but that all of us in general, both Princes and others, ought to make an 258 / THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE \. s Association, which should bear the title of the League, or the Confederation of the King, and to take a great and solemn oath, not to decline or swerve from it upon penalty of being declared such as the oath should import; and that his Majesty having so concluded, ought to dispatch messengers to all parts of the kingdom, with commission to take the oaths of such as were not there present, by which means it would be known, who were willing to live and die in the service of the king and state. And should anyone be so foolish or impudent as to offer to take arms, let us all swear to fall upon them; I warrant your Majesty I will take such order in these parts, that nothing shall stir to the prejudice of your royal authority. And in like manner let us engage by the faith we owe to God, that if any Counter-League shall disclose itself, we will give your Majesty immediate notice of it; and let your Majesty's be sub scribed by all the great men of your kingdom. The feast will not be right without them, and they also are easy to be persuaded to it, and the fittest to provide against any inconvenience that may happen." This was my proposition, upon which several disputes ensued ; but in the end the King's Association was concluded on, and it was agreed, that all the Princes, great Lords, Governors of Provinces, and Captains of Gens d'armes should renounce all Leagues and Confederacies whatsoever, as well without as within the Kingdom, excepting that of the King, and should take the oath upon pain of being declared rebels to the crown; to which there were also other obligations added, which I do not remember. . . .In the end all was past and concluded, and the Princes began to take the oath, and to sign the articles.1 The weakness of the crown's position in these circumstances is evident. Recognizing its inability to crush these local associations and fearing lest control of them would pass over wholly to the 1 Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, III, 80-86. I have used the seventeenth- century translation of Cotton, 274, 275, which preserves something of the spirit of the original. De Thou, never having seen the document in question, expresses his doubt of Montluc's veracity in the matter, and argues the improbability of the King's having followed Montluc's advice on the ground that the crown had con demned all secret associations as destructive of domestic tranquillity. "Why should the King make a league with his subjects?" asks De Thou. "Far from deriving any advantage from it, would it not diminish his authority ? Would the King not incite his subjects to do exactly what he wanted to avoid, and by his own example accustom them to town factions; to foment and support parties in the kingdom?"— De Thou, IV, Book XXXVII, 33. Unfortunately for the truth of De Thou's hypothesis, the facts are the other way, for there is documentary proof that Charles IX followed out Montluc's suggestion, and sent the declaration to all his officers requesting their adherence to it. The baron de Ruble discovered the proof in F. Fr. 20,461, fol. 58. See his edition of Montluc, III, 86, note; cf . D'Aubigne, II, 218, and n. 6. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 259 Guises, the crown tried to save its power and its dignity by fusing them into a single confederation under the King and forbidding the formation of future associations without royal consent. . But the power of the crown was not commensurate with its show of j authority. The leagues continued to multiply and to remain] independent of the crown's coercion. In the year 1565 the situa tion is different in degree but not in kind from that which existed in 1576 when the Holy League was formed. Even the Spanish affihations of the Holy League existed poten tially at this time through the treason of Montluc.1 For the wily Gascon, whose character was a combination of daring determina tion, reHgious bigotry and envy, in recommending the measures he did was really taking steps to cover up his own tracks. Montluc, despite his professions of allegiance, was angry at the queen mother, and quite ready to knife her in the dark. His heart was filled with rebelHous envy of Vieilleville, because the latter had been given a marshal's baton. Disappointed in this expectation he asked for the post of colonel-general which D'Andelot filled.2 Instead Montluc had to be satisfied with the office of governor of Guyenne, which he regarded as ill compensation of his services.3 In consequence of these grievances, even before the recovery of Havre, Montluc had entered into correspondence with Philip II, to whom he represented the necessity of Spanish intervention in France, on account of the double danger by which France was threatened through the pur poses of the Protestants and Catherine de Medici's toleration of them. The Spanish King at first hesitated, but soon availed him self of the opportunity thus afforded, for two strings were better 1 The credit of having made this important discovery is due to the baron de Ruble, Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 317-26, 329, 330, 346, 347, 362, 363. But it was Forneron who showed the world the magnitude of Montluc's treason (Hist, de Philippe II, I, 293-330). Suspicion of Montluc's course, however, prevailed in his own day. He was charged with having agreed to deliver over the province of Guyenne to Philip II in 1570 and issued a cartel against his adversaries denying that he had any intelligence with Spain. See Appendix VIII. 2 D'Andelot's appointment to this post created intense feeling among the Catholic officers. Strozzi, Brissac, and Charry openly refused to obey him (D'Aubigne', II, 207; Brantome, V, 341). 3 Forneron, I, 294, n. 3. 260 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE than one to his bow. Profound secrecy covered the negotiations. Philip's love of mystery and the delicacy of the matter led him to conceal the plan even from his ambassador in France, and operate through Bardaxi, a cousin of a Spanish captain of that name, who had been pursued by the Inquisition and had fled to France, where he sought service under Montluc in recompense of which he finaHy was rehabilitated.1 Montluc proposed the formation of a league between the Pope, the Emperor, the Spanish King, and the leading Catholic princes of Germany and Italy to avert a union of the Huguenots with outside Protestant princes for the overthrow of the Catholic religion in France.2 He enlarged upon the moral "benefit" of such a league to France, now ridden by the Huguenots to the imminent ruin of the monarchy, and pointed out to PhiHp II the peculiar interest he had in crushing Calvinism.3 The plan was for PhiHp II to kidnap Jeanne d'Albret who was to be given over to the Inquisition, and to seize possession of Beam, and thus accomplish two purposes at once — destroy the hearth of Calvinism in France, and estabHsh Spanish power north of the Pyrenees.4 Fortunately for France, the French ambassador at Madrid, St. Sulpice, was informed of the plan, though he did not know of Mont luc's treason, by a servant of the Spanish queen, and Catherine de Medici's energetic steps in the protection of Beam nipped the scheme in the bud.5 This joint plan of Montluc and PhiHp II for the seizure of Beam T Montluc, ed. De Ruble, IV, Introd., ix. 2 It will be observed that Montluc independently had come to the same con clusion as Granvella. 3 Montluc, ed. De Ruble, IV, 317-26, February 8, 1564. 4 Forneron, I, 330. D'Aubigni?, II, 294, wrongly ascribes this plot to the Jesuits. The traditional Protestant account, attributed to Calignon, chancellor of Navarre, is printed in Mim. du due de Nevers, II, 579; also in Mim. de Villeroy. The account in Arch, cur., VI, 281, is much colored. Catholic historians have denied the existence of such a plot, e. g., the abb6 Gamier in Mim. de I'Acad. des inscrip. (1787), Vol. L, 722. But since the publication of Montluc's Correspon dance there is no doubt of it. s Forneron, I, 303-6. Cabie, L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 483, gives the text of the ambassador's letter to Catherine, and his note of thanks to the queen's embroiderer who divulged the plot. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 261 and the capture of its queen telescoped with another plot against her to which Philip and Pope Pius IV were parties. On Septem ber 28, 1563, a papal bull excommunicated the queen for heresy, and she was cited before the Holy Office for trial.1 To Catherine's credit she at once took a firm stand in favor of the queen of Navarre.2 It was not in the nature of Philip II to be daring in daylight. Precaution was second nature to him. Lansac's mission to Madrid to protest against the action of Pius IV coincided with Montluc's overtures to the Spanish King. The discovery of part of the plan made PhiHp timid about pushing it at all until a more favorable time at least. Accordingly he gave Montluc little encouragement, save offering him an asylum in Spain if events should compel him to quit France on account of his treasonable correspondence,3 while to Lansac he said that " what the Pope had done against 'Madame de Vend6me' was very inopportune and would be remedied."4 In a word, PhiHp II dissembled his participation in the Pope's conduct, asserting that the procedure had been taken without his knowl edge, and that while he deplored the queen of Navarre's apostasy he could not be unmindful of the fact that she was kith and kin of the queen of Spain, his wife ! 5 There probably was a certain amount of spite work in Philip's repudiation of the Pope at this time. One of the important politi cal issues raised at the Council of Trent was the question of pre cedence between the ambassadors of France and Spain. Lansac, Charles IX's ambassador to the Council, claimed the honor of 1 D'Aubigne, II, 204, 205; Mim. de Condi, IV, 669. Charles IX's letter of November 30, 1563, to St. Sulpice gives some details of the process (U Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 186, 187). 2 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 119, 120. Her letter to her daughter in Spain, not in the correspondence, which M. Cabie cites in L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 208, displays real courage. Charles IX said he could not abandon Jeanne d'Albret "sans etre vu deserter de ses plus proches parents" (ibid., 247). The instructions to Lansac, who was sent to Spain to protest in the name of France against the papal action, show fine scorn (ibid., 224). 3 Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 327, note. 4 L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 228: "Reponse de Philippe II au sr. de Lansac en sa premiere audience, 18 fev. 1565." s Ibid., 247. 262 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE going before the count of Lara, Spain's representative, at which Philip was "picque" oultre mesure."1 The papal party in vain implored Lansac to yield. Lansac replied that "la France ne pouvait renoncer aux droits qui lui avaient ete reconnus dans tous les precedents conciles, et que, plutdt que de laisser rien innover sur ce point, ' j'6tais r&olu, selon le commandement de mon mattre, apres avoir proteste de nullite de ce concile, de m'en aller incon tinent avec tous les pre"lats de ntre nation, sans entrer dans aucune dispute ne composition.' "2 Philip II refrained from making any observation to France upon the disputed point3 pending the deci sion of the Pope.4 But such a course was impossible. The con test over the question became the absorbing topic of conversation at Rome.5 The Pope was between Scylla and Charybdis.6 Spain claimed precedence for Philip II through the crown of Castile— "chose peu veritable" — and argued that the services of PhiHp II to the church justified her pretension; to which France rejoined that her king was historically first son of the church, the Most Christian King, who "had bled and suffered for the preservation of the Catholic religion in his kingdom, for which he had combated to the hazarding of his entire state."7 Finally being compeUed to decide, Pius IV made a choice in favor of France, to the immense chagrin of Philip II who actually fell sick of the humiHation and recalled his ambassador Vargas from Rome as a sign of his displeasure.8 i L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 5. 2 Letter to St. Sulpice, February 10, 1563, ibid., 115. 3 Ibid., 135. 4 Pius IV was so perplexed that he tried to avoid pronouncing in the matter. "On avait decide^ a la derniere f&te de St. Pierre, de supprimer cette ceremonie, afin de n'offenser personne." — Charles IX to St. Sulpice, July 24, 1563, ibid., 141. s Du Ferrier, French ambassador at Venice to St. Sulpice, April 12, 1564, ibid., 252. 6 Cf . the report of the conversation between Archbishop Cispontin, the papal secretary, and D'Oysel (ibid., 273, July, 1564). 7 "Instructions donnees par Charles IX a L'Aubespine le jeune, envoye' en Espagne," ibid., 277, June 24, 1564. 8 Ibid., 279, 281, 282, 299. "It is an error to regard, as most his torians do, the course of the relations of Philip II to the see of Rome as a single consistent development, for the earlier part of his reign was dominated by THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 263 The catalogue of Spain's grievances against France, besides the question of reHgion, the dispute over precedence, and France's refusal to accept the findings of Trent which PhiHp II had recog nized1 included still another complaint. This was the border difficulty between the Spanish provinces of Artois and Luxembourg, and France. It was a complex question, partly religious, partly poHtical, partly commercial. Like the Huguenot rebellion, the growing insurrection in the Low Countries was of a double nature — reHgious and political. Each side looked to the other for sym pathy and support and neither was disappointed. The Huguenots retaHated for the assistance afforded the government of France by Spain during the first civil war by aiding the revolt of the Netherlands. This intimate connection of events oh each side of the Hne is an important fact to be observed. It was in 1563, as Granvella had divined,2 that the intrigues of a principle utterly different from that which inspired the latter. In the sixties and early seventies the Spanish king devoted himself primarily to the maintenance of the principles of the counter-Reformation; he abandoned political advantage in the interest of the faith, united with the ancient foes of his house for the suppression of heresy, dedicated himself and his people to the cause of Catholicism. . . . But in the later seventies there came a change. The spirit of the counter-Reformation was waning in France: the old political lines of cleavage had begun to reappear; Philip began to discover that he was draining his land to the dregs in the interests of a foreign power who offered hi'm no reciprocal advantages, and reluctantly exchanged his earlier attitude of abject devotion to the interests of the church for the more patriotic one of solicitude for the welfare of Spain Viewed from the Spanish standpoint, the story of this long development is a tragic but familiar one — reckless national sacrifice for the sake of an antiquated ideal, exhaustion in the interests of a foreign power, which uses and casts aside but never reciprocates. But it adds one more to the already long list of favorable revisions of the older and more hostile verdicts on the Spanish monarch. Philip's attitude toward the papacy, though not always wise or statesmanlike, was at least far more honorable and loyal to the church than it is usually represented (as, for instance, by Philippson): the first part of his reign is marked by his single-hearted devotion to the cause of Rome, and even at the last that devotion does not falter, though the interests of his conntry forced him to adopt a more national policy toward the papacy than that with which he had begun." — R. B. Merriman, Review of Herre, Papsttum und Papstwahl im Zeitalter Philipps II (Leipzig, 1907), in American Historical Review, October, 1908, pp. 117, 118. 1 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 177, July 30, 1564; R. Q. H., 1869, p. 403. 2 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 669. 264 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE the French Protestants in Flanders became a matter of serious apprehension. Valenciennes was the most aggressive city of the religion in Flanders, and Margaret of Parma actually was afraid of Montigny doing as Maligny had done at Havre. Already the prince of Orange was the recognized leader of those who sympa thized with the Huguenots. To this class England's support of the prince of Conde", and above all, the assassination of the duke of Guise, came as a real stimulus. Valenciennes, Tournay, Antwerp, even Brussels were stirred. In May, 1563, the demonstrations of the Calvinists at Valenciennes and Tournay became so bold that it required six companies of infantry to keep them overawed. But this measure, instead of accomplishing the result expected, aggra vated the situation, for the marquis de Berghes, the commander, was so ostracized by the nobles, that he lost courage. Philip II grew alarmed and wrote to his sister on June 13, 1563, that the example of France counseled most drastic suppression. In reply the regent and the cardinal Granvella implored Philip to come to the Netherlands, but he pleaded ignorance of the language and poverty as excuse. Meanwhile the Orange party practiced so successfully with the duchess of Parma that she inclined toward conciliation instead of coercion. This threw the regent and De Berghes into aHgnment, who proposed to convoke the States-Gen eral to remedy the evils — a programme which the nobles enthu siastically advocated. The similarity between the Flemish movement and the pro gramme of the political Huguenots in France is very close. r With the design of suppressing heresy in its two most active centers, GranveUa proposed to imitate the method used at Paris, of exacting a pro fession of faith together with a pledge to observe the laws, of all citizens who wished to stay in the city. Recalcitrants were to be disarmed, compelled to sell their property, one-third of the pro ceeds of which was to be confiscated for the support of the soldiers and municipal expenses, and the culprits were then to be banished 1 Granvella said as much to Philip II, July 14, 1563. See Papiers d'itat du card, de Granvelle, VII, 124; cf. Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 277 (Philip II to Alva, December 14, 1563). THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 265 from the country. This drastic poHcy called forth a mingled protest and threat from the prince of Orange, whose wealth and German connections, aside from other qualities he possessed, gave him great influence. The government begged for money and troops, "como la Hga va cresciendo."1 Orange's tactics were to persuade the provincial estates to refuse to vote subsidies or to throw the weight of the finances upon the church much after the manner of things done at Pontoise. This he began to do in Brabant where the indefinite postponement of a grant of money provoked mutiny among the soldiers. In September De Berghes went out from office, having distinguished himself by not putting a single heretic to death. The change was immediately followed by the burning alive of a Protestant preacher and the protestations of the quartet, Orange, Hoorne, Egmont, and Montigny, became bolder.2 Finally the nobles of Flanders resolved to protest to the King of Spain. PhiHp II, always hesitating and undecided, did not respond. To a petition which was sent him demanding the recall of the cardinal, he rephed by a flat refusal. The nobles showed their offense by absenting themselves from the Council of State and used their influence to detach the regent from Granvella. At last, after months of negotiation, Philip II yielded. Granvella retired to his splendid palace at Besancon in Franche Comte and the nobles resumed their seats in the council. But the four were irritated at Philip II's delay in responding to their demands for reform. It was evident, moreover, by November, 1563, that something Hke a common purpose actuated the chief provinces — Flanders, Artois, Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht.3 The Calvinists were especially numerous in the Walloon prov inces, and preachers from Geneva and England were active among them. The government undertook to restrain their assem blies, and the conflict broke out. This conflict, it is important to remark, did not turn upon the question of religion in and of itself, but upon the manner of treating the heretics. Philip wanted to 1 Granvella to Perez, August 6, 1563, Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 177. 2 Ibid., 231. 3 Ibid., 262. 266 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE apply the edicts of his father, which required the death penalty for heresy; but the government and Spanish officials in the Low Countries, Catholics though they were, were opposed to so severe a penalty and would rather have treated those offending as criminals than as heretics. But with Philip the extirpation of heresy was a question of conscience. Valenciennes still remained the most prominent place of dis affection,1 but Brussels was much infected.2 But more formidable than local spirit was the marked tendency toward a union of the provinces3 and the growing interest of the Huguenots in the Dutch and Flemish cause,4 so much so that Cardinal Granvella strongly hinted at Spanish pressure being forcibly exerted upon France for the reduction of the Huguenots.5 The cardinal hoped to see Charles IX and his mother more docile in receiving the advice of Spain since the withdrawal of Chantonnay, who was made Philip II's ambassador at Vienna. But the theft of Alava's cipher by the Huguenots threw him into despair.6 The reciprocal con nection between politics and reHgion in France and the Low Countries made the Spanish government watch the movement of events in France with vigilance.7 So acute was the situation owing to Huguenot sympathy with the cause of insurrection across the border,8 that although Granvella ridiculed the wild rumor that Montgomery was coming to Flanders, he nevertheless apprehended the possibility of a rupture with France and was reheved to know 1 See Paillard, Histoire des troubles de Valenciennes, 1560-67. 2 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 270. 3 For proof see ibid., 55, 56, and note. 4 "Les Huguenots de France sollicitent continuellement ceulx des Pays-Bas pour se revolter," writes Granvella to the Emperor on June 3, 1564 (ibid., 18). 5 Ibid., 99; cf. 104, note. 6 Ibid., 23, 393; L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 5, 275, 280, 284, 300, 305; Cor respondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 197s. 7 "Si cela de la religion succede bien en France, les affaires vauldront de mieulx." — Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 152, July 15, 1564. 8 The presence of many Belgian students at the French universities undoubtedly contributed to this sympathy. See Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 372. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 267 that precautions had been taken against any chance enterprise of the Huguenots along the edge of Artois and Hainault.1 Margaret of Parma and the nobles sent ambassadors to Spain to ask concession on two points: (1) that the provinces be gov erned by native officials; (2) that the punishment of heresy be moderated. The King hesitated long. It was not until October 17, 1565, that he gave decisive pronouncement in dispatches issued from Segovia. In them he ordered the maintenance of the Inquisition, the enforcement of the edicts, and the impoverish ment of those who resisted. In a word, Philip II would not yield. The discontent against the administration of the King of Spain now turned against the King himself. Wiffiam of Orange used the notable words, "We are witnessing the beginning of a great tragedy." In the face of the growing resistance the duke of Alva strongly advised Philip II to convert the towns into fortresses.2 For the Flemish cities were, as yet, commercial groups, not fortified burgs. With the possible exception of Gravelines, no one of them was capable of making a sustained defense. This suggestion happened to coincide with the English occu pation of Havre-de- Grace and the possible return of Calais to England in return therefor. Such a contingency could but be viewed with anxiety by Spain,3 and this fact, coupled with the uncertainty of developments in France induced Philip to follow out Alva's suggestion by strengthening Gravelines. France at once became alarmed over Calais and protested in the same breath against the building of fortifications at GraveHnes and the duty upon her wines.4 In retaliation the French government also strengthened the garrisons on the * Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 390, 527, 550, 556, 593. 2 Ibid., VII, 281. 3 The counselor d'Assonleville wrote to Cardinal Granvella after the peace of Troyes, "Adieu, Callais! conbien qu'elle nous duiroit bien hors de mains des Francois!"— Poulet, I, 570. *L 'Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 191, 194, 209, 221. Each state appointed a commission in 1563 to adjust this difficulty and other border complications on the edge of Artois and Luxembourg (for instances, see L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 268 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE edge of Picardy, under the direction of the prince of Conde" (who was governor of the province) , to the immense indignation of Spain. 1 The Spanish erections around Gravelines reacted also upon the state of things in Flanders. For new and heavier taxation was the indispensable point of departure for carrying out such meas ures, "unless one were willing to see everything said upon the sub ject vanish in smoke." The sole effective remedy for the state of things prevailing in the Flemish provinces was, of course, to reorganize the finances and the administration of justice in accordance with the demands made by the nobles. But instead" of attempting to do this, the government aimed to weaken the opposition by dividing the leaders, and the long silence of PhiHp II covered an attempt to draw away Egmont, who was regarded as the ringleader of the Flemish nobles at this time.2 The Spanish government dreaded to summon the estates, as Orange insisted should be done, for fear of things in Brabant and the other prov inces going the road of things in France under like conditions.3 In order, therefore, to provide for funds without asking the estates to vote subsidies, over which there was sure to be a conflict, the Spanish government in the Netherlands undertook to raise the needed money by tariffs. The cloth trade of England and the wine trade of France were the two commodities so taxed. In 1563 a duty was laid on French wine.4 In the case of England, the 224, 227, 228, 240, 254), whose conferences were prolonged through the years 1564-65. See the long note in Gachard, Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 270. In Collection Godefroy, XCIV, No. 16, will be found a "sommaire de la negotiation de Calais, entre le president Seguier et le conseiller du Faur, deputes de Charles IX, et les ambassadeurs de Philippe II;" original, signed by Seguier and Du Faur. In the same collection, XCVI, No. 6, is a delimitation treaty pertaining to the Picard frontier, signed by Harlay and Du Drac, at Gravelines, December 29, 1565. Charles IX refused to ratify it. 1 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 18. 2 "Un eslavon tan importante desta cadena." — Ibid., VII, 215. 3 For Granvella's opinion of the demand for the Estates-General, see his letter to Philip II, April 18, 1564 (ibid., 492-94). 4 Ibid., 294, note, and especially 495-97; cf. L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 188, 193. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 269 excuse given for the high duty placed on imported cloth was pre caution against the plague.1 France at once protested against the tariff and threatened to retaliate by taxing the herring and cod trade, though the Spanish ambassador at Paris, represented that such action would entirely destroy the wine trade and would com pel reprisal.2 Flemish merchants were doubly alarmed at the state of things, for England, too, threatened reprisal by removing the cloth market from Antwerp to Embden and imposing tonnage duties on merchant ships of Flanders driven by stress of weather into English ports for safety during storm.3 But the government in Flanders was obdur ate. Granvella declared England's threat to remove the staple to Embden to be "puerile rhodomontade." He believed that not only would the prohibition against the import of English cloth compel EHzabeth to redress the grievances of Spanish subjects against England, but that it might even make the English govern ment more lenient toward the Catholic reHgion. Furthermore, he argued, the tax would operate like a protective tariff to stimu late the manufacture of cloth in the Low Countries. "If not a single bolt of English cloth ever comes into Flanders again," he wrote "it will be to the permanent profit of the Pays-Bas. We saw this clearly last year during the plague when the prohibition having temporarily suspended the importation of this kind of goods, there was manufactured in the single county of Flanders 60,000 pieces of cloth, or more than the sum total of the three preceding years."4 In the case of French wines the Flemish government even estab- 1 "Non admettre a couleur de la peste." — Granvella to the duchess of Parma, Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 411. 2 This was a mere threat, however, as such a course would have injured France as much as the Netherlands. 3 See the letter of the president Viglius to Granvella, April 17, 1564, in Papiers d'etat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 476; cf. 481. On this whole question, so far as England is concerned see Brugmans, England en de Nederland in de eerste Jaren von Elizabeth's regeering (1558-67), Groningen, 1892; cf. English Historical Review, VIII, 358-60. 4 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle. VII, 496, 497. Cf. the observation of Assonleville in a letter to Granvella, Poulet, I, 570. The cardinal's prophecy was partially fulfilled (Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 40, 41). 270 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE lished a maximum law for their sale which cut the throat of French merchants worse than ever.1 The French government carried the action of the Flemish government up to Madrid, where for months the duty on wine and the buttresses of GraveHnes were matters of repeated interviews between St. Sul pice and the King, and were still unsettled questions at the time of the conference at Bayonne.2 Meanwhile the conflict of the Flemish reform party became more acute because it became compHcated with the question of reHgion. In the Hght of all these circumstances, it is no wonder that Philip II hesitated long before giving his consent to an interview with Catherine de Medici.3 Even then he imposed a number of conditions and regulations. He would not go in person to Bayonne — the place appointed; his wife was to be accompanied by the duke of Alva; display was to be avoided by either side both for motives of economy and to prevent having undue poHtical significance attached to an interview which was to be understood to be purely personal. Philip II's most striking regulations, how ever, were those which had to do with the French entourage. No one in the least tainted with heresy was to accompany the court. The queen of Navarre, whom the Spanish King carefully alluded to as "Madame de Venddme," the prince of Conde, the admiral, 1 "Qui est autant que couper la gorge aux marchands." — "Memoire envoye pour le roi de France a. St. Sulpice," January, 1564, in L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 210. 2 See "Note du Ministere de France en reponse aux griefs presented par 1'ambassadeur d'Espagne" in Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 584-86. Other references to this commercial matter are in VII, 62, 164, 375, 411, 476, 481, 495-97, 584, 668; V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 175, 181, 188, 191, 193, 194, 200, 206, 209, 210, 213, 217, 221, 224, 304, 350, 351; Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 6-15; 514, 515; Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 244, 246, 247; Poulet, I, 567, and n. 2. There is a memoir on the mission of Assonleville to England, April-June 6, 1563, in the Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire, ser. Ill, I, 456 ff. Undoubtedly Spain's harsh commercial policy toward France was also in fluenced in part by jealousy of the commercial relations of France and England, for the treaty of Troyes established freedom of trade between the two nations. For the great importance of this treaty in the history of commerce see De Ruble, Le traiti de Cateau-Cambrisis, 193-95. 3 St. Sulpice sent this important information in a letter of January 22, 1565 L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 338). THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES (271) and the cardinal Chatillon were specifically named with abhorrence. The queen mother acquiesced in this prohibition, save in the case of the prince of Conde, protesting that, on account of his rank, it would give great offense to forbid his presence, as well as create beHef among the Huguenots that the meeting contemplated some thing disadvantageous to them. History has shown that Cath erine's instincts were perfectly right in this particular; since after the massacre of St. Bartholomew the Huguenots-— indeed almost the whole Protestant world — jumped to the conclusion that that disaster was preconcerted at Bayonne. In vain St. Sul pice argued poHtical expediency, saying France and Spain must not be judged aHke, and that "experience had proved that the way of arms had resulted in more dangers than profit to France." PhiHp II's answer was metaffically hard; he would not consent to the presence either of Jeanne d'Albret or the prince of Conde at Bayonne, because it would be a reproach to him and to Spain for his wife to have had converse with a heretic.1 The last stage of Charles IX's long tour of the provinces was [ from Bordeaux2 to Bayonne3 where the French court arrived on j May 22, 1565.^ But that indolence of spirit which is so much associated with Spanish character seems as early as the sixteenth century to have become habitual,4 so that the Spanish queen was forced to travel in the heat (six soldiers of Strozzi's band died with their armor on from heat prostration5), which aggravated the plague prevaiHng in certain parts.6 Ibid., 366. Catherine de Medici pushed her insistence perilously far, as serting that Alava, the Spanish ambassador in France, had intimated that objection would not be made to the presence of the prince of Conde, since his exclusion might endanger the peace. Philip II promptly declared that if Alava had made Catherine believe so, he had acted in violation of instructions. "Memoire envoye a Catherine sur les reponses du roi catholique," May 7, 1564, in V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 375. 2 Egmont passed through Bordeaux on his way to Spain while the court was there (R. Q. H., XXIV, 479). 3 The reasons for the selection of Bayonne are set forth in R. Q. H., XXXIV, 472. 4 "Les lenteurs . . . qui sont habituelles en Esgapne." — L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 363. 5 F. Fr. 20,647, io\. 11. For other details of the preliminaries of Bayonne, see V Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 335-38, 347, 350, 351, 353, 354, 357-°°, 362, 363, 366, 374-78, 382. 272 ) THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE In conferences of state, especially international conferences, ^things of importance are confined within four walls. The six teenth century was par excellence the age of closet politics. The world upon the outside saw only the fetes1 that marked the inter view at Bayonne. But these festivities were no more than the flecks or wreaths of glittering foam that float upon the bosom of the water for an instant and then are gone. The real business I at Bayonne was politics. { But the great importance for three j hundred years2 attributed to this famous interview is today I proved to have had sHght foundation in fact. The light of recent research has dissipated the traditional beHef that Philip II and Catherine de Medici planned the massacre of the French Prot estants at Bayonne, and finally consummated it on St. Bartholo mew's Day.3 The truth is that not what was contemplated but {what was imagined was contemplated at Bayonne became the important historical influence of the future.) An assumed fact came to have all the force of reality. The principals in this unfortunate conference, in point of truth, were far apart from one another. Philip II's interests were wholly political, and personalities were merely incidental to his main purpose. On the other hand, the queen mother's interests were chiefly per sonal, being centered in plans to achieve brilliant marriage 1 Cf. Recueil des choses notables qui ont esti jaites a, Bayonne-Paris, 1566; and the Mimoires de Marguerite de Navarre, Book I. 2 See De Thou, Book XXVII; Mathieu, Histoire de France, I, 283; La Pope liniere, Book XI, 8. The prince of Orange and William of Hesse both believed that the massacre of St. Bartholomew was concerted at Bayonne (Archives de la maison d' Orange-Nassau, III, 507; IV, 108). 3 Some of the literature upon this famous interview is as follows: E. Marcks, Die Zusammenhunft von Bayonne: Das franzos. Staatsleben u. Spanien in d. J. 1563-67, Strassburg, 1889; Combes, L'entrevue de Bayonne de 1565, Paris, 1882; Maury, in Journal des savants, 1871; Loiseleur La St. Barthelimy, Paris, 1883; Lettenhove, La confirence de Bayonne, 1883; La Ferriere, R. Q. H., XXXIV, 457, and the same in Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd.; Philippson, L' Athinatum beige, July 1, 1882; De Croze, Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II; Boutaric, La Saint Barthilemy, d'apres les archives du Vatican (Bib. de I'Ecole des Chartes, s€r. V, III, 1); Raumer, Franhreich und die Bartholomausnacht, Leipzig, 1854; Wuttke, Zur Vorgeschichte der Bartholomausnacht; Soldan, La Saint Barthi lemy (French trans.), 1854. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 273 affiances for her children, for whose sake she ruinously com promised herself and France. If Catherine had been less vain and less foolishly affectionate, she would have striven harder for the solution of things more vital to France. It is true she was far from ignoring these issues entirely, but she weakened the cause of France in respect to them by subordinating these to her main purpose, sO that she awakened the greater suspicion of Spain by her attempts to avoid answering in those matters of most concern to Philip II and by her continual harping upon the things that were nearest to her heart, but not of most moment either to France or to Spain. When the duke of Alva drove her into a corner and compelled her to answer the questions he put to her concerning greater politics, Catherine's replies were fatal to her aspirations. What were these matters ? Alva's instructions were strict. He was to demand the expul sion of the Huguenot ministers from France within thirty days; the interdiction of Protestant worship; acceptance of the decrees of the Council of Trent ; profession of the Catholic reHgion by all office holders.1 This poHcy of suppression and compulsion out lined by his sovereign was wholly in keeping with his, the duke's, own judgment. But with greater penetration and less hesitation than PhiHp II, Alva recognized clearly the intimate connection between the politics of Flanders and the politics of France, and favored the adoption of a parallel Hne of conduct at once in the Low Countries. He was convinced that France was incapable of mana ging her own affairs and was a menace to other states, pohtically and reHgiously.2 The means of repression which Spain had often urged had not produced the results desired : they had only delayed the total ruin of the nation. Suggestion and insinuation must be replaced by a more drastic policy. Assassination was a recognized, perhaps a quasi-legitimate poHtical recourse in the eyes of the men of the sixteenth century. The old generation of French Catholics upon whom Spain could rely, the cardinal de Tournon, the duke of 1 R. Q. H., XXXIV, 483, and n. 2. 2 For Alva's judgment on the government of France see Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 276; cf. L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 341-43. ,274 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Guise, the marshal St. Andre, had passed away — one of them assassinated at the hands of a Huguenot. Tavannes and Vieille ville were reluctant to sacrifice country to reHgion, especially when a rival nation would profit thereby. The constable was the only old-time figure of prominence remaining, and he could not be relied on since the conflict between the marshal Montmorency and the cardinal of Lorraine, for he favored the side of his nephews and so was believed to be not far distant from the party of the r- admiral.1 Power had fallen into the hands of the Huguenots, '. whose leaders now excelled in personal force. "The shortest, the most expeditious way, is to behead Conde, the admiral, D'Ande lot, La Rochefoucauld, and Grammont," Alva told the duke of Montpensier2 and Montluc, the two most earnest French converts to this policy.3 But it was yet a far cry from this cool advocacy of assassina- ' tion of the Protestant leaders to the wholesale slaughter of August t24, 1572. There is really no positive connection between the conference of Bayonne and the massacre of St. Bartholomew.4 1 Nig. Tosc, III, 523; J?. Q. H., XXXIV, 492-512, n. 4. Alva frankly said that he wished the constable were gone with the rest — "el condestable que valiera mas que faltara como los otros." — Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 277. 2 The duke of Montpensier was a notoriously bigoted Catholic. The Venetian ambassador said of him: "II quale e tenuto piti atto a governare un monasterio di frati che a comandare ad eserciti." — Rel. vin., II, 155. 3 R. Q. H., XXXIV, 485. Montluc put a memoir in Alva's hands which proposed an alliance between the crowns of France and Spain for the purpose of crushing the Protestants in France. In event of the French king's.refusal to become a party to this alliance, Montluc outlined the means of defense which Philip II would have to resort to. This memoir is published by the baron de Ruble in Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, V, 23 ff. In this striking document the veteran soldier, after setting forth his favorite thesis that French Calvinism was anti- monarchical in its nature, makes a survey of the religious state of the provinces. He concludes that while Protestantism was rampant everywhere in France, in five-sixths of the country the Catholics were superior. The place of great danger is Guyenne. The mutual safety of France and Spain requires the subjugation of this province. France cannot or will not do this alone (cf. Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 342, n. 3; 343, a. 4). It remains, therefore, for the king of Spain to do so. This is the historical argument for all of Montluc's subsequent course of treason with Philip II. 4 This has been triumphantly proved by Count Hector de la Ferriere, who has shown that M. Combes, L' Entrevue de Bayonne de 1565 et la question de St. Barthelimy d'apres les archives de Simancas, Paris, 1881, has mistranslated the very documents upon which he relied (R. Q. H., XXXIV, 511 ff.). THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES ^ 275) ¦^ ...^ ¦'* The slaughter of the French Protestants as a sect was never advo-f cated by any prince in Europe, not even Philip II. There is no\ evidence at the Vatican of any Catholic or papal league for the) extirpation of the Protestants. Such a solution of the religious!- problem was not contemplated, save by one person in Europe atl this time — Pope Pius V. It is this pontiff who has the sinister] distinction of having advocated general destruction of the Prot estants, rather than a discriminating assassination of the Hugue not leaders.1 The most radical action touching the Huguenots j - Pius V was elected pope January 17, 1566 (see Hilliger, Die Wahl Pius V zum Pdpste, 1907). He had been grand inquisitoi before his elevation, and imparted a ferocious zeal to the holy office (see Bertelotti, Martiri di Libero Pensero e Vittime della Sta. Inquisizione nei Secoli, XVI, XVII, e XVIII, Rome, 1892). The violence of his character and his bigotry led to his committing several acts injurious to the Catholic cause, but it was due to him that the Spanish, Venetian, and papal fleets defeated the Turks at Lepanto. He wrote on March 28, 1569 to Catherine de Medici: "Si Votre Majeste continue, comme elle a fait constamment, dans la rectitude de son ame et dans la simplicity de son cceur, a ne chercher que l'honneur de Dieu toutpuissent, et a combattre ouvertement et ardemment les ennemis de la religion catholique, jusqu' a ce qu'ils soient tous massacris (ad internecionem usque), qu'elle soit assuree que le secours divin ne lui manquera jamais, et que Dieu lui preparera, ainsi qu'au roi, son fils, de plus grandes victoires: ce n'est que par V ex termination entiere des heretiques (deletis omnibus haeritics) que le roi pourra rendre a ce noble royaume l'ancien culte de la religion catholique." — Potter, Pie V, 35 ; letter of the Pope to Catherine de Medici, March 28, 1569. The original Latin version of this letter, the salient words of which are in parentheses above, is in Epistola SS. Pii V, ed. Gouban, III, 154, Antwerp, 1640. The editor was secretary to the marquis de Castel-Rodrigio, ambassador of Philip IV to the Holy See. An abridged edition was published by Potter, Lettres de St. Pie V sur les affaires religieuses de son temps en France, Paris, 1826. The letter is one of congratulation written to Catherine de Medici upon the Catholic victory of Jarnac and the death of the prince of Conde. (Cf. the letter of April 13, 1569, on p. 156 to the same effect.) Nevertheless, even the Pope regarded the total destruction of the French Protestants as a result more devoutly to be wished for than practicable. Pope Pius V, however, was not the first advocate of destruction, for as early as 1556 Francois Lepicart gave the same advice to Henry II : " Le roy devroit pour un temps contre- faire le lutherien parmi eux [the Protestants], afin que, prenant de la. occasion de s'assembler hautement partout, on put faire main-basse sur eux tous, et en purger une bonne fois le royaume." — Bayle's Dictionary, art. "Rose." The doctrine of assassination for heresy originally proceeded from the mediaeval church, in which it can be traced back as far as the beginning of the Crusades. Urban II asserted that it was not murder to kill an excommunicated person, pro vided it was done from religious zeal. ("Non enim eos homicidas arbitramur quod adversus excommunicatos zelo catholicae matris ardentes, eorum quOslibet trucidasse (276 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE at large, it may safely be said, that was regarded practicable in 1564-65 was to forbid and prevent future conversion,1 or else the contigerit." — Migne, Epistolae Urbani, CLI, No. 122; Mansi, XX, 713; the same words are used by Ivo of Chartres, X, 331, and by Gratian in the Decretum [causa 32, quaestio 2, canon: De neptis].) The passage stands in the revised edition, to which Gregory XIII prefixed the injunction that nothing should be omitted, and the gloss gives the following paraphrase: "Non putamus eos esse homicidas qui zelo justitiae eos occiderunt." In 1208 Innocent III proscribed the count of Toulouse (Teulet, Trisor des Chartes, I, 316), and in the same pontificate the Fourth Lateran Council declared that the Pope might depose anyone who neglected the duty of exterminating heresy and might bestow his state on others (Harduin, Concilia, VII, 19). The same canon reappears in the Decreta of Gregory IX (Lib. iv, tit. 7. cap. 13). St. Thomas Aquinas declared that the loss of political rights was incurred by excommunication (Summa [ed. 1853], III, 51). The teaching that faith need not be kept with a heretic was well established by the church in the thirteenth century. It was pleaded by the Emperor in the case of Huss — "quoniam non est frangere fidem ei qui Deo fidem frangit." — Palacky, Documenta Joannis Hussi, I, 540. The spirit of this teaching survived in the sixteenth century. In 1561 some citizens of Lucca, having embraced the Piotestant belief, were obliged to flee from the city. The government of the republic, under suggestion from Rome, passed a law on January 9, 1562, that whoever killed one of these refugees, though he had been outlawed, yet would his outlawry be reversed; and that if he himself needed not this privilege, it could be transferred to another (Archivio storico italiano, X, app. 176, 177). On January 20, Pope Pius IV wrote to congratulate the city on this pious legislation: "Legimus pia laudabiliaque decretaque civitatis istius Generale Consilium nuper fecit ad civitatem ipsam ab omni heresum labe integram con- servandam. . . . Nee vero quicquam fieri potuisse judicamus, vel ad tuendum Dei honorem sanctius, vel ad conservandam vestre patrie salutem prudentius." — Ibid., 178, 179. When Henry of Valois made oath to respect liberty of conscience in Poland he was informed that it would be sin to observe the oath, but that if he broke it, the sin of making it would be regarded as a venial offense: "Minor fuit offensio, ubi mens ea praestandi quae pelebatur, defuit." — Hosii, Opera, II, 367. The Ridolfi plot, it may be added, casts a very clear light upon the teaching and conduct of Pius V. [I owe some of the information given above to a curious accident. In 1899, among a number of books which I purchased in London, I found a number of fragmentary notes dealing with this question. There is nothing to indicate their authorship, but in recognition of the assistance of some scholar to me unknown this acknowledgment is made. It may be added that the books purchased dealt with France in the fourteenth century]. 1 This was Montluc's idea, which he broached both to the cardinal of Lorraine and Philip II, in the form of an edict which he himself improvised, and which we know that the king of Spain actually read (Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES (2 wholesale exile of the Huguenots from the realm.1) The alternative of total destruction was not contemplated anywhere in Europe or at any time, except in the single case mentioned. No such crime as the massacre of the Huguenots was planned at Bayonne, nor perpetrated as the result of that conference. The principals in the case were too far apart in intention and conviction for so gigantic a programme. The paramount purpose of the queen mother was to marry Charles IX to the elder daughter of the Emperor, Margaret of Valois to Don Carlos, and the duke of Orleans (the future Henry III) to Donna Juana, Philip II's sister. But Alva was crafty. By a series of adroit questions which tan- taHzed her hopes and preyed upon her fears, he compelled Cath erine de Medici to commit herself upon the very political issues which she wished to avoid discussing, until she was hopelessly _jt;.*^ ""omised. In vain she doubled like a fox pursued by the It is and tried to throw the duke off upon a false the n. "France must be cleared of this vicious sect," said Alva., In order to avoid replying, Catherine attempted, by a question, to turn the conversation to the subject of a universal league, whether it should be against the Turk or against the heretic. Alva was not thrown off. The queen resorted to sarcasm. " Since you understand the evil from which France is suffering so well," she said, "tell me the remedy." Alva sidestepped the direct shot, by suavely rejoining : "Madame, who knows better than yourself?" "The King, your master," said Catherine ironically, "knows better than I everything that passes in France. What means would he employ to overcome the rebellious Protestants ?" Alva resorted to the Socratic method, hoping to involve the queen in the toils of argument. 359-62. There are two Spanish translations of the first document in the Archives nationales. Philip indorsed the letter to Bardaxi in his own handwriting: "la carta para el cardinal de Lorena." — Ibid., IV, 362, note. 1 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, IX, 306; Gachard, Correspondance .de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas, I, 368; letter of Margaret of Parma to Antonio Perez, September 27, 1565. 278 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE "Has the religion gained or lost since the peace of Amboise?" he inquired insidiously. "It has gained," replied she. The answer, in Spain's eyes, was a condemnation of the policy of France; it was a thorn in the road of the queen's ambitious hopes of marriage alliance. In her exasperation, Catherine upbraided her daughter for out-Spaniarding the Spaniard. "lama Spaniard, I admit," said Elizabeth. "It is my duty."1 Catherine broached anew the possibiHty of Philip II consenting to have his sister marry her Benjamin — Henry duke of Orleans— and conferring Artois as dowry upon the pair. " The king would never consent to sacrifice one of his provinces," said Alva brusquely. "But to give a Spanish province to the duke of Orleans," argued the queen mother, blinded by maternal affection, "would be ''° same then as giving it to his own brother." ^ some ... . ,TT. efrom Alva taxed the queen with maintaining a heretic, L Ho].„^ a in the chancellorship, and of opposing the Tridentine decrees. Catherine emphatically denied the first charge, although her daughter again supported Alva's indictment by declaring that even during the life of her father, L'Hopital had passed for a Hugue not; as to the second, she said the crown of France objected to the political application of certain findings of the Council of Trent, which she hoped to have adjusted. Alva saw the vulnerable point in her reply and inquired if she aimed to call another assembly like the Colloquy of Poissy. "I recognize the danger of such assembHes," said Catherine, "but the king, my son, is strong enough to compel discussion only of those subjects which he may designate." "Was it so at Poissy?" sneered Alva. 1 The monotony of life and the tyranny of Spanish etiquette must have borne hard upon the little queen of Spain. But in the midst of the miseries of this "royal slavery," as M. le comte de la Ferriere calls it, it was a crowning humiliation to be condemned to be the instrument of Philip's political intrigues. That her young spirit rebelled, though hopelessly, against the stiuation is evident, from a pitiful letter written by her to her brother's ambassador in Spain (La Ferriere, Rapport, 28). THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 279 The queen's reply was a tirade against the cardinal of Lorraine, whom she blamed for the failure of the colloquy. In the end there was a promise given by the queen mother at Bayonne. But it was verbal, not written, and so governed by circumstances that the edge of Spain's intentions was dulled. Compromising the agreement certainly was; convicting it is not, for, aside from the fact that its fulfilment was dependent upon an impossible condition of things, Catherine never permitted herself to express in writing what the terms of this promise were. Our knowledge of it is dependent upon Alva's letters of June 15 and July 4; upon Phflip II's construction of it in a letter addressed by him to the cardinal Pacheco1 on August 24, 1565, and the dispatch of the Venetian ambassador Suriano, who was with the French queen, to the senate on July 22, supplemented by what information St. Sulpice picked up during the last days of his mission in Spain. It is evident from the careful reading of these documents that the real triumph at Bayonne was scored by the papacy; that Spain won a sterile victory, and France met an indecisive defeat. Spain and France, being unable to carry their own purpose through as each desired, compromised on a course which was an intermedi ate plane of agreement to them, but which, according to the letter, was a supreme triumph for Rome, and would have been a com- \ plete victory for Rome if the terms had ever been executed. The man of the hour was the cardinal Santa Croce, nuncio in France. His services are thus reported by the Venetian ambassador in France on July 2 : On the eve of departure, the queen, perceiving the discontent of the duke of Alva, summoned the nuncio, who was not far away, to Bayonne, in order to have him at hand. It is he who has found a solution; he has satisfied both parties. I shall be able to inform you shortly as to the nature of his solution.2 Three weeks later (July 22) the promised word was sent to Venice in the form of a cipher dispatch,3 the information in which 1 On Cardinal Pacheco see Poulet, I, 7, note and Index. 2 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., lxxxiii, lxxxiv. 3 The key to it was discovered in 1885. Suriano had been Venetian envoy at Trent. He was not the regular ambassador of the senate in France and his dispatches seem to have been in another key from that of Marc Antonio Barbaro the accredited ambassador. 280 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE had been communicated to him in strictest secrecy.1 This intensely important document reads as follows: Now that I have received positive information, I shall tell everything to your Signory that has happened. Since his arrival, the duke of Alva has not ceased to urge the queen to give his master a manifestation of her good will toward the cause of religion by some manifest act, and he had urged her to cause the decisions of the Council of Trent to be observed throughout the whole realm of France, for which his Catholic majesty would show his satisfaction. The queen had yielded readily to this proposition and had told him that she was very inclined to convene an assembly of prelates, of theologians, and savants, to examine the decisions made at Trent, without occupying them selves with doctrine, but confining themselves to the reform of abuses. The duke had found this offer strange and had not concealed his discontent over it. According to him, this was to oppose a council to a council, which would be the worst of results and mightily displease the king his master. Since he urged the necessity of this measure, before passing to any other consideration, and was so obdurate, the queen, being very pained to see him depart so unsatisfied, and things being so desperate, notified the nuncio, who was not lodged at Bayonne like all the ambassadors, and ordered the mareschal de logis of the palace to prepare accommodation for him and to have him come immediately. He came at once and being informed by the queen, went to find the duke, but was very badly received by him. The duke blamed and reproached him for not remaining firm in his opinion. The queen holding to the idea of this assembly of prelates and theologians, and the duke opposing it, the nuncio found another expedient which seemed to give satisfac tion to all. He broached it to the queen, and with her consent communicated it to the duke. This remedy, at the twelfth hour, was very opportune. It is this: This assembly shall be held: but under certain conditions. The first is that the persons chosen to participate in it shall be of such influence as to be able to demand that no Huguenot shall sit in it; secondly, the assembly must conform to that which the queen had at first proposed; that is to say, all disputes over dogma and doctrine shall be forbidden. The queen, having accepted this, authorized the nuncio to communi cate her consent to the duke, who showed himself satisfied. Both of them then came together to find the queen again, and on the next day, in the presence of the queen of Spain, the cardinal Bourbon, the marshal Bourdillon, and the leading nobles, the whole was confirmed. Great benefit can come from this: by eliminating everything that pertains to dogma, and avoiding doctrinal difficulties, all the other resolutions which are of less importance will be strengthened, especially as the 1 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., lxxxv. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES , 28i> Huguenots, the only ones who can give trouble will be excluded. There is no doubt about both the king and the queen being disposed to the Catholic religion, since they have given proofs of it. I am, moreover, assured by what the queen has said, that there is no intention to touch any of the privileges of the Holy See, nor, per contra, any of the concessions made by the popes to the kings who were predecessors of the king now reigning. The execution of this convention thus arranged is not to take place until the return of the king to Paris. The King of Spain, in the letter cited to Cardinal Pacheco, expressed his contentment with this agreement,1 not perceiving that the appHcation of it was capable of a great amount of flexi- biHty. In his blindness he thought that the nuncio had broken the loaf so as to give the greater portion to Spain; while in reality the greater part was in the hands of the Pope, Philip II having actually but the difference between a fragment and no bread. In fine, no plot was entered into at Bayonne; no crime was ever committed in pursuance of an agreement arranged there. The "plot" agreed upon at Bayonne between Catherine de Medici and Philip II of Spain consisted of an ambiguous promise, the fulfilment of which was dependent upon an impossible condition of things.2 The affair of Bayonne was not a crime; it was a colossal] blunder. The destruction of the ambitious marriage expecta- 1 Combes, 47. 2 "For a whole fortnight Catherine resisted the pressure of her daughter and the Spanish envoys, who found support in the drastic proposals of the leaders of the French Catholics. Within the last three days of the interview, however, con cessions were made which satisfied Alva and his master, though Granvella and Alva exhibited some skepticism. The queen was prompted, .... not by Alva's alleged threat that the King must lose his crown, or his brother Henry his head, but merely by her fear that the total failure of the interview would hinder the attain ment of her ends. These concessions consisted in the engagement to accept the decrees of the Council of Trent and in an enigmatical promise of punishment or remedial measures. The latter, however, probably did not refer to the judicial murder or assassination of the Huguenot leaders — a scheme suggested by Mont- pensier's confessor and welcomed by Alva — but to the expulsion of the ministers and subsequent enforcement of orthodoxy. The execution of these measures was postponed until the conclusion of the journey, but it seems probable that Catherine never seriously intended an act which would have been the inevitable sign of civil war." — Armstrong in English Historical Review, VI, 578, 579 (review of Marcks, Die Zusammenkunft von Bayonne, Strasburg, 1889). 282 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE tions of the Valois was the least loss. The irreparable thing was that France forfeited the confidence of her Protestant subjects. The secrecy that enveloped the conference made the Huguenots apprehensive of the worst. They beHeved that a Franco-Spanish alliance was made at Bayonne for their over whelming; and the second civil war was the outcome of their misgivings.1 And when finally, for other reasons, the massacre , of St. Bartholomew befell them, not merely Protestant France but Protestant Europe was convinced that the false hypothesis had 1 been demonstrated.) The count Hector la Ferriere admirably summarizes the situation: To maintain and loyally to adhere to the edict of pacification; to open to the daring sailors of France the Indies and America, which Spain and Portugal were endeavoring to close to them; and finally to rally Catholics and Protestants under the same banner against the foreigner — this was the only true French policy. The Spaniard at this time was the enemy of France. She encount ered him everywhere in her path; at Rome, at Vienna, at the Council of Trent he disputed her precedence; in Switzerland by gold and by the menaces of his agents he interfered with the renewals of the French treaties with the Catholic cantons; at the very time when Catherine and Elizabeth of Valois were ex changing false promises of alliance and friendship, Menendez was sailing for Florida, bearing orders for the massacre of all the French found there.2 1 For example La Noue, chap, xii (1567). 2 Correspondance de Catherine de Medicis, II, 509, 510; if. Q. H., XXXIV. CHAPTER XI THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES (Continued). THE INFLUENCE OF THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS UPON FRANCE. THE AFFAIR OF MEAUX From the field of Philip II's empty victory the court resumed its pilgrimage, crossing the Loire and traversing Guyenne which was "in good repose," visiting Angouleme, Cognac, Saintes, La Rochelle, and Niort en route to Nantes. The country was the veritable dominion of Calvinism in France, but as yet the Hugue nots let their hopes belie their fears.1 The progress through the western provinces was purposely slow, for Catherine still hoped against hope that Fourquevaux, who had succeeded St. Sulpice at the Spanish court, might persuade Philip II to think more favor ably of her matrimonial schemes,2 until finally, late in December, the bitter truth came out; only the younger daughter of the Haps- burgs might marry a Valois, even though he was king of France. The queen mother had been weighed in the balance by Catholic- Hapsburg Europe and had been found wanting. Then it was that Catherine turned her eyes toward eastern Europe in the hope of finding in Poland a recompense for the fondled and despicable Henry of Valois. Strange are the vicissitudes of history! The effect of Philip II's resolution was to put a mountebank on the throne of Poland and cast Marguerite of Valois into the arms of the son of Jeanne d'Albret.3 Long before this time, however, Spain had begun to be impatient for the fulfilment of the compact of Bayonne. But procrastina tion was Catherine's trump suit. She averred that the plague 1 "Tous les bruis que Ton fayst courer ne sont pas vray . Et y a tent de noblese au demourant que tou les souir a. la sale du bal je panseres aystre a Baionne si j'y voyais reine ma fille," writes Catherine to the duke of Guise (Correspon dance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 315). 2 Fourquevaux, I, 6, November 3, 1565. Cf. Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 326 — Catherine to Fourquevaux, November 28, 1565. 3 For the beginnings of Catherine's negotiations in Poland see Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., cv, 404; Capefigue, 412 ff. 283 284 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE was too prevalent to make it safe for the court to return to Paris until winter,1 and when the cold weather diminished the danger from that source, pleaded the poverty and famine of the realm as an excuse.2 It was an excuse the validity of which was every where manifest. France truly had been in the dire pangs of hunger and intense cold during the celebrated winter of 1 564-65. 3 Claude Haton, the priest-historian of Provins, who was a close observer of meteorological phenomena has given a graphic description of this season. The winter at its commencement in November [he says] was very mild and was so until December 20, the vigil of St. Thomas the apostle, without either cold or frost in the mornings. The rain was so warm that it was thought that the winter would be mild and open, but on the vigil of St. Thomas there came a great cold, accompanied in the morning by a cold rain, which by mid day turned into snow, and which fell all the rest of the day in so great abundance that the earth, which was very wet, was covered on the morrow to the depth of a foot, king's measure, and more, with snow. With this snow came a northeast wind, which froze everything under a coating of thick ice. This cold con tinued down to the last day of December. The ice was so thick that a man could cross the river without breaking through. The snow lay so heavy upon the fields that in the open places the drifts were as high as a man. After the snow-storm had passed the cold redoubled, so that even the best clad suffered whenever they went out doors. There was not a house in the village where the water did not freeze, if it was not set close by the fire; and I do not ex aggerate when I say that in many good and well-built houses wine froze before the great chimney, though the latter was heaped up with wood. I saw in many houses iron pots suspended above the fire with icicles hanging over the edge. Every night and morning when the people got up there was frost upon the coverlet, from the evaporation of the bodies of the sleepers. There was not a wine-cellar where the wine did not freeze in the casks, unless care was taken to keep charcoal fires burning there. In some wine-cellars it was necessary to close every aperture in order to prevent the wine from freezing. It frequently froze so hard that it was necessary to pierce the bung-hole with a red hot poker in order to draw it out. On the night of the 23-24 December, as also on Christmas night, the ice was so heavy upon the trees that the boughs 1 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 320. 2 "C'est la rarete et la cherte des vivres qui nous chasse," said Catherine to the Venetian ambassador (cited by La Ferriere, Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., cii). 3 See the rhyme upon it in L'Estoile, ed. Michaud, series 2, Vol. I, p. 17. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 285 were broken. These things had not been seen in France since the year 1480. ' The greatest cold was on the day of the feast of the Innocents (December 28). Many men who were exposed died in the roads. The crests of cocks and poultry were frozen and fell off some days afterwards, and many were found dead under their roosts. The sheep also died. Early in January the ice began to melt. It grew uncommonly warm for the season, so that fire became unnecessary. On the day following the edict of the king, about noon, a soft warm rain began to fall, which caused the snow to vanish rapidly. This lasted for five days, so that the earth was covered with water. And then came a second cold for three entire weeks, until the 28th of the month, and snow with a high wind came, which drove the snow everywhere and piled it in great drifts. The winter grain was frozen in the furrows. God knows how much the poor people who had no wood suffered. Most of them stayed in bed night and day without getting up except to eat once in twenty-four hours. The poor of Paris and others who had no means, were compelled to bum their furniture. Those who had made no provision for the winter, chiefly of wood, were compelled to purchase at high prices, for it was not possible to do carting because of the condition of the roads; in many cases, moreover, the bridges were destroyed. When the thaw came, the high waters penetrated houses and churches in Provins to the depth of three, four, and even five feet, washing out the very dead in the cemetery.2 At Paris the flood damaged the Pont-au-Change and caused many houses to topple. Vine- growers found themselves in great difficulty. Those who were wise cut their vines back to the root, in order that they might sprout better again, and were repaid for so doing, for they were the only ones that bore. The spring was fair and mild, so that barley and oats were sown. Yet much ground lay bare because in the fields sown with winter wheat the roots were all killed, so that no grain grew. The walnut trees seemed to be dead through all the month of April and half of May, for they did not put forth their buds. Pear and apple trees bore a few blossoms. In some places there were plums and cherries, but not everywhere.3 1 Cf. Babinet de Rencogne, "Sur un debordement de la Charente et la cherte des vivres en 1481," Bull, de la Soe art., etc., i860, $e ser., II, 3 (Angouleme, 1862). 2 Cf. Boutiot. "Notes sur les inondations de la riviere de Seine a Troyes depuis les temps les plus recules jusqu' a. nos jours," Annuaire admin, pour 1864 (Troyes), p. 17. 8 Claude Haton, I, 395-98. This statement, even if there were no other evidence, is confirmed for the south of France by the court's experience in the foothills of the Pyrenees in January, 1565 (cf. Hist, du Languedoc, V, 465). For the west of France see Chroniques Fontenaisiennes (Paris, 1841), 84, 85, and the "Journal de Louvet," published in the Revue d' Anjou in 1854. One quotation may suffice: "Au mois de febvrier, il tomba sy grande quantity de neige au pais ^286 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The winter was just as bad in Gascony, Provence, and Langue doc.) On the day of the Feast of St. John the Baptist (June 24) it snowed!1 Even the poor people were compelled to build fires, though they could not afford the fuel. The vines throughout central France were so badly injured that not a third part of the crop remained. The grain likewise was destroyed. Water courses were swollen and overflowed their banks, and in the mea dows of the Seine people had to take care lest they be drowned. As a result of the cold spring, the harvest of 1565 failed over almost all the realm to such an extent that it was necessary to aboHsh the ( tolls between provinces and to permit free trade in grain.) Paris imported wheat from Champagne, Picardy, Anjou, Lower Brittany, Burgundy, and Auvergne, the least stricken of the provinces.2 The Parlement of Paris passed an ordinance forbidding specula tion in foodstuffs and compelled those possessed of a surplus of grain to throw what was not needed for their own necessity upon the market.3 A measure (boisseau) of wheat, from January to April cost from 1 2-1 5 sous ( = r^ pecks at from 36 to 45 cents), and after April the price rose every week until harvest time, to the sum of 25 sous tournois (approximately 75 cents). Wheat was very dear in Paris and throughout all Brie, the Ile-de-France, Valois, Soissonais, and Picardy; less so in Champagne, Burgundy, and Lorraine, where there was rye and barley enough for the people. The stock starved because the grain was consumed by the people. Many people went over into Champagne in order to purchase rye and barley to make bread with until the harvest came. Fortunately grain was plentiful in Champagne, and wheat fell to 7 and 6 sous d'Anjou et fust l'hyver si froid, que les rivieres furent glacees et qu'on marchoit et passont par-dessus, et que tous les lauriers et romarins gelerent, et qu'au degel les eaux crurent et furent si grandes qu'elles rompirent des arches, ponts et chaus- sees, et fust ceste annee appelee l'annee du grand hyver." I know of no article upon this subject as a whole. M. Joubert, Etude sur les miseres de I' Anjou aux XV et XVU siecles, 1886, pp. 35 and 161, has a. little to say. The subject deserves treatment. The sources of course are almost wholly local. 1 Claude Haton, I, 331. 2 Idem, I, 409. 3 Catherine's order to the marshal Montmorency, as governor of Paris, dated November 19, 1565, is in Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, 325. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 287 per measure (from 19 to 22 cents), and corn in like propor tion after the harvest. Because of the hard times which they had experienced, many accumulated great stores in the expectation that in a short time there would again be a dearth. Wine was very dear until the vintage. In the months of August and September before the grapes were gathered, it was not possible to purchase wipe by the cup at taverns, even for silver; it was with great difficulty that sufficient wine was procurable for church service. But after the vintage the price dropped to 14 livres tournois ($8 . 70) la queue du creu, whereas it had been as high as 80 before (I49.60).1 As so often appears elsewhere in history, the economic distress and strain of poverty was followed by psychological manifestations of a religio-sociological sort, among the lower and poor classes. In 1565, in the villages of Champagne and Brie and especially in the bailiwicks of Sens, Melun, Montereau, Nogent, Troyes, Chalons, Rheims, Epernay, Chateau-Thierry, Meaux, and Provins, the belief spread among the peasantry that in honor of the Virgin they ought to refrain from working in the fields on Saturday after midday, and that this Saturday rest had been formally ordered by the Virgin in revelations and apparitions. A young girl of Charly-sur-Marne, near Epernay, boasted of having received 1 The authorities of Provins made requisition of the grain possessed by private persons and appropriated all save that which was necessary for the owners, which was sold to the townspeople at the maximum price of 20 sous per boisseau. The abbot of St. Jacques and the prior of St. Ayoul baked bread to be distributed to the poor. One of the wealthy citizens from Easter till harvest made daily distribution of bread to more than three hundred poor, besides furnishing them with work (Claude Haton, I, 409). The boisseau (Med. Latin, boissellus [Du Cange, s. v.]) was an ancient measure of capacity equivalent to 13.01 litres, approximately 12 quarts. In remote parts of France the term is still sometimes used to indicate a d6calitre. The boisseau was used for both dry and liquid measure. On the other hand the bichet (Med. Latin, bisselus and busellus, whence the English bushel) was a dry measure, representing from one-fifth to two-fifths of a hectolitre (from 4.4 to 8.8 gallons) according to the province. The setier, was a larger dry measure of 6 pecks (Paris measure). The muid (Latin modius) also was of variable capacity. That of Paris equaled 36 gallons. The queue du creu was a. large wooden cask, about equivalent to a hogshead and a half, and was used only for wine. The calculations of terms of American money are on the theory that the livre tournois in 1565 was equivalent to 3. 1 1 francs, according to the estimate of the vicomte d' Avenel in Revue des deux mondes, June 15, 1892, p. 795. 288 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE these confidences, and showed miraculous signs of her mission. But the cardinal of Lorraine caused her to be arrested and ques tioned, and she was burned alive as a witch.1 Instead of going to Paris, the court passed the winter at Moulins in Bourbonnais,2 where the famine was most slightly felt. By this time the expectations of the CathoHcs and the fears of the Huguenots were beginning to bear their bitter fruit, and in the state of public tension every incident was magnified. At Angers, in November, the Rohans, having forbidden Catholic worship upon their domains, the King had had to compel them to rein state it by threatening to dispossess them of their chateaux; at Blois the cardinal Bourbon reproached the queen mother for suffering the edict to be violated by permitting the queen of Navarre and the prince of Conde to maintain court-preachers in their entourage. The Catholics of Dijon demanded that in future Calvinist ministers be forbidden to attend the last hours of the dying, a petition which the cardinal of Lorraine supported in order to make the chancellor L'H6pital commit himself. The answer of the latter sustained the edict's grant of the right of selection in the matter of religion. Of greater anxiety still was the influx of Huguenots into the town of Moulins, Montgomery among the rest, who for the first time since the fatal tournament of June 30, 1559, looked upon the court.3 The memory of the conspiracy of Amboise haunted the queen like a specter, and was the more vivid because of the rapproche- 1 Claude Haton, I, 418. For information on this subject see Reuss, La sor- cellerie au i6e et au IJ siecle, particulierement en Alsace d'apres des documents en partie inidits; Jarrin, La sorcellerie en Br esse et en Bugey (Bourges, 1877); Pfister, "Nicolas Remy et la sorcellerie en Lorraine a la fin du XVIe siecle," Revue hist., XCVII, 225. 2 "Molins e citta, ed a. posta vicina all' Alier, sopra il quale ha un ponte; e la principale del ducato di Borbon. Vi e un bellissimo palazzo, fabbricato gia dai duchi di Borbon, posto in fortezza, con bellissimi giardini e boschi e fontane, e ogni delicatezze conveniente a principe. Tra le altre cose vi e una parte dove vi si teniano de infinite sorte animali e ucelli, delli quali buona parte e andata de male; pur vi restano ancora molti francollini, molte galline d'India, molte starne, e altre simil cose; e vi son molti papagalli vi diverse sorte." — Rel, vin., I, 32, 34. 3 When the court was a Blois so great was the number of strangers that the Knights of the Order made a house-to-house canvass. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 289 ment between the leaders of the Huguenots and the Montmorencys, who had met together at Paris in November at the marriage of the amorous prince of Conde to Mile, de Longueville. The inci dent was sharp enough to strike fire between the Catholic- Guisard and the Huguenot-Montmorency party. For when the papal nuncio indignantly demanded the cardinal of Beauvais' renunci ation of the purple, the constable bluffly said: "I am a papist. But if the Pope and his agents stiU seek to trouble the kingdom, my sword will be Huguenot. My nephew will never renounce his dignity. The edict gives him the right to it." It is no wonder Catherine de Medici was anxious to hear of the report of these words at Madrid and what Philip II would say.1 The interdiction of the Protestant worship at Moulins on January 9, 1566, on the very day that Coligny returned from the wedding festivities, was her own reply. The very next day she guarded against new fire being struck between the factions by compelling at least outward reconciliation between the admiral and the cardinal of Lorraine. On January 10, 1566, in the presence of the court, she addressed the cardinal, saying that the repose of the kingdom was destroyed by private quarrels and especially by two of his, the one with the marshal Montmorency, the other with the admiral for the murder of the duke of Guise.2 At the same time the queen mother, in order to preserve peace between the rivals, hit upon the novel scheme of lodging the cardinal and the admiral in the same house, so that each had to use the same stairway in order to reach his apartments, teffing both that each was keeper of the other, and that if either of them experienced any injury it would be imputed to the other.3 1 C. S. P. For., anno. i$6$, p. 524; cf. Nig. Tosc, III, 523. For details upon the history of the six months between July and January, see Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, lxxxvii-cv. 2 C. S. P. For., anno 1566, No. 17. Before the end of the month the old scores were officially "shelved" by decrees of the King in council (January 29 and 31, 1566). Many of the sources allude to this hypocritical reconciliation: De Thou, V, Book XXIX, 184; Poulet I, 125 — letter of Granvella from Rome; D'Aubigne, II, 223-25; C. 5. P. For., No. 57, January 29, 1566; Castelnau, Book VI, chap. ii. 3 C. 5. P. For., No. 41, January 23, 1566. 290) THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The cardinal of Lorraine, for fear of losing all his influence, ac cepted the situation (he did not stir from the side of the queen),1 and was compelled to abide by the situation telle quelle, as Sir Thomas Smith wrote to Cecil.2 But nothing could moffify the anger of the constable against the Guises, and when the duke of Guise at length came to court in February, Montmorency left it forthwith.3 While the factional feeling thus grew more embittered, serious and noble effort was yet made to carry out the demands of the States- General of Orleans and Pontoise — demands which were principles of the poHtical Huguenots. This programme was supported by the queen mother, who seems in this way to have sought to placate the fears of the Huguenots for their faith. (^The year 1566 is notable for the fact that greater recognition was then accorded the political demands of the Huguenots than at any time hitherto, so that large progress was made in the betterment of the j administrative system of France^ The King in his address to the council said that at his accession he had wanted to travel through all the provinces desolated by the late civil wars, in order to hear the complaints of his subjects and to remedy conditions in the best manner possible; that it was for this cause that he had convoked the assembly and so enjoined them, in virtue of the royal authority, to apply themselves dili gently to affairs. Then the chancellor spoke: after dwelling upon the general evils of the state, he asserted that the root of all the evils was the bad administration of justice; that the King had become convinced of this in the course of the tour of the provinces; that for himself he could not refrain from caffing things by their right name and from speaking as he thought; that those who were appointed to administer justice were guilty of great excesses; that these evils had increased owing to the impunity and the license which obtained. 1 C. 5. P. For., No. 120, February 22, 1566. 2 Ibid., No. 150, March 6, 1566. 3 Ibid., No. 136, February 25, 1566. "The constable lies at Chantilly ill at ease." — Ibid., No. 406, May 21, 1566. Poulet, I, 190, Morillon to Granvella, March 5. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 120J I do not deny [he added] that there are too many laws and ordinances in France and that the multitude of the laws and the number of the judges is the cause of much unnecessary and tyrannical litigation. But it is no less true that when new evils arise there is a necessity of new remedies, and that when the ancient laws have been abrogated either by inobservance or by license, it is necessary to make new ones in order to cure current evils and to arrest the course of public calamity. The public welfare requires new legislation. If the new laws are not observed, on account of the venality and avarice of the ministers of justice, they must be punished severely and these public pests who fatten upon the blood of a miserable people must be driven from office. Super fluous offices, moreover, must be abolished and the ruinous multiplication of legal causes stopped. The justice of the last charge was particularly manifest. Since the time of Francis I it had been the practice of the crown to seU offices and even to create them for purposes of revenue only. The chancellor further asserted that the King could not suffer those who had not the right to make laws to attribute to themselves the power to interpret them; he proposed to diminish the excess ive number of the courts, and raised the question whether the demands of justice would not be better met if the Parlement ceased to be so sedentary and became ambulatory instead — a suggestion which, it is interesting to observe, found a partial realization in the seventeenth century in the establishment of the Grands Jours d'Auvergne. He insinuated that it was advisable to subject the judges to censure and to compel them to render account of the manner in which they exercised their office, and that it might be better to estabHsh judges for two or three years than to permit the holding of office in perpetuity. (After longer deliberation, in February, 1566, the famous ordinance of Moulins was framed.) It contained eighty-six articles, and dealt radically with the evils of the time and imposed drastic reform, especially in the administration of justice. This act declared the royal domain inalienable, limited and regulated the right of remonstrances of parlement, organized circuits of inspection by magistrates especially appointed to go throughout the realm, instituted certain 292") THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE changes in the judicial administration, and pledged the word of the crown to appoint capable and honest magistrates.1 i It profoundly modified both the public and private law of France. In the former sphere the ordinance strengthened the legislative power of the crown by laying down the principle that the King's ordinances must be observed in spite of remonstrances on the part of the parlements, and even if the latter refused to register them; the maitres des requites were enjoined to punish severely any infraction or failure to observe the ordinances. The powers of the governors in the provinces were much reduced; they were forbidden to exercise the right of pardon, to levy taxes, or to institute fairs and markets. The judicial power of the great villes was almost entirely suppressed. J The communal judges were deprived of all civil jurisdiction and retained cognizance only of petty offenses; at the same time, the attempt was made to restrain seigneurial jurisdiction. The right of written proof was recognized in cases involving 100 livres or more.2 f No less than 1,500 superfluous offices, treasurerships, secretaryships, etc., were abolished. ] In the matter of religion some of the articles were a confirmation of the edict of 1563. Another article aboHshed entirely all confraternities, and prohibited the formation of all leagues.3 The financial administration came in for a most searching investigation. The flaunting arrogance of some of the King's treasurers is remarkable. Numbers of them had had houses, and even chateaux which rivaled the King's own in elegance, the means to purchase and furnish which they had secured by plundering the people and robbing the government. One treasurer — among 1 C. S. P. For., anno 1566, Introd. The text of the ordonnance is in Isambert, XIV, 189; De Thou, Book XXXIX, 178-84, has much upon it. It is he who records the speeches of the King and the chancellor. It is interesting to observe that very similar conditions prevailed in Germany at this time. See the account of the Diet of Spires (1570) in Janssen, History of the German People, VIII, 75 ft 2 Cf. Cheruel, Histoire de I' administration monarchique de la France, I, 196- 203; Glasson, Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France, VIII, 170 ff. 3 The clergy of Guyenne were so incensed at this prohibition that they threat ened to leave the country (Archives de la Gironde, XIII, 183). THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 293 four who were hanged at Montfaucon — was found to owe the crown over three million livres.1 The young duke of Guise, who had refused to be a party to the farcical reconcihation between his house and the Chatillons soon found means to leave the court. In May the duke of Nemours and the duchess of Guise were married at St. Maur-des-Fosses. It was a match which sowed dragon's teeth once more. For Nemours forsook his wife, who was a Rohan, having induced the Pope to nuffify the marriage. The Huguenots murmured indig nantly against the insult done the Rohan clan whose powerful family influence was now joined with the Chatillons and Mont- morencys.2 Catherine de Medici was not the ruler to govern France with a firm yet facile hand under the circumstances that existed in 1566. Irrespective of foreign influences, which we shall presently come to, the economic distress3 of the country, the rivalry of the great houses, and the reHgious acrimony prevaiHng made a combination of forces that needed another sort of ruler to reconcile them — a ruler such as Henry of Navarre was to be. The queen mother, while a woman of force, was so deficient in sincerity that no one could have confidence in her; so jealous of power that she would brook no other control of the King, whose sovereignty she con founded with her maternal oversight of him, making no distinction 1 See the case of the magnificence of the house of a Parisian shoemaker, who had purchased the estate of a king's treasurer and enormously enriched himself with gold and silver. Under a pretext the queen mother secured entrance to the house. Claude Haton, I, 412, gives a detailed description of its magnificence. According to an estimate of January 15, 1572, the income from the "Parties Casuelles," that is to say, from offices vacated by the death of particular possessors thereof, and from the "Paulette," was two million francs and yet the corruption in the administration was so great that the King received but a quarter of this amount (Cheruel, I, 208). 2 De Thou, V, Book XXXVII, 185; D'Aubigne, II, 224; C. S. P. For., Nos. ' 343. 344, 347, 387, April 28; Mav 3-4, 16, 1566; Forneron, Hist, des dues de Guise, n,59- 3 " On ne sait encore quant on delogera d'icy, combien que les laboureurs des champs ayent ja faict presenter deux requestes au Roy pour se retirer et sa suite a Paris jusques a ce que la recolte soit faict." — Tronchon to M. de Gordes, July 4, 1567; quoted by the due d'Aumale, Histoire des princes de Condi, I, Appendix XVI. 294 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE between Charles IX the ruler and Charles IX the son. Catherine time and again marred or ruined the progress she had made with the aid of one party's support by her own envious fear of that party's predominance. Her "bridge poHcy,"1 instead of uniting France, kept it divided. To maintain the balance of power — an immemorial Italian policy — her Italian nature resorted to dupHcity and deception continually. Accordingly, suspicion prevailed at court and suspicion prevailed in the provinces, the more so in the latter because of the Huguenots' uncertainty about what was done at Bayonne, and doubt as to Philip II's course. Men were doubt ful of their neighbors; towns were fearful of other nearby towns. "All the way of my coming hither, " reported Sir Thomas Hoby, the new English ambassador to France, "I found the strong towns marvelously jealous of strangers, insomuch that only by the sound of a bell they discovered a number of horsemen or footmen before they come; but also, after they are entered they have an eye to them."2 When the court finally moved to Paris, the great nobles came thither with such numerous trains3 that the queen sent four com panies of the King's guard ahead of his coming, and ordered the marshal Montmorency to require the retirement from the city of all those who were not of the ordinary household of each noble man and gentleman. In vain the marshal, anxious to protect his party against the Guisards, resisted the order and complained that the queen was interfering with his authority. The King ordered Lansac and De la Garde to accompHsh what Montmorency was unwilling to do. If choice must be made as to who were the worst offenders in this respect, the greater blame lies with the Protestants. It was not only impolitic, it was insolent on their part to permit Mont gomery to swagger around Paris as he did, "booted and spurred i "Politique de bascule," R. Q. H., XXVII, 274. 2 C. S. P. For., No. 275, April 12, 1566. 3 It was estimated that, beside footmen, captains, men-at-arms, there were 20,000 horsemen attached to the various factions (C. S. P. For., No. 470, M»y~ June, 1566). THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 295 with all his men."1 Apparently the queen had not the daring to compel his withdrawal, as she did that of the Guises' recruiting sergeant, Roggendorf.2 Her poHcy for the time being was to favor the Chatillon-Montmorency faction.3 Backed by the joint support of the admiral and the constable, the queen accordingly undertook to bring certain unsettled or indefinite matters of reHgion and the church to a conclusion. On May 31, 1566, Charles IX sent a series of articles to the cardinal Bourbon for consideration by the clergy of Paris, then sitting at St. Germain des Pres. Two of these had to do with the baptism of infants where one of the parents was a CathoHc, and the maintenance of Prot estants schools. Three concerned church temporalities, namely, the redemption of the fourth part of the temporals of the church, given to the King during the late civil war; the subsidy which was to expire in eighteen months; and the preparation of an edict defining the privileges and jurisdiction of the church. The residue of the articles dealt with infractions of the Edict of Amboise, such as restraint of preaching according to the edict, and the molesta tion of former Protestants who had returned to the church of Rome by the Huguenots. By an awkward coincidence, the sending of these articles exactly coincided with the arrival of the papal legate in Paris, who came to request the promulgation of the decrees of Trent in conformity with the agreement made with the cardinal de Santa Croce at Bayonne.4 Catherine de Medici's policy at this time was that of the political Huguenots. She hoped that the question of religion would settle itself with time, and to divert attention from that issue, and also 1 C. S. P. For., No. 667, August 21, 1566. 2 Ibid., No. 715, September 14, 1566. 3 Hugh Fitzwilliam to Cecil: "The constable is of great authority with the king and the queen mother; and being mortal enemy to the house of Guise is with his nephews and the Protestants for his life." — C. S. P. For., No. 741, October 3. 1566. ? Nig. Tosc, III, 515. "A man might easily perceive by the sour countenance the queen made that she liked not all that he had said. After he had saluted divers persons the king made him somewhat too short an answer for so long a demand."— C. 5. P. For., No. 444, June 1, 1566. 296 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE because there was great need of it, she energetically continued the administrative and economic reforms begun at Moulins. L'H6pital began so searching an investigation of the conduct of the King's treasurers that some of them were hanged and others banished. The constable was of service here, although his notori ous avarice tarnished the honesty of his work.1 Yet there was peril even in a policy so just and so much needed by France. Sooner or later such a course would unearth the dishonesty of bigger thieves than the small collectors of the revenue who, in many cases undoubtedly suffered for the peculation of their superiors. The administration was full of "grafters" such as St. Andre had been, who would not scruple to conceal their thievery behind the smoke of another civil war. The queen mother knew this only too well from former experience, not being unaware of the fact that one of the causes of "the late unpleasantness" was the demand of the estates that the Guises should make an ac counting and be forced to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. The government resorted to various devices to raise money and an imposition was laid upon inn-keepers. The most singular expedient, though, was the offer of a Genoese syndicate to pay the King a lump sum for the privilege of taxing dowry gifts and for a license to endure eight years to levy a crown on every first born infant, and after, for every boy born into a family five sous, and for every girl babe, three sous.2 This preposterous measure actually passed the council, and was only prevented from becom ing law by the good sense of the Parlement.3 But the events happening in the Netherlands were of greater importance to France at this time than anything within her borders. From the beginning of the insurrection there the Huguenots had recognized the important bearing of that struggle upon their own movement, and as the shadow of Philip II fell in greater length 1 "The king has made peace with his treasurers for a certain sum by the constable's means, whereof something cleaves to his fingers." — C- S. P. For., No. 733, §2, September 28, 1566. 2 According to the estimate of this syndicate France had a population of from fifteen to sixteen millions (Rel. vin., Ill, 149). 3 C. S. P. For., Nos. 1,111-15, April 18-19, J567- THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 297 each year across France, the interest of the French Protestants in the rebellion of the Low Countries increased.1 As Huguenot preachers in Flanders sowed the double seed of Calvinism and revolt, so Protestant preachers exiled from the Low Countries sought refuge in France.2 This intercourse became a formidable historical issue by 1566. The issue was understood from the beginning by all parties concerned, and Philip II and his ministers were determined to profit by the lesson of France and to prevent similar trouble by crushing all opposition in the bud. The Turk ish attack upon Malta3 had been very favorable to the Protestant cause, and the raising of the siege in September, 1565, probably influenced the King of Spain in his resolution to extirpate heresy in the Low Countries.4 The Flemish government suspected Wiffiam .of Orange who by July was openly allied with the Gueux3 and his brother, Louis of Nassau, of direct intercourse with Conde" 1 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, IX, 594, 595; Poulet, I, Introd., 1-lii, n. 2; Gachard, Don Carlos et Philippe II, I, 303; C. S. P. For., No. 641, August 13, 1566. Coussemaker, Les troubles religieux du XVIe siecle dans la Flandre maritime 1560-70; Van Velthoven, Documents pour servir a I'hist. des troubles religieux du XV Ie siecle dans le Brabant; Verly, La furie espagnole, 1565-05; Kervyn de Lettenhove, Les Huguenots et les Gueux: Etude hist, sur vingt-cinq annels du XVI' siecle (1560-1585), Bruges, 1883-85, 6 vols.; Poulet, Correspon dance du cardinal de Granvelle, I, Introd., Ivii-lxxvi; II, Introd., iv-vii; De Thou, V, 204-37; D'Aubigne', Book IV, chap. xxi. 2 The most notable of these was Francis Junius, who was driven out of Antwerp. The Spanish ambassador demanded his arrest but the prev6t de I'hotel refused, alleging with right that Junius was the ambassador of the count palatine and entitled to immunity (Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, II, Introd., cviii). 3 On this famous siege of Malta see D'Aubigne, Book IV, chap, xix; De" Thou, Book XXXVIII. It was begun on May 17, 1565. Mingled with this fear was apprehension lest even the Turk might become an ally of the Flemings and the Protestant French (Poulet, I, 357, Morillon to Granvelle). That it was not an utterly fantastic notion of him alone, see the letter of Margaret of Parma to Philip II, in Corresp. de Philippe II, I, No. 411, and Gachard. Corresp. de Guillaume le Taciturne, VI, 408. » Archives de la maison d' Orange-Nassau, I, 259-89; Poulet, I, 207; Gachard, La Bibliotheque Nationale a Paris, I, 88. "Avec la liberie' des consciences, que aulcungs pr&endent, nous ne nous trouverions pas mal si, suyvant l'exemple des Francois, nous tumbions aux mesmes inconvenientz." — Letter of Granvella, April 9, 1566, in Poulet, I, 209. 5 Sir Francis Berty to Cecil: "The Prince of Orange since Wednesday shows himself openly to take the Gueux part, and divers of his men wear their badge. This town is marvellously desolated; great riches are conveyed out, chiefly by strangers."— C. 5. P. For., No. 582, July 20, 1566, from Antwerp. 298 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE and Coligny,1 and sent Montigny — the faithless member of the patriotic quartette composed of Orange, Egmont, Hoorne, and himself — to Paris in the spring to pick up information.2 The fear lest Montgomery might come to Flanders, which Granvella had once laughed at, by the summer of 1566 had some basis of reaHty, although the braggadocio character of this adventurer discounted alarm.3 Knowledge of the solidarity existing between his revolted sub jects in Flanders and the Huguenots4 which Montluc had warned PhiHp of even two years before,5 coupled with infor mation concerning the dealings of Louis of Nassau with Protes- - Poulet, I, 307. 2 We know of Montigny's treason from a dispatch of Granvella to Philip II, July 18, 1565, in which the cardinal tells the King that Montigny is still success fully pretending to be a Calvinist and is in correspondence with the Chatillons and Montmorency. He had already been at least nine months in the pay of Spain. He got 20 ecus per diem for one job (Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, IX, 404, 595). Montigny came to Paris ostensibly to attend the wedding of the duke of Nemours' son to the admiral's niece at Easter time. We get a line on Philip II's methods at this point, for the Guises themselves were having secret and treasonable dealings with Spain, yet did not know of Montigny's relation to Philip II and treated him with scorn and contempt (ibid; Poulet, I, 329; cf. Finot, L'espionnage militaire dans les Pays-Bas entre la France et V Espagne aux XVI" et XVII' siecles). 3 Poulet, I, 304; Edward Cook to Cecil: "Montgomery has told him that the French Protestants are resolved to succour those of Flanders." — C. S. P. For., No. 661, August 18, 1566. This letter is analyzed in the Bull, de la comrn. roy. d' histoire, 3c ser., I, 129. Granvella's confidant in Brussels, the prevost Moril- lon, wrote with truth on July 7: "Je croy que si avons mal cest annee ce ne sera du costel de France." — Poulet, I, 350. Cf. Reiffenberg, Corresp. de Marguerite de Parme, 88; Gachard, Corresp. de Philippe II, I, 429, 431, 436; at p. 473 is a letter dated October 15 in Italian from the duchess of Parma to Philip expressing fear of Huguenot projects. 4 Louis of Nassau without doubt was in close connection with the leading French Protestants. See Archives de la maison d 'Orange-Nassau, I, 229; II, 196, 403. It was extremely difficult to repress the ardor of the Protestants at Valen ciennes, owing to its nearness of the French border and the number of Calvinist preachers whom the Huguenots sent into the country in June, 1566 (ibid., II, 135)' For the influx of Calvinist preachers into the country as early as 1561 see Languet, Epist. seer., II, 155. The prince of Conde' was reputed to have sold a tapestry for 9,000 florins, which he gave to the cause there (Poulet, I, 439). 5 Montluc to Bardaxi, October 27, 1564: Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 368. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 299 tant Germany1 and France, stirred the Spanish King's habitual indecision into action. He sounded Charles IX as to the possi bility of sending Spanish troops directly across France to the Low Countries and asked him to restrain his subjects from coming thither with arms,2 crowds of whom went to Flanders disguised as merchants.3 Simultaneously Margaret of Parma begged the Emperor to take the same course.4 But the government of France could not have honored Philip II's request, even if it had been so minded, without risking an immediate rising of the Huguenots. As a matter of fact, it had no desire to do so. The resentment felt by France toward Spain on account of past scores at Trent, Rome, and in Switzerland, was now all ecHpsed in her rancor because of the massacre by the Spaniards of her ill-fated colony in Florida in September, 1 565.5 1 Poulet, I, 64; Reiffenberg, 91; Archives de la maison d' Orange-Nassau, n, 175, 178. 2 Corresp. de Philippe II, I, 433. 3 The government of Charles IX even winked at the secret levies made by the prince of Conde for the benefit of Louis of Nassau, from behind the mask of an official repudiation of the complicity of any French in Flanders, denying that the prince of Conde' was ever in Antwerp in disguise (Poulet, I, 521, 3; Gachard, La Bibliotheque Nationale a Paris, II, 206. The last assertion, of course, was true. On July 24 a royal proclamation was issued at Alva's instance, forbidding French subjects to go into the Low Countries "pour negotiation ou autrement." — Poulet, I, 364; Gachard, op. cit., II, 27. 4 "Hinc illae lachrymae et ille metus," wrote the provost to Granvella (Poulet, I, 405). It was the wish of the Emperor that the King of Spain would go in person and without an army to the Low Countries in order to pacify it by kindness and not by force (Archives de la maison a" Orange-Nassau, II, 505; Raumer, I, 173, Decem ber, 1566). But Philip II could not make up his mind to come in person to the Netherlands, although advised to do so by all. For years he continued to entertain the thought and continually put it off. See a letter of the Duchess of Parma to Duke Henry of Brunswick upon the coming of the duke of Alva, January 1567, in Archives de la maison d' Orange-Nassau, III, 2 1 ff . s On April 3, 1565, St Sulpice sent word to Charles IX that Philip II had sent Menendez to Florida "avec une bonne flotte et 600 hommes pour combattre les Frangais et les passer au fil de Vipie." — L' Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 364. When Fourquevaux succeeded him the French government had not yet learned of the massacre. St. Sulpice's fragmentary information is to be found at pp. 400, 401, 404, 414' The abortive efforts of France to secure redress are spread at length in Corresp. de Catherine de Midicis, II, 209, 330, 337, 338, 341, 342, 360; and in Four quevaux, I, Nos. 4-7, 9, 15, 21, 28, 43, 47, 55, 66. The editor's account in the 300 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Alexander VI's bull had divided the western hemisphere between the Spanish and the Portuguese. Florida belonged to Spain. France had built Fort Caroline on Spanish territory. As peace existed in 1565, France argued that the massacre by Menendez was a vio lation of international law. To this Spain replied that Florida belonged to her by discovery and as all treaties between Spain and France were silent as to any change of ownership, there really had been no such change in law. Consequently the French settlers were intruders and heretics to boot. The answer was crushing, Fourquevaux was heavily handicapped, for he could not openly espouse the cause of Frenchmen who were heretics. Before news of the massacre reached France, Philip II, knowing the facts, inquired if the French expedition had been commanded or sanctioned by the French King. The only answer possible was a negative. An affirmative answer would have been tantamount to a declaration of war. "Then the incident is closed," was the Spanish reply. This was followed by a demand that Coligny, under whose sanction the expedition had sailed, should be punished. France was likewise at odds with the Emperor. The reason for this is to be found in the strong attitude the empire had lately taken on the question of Metz.1 Understanding of this question entails a glance backward. In 1 564 the baron Bolwiller, a native Introd., xv-xxi is admirable. In the Correspondencia espanola, II, 126-28, is to be found Philip II's letter to Chantonnay, February 28, 1566, in reply to the ambas sador's letter of advice about Coligny's enterprise. The blood of French colonists who had been massacred in Florida cried out for vengeance, and from the hour of its knowledge the subject of reprisal was a matter of common talk in the Norman ports (C. S. P. Dom., Add., XIII, 227). On September 24, 1566, Sir Amyas Paulet, the English ambassador informed his government that he had information that a squadron was about to sail for this purpose, although it was "late for so long a voyage" (ibid., 31). On the whole history of this ill-fated colony see Gaillard, "La reprise de la Floride faite par le capit. Gourgues (1568)," Notices et exlr. des manuscr. de la Biblioth. Nat., IV, and VII (1799); Gourgues, La reprise de la Floride, publiee avec les variantes, sur les MSS de la Bibl. Nat. par Ph. Tamizey de Larroque, 1867; Gafferel, Histoire de la Floride frangaise, 1875; Parkman, The French in North America. The newest literature upon the subject is Wood bury Lowery, "Jean Ribaut and Queen Elizabeth," American Historical Review, April, 1904, and the same author's The Spanish Settlements within the Present Limits of the United States: Florida, 1562-74 (New York, 1905). 1 De Thou, V, 37-40. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 301 of upper Alsace, but at that time baiHff of the Emperor in the grand bailiwick of Haguenau, revived the plan he had conceived in 1558, of recovering Metz by a surprise.1 Bolwiller represented that no time was to be lost if France was to be prevented from fixing her hold upon the Three Bishoprics forever. Philip II favored the enterprise and offered 20,000 sous cash, and the assignment of 8,000 ecus annual revenue of the territory, " pour celluy ou ceulx qui'lz luy rendroyent la ville du diet Metz."2 For with Metz in the hands of the Hapsburgs once more, the chain of provinces connecting the Netherlands with Spain through mid-Europe would have been practically complete, lying as Metz, Toul, and Verdun did, between Franche-Comte" and Luxembourg.3 This was at the time when Conde was recreant to his people and was dallying with the widow of the marshal St. Andre", and the idea was con ceived and abandoned of buying the prince over and bribing him to betray Metz to Spain.4 Spain, however, in order to avoid a rupture with France wished to conceal her own participation in the plot to recover Metz, and urged the Emperor Maximilian to undertake the venture.5 The plot was to tempt Metz to revolt 1 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 381, note. In 1558 Bolwiller made an inroad into France (Bulletin des comitis historiques, 1850, p. 774; a summary of a letter concerning this episode to be found in the archives of Basel). On Bolwiller see Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, IX, 36, note. The new plan was occasioned by the issue of letters-patent of Charles IX on October 9, 1564, for bidding sale or alienation of any regalian rights of the Three Bishoprics without his consent (text in Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 394). 2 Bolwiller to Granvella, October 16, 1564, on the written authority of Philip II (ibid., VIII, 429). 3 "Je tiens que les Francois, par voye de faict, y (Toul) mectront la main, comme ilz ont ja commence^ et le mesmes a Metz et Verdung." — Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VII, 465; Granvella to the Emperor, April 12, 1564. 4 Ibid., VIII, 504-6. s Ibid., IX, 44. Granvella to Perez, February 26, 1565; p. in, Philip II to Chantonnay, then stationed at Vienna, April 2, 1565. Bolwiller intrusted the action to Egelolf, seigneur de Ribeauspierre (the German form is Rapolstein), a noble of Upper Alsace. His mother was a Furstenburg. (See ibid., IX, 24, note.) Strange vicissitude, that a descendant of that house in the next century should have been Louis XIV's right-hand agent in his seizures on the Rhine through the Chambers of Reunion, playing an identically opposite part from that of his ancestors. 302 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE against France by offering to convert it into a free imperial city, it being expected that the Lutherans in the city would support' the movement.1 The alertness of the French government, however, foiled the project's being undertaken in April. In August Bol willer renewed his plan, alleging to Chantonnay that the people of Metz were ready to provide 20,000 ecus, and that there were arms in plenty stored in secret. He urged prompt action now for the French government had begun the erection of a citadel in the city.2 By this time Philip II was so anxious to see France despoiled of Metz and so impatient at Maximilian's delay, that it was even considered advisable by some to take advantage of the check given the Turks at Malta and have the Emperor make peace with them in order to have his hands free in the Three Bishoprics.3 As for himself, Philip II dared not make an overt move against France, lest in the event of war with Spain, Charles IX appeal to the Huguenots, with the result that Protestantism would profit by the diversion.4 But meanwhile things in Metz had got beyond control of either 1 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, IX, 71— Bolwiller to the cardinal March 20, 1565. Metz was early famous for its interest in the Reformation. The laxness of the episcopal discipline in the first part of the sixteenth century contributed to the growth of this spirit, and finally led to a Catholic reaction, The city was more inclined, however, to Calvinism than to Lutheranism. Charles V prohibited the exercise of the Lutheran faith, but nevertheless, the Protestants of Metz made an alliance with the Smalkald League. Under the French domination the city passed definitely from Lutheranism to Calvinism. The French governor, Vieilleville, was a moderate in policy and granted the Huguenots a church in the interior of the town. During the first civil war the Protestants in Metz remained tranquil, but soon afterward Farel visited the city for the third time, and thereafter the city's religious activity was considerable. The cardinal of Lorraine suppressed Protestant preaching in the diocese and closed the church. When Charles IX visited Metz in 1564 the edifice was destroyed and Protestant worship was forbidden. After the death of the Marshal Vieilleville, the count de Retz was made governor. One of the motives of the support of the Huguenot cause by John Casimir, the prince palatine, was a promise made by the Huguenots that he would be given the gover norship of Metz. On the subject as a whole see Thirion, Etude sur Vhistoire du protestantisme a Metz et dans le pays Messin, Nancy, 1885; Le Coullon, Journal (1537-87) d'apres le manuscrit original, publie pour la premiere fois et annote par E. de Bouteiller, Paris, Dumoulin, 1881. 2 Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, IX, 462, 463. 3 Granvella to Perez, October 15, 1565; ibid., IX, 594, 595. 4 See Philip II's letter to Chantonnay, October 22, 1565; ibid., IX 609 ff. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 303 Spain or the empire. The Calvinists in both France and the Netherlands had been quick to see the advantage afforded, for the former by gaining possession of the territory could connect France and the Palatinate, thus aiding themselves and their core- Hgionists at one and the same time, since by so doing the land route of Spain through Central Europe, via Milan, Besancon, and Luxembourg, would be cut in half. Matters came to a head in May and June, 1565, in what is known as the "Cardinal's War." On May 5 the Emperor Maximilian had issued a decree affirming his suzerainty over Metz, Toul, and Verdun. The cardinal of Lorraine at once recognized the validity of this decree, which was equivalent to treason to France. Thereupon, in the name of Charles IX Salzedo an ex-Spaniard1 and leader of the French party in Metz assumed the title of governor of Metz and appealed to the French King for support against the cardinal. The issue was really one between France and Spain. The Guises naturaUy supported the cardinal. The "war" which followed was not formidable, although the issue as stake was of great impor tance. But the cardinal soon discovered that discretion was the better part of valor and yielded to the King, more especially as neither Philip II nor Maximilian raised a hand for fear of betray ing themselves, for the cardinal feared that if he resisted longer Charles IX would refuse to pardon his treasonable conduct. He was not unaware of the fact — he did not even deny it — that it was known that he had been in treasonable communication with Bol willer and the archbishop of Treves.2 If Charles IX and the queen mother had known the full extent of the cardinal of Lorraine's treasonable conduct at this time they 1 He had served in Italy in 1555 and became the cardinal's bailiff and revenue- collector in the bishopric of Metz after the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (Com- mentaire et lettres de Montluc, I, 228). 2 For an account of the "Cardinal's War" see De Thou, V, Book XXXVII, 37-40. There is another account in the Mim. de Condi, V, 27, supposed to have been written by Salzedo himself. In F. Fr. 3, 197, folio 92, there is an unpublished letter of Salzedo's (see Appendix IX), and another of the duke of Aumale upon this incident. Chantonnay comforted Philip for the disappointment over Metz by telling him, that while the restoration of the Three Bishoprics was indeed important, because of their bearing upon the situation in Flanders, the trouble had averted a 304 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE might not have been so lenient toward him. For he was guilty not only of treasonable intercourse with the empire, but directly with Spain also. The one supremely important result of this petty war over Metz is that at this time the cardinal — and with him the whole Guise house — began those secret negotiations with Philip of Spain which culminated in the estabHshment of the Holy League. Shortly after the end of his ignominious war around Metz, burning with anger and shame, the cardinal sent a secret agent to Franche Comte, who found Granvella at Beaudencourt in July, 1565, to whom he recited the cardinal's grievances, saying that owing to the death of his brother the duke of Guise and the insolence of the marshal Montmorency, he had no hope in the justice of Charles IX. The agent then went on to point out the great danger threatening Catholic Europe by reason of what had recently happened at Metz, and, speaking for the cardinal of Lor raine, expressed the wish that Philip II would enter into a league with the house of Guise, the duke of Montpensier — Alva's convert at Bayonne — and certain others for the protection of the CathoHc faith in France and the overthrow of the Chatillons, the prince of Conde, "Madame de Venddme," and other Huguenots. This formidable overture was made under the seal of secrecy. The cautious Granvella listened but refrained from committing his master to the proposition.1 Again, PhiHp II hesitated to impHcate himself so directly in French affairs, as the cardinal of Lorraine urged, just as he had hesitated the year before with Montluc, and marriage alliance between France ' and Austria which would have been more calamitous (Letter to Philip II, October 30, 1565, in Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, IX, 625). Two years later we find the tricky cardinal of Lorraine still protesting his innocence to Catherine and praying her not to be suspicious of him (Letter of December 6, 1567, Fillon Collection, No. 316). 1 Forneron, I, 346, on the basis of Alva's letter to Philip on May 19, 1566, and the cardinal's own letter, written at the same time (both preserved in K. 1,505, No. 99, and K. i',509), assumes that the secret intercourse between Philip II and the Guises began in the year 1566 and ascribes the immediate occasion of it to the troubles in the Low Countries. He missed the inception of it by a year. Gran- vella's letter conclusively shows that it began in July, 1565. Every word of this letter is of weight. It is to be found in Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, IX, 399-402. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 305 while he waited events in the Low Countries went from bad to worse. In August, 1566, a furious outburst of iconoclasm swept through the churches of Flanders. Commencing at St. Omer, the contagion rapidly spread, and in a fortnight 400 churches were sacked in Flanders alone, while in Antwerp the cathedral was stripped of all its treasures. Images, relics, shrines, paintings, manu scripts, and books shared a common fate.1 The event stirred PhiHp to action. He determined to send the duke of Alva to Flanders to repress things with an iron hand.2 On November 18, 1566, the duke of Alva formally requested the French ambassador at Madrid to secure Charles IX's permis sion for a Spanish army to cross France. The remedy has become little by little so difficult [said the duke] that deeds not words and remonstrances, are now necessary. Having exhausted all good and gracious means to reduce things in the Low Countries, the King is con strained, to his great regret, to have recourse to force. Public assemblies, preaching, the bearing of arms, and violence prevail in the land and the King's ministers amount to nothing. The duke then outHned the plan. Ten thousand new Spanish recruits under three ensigns were to be sent to Luxembourg, Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily to take the places of as many veteran troops there, for the King was unwilling to use Italian infantry. A thou sand heavy-armed footmen and three or four hundred mounted arquebusiers, all Spanish, were to be drawn from Milan, the most loyal of Spain's Italian dependencies. An indefinite number of reiters and other mercenaries could be had for the asking. These 1 Johnson, Europe in the Sixteenth Century, 328. For interesting details by an eye-witness, see Bourgon, Life and Times of Sir Thomas Gresham, II, 121 ff. 2 Poulet, I, 509; Gachard, Don Carlos et Philippe II, 354; La Bibliotheque Nationale a Paris, II, 213. The disastrous news reached the King on September 5. For ten days he was ill with a high fever in consequence. Fourquevaux, writing from Segovia on September 11, to Charles IX, gives some details of Philip's illness and how he was treated by the physicians and then adds: "Les Espagnols sont bien marriez d'entendre que les Lutheriens dud. pais (Flanders) ont commence s'empoigner aux eglises et reliques, et a fere marier les prebtres et nonnains, avec infiniz autres maulx qu'ilz font, qui est le semblable commencement des doleurs qui advindrent en votre Royaume du temps des troubles." — DipSches de M. Four quevaux, I, 124, 125. 306 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE troops would proceed to the Netherlands through Savoy by way of Val d'Aoste or Mt. Cenis, Montme"Han, Chambery, and La Bresse, into Franche Comte and Lorraine, unless — and this was the crux of Alva's interview with Fourquevaux — the winter season made it impossible to traverse the mountain passes, in which case His Catholic Majesty desired leave of France to take them by sea to Marseilles or Toulon and thence to march them northward up the Rh6ne to La Bresse and so reach Franche Comte. No one knew better than Alva the formidable nature of this proposition to France and he used all his artifice to conceal its danger, dwelling on the mutual connection between the Huguenot and the Flemish movement and the benefit that France would derive from the crushing of the rebellion in the Low Countries. Fourquevaux in reply declared that the Huguenots would fly to arms again, if a Spanish army should enter France, to which the duke rejoined that the presence of a Spanish army would so overawe them that they would not dare to do so. The ambassador then inquired whether the Emperor could support Philip, seeing that he was engaged in a war with the Turks1 and was incapable of raising funds in his behalf. Alva told him that the German princes , would perceive that the Flemings were merely rebels and that " no prince or soldier in Germany, even were he a Lutheran, would refuse to take the pay of Spain."2 But Fourquevaux refused to be convinced by Alva's smooth words. He had information that Spain was borrowing ships from Malta, Genoa, and the papacy and Savoy and warned Charles IX to strengthen the garrisons in Languedoc and Provence.3 1 The Austrian lands were invaded by the Turks in the autumn of 1566 (Nigo ciations dans le Levant, II, 721; Languet, Epist. seer., I, 15). = It was a pose of Philip's that the expedition was purely political; cf. Gachard, Les bibliotheques de Madrid et de I'Escurial, 94 ff., based on the correspondence of the archbishop of Rossano. 3 Dispatch to Charles IX, December 9, 1566 (Fourquevaux, I, 147-52). He waited in great anxiety for instructions from Paris, daily growing more suspicious because the Spanish King said not a word to him on the subject, although he sent for him in audience on January 14, 1567 (ibid., 167-72; dispatches of Jan. 5 and 18, 1567). The tremendous financial operations of the Spanish govern ment (consult Gachard, Don Carlos et Philippe II, II, 369, 370) filled him with THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 307 This information threw the court of France into great excite ment. Catherine de Medici declared that the heretics would take up arms immediately, under such circumstances.1 The King wrote to Fourquevaux on December 24 not to spare any efforts to penetrate the designs of Spain.2 Sixteen thousand troops were sent into the Lyonnais at once.3 The marshal Vieilleville returned to Metz.4 The government began the erection of a great citadel in Verdun and to fortify the frontier against Luxembourg.3 D'An delot was sent to Switzerland to make new enrolments.6 An agent was sent into Normandy with instructions to pass along the coast and take the names of master-mariners and sailors.7 The queen of Navarre began to mobilize forces in Be"arn.8 All this time the duke of Alva kept endeavoring to quiet French alarm by reiterating that he would use all means in his power to avoid troubling France and that the army destined for Flanders, now increased by 1,500 light horse composed of Spaniards, Italians, and Albanians, would go by the valley of the Rh6ne only as a last recourse.9 Finally, in the middle of February, the duke of Alva's prepara tions were made. Don Juan de Acuna, who had been sent to alarm, and he made an unsuccessful effort to bribe the secretary of one of Philip II's ministers. He gathered that the Spanish forces would likely sail for Barcelona and disembark at Nice or Genoa (ibid., 176, 177, February 13, 1567). 'Forneron, I, 347, on authority of Alva's dispatch in K. 1,507, No. 2; cf. Nig. Tosc, III, 527. 2 Gachard, La Bibliothhque Nationale a Paris, II, 228. The dispatch was delayed on account of the illness of the courier and the heavy snows he encountered in the Pyrenees, and did not reach the ambassador until January 15, 1567 (Four quevaux, I, 168). The correspondence of Bernardo d'Aspremont, viscount of Orthez, governor of Bayonne — unfortunately much scattered in the volumes of the Bibliotheque Nationale — shows the standing danger the southern provinces of France were in from Spanish invasion (Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, III, 400, note). 3 Poulet, II, 183. 4 D'Aubigne, II, 229, note. s Poulet, II, 495. 6 D'Aubigne", II, 228; Zurlauben, Hist, milit. des Suisses, IV, 335. 7 We learn this from a letter of George Paulet. See Appendix X. 8 Poulet, II, 183; Dipiches de M. Fourquevaux, I, 173. ' Dipiches de M. Fourquevaux, I, 174, February 4, 1567. Philip II took these military preparations of the French with remarkable equanimity — even Clmrles 308 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Savoy to make arrangements with the duke for the transit of the Spanish army, returned, after having made a satisfactory settle ment. The army was to go through Savoy, via the Mt. Cenis and Chambery, cross the Rhdne at Yenne, and so proceed to Besan con in Franche Comte, where it was to be joined by German con tingents. This averted the danger threatening Languedoc and Dauphine, but threw it upon French Burgundy and Champagne.1 It was a roundabout route for the Spanish troops in the Milanais, but it was impossible to send them directly through Switzerland by way of the Grisons, Constance, Basel, and Strasburg without inflaming these localities; above all, Geneva would thereby have been menaced, and any movement imperiling that city would have fired the entire Calvinist world.2 In the face of common peril Bern, Freiburg, and Valais con cluded a defensive league on February 20, while Basel and Zurich took up arms with French approval. Fear of a joint attack of Spain and Savoy upon Geneva prevailed throughout Switzerland, which was divided into two camps, the five cantons of the center favoring designs upon Geneva and the Vaud. Spain aimed IX's positive refusal to allow the Spanish army to traverse France (March 24, 1567). He seemed to be sincerely anxious to avoid friction with France (see his letter to Granvella, February 17, 1567, in Poulet, II, 255, 256). The danger in the Low Countries was too great to allow any outside controversy. The clandestine operation of Protestant preachers in Spain itself and the smuggling of heretical books into the land, concealed in casks of wine, disquieted him more than France did at this season. (For information on this head see Poulet, II, 126, 142, 199; Nig. Tosc, III, 506; Weiss, Spanish Protestants in the Sixteenth Century.) 1 Fourquevaux (February 15, 1567), I, 180, 181. Granvella apparently, immediately after learning of the image breaking, and anticipating that either the King himself or the duke of Alva, would have to go to Brussels, sent a remarkable memoir to Philip II, in which he discusses all the various routes by which he might go, and the advantages and disadvantages of each of them. The physical difficulties of governing the Low Countries from Madrid are very evident (see Poulet, I, 469-80). 2 The Pope's nuncio had pointed out to Philip II what a splendid achievement the overcoming of Geneva would be for Christendom. The scheme was an old one. See a letter of Pius IV to Francis II, June 14, 1560, in Raynaldus, XXXIV, 64, col. *. The King, after some weeks of consideration, declared that he could not think of it; that even the duke of Savoy was against the project. (See Gachard, Corresp. de Philippe II, II, 552, and his Les bibliotheques de Madrid et de VEscuria}, lsterdam , \Utrecht .*fe; 0 Nim^egen «3^>\ ""\ Frnnkfort Dijon o ® Besancon /' ¦ M T E / ^ V ^ c1 — „>v Macon Lyons 0 DAUPU Chambery March of the DUKE of ALVA THROUGH SAVOY, FRANCHE COMTE' AND LORRAINE, >¦••*•¦*•«••¦•• Conjectured route THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES to profit by the impression produced by the passage of her troops close to the Swiss frontier to force certain miHtary advantages and dispossess France from the exceptional situation she had lately secured in the Alps. The western cantons were offered cheap salt from Franche Comte, and those of the center grain from the Milanais. The duke of Lorraine also offered salt at a low price from his duchy. As a result Bern found herself deserted by western Switzerland and apparently single- handed about to be called upon to protect Geneva from Spanish attack. Perhaps if Spain had been certain of the support of Savoy at this juncture, this might have happened, but the duke of Savoy was content to profit by the fear of the Bernois to compel them to restore the three baiUwicks which they had formerly agreed to do in the treaty of Lausanne, October 30, 1564, but had delayed to fulfil. Charles IX himself advised Bern to yield in this par ticular and in August the settlement with the duke of Savoy was made.1 AU that Philip now requested of France was leave for French subjects to provide the army with supplies in its course. Again Fourquevaux urged his sovereign to be cautious; the fact that France was just recovering from a year of famine and could ill spare sustenance for others was not so important as the necessity of avoiding every occasion of civil war.2 (On May 10, 1567, the duke of Alva sailed from Cartagena andl arrived at Genoa on May 27. St. Ambroise at the foot of the Alps was the point where his munitions and provisions were concentrated.) Here on June 2 the duke had a grand review of his troops. There 100.) On the political ambition of the duke of Savoy see Rel. vin., I, 453. He had made a treaty with Bern in 1565 (Collection Godefroy, XCIV, fol. 21). There are three excellent German monographs on Switzerland in the sixteenth and seven teenth centuries: Planta, Die Geschichte von Graubunden in ihren Hauptzugen, Bern, 1892; idem, Chronih der Familie von Planta, Zurich, 1892; Salis-Soglio, Die Familie von Salis, Lincau-im-B., 1891. For a review of the last two see English Historical Review, VIII, 588. 1 See Revue d'histoire diplomatique, XIV (1900), 45_47- 2 "Mais le faisant, c'estoit remectre le feu et le glaive dans la France plus et plus cruel qui'lz n'y ont este"." — Dipiches de M. Fourquevaux (March 15, 1567), I, 189. 310^ THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE were 19 ensigns (3,230 men), from Naples, under the command of Alonzo de Uloa; 10 ensigns from Sicily (1,620 men) under command of Julian Romero; 10 ensigns of Lombard troops (2,200 men) under command of Don Sancho de Londono; 10 Sardinian ensigns with four companies of recruits in addition (1,728 men) under command of Don Gonzalo de Bracamonte, making a total of 49 ensigns of Spanish infantry (8,778 men). The duke's cavalry was composed of five companies of Spanish Hght horse and three Italian and two Albanian companies and two companies of Spanish arquebusiers on horseback, in all 1,200 horses.1 On the march a company of r5 musketeers was placed between each ensign. [ This was the first instance in modern warfare when muskets were 1 used in the field. Hitherto this weapon had been so enormously I heavy that it was used in siege work only, balanced upon a triangle j of wood or iron.2 - I have given the figures of Mendoza, which probably is the strength of the forces when they arrived. The official roster is in the Correspondencia, No. CXXII. 2 "The front of every company by a new invention was flanked with fifteen supernumeraries, armed with musketoones, and rests wherein they laid the barrow that could not be managed by the hands. For before his time, such huge muskets as unmanageable were drawn upon carriages and only used at sieges, from whence being transmitted into the field, and those that carry them mixed with the lesser musketeers, they have been found extraordinarily serviceable in battle." — Stapyl- ton's transl. of Strada, Book VI, 31. Brantome's statement is more graphic: "II fut luy le premier qui leur donna en main les gros mousquetz, et que l'on veid les premiers en guerre et parmy les compagnies; et n'en avions point veu encores parmy leurs bandes, lors que nous allasmes pour le secours de Malte; dont despuis nous en avons pris l'usage parmy nos bandes, mais avec de grandes difficultez a y accoustumer nos soldats comme j'en parle au livre des couronnelz. Et ces mousquetz estonnzarent fort les Flamans, quand ilz les sentirent sonner a leurs oreilles; car ilz n'en avoient veu non plus que nous: et ceux qui les portoient les nommoit-on Mousquetaires; tres bien appoinctez et respectez, jusques a avoir de grands et forts gojatz qui les leur portoient, et avoient quatre ducats de paye; et ne leur portoient qu'en cheminant par pays: mais quand ce venoit en une faction, ou marchans en battaille, ou entrans en garde ou en quelque ville, les prenoient. Et eussiez diet que e'estoient des princes, tant ils estoient rogues et marchoient arrogamment et de belle grace: et lors de quelque combat ou escarmouche, vous eussiez ouy crier ces mots par grand respect: Salgan, salgan los mosqueterosl Ajuera, afuera, adelante los mosqueterosl Soudain on leur faisoit place; et estoient respectez, voire plus que capitaines pour lors, a cause de la nouveaut6, ainsy que toute nouveaute' plaist." — Brant6me, Vies des Grands Capitaines: "Le Grand Due d'Albe." THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 311 The route lay via Alessandria de la Paille, St. Ambroise, Aosta, Turin, the Mont Cenis, St. Jean de Maurienne, and the valley of the Arve through Savoy. In spite of his small array it was neces sary to divide the army into three parts, the advance guard, the "battle," and the rear guard. The "battle" each day occupied the place abandoned by the advance guard and was itself in turn replaced by the rear guard, the three divisions of the army marching one day apart. The duke of Alva commanded the advance guard, his son Don Ferdinand Alvarez de Toledo the "battle;" while the rear guard was under the command of the Itahan, Ciappin-VitelH, Marquis of Cetona formally in the service of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The army thus divided occupied fourteen days in traversing Savoy. It was a long and toilsome journey through a wild and mountainous country, where the difficulties of the march were increased by constant dread of famine. In many places the country was completely sterile. In Burgundy the march was easier and twelve days brought the army via D61e and Gray to Fonteney near Toul, whence twelve days more brought Alva by Thionville to Luxembourg (July 29), where he was joined by new forces.1 In spite of the length of the march and the hardships of it, the duke retained his traditional iron discipline and the soldiers were not allowed to forage upon the country or to break ranks.2 1 Mendoza, Comentarios, II, chaps, i-iii. There is a French translation of this work by Loumier (Soe. de l'histoire de Beige), 2 vols., i860. 2 "The duke arrived in the Low Countries offending none in his passage nor being himself offended by any one, though the French appeared in arms upon the marches of Burgundy and Colonel Tavannes by command from the French king with 4,000 foot and some troops were defence of course of the borders, ' costed ' the Spanish army. Indeed I do not think that ever army marched so far and kept stricter rules of discipline, so that from Italy even to the Low Countires, not only no towns but not any cottage was forced or injured." — Strada, VI, 31. The only instance of plundering seems to have been in the case of the property of the prince of Orange in Burgundy (C. S P. For., 1562, August 7, 1567). This discipline is all the more remarkable, considering the fact that there were fifteen hundred women with the army. "Lon a sceu le passaige du due d'Albe et de sa trouppe; quon diet estre de six mille espaignolz et quinze cens femmes." — Guyon to M. de Gordes, July 11, 1567. Cited by the due d'Aumale, Histoire des princes de Condi, I, Appendix XVI. v^^ THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE \ On August 12, 1567, the duke of Alva entered Brussels.l Gen eral terror prevailed in the Low Countries upon his arrival. The Prince of Orange left the land. Count Egmont, naively declaring that he had done nothing wrong, remained; his friend Hoorne imitated his example. Alva at once sent away all the Flemish soldiers and quartered the city with the new troops. In order to facilitate his policy the duke created a special tribunal, not composed of lawyers "because they would not condemn without proofs." This was the famous Council of Troubles which the people called the "Council of Blood." The members of it held no commissions from the King, but were the simple agents of the duke of Alva. The most celebrated of them was a certain Vargas, a criminal himself, against whom action had been suspended in return for his infamous services. If the policy of the Spanish government in Flanders took a new and different form with the coming of Alva, the revolution there was no less changed. The cardinal Granvella some months before this time had written to Philip II: "It is a general rule, in matters of state, that popular enterprises, if they do not terminate in the first outburst, generally vanish in smoke if the remedy for them be appHed before they have time to follow up the movement."1 He added that contemporary history afforded some striking examples of the truth of this observation. But the provinces he had lately governed were not of this category. For it is clear that a change had taken place in the nature of the Flemish revolt in the years 1565-67. The revolution by this time had passed through the earlier stages of defiance and rebelHon and developed an organi zation with a definite, set purpose before it. The formation of the Gueux was the clearest manifestation of this change. In its inception this famous group was an aristocratic body, composed solely of nobles, and the Spanish government had little fear then of its becoming a popular association.2 Granvella saw the simi- - Poulet, II, 183, December 25, 1566. - Morillon to Granvella, April 7, 1566: "Pas ce boult veult Ton gaigner le magistrat des villes et le peuple: que ne sera si facille comme Ton pense." — Poulet, I, 203. The following is explicit: "Et diet encores plus que, s'il se fust joinct a la premiere lighe des seigneurs, la religion fust bien avant venue, car de la, dict-il, THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 313 larity of the Gueux to the Huguenot association formed at Orleans in 1562, but he did not anticipate the popular nature it was soon to develop.1 He was soon disillusioned. What was beHeved by the Spanish government to be a somewhat close political and aristocratic com bination of nobles before long became a popular confederation of congregations having a reHgious propaganda, as weU as a political purpose.* Despite this change, however, Philip's minister did not yet beHeve the Gueux to be formidable. As Alva had declared at Bayonne that all that was necessary to destroy the Huguenot party in France was to kill the "big fish," so he now believed that if the leaders of the Gueux were cut off, their movement would die 'tanquam ex fonte emanasse has undas,' et que le Roy le doibt entendri ainse et y pourveoir avant toutte euvre, puisque de celle la est nee la seconde de la religion." — Poulet, II, 75. Cf. 118: "la premiere lighe et la secunde engendree d'icelle." — Granvella to Viglius, November 23, 1566. As late as May 9, 1567, it is called "la gentille ligue" (Poulet, II, 434). Granvella, in a letter to Philip in 1563, attributed the formation of the association to Count Hoorne (Papiers d'itat du cardinal de Granvelle, VIII, 12). Noircarmes, who was better informed, makes Brederode the moving spirit of it (Poulet, II, 613, 614). The Gueux even had a branch organization, though one historically different in origin, in Franche Comte, in the Confre'rie de Ste. Barbe. The seigneurs of the house of Rye enjoyed high civil and ecclesiastical station in both Burgundies in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Marc and Claude Franjois of Rye, father and son, were rivals and political enemies of the Perrenots — the family of Granvella and Chantonnay — and regarded them as upstarts. The Confrerie de Ste. Barbe was organized by them in Franche Comte on lines similar to the Gueux and had dealings with the latter — the members even wearing their emblem. Cardinal Granvella accused the seigneurs of Rye of aiming to establish Protestantism, in Franche Comte from Flanders. This probably was true but in a less degree. Protestant agitation was a means to an end, not an end in itself, it seems to me. If otherwise, such a catholic title for the association is very singular. On the Confre'rie de Ste. Barbe consult Poulet, I, 29; II, 44, 141. I am somewhat inclined to think that Tavanne's Confraternity of the Holy Spirit in ducal Burgundy may not impossibly have been influenced by the Confre'rie de Ste. Barbe in the adjoining county of Burgundy, for Tavannes had a long political conflict with the Parlement of Dole in Franche-Comte (see Collection Godefroy, CCLVII, Nos. 22, 23), and was familiar with things there. 1 Poulet, I, 223. * Ibid., II, 269. .This revised form of the Gueux in which Calvinism is inter jected is often alluded to as the "second league" in the letters which pass between Granvella and the provost Morillon, e. g1., ibid., 280, 437, 600. 314 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE too.1 But Alva soon discovered that the Gueux were hardly ever weakened by the detachment of certain of the nobles either by bribery or intimidation.2 By the time of his arrival, under Brede7 rode's able leadership, the Calvinists of the Flemish provinces had worked out a scheme of union in which every congregation was at once a parish, a rating precinct, a military hundred, and a political unit. Antwerp, whose population was so large and so cosmopoH- tan that police scrutiny could be easily evaded, and from which it was easy to make one's escape, was the capital of the association, as Orleans first, and later La Rochelle, was for the Huguenots.3 The Flemish government was soon alive to the necessity of breaking the power of this confederation.4 Membership in the confederation, if proved, was heavily punished. The retirement of the prince of Orange from the land was beHeved by the govern ment to be due to a prudent effort to avoid being so compromised. It was certainly true of Brederode. But Egmont and Hoorne remained, declaring they had done nothing, and renewed their oath of allegiance to the King.5 Nevertheless Granvella sarcaST tically quoted Lycurgus that neutrals were more odious than enemies. "After the towns have been cleared out," wrote the provost Morillon, "it will be time to attack the garden in order to destroy the weeds and roots there," and Spain's agent at Amster dam at the same time wrote: "God may pardon those who are the cause of one and the other league; but I assure you, unless I am much mistaken, that those who have made others to dance, have' some other purpose than we know. Time will discover it."6 This somewhat long dissertation upon the nature and develop ment of the confederation formed by PhiHp's II revolted subjects 1 Poulet, II, 42. 2 For some examples see ibid., 183. 3 This organization seems to have been perfected by February, 1567. Poulet, II, 244, has a. brief note on this matter. For an extended article see Bulletin historique et littiraire de la sociiti de I'hist. du protestantisme Frangais, March, 1879. Cf. Gachard, Corresp. de Guill. le Taciturne, II, ex, cxi, and notes. Marnix was treasurer-general of the confederation (Poulet, II, 262, n. 1). 4 Poulet, II, 33^, 336, 396. "Sine qua factum nihil," wrote the provost, tvhose conception of government was Draconian in simplicity, to his confidential friend (ibid., 353). s Ibid., 469 and 508. * Ibid., 396, 438. EXECUTION OF EGMONT AND HOORNE IN THE MARKET SQUARE AT BRUSSELS Original copper plate by Franz Hogenberg. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 315 in Flanders is not a digression beside the mark. The number of Huguenots to be found in the Low Countries in 1566-67, intriguing with their coreligionists against Spain was very great. The duke of Bouillon and the prince of Porcien were the most prominent of these.1 In the aggregate the number was so great and their participation so serious a matter for the government, that the maintenance of the frontier against the French was urged upon Alva as the first necessity, immediately after his arrival at Brussels.2 France for her own part began to erect a citadel at Verdun and to strengthen the Picard frontier, whose towns received new troops in June, and when word came that there were German troops in Luxembourg awaiting Alva's arrival, D'Andelot was sent to the frontier of Champagne with 6,000 Swiss which the government had levied.3 This action ruffled Philip II's temper, for to him it was flaunting his failure to break the alliance of the Swiss with France in his very face. His ambassador in France protested energetically and charged the queen with duplicity.4 At Madrid the nuncio inquired with curiosity of Fourquevaux, in what spirit PhiHp II — who had had an audience with the ambassador the day before — received the news of France's activities in Switzerland. "I told him," wrote the ambassador to Charles IX, "that it was the usage and custom of great kings and princes whenever they saw their neighbors arming, to assure themselves also of their realms 'See Gachard, Corresp. de Philippe II, 461, 471, 473; Poulet, I, 461, 521; II, 102, 106, 139, 143, 187, 394, 440, 451, 659, 675. 2 Morillon to Granvella, August 31, 1567, in Poulet, II, 605: "La premiere chose que l'on doibt faire sera de munir et asseurer les frontieres et renvoier chascun a son gouvernement, d'aultant que les Francois semblent voulloir esmouvoir, du moingz les Hugonaux." The cardinal had advised the duke of Alva to do this in the May preceding, when he was at Genoa on his way northward (Poulet, II, 448, 454)- Montluc's repeated warnings to Philip II, in the course of their secret corre spondence, of the succor French Calvinists were giving to his Flemish rebels (K. 1,506, Nos. 46-48) led the King to enlarge the system of espionage which he main tained in France. The movements of the admiral, the prince of Cond£, and other leaders, were carefully reported (Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, V, 75, note). On the whole practice see Forneron, I, chap. xi. 3 Mundt to Cecil from Strasburg, July 8, 1567 (C. 5. P. For., No. 1, 418). * Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, III, Introd., v. 316 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE and states."1 Calais was a double source of anxiety, first because Spain, in pursuance of Alva's recommendation, had not been con tent with fortifying Gravelines, but had actually built a fort of earth only five paces from the turnpike which marked the French limit; secondly, because at this embarrassing time Elizabeth of England had conceived the thought of reviving the English claim to Calais. 2 With the purpose of fathoming her son-in-law's designs Catherine sent the younger L'Aubespine to Madrid.3 War with Spain was already on the lips of some in France.4 In spite of the wisdom of these military precautions on the part of the French crown, the Huguenots grew alarmed lest there was a movement on foot [to repress the edict.5 There was designed intention in the unadmirable conduct of the prince of Conde, and perhaps some in that of Coligny too. The prince craved chief command of the army, and a war with Spain was in a direct Hne with his aspirations. He had been well treated since the peace of Amboise, having been given the government of Picardy and the 1 Fourquevaux (July 17, 1567), I, 237. St. Sulpice had held similar language in 1564: "Le meilleur moyen pour le prince d'avoir la paix est d'etre toujours en etat de repousser ses voisins." — L' Ambassade de. St. Sulpice, 269. 2 C. S. P. For., No. 1,402, July 6, 1567. Sir Henry Norris writes to Cecil on March 25, 1567: "A better time than this could not be found to demand Calais, they being in such distrust of their own force, wherefore it might be understood that some preparation of arms was making in England." — Ibid., No. 1,048. A year earlier than this Cecil had been advised to make common cause with theEmperor, the one to recover the Three Bishoprics, the other Calais (ibid., No. 326, April 29, 1566; cf. ibid., Ven., 394, July 3, 1567). There is a brief account of the negotiations in Bulletins de la Comm. royale d' histoire, series IV, Vol. V, 386 ff. Cf. C. 5. P. For. (1587), Nos. 1039, 1044, 1046, 1083. 3 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, III, Introd., iii; C. 5. P. Ven., Nos. 389, May 16, 1567. 4 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, III, Introd., iv. s "The prince of Conde wrote to the queen mother against the king's revoking the edict of pacification, who assured him on the faith of a princess that as long as she might prevail, she should never break it, and if he came to court, he would be as welcome as his heart could devise, and as for the Swiss they were to defend the frontiers \n case the Spanish forces should attempt to surprise any peace." — Norris to Queen Elizabeth, August 29, 1567, C. 5. P. For., No. 1,644. Catherine de Medici ordered the dispersal of the Huguenot bands on the Picard border in 1567 (R. Q. H., January, 1899, p. 21). THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 317 county of Rotrou, which was erected into a duchy under the name of Enghien-le-Francois. But his appetite for power was insatiable. In July, after angry speech with the King, Conde- had retired from court, and was followed by the admiral, who gave out that that he had discovered "some practice that wholly tended to his confusion."1 It was small politics. In this time of external danger from the furtive designs of Philip II and the blustering enmity of England, the honorable course of every subject of France was to stand by the King and the nation. The Huguenot leaders compromised the cause at large by indulging their personal vanity, their petty spite, their pique at such an hour. Friction there was, disagree ment there was over the interpretation and the working of certain parts of the edict of Amboise. The Catholics, for example, com plained that the intention of the edict was evaded by the Hugue nots, asserting that in cases where the right of preaching was per mitted to all barons and high justiciars only for themselves and their tenants, and for others of lower degree for their household only, congregational worship was held under cover thereof.2 The bigotry of Paris and its vicinity, though, was the worst source of disaffection. In the city district captains were chosen 1 The words are from a letter of Sir Henry Norris to the earl of Leicester in C. S. P. For., No. 1,537, July 21, 1567, and sound like a paraphrase of the admiral's language. The implication is that Coligny's withdrawal had some connection with the purported stealing of Alava's cipher in the May before. See C. S. P. For., No. 1,230, May 24, 1567. But according to Fourquevaux, I, 227, the Spanish ambassador accused Catherine de Medici of the stealing, not Coligny. If this be true, then Coligny must have wanted to find a pretext for leaving the court without arousing the suspicion or animosity of the King, as might have been the case if he had done so openly out of sympathy for the prince of Conde. Claude Haton, I, 406, says that Coligny was piqued because Strozzi was given the command of the new forces instead of himself. The prince of Conde retired to Valery, Coligny to Chatillon. D'Andelot soon afterward followed suit, resigning his post as colonel- general of infantry on the ground that the marshal Cosse refused to obey his orders, and retired to Tanlay near Tonnerre. The fine chateau is still standing. Thenceforward it was of interest to the prince to stir up doubt and distrust among the Huguehots by misrepresenting the true reasons for the crown's military preparation (Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, III, Introd., vi; C. S. P. For., anno 1567, p. 305). 2 C. S. P. For., No. 1,629, August 23, 1567. 318 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE by the populace to watch against Protestant activity — the nucleus of the famous Sixteen {Seize) of Paris in 1589-94. It would have been the height of political inexpediency, under such circumstances, to have tried to enforce the letter of the edict in the Ile-de-France. The July amendment of the edict of Amboise prohibiting exercise of Protestant worship throughout the Ile-de-France except in such places as should be licensed by the King, and the further one prohibiting Protestants from fining public offices in the cities,1 I believe was framed for the purpose of avoiding conflict and not with any reactionary purpose. It is certainly of significance that the liberal chancellor L'H6pital favored them.2 Patience and experience would have worked out the solution of such difficulties as these. It was criminal in the prince of Conde" to fan the ashes of the late civil war into flame once more. For in this tense state the prince deliberately exaggerated and misrepresented things for his own purpose and a spark from Flanders — Alva's arrest of the counts Egmont and Hoorne on September 9 — kindled France into flame again. The arrival of the news in France unfortunately coincided with the session of two synods of the Huguenots, one at Chatillon-sur- Loing, the other at Valery,3 Dismay prevailed in them. The preachers cried out that the arrest of Egmont and Hoorne4 was the proof of a secret alliance between Spain and France for the overthrow of Calvinism. The truth of Bayonne was out at last! Coligny's iron will might still have kept them in order, however, if in the midst of this excitement word had not also come that 6,000 Swiss whom Charles IX had enrolled to cover the French frontier against the duke of Alva had entered France. The double news was too much for the excited minds of the Huguenots. The admiral and the prince who had failed to perceive the true poHcy of France in Switzerland, in desperation turned to the constable for 1 Claude Haton, I, 405. 2 C. 5. P. Ven., July 12, 1567. 3 La Popeliniere, XI, 36, 37. 4 See Rosseeuw-Saint-Hilaire, "Le due d'Albe en Flandre. Proces des comtes d'Egmont et de Homes (1567-1568)," Siances et travaux de I'Acad. des sc. moral et polit., 4c ser., XVI (LXVIe de la collect.), 1863, p. 480. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES \3icj\ a word of truth and comfort. But the old Montmorency, who desired to have his son, the marshal Montmorency, succeed him in the office of constable1 (which the prince of Conde" coveted for himself), roughly rejoined: "The Swiss have their pay; don't you expect them to be used?"2 The words were brutally and thoughtlessly said. They merely imported anger. The Hugue nots interpreted them to mean that they were to be overcome by military force, and Protestantism coerced, if not extinguished. The synod of the Huguenots at Valery3 resolved upon war. The conference was held in the admiral's chateau at Chatillon under the outward guise of a banquet. There were present the prince of Conde", La Rochefoucault, the cardinal of ChatiUon, D'Andelot, Bricquemault, Teligny, Mouy, Montgomery, and other nobles of mark, besides some Huguenot ministers. The conference lasted the entire week, at the end of which it was resolved that all the Huguenots in France should be notified in every bailliage and seneschaussee, by the deacons and other officers of their congre gation; that they should be called upon to furnish money according to the means which they had, for the payment of reiters from Germany, which the count palatine of the Rhine was to levy; and that all the young men of the religion capable of bearing arms were to be enroUed for military service.4 The plan was as bold as it was simple. It was to gain possession J of the King's person by a sudden coup de main, for which purpose f a force of 1,500 horse was to be brought secretly to Valery. The' court at this time was residing at the Chateau de Monceaux near? Meaux, and was without more than nominal military protection.5 j 1 C. S. P. For., No. 1,155, May i, 1567. 2 D'Aubigne\ I, Book IV, chap. vii. 3 This chateau was a gift to the prince of Conde by the widow of marshal St. Andre, who was infatuated with him. After the prince's second marriage she wedded Geoffrey de Caumont (Claude Haton, I, 363). See also Clement-Simon, La Marichale de Saint-Andri et ses filles, Paris, 1896. 4 The rendezvous was a Rosay-en-Brie (La Popeliniere, Book XII, 37; D'Aubigne, IV, chap, vii; Claude Haton, I, 424, 425). 5 The Venetian ambassador Correro, in his relation of the conspiracy, ex presses astonishment that the secret of the Huguenot leaders did not leak out, and 320N THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE On the evening of September 24, the queen learned of the rendez vous at Rosay-en-Brie.) A midnight council was called. The Swiss, who had reached Chateau Thierry, were hastily summoned. The Lorraine party and the duke of Nemours advised immediate return to Paris. The chancellor and Montmorency endeavored to persuade the King against so doing.1 The former pointed out that to go to Paris would be for the King to commit himself to the most bigoted of his subjects and destroy the possibiUty of an ami cable settlement, while the constable argued that Meaux was a for tified city capable of withstanding a siege, and that to leave it might be to court defeat in the open country. In the dilemma the Swiss colonel Pfiffer cast the die. "May it please your Majesty," cried he, "to entrust your person and that of the queen mother to the valor and fideHty of the Swiss. We are 6,000 men, and with the points of our pikes we will open a path wide enough for you to pass through the army of your enemies."2 attributes the fact to the perfection of the Protestant organization (quoted by La Ferriere in Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, III, ix). It seems to me that this feature was less due to perfect organization than to the promptitude with which Conde' and Coligny endeavored to carry out the project. The lesson of the con spiracy of Amboise seven years before could not have been lost upon them. More over, the queen mother did have some intimation, notwithstanding her surprise when the shock came. For on September 10, while the court was staying at Monceaux, some armed bands of horsemen were seen hovering around, which. which caused the King's hasty removal to Mteaux (C. S. P. For., No. 1,683, Septem ber 13, 1567, Norris to Leicester). From that hour Catherine was on the alert, though she refused to attach alarmist importance to the signs she had seen until her eyes were opened. 1 Claude Haton, I, 434. 2 Zurlauben, Hist, milit. des Suisses, IV, 351; Laugel, "Les regimens suisses au service de France pendant les guerres, de religion," Revue des deux mondes, November 15, 1880, pp. 332 ff. Pfiffer had served in France during the first civil war and was made a colonel after the battle of Dreux. There is a life of him in German by Segesser, Ludwig P.fyffer und seine Zeit, Bern, 1880. Other versions of this incident are in D'Aubigne^ II, 230-32; Claude Haton, I, 428, 429; Castelnau, VI, chap, iv; De Thou, Book XLII; Nig. Tosc, III, 530. La Popeliniere, XII, 381 39, gives a good account of the behavior of the Swiss. The duke of Bouillon, an eye-witness of these incidents, has left a striking account in his Mimoires, ed. Petitot, 75. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES ^21) "Enough," Charles rejoined. "I would rather die free with you than Hve a captive among rebels."1 (The return to Paris began at four o'clock in the morning.") "When the Swiss arrived at Meaux," wrote Correro, "I vow they were the most villainous looking gang I have ever seen. Yet in battle array they were admirable. Three times they turned upon the enemy and lowering their pikes charged upon them like savage dogs in serried ranks and in good order, without one being a pace in advance of another. Thus the King was able with his suite to get to Paris."2 He reached the Louvre that night, travel- worn, hot, famished, and so angry that his fierce disposition never lost the memory of that humiliation.3 (The affair of Meaux came like a thunder-clap to most of France, t The suddenness of the Huguenot action and the all but complete \ success of it astonished men.^ "This movement," wrote the Vene- ¦ tian ambassador, "of which several thousand men had knowledge, was conducted with such precaution that nothing leaked out until it was all but an accomplished fact. This could not possibly have been done without the perfect intelligence that exists among the Huguenots, and is a striking manifestation of their organization throughout the realm."4 In the light of this judgment, it remains to describe the Hugue not form of government. The ecclesiastical — and political unit — of French Calvinism was the congregation. Congregations were grouped "according to number and convenience" into colloquies or classes which met from two to four times each year, the division being made by the 1 For Charles IX's own version of the affair of Meaux see a letter of the King to the baron de Gordes, begun at Meaux and finished at Paris, September 28, 1567, in Due d'Aumale, Histoire des princes de Condi, I, Appendix XXII. His letter to Montluc of the same date is in Archives de la Gironde, X, 437. 2 Rel. vin., II, 187. 3 The Guises made capital out of the event of Meaux and sedulously exploited the King's animosity. Martin, Histoire de France, IX, 216, suggests that Charles IX's conduct on St. Bartholomew's Day may have been influenced by this episode. *Rel. vin., II, 112, 113. 322 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE authority of the provincial synod.1 In church matters, no church had any primacy or jurisdiction over another, nor one province over another. 2 Ministers brought with them to local classes or provincial synods one or two elders chosen out of their consis tories.3 Elders who were deputies of churches had an equal power of voting with the pastors.4 The authority of a provincial synod was subordinate to that of the national synod,5 and whatever had been decreed by provincial synods for the government of the churches in their province had to be brought before the national synod.6 The grand lines of division followed the historic pro vincial divisions of France, but smaller provinces and parts of the larger ones, as Guyenne and Languedoc, were associated together. The national synod of 1559 divided France into sixteen Protestant provinces, as follows: (1) The Ile-de-France, Chartrain, Picardy, Champagne and Brie; (2) Normandy; (3) Brittany; (4) Orleans, Blesois, Dunois, Nivernais, Berry, Bourbonnais, and La Marche; (5) Touraine, Anjou, Loudunois, Maine, Venddme, and Perche; (6) Upper and Lower Poitou; (7) Saintonge, Aunis, La Rochelle, and Angoumois; (8) Lower Guyenne, Perigord, Gascony, and Limousin; (9) Upper and Lower Vivarais, together with Velay, and Le Foret; (10) Lower Languedoc, including Nime's, Mont- 1 "Discipline of the Reformed Churches in France Received and Enacted by Their First National Synod at Paris in 1559," chap, vii, canon 1, published in Quick, Synodicon in Gallia, 2 vols., London, 1692. The first consistorial regulation which we possess has been published by the Protestant pastor, Eugene Arnaud, from a manuscript at Grenoble. It bears the title ','Articles Polytiques par l'Eglise Reformee selon le S. Evangile, fait a Poitiers 1557." See Synode giniral de Poitiers 1557, Sy nodes provinciaux de Lyon, Die, Peyraud, Montelimar et Nimes en 1561 et 1562, assemblie des Etats du Dauphini en 1563, etc, par E. Arnaud. Grenoble, ed. Allier, 1872, 91 pages. At the synod of Lyons (1563) the canons of the three preceding national synods held at Paris, Poitiers, and Orleans, were reduced to a single series of articles. The deliberations of most of the provincial synods still remain in manuscript or are lost (Frossard, Etude historique et bibliographique sur la discipline ecclisiastique des iglises riformies de France, 18). 2 Chap, vi, canon 1. 3 Chap, viii, canon 2. Chap, v, canon 1, provides that "a consistory shall be made up of those who govern it (the individual churches), to-wit, of its pastors and elders." In some cases deacons discharged the elder's office (chap, v, canon 2). 4 Chap, viii, canon 8. Elders were elected by the joint suffrage of pastor and people, upon oral nomination (chap, iii, canon 1). s Chap, viii, canon 9. 6 Chap, viii, canon 14. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 323 peUier, and Beziers; (n) Upper Languedoc, Upper Guyenne, Toulouse, Carcassonne, Quercy, Rouergue, Armagnac, and Upper Auvergne; (12) Burgundy, Lyonnais, Beaujolais, Bresse, Lower Auvergne, and Gex; (13) Provence; (14) Dauphine and Orange; (15) Beam; (16) the Cevennes and Gevaudan.1 This administrative partition, however, did not remain fixed. Some provinces, like Brittany, had so few Protestants in them, that the Huguenots therein could not stand alone, and the first civil war brought out the weakness of this system. Accordingly, in 1563, the map of France was partitioned anew, and the former sixteen "provinces" were reduced to nine. Some of the changes made are interesting. For example, the Chartrain was cut off from the Ile-de-France and attached to the "province" of Orleans, manifestly in the endeavor to keep a connecting link between Normandy and the Loire country. Brittany was strengthened by the annexation of Anjou, Maine, and Touraine which formerly constituted an independent "province," which obviously drew it into closer connection with the stronger Calvinistic provinces. The "province" of Upper and Lower Poitou was combined with Saintonge, Aunis, and Angoumois, thus knitting together all the country watered by the Charente, the Clain, and lesser streams. Burgundy, Lyonnais, Beaujolais, Bresse, Lower Auvergne, and Gex absorbed the small Huguenot province composed of Vivarais, Velay, and Le Foret. But the most interesting consolidation was in the south of France. Formerly Upper Languedoc, in which were Nimes, Montpellier, and Beziers; Lower Languedoc, com prising Upper Guyenne, Toulouse, Carcassonne, Quercy, Rou ergue, Armagnac, and Upper Auvergne; Provence; Dauphine, and Cevennes- Gevaudan had each formed separate "provinces." But in 1563 this immense territory was all united to form the great Huguenot province of Languedoc. The only ancient provinces which remained unchanged in 1563 were Normandy,2 Beam, and Lower Guyenne, with Perigord and Limousin. 1 Chap, viii, canon 15. 2 The synod of Nimes in 1572 also divided Normandy into two provinces (Synodicon in Gallia, I, in, 112). At the same time Metz was annexed to Champagne. 324 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE The Huguenot ecclesiastical organization and its political organization were one and the same. The congregations, the " colloquia," the synods, constituted both taxation units and mili tary cadres.1 The strength of the Huguenot organization, how ever, before the massacre of St. Bartholomew, I believe has been exaggerated, except in Guyenne where, in the vicinity of Nerac especially, Montluc early came in contact with a powerful com bination of the Huguenots.2 The strong elements in the Protest ant organization were its simplicity and the vigilance of all, from provincial chiefs to simple pastors, who made up for scarcity of numbers by the most zealous activity.3 "If our priests," wrote the Venetian Correro in 1569, "were half so energetic, of a cer tainty Christianity would not be in danger in this country."4 It was not until after r572 that the Huguenot organization reached a high point of military and political development, when a soHd fed eration of the Reformed churches was formed at Milhaud in 1574, with rating precincts, military hundreds and civil jurisdictions.5 Exactly as the early organization of the Huguenots has been overemphasized, so has the republican nature of the early Hugue not movement been exaggerated. Apart from whatever reHgious motives may have actuated them, the Protestant nobles were influ enced by political ambition; the bourgeoisie by the hope of adminis- 1 Rel. vin., II, 115, and n. B; Commentaires el lettres de Montluc, II, Book V, 338; L'Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 107; Mimoires de Philippi, 360, col. 1 (ed. Buchon); Collection Godefroy, CCLVII, No. 46; Claude Haton, I, 425. 2 The democratic revolutionary character of the Huguenot movement in Guyenne probably owes some of its intensity to the memory of the revolt of 1548 and the merciless suppression thereof (observation of M. Henri Hauser, Rev. hist., XCVII (March-April, 1908), 341, n. 6, a review of Courteault Blaise de Montluc). 3 "Temevano prima i cattolici, non perche fossero inferiori di numero (che del popolo minuto non vi e la trigesima parte ugonotta; la nobilita e piil infetta; e s' io dicessi di un terzo, forse non fallirei) ; ma perche questi; sebben pochi, erano pero uniti, concordi, e vigilantissimi nelle loro cose." — Rel. vin., II, 120. The Huguenots fired guns instead of ringing bells as a signal of alarm (ibid., 107). The tocsin, even before St. Bartholomew, was the Catholic signal. 4 Rel. vin., II, 115. 5 Correspondance de Catherine de Midicis, I, 552; Ranke, Civil Wars and Monarchy in France, 287; Forneron, Les dues de Guise, II, 221; Anquetil, Histoire des assemblies politiques des riformes de France, I, 18. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES 325 trative and economic reform; the masses by the general spirit of dis content. The Huguenots did not present a united front until after St. Bartholomew, when the fusion of the political Huguenots with the Politiques reduced the "religious" Huguenots to a left-wing minority. Before 1572 the poHtical ideas of the Reformed, if not still inchoate, were not harmonized into one homogeneous cause, backed up by a compact and highly organized political system. Individual political theorists or fanatic devotees, of course, were to be found in the Huguenot ranks, but there was no systematic political philosophy to guide their conduct before the massacre of St. Bartholomew. It was this catastrophe that crystallized Huguenot opinion and organized combination on a large scale.1 In Guyenne, alone, where, as has been said, the Huguenot organi zation was most completely developed at an early date, does any clear republican idea seem to have early obtained.2 1 Forneron, II, 164 ff.; Hist, de Languedoc, V, 543, 544; Armstrong, "The Political Theories of the Huguenots," English Historical Review, IV, 13; Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, 13-15; Beaudrillart, Jean Bodin et son temps. 2 "Si le roy tenoit sa loy, le royaulme en seroit mieulx regy et gouverne, les antiens, qui ont tenu les concilles, ont bien regarde a cella quant ilz ont uny nostre foy avec la continuation de la monarchie des princes, car ilz ont bien poyse que le peuple, qui est gouverne' sous ung monarque, est beaucoup plus assure1 et tenu en la craincte de Dieu et a l'obeyssance qu'il doibt porter a son roy, que non celluy qui est soubz une republicque, en laquelle sa loy admene tout le monde et destruict les monarchies. Qui me voldra nyer que le roy prent ceste loy qu'il ne faille que sa personne mesmes et son royaulme soit regy et gouverne par les gens qui auront este esleuz par les estatz, qui sera son conseil sans lequel le roy ne pourra faire chose aucune. Et s'il veult une chose et le conseil une aultre, le pays ne fera sinon ce que le conseil ordonnera, parce qu'il aura este (esleu) par les estatz; et si le roy mesmes veult quelque chose pour luy ou pour aultre, fauldra que, le bonnet a la main, il le viegne demander a son conseil et les prier, la ou en nostre loy il commende au conseil et a tous, tant que nous sommes. Que l'on regarde des ceste genre ce que se faict en Angleterre et en Escosse, et si ce n'est plustost maniere d'aristocracie ou de de'mocracie que non de monarchie. Et quand le roy sera grand, il voldra de mander sa liberte, laquelle ne luy sera concedee et s'il faict semblant de la voloir avoir par force, son conseil mesmes luy couppera la guorge et feront un aultre roy a leur plaisir." — Commentaires et lettres de Montluc, IV, 297, 298 (December 1563). The baron de Ruble, in a note remarks: "Nulle part peut-etre, pas meme dans les ecrits de Francois Hotman et de Bodin, les reformes politiques que promettait le calvinisme ne sont exposees avec autant de clarte que dans ce memoire de Mon luc." CHAPTER XII THE SECOND CIVIL WAR (1567-68) 1 In this wise, after a respite of four years, the second civil war was precipitated. I There was an exodus of Huguenots at once from Paris, some repairing to the prince of Conde, some to the duke de Rohan, others to Montgomery in Lower Normandy where a war of the partisans began at once. x The capital was in a furious mood and the King's presence alone prevented the Parisians from massacring the Protestants there and the Montmorencys.2 The chief effort of the Huguenots was to seize the towns on the Seine above and below Paris, in order to stay provisions, and so to compel the government to submit.3 The capture of the Pont de Charenton4 by Conde's forces was a heavy blow to the government, as Charenton chiefly suppHed Paris with wheat and flour. The Parisians fully expected to be attacked and made preparations therefor by breaking up the stones in the streets and piling them in heaps for ready service or taking them into their houses; at the same time they destroyed pent-houses and other similar insignificant structures in order that they might the better hurl their missiles.5 So suddenly had the war been begun that the blockade of Paris for the time being was almost complete. 1 Paulet to Ceeil, October 13, 1567; C. S. P. Dom., Add. 2 Nig. Tosc, III, 549. On September 29, 1567, permission was given the populace of Paris to arm themselves. — Lettres patentes du Roy Charles IX pour ' l'establissement des capitaines de la ville de Paris et permission aux citizens d'icelle de prendre les armes. Felibien, Histoire de Paris, III, 703, 704. 3 La Popeliniere, XII, 39; Claude Haton, I, 439; La Noue, chap, xiv; C.S.P. For., No. 1,427, September 30, 1567. Norris gives the names of the towns taken by the prince of Conde's forces. — State Papers, Foreign, Elizabeth, Vol. XCIV No. 1,338. See Appendix XI. According to Baschet, La diplomatic vinitienne, 543 and note, the prince of Conde planned to burn Paris. 4 La Popeliniere, Book XII, 51, 51 bis. The slaughter at the bridge was terrible. The King's captain and the color-bearer, who managed to escape to Paris, were hanged by Charles IX. — C. S. P. For., No. 1,804, November 2, 1567. s Ibid., No. 1,763, October 14, 1567. THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 327 LagnyontheMarne,1 Charenton, Porchefontaine, Busanval,Argen- teuil, St. Ouen, AmberviUiers, and St. Denis constituted the inner zone of Huguenot control while farther out Montereau on the high road to Sens, Etampes on the road to Orleans and in the heart of the wheat district that supplied the capital,2 Dourdan at the junction of the Blois-Chartres roads, and Dreux on the road PARIS AND ITS FAUBOURGS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY toward Normandy, formed an outer circle. So closely was Paris invested that the windmills in the faubourgs of St. Denis, St. Honore", and Port St. Martin were burned by the Huguenots. The churches for leagues around were plundered of copes, chasubles, tunics, and other rich silk and satin garments. The Huguenot gentry made shirts and handkerchiefs out of the lace and linen of 1 Claude Haton, I, 444-46. 2 C. S. P. Ven., No. 407, October 18, 1567. 328 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE the clergy. But all gold and silver taken, as altar-vessels, crosses, chalices, were turned into the general spoil for the sake of the cause.1 Forced loans were imposed upon small merchants and even the peasantry were constrained to forced labor,2 so that the latter fled by hundreds to Paris. The ravages of the Huguenots were so great that they defeated the very purpose they had in mind. For thousands of the peas antry, under cover of a liberal ordinance intended to provision Paris,3 drove their cattle into the city and carted thither the grain and provisions they had stored up against the winter, where they sold it cheap, rather than see it destroyed by " volleurs quilz pillent et brulent granges, maisons, moulins et font tout le mal qu'ilz peullent faire."4 Wine, meat, and bread were not dear in Paris; beechnut oil and oats were at a reasonable price. The queen mother, who looked to Alva for the most immediate aid,5 sent the chancellor L'Hopital, the liberal marshal Vieille ville, and Jean de MorvilUers, bishop of Orleans, to confer with the prince of Conde in order to gain time. But the prince was so elated with his successful blockade of Paris that his demands rose in degree, and could not be accepted by the government. Yet the nature of these demands is to be observed, for it is evidence of the fact that the conflict was becoming more and more a political one, and that the religious issue, if not a minor issue, at least was but an element in the programme of the Huguenots. Moreover, these demands are interesting for the reason that they represent a new stage in the evolution of the struggle and that henceforth 1 Claude Haton, I, 439-45, and La Noue, chap, xvi, give some graphic details. 2 Claude Haton, I, 444, 445. 3 " Ordonnance du Roy, portant permission a toutes personnes, d'apporter, et faire apporter, conduire et amener a Paris, tant par eau que par terre, toutes especes de vivres, bleds, vins et autres; sans payer pour iceux aucunes daces, subsides, ou imposition quelconques." — Paris, R. Estienne, 1567. 4 " Lettre addressee aux echevins de Rouen par un de leurs delegues," Bulletin de la Sociiti de I'histoire de Normandie, 1875-80, p. 279. The whole letter is of interest. sAlva's reply October 24, 1567, is in Correspondance de Philippe II, II, 594' Cf. Gachard, La Bibliotheque Nationale a Paris, I, 395; II, 459; and Histoire des troubles des Pays-Bas, ed. Piot, I, 293 (chap. xlvi). Scale of Mi lea ¦n — ^Beauvais 4 / / Soissons pT^ ^^- ¦^qdRpntoisc \ ,St.oinis Meaux ^ p~) !S2-7/""\ /*--' Buaanvftr h /j$^k CfARIS __/ — -^ ^CharjEnteii "^Tagny ¦nftofl"* i , < faaTTIas V^^^ / i *~*J£^^ J^*^ Rarcheron taifce^^ Dreux V ^7==^Dourdan E~^~*'^ ^ floaJ to iroyea ~*^ J* /^-VT^tamPe' /If ^»t/"~) Montercau x^ BLOCKADE of PARIS bythe Huguenots OCT.- NOV. 1367 WW* x I) 1 iiS / Hugutnot positiona K S HUGUENOT MARCH to PONT- a -MOUSSON afUrthe battle of ST DENIS Mcthu&n X Co. THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 329 they are a permanent contention of the Huguenots and ultimately are embodied in the Edict of Toleration. The prince, whose chief object was to overthrow the Guises and get the government of the King and the management of affairs into his own hands1 insisted on the free exercise of religion throughout the realm without limi tation or distinction of places or persons; that all taxes lately authorized should be remitted and all new forms of taxation im posed since the reign of Louis XII abolished; that an accounting be made of the money granted for defraying the King's debts; that all those who had been deposed from their offices on account of religion should be reinstated ; and that four fortified towns be placed in his hands as security for the good intentions of the crown. Fur thermore, the prince demanded the dismissal of the Swiss and Spanish regiments.2 In due time the prince of Conde discovered that delay was disastrous. Although his force had daily increased by new acces sions from the south,3 nevertheless the Huguenot position was not so strong as it appeared. Paris rallied to the cause of the King and gave him 400,000 ecus, while the clergy advanced 250,000.* The duke of Guise was in Champagne with troops of Champagne and Burgundy, besides eight companies of men-at-arms.5 More over, recruits were pouring in to help the King, some from the duke of Savoy,6 some from Piedmont under command of Strozzi, whose approach the admiral and De Mouy tried to prevent, and some from Pope Pius V, who bestirred himself in behalf of France as 1 C. S. P. For., No. 1,789, October 27, 1567. 2 These demands were presented in writing to the queen's emissaries. De Thou, Book XLII; Claude Haton, I, 447; D'Aubigne, II, 232-34, have summarized them. La Popeliniere, Book XII, 41-43 gives the text. There is a monograph by Baguenault de Puchesse: Jean de Morvillier, ivique d'Or- leans: Etude sur la politique frangaise au XVI' siecle, d'apres des documents inidits, Didier, Paris, 1870. 3 La Popeliniere, Book XII, 50 bis; C. S. P. For., No. 1,856, October 10, 1567. * Da vila, I, 195. s C. S. P. For., No. 1,777, October 22, 1567. 6 A list of officers and the number of horsemen commanded by each who were sent to the king of France by the duke of Savoy.— C. S. P. For., No. 1,735, Sep tember, 1567. 33° THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE soon as he was informed of the renewal of hostilities once more.1 The Huguenots made strenuous efforts to break the Swiss alliance and to persuade the Protestant Swiss cantons to withdraw. But fortunately for the French crown, the cantons remained firm, for without the assistance of Swiss troops, Charles IX would have been hard put to it for an army, for he dared not accept the aU too interested offers of Philip II.2 As in the first civil war, both par ties looked to Germany for assistance3 and the queen mother sent Lignerolles "to practice the stay of the reiters, and on his return, to the count palatine to desire him not to succor the prince and his associates, affirming that their rising was not of any zeal of religion, but only to rebel against their prince."4 ! He wrote to Philip II, to Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, and the Venetian government urging them to succor Charles IX "against the rebels and heretics" within his kingdom, and to the duke of Lorraine to stop the reiters. — Potter, Lettres de St. Pie V sur les affaires religieuses de son temps en France, Paris, 1828. To Philip II, October 13, 1567— Potter, p. 1 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 22, p. 50); to the duke of Savoy, October 18, 1567 — Potter, p. 8 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 25, p. 54); to Priuli, Venetian ambassador in France, October 18 — Potter, p. 6 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 24, p. 53). At the same time the Pope wrote to the duke of Nevers in terms of rejoicing that Charles IX had escaped at Meaux. — Potter, p. 3 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 23, p. 51), October 16, 1567. Within a month the Pope's word began to be made good, for 10,000 pieces of gold were en route to France in the middle of November. — Potter, p. 10 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 26, p. 56), letter to the duke of Savoy of November 16, 1567. In it the Pope says he has written the duke of Lorraine to stop the reiters about to enter France. 2 The question of payment of the Swiss still remained to be settled and Charles IX was at his wits' end and actually offered a mortgage of his frontier towns, save Lyons and the frontier of Burgundy, paying 5 per cent, interest in order to quiet the importunate demands of the cantons. — Revue d'histoire diplo matique, XIV (1900), 49, 50. 3 Request of Charles IX to the bishop of Mainz to permit the reiters to pass, December 9, 1567. — Coll. Godefroy, CCLVI, No. 4. John Casimir, second son of the elector palatine, Frederick III, levied troops for the Protestants. When protest was made against this action, he gave an evasive reply. See Languet, Epist. seer., I, 27; Archives de la maison d' Orange- Nassau, II, 163, 164; La Noue, ed. 1596, p. 897. On the other hand the landgrave was hostile to the prince of Conde" and was fearful also of compromising himself with the Emperor and Spain. — Archives de la maison d' Orange-Nassau, III, 128, 164; Languet, Epist. seer., I, 35. 4 C. 5. P. For., No. 1,864, December 15, 1567. THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 331 The Huguenots also made overtures to Philip II's revolted subjects.1 By the middle of October the prince of Conde discovered that he was lying between two enemies, Paris and the new troops coming up, and every day added to his peril. There can be little doubt but that the queen mother purposely protracted the negotiations, knowing that by so doing Condi's security would be diminished. Signs were not wanting to indicate that matters were coming to a head. On October 7 the King sent a herald to the prince to pro claim that all who were with him should unarm and repair to Paris, whereby they might save their lives and goods, which, if they refused to do so, should be confiscated. The same day .the constable declared how the King, trusting to bring certain of his subjects to good conformity by his clemency, had sent his chancel lor to assure them that his edicts made for religion and pacification should be inviolably kept, and that no man should be molested for the same; and that touching other small articles he was in full mind to have satisfied them. Not withstanding, they would not submit themselves to any reason; wherefore the King was fully resolved to declare them rebels and prosecute them accordingly, for the maintenance whereof he would venture both body and goods. On October 8 proclamation was made that if the prince with his associates would submit themselves to the King within three days he would freely pardon all that was past; but if they refused, they were to be accounted as rebels and it was to be lawful to all the King's subjects to kill all such as they should find armed. In expectation of battle, the constable was made lieutenant-general of the King's army.2 Yet despite the precariousness of his situation the prince was still confident. His pride was hardened by the capture of Orleans by La Noue on September 28,' and of Soissons.4 He enlarged the 1 This is shown by a passage in which the elector of Saxony makes mention of an alliance which the French nobles had offered (Archives de la maisCn d'Orange- Nassau, III, 131, 134). Although the prince of Conde in December declared that he had not entered into a treaty with the Flemish Calvinists (ibid., 143), it is prob able that these proposals were accepted some months later. There is in existence the minute of a treaty with Conde and Coligny dated August, 1568 (ibid., Ill, No. 321, p. 285). 2 C. S. P. For., No. 1,756, October 10, 1567. 3 La Popeliniere, XII, 52 bis; D'Aubigne II, 236. La Noue himself, with characteristic modesty, scarcely mentions this feat. ¦t "Journal de Lepaulart relig. du monastere de Saint-Crepin-le-Grand de Soissons, sur la prise de cette ville par les Huguenots en 1567," Bull. d. Soe arch., XIV (Soissons, i860). 33 2 THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE Protestants' demands, requiring that Calais, Boulogne, and Metz1 be delivered to them as surety, that the King disarm first and that one church of every "good town" in France be permitted to those of the reHgion; and that 300,000 francs be granted the prince to pay his troops, "whereby they may return hence without pillage."2 The crown scornfully rejected the terms and assumed a rapid offensive. On the night of November 6 Strozzi's band destroyed a bridge of boats planked together which the prince had made in order more effectually to cut off Paris; on the foUowing day another point on the river which threatened Paris was captured by the duke of Nemours, and on the 9th Conde was compelled to withdraw from Charenton after breaking the bridge and firing the town. On November 8 the prince had made the blunder of weaken ing his main force by sending D'Andelot to seize Poissy and Mont gomery to get possession of Pontoise, the two open places in the inner zone of steel drawn around Paris.3 The crisis of real battle came in their absence, on November 10, the battle of St. Denis. It was a fierce and bloody fray beginning about 3 o'clock and lasting till dark, in which both sides suffered severely. Mont morency, "more famous than fortunate in arms," was twice slashed in the face by a cutlass and then shot in the neck and the small of his back by pistol bullets fired by the Scotch captain named Robert Stuart4 serving with the Huguenots. The old veteran, thinking his assailant did not recognize him, cried out: "You do not know. me. I am the constable." But the Scot, as he fired, replied: "Because I know you, I give you this!"5 Though the white-liveried horsemen of Conde passed through and through the King's soldiery and though the constable was mortally wounded the battle was not won by the prince.6 On November 14 the Hugue- 1 C. 5. P. For., No. 1,804, November 2, 1567. Metz was captured late in October by the Huguenots, but not the citadel. 2 Ibid., No. 1,822, November 16, 1567. 3 La Popeliniere, XII, 52. 4 On the identity and career of Robert Stuart, see Claude Haton, I, 458, n. 2. 5 C. 5. P. Ven., No. 410, November 11, 1567. Montmorency lingered two days and died on November 12. 6 There are accounts of the battle of St. Denis in La Noue, Mimoires, chap, xiv; Mim. du due de Bouillon, 379; D'Aubigne^ Book IV, chap, ix; Claude Haton, I, 457; Nig. Tosc, III, 551 ff. The editor has subjoined a note (2) giving the litera ture of the subject. \U,: m ^^m%^ H ' Jill IF LW «§N ,i^ > <« > ^ I il P!^.T^2fe£*; w&< W^' *?3 ;¦¦-. < ffl'/fSi/': jilfeiS ¦5*S°« tiy" - '• -.« •<;- sac rj^f3 ;fi KL i -4 ~V he \i--~- >m p,' «¦*¦ H. *t< 7^"~ '¦'irM *fef* | , T, , ¦ J ;.-._, -^-.J ¦ ^- ; ?s ^£u •